THE ROZVI EMPIRE
AND
THE FEIRA OF ZUMBO

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Abstract

In the seventeenth century the activities of Portuguese nationals on the Rhodesian plateau led to intense resentment by the Karanga. Between 1684 and 1695 some Karanga clans, led by a man known to us as Dombo I, expelled the Portuguese from the plateau. The clans that supported Dombo's wars against the Portuguese were later known as Varozvi. This apparently is the origin of the Rozvi as a distinct group from the rest of the Karanga.

After expelling the Portuguese, the Rozvi established a powerful empire. The greater part of the power wielded by Rozvi emperors came from within the empire. Although the emperors benefited much from their trade with the Portuguese, there is little evidence to support a suggestion that the wealth acquired thus constituted so crucial a basis for their power that they sought a monopoly of foreign trade.

The reality of Rozvi power emerges forcefully from a study of their relations with the Portuguese settlement of Zumbo. During the eighteenth century, the Rozvi armies used to protect Zumbo in moments of crisis. Through this connection Zumbo became economically one of the chief trading settlements on the Zambezi. This meant that any major upheavals within the Rozvi empire had serious repercussions at Zumbo.

Zumbo apparently did not have a similar impact on the Rozvi empire. The emperors needed Zumbo only as an alternative to the Feira of Manyika. They restricted Portuguese influence by forbidding
them from entering their empire. In trade dealings with the Rozvi subjects, the Portuguese used African agents. In the end it was first internal factors and later the Nguni invasions that led to the collapse of the Rozvi empire. Yet the eventual abandonment of Zumbo was closely connected with the fall of the Rozvi empire.
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To my wife is due special thanks for allowing me to pay a second visit to Portugal to do further research while she was expecting our first daughter. She also typed the earlier and the present drafts of the thesis.

In the end none of the above mentioned may be held accountable for the views and shortcomings in this study; responsibility for that lies solely with the writer himself.
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<td>A.H.U.</td>
<td>Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino</td>
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<td>A.N.T.T.</td>
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<td>Av.</td>
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<td>Hist. Mss. Misc.</td>
<td>Historical Manuscripts Miscellaneous</td>
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<tr>
<td>I.S.C.S.P.U.</td>
<td>Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina</td>
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<td>J.A.H.</td>
<td>Journal of African History</td>
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<td>Moç.</td>
<td>Moçambique</td>
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<td>NADA</td>
<td>Native Affairs Department Annual Annual</td>
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<td>P.R.O.</td>
<td>Public Record: Office</td>
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<td>P.R.S.A.</td>
<td>Proceedings and Transactions of the Rhodesia Scientific Association</td>
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<td>S.A.J.S.</td>
<td>South African Journal of Science</td>
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<td>T.R.S.S.A.</td>
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Introduction

In 1962 Professors R. Oliver and J.D. Fage observed that "The later history of the Changamires’ kingdom (i.e. from the 18th century onwards) has yet to be recovered by studying the traditional history of its surviving remnants." When work began on this thesis the aim was to use archival and published sources only as a part of a much wider study which was to include field work among the Rozvi in Rhodesia. Indeed it had been hoped that oral evidence would form the major part of the sources for the thesis. But as it turned out the Rhodesian Regime was unwilling to let me collect oral traditions in the country. It then became obvious that a drastic re-orientation of the whole project was called for. Since the bulk of the sources was going to come from Portuguese documentation, at first it seemed that the best approach would be to write a history of the Feira of Zumbo and its relations with the neighbouring African polities, especially that of the Rozvi. But after going through the Zumbo material it became clear that enough documentation existed to form a basis for a study which focused mainly on the political and economic relations of the Rozvi Empire and the Feira of Zumbo. As a result the thesis concentrates on the contribution and role of the Rozvi in the trading system of Zumbo. This shift of emphasis in favour of the Rozvi, achieved partly by the utilisation of the

published and available Rozvi traditional evidence, was a partial
fulfilment of our original intention of writing a history of the
Rozvi people.

Both in its conception and evolution as a specific topic this
study owed much to the work of those who have tried to solve the
Rozvi problem in the past. The fact that the Rozvi had been an
important group among the Shona before the coming of the Ndebele
into present day Rhodesia was known to many scholars of Rhodesian
history as early as before the twentieth century. Indeed among
scholars acquainted with Moçambique history as found in Portuguese
works the fact that during the 18th century the Changamires had
been the most powerful rulers in the interior of South-East-Central
Africa had been general knowledge for some time. Outside the
Portuguese sources, the earliest known modern European reference
to tradition on the Rozvi comes from the diary of the Rev. Nachtigal
written in 1862. After Nachtigal's diary we find a number of articles
either on the Rozvi themselves or on former Rozvi subject peoples.
These articles were written mainly by native commissioners and
missionaries. In this category the major synthesis of the Rozvi
traditions was published in 1935 by F.W.T. Posselt under the title
of Fact and Fiction. And as far as the Rozvi history could be
constructed from oral sources, Posselt's article has remained by far
one of the most valuable sources.

1. Wangemann: Geschichte der Berliner Missionsgesellschaft, Bd. IV:
Die Berliner Mission im Bassutolande, Berlin, 1877, p. 70.
2. Posselt, F.W.T., Fact and Fiction, Bulawayo; Rhodesian Printing
Whereas the native commissioners had been chiefly (and understandably enough) interested in ethnographic information with a strong political bias and the missionaries on information emphasizing the religious aspect, the attention of many other investigators, however, was focused on the archaeology and history of the Rozvi. The studies of the latter group has concentrated on three major themes. The first of these has been the question of the Rozvi relationship to the Rhodesian stone ruins. The second being the problem of the identification of the Rozvi and their connection, if any, with the Munhumutapa empire. And in recent years the role of trade in the Rozvi empire has attracted some attention.

As to be expected the first theme has been of particular interest to those engaged in archaeological studies. Among the early investigators who discussed the possible role of the Rozvi in the Rhodesian stone culture was Richard Hall. He mentioned the Rozvi only to dismiss them as a recent invading group who only occupied but did not build the stone ruined cities. On the other hand, Schofield through a study of pottery, stone buildings and Portuguese sources, disagreed with Hall and suggested that the Rozvi were the builders of some of the stone ruins. But by suggesting that the Rozvi may have arrived in Rhodesia only around 1700 A.D., he in effect shared the view that

the Rozvi were a recent invading group. According to Schofield the history of pre-1830 Rhodesia could be divided into the following periods:— (a) "Early Rhodesia prior to 1400 A.D.", (b) "Monomotapa - about 1400 to 1700 A.D." and (c) "Mambo - 1700-1830 A.D." Subsequent scholars have, on the whole, only modified Schofield's interpretation.

Roger Summers has agreed with Schofield that the best executed building styles and some of the most imposing stone structures, especially at Great Zimbabwe, must all be attributed to the Rozvi. But Summers challenged Schofield's date 1700 A.D. as the beginning of the Rozvi presence in the Rhodesian stone culture. Instead, by studying the various building styles and cultures at Great Zimbabwe he suggested that the Rozvi period began round about 1450 A.D. and lasted till 1830. In other words Summers is saying that Schofield's "Monomotapa" and "Mambo" periods i.e. 1400-1830 are in fact a single period representing the achievements of one group, namely the Rozvi. Summers' conclusions were largely based on his as well as Robinson's and Whitty's excavations at the Great Zimbabwe in 1958 where the three of them claimed that all the stages (from c.1100-1830 A.D.) of the Rhodesian stone building history were represented.

Summers' view that the Rozvi came into Rhodesia around the fifteenth century was rejected by Mr. D.P. Abraham. By studying oral and documentary evidence Abraham argued that the Rozvi arrived in Rhodesia before 1250 A.D. and as such may well have been responsible for Mr. Summers' Zimbabwe phases III and IV (A.D. 1100-1830). However, Abraham would have had no quarrel with Summers if the latter had only limited himself to stating that the period from 1450 A.D. onwards represented the rise and ascendancy, as distinct from the arrival in Rhodesia, of the Rozvi. Abraham thought that the early (from 1100 A.D. to c.1300) Rozvi culture was enriched during the late

1. Abraham, D.P., "Early Political history of the Kingdom of Mwenemutapa (850-1589)" in Liverhulme History Conference, Salisbury, 1962, p. 61, and footnote 1 on pages 74-75. Also "Ethno-History of the Empire of Mutapa", in The Historian in Tropical Africa, O.U.P., 1969, (ed.) J. Vansina, R. Mauny and L.V. Thomas, p. 107. It must be noted that although the above two papers were presented at Conferences in 1960 and 1961 respectively, Abraham gave somewhat different interpretation of the Rozvi origin on each occasion. In 1960 Abraham had said that initially the Rozvi were a Karanga clan which in time rose to dominate the rest of the Karanga. In 1961 Abraham claimed that originally the Rozvi were a Tswana-related group found in Rhodesia by A.D. 1100 who were in no way related to the Karanga (Mbire) who entered Rhodesia only around A.D. 1325. These two differing interpretations do not in any way affect Abraham's conjecture as to the time of the Rozvi arrival in Rhodesia, which in either case he gave as having been before 1250 A.D.

fourteenth century by the Karanga (Mbire) culture and the result of this influence was the flowering of stone building at Great Zimbabwe from the latter period. According to Abraham the above development coincided with (or was brought about by) the growing importance of the Rozvi Mambos. This increasing power of the Rozvi Mambos led to the foundation of the Kutapa empire in c.1440 A.D. In short Abraham would associate the whole Rhodesian stone building tradition (1100-1830) with the Rozvi people. Summers' position is that the Rozvi period only began around the 15th century.

But in recent years some of the views of Summers and Abraham have come under fire. First of all the work of Mr. P.S. Garlake has shown that architecturally there are certain characteristics that differentiate what he termed the "Zimbabwe type" ruins from the "Khami type". Garlake claimed that only the "Khami type" ruins were really the work of the Rozvi. By 1967 Summers had accepted this view. But according to Garlake the "Khami type" ruins flourished in seventeenth and eighteenth century, while the "Zimbabwe type" belonged to the fourteenth and fifteenth century. Garlake further suggested that the rise of the Kutapa empire signalled the decline

2. Ibid., and Abraham, in Leverhulme History Conference, op. cit., p. 62.
of the first stone building culture of the "Zimbabwe type" structures. He linked the beginning of the "Khami type" stone buildings with the rise of the Rozvi-Moyo under their rulers bearing the dynastic name of Changamire, whose origin, so he claimed, went back to a late fifteenth century crisis in the Mutapa empire. Garlake's statement that the "Zimbabwe type" ruins and in particular the Great Zimbabwe itself had flourished in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was a major blow to the Summers' interpretation. Summers had claimed that the whole Rhodesian stone building history (1100 A.D. to 1830) could be continuously demonstrated architecturally at Great Zimbabwe. To Summers archaeologically and architecturally the "golden age" at Great Zimbabwe began around 1450 A.D. But to Garlake by 1450 Zimbabwe was economically a "ghost town" of no more than mere provincial significance. This meant that the whole of Summers interpretation which had been based on his periodization at Great Zimbabwe could no longer be defended on that basis. In other words, according to Garlake, Great Zimbabwe has little to tell us about the Rozvi achievements. In addition to the studies by Mr. Garlake we have those of Mr. K.R. Robinson. By studying the pottery at the Khami ruins Robinson has been able to show that there is a special "Khami type" pottery which is found at Khami and Khami-

2. Summers, R., Zimbabwe a Rhodesian Mystery, op. cit., pp. 91-94.
3. Garlake,"Rhodesian Ruins", op. cit., p. 509; also Garlake, "Rhodesian Iron Age dating by ceramics", op. cit., p. 28. Garlake's interpretation has created a major problem of identification. Who was responsible for the "golden age" of the Great Zimbabwe? As yet we have no answer to this vital question.
related ruins in Rhodesia. This pottery is different from that found at Great Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe-related sites. Robinson has argued that the "Khami type" pottery was the hallmark of what he termed the "Rozvi Archaeology". This association of a certain pottery tradition with the Rozvi period together with Garlake's argument that the "Khami type" ruins were the work of the Rozvi have provided us with important clues for the identification of the Rozvi.

Furthermore as a result of his study of oral evidence among the Rozvi as well as his archaeological studies Robinson has made two very pertinent observations. The first was to the effect that the archaeological evidence was against the view that the Rozvi were a recent group as had been suggested by Schofield. In this respect Robinson was only stating what Summers and Abraham had already accepted and what Garlake was later to support. But Robinson's second point challenges the other three on the appropriateness of applying the name "Rozvi" to any group among the Shona before the seventeenth century. According to Robinson there was little evidence to show that the name "Rozvi" was used for any Shona group before the seventeenth century. In other words Robinson is saying that until the seventeenth century the people later called Rozvi may well have been known by another name. In Robinson's distinction between

2. Ibid., p. 25.
3. Ibid., pp. 20 and 25.
the 'arrival' in Rhodesia of the name "Rozvi" and the people now bearing that name we have an attempt to reconcile the Schofield view of the Rozvi as a recent group and the Summers-Abraham-Garlake claim which says that the Rozvi had existed bearing the name "Rozvi" long before the seventeenth century. Put differently what Robinson is saying is that the people known from the seventeenth century onwards as the Rozvi had lived in Rhodesia before that time under another name. Our own re-appraisal of the evidence would appear to lend support to Robinson's theory.

The next scholar to tackle the study of the Rozvi history was Miss Nicola Sutherland-Harris. Miss Sutherland-Harris' interest was mainly in the trade and politics of the Rozvi empire in the 18th century. She did not involve herself in the question of the origin and identification of the Rozvi. Her work was very much based on the hitherto unexploited Portuguese documents from Zumbo. The documents threw considerable new light on the study of the Rozvi, and in particular on their external trade. Miss Sutherland-Harris argued that external trade played a crucial role in the continued existence of the Rozvi empire. She found the importance of foreign trade so significant as to lead her to wonder whether it might not be possible that the Rozvi state itself had been based on external trade.

Our own work is a natural heir to all that has gone before. It begins with an attempt to offer a solution to the vexed question of the identification of the "Rozvi", as well as tracing the events leading to the rise of their empire; then it examines the political and economic power-base of that empire. Thereafter follows a discussion of the organization of external trade and an assessment of its influence and contribution towards the Rozvi power-base. After considering the influence of external trade on the Rozvi empire the discussion centres on the impact the Rozvi empire made on the Zumbo trading system. In the end we come to the conclusion that the Rozvi empire was more important to Zumbo than the latter was to the Rozvi empire. Existence of external trade in 18th century Rozvi empire turns out to have been possible only because of the power and strength of the Rozvi Mambos instead of being a cause of that power and strength. Rather than the conditions in the Rozvi empire being a reflector or mirror of the interests or impact of external trade, the evidence leads us to conclude that the reverse was the case. The trading conditions at Zumbo are seen to have been a barometer of the political conditions in the Rozvi empire.

A second point brought out in the study is that the Rozvi rulers successfully protected themselves against Portuguese interference in the internal affairs of the empire by a number of measures designed to militate against the raising of Portuguese power-bases within the empire as had happened in 17th century Mutapa empire.
The picture that emerges is one of rulers who had correctly diagnosed the intentions, strengths and weaknesses of the Portuguese and then enforced policies designed to create and perpetuate the Portuguese position of reliance on the Rozvi rulers. The story is one in which Africans whether as traders, diplomats or rulers are seen to have been active agents in moulding and influencing events rather than passive victims of situations.
Chapter One

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE RISE OF THE ROZVI EMPIRE

(I)

The Portuguese in 17th Century Mozambique

The rise of Dombo and the Rozvi empire can only be fully understood in the light of the many events that must have taken place in Mukaranga in the second half of the 17th century. And of all the factors we can identify there seems to be one which stands out as one of the most relevant if not the most relevant i.e. the Portuguese and their activities in Mukaranga. The 17th century saw the highest and lowest mark in the history of Portuguese influence in the Rios de Cuama before the 19th century. The influence reached its zenith in the second and third quarters of the century and its nadir in the last quarter of the century with their expulsion from Mashonaland.

1. The term "Rios de Cuama" was very often used before the 18th century to describe the area which during the 18th century was known as "Rios de Sena". The "Rios de Sena" extended from Quelimane to Quebrabaça (Cabora Bassa) near Chicova. It was estimated in 1821 that Rios de Sena lay between 15 and 20 degrees south latitude and 46 and 56 degrees longitude - B.A.L. 54 - XIII - 3, "Analyse Statistica, topographica, e Politica da Capitania de Rios de Senna, dirigida ao Sobradoro e Augusto Congresso das Cortes Geraes, e Extraordinarias, e constituentes da Nação Portugueza. Pelo actual Governador da Mesma Capitania. Anno de 1821," by José Francisco Alves Barbosa, p. 5, "artigo 1: Extenção e limites da Capitania dos Rios de Senna". Although Zumbo was under the Captaincy of the Rivers of Sena, yet the lands from Chicova to Zumbo were not part of "Terras da Coroa" (Crown lands). They belonged to independent chiefs.
While in the 16th century the kings of Portugal had tried to control the trade of Mukaranga by conquering the region militarily, in the 17th century the task fell on that country's nationals in the Rios de Cuama to individually spread Portuguese influence in the region. Instead of serried ranks of Portuguese soldiers marching to the highlands of Mukaranga as at the time of Francisco Barretto and Vasco Fernandes Homem, in the 17th century it was often a gradual process of infiltration by one or two traders carrying beads, cloth and guns. This approach suited the new agents for the spreading of Portuguese influence. Because of their knowledge of local conditions the prazeros were able to exploit any opportunity to increase their influence. By taking sides in the quarrels among African rulers the prazeros were able to increase the number of their protégés in the Rios de Cuama until by the third quarter of the 17th century they had a strangle-hold over the valley lands. But the power and authority exercised by the prazeros had its own inherent weakness in that it was the power of an individual; and what is more the power was exercised for personal gain by the individual. Personal profit and national interest did not necessarily coincide. The prazer was both the principle agent for increasing Portuguese influence in the Rios de Cuama as well as one of the chief causes of its destruction in the last quarter of the 17th century. In discussing the basis

1. There has been little attempt in this study to modernize the spelling of Portuguese names. Instead we have often retained the archaic forms.

of the Portuguese influence in the 17th century Rios de Cuama a
distinction between the power of the individual prazero: and that
power which was exercised by the officials of the Portuguese Crown
must be made if a true assessment of the Portuguese strength in the
1680s is to be made. And we need to know the condition of Portuguese
power in the 1680s to enable us to assess meaningfully the achieve­
ments of Dombo I.

During the 17th century the Portuguese Crown tried to increase
its power and influence in the Rios de Cuama by a variety of initia­
tives. The first of these was by devising settlement schemes in
1635 and 1677 in order to populate the Rios de Cuama with Portuguese
people. But in spite of the elaborately drawn up schemes, by the
1680s the Portuguese of the Rivers had a population of about fifty
white males and about two hundred mulattos in the whole of the Rios de
Cuama. This then was the position of the Portuguese population in
the Rivers four years before Changamire Dombo attacked Mahungwe. However
it should not be imagined that the 250 white and mulatto males were
all the fighting force available to the Portuguese in case of war.
Far from it. Many of the 250 individually possessed hundreds of
armed Africans who were ready to fight for the Portuguese. As

1. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 4, pp. 245-253, letter of the king to
vicero y-dated 24/2/1635; Axelson, E., South-East Africa 1600-1700,
pp. 97-114.
2. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 4, p. 381; Axelson, E., South-East Africa
1600-1700, pp. 144-154.
4. Manuel Barretto, "Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de
1600-1700, op. cit., p. 103.
Father Manuel Barretto observed in 1667 "The Portuguese... possess vast lands, or provinces, which they have bought, and buy everyday, from the king of Mokaranga. With the people of these lands and their mocamos, as they call their troops of slaves, they are more powerful than the king of Mokaranga himself".

The economic base of the Portuguese crown in the Rivers was never a strong one. For payment of about 40,000 pardaos a year, the trade of the whole of Mozambique (i.e. in fact of Rios de Cuama) was farmed to the Captain of Mozambique. This system continued during much of the 17th as well as part of the 16th century. When the Captain did not have the monopoly then the Royal Treasury had it.

Attempts to form an East India Company for trading purposes were tried without much success between (1629-1633). In 1635, 1643, 1671 and 1672, there were attempts to introduce free trade in the Rios de Cuama. But free trade was only tried for a reasonable period of time between 1681-1690. The reasons why there was so much instability in the economic arrangements of the Rivers lies in the fact

2. Axelson, S.E. Africa 1600-1700, op. cit., p. 3; But in Theal vol. 4, p. 35, Friar Augustine da Azevedo said that Dom de Meneses paid 15,000 cruzados for a three year lease.
that each of the above systems had its defects which the Crown found hard to remedy. The trouble with the grant of a monopoly to the Captains of Moçambique was that during the three years they had the monopoly they would try to get as much profit as possible by hook or by crook. They would buy ivory, gold etc. from the traders at the lowest possible prices but in turn would sell their beads and cloth at the highest possible price. The victims were the traders of the Rivers and as a result fewer people were interested in settling in the Rivers. Very often the Captains neglected to build or maintain the forts of the Rivers and Moçambique. Attempts to enforce a Royal Monopoly between 1618-1622 and 1673-1680 failed because like so many other forms of state capitalism, it suffered from the apathy of officials who were too interested in their own profits to bother much about the profit of the treasury. Sometimes wrong goods were brought to a wrong market. And often the crown had to use treasury funds to pay salaries of officials who could not produce enough revenue for the crown to pay their salaries. Free trade was

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2. Although the upkeep of the forts was one of the conditions on which the captain of Moçambique received his lease, in 1604 when the Dutch first blockaded Moçambique the Fort of São Sebastião was undermanned and not in proper repairs; in 1634 Pedro Barretto Rezende shows that the forts in Rios de Cuama were either non-existent or so ruined as to be useless; Fr. Manuel Barretto in 1667 found the same situation; and when Dombo threatened Sena in 1695 it was without a fort. See Axelsson, E., S.East Africa 1600-1700, op. cit., p. 16; Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 2, Pedro Barretto de Rezesande, Do Estado da India, pp. 378-401; Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 3, pp. 464, 472, 506.
opposed on the grounds that it would have led to intense competition with the result that many traders would have been thrown out of business. By the time of Dombo's wars the government in the Rivers did not have the economic means with which to buy the arms and to hire the men to fight in the wars against Dombo. It had to rely on the generosity of the Indian traders and Portuguese 'moradores' to contribute the cloth with which to prosecute the wars. Such a situation clearly had grave disadvantages.

The political administration of the Rivers suffered from incompetence and corruption, nepotism and fraud of every kind. Officials of the Rivers were often appointed by a Captain of Moçambique who usually would have bought his post at an auction in Goa. The Captain of Moçambique wanted profits, no matter how, from his subordinates in the Rivers. The calibre of settlers in the Rivers from whom its administrators had to be chosen were often degrados

1. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 4, p. 450, king to Governor of India, 20/2/1690. "On account of the frequent communication there was not a Canarin who did not take cloth to the rivers, which had lost its value as each one wishes to be the first to sell his cloth into the interior, where they meet with a very bad reception, the price of gold having been raised to such an extent that it is worth fifty per cent more than its former value".
and prostitutes and other off-scourings of humanity in Lisbon
and Goa and Moçambique who were deposited into the Rivers. Men
like Diogo Simões Madeira and Sisnando Dias Bayão relieved an
otherwise catalogue of corrupt self-seeking mediocrity. The
religious often left much to be desired. Ecclesiastical offices
were not immune to simony. If the Dominicans tended to be worldly
and profit-minded, the Jesuits were often involved in political
plots and manoeuvrings. Inter-Order rivalries usually hampered
the missionary endeavours. Axelson observed that this was parti-

"The rivers of Cuama are in a miserable state, and in danger of
the commerce being greatly decreased, which is caused by there
being no officers of justice there, and no one to govern as is
fitting, and the remedy which could be applied to this is pointed
out"; Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 3, p. 473, Fr. Manuel Barretto in his
"Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama" tells us that
in 1667 Sena was depopulated because of deaths caused by the
rivalry among the Portuguese thirty years before 1667; Theal,
R.S.E.A., vol. 4, p. 306, king to viceroy, 27/8/1666, settlers
around Sena said to have killed a chief judge, Pedro Nogueira in
the discharge of his duties.
2. For the help he gave to Gatsirusere and for his services to
the crown of Portugal see "Decada" by A. Bocarro in Theal, R.S.E.A.
3. See below, pp. 61-64.
4. Silva (S.J.), A. da, Mentalidade Missiologia dos Jesuítas
em Moçambique Antes de 1759, vol. II, pp. 127-143; Axelson, E.,
S.E. Africa 1600-1700, op. cit., p. 151; Barretto, "Informação...",
cularly the case towards the end of the 17th century when many Dominicans "were men of inferior fibre" and for whom trading became the "main vocation".

If the foregoing is a general survey of the weaknesses, potentialities and actual official power at the disposal of the Portuguese authorities in the Rios de Cuama, there is another source of "Portuguese" power which must be mentioned i.e. the power wielded by the prazo holders. It probably is no exaggeration to suggest that effective Portuguese presence in the interior of Mukaranga in much of the 17th century was due solely to the influence which the prazeros exercised. Although in theory the prazos were grants of land from the crown to prazo holders for a duration of three lives in the female line, in practice a powerful family held its lands for as long as it was strong enough to do so. Allen Isaacman has argued that, contrary to the impression created by so many scholars of the prazo system, the contractual relationship between the prazero and the crown was the least relevant aspect in the functioning of the prazo system. "For example, there are numerous instances where prazeros failed to fulfil their part of the contract and acted independently of the crown. Similarly a number of prazeros established a functioning prazo without an aforamento. Finally, even after the prazos had been legally abolished

in 1832, several continued to function in their pre-1832 form until the end of the 19th century. Most prazeros were more powerful than the nearest law enforcement agent of the crown and so the crown had often to humour and cajole the big prazeros into cooperation. The prazeros were big white "chiefs" with whom the government often negotiated rather than commanded cooperation.

If Newitt has shown that the prazeros assiduously clung to their Portuguese names, Isaacman has nonetheless convincingly argued that the maintenance and increase of the power and influence of a prazero depended more on his or her ability to manipulate and become involved in the African society. If recognition of prazero by the crown gave formal protection before the law of Portugal (which had no effective enforcement agent in the Rivers), connection with an African Mambo gave effective legitimacy to a prazero in the eyes of hundreds or even thousands of colonos. For a prazero involvement in African politics was a matter not of choice but of survival. The result was that the prazeros were often involved in petty local wars which created confusion and unrest in the Rivers and made it impossible for the crown to establish control in the

2. See glossary.
region. Fr. Manuel Barretto, as has been mentioned, wrote that Sena had lost many of its inhabitants in the 1630s because of fighting among the Portuguese prazo holders. It is said that some prazeros killed a chief judge of Sena when he tried to dispense justice. Letters from the King to the viceroy in the latter half of the 17th century show that while the official Portuguese policy was to be on good neighbourly terms with friendly African rulers like the Munhumutapas, the prazeros heedless of the royal instructions (i.e. if they ever heard of them!) increased their harrassment of the emperors and other rulers. The harrassment of the rulers of Munhumutapa and Mukaranga and the continual encroachment towards Butua by Portuguese settlers probably contributed more than anything else towards Dombo's decision to attack the Portuguese stations in Mukaranga. There can be little doubt that the Portuguese were unpopular among the African rulers in Mukaranga in the last quarter of the 17th century. Already by 1683 we are told that the prince ruling Rimuka though "in a position to transact greater trade than other provinces", was "oppositely inclined to the extent that not an ounce of gold has left his territory for many years and not an ounce of Portuguese blood will enter it for many centuries to come". The apparent ease with which Dombo won the support of the

1. See above p. 27 note 1

African rulers in his wars against the Portuguese must be taken partly as a commentary on the unpopularity of the Portuguese in Mukaranga. The viceroy of India was later to say that it had been the terrible behaviour of the Portuguese in the Rivers which caused Dombo's wars. The power and influence of the prazeros were more than once to prove a double edged sword to the Portuguese crown.

The history of the emperors of Munhumutapa in the 17th century demonstrated the effectiveness and harmfulness of the power of the Portuguese prazo holders. In the first half of the 17th century the Portuguese (especially Diogo Simões Madeira, the great land holder) helped Gatsirusere to fight his wars. In some ways Gatsirusere was to be the last Mutapa in the 17th century to take an independent and at times hostile stand against the Portuguese and still retain his throne. His son and successor Kapararidze, tried to strike a strongly independent line but this cost him his throne. Although Kapararidze nearly expelled the Portuguese from Mukaranga in 1631 - killing about four hundred Portuguese and six thousand Africans - in

2. Axelson, E., S.E. Africa 1600-1700, op. cit., pp. 40-54; See also above p. 27 note 2
3. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 4, p. 277. Diogo de Sousa de Menezes gives the figure of four hundred Portuguese killed. But Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 1 p. 46, in the extracts from Asia Portuguesa, Manuel de Faria e Sousa, gives a figure of three hundred Portuguese dead. By Portuguese, one should not think only of European Portuguese but Mulattos and Indians as well.
the end he was defeated. Already in 1629 his rival and successor, Mavura who usurped the throne with the help of the Portuguese, had acknowledged vassalage to the Portuguese crown. In 1631 an unfriendly Chikanga in Manyika was deposed by Diogo de Sousa de Menezes. On October 23, 1644 the then Kiteve signed a treaty of vassalage to the Portuguese crown at the "suggestion" of Sisnando Dias Bayão. In the same year Sisnando Dias helped a deposed Togwa regain his throne. On May 25, 1652 Mavura died and on the 4th August 1652 his successor accepted baptism as Domingos and his wife as Luiza - a sign of friendship to the Portuguese which was eventually to become a sine qua non for accession to the imperial throne. D.P. Abraham thinks that in 1666 or 1667 it was Domingos

1. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 4, p. 240, king to viceroy, 8/3/1634. It is doubtful if Mavura fully appreciated what the treaty of vassalage implied, for we hear, that he still thought he was entitled to his curva from the captain of Moçambique. For the meaning and implication of curva see glossary and chapter six, p. 272-273.

2. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 4, p. 278. The Chikanga in question was deposed and killed and the succeeding one pledged vassalage to the Portuguese crown.


4. See below pp. 61.
(Siti Kazurukumusapa) whom Manuel Barretto says was killed by his own people for fear of the Portuguese prazeros who had revolted against the emperor. But it would appear that Domingos died in 1655 and was succeeded by D. Afonso who got his throne through the help of the Portuguese. Axelson says that Dom Afonso was the Mutapa whom Barretto refers to as having been killed by his people. A young man "very crafty and cunning", was elected emperor through Portuguese help after the death of D. Afonso. This young man was Mukobwe who ruled up to 1692. All instructions by the Portuguese king that the prazeros should be stopped in their lawlessness were just empty orders which could not be enforced. It was these often mutually divided and uncontrollable white "chiefs" vying for trade and influence and constantly pushing their frontiers in Mukaranga towards the "Mae de Ouro" - Butua - upon whom Changamire Dombo fell in the 1680s and 1690s. If the prazeros had widened and exploited the dissensions and divisions (esp. succession rivalries) among the African rulers in order to increase their influence and power, Dombo was to benefit from the weakness of the Portuguese administration in the Rios de Cuama which was in no small measure

3. For evidence that Portuguese in later 17th century were pushing their frontiers into Butua, see pp. 70-71 below.
due to the ungovernable individualism of the prazeros. The very agency which had maintained Portuguese presence in the Rios de Cuama during much of the 17th century was to be, in part, the cause for the Portuguese expulsion from the plateau by Changamire Dombo.
The Rozvi: The Problem of Identification

Any study of the Rozvi (Rozwi, Warozwi, Abelozzi, Rozi, Borobres, Borobzes) must begin by defining what or which Rozvi it is referring to. There is no agreed definition either among the writers of Shona history or among the Shona themselves as to who were, or even who are, the Rozvi. Some writers see the Rozvi as a distinct group from the Shona/Karanga. But others regard them as an integral part of the Karanga. These differences have serious historical implications because they have led to arguments of whether the Rozvi as a nation existed before the 1680s or only after that period.

"From traditions preserved", claimed Posselt in 1924, "there is every reason to believe that the so-called Monomotapa empire was that of the Barozwi, ruled by a king with the hereditary title of 'Mambo'." Posselt felt that the Rozvi were a "separate people" from their Karanga subjects (Batonga). Posselt's first point implies that the Rozvi ruled the Karanga from the beginning of the Mutapa empire to about 1833. In 1960 Abraham stated that the

1. The Karanga, unless otherwise the contrary is clearly stated, as used here must be taken to mean what Ethnographers in Rhodesia call the Shona. The term Shona is of 19th century origin and came into existence after the period covered by this study. The term Karanga is used today in Rhodesia to describe only a group of Shona speakers in the South of the country who call themselves by the term Karanga.
"Rozvi" were a Karanga ruling class to which the Mutapas belonged. But in 1961 Abraham seemed to have qualified his 1960 position by claiming that the "Varozvi" were one of the aboriginal tribes of Rhodesia in no way related to the Karanga who were conquered by the invading Karanga (Mhure), the tribe of the Mutapas. "It would be a mistake," warned another man who says he has spent no less than thirty years trying to solve the Rozvi problem, "to think that the Rozvi did not exist before the great leader of the northwestern group, Shanganire (1693-about 1718) conquered Monomotapa kingdom*.

But in 1934 Fr. F. Marconnes, S.J., stated equally stoutly that "The Rozvis are a modern horde who came from the north less than two hundred years ago and the Rhodesian Zimbabwe were already in ruins long before any Rozvi ever clapped eyes on them". Marconnes

3. Sicard, H. von, "The Origin of some of the Tribes in the Belingwe Reserve", in NADA, 1948, p. 96. - Sicard stated that he has been working on the problem of Butua - Torwa for over thirty years in 'A Propósito de Sisnando Dias-Baiao' in STUDIA, No. 16, 1965, p. 179; Sicard's dates of 1693-1718 for the reign of Dombo are incorrect. The true dates being from c.1684-1695. See chapter two, pp. 75 and 86, and 68, note 2.
categorically stated that the Changamire who destroyed Dambarare and the other Portuguese feiras in the late 17th century was the 
founder of the Rozvi empire and the first Mambo. It was the 
destruction, claimed Marconnes, caused by the people under that 
Changamire which either led to the other tribes calling them 
Rozvi or it may have been out of vanity that the people of Changamire called themselves the "Rozvis or Destroyers". Other writers 
too seem to share Fr. Marconnes' view about the origins of the 
Rozvi. 

From the known Rozvi and Mutapa traditions it is possible 
to argue for both views very cogently. Most Rozvi and Mutapa 
traditions state that their separate royal houses were related 
and that they were/are the same people. But on the other hand 
Rozvi traditions leave one fairly certain that what they are 
describing as the Rozvi history is the story of their hegemony 
brought about by Dombo or the Changamire of c.1684-1695. A reading 
of the Rozvi and Mutapa traditions leaves one with the paradoxical 
impression of a related people who are asserting their distinctiveness from each other.

1. Ibid., pp. 76 and 77.
2. Ibid., p. 73.
4. See Appendix C for the important known Rozvi and Mutapa 
traditions.
Archaeological studies have sometimes been used to interpret the Zimbabwe stone culture and pottery as showing evidence of intrusions by a number of unrelated peoples into Rhodesia. Some scholars have attempted to represent some of the Zimbabwe phases as described by Summers as indications of intrusions by foreign peoples. But more recently archaeologists, including Mr. Summers, have come round to the view that the whole stone culture shows a continuum running right through the various stages. Evolution within the same cultural group rather than revolution as a result of foreign intrusion seems to be the order of the day. Differences between what one archaeologist has defined as the Zimbabwe type


5. The major feature of the Zimbabwe type seems to be the presence of standing walls.
and the Khami type of stone building are discernible but these are said to be consistent with the logic of cultural evolution within the same cultural group rather than necessarily resulting from a revolution introduced by an intruding foreign group. The Khami type is said to be predominantly 17th and 18th century in origin while the Zimbabwe type appeared in general to be older than the Khami type. All this means that archaeological findings can no longer be used to support the argument that the Rozvi are a separate race from the Karanga culture. On the other hand it does not contradict the view that the Rozvi, while being part of the Karanga race may have developed certain distinctive characteristics.

It has been argued that the Khami type ruins and the "Khami ruins" pottery usually found in those ruins are the work of the Rozvi or their subjects.

1. The Khami type show great preoccupation with building of platforms. However the presence of polychrome, incised, band and pannel or 'Khami ruins' pottery is one of the most significant common characteristic of the Khami type. Also the Khami type tends to have check pattern decorations. The Khami type seems to be restricted mainly to the South Western part of present Rhodesia.


The earliest Portuguese records write of the people of the Munhumutapa empire as Mocaranga (Makaranga) and their language as Mocaranga. The people of Kiteve, Manyika, Sedanda and Butua were all said to have been Karanga speakers. In Moçambique, the Teve, Danda, Barwe and Manyika are still sometimes ethnographically classified as a Karanga group. But in present day Rhodesia the term Karanga is, as we have already said, now used to describe a section of the Shona. Before the 18th century the Portuguese writers referred to all people now speaking Shona by the term Karanga. In 1667 and 1683 the ethnographical knowledge of the Portuguese about Rhodesia was so accurate as to distinguish the Batongas, living in Rimuka (Maramuca), from the rest of the Karangas. It is not until the middle of the 18th century that we find the people of the Changamires being called Borobzes (Varozvi) and their land of Butua being sometimes referred to as Vorobze (Vurozvi). If, as Abraham claimed in 1960, the original clan name of the ruling Munhumutapas

5. The earliest use of the term "Borobze" or "Borobres" found by this writer appears to be in Inácio Caetano Xavier "Notícias Dos Domínios Portugueses Na Costa de África Oriental" in *Relações de Moçambique Setecentista*, Lisboa, Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1955, (ed.) A.A. de Andrade, p. 145.
was Rozvi why is it that they do not appear to have ever described themselves as Rozvi to the Portuguese during over four hundred years that they were in political and commercial contact with them? And if the Changamire before 1494 called his country of Butua, "Urozvi", why is it that the term "vurozvi" (orobes, vorobze) can only be found in 18th century Portuguese sources? It appears from the Portuguese sources that there is no evidence to substantiate the claim that the term Rozvi existed before the advent of Dombo I (c.1684-1695).

From a linguistic point of view it appears that Chirozvi is basically a Shona dialect which was influenced by Sotho languages like most western Shona dialects, e.g. Kalanga, Nanzwa, Lilima etc. Professor Fortune says that "The above", meaning his discussion of a Rozvi text, "proves beyond reasonable doubt that Rozi belonged to western Shona." Of the relation of western Shona to the rest of the Shona groups, Fortune adds that "Western Shona, while undoubtedly belonging to the same language as the other Northern, North-eastern, Central and Eastern clusters of Shona, is markedly different from them in much of its vocabulary and also, but to a lesser extent, in its morphology." Therefore a linguist disagrees with both Posselt

2. Ibid., p. 67.
and Abraham when they say that Rozvi is basically a Sotho/Tswana language influenced by Shona/Karanga. In Shona the name/word Rozvi comes from *rozva* (fraud). Varozvi may mean despoilers or destroyers. Historically therefore the derivation would appear to be more meaningful when describing the people involved in the upheaval and destruction caused by the wars of Dombo.

Mutapa traditions appear to describe fairly intelligibly events going as far back as the 15th century. Some of those events are corroborated by Portuguese documents. On the other hand the Rozvi traditions are vague on events before the late 17th century. Asked in 1903-1904 by J.W. Posselt to give a king list, four important Rozvi informants claimed that the first Rozvi Mambo was Dombo, the great conqueror. The achievements of Dombo as depicted in Rozvi traditions seem to be corroborated by Portuguese sources of the late 17th century. We are led to conclude therefore that the Rozvi appear to have been those people associated with the rise to power of Dombo I (c.1684-1695). Although sometimes the term Rozvi is used to describe specifically the Royal Rozvi of the Mutupo (totem) Moyo (heart) Ndizvo, it appears that at other times it is

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1. Since the people of the great Matope appear to have been already nicknamed "Korekore". See Abraham, *NADA*, 1959, p. 62.
3. N3/33/8, "The Abelozwi (Barozwi)".
also used to describe other groups of different totems whose history seems to be closely associated with the Rozvi. Both in the 18th century Portuguese sources and in some collected traditions the house of Tumbare, Mutupo, Bepe, is referred to as Rozvi. The houses of Nabvudzi (Shava=eland), Negwande (Shoko=monkey) are often regarded as Rozvi. The latter two totems are generally regarded as typically Nbire, i.e. associated with the Mutapas. There are people of the Chuma, Ncube, Sibanda and Dube totems who also call themselves Rozvi. Von Sicard, writing about the composition of the Rozvi, says that "they were not a single tribe, but a nation composed of several tribes." Nowadays some people of the royal totem of Moyo Ndizvo are known at times to claim that the term Rozvi used to refer, and should only be used to refer, to them exclusively. But probably this tendency may be of more recent origin.

From the above discussion it appears that (a) the Rozvi are historically part of the Shona/Karanga (b) they owe their name and origins as a nation to the work and achievements of Mambo Dombo I. "The archaeological evidence" concludes Robinson, "is against a very recent arrival into Southern Rhodesia of the people now known as Rozvi, BUT THEIR DESIGNATION AS 'ROZWI' MAY BE COMPARATIVELY RECENT." (my emphasis).

2. Ibid. p. 113.  
The Kingdom of Butua: A Historical Identification

Closely associated with the problem of the Rozvi has been the question of the identification of what the Portuguese records describe as the kingdom of Butua. The kingdom of Butua is mentioned by name for the first time, in Portuguese records, in a report by Gaspar Veloso written in 1512. At that time it was said that Butua followed after the Mutapa kingdom. Although the famous letter of Alcaçova refers to the lands of Changamire where Togwa (Toloa, Toroa) ruled in 1506, it does not actually mention Butua by name. In the 1630s António Boccaro wrote that "the kingdom of Zimba (Zvimba)... has on the southern side the kingdom of Butua and on the north the lands of Urupande". In 1696 Fr. Conceição, in the Tratado dos Rios de Cuama said that after Quitamburvize (Chitomborwizi) followed the lands of Butua. Chitomborwizi is in the country of chief Chirau i.e. adjacent to Zvimba. Since Chitomborwizi and Zvimba are on the west bank of Mhanyame (Hunganyi) river, it is incorrect to say that Mhanyame was the north-eastern boundary of Butua. Butua, then, was beyond Zvimba and Chitomborwizi, but according to Abraham included Rimuka. This means that the Mupfure (Umfuli) - Sanyati (Umnati) rivers seem to have been the most plausible north-eastern boundary of Butua. In

the 19th century, once the Portuguese had concluded that the Ndebele had taken possession of Butua, they regarded the rest of North Mashonaland as being open for the extension of their influence. It is interesting that in 1889-90 the boundary of the new Distrito do Zumbo was said to be along the Sanyati and Mupfure rivers. It would appear therefore that the Portuguese had a fairly consistent idea of what the North-East boundary of Butua was over the centuries.

In the East, according to Manuel Barretto, Butua bordered on Manyika and Kiteve. But Padre António Gomes wrote in 1648 that there were other kingdoms to the west of Manyika before one came to Butua. This point was further underlined by Frei Gaspar de Macedo who said that it took six days of walking from Manyika before one entered into the kingdom of Butua. If it took six days from Manyika before one entered Butua, then it would appear that Butua's boundary could not have been anywhere further than the Sabi River.

4. Memoria e Docs. acerca... Machona e Nyassa, op. cit., p. 151; even during the early 19th century it appears the Sabi was still regarded as the border of Butua in the east. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Maço. 21, 1/6/1831, "Acressentamento", Anon.
In the west the limits of Butua are much more difficult to define as no Portuguese ever travelled that far. From hearsay the Portuguese concluded that Butua bordered on Angola. But the presence of the Kalahari desert between the two kingdoms would argue against the limits of Butua having been much beyond the lands immediately west of the Rhodesia-Botswana border.

In the South we know from João de Barros's *Da Asia* that some stone ruins which seem to answer to the description of the Great Zimbabwe were in the midst of the plains of Butua. By implication de Barros was saying Butua extended much farther south than the Great Zimbabwe. Most 16th and 17th century maps put Butua as far south as the Espirito Santo (Limpopo). A notorious exception is the map by João Teixeira Abernas in 1667 which puts Butua over the Zambezi.

1. João do Santos in Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 7, op. cit., p. 274; Padre Antonio Gomes, "Viagem que fez..." op. cit., p. 197; Fr. Gaspar Macedo, claimed that Butua came as far as the Atlantic Ocean which he reckoned to be 150 leagues from Manyika, see Memoria e Documentos acerca... Machona e Nyassa, op. cit., p. 151; But a document of 7 January, 1759 said that it was no more than 100 leagues from Caconda and Benguela to the borders of Butua. See Arquivo das Colonias, vol. 1, p. 52; Manuel de Faria e Sousa Asia Portuguesa, in Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 1, op. cit., p. 23.
Differing explanations have been offered as to the derivation and meaning of Butua. On the one hand there are those who see it as having Bushman connections and on the other there is Mr. Abraham who considers it to be derived from Guruuswa. It appears Abraham has offered the most plausible reconstruction. Dr. Samkange's attack on Abraham's Butua is largely misdirected. The Butua of the Portuguese records, and this is what we are talking about, and of the Mutapa traditions is, as Abraham has rightly claimed, the kingdom of Togwa and the Rozvi.

1. Handels, STUDIA No. 2, 1958, op. cit., p. 148; Posselt, F.W., in Official Yearbook, No. 1, 1924, op. cit., p. 62. Butua's supposed connections with Bushmen have been postulated by many other writers before Abraham's 1959 article in NADA.  
2. Abraham, "The Monomotapa dynasty" in NADA, 1959, op. cit., pp. 73-74. Abraham says that Butua is derived from the Shona word "Guruuswa" or "Guniuswa" and Tavara "Gunuvutva". The Portuguese then corrupted it to Butua (Butwa). See also Sicard, H. von, "The Origin of some of the Tribes in the Belingwe Reserve" in NADA, 1950, pp. 12-15. Although Sicard derives Butua from the Twamamba words "Mphwa-vhatwa" (sister's son) and "Mma-Bothwa" but his identification of the area of Butua does not disagree with Abraham's.  
3. Samkange, S., The Origin of Rhodesia, London, 1968, p. 3. Dr. Samkange seems to miss the fact that there are no less than three Guruuswas in Shona traditions: One in Kiteve (Sicard, NADA, 1946, p. 35), another in Southern part of Rhodesia (Abraham NADA, 1959, pp. 73-74); a third one in the south of the Limpopo near the Crocodile River (Posselt, Fact and Fiction, p. 143). There are other traditions according to von Sicard of a Guruuswa indicating a region near the Zambezi. Dr. Samkange's Guruuswa seems to belong to this category. Lastly on this question of derivation it is interesting to note that in Belingwe district there is a mountain called Vuswa or Vutwa. From Vuswa to Vutwa and finally to Butua (Butwa) as in the Abraham hypothesis does not seem a long step to make.
The kingdom of Butua as described above continued (with some additions) in much the same form after the wars of Dombo I. During the 18th century the Portuguese were to refer to Butua at times as Orobze or Orobu (Vurozvi). It is important to realize that the term 'Butua' (Guruuswa) as used by Portuguese is older than their use of the term Rozvi and before the 1680s is of greater significance to the Mutapa traditions than to the Rozvis. Indeed the Rozvis, like so many other Shona groups have their own Guruuswa/Gunibutwa, which they claim to be south of the Crocodile River. Although the historic term Butua is used in 18th century Portuguese documents together with "Orobu" or "Vorobze" (Vurozvi) to describe the Rozvi kingdom, it is possible that the Rozvi of the 18th century may in fact never have used the name Butua to describe their kingdom. It is more than likely that the boundaries of old Butua as described above mattered little to the Rozvi rulers. To the Rozvi their kingdom included the land as far north as the old Dambarare, and many 18th century Portuguese documents state that Dambarare and some of the old feiras of Muka-

ranga were in Butua. Indeed the 18th century Portuguese sources seem to describe, at times, the whole Rozvi Empire, excluding Manyika kingdom, as Butua. Much of our own description of the Butua of the Rozvi after 1695, unless the contrary is stated, must be taken to be in accord with the latter view of Butua i.e. the whole Rozvi empire except Manyika.

Descriptions of the wealth of Butua excited and intoxicated the Portuguese from the 16th century up to the very end of the 19th century. To the Portuguese Butua was the "el dorado" or the "Mae de ouro". Possession of Butua was the dream of every Portuguese regime from the very earliest years until 1890. According to the "Corografica" "Vorobze" the kingdom of the Rozvi was a country of flat but beautiful plains, full of all kinds of victuals including rice, pumpkins, watermelon, beans and all sorts of garden greens. It was rich in minerals like gold and iron. There were cattle which were used as pack animals as well as for riding. Ostriches were plentiful and their eggs and feathers were sold at Manyika. But the country had few trees and so people had to use dried cow-dung for firewood. The "Corografica" is not describing Butua as we have described it above but what it calls Vorobze which

1. "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Mocambique, No. 84, 1955, pp. 90-97, doc. 165, dated Zumbo, 13/3/1769, António Manuel de Sequeira; Report of a meeting with a Rozvi embassy. Shows evidence that Zumbo Muzungus requested the Rozvi Mambo to allow them to re-open the Feiras of Dambarare; In 1786 "Muzezuro" and Sanyati River were said to be in Changamire's empire, see A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Cx. 23, Mocambique, 3/12/1786, A.M. e Castro to N.H. e Castro.
2. "Memoria e documentos... Machona e Nyassa, p. 167, report by F.M. de Castro dated 20/11/1753, says that Butua is the same as "Imperio do Changamira".
seems to be a description of the country between Gwelo and Bulawayo. In other words it is describing the land where the Rozvi imperial aristocracy lived at the time. For this reason we prefer to use the term Butua to Vurozvi to describe the Rozvi kingdom. The whole of Butua in 18th century comprised most of the rich mineral ridge (The Great Norite Dyke) running astride the Rhodesian high veld from the source of the Bubi River in the south to the middle of the Musengezi River in the northeast. This included the gold regions of Rimuka (near where the richest gold mines in Rhodesia are found up to today: Cam and Motor Mine, Dalny and Globe and Phoenix mines), the copper mines of Duma (Sabi valley), the iron from Wedza. It included the grazing lands of Mbire and present Matebeleland. The celebrated cattle of Butua were said to be big and plentiful. In the 18th century one African mushambadzi from Zumbo was said to have owned about eight hundred head of cattle in Butua. Also it seems Butua cattle

1. A.H.J. Av. de Moç., Cx. 17, (Anon), "Descrição Corográfica de Reino da Manica seus custumes e Leis." Our identification of the Vorobze of the "Corográfica" is based on the following facts:--
(a) The "Corográfica" says that Vorobze was west of Mbire,
(b) The almost treeless plains of Vorobze as described in the "Corográfica" west of Mbire seem to fit in with that part of the country in present day Rhodesia.
were sold to the Portuguese at Manyika. So big, claimed Fr. Gomes, were the cattle of Butua, that one had to stand when milking them. Fr. Monclaro in the 16th century thought that the cattle of Butua were "as big as the large oxen of France". 

To the present day the cattle country of Rhodesia is Matebeleland and Southern Mashonaland. The two riches in which Butua excelled, according to the Portuguese traders, were cattle and gold. But as Bocarro noted about the Karanga in the 17th century it was in cattle and in agriculture rather than in gold "in which their riches consist". And both in cattle and agriculture the old Butua Togwa as well as the more expanded Rozvi Butua of the 18th century must have excelled. In 1609 Fr. J. dos Santos wrote of the people of Butua: "they are much occupied with the breeding of cattle of which there are great numbers in these lands". He makes it clear that gold production was of less interest to the people of Butua than cattle breeding. In Portuguese sources Dombo is described as having been a cow-herd of the Mutapa. The name Chirisamhuru (cow-herd) given to, at least, the Mambo who died at Manyanga (1833-4) (if not to some other Mambos) suggests connections with cattle. So strong was the pastoral streak in

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1. Liesegang, Gaza Nguni, op. cit., p. 36.
the Rozvi that one of the Mambos is said to have attempted to
tame elephants.

The above sources show that although Butua was very rich in gold, it was nevertheless in cattle that the riches of the people of Butua comprised. In chapter three we argue that it was from the internal wealth of Butua that the political and economic power and influence of the Rozvi Mambos were derived. There and in chapter two we suggest that Dombo's rise to power may well have been made possible by the influence he wielded through his possession of cattle. So that in more than one sense the Rozvi empire may well have been built on cattle.

(IV)

The Problems created by the title "Changamire" and the Togwa dynasty as seen from the Portuguese documents

The final major problem raised by our identification of the Rozvi is the relationship of the title "Changamire" and the Togwa dynasty to the Rozvi of Dombo (i.e. after 1684). In 1960 Abraham made an important reconstruction of the history of the Changamire who ruled the Mutapa Empire between 1490-1494. He traced the origins of the Rozvi kingdom to this man. According to Abraham this man took for his dynastic name the title "Changamire". On the basis of Abraham's reconstruction Changamire Dombo I (c.1684-1695) would have been either a successor or descendant of the Changamire of c.1490-1494. We have already made clear our differences with Abraham on the identification of the Rozvi. What we want to examine in this section is why the name/title Changamire should have been applied to Dombo I (c.1684-1695) and his successors as well as to the Changamire of c.1490-1494 if the latter was not the founder of the Rozvi kingdom.

The first known reference in Portuguese records to a Changamire (Changamir) was in a letter of Diogo De Alcaçova in 1506. The

second known reference to the name/title Changamire (Changamira) found in Portuguese sources is said to be in a document of 1548.

After this our next encounter with this name/title is in a letter of June 1684 written by Caetano de Mello de Castro describing Dombo. After Dombo the title Changamire is found in Portuguese sources to describe the Rozvi Mambos. But between the death of the first recorded Changamire and the rise of Dombo the rulers of Butua appear more often in Portuguese sources under the dynastic name of Togwa (Torwa, Toloa, Thoroe, Toroa) until 1683 when the last reference to the Togwa dynasty was made. On one occasion

1. Information given to me orally by Mr. D.P. Abraham in London, (August 1971). 59-60
3. Descripção dos Rios de Senna, by F.M. de Castro in 1750, published Nova Goa, 1861, p. 33, paras 68, 70; Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 5, p. 50, Goa, 21/1/1719 Conde Dom Luis de Menezes to Antônio Cardim Frees; A.H.U., Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Zumbo, 20/6/1784, Antônio Caetano de Souza to Governor of the Rivers. In fact in all the Zumbo documents pertaining to the Rozvi the ruler of the Rozvi is called Changamire.
4. Conceição, op. cit., p. 68, para. 57 (1696); Ajuda, 51-VIII-43, fl. 474, doc. dated 16/3/1683, anon.; De Barros, "Da Asia" in Theal, vol. 6, p. 267; in Memoria e Docs. Acerca... Machona e Nyassa, op. cit., p. 151; Fr. Gaspar Macedo gives the name of the ruler of Butua in 1633 as "Atorte", whether this was a corruption of Togwa we cannot say; In the already quoted letter of Alcaçova col 1506 it seems in that year Butua was under the control of Togwa.
a ruler of Butua was given as "Burrom" and in another source as "Butua". From the Portuguese sources it is not clear why the Portuguese decided to refer to Dumbo I and his successors as Changamires after more than one hundred and thirty years of non-appearance of the title.

In the late 1880s Paiva de Andrada was to write, "In my very first interview with Chiquiso, the Mambo of Rupire, I was surprised to hear him called Changamira, and I took it for granted that in this country, now divided into such small territorial units, this Mambo would have been the heir to the ancient emperor; but more lately I know that this name (Changamire) is also (used) as a honorific title given to other mambos". In present day Shona the term Changamire is still used as Paiva de Andrada discovered in the 1880s i.e. as a honorific title. For example Rukara writes about a "Changamire Munumutapa" who defied the Rozvi Mambo "Changamire Chirisamuru". If "Changamire" was a Rozvi dynastic name then it would have been inappropriate for Rukara to write of "Changamire Munumutapa". But as every Shona speaker knows, Rukara is perfectly correct to write of "Changamire Munumutapa". Alcâçova basing him-

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1. J. de Barros, Da Asia, op. cit., p. 267; See also p. 60 below.  
2. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 1, p. 274. This was confusing the name of the kingdom for that of the king.  
self on informants he met at Sofala, wrote in 1506 that the first Changamire "was a great lord... who ruled the whole kingdom (Mutapa) exiling, beheading and acting in all things as king, and was called Changamir and was the king's chief justice and the word for chief justice is amyr or as we say it governor". The "Corograica" clearly referring to Dombo, says that his name at the beginning was Changa, but he "afterwards called himself Changamire". It is Abraham who categorically stated what is already implicit in Alcagova that Changamire is a combination of the Shona "Changa" and the Arabic title "Amir". Samkange has raised some interesting points with regards to Abraham's reconstruction:

(a) the title "amir" would sound as "amiye" in Shona/Karanga
(b) the title would be "amir Changa" in Arabic. Hence the reconstructed name should have been "amiyechanga" and not Changamire.

This is particularly pertinent for if we break the term Changamire we end up with two Shona words Changa (worthless) and Mire (stand, linger; from -mira, kumira - to stand, to wait). While a "name"+"amir" combination is very unArabic, on the other hand the combination, if it be so, evidenced in the word Changamire is as characteristically Shona as one could get. Finally Samkange asked why, if the title amir was given to flatter Changa, it was not

4. e.g. Mufandimire=Mufa-(ndi)mire, Gokomere=Goko + mere, Matandangavate=Matanda + (nga) vate. In each of these cases it is a matter of joining a noun and a verbal form.
given to the other kings, like Chikanga, Barwe, Kiteve and Makoni. If it is imperative to break the title Changamire into its component parts then we would opt for the Shona combinations.

We have already made clear our own difference with Abraham on the identification of the Rozvi. It follows therefore that we cannot accept his reconstruction of the Changamire before 1494 as the founder of the Rozvi nation. Also it would appear that there is very little evidence with which to state categorically, as Abraham does, that a direct dynastic link between the Changamire before 1494 and Changamire Dombo I existed. The first Changamire was said by Alcagoa to have been a "kinsman" of Togwa. We have argued that Changamire may possibly have been a title and not a family name. The dynastic name of the rulers of Butua in the 16th and much of the 17th centuries was Togwa. The first Changamire should probably be seen as a senior member of the Togwa dynasty during his life. This might then explain why the title Changamire as the name of the rulers of Butua seems to disappear during much of the 16th and 17th centuries and the Togwa dynasty continues as the ruling house in Butua. In short, before Dombo, Butua was ruled by the Togwa dynasty. The Rozvi people and empire, the subject of our study, were "created" by Dombo.

1. See above pp. 35-43.
The above reconstruction means that we will be left with an important, but unidentified period in Karanga history which comes before the setting up of the Mutapa empire in about 1440. From archaeological evidence this empire must have been centred on "Great Zimbabwe". Until more work has been done on this, it appears that this kingdom can only be identified at present as the "Zimbabwe Kingdom", in order to avoid confusing it with the Mutapa, Togwa, and Rozvi kingdoms.

We know very few names and incidents connected with the Togwa rulers of Butua. From Alcaçova we know something about the first Togwa Changamire and much less about his son and kinsman 'Toloa' who were still fighting the Munhumutapa in 1506. Another name we have encountered is that of 'Burrom' (Boroma). Abraham says that Boroma was driven out by the first Changamire who had given him charge over the central provinces (Mbire). At this time Togwa was responsible for the southern provinces of Butua. This

1. For what amounts to a revolution in the archaeological interpretation of the Rhodesian Iron Age see P.S. Garlake, "Rhodesian Iron Age dating by ceramics" in J.A.H., vol. IX, No. 1, 1968, pp. 13-33. Garlake convincingly demonstrates that Great Zimbabwe passed its zenith by the end of the 14th century. Since that was before the foundation of the Mutapa empire (c. 1440) who then was responsible for the Zimbabwe "golden age"? The simple answer is that at present we don't know. All we can postulate is that it may have been the ancestors of the Mutapa empire i.e. the early Karanga/Mbire people.
3. See above p. 56 note 1.
interpretation means that Boroma was ruling sometime before 1494, i.e. the death of the first Changamire. But we know that J. de Barros started writing his Da Asia only after 1532 when he was appointed factor of India house. He writes of 'Burrom' (Boroma) as the ruler of the district called 'Toroa' (Togwa) "which by another name is known as the kingdom of Butua" and from his description of what appears to have been the Great Zimbabwe it is clear that Burrom was ruler not only of Mbire but of the so-called southern provinces of Butua as well. The only recorded reference to Burrom clearly suggests that he was a 16th century rather than 15th century ruler of Butua as Abraham says. But the reference Abraham cited about Boroma (the document spells the name Boloma) can hardly be said to fit in with De Barros's Burrom, because the reference in question clearly shows that the Selukwe Boloma was removed either at the time of Dombo I or after him.

There is of course the story of the Togwa ruling 1644 who has come down to us as the man whom Sisnando Dias Bayão defeated.

2. Abraham, D.P., "'Chaminuka' and Nhondoro Cults" in The Zambesian Past, op. cit., p. 35, footnote 5. Abraham gives reference N3/33/8, 'The Abelozwi (Barozwi)' in the Rhodesian archives as his archival source for the reference to Boroma. But the reference in question states categorically that the first Rozvi Mambo was Dombo. Its Mambo list is all of the descendants of Dombo. The Boloma (the text calls him "a petty chief named Boloma") was a ruler in Selukwe area. Boloma was punished because he is said to have allowed chief Mhema to settle in the former's country without informing the Mambo.
Briefly what the sources say is that when Sisnando was at Manyika in 1644 the then Togwa in Butua was ousted from power by his younger brother at the instigation of the Moors. The ousted Togwa sent a delegation to the Capitão of Manyika asking the latter to re-establish trading relations with Butua and of course to help the former regain his throne. Sisnando thought this was a golden opportunity to open up relations with Butua and so he decided to go to the deposed Togwa's help. With the help of the remnants of Sisnando's army, many having deserted or died on the way, the old Togwa regained his throne. Bayão then left the king with a garrison while he himself returned to the Rivers to get reinforcements from Moçambique, which in the end did not come. For the above achievement Prof. Boxer described Sisnando Dias Bayão as 'Conquistador da "Mae de Ouro"'. But Harold von Sicard disagrees with Boxer's claim that Sisnando Dias Bayão went and fought the Togwa in Butua. He argues that the distance and time factors involved were such as to make the episode impossible. Dr. Newitt re-evaluating the argument has pointed out the factual errors in

1. Father Gomes tells us that the people of Butua had stopped trading with the Portuguese at the instigation of the Moors, "Viagem que fez... "; STUDIA, op. cit., p. 197.
von Sicard's reply to Boxer. Essentially this can be summed up as (a) the identification of Gobira,¹ (b) indicating the existence of many more documents connected with the story of Sisnando Dias Bayão i.e. records and documents on the great prazo of Chiringoma.

Von Sicard's argument about Sisnando's expedition to Butua hinges on the assumption that the war was fought at or near Great Zimbabwe. And if this was so, argued Sicard, then the distance would have been too great to be covered in the time at bayão's disposal since his expedition seems to have taken no more than three to four months. As we have shown Dr. Nevitt's objection to the inclusion of Great Zimbabwe and districts as far as the Sabi

¹ H. von Sicard's discussion of Gobira is the least helpful part of his argument. There is no doubt that the Gobira meant in Manuel Barretto is the same place as the prazo Gobira in Kiteve. Von Sicard's report of what his driver, Obadia Ngara, told him in 1948 (p.182) shows that either Obadia Ngara had not the faintest idea of his own clan and sense of geography or simply that von Sicard misrepresented what he said. First of all, the 'Ngara' people of Gokomere, i.e. Chief Zimuto, are not 'Vambire' but 'Vagovera'; secondly, Gokomere is not a hill in the land of the Portuguese but in Rhodesia ten miles north of Fort Victoria. Thirdly, there is no hill or place called Govera opposite Gokomere, but about 30-40 miles north of Gokomere hill are the hills of Govere's country ('Makomo a Govere=the hills (mountains) of Govere). This writer is of the same clan as Sicard's informant and comes from Gokomere.
into Butua of the 17th century, is not valid. This means von Sicard's question about the distance and time involved still remains unanswered. We have read from Frei Gaspar de Macedo that it took about six days journey from Manyika before entering Butua. Since we have argued, and von Sicard does not disagree, that Sabi was the eastern boundary of Butua it means Sisnando would have taken about the same time to reach the Sabi area. But we hear that when Sisnando arrived at the place where he fought the ruler of Butua some of his troops had fled and others had died on the way. If all this happened within six days as von Sicard implied by suggesting that Sisnando only helped a Hera chief in the Sabi area, then Sisnando's army was a very strange collection of men indeed. In the eighteenth century we are told that it used to take one month for a caravan of traders to go from Manyika to Vurozvi where the capital of the Changamire was. Elsewhere in here we read that the capital of the Changamire in the 18th century was sometimes at Khami and at other times at Dhlo Dhlo and also Manyanga (Taba Zika Mambo). Great Zimbabwe is nearer to

1. See above pp. 44-46 Dr. Newitt appears to be arguing that because Butua is given by Fr. Conceição in 1696 as following after Chitomborwizi this somehow implied that Butua did not extend as far south as beyond the Great Zimbabwe and as far east as the Sabi which Sicard's map seemed to claim. Our own position is nearer to Sicard's on this point.
2. See above p. 45.
Manyika than Khami. If a caravan of traders took a month to reach Vurozvi how long could an army in a hurry carrying, not artillery, but muskets and directed by the messengers of the old Togwa have taken to reach Great Zimbabwe (if that was indeed the place they had to reach)? It would have been a very slow army if it took much more than twenty to thirty days. Considering that Bayão left without much of his army is it surprising that he reached Ruhanje when he did? Two to three months seems to be the time needed by Bayão to do what he did without even straining his army. Mere speculation of the time and distance Bayão needed, especially when it can be shown that their importance has been greatly exaggerated, should not be used to disapprove all the documents at our disposal. There probably should be no doubt at the moment that Sisnando helped the king of Butua to regain his throne. However what is questionable is whether it is proper to describe him as the conqueror of Butua. This was not exactly a conquest of Butua by Sisnando Dias Bayão. There was no act of vassalage to the king of Portugal by the ruler of Butua as had happened with the Munhumutapa, Kiteve and Chikanga.

1. In view of Garlake's article in J.A.H., vol. 9, No. 1, 1968, pp. 13-33, op. cit., it may well be that by 1644-5 the centre of the Togwa kingdom had moved to Khami. In which case Sisnando may have reached Khami.
After the story of Siamando there is very little else we know about the Togwas of Butua except that in 1683 it was said that the Togwa had trading relations with some Portuguese traders. This contact may have been with Manyika Feira, since we know that in 1635 Frei Gaspar de Macedo wrote about Butua traders going to the Feira of Manyika. After the 1683 reference the next we hear of Butua was in 1684 when a "black man calling himself king" in Butua began harassing the Portuguese of the Rivers of Sena. With that announcement, we are introduced to the advent of a new era in the history of Mukaranga while at the same time witnessing the end of Portuguese aggressiveness in that country for the next two centuries. Dombo has now entered the stage.

3. See below, p. 75; and A.H.U. Av. de Moc., Cx. 2, Sena, 24/7/1685, Caetano de Mello de Castro to king.
Chapter Two

1

DOMBO: ORIGINS AND WARS

The origins of Dombo must remain buried somewhere with his bones in the land of Manyika where he died in 1695. Contemporary and 18th century Portuguese sources insist that Dombo was a herdman of Munhumutapa who later rebelled against his master and proceeded to conquer Vurozvi for himself. To the Portuguese, Dombo was a usurper. The Mutapa traditions as published by Abraham seem to be pre-occupied with the Togwa Changamire who died around 1494. But the Rozvi traditions do not so much as mention the usurpation of Dombo. The Rozvi often present their first ruler as a conquering hero who either came from south of the Limpopo or North of the Zambezi.

1. See below, p. 73, note 2.
2. See below, p. 86.
4. For Mutapa and Rozvi traditions see Appendix C.
5. Robinson, NADA, 1957, op. cit., p. 81; Fortune, NADA, 1956, op. cit., p. 70; and Hist. Mss. Misc./RU4/1/1, Salisbury archives, Rukara Account. These, among others, postulate a southern origin before entry into Rhodesia. They claim that the Rozvi ancestors came along the Indian Ocean and landed near present day Durban in South Africa before trekking northwards towards Rhodesia. For the north of the Zambezi origin before entering Rhodesia see N3/33/8, 'The Abelozwi (Barozwi)', Salisbury Archives; Marodzi, "The Barozwi" in NADA, No. 2, 1924, p. 88.
When, at the coming of the Rozvi, the Mutapa is mentioned he is either presented as having been a priest or servant or as a brother of the first Rozvi ruler. In any case the Mutapas quickly disappear from the scene. In this respect Sebina's solution to the usurpation of Dombo is most interesting. According to Sebina at first the rulers of the Makalaka (Karanga) were known as Munhumutapas but after a time it was just decided to call them Mambos. Some Rozvi traditions try to synchronize the Togwa dynasty with that of the Rozvi. Togwa is given in one tradition as a name of a specific Rozvi Ruler. The origins of the first Rozvi ruler are so often shrouded in mystification that, it may be strongly suspected that historical amnesia is being deliberately imposed in order to hide something - which in view of the contemporary Portuguese sources would probably be the fact that Dombo was a usurper. Whether Dombo was a Togwa or Mutapa vassal before his usurpation we do not know. But all Portuguese sources insist on Dombo's already mentioned Mutapa connections. This may only reflect the views of the Portuguese informants in which case it may or may not be true. What is certain is that Dombo was interested in the Togwa throne. And that was what he got. Although the Mutapa throne was within his power in

1. Nenguwo, S., "Oral work among the Rozvi", op. cit., p. 3.
1695 he did not take it. The apparent disappearance of the Togwa dynasty after 1683 makes it difficult for us to reconstruct the actual story of Dombo's usurpation. However the usurpation probably took place between about 1683 and 1684. But because of the power he so quickly commanded we may not be far from the truth if we imagine that he must have started building his power base sometime before that. One tradition speaks of his spies and subordinates who visited and settled before him in those lands he intended to conquer. Portuguese sources corroborate this. As to the reasons for his usurpation we have very little concrete evidence since we know virtually nothing of the internal situation in Butua at that time. But if Dombo's immediate actions after his usurpation are anything to go by then the anti-Portuguese policies he followed might indicate that he represented the anti-Portuguese faction in Butua; and anti-Portuguese feeling may well have been responsible for his usurpation. This is reminiscent of another usurpation in Butua in 1644 at the time of Sisnando Dias Bayão when a pro-Moor and pro-Portuguese factions were fighting for the Togwa throne.

There are at least two or three ways in which Dombo could conceivably have seized the Togwa throne. The first is to see Dombo as belonging to a junior house of the Togwa dynasty or rather

1. See below, p. 75.
2. The last documentary reference to Togwa as rulers of Butua was dated 16/3/1683 but the first known reference to Changamire, i.e. Dombo was 26/6/1684.
5. See above, pp. 61-64.
a house which had been left out and hence disqualified from succession years before Dombo. This is a very attractive hypothesis in that it may in fact be used to present Dombo as a descendant of the first Togwa Changamire (c.1490-1494) whose throne was usurped by the junior Togwa ("Toloa") of Alcaçova. A second hypothesis is to see Dombo as coming from a house that had certain functions, say religious or military like the Mabvuzi or Tumbare families had in the Rozvi empire during the 18th century. This would have provided Dombo with a base from which to depose the Togwa kings in order to rally the kingdom to resist Portuguese encroachment into Butua during the late 17th century. Again it is possible to see Dombo as some kind of military adventurer or 'condottiere-like figure' who grew famous or notorious as a cattle robber or cattle keeper in the lands of Mbire i.e. near the borders of the Mutapa and Togwa kingdoms. And from his vantage position he would have been able to have an interest both in the Togwa and Mutapa kingdoms. In this position he would have felt strongly the threat from the Portuguese adventurers into Rimuka. All three hypotheses are attractive in their own ways. But all are equally difficult to establish. There is the possibility that Dombo may well have been all three things in one i.e. descendant of Togwa Changamire (1494) with a Tumbare-like function in the Togwa kingdom

and living in Mbire where through his cattle rearing he became a famous warrior leader. All this is speculation. Documents however bear out that Dombo was a cattle keeper, living in Mbire or lands bordering on Butua. And from Mbire he went to conquer the Togwa kingdom. The documents also tell us about Dombo's bellicose nature and military virtues. All this information at least suggests that our third hypothesis concerning Dombo's origin may contain some elements that are not too far from the truth.

Soon after his usurpation Changamire Dombo launched vigorous wars of conquest in which he threw the whole of Mukaranga and Rios de Cuama into turmoil. Summing up the causes of these wars the viceroy said "From all who write to me from the Rivers it is agreed that it was the insolences of our people that caused these wars, because those who wield power and possess Africans commit such excesses that the kings and princes provoked burst out in these disorders. Everybody in the Rivers wants to rule". Father Manuel Barretto wrote that the Portuguese prazeros were "more powerful than the King of Mokaranga himself", and that these prazeros used to commit such "thefts and violence" that the people lived in fear. If the prazeros heard that gold was to be found in any

place they would go in and buy the land. For these reasons the African rulers in the Rios de Cuama, as a matter of policy, had decided against giving information about mines to the Portuguese. Yet by the last quarter of the 17th century the Portuguese traders had not only built feiras at Chitombokorwizi, Hwanga (Angwa or Ongoe) and Rimuka (Maramuca) but, according to Manuel Barretto, some owned land as far as Rimuka. These were either on the borders of Butua or within Butua itself. Rimuka as has been suggested elsewhere may have been within Butua. Joining Angola and Moçambique by land was a Portuguese ambition which was as old as the history of the Portuguese settlement in that area. Portuguese expansion into the interior and the activities of the Portuguese nationals in later 17th century Mukaranga must, no doubt, be one of the strongest reasons why Dombo attacked the Portuguese in Mukaranga. Dombo’s attacks were directed against the Portuguese and their supporters - Indians and Africans. Dombo, deposed the

1. J. Dos Santos, "Ethiopia Oriental", R.S.E.A., vol. 7, pp. 280-281, "The reason of this severity is that Monomotapa does not wish the Portuguese to know that there are such large gold mines in his country, that they may not make war upon him through greed of them, and take the kingdom"; Manuel Barretto, "Informação..." in Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 3, op. cit., pp. 490-491; See also Ignacio Caetano Xavier's "Notícias dos Dominios Portuguezes na Costa de Africa Oriental", Relações, op. cit., p. 155, for evidence of a Kiteve who was killed by his own subjects because he wanted eleven mines—of gold to be opened in his kingdom; also on Kiteve, Ajuda, 51 - VII - 34, fl. 46, Mossambique, 3/8/1698, Pedro Coelho de Carvalho.

2. For Portuguese activities in the late 17th century and how Gonçalo João got the lands of Rimuka from Munhumutapa see Manuel Barretto, "Informação..." in Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 3, op. cit., pp. 484-486, and 482-3; see also Abraham's "Maramuca", op. cit.

3. See above p. 44.
ruling Chikanga and supported the usurper Nyakunembiri to the Mutapa throne. It is interesting to note that we do not hear of Dombo expelling the moors from Mukaranga. If in 1644 the Portuguese felt that the throne of Butua was regained by a ruler who had suffered under a moorish conspiracy, after 1683 they had no doubt that the throne was occupied by an enemy of theirs. Had Dombo not removed the Portuguese from Mukaranga soon after his usurpation, who can tell whether 1644 (when the deposed Togwa appealed to Sisnando to help him regain his throne) would not have been repeated? Also Dombo might have wanted to divert attention from his usurpation by fighting an unpopular foreign element in Mukaranga.

If political motives could be read as part of the causes of the wars of Changamire Dombo the economic advantages accruing to the Rozvi-Changamire as a result of the wars strongly suggest that financial gain was not outside the motivation of the wars. As a result of these wars the Rozvi Changamires controlled almost all the good cattle and agricultural lands as well as the gold producing areas of Mukaranga. As a result of this the greater part of the trade of Rios de Cuama henceforth depended on the goodwill of the Changamires. And as will be shown in Chapter Five, the Changamires changed the trading system in Mukaranga to their advantage.

Besides these important considerations of state it may be that the character of Dombo himself contributed towards a war-

2. See below, pp. 78-79.
policy. Fr. Conceição remarked on Dombo's "bellicose spirit"; the "Corografica" speaks of his being carried away by "an arrogant spirit and ambition"; and oral tradition remembers Dombo as a "vain and cruel" but "able ruler".

In discussing the sources of Portuguese power in the 17th century we have seen how difficult it was for that power to be effectively mobilized in defence of Portuguese national interests. We have read of all the complaints against the lawlessness of the prazeros as well as the good intentions of the Portuguese crown to have them controlled. To this must be added the fact that although the Portuguese had fire arms, technologically they were not much superior to the Africans.

Just as the Portuguese settlers had exploited the weakness and divisions among the Africans in the 17th century in order to increase their power, so also the Changamires were to profit from the disorganized nature and lawlessness of the Portuguese settlers in the latter part of the 17th century.

2. Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 145; N3/33/8, "The Abelozi (Barozwi)", Salisbury Archives. It is said that when an attempted assassination of Dombo was foiled, he gave himself the surname "Dombo Rakona Chimwanga tumuro Wuchawingeni", "Rock that defeated a hoe", Fact and Fiction. In Doc. N3/33/8, it is given as "Dombo Lakona Tschingwangwa dimuro lisatshitini" - "Oh Rock who hast stood firm against the Hoes! - how shall axes smite thee?" This may even suggest that "Dombo" may not have been his original name but a nickname. Only further research could enlighten us on this.
But how was Dombo able to fight such wars for so long a period? It is not easy to discover how he was able to marshal the forces he used to overrun the whole of Mukaranga. So little is known of what was happening inside Butua itself in the 17th century and much less of the coming to power of Dombo that it is virtually impossible to establish exactly the basis of Dombo's power at the time. But a knowledge of the nature of Rozvi power at its height should also enable us to get a general idea of what Rozvi power might have been at its inception. The basis of Rozvi power as will be shown in Chapter Three was considerable. Although Dombo, in the 1680s and 1690s could not have commanded as much power as his descendants did at the height of the empire, there can be no doubt from his achievements that his power was considerable. Also the wealth of Butua in agriculture and especially in cattle, with which Dombo was associated with in Portuguese documents must have been important sources of influence. We have already suggested that cattle may well have been a key factor in the rise of Dombo.

Apparently Dombo began his wars of conquest in the Southern provinces. The reason why it seems likely that Dombo began by fighting in the south is that after the commencement of his wars against the Portuguese he could not afford to relax his vigilance on his northern borders, as the Portuguese had only been wounded.

1. See above, pp. 50-57 and also Chapter Three.
2. This is implicit in all those who say that the Rozvi came from the south rather than the north. See above pp. 65 note 5.
but not destroyed in 1684. It would appear that his reputation already known by the time he fought at Mahungwe, may have been built partly on his southern campaigns. This means that the traditional view (Conceição, Corografica etc.) that Dombo began fighting from the north into Butua may in fact not be correct. We have no details about the actual execution of these campaigns. Dombo's attack on the Portuguese began at the Battle for Mahungwe, which took place before June 1684. An insight into Dombo's remarkable military talents and ability to organize is provided by his conduct of the Battle for Mahungwe. The importance of this Battle to the Portuguese is underlined by the fact that Caetano de Mello de Castro, then governor of Moçambique and the Rivers, himself, "for that engagement marshalled all the resources of those Rivers". The battle was joined and raged all day; the bow and arrow against the arquebus. On four or five occasions Dombo's army nearly routed the Portuguese forces. But the Portuguese exploited to the full the known advantage of the arquebus over the bows and arrows. By late afternoon the Portuguese had inflicted heavy casualties on Dombo's army. In response to this situation Dombo issued the following orders:— (a) no one was to retreat from battle during daylight; (b) the women who, it appeared,
always accompanied the Africans, were ordered to cut as much firewood as they could. These orders were immediately put into operation. Father Conceição conceded that "in being so well obeyed by his men (Dombo) enjoyed a great advantage over us (Portuguese)". Evening fell with the battle undecided. The Portuguese forces, unaware of the problems of Dombo's army, held a council of war which resolved that their men should camp in the battle field awaiting the enemy until the following morning. At one, in the morning the Portuguese found themselves suddenly surrounded by fires made from the wood which the women had cut during the battle. The impact was instant. The African troops fighting on the Portuguese side "and some who were not African (i.e. Portuguese), just like the Midianites at the sight of Gideon's torches, went into a disorderly flight; and it was a good thing that the enemy had already withdrawn as nobody would have escaped." Commenting on Dombo's tactics on this occasion Father Conceição ruefully wrote, "He was so wily and cunning that after being defeated by our arms, he vanquished us with his stratagems". At day break Dombo's army collected prizes from the Portuguese Camp. Since his army had suffered so many casualties the previous day, so Fr. Conceição thought, Dombo did not deem it

2. Ibid., p. 106, para. 107; see also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 2, Senna, 24/7/1685, Caetano de Mello de Castro to king.
advisable to pursue the Portuguese. Conceição does not give us the real reason why Dombo did not pursue the Portuguese. But in a letter of Caetano de Mello de Castro we are told that the Munhumutapa had at that very time tried to cut off Dombo from the rear by attacking "the lands of AButua where this black man (Dombo) called himself king". Dombo returned to Butua where he inflicted a shattering blow on the army of the Munhumutapa. Some Portuguese living in Mukaranga as well as all the grandees of Munhumutapa and about five thousand African soldiers of the Munhumutapa were said to have been killed on that occasion. Before Changamire Dombo returned to his kingdom he had thrown Mukaranga and the Rivers into turmoil and caused untold destruction. It was on such achievements that the reputation of the invincibility of the Changamires was to be nourished in the future. Already Dombo was so much feared that the Africans in the Portuguese army trembled "only at the mention of his (Dombo) name".

After that Dombo lingered in the country between Manyika and the Feiras of Mukaranga, replenishing his army. In June 1684 C. de Mello de Castro was writing to the viceroy of the frantic

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 2, Senna, 24/7/1685, Caetano de Mello de Castro to king.
2. Ibid., and Ajuda, 51-VII-34, fl. 50, Senna, 27/6/1698, written by the clerk Manoel Robello on behalf of the inhabitants of Sena. Paper entitled "Proposta que fizerão os Moradores dos Rios de Cuama ao Senhor V. Rey". Summarises the Wars of Dombo and has proposals for the conquest of Butua made to the V. Rey by the settlers of Sena.
efforts being made at Manyika to fortify the Feira. For some reason Dombo did not attack Manyika in 1684. Possibly he needed more time to replenish his forces. In 1685 Caetano de Mello de Castro after describing the events of 1684 informed the viceroy that, Dombo had "many kings and chiefs" still under his command and as such continued to pose problems for the Portuguese. But a letter of April 1694 shows that after the 1684 campaign against the Portuguese Dombo did not attack the Portuguese positions again until 1693. It would appear that between 1685-1692 Dombo was consolidating his position in Butua. About 1692 Nyakunembiri (Nhacunimbiri) seized the throne of Munhumutapa from its rightful successor Prince Nyamaende Mhonde, (Dom Pedro) a good friend of the Portuguese. Nyakunembiri being aware of his precarious position, appealed to Changamire Dombo to attack the Dambarare traders on the pretext, it is said, of avenging some offence done to the former by those traders. There can be little doubt that Dombo's motives for fighting on this occasion were no different from those of 1684. All that was different was the pretext for the fighting. In November 1693 "Changamira, for the second occasion descended on these feiras of the Rivers" beginning with Dambarare.

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 2, Sena, 24/7/1685, Caetano de Mello de Castro to King.
4. Ibid.; See also Conceição, op. cit., p. 106, para. 109.
There were altogether about sixty people at Dambarare comprising Indians, Africans, Whites, some women and two religious of St. Dominic. The feira was without proper defences and so some of the "moradores" grouped for the fight in the house of one Antonio Rebello the richest trader at the feira. Once again Changamire and his men proved that they earned their description as the "inimigos do sangue Portugues". Not a soul escaped at Dambarare.

The Changamire's men destroyed the church, profaned holy vessels, desecrated the sacred images and any other holy article they could lay their hands on. Changamire, it is said, had the two dead Dominicans and other Portuguese flayed and their skins displayed at the head of his army so as to strike terror into the Portuguese followers. He disinterred the bones of the dead Portuguese and prepared with them a medicine which he told his men would make them invincible against the Portuguese. This was much in line with his reputation as "a most skilled wizard".

When these reports reached the 'moradores' i.e. Portuguese and Indians of Hwangwa and some Indian traders living at Chitombo-rwizi they all fled to the Zimbabwe of the Emperor Munhumutapa where the 'Capitão Mor', Manoel Pires Saro was scheming to murder the emperor Nyakunembiri. But Manoel Pires Saro found it hard to accomplish his designs in time as Nyakunembiri was able to

2. Conceição, op. cit., p. 105, para. 104.
receive aid from the Changamire before help could be sent from Tete for Pires Saro. Instead Pires Saro safely retreated to Tete, thanks to Chief Gocha, who contrary to the orders of Nyakunembiri that he should intercept Pires Saro, allowed the latter safe passage through his lands. It may well be that Dombo destroyed Massapa and caused the abandonment of the other feiras of Mukaranga (Matafunya, Luanze or Ruhanje) between the time he came to the aid of Nyakunembiri November/December 1693 and the year (1695) he destroyed the Feira of Manyika.

In December 1693 all these sad reports reached the 'Capitão Mor' of the Rivers, Manoel de Tavora e Sampaio a settler of Sena who had already tasted the power and cunning of Changamire Dombo at the battle for Mahungwe. Tavora e Sampaio quickly sent "patamares" to Thome de Sousa, the governor of Moçambique asking him to send him soldiers and musket balls and any other forms of help he could give. But before the help from Moçambique arrived Prince D. Pedro (Nyamaende Mhande), a son of Nukombokwe and legitimate heir to the throne of Munhumutapa saw his opportunity to regain his father's throne. He left the land near Manyika where he was living and together with his brother Chirimbe and a force of four to five hundred Africans he came to Tete and visited the Capitão Mor of

2. For evidence that Dombo destroyed the Feira of Massapa see Ajuda, 51-VII-34, fl. 37, Frei Phelipe de Assumpção.
3. Ibid.; Also Axelson, E., S.E. Africa 1600-1700, op. cit., p. 103. These sources show evidence of the existence of the above mentioned Feiras.
the Rivers of Sena, in the hope of joining hands with the Portuguese in order to fight Nyakunembiri. It was agreed that their forces should converge at a certain place known as Chambo. But as it turned out Tete would not send help to the appointed place within the seventeen days agreed upon. The moradores of Tete said they could not go to Chambo because this entailed crossing the lands of "strong and war-like Africans". The Capitão Mor of the Rivers and the men from Sena went to Chambo to meet Mhande. At Chambo the men from Sena lost a lot of Africans while fighting the Mangas (Mongas?). In the end partly because of a shortage of ammunition the 'Capitão Mor' and the men from Sena returned to Sena in May 1694, leaving behind Mhande and his men. The only achievement of the Portuguese forces which had gone to Chambo according to Father Conceição was that they were able to retreat in an orderly manner "which was no small Divine mercy bestowed on our Africans".

Arriving at Sena they found the help which had been requested from Moçambique by Manoel de Tavora e Sampaio. This consisted of thirty Portuguese soldiers and their officers of whom Theodozio Francisco de Sousa was Captain. They brought sufficient powder and bullets but the musket balls were too big. They also carried a hundred bares of cloth, "the money with which to pay for the war", and some more powder, balls and guns which were spontaneously

2. Conceição, op. cit., p. 108, para. 115; gives the figure of thirty soldiers with their officers. But in Memoria e Docs. acerca... Machona e Nyassa, op. cit., p. 127, viceroy to king, 23/9/1694, gives the figure as 35 not counting the officers.
donated by the merchants of Moçambique and some of those from India.

Manoel Pires Saro, owing to lack of provisions, could not bring help to Mhande, who had to defend himself against the hostile Mongas around Chambo. Mhande sought refuge with the widow of Francisco Pinheiro, who lived with her sons in the lands of Nhabazoe. Not long after this, news was received that the emperor Nyakunembiri had granted the lands of Nhabazoe to one of his grandees who was already on his way with sufficient forces to take possession of the said lands. The widow of Francisco Pinheiro de Faria brought together all her slaves and people and those of her uncle Pedro Gonçalves Pinhão and put them under the command of Mhande. Prince Mhande was able to defeat the approaching army with the forces at his disposal. From his captives he was able to learn, that Nyakunembiri had fallen out with Dombo and so Dombo had no intention of descending with help to the Zimbabwe of Nyakunembiri. Mhande to be safe, decided to station his forces at mount Chiquiziri, lying between Dambarare and the Zimbabwe of Nyakunembiri so as to make sure that the forces of Changamire and Nyakunembiri would not be united again. When the residents of Tete saw the new turn events had taken, they decided to exploit the situation by joining forces with Mhande. Since the Africans of the Portuguese were too exhausted to undertake a new expedition a company of Portuguese men under the command of Francisco Machando Tavares was sent to Mhande. This force had to pass through the
lands of the powerful chief Gocha and as surety of his good faith
Gocha offered one of his sons to Prince Mhande. Soon afterwards
another force under Joseph de Affonsoeca Coutinho, then Capitão Mor
of the Rivers arrived at Tete from Sena. This too had to pass
through the lands of Gocha. As a further sign of his good faith
he sent his wives to the Portuguese army. All was now set for the
attack of the Zimbabwe of Nyakunembiri. But all this preparation
was unnecessary for at the sight of the on-coming forces Nyakunembiri
panicked and fled without resistance, it was "mainly seven or eight
Africans of Changamire who were the only ones to take up their
bows". Mhande took possession of the Zimbabwe and with due
ceremony was declared emperor Munhumutapa.

Nyakunembiri took refuge with the Changamire who was at this
very time at Mahungwe poised between Dambarare and Masekesi
(Massequeça) with such a mighty force that both places were in a
state of constant fear. Although it was within Dombo's power to
restore Nyakunembiri to the throne of Munhumutapa, the former,
among other reasons, was too pre-occupied with his moves against
Manyika to be bothered. Dombo's attitude to the Mutapa throne
was rather puzzling. In 1684 he slaughtered many of Mutapa
Mukombwe's people but did not take over the crown. And in 1693
although he helped Nyakunembiri, he did not demand that Mutapas

1. Conceição, op. cit., p. 109, para. 122; See also B.M.
   Add. Mss. 20903, fls. 261-2, Goa, 23/9/1694; V. Roy to king.
2. Conceição, op. cit., p. 110, para. 124.
become his vassals. Dombo's successors do not appear to have demanded vassalage from Mutapas although they sometimes intervened in the Mutapa succession disputes in favour of their own candidates. It would seem that the Rozvi Mambos out of policy did not want to add to their kingdom an ancient and proud throne which had precious little left that was valuable except its name and a Portuguese garrison to keep the puppet emperors in step. After Dambarare and the gold areas had been won, the Mutapa kingdom was no economic asset but a potential political liability.

Amidst all this there arrived at Moçambique a new governor, D. Estevão Joseph da Gama, son of the Marques de Niza, in March 1695. While preparing to restore the Rivers and to conquer Butua he died. Joseph de Affonseca Coutinho as Tenente General succeeded him. But at the beginning of July news reached Sena that Changan­
mire Dombo had erased the Feira of Masekesi and was now lord of

1. Hist. Mss. Misc./RU4/1/1, Rukara account. Rukara claims that the first Rozvi Mambo treated the Munhumutapa as his vassal and from Rukara's account it would appear that the Mutapa did not resent this until the death of the first Rozvi Mambo. As Rukara puts it, the Rozvi Mambo sent word to Mutapa saying "I am here" i.e. summoning him to his presence, "and he (Mutapa) came and ombera (did homage) Changamire Chirimunava". If we consider Rukara's claim in the context of Dombo's relationship to Nyakunembiri then it may well be that Rukara's statement is not all that far from the truth.

Manyika. And before all this was over it was rumoured that Dombo was on his way to attack Sena in order to seize the cloth in the factory there. There was great pandemonium as a wall could not be built round the city in time. The residents of Sena blocked the ends of the streets and mounted guns at the gates. There was a lack of provisions and a shortage of balls. At this very time word had also reached Sofala that Changamire was in fact pursuing some of the Portuguese who were fleeing from Manyika. There was great confusion at Sofala as people were urging the Captain of Sofala to abandon the fortress and take refuge on the island of Luabo. But it was soon realized that Changamire had in fact no such intentions. Attention among the Portuguese was turned towards Sena which was assumed to be Changamire’s target. There is another fascinating Portuguese legend in the "Discripção Corográfica" which says that Sena

1. The "Corográfica" gives as the reason of Dombo’s attack on Masekesi an interesting story. It says that a custom had been established whereby the Cap. Mor of Masekesi had to send presents (tribute) of cloth to the Changamire every year so as to be allowed to trade in freedom. However, for some years this tribute was not paid. Changamire sent his envoys to collect the tribute. But instead of paying the tribute the Cap. Mor whipped the Changamire’s envoys. Yet the "prudent king" sent another embassy. This second embassy fared no better. The ears of the ambassadors were cut off and these ambassadors were also thoroughly lashed. This, says the "Corográfica" was the cause of the great war in which Masekesi was razed to the ground. Manuel Galvão da Silva says that those whipped by the Cap. Mor were sons of Changamire. Even if this tradition, collected about a hundred years after the event, were correct, it is most improbable that Dombo’s motives in attacking Masekesi were any different from his other general motives for dislodging the Portuguese from Mukaranga. It is anyhow very doubtful that the Portuguese at Manyika were already paying protection fee (tribute) to the Changamire before 1695.

was saved by the inhabitants of Zomba, who ambushed the Rozvi army on its way towards Sena. This ambush is said to have destroyed the major part of the Rozvi army so that the remaining section retreated towards Manyika. It is important to point out that this tradition collected a hundred years after the event has no confirmation in contemporary records. All that Father Conceição, himself at Sena at the time, says is that the threat to Sena disappeared when the death of Changamire Dombo was announced to the residents of Sena at the beginning of January 1696. Considering the detailed manner in which Father Conceição, Fr. Assumpção and other contemporaries reported the wars of Changamire it would be very strange indeed that they did not mention what would have been the only heroic Portuguese episode against the forces of Changamire Dombo.

The whole question of the supposed attack on Portuguese settlements in the crown lands by Dombo's men before 1696 warrants a further comment. Roger Summers has produced a much publicized map of the Rozvi empire at the height of its power which purports to show Rozvi attacks on Tete (1693), Sena (1693) and Sofala (1695). The evidence on which Summers based his map

1. —Lobato, A., Evolução Administrativa e Econômica de Moçambique 1752-1763, 1957, p. 63. Lobato thinks that by Zomba the writer meant Zumbo. This is rather unlikely because Zumbo was probably not founded by then (see Chapter Four). Besides Zumbo would have been too far from Sena to be in a position to assist. However, may be there is no reason to read the name as Zumbo because not far from was a little place called Zomba in KiteVe's Kingdom.

is not published. But all our attempts to establish the bases of Summers' claims from the lengthy reports written by men who were then at Sena and Sofala has yielded not one piece of evidence to support Summers's dates. The documents however only seem to bear out that rumours were spread that Sena and Sofala were in danger from Dumbo but they also quickly add that all these rumours proved false. Professor Axelson's book on these events does not mention the attacks Roger Summers gives. Until Summers can establish his claims with documentary evidence, the attacks must be regarded as fictitious. However there is a disturbing statement in Axelson's book which says that in about 1693 Changamire's victorious forces flooded over the rest of Karangaland and over Portuguese estates to the VERY GATES OF TETE (my emphasis). Axelson gives two published sources for his statement but in neither of the two is there evidence to show that the Rozvi came anywhere near Tete. What these sources say is that the refugees, mainly those from Hwangwa and Chitomborwizi, fled to Tete. But whether these refugees were pursued by the Rozvi until "the very gates of Tete" the sources are silent. It is Professor Axelson's own interpretation. But as the evidence stands

1. Especially those documents in Ajuda, 51-VII-34, Senna, 27/6/1698, ffs. 50-52; "Proposta que fizerão os moradores dos Rios de Cuama ao Senhor V. Rei"; Mossambique, 3/8/1698, ffs. 46-47, "Papel da Noticia que deu da Fortaleza de Sofala", Pedro Coelho de Carvalho; There are also the reports of Fr. Conceição and that of Fr. Assumpção.
3. Ibid., p. 183.
we cannot agree even with Professor Axelsson's rather imprecise claim that the Rozvi forces came to the very gates of Tete.

When Dombo's death was announced the residents of Sena did not immediately believe these reports partly because it was too good to be true and partly because on some previous occasions false reports of the death of Dombo had been spread. However soon the army of Dombo disbanded as a result of a succession dispute among his "sons".

Before we discuss the continuation of the Rozvi wars it may be interesting to evaluate the achievements of the first Rozvi Changamire - Dombo I. In a period of about thirteen years the great Dombo had founded a new dynasty. He had brought the whole of Butua under his people's control. In a series of campaigns he is said to have made wars as far afield as Northern Transvaal and parts of present Botswana. By the time of his death he had liberated north and eastern Mukaranga (present Mashonaland) from Portuguese domination.

Dombo's skill as a military tactician was displayed at the battle of Mahungwe when he surrounded his enemies by fires at midnight. It was an imaginative device which could not have failed to achieve the desired result in the circumstances. The choice of

2. There are no Tswana and Venda traditions known to the writer to corroborate this information found in Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 145. But Doc. N3/33/8, "The Abesozwi (Barozvi)" says he raided the Venda and the Tswana. Even this seems to be a bit unlikely. If Dombo raided the Venda then probably it was some Venda who were still in Rhodesia at the time.
fighting the Portuguese first at Mahungwe instead of any other Portuguese settlement reveals Dombo as a military and a political strategist. In the first place Mahungwe was in the land of Makoni a traditional rival of Chikanga his nearest neighbour. This meant that co-operation between these two was rather unlikely. Munhumutapa was quite a distance from Mahungwe. Secondly we know from Father Manuel Barretto that as late as 1667 i.e. seventeen years before the battle for Mahungwe the kingdom of Mahungwe, was "in the possession of the Moors". Anti-Portuguese feeling must have been quite recent in Mahungwe. Mahungwe was a smaller Portuguese power base than Manyika, Dambarare of the Zimbabwe of the Munhumutapa. It was small in size. There is probably reason to believe that Dombo had politically prepared his ground in Mahungwe before he attacked for we do not hear of Makoni resisting Dombo as Munhumutapa Mukombwe did. Both Portuguese and oral tradition sources state that before attacking a place Dombo used to send spies to collect intelligence. Mahungwe seems to have been the best choice for someone who badly needed a psychological uplift among the other Africans to counterbalance the known advantage Portuguese fire-arms had in the minds of the people. Dombo himself seems to have done everything to create a myth of his own invincibility. His reputation as a

1. During the Shona rising in 1896-7 Mutapa the Manyika King refused to join the revolt mainly because his traditional rival, Makoni had joined, vide, T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7, p. 197.
3. See above, p. 68 notes 3 & 4.
great wizard, his skinning of Portuguese at Dambarare and then marching with his men carrying the Portuguese skins in front and the grinding of the bones of the dead Portuguese to make medicine can be read as attempts to instil terror into his enemies and confidence in his men. His "son" and successor too is said to have carried vessels full of oil which he claimed would kill any one he touched. In fact the magical powers of the Rozvi are littered throughout the traditions of the Shona people.

His political acumen is obvious first in that after he had realized that allowing the Portuguese a free hand in Mukaranga was incompatible with the full sovereignty of a ruler, he evicted them from the Mukaranga feiras - their power bases in Mukaranga. Similar political astuteness was displayed when he concentrated on taking only the agriculturally rich and gold producing regions of Manyika, Dambarare etc., while leaving the poorer Dande and Chidima areas under a shadowy Mutapa ruler, although it was in his power to take this also. This meant that his empire was not unnecessarily over-extended as the Mutapa empire had been at the time of Matopo. It also meant that the empire was composed of the hard core of maximum cultural affinity among the Karanga (Shona) peoples.

1. Ajuda, 51-VII-34, fl. 35, Goa, 12/12/1698, António Luís Gonçalves da Câmara Coutinho to King; Copy also in Memoria e Docs. acerca... Machona e Nyassa, op. cit., p. 129.
Finally his ability as commander and organiser is evidenced by his successes in war. The high morale and toughness displayed by his men even when the odds were against them is an indication of fighting experience they must have had and the inspirational qualities of Dombo. At Mahungwe none of his men would retreat despite heavy casualties, and when the Zimbabwe of Nyakunembiri was attacked by Mhonde it was only the seven or eight men of Changamire who were prepared to resist. In Chapter Three we shall read of the method and means of fighting of the dreaded Rozvi. Some of those innovations in fighting among the Rozvi may owe their origins to Dombo the man who destroyed the myths of the invincibility of the Portuguese fire-arms and Divine interventions on behalf of the Portuguese cause.

Compared to his successors, whose genius was displayed in the consolidation of Rozvi power by administrative and trading skills, Dombo seems to have been the most expansionist and militaristic of the Rozvi Mambos. This may be an unfair comment on the man because we have no indications of whether, after firmly establishing his dynasty, he might not have engaged in more peaceful pursuits. But as it is he died a dynamic, restless man of action. With the death of the colossus - Dombo - the tempo of fighting between the Portuguese and the successors of Dombo seems

to have been on a smaller scale. In fact the only war against
a ruling Mambo the writer has met has been in secondary works
not always very reliable. The other so-called wars of the
Changamires were in fact against various rulers in the Rivers
who may or may not have had the blessing of the ruling Changamire at the time. In 1698 the son and successor of Dombo
(Sababec or Negomo?) was feared by the Africans of the Portuguese
because he was believed to have had the ability to kill by simply
smearing some oil on any man. 'Sababec' was offering peace to
the Portuguese in 1698 but the Portuguese would not accept his
offer. He then left the north for Butua. In 1701 José da Fonseca
Coutinho, the governor of the Rivers of Sena, imprudently started
a war in Sofala. The reason for this war according to the king
of Portugal was that a king near Sofala had interfered with the
trade of José da Fonseca Coutinho who in order to be revenged,

1. Bordalo, F.M., Ensaios sobre a Estatistica de Moçambique e suas dependencias na Moçambique e suas dependencias na Costa Oriental da Africa ao Sul Equator, segunda serie, Livro Quarto, 1859, Lisboa, p. 38. Bordalo says Francisco Mascarenhas started a big war against the powerful Changamire in 1714. This point is repeated in O Território de Manica e Sofala ea administração da Companhia de Moçambique (1892-1900) by Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, 1902, p. 110. It claimed that "all or greater part" of the wars in the following years, 1701, 1708, 1710 and 1714, were against Changamire. But we argue in the text that probably all or most of those wars were not against Changamire.


fought, deposed and finally killed the said king. A brother
was put on the throne. Clearly then the war of Fonseca Coutinho
in 1701 could not be properly regarded as part of the wars of
Changamire. In 1703 according to J.J.T. Botelho, Dom João
Fernandes de Almeida established peace and order in the Rivers
of Sena. A gate at Sena carried an inscription saying that
D.J.F. de Almeida re-built the fort of S. Marcal at Sena in
1704. In 1706 de Almeida himself wrote to the king about the
war he carried on in the Rivers. In 1702 according to D.P. Abraham
Mutapa Nyadenga a supporter of the Portuguese was ousted by Dehwe
Samutumbu who was supported militarily by Changamire Negomo. But
if Bordalo can be relied upon in 1703 a Portuguese-backed Munhu-
mutapa was again occupying the throne by the help of Portuguese arms.

1. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 5, p. 7, letter of king to viceroy,
15/3/1702, also p. 13, letter of king to viceroy dated 19/1/1704
showing that Fonseca Coutinho forfeited his promotion from Tenente
to General of the Rivers because of the above incident.
2. Botelho, J.J.T., vol. 1, op. cit., p. 356; also Alcantara
Guerreiro, Quadros da Historia de Moçambique, vol. II, Lourenço
5. Abraham, "Chaminuka" in Zambesian Past, op. cit., pp. 43-44,
note 3.
6. Bordalo, op. cit., p. 119. Probably this Portuguese-backed
successor was "Ginde" who is said to have succeeded in 1707, see
Abraham, NADA, 1959, p. 81, see also Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 5,
p. 23, letter dated 16/8/1710; and pp. 34, 35 and 36, letter
dated 23/3/1712; also Arquivo Portugues Oriental, (Nova Edição),
IV-II-II, p. 164, 14/1/1709. V. Roy to king, mentions that the
Mutapa who had been put on the throne by the then Changamire had
been ousted.
It would appear that Fernandes de Almeida's campaign brought him into confrontation with the interest of Mambo Negomo in 1703. There is no evidence that the Portuguese forces actually fought against those of Negomo. What is clear is that neither the Portuguese nor their friendly Mutapa ever reconquered the lands that had been captured by Dombo.

In 1708 Inhapando (Nyamhandu) attacked the Portuguese lands near Tete. But by 1709 his army had been routed. This could not be described as a war made by the Changamire. However in 1714 we are told that the then Changamire "who had never abandoned the lands neighbouring on Sofala" renewed his attacks. Francisco Mascarenhas was killed during this war. We have said before that Dombo in fact never invaded or destroyed Sofala as J.J.T. Botelho, Bordalo and others say. To suggest then that Changamire had never abandoned Sofala since 1696 is incorrect. If there was war around Sofala in 1714 it would appear that some other chief was responsible and not the then Changamire. On the 3rd January 1715 the viceroy was already writing to the king informing him that peace had been made with Changamire. This means peace had been agreed on in the

Rivers sometime in 1714.

It would appear then that most of what are often called the wars of the Changamires between 1700 and 1730 were in fact wars by other African rulers. The successors of Dombo were consolidators and not expansionists.

In 1715 as we have already seen the viceroy was reporting to the king that peace had been made with the Changamire and the Portuguese. In January 1716 the viceroy repeated the same news that the Tenente General of the Rivers had already concluded peace with the Changamire. In an unsigned letter, which Dr. Newitt has convincingly ascribed to Manuel Gonçalves Guião we are told by the writer that he was Tenente General of the Rivers immediately after António Simões Leitão died which was in the 1708 war against Nyamhandu. António Simões Leitão's eventual successor was Rafael Alvares da Silva. It was during Gonçalves Guião's second term of office as Tenente General immediately after the death of Rafael Alvares da Silva that the ambassadors of Changamire came to discuss peace with him at Tete. Since this information had reached Goa by January 1715 it must have taken place sometime in 1714 or before. However, even if the then Changamire may have seriously wanted peace, and it shall be suggested that he did, the

1. Ibid., pp. 168-169.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 3, 1751, Anon. But see Appendix II to Dr. Newitt's thesis, pp. 249-254, Newitt convincingly shows that the letter was written by Gonçalves Guião.
Portuguese do not seem to have accepted peace with a victorious Rozvi emperor. Because in the regimento given to Anselmo de Morães da Fonseca, Tenente General of Moçambique and the Rivers, we see that Morães da Fonseca was ordered to join up with the neighbouring chiefs in order to destroy the power of Changamire. An annexe to another regimento of 1723 and addressed to Agostinho de Barros Henriques Pato, the Tenente General of Moçambique and the Rivers mentions the fact that the feiras had been destroyed and depopulated not only by the wars of the Changamires but by other kings under his sway and some other chiefs engaged in the trade of robbing caravans. This regimento asked Henriques Pato to gather intelligence for use against the Changamire because "this trading depends not only on preservation, but (also) on expanding those lands". The only peace which the Portuguese authorities were prepared to accept seemed to be peace which came from the Portuguese power. It is a sign of how misinformed the viceroy was when he proudly announced to the king in a letter dated 2/1/1730 that "Changamire, the long standing and powerful enemy of the Portuguese, today already finds himself without a (fighting) force". This was to prove a forlorn hope. The Changamire was not defeated but only temporarily checked.

2. Ibid., p. 170, (Livro de Regimentos e Instruções No 11, fl. 104V).
3. Ibid., p. 172, viceroy to king, 2/1/1730 (Livro das Monções, No. 98, f1s. 58).
mires were to prove again and again during the eighteenth century that they were still very powerful. But what the viceroy had noticed without fully understanding it was the peaceful character of the Rozvi emperors. As early as 1698 and 1714 the then Changamires were seeking peace. In 1719 the Count Dom Luís de Menezes wrote to the Tenente General of Moçambique Antonio Cardim Froes thus: "I do not expect the trade of Botica (Butua?) and the other places under his unjust dominion to be in any way by Changamire’s ambassadors, as far many years he has been in the habit of employing similar means to obtain presents and to get knowledge of the country, to be better able to invade it".

After the wars of Dombo, Manyika was under the sway of the Changamires for much of the 18th century as will be seen in Chapter Three. Yet in the same letter just quoted above the viceroy was hoping that the feira of Manyika, which had just been re-opened by Gonçalves Guião would continue. Changamire did not oppose the Portuguese at the Feira of Manyika nor apparently did his successor attack the Portuguese anywhere else between 1714 and 1730. By the 1720s he was already trading with and giving protection to Portuguese agents from Zumbo. As we have seen it was the repeated Portuguese insistence on peace based on Portuguese

1. Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 5, p. 50, Goa, 21/1/1719, Conde Dom Luís de Menezes, and also p. 54, letter of viceroy to José de Mello Leite, the feitor of Sena, same date.

2. See Chapter Four, p.179 note 1
domination which gave the impression of continuous hostilities between the Rozvi emperors and the Portuguese. It was only in the 1730s that the Portuguese officials began to accept the realities of the situation in Mukaranga which had led to prazeros like Gonçalves Guião seeking peace with the effective ruler of Mukaranga rather than harping upon untenable Portuguese domination as expressed in the Regimentos and other vice-regal instructions.

What then was the position of the Rozvi by 1730? The Rozvi emperors ruled the old kingdom of Butua, kingdoms of Manyika, Mahungwe and parts of the former Mutapa empire in north central Mukaranga. The Rozvi empire, as has been mentioned, was an area where Shona/Karanga cultural affinity was strongest. They had developed regular peaceful trade relationship with the Portuguese. The Feira of Zumbo had now put them in direct, but cushioned contact with external trade. Manyika, ruled by a vassal of theirs, was now a more manageable trading centre. And their group, the Rozvi were supreme within the empire. How the Rozvi controlled, consolidated and governed their vast conquests will be the subject of our next chapter.

1. In fact it took until 1753 for Francisco de Mello de Castro to finally squash once and for all, any Portuguese lingering hopes of conquering the Rozvis. The most telling report on this topic was when Francisco de Mello de Castro was demolishing the proposals of the Conde de Ériceira. See Memoria e Docs. acerca... Machona e Nyassa, op. cit., pp. 169-170, Mossambique, 20/11/1753, Francisco de Mello de Castro.
Chapter Three

THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF

THE ROZVI EMPIRE

The reputation of the Rozvi both as effective rulers and as a powerful fighting nation does not only dominate Portuguese writings of the late 17th and 18th centuries, but has survived in many Shona traditions. Neither the humiliation of the Nguni invasions nor the impact of colonial rule has been able to obliterate the memories of glory associated with the Rozvi dominance in the minds of many Shona peoples. No doubt the remarkable stone ruins associated with the Rozvi must themselves be a powerful and constant reminder of the golden age of the Rozvi. But the very existence of the impressive stone ruins bears witness to the organizational ability and the economic wealth the Rozvi were able to amass which must have enabled the construction of these structures.

A discussion of the various sources of Rozvi power and influence is important in that it gives us a clearer understanding of how it was that the Rozvi made such an impact on their contemporaries and on posterity. The discussion also enables us to evaluate the importance to the Rozvi rulers of the contribution of the external trade with Zumbo to their sources of power. This is vital if, because of our reliance on Portuguese documents written by people whose prime interest was trade, we are to avoid
giving the impression, by our concentration on the Zumbo-Rozvi
connection, that the chief purpose for the existence of the Rozvi
Empire was the organisation of foreign trade.

Before we can investigate the nature of the power of the
Rozvi Mambos one very important point must be made. The analysis
made here of Rozvi power does not purport to represent the actual
situation within the Rozvi empire at any given time from 1684 to
mid-1830s. The relationship to one another of the various factors
to be analysed within the Rozvi empire were not always static as
the following discussion might be misconstrued to imply. It was
a dynamic relationship which from time to time either increased
or diminished the power and influence of Mambos. But the description
of Rozvi power to be outlined here may be taken as a fair general
assessment of the power of the Mambos from 1695 to around 1795.
From the latter date a gradual, but by then nonetheless perceptible,
decline within the Rozvi empire can be detected.

(I)
Rozvi Kingship System

The Rozvi empire had a hereditary ruler who ruled with the
title of "Mambo". It is wrong to suggest that only the Rozvi
rulers were called Mambo. It is also inaccurate to say, as Posselt
does, that the dynastic name of the Rozvi rulers was Mambo. We

2. Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 134; see also Sebina,
In fact all the known Rozvi traditions use the title Nambo for
the Rozvi Ruler.
know that even during the 16th and 17th centuries the Mutapas
were also known by the title Mambo. The title "Mambo" in Shona
means "Lord" and implies the highest political authority in the
land. No evidence has been found to show that the Rozvi rulers
had an agreed dynastic name as was found in the empire of Mutapa
or the Butua kingdom of Togwa during the 16th and much of the
17th centuries. The nearest thing to a dynastic name one finds
are the royal Rozvi families who claim to have provided, during
the imperial days, candidates for the Mamboship. The fact that
the Rozvi royal houses tend to give the dynasties of their own
houses, as distinct from a king list of Mambos, has led many a
scholar into despair when trying to reconstruct the Rozvi king list.

If the Rozvi traditions themselves do not show any evidence
of a dynastic name for the Rozvi, the Portuguese records as shown
in Chapter One, provide us with what they see as a dynastic name
in the title Changamire. One scholar, himself an authority on
Portuguese documentation pertaining to the land of Mukaranga, has
firmly stated that Changamire was taken as a dynastic title by the

Oriental" says 'The reigning Monomotapa is called Mambo'.
2. See discussion of the Jiri-Gumunyu conflict in Appendix B.
3. For discussion of the title Changamire see Chapter One,
pp. 56-58. Rukara says that the first Rozvi ruler whom he calls
Sororezhou took the title of Changamire. However, we must treat
Rukara's evidence with reservation in that Rukara was an educated
man (school teacher) who may well have read published sources on
4. Chapter One, pp. 54-55.
son of the first Changamire who died in 1494. Our objections to linking the Changamire of 1494 in the Portuguese records with that of the Portuguese sources from 1684 onwards have been stated in Chapter One, where we have also raised objections to using Changamire in any sense other than a title, as is the case with the title Mambo. In short we cannot accept either the view of Posselt that Mambo was a dynastic name of the Rozvi rulers or that of the Portuguese records supported by D.P. Abraham that the title Changamire should in any special dynastic sense be linked with the Rozvi rulers only. What Posselt and Abraham are saying has the same profundity to the Shona as the statement that "the rulers of England rule with the dynastic name or title of king".

According to Posselt, succession to Rozvi Mamboship was collateral i.e. brother succeeded brother. Posselt adds that succession was arranged during the lifetime of a Mambo, though he quickly qualified this by saying that sometimes "owing to rival claims and resulting dissention and secession" the general rule of succession was disregarded. The qualification to the general rule seems to be justified by the history of the Rozvi for in

1. Abraham, D.P., "The Early Political History of ... Mwenemutapa", op. cit., p. 66.
2. See Chapter One, pp. 56-57.
3. Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 150; Robinson "History of Bikita", NADA, 1957, op. cit., p. 79; In fact the Rukara account, Professor Fortune's "Rozvi Text" and other Rozvi sources as discussed in Appendix C, either implicitly or explicitly support that collateralness was the system of succession followed by the Rozvi rulers. Many Shona chiefs in present day Rhodesia follow the same system.
1695-6 after the death of Mambo Dombo I, it is said his "sons" fought over his crown and the victor, given in one document as Sababec succeeded his father. Some oral traditions confirm that the first Rozvi Mambo was succeeded by one of his sons. Some go so far as to say that the one who succeeded was not the favourite of his father. Portuguese documents also mention a "usurper" who in 1768 was fought by the son of the dead Mambo who regarded himself as the rightful heir to his father's throne. In the end the son killed the "usurper", after a bloody war and assumed the Mamboship. It must be pointed out that for the Portuguese to describe the man who was defeated in 1768 as a "usurper" is misleading in view of what we have already seen about the Rozvi rules of succession. It could be argued that in fact the son who succeeded was the usurper. But then, all this pontification is unnecessary, for in the end, the principle of Rozvi succession seems to have been determined by factors other than simply those already mentioned. Support at court or in the kingdom seems to have been as important as the simple idea of a succession rule.

2. Conceição, op. cit., p. 111, para. 129.
3. Robinson, K.R., "History of Bikita", NADA, 1957, pp. 77-78; Sebina, A.M., "Makalaka" in African Studies, 1947, pp. 85-87; says the name of the son of the Mambo was Tumbare or Sabangu. See also Chapter Two, pp. 88, 90, 92
5. Chapter Six, p. 264.
Since succession seems to have been open to the brothers and sons of the dead Mambo and other Rozvi royal houses, probably the strongest and/or most popular prince succeeded. In one Portuguese document of 1831 it is claimed that "when he (Changamire) dies he is buried within his house and there is no period for weeping and mourning because (his) wives on the very following day present to the grandees the other Xangamere whom they would have chosen". The "acressentamento" adds that it was the mambo's great wife (Vahosi) who crowned the new Mambo. This information is not in its entirety corroborated by any other source, documentary or oral. It is true that one oral source says that the Vahosi was consulted before a new mambo was chosen.

But it is tempting to think that the writer or informant in the "acressentamento" was influenced by the practice in Kiteve, where according to João dos Santos such was the practice in the 16th century. Indeed the "acressentamento" half justifies our suspicion when it adds that "Such (i.e. choice by wives) is the practice among other Africans when they die". Now, such a statement could not be said to be true of most of Shona chiefdoms.

But other traditions claim that the succession problem was handled by Tumbare. It is said before a new Mambo was elected a member of the Tumbare house used to act as regent. Apparently

1. A.R.U. Av. de Moç. Maço. 21, 1 June, 1831, "Acressentamento".
the existence of such a mechanism in the Rozvi constitution did not stop the outbreak of a civil war during succession rivalries. In 1695-6 and 1768 we have documentary evidence of succession civil wars in the Rozvi empire. But when compared with 18th century Mutapa civil wars caused by succession rivalries, the Rozvi system appears to have been fairly effective.

Finally on the question of succession we are faced with the presence in one Rozvi tradition of one woman who succeeded to the Rozvi throne. Mambokadzi Matandangaavate is said to have been the Rozvi ruler who disarmed the Rozvi nation. By implication the eventual collapse of the Rozvi empire is attributed to her unwise decision. The association of Mambokadzi Matandangaavate with disarmament lends suspicion to the speculation that she may have been conjured up by oral tradition as the "Deus ex Machina" to explain away the Rozvi humiliation at the hands of the Nguni invaders during the 19th century.

Attributes of what is commonly referred to as divine kingship seem to have been found among the Rozvi. It is said that no deformities were tolerated in a Mambo; that in case of old age, a Mambo had to commit suicide or expect death at the hands of his own people. The first three Mambos are said to have been dispatched in accordance with this system. But this does not seem

to agree with what we read about Mambo Dombo I who died in 1695, while waging war against the Portuguese, at the very height of his glory and power. Tradition has it, as well, that there was a time limit of two to four years for each reign, but more often than not, it is added, this was not adhered to especially when a Mambo was popular or strong enough. We know for certain that Dombo I must have ruled at least from 1684 to 1695, which is nearly eleven years. We also know that from at least 1788 to at least 1802, only two Mambos ruled. This gives a minimum of fourteen years to two Mambos. Furthermore it is said that the Mambo was often hidden from the general commonalty. Robinson claims that the Mambo carried out certain rain making religious functions, but unfortunately he does not tell us what the Mambo's role in this entailed and how it related to the priests-hood's main function as rainmakers.

Although tradition mentions these so-called attributes of divine kingship, it is doubtful whether divine kingship is a particularly apt or useful term to use in the case of the Rozvi rulers. The usurper Dombo I and his descendants were in no special way, it would appear, regarded as descended more from Mwari than the other Rozvi. And what is more none of the descendants of Dombo, it would seem, ever claimed divine origin. Indeed

if we are to believe the weight of the majority of the known Rozvi traditions, there are grounds to suspect that some Rozvi Mambos were sceptical about the Mwari cult and all the delphic paraphernalia that surrounded it.

(II)

The Rozvi Mambo's Court

At the top of the Rozvi Empire was the Nambo and his court. The Nambo embodied both the executive and judicial powers within the empire. Rozvi traditions claim that the court of the Nambos was at various periods of Rozvi history to be found at Khami, Dhlochlo and Manyanga (Ntaba Zika Nambo). Although there are traditions that claim that the Rozvi court may have been at Great Zimbabwe at the beginning of the Rozvi empire, in view of Peter Garlake's work it is doubtful whether these traditions should be accepted at face value. Great Zimbabwe has such emotional and historical dominance in the history of the Shona people that it should come as no surprise if an upstart and usurping dynasty were to "doctor" its history in such a way as to forge some connection with the past of the land through association with the Great Zimbabwe. But on the objections to Rozvi occupation of

Khami, caused by the recent carbon dating and also by Garlake's work, we are in a much more difficult situation, because on Khami, Rozvi traditions are not equivocal. In view of the specific nature of some of the Rozvi traditions, there is a case for accepting at least the Rozvi claims of occupation, as distinct from the building, of Khami. But the Rozvi connections with Dhlodhlo, Nalatale and Manyanga seem to be up to now unchallenged.

The Mambo's Court was known as Dzimbabwe. The Mambo himself seems to have been given the praise name Madzimbabwe. Portuguese sources help us little in locating the Mambo's Court. Their imprecise knowledge can be seen from the documents of the time. Although the informant quoted in the "acressentamento" had been to the Mambo's court, he does not give us the place name for the court of the Mambo. All he says by way of identification is that the Mambo's court was a month's journey from Kiteve and fifteen days from Quissanga (Chishanga i.e. land immediately East of the Save River around Chipinga). The "Corografica" is no more helpful than the "acressentamento". According to the "Corografica" the Rozvi court was a month's journey from Manyika. On the first

1. See Summers, R., "Rhodesian Iron Age", in African Prehistory, op. cit., p. 171, the Khami carbon date is 1450± 95.
4. Ibid., p. 155.
5. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, 1/6/1831, "Acressentamento"
page of the "Corografica" it is stated that Dombo (the document must be referring to the son of Dombo), after the sack of Masenkasi, captured some prisoners, and "elevados vorobze Corte de Changamire". Lobato took this at its face value and asserted that the Rozvi capital was called "Vorobze". But the "Corografica" goes on to say elsewhere that the kingdom of the Mambo was known as 'Vorobze'. For the people of the Mambo the "Corografica" uses the name "Borobzes". The "Corografica" also adds that "Vorodze" as used to mean the kingdom of Rozvi which "em lingoa cafrial" is called "Goremucuro". All this goes to show that the writer of the "Corografica" did not have a clear idea of the name or location of the Rozvi Court. Indeed the writer of "Corografica" himself admits that his knowledge of the Rozvi kingdom of Butua, a name he does not use, was rather meagre. But as we have already argued in Chapter One the Vorobze of the "Corografica" seems to be referring to the land between Gwelo and Bulawayo. What all the Portuguese sources seem to agree upon is that the Rozvi capital was in the western part of present Rhodesia. In this general way they seem to reinforce the claims made already for Dhlodhlo, Manyanga and Khami as probable sites of Rozvi Capitals.

1. Lobato, A., Evolução, op. cit., p. 64.
2. It has not been possible to identify Goremucuro. The nearest resemblance phonetically we have found is Guruguru a mountain (4,386 ft. above sea level) found today between Chivi and Nhema districts close to 30° E. Long. and 20° S. Lat.
At their court the Rozvi Mambos, it would appear, ruled with the help of councillors or "magota". The available sources on this important subject are very scanty and unsatisfactory. However, one tradition stated by Marodzi claims to give us the names of the councillors of Mambo Rupengo. The names of the councillors, according to Marodzi were Tinima, Tumbare, Mabvudzi, Swabaswi, Nyepere, Rilopingwa, Rozane and Nengwande. Fortunately other traditions, and in one case the Portuguese documents, add more details about the functions of most of these personages. By far the best known names are those of Tumbare and Mabvudzi. These two appear to have been hereditary titles held in the same families. Mabvudzi is said to have been the chief priest of the Rozvi. Rilopingwa (Riropenga) and Nengwande (Nerwande) also appear to have been religious figures of some importance within the Rozvi empire. Tumbare's name/title appears both in Portuguese documents and oral traditions. In the "Corografica" Tumbare is described as the "Secretario do mesmo Changamire" to whom the Portuguese as well as Chikanga's tribute from Manyika was sent. A document from Zumbo of the year 1802 shows that the Portuguese sent "saguate" to

the then three important personages in Butua viz. to the then Mambo, to one Mandebere and Tumbare. Another Zumbo document from the 18th century mentions the sending of "saguate" to Butua for the Mambo and Tumbare. Some other Rozvi traditions remember Tumbare as a fighter who once saved the empire. We have already seen reference to the effect that a member of the Tumbare family used to act as regent during succession crises. Clearly then the Tumbare was an important court personage within the Rozvi empire, and we shall return to Tumbare and Mabvudzi when we discuss the military and religious organization of the Rozvi.

In some Rozvi traditions it is said that a Mambo's son-in-law was an important pillar of a Mambo during his rule. At the Mutapa Court this councillor was known as "Bucurume" (mbokorume). One Rozvi tradition claims that Tumbare was Mambo's son-in-law. But other traditions say the very opposite. The son-in-law was expected to be vigilant against court intrigues and the likelihood of coups.

1. See Appendix G (IV).
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Cx. 42, Mucariva, 29/12/1802, J.F. Diniz and others.
4. Fortune, "Rozvi Text" NADA, 1956, op. cit., pp. 83-84; see also below, pp. 150-151
5. Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 157; Marodzi, NADA, 1924, op. cit., p. 90, Mambo Rupengo is said to have been defended by his sons-in-law.
7. Fortune, "Rozvi Text", NADA, 1956, op. cit., p. 84.
From the list of the councillors of Mambo Rupengo as given by Narodzi there are still unexplained the names Tinima (Mutinhima), Swabaswi (Basvi) Rozane (Ruzani) and Nyepere. Whereas Tumbare, Mabvudzi and Nerwande were Rozvi of totems other than Royal Moyo Ndizvo (heart), Tinima, Basvi and Ruzani were not only of the totem Moyo Ndizvo but belonged to the houses from whom Mambos could be and were chosen. As it happened Tinima was, according to another tradition, a provincial Governor in the lands of Banga and Nhema during the reign of Mambo Rupengo. The same tradition adds that Tinima nicknamed Gumboremvura replaced Rupengo as Mambo. As for Basvi he was probably a descendant of one Mambo Basvi Rupengo. One tradition says that a Basvi together with a Tumbare were military leaders who once saved the Rozvi nation from its enemies. As for Ruzani, one tradition gives that name as that of a specific important Rozvi personage. Mbava, the famous Rozvi 'historian', was of the house of Ruzani. The present Chief Mbava is known as Ruzani. Nyepere may have been a descendant of a mambo Munyepere.

1. Ibid., Tumbare's totem was Bepe.
2. Ibid., Mabvudzi's totem was Shava (Eland) praise name (chidao) being Mpofu.
3. Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 141, Nerwande's totem was Shoko (monkey).
4. Ibid., p. 146.
Thus within the Rozvi court there were councillors who were concerned with military affairs, religious matters, tribute collections and provincial administration within the empire. We now propose to investigate these roles further.

(III)

Military Organization

We have already discussed the achievements and effectiveness of the Rozvi armies especially between 1684 and 1695. The reputation of the Rozvis as fighters seems to have held its own during the 18th century. In 1743, 1768 and 1772 Portuguese sources reveal specific incidents testifying to Rozvi military prowess. Rozvi and non-Rozvi oral traditions among the Shona are full of laudatory remarks about Rozvi achievements. But here we are interested not in the various battles the Rozvi may or may not have won, but with the organization and weapons of the Rozvi armies.

One Portuguese source states that the Rozvi armies were organized in centuries like those of the Romans, but the Rozvi armies were not paid and so they had the licence to rob for their payment. A century or a company of soldiers was apparently known as a "missoca" (regiment). According to some Portuguese sources, the armies of the Rozvi Mambos were commanded by "inhabezés"
whose rank was that of Generals. Under the Inhabezes were others whose rank resembled that of field Commanders (Cabos). One tradition suggests that it was customary for the Mambo to be with his army when it fought. While this certainly was the case with Dombo, it would appear that some Mambos preferred to let their generals conduct the expeditions.

In the field of battle the Rozvi, like other Africans in the region of Rios de Sena, appear to have evolved the following mode of fighting. They had a main body of men apparently called a "viatte". The "viatte" was flanked by two horns which were known as "Molomo" (mouth), "acumba". In this way the Rozvi seem to have anticipated Shaka by almost a hundred years. When the Rozvi squadrons were in battle they are said to have been arranged in such a way that while one was engaging the enemy another would be at its rear taking care of the wounded, replenishing and animating the vanguard, as well as making certain that none of the front liners could retreat. It is said that the Rozvi favoured a face to face close combat in an open field against their enemies.

1. F. de M. de Castro, Descripça,0 dos Rios de Senna, op. cit., p. 32, para. 66.
2. Ibid.
5. It has not been possible to find the meaning of the word (viatte).
6. Acumba may be derived from the verb -kumba, meaning gather or collect or it may stand for kumba meaning in the direction of home.
7. Andrade, A.A., Relaçoes, op. cit., p. 145; See also Appendix D, No. 12.
8. Ibid., "Corografica", op. cit.; See also Appendix D, No. 12.
It was noted that their cudgels were partickary suited for such combat. However to see the Rozvi mode of fighting as inflexible would be unfair to the people. At Mahungwe the Rozvi owed their victory not only to stubbornness and fighting formations but perhaps even more to their flexibility and resourcefulness. Even in oral tradition ingenuity and stratagems seem to be the hallmark of Rozvi fighting history. It is said that when in camp the Rozvi placed sentinels at night. A Rozvi Camp was known as a Musasa (Muçaça, Moçassa of the Portuguese documents).
The name Musasa must certainly be derived from a tree of that name out of which to this very day the Shona construct camps. The derivation cannot have been the other way round because Kusasa comes from the Shona verb Kusasa (stem - sasa) meaning to sprinkle, to broadcast, as the Musasa tree sprinkles its numerous tiny needle-like leaves at the slightest breeze.

The principal Rozvi weapons were bows and arrows, but what seems to have given them the edge over the other Africans in the region was their use of hide shields and battle axes together with their knobkerries, which, it was said, they threw with deadly

2. See Chapter Two, pp. 75-76
4. Marodzi, NADA, 1924, p. 91; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Zumbo, 20/6/1784, A.C. de Souza to Governor of the Rivers.
accuracy. They also used daggers, various forms of assegais and spears. The "Acressentamento" tells us that at the palace of the Rozvi Mambo in the 19th century were found "Muitas espingardas" as well as four rusty pieces of artillery. These four pieces of artillery are probably part of the loot from the sack of Dambarare, Mahungwe and Masekesi between 1684 and 1695. The mention of the cannons in "Acressentamento" may indicate, in view of the two cannons later found at Dhlodhlo, that during some part of the 19th century Dhlodhlo was in fact the capital of the Rozvi empire. But it must be added that the reference in the same document to a (Chuabos) fencing made of elephant tusks round the houses at the Capital may be suggestive of Manyanga. The reference to "many guns" at the palace is of great interest. We know from the documents from Zumbo that some guns found their way to the Rozvi Mambos. Gunpowder and/or about two guns were gifts the Capitãens Mores of Zumbo gave to the Rozvi Mambos almost every three years during the second half of the 18th century. In 1802 we know that the then Rozvi Mambo made a request for eight guns from Capitão Mor José Pedro Diniz. In the end Diniz stuck to custom and sent only two. Although we have no direct evidence

1. Appendix D, No. 12.
3. Since literally Manyanga means a place abounding in horns or tusks.
5. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, Mucariva, 29/12/1802, José Pedro Diniz; Report of a meeting with a Rozvi embassy.
that guns found their way from the Feira of Manyika to the Rozvi Capital, it would not be surprising if this turned out to have been the case. It is said in some traditions that the Mambo used to announce the mobilization of the warriors by firing his gun (or was it his cannon?). Although the gun may not have been an important fighting weapon for the majority of the Rozvi during the 18th and early 19th centuries we are on safe ground when we say that some, if not most, of the high ranking Rozvi probably did possess and were capable of using a gun by the 19th century. Indeed in 1862 the Reverend Nachtigall was told by his African guide in the Transvaal that the Rozvi "were black people who had guns". Clearly the reputation of the Rozvi as people possessing guns had gone beyond the borders of their empire. It is therefore less than accurate to assert that "The Rozvi" by mid-19th century "were in any case not accustomed to the use of guns".

1. Fortune, "Rozvi Text", NADA, 1956, p. 83. The Mambo's gun was apparently known as "cidzimbenyama"; Marodzi, NADA, 1924, p. 91, says Mabvudzi's gun was known as Danda (log); By saying "These are the sounds of guns Frapapa! Frapapa! Wuri! Wuri!" Marodzi implies the Rozvi of Tinima at the time had a number of guns.
2. See Chapter Seven, pp292.
The single most glaring flaw in the Rozvi Military thinking is their apparent disregard for preparations for a defensive war. Dhlodhlo, Nalatale, Manyanga and other Rozvi sites do not show much pre-occupation with preparation for defensive warfare. The Rozvi sites display grandeur, elegance and arrogance befitting a conquering group convinced of its invincibility. For over a hundred years we have no evidence that the Rozvi nation ever had to fight a defensive war. But when it did fight the Nguni invasions (in the 19th century) it was found to be unprepared for it. It must certainly be due to the limitations imposed by the availability of sources in Rhodesia that has led some scholars to ascribe the Shona successes at defensive warfare during the 1896-7 risings to their past history before the 19th century. It may be ironic, but probably not far off the mark, to suggest that it was the Nguni invasions and the Ndebele raids coupled with the necessity to have cover, imposed by the availability of granite hills in Mashonaland, that led to the Shona putting up a respectable defensive and guerrilla warfare during the Risings of 1896-7.

1. Beach, "Rising in South-West Mashonaland", op. cit., p. 147, says the Shona "were never really offensive fighters".
One rather disappointing aspect of the whole question of Rozvi military organization is the lack of information on how the Rozvi armies were trained. According to Posselt certain traditions claim that the Rozvi had no standing army, and that when a Mambo wished to mobilize his forces he sent out criers, who summoned the warriors with shouts of "Chisadza Mhomwe (Muhomwe)" - 'fill your bags with food'. Another tradition says that when a Mambo wanted to mobilize his forces he used to sound his gun and at the sound of the Mambo's gun Tumbare would play his war drum known as "Ditiwe". At the sound of Ditiwe the Rozvi "Mapfumo" i.e. squadrons would assemble at the Mambo's Court. Besides this apparently formalized method of mobilization, we have already seen that the Rozvi had special war weapons and a developed fighting formation. They have revealed themselves as determined and effective fighters. Furthermore the Portuguese documents specifically mention that among the subjects of the Rozvi Mambos the fighters came from one section only i.e. the Borobzes (Rozvi). The Portuguese documents claim that the military "drill" of Africans of Zambezia was called "Pemberagôens"

(Kupembera - to ululate from stem - Pembera). This entailed singing, chanting, ululating and the brandishing of spears. To see this rhythmic war-chanting as being the training of the warriors would be less than accurate. This was used as a morale rouser, to build self-confidence as well as to intimidate the enemy. One of the most celebrated Shona war songs goes thus:

**B A Y A W A B A Y A**

- Yowerere! Bayawabaya!
- Yowerere! M'kono Unobaya dzose!
- Yowerere! Bvunza wadvunza!
- Yowerere! M'kono unobvunza dzose!
- Yowerere! Rova warova!
- Yowerere! M'kono unorova dzose!
- Yowerere! Bayawabaya!
- Yowerere! M'kono unobaya dzose!

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- Yowerere! Stab the stabber!
- Yowerere! The bull that stabs all!
- Yowerere! Challenge the challenger!
- Yowerere! The bull that challenges all!
- Yowerere! Vanquish the vanquisher!
- Yowerere! The bull that vanquishes all!
- Yowerere! Stab the stabber!
- Yowerere! The bull that stabs all!

* Yowerere is an idiophone expressing general commotion and moaning noises.
Yet in spite of all the above indications of some unifying factor among the Rozvi fighters we have not unearthed any single piece of evidence such as the presence of an age group organization, to suggest a basis for military training for the Rozvi forces. In the end we are forced to mere speculation. From the unanimity of the Portuguese documents that the Mambo's fighters were known as Borodzes we deduce that probably the Rozvi played a role not dissimilar to a feudal aristocracy which enjoyed the arts of war, without being wholly obsessed by it. They still had time for other pursuits like agriculture and husbandry. But in times of war or trouble they rallied round the Rozvi ruling house. Marksmanship with bows and arrows would be attained in the normal course of life - particularly through hunting - an activity which the "Acressentamento" suggests the Rozvi Mambo took part in regularly and a pastime strongly hinted at by the presence of "tons" of animal bones at Khami. In an era when wild animals abounded in the country as a whole there is no doubt that in his protective role the Shona male required a high proficiency in the use of weapons for self-defence. The spread of military ideas among the Rozvi could be seen less as emanating from a formal institutionalized training and more from a flow of ideas within a group with the same common interests and similar background of a ruling aristocracy. However one must

admit that this is an open question on which oral tradition might one day throw some light.

The numbers of the Rozvi armies are hard to find, while the figures obtainable from Portuguese sources are almost certainly coloured by the Portuguese fear of, and respect for, the Rozvi armies. In 1743 it is said that the Rozvi Mambo sent an army estimated at 2,000 men to go and help the Zumbo Muzungus. But when that body of men robbed the Portuguese of 500 pastas of gold, the Rozvi Mambo sent another force which annihilated the former one. In 1780-1 it is said that the Rozvi Mambo sent a powerful army of about 3,000 men under the command of General Gumi. In 1772 a Rozvi army is reported to have relieved Zumbo from the blockade of Ganiambaze. The wars of Dombo, who it is reported killed about 5,000 Mutapa men in 1684, must have involved fairly large armies. But again on this important subject we lack firm evidence to demonstrate the military power of the Rozvi.

Finally there is the whole problem of the religio-magico powers attributed to the Rozvi rulers and their armies and their military significance. The religious factor within the Rozvi empire will be considered separately, but it is necessary to point out that the attribution of supernatural powers to the Rozvi had a great effect, it would appear, not only among the Karanga people,

1. See chapter four, pp. 185-186, 191.
2. Chapter four, pp. 191.
3. Chapter six, pp. 275-278.
4. Ibid., pp. 274-275.
as evidenced by numerous traditions, but also on the Portuguese soldiers. In 1698 the Vice-roy of India suggested that all the Portuguese soldiers in the Rivers of Sena, be they black or white, should be withdrawn and new ones - all white from metropolitan Portugal - be imported to replace them. This, argued the Vice-roy, was necessary for the Portuguese to regain the initiative against the son of Dombo I, by then ruling after his father's death, who had convinced all the Portuguese in the Rivers of Sena that if he so much as touched or smeared some of the oil he carried with him in his vessels, the person so touched would meet instant death. Traditions claiming that the Rozvi Mambos had horns containing powerful magic are well known. Some of this magic was supposed to be war magic others to be rain-making magic. The Rozvi claim to have been able by supernatural powers to produce bees to fight for them. Other forms of magic are said to have made their warriors brave and/or bullet-proof or impossible to pierce with an arrow or spear. Again the Rozvi are said to

1. Chapter Typo, p. 90, 92.
2. Fortune, "Rozvi Text", NADA, 1956, op. cit., p. 84.
3. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
5. Fortune, "Rozvi Text", NADA, 1956, p. 84. See also Colley, "Last Bashankwe Chief", NADA, 1927, p. 66 and Botelho, S.X., Estatistica, op. cit., p. 168 on how the Rozvi themselves suffered from the bees of their enemies.
have had medicine to send their enemies to sleep and to change the colours of cattle. If we take into account that the Rozvi people claimed that they were in some special way associated with Mwari, i.e. Vana vamwari (Children of Mwari), we may begin to understand what psychological advantages they had over their opponents. The Great Dombo himself did not spurn such matters but studiously encouraged belief in his magic powers as seen in his flaying of the two Dominicans at Dambarare and having their heads carried in front of his army as well as by the disinterring and crushing of the bones of the dead Portuguese in order to prepare some powerful medicine for his soldiers. Indeed the reputation which his son enjoyed in 1698 may have owed much to the actions of Dombo at Dambarare. A wizard or a witch had and still has immense effect on the minds of many people the world over. The Portuguese said that Dombo was "a most accomplished wizard".

3. Ibid., p. 105, para. 103.
Religion: Its Political Significance

There are two aspects to this matter that require attention. The first, and in some way, alien territory for a student of history happens to be a theological question. The second and indeed the more important for our purpose is the description of institutional functionaries in this field. The theological problem arises first out of the work of Professor T.O. Ranger, and recently also from that of Dr. P. Fry. Professor Ranger observes amongst the Shona people "two elaborate religious systems... (viz.) the system of the spirit mediums, or mondoro (Rhondoro) cult, and the cult of the oracular deity, usually known as the Mwari or Mlimo cult." According to Ranger "the system of the spirit mediums was particularly associated with the Mutapas and the Mwari cult particularly associated with the Rozvi Kings," and in anticipation of possible line of attack he added "that despite the innumerable connections between them they were and remained distinct systems." (my emphasis) While Dr. Fry on the whole tends to agree with Ranger's view on this matter, he

3. Ibid., p. 17.
4. Ibid., p. 18.
goes even further in his differentiation than Ranger does. According to Peter Fry there are three "quite different" religious systems among the Shona people; viz. that of the "Korekore descendants of Munhumutapa Empire (which has) a distinct hierarchy of mediums organized on a territorial and genealogical basis"; secondly that of the "Karanga... descendants of the Rozvi Empire. Their religious system is considerably more centralized than that of the Zesuru and is based on an oracle of the supreme being: Mwari" and lastly that of the Zesuru (whatever that geographical expression is meant to convey) which "is quite different from either the Korekore or Karanga".

For our discussion of the political importance of religion within the Rozvi Empire the division seen by Ranger and Fry between the Karanga and the Zesuru systems poses the question of how a Rozvi ruler was able to mobilise religious support within his realm. But if Ranger's and Fry's divisions can be seen to be more apparent than real then this problem hardly arises.

Opposed to the Ranger-Fry position are Murphree, Danceel, Abraham and Gelfand. Danceel, replying directly to Ranger's conclusions, argued that the main components of two systems detected by Ranger "are not mutually exclusive, but complimentary

parts of an integrated religious whole". The integrated nature of the so-called Mwari and Mhondoro religious systems is graphically demonstrated by Daneel. Murphree too argued for the oneness of the Shona Religion.

One of the more remarkable aspects of this controversy is that the differences detected by Ranger and Fry do not seem to be noticed by the Shona themselves who are adamant in their assertion of the unity of their religion. Graph "A" shows the historical danger of trying to impose a cultural separation of these people as advocated by Peter Fry. As it happens Fry's case study, the Chiota people, turns out to be a Manyika group, now regarded as Zezuru, with undoubted historical connections with the Rozvi.

2. Ibid., p. 51.
3. Murphree, M.W., Christianity and the Shona, op. cit., p. 50. "Thus there is no apparent conflict between the two systems. On the one hand there is the elaborate indirect approach to Mwari through the medium, the tribal mhondoro, and possibly yet another mhondoro. On the other hand there is the direct approach by the tribe to the priests of Mwari at one of his shrines. Yet the Mwari of the shrines constantly exhorts obedience and honour to the ancestors, and the mhondoro of the ancestors in turn exalt Mwari as their ultimate source of power".
4. When Dr. Fry presented his Seminar paper he was attacked by the three Shona (Zezuru, Manyika and Karanga) speaking members of the seminar on this very point.
5. Dr. Fry says that it is wrong to consider the "Shona speaking peoples as if they had a common culture", op. cit., p. 5.
THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF SOME SHONA GROUPS

The table is based on a classification into Makonawere, Kazemure and Makore, with a number of separate tribes forming an ethnological unit. Each chief is listed with his present home and original home, followed by a brief description of his relationship to other groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHIEF</th>
<th>PRESENT GROUP OR DIALECT</th>
<th>ORIGINAL HOME</th>
<th>PRESENT GROUP OR DIALECT OF ORIGINAL HOME</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chihota</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Manzika</td>
<td>Manzika</td>
<td>Original Chihota, said to have been a royal Manzika prince who left his home sometime when the Rozvi were already the rulers of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiwala</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Manzika</td>
<td>Manzika</td>
<td>The first Chiwala was said to have been a Manzika prince who came to the present area of Chikwanza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chivi</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Mtoko</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
<td>Mhori is now regarded as the most extreme example of Karanga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bere</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Mtoko</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
<td>Related to Chivi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranze</td>
<td>Manzika</td>
<td>Bhaera</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Related to Nyashambo and Seke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinamora</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Musave</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Shavuza is regarded as the purest form of Zezuru. The Shavuza people (previously Shavuza or Manzika) lived in the South Shona region earlier than the late 18th century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwitu</td>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>Muzara</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Related to Maranze.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menkuno</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Mtoko</td>
<td>Korekore</td>
<td>Related to Maranze and Seke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkashama</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Konza</td>
<td>Zekuru</td>
<td>Related to Maranze and Seke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seke</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Konza</td>
<td>Zekuru</td>
<td>Related to Maranze and Seke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutena</td>
<td>(Zangwa)</td>
<td>(Rozvi)</td>
<td>(Rozvi)</td>
<td>A branch of the Rozvi, which broke away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musika-</td>
<td>(Dondo)</td>
<td>(Rozvi)</td>
<td>(Rozvi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanhu</td>
<td>Manzika</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mzangambo</td>
<td>Kamagaga</td>
<td>Muzara</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>Related to Gwitu. Dzimba is now regarded as the most typical Karanga dialect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvimba</td>
<td>Manzika</td>
<td>Nare</td>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another interesting irony is that the Kaguvi Mhondoro on whom much of Fry's and Ranger's ideas of the looseness of the Zezuru religious system are based was not, according to two recent views, an unimportant Mhondoro who was brought to the forefront by the risings of 1896-7.

In view of the above we are unconvinced that the Ranger-Fry view need be taken into consideration as proven fact when we discuss the political importance of the religious organisation within the Rozvi empire. Too much of the evidence at the moment argues for the essential unity of the Shona religious system for us to accept Ranger's theory. Abraham has suggested that the spirits (mhondoro), shown by Daneel's graph as groups "A" and "B", had important political implications. The spirits in group "B" or tribal spirits had political importance within a tribe while spirits in group "A" or supertribal spirits, had important political implications for royal dynasties. But according to Abraham both groups "A" and "B" had sectional and restricted interests for the ruling houses whose abuses were moderated by the Hwari cult which was interested in national rather than sectional interests.

1. Beach, D.N., The Rising South-western Mashonaland, op. cit., pp. 73-4, 307; Beach says Kaguvi was the spiritual husband of Nehanda. See also Gelfand, M., The African Witch, op. cit., p. 22.
GRAPH B

A. Supra tribal spirits associated with the royal dynasties of the past e.g. Chaminuka
B. Tribal spirits (mhondoro; midzimu yenjika)
C. Family spirits (midzimu yapamusha)
D. Sub-chiefs and ward headmen of ruling lineage (vachinda) in chiefdom - future tribal spirits
E. Commoner inhabitants of the chiefdom (future midzimu)
F. Spirit- mediums (masvikiro) representing some of the main tribal spirits  

(Based on DANCEL)
It appears to be true that nowadays the further away one moves from the Mwari cult centre the more one finds the religious and political functions of the spirit mediums increasing. It is this phenomenon which led Ranger and Fry to postulate their theories of division within the Shona Theology.

The cult centre itself must have been an organization of great political importance. The three key officers seem to have been the "Eye" (Maziso), and "Ear" (Zheve) and the "Mouth" (Muromo). While some have suggested that the "Eye" as the general overseer of all that went on at the cult centre may have been a Rozvi, Daneel has found that the main authority at the centre lay not with the "Eye" but the "Ear" which appears to be reserved for a member of the Mbire tribe. Daneel has found that the "Eye" was a MuVhenda person and the Voice a MuRozvi woman. This leaves as the only non-reserved top role in the priesthood that of the "Eye". Whether this openness of the role of the "Eye" suggests that it was therefore a position open for a political appointee of a Hambo, we do not know. However, as regards the Rozvi woman who acts as the 'Voice' Daneel wonders if she was not and is not the key figure at the centre after all. Impersonating

4. Daneel, God of the Matopo Hills, op. cit., p. 44.
5. Ibid.,
Mwari must surely give the 'Voice' an aura and authority the other priests lack. The attempts of some Rozvi Mambos to silence the 'Voice' as given in some traditions strongly suggest that the "voice" had important political implications. It may well have expressed the privately held views of the subject peoples. Like the Nhondoros the "voice" may in fact have been the vehicle for expressing the consensus in the community. When Lobengula visited the cult centre it is said he denied that the "voice" was that of Mwari but a "Makalaka voice" i.e. the voice of his subjects. The possible connection between the Rozvi Mambo and the Rozvi women at the cult centre may suggest the possibility, of the way in which a Rozvi Mambo might have controlled the activities of the cult centre.

Below the priests came a whole host of minor functionaries. These were the majukwa, Manyusa and Mbongwa, Zvangoma (sing. Sangoma) and hossanah's. Since hossanah is a name borrowed from Christianity in recent years we may safely assume that during the time of the Rozvi Mambos these did not exist. But this need not mean that their function did not exist. This applies also to Sangomas which are Ndebele spirits.

2. Information from Mr. Ngwavi Bhebe.
Mbongas are young women dedicated to Mwari while young by their parents. These young women, the majority of whom today seem to be Rozvis, grow up at the cult centre in the service of Mwari. When they reach marriageable age they are regarded as Mwari's wives until they are actually married. These Mbongas, who come from all over the country, during ceremonial occasions, are possessed by their own tribal spirits or mhondoros or others of their own lesser ancestral spirits. In this way far off chiefdoms are represented and participate physically at the cult centre.

Young men who are in like manner dedicated as described above may also be possessed by their home district spirits on the same ceremonial occasions. Today these young men are known as MaHossanah but in the past they may also have been called Mbonga. When not possessed by their own home district spirits the Hossanahs may become possessed by the Jukwa or Sangoma spirits. These are "water spirits" (mweye yemvura) emanating not from dead spirits (Midzimu), but from God (Mwari) himself. The Jukwas, and Sangomas and Mbongas dance and sing during the ceremonies.

1. Daneel, God of the Matopo Hills, op. cit., p. 50.
3. Daneel, God of the Matopo Hills, op. cit., p. 49.
But of more political importance are the Vanyai (messengers). Together with the Mbongas, the Vanyai keep the outlying districts represented at the cult centre. The Vanyai are representatives of their own districts who carry the requests of their own people to the cult centre and bring back the commands of the 'Voice' to their own home districts. The Vanyai are the agents by whom the cult centre receives much of its intelligence from the outlying areas. Before the 'Voice' in the cave speaks to each visiting Munyayi he is questioned closely about the affairs in his home district by the priests at the cult centre. Daneel is probably correct in saying that the Rozvi Nambo may have regarded the regular visits of a Munyai as a sign of continued loyalty of that Munyai's region. In succession disputes the reports of the Vanyai may have played an important role. It seems that the Vunyai was not necessarily hereditary. A Munyai appears to have been either appointed by his own chief or by the cult centre. But in the end approval by the cult centre was a sine qua non for becoming a Munyai. A Munyai is sometimes called a Nyusa but more usually a Nyusa is a spirit of a dead Munyai.

1. Daneel, God of the Matopo Hills, op. cit., p. 43.
3. Ibid., p. 52.
Under the less favourable climate of Ndebele supremacy it is said that the Ndebele kings found the Mwari cult a useful secret service. During the Risings in Matebeleland and Mashonaland in 1896-7 the lines of communication of the Mwari cult seem to have made a useful contribution in some areas in the co-ordination of the Risings. It does not require much imagination to visualize how such a powerful machinery could have been exploited during what must surely have been more favourable conditions i.e. in the heyday of the Rozvi ascendancy.

On the deficit side it would appear that such a powerful force within the Rozvi empire was not always subservient to every Mambo. According to Mabvudzi, himself regarded as the chief priest of the Rozvi (was he the "Eye"?) and claiming descent from Chaminuka, the priesthood had the right to admonish all the rulers if they were seen to misuse their powers. The Mambo it is said was required

2. Ranger, T.O., Revolt, op. cit.; See also Dr. Beach, "The Rising in South-western Mashonaland 1896-7", op. cit. Dr. Beach argues that Professor Ranger has overdrawn the role of the religious during the Revolt of 1896-7. Instead Dr. Beach stresses the political factors like the impact of the Ndebele and Portuguese influence as unifying forces on some of the Shona groups. But it appears that if Beach has rightly questioned Ranger's explanation for the organization of the Revolt solely in terms of the Mwari cult officers and the Mhondoros, he himself has gone to the other extreme by minimizing their role and introducing what is at best a questionable influence of the Portuguese as a basis of co-operation among some of the Shonas. Beach, by underestimating the impact and control the Rozvi had over their empire during their heyday, tried to argue that the Rozvi past and its religious institutions could not have been a significant factor contributing to Shona unity of action during the revolt. In this chapter we show just how effective Rozvi control over their empire was at the height of their power.
to give gifts, including that of young women to serve Mwari, to the priests of Mwari. The priesthood seems to have acted as a constitutional check on the absolute powers of a Mambo. Such a role was bound to bring the priesthood into conflict with the Mambos. Behind the widespread stories of Mambos who are said to have challenged the commands of the 'Voice' may lie the conflict between the temporary and spiritual powers within the empire. This concern with the power and influence of the 'Voice' at the cult centre seems to lend force to Daneel's speculation that the role of the 'Voice' at the cult centre may be more important than was sometimes assumed. The 'Voice', protected by custom and the religious cloak, may well have articulated deeply felt views the subjects would have been too frightened to state publicly in case the Mambos did not like them. Some Rozvi traditions claim that the fall of their empire was brought about as a punishment by Mwari because one Mambo denied the authenticity of the 'Voice' in the cave as being that of Mwari. But others maintain it was because Mwari was unhappy when he saw that the Rozvi nation was praising Tumbare and Basvi for saving the nation instead of thanking Mwari who had actually enabled Tumbare and Basvi to win.

There is one tradition that claims that the priests Mabvudzi and Nerwande were implicated in the attempted assassination of Mambo Mutinhima Gumboremvura. Another tradition has it that a Rozvi Mambo killed Mutota, a Chaminuka medium. All this suggests that a Rozvi ruler needed to be on good terms with the cult's priesthood. But it would probably be wrong to try and overdraw the picture of conflict between the Rozvi Mambos and the religious arm, because in the final analysis they needed each other and practical politics dictated co-operation rather than opposition to each other. And at any rate if brute force was to be an arbiter on an issue there is no doubt as to who possessed that; the religious arm relied mainly on moral force and in the long run it would have been unwise for a Mambo to alienate it.

It was a futile yet fitting episode that the Shona religious arm should have tried to revive the Rozvi Empire during the 1896-7 Rising.

3. Ranger, *Revolt*, op. cit., pp. 289-292. Ranger says that Mudzinganyama Jiri was chosen to be the Mambo. But Beach suggests that it may have been one of the Chingombes of the period. My own reading of the sources leads me to agree with the latter view.
Provincial Administration

The diffuseness and unsatisfactory nature of the information pertaining to the Rozvi Empire is most sadly felt when one deals with its administration, yet the importance of the topic for our whole discussion of the Rozvi Empire requires us to reconstruct as much as we can from the scattered and sometimes unreliable sources.

The administration of the Rozvi Empire appears to have been based on the Shona concept of social organization. Within this concept the smallest unit of social organization is an "Imba" (family or hut) under a "saimba" (Householder or family head); a group of "dzimba" formed a "mana" (neighbourhood) under a "samana" (head of the neighbourhood); and a number of "mamana" made up a "musha" (village) under a "samusha" (village head). A collection of "misha" formed a "dunhu" (region) ruled by "sadunhu" (kind of sub chief). Above the "masadunhu" was an "Ishe" (chief) who governed a "Nyika" (Chiefdom) which was made up of a number of "Matunhu". At the top was the Nambo (Lord, King, Emperor or Paramount Chief) who was the ruler of all. To the above schematic and theoretical organization within a Shona polity, must be added a conceptual problem brought about by the victories of Dombo I in 1684-1695. As a result of these wars Dombo included within his

kingdom other kingdoms viz. Mahungwe and Manyika. As a result of this situation Dombo became a Mambo of others who were still regarded as Mambos by their own subjects. Since Shona social organization did not seem to have such a title Dombo and his descendants remained Mambos just as Chikanga and Makoni continued to be referred to by their own subjects as Mambos. It would be misleading to deduce from this conceptual limitation that the Rozvi Mambo was therefore primus inter pares with Chikanga and Makoni. Chikanga and Makoni were Rozvi vassals who paid tribute like any other vassal; and were not represented in the Rozvi state councils and had to obey the orders of the Rozvi Mambos.

How to control all the above levels of administrators, who as a general rule were the hereditary rulers of their own communities, was a major problem of the Rozvi Mambos. The control of the Rozvi Mambos over their empire emanated from their authority to legitimize and their power to coerce. At the height of Rozvi Rule, and in the same region even long after the demise of Rozvi dominance, no ruler could legitimately exercise political authority unless he had been first invested with that authority by the ruling Rozvi Mambo or representative. Although it lay within the purview of the local people to elect their ruler/chief in accordance with their particular rules of succession, it was the prerogative of the Rozvi Mambos to

1. Beach, "The Rising in South-western Mashonaland 1896-7", op. cit., p. 69. Beach suggests that the Mambo in the eyes of some subjects, may have been in fact primus inter pares.
veto an appointment, if for any reason they deemed it unsuitable. It was not unknown for a Rozvi ruler to bypass the lawful hereditary heir in favour of another whose chief claim to a throne was his friendship with a Rozvi Mambo. We have evidence that Mambo Dombo I removed the ruling Chikanga dynasty in 1695 and put his own nominee on the throne of Manyika. Among the people of Makoni it is remembered that Makoni Ciendambuya, though younger than Nehumba, was made king Makoni by the Rozvi contrary to practice. The ruling house in Chilimanzi claims that the first chief Chilimanzi owed his chieftaincy to the whims of one Rozvi Mambo by the name of Chikore, who, after being impressed by the long robe (hanzu) which the first Chirimuhanzu, a Manyika prince, was dressed in, decided to make him chief over some Govera speaking peoples.

The ceremony by which a Rozvi ruler exercised control and sovereignty over the subject rulers was known as "Kugadza ishe", (to invest a chief). According to Nbava "If the people chose a new chief without consulting their overlord (Rozvi Mambo), it was said in common parlance that they had no chief, but the one

selected or approved by the Warozvi was held to be true chief."

There are many others who back up Mbava's statement. Apparently there were at least two ways in which a chief was confirmed by a Rozvi Mambo. One was for a nominee to travel to the Rozvi court and present himself and his candidacy before the Mambo for approval. The second way was for a nominee to send messengers to a Mambo's court asking the Mambo to send representatives to invest the nominee. The first method is related with somewhat bizarre aspects by S.X. Botelho in the case of the Mutemamas, kings of Quissanga (Chishanga). Apparently for about a hundred years from its foundation every successive heir to the throne of Chishanga was invested by the Rozvi Mambo. It is said that when a Mutema heir-elect arrived at the Rozvi court he used to receive "an ox smeared with earth and mud" which he tied "to a tree near to his residence". And "If throughout the whole of that day and night until the following morning, it was found to have rained in such a way that all the earth which the ox had on its back, would have been washed away, the nominee would be approved and the Changamire (then) gave various articles of clothing and sent back the nominee accompanied by his (Changamire's) men (who were) to proclaim him king in the lands of Quissanga".

But in case the rain did not fall or too little fell so that the ox's back was not wholly washed, then according to Botelho, it was said the nominee would have lost the throne and a new one would have had to be elected by the grandees of Chishanga to undergo the same formalities and the process would continue until a successor was found. From traditions of the peoples of Makoni comes confirmation that aspirants to the throne used to be expected to go in person to the Rozvi court in order to seek approval. There is no evidence that the tantalising idea of a rain-washed ox was a prerequisite for confirmation in the latter case.

The second method was for a nominee to dispatch messengers to a Mambo requesting that representatives be sent to come and invest the nominee. One of the provinces where this seems to have been the case was the kingdom of Manyika. Evidence of this is found in 1796 when Inharugue (Inyarungwe?) succeeded to the Chikangaship. Although Inharugue was not the oldest surviving brother of the dead Chikanga he was chosen to succeed to the throne of Manyika. This resulted in troubles with some of the elder brothers who thought that they had more claim to the throne than Inharugue. Francisco Ferrão, then Capitão Mor at Manyika went on to explain to the Governor of the Rivers of Sena that

Inharugue was hoping that his claim to the throne would soon be confirmed by the ruling Rozvi Mambo, from whom no messengers had been received because, so Ferrão understood, it was winter time. In connection with this specifically documented case of Chikanga needing investment from a Rozvi Mambo during the 18th century, it should be added that while the excuse of winter may have seemed valid or reasonable to the people, especially the Portuguese, at Manyika Feira at the time, this in all probability was merely part of the explanation. Indeed we will go so far as to suggest that winter was not the most important reason for the delay. The reasons for the delay had probably much to do with the crisis in Butua caused by the 'Mahia' (Mahia in other sources) wars. This occurred around 1795 and paralysed the Butua-Zumbo trade for the remaining part of the 18th century.

According to Mbava the investiture of a new chief was performed by the representatives of the Rozvi Mambo of the time. The new king, according to Mbava was clothed with black and white calico and sheep skin and anointed with oil. Botelho also tells us that the new Hutomas were given "various articles of vestment" by the Rozvi Mambos. Mabvudzi claimed it was the religious arm

1. A.H.U. Ar. de Moç., Cx. 32, Manica 31/3/1796, Francisco Henrique Ferrão to the Governor of the Rivers of Sena. See also Liesegang, G.J., Beiträge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni in südlichen Mosambique 1820-1895. Ph.D. Köln, 1967, p. 34.
2. See Chapter Seven, pp. 287-295.
of the Rozvi administration which invested new chiefs. This claim appears to be supported by what happened at the coronation of one Mangwende in 1926. After the Native Commissioner had read the address for the appointment of Chibanda as the new Mangwende, a muRozvi, a son of Nerwande the man who had appointed the late Mangwende, stepped into the circle behind Chibanda and said:-

"I am Nerwande. Today you, Chibanda, are appointed Mangwendi, the chief of Noe. According to our old custom I put Chiremba (crown) upon your head. Take care of that which has been given to you today, be just to your people and all will salute you".

Edwards, the Native Commissioner, was so impressed that he thought as Nerwande spoke one "could almost have heard the proverbial pin drop". It does not require much imagination to visualize a somewhat more elaborate and grandiose spectacle of the above ceremony during the heyday of Rozvi dominance. Mr. Abraham claims that the coronation of the Mangwende by the Mwari-cult officers, of whom Nerwande may have been one, dates from between 1704-1710, when owing to a rivalry among the heirs to the Rozvi throne, after the death of Dombo's son, the Mwari cult officers confirmed Mangwende in his chieftaincy. Up to this very day some of the present day chiefs in Rhodesia are still partly invested by a

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1. Fortune, "Rozvi Text", NADA, 1956, p. 82.
MuRozvi person at their coronation along the lines described in the case of Mangwende. While the Native Commissioner gives a chief the power to rule, the Rozvi person bestows the authority of tradition and legitimacy to a new chief. During the Rozvi heyday both authority and power used to come from the Rozvi.

The dual functions of the Rozvi investiture of chiefs involved two very important political principles. The first of these was that by accepting investiture from the Rozvi Mambos, vassal rulers proclaimed their subservience to the Rozvi Mambos. Refusal of investiture by the Rozvi was taken as a sign of rebellion. The only known successful rejection of profession of loyalty to the Rozvi Mambo was by the Mutemas of the Sanga (Shanga), themselves regarded as of royal Rozvi origin. But as Botelho gathered from the Sangas themselves in the 1830s, the first Mutema who refused to submit to Rozvi investiture paid dearly. Indeed one may speculate whether the Mutema's successful rebellion should not be viewed in the context of events beginning around the 1790s in Butua. These events rather than the 'bees' possessed by the Midzimu of dead Mutemas, as Botelho's informants claimed, may have eventually defeated the Rozvi armies. It is interesting to note that, although the kingdom of Manyika was on the marches of the Rozvi Empire, and

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2. Ibid.
despite its connections with a foreign power i.e. the Portuguese, and the fact that the kings of Manyika had been fairly independent rulers long before their subjection to the upstart Rozvi rulers in 1695, there is no evidence that this ceremony was ever neglected. This apparent willingness to be invested by the Rozvi may indeed be used to prove the opposite of control. It may be argued that it was the very fact that the coronation implied no subservience that made men like Chikanga to tolerate the apparent humiliation of being invested by another ruler. But this argument suffers from being wholly negatively based. Since it contradicts the contemporary documentation it needs to be more positively based. It also fails to explain why the Chikangas apparently continued to pay their annual tribute to the Rozvi Mambos. We have already seen how easily the Rozvi Mambos were capable of lending armies of between 2,000 to 3,000 men to the Portuguese at Zumbo. Manyika is said to have had a population of about 5,000 men and 9,000 women. In these circumstances it is doubtful whether the small kingdom of Manyika could have withstood Rozvi power where naked force was the arbiter. A document of around the 1790s from Manyika is in no doubt as to what would have happened to Chikanga if he should ever have avoided paying his taxes to the Rozvi Mambos. An unforgettable reprisal

1. See above p.123.
2. "Corografica", op. cit. In his war against Mutapa Mukombwe Dumbo I is said to have killed over 5,000 men. See Chapter Two p. 77.
would have been Chikanga's fate, according to this document.

In the 1780s it is reported that a Rozvi Kambo had to send one of his armies to Manyika in order to enable the Portuguese to construct their fortress at the Manyika Feira without harassment. It does not appear that the Rozvi had constant recourse to such heavy handed methods of persuasion because as far as our sources go the Chikangas were reasonable subjects who never thought it wise or necessary to measure their swords against the Rozvi, notwithstanding their personal inclinations which may not always have been all that enthusiastic about their subjection to the Rozvi.

However, apart from Rozvi reprisals there is another aspect which may have encouraged and probably still does encourage the Rozvi vassals or some former vassal chiefs to seek Rozvi confirmation. This is what we have described as the Rozvi power of conferring authority or legitimacy on an heir by the ceremony of "Kugadza Ishe". We have already cited cases where the rightful heir was bypassed in favour of one whose claim to power seemed to have rested chiefly on Rozvi support. The Rozvi bestowed legitimacy on a chief and therefore legal and moral authority to rule the people. Before an heir had been invested by the Rozvi his claim to the throne could still have been challenged. It is perhaps arguable that some of the troubles in Manyika in 1796

2. Ibid.
arising from the nomination of Inharugue (Inharungwe) in preference to his elder brothers may have been exacerbated by the delay of the Rozvi to give Inharugue the aura of legitimacy through investiture. So long as Inharugue was just an unannointed, and at that, a questionable nominee, a challenge to his position was not necessarily unlawful rebellion against constituted authority.

The second method in which the Mambos controlled the loyalty of their subjects was through the imposition and collection of an annual tribute. Tribute collection had important political and economic implications. Politically the payment of tribute implied the continued allegiance of a vassal ruler to the Rozvi Mambos and refusal was taken as indication of rebellion by a vassal. The economic advantages of receiving goods from all over the empire is too self evident to need labouring and the political implications of the wealth arising out of the accumulation and possible redistribution of such property cannot be overstressed. But for the moment let us focus on the political importance and organization of tribute collecting.

It appears that tribute collecting was a function of sufficient significance for the Rozvi Mambo to have thought it necessary to appoint the great house of Tumbare to be responsible for its collection: and there are indications that a member of the house of Tumbare was usually one of the highest generals of the armies of the Mambos. In addition a member of the Tumbare family is said
to have acted as regent in case of the sudden death of a Mambo or if negotiations to appoint a new Mambo were protracted.

H. von Sicard has tried to speculate on the possible historical significance of the "Chidavo" of the Bepe clan to which Tumbare belonged. Here we intend to suggest a less elaborate interpretation of some aspects of the "Chidavo" which, it is hoped, supplement von Sicard's explanation. According to von Sicard the Bepe "Chidavo" is as follows:

Bepe
Va-Rusero,
Vapodza Gova,
Vacurur Campfundu Manji i.e. Marefu
Vacurur canhava,
Deno asiva Tumbare,
Egana bgaitsva Humoto.

The allusion to tax collecting may be inferred from the mention of "Winnowing basket", "long millet" and "satchels". The military aspect may be read into the reference to the conquest of the

3. A free translation of which I would render thus:

Bepe
The winnowing basket,
The conqueror of the lowlands,
The ant-hill of the long millet,
The ant-hill of nhava (satchels?)
Had it not been for Tumbare
The children (nation) might have burnt in the fire.

* It is a Shona practice to grow crops like millet, sorghum and maize on ant-hills because of the fertility of such soils.

4. The winnowing basket is one of the most used forms of Shona baskets. Almost any grain crop that is used as food by the Shona would normally pass through a winnowing basket before it was ready for cooking.
"lowlands" and into the last sentence "Were it not for Tumbare the children (Rozvi Nation) would have burnt in the fire". That tribute collecting involved somebody of the standing of Tumbare indicates the importance placed on it by the Rozvi Nambos.

According to the "Corografica" Tumbare used to send envoys every year to Manyika to collect the tribute. And from Posselt we learn that these tax collectors were known as "Banyamai". Only "headmen were selected for this office; relatives of the Mambo appear to have been excluded from the appointment". But Sr. Aquina claims that it was those relatives of the Mambo governing the provinces who brought the tribute to the court. The tribute was levied from the provincial chiefs who would have collected it from their subjects by stages as outlined in the social and political organization of the Shona society. There is no evidence that the subject chiefs themselves carried the tribute to the Rozvi Court.

In case of refusal by a subject chief to pay tax it is said that the Rozvi Mambo used to send a punitive expedition to the rebel chief. The "Corografica" says that if Chikanga ever dared to stop paying tribute to the Rozvi Nambos he "without doubt, would suffer severe retribution" and the Rozvi Mambo would "bring Chikanga to his senses... because the said Changa-

mire and his soldiers are of a temperament so vain that they cannot put up with defiance without seeking revenge and complete satisfaction". It must be a sign of the reality of such possible retribution by the Rozvi army that we so patently lack sufficient evidence that the Rozvi armies were regularly used to enforce tribute payment.

It would appear that tribute was paid in the form of cloth, beads, hoes, axes, gold, ivory, skins, cattle, tobacco, foodstuffs and whatever else the various regions could produce. On account of possible transportation problems it may be reasonable to assume that the nearer a region was to the Rozvi capital the more likely it was expected to bring in things like foodstuffs that entailed bulky and cumbersome transportation. This would be the case in spite of the fact that the Rozvi are said to have used the ox for riding and as a pack animal. Taxes as paid by the Portuguese to the Rozvi Mambos, and their possible political and economic implications, will be discussed in chapter six.

By means of tribute the Mambos acquired nearly all forms of wealth obtainable within their empire. It has been suggested that "It is probable that the Mambo gave as much as he received for some of these goods, as the loose structure of the confederacy


2. Chapter Six, pp. 270-273
would have allowed of nothing else". As supporting evidence Miss Sutherland-Harris quotes an early 17th century source pertaining to the Mutapa kingdom. She gives not one piece of positive evidence to show that the Rozvi Mambos as different from the Mutapas paid for their tribute. Her negative evidence is that the Rozvi empire or "confederacy" as she calls it was too loosely based to allow the Mambos to impose taxation on their subjects. In this chapter we have been showing that the Rozvi empire was more firmly based than Miss Sutherland-Harris would make us believe. The orders of the Rozvi emperors had enough teeth in them to command respect within their empire. Until more evidence can be produced there are no grounds for us to accept the speculation of Miss Sutherland-Harris. As the evidence stands tribute payment was more of an act of vassalage than a form of trade between the Mambos and their subjects.

Finally, another means by which the Rozvi seem to have controlled parts of their empire needs to be explained. This is of such obvious interest that the only tragedy is that there is so little information on it, yet it appears that oral tradition could very easily fill this gap. We are of course referring

2. It is surprising that Miss Sutherland-Harris should argue that the Mambos did not have the wherewith to impose taxation on their subjects but at the same time to imply that they had the necessary means to maintain a monopoly in internal and external trade. Surely the latter is a much more difficult thing to do or even attempt.
to the Rozvi appointment of regional governors or representatives. We have a tradition that in the kingdom of Mahungwe the house of Tandi was stationed as a Rozvi representative. From Posselt we also have a tradition that during the reign of Mambo Basvi (Rupandamananga) Mutinhima (Gumboremvura) was the king's representative among the subject chiefs Banga and Nhema. It is said that it was these subject chiefs who backed Mutinhima when he decided to depose Basvi. There are indications that one Bambiro, a Rozvi, was the Mambo's representative among the people of Zimuto, Bere and possibly some of the surrounding chiefs. A

1. Ranger, Revolt, op. cit., p. 289.
3. Informant: J. Murisi, age c.40, himself a descendant of Bambiro still living in Zimuto. The story of Bambiro was given to me by Murisi in a series of discussions we had at Gonakudzingwa between July 1966 and January 1967.

The people of Murisi, I was informed, participate (in what capacity I have not been able to ascertain) in the investiture of a new Chief Zimuto. Zimuto regards the Murisis, and all the Royal Rozvis, as his maternal uncles. The "Chidao" of Zimuto is "Makuwasha wa Mambo" (but shortened in practice to "Wa Mambo" or just "Mambo") which translates as "The son-in-law of the Mambo". It is said among the people of Zimuto that one of the Zimutos married a daughter of a Rozvi Mambo, hence the praise name "Makuwasha WaMambo". According to Sr. M. Aquina O.P. these political marriages were often used as instruments of policy by the Rozvi with many other chiefs. See Weinrich, A.K.H., (Sr. Mary Aquina O.P.) in Cult. et Dévelop. op. cit., pp. 395-6.

The explanation of the Zimuto "Chidao" and its origin is common information among all the Zimuto people of Mutupo (totem) Ngara (porcupine). But the most colourful explanation of how Zimuto became the son-in-law of a Rozvi Mambo was given to me, in December 1965, by Chikore Chimhandamba, my paternal grandfather, who must have been no less than 90 years old that year seeing that when the first white men arrived at Fort Victoria (1890?) he was already a "Jaya" (young man of between 25-30 years of age).
possible N'wando role in Kanguende may be indicated by some
of the evidence we have already seen. Among the Vahera in
present day Charter District there is a legend that a Kurozvi
Gwangwava (Gwankwaba) was the one who introduced fire and brought
hoes, axes and some kinds of grain to the Vahera. It is possible
the descendants of Gwangwava may have had political and adminis-
trative functions among the Vahera.

A Rozvi house of well known significance in provincial
administration was Chireya and his descendants. The house of
Chireya is mentioned at least twice in Portuguese 18th and 19th
century records. Once in 1784 when the ruling Chireya was said

1. See above, p. 145.
2. Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 23; Beach, "The
He calls Gwangwava a provincial, as distinct from Imperial,
Rozvi who lived in Charter District and may have had political
significance. Beach recounts a tradition showing evidence that
Gwangwava intervened in quarrels among subject chiefs.
3. For the traditions of Chireya see Tapson, R.R., "Some notes
on the Mrozvi occupation of the Sebunkwe District", in NADA,
vol. 21, 1944, pp. 29-32; Colley, D.H., "The Fate of the last
to be rebellious against the Rozvi Mambo's control and in 1890

1. A.R.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Zumbo, 20/6/1784, Antônio Caetano de Souza to the Governor of the Rivers of Sena. On this occasion the Rozvi Mambo told the Muzungus at Zumbo that because the Vashambadzi were trading only in the district under Chireya and not as far as the Rozvi Court, Chireya had begun to be rebellious and arrogant and so deserved a thorough castigation. But the Mambo could not, it was claimed, order such a measure to be taken while (a) the Zumbo Vashambadzi were still in Chireya's district and (b) before the ambassadors sent to Zumbo by the Mambo in 1782 had returned.

The significance of the above can only be understood in the light of the situation at Zumbo between 1782-1784. During this period the "Mongão" never arrived from Tete to Zumbo. This meant that during that period Zumbo had few goods for trade and hence the Rozvi envoys who were sent to Zumbo in 1782 were still there in 1784 as they were afraid to return to the Mambo without the expected quantities of goods. In fact they returned to Butua only in 1785 after the "Mongão" had arrived. The Vashambadzi of Zumbo who traded in Chireya's country during that period must have had such small quantities of goods that a journey all the way to the Rozvi court and other parts of Butua was unwarranted. In view of the fact that Chireya's country is in a non-gold producing area it is possible that the Vashambadzi were only getting ivory from the district. Chireya's district was nearer to Zumbo than the Rozvi court. The Rozvi complaint of 1784 was made in ignorance of the fact that Zumbo had received no "Mongão" since 1782 and therefore could not have carried out any significant trade with Chireya which would have made the latter "rebellious and arrogant". One is tempted to suspect that the Rozvi deliberately blew up the incident in order to pressurise the Muzungus to send their agents more regularly to the Mambo's Court and other parts of Butua.

The significance of the above incident is not that the Rozvi Mambo "did not always fully control the long trade-route to Zumbo" (N. Sutherland-Harris in Pre-Colonial African Trade, op. cit., p. 257) but that Zumbo did not have trade goods between 1782-1784 and therefore the Vashambadzi did not feel justified to go all the way down to Vurozvi to trade. Behind Miss Sutherland-Harris's comment is her hypothesis that the Mambo exercised complete monopoly on the external trade of Butua. In Chapter Five, pp. 202-213, we disagree with this hypothesis. Furthermore the Rozvi embassy of 1784 did not complain that the Vashambadzi had "stopped going by old-established routes and started passing through Chireya's land", (Sutherland-Harris, op. cit., p. 257) (the emphasis is mine) but "that the fazendas had stopped going to Abutua and for that reason the ancient routes had turned to forest; also because all our (Portuguese) trade had been in the lands of Chireya, who being his
when the then Chireya was said to have sent envoys to Victor Cordon to pledge vassalage to the Portuguese crown. The Chireyas governed the Shangwes in present day Mafungabusi District, i.e. the Sengwe area. And since the origins of some of the chiefdoms in the Belingwe area were connected with the Rozvi as revealed by the work of von Sicard, it would be interesting to find out if the practice of Rozvi governors was known in that area. Sister Aquina's researches have led her to state that the Rozvi kingdom "was divided into provinces, and each province was administered by a royal agnate whom the king appointed provincial governor." It is a pity Sister Aquina did not find the need to give examples of these governors.

(Cont.) vassal, had become rebellious and disobedient to his orders and (therefore) had merited a rigorous castigation". Cx. 21, Zumbo, 20/6/1784, op. cit. The complaint is about "ALL OUR TRADE" having been in Chireya's country rather than about changing old routes for new ones. The Rozvi embassy was not complaining about the Vashambadzi conniving with Chireya in destroying the Mambo's monopoly of external trade. That was not the issue. The complaint is not against any trade taking place in Chireya's country but against all trade being carried on only in Chireya's country.

Finally from this document it would be wrong to deduce that the Mambo was unable to castigate Chireya.

A suggestion that a wife of the Rozvi Mambo may have been permanently stationed at the Feira of Manyika appears to have been made as a result of a misunderstanding of the document in question, which in fact refers to a wife of Chikanga. A Portuguese attempt to have a 'son' of the Rozvi Mambo as a representative in Manyika does not seem to have been brought to fruition. But the mention of Rozvi women brings us to an aspect of the Rozvi polity which seems to be striking by its absence. Unlike the situation in the kingdoms of Mutapa, Manyika, Kiteve and Sedanda and others where royal women had direct and important administrative and political roles within the state, among the Rozvi this important aspect of the concept of Divine kingship seems to have been absent. The queen mothers, sisters and wives of the Rozvi Nambos do not appear to have been made provincial governors. The art of government seems to have been a special preserve of men. But this is not to suggest that Rozvi royal women were not shown much respect or did not contribute to the well-being of the empire. Robinson suggests that much respect

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 16, undated but probably written about 1780, report of João de Almeyda, Commandant of Manyika, on proposals for an embassy to the Rozvi.
was shown to the Rozvi royal women, and there are traditions which claim that Rozvi royal women, including the sisters and daughters of Mambos, were used to contract "diplomatic" marriages. It is said that the first wives - the Vahosis - of the Mambos had, according to one source, a duty to feed those who came to the court and were consulted in the election of new Mambos. It is partly because of the apparent lack of direct day to day participation of the Rozvi royal women in the governing process that makes the rule of Queen Matandangaavate so improbable.

It is obvious that this topic of the role and spread of provincial administrators - "Machinda" - desperately requires more thorough field investigation before we can ascertain with certainty the importance of these functionaries. But the evidence already cited indicates immense possibilities as to the manner in which the Mambo could have exerted his influence and control on his vassal chiefs. Finally there is one other possible source of Rozvi influence which needs much attention. In chapter one we have given some Portuguese sources which referred to the famed-cattle of Butua. The sources described the cattle as big and plentiful. They also told us that the people of Butua were

3. Ibid., p. 151.
5. See above, p. 106.
more interested in cattle keeping than in gold trading. Some sources have suggested that the first Rozvi Mambo may have been a keeper of some of the cattle of the Mutapa emperors. The system under which one person gives some of his cattle for safe keeping to another is known as "kuronzera". The person to whom the cattle have been "ronzerwa" can use the cattle in virtually any way he wished (for milk and draught etc.) except that he cannot dispose of them in any way. Disposing of the cattle remains the right of the owner. By this kuronzera system the owner of the cattle has some influence over the keepers of his cattle because if he took back his cattle the keeper will lose the use of the animals. It is conceivable that Royal Rozvi cattle may have been distributed to some of the provincial chiefs under this system. It is also possible that if Dombo had in fact been a herder of some of the Mutapa cattle then he might have increased his influence by redistributing those cattle under the "kuronzera" system. We have already referred to the fact that the name Chirisamhuru (calf herder) has cattle keeping connotations. Mbava mentions that the Rozvi people used to have magic with which to change the colour of cattle. He adds that many of the Rozvi needed such magic because they were cattle robbers.

From the Royal cattle the Mambos would have fed the Imperial Court and all those who visited the court. In view of the significance of cattle in the Portuguese reference to Butua, it is
imperative that some study of the cattle complex among the Shona/Rozvi should be undertaken before we can come to a full assessment of the role and influence of cattle in the Rozvi empire.

Until now we have been investigating the ways in which a Rozvi Mambo controlled his empire or retained the loyalty of his subjects, but it is necessary that we point out some of the problems and failures of this Rozvi system of government. The chief problem was distance. From the province of Manyika to the Rozvi court it was said to have been a month's journey. A return journey to Quissaga is said to have taken a month.

During the rainy season it would have been unwise to travel. It is true that the Rozvi at a later stage in their history used oxen for riding and as pack animals. But without good roads and in the face of wild animals and natural impediments communications were slow and risky. Lack of writing was another major defect.

On account of the distance much authority had to be delegated to local chiefs. Indeed if a chief paid his tribute and remained within the empire, it seems that he was free from much Rozvi supervision. The fact that the Rozvi Mambos, with the exception

of Donbo, accepted the principle of heredity as a basis of their system of government meant that a Mambo's choice for a successor to a particular chieftaincy was often limited to the royal house of that particular chieftaincy. In addition a Mambo could usually either accept or veto a nominee for a particular chieftaincy, which meant that considerable initiative remained with that chieftaincy. Indeed it probably would have been unwise for the Mambos to exercise their power of veto too often.

But we should not overstate the implications of the above problems as if they were unique to the Rozvi empire. All large political units of that period in Africa south of the Sahara suffered from some or most of the above problems. In the final analysis the power and authority of any ruler has to be judged by his ability, potential and actual, to persuade and/or coerce his subjects to obey his orders on issues that are vital to his empire's or kingdom's survival. On this acid test of political power all the evidence we have for much of the 18th century would seem to indicate that the Rozvi were capable of enforcing and at times did enforce their will on their subjects. It is a further aspect of effective political control that a ruler's authority is not habitually challenged. This is worth mentioning since the apparent paucity of evidence of constant Rozvi interference in the running of various chiefdoms might be used to argue against any degree of meaningful Rozvi control of these regions. Such an argument, unless backed by much more positive evidence, cannot
be accepted as proving much.

Tied to the degree of control of the Rozvi polity is the question of the term to be used in describing this polity which Dombo created in 1684-1695. Terms like 'kingdom', 'confederacy' and 'empire' have all been employed without any apparent regard for consistency. Here the term 'empire' has been applied for a number of reasons. The first and probably the most important is that it is the term used in the contemporary Portuguese sources. The same sources refer to Manyika as a 'reino' (kingdom) and to its rulers as 'reis' (kings). In the interest of consistency for the study of the region as a whole the term "empire" is therefore the logical one. The term "confederacy" if inaccurate in that the term "confederacy" has connotations of an agreement implicit or explicit among the contracting partners within the confederacy which one does not find within the Rozvi polity. The regions within the Rozvi empire were not represented in a Mambo's council. Most of these areas were brought in through conquest. 'Paramouncy' has limitations in that within the Rozvi empire were to be found rulers like Chikanga who had chiefs within their kingdoms. This situation would give a Rozvi Mambo the title of "Paramount of the Paramount chiefs" or "Supraparamount". Besides

2. Ranger, Revolt, op. cit., pp. 4, 44; Sutherland-Harris, N., in Pre-Colonial African Trade, op. cit., p. 244.
3. Ranger, Revolt, op. cit., pp. 9, 12, 13; Sutherland-Harris, N., in Pre-Colonial African Trade, op. cit., p. 244.
being a clumsy expression it has simplistic implications which
do not do justice to the Rozvi state and its level of sophi-
stication.

The sources of power and influence for the Rozvi rulers
as outlined above and the resources of the Rozvi empire as seen
in chapter one form the basis for the influence which the Rozvi
Mambos were able to wield during the 18th century. It is true
that the Rozvi Mambos derived some prestige and, at times, may
be power, from the goods they acquired in their trade with the
Portuguese, but the evidence as it stands does not support even
the mere speculation that the Rozvi state may have been built on
1
long-distance trade. Nowhere have we met anything to justify
remotely this kind of supposition. The calico was, as we saw,
used for the investiture of new chiefs and beyond this we have
no evidence whatsoever that the cloth was used to pay the Rozvi
armies - which, anyway, were not paid according to the "Corogra-
fica" - as in the Mutapa empire during the 17th century. The
suggestion by Miss Sutherland-Harris that beads may have reached
all corners of the Rozvi empire from the court of the Mambos is
contradicted by evidence which shows that the reverse was the
case. Subject chiefs paid tribute in beads and other items to
2
the Mambos. The quantities of the goods going to the Rozvi
Mambos were such as to make the influence ascribed to them

1. Sutherland-Harris, N., in Pre-Colonial African Trade, op. cit.,
p. 264.
2. See above, p. 152.
exorbitant. It is true that the Mambos received cloth and beads as tribute from their own subjects as well as from their own trading embassies to Zumbo, but it is most doubtful if the goods so obtained were enough to go beyond the imperial court requirements. In relation to the value, economic and social, of the famed cattle of Butua, the Shona traditional agriculture and other Butua natural resources, it would be most strange if what was after all relatively small amounts of beads and cloth, and an occasional 'sombreiro' and one or two old muskets at a time weighed more in the calculation of the Rozvi Mambos and their subjects. The 18th century situation in Butua had not changed much from what Bacarro concluded in the 17th century when he said that "they (Vakaranga) will not exert themselves to seek gold unless they are constrained by necessity for want of clothes or provisions, which are not wanting in the land, for it abounds with them, namely millet, some rice, many vegetables, large and small cattle, and many hens. The land abounds with rivers of good water, and the greater number of the Africans are inclined to agricultural and pastoral pursuits in which their riches consist".

In depicting thus the contribution of the external trade to the Rozvi power one is not unaware of the great extent to which the Mambos went to protect and facilitate this trade. But

1. See Appendix G.
a corrective of this nature is necessary because a use of Portuguese documents, the *raison d'être* of whose writers was trading, gives a very unbalanced view of the Rozvi empire. The documents reflect the interest of the writers. On the other hand the published Rozvi traditions hardly dwell on the Portuguese connection beyond a very generalized one-sentence-type mention in one or two sources about the Portuguese connection.

**CONCLUSION**

The above reconstruction of the Rozvi empire and its various aspects helps us to appreciate the fact that despite the importance of external trade which dominated the Portuguese documentation, the Zumbo-Rozvi relations were not solely or even necessarily the central aspect of the existence of the Rozvi empire. The empire had many other aspects of as much, if not more, political and economic import to the emperors than external trade. The discussion reveals that the Rozvi rulers commanded considerable sources of power within their empire. And it is this background of a strong and powerful internal base for the Rozvi rulers that provides us with the key to the fascinating story of Zumbo's near total economic and political dependence on the Rozvi rulers during much of the 18th century.

Chapter Four

THE ROZVI AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ZUMBO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF

THE CAREER OF FREI PEDRO DA TRINDADE

The story of the origins, glory and decline of the Feira of Zumbo gives us a unique opportunity to observe and evaluate from documentary evidence the political and economic power and influence of the Rozvi empire as seen by some contemporary foreigners. The Feira of Zumbo, like the Rozvi nation and empire, owes its origins to the achievements and consequences of the wars of Dombo I. After the destruction of their feiras and old trading connections in Mukaranga towards the end of the 17th century, the Portuguese spent nearly twenty years before taking initial hesitant steps to revive some of the old Mukaranga connections, especially with the Feira of Manyika which seems to have been re-established about 1715 after its destruction in 1695. As it turned out, however, the Rozvi rulers were not to allow the Portuguese to occupy any other of their old feiras of Mukaranga except the Feira of Manyika. Yet before official contacts were made between the Portuguese and the new rulers of Mukaranga - the Rozvi - some of the Portuguese who had escaped from the wars of Dombo concentrated much of their effort north of the Zambezi. This was not a new interest; only its

1. See Chapter Two, pp. 84-85; Also Companhia de Moçambique, Territorio de Manica e Sofala, Monografia, Porto, 1934, p. 9; See also Theal, R.S.E.A., vol. 5, Goa, 21/1/1719, Dom Luís de Menezes, pp. 52 and 54.
scale was different. With the destruction of the trade of Mukaranga intensification of Portuguese interest north of the Zambezi was the natural consequence. It was out of this reaction to the wars of Dombo that the settlement of Zumbo was established. And as soon as peace was made between the Rozvi and the Portuguese, the Rozvi connection became the central theme in the story of Zumbo. The history of this connection allows us an insight into some aspects of the military, economic and political skills and interests of the Rozvi. In the discussion that follows about this connection however we should always remember that, despite its impressive scale and sophistication as well as its overwhelming importance for the Portuguese of Zumbo, this connection represents only one facet of the political and economic life of the Rozvi empire.

(I)

Foundation of Zumbo

The name Zumbo is sometimes used in 18th and 19th century Portuguese documents to describe the three Portuguese settlements at the Zambezi-Luangwa confluence and at other times to refer specifically to one of the three settlements. The earliest of the three settlements was on the island of Merva (Merve) or

1. Although it is true that after the re-establishment of normal trading relations between the Rozvi Mambos and the Portuguese, Butua became the chief trading partner of Zumbo, it is doubtful whether at the beginning "Zumbo's main raison d'etre was to tap the Butua gold", 'Zambian Trade with Zumbo in the Eighteenth Century' by Nicola Sutherland-Harris in Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900; O.U.P., 1970, (ed.) by R. Gray and D. Birmingham, p. 231.
Chitakatira (Chitacativa). Chitakatira island is in the Zambezi River and was reported to have been a quarter of an hour's journey by canoe from Mucariva. The second settlement in order of occupation was on the east bank of the Luangwa where it meets with the Zambezi. It was this settlement at the foot of Mount Mazanzua (Masancua, Mazanura, Muzuanzua), which was strictly speaking known as Feira or Vila of Zumbo. The present day Zumbo is built on the site of the old Zumbo. The third settlement was founded in 1788 and was known as Mucariva. This was on the peninsula formed by the land between the Luangwa and the Zambezi at their confluence. Nowadays the ruins of Mucariva are marked on Zambian maps simply as Feira.

The three settlements were ideally chosen to exploit the river transport both up the Luangwa as well as down the Zambezi. Of the three it appears that Chitakatira was more easily defended and as a result it was often used as a refuge by the Portuguese in the 18th and 19th centuries when they were under attack or threat of attack from Africans. As the founders of Chitakatira


2. The most celebrated occasion being in 1804 when Jozê Pedro Diniz escaped to Chitakatira after Mucariva had been destroyed by Buruma. In 1782 during the troubles connected with Fr. Pillar (Chapter Five, p. 218) as well as between 1777-79 (Chapter Six, pp. 251, 275-276) when Cassiressaire occupied Zumbo, the Portuguese traders fled to the islands of the Zambezi.
are said to have been refugees from the wars of Dumbo, it is not surprising that problems of defence loomed high in their thinking. There is evidence to show that the Portuguese were aware of the Zumbo region before they settled at Chitakatira. In some Portuguese documents it is claimed that the lands of Zumbo were donated by one of the Munhumutapas to the Portuguese Crown. Dom Sebastião (1560-78) is one of the monarchs to whom the donations were said to have been made. It has also been suggested that the lands of Zumbo were donated by Dehwe Mupunzagutu to João V of Portugal (1706-1750). Whatever the truth of the above references may be, we do know that from the 16th century onwards the Portuguese either visited or lived at Chicova from time to time. Since Chicova was no more than six to eight days journey from Zumbo, it is quite possible the Port-

2. J.J.T. Botelho, História Militar e Política, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 387 and also Tenente-Coronel Sousa e Silva, Distrito de Tete, op. cit., p. 32; claim that it was to Dom Sebastião that the lands north of the Zambezi including Zumbo were donated by Munhumutapa.
3. Abraham, D.P., NADA, No. 36, 1959, pp. 81-2. For his source Abraham quotes J.J. Nogueira de Andrade, Arquivo das Colonias, vol. 1, No. 2, 1917, p. 94. But on p. 94 Nogueira de Andrade says that "Punzagutu" gave half of his empire to Dom Sebastião. This of course is an absurdity in that Mupunzagutu was an 18th century Kutapa while Dom Sebastião was a 16th century Portuguese king. Abraham while claiming to cite Nogueira de Andrade replaces, without saying so, Dom Sebastião with João V (1706-1750).
The Portuguese may have visited the Zumbo region as early as the 16th century. In the account of Fr. António de Conceição we have concrete evidence that by 1696 Portuguese merchants traded regularly as far as the country of chief Buruma (Umburuma). Axelson has suggested that the Uruano of Fr. Conceição may well have referred to the Luangwa River. Along the Zambezi it appears that in the later 17th century the Portuguese traded as far as Muzimo, which in the 17th century was to be the farthest point to which the Portuguese ever travelled up the Zambezi. From all this we can deduce at least two important points. First of all the settlement of Zumbo (Chitakatira) had not been formally established by 1696 and secondly the Portuguese were aware of the country around Zumbo - Chitakatira sometime before the establishment of the Feira of Zumbo.

Because of the lack of documents written at the time of the founding of the Zumbo (Chitakatira) settlement, it has not been possible to find a precise date for the foundation of Zumbo (Chitakatira). Much of what we know about the origins of Zumbo comes from sources originating from the second half of the 18th century. Even as early as 1760, the then Cap. Mor of Zumbo,

3. Chief Muzimo's i.e. Mudzimu's country is in Rhodesia around Chirundu area; on the east and south-east it borders on chief Dandawa and on the south and south-west it borders on chief Nyamunga. While on the north and north-west it is bounded by the Zambezi River.
João Collaço, was complaining that although the ancients at the Feira were claiming that the Feira was over sixty years old that year, he himself could only find documents covering a period of forty four years i.e. giving the possible dates for the founding of Zumbo as 1700 and 1716 respectively. Other dates like 1710, 1714, 1719, 1720 and even 1740 have been suggested for the founding of Zumbo.

Before hazarding another guess, let us assess all the available sources on the origins of Zumbo. But before we go any further with our inquiry we must clear up an important point about the Portuguese idea of founding a settlement (or the abandonment of a settlement for that matter). There are at least two senses in which founding a settlement might be understood. The first meaning is that of the initial setting up of a settlement by some Portuguese traders acting on their own (or even some official's) initiative. The second sense of founding is the formal recognition of the settlement by the Governors of Sena and Moçambique which took the form of the appointment of a Captain.

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 8, Zumbo, 13/3/1760, João Collaço to the Governor General.
3. "Relação da Fundação... de Zumbo", op. cit.
Mor for the already established settlement. An appreciation of the two meanings is essential to avoid the embarrassment which may arise from the divergence of the dates we have been offered by the various sources and authorities on the foundation of Zumbo.

The name of the founder of Zumbo and Chitakatira has been variously given as one fulano Pereira, a native of Goa, or Francisco Pereira or Francisco Rodrigues. To the Rozvi Mambos the Capitães Nores of Zumbo were always known as "Pereira".

This indicates that contact between the Rozvi and Zumbo started very early in the life of Zumbo. Possibly the full name of the founder of Zumbo was "Francisco Rodrigues Pereira". But we would be on safer ground if we only referred to him as Pereira, the founder of Zumbo. It is said that Pereira was one of the Canarin traders who fled from the Feira of Dambarare when Dombo attacked it in 1693. In view of what we have read in chapter two - where
it was stated that no one escaped death at the hands of Dombo - it is unlikely that Pereira and his friends were among the Dambarare merchants. But since Fr. Conceição says that when Dambarare was destroyed some settlers of Hwangwa (Ongoe) and some Indians living at Chitomborwizi fled first to the Zimbabwe of Mutapa and then from there to Tete, possibly Pereira may have been one of these traders, whom we are told later used to trade along the Zambezi from Tete or Chicova up to Buruma and Muzimo. And it may well have been from one of these trips that Pereira and some other Indian traders decided to set up a settlement at Chitakatira. But the "Rellação da Fundação e Estado da villa do Zumbo, e desta de Mucariva... " representing information based partly on oral tradition at Zumbo at the end of the 18th century, claims that Pereira fled with his "escravos" from the attack of Dombo and went straight towards the Zambezi. On arriving at the Zambezi he came to the Island of Chitakatira then known, after the name of its ruler, as Nerva. It appears that at the beginning the lord of the land was friendly to Pereira but not long afterwards he abused their friendship by robbing Pereira of a boat load of goods. But Pereira, described as having been a rough and ready man who had distinguished himself

in the fight against Dombo, confronted the chief with the intention of castigating him. The chief, terrified at the prospect of measuring his arms against Pereira, decided to compensate the latter by ceding to him the Island of Merva. Within a short time it is said that Pereira, who was to be known to the Africans as Chicalea (which seems to have meant a tough brave man) became famous in all the neighbouring districts.

The "Relação da Fundação... do Zumbo" tells us also how a chief called Mazandoa, living in the kingdom of Senga, which was under King Chifuca, requested assistance from Pereira to fight one of his rivals. Apparently Pereira fought so well that Mazandoa reported this to his master, king Chifuca. With the consent and approval of Chifuca, Mazandoa rewarded Pereira with the land surrounding Mt. Mazanzua. This land, on which Feira of Zumbo was to be built, seems to have been bound to the east by the lands of chief Mutunda, to the north-east by those of chief Tongue to the west by the Luangwa River; and to the south by the Zambezi river. For a long time during the 18th

1. Since the Indian traders at Hwangwa and Chitomborwizi fled before being attacked when they heard that all the residents of the Feira of Dambarare were killed by Dombo we probably should dismiss the claim that Pereira distinguished himself in the fight against Dombo as falsification made in the process of legend building and hero-worshipping. See Chapter Two, pp.78-80.
2. The boundaries of Zumbo were described in detail in "Relação da Discrição dos Limites da vila do Zumbo e desta Mucariva... " op. cit
177 century the land Mazanzua was to remain the sole Portuguese possession west of Chicova. The "Rellação da Fundação... do Zumbo" continues to tell us that after helping Mazandoa, Pereira was asked for military assistance by one of the two warring princes of Dande. One of these was called Muvanga. It was Muvanga who asked for Pereira's help, which he duly received and consequently was victorious over his rival. As a reward, Pereira was given land adjoining the south bank of the Zambezi near Zumbo. This land was known as Mucaranga (Mukaranga).

It was at this juncture, according to the "Rellação da Fundação... do Zumbo" that Pereira went to the Cap. Mor Geral of Moçambique who was then António Cardim Froes (1726-1730) asking to be appointed the Cap. Mor e Juiz ordinario, of the Feira of Zumbo, of Ilha de Merva and of Terra da Mucaranga. It is said that this was duly done.

On the possible date as to the founding of Zumbo there is one important point that stands out i.e. most of the sources

1. Dande is in Rhodesia just below Zumbo. It seems to be named after the river Dande. In the 18th century together with Chidima on the east they represented the two remaining provinces of the Mutapa empire. But this did not mean that Dande was under the imperial throne. The successors of the Mutapas ruled Chidima; and Dande was virtually independent, having its own kings. The kings of Dande were often very friendly to Zumbo during the 18th century.

consulted seem to agree that the settlement was founded about the time of the destruction of the Feiras of Mukaranga (Dambarare). Two of the documents give 1710 and 1714 as the years in which Zumbo was founded on the mistaken belief that the attack on Dambarare took place during those years. Since we have shown that the attack was in 1693 the above dates must be dismissed as based on wrong data. Fr. Conceição in 1696 did not mention any Portuguese settlement above Chicova. Our next estimate comes from João Collaço, who, basing himself on the memories of the "veteranos velhos" said that Zumbo was sixty years in 1760 i.e. it must have been founded around 1700. With little else to go by a date around 1700 seems the most plausible date for the settling of Pereira at Chitakatira. The apparent loss of the letters patent for the nomination of Pereira as Cap. m Mor e Juiz ordinario of Zumbo makes it equally difficult to say with certainty when Zumbo was officially founded. Because João Collaço in 1760 seems to have found documents on Zumbo going back to about 1716, this might suggest a date nearer to 1716 (most likely earlier rather than later). Professor Silva Rego thinks that Zumbo was founded in 1719. Bruce Miller says that Chitakatira was founded in 1720 and Feira of Zumbo and Feira of Mucariva (which he simply refers to as Feira) were founded in 1725. This

1. Miller does not give his source. He is obviously wrong in saying Mucariva (FEIRA) was founded in 1725, because in fact it was not founded until 1788. See above, p. 169
seems unlikely because by 1723 we are told that the island of Merva because of flooding had been abandoned for "many years" in favour of the lands north of the Zambezi. The "Rellaçao da Fundaçao... do Zumbo" gives the earliest possible date for the formal founding of Zumbo as 1726. It has been stated in chapter two that peace between the Portuguese and the then Rozvi Nambo was signed in 1714 and that the Feira of Manyika seems to have been re-established in 1715. Since the earliest source we have, claims that in 1760 documents going back to at least 1716 were still at Zumbo we probably will not be far from wrong if we opt for a date around 1715.

Finally on the question whether the lands of Zumbo and Chitakatira were procured for Portugal by Pereira or the donations of the Mutapas, we need not regard the two processes of acquisition as necessarily irreconcilable. Pereira's work could be interpreted as the effective implementation of the previously theoretical rights of the Portuguese crown. But as far as one can judge the so-called donations need not always be taken seriously because (a) they were often so imprecise as to mean anything (or nothing) (b) often the Mutapas are made to grant areas which were not within their jurisdiction. It is doubtful indeed whether Zumbo was ever within the empire of the Mutapas. But whatever the

1. Fr. Manoel de Santo Thomas, Senna, 19/6/1723, in O Chronista de Tissuary, No. 40, April 1869, p. 61; Also in "Livro das Mongoes" No. 89, fl. 506.
truth of the matter may have been, for our purpose it is immaterial whether Portuguese rights in Zumbo derived from donations by Mutapas to the Portuguese crown or from local chiefs to Pereira. The important thing was that Zumbo, unlike Mucariva which remained Buruma's land, was regarded as Portuguese property, where in theory the Portuguese had complete sovereignty.

(II)

Trindadian "Golden Age" and its significance for Rozvi History

Documents pertaining to the first fifty years of Zumbo's existence and its trade are scarce. Besides the very rare letter and report here and there, there is a dearth of information about Zumbo, from anyone who had first hand knowledge of the place, before 1760. The result is that we have to rely on generalised reports often covering the whole of the Rios de Sena and sometimes even as much as the whole of the captaincy of Moçambique. And furthermore many of these memorials were often written by secretaries to the Government of Moçambique. This meant that often they had access to their predecessors' memorials. The result is that sometimes a mistake could be carried from one writer to another. The memorialists very rarely vary the structure of presentation of their predecessors' writings. Often they look at the same problems and prescribe almost the same solutions. Of course it

1. E.g., Inacio Caetano Xavier (1758-1761), Antonio Pinto de Miranda (1767- ), Joaquim Jose da Costa Portugal (c.1778), Jeronimo Jose Nogueira de Andrade (1783-84?), Manuel Galvao da Silva (1784-1791?).
is true that often the problems were the same and therefore required the same or similar solutions, but the memorials on the whole seem to repeat themselves monotonously. The unfortunate result of all this is that we get little sense of movement in the life of Zumbo—its relationships seem to have been fixed. Sometimes the memorials record incidents in order to prove certain points, but these are few and far between, and worse still their authenticity cannot always be established beyond doubt. While most of these memorials can be generally relied upon to give tolerably correct broad outlines, they are often confused when it comes to such matters of detail as names of people and places, historical dates and geographical details. Therefore where no other corroborative evidence can be obtained these memorials must be used with circumspection—indeed with almost the same caution one would employ when using data received from oral tradition, for some of these memorials are based quite often on information obtained from oral evidence.

The above strictures against these memorials notwithstanding, it still remains difficult to demolish or dismiss two themes which run through all the memorials examined in relation to the early period at Zumbo. The first is the image they create that the period of Fr. Pedro da Trindade was the "golden age" of Zumbo. The second is that the period beginning with the death of Fr. Pedro saw a decline at Zumbo. An assessment of the career and achievements of Fr. Pedro seems to be our only way by which we
may throw some light on the "Golden Age" of Zumbo.

We know very little about the life and activities of Fr. Pedro before he came to Zumbo. In 1720 he was reported to be 
1
at Sena, and it seems that he only came to Zumbo around 1726 where he lived as vicar, Cap. Mor and mining tycoon until his death in 1751. It appears he took the vicarage of Zumbo in 1726. The first contemporary assessment of Fr. Pedro is to be found in a Report of 1744 made by Frei Francisco de Santa Catarina (O.P.). In that year Frei Catarina referred to Fr. Pedro as the greatest expert on the working of the bares in the Rios de Sena and advised the Count of Alorna, the then Viceroy of India, to request Fr. Pedro to write for him a report on the bares. In 1749 another Dominican Fr. Luís da Piedade reported from Goa after visiting Moçambique that Fr. Pedro enjoyed "great respect and authority" among the Africans "from Tete until Zumbo where he lives".

2. Andrade, A.A. de, Relações, op. cit., p. 544, says that Fr. Pedro da Trindade was Cap. Mor at Zumbo up to 1753. But a letter of 22/11/1753, by Francisco de Mello de Castro (A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 4) Moçambique, clearly mentions that Fr. Pedro da Trindade died two years before 1753 i.e. 1751. Also A.A. de Andrade, Relações, op. cit., p. 200, the anonymous report of 21 May 1762 says that Fr. Pedro da Trindade died in 1751.
3. Andrade, A.A. de, Relações, op. cit., p. 200. Here it said that Fr. Trindade was vicar at Zumbo for 25 years and died in 1751.
4. Boxer, C.R., "A Dominican Account of Zambezia in 1744" in Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, No. 125, vol. 2, 1960, pp. 4-11; and A.A. de Andrade, Relações, op. cit., p. 202, it is said that Fr. Pedro Trindade wrote some memorials on the land of Zumbo for the Marquez da Alorna. It has not been possible for us to trace these papers.
Pedro founded the Church, Nossa Senhora dos Remedios at Zumbo. In 1734 it had 262 Christians and in 1735 the number had increased to 270 and by 1749 there were as many as 478 Christians. These numbers were never to be equalled or surpassed during the whole history of Zumbo up to 1836. It was even claimed that during the period of Fr. Pedro Zumbo had as many as eighty white Portuguese settled in it. If this were true it would represent the highest ever recorded number of white Portuguese at Zumbo before the twentieth century. Most probably the figure is inflated and it merely indicates that people at Zumbo at the beginning of the 19th century, felt that Zumbo had many more white Portuguese during Fr. Pedro's period than at any other subsequent time up to 1801. Nevertheless such high figures of the Christians and non-African population are an indication of a thriving settlement.

1. Fr. Luis da Piedade gave the name of the church as Nossa Senhora do Rossario. But during the second half of the 18th century the church was consistently known as Nossa Senhora dos Remedios.
2. A.H.U, Av. de Moç., Cx. 3, Register of Christians of Zumbo compiled by Fr. Pedro da Trindade and sent to the Ecclesiastical Administrator of Moçambique, Fr. Simão de S. Tomas, together with the only surviving letter of Fr. Pedro da Trindade dated Zumbo, 10/8/1734.
Fr. Pedro is however best remembered for his mining activities. Not only is he said to have known more about the working of the bares than any other of his Portuguese contemporaries in the Rivers, but he also had his own bares. The chief among which was "Bar de Fr. Pedro" which may also have been known as "Pamba" (Pimbe, Pemba). The Bar de Fr. Pedro or Pamba was for a long time supposed to produce the best gold of all the bares north of the Zambezi. Fr. Pedro is said to have had under him as many as 1,600 African clients. Possibly António Pinto de Miranda has exaggerated the numbers, but there is no mistaking the broad implication that Fr. Pedro had very many clients. It is said that when Fr. Pedro died he left assets in gold, copper and African clients estimated at 100,000 xerafins (about £129,166.67).

1. Andrade, A.A. de, Relações, op. cit., pp. 202, 281. Sometimes it was known as Bar Chipapa; see Carvalho Dias Anais, vol. 9, tomo 1, 1954, op. cit., p. 196.
2. Andrade, A.A. de, Relações, op. cit., p. 201; Carvalho Dias Anais, vol. 9, tomo 1, 1954, op. cit., p. 196; "Descrição do Zumbo extrahida do Manuscrito de um Capitão-mor daquelle Distrito em 1764" in Almanach Civil Ecclesiastico da Província de Moçambique para anno de 1859, 39 depois do Bissexto. Moçambique 1859, by J.V. da Gama, pp. 159-160. For reasons why we believe that this article is the work of Luís António de Figueiredo, see Appendix E.
4. Andrade, A.A. de, Relações, op. cit., pp. 201; Conversion from xerafins to pounds and pence is calculated on the basis of an ounce of gold costing £12.50. One and half (1½) xerafins in the 18th century weighed one matical which itself weighed 0.155 ounces of gold.
On a number of occasions Fr. Pedro is said to have helped the "Generaes daquella Conquista" in military as well as political matters. F. de M. de Castro, governor general of Moçambique in 1752 and before then a governor of the Rivers of Sena, described Fr. Pedro not only as a man of great substance but also as one who was zealous and energetic. The one incident Francisco de Mello de Castro related to show the usefulness of Fr. Pedro to the Portuguese Crown was what took place in 1743 during which time F. de M. de Castro was himself "General da Conquista". It seems that in 1743 the various Mutapa princes, in their struggle for the imperial throne, began to cause disturbances in crown lands near Tete and in the Marave country. This was very bad for the trade of Zumbo. When Fr. Pedro received the request for help from the "General da Conquista" he sent for aid from the then Rozvi Mambo, who in turn is said to have dispatched a body of about 2,000 armed men commanded by their

1. This was a title used at times to describe the governor of the Rivers of Sena. "Conquista" (Conquest) did not only mean that the Portuguese believed that they had conquered all the Rivers of Sena, it also meant that they hoped to conquer the region some day.


Evidence of troubles from the sons of Mutapa corroborated by Fr. Santa Catarina in 1744. These troubles may be those referred to by Manuel da Costa, as taking place after the death of Inhapande whom Abraham in NADA, 1959, p. 81, calls Samatambira Nyamanda, ruling (1719 to 1735). Abraham says Nyamanda was followed by Nyatsutsu, who ruled only a short period (c.1735 to 1740). It would seem that the 1743-4 troubles would be associated with the early years of Mupunzagutu's reign (c.1740-1759). Manuel da Costa's letter was dated Zumbo, 2/3/1769, "Projecto de restabelecimento da Feira de Dambarare", "Fundo de Sec. XVIII" in Mozambique, No. 84, 1955, pp. 81-87, doc. 162.
"Competentes Cabos" (approximately rank of field commanders) and an Inhabeze (a general). The Inhabeze had orders to stay with Fr. Pedro as long as the latter had any further use of him. The Inhabeze was given a young woman for a wife by the Mambo. F. de Mello de Castro says that was a highly prized gift among the Rozvi. But as it turned out the "General da Conquista" decided not to accept Changamire's army, so when the 2,000 men arrived on the southern bank of the Zambezi near to Zumbo they were met by Fr. P. da Trindade who, probably after thanking them, gave them some cloth and asked them to go back. The anonymous memorial of 1762 in Andrade is probably alluding to incidents like the above when it claims that even the Changamire obeyed Fr. Pedro da Trindade.

Among the Africans at Zumbo Fr. Pedro was remembered for having discovered a herb of medicinal value. Indeed so lasting was the impact of Fr. Pedro's influence on the Africans at Zumbo that in 1862 Albino Manoel Pacheco tells us that the people of Buruma invoked the name of Frei Pedro in their songs. Fr. Pedro received acclamation for his missionary zeal and effective

1. Castro, F. de M. de, Descrição dos Rios de Senna, op. cit., pp. 32-33, paras 66 to 67. Since Francisco de Mello de Castro was General da Conquista - Governor of the Rivers - between 1740-1745 the incident narrated and its details must have been well known to him, since it was probably he who sent the orders that the Changamire's men should not be allowed to cross to Zumbo.
3. Ibid., p. 237.
administration from the viceroys of India and the king of Portugal himself. All his successors as capitaes mores of Zumbo, including J.P. Diniz, himself not used to regarding other capitaes mores of Zumbo as his equals, were full of praise for Fr. Pedro. According to Fr. Santa Anna, Fr. Pedro controlled the Zumbo population, African and non-African by "sua pacifica agelidade". But B.M.P. do Lago, often regarded as the 'Pombal' of Moçambique and definitely not an admirer of the Dominicans, in a vitriolic remark on Fr. Pedro, said that although the latter had been the only administrator of Zumbo who had shown any capability of controlling the inhabitants of the feira, he, Pereira do Lago, was unwilling to invoke Fr. Pedro as an exemplary administrator because the famous (notorious?) missionary was "such an ambitious and so wicked a man that he died in the midst of a mountain of more than thirty concubines".

3. "Rellação Fundação... do Zumbo", op. cit.; Although the report was written by Vincente Affonso Pereira there is little doubt that it was heavily influenced by Jozé Pedro Diniz, who in fact is presented to us as the hero Cap. Mor of Zumbo-Kucariva, comparable only to Pereira the founder of Zumbo and Fr. Pedro Trindade, about whom we are given a very clipped account.
Without in any way minimizing the considerable personal contribution of Fr. Pedro towards the prosperity and stability of Zumbo during the period of the "golden age" of the Feira, we must nevertheless observe that there was an obvious correlation between good trading conditions for the Feira and political stability within the Feira. And to a large extent continued good relations with the neighbouring chiefs also depended on the presence of trading goods at Zumbo. On the other hand, the presence of a good cap. mor at Zumbo did not always guarantee good trading conditions. It was observed by Fr. Santa Anna in 1767 and corroborated by António Caetano de Souza in 1782 that lack of trade goods by Portuguese traders at Zumbo led to troubles by the African agents. Furthermore, lack of trade goods meant that the Portuguese had little with which to give presents and pay tribute to the African rulers. Since the relation between the Portuguese and their African agents at Zumbo was more akin to that of wholesaler and retailer rather than of a master and servant, it was vital that the Portuguese traders should always possess trade goods. The problems of Fr. Pillar and Souza in 1782-84 and the apparent ease with which Correia was able to restore stability seem to be partly connected

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Zumbo, written and signed by the escrivão Manoel Jozé Gonçalves. The above is a copy based on the original. The copy was made on 10/12/1782 at Tete by Jozé Francisco de Oliveira.
3. See Chapter Six, pp. 239-259.
with the fact that the other two governed when Zumbo had little
or no trade goods while Correia's captaincy coincided with the
arrival of trade goods. Between 1782-84 Zumbo traders received
very little goods from Tete. Father Pillar was unable to pay
the full milandos demanded by the African agents of the Domi-
nicans, and the result was that they demanded and achieved
his expulsion from Zumbo in 1782. António Caetano de Souza
who took over faced troubles from neighbouring chiefs who
demanded goods under all sorts of pretexts. It was only in
1785 that Caetano Manoel Correia was able to bring peace to
Zumbo by giving presents (bocas) to nearly all the chiefs around
Zumbo as well as to Mhondoro Nhamafeca and Nhamaçoca. The first

1. See Chapter Six, p. 278, and A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 22,
Zumbo, 24/11/1785, C.M. Correia to Governor of the Rivers.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 22, Zumbo, 24/11/1785, Caetano Manoel
Correia to the Governor of the Rivers. Mhondoro Nyampfeka
(Nhamafeca) and Nyamasoka (Nhamaçoca) were only two of the five
Mhondoro within the Mutapa area of influence, the other three being
Bedza, Samarengu and Namcova. Mhondoro Samarengu (Samarengo) lived
north of the Zambezi in Chief Nhapende's country. Bedza (Beza,
Nobesa), who was described as the chief Mhondoro in the Rios de
Sena, lived near Musengezi River and Nyampfeka and Nyamasoka
lived en route to Butua. Namcova, whom D.P. Abraham does not
mention, is only given in documents as living in Dande. These
Mhondoro are found in Zumbo documents covering 1774-1825. Mhondoro
Bedza was a central figure in many of the incidents of Zumbo in the
1780s. Nyampfeka and Nyamasoka were important in the Zumbo-Butua
trade in that the Vashambadzi had to pass through their lands. For
published sources see Abraham, D.P., "Chaminuka" in Zambesian Past,
op. cit., esp. p. 30, footnote 5 and Pacheco, A.M., Diario, op. cit.,
pp. 44-45. All five Mhondoro are mentioned in A.H.U. Av. de
Moç., Cx. 38, Mucariva do Zumbo, 30/4/1801, Joze Pedro Diniz,
"Relação da Descrição dos Limites da villa do Zumbo, e desta
de Mucariva, suas distancia, confins dos Reinos, e terras
sercumvizinhas, e compresond. cias estabelecidos dos Senhórios dellas".
captaincy of Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos 1766-68 is a good example of a hard working and intelligent cap. mor who lived at Zumbo during a period of decline about which he could do very little. The fact that Fr. Pedro was so rich and that he ruled during an era of apparent abundance are important elements in any assessment of his, no doubt, important personal contribution to the history of Zumbo before 1751. Fr. Pedro's legendary success, in view of the correlation between economic prosperity and political stability, reinforces the picture of the "golden age" during the pre-1751 period at Zumbo.

Fr. Pedro da Trindade's wealth and the flourishing state of Zumbo in the first half of the 18th century have important implications for the Rozvi empire. From the documents of the second half of the 18th century we are constantly reminded that Zumbo's major trading partner was Butua - a term used to describe the Rozvi empire, excluding Manyika kingdom. In 1770 it was said that:-

"The villa and Feira of Zumbo... is the metropolis of the whole trade (of Rios de Sena) and the fountain of the large profits that the subjects of Your Majesty realize from the trade in beads and cloth which the said villa makes in the gold mines of Butua which are under the sway of King Changamira".

1. Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos spent no less than forty years in the Zumbo trade and exercised the captaincy of Zumbo on three separate occasions. He was an energetic cap. mor who wrote some useful reports on the trade of Zumbo. He got on very well with the inhabitants of Zumbo, especially Manuel da Costa, who was the most powerful trader at the time. Although he did all he could to preserve and increase the trade of Zumbo, because of the troubles within Butua over which he had no control, he had only to contend with keeping peace at the Feira. See Chapter Six, pp. 253-267 for troubles of Zumbo in the 1760s.

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 14, Sena, 15/7/1770, a report by Inácio de Mello Alvim.
In a report of 1750 Francisco de Mello de Castro, writing during the time of Fr. Pedro's captaincy at Zumbo, also stated that the greater portion of Zumbo's trade was with Butua which produced about five to six hundred pastas of gold a year. The importance of the Rozvi connection for Zumbo during this period was dramatized in the events of 1743 when the then Rozvi Mambo sent an army to quell troubles which, although outside the empire, nevertheless affected it through the Zumbo connection. The same story showed us in fact that the then Rozvi Mambo protected the Vashambadzi in their trade within Butua. The fact that the Mambo was first of all able to dispatch an army of about 2,000 men to help Zumbo, and secondly, even more significantly, that he was able and willing to send another army to punish and destroy the original 2,000 man strong army because the latter had robbed some Portuguese Vashambadzi of about five to six hundred pastas shows evidence of a virile and powerful empire indeed. It reveals how much the mambos valued the Zumbo trade route. If the second half of the 18th century is anything to go by, and there is no good reason why it should not be, then the pre-1750 prosperity of Zumbo should be seen as evidence of

1. See Glossary.
2. Castro, F. de M. de, Descrição dos Rios de Senna, op. cit., p. 32, para. 64.
3. Ibid., pp. 32-33, paras 66-67.
a relatively peaceful and prosperous Rozvi empire. In chapter six we argue that the prosperity of Zumbo largely depended on the good trading conditions in Butua. What evidence there is also indicates that the same may have been true of the pre-1750 situation. If this were so then the period before the 1750s may well represent a "golden age" of the Rozvi empire which one day archaeology and perhaps oral tradition may throw some light on.
Chapter Five

BUTUA-ZUMBO ROUTE: ITS TRADING SYSTEM

Detailed knowledge of how "the fountain of large profits" trade operated during the first half of the 18th century are rather scanty. The two major sources from this period of Zumbo trade are the Dominican Account of 1744 and the Descrição dos Rios de Senna by Francisco de Mello de Castro from the year 1750. A comparison of the trade system as described by F. de Mello de Castro in 1750 and that emerging from after that date, but before 1795-6, shows how little the problems of Zumbo changed qualitatively. Reading the Descrição dos Rios de Senna, which was written in the lifetime of Fr. Pedro, one cannot avoid concluding that the picture of a completely trouble free pre-1751 Zumbo presented by later 18th and 19th century Zumbo writers was misleading. It appears that the difference was more often one of degree rather than of kind. The system and technology of trade at Zumbo changed little before the last decade of the 18th century. Here and there new problems cropped up but the range of solutions were limited and almost always turned out to have been traditional. But if we had enough sources for the pre-1750 period on the trading system then our approach to this subject would no doubt have been different. In the absence of such information however our reconstruction will largely be based on sources after 1750. This limitation imposed by sources rather
than by choice is really our major justification for not presenting a more chronologically based analysis of this important topic.

(I)

The Trade Route

The trade goods of Zumbo had connections and ramifications that went as far as India and Portugal, but for our study we will concentrate mainly on the Butua-Zumbo-Tete section of the story. From Tete caravans of Portuguese traders and their African porters moved by land to Chicova. This section of the journey normally took between five to six days, but on occasions it could take ten or more days, depending on whether the rivers were flooded or not. At Chicova the goods were loaded in canoes and taken to Zumbo, spending another seven to ten days on the way. The full journey from Tete to Zumbo could take anything between twelve to twenty six days. The Zumbo-Tete section of the route was to prove one of the major headaches for the capitães mores of Zumbo and governors of the Rivers. The chief among these problems was the instability

1. Castro, F. de M. de, Descrição dos Rios de Senna, op. cit., p. 31, para. 62, estimated that the journey could take between thirteen to sixteen days. "Fundo do Séc. XVIII", in Mocambique, No. 84, 1955, document 162, Zumbo, 2/3/1769. Manuel da Costa, said that the journey used to take 20-24 days; Pacheco, A.M., Diario, op. cit., p. 53 in 1862 wrote of his Tete to Zumbo journey "I spent (not counting the delays and the long detours I was forced to make on account of the flooded rivers) twenty six days. But a man without cargo or "escoteiro" (lit. 'escort'), as it is said in this country, and having good weather, can do the whole distance in 16 or 18 days going four to five leagues a day".
along the whole section from Zumbo to Chicova created by the
rivalries among the Mutapa princes covering much of the 18th
century especially after the death of Mutapa Mupunzagutu in
1750. All the Rozvi interventions or attempted interventions
on behalf of the Zumbo Muzungus, as happened in 1743, 1772
and 1780-1 had their origins in the problems created by the
Mutapa princes. The pretenders to the Mutapa throne, present
in some numbers throughout the 18th century, preferred to occupy
sections of this route on both sides of the Zambezi from time
to time. The result was that relatively powerful independent
princes and chiefs were found along this route. Each chief and
princeling had to be negotiated with individually. This meant
that much cloth and beads had to be spent in tolls and presents
in order to insure safe passage for the traders. There seems
to have been little that the Portuguese could do to stop this
situation. Their traditional but progressively discredited
solution was to sign treaties with the Mutapas asking the latter
to control their vassals and to ensure safe passage for the
traders. But few if any of the Mutapas in the 18th century
especially after the 1760s were able to control all the princes
in their kingdom. Also, the Changara-Ganiambaze rivalry covering

1. Andrade, J.J.N.de, in Arquivo das Colonias, op. cit.,
vol. 1, No. 2, p. 94.
2. Chapter four, p. 185; Chapter six, pp. 274-280.
3. For example Jozé dos Santos Reis spent 3,455 panos on presents
to chiefs in 1820. See A.H.U. Av. de Mog., Cx. 70, Zumbo-Mucariva,
2/3/1821, Jozé dos Santos Reis. List of expenses incurred by the
expedition for Zumbo-Mucariva compiled by Jozé dos Santos Reis.
the period of late 1760s to about 1785, created a particularly awkward situation for the Portuguese because in 1769 Changara had signed a treaty of friendship with the Portuguese. After 1 1776 he was deposed by Ganiambaze who ruled until 1785 and indeed Changara did not succeed Ganiambaze until around 1793. Zumbo in particular suffered much because of its commitment to Changara.

The second solution was for the Portuguese to use armed strength to secure the route. During the crisis of the 1760s this was tried with varying success. It seems to have worked in securing the route between Chicova and Tete in 1769 but by 1771-1772 it was found to be ineffective. The Portuguese soon realized that they did not have the required forces to meet the

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 15, letter No. 777 Tette, 1/11/1776, Evaristo Jozê Pereira da Cruz to the Governor General.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Zumbo, 5/1/1785, Antônio Caetano de Souza to Governor of the Rivers; although Souza gave the death of Ganiambaze as recent news we probably will be safer if we assumed that Ganiambaze must have died for as long as anything up to a month before his death was known at Zumbo. Our study of the Ganiambaze story showed that he ruled as Mutapa in 1768? and then from about 1776 to 1784 or the beginning of 1785. This drastically revises D.P. Abraham's (NADA, No. 36, 1959, pp. 66, 82) reconstruction which gave Changara's reign as being 1759 to 1785.
3. It seems Ganiambaze was replaced by Mutapa Bangoma (c.1785 to c.1799). Changara ruled from about 1793 to 1806, as well as from 1769 to about 1776. For evidence that Changara was the Mutapa in 1793 see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 32, Zimbave, 1/2/1793, Emperor Changara recommendation for second Lt. Antônio Jozê da Cruz.
5. This was when Ganiambaze blockaded Zumbo and help had to be requested from the Rozvi. See Chapter Six, pp. 274-275
challenges of the "regulos poderozos". J.P. Diniz was to attempt to secure the trade of Zumbo into the interior and from Chicova to Zumbo in the early 19th century by military means, but that too proved a catastrophic disaster.

In the final analysis the only solution which the Portuguese could follow was to pay the demanded 'Milandos', 'Masanzus' and 'Bocas'. The problem always became more acute when few goods were sent from Tete to Zumbo. Since the princes and chiefs often demanded the same amount of goods this made it uneconomic for traders to venture up the Zambezi from Tete to Zumbo during such periods.

The other problem found between Chicova and Zumbo in particular was the need to hire canoes and rowers to transport the goods to or from Zumbo. More often than not it seems, the boats and sailors were hired from Africans. Prices were not always low, in fact by the late 1760s Manoel da Costa and others were complaining that payments to sailors were going up. From

1. J.P. Diniz in 1801 organized a detachment of 100 soldiers for the purposes of protecting the Vashambadzi to Mamba and the boats between Mucariva and Chicova as well as to defend Mucariva. But in spite of the 100 soldiers, Mucariva was destroyed by Buruma in 1804.
2. See Chapter Six, pp.270-274, for a discussion of these terms.
3. In 1761, Marco António de Azavedo Coutinho de Montaury, Governor of the Rivers wrote to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque, the Governor General reminding him that the Africans of the interior were only interested in the existence of Zumbo for the trade goods they received from it and without that they cared little about preserving what the Portuguese saw as their "Conquest", see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 9, Sena, 15/7/1761, Marco António de Azavedo Coutinho de Montaury to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque; a copy of the original.
Tete to Chicova a porter was paid one half a matical, and from Chicova to Zumbo a sailor was paid one matical. A cargo of ten mutores used to cost about one matical in a canoe from Chicova to Zumbo. The trader was obliged to provide food for the sailors and porters in addition to these payments.

Other hazards between Zumbo and Tete were loss of goods through robberies and shipwrecks. From Tete to Zumbo the goods were normally carried during the "mongão grande". This was the trade goods cargo that came from Tete to Zumbo in June. The "mongão piquena" came around November. In a good year both "mongães" might come but on the whole, during the latter half of the 18th century, Zumbo traders were only too happy if they could receive one "mongão" a year.

After they had arrived at Zumbo the merchants reserved some of their goods for trading at the feira, (which was estimated to consist of no more than one two hundredth (1/200) of the total of the trade of Zumbo) and some for the region north of the Zambezi, but "the greater bulk was sent into the interior, entrusted to the massambazes (Vashambadzi), a name given to those Africans who, to trade for the gold and ivory, go to Abutua whence the greater proportion of the gold which comes from the

2. Ibid., and Castro, F. de M. de, Descripção dos Rios de Senna, op. cit., p. 31, para. 63.
Rivers is extracted. It seems that in the first half of the 18th century the Vashambadzi used to spend one year in Butua.

It is even said that before the 1760s the Vashambadzi used to go to Butua in October and come back at the end of March or beginning of April the following year. But it appears that towards the end of the 18th century it was taking four years for Vashambadzi to return from Butua. In the first half of the 18th century the gold of Butua averaged yearly between about 500 (about £9,675) and 600 (about £116,250) pastas. But by the second half of the 18th century it averaged 200-300 pastas in a year. Butua gold maintained its primacy for the Zumbo trade until around 1796 when it was superseded by the ivory of Mamba.

2. Ibid., para. 63.
4. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, undated and unsigned, but clearly the work of Sebastião de Morães e Almeida, Cap. Mor of Zumbo, to Governor of the Rivers. Probably written in September 1788.
5. Castro, F. de N. de, Descripção dos Rios de Senna, op. cit., p. 32, para. 64.
6. 200-300 pastas, see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, letter No. 591, 24/9/1767, Fr. Manoel Jozé de Santa Anna to B.M.P. de Lago; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 38, Mucariva do Zumbo, 30/4/1801, "Relação dos generos de Fazendas de Portugal, e do Norte, que se comercio desta Vila, e o producto das suas Comutaçôens se exporta para MSSª e daly pa Dio, Damao, e Goa, Dominios da Impreal coroa de Portugal". By Jozé Pedro Diniz; Diniz says that a few years before 1801 Butua used to produce about 200 pastas of gold. Also before 1762 it appeared that the mines of Butua had dropped from the 5 to 600 pastas averaged in the first half of the century to about 300 to 400 pastas. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 9, Senna, 15/7/1761, Marco Antônio de Azavedo Coutinho Montaury to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque.
7. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 32, Mucariva, 21/May/1796, Jozé Pedro Diniz to Diogo de Souza.
Gold Mining in Butua and the Role of the Vashambadzi

The vashambadzi used to carry the trade goods on their shoulders when they went to Butua. They do not appear to have used canoes for their transportation to and from Butua. This fact alone must certainly be regarded as a major reason why the ivory trade of Butua never superseded that of Mamba along the Zambezi. For the Mamba ivory the Zambezi provided the highway. Of course it is also true that the gold trade of Butua was more lucrative than ivory trade and so it was natural that the ivory trade of Butua had to be over-shadowed by the gold trade. But this is only part of the answer which must always be seen in the light of transportation problems in Butua. As a rule the vashambadzi were given one half of their pay or commission before going to Butua and the other half on their return. Once in Butua the vashambadzi travelled to the known centres of gold mining in Butua. In the second half of the 18th century these centres were often referred to as the bares of Butua or Changamire. The term bar in this context was used to denote a mining area or region. The Portuguese, as distinct from the vashambadzi, in the 18th century had a frightening lack of knowledge about the actual location of the mines of Butua. All that the governor

2. In the strict sense of the term there were no bares in Butua but by the second half of the 18th century the term had come to mean any mining region. In Nyungwe bari means a mine. We do not know if the Portuguese borrowed the term from Nyungwe.
general of Moçambique could write in 1786 was that in the Rozvi Empire the gold mines were to be found in 'Abutua', in 'Muzuzuros', and Sanhate, and in Manyika the gold mining was done all along the Revue and Mutare Rivers. It is true the "Corografica" is better on Manyika mines than Manoel Galvão da Silva, on whose information the governor general wrote his 1786 report; but in respect to Butua the vagueness of Galvão is not improved upon until the mid-19th century when more precise information is available. In 1857 we are informed that gold mines were found in Manhengero (unidentified) a region in the land of the Rozvi (Orobes); in Suurocuro (unidentified) in the district of Oeras (Vuhera i.e. Buhera) worked by the "Adeveras" i.e. people living along the Devure River. Near these gold mines were found major stone ruins. This may be a reference to Matendere ruins. Also in Vuhera gold was found in the locality of Nhamuçanga (River Nyamasanga) which was mined by the people of Vuiba (Kuimba?). Again in Vuhera was found the gold mines in Guenze (Gwenzi or Rwenje River) area. Gold was also found in the region of Mussana (Chief Musana?) in the district of "Binre" (Bindura?); and again in Macomo (Makomo) in Bindura district. The people who mined here were known as "asanchuros" (unidentified). In "Binre" (Bindura?) gold was also mined by the "amuchauachas"

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 23, Mossambique, 3/12/1786 Manoel de Melo e Castro to Martinho de Mello e Castro.
(Vashawasha) in Muchauacha (around Chishawasha) area. Copper was mined in Danga (Ndanga) by the Duma people in the area of chief Mutema, and at "Pendico" (unidentified) by the people of "Munhoquerua" (Munhokwerua?) (unidentified), who were also Duma speakers. This document gives details of the mines in Manyika kingdom, in Maranke, Nhungwe and Vumba. It was to these mining areas or bares, to employ the contemporary jargon, that the vashambadzi used to carry their goods in order to trade for gold. The details of how and with whom the vashambadzi used to trade at these bares is largely unknown. All we are told is that they used to trade with the "bareiros".

But who were the "bareiros"? North of the Zambezi the bareiros seem to have been those Portuguese who worked the bares above the Zambezi. In Butua "bareiros" as found in Portuguese documents seems to be used to refer to chiefs as well as miners. It may well be that bareiros, when used as an alternative of "regulos" or "chefes", may be referring to chiefs ruling in gold producing regions. But what was the connection between the

1. (The document ends by saying that "The chiefs, ruling (lit. possessors of) the above mentioned lands had been tributaries to the emperor Changamire, but today, by treachery, a Vatua, Nezircase (Mzilikazi) has taken possession of the lands of the said Changamire, who (now) lives as a refugee in Vijanja (Nanja), the land of Chief Gambiza, in the district of Oeras (Vuhera) which borders on his (Changamire's) large territory"). Document found in Annais do Conselho Ultramarino, parte nao official, Serie 11, pp. 186-187, "Mappa das minas conhecidas no Districto de Senna", Senna, 30/7/1857, Izidoro Correia Pereira, Capitao mor of the Feira of Manica and Quiveve.

Rozvi Mambos and the bareiros? This is a relevant question because according to one scholar the "trading operations (in Butua) were strictly controlled and confined by the Mambo or Changamire who had a monopoly of gold, the main export" (my emphasis). Miss Sutherland-Harris likens the Mambo's monopoly of trade to a form of "state control". She argued that the religious and military power base of the Rozvi Mambo were politically slender and so the Mambo's intervention in trade was vital to his position. After stressing the advantages the Mambo was supposed to accrue from his monopoly of trade she concludes the discussion on the subject thus:—

"The Mambo managed to have the best of both worlds. His people, on the other hand, remained isolated, their economy having no momentum of its own, themselves bound to Mambo's wishes in trading affairs, rather than seeking the profits for themselves."

Therefore the Mambo's relations with the bareiros is clearly of crucial importance for our study as a whole. We have already shown in chapter three that the Rozvi Mambo commanded considerable political, military, religious and economic power within his empire. As a source of the Mambo's economic power we stressed taxation and the famed cattle of Butua. In so far as Miss Sutherland-Harris argues that tribute collection or taxation was

2. Ibid., p. 243.
3. Ibid., p. 245.
4. Ibid., p. 246.
a form of trade, within her own definition of 'trade' she is very right to stress 'trade' as one of the major sources of the Mambo's power. In chapter three we stressed the economic and political importance of taxation or tribute collection within the Rozvi empire. There we saw no evidence to suggest that tribute involved "an exchange of goods" between the Mambos and their subjects. And as such there is no reason to include taxation in the empire in a discussion of Rozvi trade. And therefore what we are left with is to discuss the proposition that the Mambos had a monopoly of external trade. What evidence do we have that the Rozvi Mambo had a monopoly of trade in his kingdom? Miss Nicola Sutheland-Harris says that "it seems clear from all the accounts that he (Mambo) had a monopoly over the production of the gold" (my emphasis). There must be a few hundreds of documents in the Portuguese archives relating to the Portuguese trade with the Rozvi Mambos. Out of all these Miss Sutherland-Harris quotes only two to demonstrate that the Rozvi ruler had a monopoly of gold trade. She could easily have mentioned a third one in another published source. These three documents written in 1750, 1753, 1759 respectively are the only ones out of all those consulted by this writer which might be construed to show that the Rozvi Mambos had some kind of monopoly

2. Ibid., p. 258.
3. Ibid., p. 258, note 4.
in the gold trade. The first document was written by Francisco de Mello de Castro, then governor of the Rivers of Sena; the second one was by Inácio Caetano Xavier a secretary to the government of Moçambique; and the third by a Cap. Mor of Zumbo, Manuel da Costa. The first two were memorials written by persons who would have relied for their evidence on written and verbal reports and stories of men from Zumbo. Only the 1769 document was written on the basis of information received at Zumbo by Manuel da Costa from the ambassadors of the Mambo who succeeded in 1768. But what do these documents actually say? The Descripção dos Rios de Senna says that the subjects of the Rozvi Mambos were forbidden to trade in better quality gold and could only trade in the less valuable gold. Put differently, what the memorial is saying is that the Rozvi subjects were allowed to trade in poorer quality gold to the vashambadzi. It is worth commenting here that from other documents on Zumbo we know that the Rozvi Mambos invariably sent "ouro bruto" i.e. impure gold to Zumbo during the 18th century. Indeed it would appear that the gold from the Butua trade was almost all virtually "ouro bruto". The monopoly which Mello de Castro seems to be talking about is seen to be one about more and less impure gold. Both the Rozvi Mambos and their subjects traded in impure gold. Suppose Mello de Castro was right, then in such a system we should not look for loopholes.

1. See below, p.229, note 1; See also Appendix G.
but rather avenues through which to drive an ox-drawn wagon. Such a monopoly would have been virtually meaningless even with present day means of state control. Coming to the other two documents we are told by Inácio Caetano Xavier that a chief Caroa (Karoi, Chirua, Chireya?) had found a big gold nugget in the Bar da Caroa but was unwilling to hand it over to the then Rozvi Mambo. Caroa threw the nugget into a river and from time to time traded chipped pieces of the nugget to the vashambadzi (presumably on the pretext that it was worthless gold!). The document in question says that the then Rozvi Mambo was the lord of the rich Bar of Caroa and chief "Caraoa" was his local vassal. The 1769 letter by Manuel da Costa says that, "Futhermore the said Changamire had instructed them (his envoys) to say that he had ordered three messocas (regiments) of Munhais to go and punish some of his bareiros for failing to report to him the discovery of new bares. On that occasion those messocas not only castigated the said bareiros but, without orders, also robbed the mussambazes of Manuél da Costa".

Now to conclude on the basis of only two of the above documents that "from all the accounts" the Mambo had a monopoly over the production of gold, and that he "strictly controlled" the "trading operations" is at best to show an incautious reliance

4. Ibid., p. 258.
5. Ibid., p. 243.
A closer analysis of the whole question of monopoly and the political significance of external trade reveals a different picture from that painted by Miss Sutherland-Harris. We have no document stating that the Mambo did not have a monopoly of trade, neither should we expect to find such a document. What we can do here is to present a picture of the trading system as constructed from Zumbo documents of the second half of the 18th century. When the vashambadzi left Zumbo they traded all over the bares of Butua up to the very borders of Manyika and on occasions even into Manyika itself. Some of these vashambadzi no

1. "The kingdom of Abutua is close to our settlement of Zumbo, whence, from times past, our merchants have been trading with the Africans of the said kingdom of Abutua. But the mussambazes, who do the actual trading, normally go in a southerly direction to the area where the kingdom of Changamira borders that of Manica". A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 37, 9/10/1800, Pedro António José da Cunha to D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho; See also above PP.201-202, for the bares of Butua.

2. "The chief reason why everybody is (financially) ruined and cannot continue trading... (is that) the said mussambazes conduct secret trading operations without coming (with the proceeds) to their masters. Some of the mussambazes have been organizing their own trade from Butua to Manica. Yet the said Changamira has not taken any action against them despite that on several occasions representations were made to him on this very matter. On this occasion I made further representation to the said Changamira that he should take strong action against the above mentioned mussambazes and see to it that they returned to settle their accounts with their masters. In so doing he (Changamire) would be demonstrating his true friendship... and the merchants (of Zumbo) would be able to resume trading". (my emphasis) A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Zumbo, 20/6/1784, António Caetano de Souza to the Governor of the Rivers.
doubt went to the court of the Mambos, but there is no suggestion from any source that all the gold trade of the Rozvi empire took place at the Rozvi Court. The nearest we come to it was in 1803 when an attempt was made by the Zumbo Portuguese to introduce a new method by which the trade of Butua could conceivably have been controlled by the Rozvi Mambo's court.

The Zumbo Muzungus requested the then Rozvi Mambo to send one of his grandees to Zumbo so that he could accompany the Zumbo vashambadzi to and from Zumbo. The chief function of the grandee was to insure that the vashambadzi did not trade in the bares of Butua before they had presented themselves at the Mambo's court.

"Where the said Changamira, in his presence, ought to entrust the said Mussambazes with their panganãöens to his respective bareiros, with the express command that as soon as the bartering was over, a report about the fazendas and the mussambazes should be made to him (Changamira) and, accompanied by the same grandee, they (mussambazes) should be sent back annually to this villa so that they could give the accounts of the panganãöens in the presence of the said grandee". In 1804 Zumbo-Mucariva was destroyed by Buruma. After 1803 no other Rozvi embassy is known to have visited Zumbo-Mucariva and as such the proposed trading system between Zumbo and Butua was not to be effected. Besides

1. Sutherland-Harris, in Pre-Colonial African Trade, op. cit., p. 258.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, Mucariva, 19/1/1803, Jozé Pedro Diniz.
the Shona term vashambadzi suggests itinerant traders who moved from village to village selling their goods. From the above discussion we conclude that the trading in Butua was not all or even necessarily conducted at the Mambo's court but wherever gold mining was done i.e. at the bares which were found all over the empire.

The second way in which the Mambos could have controlled external trading was by putting their officers at all the gold producing centres. Since we have just shown that trading in gold was carried on all over the Rozvi empire and not only at the Mambo's court it would appear that if such officers existed it was they who would have collected the gold from the miners and then traded it to the vashambadzi on behalf of the Mambos. Not one shred of positive evidence has been put forward to support such a speculation. In the discussion on the organization of the Rozvi Empire we have not seen provision for this supposedly critical function. On the negative side we have seen that the vassal chiefs of the Rozvi Mambos paid taxes in, among other items, gold, beads, cloth and ivory. To pay one's tribute in gold and ivory implies prior possession of those items before payment. And payment in beads and cloth indicated ability to engage in foreign trade since external trade was mainly in gold and ivory.

1. See above, Chapter Three, p. 152, note 1.
In Manyika we are told that the vashambadzi did not only pay tribute to Chikanga but to every chief and prince in whose land they traded. This indicates that trade did not only take place at the binga or court of the Chikangas but went from chiefdom to chiefdom. In brief it would appear that there is little evidence to substantiate the claim that the Rozvi Mambos "strictly controlled" the production and trade in all the gold of Butua. It is conceivable that the Mambos may have had people ("bareiros", a term perhaps used to describe miners or chiefs ruling in mining areas) who were specifically assigned for the job of performing mining operations on behalf of the Mambos. The document of 1769 by Manuel da Costa may well have been referring to such people when it said that the then Rozvi Mambo sent an army to punish his bareiros who had discovered some mines but had not bothered to tell the Mambo about their discovery. But going side by side with such officially-backed mining operations would have been that of the rest of the subject chiefs throughout the empire, who dug for gold or hunted for ivory and then traded with the vashambadzi, all without reference to the Mambos. With the gold or ivory and cloth and beads they might then pay taxes to the Mambos. In the end our own view of the gold mining in Butua comes close to Manuel Barretto's 1667 description of gold mining in Mukaranga: "A countless number of Africans and their wives and children assemble in the place where they choose to open marcondos, the chief of each village

2. See above, p. 207
forms a separate party with his people, and each begins to
open his morondo in the fashion of a well". This was done "only
in the three months which are called do Crimo (Chirimo), that
is August, September and October." This would seem to be the
reason why the Zumbo traders sent their vashambadzi to Butua
at the end of October.

A policy of total monopoly would have been difficult and
expensive to enforce and probably an inefficient means of getting
the gold. In a monopoly situation the subject chiefs might have
had little incentive to dig for much gold. On the other hand
getting the gold and ivory or beads and cloth through taxation
was less difficult and served a dual purpose i.e. economic and
political. The Rozvi Mambos had a reasonably good machinery to
enforce payment of taxation by their vassals but they would have
needed a much bigger bureaucratic machinery than the one described
in chapter three to have had an enforceable and workable monopoly
in external trade. As it is the fruits of external trade were
filtered through the Rozvi political machinery. By allowing his
subjects to trade he avoided rousing undue resentment but through
taxation he benefited from that trade. It may well be that it
was this 'taming' of the impact of external trade through the
political system which further reinforced the Rozvi rulers' immunity to the vicissitudes of the Zumbo trade.

2. Ibid., p. 458.
While the Zumbo-Butua route suffered from as many robberies and high milandos as the Zumbo-Tete section, it had a big advantage in that from time to time the Rozvi Mambos were able to exercise a restraining hand on their subjects. One of the more notorious robberies in Butua against the Portuguese vashambadzi was carried out in 1743 by the 2,000 men who had been sent by the then Mambo to go and help Fr. Pedro da Trindade. That army robbed about 500 pastas of gold from the vashambadzi. In reaction to this, "The Changamira imposed a barbarously atrocious punishment since he not only killed everything that he could lay his hand on from that body of men, but also in like manner executed their women, children and property, by sending men to attack and destroy their villages". Caetano Manoel Correia's letter of 1785 reveals an interesting practice which the Zumbo traders used in order to insure relatively safe passage for their trade goods to Butua. To prevent the vashambadzi from being robbed, claimed Correia, it had become necessary to instruct them to travel for five days up the Zambezi before crossing to the other side and it had also been necessary to send in advance, "bocas" (mouth) gifts to Khondoros Inyamafeka and Inyamasoka as well as others to "Changamira e Tombar (Tumbare)". Although an expensive practice, that was clearly a sound approach to the problem of robberies.

2. See Chapter Three, pp. 149-150. 24/11/1785 seems to be the earliest date in which the name Tumbare appears in a Portuguese document.
But if the Rozvi Mambos tried to control their subjects in order to protect the trade with Zumbo, there was one problem about which they could do little to help the traders of Zumbo. In one word the problem was summed up by the name VASHAMBADZI. It appears that the Rozvi Mambos forbade Indian and European Portuguese traders from entering their kingdom of Butua. Although no reason is given for the ban we may safely assume that the ban originated from the Rozvi fear of a recurrence of the 17th century situation when Portuguese nationals wielded power within Mukaranga. It is well worth noting that the ban seems to have been free from any racist overtones. Indeed one source asserts that some Portuguese nationals, captured from Manyika during the wars of Dumbo, were kept prisoners at the court of the Rozvi Mambos. One of the Mambos is said to have requested the Portuguese to send a priest to minister to the spiritual needs of these Portuguese, but because of the fear which the Rozvi Mambos inspired in the Portuguese no priest was found willing to exploit such a heaven-sent opportunity for missionary endeavour. There is a vague allusion to the possibility that some of the Mambos may even have taken as wives some of the captured Portuguese, since Rozvi traditions emphasize that no one who was fair skinned was allowed to succeed to the

thron because he was suspected of having foreign blood.

Finally there is evidence that mulattos from Zumbo were allowed to visit the Rozvi Court. Because of all these points it is difficult to say how rigidly the ban on white and Indian Portuguese was enforced. It is doubtful that one could always distinguish a mulatto from a Canarin or even from a Portuguese. But even if the ban was not necessarily rigidly enforced, in practice it seems the manner of the trade in Butua did not favour the non-African stranger. To be able to travel from place to place, living and looking like the people of the land were important attributes for the vashambadzi. In the end we probably have to interpret what the Portuguese documents claim to have been a total ban on all the whites from entering Butua in the context of a Rozvi determination to resist the growth of Portuguese power bases in Butua as had happened in late 17th century Mukaranga.

But even allowing for a flexible interpretation of the ban, there is no gainsaying that in practice the Portuguese themselves do not seem to have been keen to engage directly in trade with those Africans like Mamba and Kankomba who do not appear to have objected in principle to having the Portuguese in their countries.

The vashambadzi became therefore an indispensable factor in the Butua-Zumbo trade during the 18th century. The vashambadzi seem to have been men of substance in their origins. Indeed Fr. Santa Anna tells us that many of them "are almost always forros and libertos and very often are Munhaes of robber princes and chiefs" and co-operated with the Portuguese "for the purpose only of reaping the booty". Fr. Santa Anna added that "these Africans of Zumbo, are captivos as long as their masters possess some cloth and continue trading, but when the latter no longer possess cloth the former become captivos of others". The story of Sircussi (Sircusse, Sircussy) an agent of Alexandre da Costa illustrates well the relationship of the Mushambadzi and his Portuguese master, or rather trading associate. Sircussi came from the land of Pando, under the control of chief Samife whose land was on the way to Orenje and Namba following on that of Buruma. In 1785 it appears his "master" Alexandre da Costa left Zumbo for Tete. But before leaving Zumbo, Alexandre da Costa is said to have seized eight African agents and two boats belonging to Sircussi on some such flimsy grounds as that Sircussi had been an unfaithful agent. All reasonable attempts by Sircussi to retrieve his property proved unsuccessful. Sircussi then decided to use what the documents call his powerful connections

1. See Glossary for the meanings of forros and libertos.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, letter No. 591, Zumbo, 24/9/1767, Fr. Manoel Joze de São Anna to B.M.P. do Lago.
in Pande in order to harass the Portuguese trade with Mamba and Orenje. The tactic worked and by the end of 1787 Sircussi was compensated for his losses. Clearly the story of Sircussi demonstrated that he was a man of substance who controlled at least eight agents and two boats. Yet the documents of Zumbo describe Sircussi as an "escravo" (slave) of Alexandre da Costa. Also in 1769 we are told that Mushambadzi Nhamuza was robbed of about 800 head of cattle in Butua. Even if the number was exaggerated yet it underlines the fact that Nhamuza was a man of very considerable means.

The use of the term "escravos" in 18th century Zumbo documents differs from both the interpretations of the term as used by Dr. Newitt and Dr. Isaacman describing the situation further down the Zambezi. There were no prazos at Zumbo during the 18th century. Zumbo was wholly surrounded by free independent African rulers. The African agents of the Portuguese traders carried on their agriculture and kept their cattle and had their houses in the lands of independent African chiefs especially in the lands of Dande, Buruma and Senga. This had important political

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 22, Zumbo, 20/12/1787, Caetano Manoel Correia; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Zumbo, 24/12/1787, Cosme de Mello; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Zumbo, 24/12/1787, Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida to the Governor of the Rivers.
implications, in that these Africans owed their allegiance to
the chief in whose lands they lived, and from whom they received
protection. As early as 1768 Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos had
concluded that when the chips were down the African agents of
the Portuguese would almost certainly side with the neighbouring
chiefs against the Portuguese. The subsequent history of Zumbo
proved just how correct Campos had been. The costliest occasion
when this was demonstrated was in 1804 when the agents of the
Dominicans joined Buruma against the Feira of Mucariva. However
the most dramatic demonstration of the independence of these
agents and of how they interpreted their own relationship with
the Portuguese was provided in 1782 when, after they had accused
Fr. Pillar of treating some of their people as slaves, they
demanded and achieved his expulsion from his functions as vicar
and acting cap. mor of Zumbo. We come to the conclusion that
neither the vashambadzi (i.e. those engaged in trading proper)
nor the other Africans who helped the Zumbo traders by either
working their barus in Marave country or with building houses
for the traders at Zumbo nor the Manamucates (who were used

2. Santana, Dr. F., Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana, vol. 11, op. cit., p. 462.
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Four reports of meetings held at Zumbo on 23, 24, 29 and 30 October 1782, all signed by the Escrivão Manoel Jozé Gonçalves. But only copies of the above documents were in fact consulted. The copies were made on 10/12/1782 at Tete by Jozé Francisco Oliveira; See also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Zumbo, 5/11/1782, Antônio Caetano de Souza to the Governor of the Rivers.
on diplomatic missions) can in any sense be described as "escravos". Indeed in 1790 J.J.N. de Andrade described the vashambadzi as the "mercadores" of Zumbo and the Muzungus merely as "moradores".

The ingenuity displayed by the vashambadzi in manipulating the trading system to their favour is truly remarkable. From as early as the era of Fr. Pedro it had been noted by F. de M. de Castro that the chief problem for the trade of Zumbo was that the vashambadzi often decided, "in an expression of the land, (to) panducar", which in Shona is spelt Panduka (Kupanduka), meaning to rebel or turn against. This term was used to describe the act of deserting or of robbing the Zumbo merchants by their own vashambadzi who went to Butua. Sometimes these vashambadzi were robbed when travelling in Butua as happened in 1743 but at other times they squandered the goods of their masters and then claimed that they had been robbed. By 1767 Fr. Santa Anna was reporting to B.M.P. do Lago that the vashambadzi going from Zumbo to Butua had evolved a new trading practice which was very injurious to the Portuguese traders at Zumbo. According to Fr. Santa Anna whereas in the past a Mushambadzi used to take one year to go to Butua and back, by 1767 the vashambadzi had come to an arrangement among themselves whereby some of them operated solely in Butua without ever returning to Zumbo but met every year half way.

between Zumbo and Butua with the other vashambadzi whose duty it was to operate the Zumbo half of the trade. This system increased the time it took for the Portuguese trader to receive his profits as well as increasing the price of goods. By 1769 Manuel da Costa was complaining that although the fixed price of a bar of ivory at the vila of Zumbo was eighty maticaes in fact the vashambadzi were demanding one hundred and ten maticaes for a bar of ivory from the Portuguese traders. The people who suffered most were the Portuguese traders at Zumbo because they began accumulating debts and the merchants at Sena were becoming reluctant to give goods on credit to them. The vashambadzi seemed to have grown bolder and more enterprising with time as by 1784 we are informed that many vashambadzi were in the habit of receiving goods from Zumbo traders and going into Butua to start their own independent operations with the Portuguese at the Feira of Manyika. The traders at Zumbo were pleading with the Rozvi Mambos to order these vashambadzi to return to their masters at Zumbo. Above all they entreated the Mambo in 1784 not to give land to the vashambadzi as the Mambo had already done to one called Coutto.

3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Zumbo, 20/6/1784, Antônio Caetano de Souza to the Governor of the Rivers.
A final insight into the way the vashambadzi exploited their role to their own advantage is provided in an edict of March 20, 1796 made by José Pedro Diniz, the energetic cap. mór of Mucariva (Zumbo having been abandoned in 1788). Although the edict was promulgated to regulate the Portuguese relations vis à vis the vashambadzi, it nonetheless throws light on the vashambadzi activities. The first regulation said that any person within the Feira who either induced or in any way knowingly took over an African agent of another inhabitant of Mucariva, without the owner's consent was under an obligation to restore the agent to his rightful owner. If such a restitution was not made within twenty days, after the publication of the edict then the person guilty of such an offence would be liable to one month imprisonment as well as payment of a fine (for being a thief and disturber of peace), of ten maticaes for the first offence and twenty and thirty for the second and the third offences respectively. Payments were to be made to the Fazenda Real. This regulation reinforces the point made earlier that the vashambadzi changed their masters at will, depending on whether their masters had trade goods to sell or not. Regulation number two said that anyone who entrusted his fazenda to a Mushambadzi in the employment of another person without the latter's consent, such a person, irrespective of

1. See above, p. 216
whether the mushambadzi was a "forro" or "cativo" forfeited the fazenda to the original owner of the mushambadzi and also incurred the fines as outlined in regulation one. The third regulation much like the first said that whoever enticed a mushambadzi who had with him the goods of another master ought to return the said mushambadzi to his first master within twenty days of the publication of this decree. Failure to comply with this regulation made the offender responsible for any loss of fazenda incurred by the first master. At any rate such transfers were to be discouraged. Failure to comply with the above regulation made one liable to the fines outlined under regulation one. The fifth rule said any person who bought "corpo" (to be understood as goods of any kind) from a "forro" be that "forro" an African or Patricio (Mulatto) the said person was liable for the debts of that "forro". This rule was there to discourage Africans who traded independently of Portuguese traders. The sixth regulation forbade a practice which Diniz claimed had ruined many a trader at Zumbo. The practice being that some Portuguese were in the habit of waiting for the vashambadzi from Butua at the place of disembarkation and while there offered presents, gifts and other inducements to these

1. Regulation four forbade all the Portuguese inhabitants of Mucariva from having any dealings with the neighbouring chiefs or their grandees (Munhaes) without the express permission of the Cap. Mor of Mucariva.
vashambadzi. The result of all this was that often these vashambadzi would sell or give part of the gold or ivory to those Portuguese in gratitude. By the time the vashambadzi reached their masters, if they eventually did, they had to manufacture some excuse like having been robbed or such like lies to cover up their empty-handedness. For breaking regulation six, Diniz prescribed a month in prison coupled with a demand for full restitution of goods so acquired to its rightful owner and a fine in conformity with the requirements stipulated in regulation one.

The last category of African agents of the Portuguese were the "manamucates". These were those Africans used as envoys by the traders. Whereas vashambadzi were shrewd traders, the manamucates were skilful diplomats who developed expertise at parleying. It was they who were often sent to the Rozvi court to ask for help, protection or to complain about any disability suffered by either the vashambadzi in Butua or by the Portuguese traders at Zumbo as a result of the trade conditions in Butua. It was they who advised and helped the Portuguese at Zumbo in matters that involved African customs and practices as discussed in chapter six. They were the only Africans who used to be invited to attend meetings between the Portuguese at Zumbo and

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 33, Mucariva, 20/3/1796, an edict by Jozé Pedro Diniz.
2. Origin unknown - may be from Mwanamukati.
3. Chapter Six, pp. 270-273
visiting ambassadors. The milandos described in chapter six could be very costly if handled by inexperienced people. It was no wonder that in 1768 Gil Bernardo advocated that certain manamucates, especially Xambo and Chacupereza, used in the diplomatic missions to the Rozvi capital should be under the control, not of the Religious of St. Dominic or any other individual trader, but that of the government i.e. cap.™mor of Zumbo.

(III)

The Portuguese Traders at Zumbo

Because of lack of information on the quality of Portuguese traders before 1751 it is not easy for us to note what changes took place in the second half of the 18th century. But if the wealth of Fr. Pedro and 500-600 pastas of gold traded every year between Zumbo and Butua are anything to go by then we may conclude that the earlier Zumbo traders may have been men of more substance than their successors. During the second half of the 18th century men like Manuel da Costa, Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos and Jozé Pedro Diniz, all of them at one time capitães mores and outstanding traders at Zumbo, were in a class of their own among the Zumbo traders. Each of the above mentioned either lived or was involved in the Zumbo trade for no less than twenty

years. Besides the above there were very few others who were traders or inhabitants of any substance. During the 1750s to the 1770s Zumbo seems to have suffered from the presence of what the documents of the period describe as "vagrants" and "lay abouts" who occasionally took part in trade but more often lived off the others either by scheming and intrigues with neighbouring chiefs, with vashambadzi or with one trader against another or by begging. Attempts to rid Zumbo of such undesirables was one of the problems of the Zumbo capitães mores. For this reason, among others, a licence from the governor of Sena was compulsory for any trader who wanted to go to Zumbo and its trade catchment area. But apparently this did not

1. Manuel da Costa was around Zumbo for over 33 years. In the citation for his appointment as capitão mor of Zumbo in 1769 reference was made to his "services which for more than thirty years he rendered to His Most Faithful Majesty" at Zumbo. See Códice 1335 fl. (143V?), Moçambique, 14/4/1769, by Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago. For evidence that he died in 1772 see Códice 1335 fl. 270V-271V, Moçambique, 28/3/1772, by Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago, Letters Patent for the nomination of Jozé Antôonio de Azevedo as capitão mor of Zumbo; Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos was involved in the trade of Zumbo for at least forty years. In 1768 he wrote that he had already spent twenty eight years as a participant in the Zumbo trade. See "Fundo do Sec. XVIII" in Moçambique, unsigned but without any doubt the work of Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos and belonging to the letters written by him in January 1768; See also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 17, Zumbo, 19/11/1780, Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos to Caetano Manoel Correia; Jozé Pedro Diniz was at Zumbo and Mucariva for at least twenty five years interrupted only between 1804 and 1806. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Zumbo, 23/10/1782, report of a meeting of the inhabitants of Zumbo, written by Manoel Jozé Gonçalves. But among the inhabitants attending was Jozé Pedro Diniz. See above, p.218 note 3
Diniz attended the four meetings recorded on p.218
For evidence that he was at Mucariva in 1807 see Chapter Seven pp.316-317
stop the vagrants from visiting Zumbo. An attempt was made in 1769 to solve this problem by sending a "Juiz Commissario" to rid Zumbo of its vagrant population. In the 1780s the problem of vagrants changed into one of "commissarios volantes" (literally roving or wandering commissioners or agents). At Zumbo the commissarios volantes were more or less the "vadios" (vagrants) of previous decades the only difference being in name rather than in function. There is little evidence to show that commissarios volantes at Zumbo in the 1780s played the same role as those commissarios volantes introduced on mainland Moçambique and the ports of the Rivers of Sena by the Baneans. The latter type of commissarios volantes were used by Baneans to by-pass the established traders at the coast and in the ports of the Rios de Sena. There is no evidence to show that this type of trader ever became a pest at Zumbo. Indeed no letter from Zumbo, as far as we know, ever complained about the existence of such traders at Zumbo. But the problem of the vagrants, renamed commissarios volantes in the 1780s, continued to exist. The distinction as made above between the commissarios volantes as a synonym of vagrants and commissarios volantes to describe the traders introduced by the Baneans is implicitly

1. "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Moçambique, No. 84, 1955, pp. 90-97, doc. 169, Zumbo, 13/3/1769, António Manuel de Sequeira, report of a meeting with a Rozvi embassy, gives the name of the Juiz Commissario as Caetano Pereira; "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Moçambique, No. 81, 1955, pp. 137-140, doc. 103, letter No. 734, Sena, 12/7/1769, Inácio de Melo Alvim to the Governor General. Also, "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Moçambique, Nos 89-92, 1957, pp. 177-178, doc. 225, Zumbo, 18/4/1769, João Moreira Pereira to Tenente General of the Rivers of Sena. Recommended which Zumbo inhabitants should have been thrown out of the Vila as vagrants.
accepted in a letter of 1782 addressed to António Manoel de Melo e Castro. In this letter among the six reasons given for the decandence of trade in the Rivers of Sena were (a) number one the commissarios volantes who were described as "semelhantes vadios" and (b) number five the commissarios volantes as traders introduced by the Baneans. The same letter announced the outlawing of the commissarios volantes in both senses but especially those employed by the Baneans to undermine the established traders. In 1789 it was said "all or almost all the moradores of Zumbo (were) commissarios volantes". Most of the commissarios volantes were Canarins or Goanese.

But even the substantial trader at Zumbo had many other disadvantages to cope with besides those already discussed. The trader at Zumbo was always a kind of middleman because he obtained goods on credit from the merchants at Sena and then entrusted these goods to vashambadzi who in the best of times took about a year to return with the goods from Butua. By the time the Zumbo trader paid for his debt it would have been at least two years since he got goods from Sena. As Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos, by then a trader in the Rivers of Sena for twenty eight years, said in 1768, goods obtained on credit from Sena in 1768 were to be paid for in 1770. Because of defaulting by many Zumbo traders by the 1760s the Sena merchants were demanding

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Mossambique, 19/11/1782, addressed to António Manuel de Melo e Castro.
cash payment. Bernardo Coelho da Campos pointed out that traders from Moçambique sold goods at reasonable prices to the merchants at Sena, but the Sena traders sold those same goods at a higher price to the Zumbo traders. For example, capotins costing two panos were resold at Sena for three panos to the Zumbo traders and velorio of two maticaes was sold for two and half maticaes. Campos made it clear that this behaviour of the Sena merchants was a new development which had contributed much to the ruin of the Zumbo traders. He implored the governor general to allow the Zumbo traders to deal directly with Moçambique merchants and to by-pass the merchants of Sena. With the decreasing volume of the gold trade from Butua and ever increasing operational costs the Zumbo trader was often in trouble. Whereas many traders seem to have actively engaged in bares mining north of the Zambezi during the first half of the eighteenth century, in the second half very few men (e.g. Manoel da Costa, Antônio Manoel de Souza and the Dominicans), ever appear to have continued exploiting the bares around Zumbo. Sandwiched between what must have appeared as the dexterous vashambadzi and the hard-headed money-grabbing merchants of Sena, the Zumbo traders had

limited room for manoeuvre. When to that we add the dangers of losing goods through fire at Zumbo - houses were grass-thatched - shipwrecks, and the tariffs the traders had to pay to the African chiefs on the route from Tete to Butua, Mamba and Kankomba, it is amazing that they continued with the business. But then the allure of gold and the desire to get rich quickly are known to have made men do less explicable things than that. And at any rate, in the Butua trade, in spite of all the problems, the returns were lucrative enough for those who were successful to gain rewards which often justified many of the risks and frustrations involved. But as always these were the minority rather than the majority. And many of the beneficiaries lived not at Zumbo but at Sena, Tete, Moçambique and Goa. The Zumbo trader was the small man who took immense risks so that the merchants further down the Zambezi could receive their profits.

1. Beside defaulting on their debts, which was a double edged sword, the Portuguese traders of Zumbo were in the practice of debasing the gold from Butua by mixing it with filings of iron and brass. On the other hand, the Africans seem to have mixed the gold with soil before selling it to the Zumbo traders. But the Muzungus of Zumbo always washed the gold from the Africans before accepting it. This was true with gold brought by the embassies of the Rozvi which seems to have always contained washable impurities, e.g. see A.A.de, Andrade, Relações, op. cit., pp. 334-335; J.J.N. de Andrade, in Arquivo das Colonias, vol. 1, No. 3, 1917, op. cit., p. 117; "Fundo do Sec. XVIII" in Moçambique, No. 84, 1955, pp. 90-97, doc. 165, Zumbo, 13/3/1769, Escrivão António Manuel de Sequeira, report of a meeting with a Rozvi embassy. See also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, Mucariva, 19/1/1803, written by Manoel Francisco de Rozario and also signed by Jozé Pedro Diniz. This is a report of a meeting held on 29/11/1802 between the Zumbo-Muzungus and an embassy of the Rozvi. At that meeting Diniz, the capitão mor complained to the Rozvi Mambo's envoys that the Butua gold was often debased by being mixed with soil.

Conclusion

The Butua-Zumbo trading complex, as discussed above, reveals two very important points. The first is that the Rozvi Mambos allowed their subjects to take part in external trade, and yet at the same time the Mambos, in part, shared in the profits of their subjects by taxing these subjects. This was so because the subjects often paid taxes in gold, ivory, beads and cloth which were the main items of trade. The profits received by the Mambos from the Zumbo trade, either by their own trading activities or through the trade their subjects had with Zumbo, while not being the only, or necessarily the major source of the basis for the power of the Mambos, was, nevertheless, significant enough to have "persuaded" the Mambos to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Muzungus of Zumbo. The Mambos took appropriate steps to insure free movement of goods between Zumbo and Butua. They protected the vashambadzi by punishing any robberies against the latter. They even sent Rozvi armies to defend the feira of Zumbo when the feira was in danger. On the other hand the Mambos forbade the Muzungus from coming to Butua. This policy of exclusion seems to have been dictated by political rather than any obvious economic motives. It appears that the Mambos were afraid that the Muzungus, if allowed to enter Butua, would become a powerful political force as had happened in the Mutapa kingdom during the 17th century.
The second point is that the Butua-Zumbo trading system, although it involved both the Portuguese and African traders, showed that the relationship between the African traders (vashambadzi) and the Portuguese traders was one of mutual reliance. The political situation brought about by the wars of Dombo I insured that the role of the vashambadzi became crucial in the Butua trade. This as well as the calibre of many of the vashambadzi themselves made the vashambadzi and the Portuguese traders at Zumbo trading associates rather than master and slave. The trading system was such that despite its acknowledged profitability, it made the Portuguese traders at Zumbo the most vulnerable element - seeing that they were unable to fully control the vashambadzi and were often forced to accept unfavourable conditions from the merchants of Sena.
"Changamira, the most powerful (chief) of those interiors, is a man without many defects, except for his colour and paganism; because (if he had many) it would not be easy to understand his trading policy and the reason why he is able to make others obey him and love the Portuguese". (my emphasis)

One does not necessarily have to believe in the alleged near-perfection of the Rozvi Mambos in order to understand their trading policy and what do Lago called the love for the Portuguese. A closer look at the Rozvi policy, especially towards Zumbo reveals that there were very good reasons why the Mambos protected Zumbo. Hard political and economic factors seem to have dictated the Rozvi trading policy. Equally on the side of the Portuguese at Zumbo it was similar political and economic realities that determined their attitude towards the Rozvi. This Rozvi-Zumbo connection took the form of a political and economic reliance of the Portuguese on the Mambos.

This economico-political relationship meant that before c.1788 the importance of the Rozvi Empire to the existence of Zumbo was crucial. In moments of crisis for the Portuguese at Zumbo the Rozvi were ready to assist. But not once in the whole history of the Rozvi

1. See p. 275, for the full quotation.
Empire before 1833-4 did Zumbo ever send help to the Rozvi during periods of internal problems within Butua. This is not the same as saying that Zumbo was useless to the Rozvi. Far from it. Zumbo was in fact considered important enough by the Rozvi as to warrant the dispatch of Rozvi armies a number of times during the eighteenth century for the purposes of rescuing the feira from its troubles. Zumbo was a useful source of luxury goods to the Rozvi rulers. But in this function it was an alternative to the feira of Manyika, which, like Zumbo, is said to have been thirty days' journey from the Rozvi court. From the point of view of trade there was no reason why the goods going to Zumbo could not have been channelled through the feira of Manyika. Indeed in the early nineteenth century when the Rozvi empire was in decline politically, it appears to have conducted its foreign trade through the feira of Manyika. The role of Zumbo in Rozvi imperial considerations must be seen in a much wider context than simple economic calculations. During the 18th century, as we have already said, Zumbo provided an alternative to the feira of Manyika. Complete dependence on Manyika feira might have enhanced out of all proportion, the importance of a powerful provincial ruler and the Rozvi relations with the Portuguese might have been less easy to control. The

2. Leisengang, Gaza Nguni, op. cit., p. 36.
result was that the Rozvi preferred to have a broader room for manoeuvre by maintaining Zumbo and Manyika feiras in existence. Yet to Zumbo, Butua gold was a matter of survival for the feira. It is only by fully grasping the vulnerability of Zumbo both as regards its security and economic survival as well as its relevance to the wider imperial Rozvi interests that we can appreciate first the desire of the Zumbo-Portuguese to place themselves at certain times even more formally under Rozvi protection than they actually were, and secondly the willingness of the Rozvi to accede so often during the 18th century to protect their "Muzungu friends" at Zumbo.

(I)

PORTUGUESE POWERLESSNESS AT ZUMBO

(a) The Administrative Machinery

Before 1764, the year in which Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos as "Juiz Comissário do Fisco e Câmara Real" established the "Senado da Câmara" at Zumbo in accordance with the provisions of 1761 and 1763, the feira of Zumbo was governed in law, almost single-handedly by the cap. mor. This meant that the cap. mor e juiz ordinario was the chief executive and judiciary officer at the feira. The vicar, if he was not also the cap. mor e juiz ordinario, was mainly concerned with religious matters, while the

rest of the "moradores" and "mercadores", had little if any
administrative or judiciary functions. In practice however the
cap. mor e juiz ordinario, probably consulted some of the chief
inhabitants at the feira.

According to the Provisão of 1763 the feira of Zumbo, as
from that date to be known as feira e vila do Zumbo, was to be
governed by a cap. mor (whose title was changed to "governador e
cap. mor" from 1772 until after 1817 when it was known as "Comandante"
up to about 1825 when the title cap. mor seems to have been
restored). The capitão mor was assisted by a Cãmaras (Council)
composed of a Juiz Ordinario (Justice of Peace or Magistrate), a

2. A.H.U. Códice 1335, flos. 270V-271IV, Moçambique, 7/4/1772,
"Registo da Carta Patente passò a J. Antônio de Azevedo de Gom e
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 61, Moçambique, 13/6/1818, "Portaria"
of the letters Patent of the nomination of Jozé dos Santos Reis to
the commandance of Zumbo-Mucariva, signed by Barboza and registered
as No. 224 in book No. 7 of the Secretary to the government of
Moçambique; also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 61, letter No. 60, Moçambique,
29/9/1818, José Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to the
Conde dos Arcos; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 60, letter No. 11, Moçambique,
31/10/1817, José Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to José
Antônio Caldas, governor of the Ilhas de Cabo Delgado and another copy
to Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcelos Cirne, governor of Quelimane.
In 1817 Governor-General José Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de
Albuquerque initiated a re-organization of the administration of the
captaincy of Moçambique among which was the following change:-
according to Cavalcanti the use of the title governador by so many
officials in the Rivers of Sena was likely to lead to much conflict
of jurisdiction between the governors of the Rivers and those of the
minor vilas in the Rivers de Sena. Cavalcanti decreed that in future
the administrators of Zumbo were to be known simply as "Commandante".
4. Santana, Dr. F., op. cit., vol. 2, Maço 11, p. 80, letter
dated 15th April, 1830.
Procurador (Municipal attorney), Thezoureiro (treasurer), Escrivão (clerk or notary) and two vereadores (Councillors or Aldermen).

The Juiz Ordinario became the chief judiciary officer at the vila; the Thezoureiro took care of the Fazenda Real; the Escrivão was the clerk of the Judiciary as well as the Câmara; the Procurador was responsible for the legal aspects more or less as a public prosecutor; and the Câmara as a whole assisted the cap. mor in the exercise of his duties of maintaining peace both within Zumbo as well as with the neighbouring rulers, and to preserve and increase the flow of trade. All the officials of the Câmara were to be elected for a three-year period by the inhabitants of Zumbo. But the first officers had to be appointed to serve for one year.

Although the 1761 Instrução granted no more than the usual "privileges which the vilas of this Kingdom (i.e. Portugal) enjoy", in practice the câmara of Zumbo, on account of Zumbo's position as a Portuguese outpost in the midst of independent rulers, performed functions which few urban câmaras in metropolitan Portugal could ever have dreamed of. The Zumbo câmara discussed issues of war and peace; took decisions on matters of foreign relations and trade as well as questions related to the day to day running of the vila.


2. The Instrução of 1761 was a royal directive from Lisbon written by Francisco Xavier de Mendonça, the Secretary of State for the colonies, to the governor-general of Moçambique ordering the latter to set up municipal councils within his captaincy. The Provisão of 1763 was the proclamation made by João Pereira da Silva Barba, governor-general of Moçambique, instructing the settlers of Zumbo and the other vilas within his captaincy to set up câmaras in accordance with the provisions of the Instrução of 1761.
The advantages of the reforms of 1763 have been eloquently defended by Lobato: "Municipalismo" claims Lobato, protected "the people against the outrages of the governors and the despotism of the administration" and, he continues, in "grave emergencies threatening Portuguese sovereignty" the câmara could assist the governors and in the absence of a governor, for whatever reason, the câmara could act on his behalf or choose an acting Governor. But in practice the hopes expressed by the 1761 Instrução for the 1763 reforms as far as Zumbo went were rarely fulfilled. The chief and continuing problem for the Zumbo câmara in the eighteenth century was lack of people, most of all people of the right calibre, to serve on the câmara. Since the câmara in practice seems to have been open only to non-Africans, on a number of occasions the non-African population was never enough to fill all the places. Consequently at times Zumbo would have as members of its câmara persons living at Sena. Many people did not want to live within Zumbo itself, preferring to live on Chitakatira and other places away from the jurisdiction of the Vila of Zumbo. Lack of people to serve on the câmara meant that the outgoing people had to be re-elected everytime there were elections. This encouraged corruption and

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, letter No. 592, Zumbo, 15/9/1767, Manuel da Costa to B.H.P. do Lago; and also letter No. 610 of the same date signed by Manuel da Costa and others; J.J.N. de, Andrade, in Arquivo das Colonias, op. cit., pp. 115-116 (written in 1790); See also below, p. 243 note 2.
3. See below, pp. 248-252 and especially p. 250, "Portuguese population at Zumbo".
intrigues. Many of the problems of the Zumbo câmara came from the fact that its members were not paid. The câmara of Zumbo had little resources for the public works because around Zumbo there were no crown lands (Terras da Coroa) on which rents could be levied. It appears also that the câmara had not enough power to force its rulings on powerful and arrogant persons. And again it seems that the câmara of Zumbo rarely stood up against the capitães mores. The weaknesses of the câmara of Zumbo were dramatically shown in 1767. The juiz ordinario of that câmara was none other than Manuel da Costa, himself the most powerful trader at Zumbo during the 1750s and 1760s. In mid-1767 Gil Bernardo de Campos, the cap. m mor of Zumbo, temporarily left the feira to go to his lands (Prazo Sancta) at Sena, leaving Fr. José Manoel da Santa Anna as acting cap. m mor in his absence. In view of the past history of Fr. Santa Anna's captaincy it was a little surprising that Campos should have left Fr. Santa Anna in charge. But after Manuel da Costa and others had written to the governor-general denouncing Fr. Santa Anna, Campos expressed surprise at

1. Letter No. 610, see note 2, p. 237.
2. Fr. Manoel José da Santa Anna was first made acting capitão mor of Zumbo in 1762. He held the post until 1766. His captaincy was marred by the clash between himself and Manuel da Costa then the richest trader at Zumbo and also the Juiz Ordinario of the câmara of the vila. This clash contributed much to the ineffectiveness of the câmara during this period. Manuel da Costa accused Fr. Santa Anna of having engineered the murder of one of his (da Costa's) Mshambadzi by the Rozvi envoys in 1765 and generally of having bullied the other settlers. The vila experienced disunity, treachery, hunger and economic disasters during this period. Even Fr. Santa Anna experienced much trouble from the African agents of the Dominicans and himself died in debt as a result of this period. For the documentation see below, p. 241 note.
some of the charges which he claimed to have been unaware of. However he made a somewhat revealing remark when he said that Manuel da Costa and others had all agreed to the nomination of Fr. Santa Anna to the post of acting capm.™ or because everyone at Zumbo feared that if Fr. Santa Anna did not get the post he might default his debts to the other traders, especially to Gil de Campos to whom he owed much. It was also feared that if Fr. Santa Anna did not get the captaincy he could somehow cause trouble for the Pataua trade.

As soon as Fr. Santa Anna took over the commandancy of Zumbo the vila was thrown into an internal crisis. The trouble was started by Ricardo José Marques de Sousa and Fabião Furtado. José Marques de Sousa was a white Portuguese surgeon living at Sena who went to Zumbo in July 1766 and stayed there until August 1767. Although de Sousa had come to collect his debts from Fr. Santa Anna, he prolonged his stay at Zumbo on the pretext that he was selling some "fazenda" which he had brought with him from Sena. De Sousa waited until Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos had left for Sena before he started his harrassment of Fr. Santa Anna. It was said that Ricardo made false accusations against Fr. Santa Anna, publicly abused and challenged the latter's authority even within the verandah of the Church. And on a number of occasions de Sousa, armed with a gun, went to the house of Fr. Santa Anna, as if hunting for a deserter. All this, "the arrogant Ricardo" did unmindful
of the position and reputation of Fr. St. Anna.

In addition to the activities of Ricardo there were those of Fabião Furtado, himself the clerk of the "Judicial do Zumbo". Apparently Furtado accused the judiciary at Zumbo as well as many of the inhabitants at Zumbo of committing "infamies and despicable outrages". Manuel da Costa claimed that Furtado, advised by Ricardo, also made a charge of "infamy and fraud" against the former. In his interlocutory sent to the governor of the Rivers of Sena, Manuel da Costa found Furtado guilty of libel, but sentence had to be confirmed by another judge since da Costa and the whole judiciary at Zumbo were defendants in the same case. When da Costa realized that Ricardo was acting as advocate on behalf of Furtado, he ordered Ricardo to leave Zumbo on the grounds that Ricardo was a vagrant. As juiz ordinario da Costa was acting within his powers. But before Ricardo was sent away he at first petitioned the câmara of Zumbo to reverse the decision and when it would not, he decided on other tactics. He resorted to the use of threatening and insulting words as well as name-calling against the officials of the judiciary and the câmara. He threatened and promised to obtain a superior Judge from Moçambique who would be sent to Zumbo in order to flog Manuel da Costa and whip all the other Canarins at Zumbo. Da Costa's reply was to throw Ricardo in jail pending his deportation to Tete on the very following morning.
But before this could be carried out Fr. Santa Anna, now apparently reconciled with Ricardo, came to Manuel da Costa's home and ordered the latter, at first "with hue and cry and threats" and then after a time "with entreaties", to release Ricardo. Manuel da Costa refused to do so. The following day Ricardo petitioned the câmara for "pardon for his action". The case was hotly debated in the câmara but in the end the issue could not be properly discussed because in the câmara Fr. Santa Anna, by his "well known" bullying personality brow-beat the members into agreeing with him on every issue without regard to the rule of law or the justice of the matter. As a result Ricardo was set free. It was from such actions, observed da Costa, that the Feira of Zumbo had experienced so much disquiet during the first captaincy of Fr. Santa Anna. Da Costa also remarked that becuase of "the pusillanimous nature as well as by the great poverty", of the Goanese at Zumbo the latter were found to be cringing and sycophantic to anyone who was either titled, rich or overbearing in character like Fr. Santa Anna. When

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G. B. C. de Campos returned to Zumbo he was given the title of "Juiz Commissario" in order to settle the cases of Furtado and Ricardo. Campos upheld the decisions of Manuel da Costa.

The ineffectiveness of the câmara in the face of a strong-willed cap. m mor was further shown during the captaincy of Rev. Fr. Jeronimo Santissima da Trindade who, as acting cap. m mor in 1768, boasted that he had only called two meetings of the câmara during his captaincy and had no intention of calling any more unless in case of an emergency. In effect the câmara was no more than the pre-1763 council of chief inhabitants which capitães more of Zumbo used to convene in times of emergencies. Indeed even by 1767 Manuel da Costa, himself the juiz ordinario, was arguing that it were better if the offices of juiz ordinario and cap. m mor were once again held by one man. Although this suggestion was rejected, between 1769 and 1772 Manuel da Costa was to hold both


positions at the same time. By the 1780s and 1790s arguments were brought forward that the câmara of Zumbo should be scrapped as useless. Indeed it seems that after 1804 the câmara had ceased to exist at Mucariva. On the positive side the chief value of the Zumbo câmaras was their correspondence with the Governors of Sena and Moçambique. Sometimes they gave more detailed and better reports about Zumbo than the capitães mores.

1. "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Moçambique, Nos 89-92, 1957, pp. 244-245, docs. 265 and 266, letters Nos 721 and 722 both dated, Zumbo, 6/6/1768, signed by Manuel da Costa, João Custodio de Souza, Alexandre da Costa de Santa Maria, José de Quadros Meneses and Pedro Veloso de Sá to the Governor-General. Although Dr. Newitt in The Zambesi Prazos in the Eighteenth Century, op. cit., p. 165, footnote 244, stated that "Manuel da Costa never held a permanent or official position at Zumbo," we now know that from 1769-1772 he was the capitão mor of Zumbo. The citation of Manuel da Costa's appointment referred to his "serviços que por mais de trinta annos tem feito a Sua Majestade Fidelíssima" at Zumbo, as well as to the "varios postos" he held there. Da Costa's letters patent is in A.H.U. Códice 1335, fl. (143v?), Moçambique, 14/4/1768, by B.M.P. do Lago. See also "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Moçambique No. 84, 1955, pp. 81-83, doc. 162, Zumbo, 2/3/1769, Manuel da Costa e Brito to Dom Diogo de Souza. From a copy of 28/9/1796 by Benjamin Antônio de Melo at Moçambique. For a blistering attack on the Zumbo-Mucariva câmara see also J.J.N. de Andrade, in Arquivo das Colonias, op. cit., vol. 1, No. 3, p. 116; for another unfavourable comment see A.A.de Andrade, Relações, op. cit., p. 334.
(b) Military Power

In the 18th century the Portuguese did not have a garrison of soldiers at Zumbo or Zumbo-Mucariva as was the case at the Mutapa Zimbabwe or the feira of Manyika and some of the vilas further down the Zambezi. J.J.T. Botelho claims that in 1796 Zumbo had a garrison of sixty three men. It is true that Botelho puts a question mark after the figure sixty three possibly to indicate that in fact the document which Botelho purports to quote, without actually locating, clearly shows that Zumbo had no garrison in 1796. We know that Fr. Manoel do Nascimento, capitão mor and vicar of Zumbo in 1753 suggested that what Zumbo needed was a garrison composed of twenty four men and one officer all under the command of the capitão mor. After Fr. Nascimento nearly all the capitãens mores of Zumbo during the 18th century commented on the lack of forces at Zumbo. In 1789-90 Nogueira de Andrade repeated that Zumbo had neither a fortress nor a garrison of soldiers. Other proposals to have a garrison and fortifications at Zumbo were

3. Andrade, A.A.de, Relações, op. cit., pp. 202-3; see also Lobato's Evolução, op. cit., p. 56, Lobato is probably making Fr. Manoel do Nascimento sound unnecessarily bravado by suggesting that Fr. Nascimento's plan was meant to be a scheme for the penetration of Butua.
made in 1781 by Caetano Manoel Correia and by Jozé Pedro Diniz in 1796. It was according to the proposals of Jozé Pedro Diniz combined with those of Diogo de Sousa that in the end the garrison at Zumbo was established in 1801. In that year a detachment of thirty soldiers and about seventy armed mulattoes and some chosen Africans was established at Zumbo-Mucariva. In 1802 a wall was built by Jozé Pedro Diniz around Zumbo-Mucariva. Before 1801 the only way Zumbo could defend itself was in theory by means of arming Africans mainly with bows and arrows, belonging to the Portuguese at Zumbo. This, it appears, was done only in emergencies.

According to the proposals of Dom Diogo de Sousa of 1796 Zumbo-Mucariva was to have obtained a detachment of 67 soldiers comprising one tenente (lieutenant), one alferes (equivalent of present second lieutenant or ensign), three noncommissioned officers (Inferiores), one Tambor (drummer), one Ajudante (adjutant) and sixty soldiers (privates). This plan of Diogo de Sousa was to have abolished the "guarnícoes dos presídios" and established triennial detachments. The Zumbo detachment was to belong to the "companhia regular" of Tete. The capiténs mores or governadores of the various settlements were also to be the commanders of these detachments. The latter was done in order to avoid a conflict of jurisdic-

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 38, Mucariva do Zumbo, 30/4/1801, "Rellação do Estado da Tropa Regular e Auxiliar" by Jozé Pedro Diniz.
3. Ibid., and Andrade, A.A.de, Relações, op. cit., p. 365.
ction. When Jozé Pedro Diniz established the Zombo-Mucariva detachment in 1801 it was very much in accordance with the Diogo de Sousa proposals except that instead of having sixty seven troops it had thirty regulars and about seventy auxiliaries. Also the post of Ajudante is specifically given as Furriel (quarter master or his rank) by Diniz. While there is no evidence that Dom Diogo de Sousa's proposals were ever officially approved in Lisbon or effected in Moçambique, there is little doubt that his views influenced the establishment of the Zumbo detachment in 1801 and even the military re-organization that took place in Moçambique during the early 19th century.

Sometime after 1805 there was a military re-organization in Moçambique. As far as the Zumbo-Mucariva detachment went the changes appear to have been that the detachment at Zumbo was raised to the status of a "Companhia regular" which theoretically had seventy one men. According to this re-organization the Company at Zumbo-Mucariva was to be composed as follows:— One capitão (Captain), one 'Tenente', one 'Alferes', one first 'sargento' (sergeant), one second 'sargento', four 'Cabos' (corporals) two 'tambores', and sixty 'soldados' (privates). The company at Zumbo was one of the five within the Rios de Sena, the others being at

1. "Relação do Estado da Tropa Regular e Auxiliar" by Jozé Pedro Diniz, op. cit.
3. B. Ajuda 54-XIII-32 (before 1969 was 52-X-2-No. 3) fl. 83; and Botelho, S.X., Memoria Estatistica, op. cit., p. 291.
4. Ibid.
Manyika, Sena, Quelimane and Tete (under which the Mutapa Zimbarwe garrison came), which formed one "guarnição da tropa da primeira linha".

But as the appendix shows theory and practice rarely matched. The Zumbo garrison was almost never found to be at full strength either in men or in armaments. But then this was not peculiar to Zumbo-Mucariva as almost all the garrisons in the Rivers of Sena in particular and Moçambique in general suffered from the same problem both in the 18th and 19th centuries. Lack of manpower was almost certainly the major cause of the under-strength of the Zumbo-Mucariva garrison and others in Moçambique.

By 1805 José Pedro Diniz had completed at his own expense the construction of a wall round Zumbo-Mucariva. The wall was built of stone and was said to be about 1600 'bracas'. Diniz tells us that the fortress was patrolled in much the same way as was the practice within the Rivers of Sena. Sentinels were posted round the clock. This was done in order to guard against surprise attack and possible outbreaks of "violence among the Africans and other mutinies that could occur". But despite its

2. Appendix I.
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, Mucariva do Zumbo, 30/6/1803, José Pedro Diniz to João Felipe de Carvalho.
4. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 46, letter No. 116, Moçambique, 10/7/1805, Izidro de Almeida Souza e Sá to Visconde de Anadia. A braca is equal to a fathom i.e. six feet, or in the olden days 7.4 feet.
5. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, Mucariva do Zumbo, 30/6/1803, José Pedro Diniz to João Felipe de Carvalho.
military forces Mucariva was destroyed, burnt and razed to the ground in 1804. In 1813 and again in 1836 Mucariva was abandoned mainly because of the burden of keeping an army useless in the trading system of Mucariva. The Zumbo trade, at its height and for nearly a hundred years flourished not by the power of the gun but by negotiations, by cloth, by beads - in short by trade and diplomacy.

(c) Portuguese Population at Zumbo

Population as a factor in the Portuguese presence at Zumbo and the interior is rather difficult to determine. There is a dearth of any information, let alone accurate information, on the subject. The statistics given in appendix H are very unsatisfactory as a guide to the strength of the Portuguese at Zumbo. In the first place these are figures of the Christians of the Zumbo or Zumbo-Mucariva parish, i.e. not only of those actually resident at the vila but of all the known Christians within the parish of Zumbo. In other words these figures are almost always inflated as they include people outside the settlements of Zumbo or after 1788 of Mucariva. Christians from the neighbouring chiefs, baptized and attending the church at Zumbo, are also included in these figures. The second objection to reliance on these figures is the apparent internal contradiction they show. To show what is meant let us take the figures from 1788 to 1791:
The disturbing features of these figures are dramatized in the 1790 to 1791 figures when after ten people had died in 1791 and nine were born in the same year we find that a total figure of 156 people is reduced to 46. What, one would like to know is what happened to the other 109 people? Or take the 1788-1789 figures when in 1788 we have a figure of seven for the under seven and apparently no births we end with a figure of twenty six for the under seven in 1789 even though there is no evidence that anybody was born in 1789. Where, one wonders did we get the other nineteen children from. The 1788-1791 figures, as any calculation of the others would reveal, have not been chosen for their uniqueness. The weaknesses they display are common to almost all the population statistics available on Zumbo and Mucariva do Zumbo.

The most convincing explanation for these discrepancies is that already offered i.e. that many of the people included in these figures lived not at Zumbo but in the surrounding chiefdoms. This might account why some of these people who may have died or become lapsed christians just disappear in the records without trace or explanation being given.

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1. See Appendix H
Another handicap which these population figures have is that they rarely, very rarely indeed, break down the numbers of the Portuguese, Goanese, Canarins and Africans contained in each report. Yet to assess the contribution of population as a basis for Portuguese power at Zumbo we have to know much more about the composition of these figures. There are however two generalizations which a reading of the documents from Zumbo and Zumbo-Mucariva makes possible. The first of these is that Zumbo before 1836 was dominated by Goanese and not by Portuguese. At no time is there any evidence that the European Portuguese ever outnumbered the Asiatics at Zumbo between 1700-1836. The second point is that during the 18th century the settled non-African population of Zumbo and Zumbo-Mucariva rarely exceeded the number of ten. Four to ten are, on the average, the figures that are given by most capitãens mores in their letters. The letters of the capitãens mores, compared with the yearly population statistics already discussed and given in appendix H, vindicate these two assertions. It was only from the beginning of the 19th century, with the coming of the soldiers at Zumbo-Mucariva that numbers of over thirty non-Africans were found at Zumbo. It is part of the irony of events that the growth of the non-African population at Zumbo-Mucariva was to be a contributory factor to the destruction of vila Zumbo-Mucariva.

1. See for example Andrade, A.A.de, Relaçõess, op. cit., pp. 401, 334, 265; Andrade, J.J.N.de, in Arquivo das Colonias, op. cit., p. 115; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Tete, 3/6/1782, Antônio Manoel de Melo e Castro, shows that Zumbo had seven Goanese and no European that year.
A number of incidents during the eighteenth century clearly demonstrated the weakness of the Portuguese at the villa of Zumbo. Among these were the disturbances by the Africans of the Religious of St. Dominic in 1751 at the funeral of Fr. Pedro da Trindade, the troubles against Fr. Manoel Nascimento (1752-3) and Fr. Caetano Alberto in 1754, the blockade of Zumbo by Caniambaze in 1772; the attack by Casiresire in 1777-9; the expulsion of Fr. Pillar from Zumbo in 1782 by the Africans. But the most conspicuous incident was in 1788 when Prince Bereco sent his Nevanje with about thirty armed men to demand the death of António Caetano de Sousa on the grounds that the latter had killed prince Ganda in 1774. At that time Zumbo had about four to five Musungu traders. Bereco's men

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Zumbo, 29/10/1782, report of a meeting of that day copied by the escrivão Manoel Jozé Francisco de Oliveira at Tete on 10 December, 1782; also Andrade, A.A. de, Relações, op. cit., p. 200.
3. The attack must have occurred between 13/7/1777 and 28/12/1779. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Zumbo, 13/7/1777, report ordered to be written by the then acting Commandant of Zumbo Fr. Luís Lobo, and actually written by the escrivão António Manuel de Sequeira. The above obtained from a copy by Cosme de Mello, dated Zumbo, 18/8/1788; A.H.U. Códice 1339, fols. 211v-212v, letters patent for the nomination of Caetano Manoel Correia as Cap. m Mor of Zumbo, signed Moçambique, 28/12/1779, by Vasconcellos de Almeida.
4. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Zumbo, 5/11/1782, António Caetano de Sousa to the Governor of the Rivers; also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, reports of meetings held at Zumbo on 23, 24, 29 and 30 October, 1782, written by the escrivão Manoel Jozé Gonçalves. The above are copies of the original as copied by Jozé Francisco de Oliveira at Tete on 10/12/1782.
5. See glossary.
struck camp in the centre of Zumbo settlement. As negotiations for the head of Souza proceeded, the warriors of Bereco created a situation of near-anarchy at Zumbo by extorting goods from the inhabitants of the Feira through intimidation and other bullying tactics. Portuguese powerlessness in the later eighteenth century could not have been better dramatically presented than by the sight of one of Bereco's warriors swaggering, assegai in hand, through the settlement of Zumbo while Portuguese inhabitants peeped out from behind closed doors wondering if it was their turn to be dispossessed of their property.

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Zumbo, letters dated 11/1/1774 and 13/7/1777 by António Manoel de Sequeira, António Caetano de Souza and others. Copies of the above letters were made on 18/8/1788 at Zumbo by Cosme de Mello; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Zumbo, 18/6/1788 Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Zumbo, 23/8/1788, Sebastião de Moraes e Almeida to the Governor of the Rivers; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Zumbo, reports dated 7/7/1788 and 22/7/1788, by Cosme de Mello. Also "Rellacao da Fundaçao e Estado da villa do Zumbo, e desta de Mucariva", op. cit.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ROZVI EMPIRE IN THE ZUMBO TRADE

Having compared the above picture of Portuguese weakness at Zumbo with that of Rozvi power as shown in chapter three, we can now investigate and comprehend the economic and political dependence of Zumbo on the Rozvi empire.

(a) Zumbo's Economic Reliance on Butua

Butua gold was regarded as the chief source of the profits of Zumbo and the Rios de Sena. The evidence we have shows that up to around 1796 the trade with Butua was the most important source of profits for the Zumbo trade. And after 1796 onwards Butua was superseded by Mamba as the most important trading partner of Zumbo. The central importance of the trade of Butua for the Feira of Zumbo was asserted again and again by capitães mores of Zumbo as well as the Governors of Sena and Moçambique up and until about 1796. But it was first of all between about 1762-1768 and then from 1795-6 onwards that Zumbo's reliance on the Butua trade was forcefully demonstrated.

From about 1762 to 1768 the Zumbo trade was in such a terrible state that by 1768-70 the traders of Zumbo were advocating the closure of the vila of Zumbo and the re-establishment

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 32, Mucariva, 21/5/1796, Joao Pedro Diniz to Diogo de Souza.
2. See below pp.259-262 ; And Chapter Four, pp. 190-191; Also Chapter Five, p. 198.
of the feiras of Dambarare or Mukaranga. The very fact that Zumbo was to be closed in favour of the old feiras around Dambarare then under the sway of the Rozvi, was an indication of the critical importance of the Rozvi trade with Zumbo. The decision to abandon Zumbo between 1768-70 was influenced by a number of factors which helped to put the continued existence of Zumbo in the balance. These were problems like the bad administration of the acting cap. mor Fr. Santa Anna (1762-1766) and the troubles brought about along the Tete-Zumbo-Butua routes as a result of the civil wars of the Mutapa princes. Between 1751-1766 João Moreira Pereira claimed that he had knowledge of six Mutapas who ruled in that period of whom only two ruled in opposition to each other at the same time. During 1763 prince Zeze marched to the Zimbave of Mutapa Mutanica (Mutaniqua). Instead of fighting against Zeze, Mutanica fled to Marave country and so Zeze became the Mutapa. Mutanica went as far as Zumbo where

1. See above pp. 238 note 2 & pp. 2386-242
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, Tete, 28/1/1766, João Moreira Pereira to the Governor-General; also Carvalho Dias, Anais, vol. 9, tomo 1, 1954, pp. 130-33; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 9, Senna, 15/7/1761, Marco António de Azavedo Coutinho de Montaury to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque. D.P. Abraham wrote in 1959 (NADA, op. cit., pp. 66, 81-82) that Changara ruled from 1759 to 1785, but we have already seen chapter five page 196 that between about 1776 and 1785 it was Ganiambaze who ruled. From the above documents we know that when Zindave (Zindove?) killed his brother Dehwe Mupunzagutu and declared himself Mutapa in 1760 civil war broke out. Zindave was successfully challenged by Camota who became Mutapa. But Camota in turn was removed by Mutanica (Mutaniqua) the son of the blind Cariza. After a year's rule Mutanica was removed by Prince Zeze in 1763. In 1768 Ganiambaze was the Mutapa, but by 1769 Changara was the Mutapa.
he was demanding cloth from Fr. Santa Anna then acting cap. m mor.
During all these troubles in the Mutapa lands, the Zumbo merchants had from time to time to use the route on the north bank of the River Zambezi in the lands of Marave. But Mutapa princes were also known to send their armies to the lands of Marave and what was even worse some of the Marave chiefs also engaged in robbing the Zumbo traders. On the other hand the vashambadzi of Zumbo on their way to and from Butua had to pass through the lands of Prince Derere in Dande, which were also involved in the Mutapa civil wars. In 1757 Prince Chirimimba committed such a robbery that in 1769 it was still referred to as an example of the robberies that took place on the Butua route. Inacio Caetano Xavier is probably not correct in saying that the 1757 robbery, which incidentally he almost certainly exaggerates by saying that it involved about one thousand pastas of gold or 800,000 cruzados, was carried out with the connivance of the ruling Rozvi Mambo. Not only did such an action of sheer banditry go against the grain of Rozvi policy during the eighteenth century, but also, most important of all, Dande was never included within the Rozvi empire.

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, two letters from Tete both dated 28/1/1766, by Joao Moreira Pereira to the Governor-General.
Another factor mentioned as contributing to the problems of Zumbo were the robberies committed in the lands of Orenje, a term used to refer to the regions along the Luangwa valley up to the lands of chief Kankomba or at times also to include the region from Buruma's country up to chief Mamba's country along the Zambezi. Fr. Santa Anna tells us that in the ten years preceding 1767 there had been many robberies against the Portuguese merchants and other disorders in Orenje. He also informs us that during that period Joá Vicente de Meneses was robbed in the lands of chief Kankomba; Narciso Rodrigues de Montsarrate being robbed by the Batonga chief Tope; Fr. Jeronimo Maria da Santissima Trindade having been robbed by Samive; and many other merchants too lost their goods in the robberies in

1. For evidence that Orenje was different from Mamba see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 22, Zumbo, 24/11/1785, Caetano Manuel Correia to Governor of the Rivers; For evidence that Orenje was different from the land of the Batongas i.e. Mamba, see "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Mocambique, No. 84, 1955, pp. 81-87, doc. No. 162, Zumbo, 24/12/1769, Manuel da Costa, "Projecto de restabelecimento da Feira de Dambarare". For the claim that chief Mamba lived in Orenje see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Zumbo, 12/12/1782, Antônio Caetano de Souza to Governor of the Rivers. The document speaks of "Regullo Mamba de Orenje". For evidence that the land of the Batongas is also known as Orenje - see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, letter No. 591, Zumbo, 24/9/1767, Fr. Manoel Joá de Santa Anna to Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago. For the identification of chief Mamba's country see esp. Ajudha, 54-XIII-37, fl. 7, footnote 3, Joá Francisco Alves Barbosa "Analise Statistica topographica..." And also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 38, Mucariva do Zumbo, 30/4/1801, Joá Pedro Diniz. "Relação da Descripção dos Limites da villa do Zumbo, e desta de Mucariva, suas distancia, confins dos Reinos, e terras sercumvizinhas..." For identification of Kankomba see esp. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 38, Mucariva do Zumbo, 30/4/1801, Joá Pedro Diniz "Relação da Descripção dos Limites da villa do Zumbo... ". Many other sources exist confirming the observations made above.
The other factor contributing to the decline at Zumbo in the 1760s was supposed to be the increasing problems of the bares. We do not propose to discuss the organization and functioning of the bar (pl. bares) institution. There are a number of published documents and secondary works that deal fairly adequately with those aspects. Here we shall only restrict ourselves to investigating the problems of the bares in the 1760s. As early as 1744 Fr. Catarina was claiming that ambition and envy led to disorders at the bares. Fr. Catarina tells us that by 1744 the bar Raphael or Mallima, which was the first bar to be discovered, had disappeared on account of some disorders in which some people were killed. Troubles at the bares appear to have been endemic. But one of the major defects of bar mining was that although it heralded some kind of organizational innovation in mining it brought with it no technological changes. As easier deposits were worked out more difficult ones had to be worked in time with the same simple instruments and the result was reduced production. Already by 1754 the bares of Pamba and Mixonga were said to be producing less than before. In 1758, Inacio Caetano Xavier confirmed the

3. Dominican Account... 1744, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
4. The tools were the hoe, the zamba (Shona: zumbu) (which was/is a wooden basket-like container), and grinding stone or mortar.
downward trend in bares production. In that year the bar of Mano
was abandoned on account of a drought in the lands of the Marave.
However, the decline in the bares as a whole, can best be under­
stood in the light of the history of the chief bar near Zumbo
which was the bar of feira de Mixonga. After the death of its
first cap. mor Pereira de Faria in 1756, disorders broke out.
Although Manoel Caetano Rodrigues was named cap. mor of Mixonga
to succeed Faria there was little he could do to restore order
and prosperity. The disorders at Mixonga had taken place as a
result of the connivance of some Portuguese traders in the bar
of Mixonga with the neighbouring chiefs. Many traders were killed
in the battle that followed and so Mixonga was abandoned. Dom
Manoel Antônio de Almeida, Governor of the Rivers (1756-59)
charged Manoel da Costa with the task of re-opening of the feira
of Mixonga. By 1759 Manoel da Costa had successfully re-opened
the feira of Mixonga at his own expense. But in 1760 Manoel da
Costa, by then cap. mor of Mixonga, was already complaining that
the same disorders which had led to the closure of the feira of
Mixonga were threatening to engulf the place again. In 1763
Coronel Dionizio de Mello e Castro was reporting that Mixonga
produced very little gold.

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 10, Sena, 20/1/1763, Dionizio de
Mello e Castro to Saldanha de Albuquerque.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 8, Zumbo, 5/3/1760, Manuel da Costa
to the Governor-General.
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 10, Sena, 20/1/1763, Dionizio de
Mello e Castro to Saldanha de Albuquerque.
All the above factors did indeed affect the situation in the 1760s at Zumbo but as is clear from the very factors themselves these were not unique to the 1760s, indeed as we saw with regard to the bares even before 1744 troubles at the bares were well known; and problems with the Mutapa princes were also present from 1743–44 period up to the 19th century while robberies were an occupational hazard Zumbo traders had to live with during the whole of the eighteenth century. Indeed few were the years when all or many of the above factors did not affect Zumbo trade during the second half of the eighteenth century. But this did not always lead to the abandonment of the feira of Zumbo. Yet for some reason in the 1760s a decision was taken to abandon Zumbo.

The letters from Zumbo in the 1760s make it quite clear that it was the situation in Butua which undermined completely the trade at Zumbo in the 1760s and led to the need to abandon Zumbo in 1768–70. In 1770 Alvim wrote that the feira of Zumbo was "today not so rich as in the past because of the civil wars of Changamira in Abutua which was always the fountain source of the trade of these Rivers". Up to 1750 Zumbo, it will be remembered, was said to be receiving gold worth 500 to 600 pastas in a good year from Butua. Between 1750 and 1753 many letters and reports of Francisco de Mello e Castro make it clear that Butua was very important for Zumbo as well as for the Rivers of Sena and Moça-

2. See Chapter Five, p. 199.
mbique as a whole. In 1761 Marco Antônio de Azevedo Continho de Montaury then governor of the Rivers, reported that the trade of Zumbo required four to five hundred bares of cloth and two to three thousand maços of velorio. In 1767 Fr. Santa Anna estimated that in a normal year the cloth needed for the Butua trade was about four hundred bares of cloth. In other words at least four fifths (4/5) of the cloth in the trade of Zumbo went to Butua. In 1750 Francisco de Mello e Castro had stated that most of clogh of the Zumbo trade went to Butua and what was left was used north of the Zambezi. But in 1769 Manuel da Costa wrote that robberies on the Butua-Zumbo route had been "more excessive in the recent past successive seven years" and as a result little was coming from Butua. Manuel da Costa went on to claim that he personally had experienced three successive losses on the Zumbo-Butua route within the previous seven years. Apparently the vashambadzi of Manuel da Costa, especially mushabadzi Nhamuza who lost about eight hundred head of cattle, were robbed in Butua. In 1765 Manuel da Costa's mushambadzi appears to have been killed by some Rozvi envoys on the same route at the

1. Memoria e documentos... Machona e Nyassa, op. cit., pp. 159-179, letters and reports of Francisco de Mello e Castro; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 4, Mossambique, 22/11/1753, Francisco de Mello e Castro.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 9, Senna, 15/7/1761, Marco Antônio de Azevedo do Coutinho de Montaury to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque.
instigation of Fr. Santa Anna. In 1767 Fr. Santa Anna, as we
read before, was complaining that the vashambadzi had evolved
a new method of trading which increased the time needed for
a Zumbo trader to receive his profits. Indeed as early as
1768 Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos claimed that whereas it used
to take two years for a trader to get his profits from the Butua
trade, by 1768 at best it took three to four years. Because
of this new situation, Zumbo traders, who had always traded by
taking goods on credit from Sena and then paying their creditors
in the following year, were found to be many years in arrears
with their payment in the 1760s. This was true even of the
leading Zumbo traders of the time i.e. Fr. Santa Anna, Manuel
da Costa, and Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos. Even as early as
1762 Manoel Caetano Rodrigues claimed that only two men were
credit worthy at Zumbo i.e. João Colaço and Manuel da Costa.
The Sena merchants replied by demanding cash payment as much as
possible for their goods from the Zumbo traders. Indeed even the
beads for which a royal monopoly still existed in the Rivers at

1. "Fundo do Séc. XVIII", in Mocambique, No. 84, 1955, pp. 90-97,
doc. 165, Zumbo, 13/3/1769, António Manuel de Sequeira, report of
a meeting with a Rozvi embassy.
2. See Chapter Five, pp. 219-220.
3. "Fundo do Séc. XVIII", in Mocambique, No. 88, 1956, pp. 129-131,
doc. 213, letter No. 728, undated and unsigned but clearly the work
of Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos to the Governor-General written
around January 1768.
4. "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Mocambique, No. 81, 1955, p. 135,
doc. 101, letter No. 742, Tete, 24/2/1769, Inacio de Melo Alvim to
the Governor-General; A.H.U. Av. de Moc., Cx. 12, letter No. 591,
Zumbo, 24/9/1767, Fr. Manoel Jozé de S. Anna to B.M.P. do Lago.
5. A.H.U. Av. de Moc., Cx. 9, Sena, 17/7/1762, Manoel Caetano
Rodrigues.
this time, were hard to get on credit. Apparently Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque in a Bando of his had forbidden that it be sold on credit to the merchants of Zumbo or the bares. 1 Between 1761 and 1768-9, it appears no goods moved from Sena or Tete to Zumbo. And from Zumbo between the same period the only goods known to have been sent to Sena was a consignment of ivory which arrived at Zumbo from Orenje in 1766 and was dispatched for Sena and Quillimane in 1767. To describe this consignment as indicating a "1766-7 boom period" for ivory at Zumbo has implications for life at Zumbo which do not seem to agree with the situation as has been presented above. Different documents have used different adjectives to describe this cargo of ivory. Some have seen it as "a good portion of ivory", others as "a sufficient" consignment and yet another writer calls it "a low bulk consignment". Miss Sutherland-Harris appears to have read far too much into this single cargo of ivory known to have left Zumbo for Sena between 1761 and 1768.

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 9, Senna, 15/7/1761, Marco Antônio de Azavedo do Coutinho de Montaury to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque.
2. The only known attempt to carry goods from Tete to Zumbo during this time was in 1765 when some traders carrying four to five Bares of 'fato' (cf. with four hundred needed for Butua trade!) were robbed of their goods in the Mutapa lands. Those "miserable traders" returned to Tete in November 1765. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, Tete, 28/1/1766, João Pereira to Governor-General.
5. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 13; letter No. 659, Tette, 20/7/1768, Inácio de Mello Alvim to the Governor-General.
6. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, Quellimane, 10/7/1767, Inácio de Mello Alvim to Governor-General. From a copy by João da Costa Xavier.
Between 1760 and 1763, Coronel Dionizio de Mello de Castro tells us the Zumbo-Butua route was subjected to many robberies by the warring Mutapa princes through whose lands the vashambadzi had to travel. The troubles on the Butua route which seem to have spread into Butua itself from about 1762 onwards continued to increase until the vashambadzi could neither carry goods to or out of Butua. By 1765 the ruling Rozvi Mambo sent his envoys to Zumbo to find out why the vashambadzi were not coming to Butua. Fr. Santa Anna, then acting cap.\textsuperscript{m} mor, explained that Zumbo had no cloth and until the vashambadzi, who had been in Butua for some years by that time, were sent back with gold and ivory, Zumbo Muzungus could not buy the cloth to send to Butua. In 1766 the envoys of the Mambo were back at Zumbo looking for cloth from Zumbo. But the cap.\textsuperscript{m} mor gave them a similar reply as had been given in 1765. When the Rozvi envoys returned to their Mambo without cloth the latter was so furious that he threatened to send them back to Zumbo there and then but the envoys were spared the journey on account of the wars then being carried on by the "Mahias" in Butua and because one of the vashambadzi (used as Manamucates) who had accompanied them from Zumbo was ill. During the years 1765-66 famine ("a cruel fome") ravaged Butua and "revoluçoens" spread throughout the land. The above upheavals seem to be all

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 10, Sena, 20/1/1763, Dionizio de Mello e Castro to Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 12, letter No. 591, Zumbo, 24/9/1767, Fr. Manoel Joaquim de S\textsuperscript{es} Anna to B.M.P. do Lago.
we are told that might throw light as to what "Mahia" wars were. The same word "mahia" was used to describe the civil wars in
1 Butua around 1795. On this latter occasion famine and internal upheavals in Butua were also noted. It would seem that internal upheavals associated with the major famines were referred to as "mahia" wars. The troubles in Butua reached their height at the beginning of 1768. Around the end of 1767 or the beginning of 1768 a Mambo died and what the Portuguese documents described as a "usurper" proclaimed himself Mambo. The result was a civil war between the "usurper" and his supporters against the "rightful heir" lasting from January 1768 to around April or May when the "usurper" was killed in battle and the 'heir' proclaimed the new Mambo. It was not until the end of 1768 that the new Mambo was able, after pacifying his kingdom by expeditions going close to
2 Zumbo, to send an embassy to Zumbo.

To solve the problems of the Tete-Zumbo-Butua route during the troubles of the 1760s the Governor-General of Moçambique Balthazar Manoel Pereira do Lago requested in 1766 sixty sepoys from Goa to be sent to the Rivers for the duties of escorting merchants from Tete to Zumbo throughout the troubled Mutapa lands. The attempt to use sepoys in the colonization of the Rivers was not a new idea. Even as late as the beginning of the 1760s requests for sepoys had been made to the viceroy of India. But

1. Chapter Seven, p. 308
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 13, letter No. 659, Tette, 20/7/1768, Inacio de Mello Alvim to Governor-General.
in 1764 the viceroy of India had discouraged the plan on the grounds that the sepoys were excessively cowardly and had "neither energy nor courage" even for "the defence of their own houses and families... I am persuaded" the viceroy concluded "that the measure is totally devoid of practical knowledge and experience". But Balthazar was not to be put off even by those in the Rivers who doubted the feasibility of the plan and so pressed on until in 1768 sepoys were sent to the Rivers from Goa. In July 1768 the sepoys were described as "much better disciplined". By January 1770 we have a report jubilantly announcing that in 1769 a group of merchants for Zumbo had reached Chicova on their way to Zumbo without any trouble from the chiefs on the way - thanks to "twenty sepoys and an officer" who accompanied them. But the contribution of the sepoys has to be seen in the light of a treaty of friendship between Mutapa Changara and João Moreira Pereira and others made on 18th January 1769. Its chief interest to the Portuguese was to have the routes to Zumbo through the Mutapa lands re-opened.

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 13, letter No. 659, Tette, 20/7/1768, Inacio de Melo Alvim to Governor-General.
3. "Fundo do Séc. XVIII" in Mocambique, No. 82, pp. 67-8, doc. 111, letter No. 761, Tete, 22/1/1770, Inacio de Melo Alvim to Governor-General.
However, neither the twenty sepoys nor the treaty of friendship between the Portuguese and Changara were able to save the Zumbo-Tete route in 1772 when prince Ganiambaze blockaded the route. On that occasion it was a Rozvi Mambo's army that relieved Zumbo. The resumption of the movement of trade goods from Tete to Zumbo in 1769 must itself be seen in the light of the resumption of contact between Butua and Zumbo in 1769 which itself should be understood in the context of the situation in Butua. The ruling Mambo sent an army under four "Inhabezes" to go and pacify the land. The army was given a hoe as a symbol to clear the land of the "mahias". It appears that a general order was also sent to the "bareiros" to help defeat the "mahias". Also it is said three "missocas" (regiments) were sent to go and punish some of the bareiros who, probably taking advantage of the mahia troubles, had discovered new bares (mines) but had not informed the ruling Mambo about the discoveries. But instead of punishing those "bareiros" the three regiments, no doubt benefitting from the troubled state of affairs in the empire attacked, without permission from their Mambo, the Portuguese vashambadzi in Butua. But the situation was brought under control by the end of 1768 when after a series of campaigns that were carried, according to one source, almost to the very borders of Zumbo, the Mambo who ascended the throne in April or May 1768 decided to resume contact

with Zumbo. With Butua at peace and the vashambadzi who had stayed in Butua for some years able to return to Zumbo, the traders of Zumbo were once again in a position to resume trading. Although the sepoys had been "much better disciplined" as early as 1768, it was not until 1769 that they were used in Zumbo-Tete route. The sepoys had to wait until the Zumbo traders had their Butua profits before they could have something to escort from Tete to Chicova.

In the end the strongest point to show that Zumbo's continued existence by the 1760s had come to rely on the Rozvi connection was evidenced by the fact that to the traders at Zumbo the solution to their problems was to abandon Zumbo and to go and re-establish the old feiras of Dambarare (Mukaranga). This decision showed that the northern connections of Zumbo were not so highly valued as was its Rozvi trade. But lack of co-operation among the traders and the fact that Zumbo re-established its trading relations with Butua in 1768-69 proved to have been one of the chief causes why the Projecto de restabelecimento da Feira de Dambarare, was in fact abandoned in favour of staying on at Zumbo.


(b) Zumbo's Political Dependence on the Rozvi

Although the founding of Zumbo was forced on the Portuguese by the actions of the founder of the Rozvi Empire, Dombo I, it seems that even from the early days of Zumbo/Chitakatira contact between the Portuguese and the Rozvi was established. As has been seen, the fact that the Rozvi Mambos were to refer to all the Zumbo capitães mores during the eighteenth century as "Pereira" strongly argues for a Rozvi-Zumbo connection during the days of Pereira, the founder of Zumbo. This early contact between the Zumbo Portuguese and the Rozvi rulers contrasted with the hostility shown in the viceregal directives before the 1730s as already discussed in chapter two. The argument of the Conde de Ericeyra that the defeat of the Rozvi was a sine qua non for the improvement of the situation in the Rivers of Sena, was officially demolished in a number of letters and reports in the 1750s by Francisco de Mello e Castro. Castro argued that the Conde's plan was not only still-born but wholly unnecessary. In the first place the Rozvi Mambo, was so much in favour of trade with the Portuguese that he was, as seen in 1743, doing everything possible to continue trading relations with the Portuguese; and secondly the Rozvi Mambo was so powerful and feared that the Portuguese, with their paltry forces in the Rivers, could not successfully wage a war of conquest against the ruler of Butua (Castro made great play of the distance from Sena to Butua as a decisive factor
working against any chance of launching a successful attack on Butua).

After 1750 almost all the Portuguese sources whether from Zumbo, Manyika or Sena and Moçambique depict the Rozvi Mambos up to about 1795 as powerful and benevolently disposed towards the Portuguese and their trading activities. The Portuguese at Zumbo although outside the jurisdiction of the Rozvi Empire still regarded themselves as being within the Rozvi area of influence. Indeed in 1785 they were talking in terms of placing themselves under the protection of the Rozvi Mambo to the same degree "assim como se practica na manica". This never came about. The traditional relations of the Rozvi and the Portuguese continued. In accordance with this relationship the Rozvi Mambos protected the Portuguese vashambadzi trading in Butua and in times of grave danger to the survival of the Portuguese traders at Zumbo it was understood that the Rozvi Rulers would provide assistance to the Portuguese. In return for the above promise of protection the Portuguese at Zumbo paid every three years a form of tribute which by the latter part of the eighteenth century was known as "Prezidio" (lit. garrisoned place): The "Prezidio" was about five Mutores of goods. Besides the presidio the Portuguese traders

1. Memoria e documentos... Machona e Nyassa, op. cit., pp. 159-179; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 4, Mossambique, 22/11/1753, Francisco de Mello e Castro.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 22, Zumbo, 24/11/1785, Caetano Manoel Correia to Governor of the Rivers.
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 17, letter No. 912, Zumbo, 22/1/1781, Caetã Mº Corraã to Governor-General.
4. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Zumbo, 20/6/1784, Antã Caetã de Souza to Governor of the Rivers.
paid various kinds of "saguates" each time a Rozvi embassy came to Zumbo. The Rozvi embassies did not only come every three years but sometimes went to Zumbo yearly. But the most common of "saguates" was the one the vashambadzi would pay each time they visited the Mambo's Court for trade.

An examination of some of the concepts and usages employed in the Portuguese-Rozvi (African) relationship reveals a fascinating insight into how the two sides perceived their respective positions. What immediately strikes one in this relationship is how Karanga (Shona) marriage customs formed the basis of the Muzungu-Shona relations. The Shona father-in-law-cum-son-in-law relationship was almost totally duplicated in the Shona-Muzungu relations. The Shona chiefs almost always assumed the role of the father-in-law while the Muzungu or their agents took the position of a son-in-law (i.e. the supplicant and hence the weaker one). Just as the son-in-law, in Shona custom, is the one to pay "Zarura Muromo" (gift paid to begin negotiations: literally "opening of the mouth") in the eighteenth century it was the Portuguese and their agents who had to pay "boca" (Portuguese for "Mouth"). It is true an African chief who visited the Portuguese settlement asking for favours from them had the duty to pay the "boca". In such cases, which were very rare, the roles were reversed.

1. It was one of the most common of the tributes as no discussion could begin without it. See Chapter Five, p. 213, and Appendix G (iv).
From time to time Portuguese traders were asked to give goods to the African rulers so as to have 'Masanzu' (lit. tree branches, but metaphorically used to mean "misunderstanding") removed. The above payments, the Portuguese described as 'saguates' (presents). But as the Portuguese found out, and as Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos clearly stated in 1768, the above were not optional gifts, but compulsory for which non-payment would bring retribution. These exactions should more accurately be described as a form of tribute rather than "present".

Another category of exactions was what the Portuguese called chibingas (xibinges). In Shona the word is chibinge (Plural: zvibinge). When a prospective son-in-law breaks one of accepted Shona conventions the father-in-law can "bingisa" him. The only way to get out of the chibinge would be for the son-in-law to pay the fine imposed by the father-in-law. Sometimes the Portuguese referred to the zvibinges simply as milando (Shona: murandu (sing), mirandu (pl.)). Mirandu were a pest which the Portuguese traders dreaded as very often not all of these were known beforehand. Even today among the Shonas themselves one of the most dreaded aspect of marriage negotiations are the zvibinge. A milando

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1. See for example A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Maço 30, Manica, 11/4/1833, Severino de Almeida, meeting between Manyika settlers and Chimmombo, the envoy of the King of Barwe.
4. Ibid.
was anything from the killing of prince Ganda in 1774 to the refusal of Alexandre da Costa to return the boats of his agent Sircussi or failing to pay an expected "present".

Another concept borrowed from marriage customs was the word rusambo (in some Portuguese documents found as ruçambo, russambo but in present Shona also spelt rutsambo, rushambo) which among the Shona is a token (usually an arm trinket) which a girl gives to a boy as a token of her acceptance of his proposal. "Rusambo" was a token (not an arm trinket of course!) which an African chief usually sent to the Portuguese as a sign that a milando had been satisfied.

A final category to be considered is what we may properly refer to as a kind of taxation or tribute, by which payment the Portuguese recognized the sovereignty of a particular ruler over an area where the former lived or traded. Such a tribute was the "curva" which first the Arabs and later the Portuguese used to pay to the Mutapas until after 1629. The Portuguese King refused to pay the "curva" after that year, arguing that the Mutapa was by then his vassal and payment of curva would imply recognizing the sovereignty of Mutapa over the Portuguese crown and its agents.

1. See above, note p.251.
3. See p. 251; The Portuguese reply to Bereco's Nevanje regarding the death of Ganda was, at first, that the matter could not be discussed again as a milando had been paid and a rusambo received in 1777 from Mhondoro Bedza and others as a sign that the question of Ganda's death had been settled.
within the Mutapa empire. During the eighteenth century an example of the "curva" was what was called "binzo" which the Portuguese at the feira of Manyika paid to the Rozvi Mambos. The Portuguese referred to the tax Chikanga had to pay to the Rozvis also as "binzo". Failure to pay binzo invited the most dire consequences for Chikanga from the Rozvi rulers. Within this category of taxation must be included the customs duties paid by the Zumbo traders at Buruma's "Alfandega" (customs house). Such tolls and tributes were also paid to every chief through whose land the traders passed.

Although the above discussion by being restricted to the Shona world and leaving out the contribution of the "Marave group" of languages and that of the "Povos do Baixo Zambeze" is somewhat sketchy, it nevertheless gives an added weight, by its agreement with economic relations as already presented, to the picture of the Zumbo-Portuguese dependence on the Africans in general and the

3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 28, Mucariva, 30/5/1793, from a copy of the original by Jozé Sebastião de Ataide, himself the writer of the original.
5. Ibid., pp. 51-59.
Rozvi in particular. We have already seen how in 1743 the then Rozvi Mambo sent about 2,000 warriors to Zumbo to help Fr. Pedro to control the problems in the lands above Tete. What remains now is to show how this father-in-law cum son-in-law relationship was carried out by the Rozvi Mambos during the rest of the eighteenth century.

In 1772 Ganiambaze, a Mutapa prince, contending for the Mutapaship with Changara, blockaded the route between the villa of Zumbo and Tete. This was not surprising in view of the fact that in 1769 Changara had made a treaty of friendship with the Portuguese, but the official explanation for Ganiambaze’s actions was that he, as well as Barwe and Undi had been maltreated by 2 Ignacio de Mello Alvim. The cap. m mor of Zumbo at that time was Jozé Antônio de Azevedo. Apparently before the nomination of J.A. de Azevedo to the post of Governador e cap. m mor of Zumbo, two Dominican priests were vying with each other for the governorship of Zumbo. The two fathers took rather unkindly to the nomination of J.A. de Azevedo as governador of Zumbo over their heads. Not only did they despise Azevedo, but even more outrageously, they gave refuge in their lands to Ganiambaze. They were accused of having encouraged their African agents at Zumbo to collaborate with Ganiambaze. They rejected that they had any obligation to

1. See Chapter Four, pp. 185-186.
help the governador of Zumbo to defend the feira. In these circumstances, according to B.M.P. do Lago, who received his information from Azevedo and the Governor of the Rivers J.M. Pereira, Azevedo "fell back on Chief Changamira, the most powerful (chief) of those interiors", who, the writer adds,

"is a man without many defects, except for his colour and paganism; because (if he had many) it would not be easy to understand his trading policy and the reason why he is able to make others obey him and love the Portuguese. It was him, I am informed, who helped the Feira of Zumbo". 1

The Rozvi army relieved Zumbo and peace was re-established at the feira.

The third and last time a Rozvi army visited Zumbo was in 1780-81. For some unstated reason Casiresire (Casireçire, Caçicire, Cassiressire) one of the princes involved in the Mutapa wars of succession was provoked into attacking Zumbo and its inhabitants. An official inquiry (devassa) found that F.J. da Câmara, the governador of Zumbo was the one who had provoked Casiresire. When Câmara saw that Zumbo was in danger he sent pleas for help to Derere, the King of Dande and to the then Rozvi Mambo. But before help could come from either Derere or the Rozvi

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1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 14, Moçambique, 15/8/1773, Bar Mel Pera do Lago. The letter is based on reports to B.M.P. do Lago received from the governors of Zumbo and Rios de Sena.
ruler, Casiresire crossed (sometime between 1777-79) the Zambezi and committed what G.B.C. de Campos could only describe as a "massacre of the moradores and mercadores". In the fight many people died including F.J. da Câmara and Casiresire became Lord at Zumbo. Zumbo was temporarily abandoned. But help from Derere, though too late to save many of the settlers, arrived and in due course Casiresire was defeated and killed. Help from the Rozvi arrived in 1780, almost nearly a year after the incident. The Rozvi army which was estimated at about 3,000 strong and led by twelve powerful "bareiros" or "chefes" and seven or ten Inhabezes was camped on the south bank of the Zambezi. The new governador of Zumbo Caetano Manoel Correia who arrived at Zumbo in December 1780 found the Rozvi army waiting for him. What to do with such a powerful force was Correia's most pressing problem at Zumbo. At first he toyed with the idea of building a fortress at Zumbo.

1. The date of the attack is unknown but can be assigned to the period not earlier than 13th July 1777 or later than 28th December 1779. The former date gives evidence that Fr. Luís Lobo the predecessor of F.J. Câmara, was still acting capitão mor at Zumbo while the latter represents the nomination of Caetano Manoel Correia to the captaincy of Zumbo. It must be noted however that after the death of F.J. Câmara the governor of the Rivers of Sena appointed G.B. Coelho de Campos as capitão mor of Zumbo. But as soon as the Governor-General at Moçambique heard the news he relieved G.B.C. de Campos of his post and appointed Caetano Manoel Correia which suggest that the attack of Casiresire may have taken place sometime in mid-1779.

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 17, Zumbo, 31/5/1780, G.B.C. de Campos to A. Manoel de Melo e Castro.
for which he told the governor of the Rivers that fifteen bares of assorted "fato", one hundred maços of "velorio groco", "branco" and "azul pouco", and six hundred alqueires of white cowries from the coast of Moçambique Island or the Querrimba Islands, would be required for the payment of Africans needed for the construction of the fortress and also for the payment of a "hundred Borozes (Rozvi), vassals of the Emperor Changamira, our ally, to take care of whatever invasion that our secret political enemies would wish to make on us while we were fortifying ourselves". Correia stressed that a hundred Rozvi, on account of their reputation as conquerors, would be just enough to frighten the other neighbouring African chiefs and at the same time not too large a force to cause too much trouble when the time came for them to leave for Butua.

Correia also thought of using the 3,000 Rozvi fighters to punish all the chiefs including the Mhondoro Bedza, surrounding Zumbo who had ever maltreated the Portuguese. But his request for advice on this subject from Tete was not answered and so he did not pursue it. Instead Correia contented himself with the problem of trying to achieve a peaceful Rozvi withdrawal. Accompanying the Rozvi army was also a Rozvi embassy which stayed at Zumbo from at least November 1780 to March, 1781. The main reason why the Rozvi embassy and army were delayed for so long was that Correia was trying to collect the triennial contribution (taxation)
made by every inhabitant of Zumbo unless he pleaded poverty, for the payment of "saguate", to the African chiefs and kings. Although Correia, in anticipation of the needs of the Rozvi embassy, had been given by the Feitor da Fazenda Real at Tete - who was then also the Juiz Ordinario of Tete, Sebastião de Morães e Almeida, himself later to be governor of Zumbo in succession to Correia - five bares of cloth, one aroba of gunpowder, another of balls and six guns, he later claimed that much of the five bares of cloth given to him at Tete before he left had been spent on the chiefs en-route to Zumbo for the sake of obtaining a safe passage for himself and his party. From the contributions of the inhabitants of Zumbo Correia was able to send to the then Rozvi Mambo the following goods as "saguate": twenty six corjas and a dozen chuabos of "fato", two guns and an aroba of gunpowder, a sombreiro, beads and other sundry items. The Rozvi embassy was told to convey the gratitude of the vila of Zumbo for the trouble the then Mambo had taken in sending his army to help Zumbo.

In the end Correia had to be content with having achieved a peaceful withdrawal of the Rozvi army. Displeasure at the presence of the Rozvi forces was aroused among other chiefs, especially those on the south bank of the Zambezi where the Rozvi troops had been stationed, but fortunately for Zumbo, this did not immediately result in reprisal against the feira. In a way the very fact that a Rozvi army had come to Zumbo's assistance only eight years after its last visit in 1772 must have underlined, for the benefit of the chiefs neighbouring Zumbo, especially on the south bank, the fact that the Rozvi rulers were very interested in, and perhaps even very committed to, the survival of Zumbo. But how such knowledge by these chiefs may have helped Zumbo is a somewhat more problematic proposition to establish.

After the 1780-81 Rozvi help to Zumbo, no other Rozvi army was ever to visit Zumbo. In 1784 Correia thought of inviting the Rozvi to aid Zumbo against Bereco and Inyapende, but he did not pursue the matter. However Portuguese requests for Rozvi help in

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Tete, 16/12/1784, Caétano Manoel Correia to governor of the Rivers.
1795, 1802 and 1803 received no response, not so much because the Rozvi were less friendly towards them but mainly on account of the fact that they were not strong enough to give the help.

In 1788 the Portuguese were forced to abandon Zumbo for Mucariva.

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 40, Mucariva, 4/3/1802, J.P. Diniz to Jeronimo Pereira. In this letter Diniz, after receiving false intelligence of the size of the impending Rozvi embassy, wrote to the governor of the Rivers announcing that the army requested from the Rozvi by João de Souza e Brito, the predecessor of Jeronimo Pereira, was on its way to Zumbo; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 33, Mossambique, 30/12/1796, D. Diogo de Souza to João de Souza e Brito. In this letter Diogo de Souza discussed the letter of Souza e Brito, dated 13th July 1795, in which Brito announced that he, as a result of reports from Manyika and Zumbo, decided to send an embassy to the Rozvi ruler of the time asking him to send his envoys to Tete so that negotiations could take place with a view to having the Rozvi troops sent to preserve peace at Zumbo and to enable a much more intense exploitation of the mines of Manyika; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 33, Sena, 8/7/1795, João de Souza e Brito to D. Diogo de Souza, announcing that envoys, sent to the Rozvi by Souza e Brito around September 1794 to ask for Rozvi help to control the hostility of Chikanga towards the Portuguese, had not returned.


4. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Zumbo, 10/10/1788, Cosme de Mello and others. Houses were built at Mucariva during October. The move to Mucariva was precautinary. It arose out of the fact that Mhondoro Bedza ordered prince Gomo of Dande to punish Bereco for some unidentified reason. In view of the fact that earlier on in 1788 Bereco had humiliated the Zumbo Muzungus the latter feared lest Bereco should have thought that it was they who had instigated the attack. But the attack never took place and on 12th December 1788 Bereco sent envoys to Mucariva, where the Muzungus were by then living, asking them to return to Zumbo. But the Muzungus refused. See also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 25, Mucariva, 12/12/1788, Cosme de Mello.
During the 1790s Mucariva suffered from the harrassments of chief Buruma. In 1804 Buruma attacked and burnt down the vilá of Mucariva. Although the last Rozvi embassy had left Zumbo in 1803 with a request for help by the Muzungus to the Rozvi Mambo, no help ever arrived. This was mainly because internal forces had caused the decline of the Rozvi Empire. The consequence of this was the gradual but irresistible decline in the importance of the Zumbo trade which had been built on its connections with the Rozvi Empire.

It was no coincidence that when Butua was in trouble in the 1760s Zumbo was also in trouble and was nearly abandoned. Nor was it by chance that when around the 1790s the Rozvi empire showed signs of decay and actually collapsed in 1833-4 Zumbo followed suit. On the other hand there is no evidence that the problems of Zumbo had an adverse effect on the Rozvi empire, on the contrary, it was the very crises of Zumbo before 1788 that provided evidence of the continued virility of the Rozvi empire by the way in which the Rozvi armies presented themselves at Zumbo in order to prop up the Portuguese regime there. It is no exaggeration to suggest that without Butua, Zumbo might never have been anything more than a backwater Portuguese settlement.

1. The best remembered occasion was in May 1793 when Buruma seized four boat loads of fazendas and velorio containing no less than one thousand mutavas of goods. Much ill-will which led to the destruction of Mucariva in 1804 between Buruma and J.P. Diniz was founded partly on this incident. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 28, Mucariva, 30/5/1793, Sebastião de Ataide, from a copy of the original which he also wrote.
of no more consequence than the bar or feira of Mixonga which was only occasionally occupied during the latter half of the 18th century. This was not to be, because the interests of the Rozvi Rulers required the continued existence of Zumbo. But when internal problems and weaknesses shattered the power base of the Rozvi Rulers from the last decade of the 18th century onwards, the Rozvi political objectives in the existence of Zumbo gradually began to appear like a luxury of a past imperial era which the ailing empire could no longer afford. By the early 19th century the gold of Butua was sold at the feira of Manyika rather than Zumbo. After that change in Rozvi policy, the death certificate of Zumbo had already been signed and sealed. In 1813 and finally in 1836 Zumbo-Mucariva was to be abandoned not because it was under attack but because it had become an economic liability to the Portuguese.

1. Liesegang, Gaza Nguni, op. cit., p. 36.
Chapter Seven

DECLINE AND COLLAPSE OF THE ZUMBO-BUTUA TRADE ROUTE

In as much as Zumbo's glorious days were related to its connections with the Butua trade in gold and ivory, so too does it appear that when the Rozvi empire was in trouble the importance of Zumbo diminished. In the 1760s the troubles in Butua had led to the first proposal for the abandonment of Zumbo and the re-establishment of the feiras of Dambarare. The problems of Butua, detectable from 1795 onwards, coincided with proposals for the abandonment of Zumbo and the eventual establishment of the Feira of Aruangua do Norte. It is partly a commentary on the significant role Zumbo had played in the 18th century trade of the Rivers that in the early 19th century, even when it became increasingly clear that Zumbo had outlived much of its usefulness, the Portuguese authorities continued to hope against hope that somehow the vila could be revived to its former glory. The 1836 abandonment came because by that date the feira was simply an expensive irrelevance since the "Great Lord of Butua" showed no signs of recovering from his "ills".

THE END OF THE ROZVI EMPIRE

(a) Internal Factors

The known Rozvi traditions, as befit any history of a "chosen people", have ascribed the end of their empire to the displeasure of the Mwari, the God of their ancestors. It was "Nwale-Nkolo", claimed Sebina, who on seeing that a Mambo Tumbale (Tumbare) had forgotten his forefathers' customs and begun to despise "Mwale-Nkolo", caused the demise of the Rozvi hegemony. Another tradition claims that when the Rozvi praised Tumbare and Basvi instead of Mwari for the Rozvi victories over their Nguni enemies, Mwari, the jealous one, removed his blessing from the Rozvi forces. Yet another version of the story of the fall of the Rozvi empire has it that Mwari grew tired of the arrogant attitudes of the Rozvi Mambos, some of whom began to refuse to give presents to his priests. It is said that some of the Mambos tried to destroy Mwari himself, or rather his "voice" which chided the Mambos for their bad actions. At such apostasy and blasphemy the High God, Mwari of Matonjeni, the Mwari of the ancestors, decided to end Rozvi hegemony over the other Karanga peoples. The Nguni were the divine instruments invoked to punish the Rozvi.

It is the "unfortunate" task of the historian to pierce through the smoke screen so often elaborately and assiduously created and fostered by oral traditions. It is "unfortunate" for the historian because it means that he has to discover more mundane and logical causes in what is often a labyrinth of mystification and falsification, and it is unfortunate for the people under study (in this case the Rozvi) because by removing the cloak of divine intervention they are seen to have needed no more than human weaknesses to have their hegemony destroyed by superior forces. Scholars of Rozvi history have in the past either presented without comment the Rozvi accounts of the fall of their empire, or, where they have ventured to offer opinions, they have asserted that the fall of the Rozvi must be ascribed mainly to the Nguni attacks of the early 19th century.

But the indications one is able to gather from the Portuguese documents lead one to trace the decline of the Rozvi empire to at least the last decade of the 18th century. From the documents of Zumbo we know that in 1788 the Muzungus abandoned the feira of Zumbo in favour of Mucariva settlement because they feared Bereco might attack the former. In May 1793 chief Buruma, the lord of

3. Chapter Six, pp. 251-252.
Mucariva, robbed some vashambadzi of the Muzungus of Mucariva.

This was partly because Buruma did not want the Muzungus to be permanently resident at Mucariva. Relations between the Muzungus and Buruma continued to deteriorate from 1793 until 1804 when the latter attacked Mucariva. Worried about the hostility of Buruma and some of the chiefs near Mucariva settlement, the Governor of the Rivers of Sena, João de Souza e Britto, in consultation with the Governor-General, Dom Diogo de Souza, in 1796 sent an embassy to the then ruling Rozvi Mambo to ask him for help in connection

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 28, Mucariva, 30/5/1793, Sebastião de Ataide; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 28, Mucariva, 10/6/1793, Jozé Antônio Almeida Barretto to the Governor of the Rivers. After demanding very high milandos for the granting of free passage to the vashambadzi, Buruma proceeded to seize four boats carrying about a thousand Mutavas of goods from the vashambadzi. Buruma's pretext for this was that Manuel da Costa the capitão mor of Zumbo from 1769 to 1772 had received one hundred tusks of ivory from Buruma for which the former had not paid. Buruma stated that the one thousand Mutavas were payment for the first thirty and the other seventy would be recovered by similar methods. This incident was to poison the relations between J.P. Diniz, who was then the Commandant of Mucariva, and Buruma for a long time. In 1801 João de Souza was entrusted with thirty slaves and three tusks of ivory belonging to Buruma for trading at Tete. But instead João de Souza used Buruma's property to pay his own debts at Mucariva. In 1801 also Diniz attacked some people of Buruma under Manamateo a brother-in-law of Buruma. For the 1801 incidents see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 40, Mucariva, 20/2/1801, Jozé Pedro Diniz. This letter gives Buruma's goods as 30 slaves and 3 tusks but another letter in the same Caixa dated Mucariva, 4/3/1802, by J.P. Diniz to Jeronimo Pereira, Governor of the Rivers says that the number of the ivory tusks and slaves of Buruma were twenty each. For the story of Manamateo see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 38, Mucariva, 30/4/1801, by Jozé Pedro Diniz; Another letter by J.P. Diniz on the Manamateo subject is in the same Caixa and is dated Mucariva, 28/5/1801.

2. See below pp. 308 -314
with the problems at Mucariva and the feira of Manyika. He asked first that the Rozvi Mambo should send ambassadors to Tete to negotiate with him but this request went unheeded. In 1802 and 1803 further requests for Rozvi help were made by Jozé Pedro Diniz but these too were not met. Although Mucariva was destroyed in 1804, the Rozvi did not send help to Mucariva. This was in contrast to 1743, 1772, and 1780–81, when Rozvi Mambos sent armies to help the Portuguese at Zumbo, when the latter were in trouble. Even more significant is the evidence provided by the almost total stoppage of trade between Butua and Mucariva in the period from 1793 to 1802. After 1803 we have no evidence that a Rozvi embassy ever visited Zumbo-Mucariva. All the evidence from Zumbo-Mucariva only mentioned the Rozvi empire when pointing out that

2. Ibid., note 2.
3. Ibid., note 3.
4. See Chapter Four, pp. 185–6.
6. Ibid., pp. 275–279.
the trade of that region with Zumbo-Mucariva had ceased. We know from contemporary documents that from about 1795 to around 1801 there was civil war and a major drought in Butua. Indeed up to 1808 the civil wars were said to be still raging in Butua.

We have already seen how the Rozvi Mambo ruling in 1795-96 failed to send his representative to go and crown Inharugue as king of Manyika.

Evidence coming from oral sources and having a bearing on the fall of the Rozvi empire is rendered difficult to handle by lack of chronology and internal inconsistencies. Besides such and other shortcomings inherent in most oral evidence our main Rozvi sources suffer from the "Jiri-Gumunyu conflict" which has led to a process of almost continuous distortion of events especially those associated with the last forty or so years of the empire. The nature and origins of this conflict are discussed in Appendix B. There we have traced this conflict to the end of the reign of Mambo Basvi Rupengô Rupandamanhanga and to the beginning of that of Mutinhima Gumboremvura. From the oral sources

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 50, Zumbo-Mucariva, 22/8/1808, João de Souza to the Governor of the Rivers.
3. Chapter Three, pp. 143-144.
4. See Appendix B, on Jiri-Gumunyu conflict.
it was claimed that the reign of Mambo Basvi Rupengo Rupandamanhanga was associated with a two or three year drought remembered as "Ndiya" or "Shangwa" which took place during that reign. It was said that Basvi was callous, indifferent and gloried in the suffering of his people, saying "Let the days cut, and the sun scorch - I will see who will help you!" His people were said to have replied, "Ndigo rupanda-mananga gwapedzesa mbeu yavanhu". ("He is the pumpkin-eater who has finished off the seed of men").

During Basvi's reign it is said pumpkins were used as rovora (bride present) and much tribal movements and mixing are said to have taken place. The Rozvi traditions, whenever they mention Mambo Rupengo Rupandamanhanga, show that he came towards the end of the Rozvi empire. The latter is a very important point which has provided scholars with a useful clue to try to reconstruct the reign of Basvi. Frobenius, calculating in the light of Zulu migrations, thought that 'Rupenga-Mupengo' was killed in about 1780. Von Sicard thought that it was about 1790, but the Portuguese documentary evidence from Zumbo now enables us to throw fresh light on this chronology.

1. Fortune, "Rozvi Text", NADA, 1956, p. 73.
From a period beginning not later than 1788 and to at least 1802 we can be fairly certain that only two Mambos ruled. This is so because the Mambo ruling in 1802 claimed that his dead predecessor was ruling in 1788. Frobenius' date of 1780 can be eliminated on the grounds that in 1780-81 there is no evidence of a drought or civil war in Butua; if anything the Rozvi empire appears to have been fairly strong at that time as evidenced by the fact that a Rozvi army of about 3,000 warriors was sent to Zumbo to help the Portuguese. On the other hand, von Sicard's date of 1790, while an improvement on Frobenius, must still be regarded as too early by four to five years. The documents from Zumbo-Mucariva clearly show that a five year drought began around 1795. This long drought, which coincided with civil wars, was reported in the Zumbo documents up to 1801 and the civil wars up to 1808 after which date the Zumbo traders seem to have given up all hopes of ever re-opening the Butua trade. In a document of 1802 the three most important personages in the Rozvi empire:

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 40, Zumbo-Mucariva, 26/4/1802, J.P. Diniz, report of a meeting with a Rozvi embassy. The date 1788, while not specifically mentioned in the document cited can safely be deduced from the fact that the Mambo ruling in 1802 is said to have claimed that his predecessor was ruling at the time the Muzungus moved from the vila of Zumbo to the vila of Mucariva, which we already know to have been in 1788; See Chapter Six, p. 280, note 4.
2. Chapter Six, pp. 275-279.
4. See below, p. 317 note 3.
according to the list of presents sent by Mucariva Muzungus to Butua, were as follows:- (a) the Changamire, (b) one Mandebere Cupareza and (c) Tumbare. Of interest is the name Mandebere because of its resemblance to Muteveri (Mtebere, Ntevere or Muntebere) who was the son of Mambo Mutinhima Gumboremvura.

If Mandebere is not Muntebere the son of Gumboremvura who then was it within the Rozvi empire who was more important than Tumbare? In 1784 the Tumbare was given by implication as the second most important personage in Butua after the Mambo. To whom could he have been third in 1802 but to the Nevanje of the Mambo? The years 1795-96 seem then to be the earliest dates consistent with the evidence in which the Basvi - Mutinhima civil wars could be postulated. Because of the relatively high degree of correlation shown between the documentary and the oral tradition sources on the events of Butua towards the end of the 18th century (in the case of oral tradition it would be safer to say towards the end of the Rozvi empire) we find it justifiable tentatively to identify the ruler of Butua in 1788 as Basvi Rupengo Rupandamanhanga and that of 1802 as Mutinhima Gumboremvura and to calculate the end of Basvi's reign as coming after 1795-96.

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, Mucariva, 29/12/1802, J.P. Diniz and others.
4. Nevanje, see Glossary.
5. This is so because Basvi is said to have ruled for two to three years during a period of drought. Since the Zumbo documents show that the drought took place from about 1795-6, Basvi's reign would probably not have ended before those dates.
Besides the evidence for the decline of the Rozvi hegemony already cited from Manyika, there is also the oral tradition collected by S.X. Botelho-around 1835 which claimed that the Mutemas (or was it the Sanga people as distinct from their rulers?) were subservient to the Rozvi Mambos for about one hundred years before they rebelled. This would appear to suggest that the Mutema rebellion was around the 1790s. The picture of continued troubles and instability in the Rozvi empire is reinforced by some glimpses provided by some other oral traditions. Posselt recounts that he collected a tradition which said that Muteveri, the son of Mutinhima Gumboremvura, together with the priests Mabvudzi and Nerwande were involved in a plot to assassinate Gumboremvura. The plot misfired and the plotters were exiled from the court. Von Sicard has suggested that Merensky's and Nachtigall's reference to the two sons of a Mambo, one faithful to Mwari and the

1. See above, p. 287, note 1; also Liesegang's *Gaza Nguni*, op. cit., p. 34, for a claim that Manyika kingdom showed evidence of instability between 1795 to 1818.
4. Sicard, "Dyembewu", *P.R.S.A.*, 1951, pp. 196-7; The Rev. Nachtigall and Rev. Merensky belonged to the Berlin Missionary Society, and in 1862 undertook an expedition from Sekukuniland to the Northern Transvaal. During this expedition one of their guides told them about the Rozvi people; their God (Molimo), the fact that they possessed guns, and the story of the succession rivalry that took place between two "sons" of the Mambo when the latter died. The diary of Rev. Nachtigall is published in Wangemann; *Geschichte der Berliner Missionsgesellschaft*, Bd. IV: Die Berliner Mission in Basutoland, Berlin, 1877.
other sceptical about Mwari, refers to a Dyembewu and Mutinhima Gumboremvura respectively. If von Sicard is right that Mutinhima Gumboremvura was the "pagan" son referred to by Merensky and Nachtigall then the implication of two chief religious functionaries, Mabvudzi and Nerwande, in the attempted assassination of Mutinhima assumes a more significant perspective. In this incident we may have what seems a historically comprehensible explanation for much of the "divine" anger against the Mambos which is said to have led to the collapse of the Rozvi empire. It is tempting to speculate whether the heresy of Mutinhima Gumboremvura was, as far as the priesthood was concerned, the fact that Mutinhima is said to have claimed the powers to cause rain after the drought associated with Basvi. Since the priesthood specialized in rain-making, if the Mambo himself became the chief rain-maker, as Gumboremvura was claiming, the power or role of the priesthood would seriously be diminished. While Gumboremvura may have won the first round against the priesthood, in the end he probably did his empire further damage by alienating one of its hallowed institutions.

3. Ibid., p. 159; Daneel, *God of Matopo Hills*, op. cit., p. 16.
There is no evidence that Gumboremvura's successor(s) ever mended the breech with the priesthood. It appears that during Chirisamhuru's reign Tumbare was responsible for doctoring the armies of the Rozvi. Whether this was a traditional role or a new function as a result of the breach with the priesthood we cannot say with certainty. But whatever its origins it seems likely that the fact that Tumbare doctored as well as led the Rozvi armies against the Nguni invaders may have led to Tumbare being regarded as the saviour of the Rozvi nation. Because they regarded Tumbare as their saviour, the Rozvi, according to some traditions, earned the wrath of Mwari (or was it the wrath of the priesthood?)

The traditions of the Nanzwa in Wankie district seem to indicate that they left the Mambo’s capital about the time of Chirisamhuru. This is so because the tradition in question says they moved away on account of Nguni pressures. The movement of the Shawasha of Chinamhora from Mushawasha or Mahumbwi (south of Fort Victoria) to Chishawasha (near to Salisbury) is thought to have taken place in the early 19th century. The movement of the people of Gutu (not far from Fort Victoria) would seem to be also a 19th century phenomenon seeing that they appear to have come to Gutu after or

2. Ibid., p. 84.
during the Rozvi diaspora. It is by no means easy to identify every movement of the Karanga groups between 1680 and 1840, but in general it seems possible to postulate that the major population movements during this period probably took place firstly during the era of Dombo (1684-1695) and then from around 1795 onwards. It is also possible that some movements may have taken place during the troubles (hunger and civil war) from about 1760 to 1768. In view of the fact that evidence of major population movements within the Rozvi empire may be seen as an indication of instability and lack of control of the empire by the Rozvi, it is vital that every major population movement cited as evidence against effective Rozvi control must be looked at with an eye to see how far it falls within one of these three periods of probable disturbances within the empire. Until more research has been carried out on Shona oral traditions with the purpose of ascertaining the possible dating of population movements, it is not possible for us to present our view as anything but a probable hypothesis. But the hypothesis seems to cope well with nearly all the examples brought forward by Sister Aquina to prove that there were constant population movements within the Rozvi empire. Two of her examples are said to have happened in the 17th century and a third in the late 19th century. These three population move-

ments clearly have little relevance for our argument since they are outside the period of the existence of the Rozvi empire as we know it. The example of the Chilimanzi origin cannot be used as evidence of major population movement. The Chilimanzi migration was that of one prince of Manyika and his family only who came peacefully and was made a chief by the Rozvi rulers. The original Chilimanzi was no conqueror but a refugee who found favour with the Rozvi Mambos. We clearly need more evidence about dating before we could discuss her other examples.

The above picture of the Rozvi empire after 1795 is one of internal divisions, civil wars, population movements, hunger and a split between the religious and civil arms of the empire. All the ingredients for the break-up were already present, but something like a social law of inertia kept the organization in existence until a catalyst in the form of the Nguni invasions released the forces of dissolution. What is amazing is not the fact that the empire died but that it died kicking. Although during its last forty years the empire lingered on with only occasional fits and convulsions like a near-exhausted volcano, yet now and then it momentarily showed a flash of the old glory. Sometime in or after 1826 the Ngwato tried to rob cattle from some Karanga in the Rozvi empire. In the engagement that ensued

2. Ibid., pp. 394-95.
Kgari, the celebrated Mangwato warrior chief, and four of his brothers were killed. The raid was a complete failure. One Rozvi traditions claims that the last Mambo (the one killed by Zwangendaba, i.e. Chirisamhuru) sent an army to the Bamangwato in Khama's country in order to raid for cattle. It is said that this raid was very successful and many cattle were obtained. This would seem to suggest that Kgari and his army may in fact have been defeated by the Rozvi Mambo's forces. This is reinforced by the fact that the Ngwato are said to have come as far as Matopos for their raid.

1. Mackenzie, J., Ten years North of the Orange River, Edinburgh, 1871, pp. 358-9; Mr. J. Chirenje has orally informed me that there are Tswana traditions that corroborate the story. The eye witness informant of these events was Kgosidintsi Motswasele the elder brother of Sechele.
2. D.G.L., "Mlima", NADA, 1934, p. 84.
3. Information found in Tswana traditions by Mr. J. Chirenje. See note 1 above.
(b) The Nguni Invasions

Although the Nguni invasions of the 19th century were to weaken the Rozvi empire even further and finally to lead to its very destruction, those invasions give us an insight into the remarkable stubbornness, resilience and resistance of the Rozvi. The Nguni invaders were refugees running away from Shaka. They sought sanctuary and new lands in which to settle. The lands of the Rozvi were safe from Shaka and most suitable for cattle keeping which were the two things the Nguni exiles needed most. The Ndebele after 1838 were to find these lands ideal for their needs, but before 1838 the Nguni invaders for some reason did or could not permanently settle in Butua.

A recent study of the Nguni migrations between the Delagoa Bay and the Zambezi river, has arrived at the conclusion that about four groups of Nguni made contact with the Rozvi during their 19th century movements. These Nguni have been identified as (a) the Nxaba Msane Nguni, (b) the Ngwana Maseko Nguni, (c) the Nguni under Zwangendaba and (d) the Ndebele under Mzilikazi. Liesegang, with the help of D.P. Abraham, has identified the Ngwana Maseko Nguni with what Rozvi traditions refer to as the Madzviti (Nguni) of Muchechenyane (Mtshetshenyana, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane), with what Rozvi traditions refer to as the Madzviti (Nguni) of Muchechenyane (Mtshetshenyana, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane), with what Rozvi traditions refer to as the Madzviti (Nguni) of Muchechenyane (Mtshetshenyana, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane, Mucecenyane).

Contradicting this view is one Rozvi tradition which identifies Muchechenyane with Sebituane of the Makololo, though it must be said that this reference to Makololo Sebituane as Muchechenyane is the only one known to this writer. As early as 1826 Sebituane was fighting in the Tswana country not far from the Rozvi areas of influence. Some Ngwato eye witness accounts indicate that the Makololo of Sebituane followed the Ngwato as far as Matopos in present day Rhodesia. But these sources do not mention if the Makololo did fight the Rozvi. But in view of the fact that the above cited Rozvi tradition claims that the Rozvi defeated Muchechenyane it may not be surprising that no Makololo tradition is known to refer to any encounter with the Rozvi. According to von Sicard, Muchechenyane came and lived for some time in the Belingwe area not later than 1826. This date would seem to fit in with the known time of Sebituane's presence in Tswana country. Yet in favour of the Ngwana Maseko identification are the following facts:—

(a) their traditions specifically mention that they passed through the Karanga or "Ulozi" country ruled by what they call Mamba or Changamile (Changamire)

1. Liesegang, Gaza Nguni, op. cit., p. 45.
4. Information received in an oral communication with Mr. J. Chirenje
see also p. 297 notes 143
6. Chibambo, Rev. Y.N., "My Ngoni of Nyasaland", in Africa Own Library No. 3, London, 1942, p. 15; Also Ishmael Mwale's account in Margret Read's, The Ngoni of Nyasaland, International African Institute, London, 1956, p. 8; Mwale's account tells the story of the Ngwana Maseko's departure from what he called "Swaziland". Mwale uses "Ulozi" for Rozvi and "Mamba" for 'Nambo'.

(b) the Maseko Ngoni are also known as Mchecherere. Phonetically Mchecherere is the nearest name connected to the Ngoni migrations that we have found which resembles Mchechenyane of the Rozvi traditions. And besides, another Rozvi tradition claims that Mchechenyane went to Nyasaland. As the evidence stands we are inclined to agree with Abraham that the Mchechenyane Madzviti were probably the same as the Maseko Ngoni.

The second group of Ngoni to invade the Rozvi kingdom, according to some Rozvi traditions, were the Madzviti of Mpangana (Mupanga, Panga). It appears that the Madzviti of Mpangana were known as the Ngoni of Mpakana by the people of Buruma near Zumbo. Liesegang, following Schapera, seems to think that Mpakana is a corruption of Mbekane which was the surname of Nxaba (Nqaba). By the same token we may assume that the Mpangana of the Rozvi traditions was in fact a corruption of Mbekane. One Portuguese document says that after Nuava (Nxaba) had attacked Kiteve he, in 1830, went to Manyika and from there he proceeded to Changamire. In Changamire's country, as in Kiteve, Nxaba's Ngoni are said to have collected cattle as well as young women and boys. While the

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Ngwana Maseko traditions tell us that Ngwana Maseko and Nxaba Mbekane Ngoni met inside present day Rhodesia, it is a pity that no Nxaba-oriented Ngoni traditions could be found to supplement and elucidate the Ngwana traditions. But as with the Madzviti of Muchechenyane (Ngwana Maseko) those of Mpangana (Nxaba Mbekane) are remembered, in Rozvi traditions, as having fought against the Rozvi Mambo and in the end as having been chased out of the country by the Rozvi forces.

At this point we must make a diversion in order to make an observation about the counter-claims for victories in Rozvi and Ngoni traditions. It would appear that both traditions have deliberately 'chosen' their own definition of 'victory'. It appears that for the Ngoni traditions every successful raid was described as a victory. And in a sense this is correct if we accept that the sole aim of the raids was to capture cattle and take some captives and not to result in permanent settlement. On the other hand the Rozvi traditions seem to claim a victory for their ancestors if after a series of raids, irrespective of whether or not they were successful, the enemy withdrew and left their country. So long as the Rozvi resisted an enemy they didn't seem to accept that losing a battle constituted the loss of a war. In short the Rozvi traditions seem to present us with the situation

at the end of a whole campaign as constituting victory or defeat. It seems to be this reasoning which allows the Rozvi to accept that Chirisamhuru was killed by the forces of Zwangendaba and the Rozvi forces forced into flight, yet at the same time to assert that in the end Zwangendaba was chased out of the country by Rozvi resistance.

After the Nguni of Mpangana the Rozvi traditions quoted above do not seem to be in accord as to which Nguni group followed. Only the tradition collected by Robinson and the account of Rukara seem to conform to the known chronology, which was that Nxaba was followed by Zwangendaba and the latter was followed by the Ndebele of Mzilikazi. But according to the traditions collected by Professor Fortune, after fighting the Nxaba Nguni the Rozvi fought against the Nguni of Zhishiri and later against the Nguni of Mafuwe. But Marodzi says that the Nguni of Nxaba were followed by those of Mahla. These were, according to Marodzi, followed by the Nguni of Zwangendaba and the latter by those of Jongwe. But who were these Madzviti of Zhishiri, Mafuwe, Mahla and Jongwe? In Shona Zhishiri means a big bird and Jongwe means a cock. It may be that what Marodzi calls Jongwe

5. Ibid., p. 90.
is what Fortune's informant called Zhishiri. According to Cullen Young, among the clans introduced by the Ngomí was one originating from the Swazi viz. Chongwe. Could the Madzviti of Jongwe be a reference to the Chongwe Nguni (Swazis?). The identification of the Madzviti of Mahla is even more problematic. Could Mahla be a shortened form for Mahlanza-ngoloya, a heroic warrior of Nxaba who was killed in the fight between Nxaba and Zwangendaba in northern Mashonaland? Marodzi shortened the name of Mpangana (Mbekane) to Panga, could it be that by the same token he shortened the name of Mahlanza-ngoloya to Mahla? Also, should we see the Madzviti of Mafuwe as given by Fortune's informant as the Madzviti of Mahla of Marodzi or were they different? We can do no more than

2. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, op. cit., p. 50 - says that the name Swazi is derived from the Great Ngwane King Mswati who ruled after Sobhuza I who died in 1840. Von Sicard in Ngoma Lungundu, p. 44, advises that since the name Swazi, as far as Sicard knew, only occurred for the first time in 1843, it would be unwise to use it before that date. Rozvi traditions call the Ngwana (Muchechenyane) and the Nxaba (Mpangana) as well as the Zwangendaba Nguni by the name of "Swazis". Since the three groups were pre-Mswati (i.e. before 1840) it is intriguing why the Shona should remember them as Swazis. In an oral communication with Phel Bonner the writer was informed that the latter has evidence oral and documentary of the use of the term Swazi long before Mswati's reign to describe peoples who were living in North-western part of the Zulu on both sides of the Pongolo River. If this were true then the Shona use of the term "Swazi" before 1843 would not be so strange.
speculate about this until more work has been done. With the present state of available sources instead of regarding the Madzviti of Jongwe and/or Zhishiri, and Mahla and/or Mafuwe as separate and independent Nguni groups which passed through the Rozvi empire, I think it is more plausible to see them really as sections of either Maseko or Nxaba or Zwangendaba groups who distinguished themselves in their raids on the Rozvi. According to the four Rozvi traditions recorded by Marodzi, Rukara, Robinson and Fortune, the Rozvi armies were successful in chasing out of the country all the Nguni invaders of the early 19th century before the arrival of the Ndebele of Mzilikazi. As is to be expected the traditions of the Ngoni tell a different story. According to the Maseko Ngoni although the Karanga of 'Changamile' defended themselves from inaccessible hilltops the Nguni over-ran 1 the country. But probably a better picture of the Rozvi power of resistance and weakness is to be obtained from the traditions of both Nguni and Rozvi accounts of the attacks of Zwangendaba against Chirisamhuru the last Rozvi Mambo at Manyanga. According to the Rozvi traditions, at first the Rozvi armies resisted Zwangendaba but after a time they retreated in disarray with the result that their last Mambo, Chirisamhuru, was skinned alive by 2 the people of Zwangendaba. But in the end the Rozvi claim that

they, under the leadership of Tumbare, were able to expel the 1 Zwangendaba Nguni from their kingdom. Chitsa, a participant on the side of Zwangendaba, admitted that although the Rozvi country was the most desirable of all the places they had seen on their sojourn from the south, yet the Rozvi "Mambo put up a stubborn fight and then fled into the very hilly granite country, making it difficult for us to subdue him and his people". 2 According to Chitsa the last Rozvi Mambo was not captured or skinned alive, but threw himself to his death from a high cliff. The Zwangendaba forces, then besieging Manyanga where the Mambo is said to have committed suicide, were surprised to find that the Rozvi forces had vanished from Manyanga unnoticed. Although Chitsa states that the Nguni of Zwangendaba decided to leave on their own, the Rozvi insist that they drove the Nguni of Zwangendaba to the Zambezi. Indeed the Rozvi seem to have remembered the resistance against Zwangendaba and the other Ngunis by singing praise songs to the organiser of the resistance - Tumbare:

"Kudeyi asi Tumbare hwana hwaitsa mumoto!", (Were it not for Tumbare the children (nation) would have burnt in the fire"). 4

The attack on Chirisamhuru at Manyanga by Zwangendaba was probably around 1833/1834. It is said that when Zwangendaba crossed the

1. See above p.304 note 2.
2. Ranger, _Revolt_, op. cit. p. 11.
3. Ibid.
Zambezi in 1835 he left behind in the Rozvi kingdom a regiment under the command of a woman by the name of Nyamazana.

Although the Nguni invasions up to 1833/34 showed that the Rozvi were still capable of resisting, nevertheless those raids disorganized even further the Rozvi kingdom. Because the three invasions already described were all concentrated between 1826 and 1833/4, the Rozvi were given no chance to recoup their strength which was already seriously shattered by internal problems. But it was the death of Mambo Chirisamhuru in 1833/34 that must have sealed the fall of the Rozvi empire. After Chirisamhuru no one was crowned Mambo. The Royal Rozvi were divided, some under Mutinhima Muteveri, others under Basvi (Swabasvi) a descendant of Dombo I, and a third group may have come together around the house of Chirisamhuru Gumunyu. When the Ndebele came, after 1838, the Rozvi had neither an accepted Mambo nor an empire. The confusion that must have existed after the death of Chirisamhuru is reflected in the Gumunyu–Jiri genealogies where, it would appear, each house recognised its own head as the rightful successor to Chirisamhuru. Because of this evidence of a disputed and un-

2. N3/33/8 "Barozwi" SBY Archives says "No successor to Tshirisamuru had been appointed when Mzilikazi entered the country".
5. Ibid.; Marconnes, "Rozvis or Destroyers", NADA, 1933, pp. 87-90; See also Appendix A (iii and iv).
resolved succession, it is unwise for any student of Rozvi history to apply the title of "Mambo" as used for the Rozvi rulers before 1833-34 to any of the pretenders to the Rozvi throne after the death of Chirisamhuru the last.

The story of the Rozvi royal princes' resistance to the Ndebele, although full of interesting episodes, is not really part of our topic; it belongs to a study of the Shona-Ndebele relations in the 19th century. Our study ends with Chirisamhuru's symbolic fall from a cliff at Manyanga. And the last words said to have been spoken by the last crowned Rozvi Mambo sums up the sheer courage and arrogance of the successors of Dombo I which ennobled their acts even in moments of defeat. Implored by his councillors to escape from the forces of Zwangendaba at Manyanga, Chirisamhuru is said to have replied:

"The rock cannot run away, but you my children, flee for your part, I die here at Manyanga".

2. See chapter two, p. 83, on action of the eight men of Dombo who helped Nyakunembiri.
3. Fortune, "Rozvi Text", NADA, 1956, p. 74; See also Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 147. Here it is claimed that the Rozvi had a saying that "Kingship is a stone and cannot move".
The Impact of the Decline and Fall of the Rozvi on Zumbo-Mucariva

The decline of the Rozvi empire discernible from the 1790s onwards is reflected in the history of Zumbo from the same period to 1834-36. Although many other factors contributed to the decline and collapse of Zumbo-Mucariva during that period, the one and overriding factor was the loss of the Butua connection to the trade of Zumbo. In 1796 J.P. Diniz announced that ivory of 1 Mamba was the chief commodity at Zumbo-Mucariva. In other words Mamba had superseded Butua as the chief trading partner of Mucariva. From about 1795 to around 1802 there is no evidence in Zumbo-Mucariva documents that any Zumbo-Mucariva vashambadzi travelled to and from Butua for trading purposes. In 1801 Diniz wrote that from Butua,

"they used to bring, not many years ago, two hundred pastas (of gold) annually but today that interior region of Abutua is found to be in total decay because of the Machias wars and five years of successive hunger which, lamentably, all that country has experienced".

1. See chapter six, p. 256, note 1.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 32, Mucariva 21/5/1796, Jozef Pedro Diniz to Diogo de Souza, a report on the conditions of trade at Mucariva and its trading regions.
3. Ibid.; and also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 40, Mucariva, 4/3/1802, J.P. Diniz to Jeronimo Pereira. The latter document shows that the impending Rozvi embassy was to be the first since 1796 when João de Souza e Britto sent for help from the Rozvi Mambo.
It is true that in 1795 Souza e Britto did send envoys to the then Rozvi Mambo to request the Rozvi ruler to help in solving the problems at Manyika feira associated with the Inharugue succession crisis and also to assist Zumbo-Mucariva in its troubles with Buruma and the other surrounding princes. The Rozvi ruler only replied by sending an embassy to Zumbo in 1802 i.e. about six years after the request had been made.

But luckily for Zumbo-Mucariva, during those six years she was governed by J.P. Diniz one of the most intelligent men to have exercised the governorship of the feira during the latter half of the 18th century. It is a gross injustice that J.J.T. Botelho has described Diniz as a typical Portuguese backwoodsman administrator. He understood the problems of Zumbo-Mucariva as few others had done before him and wrote long and detailed reports.

1. See p. 286; also chapter six, p. 280, note 1.
2. Chapter six, p. 280, note 2.
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 30, Tette, 1/3/1795, João de Souza e Britto. Letters patent for the nomination of J.P. Diniz to the captaincy of Zumbo do Mucariva. But he had already been commandant of Mucariva, since his nomination to that post by a letters patent of 12/6/1792 found in A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 30, Moçambique, 12/6/1792, written by the secretary Manoel Galvao da Silva, but signed by the Governor-General Antônio Manoel de Mello e Castro.
on the feira and its region. And even more remarkable, he actually tried to solve some of those problems. His efforts met with mixed fortunes, partly as a result of the nature of the problems themselves and partly as a result of his own character which showed that kind of impatience and brusqueness sometimes noticed in all men of action.

1. Besides his outstanding letters, he wrote the following major reports:- A.H.U. Av. de Mog., Cx. 38, Mucariva do Zumbo
30/4/1801. "Relação da Discrição dos Limites da villa do Zumbo e desta de Mucariva, suas distância, Confinos dos Reinos e terras ser cumvizinhas, e corresponderias estabelecidas dos senhorios dellas"; Same date "Relação dos generos de Fazendas de Portugal e do Norte, que se gasta, e extrage no Comércio desta Via producto das suas comutações e exporta para Mossos e daly pê Dió, Damao, e Goa Dominios, da Impreal Coroa de Portugal"; same date "Relação da Despeza anual que faz, a Real Fazenda Nesta villa, e os Lucros q' omes² tira com Reaes Direitos na Alfandiga de Mossos, assim de Ouro, e marfim q se exporta desta Via pê o mismo. Como dispatchos dos fazendas pê estes Rios de Senna"; same date "Relação do que os comerciante's desta villa pê o fim da conservação da mesmo; alem do q' se gasta, o Cap. Mor da Mes² seu bolso"; same date "Relação do Estado da Tropa Regular, e Auxiliar; quantide dos Esta² fortificações, e o que necessita pê aumento, e defeza desta villa de Mucariva"; A.H.U. Av. de Mog., Cx. 38, Mucariva, 28/4/1801, Vincente Affonco Pereira, "Relação da Fundação e Estado da villa do Zumbo, e desta de Mucariva... ". Although this was not written by Diniz there is every reason to suggest that in its composition Diniz must have, at least been consulted. The report hero-worships Diniz's role at Zumbo-Mucariva and raises him well above most of the capitãens mores of Zumbo. There are other very long reports of Diniz which we cannot mention here but among these of outstanding value was his edit of 1796 already discussed in chapter five on pages 221-223.
Once Diniz had realized that the Butua connection with its gold and ivory as well as its important diplomatic and military protection were temporarily inoperative, he decided on a policy of arming Zumbo-Mucariva to look after her own interests. In 1796 he suggested that a body of fighting men composed of patricios (mulattos) and some selected Africans should be formed. This body of men was to be disciplined and armed with guns in order to protect the trade of the feira from Chicova to Mamba. As we saw in chapter six, by 1801 this had been paid for by Diniz. Diniz also built a stone fortress around Mucariva again at his own expense. In addition to which he constructed a stone church at Mucariva. He encouraged agriculture around Mucariva and promulgated some very useful decrees for the smooth running of its trade. In 1797 the traders of Mucariva accredited him with a number of achievements in the feira; it was said that Diniz had brought a spell of peace and calm at Zumbo and had re-opened the trade routes to Mamba and Kankomba as well as establishing fairly good relations with Buruma and Gomo, the king of Dande, and on a number of occasions from 1795-1797 he is said to have

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 32, Mucariva, 21/4/1796, Jozê Pedro Diniz to Diogo de Souza.
2. Chapter six, pp. 245-246.
3. Ibid., p. 247.
4. See below, p. 312 note 1.
intervened to stop robberies taking place on the trade goods travelling from Chicova to Mucariva. It is said that Diniz had managed to reduce the amounts of presents payable to African chiefs without causing any apparent harm to trade. Looking at things in 1797 it seemed that Diniz's aim "to restore to its pristine splendour" the Portuguese sovereignty in that part of Africa had started with a fair chance of success.

But by 1800 Jeronimo Pereira the Governor of the Rivers was reporting that although Zumbo-Mucariva was itself at peace nevertheless it was already in economic decadence because of its inability to trade with Butua and Mamba both of which were said to be in turmoil. Even the military strength which Diniz had secured for Mucariva with its fortress which was supposed to provide "perpetua conservação" for the trade and vila of Mucariva could not restore the trading prosperity of the feira.

Although in 1801 Diniz had attacked and killed a lot of the people

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 34, Mucariva, 6/12/1797, João de Souza; 7/12/1797, Manoel Coelho do Rosario; 25/12/1797, Joaquim Francisco Colaço. These were self-repeating affidavits written by the above traders all extolling the achievements of José Pedro Diniz from 1795-1797.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 34, Mucariva, 17/12/1797, José Pedro Diniz to Governor-General.
of Manamateo, a brother-in-law of Buruma who had visited the feira, that "exemplary castigation" had not frightened Buruma in the least nor had it ensured the security or prosperity of Mucariva.

By 1802 Diniz had realized that his efforts to raise the prestige and trading interests of the Portuguese at Mucariva by their own shoe strings were not possible or practical. No one could accuse him of not having tried. He did all he could to make Mucariva trade succeed in the absence of the Rozvi connection but even Diniz himself could not hide that the vila was in economic straits. More revealing were his discussions with the Rozvi embassies of 1802 and 1803. On both occasions he not only emphasized the absolute necessity for the Rozvi Mambo (Gumboremvura?) to protect the vashambadzi trade in Butua but above all he implored the Mambo to send a Rozvi army to Mucariva for the purposes of

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 38, Mucariva, 28/5/1801, Jozé Pedro Diniz; 30/4/1801, also by Diniz; See also p. 286, note 1. Manamateo was accused by Diniz in 1801 as the man who had in fact carried out the hold up by Buruma as described on page 286, note 1. Although Manamateo's actions in 1801 were anything but bellicose Diniz decided to attack him. Diniz captured 163 people and 6 ivory tusks from Manamateo's company. Among these were 21 wives, children and relatives of Manamateo. But Manamateo escaped. Buruma was to remember this incident for a long time.

2. See p. 310, note 1. Many of the reports quoted there make it clear that Zumbo was in economic troubles.


4. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, Zumbo e Mucariva, 19/1/1803, J.P. Diniz "Embaxador do Emp9r Changamira".
punishing Buruma and the other Chiefs who were causing troubles for the Feira. This continuous request for a Rozvi army from Diniz shows that even Diniz realized that his new attempt at Portuguese self-reliance at Zumbo-Mucariva had limitations. As it turned out Diniz's fears were justified because sometime in March 1804 Buruma attacked Mucariva and after about fifteen days of fighting the Muzungus were forced to abandon the Feira.

The failure of a man as intelligent and energetic as Diniz to make Mucariva successful either economically or militarily to look after its interest without the Rozvi connection propping it, further underlines the importance of the Rozvi for the Zumbo-Mucariva trade route. And also the inability of the Rozvi Mambo (Gumboromvura?) in 1795-6, 1802 and 1803 to send help to the

1. We know that on 27th March, 1804 Jozé Luis Menezes, then at Tete, wrote about the loss of Zumbo-Mucariva to the Governor of the Rivers. Menezes had received his news from an African who had arrived from Mucariva. This is explained in a letter in A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 44, Tete, 17/4/1804, Jozé Luis Menezes to Governor of the Rivers. (The above letter was found as a copy of the original made by António Jozé de Carvalho Chaves on 25/3/1804 at Moçambique.)

2. The main documents for the story of the attack on Mucariva included that quoted above in note 1, as well as the following:- A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 44, Terra Chiramba, 12/5/1804, Izidro de Almeida de Souza e Sá to António Norberto de Barboza de Villasboas Truão; Cédice 1306, fls. 83V-84 Moçambique, 24/9/1804, Izidro de Almeida de Souza e Sá to A.N.B.V.B. Truão; Cédice 1306 fls. 83V-84 Moçambique, 13/9/1804, Izidro de Almeida Souza e Sá to António Norberto de Barboza de Villasboas Truão; Cédice 1306 fls. 83V-84 Moçambique, 25/1/1805, Izidro de Almeida de Souza e Sá to A.N.B. Villasboas Truão; Santana, Dr. F., Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 462; Pacheco, A.M., Diário, op. cit., pp. 60-64. Pacheco's account is largely based on Buruma oral traditions. Very often it is inaccurate on dates as well as facts. Although it is the longest account nevertheless it is also the most unreliable.

3. See above, p. 291.
Muzungua of Mucariva was itself an indication that the empire's internal problems were of such a serious nature as to restrain the emperor's hands in the conduct of his foreign relations.

Even after the re-establishment of the feira sometime in 1804 by J.B. dos Reis Moreira there was little hope that the feira could recover its old position within the Rios de Sena, unless the old Butua connection was re-established. J.B. dos Reis Moreira only remained at Mucariva until early 1806 when he was relieved of his post in order to allow J.P. Diniz to resume his duties as Diniz had been found to be free of any blame for the attack on Mucariva by Buruma in 1804. But Diniz did not have much time to revive the trading system of Mucariva. The only achievement of Diniz was to send envoys of some of the chief mhondoros and princes neighbouring on Zumbo to the Governor of the Rivers, Truão. These

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 46, letter No. 116, Moçambique, 10/7/1805, Izidro de Almeida Souza e Sá to Visconde de Anadia; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 45, Moçambique, 16/7/1805, Izidro de A. Souza e Sá to A.N.B. de Villasboas Truão; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 47, Tete, 12/6/1806, A.N.B. Villasboas Truão to the Visconde de Anadia on the petition of J.B.O. dos Reis Moreira requesting the captaincy of Mutapa Zimbabwe and the "Habito da Ordem de Christo" for services at Zumbo.
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 46, Tete, 16/5/1806, Report of a meeting between the envoys of the chiefs and governor A.N.B. de Villasboas Truão and his Council. Written by José Sebastião Ataide and signed by him and Joaquim Francisco Colaço and Christovão Francisco and others.
envoys were jointly to declare that their masters had neither joined nor approved of the action taken by Buruma against Mucariva in 1804. They added that their masters guaranteed safe and unhindered passage to the Portuguese traders. Above all they told the Governor of the Rivers that their masters wanted none but J.P. Diniz to exercise the governorship at Zumbo-Mucariva. The above embassy was really Diniz's reply to the one J.B. dos Reis Moreira had sent in December 1805 with Buruma's envoys whose function had been to condemn Diniz for the events of 1804.

J.P. Diniz's return to Mucariva was to prove frustrating, fruitless and foolishly conceived. Both Buruma and Diniz had not forgotten nor forgiven 1804. The almost inevitable conflict took place in October 1807 when Buruma alleged that a Mucariva soldier by the name of Luís José Ferreira Lima had traded secretly with a chief Vimbe a rival of Buruma. Buruma's envoys claimed that that action was an unfriendly act for which responsibility must lie with Diniz as the man in charge of Mucariva. Buruma demanded a "heavy milando" from Diniz as well as the expulsion of Lima. But "because of the aversion which he (Buruma) had of that Gov. or Cap."

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 45, Tete, 18/12/1805, Report of a meeting between the envoys of Buruma and the governor of the Rivers, A.N.B. de Villasboas Truão, signed by José Sebastião de Ataíde.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 48, Zumbo-Mucariva, 24/10/1807, Report of a meeting held on 25/10/1807 between the envoys of Buruma and the capitão mor J.P. Diniz and his Council. Written by Luís Fortunato de Brum e Souza and signed by the latter and his father João de Souza and Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Ganho, José Daniel Pinto and others.
3. See chapter six, pp. 271-272 on discussion on "Milando".
Mor", he continued to harrass Mucariva until Diniz decided to avoid further "outrage or insult from Buruma, his immortal enemy" by leaving Mucariva. From 1804-1807 Mucariva Muzungus spent much of their time trying to cope with the political problems and little trade was organized. In 1808 João de Souza, who replaced Diniz in 1807, wrote in a report that although most of the trading interior of Mucariva were still open to trade, in Butua

"Because of the continuous wars that have been taking place there the mines have almost all been shut down and we are unable to draw the profits from there as (we did) in the past". 

It was not long before this absence of the profits of Butua made the continuation of the Feira of Mucariva pointless.

But the cutting away of the Butua gold from Zumbo had significance for the whole of the Rivers of Sena. After all previously it was maintained that Zumbo was the chief source of the profits of the Rivers of Sena because of its connection with the gold trade of Butua. One would expect, therefore, that the problems in the Rozvi

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 50, Zumbo-Mucariva, 22/8/1808 by Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Ganhado to Governor of the Rivers, Also another letter of the same date by João de Souza to the Governor of the Rivers.
2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 48, Zumbo-Mucariva, 2/1/1808, João de Souza to Governor of the Rivers. João de Souza was acting capitão mor from 5 November 1807 when Diniz left Mucariva; But João de Souza was officially made capitão mor of Mucariva on 30/5/1809. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 51, Moçambique, 30/5/1809, by the Bishop of Olba, Dom Vasco Jozé da Boa Noite Lobo.
3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 50, Zumbo-Mucariva, 22/8/1808, João de Souza to Governor of the Rivers. This is one of two letters of João de Souza to Governor of the Rivers. Known to have been written on that date.
empire, including the kingdom of Manyika from 1795 onwards, had a wider implications for the Rivers of Sena as a whole. In his "Estatistica da Capitania Dos Rios de Senna do Anno de 1806" Truão made an important survey of the political and economic situation in the whole of Rios de Sena. Of significance for our discussion was his observation that in 1806 slave exports earned more cruzados (192,920) than the export of gold (100,000). In the same year ivory exports with an earnings of 525,000 cruzados accounted for about half the total export earnings of the Rivers of Sena. Senhor J.M.T. da Cruz has shown in his thesis that from around 1796 there was a decline in gold production in Rios de Sena which fell steeply from around 1806 to reach its nadir sometime between 1810 and 1820 (between 1813 and 1820 Zumbo was abandoned) before it began to rise again from there onwards. On the other hand da Cruz argues that at around 1813 slavery figures show an upward turn which reached its peak around 1831 before it started to fall. But the ivory export shows a gentle declining graph from 1796 to reach a low level around 1834. The greater and growing interest in slaves had one important effect on Zumbo-Mucariva i.e. it led to declining interest in the slow and difficult gold production trade. When we realize that during the early 19th

1. Truão, "Estatistica da Capitania Dos Rios de Senna do Anno de 1806" in Estudos Coloniaes Miscelanea, 1889, p. 16. Original and summaries of it are found and were examined in the Academia das Ciências de Lisboa, Serie Azul, Mss. 1788 and Mss. 648, Nos 16, 17 and 20 respectively.
3. Ibid., p. 278.
4. Ibid., p. 288.
century the gold producing kingdom of Butua was torn by internal
strife and no traders of Mucariva could go there we may begin to
appreciate the message of Truão's estimates and approximations
and the graphs of Senhor J.M.T. da Cruz. But when we add also
the problems of Manyika feira from 1795 to 1818 then the dramatic
gold decline during 1813-1820 becomes even more comprehensible.
The decline in ivory was influenced, though less dramatically, by
the same forces. Interest in slavery may have at first been
influenced by the declining gold and ivory production but as time
went on it created its own dynamic which probably contributed to
the discouragement of an immediate revival in gold production.
Interest in slavery was clearly harmful to the Zumbo-Mucariva
trade because the region was too far into the interior and far
too vulnerable to engage in massive slave-hunting. With the
decrease in gold production Zumbo could only turn to ivory production.
It was partly for this reason that the Zumbo-Mucariva merchants
were interested in the founding of a new feira up the Luangwa, whose
chief function was to tap the Bisa-Kazembe ivory, then known to go
to Zanzibar, for the Rivers trade.

Truão is quite aware of the inadequacy and unsatisfactory nature
of his statistics.
2. Memoria e documentos acerca dos direitos de Portugal... Machona
and Nyassa, op. cit., pp. 350, 552; B.A.L. 54-XIII-32, Tete, 30/12/1821,
"Analyse Statistica topographica e Politica... de Rios de Senna...
1821" by Jozé Francisco Alves Barboza, pp. 81-82; For evidence
of the earliest known official contact between Kazembe and the Portu-
guese in the Zambezi see "Collecção Pombalina 721 Miscellana Cortes
e etc", pp. 308-309, letter dated Tette 12/3/1798 Dinizio Rebello
Curvo announcing the arrival of Kazembe's envoy.
With few merchants frequenting Zumbo-Mucariva and the expenses of keeping a restive garrison at Mucariva not diminishing and the chiefs en-route to Mucariva ever demanding or robbing large quantities of goods, the Governor of the Rivers, Józê Agostinho da Costa

1. From mid-1809 to 1810 the soldiers at Mucariva were not paid their salaries. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 52, Zumbo-Mucariva, 4/8/1809, João de Souza to Governor of the Rivers. In 1810 some soldiers mutinied at Mucariva. A petition of the mutinous soldiers is found in A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 53, Zumbo-Mucariva, 13/3/1810 signed by Joaquim Antônio Pereira, Manoel Pedro, Fellipe Ferreira, Józê Dias Frade and Józê Antônio Marques the writer of the Petition; all the other four could not write since they used the "X" symbols for signatures; See also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 54, Zumbo-Mucariva, 12/3/1810, João de Souza to governor of the Rivers. In this letter João de Souza gave the official reasons for the mutiny. Souza claimed that he allowed the petition to be forwarded to Tete only under duress, it being said the rebels came armed with spears and axes when they demanded their petition to be sent to Tete. Souza supported their complaint about lack of salaries but not about lack of accommodation and clothing. He refused to accept their demand to have Mucariva feira abandoned in favour of the old settlement of Zumbo. Again from mid-1811 to 1812 the salaries of the soldiers were not paid. See mid-1811 to 1812 abortions of the soldiers were not paid. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 57, Zumbo-Mucariva, 27/7/1812, João de Souza to the Governor of the Rivers.

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 50, Zumbo-Mucariva, 22/8/1808, João de Souza to Governor of the Rivers. This is one of the two existing letters of João de Souza to the governor of the Rivers known to have been written on that date. This was a long survey of the problems and prospects of trading for Zumbo-Mucariva in 1808. Among the chiefs then giving trouble were chiefs Pangura, Nhapende, Nuzengu and Gumaguma and Prince Chivera and Nhondoro Samarengo; See also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 57, Zombo-Mucariva, 27/7/1812, João de Souza to the governor of the Rivers. In this letter João de Souza complained that even when the pay of soldiers was sent from Tete much of it had to be spent in paying tolls and presents to the chiefs en-route to Mucariva. This was the case, he argued because very few, if any, traders were willing to send their goods to Mucariva for trade. And those few who did prefer to send their goods, not during the main "Mongão", when the pay of the soldiers would normally be sent, but at other times. See also pp.316-317 for Buruma's harrassment of J.P. Diniz in 1807.
decided that Zumbo-Mucariva had become a white elephant. Sometime in 1813 he instructed João de Souza the capitão mor of Zumbo-Mucariva to abandon the Feira and proceed to Tete with all the soldiers. Agostinho da Costa explained to the Governor-General at Moçambique that the Feira of Zumbo-Mucariva should be replaced by a new settlement to be founded up the Luangwa on the Marave side of the border with the Muiza (Bisa). This is the first known official recognition that Zumbo-Mucariva had by then lost its crucial role in the trade of the Rios de Sena. Although the Governor-General did not disapprove of the action of the governor of the Rivers, he made it plain that the expenses needed to send an expedition to establish such a new settlement could not be met from the Royal treasury and so had to be met from contributions obtained, by "pursuasion", from the inhabitants. The man nominated to replace Souza as governador e cap. mor of Zumbo-Mucariva, João da Costa Xavier, appears to have, at least in his letters written at Moçambique, been over zealous about re-establishing Zumbo-Mucariva

1. A.H.U. Céd. 1377, fls. 142v-143v, Moçambique, 17/2/1814, Governor-General Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Heneses to governor of the Rivers, José Agostinho da Costa; A.H.U. Céd. 1377, fls. 132-133, Moçambique, 24/9/1813, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Heneses to José Agostinho da Costa; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 69, Zumbo-Mucariva, 14/12/1820, meeting between commandant José dos Santos Reis and the envoys of chief Buruma. Signed: José Manoel Correia Monteiro, Fr. Agostinho da Conceição, Luís Fortunato de Brum e Souza, Joaquim dos Santos Montalvo and Francisco José de Azevedo.
instead of founding a new settlement altogether, but in the end his verbal enthusiasm was never translated into action. Indeed from 1813 to 1820 Zumbo-Mucariva remained officially unoccupied.

Plans for the re-establishment of the feira and vila of Zumbo-Mucariva were initiated from before 1818 and reached fruition.

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 57, Moçambique, 9/10/1813, Letter announcing the Letters Patent nominating Francisco João da Costa Xavier as governador e capitão mor of Zumbo-Mucariva; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 57, Moçambique, 25/11/1813, Governor-General Marcos Caetano de Abreu Meneses to the governor of the Rivers of Sena, Jozé Agostinho da Costa. This was a covering letter for the following petition:— A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 57, undated formal petition written at Moçambique by the capitão mor-elect of Zumbo-Mucariva, Francisco João da Costa Xavier. The petition must have been written between 9 October 1813 (nomination of F.J. Costa Xavier) and 25/11/1813 (date on which Governor-General wrote the covering letter for the petition).

2. A.H.U. Céd. 1377, fl. 242, Moçambique, 16/6/1817, Governor-General José Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to governor of the Rivers, Francisco Carlos da Costa Lace. Cavalcanti de Albuquerque discusses plans for the re-occupation of feiras of Zumbo and Manyika. See also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 61, Moçambique, 13/6/1818, "Portaria" of the letters patent of the nomination of Jozé dos Santos Reis to the Commandance of Zumbo-Mucariva signed by Barboza and registered as No. 224 of Book No. 7 of the Secretary to the Government of Moçambique; Also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 61, No. 60, Moçambique, 29/9/1818, Jozé Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, to the Conde dos Arcos; For other preparations for the re-establishment of Zumbo-Mucariva see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 66, Sena, 23/2/1820, Rodrigo Jozé de Sâ Aboim to Governor-General João da Costa de Brito Sanches. This letter informs us that in June 1819 Rodrigo Jozé de Sâ Aboim sent a soldier to mhoodoro Beza and some of the leading chiefs around Zumbo with presents and gifts in order to pave the way for the re-establishment of the feira of Zumbo-Mucariva. In January 1820 the soldier and the envoys of those chiefs were received at Tete, see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 66, Tete, 19/1/1820, Francisco Pereira Coutinho de Velharia acting commandant of Tete to Rodrigo Jozé de Sâ Aboim, the Governor of the Rivers.
only in 1820. Lt. Coronel Sousa e Silva is doubly wrong when he states that Zumbo was razed to the ground by Buruma in 1813 and re-established in 1813 after the defeat of Buruma. In fact the relations were so amicable in 1813 between João de Souza and Buruma that Buruma was to claim that when João de Souza was ordered to return to Tete with the Zumbo-Mucariva troops he (Souza) asked the chief to send ambassadors to Tete to the Governor of the Rivers to request the latter to send back the Muzungus to Mucariva. Buruma together with the mhondoro Beza, and other chiefs did indeed send

1. For the preparations of the soldiers sent to re-occupy Zumbo-Mucariva see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 66, Tete, 31/5/1820, Declaration by 47 soldiers for the Zumbo-Mucariva expedition saying that they had received three months salaries in advance signed by Jozé Bautista da Costa, Francisco Alexandre de Monsarrate, (Coporal) and one other soldier. Only these three were able to sign their names the other 44 used "X" symbols for signatures. The governor of the Rivers was furious when he heard that the soldiers had received only a three months salary instead of a year's salary as he had ordered. For this discussion see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 66, Tete, 6/7/1820, Lopo Vicente Colaço, Feitor da Real Fazenda at Tete, to Jozé Francisco Alves Barboza, the Governor of the Rivers; Also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 66, letter No. 3339, Tete, 6/7/1820, Lopo Vicente Colaço to Governor-General, João da Costa de Brito Sanches. Also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 66, Sena, 6/7/1820, Jozé Francisco Alves Barboza to Lopo Vicente Colaço; On 5/8/1820 Jozé dos Santos Reis and his men left Tete for Zumbo, see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 70, Zumbo-Mucariva, 2/3/1821, Jozé dos Santos Reis. On 15/9/1820 the expedition was at Chicova see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 69, Chicova, 15/9/1820, Report of a meeting at Chicova concerning some twenty three soldiers who had deserted. Signed by Jozé dos Santos Reis, Jozé Daniel Pinto, Jozé Manoel Correia Monteiro, Fr. Agostinho da Conceição, Joaquim dos Santos e Montalvo, and Francisco Jozé de Azevedo; sometime before 20/11/1820 Zumbo-Mucariva was re-established, see A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 70, Zumbo-Mucariva, 20/11/1820, Jozé Daniel Pinto, Fr. Agostinho da Conceição and Joaquim dos Santos e Montalvo.


3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 69, Zumbo-Mucariva, 14/12/1820, meeting between commandant Jozé dos Santos Reis and an embassy of Buruma. Signed by Jozé dos Santos Reis, Jozé Manoel Correia Monteiro, Fr. Agostinho Conceição, Luís Fortunato de Brum e Souza, Joaquim dos Santos Montalvo and Francisco Jozé de Azevedo.
envoys to the Governor of the Rivers on the lines suggested by João de Souza.

In 1813 Agostinho da Costa had hoped to replace Zumbo-Mucariva with a new settlement up the Luangwa River. By that decision Agostinho had recognized that the Zumbo-Butua connection was dead and so only by creating an alternative to Butua did Zumbo-Mucariva have a chance to survive as an important settlement. Without the Butua connection all the other Zumbo-Mucariva trading regions could not provide the security and the necessary profits which had enabled Zumbo to play a leading role in the trade of the Rivers during much of the 18th century. Even when the feira of Aruangua do Norte or feira of Marambo was founded in May, 1827 it failed to replace Zumbo-Mucariva and by 1830 it was obvious that the venture had been a failure.

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 66, Tete, 19/1/1820, Francisco Pereira Coutinho de Velharia, acting commandant of Tete to Rodrigo José de Sá Abiom, the Governor of the Rivers; Also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 66, Sena, 23/2/1820, Rodrigo José de Sá Abiom, to Governor-General João da Costa de Brito Sanches. Those who sent envoys included mhondoro Beza and Samarengo as well as chief Buruma, prince Nhamaguete, and king Gumaguma of Chicova.

2. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Maco. 3, Aruangua do Norte, 15/6/1828, José Manoel Correia Monteiro to Francisco Henriques Ferrão, Governor of the Rivers, announcing the formal occupation of the Feira. But in 1824 José Francisco Alves Barboza had sent a letter to chief Mwase (Naça, Muasse) announcing the intention of the Portuguese to build a new Feira in his country. In 1825 Pedro Caetano Pereira was given the mission to buy a convenient place for the new Feira. This he did in 1825 and took possession of the land of Chumbo and constructed houses for the Portuguese in the same year. For this information see especially Santana, (Dr.) F., Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 668-669. See also Reis, J.B., Os Portuguezes na Região do Nyassa, Imprensa Nacional Lisboa, 1889, p. 19.

When Zumbo-Mucariva was re-opened in 1820 it was the expense of keeping the garrison at the feira and the attitude of the surrounding chiefs especially the Burumas and the fear of the traders to send goods to any other interior region, but Senga Country, that foredoomed the newly re-established settlement to failure. Each

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Maço. 21, Quelimane, 23/2/1831, Manoel Joaquim Mendes de Vasconcellos e Cirne to Paulo José Manuel de Brito; A.H.U. Cód. 1469, fl. 96, Quelimane, 29/3/1834, António Mariano da Cunha, governor of the Rivers to the Provisional Government of Moçambique, on reasons for abandoning Zumbo; A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 73, Zumbo, 21/12/1824 José Daniel Pinto to José Francisco Alves Barboza, among other things requesting the soldiers' salaries. Also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 69, Zumbo-Mucariva, 14/12/1820, Report of a meeting between an embassy of Buruma and José dos Santos Reis signed by the latter and José Daniel Pinto, José Manoel Correia Monteiro, Fr. Agostinho da Conceição and others; and A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 72, Zumbo-Mucariva, 1/7/1822, and 29/6/1822. Reports of a meeting at Mucariva, between Buruma and his delegation with José dos Santos Reis and his Council, signed by José dos Santos Reis, José Daniel Pinto, José Manoel Correia Monteiro, Fr. Agostinho da Conceição, Luís Fortunato de Brum e Souza, Joaquim dos Santos e Montalvo, Francisco José de Azevedo; and Zumbo-Mucariva, 2/7/1822, report of a meeting of the Macariva Council with some Patricios, signed by José dos Santos Reis, José Daniel Pinto, José Manoel Correia Monteiro, Fr. Agostinho da Conceição and others. These reports show evidence of troubles between Buruma and the Muzungus; See also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 72, Zumbo-Mucariva, 11/11/1821, report of a meeting of the council at Zumbo-Mucariva, signed by José dos Santos Reis, José Daniel Pinto, José Manoel Correia Monteiro, Fr. Agostinho da Conceição and others; also A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 72, Letter No. 21, Zumbo-Mucariva, 10/2/1822, and letter No. 23, Zumbo-Mucariva, 10/3/1822, both by José dos Santos Reis to José Francisco Alves Barboza; and A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 74, letter No. 15, Zumbo, 15/7/1825, José Daniel Pinto to José Francisco Alves Barboza; Also Santana, (Dr. F.) F., Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana, Vol. II, p. 330, letter dated 28/7/1830. The last group of documents show evidence of troubles for Zumbo from Buruma and other chiefs.
time the authorities at Sena allowed Zumbo-Mucariva to be re-established it was always with the high expectations that it would renew its contacts with the Rozvi empire's land of Butua and Muzezuro (to be explained below) but up to 1836 that was the one thing the Zumbo-Mucariva traders failed to do. In fact by the 1830s the Zumbo-Mucariva traders had no knowledge of how to get to Butua. As for the lands of Muzezuro some of them continued to trade with the Portuguese, but not as part of the Rozvi empire but as a natural extension for the Tete-Sena-Mutapa trade. Whereas during much of the 18th century the lands that were later to be known towards the end of the 18th century as Muzezuro were often included in Butua or at any rate regarded as part of the Rozvi empire, in the early 19th century the Portuguese sources indicated not only that Muzezuro was different from Butua but more significantly

that it was not necessarily attached to the Rozvi empire. In
the 17th century the region later to be known as Muzezuro was
known to the Portuguese as Mukaranga i.e. distinguishing it from
Manyika and Butua. During much of the 18th century the same
region was identified as the area of the old feiras of Mukaranga
(or at times the feiras of Dambarare) and was regarded then as
being under the Rozvi control. In 1786 Manoel de Mello e Castro
wrote to Martinho de Mello e Castro that the mines of the Muze-
zuros were said to be within the empire of the Rozvi but not
in Butua itself. It must, therefore, be further evidence of the
decline of the Rozvi empire that in the early 19th century the
Portuguese were to regard Muzezuro as not being necessarily part

1. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 39, Moçambique, 12/8/1802, Isidro
de Almeida Sousa e Sã to the Visconde da Anadia, says that the
lands of the Muzezuros are different from, and border on those
of Changamire; see also all the documents on p. 326, notes 1
and 2 for evidence that Muzezuro was different from Butua.
2. In the last years of the 16th century Fr. J. dos Santos
said Mukaranga included lands from Kiteve to Butua, see chapter
one, p. 40. But in 1677 Fr. Manoel Barretto "Informação",
op. cit., pp. 482-487, said that Mukaranga included Rimuka,
Dambarare and Hwangwa (Ongoe) but excluded Kiteve, Barwe, Butua,
Manyika and Mahungwe.
3. For evidence that Dombo I conquered the lands of the old
Feiras of Mukaranga see chapter two, pp. 79-80. For evidence that
the Portuguese regarded the feiras of Dambarare (Mukaranga) as being
under continued control of the Rozvi Kambos see "Fundo do Séc XVIII",
Moçambique, No. 84, 1955, pp. 90-97, doc. 165, Zumbo, 13/3/1769,
report of a meeting with a Rozvi embassy in which the Portuguese
requested the Rozvi ruler for permission to be allowed to re-
establish the Feiras of Dambarare. Written by António Manuel de
Sequeira.
4. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 23, Moçambique, 3/12/1786, António
Manoel de Mello e Castro to Martinho de Mello e Castro.
of the Rozvi empire.

The abandonment of Zumbo-Mucariva in 1836 was forced on the Portuguese by the fact that it had become economically meaningless to continue with the feira when the latter's chief trading region of Butua was no more in a position to transact trade with Zumbo-Mucariva. Botelho's claim that the feira was attacked by Africans in 1836 is without foundation. All attempts to replace the Butua link whether by Diniz's policy of self-reliance or by the attempt to found the feira Aruangua do Norte proved futile. The Rozvi political and economic connections were of such significance that they could not be replaced. The problems within the Rozvi empire as a whole from 1795 onwards seem to have affected the gold trade not only at Zumbo but in the whole of Rios de Sena. It must be as much a commentary on the success of the Rozvi policies of excluding the Portuguese from Butua that from 1795 when their empire suffered from internal crises the Portuguese were in no position to exploit the situation to their

2. Botelho, J.T.T., História Militar e Política, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 7; according to Pacheco, A.M., Diario, op. cit., p. 64, the feira was handed to Buruma when the Portuguese left. And at any rate documents in footnote one above show that the 1836 abandonment was agreed upon between Zumbo and Tete before December 1834, and carried out in 1836.
advantage (as had happened in the 17th century Mutapa empire), as it is an indication of the Zumbo-Portuguese reliance on the Rozvi that when the latter were in decline the former also declined. It cannot be overemphasized that there is no evidence whatsoever that any of the problems of Zumbo-Mucariva in any way contributed to the fall of the Rozvi empire. All the evidence points to internal factors as the cause of the decline of the empire. Inasmuch as Butua had provided the major dynamism and wherewithals for the rise and success of Dombo I and had sustained the Rozvi empire for over one hundred years, it appears that the malfunctioning of the bases of Rozvi power within Butua as discussed in chapter three led to the decline of the empire. Zumbo-Mucariva only reflected the conditions in the Rozvi empire.
APPENDIX A

Some Rozvi Genealogies and Mambo Lists

These genealogies and Mambo lists are very often contradictory and confusing. None of these can be wholly relied upon to give an accurate chronology of the Rozvi Mambos. Names of Mambos seem to be remembered in a haphazard fashion. Von Sicard's and Stanford Smith's Mambo lists are long, wrong, misleading, and artificial. Mbava's list seems to represent dynasties or houses rather than individual rulers. In general all these Mambo lists are disappointingly unhelpful in reconstructing the chronology of Rozvi history. But by being distinct from, and shorter than, those of the Mutapas these Mambo lists help to demonstrate that history of the Rozvi hegemony is different from, and shorter than, that of the Mutapas. On the other hand the family genealogies (Ai) and (Aii) which deal mainly with the 19th and the 20th century history may be taken as being fairly accurate. The above mentioned genealogies demonstrate why it is that Gumunyu (Chirisamhuru) and the Jiri (Mutinhima) factions are so important in any study of the later part of Rozvi imperial
The two families are descended from the Mambos coming towards the end of the Rozvi empire. Mr. Solomon Nenguwo accused the Jiri and Gumunyu factions in Bikita of giving him "cooked genealogies". If Mr. Nenguwo was, as I suspect, hoping to get Mambo lists, then what the Jiri and Gumunyu factions gave him were clearly not Mambo lists. On the other hand if he had asked them for their family genealogies then what he was given are fairly accurate lists of the two houses. As we show in Mambo lists (Aiii) and (Aiv) it is unquestionably false that the Jiri (Mutinhima) and Gumunyu (Chirisamhuru) people would not mention a name in each other's genealogy as Nenguwo claims.

1. For a contrary view see Nenguwo, "A Few Notes", op. cit., p. 3. See also the discussion of Nenguwo's article in appendix C.

2. Nenguwo, "A Few Notes", op. cit., p. 3. For the Gumunyu he got the following list:- Sanarezhou, Chirimunhava, Chirisamhuru, Dlembeu, Nnavima, Tohwechipi, Muposi Chikore. From the Jiri faction he got the following list:- Nechisike (Gumboremvura?), Buka, Mambo, Mutinhima and Jiri.
Fig. (Aii)

**Mutinhima Gumbremvura**

**Mutinhima Muteveri (Muteveri I)**

- **Jiri Vengwa**
- **Chingombe I**
  - **Mudzinganyama**
  - **Zengeya**
  - **Marwana**

(a) Ruling in 1802
(b) Tried to assassinate his father Gumbremvura
(c) Dr. Beach says that Jiri Vengwa was a son of Muteveri Gwerengweke II and not Mutinhima Muteveri I. But the evidence at our disposal does not support such a view.
(d) Dr. Beach thinks that this is the man whom Kaguri and others wanted to make Mhonde in 1896. His descendants rule in Chirungu under the dynastic name of Chingombe.
(e) The man who changed Gummyn Christianity into a Jiri. He is the first Bubi Chief Jiri according to the Rhodesian Officials.
A COMBINED MAMBO AND GUMUNUY CHIEFS’ LIST AS RECONSTRUCTED SOLELY FROM GUMUNUY SOURCES

CHANGAMIRE SOROREZHO

CHANGAMIRE CHIRIMUHAVA

MAMBO CHIRISAMHURU (I?)

OR DYMBEWU

MAMBO BASVI RUPENGO RUPANDAMANHANGA

MAMBO DYMBEWU (II?)

MAMBO DYMBEWU CHIRISAMHURU (g)

OR CHIRISAMHURU (II?)

*MAVIMA MUBAYIWANE MHAZHAL

*TOWOCHIAP & CHIHAMUBAMU

*MUPOSI CHIKORE

RUSHINDA

MSIKA

RUKUNI

TASHANANA

MISI

(a) Sources: Rukara and Nenguwo. Rukara presents him as the conquering hero who founded the empire.
(b) Sources: Rukara, Robinson (NADA 1957) and Nenguwo. Robinson presents him as the conquering hero who founded the Rukwa Empire.
(c) Sources: Rukara and Makuvise (Fortune, NADA 1956)
(d) Source: Robinson, NADA 1957
(e) Source: Makuvise (Fortune, 1956).
(f) Ibid.
(g) Source: Rukara
(h) Source: Misi (Robinson, Khami, 1959)
(i) Sources: Rukara and Robinson NADA 1957
(j) Ibid.
(k) Ibid, 1st Gumunuy Chief in Bikita
(l) Source: Robinson NADA 1957; Ruled for a short time
(m) Source: Rukara
(n) Ibid.
(o) Ibid.
(p) Ibid.
* Retainers to the imperial throne (they called themselves Mombar)
Fig. (A iv)  

**List of Rozvi Rulers as Constructed Mainly from Mutinhima Informants:**

- Domba (a)
- Nechasiike (b)
- Nechadziike (c)
- Basvi. Rupengo Rupandamanang (d)
- Mutinhima Gumporemuura (e)
- Dyembewu (f)
- Chirisamhuru (g)
- @ Mutinhima Muteveri (h)

- MDHLANADZO OR (i)
- @ CHINGOMBE

* Muzinganyama (j)
* Zengeya (k)
* Marwana (Manxena) (l)
* Guppo (m)
* Veremu (n)

(a) Source: N3/33/8 praised as conquering hero
(b) Source: N3/33/8 In fact and fiction Nechasiike is given as coming before Domba.
(c) Source: N3/33/8 and Fact and Fiction
(d) Ibid. Ruling 1788?
(e) Ibid. Ruling in 1802?
(f) Ibid.
(g) Ibid.
(h) Ibid.
(i) Fact and Fiction and Marcomines
(j) Fact and Fiction and Lukara. See also under (A ii)
(k) Ibid.
(l) Ibid.
(m) Ibid.
(n) Fortune, NADA, 1956 interviewed by Fortune in 1950.

@ Pretenders to the imperial throne
@ Tiiri Vengwa did not rule as a chief.
* Bikita Tiiris
Fig. (Av)

**MARODZI**

CHIRISAMHURU

MATANDANGAVATE (Queen)

GUMBOREMVURA

RUPENGUO

---

Fig. (Avi)

**MBAVA**

TUMBARE

MUNYEPERE (Son of Tumbare)

TOGWA (Son of Munyepere)

CHIDUKU (became the dynastic name of all the Rova Shaka who followed.)
Fig. (Avii)

**MAMBO LIST BY VON SICARD (1946 NADA)**

1693 — about 1718 Caugamire, founder of the Rozvi Kingdom.

1718-1735 Tumbare Mambo at Marandellas

about 1735-1750 Mambo Munyepere

about 1750-1770 Torwa Dombo, Mambo of Zimbambwe

1770-1778 Mambo Necadziwe at Zimbambwe

about 1778-1783 Mambo Patirwe

about 1783-1785 Queen Matandangaavate (Rozvi)

about 1785-1790 Mambo Basvi

about 1790-1820 Mambo Gumboremvura

about 1795-1820 Mambo Ciduku. He returns from Zimbambwe to the Mbire Country.

about 1820 Mambo Dyembewu (?)

1866 The Tebele defeat the last Rozvi Chief Inhamohamo(1)

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(1) I suspect this is meant to refer to Chibamubamu as the date 1866 is given by Thomas Leask who actually saw the captured Chibamubamu (i.e. Towochipi) in 1866.
Rozvi Mambo List as Compiled by H. Stanford
Smith Nada No. 35, 1958
"Mambo of the Barozwi"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chilume Chirisamhuru I Shangamire</td>
<td>1693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hwami</td>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dhembewu I</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Muhuyepere</td>
<td>1735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nechasiaka or Nechapungura</td>
<td>1740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dombo</td>
<td>1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nechadziike or Rupandamanga</td>
<td>1770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Patirwe</td>
<td>1778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Matandangawate (F)</td>
<td>1783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Basvi Gumboremuva (iii)</td>
<td>1785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mutinhima</td>
<td>1790-1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Chiduku</td>
<td>1795-1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dhembewu II</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chirisamhuru II &amp; Rupengo</td>
<td>1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mutinhima II</td>
<td>1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(iv) Nateberi Jiri I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swabasi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Inhamohomo, Son of Rupengo</td>
<td>1866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Chupapata, Son-in-law of Inhamohomo, a Goanese Mulatto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ndhlanzo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Mzinkanyana Jiri II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Zengaya Jiri III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Marwane</td>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) Nechapungura is another name of Nechadziike (No.7) and not of Nechasiike (No.5)
(ii) Rupandamanga (Rupandamanghalanga) is another name of Basvi (No.10) and not of Nechadziike
(iii) Gumboremuva is another name of Mutinhima (No.11) and not of Basvi
(iv) Nateberi is the same as Muteveri
(v) Inhamohomo is Tondichipi Chirahubamu
(vi) Mzinkanyana is Mudzinganyama
(vii) Zengaya is Zengeya
APPENDIX B

The Historical Origins of the Gumunyu\(^1\)-Jiri\(^2\) Conflict

The quarrel between the Gumunyu and Jiri factions has all along been about which faction should provide a chief for the Rozvi living in Bikita District. This conflict is a twentieth century problem which theoretically should have little to do with the imperial Rozvi history. But because of its historical antecedents it has, as we shall presently see, important implications for any study of Rozvi Oral history. The Bikita Gumunyu-Jiri squabble arose at the time when Nyika\(^3\) the son of Muposi Gumunyuka Weshambochena was the chief of the Rozvi then living in Bikita under the Duma "paramount" chief Mukangamwi. The conflict seems to have arisen as a result of the treachery (misunderstanding?) of Mudzinganyama who having been sent by the ageing Nyika to go to the Native Commissioner at "Chitarara" or Ndanga district office to register Nyika as the chief

1. See appendix (A1)
2. See appendix (Aii)
of the Rozvi in Bikita instead registered his own surname of Jiri. Mudzinganyama then fled towards Selukwe but died on the way. Although Mudzinganyama was, according to the colonial administrators, the first chief Jiri of Bikita, he in fact does not seem to have ever exercised that authority. But his brothers, Zengeya, and Marwana each in turn succeeded to the Jiri chieftaincy.¹ According to the settler administrators of the country Gumunyu was no more the chief, but a subject of Jiri. It took no less than sixty years, and at least one murder² case as well as much quarrelling before the Gumunyu chieftaincy was official recognized by the Rhodesian authorities. As of now the Bikita Rozvi quarrel has been resolved by the removal of the Jiri faction to Zhombe. Gumunyu is now the only Rozvi chief in Bikita.

During the twentieth century much of the Gumunyu traditions from Bikita were adapted to explain the above conflict. Many scholars never seem to have realized the importance of the above conflict in what they were

¹. See appendices (Aii) and (Alv)
². Written information received from Tasiyana Shadreck Nyika dated 15/7/1971, London. See also appendix (Ai). Mukora, the son of Nyika, was killed by the people of Jiri during a brawl over the chieftaincy. The Jiri people gave a young woman to the people of Gumunyu as compensation. When the young woman was married the Gumunyu received the roora (bride present).
being told by their informants. The Gumunyu accounts, in particular, are noted for their concentration on the period after the fall of the empire and the settlement in Bikita. This has been so because the purpose of the traditions for the Gumunyus was to explain and justify their situation vis-à-vis the Jiris. Although Mr. Solomon Menguwo did not seem to have fully appreciated the significance of this conflict his article reveals the intense pre-occupation of the Bikita Rozvi traditions with the Gumunyu–Jiri interfactional rivalry. The genealogies he collected clearly show us how cavalier both the Jiri and Gumunyu Bikita factions were about the Rozvi imperial period. But those genealogies are fairly detailed for the post-imperial period. The contrast with the non-Bikita Chingombe (also Mutinhima like the Bikita–Jiris) informant and his total and detailed information about the Rozvi imperial history is most informative and striking. While this conflict has probably robbed us of information pertaining to the Rozvi imperial period it has nevertheless given us most useful information for the post-imperial period,

1. See p. 331, note 2, and compare these genealogies with appendices (Aiii) and (Aiv).
2. See appendix (Aiv) and the discussion of traditional sources in document Z3/33/8, "The Abelozwi" appendix C(iv).
i.e. the time after about 1833-4.

We have hinted before that the modern Jiri-Gumunyu conflict may in fact have a more remote antecedent. The modern Jiris and Chingombes in Charter district are descendants of Mutinhima and the modern Gumunyus are descendants of Mambo Chirisamhuru the last who died about 1833/34 at Manyanga. A study of the known Mutinhima and Gumunyu (Chirisamhuru) accounts reveals that there are certain names of Mambos who ruled before about 1833/4 which both houses are prepared to accept as having been Mambos. Of these, Dyembewu, Chirisamhuru and Basvi Rupengo Rupandamanhanga, as Mambo lists (A111) and (A1v) show, are among the best known names. But there is not one Gumunyu account known to us that mentions the name of Mutinhima, as having been a Mambo. Yet to the house of Mutinhima there is no doubt

1. See appendices (A1) and (A11).
2. This point was brought to my attention in a discussion with Tasiyana Shadreck Myika (see Appendix A1). I was arguing the Jiri case against the Gumunyu and when I mentioned the name of Mutinhima Gumboremvura as having been a Rozvi Mambo he intervened to say that his elders "flatly reject Gumboremvura ever ruled the Rozvi empire". No amount of argument would move him from this point. He then told me that everytime he had ever heard his own people (Gumunyu) discussing the imperial traditions with the Jiris whenever the name of Mutinhima Gumboremvura was mentioned the discussion would reach a cul de sac. After this discussion I went through all the Gumunyu accounts available to me and to my surprise I found that none of them in fact mention Mutinhima Gumboremvura as having been a Mambo. The Rukara account has a sentence showing that one Mutinhima was a Rozvi prince who belonged to a house which was banned from imperial
that Mutinhima Gumboremvura is a vital anchor pin for their ambitions because they present him as their last ancestor to have ascended the imperial throne before the collapse of the empire in the 1830s.

According to the descendants of Mutinhima¹ their ancestor Mutinhima, later known as Gumboremvura, was a provincial administrator among the peoples of Nhema, Banga and Chivi at the time when Mambo Basvi, nick-named Rupengo (the mad one) Rupandamanhanga (pumpkin eater) was the Rozvi ruler.² But because of a three year drought which took place during Basvi’s reign and because the latter showed callous indifference to the suffering of his people it being said that he gloated over their miseries with the words: “Let the days cut, and the sun scorch - I will see who will help you!”³ The people (Mutinhima’s faction?) are said to have been succession. In Fortune’s "Rozvi Text" the name of Mutinhima Gumboremvura is not given despite the fact that Gopo, the then ruling Jiri, and another Jiri informant were two of the five informants. Fortune’s account is dominated by the Gumunyu informants especially Makuvise. The fact that the name Mutinhima Gumboremvura does not appear in Fortune’s account, even in a footnote, despite the fact that a chief Jiri was one of the informants, would have been by far the most astounding aspect of the whole account had it not been of the fact that we now know how strongly the Gumunyus feel against Mutinhima Gumboremvura.

1. See (Aii). The leading Mutinhima houses are the Chingambes in Charter and the Jiris formerly in Bikita but now in Zhombe.
2. See (Aii). See also Chapter 7, pp. 288-291
sufficiently infuriated so as to decide on removing him from the throne. A plot was hatched whereby Basvi was asked to lead a punitive expedition against the provinces governed by Mutinhima since it was falsely claimed that they were in rebellion. During the expedition the Rozvi abandoned Basvi to be killed by the peoples of Nhema and Banga. Mutinhima, according to his descendants, was very popular with all sections including the subject peoples, and so was proclaimed Mambbo. But another tradition tells us that Mutinhima Gumboremvura survived an assassination attempt from his own son Mutinhima Muteveri (or Muteveri I) and the priests Mabvudzi and Merwande. This might indicate that Gumboremvura’s actions had not been all that popular among the whole Rozvi imperial establishment.

The claim by the present Mutinhima descendants that it was Mutinhima Muteveri who did (should have?) succeed the last Chirisamhuru (1833/34) is based on the argument that according to the collateral principle Muteveri being a son of Gumboremvura had more right to succeed than all the sons of Chirisamhuru. But both the Mutinhima and the Chirisamhuru houses claim that after the last Chirisamhuru the Mamboship never left their own houses. This shows that neither of the houses

1. Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 146
2. See Appendices (A1) to (Aiv).
has any respect for the collateral principle when it does not suit its purpose.

It must also be mentioned that a view has been expressed that the Mutinhimas may in fact represent the descendants of the Togwa dynasty. If this were true then the conflict would be even more remote and fundamental. But until more evidence has been brought to light we are content to leave the origin of the conflict to the time of Mutinhima Gumboremvura's accession to the imperial throne which we have tentatively calculated to have been after 1795-6 and before 1802.

It is the question of Mutinhima Gumboremvura's succession that seems to be at the heart of the Jiri-Gumunyu conflict and which led Solomon Nenguwo to accuse the Jiris and Gumunyus of Bikita of presenting "cooked genealogies". It is also for this very reason that in spite of the fact that the Bikita chieftaincy dispute between Jiri and Gumunyu has been solved, scholars should not expect to find the phenomenon which Nenguwo called "cooked genealogies" to disappear. While

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1. In a personal communication dated 14/8/1971, Salisbury from Dr. Beach I received the following statement which is said to have been made by D.P. Abraham. "Shortly before the Mfecane the Togwa dynasty, which had been in exile in Chipinga, conquered the Changamires and tried to get Boer and Port. (uguese) help, and founded the Mutinhima/Jiri line". Dr. Beach expressed his own reservations about this statement.
2. See Chapter 11, p. 291
the Jiri-Gumunyu conflict may well subside, the Mutinhima-Chirisamhuru family controversy will continue.
The following are some of the major sources actually quoted in the thesis. Nearly all the principal short-comings found in the traditional sources used in this thesis are covered by one or more of the sources discussed here. The chief disadvantage of all these sources is that they were collected by people connected with the Rhodesian administration. Even those like Rukara's and Marodzils which were actually written by Rozvi people were themselves written for Rhodesian authorities' consumption. Inevitably matters that may be interpreted as likely to cause offence to the white rulers would be eliminated. The history of Dombo's conquest of the country includes many of his exploits against the African societies but significantly not his expulsion of the white Portuguese from Mashonaland. The religious and military aspects are not given their due weight. This is not really surprising considering that some of these traditions were collected not so many years after the Risings of 1896-7 in which the Shona religious authorities had exhorted people to take up

I. For the rest of the traditions used in the thesis see the bibliography.
arms in order to expel the white people from Mashonaland. These traditions in general concentrate very much on the period beginning with the Nguni invasions from the late 1820s onwards. They have a tendency of telescoping the greater part of Rozvi imperial history before the 19th century. I also discuss the Mutapa works of Abraham because of their significance for the identification of the Rozvi.

C. (i) Professor G. Fortune: "Rozvi Text", NADA, 1956, pp. 67-91. Professor Fortune’s interest was mainly linguistic; to find how far Chirozvi was part of modern Shona he asked some Bikita Rozvi to tell him about their history in Chirozvi. The Chirozvi text and an English translation of the text are published.

Fortune’s story was obtained from five informants in an interview arranged by the Native Commissioner of Bikita in January 1950. The fact that the interview had been arranged by the Native Commissioner must have given Professor Fortune a government official’s status in the eyes of his informants. The fact that Fortune was a priest may have inhibited
his informants from talking about Rozvi religion. Present also at the interview was chief Jiri, a young man by the name of Gopo. Of the five informants there was one by the name of Gudo who belonged to the Jiri section of the Bikita Rozvi. The other three Makuvise, Maboke and Gwatimba belonged to the Gumunyu faction. According to Fortune the chief informant was Makuvise at whose village the interview was held. Chief Jiri is said to have spoken very little.

The formal text given by the informants is short and as such rather uninformative. It represented a compromise version of Rozvi history between the Gumunyu and Jiri factions. The names of Mambos given were only Cilisamhuru (Chirisamhuru) and Lembeu (Dyembewu).

But the comments on the text which were made privately by Makuvise are, from a historical point of view, the most important part of the whole article. The comments represent the Gumunyu faction's views at its least bigotted. The comments are not given chronologically. But they contain valuable
insights into some political, military and religious aspects of the Rozvi empire. They are also useful for the history of Nguni invasions. The biggest defect about these comments is that one is not always sure whether some of the comments, especially on military aspects, are meant to refer to the whole period of Rozvi history or just to the period of Nguni invasions.

C. (ii) K. Robinson: "History of Bikita", NADA, 1957, pp. 75-87. The interview was arranged with help of the then Native Commissioner of Bikita in 1954. Names of informants are not given except one by the name of F. Muchengeti who recorded the interview. From Robinson's Khami, p. 164 we also know that Misi the present Gumunyu was one of the chief informants. Both Shona and English versions are printed. The English translation is often inaccurate and at times seriously out of step with the Shona version.

Robinson's informants clearly belonged to the Gumunyu faction. They were presenting the combined Gumunyu argument against the Jiri
faction. From the foundation of the Rozvi Empire until the attack by Zwangendaba in 1833/4 they claim that only two Mambos (Chirimunhava and Dyembewu) ruled. The story gives more details as from the Nguni invasions to the present time i.e. the period of history that was important for the Gumunyu-Jiri rivalry. It is useful in providing an explanation of what the Gumunyu-Jiri conflict is all about.

It contains interesting attempts at welding the Mutapa and Barotse (Zambia) history with that of the Rozvi.


The account was written by Mativenga Vengai Jafinus Rukara. A Rozvi and a school teacher born around 1910. His informants included his grandfather Rukara (see appendix (A1)) and Vamatsindo, Mavima's sister's daughter (see appendix (A1)) as well as Misi the present chief Gumunyu who helped to write the story. Jafinus visited Messina (South Africa) to interview Rozvi informants there. He also interviewed the Venda chiefs Muphephu and Chibasa. But the Rukara account is a highly
political piece of Gumunyu faction propaganda. It dismisses not only the Jiri faction but more interestingly it attacks the Washaya faction. This story must not only be seen as the Gumunyu challenge to Jiri for the Rozvi Bikita chieftaincy but also as presenting a Gumunyu case to be chosen as the Mambo of all the Rozvi of Southern Rhodesia. Hence the attack on Washaya who was then interim chief of all the Rozvi. It is more detailed and partisan than either the Robinson or Fortune accounts. Its Mambo list is nothing but the Gumunyu genealogy. Even within the Gumunyu faction we can go further in saying that the account represents above all the house of Mavima to which Misi and Rukara belonged.

The first section connecting the first Rozvi Changamire and the Mutapa dynasty is a fascinating attempt to weld the two dynasties in which the Mutapas are given an inferior position vis-à-vis the Rozvi. Unlike in Robinson's "History of Bikita" where the first Mutapa is said to have been the elder brother of the first Rozvi Mambo who is said to have been Chirimunhava, in Rukara the first Mutapa
is said to have been a servant of the first Rozvi Changamire Sororezhou. But it is with the coming of Mavima Mubayiwanemhazha that the story becomes detailed and belligerently partisan. Contrary to what Misi told Robinson (in *Khami*, 1959, p. 164) and what the Qumnnyus told Robinson (NADA, 1957) Rukara and Misi claim that it was Mavima who fought against the Ngunis and was killed at Manyanga by Zwangendaba. In 1957 and 1959 the Qumnnyus had said this Mambo was Chirisamhuru or Dyembewu. This raising of Mavima by Jafinus and Misi is clearly a way of asserting the importance of the house of Mavima within the Qumunyu faction.

Therefore one should be aware that the Rukara account is (a) a Mavima house case written to assert that house's seniority within the Gumunyu faction (b) it is a Gumunyu argument against the Jiri faction (c) it is a Gumunyu "position paper" to argue for their right to be chosen as the chief of all the Rozvi of Rhodesia and (d) it is a Rozvi history meant to show the Rozvi seniority over the Mutapas.

Once the above four points are understood, then the Rukara account turns out to be one
of the most useful accounts available on Rozvi history.

C. (iv) **J.W. Posselt**: N3/33/8, "The Abelozwi (Barozwi)"

J.W. Posselt came from a German Missionary family in the Transvaal associated with the Berlin Missions to Shona country 1883-92. He was assistant Native Commissioner at Mupateri 1898-1902; and Native Commissioner at Charter 1902-1935.

Informants in Mupateri included Chizungu, Mtubayedzi?; in Charter Chingombe (of Mutinhima Muteveri) and Gwangwava? This account is largely influenced by the Mutinhima house under the Chingombes in Charter District. It genuinely tries to give a Mambo list as different from a Jiri genealogy as given to Solomon Nenguwo in Bikita (Nenguwo "A few Notes"). It starts with the coming of Dombo and ends with the death of the last Chirisamhuru at the hands of Zwangendaba. It offers small biographies for each of the seven Mambos it gives. It does not suffer from the Bikita Gumunyu-Jiri conflict which at that stage may not have assumed its latter characteristics which seem to have been introduced by the
treachery of Mudzinganyama. But by its praise of Mutinhima Gumbiremora and assertion that the last Chirisamhuru and the sons of the Mambo before Chirisamhuru i.e. Dyembewu, murdered the latter, the account seems to be accusing Chirisamhuru with the crime of Gumbiremora (see Posselt, Fact and Fiction, op. cit., p. 146). By mentioning Nechasike and Nechadzike who seem to be characters mentioned only by the Mutinhima (Jiri) group, (Nenguwo, "A few Notes") the account shows its colours.

This account is strongest on Dombo, his character and achievements. It has useful information on military aspects of Rozvi life.

C. (v) F.W.T. Posselt: Fact and Fiction, Bulawayo, 1935, pp. 134-160. "The Barozwi or Mambo and His Court". Posselt worked as an W.C. He wrote profusely on the Africans of Rhodesia especially in NADA.

F.W.T. Posselt's article on the Rozwi in Fact and Fiction is as Posselt himself says in his introduction "of divers colours and composed of different materials". This represents the range of Rozvi traditions as known at Posselt's time. Although much of the material published
comes from F.W.T. Posselt's own researches, there is reason to believe that he may have made use of his cousin's i.e. J.W. Posselt. article (N3/33/8 "The Abelozwi"). F.W.T. Posselt's discussion of the Mambo dynasty (pp. 145-148) adds little to J.W. Posselt's account, except that F.W.T. Posselt thinks that Nechasike was the first Rozwi ruler instead of Dombo. Besides traditions he himself collected, F.W.T. Posselt relied on other Rozwi published accounts e.g. Mbava's. Very often Posselt records conflicting Rozvi traditions without in any way trying to analyse them. This is true about his discussion of the Rozvi origins (pp. 140-144). But may be Posselt, who was himself not unaware of the limitations of his work, in his introduction summed up best the deficiencies in his work when he said "this essay is really a kind of mosaic of fact and faction".

Yet despite its weaknesses, Posselt's article is still the best summary picture of the Rozvi world in print. It tries to deal systematically with the political, legal, religious, military and social organization
of the Rozvi nation.

Posselt's account is much influenced by the Mutinhima (Chingombe-Jiri houses) faction; however it also contains information from the Mabvudzi family and others as well. Posselt accepts the Jiri family as being the rightful successors to the Rozvi imperial throne. He seems to have been oblivious of the importance of the descendants of the last Chirisamhuru i.e. Gumunyire. (vi)

Rev. F. Marconnes: "The Rozvis or "Destroyers""

NADA, 1939: A Jesuit priest who composed a Shona dictionary.

This account is really a summary by Fr. Marconnes of many Rozvi traditions. Towards the end of the article (pp. 88-90) it presents the Mutinhima (Jiri) view of Rozvi traditions. It has much that is primarily of interest to Nguni rather than Rozvi history. There is much that concerns purely the Mutapa kingdom (pp. 74-76).

Fr. Marconnes' article suffers from many factual errors e.g. he says that in 1677 Changamire 'utterly destroyed' the "feiras" of Chipiriviri, Dambarare and Ongwe' (p. 76). He says that in 1693 Changamire took by surprise
Tete and Sena. All this is of course wrong and casts serious doubt on Fr. Marconnes' reliability when he handles his traditional sources. He uncritically quotes chunks of various Rozvi traditions and throws them in juxtaposition without much analysis, in order to tell what looks like a chronological story. This is neither an analytical nor a chronological article on Rozvi history. It is a hybrid of both. However, Fr. Marconnes' attempt to identify the Rozvi has been found to be valuable. Marconnes is rather unsympathetic towards the Rozvi.


Marodzi was a school teacher. His story represents the views sympathetic to the house of Mutinhima. This may indicate Marodzi's own origin. Marodzi's article is a short but useful piece. Of much value is its list of the subject chiefs of the Rozvi. The traditions of some of the subject chiefs given in the Marodzi list corroborate Marodzi's claim that they were the vassals of the Rozvi. This is

1. See Chapter Two, pp. 75, 86-87.
very useful in estimating the area which may have been under Rozvi control. Also of much importance is his list of the councillors of Mambo Rupengo. By reference to other Rozvi traditions it is clear that Marodzi's identification of the Mambo who fought against Zwangendaba as having been Rupengo is incorrect, but his list of councillors is useful as a summary of some of the major Rozvi houses that might have played an important part at the Rozvi imperial Court. In chapter three we were able to identify all the eight names given by using other Rozvi traditions.¹ Marodzi seems to be the oldest source mentioning Queen Matandangaavate. He gives evidence of Rozvi riding cattle and having possessed guns. The account is also useful for the story of the Nguni invasions.

But the story ridiculously telescopes the history of the Rozvi by claiming that the first Rozvi Mambo was Chirisamhuru who fought some of the Ngunis.

C. (viii) S. Nenguwo: "Oral Work among the Rozvi: A few Notes".

An African undergraduate student at

¹ See Chapter Three, pp. 111-113.
U.C.R. (now University of Rhodesia) who spent three months trying to collect Rozvi traditions in Bikita. This is a useful introduction to the Gumunyu-Jiri conflict and its impact on Rozvi traditions. Much of Nenguwo's complaints against these two houses seems to arise from the fact that they each gave him their family genealogies when he wanted them to give him a Mambo list. Mr. Nenguwo does not show evidence in his article that he was aware of the possible difference between a family genealogy and a king list or Mambo list.¹ The fact that his informants gave him their house genealogies instead of Mambo lists may well be Mr. Nenguwo's own fault. Certainly Professor Fortune was easily given a tolerably reliable, if telescoped, Mambo list by Makuvise, a Gumunyu informant. Mr. Nenguwo's strictures against his Gumunyu and Jiri informants may be a result of his own failure to communicate with them. By using other traditional sources we can safely say that Nenguwo was given fairly accurate Jiri and Gumunyu genealogies.² These were not "cooked

¹ He uses the term genealogy when he means a king list, a term he never uses in his article.
² See appendices (A1 to Aiv).
genealogies”. Mr. Nenguwo’s suggestion that the Bikita Rozvi were not very senior in the Rozvi imperial hierarchy is mischievous and baseless and casts serious doubts on his knowledge of imperial Rozvi history.

C. (ix) Rev. S. Muhlanga (with E. Llyod): “In the Early Days” and “Mbava and others” in NADA, 1926, pp. 91-93, 107-110; "Mbava", NADA, 1925, pp. 62-64. Mbava was an old Rozvi informant who was about 100 years old in the 1920s.

The three accounts were collected by Rev. Samuel Muhlanga. Apparently Rev. Muhlanga made notes of his interviews with Mbava.

Out of these notes he and Elaine M. Llyod wrote two of the articles in NADA.

Mbava’s account represents the house of Ruzani i.e. as opposed to the houses of Mutinhima and Gumunyu and others. The names of Mambos given by Mbava as those of Mambos include a Mambo Tumbare, a Mambo Togwa, a Mambo Munyepere and Mambos going by the family name Chiduku. In chapter one we discussed the historical relationship between the Togwa dynasty (rulers of Butua from at least the 15th century to about 1683) and that of the usurping
Rozvi of Dombo I. In chapter three we suggested that the Tumbare house sometimes acted as regent in case of a disputed succession. On one occasion Mbava said that chief Zimuto was a descendant of Mambo Togwa. This is obviously untrue and casts doubt on Mbava’s clear knowledge of Togwa. In the three accounts Mbava is not consistent about his Mambo list and never mentions a single imperial Rozvi Mambo whom we could corroborate from other sources. This vague knowledge of Mambo list and failure to give his own genealogy may indicate that Mbava or the house of Ruzani while important enough to have been represented at the imperial court was itself no serious contender for the imperial throne.

But the strength of Mbava’s accounts lie in their discussion of the relation between the Rozvi and their subject chiefs as well as its general discussion of the Rozvi world. They give us something of a feeling of the Rozvi world. Moreover Mbava’s account is free of the Gumunyu-Mutinhima conflict.
C. (x) Harold Von Sicard: A Swedish missionary who has lived in Rhodesia and has been interested in Rozvi history for over thirty years. He has written profusely on the traditions of the Rozvi and Shona peoples in the South and South-West of Rhodesia. To discuss each and every article by Von Sicard would require a separate work running into a few hundred of pages. Luckily the recurrent weaknesses in Von Sicard’s articles can be fairly quickly established. Von Sicard’s interest seems to be mainly in the process of cultural diffusion. In his "Dyembewu" (P.R.S.A., 1951) Von Sicard displayed his main weaknesses. To reconstruct the person of a Mambo Dyembewu Von Sicard uses varied Rozvi, Venda and Konde (Northern Mozambique) traditions. Even taking the Rozvi traditions themselves one would have thought that Von Sicard would distinguish between those traditions that refer to an apical Dyembewu (e.g. Mabvudzi in Fact and Fiction, p. 142) and the later Dyembewu (s). But Von Sicard is too interested in his persuance of cultural diffusion to show much respect to the historian’s sensitivity about chronology.
and proper use of evidence. On page 190 he quotes Pacheco's reference to the name of Mambo Gwende (i.e. Buruma VI) who ruled in 1804 (wrongly said to have ruled in 1760) as showing cultural and historical evidence of connection with the Rozvi Nerwande and Mangwende. "I believe", says Von Sicard, "that, a couple of centuries ago, Nerwande was identical with Mangwende or chief Gwende on the Loangwa-Zambezi confluence", p. 191. When such dubious similarities of sounds and spelling are used as establishing historical connection between peoples, personalities and events then one has to be very cautious before accepting any conclusions and reconstructions made by Von Sicard.

But once one is aware of the pitfalls in Sicard's work, there is a mine of unused material in his articles especially those on the origins of some tribes in Belingwe. Above all else Von Sicard has an unrivalled knowledge of published works in German, French, Afrikaans and English pertaining to the Rozvi. The bibliographies in his articles are most helpful to all students of Shona and Rozvi history.
Some Mutapa Traditions

C. (xi) D.P. Abraham: (Kafurirakumusoro)¹

(i) "The Monomotapa Dynasty" in NADA, 36, 1959, pp. 59-86.


D.P. Abraham is an ethnohistorian who developed interest in the past of the Shona as

¹ Literally it means "the one that browses at the top" i.e. the giraffe in Korekore. The implication of the name being that like a giraffe Abraham sought traditions that few people could know of because of their antiquity.
a civil servant in the Department of African (then Native) Affairs of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Mr. Abraham possesses undoubted knowledge of Portuguese and oral sources pertaining to Shona history.

The contribution and impact made by Abraham's work on Shona history marked a turning point in the study of the Shona past. With him Shona history was rescued from the dark ages of antiquarians and other curiosity hunters and many new vistas were opened.

In the text and footnotes we have made some corrections and additions to Abraham's work. Indeed, in one or two places, e.g., the identification of the Rozvi, we have even come to a fundamentally different interpretation on an important issue to that held by Mr. Abraham. But many of the corrections and additions we have made and some which we have not mentioned in here should be seen in the light of the fact that many of the above quoted articles by Mr. Abraham represent his early work on the Shona.

For anyone using Abraham's works in order to write Rozvi history the major problem arises from what Abraham regards as the "Rozvi". What
we here classify as Mutapa traditions would have been classified by Abraham in 1960 as 'Rozvi' traditions. In fact many of the collected Shona traditions according to this view would be regarded as being "Rozvi" traditions. Before one can use Abraham's evidence referring to the Rozvi one would need to perform a very delicate operation to separate the evidence from the way Abraham used it. Because of this problem one should never quote Abraham's reference to the "Rozvi" unless it can be established beyond doubt that the source does in fact refer to the successors of Dombo I and his people.

Abraham's efforts to marry Dombo I and his followers to the first Changamire of Alcaçova has led him to use evidence referring to Dombo I, to prove issues concerning the Changamire of 1494. In footnote 37 of page 81 of "Early Political History of Mwenemutapa" Abraham has used Colonel Dionizio de Mello de Castro (1763) and the "Corografica" (which he does not mention by name) as if they were referring to Changamire I (1494) when from the texts it is clear that Castro and the "Corografica" were writing about Dombo I.
The tendency to use his evidence uncritically and at other times to read much more into a single document than can be safely assumed makes it imperative that one should avoid taking Abraham as an authority to be relied upon completely without continuous verification. But in the end it may not be easy to verify much because of Abraham's tendency to be vague as to the precise location of his sources. Phrases like "in a document of 1781 examined by me last year in Lisbon" are often regarded as adequate footnotes by Abraham. This is a pity.

However, one can only finish on a positive note by saying that it is still premature to write about the general weaknesses in Abraham's works. Many of them are simply shortcomings found in many scholars' early works. We must wait for his long promised magnum opus before a full fair assessment can be made of his work.

C. (xii) Note on "The Story of Mutape"

As given by Mutape Medium (Simon Ruza) to Professor (then Dr.) T.O. Ranger dated 17/9/62, and translated by Professor G. Fortune.

This account adds little to our knowledge of Mutapa or Rozvi traditions. The only new point
of interest for the Rozvi history is that the Mutape Medium stated that the Rozvi were his maternal uncles, ergo in Shona relationships they were Mutape's superiors. This, of course, is contrary to what Abraham was told by Mhondoro Mutota (MADA, 1959).

But there is something very serious about the Mhondoro Mutape. Although he is supposed not to know of what happened after his (possessing spirit's) death in the 15th century, yet he recounts his encounter with his 'friend' Manoel António de Sousa or Goveia, a 19th century Portuguese personality. He also talks of his conversion by Goveia, although we know that the first Mutapa never met a Portuguese priest. All in all the account leaves one with the impression that the Mhondoro of Mutape had forgotten too much of the times of Mutape while strangely knowing things that happened centuries after the death of the first Mutape.
APPENDIX D

A.H.U. Av. de Moç. Cx. 22, Tette, 11/6/1785

A list of some weapons and tools which are used by the Africans who live in the vast cerrados bordering on the districts of the government of the Rivers of Senna. The above mentioned are sent to the Illustrious Senhor Martinho de Mó e Castro by the present governor of the same Rivers, António Manoel de Mello e Castro in the first box marked (with the letter) "R".

1. Four bows of a certain kind of wood called mitarara with their restingas which are some cords made from the hide of wild animals. This weapon is used by all the Africans of the vast cerrados for shooting the arrows which they employ in their wars and with which they are nearly always armed when travelling from one place to another.

1. See glossary.
2. The other box contained herbs and medicines used by the Africans of south-east-central Africa.
3. Mitarara is the plural form of mutarara which is a hardy tree from which the Shona still make bows. For evidence that the Shona use mutarara for making bows see Odendaal, P.J., "The Bow and Arrow in Southern Rhodesia", in NADA, No. 18, 1941, p. 23.
4. Phonetically the nearest Shona word is rutsingo or rudzingo which means sinew. But in this case the document is not referring to sinew but skin. Odendaal in NADA, 1941 says that the bow strings were known as "Rukungiso" or "Rukusha" and were made of the hide of bush-buck, koodoo or hartebeest.
2. One quiver made from leopard\(^1\) skin which the same Africans call Chimine\(^2\) and which serves as a powder-horn or cartridge-belt for carrying the above mentioned arrows. This quiver can carry twenty arrows of a first kind and twenty-four of a second kind used by the Monhaes who are the soldiers of the empire of Moanamotapa, as well as by our Africans and the majority of the colonos\(^3\) in the lands subject to the dominion of Portugal. The quiver also contains sixteen arrows of a third kind which are used by the Maraves, who are those people inhabiting the vast certöens on the eastern side of the river Zambese; it also carries twenty arrows of a fourth kind which the same Maraves use after smearing the heads of those arrows with a poisonous substance manufactured by them from a certain kind of plant,\(^4\) so that should the

1. The document uses the word "tigre" but since in this part of Africa there were no tigers we have translated the word as leopard.
2. Origin unknown.
3. See glossary.
4. For evidence that the Shona used the seeds of the Strophantus Kombe to produce "uturu" (poison) for their arrows, see Ondendaal, P.J., *NADA*, 1941, op. cit., p. 24.
arrow hurt anyone it leaves the poison in the wound, and this has nearly always fatal results unless a certain remedy known by these Africans is applied to the wound. And one arrow of a fifth kind which the Monhaes as well as the Maraves use in their archery training. The above mentioned quiver is carried on the back, hanging from a belt, which goes over the shoulders, back to front, then underneath the arms forming a cross on the chest and at the back and then the two ends come around the waist to the front where they are fastened together.

3. Two short and (two) long spear-heads, locally known as Zagais (assegais), which are weapons used in war and when travelling by the Africans called Monhaes, and, following their example, by our Africans. These assegais are employed in much the same ways as we use spears.

4. Four of the above mentioned (i.e. spears) but of a different kind used by those same people and known to them as Mondo.

5. One of the above mentioned (i.e. spear) of

1. See also Gamitto, *King Kazembe*, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 71. Gamitto states that the anti-toxin was known as "Frei Pedro" it being thought that the anti-toxin was discovered by Fr. Pedro da Trindade of Zumbo.

2. Origin unknown
another kind used for the same purpose by the Africans of Marave and likewise by almost all the colonos in the lands situated on the east bank of the river Zambeze bordering more or less on the lands of the Marave people. This weapon is called Fumo by both people.

6. Two of the above mentioned (i.e. spears) of a different kind but used for the same purpose by the people of Orange who live beyond Zumbo, and are subjects of the King Changamira, whose empire is today the most powerful of all that vast wilderness. His soldiers — the Brozes — are feared even by the very Monhaes, who after these (Brozes) are more daring than anybody else.

7. Two of the above mentioned (i.e. spears) but of another sort, used by the same people of Orange.

8. One of the above mentioned (i.e. spear) of another kind used by some other people of Orange, but living further into the interior and also

1. This should not be confused with fumo, meaning petty chief. In Shona fumo, meaning spear is spelt "pfumo".
2. Changamira was not king of Orange (Orenje) in Zambia but of Butua in Rhodesia. The writer shows an appalling ignorance about the Rozvi empire. See Chapter Five, p. 201. Clearly in this document we must read "Butua" for "Orange".
subject to the King Changamira.

9. Axes are a kind of weapon used by the Africans called Monhaes when they are engaged in close combat. This weapon is known, among these people as Santo.¹ Many carry it when travelling, as it is regarded as a status symbol, since the princes never appear in public without it.² It is normally carried underneath the left armpit with the head pointing in front. While thus armed, they receive any visitor or embassy.

10. Two of the above mentioned (i.e. axes) of a different kind used by the Maraves.

11. Two of the above mentioned (i.e. axes) of another sort used by the people of Orange.

12. Four small shepherd-like sticks or cudgels which are weapons particularly favoured by the Brozes — the soldiers of the King Changamira — who because of their great prowess and daring fight fiercely and furiously in battles. They use the above mentioned weapons with such deadly accuracy that they can throw it from a long distance away and the blow is almost always fatal. They do not use any other weapon in battle since they use

¹ In Shona it is sanhu or shanhu.
² In traditional Shona society a man travelling without an axe or club was despised and considered to be woman-like.
bows and arrows only for hunting. They each carry a shield made from the skin of rhinoceros, lined with the 'deficira'\(^1\) of iron. They use these shields in war either (as protection) against an enemy when fighting at close quarters or to push forward those of their own comrades who may be trying to retreat.\(^2\)

13. Two iron racks which are usually made and used by the Marave people as well as the Monhaes. These racks are driven into the ground so as to be used as hangers for the bows and arrows. The racks form some kind of an open square surrounding the camp site of each missoca, which to them is the equivalent of a company or regiment amongst us. The same racks are used in front of the houses where their princes or notables live.

14. Two "garas"\(^3\), which are some sort of headgear made up of many porcupine quills. These "garas" are especially worn by Manhaes in war and during their war-like exercises which they call pembeqoens.\(^4\) They wear them on the head tied up by a narrow belt, that goes around the neck,

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1. Meaning and origin unknown.
2. See Chapter Three, p. 115.
3. Origin unknown.
4. See Chapter Three, pp. 120-121.
then under the arms, down to the waist where the two ends are tied together at the same place as in the case of the quiver. This is done so that the head-dress may not drop down as a result of the many leapings and multi-articulated movements that they perform with their heads during battle or military exercises, which the Monhaes are very fond of. And our Africans act likewise during any function or festivity.

15. One simbo which is a kind of iron baton used as a symbol of authority, in war and during peace-time, both by the grandees among the Monhaes as well as the Maraves.

16. One pipe of the kind used by the people of Orange, and one "tanas" (i.e. nondescript object) used for lighting the pipe and which, on account of its form also serves as a (rattle?) musical instrument with which they accompany several ballads they sing while smoking.

It is necessary to emphasize that the majority of the people of this part of eastern Africa use, with little difference, the same arms, which are bows, arrows,

1. In Shona it is svimbo.
assegais and axes and fight much the same sort of warfare. It is only the Brozes, who engage in a different mode of warfare; fighting, as I said, with the short clubs described in No. 12.

Tette, Capital of the Rivers of Senna, 11th June, 1785, António M.º de M.º e Castro.
APPENDIX E

In the *Almanach Civil, Ecclesiástico, Histórico Administrativo da Província de Moçambique para o ano de 1859*, by J.V. da Gama, pp. 159-160, there is a "Descrição do Zumbo" of 1764 by one capitão mor of Zumbo. According to A.A. de Andrade the above report was probably written by Manuel Caetano Rodrigues who was nominated capitão mor of Zumbo on the 27th April 1762. But a re-appraisal of the sources leads us to conclude that the 1764 report was the work not of Manuel Caetano Rodrigues but that of Luís António de Figuiredo capitão mor of Zumbo in 1754.

First of all there is reason to believe that Manuel Caetano Rodrigues in fact never took up his post of capitão mor of Zumbo. We know that although Manuel Caetano Rodrigues was nominated capitão mor of Zumbo on 27th April 1762, yet by October 26, 1762 he had not taken up his place at Zumbo. This was so because on 26th October, 1762 Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque governor general of Moçambique wrote to the governor of the Rivers telling him to remove Fr. Manoel José de Santa Anna from the post of acting capitão mor of Zumbo and instead to appoint

3. A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 9, Moçambique, 26/10/1762, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque to Marco António de Azavedo Coutinho de Montaury.
João Collaco as the acting capitão mor pending the arrival of another capitão mor. In a notice of 25th October 1762 the governor-general instructed Manuel da Costa that "If for any reason the Feyra of Zumbo should be without a capitão mor and a judge I order Your Honour to take over until the arrival of Manuel Caetano Rodrigues". On May 2, 1763 Manuel Caetano Rodrigues was appointed capitão mor of Manyika by J.P. da Silva Barba. This leaves Rodrigues with six months within which to have taken up his appointment at Zumbo. This makes it highly improbable that he in fact ever took up his appointment. He left no record at Zumbo and there is no evidence in any other source showing that he was ever at Zumbo during those six months.

Even if we accept that he did not take up his appointment as capitão mor it does not necessarily mean that he had no other way of obtaining information to write a report on Zumbo. After the death of Perira de Faria in 1756, Manuel Caetano Rodrigues was appointed capitão mor of Mixonga (near Zumbo). In 1760 Manuel Caetano Rodrigues was appointed the Tanadar-mor Das Terras da Coroa. Clearly these two appointments would have

3. Andrade, A.A. de, Relações, op cit., p. 530. For meaning of Tanadar-Mor see glossary.
given him much knowledge about Zumbo so that he could easily have written the 1764 report.

The decisive clue as to the authorship of the 1764 report in fact is to be found in the text itself. On page 159 the writer of the 1764 report says "There are other mines that are roughly a day's journey from Zumbo, which are called Bar da Pamba (Bar da Pamba) where only the slaves of the Religious of (St.) Dominic go to mine. In the year 1750 Pº Fr. Pedro da Trindade extracted much good gold. But when I was capitão mor in the 1754 year it was already producing less but always better quality gold" (my emphasis). The above paragraph from the Almanach should be compared with the following excerpt from Luís António de Figueiredo's signed article of 1773.¹ "The Bar da Pamba are some mines which are a little distance from Zumbo. In these mines, during my time only the slaves of the Religious of St. Dominic mined, since the latter do not allow any other person to benefit (engage in mining) in that region. In the year 1750 Pº Fr. Pedro da Trindade extracted much gold from these mines. When I was governing the district of Zumbo in the year 1754 so much good gold was extracted

that the same religious made much profit" (my emphasis). The wording and information contained in both articles are virtually the same. The writer in each case says he was capitão mor at Zumbo in 1754. Since Luís António de Figueiredo was the only capitão mor of Zumbo in 1754 there is no room to doubt that it was he who wrote the two reports.
APPENDIX F

A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Maço 12, anon. and undated; a part of which is published in Santana, F., Documentação Avulsa Moçambique... vol. 11, Maço 15, op. cit., pp. 443-445.

Dr. F. Santana suggests that the document in question may be the work of a governor of Tete. He also thinks that Francisco José da Câmara and Bernardo Coelho de Campos were probably capitães mores of Tete. Finally he feels that the document must have been written between 1780-1861.

We say the document was written at Zumbo by Caetano Manoel Correia capitão mor of Zumbo 1780-1782 and 1785-1787. We go further to suggest that the document was probably written after August and before the end of December in 1781.

Evidence of where and by whom the document was written is deduced from the following facts: - The document refers to prince Casiresire as having attacked the vila from where the document was written. It mentions chief Buruma as one who was likely to hamper the vila's trade with Butua, Orenje and Cancomba (Kankomba). Only Zumbo was likely to suffer from Buruma in the way described in the document. But the most decisive argument comes from the fact that the writer claims that
he took over the governorship of the vila from Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos who had succeeded Francisco Jose de Camara who himself had been murdered by prince Casiresire. In chapter six\(^1\) we showed, by using other documents, that Francisco Jose de Camara was killed by prince Casiresire and that F.J. de Camara was succeeded by G.B.C. de Campos who himself was replaced by Caetano Manoel Correia.

The above facts establish beyond doubt that the document was written at Zumbo and by Caetano Manoel Correia. The clues as to the time of the writing of the document are as follows:- Caetano Manoel Correia arrived at Zumbo in December 1780 and by mid-1872 he had temporarily left Zumbo for Tete. He came back to assume his governorship of Zumbo only in 1785.\(^2\) We believe that the document was written before mid-1872 because (a) virtually all the information given in the document can be shown to refer to pre-1782 events at Zumbo (b) the document says that one Alexandre da Costa de Santa Maria was then still at Zumbo\(^3\) (c) the document tells us that in August of that year the vashambadzi who had been sent to Dande 1.

\(^1\) See Chapter Six, pp. 275-276.
\(^2\) Chapter IV, p. 189
\(^3\) We know that when C.M. Correia came back to Zumbo in 1785 he found that Alexandre da Costa de Santa Maria had left for Tete. (See Chapter Five, pp.216-7) Since the document says A. da Costa Santa Maria was still at Zumbo then this must refer to Correia's pre-mid-1782 period.
by Gil Bernardo Coelho de Campos returned to Zumbo. It would have been extraordinary if these vashambadzi should have returned from Dande only around 1785 after being sent there in 1779-1780. (d) In a letter of 16th March 1781 among the people who contributed towards the presents given to Changamire that year was one Diogo Rodrigues. But the document under discussion here says that Diogo Rodrigues was dead by the time the document was written. Clearly then the document must have been written after 16th March, 1781. According to the document the vashambadzi of the dead Diogo Rodrigues arrived at Zumbo from Dande in August. We know that by June 1782 Caetano Manoel Correia had left Zumbo for Tete. This means that the document was written after August 1781 but before June 1782. Finally since the document simply says that "In the month of August the Mussambazes with the fazenda of the dead Diogo Rodrigues... arrived to this vila", without saying August of which year, it must therefore be taken to refer to the August of the year in which the letter was written as this would have been clear from the date on the letter. In other words the letter must have been written after August 1781 but before the end of December 1781.

1. A.E.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 16, Zumbo, 16/3/1781, written by Manoel Joze' Gonçalves but signed by Caetano Manoel Correia.
2. The last date which we have showing that Diogo Rodrigues was still alive.
APPENDIX G

Some Examples of the Goods which the Rozvi Embassies used to Carry to and from Zumbo (Mucariva)


On this occasion the Rozvi Mambo had sent 75 maticals of "ouro bruto" (gold with impurities) which when purified yielded only 70 maticals of gold. In return the Mambo received from the Muzungu of Zumbo, one musket, some musket balls, gunpowder and cloth, all of which were worth 48 maticals of gold. The Mambo's envoys received personal presents valued at 12 maticals. The last 10 maticals of the original 70 maticals were used to feed the Mambo's embassy while at Zumbo. It must be noted that on this occasion Zumbo was impoverished and on the verge of being abandoned. There was very little cloth at Zumbo.

G. (ii) A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 18, Zumbo, 14/3/1781 as well as Zumbo 16/3/1781; both reports written by Manoel Joze' Gonçalves and signed by Caetano Manoel Correia.
The Rozvi embassy brought 42 maticals of "ouro bruto" which when purified yielded 34 maticals and 4 tangas. For the above gold the Muzungus of Zumbo sent in exchange the following goods: 26 corjas and 13 chuabos of cloth as well as two guns and one arroba of gunpowder.

The Zumbo Muzungu made other expenses not covered by Changamire's 34 maticals and 4 tangas. These expenses cost the Zumbo traders 150 maticals as well as 57 panos of velorio (beads). The 57 panos of velorio (which came to 18 maticals) was used to buy seven heads of cattle to feed the Rozvi at Zumbo. The 150 maticals were used to buy presents for the Rozvi Mambo. Among other things these included a sombrero, some zuarte cloth, a quilt, some beads, two flask-like containers full of gunpowder and other unstated odds and ends.

G. (iii) A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 21, Zumbo, 20/6/1784, António Caetano de Souza to governor of the Rivers.

The 'present' from Changamire was worth 42 maticals of "ouro bruto" which when purified came to 36 ½ maticals. In exchange for which the Rozvi Mambo received two mutores of goods each of which valued at about 22 maticals. For the
Mambo's 'saguate' the Muzungus sent in addition to the above, 19 corjas and 6 chuabos of cloth and some gunpowder, beads and other odds and ends.

G. (iv) A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, Mucariva, 29/12/1802, Mancel Francisco do Rozario.

"Relação das despezas, que mandou fazer o senhor Capitão Mor desta villa Jozé Pedro Diniz, e com ela a expedição que fez do saguate ao Emperador Changamira por seu General e Embaxador chamado Gumy, e mais grandes de sua comitiva".

The 'gift' from Changamire was 72 maticals of "ouro bruto" which when purified came to 61 maticals. The Changamire also sent 7 tusks of ivory which weighed 6 arobas and 30 arateis groço and were valued at 29.4 maticals. Another item in the Changamire's list of 'presents' was a group of eight young people who were valued at six panos or 4 maticals. So that Changamire's 'saguate' was worth 94.4 maticals.

The Rozvi embassy stayed for ten months at Mucariva. The expenses incurred by the Muzungus of Mucariva on that occasion totalled 741 panos and 94.4 maticals. The 94.4 maticals were from.

1. The high percentage of impurities on this occasion brought a protest from the Muzungu Zumbo. See A.H.U. Av. de Moç., Cx. 42, 19/1/1803, Manoel Francisco do Rozario.
the Mambo's "present" to Mucariva and were used to buy the following goods:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mutavas of missanga beads</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mutavas of large velorio beads</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sombrero</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>08.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fire-arm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>06.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arateis of gunpowder</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>08.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arateis of musket balls and 6 pieces of flint</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>00.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arateis of Indian tin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>03.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rosaries of fake coral</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>03.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sea shells</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>02.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>handkerchiefs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>03.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arateis of wickers (dipped) in dim candles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>01.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large manchila cloth</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>08.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small manchila cloth</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>04.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gunpowder container made from Macau clay</td>
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<td>01.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>brass bell</td>
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<td>01.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plates, one saucer and one porcelain, all in chinaware</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>01.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The 741 panos were spent as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Panos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Saguate&quot; to the Rozvi Mambo</td>
<td></td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents to ambassador General Gumi</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; Gumi's second in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; third in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; fourth in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; fifth in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; sixth in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; seventh in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; eighth in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; ninth in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; tenth in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  &quot; eleventh in command</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents to some other 7 Rozvi in the embassy</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents for Mandebere Cupareza</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presents for Tumbare</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Bocas' made to the Rozvi embassy before negotiations</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) "Dous arateis de seira em vellas buzias".
Expenses for feeding the Rozvi Embassy while at Mucariva (696 alqueires of maize, 9 oxen, 12 sheep and 15 goats) 229

Presents made to Mhondoro Bedza, and Inyamapfeka as well as to King Gomo of Dande in connection with the arrival of the Rozvi embassy 72

Total expenses 741
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
<th>46-50</th>
<th>51-55</th>
<th>56-60</th>
<th>61-65</th>
<th>66-70</th>
<th>71+</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One of the 7 girls is also included among the 0-7 years old females.

---

**Christian Population of the Parish of the Mission of the Missionaries (Zumbo)**

Appendix H
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actual No. of Soldiers</th>
<th>No. of Soldiers When in Full Strength</th>
<th>Missing Soldiers</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1830-34</td>
<td>1825 49 49 18</td>
<td>1821 49 37 18</td>
<td>1806 22 37 22</td>
<td>1803 22 37 22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures come from S.X. Bonfils.

The year in which the garrison was set up.

This figure does not include the 70 auxiliary forces.

The figure does not include the 70 auxiliary forces.
## The Capitães Mores of Zumbo (Mucaria) 1719-1836

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date or Year of Appointment</th>
<th>Date or Year of End of Captaincy</th>
<th>Name of Capitães Mores</th>
<th>Name of Acting Capitães Mores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1719</td>
<td>1751</td>
<td>Pereira</td>
<td>F. Antônio de S. Joze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>Frei Pedro da Trindade</td>
<td>Fr. Manuel de Nascimento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752</td>
<td>1753</td>
<td>Fr. Manuel de Nascimento</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/4/1754</td>
<td>1755</td>
<td>Luis Antônio de Figueiredo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/11/1755</td>
<td>1759</td>
<td>Dom Jozé da Costa</td>
<td>Fr. Marcel José de São Anna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/10/1759</td>
<td>1762</td>
<td>João Colaço</td>
<td>Fr. Luís Lobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/4/1762</td>
<td>1763</td>
<td>Manuel Caetano Rodrigues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/9/1765</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td>Gil Bernardo de Célio de Campos</td>
<td>Frei Jerónimo Trindade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td>Manuel de Célio de Campos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/4/1768</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>Jozé de Antônio de Azvedo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/4/1772</td>
<td>1774</td>
<td>Gil Bernardo de Célio de Campos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/5/1777</td>
<td>1777</td>
<td>Francisco Jozé da Cámara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777</td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>Gil Bernardo de Célio de Campos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/12/1779</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>Caetano Manuel Correia</td>
<td>Fr. Vasco de costa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td></td>
<td>Senhora da Pillar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>1785</td>
<td></td>
<td>Antônio Caetano de Souza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>22/4/1787</td>
<td>Caetano Manuel Correia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1787</td>
<td>1787</td>
<td>Sebastião Morais de Timóteia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/1792</td>
<td>1795</td>
<td>José Antônio de Almeida Barreto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3/1795</td>
<td>1802</td>
<td>José Pedro Diniz</td>
<td>José Baptista da Câmara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804</td>
<td>1804</td>
<td>José Pedro de Souza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>1807</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>30/5/1809</td>
<td></td>
<td>José de Souza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/5/1809</td>
<td>1813</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>Luís Caetano Bolinho</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

ALQUEIRE a measure of about 13 litres.
ARRATEL about one pound (1 lb).
ARROBA a weight of 32 pounds.
BAR, BARES any place or settlement where gold is mined.
BAR, BARES a weight which varied between about 518-650 pounds made up of 20 Arrobas; also a bale of cloth containing 400 panos.
BOCA (mouth), present given to start any business transaction.
BROZES (BOROBZES, BOROBRES, VOROBZE, OROBES) Varozvi, the Rozvi.
CAPITÃO MOR Captain-major, rank given to any one in the position of Commander. At Zumbo the title given to the man in charge of the Feira; this was irrespective of whether he was a soldier or not.
CAPOTIM a blue cloth.
CERTÕENS Hinterland, backwoods, remote interior (especially in Brazil).
CHIBINGE transgression against established convention. Often used as an alternative to Milando in the Portuguese documents.
CHUABO a fathom of cotton cloth valued at about 500 weak réis; also 20 strings of beads.
COLOMOS Free African farmers living in a traditional manner on traditional lands which had been incorporated into a prazo.
CORJA 1/20 of a bar; 20 pieces of cloth.
CRUZADO Portuguese coin of 400 réis, worth about 4 shillings in the 17th Century.
CURVA present, tribute, paid by Arabs and later by the Portuguese to the Munhumutapa until the early 17th Century (Arabic origin qurban).
FAZENDA cloth, goods (Fazenda Real = Royal treasury).
FORROS free or emancipated Africans.
LIBERTOS Liberated slaves.
MANAMUCATE envoys (Mwanamukati? Shona).
MATICAL measure of gold equivalent to 8 tangas or 0.155 ozs.
in 18th century Mozambique (Arabic origin, mithqal or misqal).
(See under Tanga).
MBOKORUME (BUCURUME) son-in-law, right hand man (Shona).
MBONGA virgins dedicated to Mwari (God).
MHONDORO important spirit medium (Shona, Lion).
MILANDO same as Mirandu.
MIRANDU law-suit, complaint, dispute.
MISSANGA general term for beads.
MORADOR settler (non-African).
MUSHAMBADZI African itinerant trader or slave acting as agent for
a Portuguese merchant (Persian, bazar, a market).
MUSSAMBAZ same as Mushambadzi.
MUTAVA a measure equivalent to 10 chuabos of beads (see chuabo).
MUTOR (MOTOR) a third of one bar of cloth (in Shona the word is
Mutoro).
MUZUNGU Portuguese; any European, often used at Zumbo to
describe Asians and Portuguese.
NEVANJE first son or heir apparent (Shona).
OITAVA about 1/8 oz.
PANGANACENS trade goods, loads (origin unknown).
PANO a fathom or length of outstretched arms as a measure of
cloth, worth 500 weak or 200 strong réis. (about one shilling);
also 20 strings of beads.
PARDAO  coin equivalent to 360 reis of gold (300 of silver); equal to a xerafim.
PASTA   about 161/2 ozs. or gold weighing 100 maticals.
PATAMARES messengers, envoys.
REAL    old Portuguese monetary unit worth about 1/16 of a penny in Portugal.
RUSAMBO small token (e.g. arm trinket).
SAGOATE, SAGUATE gift or present.
SVIKIRO  any spirit medium.
TANADOR-MOR Overseer of taxes or chief of police, intendant.
TANGA  gold measure of twelve grains; equivalent to 60 reals; weighing 1/8 of a Matical (Axelson says it weighed 1/6 of a Matical in 17th Century).
VASHAMBADZI plural of Mushambadzi.
VELORIO beads, esp. Venetian or glass beads.
XERAFIM  coin of 360 reis of gold (300 of silver); equal to one pardao; 1 1/2 xerafims of gold weighed one matical.
XIBINGE same as Chibinge.
ZUARTE  a blue cotton cloth.
From 1684 to 1698 we have a fair amount of sources on the wars and rise of the Rozvi and the Changamire Dombo I. But the Portuguese documentary sources show a serious gap for the period 1700-1750. It may be that the documentation of that period was lost when the Casa da India was destroyed during the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. The loss of those documents is a very sad thing for the study of the early history of Zombo and the Rozvi empire. This is particularly so in view of the fact that this very period is represented in memorials and other reports of the post 1750 period as the golden age of the Rozvi-Zombo trade. However, as from the 1760s to 1813 we find almost yearly or half-yearly and sometimes monthly exchanges of letters between Zombo and Sena or Moçambique. These are supplemented by a number of memorials and reports. From 1813-1819 there are few if any documents mainly because Zombo was unoccupied. From 1820-1825 there is a profusion of documents which peters out gradually after 1825 until Zombo's abandonment in 1836.

The Portuguese sources can for our purposes be broadly divided into three important categories:

a. The letters of the vicars, captains and câmara officials at Zombo (or Manyika).

b. The letters of the governors of the Rivers of Sena and the Governor-Generals of Moçambique.
c. General memorials and reports.

The above three broad categories can be subdivided even further. For example, the accuracy and reliability of a letter of a captain at Zumbo depended among other things on whether he was reporting things he himself had witnessed at the feira or whether his report is based on evidence he received from envoys. Sources in group (b) depend on whether the governor is summarizing information received from letters written at Zumbo, in which case the letter would be almost a duplication of the group (a) information, or whether he is making his own observations based on his experience in which case the letter must be regarded as second or third degree removed from the event. Group (c) is even more varied. In the first place, there are those reports dealing with the history, commerce, military, judicial, political or religious affairs at Zumbo and written from Zumbo by men who were living or had lived at Zumbo. These reports, when they recount events happening at the same time as they were being written, are as good as the letters of the captains of Zumbo. But when they recount things that happened a hundred years or so in the past they are often as reliable as oral tradition. This is true of Manoel Albino Pacheco's Diário and the "Rellação da Fundação de Estado do Zumbo e desta Vila da Mucariva" by Affonso Pereira. In chapter four we discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the general memorials as published in A.A. Andrade's Relações and in Anais Vol. IX, Tomo 1, 1954.

1. See chapter four, pp. 180-181.
Group (a) documents can often be used as contemporary eyewitness accounts, which give us useful and fairly accurate and detailed insights. As a general rule they exaggerate the problems. Group (b) may be contemporary but very often they are not eyewitness accounts and often lack details, but usually contain useful comments on information from group (a) and might even rectify biases in group (a) information. Group (b) information has a tendency to be over-optimistic about the potentialities of Zumbo and minimizes its problems. Group (c) information is useful where there are no group (a) and (b) documents and in giving general trends over a wider span of time. But group (c) information is prone to be more inaccurate on material detail.

In general most of group (a) documents are found in the A.H.U. Moçambique Caixas and some in the Maços. Group (b) documents when coming from Sena are often in the Caixas and also the Maços but when coming from the governor-general then most of the copies of the originals are to be found in the Moçambique Códices.

Documents in group (c) come from the various Portuguese archives esp. (A.H.U., B.A.L., B.N.L. and A.N.T.T.). Some of these have already been published. But those specifically on Zumbo on the whole have never been printed and are mainly found in the A.H.U.

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