HOUSING BLACK WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA AFTER 1945: A STUDY OF STATE INTERVENTION

by

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ABSTRACT

The legislative and administrative framework, established by the nationalist government after 1948, provided the basis for the large-scale construction of racially segregated townships for African workers throughout South Africa. Direct state intervention in the production of housing partially resolved the housing shortage which had existed since before the Second World War. The thesis seeks to explain why state intervention in the sphere of housing assumed this particular form and how township policies were actually implemented. It also seeks to understand the role of these spatial forms within the social formation. It is, therefore, an analysis of policy formulation and implementation within the context of political, economic and ideological relations and conditions existing in South Africa over the period 1945 to 1965. The thesis argues that the origins of townships policies, which were legitimised by the ideology of 'apartheid', are to be traced, on the one hand, in the relations within the state - between central and local authorities around the question of housing subsidy, for example - and, on the other hand, in the relations between other organisations with interests in housing, such as building employers and trade unions around conditions of housing production. The study utilises a wide range of primary source material - in particular, a collection of unpublished memoranda, minutes and correspondence of a board created by the state, the operations of which were central to the implementation of the township policies from the mid-1950s, which is not yet available for public inspection.
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### Abbreviations

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<td>AN</td>
<td>Annexures to Votes and Preceedings</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>African Studies Institute, University of Witwatersrand</td>
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<td>BIFSA</td>
<td>Building Industries Federation of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Controller of Building Materials</td>
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<td>COLA</td>
<td>Cost of living allowance</td>
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<td>COTT</td>
<td>Central Organization of Technical Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIR</td>
<td>Council for Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Johannesburg City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBRI</td>
<td>National Building Research Institute</td>
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<td>NEAD</td>
<td>Non-European Affairs Department</td>
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<td>NFBTE</td>
<td>National Federation of Building Trade Employers</td>
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<td>OFS</td>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
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<td>SAB</td>
<td>The South African Builder</td>
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<td>SAIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute of Race Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALDRU</td>
<td>Southern African Labour &amp; Development Research Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATLC</td>
<td>South African Trades and Labour Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUCSA</td>
<td>Trade Union Council of South Africa</td>
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<td>TP</td>
<td>Transvaal Province</td>
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Acknowledgements

This thesis is the outcome of a lengthy personal involvement in the 'housing question', particularly the questions which arose when, as an architect engaged in the design of low-cost housing settlements, I became conscious of the role of technicians in policy implementation, and the political consequences of 'planning' and 'architecture'. Many people over the years have contributed in several ways to this study. Intellectually my greatest debt is perhaps due to Ronaldo Ramirez and Caroline Moser whose seminars at the Development Planning Unit afforded me the first opportunity of formulating some of these ideas. Their continuing interest in my work and their comments at critical stages of the research have been a great support. I would like to thank my supervisors: Shula Marks, for her insights and questions which led me to the richness of empirical research, and for her patient reading and comments on early drafts; and Dick Hodder, for his confidence that I would eventually 'get it all down', and his encouragement throughout these years. Thanks are due too to the friends who laboured through and commented on chapters - particularly, Caren Levy, Rob Turrell, David Satterthwaite and Jamie Mackie.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the research context and to explain the theoretical and methodological approaches adopted. As will be illustrated, the development and definition of the research focus has entailed confronting, on the one hand, stimulating yet complex theoretical debates and, on the other, a lacuna in existing accounts of social relations in South Africa after the Second World War. Particular questions for empirical research which address the gap in this literature have to be formulated, but these in turn are informed and arise on the basis of a conceptual framework and a particular methodological approach.

The first section of this chapter identifies the research context and suggests the relevance of the study to an understanding of social relations, i.e. political, economic and ideological relations, in South Africa. The focus of the study is defined, both conceptually and historically. Questions for research relating to the formulation and implementation of policies are outlined in the second section which also refers briefly to the theoretical debates concerning the state and the nature of state intervention. The theoretical approach adopted in the present study is described. In the final section of the chapter, the methodological approach is presented. Here are outlined the research parameters, the areas of research and the organisation of material.

1.1 Research Context

Class relations and class struggle in South Africa appear to have assumed a particular racial form and, with the legitimisation of racist ideology and the institutionalisation of apartheid after 1948, the state
has had a determining role in reinforcing these racial patterns. Much of the existing work on 20th century South Africa focuses on the activities and role of the state in creating and fostering divisions within the working class. The effects of these interventions have been to create a privileged white stratum within the structure of production, incorporating white workers within state structures in which their political and economic interests are represented while simultaneously excluding the majority of African workers from structures of power or representation. These analyses have tended to examine the relationship between the role of the state and the racial form which class relations have assumed at the level of the workplace or, in other words, at the point of production, and have looked at their effects or implications for the accumulation of capital. This thesis, however, seeks to understand the relationship between the role of the state and the racial form of conditions for the reproduction of the work force in urban areas. It is centrally concerned, therefore, with why and how the racially segregated 'townships' on the peripheries of urban industrial centres throughout South Africa came about.

The material conditions for millions of Africans residing in urban townships were dramatically highlighted by the student uprising and general strikes in 1976, which spread from Soweto, the largest township in South Africa.

1. Apartheid is the official government policy of racial segregation implemented in all spheres since the election to government of the Nationalist Party in 1948. The term 'apartheid' has been officially superseded periodically by such euphemisms as 'separate development' or 'pluralist democracy'.

outside Johannesburg, to other urban areas in South Africa. The growing mass struggles, which were directed against symbols of the 'apartheid state' in the townships, suggest the extent to which these conditions have been both produced and reproduced by the state.

The current study was prompted by several questions arising not only from the fact that, historically, the state in South Africa had become involved in the provision of housing and services and thereby established some of the conditions required for the reproduction of the labour force, but also that these interventions appear to have assumed a variety of forms. The townships of today express a particular form and were shaped by a series of policy responses after the Second World War to the increased urbanisation of the African population. The variety of policies relating to 'housing', such as land policies, housing finance, subsidies and rental policies, systems of tenure and policies governing space standards, give rise to differing conditions for the reproduction of the labour force, which, as the events during and since 1976 reveal, can have important political effects. It is therefore necessary to examine


4. During the uprising, there was widespread destruction of school buildings, symbols of the separate 'Bantu education' system; municipal beerhalls, the monopolisation of beer brewing and sales being a central feature of financing township expenditure (see below, chapter two); and the offices of the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards, centres of social control and administration of repressive laws in the townships.

5. For a pre-1976 description of the material conditions for Africans and an indication of the relationship between economic struggles and political strategies, see Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia, The Conditions of the Black Worker (London, 1975), in particular, ch. VIII 'A Black South African's View of the Present Urban, Rural and Industrial Situation in the Republic' (SASO student leader), and ch. IX, 'Soweto', (Ntshona, C) for a subjective description of conditions.
the form and content of policies relating to the increased proletarianisation and urbanisation of Africans in order to understand and explain the differing conditions of class struggle which have arisen for white and black workers in South Africa.  

The aim of this study is therefore twofold: to explain why and how the large-scale construction of townships was embarked upon from the early 1950s on a national basis, and to understand the role of these spatial forms within the overall social formation. The research looks at the social processes involved in policy formulation, the mechanisms for implementing various policies and the social effects of their outcome. It is necessary at this point to clarify some of the conceptual issues raised by the above.

6. This is not to suggest a type of racial/social stratification, or a correlation between racial categories and access to social resources, as an a priori basis for research. The internal divisions within a particular group to whom a common racial designation is socially imputed make such reductions problematic. For a critique and discussion on the 'racism/capitalism' thesis and racialist political practices, see Gabriel, J., and Ben-Tovim, G., 'Marxism and the Concept of Racism', Economy and Society, vol. 7, no. 2, 1978, pp. 118-153. Nor is it possible to discuss fully the debate on the class position of 'white workers'; see Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, chapter 1, in which the different categories and class divisions among 'wage-earners' are discussed in relation to the theoretical approaches of Poulantzas, Carchedi and Braverman.

7. This is not to suggest that prior to the Second World War segregated townships did not exist. The Public Health Act, No. 23 of 1897 referred to 'Native Locations', and several municipal authorities had established segregated townships before the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, No. 21 of 1923. See below, p.21. The concern of this study, however, is with the fact that the township programmes in the 1950s were coordinated at the national level.
Conceptual Focus

The study is concerned to examine state intervention in the sphere of housing for African workers. It must be stressed at the outset, however, that housing per se is not the object of research and the study is not, therefore, primarily an account of the development of housing policy in South Africa. But housing constitutes an area in which, and the means through which, social processes may be analysed. This is because various political, economic and ideological relationships exist around the 'housing question', and this complex of interrelationships therefore provides a context within which social relations may be examined.

The focus of this study is the effective implementation of particular forms of state intervention in housing, namely, the range of policies and practices relating to the conditions for the reproduction of the labour force which are expressed in the spatial formations of the townships.

The expression 'conditions for the reproduction of the labour force' refers to the range of social provisions, or means of consumption, which constitute the material conditions necessary for the 'reproduction' of a work force concentrated in urban areas, such as housing, health facilities, schools, transport and recreation. A vast body of literature attempts to explain the role of housing and other social infrastructure within capitalist social formations and the causes of state intervention in these areas.

8. A real weakness of many South African 'housing studies' is that serious political and economic issues have been left unexplored. This failure to recognise political, economic and social interrelationships has resulted in descriptions of symptoms which avoid any focus on the structural causes of housing 'problems'. See for example: Morris, P., Soweto: a Review of Existing Conditions and Some Guidelines for Change, (Johannesburg, 1980): A History of Black Housing in South Africa, (Johannesburg, 1981); and in particular the various publications of the Urban Problems Research Unit, University of Cape Town; see Dewar, D. and Ellis, G., Low Income Housing Policy in South Africa, (Lansdowne, Cape, 1979). A similar critique has been made of many South African researches in other areas, viz., that descriptions of rural poverty or the 'informal sector' tend to "flounder in a political vacuum". Wellings, P. and McCarthy, J., 'Whither Southern African Human Geography?', Area, vol. 15, No. 4, 1983, pp. 337-345; see also Sutcliffe, M., 'Review of D.M. Smith (ed.) (1982), Living Under Apartheid,' South African Geogr. Journal 65, 1982, pp. 178-9.
Recent developments in several academic disciplines recognise the importance of social processes in the analyses of social infrastructural provisions such as housing. Within the geographical literature, according to Kirby, Knox and Pinch, the emphasis on spatial patterns of resource distribution has been replaced by a focus on the question of control over resource, financial and other allocations. Interest in financial variations has widened to include the whole fiscal commitment of the state. Within sociology, various approaches, based primarily on the works of Marx or Weber, have attempted to analyse the relationship between urbanisation and political struggles around the provision of services. Saunders maintains, however, that while both Weberian and Marxist approaches in 'urban sociology' have directed attention to the need to analyse the causes and consequences of social provisions -in the context of the relationship between the state, the private sector and the working population- neither tradition has established a theoretical framework for such analysis.

The attempt at a general theory has been complicated, however, by a division which has developed within the literature and which has


11. According to Saunders, this is because, while 'space' figures prominently in both approaches, the failure to relate 'processes' to spatial categories has precluded the establishment of an adequate theoretical framework for either approach. He instead argues for a 'non-spatial urban sociology' which focuses firmly on consumption issues. Ibid., pp. 249-278.
tended to confuse many of the issues. On the one hand, there are approaches which focus on housing as a means of consumption and relate struggles over the level of provision to the sphere of consumption or distribution. On the other hand, there is a body of work which analyses the provision of housing and other social infrastructure in terms of the requirements for capital accumulation and makes the relations of production its point of departure. In the former approach, the activities of the state in the provision and allocation of housing are explained in terms of its 'urban managerial' role, or in terms of 'regulating the system'.

12. Insofar as this division has implications for the level at which social provisions are explained (see below, ns. 13 and 14). See for example, Duncan, S. and Goodwin, M., 'The Local State: Functionalism, Autonomy and Class Relations in Cockburn and Saunders', *Polit. Geogr.* Q.1, 1982, pp. 77-96, cited in Kirby et al. 'Developments in Public Provision', p. 298; see also, Saunders, *Social Theory*, chapters 6, 7 and 8.

13. For examples based on Weber's analysis of class and class conflict (located in the sphere of distribution rather than production relations), see Rex, J. and Moore, R., *Race, Community and Conflict*, (London, 1967); Rex, J., 'The Concept of Housing Class and the Sociology of Race Relations', *Race*, vol. 12, 1971, pp. 293-301; Saunders, *Social Theory*, pp. 136-148; Pahl's early work on 'urban managerialism' and how housing as a consumption resource is allocated, is discussed in *ibid.*, pp. 118-136. For much of the Marxist literature, the theoretical starting point is the role of housing in the 'reproduction of labour-power'. Within the total capitalist system, consumption is the necessary end point of commodity production. In addition, the principal function of consumption is that it is the means whereby the human labour power expended in the production of commodities comes to be replaced; it is only by consuming socially necessary use values such as housing, hospitals, schools etc., that the workforce is able to reproduce its capacity for labour which is sold afresh everyday. The provision of necessary means of consumption is a contradictory process within capitalist societies due to the contradiction which exists, according to Castells, between consumption and production, i.e., between the need to reproduce labour-power as a prerequisite for continued production and accumulation, and the need to produce commodities at the maximum possible profit. The state has increasingly intervened in the process of reproduction as the agency of 'social cohesion' and regulator of the total system, with the result that the means of consumption have become increasingly concentrated in specific spatial units.
deal with the 'political economy' of housing and the production of the 'built environment' for the expansion and reproduction of capital. Obviously, the areas of consumption and production are closely related and the apparent dichotomy/polarisation has arisen, as Saunders suggests, because a different set of questions has constituted the primary focus within each broad orientation.

and their provision increasingly centralised. Castells' concept of 'collective consumption' and its relation to the reproduction of labour-power, and his argument that consumption is the specific process through which space articulates with the social structure as a whole, is extensively treated in Saunders, Social Theory, pp. 180-218. In later work, Castells states that the causes of state intervention are located in the development of the class struggle, as well as the functional requirements of the system. See below, p. 29 n. 31.

14. The 'political economy' literature addresses questions regarding the role of housing as a commodity and its significance in the creation and distribution of surplus value, in addition to housing as an aspect of consumption and reproduction of labour-power. Questions relating to the production of housing (creation of surplus value), the ownership of housing (distribution of surplus value in rent) and the consumption of housing (reproduction of labour-power) are addressed in several publications of the Conference of Socialist Economists, Political Economy of Housing Workshop; see for example: Political Economy and the Housing Question, (London, 1975); Housing and Class in Britain, (London 1976); and Housing, Construction and the State, (London, 1980); see also Ball, M., 'British Housing Policy and the House-Building Industry', Capital and Class, vol. 4, 1978, pp. 78-99; and many of the contributions to the published Proceedings of the Bartlett Summer School, The Production of the Built Environment, (London, 1979, '80, '81 and '82). A characteristic feature of this literature is that the effects of class struggle tend to be regarded as secondary to the effects and requirements of capital accumulation. This is illustrated in the explanations offered for the introduction of rent control in the private sector, the growth of state housing provisions after the First World War and financial support for owner-occupation in Britain, and the state is perceived in 'instrumentalist' terms. See below, p. 28, n. 30.

The questions which underly the present study concern both relations of production and relations of consumption: it examines the conditions under which housing is produced and the conditions under which housing is financed and allocated. For this reason, and in the absence of an adequate general theory of 'housing', heuristic and sometimes implicit use is made of certain theoretical assumptions and concepts developed in both approaches. But before outlining the questions for research and describing the theoretical approach adopted in this study of state intervention, it is necessary to examine the historical setting to the research.

**Historical Setting**

In defining the conceptual focus of this study, a distinction was made between (i) 'housing policy' in general and (ii) the specific policies which relate to conditions for the reproduction of the African labour force in urban areas, which, for ease of reference, can be termed 'township policy'. This distinction is also reflected historically in legislation: the Housing Act of 1920 established the foundations for public housing whilst the Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923 institutionalised an administrative framework for urban segregation.

During the early phase of industrialisation in South Africa, which followed on the mineral discoveries, the emerging industrial proletariat frequently struggled against slum conditions. When the question of reform in housing conditions was confronted by the state, however, it was ideologically presented as reform through racial
Thus, a Housing Committee was appointed in 1919 to examine the question of financial assistance from central government to local authorities for the provision of housing to people of 'limited means'. The report of this Committee resulted in the Housing Act of 1920. Simultaneously, the question of the financial implications in the provision of housing was addressed in racial terms by the Transvaal Local Government Commission which was also appointed in 1919. The Commission linked the question of municipal finances to the questions of residence and the municipal franchise for Africans in urban areas.

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16. The origins of urban segregation were recognised in the provisions of the Public Health Act No. 23 of 1897, in terms of which local authorities were responsible for "regulating the use of Native locations and for maintaining good order, cleanliness and sanitation therein, and for preventing overcrowding and the erection or the use of unhealthy or unsuitable huts and dwellings". Report of the Native Laws Commission, (Fagan Commission), UG 28-1948, para. 2. For the background to urban segregation, see also Davenport, T. and Hunt, K. (eds.), The Right to Land, (Cape Town, 1974); Davenport, T., 'The Beginnings of Urban Segregation in South Africa Urban Areas: the Natives (Urban Areas) Act and its Background', Occasional Paper No. 15, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, (Grahamstown, 1971); and Rich, P., 'Ministering to the White Man's Needs: the Development of Urban Segregation in South Africa, 1913-1923', The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest, History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, (Johannesburg, 1978). Rich suggests that the campaign against slum conditions became bound up with, on the one hand, the struggle waged by white workers, particularly on the mines, against attempts to undermine their position in the structure of production, and, on the other, the 'segregationist' ideology of the group of middle-class reformers which involved itself in the struggle. See also Swanson, M., 'The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy and the Cape Colony, 1900-1909; Journal of African History, XVIII, 3, 1977.

17. Report of the Housing Committee, UG 4-1920. A Central Housing Board was established in terms of the Housing Act to provide loans from central government to local authorities for the construction of dwellings. There was no form of financial subsidisation until 1930 (see below, p. 24 n. 23). For a discussion on financial relations and the historical development in housing finance policy, see Watkins-Baker, J., 'Municipal Housing Finance in South Africa', Paper delivered to the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, South Africa, Cape Town, 1976.
The Transvaal Local Government Commission considered that all sections of the "permanent community" should be represented in local government. The now-notorious recommendation that "it should be a recognised principle of government that Natives...should only be permitted within municipal areas in so far and for so long as their presence is demanded by the wants of the white population", ensured that Africans were to be excluded from this 'community', and hence from access to representation through the municipal franchise. The Commission called for a definite policy and made detailed recommendations, most of which were enshrined in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, as a result of which several 'principles' on which urban policy was to be based were institutionalised. Central to the present study was its recommendation that "the number of Natives in urban areas" should be limited to "the labour requirements of such urban areas" and the mechanisms it established for housing these 'labour requirements' in segregated urban 'locations'.

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19. The relationship between labour requirements and the housing question was a continuing theme in reports of official commissions. See for example Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to Enquire into and Report upon the Question or Residence of Natives in Urban Areas (Young-Barrett Committee) of 1935, extracts printed as Annexure 5 to Report of the Native Laws Commission (Fagan Commission), UG 28-1948. See in particular section 1 of the Fagan Report, 'The operation of laws in force in the Union relating to Natives in or near urban areas, and in areas where Natives are congregated for industrial purposes other than mining'. The 1923 legislation provided for three forms of accommodation: hostels for single workers, chiefly migrant labourers; locations for, according to a former Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, "the normal floating and less stable section of the population who could not afford more than the necessaries of life" and who would be housed in dwellings owned by local authorities; and, "Native Villages, which were conceived as an area of the more stable and affluent section of the population whose employment was fixed and whose residence might be regarded as more or less permanent". Allison, J.S., 'Urban Native Legislation', Race Relations Journal, vol. 8, No. 4, 1941, p. 58.
The institutional framework established in terms of the 1923 urban areas legislation marks the historical point of departure for potential state intervention at a national level, not only in the questions of labour supply and allocation through the mechanism of 'influx control', but also in the question of the conditions under which the 'labour requirements' of urban areas were to be housed. It is this interrelation between labour and housing and, by implication, the relation between the spheres of production and consumption, which was established historically as an area for state intervention, with which this study is concerned. More particularly, this study traces the transformations in the relationship between labour and housing under the changed historical conditions associated with the expansion of industry in South Africa during the years of the Second World War, and the response of the state to the concomitant increase in urbanisation and proletarianisation. It is centrally concerned with the forms of intervention by the state in the material conditions of the urban industrial workforce and the range of policies relating to the urbanisation of Africans, which were formulated and implemented by the 'apartheid' state after 1948.

It is necessary now to outline the questions for research and to indicate the theoretical approach adopted in this study of state intervention after the Second World War.

20. An historical case study of urban administration on the basis of this legislation for the area of Johannesburg during the period up till 1948 is provided in the next chapter of this study. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act, No. 21 of 1923 remained the basis for policies of urban administration though it was extensively amended in 1930, 1934, 1937, 1941, 1942, 1944 and superseded by the Natives(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, which in turn was amended by further acts in 1945, 1946 and 1947, during the period prior to the Nationalist Party election to government.
1.2 Research Questions and Theoretical Approach

Implementation of housing schemes for African workers in urban areas before the Second World War was, by all accounts, subject to the vagaries of localised interests as the provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 were not mandatory. Thus, while local authorities were responsible for housing 'labour requirements', until 1937 it appears that, throughout South Africa, accommodation had been provided almost exclusively for migrant workers. Agreement between central and local government on the question of financial subsidy was reached only in 1936, and justification, on economic grounds, for the building of hostels rather than family accommodation was reinforced by the prevailing ideology of 'impermanence' for the majority of African workers in urban areas. During the years of the Second World War, however, there was an unprecedented increase in urbanisation as a result of the expanded labour demands of the wartime economy, more particularly the development of increasingly sophisticated and diversified

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21. Thus in 1938, while there were 472 urban local authorities, only 234 'locations' had been proclaimed under the regulations. Thornton Committee Report 1938-39, cited in Hellmann, E. 'Urban Areas', in Hellmann, E. (ed.), Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa, (Cape Town, 1949), p. 244.


23. Until 1930, such funds as were provided were on an 'economic' basis, i.e. there was no form of subsidisation and loans had to be repaid at prevailing interest rates. A scheme for granting 'sub-economic' loans for rehousing people from slums was inaugurated in 1930 but, until 1934, Africans were expressly excluded. In terms of the Slums Act of 1934, the Central Housing Board could recommend the financing of 'location schemes' with 'sub-economic' interest loans, if these were motivated by local authorities on the basis of slum clearance. In 1936, agreement on financial subsidy had been reached whereby sub-economic loans were made available provided local authorities, in fixing the rentals, 'made a loss' equivalent to one-half of that borne by central government. See Watkins-Baker, 'Municipal Housing Finance'.

secondary industry. By 1943, the shortage of houses for the urban African population was estimated at 125,000. These conditions of shortage, which were manifest in the squatter settlements ringing the industrial centres and the severe overcrowding of existing 'locations', persisted until the mid-1950s when, on the basis of an overall policy framework formulated and legitimised after the Nationalist Party election to government in 1948, the township programmes were implemented on a massive scale throughout South Africa.

The conditions for the reproduction of labour were transformed by this intervention. But several important questions arise in regard to the consumption-related and production-related policies through which the township programmes were in fact implemented. These questions suggest the wider significance of this study of state intervention: the financial relations devolving on the provision of housing, as also the relationship between the state, employers and the workforce, were transformed by, for example, the imposition of a tax on employers of African labour towards the costs of provision of service infrastructure. This raises important questions concerning the distribution of costs of provision of housing and infrastructure, and the nature of relationships around wages and rentals. The conditions of production, meanwhile, were transformed by the states undertaking the construction of housing and townships directly through local authority building organisations. Thus, both in the sphere of consumption and in the sphere of production, the policies pursued by the state appeared to conflict with the immediate interests of at least some sections of capital. In the first case, labour costs were increased while, in the latter, the private building sector appeared to be challenged by the direct intervention by the state in the supply of housing.


26. In terms of the provisions of the Native Services Levy Act, No. 64 of 1952.
In order to explain why and how the townships came about, and to understand the role of these spatial formations in South Africa, the central research questions fall into three broad categories. Firstly, there are those questions relating to the origins of different policies. Why, for instance, did the state intervene in the supply of housing through the form of direct production? How are the transformations and changes in policy responses to be explained? To address these questions involves an analysis of the processes of policy formulation and requires, therefore, an examination of the economic, political and ideological conditions within which and in response to which specific policies were formulated. Secondly, there are those questions which relate to the process of implementation itself. What, for instance, were the mechanisms or policy instruments through which state intervention occurred? How did these operate? To address these questions requires an analysis of the social processes involved in implementation and the conditions under which this occurred. Finally, there are questions which relate to the social consequences of implementing a range of policies. The identification of some of the political, economic and ideological 'effects', even if partial, is crucial for an understanding of the role of the townships and the possibilities for political action.

It is necessary now to describe briefly the theoretical approach adopted in the present study and to clarify the conceptualisation of the state, the nature of state intervention and the definition of 'policy' which underlies the research.

**Theoretical Approach**

This study makes an analytical distinction between the origins of certain policies - why the township policies were formulated and implemented in particular forms - and the effects of implementation. This distinction is important in order to avoid 'functionalist' explanations for state intervention, where the causes of state intervention are deduced from the 'effects', and where state interventions which operate, for example, to the benefit of capital, are explained simply in terms of the prior
requirements of capital. As the preceding section suggests, various interests can be reflected in policy outcomes, and any single-factor explanation for state intervention will, therefore, leave important questions unanswered. The ability to distinguish analytically between the causes and consequences of state intervention, and to account for and explain the variety of policy outcomes, rests, however, on a prior conceptualisation of the state. This introduces the extremely complex and immensely controversial field of theoretical debate on the nature of the state under capitalism. While it is beyond the scope of this study to offer a really comprehensive review of the variety of conceptualisations of the state, and every approach lays claim to a valid overall perspective, it is necessary to indicate the approach adopted in this study.

Subsequent chapters examine the social processes involved in the formulation and implementation of policies in order to explain why and how the townships came about. The definition of 'policy' and the methodological approach employed in this study are informed on the basis of two theoretical assumptions about the state, and the nature of

27. See above, p. 18 ns. 13 and 14.

28. It is beyond the scope of this study to offer a really comprehensive review of the debate, or to outline the variety of approaches to the state. As Kirby et al. state, "this theoretical pluralism constitutes probably the major analytical problem for services research". Kirby et al., 'Developments in Public Provision', p. 298. For example, a wide range of approaches based predominantly on the works of Weber is indicated in Tilly, C., et al., 'States and Social Structures', Proposal to the Social Science Research Council (unpub., University of Michigan, April 1983); and various approaches are reviewed in Saunders, P., Urban Politics: a Sociological Interpretation (London, 1979), chs. 1 & 4; and Saunders, Social Theory, ch. 7. Marxist political theories and various contributions to the 'state derivation' debate are collected in Holloway, J. and Picciotto S. (eds), State and Capital: a Marxist Debate, (London, 1978); see also Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (London, 1977). For possibly the best account of existing Marxist approaches, see Jessop, B., The Capitalist State, (Oxford, 1983), which focuses on three influential post-war approaches: the theory of 'state monopoly capitalism'; the West German debate on the form, functions and limits of state intervention; and, the work of neo-Gramscian theorists on the complex inter-relations between economics, politics and ideology.
state intervention. These theoretical assumptions have been formulated in the absence of a 'general theory' of the state in order to provide some of the conceptual 'tools' needed to address a variety of questions. 29

While the state in a capitalist society must accord priority to the maintenance of capital accumulation, it cannot be assumed a priori that political outcomes always reflect the immediate interests of capital.

Political outcomes often appear to conflict with the interests of capital or 'fractions' of capital. The state cannot be viewed, therefore, simply as the 'instrument' of dominant economic interests. 30 Because a variety

29. As Jessop's work confirms, there is no adequate 'general theory' of the state, nor any reason why there should be, given the fact that resorting to a single theory to explain the totality in all its determinations will result in some form of reductionism. He suggests several guidelines, which, at an 'abstract level' are pertinent to this study. Jessop, The Capitalist State, pp. 211-259. The validity of the approach adopted in this study is discussed in the conclusions.

30. An 'instrumentalist' approach to the state, in its crudest form, is economistic, reducing the state to an object or instrument available to an undifferentiated dominant capitalist class. This denies the possibility that 'other' interests can effect state activity to any extent. At a more sophisticated level, this approach claims that state intervention is a product of the relative power of different 'fractions' of capital at different points in time. A body of literature on the South African state, based on concepts developed by Poulantzas, makes the differentiation of capitalist interests their starting point and seeks to relate apartheid to the struggle between 'fractions' of capital. These accounts have been subjected to considerable criticism; see in particular Wolpe, H., 'Towards an Analysis of the South African State', International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 8, 1980, pp. 399-421. Wolpe argues that the 'fractionalists' accounts have been based on a misreading of Poulantzas.
of interests may be reflected in policy outcomes, it is important to recognise that political and ideological relations, as well as economic relations, are involved in an analysis of state intervention. As Jessop correctly points out, the state is located on the terrain of the social formation, rather than in the 'pure' capitalist mode of production. An analysis of the state, therefore, "its various conditions of existence, and its effects on other social relations will include much more than the issue of economic relations and class forces".

II The state has no 'essential' unity. It is a complex, contradictory structure comprising numerous institutions or apparatuses, which are themselves the site of struggle.

31. Various approaches identified a 'problem' in the fact that the state appears both to support the interests of capital while at the same time, to respond to and reflect what they term 'non-capitalist' interests. According to Saunders, the apparently dual role of the state can not be subsumed in a single explanatory theory, and he argues that the state operates in a different way according to the type of policy in which it is engaged. He proposes a 'dualistic perspective' because political strategies tend to be associated with different aspects of the state's role performed at different levels of its organisation. Saunders, Social Theory, pp. 249-278. While this approach appears to reintroduce a form of 'theoretical pluralism', it does refer to the internal structure of the state as differentiated which dispenses with a unitary conceptualisation. See theoretical assumption II, Other analyses have utilised the concept of 'relative autonomy' to explain the dual role of the state. The work of Castells in particular utilises the concept, developed in Poulantzas, N., Political Power and Social Classes, (London, 1973), to explain the role of the state in terms of 'regulating crises in the system' and maintaining 'social cohesion' etc. See for example. Castells, M., The Urban Question, (London 1977); 'Towards a Political Urban Sociology', in Harloe, M. (ed.), Captive Cities, (London, 1977); and, City, Class and Power, (London 1978). See also above, p. 18 n. 13. Later work by Castells locates the causes of state intervention in the development of the class struggle, as well as in the functional requirements of the system.

An important feature of this conceptualisation is the differentiated mode of organisation, operation and representation of interests within the various institutions and apparatuses. Related to this is the question of 'access' by different social classes or forms of organisation to these state structures. Several analyses emphasise the 'asymmetrical

33. This conceptualisation is crucial for an analysis of policy formulation and state intervention, because it obviates the tendency to treat the state as the originating subject of policies, and sees the state instead as a condensation of social forces in struggle. This therefore includes the possibility of political struggles within and between state apparatuses as well as the effects of the institutional structures on the constitution of political forces and the conduct of struggles 'beyond the state'. Several arguments, particularly in analyses dealing with hegemony, suggest this fragmentation and division within the state. These argue that any 'unity' has to be constituted politically. See Poulantzas' later work; especially, Poulantzas, N. State, Power and Socialism, (London, 1978). See also Jessop, The Capitalist State, pp. 222-5; and Wolpe, 'Towards an Analysis of the South African State.'

34. The 'institution' of the state is itself divided into various institutions and apparatuses: ministries, government departments (such as the Department of Labour or Native Affairs, in the case of South Africa), local authorities, central administration, organisations, parliament, judicial system, and the research related apparatus (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in South Africa, for example). Each one can represent different interests. Poulantzas, N., 'The Capitalist State: a Reply to Miliband and Laclau', New Left Review, 95, 1976.

35. It is beyond the scope of this study to enter the complex theoretical debate which exists around the definition of social classes. Classes exist in multiple forms of organisation; in economic organisations, such as associations of capitalists in particular branches of industry (for example, the National Federation of Building Trade Employers of South Africa); in politico-economic organisations, such as trade unions (for example, the South African Trades and Labour Council or the South African Association of Municipal Employees); or, in political bodies, such as political parties; in private institutions and state apparatuses. In the case of South Africa, the debate on social classes has arisen largely because of the divisions between black and white workers and the position of white 'workers' or 'wage-earners' in the racial division of labour. See Davies, Capital State and White Labour, The major theoretical approaches to the question are found in: Carchedi, G. 'On the Economic Identification of the New Middle Class', Economy and Society, vol. 4, No.1, 1975, pp. 1-83; 'Reproduction of Social Classes at the Level of Production Relations', Economy and Society, vol. 4, No. 4, 1975; 'The Economic
effects' of differential access on the ability of different social forces to realise their interests in the course of state intervention. Relations of access, limitation of access or exclusion operate in an uneven way and it is possible, therefore, that under certain conditions particular interests may be defined and organised through relations of access to state structures.

On the basis of these two theoretical assumptions, and for the purposes of this study of state intervention, 'policy' may be defined as:

Identification of State Employees', Social Praxis, vol. 3(1-2), 1976; Poulantzas, N. 'On Social Classes', New Left Review No. 78, 1972; Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, (London, 1975); and Braverman, H. Labour and Monopoly Capital, (New York, 1974). The assumption about social classes inherent to the present study is consistent with the conceptualisation of the state, namely, that the internal 'unity' of classes cannot be presupposed.

36. See for example, Wolpe's argument that, following Poulantzas, the materialisation of class powers in the state is expressed in the access, limitation of access or exclusion from the state of particular classes or elements of classes. Wolpe, 'Towards an Analysis of the South African State', pp.413-4; also, Jessop, who suggests that political forces are themselves constituted in part through the structures of political representation which involve differential access and opportunity to realise specific effects. Jessop, The Capitalist State, p. 224; a similar point is made by Gerstenberger, who argues that the activity of the state can be grasped as the result of 'social confrontations', which are mediated through a variety of channels into state apparatuses. These channels, through which a variety of interests are articulated in and through crises, account for the ad hoc nature of state activities and policy outcomes. Gerstenberger, H., 'Class Conflict, Competition and State Functions', in Holloway and Picciotto (eds.), State and Capital, pp. 149-159.

37. For a different emphasis on 'access', but still as a way of examining political relations and the apparatus of the state, see Lamb, G., 'Marxism, Access and the State', Development and Change, vol. 6, No. 2, 1975, pp. 119-135. Utilising some of the concepts developed by Poulantzas, the article suggests how the state apparatus can affect class relations via its control over the allocation of social resources. Used in this sense, access refers to issues of bureaucratism, non-market allocation, state monopolisation, incorporation and control, which are relevant to this study.
A 'resolution' at the political level of the conflicts, contradictions and transformations within and between different apparatuses or structures of the state, within which processes of access and exclusion operate in an uneven and changing way for particular classes, organisations or elements of classes.

In this sense it is possible to conceive of a short or longer term unity between 'policy' and various conflicting interests, which might at times even appear to contradict the immediate requirements for capital accumulation.

Therefore to distinguish between the causes and effects of state intervention through an analysis of policy formulation and implementation, which is the intention of the current study, means situating the analysis at the level of the complex of relations within and between the particular branches/structures/apparatuses of the state involved in a specified policy area. Furthermore, the forms of organisation of classes or 'fractions' of classes, both 'outside' and with access to state structures, with interests in a specific policy area have to be identified, as also does the content of those interests. On this basis, it should be possible to include economic, political and ideological elements encompassed in and by social relations and, in an analysis, to take account of and reflect some of the complexity of the particular social reality.

It is necessary now to indicate the methodological approach adopted in this study and to describe how, on the basis of the theoretical assumptions and the definition of policy, specific questions have been formulated in relation to the South African social formation for an analysis of state intervention.

1.3 Methodological Approach

The methodological approach adopted in this study follows both on the choice of research object - the area of state intervention and central research questions - and on the particular conceptualisation of 'state' and definition of 'policy' employed. Underlying this approach is
the recognition that, while only a partial reconstruction of a complex social reality is possible, this complexity still has to be confronted in any analysis which attempts to understand social relations through an examination of policy formulation and implementation. This is particularly the case where a range of policies and practices, with ideological, political and economic bases and effects, constitutes the object for research rather than a single policy. This approach is reflected both in the diversity of areas of research and the variety of sources utilised in the attempt to trace and explain the processes of policy formulation and implementation, and in the organisation of research findings. Initial methodological questions, however, concern the identification of both spatial and temporal parameters to the research.

**Research parameters**

The focus of the study on the geographical area of the Witwatersrand in the period 1945 to 1965, and more particularly on the municipal area of Johannesburg where Soweto is the largest 'township', is justified on several grounds. Apart from the area's contemporary relevance in terms of the state's post-1976 'dispensations' to urban Africa, and the importance, therefore, of its origins and history to any assessment of present state initiatives in the 'housing sphere', the focus is both theoretically and historically valid for two further reasons.

Firstly, the Witwatersrand constitutes the area where, historically, the interrelations between the state, capital and labour receive their clearest expression. This is obviously largely a function of the industrialisation and proletarianisation which followed on the discovery of

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38. See for example Lea, J., 'Government Dispensation, Capitalist Imperative or Liberal Philanthropy? Responses to the Black Housing Crisis in South Africa', in Smith, D. (ed.), Living under Apartheid, (London, 1982), pp. 198-216. Thus the 'reforms' in tenurial systems represented in the introduction of 99-year leasehold, are in effect a return to what existed 30 years ago as chapter 5 of this study illustrates.
of gold, but is also, in part, related to the actual size of the urban proletariat. Thus, in 1916-17, for example, 28 per cent of the total industrial workforce of South Africa was employed on the Witwatersrand. By 1941-42, industrial expansion had been accompanied by increasing concentration and no less than 45 per cent of the industrial workforce was concentrated on the Witwatersrand.

Secondly, with the conceptualisation of the state and the definition of policy employed in this study, the relations within and between central government departments and local authorities are clearly central in an analysis of policy formulation and implementation. This was suggested above in relation to the role of the Transvaal Local Government Commission in the formulation of a national policy framework for the urban areas which was legitimised in 1923. As the Young-Barrett Committee recognised in 1935, "a policy formulated by a Transvaal Provincial Commission and provoked mainly by the shocking conditions then prevailing in the slums of Johannesburg lies near the root of many provisions of the Urban Areas Act and has had far-reaching effects in the administration of the Act throughout the Union". While this reference to the origins of policy remains at the level of appearances,


it does suggest the importance of examining specific, local conditions in accounting for the variety and complexity of policy outcomes.

An examination of conditions in Johannesburg after the Second World War therefore appears important to an understanding of the evolution of policies for the provision and distribution of housing. But the periodisation of 1945-1965, reflected in the present study, is important for a further reason. At a more general level, research on conditions in the immediate post-war period should contribute to existing debates on how the character of future social organisation in South Africa became posed as a distinctly political question, and why the 'policy platform' of the Nationalist party, with its explicit concern with 'racial issues', should have secured their electoral victory in 1948.  

The chronological limit of 1965 is not an arbitrary cut-off point. By then, the township programmes had been largely implemented and the overall programme of apartheid had entered a 'new' phase: the focus of state policies relating to the urbanisation of Africans had shifted, and the apparatuses of the state were charged with elaborating and legitimising the implementation of the so-called 'homeland policy'.

42. See O'Meara, D., Volskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948, (Cambridge, 1983), chapters 12 and 15 in particular; and Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, chapter 7.

43. The Tomlinson Commission Report of 1955 had advocated a programme of investment in the rural reserves. An alternative policy of the decentralisation of industries to 'border' areas was, however, promoted by the government from the early 1960's. In 1967, to accelerate the programme, statutory controls were introduced in the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act, No. 88 of 1967. These included the limiting of expansion of existing enterprises by restricting the numbers of additional African workers. In terms of General Circular No. 27 of 1967, the official policy was 'resettlement' of the industrial reserve army of the towns in the rural Bantustans, and the large-scale construction of 'townships' in these rural areas rather than further development in existing urban townships. See for example: Legassick, M. and Wolpe, H. 'The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa', Review of African Political Economy, 7, 1976, pp. 87-107; Bell, T. Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa, (Cape Town, 1973); Beinart, W. 'The Policy of Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa', in Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia,
The parameters to the research having been defined, it is necessary now to describe the areas of research, the organisation of material and the nature of the sources utilised in this study.

Areas of Research and Thesis Structure

To answer the questions posed in this thesis it is necessary to examine the different branches or levels of the state, and any other organisations, within and between which processes of policy formulation and implementation can be traced and analysed. This can be done more readily by focusing on a 'part' of the state than in an attempt to comprehend the working of the 'whole'. This study therefore focuses on the Johannesburg City Council, the largest local authority on the Witwatersrand. As part of the state, it was itself divided into various departments which, on the one hand reflected and responded to differing and competing local interests, and, on the other, interacted with and related to other structures or organisations within the state. It was therefore both the source of policies, formulated in response to specific local conditions and involving a range of practices for municipal administration, and the means through which policies formulated in central government departments were implemented at the local level. This focus provides a context for examining the relations within the state; between local authorities and central government departments such as Native Affairs, Labour or the National Housing and Planning Commission; and between the state, employers and the African workforce of Johannesburg.

An historical and contextual background to the overall study is provided in Chapter Two which examines the operations of the Johannesburg City Council in housing the African workforce during the pre-war period.

and up to 1948. This serves to illustrate how policies for urban administration on the basis of the 1923 legislative framework were implemented and how the gap between the level of provision and social demand arose and was exacerbated with the increase in urbanisation during the years of the Second World War. In the context of a generalised housing shortage, the relations between central and local government concerning housing finance and the allocation of building resources highlights the question of costs of provision and, more particularly, the costs in the production of housing. Conditions and relations of production of housing therefore constitute an important area of research.

The approach adopted in this study represents a departure from existing analyses which focus on the sphere of production, in that the building industry is not examined primarily from the point of view of the production of housing as a commodity. Unlike analyses which deal with the 'economics' of the building industry, and see so-called 'factors of production', such as land, machinery, materials and labour, solely in relation to the process of capital accumulation, the aim in this study is to identify the content of various interests in the production of housing. For this reason, taking the land 'factor' as an example, the barriers to the accumulation of capital in the building industry, which speculation in land may create, are not examined to any extent. Instead, questions of ownership and land tenure, or land-use zoning, are touched on insofar as they serve to illustrate how conflicts emerge around the land question; the nature of political, ideological and economic struggles over land, such as the racial zoning of land in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950; and the social consequences of state interventions in the form of land policies ideologically presented as 'slum clearance' or 'resettlement'. In this study, therefore, an attempt is made to

44. See above, p. 19, n. 14.
45. These questions are addressed in chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 of this study.
include political and ideological relations -the class struggle- in the analysis of the production of housing and the evolution of policies related to the conditions under which the townships were constructed.

Chapter Three examines the relations between employers and labour in the building industry and the conditions of housing production in the immediate post-war period. Here, conditions of shortage of skilled labour and materials, rising costs of housing, and proposals for augmenting the skilled building labour force provide the context for examining relations within the building industry, and between the building industry and the state around the question of cost and rate of housing production. The content of different interests in the production of housing is expressed through such organisations as the National Federation of Building Trade Employers of South Africa, various building trade unions, and the state's housing apparatus, namely, the National Housing and Planning Commission, the Cabinet Building Committee and the Controller of Industrial Manpower in the Department of Labour.

In tracing the development of social debates, on issues relating to the conditions both of consumption and production of housing, during the period before 1948, chapters two and three identify the origins of policies. An attempt is made in Chapter Four to situate the processes of policy formulation - after 1948 and the election to government of the Nationalist party - in a wider context.

In Chapter Four, the forms of policy for housing the African 'labour requirements' of urban areas, together with the mechanisms for implementation, as defined during the early years of the Nationalist government, are examined within the overall context of the relations between the apartheid state, capital and labour. These relations centre
both on the question of 'labour requirements' and the role of the state in allocating work roles in the division of labour, and on the question of conditions for the reproduction of the labour force and the forms of state intervention. The legislative and administrative framework for the implementation of the township programmes, established primarily in terms of the Native Building Workers Act of 1951 and the Native Services Levy Act of 1952, represents the 'resolution' of various political issues surrounding the production and consumption of housing. The chapter also examines the role of the research-related apparatus of the state, namely, the National Building Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, both in the process of policy formulation and in the development of the 'technical means' for its implementation.

The aim in Chapter Five is to explain how the range of policies, which were defined and formulated on the ideological basis of apartheid, were translated into programmes and implemented within the conditions existing in Johannesburg. The case study of the implementation of policies from 1948 to 1965 examines the evolution of a metropolitan land policy which restricted the development of townships to areas South-West of the city, the bases of the provision of service infrastructure and housing, and the practices involved in the actual production of the 'built environment' through which the townships were given their 'concrete' physical form.

Finally, in Chapter Six, some of the social consequences of these state interventions are described. These effects - political and ideological as well as economic - are central to an understanding of the role of the townships, and the continuing social function of these spatial forms within the overall South African social formation.
A Note on Sources

A central tenet of the approach adopted is that, in order to locate the origins of policies and to analyse the social processes involved in a series of state practises, the analysis must break with state ideology as reflected in official discourse. The nature of what state discourse defines as 'the housing problem' - 'housing shortage', 'standards', 'housing subsidies' etc. - has therefore to be questioned. It is for this reason that, throughout the study, an attempt is made to move from the most visible or observable phenomena to the underlying causes. This approach, as preceding pages illustrate, has entailed both the identification and the synthesis of apparently disparate foci. The question of sources is therefore crucial.

Unpublished primary source material and documents which reflect process in policy formulation and implementation have been researched and selected in preference to published official 'policy' statements. Thus, where possible, policy 'themes' have been traced through the correspondence, minutes of meetings, reports and memoranda of organisations and central and local government bodies, in addition to published primary sources such as parliamentary debates, annual reports of government departments, official journals and newspapers.

46. This is particularly important where 'ideological' terms such as 'Native Housing' are used in official discourse to delimit fields of state interventions in areas such as housing finance, for example, through the 'Native Revenue Account'; or in the development of differential minimum standards of accommodation, on the basis of racial categories.
CHAPTER TWO

JOHANNESBURG CITY COUNCIL: URBAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE PROVISION OF HOUSING FOR AFRICAN WORKERS BEFORE 1948

This chapter examines the operations of the Johannesburg City Council in housing the African labour force of Johannesburg before 1948. It is concerned, therefore, with how the municipal apparatus effectively implemented segregationist policies based on the legislative framework for urban administration of 1923. The aim is both to describe the conditions under which such housing was financed, allocated and 'managed' at the local level, and to explain the context in which policies, relating to the consumption of housing, were formulated and implemented.¹

There are consequently two lines of analysis which run through this chapter. The one involves the relations within the Johannesburg City Council itself, reflected in the municipal practices which had evolved in response both to locally-defined interests and demands and to the implementation of state policies. The other focuses on the relations between the Johannesburg City Council, as a local authority, and other levels or branches of the state directly or indirectly involved in the provision of housing for the so-called 'labour requirements' of urban areas.

The first section, which describes and analyses urban administrative practices which had evolved in Johannesburg before the Second World War, provides the historical and contextual background. Municipal financial practices and the provision of municipal services are examined in the light of the prevailing ideology of racial segregation; and the extension of controls over the conditions of housing is examined through the operations of the Native Affairs Department of the City Council.

1. The background to the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, was described above, p.21. For discussion of consumption of housing as an area for state intervention in the reproduction of labour, see above, p. 18.
The second section of the chapter focuses on the response by the Johannesburg City Council to the housing shortage which arose with the increased urbanisation and industrial expansion during the war. The existing system of housing finance and the question of subsidisation highlighted with the scale of the shortage are examined against the background of increasing militancy and the confrontations between the City Council and its 'tenants'.

Finally, in the third section, the Johannesburg City Council's attempts to implement its building programme in the immediate post-war years is examined. This analysis focuses on the relations between the City Council and other organisations within the state involved with the allocation of housing resources, and reveals the nature of several constraints on the process of implementing the building programme in Johannesburg.

2.1 Pre-War Urban Administration

In order to understand the conditions of consumption of housing for African workers in Johannesburg, and the nature of the relationships involved in the provision of housing before the Second World War, this section focuses on several practices for urban administration. An examination of municipal financial practice precedes the brief discussion on the question of municipal service provision and the relation between the prevailing ideology of racial segregation and access to services. Finally, the operations of the Native Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council in implementing policies for the control over housing conditions and the labour force are examined.

Municipal Financial Practice: direct and indirect taxation

There are two significant and related features about the system of municipal finances which evolved after the establishment in 1901 of the town council in Johannesburg. Firstly, it appears that during the
period up to the Second World War the municipal budget was balanced almost entirely without assistance from central government.² Municipal expenditure was for services of local rather than national importance and the revenue base was derived from entirely local sources through indirect and direct local taxation. Raising revenue through indirect taxation was by charges to consumers of particular municipal services and the issue of certain licences. The form of direct taxation was the assessment rate which from 1919 was based on the capital value of land only, although the council retained the power to tax improvements³. It was, however, the proportional contribution to revenue by indirect and direct taxation which constitutes the second particular feature of the Johannesburg municipal financial system and which requires a brief examination.

Indirect taxation, through the trading and non-trading departments of the City Council, accounted for 77 per cent of the gross income for 1935/36. As much as 60 per cent was contributed by the former group

2. In large towns in other countries, grants accounted for a considerable portion of expenditure on revenue account: 40% in the case of Great Britain; 77% for Austria; 70% for Germany; 65% for Belgium; 56% for France and 33% for Holland. For Johannesburg however, out of an estimated turnover on revenue account for 1937/8 of nearly £4 million, only \( \frac{1}{4} \) % was anticipated as a grant from central government. See Maud, J., City Government, the Johannesburg Experiment, (Oxford, 1938), pp.290-1.

3. In levying this one direct tax in the year, the City Council could not exceed a certain maximum without the sanction of central government. From 1902 till 1919, the question of whether owners of fixed property should be taxed according to the combined value of land and buildings, or whether these should be rated separately, was disputed. It should be noted the Johannesburg system of site-value rating was not common to other local authorities in South Africa; Cape Town adopted a flat rate on the combined value and, less commonly, 'differential' system of taxing improvements at a lower rate than site-value had been adopted in Durban in 1923. ibid., pp. 91-3, 281-90 and 297-9.
which consisted of those departments concerned with electricity, gas, water, transport and produce and live-stock markets. The contribution of the non-trading departments, which included fees charged for sewerage and sanitation, rents and other revenues, amounted to nearly 17 per cent of the total income. In the same year, payers of assessment rates—the form of direct taxation—contributed less than 16 per cent to the total gross income of the municipality. In contrast to large towns in other countries, there was a marked tendency for Johannesburg to rely to an extremely limited extent on assessment rates as a means of financing municipal expenditure and the practice of applying profits from its trading undertakings, in lieu of rates, had been consistently adopted. This tendency, however, should be seen in the context of several factors.

Firstly, there was a legal limit imposed on assessment rates. The apparent contradiction between a legal limit imposed on direct taxation and the absence of any legal limitation on municipal profits, can partly be explained by the city’s early history. A rate-limit was already contained in the municipal law ‘inherited’ from the South African Republic and this could account for the insertion of a rate-limit in the first rating proclamation of Johannesburg. With regard to the absence of legislation on municipal trading there was no precedent, either in the Transvaal or in Great Britain, where the policy of utilising large profits from municipal trade to relieve rates was quite unknown.

4. In 1903, the contribution of rates to revenue had been as high as 67.8%; but by 1910 it had decreased to 22.5%, and to 15.5% in 1935/6. Furthermore, total income from rates had only increased from £264,750 in 1903 to £585,323 in 1935, while the population of Johannesburg has more than quadrupled. Ibid., tables 1 and 2, pp. 374-5.

5. Between 1926/27 and 1935/36, for instance, almost 17% of gross expenditure by non-trading departments had been contributed by profits from trading departments. Ibid., p. 295.

6. Johannesburg Rating Proclamation No. 38 of 1902, section 13, imposed a limit of 3d in the £. From 1919, Johannesburg could levy a rate of 7d in the £ on land only, or a rate of 4d on land and 3d on improvements. Ibid., p. 288.
One of the questions addressed by the Stallard Commission on local
government of 1919-21 was the removal of the rate-limit. But, there
was apparently little demand for its removal and in 1938 this still
reflected official opinion within the Johannesburg City Council.  

Furthermore, during several years, not even the permissible rate
was levied, so that the actual revenue derived from rates was
significantly less than its potential. 

Secondly, uncertainty and conflicting attitudes as to the principle
to be adopted in assessing mining and state-owned property had resulted
in methods of assessment which benefited these parties and which had
financial consequences for the municipal tax base. Government property
was exempt from rates, and despite the recommendations of the
Stallard Commission that the exemption be withdrawn and that the
government be made liable for the payment of assessment rates based
on site value, the State Property (Exemption from Rating) Bill, introduced
in 1930, became law in 1931.

The situation with regard to the taxation of mining properties
was more complex and, since the beginning of the twentieth century,
mining properties had been granted preferential treatment in the question
of local taxation. The result of legislation was that rates were paid

7. Ibid., p. 298.
8. For example, in 1935 and 1936, Johannesburg levied a rate of only
   5d in the £. Ibid., table 2, p. 375.
9. The Stallard Commission considered government exemption "the
   result of political expediency... an invisible but very real tax
   levied on the towns of the Province in favour of the general revenue".
   Report of the Transvaal Local Government Commission, T.P., I -1922,
   paras. 205-6. Provision was made in 1931, however, for the
   rating of government residential property.
10. In terms of Local Authorities Rating Amendment Ordinance No. 45
    of 1904, it was specified that value accruing to rateable property
    "by reason of the presence of precious stones or precious metals
    and by Idem. No. 22 of 1906, base metals and minerals were
    included" was to be deducted before assessing the property for
    rating purposes". As Maud points out, it was the policy of the
    Transvaal government to regard mining value as a source of
    revenue for itself, rather than for local authorities. Maud, City
    Government, p. 283
by owners of mining land only in respect of (i) buildings or other improvements which were used for residential or other purposes not incidental to mining, and (ii) the site-value on which those buildings stood. From 1916, when the rating of land apart from improvements received legislative recognition, there were differences between municipalities and mining and power companies about rating of land proclaimed under the Gold Law of 1908. The Rating Ordinance of 1933 reflected a compromise whereby the improvements-value of land under mining title was taxed at the same rate as that levied throughout the rest of the municipality on site-values, the practice adopted from 1919. The method of assessment for rating of mining properties therefore bore no relation either to the capital or the annual value, or to the income of the ratepayers. As Figure 2.1 indicates, the land held under mining title in the municipal area was very extensive, yet the contribution from mining capital to the municipal revenue of Johannesburg was both relatively and absolutely small.\(^\text{11}\)

A further factor, which will be dealt with below, was the nature of municipal services which were provided. Clearly, the underlying principle of 'ability to pay' was inherent in the psychology of the City Council during this period. There had been no extension of welfare services in any way comparable with those of municipalities in Great Britain, for instance, whereby services directed at sections of the community at the lowest level of wages were provided through general rates, subsidies or grants by central government from national revenue. As items of municipal expenditure were of local importance or the result of specific local demands, rather than the result of national policies for welfare,

\(^\text{11}\) Three separate commissions were appointed to consider the rating of mining land: the Hartog Commission, the Young Commission and the Hofmeyer Commission in 1932. For the background to the Rating Ordinance of 1933, see ibid., pp. 284-5.
Figure 2.1 Witwatersrand: Properties Administered by Anglo-American Corporation and other Mining Groups
housing, health or education, for example, the limited influence and control of central government in municipal undertakings appears to have been perpetuated and reinforced through the virtual autonomy of the Johannesburg City Council in matters of indirect taxation, and by the ability to balance the municipal accounts on this basis.

A really adequate explanation of these municipal financial practices requires an analysis of the composition and political representation within the City Council, and the nature of projects undertaken during this period. The dominance of the Ratepayers Party after 1925 certainly suggests a correlation. While this is beyond the scope of this study, the importance of the preceding outline of the contribution of rates and forms of indirect taxation to the revenue base of Johannesburg will be clarified below and in relation to the financial implications of Johannesburg's post-war building programme. It is necessary now to examine the nature of municipal expenditure and service provision during this early period in the context of the prevailing ideology of racial segregation.

Urbanisation, Segregation and the Provision of Municipal Services

Industrialisation in South Africa during the first half of the twentieth century was accompanied by an increasing concentration of the workforce in the three chief ports and particularly in the Witwatersrand

12. After municipal elections in 1919, the Labour Party controlled the Council for two years. This was the only period during which there was a substantial increase in the level of assessment rates. From 7d in the £, in 1919/20, it was raised by Labour majority to 10d in 1920/1, and the revenue from rates increased from £443,582 in 1919/20 to £637,958 in 1920/1 and to £640,304 in 1921/2. Profits from trading departments were reduced through a policy of reductions in tariff charges and increased wages to municipal workers. Total expenditure on capital account increased from £212,231 in 1919/20 to £459,044 in 1920/1 (when a municipal iron foundry and brickfields had been established), and to £582,282 in 1924/5 when Labour again had control of the Council with the support of the Nationalist Party. 1925 elections went against Labour and by 1927, the Ratepayers Party held 28 out of the 36 seats. Maud, City Government, pp. 80-5 and 225-9).
gold-mining area. In 1916-17, of the total industrial workforce, 28 per cent was located on the Witwatersrand and, by 1941-42, this had increased to 45 per cent. Table 2.1 reflects the growth in urban population and the concentration in the Johannesburg metropolitan area and the Witwatersrand.

As noted in the preceding chapter, the Transvaal Local Government in 1919 had addressed the question of urban administration in segregationist terms and had called for a definite and comprehensive policy regarding the urbanisation of Africans. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, as finally promulgated, contained several 'principles' for urban policy. Of central importance was the requirement for local authorities to enforce residential segregation through the establishment and control of separate 'locations'. In fact, what emerged with the debates on the 1923 Urban Areas legislation was an ideology of housing reform through segregation. Thus, responding to the City Council's application for a housing loan for whites in 1923 (in terms of the Housing Act of 1920), the Rent Board considered, that "the necessity for assisted white dwellings...was relatively negligible compared with the urgent necessity for the segregation and decent housing of natives". This ideology appears to have provided the basis of a report to the City Council by the Medical Officer of Health on the question of subsidised housing for whites as reflected in the quotation:

There is little or no public health necessity or justification for State-aided housing for Europeans in Johannesburg; but the conditions of European housing in certain of the central poorer districts would from the public health point of view (apart from any other) be greatly improved by the provision, in locations or native villages, of adequate suitable housing for natives and their removal from close residential association with poor whites.

14. See above, p. 22.
Table 2.1. Population (to nearest thousand), 1904 - 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Johannesburg (Total)</th>
<th>(■*)</th>
<th>Rest of Witwatersrand</th>
<th>Total Urban, SA</th>
<th>South Africa (Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>155,6 (  59,6)</td>
<td>94,9</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>5,176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>237,1 ( 101,9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>5,973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>282,9 ( 118,6)</td>
<td>246,0</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>6,929</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>474,9 ( 231,8)</td>
<td>503,0</td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td>9,590</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in brackets are for African population enumerated in Censuses for the Johannesburg Metropolitan Area.

In the event, this particular application was not proceeded with. It is, however, important to examine the impetus for reform which was afforded by the 1923 legislative and administrative framework.

In fact, four years elapsed before a separate Native Affairs Department was established within the Johannesburg City Council. When this department was established in 1927 there were 3 'locations' under municipal control, with a total of 1,585 houses and hostel accommodation for 2,280 migrant workers. The official population housed by the department was 13,910. Of the more than 100,000 people not included, some were mineworkers housed in compounds or domestic and other industrial workers housed on employers' premises. But the majority were either tenants and lodgers in the plethora of 'slum yards' throughout the city, or inhabitants in several densely populated areas on land, not owned by the municipality but adjoining municipal 'locations', such as Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare. Here, Africans had rented land and houses and, in many instances, had acquired freehold title. In terms of the existing structure of municipal organisation, conditions in all these areas were the responsibility of the Department of Public Health. In the light of the above discussion on municipal administration, these conditions must be described briefly, for, despite a general public health and sanitation 'policy' applicable to the municipal area as a whole, several questions arise in relation to the nature of services provided to these areas.

17. See Table 2.3 below, p. 59.


19. See Figure 2.2, p. 71. See also below p. 56, n. 30.
Revenue was derived from ratepayers and consumers in these areas on the same basis as described above. Assessment rates were paid both by white slum landlords, on their properties in areas such as New Doornfontein, and African property owners. However, regarding the consumption of municipal services, Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare, for instance, were not connected to the Johannesburg sewerage system and the inhabitants were dependent for sanitation on a system of pail-collection from house to house. This 'service' was undertaken by the Cleansing Department, a so-called non-trading department. As Table 2.2 indicates, from 1930/1 this department showed a consistent annual profit from sanitation fees, in large part contributed by consumers in these areas without access to the municipal sewerage system. Likewise, the Water Department, a trading department, reflected a substantial annual profit from 1927/8 to 1935/6; yet in fact no municipal water was available to Newclare until 1933, when the supply from wells was supplemented by a connection to the municipal mains. In Sophiatown and Martindale, which housed several thousand people, access to municipal water was only made available in 1935, when twenty-seven stand-pipes were installed at which local residents could queue at certain times and purchase water by the bucket. 20

Thus, while the municipal accounts may well have been 'balanced' and assistance from central government not significant in the City's finances, the material conditions of large sections of the urban population reflected their exclusion from elements of basic infrastructure. With increasing public awareness of the deteriorating conditions, 21 and called to accountability, one explanation was sought in the idea of 'dysfunction' in the conflicting relations between departments

20. Maud, City Government, pp. 144-5. A 'special assessment' scheme had been prepared in 1927, for the provision of water to Sophiatown and Martindale, but withdrawn by the Council on the grounds that it would not be possible to collect a 'fair amount' from the local ratepayers.

21. See for example, evidence in Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Act Commission Report, UG 7-1934, Parts I and II.
Table 2.2  Johannesburg City Council, Statement of Expenditure and Income on Revenue Account, (selected departments), 1927/8 - 1935/6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>1927/8</th>
<th>1929/0</th>
<th>1930/1</th>
<th>1931/2</th>
<th>1932/3</th>
<th>1933/4</th>
<th>1934/5</th>
<th>1935/6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native Locations</td>
<td>57,525</td>
<td>73,089</td>
<td>82,485</td>
<td>86,889</td>
<td>92,641</td>
<td>111,185</td>
<td>114,793</td>
<td>132,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rents, etc.</td>
<td>(40,715)</td>
<td>(55,512)</td>
<td>(61,820)</td>
<td>(63,116)</td>
<td>(67,134)</td>
<td>(92,641)</td>
<td>(111,550)</td>
<td>(125,955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks, Estates &amp; Cemeteries</td>
<td>172,762</td>
<td>180,961</td>
<td>183,736</td>
<td>186,906</td>
<td>174,353</td>
<td>128,936</td>
<td>121,945</td>
<td>138,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>(47,782)</td>
<td>(46,618)</td>
<td>(47,750)</td>
<td>(45,912)</td>
<td>(46,262)</td>
<td>(48,986)</td>
<td>(40,536)</td>
<td>(45,802)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleansing Dept.</td>
<td>211,223</td>
<td>199,492</td>
<td>189,766</td>
<td>188,820</td>
<td>169,934</td>
<td>171,386</td>
<td>161,617</td>
<td>175,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>113,435</td>
<td>140,572</td>
<td>165,600</td>
<td>180,770</td>
<td>193,238</td>
<td>208,628</td>
<td>201,594</td>
<td>253,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>294,155</td>
<td>298,865</td>
<td>309,462</td>
<td>331,959</td>
<td>337,933</td>
<td>336,454</td>
<td>301,044</td>
<td>283,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>484,775</td>
<td>561,590</td>
<td>642,610</td>
<td>627,019</td>
<td>605,758</td>
<td>644,569</td>
<td>612,837</td>
<td>715,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>(568,445)</td>
<td>(683,609)</td>
<td>(734,823)</td>
<td>(763,869)</td>
<td>(797,625)</td>
<td>(821,815)</td>
<td>(867,560)</td>
<td>(929,758)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures on the top line reflect total annual expenditure of each department. The figures in brackets on the lower line reflect total income, revenue of each department.

Source: Compiled from Maud, City Government, Appendix 1, Tables 3 & 4.
concerned with the provision of services. This was reflected in the findings of a Commission, appointed in 1935 at the request of the City Council, which enquired into the relations between the departments of Native Affairs and Public Health. The Commission found little evidence of demand from the latter for an improvement in sanitation or water supply to these areas. At the same time, the activities of the Public Health Department in attempting 'slum clearance', without alternative accommodation being made available, aggravated the conditions of overcrowding.\(^{22}\) The Commission found "a definite lack of coordination with city departments", but concluded that the organisation had not proved "sufficiently elastic to continue to function with the same efficiency in the face of difficulties created mainly by the rapid expansion of the city".\(^{23}\)

The questions of differential access to service provisions and conflict within the municipal apparatus itself in the process of policy implementation, suggested by the above, should be seen in the context of two factors. The first is the municipal franchise, as one means through which local specific demands were transmitted and reflected in various municipal practices. Thus, whereas in the Cape the municipal franchise had been established on the basis of property,\(^{24}\) in Johannesburg - and elsewhere - from 1903, access to the municipal franchise had been restricted to whites, and candidates in municipal elections were similarly restricted. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 provided for separate Advisory Boards to be established in

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22. The Commission was appointed by the Governor General. The report of the Murray-Thorton Commission was not published and the above is from sections 41 and 43, cited in Maud, City Government, p. 144.

23. Section 20, quoted in ibid., p. 145.

24. In the Cape before 1945, in terms of Ordinance No. 22 of 1925, qualification for municipal franchise was either ownership of rateable property of £100 value, or occupation of rateable property of £200 value.
municipal 'locations'. Demands emanating from residents in these areas could reach the Native Affairs Committee of the Johannesburg City Council only through the Boards, which were chaired by the 'location superintendent' who was a municipal official. As noted above, during this period only a small percentage of the population was actually housed in 'locations', and the majority of disenfranchised people in other parts of the city were thus totally excluded from any formal channels for articulating demands or influencing policy.  

The second factor involves the implementation of policies. Thus the Native Affairs Department, on the one hand, was one among many within the organisational structure of the City Council, with its functions defined in relation to local conditions and coordinating with other departments in matters of municipal administration. But, on the other hand, the central function of the Native Affairs Department was defined in relation to implementing policies formulated within central government structures. The 'autonomy' of the City Council in general, the limited control or influence by central authorities in municipal undertakings during the pre-war period suggested above did not, therefore, extend to the operations of the Native Affairs Department where, in the words of its Manager, "...every scheme forms a planned part, which not only has to fit into the mosaic of the Department's general policy, but also that of the State".

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25. This is not to suggest that the Advisory Boards participated in the formulation of policy, or that their demands were reflected in policy outcomes, to any real extent. The emergence of 'informal' and alternative forms of popular expression of demands during the war years is described below.

26. The Native Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council underwent a series of changes in name or designation and functions. Established as the Native Affairs Department in 1927, it was changed to Non-European Housing and Native Affairs Department in 1937; during 1938 to 1942, it was Non-European and Native Affairs Department; and from 1944 to 1972, it was Non-European Affairs Department.

27. See above, p. 43.

It is necessary now to examine how the Native Affairs Department had implemented policies for housing the 'labour requirements' of Johannesburg in the period before the war, in the light of the preceding discussion of the system of municipal finances and the provision of services.

The Native Affairs Department and the Extent of Control

By 1936, according to Ballenden, Manager of the Native Affairs Department, the Department exercised "some form of control over all housing of Natives within the municipal area [and was] gradually tightening up the control and compelling the improvement of housing conditions." Three distinct, yet related, areas and corresponding 'forms of control' can be seen to have evolved in the sphere of housing by the mid-1930s. These forms can be categorised as slum clearance, control over private housing, and 'location' or 'township' management.

The Johannesburg City Council designated five main areas "principally inhabited by Natives" from which, as accommodation became available in municipal 'locations', Africans were to be moved. These were: Prospect Township (cleared and completely demolished by 1938); Malay Location; and Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare. Freehold tenure existed for a number of people who had acquired property in the latter three areas before 1913 and the slum clearance scheme.


30. In the case of Sophiatown; in 1897 its owner had offered the land to the government for use as a 'location' and a lease was signed in 1899. The South African War intervened and the lease was cancelled in 1903. In 1905, Sophiatown was established as a privately-owned township. It was recognised as a predominantly 'coloured' or 'native' township when, in 1911 and 1921, restrictions against 'Non-European' occupation were removed from all but 1 stand. Martindale, adjoining Sophiatown, was established in 1905 as a freehold township with no restrictions against 'coloured' occupation. Newclare was established in 1912, with titles specifically restricting 'whites' from living there. In 1918, the municipality had laid out Western Native Township in the vicinity of these three areas. The foregoing is from a report in The South African Builder, March 1955, pp. 15-17.
proposed to reduce the population, in what became known as the Western Areas to the 'owner-occupier class'. Initially, with the closure and demolition procedures adopted by the Public Health Department, not more than 12 per cent of those affected moved to municipal 'locations'; "most of the people removed from any area diffused themselves over areas not yet cleared". But, the process of 'clearance' increased the pressure on diminishing slum accommodation; slum landlords exploited the situation, and by 1937 the Native Affairs Department reported that "the resistance... has almost disappeared". In Prospect Township and Malay Location fleets of trucks transported families with their belongings and the vacated slum dwellings were immediately demolished. Two factors contributed to the apparent 'progress' of the slum clearance scheme. Firstly, the City Council had acquired town planning powers in 1930 and embarked on the planning of Orlando Township 12 miles from the city. The building of houses had started in 1931 and, by 1936, some 4,000 houses had been completed. Secondly, in terms of the Slums Act, loans for slum clearance schemes were made available to local authorities by central government at a 'sub-economic' interest rate.

31. The total African freehold titlers in Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare was estimated as 1,242, although, according to the municipal census undertaken by the Native Affairs Department in July 1938, only 254 owners were actually in residence on their property. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European and Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1939, p. 2. See also. Hellmann, E., 'Urban Areas', in Hellman, E. (ed.), Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa, (Cape Town, 1949), p. 255.

32. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1937, p. 2.

33. During 1937/8, 1,881 families were moved from Prospect Township and 766 families from Malay Location. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European and Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1938, p. 4.

34. See above, p. 24, note 23. See Figure 2.2, p. 71.
The second form of control exercised by the Department of Native Affairs, namely, control over private housing, was related to the above insofar as the 'inspection, supervision and control of all housing outside hostels and native townships' were part of the Department's functions. The service of notices of removal from slums and proclaimed areas, and implementation of removals, were the duties of the Licensing and Town Inspectorate Branch of the Department. This Branch, in terms of the Urban Areas legislation, also investigated all applications for licenses to house Africans, conditions of accommodation, and initiated prosecution for illegal residence. Initially, according to the Manager, the policy of the Department with regard to workers housed by "established industry [was] to 'hasten slowly' in order not to unduly upset these industries or businesses". But, by 1936, as Table 2.3 shows, premises housing some 46,905 workers had been brought under the control of the Department through these licensing procedures, which simultaneously generated an additional source of revenue for the Native Affairs Department.

The third form of controls referred to as 'location' or 'township' management relates specifically to the organisation of collective services in the townships. This includes, on the one hand, the acquisition of land and all the practices involved in the production and maintenance of housing, hostels and infrastructure (services and social facilities), which correspond

35. In terms of Section 5, of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. Its duties also included, "the periodical inspection of the ten mile prohibited zone outside the municipal boundary for the prevention of the illegal congregation there of Natives". See Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European and Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1938, pp. 1-2, for definition of functions.

36. In 1936 there were 4,992 licensed premises and the revenue derived from this source was £5,040. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1936, p. 6. The financing of the Native Affairs Department is discussed below.
Table 2.3  Johannesburg City Council, Native Affairs Department 1926/7 - 1939/40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1926/7</th>
<th>1935/6</th>
<th>1936/7</th>
<th>1937/8</th>
<th>1939/40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land owned (Acres)</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>3,872</td>
<td>3,872</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses (No.)</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>5,926</td>
<td>6,113</td>
<td>8,830</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostels (No.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single men (beds)</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>5,193</td>
<td>6,766</td>
<td>6,860</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single women (beds)</td>
<td></td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL POPULATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSED BY NAD</td>
<td>13,910</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>81,060</td>
<td>86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of private housing (no. workers)</td>
<td></td>
<td>46,905</td>
<td>47,890</td>
<td>N/D</td>
<td>N/D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Manager, Native Affairs Department, 1936; Non-European and Native Affairs Department, 1937, 1938 and 1940.
to items of capital expenditure for the Department of Native Affairs accounts. On the other hand, the distribution and administration of township services includes the allocation of accommodation, the determination and collection of rents, and those practices linked with the enforcement of township 'regulations', such as general policing, demolition of illegal structures, evictions, restriction of entry and the administration of the 'pass laws', and prosecutions for 'offences' such as overcrowding or rent arrears. Table 2.4, which indicates actual convictions in the Witwatersrand, illustrates the scale of controls applied in some of these areas during the years before the Second World War.

It is necessary to outline briefly the system of finances of the Native Affairs Department. While the 1923 Urban Areas legislation required local authorities to establish and control separate townships housing the 'labour requirements' of urban industrial centres, there were no provisions for local authorities to share in the national revenue which derived from 'native taxation', or to receive other financial assistance (apart from loans) from central government to implement the policy. In terms of the legislation, however, local authorities were required to set up a separate 'Native Revenue Account', in essence a form of financial segregation. Extracts from the 'Native Revenue Account' of Johannesburg City Council are given in Table 2.5. All rents and revenue derived from licences, or fines for contraventions of regulations, were paid into the account.

37. See Table 2.5 below, p. 62.

38. It should be noted that, during this period, a system of divided control existed; the 'pass laws', section 12 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, were in fact administered by central state apparatus, namely, the Union Department of Native Affairs.
Table 2.4  Witwatersrand Area, Convictions 1934 - 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence for which convicted</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illegal possession of 'Native liquor'</td>
<td>32,378</td>
<td>37,814</td>
<td>41,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives (Urban Areas) Act</td>
<td>31,444</td>
<td>22,014</td>
<td>2,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Offences</td>
<td>17,598</td>
<td>18,850</td>
<td>18,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Labour Regulation Act</td>
<td>17,574</td>
<td>18,024</td>
<td>14,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location Regulations</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>9,070</td>
<td>13,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass Laws</td>
<td>3,487</td>
<td>15,844</td>
<td>32,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trespass</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>3,520</td>
<td>7,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>37,432</td>
<td>34,332</td>
<td>31,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>144,775</td>
<td>159,468</td>
<td>160,729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1937, p.21.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year ended 30th June</th>
<th>Cumulative Capital Expenditure £</th>
<th>Rents Net £</th>
<th>Deficit on NRA debited to Rates £</th>
<th>'Kaffir Beer' Sales £</th>
<th>Profits £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>398,842</td>
<td>37,565</td>
<td>15,488</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>447,548</td>
<td>40,186</td>
<td>16,810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>493,850</td>
<td>43,436</td>
<td>20,773</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>525,373</td>
<td>54,072</td>
<td>17,571</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>580,764</td>
<td>59,813</td>
<td>20,663</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>611,325</td>
<td>60,982</td>
<td>23,772</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>753,954</td>
<td>63,487</td>
<td>25,507</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>858,341</td>
<td>83,902</td>
<td>18,332</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>940,766</td>
<td>104,891</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1,006,252</td>
<td>117,402</td>
<td>5,144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,053,912</td>
<td>125,514</td>
<td>20,696</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,427,719</td>
<td>147,234</td>
<td>23,131</td>
<td>15,534</td>
<td>7,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,497,480</td>
<td>168,167 (Cr.)</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>59,250</td>
<td>32,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,570,843</td>
<td>168,780 (Cr.)</td>
<td>12,436</td>
<td>94,447</td>
<td>63,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,677,328</td>
<td>155,463</td>
<td>13,209</td>
<td>127,767</td>
<td>62,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,809,638</td>
<td>163,346</td>
<td>27,804</td>
<td>101,519</td>
<td>53,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,836,445</td>
<td>167,824</td>
<td>28,336</td>
<td>100,946</td>
<td>47,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>2,042,033</td>
<td>170,624</td>
<td>22,106</td>
<td>169,780</td>
<td>99,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>2,370,748</td>
<td>171,051</td>
<td>30,720</td>
<td>229,485</td>
<td>121,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2,698,958</td>
<td>186,769</td>
<td>122,649</td>
<td>128,489</td>
<td>57,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>3,280,903</td>
<td>221,992</td>
<td>182,431</td>
<td>208,779</td>
<td>47,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>4,182,258</td>
<td>292,268</td>
<td>95,899</td>
<td>286,689</td>
<td>121,837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of the Manager, Native Affairs Department; Non-European and Native Affairs Department; and, Non-European Affairs Department.
The tendency towards balancing of municipal accounts in general, identified in preceding pages, had resulted in any deficit on the 'Native Revenue Account' being debited to general rates. In 1935/36 the deficit amounted to under £7,000. By comparison, the deficit for the Departments of Parks, Estates and Cemeteries of the City Council amounted to £93,000 for the same year. However, after amendments to the Urban Areas legislation in 1937, the tendency towards the self-balancing of the 'Native Revenue Account', as separate from the system of municipal finances as a whole, became more marked. This was in response to amendments concerning, in particular, the municipal monopolisation of beer brewing and supply. From 1938, when the Native Affairs Department established the first municipal beerhall, the profits derived, often in the order of 100 per cent, contributed substantially to the revenue account and for four years the deficit was carried by the 'Native Revenue Account' itself and not debited to rates.

39. See Table 2.2 above, p. 53.
40. The control and supply of liquor had been the subject of debate for urban administrators from 1908 onwards. For an account of the 'illicit trade' and its relation to domestic economy, see Hellmann, E., 'The Importance of Beer Brewing in an Urban Slum Yard', Bantu Studies, vol. VIII, No. 1, 1934.; see also Hellmann, 'Urban Areas', pp. 258-64. The Amendments in 1937 to the Native (Urban Areas) Act, recognised three systems: domestic brewing, sale under licence by individual Africans and municipal monopoly. In 1938 the Johannesburg City Council adopted the municipal monopoly system and, as Table 2.5 indicates, profits from beer sales were substantial. By 1940, 41 municipalities had taken up the monopoly system.
41. By resolution of Council, 28 April 1942, all deficits on the 'Native Revenue Account' were transferred to the Rate Fund. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European and Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1942, Minutes of the Mayor, 1941-42, p. 73. The resolution was in the context of growing criticism of the tendency "to exploit beer-hall profits to meet recurring expenditure on ordinary municipal services i.e. redemption of capital on building schemes... which should be more properly financed by the General Account". Report of the Native Affairs Commission appointed to enquire into the working of the provision of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act Relating to the Use and Supply of Kaffir Beer, 1942-43, para. 93.
The forms of control over housing described above were consolidated in the amendments to the legislation of 1923. In 1936, local authorities contended that the task of implementing 'urban areas' policies had been made difficult by other aspects of the state's 'Native Policy', which contributed directly and indirectly to increased migration to urban areas. Thus, "the creation of machinery designed to control the influx of surplus natives into urban areas and for the removal of surplus natives therefrom" was "to be welcomed", according to the Manager of Johannesburg's Native Affairs Department. But, at the same time, it should be noted that the reports of the Department specifically state that there was no unemployment among "able-bodied natives willing to work". On the contrary, there was an estimated increase of 10,000 African male workers employed in Johannesburg for 1935/36. By July 1938, the African population in Johannesburg urban area was 239,372. Of this number, almost 25 per cent were mineworkers housed in mine compounds. But as many as 154,800 were workers employed in non-mining sectors. As Table 2.3 illustrates, the provision of accommodation by the Native Affairs Department had been far from adequate and, by 1939, according to the Manager, the results of the housing shortage were "growing more conspicuous beyond the boundaries.

42. See 'Memorandum re financial and other relations between the Municipalities and the Union Government', prepared for the United Municipal Executive, for the purposes of negotiations with a sub-committee of the Union Cabinet, in December 1936. This memorandum refers to the heavy taxation of Africans in the Reserves; the deteriorating conditions in rural areas; increasing land pressure and also the effects on unemployment and poverty of Africans arising from the 'civilised labour' policy pursued from 1924. Maud, City Government, p. 104.


44. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1936, p. 2.

45. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European and Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1939, p.1.
of the city, where a fringe of nondescript insanitary shacks [were] springing up. 46

The above examination of conditions existing in Johannesburg, and practices for urban administration, during the period before the war has revealed several important elements. Within the system of municipal finances, two particular features were identified, namely, the self-balancing of municipal accounts and the reliance on forms of indirect taxation to finance municipal expenditure. A description of conditions in large parts of the city, consequent upon their exclusion from municipal services, introduced the question of differential access and suggested the importance of segregationist ideology in accounting for the development of urban policies. Finally, a brief examination of the implementation of centrally-defined 'urban areas' policies by the Native Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council revealed that: three forms of control over housing had evolved by the mid-1930s; a system of financial segregation existed with the establishment of the 'Native Revenue Account' and the separation of municipal finances; and the tendency to self-balance the separate account was reinforced by the practice of applying profits from beer sales, in essence a form of indirect taxation. But, even before the outbreak of the war, a 'gap' had developed between the demand for housing and the level of provision. It is necessary now to examine how these conditions were exacerbated during the Second World War and how the Johannesburg City Council came increasingly into conflict with its 'tenants' over the provision of housing.

46. Despite the periodical inspection of the ten mile prohibited zone outside the municipal boundary. A Peri-Urban Areas Commission, appointed by central government to report on methods for the administration and control of such areas, was functioning by 1939. The Department's proposal to establish hostels for migrant workers in industrial areas outside the townships met with difficulty in securing suitable land, "partly due to political opposition from Europeans in neighbouring suburbs and partly due to restrictive clauses in title to land (specifically mining title) prohibiting the residence of natives not employed thereon". Ibid., p. 13. Legal difficulties arose from Sections 130 and 131 of the Gold Law of 1908, which included the "prohibition against residence and occupation of proclaimed land, and land held under mining title, by coloured persons".
2.2  The War Years: Housing Shortage and Housing Finance

The years during the Second World War saw an unprecedented increase in urbanisation, in large part the result of expanded labour demands of an economy which, with the restriction of imports, was stimulated in the domestic production of capital goods. The demand for labour and the response of the Minister of Native Affairs in 'relaxing' the enforcement of the Pass Laws in major urban areas in 1942, had resulted in the growth of the African population in Johannesburg to almost 400,000 by 1946, of whom only approximately one quarter were in houses or hostel accommodation provided by the municipality. The shortage of housing was so acute that, in the early stages of the war, the Native Affairs Department had been "forced to relax the location regulations" which prohibited lodgers and sub-letting of dwellings. Tenants thus became 'landlords' and there was evidence of severe over-crowding with two or more families to a single room.

The present section examines the housing shortage, and the City Council's attempts to contain the housing 'crisis', in the context of increasing politicisation and bargaining power of African workers and the ability of communities to organise around issues bearing directly on the level of provision of services. The scale of the shortage highlighted the system of housing finance and the relations involved in the question of subsidisation.

47. For the basis to industrial expansion during the war, see below, chapter 3.

48. During 1939, the City Council applied for a loan to provide 3,000 houses at Orlando; but, "with the diversion of funds from housing to armaments", no houses were built in 1939 or 1940. In 1941 and 1942, only 585 and 165 houses were built and none at all in 1943 or 1944. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European and Native Affairs Department, for the year ended 30 June 1939, p. 13; for the year ended 30 June 1942, Minutes of the Mayor, 1941-42.

49. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period December 1944 to June 1948, p. 4.
Politicisation of Housing: squatter 'movements' in the 1940s

The growth in militant trade unionism after 1937 was expressed in an upsurge of strike action during the war years; and, as a result, there were some gains in terms of higher wages for workers in secondary industry. These gains, however, were accompanied by a rapid increase in the cost of living, and, generally, prevailing wage levels, particularly for unskilled workers, were not sufficient to meet the costs of their reproduction. It was thus around issues of 'consumption', and

50. Though without official recognition, and subject to considerable harassment, African membership of trade unions escalated; giving the Council of Non-European Trade Unions a total membership of 158,000 in 119 unions by the end of the war. Despite the proclamation of War Measure No. 145 in December 1942, which specifically outlawed strikes by Africans, between 1940 and 1945, the number of strikes totalled 220,205 man-days. See O'Meara, D., 'The 1946 African miners' strike in the political economy of South Africa', in Bonner, P. (ed), Working Papers in Southern African Studies, ASI Communication No. 5, (University of the Witwatersrand, 1977), p. 193.

51. Compared to a rise of 10% in 'real earnings' of Africans between 1930/31 and 1939/40, there was a 52% increase between 1939/40 and 1945/46. Ibid., pp. 192-3.

52. The retail price index on all items rose by 35% between 1939 and 1945, and for certain basic consumer goods (rice, mielie meal, paraffin, coal etc.), as early as 1940, costs had increased by between 20 and 50% on pre-war levels. See Hobart Houghton, D., 'Economic Development, 1865-1965', in Wilson and Thompson (eds.) The Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. II, p. 36; and, Stadler, A., 'Birds in the Cornfield: Squatter Movements in Johannesburg 1944-1947', in Bozzoli, B. (ed.), Labour, Townships and Protest, (Johannesburg, 1979), p. 21. In 1942, the Smit Committee compared the amount of £7 14s 6d that had been found "necessary under existing conditions in Johannesburg to house, feed and clothe a Native family of five in decency", with the average monthly wage of £5 2s 11d calculated from a sample of 27,994 'unskilled' workers in thirty-five industries, including municipal employees, in the city. Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives, 1942, paras. 17 and 22.
particularly items of collective consumption - such as transport or municipal services - that large sections of the workforce were mobilised during this period. In the context of deteriorating material conditions, the increasing organisation of African workers at the 'workplace', or point of production, therefore had its counterpart in the growth of community-based struggles in the sphere of consumption, and particularly over access to housing.

With the extension of controls described above, the provision of housing for African workers had become more apparently the domain of local authorities. The shortage of housing therefore reflected the mode of operation of the municipal apparatus and struggles over housing.

53. For definition of 'consumption', see above p. 18, n. 13.
54. The bus boycotts, which started in Alexandra in August 1940, provide an excellent example of popular mobilisation around issues of 'consumption': Attempts to increase fares from 4d to 5d were met with successful boycotts in 1940 and again in August 1943. By October 1944, when bus companies again attempted to increase fares, the South African Railways and Harbours had imposed a 10% increase in railway fares throughout South Africa, affecting thousands of African workers in Orlando and Pimville (see Figure 2.2). At mass meetings, entire communities were called "to refrain from going to work" and the City Council emphasised the serious repercussions and likely "dislocation of commerce and industry" if Alexandra, Pimville, Orlando and the Western Areas "were persuaded to take similar action" to the earlier boycotts in Alexandra. The Secretary for Native Affairs suggested either a scheme under the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act of 1945 (see below, p. 85) for "compelling employers of native labour" to contribute to the transportation costs, or, subsidisation by the City Council utilising profits from the beer fund. In terms of Government Notice No. 1914, dated 10 November 1944, however, employers were required to meet increased costs, and increased fares were introduced. Only a small section benefited from employers contributions and a protracted boycott ensued which lasted until early 1945. See Johannesburg City Council Minutes, 17/10/1944, p. 845; 19/12/1944, pp. 1033-4; and 27/3/1945, pp. 295-6. This series will hereafter be cited as JCC Minutes.
were increasingly directed at these centres of urban management and control. Nowhere was this clearer than in the confrontations between thousands of squatters and the Johannesburg City Council from early 1944, when the first squatter 'movement' occurred. There were ten organised 'movements' during the next two years, marked, according to the Non-European Affairs Department, "by a growing spirit of defiance and antagonism to constituted authority". Thus, despite exclusion from 'formal' channels of political representation, a large number of 'informal' organisations responded to the need to articulate demands from various groups; associations of tenants and sub-tenants, vigilance committees or 'parties' gave "the general state of dissatisfaction and unrest", recognised by the Union Department of Native Affairs, a specifically political focus.

The protest against overcrowding in Orlando, which constituted the first squatter 'movement', was led by James Sofasonke Mpanza, a member of the Orlando Advisory Board. Mpanza articulated the response to the housing shortage by the squatters in the following way:

The segregation provisions of the Urban Areas Act prevent the Natives from acquiring land and from buying, building or hiring houses except in the locations, where, in the case of Johannesburg, no land or houses are made available for us except houses built and owned by the Municipality. By applying the segregation provisions and not setting aside any land on which we may build ourselves, the Municipality has taken on itself the duty of providing us with houses. But it has not carried out that duty; there are no houses for us. Very well, then we shall go and sit down on municipal land

55. For description of the squatter movements see, Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period December 1944 to June 1948, pp.6-8; also, Stadler, 'Birds in the cornfield'.

and wait for the Municipality to come and put a roof over
our heads\textsuperscript{57}.

On 25 March, 1944, Mpanza and a group of sub-tenants and lodgers took
possession of a piece of vacant land in Orlando and erected shanties.
By 4 April, some 6,000 to 8,000 people had established themselves
in the camp which eventually grew to 20,000 people. (See Figure 2.2).

The initial response of the City Council was to prosecute the
squatters, stressing the "constitutional danger of condoning such
illegalities, the likelihood that they would create a nation-wide
precedent...and the necessity of treating the matter as one of State
as opposed to local policy", and pressed the government to take action.\textsuperscript{58}
The Council, however, was compelled to accept responsibility for the
provision of alternative accommodation and constructed rows of one-
room 'temporary shelters', using concrete breeze-blocks with earth
flooring and with corrugated asbestos roofing placed on wattle poles
and held down with stones.\textsuperscript{59} Official recognition of their need for
housing had been attained by 4,042 squatter families, and also; since
the shelters were 'temporary', a commitment on the part of the

\textsuperscript{57.} Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the
Disturbances on the 30th August, 1947 at the Moroka Emergency
Mpanza was a member of the Orlando Advisory Board from 1935, and
the leader of the 'Sofasonke' Party ('we shall all die together').
Acquitted on a charge of inciting public violence during events in June
1944 in 'Shantytown', Mpanza undertook at a mass meeting on 29
October to see that the residents of 'Shantytown' received first
preference in the allocation of all new houses erected by the
council. Johannesburg City Council sought an order under Section
5(1)(b) of Act No. 38 of 1927, "in the interests of all concerned",
for the removal of Mpanza and his wife from Orlando "to some
place outside the Transvaal Province, where it would be impossible
for their subversive activities to be continued among the Natives in
the Witwatersrand area". JCC Minutes, 24/11/1944, p. 975.
This application was refused, but an order under the Native
Administration Act was served on 14 February 1946, which
Mpanza failed to obey and stood trial. Star, 18/2/1946.

\textsuperscript{58.} Stadler, 'Birds in the Cornfield',p. 31.

\textsuperscript{59.} The 4,042 rooms, which measured 12' x 12' and 7'6'' in
height, had a window aperture of less than 1 square foot and no door.
The total cost was £94,275, which included £939 for water supply,
and the occupants were charged 5s per month for water, sanitation
and medical services. JCC Minutes, 26/8/1947, pp. 979-80; and
13/12/1949, p. 1087.
Figure 2.2 Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, 1940s (Drawn from various sources)
authorities to provide more adequate housing later. However, the squatter 'movement' persisted and camps of various groups of more or less adequately organised squatters confronted the Johannesburg City Council. Between January and March 1946, two more camps were established, after taking possession of houses under construction in Orlando West. Amidst escalating violence following the demolition of shacks, a settlement was negotiated in March 1946, between central government, the Johannesburg City Council and the squatter leaders. In terms of the settlement, a 'controlled squatting scheme' was established at Jabavu with 1,920 stands supplied with water and sanitation. Those squatters who were employed in the Johannesburg municipal area, and who were therefore the responsibility of the City Council, were permitted to erect their own shelter with whatever materials could be acquired. "Anything in the nature of permanent structures was to be avoided", as the camp was "strictly an interim measure".

Between May and July 1946, five further movements were organised. Groups at Volkshaven, Zuurbekom and Western Native Township, according to the Manager, "were dispersed by the authorities in the early stages, before they had established themselves", but two large groups, totalling 8,000 families, merged and established the 'Tobruk' camp in Orlando West. Monogoaha, the squatters' leader, delivered an ultimatum to the City Council in December 1946 demanding the immediate supply of water and sanitation to the camp; failing this, the squatters would

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60. The formula for a settlement was reached at a meeting in Cape Town, 27 March 1946, between the Emergency Sub-Committee of the Special Housing and Non-European Affairs Committees of the City Council, the Secretary and Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, other government officials, the Orlando Advisory Board and Paul Mosaka, leader of the Pimville squatters. JCC Minutes, 30/4/1946, pp. 497-8, for details of the settlement.

61. Those who were not employed, and therefore the responsibility of central state, were "to be removed...issued with rail warrants and returned to their places of origin". Item 10 of the settlement, ibid.

62. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period December 1944 to June 1948, p. 7.
bore for water and put up windmills, or tap the Council's or the Rand Water Board's water mains, and appeal to central government for protection. At the same time, a substantial camp was organised at Alexandra by Baduza, outside the municipal border. For the Johannesburg City Council,

...the provision of services and water to these camps by the Council would be construed by the squatters as a tacit recognition of their presence, and as a moral justification of their actions and...would accelerate the already rapid process of enlargement of the camp. The state of affairs now existing is attributable solely to the unlawful arrogation ...by the leaders of the squatters of all powers of control and government in respect of an area, the occupation of which was taken by force...in defiance of authority.64

Consequently, the City Council agreed "in principle" to the removal of the camps "by whatever means are possible"; and, after lengthy negotiations with central government, the basis for a large-scale 'controlled squatting scheme', administered under War Measures, was evolved. By April 1947, the Moroka Emergency Camp for a contemplated population of 100,000 had been established south of Jabavu.65 Eligibility for settlement on the 20ft by 20ft stands was restricted to those who had been employed in Johannesburg for six months or more; and, despite the screening process, more than 90 per cent complied with

63. In terms of Sections 3 and 4 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945, after a local public enquiry, the Minister could compel the local authority to provide for the needs of "natives ordinarily employed within the area, and failing compliance by the authority, to do the work at the cost of the authority", 'Urgency Report of Public Health and Social Welfare Committee', JCC Minutes, 17/12/1946, pp. 1565-6.

64. Ibid.

65. See Figure 2.2. The camp was administered under regulations made under War Measure No. 31 of 1944, as amended by War Measure No. 18 of 1947. The services provided at 1947 comprised: 268 deep pit latrines; 800 refuse bins; water supply to 80 standpipes with 4 taps each. 'Report of the Medical Officer of Health', JCC Minutes, 29/7/1947, pp. 766-8.
the conditions. Within two months there were 35,000 people living at Moroka.

A monthly rental of 15s per stand was charged in the 'controlled squatting schemes' at Jabavu and Moroka from May 1947. This compared unfavourably with rents for serviced brick dwellings in Orlando and with the 5s monthly charge to 'tenants' in the breeze block shelters. After a protracted rent strike by the inhabitants of Moroka and violent confrontations between squatters and municipal officials, the City Council was compelled to reduce site rentals with retrospective effect.  

The increasing militancy, politicisation and the direction of housing struggles towards the municipal apparatus highlighted relations between local and central authorities in two related areas, with implications for the formulation and implementation of policies. The first involved the system of influx control and the second the question of finances, the distribution of costs of housing the African labourforce of Johannesburg. Both these areas were provided for in the Urban Areas legislation of 1923 and the various amendments, but certain anomalies had appeared in the process of implementation.

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66. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the Disturbances ...at Moroka Emergency Camp, para. 27, p. 18. This is contrary to Stadler's contention that there was widespread unemployment in Johannesburg after the war, and that "many unemployed people lived in the squatter camp". Stadler, 'Birds in the Cornfield', pp. 22-3.

67. The rental for a 2-roomed brick dwelling in Orlando was 17s per month, and for a 4-roomed dwelling £1 6s. On 30 August 1947, there was a confrontation in Moroka between squatters and Council officials which resulted in 3 deaths. This led to the appointment of the Fagan Commission to enquire into the disturbances. On 11 November, in response to representations made to the Commission by the Moroka Advisory Board, the Council undertook to reduce the rents to 10s per month for Moroka and to 9s per month for Jabavu. JCC Minutes, 25/11/1947, p. 1272; 27/1/1948, p. 56; and, 24/8/1948, p. 882. The rentals in all Council schemes for this period are given in Table 2.7, p. 83.

68. The financial relations between central government and the Johannesburg City Council are discussed in the subsequent section.
Firstly, in relation to influx, a system of divided control existed. The Pass Laws (section 12 of the Act) were administered by the central state through the Union Department of Native Affairs, while other provisions were administered by local authorities. Hence, the Minister of Native Affairs had 'relaxed' the Pass Laws in major urban areas in 1942 in response to the demand for labour. At the same time, it should be noted that, following representations from an urban local authority, a proclamation could be gazetted whereby, after a certain specified date, "... no native shall enter the urban area... for the purpose of seeking or taking up employment or residing therein." Until the first of the squatter 'movements' occurred in April 1944, the City Council "had been against such a proclamation, on the grounds that this might unduly restrict the flow of labour to the urban area", and, with the system of divided control, would prove difficult to administer effectively. By the end of 1944, however, there was a consensus within the Association of Reef Managers and Native Commissioners, representative of all the municipalities on the Witwatersrand, that the question of control had to be resolved; particularly for the immediate post-war period, when it seemed "probable that a considerable dislocation of the industrial machine" would take place and give rise to "a considerable surplus of unemployed natives, for whom some provision will urgently require to be made". Following the squatter 'movements' in early 1946 and representations by the Johannesburg City Council, the Union Department of Native Affairs agreed to recommend a proclamation on all Reef municipalities.

69. Under Section 10 bis(1) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act.


71. Minister of Native Affairs, telegram dated 18/4/1946, to City Council Non-European Affairs Committee. One of the intentions, indicated by the Minister, was the prohibition of the issue of rail tickets to Africans wishing to travel to the Reef, unless certain conditions could be complied with. JCC Minutes, 28/5/1946, p. 587.
Such a proclamation in respect of Johannesburg was requested after a Council meeting in May 1946. At the same time, however, the City Council emphasised that these measures were only a "palliative for the general problem of influx, which is fundamentally economic", and which should be controlled at the source through national policies relating to the rural areas.\textsuperscript{72} By March 1947, in terms of a general proclamation, there were restrictions on entry to all urban areas and the onus for controlling influx was placed solely on the local authorities concerned.\textsuperscript{73}

But, as noted above in relation to eligibility for settlement in the 'controlled squatting scheme' established at Moroka in April 1947, more than 90 per cent of all squatters were "normally resident and employed in Johannesburg";\textsuperscript{74} they comprised the 'labour requirements' of the city and the duty of providing for their needs in terms of housing therefore devolved on the Johannesburg City Council. It is necessary now to examine the system of municipal housing finance, and the financial relations existing between central and local government, in the context of the scale of the shortage and the post-war building programme of the Johannesburg City Council.

The Question of Subsidisation: distribution of the costs

The squatter 'movements' had focused attention on the housing conditions of the majority of Africans on the Witwatersrand; and, with increasing politicisation, the emphasis had changed, according to the manager of the Non-European Affairs Department,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Ibid. The proposal was made in Council that such measures should be "preceded by the establishment of effective labour bureaux through which statistics of labour requirements" could be obtained.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Proclamation No. 61 of 14 March 1947 provided that, with the exception of employment in the mining industry or other agreed industry, entry to any area under the control of a scheduled urban local authority was prohibited. Simultaneously, the South African Police "intensified their activities aimed at preventing crime". 'Report of the Non-European Affairs Committee' (Influx of Natives and the availability of labour), JCC Minutes, 23/11/1948, pp.1178-9.
\item \textsuperscript{74} According to a census conducted by the Non-European Affairs Department. Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into Disturbances...at Moroka Emergency Camp, para. 27., p.18.
\end{itemize}
...from complaints about inadequate housing to claims for freehold ownership of land, better political representation and so on. In short, the Native leaders merged the City's housing deficiency with the general political and economic disabilities of Natives. Squatting was presented to the Native people as a crusade to remove such disabilities. 75

These demands emanating from the African population were not, however, the only pressures to which the Johannesburg City Council, or indeed the existing housing apparatus of the state, were subjected. There was a social distribution to the housing shortage which affected those strata, not necessarily at the lowest level of wages, but with representation within the state; houses were required for returning soldiers and war workers, the so-called 'white-collared brigade'. 76

During the war, with the perceived threat of a possible Japanese invasion, available supplies of material and labour had been absorbed by the Department of Defence. Defence building ceased at the end of 1943, by which time the Van Eck Committee had reported that the immediate countrywide housing shortage in urban areas was 150,000 houses, of which 30,000 were required for whites. 77 For the Johannesburg City Council at the start of 1944, a total of 33,000 houses were required. But the City Council, in common with several of the larger local authorities, considered that work on the post-war housing programme should not be commenced "until the Government has decided its policy in regard to

75. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period December 1944 to June 1948, p. 6. (emphasis added).

76. It should be noted that of the 300,000 people in the armed forces during the war, 186,000 were white. Hobart Houghton, 'Economic Development', p. 36.

housing finance". According to a report of the Finance Committee in 1943, the loss actually incurred by the City Council on its various schemes averaged 3% per annum on the capital cost of the schemes, 1 3/4% more than the statutory minimum of 1 1/4% required in terms of the Housing Act. JCC Minutes, 25/4/1944, p. 350. See Tables 2.6 and 2.7, for 'losses' on particular schemes.

79. Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation in a statement to the Annual Meeting of the United Municipal Executive of South Africa, at Cape Town, 14 March 1944. For the proposals, see JCC Minutes, 25/4/1944, pp. 352-5. It was only in December 1944 that the basis for a 'national housing formula' was finally agreed between central government and local authorities, when 'losses' would be allocated in the ratio of 3:1.


81. 'Urgency Report of Special Committee re Post-War Development, Establishment of Industries Etc.', ibid., p. 549.
the £ on current land values" which, according to the Finance Committee, ratepayers "could not reasonably be asked to face". It is important to put this argument into perspective at this point, for, although the 'losses' which accrued to municipal housing schemes were debited to the general rates fund, in actual fact ratepayers contributed relatively little to municipal revenue, as the preceding section illustrates. It is the nature of this 'loss', however, as the difference between capital expenditure and income from rentals, which needs to be examined in greater detail. The central relationship was therefore between the determination of rents based on the income of tenants, and the total costs of the schemes.

It was the 'considered policy' of the City Council that no individual should contribute more than one-fifth of their income as rent. On the ideological basis of 'civilised standards', however, the 'civilised labour' policies from the 1920s had resulted in white workers being at the highest levels on the scale of wages. The aim of social security, as explained by the Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation in 1944, was to maintain these 'civilised standards', to "establish a certain minimum standard, below which an individual must not be allowed to fall". There were different minimum standards, however, which were racially defined and which were reflected both in the standard of housing provided and in the income limit below which state subsidisation was considered necessary. Thus, Johannesburg's post-war building programme called for "28,000 Non-European houses at £600, 5,000 European houses at £1,500".

83. See above, p. 44.
85. 'Urgency Report of Special Committee re Post-War Development, Establishment of Industries Etc.', JCC Minutes, 27/6/1944, p. 549.
the case of white workers, for whom 'sub-economic' subsidised housing had to be provided, the average annual income limit was assumed as £200; for African workers, 'sub-economic' housing loans were provided for an average annual income of up to £60. Table 2.6 shows the relationship between rents, costs and 'losses' based on the capital costs of several schemes for different racial categories undertaken by the City Council before the war. Two important factors emerge from the table, particularly in the context of the scale of Johannesburg's post-war building programme.

Firstly, on the financial basis existing at June 1944, the 'losses' to Council on housing schemes for all racial categories were over 3 per cent, over 4 per cent in the case of whites. This was well over the statutory minimum of of 1½ per cent required in terms of loans under the Housing Act. Tenders received during this period reflected a substantial increase in building costs for the same type of houses constructed before the war. 86 With rising costs of schemes, the City Council's current rental policies had implications for a substantial increase in the percentage rates for 'losses', which were in effect the differences between total expenditure (including interest and redemption charges on loans) and the annual income from rentals. It was, therefore, in this context that the Johannesburg City Council had refused to embark on its building programme until the new financial basis was agreed in December 1944, whereby, in terms of the 'National Housing Formula', central government agreed to increase its subsidy and losses would be allocated in the ration of 3:1.

Secondly, the figures for rent as a percentage of capital invested, and as a percentage on the capital value of buildings only, are illuminating insofar as they reflect the tendency to self-balance the separate 'Native Revenue Account'. 87 For African workers in the township of Orlando,

86. See Table 2.7, for increases in tender prices per square foot compared with pre-war levels.
87. See above, p.63.
Table 2.6 Johannesburg City Council, Comparison of pre-war 'Sub-economic' Housing Schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Category/Township</th>
<th>Rent as % of Capital Invest.</th>
<th>Rent as % of Capital on Buildings</th>
<th>Loss to JCC as % on Capital Invested (Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Hofmeyr</td>
<td>4,52</td>
<td>5,14</td>
<td>4,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Freeman</td>
<td>3,06</td>
<td>4,88</td>
<td>4,09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poineer</td>
<td>4,17</td>
<td>5,00</td>
<td>4,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Coloured'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noordgesig (Orlando)</td>
<td>4,79</td>
<td>5,45</td>
<td>3,92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando</td>
<td>7,32</td>
<td>8,45</td>
<td>3,26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCC Minutes, 27/6/1944, pp. 545-6, Tables I & II.
rent as a percentage of total capital, and capital on buildings only, was 3 per cent higher than in other municipal housing schemes. Clearly, this was in part a function of the low level of capital expenditure as compared to that for other racial categories. But the implications are important for the following reason: any policy for reducing the cost of housing for African workers, assuming the wage relation and rentals remained constant, would have the effect of increasing the percentage of rent to capital expended, thereby reducing the 'loss' to the City Council and, concomitantly, the subsidy from central government.

The determination of rentals was based on two main factors, according to the Non-European Affairs Committee: "the financial loss the Council [was] able to bear on the total cost of the scheme, and the cost of the houses". By June, 1945, the City Council had defined its policy for housing the 'labour requirements' of Johannesburg in relation to these two factors. The 'loss was to be limited to 1 3/4 per cent and the "only line of approach to the problem therefore appears one of reducing the cost of the houses". The cost of housing (excluding the cost of serviced land and finance charges) depended on: the number and size of rooms comprising the dwelling; the amenities provided, the general finish, and the cost and availability of materials and labour required in the erection of the house. In its 'urgency report' to Council in June 1945, the Non-European Affairs Committee indicated that, if efforts to reduce the costs of construction failed, consideration would be given to reducing the standard of accommodation provided.

88. Full details of standards, costs, rentals, loans, losses etc., for all housing schemes undertaken by the City Council for all racial categories, in the period before 1948, are reproduced in schedules contained as Annexures to 'Report by Special Housing Committee', JCC Minutes, 27/5/1947.

89. ' Urgency Report of the Non-European Affairs Committee', JCC Minutes 26/6/1945, p. 589. Full details of costs of schemes are given in Table 2.7.

90. Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Scheme</th>
<th>Date proposed or established</th>
<th>Number of Houses (population)</th>
<th>Rentals p/m (by rooms)</th>
<th>Type of Construction</th>
<th>Average Area per House (sq. ft.)</th>
<th>Contractors Involved</th>
<th>Tender Price per square foot</th>
<th>Total Cost (services, land, bldgs)</th>
<th>Cost per Dwelling</th>
<th>How Financed Annual 'Loss' to Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pimville</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>100 rooms (15,611)</td>
<td>Tank 8/- Rooms 6/-</td>
<td>Tanks and various</td>
<td>WF Tillett</td>
<td>£ 57,910</td>
<td>Ordinary Borrowing Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Native</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,285 houses (13,111)</td>
<td>2 rm 17/6 3 rm £1 1/6</td>
<td>Brick with corrugated iron roofs</td>
<td>397 WT Tillett Riddell &amp; Hammill 4s 5¼d</td>
<td>£365,622 £160</td>
<td>Ordinary Borrowing Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Native</td>
<td>1920/1</td>
<td>616 houses (4,160)</td>
<td>2 rm 17/6 3 rm £1 1/6</td>
<td>Brick with corrugated iron roofs</td>
<td>397 WF Tillett Riddell &amp; Hammill 4s 3½d</td>
<td>£ 94,249 £153</td>
<td>Ordinary Borrowing Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weemmer Hostel</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>(2,789)</td>
<td>p/bed 10/-</td>
<td>Brick with corrugated iron roofs</td>
<td>James Thompson 8s 11¼d (rooms only)</td>
<td>£115,981 -</td>
<td>Ordinary Borrowing Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolhuter Hostels</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>(3,892 m) (120 w)</td>
<td>p/bed 11/- p/bed 7/-</td>
<td>Brick and concrete, Corrugated iron roofs</td>
<td>DA Maudsley G Lobban Hulshin &amp; Bachman 6s 2d</td>
<td>£133,9 1 -</td>
<td>Ordinary Borrowing Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando East</td>
<td>1930/1</td>
<td>2,800 houses 2 rm 17/6 3,091</td>
<td>3 rm £1 1/6</td>
<td>Brick, concrete with corrugated iron roofs</td>
<td>397 EA Sayle &amp; Son TS Corteen 3s 5¼d</td>
<td>£391,888 £141</td>
<td>O.B.P. Govt, Housing Loan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando West</td>
<td>1941/2</td>
<td>750 houses (7,425)</td>
<td>2 rm 17/6 3 rm 1/6</td>
<td>Brick with corrugated iron roofs</td>
<td>397 WF Tillett EA Sayle &amp; Son 4s 3½d</td>
<td>£192,663 £257</td>
<td>Govt, Housing Loan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando East</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>100 houses (20,337)</td>
<td>3 rm £2 3/6</td>
<td>Brick and asbestos roofs</td>
<td>720 Departmental &amp; C.E.D. Workshops 11s 5d</td>
<td>£91,782 £918</td>
<td>Govt, Housing Loan (est.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanty Town,</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>4,042 rooms p/rm (20,337)</td>
<td>5/-</td>
<td>Breeze block and asbestos roofs</td>
<td>Departmental -</td>
<td>£ 95,000 £ 24</td>
<td>Loans &amp; Renewals Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Scheme</td>
<td>Number of Houses (population)</td>
<td>Number of Rentals p/m (by rooms)</td>
<td>Type of Construction</td>
<td>Area per House (sq. ft.)</td>
<td>Contractors involved</td>
<td>Tender Price per square foot</td>
<td>Total Cost (services, land, bldgs)</td>
<td>Cost per Dwelling</td>
<td>Gov Financial Annual 'Loss' to Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando West 1944</td>
<td>2,350 houses</td>
<td>3 rm £1 15/- 4 rm £2 10/-</td>
<td>Brick with corrugated iron roofs</td>
<td>635 865</td>
<td>EA Sayle &amp; Son</td>
<td>9s 8 1/2d to 10s 11 1/2d</td>
<td>£1,858,117</td>
<td>£791</td>
<td>Govt. Housing Loan £24,349 (est.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver Hostel 1944/5</td>
<td>3,336 beds p/bed</td>
<td>11/-</td>
<td>Brick and concrete, flat roofs</td>
<td></td>
<td>EA Sayle &amp; Son</td>
<td>13s 4 1/2d</td>
<td>£193,512</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Govt. Housing Loan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando 1945</td>
<td>250 houses</td>
<td>3 rm £1 15/-</td>
<td>Pre-cast concrete walls, e. iron roof</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>Anderson Housing Company</td>
<td>10s 5 1/2d to 17s 0d</td>
<td>£175,948</td>
<td>£704</td>
<td>Govt. Housing Loan £2,360 (est.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando 1946</td>
<td>289 pairs semis</td>
<td>3 rm £1 12/6</td>
<td>Concrete walls and roof</td>
<td>651/pr</td>
<td>Robert Construction Company Ltd</td>
<td>11s 9 1/2d</td>
<td>£263,848</td>
<td>£456</td>
<td>Govt. Housing Loan £3,048 (est.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando 1946</td>
<td>132 pairs</td>
<td>3 rm £1 12/6</td>
<td>Concrete walls and iron roof</td>
<td>901/pr</td>
<td>Rumble Construction 11s 11d</td>
<td>£124,885</td>
<td>£473</td>
<td>Govt. Housing Loan £1,502 (est.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabavu 1947</td>
<td>5,100 houses 2 rm n.d., 3 rm n.d.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concrete walls and roof</td>
<td>250 375</td>
<td>Lewis Construction 10s 2 1/2d</td>
<td>£1,858,785</td>
<td>£384</td>
<td>Govt. Housing Loan £19,531 (est.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental 1944-1946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td></td>
<td>Robert Constr.</td>
<td>8s 1 1/2d</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Govt. Housing Loan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * No redemption paid on £500,000 Loan for Orlando

Thus, in order to limit the 'loss' borne by the general rates fund on 'sub-economic' housing schemes for the African work-force of Johannesburg, and to obviate the necessity for an increase in rates, the 'minimum standards' could be further depressed. This potential for flexible minimum standards of accommodation was inherent in the ideological concept of 'native housing' itself and, as will be shown, was increasingly reflected in state discourse during the period of 'national housing crisis' in the immediate post-war years.\(^91\)

This section has examined the question of municipal housing finance, and the existing basis for subsidisation, in the context of the scale of the Johannesburg City Council's building programme. Under conditions of generalised housing shortage, which affected various social classes, the relation between racially-defined standards and costs of provision was highlighted. The final section of this chapter examines the interaction between the City Council and other branches of the state in the process of implementation of Johannesburg's post-war building programme.

2.3 Johannesburg's Post-War Building Programme: Constraints on Implementation

The state had responded to the social demand for housing, which emanated from various social classes, with the announcement of the 'National Housing Scheme' in March 1944; the appointment in July 1944 of the National Housing and Planning Commission to coordinate the scheme; a revised basis for subsidisation in terms of the 'national housing formula';\(^92\) and the introduction, in April 1945, of the Housing (Emergency Powers) Bill which, amongst wide powers given to the state, included the authorisation of the National Housing and Planning Commission to undertake construction of housing itself, "where local authorities were unable or

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\(^91\) The role of the research apparatus of the state in developing minimum standards of accommodation, specifically for 'native housing', will be examined in chapter four.

\(^92\) See above, p. 80.
The modification of the existing structure of state housing apparatus was paralleled at the local level, when, in July 1945, a Special Housing Committee, "which could concentrate its efforts entirely on housing", was established within the Johannesburg City Council. Perhaps the most significant modification was that the separate procedures with regard to the initiation of housing schemes (resting with the Public Health Committee in the case of housing for whites and with the Non-European Affairs Committee in the case of Africans and other 'non-European' racial categories) were amalgamated under the control of the Special Housing Committee. Loans for all housing schemes initiated by the Special Housing Committee were applied for as 'national housing loans', and had to be approved by the National Housing and Planning Commission in the first instance. When funds had been allocated, and the housing scheme thereby 'sponsored' by the Commission, the next stage in the process of implementation was the securing of sufficient building materials to carry out the contract.

Materials, which were in short supply as a result of the war, were under state control.

93. Statement by the Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation (H.G. Lawrence) in the Senate, quoted in Daily Dispatch, 5/4/1945. For reports on Debates in House of Assembly see Rand Daily Mail, 23/4/1945; Star, 23/4/1945; ibid, 30/4/1945. The measures included under the Bill empowered the government to make emergency regulations for the expropriation of land; the limitation of profits of contractors and on materials and land transactions; and for the control of labour. These aspects will be discussed in chapter 3.

94. It was subsequently the Special Housing Committee which had negotiated with central government and squatter leaders in March 1946 for a settlement of the conflict. See above, p.72. The formation of the Committee, based on proposals from the Labour Party Group, was supported by most ratepayer and non-Labour councillors, Star, 5/6/1945. Before the establishment of the Special Housing Committee, schemes were initiated by either the head of Department or Committee concerned. The City Engineer consulted the departments on the design of accommodation and called for tenders unless the contracts were carried out departmentally. On completion, the houses were handed over and the schemes 'managed' by the department. The Special Housing Committee, as appointed in July 1945, comprised the Chairmen of the Public Health, Non-European Affairs, and Works Committees and 4 members appointed by Council. For memorandum submitted by Councillor C Legum and resolutions adopted, see JCC Minutes, 24/7/1945, pp. 657-8.
The final section of this chapter examines the attempts by the Johannesburg City Council to implement its post-war building programme through the operations of its Special Housing Committee. Focusing on the interrelations between and within different levels of the state involved with the provision of resources for housing—the National Housing and Planning Commission, Building Control and Johannesburg's Special Housing Committee—this analysis indicates some of the social processes involved in policy implementation and illustrates some of the complexity, and the variety of interests, reflected in policy outcomes. It is necessary at the outset to clarify the relationships and organisational structure of the two central state housing-related bodies, the National Housing and Planning Commission and Building Control.95

The National Housing and Planning Commission was appointed in July and 'functioning' by August 1944.96 The Commission was initially a co-ordinating body, dependent on local authorities for the execution of 'national housing schemes' for which it had approved either economic or sub-economic funds. The extension of its executive functions under the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act, No. 45 of 1945 meant that the Commission could undertake building projects itself; but, whether through its own or municipal agencies, the National Housing and Planning Commission was one of several contenders for allocations of building resources, competing with industry, commerce and other government departments. Control over building materials had been instituted by the state during 1942 to ensure supplies for the Department of Defence. When defence building ceased at the end of 1943, claims on scarce

95. All information on 'Building Control' is based on the records of the Controller of Building Materials, Department of Commerce and Industries, in Government Archives, Pretoria, CBM Series.

96. The members of the National Housing and Planning Commission appointed in July 1944 were: Chairman, Major W. Brinton(former mayor Cape Town); Director of Housing, Dr. E.J. Hamlin (City Engineer Johannesburg); Capt. S.H.Kemp (member of National Health Service Commission); M.G.Nicolson (Hon. Sec. United Municipal Executive); G. O.Owen (Sec. Association of Divisional Councils of the Cape); G.R.Savage (legal rep. resigned); Brlg. Sir Edward Thornton (former member Central Housing Board); E.L. Ellenberger; Col. J.C. Holdgate (Deputy Building Controller); F. J. du Toit (Sec. for Commerce and Industries). Major J.C. Collings became Director of Housing when Dr. Hamlin resumed his position with the City Council of Johannesburg in January 1945.
resources continued to be made by the Public Works, Railways, Roads and Irrigation Departments, and the private sector. Building Control, under the Department of Commerce and Industries, was represented in Parliament through the Cabinet Building Committee (composed of the Ministers of Economic Development, Public Works, Health and Labour), which was responsible for final approval of target allocations of building materials to private and public sector projects. An Executive Committee (comprised of officials from Building Control, the National Housing and Planning Commission and the Commodity Supply Division of the Department of Commerce and Industries), advised the Cabinet Building Committee on the overall rate of permit issue for target allocations which were then approved in Parliament. Thereafter, building permits authorising the allocation of materials to approved projects were issued by the Deputy Building Controller. 97

In theory, the National Housing and Planning Commission, through its representation on the Executive Committee, was in a position to influence or determine the overall rate of permit allocation and the direction of material supplies to specific 'priority' projects. In practice however, as the following analysis of the actual operations of Building Control during the 'crisis' reveals, the allocation of resources to various categories of housing (as approved at Cabinet level and granted by Deputy Building Controller) illustrates how 'priorities' were in fact defined by the state. Table 2.8 shows the value of permits granted under Building Control to housing projects in all categories in 1944-45. It compares the estimated approved 'targets' with the value of permits actually granted in 1945-46, and gives the percentage of housing expenditure in each category. Some important factors emerge.

97. Memorandum 'Co-ordination with Building Control' by G.L.F. Borckenhagen, Controller of Building Materials to Acting Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 2/10/1946, Govt. Archives, CBM 75/16.
Table 2.8 Building Control, Analysis of Housing Permits Issued, 1944/5 - 1945/6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Value of Permits Granted 1944/45</th>
<th>% of Housing Expenditure</th>
<th>Estimated (Approved) 1945/46 £ Million</th>
<th>Value of Permits Granted 1945/46</th>
<th>% of Housing Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic houses by NHPC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1,624,322</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Economic</td>
<td>266,785</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>160,782</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Housing</td>
<td>1,552,404</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5,297,055</td>
<td>19.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses for ex-volunteers, soldiers</td>
<td>1,547,000</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3,376,921</td>
<td>12.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flats for ex-volunteers, soldiers</td>
<td>1,125,166</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3,376,921</td>
<td>12.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial housing</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1,729,121</td>
<td>6.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied houses</td>
<td>9,982,268</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7,039,191</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speculative houses, uncontrolled prices</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speculative houses, controlled 1400 sq. ft.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2,131,586</td>
<td>7.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government housing</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1,790,648</td>
<td>6.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Native Houses'</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>405,566</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>16,473,623</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>27,182,113</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Records of Controller of Building Materials, Government Archives, Pretoria, CBM 75/15.
During 1944-45, permits for building materials to a total value of £27 million were issued nationally through Building Control. Of this, permits for housing represented 61 per cent or almost £16.5 million; the balance was granted to industries, commercial institutions, government and municipal and public utility undertakings excluding housing. It will be recalled that, under the 'national housing programme', £8 million had been earmarked for 1944-45; and, on this basis, the Johannesburg City Council's programme for £1,749,750 had been submitted to the National Housing and Planning Commission. The first point to be noted from Table 2.8 is that the £8 million 'national housing programme' reflected an expenditure of little over £1.5 million. Agreement on the terms of financing between central and local authorities had been reached only in December 1944 and, partly for this reason, local authorities had delayed starting their programmes. Johannesburg, however, at June 1944, had already received tenders for 2,350 houses at Orlando Township and was in a position to utilise resources to a value of over £1.3 million on this project. Furthermore, the number of houses in its building programme could be increased if materials and labour were available. But, although the Orlando project was referred to as a 'national housing scheme' in official discourse, the records of the Controller of Building

98. This analysis deals only with the issue of permits to housing categories. For full details see 'Schedule of Permits issued by Building Control', 11/9/1946, and 'Supplementary Report of the Special Housing Committee', 13/9/1946 (Ref.SA/H.L-23/9/46), encl. in City of Johannesburg, Town Clerk's Dept. to Controller of Building Materials, 30/9/1946 (Ref.27/5). Govt. Archives, CBM 75/15. See also, 'Supplementary Report of Special Housing Committee', JCC Minutes, 24/9/1946, pp. 1195-8.

99. See above, p. 78. This was the stated intention, "even if this involves a very serious curtailment of private projects". Circular, 2/6/1944, Central Housing Board to all Local Authorities, Item(4), JCC Minutes 27/6/1944, p. 548.

100. 'Urgency Report of Special Committee re Post-War Development, Establishment of Industries Etc.', JCC Minutes, 27/6/1944, p. 549.

Materials reflected a separate category, 'Native Housing', to which had been granted less than 1 per cent of the total value of housing permits. Nationally, only £150,000 of materials had been allocated specifically to housing projects for African workers, while Johannesburg alone had required £1.3 million for Orlando.  

The value of permits granted to housing in 1945-46 increased to nearly 70 per cent of the total value of permits issued. But, the permits actually granted to each housing category bore little relation to the target amounts which had been approved by the Cabinet Building Committee. For instance, permits granted for houses and flats for ex-volunteers were approximately 50 per cent above the amount approved for 1945-46; industrial concerns received permits for 70 per cent more than the approved allocation; and, both speculative and owner-occupied housing obtained 40 per cent more than the approved amount. Yet, the National Housing and Planning Commission utilised only 46 per cent of the £3.5 million approved as its target for the implementation of schemes directly by the Commission. Of the token amount approved for 'Native Housing' - and this is the context of the 'squatter movements' which had originated in Johannesburg in early 1944 and escalated over this period focusing attention on housing conditions on the Witwatersrand - permits to the value of 1.49 per cent of total housing expenditure were granted. 

102. Of course, materials had been allocated to projects which, indirectly, provided some accommodation for African workers. These were not reflected separately in the returns but, as pointed out by the controller of Building Materials, "outbuildings to private housing provide native housing, the Gold Mining Industry and other industries erect native compounds...". Letter headed 'Building Materials for Native Houses', from Controller of Building Materials (Borckenhagen) to Commodity Supply Division, Dept. Commerce and Industries, 10/4/1948 (Ref. CLFB/JC). Govt. Archives, CBM 75/15.

With regard to the question of supply of materials to the Orlando contract, at a meeting in August 1944 between officials from the City Council, the contractors (Sayle & Son) and Building Control, the Deputy Building Controller indicated that permits would be issued for a limited number of houses each quarter, but "reserved the right of further reductions or even cancellation of a portion of the contract should national housing schemes necessitate such action". This 'right' was apparently exercised, for, in fact, by March 1949, only 802 houses in the Orlando 'national housing' scheme had been completed and the contract was terminated.

Indeed, the progress on several other housing schemes, initiated by the Special Housing Committee during this period, was constrained by the loan application procedure itself. There are several instances where loans were not approved by the National Housing and Planning Commission and applications were referred back to the Johannesburg City Council by the Director of Housing, "owing to the high cost of the schemes".

Apart from the conventional contracts entered into by the City Council and several building contractors, however, and in an effort to reduce costs and to find suitable alternatives to materials in short supply,


105. 'Report of Special Housing Committee', JCC Minutes, 31/3/1949, p. 319. Progress on the Orlando contract had been affected both by lack of materials and disputes between building artisans and the contractor, Sayle & Son. This is discussed in chapter 3.

106. See for example, Letters from the Director of Housing to the City Council dealing with: '100 houses at Coronationville', 17/10/1945 (not approved); '111 houses at Pimville, 5/10/1945 (not approved, referred back); 'Cost of services at Orlando West' 8/11/1945 (referred back for cost reductions and resubmitted), in Schedule 'Outstanding Loans for National Housing for Natives', JCC Minutes, 24/9/1946, pp. 1193-4.
a sum of £10,000 had been voted by Council in July 1944, "for the purposes of permitting experiments to be carried out in various types of housing suitable for non-Europeans". Various types of pre-fabrication and other building methods, using materials such as soil, coke and cement for bricks and blocks, were tried and, by May 1946, the Special Housing Committee favoured the principle of mass construction of pre-cast concrete housing. Proposals for the departmental mass construction of 1,700 'blocks' using the so-called "Creteweld" system were adopted by Council at its meeting on 28 May 1946. This type of construction utilised substantial quantities of cement but, since the allocation of cement to Johannesburg at this time was only 40 per cent of its pre-war allocation, the City Council made representations for an increased supply. Arguing that production costs would increase with inadequate or irregular supplies -the greater part of which would fall to the government under the existing financial formula- the City Council emphasised that it was prepared to divert materials from capital works to the proposed departmental programme. Approval "in principle" was secured from the National Housing and Planning Commission. But the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Building Materials, "in a complete reversal of recent policy", ruled that pre-cast building methods should be approved only where no alternative construction was possible, because, according to the Controller of Building Materials, "the diversion of cement to types of building which did not employ artisans

107. JCC Minutes, 25/7/1944, p. 565. The development of the research apparatus of the state, with the establishment of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and, under its auspices, the National Building Research Institute, will be examined in subsequent chapters.

108. The proposals were for 1,700 blocks of 8 rooms each to provide accommodation for 6,800 families. Memorandum submitted to the National Housing and Planning Commission by a Deputation from the City Council of Johannesburg on 15/5/1946, JCC Minutes, 28/5/1946, pp. 626-31.
might disrupt the industry". 109

In November 1946, the City Council's application for materials for the 1,700 'blocks' was still being debated in the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Building Materials. The Minister of Public Works argued that the scheme should not be proceeded with "as the shortage of cement and steel was such that it could not be diverted without seriously retarding Governmental and private building schemes throughout the Northern area". Another line in the Minister's argument stressed the "influence which additional accommodation would have on the influx of natives

109. Controller of Building Materials (Borckenhagen), Minutes of Meeting, Cabinet Sub-Committee on Building Materials, 27/6/1946, p. 2. Govt. Archives, CBM Series. The correspondence in regard to the City Council's proposals reflects the multiplicity of government departments involved in the process of implementation. The following letters refer: Private Secretary to the Minister of Health to the Town Clerk, 29/5/1946, reports on decision at Cabinet Sub-Committee meeting that "every endeavour would be made to ensure that the necessary materials are available"; Director of Housing, National Housing and Planning Commission, to Town Clerk, 7/6/1946, has "asked the Controller of Building Materials to regard this as the highest priority"; Controller of Building Materials to the City Engineer, 6/6/1946, asking for "detailed information regarding your requirements"; Town Clerk to Controller of Building Materials, 11/6/1946, enclosed schedule of requirements, which had been forwarded to Director of Housing 22/5/1946. Urged that "present and future contracts for Non-European housing should be given utmost possible priority"; Town Clerk to Secretary for Commerce and Industries, 11/6/1946, enclosed Schedule of Council's requirements; Controller of Building Materials to the Director of Housing, 10/6/1946 (copy to City Engineer), requiring information to enable regular deliveries over the period 1/7/1946 to 30/6/1947; Controller of Building Materials to Director of Housing, 10/6/1946 (copy to City Engineer), pointing out "requirements for cement are heavy", refers to Cabinet Sub-Committee meeting suggestion". Commission should only sponsor the use of concrete walling for houses where no alternative construction is possible"; Controller of Building Materials to Town Clerk, 14/6/1946, suggested that contracts which had already been let would receive materials, but "in regard to your future plans it will be necessary for me to consult with the Cabinet Building Committee in regard to questions of priority"; telegram, Special Housing Committee to Minister of Health, 14/6/1946 (copies to Controller of Building Materials and Director of Housing), requesting conference to decide on "national priorities". This correspondence is contained in 'Urgency Report of Special Housing Committee', JCC Minutes, 25/6/1946, pp. 754-6.
into the Johannesburg area". Finally, the "disagreement between housing authorities and Building Control" was referred to Cabinet level for a decision where, at a meeting in December 1946, the Executive Committee of the Cabinet Building Committee agreed to provisional approval for one half of the scheme. Thus, the Special Housing Committee of the Johannesburg City Council could claim that, in addition to the low percentage of target allocations actually approved by the Cabinet Building Committee,

...we have repeatedly made urgent representations for the allocation to this Council of greater supplies of building materials to enable us to realise native housing plans. These representations have, however, been of no avail.

In fact, between 1940 and March 1947, the Johannesburg City Council had placed contracts for the construction of 10,730 dwellings and 1 hostel with accommodation for 3,857 workers. During this period, however, it had been possible to complete only the hostel and 1,848 dwellings. Table 2.9 reflects the official housing position in Johannesburg as at June 1948. A comparison of the existing housing stock with the number of families in need of housing shows that an increase in family housing of almost 100 per cent, or over 50,000 houses, was required to meet the immediate shortage.

110. Minister of Public Works (J. W. Mushet), Report on Meeting of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Building Materials, 18/11/1946, p. 2, Govt. Archives, CEBM Series. The Minister of Health (Dr. Gluckman), however, 'strongly supported the scheme'.

111. Chairman of Executive of Cabinet Building Committee (T. Rhodes) to the Acting Prime Minister, Ministers of Labour, Economic Development, Health and Housing, Public Works, 11/12/1946, Report on Meeting of Executive Committee of the Cabinet Building Committee, 9/12/1946. The suggestion to approve one half of the scheme was made by the Director of Housing (Major Collings).

112. 'Supplementary Report of Special Housing Committee' (Comment on Schedule of Permits issued by Building Control), JCC Minutes, 24/9/1946, p. 1197.

113. Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period December 1944 to June 1948, p. 4, See Table 2.7 above, p. 83 for contracts.

114. It should be noted that almost one third of this total was for re-housing under the City Council's 'slum clearance scheme' for Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare. See above, p. 56.
Table 2.9 Johannesburg City Council, Housing Stock and Distribution of African Population, as at June 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>Rooms/Dwellings</th>
<th>Families: Reg. Tenants</th>
<th>Families: Sub-Tenants</th>
<th>Total Families</th>
<th>Total Families for Housing</th>
<th>Population est. at June 1948</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orlando East</td>
<td>5,891</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>9,391</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>46,955</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando West I</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>11,890</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando West II</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4,140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando Shelters</td>
<td>4,034</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>6,834</td>
<td>6,834</td>
<td>34,170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Native Township</td>
<td>2,282</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>3,330</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>16,650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Native Township</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>5,575</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pimville</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,262</td>
<td>4,262</td>
<td>21,315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroka-Jabavu</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophiatown-Martindale</td>
<td>12,273</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>13,340</td>
<td>13,340</td>
<td>66,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newclare</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay Location (Pageview)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Hostels</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,716</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal Compounds</td>
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<td>57,908</td>
<td>46,964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peri-Urban</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Klipitown</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klipfontein 4-Ferndale</td>
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<td>256</td>
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<td>Kensington B</td>
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<td>126</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>830</td>
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<td>844</td>
<td>7,920</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Peri-Urban Total</strong></td>
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<td>18,526</td>
<td>6,076</td>
<td>93,380</td>
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<td>21,445</td>
<td>76,584</td>
<td>53,640</td>
<td>548,406</td>
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**Source:** Johannesburg City Council, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period December 1944 to 30 June 1948, p. 3.
From the analysis presented above, and in preceding sections, it is apparent that the origins of the housing shortage, and the Johannesburg City Council's inability to implement a programme for housing the 'labour requirements' of the City on the scale required, are attributable in large part to two main factors. Firstly, with the particular system of municipal financial practices which had evolved, and the tendency towards financial segregation in the municipal accounts in particular, the conditions under which housing was financed and consumed became bound up 'ideologically' with the question of subsidisation. With accumulative 'losses' reflected, and debited, in the general rates fund, a gap between the demand and the level of provision of housing had developed even before the war. The financial implications of the housing deficit in Johannesburg assumed proportions which, according to the City Council, 'the ratepayers could not reasonably be asked to face'. For this reason, and in the context of rising building costs, the Council delayed starting its building programme and provoked the central authorities into modifying existing policy in regard to housing finance.

The second factor which contributed to the inadequate progress in the City Council's programme was clearly the nature of the state itself. While the shortage of building materials would have constrained the rate of housing production in general, competing interests and divisions -which were reflected in the actual process of building resource allocations- served further to constrain the progress of specific projects, the schemes in Orlando in particular. Thus, officials in the state's housing apparatus, such as the Director of Housing or the Controller of Building Materials, defined the question of building priorities in terms which suggest differential access for various interests.
The question of distribution of costs of subsidisation between central and local authorities arose because of the inadequate wages paid to the majority of African workers: how much of the capital expended on housing was recoverable as rent, over what period of time and which part of the state should bear the 'loss'? Clearly, the question of how the costs of housing, which in effect determined the City Council's rental policies and the degree of subsidisation, were actually arrived at, needs to be addressed. Direct control over the cost and rate of housing production was, to some extent, removed from local authorities through the process of contracting, which introduced other class-based organisations into the process of provision of housing at the level of production. The next chapter therefore examines these organisations involved in the production of housing and the content of their interests in the housing question.
CHAPTER THREE

SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE PRODUCTION OF HOUSING BEFORE 1948: ORIGINS OF POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEBATE

The conditions under which housing was financed, and the context within which policies, relating to the 'consumption' of housing, were formulated and implemented, were examined in the preceding chapter. The question of distribution of the costs of subsidisation emerged as a dominant theme in the relations between local and central authorities in regard to the provision of housing for the African work force in urban areas. The aim of the present chapter is to examine the conditions under which such housing was produced, to identify various interests in the production of housing and to analyse the relationships devolving on the costs of housing production. The focus is therefore the social context within which policies, relating to the 'production' of housing, were formulated and implemented.

By way of an introduction to this analysis, the relationship between the cost of production of housing, rentals for African workers and subsidisation, as reflected in state discourse before 1945, will be outlined. This theme is important and provides the overall framework to the chapter, as it suggests specific questions concerning the relations of production of housing which are addressed in subsequent sections.

The relationship between the cost of housing, rentals for African workers and subsidisation, was expressed in some official discourse in terms of the cost of labour contained in the construction of housing, and the monopolisation of skilled work by white building artisans. Thus, the payment of standard wage rates for skilled work - in practice confined

1. Why skilled work was, in general, the preserve of white workers has been extensively treated in existing literature. See for example, Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold, for a study of the mining industry; Kaplan, "Class Conflict, Capital Accumulation and the State", chs. 1 and 2 in particular; Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, parts I and II; and O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, part II in particular. No in-depth studies exist, to my knowledge, on the division of labour and relations of production in the building industry at the end of the war.
to white artisans - on local authority housing contracts, according to the Native Economic Commission of 1930/32, "... overcapitalises the location ab initio, and frequently there is no escape from the necessity to subsidise rent". Similarly, in 1935, the Young-Barrett Committee argued that "the only reason why the rental charged must be sub-economic is the manifest inability of the Natives to pay rents based on the cost of houses constructed of durable materials and by European labour". The Smit Committee, appointed in 1941 to enquire into "the social, health and economic conditions of urban Natives", proposed "a more liberal application of the segregation policy", as a means of securing skilled employment for African workers and cheaper houses at lower rent. Arguing that it was highly anomalous to compel a labourer earning 3s 6d a day to pay rent based on capital charges created by artisans earning 3s 6d an hour, the Committee suggested that all work, "which they are capable of performing for the benefit of their own people", should be reserved "in the area set aside for Native occupation". In order to secure cheaper houses at lower rent, it would be necessary for wages for skilled work "to be materially below the European level"; a differential wage for skilled work, established on a racial basis, would be required.


4. Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives (Smit Committee), 1942, paras. 185-7. This claim for a "more liberal" application of segregation, in terms of the removal of restrictions on skilled work in 'locations', was made in the early 1930s by the Native Economic Commission of 1930/32. It was taken up on the grounds of 'equity' by various liberal organisations, such as the Institute of Race Relations, during the 'housing crisis' in the immediate post-war period. See for example Hellmann, 'Urban Areas' p.249.

5. It should be noted that the potential for a differential wage for skilled work in fact existed under the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 36 of 1937. Special provision for excluding an urban 'native location', or any class of work in such a location, from the scope of an Industrial Agreement on wages and conditions of employment, was contained in Section 51 of the Act.
The principle advocated by the Smit Committee was supported by local authorities on the Witwatersrand, faced by the increasing urbanisation and proletarianisation of the war years. The Johannesburg City Council, confronting increasing militancy and the wave of organised squatter 'movements', believed that "...the influence of agitators, as well as much of the prevailing native unrest, would...be minimised...by the creation of greater economic opportunities". This view was endorsed in a circular, issued after a meeting of the Association of Reef Managers and Superintendents of Urban Native Administration and Native Commissioners in 1944. The Association advocated the development of local industries in 'locations' where goods could be produced for "local native consumption by natives trained in skills at institutions...particularly of a vocational nature". The production of houses by skilled African artisans was specifically envisaged. In order to "secure the two-fold benefit", identified by the Smit Committee, the Association urged local authorities to consult with other interests over the question of introducing a differential wage for skilled work performed by Africans in 'locations'; and to subsidise experiments directed at reducing the skilled labour input in house construction by, for example, utilising methods of pre-fabrication.

The Johannesburg City Council had, in fact, voted a sum of £10,000 for the purpose of experimentation in July 1944 and, in August 1944, formed a Sub-Committee to consult with Master Builders, Building Trade Unions and the Department of Labour. A meeting was held in January 1945, on the basis of a questionnaire formulated by the Sub-Committee. This meeting revealed that the Union Department of Native Affairs and the Master Builders were in favour of the proposal. But,

7. Ibid., p. 684
8. See above, p. 93.
despite the inclusion of protective legislation, "to prevent natives from carrying out skilled work in the building trade outside such areas", as a necessary precondition for any such scheme, the proposal was "opposed strenuously" by the trade unions, who were supported by the Union Department of Labour. The unions had no objection to the employment of skilled African artisans, "...provided they were paid standard trade union rates". For the Sub-Committee of the Johannesburg City Council, "in view of the greatly increased cost of native houses... and the fact that it had been impossible to reach any agreement with the trade unions on this point", the matter was considered to be beyond the scope of the City Council. Accordingly, the recommendation that the question be referred to "appropriate Ministers" and "handled by the Government on a national basis", was adopted by the City Council in May 1945. 10

Several important questions are suggested by the foregoing paragraphs. On what basis had the Master Builders favoured the proposal formulated by the Johannesburg City Council Sub-Committee, and what was the content of their interest? Why were building trade unions "strenuously opposed" to the proposal? Was there, in fact, a consensus within the unions on the definition of labour's role in reducing the housing shortage? What was the nature of the relationship between the trade unions and the state Department of Labour? And how was this initiative from the local level taken up within the various branches of the state?

In attempting to answer these questions, the analysis in this chapter will focus on the contentious issues raised by the Sub-Committee's initial questionnaire, and will define the content of different interests in relation to these. The central issues concerned the conditions under

which, either departmentally or by contract, use could be made of "native operatives" in the erection of houses; the payment of differential wages; the method of training and the question of protective legislation. These questions were defined specifically in relation to the provision of housing for African workers, more particularly to the conditions of production of such housing. But they cannot be seen as separate from either conditions in the building industry as a whole, or social relations in general, because of the political and economic implications of potential state intervention. It is the intention, therefore, to describe the context within which these proposals were mooted and to identify the wider social debates with which they became linked.

Conditions and relations of production in the building industry are examined in the first section, in order to clarify the different positions adopted by employers and building trade unions on the post-war housing shortage. The second section traces the process of policy formulation and describes the proposals for the state intervention in training to augment the building labour force. The final section focuses on the relations between the trade unions and the state and, in tracing the development of the debate, places the relations of production of housing within the wider context of social relations in South Africa at the time of the elections in 1948.

3.1 The Question of Productivity in the Building Industry: Cost and Rate of Housing Production

It is necessary to describe, briefly, the effects of the industrial expansion during the war, particularly on the division of labour within general manufacturing production, before examining the conditions and relations of production in the building industry. This is important because calls for increasing the productivity in house-building and a consequent 'cheapening' of housing were made against the background of the 'rationalisation', and increased productivity of labour, which had occurred.

in the manufacturing sector during the war. 12

During the years of the Second World War, there was both an increased demand for locally-produced capital goods, since imports were restricted, and a relative shortage of skilled artisans in industry generally. 13 With the stimulus of the war, production in the metal, engineering and machinery industries expanded rapidly, supplying the consumer goods industries with many of the capital goods. There were significant technical innovations and developments in the former industries, often based on war-related defence projects. But these new technologies and organisation for production during the war had implications for the production processes in the consumer goods industries; and during the ten years up to 1943/4, the total volume of manufacturing increased by 127.6 per cent, while industrial employment increased by 96.6 per cent. 14

This increased productivity was achieved by the 'rationalisation' of the labour process: an increasing number of production processes were broken into single operations of a semi-automatic repetitive nature. With the installation of units of machinery, these operations could be performed by 'semi-skilled', 'partly-trained' or 'operative' labour. A skilled worker was allocated the control or supervision of a series of such

12. The term 'increasing productivity' refers to the introduction of more efficient methods and machinery, with the result that ever smaller quantities of labour time are incorporated into ever greater quantities of product. See Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, ch. 8.

13. Of the approximately 300,000 workers absent from production as a result of the war, 186,000 were white and the majority were skilled. Hobart Houghton, 'Economic Development', p. 36.

machine units, which were 'fed' by operative labour. The greater utilisation of 'semi-skilled' or operative labour, selected from the ranks of the unskilled workers, reduced the dependence of capital on skilled labour, which, in the context of a shortage, was significant. At the same time, 'de-skilling' or 'diluting' the labour process in this way had implications for the labour cost structure of production; particularly in South Africa, where the bargaining power of skilled workers had resulted in a wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers of considerable magnitude.

Some indication of the relationship between 'race' and 'skill' can be gained from investigations by the Wage Board between 1940 and 1945, although no comprehensive data on the racial division of labour in production is available. Of the 48,000 workers covered by the

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15. This description oversimplifies a complex subject: the application of science and technology in the transformation of the labour process embraces all its aspects, namely, labour power, the instruments of labour, the materials and the products of labour. For an analysis of science and mechanisation in industry, see Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, part II, pp. 155-235. The productive processes in different industries are different; and the manner in which these are rationalised can vary. For a series of case studies on the labour process in different industries, which address the issues raised by Braverman, see Zimbalist, A. (ed.), Case Studies on the Labour Process, (London, 1979). The attempt to rationalise the labour process in house-building production in South Africa, is examined in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

16. A comparison of minimum wages in 1939 for the metal, engineering and machinery industries in Britain and the Witwatersrand, revealed that wages for skilled workers on the Witwatersrand were 39 per cent higher than for skilled workers in Britain; for unskilled workers in these industries, however, the minimum wages for British workers were 274 per cent higher than for those on the Witwatersrand. Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 286, 'Investigation into the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industries in the Union of South Africa', para. 352.

17. The Wage Board was established in terms of the Wage Act, No. 27 of 1925, which applied to industries where employers and workers were not organised. The Act was therefore complementary to the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 11 of 1924, which set up machinery for consultation between employers organisations and trade unions for the determination of wages and conditions of employment by collective bargaining. For unorganised workers, mostly unskilled, the Wage Board recommended minimum wages and conditions of employment which, when approved by the Minister of Labour, had the force of Law.
investigations on the Witwatersrand, less than 3 per cent were white. This was true also of other industrial centres. 'Operative' positions were being filled increasingly by African workers, as was evident in the sheetmetal industry, which, as early as 1940, had almost 20 per cent of its workforce composed of African operatives. 18

That further capital accumulation depended on the expansion of the manufacturing sector of production was recognised by a number of government commissions during these years. In 1941, the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission called for increased productivity, in terms of a redefinition of skilled wage categories to facilitate industrial mechanisation. 19 The Social and Economic Planning Council also called for a "reclassification of skilled labour" and the greater utilisation of semi-skilled and operative labour. 20 This theme was expounded more fully by the Board of Trade and Industries in its report in 1945, on the future of manufacturing industries in South Africa. The Board held that "...the optimum allocation of resources requires that each worker should be employed in the sphere and in the capacity in which he is most productive". The organisation of industrial production in South Africa, however, according to the Board, was on the basis of

...a superstructure of skilled artisans whose wages are high, resting on a basis of unskilled labour whose wages are inadequate to maintain a decent standard of living and efficiency, but the labour cost of which is not low by reason of the sort of work to which they are generally restricted. 21


Calls for increased production and productivity of labour through mechanisation; de-skilling and diluting the labour process through the greater utilisation of semi-skilled or operative labour; and the introduction of African workers into these positions, thus emanated from various quarters at the close of the War. 22

In the context of a generalised housing shortage, the question of increasing productivity in the building industry, linked as it was with the question of reducing the costs of production, became a dominant theme in the social debates on the housing crisis in the immediate post-war years. It is therefore necessary to examine the conditions and relations in the building industry as the context within which the proposal to use 'native operatives' in the erection of housing was made.

Conditions of Production: the labour process in building

Following a meeting with representatives of local authorities, soldiers' organisations and trade unions, in December 1944, the National Housing and Planning Commission appointed a Sub-Committee to consider the question of reorganisation of the building industry, "with a view to speeding up the provision of housing." 23 The Sub-Committee, under the Chairmanship of J. D. F. Briggs, chairman of the Building Workers Industrial

22. For industrial employers, according to the Director of the South African Federated Chamber of Industries, "the growing placement of Natives in Secondary Industry is one of the most important issues facing employers today". Agenda Item for meeting of the Executive, Council, dated 20/11/1946, 'The Native in Manufacturing Industry'. (I am grateful to Doug Hindson for making this material available to me).

23. See above, p. 87, for information and composition of the National Housing and Planning Commission. After the conference, 4 sub-committees were formed by the Commission to report on various aspects. Sub-Committee No. 4, presided over by J. D. F. Briggs, included C. Legum as Secretary (Councillor in Johannesburg City Council), Dr. J. Hamlin (City Engineer of Johannesburg), Dr. G. D. Laing (Medical Officer of Health of the City Council), J. S. Fotheringham (Chairman of the City Council's Post-war Development Committee), Col. Holgate (Controller of Building Materials), Dr. E. A. Bezuidenhout, R. E. Stevens, and G. G. Ewer.
Union, found that insufficient skilled labour was available to provide more than 50 per cent of the housing required in a ten year building programme, and suggested that the question be examined "from the same point of view as adopted in the rationalisation of the engineering industry for war purposes". Several questions arise in this regard which relate to the nature of the building industry itself.

Firstly, how had conditions associated with the war affected production in the building industry? Secondly, what was the structure of production in the industry, how was the building process organised and how did this affect the possibilities for rationalisation, particularly the labour process in house-building?. To address these questions, the analysis focuses on the interests of organised employers in the building industry, as articulated through the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, and various building trade unions representative of white building artisans.

In the initial stages of the war there had been a curtailment of building projects. But there had been an increased demand for building production when, under the perceived threat of a Japanese invasion, a massive defence building programme was embarked upon. Employers in the building industry, however, had not committed themselves to new apprentices, to replace artisans who joined the forces, and, in addition, there was a government ruling that engineering apprentices were more essential on the 'home front'. Thus, when the defence programme was initiated, there was an incursion into the building industry of thousands of workers who had not undergone any real apprenticeship. Fortifications,

24. 'Report of National Housing and Planning Commission Sub-Committee No. 4', printed in JCC Minutes, 30/1/1945, pp. 107-112.

25. The National Federation of Building Trade Employers of South Africa was formed in 1904 and comprised local associations of builders and various sectional trades. In 1947 it was composed of 15 registered Master Builders Associations in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. By January 1950, the membership of affiliated associations had increased from 1,200 in 1940 to 3,000. The South African Builder, August 1945, p. 7; February 1947, p. 9; and, January 1950, p. 9. The South African Builder, official journal of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers is cited hereafter as SAB.
aerodromes and military camps were constructed rapidly but, according to a spokesman for building employers, this was achieved, "...by the sheer weight of numbers and hours worked, but the output per man hour had greatly declined." This view was apparently shared by the trade unions, for, according to the Secretaries of both the Building Workers Industrial Union and the Western Province Building Electrical and Allied Trades Union, at least 70 per cent of the workers in the building industry, in the early stages of the war, "must be regarded as inefficient".

For employers in the building industry, the rise in housing costs was directly attributable to the question of labour productivity, and production costs were compounded by the question of labour supply. According to an editorial in the official journal of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, "in times of unemployment or an abundance of labour, the productivity of the least efficient unit employed will be much higher...this means in effect that under competitive conditions the minimum wage tends to become the maximum wage". Since labour costs were linked to labour supply, it was necessary to augment the skilled labour force through the facilities of the Apprenticeship Act of 1944. But, more importantly, according to an editorial in September 1946, there was a need "for a general dilution of labour in the building industry...and

26. N.W. Gallagher, MC, Executive Member of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, to 39th Annual Congress in October 1944, at Johannesburg. Text of speech in records of the Controller of Building Materials, Govt. Archives, CBM 111.


29. SAB, December 1947, editorial 'Rising Costs', p. 9. The operations of the Apprenticeship Act are discussed in more detail below and in chapter 4.
the acceptance that the place of the native is within this avenue of employment". 30

Thus, the reaction of the Master Builders Association to the proposal for "native operatives" on the construction of houses, initiated by the Johannesburg City Council Sub-Committee, 31 was entirely consistent with what employers were urging for the industry as a whole, namely, "ways and means to make more productive use of this labour supply". 32 At its Annual Congress in 1944, and again in 1945, the National Federation of Building Trade Employers placed on record its agreement that "Natives should build their own houses in Native townships under competent supervision". It was believed that "the outlet for Natives trained in this way is unlimited, and a flow of trained labourers into the industry must have a marked effect on production". 33 Employers thus anticipated the entry of 'more productive labourers', trained by local authorities, into the building industry which would be in the long-term interests of the industry, in terms of increasing the productivity of labour. It is necessary now briefly to examine the characteristics of the building industry, its organisation and the possibilities for rationalisation.

According to an executive member of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, at the Annual Congress in October 1944,

30. **SAB, September 1946, editorial 'The Place of Native Labour in the Building Industry', p. 9.** This reference to the dilution of labour was not confined to the labour process in the erection of a building on a given site, but recognised certain changes in the industry, and the "extent to which workshops contribute to the fabric of the building". Thus, there were implications for the labour costs in the manufacture of building materials and components. See **SAB, April 1945, pp. 9-13, and 45.**


32. **SAB, December 1946, editorial, p.9**

33. **SAB, September 1946, editorial 'The Place of Native Labour in the Building Industry', p. 9.**
"the war did not produce a machine which could be harnessed to do for the building industry what was done for the manufacturing industries". The truth of this statement is borne out in Table 3.1, which reflects consistently low levels of capital investment in machinery, plant and tools, compared with the value of the output of the industry. In 1941/42, for example, the value of fixed capital (excluding land and buildings) was just over 4% of the value of gross output. For private industry as a whole (which included the building industry), the value of capital invested in machinery, plant and tools was 22% of value of gross output, for the same year. The building industry was in fact made up of a large number of small, labour-intensive firms; in 1941/42, according to the Industrial Census, more than 14% of all private building enterprises had only 4 employees or less; almost 40% of enterprises had 10 or less employees; and 61% had 20 or less.

The fact that the building product was generally assembled in situ, and that relatively low levels of capital investment were required to undertake production, meant that although the dominant form of exchange was building to contract, the entry of speculative builders was facilitated, particularly in house production.

34. N.W. Gallagher, MC. See above, n. 26.
35. Census of Industrial Establishments, 1941-42, UG 20-1945, table 1(b), pp. 14-5. This was also the case in the British Building Industry, with relatively low levels of fixed capital per unit of output and per person employed. See, Ives, G., 'Fixed Capital in the British Building Industry', The Production of the Built Environment, Proceedings of the Bartlett Summer School, (London, 1979), pp. 107-119.
37. During the first two months of 1946, for instance, as many as 250 new firms of building 'contractors' registered as employers with the Witwatersrand Inspectorate of Labour. According to the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, 'a large number of employees were setting themselves up as contractors'. SAB, May 1946, p. 9. Table 2.8 above, p. 89, indicates 'speculative houses' as a distinct housing category to which Building Control allocated more than 8.5 per cent of all permits for building materials in 1945/6.
### Table 3.1 Statistics for the Building and Contracting Industries (Private), 1938/9 - 1948/9

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<th>Equipt. plant &amp; machinery £000</th>
<th>Employment Total</th>
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<th>Salaries and Wages Total £000</th>
<th>% white</th>
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<td>660</td>
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<td>5,177</td>
<td>58.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944/45</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>34,507</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>6,282</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>8,278</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945/46</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>40,809</td>
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<td>7,551</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>9,893</td>
<td>20,831</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946/47</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>54,467</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>10,514</td>
<td>56.7</td>
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<td>1,840</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>67,625</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>14,058</td>
<td>57.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,565</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>78,733</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>17,426</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>24,264</td>
<td>53,955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Union Statistics for Fifty Years, Table L-29
tended, therefore, to take the form of a quantitative expansion of a given labour process, and production had been sustained by a greater intensity in the use of labour, rather than by changes in technology or revolutionising the labour process by the introduction of machines. Where machines had been introduced in building production—for example, the concrete-mixer—they were more an alternative to labour, rather than integrated with the labour process to dictate the pace and content of labour, as in the case of manufacturing production. The labour process in building was therefore discontinuous, with workers moving from one point of work to another rather than 'work' being brought to the workers. It was potentially the building workers who controlled the output.

The particular form of the technical division of labour in building reflected the craft-based character of production. Individual crafts, or trades, entered at different points in the production process; and artisans, in many cases, owned the tools of their trade. The different trades—bricklaying, masonry, plastering, carpentry, painting, plumbing, electrical—each contained a range of 'skills' and individual craft unions had resisted dilution of the labour process on the grounds that the nature of craft processes did not lend themselves to mechanisation; there was therefore not much scope for operative labour. In this regard, training—apprenticeship for the trades—had been, traditionally, an important

38. It should be noted that the production of some building materials or components could be undertaken under workshop conditions and here, the introduction of machinery and the rationalisation of the labour process would be similar to general manufacturing. There was a shift to the off-site production of some constructional elements after the war, and this was accompanied by the drive for standardisation of building products. SAB, March 1945, editorial 'Standardisation in Industry', p. 9.
source of control over the labour process for individual building trade unions in resisting the process of de-skilling. 39

From the above it is clear that the classification of skills, and the form and content of training, cannot be seen as separate from the labour process; and attempts to introduce changes, either through new techniques or reductions in training periods on the basis of a re-classification of skills, were areas of potential conflict. Trade unionism within the building industry had improved conditions for skilled workers over the years largely on the basis of the bargaining power exerted through control over the labour processes in different trades. 40 The calls for a 'general dilution' of the building industry, emanating from organised building employers at the close of the war, should therefore be viewed in this context.

At the close of the war, there were no less than 8 trade unions representing different groups of artisans in the building industry affiliated to the South African Trades and Labour Council. 41

39. These observations on the labour process in building are clearly not specific to South Africa, and the history of struggles within particular trades to maintain their craft and the range of skills should be seen in broad historical perspective. For a discussion on the experience of craft unions in Britain, see for example Druker, J., 'The History of Construction Unions: the Process of Structural Change', The Production of the Built Environment, 1979, pp. 69-74; Austrin, T., 'The Breakdown of Craft Unionism in the Construction Industry, 1945-70', in Political Economy of Housing Workshop, Housing, Construction and the State, (London, 1980), pp. 57-62.

40. Wages and conditions of employment in the Building industry are discussed below.

41. Membership of the unions in October 1948 was: Building Workers Industrial Union-8,033. This was the largest and not craft exclusive union. By 1949, its membership had increased to 12,000; Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Union-1,467; Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers-4,765; Operative Plasters Trade Union-330; Operative Plumbers Association-27; General Building Workers Union-180. The Operative Masons Society and the Western Province Building Electrical and Allied Trades Union had disaffiliated from the South African Trades and Labour Council by this date. South African Trades and Labour Council, 'Memorandum to the Industrial Legislation Commission', December 1948, Annexure, B. p. 48. TUSCA Archives Archives, ICS M, 868, (F.51); also, Building Workers Industrial Union of South Africa, Circular No.2227, 15/11/1949. Ibid., (F.55).
of labour in the building industry was perceived, from several quarters, as affecting the possibilities for increasing the productivity in the building industry. According to the Social and Economic Planning Council,

Labour has been even more resistant to technological development than management. Trade Unions is powerful in the industry, and while some of the rules... are directed towards the protection of their health and safety... a considerable part is devoted to the maintenance of the bargaining power of labour, and the advancement of their special interest. \(^{42}\)

The 'special interest' of building trade unions included the 'restrictive practice' of classifying certain operations as 'skilled' work which, in the opinion of the Social and Economic Planning Council and building employers, were no more than 'semi-skilled'. In this way, the argument continued, "the breaking down of production processes into single operations which can be performed by semi-skilled labour, such as has been the basis of cheap mass-production, has been resisted, and pre-fabrication opposed". \(^{43}\)

The preceding description of conditions in the building industry at the end of the war has revealed some of the characteristics specific to the process of building production. It appeared that the question of increasing productivity in the industry was defined differently, according to the interests of either organised building employers or trade unions. Thus, for the former, with the tendency to numerous labour-intensive firms, in the context of a shortage of skilled artisans, the question of labour productivity was linked to labour costs; and the extent to which these could be reduced by 'a general dilution of labour'. This approach was also shared by local authorities and other organisations within the state. For trade unions, however, the question of supply of trained artisans was a distinct and separate issue from the reduction of labour.


\(^{43}\) Ibid.
116 costs. Diluting the labour process with operative labour potentially undermined control by skilled artisans, over both the form and content of training and the output of production, with the consequent weakening of their bargaining position vis-à-vis wages and conditions of employment. It was partly for this reason that building trade unions had "strenuously opposed" the proposal submitted by the Johannesburg City Council Sub-Committee to representatives of the building industry in January 1945. 45

But the bargaining position of skilled white building artisans was threatened from another source, namely, the possibility of a differential wage defined on a racial basis. 46 Thus, discussion on the conditions under which "native operatives" could be used in the construction of houses in segregated townships became bound up with the economic position of building artisans at the end of the war. The opposition by building trade unions should, therefore, also be seen in the context of the relations between organised employers and building labour on the question of wages and conditions of employment in the building industry.

**Relations in the Building Industry: wages and conditions of employment**

In addition to the characteristics of building and the importance of control over the labour process, outlined above, there were other features associated with the need for unionism within the building trades. According to traditional organisation of building methods, building workers were paid by the hour. Since it was the hourly wage which determined the labour costs of building, the form of payment often proved the battleground over which wider issues of industrial control were fought. When delivery of materials was delayed, workers were frequently laid off, or extra artisans could be taken on for a few days to speed up production. This

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45. See above, p. 102.

46. Ibid. This would facilitate the substitution of 'cheap labour' for skilled white artisans.
resulted in building workers being unemployed more often, and for longer periods, than most other trades; and the casual nature of the building industry had enabled employers to hire or shed labour with relative ease. Insecurity and irregularity of employment, and the form of payment in accordance with time worked, were major features of the building industry associated with the growth of unionism within the building trades. Improved conditions had been built up over the years, and the hourly wage rate for building artisans was somewhat higher than for other artisans. But, for the above reasons, the annual wage was often less than that received by skilled workers in other trades.

Relations between organised employers and labour in the building industry were strained towards the end of the war. Building workers had not had an increase in the basic wage rate, apart from a cost of living allowance, since 1934, and existing Industrial Agreements terminated in January 1944. Negotiations between employers and trade unions for a new basis for agreements had broken down and, at the instance of the trade unions, the matter had been referred to arbitration under War Measure No. 9. During the arbitration proceedings towards the end of 1943, the trade unions' contention that, notwithstanding a minimum wage of £7 14s per week provided for in the Industrial Agreement, the average wage of building artisans did not exceed £4 19s 6d per week was supported by Ivan Walker, Secretary for Labour and Controller of

47. In 1919, building workers had waged a successful 12 week strike for a 44-hour week. The average working week at that time was 50 or more hours.

48. In 1943, carpenters, plumbers and bricklayers had a minimum wage rate of 3s 6d per hour and a 44-hour week. This compared with 3s 3d per hour and a 46-hour week for artisans in the iron, steel, engineering and metallurgical industries. Union Statistics for Fifty Years, Jubilee Issue 1910-1960, tables G-28 and G-29.

Industrial Manpower, who acted as arbitrator in the dispute. The Walker Award, presented in March 1944, recommended the establishment of a Commission to investigate all the factors which had influenced the rise in building costs, including increases in the cost of building materials, the price of land, profits accruing to building contractors, in addition to increases in the cost of labour. Building trade unions accepted the award, which included a freezing of wages and a measure of control over labour, because these other factors, which, according to the Chairman of the Building Workers Joint Executive, J. D. F. Briggs, "had nothing to do with the workers in the Industry", were to be considered in the question of overall cost reductions.

For building employers, however, the award was "of such a revolutionary nature, and contained so many features outside the terms of reference", that the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, acting on behalf of the Associations of Master Builders in Durban, Pretoria and the Witwatersrand, was "compelled to challenge it in court". According to the Secretary for the Master Builders and Allied Trades Association, the function of an arbitrator appointed to settle wage conditions in an industry was "not to usurp the functions of Parliament by introducing profit limitation in the form of legislation". The award was subsequently

50. Walker stated that during 1941-3, "some 7,000 building trade artisans in the Transvaal were not employed for more than an average of 40 weeks per annum", and this was during the "boom period" of defence building. Building Workers Industrial Union, Central Strike Committee- Building Industry, 'Statement Regarding the Strike in the Building Industry in Johannesburg and Pretoria', 5/8/1947, para. 3. TUCSA Archives, ICS M. 868, (F. 46).


52. Forward, 19/1/1945.

53. 'Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Master Builders and Allied Trades Association (Witwatersrand), for the year ended 31/12/1944', SAB, February 1945, pp. 31 and 45.

54. M. H. Manley, Secretary of the Master Builders and Allied Trades Association, quoted in Star, 14/3/1945.
set aside as invalid in the Supreme Court. Arbitration was again invoked under the War Measure, with the Wage Board appointed as arbitrators. In many respects, this award, which was gazetted on 17 November 1944, was less favourable to the interests of building artisans than the original award and there was considerable dissatisfaction within the ranks of white building workers. 55

Under the Arbitration Award for the Building Industry of November 1944, a 44-hour week of 6 working days had given way to a 43-hour 5-day week. But building artisans continued to demand a 40-hour week. Their dissatisfaction with the award was reinforced by the announcement in early 1945 of the Minister of Labour's intention to introduce a Bill, the objective of which was to ensure full employment for skilled workers after the war through the gradual shortening of hours for all industries. The Joint Executives of the Building Trade Unions demanded a 40-hour week with the same weekly wage; the demand for reduced working hours was therefore coupled with a demand for a corresponding increase in the hourly wage rate. 56 Organised employers in the building industry argued that the post-war economy was in a transitional state and that the output of labour did not "conform to any known standards". In January 1947, the Federation still maintained, in an editorial in its official journal, that "it would be unwise to create false wage standards by increasing basic wages until the value of the post-war production of our labour force is determined". 57

The conflict between organisations of building employers and building trade unions on this issue culminated finally in a protracted strike on the Witwatersrand during August and September 1947. 58 But

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56. SAB, January 1945, p.9.
57. SAB, January 1947, p. 9.
58. See below, p.141 for discussion on the strike.
the 'unsettled conditions' after the war were reflected also in individual contractual relations: one example was the large Orlando contract for 2,350 houses, which had been entered into by the Johannesburg City Council and E.A. Sayle and Son (Pty) Ltd., in August 1944. 59 A dispute, over the daily output of bricklayers employed at Orlando, arose in February 1945 and continued until July. 60 During this dispute and with the publicity given to the question of output, the time wage came under attack from employers in the building industry and from local authorities. 61

Skilled building workers in the immediate post-war years, despite the comparative bargaining power which derived from a shortage of skilled artisans, thus perceived the undermining of their control in three areas, namely, control over the output of labour, the form of payment, and training, both by the actions of individual employers and associations of building employers, and by the state. The next section of the chapter examines the role which organised labour in the building

59. See above, p. 92.

60. In February 1945, the contractor estimated that an average of only 248 bricks per bricklayer were being laid per day, whereas the expected output was 650. He maintained that the rate of progress was being retarded either because the building force was "deliberately going slow on the job or was so inefficient that they should not be accepted by trade unions as qualified bricklayers". Strikes and dismissals ensued and the result was an application by the contractor to the Supreme Court for an order interdicting the Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Union from encouraging workers to leave the site at Orlando. Star, 18/7/1945. Supreme Court of South Africa, Witwatersrand Local Division, 'E.A. Sayle & Son (Pty) Ltd. vs. Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Union of South Africa', 17/7/1945. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F.40).

61. The time wage was periodically subject to attack from building employers whose stated preference was for a system of payment by results, or the 'piece-work system'. Trade unionism within the building industry was, traditionally, fundamentally opposed to this form of remuneration on the basis of output achieved, since it clearly undermined the workers control of output. See report in Forward, 25/1/1946, on contractors contravention of the arbitration award by offering 'piece-work rates' on housing contracts. The system of payment by results was proposed at the Annual Conference of the Institution of Municipal and County Engineers, in August 1945, Star, 27/8/1945; and at the Conference in 1946, by Dr. Hamlin, City Engineer of Johannesburg. Star, 16/9/1946; 17/9/1946. See various articles in the South African Builder during 1945, and particularly, SAB, April 1946, p.9.
industry defined for itself in relation to the housing crisis, and traces
the development of the state's proposals for intervention in the supply
of skilled labour.

3.2. The Process of Policy Formulation: State Intervention in the
Relations of Building Production

It was suggested in the preceding section that, in the view of
building trade unions, the supply of trained artisans was a separate issue
from the question of reducing labour costs. It is the intention in this
section, firstly, to examine the relation of the skilled building labour
force, existing at 1945, to the labour requirements for the post-war
building programme, and the proposals for augmenting the labour force.
Secondly, the background to the introduction of 'emergency powers' by
the state, in 1945, and the reactions to regulations governing training
and the control of labour will be described.

The Demand for Skilled Labour and Labours' Demands

At the start of 1945, there were 22,000 artisans in the building
industry. With approximately 4,000 building artisans in the forces and
4,000 who, with intensive training, could be admitted to the industry, a
total of 30,000 could be reached in a comparatively short period after the
war. The immediate housing requirements were for 150,000 houses in the
urban areas, and an additional 290,000 would be required over the next
ten years till 1955. In estimating the demand for skilled labour the
Sub-Committee of the National Housing and Planning Commission assumed
a figure of 2,3 skilled artisans per house per annum. In order to equate
the "labour value" for the different categories of housing, particularly for
different standards of accommodation which were racially defined, the
Sub-Committee assumed "four non-European homes as being equal to

62. 'Report of National Housing and Planning Commission Sub-Committee
No. 4', JCC Minutes, 30/1/1945, p. 107.
Table 3.2 illustrates the findings of the Sub-Committee and the requirements for programmes to deal with the immediate and longer-term housing needs. The conclusion was that, even if the state embarked on a fifteen or twenty year programme, "the European needs alone could not be met".

The position of building trade unions on the housing crisis was clarified in their proposals for the long-term building programme which outlined the collaborative role for labour. According to the statement by J.D.F. Briggs, as Chairman of the Building Workers Joint Executive and the South African Labour Party, in January 1945, building unions were prepared to increase the skilled labour force and would assist in training workers rapidly "to make up whatever real shortage there is", but reorganisation or rationalisation of the building industry had to be accompanied by a guarantee to building artisans that existing conditions, which had been built up over the years, would not be endangered. In its report to the National Housing and Planning Commission, the Sub-Committee had, in fact, drawn attention to the reorganisation of the British building industry after the 1914-18 war. Under the Labour Government from 1924, agreement had been reached with building trade unions to augment their numbers in return for a guarantee of steady employment for fifteen years. In the opinion of the Sub-Committee,

63. Ibid., Appendices A & B, pp. 110-1. The figure of 2,3 artisans per house was based on details of the labour force and house production in Britain during 1925-1935. The racial categorisation in housing standards was described above in relation to the City Council's post-war building programme. See above, p. 79.

64. Ibid. The details in Table 3.2 reflect neither the skilled labour required for maintenance of existing building stock (residential and non-residential), nor the artisans required for non-residential buildings. Maintenance alone would employ a further 5,500 skilled tradesmen per annum.

65. Forward, 19/1/1945.
Table 3.2 Housing and Skilled Labour Requirements, South African Urban Districts, 1945-1955.

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<th>Total</th>
<th>'Equivalent'</th>
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<th>Black</th>
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<tr>
<td>Immediate Requirements</td>
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<td>(60,000)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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<td>(30,000)</td>
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<td>150,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>440,000</td>
<td>(245,000)</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>(65,000)</td>
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**Programmes:**

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<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>'Equivalent'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>5 yr (Immediate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
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<td>(12,000)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>(6,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>13,800</td>
<td>13,800</td>
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<td>10 yr (Total)</td>
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<td>41,400</td>
<td>14,950</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15 yr (Total)</td>
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<td>Housing</td>
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<td>12,000</td>
<td>17,333</td>
<td>(4,333)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>37,566</td>
<td>27,600</td>
<td>9,966</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 yr (Total)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>28,175</td>
<td>20,700</td>
<td>7,475</td>
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</table>

* 'Equivalent' in brackets
** Figures for skilled labour required per annum underlined

freedom from the fear of unemployment, if large numbers of additional artisans entered the industry, facilitated the rationalisation of the British building industry and, during 1925-1935, while the labour force was increased by 26.5 per cent, the number of houses produced increased by 100 per cent. 66

The proposals of building trade unions for post-war building in South Africa comprised, essentially, the following demands: that the government make itself responsible for continuous employment in the building industry for a period of 10 to 15 years; that the government appoint a committee to ascertain "exactly how the building industry can be rationalised and how controls... can be imposed on the building industry for the production of houses"; that profits in the industry be limited, as suggested in the Walker Award; 67 and that the price of building materials and land be controlled.

The demand for a guarantee of employment to building artisans was supported in several quarters during the first few months of 1945. In Senate Debates during March, on the policy of the Minister of Public Works, a guarantee was presented by Labour Senators as the "means of securing the dilution of labour needed for the solution of the country's housing problems". 68 The same argument was contained in a memorandum prepared by the City Engineer of Johannesburg in January 1945 and issued to all members of Parliament and the Senate representing constituencies in Johannesburg. 69 Following a conference on 19 March

66. 'Report of Sub-Committee No. 4', JCC Minutes, 30/1/1945, p. 109 and Appendix C, p.112. Details of the agreement between the Labour Government and the British Building Trade Unions were published in Memorandum Cmd. 2151, 1924, 'Housing and Financial Provisions'.
67. See above, p. 118.
68. Labour Senators, Basner and Smith, quoted in Forward, 23/3/1945.
69. 'Report of the Special Committee re Post-War Development, Establishment of Industries Etc.', JCC Minutes, 30/1/1945, pp. 107-12.
1945, convened by the Mayor of Johannesburg, which represented "public bodies specially concerned with housing", a telegram had been dispatched to the Prime Minister. The general feeling of the conference, according to the Mayor, was "frustration and deep disappointment" at the government's failure to act on the report of the National Housing and Planning Commission Sub-Committee, particularly the recommendations concerning a guarantee of employment to building artisans. Smuts' reply to the Mayor of Johannesburg, dated 16 March, intimated that "comprehensive proposals to deal with all aspects of the housing question had been prepared by the Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation"; and, on 4 April 1945, H.G. Lawrence, the Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation, announced the 'emergency powers' contemplated by the state.

In addition to the Housing (Emergency Powers) Bill's intention to give executive powers to the National Housing and Planning Commission to acquire land and undertake the construction of housing itself, legislative provision was made for limiting the profits on land transaction, materials and contractors' profits on 'national housing'. But more importantly, in the present context, on the understanding that "the interests of the existing labour force would not be jeopardised", the Secretary for Labour was authorised to negotiate with building trade employers and trade unions for a "more satisfactory number of apprentices, satisfactory wage scales and dilution of labour".

70. The following organisation were represented at the conference; S.A. Federated Chamber of Industry; Association of Chambers of Commerce; National Federation of Building Trade Employers; South African Institute of Race Relations; National Council of Women; and Rotary Club, which had been instrumental in the convening of the conference. Telegram, Mayor of Johannesburg, Immink, to Prime Minister, Smuts, 20/3/1945. SAIRR Archives, "B" Boxes.

71. Telegram, Prime Minister, Smuts, to Immink, 26/3/1945. SAIRR Archives, "B" Boxes.

72. See above, p. 85.

73. The 'National Housing Scheme' introduced in 1944, was described above, p. 78.

Draft Regulations were gazetted under the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act, No. 45 of 1945, on 20 July 1945. Under the Labour Regulations, provision was made for a ten year guarantee of employment to "registered artisans" and the Secretary for Labour would arrange for the training of learners; the form and content of training,

...being determined with due regard to the principle that native and non-native artisans will be restricted to performing work of a nature and standard usual in dwellings for occupation or use by natives and non-natives respectively.

Thus, while the state's proposal for augmenting the building labour force appeared a pragmatic response to the shortage, it also reflected the intention to introduce qualitative changes in the form of differential training. Training -both the form and content of training- was traditionally an important source of control by building trade unions over the labour process. The state's proposals were based specifically on changes in training and on state-controlled training schemes. They were destined, therefore, to give rise to conflicts between building trade unions and the apparatus of the state, notwithstanding the guarantee of employment.

The development of the state training scheme, and the initial reactions from organisations with interests in the relations of production of housing, are described below.

State Training Proposals

The Draft Regulations, published in July 1945, were expected in their final form by mid-August. But, with the negative reaction by building trade unions and representations to the government, this was delayed until January 1946. In a letter to the Minister of Labour in September 1945, the Joint Executives of the Building Industry had stated that "the trade unions will not agree to the training of native artisans on

75. Draft Regulations were published under Notice No. 1243, Government Gazette, 20/7/1945, pp. 158-73.
76. Ibid., para. 82(1), p. 169.
77. See above p. 113.
The trade unions received an assurance from Ivan Walker, in November, that they would be "fully consulted" by the government, before any steps were taken to introduce "native learners"; and indeed, when the regulations were finally published in January 1946, all references to Africans doing skilled work had been deleted.

But social pressure for government action was increasing during the early months of 1946. The growth of "shanty towns", and the material conditions of the thousands of squatters on the Witwatersrand, was given increasing exposure in the press; and the City Engineer of Johannesburg, Dr. Hamlin, represented a significant section of public opinion, when he stated that it was "questionable whether the vested interests of less than 30,000 building trade artisans should be allowed...

78. It should be noted that this statement refers to the inferior training, which the trade union executives believed was contemplated by the authorities, rather than being overtly racist as it appears. Joint Executives of the Building Industry to the Minister of Labour, 10/9/1945 (signed by the General Secretaries; Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Union, Barton; Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, Tyler; Building Workers Industrial Union, Blake; Operative Plasterers Trade Union, Wilton; Operative Masons Society; Ackerman; S. A. Electrical Workers Association, Calder), encl. Annexure "B" to Memorandum submitted to the Minister of Labour by the Building Workers Industrial Union, Circular No. 2227, 15/11/1949. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868,(F.55)


81. See above, p. 67.
to delay the essential building programme.  

In April 1946, the Directorate of Demobilisation issued a circular which outlined a separate scheme for the intensive, full-time training of African ex-volunteers, under the Central Organisation of Technical Training, COTT, Scheme. Almost six months later, at a meeting in September 1946 of the Joint Advisory Board for the Building Industry, Ivan Walker announced the government's intention to implement the training scheme outlined in the circular of the Directorate of Demobilisation. The COTT scheme envisaged technical training in ten groups of occupations; building trades comprised the first group and details of the proposed scheme were outlined to the Joint Executives of the Building Industry by the Acting Prime Minister in November 1946. These

82. Memorandum by City Engineer, Dr. Hamlin, JCC Minutes, 30/1/1945, p. 109. This theme was expounded by the Institute of Race Relations and soldiers organisations. See, in particular, Memorandum by the Director of the Institute of Race Relations, J.D. Rheinalt Jones, 'The Place of non-Europeans in Industry, Housing and other Municipal Problems', submitted to the National Housing and Planning Commission in early 1945, cited extensively in SAB, April 1945, pp.9-11. At a conference in Johannesburg, 18/2/1946, convened jointly by the South Africa Legion, B.E.S.L., the M.O.T.H. organisation and the Springbok Legion, 'speakers urged use of Native artisans', according to report in Star, 18/2/1946. It should be noted that the Johannesburg City Council was itself divided on this issue. See below, p.132.


84. Joint Executives of the Building Industry to The Acting Prime Minister, Hofmeyr, re 'Introduction of Native COTT Learners into the Building Industry', 31/10/1946, para.5. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868(F.42).

included, the numbers of learners to be trained; the fact that they would not necessarily be confined to ex-volunteers; details on the period of theoretical training and the fact that "they will not be trained in the same degree of skill as the European artisan but in accordance with the requirements of native housing"; the wage rate would rise by effluxion of time to 2s per hour, "but not in excess thereof"; and the employment of trainees would be by local authorities, failing which, public utility concerns, or lastly, by profit-making enterprises confined to "prescribed non-European areas". 86

To implement the Central Organisation of Technical Training Scheme, described above, the state clearly required the cooperation of white labour in the building industry. For this reason, perhaps, the Secretary for Labour had delayed making his announcement until the employment guarantee agreement came into operation on 1 August 1946. 87 The agreement had taken fifteen months to negotiate between the government and trade unions in the building industry. Only 60 per cent of building artisans had accepted the guarantee and registered in terms of the agreement, however, and the date for registration was extended until mid-October 1946. 88 But, following a meeting of the Joint Advisory Board on 28 October, the government was again requested not to proceed with the scheme until further negotiations had taken place. 89 Despite

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86. Ibid., para. 6(b), (c), (d) and (f).


88. Rand Daily Mail, 2/8/1946. In September, according to a report, only 3,580 of the 21,853 eligible artisans in the building industry had registered for the guarantee. Forward, 27/9/1946.

89. Joint Executives of the Building Industry to The Acting Prime Minister, Hofmeyr, re 'Introduction of Native COTT Learners into the Building Industry', 31/10/1946, paras. 6 and 7. TUCSA Archives ICS M. 868 (F. 42).
these representations—and both employers and trade unions were represented on the Joint Advisory Board—a COTT scheme was initiated in Johannesburg in November 1946. Before examining the responses of employers and trade unions in the building industry and the potential political repercussions of the state's actions, those factors which help to explain the government's determination to proceed in the face of trade union opposition need to be identified.

The government's intention to implement the COTT intensive training scheme, with differential wage rates as an integral component, despite the opposition from organised white labour, was based to a large extent on the results of the 'experimentation' undertaken by local authorities from the beginning of 1945, and the representations made on this basis by local authorities and other organisations. The scheme also reflected a policy which was, in fact, in operation in other branches of the state; for the Department of Native Affairs had already trained African ex-volunteers and had formed 'building gangs' to do work in the 'Native Trust Areas'. The Directorate of Demobilisation contributed 2s per day to the wages of 'trainees' in lieu of paying for the training. In addition, the results of the housing survey of 560 local authorities, conducted by the National Housing and Planning Commission, had established that, of the 164,000 houses needed immediately in urban areas, 126,000 were required for Africans.

90. According to the Minister of Native Affairs, Major P. van der Byl, at a conference on housing for African ex-volunteers convened by the Springbok Legion and the M.O.T.H. organisations in Johannesburg, 11/7/1946, "the Native Affairs Department...was continuing to press for the widest acceptance of the principle that natives should be employed to build for their own people in urban locations and villages. Rates of pay acceptable to natives, but less than trade union rates, would keep the cost of dwellings to a level commensurate with the ability of the native occupants to pay". Rand Daily Mail, 12/7/1946; Star, 11/7/1946. The Native Affairs Department had for some time used ex-volunteers to do 'native trust work' in the Hamanskraal and Kingwilliamstown districts. See for instance the report of the Director of the Institute of Race Relations, Rheinallt Jones, after a tour of 'native trust areas', cited in Rand Daily Mail, 18/6/1945.

Several local authorities had embarked on "experimental programmes", following a meeting in December 1944 of the Association of Reef Managers and Superintendents of Urban Native Administration and Native Commissioners. A well-publicised experiment at Pietermaritzburg had combined a degree of pre-fabrication with variations in the basic wage rates for 'artisans', and the savings obtained on ruling contract prices averaged 22 per cent on construction costs. Similarly, the Vereeniging Municipality had constructed houses departmentally with an estimated saving of 15 per cent. Methods of construction as alternatives to brickwork which reduced the amount of skilled labour required and were adaptable to mass production had been experimented with. Unconventional building methods which relied less on the traditional craft processes, such as the Pise-de-Terre method which had been adopted by the S.A. Railways and Harbours in a housing scheme for African railway workers, were specifically favoured by such organisations as the S.A. Institute of Race Relations which anticipated reduced opposition from craft unions on this basis.

92. See above, p. 101.

93. The scheme utilised pre-cast concrete rafters and roofing slabs; and a building work force of 17 African 'artisans', on six wage scales according to proficiency, 25 unskilled labourers and 1 white supervisor, had completed 100 experimental houses of 3 types. Darvill, D., 'Pietermaritzburg', Paper delivered at the 24th Annual Conference of the Institute of Municipal and County Engineers, August 1945, SAB, February 1946, pp. 21-3.

94. Star, 29/6/1945; Rand Daily Mail, 2/7/1945.

95. In the method employed by the S.A. Railways and Harbours, walls were built up within moveable frames by unskilled labourers under the supervision of 1 foreman. The cost of labour and material was £140 for a 3-roomed dwelling with bathroom. (Compare with Table 2.7 above, p. 83). Director of S.A. Institute of Race Relations, J.D. Rheinalit Jones, to The Town Clerk, Municipality of East London, 5/1/1946, in reply to a request for information on how to develop a scheme for using African 'operatives' on municipal housing. SAIRR Archives, "B" Boxes.

96. Ibid. See also Memorandum prepared for the S.A. Institute of Race Relations and for distribution to all local authorities, Archibald, A.J., 'Native Housing- the only realy solution; construction by native labour', 8/1/1946, Ref. R.R. 11/46.
But, as far as the Johannesburg City Council's experimental programme was concerned, the Council itself was divided on the issue. The Labour Party Group in the Council had consistently opposed the employment of trained African artisans at differential wages, maintaining the trade union principle of 'the rate for the job'. The emphasis in Johannesburg's experimentation had tended, therefore, towards technical innovations in constructional methods, and where 'substitution' had occurred, it had been in the field of building materials, rather than labour. Thus at a City Council meeting in June 1945, after a lengthy debate, the recommendation that the Council use trained African labour experimentally was rejected by 14 votes to 9. The Johannesburg City Council had, however, referred the question to the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Native Affairs, with the request that the Cabinet Committee report "as soon as possible". The growth and intensity of the squatter 'movements', with which the Johannesburg City Council was confronted during 1946, gave weight to the argument of the Ratepayers Party and to that of the City Engineer, cited above.

But why had the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, in conjunction with the Joint Executives of the Building Industry trade unions, called on the government in October 1946 not to proceed with its training scheme until further negotiations had taken place? As stated above, organised employers in the building industry had recorded their agreement with the proposal, that Africans be trained for work on local authority housing schemes in the 'locations', at the Annual Congress in 1944, 1945 and again in 1946, anticipating a flow of trained labourers into the industry from this source; and, since from the ranks of 'unskilled' but trained labourers a class of semi-skilled operatives could

97. 'Report of Special Housing Committee' (Non-European Experimental Housing), JCC Minutes, 25/6/1946, p. 733. See also Table 2.7, p. 83 above, for building contractors involved in the experimental programme.

98. Rand Daily Mail, 19/6/1945. The divisions within the City Council were reported on in Star, 11/7/1945. See also JCC Minutes, 29/5/1945, p. 486.
be selected, the policy was perceived as in the long-term interests in terms of increasing labour productivity. Where the COTT scheme formulated by the Directorate of Demobilisation differed, in the opinion of building employers, from the original proposal, was that whereas in the initial proposal African workers could have been excluded from the ranks of skilled workers and "prevented indirectly from competing with European artisans, the recognised and relatively permanent status conferred on natives trained by the State places them in a different category to the casually-trained natives employed by local authorities". 99

The potential political repercussions, which were inherent in state intervention in training, were more explicitly dealt with by the trade union executives. Ivan Walker, at several meetings of the Joint Advisory Board where the issue was discussed, stated that artisans were not necessary to the 'type of building proposed to house natives'. For trade unions, however, although,

the standard of training intended by the authorities is little higher than is required to produce skilled labourers or assistants, such exact distinction is unlikely to weigh with members who see in the employment of natives "trained by the Government" a grave threat to their economic and racial securities. 100

This theme was taken up in an editorial in the journal of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, in December 1946. "Adequate safeguards", in the opinion of the editor, were not possible in the application or adaptation of existing industrial legislation; yet conditional approval of the policy implied "a total segregation of the native labour employed on such schemes from the rest of the Building Industry". Ways and means to control the movement of "native labour" were required. But,

99. SAB, December 1946, p. 9. (emphasis added)

at the end of 1946, the heightened struggles by African workers had climaxed with the African mineworkers' strike, \textsuperscript{101} and "in the face of political considerations" such as this, the editorial concluded that "measures to provide for direct discrimination on a racial basis may not be found possible."\textsuperscript{102}

The final section of this chapter focuses on the relations between trade unions and the state, with the government's pursuit of its policy, and the context within which white workers perceived state training schemes as a threat to their 'economic and racial securities'.

### 3.3 Trade Union Interaction with the State: Social Relations in a Wider Context

This final section of the chapter describes the deteriorating relations between building trade unions and the state around the training issue. It examines the context within which the debate on training and 'adequate safeguards' became linked with the interests of white workers outside the building industry in the immediate post-war years.

When the COTT scheme for training African ex-volunteers for the building industry had first been formulated by the Directorate of Demobilisation, \textsuperscript{103} it appeared that, at this stage, there was little consensus within the building trade unions on the training issue. The South African Trades and Labour Council circularised the draft proposals in May 1946 and several unions responded favourably. The African Cement Workers' Union, for instance, suggested "whole-hearted support."\textsuperscript{104} and


\textsuperscript{102} SAB, December 1946, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{103} See above, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{104} Secretary, African Cement Workers Union to Secretary, South African Trades and Labour Council, 10/6/1946. TUCSA Archives, ICS M-868 (F,42).
the Building Workers Industrial Union also had no objection to the scheme, provided that a protective clause was inserted. Other unions, such as the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers and the Amalgamated Engineering Union, strongly opposed the scheme. All unions agreed, however, that the government had not consulted them sufficiently in the formulation of the scheme, and that lack of consultation contravened the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act of 1945. On these grounds, and supported by the building employers' representatives on the Joint Advisory Board, they had requested a stay in the implementation of the scheme.

Despite these representations, a training scheme was initiated at Milner Park, Johannesburg on 11 November 1946 with 50 African ex-volunteers. The Building Workers Industrial Union immediately refused to cooperate or to have anything to do with the scheme. The COTT instructors were ordered to withdraw, or face expulsion from the Union, and, despite government offers of protection, they left the training scheme. The government continued the scheme with army instructors. Notwithstanding the unambiguous attitude of the Building Workers Industrial Union, the building unions as a whole had no definitive policy on the training issue. The Joint Executives of the Building Industry, which

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105. General Secretary, Building Workers Industrial Union (Blake) to Secretary, South African Trades and Labour Council, Ref, 59712, 18/6/1946. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F.42).

106. General Secretary, Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers to Secretary, South African Trades and Labour Council, Ref. No. HFT/LB. 3096, 14/6/1946; Secretary, Amalgamated Engineering Union to Secretary South African Trades and Labour Council, Ref. PWH/LZ, 10/6/1946. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F.42).

107. The Housing (Emergency Powers) Act, No. 45 of 1945, Section 2(1), para. 5, provided that no regulation could be made unless the Minister of Labour had consulted those trade unions registered under the Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 36 of 1937.

108. See above, p. 129.

represented 5 unions, had come together during the negotiations with the government on the question of guaranteed employment in the building industry.\textsuperscript{110} That the Joint Executives had not built up any stable cohesion as a body, however, was shown in the lack of unanimity on the guarantee agreement, which left constituent unions free to accept or reject the guarantee. The Joint Executives came together again on the training issue and, when on 10 December 1946 they sent a deputation to the S.A. Trades and Labour Council "protesting against the dictatorial actions of the authorities", they were urged to determine a general policy which would be "in the interests of all workers in the industry".\textsuperscript{111} For its part, the Trades and Labour Council requested the government to call a national conference of all interested parties before promulgating any regulations for the building industry.\textsuperscript{112}

Government officials met trade union representatives at a meeting on 24 January 1947, the purpose of which was to draw up protective regulations. Prior to this, in early January, a 'statement of policy' had emerged from the building unions. According to the statement, the answer was "not poorly built houses for poorly paid Natives, but higher wages all round and an increased government subsidy where necessary". Financing sub-economic housing was the responsibility of the state and local authorities. Trade unions in the building industry would not accept the principle that wage rates of artisans should be lowered to make schemes "for housing poor people at low rents" possible. Negotiations should be opened in the 'established trade union manner' on several main lines of policy, which included the following: that Africans be given proper training to enable them to become fully trained artisans; that during the learnership period, control over conditions be vested in a committee composed of

\textsuperscript{110} The Joint Executives of the Building Industry comprised the Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Union, the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, the Building Workers Industrial Union, the Operative Plasterers Trade Union and the S.A. Electrical Workers Association.

\textsuperscript{111} South African Trades and Labour Council, National Executive Committee, Minutes of Meeting, Johannesburg, 10/12/1946, pp.5-9. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F.43).

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 9.
employers and trade unions representatives; that, once qualified artisans, Africans should fall under the Industrial Council agreements or Arbitration Awards for the building industry in the area concerned, and not be exempted in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act; and that learners should be confined to work on "native housing in Native areas". Thus, while the trade unions wanted properly trained artisans, they wanted to control the entry of Africans into the building trades.

At the meeting between trade unions and government on 24 January 1947, however, the unions met with little success. Ivan Walker stated that the question of training was "not under discussion at all". The COTT scheme was "an accomplished fact" as far as the government was concerned and would continue with or without the approval of the unions. The purpose of the meeting was to draw up regulations to protect "white standards", but if the unions decided not to participate, this would be done without their collaboration. The unions, for their part, found the meeting entirely unsatisfactory and, with Walker's warning comment that "no set of citizens were stronger than the State", made further representations. On the next occasion, 7 July 1947, the trade unions

113. See above, p. 100, n. 5.
114. General Secretary, Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Union to Secretary, South African Trades and Labour Council, 7/1/1947. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F.46).
115. Department of Labour, Report of Meeting between Representatives of the Government and the Trades Unions, Johannesburg, 24/1/1947, pp. 1-20, encl. Secretary for Labour to Secretary, South African Trades and Labour Council, Ref. 1612/53-3, 4/2/1947. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F.46). Present at the meeting chaired by the Chief Inspector of Labour, for the Minister of Labour, were: government officials from the Departments of Commerce and Industries, Union Education, Native Affairs, Public Works; the Central Organisation for Technical Training and the Directorate of Demobilisation. For the Trade Unions, there were representatives from the Building Workers Industrial Union, Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Union, Operative Plasterers Trade Union, S.A. Electrical Workers Association, the Western Province Building Electrical and Allied Trades Union, the South African Trades and Labour Council, the S.A. Railways and Harbours Artisan Staff Association and the South African Association of Municipal Employees.
116. Ibid., pp. 6-8.
met the Cabinet Building Committee.\textsuperscript{117} Before discussing the outcome of this meeting, it is important to draw attention to a development in the debate.

By early 1947, the training issue had gone beyond the interests of white workers in the building industry. Thus, at the meeting in January, trade union representation included the S.A. Railways and Harbour Artisan Staff Association and the S.A. Association of Municipal Employees. The extension of representation reflects an important development in the debate between white labour and the state. It indicates the increasingly political nature of an apparently pragmatic response to the shortage of skilled labour. The S.A. Railways and Harbours Artisan Staff Association became involved because the constructional methods employed in the provision of housing for African workers during 1945 relied solely on unskilled labourers and foremen.\textsuperscript{118} Building artisans employed by the South African Railways and Harbours were represented by the Artisan Staff Association which feared that the scope of the COTT scheme could be widened to include classes of work on which white artisans were "exclusively employed". In a letter to the Acting Prime Minister in November 1946, the Association urged the government to "explore all other avenues before finally deciding to introduce this revolutionary departure from accepted practice".\textsuperscript{119} The implications of the COTT scheme for the S.A. Association of Municipal Employees arose because employment of trainees was to be restricted to local authorities in the first instance.\textsuperscript{120} This, according to the General Secretary of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item[I17.] The Cabinet Building Committee was described above, p. 88. It exercised control over building materials and labour resources in the building industry.
  \item[I18.] See above, p. 131.
  \item[I19.] General and Organising Secretary, S.A. Railways and Harbours Artisan Staff Association to the Acting Prime Minister, Ref. M.A. 36, 18/11/1946. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.8686 (F.42).
  \item[I120.] See above, p. 129.
\end{itemize}
the Association, "could well set large sections of the 90,000 employees (of all races) in that service in an uproar": the whites, because it was perceived as a "threat to their economic and racial securities"; and "the Non-Europeans, because of the wide margin between trainees wage rates and the prevailing rates for other Non-European workers". 121 The COTT scheme was intended for training in ten groups of occupations and all groups were found in local government service. 122 Opposition to the scheme would intensify if training was extended; for, even if employment by local authorities was not a first consideration as with the building occupations in group one, there would "inevitably be infiltration of trainees into the service". The repercussions in local government service, therefore, were "likely to be as great if not greater than in any other single sphere of activity". In the opinion of the General Secretary, it was essential for "loyal attachment to domestic views to be subordinated to a co-ordinated policy" embracing the whole trade union movement. 123

Thus, in order to ensure that the training question and employment of African 'artisans' was not determined unilaterally by government officials rather than "in permanent, formal conjunction with the trade unions", 124 the South African Association of Municipal Employees was represented at the meeting in January 1947 between the state and the white labour movement; and, again at the meeting, on 7 July 1947, with the

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121. General Secretary, South African Association of Municipal Employees to Secretary for Labour, Ref. GS, HO5NAL.1 13/12/1946, TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F,42).

122. The other occupations included: engineering operations in factories, garage attendance, assistant sheetmetal, panelbeating and vulcanising artisans, general car repairs and spraypainting, maintenance, assistants to sanitary and food inspectors.

123. General Secretary, South African Association of Municipal Employees to Secretary. South African Trades and Labour Council, 17/12/1946. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F,42).

Cabinet Building Committee. The demands put forward by the trade unions on this occasion were essentially: that the safeguards contained in the Housing Emergency Regulations be embodied in an Act of Parliament; that the Industrial Conciliation Act be amended so that the whole building labour force would come under its provision; and that a National Board be appointed to supervise training and to determine wages. The Ministers' response to the first proposal was that a rigid Act of Parliament to regulate conditions which were essentially fluctuating would be unworkable. The other proposals were not connected with "the immediate problem of absorbing COTT trainees", and, furthermore, part of what the unions envisaged would be covered by the proposed Commission, which would enquire into the working of the Industrial Acts. Once again, the unions were requested to submit further safeguards. For their part, the unions indicated that a solution which did not go further than the COTT scheme, and which did not help to place the industry as a whole "on a sound basis, would probably not be found acceptable".

125. Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet Building Committee to meet Representatives of the Building Trade Unions, 7/7/1947, Govt. Archives, CBM series. Present for the government were: Minister of Public Works and acting Minister of Economic Development (Mushet), Minister of Health (Dr. Gluckman), Secretary for Commerce and Industries (du Toit), Building Control Adviser (Rhodes), Labour Adviser (Walker), Under-Secretary for Labour (Lewis), Chief Inspector of Labour (Freestone), Controller of Building Materials (Borkenhagen), Controller of Iron and Steel (Nicholson), Private Secretary to the Minister of Health (Wood). For the Trade Unions, there were: Building Workers Industrial Union (Briggs), Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Unions (Huyser), Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers (Tyler), S. A. Electrical Workers Association (Calder), Operative Plasterers Trade Union (Ritter) and South African Association of Municipal Employees (Louttit).

126. Ibid., para. 7. Regulations made under the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act, No. 45 of 1945 were not permanent: the Act was itself a temporary measure and initially established for 3 years only.

127. Ibid., para. 8. The Industrial Legislation Commission was continued under the Nationalist government after 1948.

128. Ibid., para. 10.
The negative response from the Cabinet Building Committee to the demands put forward by the trade unions on 7 July 1947 reinforced the dissatisfaction within the ranks of white building workers. Their calls for the industry to be put 'on a sound basis' were made against the background of their deteriorating economic position and of a breakdown in negotiations with employers' organisations after ten months, without a settlement having been reached.\(^{129}\) Ivan Walker, as arbitrator during the proceedings at the end of 1943, had supported the contention of the building unions for an increase in basic wage rates. His Award had been set aside, however, and building workers had not had an increase in their basic wage rates for over fourteen years.\(^{130}\) Real wages in the building industry, in mid-1947, remained below the level which had prevailed in 1939.\(^{131}\)

The major demand of the unions was for a consolidated wage; they wanted an increase in the wage rate to 5s 9d per hour, inclusive of a cost of living allowance on a sliding scale, and a method to stabilise wages at not less than 5s per hour for a 40-hour week.\(^{132}\) This had been refused by organised employers in the building industry; a strike was called, and approximately 8,000 building workers in Johannesburg and Pretoria came on strike from 1 August 1947. Supported by 5 unions - the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, Building Workers Industrial Union, Amalgamated Bricklayers Trade Union, Operative Plasterers Trade Union and Operative Masons Society - the strike lasted for over 9 weeks. On 6 October 1947, the agreement which had been reached on 2 October became operational.\(^{133}\)

\(^{129}\) See above, p. 119.

\(^{130}\) See above, p. 118.


\(^{133}\) Building Workers Industrial Union, Executive Council, Circular No. 2072, 30/7/1947. For reports on the strike by the Johannesburg branch, see Circular No. 2088, 22/10/1947; and for the Pretoria branch, see Circular No. 2093, 17/11/1947. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F.46) and (F.47).
In terms of the settlement, which would remain in force until 31 December 1951, there was no consolidated wage, although basic wages would be increased by 1d per hour each year from 1 January 1949. Hours of work would be decreased progressively from 44 to 40 hours by January 1951.\(^{134}\) During the strike and negotiations for a settlement the employers had, in fact, offered conditions which were better than those finally obtained. These had been rejected by the unions; yet the final outcome reflected only an increase commensurate with the reduction in working hours, rather than higher weekly earnings.\(^{135}\) The strike then cannot be seen as entirely successful as far as the demands of the white building workers were concerned; at the conclusion of the strike, real wages had an index of 982 compared with 1001 for 1939.\(^{136}\) At the time of the general elections in early 1948, the economic position of white building workers had therefore deteriorated.

But it was the actions of the state which increasingly were perceived as contributing to the deterioration in conditions of white building workers. The Department of Labour, in particular, had imposed controls during the years of the war and immediately afterwards which reduced the standards of workers in the industry. Specific 'emergency

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135. Building Workers Industrial Union, Executive Council, Circular No. 2087, 20/10/1947, pp. 3-5; See also South African Trades and Labour Council, National Executive Committee, Minutes of Meeting of Sub-Committee appointed to investigate all aspects of the Building Strike, 17/12/1947. TUCSA Archives, ICS M. 868 (F. 47).

136. Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission, UG 62-1951, Table 36, para 234. According to a 'fact-finding' Sub-Committee appointed by the S.A. Trades and Labour Council to report on the strike, the strike ballot (conducted much earlier) had not been overwhelmingly in favour of coming out on strike. Some of the unions were not prepared and had insufficient funds for strike pay. There was also a lack of co-ordination between the actions of the Pretoria and Johannesburg branches of the Building Workers Industrial Union, which had been exploited by the Press and by employers organisations. South African Trades and Labour Council, National Executive Committee, 'Report on the Building Industry Strike' 16/3/1948. TUCSA Archives, ICS M. 868 (F. 47).
measures' had been endorsed which undermined their position and resulted in economic losses, such as the outcome of compulsory arbitration in 1945.\textsuperscript{137} This perception by white building workers of the failure of the Department of Labour to represent their interests was reflected in the evidence given to the South African Trades and Labour Council on the 1947 strike. The Chairman of the Central Strike Committee, P. Huyser, stated that the "bureaucratic action of the Labour Department during the years of negotiations with employers preceding the strike", together with the setting aside of the previous award in 1944, "gave the workers no confidence in the Department of Labour and arbitration as a whole".\textsuperscript{138} Another spokesman, G.H. Beetge, member of both the Central Strike Committee and the Pretoria Strike Committee, stated that the "Labour Department was to a large extent to blame for the strike", due to its method of dealing with the demands of the building workers. The decision on strike action had, in fact, been taken in February 1947, but the application by the unions to hold a legal strike had been held up by the Department of Labour.\textsuperscript{139} The actions of Ivan Walker, Secretary for Labour and Controller of Industrial Manpower, particularly after the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act of 1945, both in controlling the labour resources of the building industry and in his dealings with the trade unions on the training question, had effectively polarised white building workers and the state. The importance of the training question, however, went further than the interests of skilled white workers in the building industry or, indeed, those interests in local government service represented by the S.A. Association of Municipal Employees.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{137} See above, p. 119
\item \textsuperscript{138} South African Trades and Labour Council, National Executive Committee, Minutes of Meeting of Sub-Committee appointed to investigate all aspects of the Building Strike, 13/12/1947, p. 6. TUCSA Archives, ICS M. 868 (F.47).
\item \textsuperscript{139} South African Trades and Labour Council, National Executive Committee, Minutes of Meeting of Sub-Committee appointed to investigate all aspects of the Building Strike, 17/12/1947, p. 8. TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868 (F.47). Beetge in fact suggested that what had been conceded finally by employers could have been attained without the strike.
\end{enumerate}
During the social debates on the conditions under which Africans could be trained for the building of houses, a further area of 'racial insecurity' was highlighted; namely, the insecurity for certain strata of white workers who were not 'skilled'. Although, with the industrial expansion during the war, there had been changes in the racial allocation of particular places in the industrial division of labour, there had been no significant shift in the racial hierarchy in production; it was white workers who generally moved into supervisory positions. Still there were certain strata of white workers who feared that their position would be undermined by the inclusion of Africans in operative positions. This fear was compounded by the fact that, after the war, access to training schemes was to some extent 'conditional'. While the number of whites undergoing apprenticeship training increased by 37 per cent from 1944 to 1948, from 15,671 in all trades to 21,513, this training was not equally available to all whites. Under the Soldiers and War Workers Employment Act of 1944, war veterans were given preferential access to various training schemes; and for a number of mainly Afrikaner workers in the 'lower levels' of industrial or state employment access to artisans training schemes was less secure. According to National party sources in 1947, there were as many as 18,000 potential trainees who had been unable to gain access to any of the state training programmes. By early 1948, during the Parliamentary Session, this theme gained dominance, and, with the build-up to the elections, became a crucial element in the 'apartheid' platform of the National Party.

142. See for instance the debate on the "Vote for Native Education" on 8 March 1948. The 'Vote' made provision for vocational training for the building industry in areas such as Zwelitsha near King-williamstown, where after the unsuccessful attempts to introduce the COTT scheme at Milner Park, the government had concentrated its resources. House of Assembly Debates, 1948, cols. 2831-2854. For other statements by Nationalist M.Ps dealing with the lack of training facilities available to "Afrikaner youths", and appealing to racial prejudice, see ibid, cols. 1216-9; 1325-30 and 1369-74. The government's immigration scheme also came under attack. In 1947 for instance, 1,388 artisans in the building trade had been 'imported'. ibid, col. 3286.
Davies has argued that the structures and organisations, within which white wage-earners were incorporated, such as the Labour Party and institutionalised trade unions, failed to represent the interests of their memberships under the changing material circumstances after the war; and that this was an important factor contributing to the growth in support for the National Party during this period. The conflicts involving building artisans, particularly their struggles over the racial allocations of work roles in the building industry from 1946, described in preceding pages, certainly represented an important gain for the National Party. Prior to 1945, they had not had much support from artisans in strongly unionised craft unions since an element of Nationalist Party ideology (during this period) demanded a restructuring of industrial relations machinery which would eliminate trade union bargaining. Moreover, the Nationalists were on record as being opposed to the maintenance of craft barriers; craft unionism had been important to artisans defending their 'monopoly of skill' and had benefited them materially. By supporting the campaign against the training of Africans, however, the Nationalists built up a base in the Pretoria branch of the

143. Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, chapter 7. For the most comprehensive explanation for the growth in support for the Nationalist Party during the immediate post-war years, see O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, chapter 15 in particular. The Labour Party, in fact, split in 1946 and in the 1948 elections did not even field candidates in many of the mining constituencies, which traditionally had been an important base for its support. The 'social security' programme of the United Party virtually collapsed between 1946 and 1948; and the Labour Party could offer no alternative. As O'Meara illustrates, the Nationalist Party programme addressed the material interests of its white worker supporters.

144. In a speech in 1943, Schoeman stated: "This system of collective bargaining has outstayed its usefulness entirely... Under the new economic system which we want to bring about... the State will accept full responsibility for fixing wages and the regulations of working conditions and the principal function of the present trade unions will disappear". House of Assembly Debates, 1943, cols. 87-8.

145. See, for example, the debates on the Apprenticeship Act. House of Assembly Debates, 1944, col. 5091 et seq.

146. See above, p. 117, n. 48.
of the Building Workers Industrial Union, and by the time of the elections there was substantial support from a section of building artisans in addition to the broad-based support in the railways and the mining industry which were National Party strongholds among key strata of white workers.

The National Party offered potential supporters the 'benefits of Apartheid', which, while largely undefined at this stage, implied the implementation of some system of job colour bars, or racial quotas, and also the redirection and reallocation of the African reserve army of labour from the towns which, while primarily intended to benefit capitalist agriculture, would also reduce the pressure on white industrial workers. In the election, the Nationalists gained new seats in the rural areas and picked up 8 seats in the mining areas of the Witwatersrand and 5 in Pretoria. The results of the election, announced in June 1948, in which the National Party secured a small majority of 5 seats, reflected therefore, in a very real sense, the importance of white workers' support for their electoral victory.

This chapter has described how several themes, defined initially by the Johannesburg City Council in order to reduce the cost and increase the rate of production of housing for African workers, were taken up within the apparatus of the state and formulated into proposals for

147. The Garment Worker, September/October 1947.
148. For an outline of Nationalist policy, see Star, 29/3/1948.
149. According to an estimate by the Tomlinson Commission in 1955, with the industrial expansion during the war years, 40 per cent of the increase in the number of Africans employed in industry came from white-owned farms. Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, p. 288; see also O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, chapter 15, for the reflection of agricultural capitalists' interests in the Nationalist Party Programme; and Morris, M., 'Apartheid, Agriculture and the State', SALDRU Working Paper No. 8, (Cape Town, 1977).
150. O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, p. 226.
intervention in the conditions and relations of production of housing. With the examination of different interests of employers and trade unions in the building industry, and the relations between them, the potential political repercussions of these forms of state intervention were identified. Finally, the analysis focused on the relations between the state and white workers and suggested that the issues of training, wages and 'protection' went beyond the interests of white building workers and were linked with wider social debates. The implications of this were seen in the elections in 1948.

The following chapter explains how these conflicts were resolved at the political level and examines the response of the state, with the Nationalist regime, to the struggles of an increasingly proletarianised urban African population.
CHAPTER FOUR

PROCESS OF POLICY FORMULATION AFTER 1948: THE APARTHEID FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION IN THE REPRODUCTION OF LABOUR

The preceding chapter described how the state's attempts to intervene in the production of housing for African workers through state training schemes became bound up both with capital/labour relations in the building industry, and with the deteriorating economic position, and 'racial insecurities', of other strata of white workers. This feature is important to an understanding of policies which were formulated and implemented after the change in government in 1948. But there is another important factor explaining the formulation of 'apartheid' policies which centres on the struggles of the African working class and the problems which an increasingly proletarianised urban African population posed for white labour, capital and the state. No less than its predecessor could the Nationalist government afford to ignore the conditions necessary for the reproduction of the workforce.

There are consequently two lines of analysis contained in this chapter which examines the processes involved in the formulation of apartheid policies. The first is the role of the state in allocating positions in the racial division of labour and the conditions under which this intervention occurred. The second is the role of the state in determining conditions for the reproduction of the workforce; here the analysis focuses on the definition by the state of a coherent and comprehensive set of policies directed at the African working class in urban areas.

These two distinct, yet related, areas of state intervention after 1948, are analysed in sections one and two of this chapter. In the final section an attempt is made to explain the basis to the legitimisation of the policy framework for state intervention in the conditions of production and consumption of housing, through an examination of the role of the research apparatus of the state.
4.1 State Intervention in the Racial Division of Labour

Shortly after the Nationalist government assumed office, the Central Organisation for Technical Training scheme came under attack from the Minister of Labour, B. J. Schoeman. In its "existing form", and in the absence of legislation to protect the position of white building workers, "the scheme was not in line with Apartheid". While a new scheme would probably be introduced, "it would have to come as part of the larger scheme".¹ This section traces the formulation of such a policy, which was finally enshrined in the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951. It suggests the relation between this policy and the 'larger scheme' of apartheid in terms of the requirements for capital accumulation during this period.

The Joint Advisory Board for the Building Industry, under the Chairmanship of Ivan Walker, considered a Draft Bill in June 1949.² The object of the Bill, which was gazetted on 16 September 1949, was to provide for the training and registration of "Native Building Workers", to regulate the conditions of their employment and "other incidental matters". The Bill confined the employment of these workers in skilled trades to 'native areas' and made it an offence on the part of any employer to employ an African on skilled work in any other area without the consent of the Minister of Labour. Skilled work was defined to include bricklaying, masonry, plastering, carpentry and joinery, painting, sign-writing, plumbing, woodmachining, electrical fitting and wiring.³ According to a

¹ Minister of Labour, quoted in SAB, August 1948, p. 11. In fact, by December 1947, only 206 Africans had received training under the COTT scheme, House of Assembly Debates, 1948, col. 3079. The scheme at Milner Park, Johannesburg, had been closed under the pressure from the Building Workers Industrial Union and African trainees had completed their training at Zwelitsha, in the Ciskei. House of Assembly Debates, 1950, col. 1790.

² Joint Advisory Board, Building Industry, Minutes of Meeting, 3/6/1949, BIFSA Archives, Files No. 2.

memorandum of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, these proposals were "in the main, acceptable to and adequately [met] the requirements of the employers in the Building Industry". An important deviation from existing industrial legislation, however, was the provision empowering the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Minister of Labour after consultation with the Advisory Board to be established in terms of the Bill, to prohibit the employment of these workers on skilled work by persons other than employers in the building industry.

The particular interpretation of the Industrial Conciliation Legislation, whereby the character of an industry was determined not by the occupation in which the workers were engaged but by the nature of the enterprise in which employer and worker were associated, had resulted in a situation whereby owner-builders, flat owners, estate agents and even municipalities, and others, who undertook various building projects or repairs and maintenance, were not recognised as employers in the building industry. In these building projects, therefore, recognised wages and conditions of employment had not been observed since they were not subject to the provisions of existing industrial agreements in terms of the legislation. It was in these areas, outside the precincts of organised industry, that trade unions contended that the problem of "cheap labour" was most acute and endangered the standards of the skilled white building artisan. The above provision was therefore an attempt to extend effective protection to white building artisans in all areas in which their position might be jeopardised.

4. National Federation of Building Trade Employers in South Africa, 'Memorandum on Proposed Native Building Workers Bill', 18/11/1949. The Draft Bill had extended protective measures also to 'semi-skilled' work and the representations made by the National Federation of Building Trade Employers, submitted to the Minister of Labour, resulted in these being removed from the Bill as finally gazetted in September. Organising Director and General Secretary, National Federation of Building Trade Employers to representative of Joint Advisory Board, Ref. NFN.15, 3/6/1949. BIFSA Archives, Files No.2.

5. Minister of Labour's introduction to the Bill, House of Assembly Debates, 1950, col. 1789 et seq. This aspect is treated in chapter 6.
Despite these provisions, the Building Workers Industrial Union was opposed to the measure "in its entirety". This union, at the end of 1949, had 43 branches and represented 12,000 building artisans in all trades.⁶ A degree of support for the COTT scheme of the previous government had been apparent from the Building Workers Industrial Union in the early stages and subject to protective conditions.⁷ But the hardening of attitudes expressed in the opposition to the Bill reflected the increasing unemployment which white building artisans were experiencing during the years 1949 and 1950.⁸ The opposition by white labour was, in fact, even more broadly based, as was shown at the annual conference of the South African Trades and Labour Council after the Bill had been introduced to the Parliamentary session in February 1950. At the conference, 61 affiliated unions representing 121,309 members unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the provisions of the Native Building Workers Bill.⁹

While the Bill had been introduced in February 1950, full parliamentary debates only occurred during the 1951 session, when, despite the opposition from trade unions, it was passed. The Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951 came into operation on 1 October 1951.¹⁰

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7. See above, p. 135.

8. According to the Minister of Labour, at one stage there were 2,000 building artisans unemployed in Pretoria. House of Assembly Debates, 1951, col. 862. The amounts paid out in guaranteed wages to registered artisans under the employment guarantee increased during 1949 to £34,338 7s 9d, and to £39,089 7s 8d in 1950. Department of Labour Report for 1949, UG 50-1951, p. 21; for 1950, UG 71-1951, para 49.


10. For debates on the Bill, see House of Assembly Debates, 1951, col. 857 et seq.
It is important to examine the context within which the debates on the Bill took place in order to locate this policy within the Nationalists' 'larger scheme' of apartheid.

In the immediate post-war period, with relatively large investment of foreign capital in manufacturing industry and the concentration of economic ownership, there was an increasing tendency towards monopoly in South African industry. \(^{11}\) Davies has argued that, despite their anti-monopoly rhetoric, the Nationalist regime could not, "except at the cost of a major disruption of capitalist production, have promoted any non-monopoly 'national' path of capitalist industrial development". \(^{12}\) The transition to relations of monopoly capitalism entailed raising the organic composition of capital; in other words, increasing the value of capital invested in machinery in relation to capital advanced in the form of wages. Under these conditions, with the 'tendency for the rate of profit to fall', it was necessary, among other factors, to increase the productivity of labour. \(^{13}\) As the preceding chapter showed, this was precisely what industrial employers were calling for in the immediate postwar period. At no time during this period, however, did they recommend eliminating the racial hierarchy in the social division of labour. Rather they sought to establish it at a higher level, by the 'more productive use' of Africans

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13. Other 'counteracting tendencies' to the falling rate of profit are suggested in chapter 6. While a degree of controversy surrounds the concept of the falling rate of profit, it is beyond the scope of this study to enter into this debate. See for example, Meek, R., 'The Falling Rate of Profit', in Howard, M.C, and King, J.E. (eds.), The Economics of Marx, (Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 203-18; and for the original presentation of the argument, Marx, K., Capital, Vol. III (London, 1959), chapters XII, XIV and XV.
in operative positions and extending the employment of whites in supervisory and skilled positions. Various training schemes were initiated during this period to meet the demand for skilled labour. Between 1944 and 1948, the existing Apprenticeship scheme was extended and the number of whites undergoing training increased by 37 per cent. But the number of whites qualifying as artisans under the other schemes was relatively small. In this regard, it is important to examine two other Bills which were introduced during the 1951 Parliamentary session, along with the Native Building Workers Bill, namely, the Apprenticeship Amendment Bill and the Training of Artisans Bill.

The Apprenticeship Act of 1922, as amended in 1924 and 1930, was replaced by a Consolidated Act in 1944. A Commission on Technical and Vocational Education (De Villiers Commission) appointed in 1945, reported in 1948, after the Nationalist government came to power. Its report was taken as the basis for an investigation by a Ministerial Committee under the Minister of Labour, the findings and recommendations

14. See above, p. 144. For an excellent discussion of the concepts 'skill', 'training' and 'education' which demystifies the industrial sociological category of 'upgrading', see Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, pp. 424-447.

15. By 1950, only 2063 whites had qualified as artisans under the COTT scheme; under the Soldiers and War Workers Unemployment Act of 1944, 1247 had qualified as artisans. Of these only 107 were building artisans. Department of Labour Report for 1950, UG 71-1951, tables 11 and 14.


of which were incorporated in the Apprenticeship Amendment Bill introduced in 1951. In 1949 and 1950, more apprentices were indentured than at any other period during the operation of the Apprenticeship Act; 7,109 and 7,518 new contracts were registered respectively and, at the end of 1950, there were 24,379 contracts in operation for all industries. Of these, 5,232 were in operation for the building industry.\(^\text{18}\) Despite this increase, industry was experiencing a severe shortage of skilled labour. According to a Department of Labour survey, at the beginning of 1951 the existing shortage was more than 10,000 artisans for the various trades as Table 4.1 indicates.

The Apprenticeship Amendment Bill reduced the period of apprenticeship from 5 years to 4 on the successful completion of a trade test and it increased the wages paid to apprentices.\(^\text{19}\) In an earlier Bill, provision had been made for the training of adult whites along the lines of the COTT scheme to meet the shortage of artisans. The trade unions held that such training should be divorced from a measure dealing with apprenticeship in the 'traditional' sense and, for that reason, the Minister of Labour had introduced the separate Training of Artisans Bill in 1951.\(^\text{20}\)

To supplement the training envisaged under the 'traditional' system, the Training of Artisans Bill established a system of intensive training and trade testing for adults, whom the Minister of Labour acknowledged, "from the nature of things", would "not be natives". In introducing

\(^\text{18. House of Assembly Debates, 1951, cols. 5089-97.}\)

\(^\text{19. It should be noted that apprenticeship terms in Britain were only reduced to 4 years in 1964. Austein, 'The Breakdown of Craft Unionism in the Construction Industry, 1945-70', p. 57.}\)

\(^\text{20. House of Assembly Debates, 1951, cols. 5145-9.}\)
### Table 4.1 Skilled Labour Shortage, 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trades</th>
<th>Existing Shortage as at February 1951</th>
<th>Estimated Additional Requirements For Next Three Years, If:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>4,763</td>
<td>9,285</td>
<td>5,461</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>3,415</td>
<td>6,522</td>
<td>3,279</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,356</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,579</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,504</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Department of Labour, 'Survey of Skilled Manpower' 24/2/1951*
the Bill, B.J. Schoeman made it clear that the intention was to elevate the level of the 'unskilled' and 'semi-skilled' white worker. In the railways particularly, there were hundreds of workers who, because they had not undergone an apprenticeship, "could not achieve artisan status". According to the Minister,

We have a reservoir of unskilled European labour, and my contention is that we should not create a permanent stratum of unskilled European labour. We should lift them out of it...give them training. That is how we get the movement from the unskilled right to the skilled. 21

In the case of the white 'semi-skilled' workers, "who have already acquired a large amount of knowledge of the particular trade, provided they can pass a test which is set with a little further training... they will then get the status of artisans". For adult trainees, namely, the 'unskilled' white workers, provision was made for one year of intensive training at an institution controlled by the Department of Education, Arts and Science on the lines of the old COTT scheme. During this period, they would continue to receive an allowance equal to the wages drawn previously, "because we may be dealing with adults who have families and other obligations". Thereafter, they would be placed in the service of an employer designated by the Minister of Labour for a period of further training. This period could be reduced by the successful completion of a trade test after a minimum of one year's training in employment. These trade tests for artisan status were the same as apprentices had to undergo on completion of the apprenticeship terms, and were to be administered by the National Apprenticeship Board. 22

The debates on these Bills reflected the support from organised industrial employers for the contemplated measures. The rationalisation of the labour process and reorganisation, involving the 'promotion' of white workers, would be facilitated by these interventions to restructure industrial training programmes and both the Bills were passed during the

1951 Parliamentary session. 23

That it was only in the building industry that the restructuring
of industrial training programmes included training for Africans,
through the totally separate system established in terms of the Native
Building Workers Act, can be explained by economic, political and
ideological factors. The craft nature of the labour process in house-
building and the more sharply defined delimitation between 'skilled'
and 'unskilled' building work, as compared with manufacturing in general,
had complicated the rationalisation of the building industry. Whereas
manufacturing industry emerged at the end of the war 'reorganised' but
with its racial hierarchy intact, the existing delimitation between 'skilled'
and 'unskilled' positions in building production came under pressure from
both building employers and the state with the shortage of building artisans.
The Native Building Workers legislation was therefore a two-fold measure:
it provided the 'means' for circumventing the 'monopoly of skill' by
white artisans in 'specified' areas and reorganising house-building produc-
tion on this basis. But, at the same time, it extended protection to white
building artisans in all areas where their position might be 'jeopardised'.

23. See for example, South African Industry and Trade, May 1951, for
industrial employers' reactions. These three measures, which
taken together restructured the 'training' required by industrial
capital during the early apartheid period, express a form of state
intervention in the reproduction of labour-power. This is because
'apprenticeship' represents an expense in developing labour-power
and hence is a factor which enters into the determination of its
value. As Marx argues, a reduction in the expenses of apprentice-
ship, through shorter terms or intensive forms of training, causes
a fall in the value of labour-power. This "implies a direct increase
of surplus-value for the benefit of capital; for everything that shortens
the necessary labour-time required for the reproduction of labour
power, extends the domain of surplus-labour", and hence profit.
A simplification of functions and a dilution of the labour process on
the basis of 'operative labour' diminishes the overall cost of apprent-
iceship. At the 'lower levels' and for 'unskilled' labour it vanishes.
Marx argues that the development of industry and the consequent
revolutionising of the forces of production, produced a tendency for
the homogenisation of the value of labour power, towards the eliminat-
ion of differing values based on the cost of reproducing different skills.
This tendency is illustrated and clarified in Braverman, Labour
and Monopoly Capital.

24. See above, p. 121.
It will be recalled that building trade unions in 1947 had demanded that safeguards be embodied in an Act of Parliament.\textsuperscript{25} Building employers, too, had argued that, if the state was to train Africans for building work, it would be necessary for "a total segregation...from the rest of the Building Industry".\textsuperscript{26} Whereas it had been contended that measures providing for direct discrimination on a racial basis may not be possible, the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951 was indeed such a measure. The Minister of Labour described it as constituting a positive step in the application of apartheid, as it would "afford the Native an opportunity to develop in his own area and to improve his position economically and to rid himself to a great extent of his sense of frustration".\textsuperscript{27}

The other side of the 'apartheid coin' was that, in order to protect the white artisan, a statutory job colour bar had been introduced into the building industry. With the promulgation of the Act, no employer in the building industry could employ Africans on skilled work in 'specified' areas. This restriction could, furthermore, be extended to all persons undertaking building work in 'specified' white areas by proclamation.

Thus existing areas of employment were to be curtailed and those Africans with training or experience in the building trades were to be restricted to work in defined areas, a form of labour conscription. Furthermore, although the provisions of the Apprenticeship Act had not in practice been utilised for training African workers for the building industry, it had contained no racially exclusive clauses. In terms of the Native Building Workers Act, however, Africans were expressly excluded from all the provisions of the Apprenticeship legislation.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} See above p. 140.

\textsuperscript{26} See above p. 133.

\textsuperscript{27} House of Assembly Debates, 1951, cols. 1792-3. The rhetoric of apartheid appears not dissimilar to the 'more liberal application of segregation', which was called for by both the South African Institution of Race Relations and the Johannesburg City Council in the immediate post-war years. See above, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{28} Under Section 12 of the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951.
no provisions for the settlement of disputes. Compulsory arbitration under War Measure No. 9 would continue to be enforced to settle a dispute. Anything else, such as the recognition of collective bargaining rights, was, according to the Minister of Labour, "out of place in a Bill of this kind". 29

Organised employers in the building industry were "pledged to lend the fullest support" to the policy. According to an editorial in their official journal, the "considerable economic significance" of the Act was that it placed the industry in a position to use "more productively the vast potential native labour supply which [had] been totally excluded from occupations...outside the range of unskilled operations". For building employers, therefore, "the permissive element in relation to the interests of Natives and the protective element in relation to the interests of non-Natives are complementary". 30

The National Party had promised potential supporters the 'benefits of apartheid'. The means for applying 'apartheid' to the conditions and relations of production in the building industry was the Native Building Workers Act and the administrative and legislative framework which was established in 1951 for state intervention in allocating work roles in the building industry. It is necessary now to examine the process of formulation of policies directed at the African working class in urban areas and the role of the 'apartheid' state in determining conditions for the reproduction of an increasingly proletarianised labour force.

30. SAB, August, 1951, p.9.
4.2. Housing Policy and Social Control

The question of the 'permanence' of the African urban population had again become a central issue in the formulation of 'Native policy' during the years immediately after the Second World War. The Native Laws Commission (the Fagan Commission) appointed in 1946 to inquire into the operation of laws relating to Africans in urban areas had been concerned to establish a rationale for a proposed policy "facilitating and encouraging the stabilisation of [African] labour", which was intended to promote the development of a permanently urbanised African labour force, outside the mining industry which would continue to use migrant labour. The policy of the National Party was diametrically opposed to this proposal and the change in regime marked the beginning of a new phase in state reaction to the increasing proletarianisation of African workers. According to the parameters of Nationalist policy outlined in a party committee report:

The ideal of total Apartheid, which should be aimed at is the gradual elimination of Natives from industries in white areas, but it is realised that it will be only achieved after many years...
As long as such Natives remain in urban areas... separate residential areas must be provided for them... It must be clear, however, that their presence in the white urban areas will be considered as temporary and that they will never be able to lay claim to political rights of any kind equal to those of the whites and that they will never be able to own real estate.

In pursuing the 'ideal', as Legassick has argued, "the Nationalist government could not, any more than its predecessor, ignore the structural

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31. As indeed the question of 'permanence' was a central issue in the formulation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, No. 21 of 1923. See above, p. 22.
32. Report of the Native Laws Commission, UG 28.-1948 (Fagan Report), para 65 (19). See also Section III.
33. The major parameters of Nationalist policy were outlined in the report of a party committee under the chairmanship of P. O. Sauer released during 1947, 'Verslag vir die Kleurvraagstuk Komitee van die Herenigde National Party', mimeo, 1947, (Report of the Colour Question Committee of the Re-united National Party, known as the Sauer Report), paras. 45 and 33.
crisis which required the state to involve itself more directly in the reproduction of labour power". In this, however, the definition of housing policy was to be guided by certain principles reflecting the aims of 'total apartheid'. This section traces the formulation of a policy framework for state intervention in conditions for the reproduction of the African labour force in urban areas.

**The Role of Housing Policy Defined**

The question of housing policy was only dealt with tangentially by the Fagan Commission, to the extent of a tacit acceptance that the costs of 'subsidised' accommodation for the 'stabilised' African labour force would continue to be shared between central and local authorities. The general approach of the Commission was that, as far as possible, this housing was to be provided on an 'economic basis', hence the implicit recommendation to use the Africans on skilled building work at differential wage rates. The Nationalist government acknowledged that the housing backlog had to be made up for the 'legitimate' workers demanded by industry. But, in keeping with the 'ideal' of gradually reducing the numbers of Africans in urban areas, any housing policy was to be linked to the system of influx control on the one hand, and to be based on a particular

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35. Report of the Native Laws Commission, UG 28-1948, paras.35 and 62. By including extracts from the report of the Departmental Committee appointed to enquire into the question of residence of 'Natives in Urban Areas', known as the Young-Barrett Committee, of 1935, as Annexure 5, the Fagan Commission endorsed, implicitly, earlier recommendations by government commissions and committees in this regard. See above, p.100.
system of financing involving employers, on the other. Furthermore, it was to be linked with the enforcement of residential segregation, the containment and controlling of the vast squatter areas, and the 'ordering' of racial patterns prevalent in many large urban areas, such as Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare in Johannesburg.  

Dr. A. J. Stals, Minister of Health and Housing, criticised the previous government which "had allowed free migration by Natives to town areas causing a situation over which cities 'could exercise no control"; The Nationalist regime immediately confronted this 'situation' by restructuring the administration of the existing influx control system. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1949 amended the procedure for establishing labour bureaux, the functions of which were to include registering unemployed Africans, placing workseekers in jobs and controlling the movement of African labour into the 'prescribed' areas. In November 1949, the Governor-General issued a proclamation which closed urban areas under the control of 21 local authorities (including Johannesburg) to the entry of Africans, except for mine employees, temporary visitors and those who had already been engaged for employment. Early in 1950, the regulations governing influx control and the registration of service contracts were extended to 95 urban areas.

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36. The implementation of this aspect of state policy is treated extensively in the following chapter. See above, p. 56, n. 30, for the historical background to the so-called 'Western Areas' of Johannesburg, as Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare came to be called.

37. Minister of Health and Housing quoted in SAB, October 1948, p. 11. It should be noted that this statement is not strictly accurate. See above, p. 75, ns. 71 & 73.

38. Survey of Race Relations, 1949-50, pp. 37-9. The closure of urban areas was made under Proclamation No. 271 of 1949. It should be noted that a similar proclamation had been issued in March 1947, before the Nationalist government. In addition, the Johannesburg City Council had proposed that a system of labour bureaux should be established as early as 1946. See above, p. 76, ns. 72 & 73. The Fagan Commission also recommended "the institution of a wide but centrally organised network of labour bureaux". Report of the Native Laws Commission, UG 28-1948, para. 44.
The policy of residential segregation was to be strictly enforced, and, to this end, the Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950 was passed. 39 This legislation imposed control throughout South Africa over inter-racial property transactions and occupation, a form of racial zoning of land and premises. Although it excluded African 'townships', it was clearly directed at places such as the Western Areas of Johannesburg, which referred to Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare. 40 During early 1950, police action in enforcing influx control measures in these areas had provoked serious riots. The events in Newclare were described by Smuts as "a grave threat to the safety and well-being of the public", when he moved an adjournment of Parliament on "a definite matter of urgent public importance". 41 According to the Minister of Justice in the debates on the increasing mobilisation and militancy of the African working class, "existing legislation [was] in many respects inadequate" to contain the struggles which appeared to be spreading from the workplace and becoming community-based. 42 The Minister indicated that measures were being

39. The Group Areas Bill was introduced in May 1950 by Dr. T.E. Donges, Minister of the Interior. For the 'principles' and historical background, see House of Assembly Debates, 1950, col. 7434 et seq. It is important to note that, under the previous government, segregation of South African Indians had been legitimised in the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946. This proved to be the forerunner of the Group Areas legislation. Davenport and Hunt (eds.), The Right to Land, Section 4 in particular deals with ownership and occupation of land by Africans and Asians in urban areas.

40. See above, n. 36. For a detailed study of the conceptualisation and effects of implementation of the Group Areas Act in Cape Town, see Western, J., Outcast Cape Town, (London, 1981).

41. House of Assembly Debates, 1950, cols. 1312-1417, for parliamentary discussions on the 'riots'.

42. Ibid., cols. 1311-2. These parliamentary debates reflect the theme of the potential linking of consumption-related and production-related struggles of the African working class, a theme which had been articulated by the Board of Trade and Industry in its report on the future of manufacturing industry, in 1945. The Board held that "Racial and class differences will make a homogeneous Native proletariat which will eventually lose all contact with its former communal relations which had previously given their lives a content and meaning. [These 'communal relations' previously subsidised the
prepared "to provide adequate powers to the Government to remove Native townships where it may appear to be necessary and where they are dangerous for the public safety". 43

In a statement on the "explosive situation", Dr. W. M. Eiselen, Secretary of Native Affairs, pointed to the role of housing policy in social control, restricting the African population in urban areas to those required by industry -the 'labour requirements'- and fulfilling the 'ideal' of total Apartheid:

...In the nature of things, the urban areas are in themselves a fruitful breeding ground for unrest because the Native population has increased so rapidly that housing measures could by no means keep pace with the great influx of population. ...The most pressing single need of the Native community is more adequate housing. Only by the provision of adequate shelter in properly planned Native townships can full control over urban Natives be regained, because only then will it be possible to eliminate the surplus Natives who do not seek or find an honest living in the cities. 44

The programme for social control contemplated by the Nationalist regime implied, therefore, the provision of housing for 'legitimate labour

the reproduction of labour-power with the product of the reserves, thus maintaining the basis for low wages in the urban areas. See above, n. 34. Large numbers of Natives congregated in amorphous masses in large industrial centres is a matter which no Government can view with equanimity...can very easily develop into a menace rather than a constructive factor in industry". Board of Trade and Industries Report No. 282, 1945, para. 135. Possible areas requiring policy responses identified by the Board, included, regional planning to bring about a measure of 'decentralisation' of industry, transferring some of the industries making 'cheap and standardised wares for Native consumption' to the reserves, residential segregation and 'racial parting in factories.'

43. Ibid. These 'measures' were finally to take the form of the Natives Resettlement Act, No. 19 of 1954, which established a Resettlement Board responsible directly to the Minister of Native Affairs to undertake the removals of Africans from the Western Areas.

44. Secretary for Native Affairs, covering minute to Department of Native Affairs Report, 1949-50, UG 61-1951, pp. I-II, (emphasis added).
requirements' in properly planned segregated areas. The existing shortage of housing, however, would be compounded with the implementation of the other legislative measures such as the Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950; the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, No. 52 of 1951; and the contemplated measures for actually 'removing' townships, which were legitimised in the Natives Resettlement Act, No. 19 of 1954. A policy framework adequate to the task was clearly required.

In preceding chapters, two issues have been identified as being central to the formulation of a policy framework, within which the state's agencies might tackle the housing question. The conflict arising around the use of African building workers to reduce the costs of production of housing appeared to have been resolved at the political level with the promulgation of the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951. The other issue concerned the question of distribution of the costs of housing and involved the system of housing finance. How this question was resolved, and the role of the resultant policy in the 'larger scheme' of apartheid, is examined below.

The Department of Native Affairs and the Formulation of Policies

The Fagan Commission appointed under the previous government made no recommendation to alter fundamentally the financing of 'subsidised' housing. Under the Nationalist regime, however, there was a significant restructuring of state apparatuses involved with the provision of housing and, from 1950, the Department of Native Affairs became increasingly

45. The debate and formulation of this 'policy' is examined in detail in the next chapter.

46. See above, p. 158.
dominant in the formulation of housing policy. One result was a 'radical' approach to the question of housing finance. 47

A preliminary step involved the reorganisation of the Directorate of Housing to bring it more closely under the Minister of Health. The National Housing and Planning Commission was reconstituted with members more sympathetic to the 'principles' of apartheid. By 1949, the South African economy reflected a downturn and, on the recommendation of the reconstituted Commission, the 'National Housing Scheme' initiated by the previous government 48 was abolished in September 1949. 49 The National Housing and Planning Commission considered that the scheme had resulted in wasteful expenditure and redefined the general approach which would be adopted by the state in the provision of housing funds, in the following terms:

...the State and local government should provide only the minimum needs of those who are unable to help themselves. Anything above the strictly minimum requirements must be regarded as non-essential, to be provided by the tenant at his own cost as his economic position improves...housing should as far as possible be on a fully economic basis and ...the capital cost of dwellings should be adapted to the income of the particular groups. 50

47. With the appointment of Eiselen as Secretary for Native Affairs in October 1949, and even more so after Verwoerd was brought into the Cabinet as Minister of Native Affairs in October 1950, the relationship between the Department of Native Affairs and the National Housing and Planning Commission changed. A statement which appeared in the same form in the reports of both bodies confirmed that the Department had progressed from a consultative role in the formulation of African housing policy to an equal partner with the Commission: "Native housing schemes will be examined by the Commission and the Department of Native Affairs acting jointly and concurrently...". National Housing and Planning Commission Report, 1950, UG 46-1951, p. 10; Department of Native Affairs Report, 1951-52, UG 37-1955, p.26.

48. See above, p.78, for the 'National Housing Scheme'.


Average annual wage rates for Africans in secondary industries (including construction), which had risen slightly during the war years, declined sharply from 1948, as Table 4.2 illustrates. How the state was to resolve the apparent contradiction between declining wages and the scale of the housing shortage against the background of the Treasury's position, was intimated by the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. Jansen, when he stated in 1948, soon after assuming office, that a role for employers was being considered. According to the Minister, "an amazing feature of the position" was that, "particularly in dealing with urban Natives in the past, employers, who really are the people responsible for the Natives being in the urban areas, have been left out of the picture entirely". 51 By April 1949, a proposal had been formulated which was outlined at a conference in Cape Town by the Minister of Native Affairs. What was contemplated was that all urban employers—industrial, commercial and otherwise, including householders—who did not "provide accommodation for their native servants on their premises", should contribute towards the cost of 'subsidised' housing. 52

Industrial employers objected that if they were compelled to contribute towards the costs of housing their workers, their production costs would increase. This would have the effect of increasing the cost of living while simultaneously jeopardising the position of smaller and

51. Minister of Native Affairs quoted in SAB, October 1948, p.15. In 1935, a Departmental Committee recommended that employers should be made "primarily responsible". Report of the Young-Barrett Committee, paras. 29 and 30, Extracts contained as Annexure 5 in Report of the Native Laws Commission, UG 28-1948, pp. 61-3. This recommendation was not strongly endorsed by the Fagan Commission.

52. SAB, April 1949, p.11
Table 4.2  Average Annual Wage Rates for Africans in Industry  
(excluding mining) 1939/40 - 1952/53

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>At Current Prices</th>
<th>At Constant (1959/60) Prices</th>
<th>Percentage Increase/ Decrease over previous year at Constant Prices (1959/60)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941/42</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>10.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942/43</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>8.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943/44</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>10.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944/45</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>10.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/46</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946/47</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947/48</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>0.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948/49</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>- 1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949/50</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>- 1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>- 0.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>- 0.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>- 0.9 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, Table 26, pp. 332-3.
struggling industries. According to the president of the Federated Chamber of Industries, the singling out of "one class to carry the burden of what should be a nation-wide responsibility", was deprecated by industry. Industry was one of the biggest taxpayers in the country and "none of the towns competing for industries had spoken of labour forces as a moral responsibility of employers". Finally, industrialists raised the familiar arguments about productivity and the implications of the proposal for "the meaning of wages". As an editorial in the journal of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers expressed the wage relation and the costs of reproduction:

The idea of subsidisation applied in the form of financial contributions towards housing will make it exceedingly difficult to appreciate the moral and economic concept of wages in the new scheme of things.

Although the proposal outlined by the Minister of Native Affairs in 1949 was not proceeded with in this form, by the 1952 parliamentary session an alternative policy had been formulated which envisaged contributions from employers towards the costs of service provision. Dr. H. Verwoerd had entered the cabinet as Minister of Native Affairs in October 1950 and the Department of Native Affairs became increasingly dominant in the formulation of a comprehensive set of policies directed at African workers which was consistent with the aims of total apartheid. Introducing the

53. Ibid., and SAB, May 1948, pp. 11-3, for discussions at the conference. The argument about the position of smaller and struggling industries being jeopardised if labour costs were increased, one effect of contributing to housing an amount additional to the wage, is dealt with by Kaplan in terms of Marx's analysis of the differential impact of wage fluctuations on capital of different organic composition. Thus 'smaller and struggling industries' would tend to a lower organic composition of capital and would be labour intensive. For these, accumulation had to occur through reducing the 'wage bill'. Kaplan, 'Class Conflict, Capital Accumulation and the State', chapter 8.


55. SAB, December 1949, p.9.
Native Services Levy Bill in June 1952, the Minister of Native Affairs described it as "a basic requirement", a pre-condition for the implementation of the housing policies which had been defined by 1952. It is necessary to describe how and why, this 'radical' approach to housing finance had evolved.

The Department of Native Affairs had very precise requirements in the choice of sites for housing the African 'labour requirements' of the cities. In line with the concept of racial zoning embodied in the Group Areas legislation, Verwoerd advocated "as a first principle", the setting aside in every town or industrial area, of "a comprehensive location site...large enough to house the whole of the working native population, so that peri-urban squatting, the overcrowding of native residential areas and unlawful lodging in backyards may be stopped". A broad hinterland had to be available for further growth, because as long as "economic requirements weigh more heavily than other interests [this] appears to be unavoidable". The demand for one adequate site was seen as necessary in order to avoid the series of smaller 'locations' which, according to Verwoerd, "lead to the fusion of white and non-white residential areas". The conditions for approval of 'locations sites' by the Department of Native Affairs were explicitly summarised by Verwoerd as follows:

...adequate distance from the white township; preferably a connection with the native area of a neighbouring town so that the number of areas may decrease;...separated from the European area by an area of industrial sites where industries exist or are being planned; within easy transport distance of the town or city, preferably by rail and not by road transport; the provision of a connecting road of its own with the city is

best designed to run through the industrial area; the provision of suitable open buffer spaces around proclaimed location areas, the breadth of which should depend on whether the border touches on a densely or sparsely occupied white area and a considerable distance from main, and more particularly national roads. 58

The acquisition of adequate land for housing purposes, even before the introduction of these conditions, presented a problem for local authorities, particularly in the mining areas of the Witwatersrand where the Gold Law had restricted the use of land in mineralised areas. 59 In order to overcome the difficulty with mining interests, the Minister of Native Affairs had, as he put it, "sought the assistance of the Minister of Mines" to have the Gold Law amended. In future, deep level development and prospecting activities in "native locations" would be permissible without the mining rights having to fall back to the state. 60

Access to adequate land having been secured in theory, the Department of Native Affairs defined its approach to the provision of housing 'on an economic basis'; 'economic housing' was to mean something quite different from that defined by the previous government. On his appointment as Minister of Native Affairs, Verwoerd had rejected the proposal for contributions from employers towards the costs of subsidising housing, because "it was founded on uneconomic building methods". As he put it, it would be "economically impracticable" to initiate a housing campaign on a national scale, "if the whole of the urbanised native population is...to be carried on the backs of the taxpayers from the hut to a modern planned residence". 61 But, by 1952, the 'site and services'

58. Ibid., pp. 42-3.
59. See above, p. 65, n. 46.
60. Pelzer, Verwoerd Speaks, p. 43.
61. Ibid., p. 45.
scheme had been devised within the Department of Native Affairs as an adjunct to the provision of 'conventional' housing, and the Native Services Levy was a necessary precondition for its implementation; a source of funding to finance its implementation without diverting funds from the complementary effort by local authorities to provide housing utilising African building workers, under the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951.

In terms of the site and services policy, 'suitable sites' with essential services, in 'well-laid-out townships', would be provided on a massive scale. On a certain percentage of these sites, local authorities would build 'economic' houses using African building workers, as and when housing funds were available. For the rest (mention was made of 80 to 90 per cent), the policy of 'self-help' would apply. 'Self-help' meant, in the ideological discourse of the Department, that "the natural capacity

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62. For a description of the site and services scheme, see Minister of Native Affairs speech in second reading of the Native Services Levy Bill. *House of Assembly Debates*, 1952, col. 7765 et seq. See also Editorial, "The Necessity for Site and Service Schemes", *Bantu* (an "Informal Publication of the Department of Native Affairs"), No. 9, 1955; Mocke, Wm. C., 'Site and Service Schemes - The Realistic Approach to Resolving the Bantu Housing Backlog', *ibid.*, pp.6-29. See below, n. 63, for use of term 'Bantu'. The precedent for the site and service policy was clearly the 'controlled squatting schemes' established at Moroka and Jabavu in Johannesburg after the squatter movements during the early 1940s. See above, p. 73. It should be noted that the concepts of 'self-help' and 'site and services' are central to the current policy debates on state intervention in the provision of low income housing in LDCs. Promoted by the World Bank and other aid agencies, housing policies which have been formulated and implemented on the basis of the self-help efforts of the urban poor have been subjected to substantive critique, See for example Ward, P.M. (ed.), *Self-Help Housing. A Critique*, (London, 1982).
and tradition of the Bantu for building his home is given its chance". The justification for the site and service approach to housing the 'labour requirements' of cities was expressed in terms of social control by the Minister of Native Affairs. Instead of 'illegal' squatting on unsuitable sites without services, "in uncontrolled and uncontrollable communities... ordered communities could be with one sweep concentrated on a sound basis". According to Verwoerd, "orderly housing [was] a prerequisite of proper control". The site and services scheme was a "scheme to house all workers under control, co-ordinated with the control of influx" which would be made effective by means of the system of labour bureaux. But, in "conformity with the apartheid principle of residential segregation", there was in most cases a considerable distance between the 'location' and the city, and the cost of linking services, which could be financed only from normal loans, was prohibitive to local authorities. There was no system for subsidising the costs of access roads and trunk services for water,

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63. Pelzer, Verwoerd Speaks, p. 46. It should be noted that from 1951, when the Bantu Authorities Act, No. 68 of 1951 was passed, the government began using the term 'Bantu' instead of 'Native' in certain of its legislative measures, retaining 'Native' in others. Hence the Native Building Workers Act, the Native Services Levy Act, and so forth. In 1954 a Division of Bantu Education was created within the Department of Native Affairs and in 1958, the Department of Native Affairs was divided into a Department of Bantu Administration and Development and a Department of Bantu Education. After 1962, the term 'Native' was no longer used officially, 'Bantu' being substituted throughout. The emphasis in state policy was, by this stage, on 'ethnic' differences rather than 'racial', in pursuit of the 'tribal homelands' policy. 'Bantu' provided the ideological conceptual basis to the territorial separation of various African communities. In terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, No. 46 of 1959, eight African 'national units' had been reconstituted, and land in the reserves was to be identified with each of the units.

64. Ibid., p. 47. See above, p. 122.

65. See above, p. 60, for discussion of municipal finance in the case of Johannesburg.
sewerage etc., which had to link up with the "European areas" in the cities. The intention of the Native Services Levy Bill was therefore to impose a levy of 2s 6d per worker, per week, on those employers "who make use of Native labour but who are doing nothing whatever about housing for them". The linking services required for the proposed townships would be paid for out of the fund created by the levies. In addition, loans would be available from the fund for the provision of services within the township itself. The collection of funds would be linked up with the administration of the service contract system in the area concerned by the relevant local authorities.

Introducing the Native Services Levy Bill in June 1952, the Minister of Native Affairs stated that the provision of services under this form of financial subsidy would mean that "rents", for either a serviced site on which the tenant erected the dwelling or housing constructed by African building workers, would "probably, for the first time, be within the means of Natives...even of those who receive lower wages". Furthermore, of the 2s 6d per week levy, 6d was to go towards transport services. The proposed townships for Africans would be located some distance from the cities, if all the conditions laid down for the approval of sites were complied with, and, as Verwoerd pointed out, it was "well known" that "when transport costs are increased there are often disturbances, terrible riots such as have occurred at Alexandra". The state initially had provided subsidies to transport companies, and thereafter loans, but the "hard facts" were that larger numbers of workers would have to

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66. Mine employers and certain industrial employers who had their own housing schemes for workers, such as compounds, or private householders who "have made provision in their backyards", were not affected by the proposed Bill. House of Assembly Debates, 1952 col. 7766.

67. Ibid., col. 7770.

68. Ibid., col. 7768. See above, p. 68, n. 54, for description of the bus boycotts in Alexandra during the early 1940s.
be transported greater distances from their place of residence to their work places, and "it cannot be done unless a subsidy is available".  

The proposed levy was therefore presented to employers as a limited, contingent measure to resolve the potentially "explosive situation", and, by May 1952, the collaboration of employers appears to have been secured. According to the representative of the South African Federated Chambers of Industry, although employers strongly objected in principle to the form of taxation envisaged in the Bill, "as it was tantamount to discrimination in wages on a racial basis", the housing situation was so serious that "a virile programme of housing development could not be delayed any longer". The proposed levy intended to make that a "fundamental possibility, and employers should therefore consider themselves duty-bound to collaborate...even though it implied a departure from their basic objection to that form of taxation".

With the passage of the Native Services Levy Act, No. 64 of 1952, and the earlier Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951, the Nationalist government had effectively 'resolved' the two major policy issues which have been identified in preceding chapters. Within the legislative framework thereby established, a coherent two-phase strategy had been formulated to enable the state housing apparatus to approach the housing question systematically: in the first phase, the 'squatter problem' was to be brought under control as quickly as possible through the extensive application of site and service methods; in the second phase, the temporary dwellings in the site and service schemes were to be gradually replaced by 'permanent' houses, either through the 'self-help' efforts of the 'tenants' themselves or through the interventions of local authorities utilising African building workers, with loans provided as far as possible on 'an economic basis'.

69. Ibid.

For the first time since the 'squatter movements' during the early 1940s had focused attention on the housing conditions of Africans in urban areas, a policy framework apparently adequate to the scale of the shortage, and able to relate the 'capital cost of dwellings' to prevailing wage levels, had been arrived at. But, concurrently with the evolution of this comprehensive housing policy, there had been significant developments within the research-related apparatus of the state. Thus, the process of policy formulation had been matched by development of the 'technical means' for its implementation. It is therefore necessary to examine the programme of research conducted from 1947 by the National Building Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, and to trace the development of policy instruments, the 'scientific' techniques and models through which the 'principles of apartheid', as expressed in housing policy for African workers, might be given 'concrete'; physical form.

4.3 The Role of Research and the 'Scientific' Basis to Policy

The question of 'scientific research' arose in general as a result of the industrial expansion and the diversification within manufacturing production which had occurred during the years of the Second World War. In March 1945 the Standards Bill was before the House of Assembly, designed to promote standardisation in the manufacture, production, processing and treatment of commodities. The Standards Act, which established the South African Bureau of Standards, was linked to the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, a statutory body which was established by the end of 1945, "to coordinate and promote research of all kinds". Within a year, the National Building Research Institute had been set up as a relatively autonomous unit within the Council with its primary task defined in terms of a programme of research into low-cost housing. This final section of the chapter describes the

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71. See above, p. 166 for statement by National Housing and Planning Commission.

72. See above, p. 103.

73. SAB, March 1945, editorial 'Standardisation in Industry', p. 7.
development of the research programme and identifies the role of
the research findings in both the formulation and implementation
of policies.

Standards of Accommodation: the formulation of 'irreducible
minima'

By May 1947, a committee had been constituted by the Council
for Scientific and Industrial Research to investigate standards of
accommodation for 'state-aided housing', at the request of the Director
of Housing of the National Housing and Planning Commission. The
Committee became known as the Research Committee on Minimum
Standards and, by its third meeting in December 1947, no less than nine
sub-committees had been formed. It was apparent that the report
commissioned by the National Housing and Planning Commission was
merely the first step in a programme of fundamental research into all
aspects of the housing product. According to N. Hanson, chairman of

74. This committee was formed in the context of the rising costs
of housing after the war, the shortage of materials and skilled
labour, and the attempts by the National Housing and Planning
Commission to implement its post-war housing programme.
See above p. 88 , and p. 107, for detailed discussion. Represented
on the committee were the following: National Housing and
Planning Commission, Department of Native Affairs, Social Welfare
Department, S.A. Bureau of Standards, S.A. Institute of Architects;
Department of Public Health, National Council for Social Research,
United Municipal Executive, S.A. Institute of Race Relations,
National Council of Women, Federale Vrouerad, Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research, National Building Research
Institute, and co-opted members from the Universities of the
Witwatersrand and Cape Town. Minutes of the Exploratory Meeting
of the Standards of Accommodation Committee, Council for Scientific
and Industrial Research, 8/5/1947, Govt. Archives, CBM 75/7/2/2.

75. Sub-committees were formed to study the following: Social trends,
population needs, family structure and family economics; Legislation;
survey attitudes of occupants to housing; estate planning;
ventilation; heating and cooling; lighting; noise; and, house planning
and design. For scope of work and terms of reference of each sub-
committee, see Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Research
Committee on Minimum Standards of Accommodation, Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research, 4/12/1947, pp. 5-19, ibid.
the committee, the committee "had not been empowered to deal with
the cost of buildings, its function being to study minimum standards
from a scientific point of view" but the question of costs would enter
the scope of the research committee's work when the study on standards
had been completed. 76

The sub-committee on house planning and design agreed that, in
theory, no differentiation in minimum standards, on the basis of race,
should apply. These were termed "irreducible minima", below which
"no human being should be permitted to live". According to P.H.
Cornell, organising secretary of the Research Committee on Minimum
Standards, however, "in practice the 'irreducible minima' would apply
particularly to Native housing and the...standard for European housing
would probably be a build-up on this basis". 77 An Interim Report on
standards was submitted to the National Housing and Planning Commission
in 1949. 78 It should be noted that the minimum standards recommended
by the Research Committee came under review almost immediately. The
National Housing and Planning Commission had been reconstituted after
the Nationalist election to government, 79 and a special inter-departmental
committee of the 'new' commission, the Native Affairs Department and the
National Building Research Institute made further reductions in the 'irre-
ducible minima', almost 30 percent in the case of space standards. 80

76. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Research Committee on Minimum
Standards of Accommodation, Council for Scientific and Industrial

77. Minutes of Sixth Meeting of Sub-Committee No.9, Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research, 5/4/1948, confidential, 4/48,
720.111(9), para. 2(a), ibid.

78. National Building Research Institute, Interim Reports of the Research
Committees on Minimum Standards of Accommodation, CSIR Research
Reports Nos. 22-30, (Pretoria, CSIR, 1949).

79. See above, p. 166.

80. Provision was made for two occupants to sleep in the living room and
certain room sizes were decreased. National Housing and Planning
Commission, 'Report on Minimum Standards of Housing Accommod-
oation for Non-Europeans', July 1951.
These revised standards were accepted by other building authorities and the technicians within the National Building Research Institute developed a series of 'type plans' showing the application of these standards, described as "among the lowest in the world", by the Director of the National Building Research Institute. Figure 4.1 illustrates two such type plans, the NE. 51/9 and NE.51/6. In addition to its role in formulating minimum standards of accommodation, the long-term research programme of the National Building Research Institute after 1950, which addressed the housing shortage reflected in Table 4.3, fell into two main areas. The first dealt with the "rent paying capacity" of African workers and the use of socio-economic surveys to establish this. The second dealt with how the costs of housing were arrived at and where reductions could be made.

The first socio-economic survey undertaken by the National Building Research Institute was carried out in the Springs municipality on the Witwatersrand. On the basis of this, a Committee on Socio-Economic Surveys for Native Housing Research was set up, consisting of representatives of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the National

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81. Jennings, J.E., 'The role of Native Housing Research in the Provision of Housing for the Urban Bantu', Paper Presented to the Annual Conference of the Institution of Municipal Engineers, Municipal Engineer, 1952, p. 119. Compared with similar standards in 16 "other civilized countries", on the basis of occupancy in single storey 2 bedroomed houses, the NE. 51/9 type (see Figure 4.1) had a net area per person of 61 square feet, while the average for the other countries was 141. See also Calderwood, D.M. and Connell, P.H., Minimum Standards of Accommodation for the Housing of Non-Europeans South Africa, CSIR Research Report No. 83, (Pretoria, CSIR, 1952). The NE. 51/9 type house had 4 rooms and an area (gross) of 582 sq. feet. The nett area was 481 sq. ft. See Table 2.7, p. 83, for a comparison of the areas of 4-roomed dwellings built by the Johannesburg City Council before 1948.

Figure 4.1 National Building Research Institute, Type Plans

(Jennings, The Role of Native Housing Research, p.122)
Table 4.3  Housing Stock and Shortage as at 31 December 1951, for Urban Local Authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Local Authority</th>
<th>African Population At 31/12/51</th>
<th>Total No. Houses in Location</th>
<th>Private Ownership</th>
<th>Local Authority Owned</th>
<th>Shortage As At 31/12/1951</th>
<th>No. Required 1952 - 1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>823,000</td>
<td>32,750</td>
<td>11,552</td>
<td>21,268</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>121,166</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>2,182</td>
<td>1,858</td>
<td>11,843</td>
<td>3,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germiston</td>
<td>64,195</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benoni</td>
<td>60,718</td>
<td>2,072</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springs</td>
<td>85,859</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roodepoort</td>
<td>46,400</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boksburg</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krugersdorp</td>
<td>46,243</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randfontein</td>
<td>21,072</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>148,910</td>
<td>2,302</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2,304</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>36,488</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>18,050</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>60,223</td>
<td>6,457</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,457</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>52,850</td>
<td>3,589</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>41,864</td>
<td>3,835</td>
<td>3,132</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberley</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>2,526</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS FOR PROVINCES* (includes the smaller local authorities not listed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Houses</th>
<th>Total Private</th>
<th>Local Authority Owned</th>
<th>Shortage As At 31/12/1951</th>
<th>Total Required 1952 - 1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>1,759,170</td>
<td>88,189</td>
<td>38,078</td>
<td>38,354</td>
<td>96,428</td>
<td>86,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>445,136</td>
<td>42,502</td>
<td>25,451</td>
<td>17,051</td>
<td>37,625</td>
<td>42,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>271,451</td>
<td>5,156</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>4,322</td>
<td>21,032</td>
<td>33,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>198,010</td>
<td>24,317</td>
<td>22,492</td>
<td>1,837</td>
<td>12,243</td>
<td>24,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals for Union</td>
<td>2,673,767</td>
<td>160,164</td>
<td>85,535</td>
<td>61,564</td>
<td>167,328</td>
<td>185,873</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Native Affairs, Survey 1951.
Council for Social Research and the Department of Native Affairs, to direct surveys in other urban centres. The work of this Committee continued until 1958 and confirmed the results of the first survey which had found the "existence" of 3 income groups: 83 The so-called 'economic' group consisted of those people who were "able to afford the basic requirements of life and an economic rent" and 40 per cent of the population were found to be in this category. The 'sub-economic' group comprised 13 per cent of the total. These could afford the basic requirements but required subsidisation of their rentals. But 47 per cent of the population could "not afford to pay any rent without jeopardising their requirements for the minimum necessities of life". The provision of housing for this 'sub-sub-economic' group was, according to Jennings, the Director of the National Building Research Institute, "probably the greatest problem facing the country [and] presented the greatest challenge to the technician". 84

Apart from the reductions made in the space standards of dwellings, the research programme of the National Building Research Institute was directed towards reducing the costs of various components making up the actual dwelling and the costs of infrastructural services in housing schemes. The latter was through increasing density in township schemes (increasing the number of units per acre) and determining the 'optimum' layout to achieve 'economies of scale', through a series of experimental townships which were developed in collaboration with various local authorities. 85


84. Ibid., p. 104; and Jennings, 'The Role of Native Housing Research', pp. 115-7. See above, Table 4.2, p. 168, for declining wages over this period.

The first 'experimental town' was at Witbank and, subsequently, in the Kwa Thema township developed with the Springs Town Council technicians had the opportunity of testing out research proposals both in township design and in methods of construction of the standard house types. The increased density obtained in Kwa Thema township, which was planned for an eventual population of 50,000, should be seen in the context of the conditions for approval of schemes which were imposed by the Department of Native Affairs, in line with the 'ideal of total apartheid'.

In planning Kwa Thema, according to the Town Engineer of Springs in 1953, "very large buffer strips between the township and neighbouring European agricultural holdings had to be provided". The area comprising the 'buffer strips' and consequently 'lost' to housing, or indeed any other use for the residents of the township, was no less than 30 per cent of the total land purchased for the scheme. The cost of the land had "unfortunately to be included as part of the total cost of Kwa Thema". The research work of the National Building Research Institute in regard to

86. Average density in a 'typical' township layout had been found to be 4 dwellings per acre gross. In Witbank, this was increased to 5.3 dwellings. Hector, A.R. and Calderwood, D.M., 'New Native Township for Witbank Municipality', S.A. Architectural Record, Vol. 36, No. 5. 1951.

87. See, Mitchell, R., 'Kwa Thema - the Construction of Native Housing by Native Building Workers', Municipal Engineer, 1953, pp. 86-104, for background and details of the scheme, which was initiated by A.J. Archibald, as Town Engineer of Springs, in early 1951. By early 1953, most of the "major problems at Kwa Thema had been satisfactorily resolved", according to Mitchell, his successor, and Archibald took up the post of Director of Housing with the Johannesburg City Council. See below chapter five.

88. See above, p. 170.

89. Mitchell, 'Kwa Thema', p. 89. The Department of Native Affairs laid down a minimum width of 600 feet for the 'buffer strips'. Of the total ground purchased for the scheme, namely 1,728 acres, no less than 530 acres were given over to buffer strips. In terms of the conditions, this land could not be used on the Kwa Thema side. The questions suggested by the transference of the costs of applying 'apartheid buffers' to the 'capital cost' of the housing scheme are taken up in the final chapter of this thesis.
reducing the costs of dwellings was, in large part, based on 'fieldwork' at Kwa Thema. Co-ordinated by the Committee on the costs of Native Housing under the chairmanship of T.H. Louw, President of the Institute of South African Architects, and financed with a grant from the National Housing and Planning Commission, detailed specialist studies were undertaken by 5 sub-committees on different aspects of the costs of production of housing. These studies included structural elements of the building, namely, foundations, walls, roofs, etc.; the question of building materials, their availability and systems of purchase; overheads and profits in building contracts; screening unorthodox methods of construction; and, perhaps the most influential study, increasing the 'efficiency' and productivity of labour in house-building. The findings of these research subcommittees were included in the comprehensive and influential report on the 'Costs of Urban Bantu Housing', which the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research presented to the National Housing and Planning Commission at the end of 1954.90

By this stage, the collaborative efforts of the National Building Research Institute, the National Housing and Planning Commission, the Department of Native Affairs, local authorities and various 'scientific' and professional institutions had resulted in the development of techniques and instruments on which the large-scale implementation of the township programmes from the mid-1950s would be based. The translation of national policies into programmes at the local level, through the mechanisms and techniques which have been described above, is examined in the next chapter which focuses on Johannesburg. Before this, however, it is important to identify the role played by the National Building Research Institute in determining the modus operandi of the apparatus which was established to give effect to the Native Building Workers Act of 1951, namely, the Native Building Workers Advisory Board. It will be shown that the 'scientific' basis to the reduction of both space and performance standards of dwellings, provided by the research apparatus of the state, was accompanied with a 'scientific' basis for the 'rational' exploitation of African building workers engaged in the production of houses.

The Basis for 'Rational' Exploitation of African Building Workers

The Native Building Workers Advisory Board, under the overall control of the Minister of Labour, was established in terms of Section 2 of the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951. The primary function of the Advisory Board was to institute a range of practices for the augmentation of a skilled African workforce, for the building of housing for the African working class in 'specified' urban areas, while simultaneously protecting the position of white artisans in the building industry. In terms of the legislation, the Advisory Board was required to recommend regulations for the form and content of training of learners as 'Native Building Workers' and for the registration of such learners and building workers. In addition, minimum wage rates and conditions of employment for each category were to be recommended to the Minister of Labour.

The first Native Building Workers Advisory Board was constituted on 1 August 1952 and comprised the Under-secretary for Labour as chairman; 5 members representing building employers' organisations; an equal number representing white building trade unions; one representative of the "interests of Native Building Workers"; one representative of employers of Native Building Workers, namely, local authorities; one adviser in connection with "matters affecting Natives", from the Department of Native Affairs; and representatives from the Department of Labour.

The Advisory Board held its first meeting on 4 December 1952, on the basis of proposals which had been formulated by an Inter-Departmental Committee during 1952. This committee consisted of representatives

91. See above, p. 158.
92. Under Sections 10 and 11 of the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951. In terms of Section 12, none of the provisions of the Apprenticeship Act of 1944 (as amended in 1951) were to apply to learners.
93. Section 13 provided for minimum rates of remuneration, working hours or other conditions to be determined by the Minister of Labour after consultation with the Minister of Native Affairs, the Wage Board and the Native Building Workers Advisory Board.
from the National Building Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; the National Housing and Planning Commission; the Department of Labour; the Department of Native Affairs; the Department of Education, Arts and Science; and Provincial Administrations. The proposals submitted by the Inter-Departmental Committee, which were agreed to by the Advisory Board, effectively provided the basis for the operation of the Building Workers Advisory Board in implementing the terms of the Native Building Workers Act with regard to training and wages. These proposals are examined briefly below.

It should be borne in mind that during 1952 the research work of the National Building Research Institute, particularly the various sub-committees on the costs of 'Native Housing', was well under way. With the development and adoption of standard type plans, detailed studies of the methods and work operations involved in their construction were undertaken. So-called 'cost norms', for materials, labour and overheads, were established for the NE. 51/9 type house in standard construction as a basis for comparison, and thereafter a series of 'reduced cost norms', covering cost-reducing variations in specifications, had been introduced. Based on the results of these studies of labour 'standards', a scheme for training and trade testing of building workers had been submitted to the Advisory Board. The essence of the proposals, according to the Inter-Departmental Committee's memorandum, was that,
simple, serviceable Native houses/which had been/ designed to allow for their construction by Native Building Workers who will not be required to show the same standard of skill as demanded from European artisans...may be built at minimum cost".  

The Inter-Department Committee proposed that, before embarking on a training programme, the existing skilled labour force—namely, those workers who had gained experience or received training in the building trades, primarily in government departments—should be ascertained by calling for applications for registration as Native Building Workers through the machinery of the Department of Native Affairs. If insufficient building workers were registered on this basis, a training scheme would be initiated under Section 10 of the Act. A certain amount of response was anticipated, however, as existing opportunities to do skilled building work in areas other than the townships were curtailed in terms of Section 14 and 15 of the Native Building Workers Act. By July 1953, a total of 2,065 applications had indeed been received from 124 centres.  

Registration as Native Building Workers would be on the basis of trade tests, which were limited to the four main operations in the erection of a standard house type, namely, bricklaying, plastering, carpentry and painting. The trade test standards were formulated on the basis of a

98. *Inter-Departmental Committee, Memorandum, 'Proposed Scheme for Trade Testing and Training', 17/10/1952, p. 1. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1.*


100. *Inter-Departmental Committee, Memorandum, 'Proposed Scheme for Trade Testing and Training', 17/10/1952, Annexures B, C, D and E. In 1955, 'plumbing' was added to the trades and trade test standards were approved by the Advisory Board. National Federation of Building Trade Employers, Report on Meeting of Native Building Workers Advisory Board, Circular No. 1955/40. NFN. 15/1, 18/3/1955, p. 2. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1.*
series of 'labour time studies', which had been conducted at Kwa Thema by the costs division of the National Building Research Institute. 101 Apart from the general knowledge required of the workers of the tools and materials in each trade, and the various work processes and construction details which required diagnosis and proficiency, the real 'measure' of proficiency and basis for registration was 'productivity', the output of the worker per hour or per day. This was measured over the two-day test. 102

As far as training was concerned, the 'cost norm' studies had shown that brickwork accounted for 81 per cent of skilled labour and for 61 per cent of unskilled labour engaged in the NE. 51/9 dwelling. 103 The Inter-Departmental Committee therefore proposed that the training scheme for learners should initially be limited to bricklaying. Under Section 10 of the Native Building Workers Act, training was not to exceed four years, and might consist of a period in an approved institution and a period in employment with a 'designated' employer. The scheme submitted to the Advisory Board, however, envisaged that the full period be spent in practical training with an employer(s) and that there should be no institutional training whatsoever. Under the system proposed, 'learners' were graded into B and A and placed in the service of an employer 'designated' by the Minister of Labour, who, after consultation with the Advisory Board,


102. A "brickworker" for example had to lay 625 bricks per day on a NE. 51/9 type house, and to set up a door frame and an adjacent window frame in 1 hour; a "plasterworker" had to cover 35 sq yds. of external walling or 28 sq. yds. of internal walling per day; a "woodworker" had to make a batten door in 4 hours; and, a "paint-worker" had to be able to paint 8 sq yds. of walling in 1 hour, and glaze 32 panes of 1 sq. ft. per day. Note the different terminology indicating the difference in skills required of bricklayers, plasterers, carpenters and painters. This illustrates the ideological component of the concept 'skill'. See above, p. 114, for discussion of skill and technical division of labour in building and control over the labour process.

103. Glen 'Time studies of labour', p. 51.
the Minister of Native Affairs and the Minister of Education, Arts and Science, would determine the number of learners to be trained during any given period. Although a learner entered into an 'agreement' with an employer for a prescribed period of training, local authority building schemes were dependent upon finance being made available annually by the National Housing and Planning Commission and, hence, building operations frequently were reduced or ceased because of lack of funds. A provision in the legislation allowed the Minister of Labour to authorise the discontinuity of training in employment for any 'learner'. This, together with the absence of institutional training, would enable employers to adapt to the discontinuity in housing funds experienced by most local authorities. As the Chairman, S.D. Mentz, expressed it at a meeting of the Advisory Board in March 1953:

As there was no institutional training there would be no pool of learners who would have to be placed with employers. The number of learners would be determined by the needs of employers. Where a local authority wished to commence a building scheme it would determine the number of Native Building Workers, learners and labourers it required. Similarly, if a local authority had to curtail its operations, the number of learners, and the responsibilities in regard to their 'training', could be reduced. This highlights an important difference between the traditional system of apprenticeship training in the building industry, which guaranteed employment for apprentices, the Training of Artisans Act of 1951, which also guaranteed employment, and the Native Building Workers Act, which explicitly excluded Africans from provisions of the Apprenticeship Act.

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104. Inter-Departmental Committee, Memorandum, 'Proposed Scheme for Trade Testing and Training', p. 5. Conditions of 'learnership' for Grade B were a minimum period of practical training of one year and a maximum of two years, before undergoing a test for Grade A. After a minimum of one year in practical training as Grade A, a worker could undergo the trade test for registration as a Native Building Worker.

105. Under Section 10(3)(a) and (5) of the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951.

In practice, learners could be 'hired and fired' on the same basis as unskilled casual labour, the category of building labour most susceptible to building fluctuations. 107

The training schedules and test standards, as indeed the terms of the Native Building Workers Act, had been formulated on the basis of orthodox 'brick and mortar' methods of construction. But, while brickwork represented over 60 per cent of the work on a standard house, only 20 per cent of the brickwork operations were fully skilled and a system which introduced 'operative labour' had been developed at Kwa Thema, under the auspices of the National Building Research Institute. 108 The system involved breaking down the work processes in the construction of a standard house type into a number of 'tasks', each of which contained a range of 'skills' and was performed by a particular group of workers, who then moved on to another house to perform the same task while a second group completed its specific task on the structure. Workers employed on the 'task-system' were not classified on the same basis as learners and building workers under the Act, neither could they comply with the training schedules. A sub-committee was appointed to consider the 'exemptions necessary to permit native labour being employed as operatives under

107. It appears that the provisions for discontinuing 'training' periods were exercised to a considerable extent. From 1953 to June 1956, 27.2 per cent of the total 'designated' learners were dismissed or resigned; by 1957, this increased to 31.5 per cent, and to 56 per cent in 1961. It is not possible to establish the proportion in each group, but it can be safely assumed that the number of resignations would be negligible, given the requirement for employment in order to remain in the urban areas in terms of influx control regulations. Department of Labour, 'Progress Report', encl. Native Building Workers Advisory Board, Minutes of Meeting 4/9/1956. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1; Department of Labour, 'Progress Report as at 30th June 1957'. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 2; Native Building Workers Advisory Board, Minutes of Meeting 3/4/1962, Annexure 3. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1.

the Act". 109 The representative of the National Federation of Building
Trade Employers on the Advisory Board expressed the employers' support for the system in terms of the increasing productivity of labour it facilitated:

Having inspected schemes employing the "task-system"...
I felt that this system, in which training is limited without prejudice to output, should be commended in the light of present needs, and accordingly supported the...employment of operatives and expeditious training up to a minimum standard of proficiency.110

By mid-1954, the National Building Research Institute had produced an evaluated grading in the trades for workers performing the 17 tasks under the 'operative system' which corresponded to the orthodox classification provided for in the legislation. 111 Why it was important for local authorities to be 'designated' as employers under the Act and to be able to register the employment of learners - on either orthodox or operative systems - was related, almost entirely, to the wage determinations made under the Act, and their effects on the labour cost structure in house production. This function of the Advisory Board must be briefly examined.

109. Workers were divided into those responsible for setting out; building corners and other datum points; building straight walls and filling in brickwork. National Federation of Building Trade Employers Circular No. 1954/85. NFN,15/1, 16/6/1954, p. 1. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1.

110. The Director of the National Federation of Building Trade Employers of South Africa, D. de C. Malherbe. Ibid., (emphasis added). In regard to 'output', the average output of operative bricklayers at Kwa Thema was in fact 800 bricks per day, considerably higher than the required standard of 625 for the trade tests. See above, n. 102.
Department of Labour, Ref. 1612/70-6, Annexure B, p. 5, encl.

111. At the request of the Chairman of the Advisory Board, the National Building Research Institute produced a method of grading, in which 10 per cent of operatives in a 'gang' would receive the rates of pay prescribed for building workers; 22 per cent would be the equivalent of Grade A; and 68 per cent would receive rates prescribed for Grade B. It was estimated that the ratio of operatives to labourers would be 1:1, 4. See 'Notes on a meeting between the N.B.R.I., the Department of Labour and the Department of Education, Arts and Science', 9/4/1954, encl. National Federation of Building Trade Employers, Circular No. 1954/85. NFN, 15/1, 16/6/1954, BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1.
The basis of the determination of minimum wage rates was to be found in the Inter-Departmental Committee's memorandum. The most important aspect of the proposals was that wages should be based on the wage rates for unskilled labourers prevailing in the building industry in the various areas covered by different Industrial Council Agreements, rather than relating to rates existing for skilled building artisans. This was proposed "in order not to run contrary to the conditions prevailing in the industry in various areas", but was to have significant effects on the labour cost structure of the building projects of local authorities. There were considerable variations in wages and conditions for unskilled building labourers in various areas.

There were three components to the hourly wage, namely, the basic wage rate, the statutory cost of living allowance (C.O.L.A.) calculated on the basis of War Measure No. 43 of 1942, and a holiday fund. For unskilled building labourers working a 44-hour week on the Witwatersrand, for instance, the total hourly wage was 1s 5d at 1 July 1953. In the Cape Peninsula, by contrast, total wages amounted to 1s 11d per hour with a 42-hour week, and the 'agreement' for the Orange Free State Goldfields prescribed a total wage of 8d per hour, with a 52-hour working week. In spite of the variations, the basic rates for unskilled building labourers prevailing in each area were proposed as the basis for calculation of wages for learners and building workers registered under the Act, as follows:

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112. Inter-Departmental Committee, Memorandum, 'Proposed Scheme for Trade Testing and Training', p. 6.

113. See below, chapter five, for the case of Johannesburg City Council

114. Of this, the basic hourly rate was 8¾d, since 5 September 1949; the C.O.L.A. was 7½d, which had increased from 4½d in September 1949; and ½d per hour was supposedly for the holiday fund. 'Witwatersrand Labour Costs', SAB, July 1953, p. 23.

115. 'Schedule reflecting conditions of employment in the Building Industry for the various areas as at 1 July 1953', SAB, August 1953, p. 31.
learner Grade B's basic wage would be 1d per hour more than the basic wage prevailing for labourers in the area concerned; learner Grade A's basic wage would be 2½d per hour more than Grade B; and for skilled workers registered as Native Building Workers, the basic wage rate would be 5d per hour more than Grade A. The Inter-Departmental Committee's proposals were accepted by a majority vote of the Advisory Board at its first meeting in November 1952 and the proposed Determination was published on 1 May 1953. For 'Native Building Workers' on the Witwatersrand, a basic wage rate of 1s 5½d per hour was prescribed, which, together with the cost of living allowance, amounted to a total hourly wage rate of 2s 3d per hour. By comparison, the total hourly wage rate for white artisans in the building industry as at 20 March 1953 amounted to 7s 5d. Of this, the basic wage was 3s 9d; cost of living allowance was 3s 1d; a holiday fund of 6d and a benefit fund of 1d. The Determination was published in its final form and came into operation on 23 November 1953. It remained binding until November 1956.

The suggestion to base wage rates for registered learners and building workers engaged on skilled work on the rates prevailing for unskilled workers was of crucial importance. Firstly, this meant that any increase in wage rates reflected in Determinations would only be formulated in response to, and after, wage rates for unskilled labourers had been increased by various Industrial Council Agreements for the building industry in the areas concerned. Thus, on the expiry of the first Determination in November 1956, as there had been no increase in labourers' wage rates during the period, minimum rates remained

117. 7 members voted for, and the 3 trade union representatives against, accepting the wages proposed by the Inter-Departmental Committee. Native Building Workers Advisory Board, Minutes of Meeting, 4/11/1952, p. 9. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1.
unchanged in the second Determination, which was published on 4 January 1957 and remained in force until 13 January 1960. By February 1959, the National Federation of Building Trade Employers had agreed to increase wages of labourers under the various Industrial Council Agreements; thus 'appropriate increases' were recommended for learners and building workers in the third Determination, which was published in January 1960.

Secondly, the 'total segregation', on a racial basis, of skilled workers in the building industry, which building employers had proposed at the end of 1946, was actually achieved with the separation of wage regulating mechanisms. Wages for skilled white building artisans were negotiated on Industrial Councils, within which the interests of both trade unions and building employers were represented. In the case of 'Native Building Workers', wages were 'determined' by the Advisory Board in conjunction with the Wage Board and the Department of Labour. While trade union representatives on the Advisory Board consistently opposed the wage rates in the Determinations, on the grounds that they were "too low", attention should be drawn to the 'majority vote' which was evident throughout the period. On each of the Advisory Boards constituted between 1953 and 1965, the representative of "the interests of Native Building Workers" was none other than W. J. P. Carr, who, simultaneously, was the Manager of the Native Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council and therefore, in effect, was also representative of "the

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122. Wage Determination No. 186 under the Wage Act came into operation on 17 August 1959 and laid down minimum wages for all unskilled labour on the Witwatersrand. Government Gazette, No. 6265, 24/7/1959. See Native Building Workers Advisory Board, Minutes of Meeting, 7/12/1959, Item, 6, p. 3. BIFSA Archives Files, No. 1; and for details of the third Determination, Government Notice No. 130, Government Gazette, No. 6358, 29/1/1960.

123. See above, p. 133.

124. See for example, Native Building Workers Advisory Board, Minutes of Meeting, 4/11/1952, p. 9; 4/9/1956, pp. 11-14, BIFSA Archives Files No. 1.
interests of employers of Native Building Workers". 125

The fundamental importance of the InterDepartmental Committee's memorandum to the functioning of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board has been illustrated in preceding pages. Formulated largely on the basis of the 'scientific' research conducted by the National Building Research Institute, the proposals for 'training' and the basis to wages are crucial for an understanding of how the townships for African workers were implemented throughout the country from the mid-1950s.

The analysis presented in this chapter has illustrated how four 'contentious issues' concerning the production of housing for African workers, first raised in a questionnaire formulated in 1944 by a sub-committee of the Johannesburg City Council, were gradually resolved. 126 The collaboration between different levels and branches of the state, and the interaction between processes of policy formulation and implementation within the apparatuses of the state; had, by 1954, resulted in the establishment of the 'necessary pre-conditions', under which: use could be made of 'native operatives'; differential wages for skilled work had been introduced; the method of 'training' implied no cost to the building industry or to the state; and the protection of the interests of white building artisans had been secured. The next chapter examines the translation of 'apartheid' policies into programmes at the local level and describes the process of implementation of the South-West Townships programme by the Johannesburg City Council during the period 1954-1965.

125. Although it should be noted that for the third Determination, it was in fact Carr who proposed the increases; 20 per cent for Grade B, 15 per cent for Grade A, and 10 per cent increase for building workers. In this regard, he was perhaps influenced by the findings of the National Institute of Personnel Research which conducted research into the Johannesburg City Council's wage policies and found that 96 per cent of the Council's African labour force was living "below the 'Poverty Datum Line'" and recommended general wage increases. See below, p. 237. Department of Labour, 1612/70/2/1 (confidential), Minutes of Meeting of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board, 7/12/1959, p. 3. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1. Carr's alternate on the Advisory Board was D. F. Hennesy.

The focus in this chapter reverts back to the local level and to an examination of the relations between the Johannesburg City Council and central government, particularly the Department of Native Affairs after 1948. The Department had acknowledged that the housing backlog had to be made up for 'legitimate' workers, but, as shown in the preceding chapter, this was to be linked to a tightening up of the system for influx control, on the one hand, and a redistribution of the costs of housing through a system involving employers, on the other. Furthermore, any housing programme was to be related to the enforcement of residential segregation, the 'ordering' of racial patterns in areas such as the Western Areas of Johannesburg, and the control of existing squatter settlements. The aim of the present chapter is to explain how policies, which were defined and formulated on the basis of 'the ideal of total apartheid', were translated into programmes and implemented within existing conditions in Johannesburg.

The first section examines the concept of racial zoning as applied to the metropolitan area of Johannesburg and shows how the 'principles' and guidelines for racial planning, formulated within the Department of Native Affairs, were translated into a concrete land policy for Johannesburg. In the second section, the implementation of the townships programme, on the basis of the 'site and service' policy approach of the Department of Native Affairs and departmental construction, is described. Finally, the practices and programming of activities for the mass production of housing undertaken by the Housing Division's building organisation, are examined in detail.

1. The name Soweto is derived from 'South-Western Townships'.
2. See above, p. 161.
3. See above, p. 172.
5.1 Racial Zoning and Land Policy

The concept of racial zoning and, related to this, the conditions for approval of sites selected for housing schemes as defined by the Minister of Native Affairs were legitimised with the passage of the Group Areas Act of 1950. This Act, which provided for the ordering of racial patterns and control over interracial property transactions and ownership, was directed specifically at areas such as Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare, the so-called Western Areas of Johannesburg, where Africans had owned property for generations. It should be recalled, however, that the Western Areas had been at the centre of debates within the Johannesburg City Council since before the war, when a scheme under the Slums Act envisaged the reduction of population in these areas to the "owner-occupier class". In October 1944, Council had, in fact, adopted proposals for the complete reconstruction of the Western Areas on a racial basis and all previous resolutions had been rescinded. The concept of the racial zoning

4. See above, p. 163.

5. See Figure 5.1, p. 205. Conditions in Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare during the 1930s were described above, p. 52. In the original slum clearance scheme, 5469 families would have been displaced from these areas under the Slums Act of 1934. In response to the strong opposition to the scheme, a commission was appointed by the Administrator in 1939 (the Glen Leary Commission). Administrator's Notice No. 252, 10/5/1939. By April 1943, the decisions of the commission had still not been made public. The Provincial Secretary had, however, enquired whether the Johannesburg City Council would be prepared to incur the "colossal expenditure" involved and to obtain the sanction of both houses of Parliament. Provincial Secretary to Town Clerk, 6/7/1942, JCC Minutes, 17/10/1944, p. 863.

6. In early 1943, representations were made by Councillor S. J. Tighy, M.P. for the complete "elimination of non-European occupation" in Martindale, Sophiatown and Newclare and the re-sale to whites of the ground vacated. His memorandum envisaged that "other native areas in the city [would] be treated in a similar manner" and included the elimination of Alexandra Township. S. J. Tighy M.P. to Town Clerk, 13/1/1943. Tighy's proposals were not accepted by Council but comprehensive proposals by the Special Committee Re Post War Development, Establishment of Industries, etc., were adopted by Council at a meeting in October 1944. The proposals included i.a.; that all Africans in Newclare be moved and housed in Orlando/Pimville area and Newclare be expropriated and converted into a "purely Coloured area"; also those in Sophiatown and Martindale, which were to be expropriated and converted into a "European area" and rezoned as a business and light industrial area, respectively. JCC Minutes, 17/10/1944, pp. 863-6.
of Johannesburg thus predated the Group Area Act. In October 1944, it was considered that Council had "ample powers under the Housing and Slums Act, Natives (Urban Areas) Act and the Local Government Ordinance to bring about the change". However, from 1944, the Johannesburg City Council was confronted with the growth of organised 'squatter movements' and, with attention focused on the acute shortage of housing for urban Africans, there was no further discussion or resolution on the future of the Western Areas until after the 1948 election. The electorate had been promised the 'benefits of apartheid' by the Nationalist party and, in October 1949, a deputation of whites from areas adjoining the Western Areas made representations to the Minister of Native Affairs regarding "the presence of coloureds, Indians and natives in these areas". This was a period of heightened struggle, which followed on the riots in Durban involving Africans and Indians, and in February 1950, Johannesburg City Council adopted the motion "that all Natives should be removed from Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare, ..without further delay".

The Western Areas Removal Scheme

By May 1950, a survey of the Western Areas was underway at the same time as the Group Areas Bill was being debated in Parliament.

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7. 'Report of Special Committee Re Post-War Development, Establishment of Industries, etc., JCC Minutes, 17/10/1944, p. 865.
8. See above, p. 69.
At several meetings in June, however, officials of the Johannesburg City Council assured representatives of African ratepayers in the Western Areas that the survey had nothing to do with either the Group Areas Act or the Western Areas Removal Scheme. It was "concerned only with relieving overcrowding and removing slum conditions".  

Prior to the report on the survey being submitted in April 1951, however, methods for implementing the removals and the financial aspects had been considered by the Minister of Native Affairs. According to Dr. Eiselen, Secretary for Native Affairs, the proposals formulated by Verwoerd, in which the Johannesburg City Council would "undertake the role of active partner whilst the Government co-operates by providing the funds", had already received cabinet approval. On 3 October 1951, the Council agreed in principle to accept responsibility for the removals, "subject to satisfactory financial arrangements being made between the Government and the Council". It was, however, the Department of Native Affairs...

12. On 2 and 16 June, 1950, Councillor I.E.B. Attwell, Chairman, Non-European Affairs Committee and W.J.P. Carr, Manager, Non-European Affairs Dept., gave these assurances. Carr disassociated the Dept. from a statement in the Rand Daily Mail, 13/6/1950, which linked the survey to the contemplated removal of 100,000 people from the Western Areas to the Orlando/Pimiville area. See 'Memorandum from African Anti-Expropriation Ratepayers Association and Proper Housing Movement', JCC Minutes, 9/12/1952, pp. 1061-70.

13. The Minister's proposals were that the removals were to be undertaken in each area in two stages: (a) by the Council removing Non-Europeans from a broad buffer strip along the boundary of each area where it adjoined an occupied European area, such strips to be left as open buffers or to be developed immediately as industrial buffer zones, and (b) thereafter ensuring the further removal from each "buffered off" area either by a continuation of the process under (a) or by the purchase for approved purposes of the sites in that area by European individuals or interests. The Government would commit itself to the provision of loans; a portion of the sum made available each year would be for the purchasing or expropriating of buffer strip land. Secretary for Native Affairs to Johannesburg City Council, 3/4/1951. JCC Minutes, 24/4/1951, pp. 430-1.

Affairs which assumed the 'active role', initially in conducting negotiations between the Department of Mines and various mining companies to secure adequate and 'suitable' land and, thereafter, through its representatives on the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the Council in June 1952 at the instance of the Minister of Native Affairs.  

The establishment of the Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee was important in two respects, both of which related to the formalisation of central/local relations which was implied by such a joint committee. The composition of the committee - with three officials from the Johannesburg City Council and two representatives from the Department of Native Affairs - ensured that centrally defined policies would be translated into programmes likely to be acceptable to both. For the people directly affected, to whom any scheme was unacceptable, the formation and operations of a joint committee dispelled any doubt as to the responsibility borne by the Council. In the face of growing opposition to the scheme.  

According to the Secretary for Native Affairs in April 1952, "the time [had] arrived when your Council should be informed confidentially of the progress made..." Accordingly, a deputation met the Minister of Native Affairs, in Cape Town on 7 May 1952. His comprehensive land proposals concentrated on farms adjoining Orlando 'location'; Meadowlands - the eastern portion of which was owned by Council- and Diepkloof No. 9. The Council was instructed to form an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the land proposals. Two representatives from the Department would liaise between the Minister and the Committee which would receive "increasing powers". Sec. for Native Affairs to Johannesburg City Council, 30/4/1952, and report of meeting in JCC Minutes, Special Meeting, 11/6/1952, pp.470-2; also, JCC Minutes, 27/1/1953, pp.109-10.  

The Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee comprised: J.J. Page, Chairman General Purposes Committee; G.B. Gordon, Chairman Finance Committee; L.V. Hurd, Chairman Non-European Affairs Committee, for the Johannesburg City Council; F.E. Mentz, M.P. and C.A. Heald represented the Department of Native Affairs and were the liaison officers. It is significant that Mentz was also the Chairman of the interdepartmental 'fact-finding' committee which had been appointed during 1952 by the Minister of Native Affairs to submit recommendations for the selection of 'Native residential areas' on a regional basis for the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging areas. See below, for discussion of Mentz report and land policy proposed for Johannesburg.
in April 1952, the City Council had claimed that "this is not the Council’s scheme, it is being dealt with by the Government under the Group Areas Act". ¹⁷ But when the Ad Hoc Committee reported in December 1952, however, complicity could no longer be denied. The scheme proposed differed from the 1944 proposals, which had been adopted by Council, in only one respect. ¹⁸ Whereas it had then been contended that Council had sufficient powers to effect the 'racial reconstruction' of the Western Areas, by 1952 conditions were such that, in order to implement the removals, not only were the provisions of the Group Areas Act to be invoked but, in addition, the Ad Hoc Committee recommended further restrictive legislation. The purpose of the latter was "to enable Council to acquire properties from owners who prove unreasonable", in terms of existing legislation. ¹⁹

In order to effect the removals of Africans from the Western Areas, Sophiatown and Martindale were to be declared a 'group area' for white occupation and eventual ownership and Newclare was to be proclaimed


¹⁸ Although the 1944 proposals had not granted freehold title in Meadowlands (99 year leasehold was proposed) for those dispossessed in the Western Areas, freehold title was to be available at Zuurbekom, 23 miles away. The Ad Hoc Committee offered no freehold title to property. For details of the scheme, see ibid., pp. 1052-61. The proposals were accepted by the City Council in January 1953, when the United Party group in Council agreed to proceed with the scheme. 'Report of Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee', JCC Minutes, 27/1/1953, pp. 102-10.

¹⁹ 'Supplementary report of the Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee', JCC Minutes, 9/12/1952, p. 1054.
for 'coloured' occupation and later ownership. The 'necessity' for additional legislation was perceived in the context of growing opposition to the scheme. In October 1952, at the height of the Defiance Campaign against unjust laws organised by the African National Congress, Dr. A.B. Xuma, Chairman of the African Anti-Expropriation Ratepayers Association and Proper Housing Committee, had asked in a memorandum submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee,

Under what law, which discriminates against and affects only African ratepayers from the rest of the ratepayers of Johannesburg and compels African ratepayers to acquiesce to compulsory removal without their consent, is action taken? We know of none... We have no intentions to surrender our properties to subserve discrimination and white domination.

By the 1954 Parliamentary session, however, additional legislation had been formulated within the Department of Native Affairs and the Minister, Dr. H. Verwoerd, introduced the Natives Resettlement Bill, the implications of which will be discussed below. Here, it is necessary to situate the proposals for the Western Areas in the wider context of emerging patterns of responses by the state to the urban African population.

20. The legal effects of an area being proclaimed for white occupation were; (i) a year after publication of the proclamation, all disqualified persons were to vacate the properties unless granted a permit to remain in occupation; (ii) the owners of properties could continue their ownership, or sell to anyone in their own racial group, as the area would remain controlled in respect of ownership. The legal effects in the case of a group area for ownership by whites were; (i) the owners could continue their ownership for their lifetime but could not sell or bequeath the property to anyone not of the white racial group; (ii) after a certain date, no person could acquire immovable property in the proclaimed area unless of the white group except under permit. Ibid.

21. The Campaign started on 26 June, 1952 and continued until December. Although most successful in the Eastern Cape, rather than the Transvaal, it attracted international publicity and support and led to tremendous growth in support for the African National Congress. For a detailed account see, Benson, Struggle for a Birthright, pp. 140-156. See also, n.23 below.

The Mentz Committee and the Formulation of a Metropolitan Land Policy

The debate and struggle for the Western Areas was central to the evolving pattern of state responses to the urban African population. The increasing organisation of resistance and mass mobilisation from 1949 was met with increasing repression and violence. The relationship between "properly planned townships" and the regaining of "full control over urban natives" was stressed repeatedly by Verwoerd and other officials of the Native Affairs Department during this period of "unrest". It was, therefore, within this context that Verwoerd had appointed an interdepartmental "fact-finding" committee during 1952 to investigate and report on the question of selection of 'native residential areas' on a regional basis for the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging areas. Members of this committee, under the Chairmanship of F. E. Mentz M.P., were Dr. Moolman of the National Resources Development Board; Heald, an under-Secretary of the Native Affairs Department and Barker, an official of the Land Tenure Advisory Board, which had been established in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950. Mentz and Heald were, in addition, the two members whom Verwoerd had appointed to the Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee as liaison officers. The Western Areas proposals would therefore be integrated into any land policy for regional planning on a racial basis; in essence the terms of reference of the committee members, whom Verwoerd described as "experts" in the spheres of "native housing in cities and racial planning".

23. From 1949, when a 'Programme of Action' had been adopted at the annual conference of the African National Congress, there was frequent and turbulent protest. During 1950 there were three major demonstrations and popular mobilisation reached a peak in 1952. Although 'formal' membership is not a valid measure of its political significance, the African National Congress had 100,000 paid up members in October 1952. A few months previously, before the start of Defiance Campaign, the number had stood at 7,000. The campaign had been successful in terms of mobilising people on a large scale; for instance, of the 10,000 volunteers called for, more than 8,500 had gone voluntarily to jail despite the intimidating effect of police action. See Benson, Struggle for a Birthright, p. 159.

24. See above, p. 164.

It should be noted that, according to a memorandum submitted to the Mentz Committee, the Johannesburg City-Council had considered the question of siting townships on a regional basis prior to 1948, and the Witwatersrand Non-European Regional Planning and Housing Committee had been formed in 1947. But nothing had materialised and, in 1949, the Transvaal Municipal Association Executive Committee made representations for the establishment of a regional planning body "to determine the most suitable locality for the establishment of Native townships". Finally, early in 1952, the Council had called a meeting of representatives of Reef municipalities to consider "some general principles regarding the siting of Native townships on the Reef".  

On 29 September 1952, following a series of local inspections, the Mentz Committee met in Johannesburg to recommend some 'general principles' for the Johannesburg area. Figure 5.1 indicates the areas.

26. The Witwatersrand Non-European Regional Planning and Housing Committee held a number of meetings, under the Chairmanship of Councillor A.E.P. Robinson, at which a master plan prepared by Col. Bowling - a City Planner of Johannesburg - was considered. In February 1948, a minute had been sent to the Town Clerks of the various Reef municipalities, to the Native Affairs Department and Provincial Administrations, enclosing reports in connection with the establishment of jointly sponsored "Native towns to serve the whole of the Reef". What was proposed was the creation of a "single widely representative body endowed with all the overriding statutory powers necessary to bring satellite Native townships into immediate existence...". Memorandum, 24/9/1952, signed by J.H. Nolte for Town Clerk and W.J.P. Carr, Superintendent of Non-European Affairs, Johannesburg City Council, cited by Nationalist M.P. van der Walt (Pretoria-West) in House of Assembly Debates, 1954, cols. 2733-4.

27. The Mentz Committee met representatives from the following bodies: Municipality of Johannesburg; Anglo American Corporation of S.A. Ltd.; New Consolidated Goldfields, Ltd.; General Mining and Finance Corporation, Ltd.; Rand Mines Ltd. (Central Mining Group); Union Corporation, Ltd.; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co. Ltd.; Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce; Die Johannesburgse Afrikaanse Sakekamer; Transvaal Chamber of Commerce; Peri-Urban Areas Health Board; Western Areas Local Area Committee; North-Eastern Local Area Committee; Fontainebleau Health and Vigilance Committees; Linden Property Owners; Nancefield Vigilance Committee; Catholic Mission; Albertynsville Squatters;
Figure 5.1 Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, 1952: Findings of the Mentz Committee

(Mentz Report Part IV)
both within the city and beyond the municipal boundary in the peri-urban areas, which concerned the Mentz Committee. According to Verwoerd, a lack of long term planning had resulted in the "disorderly development" evidenced by "slum areas such as Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare in the heart of the city; mixed residential areas such as Pageview and sections of Nancefield; squatter camps in a circle around the city at Kensington B, Witpoortjie and Albertynsville... 'squatters' in the backyards of the European residential areas and 'locations in the sky' on the top storeys of flats". 28 The findings and recommendations of the Mentz Committee are summarised below and should be read in conjunction with Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. 29

(i) North and North-East:

Proposals by A. J. Cutten - a Johannesburg City Councillor - and the Peri-Urban Areas Health Board, that farms in the northern areas be allocated as a residential area were rejected because this "would create another 'black spot' in the European area". 30

Protea Coloured Township; Nationalist Party Councillors on the Johannesburg City Council; owner of the farm Klipriviersoog and Mr. A. J. Cutten a town planner on his own behalf. See Mentz Report Part IV, para. a. (Translated from the original by Translations Dept. City Hall, Johannesburg, November 1953). Johannesburg Municipal Reference Library.

28. Statement by Dr. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, "Orderly Development", Department of Native Affairs, December 1953, p.1. Johannesburg Municipal Reference Library. The reference to squatters in backyards and "locations in the sky" found expression in the amendments to the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, No. 16 of 1955, in terms of which, owners of buildings such as flats were prohibited from having more than five Africans residing on their premises without the consent of the Minister. Regulations regarding domestic servants were also tightened up. In 'white areas' these workers could reside only on their employer's premises.

29. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are drawn from sketches contained in the Mentz Report and reproduced in statement by Minister of Native Affairs, "Orderly Development", pp. 5 - 6.

30. The Committee felt that the northern suburbs, with an African population of 21,000, did not warrant a separate residential area as these were mostly domestic workers accommodated on their employers' premises. Mentz Report, para. 5. A. J. Cutten was a town planning consultant and outspoken critic of Nationalist party policy. See Cutten, A. J., 'Native Housing', S. A. Architectural Record, May 1952 pp. 114-125, particularly his plan for "rational worker distribution for Johannesburg", p. 117.
Figure 5.2 Mentz Committee Regional Planning Proposals

(Mentz Report Part IV)
a population of 80,000 Africans at 1952, in the north-east peri-urban area, was regarded as the residential area for those Africans working in the northern areas. The Committee recommended that those working in other parts of Johannesburg and elsewhere should be moved to 'locations' serving those areas. If this were done, and influx controls exerted, the existing size of Alexandra would be "sufficient to serve the northern and north-eastern suburbs for many years". Squatters in the peri-urban areas such as Kensington 'B' were to be removed and steps taken "as soon as possible to secure this area for European ownership and occupation".31

(ii) City Area:

Africans from the Western areas were to be moved to Meadowlands and Diepkloof which was land adjoining existing township development by the Council in areas south-west of the city. Pageview was to be included under the scheme and, after all inhabitants from these areas had been moved, Western Native Township - housing 20,000 people - was also to be removed although "fairly well isolated". Eastern Native Township however, was "well isolated" as it was situated between "dams and mining works". As the industries in the vicinity were 'served by the inhabitants', it was recommended that this township with a population of 4,200 should remain.32

(iii) South-West Areas:

The National Party Group in the Johannesburg City Council submitted a general planning scheme to the Committee. This envisaged the establishment of a 'group area' for Africans on land to the south-west of the city.33 Here, on 5,630 acres, the City Council had established

31. Mentz Report, para. 5.
32. Ibid., para. 13.
33. It is possible that the Memorandum of 24/9/1952, signed by Nolte and Carr, (see above, n. 26) constituted part of this submission. Dr. Verwoerd refers to the Memorandum during the debate on the Natives Resettlement Bill. House of Assembly Debates, 1954, cols. 2887-9.
'locations' at Orlando (East and West), Pimville, Moroka, Jabavu, Dube and Mofolo. In addition, the Council owned a further 4,001 acres which could be made available immediately for housing. These proposals, which were endorsed by the report of the committee, assumed the Potchefstroom/Johannesburg railway as the southern 'boundary' to the proposed group area. The situation of Pimville in relation to the latter was therefore considered "entirely wrong" and it was recommended that this location should be moved to the area north of the railway. To the south of Pimville, according to the committee, conditions were "critical" however: "Persons of all races live together in these areas and improvement [was] most necessary". Africans in the vicinity of the white 'township', Nancefield, were to be moved north of the railway and industries were to be established to form "the necessary buffer strip between the two racial groups". In terms of the conditions laid down for 'racial planning' of cities, it would be unacceptable to the Department of Native Affairs to have the national Johannesburg/Potchefstroom road running through the townships. It was consequently recommended that this national road should be diverted to pass south of the railway. The existing road could serve as an access road from within the townships to the city.

With regard to the necessary hinterland for future expansion, the Committee considered that several farms - including Meadowlands - situated north of the railway and adjacent to the existing 'locations' were "eminently

34. See Figure 5.3
35. This excluded the portions of the farms Meadowlands and Diekpoof No. 9, which were required for the rehousing of people from the Western Areas.
36. Mentz Report, para. 18. Negotiations between the City Council the the Department of Native Affairs about the exclusion of Pimville continued until 1961, when it was finally agreed that the so-called 'Mentz Line' would be deviated to include Pimville within the South-Western Townships, or Soweto as these came to be called.
37. Mentz Report, paras. 10 and 17.
38. See above, p. 171.
suitable". Not only were there small white populations settled there, but the mining concerns which owned the land had no objection to their being set aside as hinterlands provided that their interests were protected. 40 Further to the west, the farm Zuurbekom No. 9, two-thirds of which lay north of the 'line' was designated as the 'long term hinterland'. It was considered that this area might never be required, however, in view of the government's policy that "industries should be moved nearer Native territories". 41 Nevertheless, further small holding schemes or estate developments on this farm were to be prevented.

The Mentz Committee was "convinced that the natural Native residential area" [sic] for Johannesburg was to the west, north of the Potchefstroom railway line. Their proposals, illustrated in Figure 5.2., reflected the 'principles' enunciated by the Minister of Native Affairs and represented, in his words, "the path to orderly development ". 42

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40. The farms concerned were: Vogelstruisfontein, Doornkop and the portion of Klipriviersoog situated north of the line. Except for the latter these farms were owned by mining concerns. Ibid., para. 14. See above, p.204,n.27, for mining interests represented at the Mentz Committee meeting in Johannesburg.

41. Mentz Report, para. 15. It should be noted that the concept of industrial decentralisation, linked as it was to the question of influx control in urban areas, was a central component of the overall apartheid conceptual framework. See for example, Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa (Tomlinson Report), UG 61-1955. But, programmes for implementing industrial decentralisation policy were only promoted by the government from the early 1960's; and then to 'growth poles' in 'border areas' in the first instance, rather than the rural areas designated as 'homelands' themselves. See above, p. 35, n.43.

42. The 'location' site proposed for Johannesburg by the Mentz Committee with available land and immediate hinterland was sufficient for over half a million people and therefore, 'comprehensive enough to house the whole of the working population'; furthermore, it adjoined 'locations' of neighbouring towns on the Witwatersrand so that the number would 'decrease rather than increase'. Roodepoort 'location' was included and those of other local authorities such as Maraisburg, Krugersdorp, Randfontein etc., would form one complex with Johannesburg's area in the future. Mentz Report, para. 11. See statement by Dr. Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, "Orderly Development", Department of Native Affairs, December 1953. See also, House of Assembly Debates, 1954, cols. 2528-30 and 2887-9, for Verwoerd's endorsement of the Mentz Report.
The report of the Mentz Committee was made available to the Johannesburg City Council in November, 1953. The proposed 'land policy' implied a regional redistribution of residential areas for the 'labour requirements' of the Witwatersrand and was therefore far wider in scope than the Western Areas scheme, in terms of the spatial (and social) reorganisation envisaged. During the period of operation of the Mentz Committee, however, relations between the Department of Native Affairs and the United Party group in the Johannesburg City Council, particularly with regard to the Western Areas scheme, had by all accounts deteriorated.

The report of the Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee had finally been approved by the Johannesburg City Council in January 1953; the only objection to the scheme was the question of freehold rights for those who were to be dispossessed of their property in the Western Areas. 43 According to Verwoerd, however, the City Council had "reneged" following the "agitation" caused by meetings between United Party members of Parliament and the City Council, 44 and the Department of Native Affairs had therefore proceeded with the scheme through an Advisory Committee which

43. But, as Verwoerd correctly pointed out, the policy of the Johannesburg City Council in 1939, on the question of granting property rights to Africans removed from the Western Areas, and that adopted in 1944 (see above, ns. 5 and 6) did not differ essentially from the policy of the Native Affairs Department. For instance, Meadowlands had been considered as a site for rehousing, but under a system of 99 year leasehold and not freehold. Full property rights were to be granted at Zuurbekom, however, but this was 18 to 23 miles away from Johannesburg (See Figure 5.1.). According to Verwoerd, the City Council "...just as in Orlando... wanted to control their locations in a manner in which they cannot be controlled when Natives have full property rights". House of Assembly Debates, 1954, cols. 2531-2.

44. The Nationalists had been returned to power with an increased majority during the elections in 1953. The Mentz Report was rejected by the Tucker Report on the urban policy approach of the United Party, released by Strauss -leader of the United Party- when the Party's support for the Western Areas Scheme was withdrawn. See Rand Daily Mail, 13/3/1954; Sunday Times, 14/3/1954; and Star, 16/3/1954, for reports. See Verwoerd's discussion in House of Assembly Debates, 1954, col. 2527.
had been appointed with effect from 1 August 1953. The original Ad Hoc Committee had recommended the establishment of a separate board to implement the removals and, during March 1954, with the almost simultaneous publication of the Mentz report, the Natives Resettlement Bill was introduced to Parliament by the Minister of Native Affairs, the object of which, as set out in the preamble, was,

To provide for the removal of Natives from any area in the magisterial district of Johannesburg or any adjoining magisterial district and their settlement elsewhere, and for that purpose to establish a Board...

In order to implement the Western Areas Scheme and to resettle 'properly' all the "squatters, tenants or illegal occupants", on the regional basis indicated in the Mentz report, the Natives Resettlement Board, established in terms of the Natives Resettlement Act No. 19 of 1954, came into effect on 1 August 1954.

The preceding pages have described how the 'principles' and guidelines for racial planning, formulated within the Department of Native Affairs, were translated into a definite land policy for the metropolitan area of Johannesburg by early 1954, and how the reconstruction of the

45. The Advisory Committee functioned until 31 July 1954, when it was replaced by the Natives Resettlement Board. The composition of the Committee reflected the "increasing powers" which Verwoerd had promised the original Ad Hoc Committee, and which would be increased still further with the Board. It comprised: Chairman, W.H.L. Heckroodt, "an expert on transport and an experienced businessman" F.E. Mentz M.P., a member of the Native Affairs Commission, Verwoerd's "representative" and Chairman of the Mentz Committee; Representatives from the National Housing and Planning Commission and Provincial Administration; Superintendent of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council; and four members of the City Council - Chairman of Finance Committee, Chairman of Native Affairs Committee, Chairman of the General Purposes Committee and "a member of the opposition". Verwoerd in House of Assembly Debates, 1954, col. 2534.

46. For the debate on the Bill, which came into force as the Natives Resettlement Act, No. 19 of 1954 on 1 August 1954, see House of Assembly Debates, 1954, col. 2515 et seq.

Western Areas on a racial basis, first mooted within the Johannesburg City Council itself, became a central component of the policy for the racial zoning of land on a regional basis. The questions which arise with regard to the formation of the 'Resettlement Board' - a central government body - for implementing compulsory removals and resettlement 'elsewhere', and the subsequent transformation of the 'traditional' relationship between central and local authorities in matters of urban administration, which the increasing centralisation implied, will be addressed below and in the final chapter. Now, however, it is necessary to examine the processes involved in the implementation of the township programmes and to explain how the South-West Townships of Johannesburg were given 'concrete' physical form.

5.2 Implementation of the South-West Townships Programme

The preceding section described how the 'land policy', which restricted the development of townships and the provision of houses for African workers to areas south-west of Johannesburg, was formulated on the basis of several apartheid planning 'principles' and legitimised by 1954. This section focuses on the formulation of the townships programme on the basis of the 'site and services' approach imposed by the Department of Native Affairs and the implementation of the departmental construction programmes. The section therefore examines how the two legislative components of the policy framework for state intervention in the supply of housing, namely, the Native Services Levy Act of 1952 and the Native Building Workers Act of 1951, were implemented in Johannesburg.

48. The relationship between local authorities and central government departments was called into question because, in terms of Section 10 of the Natives Resettlement Act, No. 19 of 1954, the Resettlement Board could be designated as an 'urban local authority' for the application, within certain specified areas, of certain provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act, No. 25 of 1945. For the legal aspects of the Resettlement Act, as compared with the Urban Areas legislation as consolidated in 1945, discussed in detail by Dr. D. L. Smit M. P. (East London City), see House of Assembly Debates, 1954, cols. 2603 et seq.
It was suggested in chapter four that the evolution of a coherent policy framework for intervention in the production of housing had been matched by the development of the technical means for its implementation through the research apparatus of the state, namely, the National Building Research Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Following the passage of the Native Building Workers Act in 1951, much of the research work, organised and coordinated by the National Building Research Institute, was based on Kwa Thema, a 'township' of the Springs municipality on the Witwatersrand. Kwa Thema represented the first attempt to construct a township with the employment of Africans on all skilled work in terms of the Native Building Workers Act. Initiated by A.J. Archibald, the Town Engineer of Springs, towards the end of 1951, the scheme had involved close collaboration with the National Building Research Institute, the National Housing and Planning Commission, the Department of Native Affairs and the Union Health Department. It was this collaboration which had resulted in the comprehensive and influential research report on the 'Costs of Urban Bantu Housing'.

49. See above, p.183, for background and description of Kwa Thema.

50. A.J. Archibald had been a protagonist in the social debates preceding the passage of the Native Building Workers Act in 1951. From July 1945, on his return to S. Africa, he worked closely with the S.A. Institute of Race Relations and the Rotary Club, "privately and as Town Engineer of Springs", in campaigning to end the monopoly of white building artisans in skilled building work. See for example correspondence between Archibald and Rheinallt Jones, Director of the SAIRR, 1945, William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand, SAIRR'B'Boxes. Archibald prepared a memorandum for circulation to all local authorities in 1946; Archibald, A.J., 'Native Housing, the only real solution: Construction by Native Labour' South African Institute of Race Relations Memorandum R.R. 11/46, 8/1/1946.

51. See above, p.184, see also, Mitchell, 'Kwa Thema'; and Jennings, 'The Role of Native Housing Research'. 
published in 1954. Thus smaller local authorities on the Witwatersrand had exploited the provisions of the Building Workers Act, and the technical 'expertise' of the National Building Research Institute, to reduce the costs of their respective housing backlogs. But what of the Johannesburg City Council and its immense building programme?

By December 1952, the Johannesburg City Council had resolved to create the position of Director of Housing and; in January 1953, Archibald was appointed. By February 1954, the Johannesburg City Council had finally been designated an employer under the Native Building Workers Act, and a separate Housing Division had been established to implement the township construction programmes, a 'direct labour organisation' under the Director of Housing. It had therefore taken a full decade for departmental construction utilising skilled African labour at differential wage rates within the townships, a scheme first mooted in 1944 within the Johannesburg City Council itself, to become operational.

52. National Building Research Institute, Research Studies on the Costs of Urban Bantu Housing, CSIR, Series DR10, Pretoria, 1954. The report, which was presented to the Secretary of the National Housing and Planning Commission in December 1954, contained detailed specialist studies undertaken by the NBRI. A direct result of the report had been a Department of Native Affairs circular to all local authorities, which imposed a maximum cost limit of £250 on houses. JCC Minutes, 6/12/1955, p. 1059.

53. For Witbank, see Hector and Calderwood, 'New Native Township for Witbank Municipality'; see also, Jennings, 'The Role of Native Housing Research', Only Springs municipality had reduced their actual backlog by 1954, however, according to a survey undertaken by the Department of Native Affairs.

54. JCC Minutes, 27/1/1953, p. 100.

55. Prior to this, agreement on the employment of African building artisans had been reached by the City Council in October 1952, well after the promulgation of the Native Building Workers Act of 1951, and then, only in relation to repairs and maintenance of buildings. In October 1953, it was resolved to apply for designation as an employer under the Act, in order to reduce the costs of new construction by applying reduced rates of pay to learners employed on skilled work. (See above, p. 192, for wages and conditions of employment of learners). In December 1953, the application still had not been submitted because it had been considered "prejudicial to the Council in its labour relations in other fields". JCC Minutes, 27/10/1953, p. 871 and 8/12/1953, p. 1074.

It will be recalled, however, that in order to contain the squatter 'problem' and to 'house all workers under control', the site and services scheme had been formulated within the Department of Native Affairs during 1952, as an 'adjunct' to the provision of conventional housing by local authorities.\(^57\) The Native Services Levy Act of 1952 had been passed to provide a source of income to finance its implementation, and regulations under the act became effective on 1 January 1953. The Native Services Levy Fund, created by a 'Levy' on employers of 2s 6d per week per worker, formed part of the 'Native Revenue Account' of local authorities.\(^58\) By way of a direct charge against the Fund, essential linking services to proposed townships (located at considerable distance from existing infrastructure) could be provided at no 'cost' to local authorities and, by way of grants and loans from the Fund, services could be provided within the townships themselves.\(^59\) By June, 1953, the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council had registered over 12,500 employers under the Act, employing approximately 95,000 workers. A revenue of about £600,000 per annum was anticipated from the levy\(^60\) and on this basis, a works programme for the provision of sewerage, roads and water reticulation to existing areas such as Orlando, Moroka and Meadowlands had been submitted to the Minister of Native Affairs.\(^61\)

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57. See above, p.172.

58. See above, p.60, for background to 'Native Revenue Account'. See below, Table 6.4, p.267, for details of Johannesburg City Council's 'Native Revenue Account' over the period 1948 - 1965 and the impact of the Native Services Levy Fund on the Account.

59. Table 5.2 below, p.227, gives the projects approved and financed by the Native Services Levy Fund of the Johannesburg City Council.

60. For the organisational methods employed in implementing the regulations made under the Act, see JCC Minutes, 9/12/1952, pp. 1027-9; and Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department Johannesburg City Council, for the period 1 July 1952 to 30 June, 1953, pp. 3-5. Of the total contributions of £339,456 collected during the first six months, £57,021 was transferred to the Secretary of Transport to subsidise the costs of transport of workers from the townships to the City area.

61. 'Report of Special Housing Committee', (Proposed Works Programme in the Native Areas, 1953-1956), JCC Minutes, 24/2/1953, pp.234-6. See Figure 5.1, p. 205.
It is necessary to examine the site and service scheme in detail because, as will be illustrated below, it was to become the central policy instrument of the Department of Native Affairs and the basis for the implementation of the townships, rather than an adjunct to local authority building programmes.

The Site and Service Scheme

Initially, the Johannesburg City Council had not supported the Department of Native Affairs in its policy for large-scale site and service settlements. At 1953, the Moroka Emergency squatters camp which had been established in 1947 still had a population of 55,000 housed in 'temporary' shelters on 20' x 20' stands, and in the 4,034 breezeblock rooms in Orlando West Shantytown - also an ad hoc emergency measure by the Council - no less than 34,000 people were 'housed'. The Special Housing Committee of the Johannesburg City Council had been strongly opposed to the extension of squatter settlements on a more permanent basis, which was how the site and services scheme was perceived. By early 1954, however, the integral nature of 'sites and services' to the range of policies relating to housing the African labour force, which were emerging from the Department of Native Affairs, was apparent. Thus a deputation from the Johannesburg City Council to the Minister of Native Affairs in April 1954, to discuss housing loans for a departmental building programme of 2,000 houses in Mofolo, were informed that from then on, available housing funds were to be primarily devoted to the acquisition of land for site and services schemes. According to the Secretary

62. JCC Minutes, 26/5/1953, p. 407; Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953, p. 5. See above, p. 67, for the background to the 'controlled squatting' scheme at Moroka and Orlando temporary rooms; also Table 2.9, p. 96.

63. Indeed, as the Parliamentary debates in March 1954 on the Natives Resettlement Bill made explicit, the actual formulation of policies for 'resettlement' and the contemplated amendments to the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act of 1945 relating to influx control were based on the concept of large-scale site and service schemes. This aspect will be covered in more detail in chapter 6.
for Native Affairs, "if this principle were accepted and evidence of its implementation forthcoming, he [Minister of Native Affairs] would be prepared to ask for special funds for the purchase of land, leaving the normal housing funds for the building of houses in the schemes". By June 1954, Johannesburg City Council had adopted a scheme which provided for a total of 30,000 serviced sites.

But, in contrast to the "very austere type of project" which the Minister had in mind, "consisting of piped water with communal stand-pipes, graded untarred roads, minimal streetlighting, a temporary WC of the pit or bucket type on each plot or, when waterborne sewerage is provided, communal latrines and lavatory blocks and communal washhouses", the City Council had recommended augmented services. This modified scheme was not, however, accepted by the Minister of Native Affairs. In view of 'limited funds' and the large numbers of people whom the Department intended to resettle, it was not considered "possible in every scheme to delay settlement until sewerage and water were supplied to every stand". The Department in fact required 50,000 sites and insisted that the Council institute a pail service and reduce water reticulation to a minimum. Table 5.1. gives details of the site and service scheme: the standards of infra-structural development within the townships and the terms of financing under the Native Services Levy Fund. In accordance with this, in February 1955, the Johannesburg City Council adopted a programme for the provision of

64. Secretary for Native Affairs to Johannesburg City Council, 14/4/1954, JCC Minutes, 29/6/1954, p. 654.
65. 'Report of the Special Housing Committee' (Site and Service Schemes), JCC Minutes, 29/6/1954, pp. 654-660.
Table 5.1  Department of Native Affairs, Site and Service Scheme

Survey and Planning  
(80% of costs covered by grant from N.S.L. Fund
20% .........................loans from N.S.L. Fund)

If survey and planning layout of land to be utilised for site and service scheme was undertaken solely for the purpose of determining routes of roads, water mains, high tension lines and sewerage mains or pipes within the schemes, full costs (comprising 80% total costs) would be covered by a grant from the Fund. The subdivision of blocks into residential sites was to be undertaken later and financed by way of a loan.

Link Services to Townships  (Full costs - direct charge N.S.L. Fund)

Water to the reservoir for internal reticulation; access roads and bus routes; outfall sewers and sewerage disposal works; and electrical reticulation to transformer stations. All provided by way of a direct charge against the Fund.

Rudimentary Services within Townships  (Grants from N.S.L. Funds)

- Communal water supply; standpipes at approximately 1000 ft. intervals
- Untarred roads but of sufficient standard for nightsoil and rubbish removal service to operate effectively. Essential drainage works including stormwater drainage to be included in the road system. But, high standard tarred bus routes were permissible, "as it is essential for workers to get to work".
- Streetlighting for control purposes only; every third street in addition to the bus route.
- Sanitation: 1 convenience per stand of pit privy, bucket system or waterborne sanitation. Full sewerage reticulation not permitted if implementation of the site and service scheme was thereby delayed.

Method:

The Department of Native Affairs envisaged the provision of sites, in stages: Families would be settled on the first batch of 40' x 70' sites with rudimentary services and "permitted and persuaded" to erect a temporary "Native-type house", using local or waste materials, or a £35 building materials loan from the local authority. A second batch of sites would then be laid out and, concurrently with the servicing of this area, some housing and fuller services would be provided in the first section People had to be settled in temporary shacks before loans would be granted for the construction of permanent houses.

Source: Compiled from JCC Minutes, 22 and 25/2/1955, pp. 197-9; and 28/6/1955, pp. 606-7.
50,000 sites with rudimentary services. The first site and service scheme approved by the Minister of Native Affairs consisted of 424 sites in Moroka North and was available in July 1955. The second scheme was 872 sites in Central Western Jabavu and, by December 1955, site and service schemes comprising almost 10,000 stands had been approved with the plan to provide 10,000 serviced stands per annum.

The Production of Houses

With the establishment of the Housing Division and registration of the Johannesburg City Council as an employer in terms of the Native Building Workers Act, departmental construction was underway by February 1954; 150 building workers were employed and houses were being constructed at the rate of 12 per day. Building up the Housing Division as a direct labour organisation with sufficient 'skilled' labour to undertake the production

66. 'Report of General Purposes Committee' (Site and Service Schemes). JCC Minutes, 22 & 25/2/1955, pp. 197-9. It should be noted that, in terms of circulars of 3 & 12 August, 1954 issued by the Department of Native Affairs to all local authorities, any applications for housing funds would be considered only in respect of plots in site and service schemes. Only if the Johannesburg City Council made 'adequate progress' with the servicing of sites, would it be allocated funds for housing which would keep the departmental building teams engaged in the construction of houses. Site and service schemes were to be planned strictly in accordance with the 'Guide to the Planning of Non-European Townships', issued to local authorities by the National Housing and Planning Commission in July 1951. See also article by Senior Urban Areas Commissioner of the Department of Native Affairs, Mocke, 'Site and Service Schemes'.


68. See Figure 5, p. 223. In addition to site and service schemes No. 1 and 2 at Moroka North and Western Jabavu, No. 3 (extension to Central Western Jabavu); No. 4 (Mofolo North) and No. 5 (Molapo) had been approved. JCC Minutes, 6/12/1955, p. 1057.

of housing presented no real problem. Initial constraints on production appear to have been rather the fact that insufficient schemes had actually received the approval of the Minister of Native Affairs, or indeed been authorised by the City Council itself. Thus, apart from 200 houses authorised at Dube township, the only work available for the building team, until a start could be made on Mofolo township, was, ironically, at Meadowlands which was being developed by the Natives Resettlement Board for the people removed from the Western Areas, and where 300 stands had been serviced.

By July 1955, the first occupants were settled in site and service schemes and the Council could apply for funds for the construction of permanent housing within the schemes. Until June 1957, the only basis for approval by the Department of Native Affairs, however, was the construction of 'half-houses' i.e., the construction of a complete foundation for a NE51/6 type house, but with the superstructure for two rooms only. The costs have been reduced 'by deleting all items not absolutely essential [sic!] in fact by providing for the erection of a skeleton structure of walls, a

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70. As Chapter 4 illustrated, 'training' was on site for the labour force engaged on repetitive work processes, or operative labour. For more skilled operations, the Orlando Vocational Training Centre under the Non-European Affairs Department, had trained 60 building workers and 72 carpenters from 1944-1951 and, in February 1952, had 110 students. A Departmental Survey in February 1952 found a total of 369 building artisans resident in the townships of Orlando, Jabavu and Moroka, according to the following trades: 73 bricklayers; 60 plasterers; 75 carpenters; 43 plumbers; 103 painters; and 15 building contractors. JCC Minutes, 28/10/1952, p. 856.

71. For instance, during 1949, 1950 and 1951, no housing schemes had been authorised. In 1952, a scheme for 1,000 houses in Orlando West had been approved and in 1953, schemes were approved for 2465 houses in Mofolo and 850 houses in Orlando West Extension.

72. The Johannesburg City Council had "refused to take any part in the planning, organisation and execution of the scheme for the removals", although essential services would be provided by the City Engineer's Department to the areas being developed for the scheme. JCC Minutes, 22/9/1953, p. 767. In March 1954, authority was given to the Housing Division to construct houses at Meadowlands for the Resettlement Board. JCC Minutes, 30/3/1954, p. 357.
roof, doors and windows". Only the kitchens were provided with a solid ashcrete floor.

The processes and procedures, involved before departmental construction could actually begin on a given site - the conditions to be complied with before applications for funding could be made; technical amendments to schemes, required by the Department of Native Affairs before approval of loans, and the consequent delays; and the lack of continuity of funds and financial resources - all contributed to the relatively slow start to the South-West Townships building programme. But from 1957, the rate of housing production and an expansion of the building activities of the Housing Division generally increased dramatically.

The increased rate of production of houses was in large part accounted for by the fact that capital, in the form of a £3 million private loan, had been made available to the housing account in August 1956. Access to a source of funds supplementary to the 'regular' provision of housing funds from the Housing Office provided the basis for a continuity in funds and facilitated the reorganisation of the Housing Division for the mass production of housing. But, in addition, with the adoption of the site and service approach, by 1957 as Figure 5.3 shows, extensive areas of land had been planned for site and service schemes, most had been approved and many were serviced.

73. 2,250 houses had been constructed on this basis in site and service schemes 2, 3 & 4. The imposition of these conditions by the Department of Native Affairs clearly affected the organisation of building work operations, which had been 'rationalised' on the basis of the construction of whole houses, and "it was with some misgivings" that a scheme for a further 4,500 half houses in S & S schemes 5, 6 & 7 had been submitted in May, 1956. An amended scheme for 3,200 whole houses, which, without altering the amount of the loan originally approved, resulted in an increase in accommodation of 16.4% was finally approved in June 1957. JCC Minutes, 27/9/1956, p. 108 and 27/8/1957, pp. 95-7.

74. This will be examined in the final section of this chapter. See also below, n. 80.
Figure 5.3 South-West Townships: Proposed Site and Service Schemes, 1957

JCC Minutes, 24/9/1957, Minutes:1869-76
The loan of £3 million to the Johannesburg City Council, described as "the largest single housing transaction ever to have been concluded" was made by mining capital specifically for a slum clearance scheme. Seven mining groups participated in the loan which was initiated by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation. It will be recalled that the large mining interests on the Witwatersrand, although controlling extensive areas of land, had in fact contributed relatively little to the City's finances due to the particular system of municipal rating and taxation, which had been evolved in the Johannesburg City Council before the Second World War. Furthermore, the loan was made on the basis of the interest rate prevailing on Government housing loans 4 7/8 per cent. It therefore included no form of subsidy but was an 'economic' loan and would therefore ensure an 'economic rental'; no burden would be placed on the white community, in the opinion of the Minister of Native Affairs. Oppenheimer explained the intervention by mining capital:

75. The mining finance houses which participated in the loan were: the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd.; the Central Mining and Investment Corporation, with which was associated the Rand Mines Ltd.; the Anglo Transvaal Consolidated Investment Co. Ltd.; the General Mining and Finance Corporation, Ltd.; the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co., Ltd.; the New Consolidated Goldfields, Ltd.; and the Union Corporation, Ltd. Star, 14/8/1956.

76. See above, p. 45.

77. Star, 14/8/1956. In 1953, in terms of an amendment to the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act of 1945, the Minister of Native Affairs could determine different rentals for any particular dwelling according to whether the tenant's income was 'sub-economic' or 'economic'. A family income of £15 per month was laid down as the limit, above which, tenants were disqualified from the 'subeconomic' group and the subsidy of the 'sub-economic' interest rate of 3 1/2 per cent fell away. Confronted with the payment of higher interest rates if the tenants income exceeded the limit, local authorities were to increase the rents charged to 'economic rentals' or incur additional 'losses' which were not recoverable from either the 'Native Revenue Account' or the profits accruing from the sale of 'Kaffir Beer' (see above, p. 76, for background to distribution of losses). See 'Urgency Report of the Non-European Affairs Committee' (Review of Rentals in Native Housing Schemes), JCC Minutes 27/7/1954, pp. 723-5. The Johannesburg City Council had considerable difficulties in complying with these conditions as will be shown below in chapter 6, and made frequent representations to have the limit increased.
It is no more than enlightened self-interest that we should do what we can to ensure that the conditions in which they live should make for healthy, efficient, law-abiding and contented service.\textsuperscript{78}

The loan was made conditional upon the 'slum clearance scheme' being additional to any other schemes which the City Council had approval and funds for, and was for the construction of "properly built townships, fully equipped with normal sanitary and other essential services and offering communal amenities in conformity with the latest advanced ideas in urban settlement".\textsuperscript{79} It was to be used, therefore, for the provision of 'whole' houses and the continuity which the loan ensured meant that the Housing Division could indeed programme its activities for the mass production

\textsuperscript{78} SAB, September 1956, p. 15. Why mining capital in fact became involved in the provision of housing for African workers not employed specifically on the mines, is partly accounted for by the tremendous expansion of production in goldmining after 1948, and the diversification of mining capital into manufacturing and other urban-based industries. Thus, there were 'self-interests' in reducing causes for potential mass protest, and the linking of struggles over housing conditions to industrial protests. Whereas in 1946, gold exports financed 46 per cent of total imports, in 1961 this figure had risen to 56 per cent, as a result of the opening of new goldfields. From 1953 to 1956, gold production increased at an annual average of 8.2 per cent. Innes, D., 'The Role of Foreign Trade and Industrial Development in South Africa', in Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia, The Economic Factor (London, 1975), Paper No. 9, pp. 123-4 and 133; Between 1948 and 1956/7, no less than 17 new mines were opened, 10 of which were in the Orange Free State. Wilson, F., Migrant Labour in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1972), table 3, pp. 8-9. In the context of the expansion of production in the O.F.S., and the associated construction activities in providing the housing and infrastructure, attention should be drawn to the wages and conditions of employment existing for building labourers under the Industrial Council Agreement in the area. See above, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{79} According to the Chairman of the committee representing the 7 mining groups, C., Anderson, President of the Transvaal and O.F.S. Chamber of Mines. Quoted in Star, 14/8/1956.
of the equivalent of 5,000 houses per year. The impact of the loan on the rate of production by the Housing Division was immediately apparent, with more than 2,600 houses being erected during the first three months of the scheme. The impact of the Native Services Levy Fund on the provision of necessary infrastructure is reflected in Table 5.2.

Figure 5.4 illustrates the process of provision of houses in the South-West Townships over the period 1955-1965. It indicates the production of houses by the Housing Division in areas under the control of the City Council and the housing undertaken in areas under the Natives Resettlement Board. The construction

80. The National Building Research Institute sub-committee for research on the efficiency of labour in house-building (as part of the research on the 'Costs of Native Housing' referred to above, p. 184, had found that the productivity of labour was particularly "sensitive to external circumstances like shortage of funds". For lowest costs in a project for the mass production of housing, the sub-committee recommended the following procedures:— the 'rate' of building which could be economically undertaken by the organisation envisaged (i.e. the size and labour structure) should be fixed and the building organisation built up as quickly as possible to this programmed rate. This rate should be maintained at this level until the project neared completion, where the 3rd stage—the winding up—should be planned to take place as quickly as possible. "Relative inefficiency" would be experienced in the building up and winding down stages but this would be balanced by higher efficiency when work was operating at the planned programmed rate in the intermediate stage. Any interruption in this general form, particularly in the middle stage, would result in low efficiencies. Continuity of funds was therefore considered by the sub-committee to be a prerequisite for such programming, and therefore an essential precondition for increasing the productivity of labour and reducing costs. The above is from a paper delivered to the Annual Congress of National Federation of Building Trade Employers in 1954, by T.H. Louw, the Chairman of the Committee on the Costs of Native Housing, 'The Impact of Research on the Costs of Native Housing on the Building Industry', SAB, December 1954, pp. 13-23.

81. Figure 5.4 has been drawn from data compiled from Annual Reports of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department of the City Council; Annual Reports of the Natives Resettlement Board; and Reports of the Chief Housing Engineer, Housing Division.
### Table 5.2 Johannesburg City Council, Native Services Levy Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total collections: 1/1/1953-30/6/1965</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>N.S.L. Fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less administration costs</td>
<td>8,776,971</td>
<td>8,524,408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Approved Projects: at 30/6/1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Costs (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-outfall and link sewers</td>
<td>1,017,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage disposal works</td>
<td>1,197,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation: Latrines, reticulation, fittings and installation</td>
<td>1,360,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water mains</td>
<td>1,047,524</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water towers and reservoirs</td>
<td>444,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road and bus routes</td>
<td>1,822,028</td>
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<tr>
<td>Widening and re-alignment of roads</td>
<td>106,159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Streetlighting</td>
<td>348,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity supply</td>
<td>606,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey and layout</td>
<td>53,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing of sites</td>
<td>11,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nightsoil intake</td>
<td>3,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry expenditure</td>
<td>33,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditure: to 30/6/1965</strong></td>
<td>8,053,119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Direct charges & grants                           | 5,006,167 |
| Loans                                             | 871,091   |
| Amount required for approved projects             | 2,175,861 |
| **Balance in Native Services Levy Fund at 30/6/1965** | £ 471,289 |

**Source:** Complied from JCC Minutes, Annual Reports of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department; Lewis, 'A city within a city', p. 35.
Figure 5.4 Annual Housing Production in the Townships, 1955 - 1965
programmes in Meadowlands and Diepkloof, adjoining Council-controlled schemes in Orlando, were undertaken directly by the Resettlement Board for the rehousing of families removed from the Western Areas; thus, simultaneously with the implementation of site and service schemes and the departmental building programmes of the Johannesburg City Council's Housing Division, there was a second direct labour organisation operating under another 'local authority' in the area south-west of Johannesburg. 82

It should be noted with regard to the provision of service infrastructure to the townships of the Resettlement Board that, according to the Native Services Levy Act, the Fund administered by the Johannesburg City Council was used for the financing of approved projects in these areas. Infrastructural developments at Meadowlands and Diepkloof are therefore included in projects approved from the Fund shown in Table 5.2. 83

82. The Natives Resettlement Board had applied for designation as an 'urban local authority', following "the refusal of the City Council to co-operate in the removals..., and in order to exercise the necessary control" (see above, p.211). Designation was effected by Proclamation No. 243 and No. 244 in 1954. As a 'local authority', the Resettlement Board established its own direct labour organisation, employing 'Native Building Workers' under the Act from 1954/55. Apart from the 300 houses built by the Housing Division in Meadowlands, all further construction in the 'resettlement areas' was undertaken directly by the Resettlement Board. See Natives Resettlement Board, Annual Report, 1954/55, paras. 2, 3 and 8. There was, however, collaboration between the technical staffs of these two 'authorities'. See for example JCC Minutes, 30/9/1954, p. 996, where the Johannesburg City Council formulated its policy for participation in the work of the Resettlement Board. See also chapter 6 below, which examines the relationship between the Johannesburg City Council and the Resettlement Board over the period till 1965 in more detail.

83. For example, the Native Services Levy Fund, Project No. 21 comprised a link sewer to the Meadowlands hostel site; Project No. 22 was access roads to Meadowlands; Project No. 23 was for access roads to Diepkloof; and Project No. 38 was for bulk electricity supply to Meadowlands West. See JCC Minutes, 28/2/1956, p.182; and 31/7/1956, pp. 129-30.
Figure 5.5  Soweto 1965: Development by Johannesburg City Council and Resettlement Board

(Urban Foundation, Soweto, 10.4)
The preceding diagrams reflect the effects of the two-phased strategy on which development of the South-West Townships was based: implementation of site and service schemes in the first phase, and departmental construction in the second. It was suggested above that the continuity of funding, ensured by the loan from mining capital, had a significant impact on the rate of production of housing (illustrated in Figure 5.4) in terms of the programming of production activities which the Housing Division was able to achieve from mid-1957. In this final section of the chapter, it is the intention to examine the nature of these activities in more detail.

The extent of development in the South-West townships which existed at June 1965 is shown in Figure 5.5 and, for Johannesburg City Council controlled townships, in Table 5.3 below. Of the more than 61,800 houses which had been erected in the area since Pimville had been established in 1919, the Housing Division, since its inception in 1954, had been responsible for over 73 per cent. There were, however, two forms in which construction was undertaken: directly, through the Housing Division's building organisation, which was formed and operated on the basis of the Native Building Workers legislative framework, which will be examined...

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84. All the records of the Housing Division, together with those of the Non-European Affairs Department relating to Africans in urban areas, were transferred to the 'Bantu Affairs Administration Boards in 1972, when the management and control of townships was centralized under Boards established in terms of the Bantu Affairs Administration Act, No. 45, of 1971 and controlled by central government. The material contained in this section has been compiled from the minutes of monthly meetings of the Johannesburg City Council; annual reports of the Chief Housing Engineer of the Housing Division (the first of which was submitted for the period 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963); and interviews with A.J. Archibald, Director of Housing 1953-1960, and D.C. Simpson, Housing Engineer from 1955 and Assistant Chief Housing Engineer from 1960.

85. See above, p. 226.

86. During the period 1954-1965, the Housing Division built 45,170 houses.
Table 5.3 Johannesburg City Council, Housing Statistics, Soweto June 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Township</th>
<th>Built by Municipality Housing Funds</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Self-Builders Loans</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total No. of Houses</th>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>4,427</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>847</td>
<td>1,001</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>2,389</td>
<td>456</td>
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<td>Jabavu</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mofolo</td>
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<td>2,387</td>
<td>4,518</td>
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<td>Dube</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1,448</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Western Jabavu</td>
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<td>Chiawelo</td>
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<td>323</td>
<td>2,573</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phiri</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>2,202</td>
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<td>2,039</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naledi</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4,048</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Emdeni</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,303</td>
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<td>5,584</td>
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Source: Johannesburg City Council, Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1965 Schedule C.
below; and, indirectly, with the Housing Division sub-contracting work to African contractors on a 'labour-only' basis for a fixed price per unit.

As stated above, the Department of Native Affairs, until June 1957, had approved only the building of 'half-houses' in site and service schemes. To complete the brickwork superstructures to these half-houses, the Housing Division had been authorised to employ African building contractors on 'labour-only' contracts for a price not exceeding £10 per house. This was extended in August 1957 for brickwork to a complete NE51/6 type dwelling at a price of £21 per unit. An average of 30 houses per week were being constructed on this basis by the end of 1957; "an ideal arrangement", for small-scale construction in site and service schemes in which families were already settled in temporary accommodation. The Housing Division could therefore concentrate its building labourforce on the large-scale mass production of houses which, by December 1957, were being built for a total cost of £150 per unit.

With regard to the building organisation of the Housing Division, established and operating on the basis of the Native Building Workers legislative structure, three related aspects will be focused on below; the labour cost or wage structure for the different categories of labour on which the building organisation was based over the period 1954-1965 (see Table 5.4); the labour process and division of labour based on the 'task' system; and, the relationship between incentive schemes and the productivity of labour.

87. See above, p. 221.

88. It is not possible to establish what percentage of total house production was undertaken on this basis, but, by May 1958 brickwork superstructures were being completed by 'labour-only' contractors at a rate of nearly 50 per week. The contracts were extended to Zola, which was developed under the 'slum clearance scheme', where semi-detached NE. 51/7 type units were constructed for £36 per pair. These practices, and indeed the 'labour-only' prices, were still in force in May 1959. See JCC Minutes, 27/8/1957, p. 94; 10/12/1957, p. 2349; 27/5/1958, p. 932 and 26/5/1958 p. 867.
### Table 5.4 Johannesburg City Council, Housing Division: Categories of Building Labour and Wages

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<td>2 8/9</td>
<td>2 12/9</td>
<td>2 15/11</td>
<td>6 86</td>
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<td>3 9/4</td>
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<td>3 9/4</td>
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<td>2 12/6</td>
<td>20,30</td>
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</tr>
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* Incentive Bonus scheme introduced during 1957. See below, p.

** Decimalisation of currency in February 1961. Existing rates converted to Rands and cents. From 1962 all wage rates were consolidated and the statutory cost of living allowance removed. See above, p. for wage determinations made under the Native Building Workers Act of 1951.

Source: Compiled from Johannesburg City Council, Minutes of Meetings, 1954 to 1962.
Wages

It was stated above that building up the organisation with sufficient 'skilled' labour presented no real problem for the Housing Division, and, with the 'task' system, training was, in any event, "on the job". The question of 'unskilled' labour, however, the category of building labour not covered by the Native Building Workers legislation initially presented a problem due to the extremely low wages paid by the Johannesburg City Council to 'unskilled' workers. The Council was a large employer of 'unskilled workers whose wage rates were based on the scales determined in terms of the so-called Botha Award of 1947. There were more than 10,000 workers on the lowest grade, of whom 1,000 were employed by the Housing Division at the beginning of 1955. The minimum wages were low, compared to the building industry and indeed to other large employers of "this type of labour" - such as the Natives Resettlement Board and the Pretoria City Council - and the Housing Division

89. See above, p. 220
90. In terms of the Botha Award of 1947, unskilled workers were graded from VI to I with 3 rates corresponding to years on each grade. Table 5.4, 'Labourer' reflects the minimum rate for the first year on Grade VI. More than 10,000 workers on Grade VI were employed at the end of 1954 by the City Engineer's Dept., the Non-European Affairs Dept. and the Housing Division. JCC Minutes, 22/3/1955, p. 334. The total weekly wage comprised a basic rate per hour, on the basis of the Botha Award, plus a statutory cost of living allowance. The C.O.L.A. had been introduced during the Second World War and had been revised on 8 occasions, the last 3 being April 1951, April 1952, and March 1953, when the Retail Price Index figures, compared with a base of 100, were 169, 183 and 189 respectively. JCC Minutes, 30/4/1957, p. 698. The question of a revised basis to labourers' wage rates was only resolved in 1959, when a wage determination made under the Wage Act fixed minimum wages for all unskilled workers employed by local authorities on the Witwatersrand. The determination introduced a consolidated wage and removed the C.O.L.A. JCC Minutes, 25/8/1959, p. 1590. See above, p. 194.
had difficulty recruiting "more efficient types" of labourers.  

To increase the wage rates of building labourers as a group would "result in applications from other groups which would be difficult to resist", and several practices were introduced to facilitate the paying of wages, to "selected labourers", at a rate "more nearly approximating that paid in industry". For instance, 5 per cent of building labourers, of the "boss boy type", carried out 'semi-skilled' operations and were placed on a higher wage scale in terms of the Botha Award; and, an incentive bonus of up to 2d per hour was introduced in January 1956, when 800 building labourers were immediately required "to keep 400 Native Building Workers... fully occupied". By April 1957, however, the Johannesburg City Council had finally resolved to increase the total weekly earnings of all the unskilled workers, of whom there were approximately 18,700. This was not done by an increase in the basic rates, but by way of an addition

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91. As at January 1956, the comparative total weekly earnings of building labourers were: Johannesburg City Council, £2 2/9 to £2 3/9, Natives Resettlement Board, £2 2/9 to £2 15/9; Pretoria City Council, £3 2/-; Building Industry on the Witwatersrand, £3 1/5. JCC Minutes, 31/1/1956, pp. 84-5. Why the City Council was not bound by existing Industrial Council Agreements for the building industry in regard to unskilled labour, was due to the fact that under the Industrial Conciliation Act, municipalities were not recognised as employers in the building industry. See above, p. 150. Industrial agreements did not therefore have to be observed. In addition, in terms of Section 51(1) of the Industrial Conciliation Act, of 1937, "native areas" could be excluded from the terms of Industrial agreements. Under the Native Building Workers Act, however, the Johannesburg City Council had been 'designated' an employer, and was bound to wage rates for learners and building workers made under the Determinations.

92. Labourers engaged on concrete or mortar mixing, ensuring that ingredients were added in the correct proportions etc., or in charge of bagging teams, carried out 'semi-skilled' operations and from 1 July 1955, were paid in accordance with the rate for the first year on Grade V. Their total weekly earnings therefore increased to £2 7/9 (see above, ns. 90 & 91). JCC Minutes, 22/3/1955, p. 334.

93. If schemes were not completed before the end of the financial year, unexpended balances had to revert to the Treasury. JCC Minutes, 31/1/1956, pp. 84-5.
of 6s per week to the statutory cost of living allowance. The C.O.L.A. was further increased by 4s per week in April 1958. But, despite these increases, the total emoluments paid by the Johannesburg City Council were well below those paid by Commerce and Industry. The National Institute of Personnel Research, investigating for the Council "any factors that may influence the efficient utilisation of the Native labour force", found that "not less than 96 per cent of the Council's Native labour force is living below the 'Poverty Datum Line', as compared with between 46% and 66%, depending on the locality, in the rest of the Union". The Institute recommended general wage increases.

By the middle of August 1958, however, there was a "trade recession" and the registration and influx control branch of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council experienced "a considerable decrease in the demand for labour [by Johannesburg employers] and a sharp increase in the number of workseekers reporting daily". The demand for labourers by the Council, particularly the Housing Division with the expansion of activities during 1957/58 for implementing the 'slum clearance scheme', therefore appears to have been met without an increase in the basic rates for 'unskilled' labourers.

94. In September 1956 the City Council had approved of a labour survey being carried out by the National Institute of Personnel Research of the CSIR. The terms of reference were "recruitment, classification, training, supervision, pay and incentives, work performance, and any factors that may influence the efficient utilisation of the Native labour-force". In January 1957, the Director of the Institute, Dr. Bieshewel, recommended wage increases and, following a petition from labourers employed in the City Engineer's Dept., Council approved an increase in the C.O.L.A. By 1957, the Retail Price Index had risen to 207, by 18 points over March 1953 (see above, n. 90), without a corresponding increase in the statutory cost of living allowance. JCC Minutes, 30/4/1957, pp. 697-701.


96. The "disparity between available labour and the demand" continued into the first half of 1959. Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959, pp. 13-4.

97. The ability to recruit unskilled labour at inferior wages is partly accounted for by the 'rationalisation' of the 'labour allocation' process. See chapter 6.
But what was the relationship of building labourers to the division of labour in house-building production? How was the labour process organised on the basis of the differentiation of labour reflected in the categories in Table 5.4? And, how had the increased rate of production reflected in Figure 5.4 been achieved?

Operative Labour and the 'Task System'

As mentioned above and in the preceding chapter, the organisation on which the mass production of houses was based, as developed at Kwa Thema by A. J. Archibald in conjunction with the National Building Research Institute, consisted in breaking down the work processes involved into a number of separate tasks, each task being the responsibility of a team. Each task, or stage, was broken down into its basic requirements of labour, materials, plant and transport. Each team was allocated the necessary plant and materials for the task to be performed and a supply and stores system was organised to ensure that each team would be kept supplied with the necessary materials for its task. A labour 'pool' was kept employed on special work, from which skilled and unskilled labour could be drawn to replace team vacancies. A team was headed by an experienced "artisan leader", who not only executed the most difficult work but was also responsible for the supervision of a number of artisans, together with the labourers required for the particular task. The proportion of labourers to artisans (either learners or building workers, registered in the trades) varied according to the nature of the task. Table 5.5 illustrates the tasks involved in the erection of a standard NE, 51/6 house type, and the 'standards' which were set for the weekly output of the building teams. A number of teams were under the control of foremen and assistant foremen. By September 1957, with the commencement of the £3 million building programme, there were three African foremen in charge of three construction units. Each foreman was "required to maintain working and
Table 5.5  Johannesburg City Council, Housing Division: Task System employed on NE. 51/6 Type House.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Artisans 'Building Workers' and 'Learners'</th>
<th>Labourers</th>
<th>Output per week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foundations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Excavation, 3 cu. yds/house</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ashcrete, 2 1/2 cu. yds/house</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Brickwork foundation</td>
<td>1 bricklayer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7-9 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Filling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Floors, ashcrete slabs to kitchens only</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>slabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Superstructures:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Brickwork</td>
<td>7 bricklayers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5 1/2 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Roof purlins</td>
<td>1 carpenter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Roof sheets</td>
<td>1 carpenter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Glazing</td>
<td>1 glazer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Painting - internal</td>
<td>1 painter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Painting - external</td>
<td>1 painter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Plastering</td>
<td>1 plasterer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Gables</td>
<td>1 bricklayer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Brickwork pointing</td>
<td>1 bricklayer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Beamfilling</td>
<td>1 bricklayer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Separate W. C. structures:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Ashcrete floor slab</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>slabs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Superstructure</td>
<td>1 bricklayer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 pairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Roof</td>
<td>1 carpenter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 W. C. pan installation</td>
<td>1 plumber</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The task work operated on a weekly basis

Source: Compiled from 1972 data (see above, p. 237 n. 84) made available by D. C. Simpson, Housing Engineer from 1955.
disciplinary control of a labour force of 350 men, including 100 brick-layers, having a potential output of 18 houses per day". It was at this stage that a scheme for increasing the 'potential output' had been introduced. This was a system of 'payment by results' which linked increased productivity of labour, and consequent reductions in labour costs, to increased weekly 'earnings'. The incentive scheme is examined below.

**Payment by Results**

Provisions existed for the payment of incentive bonuses to those workers employed in terms of the Native Building Workers Act of 1951. The incentive scheme operated by the Housing Division, however, was based on the output of the team, rather than the individual, and therefore included workers not covered by the determinations made under the Act. As Table 5.5 shows, over 70 per cent of workers involved in total operations were labourers. According to the rationale of the Housing Division as 'employer', an increase in basic wages, particularly "where the performance of an individual no longer merits the additional pay", did not "necessarily in themselves act as an incentive...It is preferable to

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98. As shown in Table 5.4, team leaders were paid slightly more than artisans on the top grade. For the additional responsibility of assistant foremen and foremen, the basic hourly rates had been increased from 2/3 and 2/6 to 2/6 and 3/- respectively. JCC Minutes, 28/5/1957, pp. 896-7; and 24/9/1957, p. 1808. See Ibid., 23/2/1954, p. 230, for responsibilities of team leaders. These basic hourly rates of skilled building workers in positions of supervision and control should be compared with the basic hourly rates applicable in the building industry in general. See above, p. 193.

99. Although it was only in June 1958 that Council gave authority for the payment of incentive bonuses and confirmed the action of the Director of Housing in introducing the payments. JCC Minutes, 24/6/1958, p. 1070-2.

100. Clause 9. of Wage Determination No. 2464, 13/11/1953. Springs Municipality had operated an incentive scheme at Kwa Thema and had made representations to the Native Building Workers Advisory Board on the first Determination, see Department of Labour, Ref. 1612/70-6, Annexure B, pp. 5-6, encl. Department of Labour, Ref. 1612/70-2/1, Agenda, Native Building Workers Advisory Board, 19/8/1953. BIFSA Archives, Files, No. 1.

101. The composition of the building labour force engaged in the production of townships throughout the country over the study period is examined in detail in chapter 6.
maintain a standard basic pay [for each category of labour] and to add to this a variable bonus determined by the output of a particular team". The example of a "superstructure team" for the brickwork to the NE,51/6 type house was most typical and provided the basis for the incentive scheme which was rationalised in terms of the following argument.

A superstructure team of "usual strength" consisted of 7 bricklayers, of whom 4 were learners, and 7 labourers. The wages of the team totalled an average of £45 per week, during which week the completion of superstructures to 3 NE,51/6 type houses was the basic standard or "norm" for the output of the team. The labour cost of a superstructure (including direct supervision and a proportion of fixed and variable overheads) was approximately £20. Thus, if the team completed 4 superstructures instead of the "norm", there would be a 'saving' of £20., i.e. without advancing further wages, or the employment of additional workers, additional output would have been achieved. But an incentive 'bonus', in effect paid out of the 'savings', was required to obtain the increased intensity of labour which would result in the additional output. The principle introduced was that workers would "participate in calculated savings consequent upon performance additional to the basic task up to a maximum of 50% of such savings expressed as a percentage of weekly wages". Limits


103. This appears to conflict with the information given in Table 5.5, where a brickwork superstructure team has 8 labourers and the task for the week is given as 5½ houses. As stated, this data is for 1972 and the composition of the team could have been different -with more competent/registered bricklayers and no learners - or, a point which will be dealt with below, increasing productivity of labour had resulted in establishing a higher level-for the "norm" by 1972.

104. As mentioned above p.253, the brickwork superstructure to NE,51/6 type houses was contracted out on 'labour-only' contracts for £21. The cost over the wages of the team involved in the directly productivity labour, i.e. £15 per house, included the wages of those workers engaged in the material supply/transport and stores, as well as the costs of supervision.
were set: firstly to the amount of bonus payable to any worker; and, secondly to the "upper standards of performance beyond which work of acceptable quality cannot reasonably be expected". 105

As Table 5, 6 illustrates, the maximum bonus was limited to 30% of the total weekly earnings of the team and the 'upper standards' were limited to 5 units per week for the NE.51/6 type house, where the "norm" was 3 superstructures. For less than one third of the total weekly earnings of a team advanced in the form of a 'bonus', therefore, the team would in fact have 'performed' additional work to the 'value' of two thirds the "normal" weekly task. The operation of this form of payment by results, on the basis of the division of labour entailed in the "task system", represents the single most important explanation for the increased rate of production maintained until the early 1960s and the reduction in costs of housing production. Reference to Table 5.7, which lists all the building projects undertaken by the Housing Division throughout the study period since its inception in 1954, reveals consistent and substantial 'savings' on housing projects. Where excesses did occur—in total expenditure over the available loans—on particular projects, these were generally other building types such as halls or administration offices, where mass production techniques could not be as successfully applied as in the rationalised house-building labour process. But despite these 'excesses', the 'built environment' of the South Western Townships, which included schools, shops, administration offices and beerhalls—essential to the system of municipal finances and to self-balancing the accounts—106 and had been produced on the basis of the Native Building Workers legislation, showed an overall 'saving'. More

105. Details of the incentive bonus scheme are from reports of the Establishment Committee, in JCC Minutes, 24/6/1958, Minutes: 1070-2; and 24/5/1960, Minutes: 1112-4.

106. See Table, 5.4, p. 267, for impact of 'beer profits' on the 'Native Revenue Account', 1948-1965.
Table 5.6 Housing Division 'Incentive Bonus Scheme' 1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brickwork superstructure Team</th>
<th>Standards for NE 51/6 type house &quot;Norm&quot;</th>
<th>Labour Category &amp; Total Weekly Earnings</th>
<th>Bonus payable at percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Narm&quot; 3 3\frac{1}{2} 4 4\frac{1}{2} 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NIL 7\frac{1}{2}% 15% 22\frac{1}{2}% 30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£</th>
<th>s/d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Labourers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12/9 4/- 8/- 12/- 16/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Registered Learners:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i who have not passed test</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15/9 4/- 8/- 12/- 16/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii who have passed test</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9/4 5/- 10/- 15/- 20/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii in 2nd year after test</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3/9 6/- 12/- 18/- 24/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Registered N.B.W's:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i &amp; others on skilled work</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0/9 7/6 15/- 22/6 30/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii more competent N.B.W's &amp; others on skilled work</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18/9 9/- 18/- 27/- 36/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Team Leaders</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16/- 10/- 20/- 30/- 40/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCC Minutes, 24/5/1960, Minutes: 1112-4; and above, Table 5.4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date of Completion/Acceptance by N.E.A.D.</th>
<th>Township</th>
<th>Type of Construction</th>
<th>Proportion of Vote available £ s.d.</th>
<th>Total Expenditure to 1965 £ s.d.</th>
<th>Percentage Savings/Excess on Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/1955</td>
<td>Meadowland</td>
<td>houses</td>
<td>56,143.15/11</td>
<td>56,143.15/11</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2/1954</td>
<td>Dube</td>
<td>beer halls</td>
<td>130,109.10/8</td>
<td>130,109.10/8</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3/1956</td>
<td>Mofolo</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>12,000.13/13</td>
<td>12,000.13/13</td>
<td>19.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5/1956</td>
<td>Noordgesig</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>13,717.7/10</td>
<td>13,717.7/10</td>
<td>14.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3/1956</td>
<td>Orlando West Ext</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>26,502.6/3</td>
<td>26,502.6/3</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12/1957</td>
<td>Dube</td>
<td>beer halls</td>
<td>44,101.8/5</td>
<td>44,101.8/5</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4/1956</td>
<td>Moroka North</td>
<td>schools</td>
<td>75,984.18/4</td>
<td>75,984.18/4</td>
<td>13.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>12/1956</td>
<td>Zondi</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>83,359.3/1</td>
<td>83,359.3/1</td>
<td>9.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>11/1957</td>
<td>Chiawelo</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>84,654.15/3</td>
<td>84,654.15/3</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>8/1958</td>
<td>Dhlamini</td>
<td>schools</td>
<td>75,984.18/4</td>
<td>75,984.18/4</td>
<td>13.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>11/1957</td>
<td>Mapetla</td>
<td>beer halls</td>
<td>30,093.2/6</td>
<td>30,093.2/6</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7/1958</td>
<td>Phiri</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>269,448.15/8</td>
<td>269,448.15/8</td>
<td>16.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>12/1958</td>
<td>Jabulani</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>167,335.5/8</td>
<td>167,335.5/8</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>12/1958</td>
<td>Chorugwe</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>13,717.7/10</td>
<td>13,717.7/10</td>
<td>14.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1/1959</td>
<td>Molapo</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>203,821.9/4</td>
<td>203,821.9/4</td>
<td>15.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>2/1958</td>
<td>Coronationville</td>
<td>beer halls</td>
<td>36,450.13/13</td>
<td>36,450.13/13</td>
<td>12.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>12/1955</td>
<td>Valdora</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>222,500.10/8</td>
<td>222,500.10/8</td>
<td>14.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2/1958</td>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>242,516.9/10</td>
<td>242,516.9/10</td>
<td>15.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>8/1958</td>
<td>Diepsloot</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>103,189.14/1</td>
<td>103,189.14/1</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>9/1956</td>
<td>Diepsloot</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>90,000.11/3</td>
<td>90,000.11/3</td>
<td>12.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>9/1956</td>
<td>Diepsloot</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>203,821.9/4</td>
<td>203,821.9/4</td>
<td>15.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>9/1959</td>
<td>Orlando West Ext</td>
<td>beer halls</td>
<td>27,107.11/8</td>
<td>27,107.11/8</td>
<td>18.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>9/1959</td>
<td>Orlando West Ext</td>
<td>halls</td>
<td>203,821.9/4</td>
<td>203,821.9/4</td>
<td>15.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date of Completion/ Acceptance by N.E.A.D.</td>
<td>Township</td>
<td>Type of Construction Houses</td>
<td>Proportion of Vote available</td>
<td>Total Expenditure to 1965</td>
<td>Percentage Savings/Excess on projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>9/1959</td>
<td>Orlando West Ext. 1,000</td>
<td>268,615</td>
<td>219,320</td>
<td>9/5</td>
<td>18.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>9/1959</td>
<td>Mofolo 2,330</td>
<td>584,350</td>
<td>514,208</td>
<td>19/1</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>9/1959</td>
<td>Mofolo</td>
<td>admin offices</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>1/9 +21.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>9/1960</td>
<td>Trading facilities in Hostels</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>4,616 10/4</td>
<td>38.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>10/1960</td>
<td>Noordgesig 100</td>
<td>41,636</td>
<td>39,948</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>10/1960</td>
<td>Noordgesig 350</td>
<td>141,821</td>
<td>139,049</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>2/1960</td>
<td>Zola (Sewerage) 50,846</td>
<td>14/1 68,800</td>
<td>35.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>6/1960</td>
<td>Dube 344</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>83,424 10/1</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>schools</td>
<td>406,624-00</td>
<td>478,886-11</td>
<td>+17.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>5/1961</td>
<td>Noordgesig 150</td>
<td>83,910-00</td>
<td>80,296</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>8/1961</td>
<td>Noordgesig 139</td>
<td>66,720-00</td>
<td>58,097</td>
<td>12.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>1/1962</td>
<td>Noordgesig 4 (experimental)</td>
<td>6,000-00</td>
<td>7,816-07</td>
<td>+30.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>1/1962</td>
<td>Mofolo North (experimental)</td>
<td>3,200-00</td>
<td>4,257-12</td>
<td>+32.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>3/1962</td>
<td>£3 (R6) Million Slum Clearance Scheme</td>
<td>584,380-00</td>
<td>628,378-00</td>
<td>+7.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>6/1962</td>
<td>Nacefield beer halls</td>
<td>62,000-00</td>
<td>58,340-74</td>
<td>28.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>6/1962</td>
<td>Tladi/Senoane admin offices</td>
<td>11,000-00</td>
<td>7,723-91</td>
<td>29.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>6/1962</td>
<td>Dube (Chapel) 6,300-00</td>
<td>5,690-17</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>6/1962</td>
<td>Coronationville halls</td>
<td>14,500-00</td>
<td>12,578-48</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>7/1962</td>
<td>C. West. Jabavu 760 (&amp; fences)</td>
<td>288,800-00</td>
<td>275,065-00</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>7/1962</td>
<td>C. West. Jabavu Ext. 466 (&amp; fences)</td>
<td>177,080-00</td>
<td>157,115-00</td>
<td>11.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>7/1962</td>
<td>Mofolo North 1,274 (&amp; fences)</td>
<td>484,120-00</td>
<td>437,152-00</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>10/1962</td>
<td>Moroka North 400</td>
<td>134,500-00</td>
<td>129,452-00</td>
<td>3.75</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>10/1962</td>
<td>Moroka North 400 (fences)</td>
<td>12,000-00</td>
<td>9,560-00</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>11/1962</td>
<td>Dube 900</td>
<td>424,700-28</td>
<td>425,348-66</td>
<td>+.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>11/1962</td>
<td>Dube 900 (fences)</td>
<td>21,290-72</td>
<td>20,712-98</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>11/1963</td>
<td>Jabulani (hostels) 490,200-00</td>
<td>510,982-00</td>
<td>+4.24</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>11/1963</td>
<td>Nancefield (hostels) 520,178-00</td>
<td>411,650-00</td>
<td>20.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>11/1963</td>
<td>Dube (hostels) 612,158-00</td>
<td>469,341-00</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>11/1963</td>
<td>Tladi/Moletsane 1,250</td>
<td>1,309,380-00</td>
<td>1,297,181-00</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>3/1963</td>
<td>Molapo 350-00</td>
<td>513,000-00</td>
<td>484,371-00</td>
<td>9.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>6/1963</td>
<td>Mdeni 1,045</td>
<td>402,280-00</td>
<td>349,574-00</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>11/1963</td>
<td>Mofolo South 641</td>
<td>244,810-00</td>
<td>215,831-00</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>7/1964</td>
<td>Orlando West 1,000 (&amp; fences)</td>
<td>598,322-00</td>
<td>549,320-00</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>1/1965</td>
<td>Zondi 875-00</td>
<td>297,500-00</td>
<td>341,908-00</td>
<td>+14.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>1/1965</td>
<td>Jabulani 1,015 (fences)</td>
<td>385,340-00</td>
<td>372,906-00</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>1/1965</td>
<td>Naledi 2,054 (fences)</td>
<td>829,570-00</td>
<td>717,383-00</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>1/1965</td>
<td>Zola 1,307 (fences)</td>
<td>525,960-00</td>
<td>467,617-00</td>
<td>11.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Projects 1 - 83 R 20,395,184-26 R18,669,691-17

Notes: * Self-builders with municipal loans; ** Decimalisation of currency to Rands and Cents in Feb, 1961.

Source: Housing Division, Report of the Chief Housing Engineer for the period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966, Annexure C.
than 8 per cent had been saved on total expenditure compared to the loans which had been approved. 107

It should be noted that, by the beginning of 1959, incentive schemes were proposed for other departments within the Johannesburg City Council. The Organisation and Methods Division, of the Establishment Committee, resolved that incentive schemes "for all aspects of sewer construction", "laying of water mains" and "excavation" in the City Engineers Department, and perhaps the Electricity Department, on the basis of 'scientifically determined standards', would be in the interests of the City Council. Consultants, who were "qualified in work study", were accordingly engaged. 108 The scientific standards, which were presented in October 1959, revealed that the existing output of labour in sewer construction and laying of water pipes, "could be more than doubled under suitable incentive conditions". Furthermore, with the introduction of incentives, "the reduction in the labour complement, whilst maintaining the present rate of construction", would result in a saving of £29,400 per annum. 109

This concern within various departments of the City Council, to reduce the 'labour complements' while increasing the productivity of the labour force, should be seen in the context of the wage increases which came into effect in August 1959 for unskilled labour and in early 1960 for

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107. One effect of these 'savings' was that the Johannesburg City Council could submit revised financial details to the Bantu Housing Board, which was set up in terms of the Housing Act, No. 10 of 1957, as a parallel institution to the National Housing and Planning Commission. Thus Government National Housing Loans which had been negotiated for each project could be closed at reduced figures. This aspect is examined in more detail in the final chapter.

108. JCC Minutes, 27/1/1959, Minutes: 45-6.

109. JCC Minutes, 27/10/1959, Minutes: 2033-37. It should be noted that by 1965, some 565 miles of water mains had been laid and 478 miles of sewer had been constructed in the South-West townships of Johannesburg. Lewis, 'a City within a City', p. 11. Most of the infrastructural development was on the basis of production 'incentives'.

'learners and Native building workers'. The increase of 3d an hour for certain categories of labour would result in an annual cost to the City Council of £30,509, £10,750 for the City Engineers Department and the balance for the Housing Division. The incentive schemes implemented within the former and the reduction in labour more than compensated for the increase in wages. For the Housing Division, to 'counteract' an increase of £5 to £6 per house resulting from the wage increases, the percentage bonus payable to building workers under the incentive scheme was reduced. Except for labourers, whose 'bonus' remained at the rates shown in Table 5.6, namely, from 7½ per cent to 30 per cent, in May 1960 the percentage rates were adjusted to range from 5 per cent to 20 per cent. Thus for one fifth of the total weekly earnings of a team payable as a bonus, the team would still perform two thirds additional work to the weekly task.

110. See above, p. 194, n.122. In terms of Government Notice No. 556, Government Gazette, 22/4/1959, the rates increased to 1s 1d per hour for a registered learner Grade B and to 1s 8½d per hour for registered Native building workers. Team leaders, who were not provided for in the Determination, had their basic rates increased to 2s 3d per hour.

111. Insufficient data on employment exists to establish the relation between the operation of the incentive scheme in the Housing Division and a relative reduction in its 'labour complement'. In 1960, the only year for which figures are available, the skilled component of its building labour force comprised: 59 registered learners on Grade B; 71 Grade A learners; 149 learners in the second year after passing the test; 323 registered 'Native building workers'; 106 'more competent workers'; and 14 team leaders. JCC Minutes, 24/5/1960, Minutes: 1116, Annexure. No figures exist for the labourers employed by the Housing Division, although from Table 5.5 above, it appears that many of the tasks were undertaken solely by labourers. Some conclusions will, however, be drawn from national level data on the skilled and unskilled building labour force employed under the Native Building Workers legislation, which is examined in chapter 6. The City Council was the largest employer under the Act, therefore these findings will indicate the position in the Johannesburg City Council approximately.

112. The maximum bonus at 20 per cent, for the production of 5 houses instead of the norm 3, amounted to 14/- as against 16/- for Grade B learners, and for team leaders the bonus reduced from 40/- to 31/-. JCC Minutes, 24/5/1960, Minutes: 1112-4.
The preceding analysis of the operations of the Housing Division reveals precisely how an increase in the productivity of labour was achieved. Ever smaller quantities of 'labour time', and 'labour costs', were reflected in ever greater quantities of the housing product over the study period. Thus, in the process of increasing the intensity of labour, which was attained partly as a result of the low 'standard basic pay' and the 'variable bonus', the building product was 'cheapened'. The identification of the mechanisms and organisational methods through which the rate of housing production was increased, with the simultaneous reduction in costs of production, raises an important question concerning the distribution of the costs of housing.

The Housing Division was, in principle, a non-profit building organisation employing direct labour and operating without the intervention of private building contractors. The organisational methods and techniques which were utilised in the production of Soweto, however, were based almost exclusively on forms of exploitation of building labour which had been traditionally and consistently opposed by trade unionism within the building industry. The case study thus highlights the operations of the Housing Division, and other departments within the Johannesburg City Council which adopted similar practices, in the role of employer. Of central

113. See above, p.240. Note that, by 1972 as Table 5.5 indicates, the weekly task or 'norm' for a brickwork superstructure team had increased to 5½ houses instead of 3. See above, p.241, n. 103; also, p.104 n. 12; p.105 , n.15; and, p.120 n, 61.

114. The only exception was Contract No. 26 for 1,000 houses at Molapo, which was awarded to Longtill Ltd. in August 1957. A loan for 3,200 NE. 51/6 'austerity' houses had been approved by the Department of Native Affairs, on condition that the Council commence construction immediately. Departmental building teams were insufficient and tenders were called from 10 private firms, of whom 5 submitted formal tenders. Negotiations between the Director of Housing and Longtill Ltd. resulted in a reduction in the tender price to £153 per unit. The Housing Division was at this stage building for £149 per unit. JCC Minutes, 27/8/1957, Minutes, 1655-7 (71/5/1) (D. of H. 18/57); and, Minutes: 1674-7 (71/5/18) (D. of H.22/57).

115. See above, p.120 , n. 61.
importance is the form of the relations of exploitation which were established between the local authority, as employer, and the African labour force employed in the production of housing and infrastructure in the townships. These relations suggest a 'redistribution' of the costs of housing, namely, through the unpaid labour of African building workers in fact 'subsidising' a part of the costs of production.

The aim in this chapter has been to explain how policies which were defined and formulated on the basis of the 'ideal of total apartheid' were translated into programmes and implemented within the existing conditions in Johannesburg. In this regard, the translation of racial zoning 'guidelines' into a comprehensive metropolitan land policy and the development of site and service schemes in townships south-west of the city, on the basis of the Native Services Levy Act, were examined in the first two sections of the chapter. The analysis presented above of the implementation, at the local level, of the Native Building Workers Act, suggests important questions concerning both the distribution of costs of housing and the nature of the relationship between the City Council as employer and the African labour force. It is necessary now to examine some of the social consequences of these forms of state intervention. The housing conditions for African 'labour requirements' of Johannesburg were clearly transformed by the direct intervention in the supply of housing; but how, for instance, had the relationship between the Johannesburg City Council, as 'landlord', and its tenants been affected in the process of producing Soweto?
CHAPTER SIX

CONSEQUENCES OF STATE INTERVENTION: SOME ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF TOWNSHIP POLICIES

The aim of this final chapter is to identify some of the consequences or social effects, of the various forms of state intervention in conditions for the reproduction of the African labour force analysed in preceding chapters. Underlying this study has been the twofold aim of explaining why and how the large-scale construction of townships was embarked upon by the state; and understanding the role of these spatial forms in the overall social formation.

The first section examines the effective operations of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board at the national level and focuses on the state as 'building employer'. This enables the relationship between the construction of townships throughout South Africa and relations of production in building to be established. It also briefly examines the mechanisms through which 'apartheid' was applied to the building industry and identifies some of the consequences of this intervention.

The second section examines the effects of state intervention in the costs of production of housing and infrastructure on the relationship between the state, employers and African workers around rentals and, related to this, wages. The analysis focuses on the Johannesburg City Council as 'landlord' and the relationship with its 'tenants' in Soweto.

The final section looks at the wider social context within which township programmes were implemented by local authorities. It attempts to

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1. See above p. 185, for background to the operations of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board in augmenting the skilled building labour force and determining wages.
explain the relationship between these spatial forms and the overall policy of 'apartheid' and identifies the effects of increasing centralisation in policy formulation and implementation.

6.1. Township Production and Relations of Production

The preceding chapter looked at the implementation of centrally-defined policies in Johannesburg. It examined the processes involved in their translation into programmes and projects at the local level and suggested an important feature concerning the nature of state intervention: the local authority, in implementing a range of policies for the production of townships, assumed the role of 'employer'. The practices employed by both the Johannesburg City Council and the Natives Resettlement Board—as 'direct labour organisations' and employers of building workers and learners registered under the Native Building Workers Act of 1951—resulted in an increase in the rate of housing construction and a considerable reduction in the costs of production. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, the building activities of these two organisations represented a significant proportion of the total housing for 'labour requirements' of urban areas, which was undertaken on a similar basis by local authorities throughout the country. With the effective restructuring of the building workforce in terms of the Native Building Workers legislation, well over a quarter of a million houses and hostel accommodation for 162,000 'single' workers were constructed by local authority building organisations in townships throughout South Africa from 1952 until 1965.2 As in the case of Johannesburg, building activities were not confined to the provision of housing and, as Table 6.1 indicates, the entire 'built environment' was constructed on the basis of the provisions of the Native Building Workers Act.

2. This is not to suggest that the housing shortage had been resolved by 1965. See Table 4.3, p. 181. The decline in the rate of house production after 1960 was related to changes in overall policy. This is discussed in the following section.
Figure 6.1 Annual Housing Production under the Native Building Workers Act of 1951: All Local Authorities

(Annual Reports of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board)
Table 6.1  Housing Accommodation and Other Buildings Constructed Annually under the Native Building Workers Act, during the period 1952-1965 throughout South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Houses</th>
<th>No. of Hostels</th>
<th>No. of Beds</th>
<th>Other Buildings (1)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (2)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (3)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (4)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (5)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (6)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (7)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (8)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (9)</th>
<th>Other Buildings (10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>5,491</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>6,738</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>6,528</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3,297</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>13,729</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>5,928</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>15,666</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>11,136</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>25,940</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>22,314</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>36,695</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>26,429</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>27,213</td>
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<td>23,952</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>24,257</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>13,754</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>22,985</td>
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<td>11,684</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>25,939</td>
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<td>7,156</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>721</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>21,951</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>11,594</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>19,886</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>9,108</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>15,489</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>14,781</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL at 1965</td>
<td>268,505</td>
<td>5,625</td>
<td>162,681</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6,221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other Buildings: (1) schools (2) clinics, (3) halls, (4) administration offices, (5) police stations, (6) churches, (7) shops, (8) sports fields, (9) post offices, (10) other.

Source: Annual Reports of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board, 1952 - 1956.
While it was possible, in the example of Johannesburg, to establish the relationship between the costs of building production and production-related policies through analysing, for instance, the incentive scheme operated by the Housing Division, this is not the case with overall township production. National level cost statistics were not maintained by the Native Building Workers Advisory Board, the statutory body set up to implement the provisions of the Act. But the operations of the Advisory Board do enable relationships to be established in two other important areas: the relationship between production in the townships and the employment of building workers and learners under the Act; and, the methods employed to protect the position of white building artisans and the application of 'apartheid' to relations of production.

The Building Labour Force in Township Production

Although it is not possible to establish the relationship between employment of building workers and township production in the case of Johannesburg, it can be examined on a national basis. Several important features become apparent. Table 6.2 gives figures for the number of workers in each category—registered building workers, learners, and labourers—employed annually by local authorities on township production throughout South Africa. The proportional composition of the labour force is graphically illustrated in Figure 6.2, which shows a correspondence with the annual production of houses. But the most important insight

3. See Table 5.7, p. 244, for costs of all township projects in Johannesburg and 'savings' attained by the Housing Division. Unfortunately, for the purposes of this study, the Native Building Workers Advisory Board decided not to compile statistics on local authority building costs.

4. Data on the number of workers employed on township production by the Housing Division was available for 1 year only. See above, p. 247, n. 111.

5. See Figure 6.1. A direct correlation between the structure and composition of the labour force employed and the annual rate of housing production is not strictly possible, however, because the labour force was engaged in simultaneous production of other types of buildings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Labour Force</th>
<th>Total (cum) Registered Big. Workers</th>
<th>Building Workers No.</th>
<th>% of total Labour</th>
<th>Learners No.</th>
<th>% of total Labour</th>
<th>Labourers No.</th>
<th>% of total Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>15.89</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>80.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2318</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>14.79</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>1791</td>
<td>77.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4008</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>3347</td>
<td>83.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>6602</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>15.16</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>4924</td>
<td>74.59</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>8264</td>
<td>1205</td>
<td>1189</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>6025</td>
<td>72.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>8444</td>
<td>1709</td>
<td>1396</td>
<td>16.53</td>
<td>1323</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>5725</td>
<td>67.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10937</td>
<td>2027</td>
<td>1341</td>
<td>12.26</td>
<td>1344</td>
<td>12.28</td>
<td>8252</td>
<td>75.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>13113</td>
<td>2373</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>14.08</td>
<td>1435</td>
<td>10.94</td>
<td>9831</td>
<td>74.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>10517</td>
<td>2787</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>15.16</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>9.97</td>
<td>7873</td>
<td>74.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>8388</td>
<td>3153</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>19.61</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>5967</td>
<td>71.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>10650</td>
<td>3446</td>
<td>2024</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>7909</td>
<td>74.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8501</td>
<td>3605</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>20.84</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>6070</td>
<td>71.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7734</td>
<td>3757</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>22.16</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>5641</td>
<td>72.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6708</td>
<td>3987</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>20.69</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>4937</td>
<td>73.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.2 Composition of Building Labour Force Employed on Township Production, 1952 - 1965

(Annual Reports of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board, 1952 - 1965)
to be gained from these statistics on the proportional composition of the building workforce over the period 1953 to 1965, is the changing ratio of 'skilled' workers -registered building workers and learners- to 'unskilled' building labourers.

The production of housing reached a peak in 1958-59, with over 36,000 houses being constructed. This increased production appears to have been achieved, however, not through the increased employment of skilled building workers and learners, but through the expansion of employment of labourers. The unskilled labour category increased by 44 per cent from 1957 to 1958, and by a further 19 per cent during 1959. Increased production was therefore attained, not through the expansion of a given labour process, but through the 'rationalisation' of the labour process in house-building and through diluting the labour process through the 'task system' which facilitated the large-scale introduction of labourers.

The implications of this ratio of skilled to unskilled building labour on the labour costs involved in township production would have been considerable: exemptions from the wage rates prescribed by Industrial Councils for unskilled building labourers could be granted in the townships and all areas within the scope of the Native Building Workers Act. By 1958, such exemptions to local authorities appear to have been established practice.

6. See above, p. 107, for post-war discussions on increasing the productivity of the building industry and the possibilities for 'rationalisation'.

7. It appears that the practice of applying for the exclusion of 'Native areas' from the scope of Industrial Council Agreements was increasingly adopted by municipalities. At a meeting of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board in 1963, for instance, F. W. Buckland, representative of employers'organisations stated, "... when building employers performed work on municipal schemes, they were exempted from the provisions of the agreement and were allowed to employ unskilled labourers at the same wage as was paid... by municipalities". Native Building Workers Advisory Board, Minutes of Meeting, 5/3/1963 p. 5. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1. (It should be noted that in terms of Department of Housing Circular No. 3, 10/12/1962, all future housing schemes had to invite tenders from the private building sector. Local authorities were not precluded from tendering).
There is another important question which arises from Table 6.2. This concerns the relationship between the total number of skilled building workers registered under the Act and the number of workers actually employed annually by local authority building organisations. It appears that from 1956-57, there was certainly no shortage of registered skilled building workers. The gap between registrations and actual employment on townships increased steadily, however, and in 1965 only one third of registered African building workers were in employment with local authorities. Without official 'artisan' status, yet trained to a certain level of 'skill', these building workers who were not employed on housing or township projects were clearly available to the building industry. But, under what conditions of employment and at what wages?

The object of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board was to augment the skilled African building workforce for the production of housing for African workers, while simultaneously protecting the position of white artisans in the building industry. The operations of the Advisory Board in determining conditions of 'training' and wage levels have been briefly described. It is necessary now to examine the operations of the Advisory Board in the application of 'apartheid' to the relations of production. In the analysis that follows, the process of implementing certain provisions of the Native Building Workers Act is described, and some further consequences of state intervention in the relations of building production are identified.

Apartheid and Relations of Production

In terms of the Native Building Workers Act of 1951, and in order to protect white building artisans, no employer in the building industry could employ African workers on skilled building work— as defined in the legislation— in areas outside the townships. Furthermore, this

8. See above, p. 185.
9. See above, p.158, Employers in the building industry were restricted in terms of Section 14 of the Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951.
restriction could be extended by proclamation to all persons undertaking building work. In May 1954, the Minister of Labour 'invited objections' to the proposed application of Section 15 of the Act, which contemplated extending the prohibition to include persons other than employers in the building industry.\(^\text{10}\)

The response was considerable, and the range of the objections which were received and considered by the Native Building Workers Advisory Board in July 1954, indicated the extent to which employers outside the building industry made use of African workers on 'skilled' work, particularly of a 'jobbing' nature. Factory owners, property owners and also mine-owners employed a significant proportion of African workers on repairs and maintenance of premises.\(^\text{11}\) As the South African Federated Chamber of Industries, acting on behalf of 'manufacturers generally', pointed out in its representations to the Minister of Labour, "it is customary for Native labour in factories to be diverted to maintenance and repair work...during non-productive periods...This work is done by handymen at about half or two-thirds \([\text{white}]\) artisan rates". These workers were "extensively employed throughout the manufacturing industry and the provision of the proposed proclamation would increase costs".\(^\text{12}\)

Despite these representations, however, the Native Building Workers Act was amended during the 1955 parliamentary session. A statement by the Minister of Labour, Senator J. de Klerk, made clear that, while it was the intention to apply the restriction to all persons undertaking building work -except on farms which were excluded, as were the mines- the prohibition was there as an overall control. This control could be modified

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11. Representations were received from: S.A. Federated Chamber of Industries: Transvaal Association of Property Owners; Steel and Engineering Industries Federation S.A.; Natal Employers Association; Institute of Estate Agents and Auctioneers S.A.; Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers of S.A.; Corporation of the City of Durban; and Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines, Gold Producers Committee, Department of Labour, Ref. 1612/70-16, encl. Native Building Workers Advisory Board, Minutes of Special Meeting, 26/7/1954. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 1.

through the process of exemption. According to the minister's statement, the purpose of the amendments was "to ensure that native building workers, who are being trained in order to assist in alleviating the native housing shortage, should not be diverted from this purpose and thereby endanger the livelihood of European building workers...It is appreciated, however, that it may not be practicable to apply the prohibition in all urban areas and in respect of all classes of work. It is for this reason that the law gives the Minister power of exemption". Although exemption would be granted only on the basis of a shortage of white artisans, in particular areas or classes of work, the essence of exemption was that the state could intervene directly in relations of production beyond the spatially-delimited 'township' areas. Indeed, when the terms and conditions of exemption were set out in June 1956, the scope of the Act had been extended not only to building work outside the building industry but to include all skilled work as defined, wherever it was performed.

The implications of this development are of crucial importance. At the level of appearance, a 'blanket' restriction on African workers undertaking any skilled work had been imposed in terms of a provision in the Native Building Workers Act. But through the process of granting exemptions, the state in theory could control the entry of African workers into areas of skilled work in all industries, which hitherto had been monopolised by white workers. A Department of Labour official explained the amendments, and the "necessity for granting exemptions", to the Native Building Workers Advisory Board in December 1955:

13. Statement by Minister of Labour, encl. Secretary for Labour to Secretary, National Federation of Building Trade Employers in South Africa, Ref. No. 1612/70, 7/9/1955. BIFSA Archives, Files No. 2.

14. Government Notice No. 1061, Government Gazette, 15/6/1956. From September 1956, the Johannesburg City Council converted "the bulk of artisans positions in the Native Areas" (in all trades) to 'Native Industrial Workers', "with marked success". Wage scales equivalent to 'Native Building Workers' were adopted. JCC Minutes, 29/4/1958, Minutes: 629-30. In 1946, concern about the 'infiltration' of African 'trainees' into local government service had been expressed by the South African Association of Municipal Employees, with the COTT Scheme. See above, p. 139.
Broadly speaking it was the intention to exempt industrial and business concerns from the prohibitions of the Act in respect of all process work and also to exclude manufacturing concerns in respect of the manufacture of articles. The Federated Chamber of Industries had indeed requested exemptions in respect of "operations forming an integral part of the process of manufacture or the supply of any product or service" in industries as diverse as furniture manufacturing, ship repainting, sheetmetal working, box manufacturing and cement and allied products manufacture. The reason for exemption was simply "economic". General exemptions were in fact granted in June 1956.

The foregoing suggests how the application of 'apartheid' to relations of production -building production in the first instance- as expressed in the Native Building Workers Act, could accord with the requirements of industrial employers in terms of reducing the wage bill, while simultaneously appearing to 'protect' the position of white workers. According to the Department of Labour, "the availability...of non-Native labour was a factor which was taken into consideration in all instances" when exemptions were decided on. However, 50 per cent of exemptions which had been granted by December 1957, in addition to the general exemptions of June 1956, were for no fixed period. Apartheid structures, such as the Native Building Workers Advisory Board, thus provided the means for introducing African workers into skilled positions, and for state intervention in the division of labour and the labour process in various industries. Indeed, after the amendments in 1955, the activities of the

16. Ibid., Annexure A, pp. 3-4.
19. Ibid.
Advisory Board, as reflected in minutes of meetings, were centred largely on the questions of exemptions under Section 15 of the Native Building Workers Act.

The impression should not, however, be given that the structures of the state actively promoted the large-scale employment of African workers in positions of skill. The essential point is that through structures such as the Native Building Workers Advisory Board, the conditions of entry could be controlled. 20

The developments identified above in relation to the functions of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board are important to this study of state intervention for two reasons. Firstly, they show how state structures which are formed in one setting - in response to specific conditions such as a shortage of skilled labour for house-building production - can, in the process of implementation of a range of policies, have effects in areas which are quite removed from the initial policy intentions. Secondly, in the context of the relationship between the state, employers and the African work force, this section has also shown a connection between the processes involved in the production of the townships and relations of production in general. Starting with an examination of the state in its role as 'employer' in township production, the analysis showed how state intervention in relations of building production had effects on general production relations, with significant potential consequences for the racial division of labour and the labour cost structure of industrial production.

It is necessary now to examine the relationship between the state, employers and African workers around the conditions of consumption of housing. The conditions of housing had certainly been transformed by state intervention in relations of building production. But how had the effects of state intervention in reducing the cost of production of housing and infrastructure in the townships affected the relationship between the

20. This point bears directly on the question of state intervention affecting the nature of 'labour requirements' and regulating the supply of labour to industries, which is taken up in the following section.
state, employers and African workers around rentals and, related to this, wages? The analysis which follows reverts back to Johannesburg and to an examination of the Johannesburg City Council as 'landlord' and the relationship with its township 'tenants'.

6.2 Cost of Production and Costs of Reproduction: Soweto

The development of the South-West Townships of Johannesburg over the period 1953-1965, which was described in the preceding chapter, is reflected in Table 6.3 in terms of capital expenditure on the 'Native Revenue Account'. The methods and mechanisms facilitated by the Native Building Workers Act of 1951 and the Native Services Levy Act of 1952 provided the basis for the provision of service infrastructure and the building programme of the Housing Division. The impact of annual contributions by employers to the 'Native Services Levy Fund' on the Account was considerable. In 1954 and 1955, before the massive building effort of the Housing Division, contributions to the Fund in fact surpassed the total income from rentals, and, by the end of the study period, the provision of service infrastructure as a percentage of total capital expenditure had increased from 9.26 in 1953 to more than 35 per cent in 1965. These costs were borne by the Native Services Levy Fund, rather than financed by loans negotiated by the City Council from central government. This apparent redistribution between the state and employers of part of the costs of housing in regard to service infrastructure, needs to be seen in the light of the preceding analysis of the operations of the Housing Division. As reflected in Table 6.3, the amount of capital invested in buildings increased significantly, with projects undertaken directly by the Housing Division accounting for over R18.5 million, or approximately 34.5 per cent of total capital expenditure in 1965. Taken together, then, the

21. See Table 6.4, p. 267.
22. See Table 5.2, p.277 , for details of the Services Levy Fund.
23. See Table 5.7, p.244 , for projects undertaken by the Housing Division in Soweto.
Table 6.3  Johannesburg City Council: Capital Expenditure on 'Native Revenue Account', 1953 and 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>% total expenditure</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>% total expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land (1)</td>
<td>2,641,334</td>
<td>20.90</td>
<td>2,451,337</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>8,231,541</td>
<td>65.14</td>
<td>27,773,749</td>
<td>51.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery, plant, tools, equipment (2)</td>
<td>505,438</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>1,550,011</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service infrastructure (3)</td>
<td>1,170,028</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>18,821,895</td>
<td>35.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway siding and sundries(4)</td>
<td>31,676</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>9,721</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>48,823</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>396,297</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debtors on House-selling schemes (5)</td>
<td>8,576</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>2,485,559</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>12,637,416</td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td>53,488,569</td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Decrease in 1965 accounted for by transfer of land to Resettlement Board, eg. Meadowlands.

(2) Includes medical appliances and office machinery in administration offices.

(3) For projects approved from Native Services Levy Fund, as at 1965 (R16,106,238), see above, Table 5.2, p.

(4) In 1953, 'sundries' included livestock.

(5) In June 1965, 9,500 houses had been purchased in the townships. Of these, 1,739 were more than 3 months in arrears in payments. JCC Minutes, 31/10/67, Minute: 2104.

Source: JCC Minutes; and, Lewis, 'A city within a city', p. 34.
operations of the Services Levy Fund and the Housing Division as a 'direct labour organisation' accounted for almost 70 per cent of total capital expenditure on the Revenue Account at 1965.

The direct effects of these forms of state intervention were an increase in the rate of housing production, with a simultaneous reduction in the costs of housing and infrastructure. But when the actual operations of the Housing Division were analysed, the source of 'savings' on projects was located in the relations of exploitation which were established between the Johannesburg City Council, as employer, and the African building labour force. These findings therefore also suggested a 'redistribution' of costs of housing, namely, through 'subsidising' part of the cost of production by incorporating increasing amounts of unpaid labour of African building workers. 24 The aim in this section of the chapter is to examine the question of distribution of costs of housing in further detail.

The conditions under which the 'labour requirements' of Johannesburg were to be housed had certainly been transformed by 1965, but how did this affect the relationship between the state, the African work force and employers around rentals and, directly related to this, wages? In the analysis which follows, the effects of state intervention in reducing the costs of production of housing and infrastructure in the townships are examined in relation to the costs of reproduction for the African work force in the South-West Townships of Johannesburg.

Financial Relations and Rental Policies

One result of the consistent and considerable 'savings' on projects executed by the Housing Division over the period 1955-1965, was that the Johannesburg City Council could submit revised financial details of schemes

24. See above, p. 242, for analysis of the 'incentive scheme'.
to the Bantu Housing Board, and request that the Government National Housing Loans, which had been negotiated for each project, be closed at reduced figures. Reduced capital costs on the various schemes, reduced loans and therefore less payable as interest and redemption, meant that, in theory, rentals could be fixed according to the lower capital costs. But a closer examination of rental policies formulated over this period reveals that the consumption of housing as expressed in the rent relation, bore little relation to the capital costs of the housing. In practice, rental policies reinforced the tendency to balance the municipal accounts, and to make the costs of reproduction of the work force in the townships -as reflected in Table 6.4- self-financing. It must be emphasised at the outset that these policies were largely the result of the steady erosion of all forms of subsidisation by central government and, indeed, the increasing involvement by the central Department of Native Affairs in matters of urban administration, particularly in the townships.

The Minister of Native Affairs stated in 1954 that the government intended to eliminate 'sub-economic' loans for African housing. With the publication of the research findings of the National Building Research

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25. The 'Bantu' Housing Board had been set up in terms of the Housing Act, No. 10 of 1957, as a parallel institution to the National Housing Commission. A National Housing Fund was also created from which both bodies were empowered to make loans to local authorities.

26. National Housing Loans granted for the following schemes and the reduced amounts which the votes were closed at in 1959, were: Orlando West (500 pairs of semis) £405,761, vote closed at £365,232; (130 pairs of semis) £98,747, vote closed at £94,897 Orlando West Extension (1000 houses) £345,055, vote closed at £297,404; Mofolo (2330 houses) £759,000, vote closed at £697,766 JCC Minutes, 29/9 29/9/1959 Minutes: 1882. Item (N.E.A.D. 262/59).

27. See above p. 82 , for the City Council's rental policy in 1945.

28. The 'rent', was in fact made up of two components: a 'house rent' and an amount for 'site rent'. The latter included the costs of administration, the costs of land and services charges. Thus, although the capital costs on housing had been reduced, 'site rentals' incorporated the costs of land forming 'buffer strips' to townships. See above, p. 183 . Thus township residents bore the cost of reproducing 'apartheid'.

Table 6.4 Johannesburg City Council: Extracts from the 'Native Revenue Account', 1948 - 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Capital Expenditure (cum)</th>
<th>Rents Nett</th>
<th>Deficit on NRA debited to Rates</th>
<th>'Kaffir Beer' Sales</th>
<th>'Kaffir Beer' Profits</th>
<th>Annual contributions by employers to N.S.L. Fund (Transport)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>4,182,258</td>
<td>292,268</td>
<td>95,899</td>
<td>236,689</td>
<td>121,837</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>4,804,844</td>
<td>331,566</td>
<td>164,202</td>
<td>327,047</td>
<td>181,215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,420,407</td>
<td>326,806</td>
<td>241,958</td>
<td>327,445</td>
<td>174,724</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>5,851,194</td>
<td>419,832</td>
<td>327,756</td>
<td>414,023</td>
<td>175,131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>5,968,910</td>
<td>429,090</td>
<td>335,905</td>
<td>499,420</td>
<td>201,576</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>6,318,708</td>
<td>484,281</td>
<td>348,612</td>
<td>614,830</td>
<td>239,835</td>
<td>261,564</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>6,899,378</td>
<td>539,517</td>
<td>136,758</td>
<td>701,534</td>
<td>366,230</td>
<td>557,841</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>7,745,566</td>
<td>571,476</td>
<td>170,858</td>
<td>823,203</td>
<td>427,156</td>
<td>615,141</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>9,491,701</td>
<td>669,943</td>
<td>129,052</td>
<td>892,196</td>
<td>407,846</td>
<td>657,048</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>11,326,214</td>
<td>857,060</td>
<td>214,700</td>
<td>1,029,041</td>
<td>525,101</td>
<td>680,467</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>14,648,270</td>
<td>1,174,131</td>
<td>215,910</td>
<td>1,108,528</td>
<td>539,538</td>
<td>710,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>18,034,086</td>
<td>1,436,943</td>
<td>121,580</td>
<td>1,284,856</td>
<td>645,495</td>
<td>736,665</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>20,453,607</td>
<td>1,553,106</td>
<td>343,125</td>
<td>1,345,545</td>
<td>649,834</td>
<td>700,321</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>22,078,041</td>
<td>1,695,201</td>
<td>426,104</td>
<td>1,409,936</td>
<td>619,956</td>
<td>702,369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Decimilisation R of currency (£44,156,082)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>46,934,247</td>
<td>3,516,503</td>
<td>731,357</td>
<td>3,027,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>50,042,554</td>
<td>3,652,230</td>
<td>913,481</td>
<td>3,228,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>51,877,747</td>
<td>3,760,241</td>
<td>731,905</td>
<td>4,215,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>53,488,569</td>
<td>3,900,000</td>
<td>474,520</td>
<td>5,204,223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Annual Reports, Manager, Non-European Affairs Department; and, Lewis, 'A City within a city', p.35.
Institute on the 'Costs of Urban Bantu Housing', the Department of Native Affairs considered it possible to provide funds only on an 'economic' basis. This meant in effect that prevailing market interest rates would be charged on loans for housing projects with decreased capital costs. 30 Apart from the provision of loan funds for new housing, however, the Minister of Native Affairs was able to intervene in the actual determination of rentals within townships under the jurisdiction of local authorities, through an amendment in 1953 to the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945. 31 The Minister was empowered to determine rents on the basis of the income of the tenant, even in pre-existing housing schemes of local authorities which had been erected from sub-economic funds before the Second World War.

The principle introduced was that of differential rentals for any particular dwelling, according to whether the tenant's income was classified as 'sub-economic' or 'economic'. The Minister of Native Affairs determined the income limit for this classification as a total family income of £15, above which the tenant was considered 'economic'. All local authorities were directed to amend the tariffs of rentals in their regulations, to make provision for corresponding 'economic' rentals for all dwellings and hostels erected from sub-economic funds. 32 The revised rentals in older housing schemes of the Johannesburg City Council, approved by the Administrator and the Minister of Native Affairs, became effective on 1 November 1954 33 and marked a 'new' phase in the relationship between the City Council as landlord and its tenants. Like the squatter movements during the early 1940s, which had politicised the housing shortage, the provision of housing acquired a distinctly political focus during the 1950s.

30. See above, p. 184. The Housing Office notified local authorities that, from August 1955, it would no longer approve loans for houses costing more than £250. JCC Minutes, 6/12/1955, Minutes: 1059.
31. See above, p. 224, n. 77.
33. See Table 6.6, p. 273.
particularly in the struggles which developed around the question of rent increases. More than 18,400 families were in accommodation which had been erected from 'sub-economic' funds.

The actions of the Minister and the Johannesburg City Council were immediately challenged and an application for an order declaring these invalid was successfully upheld. But, in spite of this, and the rejection of rent increases by the 'Native Advisory Boards' in Orlando, Pimville, Dube, Eastern Native Township and Jabavu, the City Council adopted revised and amended increases in May 1955. After further amendments, required by the Supreme Court, the City Council introduced a graduated system to "reduce the severity of the increase [of rents] from the sub-economic to the economic". Again, in December 1956, following several unsuccessful attempts to introduce the increases and attempts to get the 'official' income limit raised, the City Council decided on "independent action" and established an £18 limit, with any loss to be for

34. See above, p. 67.

35. Three separate actions were commenced against the Minister of Native Affairs and the Johannesburg City Council. The Court set aside both the Minister's determination and the Council's amendments to the regulations. JCC Minutes, 26/4/1955, pp. 439-442. The struggles around rents in the townships, for contemporary analysis, represent an important area of research: so too, does the relationship between the local authority and juridical structures of the state which is suggested by the above. The only material available to this study are the records of the Johannesburg City Council.

36. Comments received from the various Advisory Boards were simply forwarded to the Minister of Native Affairs. The generally ineffectual status of the Boards is reflected in the comments of the Moroka Board, eg., 'this matter does not vitally concern the Moroka Board inasmuch as houses have not yet been provided for Moroka residents: no decision taken'. No comments at all were received from Western Native Township Advisory Board, one of the principal townships affected by the rent increases. JCC Minutes, 24/5/1955, pp.508-511.

37. The Supreme Court ruled that "regulations determining location rentals are vague, and, for that reason, void when they provide for different rentals...without making it possible for the public to identify a particular dwelling or room with a prescribed rental". JCC Minutes, 28/2/1956, p. 187; see also, JCC Minutes, 27/3/1956, p. 305. Item (122/3/2) (N.E.A.D. 72/56).
the Council's account. By early 1957, the City Council had raised this limit to £20 and was committed to a rental policy which recognised tenants with a monthly family income of £20 and less as requiring subsidisation. The 'independent action' of the Johannesburg City Council was in fact taken in the context of the increasing organisation and mobilisation of the African working class during this period, particularly around issues concerning the material conditions in the townships.

Material Conditions and Confrontations in the Townships

The growth of township-based organisation from the mid-1950s, and particularly in the first few months of 1957, again focused attention on the material conditions of African workers. The residents of the township of Alexandra organised a successful bus boycott following an increase in fares. For 3 months, residents walked to work from Alexandra situated outside the city boundary. To break the boycott, the City Council and the Chambers of Commerce had raised the Native Services Levy from 2s 6d to 3s per week per worker, in order to 'subsidise' the bus company.

The Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council conceded that the bus boycott "was an eloquent plea not so much for lower bus fares but for higher wages". In this, it was partly successful. Labourers' wage rates were to be investigated by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry; and, it will be recalled, the City

38. JCC Minutes, 4/12/1956, Minutes: 1811-2. Item (122/3/2)(N.E.A.D. 239/56). It should be noted that at this stage, the income limit below which subsidies would apply for whites in the 'sub-economic' category had been determined at £30 per month.


41. Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, 1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957, Part IV, p. 12.

42. Although it was only in August 1959 that the new wage determination for minimum wages for unskilled labour came into operation. See above, p. 194, n. 122.
Council—itself a large employer of unskilled workers—increased the cost of living allowance of its labour force. The results of several socio-economic surveys carried out by the Non-European Affairs Department during the bus boycott, forced the City Council "to take cognisance of the prevailing economic circumstances". The so-called 'Poverty Datum Line'—the "scientifically determined... minimum monthly income required to maintain basic working efficiency and decency for a family of five"—had been set at £19 11s 6d for Johannesburg. Table 6.5 compares the average family incomes in several townships, which, apart from the Orlando West sample, were well below the 'poverty datum line'.

There were more than 18,400 families living in housing which had been provided with 'sub-economic' funds and, despite raising the income limit from £15 to £20 per month, there were nonetheless some 9,000 families who were affected by the revised tariffs which are reflected in Table 6.6. In September 1957, the City Council attempted to increase the rent of thousands of houses in Orlando, Pimville, Western Native Township and Eastern Native Township. A boycott against the increased rentals was organised and successfully sustained for 5 months. Once again, the possible linking of community-based struggles and the workplace was emphasised by employers. The Transvaal Chamber of Industries made "strong representations" to postpone the rent increases, "in view of the adverse reaction which the Chamber believes would undoubtedly be...

43. The Johannesburg City Council employed approximately 18,700 unskilled labourers in April 1957, and increased the cost of living allowance by 6s per week. See above, p. 236.

44. JCC Minutes, 26/3/1957, Minutes, 566-568, Item (122/3/2) (N.E.A.D. 62/57); see also the findings of the National Institute of Personnel Research, that 96 per cent of the City Council's African workforce were living below the 'poverty datum line'. See above, p. 237, n. 94. As Wolpe has remarked, the 'poverty datum line' is an ideological device justifying the perpetuation of differentially low wages to Africans. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power', p. 448. It is therefore part of the whole ideology of 'separate development', in the same way that minimum standards and the ideological concept of 'Native housing' have been shown to provide the ideological justification for differential conditions for the reproduction of labour.

45. Compare with Table 6.6, for rentals.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earned Family Income/month</th>
<th>Orlando</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Orlando</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Jabavu</th>
<th>Eastern Native Township</th>
<th>Families in all Townships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. in sample</td>
<td>% total</td>
<td>No. in sample</td>
<td>% total</td>
<td>No. in sample</td>
<td>% total</td>
<td>No. in sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£ .-/1 - £ 5</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£ 5. -/1 - £10</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£10. -/1 - £15</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£15. -/1 - £20</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£20. -/1 - £25</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£25. -/1 - £30</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£30. -/1 - £40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£40. -/1 &amp; over</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Family Income/month


Source: Schedule, JCC Minutes, 26/3/1957, Minutes: 569, Item (122/3/2) (NEAD 62/57)
Table 6.6 Johannesburg City Council, Non-European Affairs Department: Township Rentals (revised tariffs)

I  Schedule of Differential Rentals for Existing Sub-Economic Schemes: Eastern Native Township, Western Native Township, Orlando East, Orlando West, Jabavu and Pimville

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dwellings</th>
<th>Sub-economic monthly rental</th>
<th>Economic monthly rental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£. s. d.</td>
<td>£. s. d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-roomed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>2 5 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 6</td>
<td>2 10 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 12 6</td>
<td>2 17 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-roomed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 10 0</td>
<td>2 15 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 12 6</td>
<td>2 17 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
<td>3 5 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-roomed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 17 6</td>
<td>3 2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
<td>3 5 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 5 0</td>
<td>3 7 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 7 6</td>
<td>3 10 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 12 6</td>
<td>3 12 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 15 0</td>
<td>3 17 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II  Rentals applied to new Townships: Mofolo South, Mofolo North, Central Western Jabavu and Extension, Moroka, Chiawelo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dwellings</th>
<th>Sub-economic monthly rental</th>
<th>Economic monthly rental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-roomed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE.51/6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (detached)</td>
<td>3 12 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE.51/7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (semi)</td>
<td>3 10 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-roomed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE.51/13A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (austerity construction)</td>
<td>3 17 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-roomed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE.51/6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>2 15 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE.51/7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>2 7 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCC Minutes, 28/2/1956, p. 188; and 28/4/1959, p. 737.
engendered in the Natives and the probable disruptive effects on industry... through stoppages of work and other manifestations of resentment". The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce similarly had "a definite interest in peaceful labour relations, which would suffer damage from an immediate increase in rentals", and prevailed upon the City Council not to proceed. With arrears accumulating rapidly, the Johannesburg City Council was forced to compromise, and, in January 1958, agreed that the higher rentals would be payable only by new tenants. But rent strikes, like the successful bus boycott which preceded the rent boycott, were a form of resistance which was readily 'available' and around which African classes in the townships could be mobilised for mass action. As Table 6.7 illustrates, rent arrears in the City Council's housing schemes rose steeply from 1958, and in March 1960 approximately 25,000 tenants were in arrears with their rents.

This period coincided with the massive building effort by the Housing Division, when thousands of houses were added to the existing stock of the Johannesburg City Council. Although the majority of these houses were 'modified' Type NE 51/6, of "austerity construction", with the removal of subsidised interest rates, they brought higher rents and transport charges to the tenants who were moved from Moroka or Orlando as part of the 'slum clearance scheme'. Table 6.6 illustrates the rentals applied throughout Soweto which, when compared with the prevailing wage levels, imposed economic hardship on the majority of the African work force of Johannesburg.

46. JCC Minutes, 28/1/1958, Minutes: 108. Item (122/3/2)(N.E.A.D.31/58)
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., Minutes: 109; and, Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958, p. 4.
50. 'Austerity construction' meant that costs had been further reduced by "deleting all the items not absolutely essential, in fact by providing for the erection of a skeleton structure of walls, a roof, doors and windows!", Only the kitchens were provided with floors of solid ashcrete. JCC Minutes, 27/9/1956, Minutes: 1183. Item(71/5/1) (D. of H. 34/56).
51. See above, p. 224.
Table 6.7  Johannesburg City Council: Rent Arrears in Housing Schemes for African Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Rents (Nett)</th>
<th>Total Arrears</th>
<th>Arrears as % of total rents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>£857,060</td>
<td>£21,779</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>£1,174,131</td>
<td>£90,669</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>£1,436,943</td>
<td>£214,923</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>£1,553,106</td>
<td>£236,581</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961*</td>
<td>£1,695,201</td>
<td>£215,725</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R (3,390,402)</td>
<td>R (431,450)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>£3,516,503</td>
<td>£294,613</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>£3,652,230</td>
<td>£171,039</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>£3,760,241</td>
<td>£117,153</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>£3,900,000</td>
<td>£83,250</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>£3,994,655</td>
<td>£55,074</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Decimalisation of currency

Source: Compiled from Annual Reports of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, 1959-60; 1960-63; 1963-65; JCC Minutes 6/12/1960, Minutes: 2541,
It appears that from 1961, rent arrears in Johannesburg's townships began to decrease. This is, in part, accounted for by the increased pressure on existing accommodation when the rate of housing production declined. Tenants took in lodgers, and thereby supplemented their rentals. But the reduction in rent arrears was also related to modifications in practices of 'township management', 'new concepts in administration' and the introduction of further controls over the conditions of residence for the majority of the African labour force of Johannesburg. It is necessary briefly to examine the 'management' of these conditions in order to identify the role of housing in the evolving pattern of state responses to the struggles of the African population.

'Management' of Conditions for the Reproduction of Labour

By 1955, the legislation impinging directly and fundamentally on the management of conditions under which the 'labour requirements' of Johannesburg were housed included no less than twelve principal Acts with amendments. Influx control regulations had been administered by

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52. See Figure 5.4, p. 228.

53. The Prosecution Section of the Non-European Affairs Department had been organised in April 1955, before the expansion of the South-West Townships. With the rent boycotts, the Organisation and Methods Division of the City Council undertook an investigation, and proposed a separate Rent Control Section within a completely reorganised Townships Branch of the Non-European Affairs Department. The final report of the Organisation and Methods Division was considered by the Council in May 1964. The proposals constituted "a new concept of administration of Bantu Townships" JCC Minutes, 26/5/1964, Minutes: 1130-9, Item (200/3/60)(O. & M. 2/64).

the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council since 1953. According to the Manager, W.J.P. Carr, through the operations of the Labour Bureau, "both demand for labour and its supply can be checked and only those workers who are required in excess of the local supply are permitted to enter the area".55 In August, 1955, the Johannesburg City Council defined its housing policy in relation to the question of influx control. This policy is examined briefly because it is only against this background that the production of houses and hostel accommodation by the Housing Division from 1955 to 1965 can be fully understood.

All Africans in urban areas were classified and categorised according to Section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, No. 25 of 1945 as amended. These provisions determined conditions of residence and security of tenure in urban areas: those born and permanently resident in Johannesburg complied with Section 10(1)(a); those who had worked continuously in the area for one employer for ten years, or who had remained continuously, "lawfully", in the area for not less than fifteen years, were classified as Section 10 (1) (b); 'dependents' of men under the first two categories, "ordinarily resident with such Natives", were classified as Section 10 (1) (c); and, finally, the largest group, those who had been granted permission to remain in the urban area under Section 10 (1) (d) of the Act. All those in the last category "depend upon the existing state of the the labour market for their security of tenure" and on officials at the local Labour Bureau for permission to remain in the urban areas. 56

55. The Labour Bureau registered 'suitable' workseekers, dealt with enquiries from employers and placed workers in employment. The operations of the Labour Bureau therefore were directed towards 'rationalising' the process of allocating available labour. Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, 1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957, p. 12.

56. 'Report of the Non-European Affairs and Housing Committee' (Influx Control in Relation to Housing), JCC Minutes, 30/8/1955, pp. 742-4, Item 10 (401/12).
There was, according to the Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department in 1955, a "growing surplus of labour" amongst groups with Section 10 (1) (a), (b) and (c) status. Employers did not "favour this class of worker" with security of tenure, preferring 'migrant labourers' who, "to obtain a foothold in Johannesburg", were prepared to accept lower wages and menial work and who were "more amenable to discipline" because they lacked security of tenure in the city. These 'migrant workers' were in fact all those workers with Section 10 (1) (d) status, the category of labour on which the city of Johannesburg was dependent; "if this is not forthcoming, employers, such as the Council, and, in fact, industry itself, would come to a complete standstill". The housing policy, as defined and adopted by the Johannesburg City Council in August 1955, centred on workers categorised as Section 10(1) (d). The following lines of policy were adopted.

(1) All the Africans accepted as Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) prior to the 1 January 1953 were allowed to take up any type of accommodation and employment offered.

(2) For Section 10 (1) (d) workers, those who had entered Johannesburg after 1 January 1953 with their families, would be accommodated on a letting basis only and "warned that once they are discharged from their present jobs they will only be allowed to remain in the area...if they are prepared to take up employment in the category of labour where workers are in short supply. Should they refuse to do so they will have to leave the area".

(3) Those Section 10 (1) (d) workers who were single, or who had left their families in the rural areas, would be housed in single accommodation, and "warned that they may not bring their wives and families into the area unless authority is obtained from the Council", on the understanding that "as soon as the Native is discharged and becomes surplus to requirements he and his family will be required to leave the area".

57. Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1955, p. 11.

58. 'Report of the Non-European Affairs and Housing Committee' (Influx Control in Relation to Housing), JCC Minutes, 30/8/1955, p. 743.

59. Ibid., p. 744.
It is against this background that the production of houses and hostel accommodation by the Housing Division, described in the preceding chapter, can be fully understood. At the end of 1965, of the total existing housing stock in Soweto approximately 83 per cent was owned by the City Council and allocated to tenants on a letting basis. Of the more than 45,000 houses constructed by the Housing Division between 1954 and 1965, the majority were of 'austerity construction', with reduced standards of materials and finishes. The building programme was directed, therefore, specifically at that category of African labour with Section 10 (1) (d) status, for whom there was "a constant demand".

The operations of the Labour Bureau in Johannesburg in controlling the conditions under which the supply of labour was channelled into various sectors of employment, where 'workers were in short supply', were complemented by the activities within other branches of the Non-European Affairs Department. 'Management' practices included the registration of all service contracts between employers and African workers, the collection of fees from employers for the Native Services Levy Fund and the allocation of accommodation to those Africans whose labour-power was

60. See Table 5.3, p. 232.
61. See above, p. 274. n. 50.
62. According to the Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department, there was a 'constant demand' for labour in categories of work such as, heavy industry labourer; bag carrier with milling and coal firms; timber yard labourer; dairy worker; building labourer; labourer on S.A. Railways and Harbours, or in the service of the City Council; domestic servant and flat cleaners; or any job in which the hours were irregular. Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1955, p. 11.
required by the city of Johannesburg. These bureaucratic controls and procedures for 'managing' the local labour market thus provided the basis for determining relations between employers and the workforce. An example is provided by the rent strikes in the townships.

During 1960, when rent arrears in the townships were at their highest, the Johannesburg City Council held consultations with representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Industry, Afrikaanse Sakekamer, Chamber of Mines and other large employers' organisations, "primarily to acquaint them with the extent of the problem...and to invoke their assistance". The conflict between the state and Africans

63. The activities of the Labour Bureau in Johannesburg expanded from placing 9,719 workers in employment in 1952/53 (of whom 6,323 were with City Council departments), to placing 132,732 workers in 1958/59. Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953, p. 9; 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959, p. 14. In 1964/65 the total number of African workers registered as employed in Johannesburg was 344,887. Of this total, the Labour Bureau had placed 160,039 workers during the year. A larger number were registered as 'workseekers' each year to maintain a 'pool' or 'reserve' of labour to facilitate the distribution of workers at short notice. But in 1964/65 Johannesburg experienced an 'economic boom', as a result of which "the labour supply was inadequate to meet the demand and in order to meet the shortage in most categories, especially in the case of heavy manual labour, recourse had to be taken to the large-scale introduction of workers". Employers in the building industry and in civil engineering, and the City Council, recruited labour from the rural areas. Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1965, pp. 13-5.

64. It should be noted that in 1963/64 there was a major overhaul of the 'urban areas' legislation and an increasing centralisation of control in terms of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, No. 76 of 1963, Act, No. 42 of 1964; Bantu Labour Act, No. 67 of 1964; and Bantu Labour Regulations, Government Notice R 1982 of 1965. This legislative framework established a centrally directed labour bureau system for regulating the supply of African labour. According to the Manager, the amendments to the legislation 'emphasised' the "employment and accommodation aspects of influx control" and placed the "functions of the Local Labour Bureau in a stronger perspective". Ibid., p. 16.

in the townships had escalated during the latter half of the 1950s and, following the Sharpeville massacre at Vereeniging in March 1960, a state of emergency had been called. The intensified repression, which was to characterise the 1960s, was embarked upon by the state. The organisation of mass-based rent strikes and collective action in the townships south-west of Johannesburg was made increasingly difficult, if not impossible, partly as a result of a resolution adopted by the Johannesburg City Council in December 1960. Authority was given to the Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department to arrange with employers for the collection of current rent and arrears, by means of monthly or weekly deductions from the wages of individual workers. Although it is difficult to establish the extent to which this practice contributed to the declining rent arrears from 1961— and there are other important factors to be considered—the above is important. It shows the potential for state intervention in the actual contractual relations.


67. JCC Minutes, 6/12/1960, Minutes: 2546, Item (324/5/6)(N.E.A.D. 222/60). This authority was provided for in terms of Section 20(3) of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945.

68. The amendments to legislation (see above, n. 64), and the 'rationalisation' of township administration procedures (see above n. 53) contributed towards regaining control over the rent situation. In addition, by December 1960, the City Council had arranged with the Chief-Magistrate for 2 courts to hear rent cases (rent cases took on average 8 minutes), and there was pressure on existing accommodation. The Council's official waiting list for housing in the townships was 4,000 in June 1965. Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, 1 July 1963 to 30 June 1965, p. 4. For details on the procedures for enforcing rent payments, namely, the issuing of summonses and court prosecutions or ejection in terms of Section 58 of the Housing Act, No. 10 of 1957, and for a description of the relations between the City Council, the juridical apparatus and the South African Police, in the attempt to contain the rent crisis, see JCC Minutes, 6/12/1960, Minutes: 2541-2546, Item (324/5/6)(N.E.A.D. 222/60).
between individual workers and employers around the costs and conditions of reproduction of labour-power, and highlights the nature of the relationship between the political and the economic spheres in South Africa.

Preceding pages have identified some of the consequences of state intervention in the costs of production and costs of reproduction. The interrelation between practices for housing 'management' and the 'management' of labour were described for the case of Johannesburg. But no satisfactory explanation has yet been given for the apparently contradictory actions of the state in reducing the costs of housing and infrastructure in the townships on the one hand, and, on the other, pursuing rental policies which provoked such wide-spread opposition and political mobilisation in the townships. In order to explain this apparent 'contradiction', reference has to be made to the wider political context of policy formulation and implementation. The section which follows examines the effects of the increasing centralisation of policy on the relationship between the state, employers and the African working class and attempts to situate the townships within the overall 'apartheid' policy framework.

6.3. The Context of Policy Formulation and Policy Implementation

The final section of this chapter examines the context within which township programmes were implemented by local authorities throughout South Africa from the mid-1950s and attempts to establish the relationship between these spatial forms and the overall policy of 'apartheid'. Three aspects of the interrelationships between the state, employers and African workers in the process of policy formulation and implementation are examined.

The process of individualising political relations has obviously important effects on how political struggles are mediated (see above, p. 31, ns. 36 and 37). Relations between African labour and employers, and between Africans and the state, were/are experienced as fragmented, as a result of the 'individual's' encounter with the institutional process within state structures. The role of bureaucratic procedures and the effects of rule-defined classifications and categorisation of African workers are examined below with regard to the social control and spatial reorganisation which was effected in Johannesburg during the period 1955 to 1965.
The first concerns the removals of all state subsidies from the housing of African workers, the apparent contradiction identified above. Here, through focusing on the relations concerning the distribution of costs of reproduction of labour, between the 'apartheid' state, employers and African workers, an attempt is made to locate township rental policies in the context of overall apartheid policy. The second aspect concerns the implementation of policies which were directed at 'regaining control' over African workers and 'eliminating' those who were 'surplus to the labour requirements' of urban areas. Here the consequences of state intervention are described in the case of Johannesburg. Finally the effects of increasing centralisation of both policy formulation and implementation are examined in the context of the relationships within the state - between central and local authorities - and between the state and the African population.

Townships and 'Bantustans': the context of policies

An important feature of the overall policy towards the African population, which was evolving within the state apparatuses during this period, was the relation between the 'short-term' and the 'long-term' policy objectives, and the social context within which these objectives were defined. The Minister of Native Affairs had expressed the context of policy formulation, in an address to the Federated Chambers of Industry in 1954, in terms of "the relationship between those who initiate Native policy and those who are engaged in industry", and defined policy objectives which would "reconcile the economic and social needs". The 'long-term' policy objective, based on the 'ideal of total apartheid', was the gradual 'elimination' of Africans from industries in so-called white areas. The labour required by industry would eventually be housed in the rural reserves, where, according to Verwoerd, "a whole Bantu superstructure of social life and administration" could be established. Industry would have to be attracted, 'decentralised'


71. See above, p. 160.
or 'relocated' to border areas adjacent to these Bantustans. Since industrialists had to be 'attracted', those factors which were important to the "competitive structure of industry -transport, tariffs, power, wage determinations, etc... [would] be linked together in any future planning". It was initially envisaged that the industries which decentralised would be labour-intensive. The abundance of labour and 'the absence of restrictions on making use of that labour' would increase the profitability of undertakings, without the introduction of new machinery or capital. 'Short-term' policy was the planning required in the transitional period, while 'economic requirements weigh more heavily than other interests'. But any policies which were implemented in the urban areas

72. Pelzer, Verwoerd Speaks, p. 56. The 'border industry' policy had in fact, been formulated and implemented under the Smuts government. The Board of Trade and Industry had recommended industrial decentralisation to lessen the threat of a concentrated African workforce in urban areas (see above, p.163, 42). Several factories, such as the Good Hope Textile factory at Zwelitsha, were established through the initiative of the Industrial Development Corporation from 1945 to 1948. The Fagan Commission had also endorsed the policy in order to reduce the urban influx. Legassick, 'Legislation, Ideology and Economy', pp. 16-7.

73. Pelzer, Verwoerd Speaks, p. 57. In 1960 the Permanent Commission for Location of Industry and Development of Border Areas was created and a series of incentives towards decentralisation were introduced. These included rail rebates, interest-free or low interest loans, port rebates and preferential terms in state tenders etc. Legassick, 'Legislation, Ideology and Economy', p. 25. See above, p.35. A public corporation, the Bantu Investment Corporation, was set up by the government in 1959 to stimulate development within the Bantustans. Beinart, 'The Policy of Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa', pp. 95-103.

74. This assessment was based on the pattern of industrial development which existed; with certain industries, such as the metals and engineering industries, tending to concentrate in urban areas, while other sectors, such as food, textiles, clothing, paper and pulp had decentralised for a variety of reasons. For a study of the extent and the nature of decentralised industries before 1960, see, Bell, Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa.
were to be reflect, simultaneously, the overall 'long-term' policy objectives. 75

In terms of the short-term requirements, thousands of houses had to be constructed at existing industrial centres to make up the shortfall in housing for the 'labour requirements'. 76 But, at the same time, in order to reduce the concentrations of African labour, industrial development at these centres was to be controlled, the migrant labour system was to be encouraged, and capital intensification of industry and the rationalisation of work and production methods was to be 'actively' promoted. 77 It is against this background that the production of the townships by local authorities throughout South Africa, as reflected in Table 6.1, can be assessed, and the removal of state subsidies on housing can possibly be explained.

The imposition of the Native Services Levy on certain categories of employers was, in effect, a tax which made African labour relatively

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75. See above, p. 170 for Verwoerd's description of 'short-term' urban planning reflecting the 'long-term' objectives. By 1962, the government had refined the concept of decentralisation and was committed to the development of 5 industrial 'growth points'. In 1964 incentives were increased and by the mid-1960s, policy statements began to suggest that capital-intensive industry also decentralise. Beinart, 'The Policy of Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa', pp. 99-100.

76. See Table 4.3, p. 181, for housing shortage existing in urban areas in 1951.

77. Controls over the use of land for industrial purposes existed in terms of the Natural Resources Development Act, of 1947, as amended in 1955. The Minister of Labour, B.J. Schoemann, frequently 'promoted' methods for increasing the productivity of labour. Referring to industry's reliance on "so-called cheap labour [and] an apparently limitless source of unskilled labour", the "outmoded machinery" and "inadequate equipment", he pointed to the need for incentive schemes. To 'actively promote' incentive schemes, he refused to publish Industrial Agreements if they contained clauses prohibiting systems for 'payment by results' or 'piecework'. Opening Address to The National Development Foundation of South Africa, 24/6/1951. S.A.T.L.C. Records, TUCSA Archives, ICS M.868;(F,62);and SAB, July 1951, editorial 'Production Incentives', p. 11.
'more expensive'. While on the one hand this practice mobilised interest-free finance for local authority infrastructural development in the townships, on the other it induced certain industries to examine the effects of this tax on the total wage bill, particularly comparatively labour-intensive industries. In some cases this resulted in a rationalisation of existing production processes. By increasing the productivity of labour with the introduction of mechanisation, the labour complement could be reduced. In other cases, relocation to industrial sites in the 'border areas' proved more advantageous, given the 'competitive structure of industry'. Either way, the effects of this form of state intervention

Mines, or factories with 'compounded labour', rural employers and farmers were exempt from the provisions of the Native Services Levy Act. No. 64 of 1952. But to manufacturing industry and commerce, the 'levy' on each identifiable worker, instead of a tax on profits or interest, implied higher labour costs.

According to trade union correspondence, in the textile industry in 1953, certain employers were "openly and blatantly 'recovering' this levy from their employees...social security measures such as sick or provident funds refused...[the question of the levy] was brought up during wage negotiations. At one particular textile factory there is a process of eliminating Africans and employing other races". African Textile Workers Industrial Union, National Secretary, to Joint Secretaries, S.A. Trades and Labour Council, 16/6/1953, p.2. S.A.T.L.C. correspondence 1953, TUCSA Archives, ICS M. (F.68). According to the Western Province Local Committee of the S.A. Trades and Labour Council, "it has become more difficult to obtain higher wages for workers as employers use the excuse of the levy for their refusal...Many employers are already unwilling to employ African labour". Acting Sec., Western Province Local Committee to Joint General Secretary, South African Trades and Labour Council, 27/6/1953. Ibid.

The extent to which individual employers reorganised production processes in response to higher labour costs remains an important area for further research. The preceding case study on Johannesburg City Council reveals substantial reorganisation, and the introduction of methods for increasing productivity, when faced with generalised wage increases in 1959. There was a simultaneous reduction in the labour 'complement'. See above, p. 246

There had been the tendency to 'relocate' well before the introduction of this particular form of tax. The 'tax' would tend to reinforce this. See above, p. 284, n.74.
in the costs of reproduction of labour tended to reduce the 'labour requirements' in so-called white urban areas. Through the mechanism of influx control, those workers who were 'surplus' to requirements were relocated, increasingly from the 1960s, to the Bantustans.

Similarly, state intervention in the production of housing, which resulted in reduced capital costs, was not intended to 'subsidise' or maintain the low wages paid by industry to African workers in urban areas. On the contrary, the removal of subsidised rentals and interest rates, which, while possibly benefitting finance capital, was directed towards raising wage levels, and exposing urban employers "to the full cost of living needs of the Native". This pressure was, however, linked to the rationalisation of industry which was anticipated with general wage increases, and which would secure a reduction in 'labour requirements'. As both the Minister of Native Affairs and the Minister of Finance expressed the relationship between costs and control over the reproduction of labour, and the interaction between the 'short-term' and 'long-term' objectives, "as long as employers are assured that the State will come along... and provide housing..., transport..., cheaply..., employers will then be inclined...

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82. This is an important area for future research. The question of financial relations, more particularly the effects of interest rates on housing loans, and the overall cost of housing has not been adequately addressed in this study. In 1945, when building costs were rising steadily and the City Council of Johannesburg was faced with its post-war building programme, Colin Legum, Chairman of the Special Housing Committee, pointed to the 'savings' which could be anticipated if finance charges were controlled, rather than contemplating savings through the payment of differential wages for skilled work, if loans were advanced at 1 per cent interest through state loans; see for example Arbeids Bulletin, July 1945. In fact, by 1960, interest rates on housing schemes in Moroka township were 5 per cent. JCC Minutes, 6/12/1960, Minutes: 2525 Item (71/5/9) (N.E.A.D. 302/60).

83. It will be recalled that during this period the Committee on Socio-Economic Surveys for Native Housing Research had conducted research into the 'rent-paying capacity of Africans in urban areas. In all cases, it was found that 47 per cent of the population in the townships could not afford to pay any rent 'without jeopardising their requirements for the minimum necessities of life'. See above, p. 182.
to employ too many Bantu, with all the resultant State expenditure". 84

Indeed, after 1958, as Figure 6.1 illustrates, the annual rate of housing production in the townships throughout South Africa steadily declined. The massive building programmes implemented from 1954 to 1959 were in line with the 'short-term' objectives. The houses were of 'austerity construction', in 'orderly', planned townships, which were located according to the 'principles' outlined by the Department of Native Affairs. 85 From 1959, however, under the Premiership of Verwoerd, the political and economic restructuring of the Bantustans and the 'border areas' gained momentum, and the 'long-term' policy came into operation.

The following section examines the relation between 'townships' and the concept of 'bantustans' in more detail. The relationship between the provision of housing and social control is examined in the case of Johannesburg. Several features, associated with the increasing centralisation in both policy formulation and implementation, are identified.

'Social Control' in Johannesburg: central and local authority relations

This section examines the relations between local and central authorities in the process of policy implementation, more particularly those policies which were directed at 'regaining control' over Africans in the urban areas and 'eliminating' those who were surplus to the labour requirements of Johannesburg. Preceding chapters outlined the increasing centralisation of the process of policy formulation. The role of the Department of Native Affairs in determining land policies and land-use plans of urban authorities to achieve both a 'rational distribution' of the African workforce, and 'apartheid buffers' to racially segregated residential areas, has been described. 86 The enforcement of the policy

84. House of Assembly Debates, 1958, col. 858.
85. See above, p.170.
86. See above, p. 203.
of 'sites and services' as the basis for approval of local authority housing programmes and housing loans was shown for the case of Johannesburg; and, as the preceding section revealed, with the policy of differential rentals the Minister of Native Affairs was able to intervene directly in the actual determination of rents in local authority housing schemes. The present section identifies other features which were associated with increasing centralisation in the process of implementation, and examines some of the consequences arising from the interventions of the Department of Native Affairs in the 'municipal affairs' of the Johannesburg City Council.

These interventions took place primarily through the Natives Resettlement Board, which was created as a centrally-directed 'urban local authority' in 1954 in order to implement both the land proposals recommended by the Mentz Committee and the Western Areas Removal Scheme. The production of houses by the building organisation of the Resettlement Board in areas adjoining the south-west townships of the City Council was illustrated in the preceding chapter. It is necessary now to examine the relations between these two 'local authorities' in the process of implementing a range of policies for the spatial and social reorganisation of Johannesburg.

The formation of the Resettlement Board as an urban local authority, but directly responsible to the Minister of Native Affairs, was described during the parliamentary debates on the Natives Resettlement Bill as "an entirely new development in the management of urban Native affairs". Much of the opposition to the Bill centred on the perceived 'loss' of local autonomy since the Board, in theory, could function to implement all aspects of the urban areas legislation. The Johannesburg City Council could, therefore, "be forced to relinquish its powers on local administration to...an extraneous official body".

87. See above, p. 217.
88. See above, p. 212.
89. House of Assembly Debates, 1954, col. 2547 (Dr. Gluckman).
90. Ibid., cols. 2540-56, for opposition to increasing centralisation of powers; for a discussion of the 'legal aspects', see speech by Dr. D.L. Smit, cols. 2603-14.
In point of fact, it appears that when the City Council accepted the report of the Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee in January 1953, it recognised that special legislation was required to carry out the 'removals' of some 70,000 people. The City Council had instructed the Ad Hoc Committee to report on the constitution of the implementing 'body' - and any additional legislative powers considered necessary - because it was considered "impracticable" to assign the scheme to a "normal committee functioning normally". The report of the Ad Hoc Committee emphasised that,

...the success of the scheme depends entirely on the freedom of the body entrusted with carrying it out from the normal restrictions placed by law and by the Council's own regulations on the working of committees...to avoid the delays which normally confront a local authority in carrying out a scheme of this nature.

During 1953 and particularly after the elections, however, relations between the Department of Native Affairs and the United Party group in the Johannesburg City Council deteriorated and, by the time the Minister introduced the Natives Resettlement Bill in March 1954, the City Council had officially withdrawn its support from the Western Areas Removal Scheme.

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91. See above, p. 201, n. 18.
92. This instruction was given on 11 June 1952, 'Report of Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee', para. 7, JCC Minutes, 27/1/1953, p. 103.
93. Ibid. It was resolved that the 'body', "without further reference to the Council or its Finance Committee" and "notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law", should carry out such functions as: land acquisition (expropriation or purchase); removals and rehousing; to construct dwellings and to enter into contracts without calling for tenders; to engage staff "outside the scope or jurisdiction of any trade union agreements"; to borrow finance through the Department of Native Affairs from central government; and to initiate proclamations of 'group areas'. Ibid., recommendation 2(i)(xiv), pp. 104-5.
94. See above, p. 211, n. 44. It should be noted that, despite these strained relations, the City Council authorised its departments to undertake certain work for the Advisory Committee of the Western Areas Clearance and Development Scheme, which took over from the Ad Hoc Committee and operated before the establishment of the Native Resettlement Board. The City Engineers Department was authorised to provide services in Meadowlands in September 1953 and, in March 1954 during the debates in Parliament, the Director of Housing was authorised to construct dwellings for the rehousing of people from the Western Areas. JCC Minutes, 22/9/1953, Minutes: 767; and 30/3/1954, Minutes: 457.
will be recalled that the functions envisaged for the Resettlement Board were to undertake removals of Africans from any area in the magisterial district of Johannesburg or any adjoining magisterial district. Thus a deputation from the City Council in May 1954 which urged the government not to proceed with the Bill, claimed that the Bill was "unnecessary" and "unjustifiably interferes with the prerogatives of the Council". The deputation argued that the City Council should be 'entrusted' with carrying out the scheme, with a "free hand to secure the co-operation and support of the persons affected through the acceptance of agreed safeguards".

Verwoerd dealt with the Johannesburg City Council's 'declaration of policy', and the objections of the Opposition particularly in regard to the modus operandi of the proposed Resettlement Board, during the parliamentary debates on the Bill. To the objection that there was no provision for consultation, the Minister of Native Affairs responded bluntly, "of what use is consultation if one is not going to act accordingly?". Countering the criticism that removals would not take place on a voluntary basis, he stated: "but what does this theory of residential segregation mean when a man says: I will just have segregation provided those people are willing to move? In general we know that in the light of the spirit we now have in South Africa there will be opposition in any mixed area to removal especially when the opposition is incited by financial interests. Therefore to think that one can remove them without doing so systematically is foolish. One cannot have this removal voluntarily. One must organise it...". Thus the Resettlement Board was established and functioning from 1 August 1954 and, on 30 September, the Johannesburg City Council formulated its

96. These 'safeguards' included compensatory freehold title, and the City Council urged the government, "as a matter of urgency to reconsider its policy in this connection". Ibid. recommendation (a)(12), p. 545.
98. Ibid., and col. 2540.
"policy for participation in the work of rehousing the displaced Natives". 99

The following passage occurred in the report of the General Purposes Committee:

The Board should also be informed that though the Council does not desire that its officials should take any part whatever in the removal of the natives from the Western Areas and their initial settlement in the Meadowlands area, in other respects the officials will be authorised to keep in close touch with the Board and to assist it where necessary in the interests of the City as a whole, for example, in the provision of essential services in the Meadowlands areas; and particularly in the discharge of any positive duties which the Natives Resettlement Act may impose upon them or the Council. 100

The Resettlement Board was designated an 'urban local authority' in order to apply certain provisions of the urban areas legislation, more particularly those provisions relating to influx control under Section 10 of the Act, in certain 'specified' areas. 101 The areas 'specified' initially were Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare; Pageview was also a 'specified' area but was administered by the City Council. In these areas, the Resettlement Board set up its influx control machinery which, in addition to determining the eligibility of residents for rehousing in terms of their status under Section 10, 102 would undertake a census to establish the percentage of 'economic' rentals which could be imposed, the types of accommodation required and the 'ethnic groups' in which the population could be classified. The latter information was to enable the Resettlement Board to apply the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945 -more particularly Section 10- the Natives Resettlement Board was designated an 'urban local authority' in terms of Proclamation No. 243 and No. 244 of 1954. Natives Resettlement Board, Annual Report, 1954/55, UG 58-1955, para 3, p.1.


100. Ibid. See also, JCC Minutes, 25/8/1959, Minutes: 1754, Item (120/9/2) (T.C.77/59), where authority was granted to other departments to undertake work for the Resettlement Board.


102. See above, p.278, for Johannesburg City Council's housing policy in relation to qualifications under Section 10.
Board to implement its "policy that semi-fit and disabled persons who cannot pay a sub-economic rental" should be endorsed out of the urban area. These were the 'necessary investigations', "in order to assist persons of this class to return to their places of origin".\textsuperscript{103} Table 6.8 illustrates the application of influx control measures by the Resettlement Board and the scale of the actual removals. In its report for 1956/57, the Resettlement Board referred explicitly to the relation between housing and influx control: "whereas in the beginning Natives were slow to report, it is found that they now present themselves for influx control purposes in increasing numbers. It is realised that they will not be resettled unless they qualify in terms of section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act".\textsuperscript{104}

It should be noted that, over the period, further areas were added to the list of 'specified' areas from which removals were undertaken. These areas had been identified by the Mentz Committee\textsuperscript{105} and influx control and other measures were enforced by local authorities other than the Resettlement Board, although the actual removals were implemented by the latter. Thus in Pageview influx control was enforced by the Johannesburg City Council; in Alexandra Township, which was declared a 'specified' area in February 1959 -when 'routine removals' from the Western Areas had been completed - influx control was enforced by the Peri-Urban Areas Health Committee;\textsuperscript{106} in Kensington 'B', which was 'specified'

\textsuperscript{103} Natives Resettlement Board, Annual Report, 1954/55, UG 58-1955, para. 6(2), p. 8. The significance of 'ethnic grouping' to the process of policy formulation is discussed below.

\textsuperscript{104} Natives Resettlement Board, Annual Report, 1956/57, UG 17-1958, para. 5(1), pp. 2-3. In 1956, the Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council claimed that "as a result of the activities of the Natives Resettlement Board, some 10,000 persons have been moved from the urban areas to the Native areas", Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{105} See above, p. 206, for proposals of the Mentz Committee.

Table 6.8 Operations of the 'Natives Resettlement Board', Johannesburg Metropolitan Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year ended March</th>
<th>Influx Control ('Section 10')</th>
<th>'Resettlement'</th>
<th>'Specified' Areas</th>
<th>Total Population in Meadowlands &amp; Diepkloof Families</th>
<th>Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. applicants</td>
<td>Granted</td>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>No. removals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>15,793</td>
<td>11,295</td>
<td>4,498</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>Sophiatown, Martindale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>17,653</td>
<td>12,985</td>
<td>4,608</td>
<td>10,385</td>
<td>&quot; &amp; Newclare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>18,370</td>
<td>15,637</td>
<td>2,733</td>
<td>11,960</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>41,181</td>
<td>37,158</td>
<td>4,023</td>
<td>14,438</td>
<td>&quot; &amp; Kensington B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>36,115</td>
<td>34,073</td>
<td>2,042</td>
<td>17,968</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>18,734</td>
<td>18,190</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>9,323</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>15,822</td>
<td>15,047</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>10,956</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>30,363</td>
<td>29,119</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>12,902</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>23,556</td>
<td>19,255</td>
<td>4,301</td>
<td>7,285</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Annual Reports of the Natives Resettlement Board, 1954/55 to 1963/64
in April 1959, controls were vested in the municipality of Randburg. Once the removals had been executed and people were resettled in the townships of Meadowlands and Diepkloof, all practices for the management and control of the townships -including influx control- were vested in the Resettlement Board.

The original intention of the Natives Resettlement Act was that the Johannesburg City Council would take over the completed townships which had been developed by the Resettlement Board and administer them together with the other adjacent South-West townships. This did not occur, partly for the reason that, despite the enormous construction programme of the Resettlement Board's building organisation, 'zones' within the townships did not become completed simultaneously due to the policy of 'ethnic grouping'. The question of 'ethnic grouping' had first been raised by the Department of Native Affairs in relation to the resettlement of dispossessed Africans in Meadowlands and Diepkloof adjoining Orlando. The Department's proposal to resettle families according to ethnic groups was considered "completely retrogressive" by the Non-European Affairs Committee of the Johannesburg City Council,


108. In terms of Section 28 of the Natives Resettlement Act, the Johannesburg City Council was bound to accept transfer of any land and improvements in new areas for rehousing. In December 1955, when 2,000 families were 'resettled' in Meadowlands, the Council asked when completed and occupied parts could be "transferred to its control". According to the Council, "to have so large a location administered by another body, while it is for all practical purposes in the confines of the Council's own native areas, is causing difficulties...distinct differences in administrative procedure are evident". 'Report of General Purposes Committee', JCC Minutes, 6/12/1955, Minutes: 1052-3, Item (122/3/4) (N.E.A.D. 144/55).

109. According to the Secretary, Natives Resettlement Board, development in February 1956 was taking place in 4 'zones'. Each 'zone' of 1,500-2,000 dwellings would eventually form a 'superintendency'. Families were "settled according to their ethnic groups and [were] spread over three partially-completed zones", and it was not considered "practicable" to hand over to the Council at that stage. 'Report of Non-European Affairs and Housing Committee', JCC Minutes, 28/2/1956, p. 183, Item (122/3/4)(T.C.15/56). By 1959 there had still been no transfer to the City Council. JCC Minutes, 29/9/1959, Minutes:1877.
and in July 1954 the Council resolved that it could not support the proposal. Nevertheless, the following month, a departmental circular instructed all local authorities to apply the policy of ethnic grouping not only to new housing schemes, but to site and service schemes and to existing townships. The advantages claimed by the Department of Native Affairs were that education of children in their home language would be improved; that tribal discipline could more easily be kept; that it would be easier to introduce some measure of self-government when the Native Advisory Boards were replaced by bodies who would be responsible for certain executive functions; and that municipal control would be simplified. The Department used the example of the system applied by mine owners to enforce discipline on the work force through ethnic grouping. Yet according to Carr, Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department, any "success of ethnic grouping on the Mines is due entirely to the fairly strict discipline under which the natives are employed, a degree of discipline that the Council could not possibly exercise over its thousands of tenants". The Native Advisory Boards were unanimous in opposing the application of the policy. Notwithstanding this opposition, however, in January 1955 the City Council agreed to implement the policy of ethnic grouping. It had been made clear that funds would be allocated "only on condition that the policy [was] applied".

110. 'Report of Non-European Affairs Committee', JCC Minutes, 27/7/1954
Minutes: 722-3, Item (120/9).


112. The Native Advisory Boards adopted a resolution at a meeting of the Joint Boards on 13 November 1954, "rejecting in toto the creation of ethnic grouping of Africans, as such a policy is ostensibly intended by its authors to divert the Africans away from the acquisition and adoption of the Western way of life..." Ibid., p. 75. The concept of 'ethnicity' would provide the ideological basis for the justification of differential levels of necessaries of life.

113. JCC Minutes, 25/1/1955, p. 75, Item (122/2/14).
The extensive building programmes of both the Johannesburg City Council and the Resettlement Board from 1955 to 1965, which resulted in the addition of more than 67,000 houses to the existing stock of housing for African 'labour requirements', had considerable effects on both the social and spatial organisation of Johannesburg. The redistribution of the African population and the transformations within the three main administrative divisions of the metropolitan area - city, townships south-west of the city, and peri-urban areas - are illustrated in Table 6.9. When it is borne in mind that the physical development of Soweto by the City Council, and the adjacent areas of Meadowlands and Diepkloof by the Resettlement Board, was accompanied both by the spatial relocation of thousands of families and the allocation of either sites or houses on an 'ethnic' basis, the impact of the Department of Native Affairs on the social reorganisation and 'ordering' of Johannesburg is clearly fundamental.

According to Carr, at the start of the building programme in 1955, it was necessary "to screen every applicant for a site or a house, to ascertain whether he is lawfully employed in Johannesburg and, if so, whether he is entitled to remain in the area permanently as of right, or whether he is only conditionally employed. Furthermore, it is necessary to ascertain what his ethnic group is - as present policy requires Native families to be housed in ethnic groups...". Thus the bureaucratic procedures involved in implementing the Department of Native Affairs's scheme 'to house all workers under control', as articulated in 1952 by Verwoerd, contained the elements for structurally reinforcing the non-homogenous nature of the African workforce. These elements of ethnic

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114. See above, p. 228, Figure 5.4.
115. For instance, 10,178 families had been moved from Alexandra Township and relocated in Meadowlands and Diepkloof by March 1964. Bantu Resettlement Board, Annual Report 1963/64, para 5 (4), p. 6.
116. Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1955, p. 4.
### Table 6.5: Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, Distribution of African Population, 1955 - 1965

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**SOUTH-WESTERN TOWNSHIPS**

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**Resettlement Board**

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**TOTAL URBAN AREAS**

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**TOTAL PERI-URBAN AREAS**

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**TOTAL METROPOLITAN AREA**

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<td>711,600</td>
<td>706,389</td>
<td>713,808</td>
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**Source:** Compiled from Johannesburg City Council, Annual Reports of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department; and, Annual Reports of the Natives Resettlement Board.
categorisation and differential tenure under Section 10 of the so-called urban areas legislation were both expressions of social control. They were 'ideologically' central to the overall apartheid policy, and to the 'long-term' policy objectives which were formulated within the state's apparatuses during the 1950s. 117

To conclude this chapter, it is necessary to examine briefly the effects of increasing centralisation -which has been shown both in the process of formulation and in the process of implementation of township policies- on the nature of the 'traditional' relationship between central government and local authorities.

The interventions by the Department of Native Affairs in the 'municipal affairs' of Johannesburg were not, however, accomplished 'without problems', particularly with the struggles against enforced removals. 118 But frequently there was also opposition to various aspects of state policy from the Johannesburg City Council itself. Although this opposition appears to have been related more to questions of implementation than to questions of principle, it reflected a contradiction: the contradiction between, on the one hand, the increasing centralisation in policy -both formulation and implementation- and, on the other, the realities of

117. See above, p.160. See also Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, further discussion.

118. Particularly in Alexandra Township where, according to reports of the Resettlement Board, the removals were not "being accomplished without problems". Natives Resettlement Board, Annual Report 1960/61, R.P. 13-1962, p. 7; 1961/62, R.P. 28-1963, p.8. The Peri-Urban Areas Health Board was unable to compile a census of those to be resettled because, with the removals, accommodation within Alexandra became more easily available. People on whom notices were served changed their residential addresses and removal orders in terms of the Act could not be obtained. For accounts of the struggles and the formation of the Anti Peri-Urban Areas Action Committee, see Rand Daily Mail, 30/10/1959; Izwi lase Township, June/July 1982; also Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa.
'managing' the ever more complex and comprehensive system of institutionalised social control in the townships.\textsuperscript{119}

As preceding pages have described, from the mid-1950s there was heightened struggle between the City Council and its 'tenants' in the townships. In 1957 the scope for intervention by the Minister of Native Affairs in the 'affairs' of local authorities was widened. In the debates on the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill -which became Act No. 36 of 1957-, the Minister, Verwoerd, went so far as to state that "the local authority system is a means of executive organisation to apply the policy of the country in Native affairs".\textsuperscript{120} By June 1958, a Departmental Committee under the chairmanship of F.E. Mentz had been appointed by Verwoerd, "to co-ordinate and smooth the administration of Natives in Johannesburg".\textsuperscript{121} And by September 1958, a number of assurances had been extracted from the City Council which were 'accepted' by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Dr. Eiselen, for the Minister. The Johannesburg City Council defined its relationship with central authorities with the following resolution:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} In addition to the City Council's opposition to site and service schemes, ethnic grouping, differential rentals and the Western Areas removal scheme, there were other conflicts with central government. The Department of Native Affairs, for instance, insisted that with the £3 million loan, the City Council should provide a large amount of hostel accommodation. This was in order to implement the 1955 amendments to the urban areas legislation which reduced the number of 'single' workers who could be accommodated in private premises in the City. See above, p.206, n. 28. For background to the Council's resolution that "no steps be taken", and correspondence between central and local authorities on this issue, see JCC Minutes, 23/11/1956, Minutes: 1547-52.
\item \textsuperscript{120} House of Assembly Debates, 1957, cols. 3222-4. In terms of Act No. 36 of 1957, reports of Managers of Non-European Affairs Departments of local authorities had to be forwarded to the Secretary for Native Affairs. The Minister was empowered, without consultation with local authorities concerned, to vary or reject municipal regulations. SAIRR, Laws Affecting Race Relations, p. 61.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Star, 14/6/1958. Mentz had been on the Western Areas Ad Hoc Committee and had been chairman of the 'Mentz Committee'. See above, p.200, n. 16.
\end{itemize}
The Council...accepts that according to the Act of Union there can only be one source, namely the State, of policy based on laws dealing with Native administration in South Africa, and that the Council will restrict itself to executive duties in this regard as agents of the State. That it is the Council's task to carry out such policy of the State and not for it to form basic policy of its own.122

From this point onwards, the collaboration of the City Council, in implementing all aspects of 'state' policy relating to Africans in the metropolitan area of Johannesburg, appears to have been secured. With its function unambiguously defined in terms of providing the 'means of executive organisation', the Johannesburg City Council restricted its activities to implementing centrally-defined policies.

Thus it was that, by June 1959, according to the Manager of the Non-European Affairs Department, 'a start' had been made with planning the removal -by the City Council- of 2,300 families living in Western Native Township. Building by the Housing Division in 2 townships in Soweto, for the various ethnic groups, started in July 1960 and by September removals were "underway".123 As Table 6.9 illustrates, by 1963, the entire African population of Western Native Township had been removed to either Moroka or Chiawelo Extension 2 in Soweto.124 But while, at the level of appearances, state intervention was presented in terms of 'the Council's task to carry out the policy of the State', this 'distancing' of the state cannot mask the essential connection between the processes of policy formulation and implementation. The Johannesburg City Council may well have ceased to 'form basic policy of its own' but, as the 'means of executive

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122. 'Report of General Purposes Committee' (Native Housing: Assurances Required of the Council), JCC Minutes, 30/9/1958, Minutes: 1899

123. Annual Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959, p. 6; for the period 1 July 1960 to 30 June 1963, pp. 1-2.

124. See Figure 5.5, p. 230, "Special features", such as internal doors, plastered walls and concrete floors in all the rooms, were offered as 'compensation' for the fact that some of the tenants of Western Native Township had been living in their homes since 1919. Ibid., p. 2.; JCC Minutes, 27/3/1962, Minutes: 815
organisation' within the state, it -together with all local authorities- simultaneously provided the technical basis for the formulation of state policies. A brief examination of the activities of the Research Section of the City Council illustrates this point.

By the end of the 1950s, the Research Section of the Non-European Affairs Department of the Johannesburg City Council, which monitored social and economic conditions through periodic surveys in the townships, was "more than fully occupied with three very urgent requests by the Government, all intimately connected with various aspects of Bantu Policy". The first survey, completed by 1960, required the district of origin of every registered tenant and the 'tribal chief' who was 'acknowledged'. This data was added to the overall 'social information', with which the apparatuses of the state developed the techniques and instruments for translating the concept of 'Bantustans' into the reality of apartheid. The findings expanded the basis of existing 'social statistics' -compiled with the implementation of ethnic grouping in townships throughout South Africa- which had been central to the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, No. 46 of 1959, in terms of which 8 African 'national units' were recognised.

The second and third 'tasks' of the Research Section concerned the terms of reference of 2 commissions which were appointed by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in early 1961. On 28 February 1961, the Johannesburg City Council agreed that, in conjunction with the Department of Census and Statistics, information would be supplied to the Commission of Inquiry into Idle and Unemployed Bantu in Urban Areas.

125. Report of the Manager, Non-European Affairs Department, for the period 1 July 1960 to 30 June 1963, pp. 8-9.
126. See above, p. 173, n. 63.
127. 'Report of the Non-European Affairs Committee' (Inter-Departmental Committee to Inquire into the Problem of Idle and Unemployed Natives in Urban Areas), JCC Minutes, 5/12/1961, Minutes; 2549. The Second Commission was established to investigate the presence of 'Protectorate and Foreign Bantu within the Republic.'
The removal of 'surplus' and 'non-productive' Africans from 'white' urban areas gained momentum from this date. Defined to include the aged, unfit, widows, women with dependent children, the notorious General Circular No. 25 of 1967 urged that, 'no stone was to be left unturned to achieve the settlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu'. The role of township policies—particularly the range of practices involved in their administration and management—and the local authority system as 'the means of executive organisation' within the state are therefore central to an understanding of how the ideology of apartheid was institutionalised and legitimised within South Africa. They simultaneously provided the means for implementing the Bantustans.

The analysis in this chapter has identified some of the consequences of state intervention in conditions and relations of production and consumption of housing for African Workers. Taking the state in its role as employer and examining the overall production of the townships, the first section showed how the operations of the Native Building Workers Advisory Board applied 'apartheid' to relations of building production. The findings that state structures enabled the dilution of labour not only in building but also in general production are important. They suggest the possibility of an overall increase in the productivity of labour through the introduction of African operatives and consequent transformations in the labour process, at a time when, by all accounts, South African capitalist development required minimising its total wage bill. This contributes to existing analyses which seek to explain how repressive structures of apartheid aid the process of overall capital accumulation in South Africa. The examination of the activities

128. The relation between the forms of state intervention which reduced or eliminated the costs of training labour, hence reduced the costs of reproduction of labour-power, and the expansion of capital must remain speculative. Methods of quantifying this connection are beyond the scope of this study. See Gerstenberger, 'Class Conflict, Competition and State Functions', p. 159. See also, above, p. 157, n. 23.
of the state in its role as 'landlord' revealed that as a consequence of reduced costs of production of housing and infrastructure in the townships, all subsidies were removed. The consumption of housing as expressed in the rent relation, was seen to include a component for costs of 'management' and administration of township services and the 'labour requirements'. The potential for state intervention in contractual relations between individual workers and employers around wages and rentals highlights the provision of housing as part of the political process.

This theme provided the background to the final section which examined the relationship of the townships to the process of formulation and implementation of apartheid policy. Here through analysing some of the features associated with the implementation of the townships, and the effects of increasing centralisation of policies for social control, the role of the townships in the overall social formation is highlighted.
This study has examined the relationship between the role of the state and the form which conditions for the reproduction of the African workforce in urban areas assumed during the 1950s. The aim of this thesis has been twofold: to explain why and how the large-scale construction of racially segregated townships was embarked upon by the state; and to understand the role of these spatial forms within the overall social formation. In seeking to avoid merely describing policy outcomes or attributing causes of state intervention to some of the observable effects, the study focused on the social processes involved in the formulation and implementation of township policies. This concern necessitated the analysis of those social conditions—economic, political and ideological—within which, and as a response to which, direct state intervention in the supply of housing and infrastructure in the townships occurred.

The central research question was not why the state in South Africa should have intervened in the housing conditions of African workers. The provision of housing by local authorities for the 'labour requirements' of urban areas had, historically, been established as an area of state intervention. Rather, the question is why intervention took particular forms after the election to government of the Nationalist party in 1948. Related to this were questions concerning the modus operandi of the structures or institutions established to give effect to state policies, and the social consequences of state intervention in conditions for the reproduction of labour.

There were two 'guiding principles' present, if sometimes implicitly, throughout this research. The first concerns the nature of state intervention and the definition of policy. The second concerns the nature of housing. If one was to account for the variety in policy outcomes—in areas such as rentals, land, standards or service provisions—and not describe the origins
of these policies simply in the terms utilised by their practitioners, nor accept reductionist or single-factor explanations for state intervention, then a 'working definition' of policy which would encompass economic, political and ideological relations was required. The approach adopted in this study, on the basis of two theoretical assumptions about the state and state intervention, enabled the analysis to identify policy themes and to trace the formulation of policy and the development of the technical means for implementation. These social processes are expressed in a complex of interrelationships: in the relations within the state, for instance -between different levels such as local authorities and central administration or between different institutions such as the research apparatus and organisations for housing provision - and in the relations between other organisations with differential access to state structures, and hence with varying abilities to realise specific interests in policy outcomes.

Concerning the nature of 'housing', the approach adopted in this study is a response to the fact that, historically, the relation between labour and housing, and by implication the relation between production and reproduction, had been delimited as a field of state intervention. To account for transformations in the relationship between labour and housing, and in the form of state intervention in conditions for reproduction which the townships express, the analysis therefore had to confront issues bearing on conditions and relations of production as well as consumption, such as costs of housing production, wage levels and rentals. The relationship between the state, labour and employers provided the context within which these various issues could be analysed.

1. See above, p. 32.
This thesis has shown how housing conditions for African workers in urban areas throughout South Africa were transformed through state intervention in the supply of housing, with the large-scale construction of townships from the mid-1950s. In seeking to explain why and how the state intervened directly in relations of housing production, preceding chapters examined the conditions under which housing for African 'labour requirements' was both financed and produced in the period before the nationalist election to government and the institutionalisation of apartheid ideology. This analysis identified several policy 'themes', frequently initiated at the local level in response to specific local conditions, which were taken up within the state's apparatuses and became subjects of social debate on the 'housing question'. The question of housing finance and the distribution of the costs of subsidisation between central and local authorities became a dominant theme, particularly in the context of the post-war housing shortage. Chapter 2 traces the origins of the housing shortage and provides the context to the study.

Related to the debate on subsidisation was the question of cost and rate of housing production. And since the process of contracting removed direct control from local authorities over these aspects of housing, other interests such as building employers and building artisans were introduced into the analysis. By focusing on the content of different interests in the production of housing, more particularly the positions taken on the shortage of skilled building artisans by the state, organised employers and white workers in the building industry, chapter 3 illustrates how proposals for state intervention in training were destined to become bound up both with struggles by building artisans against their deteriorating economic position and the 'racial insecurities' of other white workers. These proposals were a key factor in the election platform in 1948, when the future social organisation of South Africa became posed as a distinctly political question.
The proposals for state intervention in relations of building production were not, however, dismissed under the National party government. On the contrary, as chapter 4 indicates, in the process of formulating policies for apartheid, the training proposals were modified and incorporated within a coherent and comprehensive framework which enabled the state to intervene in the reproduction of labour in two ways. In the first, legitimised under the Native Building Workers Act of 1951, state structures operated to allocate positions in the division of labour in building production. In the second the state determined the conditions and relations of production of housing for African workers. In this analysis of the process of policy formulation, the role of research-related apparatuses—both in developing the 'technical means' for policy implementation and in providing the ideological justification for reductions in standards—emerged as a key factor explaining the basis to township policies.

How apartheid policies were translated into programmes at the local level was examined in chapter 5, which focused on the Johannesburg City Council and the construction of Soweto. This case study of the mechanisms through which housing and infrastructure were provided in the townships suggested several important findings concerning the nature of state intervention. Operating without the intervention of private building contractors, the Housing Division's building organisation increased the rate of production with a simultaneous reduction in the costs of housing. On closer examination, the source of the 'savings' was located in the particular form of exploitation of African building workers. Their unpaid labour subsidised part of the costs of production of housing and infrastructure where similar practices were instituted. These findings gave rise to further important questions concerning the activities of the state.
in its role as employer - rationalising the labour process in building production - and in its role as 'landlord' concerning questions of distribution of the costs of housing. These were addressed in the final chapter.

In seeking to identify the consequences of state intervention, and to understand the role of the townships within the overall social formation, chapter 6 focused on three relationships. Firstly, an examination of the relationship between the production of the townships and relations of production showed how state structures, which were formed in a specific setting, had effects in areas which were quite removed from the initial policy intentions. Secondly, an analysis of the relationship between the costs of production and costs of reproduction showed that, as a consequence of the reduction in house-building and infrastructural costs, all state subsidies were removed. The tendency to make costs of reproduction of the labour force in the townships self-financing was thereby reinforced. Finally, the relationship between local and central authorities was examined in the light of the increasing centralisation in both policy formulation and implementation. Here, the townships were situated in the context of overall apartheid policy. The range of practices for social control involved in the process of implementing the townships appeared to be central to the process of formulation and, increasingly from the 1960s, implementation of 'Bantustan' policies.

While in 1948, 'apartheid' was a somewhat vague concept, this study has highlighted some of the social process involved in its 'clarification' and elaboration during the 1950s. It is hoped that, through the focus on the role of the state in conditions and relations of production and consumption of housing for African 'labour requirements', this thesis makes a contribution to the understanding of social relations in South Africa and the formation of state structures for institutionalising the oppression of apartheid.
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