SOCIALISM, MARXISM AND COMMUNISM
IN THE THOUGHT OF HU HAN-MIN

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ABSTRACT

In the history of republican China, Hu Han-min played an important role both in its political affairs and in its intellectual life. This study concentrates on Hu's political and social thought, with the emphasis on the period from 1919 to 1927. From the time he joined Sun Yat-sen's nationalist movement in 1905, until his death in 1936, Hu devoted his intellectual energies to the study of the varieties of western socialism. In 1919 he wrote an important series of articles for the Shanghai periodical Chien-she on the materialist conception of history. This represented one of the first comprehensive discussions of this aspect of Marxism to be presented in China. Hu followed with articles interpreting Chinese cultural and social history through the application of historical materialism.

During the 1920s, Hu was concerned primarily with political activities. This was the time of the United Front between Sun's nationalist party, the Kuomintang, and the recently founded Chinese Communist Party. Hu initially supported this alliance for the Soviet support that it brought the Kuomintang. However, he altered this position because growing Soviet influence in China threatened the nationalist movement, and because the Chinese Communist Party threatened rural China with social revolution. As a result, Hu took a prominent part in bringing about the termination of the United Front.

Hu's hostility to the Communist Party did not imply a similar attitude towards Marxist theory. Hu maintained an interest in it. His main work in the last years of his life lay in building Sun Yat-sen's theories into a system which was capable of counteracting Marxism. The results of this venture were mixed, but Hu's exposition of Sun Yat-senism reveals much about the strengths and weaknesses of Kuomintang doctrine.
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The lifetime of the Chinese political activist and thinker Hu Han-min fell during one of the most critical periods in the history of China. Born in 1879 Hu came of age in the last years of the nineteenth century, a time when China was experiencing attacks on its traditional culture of an intensity and nature never before experienced. In those years the last illusions held by the imperial government that it could ignore the West were dispelled. Then, in 1911, came the disintegration of that political system. This was followed within a few years by the virtual fragmentation of the nation itself. At the same time the age-old Confucian social system which had been the underpinning of the imperial order finally fell victim to the repeated critical assaults directed at it, perishing ultimately because it was basically irrelevant to the modern age. The question which faced the men of Hu's generation was what should replace the former Confucian social and political structure. Until his death in 1936 Hu grappled with this fundamental problem of how to construct a strong, unified and socially just nation.

It was evident to Hu, and to many of his contemporaries, that there was no way in which the old culture could be revitalized
to contend with the pressures of the industrialized West. The quest then became one of finding the route that would guarantee the attainment of national "wealth and power." Outright westernization presented itself as a possibility—the antithesis of Confucian restorationism—but it was equally untenable, and appealed only to a few. In fact, even this concept was a mirage, since the West was not a single entity, but a complex of national cultures, and different strains within those cultures. The answer, it seemed, lay in the selection of certain aspects of western culture, and the adaptation of these to Chinese conditions. But even if there were agreement on this point, the way out of the morass was not an easy one to find. Western ideas, regardless of their appropriateness, had to be translated into a political idiom which removed Chinese cultural resistance to them. For all these reasons, the formulation of a political ideology that would rescue the Chinese nation often proved to be a frustrating intellectual struggle, not only for Hu Han-min, but for all of his political contemporaries.

Although the men of this period offered many different solutions to China's ills, all of them responded to the one fundamental emotional force of nationalism. In the life of Hu Han-min this is a constant, from his study of the anti-Manchu patriotic writers as a youth, to his unwavering opposition to Japanese aggression during his last years. Hu was certainly prepared to accept on his own terms much of what the western world had to offer China. However, the forceful imposition on China of any foreign political or cultural system brought at
once to the surface Hu's uncompromising sense of nationalism. Hu was faced with the task of finding a political ideology which would secure the elusive unity, and liberate the national energies necessary to produce a strong China. He believed he had found this in the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, and these he later attempted to develop into a more cohesive and satisfying political philosophy. Sun's ideas ultimately proved inapplicable to China, it is true, but the reasons for their failure explain much about the inadequacy of social reformism in solving the problems of twentieth century China.

In order to make a fair assessment of the political thought of Hu Han-min, it is necessary to note that Hu was as important a figure in the political history of republican China as he was in its partisan ideological history. His first commitment always was to politics. However, the continual demands of his intense political life imposed certain restrictions on the organic development of his thought. Hu's considerable intellectual activity actually was concentrated into periods of enforced retirement brought about by unfavourable turns in his political fortunes. In his life three important periods of creative intellectual work may be singled out, as well as a final one that might be seen as an epilogue to his career. From 1905 to 1907 Hu wrote extensively for the T'ung-meng-Hui publication, Min-pao (The People's Report), in which he attacked the Manchus and their defenders, and outlined and elaborated on Sun Yat-sen's early ideas on social reform. Over the year from mid-1919 to mid-1920 Hu contributed his most important and valuable work to
the Kuomintang journal, *Chien-she (The Construction)*. The essays written at this time surveyed Marx's theory of historical materialism, and attempted to utilize it in reinterpreting the Chinese past. The third period of intense intellectual productivity was that of 1927-1928. This followed immediately upon the breakup of the United Front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Hu presented a critique of the Communist Party and of Marxism, while trying to build a more sophisticated theoretical structure for Sun Yat-sen's theories. Finally, in the years from 1933 to 1935, when Hu was a political exile living outside China, he wrote at great length on current Chinese political questions. However, in this period, little of theoretical interest was created; Hu confined himself to repeating and emphasizing the ideas of Sun Yat-sen and his own expositions of them.

The topical focus of this study of Hu Han-min is his perception of three related intellectual importations from the West: socialism, Marxism and Communism, all forms of the collectivism that Hu Han-min and his mentor, Sun Yat-sen, held to be fundamental to their political philosophy. Hu's fascination with these ideas is a motif that runs through his thought from 1905 until the time of his death. Since Hu was also a political activist, he realized that it was necessary to find a political mechanism if any socialist ideals were to be realized. It can be argued that it was the long years of political frustration rather than a sustained process of intellectual deduction that led Hu to embrace the Leninist model of party organization in the 1920s. This departure confronted Hu with a new problem. Although the alliance with the Chinese Communist
Party provided the Kuomintang with a highly useful political apparatus for stimulating mass participation in the nationalist revolutionary movement, it was bought at the price of Russian involvement in Chinese affairs. This conflicted with the one value that was always decisive in Hu's political system, his nationalism. As a result, he demanded the termination of the alliance with the Soviet Union, and the eradication of the Chinese Communist Party. However, the position that Hu took towards the Communist Party, whether in its Russian or Chinese form, did not carry in its wake a complete rejection of Marxism. Through all of his ensuing writings there is obvious a lingering intellectual fascination with Marx, and especially with the theory of historical materialism.

From this brief survey of Hu's life it is apparent that in making a study of the substance of Hu's thought, and in tracing its evolution, it is necessary to bear in mind the record of Hu's political activities. In the years prior to 1919 Hu gained much practical experience from his work with Sun Yat-sen. In particular, he came to realize that the success of the revolutionary movement depended on an effectively organized political party. The hard and frustrating struggles of these years profoundly shaped the course of Hu's intellectual and political life in the vital decade that began in 1919.

Early Years and Formative Influences

The main source of the early life of Hu Han-min is his autobiography, a terse account written about 1915 when he was in his
The narrative focuses primarily on the first decade of the century, when Hu became involved in conspiratorial activities designed to overthrow the ruling Manchu dynasty. Very little space is devoted to recounting his early years. When mention is made of them, it is done so in a highly impersonal manner, illustrating well Benjamin Schwartz' comment that "the biographical tradition of China does not dwell on the psychological subtleties of childhood." It is possible to glean a few facts from this period, however, and these should be put on record at the outset, before the formative political influences on Hu's youth are described.

Hu Han-min was born near Canton on December 9, 1879. His given name was Yen-kuan, which he altered to Yen-hung. When he came of age at twenty-one, he adopted the formal name (tzu) of Chan-t'ang, by which he is sometimes referred to in later life. Han-min, the name most readily associated with him, was a pseudonym meaning "The Chinese People," which he assumed in Japan in 1905. Sometime later Hu acquired a literary name (hao), under which he published several collections of poems. Hu's pen-name, Pu-k'uei shih chu, was drawn from a passage in the Shih Ching (The Book of Odes), and translates literally as "The Master of the Studio of Ever-filial Piety." This name should not be interpreted as evidence of some latent affection on Hu's part for the Confucian system of social relationships. It was simply a token of the dedication that he felt throughout his life to the memory of the parents he lost in his youth.

Although Hu Han-min was born and raised near Canton, he was
Cantonese only by accident of birth. On both sides of his family he was of Kiangsi descent. His grandfather, Hu Hsieh-san, was a government clerk who had moved the family home to Canton in the course of his work. He had married his son Wen-chao to a daughter of a Kiangsi family of some local prominence, and this couple became parents to a family of seven children. Hu Wen-chao, like his father, was a low-level government functionary, who served as a clerk in the judicial branch of the local (hsien) administration. This position on the periphery of the world of officialdom ensured a certain degree of security, though only a limited income. The large family put a strain on this, and Hu later recalled with evident pride how his "hard-working and frugal" mother coped with such a demanding life.

If Hu's early years were characterized by difficult economic circumstances, there was one advantage that his background gave him over the vast mass of the Chinese people. The tradition of literacy and government service in his family provided him with the home environment and the means of sustenance necessary for him to embark on a classical education. For a child growing up in the 1880s and 1890s the traditional examination system still offered the only guaranteed access to a respectable and perhaps profitable career. As a young student Hu revealed the powers of memory and concentration that characterized him throughout his life. In his autobiography he recalled that by the age of ten or eleven he had read the thirteen classics and could recite several thousand characters daily from them. He would have gone on to try the examinations had his father not died suddenly in the fall
of 1891. Hu now had to study on his own. Then in 1893, when he was only fourteen, his mother died. In order to support the younger children Hu and his older brother became tutors for the next few years, and Hu's examination plans were temporarily postponed. 6

These years in the 1890s probably were the most difficult in Hu's life. The death of his parents affected him very deeply. In his autobiography Hu expressed his profound respect for them, and stated that his father's "probity and integrity" had made an indelible impression on him. Hu also remarked that his father had regarded him highly when he was a boy because of the great powers of memory that he brought to his studies. 7 One might speculate that Hu's lifelong studiousness and intellectual curiosity were an outcome of the strong bond that had been formed between his father and himself. Whether or not this is true, Hu definitely felt an obligation to realize his parents' expectations, and this feeling he gave public expression to in his choice of literary name. The loss of his parents was not all that Hu suffered during these years. Four of the younger members of the family died, leaving Hu with only his eldest brother, Ch'ing-jui, and youngest sister, Ning-yüan. Some thirty years later Hu stated that these repeated losses had left him in a severe state of depression. This only began to lift when he was about twenty-one. The principal cause of this, Hu said, was his growing emotional and intellectual absorption in the current political problems facing China. 8

This turning to political interests did not mark a completely
unexpected development on Hu's part. It had been expedited by his employment on the Canton reformist newspaper, the Ling-hai pao, which his brother edited. Hu's political consciousness also had been prepared by his reading of the Ming loyalist writers Wang Fu-chih and Ku Yen-wu. From these men Hu said he had come to understand that "the subjugation of China by an alien race, the Manchus, was something beyond all reason." But what drove home the illegitimacy of the Manchu claim to the imperial mandate was not so much nationalist theory but the dismally ineffective record of the government in preserving China against the foreign threat. Probably there has been no period in China's modern history equal in effect to the six years from 1894 to 1900. In this brief time the general mood of the nation's political "class" shifted from complacency to despair about the prospects of national survival. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 brought disgrace on the nation because of the derisory treatment meted out to China by a country long felt to be her inferior. This feeling of humiliation was felt especially by the young. In Hu's words, the defeat in the war meant that "the Ch'ing court could no longer conceal its rottenness and impotence."\(^9\)

As a consequence of the war the western powers demanded military bases and further commercial privileges in order to restore their position against that of the suddenly emergent Japanese. This led to the "scramble for concessions" in 1897-1898. In the space of a few months the imperial government handed away leaseholds and zones of economic penetration to Russia, Germany, France and Britain. For many this seemed to
portend the imminent partition of China, when the empire would be "carved up like a melon." It was this sense of impending disaster that brought about the "hundred days of reform" in the summer of 1898. Although this episode also represented an attempt by the young emperor to assert himself politically against the Empress Dowager, it was motivated more by a desperate hope that China could be modernized and strengthened overnight by the promulgation of a host of western style reforms. Guiding the emperor in this attempt was a small group of heterodox Confucian scholars led by K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and T'an Ssu-t'ung. According to Hu's later account, he was impressed at the time by the reform group, and welcomed their efforts to introduce change into the traditional system. However, the "hundred days" soon ran into the vested interests of traditional officialdom, and in September a palace coup d'etat restored the Empress Dowager and the most conservative of her followers to power.

The domination of the government by the most obscurantist Manchu and Chinese bureaucrats led directly to the Boxer rebellion. In the course of this century it has become obvious that this was an event of overwhelming significance in the history of modern China. At the time it produced no less important an effect on those who were young and politically aware. The willingness of the imperial government to tolerate, and then sponsor, the disorganized bands of Boxer rebels in their wild attempt to drive out the western imperialists indicated not only the hopeless incompetence of the Manchus, but also the world of unreality they inhabited at this desperate moment in China's history. The easy
suppression of the Boxers by the Japanese and the western powers, and the imposition of a staggering indemnity on the Chinese government seemed to threaten the imminent bankruptcy of the nation, and its possible political disintegration as well. For many of the politically articulate in China the Boxer rebellion was a watershed in the development of their disillusionment with the Manchus, and ultimately the imperial institution.\textsuperscript{12}

The record of the Manchu government, and Hu's response to it, are both easy to assess. The significance of the Boxers themselves in the history of modern China is a more problematical question. Hu gave it some consideration in his autobiography. This section was written later, probably in the 1920s, and inserted in the earlier text, an indication perhaps of a growing recognition on his part of the importance of the Boxers. He characterized the movement in this way:\textsuperscript{13}

*The Boxer Rebellion not only had an influence on the Ch'ing government itself but on both China and the world at large, and its effect was felt even in the 1911 Revolution. The general motive behind it was that of driving out the foreigners—it was a reaction to the oppressions of the Great Powers—but its specific character was extremely complicated. It included peasants, secret society members, princes of the Ch'ing house and reactionary bureaucrats.*

Hu then went on to describe how the missionaries and merchants of the foreign powers had disrupted China's traditional economy and social patterns, especially in the north. The acquisition of concessions and spheres of influence threatened the very existence of the country as a political unit. These pressures had brought about the great explosion of 1900. Hu made the following judgement about the events of that year:\textsuperscript{14}
The expression of nationalist ideas among the peasantry was of the greatest value in the forward movement of revolutionary history. However, the major weakness of the Boxer Society, and the cause thereby of its complete failure, lay in the leadership. The secret society chieftains were totally without political intelligence, and relied on the coarsest type of superstition as their weapons. Revolutionary ideas are to liberate and transform; those of the Boxers lay in the ignorant restoration of the past. The two were completely different. But both movements arose from the common ground of resistance to imperialist aggression.

(Emphasis added.)

These remarks are of more than usual interest, because of their similarity in tone to the evaluation of the Boxers made in 1924 by Hu's noted contemporary, Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Ch'en defended the Boxers against the charge of xenophobia, and stated that they were in fact representative of the great mass of the Chinese people, and not simply a deluded minority sect. To him the Boxer rebellion constituted "the great and tragic prologue" to the Chinese national revolution. It should be noted, though, that Ch'en's views had gone through an evolution. In a 1918 article, written while he was still a champion of western liberalism and science, Ch'en disparaged the Boxers for treading "the dark path of superstition and theocracy." In contrast to Ch'en, Hu seems to have grasped more directly the contradictory nature of the Boxer movement. This may have been because Hu never went through a period of outright westernization, although it is certainly true that he was highly critical of traditional China. Thus, it may be argued that he never felt constrained to reject entirely that which at first glance may have seemed to be backward and irrational in his culture. This enabled Hu to view the Boxers as representative of both the shortcomings of the traditional peasant rebellion,
and the newly developing nationalist longings of the twentieth century. 15

Since these comments on the Boxer rebellion were written some years after the event it cannot be said with any certainty how many of its long-range implications Hu grasped in 1900. About his immediate feelings towards the Manchu government there is no doubt. Hu singles out in his autobiography a personal incident from that year that was of great importance in directing him into the revolutionary path. This concerned a young man by the name of Shih Chien-ju, who met his death in an abortive attempt to assassinate the governor of Kwangtung. Shih was a member of the Hsing-chung Hui (The Revive China Society), the revolutionary organization that had been founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1894. Sun's name had come to the attention of Hu the following year through western missionaries, but did not make any imprint on him at the time. Now, as a result of Hu's close friendship with Shih Chien-ju's brother, this revolutionary organization, and the world of anti-Manchu revolutionary activity, were brought home directly to Hu. Years later Hu paid homage to the example of revolutionary dedication that Shih had set for him at that time. 16

As a result of his growing political radicalism Hu decided that he had to go abroad to study in a freer and more vigorous intellectual climate. For most young Chinese this meant Japan, not only because that nation seemed to possess superficial similarities in language and culture, but more because Japan stood out as a model to those who sought to reform and modernize China. In order to undertake this programme of study Hu needed
money. He set about raising these funds in an imaginative if illegal way. He decided to hire himself out to take the examinations on behalf of a wealthy patron. Since his experience as a journalist did not act as a suitable recommendation of his talents, he tried the chu-jen examination in 1900, and achieved the degree. The next year he acted as a substitute in the lower level preliminary examinations.17 This whole episode would have only anecdotal interest if it were not for the impressive level of achievement implied by winning the provincial degree, and at the early age of twenty-one as well. The traditional examination system made little allowance for independent thought, but it demanded a formidably literal knowledge of the Confucian classics. Because of this, Hu carried with him throughout his life a familiarity with the ancient culture which was denied to many of his later revolutionary compatriots.

With his financial problems settled, Hu set off for Japan in June 1902. He enrolled at the Kobun Institute in Tokyo, a school set up by the Japanese specifically for the growing Chinese student community. It offered courses in subjects such as law, political science and teacher training. Hu's stay in Japan was short-lived, however, as he soon became involved in a dispute between the Chinese ambassador and Wu Chih-hui, a somewhat older man who had become a leading figure among the Chinese students. Because of his political activities, Wu had been expelled by Tokyo at the request of the Chinese government. Hu tried to convince the Kwangtung student association to mount a general withdrawal from school to show support for Wu. This attempt at
mass organization met with failure. Hu left on his own, and returned to Canton.  

After his return to his home city Hu served briefly as general editor of the Ling-hai pao. This paper had moved to a more radical position than the one it had held in 1898. Before long Hu came under suspicion as a possible revolutionary and was forced to leave Canton. He went to Kwangsi in early 1903, where he taught ethics and literature at the Wuchow middle school. According to his own description Hu also instructed the students in "the need for a national revolution." It is not surprising, then, that Hu's activities brought down on his head the wrath of the local gentry, and that he was compelled to resign. Looking back later on his experiences at Wuchow, Hu said he felt a sense of pride in the fact that most of the Kwangsi participants in the 1911 Revolution had been former students of his. When he arrived back in Canton he found a large group of students preparing to leave for Japan to register at the Tokyo Law College. Hearing that the atmosphere in Tokyo had become an exciting one, with many radical organizations flourishing, Hu decided to join the group. In late 1904 Hu left on his second journey to Japan.

**Dedication to the T'ung-meng Hui**

On August 20, 1905 there occurred the event which would provide Hu with the political mission that he had been searching for over the previous several years. This was the founding of the T'ung-meng Hui, the "Alliance Society," which merged the different Chinese revolutionary groups in Tokyo into a common
organization under the directorship of Sun Yat-sen. Hu was absent in Canton at the time of the inaugural meeting. Shortly after, he returned to Tokyo where he was invited to the home of a fellow student, Liang Chung-k'ai, in order to meet Sun. At this initial encounter both young men were won over at once by Sun's personal magnetism and revolutionary optimism. Together with their wives they took the oath of allegiance to Sun and the T'ung-meng Hui.\(^{20}\)

Once he joined the organization, Hu rose quickly. He was named a member of the principal committee at headquarters, and soon after became secretary to the party. These posts brought him into almost daily contact with Sun. Hu's specific responsibilities concerned the organizational development of the party, and the propagation of Sun's political and social ideas.\(^{21}\) With his classical education and journalistic background, he was particularly well suited to this latter task. When the party journal, Min-pao (The People's Report), was founded in November 1905, Hu was appointed principal editor.\(^{22}\) In this capacity, he drafted the T'ung-meng Hui's most famous anti-Manchu declaration, "The Six Great Principles of the Min-Pao."\(^{23}\) After editing the first five issues, Hu returned to fulltime political work in mid-1906, relinquishing the editorship to Chang Ping-lin. However, he continued to write, and in the course of the ensuing half-year he contributed several important articles to the journal. These articles were prompted by the vehement attacks being launched on Sun's political and social policies in Hsin-min ts'ung-pao (The Renovation of the People), the newspaper of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Constitutionalist group. Hu's discussion of Sun's programme of social reform will be examined in chapter II. As a result of his
political and journalistic activities, Hu's reputation began to spread. This received the most direct confirmation towards the end of 1906 when the Manchu government put a price on his head.  

The year 1906 also was the occasion of Hu's graduation from his two-year programme at the Tokyo Law College. This had given him an introductory knowledge of western law and politics, and more important, a thorough familiarity with Japanese. Command of this language opened up to Hu the many western works that were being translated into it at this time. With the completion of his degree, and his release from editorial duties at Min-pao, Hu was able to devote himself largely to party organization. His new responsibilities did not last long. In March 1907, Sun Yat-sen was expelled from Japan at the instigation of the Chinese government, though the Japanese, hedging their bets on the future, sent him off with a donation to his cause. Hu followed his leader into a life of ceaseless conspiratorial activity, which sought to ignite the anti-Manchu revolution from China's south-east periphery. 

The expulsion of Sun had a highly disruptive effect on the fortunes of the party. It had now lost its headquarters in Tokyo, with the result that the centre of gravity followed Sun's movements about south-east Asia. Problems of discipline and organization became endemic in the T'ung-meng Hui, and these contributed greatly to the repeated failures of its attempts to ignite revolutionary uprisings. Sun had no sooner left Tokyo in 1907 when a split appeared, initiate by Chang Ping-lin and some of the members left behind there. They took exception to
Sun's monopolization of party funds, and less pointedly, to his general leadership of the party. Their attacks on Sun were brought to an end, but they left a residue of bad feeling between Chang and the Sun group.27

Hu's movements about south-east Asia and his conspiratorial activities form an extremely complicated chapter, one whose detailed consideration belongs first of all to the narrative of T'ung-meng Hui history. The confused chronicle of his life from 1907 to 1911 may be divided into four periods of revolutionary work, each of these centring for about one year on a city that happened to be the base of operations at the time.28 Hanoi in 1907, Singapore in 1908, Hong Kong in 1909, and Singapore again in 1910 were the main points in his revolutionary travels during these years. The reason for drawing attention to this four-fold division of Hu's activities is not simply one of convenience, though. Edward Friedman has characterized the T'ung-meng Hui as "Blanquist" because of the obsessive conviction of its members that the Manchus could be overthrown through conspiratorial putschist activities.29 There certainly is truth in this as a general characterization of the T'ung-meng Hui strategy. However, in the course of Sun's "ten unsuccessful revolutionary attempts" there was a measure of development in his organization's approach to military and political strategy. In the case of Hu Han-min, it is apparent that the experiences of these years produced a growing awareness of the vital importance to the revolutionary cause of a highly disciplined and dedicated political party.

At the outset, the T'ung-meng Hui military strategy consisted
of little more than raids on random border points in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Between May and September 1907 three small-scale uprisings organized from Hanoi were suppressed with relative ease by the imperial forces. In December allies of the T'ung-meng Hui captured the government fort at Chen-nan-kuan, which guarded a frontier pass on the Kwangsi border. This was located close to the Annam-Kwangsi railway, but was otherwise far from any place of importance. Sun and Hu made their way to the scene of the uprising, but were forced to flee when government troops arrived and quickly reclaimed the fort. This happened to be the only occasion during these years in which either Sun or Hu was involved in actual fighting. When the two men returned to Hanoi they were expelled because of pressure exerted on the French by Peking. Sun left in March 1908, and after some difficulties Hu found his way out of Singapore.

The next revolutionary venture was also staged at a small, isolated border town. In April 1908 an uprising was organized at Hokow, which was located on the frontier between Yunnan and Annam. One of the special characteristics of this revolt was the T'ung-meng Hui's reliance on secret societies. These quickly proved to be the most unreliable of allies, lacking discipline in the face of government troops, and totally bereft of understanding of the political goals of the revolutionary movement. Largely as a result of the Hokow revolt Hu began to experience serious doubts about the value of secret societies to the party's cause. He told Sun that organizational work ought to be directed toward the official government forces. Sun rejected this advice.
for the time, since he thought the regular troops would be too
difficult to manage. He also felt that the numerous uprisings,
failures that they might be, still constituted "the seeds of
success." He was prepared to continue to work with local secret
societies, or any group that he could rally to his banner. In
contrast to Sun's romanticism, Hu seems at this early stage to
have realized the futility of trying to adapt traditional means
of protest to a modern revolutionary cause.  

During his time in Singapore Hu devoted his energies to a
combination of journalistic, organizational and fund-raising
activities. He became the director of the local branch of the
T'ung-meng Hui. He also worked on the party newspaper Chung-
hsing jih-pao (The China Revival Daily News). Along with Wang
Ching-wei, Hu attempted to raise the low level of political
consciousness of the overseas Chinese. According to Hu's
observation, their primitive, tribal society filled them with a
superstitious reverence for the imperial institution, and this
made them easy victims of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's reformist party. Hu
believed that the overseas Chinese needed their sense of racial
identity stimulated if they were to participate vigorously in
the struggle against the Manchus.  

During his stay in Singapore Hu had ample opportunity for contact with his fellow countrymen,
as he spent much of his time in Malaya and Thailand raising funds
and spreading Sun's ideas among the Chinese communities.

At this time Hu published a major attack on the scheme
proposed by the Manchus for the gradual introduction into China
of constitutional government. In October 1908 his article,
"Alas! The Manchus' so-called Constitutional Outline," continued the same basic line of argument that had been employed in Min-pao. Hu attacked the Manchus as racially unfit to rule China, and incapable of implementing any genuine reform. The constitution was nothing but a stratagem by which the Manchus intended to swindle the Chinese people, since it set out to restore to the central government the financial and military power that the Manchus had lost over the preceding half century. Hu concluded by stating that the Manchus had been forced to take notice of the western ideas gaining currency in China. Thus they utilized this new kind of constitutional vocabulary. However, their real intentions with regard to the Chinese people remained as evil and despotic as ever.

In the spring of 1909 Sun departed on a trip to Europe to tap potential support there. Hu went to Hong Kong, which became his third centre of operations during these years. Plans were developed that marked a notable strategic step forward from the simplistically conceived Hokow uprising. The units of the New Army stationed in Canton were to be made the object of T'ung-meng Hui infiltration. Hu acted as director of the Hong Kong branch of the party in this operation. Preparations toward an uprising in February 1910 appeared to be going well. Then, by accident, news of the plot became known, and a hastily staged outbreak was put down with considerable loss of life. This defeat came as a great blow to Hu, not only because of the time, men and cost expended, but because the conspiracy had brought about the first penetration of government troops, the course of
action favoured by Hu over the two previous years. With this failure Hu returned to Singapore in March 1910, and made it his base for rebuilding the depleted party treasury. One significant gain that was made at this time, though, was the cooperation offered by the talented revolutionary leader, Huang Hsing. In a later assessment of the events of this period, Hu stated that Huang's formulation "outlined the steps and laid down the strategy of the subsequent revolutionary actions." This strategy continued the policy of infiltration of the New Army, but went one significant step further. The army would now be used as the base for seizing the city of Canton, which in turn would become the focal point of the rebellion. To build towards this, Hu set off through south-east Asia, while Sun departed for North America. All this activity soon made the Manchu government aware that another revolutionary attempt was being planned for Kwangtung. When the revolt that later became known as the Huang-hua-kang Uprising broke out on April 27, 1911 the Manchus were prepared. The revolt was soon suppressed, and both Hu and Huang Hsing were fortunate to escape with their lives. The largest offensive mounted by the T'ung-meng Hui had failed, but this defeat caught the imagination of people in a way that the many earlier attempts had not. A few years later Hu wrote in his autobiography the following sympathetic and just appraisal of this final T'ung-meng Hui uprising:

It was a moving event at the time; years have passed, and it is still a moving memory today. As a consequence of it the Manchu court was shaken, and the people acquired the will to brave all. It was a call to the Wuchang Uprising . . . . Therefore, in the whole balance of the revolution,
it can be said that although the upheaval of April 27 failed, its effect was one hundred times greater than the successful realization of its immediate goal would have been.

After the collapse of the Huang-hua-kang revolt the T'ung-meng Hui membership found itself for the moment in a dispirited and disorganized state. Hu set off for Singapore on another round of preparing for the success that never seemed to come. He was in Saigon when it finally did arrive in the form of the unexpected Wuchang revolt of October 10, 1911. Ironically, that outbreak owed virtually nothing to the efforts of the T'ung-meng Hui. The momentum of the revolution passed outside the control of the movement that had dedicated its whole existence to the achievement of political power. The unheralded despatch of the fatal blow to the Manchus was displayed plainly by Sun Yat-sen's absence in America at the time. Hu Han-min was closer to the scene of these great events, and in late October he left for Canton. For a period of a year and a half Hu was taken out of the peripatetic life of a revolutionary conspirator, and brought into the exercise of actual political power.

The Frustrations of the Republic

The first weeks of the new republic seemed to open auspiciously for the leaders of the T'ung-meng Hui. Hu Han-min's own reputation as a famous revolutionary was soon attested to in his home province of Kwangtung. On November 9 an assembly composed largely of members of the Canton merchant community elected Hu military governor. This was immediately confirmed by the
Provincial Assembly, the gentry-dominated advisory body that had been created by the Manchus. Three days later Hu reached Canton to take up his post. However, his tenure as governor proved to be very short-lived because of the demands of the national political scene.

On December 21 Sun Yat-sen arrived in Hong Kong on his return from America. Sun was determined to go on to Nanking to establish a provisional national government there. Hu and Liao Chung-k'ai disagreed with this policy, and recommended that Sun remain in Canton until he had consolidated his military and political strength. To proceed to Nanking would place Sun in a relatively defenceless position against both the Manchus and their powerful and politically ambitious general, Yuan Shih-k'ai. Sun argued that an administration with at least national pretensions was necessary as a bargaining lever to force Yuan to topple the dynasty. More important, a newly constituted republican government was necessary to ward off possible foreign intervention as the imperial government disintegrated. Hu and Liao bowed to Sun's opinion, and Hu resigned his position in Canton to Ch'en Chiung-ming in order to accompany Sun to Nanking as his personal aide. They reached Shanghai on December 25, and four days later Sun was elected provisional president by a meeting of provincial representatives. On January 1, 1912 he took office in Nanking as the first president of the Republic of China. Hu became secretary-general to the president's office, a post which made him chief executive-assistant in the new government.
The seeming ease with which Sun was adopted president by one part of the nation disguised many splits forming within the T'ung-meng Hui. The first concerned the nature of the presidential power, whether it was to be construed on the American model of strong executive authority or on the parliamentary one of authority being vested primarily in the premier and his cabinet. Both Sun and Hu supported a strong presidential power, basing their argument on China's need for as much authority at the centre as possible. This was opposed by a section of the party based in Shanghai under the leadership of Sung Chiao-jen and Ch'en Ch'i-mei. These men favoured the parliamentary system, partly out of fear that Yüan Shih-k'ai would abuse his power should he succeed to the presidency. This group was able to prevail on Sun to change his mind, but the Provisional Parliament at Nanking refused to pass the necessary amendment and the provision for a strong presidency remained. 40

A more important difference to appear within the T'ung-meng Hui concerned the future form and role of the movement itself. The birth of political freedom in China brought about a proliferation of small parties vigorously representing every factional interest. The leaders of the T'ung-meng Hui had to decide whether they should transform the movement into an open party which would join the parliamentary fray on the same terms as its competition, or whether they should preserve it as a closed revolutionary organization with a tightly controlled and highly select membership. At the party congress in March 1912 Hu took the position that the closed, exclusive party should be maintained.
This clearly reflected Hu's concern about the need for a tight organizational structure to ensure the success of the movement, a lesson he had learned from the problems experienced by the T'ung-meng Hui in disciplining its membership in the pre-revolutionary period. 

In opposition to the stand taken by Hu, the Shanghai wing of the party argued that the military phase of the revolution was now complete, and that the second stage, that of open political activity, had been reached. This view was the one that prevailed. The T'ung-meng Hui was changed into an open political party with a wide membership and ambitions for victory in the parliamentary arena. Within little more than a year this new political party, the Kuomintang, as the T'ung-meng Hui was renamed in the summer of 1912, was under attack by Yuan Shih-k'ai, and its national pretensions temporarily ended. What Hu never forgot about this whole debate on the form of the party was that whatever political effectiveness it might possess could only result from its limitation to a select and dedicated body of followers of Sun Yat-sen. The experience of the mistaken 1912 reorganization confirmed what he had come to feel as a result of his earlier T'ung-meng Hui activities, and it remained with him as an example of what the revolutionary party must avoid if it ever was to gain success in China.

Shortly after the T'ung-meng Hui transformed itself into an open, national institution Hu Han-min returned to the narrower, if more substantial, world of Cantonese provincial politics. In February Sun and Yuan came to an agreement by which the north
and south were to be reunited and Yuan was to become president. Sun's resignation from his office took effect at the beginning of May. From Nanking Sun and Hu proceeded on a heroic progress to Canton, which Sun had not visited since his youth. Sun then went to Shanghai, where he immersed himself in drawing up countless programmes for the development of China. Hu remained in Canton, where he resumed the governorship surrendered to him voluntarily by Ch'en Chiung-ming. At this point Hu's autobiography breaks off, but it is possible to reconstruct his life over the next few years from other sources. 43 To some extent the record of these years remains fragmentary and disjointed. This is due, however, not so much to the lack of documentation as it is to the haphazard life that political events in China forced Hu to lead.

Hu's second term as governor of Kwangtung lasted from April 1912 to June 1913. Conflict with Peking was endemic over the respective areas of national and provincial jurisdiction. Hu also found himself in a struggle with the gentry-dominated Kwangtung provisional assembly over the extent of his executive powers. Hu claimed that the assembly possessed only a consultation function in view of its undemocratic nature. In turn the assembly attempted to impeach Hu. 44 This struggle, which was an indication of the problems faced by executive authority in China at that time, went unresolved during Hu's governorship.

One interesting aspect of Hu's tenure as governor was the effort made to introduce Sun's equalization of land rights into the Kwangtung countryside. Perhaps inspired by a visit to Canton
by Sun himself, the provisional assembly supported the executive in implementing the first stage of the plan in June 1912. This involved the determination of the current value of all land, an assessment which was to be made by the owner. New title deeds incorporating this value would then be issued by the province. This stage was never completed. It took more than the six months originally allotted to it because of the high degree of absentee land ownership in Kwangtung. With the removal of Hu Han-min and the Kuomintang from office in 1913 the whole scheme came to an end.  

In other areas the Kwangtung government was forced to take a more conservative approach to the problems besetting it. To bring about a recovery from a period of severe inflation at the time of the revolution, it was necessary to impose a programme of financial austerity. This restored the value of the province's paper money, and regained the confidence of the merchant's community, but at the usual price of a reduction in social measures. The government also was faced with a general breakdown of law and order in some of the rural areas of the province. The existence there of bandit groups was compounded by the disbandment of the peasant armies formed at the time of the 1911 revolution, since the unemployed troops frequently found their way into banditry. Disbandment and financial retrenchment had begun under Ch'en Chiung-ming, and Hu continued these policies without hesitation. In May 1912 he gave the order for the destruction of these bands of liu-min. The repression was severe, though it was recorded that by the fall western Kwangtung
had returned to calm at last. 47

In other less immediately contentious areas Hu's government attempted to effect modernizing reforms. The legal codes were updated with western procedures being introduced. The government attempted to enforce provisions against footbinding. Buddhism and Taoism came under attack because of the superstitious nature of their religious belief and the social parasitism of their religious establishments. Government supported schools were prohibited from teaching the classics and venerating Confucius. In the administration itself the use of formal titles was abolished. 48 Hu Han-min tried to confront the most intractable governmental problem of all, the widespread existence of corruption. This was more than one man ever could overcome, but Hu did set an example of the "new administrator" in the honesty of his own person. Throughout his career, whether in public office or out of it, this aspect of Hu's political and moral character never was challenged. 49

Hu's downfall in Kwangtung came as a result of national rather than local causes. In December 1912 the Kuomintang won almost half the seats in the nation-wide elections. Yüan Shih-k'ai at once set about trying to fragment this bloc through bribery. Finally he decided to render it leaderless by arranging the assassination of its parliamentary leader, Sung Chiao-jen, in March 1913. The culmination of Yüan's betrayal of the constitution was his unilateral negotiation of a "reorganization loan" from a consortium of western nations. This he arranged in order to free himself completely from parliamentary control.
Hu protested against this action, and was supported by the Kuomintang governors of Kiangsi and Anhui. Yüan's reply to this challenge was to remove all three from office, Hu's dismissal coming on June 14. Hu was assigned a new position, that of "Pacification Commissioner for Tibet," but this almost derisory gesture by Yüan was immediately rejected. The Kuomintang forces in south China then launched an attack on Yüan that became known as the "second revolution."\(^{50}\) Within three weeks the military campaign proved to be a complete failure. The Kuomintang's parliamentary representation in Peking was proscribed as well. At the end of July Sun and Hu fled to Shanghai and from there to Japan. Gradually all the prominent members of the T'ung-meng Hui reassembled in Tokyo, there to begin work again for the victory they thought they had won in 1911.

In analyzing the events of the recent past Sun came to the conclusion that the main cause for the failure of his revolutionary movement was to be found in its excessively loose organization. To remedy this defect he reassembled his followers into what was planned to be a small, closed group of committed revolutionaries. This new organization, formed in early 1914, took the name the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Chung-hua ko-mingtang).\(^{51}\) In order to forge a sense of cohesiveness and discipline within this body, Sun demanded, almost out of desperation it would seem, a personal oath of allegiance from every party member. This practice, which was one of the more noteworthy characteristics of the new party, was more reminiscent of a traditional secret society than a modern revolutionary movement.
In addition to this, Sun also insisted on the finger-printing of all the membership.

Hu Han-min's activities in the Chinese Revolutionary Party are reminiscent of those he carried out a decade earlier in the T'ung-meng Hui. He acted as the general editor of the party organ, Min-kuo tsa-chih (The Republican Journal), which seems to have had a short history, probably for financial reasons. At the first general meeting of the Revolutionary Party in July 1914 Hu was placed in charge of the political bureau, the unit concerned primarily with anti-Yüan propaganda and activity. Towards the end of the year, at a conference called by Sun to discuss revolutionary strategy in China, Hu drafted the regulations on military law and local government for the anticipated provisional government. All of this work, though, would have remained no more than an exercise on paper if Yüan Shih-k'ai had not engineered his own downfall.

In the summer of 1915 Yüan set up a society charged with the task of considering the possible reinstitution of the monarchy. Yüan's intention to gain the imperial throne for himself was patently obvious to all. Immediately opposition began to form throughout the country, even among those whom Yüan had counted as his supporters. The one national issue which the 1911 revolution definitely had settled was that the empire had passed forever. Although Yüan finally realized this, Sun Yat-sen had now gained further impetus for his revolutionary activities. From his Tokyo base Sun planned for an insurrection in the Lower Yangtze Valley. To finance the recruitment of
troops Sun sent Hu on a fund-raising expedition to the Philippines in late 1915. By the time Hu returned to Tokyo in February 1916 the anti-Yüan movement in China was rapidly gaining momentum. Hu then went on to Shanghai, where Ch'en Ch'i-mei was in charge of the Chinese Revolutionary Party's plans for the uprising. Before this could be organized Ch'en was assassinated in April by Yüan's henchmen. This brought to an end Sun's "Shanghai-based strategy." However, the loss of Ch'en was fatefuly avenged by Yüan's own sudden death on June 6. This elevated Li Yüan-hung to the presidency, and terminated, at least temporarily, the growing state of civil war in China. Hu recounts that he took advantage of this unexpected respite to go to Hangchow and enjoy the delights of the West Lake.

During the year of Li's presidency Hu spent much of his time in Peking on two missions on behalf of Sun. Hu was also responsible for liaison with the members of the Kuomintang parliamentary delegation. This had assembled in Peking in even more disorganized condition than at the time of its formation in 1912. Hu and other Kuomintang leaders were awarded honorific military ranks by Li Yüan-hung for their services to the Republic. However, it was apparent that neither Li nor his premier, Tuan Ch'i-jui, intended to share their powers with an independent parliamentary body. But once again the victories Sun never seemed able to gain himself were brought to him by others. Li and Tuan fell out with each other over the question of China's entry into the First World War. Tuan pushed this measure through, Li dismissed him, and Tuan then rallied his considerable following of generals behind
him. Into this chaotic picture suddenly emerged Chang Hsün, an older retainer of the imperial family, who came to Li's aid at the price of restoring the Manchu dynasty. This was enough to consolidate decisive support behind Tuan, who now posed as guardian of the republic.

Chang Hsün's action was also sufficient to trigger off a separatist movement in Canton. Part of the navy mutinied and sailed there to back up an independent government dedicated ostensibly to the protection of the constitution. A remnant of the Peking parliament met in Canton and on September 10, 1917 elected Sun Grand Marshal of the Military Government. Hu was named minister of communications in the new administration. However, despite Sun's grandiose title real power in the province was held firmly by a clique of generals. Of the four governments headed by Sun in his lifetime this was probably the most futile. A reorganization of the command which demoted Sun to the position of one of several committeemen finally proved too much even for his energies, and he resigned in despair in May 1918. Hu gave up his token position and returned with Sun to Shanghai.56

The failure of the Canton government marks a convenient point to terminate the narrative of the first phases of Hu's revolutionary career. The following two years' enforced retirement that Hu spent in Shanghai allowed him an opportunity for new intellectual explorations, a topic to be treated in chapter III. Moreover, the years Hu spent working with Sun from 1905 to 1918 form a period in which futile experimentation and repeated failure made Hu fully aware of the inadequacies of Sun's
organization. But how could the party be transformed into a
dynamic and successful instrument? The answer certainly had not
been found by 1919, but the quest for it dominated Hu's political
searchings, and made him receptive to any theory that offered an
effective vehicle for revolutionary action. At the same time
the revolutionary party required a social message. With respect
to Hu, it will be recalled that much of his activity on behalf
of Sun Yat-sen's cause consisted of routine organizational work.
However, Hu certainly had given consideration to the social
content of the movement when time had permitted him the opportu-
nity for detailed study. During the two years he spent from
1905 to 1907 working for the party publication, Min-pao, Hu
confronted many problems concerning general socialist theory
and its application to China. These writings constitute the
body of Hu's work on theoretical matters prior to 1919. An
examination of them reveals certain underlying assumptions with
regard to the fundamental question of social reform. These
assumptions became fully manifest in Hu's political thought and
activity in the 1920s.
CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL REFORMISM OF THE T'UNG-MENG HUI

Introduction: Hu Han-min and Min-pao

In the two years from 1905 to 1907 Hu devoted his intellectual energies to the T'ung-meng Hui journal, Min-pao. This organ served as the party's principal forum for its opposition to the Manchus, and its advocacy of a republican government for China. As well as carrying out this fundamental political mission, Min-pao gave public expression to the ideas which the leader, Sun Yat-sen, had formulated on social policy. Curiously enough, Sun made almost no direct contributions to his party's journal, but he either supervised or else gave final approval to articles written by others. This was the case with three of the major statements of T'ung-meng Hui political and social policy drafted by Hu: Sun's own introductory preface of November 1905; Hu's famous outline of the party programme, "The Six Great Principles of the Min-Pao"; and his final contribution to the journal, "To the Denouncers of the Min-sheng-chu-i."

As a result, there exists from this time a large body of material signed by Hu. However, it is difficult to trace the evolution of Hu's own social thought because of his role as the expositor of Sun's ideas. In evaluating this early stage of Hu's intellectual career, it is not possible to penetrate
further than his official presence, apart from one or two brief discussions he made on matters falling outside the confines of party doctrine. The consequence of this impersonality is that it becomes necessary to deduce Hu's political and social thought from the intellectual currents present in the Min-pao group, to which he belonged, and secondly, to present the major statements of party policy which, if Hu did not create, he certainly endorsed. The point must be borne in mind that, regardless of their genesis, the ideas which Hu embraced in the Min-pao period remained with him throughout his life as a dedicated follower of Sun Yat-sen's national mission.

The Min-pao Programme:
State Socialism and Land Equalization

During the time that Hu was associated with Min-pao, first as general editor, and then as a major contributor, there appeared in the journal many translations and discussions on the subject of western socialism. These were written by young T'ung-meng Hui members such as Liao Chung-k'ai, Feng Tzu-yu, and Hu's very close friend, Chu Chih-hsin. Liao, who was fluent in English, translated a fragment of Henry George's Progress and Poverty under the pseudonym "Slaughter the Rich" (T'u-fu). He also translated a chapter from A Handbook of Socialism, by W.D.P. Bliss. In this brief excerpt, Bliss discussed the development of socialism in the nineteenth century as a response to industrialism and the consequent impoverishment of the mass of the people. He also divided the history of socialism into five
phases, the final two of which spoke of the struggle in the First International between the socialist forces under Marx and the anarchists under Bakunin. Bliss supported the position taken by Marx, but in his overall approach, he emphasized the moral and non-violent character of socialism.²

This conception of socialism as a peaceful, constructive philosophy received further development in the articles by Feng Tzu-yu and Chu Chih-hsin. Both of these men were intrigued by the experience of socialism in Germany. Feng, although sympathetic to the German Social Democratic Party, actually was more attracted to the state socialist measures implemented by Bismarck. What impressed him about these programmes was the result: the great industrial power of the German state, combined with the improved living conditions enjoyed by its citizenry.³ This belief in the efficacy of state socialism was also shared by Chu Chih-hsin, although he believed that the full enactment of its programme would have to await the eventual triumph of the social democratic movement.⁴ However, regardless of their differing positions on the Bismarckian brand of socialism, both Feng and Chu stressed the role of the state in strengthening and enriching the nation.

Chu Chih-hsin's understanding of the constructive reformism of socialism may be seen clearly in his brief article on Marx which was published in Min-pao in January 1906. This constituted the only discussion of Marxist theory to appear in the journal, and it contained the first translation into Chinese of an excerpt from Marx: the ten demands of the Communist
League set down by Marx in The Communist Manifesto. In his article Chu portrayed Marx as a political moderate, which is understandable in view of the association of the latter's name with the social democratic parties of the Second International. This essentially peaceful interpretation of Marxism caused Chu to minimize the possibilities of violent class struggle. Marx, according to Chu, "possessed a strong hatred of war," and would resort to force "only if there was no other means by which inequity could be removed."  

When he came to translate the ten point programme from the Manifesto, Chu emphasized the two which involved reforms of a fiscal nature. These were the second and third listed by Marx, respectively proposing "a heavy graduated income tax," and "the abolition of all right of inheritance." The other eight points were presented without commentary. There is one further interesting aspect to Chu Chih-hsin's treatment of Marx. Martin Bernal has drawn attention to the manner in which Chu rendered the closing call to arms of the Manifesto. In the words of Marx, the Communists "openly declare that their ends can be attained only in the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." Chu transformed this into, "they proclaim openly their actions to remove all unjust organization within society, and to rebuild it anew." Finally, in his translation of the term "proletarian," Chu adopted from the Japanese the phrase p'ing-min, which literally means "the common people," and corresponded to fu-shen, "rich gentry," the first Japanese equivalent for "bourgeois." The question of the translation
of terminology will be discussed further in the next chapter, with respect to Hu Han-min's study of historical materialism in 1919. In the case of the first translation of Marx into Chinese in 1906, too much should not be read into the virtually all-embracing nature of the term "common people" to translate "proletariat." What emerges from Chu's article is the picture of Marx as a practical and moderate social reformer.

The translations and articles by Liao, Feng and Chu contributed to the creation of the general "socialist" milieu in which Hu worked during the Min-pao period. Since he edited the first five issues, which included Chu's article on Marx, he obviously shared in this knowledge, and presumably accepted the interpretation being given it by his close colleagues. However, it is necessary to maintain perspective on the T'ung-meng Hui intellectual world. Marx was only one of many European socialist figures of note. Socialism itself was seen in terms of general programmes which had been applied in distant European countries. For the members of the T'ung-meng Hui, the policy which promised the social and economic redemption of China was the "equalization of land rights" (p'ing-chün ti-ch'üan). This plan was held by Sun Yat-sen to combine the most advanced western social thinking with the realities of the Chinese "social problem."

There is probably little doubt that, of all Sun's ideas, the equalization of land rights is the most inadequately thought out in regard to internal consistency. The details, as well as the background, of this scheme have been discussed elsewhere with great insight and thoroughness, particularly by
Here, only the general outline of Sun's policy will be presented. What is worth more attention, and what has struck all students of Sun's social programme, is its non-revolutionary nature. Regardless of the many loose ends, and the changing definitions given its terminology, the land rights policy indicates certain fundamental assumptions about rural Chinese society, and the limits of T'ung-meng Hui social policy. Lest this seem of ephemeral importance, it should be stressed that the equalization of land rights remained a cornerstone of Sun's social programme not only in the early revolutionary days, but throughout his political career. In addition, Hu Han-min, until the end of his life, held it to be the essential ingredient in China's rural reconstruction.

Sun apparently made his first acquaintance with the land rights idea in Japan around the turn of the century. This came about through the influence of his close Japanese friends, the Miyazaki brothers, who were socialist enthusiasts of Henry George's principle of the single tax on increments in land values. At this time Sun read *Progress and Poverty*, and began to contemplate the importance of the land question in history. Sun probably was spurred to do this from his recent travels in Britain and western Europe, where he had been struck not only by the gap between wealth and poverty, but also by the rapid increase of urban property values in areas experiencing commercial and industrial growth. However, Sun also looked back into China's own history for examples of solutions to the land problem.
of the distant past.

Since these measures were later cited by Hu Han-min as evidence of a reformist tradition native to China, they are worth a few words of description. The first "land equalization" scheme in China's history was the well-field (ching-t'ien) system, which supposedly had enjoyed a brief existence about the tenth century B.C. The division of land into blocks of nine equal units (which bore a graphic resemblance to the character for a well) ensured the common people a basic level of subsistence. This was followed some centuries later by the equal-field (chün-t'ien) system, introduced in 9 A.D. by the usurper Wang Mang. In order to rescue the state from the near bankruptcy endemic in the last years of the early Han, Wang Mang tried to break up the large estates and redistribute the land in order to provide the state with an adequate revenue base. Later dynasties attempted to revive the equal-field system, but in every case met with failure. As a result of his study of these measures, together with his reading on current ideas of land reform, Sun decided, probably about 1902 or 1903, to add what he termed "the equalization of land rights" to the Hsing-chung Hui platform. This constituted a noteworthy addition to the goals of the movement, since up to this time, they had been defined in the narrow political terms of expulsion of the Manchus and the establishment of a republic.

Although he now spoke of land rights as one of the objectives of his party, Sun did not define what he had in mind. On the basis of comments made at the time by Chang Ping-lin and
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Bernal suggests that Sun may have been advocating land nationalization, with compensation, should the need for expropriation arise. Speculators holding undeveloped land either would be heavily taxed or forced to develop their property. The details of this earliest phase of Sun's land programme may be unrecoverable, but the intention behind this system is clear.

In a letter of December 1903, Sun touched on three of the fundamental points in his social philosophy. First, he stated that in the West, concentration of land already had taken place, and that society there had divided into two classes of rich and poor. Secondly, China did not suffer from such an acute social problem: "The gap between rich and poor is not like that in Europe and America." This was because the productive forces in China were still on the level of the individual peasant. Industrialization, and the attendant concentration of wealth, still lay in the future. The third point was to Sun the logical conclusion to the first two. If China implemented the proper preventive measures before it was too late, the social evils of the West could be avoided. To this end, state purchase of excessive land-holdings, and the prevention of land speculation appeared as the policies designed to place China on a path which would elude the polarization of society that marked the West.

Once the T'ung-meng Hui was founded, and Min-pao established as the party organ, it became necessary for Sun to work out the details of his social policies. In doing this, his younger colleagues such as Chu Chih-hsin, Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Han-min
played a part, though as mentioned earlier, the relative participation of each is impossible to judge. Sun contributed the preface to the first issue of Min-pao, which was published in November 1905. In this brief statement, which he dictated to Hu, Sun for the first time spoke of min-sheng-chu-i, the term probably best rendered into English as "the principle of livelihood." Until this time, Sun had used the Japanese expression she-hui-chu-i to translate the word "socialism." It has been speculated that Sun chose this term because it matched the other two principles he had been discussing over the preceding year: min-tsu-chu-i ("the principle of nationalism"), and min-ch'üan-chu-i ("the principle of democracy"). This seems likely in light of Sun's reference from this time onward to his Three Principles of the People, the san-min-chu-i. Apart from this change in terminology, which was certainly of some significance in determining the form in which party ideology was expressed, Sun's preface to Min-pao said little of a specific nature. However, in it he reiterated his belief that China could avert the West's social problem through the implementation of his programme, and actually went so far as to surmise that "our country's cure for the social problem could be the first to develop."  

At the same time as he wrote the Min-pao preface, Sun issued the Proclamation of Military Government, also known as the Manifesto of the T'ung-meng Hui. In this document, Sun outlined his theory of the three stages of the Chinese revolution: three years of military unification; six years of
tutelage, during which the people were to be trained in the practice of self-government; and finally, the adoption of full constitutional rule. Sun also attempted to spell out the equalization of land rights policy more clearly. Since this definition survived more or less intact, its main provisions should be noted:

We should improve our social and economic organization and assess the value of all land in the country. The present value of land will still belong to the owner. But all increases in value resulting from reform and social improvements shall belong to the state to be shared by all the people in order to create a socialist state (she-hui ti kuo-chia) . . . .

This formulation indicated a move away from the possible nationalization of land Sun had spoken of earlier. The focus now was on expropriation of unearned increment, which would finance an as yet undefined programme of social reform.

It was in order to draw together the various statements made by Sun on the land question, as well as to express the basic political goals of the party, that Hu wrote "The Six Great Principles of the Min-Pao." This article, which appeared in April 1906, constituted Hu's first presentation of party policy. After explaining the need for a revolutionary journal, Hu discussed the first three of the Min-pao principles in terms of their correspondence with the Three Principles of the People. "Overthrow the present evil government," and "Establish a republic," were straightforward equivalents of the principles of nationalism and democracy. The third Min-pao principle, which Hu called "Land nationalism" (t'u-ti kuo-yu), was to be equated with the principle of livelihood. In regard to this
objective, Hu referred to the varieties of socialism which existed, and the need for China to choose the one which was appropriate. According to Hu, socialism could be divided into communism, state collectivism, and land nationalization. The first of these may be referred to as anarcho-communism, at least such is Bernal's surmise. By state collectivism (kuo-ch'an-chu-i), Hu definitely had in mind the "constitutional democracies," where social policies were being enacted in the people's welfare. Land nationalization, Hu admitted, actually was a form of state collectivism, but he preferred to treat it separately, since it was the only policy "which could be applied to China in its present stage of development."  

In presenting the case for land nationalization, Hu quoted the basic arguments of the Henry George school on the central role played by land in social and economic history. Land, an essential element in production, was not man-made, and therefore should not benefit private owners. Throughout the centuries the value of land had increased, thus enriching the landlord without his having to labour. Accordingly, the landlords were able to absorb all "capital and wealth," while the tillers of the soil became steadily more impoverished. However, after he had produced this outline, Hu then stated that he did not have present-day China in mind when he referred to the evils of landlordism. Rather, this social problem, which other countries had experienced, could be averted if Sun's equalization of land rights was quickly put into effect. Hu pointed out that land values in the coastal ports currently undergoing commercial
development might increase as much as ten times in the following ten years if they were not checked. With the success of the revolution, and the consequent "advance of civilization" throughout all of China, the same process of escalating land values would be accelerated in the interior. To prevent the social catastrophe from occurring, Hu stated that the new government would expropriate all land from its owners. In return, the government would grant the right to cultivate the land to those who were prepared to do so on their own. Therefore, there would be no private landlordism or tenancy; the sole owner would be the state, but cultivation would remain an individual right. In conclusion, Hu said that the state would levy moderate taxes on these individual "land-holdings," but only after parliamentary approval had been granted.23

To what extent Hu was responsible for directing Sun's land rights policy back towards land nationalization cannot be ascertained. Hu makes no mention of this in his autobiography. In fact, there was little significant difference between the two positions, despite the seemingly more radical nature of the Min-pao proposal. This was because Hu fully accepted Sun's contention that Chinese society was not divided by extremes of wealth. In the "Six Principles of the Min-Pao," Hu endorsed this interpretation:24

One of the truly unique characteristics of our political history has been the absence of a noble class since the Ch'in and Han dynasties. (The Mongol and Manchu dynasties are not to be considered, as they maintained a nobility according to their own alien practices). After the overthrow of the Manchus, there will no longer be any distinction between classes. (Original emphasis)
Class in China, then, was a political phenomenon, a point emphasized by Hu when he went on to say that, "while the United States possesses economic classes, China has none." The consequences for the T'ung-meng Hui of this characterization of Chinese society will be discussed later. In terms of the land rights policy, the "classlessness" of China meant that there would be little opposition to this programme. The government expropriation of all land would provoke little social disruption, since most Chinese supposedly were small individual land-holders, and would in effect continue to be so after the government assumed nominal ownership of their land.

To bring the discussion of the land rights question to a close, there is one final statement made by Sun that should be noted. Because of Hu's advocacy of land nationalization, another element had been added to the ill-defined land rights programme. Sun attempted to make a final clarification of his policy, in so far as it ever was possible, in a speech given in December 1906 on the occasion of the first anniversary of Min-pao. Sun spoke of fixing land prices once the revolution had occurred, and expropriating any later increases in land value. The expropriation of ownership was allowed to lapse: Sun stressed that violence and confiscation were not part of his social programme. But the intent of this programme remained unaltered. China would be spared "the evils of a rich minority achieving a monopoly." Not only that, by implementing the single measure of the land rights policy, China would become "the richest country in the world," which no other nation would be able to equal.
With this optimistic flourish, Sun concluded his discussion of land rights, and, although a few further details were added in later years, they did not alter the basic position which Sun had settled on at this time.

There is one additional aspect of Sun's principle of livelihood to mention, especially as Hu may have been responsible for its original formulation. In a lengthy counter-attack on Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, entitled "To the Denouncers of the Min-sheng-chu-i," Hu in March 1907 introduced the "nationalization of big capital" into the T'ung-meng Hui programme. This in effect meant the expropriation of "natural monopolies" such as railways and public utilities, a course of action which was central to the state socialism practised in many west European countries. Once again the question of Sun Yat-sen's responsibility in determining policy arises. Sun approved the article and supposedly had studied its contents. However, he made no further mention of this proposal until 1912, when it was given the name "regulation of capital" (chieh-chih tzu-pen), and was granted equal status with the equalization of land rights in the principle of livelihood. Bernal believes this new social reform was dropped temporarily from the party platform after Hu first raised it because Sun feared it might alienate support from the petty merchants of the overseas Chinese community. However, Hu had emphasized that the T'ung-meng Hui in no way intended to penalize small productive enterprises. As with the land rights policy, the regulation of natural monopolies sought to prevent the development of a future social
evil, in this case, the domination of the state and the economy by "big capitalism."

With respect to the point raised by Bernal, it is not at all implausible to suggest that Sun had the overseas Chinese community in mind when he abandoned the regulation of capital programme, since he frequently changed his position to gather in any potential political support. On the other hand, it may be argued as strongly that Sun's tendency to experiment, at least momentarily, with virtually any "progressive" idea makes it difficult to assign such a direct cause to any change of attitude on Sun's part. Regardless of the resolution of this question, there is no doubt as to the general character of Sun's social programme. Its message was that of a gradualist and reformist approach to China's social problem, which, in any event, was not exceedingly severe. China was poor, but China was not divided into entrenched economic classes of rich and poor. The revolutionary energies of Sun and the T'ung-meng Hui, therefore, could be directed at the one obviously political goal, the destruction of the Manchus.

Hu shared all of these positions, and he advanced them as strongly as possible in his discussions of party policy. However, in comparison to Sun, Hu possessed a greater talent for detailed theoretical work, and a greater interest in questions of a social nature. As a result, there are to be found in Hu's Min-pao articles comments which offer some insight into his political thought at this time. While these were not set out in a systematic manner, they are sufficient to indicate
certain political and social attitudes which remained basic to Hu during the course of his life.

The Limits of Social Change

According to Hu's later recollections of his first meeting with Sun Yat-sen, he was very much impressed by Sun's exposition of the principle of nationalism, and by his insistence on China's need for an immediate revolution. However, Hu also admitted that at this initial encounter he and Liao Chung-k'ai confessed to doubts about the principle of livelihood and the equalization of land rights. They were quickly won over by Sun's persuasiveness, and Hu went on to write many articles for Min-pao in defense of Sun's third principle. This momentary indecisiveness Hu later attributed to "the capitalist economic theory" and "the textbooks which went no further than social reform" that he had been exposed to at the Tokyo Law College. It is more likely, though, that Hu's initial reluctance about the principle of livelihood betrayed a youthful lack of awareness of China's social problem. If this was so, Hu was not alone, as many students had expressed strong opposition to Sun's social programme at the founding meeting of the T'ung-meng Hui two weeks earlier. What drew them to Sun Yat-sen was his mission of political revolution; social change seemed of little relevance to the one objective of driving out the Manchus. In this context, Sun's persistent emphasis on social reform certainly stands to his credit, even if he did not elucidate his ideas carefully. This concern about the tasks of social reform and
economic development which would face the new post-revolutionary
China Sun was able to impart to Hu.

As noted above though, it is precisely the success enjoyed
by Sun in winning over Hu that makes the description of Hu's
thought at this time so difficult. There are two articles, and
one exposition which stand out as exceptions to this rule. The
first of the articles, "The Most Recent Political Opinions of
Mr. Yen Fu," was published in the second issue of Min-pao in
January 1906. This, incidentally, was signed "Han-min," the
first appearance in print of Hu's famous pseudonym. The
second article actually dates from 1908, after Hu had left
Tokyo. It was a brief note contributed to the Paris anarchist
journal Hsin shih-chi (New Century), its title being "Unmarried
Women in Kwangtung." This very interesting short statement
on women's rights stands apart from all of Hu's other writings
at this time, both in regard to content and degree of personal
expression. The final article to be noted before Hu's views on
Yen Fu are examined was an exposition entitled "Anti-foreignism
and International Law." This lengthy work consisted of summaries
of books and lecture notes Hu had compiled from his legal studies
in Tokyo. According to Hu's account, his main purpose in
writing this was to enlighten Chinese readers on the legal rights
which China had title to against the foreign powers. Hu said
that blind anti-foreignism was not only misguided, but in view
of the Boxer catastrophe, highly dangerous to the national
future. China in fact was legally empowered to take a much
stronger stand than it did against foreign imperialism: it was
only the incompetence and treason of the Manchus which had allowed China's legal rights to go unexercised.\textsuperscript{33} The main conclusion about Hu's political thought which this study indicates is the deep commitment he felt to orderly, legal methods of solving political and social problems. This was particularly true of social change: to be effective and just it must never degenerate into social disorder.

Hu's article on Yen Fu was in the first instance inspired by political issues, such as Yen Fu's supposed opposition to the anti-Manchu nationalism of the T'ung-meng Hui. However, in the course of his discussion Hu drew on materials which afforded an interesting insight into his thinking.\textsuperscript{34} In reference to Yen Fu's translation of Herbert Spencer's \textit{A Study of Sociology}, Hu raised the issue of the organic theory of the state. Hu mentioned first that the development of this theory of the virtually independent existence of the state was a reaction to the social contract theory, which had overemphasized the range of freedom of the individual. However, in his view, the organic theory represented the other extreme. It gave too much weight to society, and too little to the individual. Furthermore, the state must be regarded as the creation of individual men. Even though the state acquired a certain degree of autonomy, it was false to describe it in biological terms.\textsuperscript{35}

The central part of Hu's discussion consisted of a synopsis of arguments developed to counter the organic theory by a Japanese scholar, Onozuka Kiheiji.\textsuperscript{36} Since Hu quoted these points, and commented on them with obvious approval, they may
be taken to indicate further his position on the scope for human activity in changing society. First of all, Onozuka drew attention to the expansion of the area of freedom as nations became more civilized, in contrast to primitive society, where the group was all-powerful. Hu expanded on this by mentioning the various levels of self-government which existed within the modern state. Secondly, the state was a product of both man and nature, but man's responsibility for its existence was the greater. Living organisms were ruled by a natural life cycle, but this was not true in the case of the state, since its survival over the centuries was a result of the conscious efforts of men on its behalf. Hu endorsed this fully, and went on to state that man and nature together brought about change; neither could function in the absence of the other. The final point of interest raised by Onozuka was that the state was created by man for a certain end, while the living organism comes into existence without such a specific goal. In other words, the state cannot exist apart from the human will to create it, although that must be exercised with regard to the natural conditions in existence.  

With Onozuka's arguments to support him, Hu then called on the Chinese people to shake off their political fatalism, and change the moribund form of government which was such a burden to them. For two thousand years there had been no progress in China, and in fact, under the Manchus, there was regression. Yet, there was hope for change, Hu said, if the people would realize that no institutions were immutable. They were the ones
who possessed the capacity to change the state, if only they would exercise their will. This did not mean that the people could alter the state exactly as they saw fit. However, in China, the balance between the individual and the state was weighted far too much in favour of the latter. Yet, as Onozuka had shown, there was no cause either to adopt a passive attitude towards the state, or to believe that social life was completely determined by nature.\(^{38}\)

Although the main points advanced in the Yen Fu article were inspired by an outside source, the questions Hu touched on were wider in scope and certainly of a more philosophical nature than anything else he discussed at this time. His other articles dealt with the more specific ramifications of Sun's social policies. Throughout these, however, there was present the conviction that national greatness and social justice were in the grasp of the Chinese people if only they would rally to the revolutionary cause. At the same time, throughout Hu's work there is present the other theme of moderation in the area of social change. This second theme is the one which emerges with great clarity in the course of his polemics with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who had directed several attacks at the land equalization programme, the most famous being his article of December 1906, "Is a Social Revolution Really Necessary?" It was to answer this challenge that Hu replied in March 1907 with his long presentation of T'ung-meng Hui policy, "To the Denouncers of the Min-sheng-chu-i."\(^{39}\) These two articles are often cited as examples of the supposedly contrasting reformist and radical
positions occupied respectively by the Liang and Sun groups. However, such differences between the two were primarily of a political nature: constitutional monarchy versus the republic. There they were real enough. But in the area of social policy, the differences appear to be minimal. An examination of the main points raised by Hu in his refutation of Liang reveals the T'ung-meng Hui position to be a gradualist programme of reform which most decidedly sought to avoid any type of social disorder.

It may not be an overstatement to say that Hu's overriding concern in composing his reply to Liang was precisely to refute the claim that the principle of livelihood was aimed at causing massive social chaos by stirring up the lower orders of society. At the outset Hu made clear what he understood by the term revolution, which was used so regularly by the T'ung-meng Hui. He defined it as a form of social change which often came about in a natural manner; therefore, it did not necessarily imply social destruction. To illustrate this point, he cited the changeover from human porterage to the railway as an example of a revolutionary development in communications. Change must take place, Hu stated, but it should be carried out legally, and should not throw society into disruption. Moreover, the T'ung-meng Hui programme envisaged no such thing as social levelling. Hu was most emphatic about this point. He agreed that the ultimate goal of the party was equality, but it was an equality which was "psychological" (hsin-li ti) in nature, not "mathematical" (shu-li ti).

This theme of moderation in social policy stands out in
Hu's brief comments about Marx, and in his somewhat longer treatment of foreign investment in China. Hu apparently shared, or had been influenced by, Chu Chih-hsin's view that at heart Marx was a moderate reformer. This interpretation emerges from Hu's refutation of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's charge that socialism was undesirable because it went to extremes:

The two men who must alarm the world today with their theory of capital are Marx and Engels. Yet they not only allow for private ownership of personal capital for one's own immediate use, but also for the private ownership of capital by peasants and handicraftsmen... It cannot be said that even in the case of the most extreme socialism that all capital will be nationalized.

This basically sympathetic attitude towards capital also appears in Hu's dismissal of Liang's concern over foreign economic imperialism. Liang had argued that it was necessary to build up native Chinese capitalists to strengthen China's economic power. Hu, on the contrary, said that the T'ung-meng Hui welcomed investment. The foreign capitalists could pour in money, so that China would become "the equal of America and Australia." The only social problem would be be one of an excess of capital, and this could be managed by proper regulatory measures. Where Liang had gone wrong, Hu said, was in confusing military with economic imperialism. It was only foreign military imperialism which must be opposed. Economic imperialism was beneficial in its effects. This concept of the dual nature of imperialism Harold Schiffrin has traced to a Japanese source. However, in view of the generally sympathetic T'ung-meng Hui attitude towards private capital, this theory probably did no
more than afford academic support for Hu's economic convictions.

Hu then went on to discuss the unique nature of Chinese society, and the basically optimistic prospects that existed for its regeneration. To begin with, Hu reiterated the official party view that the social problem was becoming more acute in both Europe and America. In the case of the latter, the existence of plentiful land, and the absence of a monarch and a nobility, had not prevented the development of social problems. Trusts and monopolies dominated the economy, while high rents and unemployment were widespread. This proved, Hu said, that the extremes of wealth and poverty in society could not be attributed simply to the existence of a "feudal nobility," although this partly accounted for the social problem facing European countries. The more important cause of social misery in Europe and America was the unrestricted play of economic forces—the exercise of what Hu called the "theory of license." As a consequence of this, a small minority had gained control of both land and capital.

Hu then turned his attention to China's social problem. It was more manageable than the one oppressing Europe, since China fortunately lacked a "noble class," but it was more difficult of solution than the one confronting America. However, Hu pointed out that China possessed one great advantage over the industrialized world. In comparison to the latter, China, as Sun described it, "was still a youthful society." This meant that the prospects for China's future social and economic development were highly optimistic. Hu cited the opinions of "modern
socialist scholars" to support this view: "the possibility of a nation practising socialism is in inverse relationship to its progress in civilization." The social problem in Europe and America, therefore, had become burdensome and deep-rooted because of its age and complexity. China was not bound by such conditions. Hu then concluded the argument with a most curious illustration of this point: "New Zealand is a wild island in the South Sea. At any moment it may become a socialist 'utopia' (le-t'u)."45

Once Hu had given expression to this early "great leap" theory, he then advanced the standard T'ung-meng Hui prescription for realizing the ideal society. This meant, once again, the equalization of land rights, and in addition, the regulation of natural monopolies, the new policy which Hu had enunciated in this article with Sun's apparent backing. As discussed earlier, both programmes aimed at the prevention of future social problems, rather than at the solution of the present ones, which were not held to be of a critical nature. Yet it was necessary for Hu to stress that the T'ung-meng Hui programme not only was the only one suitable to China, but in fact was a unique theory by which the social problem could be solved. As a final note, it should be mentioned that this greater emphasis on Sun's theories was accomplished by a change in political terminology. Up to this time, min-sheng-chu-i had appeared in the pages of Min-pao as a term virtually interchangeable with the conventional translation of socialism, she-hui-chu-i. Hu now pointed out that the two expressions were quite different, and that min-sheng-chu-i,
which Sun also referred to as "demosology," was a distinctive form of socialism, and the only one applicable to China. The debate over the nature of the T'ung-meng Hui social programme rested at the point reached in the polemics of early 1907. Sun was expelled from Japan in March of that year, and Hu left with him. This brought to an end Hu's contributions to Min-pao. The time of his departure also coincided with the end of the journal's creative period in political discussion and controversy. The changed fortunes of the T'ung-meng Hui leaders did not alone account for the different journalistic atmosphere in Tokyo. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's paper ceased publication later that year, largely as a result of dwindling political support for the Constitutionalist position. The most perceptive and stimulating critic of the T'ung-meng Hui's political and social policies had now withdrawn from the scene. At the same time, there took place among Chinese student activists in Japan a move away from western social democratic theories, and a redirection towards anarchism, usually of the violent variety. For the moment, anarchism became the panacea for all political and social ills, and student attention turned away from the much more moderate, not to mention prosaic, philosophy of Sun Yat-sen.

Political Revolution, Social Reform

In attempting an analysis of the T'ung-meng Hui concept of revolution, attention should be drawn to the great gulf that existed between political and social priorities in Sun's thought. While it is true that Sun was moved by the social misery of
rural China, having experienced it in his own childhood, nonetheless in his adult life his concern was almost completely political. The same generalization might be made of the T'ung-meng Hui membership as a whole. It is necessary to strike a balance here. Sun and his followers were among the first to devote attention to China's poverty, and to search for a way of ending it. Social questions, then, were by no means unimportant. However, they were definitely of secondary importance. The one consuming ambition was the attainment of political power. With the achievement of this, it was believed that the resolution of China's social problems would come about with relative ease.

A corollary of this view was the faith held by the Sun group in the efficacy of political power. In the pre-1911 period there existed in the T'ung-meng Hui, perhaps understandably because of inexperience, a rather naive belief in the natural integrity of government structured on constitutional principles. After 1911 Sun and his followers were quickly disabused of the hopes they had placed in a democratic republic. However, they still retained their faith that political solutions could be found for all social problems, and that no social problem could fail to be solved by rational, state-legislated plans. This "legislative reformism" not only was one of the basic characteristics of T'ung-meng Hui ideology, but also of the actual practice of its successor, the Kuomintang, once political power was achieved.

The suitability of this measured approach to China's social problems received further confirmation from the analysis Sun made of Chinese society. What was distinctive about China was the
absence of serious economic divisions. Classes existed, but only on the political plane. The Manchus were the oppressors, the Chinese people the oppressed. Beyond the existence of these "two classes," there were no important divisions to be found. All Chinese suffered from poverty; the differences of degree in this condition were held to be of little consequence. The regeneration of the nation and of society as a whole, therefore, was the principal objective of Sun's revolution. This goal in itself was not an unworthy one, but it was purchased at a high cost, that of ignoring the sharp economic divisions which indeed disfigured Chinese society, especially in the increasingly volatile countryside.

The implications of this neglect of the social tensions present in Chinese society did not reveal themselves fully to Sun's party until much later, probably not until after the death of Sun himself in 1925. During the T'ung-meng Hui period the immediate task facing the party was the political revolution. To this end, Sun's followers devoted all of their energies. The theoretical discussions of social policy which had preoccupied many of them in Tokyo now must have appeared distant, and of little application to their current struggles. Because of his position at the centre of Sun's movement, Hu was absorbed completely in the many efforts during these years to secure, and to retain, political power. Not until 1919 did he have the opportunity to turn once again to theoretical interests of the kind he had begun in Min-pao.
CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND ITS INTERPRETATION

The Context of the May Fourth Movement

The Revolution of 1911 brought to an end the imperial political system which had endured for two thousand years. The attempted restoration of the monarchy by Yuan Shih-k'ai five years later underlined the fact that it could never be called back to life. This particular issue was settled clearly and in surprisingly short time. However, the old Confucian culture which had supported this political system still dominated the intellectual world and social relationships of the Chinese people. This was certainly true with regard to the Chinese elite, in whom Confucianism had attained such a highly formalized and carefully delineated status. This higher culture came under attack by scattered individuals towards the turn of the century, and in fact, such men as K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao represented what Benjamin Schwartz has called the "breakthrough generation" in the Chinese reevaluation of the classical tradition.\(^1\) However, these men remained isolated from the large body of the intelligentsia. It was only after 1911 that intellectual disaffection came to embrace much of the educated elite, particularly the members of the young student generation. These were the people who led the demonstrations against the
Versailles Treaty on May 4, 1919, and it was this nationalist protest that soon came to give its name to the whole movement of cultural iconoclasm that had been in the making for the preceding several years.

In accounting for the sudden increase in the intensity of the attacks on the Confucian orthodoxy, one must take note of the Revolution of 1911, and its failure to realize any of the hopes that had been pinned on the destruction of the imperial political order. The inability of the Republic to function as an adequate political system, or to provide for the defense of China against foreign imperialism, proved that parliaments, constitutions and the apparatus of western liberal democracy could not be applied overnight to China. What that experience also made very clear was that the former equation of China's weakness with the ruling Manchu dynasty was no longer tenable as an explanation of China's worsening domestic and international positions. Yet this belief in the treachery of the Manchus and the promised utopia of the Republic had been shared by most of the pre-1911 revolutionaries, and had been central to the political philosophy of the T'ung-meng Hui. Now it became necessary to search within China's own traditional way of life for the causes of national weakness, and in complement to this, to search the culture of the modern West for the reasons for its strength. With the growing desperation of China's situation in mind, the young generation was quickly drawn towards total rejection of that traditional culture, and, in a less clearly definable progression, towards the acceptance of one or several of the many
competing philosophies that might be identified with that entity known as the "West."  

The May Fourth movement, in its broader cultural sense, involved both destruction and construction. "Smash the old, build the new!" became one of the famous slogans of the movement. In this dual process a leading role was played by the journal Hsin ch'ing-nien (New Youth), which had been established in Shanghai in 1915. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a prominent member of the intelligentsia and at the time a dedicated student and admirer of the liberal West, was the first editor. Hsin ch'ing-nien brought to its readers the call for national regeneration, with youth, unspoiled and uncorrupted, leading the way. A new culture, free from the backwardness and oppressiveness of the old patriarchal Confucianism, had to be created. The ideals held up to Chinese youth were those of "science and democracy." These values of the rational and liberal western tradition would be the route through which China would realize the political victory and the national strength which had eluded the nation in 1911. To this end Hsin ch'ing-nien launched an unceasing barrage of attacks on all aspects of the old culture. At the same time, in keeping with its "constructive" function, it introduced Chinese readers by means of translations and digests to the political and artistic content of that western culture.

It was through the pages of Hsin ch'ing-nien that the revolution in the written language was promoted during these years. In January 1917, Hu Shih, a young student recently returned from studying under John Dewey in the United States,
published an article calling for the replacement of *wen-yen*, the classical language, by one resembling more the vocabulary and style of the spoken language. This battle was soon won. The written medium became *pai-hua*, the "common language," though this was something of a misnomer at the time, as it retained for some years a certain stiffness as well as many literal allusions. Nevertheless, the change in language was one that in no way can be minimized. It was one of the easiest and most complete victories of the May Fourth participants, perhaps indicating how prepared the Chinese elite was for change in at least certain cultural areas by the time it finally came. Hu Han-min was one of those who made the adjustment immediately in his public writing style. In a published letter of July 1919 he justified the adoption of *pai-hua* in words that would have been shared by all caught up in the new movement:^{4}

> If someone wishes to express an idea, he cannot do so very easily in the old language, because of the imprisoning effect of its many rules. This not only runs counter to democracy (*p'ing-min-chu-i*), but prevents the progress of thought.

The classical language, with its terse, convoluted and often obscurantist style was not only a part of the old social order, but an agent of its preservation as well. The journals of the May Fourth period not only brought about its displacement, but in their constructive capacity, they led the way in shaping the new written language into a fluent and sophisticated means of communication in its own right.

During the first years of the May Fourth movement the challengers to the old order focused primarily on the cultural
attack. Beginning about 1918 the emphasis began to shift towards contemporary political issues. This was reflected in Hsin ch'ing-nien, where articles both narrower in scope and more partisan in tone began to appear. The Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 partly accounted for this, although the full impact of this great upheaval did not make itself felt in China until well into 1919. However, the first tremors from Petrograd and Moscow produced an immediate effect on one of the key figures of this second phase of the May Fourth period, the Peking University historian and political theorist, Li Ta-chao. In two articles published in Hsin ch'ing-nien over the latter half of 1918, Li welcomed the Bolshevik Revolution, and hailed it as a forward step in the progressive liberation of mankind. To China it could serve as an example of a nation being reborn and remade. Li's enthusiasm was directly a result of the promise held out by the October Revolution. It did not represent any commitment to Marxism. In the words of Maurice Meisner, there was "nothing to suggest that he had even begun to consider seriously Marxist theory." But the turning had been taken, and the search for the theory that had made possible the Bolshevik Revolution soon would be undertaken.  

The major stimulus to the redirection of the May Fourth movement into political channels in 1918-1919 was provided not by the Russian revolution but by Japan and the western powers. Anti-Japanese activity in the form of student agitation and merchant boycotts had flared up in 1915 in response to the Twenty-one Demands pressed upon Yuan Shih-k'ai. Through these
Japan sought to extend its sphere of influence, which had been strengthened through the wartime occupation of Germany’s Shantung leasehold. At the Versailles Peace Conference the Chinese expected to regain at least the German concession. However, the Allies handed over the former German concession to Japan, in keeping with a secret treaty made earlier. This action produced in the student population a wave of monumental disillusionment in the western democracies. This anger was even further intensified when the news was made public that the Peking government had secretly agreed to Japan’s position in Shantung several months previously. To the members of the May Fourth generation there could have been no more graphic illustration of the collusion between foreign imperialism and the old corrupt political order in China. Student demonstrations broke out in Peking on May 4, 1919, and very quickly spread to Shanghai and other cities. Hu Han-min, who was in Shanghai at the time, characterized the period as one of "the swelling of a great patriotic tide." It was, he felt, the just response of a people humiliated by Japanese imperialism and betrayed by the indifference and corruption of its own rulers.  

Although cultural questions continued to interest the May Fourth participants, the movement now moved into a more highly intensive political phase. It was this shift that contributed greatly to the receptiveness of many Chinese intellectuals to the introduction of Marxism in 1919. Hu Han-min played an important role in this phase of the movement. This came about partly by chance, since his own political activism had been
terminated momentarily by the failure of the Canton government the previous year. However, the interest Hu had shown in socialist theory in Min-pao more than a decade earlier makes it evident that a return to this type of intellectual speculation did not constitute an unexpected departure on his part. In the spring of 1919 Hu began the study of historical materialism. This theory offered a challenge to his considerable intellectual powers. More important, it provided him with a new analytical tool for the reevaluation of the Confucian tradition that had brought China to the seeming nadir of its national life.

The Introduction of Marxism into China

It is not often that the introduction into a culture of an important intellectual current can be pinpointed to one year. In the history of modern China this claim may be put forth without too much hyperbole for 1919, when Marxism made its entry into the Chinese intellectual world. The suddenness of this is not only explained by the growing anti-imperialism of the May Fourth movement. The main reason for the ignorance of Marxism prior to this date was the dearth of Marxist materials available in Chinese. There existed some random references to Marx and his theory, it is true. However, the translations were too slight, and chosen too haphazardly to convey any sense of the scope and complexity of Marxism.

A brief examination of what was available to Chinese readers at the beginning of 1919 reveals the problem facing anyone wishing to make a serious study of Marxism. Hu Han-min, as editor
of Min-pao, had published Chu Chih-hsin's biography of Marx in 1906. This sketch had contained the ten-point proposal from The Communist Manifesto. Two years later another Tokyo based Chinese student journal, T'ien-i pao (Natural Justice), printed the first chapter of the Manifesto. This was the first translation of any substantial length. However, it was buried amidst a mass of articles on both the peaceful and violent brands of anarchism, an illuminating comment on what minor figures Marx and Engels were at that time compared to Kropotkin and Bakunin. Later in 1908 that same journal printed a very brief summary of the chapter on the family in Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Last of all, in 1912 a translation of Engels' Socialism: Utopian and Scientific appeared in the Shanghai periodical Hsin shih-chieh (New World). This listing actually exaggerates even the minimal exposure of Marx and Engels to the Chinese reading public. Since these journals had virtually no circulation inside China these materials in effect were restricted to the overseas student and T'ung-meng Hui groups. What can be surmised from the record is that those such as Li Ta-chao and Hu Han-min had the opportunity at the most to gain an acquaintance with only a few excerpts from the corpus of Marxism.

In May 1919 the years of neglect suddenly came to an end. There were two periodicals that led the way: Ch'en-pao fu-k'lan (The Morning Post Supplement), which was published in Peking under Li Ta-chao's editorship, and Hsin ch'ing-nien. Ch'en-pao published a translation of Wage Labour and Capital from May 9 to June 1, and then followed on June 2 with a translation of
Kautsky's *Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx*, which appeared in instalments until November 11. With the completion of the latter work, the specific interest in Marxist literature on the part of this newspaper came to an end.9

The most important translation to appear in *Ch'en-pao* was an article by the Japanese scholar Kawakami Hajime entitled "Marx's Historical Materialism." This was published between May 5 and May 8, and was reprinted in the special *Hsin ch'ing-nien* issue on Marxism that was published the same month.10 Kawakami Hajime, who later became a full convert to Marxism and a member of the Japanese Communist Party, is a figure of importance in the transmission and interpretation of Marxism to the Chinese at this time.11 Unfortunately, this intriguing aspect of China's modern intellectual history has not been made the subject of a study. However, it is clear that in the cases of Li Ta-chao and Hu Han-min, Kawakami was influential in introducing them to Marxism as a system. This is certainly true with respect to the theory of historical materialism.

Kawakami Hajime probably had been the first Japanese to acquire a degree of familiarity with the theory, and with some of the objections that had been raised against it. This had come about through his translating in 1905 a brief work called *The Economic Interpretation of History*. This book was composed of articles written three years earlier for the *Political Science Quarterly* by an American political economist, Edwin R. A. Seligman.12 Much more will be said about this later, since this work, in the form of Kawakami's translation, had considerable
influence on Hu Han-min. Here it is sufficient to note that Seligman's interpretation, as indicated by the title, followed the orthodox school of Marxism in so far as it assigned the economic base almost irresistible force in bringing about historical change, and held economic factors directly responsible for all phenomena in the political and ideological world.

According to his later admission Kawakami found this new theory rather puzzling at the time he was introduced to it through Seligman's book. He had been drawn to translating the book more for what it might tell him about economics than about history. Furthermore, the seeming determinism and ethical relativism troubled him. Kawakami's biographer, Gail Bernstein, states that neither Seligman nor historical materialism made much impression on him at the time. It was not until about 1917 that Kawakami returned to Marx, and it was towards Marxian economics that he directed his interest. This was not so much because he was an economist by profession as it was because Marx offered an explanation for poverty that helped answer Kawakami's moral searchings. Historical materialism he does not seem to have rediscovered until 1919. During that year, and into the next, his journal, Researches in Social Problems, published articles by him explaining basic Marxist concepts. The material was drawn from German and English language sources, both of which were beyond the reach of most Chinese and Japanese intellectuals. The article translated into Chinese in May 1919 was taken from this Japanese series. For those like Hu Han-min, who read Japanese fluently, the complete expositions of Kawakami Hajime
were available. Hu did rely on some of these in his early writings on Marxism.

The late return of Kawakami to historical materialism is not without its ironies in respect to the effect it had on Li Ta-chao and Hu Han-min. Kawakami, who was regarded as a guide by these men, was himself wrestling with problems in comprehending Marx's theory. Thus the "struggle" with historical materialism—the struggle to understand its complexities, to locate its balance between determinism and activism, and to measure its scope for ethical behaviour—was being repeated twice over. It should be said that Kawakami acquired an increasingly sophisticated grasp of Marxism in the course of the following year. So did Li and Hu, perhaps partly because of their distant mentor's own increasing erudition, but probably much more because of their own advancing studies. There were cross influences, no doubt, but it is more reasonable to see all three men working each in his own way towards a resolution of the same problems posed by historical materialism.

The momentary significance of the Kawakami article in Ch'en-pao is revealed in two different aspects of it that turned up in Li's and Hu's early interpretations of Marx. First of all, at this stage in his studies of Marx, Kawakami still seemed to be under Seligman's remote influence as far as what might be called the "basic character" of historical materialism was concerned. Kawakami stated that, in his opinion, historical materialism ought to be called "the economic interpretation of history." This rewording by Kawakami raises a serious problem,
one that is more than a question of semantics. By referring to
the theory as the "economic" interpretation the complexity of
the interaction among the different parts of social life becomes
blurred. This is brought out later in the article when he
interprets the relationship between base and superstructure
quite one-sidedly in favour of the dominance of the former. Thus
he expressed a certain dissatisfaction with the theory:
"all of the events that take place in history cannot be explained
solely by regarding economics as the cause." This rigid
formulation of the relationship between economic base and
ideological superstructure was repeated by Li Ta-chao in his
first discussion of Marxism, and he too shared the same dissatis-
ifications. The second point of note with regard to Kawakami's
interpretation is the very terse but suggestive gloss made by
him on the term "social revolution" that Marx uses in the Preface
to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Kawakami
explained it simply: "This means change (pien-hua) in the
organization of society." This remote, impersonal and morally
neutral view of social revolution, one which was reinforced by
his reading of the orthodox Marxist Karl Kautsky, was to be an
important component in Hu Han-min's conception of historical
materialism.

Along with Ch'en-pao the other major source of materials
on Marxism in the spring of 1919 was Hsin ch'ing-nien. In May
its famous special issue on Marxism was published. The table
of contents provides an illuminating glimpse into the concerns
of these early students of Marx. There appeared two brief and
flattering biographies of Marx, a critique of Marxian economics, the reprint of the Kawakami article, and an essay with the fascinating title of "Marx's Historical Materialism and the Chastity Question." There were also two articles written specifically on the theory of historical materialism. The first, simply entitled "Marxist Theory," was written by Ku Meng-yü; the second, by Li Ta-chao, was called "My Marxist Views," and represented Li's first venture into Marxist theory. Each of these articles is of interest in tracing the problems faced by Chinese thinkers in coming to an understanding of Marx.

Ku Meng-yü, author of the first of these, was one of Li Ta-chao's colleagues at Peking University. Later he became a member of the Society for the Study of Marxist Theory, which was a spiritual predecessor of the Chinese Communist Party. However, rather than giving his political allegiance to it, Ku went on to become a prominent member of the Kuomintang. In his Hsin ch'ing-nien article Ku provided a short sketch of the theory of historical materialism, with some emphasis on Marx's indebtedness to Hegel and Feuerbach. However, Ku showed little awareness of Marx's conception of the relationship between base and superstructure, and as a result believed that Marx had placed too much emphasis on economic forces. Ku accepted one of the revisionist critiques of Marxism, that law acted as one of the fundamental determinants of social life and thus of the mode of production. He also believed in the eventual victory of socialism through evolutionary means. Class struggle did not necessarily carry violent overtones; labour
unions and the type of political power made possible by the concentration of workers in factory organization both made socialism a certainty. It is also of interest that Ku Meng-yü stated that for him historical materialism was a "method of historical investigation." Its main value, then, was as a tool of historical analysis. This assessment of the function of the theory was shared by Hu Han-min, and it divided both of these men from Li Ta-chao.

The second of these two articles, Li Ta-chao's "My Marxist Views," offers a striking example of the difficulties faced by a Chinese intellectual at that time in coming to an understanding of Marx through the medium of haphazard translations and commentaries available either in Japanese or in his own language. As mentioned earlier, Li had been influenced by Kawakami Hajime, and to Kawakami Li also owed his introduction to some of the basic source materials: excerpts from The Communist Manifesto, The Poverty of Philosophy, and the Preface to a Critique of Political Economy. However, in its main line of interpretation, his essay, whether Li realized it or not, actually represented the "Marxist views" of an Italian scientist, Eugenio Rignano, who had written a chapter on historical materialism in a collection of his work called Essays in Scientific Synthesis. Approximately one-third of Li's article was taken directly from Rignano; as a result, it is a curious amalgam of the views of two different authors, both labouring under similar misapprehensions.

Rignano certainly possessed a simplistic understanding of
Marx. His chief error, which he passed on to Li, lay in seeing the theory as one of unmitigated economic determinism. Thus there was no room for free human activity, and so, to Rignano (and Li), Marx's concept of class struggle seemed completely at odds with the assumption that the mode of production carried history inexorably in its wake. In taking this approach Rignano appeared to be wholly unaware of the comments made by Marx and Engels on the degree of mutual influence that occurred between the economic base and the more "activist" superstructure. In fact, Rignano thought that he had advanced a trenchant criticism of Marx by drawing attention to the retarding effect of legal systems on economic development, and Li in turn repeated this point in his essay. Neither seemed aware that Engels had discussed this in the letters he wrote late in life on historical materialism. 29

As a result of Rignano's incomplete and highly mechanistic interpretation of Marxism, Li made a somewhat unenthusiastic conversion to the theory. The vision of man changing his own destiny had attracted Li to the Bolshevik Revolution, and thence to the Marxist theory that lay behind that event. However, he could not embrace that theory fully until he had stripped it of the excessive determinism that Rignano had conveyed to him. 30 Only when he received the message of Leninism did Li find that he could reconcile his own emotional commitment to political activism with the demands of Marxist theory.
The Founding of Chien-she

It was not long after the May Fourth incident that Sun Yat-sen and his group in Shanghai entered the ideological fray. In the heated intellectual atmosphere of the time it was clearly necessary for Sun to have a forum for his views, one that could compete with the many publications already in circulation among the intelligentsia and the youth of China. Under the auspices of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, which later that year was renamed the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang), two journals were founded. These were Hsing-ch'i p'ing-lun (The Weekly Critic), and Chien-she, which carried the English subtitle, The Construction. The first named of these appeared on June 8, 1919 and ran through fifty-three issues until June 6, 1920. Chien-she, which carried lengthier articles, commenced publication on August 1, 1919. Its final issue was that of September 1, 1920. In all, it published twelve numbers.

As might be expected, the contributors to the two journals to a large extent overlapped. The members of the Chien-she Society were Tai Chi-t'ao, Chu Chih-hsin, Liao Chung-k'ai, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. All but Tai had been with Sun since the Min-pao days. Some division was made in editorial responsibilities for the two journals; for example, Tai took charge of Hsing-ch'i p'ing-lun and used it as the main platform for his own work, contributing at least an article a week. Hu and Chu Chih-hsin, along with Tai, were joint editors of Chien-she. As a further illustration of the closeness of the intellectual world in China at this time, Li Ta-chao acted as
the Peking representative for Chien-she, and he also made a few brief contributions to both publications.\textsuperscript{33}

It was in Chien-she that Hu published all his articles in the 1919-1920 period. In the course of that year he displayed a growing sophistication in his handling of the concept of historical materialism. This gives reason to suppose that Hu was only really coming to grips with Marxism in the spring and summer of 1919, despite his previous exposure to more general socialist thought. In the opening issue of Chien-she there appeared Hu's first writings of the May Fourth period: one article was a synopsis and critique of the theories on mass psychology of the French social scientist, Gustave Le Bon; the other was a short speculative essay called "Mencius and Socialism."\textsuperscript{34} In the first article, Hu was concerned to show that Le Bon's rather contemptuous attitude towards mass behaviour, as expressed for example in mass political movements, was completely mistaken. Here it was that Hu declared how much genuine motivation, self-discipline and restraint, and true patriotism characterized the current May Fourth movement in China.\textsuperscript{35} The first reference made to Marx in these articles appeared in "Mencius and Socialism." In this article, Hu exaggerated somewhat the socialistic propensities of Mencius in order to find a socialist presursor in the Chinese tradition. This momentary awkwardness disappeared by the time of Hu's fall articles. In October he published the first half of his "Materialistic Investigation of the History of Chinese Philosophy," which surveyed the history of ancient China and the whole Chinese philosophical heritage
in impressive style. His second major study to utilize the methodology of historical materialism was his "Enquiry from an Economic Standpoint into the Family System," which was published in May 1920. This traced the development of the traditional patriarchal system, that central part of the old order which was under sustained attack during the May Fourth years.

In the December 1919 issue of Chien-she, after finishing his survey of the Chinese philosophical tradition, Hu presented a long discussion of the theory of historical materialism itself. This bore the title, not quite so cumbersome in Chinese, of "A Criticism of Criticisms of Historical Materialism." It was Hu Han-min's major treatment of Marxist theoretical concepts in their own right. Here Hu laid out the principal texts of Marx and Engels, and attempted to refute or moderate the criticisms expressed by several Western theorists. This exercise proved to be much more than a comparison of texts. In the article were revealed, as had been the case with Li Ta-chao, the readjustments of Marxist vocabulary and Marxist concepts that Hu either consciously or unwittingly made in order to render the theory suitable to his own personal outlook, or, more significantly, applicable to China. One particular concern of Hu's was the relationship between economic forces and ethical norms. This was given amplification in his January 1920 article, "Class and Theories of Morality." His last contribution to Chien-she in August of that year was on the same topic, being a synopsis and comparison of the ethical views of Karl Kautsky and Achille Loria. These three works
focused more than the others on the specific content of historical materialism. However, all of Hu Han-min's articles at this time were infused with the "spirit" of the theory; thus his understanding of Marxism must be sought in the totality of his work.

The Background to Hu's Marxism

Before examining Hu's articles on historical materialism it is necessary to identify the strain of Marxism which Hu encountered in his researches. It has been mentioned that Kawakami Hajime, Li Ta-chao and a few other writers had been the first to make Marxist ideas of any sophistication known in China, either in the form of translation or discussion of them. However, their conception of Marxism, and Hu's as well, all had a similar background--the world of central European Marxism, specifically that of the German social democratic movement of the turn of the century. In the case of Hu Han-min this is extraordinarily apparent, perhaps because the critiques of Marxism that he had studied indirectly reinforced the view that the Marxism of that time was indeed the true faith. The "delayed reaction" to social democratic Marxism may have been due to the culture lag or simply the translation lag between western Europe and China; whatever the reason might be, the reader is left with the uncanny feeling of having been transported back two decades into the world of the central European socialist movement, a time of massive optimism about the socialist future. Paradoxically, both this political movement and the future it had envisioned lay shattered at the time that Hu first encountered Marxism in 1919.
What were the main components of the Marxism dominant at the turn of the century? The arbitrary selection of these, and the necessary simplification involved, will carry obvious risks. However, there are several characteristics that can be isolated, and whether or not these tell the whole story about European Marxism they can be justified because they clearly influenced Hu's understanding of it.

To begin with, Marxism in the 1890s was a theory that had undergone considerable elaboration by Engels, who had created, or certainly developed, the idea of scientific socialism. Engels had given particular stress to Darwin's theory of evolution, and thus had joined Darwin with Marx. Biological and historical evolution became one; the history of nature and the history of man were united. Now, regardless of whether this represented a perversion of Marx's conception of man's history being separate from nature, and regardless of whether dialectical materialism was a legitimate form of reasoning, there was one incontestable historical result of Engels' work. This was the belief that the coming of socialism was a matter that had been scientifically proved. Marx's conclusions about the "laws" of history and economics were seen as scientific, and this science said that socialism, at least in western and central Europe, was bound to be realized. Thus there reappeared in Marxism, many years after the apocalyptic certainty of The Communist Manifesto, a deterministic element, one that was to cause the orthodox Marxists increasing trouble, especially in the years after Engels' death in 1895.
However, this problem created by Engels, or at least this problematic side of Marx that Engels had brought into the open again, was only a part of the dilemma facing German socialism at this time. In addition to this, there was the question raised by the development of a strong social democratic political movement. At first glance, the combination of economic determinism supposedly proven by science and the voluntarism implied in a mass political movement seems contradictory, not to mention the juxtaposition of the Marxist goal of social revolution with the actions of a democratic political party. This did not prove to be the case, although the tensions created by these conflicting demands were severe, and did contribute eventually to the breaking off from the movement of the Russian Bolshevik faction. Around the year 1900, which is the key point in time for an understanding of Hu Han-min's Marxism, there seemed to be no contradiction between the class struggle necessary for the triumph of socialism, and the mass democratic political movement, since the latter was simply the means by which the former was to be realized.

In this regard, it is important to observe that Engels, in his introduction to Marx's *Class Struggles in France*, written only a few months before his death in 1895, spoke with great enthusiasm of the rapid increase in votes for the German Social Democratic Party. The future seemed assured, since the workers were using the ballot to conquer political power. There was included in this important last work of Engels the caveat that violence would have to be used if the bourgeois
state tried to deprive the workers of their just electoral gains. However, there is no doubt that Engels, at least in so far as democratic Europe was concerned, wrote off the barricades of 1848 and the Paris Commune as being futile sacrifices of the working class, and instead saw the peaceful democratic process to be the key to victory. In doing this, it should be noted, Engels was building on some earlier utterances of Marx. In 1872 Marx had stated in Amsterdam that the United States, Britain and Holland might find a peaceful route to socialism. Eight years later, in the introduction he wrote to the French Socialist Party constitution, Marx noted optimistically that the workers were turning bourgeois democracy to their own use.

At first sight, these new directions indicated by Marx and Engels late in their lives seemed to be of limited value because of their restriction to bourgeois constituencies. This may well be true, but for the purpose of understanding the transmission of this form of Marxism to China, and particularly to an individual such as Hu Han-min, the caveats expressed by Marx and Engels in their original texts were not conveyed. But what was conveyed was a sense of ideological flexibility depending on the particular nation or society involved. This is certainly very true in Hu's case; in his encounter with Marxism in 1919 there is no evidence ever displayed that Hu saw one form of Marxist political action to be the only one possible, nor for that matter did he seem to see that there was any one form specifically and immediately applicable to China. Rather, historical materialism appealed to him because of the insights
it provided into the historical process, and the outline it offered of the workings of history on the grand scale.

As a consequence, then, of the late writings and actions of the founders of the faith, Marxism had developed about the turn of the century the somewhat awkwardly reconciled characteristics of philosophical determinism and mass political action. The attempt to synthesize these fell to Karl Kautsky, a close friend and disciple of Engels, and the leading theoretical spokesman for the German social democratic movement at this time. Kautsky's explanation of the concept of class struggle is most relevant to the later comprehension of the term by Kawakami Hajime, Li Ta-chao and Hu Han-min. Kautsky, in keeping with the "scientific" and deterministic strand then current in Marxism, emphasized that the revolutionary changes in society were a result of great changes that were working themselves out slowly amongst the forces of production. Here he was going back to the words of the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy: "the period of social revolution," when "with the change in the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed." Class struggle was tied to these great underlying economic changes. Because of this, there was no reason to engage in class struggle of an excessive or violent nature if the conditions were not ripe. Scientific socialism was to sharpen men's insights and prevent such adventurism.

All the same, in this revision of Marxism the rhetoric of class struggle had to be maintained, as the concept was for
Marx a fundamental part of his investigation. In reality, the terms "class struggle" and "social revolution" for Kautsky became transmuted into essentially democratic and non-violent concepts, at least in the short run. Social revolution, then, had become divided into two parts: one consisting of change taking place within the economic base, over which men had no direct control; and the other consisting of political action through which the workers were to gain control of the state—in Germany, for instance, when they wrested power from the bourgeoisie and their allies through the ballot box. Thus the concept of revolution not only had lost its apocalyptic tones of 1848, but it had veered close to signalling simply the accession to power of a new group of power-holders. That is, it had lost something of its earlier sense of massive social change accompanying convulsive political upheavals. In China, Li Ta-chao was searching for the more volatile brand of Marxism; Hu Han-min, on the other hand, accepted the Kautskyite interpretation without any intellectual reluctance.

The second aspect of the German social democratic movement that found its way into Hu Han-min's Marxism is one which is more immediately discernible than the previous one. Because of the much accentuated emphasis on the "scientific" nature of Marxism there was launched, also about the turn of the century, an assault on the theory by the German and Austrian neo-Kantian school. Simply put, the main contention of this group was that Marxism did not explain why socialism ought to come about, or why anyone ought to strive for its attainment. The neo-Kantians also were
responding to a worrisome feeling, one shared by many sympathizers with Marxism, that the theory was entirely devoid of moral and ethical principles, all ideas being nothing but the product of different economic configurations. It was in reply to this challenge that Kautsky entered the lists in 1906 with his *Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History*. 52 Hu Han-min displayed a very close familiarity with this work in his May Fourth writings, and to a very large extent he relied on it as a guide to understanding the relationship between economic forces, social class and the world of ethical thought.

Kautsky based his interpretation on the supposed affinity that existed between Marxism and Darwinism; and in fact it was for this assumption that Hu held Kautsky in such high regard. 53 The first premise in Kautsky's argument was the existence of the "social instinct," which had evolved in man from primeval times. 54 On to this Kautsky grafted historical materialism. This enabled him to formulate a morality for the oppressed, or as he termed them, the "uprising classes." The morality that had been developed by the ruling class was self-justificatory, and the ruling class naturally attempted to delude the oppressed classes with this "morality." However, in a formulation that seemed to stray dangerously close to an idealist position, Kautsky stated that the oppressed classes, in particular the proletariat, were proof against this, and instead created their own morality on the basis of their own class interest and the experience of their own class struggle. 55 Thus, beginning with the concept of the basic social instinct which he took from Darwinism,
Kautsky argued that historical materialism not only allowed for moral principles, but made for an even higher morality on the part of the oppressed. Although this case for the superior morality of the proletariat did not convince Hu, the general method of argument employed by Kautsky was highly influential on his own consideration of ethical systems.56 The importance of Kautsky's approach lay in his deduction of ethical values from a combination of evolutionary factors as revealed by Darwin, and economic factors as revealed by Marx through historical materialism. This identification of Marx with Darwin, whose reputation was then at its apogee in the science-filled atmosphere of the May Fourth years, could not but strengthen the "truth" of the materialist conception of history.57

Apart from Kautsky there was one other significant interpreter of Marx for Hu Han-min. This was Edwin Seligman, the American economist, whose book, The Economic Interpretation of History, had been translated into Japanese by Kawakami Hajime in 1905. Seligman, a scholar of considerable repute, said that he had composed this brief work to explain the premises of historical materialism to those unable to read the original German language texts.58 Seligman was familiar with all the works of Marx and Engels that had been published by 1901, the time of the publication of the articles later reprinted in his book. He was also well abreast of developments in the German social democratic movement, such as the growing controversy between Kautsky and the revisionists over the accuracy of Marx's analysis of the health of west European capitalism.
There is no doubt that Seligman's volume played a very important role in the formation of Hu's conception of historical materialism. As well as providing a general sketch of Marx's life and of the Marxist movement, Seligman offered for the first time to Hu the basic texts regarding the theory. The imposing collection of source materials laid out by Hu in the introduction to his December 1919 article was drawn largely from Seligman's book. The texts from The Holy Family, the first and third volumes of Capital, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Wage Labour and Capital, and most important of all, Engels' letters of September 1890 to Joseph Bloch and January 1894 to Heinz Starkenburg on the problem of economic determinism and historical materialism, were all made available by Seligman. All of these texts emphasized the complexity and subtlety of the economic process acting on the life of man. They drew attention to the degree to which man himself could make his own history, though in Marx's famous words, "not as he pleased." These were invaluable supplements to the relevant sections of The Communist Manifesto and the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy that Kawakami Hajime had made available in his Ch'en-pao article, and they allowed for a much more refined grasp of historical materialism than, say, had been possible for Li Ta-chao. Furthermore, the presentation of these texts in his December essay was not only of importance to the development of Hu's own argument; just as valuable as this, he had made available to Chinese readers for the first time the essential materials of the Marxist conception of history.
Seligman's interpretation of historical materialism exercised a strong effect on Hu, though it is certainly true that Hu's own intellectual bent took him in the same direction. Basically, the analysis made by Seligman separated the "scientific socialism" of Marx from his "economic interpretation" of history. As Seligman expressed it: "Socialism is a theory of what ought to be; historical materialism is a theory of what has been." They were "at bottom entirely independent conceptions." The first point that Seligman made in his critique of socialism was that Marx had been badly mistaken in his assessment of the state of western capitalism; not only had capitalism survived but it had prospered in the late nineteenth century. Secondly, regardless of the merits that the Marxian analysis of capitalism might possess, it was not possible to deduce the existence of class struggle from any such economic postulates. The presence of class struggle in a society had no necessary association with the economic factors located by Marx. The last argument that Seligman advanced was that if socialism should succeed capitalism, which he doubted, the time required for this transition would be of such a length that the question of socialism was of no immediate relevance. Since Marx himself had shown how slow the change from feudal to capitalist society had been, Seligman said that it would only be logical to expect the development of the socialist economic base to be equally drawn out. In his view, the Marxian analysis of capitalism either was in error, or else was of no practical concern.

On the more positive side, Seligman accepted what he called
"the economic interpretation of history," that part of Marxism that provided a means of analysis of past and present events, and in this respect he cited examples of non-socialist scholars who also were applying the theory in their research. Seligman's own application of the theory was somewhat erratic, though. Despite frequent references to Engels' letters on the subject, and despite his repeated cautionary words about "economics only being the final cause in the midst of a host of factors," Seligman adopted a rather mechanistic view of historical causation. The American Civil War he described as being "at the bottom a struggle between two economic principles," and the Spanish-American War he explained as being "the outcome of the sugar situation" that had caused the Cuban insurrection. Although he took a more subtle approach to the rise of nineteenth century democracy, which he attributed to the Industrial Revolution, Seligman tended to see economic causes determining political events in a direct way.

Hu toyed briefly with this monocausal approach when he stated that the First World War had resulted from "the struggle for markets and colonies." On the whole, Hu did not interpret historical causation in such direct economic terms. His explanation of the war may have been a reaction to the continual political and economic depredations of the imperialist powers in China. In his general application of historical materialism, Hu emphasized that economic factors worked in a subtle and often indirect manner. In taking this approach, Hu was more consistent than Seligman had been. What is particularly striking,
though, is the degree to which Hu shared, or else adopted, Seligman's basic response to historical materialism. Seligman opposed "scientific socialism;" Hu, if he did not oppose it, certainly ignored it. Most worthy of note, both shared the belief that the genius of Marx's theory lay in its being a new historical methodology. The prophetic and emotional side of historical materialism possessed no appeal to Seligman or to Hu Han-min; for them the attraction of the theory was completely an intellectual one.

**Economic Determinism and Human Will**

Hu wrote his principal essay on historical materialism to disprove the objections raised by several critics to the supposed economic determinism that the theory contained. None of these critics denied the importance of economic forces in history, but all reacted in one way or another to what they saw as the blind determinism that characterized turn of the century Marxism. In some cases this was the result of their own inadequate grasp of Marxism, and here greater familiarity with the relevant texts enabled Hu to dispose of the charges without difficulty. For example, Eugenio Rignano, who had exerted an unfortunate influence over Li Ta-chao's early Marxism, had argued that an unresolvable contradiction existed in Marx's theory between the "economic process" and class struggle:

Either the struggle between the different classes . . . exists, and it follows that economic phenomena may be modified in one direction or another according as this or that class becomes preponderant; or, the economic process, as immutable as the orbits of the planets in the heavens, follows its inevitable course apart from any human influence whatsoever . . . .
Rignano, as Hu pointed out, was completely unaware of the degree to which Marx and Engels both emphasized the considerable scope open for human activity, though always within certain limiting conditions. Engels had stated late in his life that he and Marx had been partly to blame for this exaggeration of the economic factors in history since they had been waging battle against the idealists in the 1840s. However, as he made clear in his letter of September 1890 to Joseph Bloch, from which Hu quoted, blind economic determinism was unalterably opposed to the theory he and Marx had created:

According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I has ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase.

Another critique of Marxism based on a faulty understanding of historical materialism was advanced by the Italian economist Achille Loria. Loria is worth some words of introduction because of the very high esteem in which he was held by Hu. In the 1880s Loria had excited a minor controversy in European Marxist circles because of his work on Marx and Marxism. Engels had denounced a biography Loria had written of Marx as "brimming with misinformation," and he had charged that Loria had "falsified Marx's materialist conception of history and distorted it with an assurance that bespeaks a great purpose." Engels may well have regarded this purpose as realized in The Economic Foundations of Society, which Loria published in 1886. His harshest words were directed towards this, since he believed,
not without justification, that Loria not only had plagiarized Marx, but also had grotesquely simplified historical materialism by making the supply of land and the size of the population the dominant economic forces in history. Loria's role in the late nineteenth century revisionist movement proved to be quite an ephemeral one. However, his survival, if not actual prospering in China during the May Fourth period, is an illuminating comment on the haphazard process of selection by which European social science was being introduced into China. It is also an interesting illustration of the curious collection of materials Chinese intellectuals had to contend with in coming to an initial comprehension of such a rich and complex theory as Marxism.

As will be shown later, Hu did adopt some of Loria's ideas on the relationship between the interests of the governing class and the moral theories propounded by them. However, he shared Engels' disagreement with Loria's particular "economic interpretation of history." Loria had based his critique of Marx on the latter's supposedly excessive emphasis on the technological forces of production. Loria argued that these instruments were themselves products of human invention; thus, man was placed back at the centre of history. It may be said that Marx himself was not overly careful about his use of the term "forces of production." As Hu observed, the statement in *The Poverty of Philosophy* that the hand-mill produced feudal society while the steam-mill brought forth capitalist society certainly indicated the importance Marx attached to the instruments of production.
that the forces of production were defined as consisting of more than machinery. Land itself was one of these forces. Hu did not disregard human inventiveness, but its effectiveness ultimately depended on the social and economic environment. To this effect Hu cited Kautsky's illustrations that the introduction of technology by the British and the French into their colonies had not resulted in a sudden transformation of the mode of production in these regions, because geographical and historical conditions already in existence acted as impediments to or modifiers of these new productive forces. In Hu's view, instruments of production could be introduced into a society, but in themselves they could not determine the course of that society's development.

This question of the role of the individual in history received further elaboration by Hu in his discussion of one of the more curious works to come to his attention, The Spiritual Interpretation of History, a book written by Shailer Mathews, Dean of the Divinity School at the University of Chicago. Mathews had objected to what he called Marx's "simplistic monist interpretation of history," and he also felt that Marx had grossly underestimated the importance in history of the great political figure or moral leader. This claim Hu dismissed as displaying an obsolete eighteenth century attitude about the "greatness of the individual." It also had a distinctive "theological odour" about it. Hu repeated basically the formulation employed in discussing Loria and the problem of human creation of the instruments of production. There was room in
history for the great man, but he could realize his potential
only under the right conditions. As Seligman put it, such a
man is great "because he visualizes more than anyone else the
fundamental tendencies of his society, and expresses to his
fellow men the spirit of the age, which he embodies in himself."

Hu observed that Marx and Engels themselves were examples of how
men struggled to alter their destiny: both were active propa­
gandists and both had worked in the First International. Yet it
had to be remembered that these men were products of the age in
which they lived, and Kautsky himself had admitted that such
"deep thinkers" as Marx and Engels could not have produced their
philosophy in the eighteenth century, "before all the new sciences
had produced a sufficient mass of new results."

A more stimulating challenge to Marx, and one that reveals
Hu's own activist inclinations, centres around the question of
the part played by law in human history. The specific critique
in question here was written by Rudolf Stammler, a noted German
professor of jurisprudence and a member of the neo-Kantian
school. Stammler had distinguished between the "form" and
"matter" of social life. Form, or more fully, "forms of
external regulation" consisted of the juridical norms that
regulated man's activities, including all the ways in which he
carried on production. Economic activity was defined as "matter,"
which was acted upon and determined by the legal regulations
surrounding it. Stammler did admit to interaction taking place
between legal forms and economic forces, but the effect of his
hypothesis was to invert the fundamental Marxist concept that
the ideological superstructure, which included law, ultimately responded to changes in the economic structure of society. Hu refused to accept such a reformulation of Marx, but he was forced to argue his position on empirical grounds. Historical evidence indicated to Hu that the effectiveness of law was dependent on economic conditions. In the Middle Ages, for example, Church law had been unable to prevent usury when money was in scarce supply. On the other hand, the important labour legislation enacted in the late nineteenth century was a direct result of the rise of the urban class which had been created by the great economic forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution.

These examples illustrated the ultimate responsiveness of law to economic pressures. But Hu did not view law as solely a passive response to these pressures. Engels had stated that elements of the superstructure, such as constitutions, juridical forms, justice and philosophical theories all "exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form." Hu himself had pointed out in his earlier essay on Le Bon that law could have a positive social function. In sharply disagreeing with Le Bon's pessimistic assessment of mass behaviour, Hu had argued that law could influence society, and thus alter the behaviour of its individual members. Hu's activist conception of law placed it almost in an educational role. (In fact, in this essay Hu went on to discuss the value of education in changing national attitudes, and in adapting cultures to meet new historic challenges in the way that Japan had done.) This interpretation
of the value of law, or rather, of "progressive legislation" is not surprising. Law may have been dependent in the last analysis on economic factors, but short of that, Hu saw it as an important agent for the reconstruction of the nation.

There is one final critique raised in Hu's essay on historical materialism that is important to note, though this is because of what he fails to say in the rejoinder. Both the German social democrat Eduard Bernstein, and an American professor by the name of Charles Ellwood, shared similar misgivings about the primacy of the economic motive in history. Both believed there existed many other equally decisive forces that determined human behaviour. Bernstein emphasized differences of race, religion and homeland as being more significant than economic relations. Ellwood, whose college textbook, Sociology and Modern Social Problems, is cited by Hu, pointed to the vital importance of psychological factors in shaping man's social behaviour. He stated that the responses of people to environmental stimuli varied on the basis of their heredity, instincts and habits. Ellwood concluded that "scientific sociology and scientific psychology" had found that there was "no reason for believing that economic stimuli determine in any exact way, or to such an extent as Marx thought, responses to other stimuli." Every social problem, therefore, consisted of a "multitude of factors or stimuli," within which economic ones were significant, but not dominant.

In reply to these charges, Hu stated that Marx had not proposed a theory of total economic determinism. Therefore,
elements in the superstructure, such as a people's attitudes towards religion and homeland, could react back on the economic base. Ellwood's supposition that instinct and heredity were of great importance repeated what Darwin had said earlier. Hu said that he did not disagree with this, but he wished to note that these aspects of man's self evolved over such a long time that they were not of immediate concern in discussing man's history. It seems probable that Hu believed these psychological factors ultimately to be responsive to economic forces. But this problem is a very difficult one, since the crucial question is not whether these factors existed, but rather the degree of autonomy they possessed. It is true, of course, that the scope allowed for activity by non-economic factors is the most perplexing aspect of historical materialism. However, with respect to these psychological components of man's makeup, the problem becomes a more difficult one, or certainly a more unpredictable one, as it touches on so much of man's irrational self.

Hu cannot be reproached for failing to reply adequately to the above critique, since the concept of the irrational in human behaviour was only developing in psychology at the time. Yet it is curious that Hu should have failed to note here the power of nationalism, since he was so aware of the intensity of this emotion in the China of the May Fourth movement. This nationalism had been created from the Chinese sense of race and homeland, and brought to fruition by the threat posed to national survival by foreign imperialism. Perhaps Hu underestimated the strength and intensity of nationalism at this time, when he was
involved in the study of a philosophy which was a product of the scientific and rational world of the nineteenth century Europe. Whatever the reason might be for this, Hu's position on nationalism in 1919 stands out in marked contrast to the critique of Marxism he developed several years later, a critique based in the first instance on Marx's neglect of this vital force.

In making an evaluation of Hu's resolution of the tension between economic determinism and human will, it is apparent that Hu struck a judicious balance between the two, a position that reflected the Marxism that he had absorbed from Kautsky. This did not minimize the importance of economic forces, or their ultimately decisive power. One of the critiques examined by Hu, that of the eminent Russian economist, Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, had advanced the hypothesis that with the progress of civilization the capacity of economics to influence history lessened. Man became freer, and the human mind asserted an increasingly greater role in determining man's future. This view Hu categorically rejected. Society had become more complex, and economic forces had become more subtle, but they were as dominant as they ever had been. It was in this context that Hu pointed to the recently ended Great War as an unchallengeable example of the economic fact: "all of the doctrines and all of the slogans were mere window-dressing. The most important and genuine motives for it were the struggle for markets and the struggle for colonies." Apart from providing an ultimate cause for historical events, the economic interpretation in Hu's application of it
served to explain the great events of history. Hu definitely did not see it working in the determination of the lesser events and the day to day activities of men. Thus there was considerable scope for the individual and the group to work out the future, within the necessary preconditions. Political activism was virtually an innate part of Hu's character; however, his formulation of the degree of freedom permitted in Marxism probably owes as much to careful intellectual analysis of the texts as it does to his emotional promptings. Certainly there was no conflict here. But historical materialism was more than a methodology of history; it was a programme of social revolution. Its call for class struggle and the triumph of socialism presented quite a different set of problems to Hu Han-min.

**Class Struggle and the Mode of Production**

In Hu's approach to the conceptions of class and class struggle, there is apparent the same tendency of thought that characterized his writings for Min-pao more than a decade earlier. Kautsky's exegesis of Marxism provided further support for this attitude, and filled in some of the definition of the appropriate Marxist terminology. Hu's explanation of the origin of class is derived from Kautsky: the division of labour and the production of material goods gradually produced inequalities amongst men, which at the outset of human society were minute, but with time widened into the class differentiation of today. However, in his understanding of the term "class," Hu showed no change from
his position of 1906. Society was divided into two camps, the oppressors and the oppressed, and these were defined politically rather than economically. The dominant group Hu referred to in many ways: its members were the "ruling class" (chih-p'ei chieh-chi), the "class with power" (ch'iang-yu-li ti chieh-chi), the "powerholders" (chu-ch'uan-che), the "conservative class" (pao-hu chieh-chi). 90 In fairness to Hu, this lack of precision was not always aided by the translations he utilized. In the excerpt from The Communist Manifesto that he quoted, "bourgeoisie" was rendered in its reasonably accurate Chinese version of "property-holders" (yu-ch'an-che). However, in an excerpt from Kautsky, this term appears as "the class with authority and power" (ch'uan-li chieh-chi). 91 And in Loria's work, which exerted some influence on Hu, the term "capitalist class" was used to describe virtually any group holding power, as for example, when Loria described as "capitalists" those who had oppressed the serfs in the middle ages. 92 Opposed to this ruling class was the equally vaguely defined class of the oppressed. The term "proletariat" is seldom used by Hu; it appears only in the translations of passages from Marx and Engels. The terms "oppressed," "governed" or "exploited" appear as descriptions of this class, but the one expression used most frequently is "the class of the common people" (p'ing-min chieh-chi). This is the translation used for proletariat in all of the excerpts from Kautsky. 93

Hu's understanding of class struggle is a logical consequence of two of his basic conceptions of Marxism: his generalized view of class in terms of oppressors and oppressed, and secondly, his
Kautskyite interpretation of change in evolutionary terms. Marx had spoken in The Communist Manifesto of the history of mankind being the history of class struggles, and Hu took note of this in several places in his article on historical materialism. This conception certainly could not have been novel to anyone surveying the long history of Chinese peasant uprisings, nor could it have gone without a response in one who had been at the centre of political struggle for as long as Hu had been. However, when Marx talked of class struggle he had in mind specific social groups opposed to each other at specific points in human history: for example, lord versus serf in the feudal stage, capitalist versus proletarian in the present bourgeois era. Marx sympathized with the many social uprisings that had occurred throughout history, and he did see them fulfilling a certain function in undermining the old social order. Nevertheless, they did not play a significant historical role unless the mode of production of the old society was undergoing transformation. At this point class struggle was necessary to bring about the transition from the old historical epoch to the new one. Marx, then, clearly saw the working out of history tied to changes in the economic substructure of society. With this in mind, it can be seen that Hu's more general view of class struggle simply being the struggle between rulers and ruled altered this crucial concept, and stripped it of its scientific socialist character, whether Hu realized it or not.

These varying terms present more than a question of semantics.
involved in the translation of concepts from one culture to another. The political character of the terminology chosen by Hu to describe these "classes" indicates a subtle shift away from Marx's original conception. Although Marx spoke generally of two classes being opposed to each other at each stage in history, he defined these classes in terms of their relationship to the means of production. In Hu Han-min's interpretation, these classes appear to be defined in terms of their relationship to political power. This definition naturally encompasses economic power; Hu often refers to the "exploiting and plundering" character of the ruling class. However, this seems to be more a result of the political strength of the class than a result of its monopoly of the means of production.

The consequences of Hu's political interpretation of Marxism are considerable, for the oppressors of the mass of the "common people" were now defined politically rather than economically. In 1906 in his "Six Great Principles of the Min-Pao," Hu had said that there were no economic classes in China, only the ruling class of the Manchus. In 1919 his interpretation of Marxism continued this line of thought. In the view of Hu Han-min, Sun Yat-sen and the rest of the Kuomintang leadership, China's "class" of oppressors was composed of a small group of imperialists, compradores, warlords, and traitors. These four groups were not viewed so much in economic terms as they were in terms of their political strength. This was true even in the case of the two with obvious economic power: the imperialists and the compradores. Hu's interpretation of class, certainly
as it applied to China, seems neither accidental nor capricious, but consistent with his viewpoint of the T'ung-meng Hui period. That China was divided into two classes of oppressors and oppressed may have had some validity, and certainly may have been a political convenience, but the definition of the ruling class in terms that were primarily political, and only secondarily economic, once more disguised disturbing realities about the nature of China's society.

This tendency to see class struggle as the equivalent of any type of social struggle received confirmation, though not in a direct way, from Kautsky's exposition of Marxism. As mentioned earlier, Kautsky had fused biological evolution with historical materialism, and at the same time had defined social revolution in terms that implied both its inexorability and its possible non-violent attainment. Hu explained this as follows: 98

Historical materialism realizes that social revolution is something that is bound to occur, sooner or later, and regardless of what methods may be employed. The seeds of its success already have been fertilized in the womb of the old society. . . . Historical materialism does not sever social revolution and social evolution into two parts. Thus when it came to the concept of "social revolution," Hu fell back on what might be termed historical materialism in its grand and panoramic aspect, which saw change working itself out slowly and relentlessly in the womb of society. In this sense, as Hu stated, evolution and revolution almost became one. This formulation admittedly poses difficulties for the notion of immediate social struggles, and this is not clearly resolved in Hu, but neither was it in the thought of his theoretical guide, Karl
Kautsky. At this point, it may be best to sum up Hu’s understanding of class struggle by saying that he did not see it in the apocalyptic terms of social upheaval as Marx did in the Manifesto, since he accepted the Kautskyite reading of the impersonal quality of the essential economic changes. At the same time, it may be said that Hu accepted the need for class struggle in the sense of social struggles of the oppressed against their oppressors, which were necessary for the righting of social wrongs, and more important, for the eviction of incompetent rules and the replacement of them by those who could rebuild the nation’s power.

The above characterization of Hu’s historical materialism may become more plausible if one last question related to class struggle is considered. This is the mode of production, defined by Marx as "the totality of productive relations," each example of which indicates a "different stage" in the history of mankind. Hu was certainly aware of this concept: the definition of it given here is taken from Wage Labour and Capital, which was quoted in Hu’s essay on historical materialism. However, it does not seem to have played a very important role in Hu’s thinking. The only place in Hu’s writing in which mention is made of the five stages of history formulated by Marx is in the material excerpted from the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy. But this sense of dynamic social development was compromised in the other quotations provided by Hu. For example, the reference in Wage Labour and Capital to "ancient, feudal and bourgeois society" is rendered into "ancient, feudal and present-day (chin-jih)
society," and in the Manifesto, Marx's statement about bourgeois society emerging from the ruins of feudal society has been altered to read "contemporary" (chin-shih) society emerging from feudal society. It would appear then that the concept of the mode of production and the progression of stages in history was definitely blurred and of secondary importance in Hu's understanding of historical materialism.

This inattention on Hu's part quite likely reflects the inapplicability of Marx's framework to the Chinese historical experience. Hu's discussion of the Chinese past, particularly in its pre-imperialist phase, will be examined in the next chapter. It may be noted here that the only stage mentioned by Marx that Hu also utilized in his study of ancient China was that of feudalism. However, in this case the derivation from Marx is most unlikely, since the Chinese had referred to the period of their history from about 1000 B.C. to the Ch'in unification in 221 B.C. as the feng-fen era, the period of "enfeoffments." Hu had no doubt that the Ch'in unification and the resulting consolidation by the Han dynasty marked the most important transition in the history of China. What ultimately explains the Ch'in-Han divide in China's history Hu does not venture to say, an omission shared by many students of that most perplexing yet fundamental redirecting of Chinese government and society. The economic cause of the Ch'in-Han triumph Hu does not suggest; instead he seems to see this as a political phenomenon, military conquest followed by a political reordering of the state and of the intellectual lives of its subjects.
It is apparent that Hu, also in company with many later students of the Chinese past, viewed the period from the Ch'in to the mid-nineteenth century as basically one. Hu did not put forward a term to describe this period, but he did characterize its economic features in the following manner: 103

The Chinese people wavered between a household economy and a town-based economy. They did not reach the stage of a national economy. There was no great change in the mode of production. Therefore, there was no change whatsoever in the relations of society.

It was the European Industrial Revolution, brought to China as a result of the changed nature of communications, that ended this stagnant phase of the nation's history. With it came economic and military oppression which China could not oppose. China was now drawn into the world economy, and the old local character of the Chinese economy had become a part of the past. The social relations of Chinese society were being shaken and the lives of people were filled with great uncertainty. 104

To sum up: Hu was prepared to allude to the mode of production, although he did not go further than the above examples in defining the characteristics of each mode. It is interesting and quite revealing that Hu paid little attention to Marx's Europocentric analysis of the stages of human society. Presumably Hu saw these stages as a hypothesis limited to Europe in the way originally intended by Marx. When examining his own society in light of historical materialism, Hu saw a history different to that of Europe. The mode of production may have been a useful conceptual tool, but the social pattern it revealed was a uniquely Chinese one. This carried with it one further conclusion: if
the mode of production and the stages of history in China were unique to China, then the social revolution would follow a different path from that sketched out by Marx and Engels for Europe.

**Historical Materialism and Ethics**

What Hu found most suggestive in his researches into Marxism was the relationship Marx believed to exist between economic forces and man's ideological life. Because of his own thorough grounding in the Confucian classics Hu could not but find this question of the origins of social morality a most pertinent one to China. Through the mediation of Karl Kautsky's book, *Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History*, Hu largely derived his understanding of the Marxist conception of ethics. This was supplemented by excerpts from *The Economic Foundations of Society*, the work by the Italian economist Achille Loria. Hu devoted his last article for Chien-she, "The Ethical Views of Kautsky and Loria," to a summary and comparison of their respective ideas. However, Hu was certainly familiar with the work of these two men well before he wrote this article. Their conceptions clearly influenced all of Hu's own writings, and particularly his analysis of China's traditional ethical systems.

Hu's main interest lay in trying to understand the nature of that relationship that existed between the economic forces of society and the ideas held by society. Were the individual members of society determined in their beliefs by economic causes beyond their control? Or did there exist freedom of thought and
freedom of choice, in other words, the scope for genuine ethical behaviour? Kautsky's presentation of this question in terms of Darwinian evolution had provided Hu with a convincing solution. According to Kautsky, man's moral nature was derived ultimately from the existence in him of the "social instinct." This instinct displayed itself in man's membership in the group, since this was necessary for man's survival. As the needs of the group changed so did the specific forms in which the "social instinct" expressed itself. These were the different moral codes set up by the group for its own regulation. All morality, therefore, was relative to the time, place and practitioners of the particular code; there did not exist such a phenomenon as absolute morality or absolute immorality. Social demands formed themselves into moral demands, and with changes in the economic structure of society these in turn underwent alteration. Kautsky believed that a certain amount of interaction between the ethical and economic components of society was possible, but that in the long run "spiritual" forces always gave way to the economic forces. Hu endorsed this interpretation; in his words, ideological forces were the "servants," not the "masters" of social needs. Thus, autonomy of the human will was not denied completely by Kautsky or Hu, but it could operate only within limits circumscribed by social forces which ultimately responded to economic ones.

After establishing this basis for social morality, Kautsky then applied it to the class exploitation and class struggle that made up human history. Because of its more powerful position the ruling class often was able to exert moral demands on the
exploited class that served to guarantee its own privileges. This did not always result from the conscious design of a specific ruling group. Moral demands frequently turned into custom with the passage of time, and men came to observe them without realizing the social demands that lay behind them. The mode of production changed, social needs changed, but the old moral "laws" preserved for some time their independent existence. Thus they supported the entrenched ruling class, which stood to gain from this check imposed on the newly developing social forces. This explanation made a very strong impression on Hu, particularly the point made by Kautsky about the tenacious survival of what Hu called "outdated" moral systems. The reason for this is quite evident. No theoretical insight could be more applicable to the study of China's own outdated moral system, which for too long had propped up the twin burdens of the imperial government and the Confucian family system.

One aspect of this question that intrigued Hu was that of how the ruling class made use of ideas of morality to strengthen its position. Kautsky believed this was done in a rather crude and domineering fashion. He felt that the force of "public opinion," by which term he seems to have meant something akin to conscience, was effective only within a specific class. This pressure could not be used by the ruling class to convince the oppressed class to act against its own interests. Thus the ruling class had to employ more forceful weapons, such as its superior armed or economic might, its better organization, its police, judges and any other possible means to extract obedience
from the exploited. In addition, the ruling class propagated "moral principles," though Kautsky is not clear how these were to be distinguished from "public opinion." In his view, the Church was assigned "the special task of conserving traditional morality." Without this support, Kautsky maintained that the moral authority of the governing class would soon disintegrate.  

The final point that Kautsky had to explain was how the oppressed class developed a moral sense if the dominant morality was that of the ruling class. In his view, the oppressed "uprising" classes always had possessed the ideals of freedom and equality that drove them on against their exploiters. At one point, Kautsky admitted that he did not know what the source of these might be, but in another place he explained it as "nothing more than the complex of wishes and endeavours that are called forth by the opposition to the existing state of affairs." This was the "motive power" in the class war, although ultimately Kautsky had to assign this moral force to the economic conditions of society.  

Once he had accounted for the existence of this almost natural morality in the exploited classes Kautsky found the explanation of its historical development an easier task. The social instincts and virtues possessed by the uprising classes were sharpened by the class war. This happened because the exploited had to put everything into the social struggle, while the rulers fell into effeminity, content to leave their moral defense to intellectual hirelings, or else fell into disarray among themselves fighting for the social surplus. In addition
to this, there was an important role to be played by certain individuals of high moral conscience, who left the ranks of the ruling class and joined the uprising class because of their awareness of the workings of society and the direction of its development. As examples of such people, Hu mentioned "Russia's most famous personages: Tolstoy, Bakunin, Kropotkin and Lenin, all of whom were of the nobility," and all of whom possessed "such fierce sympathy for the oppressed." Thus, there was room in historical materialism for the operation of the individual conscience. This was linked to an understanding of scientific socialism, which in Kautsky's view provided those gifted with political leadership and moral awareness the means to alter the lot of society, even if they were only able to immediately achieve limited reforms because of the prevailing social and economic realities.

Kautsky thus was going directly back to Marx in stating that man had to distinguish between what was necessary, and what was open to change. It was in his struggle for what was attainable that man could realize some of his voluntarist promptings. For Hu Han-min, Kautsky had made an effective reconciliation of the deterministic and activist elements in Marx, and had demonstrated that ethical conceptions and the striving for new ethical systems were human actions of social worth. Furthermore, by placing the social instinct on a Darwinian foundation, Kautsky, in Hu's estimation, had strengthened the theory of historical materialism. Hu did not accept all of Kautsky's argument that the uprising classes possessed their own virtually innate morality in defiance
of that of the ruling class. This is a minor point, though. Hu absorbed from Kautsky's exposition of Marxism the emphasis given by Kautsky to the relative nature of all moral systems, and his belief in the close relationship of these moral systems to class society. These ideas became important components in Hu's interpretation of China's own ethical tradition.

It was in the work of Achille Loria that Hu found a more complex and satisfying explanation of the manipulative character of moral systems in class society. Loria's interpretation, which owed much to Marx, provided Hu with a conceptual framework which he later utilized to analyze China's traditional ethical system. Loria believed that there were two different functions served by the moral systems present in society. The first was the imposition of restraints on the ruling class, so that its exploitation of society would not become so severe as to cause the oppressed to rebel. The other function served by morality was the inculcation of ideas of compliance and non-resistance into the oppressed class. In Loria's view, the expression of what he called "pure egoism" was the ultimate social goal; that is, the realization by the group and by the individual of the highest and most responsible interests of each. The morality that was prevalent in capitalist society, for example, deliberately interfered with the "egoism" of the working class, since the realization of that would threaten the dominant position of the ruling class.

Loria regarded public opinion as the crucial force in the modern world for the propagation of this self-interested morality by the
rulers of society. Following Marx's conception, Loria believed these moral ideas to be effective throughout society, and not just within the class generating them, as Kautsky seemed to believe. Hu followed Loria's explanation, though it is interesting that he tried to mediate somewhat between the two positions by making the highly plausible suggestion that only when the members of a class developed "a very clear sense of self-consciousness" would they cease to be influenced by the prevailing ideas of the dominant social class.

Both Kautsky and Loria agreed that religion acted as a servant of the ruling class. Loria gave detailed attention to the changing forms of religious belief in western history, basing his analysis on the periodization conceived by Marx. In the ancient slave societies, for example, moral standards were enforced through fear of immediate punishment. This did not prove effective in disciplining the oppressed of society, since as slaves their condition was already one of utter misery. Christianity, which Loria identified with the serf system, improved immeasurably on the ancient religions, as it deferred rewards and punishments to the future life. Salvation acted as a lure to make men act opposite to their actual "egoism" in this life. The moral system propagated by Christianity made the exploiter restrain himself, while it gave the exploited the illusion of eternal bliss to come. In recent times, according to Loria, religion had been supplanted by public opinion. This new moral force prevented the capitalist class from overreaching itself in exploitation, while it ensured the obedience of the
workers by deluding them with notions such as the sanctity of property.

Loria thus arrived at the same conclusion expressed somewhat later by Engels in his letter to Franz Mehring, that is, that men often act because of falsely perceived motives. In the case of the exploited of society this was frequently so. Morality was the product of the dominant class interest, but it was a product of a subtle and insidious sort. It was a prudential morality for the governors, and a morality of obedience and endurance for the governed. This conception by Loria of the dual function of moral systems Hu Han-min found highly suggestive, and he saw many applications of it in the ethical systems developed in imperial China.

The Historical Materialism of Hu Han-min

In his writings of late 1919 Hu Han-min embraced the theory of historical materialism with unqualified enthusiasm. This concept had transformed the disciplines of sociology, economics and history, as well as the socialist movement. Thus he could say that historical materialism had "virtually delineated a new epoch." Its impressiveness was attested to by the highest praise that could be given: it was ranked by Hu as equal to Darwin's theory of evolution. However, it is apparent that the aspect of historical materialism that appealed to Hu was what might be termed its grand conception of history. Historical materialism could help explain the relationship between a society and the "mode" of thought prevalent in it. The theory could assist in
the explanation of the evolution of such dominant ideas. Historical materialism was also of value because of the insights it provided into the workings of society itself: it revealed the function of economic interest, and it indicated how society had always been divided into the two classes of oppressors and oppressed. But as Hu's understanding of historical materialism is viewed in a closer focus, it becomes apparent that the revolutionary social content of the theory was given little prominence. This does not imply that Hu was fatalistic; quite the opposite, since Hu was a committed political activist. His activism, however, took him in a different direction than that outlined by Marx in his analysis of modern society. Hu's direction was that of the nationalist movement, to which he had long dedicated his life, and which sought, in however flawed a manner, a Chinese route to China's regeneration.

Thus what is so striking about Hu's historical materialism is its intellectual character, rather than its emotional urgency. His major discussion of it in December 1919 has been described by Benjamin Schwartz as "a more thorough treatment of the subject than anything we can find in the writings of either Li Ta-chao or Ch'en Tu-hsiu." The accuracy of this assessment is certainly beyond doubt. Yet, if the specific responses to Marxism on the part of two of these actors, Li Ta-chao and Hu Han-min, are compared, there becomes apparent an interesting irony. Li Ta-chao, probably through no fault of his own, misunderstood at first the fundamental nature of historical materialism, but within a short time the demands of his own political temperament led him not only to correct his mistakes, but to
embrace Marxism-Leninism as a political movement. Hu Han-min in 1919 had a much better grasp of the complexities of the theory, but his appreciation of Marxism was a more cerebral one. Historical materialism impressed Hu as a great creation of the intellect, but it did not impinge on his political emotions as it did on those of Li Ta-chao.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao both committed themselves to the new Leninist turning. What drew them to Marxism was the revolutionary message which, in Lewis Feuer's fitting characterization, "provides the most natural idiom and vision for the exploited persons in all societies." Ch'en and Li responded to the prophetic side of Marxism; Hu responded to its analytic quality. Hu's loyalty remained with the national revolution, a goal profoundly different from the social revolution essential to Marxism.
CHAPTER IV
THE REASSESSMENT OF THE CHINESE PAST

Preliminary Guidelines

In October 1919, Hu Han-min published the first part of "A Materialistic Investigation of the History of Chinese Philosophy." This essay represented Hu's most extended and systematic analysis of the Chinese intellectual tradition. It also serves as an excellent illustration of Hu's interpretation of historical materialism as a theory valuable primarily for the historical hypotheses it suggested. In this essay, and in shorter works written for Chien-she, Hu used Marxism to reinterpret the rich and varied Chinese past. At no point, however, did he attempt to force that past into a prescribed or mechanistic interpretive scheme.¹

Throughout his study of Chinese philosophy, Hu stressed that the complexity of the interaction between the economic base and the ideological superstructure ruled out any analysis based on rigid economic determinism. In the list of points prefacing this essay, Hu made clear his balanced understanding of historical materialism: "Social life and social needs govern (chih-p'e) the minds of philosophers, but once a specific philosophy is formulated, it in turn influences society."² Elsewhere in the essay Hu cited Engels' late letters on historical materialism, and Seligman's
exposition of the theory in support of the argument that economic factors could not explain each discrete event in human history. As Hu phrased it: "When social change occurs the most important cause is the economic one, but this is not to say that only economics brings about social progress." This admonition should be borne in mind, since Hu's discussion of the Chinese philosophical tradition frequently focused on the relationship between political factors and the world of thought, rather than on the relationship between the mode of production and its ideological epiphenomena.

Along with this perspective on Hu's historical materialism, there are two other points to be noted about his treatment of the Chinese past. First of all, Hu called for a critical but dispassionate examination of the intellectual tradition. This reevaluation was essential in the case of Confucianism, since the ruling class had exploited its teachings of obedience and hierarchy to support its own privileged position. However, this was not Hu's main concern. He saw the battle against the supporters of traditionalism as already won: their position he dismissed as "derisory." Hu's worry was that the whole of the Chinese past might be swept away by the critical assaults of the May Fourth movement. Thus he warned that the past must not be viewed simply as "meaningless tradition." In regard to his own particular interest, China's philosophical heritage, Hu expressed the fear that the ancient systems of thought might be rejected without exception as intellectually empty and socially harmful. The past merited severe criticism, in Hu's judgement, but it held
much that was of value, and this must not be lost to China.

The second aspect of Hu's interpretation of the past which should be noted concerns the question of equivalence between the Chinese and western historical traditions. Hu did not express himself explicitly on this point; however, by adopting different perspectives it is possible to resolve the seemingly ambiguous positions he expressed. Hu's basic belief, which is implicit throughout his essays, was that Chinese history followed its own path, and that it must be examined on its own terms. Western examples might be brought forward for comparative purposes, and western ideas of history might be highly suggestive, but neither should be applied literally to China. In his essay, "Mencius and Socialism," which was published in the first issue of Chien-shi, Hu indicated at the outset the limitations within which any comparison of China and the West, past or present, must be conducted. Modern socialism, he stated, stemmed primarily from the social discontent rising out of the Industrial Revolution. Since China had not undergone such an experience, ideas equivalent to those of modern European socialism had not been developed. As Hu concluded: "Ancient methods cannot be applied to the present, nor can present European socialist ideas be applied exactly to China."\(^7\)

In a much more general sense, however, it was possible to compare China with the West. The social dislocations of the late Chou period of China's history brought forth an attempt to solve the "social problem" which had certain parallels with the European response to the crisis of industrialism. Both periods were
characterized by sharpened awareness of fundamental human concerns, such as those of freedom, equality, and the satisfaction of basic material needs. In addition, both periods were characterized by a great intellectual response in the realm of social and political thought. Here it may be observed that the nature of the equivalence between China and the West, which superficially appears to be the most general of all, actually may be the most significant. Hu may have rejected precise analogies with the West, but he saw in the Chinese tradition, particularly in the case of the great age of Chinese philosophy prior to the Ch'in unification, an intellectual vigour and a degree of accomplishment equal to whatever the West had created. Although the cultural tradition of China required critical scrutiny, Hu always regarded it as a heritage which was most imposing in its scope and possessed of its own intrinsic value.

**Historical Periodization and the Well-Field System**

In his essay on philosophy, Hu took as his starting point the political and social disorder which had become endemic in China during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The origins of this problem were to be found as early as the eighth century B.C., when the Chou dynasty, the feudal overlord of all the Chinese states, was forced to move its capital to the east under the pressure of nomadic invasions. This signified the end of the Chou as an effective dynastic power, although the fiction of Chou sovereignty was maintained until the third century B.C. because of the symbolic religious functions which only the Chou
monarch could carry out. With the decline of the Chou, the many small feudatories began to vie with one another for territory and spoils. Out of these there eventually emerged several powerful kingdoms which possessed the military might to spread destruction throughout the land. By the late Chou, the time more familiarly known as "the era of the warring states," China had become the scene of constant warfare among these kingdoms. \(^{11}\)

The conditions of life during this period were rued constantly by the writers living at the time. Mencius depicted the age as one in which the natural order of things had been reversed: \(^{12}\)

\begin{quote}
In wars to gain land, the dead fill the plains; in wars to gain cities, the dead fill the cities. This is known as showing the land the way to devour human flesh.
\end{quote}

The miseries of the common people Mencius described in a similar passage: \(^{13}\)

\begin{quote}
There is fat meat in your kitchen and there are well-fed horses in your stables, yet the people look hungry and in the outskirts of cities men drop dead from starvation. This is to show animals the way to devour men.
\end{quote}

It was to counter this breakdown of the social order, which manifested itself in every type of crime, from regicide and parricide to the exploitation of the common people, that Mencius constructed his philosophical system. This was true of all the thinkers of the late Chou. Hu's statement that these men were responding directly to the well-chronicled conditions of their time was hardly contentious. \(^{14}\) But what ultimately lay behind the political and social disorder? This was the most important question, and truly the most perplexing one to answer. Hu searched the classics, and found what he thought to be the
underlying economic explanation in the disintegration of the ancient well-field system.

Before Hu's discussion of the well-field system is examined, it is necessary to make a few comments on the historical materials available to him in 1919. At this seemingly late date, the classics remained virtually the only source for the study of China prior to the Ch'in dynasty. This meant that any investigation of ancient China had to be drawn from works such as the Shih Ching (Book of Odes) and the Shu Ching (Book of History), which dated from the early and late Chou respectively. Some help also was provided by philosophers with a historical interest, such as Mencius and Chuang Tzu. Apart from studying these products of the traditional literary culture, there was no alternative, for the archaeological discoveries which would serve to transform the state of knowledge about ancient China lay a few years in the future. It was in 1921, for example, that excavations were begun at Yang-shao, which revealed the existence of a late neolithic culture possibly identifiable as the mythical Hsia dynasty. Not until 1928 was the capital of the late Shang dynasty unearthed at Anyang, proving the historical existence of the predecessors of the Chou. Thus the critical historian of the May Fourth period was placed in the position of attempting to reinterpret the traditional view of the past through the materials which served as the foundation of that tradition. In the absence of other sources of evidence, the historian had to examine the classics in exceedingly minute detail in search of a few neglected facts. Out of these he had to try to build a
new interpretation of the historical tradition.\textsuperscript{16}

The thinness of the literary stratum of materials is nowhere more evident than in the case of the well-field system. Mencius provided the most complete description of it in the following brief passage:\textsuperscript{17}

A \textit{ching} is a piece of land measuring one \textit{li} square, and each \textit{ching} consists of 900 \textit{mu}. Of these, the central plot of 100 \textit{mu} belongs to the state, while the other eight plots of 100 \textit{mu} each are held by eight families who share the duty of caring for the plot owned by the state. Only when they have done this duty dare they return to their own affairs.

Apart from this, there is only one other place in which Mencius alluded to the well-field. In a section describing the ideal society of the early Chou, Mencius spoke of the two social orders, the rulers and the common people. The former, he said, were arranged into a hierarchy, with carefully prescribed privileges and responsibilities attendant upon rank. The common people, whose duty it was to obey the ruling elite, were distributed on the hundred \textit{mu} plots of land divided in the well-field pattern. This arrangement guaranteed their self-sufficiency, and together with the clearly defined social hierarchy, created harmony and stability. Mencius concluded by observing that the feudal lords had destroyed all this, so that by the time he was writing, the ideal social structure of the early Chou lay far in the past.\textsuperscript{18}

In his opening reference to the well-field system, which was made in the "Mencius and Socialism" article, Hu admitted to the limited nature of the evidence available for the study of the early Chou: "None of the social conditions of that age are easily ascertainable."\textsuperscript{19} Apart from Mencius, there was "no other
reliable testimony" to the existence of the well-field. However, at this point in August 1919, Hu did not appear to be overly concerned whether or not the system actually had existed. The main argument he wished to advance was that, regardless of the historical authenticity of the well-field, Mencius had responded to the "social problem" of his age by looking back to the Chou for the ideal social order.20 This non-committal attitude on the part of Hu did not last long, though. Two months later he published the first part of his essay on the Chinese philosophical tradition. In this Hu advanced the claim that the well-field in fact had existed, and that its disintegration was responsible for the decay of the Chou social order, and the eventual social chaos of the warring states period. Such an avowal immediately prompted a response from Hu Shih, who professed skepticism about the well-field, or any system of land tenure remotely resembling it. As a consequence, a debate was initiated which not only touched on the authenticity of the well-field depicted by Mencius, but more importantly, ranged into the much wider question of the periodization of China's ancient past.

In outlining the position taken by Hu Han-min in the controversy, it is necessary to begin with his general characterization of early Chou society. Hu accepted the traditional Chinese description of this period as being feudal in nature. The feudal system (feng-chien chih-tu; to use the modern term) had been set up in the eleventh century B.C. by the Chou conquerors in order to facilitate the administration of their newly won kingdom. By means of the process known in Chou times as feng-fen, or
"division on the 'enfeoffement' basis," the Chou monarch split the realm into approximately one hundred vassal states, and these in turn were subinfeudated into hundreds of lesser fiefdoms (fu-yung). A sharp divide existed between this ruling class and the mass of the common people. It was to this latter group, Hu argued, that the well-field pattern of land-holding applied. He defined the system as one of "communal property" (kung-ch' an) created by "the equal distribution of land on the basis of population." In this formulation it is unclear whether Hu meant that the land was commonly owned and worked, or whether it was divided into equal but privately owned allotments worked on a cooperative basis. Hu never resolved this ambiguity. However, regardless of what precisely he had in mind, the import of his argument remained unaffected: the well-field system was the underlying cause of the social stability of the early Chou because of the basic subsistence it guaranteed to the mass of the people.

Hu made it abundantly clear that the feudal political structure and the well-field system were intimately bound together. In the early stage of their development they "supported each other"; later they "dragged each other down to destruction." There were two factors primarily responsible for the breakdown of the well-field system. The first of these was the inevitable growth in population. This argument, which Hu had drawn directly from Malthus, found support in Han Fei Tzu's depiction of late Chou China:
But nowadays no one regards five sons as a large number, and these five sons in turn have five sons each, so that before the grandfather has died, he had twenty-five grandchildren. Hence the number of people increases, goods grow scarce, and men have to struggle and slave for a meager living.

As a result of the pressure of population the hundred mu allotments were no longer sufficient to support much larger families; while at the same time many of the allotments were being fragmented into units too small to guarantee subsistence. The second reason advanced by Hu for the demise of the well-field was the rise of the merchant class. With the development of specialization, called "the hundred crafts" by Mencius, the merchants gained wealth through their monopoly on the exchange of products. Evidence from the Tso Chuan indicated that, by the early eighth century, merchants held great power. As time passed, the merchant class was able to gain control of the peasants' land, and the weakened Chou state could do nothing to prevent the alienation to the merchants of the old land allotments. Hu felt that by the time the Chou capital was moved to the east in 771 B.C., the well-field system was badly decayed. By the beginning of the warring states era in the fifth century B.C., it had long ceased to exist.

As soon as Hu had published the first part of his article on the Chinese philosophical tradition, he was challenged by Hu Shih on his well-field hypothesis. The latter advanced three major criticisms of Hu's position. First, Hu Shih questioned the nature of the evidence Hu had cited. In Hu Shih's opinion, the absence of sufficiently detailed and reliable accounts from
the early Chou made it impossible to draw an accurate picture of the well-field system. In fact, Hu Shih said, he suspected that the system was nothing more than a "utopian" fantasy of the warring states period, which Mencius had further elaborated in order to "praise the past and diminish the present." Hu Shih then went on to argue that, in the event that the well-field was not a spurious creation of the late Chou, it still remained unlikely that the system detailed by Mencius could have existed. The "half-tribalized, half-civilized" society of the early Chou was incapable of implementing such a precise and methodical type of land division. If attempted, it could be no more than a crude approximation of the social structure Mencius had outlined.27

The final point of contention concerned the relationship between the feudal rulers and the common people. In the discussion of Hu's well-field hypothesis, Hu Shih was supported by a new participant in the debate, Chi Jung-wu. Both of these men agreed with Hu that the feudal political order formed the ruling class in the early Chou. Where they disagreed sharply with Hu was over his contention that a system of communal property owned by the common people could exist alongside this class structure. Hu Shih stated that if the hundred mu allotments had existed, they did not represent the equal distribution of land on the well-field pattern, but rather the apportionment of a feudal lord's estate to his tenants. Instead of providing the people with a basic level of subsistence, the well-field actually stood for their exploitation.28

Chi Jung-wu carried this argument further in his article.
He said that he found it difficult to believe that the concept of private ownership of land was unknown in the early Chou. Chi quoted extensively from Jenks' *History of Politics* to explain man's prehistoric evolution. As far as the development of private property was concerned, the key stage was the pastoral, for it was during this time that private ownership of moveable goods, such as cattle, came into existence. This led to the creation of wealth, and the beginnings of class differentiation. In the next stage, which was that of agricultural society, private ownership was extended to include land, and this in turn widened disparities.  

Since the well-field system represented a form of land-holding in an agrarian society, Chi asked how such a system could escape the influence of private property relationships. In his understanding it could not; therefore, he shared Hu Shih's position that the well-field was nothing more than a form of land-tenantry. In Chi's words, the inescapable fact which had to be confronted was that "a system of communal property ... could be spoken of only if there first existed equality among the people."  

In replying to Hu Shih's charges that the well-field was either a spurious creation or only a rough approximation of the social order Mencius had portrayed, Hu admitted that insufficient evidence made it impossible to describe the early Chou with any precision. He conceded that the system outlined by Mencius may not have been literally accurate in its details. However, he completely rejected the suggestion that Mencius had arbitrarily fabricated the historical record. Hu then went on to say that
Hu Shih had gone to extremes by dismissing the well-field on the
grounds that the early Chou could not create such a minutely
detailed structure. It was one thing to question the degree of
complexity possible in the well-field system; it was quite another
to dismiss the system out of hand. Hu believed that the limited
materials available pointed to the existence of some type of
communal land system, and until further evidence came to light
he was prepared to work with them.

When it came to refuting the interpretation advanced by Hu
Shih and Chi Jung-wu that the well-field represented a form of
land tenancy, Hu was forced to spell out his own argument in more
detail. First of all, he indicated where the well-field belonged
in the evolution of society:

The well-field system was a type of common land owner­
ship (kung-yu-chih) which existed in ancient China prior
to the development of private land ownership. We must
distinguish it from the systems of equal land ownership
which are dated subsequent to the development of
private property.

Therefore, the farmers of the equal allotments were not tenants
or serfs. According to Hu, they possessed the right to use the
land, while the feudal rulers possessed only the right to collect
taxes, which, as Mencius had said, were drawn from the central
allotment of the well-field. Hu also took exception to the
statement that a communal land-holding system could not coexist
with a class society such as that of the early Chou. In this
regard, Hu said that Chi had distorted the concept of social
evolution, when he implied that private property in land abruptly
came into existence once man moved beyond the pastoral stage.
Chi had ignored the transitional period, when characteristics of both societies might be found. There was no reason, then, why communal property in land, a characteristic of the pastoral stage, should not be found in the initial phase of the agricultural stage.  

Hu also made the point that Chi had relied excessively on Jenks' *History of Politics* for his interpretation of prehistory. While Jenks had much of value to offer, Hu said that his hypotheses could not be accepted without reservation, since China's social history displayed its own unique characteristics. This was true of the subject under discussion. Travellers among the minority peoples in southern China had reported the common cultivation of land, with division of produce taking place after the tribal chieftains had been given their share. Why did this form of social organization still exist? It was not because the tribesmen believed in some philosophy of absolute equality, Hu stated, but because their mode of production had undergone virtually no change from primitive times. With such a low level of technology, and such restricted utilization of the land, these peoples had progressed little beyond the pastoral stage, with its very rudimentary communal agriculture. Thus contemporary evidence could be found within China to prove the reality of the ancient well-field system.  

With the presentation of this rebuttal of Chi Jung-wu, Hu's participation in the debate came to an end, and shortly after the controversy reached its unresolved termination. In weighing the materials of the debate, how should Hu's case for the well-field
system be judged? The first question to arise is that of the historical existence, at least in rough outline, of the social system which Hu believed to have characterized the early Chou. On this point the current assessment of that distant time provides a mixed response. With the exception of official Communist historiography, which views the early Chou as a slave society, there is little disagreement concerning the feudal political structure established by the Chou conquest. What form of social organization was to be found beneath this feudal elite is much more problematic, although the presence of such a precisely organized structure as the well-field is highly dubious. There is also agreement that the common people provided some form of support for their feudal overlords. Where the disagreement is to be found is on precisely the same question which Hu debated with Hu Shih and Chi Jung-wu, that of the relationship between the feudal ruling class and the common people who worked the land.

Apart from the official Communist view, which holds the well-field to be part of Chou slave society, there are three modern interpretations of the ancient system which are of note. In his study of Chinese feudalism, Derk Bodde states that there may have been an arrangement whereby peasants privately cultivated their own land and commonly cultivated that belonging to their overlord. According to his surmise, the well-field system depicted by Mencius may represent a memory of an early Chou administrative and economic unit. Fung Yu-lan also admits to the possible existence of the well-field, but in contrast to Bodde, he interprets it as a system by which the feudal overlords allocated
labour duties to their serfs. On the other hand, Hu's belief that communal property-holding existed under a feudal chieftain receives support from the Chinese historian, Hsü Chung-shu, who noted that certain frontier peoples, such as the Li-shu in southeastern Yunnan, carried on "extensive agriculture accompanied by per capita allotment of land." This practice he described as having "many features similar to the well-field system." In sum, the evidence is inconclusive, but the existence in the early Chou of some form of general cultivation of the land on behalf of the feudal overlords appears likely. It may not be possible to reach any closer to the well-field than this.

The second, and more intriguing, question to be answered concerning Hu's well-field hypothesis is whether it represents a historical materialist analysis. On this point there already exists some confusion with respect to Hu's role, a consequence of an otherwise brilliant article on the well-field in twentieth century historiography by the late Joseph Levenson. In this essay, Levenson states that Hu interpreted the well-field as a "society of primitive communism." As a result of Hu's periodization, Levenson states, the way was opened up "to document a general phase of history from famous Chinese sources." Now, there is no doubt that Hu's studies of historical materialism during 1919 influenced him to attempt to find an economic basis for social change, and to define the relationship which existed between social conditions and the ideas they created. This was stated by Hu at the outset of his essay on the philosophical tradition of China. However, it is a considerable leap from
this position to the claim that Hu was attempting to fit China into the Marxist scheme of historical periodization.

This characterization of Hu's position may be documented from the statements Hu himself made in the course of the well-field controversy. To begin with, Hu did not use the term "communism" in discussing the well-field society; he referred to it as the "communal ownership" (kung-yu-chih) of land. Lest this seem semantic quibbling, Hu stressed the point that, when he spoke of the communal society of the well-field period, he had not implied that "the Chou was a communist (kung-ch'\an) society, nor that some kind of absolute egalitarianism in property had existed." Furthermore, Hu not only noted the presence of the feudal political order, but he expressly tied it together with the well-field system. He also said in reply to Chi Jung-wu, that the existence of communal land-holding did not necessarily mean the absence of social classes. All of these remarks serve to indicate that Hu definitely was not advancing a case on behalf of a primitive communist stage in China's history.

If Hu did not intend to impose a Marxist historical stage on the Chinese past, to what extent can it be said that his analysis reflected a more general Marxist interpretation of history? It has been shown that Hu may have been correct in his belief that some kind of communal working of the land existed in early Chou society, and that the feudal ruling class received support from this system. However, in describing this social order, Hu failed to specify the nature of the relationship existing between the commoners and their feudal rulers. It is
this omission which ultimately makes Hu's argument difficult to pin down. Hu did not provide an adequate answer to the objection raised by Hu Shih and Chi Jung-wu that a genuinely communal form of property-holding, that is one which benefited only the property-holders themselves, could not exist in a class society. This objection, it may be noted, possessed an even more telling effect when applied to the well-field system, since the class society with which it supposedly coexisted was the intricate and rigid feudal hierarchy of the early Chou.

If social classes existed, as Hu admitted, then it is difficult to understand how a non-exploitative relationship could have existed between the ruling class and common people working the land. Although Mencius, in his depiction of the well-field, said that the state received the product of the central field, while the eight surrounding families enjoyed the product of their own labour, it would be optimistic indeed to believe that such a system could work with the scrupulous honesty and self-restraint Mencius imputed to it. Since the common people not only lacked political and military power, but also were confronted by a military ruling class, the balance between rulers and ruled could only be of momentary duration, if it were even conceivable. Hu's failure to consider this point is puzzling, all the more so in light of his clear understanding of the military character of the Chou feudal elite. Hu's references to backward tribal societies which practised communal agriculture did not provide an answer, since he again neglected to define the relationship between tribesmen and their chieftains. Tribal
land farmed by primitive agricultural techniques may have produced little surplus wealth, but this did not mean that exploitation was absent from these societies.

In conclusion, Hu's essay on early Chou social history must be judged from the perspective of the intellectual world of May Fourth China. Regardless of the accuracy of his portrayal of the well-field system, the debate Hu initiated was a significant part of the reexamination of the national past then under way. When Hu presented the hypothesis that the well-field had flourished and decayed, thus bringing about great changes in the social order, and eventually in the world of thought, he was presenting China's history in a manner which Levenson called "socially evolutionary." For Levenson, this sense of dynamism imparted to the ancient tradition was of more significance than the literal accuracy of Hu's interpretation of one aspect of that tradition. This may be the most fitting assessment of Hu's role in the well-field debate.

The Philosophical Response of the Late Chou: The Three Schools

The thesis put forward by Hu, then, was that the disintegration of the feudal order and the well-field system of the early Chou took place simultaneously. With the development of specialized crafts and the increase of commercial wealth, the feudal lords were able to wage wars of a longer and more destructive nature. At the same time, the pressure resulting from the increasing population, and the exploitation practised
by the rising merchant class had deprived the common people forever of that basic measure of subsistence they had formerly enjoyed. Because of the incessant feudal warfare, and the inescapable economic insecurity, life for the mass of the people in the late Chou was precarious indeed. China had developed what Hu termed its own "social problem" which was reflected in a complete breakdown of the old order of social relationships and personal morality. But there was one beneficial feature in this otherwise bleak picture. The late Chou generated "an extraordinary response in social thought": it produced the great age of Chinese philosophy. 46

As indicated in the opening words of his essay on the philosophical tradition, Hu proposed to analyze this response from a historical materialist viewpoint. Despite this professed aim, however, Hu did not state at the outset precisely what methodology he had in mind when utilizing this concept. It is necessary, then, to extricate from his discussion the guiding principles of his analysis. First, and not unexpectedly, Hu approached Chou society in terms of the familiar "two-class" model of governors and governed, oppressors and oppressed. Throughout his consideration of the social problem of this era, these terms continually reappear to describe the two combatants of the class struggle. In fact, many of the terms cited in the preceding chapter to illustrate the various translations of "oppressors" and "oppressed" are drawn from Hu's discussion of late Chou society and thought. 47

The division of ancient and imperial society into these
two groups provided a general framework for Hu's analysis, but one that did not of itself go far as a Marxist approach. At a minimum, a historical materialist analysis should consider the class origins of the philosophers, and secondly, it should define their relationship to the prevailing class structure. In Hu's study of Chinese thought, the first question was given little emphasis. At one point Hu made reference to the Marxist concept, elaborated on more fully by Kautsky, that in a time of social disintegration, elements of the "intellectual proletariat" broke free from the ruling class and took a stand on behalf of the oppressed. In this context, Hu mentioned the wandering scholars (shih) of the Chou period. However, he did not go any further in describing the characteristics of this group, nor did he attempt to pinpoint its specific class origins.

Now, it is true that vagueness and uncertainty surround the problem of the class character of the various Chou philosophical schools. Fung Yu-lan, for example, describes the shih of the time of Confucius as unengaged in any form of productive activity, and reliant completely on government office and teaching for survival. Originally the shih had been military officers of the Chou state, but with the breakdown of the Chou feudal order they lost this status, and merged with the ju, the term applied loosely to those with an interest and competence in education and the arts. Confucius, in Fung's terms, was "if not the originator," at least "the great patron" of the shih. To give one further example, the origins of the school of Mo Tzu have been located in the middle and lower levels of society,
perhaps among the urban craftsmen and professional guilds. This produced a type of thought which, to use Frederick Mote's admittedly facetious description, "reeks of what we like to consider lower middle class virtues." However, whether or not Hu was in a position in 1919 to reach more than tentative conclusions regarding the social origins of the philosophical schools is not really the question. The one which is of importance is that Hu did not search for their class origins. Although he made reference to the high degree of activity on the part of the "intellectual class" during times of political and social collapse, he did not take a Marxist line of analysis by investigating how the prevailing social disorder had affected the security and status of the members of the "class." In handling the great age of philosophy of the late Chou, Hu did not go beyond treating the specific schools of thought as more than a general response to the chaotic character of the age.

Where Hu more evidently tried to apply Marxist notions of class was in analyzing the attitude of the philosophers towards prevailing class relationships within the Chou. This allows some scope for discussion, since Hu worked out "positions" on this question for each of the three major schools. The first to be considered is that of Lao Tzu. In Hu's estimation, Lao Tzu was the most "revolutionary" of the ancient philosophers, since he wished "to smash the whole class system." Hu characterized Lao Tzu's philosophy as one that "embraced the doctrine of thorough destruction." Lao Tzu believed the "political process to be the root of evil." As a result of
the growing complexity of society, the political class had become more powerful, and had acquired more extensive and more highly specialized means to carry out its arbitrary and ruthless acts. Politics, then, was for Lao Tzu the root of the "social problem." The solution to this lay in a return to the simplicity of the distant past: the population of the state should be reduced; people should lay down the tools of war, shun the use of ships and carts, and live peacefully and contentedly in their own small states without any contact with their neighbours. According to Hu, Lao Tzu regarded civilization as the enemy. He opposed material progress, the development of knowledge, and the creation of new human wants. Therefore, he advocated the curbing of individual desire, whether for material possessions, or more importantly, for knowledge itself, to be the key to recapturing the long-lost age of peace and contentment.

The best summation of Lao Tzu's philosophy, Hu suggested, was contained in one phrase: "The way never acts yet nothing is left undone." This concept, translated usually as "non-action" or "doing nothing," was in the first instance a philosophy of government. Although Lao Tzu wished to destroy the "whole political class," this did not suggest to Hu that the destruction of government itself was implied. The function of government in Lao Tzu's ideal society was "to refrain from interference" in the lives of the people. Although Lao Tzu's philosophy possessed an important mystical component, Hu viewed it primarily as political in nature: a formulation shared, it may be noted, by A.C. Graham, who has stressed that "doing-nothing" is
advised by Lao Tzu as "a means of ruling, not as an abdication of ruling." However, because Lao Tzu's ideal society could be realized only if enough people could be prevailed upon to forsake civilization and return to the simple past, Hu saw his political philosophy as completely impracticable. That this "revolutionary" transformation of society back to an earlier stage was impossible did not detract from Lao Tzu's importance as a political thinker. His radicalism had to be understood as a significant, although highly idealistic and escapist, response to the pressing social problem of his age.

If Lao Tzu counselled a dismantling of civilization and a return to primitive simplicity, Mo Tzu, according to Hu, was concerned only with practical matters of the present time. Mo Tzu neither lamented nor praised the social system; he was concerned with "doing no more than preserving existing conditions." Therefore, he had created an ancient Chinese form of "pragmatism." In evaluating the worth of any set of teachings, Mo Tzu applied the "three tests," those of "basics," "verifiability," and "application." Mo Tzu was interested only in providing practical answers to ease the life of the people of his day. This included the training of the people in the arts of self-defense, since security of their city-states was the matter of foremost importance in the age of the warring states. On a more philosophical plane, Mo Tzu advocated a mixture of teachings, though the thrust of these was towards the elimination of extravagance, not so much because simplicity was the ultimate social goal, but because calculations of "profit" and "utility"
should guide the people. Hu quoted the list of practical reforms which the sage should draw from in advising on the particular malady afflicting a state: exaltation of the virtuous if confusion were present; simplicity in funerals if the country were in poverty; condemnation of music and wine if the people were over-indulgent; reverence of Heaven if insolence were widespread; and universal love and the condemnation of offensive war if the country were engaged in conquest and oppression. This last doctrine, that of universal love, was termed by Hu an answer to the problem of "class struggle."\textsuperscript{62}

As far as Hu's argument goes, it may be noted that the depiction of Mo Tzu as being indifferent to whether the class system should be maintained or eradicated amounted to support of the existing social order.\textsuperscript{63} Hu did not comment on this point, perhaps because he regarded it as implicit in his argument. More likely, though, Hu felt that the principal object of this exercise was to indicate the position taken by the Chou philosophers towards the class system of their day; he was not assessing "praise or blame" for the particular positions. It was this lack of a clear-cut position on the desirability of the class system that, in Hu's view, made Mo Tzu stand out in contrast to Lao Tzu and Confucius.\textsuperscript{64}

In view of the central role played by Confucianism throughout most of China's history as the official creed of the ruling class, it is not surprising that Hu devoted particular attention to it in his study. In contrast to Lao Tzu, Confucius believed that the development of civilization was both natural and
desirable. Speaking of the good fortune of the people of the
state of Lu, Confucius said: "Chou could survey the two preceding dynasties. How great a wealth of culture! And we follow
upon Chou." This heritage was not to be rejected; it was only
to be purified of the corrupt elements which had compromised its
moral excellence.

In terms of his class orientation, it followed then that
Confucius "upheld the whole class system." Hu stated that
Confucius proposed two essentially reformist means by which the
society of his day might be restored to its ancient grandeur.
First, he advocated the rectification of names (cheng ming), or
in Arthur Waley's more pointed translation, "the correction of
language." With the correct use of language the ruler would
know how to behave as a true ruler, the minister as a true
minister, the father as a true father, and the son as a true
son. Not only each official of the state, but each member of
society would carry out his proper functions in the hierarchy.

No longer would the feudal lords and ministers usurp the rights
and powers of the Chou monarch, nor would the common people
meddle in the affairs of their rightful governors: "When the
Way prevails under Heaven, policy is not decided by Ministers;
when the Way prevails under Heaven, commoners do not discuss
public affairs." As a result of this correction of language,
confusion would no longer exist, only harmony.

The second reform advocated by Confucius, "rule by moral
force" (wei-cheng i-te), was also directed at the rulers of
society. Superficially, this concept bore a resemblance to
Lao Tzu's idea of non-action.70

Govern the people by regulations, keep order among them by chastisements, and they will flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force, keep order among them by ritual and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord.

What was characteristically Confucian about this approach, however, was that its goal was the creation of a good governing class, and not the reduction of this class to virtually nothing, as Lao Tzu had desired.71 Confucius believed that the excesses of his day stemmed primarily from a lack of virtue on the part of society's rulers. Since he recognized that the common people did not have the power to resolve the social problem, it was necessary that the ruling class be inculcated with virtue, if the welfare of the people were to be ensured. In Hu's summation, Confucius accepted the existence of class society, but in order that this society not destroy itself in "class struggles," the governing class had to learn once more how to govern properly.72 Far from being a "revolutionary" like Lao Tzu, Confucius was, in Hu words, an advocate of "peaceful reformism."73

This analysis of Confucianism receives further treatment in Hu's discussion of Mencius. The latter, it may be recalled, was the subject of one of Hu's first Chien-she articles, "Mencius and Socialism." In it, Hu endeavoured to show that Mencius harboured certain ideas which might be termed socialistic, although he could not devise a political mechanism to ensure their realization. According to Hu, Mencius indicated some
inklings of a historical materialist approach in his philosophy, since his first assumption was that man's basic material needs must be satisfied before his intellectual and spiritual nature could be developed. Such an analogy, it may be observed, was rather crude, as well as being inaccurate. Marx had stated that it was the manner in which the production of man's material needs took place that determined his social relationships and the content of his ideology. He definitely had not implied that once these basic needs were satisfied, men had the freedom to engage in educational and cultural pursuits: this freedom was absent as long as class society existed. This misreading may represent nothing more than an initial difficulty Hu confronted in grasping the theory of historical materialism; on the other hand, as will be discussed later, it may indicate a basic failure to understand fully what Marx meant by the mode of production. However, from this point, Hu went on to argue more persuasively that Mencius proposed to ensure the basic welfare of society through what Hu termed "the management of the people's production." There were two parts to this. First, Mencius advocated the restoration of the well-field system, since it guaranteed the common people self-sufficiency, and thereby promoted social stability. In Hu's rather optimistic words, "its implementation would have solved nine-tenths of the social problems." Second, the state should restrict its activities, and interfere in the lives of the people only to conserve resources and provide aid in time of emergency. Incidentally, in regard to this second set of measures, Hu for once broke his own admonition about
finding specific parallels between ancient China and the modern West: with some hyperbole he stated that these programmes of "conservation" and "benevolent intervention" were "the same as those practised by modern civilized countries." 78

How did Mencius propose to implement this programme? As far as his first policy was concerned, Hu said it was most unlikely that the ancient well-field system could be restored with anything approaching the precise mathematical equality it demanded. This was only part of the problem, though. The major obstacle confronting Mencius was his own conception of human nature, since he believed mankind to be divided by fundamental differences of intelligence, morality, and skill. Mencius joined this assumption to his belief in the division of labour—"the hundred crafts"—and produced the classic statement of his political philosophy: 79

There are affairs of great men, and there are affairs of small men.... If everyone must make everything he uses, the Empire will be led along the path of incessant toil. Hence it is said, 'There are those who use their minds and there are those who use their muscles. The former rule; the latter are ruled.' Those who rule are supported by those who are ruled.

Mencius admitted quite willingly, then, to the existence of the "two classes" of society, the governors and the governed. However, as Hu argued, Mencius could suggest no practicable means of regulating the relationship between them. On the one hand, he stressed that authority was essential to society and that the people were obligated to acknowledge it; on the other hand, he emphasized that the ruler held grave responsibilities and that the people had the right to overthrow him if he abused
his trust. The only resolution of this dilemma which Mencius could suggest was the earlier Confucian one of inculcating the members of the governing class with virtue, so that they would always be aware of their obligations to their subjects. However, this was an inadequate solution. Hu concluded by stating that the inability of Mencius to provide a political mechanism to link the governors and the governed created the basic impasse in his system, and prevented the realization of his commendable social goals.

Although Hu did not make the point, it may be seen that Mencius had taken the same line on the "class system" as had Confucius. If his utopian scheme of reinstituting the well-field is set aside, Mencius may be seen to share the Confucian reformist position which was directed towards preserving the status quo. Hu's failure to make explicit the conclusions of his analysis of Mencius probably reflected the fact that in August 1919 he had not worked out fully his argument on the "class orientation" of the philosophers. This had to wait until the fall of the year, and his longer articles on the entire heritage of Chinese thought. Regardless of this, the direction of Hu's analysis is clear. Apart from the Taoists, who looked back with utopian hopes to a distant time of primitive simplicity, the late Chou philosophers supported the existing class structure of governors and governed, and sought only to remove the abuses which had compromised the effectiveness of this social order. As seen above, Confucius and Mencius tried to do this by the cultivation of noble qualities of self-restraint and benevolence
in each member of the ruling class. However, this dual emphasis on "class society" and social responsibility, or "reformism," made Confucianism more than a philosophy for individual betterment. It was also a political philosophy which could be well utilized to protect the interests of the ruling class, and to support the power of the state. In his discussion of the imperial epoch in China's history, Hu went on to show how Confucianism was developed to serve those ends, and how it acted as a burden which crushed the free spirit of the Chinese people.

The Ch'in-Han Divide: Politics Dominates Philosophy

Hu was in no doubt that the great age of speculative thought came to an end with the Ch'in unification of 221 B.C. With the triumph of the Ch'in, and the consolidation of the imperial system by the succeeding Han dynasty, the state became the ideological arbiter in Chinese life. As a result, China entered two thousand years of intellectual stagnation, when, as Hu put it, "the world of thought showed no advance." However, to judge by Hu's analysis, the reason for this significant turning point in China's intellectual history appears to have been fundamentally political in nature, and not economic. Here it may be appropriate to review briefly the argument advanced by Hu about the changes which had occurred earlier in the Chou economic substructure. In this view, the early Chou was characterized by the existence of common property in land, although the ruling political structure was feudal. With the growth in population, and the rise of the merchant class,
this system disintegrated, bringing about great hardship for the mass of the people. At the same time, the collapse of the old order of rigid social relationships, and the rising level of wealth and military technology made it possible for the feudatories to engage in constant warfare. The eventual outcome of this process was the victory of the state of Ch'in, and the inauguration of the imperial age.

From this outline, it is apparent that Hu regarded the Ch'in and Han dynasties as the political culmination of the economic transformation of the Chou. What is not so clear, however, is the character of the new mode of production. Hu referred to it on only one occasion:

The Chinese people wavered between a household economy and a town-based economy. They did not reach the stage of a national economy. There was no great change in the mode of production. Therefore, there was no change whatsoever in the relations of society.

This is not too helpful, apart from indicating Hu's conception of the localized character of the traditional economy, and emphasizing once more his belief in the stagnation of the imperial epoch. What Hu seems to have held responsible for this unchanging mode of production, regardless of its precise form, was the dominant power of the state. This, admittedly, is somewhat speculative, since Hu never filled in the details of the different sets of productive relationships which had occurred in China's history. However, there is reason enough to argue that Hu, in effect, believed politics to be capable of deciding much more than the immediate course of history, even if economic forces acted as the final determinants. This certainly
is the case Hu presented with respect to the overpowering and
long-lasting influence on Chinese society of the state orthodoxy
created in the early Han.

Hu shared the traditional view that the final development
of the state Confucian ideology came about only after trial and
error on the part of the ruling class. First came legalism,
which supposedly had been applied in the state of Ch'in in the
fourth century B.C. by Shang Yang, and theoretically elucidated
in the following century by its most famous advocate, Han Fei Tzu.
Hu stated that Han Fei Tzu had "arrived at the philosophy of
legalism through an economic investigation of society." This
claim Hu based on a quotation cited earlier: "But nowadays no
one regards five sons as a large number, and these five sons
have five sons each.... Hence the number of people increases,
goods grow scarce, and men have to struggle... for a meagre
living." This speculation may not be defensible on the basis
of such slender evidence. However, Hu's statement that all of
the philosophical schools of the late Chou were moving in a
legalist direction is more convincing. Because of the social
disorder of the late Chou, men had come to feel that "evil laws
were better than no laws at all." Han Fei Tzu dismissed the
primitive simplicity of Lao Tzu, the universal love of Mo Tzu,
and the paternalistic benevolence of Confucius, replacing them
with his doctrine of the absolute authority of the state,
enforced through harsh penalties. In order that society never
fall into such chaos again, Han Fei Tzu said that everything
should be done to make "the state wealthy" and "its armies
powerful." Because of this subordination of every citizen to the interest of the state, and the practice of all the stratagems of "statecraft" to ensure the survival of the state, Hu characterized legalism as a philosophy of "narrow utilitarianism."87

It was this legalistic creed which the Ch'in attempted to implement throughout the empire after the conquest. Mass uprisings broke out because of the severity of legalism, and the Ch'in dynasty quickly came to an end, to be followed by the Han. Taking advantage of the experience of its predecessor, the Han governing class, according to Hu, worked out an official philosophy much more subtle than that of the crude Ch'in legalism. Hu stated that this philosophy, which later became known as "state Confucianism," was much more effective since it was directed towards both the governors and the governed, an argument, it may be noted, which Hu had drawn from Loria.88 Because it taught the ruler that he had certain obligations to fulfill, Confucianism acted as a check on his absolute power, thus restraining him from reckless actions which might drive his subjects to rebellion, and bring about the overthrow of the "powerful class" (ch'iang-che chieh-chi). At the same time, Confucianism taught the members of the "weak" or "powerless class" (jo-che chieh-chi) that acceptance and obedience were the virtues they should cultivate. He summed this up by saying: "Whenever class society exists, the ruling class will make use of a morality of 'compromise and mediation' (t'iao-ho che-chung), as this is most in its interest."89 As a consequence, the Han
ruling class invested the original philosophy of Confucius with a "religious" character, and in turn, this newly created state Confucianism became the support for an "authoritarian monarchical regime." 90

Hu attributed the extinction of the great age of the philosophers primarily to the suffocating effect of this state orthodoxy. Traditional explanations, such as the burning of the books by the Ch'in, he did not regard as particularly convincing. 91 The state utilized the intelligentsia, or in Hu's words, the "learned class" (chih-shih chieh-chi), to defend its own class interests. The Han established the doctorates in the five classics, the Ch'ing added further degrees to the examination system, and, even in present-day Europe and America, "the scholars and professors have been suborned by the capitalists." 92

There were exceptions to this pattern, of course. Following Kautsky's explanation, Hu said that some members of the intellectual class took the side of the oppressed when "social conditions were in upheaval," and "the authority of the ruling class could no longer reach out" to restrain them. This point he illustrated with examples from China's own tradition. The philosophers of the late Chou, the Tung-lin Academy of the late Ming, and the overseas students of the late Ch'ing, the group to which Hu had belonged in his youth, all represented this uncorrupted and uncompromised part of the intelligentsia. 93

However, despite the integrity of their thought, and even their momentary political importance, they remained peripheral to the main course of Chinese intellectual history which was dominated
by the orthodox tradition.

It is quite apparent from Hu's major essay on the history of Chinese philosophy that his own intellectual sympathies for the tradition became decidedly less enthusiastic when he moved into the imperial epoch. This is also revealed in his handling of the material under examination. For the pre-Ch'in part of his study Hu was prepared to throw out hypotheses on such questions as the economic and social character of the early Chou, the change in the mode of production in the late Chou, and the political response of the great thinkers to the social problem of the warring states period. His treatment of post-Ch'in philosophy lacks this provocative quality. It seems, rather, to reflect the undifferentiated nature of the social and intellectual order which Hu believed had remained basically unchanged for two millennia. As a result, the second half of his study of philosophy does not, on the whole, go beyond summarizing the main ideas of the principal thinkers of the imperial age.

Throughout his discussion of the post-Ch'in period, it is apparent that Hu was forced to explain the philosophers under consideration in terms of their response to problems which were fundamentally of a political nature. Hu himself emphasized that the writings of certain figures, such as the late Han recluse, Wang Fu, were prompted directly by the political instability of the day. Wang Fu, a harsh critic of the contemporary government and society, advocated a return to the pure strain of philosophical Confucianism which had existed prior to the Han adulteration of it. Similarly, Chung-ch'ang T'ung, who lived
in the troubled times of the third century, looked back to the pre-Han era, but he believed that a return to legalism would bring order and justice to society. Both of these men were products of the age of political and social chaos which had set in with the disintegration of the eastern Han in the second century. These conditions of instability lasted for four centuries, the period of the Six Dynasties, during which northern China was subjected either to continuous barbarian attack, or direct barbarian rule. The most significant response to the "social problem" of the Six Dynasties was the rise of Buddhism. This faith, Hu observed, offered salvation in another world, a prospect which held out hope both to the mass of the common people, and to members of the aristocracy broken in the political struggles of the day. Once order was restored by the Sui and the T'ang in the early seventh century, Buddhism slowly went into decline, and under the patronage of the state, Confucianism once again enjoyed a resurgence of strength. In the twelfth century, Confucianism reached its apotheosis as the state philosophy, when Chu Hsi laid down his readings of the classics. Now finally restored to their former eminence, the classics, along with Chu Hsi's commentaries on them, became the essential components of the imperial examination system, which both served and supported the state for the next seven hundred years.

The above statement indicates that Hu's survey of post-Ch'in philosophy did not embrace any interpretations of a particularly unconventional nature. This by no means implies that the second part of Hu's study is lacking either in scope or
erudition. Hu Shih in fact complimented Hu on his treatment of the orthodox and unorthodox schools of Han thought. However, in terms of his avowed historical materialist purpose, Hu was unable to explain the philosophers of the imperial age apart from their reaction to events which were political in nature. This is illustrated, for example, in his discussion of the escapist response to the social problem of the third and fourth centuries, a problem which Hu saw caused by the disintegration of the Han dynasty, and the accident of the barbarian invasions. What this points to is that Hu seemed to believe that the virtually unchanging mode of production of the imperial age made politics the decisive factor in social and intellectual life.

From a Marxist point of view, there was nothing incorrect about viewing these two thousand years in such a way: Engels had written that a direct economic cause could not be associated with every event in the phenomenal world, though ultimately economic factors asserted themselves in determining change. The question is one of balance. To what extent did politics, in other words, one part of the superstructure, become virtually independent, and in turn, come to dominate other elements of the superstructure, not to mention the economic base? Hu's argument that the pre-Ch'in tradition of speculative thought was replaced either by official Confucianism, which served the interests of the state, or mysticism which sought escape into another existence, implies that the course of two thousand years of Chinese intellectual history was directly the product of a political cause. However, if politics could determine the
thought of an age, then politics could change it as well. The stagnation which Hu saw in the imperial era superficially may indicate a pessimistic outlook on the nation's history, but the belief that political action could alter that tradition, and build a new one, held out a much more optimistic prospect for China's regeneration.

The Tasks of the Present

In the course of the May Fourth assault on Confucianism, it is not surprising that Hu also directed his attention towards the age-old patterns of Chinese family life. This he did in his article of May 1920, "An Enquiry from an Economic Standpoint into the Family System." At the outset, he stated the two positions which had formed with respect to this institution. The defenders of the patriarchal family said that it should be preserved, since it provided for mutual assistance and the expression of feelings of mutual warmth on the part of its members. Opposed to this stance were those who said that the traditional family system should be destroyed, both in the interests of its individual members and of society at large. They dismissed the old system because of its domestic authoritarianism—what Hu termed its "class dictatorship," its encouragement of dependant and parasitic behaviour, and its hypocritical standards of morality. Hu declared, though it was scarcely necessary, that his sympathies were completely with the critics of the old family order.101

Although Hu obviously felt that the Confucian family could
be attacked because of its intrinsic oppression and injustice, he preferred instead to show its irrelevance to the modern age by applying a historical materialist analysis. There were three components to this in Hu's study of the family, two of them made explicit by him, and the third stated not quite so forcefully. Hu's most important objective was to show how the Confucian norms of family behaviour, which supposedly reflected unchanging moral principles, were in fact nothing more than the product of economic forces which had operated in the distant past. Secondly, while the Confucian family system had come into existence originally because of the social demands of the time, it no longer corresponded to the economic or social realities of China. Although Hu did not phrase it precisely in this way, the Confucian family illustrated how one part of the superstructure not only had acquired a great measure of independence, but also possessed sufficient power to influence the course of social development. This is the implication of Hu's statement that old beliefs and customs tended to persist long after their original social usefulness had passed. This phenomenon Hu explained in terms of a basic intellectual inertia in man's makeup, which may have had its distant beginnings in the biological need of the organism for rest. The third point Hu set out to demonstrate was the role of the state in propping up and extending the life of this obsolete system of values. As in his analysis of the philosophical tradition, Hu saw the unification of China as the great turning point. In regard to the family, the Han used the authority of the state to formalize
and preserve the hierarchical, male-dominated family system of the Chou. As a result, there had survived into twentieth-century China a moral code which by the beginning of the imperial age was already out of date.

In explaining the origins and development of the family, Hu accepted the stages of prehistory laid down by Engels in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, and further elaborated by the late nineteenth century sociologist, Ernst Grosse. According to Grosse, who was quoted by Hu, the primitive age consisted of five stages: lower and higher level hunting and fishing, pastoral society, and lower and higher level agriculture. In the first two stages, all property was communally owned and the clan, which was determined by blood relationship, acted as the basic unit of social organization. It was in the pastoral stage, described by Engels as "the first great social division of labour," that private property came into existence in the form of movable goods, usually cattle. With this development, men arrogated to themselves a superior position, and destroyed the former equality which had characterized relations between the sexes. In the following stage, that of communal agriculture, patriarchal authority asserted itself fully within the clan, although the rough egalitarianism of labouring in the fields somewhat mitigated the effects of male superiority. The final phase of primitive society, higher level agriculture, was marked by the development of private property in land, the rise of the merchant class, and the division of labour through craft specialization. During
this stage the old clan system completely disintegrated, since
the common ownership of property which had underlined the blood
relationship no longer existed.

Hu identified the communal form of agriculture, that is,
the lower level phase, with the well-field system. This meant
that the early Chou was a clan society displaying increasing
male predominance. The transition from the lower to upper stage,
and the attendant demise of both the clan and the well-field
system, Hu associated with the end of the western Chou in the
eighth century B.C. However, the disintegration of the
communal society of the early Chou was not accompanied by a
basic change in family organization. While the clan itself may
have disappeared, to be replaced by the large family, the
concepts of male supremacy and patriarchal authority not only
survived, but prospered until the present time. Hu attributed
their persistence throughout this long age to the fact that
China remained essentially an agrarian society, with little
change in the economic substructure occurring. The Ch'in
unification strengthened the patriarchal system, since the
stability of the state was furthered by family relationships
which clearly defined precedence and obligations. Under the
Han dynasty were promulgated the three bonds, which specified
the duties of subject to ruler, son to father, and wife to
husband. It was during the Han as well, that the inferior
position of women was clearly defined in the law codes. From
this time dated the seven traditional reasons for a husband
divorcing a wife: disobedience to his parents, failure to
produce a male heir, adultery, envy, jealousy, talkativeness and theft. 107

Because of the virtual standstill of the agrarian mode of production for more than two thousand years, this antique family structure had managed to survive into the twentieth century. Its foundations, however, had become very shaky, and the entire Confucian social order was ripe for overthrow. But the May Fourth attack was not to be justified primarily on moral grounds, although they were very persuasive. More specifically, Hu explained that the time was most propitious for challenging the old order, because the mode of production which had underpinned it was now undergoing radical change. Hu did not see this development as having been generated within China. His comments on the subject are brief, but they indicate clearly his view that the economy began to change only with the impact of the West in the nineteenth century. China had been forced into the world market. This had produced much dislocation, especially in the villages, where the former partly household, partly town-based economy had lost its local self-sufficiency. At the same time China was experiencing a new economic phenomenon, the growth of large urban industrial and commercial centres. In both city and countryside, the economic order which had supported the patriarchal family system either was no longer to be found, or else was in a state of decomposition. 108

Hu based the claim that the large, patriarchal family was doomed to destruction on the experience of the industrial West.
There the capitalist demand for individual units of labour to man the factory work forces had broken the old village-based family group. This had two consequences. The nuclear family itself had been placed under strain because of the demands placed on it by the struggle to make a living. However, at the same time, the capitalist economy had brought about a legal system designed to define and protect the position of the individual. Hu pointed to the emphasis on individual rights and legal equality in America and western Europe, where the nuclear family, unencumbered by parasitical relatives, was the basic social unit. Monogamy was the law everywhere; concubinage was nowhere to be found. Marriage took place through freedom of choice, and women possessed the same rights as men regarding divorce. Children, once they had reached maturity, were able to leave the family home, and were able to own property in their own right.\textsuperscript{109}

Hu was under no illusion that these legal rights could be exercised unless there were the economic independence present to support them: that point he had made more than a decade earlier in his article, "Unmarried Women in Kwangtung."\textsuperscript{110} However, the enactment of legal change was an important step in "the progress" of the family, and in the improvement of the position of women. While the reduction of the family to its nuclear size was, in Hu's description, an "inevitable" consequence of economic change, his advocacy of the creation of legal safeguards indicated his belief in the fruitfulness of human activity, an illustration once more of Hu's resolution
of the stress between the deterministic and voluntaristic
elements within historical materialism.111

The time had now come, Hu said, to press the attack on the
traditional Chinese family order. In the world at large there
was a "socialist tide" which had been spreading throughout all
nations since the end of the First World War. All of the
exploitative powers of the pre-war period were in crisis.
Within these nations, the war had led to great changes in the
position of women, placing them into many occupations formerly
reserved to men. The basic question of work to support the
independence of women had been "half solved." In 1906 Kautsky
had predicted the eventual disappearance of the traditional
family structure which was based on the restriction of women to
nothing but household work. Writing in 1920, Hu said that
Kautsky not only was right, but also that his hopes would be
realized in the very near future.112

Hu in fact appeared to be in a highly optimistic mood at
this time, perhaps because the great political and economic
changes resulting from the First World War portended the break­
down of the old order throughout the world, and the arrival of
the "socialist tide." Nothing more can be said about the
reasons for his buoyant hopes at this point, since he said
nothing further to explain them. He did, however, close the
discussion of the family system in China with a statement
uncharacteristically utopian for him, and one which seems more
expressive of the Confucian Great Harmony than it does of the
communist society envisaged by Marx:113
The transformation of the economic organization of society will bring about the realization of a cooperative democratic society, where inequality in property has come to a natural end. At the same time, man's instinctive love for self and for others will attain its fullest development, while the bonds that imprison both men and women, parents and children, will be replaced by the pure and honest emotion of love.

In a postcript Hu promised that at some later date he would discuss the ideal society of the future. Unfortunately, the opportunity to do this never came. The demands of politics once more interfered, and after the publication in August 1920 of his summary of the ethical views of Kautsky and Loria, Hu wrote nothing more for Chien-she. Shortly afterwards, the journal ceased publication, when all its major contributors followed Sun Yat-sen to Canton. Thus, there came to an abrupt end the remarkable set of articles which Hu had composed for Chien-she over the course of little more than one year.

**Historical Materialism and the Chinese Past**

Hu Han-min had declared that his intention in discussing the Chinese past was to subject it to a historical materialist analysis. To what extent can it be said that this was borne out in his articles? There are three areas which immediately come to mind for an evaluation of Hu's work: first, the periodization of Chinese history; secondly, his conception of class struggle; and thirdly, his view of the relationship between economic and non-economic factors. To some degree these topics overlap; they are not meant to be self-contained categories. In examining the first of these, it is obvious that
Hu's discussion of the well-field system brought him directly into the question of periodization. Hu described the ruling structure of the early Chou as feudal, while the common ownership of property was enjoyed by the mass of the people. The objection that two such structures could not exist simultaneously has been made earlier; the existence of a class, in terms of a Marxist analysis, implied that the commonly worked fields were demesne land rented in some form from the feudal overlords. If this objection is granted, then the society Hu depicted was feudal in nature, that is, feudal in the sense understood by modern scholars such as Bodde, Gernet and Levenson, and for that matter, by Hu Shih at the time of the well-field debate.

Where Hu's claim for the feudal-communal system ran into trouble was precisely in the significant area of class relations. As mentioned earlier, Hu believed that a genuinely communal system of property-holding (for that indeed was the import of his conception of the well-field) could exist within a class society. On this point, Hu's application of historical materialism compromised the essential character of the theory. This vagueness, or even lack of concern, in regard to the concept of class is one of the most striking aspects of Hu's treatment of the Chinese past. The terms "governors and governed," "oppressors and oppressed," it is true, appear many times in the course of Hu's writings. There is nothing objectionable in the use of such terms. In The Communist Manifesto, a work with which Hu was very familiar, Marx spoke repeatedly of the two opposing camps of the exploiters and the exploited. The
point of contention about Hu's analysis, certainly from a Marxist point of view, is the way in which Hu altered the concept of class struggle so that it became both diffuse, and primarily political in nature. Throughout his essay on philosophy, for example, Hu referred frequently to the "class struggles" of the Chou: Confucius advocated the correction of language and the inculcation of virtue "in order to end the class struggles" of his time. However, the struggles of the late Chou, in fact, were struggles among the ruling class, not between the ruling class and the mass of the people. The latter appear in Hu's analysis as the suffering victims of the interminable, internecine conflicts going on within the ruling elite. That the mass of the people during the late Chou played only a passive role does not constitute a flaw in Hu's analysis. Rather, it is Hu's definition of class struggle in terms of the power struggles within the ruling class that divests his analysis of that essential message of the inevitable conflict between the oppressed and the oppressors.

If Hu's imprecise conception of class is admitted, and it is one which seems to reflect a life-long unwillingness on his part to approach class in the Marxist sense, it may then be stated that his analysis of the Chinese political and intellectual heritage has much to commend it. In terms of the correlation of economic factors and intellectual responses, Hu's interpretation certainly was not a crude or vulgar Marxist one. Hu recognized the importance in China's history of the power of the state to create an official ideology, which in turn
maintained the authority of the state and the ruling elite.

It may be objected that Hu went too far in this direction, that he separated politics too much from the mode of production. As has been indicated, Hu's description of the agrarian mode of production which lasted from the late Chou until the nineteenth century is very sketchy in its outline. In addition, it may be noted that Hu did not pay sufficient attention to the changes in the forces of production, as illustrated by his attribution of the rise in population during the Chou solely to natural increases in population, rather than to the greater productive capacities made possible by new instruments of production. However, this absence of detail, and the neglect of certain components of the historical methodology, may result from nothing more than the early stage of Hu's study of Marxism. The issue cannot be settled, for the termination of Hu's Chien-she period, and his return to intensely demanding political work, removed the possibility that he might further sharpen and deepen his understanding of Marxism.

There is one final comment of Hu's which should be noted because it serves as a bridge between his intellectual and activist careers, and also illuminates his conception of the role of the elite to which he belonged. In the course of his discussion of Mencius, Hu remarked that there was great room for diversity in society, and that inequalities among men in regard to ability did not imply an unjust society. What modern socialists sought to achieve was the removal of artificial inequalities, and not the levelling of society to a common
The similarity here between Hu's statement to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in 1907 that the equality proposed by the T'ung-meng Hui was "psychological," and not "mathematical" is indeed striking. However, Hu was quite definite that an intellectual elite was necessary even when artificial inequalities were eliminated:

A society in order to live, must rely on many who work with their physical strength. But if scholars, thinkers, artists are all absent from that society it will only be able to imitate, never to create. It can only regress, never advance, only experience material enjoyment, and never spiritual fulfillment. Economically speaking, these creators may be said to be the producers of a kind of invisible property.

It is not difficult to trace the link between "the producers of invisible property" and the revolutionary elite, "those who understand in advance," who provided the leadership for Sun Yat-sen's political and social revolutions. As with the ideal governors portrayed by Mencius, the political elite to which Hu belonged was supposed to act disinterestedly on behalf of the common people. Mencius, Hu observed, had failed to discover an adequate political mechanism for joining the interests of the governors with those of the governed. During the 1920s, it was the turn of Hu Han-min and the Kuomintang to try to find this elusive mechanism which would realize the true political and social aspirations of the Chinese people, without creating the irresponsible and privileged "governing class" which had existed throughout all of China's past history.
CHAPTER V
THE LESSONS OF THE UNITED FRONT

Introduction: The Significance of the United Front Period

The period from 1922 to 1927 is one of great complexity in the history of modern China. Its significance in the development of the Chinese revolution of this century is incalculable. During these years the Kuomintang entered into an alliance with the newly established Chinese Communist Party and with that party's ideological mentor, the Soviet Union. This "United Front" brought with it aid to the Kuomintang of both an organizational and material kind, such that by 1927 the revolutionary movement in its nationalist guise had reimposed a larger measure of unity on China than had existed for more than a decade. But this triumph of the Kuomintang armies at once brought into the open in the starkest form the social implications of the revolutionary movement. To what extent should the masses be taken into the movement? Which party should exert hegemony over the revolution? For even enlightened leaders of the Kuomintang such as Hu Han-min, there were limits beyond which they would not go in fomenting the social upheaval that might sweep aside the party to which they had committed their lives.

Throughout much of the United Front period Hu was close to the centre of the political scene. This was especially the case
in the two formative years of the alliance from 1922 to 1924. It is evident from the record that Hu supported the alliance at its inception, since he believed that the organizational capabilities of the Soviet model would strengthen the Kuomintang, and thus make possible the realization of Sun Yat-sen's ideals: the reunification of the nation, the reassertion of national dignity against the imperialist powers, and the reform and regeneration of China's political and social structure. However, within a year of the official reorganization of the Kuomintang, Hu came to experience serious doubts about the party's relationship with both the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Which of these two "allies" came to trouble him first is difficult to determine, particularly since they must have appeared at the time to possess such a symbiotic relationship. There is no doubt, though, that Hu's nationalism was the vital underlying force that drove his misgivings to the surface, and compelled him to break away from the alliance.

This change in political position on Hu's part was accomplished by a new focus in his political writing. It now became necessary for Hu to refute the claims of Marxism, as it provided the theoretical underpinning for the Communist movement, whether in the form of the Soviet "model" or the local Chinese party. It also became necessary for him to stress the ideas of Sun Yat-sen to a degree he had not done earlier, since they had to become the ideology which would unite and inspire the Kuomintang towards the building of a new China. It should be emphasized, though, that the theoretical position that Hu reached by the end of the
United Front period does not appear to have been primarily the result of any abstract intellectual evolution on his part. Rather, it was the result of experiences he underwent in his participation in the United Front. To a large extent, then, Hu's changing responses to Marxism and Communism must be sought in the record of his activities in the complex world of United Front politics.

Background to the United Front: 1920-1923

Hu's period of intellectual retreat in Shanghai came to an end in late 1920 when a group of "progressive" warlords under Ch'en Chiung-ming regained control of the Canton region and invited Sun Yat-sen back to work with them. Hu accompanied Sun, and in May 1921 assumed the positions of Chief Counsellor, Chief of the Civil Affairs Bureau, and Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau. However, this government proved to be of little significance in light of the warlord control of Kwangtung.¹ As in 1917-1918, Sun was directing an administration on the sufferance of others. Once again the experience turned out to be equally short-lived, as Ch'en expelled Sun's government from Canton on June 16, 1922. Both Sun and Hu found their way back to Shanghai to set about regrouping once more.

In the months following the expulsion from Canton Sun's career seemed to have reached its nadir. According to one assessment, "many of Sun's friends and followers advised him to give up political life completely in view of his demonstrated inefficiency."² Sun's indestructible optimism prevented this
from happening, but the unpromising political situation did make him receptive to any new methods that might promise hope. It was against this background that the Comintern representative Maring (Henrik Sneevliet) met Sun in August 1922 with a proposal for a United Front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This type of tactical alliance between Communists and "bourgeois nationalists" Maring first had promoted in the Dutch East Indies in the form of the Sarekat Islam. Now Maring sought to create a similar type of alliance in China. 3

This Chinese version of the united front strategy had been several months in the making before Maring presented his plan to Sun Yat-sen. His first contact with the Kuomintang leader had come in December 1921 at Sun's military headquarters in Kweilin. In the course of their discussions Sun enquired at length about conditions in the Soviet Union, while Maring stressed the need for mass organizational work on the part of the Kuomintang. Maring may have made suggestions to Sun about the reorganization of the KMT, and may have proposed some form of cooperation between the KMT and the CCP. It is apparent that Maring was impressed by Sun's interest in the Soviet Union, and by Sun's somewhat socialistic ideas. 4 Since the KMT seemed to be a possible ally, Maring next had to convince the Chinese Communist Party of the value of this alliance. This he attempted to do at a party plenum called in April 1922 at Hangchow. On his own initiative Maring proposed a United Front, by which the Communists would abandon "their exclusive position towards the Kuomintang" and would develop instead "political activities
inside that party." CCP members would enter the KMT, but at the same time the party would retain its own separate organization. As far as the KMT was concerned, its loose structure would make possible the rapid development of Communist organized mass activities. Ultimately, the CCP would be able to seize control of the KMT.5

Despite Maring's arguments in favour of the advantages of a United Front with the Kuomintang, the CCP leadership was lukewarm in its reception of the policy. Maring set off to Moscow, where he received official Comintern endorsement of his plan in the form of a directive on July 18 instructing the CCP to join the KMT. Maring then returned to China with this message, called a second plenum at Hangchow in August, and there presented the CCP with his united front strategy.6 This was fully accepted by the CCP leaders. Since this plenum coincided with Sun Yat-sen's return to Shanghai after his eviction from Canton, Maring was able to meet at once with Sun, and to advise him that the Comintern had instructed CCP members to join the KMT. Sun was agreeable to this arrangement, and shortly afterwards CCP members began to enter the Kuomintang on an individual basis.7

In making this important decision to admit the Communists into his party, Sun was supported by his long time associates, Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai and Hu Han-min. Hu certainly realized that the KMT was in desperate straits, and so he was most ready to accept a working relationship with the Soviet Union. This prospect of Soviet aid was what gave the United
Front its main appeal to the KMT. As far as the Chinese Communists were concerned, Hu supported Sun's decision to admit them to the KMT, although he did not display great enthusiasm for this policy. He did accept it as a political necessity, and the record shows that he was prepared to take an open attitude towards the alliance, and to see how it would work out in practice. In addition, Li Ta-chao’s assurance that the CCP would take the Three Principles of the People as the ideological basis of the alliance may have convinced Hu that the Communists would not try to wrest power from the KMT.

Along with the new arrangements for cooperation with the CCP and the Soviet Union, the KMT set into motion a programme of party reorganization. This slow process began in September with a conference in Shanghai attended by senior KMT personnel and two CCP delegates. This conference approved the United Front agreements made by Sun, and set up a committee to plan further details of the reorganization. Hu and Wang Ching-wei were appointed to draft the declaration on party reform. This manifesto was published on January 1, 1923. It began by recounting in brief the history of the party, and then provided an outline of the Five-Power Constitution, the plan suggested by Sun for the division of government into five mutually balancing parts. Sun's programme for the equalization of land rights and the government management of "natural monopolies" was advanced, along with a list of measures, all very moderate in nature, directed towards the economic betterment of the nation. A party constitution was drafted to supplement this document. It
outlined the administrative structure of the KMT: annual party congresses, the first of which was scheduled for January 1924; various committees on the national level, and a network of branch committees on the lower levels of the province and district. Sun's preeminent position was safeguarded. He was granted supreme power over the party in his capacity of Tsung-li (Director-general), and he was also given the right to name his own advisory council. Shortly after these reorganization meetings took place Sun further strengthened his position in the new alliance through a series of negotiations with the Soviet emissary, Adolph Joffe. In a joint declaration issued on January 26, 1923, Joffe promised Sun the assistance of the Soviet Union, while assuring Sun that neither Communism nor the Soviet system was suitable for China at that time. To Sun, and to those older members of the KMT such as Hu, this admission seemed to guarantee KMT hegemony over the United Front.

With his party in the process of reorganization, and with the Soviets prepared to render him aid, Sun only required a territorial base. This soon materialized, once again in Canton, and this time it proved durable. In late January 1923 Sun's forces, helped by those of two local warlords, drove Ch'en Chiung-ming out of Canton. The next month Sun returned to set up his "National Government." He took the title of Generalissimo, and Hu was appointed his special assistant, with the title of General Adviser to Headquarters. Throughout the year, the consolidation of the base area took place. The most important task that now faced Sun and his supporters was the completion of
the party reorganization. This received a great stimulus with the arrival in October of Michael Borodin, the envoy of the Soviet Communist Party. Borodin immediately became a special adviser to Sun, and helped to direct the Kuomintang towards its forthcoming First Congress.

After Borodin's arrival, Sun appointed a nine-man committee to draft the new party manifesto, and the final version of the party constitution. Hu was named a member, as was Liao Chung-k'ai. T'an P'ing-shan was the only Communist on the committee. Borodin acted as adviser. Very quickly there appeared a split on the question of social policy. Borodin proposed radical policies of labour reform and land confiscation which met with opposition from the KMT members. Sun persuaded Borodin to settle for milder measures, such as rent reduction and the formation of peasant associations. This programme was adopted for the party manifesto, and the breach between the two sides was momentarily closed.

At the same time as he was facing this challenge from the left, Sun also had to contend with an attack on the United Front from veteran members of his own party. In December Sun was presented with an impeachment of the Communists by Teng Tse-ju and several representatives of the newly forming "right." This motion called for the expulsion of the Communists, who were charged with being agents of Moscow and proponents of social revolution. Sun used his great authority to reject this motion, and to force the members of the right to accept the alliance. He told them that at all times the Soviets would have to
cooperate with the KMT. If they did not, the alliance would be
terminated.\(^\text{16}\) Hu supported Sun in all of these measures. He
did not share Liao Chung-k'ai's enthusiasm for the United
Front, but he felt, as did Sun, that the alliance was of value
to the KMT. He was prepared to give the CCP a full opportunity
to prove its intentions.\(^\text{17}\) At the First Congress of the
reorganized Kuomintang, Hu established his centrist position
more firmly.

The First Year of the United Front:
January 1924–March 1925

On January 20, 1924 the First Congress of the Kuomintang
met in Canton with 160 delegates in attendance. Sun appointed
Hu to a five-man presidium to guide the deliberations of the
congress. The policies of alliance with Russia and cooperation
with the CCP in the form of a United Front were accepted. In
addition, the Leninist principle of centralized organization
was imposed on the party, though the effect of this was somewhat
compromised by Sun's reservation to himself of final authority
on all questions. Within the KMT itself there was some
opposition to the specific terms of admission granted to the
Communists. Towards the end of the congress the party
constitution came up for debate. One of the delegates, Fang
Jui-lin, proposed a motion prohibiting KMT members from holding
membership in any other party. In this he was supported by a
young representative of the Canadian overseas Chinese, Huang
Chi-lu.\(^\text{18}\) This motion would have forced the CCP members to
renounce their own party membership if they were to join the KMT.

Li Ta-chao replied to this challenge. He stated that the CCP had entered into the alliance with the KMT in order to bring about the national revolution, and not to change the KMT into the CCP. He and his colleagues joined the KMT as individual members of the Third International and the Communist Party, and not as a bloc intent on implementing its own policies. However, some members of the KMT were unconvinced by these assurances. They demanded that special measures be taken for the supervision of the Communists. Hu then intervened in the debate. He sought to avoid a split appearing in the newly formed alliance. Hu advanced the suggestion that further regulations were unnecessary, since the party constitution made adequate provisions for party discipline. If problems should arise they could be settled within the existing framework. This motion was accepted, and for the moment the contentious issue of Communist participation was laid to rest.19

At this initial stage in the history of the United Front, it is abundantly clear from the evidence that Hu fully accepted the need to work with the Communist Party, and that he had an open mind about the future of the alliance. For him the most important benefit of this new arrangement was the organizational reconstruction of the Kuomintang. In this respect Hu seems to have been more of a scientific revolutionary, or "natural Leninist," than Sun Yat-sen, who may have had a more enterprising spirit but who lacked the inner discipline and consistency to
make the revolutionary movement effective. Thus it was that the concept of democratic centralism especially appealed to Hu as a way out of the party's previous difficulties. He defended its adoption in one of the early sessions of the Congress:

If our party wants to attain the goal of the national revolution, and become the party of the masses, then it cannot rely solely on a spirit of self-imposed discipline on the part of its membership. A revolutionary mass political party must possess a universal and coercive type of discipline. . . . If we lack the organization and the discipline that is based on democratic centralism we absolutely will not succeed. A political party without organization might as well be an anarchist club. In no way can it be a vanguard for the people, nor can it struggle for the liberation of the nation.

To the KMT this structure offered a striking alternative to the extremely individualistic and often disorganized parties of the past. Hu had always emphasized that these flaws had arisen from the loose structure of the T'ung-meng Hui and the Chinese Revolutionary Party, and he had also frequently drawn attention to the mistake that had been made in turning the T'ung-meng Hui into an open political party in 1912. This explains why he readily adopted the new form of organization taken by the party in 1924, and why he was willing to work with the CCP in the United Front. But his acceptance of the reorganization was completely for the purpose of securing the national revolution in China under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang. There was no compromise that could be made with this fundamental belief.

Throughout much of the year and a half following the First Congress, Hu was involved in United Front work at the centre, in the city of Canton itself. Hu's position in the KMT was a key
one. At the congress he had been elected to the five-man standing committee of the Central Executive Committee (CEC). Because of his seniority in the party Hu was detailed temporarily to Shanghai for organizational work. This was the head office of one of the five regional bureaus of the party that had been set up immediately after the First Congress, and next to Canton it was the most important. On February 25 the first meeting of the Shanghai Executive Bureau was held. Hu, Wang Ching-wei and a member of the party right, Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, formed the standing committee which supervised the Bureau's functions. In addition, Hu took on the directorship of the important Organization Bureau. 22

It was while he was in Shanghai that Hu came into contact with the young Mao Tse-tung, who had been named his deputy in the organization office. Mao also acted as secretary to the full Executive Bureau, over which Hu presided as chairman. What effect this working relationship may have had on the two men is difficult to say, especially as Hu was called back to Canton less than four months after his arrival in Shanghai. Mao certainly was an enthusiast about United Front work at this time, to the extent that one of his rivals in the party, Li Li-san, later referred to him unflatteringly as "Hu Han-min's secretary." 23 Robert Payne, in his sometimes rather fanciful account of Mao's life during these years, states that Mao held Hu in esteem because the latter had edited and written for Min-pao in the formative period of Mao's youth. Furthermore, Mao supposedly gained from Hu "a close knowledge of the workings of the Kuomintang." 24 Neither of these claims is implausible; in fact,
Hu's writings on Marxism in 1919, taken along with his impressive revolutionary career, do make it possible that Mao may have held Hu in high regard at this time.

Whether or not the above speculation is true, it does seem most unlikely that, conversely, Mao made much of an impression on Hu during the Shanghai period. Mao's position was much too junior, the gap between the two men too great for anything but the formal working relationship, and contact was probably limited to official meetings, where Mao took the minutes. According to Huang Chi-lu's recollection, the only occasion on which Mao's name came up during the United Front years was in 1926, when in a conversation Hu dismissed Mao as being simply "a little Communist devil" (kung-ch'an-tang hsiao-kuei). Not too long after Hu left Shanghai, probably by the end of the summer, Mao himself retired from the Bureau on the grounds of ill health, though it is more likely that criticism from his own party colleagues, and increasingly hostile activity by Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang and his anti-Communist supporters, made Mao's position untenable.

During his brief stay in Shanghai, then, it is apparent that Hu Han-min worked for the attainment of the United Front objectives. In addition, he defended the alliance publicly. Hu's attitude is displayed clearly in an article that was published in the March issue of the Bureau's journal, Min-kuo jih-pao (The National Republic Daily). Under the title, "A Criticism of Criticisms of the Kuomintang," Hu responded to charges levelled at the KMT by several Hong Kong newspapers. In more
detail he also discussed some points raised the previous December in Hsin ch'ing-nien by the noted Communist, Ch'ü Ch'iu-p'ai. In his article, which was called "From Democracy to Socialism," Ch'ü attacked the secret society type of organization of the old Kuomintang, a style he dismissed as being characterized by the use of such "playthings" as finger-printing of members and oaths of allegiance to the leader. Hu took this particular criticism with some sensitivity, since he had been involved closely with Sun in all the earlier unsuccessful revolutionary movements. However, he willingly accepted Ch'ü's criticisms about the overly loose structure of the party at that time. Hu stated that, from these earlier experiences, the KMT had recognized that lax discipline had resulted in individual members interpreting party doctrine to suit their own interest. Such derelictions went uncorrected, since the party did not have the means for supervision and control. However, the recent KMT reorganization marked a major step forward, and Hu said he hoped that Ch'ü's misgivings would now be laid to rest.

Hu then went on to discuss matters beyond those of organization. The party was to appeal to the broad mass of people. He dismissed as absurd the rumours propagated by some Hong Kong papers that the KMT was being "Bolshevized," and he pointedly welcomed into the party the Communists or any other sympathetic group, so that all could work for a "movement of all the people." Hu also called on "all progressive thinkers" to join the party. In his formulation of the "movement," Hu expressed the fundamental
Kuomintang viewpoint on the class question. Since Sun Yat-sen had made the definition that all Chinese, with the exception of the compradores, warlords and a few other renegades, suffered from a common fate of oppression, then the way into the KMT was open virtually to all. Class cooperation was essential in the struggle against imperialism. There was a vital necessity for a United Front to carry out this mission.

In this article, however, Hu agreed that the above call for cooperation might not prevent conflict between the CCP and the KMT. He admitted that there were the two distinct groups in the alliance, but he attempted to gloss over the difference by referring to their adherents as the "new" and the "old" party members. Hu quoted Li Ta-chao's assurance to him that the only thing to separate the two groups was the time of their entry into the KMT. Any policy disagreements, Hu went on to suggest, would occur simply over the speed with which decisions should be implemented. These differences would be minor ones, and would cause no problem to the alliance since party regulations and party discipline were accepted by all members. Hu again invoked Li's promise that CCP members were working for the good of the KMT as a whole, a promise seized on regularly at this time by KMT defenders of the United Front. In summary, it may be said that at the beginning of his work in Shanghai Hu definitely wanted the alliance to function, but he was under no illusion about possible tensions developing between the two partners. He may well have been trying to convince himself of the feasibility of an ultimately unworkable political alliance. However,
it was not the theoretical position of the CCP but the political actions of that party that primarily determined Hu's assessment of the United Front during its formative stage.

There is evidence offered by two quite different sources, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Huang Chi-lu, that by the end of his stay in Shanghai Hu had come to experience some definite doubts about the alliance. There had been friction between KMT and CCP members in Canton and Shanghai since the First Congress. The presence in Shanghai of such members of the KMT right as Hsieh Ch'ih and Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang may account for difficulties created on the KMT side in that city. However, the main cause of the growing estrangement between the KMT and the CCP was the success of the latter in organizing mass movements among the students and workers, the more volatile sectors of the urban population. With its tightly knit organization and idealistic social message the Communist Party could not but achieve impressive results on the grass roots level, and this in turn threatened the hegemony of the Kuomintang over the whole nationalist revolutionary movement. To discuss this growing friction in the United Front the CCP called a plenum in Shanghai in May 1924. Chang Kuo-t'ao's recollection of a conversation with Ch'en Tu-hsiu is most revealing of Hu's position at the time. Ch'en happened to mention that Wang Ching-wei and Chang Chi had just called on him to make known the feelings of Hu and Hsieh Ch'ih on the growth of "fractions" within the alliance. Both Hu and Hsieh believed that this development contradicted the assurances given earlier in the year by Li Ta-chao. Ch'en admitted privately to
Chang that he understood why they were concerned. From his own point of view Ch'en said that the early manifestation of these misgivings troubled him greatly. Chang relates: "He (Ch'en) felt that Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei and Chang Chi were in a position to represent the whole KMT.... These three could not be considered rightists; they supported the reorganization of the KMT." This indicated to Ch'en the seriousness of the differences that were beginning to show.

In the same vein, Huang Chi-lu remarks that by the summer of 1924, that is, just after his return from the Shanghai Bureau, Hu was becoming "anti-Communist" in the sense of wanting "limitations" placed on the CCP's activities. Hu did not want the CCP expelled from the United Front. As long as Sun was alive he believed the Communist Party could be managed. However, doubts certainly were arising in Hu's mind about the participation of the Communists in the KMT. There was a contradiction here that could not be resolved as long as the CCP continued to develop its own organization and popular support. As a result, Hu Han-min and those other party members who originally belonged to the centre became increasingly more uncertain of the policy of "toleration," and began to move slowly towards a position on the right.

Before Hu had further opportunities to confront the growing problems in Shanghai, he was summoned back to Canton on May 13. Sun named Hu and Tai Chi-t'ao as political instructors at the Whampoa Academy, which was then accepting its first class of cadets. Both men were to lecture on Sun's theories. The more
important reason for Hu's sudden return to Canton lay in Sun's deteriorating health. Sun always seems to have regarded Hu as his first administrative deputy. Hu was placed in charge of Military Headquarters while Sun was absent from the front, and later was named Chief of Staff. Sun also created a new advisory and executive body, the Central Political Council, and appointed Hu to this intimate inner group. The creation of this body, incidentally, represented a diversion of authority from the Central Executive Committee, which supposedly was second to Sun himself in terms of power within the party, although at this time the Political Council did not play a noticeable role in party affairs. At the initial meeting of the Council a Military Affairs Committee was formed, with Hu as one of the nine members. In the proliferating committee system of the Canton government Hu continued to collect political positions, but this system made for a confused and dangerous dispersion of power which only Sun Yat-sen was capable of holding together.

Hu's loyalty to party policy and his continuing attempt to maintain in public a centre position towards the United Front are confirmed by his reaction to an attempted impeachment of the CCP. In June 1924 three members of the KMT Central Supervisory Committee presented this bill, and withdrew it only when Sun showed his displeasure. Hu backed Sun's decision. However, the whole matter of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation required further discussion. This took place at the second plenum of the KMT, which was held in mid-August. As chairman of one of the sessions Hu presented the problem that existed for the party. There were
three positions that had established themselves by that time. One was full support of the alliance; a second was that of complete opposition to it. The third position, which was the one held by Hu himself, favoured CCP participation in the KMT as long as the former did not form a "fraction" carrying on clandestine activities. The question, as always, was how to ensure that the CCP would keep itself in the open. The plenum, in its communique, repeated the admonitions against secret activity in the KMT, and emphasized again the leading position of the KMT in ideology and politics. Hu also suggested the creation of a body to act as liaison between the KMT on the one hand and the CCP and Comintern on the other, as he thought that this might allow for more direct and forthright contact between the two partners. This proposal was mentioned in the communique as well, but it seems never to have been acted upon. Hu did not follow up his suggestion. Once more, military problems became pressing in Canton, and these demands, taken with his work as Sun's deputy, took up Hu's attention in the ensuing months.

With the plenum scarcely finished Sun set about organizing his latest military endeavour, a northern expedition designed to push up into Hunan. As he was leaving for the front he appointed Hu to the positions of Acting Generalissimo and Governor of Kwangtung. Both titles Hu retained until the formation of the National Government in July 1925. This dual appointment superficially made Hu the second most powerful man in the Kuomintang administrative structure. However, the political infrastructure in Canton was by no means a highly integrated one,
and authority often could not be enforced on the lower levels, particularly the military ones. Sun had complicated the whole problem by his own compulsive committee forming, which played havoc with the party's organization. All of these entangled strands are to be seen in the episode of the Canton Merchants' Corps in October 1924. Moreover, this event throws another interesting sidelight on Hu's growing doubts about the United Front.

The Canton Merchants' Corps was a para-military body financed by compradores with Hong Kong connections. It posed a serious threat to KMT control of Canton. In early October the decision was taken to disarm the force, and Hu issued the command to do so. The order was not complied with. At this point the picture becomes somewhat obscured, but the evidence does show Hu being pushed into the background despite his presumably supreme position in Canton. On October 9 Sun ordered Chiang Kai-shek to organize a Revolutionary Committee to deal with the Corps. When Borodin heard of this he met with Chiang and "expressed himself strongly" against the inclusion of Hu and Wang Ching-wei in the Committee. Chiang neglected to take Borodin's advice, and wrote to Sun requesting the inclusion of the two in the Committee. Sun then completed the exchange with the following significant comments:

The Revolutionary Committee must be formed at once to meet all kinds of emergencies. It is unnecessary to include Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei in the Committee. Today our revolution must follow the Russian pattern, and Hu Han-min has lost faith in this.... Henceforth our revolution can never succeed unless we follow Soviet Russia as our model. I am afraid that both Hu and Wang cannot bring themselves to accept this policy.
In typical fashion, the next day Sun changed his mind and named Wang to the Committee. Hu was also allowed to attend, but without voting rights. The KMT troops were mobilized, and two days later the Corps had been removed as a threat to the city and the party. In this military operation the Whampoa cadets under Chiang Kai-shek played a conspicuous part, which was an indication of a new source of power being forged at this time. In a much more negative way, however, the political side of the Canton Merchants' episode was a clear revelation of how officially delegated power, in this instance Hu's, could be so easily undercut.

The Revolutionary Committee imbroglio may have been a rather insignificant event in itself, but it is of note for providing Sun's assessment of Hu's changed attitude towards the Russian alliance. At this time Hu's point of view remained private to his colleagues in the upper levels of the party. Sun's statement did not appear publicly until 1926. Hu's loyalty to leader and party kept him in official support of the United Front despite his now apparent misgivings. His growing disillusionment with the United Front and the Russian alliance was not a response, primarily, to the social policies being promoted by the CCP. It is true that Hu was becoming concerned about CCP influence over the mass organizations, but this was prompted more by the question of power than it was by the question of social policy. The motive force driving Hu towards a break with the CCP was his nationalism. He feared that both the CCP and KMT were being made subservient to Russian direction. This was more so regarding the CCP, since it seemed to be a willing victim. However, Sun was wrong
when he said that Hu no longer wanted to follow the Russian model. Hu welcomed the lessons to be learned from that model, and this is made obvious by Hu's words and actions before and after the reorganization of 1924. But he refused to accept any foreign direction of the revolutionary movement to which he had devoted his life, regardless of the value of the model offered.

Shortly after the resolution of the October incident, Sun set off for Peking at the invitation of the warlords there to discuss the possible unification of China. His illness was in its terminal stage. While in Peking Sun died, and the KMT was deprived of the one man who, despite his many faults, had held together and pushed forward through sheer tenacity and force of personality the Chinese nationalist movement.

The Political Eclipse of Hu Han-min: March-September 1925

The death of Sun Yat-sen cast a long shadow on the Kuomintang and on its relationship with the Chinese Communist Party. Sun's death also spelled the end to any hopes that Hu Han-min might have possessed that he would succeed to the leadership of the party. In less than four months Hu had lost his position as second man in the party, and had been named foreign minister in a government that had virtually no foreign relations to manage. Shortly thereafter, he was sent to Russia as an emissary of the Canton-based National Government on a mission that euphemistically disguised his position as a temporary political exile. After his return to China in the spring of
1926 Hu did play a role intermittently in the Kuomintang as a result of his close former association with Sun Yat-sen, his long revolutionary career, and his own talents as an ideological spokesman for the party. However, he had little in the way of a personal power base to fall back on. His later participation in the Nationalist Government in Nanking came about largely through Chiang Kai-shek's need for an ally. In view of Hu's own sense of seniority in the party, and his own independence of mind, it is not surprising that after 1926 he spent only three of the remaining ten years of his life in office. Whatever Hu might have brought to the Kuomintang in the form of enlightened, uncorrupt and nationalist leadership had been lost by late 1925 with his displacement from the Canton political stage.

It is possible to trace back to Sun Yat-sen himself one of the main factors that undermined Hu's position. Although it is true that Sun occupied such a preeminent position in the Kuomintang that there was no obvious successor to him, he had contributed greatly to this problem by treating the KMT as his own personal political preserve. At the time of his death, no clear line of succession had been established.42 In addition to Hu, there were three other men who possessed a claim to recognition by the party, and who were reluctant to grant to any of their peers a position equal to that occupied by Sun. First among the three was Wang Ching-wei, whose association with Sun went back to 1905, though it was not as close or unbroken a relationship as Hu's had been. Second was Liao Chung-k'ai, who was gifted in administrative ability and was favoured by the party left and the Communist
allies. Third was the most recent addition to the inner circle of disciples, Chiang Kai-shek, the builder of the party army. Hu Han-min stood opposite to them as the most senior administrator after Sun's death, occupying the posts of governor of Kwangtung and Acting Generalissimo. These offices in themselves by no means gave Hu an undisputed claim to the succession, but in March 1925, when the new political situation had to be resolved, they placed Hu in a starting position certainly somewhat more equal than that of the other three contenders. For them the problem was this: if Hu could be neutralized or removed from power by constitutional means, party harmony might not be disrupted, but if illegal means had to be used the party might be split irreparably due to the strength of Hu's civilian following. Unfortunately for both Hu and the future course of the Kuomintang it was the second course that was the one more probable of realization.

In accounting for the removal of Hu from the centre of the political stage there are two important contributing factors that can be identified. The first of these was the hopeless confusion that existed within the different policy-making organs of the KMT. As already mentioned, Sun Yat-sen had subordinated to himself the whole party apparatus, and in so doing, had also obliterated the lines of authority that were supposed to exist between himself and the lower levels. He continually bypassed constituted organs such as the Central Executive Committee through the creation of ad hoc bodies. The most important of these was the Political Council, which was formed by him in July
1924 to act as his chief advisory and executive aide. Theoretically this body was subordinate to the CEC, but in effect Sun allowed it to assume the powers earlier vested in the larger body. The consequence of actions of this sort was that Sun had concentrated all power in his own hands and in those of a few close associates. The problem of the Political Council was made worse by Sun's frequent changes of its membership. James Shirley has commented that Sun's practice of haphazardly enlarging the Council had a most unstabilizing effect on it, and that after his death its members took upon themselves the right to expand or contract their numbers at will. The chief "constitutional" threat to Hu Han-min's position lay in the existence of this shadowy but powerful inner-party body.

The second factor that brought about Hu's demotion was the changing Kwangtung military situation, which ironically was improving for the KMT at this time. An attack that Ch'en Chiung-ming had launched on Canton shortly before Sun's death had just been repulsed by the counter-attack known as the First Eastern Expedition. This had been led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Soviet military advisers, although Hu exercised nominal civilian control. Once again the small party army of Whampoa cadets played a vital role in the victory. This success took the pressure off the eastern front for the KMT forces. Next in line was the effective restoration of Kuomintang control over the city of Canton, where the garrison consisted largely of the armies of two petty warlords of rather dubious loyalty to the nationalist cause.

It was ostensibly to resolve the Canton military situation
that a conference was held in eastern Kwangtung at Swatow in early May. At this meeting two leading KMT generals, Chiang Kai-shek and Hsü Ch'ung-chih, were present, along with Liao Chung-k'ai and Wang Ching-wei. According to James Shirley's investigation of this little known conference, the decision was taken there to push Hu into the background. In Chiang's diary mention is made of a discussion between Wang and Chiang about "political affairs," and about "plans to put an end to individualistic actions" within the party. Chiang stated that Wang "only wanted my word to decide." Although nothing more is known about this conference it is perhaps significant that all of its participants gained substantially when the government reorganization took place. Chiang, Hsü and two other allied generals held the military power in Kwangtung, but as Shirley has observed, they did not wish to replace Hu's government with an overtly military regime. Liao and Wang, in addition to offering their undoubted political and administrative skills, provided "the necessary respectability associated with the traditional civilian followers of Sun."

The showdown with the two militarists in Canton took place in early June. The troops of Chiang and Hsü made short work of the old style warlord armies. The stage was now set for the solution of the "political problem." This began with the convocation of a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee. At this session it was decided that there would be no successor to the position of Tsung-li and that a collective leadership organ, the National Government Council, would be
created to manage governmental affairs. With respect to party affairs the continued existence of the Political Council was sanctioned, and it was stated that the Council would supervise the National Government on behalf of the CEC. These decisions all met with Hu's approval, as he had been involved in discussions since Sun's death concerning the reorganization of the government on a more regularized civilian basis. On June 24 Hu gave public notice of the impending reorganization and transferral of his powers. Four days later the sixteen member National Government Council was named, with Hu, Liao, Wang, Hsü Chung-chih and Tai Chi-t'ao the major figures in it.

As the reorganization of the government moved on to completion, Hu obviously assumed that he would be continuing to serve in it in an important capacity. Here he was completely mistaken. Quite suddenly, on July 1, the Political Council, without having consulted Hu, announced the executive of the new government. Wang Ching-wei became the Chairman of the National Government Council, Liao became Finance Minister, Hsü took on the Defense Ministry, while Hu received the almost meaningless post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, an appointment that he later suggested was inappropriate in view of his lack of knowledge of "foreign etiquette" and of any foreign language apart from Japanese. Two days after the reorganization, Liao Chung-k'ai strengthened his hand further by succeeding to Hu's other former position as governor of Kwangtung. The only significant influence Hu retained was that of membership in the five-man standing committee of the Government Council.
This sudden and sweeping change in the balance of power within the Kuomintang had serious repercussions in the party. Many objected to the role played by the Political Council in deciding such an important matter, and in such a conspiratorial manner as well. Hu actually was a member of the Council, but had not attended the crucial meeting as he was completely unaware of any important business to be discussed. An attempt to question the Council's action was made at once by two of Hu's old friends, Tsou Lu and Teng Tse-ju. Tsou, a member of the CEC, challenged Wang Ching-wei on the Political Council's unexpected move. Tsou did not have sufficient strength to overturn the decision. Wang promised future abstention on the part of the Political Council from such decisions in return for approval of the reorganization. Thus the conspirators gained legal sanction for their coup after the event.

The matter did not rest here, though. Splits in the party soon began to appear, both on ideological grounds, because of the supposedly leftist orientation of the new government, and on factional grounds, because of the resentment of the older party members towards the arrivistes on the Canton political scene. Hu Han-min accepted his demotion temporarily out of loyalty to the party, and in his inaugural address as Minister of Foreign Affairs he tried to convey his satisfaction at taking on what he referred to as the important foreign responsibilities of the new administration. Privately he set about trying to reverse the Political Council's decision. For this he had much support, especially among the Kwangtung members of the KMT, who resented
the manner in which Hu had been deprived of his former position of importance. Huang Chi-lu, the opponent of Communist participation in the United Front at the First Congress, states that Hu sent him as an emissary with a "secret letter" to various members of the Central Executive Committee to bring them to Canton for a full plenary session. Some of these men already had arrived when the murder of Liao Chung-k'ai on August 20 radically changed the political situation. This allowed Hu's opponents once again to move first, and to assume emergency powers which were not responsible to the party machinery. This closed for good any opportunity that Hu might have had to regain some of the former power he had enjoyed.

It is worth noting that in all these machinations that went on in Canton the CCP played no role. Its Central Committee actually regarded Hu with some favour. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Hu was seen as the representative of the middle of the road faction in the KMT, a man willing to support the policies of alliance with Russia and acceptance of the CCP even if he was not overly enthusiastic about them. Ch'en Tu-hsiu told Chang in May 1925 that there would be trouble if Hu were "forcibly dragged down from his position of Acting Generalissimo," since Hu's influence in the Kuomintang was "very deep rooted." This view was not one shared by Borodin, however. By this time there existed between Hu and Borodin the most intense antipathy and suspicion. Chang mentions that Borodin did not speak of Hu in particularly flattering terms when they met in Canton in the spring of 1925. He also states that Borodin obviously had "no
confidence" in Hu, and that "when the opportunity presented itself, he would certainly suppress Hu." Further evidence of the strained relations between these two men comes from the erratic but useful source, Tang Leang-li, who states that Hu asked Borodin to become an adviser to the Foreign Ministry after his assumption of the portfolio, but that in a short time Borodin had "practically severed relations with Hu." Chang Kuo-t'ao's belief that Borodin would move against Hu if the opportunity presented itself was borne out in the events that followed Liao's assassination. But it must be emphasized that Borodin's role in internal Kuomintang affairs was extremely limited. Hu's fall from power resulted completely from a conspiracy within the KMT leadership. Whatever Borodin might be able to contribute to this could do nothing more than support decisions already taken by Hu's own political rivals.

The Liao Chung-k'ai affair marked the termination of Hu's participation in the Canton government and led directly to his "mission" to the Soviet Union. Much has been made of Hu's supposed involvement in Liao's death, although to this date not a shred of evidence has been produced to support this accusation. The major cause for suspicion has simply been one of guilt by association resulting from the fact that Hu's cousin, Hu I-sheng, was a suspect in the crime. (This purported involvement of Hu Han-min has been furthered by the mistaken notion held by many historians that Hu I-sheng was his brother, and therefore a presumed political intimate of Hu's.) The Liao Chung-k'ai case probably will never be resolved. What is known is rather
limited. Hu I-sheng was a member of the right in Canton, an editor of a newspaper there, and a definite political malcontent. He was able to find some support for his opposition to the National Government among troops in Hu Ch'ung-chih's Kwangtung Army, and with them formed a secret society named the "Culture Circle" (Wen-hua t'ang). This came to the attention of the Canton government, but before anything could be done, Liao was murdered on August 20. One of the assassins was caught, and soon the trail led to Hu I-sheng, though it is uncertain whether he had participated directly in the assassination plot. Two other men, one of whom was a former secretary to Sun Yat-sen and an acquaintance of Hu Han-min's, were arrested, but Hu I-sheng eluded capture and escaped to Hong Kong.

This assassination had great consequences for the balance of power within the Kuomintang. As soon as the murder occurred an emergency meeting of its different committees delegated dictatorial powers to a three-man Special Committee composed of Wang, Hsü and Chiang. For Chiang this was the first post of a civilian nature that he had held in the Nationalist movement. The immediate tasks of the Committee were to settle the Liao affair and prevent any further right-wing terrorist activities. However, the plenary powers granted it also spelled the end of the period of broadly based collective leadership in Canton. One of the first acts of the Committee was to grant Hu Han-min refuge at the Whampoa base. Because of the involvement of his cousin, and the antagonism that existed between his followers and those of the Wang-Liao faction, suspicion fell on Hu in the
excited days following the murder. This was aggravated by some of the local Communists, who took a more hostile attitude towards Hu than did their Central Committee in Shanghai.

The problem that presented itself then to the Special Committee was what should be done with Hu in view of the tense political scene in Canton. Borodin, who was the adviser to the Committee, wanted to have Hu put under arrest, but this was vetoed by Chiang and Wang. Borodin then offered another solution. Hu was to be sent to Moscow as the KMT representative to the Comintern, which was scheduled to meet in plenary session early the next year. This proposal was readily adopted by the Committee. It also removed from the Canton political scene the man Borodin most wanted out of the way. According to Harold Isaacs, the "skilful manoeuvring" by which Borodin accomplished this was something of which he was "evidently very proud." Borodin intended more than a short, investigative trip for Hu. On the eve of Hu's departure for Russia he sent a telegram to the CCP Central Committee in Shanghai which explained the nature of Hu's mission, and which stated that he hoped that the Comintern would keep Hu in Russia and not permit him to leave. Borodin's request for support for this proposal met with a mixed reception. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, the Central Committee always had regarded Hu as "a representative of the centre of the KMT." Voitinsky, the Comintern representative, opposed Borodin's suggestion. He stated that if Hu had been involved in the Liao plot he should have been punished in Canton; otherwise he would have to be treated as innocent. Apparently Borodin agreed to
send this contradictory formulation of the case to Moscow, which, as Chang remarked with understatement, "would give the Comintern a difficult problem to deal with." Thus, in a strange turn of events, Hu's relationship to the Liao affair was inconclusively settled by the CCP in Shanghai, and Hu was to go to Moscow as the representative of the KMT, with little about the background to his mission sent on ahead to the Soviets.

The Russian Experience: October 1925-March 1926

The arrival of Hu Han-min and his party of five in Moscow on October 18 was greeted with great fanfare and a massive public reception. Pravda gave full coverage to the event and described Hu as "one of the most eminent leaders of the Chinese revolutionary movement." For the Soviet regime Hu in fact was one of the most senior men from a sympathetic but non-Communist Asian party to have been sent on a mission to Moscow, and throughout his stay Hu was treated as a great revolutionary celebrity. Whatever suspicion, however unjustified, there had been cast on Hu because of the Liao affair obviously had not penetrated very deeply into the Russian leadership.

This point is worth a few words of elaboration, since the question naturally arises that both Moscow and Hu Han-min simply played out a game of mutual self-deception, one which renders meaningless all of the political statements made by each party. However, on the "Hu question" Moscow certainly had little information to go on. As previously mentioned, the CCP Central Committee had given up trying to resolve the problem, and had
sent an ambiguous telegram ahead to Moscow. Karl Radek, the Comintern member who was Hu's principal host, apparently knew nothing of the immediate political background to Hu's mission. Some vague inklings about something being amiss were present, though, as Pravda published a rumour printed in a Tientsin newspaper to the effect that Hu had been tricked on board a Soviet ship and would not be permitted to return to China. According to the Pravda account, Hu "declared that this was a lie from beginning to end." There the matter rested. If in fact the details of the Liao case were known in Moscow, then one might assume that some type of cover-up had taken place in the highest circles. It is impossible to know. The Russians either regarded Hu as a bona fide delegate, or else they made the necessary allowances because of the political importance of his mission. As for Hu himself, he was a skilled political figure in his own right, a man who had to play a careful hand on behalf of the political movement that had sent him to the Soviet capital. Some mutual deception was to be expected on both sides.

Having made the above argument, it may then be said that the message Hu brought to Russia was one in which he put the Kuomintang position in the most obvious and emphatic way. A certain amount of rhetoric did accompany the substance of his case, but this consists of slogans and exhortations natural to the heated professional revolutionary scene in Moscow. Divested of these embellishments, his words clearly spelled out the hegemony of the Kuomintang in both the ideological and political spheres of the Chinese revolution. One searches in vain for any
references to the Chinese Communist Party, despite Hu's being a guest of the Comintern. Hu stressed that the Chinese revolution was a multi-class, anti-imperialist movement directed by the KMT, and that what assistance the Russians could provide was in the area of revolutionary strategy and tactics. This message was put so forthrightly that it is difficult to see why some historians have seen Hu duping the Russians with his slippery rhetoric. This misreading seems to result largely from the erroneous assumption that when Hu left for Moscow he was either a reactionary, which he never was, or a disguised rightist, which at that time he was not. To be precise, Hu left Canton in September 1925 as a man with serious doubts about the ability of the KMT to work with the CCP and the Russians in the United Front. However, it was his experiences in Russia that confirmed these doubts. But whether in Canton, in Russia, or back in China after his mission, Hu was first of all a representative of the Kuomintang, and a man with an unshakeable belief in the unique role that the KMT had to play in the Chinese national revolution. This was the touchstone of his political faith, and this never changed, regardless of the tactical shifts necessitated by the political situation.

From the beginning Hu laid emphasis on the investigative purposes of his trip. Pravda printed a statement by Hu on this point in its coverage of his arrival in Moscow. The ideas that Hu gave expression to throughout this time in Russia were stated here with transparent clarity.
We have come to the USSR in order to study on the spot the political and economic situation of the USSR, as well as to study the changes in the social and economic structure of the state that have taken place since the Revolution. We wish to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks the tactics and the strategy which should be followed by the revolutionary organization in China during this epoch of the national-revolutionary movement in the East.

Hu then went on to describe the situation in China:

The Chinese people must continue their national-revolutionary struggle against the imperialists, and in this work they must go arm in arm with the world proletariat.

The movement is now reaching deep into the popular masses of China. The goal of this movement is the complete liberation of China from the imperialist yoke. It is not true that this movement is presently weakening. It is going deeper and deeper, taking in newer and newer strata of the people all the time.

Shortly after his arrival Hu was asked to contribute articles to Pravda and The Workers' Gazette. The longer of the two he wrote was entitled "Impressions of the Soviet October Revolution." It had been submitted to Pravda in time for the November celebrations in response to an invitation from Bukharin, then editor of the paper. In the November 7 issue the opening paragraph of the Chinese text was reproduced, along with the Russian translation, and a promise that the balance of the article would soon follow. The exuberant tone of Hu's greetings is conveyed in this excerpt:

The Soviet October Revolution is the greatest event of the twentieth century: it is the first cry of proletarian liberation, the first court to proclaim the death sentence on capitalism, the first gospel for the oppressed peoples of the world, the first act in bringing about the success of the Marxist revolution. It is the first chapter in the true history of mankind. Those of us present on this day . . . have impressions so countless . . . that it is possible for me at the moment only to discuss the four most important aspects of the relationship between the October Revolution and the Chinese Revolution.
After this heady rhetoric, certainly fitting to the occasion, the four points were presented in a much more sober manner, and one which implied Chinese dependence on Russia for no more than advice on how to carry out the revolution. These comments appeared in Pravda on November 19. The introduction and the first point made by Hu were omitted from the Russian text, but this seems likely for want of space. A comparison of that part of the text printed in Pravda with the full Chinese text, which was not published until May 1927, shows no significant differences, although the Russian text does read more like a precis. The agreement between these passages leaves no reason to doubt that the later complete Chinese text is not a faithful version of the article Hu submitted to Pravda. Because of its completeness, the Chinese text is used here to convey Hu's views on the Russian revolution.

According to Hu, the first form of assistance rendered to the Chinese revolution was to be found in the inspiration provided by its Russian counterpart. As a result of the Russian experience, the Chinese could see more clearly the future course of their own revolution. It is interesting to note that Hu admitted that the chief flaw in the Chinese revolutionary movement during the early years of the century was its overly political focus. This had come about because the overthrow of the Manchus had preempted all other concerns. The force of imperialism had been completely ignored. The masses had not counted for enough in the calculations of the revolutionaries, and had been neither organized nor trained. Therefore, the
Republic proved a fiasco, undermined by its weak internal foundation and by its inability to withstand external pressures. The Russian example had pointed out how much deeper a revolution must go in order to succeed, and how much more militant a stand against imperialism it must adopt. With regard to the question of imperialism, Hu stated that the greatest example of revolutionary leadership provided by the Russians was to be found in their renunciation of the unequal treaties. The imperialists had accused the Russians of stirring up the Chinese to engage in revolution. In fact, said Hu, they were completely correct. However, it was not material assistance but the moral example set by the Russians that had provided such a stimulus to the Chinese revolution.

Hu next discussed China's workers and peasants. Here he elaborated on the point made above that the failure of the 1911 Revolution was in large part due to the minimal involvement of these people. From the Russian experience the Chinese revolutionaries had learned that, since these people provided both the basis and the rearguard of the revolutionary forces, their consciousness had to be developed, and their cooperation with the workers and peasants of other countries had to be furthered. For the workers the development of this consciousness was not so difficult. They realized that the Canton national government was "their government." The peasants, however, presented more of a problem, as they were "lacking in education" and were "extremely conservative." They were scattered about the countryside in many small villages, far from the centres of political
life. But they did account for eighty percent of the population. It was encouraging to note that they were beginning to display greater political awareness, as well as accepting the leadership of the revolutionary party, that is, the Kuomintang. Here Hu cited the involvement of the Kwangtung peasants in fighting Ch'en Chiung-ming as an encouraging example of this trend. However, these new developments could be furthered only by party direction. The lesson that the party must involve itself in this type of work had been one taught most effectively by the Russians.

In discussing how the Russians helped bring about a better understanding of the role to be played by the workers and peasants, Hu revealed a significant gap in his own comprehension of the problem. He credited the rising political awareness of both groups to their recognition that imperialism lay at the root of their misery. The urban worker suffered capitalist exploitation directly, while the peasant suffered the depredations of the warlords, who were tools of the imperialists. Hu certainly could argue that foreign imperialism did have an effect on the peasant in this way, but the explanation did not go far in accounting for the poverty and wretchedness of the peasant's life. And warlordism itself owed as much to internal Chinese conditions as to foreign sponsorship. What stands out in Hu's assessment of the peasant's lot is the absence of any reference to the immediate and crucial problems affecting the peasant's survival. In this discussion the concepts of landlordism and usurious exploitation of the peasantry never appear. The whole
oppressive social and economic system of rural China is missing from Hu's depiction of the peasant problem, a notable omission in view of the Russian audience he was addressing. Why then did Hu want to mobilize the peasantry? There was one major reason for this, the destruction of the imperialists and their henchmen. The introduction and practice of proper organizational techniques would facilitate this. Although he could not say it bluntly, the possibility that this newly organized power might be directed, or might move spontaneously, towards social revolution was a concept he could not accept, because for Hu the necessary social betterment could only come about in an orderly manner under the supervision of the Kuomintang.

The third and fourth points raised by Hu were quite straightforward examples of what Melville Kennedy has called "operational guidelines" that the Russians had outlined to the Chinese. These concerned the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1923-1924 and the creation of a party army. Hu reiterated many of the observations he had made elsewhere about the loosely organized, ill-disciplined character of the nationalist movement prior to the reorganization. In this respect there is an interesting comment made by Hu to the effect that the excessively individualistic actions of the members of the earlier parties resulted from their backgrounds either in the intelligentsia or petty bourgeoisie. One other comment is worth noting because of its unintentional foresight with respect to the future of the KMT. In the conclusion to his fourth point, Hu ventured the opinion that "in the history of the Chinese revolution the
value of creating the party army will be as great as that
of reorganizing the party.\textsuperscript{81}

Hu's \textit{Pravda} article flattered the Russians without saying
much about the current Chinese situation. His other article
published at the time, "The True Meaning of the Kuomintang,\textsuperscript{82}
laied out the theoretical position of the KMT with complete lack
of ambiguity. At the outset he stated that:\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{quote}
The programme of the Kuomintang is derived from the Three
Principles of the People. The KMT is the only organization
for those taking part in the Chinese revolution. . . .
The KMT is based on the workers and peasants, and it acts
in the interest of all the people.
\end{quote}

Following Sun Yat-sen's lead, Hu defined the present task of
the Chinese revolution as being the overthrow of warlordism and
imperialism. The means by which this would be achieved was an
alliance of all the oppressed within China. Hu spelled this out
in more detail:\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{quote}
In the period of the national revolution all the Chinese
people make up a class suffering bitterly under imperialist
oppression. Apart from that class of militarists and
compradores which intrigues with imperialism, all other
classes strive for China's freedom and equality. . . . We
certainly shall bring together the strengths of the
different classes in order to advance the revolution. We
certainly shall not treat any class with disdain, nor
refuse to work with any class.
\end{quote}

Here may be noted once again not only the familiar two-class
formulation of Chinese society, but also the extremely imprecise
use of the term "class." In this passage, specific groups such
as compradores are described as members of a class. Hu refers
to classes in such a way as to indicate that he had in mind
several different classes within China. Perhaps they might be
better termed "sub-classes," since Hu never abandons the general
framework of the two classes of oppressors and oppressed. These various lesser classes seem to represent interest groups more than anything else, though of course there was a connection between the interest group and its economic position. With the exception of the pawns of the imperialists, all these groups sought a free and equal China. The common national aim completely overrode whatever internal divisions might exist among them. Force was necessary only against those "classes," or more accurately, groups, that opposed the national interest. Thus the concept of class, as displayed here, was not only used indiscriminately by Hu, but more important, it was used in a manner that divested it of its vital Marxist sense of irreconcilable social struggle.

The final point of note in this article is Hu's statement of the doctrinal supremacy of Sun's teachings within the KMT. In ideological matters, there could be "no divergent interpretations." Hu spoke briefly on min-sheng-chu-ı, quoting Sun's beliefs that this principle embraced both socialism and communism, and that the ultimate goal of communism could be realized only through the application of his own ideas. Hu also proclaimed that this principle of the people's livelihood would not be allowed to degenerate into the reformist socialism of the Second International, a ringing promise obviously designed for the edification of his Russian hosts. What is of more concern is Hu's concluding statement on the question of KMT ideology:

We absolutely shall not allow anyone to cut off (ko-lieh) one part of the Three Principles of the People in order to use it in the interests of his own class. This would mean the rejection of the doctrine in its entirety.
Given the above definition of the Kuomintang position, it is impossible to see how there could not be conflict between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party. Only for immediate political reasons could this difference be ignored. However, in light of what he wrote in Russia, Hu cannot be charged with furthering a deception that the United Front alliance would last indefinitely, or would last even in the short run on anything but the Kuomintang's own terms.

These two articles, together with the statements made to Pravda immediately after his arrival in Moscow, constitute the principal public record of Hu's activities in the Soviet capital during the fall of 1925. In December, Hu had some informal meetings with the Soviet leaders, and late in the month he conveyed the official greetings of the Kuomintang to the Fourteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. For the most part, though, he was biding his time until the scheduled February convening of the sixth session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), to which he had been accredited as the Kuomintang representative. It was during these months that Hu was inactive in Moscow that there occurred two events in China which cast a revealing light on Hu's attitude towards the United Front, and, conversely, on the attitude of the United Front participants towards Hu. The first of these events was the Western Hills Conference of November 1925. The growing Communist influence in the alliance had caused a group of senior KMT members, which included Tsou Lu, Chang Chi and Tai Chi-t'ao, to set up their own Executive Committee and expel the Communists
in the name of the Kuomintang. Most of the men involved had been members of the Shanghai Executive Committee, which tends to confirm the view that Shanghai was the place where the United Front ran aground most quickly. According to Huang Chi-lu, Hu "sympathized" with the aims of this group of dissidents, most of whom had been on their way to Canton in support of Hu when the Liao affair occurred the previous August. However, when Hu heard of the Western Hills Conference, he despatched a telegram to Wang Ching-wei denouncing it. Without doubt, political constraints made him adopt this position publicly. But it is also possible to argue that, whatever his sympathies towards the breakaway group may have been, Hu was compelled to draw the line when the unity of the party was threatened. Limitation of the Communists was one matter; fragmentation of the movement he had worked so long to build was quite another.

The other event of importance was the Second Congress of the Kuomintang, which was held in January 1926. Hu was elected, in absentia, to the Central Executive Committee, and then to the Standing Committee of the Political Council. What is noteworthy about these elections is that Hu was tied with Chiang, Wang and T'an Yen-k'ai for the highest number of ballots, 248 out of a possible 252. At this congress the influence of the CCP and the left wing of the KMT was at its strongest. Hu was still regarded, evidently, as one of the most eminent United Front leaders, and as a man of a centrist political position not identified with either wing of the KMT. He may well have been seen as a symbol of unity, as well as a party representative.
doing good ideological work in Russia. In this respect, the leftist delegate Teng Yen-ta reported to the congress on his recent meeting with Hu in Moscow. According to Teng, the Russians regarded Hu with the greatest respect due to his work for the Chinese revolution. Hu, for his part, had come "to understand the fundamentals of the Russian revolution," and had taken note in particular of the strict discipline that prevailed within the Soviet Communist Party. Teng passed on to the congress a message from Hu expressing his concern over the unwillingness of "some comrades" to accept party discipline. Hu also felt that the time was favourable for the national revolution because of the conflicts among the militarists. In keeping with his Moscow style, Hu concluded his message by declaring that the revolution must be carried out with the aid of foreign revolutionary parties and the revolutionary masses of China. 92 This report by Teng was well received, testifying to Hu's continued high stature in the alliance, at least while he was conveniently out of the political storms then building in China.

In February Hu was drawn back into the world of Moscow politics, at least in an honorary capacity. On February 10, he was received as the guest of the Krestintern (the Peasant International), and its research body, the International Agrarian Institute. At this meeting he was introduced as "a senior member of the Kuomintang, who has given much study to the peasant question." Five days later, Hu was appointed to the presidium of the Krestintern's executive body, the International Peasant Council. 93 This position carried with it no obligations or
powers, as the Krestintern possessed little organization beyond its head office in Moscow. Of the many international Communist bodies set up in the Soviet capital, the Krestintern owns one of the least substantial histories, with its formal activities limited almost completely to the two years from 1923 to 1925. At the special reception arranged for Hu the Krestintern limited itself to exhortation. Organizational work among the world's peasantry should be intensified, and the Chinese peasantry should be brought into "close contact" with the peasant movements of other Asian countries in the common "struggle of the peasants against imperialism." This appeal for the mobilization of the peasantry as part of the anti-imperialist campaign was one which Hu fully supported, as long as peasant activity did not exceed this role.

Two days later, on February 17, the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern held its opening session. Hu's attendance at this congress had been the ostensible purpose of his despatch to Moscow the previous fall. This session of the Comintern was the last in which Zinoviev was able to exercise any of the power belonging to him as head of that body; in the December plenum later that year, he was shouted down in the hall by his Stalinist opponents. On the opening day of the session, Hu was featured as the distinguished guest. Zinoviev began the proceedings by declaring that the Comintern would have to devote increased attention to the revolutionary movements of the East. Hu's reception was lavishly described in Inprecor.
The Congress Hall presented an unforgettable picture when the generalissimo of the Canton Army Hu Han-min stepped up to the tribune in military uniform. For several minutes the speaker was unable to commence speaking on account of the renewed applause. The solidarity between the revolutionary proletariat of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East was expressed here with striking clearness.

A brief synopsis of Hu's remarks followed. Apparently "an even greater pitch of enthusiasm" was reached when Hu conveyed his greetings, and demonstrations of support "punctuated nearly every sentence of the Speaker." However, in the transcript reproduced in Inprecor, Hu seemed to be giving away little of substance. In words echoed by Chiang Kai-shek himself later that year, Hu declared:

There is only one World Revolution, and the Chinese Revolution is part of this world revolution. The slogan of our great leader, Sun Yat-sen, is identical with the slogan of Marxism and Leninism. No one has faith any longer in the II International. The influence of the III International has considerably increased in China of late. The movement embraces intellectuals as well as large sections of workers and peasants, the entire proletariat. The Kuomintang slogan is: For the masses, i.e. seizure of political power together with the workers and peasants! All these slogans coincide with the policy of the III International. The III International is the headquarters, the general staff for the Revolution.

After offering these generous greetings Hu had nothing more to contribute to the official record of the plenum. He did have several private meetings with Trotsky, Zinoviev and Stalin in which the possibility of the Kuomintang being granted membership in the Comintern was discussed. According to Hu's account, Zinoviev favoured this, and it appeared as if the KMT would be allowed to join, but Stalin intervened. Stalin expressed to Hu his concern over complications arising from the activities of
the KMT right wing in the event that the party entered the Comintern. He also questioned the attitude of the imperialist powers to such a move. Hu felt neither of these was a serious problem, but he did not push the case too far. It had become evident to Hu that the problem was not being discussed on its own merits, but rather had become entangled in the growing struggle between Stalin and his opponents. With Stalin's power clearly in the ascendancy at this time, the only resolution of the issue lay in Zinoviev backing down. The ECCI voted to defer the decision on the admission of the Kuomintang until later in the year, and with this the problem was in effect indefinitely shelved.\footnote{\text{100}}

The official justification for Hu's mission to Moscow had been to act as KMT delegate to the Comintern. Now that the plenum was drawing to a close, Hu prepared to return to Canton. On the eve of his departure he addressed a gathering attended by Joffe, Radek, Trotsky and other party leaders to mark the first anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death. Hu spoke in memory of the deceased leader, and then closed his remarks by proclaiming, "Long live the union of the Chinese people and the working masses of the world! Long live the world revolution!"\footnote{\text{101}} On March 13 Hu left by rail for Vladivostok. Although his departure did not receive the festive crowd participation that had marked his arrival five months earlier, Hu was still regarded as a celebrity. Pravda published his final message, "Parting Words to the Workers and Peasants of the Soviet Union," which summed up well what Hu had been saying consistently during his stay in
Moscow. Hu began with the reason for his coming:

Since we recognized Moscow to be the world revolutionary centre I came here first of all to study revolutionary methods, and secondly to establish closer ties between our revolutionaries and the world revolutionary centre.

He went on to emphasize the unique role played by Sun's political teachings, and by implication, the unique role of the Kuomintang. In a manner that might have seemed presumptuous to the leaders in the Kremlin, Hu almost equated the Chinese revolution to the Russian revolution:

Our great leader Dr. Sun Yat-sen has traced out for us the path of revolution: from the national to the world scale, in other words, from the liberation of the worker-peasant masses in China to the liberation of the masses in the whole world. This is why our victory shall prove to be your victory and the world's victory, and our defeat to be your defeat and the world's defeat. And similarly, your attainments shall prove to be ours, your sufferings ours, and your problems our problems.

After paying his respects to the impressive achievements of the Soviet government both in material construction and in fostering "the growth of a proletarian culture and civilization," Hu turned to the most important question, that of the struggle against imperialism:

At present the struggle in China between imperialism and the oppressed masses has caught fire, and we have come to the point where the question of whether the world will be imperialist or proletarian must be decided. Thus the world imperialists have been concentrating all their strength against China. . . . We hope that we shall struggle together not only with the worker and peasant masses of the Soviet Union but together with the workers and peasants of the imperialist countries. For this it is necessary to have in Moscow a revolutionary centre, and we choose you as leaders and teachers not only for ourselves but for the worker-peasant masses of all the world.

With this last message Hu set off, reaching Vladivostok a week later. There he had to wait a month for a boat to take him to
Canton. Borodin was also en route to the same destination, and together these two unlikely companions set sail on April 20. Hu had been in Russia just over six months.

During these months in the Soviet capital, Hu obviously had had to keep his own conclusions to himself. When he returned to Canton he soon made them evident to the other senior leaders of the Kuomintang. Doubts he had entertained earlier about the Chinese Communist Party, the USSR, and the relationship between the two had been confirmed by his recent experiences in the "world revolutionary centre." In many respects Hu's reactions were akin to those of Chiang Kai-shek three years before. Both men had been impressed by the power of the Soviet state and the discipline of the Soviet party, and both men emerged from their first-hand experiences with a profound mistrust of Soviet intentions in China. The organization, iron discipline and dedication of the Soviet Communist Party particularly impressed Hu, which was understandable in view of his long involvement in the frustrating history of the Chinese nationalist movement. He never lost this respect for the technique of revolutionary management that the Russians practised so effectively.

What turned Hu away from the Russian alliance was his unshakeable conviction that not far beneath all the protestations of world proletarian revolution lay the vital driving force of Russian imperialism. Furthermore, this imperialism did not even result from actions taken by general agreement of the Communist leaders gathered in Moscow; instead, it was the product of a small elite that had gained a monopoly of power over the Soviet
party. One year later Hu explained his belief in the following manner:

When I went to Russia . . . I believed that the Third International was the general organ of world revolution, not something managed by Soviet Russia, or manipulated by one or two men, but impartial and honest towards all small and weak peoples. . . . The Third International was manipulated by the Russian Communist Party, and the leaders of the different Communist Parties all were under the shadow of a few men in that Party. How the Russian Communist Party finally will take over the world is known only to these few men; the rest are kept in the dark.

Hu's protestations of openminded innocence may be discounted as disingenuous, but his conclusion about the way in which the Comintern worked has a genuine ring to it. The time of his stay in Russia was an ideal one for exposing how all political questions were subordinated to the power struggle in the Kremlin. The dispute over the admission of the KMT into the Comintern furnished Hu with an apt illustration of this process. In Hu's estimation, the Chinese national revolution was treated by the factions contending for power in Moscow as nothing more than a "tool" in their struggle. Furthermore, once this struggle had been decided, the victorious faction then would utilize the Chinese revolution for the extension of Soviet influence in China. This conclusion about Moscow's role in China made Hu regard the Chinese Communist Party as a much more dangerous threat to the Kuomintang than he had hitherto imagined, since the growing strength of the CCP not only posed a danger to the social order, but also challenged the very independence of the national revolution. These two themes of preserving the social order and reasserting full Kuomintang control over the revolutionary
movement came to dominate Hu's political thinking after his departure from Russia.

Retirement from and Return to Political Life: April 1926-August 1927

On April 29, 1926 Hu arrived back in Canton to find a much changed balance of political forces in existence. A little more than a month earlier the March 20 Incident had occurred. The exact circumstances surrounding this event have not yet been fully explained, but the implications it possessed at the time for relations between the Kuomintang and its United Front allies soon made themselves apparent. The Incident itself resulted from Chiang Kai-shek's charge that a coup had been planned against him when a gunboat moved towards his headquarters without any prior warning. He reacted by placing the Soviet advisers under detention, and by arresting the leading Chinese Communist cadres, particularly those attached to the army as political commissars. All of these people were soon released, and Chiang apologized to the Soviets for these excessive measures, which he blamed on his subordinates. However, the freedom of movement of the Soviets and Chinese Communists remained restricted, especially in the army.

In the civilian government, Wang Ching-wei, the leading spokesman of the Kuomintang left, was forced into virtual retirement after the Incident. However, Chiang still needed Soviet support for the proposed northern expedition; it was therefore necessary for him to make a show of rejecting the
right. He did this by turning down a proposed reconciliation offered by the Western Hills group and by making a great display of his support for the mass organizations. Chiang also needed support within the Kuomintang for his ambitions, since his political position at this time was by no means unchallengeable. But the allies he was searching for would have to be men dependent on him. Those who were older and more distinguished in party service than himself would have to be manoeuvred out of the way. In retrospect, it is apparent that the return of Hu Han-min to the complex Canton political scene was too unsettling a factor to be tolerated.

What happened precisely between Chiang and Hu in early May 1926 remains unknown, but it is possible to reconstruct some of the currents that prevailed in Canton then. By the time of Hu’s arrival the right had realized that Chiang was not going to turn towards them as they had expected after the March 20 Incident. According to one of the secret documents seized in the 1927 raid on the Soviet embassy in Peking, a report by the military attaché, Seifulin, the Canton right had gotten Hu Han-min "as their 'Chief Advance Commander' and organizer." They apparently made plans to erect a triumphal arch for him, and to demonstrate on behalf of his reentry into the Canton government. Hu was supposed to have met with Wu Ch'ao-shu, Sun Fo and Li Chi-shen, all of whom were regarded as reactionaries by the Canton CCP. It is likely that Hu met with these men, who were old colleagues of his, but the claim that the right tried to monopolize Hu cannot be substantiated, nor the claim that Hu was
receptive to any such overtures. It is clear that a large faction of party members loyal to Hu did remain in Canton, and wished to see Hu back in power in a Hu-Chiang alliance. Some of these may have wanted to see more stringent measures taken against the Communists. However, the complexity, if not the confusion of the Canton political scene, is revealed by the fact that some party members actually thought that Hu's experiences in Russia would give him a better understanding of how the Kuomintang could most effectively carry out the United Front policies with the Russians and the CCP. Furthermore, as far as the CCP Central Committee was concerned, Hu was still regarded as a representative of the KMT centre. In the brief period of his return to Canton Hu refrained from public statements. Since he had not committed himself openly he could appear as all things to all factions in the struggle for power.

In private, however, Hu did make his change of mind about the Russian alliance and the United Front apparent to the upper echelons of the Kuomintang. Liu Lu-yin, a very close friend of Hu's, stated a year later that it was at this time that Hu denounced the machinations of the Comintern, the Soviet Communist Party, and the Stalin leadership. He made these accusations in the Political Council and to a conference of high level Kuomintang officials. Hu also stated that the CCP was nothing but a tool of the Russians, and that the Russian intention was to reduce the KMT to the same role. He advanced the slogan, "No party outside the party, no factions within the party!" but this and other warnings fell on deaf ears. Since
Liu brought this to light only after the break with the CCP in 1927, it might be argued that Hu's statements may have been exaggerated to help justify the repression of the Communists then taking place. This is unlikely in view of what is known of Hu's meeting with Chiang in early May shortly after his return to China. According to the account given by Borodin, Hu told Chiang to arrest him so that he would be unable to remove the severe restrictions placed on Communist activities as a result of the March 20 Incident. However, Chiang refused to do this, as he was still balancing off the right against the left in his public actions. This careful political juggling by Chiang is best seen in his release shortly before Hu's return of Sun's letter of October 1924, in which Sun had pointed out Hu's loss of faith in the Russian model. In this instance Chiang was playing to the left, while at the same time preventing an eminent rival from regaining a political base. When Hu met Chiang an impasse soon developed. Less than two months after his arrival, Hu departed for Shanghai, ironically sharing the same boat into "exile" with another victim of Chiang's manoeuvrings, Wang Ching-wei.

After his return to Shanghai Hu retired temporarily from active political life, and devoted his time once more to literary work in order to make a living. He edited Tsou Lu's History of the Canton Revolution of March 29, an account by that party veteran of the famous Huang-hua-kang uprising of 1911. Hu also began to prepare a definitive edition of Sun's works. This was to be his major editorial project, one that was not
Hu's work, however, was not restricted to Kuomintang materials. It is interesting to note that the two major translations he did during this time were on the topics of historical materialism and Marxian economics. The first of these was the translation Hu made from the Japanese edition of part of Max Beer's *General History of Socialism and Social Struggles*. Beer's wide-ranging if rather elementary work was a general survey of European socialist and proto-socialist thought from antiquity to the First World War. As the title indicates, Beer gave emphasis to class struggles in light of a general historical materialist approach, though it should be remarked that this work was primarily narrative and not theoretical in content.

Hu translated the two volumes that covered the history of modern Europe. These appeared under the titles of *Socialism in the Age of the Industrial Revolution* and *Society in the Age of Marx*.

In the first of these, which in the original version was called *Social Struggles and Thought*, Beer outlined the history of England and France from the mid-eighteenth century to the rise of Chartism, described as England's "first social revolutionary movement," and the Paris uprisings of 1848, which toppled the monarchy but fell victim to the bourgeoisie. Physiocrats and Adam Smith, the Luddites and Robert Owen, Fourier and St. Simon, all received passing mention in this survey. The second volume, *Social Struggles and Modern Society*, focused primarily on Germany, containing an account of early nineteenth century Germany social and political movements, the revolution of 1848, and a biography of Karl Marx. Attention was
also given by Beer to the First and Second Internationals, and the collapse of the Second International at the outbreak of war in 1914. A few pages were devoted to the economic roots of imperialism, and Lenin's name and the Bolshevik Revolution were mentioned, but these topics seem to have been too close to the time of writing to have received a considered interpretation.

Hu published his translation of Beer in late 1926. A few years later he explained that there were two reasons for his decision to choose this work. First, he wished to provide Chinese readers with a general account of European history and socialist thought over the preceding two centuries. Secondly, he sought to make more widely known the concept of historical materialism, and its application to concrete historical problems. This latter reason, he said, explained as well the publication in 1925 of six of his essays from Chien-she in a collection entitled, Studies on Historical Materialism and Ethics. It is quite evident, then, that Hu's own break from the Communist alliance in 1926 had not prejudiced his interest in Marxism as a general method of historical enquiry. However, his selection of Beer's work, which is restricted to the history of western Europe, may indicate that Hu believed that area to be the most fruitful field for the application of Marxian analysis.

Hu's continuing interest in Marxism as an intellectual system is also apparent in the second translation that he worked on at this time. In January 1927 he completed Tai Chi-t'ao's retranslation from the Japanese of Karl Kautsky's Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx. Tai had begun this in the November 1919
issue of Chien-she, and had continued it in each successive number until the magazine ceased publication in the summer of 1920. He had left uncompleted the final three chapters of the third part. These included the "iron law of wages" and "the industrial reserve army" of the poor, as well as Kautsky's concluding explanation of the rise and fall of the capitalist mode of production. Hu completed the translation of these chapters, and the book was published in October 1927 under Tai Chi-t'ao's original title, An Introduction to 'Capital':

In his preface to the book, Hu stated that he had finished the translation and arranged for its publication because of the high regard he had for Kautsky's introduction to the study of Marxian economics. According to Hu, Kautsky provided the necessary background to Marx in a manner which simplified the subject but did not treat it superficially. Hu also considered Kautsky's book to be doctrinally sound, despite the attacks levelled at the man by Lenin and the Soviet Communists. Hu was quite aware of the nature of the charges against Kautsky. In this regard, a comment made by Hu is of particular note because it shows that by this time Hu had clearly identified the gradualist political character of Kautsky's interpretation of Marxism:

For the most part, his political thought cannot be separated from the German social environment of the late nineteenth century. Because it often displayed a compromising tendency, it has been labelled as opportunist.

Hu quoted Lenin's words that Kautsky and his colleagues "had distorted the true theories of Marx" by turning the concept of
revolution into the belief that it was possible to co-exist with the bourgeoisie. Hu did not develop this point. He did state that, whatever the merits of the later charges directed against Kautsky, there was no doubt as to the depth of his knowledge about the economic theories of Karl Marx. In Hu's view, Kautsky's book on Marxian economics was free from the faults of compromise that Lenin had attributed to Kautsky and his democratic followers.  

In completing the Kautsky translation and in seeing to its publication six months after the purge of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Han-min obviously showed that his intellectual fascination with Marxism was a calling that he did not confuse with the immediate political demands of destroying the Communists and severing the alliance with the Soviet Union. Marxism the system, impressive but open to reasoned criticism, was one matter. The Chinese Communist Party, with its sponsorship of social upheaval and its ideological dependence on Russia, was quite another. Over the winter of 1926-1927, Hu proceeded in each of these directions simultaneously, and without seeming to experience any sense of conflict. Although he had withdrawn from open political activity, the record that can be reconstructed makes it plain that after his departure from Canton in May 1926 he continued to keep in close touch with those of his Kuomintang colleagues who were seeking to bring the United Front to an end. This group included such party veterans as Lin Sen, Wu Ch'ao-shu, Wu Chih-hui, Li Shih-tseng and Tsou Lu.  

All of these men had been associated with Sun Yat-sen since the early days of the nationalist
movement, and all now shared Hu's antipathy towards the young Communist Party which seemed to threaten the hegemony of the KMT over the revolution.

The tension that existed between the two partners in the United Front could be disguised no longer once the Nationalist armies launched the Northern Expedition in July 1926. Very quickly what had been an uneasy arrangement in the relatively static political scene of Canton became a struggle for the vast territories and great population that fell to the advancing armies. Both social revolution and the prospect of losing control of the whole revolutionary movement confronted Chiang Kai-shek and the other Kuomintang leaders. By late 1926 the signs of a Nationalist suppression of the Communists were becoming evident: in Kiangsi, which then marked the forward position of Chiang's armies, assassinations of Communist and peasant union leaders were taking place. When Chiang's forces reached the outskirts of Shanghai on March 26, to be welcomed by the General Labour Union whose insurrection had driven out the local warlord, the forthcoming showdown between Kuomintang and Communists for control of Shanghai, and of the revolution itself, should have been apparent to all.

Two days after Chiang's arrival a few members of the KMT General Supervisory Committee met to propose a motion to purge the party of the Communists. Within a few days Hu was brought back fully into the political manoeuvrings. On April 3 he met with Wang Ching-wei, who was en route to Wuhan, where he hoped to recoup his political fortunes with the aid of the
left-leaning wing of the Kuomintang there. The decision had been taken to purge the party of the Communists, and Hu tried to prevail on Wang to remain in Shanghai and join in the restoration of Kuomintang supremacy. Wang prevaricated, then went on to Wuhan. He worked out an agreement with Ch'en Tu-hsiu, which gave him the power he sought, and which incidentally allowed the Communists three months further grace before the purge began its final phase in Wuhan.

In Shanghai the purge moved quickly to its consummation. What is striking about it is that, contrary to later accounts that have portrayed it as a sudden coup or completely unexpected betrayal, its probability was spoken of openly for at least two weeks before it occurred. The North China Herald printed almost daily accounts of a rift forming between Chiang and his Communist allies, and of the likelihood of his staging a purge. On April 12 it came, and the Shanghai labour union and Communist Party base in that city were decimated.

Once Chiang had destroyed all opposition in Shanghai, he directed his attention towards forming a new government based solely on the Kuomintang. On April 15 a conference of the Central Executive Committee met in Nanking. It endorsed the proscription of the Communists, and the establishment of a national government with its capital in that city. Hu acted as chairman of the session, and reemerged into political life as one of the leading proponents of the purge. On April 18 the new regime officially assumed office, and this effectively inaugurated what later became known as the Nanking Decade.
In an article entitled "Even the Pinks Excluded," the North China Herald made the following assessment of the new Nanking administration:

The 'rightness' of General Chiang Kai-shek's Government cannot be questioned, as the leading spirit of the Nanking Conference is Mr. Hu Han-ming (sic). This leadership closes the door to even pink Communists. Mr. Hu spent some time in exile in Moscow; where he learned all the methods of the Third International. Since his return to China last May, he has been active in creating the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists which has now eventuated.

It is unlikely that Hu's 'rightness' and what the North China Herald had in mind were identical. There was no doubt about Hu's anti-Communism, and the remarks made about Hu's experience in Russia are very perceptive. However, Hu's own anti-imperialism, of which his anti-Russian feelings were a natural part, and his own genuine concern for social reform, albeit in a guided form, definitely would have separated Hu by a wide degree from the North China Herald's editors and sponsors.

It was true that Hu played the role of at least one of the guiding spirits in the new regime. He was named chairman of the National Government Council. Within the party, he held the position of chairman of the Political Council and head of the Propaganda Department, as well as membership in the standing committee of the Central Executive Committee and the Military Affairs Committee. There were also several lesser committees, such as those of finance and foreign affairs, to which he was appointed. However, despite this impressive array of government posts, Hu's actual role in the development of a new civilian administration was limited by the dominant position held by the
military under Chiang Kai-shek. During his four-month tenure of office, Hu probably devoted the greater part of his attention to the Propaganda Department. He made countless addresses to party workers, troops, mass gatherings and meetings of the Central Executive Committee. In these speeches, and in articles published in the party press, Hu presented his condemnation of the Soviets and the Chinese Community Party, along with a critique of the Marxist theory that had supported these intrusions into Chinese life. At the same time he attempted to build Sun Yat-sen's ideas into an ideology that would provide not only an effective rebuttal to the Marxist challenge, but also would ensure the implementation by the Kuomintang of the political and social message that Sun's doctrine contained.

Hu's departure from the Nanking government after such a short time resulted from the manoeuvres conducted in the summer of 1927 to reunite the Nanking and Wuhan factions of the KMT. On July 15 Wang Ching-wei turned on the Communists, thereby terminating the final stage of the First United Front. Neither the Wang nor Chiang groups could agree to work together in a reunified party. Both men decided to withdraw from the political scene, though for Chiang this retirement was only a tactical retreat until political conditions changed for the better. Hu supported Chiang's decision to step down. On August 14, the Nanking administration resigned, and Hu accompanied his colleagues back to Shanghai. At this point Hu made a break from political life, and did not join Chiang in seeking a return to office. Hu's intermittent bad health
contributed to this decision. In January 1928, he set off on a voyage which took him to the new republic of Turkey, and then to western Europe, as a representative of the Kuomintang. On his return to China in the fall, he was brought back into the government as president of the Legislative Yuan. Hu continued to speak and write at every opportunity on the teachings of Sun Yat-sen. However, what he said during the last year of his life served mainly to emphasize and elaborate upon the positions that he had worked out during the critical year of 1927.
CHAPTER VI

A NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY FOR CHINA

Introduction: The Legacy of Sun Yat-sen

In late 1927 Hu Han-min published twelve of his most important speeches and articles from that year in a collection called The Historic Mission of the Followers of the San-min-chu-i. The choice of title was not in the least fortuitous: in fact, it expressed most explicitly Hu's conception of his political role in the years following Sun's death. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Hu saw himself as the guardian of the legacy Sun had bequeathed to the Kuomintang and to China. In 1927 Hu came to the fore to defend this legacy against both the Soviet Union, which threatened China's national sovereignty, and the Chinese Communist Party, which raised the spectre of social anarchy. In the years after 1927 Hu had to continue this struggle, but now within the Kuomintang itself, where the liberal and reformist spirit of Sun Yat-sen was threatened increasingly by the traditional evils of corruption and bureaucratism.

As with his earlier writing for Min-pao, those of the last period of Hu's life raise a problem of analysis because of their deliberate identification with the thought of Sun Yat-sen. In the earlier years this could be attributed to Hu's youth, and to his inexperience in the world of T'ung-meng Hui political and social thought. In the two decades which separated the Min-pao period
from 1927 Hu had gathered an immeasurable amount of political experience, and his intellectual searchings had led him to his studies of historical materialism during the May Fourth years. In one way, then, it is curious that Hu should have returned to the role of expositor after such a rich and creative period of his life. But if one brings to mind Hu's unwavering dedication to the memory of Sun Yat-sen, as well as his deep commitment to Chinese nationalism and his belief in the principle of guided social reform, then the character of Hu's political discourses after 1927 becomes much less problematic. It can also be argued that the insistence with which Hu repeated the fundamentals of Sun Yat-senism in the ensuing years was a result not so much of dwindling creative powers, but of a conviction that only a literal adherence to the ideas of the late leader would ensure the realization of the goals he had set out for the party.

While it is possible, then, to suggest a basis for the motivation which underlay Hu's writings of the post-1927 years, it still remains a difficult task disentangling Hu's own work from that of his mentor. It should be said at the outset that Hu's writings on such interrelated topics as Marxism and the CCP, the KMT and Sun Yat-sen's social policies, do not form a cohesive or systematic body of materials. Rather, Hu's ideas are to be found scattered through many short speeches and articles. Perhaps because of the intensity of the battle against the CCP Hu was not concerned with long carefully considered articles similar to the ones he had composed earlier on historical materialism or traditional Chinese philosophy. However, once the repetitiveness of
argument, and the predictable polemical style, are discounted, there remains a critique of Marxism and the Chinese Communist Party which expresses clearly the political viewpoint of a man who was both a committed nationalist and a social moderate. Such an avowal of intrinsic merit cannot be offered so readily for the elaborations made by Hu on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen. Because of the quality of the materials he was working with, and because he limited his role primarily to that of expositor, Hu could add little of theoretical novelty or interest to Sun's political philosophy. Yet even here the examination of Hu's work is of historical value, since Hu's failure to develop an effective ideology for the Kuomintang pointed out the fundamental inadequacy of Sun Yat-sen's thought.

Sun Yat-sen, Maurice William, and the Principle of Livelihood

Before an analysis of Hu Han-min's critique of Marxism can be made it is necessary to present Sun's position on social reform in general, and Marxism in particular. As indicated in chapters II and V Sun's social programme centred on the two policies of the equalization of land rights and the regulation of capital. These measures, which were worked out during the T'ung-meng Hui period, conceived social change in reformist and state-directed terms. After the 1911 revolution the following decade of political misfortunes prevented the Sun group from giving social policy the sustained theoretical consideration of the Min-pao years. One reference from that period indicates not only the persistence of the reformist side of
Sun's programme, but an increased emphasis on the role of the state in implementing reform. Such is the message to be found in a speech given by Sun in 1912 on "The Principle of Livelihood and State Socialism."¹ In this talk Sun spoke of the superiority of state-managed reformism of the Bismarckian variety, a position which had been adopted several years earlier by Feng Tzu-yu. In his 1924 lectures on the Three Principles of the People Sun returned to this theme. Bismarck had nationalized natural monopolies, such as those in the communications field, and he had promoted reforms in working conditions, as well as providing state pensions and workers' insurance. As a result of his efforts Bismarck had raised Germany to the position of strongest nation in Europe on the eve of the First War: he had "transformed a weak Germany into a powerful state."²

There was one other reason for Sun's fascination with Bismarck. Not only had the German leader shown the way to the attainment of national strength, but also he had muted class conflict and politically disarmed the German socialist party in the process. In his fourth lecture on democracy, which was given in April 1924, Sun emphasized this point:³

The Socialist Party advocated social reforms and economic revolution. Bismarck knew that they could not be suppressed by political power, so he put into effect a kind of state socialism as an antidote against the Marxian socialists' programme. Further on in the lecture Sun again complimented Bismarck's social reformism and political acumen: "by invisible means he caused the very issues for which the people were struggling to dissolve."⁴ These quotations should not minimize Sun's commitment to social
change, nor imply a calculating exploitation of the people's needs for his own political ends. What they do emphasize, as does everything in Sun's political life, is the unyielding belief that orderly change would come about in China only under his leadership, and by extension, under that of the Kuomintang. This is the most important premise of Sun's social thought, and it is one that was shared entirely by Hu.

In the United Front period, however, it was not enough for Sun to argue the virtues of state socialism. With the growth of the Chinese Communist Party, and the spread of Marxist ideas, especially among the youth, it was necessary for Sun to meet directly the challenge of Marxism. In doing this Sun drew substantially on the work of an American writer, Maurice William, for the content and vocabulary of much of his case. The relationship between Sun, the leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party, and William, an obscure Brooklyn dentist who had dabbled in political philosophy, is indeed a most curious one, and one which affords an illuminating, if unflattering, insight into Sun's intellectual processes. William was the author of a book entitled The Social Interpretation of History, which was first published in 1921. In this rather lengthy and ill-organized work William attacked the radical wing of the European socialist movement, with his harshest words saved for the Russian Bolsheviks. William focused in particular on fundamental Marxist concepts such as the omnipresent nature of class struggle, the pauperization of the working class under capitalism, and the inevitability of violent revolution. In place of Marx's materialist conception of history William substituted his
own "social interpretation of history," an unclearly formulated theory derived in large part from the biological evolutionism of Charles Darwin. According to this theory, the key to understanding human history was the "struggle for existence." This was an elemental force which motivated both society and the individual. It was responsible for all progress and social change. In William's view, the class struggle described by the Marxists was only one of the many forms taken by this struggle for biological and social existence. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, William argued that class struggle ought properly to be seen as a diseased byproduct of social evolution, one which could be prevented through the enactment of proper social policies.

At some point, probably in late 1923, Sun read William's book, and absorbed those of William's arguments which suited his own predispositions. Sun was much taken by William's "social interpretation of history," and the idea of "the struggle for existence" became the foundation of the political and social philosophy that Sun now attempted to develop in more systematic and detailed fashion. However, it is most unlikely that the adoption of "social evolution" as the motive force in history required any change in Sun's own ideas. Although Sun had not elucidated any general theory of history, his various social and political notions were not at all out of place with a vague type of evolutionism: it might be said that it was precisely because of their lack of rigour that they fitted so naturally into such an ill-defined, if not banal, scheme as the one proposed by William. Sun also noticed that William had spoken of specific
social policies which had raised the standard of living of the west European working class, and thereby had defused the social democratic parties. These social policies appeared to Sun to be identical to those he advocated in his Principle of Livelihood. As a consequence of his study of William's book, Sun mentioned William by name in his first lecture on livelihood, which was delivered in August 1924, and he lauded William for being the creator of a "new theory," which "tallies exactly with the third principle of our party."9

As mentioned above, it was in the provision of certain arguments against Marxism that the influence of Maurice William on Sun can be seen at its most obvious. In his first two lectures on livelihood Sun made generous, and for the most part unaccredited, use of The Social Interpretation of History, a fact which later exercised William greatly, causing him to publish a book entitled Sun Yat-sen versus Communism, in which he took personal credit for Sun's supposedly overnight conversion to an anti-Marxist stance.10 Sun's history as the leader of the nationalist movement, and his own idiosyncratic and eclectic social reformism, with its definitely paternalistic stamp, easily disprove William's fanciful claim. However, the comparison made by William in his second book of selected passages from The Social Interpretation of History and Sun's lectures on livelihood reveals the derivative nature of several points stressed by Sun. Since these were later drawn on by Hu Han-min in his critique of Marxism, they should be mentioned briefly.
To begin with, William gave considerable emphasis to the scientific nature of Marx's researches. As he put it, Marx "applied the scientific method," and "history alone furnished the basis of his conclusions." In William's view, Marx would have revised his theories constantly to incorporate new scientific knowledge and historical experience. He would not have remained fixed on the Europe of 1848, which for some reason William regarded as the locus classicus of the Marxist worldview. Marx, "were he living today," would have altered his theories, presumably to a social evolutionary position, since he "would have readily grasped the full significance of modern social progress." This point about the scientific method employed by Marx was enlarged upon by William in several places, the most curious of these being William's contention that, because of his scientific mind, Marx "had no schemes of his own to foist upon society." 12

The main object of William's attack on Marxism was the theory of class struggle. According to William, class struggle was a result of "insecurity in the means of existence." This meant that it was "an effect," and "not a cause" of social unrest. This was why the materialist conception of history was inadequate, since it had "inverted everything" through explaining effects rather than causes. The most memorable passage in William's argument was phrased in the following manner: 13

Marx was a social pathologist. He studied social pathology and mistook the phenomena he observed for the laws of social biology. The manifestations of the class struggle are symptoms of social pathology analogous to such symptoms as pain, heat, redness and swelling in human pathology.
This metaphor caught Sun's imagination, which is not surprising in view of Sun's medical background. Sun was particularly taken by William's description of Marx as a "social pathologist," and to this he added his own comment that Marx definitely could not be regarded as a "social physiologist." In his second lecture on livelihood Sun reproduced almost verbatim William's discussion of class struggle. Sun endorsed William's belief that the struggle for existence was the motive force in history, and that class struggle played only a peripheral role. As Sun concluded, "Marx, in his study of social problems, found only one of the diseases of society; he did not discover the law of social progress."

From The Social Interpretation of History Sun also drew on William's discussion of the social reforms which had made class struggle irrelevant to the current age. These social reforms William saw as "the operations of social evolution." They were being carried out in "four well-defined forms: social and industrial reforms, public ownership of the means of transportation and communication, direct taxation, and government activity in the redistribution of wealth." Direct taxation was seen by William as being of great importance, since it was by this means that the state removed from the capitalist class much of the surplus wealth it had accumulated. In turn this wealth was utilized by the state to underwrite its "social endeavours." Once the "distribution of consumable wealth" had fully taken place, the "basic problem of security in the means of life" would be solved. In the capitalist countries this process of redistribution of wealth had been going on over the preceding half century. Sun took note of the four
types of social reform outlined by William, and in his lectures he spoke of them as "the four peaceful methods" which his third principle would implement in China. What was probably of more significance to Sun was William's assertion that these reforms, and the consequent lessening of the social problem, had been effected in a non-violent way: "not by uprisings of the populace against the Government, and surely not by civil war... but by the majority of consumers using their organized authority as the City, State, or National Government." This idea was given further emphasis by William in a later passage, which is to be noted because of the striking manner in which it supported Sun's contention that the political movement he led stood for the interests of all the people, regardless of class, against a few "antisocial minorities":

Instead of uprisings against the Government by the populace as in the case of former revolutions, we see the 'populace', i.e., the majority of social beings themselves organized as the Government 'uprising' against their exploiters. Both are social revolutions, aimed against antisocial minorities, the difference being that former revolutions were directed against the Government, which itself was the oppressor, while to-day the people constitute the Government and use their organized power against the antisocial portion of the populace.

In both the area of specific social policy, and the more diffuse regions of political philosophy, the ideas of Maurice William indeed "tallied" with Sun's principle of livelihood, and provided Sun with further evidence of the rightness of his theories.

After giving William recognition for the influence he cast on certain aspects of Sun's thought, it is necessary, last of all, to take note of the arguments Sun himself developed to counter the
challenge of Marxism. The first of these was based on the recent experience of the Soviet Union. In Sun's view, the Bolsheviks had attained a degree of success in carrying out the political revolution, but, because of Russia's backwardness, they had met with failure in the economic revolution. As Sun put it, "the economic life of her society has not reached the standard of economic life in Great Britain or the United States, and is not ripe for the application of Marx's methods." When the Bolsheviks realized that communism was not practicable, they adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP), a much more realistic programme of modern social reform. Sun was intrigued by the Russian experiment from the time he first heard of it from Maring in late 1921. On that occasion Sun said that he was both surprised and pleased to hear of the Russian change of heart in social policy. He also stated that there appeared to him to be little difference between the NEP and his own plans for national reconstruction. This indicated to Sun the superiority of his principle of livelihood, and in the 1924 lectures on the Three Principles he developed this theme. What the Bolsheviks had discovered only after great social hardship and prolonged experimentation Sun already had laid out for China in his principle of livelihood.

In the final years of his life Sun also began to advance the claim that the principle of livelihood not only was superior to Marxism and all other socialist creeds, but had absorbed their good points and had developed them in a politically much more practicable manner. It took Sun some time to work out the precise formulation of this idea. Comments of his can be cited...
to give the impression that he equated communism, a term he never precisely defined, with his own third principle of livelihood. In December 1923, for example, he turned down Teng Tse-ju's attempted impeachment of the CCP with the remark that "essentially, there is no difference between the Principle of Livelihood and Communism."\(^\text{22}\) Probably the most famous expression of this theme is to be found in Sun's August 1924 lecture, when he declared that, "The Principle of Livelihood is socialism, it is communism, it is utopianism."\(^\text{23}\) However, these statements notwithstanding, Sun's intent definitely was to subordinate all other social philosophies to his own. To resolve the ambiguities he had created around the principle of livelihood, Sun drafted a brief but noteworthy revision to the definition quoted above. It was changed to read: "The principle of Min-sheng is used to take the place of socialism. Also, it is used to encompass all the problems of socialism."\(^\text{24}\) This clarification did not come to light until after Sun's death. However, it does provide textual evidence, if that is needed, for Sun's belief in the universal applicability of his theories. This was a claim that later provided one of the cornerstones of Hu Han-min's exposition of Sun's philosophy.

In the final analysis, the seeming contradictions which characterized Sun's interpretation of communism disappear when they are placed in the proper perspective. Sun indicated that this was the correct approach to his philosophy:\(^\text{25}\)

I can put my distinction today between communism and the Min-sheng Principle in this way: communism is an ideal of livelihood, while the Min-sheng Principle is practical
communism. There is no real difference between the two principles—communism and Min-sheng—the difference lies in the methods by which they are applied.

In the short term the methods to be used were those of moderate and gradual reform under the direction of the state. Sun assured all property-holders that they had nothing to fear from his poli­cies, since the principle of livelihood was completely at vari­ance with western notions of nationalization, which he said amounted to confiscation. He repeated the social analysis that had been central to his programme for twenty years: "China now is suffering from poverty, not from unequal distribution of wealth." The methods of Marx, Sun admitted, could be applied to a society divided by great inequalities of wealth. But they were inappro­priate to China. Since industry had not yet developed, "class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat are unnecessary." 27

In the long term, Sun spoke of the coming of a communist society. However, even here his understanding of it placed a great gulf between Marx and himself. His conception of communism owed as much to his Chinese background as it did to western influ­ence. It has been aptly described as "some type of utopian communism as envisaged by ancient thinkers like Plato or Confu­cius." 28 The words with which Sun closed his second lecture on livelihood capture best his understanding of the term communism, one which at the same time looks ahead to the utopian future, and backwards to China's national heritage: 29

If this is true [the Min-sheng Principle], the people will not only have a communistic share in state production, but they will have a share in everything. When the people share everything in the state, then will we truly reach the goal of the Min-sheng Principle, which is Confucius' hope of a 'great commonwealth.'
Hu Han-min on Marx, Lenin and the CCP

In his discussion of Marxism, Hu stayed within the framework constructed by Sun Yat-sen, although the knowledge of Marxism which he had acquired during the May Fourth period, as well as the political conclusions he had drawn from the United Front, enabled him to construct more elaborate arguments about Marxism and the Soviet Union. There are many points in Hu's work similar to those raised by Maurice William and Sun Yat-sen, but these undoubtedly resulted as much from a coincidence of views as they represented deliberate derivation by Hu. As an illustration, all three men paid respect to the creative genius of Marx, which they saw embodied in the use he made of the scientific method in the construction of his theories. Whether Sun had reached this conclusion on his own, or whether he had adopted it from his reading of Maurice William, is difficult to say. In the case of Hu, it is apparent from his earlier work on historical materialism that he possessed a high regard for Marx. His writings during the 1927-1928 period show that he retained this interest in Marx, though his sentiments had become highly critical by then.

Hu opened his discussion of Marxism by observing that communism had been a utopian ideal throughout history. From the time of Plato until the nineteenth century, men had engaged in wishful imaginings of this future society. The great importance of Marx lay in the break he made with this tradition when he attempted to build a theory derived from an analysis of history itself. He had done this by presenting the hypothesis that communist society was a necessary consequence of conditions
existing within the capitalist system. However, in constructing this argument, Marx had not completely divested himself of the older type of utopianism. As a result, his work contained both a "scientific" analysis of nineteenth century capitalism, and a "prophetic" depiction of the communist future. Hu admitted that, in fact, it was the presence of these two aspects in Marxism that gave it such an "inflammatory" appeal. Nevertheless, they constituted a major contradiction in the theory. Furthermore, each of these components was open to attack. The conclusions Marx had drawn from his study of nineteenth century Europe were highly questionable in terms of methodology, while his prophecies of the future communist society had been proven wrong by the historical record.

In making his first point, Hu did not disagree with the analysis Marx had presented of western bourgeois society. What he objected to was the narrow range of materials used by Marx to construct a theory claiming universal application. Marx had studied only two or three countries in western Europe. Even America had been largely neglected. Because it was limited in such a way, Marxism could be utilized as a philosophy of revolution only by a small group of countries in the industrialized West. When it came to examining Marx's record as a prophet, the assessment, Hu believed, could only be negative. Here Marx was wrong even in regard to the European nations he had studied so closely. The capitalist system had not collapsed. The most developed countries had not experienced a social revolution; instead, a revolution had taken place in Russia, where the
system of production was comparatively undeveloped. In the West, state socialist measures were alleviating the misery predicted by Marx. The concentration of capital in city and town, the acquisition by capital of all surplus value, the growing immiseration of the workers, the lengthening of the workday, and the rise of commodity prices, all had failed to come about. Thus, Marx had to be characterized as a failed prophet. Such a man, in Hu's estimation, did not have the credentials to be a "world revolutionary leader."35

The greatest miscalculation made by Marx was his underestimation of the force of nationalism. The disintegration of the Second International at the outset of the First World War proved conclusively to Hu that race and nation were far more potent forces than the international brotherhood and solidarity of the proletariat. Hu described the impotence of the European social democratic leaders at the outbreak of the war:36

All of them stood for class struggle. They would have nothing of racial or national boundaries. Their resolution was most determined. When they returned home, they advocated the transformation of the war between nations into civil war. But, as in the past, the war was one between nations. They advocated the transformation of the war into a class war, but also to no avail. The disciples of Marx in one nation attacked his disciples in the next nation; and the proletariat of one race attacked the proletariat of the next.

Hu went on to point out that this lesson was not lost on Lenin who recognized the revolutionary potential of the East. This was symbolized in the Comintern adoption of the Leninist slogan, "Oppressed peoples of the world, arise!", to supplement the old Marxist slogan, "Workers of the world, unite!"37 However, Lenin
regarded class revolution as the ultimate goal. The nationalist movements of the colonial world acted only as accessories in achieving this end. The effort made by the Comintern to manage these revolutionary movements indicated that the Soviet Union was as guilty of the charge of imperialism as the western powers. In Hu's words, the Soviet Union "everywhere had betrayed the principle of self-determination of peoples." As with the Marxism of the Second International, the Marxism of Lenin had met with complete failure wherever it was exported because it could not overcome the "principle of nationalism."  

As far as Lenin was concerned, Hu saw him as little more than an unscrupulous demagogue who had inflicted untold hardship on the Russian people through his fanatical adherence to the doctrines of class struggle and proletarian dictatorship. Hu did not accept Lenin as a successor to Marx; he made it quite clear that Leninism was not to be confused with Marxism. What was Leninism then? Externally, it represented nothing more than Russian national aggrandizement. Internally, it represented the monopolization of power by the Communist Party, the "new class," although Hu did not use that precise term. In a speech given in July 1927, Hu referred to the famous words on the banner of the bandit heroes of Liang-shan-po, "Carry out the way on heaven's behalf." He then asked: what heaven did the Russian Communists represent and what way did they intend to carry out. In answer to these two questions, Hu responded:

Russia's worker-peasant dictatorship is in no way a genuine proletarian dictatorship. It is nothing more than a dictatorship of the Communist Party. It is said
that the Communist Party must be allowed to exercise dictatorship today, so that the dictatorship of the proletariat may be realized in the future. But who would venture to guarantee that these words ever will come true?

Stalin had stated that Leninism was the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution. Hu summed up his conclusions in the slogan, "Leninism is the theory and tactics of 'exploiting' (li-yung) the proletarian revolution."43

As with Sun Yat-sen, Hu was particularly interested in the Russian experiment of the NEP, which indicated to him that Lenin had realized the error of his earlier ideas of social disruption. It also indicated that the state could play a leading role in building a new social and economic order, especially in the countryside. Since Hu discussed this question in a much more dispassionate manner than usually reserved for Lenin's policies, it is worth outlining the points raised, especially as he had in mind the obvious similarities between the Russian and Chinese rural problem. To begin with, Hu noted the backward state of the Russian peasantry on the eve of the First War in comparison to that of the rural population in the West. Capital had not begun to enter the villages and disturb the old social relationships. The nobility still dominated that rural world. When the revolution occurred in Russia, Lenin was forced to improvise policies which took into account both the current political realities and the backward economic conditions of the countryside. Hu noted three different stages in Bolshevik policy. First, it was necessary for Lenin to gain the support of the peasantry: hence the programme of land distribution. Once the
peasantry had gained land, what Hu described as "petty-bourgeois consciousness" set in among these small landholders. The second stage of Bolshevik policy was one of grudging acceptance of the peasantry which was no longer regarded as the ally of the proletariat. The third stage marked a return to the earlier positive attitude towards the peasantry. The middle peasants were raised to being allies of the proletariat. However, in the NEP there was a new actor on the stage: the state.  

Hu gave considerable emphasis to the significance of the Soviet exercise of "the power of the state" in rebuilding the rural economy. The NEP showed that political power could determine the course of economic change, and thus invalidate Marx's forecasts about the fate of the peasantry:

The establishment of Soviet political power and the nationalization of the most important means of production have prevented a western European type of development. . . . Thus there has been opened up a new path.

Hu quoted from Stalin's recently published Questions of Leninism to illustrate the state-sponsored reformist policies being applied to rural Russia. Production and marketing cooperatives and the provision of easy credit were two of the means by which the peasantry was being saved from the impoverishment predicted for it. Stalin also had pointed out that it was necessary to have a socialized industrial base in order that cooperativization be promoted. This further indicated the need for state direction of the economy and planning of rural development. Hu commented that the anti-rich peasant, pro-poor peasant line taken by Trotsky and Zinoviev was more in keeping with the "spirit of
Marxism." However, Stalin was the inheritor of the revisions made by Lenin, who had come to realize the futility of the class struggle. Hu expressed uncertainty about the future of the Russian peasantry, because the Communists continued to stress the development of the industrial proletariat. Their policies towards the peasantry were grounded, first of all, in "political utility," and not in genuine concern for the peasantry. Hu felt constrained to remark that they were "truly countless thousands of li removed from Sun's agrarian policies." But apart from these comments, Hu's discussion of the NEP indicates that he saw it in very favourable terms. Through trial and error the Russians had worked out a policy which approximated Sun's principle of livelihood. Nothing could better testify to the superiority of Sun's theories than this revision of Marxism by the first Marxist state.

Despite their imposition of the NEP at home, the Russians continued to export the doctrine of class struggle in order to further their own national interests. According to Hu, in 1922 they had turned to China as their last hope when their plans for European revolution failed. The Bolsheviks singled out the Chinese peasantry, and through the medium of the newly founded Chinese Communist Party, they hoped to promote "great disorder" (tao-luan) in the Chinese countryside. Hu cited Borodin's dismissal of KMT proposals for rural cooperatives and rent limitation, and his advocacy in their place of the slogan "land to the peasants" as evidence of the Bolshevik plan to create social chaos. In promoting this policy, Borodin found a most
willing subordinate in the CCP. The CCP possessed no ideology of its own; it had imported what Wu Chih-hui called a "foreign eight-legged essay" (yang pa-ku). It advanced a fraudulent type of class analysis to turn one group of the peasantry against another. At the same time, it cynically mobilized the "dregs" of rural China to further its ends.

The poor peasants are to struggle against the tenant farmers; the tenant farmers against the independent farmers; the independent farmers against the petty landlords; the petty landlords against the middle landlords; and the middle landlords against the big landlords. Under these conditions, the dregs of rural society (ti-p'i liu-mang) will completely shake apart that world.

Hu drew back in aversion from the spectre of social upheaval in the countryside and the riot of the éléments déclassés. At the same time he reacted as intensely to the attempt made by the CCP to push aside the KMT. The tactics of the CCP, Hu charged, could be summed up in the phrase, "Occupy all organs of power, and gain them for the left." To attain this objective, all authority was open to attack: the CCP policy was one of "Down with everything!" The Communists attempted to create splits within the KMT by dividing the party into spurious factions. Left, right, new left, new right were categories concocted by the CCP solely to agitate the KMT membership and turn it against itself. This constituted a threat to the political movement Hu had been a part of for more than twenty years. The virulence with which Hu denounced the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 can be seen as part of a response to this mortal danger to the KMT. As for the response itself, it cannot easily be divided into its
component parts. Nationalism was a factor of equal importance in his concern for the party. The CCP not only served the Soviet cause, but also threatened the KMT, the embodiment of Chinese nationalism. At the same time the CCP had thrown aside the programmes Sun Yat-sen had devised for China's social betterment, and had replaced them with imported ideas of social revolution inapplicable to Chinese social conditions. All three elements—party, nation and the social order—were inextricably combined in determining Hu's intellectual rejection of Marxism, and his uncompromising attack on the CCP.

The Kuomintang and the Masses

With the destruction of the Communists and the completion, at least in the official view, of national unification in 1928, the Kuomintang faced the much more difficult task of national reconstruction (chien-kuo). The military phase of the revolution was over; now there began the period of tutelage. Sun Yat-sen envisaged tutelage lasting only a brief six years before full constitutional democracy was attained.\(^53\) The challenges facing the Kuomintang were immense if this programme were to be realized.

There is no question about Hu's belief in the unique role to be played by the Kuomintang in the tutelary stage of the Chinese revolution. The theoretical justification lay in Sun Yat-sen's three-fold division of humanity, with those who understood in advance being the leaders of those who understood later or never at all. The first group was equated with the party, whose members had mastered Sun's ideas and would apply them to
the solution of China's problems. Of more concern are Hu's conception of the "masses" (min-chung), whom the party had the responsibility of guiding, and secondly, his understanding of the relationship which should exist between the two. An analysis of Hu's work soon makes it apparent, not unexpectedly, that the "masses" were for him an undifferentiated and neutral social group, in other words, simply the great mass of the people. They were definitely not seen by him as composed of different classes. To have done so would run counter to Sun's depiction of Chinese society as one of shared, classless poverty.

It was the responsibility of the KMT to guide and educate this amorphous mass by organizing mass movements. Leadership of these movements, Hu noted, had to be provided by "members of the educated classes." This identification of the intelligentsia with the KMT explained, incidentally, why the Communists had launched such wild attacks on the intelligentsia. Given such profoundly differing levels of capability, it was only logical that the party approached the masses in a highly paternalistic manner. Throughout Hu's work the masses appear as an unconscious being which can only be awakened from the outside. This must be done with great care, however, as Hu indicated in his article "Revolutionary Theory and Revolutionary Work":

... step by step we will awaken the masses, and step by step we will take actions on their behalf. We must not cause the masses suddenly to have extravagant hopes, only to experience disillusionment later.

The problem of leadership of the masses was discussed at greater length by Hu in "The Kuomintang Theory of Mass Movements."
Much of this article was devoted to outlining Sun's three-stage theory of political development, and to attacking the Communists for their unscrupulous exploitation of the labour and peasant movements. Hu stated that the importance of the mass movements had changed as China moved from the military to the tutelary stage. During the period of the military unification of China, the mass movements helped to realize the nationalist goals by attacking the warlords and their allies. Once that violent stage was past the work of reconstruction began. The mass movements now were to be guided in attaining the political and social goals of Sun Yat-sen's programmes. The party was to supervise all mass organizations, and party members were to permeate them in order to guide them from within. It was of utmost importance that the masses, whose volatility was always worrisome, should not be stirred up. The posters, slogans, and inflammatory speeches of the military stage must now be avoided.\(^56\)

Since the active leadership of the party contrasted so sharply with the passive role of the masses, it followed that the party would face a major problem in keeping itself responsive to the interests of the masses. Hu was well aware of this issue, and returned to it frequently. He suggested that the problem could be resolved if three steps were taken. First, the masses must be made to understand and trust the party. Second, the party must not allow itself to become a special privileged class. Third, the members of the party must constantly be prepared to sacrifice themselves for the good of the party, or for the masses.\(^57\) Of these it was the second which most concerned Hu. By the time
of his return to government in October 1928, Hu had come to the conclusion that bureaucratization and corruption within the party were becoming serious problems. There were members to be found who saw the party as nothing more than a means of dominating the people. These individuals abused the principle of party leadership in order to exploit the masses and safeguard their own positions. They had become a "party gentry" (tang lao-yeh) and affected "party airs" in their work (tang ch'i). Their only goal was the enjoyment of office at the expense of the masses.58

The corruptions of office, however, were not limited to certain individuals in the party. Hu feared that the Kuomintang as a whole might become a privileged class set apart from the people. The lesson of the Soviet party had not been lost on Hu. A similar development on the part of the KMT would create a perilous situation in Chinese society:59

In this revolution of all of the people we absolutely cannot tolerate the existence of classes. How then can we allow ourselves the right to become a separate class?

If the party were to become divorced from the masses in such a way, it would in effect become a "counter-revolutionary." To prevent this occurring the party constantly had to bring its attitudes and work style into line with those of the common people. This process Hu called p'ing-min-hua, which may be rendered approximately as party "popularization."60

In addition to the corruptions of office, both party and government faced a more subtle but equally serious problem in the persistence of old bureaucratic habits. The yamen style
of work was by no means dead. Some officials followed rules much too closely; others refused to trouble themselves with routine business matters. Moreover, there was a continual evasion of responsibility on the part of such people. Hu regarded the problem of bureaucratization as particularly dangerous to the KMT, since bureaucracy in China traditionally had implied corruption and negligence of duty. This was not the case in the West. Bureaucracy was necessary to the organization of modern life. A properly regulated and honest officialdom was essential to China. But already too many people in the party and government were slipping into the old bureaucratic habits.61

What solution did Hu provide to this question of bureaucratization and corruption which was increasingly afflicting the KMT? The problem exercised him greatly; yet he was unable to find an answer. He could offer nothing more than ceaseless exhortation to the party members to follow the teachings of Sun Yat-sen and to act in a selfless and dedicated manner. There was nothing of an ideological or institutional nature that Hu could suggest to rectify the serious problems surfacing in the party. Given the lack of participation by the masses, and the absence of a revolutionary social ideology to motivate the leadership, it was impossible to infuse the bulk of the party membership with a sense of anything wider than immediate personal interest, or to promote administration in anything but the traditional bureaucratic manner. Against this reality, Hu's repeated calls could have little more than a momentarily inspirational effect.
The Exposition of Sun Yat-senism

In January 1928 Hu published his most important contribution to Kuomintang political theory, *The Interlinked Nature of the Three Principles of the People*. This extended essay, which runs to over a hundred pages of text, was written basically as an exposition of the ideas of Sun Yat-sen. It cannot be called a major piece of creative work, although it is true that Hu attempted to present Sun's ideas in a more systematic manner, and with a stronger background of historical evidence to support them. It must be said that a careful examination of this essay reveals a very uneven quality. It is a rather disconcerting blend of a sound general knowledge of western political thought combined with arbitrary and narrow definitions of fundamental terms such as democracy, capitalism and militarism. The content of the essay consists in fact of several different arguments which have been forced into an overall theoretical structure. Yet it must be recalled that this work was the creation of a man with an excellent intellect, and that it has probably done most to establish Hu's name as a theorist in the official Kuomintang party roll.

At the beginning of this work Hu stated that Sun's ideas were based on "the fixed laws of evolution," an assertion that revealed how far Hu had come from the doubts he had expressed about such laws in 1919. The evolutionary laws which Hu now had in mind were those of the struggle for existence as formulated by Maurice William. This struggle, as Sun pointed out, could be reduced to the inescapable fundamental reality of "the
The struggle of man against man." Hu illustrated other forms the
struggles had taken in the course of history: priests against the
monarch, the monarch against the nobility, the monarch against
the people, workers against capitalists, the colonies against
the imperialist nations. The forms of the struggles in human
history were so numerous that they "could not be divided into
clear and obvious stages." Neither was it possible to claim
that there was one basic form of struggle in which all others
were subsumed. Class struggle, for example, could explain only
some of the ways in which men had contended with each other.
In no way was it the key to human history.

Having made this argument Hu then observed that Sun grouped
all forms of struggle under three categories: the national revo-
lution, the political revolution, and the social revolution.
According to Hu, the categories recognized by Sun not only
embraced every form of the conflict amongst men, but also the
whole of human history. In each of these three areas of the
social struggle, Sun had constructed one of his revolutionary
principles. As a result, the three principles of the people
were all-embracing in nature. Because they supposedly took into
cognizance every aspect of reality, they were also seen by Hu
as supportive of each other. It was this "chained" or "inter-
linked" characteristic of the three principles that Hu cited as
the guarantee of their indestructibility.

Opposed to the power of world revolution, which was to be
found in Sun's three principles, was imperialism, the expression
of world counter-revolution. According to Hu, imperialism was
"the crystallization" of the three forces of militarism, capitalism and bureaucratism. These three forces possessed a kind of evil interdependence which gave imperialism its great strength. Defining imperialism as a western-generated phenomenon, Hu stated that for the past five hundred years mankind had been suffering from its scourge. At the time he was writing approximately two-thirds of the land and population of the world was exploited by European, American, or now Japanese, imperialism. As an indication of the power of the imperialist nations, Hu pointed to the British empire, contending that each Englishman could be said to have on the average ten non-white people subject to him.

The components of imperialism, that is, militarism, capitalism, and bureaucratism, Hu traced back ultimately to individualism. On the level of the individual human being, there existed the desire for domination over others. It was true that individualism might result in artistic and scientific creativity, but it was more likely that individualism would express itself in the search for political or economic power. In present-day society this drive for power had taken more advanced and original forms. A good example of this was to be found in militarism, which Hu defined as the state organized primarily for military purposes. Originally man had organized himself militarily for self-defence, but now the state set out on a deliberately aggressive path. Militarism was insatiable in its appetite, and it subordinated to itself both its own citizens and the people of conquered lands. However, militarism was more than just a desire for the land and wealth of other nations. The pursuit of empty
glory, the hatred of one race for another, the cultural arrogance possessed by a self-professed "superior culture" towards an "inferior culture," all stimulated militaristic adventures. No one theory, economic, political, or otherwise, was fully sufficient to explain militarism.

When Hu examined capitalism he traced its origins to the struggle by the individual to gain power through property. In time, greater aggregations of property were built up, so that capitalism had come to be a force not only within the western nations, but also over the world at large. Capitalism as a major force in society was a product of the preceding four centuries. The capitalist era had resulted from the great developments in navigation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The economic and social system that had come into being as a result of these developments gave great scope for the expansion of individual power. Some men were able to dominate certain areas of production, and thus were able to dominate the productive power of other men, or of whole social classes. The owners of the means of production were therefore able to enjoy the wealth created by others with little expenditure of labour themselves. This type of social division was characteristic of the industrial nations. It is significant to note here that Hu did not see this division existing in his own society. In his view, the control of property in China by individuals or by privileged social minorities was not in the least "excessive."

Class conflict, therefore, was not imminent in China.
After these mechanistic definitions of militarism and capitalism, Hu's explanation of bureaucratism has more immediacy to it. Hu stated that bureaucratism was a characteristic of all nations, although it was most virulent when put at the service of the other two counter-revolutionary forces. The bureaucracy was a privileged and parasitic group dependent on the state, and concerned solely with the survival of its own special status. It included, in Hu's definition, not only government officials but professional politicians of the type to be found in the Peking warlord regimes. Since the bureaucracy was not involved in production, it did not possess any economic independence. As a result, its members ingratiated themselves with whatever government was in power. Since they lacked an ideology of their own, bureaucrats always assumed that of the ruling group. In the parliamentary democracies, whose system of government Hu termed "empty and hypocritical," the whole political class, whether elected or non-elected, served the interests of the ruling capitalists. In the imperialist countries, bureaucratism served its twin masters of militarism and capitalism. As a final example, Hu cited the colonial administrations, where bureaucratism was indispensable to the management and exploitation of the colonial peoples.

Hu then provided a brief sketch of the history of western imperialism. In doing so he demonstrated a sound knowledge of European history over the preceding four centuries. Hu regarded mercantilism as the first institutionalized form taken by imperialism. With the great advances in technology made during the
Industrial Revolution, the western nations gained unparalleled strength. It was in this stage of imperialist technological superiority that China now found itself.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, a small state such as England was able to oppress much larger but weaker nations. Hu's comments indicate that he regarded England as still the chief oppressor of the Chinese. However, Hu also pointed out that competition among the industrialized powers for raw materials, markets and territory had drained the strength of English imperialism. By the end of the nineteenth century the United States and Germany had come to challenge England's supremacy.\textsuperscript{72}

The late nineteenth and early twentieth century was also an age of rising nationalism. In the West, nationalism originally was identified with the demands of different peoples for self-determination and political independence. With the development of state power, economic nationalism replaced the earlier political nationalism. This very quickly turned into imperialism, which invaded other people's territories, and oppressed them for its own ends. In the eastern countries, nationalism arose as a direct response to imperialist aggression, since each people "desired its own independence." At one point in his discussion Hu seemed to imply a racial definition of nationalism when he stated that imperialism was the "subjugation of the colonial races by the white race."\textsuperscript{73} This was uncharacteristic, since the focus of his discussion was the political oppression of China not only by the western powers, but also, most recently, by Japan. Although Hu spoke of the cultural arrogance and economic greed characteristic of these nations, his own response was generated by the affront the imperialist powers presented to China's national dignity.
With this sketch of imperialism as a background, Hu then demonstrated how the Three Principles of the People would triumph over the forces of counter-revolution. The superiority of Sun’s ideas lay in their specific application to China’s revolution, which was the youngest of world revolutions. According to Hu, each historical epoch witnessed a development in the nature and achievements of revolution. The American and French revolutions had overthrown monarchical rule, but had failed to eradicate the class system. The Russian revolution had destroyed czarism and capitalism, but the dictatorship of the proletariat in reality had resulted both in the personal despotism of Stalin, and the emergence of a communist imperialism no different from the former capitalist imperialism. In comparison, the Chinese revolution would rise above these limitations to a higher stage.

This belief in the opportunities afforded China by the earlier revolutionary experience of other nations was by no means unique to Hu. In 1918 Li Ta-chao had compared the French and Russian revolutions, and spoken of a progressive enlargement of revolutionary goals. The French Revolution had been primarily nationalistic, though it had "a social revolutionary flavour." The Russian revolution was basically socialist, "with a world revolutionary colour." China’s revolution would fall heir to both of these. Hu certainly did not see China’s revolution as an apocalyptic social transformation as did Li Ta-chao. Sun’s Three Principles would act as the guide to realizing China’s nationalist revolution. Yet both men shared a common faith in the great potential China possessed for revolution, and for world revolu-
tionary leadership. Such a faith, it may be argued, was not so much a product of any process of rational deduction as it was the expression of a need to place China once more at the forefront of world historical development.

The major part of Hu's essay was devoted to an explanation of Sun's theories of nationalism, democracy and livelihood, which were regarded by Hu as unarguable political and social truths. Hu conceived his own work to consist of providing an exposition of each of these, and took as his point of departure Sun's famous summary of the Three Principles: 76

Cosmopolitanism (shih-chieh-chu-i) is the ideal of nationalism, nationalism is the realization (shih-hsing) of cosmopolitanism; anarchism is the ideal of democracy, democracy is the realization of anarchism; communism is the ideal of the people's livelihood, the people's livelihood is the realization of communism.

In his treatment of the principles of nationalism and democracy Hu did not go beyond the oddly contrasting mixture of minutely detailed programmes and vague utopian ideals presented by Sun. Without stating the means of implementation Hu maintained that the principle of nationalism would bring an end to class conflict, war and even national borders. 77 With respect to the principle of democracy, Hu argued that both anarchism and bourgeois democracy were inapplicable to China, the first because it lacked practicable means of realization, and the second because it was essentially a fraudulent device for perpetuating the rule of the bourgeoisie. China's political future lay in the adoption of Sun's ideas on the organization of the state. Sun's model, a curious amalgam of the American presidential system, traditional Chinese politi-
lcal institutions, and radical measures advanced by the American Progressive movement, vested ultimate authority in the people through granting them the rights of suffrage, initiative, referendum and recall. At the same time it provided for the exercise of government through the operation of the five-yüan system, which represented the executive, legislative, judicial, examination, and supervisory functions of the state. 78

Not surprisingly, the longest section of Hu's essay was devoted to his refutation of Marxism. However, there is nothing to be found in it that adds to the arguments brought forth by Hu in his articles and speeches of 1927 discussed earlier in this chapter. It might be observed that, in comparison with the rest of the essay, the discussion of Marxism stands out as much more forceful, pointed, and interesting. As a whole, The Interlinked Nature of the Three Principles of the People is unconvincing as a theoretical work, despite its genuine nationalist concerns, and its periodic historical insights. Even a preliminary study of this work reveals an unwillingness on Hu's part to give more than a forced or artificial definition of the terms he employed, which reduces at once the value of any discussion of such concepts as militarism or imperialism. More perplexing is Hu's fascination with highly stylized arguments which are presented more in terms of symmetry than intrinsic logic: for example, the three forces of counter-revolution which were opposed to the three forces of revolution, and the three principles of Sun Yat-sen which were to solve the three fundamental problems of mankind. 79
There is also present in the work a strange imbalance between what Hu chose to recognize, and what he chose to ignore. This can be illustrated with reference to his treatment of the principle of democracy. Sun believed that this principle could be realized largely through the practice of the mechanistic political measures advocated by the American Progressives in the early years of the century. Several of the American states had enacted these in order to facilitate the direct expression of the people's will. Yet it soon became apparent that the measures of initiative, recall and referendum were, at best, cumbersome political devices, or at worst, were susceptible to the traditional forms of corruption and manipulation. By the time of the First World War most of these laws had fallen into abeyance. By 1927 it should have been apparent that this important part of Sun's doctrine was no longer tenable, or at least, could not guarantee the popular political democracy it promised. In his discussion of the principle of democracy, Hu showed no awareness of this problem, however.

This omission is all the more noticeable in light of his great interest in the New Economic Policy and the revisions Marxism was undergoing in Russia. Admittedly, Marxism and the Soviet experience were of much greater political significance to Hu, and his former mission to the Soviet capital had given him particular insights into the Soviet world. This still does not completely account for the unreflective acceptance by Hu of Sun's ideas on democracy. There is a frustratingly static quality about Hu's exposition of Sun Yat-senism. Perhaps his literalness
represented an unwillingness to come to grips with any questions which might undermine the foundations of Sun's ideological structure. Whatever the reason might be, it is apparent from The Interlinked Nature of the Three Principles of the People that Hu's complete dedication to the life and thought of Sun Yat-sen had forced him into an increasingly confined and inflexible intellectual position.

Last Reflections on Marxism and Sun Yat-senism

In 1933 Hu published in the San-min-chu-i yueh-k'an (The Three Principles of the People Monthly) two important essays which further attempted to point out inadequacies in the theory of historical materialism. At the same time Hu sought to construct a stronger philosophical base for Sun Yat-sen's ideas. The first of these was entitled "The Conception of History in the Three Principles of the People."80 It had been originally written to preface a translation by Yeh Ch'i-fang of the full five volumes of Max Beer's General History of Socialism and Social Struggles, the work Hu had translated in part in 1926. The second essay, "The Concepts of Idealism and Materialism in the Three Principles of the People," was a shorter but more speculative composition.81 Both articles provide some interesting last thoughts on historical materialism. What may be of more significance, however, is the evidence offered by these works of how difficult a task it was for Hu to develop Sun Yat-senism into a convincing political philosophy.

Hu opened his discussion of the three principles' theory of
history by stating that there were certain areas in which the historical materialism of Marx was of value. These he enumerated as follows: the "relationships which existed within society;" the effect of the "institutional culture" (chih-tu ti wen-hua) on the "spiritual culture"; the prejudices of mankind; and the way in which individual self-interest was formed into class interest and class struggle. Hu then charged that historical materialism was seriously flawed because it lacked the comprehensiveness necessary to explain all historical phenomena. Abandoning the well-balanced understanding of the theory that he had displayed in his Chien-she writings, and forgetting as well the letters of Engels which he had quoted from so extensively, Hu characterized historical materialism as being "a theory of economic monism," one which explained all historical change in terms of "the economic structure."\(^8^2\) Hu admitted that this type of theoretical imbalance was not only to be found in Marxism. Every theory was limited by the state of knowledge that prevailed at the time of its inception. Lenin himself had observed that advances in science constantly affected man's conception of the truth. When viewed from the outside, any philosophical system, regardless of its internal consistency, could be seen to possess only a small measure of the truth.\(^8^3\)

It is surprising that after focusing on the limitations inherent in any theory, Hu should then claim an absolute value for Sun's ideas. The "struggle for existence," which, as has been discussed earlier, Sun adopted from Maurice William, provided the motive force behind all historical change. Sun
believed food and self-defense to be man's primary needs. The former caused man to organize himself in increasingly more sophisticated levels of production and distribution. At the beginning there was primitive man, the hunter; in the present day, there was the industrial capitalism of the West. Similarly, self-defense, which Sun equated with government, evolved from the level of the individual through the more advanced forms of the monarchist and militarist state, until it reached the present imperialist stage. Hu then went on to charge that, in contrast to Sun's comprehensive theory, Marx's so-called productive forces and mode of production represented nothing more than two of the many means by which man took part in the struggle for existence. In a statement unfortunately not elaborated on, Hu then pointed out that changes in the cultural and economic structure of a society followed upon changes in the struggle for existence. This observation would appear to take the argument back to the proposition that man's first need was the production of his own subsistence, which then determined man's social organization and cultural values—the starting point of Marx's analysis of society. Hu made no comment on this implied coincidence, but simply reasserted his belief that existence (sheng) not matter (wu) was the motive force of social evolution.

Hu devoted the remainder of this essay to a rather scholastic survey of world thought which was designed to prove that non-material forces were as important as material ones in determining the course of history. In presenting this argument, he ignored the fact that, when Marx spoke of the influence of the economic
base on the superstructure, he was formulating this in terms of society at large, not in terms of each member of society. In 1919 Hu was well aware of the scope for individual actions and eccentricities within the limitations imposed by the relations of production. In 1933 he no longer recognized this. From Max Beer's general history, Hu quoted such disparate sources as Philo, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, St. Augustine and Gregory VII to prove his argument that men were activated by more than a simple response to material interests. Philo, for example, had pointed out that the Essenes had shunned all but the bare essentials of life in their search for a more spiritual existence. Aristotle had written that excessive desire rather than genuine need had prompted man's greatest crimes, while St. Augustine contended that "it was not the possessions but the desires of mankind" that required equalization.  

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Hu concluded his essay with a more persuasive case than that offered by his curious list of philosophers and ascetics. He drew attention to several significant passages in Bertrand Russell's Bolshevism: Practice and Theory. Russell stated that it was necessary to revise Marxism by taking into consideration vital non-economic factors in explaining history. In the modern world nationalism was the most important of these. This was an argument which Hu had put forward against Marxism since at least 1927. Furthermore, Russell stated that the discoveries of modern psychology made it impossible to consider man always to be motivated in his actions either by rational self-interest or the interest of the economic class to which he belonged. According
to Russell, Marx had inherited from the British orthodox econo-
mists a fundamentally optimistic view of man's nature, but this belief in the rationality of the human psyche could no longer be maintained. 87

In this essay on idealism and materialism Hu attempted to provide Sun Yat-senism with a more sophisticated intellectual apparatus. Hu took as his point of departure a statement by Plekhanov to the effect that all philosophical systems were monistic, since they held mind and matter to be mutually exclu-
sive. One proceeded from the other; both could not exist on equal terms. Plekhanov believed matter to be the ultimate reality, but, in Hu's opinion, there was no reason why mind could not be regarded in the same way. Because of their fixation on either mind or matter, western theorists had produced defi-
cient political ideologies. 88 Marx was a good example of this failing. In The Poverty of Philosophy Marx believed he had destroyed the idealist philosophy then dominant, and had replaced it with the superior theory of historical materialism. In fact, Marx had merely substituted the word "matter" for the word "mind," and thus he had remained imprisoned by the old preconceptions. 89

Hu observed that over the past few thousand years the respective claims of mind and matter had been argued endlessly. Now the supporters of each were drawing on modern science. The idealists believed that psychology would prove mind to be the ultimate reality, while the materialists believed that physics would do the same for matter. Their hopes never could be real-
ized, however, since the mind-matter dichotomy was an erroneous
formulation of the problem. Hu proposed in its place a concept which he termed "necessity" (hsü-yao). This was the ultimate reality in man's life; both mind and matter had to be subsumed to it. Hu then went on to relate revolution to the above categories. Revolution was first of all an expression of the fundamental struggle for existence, or in other words, an inescapable response to necessity. In its more advanced stages revolution was charged with the responsibility of undertaking reconstruction in both the spiritual and material areas of man's life. These areas Hu equated with the philosophical concepts of idealism and materialism, though he offered no explanation for this sudden change of definition. Hu then concluded this forced and unconvincing argument by stating that Sun Yat-sen's ideas on "psychological transformation" constituted the proper recognition of the idealist side of the troublesome dichotomy, while his plans for economic reconstruction did the same for the material side. Therefore, Sun had mended the age-old rift between idealism and materialism.

After this highly forced theoretical construction Hu's concluding remarks on the current state of Sun's ideas in China are of much more interest, both for what they reveal about the nature of official KMT ideology in the early 1930s, and for what they tell of Hu's commitment to Sun's political and social ideals. Hu began by noting that there had been a persistent effort over the past decade to distort the ideas of Sun Yat-sen. In the United Front period the Communists had attempted to equate the Three Principles with Marxism. Hu repeated the point that,
because of his concentration on "matter" (wu) or "profit" (li), Marx had failed to grasp the workings of history as a whole. Marx had examined only modern bourgeois society, with its class-ridden system of productive relations, and as a consequence, he had reached the conclusion that class conflict was endemic in all societies. In words which Hu borrowed from Maurice William, Marx could claim to be no more than a "social pathologist," whose remedies were not applicable to China. 92

Hu then summarized the differences between Sun and Marx in tabular form. This provides a convenient statement of the main points in Hu's nationalist ideology. Hu began with the observation that Sun's revolutionary philosophy was "an existence conception of history" (sheng ti shih-kuan), as opposed to a materialist conception of history. The revolutionary masses were made of "all the people," and not only the proletariat. The enemies of the revolution were listed as, first, imperialism; second, the warlords and traditional politicians, both of whom represented the "feudal power" in China; and thirdly, the "local thugs and evil gentry" (t'u-hao lieh-shen). In comparison, Marx simply saw the bourgeoisie as the enemy. The nature of revolution, therefore, in Sun's case, was national, while in Marx's it was social. Last of all, Hu compared the "means of revolution" (ko-ming shou-tuan). Sun's revolution would be attained through the national revolution and the promotion of the programme of democracy, while Marx utilized only the class struggle and a worker-peasant dictatorship. 93

After presenting this schematized vindication of Sun's
theories, Hu turned to the more immediate and dangerous threat to them posed by the Kuomintang itself. By the early 1930s the KMT leadership had abandoned most of its pretensions to social reform, and had moved to a position on the right which stressed the nation and party, and the obligations of the populace to obey. This shift found ideological expression in Confucian "restorationism," which was characterized by an assortment of quasi-mystical notions centring on such ill-defined ancient concepts as propriety (li) and righteousness (i). Supplementing this was the promotion of a cult of Tseng Kuo-fan, the hero of the imperial cause against the Taipings. The object of both of these experiments in political revivalism was the same: the attainment of social stability throughout the nation. Mary Wright described this aptly when she wrote that, "in the view of the Kuomintang ideologists, Confucianism was the most effective and cheapest means ever devised by man for the purpose." 

Equally important to the restorationist movement was the reassessment of Sun Yat-sen to emphasize his supposed link with traditional Confucianism. At the same time the undeniable "modern" component in his political and social ideology was deemphasized. The leading spirit in the reinterpretation of Sun Yat-sen was Tai Chi-t'ao. He had seized upon references made by Sun to such Confucian concepts as "benevolence" and "love" (jen-ai). There is no dispute over the fact that Sun included these and other ideas from the Confucian tradition in his eclectic political philosophy. However, Tai Chi-t'ao's assertion that these elements constituted the essence of
Sun Yat-senism in effect minimized the modern thrust of Sun's thought, and left it little more than a vague, mystical defence of the status quo in China. According to Tai, Sun's thought was indisputably a part of "orthodox tradition" (cheng-t'ung). Sun Yat-sen was heir to the moral conceptions of that tradition developed from the time of Yao and Shun down to the time of Confucius and Mencius.97

Hu reacted strongly to these attempts to "Confucianize" Sun Yat-sen. Although he did not mention Tai Chi-t'ao by name, he referred to the two statements mentioned above, and described them as being arbitrary and without foundation. If they were an accurate description of Sun, then he would have no claim to his reputation as a great revolutionary thinker and leader. The irrelevance and the danger to China of the whole Confucian restorationist movement were put by Hu in the following words:98

When I read the newspapers I wonder whether we are in the year 1933, when Japan has already seized Manchuria from us, and is infiltrating the north of China, or whether we have retreated three thousand years into the past—or at the very least, five hundred.

Even more absurd to Hu was the attempt being made by some to reconcile Sun's ideas with Buddhism, a religion for which Hu never possessed any sympathy. He abruptly dismissed it as "idol-worshipping and unrevolutionary." However, he was forced to admit that this need to present Sun Yat-sen in Confucian or Buddhist terms reflected not just the force of superstition, but also the unfortunately deep rooted Chinese habit of justifying any activity in the present by reference to the past.99
In conclusion, Hu returned to his earlier theme of the intrinsic excellence of Sun's ideas. He called for open debate in China in place of the current intellectual repression, since the manifest superiority of the Three Principles to all other ideologies could be demonstrated most convincingly in a free environment. Sun had created a "practical and scientific theory," which was based on the laws of human social evolution, and not on metaphysics or materialism. Plekhanov's statement that all philosophical systems were monistic was true only of western creations, such as Marxism. It was not true of the Three Principles, which comprehended all human experience. The most important point to note about them, Hu emphasized, was their completely sufficient nature, which made any additions or revisions unnecessary. Anyone who tried to alter the substance of the Three Principles, whether in a Marxist, Confucianist, Buddhist, or any other direction, was an enemy of Sun Yat-sen.

The Limitations of KMT Ideology

At the heart of Hu Han-min's ideological searchings was the need to find a revolutionary doctrine unique to China. His rejection of Marxism, and his claims for the infallibility of Sun Yat-senism were both prompted by this need, probably more so than by his commitment to the preservation of the social order. It was necessary for all revolutionary ideologies to take into consideration the characteristics of each nation of the world:

If a world revolution can be attained through a single ideology which can break down national boundaries....then.
that revolution must reflect the needs of the people of the world. If it does not, it is not a revolution. How can it be said, then, that the so-called unique ideology is anything more than a rigid formula. . . ?

This statement begs the question of Hu's own claim for the universal efficacy of Sun Yat-senism, although it appears that Hu sought to escape this contradiction by maintaining that the Three Principles were of sufficient scope to encompass all national differences. As a possible resolution of the anomaly in his argument, this formulation is not persuasive. However, the exportability of Sun Yat-senism was not the main concern of Hu's ideology: in fact, it may represent a type of nationalistic self-assertion as much as it does a reasoned intellectual proposition. The fundamental value of Sun's ideas lay in their suitability to the unique conditions of China, and it was this which justified the exclusion of all alien revolutionary ideologies from China.

It was the pretensions of Marxism to universal validity, irrespective of national differences, which Hu found completely unacceptable. Whether or not Hu felt Marxism could be revised to acquire a national form cannot be ascertained, since Hu's utterances on this topic are inconsistent. As noted earlier, Hu often stated that Leninism was nothing more than a cynical form of power manipulation, completely divorced from Marxism. Yet, on another occasion, he replied the contrary, when he stated that the failure of the Russian revolutionary experiment was not only a result of particular Russian conditions, but also an inevitable consequence of the Russian attempt
to implement the defective theory of Marxism.\textsuperscript{103} The possibility that Marxism could be revised is also implicit in the attention given by Hu to the qualifications which Marx made in 1872 to his earlier belief that violent revolution was the only path to victory for the proletariat.\textsuperscript{104} Marx had stated that the workers might hope "to secure their ends by peaceful means" in some countries, such as the United States, England and Holland. Hu did not choose to complete this excerpt, since Marx went on to indicate that force probably would have to be used in the other European countries. This may constitute a distortion of Marx's words; on the other hand, Marx's exemption of several nations from his earlier universal formulation of revolution may have indicated to Hu that the path to revolution was unique for each nation. Since Marx had not spoken of the Asian nations, there was even more reason for Hu to see Marxism, revised or unrevised, as inappropriate to China.\textsuperscript{105} Because it was based on the experience of the industrialized West, Marxism, as Hu put it, could have no relevance to the backward (\textit{lo-hou}) nations of the world, as it did not offer them the means (\textit{pan-fa}) by which they might achieve revolution.\textsuperscript{106}

For convenience, it may be possible to simplify Hu's position on Marxism in the following manner: the Marxism of Marx himself was inapplicable to the non-European nations; and secondly, if it were possible to revise Marxism it had not been successfully achieved, certainly not in the Soviet Union, the only state which claimed, rightly or wrongly, to follow the Marxist doctrine. As far as China was concerned, the philosophy
of Sun Yat-sen and the leadership of the Kuomintang were the two lodestones of the Chinese revolution. Sun had recognized the essential characteristics of Chinese society when he described its universal poverty, and he had organized the Kuomintang as the political movement of the oppressed of China against their warlord and imperialist oppressors. Hu stated flatly that it was completely fallacious to maintain that "a party of workers and peasants was the most revolutionary" to be found. The followers of the Three Principles constituted the world's most revolutionary party, which "definitely was not a peasant-worker party," but one representative of all the people. Its unity could not be threatened by the development of factions of the left or the right. Any attempt to do this would imperil "the all-inclusive revolutionary party," and would be tantamount to "counter-revolution." 

Hu's determination to promote a nationalist ideology for China, and to implement it through an independent political party, was a logical consequence of his own fundamental Chinese nationalism. Whatever the theoretical weaknesses of Sun Yat-senism may have been, it did provide its adherents with a supposedly unique Chinese political philosophy. However, Sun Yat-senism in reality was more a set of programmes than it ever was a philosophical system, even if its obvious inadequacies as the latter are discounted. A brief examination of these programmes, in so far as they sought to solve the great social problem of China, that of the peasantry, reveals how limited Sun's grasp of the countryside was. The approach taken towards the peasantry was, first of all,
a highly patronizing one. In Hu's explanation of KMT rural policy, the peasantry appears as a great, undifferentiated mass. Peasants were to be helped by "the power of the state"; on no account were they to be "thrown into disorder." Hu sketched out the programme of rural reform, which was to begin with the land-survey initiating the equalization of land rights policy. The state also would set up agricultural banks to make low-interest loans available to the peasants, thereby enabling them to "escape the usurious interest charges of the t'u-hao lieh-shen." The state would establish cooperatives to facilitate the sale of produce, and so help the peasants avoid the manipulation of the market by exploitative merchants. Irrigation and conservation projects would mitigate the ravages of natural disasters, while new scientific knowledge, as applied in such important areas as the improvement of farm implements and the development of fertilizers, would bring about an increase in production. In these ways, the welfare of the peasantry would be secured. Then, as Hu concluded, "What need will there be for the disruptive methods of the Communist Party?"

Viewed from one perspective, there was nothing intrinsically wrong with the above prescription as a long-term solution to some of the problems of China's countryside. Increased production was essential to the nation's economic, social and political betterment. However, what Sun, Hu and the rest of the progressive KMT leadership refused to consider when they laid out their carefully detailed plans was that the Chinese countryside was not a homogeneous whole, which could be rescued from poverty through the general application to it of technology, easy credit and other such measures. Apart
from the awkward, and persistently ignored, question of how these programmes were to be financed, the KMT plan for rural reconstruction was fatally flawed because it discounted the infinite gradations of poverty which existed among the peasantry, and it made light of the virtually unchallengeable domination of the countryside by the traditional elite. Hu referred to the exploitative elements of rural society, the unscrupulous merchants and the 

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hope was extraordinarily optimistic. In sum, it may be said that half of the rural problem, that of endemic poverty, was recognized from the beginning by the KMT leadership, but the other half, that of the oppressive traditional social structure, was continually minimized, if not ignored.

With such a solution to offer for the regeneration of rural China, the KMT had no alternative but to stress social order and discipline while the slow measured pace of reform altered the lot of the peasantry. This approach was applied to China at large. Hu said that the party must emphasize the "centre," as opposed to the "left" or the "right," although he took pains to explain that this did not imply any form of compromise with the enemies of society. At the same time, Hu underlined the obligation of the party to lead the masses through the period of political tutelage
and economic reconstruction, and to hold firm to the ideology of Sun Yat-sen in carrying out its tasks. Yet it is apparent that this ideology was too compromising to act as a vehicle of social change in China, and it was too weak as an intellectual structure to compel the allegiance of most of the party membership to its genuinely progressive aspects. While there were a few in the party such as Hu who preserved their faith in Sun Yat-senism, it was manifestly clear that once the party had settled into power in 1928 most of the party membership gave the official ideology no more than a ritual acknowledgement.

Hu was fully aware of this lessening of revolutionary spirit in the party, and he attempted to counter it. In doing so, he was reduced to a most ironical position for a man who saw himself as a modern revolutionary, for he could do nothing but ceaselessly call on party members to become better men through constant rededication to the party's mission and Sun Yat-sen's teachings. As a young man, Hu had broken with all of the obvious traits of Confucianism. But when he was confronted with the problem of reinvigorating the political movement founded by Sun, he could offer nothing more than an essentially Confucian solution: the provision of good leaders, imbued with a high sense of political virtue, who would govern honestly and genuinely implement the party's programmes of reform. In this respect, Sun Yat-senism revealed its fundamental political weakness, since even its most thoughtful and dedicated followers, such as Hu Han-min, ultimately had to fall back on the chimerical hope that its goals were attainable if only enough good men could be found.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: THE CAREER AND THOUGHT OF HU HAN-MIN

Political Power and Political Exile: 1928-1936

The last years of Hu Han-min's life were ones of deep frustration. Although he was invited back to Nanking in the fall of 1928 to join the newly proclaimed National Government, he soon found his political role severely circumscribed. Hu was appointed president of the Legislative Yuan in the five-power administrative system officially promulgated on October 4. According to the model which had been drawn up earlier by Sun Yat-sen in his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, the Legislative Yuan was declared "the highest legislative organ" of the government, with "the power to decide upon the following: legislation, budgets, amnesties, declarations of war, conclusion of treaties," as well as other matters involving international relations. However, the exercise of these powers was very much restricted by the allocation to the Executive Yuan and the State Council of virtually the same responsibilities. The Executive Yuan was "to decide on" all bills which were to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan, while the State Council, the highest organ of the state, was granted the right to declare war, conclude treaties, and to "exercise all the government powers of the Republic of China." In this confusion of jurisdictions what, in effect,
determined questions of policy was the possession of real political power, whether financial, military or factional, and not the letter of Sun Yat-sen's complex constitutional structure. This meant that the Legislative Yuan was reduced to a deliberative function, while effective authority resided in whatever part of the state structure Chiang Kai-shek and his entourage happened to occupy.

Hu Han-min himself had been brought back into the Kuomintang ruling elite largely because of questions of factional balance. In the February 1928 plenary session of the KMT Central Executive Committee, Wang Ching-wei and his purported left-wing allies had been forced into political retirement. Chiang Kai-shek, while obviously the preeminent political figure, required the support of one of the major factional groupings in the party if his position were to be consolidated. This was provided by the reentry into the Nanking government of Hu, not so much because he was the active leader of a clique, as because he was regarded by the veteran members of the party, particularly the large Cantonese contingent, as their leader due to his long service to the party. This role was one which Hu fully accepted. Since he had been associated with Sun Yat-sen from the founding of the T'ung-meng Hui, Hu saw his position in the new government as that of propagator and defender of Sun's teachings about the party and the nation.

In the two and a half years in which he served as president of the Legislative Yuan Hu had the opportunity to exercise those legalistic interests which had been revealed two decades earlier.
in *Min-pao* in his lengthy study of foreign exclusionism and international law. From the testimony of contemporary observers, Hu applied himself to his work with great personal integrity and dedication, qualities which stood in sharp contrast to the traditional bureaucratic habits of indolence and peculation which were reasserting themselves all too quickly in the Nanking regime. It is unfortunately the case, however, that many of the laws drafted by the Legislative Yuan never had any application to the lives of the citizens of the Republic. An exception to this statement might be cited with respect to the promulgation of modern codes of criminal and civil law, and the provision of properly trained judicial officers. The goal of these endeavours was one of utmost importance to the Nationalist government: the abolition of the foreign privilege of extraterritoriality, which was the centrepiece of the system of the unequal treaties.

In two other important areas of legislation, women's rights and rural reform, the Kuomintang legislation remained confined largely to paper. In 1930 a new civil code concerning the rights of women declared legal equality to exist between the sexes. Both enjoyed the right to vote and stand for office. Women, married as well as unmarried, had the right to inherit property. Grounds for divorce were identical for both sexes. There were other provisions which made the code one of the most modern of its time, so that Hu Shih termed it "a gigantic and bloodless social revolution." The reality, however, was otherwise. This legal code could have little application to any women apart from those who were members of the small west-
ternized bourgeoisie in the large cities. The land legislation passed in the same year limited peasant rents to a maximum of 37.5 percent of the crop, and allowed for the compulsory purchase of holdings of absentee landlords. With rural China still in the grips of the traditional social structure, and with Nanking unwilling under any circumstances to challenge the rural landed class, there was no way in which such a law could be applied. This in fact was recognized when Nanking deferred even its official promulgation to 1936. For Hu Han-min, though, it may be said that the enactment of legislation in itself constituted the essential first step in the orderly realization of Sun Yat-sen's programme of social reform.

In early 1931 Hu broke with Chiang Kai-shek and resigned from office. There were two immediate points of difference, although Hu's frustrations at presiding over the impotent Legislative Yuan, along with his deepening resentment of Chiang's dictatorial political style, had prepared him for the break well before it came. The ostensible cause for Hu's withdrawal from political life lay in his opposition to the proposed provisional constitution (yüeh-fa), which was to guide China for the duration of the period of tutelage. In Hu's interpretation, which was certainly open to challenge, Sun's teachings forbade the adoption of a constitution prior to the transition to the final stage of full constitutional rule. It is likely, however, that Hu was as much concerned about Chiang using the yüeh-fa to strengthen legally his own considerable powers, since the constitution made provision for a President of the Republic.
This could be blocked by a literal reading of Sun's texts, which Hu felt particularly competent to make. 7

That the break between Hu and Chiang resolved itself into a struggle for power between two strong figures, each representing a separate interest in the Nanking government, may be seen in the other matter of contention, the proposed silver loan. Hu took the initiative as president of the Legislative Yuan in negotiating a loan of one thousand million ounces of silver from the United States. This was to be used by the Legislative Yuan to underwrite many of the policies of national reconstruction outlined by Sun Yat-sen. The successful negotiation of such a loan would have strengthened appreciably the position of the Legislative Yuan, since budgetary control hitherto had remained in the Executive Yuan, which was dominated by Chiang and the military. The upshot of the increasing tension between the two men was Hu's resignation on February 28, 1931. Chiang immediately placed Hu under house arrest, which he explained was in Hu's best interest, since counter-revolutionary elements in the treaty ports might entice him there and exploit his good name. 8

Hu's arrest once more placed a strain on the fragile structure of the KMT. In Nanking Hu had a large following among the rank and file members of the government and the party, who saw him representing their interests against the clique of militarists, financiers and relatives which surrounded Chiang. More important in terms of power relationships was the support Hu enjoyed on the part of party elders, many of whom originated as
he did from the province of Kwangtung. This mixture of political principle and regional self-interest was demonstrated most tellingly by the coup staged in Canton by Ch'en Ch'i-t'ang at the end of April, 1931.9 Ch'en declared Kwangtung independent of the dictatorial Chiang regime; at the same time Ch'en demanded the release of Hu. When Canton and Nanking failed to resolve their differences, Ch'en called for a punitive expedition against Chiang. Preparations for this were under way when the Japanese suddenly invaded Manchuria on September 18. This brought about a truce between Canton and Nanking, and temporarily restored a superficial state of unity to Nationalist China. Ch'en Chi-t'ang was recognized as head of the KMT Branch Council in the south, and Hu Han-min was released from detention.

After his release Hu proceeded south to Canton, but he soon found that the support of the military clique there did not go as far as allowing him an active role in Canton politics. Hu went on to Hong Kong, where Ch'en provided for the upkeep of a large establishment.10 Once more Hu turned his attention to literary work. With Liu Lu-yin he edited the San-min-chu-i yüeh-k'lan, which published its first issue in Canton on January 15, 1933. Hu was the moving spirit behind the journal, and over its first two years he contributed articles to it on a regular basis. For the most part, these consisted of comment on current Chinese affairs, and repeated explication of the familiar doctrines of Sun Yat-sen. There are certain points of interest which stand out. Hu attacked the Chiang regime unremittingly for its "subservient" attitude towards Japanese aggres-
sion in north China. He attacked it almost as insistently because of its political dictatorship, and its support of fascist organizations such as the Blue Shirts, both of which insulted Sun's principle of democracy. Hu continually stressed the need for implementing Sun's principle of livelihood. This led him to laud the Soviet Union's first five-year plan, which he saw as proof that a nation could industrialize quickly through state direction and mass involvement. In his view the Soviet Union's plan fell short of what China could realize in the Three Principles, but, as he noted, the Soviet Union had realized impressive gains in national power, while China had yet to confront the tasks of national reconstruction.

After 1934 Hu's contributions to the journal decreased quickly in number. This was attributable largely to his recurring ill health, the reason for a voyage of relaxation which he made to Europe in 1935. While he was absent from China, the KMT held its Fifth Congress in November of that year. The party members met under the shadow of increasing Japanese aggression and growing party factionalism. Unity, both in the nation and in the party, became a theme of the Congress. As a result, overtures were made to Hu to rejoin the government, and his importance to the party was recognized in his election to the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee. When he arrived in Hong Kong in April 1936 on his return from Europe, envoys of Nanking were sent to meet him. He set out for the capital, but he had only reached Canton when a cerebral haemorrhage struck him down on May 12, at the early age of fifty-six.
Hu was given a state funeral, memorial meetings attended by thousands of mourners were held throughout the country, editorials were written lamenting his death, and a testimonial volume by his colleagues was published. Shortly after his death Hu's will was made public. This prescribed the national tasks, resistance to Japan, opposition to dictatorial rule, and suppression of the communists, if the Three Principles were to be realized. Some doubt was cast on the authenticity of the will because it appeared to serve the interests of the dissident Canton government. Whether this faction benefited or not, there is nothing about Hu's enjoimments which was out of character with the course of his entire life. According to contemporary accounts, the sentiments expressed on the occasion of Hu's death were genuinely motivated. In a time of growing national and international crisis for China, Hu's political dedication to the ideals of Sun Yat-sen, and his uncompromising nationalism in the face of Japanese aggression, were held up as examples to the nation of what was best in the nationalist cause.

An Assessment of the Political Thought of Hu Han-min

There are certain basic statements to be made, or repeated, concerning the nature of Hu's intellectual career. His life of intense political activity imposed severe, and usually unpredictable, limitations on the opportunities that he had for sustained study. The most striking example of this is his abrupt termination of writing for Chien-she, the high-point in terms of his creativity. Hu's work, at least when regarded superficially,
displays a rather compartmentalized quality, with great outbursts of theoretical work set off by long periods in which he composed nothing apart from routine party directives. However, while this generalization is true in so far as the schedule of his writing career is concerned, it may disguise the basically unified nature of what he wrote over the thirty years of his political life.

A second point to raise at the outset is that of the nature of the intellectual relationship between Hu and Sun Yat-sen. From his early days in the T'ung-meng Hui, Hu saw himself as the young disciple of the old master. This concept was deeply embedded in the Chinese intellectual tradition. However, it did not preclude Hu's independence of mind, nor did it prevent him from ranging into his own areas of interest, as indicated in his studies of Marxism during the May Fourth period. At the beginning of the relationship, Hu wrote in Min-pao almost as a literal expositor of Sun's social reform policies. Curiously enough, at the end of his career, Hu again assumed the role of expositor, but this time it was to remind the Kuomintang of the faith it was losing, not to make converts to the revolutionary cause. Regardless of the specific focus of Hu's interests throughout his life, he saw himself as the defender of Sun Yat-sen's political and social mission.

A last preliminary statement concerns Hu's fundamental political activism. Through many long years filled with setbacks he fought on behalf of Sun's cause. Activism was not only a part of his emotional makeup; it was central to his intellectual comprehension of the world. From his early article on Yen Fu
through his more sophisticated interpretations of historical materialism, Hu emphasized the great scope for activity open to the individual. Although the ultimate causes for this belief cannot be determined, the consequence of it was a voluntarist interpretation of man's role in politics and history.

The aspects of Hu's character and thought mentioned above are easily identifiable. Where the problem becomes difficult is in ascertaining the relative degree of traditionalism or modernism in his thought. This is a significant question, since Hu belonged to a generation which fell into both the world of Confucian China and that of the modern West. In Hu's case this is particularly evident. As a youth, he was trained to take the imperial examination, and at the age of twenty-one he attained the provincial degree. Hu possessed a grasp of the traditional culture shared by few of his contemporaries. Yet in his thought, there is little direct evidence of the influence of that culture. Hu seemed able to set it aside, without any noticeable intellectual stress. His attitude towards the Confucian tradition was highly dispassionate, indicating, perhaps, a high degree of self-assurance about the ideas he had adopted in its place, as well as a lasting pride in his nation's past.

If Hu's attitude towards the traditional culture is clear, and it was a surprisingly non-partisan one for the time, the presence of what might be termed residual Confucian influences in his thought remains a much more open question. There are certain ambiguities to be found in Hu's major social and political positions, and they may represent a tension between the tradi-
tional culture and that of the modern West. This is not to imply that Confucianism and modernity represent polar extremities, nor that Hu's ideas may be fitted into such tidy and convenient categories. The question of politics, the first point to be considered, illustrates the difficulty involved here. Was the traditional Chinese emphasis on the importance of politics necessarily a Confucian preserve? Taoism was also concerned with the role of government. On balance, though, it may be argued that Confucianism, with its emphasis on practical and theoretical matters of government, represented the dominant strain in a widely shared Chinese tradition of politics.

In Hu's case, the fascination with politics is obvious. The theme which emerges in his analysis of the Chinese philosophical tradition is the dominance of politics over thought. When it came to analyzing society in the present, Hu saw political classes, not economic classes. To what extent, though, did he view political activity from a traditional perspective? Hu was attracted to Sun's conception of a party composed of "those who understood in advance," in other words, a benevolent intellectual elite whose duty it was to guide the masses. This paternalism, highly reminiscent of the Confucian attitude towards the common people, became more pronounced after 1927, when the Kuomintang had power to exercise on a wide scale. The party, according to Hu, was to educate and lead the masses, but it was to take great care lest the masses be stirred up, and social order be the result. Does this reflect a commitment on the part of Hu to such a fundamental Confucian notion as harmony? It cannot be
that simple, in view of the fact that Hu was a hard-headed political realist who had not shrunk back from political revolution. His aversion to social revolution may stem partly from this, but it also was a product of his conviction that rationally conceived and executed social policies were the most effective solution to the problems facing the Chinese masses.

If certain of Hu's political attitudes might be regarded as exhibiting Confucian characteristics, the mechanism through which he chose to express his political interests was completely of the twentieth century. This was the political party, an entirely new departure on the Chinese scene. Hu devoted his life not only to Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary goals, but just as much to the succession of parties which Sun organized to realize his aims. Hu's modernity in this regard is even more apparent from the eagerness with which he embraced democratic centralism when it was brought to the Kuomintang by the Russian advisers in the First United Front. For the sake of argument, it might be objected that democratic centralism and the political culture of the traditional government elite shared certain characteristics, such as complete accountability to higher authority, and the irresistible pressure of the group. There may be parallels here; all the same, there was a fundamental difference between the two in that the traditional political structure eschewed open rules and compulsion, and preferred to operate instead through a system of only slowly mastered intimations and allusions. Democratic centralism, and the Leninist type of political party, were set apart by a vast divide from anything the traditional
political culture had produced, regardless of the obvious authoritarianism, and even capriciousness, of both.

The modernity of Hu's political thought also may be seen in his conviction that the rule of law was essential to a regenerated China. In Confucian China there had not been a lack of individual laws, but law as an abstraction in the western sense was non-existent. Through the course of his life, from the time of his enrolment in the Tokyo Law College, Hu attempted to give practical expression to his legal interests. The most lengthy work to his credit was the survey he wrote in Min-pao of the principles of international law. In 1928 as president of the Legislative Yuan, Hu actively sponsored legal equality for women, and promoted the development of modern codes of criminal and civil law. It might be said that this intense dedication to law became a liability to Hu as a political thinker. He saw the solution to social problems lying in carefully framed legislative proposals. Such an approach, however, was of genuine application only to societies less rent by division than China. To put Hu's interest in law into perspective, it is necessary to recall that to a member of the young generation in China at the turn of the century, law did not signify maintenance of the established order. Instead it represented the modernization of China, the advancement of equality among the people, and the liberation of the individual from state authority. If Hu's legalistic propensities are to be associated with his commitment to gradual, social reform, then it would be unfair to deny him credit for promoting the advancement of China in an area where the nation had been notably deficient.
A survey of Hu's political career and intellectual interests reveals a content that was modern, although it was sometimes infused with a more traditionalist spirit. In the case of the focal point of Hu's life, the Kuomintang, the record of the late 1920s and early 1930s was one of an irresistible slide back into tradition. Hu dismissed its Confucian restorationsim as a slander on the teachings of Sun Yat-sen. However, was the pure, undefiled ideology of the Kuomintang relevant to China at that time? Hu did not seem willing to confront the question. Instead he repeatedly emphasized the undoubtedly good aims that Sun had in mind: national dignity, democracy, and the general welfare of the Chinese people. The realization of these goals, Hu admitted, would require much time and hard work. But they were attainable if Sun's policies were followed. To this end, Hu consistently exhorted the members of the party to return to the true faith, and thereby, it would appear, regain the art of governing properly.

Did this signify a reversion on Hu's part to the traditional Confucian belief that good government was the inevitable consequence of the actions of good men? Hu's insistence on the need for China to implement fully the many structural changes in government which Sun had proposed gives evidence once more of the modern component so prominent in Hu's thought. Yet, paradoxically, this sustained exhortation for a party membership morally pure to carry out Sun's ideals was, in fact, Confucian in effect, though not in intent. But the reality of the Kuomintang was the preemption of most of its positions of authority by people who were of the traditional political elite. Hu realized this, and
attacked those whom he described as the party gentry. What he did not, or would not, recognize was that the Kuomintang hostility to social revolution was the force that drew these people into the party, and kept out those who would breathe new life into it. Because of the social realities of China, particularly the rural areas, there was no prospect that Sun Yat-sen's political and social doctrines could be implemented, even if sufficient good men could be found to carry out the party's tasks. Sun had developed his ideas at a time when the political revolution excluded more than passing concern for other issues. By the 1920s, however, the social revolution no longer could be ignored. In this regard, Hu belonged to the early generation of Chinese revolutionaries, whose attention was devoted primarily to the political sphere. When the political movement to which he had devoted his energies finally achieved a measure of success in the 1920s, the problem to be solved by the party had changed to one it was not equipped to handle. In Hu's case, this problem was compounded by his own dedication to the letter of Sun's teachings, and by his own fundamental belief in the exercise of human activity within a framework of orderly change. However, Hu was not alone in containing in himself the ambiguities mentioned above. They were inescapable for all of the members of his generation. In fact, it may be said that the struggles China has endured over the past century for cultural and social transformation have made such ambiguities a characteristic of every generation.
ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes and within entries in the bibliography. Full information is provided under the main bibliographic listing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Chien-she (The Construction).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCN</td>
<td>Hsin ch'ing-nien (New Youth).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAS</td>
<td>Journal of Asian Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHH</td>
<td>Hu Han-min, &quot;San-min-chu-i ti lien-huan-hsing&quot; (&quot;The Interlinked Nature of the Three Principles of the People&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Min-pao (The People's Report).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPK</td>
<td>Chiang Yung-ching, &quot;Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-p'u-kao&quot; (&quot;A Chronological Biography of Mr. Hu Han-min&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMCISM</td>
<td>Hu Han-min, San-min-chu-i-che chih shih-ming (The Historic Mission of the Followers of the Three Principles of the People).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Hu Han-min, Hu Han-min tzu-chuan (The Autobiography of Hu Han-min).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People.</td>
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Chapter I

1. The time of writing of the autobiography (tzu-chuan) is uncertain. It came to light in 1949, and was published four years later in Lo Chia-lun, gen.ed., Ko-ming wen-hsien (Revolutionary Documents), Volume III, (Taipei, 1953), 373-442. There is a brief introduction to the autobiography tracing the circumstances of its discovery. The edition used in this study was published under the title, Hu Han-min tzu-chuan, hereafter cited as TC, by the Chuan-chi wen-hsueh ch'u-pan-she, (Taipei, 1969). Its text is identical to the 1953 edition, but the pagination is different.

Internal evidence points to a possible dating of 1915-1917, though it appears that several passages were either composed or rewritten some time after 1920. The account breaks off very suddenly in May 1912. As it is written almost wholly in wen-yen it is difficult to believe that it could postdate 1919, by which time Hu had readily adapted his style to pai-hua. The elaborate detail given the T'ung-meng Hui uprisings of the 1907-1911 period suggests a fairly close proximity to the events. The years 1915-1917 also seem possible as this was a low point in the political fortunes of Sun's group. Much of this time Hu spent in Shanghai.

There is in the autobiography a reference to Marx and the theory of historical materialism on 35, and one to the Soviet revolution on 69. These are both to be found in passages of pai-hua interpolated in the wen-yen text. The account of the Boxer uprising to be found on pages 6 to 8 is likewise largely composed in the new style. It is possible that these were rewritten during Hu's stay in Moscow over the winter of 1925-1926. According to the recollection of an old friend and political colleague, Huang Chi-lu, Hu "worked on his autobiography while he was in Russia." (Interview with Huang Chi-lu, Taipei, July 9, 1975).


3. TC, 1-2. Much of the material in the autobiography is reproduced in Chiang Yung-ching, "Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-p'u-kao" ("A Chronological Biography of Mr. Hu Han-min"), hereafter cited as NPK. This source is published in Wu Hsiang-hsiang, gen. ed., Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts'ung-k'an (Collected
Materials on the History of Modern China), (Taipei, 1961), Volume III, 79-320. The NPK is an impressive collation of many sources on Hu's life. However, it carefully avoids any editorial comment, and it omits materials concerning certain contentious episodes in Hu's later political career.

There is also a brief summary of Hu's life to be found in Boorman, Howard and Howard, Richard C., editors, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Volume II, 159-166. Its usefulness is affected by the presence of several errors, as well as the omission of some important facts about Hu's career.

4. This collection has been published under the title Pu-k'uei shih shih-ch'ao (Poems from the Studio of Ever-filial Piety), (Taipei, 1958). The reference is taken from ode 202: "My lord will have pious sons,/ Pious sons in good store." See Waley, Arthur, The Book of Songs, (New York, 1937; reprinted Grove Press, 1960), 214. My appreciation to Professor Jan Yun-hua of the Department of Religion, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada for identifying the source of this quotation.

5. TC, 2.
7. Loc. cit.
8. NPK, 87. Chiang quotes from a speech given by Hu in December 1930.
10. TC, 2.
11. Ibid., 2-3.
12. Ibid., 5-6. See also Wright, Mary, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 1-4. In her introductory essay Mary Wright draws attention to the importance of the year 1900 as a turning point in China's modern history.
13. TC, 6. This section may have been written in 1925-1926.
15. For excerpts from Ch'en Tu-hsiu's two articles see Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène and Schram, Stuart R., editors, Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings, (London, Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1969). The first of these is "Two Mistaken Ideas We Have About the Boxers," 223-224; the second, "The Monument to von Ketteler," 210-211. Professor Stuart
Schram drew my attention to the dialectical nature of Hu's interpretation of the Boxers, and its contrast to that of Chen Tu-hsiu.

16. TC, 5. The reference to Sun Yat-sen is in TC, 2.

17. Ibid., 8. See also NPK, 88, n. 1. Chiang points out that the date Hu passed the chü-jen examinations must be 1900, rather than 1902, the year given in Hu's account. The latter date is completely at variance with the rest of Hu's chronology.

18. TC, 9.

19. TC, 11. There is a testimonial to Hu by one of his former students at Wuchow in Liu Lu-yin, ed., Hu Han-min hsien-sheng ch'i-nien chuan-k' an (Mr. Hu Han-min: A Memorial Edition), (Canton, 1936), 67-74.

20. TC, 15.

21. Ibid., 16. Hu lists his duties and daily itinerary at the party headquarters.

22. Min-pao has been reprinted in four volumes by the Committee for the Compilation of Party Historical Materials of the Kuomintang Central Committee, (Taipei, 1969).


25. Japanese was the only foreign language that Hu mastered. According to his daughter, Hu later learned to read English, but only with considerable difficulty. (Interview with Hu Mu-lan, Taipei, July 12, 1975).


31. TC, 28.


33. Gasster, op. cit., 95-96.

34. Hu Han-min, "Wu-hu! Man-chou so-wei hsin-fa ta-kang." This was published in Chung-hsing jih-pao, September 24-October 9, 1908. See Gasster, op. cit., 99.

35. TC, 36-38; Hsueh, op. cit., 75-77.


37. TC, 44; Hsueh, op. cit., 93; Rhoads, op. cit., 199-202.

38. TC, 49-52; Rhoads, op. cit., 225-229.


41. TC, 71-74, Yu, op. cit., 78-80; Friedman, op. cit., chapter 2, passim (29-47).

42. There are countless later references to this problem in Hu's writings. A very good illustration of this, which will be discussed in chapter V, is his 1924 article, "A Criticism of Criticisms of the Kuomintang." In it Hu categorized the 1912 creation of an open party as a disastrous mistake.

43. The autobiography terminates in May 1912, just after Hu's resumption of the governorship of Kwangtung. The main source for the following years is Nien-p'u-kao, although it is very spotty in places. Rhoads, op. cit., is quite useful on 1912-1913, the year of Hu's governorship.

44. NPK, 135-137; Rhoads, op. cit., 248.

45. Rhoads, op. cit., 257.

46. Ibid., 240-241.

47. Ibid., 239-240.
48. Ibid., 253-255.

49. This judgement appears in several accounts. For example, Eastman, Lloyd, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974), 320, n. 50. Eastman's informant also mentioned Wang Ching-wei as another uncorrupt member of the Nationalist government. The only adverse comment to my knowledge is to be found in Tang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, (London: G. Routledge, 1930), 327. Because he was a close follower of Wang Ching-wei, Tang had few kind words for Hu. However, the furthest he went was to charge that Hu was guilty of nepotism.


51. Friedman's study of the Chinese Revolutionary Party is the definitive work.

52. NPK, 150-152.

53. NPK, 154-160; Friedman, op. cit., 105-112.

54. NPK, 160.


56. NPK, 170.
Chapter II

1. MP, Number 1, (November 1905), prefatory materials, 0012. Since consecutive pagination was not used in Min-pao until the fourth issue, the master numbers of the Taiwan reprint are given in each reference.

2. Liao Chung-k'ai, translator, "She-hui-chu-i shih ta-kang" ("A Basic History of Socialism"), MP, Number 7, (September 1906), 101-111 (1037-1047), especially 110-111. For the original, see Bliss, W.D.P., A Handbook of Socialism, (New York: C. Scribner and Sons, 1895), 39-49.


5. Chu Chih-hsin, "Te-i-chih she-hui ko-ming-chia hsiao chuan" ("Short Biographies of German Social Revolutionaries"), MP, Number 2, (January 1906), 0223-0239. Chu followed this in the next issue with a sketch of Ferdinand Lassalle.

6. Ibid., 0232.


8. Chu, ibid., 0228-0229; Feuer, ibid., 82. See also Bernal, Martin, Chinese Socialism to 1907, (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1976), 117. This is the most comprehensive study of the subject to date.

9. Chu, ibid., 0227-0228; see also Bernal, op. cit., 117.


11. Hu's continued dedication to the land rights policy in the late 1920s is discussed in chapter VI.


13. Hu cited the well-field as an early attempt to solve the land question in "Six Great Principles," 0344.
17. TC, 18.
18. Sun Wen, "Fa-k'an-tz'u" ("Preface"), MP, Number 1, 0010. See also Bernal, op. cit., 68.
23. Ibid., 0345-0346.
24. Ibid., 0342.
26. Hu Han-min, "Kao fei-nan min-sheng-chu-i- che" ("To the Denouncers of the Min-sheng-chu-i"), hereafter cited as "To the Denouncers," MP, Number 12, (March 1907), 100 (1824).
29. TC, 15.
31. Hu Han-min, "Shu hou-kuan Yen shih tsui-chin cheng-chien" ("The Most Recent Political Opinions of Mr. Yen Fu"), hereafter cited as "Yen Fu," MP, Number 2, (January 1906), 0241-0257.

In this note, Hu described a practice to be found in certain parts of Kwangtung, whereby women who rejected arranged marriages banded together in self-supporting groups. Hu commended them for their assertiveness, but he observed that their success stood as proof that equality for women was unattainable unless they possessed economic independence.

33. TC, 18. See Cochrane, Donna M., Hu Han-min's Articles in Min-Pao, (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1960), 54-83 for a precis of this discussion.

34. Ibid., 31-32.


36. Onozuka is identified in Cochrane, op. cit., 36, n. 1.

37. Hu, "Yen Fu," 0248-0250; see also Cochrane, ibid., 40-43, for a synopsis.


39. There is an excellent summary of the Hu-Liang controversy in Bernal, op. cit., 141-160; and a briefer account of it in Li, op. cit., 34-43. Hu wrote his article under the pseudonym, "Min-i" ("The People's Interest").

40. Hu, "To the Denouncers," 49 (1773).

41. Ibid., 102 (1826). These terms are emphasized in the original text.

42. Hu, ibid., 58-59 (1782-1783).

43. Ibid., 64 (1788).

44. Loc. cit.

45. Ibid., 90 (1814).

46. Ibid., 126 (1850); Li, op. cit., 24.

47. For the triumph of anarchist ideas among Chinese student radicals in Japan, see Bernal, op. cit., 198-220.

41a. Ibid., 100 (1824).

41b. Ibid., 70 (1794); Bernal, op. cit., 146.

Chapter III


2. Ibid., 6-7; Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960). This is the classic account of the May Fourth Movement. See in particular 300-313.


6. Chow, op. cit., chapter 4, 84-116, for the account of the demonstrations. For Hu Han-min's observations, see Hu Han-min, "Lü-pang i ch'ün-chung hsin-li" ("Le Bon's Crowd Psychology"), hereafter cited as "Le Bon," CS, Volume I, Number 1, (August 1919), 77-78.


8. Loc.cit.


10. Ibid., 115-116.


paperback reprint 1961). The articles making up this book first appeared in the Political Science Quarterly, Volumes XVI and XVII (1901-1902). Edwin Seligman (1861-1939) was the first editor of The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. His book on historical materialism had quite an impressive publishing history, being translated into the major west European languages, as well as into Japanese and even Armenian.


14. Ibid., 95.

15. Ibid., 109.

16. Ibid., 119-123.

17. Kawakami Hajime, "Ma-k'o-ssu ti wei-wu-shih-kuan," ("Marx's Historical Materialism"). The Ch'en-pao article was reprinted in HCN, Volume 6, Number 5, (May 1919), 509-516. For this reference see 514, upper part.

18. Ibid., 516, upper.

19. Ibid., 514, lower.

20. Ibid., 513, lower. For Marx's Preface, see Feuer, Marx and Engels, 83-87.

21. HCN, Volume 6, Number 5, (May 1919), 1-2, for table of contents.

22. Chow, op. cit., 244, note k.

23. Ku Meng-yl, "Ma-k'o-ssu hsüeh-shuo" ("Marxist Theory"), HCN, Volume 6, Number 5, (May 1919), 450-465. In particular note 452-458. The article is signed Ku Chao-hsiung.

24. Ibid., 455-456. The evaluation of historical materialism is on 456, upper part.

25. Li Ta-chao, "Wo-ti ma-k'o-ssu-chu-i kuan" ("My Marxist Views"), HCN, Volume 6, Number 5, (May 1919), 521-537. See also Meisner, op. cit., 91-95.

26. Li, op. cit., 527-530.


28. Li, op. cit., 533, upper part, makes one mention of Rignano.
by name. About one-third of Li's article is an exact translation of selected portions of Rignano's chapter on historical materialism. This material carries the burden of Li's argument. It should be noted that a different attitude towards the identification of sources then prevailed in China, and Li may have felt that his solitary reference to Rignano was adequate.

29. Ibid., 532-533; Rignano, op. cit., 195-196 and 204. The most important of Engels' letters are those to Joseph Bloch (September 22, 1890), Franz Mehring (July 14, 1893), and Heinz Starkenburg (January 25, 1894). See Feuer, op. cit., 436-439 and 446-451.


31. Introduction to Periodicals, Volume I, 550-558, for the index to Hsing-ch'i p'ing-lun. This periodical is not available outside the People's Republic of China. Hu is listed as a contributor to a discussion about "the liberation of women" (issue Number 8, July 27, 1919).

32. Introduction, Volume II, 752-754 for the index to Chien-she. There was a Volume III, Number 1 published in late 1920 but this did not involve the group to which Hu belonged. All the members of the Chien-she Society had followed Sun to Canton. For a discussion of CS, see Introduction, Volume I, 221-234.

33. Ibid., 221; Chow, op. cit., 299, note c, for Li Ta-chao's connection with CS. Sun Yat-sen had no editorial functions on the Kuomintang journals, but he contributed lengthy plans for the development of China's harbours, railways and other means of communication.

34. Hu Han-min, "Mencius and Socialism", (Chien-she). See Huang Ch'ang-ku, ed., Wei-wu-shih-kuan yü lun-li chih yen-chiu (Studies on Historical Materialism and Ethics), (Shanghai, 1925), 155-178. The Huang edition of Hu's 1919-1920 writings is used when available.

35. Hu Han-min, "Le Bon," 78. The editors of the Introduction to Periodicals completely distort Hu's statements on the May Fourth movement. By tendentious selection, and by the implication that Le Bon's views were shared by Hu, they charge that Hu opposed the mass movement, and wanted to see it severely restricted in its scope (226-228). Whatever Hu's later attitude towards the mass movements of the 1926-1927 period might have been, he certainly supported the struggles of the May Fourth period.


38. Hu Han-min, "Wei-wu-shih-kuan p'i-p'ing chih p'i-p'ing" ("A Criticism of Criticisms of Historical Materialism"), hereafter cited as "A Criticism," CS, Volume I, Number 5, (December 1919), 945-989; Huang, op. cit., 1-61. The Huang pagination is used here. Chow, op. cit., 298-299 makes the puzzling statement that this was "almost a direct rebuttal, point by point, of Li's article." This is not the case, though Li's earlier article may have inspired Hu to write a more comprehensive and balanced study of historical materialism.


42. Ibid., 244-258 on dialectical materialism. Note in particular 245-248. In his review of Lichtheim's book Lewis Feuer stated that Lichtheim had understated the degree to which Marx himself was moving in the direction of equating his method with that of biological evolution. Whether or not this is defensible, it still remains true that Engels worked out the theory in detail. The Feuer review, "Marxism as History," is to be found in Survey, Number 41, (April 1962), 176-185. See 178 for the above comment on dialectical materialism.

43. Engels, Frederick, Introduction to 'The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850,' hereafter cited as Class Struggles,

45. Engels, Class Struggles, 129.

46. The potential of this aspect of Marxism was developed by Hu in 1927 when he stressed that violent revolution was not the sole path to change. By that time Hu had become aware of the Amsterdam speech, and its suggestion of a peaceful route to political power. See chapter VI.

47. Lichtheim, op. cit., 259-277 has a very good discussion of Kautsky.


49. Ibid., 9. See also the introduction by Robert Tucker to Kautsky's The Class Struggle (Erfurt Program), (New York: Norton Library, 1971; reprint of Kautsky's 1892 text), 1-5.

50. Engels, Class Struggles, 128.

51. Lichtheim, op. cit., 290-300.


55. Ibid., 120-126, for "The Moral Ideal."


57. Ibid., 55. In his article on Le Bon (88-89), Hu mentioned that hitherto mankind had been ruled by superstition, but now science was freeing men of this burden. For the influence of Darwin at this time, see Chow, op. cit., 293-296.


60. This is the most comprehensive set of translations to my knowledge. Chang Ching-lu, op. cit., shows that most of the translations of Marx and Engels only began to appear after 1920.


62. Ibid., 85-86.


67. Hu, ibid., 59; Feuer, ibid., 436.

68. Hu, ibid., 40.

69. This comment is made by Engels in his 1894 preface to Karl Marx, Capital, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1960), Volume III, 16-17.


71. Hu, "A Criticism," 43-44. In view of the importance of the land question in Sun Yat-sen's thought, it may seem surprising that Hu was not more receptive to Loria's ideas. The similarity between the two positions does not go far though. Loria attempted to build a pseudo-Marxist structure with land and population as his own forces of production. Sun was concerned with land as a commodity, and sought to prevent its monopolization leading to future economic injustice.

72. Hu, ibid., 43. For the excerpt from The Poverty of Philosophy, see Bottomore and Rubel, op. cit., 108.
73. For Engels' letter to Heinz Starkenburg (January 25, 1894) see Feuer, Marx and Engels, 448-449. For Kautsky see Ethics, 104. Hu cites both of these in "A Criticism," 59-60.

74. Hu, ibid., 42.


77. Hu, ibid., 51-52; Seligman, op. cit., 97-98.

78. Hu, ibid., 32; Kautsky, Ethics, 69. The Kautsky remarks are in Hu, ibid., 2.

79. The book by Stammler (1856-1938) was Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung (Economics and Law According to the Materialistic Conception of History), (Leipzig, 1896). This was one of the first major critiques of Marx's sociology to appear after his death. See Botтомore and Rubel, op. cit., 47-49. Hu provides excerpts from Stammler in "A Criticism," 16-17.


83. Ibid., 97-99.


88. Hu, ibid., 27.
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91. Hu, "A Criticism," 6. For the original passage in The Communist Manifesto, see Feuer, Marx and Engels, 49. For the Kautsky excerpt, see Hu, ibid., 47 and Kautsky, Ethics, 71.


93. Examples of this are to be found in Hu, "A Criticism," 2 and 47. See Kautsky, Ethics, 69.


99. Ibid., 9. The excerpt from Wage Labour and Capital is to be found in Marx and Engels: Selected Works, Volume I, 90.

100. Hu., ibid., 12.

101. Ibid., 5, 9; Feuer, Marx and Engels, 49, for the excerpt from The Communist Manifesto.


103. Loc. cit.


110. Hu, ibid., 202; Kautsky, ibid., 121.
111. Hu, ibid., 206; Kautsky, ibid., 123.


113. Hu, ibid., 214; Kautsky, ibid., 122-123.

114. Hu, ibid., 214. This is the only reference to Lenin in Hu's writings of this period.


118. Feuer, Marx and Engels, 446-447. Engels in his letter of July 14, 1893 to Franz Mehring defined "ideology" as "a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously ... but with a false consciousness." Loria seems to have reached the same conclusion on his own.


121. Feuer, "Marxism as History," 185.
Chapter IV

1. In the opinion of Maurice Meisner, Hu applied the materialist conception of history to the study of traditional Chinese history "in an impressively sophisticated manner." See Meisner, Li Ta-chao, 280, n. 3.


3. Ibid., 152.


8. Ibid., 156.

9. Ibid., 178.


15. For brief surveys of the neolithic and Shang cultures, see Levenson and Schurmann, op. cit., 8-26; and Gernet, op. cit., 31-68.


18. Lau, ibid., 151-152 (V:B:2).


20. Ibid., 162.


23. Ibid., 78.

24. Ibid., 75. For the passage from Han Fei Tzu; see Watson, Burton, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); section on Han Fei Tzu, 97, (chapter 49).

25. Hu, ibid., 76.

26. Ibid., 73.


28. Ibid., 4-5.

29. Ibid., 82-85, (Chi Jung-wu, April 24, 1920); Jenks, History of Politics, 30; 57-58.

30. Ibid., 86-87.

31. Ibid., 116. (Quoted in Hu Han-min's reply, April 30, 1920).

32. Ibid., 38-39. (Hu Han-min, January 14, 1920).

33. Ibid., 45-46.

34. Ibid., 40-41.

35. Ibid., 116-117. (Hu Han-min, April 30, 1920).

36. Ibid., 120.

37. Ibid., 116-117.

"Ill-wind," 41-42, and 142, n. 72, discusses the post-May Fourth Marxist controversy over whether the central allotment (kung-t'ien) of the well-field pointed to a slave or feudal stage of society.


42. Levenson, "Ill-wind," 29-30.


44. Ching-t'ien-chih, 116.

45. Levenson, op. cit., 29.


47. See, for example, "Class and Morality," 225, 231, 233, 240.


52. Ibid., 78.

53. Ibid., 79. This is adapted from Lau, D.C., Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, (London: Penguin, 1975; first edition, 1963), 142 (LXXX).

54. Hu, ibid., 86.

55. Hu, ibid., 79; Lau, ibid., 107 (XLVI).

56. Hu, ibid., 80; Lau, ibid., 96 (XXXVII).

57. Hu, ibid., 80.

59. Hu, ibid., 86.
60. Ibid., 83.
62. Hu, ibid., 89. The preceding passage is adapted from Mei, ibid., 251 (XLIX).
63. Hu, ibid., 88.
64. Loc. cit.
68. Hu, ibid., 84; Waley, ibid., 166 (XII:11).
69. Hu, ibid., 84; Waley, ibid., 204 (XVI:2).
70. Hu, ibid., 85; Waley, ibid., 88 (II:3).
71. Hu, ibid., 88.
72. Ibid., 84-85.
73. Ibid., 87.
75. Feuer, Marx and Engels, 84-85, (A Preface to the Critique of Political Economy).
77. Ibid., 161.
78. Ibid., 163-164.
79. Ibid., 166-167; Lau, Mencius, 101 (III:A:4).
80. Ibid., 171-172; Lau, ibid., 179 (VI:B:10).
82. Hu characterized the imperial epoch in these terms in several places: for example, "Mencius and Socialism,"
178; "Philosophy," 150; and "Ju-chiao p'ai t'a chih t'ai-tu chi ch'i shou-tuan" ("Confucian Exclusionism: Its Principles and Methods"), CS, Volume I, Number 2, (September 1919), 385.

85. Loc. cit.; Watson, Han Fei Tzu, 97 (chapter 49).
87. Ibid., 102.
90. Ibid., 230; "Philosophy," 111.
93. Ibid., 225.
95. Hu, ibid., 127-128. For Chung-ch'ang, see Balazs, ibid., 213-225.
96. Hu, ibid., 136.
97. Hu, ibid., 142-143.
98. Ching-t'ien-chih, 5-6.
100. Feuer, Marx and Engels, 436-437.
102. Ibid. 244.
103. Ibid., 292.
104. Ibid., 257-260; Marx and Engels: Selected Works, Volume II, 185-190.
105. Hu, ibid., 291.

106. Ibid., 247, point 4.

107. Ibid., 292.

108. Ibid., 247, point 5. This statement about the effect of the West on China's traditional agrarian economy is also made in "Philosophy," 150.


110. Ibid., 246.

111. Ibid., 275.

112. Ibid., 288; Kautsky, Ethics, 127.

113. Hu, ibid., 305.


115. Levenson, op. cit., 29 refers to Hu's account of the breakdown of the well-field as being possibly too "Malthusian" for a Marxist analysis. Hu may well have drawn his explanation from Loria, op. cit., 4: "the normal increase in population eventually results in the appropriation of all lands cultivable by labour alone, and the economic system then undergoes a radical transformation."


117. Ibid., 174.
Chapter V

1. NPK, 178-180.


5. Bing, op. cit., 684; "Documents on the Comintern," 105. These works alter the previously held belief that it was Sun who conceived and laid down the United Front arrangement. See, for example, Leng Chuan Shao and Palmer, Norman, Sun Yat-sen and Communism, 59-60.


8. Interview with Huang Chi-lu, emeritus director of the Kuoshih-kuan (Party History Institute), Taipei, July 9, 1975. Huang spent two years studying at the University of Toronto in 1922-1923, and at the same time edited a newspaper in the city's Chinatown. In late 1923 he returned to China as an overseas delegate to the Kuomintang First Congress.

The point about Hu's faithfulness to Sun's United Front strategy was also stressed by Hu's daughter, Hu Mu-lan, in an interview in Taipei on July 12, 1975. Over about the last ten years of her father's life she was both his travelling companion and political confidante.


13. NPK, 195-196.


17. NPK, 197.


19. Ibid., 43.

20. A good example of Sun's erratic political behaviour is given in Cherepanov, A.I., *Zapiski Voennogo Sovyetskogo v Kitae* (Notes of a Military Adviser in China), (Moscow, 1964), 67-71. On the morning of his presentation to the Congress of the carefully worked out Manifesto, Sun suddenly decided to replace it with a vague, utopian statement of the national destiny, without any mention being made of the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement. Borodin was able to prevail upon Sun to keep the original draft.

My attention was drawn to this interesting and most illustrative example of Sun's political style by Professor Stuart Schram.

21. Minutes of the Kuomintang, 21-22 (Session 6, January 22, 1924).

22. NPK, 200, 202.


25. Interview with Huang Chi-lu. Huang emphasized that the lack of interest at that time in Mao was due to Mao's very junior position in the United Front.
26. In the collection Hsien-tai shih-liao (Materials on Modern History), Volume I, (no author, Shanghai, 1934), there is an article on the early history of the Shanghai Executive Bureau by Ta Te, "Shang-hai chih-hsing-pu hsiao shih" ("A Short History of the Shanghai Executive Bureau"), 90–94.

27. Hu Han-min, "Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang p'i-p'ing chih p'i-p'ing" ("A Criticism of Criticisms of the Kuomintang"), in Lo Chia-lun, ed., Ko-ming wen-hsien (Revolutionary Documents), Volume IX, (Taipei, 1955), 49–64 (1255–1271). Ch'ü Ch'iu-p'ai's article, "Tzu min-chih-chu-i tao she-hui-chu-i" ("From Democracy to Socialism"), HCN, Number 13, (December 20, 1923), 245–267, was published under the pseudonym, Ch'ü Wei-t'a.


29. Ibid., 52.

30. Ibid., 59, 63.


32. Chang, ibid., 344–345; Ming-pao, ibid., 92.

33. Interview with Huang Chi-lu.

34. NPK, 203; Wilbur and How, op. cit., 155–156.

35. NPK, 203–204.

36. Ibid., 204.

37. Ibid., 205.


39. Leng and Palmer, op. cit., 75–76. Their translation is used here. The original letter is to be found in Chung-shan ts'ung-shu (A Collection of Sun Yat-sen's Letters), Volume IV, (Shanghai, 1927), section 3, 51. The letter was released by Chiang Kai-shek in 1926.


41. Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., 503; Ming-pao, Volume II, Number 4, (April 1967), 98.

42. The best survey of the succession struggle in Canton is
Shirley, James, "Control of the Kuomintang after Sun's Death," JAS, Volume XXV, Number 1, (November 1965), 69-82.

43. The office of Generalissimo, like that of Tsung-li, seemed to mean Sun himself, so presumably it fell into abeyance with the demise of the occupant. Hu Mu-lan stated that her father wished to hand this special power back to the party after Sun's death.

44. Shirley, op. cit., 73-74.

45. Ibid., 78-79; NPK, 209. See also Tang Leang-li, Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, 199-200.

46. Shirley, op. cit., 78.

47. NPK, 208.

48. Shirley, op. cit., 80; Domes, op. cit., 119-120; NPK, 212-213.

49. Selected Documents and Addresses By Hu Han-min, Minister of Foreign Affairs, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, Canton, 1925), inaugural address by Hu, 2. This small collection was published in English.

50. Shirley, op. cit., 81.


52. Selected Documents and Addresses, 1-3.

53. Interview with Huang Chi-lu. Huang stated that when the Liao assassination took place some of these CEC members found their way to Peking, where they convened the Western Hills Conference later that year.

54. Shirley, op. cit., 81; Domes, op. cit., 131.

55. Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit, 457-458; Ming-pao, Volume II, Number 2, (February 1967), 66.

56. Chang, ibid., 455-456; Ming-pao, ibid., 65.


60. Domes, ibid., 132.
61. Wilbur and How, op. cit., 165.
63. Isaacs, op. cit., 84.
64. Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., 461; Ming-pao, Volume II, Number 2, 67.
65. Hu did not have any illusions about the motive behind his mission. At the time of his departure he wrote a poem, "The Prisoner of Ch'ub, in which he compared himself to a famous exile mentioned in the Tso Chuan. See NPK, 218, and Hu, Pu-k'uei shih shih-ch'ao, year 1925, "Ch'ub ch'iu."
66. Pravda, October 20, 1925, 3.
67. Brandt, op. cit., 199, n. 43.
68. Pravda, October 20, 1925, 3.
69. Examples of this are to be found in Brandt, op. cit., 56-57; Isaacs, op. cit., 86-87; Harrison, James, The Long March to Power, (New York, 1972), 534, n. 1.
70. Pravda, October 20, 1925, 3.
71. Loc. cit.
72. NPK, 220.
73. Pravda, November 7, 1925, 8. The full Chinese text is in Hu Han-min, Hu Han-min hsien-sheng tsai-o yen-chiang lu (Lectures Given by Mr. Hu Han-min in Russia), 3rd edition, (Canton, 1927), 1-24. The Chinese title of this article is "Su-o shih-yüeh ko-ming ti kan-hsiang."
74. This edition, which is cited above, is the one available closest to the date these articles were written in Russia. The only reason for concern about the accuracy of its contents is that this edition was published after the break between the KMT and the CCP in April 1927. However, there is no indication that the contents have been altered in any way to agree with Hu's anti-Soviet position after the April purge.
76. Ibid., 5-12.
77. Ibid., 10-11.
78. Ibid., 5-12; in particular, 11.

79. Ibid., 12-18, for the third point; 18-23 for the fourth point. See also Kennedy, Melville, "Hu Han-min: His Career and Thought," in Hsueh Chun-tu, ed., Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China, (New York, 1971), 287.

80. Hu, ibid., 15.

81. Ibid., 22.

82. The second item in Lectures Given in Russia is entitled "Kuo-min-tang ti chen chieh," 25-33. Only the Chinese text of this is available.

83. Ibid., 25.

84. Ibid., 26.

85. Loc. cit.

86. Ibid., 28-29.


88. NPK, 221; Chang, op. cit., 463.

89. Interview with Huang Chi-lu.

90. NPK, 221.

91. Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hui-i chi-lu (Record of the Second Kuomintang Congress). This was published in April 1926 by the KMT Central Executive Committee. See 145-146.

92. Ibid., 221-222, for Teng Yen-ta's report.


94. Ibid., 952-956. According to Carr, after mid-1925 the Krestintern does not appear to have had any more formal sessions of its executive council.

95. Ibid., 763.

96. Inprecor, Volume 6, Number 17, (Special number, March 4, 1926), 253. The format of this quotation is that of Inprecor.

97. Ibid., 256.

98. Loc. cit. For Chiang's comments on the Third International

99. Tang, op. cit., 247, 328; Brandt, op. cit., 57; Hu Han-min, "Min-tsu kuo-chi yü ti-san kuo-chi" ("The Nationalist International and the Third International"), in Wu Man-chün, ed., *Hu Han-min hsüan-chi* (Selected Works of Hu Han-min), (Taipei, 1959), 78-81. See also Carr, op. cit., 766, n. 2. Carr states that if a decision to admit the KMT had been taken, "it was apparently not carried out." Hu's recollections help to clarify this hazy episode.

100. Hu, ibid., 79-80; NPK, 230.


102. Ibid., 2.

103. Loc. cit.

104. Loc. cit.

105. NPK, 232.

106. Hu Han-min, "Chung-yao ti liang-ko p'i-p'ing" ("Two Important Criticisms"), in Hu Han-min, *San-min-chu-i-che chih shih-ming* (The Historic Mission of the Followers of the Three Principles of the People), (Shanghai, 1927), 149-150.

107. This characterization of the CCP recurs in all of Hu's writings during and after 1927. See chapter VI.


109. Isaacs, ibid., 93-96; Wu, ibid., 591-592.

110. Isaacs, ibid., 98-99; Wu, ibid., 592.

111. Wilbur and How, op. cit., 266-267.


113. NPK, 233-234.


115. Chang, ibid., 503; *Ming-pao*, ibid., 98.
116. NPK, 235.


119. Hu, ibid., 209.

120. Huang Ch'ang-ku, ed., *Wei-wu-shih-kuan yü lun-li chih yen-chiu (Studies on Historical Materialism and Ethics)*.


122. Hu, ibid., preface 8.

123. Ibid., 7.

124. Ibid., 7, 9.

125. Interview with Huang Chi-lu. Huang stated that Hu carried on "underground activities," and that Hu used him as an envoy to the other anti-Communist party members. Hu Mu-lan also stated that her father had maintained contact with the party elders mentioned.

126. Isaacs, op. cit., 143-145.


128. NPK, 236-237.

129. See *North China Herald* (Shanghai) for the two weeks prior to the April 12 suppression of the Communists. In view of the anti-Communist incidents which had been taking place over the preceding several months, the *North China Herald's* assessment of the Shanghai political situation seems most credible.

130. Chiang, *Pao-lo-t'ing*, 166.

131. The Nanking Decade is usually reckoned from the establishment of the five-yüan government in October 1928 after the
unification of northern and southern China supposedly had been completed. For all purposes, the new government can be dated from the dissolution of the United Front in April 1927.


133. NPK, 239.

134. Ibid., 245-246. Hu Mu-lan stated that her father withdrew out of support for Chiang.

135. Ibid., 251-259. This recounts Hu's voyage to Europe and his return to political life. Hu assumed the presidency of the Legislative Yuan in October 1928. A brief summary of his activities there is provided in chapter VII.
Chapter VI


3. Ibid., 271.

4. Ibid., 272.

5. William, Maurice, *The Social Interpretation of History*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1922). This book was privately printed by William in 1920, and then published in New York in 1921. William was later made an honorary member of the Kuomintang.


9. TPP, 382-383.


12. Ibid., 90.

13. Ibid., 79-80.

14. TPP, 390-391.


16. Ibid., 121-122, 126.

17. TPP, 409-441.


19. Ibid., 162.
20. TPP, 439.
22. Ibid., 74.
23. TPP, 364.
25. TPP, 416.
26. Ibid., 434.
27. Ibid., 417.
29. TPP, 444.
31. Hu Han-min, "San-min-chu-i ti lien-huan-hsing" ("The Interlinked Nature of the Three Principles of the People"), hereafter cited as LHH, in Lang Hsing-shih, ed., Ko-ming yü fan-ko-ming (Revolution and Counter-revolution), (Shanghai, 1928), 229-346. Section 7 of this essay is a discussion of communism and the min-sheng principles. For this reference see 299. Hu's treatment of Sun Yat-senism is discussed later in this chapter.
A brief statement by Hu of the points raised concerning Marxism is to be found in "San-min-chu-i chih jen-shih" ("An Introduction to the Three Principles of the People"), hereafter cited as "Introduction," in SMCISM, 7-11.
32. LHH, 300-301.
33. LHH, 301; "Introduction," SMCISM, 7-8.
35. LHH, 302-303.
38. Ibid., 9.
43. Ibid., 148-149.
45. Ibid., 105.
46. Ibid., 110.
47. Ibid., 108.
49. Hu Han-min, "CP ti shou-tuan ho ts'e lüeh" ("The Communist Party's Methods and 'Stratagems'"), SMCISM, 142.
51. Hu Han-min, "Pu-yao jang CP ti tang" ("Do not be Swindled by the Communist Party"), hereafter cited as "Do not be Swindled," SMCISM, 114.
52. Hu Han-min, "Pu-yao jang CP tao-luan kuo-min ko-ming" ("Do not Allow the Communist Party to Disrupt the National Revolution"), SMCISM, 128.
58. Ibid., 3.
59. Ibid., 5.
60. Loc. cit.
61. Ibid., 13-14.
62. A synopsis of this essay is to be found in Kennedy, Melville T., Jr., "Hu Han-min: Aspects of his Political Thought," Harvard Papers on China, Volume 8, (Cambridge, Mass: East Asian Research Center, 1954), 75-106.
63. NPK, 261.
64. LHH, 261-262; see also "Introduction," 1-2.
65. LHH, 261; "Introduction," 2-4.
67. Ibid., 229-230.
68. Ibid., 230-232.
69. Ibid., 233-234.
70. Ibid., 235-236.
71. Ibid., 253-254.
72. Ibid., 247-248.
73. Ibid., 252.
74. Ibid., 256.
75. Meisner, op. cit., 63-64. Li's article, "A Comparison of the French and Russian Revolutions," was published in 1918.
76. This formula was developed by Hu from Sun's definition of the principle of livelihood, TPP, 416.
79. These points are also stressed by Kennedy in his article "Hu Han-min: His Career and Thought," in Hsüeh Chün-tu, ed., Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 293. This article is an abbreviated and slightly revised version of Kennedy's earlier essay in the Harvard Papers.


82. Hu, "Concept of History," 211-212.

83. Ibid., 213.

84. Ibid., 214.

85. Ibid., 215.

86. Ibid., 215-218. The excerpts from Philo, Aristotle and Gregory VII are to be found in Beer, General History of Socialism, Volume I, 46-47, 103, and 207-208.


89. Ibid., 199.

90. Ibid., 198.

91. Ibid., 201-202.

92. Ibid., 205-206.

93. Ibid., 205.

94. The best treatment of this is to be found in Wright, Mary, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly, Volume XIV, Number 4, (August 1955), 515-532.

95. Ibid., 524.


97. Ibid., 89; Linebarger, Political Doctrines of Sun, 69.


100. Ibid., 207.


102. Ibid., 24.

103. Ibid., 19.


105. There is no indication from Hu's work that he was aware of the articles Marx wrote for the New York Daily Tribune on India and China.


107. Ibid., 22.

108. Hu, "Do not Allow the Communist Party to Disrupt the National Revolution," SMCISM, 129.


111. Hu, "Do Not Allow the Communist Party to Disrupt the National Revolution"), SMCISM, 131. For the ineffectiveness of the KMT attempts to penetrate the traditional rural elite, see Kuhn, Philip A., "Local Self-Government Under the Republic," in Wakeman, Frederic, Jr., and Grant, Carolyn, editors, Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 287-295.

112. Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming ti nu-li yü fang-hsiang chih jen-shih" ("Understanding Revolutionary Tasks and Directions"), SMCISM, 33-34.
Chapter VII


2. Ibid., 1191-1192; Domes, Vertagte Revolution, 314-315.

3. Eastman, Abortive Revolution, 320, n.50.


In evaluating Hu's argument that the yüeh-fa was not in accordance with Sun's wishes, it should be noted that a revision of Sun's programme already had taken place with the implementation of the five-yüan administrative system prior to the stage of full constitutional government.


11. Hu Han-min, "Wei Chiang-jih t'o-hsieh cheng-kao yu-pang jen-shih" ("A Declaration to Friendly States Concerning the Chiang-Japan Compromise"), in San-min-chu-i yüeh-k'an, Volume I, Number 5, (May 15, 1933), 1-10.


13. Hu Han-min, "Ts'ung su-o chien-she hsiang tao tsung-li ti chien-kuo fang-1üeh," ("From the Reconstruction of Soviet Russia to a Consideration of the Leader's Programme of National Reconstruction"), in ibid., Volume I, Number 2, (February 15, 1933), 1-38. The concluding section of this article is also to be found in Wu Man-chün, ed., Hu hsüan-chi, 151-174. See in particular, 151-154, 173-174.
14. NPK, 314.


Hu's colleague, Liu Lu-yin, edited Hu Han-min hsiien-sheng chi-nien chuan-k'an (Mr. Hu Han-min: A Memorial Volume).

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---. "Pu-yao jang CP tao-luan kuo-min ko-ming" 不要讓 CP 破壞國民革命 ("Do not Allow the Communist Party to Disrupt the National Revolution!"), SMCISM, 125-132.

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GLOSSARY

Chang Chi 張繼
Chang Hsun 張勳
Chang Kuo-t'ao 張國焘
Chang Ping-lin 張炳麟
Chen-nan-kuan 鎮南關
Ch'en Chi-t'ang 陳濟棠
Ch'en Ch'i-mei 陳其美
Ch'en Chiung-ming 陳炯明
Ch'en-pao fu-k'an 晨報副刊
Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀
cheng-ming 正名
cheng-t'ung 正統
Chi Jung-wu 季融五
Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石
ch'iang-che chieh-chi 強者階級
ch'iang-yu-li ti chieh-chi 強有力的
chieh-chih tzu-pen 節制資本
chien-kuo 建國
Chien-she 建設
chih-p'ei 支配
chih-p'ei chieh-chi 支配階級
chih-shih chieh-chi 知識階級
chih-tu ti wen-hua 制度的文化
chin-jih 今日
chin-shih 近世
ching-t'ien 井田
ch'iu-sheng 求生
Chu Chih-hsin 朱執信
chu-ch'uan-che 主權者
Chu Hsi 朱熹
Ch'u Ch'iu 楚囚
Chuang Tzu 莊子
Chung-ch'ang T'ung 仲張統
Chung-heing jih-pao 中興日報
Chung-hua ko-ming-tang 中華革命黨
Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang 中國國民黨
chü-jen 舉人
Ch'i Ch'iu-pai 翟秋白
Ch'i Wei-t'a 屈維它
ch'üan-li chieh-chi 權力階級
chün-t'ien 均田
Fan Chen 范綏
Fang Jui-lin 方瑞麟
fei shu-li ti 非數理的

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feng-chien chih-tu 封建制度
feng-fen 封分
Feng Tzu-yu 馮自由
fu-shen 富紳
fu-yung 附庸
Fung Yu-lan 馮友蘭
Han Fei Tzu 韓非子
Han Yu 韓愈
Hokow 河口
Hsia-ts'eng chieh-chi 下屬階級
Hsieh Ch'ih 謝持
Hsin ch'ing-nien 新青年
hsin-li ti 心理的
Hsin-min ts'ung-pao 新民叢報
Hsin shih-chi 新世紀
Hsin shih-chieh 新世界
Hsing-ch'i p'ing-lun 星期評論
Hsing-chung Hui 興中會
Hsü Chung-shu 徐中舒
Hsü Ch'ung-chih 許崇智
hsü-yao 需要
Hsün Tzu 荀子
Hu Chan-t'ang 胡展堂
Hu Ch'ing-jui 胡清瑞
Hu Han-min 胡漢民
Hu Hsieh-san 胡斐三

Hu I-sheng 胡毅生
Hu Mu-lan 胡木蘭
Hu Ning-yüan 胡寧遠
Hu Shih 胡適
Hu Wen-chao 胡文照
Hu Yen-hung 胡衍鴻
Hu Yen-kuan 胡衍觀
Huang Chi-lu 黃季陸
Huang Hsing 黃興
Huang-hua-kang 黃花崗
Jan Yün-hua 冉雲華
jen-ai 仁愛
jo-che chieh-chi 弱者階級
K'ang Yu-wei 康有為
ko-chieh 割裂
ko-ming shou-tuan 革命手段
Ku Meng-yü (Chao-hsiung) 魯孟餘（兆熊）
Ku Yen-wu 徐中舒
kung-ch'an 共產
kung-ch'an-tang hsiao kuei 共產黨小鬼
kung-t'ien 公田
kung-yu-chih 共有制
kuo-ch'an-chu-i 國產主義
Kuo-shih-kuan 國史館
Lao Tzu 老子
Li Chi-shen 李濟深
李立三 Li Li-san 李石曾 Li Shih-tseng 李大钊 Li Ta-chao 黎元洪 Li Yuan-hung
李一能 利用 Li-yung 梁啓超 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁山泊 Liang-shan-po
廖仲恺 Liao Chung-k'ai 列子 Lieh Tzu 林森 Lin Sen
梁海報 Ling-hai pao 劉蘆隱 Liu Lu-yin
陸遷 (liu-min) 流民 (流民) Liu-mang (liu-min)
樂土 lo-t'u 毛澤東 Mao Tse-tung
民衆 min-chung 民權主義 min-ch'üan-chu-i
民意 Min-i 民國日報 Min-kuo jih-pao
民國雜誌 Min-kuo tsa-chih 民報 Min-pao
民生主義 min-sheng-chu-i 民族主義 min-tsu-chu-i
明報月刊 Ming-pao yüeh-k'an
墨子 Mo Tzu
墨, ch'ing 畛, 頌 pai-hua 白話 pao-hu chieh-chi
保護階級 pien-chien 習俗 pien-hua
變化 p'ing-ch'un ti-ch'üan 平均地權 p'ing-min
平民 p'ing-min chieh-chi 平民階級 p'ing-min-chu-i 平民主義
p'ing-min-hua 平民化 Pu-k'uei shih chu 不屈室主 san-min-chu-i
三民主義 San-min-chu-i yüeh-k'an三民主義月刊 Shang Yang
商鞅 she-hui-chu-i 社會主義 she-hui ti kuo-chia 社會的國家 sheng ti shih-kuan
生,物 sheng, wu shih-chieh-chu-i 世界主義 Shih Chien-ju
史堅如 Shih Ching
詩經 shih-hsing
實行 shih, ju Shih Shen
書經 Shu Ching
儒士,儒 Shih Shen
孫科 Sun Fo
Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙
Sung Chiao-jen 孫教仁
T'ao-luan 大描亂
Tai Chi-t'ao 戴季陶
T'an P'ing-shan 謝平山
T'an Ssu-t'ung 謝嗣同
T'an Yen-k'ai 謝延閔
T'ang ch'i 黨氣
T'ang lao-yeh 黨老爺
Tang Leang-li 湯良禮
Teng Tse-ju 鄧澤如
Teng Yen-ta 鄧演達
Ti-p'i liu-mang 地居流氓
Tiao-ho che-chung 調和折衷
T'ien-i pao 天義報
Ts'ao Wei-yuan 曹維元
Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩
Tso Chuan 左傳
Tsou Lu 鄧魯
Tsung-li 總理
T'u-fu 屠富
T'uo-hao lieh-shen 土豪劣绅
T'u-ti kuo-yu 土地國有
Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞
Tung-lin 東林
t'ung-hsin 通信
T'ung-meng Hui 同盟會
Tzu-chuan 自傳
Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛
Wang Fu 王符
Wang Fu-chih 王夫之
Wang Mang 王莽
Wei-cheng i-te 為政以德
Wen-yen 文言
Wen-hua t'ang 文化堂
Wu Ch'ao-shu 伍朝樞
Wu Chih-hui 吳稚暉
Wuchow 悟州
Wu, li 物利
Yang pa-ku 洋八股
Yang-shao 頭韶
Yeh Ch'i-fang 葉啟芳
Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang 葉楚伧
Yen Fu 嚴復
Yu-ch'an-che 有產者
Yüan 院
Yüan Shih-k'ai 袁世凱
Yüeh-fa 約法