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THE THAIS OF KELANTAN

A SOCIO-POLITICAL STUDY OF AN ETHNIC OUTPOST

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ABSTRACT

A study of the 'political integration' of a minority group in a new state can undertake little more than to suggest the relative importance of positive and negative current responses to the new political environment, and the result will be an analysis in terms of movement towards or away from an essentially notional goal of integration. This technique may, however, have relevance in the older states too, where no integration of a minority, and common political identity between groups, should ever be regarded as immutable. On the other hand, while this study of the Buddhist Thai of Kelantan concludes on a pessimistic note concerning future trends, it is not intended to subscribe to the proposition that a plural society is by definition non-integrable. The plural society of colonial Kelantan was distinctly an integrated society, and the situation of the Kelantan Thai today is, on balance, still an integrative one. The observer's expectation of a future movement towards alienation arises from a projection of current political trends and a prediction that the changing environment will be increasingly perceived as hostile in terms of the Thais' received or evolving political values. The integrative ambience of today is likewise explained in terms of a consonance between the political environment and the values, or political culture, moulded by historical experience both colonial and pre-colonial - albeit a lack of political structure and leadership inhibit resistance. But more fundamental and unchanging than any value prescriptive of an ideal political or social system and roles within it, is ethnic identity, chiefly defined and perpetuated in the

Kelantan Thai case by the Buddhist religion. More significant (for alienation) than an incipient political dimension of religious identification with Thailand may be a sense that democratic politics demands submergence of a minority's identity.

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PREFACE

This dissertation, a socio-political study of the Buddhist Thai of Kelantan, in the north-east of the Malay Peninsula, had its logical origins in the earlier experience and training of its author and the author's wife, although neither the experience nor the training were chosen with a view to this particular study. The author was a teacher of history in the principal English secondary school of Kelantan from 1962 to 1965. During this time he and his wife learned Malay, and became very attached, as people will, to their adopted home. In 1965 the author was offered a 'state-studentship' by the British Department of Education and Science to pursue research in South-East Asian politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, for three years. Anxious to extend his field of interest beyond Malaya, he sought, and was generously encouraged, to take a course in another language. The language chosen was Thai.

There was as yet no notion of returning to Kelantan; indeed Thailand seemed a more attractive field for investigation. But the author's previous experience in Kelantan and lack of contacts and local knowledge in Thailand, made a study of the Kelantan Thai¹ look more plausible than any other project, when the time came to settle for a subject. The London Committee of the London-Cornell Project for East and South-east Asian Studies (financed jointly by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Nuffield Foundation) took the same view on being approached for a travel grant. Thus the present study came into being.

This is an appropriate point at which to acknowledge the generous help of the London-Cornell Project, which sent not only the author, but also his

wife and young daughter, into the field and reimbursed a number of expenses not covered by their maintenance grant. Equally indispensable, however, was the guaranteed three-years' income and fees from the British government state-studentship, without which the author would probably never have entered Asian studies at all.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge with gratitude the watchful advice and encouragement of Professor Hugh Tinker, who has coaxed the dissertation forward and inspired some truly valuable insights in the course of its development.

Information used in the dissertation and communicated by individuals is often acknowledged in the notes, but many persons remain unmentioned by name: particularly staff of the School of Oriental and African Studies who have given training, encouragement or assistance, from time to time; members of the Civil Service in Kelantan and in Bangkok, who helped courteously and painstakingly; and countless others who assisted in small and large ways with facilities and information - most of all the Thai farmers and their families who generously welcomed the visitors and answered their questions tirelessly to the end. Acknowledgements will be made more fully if the opportunity arises to rewrite the study in the form of a book.

Transcription. Malay words in the text are written in the standard peninsular spelling, without any attempt to reproduce the Kelantan phonology.

Thai words are given in an adapted version of the phonemic transcription of Professor Mary Haas² familiar to all students of Thai. The author assumes that this study will have as strong an appeal to students

of Thailand as to any other group, and he would rather not have this group misled by abandoning the familiar transcription for the greater convenience of non-readers of Thai. The advantage gained in communication with non-readers (to whom the words, even if correctly pronounced, have scant significance), would not outweigh the loss of communication with those who do read Thai. In fact the phonemic transcription is easy to follow, and is made even easier here by the replacement of four phonetic symbols by letters from the English typewriter (under partially Germanic inspiration). The following comments will help to elucidate what is not self-evident.

Long vowels are indicated by a double letter, as : uu

Aspirate consonants are followed by an 'h', as: th. This combination is simply pronounced like an English 't' but rather more explosively.

c is an unaspirate form of ch and does not sound like the palatal k.

Final consonants are always 'stopped', just as in Malay. They are written with d, b, and g.

The symbol o indicates a vowel roughly equivalent to the sound of the English word 'or'; it here replaces the ɔ of the Mary Haas transcription.

y does not indicate the close German 'ü' (this is not heard in Thai) but the curious Thai vowel in words like myang (a city, a state) which sounds to non-Thai ears like u. Technically, it is described as a central unrounded high vowel.

The ɲ of the Haas transcription is rendered here by ng and becomes self-explanatory.

j is equivalent to the English consonant 'y' (in 'yell') if appearing

in the initial position in a Thai syllable. It is also the equivalent of i if at the end of a diphthong.

ö stands for the sound familiar to us from German 'Röhre', etc. It replaces here the θ of the Mary Haas transcription.

i, o, u, e, and ä (ϵ in Haas), correspond to German equivalents and are not diphthongised.

Diphthongs are indicated phonetically in both their parts. w in a diphthong sounds like u.

Short a (except in a diphthong) is rather close to the English vowel in 'cup'; long aa sounds like the English vowel in 'park'. As the second element (short) in a diphthong, and (infrequently) as an unstressed short initial syllable in polysyllabic words, it sounds like the unstressed English indefinite article 'a'. This a figures too in the diphthong iaw, which most people would transcribe on first hearing as io.

Readers of Thai will want to know how dialectal variations from standard Thai are to be handled. The answer is that they will be ignored, and all words given as if pronounced by standard Thai speakers. (Tones, however, will not be indicated in any form.) The vowel uu, which is always pronounced oo in the village where most of the author's research was done, will be rendered with uu. ii, which often changes to ee in that village, will remain ii. j, which usually sounds like nj- and in certain words like tj, will appear as j. Loan words will be spelt with a notional standard Thai phonology.

The policy on spelling will have the advantage of helping the reader

of Thai to recognize the words. The inclusion of standard tones on the other hand would hardly further recognition. But the omission even of dialect tones is due to a two-fold, special problem. Firstly, the only dialect of Kelantan and Narathiwat treated by Marvin Brown³ is the Taag Baj dialect, to which he gives eight distinct tones. Some of these 'wobble' in a way not easy to indicate with a combination of strokes above the word, even were these the tones one wished to indicate. Secondly, and more importantly, the Thai dialect of the village of Samöörag, where the author stayed for ten months with his family, is not the Taag Baj dialect described by Marvin Brown and spoken with minor variations (according to the author's impression) in all but two of Kelantan's Thai villages. The Samöörag tones are both easier and, in a way, more difficult to transcribe than those of Taag Baj.

Transcription should be easier in that there appear to be only two (perhaps three?) basic tones: a high tone, characteristic of H1, H3, M1 and M3; a shallow falling tone for M0, L0; and a steeper falling tone (which sometimes seems to start scarcely higher than for the first two) for H0, L1, L3, L2, M2 and H2; while H4, M4 and L4 appeared generally and indiscriminately high. Apart from the question whether there are two falling tones, the only difficulty here is the promptings of an inner scepticism which tells one that a Thai tone system cannot be as simple as this!

Yet this simplicity is disturbed by an equally astonishing flexibility in the use of the high tone. A word 'normally' pronounced with a falling voice will invariably be high if it is the second word in a phrase where

the first word is the important one: e.g., khwaaj raw (my buffalo) becomes not khwâaj râw in the dialect but khwâaj râw. On the other hand a villager stressing his possession of the buffalo would say: khwâaj râw lâ, the first, unaccented word having a level or low tone (perhaps because the second word pulls the voice away before it can fall?) A high pitch is sustained in the dialect, too, at the end of the first of a pair of statements which are to be contrasted, thus: wád níi ngaam: khǒng nán māj ngaam ('this monastery is beautiful but that one isn't' - standard Thai tones) becomes: wád níi ngáam: khǒng nán māj ngáam. Actually the mere implication of a contrasting statement to follow is enough to lift the voice, so that 'it's not my buffalo, [it's his]' will be: māj chāj khwaaj râw.

A completely new tone intervenes - a high rising one - where a speaker wants to correct a negative assumption, or even to give a positive answer to an open question, sometimes; or to emphasize the distinction between what we call 'critical pairs' of words. Thus if you ask a Semerak Thai to give a name to the horse (māa in standard Thai) he or she will say: níi māa (note the high unaccented níi). You then say "Well, what's that animal under the house, then?" (meaning the dog: in standard Thai mǎa) and your informant will reply in amused surprise: nán māa. The result is the same if you ask for the dog first and the horse afterwards. The second of the pair is always given on a high and rising tone.

Mild consternation was provoked when a group of ladies were asked to distinguish between 'hungry' and 'poor'. Hungry in Samōtrag is jāag (standard Thai jāag⁴). The ladies gave this high tone correctly. Then they were

asked for 'poor'. This is normally in Samörag, as in standard Thai, jaag⁵, but in the interests of contrast the answer could only be nán jaag - which the ladies admitted to their own surprise and dismay was pretty much what they had just said for hungry. This was not a kind trick to play, because the two words are normally distinct. Only pairs of the dog and horse type are normally indistinguishable (to the outsider at any rate).

In such a situation, the author feels little confidence in stating what the 'normal' tone really is for any given word. In this state of indecision it would be unwise to attempt to devise a set of tone marks.

A short description of the conditions and location of the author's work belongs properly here in the preface.

Such historical background as it was possible to gather for Chapter III - time is a hard master - was gathered mostly from secondary English language sources, to a small extent from documents at the Public Records Office, London, and, also to a small extent from verbal enquiry among the Thai people of Kelantan. The author found no time to visit the national archives at Kuala Lumpur or Bangkok, to search for material in South Thailand, or even to make rigorous enquiry after documents in the temples of Kelantan. The author had hoped to be able to read the annual reports for Kelantan from 1904 to 1909 for references to the Thai community, but these reports, said to be held at the State Secretariat, Kota Bharu⁶, were missing, presumed stolen, by the time of the author's first visit to the Secretariat in October 1966.

The paucity of solid historical material in Chapter III is a matter for real regret, because the historical situation of the Kelantan Thai is not incorporated in the dissertation out of any mere desire to 'fill out' space or 'fill in' a background. The postulated historical condition of the community occupies an important place in the total argument.

The author and his family occupied a small tiled house in Baan Samøbrag for ten months, from October 1966 to July 1967. Kampong Siam, Semerak, is a Thai village with one wat, situated in the last meander of the slow Semerak river, close to the sea (but not a fishing village) in Pasir Puteh district (see the map, page 49). It lies only $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the Trengganu border and Besut estuary, and 33 miles (one hour) by taxi from Kota Bharu the state capital. The distance as the crow flies to the Thai border at Rantau Panjang or Pengkalan Kubor is some 36 miles, but the Kelantan river has to be negotiated on the way. Until the Kota Bharu road bridge was opened in 1965 this had to be done by ferry. The road and/or rail distance to the border crossings is about 45 to Pengkalan Kubor (to cross to Taag Baj) and to Rantau Panjang (for Sungai Golok) over 50. Kampong Siam Semerak is more isolated from other centres of Thai culture in Kelantan, and more distant from Thailand, than any other Kelantan wat (but there are two further Thai hamlets in Trengganu without wats).

Semerak was chosen as a base because of its isolation. It was hoped that one could assess here the persistence of ties and identification with other parts of the Kelantan Thai community, and with Thailand, in a situation of long isolation. Equally one would hope to find integration with the Malay world more developed, and suggestive of more widely applicable hypotheses,

than in the villages of north Kelantan. Most of the latter seemed too close to Thailand not to be strongly attracted to identification with the homeland (or this was the author's surmise before arriving in the field). The north-Kelantan Thai villages tend also, in combination with each other, to make up large concentrations of Thai population which would probably be less prone to contact with the Malays than an isolated centre like Samöbrag. If one were to study political integration at all in a nation where democratic politics was only 12 years old (the first elections in the countryside were held in 1955), and sovereignty only 10 years old, one would need to find a community where some degree of practical identification with the environment was difficult to avoid or reject.

In thus assuming that Samöbrag might reveal differences with other Kelantan Thai villages, the author was taking a calculated risk that the findings about leadership, political attitudes, political organisation, and the like, would have a limited relevance for the Kelantan Thai as a whole. To discover something about these matters in other villages he went on tour with his family to five other villages in August 1967, after ten months at Samöbrag. The tour took in Baan Maalaj (Baan Samöbrag's sister village near Bachok⁷); Baan Bəqsaməd outside Tumpat; Baan Jaamuu and Baan Jung Kaw in west-Tumpat district; and Baan Bangsä' at Batu Tiga in Pasir Mas district, the site of Wad Udtamaaraam where the Chief Abbot of Kelantan has his seat. The travellers stayed for four or five days at each place. During the period of residence at Semerak there had been opportunity to become acquainted with the two hamlets in Trengganu and three more in Pasir Puteh district (see map, page 49) none of which has a wat.

These hamlets, and the five villages visited on the tour, showed characteristics which distinguished them in various ways from Samörag. Yet contrary to the author's fears, there was much that identified them as one community with Samörag, both in the problems faced and in their adjustments to them. Closeness to the border makes physical migration less intimidating but if the migratory option be once rejected there is no recourse to mental migration and flights from political reality. Thus it has seemed possible to write of "the state of the Kelantan Thai" in spite of the preponderance of Semerak and Pasir Puteh district data. But no generalisations from this data are hazarded without good reason, and the village to which specific data refer is made clear at every point in the dissertation.

The three visitors were quickly welcomed at Samörag village. This was due in part to the nostalgia for British rule which is an important political phenomenon: and due in part also to the readiness of the visitors to take part in the activities of the wat. The author found his Malay still more fluent than the Thai learnt in London, and he used Malay for some $2\frac{1}{2}$ months before switching to the Samörag dialect. His wife began a study of household economy, using Thai, after $3\frac{1}{2}$ months. The youngest member, the surest key to people's hearts, spoke the dialect fluently after 7 months, to the envy of her parents.

The idle and sometimes malicious curiosity of certain Malays of the district was unpleasant for the visitors and a plague on the Thais in the first two months. But the visitors were able in due course to make an im-

pression of friendliness and goodwill among people outside the village - probably a visit to the P.M.I.P. assemblyman did more good than any other single act - and towards the end the Thais were being generally complimented on their good fortune in having the Europeans to stay with them. This, incidentally, revealed an undercurrent of good will between the communities which was not apparent in the earlier statements of the Semerak Thais.

Apart from the expectation of a greater degree of integration in a village long isolated from other Thai centres and from Thailand, the author approached the study with as few as possible hypotheses and preconceptions. The theoretical considerations which follow in Chapter I were stimulated essentially by the experience of the research itself in combination with some methodological literature studied, for better or worse, only on the author's return from the field. The author is happy to align himself with the sentiments of Fred W. Riggs, who admits, in the introduction to his work on the Thai bureaucracy⁸, to a "lack of a priori conclusions and hence a shamefully imprecise and unpredictable research methodology", finding himself "in the position of Pirandello's roles in search of a play."

The characters in the 'play' which follows spoke their parts during 1966 and 1967 with very little prompting from the 'dramatist'. The usual research 'technique' was that of participant observation - with a lack of hypotheses little else was possible anyway in the early months. In an attempt to establish a correlation between wealth and leadership the author undertook a survey of all the land in the village - a monumental task which answered the question (negatively) long before it was finished, but had to be carried through to the end because it was a godsend to the villagers.

The villagers, in any case, now know the official lot numbers and correct rent of the land they occupy, and this was the least service the author could perform in return for all their help to him. Questionnaires were never made or handed out. The author memorized the questions and the answers in interviews to assess public opinion and communications, and wrote them up immediately afterwards. Only statistical data such as age, nationality status, number of children, were ever noted down in the presence of the informant. A portable tape recorder was used to record the dialect - the subjects chosen for conversation were village history, midwifery, magic, etc. No interviews relating to political questions were recorded - indeed they most frequently took the form of passing the time of day and lacked an interview-like 'structure' altogether. Because of unfailing good will there were no inhibitions about answering any question, but some would ask cautiously about the statistical data, after the author had noted it down "where are you going to send all this to?" One could never explain the purpose of the work too often; and it might have been unfortunate in some cases to try to write down confidential opinions or record them. Everyone knew the findings would be published eventually, in the English language, but some would have disliked the idea of 'being quoted' personally. Besides this, tape recordings have to be played over afterwards - immediately afterwards - which may be difficult to arrange; and once the living context is absent, in a language where one is at a very early and elementary stage of understanding, not a great deal of the meaning of the interview would survive from the live event.

The author visited Bangkok in August and September 1967 to enquire into

the attitude of the Thai government and press and the Buddhist Order to the Kelantan Thai question. The state of the Kelantan Thai became an international question in November 1966 by the action of the first Thai Consul in Kota Bharu (see Chapter VII). The author of this study has no responsibility for this development, but clearly his data could be used by interested parties on both sides to damage good relations. This is an occupational hazard for any researcher. The author trusts that his admiration of the reciprocal tolerance and restraint of the Malaysian and Thai governments - especially towards each other's instinctive concern for minorities beyond the border⁹ - will testify to his own wish for a harmonious outcome. The author trusts that if his findings and conclusions are useful in any way it may be in pointing the path to just such a happy and honourable integration of the Kelantan Thai minority in the nation of Malaysia as the two governments are committed to work for.

FOOTNOTES

1. Without previous acquaintance with Kelantan, indeed, the author might never have become aware of the existence of a Thai community there. Outside of the official Malayan censuses (e.g. J.E.Nathan, The Census of British Malaya, 1921, London 1922; and Federation of Malaya, Department of Statistics: 1957 Population Census, Report No.10 State of Kelantan, Kuala Lumpur, 1959) the Thai of Kelantan receive scant recognition in the South East Asia literature. W. A. Graham's gem (W.A.Graham, Kelantan: a State of the Malay Peninsula, Glasgow 1908) remains the best authority ancient or modern but is even then not wholly reliable. Virginia Thomason and Richard Adloff (Minority Problems in South East Asia, Stanford, 1955; see pp.160-1) limit the Malayan Thai by implication to the State of Kedah. An ethnic map in a publication of 1964 (viz. Le Bar, F.M. et al., Ethnic Groups of Mainland South-east Asia, New Haven, Mass., 1964) shows Thai culture penetrating the Malay area of the Kra-Malay Peninsula no further than a line drawn from Phuket Island on the west down to Thalee Luang on the east - i.e. to the north even of Songkhla! One would like to enjoy Stewart Wavell's colourful, sensual travel-book, The Naga King's Daughter (London 1964) as a travel-book and not drag it into the present discussion at all. Unfortunately, it has an intellectual theme which calls for a response, given the likelihood that students will refer to it in the absence of other sources. However, as neither the book nor the response deserve the prominence of the front page, a short discussion will be found appended as Appendix I. at p.254.
2. See: Mary Haas, Thai Reader, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington D.C., 1954; and Thai-English Student's Dictionary, Stanford, 1964.
3. See: J.Marvin Brown, From Ancient Thai to Modern Dialects, Bangkok, 1965; pp. 15 & 135.
4. N.B. The gloss of jaag in standard Thai is somewhat different - it means 'to want' in the sense of 'to desire to'.
5. jaag is not used for 'poor' in the standard language, but the gloss, 'difficult' is common to Samørag and standard Thai.
6. See: K.G.Tregonning, ed., Malayan Historical Sources, History Department, Singapore University, 1962.
7. c.p. Chapter III, p. 81 , infra. This village speaks the same dialect as Samørag. Dialect, even within the small Kelantan Thai population, is an unfailing indicator of historical relatedness between individual villages.
8. In Fred W. Riggs, Thailand, The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu, 1966. See Introduction, pp. 6 & 8.

9. See Chapter VII, p.195 , *infra*, et seq.

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

This 'socio-political' study of an ethnic minority in South-east Asia examines several sociological as well as strictly political aspects of the life of the Kelantan Thai, but it is offered as a dissertation in political science, and its theme is political integration. Consideration of the sociology of the community is geared and subordinated to this theme.

The author understands 'political integration' fundamentally, in the first of the five senses enumerated by Myron Weiner in a well-known article¹:

"...the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity. When used in this sense 'integration' generally presumes the existence of an ethnically plural society in which each group is characterised by its own language or other self-conscious cultural qualities, but the problem may also exist in a political system which is made up of once distinct independent political units with which people identified. National integration thus refers specifically to the problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows - or eliminates - subordinate parochial loyalties."

The Federation of Malaya became independent on 31 August 1957. The author began his field research just nine years and a month after that event - a point in time too early for a complete Malayan national identity to have emerged among the Kelantan Thai, although the territorial conditions were satisfied long before: on 15 July 1909, to be precise.² What this dissertation considers then, is not, simply, 'the Malayan identity of the Kelantan Thai', but the process of growth towards or decline away from a notional state of national identity. The process of growth towards identity will be called 'political integration'; its opposite, a decline from identity, had best be called 'reversal of political integration' or (incipient) 'alienation' since 'disintegration' is too suggestive of anarchy to be appropriate in the case under study. The term 'failure of integration' is too suggestive of immobility to be useful for a situation where change is of the essence.

Nevertheless, what the observer catches of the reality in the space of a few months is more like a static than a dynamic state. He gets to know his subject at a particular point on the ongoing process of integration.

How shall one identify this state of integration? There may be room for confusion in the twin referents of the word 'assimilation'. One could incorporate the 'state of assimilation' into the definition of integration: a group which is 'integrated' or 'integrating' (conceived as a quasi-static state of being) is one which is 'assimilated' in such and such ways. Alternatively, the 'process of assimilation' may be one which leads to the quasi-static state of integration. A choice must be made between assimilation which defines integration, and assimilation as a notionally prior factor. The advantage of the latter approach would be an ability to isolate a group's earlier experience and identify the integrative significance of it.

Keeping causes and results separate is not difficult if ones contact with the living situation is relatively brief. One is bound to look outside the brief months of ones contact to earlier events, for much of the explanation of what one sees. In so doing one comes easily to order the data into two classes: what one had observed and the postulated causes of what one observed - even if some of the causes, such as the ongoing process of assimilation itself, can be observed in the living situation. Assimilation and integration are not necessarily separate in time. But since they can very usefully be separated in the case under study, this dissertation will employ a fairly systematic periodicization.

Yet it is hard to achieve a total and pure divorce of the two classes

of data, even at the conceptual level. Can one identify and describe a state of 'political integration' without betraying a preference for a particular type of explanation? In identifying 'political integration' this author is inclined to pick out a syndrome of positive behavioural responses to the social and political environment on the part of the minority. But 'responses' imply a previous conditioning experience. The type of explanation is already indicated by the description of the observed situation.

Another preliminary point to be made clear is that, just as Weiner's completed national identity is political in the very broadest sense of all that makes for identification with a nation, this dissertation will attempt to describe and explain both conventionally political behaviour (such as effective integration with given political and governmental structures and modes on the basis of acquired skills and associated values) and identification with the overall societal structure on the basis of legitimacy stemming from its varied impact on and perception by the minority. But identification too may often have to be deduced from behaviour of a non-verbal kind: not all the statements of informants should be accepted uncritically. 'Consciousness' may not exactly reflect 'existence' in the early stages of change. (Nor need it be consciousness that lags behind the latter - it may forerun a process like alienation.) To put it another way, in the early stages of nation-building, when a group is not 'integrated' but at best 'integrating', we are necessarily referred to various functional pre-conditions of integration as indicators of the existence of such a process: conditions related, for instance, to Weiner's concepts of good

elite-governed communication, and capacity to organise for common purposes. (Weiner gives these among his assembled definitions of integration: of course these forms of integration are complementary, not exclusive, to integration in the sense of the achievement of common identity; the latter indeed can only come about and be completely understood through the contribution of such cultural and structural changes - which should be regarded as means towards a common end - even if we find it convenient to make a distinction between 'general identification', as revealed most strikingly in good relations with other races, and 'integration with political structures, etc.')

Needless to say, we are not interested in how far the Thais have become "like Malays". This sort of total assimilation might immeasurably help the emergence of common nationality, but such a process is so little advanced among the group in question that it would be futile to attempt to operate with such a definition and model of national integration. What we are committed to study is how far our group are behaving "like Malaysians", i.e. have assimilated to common social values or an incipient common identity with the social environment (this aspect to be dealt with in Chapters II and III); and assimilated habits and values relevant to particular political modes and structures (a theme which will be postponed to Chapter V).

Regarding the conditioning-and-response approach foreshadowed above: its function is to facilitate the analysis of historical cause and effect, not to reduce political behaviour to a mere mechanism. While habits and skills are certainly part of the learned response to specific contemporary structures and groups, the situation in which that learning or assimilation took place also constituted a normative experience in implanting values for

present and future conduct, and expectations from the environment. Values imply freedom of future choice. They are particularly apparent in attitudes to the overall societal structure and its legitimacy. They are the normative element in political culture. A concept of 'models' will also be invoked below in delineation of the descriptive side of political culture - and to give further point to our anti-mechanistic bias.

But first consideration in this opening study of some of the literature of the plural society and political integration will be given to a work which in fact seems irrelevant in some ways and even wrong at times in the light of the realities of the Kelantan Thai situation. Nevertheless its hypotheses are stimulating and offer a valuable starting point: even if ones conclusions are often in contrast and reaction to its own. That book is Deutsch's Nationalism and Social Communication.³

An important difficulty of this work seems to be its failure to make a clear distinction at all times between different types of assimilation. Linguistic assimilation appears to be equated, by implication, at several points in the book, with integration to a national identity. For example:

"...The Slavic settlers of the Peloponnesus were assimilated to the Greek speech of the towns during the 'dark ages'; the peasants of Egypt gradually changed their Coptic speech for Arabic between the seventh and twelfth centuries A.D. (although the process may not have been completed until the sixteenth); and the Wendish peasants of Eastern Germany gradually became Germans between the tenth and the eighteenth centuries."⁴

This, of course, is a too exclusive definition of nationality (even if, as we shall later show, unassimilated language and ethnicity are a potentially important inhibiting factor in integration). Deutsch is writing, however,

with the intention of seeking factors for nationality other than those put forward in the many facile accounts of the past. He recognises, when addressing this problem consciously, that linguistic assimilation is neither a necessary condition - as in Switzerland⁵ - nor a sufficient condition - as in Ireland⁶ - for common nationality. This study of the political integration of the Kelantan Thais will take as one basic assumption that it is not necessary to be assimilating linguistically in order to integrate to a nationality.

What is not at all ambiguous in Nationalism and Social Communication is the view that once a process of assimilation in some kind has been inaugurated, only social mobilisation of the affected groups is necessary to create a common nationality between them. Mobilisation and intensive social communication appear to be a sufficient condition for nationality. The quality or type of assimilation are disregarded and the 'impartial' (because quantifiable?), forces of social communication hold sway over the process.

"...assimilation can be accelerated very greatly by increasing the rate of new experiences from society. This may occur by a total change of environment, such as in a group migration..... but immigration is not the only way in which a greatly increased stream of new similar experiences may come to bear upon the members of two different peoples. Instead of packing up and going where the new experiences are, the members of several peoples may stay put and have a flood of new experiences come to them in a period of major social change." 7

There is no doubting the significance of periods of intensive communication and rapid change, in the relations of groups. But is the process of national integration as ineluctable as Deutsch would seem to have us believe? Must every development be unilinear? When a group first begins to assimilate

in some way to its environment - be it before the era of mobilisation or during it - this involves a change of direction. Why, a priori, should there be no more than one change of direction in the history of a group so long as it remains an identifiable group? May there not be intermediate cases between groups which assimilate progressively to the point of disappearance and the groups (whose existence Deutsch recognises⁸) which resisted assimilation from the start?

If we consider assimilation to occur not only in terms of language but also of political structures and values, assimilation involves a reidentification of the self which, however elementary the level, is within the area of the cognitive. A purely mechanistic, behaviouristic interpretation of cultural change cannot be satisfactory for any human society at any period (given our understanding of the term homo sapiens). But if choice can be exercised once, may it not be exercised again, in an opposite direction, in circumstances where changing internal values and changing outside conditions cease to be compatible - and provided the group retains some of its identity (in the form of a language, for instance, or perhaps an independent political structure)? As Kunstädter points out in his discussion of the same problem:

"Many of the minority peoples in South-east Asian countries (such as the Shan in Burma and the Tai groups in North Vietnam) were, and still are, internally organised on a level which necessarily brings them into structural opposition with the 'central government'." 9

This is a serious matter for integration, even though:

"One book more than any other has destroyed the illusion that tribal groups are isolated, independent, homogeneous, self-sufficient, stable entities: this is Edmund Leach's Political

Systems of Highland Burma, published in 1954."¹⁰

In other words, notwithstanding a centuries-long symbiosis and membership of one overshadowing political system, integration in the new nation states is not an inevitable outcome. In a period of heightening self-awareness - the period of mobilisation to which Deutsch attaches great importance - it might be appropriate to shift the position from a denial of the a priori probability of integration to an a priori expectation of integrative decline in societies which retain tangible elements of plurality. This is the ultimate bias of the present study - although in earlier chapters, elements of ongoing integration among the Kelantan Thais will be picked out, and the conditions for such a phenomenon. (And the Kelantan Thai lack - unlike many upland tribes of South-east Asia - an independent political structure.)

The seeming paradox of the Kelantan Thai case arises from the fact that in the first half of the present century, a period of incipient but not intensive mobilisation for all groups in the state, the trend appears to have been integrative; and this trend has not yet worked itself out, given a certain continuity of political conditions since Independence (i.e. contemporary conditions evoke a positive response from a group whose most recent political values were acquired in the colonial period - see Chapters II & III). On the other hand, apart from the nostalgic preference for British rulers as such, the new values relating to socio-political structure, acquired during the colonial era and under the special impact of intensifying social communication, are less easily satisfied in a state now ruled by an extremist Malay party, and future prospects for integration are not entirely encouraging. Even under an Alliance government alienation could develop.

Thus the integration made possible by assimilative processes during the (limited) mobilisation of colonial rule was predicated on certain socio-structural conditions (in terms of rights and relative status in the society) associated with colonial rule itself. Its legacy is equivocal. Moreover, while the environment may become less favourable, values relating to desired status would seem to be able to change in only one direction: towards an ever greater insistence on equality.

At the root of the problem, always, is the persistence of Thai identity, enhanced, but not created, by colonial rule. Before giving consideration to a number of writings on the plural society and the conditions for the integration of diverse groups, it will be in place here to suggest the importance of this kind of study in the world context.

The politically developed nations, the complacent breeding grounds of the very ideas of political unity and integration, are now in the throes of political upheavals consequent upon the upsurge of long-dormant regional and ethnic nationalisms. These upsurgings are often - as in Belgium and Canada - the product of a prior experience of improving status granted in the interests of ultimate integration. A generation later, if equal status is still felt to be more nominal than real, demands can arise for a fulfilment of the promise, even to the point of political independence from the majority, or previous dominant, cultural group. An era in which even Great Britain can no longer feel certain of her future territorial integrity, is one which needs new models of the national integration process. Appropriate models will have to retreat from the advanced positions of political science in that any

pretensions to predict political development (however modest and circumscribed) must be given up. If we do hazard to project a course of possible development we must try to err on the cautious side as to the likelihood of integration. The present study is offered partly as a contribution to such a more cautious mode of analysis of the plural society. Integration in South East Asia - or any other place - is bound neither to succeed nor to fail. The past is complex and the programmes and policies of the present must be chosen to elicit positive responses to nation building. For every positive response there may be a negative one in reserve.

It was stated above that the earlier part of the study would deal with elements of integration. Since views have differed on the possibility of achieving any integration in diverse societies, it may be useful to see where the present study stands along the continuum of learned assessments of the question.

Discussions of the concept 'the plural society' generally go back, by almost ineluctable convention, to the author who fathered the term: J.S. Furnival¹¹. This is not an undesirable convention to observe here if we want to examine a representative selection of models of social relations in the plural society - for the view of Furnivall has come to occupy, in recent years, the position of 'minority opinion', and almost has to be quoted if his species of view is to be represented at all.

However, Furnivall does not stand at the extreme end of the spectrum. He himself took pains to criticize the views of the 'plural economy' school of Dutch writers, who could not conceive of any assimilation of new values and behavioural traits by rural communities whatsoever, even in the economic

sphere. J. H. Boeke sums up his own view in the following words:

"Trekken wij een voorloopige conclusie uit het voorgaande betoog, dan moet deze aldus luiden: dat de individualistische, kapitalistische, op het vrije, niet door sociale normen gebonden, ruilverkeer betrokken theorie voor het begrijpen van de oostersche samenleving onbruikbaar is, omdat deze samenleving niet individualistisch en niet kapitalistisch is, in hoofdzaak buiten het marktverkeer en de geldhuishouding blijft en, voorzover daarin opgenomen, aan alle zijden door sociale normen gebonden is. Aan den anderen kant moeten de opgesomde kenmerken van deze theorie haar juist bij uitstek bruikbaar maken voor het westersche en verwesterschte deel der dualistische samenleving: hier een zakelijkheid, rationalisme, individualisme en economische doelstelling, vollediger en absolueter dan in de homogene westersche landen..." 12

Boeke's theme is in reaction to other economists who had tried to analyse the Netherlands Indies economy wholly in terms of the working of the profit motive: he describes the native economy as "bound by social norms on all sides", and would limit the capitalist economy (analytically) to the European or westernized sectors, noting however that these sectors are as insensitive to social norms as the native economy is unpermeated by capitalist principles.

Furnivall argues colourfully and convincingly for the revolutionary transformation of peasant economy in Indonesia since the coming of the Dutch:

"We have noticed that, in the early days of Dutch rule, the people took to new crops when these were profitable, and that a rise of price for any commodity increased the supply to an extent that was sometimes embarrassing, whereas a fall in price led to a shortage of supply. It may be argued that these variations were due to official stimulus, but we are told that officials failed, even by penalties, to prevent the people from cutting down their coffee plants when prices were inadequate, and it must have been more difficult to make them plant

crops; thus the variations in supply would seem to have an economic explanation in variations of demand. A few years later Muntinghe tells how people had taken to specialising in tobacco and vegetables, and again a few years later we find Van Hoëvell, even at the height of the Culture System, reporting that there had grown up in East Java a differentiation of function purely economic in character....Again although native agriculture is largely for home consumption, we are told of native money-lenders who add field to field no less rapaciously than the banias of British India, and it is not quite easy to accept as wholly satisfactory the explanation sometimes put forward that in this matter they aim at improving their social status rather than their economic standing....among some classes, notably the people of Menangkabau, there are individuals who can hold their own against the Chinese, and the native hajjis have long been a byword for extortion...one is impressed by the avidity with which Natives in Java as elsewhere in the East, have seized on the opportunity given them by the petrol engine to set up business on a small scale with taxis and motor-buses..." 13

This is a description of change; yet Furnivall's plural society is essentially characterised by a lack of convergence between the groups which constitute it. They only have the economic motive in common. In Furnivall's famous words, Netherlands India is "an example of a plural society: a society, that is, comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit."¹⁴

How plural is the 'plural society'? One can approach this question as a cultural and psychological one, as was done in this section so far: can and do groups assimilate to each other's behaviour and culture, or at least to certain common values? One can, alternatively, or in combination with this, approach the question as one concerning the structure of social relations between ethnic groups: how absolute are their divisions, which type of structure best facilitates mutual assimilation or learning of common values, and which structural scheme offers the most reliable description of

known 'plural societies'?

J. Rex states the problem on both levels:

"What is needed on the theoretical level to systematize Furnivall's most important insights is an explicit statement, both of the way in which pre-existing cultures are brought into relation through the market, and of the way in which the market, which draws people together into a single social system, also divides them into new dynamically related groups." 15

As to cultural convergence, we can choose between the view of M. G.

Smith that:

"when groups that practise differing institutional systems live side by side under a common government, the cultural plurality of this inclusive unit corresponds to its social plurality..." 16

or the contrary (and to this author more convincing) comment of Vera Rubin:

"...Smith's view of cultural homogeneity as a condition of societal homogeneity may seem Utopian in the sense that such a society would not only eliminate cultural differences but provide a harmonious setting in which there is no conflict of interests. Such a Utopia is neither in the line of evolutionary trends to greater complexity and heterogeneity, nor is it a necessary prerequisite for an integrated social order. We may have racial and cultural pluralism in a single territorial unit without conflict where there is an opportunity through communication and through channels of mobility for core values and desired statuses to be diffused to the various segments of the social structure." 17

Lloyd Braithwaite, in the same symposium, is seen to be aligned with Vera Rubin on the sharing of values. He also writes with insight on the nature of assimilation under colonialism and on the usefulness of Furnivall's stratified plan of the structure of a colonial society (to which point we shall recur shortly):

"The concentration on the phenomenon of the lack of social will of which Furnivall speaks obscures the really important fact that society cannot exist without a minimum sharing of common values, without a certain amount of 'social will'... he tends to lay too great stress on the economic factors affecting policy and too little on the necessary existence of sentiments favourable to the metropolitan power and the ways and means by which such sentiments are inculcated and encouraged...." 18

We read later, in Braithwaite's conclusion:

"A discussion of the various groups on the island [i.e. Trinidad] would show a varying degree of assimilation to the dominant social values and culture. The analysis in terms of social stratification serves the useful purpose of stressing the common values of the society." 19

To pass any judgement on Furnivall's idea of the structure of the plural society, we must try to reach a clear view of what the idea is. Furnivall's writing is somewhat ambiguous. A society such as Canada he sometimes calls a 'plural society'²⁰, elsewhere distinguishes it as a 'society with plural features'²¹ because of its common values. The Hindu society of India is characterised at another point as a plural society, although Furnivall seemingly withdraws the epithet in the next sentence:

"Perhaps the only plural society inherently stable is the Hindu society of India. Here there are separate groups or classes, partly racial, with distinct economic functions. But in India caste has a religious sanction, and in a plural society the only common deity is Mammon. In general the plural society is built on caste without the cement of a religious sanction...." 22

Through the latent ambiguity one is able to trace a thread of consistent meaning. The colonial plural society is the plural society par excellence. Culturally it is without shared values. Structurally it may be conceived as a stratified society (notwithstanding the characterisation 'social orders

which live side by side'):)

'One consequence of the emphasis on production rather than on social life, which is characteristic of plural society, is a sectional division of labour; although the primary distinction between the groups may be race, creed or colour, each section comes to have its own functions in production, and there is a tendency towards the grouping of the several elements into distinct economic castes...' 23

The European caste rules, the immigrants have economic power at the middle level, the indigenous people are at the bottom of society as the agricultural caste. Such a structure, did it exist, would not strongly conduce to common values - which perhaps explains Furnivall's pessimism on that score. In the context of the Kelantan Thai and the present dissertation, the point must not be allowed to pass un-noted that our group is a rural minority, and the assimilation which is in question today is that to the rule of the majority rural group, the Malays, not of any immigrant group higher in a notional economic hierarchy. However, this point is well made, not in disqualifying the Kelantan Thai from further consideration in the discussion - they are, in fact, at the present time, in a subordinate position in a socio-political structure, which might seem to earn them a place in the Furnivallian scheme of things! - but in suggesting the question whether, in the post-independence situation that most troubled Furnivall, a rural indigenous majority ever has to make adjustments of values to realise a genuine accommodation of alien groups in their polity. Is it not they who occupy the top place in the hierarchy (if there is a hierarchy) after independence? Is it not the immigrant entrepreneurs and shopkeepers who have to 'fit in', however favoured their status before? If the latter are a minority, assimilation to certain common values might be achieved, if only

by force! (Furnivall stresses the primacy of force as a cement to the different social orders of the plural society). But this is to speculate along lines indicated by Furnivall's hierarchical scheme, without questioning its validity as such.

Two writers who have commented recently on Furnivall's stratified analysis will now be quoted. The first two commentaries are by H.S.Morris; the third is an extract from the article by Braithwaite already cited.

"East Africa is an example of a plural society in which the various sections of the population are marked off from one another by criteria of physical and cultural differences. The inhabitants of the country conceptualise the structure of their society in a slightly simpler version of the scheme used by Furnivall to describe the mixed or composite societies of the Far East. In Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, Europeans are thought to constitute an administrative, legal and directive upper class, the Indians are said to form an economic and trading middle class, and Africans are believed, by themselves as much as by the other sections of the population, to be the urban and rural working classes of the society.

The physical and cultural differences which correspond with these divisions of the people and the relative lack of mingling among them allow the members of the society to overlook the differentiation into groups and categories within each section, even though these latter divisions may in fact be structurally more significant in the composition of the total society than the broader 'racial' categories. This stereotyped view of the society also allows its members to overlook the actual mingling of members of all sections which occurs, and which is comparable with that found in stratified societies which are not usually classified as plural." 24

Thus stratification is more characteristic of the internal organisation of the ethnic categories than of the ordering of the whole categories in relation to each other. The idea is developed later for Malaya:

"In a large scale society like that of Malaya today, members of the Malay, the Chinese, the Indian and the European sections of the population are employed in the Civil Service and are

ranked in it without ostensible regard to race. Put in another way, in an area of ranking in the social system ethnic affiliation is theoretically ignored. On the other hand, since political independence from Britain, ethnic sections have increasingly begun to behave as corporate groups (Freedman 1960). In other words, all members of society in Malaya are now expected to enter relationships of ethnic incorporation, which for an individual are limited to one set of ethnic assets. It should be noted, though, that these relationships are not those of corporate ranking. It would be almost impossible to place the Malays as a group above or below the Chinese or the Indians; and the overall system of group relations is not one of stratification, whatever hierarchies may or may not exist within the separate ethnic sections. In short Malaya and other similar "federal" plural societies display relationships of universal and sectionally limited incorporation, but not of universal corporate ranking." 25

The sharing of various occupational roles among the races in this type of structure evidently lends it a culturally unifying character, and few would deny the validity of this structural scheme for Malaya as a whole. On the other hand, as we have seen, Braithwaite accepts the notion of stratification in colonial society because it facilitates our understanding of assimilation to a set of 'dominant social values'. After all, even if the several races in a colonial plural society interact as categories at all levels, they are certainly subordinate, collectively, to the colonialist, the metropolitan power. Psychologically,

"...a major need of the individual in a subordinate social system whose particularistic-ascriptive values have been torn asunder would appear to be acceptance of another set of such values. Hence it comes about that the first reaction of many colonials is toward the acceptance of the superiority of the scale of values of the subordinate social system." 26

Certainly the Kelantan Thai became integrated with colonial Kelantan partly because it was colonial. Chapters III to V will address themselves

in part to the question of the extent to which the 'superordinate values' favouring British rule are distinguishable or not from values for an integrative relationship with the society as a whole (in spite of Britain's departure). In one sense colonial society is hierarchical: power is monopolised by the metropolitan power. But in terms of the structure of relationships between the ethnic communities the society is more characterised by 'side-by-side', interlocking and interacting categories. Is such sense of community as may arise in these circumstances legitimised solely by European sponsorship or is it an autonomous reality (arising from a general social assimilation - assimilation to non-ascriptive social values) which can survive Independence (so long as the structure itself survives in important respects)? As a sense of inter-racial equality should grow not merely from the knowledge of common subordination to the colonial power, but also from day-to-day interaction on a footing of practical equality (see Chapter II) there may be grounds for some optimism.²⁷

Nevertheless, the British departure has not constituted simply the removal of the top segment in the structure. The Thais' situation today is not, on the face of it, comparable to that of the Chinese. Let us refer to Freedman's comparison of Malayan society before the Pacific war and since Independence. In the former period,

"The plural society...consisted not of ethnic blocks but of ethnic categories within which small groups emerged to form social ties inside and across ethnic boundaries. In any one locality a balance was struck between the interests of Malays, Chinese and Indians. A rich and influential Chinese in one of the states, for example, maintained his position vis-a-vis Chinese and non-Chinese partly as a result of his relations with Malay power-holders..." 28

Thus again the idea of interacting and interlocking categories. This leaves its mark on the new political structure; but politics in turn causes a sharper definition of ethnic boundaries and a new consciousness of membership in an ethnic block. This new political alignment is the real pluralism for Freedman:

"The compromise in the Alliance has an important economic aspect. There is in Malaya no neat hierarchy of Furnivallian 'orders' endowed with specific economic functions. The Asian 'immigrant' population does not sit squarely in the middle of the occupational pyramid performing only intermediate economic roles. Chinese and Indians are distributed over a wide range of economic functions, while in the period since the end of the Second World War, a sizeable number of Malays have appeared in the ranks of industrial employees... One of the disadvantages of the notion of the plural society, as Morris has pointed out, is that it tempts us to argue from cultural and 'racial' appearances to social realities. Through most of its modern history Malaya has shown important cultural and 'racial' divisions but these divisions had not created cleavages running the length and breadth of society....there was no framework for the massive alignment of ethnic forces. In the Federation of Malaya the attainment of independence has furnished conditions for such an alignment..." 29

Yes. But for all the preponderating balance of the Malays in the national Alliance it is not said that the Chinese are now reduced to a position of subordination in a hierarchy. For the rural, out-numbered Kelantan Thais Independence has brought a different fate. The elevation of one formerly equal group to inherit the crown of the retreating metropolitan power, in a way not paralleled in the Peninsular political system as a whole, has destroyed the conceived equality of status with the Malay 'category' which the Thais had enjoyed for 48 years. And the sensation of equality for the Thais, a group without representation higher up the economic scale, did depend more heavily on the notion of a shared relationship to power than on the less abstract realities of shared economic statuses with other groups

in society, or even the reality of friendly interaction with Malay neighbours during the British era.

Methodologically, our analysis here must entail a concept of 'model': the sort of model of society that a Thai constructs when he perceives the status of his race in society as equal or unequal to others (it is not sociologists alone who construct models). In terms of Barbara E. Ward's much cited trio of models³⁰ the Thai model of colonial society, being retrospective and coloured somewhat by nostalgia, would count basically as an 'ideological model', and behaviour and legitimisation are ordered by reference to it. But it purports to be a description, too, of remembered experience and is partly a 'home-made' or 'immediate' model with objective elements which we cannot ignore in reconstructing colonial history in Kelantan. So far as the model is an objective and not purely subjective reconstruction, it will thus overlap with our own 'observer's model'. But its true power lies in the more subjective, simplifying, and ideological facets of its account of British rule. This account reveals - and in a sense summarises - some of the learning processes which are at the back of current responses. We consider that it is not in last resort the ideological model that has determined behaviour but the formative experience behind the model - just as values prescriptive of behaviour also reflect experience.

This is the basis of the periodicisation adopted in this study between events before and events after Independence. The changing historical experience of the group is conceived as a varied conditioning process which will be betrayed in its responses to contemporary further changes. This is not an original proposition. Yet it gives a larger role to historical change

and the changing values of a group than Deutsch, with his sense that assimilation is an uninterrupted process once begun (regardless of the forms new experience takes) and gives rise to a constant, integrative response (even to new stimuli). It is only necessary to bear in mind the cognitive factor in learning - the adoption of values and expectations as well as mere 'assimilation' with its involuntary connotations. And it is precisely in a situation where a group is only partially assimilated that its residual identity will enable it to experience change and acquire values in ways unique to itself and not in common with the majority culture. This is the inner dynamic of the group's relations to its environment. The assimilation of the Kelantan Thais before British rule was of a negative (but not insignificant) kind, relating to an acceptance of belonging to a Malay Kelantan (rather than to Thailand) and being subjects of a Sultan (see Chapter III); but it left Thai cultural identity untouched. More positive social assimilation in the British period is indisputable and is an important constituent element in today's integration, but that period again left untouched - when not actually enhancing - Thai cultural identity. Indeed, given inherited Thai identity, social assimilation could scarcely proceed in an era of incipient mobilisation except on the basis of a realisation of socio-political values which make stricter demands of society than in earlier times. These expectations (notably of equal ethnic status) were simultaneously satisfied by the colonial society but as conditions change in a new direction they become a potential obstacle to continuing integration. (Where alienation has not, in fact, immediately transpired, it is still apposite to examine historical experience, but for learning relating to specific modes and structures of

the political system, diluting the alienated response in the post-Independence period; while recording new patterns of conditioning in the present which could in due course lead to an estrangement.)

By 'cultural identity' is understood, in this dissertation, linguistic and religious distinctiveness. Such distinctiveness is not a necessary bar to political integration. By contrast, the nature of political culture has a more direct bearing on political integration. The shared mental models or perceptions of the socio-political structure - in combination with learned values - affect legitimisation of that structure as a whole. The community's understanding of an appropriate political role in that structure - or what we shall refer to (Chapter V) as the 'mode' of their politics, with the concomitant strength or relative weakness of the assertion of right to equality - may in effect modify the legitimisation process in one direction or the other. But both models of ethnic ranking and conceptions of an appropriate political role among the Kelantan Thai rest, characteristically, on the assumption of cultural identity and the underlying need for bridging structures and defined relationships between a bounded Thai community and its environment. This is likely to prove in the long run the most significant politico-cultural reality in the Thais' situation, and a constant where other facets of culture are in a state of movement, conditioned by change in the environment.

Finally, it follows from the attempt here to be undertaken to adjudicate, as it were, between conflicting evidence of integration and alienation, that the study will appear at times vacillatory between alternative analyses. In a situation of both environmental change and cultural transition, this is in-

evitable. Indeed to express an exclusive preference for one analysis would be untrue to the natural diversity of the phenomena and imply an ineluctability of cultural trends which we have already been at pains to deny. Such a study as this is made no easier, either, by the fact that when one has adjudicated and declared that certain behavioural indicators are for the time being more weighty than others and that therefore 'integration' is occurring, objections can be brought against the proposed indicators in favour of an alternative definition. But this is no doubt a hazard common to much research in the social sciences. We turn now as courageously as may be to our 'dialogue' or 'dialectic', hopeful that it will both adequately inform within its limited area, and, through its emerging analysis, contribute a little to an understanding of the conditions for national integration on a wider stage.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Political Integration and Political Development" by Myron Weiner; in "New Nations, the Problem of Political Development", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, No.358, March 1965, p.53.
2. See First Adviser's Report Kelantan, by J.S.Mason. 15 July 1909 was the day on which Mr. W. A. Graham handed over his duties to Mr.Mason, and Siam transferred her suzerainty to Britain.
3. Nationalism and Social Communication by Karl W. Deutsch, 2nd edition, Cambridge, Mass., 1966.
4. Deutsch, *ibid.* p.120.
5. Deutsch, *ibid.* p.97.
6. Deutsch, *ibid.* p.157.
7. Deutsch, *ibid.* pp.118-9.
8. As in the case of German minorities in Eastern Europe - see Deutsch, *ibid.* pp. 121 and 155.
9. Peter Kunstadter, in P. Kunstadter, ed., South-east Asian Tribes, Minorities and Nations, New Jersey, 1967; p.41.
10. P. Kunstadter, *ibid.* p.42.
11. J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: a Study in Plural Economy, Cambridge, 1939.
12. J. H. Boeke, "De Economische Theorie der Pluralistische Samenleving", in De Economist, 1935: 781.
13. J. S. Furnivall, *op. cit.*, pp.454-5.
14. J. S. Furnivall, *ibid.* p.446.
15. J. Rex, "The Plural Society in Sociological Theory", British Journal of Sociology, 1959: 117.
16. M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism", Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 83, 1959-60: 767.
17. Comment by Vera Rubin in A.N.Y.A.S., *ibid.*, p.784.
18. Lloyd Braithwaite, "Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism", A.N.Y.A.S., *ibid.*, p.818.

19. L. Braithwaite, *ibid.* p.830.
20. J. S. Furnivall, *op.cit.*, p.446.
21. J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, Cambridge, 1948; p.305.
22. J. S. Furnivall, *ibid.* p.308.
23. J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India, p.450.
24. H. S. Morris, "The Plural Society", Man, August 1957: 124 (excerpted from a paper read in the Race Relations Group of the British Sociological Association Conference, London, March 1957).
25. H. S. Morris, "Some Aspects of the Concept Plural Society", Man, June 1967: 180.
26. L. Braithwaite, *op.cit.*, p.818.
27. Lloyd Braithwaite too, as we have noted, is optimistic on the basis of his Trinidad observations. However, he too regards the transition to Independence as fraught with potential difficulties, in that the different elements of a plural society may again seek the security of a set of ascriptive values as European domination is withdrawn, leaving a new vacuum. These ascriptive values may be those of race.
28. Maurice Freedman, "The Growth of a Plural Society in Malaya", Pacific Affairs, 33, 1960: 167.
29. M. Freedman, *ibid.* pp.167-8.
30. Barbara E. Ward, "Varieties of the Conscious Model" in The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology, (A.S.A. Monographs, 1) London and New York, 1965; pp.113-137.

CHAPTER II: THE SOCIAL SETTING

This chapter will attempt to place the Kelantan Thai in their social context. The analysis of integration cannot begin before some basic information has been set down about the community. But already in the course of this narrative one assimilative current of the British period will be indicated: that which flowed from increasing communications between Thai and Malay society, and the changing posture of Malay individuals towards Thais. The latter, as much as the new subordination of all races to British power, was a development which helped to structure the Thais' perception of colonial society as an equitable one, and assisted their acceptance of it in this century. (However, we conceive that a favourable overall structure was in turn an essential environment for the more involuntary processes of social assimilation to go forward.) Elements of integration at the present time, where related to changes in Malay society, are sketched in without attempting to make a hard division between colonial and post-colonial Kelantan. There is a continuity which evokes the same responses, or, in normative terms, certain expectations acquired during the assimilative interaction of the colonial period can still find satisfaction at the level of personal contact with Malay fellow-Kelantanese. There is thus some assimilation, both ways, to certain common values of mutual acceptance and shared identity as Kelantanese country people. At the same time, 'cultural' assimilation to the Malay community is obstructed by Muslim exclusiveness, so Thai identity is upheld, as it were by an outside volition, while increasing communications from the wider Kelantan world enhance awareness of its social structure and the Thais' position in it. This can only be a factor for acceptance so long as the perceived system of ranking corresponds to received or simultaneously generated

values and expectations.

The Thai of Kelantan are overwhelmingly a rural community. The last official census¹ in 1957 disclosed that out of 6,727 Kelantan Thais, only 99 were resident in Kota Bharu town. However, other Thais are found in the smaller townships of the state, such as Pasir Puteh, or Machang: very often they are the wives of Chinese shopkeepers, but sometimes Thai couples set up a shop independently. For instance in Machang district where there is no rural Thai settlement, 38 Thais are recorded, and these may be counted as urban or semi-urban population.

The Kelantan Thai are only slightly more numerous than the Indians in the state, as the following figures from the last census show. As the category 'Indian' comprises a number of distinct, small communities, the Thais are certainly not the smallest community in the state, but if we overlook the various jungle aborigine groups, they are clearly the smallest rural community. (The only other proviso would be that the state does have its complement of country Chinese and country Thai-Chinese, and their numbers are probably not in excess of the Thai.)

All Malaysians	463,118
Malays	458,717
Chinese	28,861
Indians (excluding Ceylonis & Pakistanis)	5,665
Thai	6,727
Other	1,151
All Races	505,522 ²

The 1957 distribution of the Thais by district is as follows. For each

district the principal centre or centres of Thai settlement - defined as villages or hamlet groups having a monastery or monasteries - are indicated.

(c.p. map p.49)

Kota Bharu town	99	-----
Kota Bharu rest	225	Baan Sadang (1 wat)
Pasir Mas	928	Baan Bangsai ¹ (1 wat); Baan Khoog Koo (1 wat)
Ulu Kelantan	58	-----
Pasir Puteh ³	514	Baan Sam ⁸ rag (1 wat)
Bachok	369	Baan Maalaj (2 wat)
Machang	38	-----
Tumpat	4,216	Baan Boosamed (2 wat); Baan Naj (1 wat); Baan Khaw Din (1 wat); Baan Khoog Sijaa (1 wat); Baan Jang (1 wat); Baan Jaamuu (1 wat); Baan Jung Kaw (3 wat); Baan Tuuwaa (1 wat).
Tanah Merah	280	Baan Theasong (1 wat)
Total of population	6727 ⁴	Total of wat: 18

Besides these 18 Thai wat, located in the midst of Thai settlement, there is one further Theravada Buddhist wat, with Thai monks, but situated in a Thai-Chinese village: at Tanoong in Pasir Mas district, At Wakaf Bharu, in Tumpat district just across river from Kota Bharu, a site has been found for still another to serve the local Thai-Chinese population. Wakaf Bharu wat will be, like Tanoong, an integral part of the Kelantan Sangha, indistinguishable, except for its ethnic support, from any other wat in Kelantan.

Further to the population concentrated round Thai wat there are other hamlets in the midst of Malay settlement which have only a monks' pavilion.




Figure 1.

Kelantan Wats, with waterways, and five settlements in the Pasir Puteh and upper Trengganu Districts.

1	Baan Tuwaa	9	Baan Naj	15	Baan Bangsã'	20	Ligii
2 - 4	Baan Jung Kaw	10	Baan Khaw Din	16	Baan Sadang	21	Bukit To' Chit
5	Baan Jang	11	Baan Jaamuu	17	Baan Thaasong	22	Khaw Joon
6 - 7	Baan Bqsamed	12 - 13	Baan Maalaj	18	Baan Samðrag	23	Pog Kiang
8	Baan Khoogsijaa	14	Baan Khoog Kqq	19	Baan Tanoong	24	Batu Balai

The author is familiar with all three such hamlets in the Pasir Puteh district and these are indicated on the map given at page 49 ; likewise the two hamlets in Trengganu. Most of the remainder are not known to the author and none are indicated on the map for the other districts of Kelantan.

The typical Thai village is a cluster of thatched or tiled houses - sometimes closely grouped, elsewhere less so - standing amidst fruit and coconut trees on an elevation bordering its rice fields. Some villages consist of more than one such cluster, and these constituent hamlets are then separated from each other and from the parent hamlet and wat by tracts of rice field or meadow (e.g. Samööräg, with three hamlets). Or more than one hamlet may have its own wat (e.g. Maalaj). The closeness of Malay settlement will depend on the terrain. If the plateau or knoll (khoog) on which the village stands is truly marooned in the low-lying rice swamp, or stands on a river bank, the nearest Malay village will never be able to extend to the bounds of the Thai settlement. The older villages are generally characterised by such immunity. The earliest settlements seem generally to have been early enough on the ground to choose the sort of location which allowed seclusion. Once a Thai village is established, no Malay would ever move into it. But a Malay village may reach to the very boundary of the Thai land, as a result of Malay population growth and village extension. All Thai village communities have the sensation of being more or less 'surrounded' by the Malay peasantry.

A Thai village in Kelantan is not, as in central Thailand,⁵ the area defined by a wat, but a distinct and circumscribed ethnic community, whose identity defines the wat rather than the opposite. However, the wat reinforces in turn the sense of community, and by drawing the people constantly

to itself in religious activity strongly inhibits the rise of centrifugal orientations. The exception which rather confirms the rule is the people's orientation through the wat towards fellow Thai Buddhists throughout Kelantan.

The wat involves the whole village, by a system of daily rotation, in the task of preparing food for the monks. It is the scene of most of the Thais' many rituals during the year, including some of animistic ambience.⁶ Certain special ceremonies held at a wat attract villagers from other parts of Kelantan. The chief among such ceremonies is Khaw Phra' (entering monkhood) which unites the whole Kelantan community in merit-making as one village after another takes its turn as host to hundreds of guests from outside. The sponsor of a candidate will invite as many acquaintances as he can from other villages to increase income and his chances of paying for the sponsorship without incurring debt - but the social function overrides the economic. This is apparent even in the smallest village ceremony where no outsiders are invited.

The permanent institutional structure uniting the Kelantan Thai community is the Sangha; the chief wat is at Baan Bangsa'. The monkhood offers the opportunity to young men to visit other villages in the state or in Narathiwat without invitation or special pretext;⁷ monks carry news of developments in other parts of the state more than laymen do. As to the structure of the individual village community, the abbot's office commands deep respect, which is only intensified if the abbot is a man of great personal energy and intelligence. The abbot's leadership can extend well beyond the communal maintenance of the wat to the repair of village roads and bridges, and even to

putting a man's case to the District Officer in some matter requiring the Administration's sympathy. A good abbot therefore usurps notionally some civil functions from would-be lay leadership. The abbots are almost invariably natives of the village where they hold the office.

While the abbot derives his authority from the office itself rather than from external institutional sources, the headman's authority derives far more from the government which created the post than from any traditional status in the community. (And there is no statewide lay leadership). When the government was British the fact of being the government's nominee gave the headman very special authority and some Naajs became known and respected throughout the whole Thai community. Under a Malay government the advantage is negative. The period of British rule was too short, apparently, for the office to become a village institution rivalling the abbot's office for leadership. The rise of such an institution may be inhibited too by the incurable individualism of the Thai farmers.⁸ But it is obvious that such a development is also hamstrung by the fact that the community's natural leaders are reluctant to fill an office that is subject to Malay nomination and direction.⁹ The Naaj Baan's status is made further ambiguous by the fact that a 'Naaj' in Kelantan today is not always a government Penghulu (with an allowance, today, of \$240 p.a.). He may be simply what the Malays call ketua kampong - an unpaid, yet still hardworked, nominee of the Penghulu in a nearby Malay village. The sort of man who will accept this indignity is inevitably one without a strong personality, who lacks reserves of respect in the community. The Naaj at Samörag, for example, is a mere 'ketua' - but at least he has his appointment direct from the Peggawa, whose house is nearer than

the Penghulu's. Government business can, therefore, be transacted one stage higher up the hierarchy.

The administrative structure of Kelantan to which the Thais are subject is distinct from that pertaining to other states of Malaya. A village headman is called 'ketua kampong' as elsewhere, but the Penghulu is responsible for a special, intermediate group of villages or a large village, called a Mukim, and has a correspondingly lower status than the Penghulu elsewhere - however as the equivalent of a high-grade village headship the office has the effect of creating a higher village status where conferred. The next highest unit in Kelantan is the Daerah, under a 'Penggawa' - this corresponds to the 'Mukim' of other states under its Penghulu. Daerah Semerak has six small, Kelantan-type mukims. The highest district below the State (Negeri) is the Jajahan, corresponding to the 'Daerah' elsewhere. The Kelantan District Officer (D.O.) is thus called in Malay 'Ketua Jajahan', not 'Ketua Daerah'.

The Penggawa, in theory, is an important government servant, the D.O.'s delegate in the countryside. He must give his approval for the annual renewal of a lease of government land, and should report illegal squatting. He has the power of arrest of wrong-doers. However, this power has now fallen into disuse, being taken over by the police. This is a welcome protection to many Penggawas at a time when any vigorous law-enforcement can be given a political colour and result in political reprisals - from above in the form of a punitive transfer, or from below in the form of intimidation. The Penggawa's word is no longer decisive in deciding the extension of a lease, for the D.O. himself must defer to a political committee of the local state-assemblymen. He can do nothing about illegal squatting if the squatters are

members of the ruling party. General order in the countryside - which is, in fact, very good by any standards - is guaranteed by the Federal Police.

The district office is the hub of the administration and this is where the politicians go to exercise their power in the day-to-day life of the community. A citizen who does not vote for the present governing party may not expect special favours from the district office, but he will often find an Alliance district secretary or state-assembly candidate there to help him assert his basic rights. Kelantan has the distinction, of course, of being the only state of Malaya still governed by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. (In Trengganu power returned to the Alliance after two years of the P.M.I.P., in 1961). Although state governments have comparatively few powers by any federal standards, one of their preserves is land, which is scarcely an unimportant matter for rice farmers. The P.M.I.P. and its land policy are the institutional expression of that Malay encirclement and menace which Kelantan Thais traditionally, almost instinctively, dwell in fear of.

Thais must go to the district office to pay their land tax and land rent and to distribute land among heirs. Today, the district office handles applications for citizenship on behalf of the Federal Registrar. The D.O. chairs the local language committee which tests applicants. The need to visit the district office arises for most Thais once or twice a year at the least.

The economic system of the Thai village brings about further multiple contacts with the world outside it. This interaction is facilitated by the improved transport system of Kelantan in the present century. Only two villages stand beside a metalled road, and the whole of West Tumpat district

is served only by a network of bumpy laterite roads; but for Bangsa' and Khoog Koo villages in Pasir Mas district laterite roads are supplemented with a train service to Thailand or Kota Bharu. All villages are accessible to motor vehicles, most even in the monsoon. Diesel taxis and regular buses to the district centre or the state capital Kota Bharu ply the laterite as well as the metalled road system, and these services can be reached in a Malay trishaw if the village is a little isolated from them. The author has not heard of any Thai peasant owning a car, but all men own bicycles, which may be used for quite long trips.

It is problematic how far improving transport has actually been instrumental in bringing about the changes which define the present economic system of the Thai village, and the changes in its social patterns. Before there was road transport, Thais of Samörag used to walk across country six miles to the district office at Pasir Puteh. They used to walk or canoe up-coast 18 miles to festivals at Maalaj. Migration across Kelantan in search of new land early in the present century was all on foot, as those who took part in it as children still recall.

The following sequence of development can, however, be inferred. The founding of estates and the building of roads early in this century by British enterprise gave the first chance of employment outside the villages. A small influx of cash brought the possibility of - and a taste for - acquiring the new manufactured or processed articles now appearing in the local markets, from batik sarongs and baju kebaya to china plates, coffee and sugar. Dependence on outside sources of supply (for Samörag this meant the small Malay

market and the few Chinese stores at Cherang Ruku) became established before long, as village weaving and other skills - including the preparation of various specialities in the way of food-stuffs - ceased to be practised. The building of roads, besides offering work to Thais, later allowed the search for more work (which increasing involvement in a cash economy, and changing tastes, necessitated) to extend further afield, but it did not initiate that search (in the sense of providing easier access to the first outside employment that ever became available). The rise of a Chinese urban community created a demand for pork, and pig-rearing became a leading economic activity, providing an important source of income other than employment outside. However, the departure of a steady stream of women to Chinese households as wives, over the years, continued the slow but progressive involvement of the Thais in the process that we call 'social mobilisation': i.e. exposure to new structures and communications of the wider world. Chinese enterprise - as in motorised fishing - today offers steady employment to many Thai men, and since the Second World War many teenage girls have taken work in Chinese households as cooks and baby-minders. The men's employment invariably involves association with Malays too.

Within the village many attest to the more or less willing relaxation of authority by parents - due, perhaps, both to the easing of the struggle to subsist which had once involved every member of the family full-time, and to the increasingly independent outlook of young people having experience of the world outside the village. Religion has been trimmed of some inessentials; there is a rejection of the old blind faith by some men; but spirit ceremonies

are the most prone to decay. The death of the Nopraa drama at Samöörärag in the last 15 years is due to the unwillingness of young men to become the submissive disciples of the Nopraa master for many years, especially when preference and necessity indicate frequent or extended absence from the village in pursuit of cash income. Parents claim to be careful to ascertain the wishes of their children these days before arranging their marriage. In fact many young people choose their partners without their parents' assistance, and seek their parents' intervention only to make the formal approaches and arrangements. Parents say that they are more lenient to young children, who are less respectful than in the past.

In all this, change in the world outside has had a fundamental impact on the economy and various social patterns of the village. Economic change in the village consists, in turn, of ever increasing dependence on the world outside as a supplying and receiving market and as employer. Ever improving transport facilitates and furthers this dependence and multiplies the contacts to which it must give rise. (It must be noted that these contacts include contacts with the other Thai villages of Kelantan, not with the Chinese or Malay communities alone. On his way to some employment far afield a Thai will seek shelter at another village on the way. This is apart from the greater ease of attending festivals at other wat in recent times.)

Yet amidst change, the major economic activity of the Thai remains the cultivation of wet rice. At Samöörärag in good years some families can sell rice outside the village (to local consumers, not to wider markets) but essentially it is grown for personal consumption. Selling rice for cash is

freely attributed to the increased yield under government fertiliser - supplied by the Malay government of Kelantan since Independence. Some Thais at Samöörag still have to buy some rice, even in a good year.¹⁰ Other villages, judging by the size of their houses - e.g. Böqsamed - may have been familiar with rice surplus already in the past. But the richest village, Bangsä', owes its wealth to its rubber, at home and across the Thai border. Many villages, like Samöörag, diversified their economy by fairly intensive pig-rearing. There are no Thai fishing villages: Thais of Samöörag net riverine fish for personal consumption; three others work as van drivers for a Chinese motorised fishing company at Cherang Ruku and Besut, and four more carry boxes at the landing stages; only one Thai in 1967 was a regular member of a fishing crew.

In the years since the war the outside environment has begun to add various services to the manufactured and processed goods and the employment opportunities already offered. There is a money-spinning Indian private doctor at Pasir Puteh who gives injections to Samöörag Thais for most maladies, at \$7-\$8 a time. (When these are ineffective, as they often are, resort is had to one of the medical mōō of the village - whose skill has not demised like so many other village skills.) Village cures or injections are preferred to the hospital service at Kota Bharu or at Kampong Raja (Trengganu). Hospital treatment is either too drastic - involving an amputation or a long stay away from home; or too little convincing, consisting of a few pills without explanation. Nor are the hospital doctors unwilling to send hopeless cases home without treatment, which does their name little good in the countryside.¹¹ However,

the hospital's services continue to be sought in severe cases. There is no objection in principle to operation or transfusion. The hospital takes no fees but a trip entails taxi fares (\$2.80 return to Kota Bharu).

There is a government midwife and a weekly maternity clinic at Cherang Ruku, run by the Federal Ministry of Health. The clinic is attended occasionally by expectant mothers of Baan Samöörag and in emergency the government midwife is called to a birth. But for normal births - which are never properly anticipated, and happen too quickly for the government midwife to be called anyway - the Thai midwife is not only adequate (because very competent) but also preferred for her knowledge of the right protective incantations against the evil spirits which attend the event. The government midwife, moreover, is a Malay, and her presence may complicate or endanger the situation by the admission of Malay spirits. This is the sort of reaction which constantly reminds the observer of the resilience of culture and the Thai identity in the midst of modernisation and a Malay society.

The government's agricultural fertiliser at \$7.7¢ a bag is used as a matter of course. The amount purchased varies from holding to holding. The average at Samöörag seems to be about 3 or 4, where the average holding is 2.025 acres, per each of 72 economic families. The exhausting labour of pounding rice in a huge wooden mortar to remove the husk has yielded without a struggle to machine milling at a Malay cooperative mill in the last 10 years. One Thai at Samöörag now has a small clandestine mill at his house. At Jung Kaw a Thai joined a government-sponsored Coop in the early '50s and has had a fully licensed mill in operation ever since.

Primary Malay education has become accessible to all Thais at some time since the war; even English education is offered up to 5th form (secondary) level at Bachok, Tumpat and Pasir Mas. Adults too old to have been to a primary school may acquire basic Malay literacy in evening courses brought to the village. (Almost all Thai men are basically literate in Thai by the time they leave the monkhood.)

In the last five years a further link with the outside has arisen in the shape of transistor radios. Sam88rag is certainly backward in having no more than five working sets. But a large number of radios would not mean a large accession of new communications, for country Thais rarely understand the Standard Malay or the Standard Thai of radio bulletins and other programmes. Radios when bought, or received from friends or kin in town, tend to fall into disuse and disrepair because they offer too little entertainment or meaningful instruction. This is not to say, however, that an intelligent monk or layman may not pass on information which he has picked up and understood. Most knowledge - and misunderstanding - of world events is in fact traceable to the Malay radio via the coffee shop. Newspapers in Thai villages, if seen at all, are out-of-date copies of Thai papers brought in by travellers.

A traditional link with the outside which has been maintained is meeting the demand of many Malays for Thai medicines and charms. This is one service that the Thais provide rather than receive or buy. Malays will travel a long way to seek the help of a particular m99 or renowned monk. Malays, like Thais, believe in the power of a monk's words to dispel even and deter spirits - although a monk is prohibited to believe in spirits himself. Where

Malay respect differs from the Thai is in being based on a belief in the monks' equal power to do harm. (Whatever its basis, the respect of the Malays may be one factor to explain the Thais' general immunity from interference and intimidation by Malay peasants adhering to the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. cp. Appendix XII, p.286.)

The modern era has been a time of constantly increasing contacts outside the village, entailing dependence on the outside and a sense of belonging to a Kelantan community. But new relationships have involved Chinese and other Thais - and the British (see Chapter III) - as much as the Malays, even though the rural environment is totally Malay and as such a matter for obsessive concern to some Thais. The general growth of contacts with the outside has brought with it, for Samörag, an increase of friendly, daily contact with the surrounding Malays. But cultural assimilation is almost nil. Perhaps the surest test of a community's ability to assimilate is its attitude to inter-marriage and religious conversion. Marriage patterns at Samörag, for one, hardly suggest an imminent Islamicization (but they offer ample evidence of the de-isolation of the village in the present century). To' Thid, a learned and much beloved elder layman of Samörag, discussing the parental role in contemporary marriage-making as he conceives it, observed:

"I will give my daughter to any man of any race who asks for her, provided that:

1. My daughter wants him;
2. He is a good man;
3. He eats pork."

The data given later,¹² make the point in some detail. There is no objection to a non-Buddhist as such but the peculiar and fanatical beliefs of the Malays and the total break which they demand from anyone crossing the line, rule out the arrangement of such unions. The worst part of such a fate would be the inability to continue to do merit. (Eating pork has become symbolic only because the Malays have made a major issue out of it.) Only the socially isolated can make the conclusive, and usually, final break by their own decision and act. Only one woman and six men, to the author's knowledge, were 'lost' to Islam from Samöörärag during the last 50 years, and the woman returned to the village to die. (The present population of the village is 353.)¹³ The Thais are not proud of those who cross over to the Malay community, but on the other hand they are less likely to suppress such information about their brothers and children than a much-married woman is to understate the number of her husbands. Perhaps the fact that a Thai who crosses over is invariably a person without high moral standing in the community in the first place, makes it easier to mention his departure. The strongest pressure to become a Malay has lain in the relative shortage of Thai women in a village such as Samöörärag owing to the popularity of marriage to Chinese at a time when life was still much harder than it is now, and when the sex ratio among the Chinese was out of balance: a popularity clearly evidenced in the statistics. The more feckless sort of Thai would be hard put to it to find a wife and his only resort would be to a Malay village, where even the feckless convert is received with a joyful indulgence. The Thais note with irony that these 'converts' continue to eat pork.

In saying all this we do not wish to shatter the incipient image of a community that is integrating with its environment. In the course of the dissertation it will become clear that ethnic identity is no bar to political integration. On the other hand, a too rapid assimilation to Malay culture, if sensed to be the policy of the Malays, would be sure to put integration into reverse. Religious identity, freedom and security are precisely the preconditions of successful integration.

The marriage data at Appendix III reveal, in striking contrast to the avoidance of a Malay 'fusion', the rise of the Chinese connexion at SamŪrag. Before pursuing further the theme of Thai identity in a Malay world it will be in place to elaborate on this other trend, in the context of a short historical sketch of the Chinese in Kelantan.

The history and sociology of the Chinese of Kelantan, when they come to be written, must give prior attention to the distinction - and interaction - between the 'old' and the 'new' Chinese. In Graham's time¹⁴ the monopoly of the old Hokkien was just beginning to be challenged by an influx of Hailam and others from Singapore, and at Kota Bharu, Kampong China under its Captain ceased to be the only centre of Chinese residence, as the newcomers set up shops in the town proper. Today the 'new Chinese', mostly Hokkien in fact, but speaking their language in an uncorrupt form and far less assimilated to any local cultures, are the majority. The old Hokkien still people Kampong China and a few settlements in the countryside, such as Tanong on the road to Pasir Mas, and the Chinese half of Maalaj (85 houses). They speak Kelantan Malay without an accent (this is noted with surprise by outsiders and is

occasionally held up as a model by politicians) and are very brown-skinned. New Chinese often attribute this to their long residence in Malaya, under a hot sun (!), but the real reason is a strong Thai admixture. If conditions permit it, as at Maalaj, the Chinese are tri-lingual in Hokkien, Malay and Thai. At Tanoong, although they have a Thai abbot, Thai has been lost among the younger people. At Kampong China, Kota Bharu, too, Thai is preferred by the very old ladies but not otherwise.

An 'old Chinese' whose family, by reason of living in a settlement far from a Thai village, or opening land in a completely isolated place, has ceased to use the Thai language, will usually be referred to as 'ciin bog' by the Thais, that is, just 'country Chinese'. (Ethnic Chinese with no Thai blood who have lived in the kampongs for a generation or two, are also 'ciin bog'.) An urban 'old Chinese' who has severed his Thai bonds will at least be called 'ciin Kalantan'. If strong Thai connexions are maintained then he is invariably 'ciin thai' - a Thai-Chinese. (Thai-Chinese are always Theravada Buddhist.)

The Thai-Chinese population came into being in the Bachok, Kota Bharu and Pasir Mas districts some time well before 1900 and was the not unnatural consequence of the absence of women among the very early Chinese immigrants, and the religious bar to Malay women taking Chinese husbands. In the first two or three generations double identity was maintained easily, although to the uninitiated they counted simply as Chinese; the category 'Thai-Chinese' is still today perfectly distinct from 'Thai' and from 'Chinese'. Of course, a Thai-Chinese woman or man could lose this identity

by settling in a Thai village. The monolingual offspring of such a man might still be referred to as 'luug ciin' (best translated as 'a person with a Chinese ancestor') but the grand-children would be completely re-assimilated to the country Thai community. Conversely the Thai part of the identity would be dropped by prolonged settlement far from a Thai village, especially round Kota Bharu. Today the far stronger trend is for country Chinese and Thai-Chinese to become urbanised and merge by marriage and assimilation with the 'new Chinese'.

In contrast to the rural semi-Thai Chinese of the 19th century, the immigrants of the 20th century are urban or semi-urban. This community like the earlier wave, suffered at first from a severe sex-imbalance. Wives were again sought among the Thais and this time among the Thai-Chinese. The search reached into further corners of the state and Samörag village was affected. A village such as Bōpsamed was too prosperous, at least by the 20th century, to respond to any but a few of the latest Chinese requests for wives. Samörag by contrast responded eagerly to the novel opportunity, as the figures bear witness.

It is impossible to fathom what combination of poverty, vanity, autocratic crassness or sheer simplicity, moved those Thai fathers to sell their daughters into the new immigrant society for \$100 or so. Bōpsamed Thais still hold the Semerak Thais in contempt for it and frown at the admixture which results when a Thai widow or divorcee brings her children back to the village to be brought up as Thais.¹⁵ Generally, though, the children of the 20th century marriages grew up in urban Chinese communities cut off from Thai

culture, and no Thai would ever call them 'ciin thaj.'. The wives continue to do merit at their native wat during their lifetime and their husbands are as a rule generous to Thai parents-in-law. Chinese New Year is celebrated at Samöörag with the making of Chinese cakes, which are offered to the Chinese sons-in-law and grand-children when they come visiting on the second day. There is little communication between the two sides because of language difficulties. It is a happy occasion, though. Cash gifts are left for the parents and needy brothers and sisters of the wife. Recently Chinese New Year has brought all the teenage boys and girls back to the village from their employment in Chinese shops and households. The employers of these young people, even if unrelated by marriage, often pay their parents a courtesy visit at this time.

There is no doubt that the many Thai girls who now experience urban life before marriage would like to be the object of a marriage petition from town, to save them from a life of back-breaking agricultural labour. They would make more willing brides than the simple, fearful maidens of the 1920s, making their very first journey outside the village. But the demand for Thai wives seems to have slackened since the war. 20 known marriages of Samöörag women with ethnic Chinese ('ciin trong', or 'ciin myang') were in the 51-60 age-group, approximately; 20 were in the 41-50 age-group; but there were only 11 among the 31-40s and 10 among the 21-30 group. The under-20 group has 7 marriages to Semerak Thais and one to a Thai-Chinese, but none so far to an ethnic Chinese to its account. As the sex-ratio in the Chinese community becomes balanced this development is only to be expected.

Nevertheless, new links with this modern, Malayan, urban elite are always being created through employment. The Chinese like to employ Thais, and, if they marry one, recognise clear obligations in the wife's village. Descendants of the 19th century fusion who are now assimilating to 'new Chinese' society may yet recognise an affinity and certain moral responsibilities attendant upon wealth and political weight. One of the most generous patrons of the Buddhist Order in Kelantan is a Chinese estate owner who is a keen convert to Theravada Buddhism through the proselytizing of the Malayan Buddhist Association and of his wife, an 'old Chinese' native of Kelantan. The ceremonies of Thood Phaa Paa at Samörag and Thood Khathin at Sadang in 1966 were both sponsored by a successful Thai-Chinese business woman and her sister. The direct political significance of Chinese patronage is discussed in Chapters V and VIII. But the chief social role of the Chinese in this century has been to introduce Thais to urban life and employment, which increases substantially the Thais' exposure to outside communications and new values, and their identification with Kelantan's Sino-Malay society, through involvement on favourable terms: economically, through the opportunity to share in some degree in urban prosperity (perhaps more than the Malays); socially, through association with the Malayan urban elite as clients and kinsmen. Village culture too is being constantly modernised¹⁶ - yet not Sinified. Language, to give one example, strikes the observer initially both by the strength of its Malay content and the absolutely minimal influence of Chinese - even at Maalaj, with a Thai-Chinese village next door.

But the Malay influence is no more than skin-deep. The language of Samörag and all the other villages is the Thai of the far south. The author

counted some 151 loan words from Malay (or from English via Malay) at Samörag. Many of these clearly date from the present century and the growth of contacts with a rapidly changing outside world, and describe objects and activities emanating from outside. But there are some important verbs which have completely replaced Thai equivalents, even for everyday actions which have no connection with the modern administration and economy¹⁷. This trend has certainly gone further in Samörag than in any other Thai village. On the other hand, with only one exception Malay words are assimilated completely to Thai phonemes. This has the curious effect with a word such as 'hairan', 'to be surprised', of producing a more 'standard' Malay pronunciation than the Kelantan Malays achieve. The Thais include the final 'n', thus: hajran. (In Kelantan Malay the final 'n' can only be guessed at: haire.) A Malay final 's' becomes stopped 'd' and the accent is put on the second syllable - which is invariably lengthened - so that a word like 'pengeras' - 'doctor's fee' - becomes almost unrecognizable as k(a)raad. The only phoneme adopted from Malay is the aspirate final in a word such as 'memerentah', 'to have the running of' (a piece of land), which Semerak Thais as well as local Malays pronounce as rãth^h. This is probably a recent borrowing, made possible by incipient bi-lingualism.

The tonal characteristics of the unique Samörag and Maalaj dialect were described earlier.¹⁸ It is natural to speculate that the drastic simplification of the tones and the apparent elements of syntactical intonation may be a product of a centuries-long contact situation. Such contact certainly never occurred at Samörag, where nearby Malay settlement dates largely from

the British period. But Maalaj, upcoast, from whence the Samööräg Thai on linguistic evidence surely migrated, is much less isolated from the Malays and could have a long history of contact with that community. Yet why should vocabulary remain overwhelmingly southern Thai (complete with tell-tale Chiangmai words), and phonemes yield scarcely a point? Whatever the validity of the author's analysis of the tonal situation, there is no question but that the language of the most remote and probably oldest Kelantan Thai group is Thai.

Near bi-lingualism has become common amongst the men of Samööräg but is rare amongst the women, who are more likely to know some Hokkien as a second language. However, young girls who now attend Malay school are becoming fluent Malay speakers. Malay is never spoken by Thai to Thai.

The reasons why Samööräg women speak little Malay, even though the village is cut off from other areas of Thai settlement, are to be sought in the following facts. Samööräg is encircled on two sides by its river and is separated from the market and village of Cherang Ruku by sandy scrub land a mile across which in the past no woman dared to cross for fear of tigers and thieves; only on the western side (Baan Tog) has the recent extension of Kampong Lembah brought Malay houses almost into the Thais' back gardens - see map, page 70 - with fairly regular opportunities for conversation with Malays who pass the time of day on their way to and from market. The only Malays who stop regularly in the other two sections, Baan Klaang and Tham Phaj, are two women who hawk cakes and the men who fetch down coconuts with the help of a monkey. Recent building by PMIP members on the scrub-land

south of the wat does not bring about contact since, apart from mutual distaste, these Malays have no business in the Thai village and to reach the market have to walk in the opposite direction. In general, to meet Malays, a Thai woman at Samöörärag must walk to the market a mile away - but her husband is more likely to buy necessities on his bicycle, and there is a village shop anyway for most things. If she does go to Cherang Ruku she won't have any taste for idle chatter with Malay women whom she may inwardly distrust and fear. Indeed she will probably do her shopping with a Chinese grocer. Almost the whole of social life for a woman centres on the wat - except that once or twice a year she may attend a festival at another Thai village. Only the men-folk receive and accept invitations to Malay feasts on the occasion of weddings and rites of adolescence (masok Jawi) - at \$1 a seat! The few women of Samöörärag who speak Malay fluently have learnt it while married to Chinese shopkeepers in other parts of Kelantan. The teenagers who now find domestic work in the towns do not experience contact with the Malays and their language - they overleap, as it were, the rural environment. It is only the under-13s who meet their Malay contemporaries by attending school at Cherang Ruku.

In summary, the physical situation of Baan thaj Samöörärag makes it a more sequestered place than any other Thai village in Kelantan, and thus it is not excessively more prone to Malay contacts than the great Thai concentrations of Tumpat district. The Malays are closer here than they are to the Thais of Baan Naj or Jung Kaw, but there is scarcely more mixing for Samöörärag Thais who stay at home. This contradicts the author's original

surmise¹⁹ that Samöörag would be more subject to contact with the Malay world than other villages. Culturally, Samöörag feels itself to be distinct from its surrounding environment but integral to the scattered Thai community of the state, notwithstanding considerable social interaction between Thai men and Malays on a footing of economic and social equality and a growing ease of association through bi-lingualism.

Intelligent Malays who know the Thais as work-partners and are even aware of some of their festivals, will say generously but sincerely, "They are like us". Seen from within a Thai village, however, there is a world of difference between the purposeful serenity of a community doing merit at the wat and in many small ways, confident of the ultimate goal of successive birth and death; and the warring, factional, irrational Malay mass outside, stealing to do merit (there is more theft during Ramadan and the Thais equate this month, and the Hari Raya which concludes it, with their own great occasions of merit-making), murdering their rivals, divorcing their wives at whim, declaring belief in a God whom none can describe and few obey. The Thai wat and its village are an oasis of calm to the Thais and to anyone who is accepted into the community. Buddhism it is above all that identifies the Thais, and the wat ensures the perpetuation of that identity. Buddhism, if not immune to change, is generally not subject to decay in the way that animistic practices and beliefs are. Even the sparsely populated wats of the present time are sometimes welcomed on the ground that the monks of today are never parasites, but do merit because they really want to.

Change in many things, chiefly reflecting change and modernisation in the

outside world, has been familiar long enough to be accepted without protest. But the Thais would not admit that the changes have been in essentials. The Buddhist religion flourishes uncorrupted - if not always perfectly understood; and the doing of merit and belief and participation in the progression through death to rebirth are what define a Thai above all. In answer to the question (which was meant rather in a political sense): "How do you see the situation in 10 years' time? Do you think there will still be Thais here?" the author time and again received the answer: "As long as the wat are here there will be Thais."

If the wat disappear there can no longer be Thais in Kelantan. As long as the wat survive, the villages in which they stand will be Thai. This is a matter of simple fact and logic. At present the primary condition for the existence and continuance of a Thai community in Kelantan is fulfilled: a spontaneously flourishing Buddhism.

Nevertheless it is possible to conclude with an account of a significant level of integration with an environment traditionally considered so hostile. In this chapter we are interested in general social identification rather than integration with particular political structures and 'modes'. (These latter aspects of integration certainly have a bearing on the wider identification; but, constituting a sufficient theme of their own, they will be discussed later, notably in Chapter V.) Now general social identification is expressed and can be identified in more than one way. A strong sense of natural

political equality stems both from immemorial residence and from the experience of equal status under British administration (see Chapter III). A sense of natural equality, if not frustrated, assists a sense of identity with the state and society of Kelantan. Another factor for identification in recent times has been economic mobilisation through the Chinese relationship, bringing both awareness of the wider Kelantan community and an acceptable socio-economic status within it. This we have related, but what of assimilation to the local Malay community? This is a case where 'charity' must begin 'at home'. No amount of identification with the 'wider' Kelantan community can be taken to constitute a Kelantan identity without the strong foundation of a positive relationship with the immediate environment, the local Malay neighbourhood.

Most striking is the welcome given to Malay education as a means to a greater viability in relations with the administration and the market. The welcome to primary schooling for Thai children is stronger among those with outside experience than those who stay at home - and this means, in effect that the women are the less enthusiastic, being the more superstitious group and the main carriers of anti-Malay beliefs (as in the matter of child-birth). It is the mother who will readily believe her son's complaint that Malay boys at school bully him; and the father who will exert considerable pressure, not excluding physical violence, to make the boy continue at school till he is basically literate. The sensation of being closed in by Malay society is still basic to the community's universe and is inculcated in small children but it is associated at maturity with values for self-respect through a pragmatic, out-going adaptation, not values for a fearful withdrawal or defensive

isolation.²⁰ Thai boys of 17 or so at Samöörag seemed to like to demonstrate their independence of parental and cultural restraints by cultivating Malay friends of their own age in the district. Some of them develop a convincing Malay personality for the purpose and duration of these contacts: cocky, self-assured, irreverent. In the smaller Thai settlements²¹ where there is no government-appointed Naaj and no monk, one finds a de facto lay leadership in the persons of intelligent, bi-lingual men who have cultivated the assertive, even domineering personality of the Malay rustic boors - when they speak to Malays but not otherwise.²² These men by their adaptation fill an intermediary role between the community and the Malay world (including the District Office).²³ They are the agents of the Thais' capacity to prosper happily even as an out-numbered minority in a Malay society.

Adults of both sexes have taken advantage of the three-year adult literacy classes brought into the villages by the Ministry of Rural Development, and twelve men of Samöörag are now entitled to hang the certificate of completion and satisfactory achievement on their walls. The young Malay teacher who had taken the course at Samöörag wat in the evenings told the author that the Thais were his best pupils - their previous literacy in Thai helps them to pick up the new Roman alphabet of Malay faster than the average Malay beginner. This teacher also appreciated his Thai pupils for their consideration in bringing melons and rice to his house.

This is the sort of courtesy and mutual regard which become familiar after one has stayed for some time in a Kelantan Thai community. The Thais complain loud and frequently about the land and citizenship laws. At Samöörag they resented the snooping and malice which they experienced from certain

quarters when the Europeans arrived in the village. Malay curiosity at any time they regard as a tiresome and disconcerting trait of that race. Ancient racial antipathy and fear sometimes break surface, particularly among the Thai women. But with this ancient antipathy goes a stoical acceptance born of long familiarity; and a man who condemns the Malays in one breath is capable of doing them credit with the next, for having 'improved' in the last generation. As a small boy he might have been tormented by Malay bullies when he left the village, even under the eyes of his mother. As a young man he saw Malays spit on the ground in disgust as he went by on his way to hunt wild boar. The attitude of the Malays in Semerak district has generally become more tolerant. It is also certain that the Thais themselves have become more tolerant. Primitive fear of the Malay peasant as a vicious and unpredictable alien began to give way among the men to a certain acceptance, turning to friendliness, towards Malays who took work alongside Thais or took their turn at the District Office, and were seen to be just poor, ordinary peasants like the Thais themselves.²⁴

When one considers all the signs of the mellowing of Malay society in the course of its modernisation, the intolerance of P.M.I.P. rule seems an unreality or an aberration. The truth is that the Semerak Thais seem to locate favourable Malay attitudes in the Cherang Ruku area, among Malays who became more modernised in the middle and later British period and came into contact with the Thais through the motorised fishing industry. These Malays today support U.M.N.O. More traditionally-minded Malays still despise the Thais for keeping pigs, but it is also possible that traditional respect

for Thai medicine and charms modifies the sort of hard attitude to the 'fakir' which Islam and P.M.I.P. tenets dictate. In any case, political mobilisation by the P.M.I.P. was initially in response to the alien Chinese menace, not to the familiar and long-established Kelantan Thai.

A telling incident, reflecting the growth of tolerant attitudes, was witnessed by the author's wife at the Cherang Ruku weekly maternity clinic. Two Thai ladies attending for pre-natal advice surprised all the Malay women present when they produced red (alien) identity cards for the nurse to copy down their names. "Why have you got red cards? You have always lived here like us! Just think, if they had given us red cards!" exclaimed two of the Malay patients. At Baan Maalaj Malays fill vacant places in the Thai Nopraa orchestra. In all districts Malays invite numbers of Thai men to their wedding feasts and were it not certain that Malays would be deterred by fear of pork, a few Malay friends would certainly be invited to Thai weddings, and without the economic motive which characterises the Malay wedding invitations: the Thai wedding is not structured for large-scale catering and profit. But many Malays are invited to the Khaw Phra' (monk-entering). Although the economic motive in this case is strong (a Malay makes a good guest, Thais will say wryly, because he pays a dollar and only touches the biscuits and bananas) it is just as much a courtesy symbolising for both sides a common identity and interdependence as Kelantan country folk. The Thais recognise Malay friendship when they see it, and are ever willing to reciprocate. We will conclude with a touching example. In March 1967, Samörag landowners gave generous cuts of well over the standard 8:40 harvested sheaves to their poor Malay harvesters. This was done out of genuine gratitude and pity in view of the exceptionally scorching harvest weather of that year.

FOOTNOTES

1. Federation of Malaya, Department of Statistics, Population Census 1957, Kuala Lumpur, 1959; Report No. 10, State of Kelantan; Table 5, p.9.
2. Ibid., p.9.
3. The author's count for this district in January 1967 was 624. He excludes from this figure 15 'lung ciin': people with a Chinese father or of Thai-Chinese descent (for definition see infra p. 65) who, living as members of a Thai community, are already by upbringing, or are becoming by adoption, indubitably Thai; but who carry a Chinese name on their birth-certificate and identity-card. Such persons are fairly certainly counted as Chinese by government census-takers.
4. Population Census 1957, op.cit., pp.9-10.
5. Particularly the village of Bang Chan immortalised in the writings of the Cornell Modern Thailand Project. The villages in Kelantan are thus more like their counterparts in the north: c.p. Michael Moerman, "Ban Ping's Temple: the Centre of a 'Loosely Structured' Society", in: Manning Nash, ed., Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism, Yale Cultural Report Series, No.13, 1966; p.138.
6. See Appendix II, p. 256 , for a list of these rituals at the village of Samöbrag. N.B. rituals vary from one village to another. Maalaj rituals are nearly identical with Samöbrag (and as such are part of the evidence of a historical connexion) but this is exceptional.
7. Out of 79 living men of Samöbrag eligible to be or have been monks, only 5 have not been. But there is a trend to shorter sojourns in the Order, so that while the 38 living laymen of the village who were in the monkhood before the war were so for an average of 4.71 years, the 34 who entered since the war stayed for an average of 2.64 years each. Until the war there was a second wat at Samöbrag. The wat inmates by then had become too few to merit maintaining two establishments. The modern trend, so far as it is established, to a shorter monkhood, may be due to the relatively greater freedoms and pleasures of the life of the young layman compared to former times.
8. Few groups were ever observed among the men of Samöbrag unless based on close kinship, although women are brought together in more stable association by the rotation of temple duty among groups of houses. It is noticeable in a Thai village how elderly parents are often accommodated by their own choice in a separate house rather than in the houses of the adult children even if those children have to carry food to the parent each day because he or she is no longer strong enough to prepare it alone. The old folk prefer the freedom of eating at times of their own choosing, and being master in their own house, however small. As members of an

extended household they would be too conscious of their children's hospitality. Extended households are not exceptional, but not the only rule where elderly parents survive. Young married couples try as a rule to establish a separate household and by the same token unmarried uncles and brothers live independently and fend for themselves. At Samörag, out of 84 houses 11 were the houses of elderly people living separately from the extended household to which they could have attached themselves if they had so wished - a step which they are constantly urged by their children to take. For purposes of the rice economy, however, these old folk do belong to extended families and are indeed normally the titular owners of the family's land. From this point of view there are 72 families (rice-producing units) large and small in a village of 353 souls, sharing rice land totalling 145 acres 779 dēpa according to the author's calculation.

9. The question of leadership is discussed and analysed in full in Chapter VI.
10. But even a Samörag family which is almost landless will have no difficulty in obtaining a lease of neighbours' rice land. No one seems to regard the rent of $1/3$ of the harvest, or $1/2$ if the owner supplies fertiliser, buffalo, etc., as onerous. The Thais call this kind of lease 'phuwaag' (from Malay pawah).
11. c.p. Rosemary Firth's similar findings among the Malays, published in Housekeeping among Malay Peasants, London, 1966; p.198.
12. Appendix III, p. 260 . A note on divorce in the community is appended, as well as an explanation of the method of collecting the data.
13. This figure includes 7 with Chinese names on their identity cards.
14. W. A. Graham, o.cit. p.20.
15. There are however one or two cases of returned widows continuing to send their children to the local Chinese (Mandarin) school if there is one.
16. One obvious effect of urban employment is that Thai girls of Samörag always wear modern frocks and dresses when they go to town, a habit which has only just begun to appear among Malay girls - and then only the most daring and ostentatious of them - in Semerak district. (At Kota Bharu, incidentally, short skirts are now (1967) quite a common sight among Malay girls, but the author never saw such a thing in 1963 while he was resident in Kota Bharu. Rosemary Firth's comment on urban dress in 1963, if it refers to short skirts, is difficult to account for - see Rosemary Firth, op.cit., p.202). Within the Thai village, habits of dress are also distinct from Malay patterns in certain ways. See Appendix IV, p.264.
17. See Appendix V for a list of loan words. (p.266)

18. See Preface, pp. 10-11.
19. See Preface, p. 13.
20. A few years ago Khy Muag, a Sam⁸rag lady of about 50, was suddenly stricken with a terrible swelling of the cheek and jaw. Characteristically, it was blamed on a spell exercised by a Malay whose house she had recently passed on the way to market. With equally characteristic aplomb, however, the Thai m⁹⁹ prescribed a poultice of pig's dung to drive the Malay spirits from Khy Muag's face. The author may also be permitted to mention how his own daughter, aged 3, learned two contrary roles in relation to the Malays. With her playmates in the village she would scatter and hide trembling behind trees when Malays approached; but she liked to accept the invitation of the author's 'landlord' and general assistant ⁸ K⁹⁹ to ride on the back of his bicycle to market and "look at the Malays" (pai l⁸⁸ kh⁸⁸g) in the coffee shop or "see the Malays playing ball". (The self-assurance which this requires comes, of course, much later for Thai children.)
21. Specifically, Batu Balai, Pog Kiang, Khaw Joon, of those known to the author.
22. They truly dominate even an exchange of courtesies on the road, by mastering the trick of asking the first question about destination when a Malay approaches and continuing the interrogation till he has passed and is out of earshot again. Thereby you prevent the Malay from getting in a question edgeways and finding out where you are going. If he does manage to ask, you anyway tell him a lie - another Malay art which stands this sort of Thai in good stead. (NB. This may seem defensive but it is a normal form of social interaction between Malays.)
23. Behaviour relating to political and governmental structures is described at Chapter V.
24. An odd feature of Thai statements about Malay intimidation is that they so often refer to other villages than the informant's own. When one enquires at the other village in question one finds that the Malays there behave themselves acceptably. This distorted impression of the circumstances of other villages may arise from the fact that Thais often visit them only on the occasion of a monk-entering, when large numbers of Malays converge on the monastery for the entertainments or just to wonder at the heathen spectacle. These Malays are not by any means all from the neighbourhood of the wat holding the ceremony. Occasionally there are trouble-makers among them and clashes can arise between these elements and drunken Thais.

CHAPTER III = HISTORICAL

The curious outsider is not alone in wondering how and when the Thais came to Kelantan. The question is often posed by the people themselves, and has many times been posed in the past. It is not a new fashion, brought to life by Thai nationalism or stimulated by the pretensions of the modern Malay state. It is therefore significant that no Thai has, or claims to have, any knowledge of the epoch in which the Thais first entered Kelantan, and the manner of their coming. These matters are beyond tribal memory. There is at Samörag a tradition that their ancestors were sent "from Bangkok", or from Sukhothai, to catch a white elephant which had escaped. They were not to return without the elephant, on pain of death. This story is treated quite frankly by the Samörag folk as a legend which one can believe or reject according to taste. But they do support the idea of a Bangkok origin by saying that Bangkok and Samörag Thais understand each other remarkably well,¹ whereas with Nakhorn there is unintelligibility.

Of all the Kelantan Thai villages, Samörag and Maalaj, speaking an identical, partly intoned (rather than tonal) dialect, and isolated in identical positions 3/4 mile up the Sungai Semerak and Sungai Kemasin respectively, are the most likely candidates for a martial origin. Samörag guards the approaches from Trengganu admirably. Maalaj, likewise accessible to ships, threatens and dominates the Bachok district. If their unique dialect is not the product of long isolation, or contact with the Malay language at Maalaj following a move from lower Patani (Samörag being in this case a later colonisation from Maalaj) then the twin settlement might have involved settlers originally from another frontier region where a linguistic contact situation

had arisen; or from a subjugated ethnic group whose assimilation to Thai was incomplete at the moment of the migration. An isolated migration across great distances such as this, would suggest government initiative and a military or imperial purpose (although soldiers could also be recruited in the 'Narathiwat' area and despatched by sea southwards to their new location). The legend of the elephant hunt would appear to strengthen the supposition of official inspiration.

Whatever the case, there is no tradition here of a martial or empire-building role. On the contrary, the pride of the Samörag Thais is in their ancestors' lonely pioneering and many generations of survival unprotected and unsponsored by Thai power. They remember no rule but Malay rule.

All Thais of Kelantan who have given the matter thought agree, however, in regarding the Maalaj-Samörag group as the most ancient settlement. It is also agreed that Tumpat was the earliest and nuclear settlement among the northern villages, with Baan Naj remaining the chief wat till about 1920. Again, no one can set a date to the northern settlement (with the exception of Bangsü', probably early 19th Century, and Sadang, late 19th Century), and there is no imperial tradition. In this case, however, although the nuclear migration can hardly have been later than 150 years ago (given the lack of any knowledge of its epoch) the lack of any imperial tradition is more likely to be due to a genuine lack of any such original purpose,² than to a loss of memory with the passage of many generations (which might apply to Maalaj and Samörag). For language leaves little doubt that the Thai villages of Tumpat district represent two main, gradual extensions of settlement from lower Patani.³ Piece-meal extension is also invited by the terrain, and the uniform type of (Malay)

political system on either side of the Golok river. Piecemeal extension from one territory to another virtually identical with it is, incidentally, not conducive to the establishment of any tradition at all of the era of settlement.

An inspection of the physical map of Kelantan shows that the line of the Golok River chosen for a boundary by the negotiators of 1908-9,⁴ while no doubt correct in broad principle as the line dividing the kingdom of Patani from Kelantan, does not constitute a sharp point of geographical discontinuity. The Kelantan plain is made up of two distinct river systems, that of the left bank and that of the right, separated by an independent river, the Sungai Kelantan, which is unrelated to either. The left bank area is roughly defined by the districts of Tumpat, Pasir Mas and Tanah Merah, the right bank by the districts of Kota Bharu, Bachok and Pasir Puteh. Nearly the whole of the surplus waters produced by the left-bank plain flow not into the Kelantan River, which owes its size and force to the Ulu, but north and westwards to the Golok. The waters of Kota Bharu, Bachok, and Pasir Puteh meander indecisively and tend to stagnation, but their ultimate destination is the sea at Sabak, at Maalaj (Sungai Kemasin) and Semerak (Sungai Semerak). The existence of two distinct segments of the Kelantan plain can be invoked, incidentally, to justify the epithet 'isolated' for Semerak and Maalaj. But here it was intended rather to show that the left bank, the chief area of Thai settlement, is not geographically integral to Kelantan and is easily accessible by foot or up the various tributaries of the Golok. (c.p. map p.49).

A third group of villages is: Baan Bangsã', Baan Khoog Koo and Baan Thaa Song, all three situated on the banks of the Sungai Lemal. Their dialect has

the eccentric 'wobbliness' of Taag Baj in the most pronounced form of all the Kelantan villages, and were this not enough, the map only allows one assumption about their origin: this was a slow migration inland from Taag Baj. There is agreement among the Thai that Bangsã' is comparatively new (this still might mean at least 150 years old) and at Bangsã' itself some people believe that Thaa Song is older, although further upstream, and was the source of the Bangsã' ancestors.⁵ That such a hypothesis would involve a 'retreat' is not incongruous. The settlement of the Kelantan Thais should not be imagined as a planned advance into new territory, ever onward with ne'er a look back. The search for land can lead in any direction, to whatever land is discovered for the purpose the searcher has in mind. The Bangsã' Thais early in this century themselves branched out in two contrary directions, attracted by the prospect of rubber planting. One group struck south-east to Khaw Joon on the Trengganu border (today a village of 23 houses); another went 'back' to Tanjong Balek near Sungai Golok town, on the Thai side of the frontier. (The wealth of Bangsã' today is attributed to the rubber holdings across the border). Men of Baan Jang,⁶ probably in the latter half of the 19th century, used to cross the Kelantan River to hunt wild pig in the jungles of Gunong, and were attracted to some cultivable rice land where they established a new village, Baan Sadang. Early this century, a new generation from Baan Sadang set up a hamlet in the hills behind Seligi and planted rubber (Thai: Ligii; 10 houses). Shortly before the Second World War groups from Samãrag and Khaw Joon set up a hamlet at a place further south still called Bakat. When this became untenable in some way as a result of the Japanese occupation, a further move was made to Batu Balai on the main Trengganu road, some 12 miles south of Jerteh,

in 1947, and rubber was planted. In the intervening period the original 20 houses have diminished to 10, and the rest having migrated to Narathiwat. Batu Balai will be the last and the southernmost Thai settlement on the Malayan east coast, barring the success of a petition for land in Ulu Kelantan.⁷

Perhaps the most interesting settlement of all in the 20th century is Pog Kiang near Kampong Raja, Besut. This was neither a case of further 'penetration' nor of 'retreat' by Kelantan Thais but of original pioneering from Thailand. Four men from the village of Pron (now in Narathiwat) came into Kelantan about the year 1900 to practice their arts, and, crossing over to Trengganu, found some land going for the asking. In the course of a few years seven more men of Pron were attracted to the place and it slowly and painfully became productive of coconuts and rice. In the end, only the son of one of the pioneers stuck it out - Caw Dĕng, now aged 86; his father and all the original older generation of Pron men returned to Thailand, and Dĕng only remained in order to defy the ridicule of his kinsmen. Meanwhile the settlement survived with new blood from Samĕrag, at least three later migrants from Pron (a man and two women, still alive) and three ethnic Chinese. There are now 18 houses. The dialect is as at Samĕrag. Caw Dĕng and the three other Pron migrants have lost their original accent.

The manner of Pog Kiang's founding and survival illustrates as well as any other example the haphazard and uncertain nature of colonisation. It may also be symbolic of the way Kelantan as a whole was originally colonized by Thais (if we can rely upon the evidence of language, geography, and these recent historical movements): by isolated and unconcerted acts of enterprise

on the part of Patani farmers. Only Samörag and Maalaj by their strategic location, and the missing regimental elements mentioned by Graham suggest that strategic settlement was pursued for Kelantan at any time at all.⁸ Colonisation from Patani was probably mostly complete by the early 19th Century but there was one example as late as 1900. The earliest date and the main period of entry cannot even be guessed at. The earliest possible date would depend on the date of settlement of the first nucleus of Thais in the Nara area.⁹

Although there may have been occasional settlements of soldiers at times across the centuries - and Maalaj and Samörag, if any, are candidates for such a role¹⁰ - the memory of it has been lost. This puts all the Kelantan Thai settlements on an equal footing in relation to the state of Kelantan. They have no imperial tradition, no trait of arrogance in their political culture. This is at once a possible form of evidence for, and is explained by, the circumstances of settlement in the state; the very late assertion of Thai suzerainty; and the fact that even when in the late 19th century suzerainty began to change into a form of control at Kota Bharu,¹¹ the Kelantan Thais were neither agents nor beneficiaries of this suzerainty. Today it is not as conquerors that they claim their rights in Kelantan but as pioneers who by their own courage and labour opened up land. The Malays were always the majority, and the Thais depended on their good graces for survival, not on the power of Thailand. The Malay nature of rule at Semerak, for instance, comes out clearly from the accounts of old people, even on the eve of the British take-over, i.e. at the height of Siam's pretensions in the state.

That 'rule' was characterised by insecurity for all peasants, of whatever race. There was no security or redress against raiding parties who crossed

over from Trengganu and stole women, so said an old Thai-Chinese of Cherang Ruku, Tom Booi. The penggawas and penghulus were Malay, although there was once a Thai who was promoted Penggawa by the Sultan for his remarkable ability to snap a board in two with a single blow. Thais were in Malay service and not vice-versa. At Cherang Ruku at century's end there was a Thai mpp (a native of Boosamed) who kept the elephants of the local raja. In the old days, before the British introduced land rent, the Malay officials used to come and count the harvest and take a proportion in tithe. No Thai officials or Thai soldiers figure in the recollections of that time. Maalaj offers an exception which proves the rule. It was the son of the old Thai-Chinese Tom Booi of Cherang Ruku who told the following story.

Tom Booi's grand-father was a famous Thai of Maalaj, Datok Misai Merah (to the Thais nuad dääng), who became hulubalang to the Raja Muda of Kemasin. There was war between Raja Bukit of Bukit Marak and the Raja Muda of Kemasin. Kemasin was the prize Raja Bukit hoped to win and annex. As the two sides closed in combat 12 horsemen in black sent by the King of Thailand suddenly intervened and shouted, "Don't fight, we are on your side!" There was confusion, as neither side was sure which side the horsemen referred to, and the fighting stopped. After this the Thai authority relieved the Rajas of their authority and appointed Malay 'Longs' (luang) in their place.

Incidents like this¹² brought a rare demonstration of the power of the Thai king, but let us note that a local Thai figure was here in the service of the Malay royalty and that the reported result of the war was a reorganisation of authority using Malays, not Thais. Malay rule was in the order of things. Indeed at the end of the century not all English observers could agree

that Siam's authority over the state, even then, was everything that the protagonists of a British forward policy claimed. Mr. Beckett, the acting Consul in Bangkok, sent to investigate an allegation that Siam was using the hunt for the Pahang rebels as an opportunity to strengthen her influence,

"recorded [writes Eunice Thio]¹³ the 'feebleness' amounting practically to 'non-existence' of Siamese authority in Kelantan and Trengganu. Siam, he said, was reluctant to take strong measures against the Malay chiefs to compel their cooperation in the capture of the Pahang men, because she was afraid of alienating an obedience which was purely nominal."

This feebleness is attested further by the inability of the Siamese Commissioner to prevent the Raja from signing away vast tracts of the state to an adventurer like Duff.¹⁴ The Agreement of 1902 was therefore a British attempt to make Siam's authority felt where it had been lacking before, besides being, in the not very long run, the wedge to open the way to a British advance.¹⁵

The relevance that is here claimed for the Kelantan Thais' long experience of Malay political dominance is two-fold (further dimensions will be discussed later).¹⁶ The Thais' political relationship to the Thai kingdom was indirect and tenuous, mediated by the vassal system: such absence of a tradition of Thai rule is a negative, but in no way insignificant, factor for later integration with a modern Malay sovereign state. The long establishment of Thai culture in Kelantan, on the other hand (predating Malay settlement in some districts), gives a sense today of the rightfulness of their presence in the state. This too is potentially integrative, albeit long settlement in the proximity of Malays, prior to modern times, seems to have bred attitudes largely of fear and distrust towards the latter community. The integrative

potential appears from statements such as: "There will always be Thais in Kelantan". This is not an expression of blind political confidence, but rather a normative, ideological statement, meaning: "There ought to be Thais here because it is our right". The sense of being people of Kelantan is one reason for the keenness to get Malayan citizenship when it was offered, first between 1950 and 1952, and later, between 1957 and 1958: Thais in several villages took out citizenship, as they informed the author, "To be considered natives of here." It can be argued that there is an economic motive, in that citizenship confers the right to inherit land. But the ancestral land in turn symbolizes the validity and dignity of the claim to recognition and membership in Kelantan.

This claim to membership of Kelantan, and to the rights which are due to loyal subjects, was eloquently expressed on the Samöörag Thais' behalf by a Malay petition-writer in July 1966. The occasion was a petition to the Mentri Besar not to withdraw the Thais' Temporary Occupation Licences to certain rice land.¹⁷ The preamble read as follows:

"Ada-lah kami² yang bertanda tangan di-bawah ini memaalomkan kepada Datok, sungguh kami² di-sebut se-bagai bangsa Siam tetapi bagi-mana-kah keadaan di Negri Siam itu, kerna kami telah beberapa tapis lama nya dari datok-nenek-moyang kami bertaat stia di Negri Kelantan ini dan pun perkataan BANGSA SIAM ITU, hanya tinggal sebagai perkataan sebutan sahaja lagi, dengan kerna itu-lah kami² ini sebenar² nya Warga Negara Tanah Melayu yang menumpukan taat stia nya di Negri Kelantan ini dari sejak datok nenek moyang kami lagi, maka dengan kerna itu se-imbang lah kami dengan orang² Melayu yang taat stia kepada Negri nya." 18

It is a paradox, perhaps, of the Thais' historical experience, that a certain potential for national integration has been passed down from a period in which contact and integration were minimal. The British period that we

we shall describe below was one of rapidly growing contact and political integration, yet the legacy is more often in the form of cultural obstacles to further integration.

To complete the picture of the Malay historical environment of the Kelantan Thai, let us briefly consider the conditions in 'Narathiwat' (the modern equivalent of the petty Malay states of Saiburi, Raman and Rangae). If this area was Malay when the Thais first pushed across the Golok into Kelantan, it was scarcely less so in the late 19th Century. There is no case for suggesting that, for all its uncertainty in Kelantan, Thai power was in some sense poised at the border and therefore an implicit reality in the situation of the Kelantan Thai. This is very important indeed, because it might be objected that villages nearer the border than Samöörag would be far less isolated from Thai government than the author's generalisation has claimed. For all Siam's closer control over the Seven States, they lived like Kelantan under their own rulers and customs¹⁹ and the whole of Patani was an area of endemic revolt. Indeed the division of Patani into seven segments²⁰ was the Siamese reaction to a serious revolt of 1790. By the time of the tours of Chulalongkorn,²¹ administrative reorganisation had brought the Monthon and the Changwat as far as Songkhla but no further south. The Phra'jaa Ngongcig might receive funds to build a temple wherein to drink the water of allegiance²² on home ground, but there was no sense that the new assertion of Thai control - it was experienced as a new trend in Patani as in Kelantan, albeit taking off from a slightly more advanced stage of existing supervision - was unanswerable or in the proper order of things. Eunice Thio states:

"As Siamese officers took over the collection of revenue and the exercise of jurisdiction, the Raja of Patani complained to the authorities in Singapore and asked for British protection. In February 1899 the Raja of Sai similarly protested against the action of Siamese officers in his state and expressed a desire to settle in Perak." 23

A communication from the British Minister at Bangkok, Becket, to Foreign Secretary Grey, dated 8th October 1908,²⁴ (in connection with the Anglo-Siamese negotiations for the Malay states) forwards a report from the British Vice-Consul at Songkhla, W. A. R. Wood, that this gentleman was being besieged by petitioners for British protection. Wood claimed to have been asked to become Raja himself!

As to its population Patani was still - and is still today - like Kelantan, part of the Malay world. Pallegoix's opinion that by the middle of the 19th century Siamese had become a majority in the area,²⁵ should be compared critically with the figures in the 1960 Census,²⁶ which still shows for Changwat Narathiwat an Islamic population of 208, 098, as against 55,122 Buddhists. (However, the latter figures should not be allowed to obscure the extent to which Narathiwat has been incorporated into the modern Thai state since 1909. If the Kelantan Thai identify in a limited way politically with Thailand, it may be due - see Chapter VII - to change across the border: but change subsequent, not prior, to 1909).

A small irritation attending the transfer of Kelantan suzerainty to Britain in 1909 was the alleged attempts of the Siamese government to prevent emigration from areas like Legoh and Kuala Tabal which had newly come under Siamese control as part of the rationalisation of the boundary, and to attract Kelantanese into Siamese territory under false pretences.²⁷ Peel, British

Minister at Bangkok, noted that such allegations, if true, would represent an infraction of the provisions whereby "no man should be made to suffer in person or property for preferring his old allegiance."²⁸ The allegations could not be substantiated by enquiries from the Thailand side. What is certainly clear is that any attempts to restrain Malays from migrating met with almost uniform failure, and Kelantan was positively embarrassed by the flood. Phya Sakdi Seni, the High Commissioner for Patani, on arriving at Kuala Tabal to take over the district for Thailand, found that "by far the greater number of the young and able inhabitants of the district had fled across the Golok river, on it becoming known that they were about to fall under Siamese rule."²⁹ From the Kelantan side Mason reported that: "Thousands of Malays have left Tabal district and are now being settled in the upper reaches of the Golok in Kelantan territory..."³⁰ "I am settling them as well as I can".³¹

The principle that "no man should be made to suffer...for preferring his old allegiance" was incorporated into the treaty with specific regard to subjects of his Siamese Majesty who might wish to remove themselves from Malay rule or British protection in the ceded territories.³² It was certainly not anticipated on the British side that there would be a mass exodus nor that any British Adviser would ever contemplate restraining such voluntary migration if it occurred. The clause was included in the treaty for a reason extraneous to Kelantan:

"The provision regulating the rights of persons in the ceded territories appears at first sight somewhat unnecessary but I learn that some question in this connection arose on the cession of Krat to France in 1904. Apparently the Siamese population in the Province of Krat commenced to migrate in large numbers into Siamese territory. This led to an accusation by the French

authorities that this migration was due to Siamese machinations and attempts were made to arrest the exodus. Under the circumstances the King of Siam has desired that this subject shall be specially referred to in the present Treaty." 33

Did the Thai of Kelantan perceive Malay rule as a disaster in the way the Malays of Legeh and Tabal (Taag Baj) perceived the approach of Siamese rule? The evidence of Graham would suggest that they did, for he claims a Thai population of 'about 15,000' in 1907,³⁴ and the 1911 census³⁵ found a meagre 5,355. Of course we can reject Graham's estimate as one unsupported by a count, just as we reject Pallegoix's fantastic claim for Patani³⁶ and shall reject the Thai Consul's claim of 'about 12,000' Thai in Kelantan today.³⁷

In fact, if the Thais did stay put in Kelantan this would not amount unambiguously to a choice of Malay rule. The state of Kelantan had become in the course of the last seven years something different from either a Malay state or a Siamese state, namely an outpost of wholesome European influence, felt in the form of improved security and an increasing economic activity (if Graham is to be believed). The choice was not, by now, one between Malay rule and Thai protection, but between British-protected rule of which the residents of Kelantan had some experience and Thai rule of which they still had none. To say this is not to deny what was argued above: that before 1902 the government of Kelantan was Malay government. The point is that if the Kelantan Thais were aware of the withdrawal of Siamese suzerainty (probably they were not aware) the alternative was not any longer, by 1909, Malay rule pure and simple.

In this light it is incredible that over half the Thai population could

have fled. It is certain that none left Samöbrag - if they had, the village would have far more links with Thailand than it now does. If villages nearer the border had packed up and deserted the state, one might have expected to read about it in the official correspondence. But as of 2nd April 1910, as we have seen,³⁸ the situation was that "no Kelantan men have entered Legeh." A little deduction from simple principles may help us. The Thais had their land in Kelantan and were comparatively prosperous. Today, as security is threatened, there is no inclination to desert the land their forefathers first cleared and occupied. Why should there be mass desertion at a time when security was palpably improving? It is, also, questionable whether awareness of the change of rule would have been communicated to the mass of the peasantry anyway. (The Thais of Semerak are in a state of extreme vagueness as to what month and in what year Malaya became independent. Momentous events make their impact slowly in the countryside even under modern conditions.) Additionally, it is not demonstrated that the Kelantan Thai were conscious of being in a Siamese state at all before 1909. At least the Kelantan Malays of Kuala Tabal had no such idea about their territory before 1909.

Thus British influence came to Kelantan quietly and in two stages, and Siam's influence, which had been nominal, slipped unlamented away. The lack of political upheaval however did not mean that the new presence did not make itself steadily felt thereafter in the lives of the people. The real Kelantanese revolution, a revolution of modernisation and economic development, was now to begin.

We have surmised that the seven years of Graham's advisership brought minimal security and the first small upsurge of economic activity. The ripples from these changes at the capital, round Tumpat port and in Duff territory, may hardly have reached Semerak by 1909, but it was no later than that year - it might have been a year or two earlier - that European planters entered the Semerak district with Ceyloni clerks and overseers to plant coconuts. For the first time the Thais of Semerak could go out and earn cash which was a terribly hard come-by commodity before that time. Men and women now in their sixties and seventies invariably recount how they went out to open the heaths along the shore and south of Cherang Ruku for the copra plantations. To' Thid Nqon never tires of telling how he became Tuan Owen's 'boy'. There is a feeling that these plantations, which have now reverted to the state, are in some way 'Thai' too because the Thais did all the work. There were too few Malays in the immediate vicinity at the time.

But word spread among the Malay community at large that the European planters were weak and vulnerable because they walked around unarmed and didn't lock their houses. This led the Malays to march on Pasir Puteh in 1915 led by the fanatical To' Janggut, and the planters at Semerak packed up in a hurry.³⁹ The next development was the arrival of a gunboat off Semerak which fired shells on Pasir Puteh. So began the 'first war' for the Thais of Semerak - more frightening by far than the second, which largely passed them by. The shells whined high over the village and the women and children fled to Pog Kiang. In the wake of the barrage a detachment of Sikhs, packed shoulder to shoulder, passed in motor boats on the river, advancing on Pasir Puteh. After

the death of Janggut his photograph was taken by the British and displayed around the countryside. Then the Europeans returned to their estates and stayed until the second war.

The Janggut affair - or the 'Pasir Puteh riot' as Mr. R. J. Farrer nicely called it⁴⁰ - turned out ignominiously for the Malays, and the Semerak Thais were suitably impressed. The Europeans gave employment and patronised the Nqraa on their estates. They had squashed Malay revivalism with military technology. And they administered efficiently and fairly from the new District Office at Pasir Puteh. One of the first fruits of the new administration was the land survey and issue of title, followed by the new and equitable cash rent in place of tithe. In 1922 the metalled road reached Cherang Ruku and Besut from Pasir Puteh, and a customs post was set up at the Trengganu border.⁴¹ The building of the road provided more work for young Thais.

The European presence was felt directly, and personified by Europeans directly. The epithet 'unfederated Malay State' is a misleading one, as much so as the earlier label, 'under Siamese control'. The British were as ubiquitous after 1909 as the Thai officials were distinguished by their absence before. That there was a strong and very important thread of continuity in the role played by Malays at all levels, from Penggawa up to Mentri Besar, is an important fact, but the popular conception of the U.F.M.S. as an area of Malaya which development and the British presence somehow passed by, is erroneous. This conception betrays itself in the judgement of Tregonning that:

"The Unfederated States enjoyed the services of British specialists, but the district administration was Malay." 42

In contrast to this, the history reveals Mr. W.E. Pepys taking over the District Office at Pasir Puteh in May 1915 to restore confidence and order

after the riot. He occupied the post till 1920, when his departure "was much felt by the population of the district...."⁴³ Mr. L. H. Gorsuch was visiting D.O. in charge of Pasir Puteh and Bachok from 1929 to 1932. Mr. L. Forbes who later became Commissioner of Lands, had his first Kelantan posting as D.O. in the Ulu in the early '20s.⁴⁴ The business of survey and inspection brought other Englishmen frequently into the kampongs, and if it was not business then it was the pursuit of diversions like shooting or an interest in culture. Noel Ross was a familiar figure to the Semerak Thai before the war, as the officer in charge of drainage, and a frequent visitor to the wat where he was a connoisseur of their entertainments. During the war he disappeared and the Thais feared for his safety; but he returned, equipped with the Thai language, learnt in Thailand during captivity. As Commissioner of Lands and Mines, 1946-49 and British Adviser 1952-3 he continued his friendly association with the Thais. He above all and in spite of himself personifies the benign British presence, and solicitude for the community (although he denies ever showing any favouritism⁴⁵ or having spent more time with the Thais than with the Malays.) However small the proportion of Europeans in the Kelantan service compared to the Federated Malay States - statistically one can no doubt demonstrate a striking difference - the fact is that this was British-style administration by Englishmen who were known personally and held in respect and affection by country Thai and country Malay alike.

To hear the Thai speak, one would sometimes imagine that they were a breed set apart or above all the rest of their English patrons. You hear the same thing in Malay kampongs, with a little more reason: Kelantan was administered as a Malay state and the Malay Reservation Enactment was passed in 1930. But

the Thais in practice experienced no difficulty in buying land from each other or from non-Siamese: permission was sought and given as a pure formality. Above all the Europeans were accessible without regard to race. The importance of those appearances in the villages cannot be over-emphasised. Countless personal bonds were forged, here where Tuan So-and-So drank coconut milk from someone's tree or took shelter from the rain in his house, there where a boy rowed Tuan Somebody Else across a stream or held his guns. The great authority of one of the first Naaj Baan of Samßrag in the British period was attributable in an important degree to the fact that an Englishman had come to the village personally to sound out the community for a suitable candidate. (The British made a point of giving the Thais their own penghulus if they could, which acknowledged and enhanced the Thais' identity and self-respect.)

To put it in 'socio-structural' terms - i.e. in terms not of the formal administrative structure nor of 'social structure' in one of the usual senses of that phrase, but in terms of the scheme of conceived overall ethnic ranking and power in the society - the Malay race had been demoted from its dominant position in the countryside to one of conceptual equality with the Thais under British patronage. The erstwhile law-givers now received law and their access to the power-holders was not more complete than that of the Thais, (even if more developed, for the mass of the Malay peasantry, than previous access to their own aristocracy.) It does not create complete understanding to demonstrate that the Penggawa was always a Malay and the D.O. quite often too. To say that the formal administrative structure, up to the State Council and the

Sultan, was predominantly Malay, is accurate, and it is true and axiomatic that the Malay ruling class, now incorporated into the administrative structure, had more access to power - and indeed more share in administration - than any peasant of any race. Yet the whole of this structure was run on European principles, not for the Malays' exclusive benefit, and was in any case circumvented by the Europeans' appearances in the kampongs so far as the Thais perceived the power relationships (and what we have to stress here is their perception of those relationships, not the formal set-up). Even at the District Office with no European in sight, the European presence was implicit. Caw Dǎǎng of Samǒǒrag tells with glee how he was called to see the Malay D.O. some time about 1952 on some minor business. The D.O. was busy and told him to come back next day. Samǒǒrag lies nine miles from Pasir Puteh and Caw Dǎǎng was not minded - and who would blame him? - to come all the way back again, so he said that Tuan Ross had called him to the beach next day to help with water-sports. The business was transacted immediately. (The story of Tuan Ross's summons was fabricated).

Direct, personal and equal access to authority....this above all (but together with the changing posture of individual Malays described in the previous chapter) determined the Thais' conception of the structural situation, a situation no less real to them for lacking formal institutional expression. Their model of colonial society becomes apparent from all the Thais' statements about British rule, just as its antithesis emerges from statements about Malay rule today: e.g. "khon khaaw pogkhrǒong myankan: khǎǎg khaw bid" (literally: The white men administered equally, the Malays, they oppress."); or again,

"khHgg man haj chaad eng koon: khon angkrid maj khid chaad araj phasaa araj"
("The Malays, they give to their own race first; the English didn't reckon what race or kind you were.")

One may ask, sceptically, what tangible advantages such direct and equal access brought the Thais, i.e. what was its function? Was the European presence in the kampongs any more than a skilful public relations exercise? But the willingness to listen is, after all, part of the function of successful government. To articulate popular feelings to the government is already to achieve a partial satisfaction, without the government taking any specific action. In fact the government did satisfy several desires of the Thai community, these desires being very basic and born of centuries of insecurity and minimal access to government: the desire for security, for fair treatment by government and dignity vis-a-vis the Malays, for access to land and for marginal increments in the standard of living. Needless to say, there was no desire (there is no desire today) to participate in decision-making, and the Europeans did not seek to encourage it. There was no question of a democratic 'mode' of rule. The Thais are highly sensitive and resentful towards any sign of arrogance in any person, but they appear to have accepted the ineffable lordliness of the European officers as a style fitting a patron. The conditions of life under British rule marked such a radical transformation that all Europeans were ascribed the virtues of concern and understanding for the peasant's condition, where more critical and 'universalistic' criteria⁴⁶ might have led to a different appraisal in some cases.

Far more epoch-making than the material fruits of good administration -

or the sheer efficiency of administration, which also internalised new values in those who experienced it - was its seemingly indiscriminating, impartial treatment of all races. In conversation one is repeatedly told that the government clerks were not as arrogant (kong) as they are now. They even went out of their way to help the Thais, knowing of the Thais' good relations with the British. (Caw Dääng of Samöörag believes that some of the hostility of the clerks today is a form of retribution for the favoured status enjoyed by the Thais before Independence.) "Khääg klua khon khaaw." ("The Malays stood in awe of the British.") Experience of a societal structure in which the Thais enjoyed equal status with the other races has left indelible values in the Thais' political culture prescribing this kind of structure as a necessary condition of - and possible obstacle to - further integration. It is also plain that the affection which some Europeans had for the Thais, and the equal (not to say subjectively favoured) status enjoyed as subjects, enhanced Thai identity. For the time being, however, their identification and integration with the state and society were rewarded and reinforced. The colonial plural society was, of itself, an integrated society. (Nor has this integrated society yet wholly passed from the scene.)

A further and more extreme attribution to the British experience would be that only British rule is now acceptable. The nostalgia for those years is at times overwhelming. Perhaps the author's appearance on the scene unstopped a flood of memories and wishful thoughts which are otherwise easily repressed. But the nostalgia is kept alive by other stimuli than the sight of young Europeans in the state and locality. Local Malay friends often confide their own

nostalgia because of the bitter divisions that have rent Malay society since Independence. (UMNO men in Kelantan have a further, specific, grouse about discrimination in favour of PMIP members in the alienation of new land; while the PMIP think of the British period as one when the Chinese were less assertive than now.)

Chapter V will show that the Thais' condemnation of Malay rule as such is partly a comment on the form that Malay rule has taken in Kelantan, not precluding integration with any Malay system. In mitigation of rejection, there are the positive neighbourhood relationships narrated in Chapter II (giving a sense that equal ranking among the races is partially preserved), and a dimension of the same phenomenon at the level of party conflict (see Chapter V). The tradition of Malay rule before 1909, and the continuance in office of a Malay elite thereafter - not to mention the mode of British rule itself - are also highly significant formative factors, in that part at least of the spectrum of Thai political values offer a basis for acceptance of the contemporary political environment. But in the long run the pre-conditions for integration may prove, as a whole, too demanding, and the formative experience of British rule, under incipient social mobilisation, will have played a leading role in creating such a dissonance between expectations and the realities of independent Malay rule - whatever the extent of assimilation to such rule before the mobilisation era, and whatever the extent of assimilation to membership of a Kelantan political system during the era of early mobilisation itself (the colonial era).

We conclude this chapter with a reiteration of the same thought, but with reference to a comment of Lucian Pye. In his study of South East Asia

in The Politics of the Developing Areas,⁴⁷ having characterised the Malay states generally as subject, in the British period, to "the principles of indirect rule" (albeit experiencing "greater bureaucratization and a greater reliance upon British concepts of law"),⁴⁸ Pye later suggests that (in spite of Western impact), in South East Asia generally:

"...the formal structures of government were not the leading innovators or examples of modern practices, but rather, social changes tended to take place at a faster pace. Often under indirect rule changes in the authoritative structures of government occurred only in order to keep up with changes in the social or economic patterns of life. In most cases where indirect rule was practised the formal structures of government have been inadequate to the task of guiding or controlling the pattern of change during the post-colonial period." 49

This characterisation does not help us to an understanding of the Kelantan Thai case. With Pye, the emphasis is very much on the backwardness of government. But in Kelantan, as we have sought to illustrate, government did advance tangibly in its style and achievements, being under manifest European auspices, in spite of genuine principles of indirect rule. As far as a minority like the Thais is concerned, colonial rule was far in advance of what indigenous society could be expected to throw up. Alienation after Independence is attributable not to the colonial era institutions having been outpaced by social change, but to the institutions of independent government suddenly being viewed as a retrogression from the high standard of their predecessors, in the light of values for legitimation of these. It is difficult to assess the compatibility of a level of social development and a given level of development in the authoritative structures, as Pye would have us do. It is easier, and perhaps more to the point in studying political integration, to look to the political values of a group as moulded by historical experience, and to consider whether these values legitimate the political structure at the present time.

FOOTNOTES

1. If we view the Maalaj-Samöbrag dialect as tonal, its tonal patterns show far more correspondences with northern and central dialects than those of Taag Baj do. The coalescence of M0 and L0 is found in ten dialects of the northern and central families, including Bangkok (according to the charts in J. Marvin Brown, op.cit., pp.75-135) and only one of the southern family: viz., (Northern or Central Thai:) 11. Phuan; 14. Bangkok; 19. 1750 Luang Prabang; 20. Luang Prabang; 21. Kaen Thao; 22. Dan Sai; 23. Loei; 48. Si Saket; 49. Tha Tum; 52. Khorat; (Southern Thai:) 56 Chumpon. The only one of these which shows a shallow falling tone, like Samöbrag, is Bangkok. The rare coalescence of L1, L3, H2 and M2, is a characteristic of only four of the dialects described by Marvin Brown: 4. Shan (Chiang Rai); 12. 1650 Ayuthaya; 13. U Thong; and 14. Bangkok.
2. The author did not manage or chance to turn up any traces of the "several villages near the coast, the forebears of the inhabitants of which came from Siam proper, accompanying the Siamese general Phaya Pitsnulok on a military expedition some sixty years ago and afterwards being left behind to keep the peace between Kelantan and the neighbouring state of Sai..." (W.A.Graham op. cit. p.20). The case against Maalaj or Samöbrag being the villages referred to is that the author would surely have heard of such a martial origin as recent as the 1840s, and also that they are wrongly placed to keep the peace between Kelantan and Sai. It is possible and likely that the troupes in question merged with the existing population somewhere in the Tumpat district.
3. Viz., a group comprising Baan Boosamed, Baan Naj, Baan Khoog Sijaa, Baan Khaw Din; and another comprising Baan Jung Kaw and Baan Tuwaa. These groups have distinct and recognisable accents of their own but are basically, in the author's impression, very close to Taag Baj (see J.Marvin Brown op.cit., p.135). Baan Jamuu and Baan Jang the author has not been able to place. They may be separate extensions from Patani: Baan Jamuu has direct river access across the border. But Baan Jang is said by some to have historical links with Baan Naj.
4. See the Boundary Protocol attached to the Treaty signed at Bangkok on March 10 1909 (given in Sir William Maxwell and W.S.Gibson, ed., Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo; London 1924; p.218) The boundary follows watersheds across most of the Peninsula but on reaching "the hill called Bukit Jeli or the source of the main stream of the Sungai Golok...the frontier follows the thalweg of the main stream of the Sungai Golok to the sea at a place called Kuala Tabar."
5. Beliefs about the age or source of a village sometimes reflect the fact that the informant himself had an ancestor who came from a certain place. Such facts are remembered extremely well - and a man of over 60 who knows that his great-grand-father came from outside the village but admits that there were already Thais there, pushes back the founding of the village

- beyond 1830. This applied to two informants of Bangsá' whose great-grand-fathers but not great-grand-mothers stemmed from Phatalung. On the assumption that 1830 would be remembered, the author felt confident in dismissing the idea that Sambúrag and Maalaj were established in 1840: see note 2.
6. Some say it was men of Baan Naj. The author did not have the chance to check this at Baan Sadang itself. One abbot stated that the Buddhist traditions relate it to Baan Jang.
 7. See Chapter VIII, note 6, p. 249. The Trengganu Government in collusion with the Kelantan Alliance Party is also now receiving applications from individual Kelantan Thais for new land. Trengganu is, of course, underpopulated and underdeveloped by comparison with Kelantan.
 8. Although the dialect of the Tumpat coastal group (Boosamed, etc.) is closely akin to Taag Baj, it is of course conceivable that this location could have commended itself strategically at any time, accessible from the sea and providing a base from which to intercept northward movements against the dependency of Patani. It is conceivable that the original nucleus could have been established by policy, just as in the 19th century a military force was sent down there (it is unlikely to have been located anywhere else to "keep the peace between Kelantan and Sai", and with the large numbers of Thais already there, it could all the more quickly have merged with the environment.) But the main migration can easily be imaged to have been in the nature of a slow infiltration from upcoast. Actually, Graham's idea of the purpose of the (Tumpat?) settlement - see note 2 - is in conflict with the original mission of the force, which was, of course, to uphold the authority of the Sultan of Kelantan against his internal rivals: see Walter Vella, Siam under Rama III, New York, 1957; p.70. A more likely purpose of settlement would have been to forestall further collusion between Kelantan and the Seven States such as occurred in 1831 against Siam.
 9. While the colonisation of North Kelantan by Taag Baj speakers was surely in the nature of a slow and unplanned extension, this is far less easy to believe of the original Patani 'Taag Baj' nucleus itself. On the basis of J. Marvin Brown's reconstruction - see especially: J. Marvin Brown, "The Language of Sukhothai: Where did it come from and where did it go?", The Social Science Review of Thailand, June 1966: 39-42 - '79. Tak Bai' is a colateral dialect of '54. 1450 Nakhon', i.e. a development not from 1450 Nakhon but from '53. 1250 Sukhothai'. In other words, the first colonisation of lower Patani must have occurred simultaneously with the colonisation of Nakhorn. Such a phenomenal double leap of pioneering population is difficult to conceive without Ramkamhaeng's own sponsorship. If one wishes to assume slow penetration, one must also reject the assumption that Taag Baj (No. 79 in Marvin Brown's charts) is descended from Sukhothai. In fact, on Marvin Brown's own evidence, No.79 would seem to share more in common with the later Ayuthaya dialects. The character-

istic merging of the tones H1, H3, M1 and M3 into one block is found nowhere else in the South, but occurs in: 3. 1150 Chiang Saen; 4. Shan (Chiengrai); 5. 1650 Chiangmai; 7. Phrae; 8. Nan; 9. Lampang; 10. Chiangmai; 11. Phuan; 12. 1650 Ayuthaya; 13. U Thong; 14. Bangkok. This coincidence is by no means as complete as between Sam⁸rag-Maalaj Thai viewed as a total dialect, and Central-Northern dialects: c.p. note 1 above. Yet the idea of a 13th Century migration perhaps merits a critical reconsideration, balancing the historical possibilities realistically against laryngeal theory.

10. But even their 'strategic' position could just be due to the natural fact that would-be settlers will use rivers for preference to gain access to a jungled landscape. If a suitable spot for a settlement is found 3/4 mile up river, why go further? It anyway allows of a rapid retreat if the worst comes to the worst. Before giving equal weight to the strategic theory we should really consider the strategic or tactical ends which might have been served by such a policy. In the 19th century it was not to dominate an area, but (a) to protect one Malay vassal from the machinations of his rivals; of (b) to punish or forestall alliances against Siamese power. The putative garrisons of Maalaj and Sam⁸rag could have kept a watchful eye on the Rajas of Bachok and Semerak respectively, in the interests of the Sultan of Kelantan, and have stood ready to prevent attacks from the South against Kelantan - or against Siamese power itself. But if the author is correct to assume that Maalaj and Sam⁸rag are older by a few centuries than 1840, we need to identify a period when Thai power was as immediately felt in Kelantan as in the 19th century. This is not easy. The conventional view is expressed by Thamsook Numnonda in her Ph.D. dissertation, The Anglo-Siamese Negotiations, 1900-1909, London University, 1966, p.48: "The Malay states of Kedah, Perlis, Pattani and Setul became dependencies of Sukhothai in the 13th century when Siam first made conquests in the Malay Peninsula. [Thamsook Numnonda's source is: Prince Damrong: Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin, Rachakan thi 2, Bangkok 1916, pp.311-2; and Prince Damrong: Prachum Phongsawadan Phak thi 3, Bangkok 1914, pp.2-3.] But it was only in 1769 that Kelantan and Trengganu came under Siamese suzerainty [Phongsawadan Chabab Phraratchahatleka, Bangkok 1952; Vol. II, Pt.II, p.28/....] The aim of protecting the new vassal Patani from its rivals might, incidentally, provide the context for a Thai migration to Taag Baj under Ramkamhaeng which we sought above - see note 9.
11. The Rajas of Kelantan, having come voluntarily under Siam's suzerainty in 1769, were dependent upon Bangkok for the confirmation of their succession, and sent tribute, but the intervention in a dispute over succession in 1835 (described by Walter Vella, op.cit., p.70) and political interventions in the growing anarchy of Kelantan politics in the final decades of the 19th century, were always a far less stringent form of surveillance or control than was exercised in Patani at equivalent periods. The seven sub-states of Patani had many characteristics of 'Outer States' - hua myang

๑๑๑๑ - as described recently by Charles Keyes for North-east Thailand (in ISAN: Regionalism in North-east Thailand: Cornell Interim Report Series, 65; Ithaca, 1967; p.15). "Their chiefs [i.e. of Patani] were chosen by Bangkok and retained their powers only as long as they pleased Bangkok." (W. Vella, op.cit., p.62.) "These seven states...were probably the most closely controlled of any of the Malay vassals." (W. Vella, op.cit., p.62). But as we argue on p. 90 infra, even this did not amount to a great deal, and if tenuity of control applied to Patani it was even more the case in Kelantan, a genuine vassal, where nothing like control appeared until the very end of the era. When it appeared it was, paradoxically, partly the product of a British design to forestall French and German designs in South Thailand, by asserting unequivocally Siam's superior status in the Peninsula, especially in the Secret Convention of 1897 and the Boundary Agreement of 1899. This development is admirably clarified by Eunice Thio (see her British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1909; Ph.D. dissertation, London University, 1956). This British design accorded, it is true, with Siamese aspirations for some little time past, and the growing instability of the state made intervention almost imperative by some party. But promotion of Siam was not to be British policy for long. The Agreement of 1902, which brought Mr. Graham, and Mr. Thomson (of the Straits Service) to Kelantan, marked both the high water mark and the turn of the tide for Siamese control, for it represented the principle that only Englishmen could effectively keep order and preserve Kelantan from the depredations of foreign - and English! - concession seekers.

12. Of course the Thais must have known something about the pretensions of Thailand in the late 19th century. Naa Can, aged 74, who recalled the story of the Thai elephant ๑๑๑ at Cherang Ruku, (p. 87 above), followed a monk up to Baan Naj as a joom - in about 1905? - and saw the bunga mas ship moored in the Kelantan River. The accounts of the royal tours of the Malay Peninsula published in 1924 and 1925 tell of visits to Kelantan in 1888 and 1890 (see: Codmaaj heed Phra'baad somded Phra'cun ๑๑๑ klaw caw yuu hua Saded praphaad ๑๑๑ malaajuu khraaw r.s.107, pp.5-8; and r.s. 109, p.53, respectively; published at Bangkok, 1924. On the second occasion high seas prevented His Majesty from entering the river, but in 1888 he came to Kota Bharu.) In 1898 there was a further visit, the occasion when the Raja was promoted to the dignity of Deechaanuchid, i.e. Sultan (see Codmaaj heed raja' thaang Saded praphaad naj rachakaan thii 5 Saded praphaad hua myang naj ๑๑๑ malaajuu, radtanakoosin sog 117; published Bangkok 1925; pp. 5-8.) In 1900 the King again visited Kota Bharu (see Codmaaj heed...etc., as 1898 but dated Sog 119; pp.33-34) and once more, finally, in 1905 (see Codmaaj heed...etc, as 1898 but dated Sog 124; pp.98-99.) In 1898 ten abbots of Kelantan came to attend the arrival of the King at Kota Bharu, and in 1905 an unspecified number of monks was chanting the montra between the landing stage and the pavilion set up for the reception. The summoning of monks on such occasions would have brought the royal visits to the knowledge of the whole community. However, the author never heard mention of ~~these~~ progresses during his historical enquiries at Semerak or elsewhere.

13. Eunice Thio, op.cit., p.335.
14. See The Malay Peninsula, by Arnold Wright and Thomas H. Reid, London, 1912, p.157. Duff negotiated 3,000 square miles of territory in the Ulu and comprehensive administrative powers over it for the sum of £2,000 plus 200 shares (to the Sultan) in his syndicate.
15. C.p. note 11, above.
16. These other dimensions, discussed in Chapter V, are acceptance of the rule of Malay Sultans in a positive sense (there is a forecast of this already in the passage translated at note 18 below); and assimilation to the role of clients in general.
17. The incident which gave rise to the fear of the loss of these licences is related at Chapter IV, p. 122. The Thai reaction is further discussed at Chapter V, p. 143.
18. The author offers the following translation: "We the undersigned do (humbly) declare to Your Honour that although we are (traditionally) called 'the Siamese', we know little of what goes on in Siam. For we have been loyally resident in Kelantan for many generations reaching back beyond our great-grandfathers' time. The expression 'the Siamese' survives only as a form of speech, and thus we are true citizens of Malaya, showing our loyalty to this state of Kelantan since the time of our ancestors. In fact we are of one kind with the Malays whose natural loyalty is to their state."
19. Walter Vella, op.cit., p.61.
20. Viz.: Pataanii, Jiring, Rānggā, Nong Cig, Jaalaa, Sajburii; see Walter Vella, ibid., p.61.
21. See note 12, above; and Codmaaj heed....etc. opera cit., especially that for Sog 117 (1898) p.4.
22. Codmaaj heed....etc. op.cit., khraaw r.s.108 (1888-9) p.38.
23. Eunice Thio, op.cit., p.394. She in turn quotes W.W.Skeat and Dr.F.F. Laidlaw in J.M.B.R.A.S. Vol. XXVI, 4, December 1953: "The Cambridge University Expedition to parts of the Malay Peninsula, 1899-1900."
24. Foreign Office 422-62 (Affairs of Siam, Further Correspondence XX).
25. Pallegoix, Description du Royaume Thai ou Siam, 1854; Vol. I, 25; and quoted by Walter Vella, op.cit., p.77.
26. Thailand, Central Statistical Office, National Economic Development Board: Population Census, 1960 (Changwat Narathiwat).

27. See J.S.Mason, British Adviser, to Federal Secretary, F.M.S., dated 2nd April 1910; F.O. 22983 in F.O. 371/984: (Para.4)
"I was informed on March 31st by the ex-Kamman of Jeli (now a Kelantan Government official, as Jeli is in the land ceded to Kelantan) that Nai Ban Samat, of Kampong Kuchi in Ampur Legeh, threatens all Legeh men that their property and padi will be confiscated if they migrate to Kelantan. Nai Ban Samat states that he has received authority on this point from the Ampur of Legeh, Che Draman. Nai Ban Smat has promised Kelantan people that if they will migrate into Legeh they will never be "krah'ed" and that the poll tax will be remitted until the time of their grand children. (No Kelantan men have entered Legeh: several Legeh men have migrated into Kelantan.)"
28. Peel to Grey, 16.5.1910; F.O. 22983, in F.O. 371/984.
29. W.A.R.Wood to Beckett, 2.8.1909, in F.O. 422-64, (Affairs of Siam, Further Correspondence XXI.)
30. Mason to Federal Secretary, 2.4.1910; F.O. 22983 in F.O. 371/984, para.6.
31. Ibid., para. 9.
32. Anglo-Siamese Treaty, signed at Bangkok, March 10th 1909; Clause three: "...subjects of His Majesty the King of Siam residing within the territory described in Article I who desire to preserve their Siamese nationality will during the period of six months after the ratification of the present Treaty be allowed to do so if they become domiciled in the Siamese dominions. His Britannic Majesty's Government undertakes that they shall be at liberty to retain their immoveable property within the territory described in Article I." (Given in Sir W.Maxwell and W.S. Gibson, op.cit.)
33. Enclosure 14 in: Paget to Grey, 27.2.1908, in F.O.422-62, (Affairs of Siam, Further Correspondence XX.)
34. W.A.Graham, op.cit., p.20.
35. See J.E.Nathan, op.cit., para. 341, p.92. The 1921 total is 6,255.
36. See note 25, above.
37. Reported in The Straits Times, November 15 1966.
38. See note 27, above.
39. This is the view of the affair from Samôrag. The Thais understood it as a peasant rising and knew nothing of promotion by higher interests. They had a keen sense that it was a movement to drive out the foreigner and restore Kelantan to the Malays. C.f. the suggestive analysis along the same lines by James de V.Allen: "The Kelantan Rising of 1915: Some

Thoughts on the Concept of Resistance in British Malayan History", Journal of South East Asian History, September 1968: 241-257. We quote from this article again in Chapter V, p.149.

40. Adviser's Report Kelantan, 1915.
41. Personal communication of Mr. Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu who was in charge of the post when it opened.
42. K. G. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, Singapore, 1964; p.225.
43. Adviser's Report Kelantan, 1920.
44. These are just three examples brought to the author's notice by the personal communications of the three retired officers. (The author is warmly appreciative of their help and interest; also of the service of the British Association of Malaysia in putting him in touch with them.) Valuable communications were also received from Mr.D.Headley (B.A., 1953-57), Mr. N.Ross (B.A., 1952-53), Mr.J.Innes Miller (Legal Adviser, 1941), Mr.T.W.Clayton (Assistant Adviser 1913 and High Court Judge), and Mr.C.C.Brown (Kelantan High Court Judge in the 1920s and author of Kelantan Malay, Singapore, 1927). That the extent of the European staff establishment was not fortuitous is suggested by George Maxwell's recommendation after the Pasir Puteh rebellion that more European officials be sent as a matter of urgency (in Young to C.O.Conf. of 2 June 1915, C.O. 273/426: quoted by James de V.Allen, op.cit., p.250.) Maxwell was a keen federalist and thought Kelantan eligible for federation as soon as the railway was built from the West Coast.
45. The only act which he remembers as being of benefit to the Thais was his rescinding of a tax on their entertainments while he was B.A. However, it is not any single policy, but the sum of European policies and above all the quality of government which the Thais remember - its accessibility and its concern.
46. ...the criteria, let it be confessed, of the present author, who stands a good two generations in time behind the colonial servants in question and not very close to them in social origin. But the Thais do usually judge behaviour in terms of a normative continuum from humble to arrogant, and the author could never have become accepted in Samöörag village as an honorary member on the basis of the master-servant relationship. On the other hand, the old respect for Europeans eased his initial welcome.
47. The Politics of the Developing Areas, ed. by G.A.Almond and J.S.Coleman; New Jersey, 1960.
48. Ibid., p.91.
49. Ibid., p.99.

CHAPTER IV: THE RISE OF MALAY POLITICS, AND THAI ALIENATION

It is appropriate to describe the hostile factors in the Thais' environment before its more tolerable aspects, because they strike the student of minority problems irresistably in his first exposure to the situation. They are also what the Thais always talk and complain about. On the first evening in his new house the four men most closely concerned with the arrangements for the author's installation¹ were not slow to express their discomfort and apprehensions under Malay rule. The motives for giving Independence are so remote from the Thais' understanding that it is a common belief that the British have not withdrawn at all but are simply giving the Malays a probationary trial in harness, and are watching from the side-lines ready to intervene and retrieve the situation if it gets out of hand. The reappearance of young Europeans on the Kelantan scene in the last few years (the Peace Corps) and the author's arrival in the village were taken as auguries of the British 'second coming' which is expected by some as earnestly as it is desired. Nostalgia for British rule is sometimes expressed very strongly indeed and Malay rule in any form tends to be denied legitimacy; for in Kelantan not only has popular British patronage been withdrawn, but the patent equality of status of the races in the colonial plural structure has been very drastically called in question. The British "let the Malays rule" (haj khääg pogkhrøng) and the result is a revolution in the relative ranking of the communities. The popular Thai 'immediate' model of Independent Kelantan inevitably places the Malays at the top of the new hierarchy, suppressing (bid) the rest. Although sweeping rejection of Malay rule as such is misleading, it is impossible to find a Thai who will say expressly that he can accept independent

rule, and indeed Malay rule was rejected at Samöörag long before its peculiar abuses in Kelantan had a chance to be experienced - viz. in 1955, at the first General Election, two years before Independence and four years before P.M.I.P. swept to power in the Kelantan state government. This was done by voting exclusively Parti Negara. The same vote was cast overwhelmingly by Thais in other villages visited by the author, if in constituencies where Negara had fielded a candidate.² At Boosamed and Jung Kaw the author heard of a few votes for the Alliance at this time but there the differences between the two parties were not, apparently, clear to all the Thai voters. The first reason for voting Negara there³ was often that its symbol, a sheaf of rice, seemed more fitting for rice farmers than the rya baj - the sailing boat - of the Alliance with its apparent appeal to fishermen. If the symbol was all that guided some voters, it is understandable that some would support the Alliance. But the informants usually remembered - as an afterthought, without special prompting - that Parti Negara was the British party and that some people had this in mind too when they supported it. At Samöörag this is the only reason given. (At Baan Bangsä' the Alliance was supported from the beginning because there has never been a Negara candidate in the various national and state constituencies in which the village has found itself from 1955 up till 1964.)⁴

The reason why Baan Samöörag was so well informed about the stakes in the first election may lie in the regular contacts between Semerak Thai men and Malays, at the Cherang Ruku coffee shop and on the fishing boats. Also in the fact that the Penggawa at that time was a Negara supporter, who would have appealed to the Thais' reason and feeling - by telling them what was at stake - as well as to their loyalty to himself.⁵ But the Penggawa was neither

the prime factor swaying the Semarak Thais' decision nor the prime source of information on Negara's policy. Who then said it was the British party? "The Malays said so."

Indeed they did. Two great issues differentiated Parti Negara from U.M.N.O. in the 1955 election campaign. One was independence from Britain, the other was alliance with the Chinese. There was a superficial contradiction in the stand of each party on these issues. Parti Negara's stand on Independence was on the face of it anti-nationalist, but it was justified as a stand in defence of the Sultans and of Malay integrity, and of course since its formation as the Malayan National Conference in 1953, Parti Negara had represented Dato Onn bin Jaafar's new-found communalism.⁶

"Any Malay who demands independence from the British is a traitor to his ruler, said Dato Sir Onn bin Ja'afar, Secretary General of Parti Negara, speaking at a rally here last night [Kota Bharu, on 25th April 1955] attended by nearly 1,000 Malays. He referred specifically to UMNO leaders who, he said, were making this demand. He said that Malays in Penang and Malacca owed loyalty to the Queen but those in the Malay States owed it to their rulers....Malays should not be misled by the ignorance of UMNO leaders, who had allowed UMNO's policy to be dictated by the Malayan Chinese Association..."⁷

The emphasis on the sovereignty of the Sultans and the illegality, therefore, of asking the British for Independence was a mere quibble. The fear of the consequences for Malaya - and for the Malays - of the double loyalty and the dominance of the Chinese, though, was surely a genuine fear for Dato Onn, even if party interest, following the rout in the first three state elections (in Johore and Trengganu, 1954, and in Penang, February 1955), also indicated the postponement of Independence till such time as the party might have a prospect of forming the first independent government.⁸

In contrast to Parti Negara, the United Malays National Organisation was committed to an inter-communal policy, but was thinking in terms of Merdeka within the life of the forthcoming partly-elected Legislative Council, about 1959. Naturally, the whole rationale of the Chinese alliance (and subsequent events and indeed the whole success of independent Malaya have vindicated it) was that inter-communalism is the only possible foundation of nationalist power. The Chinese alliance was a means to a certain end: Independence. UMNO too was pursuing a nationalist end, but the higher of the two options, involving a risk proportionate to the stakes.

Yet it is slightly ironical that the party which was openly communal at that time should have won the Thais' support, while the party of all the races was rejected. The paradox stems from the fact that the communal conservatism of Negara had made them shrink from the means necessary to achieve the supreme end of Independence, and this turned them into the party of the status quo. UMNO, just as much a Malay party, accepted the political imperatives and embraced inter-communalism only in order to come forward unambiguously as the party of national independence. Negara was smeared as the "Parti orang puteh" - the Englishmen's party. But as far as the Thai vote was concerned nothing could be better propaganda for Negara, coming, as it did, 'from the Horse's mouth': "The Malays said so."

Thus it came about that the Thais' first chance of participation in the new political process was used to register whole-hearted rejection of it. How sound their instinct was! Independence in Kelantan could only mean Malay rule. It was no unkind distortion that made UMNO appear in the guise of a Malay nationalist party, for Independence was a Malay nationalist policy and UMNO

made much of it. The rejection of Independence evinces strong values favouring British rule and rejecting Malay rule as such, when the choice is offered. It is only since Independence that the Thais have reconciled themselves to association with the Alliance and have come to appreciate and praise its inter-communal qualities. But these have become more easily apparent with the rise of an extreme communalistic party on its 'right'. The evidence of 1955 is that Malay rule as such was unwanted. The evidence must be accepted -- without, however, subscribing to the non-sequitur that no integration is possible outside the framework of British rule.

The total defeat of the Thais' party in Kelantan (as in the rest of the Federation) in 1955 must have given them some premonition of great and inauspicious changes to come, but Independence itself passed uneventfully and many Thais take refuge from the realities of political change even now by refusing to believe that the British have really betrayed their trust. Whatever the reservations and fears following 1955 there was nothing to warn the Thais of the magnitude of the approaching revolution. How many Malays of UMNO dreamed that the fruits of Independence would slip so soon and so completely from their grasp?

In the first state council elections to all seats, held in Kelantan on 24th June 1959, the party of the kampongs, the party of Islam, swept to power in all but two⁹ of the 30 constituencies.

For the Semerak Thais the utter defeat of their chosen party for the second time in four years was a poor invitation to identify with the new process. (The Negara having disappeared from the scene in Pasir Puteh Tenggara

constituency, and the old Penggawa being imprisoned for embezzlement - his successor is pro-Alliance - the Semerak Thais had inevitably transferred their allegiance to the Alliance.) But the peculiar character of the party which took power was far more demoralising than defeat as such. PMIP speakers had campaigned at Cherang Ruku on a programme which included the prohibition of pig-rearing and the 'nationalisation', in a theocratic sense, of fakir temples.

In other Thai villages the 1959 election is remembered as the election when the Alliance was generally supported for the first time. The fact that it was the party in power when the second state elections were held would have given it a built-in advantage even in constituencies where Negara put up a candidate, provided the Penggawa was an Alliance supporter himself and could add his personal pressure to the attraction of the party of power to a loyal minority. In any case Negara could no longer fight on a pro-British ticket and the Alliance could validly pose as the Thais' best guarantee against PMIP fanaticism (without, presumably, fearing that their worst fears would actually be realised in the election.)

However, Negara was still in the running and must have taken some Thai votes in the four state constituencies where Negara candidates faced a partly Thai electorate.¹⁰ In Rantau Panjang the Negara candidate even appears to have been a Thai, from his unmistakable (Malay) nickname, Gelap Pak Wel. His poor showing - 66, lost deposit - may reflect the absence of any major Thai settlement in that constituency. In Tumpat Tengah the Negara was actually opposed by a Socialist Front candidate of mixed Thai and Indian parentage, who attracted 341 votes, a large proportion of them Thai.¹¹ In the parliamentary




Figure 3.

Kelantan Parliamentary and State-Assembly Constituencies, 1964, showing principal concentrations of Thai population.

The State-Assembly constituencies are :

1	Tumpat Barat	8	Tendong	16	Kota Bharu Timur	24	Pasir Puteh Tenggara
2	Tumpat Tengah	9	Bandar Pasir Mas	17	Kota Bharu Barat	25	Machang Utara
3	Tumpat Timur	10	Bandar Hilir	18	Kota Bharu Selatan	26	Tanah Merah Timur
4	Kuala Kelantan	11	Bandar Hulu	19	Rantau Panjang	27	Tanah Merah Barat
5	Kota Bharu Utara	12	Kota Bharu Tengah	20	Lemal	28	Machang Selatan
6	Kota Bharu Pantai	13	Bachok Utara	21	Tok Uban	29	Ulu Kelantan Timur
7	Meranti	14	Bachok Tengah	22	Pasir Puteh Utara	30	Ulu Kelantan Barat
		15	Bachok Selatan	23	Pasir Puteh Tengah		

elections Negara put up only one candidate, for Ulu Kelantan, which in the event was won by the Alliance.

In the 1964 General Election Negara fielded no candidates in Kelantan; likewise in the state elections. The PMIP won again, this time with 21:30 seats in the state assembly and 8:10 parliamentary seats.¹² Subsequent by-elections have shown distinct Alliance improvement and a growing PMIP problem would seem to be the defection of leaders at various levels to UMNO.¹³ An Alliance victory in 1969 is by no means impossible, if not yet predictable with certainty.

Meanwhile, it would be a distortion to pretend that in the Thai mind there is not a deep sense of outrage at the fundamental reverse of their fortunes and status brought about by the restoration of Malay rule in Kelantan. This sense of outrage is patently a response conditioned primarily by the learning experiences of British rule. Malay peasant power in Kelantan has cast the ethnic relationships from a mould of equality into the hierarchical scheme of the 'classical' plural society. PMIP practice has not gone to the lengths of banning pigs, but it has unpleasant features enough. Firstly, land. Pressure on the Thais in this field is on two fronts: legal and illegal. Legally, the PMIP government has a strong enough weapon against non-Malays in the land-laws of the British era, if operated strictly. The irony of the situation is that entrepreneurs of the major immigrant race - from whose inroads Malay land was supposed to be protected by the Malay Reservation Enactment of 1930 and subsequent consolidations - can today use their wealth to oil the machinery which processes applications for exemption. (The PMIP

leadership on all evidence is excessively corrupt - but the Alliance clique who preceded them in office set no better example.) The rural and indigenous Thais, who represent no threat whatsoever to the Malays' inheritance, suffer under the strict application of the law.

It is a rare Thai who realizes that the law was written by the British. But this is understandable, because in the British period permission to buy land, even Malay land, appears to have been given to Thais without delay. It is necessary to understand here that the most common Thai requirement from the State Executive Council (the body which advises the Sultan on land matters) was and is simply the facility of buying Thai land from Thais, rarely land owned by Malays. This was something that could scarcely be interpreted by the British as a breach of the spirit of Malay Reservation. Yet permission always had to be formally sought, for Thai land, like the whole of cultivated Kelantan, is 'Malay Reservation'.¹⁴ It is this fact which now enables the PMIP government to erode Thai land by holding up transactions between Thai and Thai for six months or more, thus forcing the needy vendor to sell to a Malay. The Thai who needs and can afford the lot goes without and the total of land available to the community shrinks. Sometimes the amount of land available is increased for a while by a purchase from a Malay - but this cannot be registered and the Malay could walk in any time and reoccupy the land without compensation. The author came to know of only one case of alienation of a piece of government land to a Thai for freehold occupation, even though alienation is proceeding slowly but quite steadily under present policy.

Another perfectly legal way in which Malay land could be increased at the

expense of Thais is to refuse to renew the lease of state land taken under a 'T.O.L.' (Temporary Occupation Licence). At Samörag 18.77 of the 145.779 acres under rice cultivation are in the category 'state land' and subject to sudden withdrawal by the government. Fortunately, it is not the government's policy to withdraw Temporary Occupation Licences from their present holders. The largest group which would be affected by such a policy would presumably be Malaysupporters of UMNO, who are the first object of PMIP hatred. The result would be immediate internecine conflict. An UMNO Malay in Pasir Puteh district even threatened armed resistance to a pending move to evict him from land where he had squatted for some time without any rights whatsoever; no one doubts that the consequences of suspension of T.O.Ls would be the same, but on a scale commensurate with the numbers affected - and the licences are often of long standing. The PMIP is not afraid of conflict as such, nor would the reaction against them be organised or supported by Kelantan UMNO. But the fighting would be very likely to lead to Federal intervention and perhaps a suspension of the State Constitution. This is the last thing the PMIP wants.

The easiest way the PMIP can satisfy its supporters, if not by granting a proper alienation in the jungle or at its fringes (all of which takes a long time to set on foot) is to give them 'permission' at the district-party level to squat illegally on government heath or coconut land or in jungle, and build a house. There is a good chance that no future government will want to take on itself the trouble of throwing them out and eventually deeds will be issued and the land alienated. The present Penggawa of Semerak and the D.O. of

Pasir Puteh arê naturally powerless to do anything about the illegal squatting by PMIP members at Semerak since 1964 without the support of their superiors, and by July 1967 the only action taken against the assemblyman who had given the wink to his supporters was a police enquiry into an allegation of corruption and/or fraud. (The allegation was certainly the work of UMNO, but it was based on the locally well-known and acknowledged fact - not a fantasy concocted for propaganda - that the assemblyman had taken \$60 'fees' per acre of land occupied by his own supporters, as well as making out false receipts and chits relating to their 'rights' on the land.)

All this does not affect the Thais directly, but a variation of the above theme is to 'permit' a party member to occupy coconut land which is already subject to a T.O.L. but in the name of someone less dangerous than an UMNO Malay. Such a person was the mild-mannered Naaj Phlab, the headman of Sambörag in 1966. The Malay who dispossessed him in 1966 claimed to have paid for temporary occupation himself. Naaj Phlab's plight was not serious enough for the Penggawa to exert himself hard to disprove the Malay's claim to have a licence. It took nine months to persuade the Malay to move. And three months later he was back anyway.

The pretensions of PMIP assemblymen in their districts would be laughable did they not reflect a large measure of real power. Indeed the power flows from the pretension: the party faithful take the assemblyman at his word when he says he has the authority to let them occupy state land; and by occupying the land contrary to law they become the tangible manifestation of his power.

In the 1964 General Election the assemblyman for Pasir Puteh Tenggara

even 'reserved' an area of sandy heath, within the confines of the Semerak Thais' area of settlement and cultivation, to the Thais themselves if they would vote for him. No doubt he would have been true to his word in the event of getting Thai support, for the area was not attractive to any Malay. But the Thais did not support the PMIP and it is inconceivable that they ever will, because illegal occupation has become the party's characteristic weapon against the Thais, not a credible or desired advantage (the Thais are too law-abiding) of Thais supporting the party.

The audacity of the local party reached its newest limits at Semerak in July 1966 when a party man masquerading as a Survey Officer acting on the D.O.'s orders went to the Thais' richest T.O.L. rice land at midday, when no one was about, to 'survey' it prior to 'reallocating' it to Malay applicants. This was a very different matter from the threat to one man's coconut plot. Several Thais were affected. The matter was taken to the Penggawa at once. One exceptionally tough - and very un-Thai - character, Nuj Kong ('Big-headed Nuj') threatened violence. The Penggawa knew that this for once was an explosive situation; the D.O. in the name of his dignity and such authority as he still enjoys could not allow this flagrant abuse of his name to go unchecked. The Officer Commanding the Police District was apprised of the threat to individual rights and more especially of the danger of violence. Apart from the repercussions of violence, the PMIP government was not prepared to go so far towards denying its own writ (here represented by the Temporary Occupation Licence) in the countryside. On this occasion, therefore, the local party's initiative fell flat. But the incident remains in the 'landscape' of Malay-ruled Kelantan as perceived by the Samöbrag Thais.¹⁵

At the district office today the amenability and accessibility of the D.O. has come to depend rather on his political views. The D.O.'s freedom of action and authority within the district office are greatly circumscribed, whatever his views, by the ubiquitous PMIP assemblymen or their agents. Their power is felt as strongly at the district office as British power before them, and is probably feared more because PMIP favours are bestowed selectively. Petty but increasing venality of the clerks is a constant grievance. Even if the government does not withhold renewal of a T.O.L., or if no Malay occupies a Thai's leased government land, a clerk can cause untold anxiety by refusing to issue a new licence till a bribe is paid - and this even when the D.O. has ordered him to issue the licence without delay. The political and venal motives are usually difficult to disentangle, but less so, perhaps, where a Thai is obstructed in his application for citizenship.

Citizenship is vital for farmers because it enables them to inherit and have title to land. It also entitles one to vote.¹⁶ Voting is viewed by most Thais as primarily a duty, not a right, so disenfranchisement arouses no resentment. The PMIP of course attaches great importance to limiting the Thai vote as an Alliance vote, and has no intention of preventing Thai inheritance. But the Thais believe that the PMIP would withhold citizenship to deprive them of their land.

Another common misunderstanding, which yet has some objective foundation in the Thais' experience, is that the state government issues nationality. The Federal Registrar for Kelantan and Trengganu has his office at Kota Bharu, but the issuance of identity cards (compulsorily to all persons of 13 and over)

is mostly delegated to the district offices, as well as the handling of applications for citizenship. Thus the Thais will often be dependent on pro-PMIP clerks to tell them, inter alia, that if they are already citizens they can apply as of right to register their native-born children as citizens before the child is 21.¹⁷ They are never told, and so, when a young person is taken by the parent at the age of 12 to apply for an identity card, a red one is issued. If the parent protests he is still not told that nationality is obtainable immediately, but rather that the juvenile must wait till 18 and then apply himself.¹⁸ Although registration on that occasion is also of right (regardless of the father's status), certain conditions have to be satisfied, including the language test, a hurdle which can be used effectively by unfriendly interests on the district language boards to limit the number of successful candidates. Meanwhile the young person is disqualified, in spite of his Malayan birth-certificate, from eligibility for scholarships to see him through lower secondary school if he has the brains to get him so far, and from employment by estates and companies, which is strictly for citizens only. In the early part of 1967 the author found that there were 104 young Thais in the whole of Pasir Puteh district aged between 10 and 21. Of these, 97 either had red cards or seemed to have no prospect, if they were under 12, of getting citizenship in time for a blue card to be made out for them. What is profoundly disheartening and offensive to the Thais is that all but two of these young people (in Pasir Puteh district) have Malayan birth certificates, being born since the Japanese occupation, and their parents themselves are citizens for the most part. However, even the few who are aware of the different loci of power in the Malayan state do frequently blame 'PMIP law' for it, not

'Alliance law'. Poor communications, which hinder the Thais so much in their encounters with the bureaucracy, can at least conduce to a certain optimism about the conditions which would follow the fall of the PMIP. Behind the blanket condemnation of Malay rule there often lurk hopes of better things to come, even hopes which are, strictly, misinformed.

To the extent that unfriendly clerks are withholding necessary information, the PMIP can be held responsible for obstructed access to citizenship, but the PMIP could scarcely obstruct at all were it not for the Federal authorities' bureaucratic - but in east-coast conditions unrealistic and unreasonable - insistence on documentary validation for certain statements relating to citizenship rights. As it stands the present law is more liberal to first and second generation non-Malays (i.e. in its naturalisation and registration clauses respectively) than the British legislation of 1948 or 1952. For third generation or older immigrants the British legislation of 1952 still applies under which 99% of Kelantan Thais should be admitted to citizenship by operation of law.¹⁹ Indeed the British administration before and after 1952 issued operation-of-law citizenship to any Thai who needed a passport, accepting the Penggawa's testimony that the applicant's family had resided in Kelantan immemorially. The D.O.s at Bachok and Pasir Mas in particular, between 1949 and 1952, made it a point to advertise the future advantages of citizenship to all the Maalaj and Bangsa' Thais, viz. equal rights with other races, specifically rights of inheritance.²⁰ Many took out citizenship at that time; juveniles as young as 12 were in some cases made citizens. Nor was the independent Malayan regime reluctant in its first two years to enrol citizens on prima facie evidence of

right. In Pasir Puteh district, of 253 Thais aged over 31 in 1967 (i.e. persons who had reached their majority in 1957, the year of Independence) 190 were issued with a special form of citizenship²¹ in late 1957 or early 1958. The purpose of this massive enrolment was to recreate an electorate now that voting was to be reserved only to proven citizens. (In 1955 no certificate of nationality had been required.) But the certificates of nationality themselves were still issued without documentary proof of right.

Now these 1957-8 certificates were sometimes issued by Penggawas and Penghulus at the D.O.'s direction, but the major initiative in mobilising the people to make their thumb print on the declaration of loyalty and accept the certificate came from the political parties, interested in acquiring voters. The government's generosity was badly abused and many new citizens were created (especially in the west-coast states) who had no rights, as immigrants, to the status. By 1960 the doors were closing against the flood of applications, and for the first time Registrars insisted on production of a birth-certificate in support of every claim of a Malayan birth-place. Citizenship by operation of law is now granted, in principle, only on the production of two birth-certificates, ones own and that of ones father, on whose birth in Malaya ones right primarily rests. Since the generations who were over 21 in 1957 were born in an era which knew practically no birth-certificates, they cannot substantiate their children's right to citizenship by operation of law, even though they themselves may have been granted a form of citizenship on precisely that basis in 1957-8.²² That is why their children now in the 10-21 age group have to use the registration channels, and so fall foul of obstruction.

That is the major injustice of which the Thais complain. But at least the under 22s as of 1967 have birth-certificates and if they didn't attend primary school they will have the opportunity of adult education to bring their Malay up to the standard required by the local board.²³ From 1969, when the children born since Merdeka begin to apply for identity cards, blue cards will be issued automatically. This will be received with relief but will also add to the Thais' sense that the laws are arbitrary. Indeed it has taken this university-educated Westerner some months to penetrate and understand all the complexities and anomalies of the citizenship laws.

Parents at Bangsã' and Maalaj have been particularly affected by a certain decision taken, it is claimed, at the beginning of this decade, but only in the last two years made fully operative in the district offices. A majority of Bangsã' and Maalaj parents have citizenship by operation of law (1948 rules) as a result of the generous initiative of the British administration through the D.O.s of those two districts. One of the clauses of the (State citizenship) legislation which followed in September 1952 conferred state citizenship by operation of law on any person holding Federal citizenship under the previous legislation²⁴ and another clause conferred automatic citizenship on their children whenever born.²⁵ The prestige of operation-of-law citizenship under the 1948 and 1952 laws appears to have been such that even when, about 1960, parents were being generally required to prove their own birth in Malaya, both the pre- and the post-September 1952 certificates of operation-of-law citizenship were still accepted in practice as proof of birth in Malaya. It was accepted and well-known among the Thais that those old documents of citizenship issued by the British entitled their children to blue identity cards.²⁶

But since 1966 the children of pre-September 1952 operation-of-law citizens born (a) since 13th September 1952, or (b) before the father was issued a citizenship document, have been regrouped in practice as well as in theory with the children of other citizens, and the citizen parent now has to produce his own birth-certificate. If he has none, the child gets a red card. The official position now is that even the blue cards already issued on an operation-of-law basis to these children, if they were due for a card at any time between 1960 and 1966, are invalid and should be withdrawn if discovered. A blue identity card is no proof in itself of citizenship under the latest interpretation. Children born during the brief months between the father acquiring citizenship under the 1948 rules and the superseding of those rules by the 1952 rules, are however still entitled to automatic citizenship without a paternal birth-certificate. Children born between September 1952 and August 1957 of fathers who held at the time of the child's birth an original document of state nationality by operation of law under the 1952 rules are also still eligible without a paternal birth-certificate! It was suggested to the author that it was easier to devalue a British Federal document than one issued (in theory) by the Sultan.²⁷ But even this facile explanation overlooks that the continued validity of the pre-1952 documents after 1952 was guaranteed by those very state laws of September 13th 1952. Insistence on birth-certificates across the board would have made sense but the creation of new categories of privileged and under-privileged simply brings the law into further discredit.

This change in the ground rules has affected mostly the Thais of Bachok

and Pasir Mas districts, i.e. at Maalaj and Bangsã' of the villages known to the author. The group of juveniles affected is actually quite small, barring a mad attempt by the bureaucracy to round up all cards issued in error. Only the age-group 11-13 in 1967 (10-12 in 1966 when the loophole was closed) stood to benefit by a continuation of the special status of the operation-of-law citizenship issued under the 1948 rules. The 0-10 age-group in 1967 will get blue cards in any case from 1969. But unequal treatment between siblings in one family causes considerable resentment and distrust towards the administration,

A very characteristic group among the Thais is the 21-31 year-olds with red cards. In Pasir Puteh district, of 60 Thais in the age group, only 10 had blue cards, 3 had red cards but possessed a birth-certificate (one at Samöörag dated 1941, two more applied for retrospectively by the parent), and 47 had red cards and no birth-certificate. They lack birth-certificates almost by definition, being born, like their parents, before the British Military Administration (1946). As an under-31 group they were too young in 1957, 10 years earlier, to be affected by the mass hand-out.²⁸ Without their own birth-certificates²⁹ they are not qualified for consideration under the registration rules now in force, but must apply, as aliens, for naturalisation.³⁰

Naturalisation involves an 'adequate' knowledge of Malay, not just the elementary knowledge prescribed for registration. Candidates must prove residence in the country for 10 out of the last 12 years. Six out of the seven young men entering the monkhood at Samöörag in 1967 were in this category. They did not complain of any specific loss of rights, but are hurt and alienated by the suspicion which accrues to them as 'aliens' when involved in procedures

like a police check at road blocks. Red card holders are questioned closely about their background and destination. Perhaps aliens should be subject to this inconvenience; but the ultimate irony and insult of the red cards held by the Kelantan Thai is that their birth-place on the card is given clearly as Kelantan.

In Pasir Puteh district only 37 out of 253 in the 31-plus age-group have red cards. Most of these are old people who were discouraged from requesting citizenship in 1957 on the ground that they were already title-holders of their land and would not need citizenship in order to inherit it. The politicians probably doubted whether they could rely on the elderly to make the journey to the poll at election time. These elderly people accepted the idea and they still express no resentment. But there are not a few people of middle age, over 30, who were simply absent from the villages on the day when the hand-out occurred, and who want citizenship.³¹ This group is largest in Jung Kaw because the Penghulu there was a Malay supporting the PMIP: on the day when he brought the certificates for distribution he instructed only one person from each household to come. Often the woman has citizenship but the husband, who was in the fields at the time, hasn't.

Not the least of the difficulties in analyzing the citizenship status of the Kelantan Thais lies in the great variation in practice from one district to another across the years. Clearly some villages have less reason for discontent than others.³²

In closing one should add that Malays too who were not at some time handed a certificate of citizenship and who have no birth certificate or who

have lost it, are treated just as strictly by the administration. However, a Malay, to claim citizenship by operation of law has only to prove that he was born in Malaya, not that his father too was a native.³² It is not only the bureaucratic concern with proof that discriminates against the Thais. The Malayan Constitution distinguishes between two types of population for citizenship purposes: the Malays and aboriginal tribes; and the rest. The 'rest' are assumed to be immigrants and are expected to accept certain conditions for citizenship. The indigenous Kelantan Thai are grouped, as non-Malays, with the immigrant races and are subject to the same disabilities. However, the disabilities only become apparent when bureaucratic pedantry transfers the Thais effectively from the 3rd generation category (where rights to citizenship are equivalent to Malay rights) into the 2nd (registrable) or even the 1st (naturalisable) category of immigrants. Disability is compounded by illiteracy and poor communications and the machinations of petition writers, which make the rules more of an obstacle than they are to the Chinese for whom they were designed.

It is an irony that the Federal authorities should have made the rules regressive in their application even while the formal trend is to a much more liberal position (compared to 1948 and 1952) under M.C.A. pressure. Some civil servants pride themselves on doing their job better than the British did it, but in failing to know the conditions of rural life (as in regard to birth-certificates) and of district administration and politics, they apply the laws in an extremely formalistic spirit, and deprive them of a vital element of popular identification. It was the curious quality of British law never to

seem unintelligible, obscure or remote. Perhaps the much less complex nature of administrative problems in earlier years helped as much as the readiness of the British administrators to bring the law - personified by their own physical presence - into the kampongs. In the popular Thai view everything is of a pattern. The concept of citizenship was first introduced to them by the British and its acquisition was facilitated or encouraged. Now "the Malays" are taking it away.³⁴ The Thais are stunned and angered by the developments of the last ten years. That they still strongly assert their rights to citizenship is one sign of the potential for integration which, as Chapter V will show, enjoys a certain realization even now.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Naaj Baan and Caw Dääng (the most educated layman), who had been called to the district office a fortnight previously to hear the D.O.'s earnest wish that the author and his family be accommodated in the village; the carpenter who had completed the house ready for occupation; and the house's owner.
2. Viz: (apart from Kelantan Timor), Kelantan Utara and Kelantan Tengah. See Appendix VI, p.271 for candidates and results of the 1955 election to the Legislative Council of the Federation of Malay, held in Kelantan.
3. At each of the villages visited on the author's tour in August 1967 the question of the village's alignment in 1955 was discussed with some half dozen intelligent informants, who were asked to say both how they personally voted and how the village as a whole behaved at that time.
4. There have, of course, been six country-wide elections (State and Federal) in Malaya since 1955. The Thais of Semerak have only participated in five because the state-assembly seat for their district was uncontested in 1955. In the 1955 election to the Kelantan state assembly all 16 elective seats went to the Alliance - 8 unopposed, 8 contested (see The Straits Times 21 September 1955). In Kelantan this success merely echoed the earlier victory in the Federal elections. Only three of the state elections of this period can claim the historian's attention as events which demonstrated the validity of the Alliance formula and thereby boosted Alliance self-confidence for the General Election campaign to come. (These would be the Trengganu election, October 1954, the Johore election, November 1954, and the Penang election, February 1955). But it is surprising and regrettable, in any case, that K.J.Ratnam should have seen fit to play down the first series of state elections, even to the extent of writing: "Only municipal and town council elections were held between 1952 and 1955, the first general elections being held in July 1955." (K.J.Ratnam, "Political Parties and Pressure Groups", in Wang Gang Wu, ed., Malaysia, A Survey, London 1964; Chapter 22, note 4, p.438). Ratnam's collaborator, R.S.Milne, has written: "So far there have been three General Elections in Malaya, in 1955 for 52 out of 98 seats in the Legislative Council, and in 1959 and 1964 for 104 seats in the Federal Parliament. In 1959 and 1964 there were also elections for the state legislatures in Malaya..." (R.S.Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia, Boston 1967, p.95.)
5. The alignment of the Penggawa is itself a factor which must not be discounted, it is true, in the explaining of why the Thais vote as they do. But at Samöörag in 1955, as subsequently, there was at least no conflict between natural party preference and obedience to the Penggawa. And while the Thais of Samöörag sometimes say they support the Alliance today because it is the Penggawa's party, this is very rarely said of the pro-Negara vote in 1955: Negara was the party for British rule and that was the primary consideration. Another, subsidiary consideration however was that Negara was the party of Dato Nik Kamil, ex-Mentri Besar - see note 4 Chapter V, p. 156 - and a candidate in Kelantan Selatan constituency.

6. The rise of Parti Negara is described in several works on the period, including K.J.Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 1965; pp. 158-9.
7. The Straits Times, 27 April 1955.
8. This latter analysis is suggested by a Straits Times leading article entitled "The Promised Land": The Straits Times, 21 June 1955.
9. Viz., Ulu Kelantan Timor, where a Malay won for the Alliance, and Bandar Hilir, which fell to an MCA candidate: see The Straits Times, 26 June 1959. In the parliamentary elections held on August 19th 1959, only 1 out of 10 seats - Ulu Kelantan - was retained by the Alliance: see The Straits Times, August 20 1959. See also Appendix VII for candidates and full results of the 1959 State Elections and Appendix VIII for the Federal Parliamentary Elections which followed.
10. Viz., Tanah Merah Timor (Baan Thaasong) where Negara polled 980 votes of 6,435 cast; Bachok Tengah (Baan Maalaj) where Negara polled 405 votes of 6,122 cast; Kota Bharu Timor (Baan Sadang) where Negara polled 229 votes of the 6,865 cast (deposit lost); Tumpat Tengah (Baan Boqsamed, Baan Naj, Khoog Sijaa, etc.) where Negara polled 968 votes of 5,762 cast.
11. This is the view of C.W.Sook himself. See Chapter VIII, p. 239, for a further consideration of this candidature.
12. See Appendix X for results of the 1964 State Elections and Appendix XI for the Kelantan elections to federal seats.
13. This occurs mostly at the local level, without fanfare. But the PMIP government seemed within the grasp of the fate that befell the PMIP government of Trengganu in 1961, when in August 1968 one Independent (PMIP prior to 1965) and three PMIP assemblymen joined UMNO, a further PMIP assemblyman becoming independent. (Berita Harian 19 August 1968). However, within two days PMIP had recovered 2 of its 3 defectors to UMNO plus the temporary Independent. UMNO retained only the former Independent and one of the PMIP defectors.
14. A native of Kelantan (see Appendix IX for the definition) needs no permission to buy land in Kelantan as such, but if he is not a Malay he usually does need permission, most of Kelantan being declared Malay Reservation. Much of the current buying of land in and on the outskirts of Kota Bharu by Chinese magnates is in breach both of the Malay Reservation Enactment (because they are Chinese) and of the laws preferring natives of Kelantan. These Chinese and some big Malay investors are from the west coast. A Malay from outside the state must seek permission to buy land even in Malay Reservation. No state of Malaya is so strict on this point as Kelantan. Its special position is preserved in the National Land Code 1965.

15. See Chapter III, p.89, for the preamble of a petition written on this occasion, and Chapter V, p. 143, for an analysis in terms of how redress was sought.
16. This has been the case since 1959 but in 1955 all adult Thais were allowed to vote. Non-citizens were thus disenfranchised after Independence. Then in 1960 they received red identity cards. There are four colours of identity card: blue for citizens; red for permanently resident aliens; green for temporary residents; brown for persons with a criminal record. Possession of an 'I-C' has been genuinely enforced since 1960 when the new plastic-laminated cards in four colours were introduced to replace the British issue. More potent than any fine in impressing the importance of a card, however, have been the rights attaching to its possession (it has been treated until very recently as the equivalent of a document of citizenship; but see p. 128 infra re. changing interpretations.)
17. Under the (Malaysia) Citizenship Laws 1964, Part III 15 (3): "...a person under the age of 21 years who was born before the beginning of October 1962 and whose father is (or was at his death) a citizen but not a Singapore citizen, and was also a citizen at the beginning of that month if still alive, is entitled upon application made to the Federal Government by his parent or guardian to be registered as a citizen if the Federal Government is satisfied that he is ordinarily resident in the Federation outside Singapore and is of good character."
18. Under the (Malaysia) Citizenship Laws 1964, Part III 16: "...any person of or over the age of 18 years who was born in the Federation before Merdeka Day is entitled upon making application to the Federal Government to be registered as a citizen if he satisfies the Federal Government
 - (a) that he has resided in the Federation outside Singapore during the seven years immediately preceding the date of the application for periods amounting in aggregate to not less than five years;
 - (b) that he intends to do so permanently;
 - (c) that he is of good character; and
 - (d) that he has an elementary knowledge of the Malay language."
19. As under Kelantan Enactment No.2 of 1952; 4(c): "any person born before, on or after the prescribed date [i.e. 13 September 1952] in the state, one of whose parents was born in the Federation of Malaya..." [shall be a subject of the Ruler of the state by operation of law and hence a citizen of the Federation].
20. The 'Templer' laws of 1952 (the State Citizenship Enactments) had as one aim the "crystallization of a nation" in face of Communist rebellion - F.G.Carnell: "Malayan Citizenship Legislation" in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, October 1952 - even though Federal citizenship was to be acquired chiefly through the medium of State Citizenship, a device which one observer characterised as a step "not forward but backward towards the feudal period of Malayan history": Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Modern Malaya (Background to Malay Series, 9) Singapore,

1960, p.51. But the citizenship issued by operation of law at Bachok and Pasir Mas to many Thais came under the 1948 Agreement on Federal Citizenship and as such would seem to advance the date of British interest in Malayan nation-building. Of course the Alliance legend that only the Alliance aspired to creating a nation, while the British merely divided to rule, was already belied by the 1946 proposals for Malayan Union which the Malay interest, represented in Umno, boycotted.

21. A "Certificate of Citizenship issued under Article 30 of the Constitution (The Citizenship (Registration Authority) Rules 1957 - Form K1 (Rule 15))". This document declares that: "Whereas a doubt has arisen whether the person....is a citizen....and the said person has made application....for a certificate that he is a citizen....the registration authority is satisfied on the evidence produced to him that such certificate should be granted...." At that time application rarely needed to be made by the 'applicant' and no evidence worth the name was elicited from him.
22. The bureaucracy invokes legal history and points to the fact that registration of birth became compulsory in 1926. But without accompanying advantages or sanctions, laws like this take time to become operative. They must also be understood by the Pengawas who were supposed to issue the certificates of birth before the war. Furthermore, paper documents have a comparatively short life in villages where they are vulnerable to damp and termites. 30 years would be an unusual period for a small scrap of a birth-certificate to survive. The author only ever saw the remains of one pre-war birth certificate at Samöbrag, dated 1941.
23. The test is in Standard Malay, not dialect, but the level demanded varies enormously from district to district, depending often on the political views of the chairman. In Tumpat district the latter is the D.O., a PMIP supporter, who asks Thai naturalisation candidates to name the Sultan of Kelantan and the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia. For registration the standard is supposed to be 'elementary', for naturalisation 'adequate'. These categories are obviously open to a wide range of individual discretion.
24. Kelantan Enactment No.2 of 1952; 4(d): "any person not being a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies who was born in the state and under the provisions of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 at any time in force was immediately before the prescribed date a Federal citizen..." /shall be a subject of the Ruler of the state by operation of law and hence a citizen of the Federation/.
25. Kelantan Enactment No.2 of 1952; 4(f): "any person, wherever born, whose father....(i) was born in the state and, at the time of the birth of such person, was, under the provisions of this Enactment, or would have been had the provisions of this Enactment been then in force, a subject of the Ruler;...." /shall be a subject of the Ruler of the State by operation of law and hence a citizen of the Federation/.

26. Blue cards were issued to children without formality. No certificate of citizenship was made out. The blue card was sufficient proof until very recently of citizenship.
27. Much of the above information was acquired in discussions with two Federal Registrars at Kota Bharu and their clerks at the Registry, Wakaf Siku, Kota Bharu.
28. Some at the upper end of the 21-30 group at Maalaj were actually given operation-of-law citizenship by the British in the 1949-52 period, when they were aged 12. Also many other juveniles now in the 31+ group, who in other villages would have been affected by the 1957-8 distribution.
29. If a parent still lives it is possible to make a retrospective report of the birth. But the procedure is little publicised in the Thai villages, and besides involving a small fine for making the report late, involves the services of a petition-writer too. Some petition-writers are efficient and honest but minor fortunes (by peasant standards) are sometimes lost to persons posing as petition-writers and promising to win favours from the administration which are (in reality) either unobtainable or obtainable without charge. Fear of what is believed to be unavoidable heavy expense keeps many peasants away from the District Office.
30. Under the Malaysia Citizenship Laws 1964: 19 (1), (2) and (3).
31. In Trengganu and some parts of Kelantan this group were given a respite in 1962 when some numbers of Registrations were given to bona fide applicants without birth-certificates.
32. The situation in Pasir Puteh district as of early 1967 - which is worse than Bachok and Pasir Mas but better than West Tumpat (the part of Tumpat district where Jung Kaw is located) - may be summarised thus:
Under 10 (total 207): 207 without cards but all will be accepted as citizens after 1969:
10-20 (total 104): 95 either have or will soon have red cards but they have birth-certificates;
7 have blue cards;
2 have red cards and no birth-certificates;
21-30 (total 60): 47 have red cards and no birth-certificates;
10 have blue cards;
3 have red cards but possess birth-certificates;
31+ (total 253): 190 have blue cards as a result of the free distribution of citizenship, in 1957 and 1958;
21 have blue cards on some other form of citizenship;
37 have red cards and no birth-certificate;
5 not known.

(Total population: 624)

33. Kelantan Enactment No.2 of 1952; 4(b): "any Malay born before, on or after the prescribed date in the State" shall be a subject of the Ruler of the state by operation of law and hence a citizen of the Federation⁷.

34. The Thais cannot locate Independence with any exactitude. There is a quite general idea that the 1957-9 hand-out of citizenship was done by the British; the Malay government thus gets less than full credit for it. The elections of 1959 and the coming to power of the PMIP mark the most conspicuous watershed in recent history. Everything before that tends to be grouped under the British auspices.

CHAPTER V: DIMENSIONS OF INTEGRATION

Since we have emphasised the importance, following the colonial experience, of Thai perceptions of the overall societal structure of Kelantan - their model of ethnic ranking - for identification with and legitimation of the socio-political system in which they find themselves, it is to the point to begin a chapter on elements of integration with a description of mitigating factors in the environment: factors which are obvious to the Thais, however selective and ideological their usual accounts of the world they live in. We will then proceed to describe Thai behaviour in relation to various governmental structures, behaviour being, we believe, as valuable an indicator of political integration as any statement by a subject. This same principle motivated the description of good relations with Malay neighbours at the end of Chapter II.

The Malayan Federalism which has made state power possible for the RMIP in Kelantan and has led to a good measure of Thai alienation, is yet strikingly circumscribed by the standards of some federal systems. Federal power is most tangibly represented in Kelantan by the police, who protect civil rights and maintain order efficiently, contrary to PMIP boasts of omnipotence. The police at Cherang Ruku in 1967 were indeed readier to prosecute the minor offences of PMIP men than of others because the wife of the assemblyman had claimed publicly that the police were 'in her hand'. As if to disprove her pretensions, an extraordinary incident occurred in that year, when thefts of stores from the R.A.F. Holding Company at Gong Kedak airfield were traced to a pro-PMIP Penghulu. Suspicion fell from thence on the assemblyman. His ostentatious modern house was surrounded one night by R.A.F. Police, while the

house was searched by a high-ranking officer of the Malayan Police, accompanied by an Englishman. Even without this rebuke to the party's claims of immunity, the Thais have the regular assurance of the policemen's sympathy in the latter's taste for good toddy, which only the Thais make. Indian policemen have a taste bordering on addiction. It is in fact illegal to sell toddy without a licence, and the police are abetting an offence in providing custom. The Thais would never try to make capital out of the indiscretion, for police good will is too precious to lose. But the illicit rice mill in Samörag village is known to the Officer Commanding Police District (a Malayan Indian) and Nuj Kong may operate it discreetly in the knowledge that no action will be taken. In Kelantan the police need all the friendly citizens they can find and if the Thais provide toddy for off-duty delectation, so much the better. The Thais enjoy a measure of immunity as a matter of course. The relationship is one of unwritten reciprocity.

The Chinese, Indian and Malay officers of the Federal Police, as men often of West Coast origin, seem to personify the principle of multi-racialism on which the national political system of Malaya is built. Nor are they mere neutral servants of the Federal Government, but strongly identify with Alliance principles of racial parity, modernisation, and national development, of which they are the vanguard on the East Coast. The Malay constables (more often Kelantan men) are likewise identified with the Alliance and committed proudly to ideas of modernisation and rationalised government, against the PMIP's obscurantism and peasant backwardness.

One very important right which federal power guarantees in Kelantan is, of course, the freedom of political association itself. Alliance political

organisation is strong in the state and puts out quantities of propaganda, including propaganda for multi-racialism. Little demonstrates better Kelantan's lack of autonomy from outside influences than the presence of this characteristically West Coast ideology of ethnic parity - an ideology dear to Thai hearts but incapable of arising spontaneously in Kelantan circumstances of overwhelming Malay dominance. This ideology is brought to Thai ears regularly by both Malay neighbours (UMNO supporters) and Chinese kinsmen or employers, anxious to keep up Thai spirits and their party loyalty. Although this propaganda may be storing up nothing but disappointment and reaction for the time when inflated hopes are frustrated (numerous Thais are unaware of Malay dominance in the Alliance, even in Kelantan), the result of Alliance activity for the moment is to lend the Kelantan world a far less formidable aspect than if it were totally dominated by the PMIP. At Samörag, invitations to rallies from UMNO stalwarts in nearby Kampong Lembah add a new opportunity for association on equal terms to the existing pattern of invitations to wedding feasts. Some Thais are in almost daily contact, through employment, with Malays who have no superior pretensions and no arrogance of religion, and whose friendly disposition is verbally enhanced by the repetition of Alliance slogans about racial partnership if the individual is a party enthusiast. The bitter division brought to Kelantan Malay society by the rise of politics is apparent to the Thais, and although the most sceptical among them will dismiss it as a new variant of old Malay feuding, and put all the good in the Alliance down to the Chinese, yet the Malays' ideological division and the chance of a change of government in 1969 do qualify Thai pessimism and alienation. Meanwhile the Chinese, some of whom are kinsmen or employers to Thais, continue

to enjoy a privileged economic position and are a prominent element in the Kelantan Alliance, both giving local substance to the imported principle of ethnic partnership in politics, and lending to the Thais, as their successful urban elite, a sense that a certain parity with the Malay ethnic category is preserved, in spite of 'Malay rule'. And indeed, one element in Malay peasant society itself - the modernising UMNO partisans - give moral support and a limited realisation to such parity through their courteous, undomineering relationships with the Thais.

A further point of continuity from the colonial period is the state's administrative structure. It is difficult to attribute this directly to federal power, except in that the practice of legality in general reflects the Central Government's guarantee of law at all levels. The PMIP government of Kelantan has found its bureaucracy an adaptable enough instrument for its purposes to be happy to retain it, anyway (albeit with D.O.s and Penggawas whose prestige has declined in proportion to the rise of party influence within this structure). But whatever the case, the structure and the familiar, often pro-Alliance personnel are still there, giving their services promptly and fairly to any race in matters not challenging PMIP priorities. Land is transmitted speedily, ordinary land-rent is accepted without delay, and calls to attend the district office are always received. Notwithstanding PMIP infiltration of the district office, the D.O.'s personal room generally remains accessible and his office comprehensible to a community so many of whose habits and expectations vis-à-vis the administration were formed under the British. And there is a familiarity with, and acceptance of, procedures, and a confidence of redress, that surely cannot be overlooked as indicators of

integration.

Striking evidence of such confidence was provided by the reaction of the villagers involved in the 'false survey' incident at Samöörag in July 1966.¹ Seven men went out to remonstrate with the would-be 'Survey Officer' when they heard of his plans - most of them taking their licences with them. Only one man, Nuj Kong - a highly and exceptionally self-assured person, nicknamed 'Kong' because the Thais regard him as arrogant - threatened to fight anyone who came to take his land. But Nuj had good reason to discount the effectiveness of redress, because - equally exceptionally by Thai standards - he had no licence. The reaction of his arch-enemy, the law-abiding Caw Kähw, was more typical. He went straight to the Penggawa thereafter to enlist his help. His elder brother, Caw Sug, soon afterwards employed a petition-writer on behalf of all T.O.L.-holders to write to the Chief Minister and the District Officer (appealing against what was still thought, certainly, to be a move sanctioned by the administration, but under the unwholesome influence of party militants). Organising a petition, or paying a visit to the D.O. to lay a problem before him, are, in fact, the normal recourse of any Thai with a modicum of self-confidence and a command of the Malay language. In some places an active Alliance assemblyman or assembly candidate will be approached for a sympathetic hearing, especially if the D.O. is suspected to be a PMIP man; but there is nowhere in Kelantan where Thai villagers are without some channel for the communication and settlement of grievances. Indeed it is partly indicative of how the Thais have been impressed by the differentiation of Malay society, that they will label any administrator who shows them a favourable face: 'Alliance'; and the less amenable, or taciturn ones: 'PMIP',² re-

gardless of whatever their objective affiliations might be. This habit also indicates the considerable importance for the Thais of the issue of relative ethnic ranking: all Malays are seemingly judged by reference to their supposed stand on it. (And there are sufficient representatives of the 'right' view in administration and party structure, both to ensure effective Thai integration with these structures, and to add to their general social identification in terms of a sense that, through good treatment by administrators and politicians, the Thai race still enjoys a reasonably equitable position in society.)

Now an administrator's support for Alliance principles is assumed, even ascribed, so long as he conforms to certain administrative standards of fairness, accessibility, etc. Ethnic equality in practice thus appears to be a matter, very largely, of equal treatment at the hands of an administration - just as it was, indeed, under British rule. (Good treatment by one group of peasants is not the whole foundation of a sense of equality.) In short, the Thais' political integration is in terms not of democratic, 'mobilised', participation, but of a more traditional 'mode' of politics: that of the patron-client relationship, institutionalised in relations with the district administration and the Alliance Party (and no less an integrative relationship than democratic participation, provided the system rewards its clients' loyalty with whatever degree of attentiveness and security they consider fitting.)³ But it does not mean racial inferiority to take justice from a Malay D.O. or Penggawa, or to give support to a political party - Negara, Alliance⁴ - partly on the basis of standing 'dyadic ties' with Malay notables, school-teachers

D.O.s and Penggawas.⁵ For all the Thais' rational adherence to Alliance principles today, and equally rational support for Negara in 1955 as the anti-Independence party, patron-client relations between Thais and Malays have undoubtedly constituted an important bridge to the new political system ever since democratic activity began in Kelantan: a bridge no less important than the similar structure of relationships with wealthy Chinese and one prominent Tamil.⁶ Also, UMNO candidates and assemblymen are approached for assistance and favours in terms of the client or suppliant role familiar from encounters with Malay D.O.s. Now it is clear enough that the assimilation of British principles of administration, and continuation in office throughout British 'indirect' rule, have helped to legitimate the Malay administrative elite in recent times; while UMNO leaders, often recruited from the ranks of the bureaucracy (state or federal) still carry something of the colonial aura by speaking English. But Malay administrators and UMNO politicians are perceived to be Malay and are referred to as 'khääg', by the Thais, like any Malay peasant. We cannot avoid an attempt to analyse more deeply how it is possible for 'Malay rule' to be condemned, even while Malay patronage remains for the Thais a significant corner-stone in a legitimate political universe. What is the historical origin⁷ of these values (for Malay patronage), superficially at odds, as they are, with the more universalistic values of the structure of colonial society?

The situation to be explained is, in essence, that the Thais quite freely, almost ascriptively, award legitimacy to old and new Malay political structures and personnel; whereas it has been argued that, since the British experience, legitimacy should spring from a model of ethnic ranking in which no race dominates another. Of course it may be pointed out that good Malay administrators

conform to a certain style and tradition of administration and patronage, which treats the Thai public on an equal footing with the Malay public, and so preserves the sensation of equal ethnic ranking within the population by and large. But 'conformity to a certain style, etc.' still side-steps the question. How can a Malay meet the criteria?

Although today patronage is located both in the party system and the administrative structure (while not all members of the latter can be counted upon to be well-disposed towards Thais) the Malay bureaucracy and district administration was once the only political structure that the Thais knew, and it is difficult to escape the supposition that it was in the course of long interaction with this structure that the trait of amenability to Malay patronage became rooted in the Thai political culture. This structure remains the most relied upon even after the rise of an Alliance (party) presence in the state, and one senses that many Thais see it as their bulwark against 'the Party' (PMIP), not perceiving that technically 'the Party' is master of the bureaucratic structure, and overlooking conveniently that some members of the bureaucracy do support the PMIP. (Conversely, the Alliance is imperfectly distinguished from the bureaucratic structure, particularly where a respected Penggawa or D.O. are identified explicitly with that party.) Dependence upon the Penggawa at Samöörög is equalled by loyalty to his command, be it in turning out in force to vote, or in supplying labour to mend a public footbridge or lay turf for a visit of the Sultan to Semerak beach. There was an echo of a very ancient attachment in one Thai's justification of his loyalty: raw pen phraj khøong khwääng ("we are the Penggawa's folk"). This is a sentiment both older and more deeply-rooted than the colonial principle of the equality

of all races.

Certainly there is no a priori reason to imagine that, in the absence of Thai power in the 19th Century and earlier, the Thai minority lived in a political and social vacuum. We referred, in the course of Chapter III, to various Thais who took service with Malay rajahs or Sultans. The D.O.s of today are recruited from the social class of the erstwhile rajahs and petty warlords of Kelantan. Why should the declaration of loyalty read to the Sultan at the inauguration of Chief Abbots in Kelantan⁸ not be taken as serious evidence that the Sultans - and, no less likely, their hierarchy down to the lowest royal servant - were traditionally accepted as the Thais' patrons? Such a tradition would partly explain receptivity to Malay patronage today. From the years 1923 and (approximately) 1934, Mr. Nagaratnam recalls two instances when all the abbots of Kelantan, with a large number of their subordinate monks, were summoned to the Balai Besar (the Old Palace at Kota Bharu) to chant the montra 40 days and exorcise the evil forces brought to light when lightning struck the Sultan's flag-pole. Court circles of Kelantan speak today of their sense of a trust held traditionally for the Thais, and though one may doubt whether this trust was always perceived with the altruistic intensity that sentimental hindsight would have us believe, there is nothing spurious about the present attitude of the Malay elite that the Kelantan Thai are entitled to the state's generous hospitality and tolerance as one of its indigenous communities. For their part, the Thais not only assert their right, on the grounds of immemorial residence, to the status and privileges of citizens, but accept in a positive way, for similar reasons of immemorial clientship in a Malay system, that the state is a Sultanate.

In seeking further historical bases of the Thais' acceptance of Malay

authority, one's attention is attracted to the fact that the Sultan was in turn the King of Thailand's vassal. This however, seems to this author to have only a peripheral utility in explaining the legitimacy of Malay patronage. So far as Kelantan had a regular attachment at all to the Thai political system (the state was a vassal, at best, not a hua myang)⁹ it arose from the assertion of the hegemony of one political system (the Thai) over parts of another (the Malay) with which it came into contact through expansion. Although Thai expansion as a whole ethnic movement had produced pockets of Thai settlement within the Malay world as well, the hua myang of Patani and the vassals of Kelantan and Trengganu remained Malay states whose identity could never be subsumed in an overarching Thai identity in the way that may come about as Central Thai control is asserted over related groups like the Thaj Laaw¹⁰ and Thaj Lyy.¹¹ True, the Kelantan Thai themselves never surrendered their ethnic identity and religious orientation to Bangkok¹² and this could have political consequences in the future.¹³ But as soon as a politically legitimating function is sought in Bangkok's suzerainty over Kelantan, the danger arises of the analytical emphasis shifting from the Malay nature of rule in Kelantan to an analysis in terms of Thai power and an all-embracing Thai political system - features manifestly absent from Kelantan Thai memories and traditions about their situation before the coming of the British. We prefer to follow the peasant style of calculation, casting a pragmatic eye on the close, immediate, Malay environment for factors which may have contributed to the Thais' willingness to align their loyalties with Malay pengawas and rajas. What tangible and valued service could the traditional Malay elite traditionally offer?

The growth of good relations with Malay neighbours we attributed to change in Malay society in the modern era.¹⁴ But in this respect culture is still in a state of flux. Many women dwell in neurotic suspicion of Malay peasant intentions, children are still taught to fear kidnapping and circumcision, the very isolation of most Thai villages in areas of wholly Malay population moulds a culture of cautious, watchful, alienated quiescence. The rise of integrative traits is always in competition with this underlying alienation. The rise of the PMIP has confirmed traditional fears of the overwhelming Islamic flood. Yet if the fears are traditional, nor are the dangers new. The PMIP flourishes in a social context.

That context is a deeply Islamic populace long dominated by its religious officials (imams) and religious teachers (tok guru, ustaz). 'The First War' in Pasir Puteh district¹⁵ is remembered as a Malay peasant rising to drive out the British. Although one Engku Besar was involved in the movement, James de V. Allen notes, in his recent, brilliantly suggestive study,¹⁶ that two hajis and a penghulu (To' Janggut alias Haji Mat Hassan; Haji Said; and Penghulu Adam) were also leaders. Quoting Graham,¹⁷ Allen also observes:

"We are told that at the village level in Kelantan leadership was generally divided between the To' Kampong (subordinated through the To' Kweng to the Royal Family in Kota Bharu) and the imam. Supposing, as seems likely, the Royal House's control over the Pasir Puteh district was weak on account of the fact that it had been, until recent, troublous times, independent: it seems then likely that the imams - the hajis and such seyuids as there were - would have been correspondingly stronger there." 18

The comparative weakness, in one district, of the state structure, legitimated by the Sultan's authority, would not make it any less a refuge, in the eyes of the non-Muslim Thai minority, if Allen's insight on rural leadership is correct.

Encircled by the threatening Muslim mass, where else should the Thais have looked, in earlier times, but to the royal structure, or to some local high-class patron, for a counter-balance and protective shield? British rule having now proved to have been but an interlude, and peasant Islam having reverted to its old, threatening posture, a traditional cultural pattern, evolved in identical circumstances, has been found relevant once again. The superficially contradictory attitudes that (a) 'The Malays' should not be entrusted with rule; and (b) we live in a 'Malay State' whose laws we willingly obey: simply reflect the ancient reality of a dual structure of authority and leadership in Kelantan Malay society. The Malay law that Thais willingly obey is the law of the Sultan, the District Officer, the Penggawa.¹⁹ The Malays who should not be entrusted with rule and whom the British so unwisely let into office (haj pogkhrong) at Independence, are the imams and gurus and their mass following, today organised politically under the PMIP banner,²⁰ but no strangers in Thai experience.

All this is not to say that British rule internalised no important new values for an equitable ordering of ethnic ranking in society. It is the British experience that conditions the peculiar force of rejection and disgust towards 'Malay politics' today, even if fear of Malay peasant domination is already much older. That the environment also offers Malay patrons, in the bureaucracy and UMNO, and that a cultural pattern (of partly pre-colonial provenance) survives, through which Thais can use and legitimate these structures and personnel, are circumstances which mitigate but do not fundamentally alter the dissonance between colonial expectations and post-colonial realities.

Thai expectations are stricter, and are becoming stricter still as social mobilisation proceeds. Even the administration of benevolent, well-bred Malays will lose legitimacy in due course (and this trend is already apparent)²¹ if Thais are not trained up to responsible positions in the district administration, to personify ethnic parity at the higher level.

Nevertheless, for practical purposes and in the last resort, the emphasis must be on contemporary and future development. While the British experience did bequeath an 'ideological model' of the perfect social structure, the historical chapter in this study has made it clear that if the resident races were equally ranked among themselves in colonial society, all were in a position of inferiority in relation to the European power, whose subjects or clients they were. The system of political roles, the 'mode' of government, as it may be called, abstracted from the overall socio-political scheme, was not participatory but authoritarian, a system of patronage at best, not democracy. The Thais favoured it because British patrons offered superior guarantees against the Malay peasant menace, compared to Malay rulers. But if loyalty was offered more freely to the new system, the Thais' political role remained that of subjects of power, not that of participants in power. The British established no independent political structure for the Thais - with the potential exception of the direct appointments of Thai Naa-j Baan (Penghulus), by British officers. But this only enhanced the subjective status of the Thais without giving them the institutional means to assert an independent political existence as a community after the British withdrawal. The authority of individual Naa-j Baan was confined to their own villages, and

even if reputations sometimes spread among the Kelantan Thai community, a political role was out of the question for a government servant particularly when the whole administrative structure was handed over to the Malays in 1957.

It is only possible to conclude the analysis of the British impact with an emphasis on the failure of the British either to establish for the Thais an independent political structure; or to implant the ideas of an independent, positive, role and of popular sovereignty. Indeed popular sovereignty with its inherent advantage to the majority is precisely what the Thais thank colonial rule for not introducing (except in its final moment of aberration at Merdeka). The British were the true pillars of continuity from the past, more so, in a sense, than Malay notables and D.O.s themselves. The Thais' ideology is distinctly impoverished. With no independent political structure to boot, the Thais were ill-prepared to challenge the rise of Malay peasant hegemony, and this provides one more fundamental - although negative - reason why the Thais accommodate themselves so well to the new political situation. They have upgraded expectations of government and society which English-educated Malay patrons are still able partly to satisfy; while another precondition of national integration is fulfilled: a consonance of political tradition between rulers (one section of them) and ruled, an 'identific' consensus between the two sides about the desirable 'mode' or 'formula' of the political system.²² Structurally, the Thais are integrated as clients ("organised for common purposes" in Weiner's terms) with the long-established district administration and the newer Alliance party, whose personnel is often recruited from an identical milieu with the former. But the British political system has also

left the Thais unequipped for anything but a client or subject role, and the good government which is 'expected' is bestowed, it does not yet stem from popular will. If the Thais felt entitled to choose their rulers, the rejection of Malay rule, indeed, would be less easily diluted by considerations of the quality of administration. Methodologically, it is plain that the analysis of a colonial plural society, even with ample attention to assimilated values of general identification and legitimation (or their opposites) may be incomplete without a consideration of the political dynamics. The subject-client relationship (the 'mode' of Thai politics) that has emerged from the pages of this chapter is not just one form of integrative response. It is a feature of political culture which has drastically limited the possibilities of resistance to changed conditions, even where these conditions are felt to lack legitimacy.

Be this all as it may, the Thais now know that Malay rule, high-class or peasant, is not an historic necessity.²³ The ideology of equal ethnic status may give no immediate guidance as to a role by which to struggle against loss of status, but the aspiration to equality remains and further change can hardly be towards a less universalistic ambience: the aspiration is almost bound to increase as change in the environment gathers pace and mobilisation goes forward. Acceptance of the patronage of the Alliance or of Malay administrators is effected with a skill which comes from long experience - and which colonial rule, where not directly fostering, did little to reverse - but it all has a certain air of the provisional.

Transition is a dynamic state, like integration itself. There is movement -

forward or back. Current experience is adding greater insistence to the ideal of equal status. At the same time, Thai cultural identity remains strong. The questions for the future are (a) whether a political structure can or will come into being to institutionalise a new, and self-assertive, democratic-type role for the Thais; and (b) whether such a structure will be used to struggle out of the system or into it, i.e. whether its resistance to discrimination will take the form of progressive alienation, or lead to progressive integration. If a political structure arises, the identity of the interests sponsoring it will have a bearing on the function that it adopts.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Chapter III, p.89 , and Chapter IV p. 122, for further details relating to this incident.
2. The terms for these parties among the Thais are:
Alliance: Parigkhatan (Malay 'perikatan'): Ammanuu (English and Malay 'UMNO'); rya baj (Thai for 'sailing ship', the Alliance symbol);
PMIP: Pha^h (from the Jawi anagram, B-A-S, of 'Parti Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu' - the Kelantanese final aspirate in place of s is reproduced by phonemic adoption in the Thai); daw dyan (Thai for 'star and moon', the PMIP symbol); Phaathii (from English and Malay party/parti - only the PMIP is 'the Party' in Kelantan, the Alliance is not).
3. The term 'mode', first introduced into the discussion at Chapter I, p23, seemed a suitable term for what might just as well be called the 'style' of government. Integration is facilitated where the style of government is acceptable to the governed. This rather intangible facet of integration seemed to need distinguishing from skills relating to the use of specific structures (such as a district administration with familiar procedures): it concerns a more fundamental, ideological agreement, and hence integration, between the two sides about their roles in the political system. Weiner is talking about something similar when he refers to integration as (by one definition) a process of bridging a communications gap between elite and governed, and (another definition) the achievement of a minimum value consensus about legal norms. (Myron Weiner Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, op.cit., pp.53-54) Claude Ake's essay, A Theory of Political Integration, speaks of 'identific' political systems, of which one characteristic is acceptance by the governed of the 'political formula' of the political class. The term 'political formula' is taken in turn from Gaetano Mosca, and corresponds to what the author of this dissertation has meant by 'mode' (Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, Illinois, 1967; especially pp.108-111.)
4. At Maalaj, the late Naaj, as recounted by his son, recognised an obligation to a certain Malay patron to use his influence in the village to win support for Parti Negara in 1955. At Sam⁸⁸rag, apart from the fact that the Penggawa at that time supported Negara (c.p. Chapter IV, p.112) the Naaj, To' Naaj K⁹⁹j, was influenced in the advice he gave his fellow Thais by a special meeting which was held at Pasir Puteh by Dato Onn bin Ja'afar himself with the Penggawas and Penghulus of the district, and at which Onn solicited their support. At Jung Kaw, where the 1955 vote was divided between Alliance and Negara, the cooperative rice miller, Caw Saw, said that he had voted Alliance because the Chairman of his Cooperative was a Malay aristocrat to whom he recognised an elementary allegiance and obligation in such matters. The Cooperative Chairman had

indicated that all his licence-holders would please him by supporting Tengku Abdul Rahman. One of Kelantan's notables who suffers nothing at all in Thai eyes from being a Malay, and whose party allegiance was an influence on the Thai orientation in 1955, is Dato Nik Abdul Kamil. He was in Kelantan service from 1931 till 1952 and was Mentri Besar when he left the state on transfer to the Federal Government (see biographical note in The Straits Times 10 March 1955). Noel Ross informed the author (personal communication dated 1. 6. 1966) that as Mentri Besar "he did much to try to raise the prestige of the Thai abbots of monasteries in Kelantan and give them some status." L.H.Gorsuch, Esq., O.B.E., informed the author that Nik Kamil's father was Dato' Perdana Mentri before him (personal communication dated 9. 6. 1966). In 1955 Nik Kamil led Parti Negara in the Federal elections in Kelantan, but was defeated. In 1964 he returned to fight a Kota Bharu seat for the Alliance, and won, but hopes that he would become an active force again in Kelantan life were to be disappointed for the time being. In December 1966 he was replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister as Chairman of Kelantan UMNO State Liaison Committee (see The Straits Times, 28.12.1966). But Caw DAAng of SamBrag, unaware of Nik Kamil's multiple interests outside the state, still says "If only we could get word to Nik Kamil about our problems, he would do something."

5. Malay school-teachers were among those who brought round certificates of citizenship in 1957-8, and have canvassed for the Alliance since. Malay headmasters at Batu Balai and Pog Kiang in Trengganu (see Chapter VIII, note 24, p. 252) took the lead in coopting their local Thais as members of UMNO in 1965. But a Malay Penghulu or Penggawa nowadays will only exert his influence over Thais when he himself is an Alliance supporter, for the Thais are now sufficiently aware of issues to reject any party but the Alliance. Thus a pro-PMIP Penghulu or Penggawa neglects them at all times, including elections, and makes no attempt to win them over. A pro-Alliance Penghulu or Penggawa, on the other hand, is preaching to the already converted: all he can do is to aim for a full election turn-out. Looking back to 1959, though, before the PMIP had taken power and become familiar to all the Thais, it was possible for one Malay Penghulu - at Jung Kaw - to win over a modest Thai support for the party. This (unique) event certainly demonstrates something of the importance of traditional ties in deciding the form of the Thais' initial entry into politics. Nevertheless, in the Jung Kaw case, a certain shop-keeper, Caw Nob, a likeable but eccentric worthy, who communicates both news and views to the community by the constant walking and 'visiting' (thiaw) to which his restless nature drives him, had been won over to the PMIP by the promise of a gun licence. Over and above the influence transmitted by the Penghulu through Caw Nob, PMIP canvassers had used mildly intimidatory tricks such as writing down Thais' identity-card numbers as if to seal pledges casually given to the canvasser to support his party at the election. These canvassers took advantage of the lack of Alliance propaganda in the area to project the PMIP (not too inaccur-

ately, as it turned out) as a party bound to take power and therefore worth supporting as the price of decent treatment after the election. Here we see the Thais acting out of uncertainty and fear. The nervous quiescence that we shall recur to (p. 149 , and note 19 , p. 158 , of this chapter) and have referred to before (Chapter II, p. 76) is distinct, at its extreme, from any integrative trait. The proverbial law-abiding of the Kelantan Thais, although productive of stability, is sometimes difficult to characterise as 'integration'.

6. Namely, Mr. Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu, a civil servant attached to the state bureaucracy as early as 1922, subsequently cloth merchant, cinema owner, philanthropist, and a leading figure in the Kelantan Alliance. His first service to the Thais was the court action he fought in 1946 on behalf of the wat at Baan Naj (see note 19, p. 159 , below). He explains his sympathy towards the Buddhists in terms of the likeness of Buddhism to Hinduism. However, his wife is a Kelantan Hokkien, which may have provided an initial point of access to the Thai community. There were two Chinese on the Board of Trustees set up on Mr. Nagaratnam's instance to have custody of all wat land in Kelantan, following the 1946 case. The five members were: the late Dato Kaya Budi, of Tumpat; a Mr. Ang Keng Yew of Kota Bharu; a Madame Ang of Kampong China, Kota Bharu. Concerning Chinese political influence over the Thais, the Chinese estate-owner and philanthropist mentioned at Chapter II, p. 67, (Mr. Aung Cui Li by name) disclaims any political interest or influence at all. But several taukehs were active in 1957/8 in the great hand-out of citizenship and registration of Alliance voters. The most significant example of Chinese patronage providing a bridge to democratic involvement, is Mr. Wee Suu Hung of Kampong China, whose role is fully related at Chapter VIII, pp. 239 et seq.
7. Strictly, one should seek independent historical evidence of relationships which could have formed the cultural patterns which we observe in the present. But once such evidence is found, it is tempting (and perhaps not altogether disreputable) to include one's cultural observations as further, retrospective, evidence for the existence of that formative historical situation.
8. See Chapter VII, p. 185, for further details of this ceremony.
9. See Chapter III, note 11, p. 106, on this point.
10. C.f. Charles F. Keyes, *op.cit.*, pp. 10-21, p. 59.
11. C.f. Michael Moerman, Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilisation: Who Are the Lue?, *American Anthropologist*, 67, October 1965; p. 1222; and Michael Moerman in Manning Nash, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

12. It is true that a common sight in Kelantan Thai homes is a picture of H.M. The King of Thailand. One receives a variety of explanations for this. "We put it there to look at" (= "It's a pretty picture"); "A visiting monk gave it to us"; "Someone gave it to me when I was in Thailand." This group of replies are the commonest and are not in the least insincere for being non-committal on the political implications. (Political implications may be sought by the observer but not be apparent to the subject.) One intelligent and politically conscious Thai at Samörag had asked a monk to bring a picture on his next visit - but the picture was "no good" because the King was without head-dress. Caw Kääw had only wanted the picture to protect his house from evil, and such protection is only guaranteed by the likeness of the King in full regalia, including his crown. There is another group of people who say they put up the picture "because he's the same race as we are" (man chaad diaw kab raw: man khon thaj, raw khon thaj). Only once at Samörag was the answer heard: "He's the King of Thailand and we are Thais too." But even this seemed no more than an expression of ethnic, not political identification. When the informants who had indicated some form of identification with the King were then asked: "Do you regard him as your King?", the reply was always: "No, we live here in Kelantan, the raja (phijaa) here is a Malay, and we obey him." There are no grounds at all for the patronising assumption of The Straits Times that "till a Thai Consulate was established in Kota Bharu which could gently tell them otherwise, they had thought themselves Thai nationals." (The Straits Times, editorial, 15 November 1966).
13. See Chapter VII, pp. 193-4.
14. See Chapter II, p. 76.
15. See Chapter III, p. 95.
16. James de V. Allen, Journal of South East Asian History, op.cit., p.247.
17. W.A.Graham, op.cit., pp.31 and 113.
18. James de V. Allen, op.cit., p.253. The To' Kweng was the head of the Kweng, as the 'Daerah' were called in those days. The term kweng, of Siamese origin, has given way in the course of the years to daerah, in the Malay language, while the To' Kweng has become Penggawa. The Thais however, still call the Penggawa "Khwääng".
19. Respect for the established law, however, can go to extremes, and merge with what we termed 'alienated quiescence' itself. For instance, there is quite pathetic respect accorded to documentary land title. When title first became registrable in this century, Malays as well as Thais would sometimes distribute their land to all their children on the

customary basis, but for convenience or cheapness sake only have the title registered in the name of the eldest son. The land then descends legally in that line, and come a day when the youngest in the line no longer feels the old force of obligation towards collaterals but discovers to his delight that he has official title, he may demand that 'his' land be handed over. At least this is what many fear will happen. The village can bring no sanctions to bear against such conduct. In an interesting action fought in 1946 by Mr. Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu on behalf of the abbot of Baan Naj against the descendant of a Thai who had made a customary transmission of his land to the wat in the 19th century - without making a legal transmission - the precedent was established that custom was to have greater force than documentary title in certain circumstances. But the doubt is probably justified whether Malay administrators at the District Office level will have the patience and empathy to follow the ramifications of a Thai family dispute if one is brought to them. And to take it to court is intimidating in several ways. Always the Thais' worst enemy will be their own doubts about the force of their own custom in official law and 'Malay law'.

20. The PMIP banner consists, significantly, of a yellow star and crescent on a green ground. The comparative weakness of the influence of a ruling-class type of elite in rural Kelantan may be partly attributable to the absence of large agricultural estates. The notables who led Parti Negara and the Alliance in 1955 proved too remote from the kampongs once the religious elite became mobilised as the Kelantan PMIP for the 1959 election. It was left to a few pro-Alliance Penggawas and school-teachers to salvage a nucleus of UMNO support in the midst of the PMIP land-slide.
21. It is often remarked that the Thai Government appoints Malays as D.O.s in South Thailand.
22. Refer again to note 3, p.155, of this chapter, for a discussion of these concepts.
23. A postscript on the argument of this chapter is to be found at Appendix XII, p.286.

CHAPTER VI: FURTHER ASPECTS OF CULTURE

The Thai of Kelantan described in Chapter II are a community of distinct culture, proud of their Buddhist religion. Religion is the area of culture least prone of all to assimilation - which is equivalent to saying that the Thais do not wish to lose their identity, for a Thai is essentially defined (among the Kelantan Thai) as a Buddhist, speaking the Thai language. The implication of such an attitude for integration is not, certainly, that integration cannot occur, but that it must occur in a sense 'unawares'. The Thais' religion is extremely tolerant and eclectic, and is far from being at the root of the Thais' (modified) refusal of legitimacy to Malay rule. But because it defines the Thai and indeed stipulates his nature rather precisely, it excludes from the Thai universe the notion of convergence of the races. Or if, in view of occasional inter-marriage, it is admitted grudgingly to be possible, convergence is certainly not regarded as permissible.

The sort of convergence described in the earlier chapters is not, fortunately, understood as convergence, because it does not encroach on what is essentially Thai. It does not encroach on the freedom of religion itself, or on the related freedom of language, and the community's leadership. Malaya allows complete religious freedom, although the official religion is Islam, and Malays (defined - note the parallel - as Muslims habitually speaking the Malay language) have more rights than other races. Education in the Malay language is acceptable to the Thais because of its entirely secular value and content; and it does not prescribe the Thai language nor exclude or rival the traditional elementary education in Thai which is necessary in order to become a monk. (Boys and girls nearing school age but not yet old enough to be called, like to attend wat school in the evenings in imitation

of their older siblings; thus Thai education is experienced in advance of Malay education but under Malay education's stimulus.) Malay rule and Malay patronage are structures bridging the Malay and the Thai worlds and involving the adaptation of one to the other; but the Thai community is not yet called upon to identify with Malay leadership by that free conviction which informs the relationship of a layman to his abbot (being based on the reciprocity of giving and receiving merit) or, for that matter, the relationship of villagers to a fellow Thai (secular) leader where such a figure arises. And these relationships within the community are preserved.

Freedom to do merit and to preserve special relationships with fellow Thais make a community which, while highly dependent on the Malay world in many ways, is spiritually complete and self-sufficient. This core of self-sufficiency centring round merit-making cannot be yielded, logically or morally, without the community's identity being forfeited. A Thai is stipulated in the community's universe to be a descendant of Thai ancestors who laboured to bring him into the world as a member of a Buddhist community. This priceless gift of human life (as a Buddhist), with its manifold opportunities to do merit, may be partly repaid by certain prescribed acts of such merit-making on one's parents' and ancestors' behalf.¹ No Thai leaves out these rudimentary acts of gratitude. But the fundamental goal of merit-making and of life itself is one's own Enlightenment.

This goal is not of itself chosen or optional, but inherent in any man's existence, being the ultimate end of every series of birth, death and rebirth. One is free within the limits of one's present capacity simply to acquire more or less merit and so advance along the road at a quicker or

slower pace. However, while all living creatures are involved in this eternal progression towards perfection, a Thai is born into a religion which has a special insight into man's condition and instructs its members in the best use of their present existence. There are very few Thais in Kelantan who could contemplate rejecting the opportunities which are their Thai birth-right, by ceasing to be Buddhists. The other motive - of adding gratefully to the merit of ones parents and ancestors - is as strong for some as the more self-interested one of acquiring it on one's own account. Four out of the seven young candidates for the monkhood at Samöörag in 1967 gave priority to the motive of adding to their parents' merit; one of these added the relief of the suffering of his ancestors. One primary basis of such feelings of gratitude and obligation seems to be that being born a Thai is a special privilege.

The foregoing is a description of some fundamental popular beliefs and attitudes in the Thai villages of Kelantan. These beliefs are freely expressed in moments of reflectiveness, or when praising or justifying the ceaseless round of wat ceremonies, or when answering a stranger's question about what it means to be a follower of the Buddha (thy phud). The author did not normally consult abbots or long-time monks on the meaning of Buddhism. His impression was that these more learned Thais were too sophisticated to be representative of all popular religious beliefs, yet not sufficiently emancipated from them, or sufficiently learned, to give expert guidance on doctrine. But so far as they were qualified to give proper guidance, their instruction might be expected to diverge significantly from the beliefs of the village folk at a number of points.²

For one thing, we are given to understand from our readings on Buddhism - and even from some writing on popular Buddhism in Thailand - that the aim of merit-making is to break out of a potentially endless cycle of death and rebirth. The Thai peasant in Kelantan has been encouraged in a more sanguine view. A long and virtuous life in which much merit is acquired will not remain unrewarded. A man will have advanced along the road towards a goal which he does not believe to be beyond ultimate reach; and even though no one knows how long the journey will last, provisional rewards are already assured in the next following life, in the form of an increased intelligence and awareness, increased happiness and fortune. The retribution for a bad life (baab) is just as certainly torment and a slipping back from the goal. The underlying concept is one not of cyclical but of linear progression.

It is also noticeable that the Kelantan Thai peasants give an important place to conventional virtue and conventional sin. An influential (if, alas, not always reliable) monograph³ strictly distinguished formal merit-making from virtuous living, as to their consequences in the future. Virtue was depicted as having an immediate, yet ephemeral, importance in a person's life. The Kelantan Thai peasant by contrast, while in no way planning or organising his virtuous conduct with a view to advantages in future lives, recognises rewards and penalties for the sort of life a person leads aside from formal religious observance. Karma, the capacity of the individual (not referred to as Karma among the Kelantan Thai) is recognised as a limiting factor, but within these limits a man is not further restricted to the temple round as the sole source of merit. Much merit (bun) was thought to accrue to the author of this study and to the author's wife as a result of their advice

and help to the villagers of Samõõrag.

The Kelantan Thai, then, in accordance with the normal Buddhist analysis, believe that all creatures are subject to laws of death and rebirth. It is not necessary to be a Buddhist to be subject to these laws, nor are other races unable to acquire merit. The Buddha's injunctions simply offer the better guidance on this point, which is one reason for wanting to remain a Buddhist and wanting to show gratitude to parents and ancestors,⁴ as already stated. But of course, one cannot do merit for the ancestors either without remaining a Buddhist; this, too, is an impulse, and a powerful one, to regarding oneself as irrevocably a Thai. And the still vital animistic tradition provides that an ancestral presence is felt; it is no mere memory that the Thais cherish. Also, one came from Thais and to Thais oneself must return. A Thai woman does not lose her identity by marrying a Chinese, but some people express reservations about the mixed offspring: their spirit will be tragically uncertain to which community it must return. As to becoming a Malay, the implications are profoundly disturbing. The most contemptible - almost the only contemptible - characteristic of the Chinese in the Thai view is the readiness of some of their number to sell baby girls to Malays.

The Thais seem not to make a distinction in their minds between honouring the dead by acts of merit-making and by invocations performed by a mōō together with offerings of food. Animistic observances have so penetrated the ceremonies of the wat that it is difficult to make a distinction physically, let alone conceptually, on occasion. The ceremony of Saj Raan (filling the stalls) at the end of the 10th month is held at the wat in association with a Saj Baad for the monks, but the prior intention is that food be placed on two

stalls for the spirits of the departed. Water is poured slowly into a bowl for them to drink before they leave the scene at the end of their annual feast. Water is poured in like manner by the surviving children and other close kin during the Suad Mon performed before and after cremations. On the other hand the animistic ceremony of Waj Khruu (honouring past teachers), performed at Samörag on the 4th day of the 5th month each year at the house of the Nqraa master, includes a chanted Pali 'Nammo tassa'.

Notwithstanding the interpenetration of two traditions, the Thais are constantly reminded of their dead. They attend to their wants in the same selfless spirit with which they attend to the material needs of living parents. Identification between living and dead is complete. A bad man who didn't observe his natural obligations would not cease to count as a Thai after death. His spirit, indeed, would have to account for his negligence to his ancestors, when he himself was called to join them. The world of Thai spirits has its Malay counterpart too, which makes this universe logically complete. Unidentified spirits which work mischief on Thais are usually assumed to be Malay. 'Spirits of the place', and 'guardian spirits' associated with one Thai community are favourable to Thais and not Malays. This by the way has one special consequence for attitudes to land: even Temporary Occupation Licence land, if opened originally and leased from the spirits of the place by Thais, is regarded as irrevocably Thai.

There is an unresolved contradiction between the belief that a spirit returns to its own, and the belief that the punishment for an evil life will be rebirth not as a Thai, not even necessarily as a human being, perhaps as some lower kind of life. People will muse: 'I wonder where we shall meet

next time - who knows what I shall be in the next life!' Such uncertainty is in strange contrast to the notion that there is one part of oneself which is irreducibly Thai, whatever Buddhist doctrine may say. The uncertainty is made easier to bear by this opposing current of reassurance to the effect that the Thai in one, at least, will not perish.⁵

Concerning religion, then, the Thai of Kelantan neither wish to cease to be Buddhist nor do they believe that it is possible to cease to be so. Buddhism is technically an option, but since one's ancestors were also Buddhists, this too has become part of the idea of a Thai, and tends to be as strictly prescribed as any other part of a Thai's nature. Indeed, if the Buddhism be taken away, there is little distinctive left besides the language. Buddhism has been effectively assimilated to the definition of a Thai, and the motives for observing Buddhist precepts are inextricable from the ancestral tradition.

Such attitudes may be discernible in rural Thailand too but they act in a Malay environment as a mechanism for preserving ethnic identity and boundaries. It seems a fair hypothesis that the special strength in Kelantan of the awareness of Thai ancestry, the perpetuity of the Thai self, and the two opposed communities of spirits, Malay and Thai, is attributable to peculiar environmental and historical circumstances. Today, although the Kelantan Thai are highly tolerant, as Buddhists, to other religions, the imperatives of the animistic and ancestral tradition restore the balance, working against Buddhism's inherent eclecticism, to declare that to yield a point here would be to lose all. In Thailand it is possible to become a Christian, or a Muslim, and to remain a Thai - at least in language and nationality. Not so in a Malay world. The survival of the community depends on sharp cultural boundaries, as sharp

as the boundaries which often divide a Thai settlement from the Malay land encircling it. The spirit community stands guard over these boundaries.

Politically, the consequences of this Thai identity are varied. On the one hand the Thais will react with determination and hostility to any move conceived as a threat to their identity. As the religion occupies such a large portion of that identity, freedom of religion is a major expectation from Government. However, this being allowed, and even fostered, by the Malayan Government, the Thais are not difficult to satisfy. Within the framework of religious freedom and cultural identity, political integration can proceed.

Nevertheless, integration must be on the basis of 'unity in diversity'. The ability to conceive of a society in an ideological scheme of whole racial entities, which touch but never mix, is a product as much of the cultural tradition as of the historical and political background of the community. Nor can it be doubted that the increasing communications from the world around and the sensation of a new status under British rule themselves added to self-awareness, even while the Thai and Malay communities were learning to live and work together as members of a common political system. Ethnic demarcation gives the Thais a curiously detached outlook on Malay politics at times, and the UMNO-PMIP struggle can be dismissed as a feud having entertainment value to the Thais. They accept invitations to Alliance rallies often for entertainment primarily. (But detachment is also fostered by the almost total irrelevance of UMNO speeches to Thai interests.)

In contrast yet again, Buddhism's eclecticism and tolerance, conscientiously taught by the monks, make it possible for Thais to judge individual

Malays on their merits. Thais are quite ungrudging in their praise for good Malay officials. This openness to other men's virtues assists the Thais' consciousness of the differentiation of the socio-political structure in Kelantan - mitigating the effects of conceiving society in terms of monolithic blocs or categories.

The several consequences of the primacy of religion are dwarfed, however, by its effects upon the structure of leadership within the community. Village life revolves around the wat. The great merit of the abbot and his important role in acts of merit-making by the laity, make him the undisputed head of each village community. The sanctity and learning of the Chief Abbot of Kelantan make him the equally undisputed head of the Kelantan Thai community as a whole.

Unlike in Thailand, the abbots are not approached to legitimate or lead government development programmes.⁶ There are no such programmes affecting Thais in Kelantan. But this, if anything is to the advantage of the Sangha's authority in village life, for the mobilisation of the monkhood in Thailand in a national secular role has been argued to have weakened the original basis of its prestige.⁷ In Kelantan the Sangha is concerned with village life and provides de facto village leadership, but from the firm base of the wat, without the secular role becoming explicit, diverse, and self-defeating.

Abbots' secular concerns vary with their intelligence and individual energy and social conscience. In the author's experience abbots undertake to dedicate new houses (suad ryan) and preside over the physical removal of houses from one site to another. The abbot of Samōrag initiated communal

work on the repair of a village road after the 1967 flood. (The headman of the village lacked the respect to achieve a response if he had tried to organise this activity - only a headman who is a strong personality in his own right, or an abbot, or an order from the administration, can mobilise Thais for a common purpose outside of religious activities or matters of kinship.) An abbot will sometimes approach D.O.s with petitions on behalf of his village or individual villagers, and help them fill in forms (if he can write Malay), or lead them to an appointment in Kota Bharu if they do not know the way.

But the authority of the abbot in all these things stems from his religious role. It is perhaps not so important that he pre-empts certain secular functions, as that his authority is there. Leadership in a Thai community is almost defined as the religious leadership because of the orientation of the people to the wat and the tendency to act communally almost exclusively in matters pertaining to religion. Other factors then assist the monkly pre-eminence.

It is the author's impression that the period of monkhood of all the male villagers bestows on each an equality of high status with his near contemporaries. Only men of advanced years with, preferably, a long spell in the monkhood or as Naaj Baan, have higher status than the rest; relative wealth is of very little, if any, significance at all. All men who have been monks are properly addressed and referred to as 'Caw' - literally, 'lord' - as: Caw Sug, Caw Nuj; rather than the more familiar (but also permitted) "A' Sug, "A' Nuj. Some villages use the 'Neen' prefix. It is therefore difficult for younger men of an intelligent and more assertive nature to adopt a leadership role and not be condemned as upstarts or power-lovers. Naturally

Buddhist culture inhibits the development of assertive personality traits; but basically the problem for would-be secular leadership is not that the community does not believe in higher secular status, but that high status has normally to be shared. No one should rise above the rest unless by virtue of age and great experience or wisdom. This attitude is combined with an incurable individualism which resists even small-scale cooperative effort - e.g. to repair a bund when ones own rice field is not immediately threatened by flood waters.⁸

In smaller hamlets without wats and closely encircled by Malays, the assertive personality type fills a de facto leadership role because of his ability to handle Malays and get things done. The prospects for this leadership structure look better than in the larger villages,⁹ with their formal channels of access to Malay authority through an appointed Naaj, and their abbots. The swagger and bravado of big Nuj (aged 45), at Samöörag, won him a ready following of the 17-19 year olds, and during the great flood he was a useful mobiliser of youthful manpower for felling dangerous coconut trees. But his contemporaries look askance at his pretensions.¹⁰ His nick-name 'Kong' means 'big-head'. This is really a great loss to the community politically, because Nuj alone among the Samöörag Thais has calculated the power of the Thai vote if with-held from the Alliance in marginal constituencies.¹¹ He also has exceptional mobility across the state and into Thailand as agent to a Chinese pig-dealer.

It may be asked what could not be made of the institution of Naaj Baan. But this seems on balance less a source of actual or potential leadership

than an obstruction to it. It pre-empts leadership just as the Sangha does. Even at the height of its prestige, when it was a direct British appointment, the office of Naaj Baan (Penghulu) was part of the administrative structure and had scant powers of initiative. As part of a Malay structure today - and especially if reduced to simple 'ketua kampong'¹² - its prestige is immeasurably less and the people willing to take the job increasingly the village dogs-bodies. Yet there it stands, and Thais will always reply if asked who is the chief person in the village: "Naaj lā'" ("the Naaj of course!"). Retired Naajs of the British period command in fact the greater respect; they exert influence on individuals who are susceptible and amenable to it; but as elderly men in retirement they have less motive to walk around and their magnificent presence is only experienced by those who visit them in their houses. And always the current Naaj remains the only man in frequent authoritative contact with all the people, albeit on petty matters and always at the Penggawa's hest.

It is not inconceivable that the Thais could have had an institution of secular village-level leadership¹³ before the modern period and that its indigenous roots only began to be undermined after its integration into the authoritative structure outside the village (probably before the 20th century). That a leadership should serve as a link with authority outside the village is of itself not derogatory. In the smaller settlements without wats, as we have seen, leadership begins on the basis of an intermediary role. And the Thais need leadership more in their 'external' relations than internally, given the internal pre-eminence of the abbot. Under the British the

Naaj's authority was enhanced by his direct access to British patrons, and some Naajs won a state-wide reputation in the Thai community. But by the time of Independence the Naaj's office had become excessively dependent on outside inspiration, like so much else in village life in the modern era. If there was once an indigenous tradition and institution of secular village leadership it is difficult to see how this could be re-established even in the strange event of the government Naaj-ship being abolished. Meanwhile, the government office stands in the way of alternative structures emerging. Of itself it cannot, of course, adopt a 'political' role, independently of the administration.

When one considers the Thais' problems in the context of Malayan democracy, and the question of leadership, it is a leadership with external political functions that one sees to be particularly lacking; for democracy not only permits the assertion of group interests but indeed compels it so far as any group is unwilling to let other groups contest and monopolise power and the resources of the political system. If Thai civil leadership has always functioned as a bridging factor between Thais and the political system of the Malays, such a role today is imperative. Now the leadership of the Sangha, dominating everything, and the much weaker institution of Naaj Baan, are both active forces in village life. But the Naaj Baan is prevented by his government appointment from using the office for new political purposes. The true and unrivalled heads of the village communities, the abbots - and the head of the Kelantan Thai community, the Chief Abbot - are forbidden, ironically, by the rules of the Sangha of Thailand to take up any political

role. Laymen are astonished at the suggestion that the abbot should be concerned with politics: it is unthinkable.¹⁴ But the retired Naaj, and other senior secular figures - in the hypothetical case of the existing Naaj-ship dropping out - would prove to have been too long schooled in the client role and poorly equipped to initiate a completely new type of political relationship with the Malay world. It must be emphasised however that so long as the environment was or is structured for a reciprocal (and in terms of other groups' status, equitable) client-patron relationship to authority, the lack of an independent political structure is integrative.

If secular communications are needed to assist the rise of a new leadership in the village¹⁵ the need would be even more pressing if such a leadership were to represent the village in external political relationships, for this would imply a disciplined front and agreed line, and a line probably at odds with the average villager's instincts. Curiously, inter-village communications are already rather good, thanks to the movements of monks and the apparent willingness of villagers to take a broad interest in what goes on in the rest of the community. Once individual villages were organised, a state-wide structure would be comparatively an easier matter although entirely without historical precedent, given the uncoordinated, haphazard and long drawn out nature of settlement. If a state-wide leadership could then be found to head it and hold it together this would relieve village leaders of the heavy strain of dealing with local politicians and administrators directly. A state leadership, though, would need 'independent means' (i.e. independent of villagers' erratic contributions) and a regular supply of time

and energy for visiting the far-flung settlements, and probably a private car. These things are not usually given to a rice farmer. A government servant or teacher is indicated. But the tiny handful¹⁶ who have made or are making this grade through English education, apart from being too young by the Thais' standards for leadership, bear witness to the sad - and universal - syndrome of the intelligent, thoughtful, and diligent youth alienated by his education from parents, elders and contemporaries.¹⁷

In sum, the prospects are discouraging for a secular Thai leadership to emerge spontaneously either at state or village level, although in the smaller settlements without an abbot or a separate Naaj, go-betweens with the Malay community show the makings of leaders. The fact that both these persons and the official Naajs in some sense already perform a bridging or representative function to the political system certainly provides a useful precedent for civil leadership having an 'external' role as its major attribute. But until an independent leadership structure does come into being the community has no alternative to its passive client role. Up to the present time this has not been contrary to integration. The client role is what the Thais are best adapted to. They are even prone to reject new types of leadership for fear of the new types of political role and risks which they might be called upon to accept by such leaders. Even the new political communications of democracy and changing economic expectations in this period of more rapid change and social mobilisation need not immediately cause the client role to be rejected. If the first priority is religious and ethnic integrity, and clientship (either to the D.O. or to the local Alliance or both) guarantees this, an independent political role will not be sought. At the worst one might say

that the 'civil' (i.e. lay) authoritative structure in the village is simply, from the people's point of view, entrusted with a function which the Sangha would perform if it could: namely, to protect the practice of Buddhism in the community, but by arranging the appropriate external relationships rather than the internal ones. This essentially negative requirement from the environment has made the client role a correct and acceptable one up to the present time, and the government-appointed Naaj an acceptable representative.

Unfortunately, clientship may abruptly cease to be the guarantee of cultural security and integrity that it traditionally has been. This is apart from material equality, which democracy rather doubtfully guarantees to the client minority which cannot stand on its own feet. The Thais are generally not concerned about their lack of political leadership. They are largely ignorant of any need for it. But there are interests willing to supply the need, in a way which, so far from moderating, could aggravate the dangers of the democratic system for the Thais, at the same time as teaching a new role and correspondingly sharpening expectations. These interests are the Alliance party of Kelantan. The dangers that the Thais might perceive in Alliance plans for organisation of their community are independent of the outcome of the 1969 state elections - although this itself could become a turning point, even with an Alliance victory. In Chapter VIII we shall review and interpret Alliance plans for the Kelantan Thai, and the chance of an Alliance victory, as developments which, in the continued absence of independent political organisation, could initiate a change of direction away from integration. Such a change can never be excluded from the range of possible developments in the plural society. The appeals of the 'motherland', to which we turn next, are an additional factor in the balance.

FOOTNOTES

1. In particular, ceremonies of Saj Baad at cremation and at prescribed intervals thereafter; entering the monkhood; and Saj Baad Paa Chaa (the festival of the cemetery) at the beginning of the third month.
2. But obviously the Thai peasant does get a large part of his metaphysical beliefs from the teaching of his abbot.
3. viz. Thai Culture and Behaviour by Ruth Benedict, Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 4, Cornell 1952. See p.36 for her remarks on conventional virtue.
4. The author is not in a position to assert that Kelantan Thai beliefs are unique, having no personal acquaintance with peasant communities in Thailand. Indeed although some texts, such as Ruth Benedict's cited above, paint a different picture, there is one account which suggests that there may be far-reaching similarities between traditional village beliefs in Central Thailand and those met in Kelantan. This account is Phya Anuman Rajadhon's Life and Ritual in Old Siam (New Haven, 1961). On page 68, concerning the motives of the act of buad (entering the monkhood) he writes: "A son who becomes a novice or a monk is in popular belief a mysterious agent for helping save his parents from hell when they die."
5. Ruth Benedict's compilation from older sources (op.cit. p.17) is more helpful here, although making a distinction between the 'soul' and the 'lower soul' that the author never heard expressed by Kelantan peasants (this could represent a failure of understanding by the present author, but in general he is satisfied that the Kelantan Thai live happily with a number of contradictions which they do not seek to resolve for themselves or to explain to others). Ruth Benedict's explanation is as follows: "Acts and prayers of propitiation in Thailand are made not in the Buddhist worship but to the phi. Even a peasant hardly makes an appeal for specific help in Buddhist worship, but the phi are propitiated and besought. These are spirits of the dead; not the soul, which represents man's full character and passes on into endless reincarnations, but his 'lower' soul, his passions, which may haunt the world he has left and disturb the living." The nearest to this elucidation that the present author heard in Kelantan was the remarks of the abbot of Samöörag about phii, when the author asked him what a Buddhist should believe on the subject. The abbot asserted that the villagers' beliefs were absolutely erroneous: there are no phii, only the essence or soul of each human being which passes on in some way. The abbot is not in a position to educate his folk in the distinction because he could not avoid condemning some of their most strongly-held convictions, which would only arouse undesirable resentment and friction.

6. c.p. de Young, J.E.: Village Life in Modern Thailand, Berkeley 1955, p.148: "The wat is politically and socially important in the new as well as the old type of Thai village. No community program can succeed without its approval. Some sort of religious service accompanies the announcement of any new measure by the central government to gain for its decrees and programs the aura of the wat's sanction."
7. c.p. Mulder, J.A.N.: "De boeddhistische monniken als instrument van regeringspolitiek in Thailand" in Mens en Maatschappij, jrg.40, No.4, 1965, p.287: "Het ziet er naar uit, dat de monniken met hun prestige de zelfde weg op zullen gaan als de dorpschoude: Immers, sinds het dorpschoude een semi-regeringsambtenaar is geworden, die, hoewel door het dorp gekozen, niet meer op basis van het dorp staat, maar veeleer als laagste ambtenaar aan de regeringspyramide hangt, heeft hij veel invloed verloren. Zijn gezag was het gezag van een primus-inter-pares; het uitvoeren van regeringsorders en aanbevelingen heeft zijn positie verzwakt. Mutatis mutandis zal hetzelfde voor de monniken gelden. Door zich actief te bewegen op moderne niet-religieuze terreinen, lijkt het mij, dat zij niet alleen hun potentiële extra-religieuze invloed zullen verliezen, maar bovendien aan godsdienstige invloed zullen inboeten." In this passage the declining prestige of the village headship in Thailand is compared with the foreseeable fate of the monkhood. The incorporation of the village headman into the administrative structure in Kelantan shows comparable consequences with Thailand, but the Kelantan Sangha has not gone this way.
8. Corollary to individualism are poor communications between one villager and another even on very elementary matters...yet channels of communication about non-wat affairs would seem to be one pre-condition for structures of secular organisation and leadership to arise. Of two men not kinsmen working contiguous vegetable plots at Samûrag one was a van-driver whose access to outside information had enabled him to buy an effective insecticide against a caterpillar pest. His neighbour had the same pest on his plot but never knew of the other's problem nor that there was a cheap cure for it. These two villagers were on friendly enough terms but the state of the other's crops was something neither felt it appropriate to ask about. There is also an astonishing variation in knowledge and expectation about politics even between close neighbours. The author interviewed seven blue-card-holding male villagers aged between 35 and about 60, to elicit expectations about whether an Alliance victory would make it easier to obtain nationality and land; and knowledge about what party held power in the neighbouring state of Trengganu, and at Kuala Lumpur. The group questioned were close neighbours of the author and of each other. A rather uniform result was expected because the group was not randomly sampled from the whole village. In the event the exercise proved highly instructive about the poor state of communications. Concerning (a) land, and (b) nationality under the Alliance....neighbour 1. didn't know; 2. wasn't sure; 3. was certain of improvement; 4 couldn't

answer for (a) but thought (b) would be as before; 5. expected an easing; 6. didn't know; 7. answered yes, easier for (a), because he had seen the result of Alliance government in Trengganu, but on (b) he wasn't sure. Concerning the identity of the governments in (a) Trengganu, and (b) Kuala Lumpur...Neighbour 1. didn't know; 2. didn't know; 3. knew that (a) was Alliance, but didn't know about (b); 4. answered 'Alliance' for both; 5. 'Alliance' for both; 6. didn't know; 7. gave (a) Alliance, but didn't know (b). Only No. 5. of this group was prepared to state which authority issues nationality, but he gave Kelantan. No.7 knew that Kuala Lumpur had a hand in the issuance of birth-certificates and thought that this might possibly apply to nationality as well.

9. It must not be thought that the larger Thai groups are so unstructured that they are incapable of acting in unison in the face of any challenge. Ad hoc leaders arise and make their voices heard in different circumstances as in organising some kind of petition on a specific issue. Thais are very adept at following one man of recognised qualification in his particular field, and submerging their own ego. There is excellent corporate effort on wat works under the guidance of carpenters, etc. But as specific skill alone qualifies to lead there is at times a crippling reluctance to take the initiative among a group of equally unqualified men. It came about that in the course of building a coffin at Samörag the group of amateur carpenters perceived that one board was too long but in the absence of direction, two of the group set to sawing at opposite ends. The result was a plank that was too short.
10. Young Thai farmers of an intellectual disposition, with a good Thai education, are no better placed than the dominant personalities to win a following. If their personalities are acceptably modest, their youth still counts against them, and ultimately their political proposals are likely to appear too radical to a community still so thoroughly conditioned to passivity in dealing with the Malays. The idea of abstaining in an election for instance would conflict right at the start with the Thais' idea that voting is compulsory and not really secret.
11. See Chapter VIII, note 21 p. 252 for an analysis of marginality in state and national constituencies in Kelantan on the basis of 1964 voting.
12. There seems to be an incipient trend to taking the Penghulu-ship out of Thai hands. This has happened now at Samörag and Jung Kaw and Khaw Joon to the author's knowledge. The first two communities would seem to be large enough and distinct enough to justify the British policy of a separate Thai Penghulu. Yet one should not immediately assume Malay malice-aforethought. At Maalaj a young Thai has succeeded to his father since Independence and it is certainly significant that he had to be cajoled into it. (The father was not allowed to retire till the son

agreed to take over). It appears that unwillingness to serve the Malay structure can be an initial cause of the Penghuluship being withdrawn. The alternative post of unpaid katua kampong is then, naturally, even more difficult to fill. Meanwhile, at the other end of the scale, the Penghulu of Mukim Repek in which Baan Bangsã stands, is a Thai with many Malays under his authority (but he lives outside the Thai village and is an exceptionally 'Malayan' figure, Malay-educated before the war and with English-educated children. One of his sons is a headmaster at Keterah.)

13. One of the most influential (among many influential people) at Bangsa'' was the Sangkharii, the lay messenger of the wat. This office, existing in every village, is still officially recognized by the state government and the incumbents may apply for a small stipend, in consideration of assistance (formerly) rendered to the Naaj. But the office exists independently of the government and is considered by some at Bangsã' a potential foundation for a lay leadership - or at any rate a structure which (in that village) cannot be ignored. This has its negative side, it is clear. The vitality and authority of the Sangkharii-ship at Bangsã' is attributable partly to the importance of the Bangsã' wat. The Sangkharii might stand in the way of alternative leadership; nor could he himself pursue, as a leader, any course which the Chief Abbot might judge incompatible with his basically ecclesiastical appointment.
14. Even the concept of pre-emption (of any leadership role) would be hard for most Thais to accept. The formal position is that the abbot has no secular functions, just as the only lay leader formally acknowledged is the Naaj. Also entirely absent in Kelantan is the idea that monkhood could or should be a period of training or preparation for leadership afterwards.
15. See Note 8 above.
16. They are: 1. The headmaster of Keterah English Primary School (aged 25, ex-Bangsã'); 2. The post-master at Bachok (ex-Tumpat); 3. A student trainee at Serdang Agricultural Collège (ex-Tumpat); 4. A student trainee at the Rubber Research Institute (ex-Tumpat); 5. A sixth-form science student at Alam Shah Malay Secondary School, Kuala Lumpur (now at University of Malaya?)(ex-Baan Jasmuu, aged 24); 6. A Thai (once of Baan Jang) who migrated to Kuala Lumpur, took work with an English company and was encouraged and sponsored by European friends to pursue an education which has led to London University; he is said to have severed his ties with Kelantan almost completely and to have forgotten his mother tongue. There is a regular, small contingent of Thai boys at Tumpat Secondary English school, some of whom will continue to qualify for government grants for traineeships, etc., but this group will surely remain very small and inconsequential.

17. There is one other institution which had a potential utility in giving the Kelantan Thais leadership, but is now bankrupt. This is the office of "Head of the Thai Community", currently occupied by a Thai Chinese, Enche Tan Ker Liang. As this office was the object of a manoeuvre by the Alliance early in the 1960s, its role will be explained at Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER VII: THE ROLE OF THAILAND

Thailand's interest in the Malay Peninsula has waxed and waned across the centuries according to her capacity to assert it. After the intervention of the British empire, first on the west, then on the east coast of Malaya, and the drawing of a firm boundary between Thailand and British Malaya, Thailand's interest in the parts of the Peninsula south of that boundary lay repressed. But there are more ways than conquest to develop and further an interest in a neighbouring area; and if the neighbouring country is later transformed from part of a foreign empire into a friendly-disposed nation state, given adaptability (on the part of the 'interested' country) to the changed conditions, a traditional interest may be reasserted in contemporary form.

It may appear a little facile to equate the contemporary interest with the old as manifestations of a single historical phenomenon. The 'historical perspective' can too easily blur important distinctions. However, in Thailand's case it may be observed that the frontier drawn in 1909 did not sever the whole of the Malay Peninsula from Thailand. Indeed the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 confirmed the Thai interest in the area north of the frontier as never before. Thus there is a strong continuity of Thai interest throughout the century, in the Peninsula as such. The present manifestations of Thai interest in Kelantan are in part repercussions and extensions - as it were, an overspill effect - of the assertion of Thai hegemony north of the frontier. There is also an element of response to Malay nationalism's rival concern with Patani, as well as an instinctive concern for fellow Thais across the

border. But most striking of all Thailand's 'excursions' into the affairs of Kelantan since 1909 has been, of course, the period of bogus sovereignty bestowed by Japan on 20 August 1943.¹

Thailand's administration only came into effect three months later and thus had a duration of some 21 months in all - but it left some traces, not least, and most appropriately, the idea entertained by a minority of Kelantan Thais that the 1944-45 interregnum restored an earlier Thai sovereignty over Kelantan rather than intermittent suzerainty. This re-reading of history is today reinforced by certain itinerant monks from South Thailand, together with another tenet of the chauvinism of the 1930s:² that the Thai race comprises the Lao (Thaj Laaw) and the Cambodians (Thaj Khameen), as well as the present inhabitants of Thailand.

Activities undertaken by Thai nationals in Kelantan, or inspired from Thailand, and policies formulated in Thailand concerning Kelantan, may be analysed as belonging broadly to two kinds: (a) acts and policies reflecting solicitude and traditional responsibilities towards the Kelantan Thai, but respect for Malayan sovereignty; (b) acts and policies implying a non-recognition of Malayan sovereignty. Naturally enough, the line between the two categories is not easy to draw, for solicitude for Kelantan Thai welfare can contribute to enhance the Thai identity of the community and alienate its loyalty to the Malayan state. Moreover there is flexibility on both sides about the restraints which sovereignty imposes, and a tolerance of certain acts which in a European context would be defined as unfriendly.

The Thai occupation of 1944-45 was the most extreme possible expression

of Thailand's denial of foreign sovereignty over the Malayan territories that were once 'hers', and it left behind a minority current of thought in the same spirit, in particular among certain village intellectuals of Bangsa'. But the immediate impact on the majority of Kelantan Thai was very slight. It is difficult to elicit recollections of the Thai occupation. What is recalled is often the rapacity of the Thai soldiers compared to the Japanese, and one or two temporary 'marriages' with Thai women. The most lasting memorial to the occupation is the institution of four grades of Thai primary education for boys and girls in villages where a monk or layman was qualified to teach. At Boosamed village a school house was erected outside the wat.³

The Thai Ministry of Education has continued since the war to support primary education in the Thai villages of Kelantan, notably by supplying text-books. This meets no resistance from the Malayan authorities, as the classes are held in the wats, often by monks,⁴ and the purpose is assumed to be religious. Certainly most villagers associate Thai education with religion alone, even though the text-books are secular in content. The books are distributed from Boosamed wat by the Kelantan Sangha. This is a policy compatible of itself with respect for Malayan sovereignty.

However, just as the background to the introduction of primary education was rampant Thai chauvinism, so also part of the drive behind current assistance to wats, to young monks, and to wat primary schools, etc., is nationalist; and the assistance indeed not without anti-national possibilities from a Malayan point of view. To understand more fully such possibilities it is necessary to consider the governmental and ecclesiastical structure behind

the pastoral and educational effort in Kelantan; the scope, in more detail, of this effort; and the nature of Thai government policies in that part of the Malay Peninsula belonging to South Thailand. But before considering contemporary developments we must give attention to the traditional basic structure binding the Sangha of Kelantan to its parent body, and the longer-standing consequences of these links.

The normal organisational structure of the Sangha in Thailand reflects the structure of regional civil administration. The whole is headed by the Supreme Patriarch (Somdedphrasangkharad), assisted by a deputy (Mahaatheerasamakhom) and certain monks of 'ministerial' rank, such as the Somdedphra-raachaakhana'. Under the latter are ranked in descending order (a) the heads of regions (Cawkhana'Phaag); (b) the heads of provinces (Cawkhana'Cangwad); (c) the heads of major districts (Cawkhana'Amphòò); (d) heads of minor districts (Cawkhana'Tambon); (e) the abbots of wats (Cawaawaadwad). The Kelantan Sangha fits into this structure, under the authority of the chief monk of the southern region at Nakhonsrithammarat. In only one respect does the organisation in Kelantan diverge from that in the provinces of Thailand - and this is merely a reflection of the small size of the Kelantan Thai community: there is no intermediate administrative rank between Cawkhana' Cangwad and Cawaawaad. (However, a few abbots have more senior status than others. During the war the Thai government appointed four to the special dignity of 'Thankhruu'.)

The chief abbot of Kelantan, whose rank properly expressed is Phraraachakhana'Phra'khruusanjaabad, has equivalent status with the head monk of

any Thai province.⁵ The phad jod or long-handled fan which is the insignia of the office is bestowed on new incumbents in the name of the King of Thailand and the Council of Great Elders, who make the appointment. The late 'Caw Khun'⁶ of Kelantan died on 19 November 1962 and at the inauguration of his pupil and successor Caw Khun Can (following the cremation at Bangsã' on 8 June 1963)⁷ it was the First Secretary of the Thai Embassy, Kuala Lumpur, Naai Wichet Suthayakhom, who represented the King of Thailand and brought the insignia.

The chain of religious authority from the King of Thailand down to the least Kelantan novice is uninterrupted by international frontiers. Only the presence of a Thai diplomat and the Sultan of Kelantan⁸ stand to remind one that these ceremonies are not taking place on Thai soil. The Kelantan Sangha is more integral to the Sangha of Thailand than Kelantan ever was to the Thai state, and the completion of the rail link from Songkhla shortly after 1930 facilitated a more regular flow of communication and influence from the Sangha of Thailand than in the past.⁹ The wats of Kelantan find a natural place in the itinerary of any Songkhla monk who decides to tour the region to the south, for in every way except politically these Thai villages and wats are part of one system with their Narathiwat counterparts. Some monks of the South spend extended periods in Kelantan, where they perceive a need for their services. The abbot at one of the two Maalaj wat is a young Thai national who first stopped behind in Kelantan to teach the children at Samßrag village. A similar case is mentioned by Phan Eeg Pin Muthukan,¹⁰ of a monk from the Golok district who has moved to Baan Khoogsijaa to run the primary

school classes. Sometimes monks are invited from South Thailand by the Kelantan Sangha or by individual villages to come and preach, or to help with the instruction of monks.¹¹ Another type of regular visitor are the annual committees of examiners of religious instruction (for monks). The departure of two committees from Bangkok was recorded by one of the daily newspapers in 1968.¹² One committee headed for Kelantan, the other for the west coast, where it was due to advise also on the arrangements for the cremation of Kedah's chief abbot.

All these manifestations of the activity and influence of the Sangha of Thailand are consequences of an ancient reality: the geographic continuity of the Thai Sangha's organisation from South Thailand into an area long under Thai suzerainty. That this influence continues sixty years after suzerainty came to an end is not the consequence of a political decision taken in Thailand, but of the fact that neither the British nor subsequent regimes in Kelantan have seen any cause to interfere with Thai religious affairs. So the Kelantan Sangha has continued to be a member of the Sangha of Thailand. This traditional relationship is without political consequences, unless we count the upholding of a Thai identity as one. Apart from a nationalistic leaning on the part of some individuals, the motivation behind the trips of the monks from South Thailand is generally no more nor less political than the maintenance of the Sangha in Thailand by a state whose legitimacy and stability are traditionally bound up with its Buddhist religion. But if the Thai state has felt an instinctive interest in maintaining the national religion, it has also firmly excluded the Sangha from a political role in the active sense. The traditional influence of the Sangha of Thailand in Kelantan has therefore been almost

totally devoid of any political overtones, and its activities are not a challenge to Malayan sovereignty.

This judgement cannot be applied, however, to certain developments which have overtaken the Thai Sangha since World War II, incidentally augmenting and modifying its impact in Kelantan. The concept of an apolitical Sangha has ceased to be a useful tool of analysis in Thai affairs, unless carefully qualified. It is no longer thought sufficient that the Sangha should merely exist, stabilising society in negative fashion. On the one hand its authority is mobilised in support of the government's civil programmes and decrees.¹³ On the other, the Sangha is given a more positive religious role, appropriate to an era of nation-building in place of simple stabilisation or perpetuation. It is this Buddhist revivalism that has a marked impact in Kelantan, through the 'overspill' activities of new Sangha agencies and the government departments with which they work in closest collaboration. A new type of monk is seen in Kelantan, committed - even militantly¹⁴ - to national and social renewal, well-educated, well-trained, sometimes quite charismatic.

The political objectives of the Buddhist revival are apparent in the tasks allotted to the batch of new agencies founded since 1960. The enterprise is a little more diverse and complex than an attempt "to tap and strengthen some unifying national emotion that would enable the country to resist the corrosive effect of Communism"¹⁵ but the nation-building content (to use the up-to-date terminology) is prominent, even an element of 'revolution for export'.

The Thammaphadthanaa is an agency based at Chiangmai which prepares

monks and boys from private schools to go into northern villages as teachers and community developers. The Nuajphrathammacaarig, in collaboration with the Department of Social Welfare (Ministry of Interior) takes the Buddhist 'out-reach' to the Hill Peoples. The Thammathuud trains and sends missionary monks abroad, working with the Department of Religious Affairs (Ministry of Education). The Nuajphadthanaakaanthaangcid, a creation of the Mahaathaad Foundation, is committed to raise the standard of welfare and dignity of Thai Buddhist communities, by diffusing positive attitudes to modernisation, health, education, and so on.

The work of Thammathuud is oriented to the world beyond the boundaries of Thai Buddhism. Kelantan is situated within those boundaries and is not subject to a missionary effort. But by the same token Kelantan does attract the attention of monks concerned with the revival of Buddhism and national purpose in the South. The great revivalist preacher Panjaanatha', who tries to visit Kelantan once a year, if a busy schedule allows, is not attached to any agency (he and his followers are something of an agency unto themselves). But his purpose corresponds to that of Nuajphadthanaakaanthaangcid in that both see a special responsibility in the South. Panjaanatha' raises funds for his mission from wealthy Thai patrons and can draw on Ministry of Education funds to assist temple building or to assist young monks further their education in Bangkok.¹⁶ The Nuajphadthanaakaanthaangcid, as an agency of the Mahaathaad Foundation, can draw on funds collected by its lay following, or contributed by the government; or call in Ministry of Education/Department of Religious Affairs assistance with teaching material so far as the Ministry

is not already active. Monks of either group see themselves in a catalyst role. Secular funds are called in when the will to use them constructively has been brought to life by preaching and example. This example is offered, of course in situations where a Buddhist Thai infra-structure already exists. Kelantan, with its wats, and wat-schools supplied since the war by the Ministry of Education, constitutes such a situation.

When the new Buddhist college of the Nuajphadthanaakaanthaangcid at Chonburi - "The School for the Propagation of Buddhism" - comes into action, this agency will add an expressly missionary role to its repertoire,¹⁷ for it will then train novices from outside Thailand as well as Thai nationals willing to spread Buddhism abroad. Malaysian nationals will qualify for places at this college. But at the present, Kelantan is affected by Buddhist revival because of its geographical and structural links with South Thailand, and our analysis continues along these lines.

What is the attraction of South Thailand to an organisation like Nuajphadthanaakaanthaangcid? Why does the government support the Foundation with funds and patronage? The proximity of North and North-east Thailand to the unstable - if not already communized - territories of Laos, North Vietnam, Burma and China, and the interest and support of the United States, have caused Thailand's nation-building enterprise to become loosely equated with the struggle for the allegiance of the Thai-Lao and the hill peoples. Yet before this problem came to the attention of either the world at large or the Thai government, there was a southern question, whose ingredients were the resistance of the Malay population of the South to cultural or political assimilation; and the traditional (but since 1909 intensified) drive for Thai hegemony over

the area. Since the 1930s the drive for effective control has taken on nationalistic, if not frankly chauvinistic overtones,¹⁸ while the Malay population of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat, never in historical record a malleable element, has become just as much affected by the nationalist spirit of the times and inspired by the rise of two Malay nations to the south. We need not be detained by cases of downright provocation. There is a fundamental antipathy between Islam and Buddhism (which Muslims perceive more clearly than Buddhists)¹⁹ so that however cautiously and liberally the Thai government moves, there can be little prospect of anything but many decades of continuing tension and unrest.

Now what is of great interest to our study is not so much Thai policies towards the Malays of the South, as policies towards the Thais of the same area. Not only must Thai numbers be brought up (partly through sponsored migration)²⁰ but Thais in the South must develop a positive loyalty to the Thai state, for if even the Thais of this strategic and unstable area cannot be relied upon, all is lost. (It must be remembered that the rural Thais of old Patani, like the Thais of Kelantan, have been remote from the centres of Thai power until recent decades. Loyalty to the modern Thai state will not grow unassisted out of the old cultural identification with myang thaj.²¹) Positive loyalty will arise with rising standards of living, through education, and through the influence of a revitalised and modernising Buddhism, inculcating both values of direct loyalty to a Buddhist state and values favourable to the modernisation which indirectly leads to the same goal. A modernised Buddhist culture, also, will bring not only satisfaction and self-respect to its Thai members but become a more attractive model to members of the alien

culture.

The young monks involved in this mission are frankly patriotic and they see more or less clearly that Thailand and her religion are under scrutiny on this cultural frontier. As the Malays cannot be proselytised the mission is a national and Buddhist priority of the utmost urgency.²² But in no case in the author's experience did this patriotism smack of chauvinism; and love and sympathy towards the simple and long-neglected Thais of the South - a minority in their own country - were always felt more strongly than any political emotion. The elements of a political grand design may be inferred, though, from the government's keen support of the Buddhist mission to the South, from one's knowledge of the role of Buddhism in nation-building in other minority areas of the country, as well as from any pragmatic assessment of the conditions for southern security. The role of the Thais of the South must be central in some way to any political strategy.²³

The mission to the South reaches to the Thai minority of Kelantan, again, through the unbroken structural link with the Sangha of Thailand. The agents of the Buddhist revival follow the same circuit as the southern monks who come without special motive. In estimating the significance for Kelantan Thai political attitudes of the new monkish activity, we recur to the continuum proposed above, a continuum from acts derogatory to Malaya's sovereignty, to acts representative of simple solicitude for the Kelantan Thai. The revivalist monks of the author's acquaintance, as men of considerable intelligence and idealism, were not chauvinistic - albeit there is room for speculation about the governmental motives behind the heavy support given to revivalist activities in Kelantan. (If anything, it is the uneducated monks of South Thailand who betray

anti-Malay prejudices and put about the idea that Kelantan was once a part of Thailand.) Motivated primarily by sympathy for these forgotten Buddhist communities, the revivalists preach tolerance to Malay neighbours and the necessity of acquiring basic literacy in Malay so as to prosper in the country in conformity with its laws. But given the monks' special training, no sermon exhorting the folk to raise its standards by diligent effort can avoid reference to the model rural communities of Thailand. Such communities prosper and advance because they observe the Buddha's precepts, while working industriously to improve their standards in collaboration with the welfare and agricultural services of the Thai government. The Malayan government is not (one feels) a comparable entity, for it has no place in a Buddhist design. A Buddhist community in Malaya should obey Malay laws with sincerity, but more in pragmatic recognition of its situation than from respect for the positive qualities of the government. (The monks know nothing, in any case, about Malayan programmes for rural development and public welfare.) The reaction of some of the villagers of Samöbrag who heard one of these sermons was to be confirmed in their political philosophy of conformity to Malay law; the implicit exaltation of modern Thailand found no response on this occasion. But there is a basis for a response to grow - even at Samöbrag, so far from the border - in the villagers' vision of a myang thaj. to which they have always belonged. The very person of the new type of monk, by his intelligence and outstanding moral stature, corresponds to the old idea of a monk from the myang. His voice is an echo of the Thai metropolis, for he is a native of Central Thailand or Bangkok, not of the south. His sermons conjure up an image of the myang which corresponds to the villagers' vision - albeit with some modern accretions.

The Thais of Kelantan do strongly identify with 'Thailand': but Thailand in the form of an esoteric image with ascribed qualities (an 'ideological model' of the ancestral home) not the modern nation state, and the realities of its corruption and power indelicately wielded. The Thailand of the Kelantan Thais' romantic imagination is a distillation of ideal and some real cultural elements. It has all the characteristics of a 'Great Tradition'²⁴ but with a purified Sangha (under the King) occupying the role of elite, rather than some secular aristocracy. (This is particularly understandable in that the sole experience of Thailand that many Kelantan Thais have, is a pilgrimage to the shrine of Nakornsri Thammarat, where thoughts and the limited environment of the pilgrimage are all directed to build up strong religious images.) The ancestral home, myang thaj, is frequently held up for wonder on account of the purity and beauty of speech there, compared to the 'coarse' country dialects of Kelantan. The folk are exquisitely courteous at all times, in the romantic model. Dedicated and educated monks who visit Kelantan villages reinforce (in spite of honest motives) this romantic or 'ideological' model and the Thais' orientation to Thailand.

There is an alternative, negative, model of Thailand current, based on experience of conditions in the South, whose significance will be mentioned in the next chapter. The positive model, meanwhile, is potentially unfavourable to political integration in Kelantan and Malaya; not merely for the cultural identification which it carries with it, but for a certain political dimension which is inherent in the model and is capable of extension and exploitation in modern conditions. Pictures of the King of Thailand decorate

the majority of Kelantan Thai homes. Although these Thais lack any tradition of Thai rule, the Thai King has always been at the head of the myang of the Great Tradition and has even continued to appoint the chief abbot of Kelantan. The Kelantan Thais conceive themselves to be members of the myang by virtue of their race and religion. It is not, certainly, a political nation within set territorial bounds, for it embraces Thais both within and without Thailand's borders. Even in the past when those borders were undefined, the Thais did not think themselves to be in a direct political relationship to the Thai King. There was no contradiction between their identification with him as head of a great cultural and ethnic family and of the Sangha; and acceptance of the day-to-day political reality of Malay power, mediating through the vassal system their political relationship to Bangkok. Nevertheless, there is a quite general expectation today of the solicitude of the Thai King and government for the secular welfare of Thais outside the frontiers, and if this is neither a traditional experience nor a product of the short war-time occupation, it may reflect at least the rise of nation states in the area (particularly the state of modern Thailand just across the border) and the pretensions of such demarcated political units to be the heirs of the ethnic, cultural, unbounded 'nations' of the past.²⁵ Kelantan Thais often point to the attention paid by the Malayan government to the affairs of 'their people' (chaad khaw) in Patani, and take equally for granted that the Thai Consul in Kelantan should look to the general welfare of the Kelantan Thais as the modern Thai government does for its citizens. The new social obligations of the modern state are thus perceived but not its territorial delimitation. (But by no means do Kelantan Thais think themselves Thai citizens or subject to Thai law and government.)

Such a ready adaptation of the primordial idea of membership in an ethnic myang thaj to new political conditions offers a fruitful field of activity to any person or interest that might wish to maximise Thailand's advantage in Kelantan. (The bureaucratic interests which finance education and Buddhist revival in the state can scarcely be unaware of the potential influence of the new monks.) Acts directly and intentionally prejudicial to Malaysian sovereignty can go un-noticed, moreover, because of the general and quite remarkable tolerance on the Malayan (official) and (even) popular Malay side of manifestations of cultural orientation beyond the borders, even with moderate political overtones. It is therefore not only one small, unsophisticated group (the Kelantan Thais) who take this kind of orientation for granted. Before considering the occasion and possible motives of Thailand's establishment of a consulate at Kota Bharu in April 1966, we will explore further this quite wide-spread feature of flexible interpretation of the new concepts of sovereignty and the state.

As a first example we may take the atmosphere of tolerance that surrounded the first visit of their majesties the King and Queen of Thailand to the Federation of Malaya in 1962. There is no objection to the traditional patronage of the King towards the Thai community of Malaya, expressed in terms of religious ritual. The Straits Times reported without disfavour the unveiling of the eyes of the great Reclining Buddha at Penang.²⁶ At Wat Mek Prasit, Ipoh, the royal couple were able to greet about 350 guests, invited from all over Malaya, "many of whom were of Thai descent."²⁷ Two days later it was recounted how 70-year-old Mme Hia of Bangkok presented a cheque for Tcs 20,000 to King Bhumibol towards the construction of a new Thai temple at

Petaling Jaya. "A well-known philanthropist, she had made donations through the Thai King to a number of temples in her own country. And King Bhumibol had suggested that she comes to Malaya and make a gift to the new temple in Petaling Jaya."²⁸ But perhaps the performance of these ritual duties is less remarkable than the equally well tolerated appointment of chief abbots by the Thai King, which might be thought to carry political implications by conventional (European) standards of sovereignty.

The elite attitude of indulgence towards manifestations of seeming loyalty to the Thai King has a potential counterpart in popular Malay conceptions of nationality. In Kelantan Malay linguistic usage a distinction is made between *kera'ayatan* (citizenship) and *bangsa* (race), and it is realised at one level of perception that people of non-Malay race do have the blue cards of citizens. However, *bangsa*, like the word *phasaa* among the Kelantan Thai, has a wide spread of connotation. Before the rise of '*kera'ayatan*' and '*kewarganegaraan*' to denote citizenship, '*bangsa*' did service for 'a people' both in the sense of a 'race' and of a legal nationality. In other words, it had the same ambiguity as formerly the English word 'nationality', which today is generally equivalent to legal nationality or citizenship, but at Versailles and in the inter-war years referred also to the ethnic entities or races of Europe regardless of international boundaries and legal status. The ambiguity of '*bangsa*' in Malaya is being maintained today by official influence as well as popular habit. For instance, '*bahasa kebangsaan*', the national language, is to be taken by the Malays as the language of the Malay race and nation, but by the Chinese and others as the language of the Malayan (recently 'Malaysian') nation. The government seems to have decided to uphold the double meaning of *bangsa*, hoping

that the Malays will in due time enlarge their notion of a people and nation to include other races than themselves. The people and nation (bangsa) will then be the Malaysian people or nation, while race will eventually be expressed only by the word 'kaum' (community, group). In the medium term, however, the deliberate confusion of the two concepts must have the opposite effect. Rather than other races becoming included as equal parts of one nation, regardless of race, nationality will continue to be associated exclusively with one race. Non-Malays may come to be regarded, through popular assimilation of a new to an old concept, as members of other nation-states (i.e. if the Malays are the people of the state of Malaya, the Siamese must be members of Siam) even against the evidence of blue cards and citizenship documents - and frontiers- and despite a traditional, popular acceptance of a Siamese presence (see Appendix XII)

Naturally this can have discrimination as one of its consequences. Thais who have not yet received nationality are often stated on their red (non-citizen) identity cards to be 'Siamese subjects', even while their birth-place is given as Kelantan.²⁹ But we must not hastily condemn these attitudes. An incident at Pasir Puteh contained elements of disadvantage and advantage to the Thai concerned. A' HĀng of SamĀrag, a blue card holder, went to register a claim to part of his grandfather's estate against his uncle. HĀng was told by the clerk in all friendliness, as reported, that as a Siamese he should see the Thai Consul in Kota Bharu about the laws relating to Siamese inheritance; only then could the clerk say whether the uncle was unjustly invoking Muslim law concerning inheritance through females who pre-decease their fathers (as HĀng's mother had done). The clerk, like the uncle, was wrong. There is a statute covering inheritance by non-Malays. But if the clerk assumed, as

apparently he did, that 'modern notions of nationality' imply conformity to the laws of the majority (and what is so inaccurate about this assumption in general?) then we must give him credit for being willing simultaneously to waive these notions and recognise that a man's preferred way of life may be best understood by one of his own people, one who (however) in 'modern terms' is a foreigner. Political and cultural pluralism are recognised and accepted in a quite commendable way.

European eyes may see a contradiction in the readiness of certain Kelantan Malays (notably the traditional elite and various ranks of the state administration) to both generously accept 'the Siamese' as fellow Kelantanese; and then to surrender them, as it were, as 'Thais' into the hands of the modern state which appears to claim their allegiance on the grounds of race and religion. The contradiction is only present if the receiving side abuses this act of good faith, and really treats the 'surrendered' people jealously like newly-acquired citizens. The implicit intention on the Malay side, as it appears to this observer, is not to release, let alone expel, the Siamese from their traditional membership in the Kelantan community, but on the contrary to afford them certain cultural facilities which will enrich and reward their membership. It is the essence of this synthesis between the old concept of ethnic community and the new one of national sovereignty that the concept of sovereignty undergoes adaptation from its European form. It becomes both in a sense more ambitious (in refusing to accept territorial limits) and yet less so, because such external responsibilities and claims as arise are expected to be characterised by humanitarian concern, not thrusting chauvinism and the seizing of political advantage. District Officers and other educated persons seem to find it natural that the Consul should be seen at religious ceremonies

in the Thai villages, and if asked whether he has any right to look to the interests of the Thais, such persons are likely enough to reply that as the PMIP is in power it is good for the Thais that the Consul should be there to take an interest. It is humanly desirable and right.

The ready indulgence of pluralism is rather more characteristic of Malaya within her own territories, certainly, than of Thailand in regard to her southern provinces. We have suggested³⁰ that the Thais benefit indeed from the political institutionalisation of pluralism which results from the preponderance of Chinese in the west-coast states of Malaya. In South Thailand too the concept of a people is being extended to include Malays. Citizenship is much more readily available to Malays there than to the non-Malays in Kelantan. But it is these Malays who are being required to make the big cultural concession (by being called 'Thai'), not the Thai people (by welcoming 'Malays' as fellow nationals). In Kelantan the minority Thais do not receive the legal appellation 'Malay' when they take citizenship but rather 'Malaysian'. Ethnic identity in Malaya is respected. In South Thailand (in the Malay view) ethnic identity is directly threatened by the equation of legal nationality with race to the advantage of the ruling majority.

On the other hand, the Thai government puts a considerable effort into the building of mosques in the South and never fails to uphold verbally the principle of freedom of religion at least. As to the Thais of Malaya, most quarters in Thailand hold it as self-evident that Thais beyond the border will retain an orientation to the motherland or kin-state, and that this must call into being a sense of responsibility and concern on the part of the latter. For all that nervousness and clumsiness in Thailand may cause recognition of her own southern pluralism to be withheld in some ways, or yielded only under

pressure, one can nevertheless discern the common principle running through attitudes on both sides of the frontier that modern national boundaries are not absolute, that primordial cultural orientations should not be suppressed, nor the patronage which they call into existence be denied. Nothing illustrates this standpoint better than the article by Chawalid Panjaalag referred to above³¹ and the commentary in Phan Eeg Pin's book on Islam.³²

Phan Eeg Pin has written an eminently moderate and generous account of the conditions of the Buddhist religion in Malaya, even accusing the Malayan Thais (unjustly, in this student's experience) of an arrogant refusal to accept Malay education.³³ But noting that as a result of a paucity of religious education (notice this interestingly modern view of Buddhism) there are too few men able to come forward as leaders of the Kelantan Thais, Phan Eeg Pin then proceeds disarmingly to describe the new Thai Consul at Kota Bharu, Naai Wicheed Suthayakhom as perfectly cast for the role:

"When one has contemplated the fate of the Thais in Malaysia one cannot help but think that the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in establishing a Consulate at Kota Bharu will cause great delight among the Thais of that State. It will have the effect of giving them a moral boost in exactly the right way and just at the right time, especially as Naai Wicheed Suthayakhom, the present Consul, is highly fitted to the duties of the office. He is a man of diligence and compassion, full of charity and generosity towards his fellow Thais, a thoroughly praise-worthy person." 34

Further on, Phan Eeg Pin praises monks who go to Malaya and Singapore to establish wats, because - while creating international understanding - they allow Thais to uphold the dignity of their race and religion.³⁵ This sort of effort is highly commendable and deserves the support of Thailand. But support should not be indiscriminating. In Kelantan there is far more need of Thai education than of funds for temple construction.³⁶

Chawalid Panjaalag, in some ways more pragmatic than Phan Eeg Pin, points out the limitations of the consular role, but identifies with insight the central importance of the wat in the community life of the Kelantan Thai. He dismisses the idea that the Consul should accept responsibilities for their leadership, and reasons that a corps of young volunteers from Thailand, to assist the community, might not conduct themselves with the decorum and maturity necessary to win the confidence and respect of old-fashioned country folk. Given, however, the well-established pattern of invitations to monks to come and teach religion, Chawalid proposes that monks trained in agricultural techniques and community development should be invited to Kelantan to help the Thai villages improve their standards of life. He is confident that the government of Malaysia would concur in such a project.³⁷

Yet notwithstanding the considerable tolerance towards outside involvement, especially in Malayan circles, there is certainly a point in the development of any issue - a point never exactly predictable - where tolerance and patience will give way to impatience and obstruction. Naai Chawalid rejected the idea of a lay 'Peace Corps' only on the grounds of their youth. He cannot be aware that the Malayan Ministry of Rural Development has already refused to countenance the plan of one of its expatriate advisers to survey the Thai economy of Kelantan with the help of a team of Thai students from Bangkok.³⁸ Perhaps the combination of two foreign nationalities in the proposal was what tipped the balance towards a posture of conventional nationalist rigidity in this case. Be this as it may, the posture of indulgence is not without limits, even on the Malayan side. Thailand is particularly bound by the circumstances of her policy in her Malay areas to have a lower threshold of tolerance than Malaysia

to outside concern. The involvement of certain Malay nationalist interests (not excluding interests within the orbit of the ruling party, such as the paper Utusan Melayu) poses a latent threat to the stability of the southern provinces at all times.³⁹ The Thai Ministry of Interior at least, by its statements and warnings, clearly regards many manifestations of Malayan concern as having exceeded the acceptable limits.⁴⁰

We consider now a development on the Thai side which appears to be initiated with a view to restoring the balance of advantage somewhat in Thailand's favour, and which would certainly be unacceptable to the Malaysian government if fully publicised. But acts blatantly antipathetic to sovereignty can grow imperceptibly out of acts reflecting moral concern. Some acts are inherently ambiguous.⁴¹ Above all, the standards by which such things are judged are poorly defined: this is a moral environment perfectly structured for interests seeking outright nationalist advantage. Another analysis of Thai and Malay orientation to their related minorities beyond the borders could be in terms of the plurality of nationalism: some parts of government and society are more ready to exceed the locally acceptable limits than others. But apart from any innate tendency to go to extremes, the Thai Ministry of Interior has adequate reason to try to secure the position in the South against Malayan provocation, by making a comparable issue out of the Kelantan Thai question. In due course Malaysia may find herself not only moved by a notion of reciprocity to tolerate the augmented Thai involvement in Kelantan, but may even feel it in her interests to keep a tighter hand on her own excesses of involvement in Patani, to remove the excuse for Thailand's activities in Kelantan. The limits of tolerance and sovereignty would by then have become

much more explicit and indeed stricter, and the relations of the two countries would have entered a phase of more orthodox relations between two sovereign states.

The ideological unity and common interest against Communism which are a self-evident condition for the tolerance of outside concern towards minorities, also form the background to the appointment of a Thai Consul to Kota Bharu on 21 February 1966. There is much business connected with border security that a Consul can handle. But one should also take note of the exceptionally good relations between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok at the present time owing to Thailand's readiness to maintain a friendly neutrality during Indonesian Confrontation - culminating in the mediation which brought Confrontation to an official end at Bangkok in June 1966. It is possibly due to Confrontation and Thailand's friendly attitude towards Malaysia that there has been no later official statement as nearly provocative and interventionist as the Tengku's of May 1961. The goodwill of Thailand towards Malaysia has been too vital to set at risk. The establishment of a Consulate on the east coast is likewise open to interpretation as a benefit to Thailand arising from Malaysia's crisis and Thailand's attitude to it. The Straits Times ignored both the appointment of Naai Wichet from Kuala Lumpur (21 February 1966) and the official opening of the Consulate on 30 April 1966.⁴² But Malaysia's motives for granting the Consulate are of less concern here than those of Thailand in seeking it.

The first activity of the Consulate that came to the author's attention after he took up residence at Semerak (October 1966) was a secret survey of Thai population, land and livestock. This had been carried out by an inconspicuous Kelantan Thai, staying two or three days in all Thai villages and

hamlets of Kelantan. Although the results of this brief enquiry must have been grossly inaccurate - for no Thai knows the acreage of his land except in the few districts where a recent land survey has produced a series of tracings for every land-owner - the author assumed that the purpose was to assess need and eligibility among individual families for plots on the pioneer colonies of Narathiwat. It was believed among Malay nationalists and Patani exiles in Kelantan that the Consul would be concerned primarily to recruit Thais to the Narathiwat population and to check on the movement of undesirable nationalist elements back and forth between Kelantan and Narathiwat. (If you believe the Alliance is capable of any infamy, it is by no means incredible that Kuala Lumpur would collaborate in the Thai strategy for South Thailand). The author is still of the opinion that the secret survey was related to the Thai migration policy, not to any search for a propaganda issue - for one of the Consul's major preoccupations is certainly recruitment of migrants. Indeed he came to advertise the 'nikhom' at Maalaj village even before his move from Kuala Lumpur; and he collected names at Samborag not long after his posting, as a petition from that village had been forwarded to the Kuala Lumpur embassy in 1965 by the Chief Abbot of Kelantan. The only reason for doubt about the motive of the secret survey was presented by a remarkable report which appeared in The Straits Times in November 1966. This appeared at first to have such an exclusively propagandist inspiration that a similar interpretation suddenly seemed possible for the survey. The outcome of the author's investigation, described below, was however that the report was connected, if somewhat involvedly, with the migration policy, although certainly having a propagandist function as well. We will examine first the background

to the Consul's role in migration policy, and then continue with the question of propaganda function. (Both, of course, relate to the security of the Thai South. The further general function of establishing the Thais' dependence upon the Consulate or their orientation to Thailand is probably shared - in view of their secular, bureaucratic sponsors - by the revivalist monks.)

The security of the South in Thai policy depends partly on filling it with more Thais. This is objectionable to Malay ethnic sentiment whatever the source of the settlers and to official self-respect if Malaya is made one of the recruiting grounds. The Consul has denied⁴³ that Thailand aims to bring up Thai numbers in the South, pointing out the folly of acting as if racial ratios counted. If this principle were accepted, West Malaya would have to be handed over to the Chinese, and Patani, for the time being, to the Malays. But Kunstadter, in a note to a passage on resettlement, remarks:

"Thailand has not embarked on deliberate policy of resettlement of the population in minority areas for purposes of control, but some of the resettlement and development projects (nikhom), especially those associated with relocation of populations in areas affected by dams, have had this effect...." 44

The Thai Government's own publication on the self-help colonies is even more explicit.⁴⁵

There are now two nikhom near Sungai Golok, one established about six years ago, Nikhom Wāng; another established in 1966, Nikhom Suung. Professor Patayaa Saihoo of Chulalongkorn University has remarked⁴⁶ on the anomaly that in a Malay area the Malay race cannot enjoy the advantages of these colonies. The Consul states that the recruits are people resettled from the barren North-east, or any Kelantan Thais who migrate voluntarily after being rejected

for Malaysian citizenship.⁴⁷ But it is not denied that the recruits are Thais. The establishment of a temple in each settlement assists the cultivation of civic attributes and social stability which is one aim of the nikhom since their inception in 1940. But this marks them as Thai in every way. Under the land laws of Kelantan, as now operated, Kelantan offers a ready pool of Thais for recruitment. There is scarcely a village which has not seen a member migrate to the nikhom at some time in the past five years. The village with the worst land problem, Maalaj, sent forty families in 1966 as a result of Naai Wichet's advertisement.

The newspaper report of November which provoked the question whether the Consul didn't have some darker motive for his land and population survey, read as follows:

Malaysian or Thai Citizens? 5,000 don't know
by Padman Gopal. Kota Bharu, Mon.

"More than 5,000 people in Kelantan do not know whether they are Malaysian or Thai citizens. These people, scattered all over the State, have approached the Thai Consul here to use his good offices to obtain new land from the Central Government for farming. Now all have been politely told they are not Thai subjects. They cannot seek assistance from the Malaysian Government because as far as the Malaysian Government is concerned they are Thai subjects.

The Thai Consul, Mr. Wichet Suthaya Khom, confirmed today that ever since the consulate was established six months ago he had been approached by hundreds of people who complained that they did not have enough land for farming. He said: "There are about 12,000 Malaysians of Thai origin all over the State and about half of them are regarded by the Malaysian Government as Thai subjects. Our problem is that of these red identity card holders about 95% were born in Kelantan. Most of them have never set foot on Thai soil. Their ancestors had been living in Kelantan before the British came to Malaya and the land they own now belonged to their great grand parents some 80 to 100 years ago. So according to the Thai Nationality Act they are not Thai citizens and cannot be considered as such. Almost every day I have these people coming to me for help

and I have had to explain the difficult position to them. We sympathise with them but legally we cannot accept them as Thai citizens. So these people are faced with a problem of being stateless. I have raised the matter with our Embassy in Kuala Lumpur and I am confident the Malaysian and Thai governments will be working out an amicable solution to the problem." 48

Observe the almost unanswerable jibe about Malaysia making aliens out of its own people by the red card system. The Consul knows full well that the Malaysian law does not regard its red card holders as being necessarily foreign citizens, but nothing could serve the purposes of propaganda better. He also knows that even when the Thais get nationality the Central Government will not be able to help them; the land problem is due to the special political conditions in Kelantan.

The Straits Times with exquisite but characteristic condescension explained the error of these "unfortunate people" but seemed itself to be in deep water legally where it suggested that the law on citizenship was so hopeless to its tasks that it would have to be changed. (Note the willingness to entertain Bangkok's concern and even consult the Thai government about people who "for most practical purposes...are Malaysians.")

Stateless People

"About 6,000 people in Kelantan have recently found themselves to be stateless persons. Till a Thai consulate was established in Kota Bharu which could gently tell them otherwise, they had thought themselves Thai nationals. But the Consul has had to explain that they were not born in Thailand and that no amount of sympathy can change the law by which Bangkok determines citizenship. But neither are these people Malaysians, as they carry the red identity cards of non-citizens. Thus through no fault of their own they have no country, a condition which sets them apart from all other racial groups in Malaysia.

There seems to be a clear case for federal action to help these people. As there is no question of dual citizenship arising, as the Thai government has made its position clear, and as for most

practical purposes they are Malaysians, a special legislative initiative would be both humane and realistic. Bangkok would need to be consulted, of course, (and so would the unfortunate people themselves) but it is hard to imagine any difficulties arising. This would not help the people get land in Kelantan, the issue which took them to the Thai consul in the first place, but it could offer something much more valuable." 49

The next day, the Malaysian Prime Minister was questioned at his post-cabinet press conference. 'Normal' considerations of self-preservation might have been expected to lead someone at Kuala Lumpur to check on the Consul's figure of "about 12,000 Malaysians of Thai origin", which exceeds the 1957 Census figure by a round five and a quarter thousand: 77% in nine years without migration. Even the inflated figure of 50% stateless should have aroused suspicion. Yet the Tengku's comment was that he knew nothing about it, but was going to investigate and find a solution for this undesirable situation. "Perkara ini tidak harus di-benarkan berlaku. Mereka tidak boleh di-benarkan terapong² tanpa negara."⁵⁰

Bangkok's reaction was to appoint a committee of the Foreign Affairs Ministry to which the Consul was summoned for questioning about the status and needs of the Kelantan Thais. By December 20 the Thai government had taken the position that: "Malaysians of Thai descent are not Thai nationals..."⁵¹ but that the Thai government "could ask the Malaysian government to request the state government to give consideration to the request of these persons."⁵² Although the setting up of a committee on the question had seemed at the time to be the second step in a concerted propaganda exercise, the matter petered out quickly but for an accusation by the Minister of the Interior in February 1967 that relief rice donated to the Malaysian government after the great flood

was not given to the Thais of Kelantan as to other races. "Malaysian citizens of Thai descent living in Kelantan have been discriminated against and are not receiving equal rights like Malaysians of other racial origins."⁵³

If there was to be a government-inspired press campaign no worse time could have been chosen for it, with the King's birthday following on the heels of the announcement of the committee, and then the Bangkok Games. The Bangkok Post, Phim Thai, Thai Rat, Daily News and Sayam Nikorn carried reports on 17 or 18 November of The Straits Times report of 15 November, without comment, but mostly selecting and stressing the shortage of land and livelihood. On December 2 only Bangkok Post and Sayam Rat, and on December 3 Sayam Nikorn, carried a statement by the Foreign Ministry announcing the committee of enquiry. The only person, ironically, to comment sympathetically about the Kelantan Thais was the eminent Kukrit Pramoj of Sayam Rat - a man who abhors all excesses of nationalism and is a thorn in the government's side for this very reason. By coincidence he was running a travelogue of a recent tour from Ceylon through Singapore to North-west Malaya, when the news about the Kelantan Thais was current. On December 3 he wrote of a meeting with Tengku Abdul Rahman in Kedah and concluded as follows:

"I think I can say that my feelings in coming to stay at the house of my distant relative (Tengku Abdul Rahman) were persistent and irresistible feelings of pride and delight to see him having his own little house and being able to live there happily. And when I thought this way, all I wanted was to wish on all my brethren across the border prosperity in greater measure still. I had never thought that these junior relatives ought to respect their more senior kinsmen and accept their opinion on every single matter. Far less did I ever think it fitting to 'knock down the fences' and absorb us all into one family.

As a matter of fact in Kedah and other states of North Malaya there are people of Thai race, in considerable numbers. A large propor-

tion of them are Malaysians, having equal rights with Malaysians of all other races, enjoying security in their general livelihood, in their religion, and in their culture, exactly like other Malaysians. There is not a single matter which should give rise to any trouble. Now we Thais, whatever the circumstances, will always be Thais. Even if we had to use the language of Malaysia to have communication with other people, and on government business, in our own homes we should go on speaking Thai with each other. As to our religion, we should certainly continue to be Buddhists. The only way those Thais (of Kedah) will be able to live happily is through their conviction that they must call themselves Malaysians and show loyalty to the Paramount Ruler and the Malaysian people, without any feeling or suspicion of being anything else.

I write all this because I have come to understand that there are certain Thais who stupidly think of themselves as a Great Power and like to take a trip round Malaysia; and when they come across Thais there, they get excited and say or do things which produce doubts in their listener's mind which nation he does belong to. Now this sort of behaviour is rather contrary to a sense of responsibility and cannot be of profit to anyone whatsoever.

Very recently there was news that there are as many as 5000 Thais in Kelantan who are faced with the problem of having no land to find their food. When they went to petition for land from the Malaysian government, it then came to light that these Thais have not become registered as Malaysian citizens according to the correct legal procedure. I wonder whatever these people were at when Malaysia got its independence for the first time! When this problem arose these 5000 Thais came and complained to the Thai Consul in Kelantan, asking him to help, but the Thai Consul is not competent to help at all because, according to Thai law, these 5000 Malaysian-born Thais are not in fact Thais anymore. However, judging by what I have gathered, there is good reason to believe that the Malaysian government has a benevolent and sympathetic attitude to all these Thais and that it will be possible to resolve and overcome this problem for their good and welfare. Of this there need be no doubt." 54

If it is ironical that the anti-chauvinist Kukrit should be the only editor to give the matter a slightly sympathetic word, more ironical still is the editorial of Kietisak on December 5 - a paper characterised by many as of 'the sensational type'. The logic of the original is extremely difficult to

follow. But the following paraphrase in the Bangkok Post column "What the Papers Say" gives perhaps a fair impression, including the editor's dismissal of the Thais' complaints as a fiction of The Straits Times. From a reading of the original it appears that the writer is afraid that it is a case of interests in Malaysia trying to disturb the good relations between Malays and Thais in South Thailand, because he stresses how Malays and Thais trade together and live harmoniously, as brothers.

Malaysia Distorts Reports
by Tee Mahapaurya

"Kiettisak yesterday said in its editorial that the problem of the Thai Islamic people in Malaysia's Kelantan State would not have gained such magnitude had not the Malaysian newspapers publicised it. That problem should not become an international affair, the paper said, because those people had been residents of the state for generations and are not concerned about any special rights or privileges, it said. It is regrettable that the Malaysian papers should see fit to publicise any news over this problem, it was said. This may lead only to more misunderstanding. As for the Thai people, although it is known that Kelantan used to be a part of Thailand, Thais still feel that Islamic people are brothers, and inseparable, it was added. The Malaysian newspaper reports may aggravate the matter rather than improving the situation, Kiettisak opined.

It also questioned Thai government involvement in the matter in the joint special committee. It said it did not understand what will be the benefits of such action. The proposition of moving these people back within Thai territory is out of the question, it was stated. Kiettisak said although the matter seemed to come to a head with the reports in the Malaysian newspapers, it expressed the hope that the Thai and Malaysian governments would not hold this matter as an international dispute between the two countries because it belonged to the past and should not concern the present, it was said." 55

The Kiettisak writer is aware, like Kukrit, of the dangerous possibilities in this kind of issue, but it may be surmised that he was kept from steering too close to the reef himself only because he couldn't believe that there are

true Thais in Kelantan. No eloquence could speak as clearly as this sad muddle for the lack of any government inspiration. The Thai government's facile belittlement of racial distinction, when it calls the Malays of the South 'Islamic Thai', has rebounded against the true Thai of the deeper South, who are conceived here as nothing more nor better than a Malay variant. The Kiettisak editorial neither serves the purposes of would-be propaganda against Malaysia (The Straits Times excepted!) nor does it even convey the ostensible Foreign Ministry position that the Consul is faced with a genuine but unsolicited problem which can best be disposed of by going into the facts.

The author was privileged to obtain two interviews at the Foreign Ministry in September 1967.⁵⁶ His assumption prior to these interviews was that there was an ostensible and a real reason for the setting up of the December 1966 committee. As it was not clear, however, what the real reason really was, access to the Ministry was sought so as to elicit, if possible, an answer in this respect. Certainly after the complete lack of a propaganda campaign had become apparent from a reading of the press, the hypothesis of propaganda motive no longer exerted much attraction. But enquiries in Kelantan in the intervening months had in fact produced another hypothesis, which the Foreign Ministry encounters might help to confirm.

The most surprising element in the Consul's original statement to the press was the claim that hundreds of Thais had approached him within six months of the opening of the Consulate, to ask for help in obtaining land in Malaya. Although the Thais hold that the Consul can and should use his good offices on their behalf in various ways, it was a surprising claim that the Consulate had been besieged by hundreds of voluntary petitioners from the countryside. The

Consulate is not located on one of the roads which Thais travel to reach Kōta Bharu. Country folk do not naturally incur the expense and trouble of a trip to the capital without a clear knowledge of their destination and the certainty that on the day of their visit their business will be dealt with. How could such numbers have made the journey to the newly-opened Consulate without some special information and inspiration?

In due course it became apparent that the Consul was in the habit of summoning Thais to his office in connection with, notably, recruitment to the colonies in Narathiwat. It seemed that the Consulate had indeed received many visits from local Thais, but neither to petition for land in Malaya nor on purely rustic initiative. Why then the misleading statement to the press? Propaganda was certainly served by it, but the function of smoke-screen to the illicit side of the consular role seemed increasingly plausible.⁵⁷ The Consul had gone to some lengths to convince the reporter from the Straits Times of the genuineness of his story, and the reporter, Padman Gopal, probably believed it himself, even while realising that the Consul was anxious that the story should not be known to have been inspired. (Gopal was called to the Consulate to meet four men of Baan Jaamuu, but told the author, when asked in December, that these four men had approached him at the Straits Times office, whereupon he had interviewed the Consul in order to verify their story.)

The meeting with the Consul and the four Jaamuu men had been carefully stage-managed.⁵⁸ The four farmers were men who had been short-listed, at the request of the Consul, by their abbot, for plots at Nikhom Suung. They were attending the Consulate on a pre-arranged date in November 1966 to make arrange-

ments about their move to South Thailand. The abbot of Jaamuu led them to the Consulate as they didn't know the way. Only one of these men had a red card, the other three were Malaysian citizens. The Consul took away these three blue cards and retained them till after the meeting with the reporter. However, the men did not realise that the man taking notes was a newspaper man; the Consul spoke to him in English; and the would-be state-less petitioners for land in Kelantan were hardly required to say anything or answer any questions.

The aim of the interviews at the Foreign Ministry, then, was to try to establish whether the Consul's report and the committee of the Ministry had been designed to screen the use of the Consulate as a recruiting centre rather than - but not excluding - to create propaganda. The manifest motive: to get to the bottom of an unsolicited problem was not held to be plausible before the interviews took place. The first interview was with Prachaa Khana' Keesom of the Information Department. He was a member of the December Committee which had sat on the problem. He gave an impression of very considerable astuteness; his answers were diplomatically perfect: to the point and not apparently evasive. But they reiterated the official reason for the establishment of the committee, and their very virtuosity (he had had no warning of the interview) left the author with doubts of the Foreign Ministry's sincerity. The gist of the interview, written up a few hours later, is as follows:

K.: What has the committee decided?

P.: Well, we discovered that the situation in Kelantan is due to the Kelantan government, not the Tengku's government. Anyway, there is no cause for action, because these people cannot under any circumstances be considered Thai citizens.

- K.: If this is so obvious, why did the Consul make the statement to the press, and why did you appoint the committee in the first place?
- P.: The Consul did not volunteer his statement - a reporter came and asked him. Whenever there are people making a lot of complaints the press tends to hear of it.
- K.: Wasn't there a risk that the Malaysian Government would accuse you of interference?
- P.: If ever any little problem did arise between us, we could settle it immediately on the golf course. There would be no public recriminations. We have absolutely excellent contact with Razak and Mohamad Ghazali Shafie. But of course we for our part would never do anything that could lead to misunderstandings. Our committee was established just to find out the facts.

But any suspicion that Prachaa Khana' Keesom might be willing to conceal any matter was allayed by his cordial invitation to seek out the officer in charge of the Malaysia desk. This officer was Naai Suwat. The author felt that Naai Suwat was reminding himself intermittently that as a diplomat he should not be too open with enquirers; there were moments in this 30 minute discussion when there seemed to be some suppression, some sticking to an official story as opposed to a known, real, one. But these moments were intermittent and striking only for the contrast they afforded with Naai Suwat's quite 'undiplomatic' personality. He gave his time beyond the call of courtesy or duty, and was frank even when trying to be guarded. He talked freely for minutes at a stretch. His thoughts were not all easy to follow in English. He may not have grasped the meaning of all the author's questions at once, and the interview as reported is more structured than in reality.⁵⁹ Only the last sentence of Suwat's is verbatim, because unforgettable.

- K.: It seems to me that Thailand has been taking some interest in the Kelantan Thais. Why is this?
- S.: Well, we are Thais and they are Thais. It is natural for us to feel some moral obligation towards them. They came

from our country originally and now they find themselves in Malaysia.

K.: Is the Committee still in existence?

S.: There is no committee.

K.: But the committee which was announced in the press last December?

S.: No, not now....well, that committee still exists really, it hasn't been disbanded. It can meet again if necessary.

K.: What was the committee's conclusion?

S.: Principally that this is Malaysia's problem, and that the special political conditions in Kelantan have given rise to it. It is not Thailand's business. But perhaps you can tell me something about the situation in Kelantan. Will the PMIP win the next election? How, in your view, does PMIP rule affect the Thais, and what about their attitude to Patani?

K.: The prospects of the PMIP in Kelantan are still good, but you have nothing to worry about from the Malaysian Government - the agitation on Patani will remain an opposition thing, and even there subject to strict surveillance by the Alliance government. As for the Thais, the problem arises because PMIP won't give land for rent or for alienation to non-Malays - nationality is not the crux of it. But who informed your committee about the special conditions in Kelantan - Wichet?

S.: Yes.

K.: If Wichet knew so well about the situation why did he raise the question in the first place?

S.: The issue was forced on him, really, by the flood of people coming to his office. That's why we have not finally closed the question: that is, we cannot say these people are no concern at all of ours. If they come and plead for help you cannot turn them away. Yet we have to be careful not to appear to interfere with Malaysian affairs. What do you think?

K.: I think it is admirable that Thailand takes this humanitarian view. On the other hand if the Consul helps them as much as he is doing, getting them nationality, sending them to the nikhom, he will make them think of themselves as Thais even more, and then it will be more difficult for them to find their place in Malaysia.

S.: But excuse me, the Consul is not helping the Thais in the way you say.

K.: But he is recruiting settlers for the Nikhom.

S.: No not now. 5 years ago the embassy at Kuala Lumpur took the names of Kelantan Thais who applied of their own free will. Now they cannot apply to anyone in Malaysia. If they want to get a place at a nikhom they must go to live in Thailand first and apply there. Of course we cannot prevent them coming across and nor can the Malaysian government stop them from leaving.

- K.: I feel rather embarrassed to inform you about what Wichet is doing....
- S.: What is Wichet doing? Please mention it.
- K.: I hope that you will not mention to him that I told you.
- S.: No, no, no.
- K.: Well, he has actively recruited settlers round the villages and the Thais go to his office to put down their names.
- S.: Not now, I think. That was five years ago, but not now.
- K.: May I ask you, could the Consul be asked to cooperate with the Minister of Interior in getting people for the nikhom?
- S.: He's a very important man. (Naai Suwat's actual words, spoken reluctantly.)

The author parted from Naai Suwat with the conviction that this officer had not known about the recruitment in Kota Bharu. It was a conviction owing much to intuition, but observers at the University confirmed that it was quite in the order of things in the Thai bureaucracy for the Interior Ministry to be working at cross-purposes with the rest and without their knowledge.⁶⁰

Professor Jacques Amyot pointed out that the Minister of Interior, General Prapart, besides Police, Interior, and the primary schools, has many foreign appointments in his hand. (The Consul in Kelantan had indeed held a military rank.) Even if the author was deceived by Mr. Suwat, the result is much the same. The Interior Ministry's policy is not in line with Thailand's international policy on the southern side. If the Foreign Ministry knew about this, they would certainly have liked to forget it.

What has been shown in this account is that Thailand has two postures on the Kelantan Thai question. That explains why the appointment of the committee in Bangkok was not the second step in a campaign against Malaysia. The Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister are firmly wedded to friendship with Malaysia. By contrast, the Interior Ministry seems capable of making use of the Kelantan Thais. The Consul's first statement showed good propaganda sense, and the

Interior Minister used flood relief blatantly for the same end. But the primary purpose of the Consul's statement does seem to have been to screen his recruiting activities from the public view - and perhaps from the view of his Ministry as well, so that the Committee was set up quite sincerely for the purpose of fact-finding.

It is understandable that the Interior Ministry, which has to control the situation in the South if the Malays get out of hand, is the least likely to take an optimistic view of what might come out of Malaya in the future, particularly from its press and nationalistic elements. The Interior Ministry under its military boss is like a Thai counterpart to the watchdogs of Malay nationalism, Utusan Melayu and the PMIP, although the Kelantan Thais are probably too small and forgotten a community to excite genuine emotions of sympathy in that quarter of the bureaucracy. Their existence is merely useful in the context of southern security. (Such a conclusion is enhanced by the very unsympathetic personal attitude of the Consul himself to the Kelantan Thais.)

But why has the advantage not been further exploited? The ignorance and indifference of the Thai press could easily be overcome but it is likely that the Interior fears that over-propagandising this issue could stir up annoyance in the Malay press and have a rebound in new unrest in South Thailand. The Kelantan Thai issue, once created, is best kept as a card in reserve, to be played defensively. The situation in the South dictates a defensive approach at this stage of nation-building. Furthermore, if Malay resentment were provoked the illicit activities of the Consul - which it was probably the prior aim of the tactic to conceal - might come under scrutiny, and the strategy in

the South receive a set-back on the migration front. Calm, and assimilation, are the priorities in the South. For the time being propaganda, if overdone, would defeat these ends.

The recruitment of Thais for the nikhom is already an intrusion into Malaysian sovereignty but the Consul seems to be working out a yet more grandiose long-term design, namely, to establish the Consulate as the natural focus of the Kelantan Thais' dependence (phyng), the Consul or the Thai state as their primary patron.⁶¹ If loyalty is successfully kindled the future may see (a) spontaneous migration from Kelantan, unconnected with the nikhom; while (b) the Thais remaining in Kelantan would have been transformed into a sphere of extra-territorial influence of the Thai government, a 'constituency' to be exploited in the overall southern context as desired, and on a more ambitious scale than the propaganda to date has hinted. What is astonishing to the outside observer is the extent to which the Malaysian government not merely overlooks but cooperates in this enterprise. The Alliance government, pressed by the Alliance Party of Kelantan for some little time past to intervene in the procedures which were obstructing citizenship for the Thais, only took earnest cognizance of the question after the Consul's press statement in November 1966. No legislative changes were made (as The Straits Times proposed)⁶² but a no less radical departure was undertaken in giving the Consul forms of application for citizenship by registration and forms for the late registration of birth. (This was without the knowledge of the Federal Registrar in Kelantan, who alone is entitled to issue forms under the known rules.)⁶³ Even those Thais who succeed in achieving Malaysian citizenship through the Consul will say that it was the Consul who did it, not 'the Malays'. But a

far more significant class are those who went to the Consulate early in 1967 and heard it from the Consul's own mouth that no one, not even he, could achieve citizenship for them, because they were without birth certificates or some other means of establishing birth in Kelantan. The Consul has not taken upon himself to peddle Malaysian naturalisation, and it seems plausible that while acting on behalf of the Malaysian government and Alliance Party to get one group of Thais registered as citizens (and so onto the voting rolls), he is isolating for his own ends another group by dashing their hopes of ever finding an honourable place in the Malaysian state. A significant proportion of this group are, of course, 21-31 year-olds, as was illustrated at Chapter IV, and a desirable acquisition to Thailand if they chose to migrate.⁶⁴ To ensure that Thais of both groups - registrable and naturalisable red-card holders who had no application in process of consideration through the normal channels - would make the trip to the Consulate, the Consul in March 1967 let it be known throughout the Thai villages that if red-card holders did not get a blue card soon, they would be fined \$100. But this was a gross misrepresentation of Malaysian policy.⁶⁵

On his visits to villages the Consul affects an authority in the Thais' affairs, and responsibility for their conduct, whose intention is unambiguous. At Jung Kaw he spoke to the assembled villagers and told them that as Thais in a foreign state they had a duty to behave decorously and in conformity with local law. At Khaw Joon he left his card with the widow of the late Naaj and told her to come to his office if ever any Malay clerk gave her trouble. The secret survey of land and live-stock was the first ever done with a view to

helping the Thais. The Consulate is now the clearing house for Ministry of Education funds for temples and wat schools. The school of Pali opened in 1967 at Bopsamed was set on foot by the Consulate. Itineraries of preachers are now fixed by the Consulate and the Consul always makes an appearance at the inauguration of new buildings which were constructed with Thai funds.

This bold bid for the Thais' allegiance is being made with the partial connivance of Kuala Lumpur, but the Consul is also much assisted by the popular and official view-point in Kelantan that the Consul's attendance at Thai wats, so far as not religiously motivated, is proper to the office of one to whom people of Thai descent are bound by a common language and religion. This view is strong among moderates in the state's district administration. (As for PMIP intellectuals, if they are not in touch with all the Consul's latest moves, they foresaw them in principle before he took up his post: but protest could lead to an angry Thai reaction in Patani and disturb the surface calm which the secessionists need, as much as the Thai government, while their strategy matures.⁶⁶) The Consul has little active competition from the district administration for the 'hearts and minds' of the Thais. He was the first and only representative of any government to inspect the irreparable flood damage at Samöbrag after the disaster of January 1967.

The first consequence for the Kelantan Thai of their becoming an international issue is likely to be that the government in Kuala Lumpur will take more notice of their existence and problems than it has been wont to do. But as and if the Consulate establishes itself as patron and leader of the Kelantan Thai community, not only the minority who are recruited to nikhom, but the community as a whole, will be subject to a new appeal and pressure to reconsider

its loyalty. This appeal will augment that exerted by the new monks of Thai nationality. Although the monks' appeal is not wholly deliberate or conscious on their part, it is unlikely that the Departments subsidising their journeys across the border would spend the money without the prospect of some political advantage. To this extent the Buddhist revival is not merely an accidental or 'over-spill' phenomenon in Kelantan, but, like the Consular functions, part of the continuing aspiration of Thailand to hegemony or influence in the Peninsula. Malayan official indulgence and insouciance assist this aspiration and threaten to vitiate the undoubted advantage to the integration of a plural society which flows from a policy of tolerance towards cultural diversity.

It is inconceivable that true hegemony over Kelantan will ever be restored. The Kelantan Thai are no future fifth column in an irredentist situation. Their role is more likely to be instrumental in strengthening Thai hegemony further north. Yet whatever the case, they are being faced with an alternative to political integration with Malaysia. The following chapter will further develop the assessment of the Kelantan Thai response to the Thailand option.

FOOTNOTES

1. See F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in Asia, London 1954: p.349. Tjengganu, Kedah and Perlis were also handed to a Thai administration in belated fulfilment of the secret conditions of the Japanese-Thai Alliance of 21 December 1941.
2. See Sir J. Crosby, "Siamese Imperialism and the Pan-Thai Movement", Fortnightly, Vol. 153, 1943.
3. The school house erected at Boosmed was subsequently handed over to the Malayan government and is now a Malay 'national-type' primary school. The Thai occupation affected the state school system of Kelantan only in the addition of Thai to the curriculum, along with Japanese. (English had been proscribed completely by the Japanese.) Some Thai teachers were brought in to teach the language. No reorganisation could be undertaken in such a short period and under conditions of terrible hardship. This applied to the state administration too, as officials recall; but they too had to study Thai and all correspondence and even verbal communication was supposed to be in Thai.
4. The mobilisation of Kelantan monks as primary school teachers offers a further interesting contrast with the role of the Sangha in modern Thailand. (c.p. Chapter VI, notes 6-7 p.177). Although since the war the Sangha has been mobilised for new secular purposes, as noted by Mulder (op.cit.) and de Young (op.cit.), one field where the monks have lost a traditional function is education. K.P.Landon noted already in his article "The Monks of New Thailand" (Asia, New Hampshire, March 1940) that even though the majority of primary schools in 1936-7 were still located in wat grounds, they were nearly all under government auspices. Thus at the time when the Kelantan Sangha found its educational responsibilities growing, the secularisation of primary education across the border, aspired to by King Chulalongkorn, was just reaching fulfilment. However, some laymen have also been conducting school classes in Kelantan.
5. There are three other monks of this status in Malaya: the Chief Monk of Kedah; the deputy Chief Monk of Kedah; and a special appointee at Penang. (The names and addresses of all four are given in the more comprehensive type of Sangha desk diary, the Patithinsaadsanaa, published annually in Bangkok.) But the Kelantan Thai and the Kelantan Sangha have no communication with Kedah, indeed virtually no knowledge of it. All communication is north-south.
6. His photograph appears in Stuart Wavell, op.cit., as also that of his successor.
7. Dates supplied by Enche Tan Ker Liang, "Head of the Thai Community of Kelantan".

8. The Sangha of Kelantan recognises the Sultan's civil authority and technically it is by that authority that a new Chief Abbot is appointed. The Sultan attends the inauguration by invitation of the Sangha and listens to a petition that the monks be allowed to proceed to a nomination and appointment. The Sultan in turn directs that they do so proceed. The introduction of insignia from Thailand is thus not considered in breach of Kelantan sovereignty.
9. The picture that the author has been able to reconstruct of the patterns of communication earlier in the century is of long-term Kelantan monks spending much more extended periods in South Thailand than they do today, while rather few monks from Thailand ever made the journey down to Kelantan. In more recent times the trend has reversed, although the majority of short-time monks do manage, through improved transport, to devote a small part of their time in the Order to a trip into Thailand.
10. In Pai Arab kap Phan Eeg Pin Bangkok, 1967: p.100. The author was formerly a chaplain to the army, and is now a leading official of the Ministry of Education (Department of Religious Affairs). His book is an examination of the political and social conditions of Islam in several countries, including Malaysia. In the case of Malaysia the state of Buddhism is considered extensively.
11. Chawalid Panjaalag, an executive assistant on The Social Science Review, Bangkok, writing in the December 1967 number under the title "Khwaamdyadroonkhongkhonchyachaadthajthii kalantan" ("The hardships of the people of Thai race in Kelantan") finds such invitations a very significant pattern in Kelantan Buddhist life, and a potential basis for enlarged activities in the future (see p.71 of his article). For further commentary on this article see infra, p.201.
12. Siam Nikorn, February 2 1968.
13. See J.E. de Young op.cit., p.148. However, the author's friend Aacaan Kamol Somwichien finds that Western analyses go too far when they infer a complete break with the past in the adoption of civil commitments. The monk always had a civil role of some sort, as teacher or healer, for instance.
14. The author is inadequately informed about the state of affairs in Thailand; but it would not be astonishing if the Thai government found that it had unleashed, in Buddhist revival, a tiger which was not always willing to be ridden by its secular master. Professor Hans-Dieter Evers has suggested to the author (personal communication, April 1968) that the old distinction between the Mahaanikaaj and Thammajud sects - long lost except in the names owing to the adoption of the Mongkut reforms by the whole of the Order - has been revived, with the 'reformed sect' becoming the home of a new generation of social reformers. However, while in Kelantan the author was not aware of the reformist travellers being associated with one sect as against another.

15. V. Thompson & R. Adloff, op.cit. p.271, writing on Thailand's Buddhist revival in 1954.
16. Phra' Silananda, a disciple of Panjaanatha', told the author that these young monks were sent up to Bangkok (up to twenty at any one time from Malaya) in the hope that they would later take up positions of leadership in the community. He regretted that far too many of them took the opportunity to settle in Bangkok and gave up all thought of returning to Malaya.
17. With its own broadcasting unit as well, the Mahaathaad Foundation may be considered a 'fast-growth' sector in the revivalist field. If one is to search for potential centres of independent and even oppositionalist reformism, it may not be necessary to look further than this. That the government is alert to such a danger may be deduced from the arrest of the head of Wat Mahaathaad in 1962, on suspicion of subversive activities, by the Sarit government. (However, the foundation stone of the new missionary college was laid in July 1967 by the new Prime Minister - as the author was informed at Wat Mahaathaad.)
18. E.g. the decree that all men should wear trousers and topees, one of a number of measures of the fascist period that Fraser notes as being particularly offensive to Malays. (T.M.Fraser Jr., Rusembilan, Cornell 1960: p.94.) But the measures of the Phibul era fell heavily upon many Thai traditions too. Thai chauvinism in the South today is directed towards the Malays and, judging by their resistance, is felt by them. The author is indebted to M.R.W.Kukrit Pramoj for information about an enormous Buddha statue that it was recently planned to construct in the Malay part of Thailand, from the proceeds of a tax on rubber. Rubber is tapped by the Malays, who would have had to bear the tax more or less in full. Another more general grievance is the terminological tactic of calling the Malays thaj isalaam, ostensibly to show that Thai citizenship is for all natives of Thailand whatever their religion, but suspected of being a means to undermine Malay culture by denying its existence.
19. The Thai may find the Muslim's belief in "God" an oddity. The Malay can only regard a Buddhist as an atheist and idolator. But the underlying antipathy is obviously aggravated by a measure like the inclusion of Buddhist morals in the curriculum of primary schools (see T.M.Fraser Jr., op.cit., p.116) - something that the Thais in Kelantan are spared.
20. See p.205 paragraph 1 infra et seq.
21. This concept is elaborated infra, p. 194.
22. This account of Buddhist aims in the South is the author's interpretation of information given to him in the course of a year by some half-dozen monks concerned actively with revival. The most explicit statements were

made by Phra' Silananda, who accompanied Panjaanatha' to Samöörag in June 1967, and by a young executive monk at Wat Mahaathaad - Phra' Yaanuttaroo - in Bangkok, September 1967.

23. Regrettably the author has been too short a time in Thailand to collect evidence with a direct bearing on such a 'Grand Design' behind the Buddhist mission in the South. But M.R.W.Kukrit Pramoj and Aacaan Patayaa Saihoo in conversation with the author supported his assumptions from their own observations.
24. I.e. the concept of a 'Great Tradition' elaborated by Robert Redfield in Peasant Society and Culture, Chicago, 1956.
25. In contrast to the unbounded and interpenetrating, yet political systems of Burma as described by E.R.Leach in his study "The frontiers of Burma" Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3, 1960, this posited myang of the Kelantan Thai is strictly a cultural tradition, a 'Great Tradition'. But as Leach points out, there is a common, if misguided, tendency in Europe and Asia to equate ethnic groupings retrospectively with political systems. Some Kelantan Thais make this mistake, whereas in reality they have for centuries been members of the Malay political system, linked only indirectly to Bangkok. On the other hand, the Kelantan Thai did migrate originally from the Thai political system into the Malay area. It is not as unwise as it may be in Burma to attribute ethnic distinctions to archaic political identities, even if the semi-political identity is only re-added at a later date. And even this part of the Malay system continued to be attached to the periphery of the Thai system. But what is in any case, quite striking about the new sense of bonds to the modern Thai state is the parallel with the way Nanyang Chinese identification with modern China was reawakened out of inherited cultural identity at the beginning of this century.
26. The Straits Times, 26 June 1962.
27. The Straits Times, 25 June 1962.
28. The Straits Times, 27 June 1962.
29. But at least it is standard practice to write "Warga Negara Malaysia" on all blue cards in the 'bangsa' space.
30. See Chapter V, p. 141 above.
31. Chawalid Panjaalag, op.cit. The present author believes that this article may have been commissioned by the editor (Sulak Sivarak) of Social Science Review, as a result of the present author drawing his attention to the existence of the Buddhist Thai in Kelantan, in September 1967. One does not work in a vacuum.

32. Phan Eeg Pin, op.cit.
33. Phan Eeg Pin, ibid., p.99.
34. Phan Eeg Pin, ibid., p.101.
35. Phan Eeg Pin, ibid., p.105.
36. Phan Eeg Pin, ibid., p.106.
37. Chawalid Panjaalag, op.cit., pp.70-72.
38. The author understands this on the good authority of Professor Jaques Amyot, Chulalongkorn University (personal communication, August 1967).
39. The Malay propensity to become involved in Patani's affairs was most evident, this decade, in 1961, but as recently as 1966, in a period of unprecedented good will between the two countries, The Straits Times reported under the date line Sungai Patani (Kedah) on 2 July:
"Malaysians were today urged not to get themselves involved in the separatist movement in South Thailand. The call was made by the Minister of Education, Inche Mohammed Khir Johari...."
40. E.g. a statement by Police General Luang Chattrakarn Kosol, reported by The Straits Times July 26 1960, in which he called allegations in the Malay press "part of a smear campaign for political purposes"; or the report in the Bangkok Post 17 March 1961 entitled "Alert in South during Festival" which inter alia stated: "It is generally believed that most of the Thai Muslims in the southern provinces are loyal to Thailand but certain elements would appear to be under the influence of Malayan mischief makers." Thailand could do little about it, which may explain why she adopted a conciliatory approach to Malay criticism of her policy in South Thailand at this time: c.p. the press conference given by General Luang Chattrakarn at Kuala Lumpur on 3 August 1960 (see The Straits Times 4 August 1960). However, one advantage accruing from Thailand's restrained reaction may have been that the Malayan authorities felt bound to show a certain reciprocity (as well as spontaneous indulgence) in accommodating the Thai King's patronage to Thai temples in Malaya the next year.
41. A case in point is Tengku Abdul Rahman's speech to the UMNO General Assembly of 1961, paraphrased in The Straits Times' leader of 8 May 1961. A typical passage from the leader: "The Federal Government's leaders are not without strong sympathy for the desire of the Malays in the four provinces to live their way of life - as non-Malays in Malaya are allowed to live theirs. Tengku Abdul Rahman on Saturday spoke warmly of the love the Malays bear for their brethren across the border...What he will not do is to engage in courses of action that would undermine Malaya's friendly relations with Thailand..."

42. These dates were obtained from a member of the Consulate staff. Naai Wichet, of course, was the official who attended the inauguration at Bangsâ' in 1963. He had had a brief for east coast affairs while at Kuala Lumpur.
43. At an interview granted to the author by the Consul in December 1966.
44. P. Kunstadter, op.cit., Introduction, p.7.
45. See Thailand, Department of Social Welfare: Self-Help Land Settlement in Thailand, Bangkok, 1964, which gives the following types of project under the National Economic Development Plan:
 - (a) Ordinary Self-Help Land Settlement Project
 - (b) Land Settlement for the Hill Tribes
 - (c) project for Resettlement of People in Some Areas
 - (1) Project for Resettlement of people displaced by the construction of the Bhumipol Dam, Hod, Chiangmai;
 - (2) Project for Resettlement of people displaced by the Nam Pong Project, Khon Kan;
 - (3) Project for Resettlement of people displaced by the Lam Pao Project.
 - (4) Project for Removal of people into Provinces along the southern Border.
46. Personal communication, September 1967.
47. The truth is that Malaysian citizens are accepted too. Three out of the four pioneers met by the Straits Times reporter in the incident described at page 214 infra, were citizens. Malaysian citizens can get government help for their private rubber holdings in Narathiwat. Thais from Kelantan can even move freely in South Narathiwat without border passes.
48. The Straits Times, 15 November 1966.
49. The Straits Times, (leader), 15 November 1966.
50. Berita Harian, 17 November 1966. "This matter ought not to be allowed to go on. We can't let them drift along without a nationality."
51. Prime Minister Thanat Khoman, quoted in The Straits Times 21 December 1966.
52. Bangkok Post, 20 December 1966.
53. The Straits Times, 2 February 1967.
54. Sayam Rat, 3 December 1966. The author acknowledges gratefully the help of Aacaan Kamol Somwichien in the translation of parts of this passage.

55. Bangkok Post, 6 December 1966
56. These were arranged through the influence of Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, whose generous help to the author while in Bangkok must here be acknowledged.
57. The Consul may have feared that the Malay staff of the Consulate might have become suspicious and make complaints outside.
58. As Gopal had identified to the author the village from which his informants came, it was an easy matter to seek them out and compare their story of events with Gopal's. (In spite of the 'stage-management' the first initiative in the Jaamu involvement in the nikhom question had come from one Caw Need of that village, who had made a petition for nikhom land to the Consul; this led to the Consul's request for a short-list. A Samßrag man had also taken the first initiative on behalf of his village in this matter: see p. 204 above.)
59. Apart from the fact that the author's records of the interviews are not complete accounts of all that was said, this method of presentation is open to criticism on grounds of bad taste and pretension in that the author intrudes his own personality too much and in an unpleasantly superior posture. The author has felt moved, nevertheless, to do this in order to lend credence to judgements which took shape in these interviews, as a product of the whole ambience of the exchanges rather than of any single reply.
60. C.p. also D.A.Wilson, Politics in Thailand, Cornell, 1962, on inter-departmental competition (p.163): "The tendency of the bureaucracy to break up into competing groups because it is under no pressure from articulate expressions of interest from constituencies outside the government results in a dispersal of power to make policy..."; or on the role of the military in politics (p.188): the soldier "believes himself to be a part of the organisation upon which the fate and honour of the nation depend. This tends towards the belief that what is good for the army is good for the country. Coupled with this sense of the vital importance of the army itself is a very limited view of politics and government. The highest virtues of duty, honour and nationalism do not lend themselves to a subtle sense of restraint and patience."
61. In the view of Tan Ker Liang (about whom further information in Chapter VIII) Naai Wichet first revealed his pretensions at the time of the cremation at Bangsß' in 1963. He forced Enche Tan to amend the Thai version of his loyal address to the Sultan in accordance with good Thai style and terminology, removing the Malay element. (Enche Tan, as "Head of the Thai Community," reads the address in both Malay and Thai.)
62. See the editorial of The Straits Times, 15 November 1966, quoted at p. 207. above.

63. A PMIP type of hypothesis to explain the Federal Government's indulgence towards the Consul would be that Kuala Lumpur is committed to betray Malay nationalism in Patani by allowing sponsored Thai migration into the area, in return for the Consul's assistance with the recruitment of new Alliance voters in Kelantan. Stability in mid-Peninsula would be assured by an Alliance victory in Kelantan and a stronger Thai hegemony in south Thailand. The war against the Communists on the border could then be prosecuted more effectively. Such a hypothesis would seem to be untrue to the Tengku's generous and un-Machiavellian nature, which never leads him into conspiracies but often into rash statements and disastrous friendships. The trust extended to the Thai Prime Minister and the Consul in 1966 is more likely to be found to belong in the latter category.
64. Morally, the Consul is well justified in regarding as potential recruits those whom Malaysian law so unjustly hinders from becoming citizens.
65. Its only possible relation to truth may be through a report that appeared in The Straits Times, 15 December 1966, to the effect that "Anyone who came to live in Malaysia after Merdeka Day will have to pay a \$100 fee for citizenship by naturalisation....."
66. A Machiavellian hypothesis to explain PMIP silence would be that a run-down of the Thai population of Kelantan may be seen as producing an increment of land to the Malays.

CHAPTER VIII: PROSPECT

The 20th Century has been an era of intensifying communication and whereas this brought with it steady assimilation to a Kelantan society, Thailand has been able increasingly to assert an attraction from across the border. As important as the assertion of Thai control down to Sungai Golok has been the rise of new means of communication between Thailand and Malaya such as the railway link to Pasir Mas (opened in the early 1930s), and in recent years a strong short wave radio service. Young people, notably from the villages of Pasir Mas and Tumpat districts, have cheap and rapid access to Thailand, while in the return direction come not only itinerant Bhikkus but school text books, novels and pin-ups. Marriage of women across the border is increasing from villages like Bangs^u, Jung Kaw and Jamuu and this is in part already a second generation repercussion of earlier movements into Narathiwat to plant rubber: there are uncles and aunts across the border to arrange these liaisons. These same uncles and aunts in the Sungai Golok area are to be found adopting nephews and nieces from Kelantan to give them an elementary public schooling in Thai.¹ The young 'intelligentsia' of the border villages - and even as far south as Sadang - are progressively and consciously dropping their dialect and its Malay accretions and using standard Thai tones, idiom and vocabulary.

Yet, interestingly, there is some scepticism about this education among those peasants (the majority) whose families have no experience of it, and even among the boys who return to Kelantan to help their parents when their schooling is over. They find themselves at a disadvantage compared to their contemporaries who attended a Malay school. Even close to the border there

is a feeling - as deep as at Samörag - for the realities of the situation: this is a Malay state and if we choose it as our home we must make our adjustments. Three of the most successful Bangsá' boys, understanding the logic of their situation, have stayed on in Thailand, two taking further or higher education. It is reported by Bangsá' contemporaries that these youths expressed strongly nationalist sentiments on their visits home. However, this led them to seize the opportunities offered in Thailand, not to return home and spread the nationalist gospel among unenlightened peasant kinsmen. Probably their decision was for the best. Nationalist activity would be a thankless and frustrating task among the Kelantan Thai at this time, particularly if starting from the assumption of Thai nationalism and alienation. The Kelantan Thai do not want to be alienated; they want to become integrated on terms of dignity. The would-be prophets would also lack employment in Malaya consonant with their abilities. In any case, education in Thailand is not being put to this kind of use. Its effect is even to drain off some of the intellectual and socially conscious resources of the community through emigration.²

Attitudes to Thailand among the generality of peasants are equivocal. On the one hand there is the ideal model of a Thailand complete in moral purity, which the better type of visiting monk keeps before the community's eyes. But improving communications have also given rise to invidious comparisons between the state of security in Thailand and Malaya. Not a few Thais give as a reason for hesitating to accept pioneer land in Thailand that the local inhabitants are allowed to settle petty feuds with the gun. Then

there are reports of thieves and vagabonds taking refuge in the Buddhist Order. But the most disastrous damage has been done to Thailand's image by the nikhom experiment itself.

This damage is unrelated, essentially, to the physical destruction of Nikhom Suung in the January 1967 flood. The loss of houses and topsoil merely frustrated; as did the difficulties of maintaining two establishments, one in Thailand, one in Kelantan, which the Kelantan farmers - rather unwisely from Thailand's point of view - has been allowed to do.³ What was psychologically devastating was the first experience of Thai bureaucratic venality and lethargy. Kelantan Thais were considered fair game by Thai clerks and met obstacles in drawing their rightful pioneer allowances. Medical attention was not forthcoming as in Kelantan when called for - nor was it free. On their return to Kelantan the Consul vented his rage on the unfortunate pioneers for the failure of the project. The Consul's arrogant demeanour with peasants has begun to rankle indeed with nearly all Thais who have had dealings with him. Although expectations from the Consulate are growing, this is not yet by any means equivalent to a new identification with Thailand, excluding the aspiration to become integrated with Malayan society.

It is a paradox that while emigration might be motivated by dissatisfaction with Malayan conditions, and the material and spiritual attractions of Thailand, the departure of the discontented and the patriotically inclined lowers the level of discontent in the community - not least through the relief of pressure on physical resources. Migration is a safety valve which could postpone political alienation for longer than might be projected from other indicators, notwithstanding the possible long-term alienative effect of having

successful and contented kinsmen in Thailand. But the sponsored migrants have not sent - or brought - back glowing reports.⁴ Moreover, diversification into tobacco at Maalaj and the extensive use of artificial subsidised fertiliser on rice-fields this decade has increased yields and counter-balanced the startling growth of population since 1957.⁵ Wise villagers note that although their fathers had more land (per family) they didn't get so much rice from it. All the Thai villages show signs of material prosperity in some degree in the form of solid and quite costly new houses on concrete piles with boarded walls, shutters, and tile or corrugated asbestos roofs.⁶ In sum, the attractions of Thailand, such as they are, are countered by circumstances in Kelantan: both the sense of relative status described in Chapter V, and economic standards. Further, although one may speculate that reluctance to migrate will increase pressure on resources - and hence political alienation - in the long run (just as migration can be supposed to have the opposite effect), the appearance at the moment is that a disappointed, returning migrant tends to count his blessings in Malaya and make up his mind to flourish in it on the terms to which he is accustomed.

More paradoxical than anything else was the political situation observed by the author at Bangsã' in the course of a four-day visit in August 1967. Here the effect of modern Thai culture is seen more clearly than anywhere else in the state. Thai consciousness, even patriotism towards Thailand, is not confined to a few young men, but flourishes among their fathers (we are talking here in terms of not more than some half-dozen men in their fifties, but this is a striking number by the standards of other villages).⁷ They

form an impromptu clique when occasion offers and speculate on the origins of the Kelantan Thai. They subscribe to the principle that Kelantan was once part of Thailand, one of them to a quite paranoiac degree. Yet as literate and thoughtful men they have mostly welcomed the Alliance initiative in offering them a party branch at Bangsã', because this could be a means to organise and integrate the far-flung and unenlightened Thai peasant mass into the Malayan democratic system on just terms, where previous tentatives have foundered. Wee Suu Hung, the Kota Bharu town councillor who set the idea on foot in Kelantan, had no doubt that the high level of education at Bangsã' qualifies it to have the first branch. He is not mistaken.⁸ Thai consciousness is not incompatible with a genuine wish to remain Malayan. One young rubber tapper, an English-educated activist of the new branch, told the author that he loved Thailand but believed in the Malayan political system.

It is certainly, then, not primarily from Thailand that alienation will come. Its roots are rather in the Kelantan situation, except in so far as communications from Thailand help maintain a Thai cultural consciousness. Firstly, self-consciousness is heightened by the unfavourable aspects of the present environment. Discrimination on nationality (and hence, for young people, on employment) and on land, and the ostracism experienced by some children from the Muslim majority in school, not to speak of the declared religious principles of the Kelantan government, all combine to define the community more sharply in distinction to its environment. Unlike the sense of identity enhanced by British rule - which was at the same time integrative with the society because of the favourable status enjoyed in it - identity is now potentially defensive instead of outgoing in terms of the environment.

Identity is ceasing to be assimilative, albeit, for the reasons already discussed, the colonial responses have retained some of their force and validity into the later period. PMIP rule, considered as a new stimulus to behaviour, has not dictated the whole response in these ten years of Independence. Considered as a new learning experience, on the other hand, it must act to erode the inherited and spontaneous assumption of membership in Kelantan's society, especially among the younger people, the 'recruits' to the political system, who have no personal recollection of the period of satisfactory membership. Any future deterioration, even a lengthy stabilisation of the present conditions, must increasingly be perceived from a standpoint of estrangement, unequipped and unwilling to see mitigating circumstances.

At the same time education, and Alliance propaganda, are implanting an idea of popular will. This has been truly a decade of political mobilisation. While the Alliance still relies in the last resort on the authoritarian or patronising directive of a Penggawa or Penghulu to get out a full Thai vote at elections, the idea of a free partnership of the races is disseminated by word of mouth between times. This is done spontaneously and sincerely by Chinese friends and kinsmen and by neighbouring Malays to keep up the Thais' morale or reinforce their party loyalty. The Alliance ideology (at least for consumption by non-Malays) is far more explicit than ever British principles were, that ethnic groups are entitled to cultural identity and equal rights. Moreover, the right to identity and equality is willed by the people through elections. Plainly, this notion gives the desire for equality a greater urgency than under colonial rule; the community ceases to accept

what is bestowed without complaint. The founding of Alliance branches in Thai villages which we shall give an account of below, is now institutionalizing the Thais' will for equality and identity.

Equality for the generality of Thai farmers still means, before anything else, equality of access to new land and the right to buy land from others. The retention of power by the PMIP after the 1969 election would be blow enough but, curiously, one can foresee a greater shock from developments after an Alliance victory. The Alliance, to keep power in Kelantan, once won, would be obliged to pursue a pro-Malay policy in the land sector. Nor would it be under pressure at all from its ill-organised Thai clients (the appearance of an independent political structure in the form of party branches is deceptive). One can anticipate greater security of Temporary Occupation Licence land but not necessarily equality of access to the jungle fringes. Would a new government be prepared to modify the Malay Reservation Enactment? This is a cardinal Malay tenet. As to Federal citizenship laws, these are not affected by changes of power at the state level.⁹ Only under Alliance rule would many Thais be brought to realize that the Malays are the dominant partner in the party.¹⁰ This insight is not altogether absent in the Thai villages, but it has only come to a minority.¹¹ It is conceivable that Kelantan's socio-political structure might for the first time come to appear irrevocably hierarchical and repressive under Alliance rule.

In these circumstances the essentially provisional nature of the Thais' previous integration would be laid open to a 'final analysis'. Identification with Kelantan has been assisted by effective integration, as clients, with

certain parts of the political system of the state. The claim of these elements to the Thais' loyalty has been based not only upon tradition and the provision of a certain security, but (more especially) on the promise of a transformation when the PMIP is ousted. The Thais' partisan identification has been, in fact, with a political minority within the state, whose exclusion from power has helped to obscure - by default as much as by design - the true balance of power and interest within it. Kelantan is a unique political subsystem within the Malayan system; it awaits its own integration with national patterns. So long as this integration is postponed, the Thais must await the true test of their capacity for national integration. One must feel pessimistic about the outcome when this test eventually comes.

Yet, worse than any sense of material deprivation and social discrimination under Alliance government could be a feeling of threatened identity through Alliance organisation. The secret of the astonishing success of the Alliance system in Malaya lies partly in the size of the Chinese community, which enables it to extract acceptable rewards from the system. Now these rewards are not only of a material nature, but embrace the assurance of cultural integrity: the rate of assimilation is negotiable like other political goods. The setting up of Alliance branches in Thai villages is too recent a development for the observer to be dogmatic about possible consequences; yet it is possible to indicate dangers in the light of the pattern of Chinese integration and the given resilience of Thai culture.

The outside attempts to organise the Kelantan Thai date from the earliest days of independent political activity. In the 1959 period persons unknown are reported to have approached the late Gao Khun (Chief Abbot) at Bangsá'

with a proposal that a state Sangkharii¹² be appointed with the functions of a political organiser (presumably with Alliance loyalties). The Abbot went so far as to request the eminent Naaj (subsequently also deceased) at Khaw Joon to consider taking up a state-wide role. But informants at Bangsã' and the late Naaj's brother, recall that he was already past the age when he could have actively fulfilled the proposed functions. It was also suspected that the venerable Caw Khun, suspicious of politics, deliberately appointed a man of his own generation whom he knew would not be able or even inclined to carry out the radical functions of the proposed state Sangkharii-ship.

At some time not long after the 1959 victory of the PMIP an initiative came from Bõpsamed in favour of outside intervention in Thai affairs. The young Caw Sug felt at that time¹³ that the office of "Head of the Thai Community" was occupied by an inappropriate person, being Enche C.W.Sook, an English-educated clerk of mixed Indian and Thai parentage who had stood as a Socialist Front candidate in the Tumpat Tengah State constituency in 1959 and carried a number of Thai kinsmen and friends with him. The office of "Head of the Thai Community" has - and had then - as almost its sole function the salutation of the Sultan on behalf of the Thai community at his birthday, although it acts as intermediary with the state bureaucracy on the occasion of the cremation of a Chief Abbot. The bureaucracy has a hand in the appointment, and Enche C.W.Sook's qualifications were his literacy combined with domicile in a Thai village (Bõpsamed) and knowledge of the Thai language. His position at Bõpsamed is in fact socially peripheral for his interests lie outside. But he was well qualified for the bridging role. Caw Sug, his neighbour, was alarmed by the Socialist Front candidacy and approached Enche Wee Suu Hung of Kampong China, Kota Bharu, to take over the "Headship" and use it to bring some organisation to the Thais but with an Alliance bias.

Wee Suu Hung is the head of an 'old Chinese' family of Kelantan with a

tradition of service to the Thai community. He regretted not being able to take up the "Headship" himself, through pressure of other political commitments. But politically he liked the idea of using the "Headship" to steer the Thais away from a potential S.F. connection into the Alliance fold. In terms of his family's traditional sense of responsibility to the Thais he was glad to have the chance of organising them in such a way, so that their general interests could be represented to the state government. (It was essential however to keep the party-political element secret.) Wee Suu Hung decided to put an Enche Tan Ker Liang up to the task: a Thai-Chinese petition-writer of assured Alliance sympathies.

It is difficult to understand how Enche Wee could regard Enche Tan as an appropriate candidate. The British Military Administration had relieved him of his position at the Kelantan Customs (Preventive Branch) in 1946 in consideration of certain services to the preceding Japanese and Thai administrations.¹⁴ However, the choice was made. Wee Suu Hung inspired a Thai petition to have C. W. Sook removed and the state bureaucracy accepted Tan Ker Liang in his place. Ker Liang proceeded to propose to the state government in June 1960 that his office be expanded into a Protectorate along the lines of the Protectorate of Aborigines. This was turned down but the Registrar of Societies accepted the formation of a Thai society called Samaakhomphudthaborisadthajtrakunhëügrathakalantan.¹⁵ Ker Liang motored to all the Thai villages, collected initial membership fees of \$3 from up to 400 villagers,¹⁶ issued membership cards and returned thereafter to collect 50¢ a month. This appears to have been too much, especially when Ker Liang failed to produce any achievements in the way of successful citizenship

applications (some Thais gave him much more than \$3 for this favour) or state assistance to temples (which he is alleged to have claimed to be able to arrange). The Thais believe their money went into Ker Liang's pocket. Ker Liang told the author that driving round the villages consumed part of the money while the Chinese owner of a house hired as a meeting place at \$50 a month employed thugs with grudges dating from the war and pre-war period to intimidate him into paying the rent before the society was properly established. He applied to wind up the society in 1967 but it had long been moribund.

The unfortunate fate of this plan did not reflect on the Alliance because the political motive had been concealed. Wee Suu Hung's next move was his attempt from about 1965 to institutionalize Caw Sug's incipient leader's role at Bqpsamed by showing him how to organise a Friendly Society to pay funeral expenses and prevent Thais from mortgaging or selling land to do merit when their parents died. This society is now functioning unofficially. Its leader is credited in the village with obtaining the new crematorium single-handed, which is a valuable boost to his authority.¹⁷

The latest and boldest development, but the one with the potential to alienate the Thais affected by it, is the establishment of Alliance party branches in Thai villages.¹⁸ Wee Suu Hung is again the driving force and it is a move in the same spirit as his policy on the "Headship". He sees advantage to the party in mobilising the Thais as party members and advantage to the Thais in building up a state-wide lay political structure to represent their interests. But unlike the "Headship", which was not expected to develop native roots, the accent now is on autonomous and self-sustaining existence once the branches are under way. Bangsã' was chosen for the first experiment.

The branch was set up in April 1967 on the visit of a delegation from the Alliance state caucus. The Thai coffee-shop keeper was easily persuaded to become the leader but there is no shortage of educated men in the village who could have taken the position.¹⁹ There was general confidence among the educated that Bangsa' could become in this way the leader in the Thai political structure that they had so long seen to be necessary to the community. Like Wee Suu Hung they saw this future structure as a Thai organism with its own personality, operating as autonomously as the other ethnic parties within an Alliance framework, if on a more minor scale and without the title and status of a party.

The strong element of altruism in Wee Suu Hung's make-up contributes to Thai confidence in his schemes. Like Mr. Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu²⁰ and other patrons he is a builder of bridges for Thai identification with and now participation in the Alliance Party. But not least striking about the party branch scheme is how a democratic institution is here passed down through a patron-client structure - in much the same way as voting has been influenced quite largely by exploiting feelings of clientship and obligation. However, there is here a tangible element of deliberate cultural engineering by democratic politicians committed to a new 'mode' or 'formula' of politics. In their scheme of things a patron-client relationship cannot any longer be defined as integrative: a democracy can only integrate its citizens 'democratically', even if the initiative has to come from above. The Thais, meanwhile, will accept the party branches partly on trust because their 'pedigree' or ascriptive qualities are good, and the Bangsa'' people in general understand that a future

Alliance government will reward its friends for their loyalty. But both Wee Suu Hung and his intelligent 'clients' at Bangsâ' are aware of the pragmatic necessity for an independent Thai voice in a democratic political system. And the party branches as they are established village by village will in turn put a greater insistence into Thai aspirations to equality through the democratic idea which they symbolise. One problematic question is how far this new structure will be able to make its voice heard in the democratic jungle. It will surely lack the autonomy to which it aspires and this will deny it the ability to exert pressure on party and government (in the event of an Alliance victory). In terms of material rewards, this 'participation' will thus prove bogus, frustrating the very expectations it raises. Through the peculiar form of its bonds to the rural Alliance it may also increase, in absolute terms, the subjective sense of inferior status in the plural society; and alternatively, or in addition, may pose a subjective threat to cultural autonomy.

As in any democratic system, the most effective sanction of the Thai electors for equitable treatment by the Alliance party and by any future Alliance government would be a withheld or transferred vote. Since the Thais are not going to be constituted a party with access to the characteristic bargaining between Alliance partners before elections, it is especially necessary for them to preserve the free dom to withhold their vote as a group once they are organised.²¹ But it seems improbable that the Alliance will supply the transport and other facilities of communication necessary for a state Thai leadership to arise. In the event of a unitary state leadership arising and the threat of a withheld vote being made, the possibility can be conceived of a counter-suggestion coming from UMNO to the effect that the

branch of the 'ungrateful' leader could easily be closed by allowing its members' subscriptions to lapse. Without an Alliance branch that village would no longer qualify for any favours from party or government. The most fundamental weaknesses of the Thais would be uncovered in such a contest of wills: apart from their numerical weakness, there is no other party to which the mass of peasants wish to go. They are not like the Malays whose thoroughly plausible sanction against UMNO is a threat of transferring allegiance to PMIP. For the Alliance to withdraw its support from a Thai leader²² would very effectively bring the rest to heel during the long transition from a docile, client culture to psychological autonomy. But of course the defeat would be resented and be a blow to integration.

Wee Suu Hung has an instinct for the need of a small ethnic community for organisation in democratic politics but he also assumes - instinctively but by contradiction - a basic unity of interest between all races. The Alliance having given political form to this natural unity, every group has a unity of interest with the Alliance. As an MCA man of long standing Suu Hung forgets that the Chinese owe more to their size and bargaining power than to natural identity of interest with the Malays. The minute size of the Kelantan Thai community makes it probable that democratic politics will continue to show up a disharmony of interest with the majority. Party or governmental largesse will have to continue to be motivated by a sense of patronly obligation.

The true motivation will be of no concern to the Thais, provided their growing expectations are fulfilled. But these may not be fulfilled. If this happens it will be a function of two factors: (a) the lack of bargaining

power of the community which we have just analysed; and (b) the likely weakness of the non-Malay patron element in the Kelantan Alliance to assert Thai interests on their behalf.

This brings us in turn to the structure of the bonds of Thai Alliance branches to the rural Alliance, which could have damaging effects apart from material disappointment. To the Thais the Alliance is not a Malay party in a proper sense. In reality, UMNO is the dominant partner in the Kelantan Alliance, and to a far greater extent than in Malayan areas of Chinese concentration. In the rural areas the Alliance is entirely synonymous with UMNO and the consequence of establishing Alliance branches in Thai villages is to subject the Thais to the command of a local Malay political boss and his lieutenants for the purpose of organising rallies, canvassing and voting. Alienation could arise in these circumstances in one or both of two ways.

Firstly, UMNO party enthusiasts necessarily slip from their role of friendly, neighbourly persuader, into that of coercive mobiliser where a Thai branch has arisen, for the Thais have thereby incurred party discipline. Taking an order from a Malay peasant is something that no previous political system has asked of the Thais but the new structure which gives rise to such a thing also brings a more urgent sense that it is impermissible. The hectic pace of the last hours of an election campaign puts a particular peremptoriness into instructions delivered by word of mouth. This was observed in the parliamentary by-election held in Pasir Mas Hulu constituency on August 19 1967, involving the new Bangsa' branch. UMNO in the country districts has never thought it necessary to exert special effort to win over Thai hearts

and has nowhere canvassed them as carefully and courteously as the PMIP. Now that Bangsa' is incorporated into the party its loyalty is taken even more for granted, and the local hierarchy apparently thought nothing of cancelling the candidate's visit to the village without warning or subsequent apology when the Deputy Prime Minister descended upon the state to give a speech somewhere else. This was an instructive experience to several untutored Thai farmers; while the 'intellectual' founder members of the branch rationalised the incident but could not entirely conceal their sense of confidence abused. The Malay peasant organisers take Thai quiescence for granted but as cogs in the larger machine themselves they know no obligation to reward or recognise Thai loyalty as patrons would do.²³ The reciprocity of a patron-client relationship is lost, but the dignity of the autonomous man does not take its place. Nothing could be better calculated to give the Thais a sense of being subordinate to the Malay race.

To understand the second, and more serious, potential factor for alienation, let us look at the Thai Alliance branches from the point of view of an UMNO local secretary. His attitude to the Thais is tolerant. In common with many Kelantan Malays he allows them freedom, in principle, to choose their cultural orientations. But as they speak Malay well and fit in with Kelantan society he may tend in practice to discount their distinctiveness. "They are like us" it is often said. As they have made an apparently democratic choice to join the Alliance but not through a separate ethnic party he is even more strongly given to assume identity of interest between them and UMNO. He begins to take their reliability for granted less on the grounds of their traditional

docility as clients than on the assumption of ideological identity with the Malays as represented in UMNO. He and his party workers assume a fraternal bond with the Thais over-riding and subsuming that or discipline. He sees himself as a leader to the Thais, democratic style. This new type of posture is becoming visible in the behaviour of party officials towards Thais. It could come to be viewed by Thais as the most insidious consequence of their political mobilisation. It demands a completely new kind of assimilation to Kelantan society whereby Thais are offered equality (of sorts) not on the basis of separate identity but of notional merger with the Malays as one brotherhood. This must be wholly repugnant to a community whose cultural identity remains so distinctive.²⁴

This projection of a hypothetical trend may be unduly pessimistic. It was proposed in the first chapter of this dissertation that no trend is ineluctable, and this applies to alienation as well as to integration. The Kelantan Thai case is one that is exceptionally difficult to make predictions about in that Thai political culture is not stable or consistent. The emerging, democratic-impregnated culture, with its more insistent expectations of equality, has not yet achieved institutional form throughout the community. Thailand's influence is likewise at any early stage. However, this influence is institutionalised and will be a permanent factor. As and if changing Thai political culture increasingly perceives its environment as unfeeling or hostile, Kelantan Thai affairs could become the troubled waters proverbially fished in by unfriendly interests. Having failed to find leadership towards honourable integration with the democratic system, the Kelantan Thai would be susceptible

to offers of leadership and political organisation oriented to alienation and resistance. The community could become cumulatively an object lesson for the frequent failure of political integration in this world of the later 20th Century.

FOOTNOTES

1. From Bangsá' (a village of 80 households) where this trend is most apparent, at least 12 boys and girls are being or have been since the war educated in Thailand.
2. c.p. the anxiety of Phra' Silananda (see Chapter VII, note 16 p. 225) that young Kelantan monks sent to Bangkok for education do not return to take up positions of leadership in their community.
3. At Maalaj, which contributed by far the largest number of settlers at 36 house-holders, only three had sold up their Kelantan property. 12 returned to Maalaj for good after the flood disaster, while another 21 continued to work on their plots but on a commuting basis. A shortage of padi land at Maalaj has now been compensated by the establishment of a Malayan Tobacco Company station close by.
4. In contrast, pioneers who go privately to open up jungle illicitly for rubber seem to be more successful. This is perhaps because they go without fanfare or haste and only those who make a success are remembered. (See H.Freyne, "Land of Smiles", Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 February 1962 for a note on illicit occupation of state jungle land in Thailand. The government was said to be planning at this time to use helicopters to spot the law-breakers and their works.)
5. In Pasir Puteh district on the author's count, the increase has been some 21.4% in 10 years. (c.p. Chapter II. p.48 & Chapter IV, p. 137, note 32 .) The growth for the whole state between 1921 and 1957 was from 6,255 to only 6,727. (See J.E. Nathan op.cit.: and Federation of Malaya Department of Statistics 1957 Population Census, op.cit.)
6. But there is a genuine subjective sense of mounting pressure - enhanced perhaps by the unfavourable political atmosphere and the fear that no matter how much the population rises in the future the land will not be increased. The Consul's offer of nikhom land certainly met a ready response at Maalaj. Elsewhere individual villagers had taken the initiative. It was the appeal of Thais to Mr. Nagaratnam of Kota Bharu that brought him to approach the state government on their behalf in 1965. The government suggested that he demonstrate the desire for land by sponsoring a petition. This he did and it contained 500 signatures and marks. The government asked if the Thais would be willing to occupy land in the Ulu, at Kemubu. The community was again sounded out by Mr. Naga and he understood that they would accept land in the Ulu. At the time of the author's departure from Kelantan in August 1967 no decision had been taken by the government.
7. Apart from elementary education in Thailand in recent years there has always been - since 1944 - a very good wat school at Bangsá' (the chief wat of Kelantan).

8. Bangsá' has several potential leaders; but it is not implied that "elite-mass communications" are much better here than in other villages. The Bangsá' elite constantly complain about the lack of peasant receptivity to new ideas. The Alliance's role is seen as providing a needed outside stimulus to Thai organisation.
9. However, by 1969 the efforts of the Alliance party and the Consul to register Thais as citizens will be beginning to make some inroads into discontent on this score. 12-year-olds who apply for identity cards will begin to get citizenship by operation of law.
10. Some villages call the Alliance 'MCA' because they know it chiefly through Chinese kinsmen or patrons in the nearest district centre. But even where UMNO Malays are commonly met, many Thais maintain that "we do not support a 'Malay party' - the Malay party is the PMIP." In the two Thai settlements of Trengganu cynicism about the Trengganu (Alliance) government is a much more dominant trait. See note 24 p.252 infra.
11. But already a quite common grievance (not linked to an analysis or understanding of the Alliance party structure) is that the Alliance (i.e. the Ministry of Rural Development) spends considerable sums of money on mosques and madrashahs, and next to nothing on Buddhist facilities. Only Bqqsamed has received a subsidy of \$3,000 to build a modern crematorium. This is compared unfavourably with the Thai government's heavy outlay on mosques in South Thailand, not to mention its donations to wats in Kelantan which have considerably exceed the Alliance's \$3,000. An Alliance government of Kelantan would be expected to improve on the party's present performance in this regard as for land. A new view of the nature of the Alliance would be hastened by Chinese disaffection from the party as Malay cultural and economic pressure builds up on the national level. The young Bqqsamed man, Caw Sug, who acts as village go-between with the party and who organised the building of the crematorium, is the most cogently sceptical of all Thais met in Kelantan about what the Alliance stands for. Apart from personal experience, he has had a touch of the P.A.P. heresy from travelled young Chinese friends in Tumpat town. (He learnt to speak some English in Penang while a monk). At Samórag, the highly sophisticated Caw Dháng returns from UMNO rallies less amused by its feuds with PMIP (c.p. Chapter VI, p.167) than angered by the irrelevance of most of its propaganda to Thai needs and its complacent disregard of the Thais' existence when UMNO figures of Federal stature visit the Kelantan countryside.
12. c.p. Chapter VI, note 13 p.179 for definition.
13. c.p. note 11, above, regarding his present attitude.
14. Services popularly alleged to have been those of informer and procurer to the Japanese and Thai administrations respectively. Tan Ker Liang

states that his (admitted) unpopularity in certain quarters is due to his scrupulous work in the Customs Police before the war and his favoured position as interpreter to the Thai administration.

15. "The Buddhist Community Association of the Thai Clan of Kelantan", rendered in Malay "Persatuan Keturunan Kaum Thai Phuth Kelantan". Its aims were stated to be: to raise the Thai standard of living to the level of other races; encourage their study of the National Language and other matters including civic responsibility; to help Thais over misfortune and accident; cherish Thai custom and religion while encouraging good relations and association with other races; to cooperate with the authorities in matters affecting Thai welfare; and to bring Thai problems to the notice of the authorities.
16. Ker Liang's estimate.
17. c.p. note 11, p. 250 above. The 'fairy-godfather' was of course Wee Suu Hung, now a leading agent of the Ministry of Rural Development in Kelantan. But more remarkable and praiseworthy than steering Rural Development funds into Thai hands was his achievement in launching Caw Sug as a leader in a community so reluctant to give any authority to younger laymen.
18. This had been made possible by a change in Alliance policy in December 1965, allowing individuals or groups other than Malays, Chinese or Indians, to have direct membership of the Alliance. Eurasians and intellectuals were particularly aimed at by this move. See The Straits Times, 20 December 1965, which quoted Tengku Abdul Rahman as saying: "This will allow all Malaysians like the Eurasians and Ceylonese, to join the Alliance Party direct. It will also enable Malaysians, for example, some Chinese, who may want to join the Alliance, to do so, even though they do not want to be M.C.A. members." The Straits Times also noted that the success of the same policy in Singapore earlier in the year under Khir Johari's chairmanship, had prompted the move. However, Mohammed Khir Johari stated in The Alliance Vol. 1:7, July 31 1966, that the change of policy was merely forced on the Alliance by a change in the Societies Act barring associate membership of UMNO, MCA and MIC. (He did not mention non-Malay ordinary members of UMNO, who were not forced to transfer to direct Alliance membership in this way. See note 24, p. 252 infra.)
19. In July 1967, 11 members were recruited at Maalaj but a leader was difficult to find. The Bangsã' branch was claiming in August that all the men of that village had joined. This may be attributable to the number of committed 'founder members' able and willing to visit the rest and persuade them to part with \$1.

20. Both men have recently put some considerable time and effort into informing Thais how to apply for citizenship and persuading them to go to the Registry in Kota Bharu, where Mr. Nagaratnam is on the language board, and not to their District offices. The sense of a patron's obligation outweighs party interest markedly in the author's observation.
21. As will be seen from the figures at Appendix X there are 10 state constituencies of a marginal nature (defined as a seat held by either party by less than 1000 votes.) In fact, only two of these constituencies, Pasir Puteh Tenggara and Tanah Merah Barat count a body of Thais among their electorate, whose abstention or switch of loyalty could destroy Alliance hopes of winning these seats in 1969. On the other hand Tumpat Tengah, with an Alliance majority (October 1964 by-election) standing at 1,743, owes its status to the very large number of Thai voters as well as Chinese in that district. Massive Thai defection could be just as unwelcome to the Alliance here as in Pasir Puteh Tenggara. Given the symbolic importance that the Kelantan state assembly has acquired as the last bastion of the PMIP, there is really no part of the state where a plausible threat of defection would not cause the Alliance considerable concern. (In parliamentary terms it is again Pasir Puteh, Tanah Merah, and Tumpat, which combine marginality with a partly Thai electorate: see Appendix XI). The relevant map is at p.117.
22. Having set up Caw Sug as a leader of Boqsamed, Wee Suu Hung is faced with a dilemma in deciding whether to establish a party branch there, for Sug is quite open to Suu Hung in his new-found criticism of the Alliance (see note 11, p. 250 above). But if he does establish a branch with Sug as leader it might prove an effective curb to Sug's rebel ideas. He would find it difficult to argue for not supporting the Alliance if he were the official Alliance leader. This will indeed be the subtle strength of any Thai Alliance branch from the hierarchy's point of view. No Thai peasant will see the logic of not voting Alliance when he is a paid-up member of it. This attitude will join with both the lack of an alternative party, and the idea that voting is compulsory (See Chapter VI, note 10 p. 178) to make abstention unlikely for some years to come.
23. Even so lowly a figure as a Malay Penghulu, if he has the authority to sway or reinforce the Thais' voting preference, does so on the unspoken understanding that he will be attentive to the Thais' needs in the years to come.
24. In September 1964 the UMNO General Assembly decided to admit non-Muslim natives of Malaysia as ordinary members. Non-natives were also to be admitted as associate members for the first time. (See The Straits Times 7 September 1964). The motive for the admission of non-Muslim natives was to strengthen UMNO in Sarawak and Sabah. However, within a few months UMNO Trengganu had recruited the Thai men of Pog Kiang and Batu Balai as ordinary members and they were still ordinary members in 1967. At

Batu Balai (9 Thai households) membership was regarded as a way of placating the Malays, although some genuine respect attached to the Headmaster who had initiated the offer. There was not yet a sense of dangerous political mobilisation, perhaps because this was not a party branch as in Kelantan. But the payment of the annual fee of \$1 was regarded as a way of keeping the Malays at arm's length and the senior man found Malay pressure on him personally to join in canvassing very distasteful. (In fact UMNO had not invited Thais to any of its meetings. Only a big taukeh at Jerteh town had summoned them once or twice to - MCA? - meetings). There was certainly a pervasive sense of alienation because Alliance rule had not lived up to hopes in the material respect. At Pog Kiang (18 Thai households) Thais had been invited to UMNO meetings and voted on some kind of resolution. Those who had attended had not seen any menace in this activity - perhaps because the Malay Headmaster had coopted them as members and they were happy to accept his patronage. But here no-one had been dragooned into canvassing. Those at Pog Kiang who were sceptical about the Alliance were so because of its land policy, which was said to have disappointed expectations.

APPENDIX I

Discussion of The Naga King's Daughter (by Stewart Wavell; London, 1964) as a source on the Kelantan Thai.

Wavell's theme is the unity of South-east Asian culture and legend, particularly as between the Malays, the Negrito and the Thai along the road from Pahang to Nakorn Sri Tammarat. This theme does seem to the present student to be taken, perhaps unintentionally, to the point where real differences between Malay and Thai are glossed over. Thus on his visit to Maalaj village, near Bachok, to record Thai Nqraa he writes (page 134):

"The Menora is a form of opera which was performed in the Courts of the ancient kingdoms. No one could tell me its origin. It was thought to be Thai. The words belonged to old Kelantan: many were identifiably Malay, but there were a good many which even the performers themselves could not understand."

Perhaps it is merely careless expression which gives the impression that in Wavell's view the Nqraa in Kelantan is not a Thai art. If so, then notice how he claims a difference in name between the 'Menora' of Kelantan (the Malay word) and the 'Nora' of South Thailand (page 159). This is without basis in fact: the Kelantan Thai also call Nora 'Nqraa'. He also attributes the "preservation" of Nqraa in Muslim Kelantan not to the Thai but to "the Buddhists":

"Then occurred to me what should have been obvious: the Menora had been performed in a Buddhist temple. It owed nothing to the Buddhists but the Buddhists had preserved it. How strange." (p.135).

Now the book's primary theme is cultural unity across religious boundaries - which in turn implies the limited impact of the great religions on ancient culture. If these phenomena - such as Nqraa - are pre-Islamic and pre-Buddhist, it seems inconsistent to then attribute the survival of Nqraa to Buddhism, rather than to its own resilience as a non-religious cultural activity among the people who perform it. Wavell is surprised by his own attribution. "How strange", he says. Is it perhaps that he has created an imaginary problem by postulating one hundred percent cultural unity across the area? Of course if the people are essentially of one race and culture, only religion can explain diversity. Only if we allow the Thai a separate ethnic identity is the survival of distinct cultural forms otherwise explained.

Unwilling to admit that the Kelantan Thai are Thai, Wavell even appears to say that Buddhism itself in Kelantan is sui generis. He made his Nqraa recordings, it seems, in one of the mda wad, or kud (priests' dormitories) at Maalaj, but he refers to this "large, ramshackle wooden structure" as a temple (p.134). If it be agreed that 'temple' is the popular English tag for a Thai Uposatha Hall or Bood, it may also be agreed that some readers might be given a strange idea of the type of Thai temple found in Kelantan, and of the uses to which they are put! Wavell uses the word 'Siamese' only once in reference to the Kelantan Thai (p.136), in a quotation; and once, independently,

in reference to a temple (p.134); but he uses the term freely for the Kelantanese Malay shadow play (e.g. p.114) without explanation. This might create doubts as to the particular significance of 'Siamese' when applied to a temple. (The word 'Thai' is used exclusively in the book for the Thai of Thailand.) Wavell repeats without sceptical comment an offensive Malay account of sexual rites associated with becoming a monk (p136), and shows a "novice", in a picture opposite page 129, with long hair and a blue sarong!

Perhaps this is not a book to be taken seriously. What one at first takes to be the central theme, the cultural unity of the area, is maintained for Kelantan but not, contradictorily, for the case of 'Menora' south of the border and 'Nora' north of it. The population becomes 'Thai' north of the frontier but is Malay in Kelantan. The real sense in which cultures do mix in the area - through the migration of peoples and settling in discrete units side by side, disregarding modern frontiers - is completely lost on Wavell. His true position would sometimes appear to be that what is in a Malay state is Malay and what is in a Thai state is Thai. And this is no more realistic than to pretend that all culture up the Peninsula is the same. Were either proposition true there would be no call to write the present dissertation.

APPENDIX II

Festivals and Ceremonies at Samöörag, or participated in by Samöörag people at other places.

Wan Phra' is observed four times every lunar month, and time is counted in lunar months and weeks by all except a few men employed in the fishing industry. Daily rab siin in Lent is not observed at Samöörag, unlike some other Kelantan villages. This appears to be connected with the lethargy of the Samöörag abbot.

10th Month. On an auspicious day towards the end of 10th Month (October 10 in 1966) the chief mōō holds RHġg Naa - a simple offering to the spirits of the place to initiate transplanting. Simultaneously, two fighting cocks are set at each other three times. One informant said this was thought to protect the crops from vermin.

End of 10th Month. Saj Raan, where food is heaped upon platforms as an offering to departed parents and ancestors. One of the year's many Saj Baad for the monks is also held.

Middle of 11th Month. Qōg Phansaa (end of Lent) is marked with a Saj Baad. On 29 October 1966, the eve of this ceremony, the Abbot, who alone had observed Lent at Samöörag that year, received cloth and other utilities in a ceremony of Thōōd Phaa Paa sponsored by a Thai-Chinese business woman of Cherang Ruku. Cloth was also given to the two sangkharīi (wat messengers) who were beginning a year of duty.

5th day, Second Half of 11th Month. Several villagers journeyed to Baan Sadang for a much bigger, but similar ceremony of Thōōd Kathin. The abbot of Sadang is one of the most venerated in Kelantan. Income from his charms and talismans has helped to make the wat a comparatively wealthy and well-appointed one. This in turn attracts many monks to spend Lent there.

12th Month. In late November and early December, as individual families finish transplanting, the draught animals (oxen or buffalo) are fed with glutinous rice in banana leaf packets, as a sign of gratitude for their help in ploughing. This is called Pōōn Ngua.

1st Month. At about the same time (15 December in 1966) the monks chant the montra over vessels of water in the ceremony of Suad Naa. The water is sprayed by each family over the young rice to protect it from harm. (Like many wat ceremonies, this one is preceded by offerings of sweetmeats and rice to the spirits of the place, gods, ancestors and past teachers, on the part of a mōō.) A lapsed custom of performing Suad Naa in a pavilion in the fields themselves was revived from 26 to 28 February 1967, when the rice was attacked by insects.

End of 2nd Month. Chinese New Year. Families with some Chinese ancestry may burn prayer books and let off crackers. Most families make Chinese cakes in case of visits by Chinese.

Middle of 3rd Month, (24 February 1967), Saj Baad Paa Chaa: a festival of remembrance, with visits to recent graves. Sumptuous food is prepared for the monks, the men assisting in carrying it (haab) to the wat. In the evening the people carry sand to the wat and process round the abbot's house.

4th day, 5th Month, (13 April 1967), Waj Khruu: a ceremony held by men at the house of the former Nqraa master. 15 years ago, when there was still a troupe and orchestra, a full Nqraa was held. Today, the Nqraa masks are taken out and honoured. At the same time, the women folk carry rice to the most esteemed members of the village, (usually the elderly).

Middle of 5th Month. Aab Naam Phra', the bathing of a small Buddha image and of the Abbot. The youths splash the women and girls with water on their way out of the wat.

1st evening, Second Half of 5th Month. New Year. The moq petitions the spirits and past teachers for favourable consideration in the year ahead. Candles are burnt on a makeshift tree, firecrackers let off, and small flags made for storing in the roof of every porch, to mark the age of the houses.

5th Month. Following the harvest, some merit is acquired by making rice noodles (khanom ciin) and taking them to the monks and to friends.

4th day, 6th Month. Recently cremated bones, and the exhumed skull of a buried man, were taken on this day in 1967 to Baan Tanoong for collective incineration in a paper temple.

Middle of 6th Month, (23 May in 1967). The Kathin Hog Dyan when magnificent gondolas of bananas are taken (haam) to the wat for the monks, who draw lots for sharing out the offering. There is a morning procession to the wat, led by a tall flag-pole, with much banging. In the evening, a procession three times round the Abbot's house, and carrying sand to the wat. This coincides with the Chinese Buddhists' Wesak Day in Malaya, and a small Chinese shrine is decked out at the wat. However, no Chinese or Thai-Chinese came to Samd'rag for this ceremony in 1967.

17th evening and 18th morning of 6th month. Waj Lang Bood, or the honouring of the Caw Ceb Caw Khaj (the Lord of Sickness and Fever) alias Phoo Than Somded, who visits the village with his band of spirit followers once a year. A tiny sampan loaded with food (including roasted 'puff' rice - khatoo) is launched on the river to carry away Phoo Than Somded with all the village's sickness and ill fortune. The abbot splashes the assembled people with consecrated water after the patron spirit's departure. Although the traditional three nights of Nqraa are now no more than a memory, this ceremony retains a

powerful hold on people's emotions and imaginations (and it may not be extravagant to see in it a special prop to village identity, and to Thai identity within a Malay environment). It takes a different form in other Kelantan villages (except Maalaj) but in some villages is not known at all.

7th Month. Between harvest and transplanting is the season of ordinations. Samöbrag villagers responded to several invitations to attend these ceremonies in other parts of Kelantan. This is not an annual event in every village, but in 1967, seven young men of Samöbrag village, or the Pasir Puteh and north Trengganu area, were due for ordination. The festivities and ceremonies took place over three days and nights from 30 June to 2 July. The Chief Abbot of Kelantan presided at the religious ceremonies. The tham khwan naag was performed by a skilled mōō of Maalaj. The candidates in their princely finery are borne to the wat on bamboo biers, accompanied by a raucous recital of phaag naag. A shadow theatre team from Jung Kaw and Ramwong and Nōraa groups from Maalaj were hired for the evening entertainments.

11th day, Second Half of 7th Month, this being the day immediately following the ordination, i.e. 3 July 1967, the village observed the ceremony of Long Bood. This consisted of a saj baad for the new monks held in the bood itself. Joss-sticks are burnt in the sand around the wall of the bood.

16th, 17th and 18th evenings of 8th Month. Khaw Phansaa - entering Lent. The villagers offer puff rice and coconut oil to the monks. On the mornings following the evening ceremonies the resident monks line up outside the wat to receive their cooked rice. (On other days of the year the wat boys - joom - tour the village to collect rice in the early morning. The monks at Samöbrag rather rarely come out begging themselves.) Young monks often spend Lent in another village than their own. As Kelantan is subject to the eastern monsoon, the anomaly arises that Lent falls in the dry season.

Occasional Ceremonies

Marriages are animistic ceremonies performed by a mōō - who is conveniently synonymous with the headman at Samöbrag. They are not reported to the Penggawa, for fear of obstacles to divorce. Glutinous rice flavoured with coconut milk is cooked by male kinsmen and friends. The festivities are simple at Samöbrag, compared to some other villages. There is no procession of the bride-groom's entourage to the bride's house, no dousing of the couple, no extended invocation of the spirits (as observed at Jung Kaw). Betrothal occurs a few weeks before the wedding when a delegation of ladies carries betel leaves to the bride's house to 'ask for the bride'. A modern type of ring is presented at an unspecified moment before the wedding and is returned with the bride money if the bride runs away. Although one heard tales of quite large sums of bride money being paid to the bride's father in other villages on certain occasions in the past, at the most expensive of three Samöbrag marriages in 1966-7 the bridegroom's expenses amounted to: a nominal bride money of \$24, the cost of the ring (\$23), plus \$198 for the wedding clothes and hospitality. \$40 was

recuperated in the form of gifts of cloth. The balance of a total cost of \$366.50. (including the \$40 of cloth given to the couple) was met by the gifts, in kind and cash, of guests, presented at first to the bride's father, in whose house the ceremony was held. Although the bulk of the wedding expenses seem to fall invariably on the groom, the ceremony and entertainment will be held in whichever house (the bride's parents' or the groom's) appears to be most fitted to it in terms of size and cooking facilities.

Another occasional ceremony is Suad Ryan - consecrating a house. This service is performed by monks.

On 24th April 1967 the boys banged pots and pans and shouted *Chuaj oo khää oo khaj* to rescue the moon from an eclipse.

The midwife performs a *waj khruu* at the house of a mother 40 days after birth. The new mother anoints the midwife's hair and limbs.

The dead, if they die 'well' - i.e. not by an accident or before old age - are cremated two or three days after death. The extent of chanting by monks in this interval will depend upon the investment in yellow cloth (for doing merit) on the part of the deceased; or the resources and taste of the surviving children. All women of the village assist, uninvited, with threshing rice. All families take an offering of milled rice (*tham khaaw*) to the house where the body lies, to do merit by the deceased. The men make a coffin and on the day of the cremation construct a pyre. A *saj baad* is held on the cremation morning and again a week after the death, a bundle of bone fragments being placed in a pagoda on the latter occasion. People who die 'badly' are buried without ceremony, but the skull can be exhumed and burnt at a later date.

APPENDIX III

Marriage Patterns at Samöörag, with a note on
divorce

Data on marriage were collected in the following way. Every living person was asked to state every marriage which he or she had ever contracted. All except the oldest villagers were asked about all the marriages of their parents, so that a partial picture was built up of the generation now passed away - people who would now have reached ages of from 70 to 100 if they were alive. All living persons were asked to give the last or latest known marriages of their siblings deceased or not now resident in the village. The overall result, therefore, is an outline of marriage patterns since a little before 1900, with gaps inevitably occurring in the earlier years. Anyone of the deceased generation who migrated from the village leaving neither children nor an elderly brother or sister behind who could have informed the author of it, would be unrecorded. But as only the last marriage of known emigrant siblings was recorded, and not marriages prior to the departure, if any, the figures for endogamous marriage are also lower than they probably should be. The figures have the advantage of reflecting movement in and out of the village reasonably well, but not the total of marriages contracted by the people who figure in the survey. Conversely, since several of the marriages refer to the same person, the numbers of people involved cannot be found by adding up the recorded marriages.

The data are now presented in two blocks, divided at those villagers who had reached or would have reached, if living, their 70th birthday in 1967 - and whose first marriage would have taken place, probably, not earlier than 1917, at least in the case of the men. The 71-100 (?) group needs to be taken separately because there are inevitably marriages missing from the record for that generation. But for what it is worth, the available information does suggest a much more strongly endogamous pattern compared to the later generations, with outside links predominantly to the sister village of Maalaj.

Of 74 known marriages of Samöörag men in the 71+ group:

68 were to women of Samöörag (of these, 2 couples settled outside the village, 1 at Batu Balai, 1 at Pog Kiang);
2 were exogamous (patrilocal) with Thai women from other villages, viz. Maalaj, 2;
3 were exogamous (matrilocal), Samöörag men settling at: Maalaj, 1; Gee Hee (Sungai Padi, Thailand), 2 (these were 2 brothers who went to perform Nöraa); 1 man became Malay.

Of 69 known marriages of Samöörag women in the 71+ group:

54 were with men of Samöörag (with 2 couples settling outside);
5 were exogamous (patrilocal): viz. 3 at Pog Kiang; 2 at Maalaj;
1 was exogamous (matrilocal), a man of Maalaj coming to Samöörag;
1 woman married a Maalaj man with whom she settled at Sera' hamlet near Samöörag;

4 women married Thai-Chinese, matrilocally;
4 married ethnic Chinese (only 1 of whom came to Samöörag).
None are known to have been lost to Islam.

Out of 185 known marriages contracted by Thai men of Samöörag, aged under 70 in 1967:

138 were with women of Samöörag - but of these, 8 couples settled elsewhere: viz., 2 at Pasir Puteh; 1 at Bukit To' Chit, Pasir Puteh; 1 in lower Trengganu; 1 at Batu Balai; 1 at Cherang Ruku; 1 at Kota Bharu; 1 at Jamuu, Patani;

13 were exogamous (patrilocal) marriages with Thais of: Khaw Joon, 2; Sadang, 1; Maalaj, 1; Pog Kiang, 2; Liigii, 2; Batu Balai, 1; Boosamed, 1; Jung Kaw, 1; Cee Hee (Thailand), 2 (the latter refer to 2 marriages of one itinerant female shadow player who settled for short periods in Samöörag and took a different husband on each occasion - she was in fact the daughter of one of the two Nöraa players who left Samöörag earlier);

9 other marriages were exogamous (matrilocal) with Samöörag men settling at: Baangsä, 1; Boosamed, 1; Batu Balai, 1; Maalaj, 2; Khaw Joon, 2; Pog Kiang, 2. Additionally, 3 men are known to have migrated to Baang Naraa in Narathiwat, where they may or may not have found wives. Another was sent to Cee Hee as an orphan child and may have married. Another still migrated to Patani and is known not to have married...;

7 men took wives from other villages but settled neither in Samöörag nor in the village of the wife: Maalaj, 2 - moved to Batu Balai; Maalaj, 1 - moved to Kota Bharu to join the staff of the Thai Consulate in 1966; Khoog Sijaa, 1 - settled at Cee Hee; Khaw Joon, 1 - moved to To' Dääng, Thailand; Bukit To' Chit, 1 - moved into Pasir Puteh town; Baangsä, 1 - moved to Khaw Joon;

4 men married Thai-Chinese women who took up residence at Samöörag;

4 married Thai-Chinese women matrilocally;

2 married Thai-Chinese and settled in a place other than the village of the wives;

2 married Chinese and left Samöörag;

6 only, became Malay - pen khääg.

Out of 292 known marriages contracted by Thai women of Samöörag in the age group up to 70:

152 were with men of Samöörag (the discrepancy of 14 with the male statistics arises from the fact that as men usually marry at a later age than women, some of this group are found in the over-70 generation); 8 of these couples left the village, as noted above;

26 were exogamous (patrilocal) marriages with Thais of other villages, viz., Kota Bharu, 1; Pasir Puteh 1; Besut 2; Pog Kiang 4; Batu Balai 2; Khaw Joon 2; Liigii 1; Baan Sadang 1; Thaa Song 1; Maalaj 9. One woman moved to Rantau Panjang on the Thai border and is not known to have married. A middle-aged widow accompanied her son to To' Dääng, Narathiwat. Two others found husbands at unspecified places across the frontier....;

13 other marriages were exogamous (matrilocal), with Samöörag receiving men from: Jelawat 1; Maalaj 7. Some 50 years ago a messenger of the Sangha from Nakornsri thamarat took a liking to the village and raised a family there. One woman was married for a short time to a Thai overseer on a nearby European copra plantation on the eve of the war - this man had come from Bangkok and was the brother-in-law of the European manager. 3 other women became the temporary wives of Thai soldiers during the Thai occupation (1944-5);

4 women took husbands from other villages but settled neither in Samöörag nor in the village of the husband: Maalaj 1 - moved to Kuala Krai; 1 Baangsä' - settled on a nikhom (pioneer colony in Narathiwat); Maalaj, 1 - moved to Bukit To' Chit; Baan Naj 1 - moved to Bukit Kechik (Melor, Kelantan);

22 more married Thai-Chinese men patrilocally;

4 married Thai-Chinese men matrilocally;

69 married ethnic Chinese (only one of whom came into Samöörag); this group breaks down thus:

Age group	61-70:	8/65	marriages;
"	"	51-60:	20/67
"	"	41-50:	20/73
"	"	31-40:	11/43
"	"	21-30:	10/38
"	"	Under 20:	0/8

1 married a Ceyloni employee on a nearby copra plantation;

1 lastly, married a Malay soldier. It was not her first marriage, and she returned to the village to die.

A Note on Divorce

The formal rule about divorce is that both parties must agree and inform the headman, who will give his consent if his mediation fails. But a state of de facto divorce arises when a young bride runs home to her parents and resists all pressure and entreaties to rejoin her husband. In the Thais' own view there is less divorce today than formerly, because parents today consult their children before arranging a marriage. This complimentary account of changing parental norms is perhaps a little idealized, in that even if girls are formally asked their opinion, they are too obedient to their parents' preference to say no. First marriages do still break down. But second marriages are generally very stable and live up to the Thai ideal of a life-long, harmonious partnership. There is sincere contempt for the Malays' habit of disposing of a wife when her charms cease to satisfy - although a Thai man has sound reasons for keeping a wife in a situation where women are (a) scarce, and (b) often well dowered with land (inheritance is entirely equal between children and a woman's estate is not surrendered to the husband on marriage). A woman of restless temperament combined with outstanding beauty is correspondingly freer to desert her mate and marry again, and these factors are often found to be present where a woman was divorced more than once. An alternative outcome, where these factors obtain, may be adultery, which the husband is willing to overlook, both from material and charitable considerations. But

if the 'lover' really falls in love with the woman, this may lead to divorce anyway, or to two divorces if the lover is himself already married. There is a distinct reluctance to confess to a history of several marriages (say over three) but if others are present when the question is asked they will tease the informant and remind him of the rest amidst much laughter. The author did not attempt to work out an essentially meaningless average of divorces per person. Samöbrag gives an impression (with which it is suitable to conclude) of stable family life, within an atmosphere of tolerance towards minor deviation. The very tolerance towards minor deviation (such as an occasional adultery) may be a factor against frequent divorce. Perhaps one in ten, men or women, marry more than three times in a life-time; and of course the three-timers, who are a little more common, often become so through the death of a spouse.

APPENDIX IV

Thai Dress

Women's dress in one respect is still distinctively Thai. Although there are few black sarongs now at Samörag (this is however almost standard attire up at Jung Kaw); and the horizontal upper garment, which used to be wound around the torso, leaving the shoulders and arms bare, when a woman went to the wat or further afield, has generally given way to the Malay baju kebaya with long sleeves (they call it sya); yet in her home and its immediate vicinity - as when fetching water or visiting a friend with baby on hip - many Thai wives are unlikely to wear any top garment at all. This applies to all Thai villages in Kelantan but if Malays pass by frequently, the habit tends to be suppressed outside the house. Some women of middle age who have lived long in towns as the wives of Chinese, and returned latterly as widows to the village, prefer to remain covered either by a sya or by a sarong hitched and fastened above the breast to act as upper and lower garment in one. But the trend among younger women is equivocal. As teenage cooks and baby-minders in Chinese families the junior generation learn to wear short skirts and blouses with, of course, the universal brassiere; if they return and marry in the village they will practise the traditional undress after the first child.

The author offers here the conclusions of himself and his wife about the psychology of the phenomenon, based on their enquiries and observation. The pretty bosom of a young woman is appreciated as in other societies and traditionally at adolescence a girl would feel shy and cover herself. The time when they first wore a horizontal cloth (pid nom, i.e. covered the breasts) is one of the convenient landmarks in the life of an elderly lady, by reference to which other events can be located, as:

"I had already begun to wear a top garment when the first white men were seen in this district."

But after two or three children were born they would no longer feel self-conscious, because their breasts had lost their beauty and were regarded as just a utility. Three intelligent and perceptive men of the village, aged between 50 and 60, admitted smilingly, when asked, that Thai women are not shy like others are, but this was simply because it was more comfortable to do the cooking, get bathed, and nurse the baby untrammelled and unrestricted by an upper garment, and they only uncovered anyway after beauty had passed. The last statement was made in complete sincerity; but two of these informants, when asked to say whether the charms of certain young women whom the author named had really faded so much, were obliged to admit that this was not so. It was the first time they had given it any thought, and they were astonished to realize that the traditional rules were not always being observed. This change among the young women had not gone unnoticed however by two devout, elderly ladies, who said in scandalised tones that they would never have had the boldness to uncover so young, even to suckle their first child publicly.

The rule about waiting till beauty has faded is surely a very important

norm, which must be maintained in theory even while it has ceased to dictate the practice. The young women who uncover are able to display their beauty while it lasts, this being the privilege of the modern Malayan girl of the towns - and why not in the country too? The return to the village is not the absolute end of youth for them. But this is contrived not with modern clothes and a brassiere but by the manipulation of tradition. They are not set on enticing their neighbours' husbands. This increases rather in direct proportion to the amount of clothes, so that the 'bad women', the khon chua, who keep an open window for almost any lonely male, are always the most covered and the most dressy. If the husbands suspected their young wives of such motives they could not allow them to appear outside the house as they do. The convention that their wives are not beautiful at all because they are mothers saves face and freedom all round.

Elderly men and women shave their heads. Men, otherwise, have their hair cut in modern, urban style. Long hair worn by a boy is a sign of a female impersonator in a Nōraa troupe. The long and lovingly tended hair of the women a generation ago has succumbed to recurring onslaughts of the permanent wave (whose only lasting feature is not, indeed, the curls, but the clipped hair). One sure distinguishing mark of Thai men is their tatooing with Pali characters and various magical signs.

The men's dress is not unlike the Malay pattern, except that the very long chequered sarong worn by Malays when walking out on Fridays is confined to the 'joom' who live at the monastery in the last weeks before entering monkhood. Everyday wear is a sarong generally worn at knee length or less (shorter than a Malay would wear it), with some kind of shirt or no shirt at all, both for work in the fields and attending the wat. Trousers are worn by the middle-aged and young men to go to town, following the contemporary Malay pattern. Some young men wear jeans to plant rice. All men except the oldest wear a pair of shorts for work as often as a sarong. Teenage girls wear a batik sarong and blouse (not a baju kebaya) when in the village, but put on their modern frock or skirt to go back to work or to visit the town. The phaa phaad chiang, the diagonal sash of the Thai, is mandatory for both sexes at the wat. It makes a handy baby sling too. The women always wear it to the market. Girls under the age of 13 today wear either a sarong or a print frock in the village, little boys wear shorts.

APPENDIX V

Loan Words at Samörag

The following words are in general use. The list does not include Malay words used consciously for fun or effect by a few speakers. Otherwise, it is very nearly exhaustive, for Malay words are rather easy to spot in Thai speech. One tends to learn them fairly early in ones acquaintance with the dialect: in later months, the new words are predominantly of the monosyllabic, pure Thai type. In villages nearer the Thai border, a few young people are preferring Thai words to Malay loan words, but this is part of an effort to use standard Thai in place of the village dialect as such.

There are a very few words in use which are not readily identifiable as Thai, but neither are they apparently attributable to Malay or Chinese. Such words are not given here. But words which seem fairly certainly to be derived from Malay or Chinese are given after the main lists. The main Malay list is divided into four general, and necessarily overlapping, categories:

1. agricultural activities and objects; 2. household activities and objects, clothing and food; 3. economic, administrative and political terms; 4, other. The Thai version of the words is preceded by its Malay equivalent and followed by an English translation (of the Thai.) Meanings of words which have not excluded a Thai equivalent are asterisked.

Malay

1. Agricultural

biri	birii	sheep
chamor	chamaa	to sow* (not rice)
cherut	cuud	to cut (grass) with a sickle
geretak	kathog	footbridge
jalor	jaloo	strip of rice land 60' x 600'
kapak	kupaag	miniature axe
pawah	phuwaa'	a land lease, share-cropping arrangement
piama	phijaam	(wet) season*
sembeleh	malä'	to slaughter
sigai	sakaj	pole-ladder
terendak	ceenogg	rice-planter's hat
tuak	thuwaag	toddy

2. Household, etc.

aiskrim	naam sakrim	ice cream
bakau	bakhaw	tobacco*
beg	beg	shopping bag
chat	chaad	paint, to paint
choklat	chaglaad	sweets
gambir	kamää	gambier
gandum	kanom	wheat flour
guni	kuning	sacking, grain sacks

jabir	jabee	a sling basket of plaited straw for travel
kendi	khanii	kettle
kopi	khøphii	coffee
kopi	khøphii	cigarette tin
kopiah	køpiew	hat*
meja	məjəə	table*
rokok	ləəkhəəə	cigarette
roti	ləthii	bread
sekut	sakhuud	crackers (savoury biscuits)
talam	talam	large round tray
tebeng	thebeng	partition

3. Economic, etc. (This category is always expanding. Technical words of English extraction will soon be gaining currency in greater numbers.)

awak	awaag	fishing crew
bahagian	bakian	part (of an inheritance)*
bandar	bandaa	town
bas	rod ba ^h	bus*
benar	benaa	to permit*
beng	beng	van
bin	beng	surname, i.e. father's name on birth certificate, etc.
chuchok	cəcəəəə	to vaccinate*
da'awa	dawaa	to accuse, prosecute
daba	dabaa	double(d)(as of wages)
denda	dendəə	a fine*
D.O.	Dii Oo	District Officer
gaji	kajii	wages*
hasil	asee	land tax
ihtikar	takaad	monopoly, farm
jam	jaam	hour
kad	khad	identity card
kansel	khasəə	to cancel*
kapal	khaphaa	steam ship
kawasan	khaawaasan	area*
kelan	khalan	deep-sea fishing month of about 21 days
kerani	khraaning	clerk
keraayatan	kharaajathan	citizenship
kompas	kupaad	to measure, survey (land)
koyok	khəjəə	plaster
kuasa	khwasəə	civil authority
kuat	khuwaad	have rights, authority over*
laba	labaa	profit; advantage
laku	lakhuu	be a success (economic)
lelong	lələə	to auction
lesen	leseng	licence*
mahkamah	roong khama ^h	magistrate's court*

memerentah	rãtho ^h	to have the running of (piece of land)
mengaku	ngakhuu	admit (to a crime)
meshin	mãsheng (khaaw)	to mill (rice)*
minggu	mingguu	7-day week
motor	mõthoo	motor boat
notis	notee	to claim distribution of an estate
nombor	lombong	number
paip	phahiid	standpipe
pajak	phajaa'	farm, monopoly
parang	pharãã	to cancel*
pas	pha ^h	a pass, permit
pas	pha ^h	qualified, passed*
pejabat	phajabaad	office
pereksa	pharããgsoo	to examine*
pesaka	saakhoo	inherited
plan	phlang	map
pom	phom	form
ripot	lipoo	make a report, complaint
rugi	rukii	material, economic loss
saksi	sagsii	a witness
saman	saman	summons
sharah	sara'	to lecture, make a speech
sijil	baj sijee	a certificate
stop	satoog bia	out of cash*
teksi	thegsii	trishaw
tembok	themboog	highway
tes	thãã'	a (medical) test*
tep	thããb	recording tape, tape recorder
tepek	tããpããg	pin, paste up (a notice)
tolak	tõloog	to transmit inter vivos, leave to
tukang	thukhang	a specialist
tukang steshen	thukhang satheshãng	petition writer
undi	unii	to vote, ballot*
wad	waa'	hospital, hospital ward*

4. Other

adil	adee	just, equitable*
bagih	bakãã	trance
balah	balah kan; loo kan	have a row, argument*
balek	balããg	topple over, turn turtle
bichara	chara	(a) bother about; (b) organise*
bidan	midan	midwife
biru	biruu	blue*
bisa	bisoo	poison*

2	bodoh	bəḍəḍ	stupid*
	chadang	chadang awaj	put aside, save*
	champur	chaphəḍ	mix*
	chermat	chumaad	careful
	dengki	dekhii	jealous
	gak	kag	a pivotal enclitic in Kelantan Malay*
	gamak	kamaag	(a) to reckon, estimate, guess* (b) probably*
	ganas	kanaad	to damage maliciously
	ganti	kantii Kan	exchange*
	gelir	kilee kan	to take turns*
	hala	halaa paj	go in the direction of*
	harap	haraab	have confidence in
	hairan	hajran	be surprised
	jadi	jadii	manage to*
	jaga	jakəḍ	look after, stand guard over*
	janji	janjii	to promise, guarantee
	jawab	jawaab	to reply
	keramat	khramaad	enchanted (places or objects; sometimes persons)*
	ketek	khatəḍg	monastery, wat*
	khemah	khema'	tent
	kuning	khuning	yellow*
	kurang	kəḗrang	(a) less than; (b) scarce, short of*
	kurang2	kəḗrang-kəḗrang	at the least
	lebeh kurang	lebee kəḗrang	more or less*
	masing2	maasing-maasing	each for himself, respectively
	mujor	mujəḍ	fortune, fortunately
	nak	nəḡ (negative: ' maj nəḡ)	to want to
	nikah	nikha ^h kan	to marry
	padan	phadan	be satisfactory, sufficient*
	pakat	phakaad	cooperate
	pelek	phaləḍg	(speak with) an accent*
	pengeras	kharaad	doctor's fee
	pintas	pitha ^h khaang	to cross to the (other) side (of road)*
	pun	pun	Malay enclitic, used at Samörag with thyng ('although')
	punah	phuuna ^h	devastated*
	rajin	rajen	diligent, busy at
	restong	raadsaduang	cancer of the nose
	sadia	sadia	ready to
	selut	salud	muddy*
	silap	silaaab	silent, hiding*

timbang	timbang	(a) weigh*; (b) consider, deliberate*
tipu	thiphuu	to cheat, deceive*
tiru	thiruu	imitative, copied, false
To'	To'	honorific prefix for elderly man
wayang	wɔ̄ɟang	theatre*
wayang gedak	wɔ̄ɟang kadʔg	the Thai shadow theatre* (called in Thailand nang talung, and not to be confused with the Malay wayang Siam)

Probable Malay derivatives

chakap?	changkhab	efficient, competent
rasa?	saa waa	(a) to feel; (b) it seems
sahaja?	jaa	only
	<u>Chinese</u>	
	angmɔ̄ɔ̄	Englishman, European, English*
	binpɔ̄ɔ̄	handkerchief
	ciam	a cent
	kag	10 cents
	lenchuu	lipstick
	teekhɔ̄ɔ̄	kettle
	thɔ̄ɔ̄haa	be in mourning
	utaw	flat-iron

Probable Chinese derivatives

lyng	50 cents (in:saam lyng, \$1.50)
wa'	refrigerator
lag	to lock

APPENDIX VI

Kelantan Candidates and Results in the 1955 Elections to the Federal Legislative Council (given in: T.E.Smith, Report on the First Election of Members to the Legislative Council of the Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1955.)

Kelantan Selatan

Abdul Khalid bin Awang Osman (Alliance)	21,746
Dato' Nik Ahmed Kamil bin Mahmood (Negara)	7,175
Haji Mohamed Noor bin Haji Yusoff (PMIP)	3,600

Kelantan Timor

Nik Hassan bin Haji Nik Yahya (Alliance)	30,954
Dato' Nik Ahmed bin Haji Nik Mahmood (Negara)	4,019
Mohamed Asri bin Haji Muda (PMIP)	2,292
Mohamed bin Ibrahim (Independent)	883

Pasir Mas

Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Abdul Ghaffar (Alliance)	20,963
Haji Mokhtar bin Haji Ahmed (PMIP)	7,507

Kelantan Utara

Tengku Indra Petra bin Sultan Ibrahim (Alliance)	28,428
Dato' Nik Hussein bin Nik Zainal (Negara)	6,295

Kelantan Tengah

Abdul Hamid bin Mahmud (Alliance)	28,422
Tengku Annuar Zainal bin Tengku Zainal Abidin (Negara)	2,970
Dato' Nik Mohamed bin Abdul Rahman (Independent)	1,154
Idris bin Haji Mohamed	721

APPENDIX VII

The 1959 State Elections
(source: The Straits Times, 26 June 1959)

Each group of three seats represents the area of one parliamentary constituency. The equivalent parliamentary seat is indicated in brackets beside the name of the state seat. c.p. map, p. 117.

		Map Reference No.
<u>Tumpat Barat</u> (Tumpat)		1
Tuan Guru Haji Daud, PMIP	4,208	
Othman bin Mohamed Udin, Alliance	1,017	
Ibrahim Tunggal, Independent	147	
PMIP majority	3,191	
<u>Tumpat Tengah</u> (Tumpat)		2
Mustapha Awang, PMIP	2,253	
Foo Chow Yong, Alliance	2,200	
Yahya bin Abdullah, Negara	968	
C.W.Sook, S.F.	341	
PMIP majority	53	
<u>Tumpat Timor</u> (Tumpat)		3
Inche Ishak Mustapha, PMIP	3,469	
Haji Wan Idris Haji Taib, Alliance	2,754	
PMIP majority	715	
<u>Kuala Kelantan</u> (Kelantan Hilir)		4
Wan Yusoff bin Wan Yaacob, PMIP	2,780	
Nik Hassen bin Nik Hussain, Alliance	1,405	
Haji Abdul Karim bin Haji Abdul Malik, Negara	1,072	
PMIP majority	1,375	
<u>Kota Bharu Utara</u> (Kelantan Hilir)		5
Abdullah Ahmad, PMIP	3,426	
Yusoff Bashah, Negara	1,262	
Che Halimah binte Idris, Alliance	1,061	
Haji Wan Dollah, S.F.	169	
PMIP majority	2,164	
<u>Kota Bharu Pantai</u> (Kelantan Hilir)		6
Nik Abdullah Haji Arshad, PMIP	4,437	
Abu Bakar Mohamed Al-Ahmadi, Alliance	1,222	
Mohamed bin Haji Abdullah, Negara	421	
Che Wil Alias Gan Ti Wah, S.F.	207	
PMIP majority	3,215	

<u>Meranti</u> (Pasir Mas Hilir)		7
Nik Man, PMIP	4,989	
Yusoff bin Mat Akib, Alliance	340	
PMIP majority	4,649	
<u>Tendong</u> (Pasir Mas Hilir)		8
Tuan Guru Haji Che Hassan, PMIP	4,075	
Mohamed Zain bin Harun, Alliance	1,074	
Imam Abdullah Tepoyak, Independent	238	
Che Gu Haji Awang, Independent	222	
Mat Noor Yusoff, S.F.	215	
PMIP majority	3,001	
<u>Bandar Pasir Mas</u> (Pasir Mas Hilir)		9
Che Gu Omar, PMIP	3,657	
Che Hassan bin Haji Ismail, Alliance	1,715	
Dato Lankimin, Negara	85	
PMIP majority	1,942	
<u>Bandar Hilir</u> (Kota Bharu Hilir)		10
Wee Khoo Hock, Alliance	3,027	
Haji Nik Adeeb, PMIP	1,745	
Nik Mat Dato Amar, S.F.	369	
Nik Mahmood bin Nik Abdul Majid, Independent	15	
Alliance majority	1,282	
<u>Bandar Hulu</u> (Kota Bharu Hilir)		11
Haji Che Muda, PMIP	3,249	
Hamid Haji Yaacob, Alliance	1,977	
Hasnah Yusoff, Negara	204	
Idris bin Haji Mohamed, Independent	87	
PMIP majority	1,272	
<u>Kota Bharu Tengah</u> (Kota Bharu Hilir)		12
Mohamed Asri, PMIP	4,357	
Hassan Haji Yaacob, Alliance	1,206	
Ustaz Salleh bin Daud, Negara	401	
Noor Prol, S.F.	118	
PMIP majority	3,151	
<u>Bachok Utara</u> (Bachok)		13
Shafei bin Ahmad, PMIP	5,557	
Jaafar bin Mohamed, Alliance	1,290	
Haji Nik Mohamed Salleh, Negara	222	
PMIP majority	4,267	

		Map Reference No.
<u>Bachok Tengah</u> (Bachok)		14
Mohamed Amin bin Haji Yaakub, PMIP	4,533	
Che Wel alias Ismail bin Yusoff, Alliance	1,022	
Mohamed Yusoff bin Yahya, Negara	405	
Nik Mat bin Haji Wan Hassan, S.F.	162	
PMIP majority	3,511	
<u>Bachok Selatan</u> (Bachok)		15
Haji Othman bin Haji Ismail, PMIP	4,498	
Ismail bin Haji Ahmad, Alliance	1,220	
Nik Abdul Majid bin Nik Abdul Rahman, S.F.	105	
Othman Adam, Independent	65	
Haji Mokhtar bin Haji Ahmad, Negara	40	
PMIP majority	3,278	
<u>Kota Bharu Timor</u> (Kota Bharu Hulu)		16
Saufi Idris, PMIP	5,103	
Che Gu Mat Haji Ali, Alliance	1,399	
Ismail bin Daud, Negara	229	
Tuan Man bin Tuan Salleh, S.F.	134	
PMIP majority	3,704	
<u>Kota Bharu Barat</u> (Kota Bharu Hulu)		17
Abdul Rahman Awang Sulong, PMIP	5,426	
Haji Zaid, Alliance	920	
Haji Osman bin Saman, Negara	439	
Ustaz Wan Semail, S.F.	358	
PMIP majority	4,506	
<u>Kota Bharu Selatan</u> (Kota Bharu Hulu)		18
Haji Ishak Lofti, PMIP	5,041	
Nik Hassan bin Nik Yahya, Alliance	1,334	
Che Gu Noor, S.F.	306	
Haji Abdul Majid bin Haji Ibrahim, Independent	100	
Che Gu Derahman, Negara	49	
PMIP majority	3,707	
<u>Rantau Panjang</u> (Pasir Mas Hulu)		19
Abdul Rahman Haji Daud, PMIP	2,521	
Nik Yusoff bin Nik Lodin, Alliance	1,241	
Gelap Pak Wel, Negara	66	
PMIP majority	1,280	
<u>Lemal</u> (Pasir Mas Hulu)		20
Tuan Guru Haji Haron, PMIP	3,367	
Omar bin Haji Ahmad, Alliance	1,070	
Mat S.O., S.F.	57	
PMIP majority	2,297	

		Map Reference No.
<u>Tok Uban (Pasir Mas Hulu)</u>		21
Ustaz Abdullah, PMIP	4,389	
Yaacob bin Awang, Alliance	1,183	
PMIP majority	3,206	
<u>Pasir Puteh Utara (Pasir Puteh)</u>		22
Tangku Mohamed, PMIP	4,666	
Wan Isma' binte Abdul Kadir, Alliance	1,274	
Hassan bin Yaacob, Negara	426	
Mat bin Che Moh, S.F.	106	
PMIP majority	3,392	
<u>Pasir Puteh Tengah (Pasir Puteh)</u>		23
Ustaz Wan Sulaiman, PMIP	3,365	
Haji Abdul Rahman bin Haji Yusoff, Alliance	2,826	
Ustaz Abdullah bin Haji Mohamed, S.F.	218	
PMIP majority	539	
<u>Pasir Puteh Tenggara (Pasir Puteh)</u>		24
Ustaz Abdul Rahman, PMIP	4,868	
Ghazali bin Yusoff, Alliance	2,207	
Haji Alias Tok Imam, S.F.	204	
PMIP majority	2,661	
<u>Machang Utara (Tanah Merah)</u>		25
Haji Mohamed bin Nasir, PMIP	4,466	
Ibrahim bin Mohamed, Alliance	2,834	
Mohamed Taib bin Haji Ibrahim, Negara	629	
PMIP majority	1,632	
<u>Tanah Merah Timor (Tanah Merah)</u>		26
Che Gu Daud, PMIP	3,184	
Othman bin Ahmad, Alliance	2,094	
Haji Wan Yusoff bin Wan Ali, Negara	980	
Mohamed bin Ali, S.F.	177	
PMIP majority	1,090	
<u>Tanah Merah Barat (Tanah Merah)</u>		27
Yusoff bin Abdul Latif, PMIP	3,345	
Hussin Driver, Independent	865	
Abdul Ghani bin Mohamed, Alliance	765	
Wan Jaafar bin Haji Wan Mahmood Penglina Bayu, Negara	712	
Said bin Awang, S.F.	144	
PMIP majority	2,480	

Machang Selatan (Ulu Kelantan)

Haji Mohamed Noor bin Haji Yusoff, PMIP	4,434
Ustaz Salleh Zaki Hussin, Alliance	2,655
Mohamed Ghazali bin Haji Noh, Negara	315
Ismail bin Omar, S.F.	241
PMIP majority	1,779

Ulu Kelantan Timor (Ulu Kelantan)

29

Ngah Ali, Alliance	3,051
Wan Ismail bin Wan Ahmad, PMIP	1,978
Haji Nik Jaafar bin Nik Soh, Independent	608
John S.F.	305
Alliance majority	1,073

Ulu Kelantan Barat (Ulu Kelantan)

30

Khaidir Khatib, PMIP	1,472
Wong Yeow Wye, Alliance	1,126
Tuan Haji Mohamed Yusoff Bangs, Independent	853
Wan Yaacob bin Wan Ahmad, Negara	347
Che Hussein ARO, S.F.	99
Mat Che Latch, Independent	56
PMIP majority	346

APPENDIX VIII

Parliamentary Elections, 1959
(source: The Straits Times, 20 August 1959)

Tumpat

Haji Che Hassan, PMIP	10,249
Mahmood bin Zakariah Juhan, Alliance	6,380
PMIP majority	3,869

Kelantan Hilir

Wan Mustapha bin Haji Ali, PMIP	12,438
Hassan bin Haji Yaacob, Alliance	4,327
PMIP majority	8,111

Kota Bharu Hilir

Haji Ahmad bin Abdullah, PMIP	9,463
Nik Ismail bin Nik Hussin, Alliance	6,302
PMIP majority	3,161

Kota Bharu Hulu

Tuan Hussin Rahimi, PMIP	14,775
Ismail bin Ibrahim, Alliance	3,749
PMIP majority	11,026

Pasir Mas Hilir

Nik Man bin Nik Mohamed, PMIP	12,422
Che Omar Haji Ali, Alliance	3,130
PMIP majority	9,292

Pasir Mas Hulu

Dato Raja Hanifar bin Haji Abdul Ghani, PMIP	9,518
Yaacob bin Awang, Alliance	3,559
PMIP majority	5,959

Bachok

Zulkifli bin Mohamed, PMIP	13,880
Nik Mohamed bin Ali, Alliance	3,761
PMIP majority	10,119

Tanah Merah

Othman bin Abdullah, PMIP	12,752
Ustaz Azhari bin Abdul Rahman, Alliance	6,744
PMIP majority	5,978

Pasir Puteh

Ustaz Mohamed Asri, PMIP	12,284
Mohamed Idris, Alliance	6,630
PMIP majority	5,644

APPENDIX IX

Definition of a "Native of Kelantan"

(as appended to The Malay Reservations Enactment, 1930; The Sultanate Lands Enactment, 1934; and all subsequent amendments and consolidations of the Kelantan land laws, including the National Land Code, 1965)

'"Native of Kelantan" means a person who falls within any of the following classes:

- (a) Any person born in Kelantan whose father was a Malay;
- (b) Any person born in Kelantan whose mother was a Malay and whose father was a Muslim;
- (c) Any person wherever born whose father was a Malay born in Kelantan;
- (d) Any person wherever born both of whose parents were Malays and who has resided at least 15 years in Kelantan;
- (e) Any person who was born in Kelantan and whose father was also born in Kelantan.'

The definition of a Malay in operation in Kelantan (see Malay Reservations Enactment, 1930; 3 (i)) is as follows:

'"Malay" means a person belonging to any Malayan race who speaks any Malayan language and professes the Mohammedan religion; and shall include (a) the Majlis Ugama Islam; (b) the official Administrator when acting as administrator or trustee of the estate of a deceased Malay.'

APPENDIX X

The 1964 State Elections
(source: The Straits Times, 27 April, 1964)

Each group of three seats represents the area of one parliamentary constituency. The equivalent parliamentary seat is indicated in brackets beside the name of the state seat. c.p. map, p.117.

		Map Reference No.
<u>Tumpat Barat</u> (Tumpat)		1
Haji Daud, PMIP	4,084	
Mohamed bin Musa, Alliance	2,041	
	PMIP majority 2,043	
<u>Tumpat Tengah</u> (Tumpat)		2
Mahmood bin Mat Amin, Alliance	4,217	
Haji Abdul Rahman, PMIP	2,948	
	Alliance majority 1,269	
<u>Tumpat Timor</u> (Tumpat)		3
Omar bin Awang Kechik, Alliance	3,786	
Ishak bin Mustapha, PMIP	3,133	
	Alliance majority 653	
<u>Kuala Kelantan</u> (Kelantan Hilir)		4
Wan Yusoff Haji Yaacob, PMIP	3,071	
Abdul Majid bin Abu Bakar	2,428	
	PMIP majority 643	
<u>Kota Bharu Utara</u> (Kelantan Hilir)		5
Abdullah bin Ahmad, PMIP	5,025	
Yusoff bin Othman, Alliance	1,893	
	PMIP majority 3,132	
<u>Kota Bharu Pantai</u> (Kelantan Hilir)		6
Nik Abdullah bin Haji Arshad, PMIP	4,631	
Nik Hassan bin Ibrahim, Alliance	2,124	
	PMIP majority 2,507	
<u>Meranti</u> (Pasir Mas Hilir)		7
Nik Man bin Nik Mohamed, PMIP	5,198	
Wan Mohamed Zain, Alliance	432	
	PMIP majority 4,766	
<u>Tendong</u> (Pasir Mas Hilir)		8
Haji Che Hassan, PMIP	4,416	
Jaafar bin Idris, Alliance	2,245	
	PMIP majority 2,171	
<u>Bandar Pasir Mas</u> (Pasir Mas Hilir)		9
Haji Omar bin Awang, PMIP	3,776	
Abdullah bin Che Sim, Alliance	2,588	
	PMIP majority 1,188	

	Map Reference No.
<u>Bandar Hilir</u> (Kota Bharu Hilir)	10
Foo Chow Yong, Alliance	4,654
Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad, PMIP	2,213
Alliance majority	2,441
<u>Bandar Hulu</u> (Kota Bharu Hilir)	11
Ibrahim bin Ismail, Alliance	4,159
Haji Che Muda, PMIP	4,096
Alliance majority	63
<u>Kota Bharu Tengah</u> (Kota Bharu Hilir)	12
Mohamed Asri bin Haji Muda, PMIP	4,724
Haji Ibrahim bin Mohamed, Alliance	2,488
PMIP majority	2,236
<u>Bachok Utara</u> (Bachok)	13
Shafei bin Ahmad, PMIP	4,535
Ismail bin Yahaya, Alliance	2,811
PMIP majority	1,724
<u>Bachok Tengah</u> (Bachok)	14
Mohamed Amin bin Yaakub, PMIP	4,308
Yusof bin Salleh, Alliance	2,459
PMIP majority	1,849
<u>Bachok Selatan</u> (Bachok)	15
Haji Othman bin Haji Ismail, PMIP	3,760
Mohamed Zein bin Abdullah, Alliance	2,905
PMIP majority	855
<u>Kota Bharu Timor</u> (Kota Bharu Hulu)	16
Saufi bin Idris, PMIP	4,743
Wan Aziz bin Haji Wan Omar, Alliance	2,859
PMIP majority	1,884
<u>Kota Bharu Barat</u> (Kota Bharu Hulu)	17
Abdul Rahman bin Awang Sulong, PMIP	5,787
Ahmad bin Yusoff, Alliance	1,713
PMIP majority	4,074
<u>Kota Bharu Selatan</u> (Kota Bharu Hulu)	18
Haji Ishak Lofti, PMIP	4,956
Meor Abdullah bin Meor Ahmad, Alliance	3,405
PMIP majority	1,551
<u>Rantau Panjang</u> (Pasir Mas Hulu)	19
Ahmad bin Yatim, PMIP	2,857
Wan Mahmood bin Wan Konok, Alliance	1,757
PMIP majority	1,100

		Map Reference No.
<u>Lemal</u> (Pasir Mas Hulu)		20
Haji Haron bin Haji Sulong, PMIP	3,293	
Mohamed Zain Haji Awang, Alliance	1,626	
PMIP majority	1,667	
<u>Tok Uban</u> (Pasir Mas Hulu)		21
Abdullah bin Haji Yusoff, PMIP	3,676	
Hamzah bin Haji Ismail, Alliance	2,008	
PMIP majority	1,668	
<u>Pasir Puteh Utara</u> (Pasir Puteh)		22
Abdul Kadir bin Mohamed Saad, PMIP	4,074	
Wan Muhammed bin Wan Abu Bakar, Alliance	2,912	
PMIP majority	1,162	
<u>Pasir Puteh Tengah</u> (Pasir Puteh)		23
Haji Muhammad bin Haji Ismail, Alliance	3,959	
Wan Sulaiman bin Haji Ibrahim, PMIP	3,499	
Alliance majority	460	
<u>Pasir Puteh Tenggara</u> (Pasir Puteh)		24
Abdul Rahman bin Mohamed Salleh, PMIP	4,091	
Raja Mahmud, Alliance	3,501	
PMIP majority	590	
<u>Machang Utara</u> (Tanah Merah)		25
Mohyiddin bin Tengah, Alliance	4,283	
Haji Mohamed bin Nasir, PMIP	4,150	
Alliance majority	133	
<u>Tanah Merah Timor</u> (Tanah Merah)		26
Omar bin Muhammed alias Mamat, PMIP	4,418	
Ismail bin Abdul Samad, Alliance	4,028	
PMIP majority	390	
<u>Tanah Merah Barat</u> (Tanah Merah)		27
Yusoff bin Abdul Latiff, PMIP	3,756	
Mohamed Zin bin Ismail, Alliance	3,273	
PMIP majority	483	
<u>Machang Selatan</u> (Ulu Kelantan)		28
Yaacob bin Ismail, Alliance	4,587	
Haji Mohamed Noor bin Haji Yusoff, PMIP	4,481	
Alliance majority	106	
<u>Ulu Kelantan Timor</u> (Ulu Kelantan)		29
Yusoff bin Haji Mohamed Salleh, Alliance	5,253	
Haji Wan Ismail bin Wan Ahmad, PMIP	2,928	
Alliance majority	2,325	

Ulu Kelantan Barat (Ulu Kelantan)

30

Ismail bin Daud, Alliance	2,982
Khaidir bin Khatib, PMIP	1,871
Alliance majority	1,111

APPENDIX XI

Parliamentary Elections, 1964

(source: The Straits Times, 27 April 1964)

Tumpat

Wan Hassan, PMIP	10,248
Che Lat bin Kassim, Alliance	10,056
PMIP majority	192

Kelantan Hilir

Haji Ahmad bin Abdullah, PMIP	12,721
Tengku Abdullah Ahmad, Alliance	6,496
PMIP majority	6,225

Kota Bharu Hilir

Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil, Alliance	11,585
Wan Mustapha, PMIP	10,929
Alliance majority	656

Kota Bharu Hulu

Haji Hussein Rahimi, PMIP	15,656
Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Mat, Alliance	7,915
PMIP majority	7,741

Pasir Mas Hilir

Muhammad Fakhruddin, PMIP	13,476
Haji Mokhtar bin Haji Ahmed, Alliance	5,261
PMIP majority	8,215

Pasir Mas Hulu

Abdul Samad Ahmad, PMIP	9,857
Husein bin Ahmad, Alliance	5,496
PMIP majority	4,361

Bachok

Zulkifli Muhammad, PMIP	12,659
Hassan Haji Mohamed, Alliance	8,278
PMIP majority	4,381

Tanah Merah

Mustapha bin Ahmad, PMIP	12,318
Isahak Abdul Hamid, Alliance	11,549
PMIP majority	769

Pasir Puteh

Mohamed Asri, PMIP	11,798
Haji Idris bin Ismail, Alliance	10,393
PMIP majority	1,405

Ulu Kelantan

Hussein bin Sulaiman, Alliance	12,681
Haji Wan Yusoff, PMIP	9,108
Abdullah bin Mat Arif, S.F.	414
Alliance Majority	3,573

APPENDIX XII

Thai Medicine and Nqraa in a Malay Society

This note forms a postscript or final commentary on the argument, developed in Chapters III and V, that what the Thais' integration owes to the historical experience of the pre-British era is only a sense that Kelantan is their rightful home (by a kind of jus soli), plus an acceptance of the hegemony of a Malay ruling class (with its negative corollary, a lack of political expectations from Thailand.) The growth of identification with a part of the Malay peasant population - the acquisition of the common values of neighbourliness and a shared sense of being Kelantanese peasants - we attributed to a period of change in Malay peasant society, the period after 1909. The Thai attitude to the Malay peasantry and its religious leadership before 1909 we postulated to have been wholly one of hostility and suspicion. But there is one more facet of primordial Thai-Malay relations that should be mentioned, because its significance is potentially in contradiction to the posited non-identification and non-integration with Malay peasant society before the British era. This facet is the quite wide-spread Malay confidence in Siamese medicine and charms (cited in Chapter II, p. 61 as a possible factor preventing Muslim intimidation of Thais). Today, increasingly, Kelantan Malays will buy patent medicines with Thai labels, imported - or supposedly so - from Thailand itself. But the old habit of reliance upon the Kelantan Siamese is still met in the kampongs. At Samûrag during the author's stay, Malay women often bought love salves made from coconut oil; a Malay teacher had been persuaded by local advice to seek a Buddhist talisman for good luck on the road; another Malay was bathed in water in which some of the Nqraa master's theatrical props had been immersed, to cure him of a malignant eczema; and Thai moq with skill in treating such maladies as post-puerperal hysteria and malarial fevers would be called from quite great distances to attend a case. Certain monks are renowned for their efficacious charms and cures.

Such Malay dependence predicates a long-established tolerance of 'Siamese' custom and the Thai presence, which indeed manifests itself at times outside aristocratic or bureaucratic circles and in the form of sentiments which seem to betray a rural tradition of tolerance (tolerance of primordial diversity) rather than the new, brotherly familiarity of workmates and UMNO enthusiasts (with the paradoxically intolerant dimension that we project in Chapter VIII). The problem of interpretation here posed is: whether Thai-Malay interdependence a century ago lent subjective security and an embryonic, reciprocal identification (with the Malays as fellow peasants), which the new 20th Century identification could take as its natural starting point; or was the provision of medical care merely an insurance against Malay intolerance? Can we go beyond Kunstaedter's identification of traditional structural integration ("...the press of present day events should not blind us to the fact that the existing patterns of relationship are the results of many centuries of development. The groups in question have never been completely isolated nor have they been entirely independent of the dominant political and economic structures of their regions," P. Kunstaedter, op.cit., pp. 3 and 5) and talk of the beginnings of common identity and nationality in an earlier epoch than the present one?

There are forms of Thai-Malay interaction (c.p. Chapter II, pp 74-76) which in fact bear of two interpretations: either as 'positive, outgoing', or as 'defensive, cautious, suspicious, etc.', however valiant the observer's attempts to categorise one way or the other. In the case of the traditional Malay use of Thai medicine, there is no need for doubt that the *moo* involved then were personally motivated, as now, by a combination of material inducements and compassion for the sick, rather than the motive of keeping the Malays at bay (though a *moo* who is tired, or doesn't need money, will still respond to a call on the grounds of fearing to anger the Malays who sought his services). An intelligent man who travelled in the Malay kampongs and got to know the Malays would not harbour excessive fears and superstitions about them. However, we must remember that the number of Thais involved in these contacts with the Malay peasantry might be only 3 or 4 in 200. While it is quite common for a Thai man to learn a medical speciality, fame outside their own village comes to a rare minority. Therefore while Malay society might have been more tolerant in practice towards the Thais than the Thais realised, their embattled universe would take no note of the opinions of one or two doctors with contacts in the Malay world. In any case, a man with outside experience has no motive to challenge a village myth which he himself subscribes to at one level of consciousness (even today, with many Thais having favourable experiences of Malay society, contrary perceptions are common in the same individuals and are often the only ones expressed publicly). As the equipment of a traveller 70 years ago included a spear, along with the indispensable betel set and a supply of rice, those who saw him depart or return could not but be confirmed in their belief that journeys in the Malay countryside were a hazardous business, even though the greater danger of attack might be from wild animals and not Malays. The general view of medical service may easily have been that it was a necessary function, performed by the few to guarantee the security of the many from molestation.

Still today, in the midst of much socially integrative behaviour, defensive traits are apparent. It may be objected that when statements go contrary to manifest behaviour they are fulfilling the function simply of asserting Thai identity in a symbolic way...yet individual phenomena (as well as individual attitudes) often reveal a genuine inner ambiguity. This discussion of the function of Thai medicine and magic in Thai-Malay relations can suitably be concluded with a reference to *Nqraa*. Its decline was set on foot by the lack of interest among young men and boys in becoming disciples of a *Nqraa* master for many years. But the decline is accelerated by the decline of the Thai audience. And this has come about because in this century the *Nqraa* drama in Kelantan (the enacted scenes and narration of the story, not the invocations and choruses) has come to be performed in Malay to please the Malays who flock uninvited to the entertainments at ordination time, or who may commission a *Nqraa* to be performed in a Malay village in fulfilment of a vow. (The Sultan's Birthday celebrations are another occasion when the audience is 100% Malay; and now the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the National Museum have commissioned performances at Kuala Lumpur by the Maalaj troupe.) The most entertaining part of the drama is thus incomprehensible to Thai women and children

and not a few Thai men. But no one would like to frustrate Malay expectations by cancelling the Nqraa and other spectacles at ordinations, even if the great 'invasion' of Malays on this occasion both suffocates the Nqraa and tends to breach the calm and security of the village at the most precious moment in several of the participants' lives.

A casual observer might classify this assimilation of Nqraa to the requirements of Malay society as an example of social integration. He might point, too, to the presence of two or three Malay players in the Maalaj Nqraa orchestra. But these Malay friends were invited to join because of a shortage of Thai players, consequent upon decline. And analysis shows that decline to be connected with a persistent Thai desire to placate Malay society, not to assimilate to it. It is true that the increasing Malay attendance at ordination entertainments in the wats stems from modernisation - a decline of taboos - in Malay society, not rampant Islam. But we must be prepared to consider the possibility (and this is done in political terms at Chapter VIII) that it is less traditional Islam (which even in its new nationalist guise has been willing in practice to live-and-let-live culturally) than modernised Malay society, which may present Thai society with its most serious challenges.