

THE PROBLEM OF UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE MODERN AFRICAN STATE:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE SUDAN

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the problem of human diversity within the modern African state, and in particular the efforts of one African state, the Sudan, to maintain its territorial integrity and to come to terms with its human diversity. The work begins by tracing the development of the nation state as a form of spatial and political organization expressing the relationship between the nation, the homeland and the political state. The variety of means employed by governments to adjust the relationship, and the forces within states which can lead to disintegration are examined. A set of criteria involved in the development of secession movements is suggested, and subsequently used as guidelines in the study of the phenomenon of secession in Africa. Consideration is also given to the variety of power-sharing formulae employed by governments as solutions to such problems. The traditional African concepts of spatial organization and attitudes to human diversity are examined to form the basis for an understanding of the effects of the imposition of colonial rule, and of the resultant post-independence experience of threatened disintegration and secession in several African states. In the latter part of the work an examination of the experience of the Sudan demonstrates the degree to which a history of resentment, followed by questionable colonial and post-independence policies, resulted in threats to her territorial integrity. The solution to the problem is examined and an assessment made of the possibility of success for the current, more accommodating policy of recognizing the reality of diversity and of encouraging decentralized government.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

£ Sudanese (£S) = US\$ 2.50  
US\$ 1.00 = £S 0.40

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres = 10,000 m<sup>2</sup>  
1 feddan = approximately 1 acre  
1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles  
1 square kilometer (km<sup>2</sup>) = 0.39 square miles = 100 ha  
1 kilogram (kg) = 2.20 pounds (lbs)  
1,000 kgs = 1 metric tonne = 0.98 long tons

ABBREVIATIONS

UNICEF	United Nations Childrens Fund
WHO	World Health Organization
ACROSS	African Committee for the Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan
LRCS	League of Red Cross Societies
GLRA	German Leprosy Relief Association
CBS	Catholic Relief Services
RRRC	Resettlement, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
HEC	High Executive Council
PRA	People's Regional Assembly
RMFEP	Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
RMCTR	Regional Ministry of Communications, Transport and Roads
RMAAPF	Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Production and Forestry

## PREFACE

The subject matter of this thesis falls within the broad field of political geography, defined as the study of the centrifugal and centripetal forces at work within and between states. To date very little has been written on the political geography of Africa. (1) And yet the continent presents the political geographer with a rich variety of issues and problems. Africa now has a larger number of independent nation states than any other continent, and most of these states have had less than two decades of experience in nation-making. Moreover, fourteen of the states are land-locked, and the colonial boundaries, largely continued into the modern pattern of independent nation states, show little regard for ethnic or geographical realities.

For the purposes of the present study, attention is directed first to the problem faced by so many African governments in trying to create a sense of national unity - to identify and foster the centripetal forces within their own national boundaries. Secondly, and more specifically, the thesis focusses on the background to and characteristics of past, present and potential secession movements. (2) Finally, this specific issue is examined at some length for one African state - the Sudan - where secession has been a long-standing issue of great importance, not only to the Sudan, but also to its neighbouring countries.

This study is based partly on field visits made to Africa between 1974 and 1976 which included a stay of some twentyfour months in the Sudan. Despite considerable financial and logistical problems I was able to visit Juba, Wau, Aweil, Tonj, Nimule and Malakal in the Southern Region and Khartoum, Kassala, Kashm El Girba, Suakin, Port Sudan, New Halfa, Wad Medani, Kostis and the Nuba Mountains in the North. I was particularly fortunate in being permitted to travel in the Southern Region during a politically delicate post-war period, for which I am grateful to the Sudan Government.

In the difficult problem of transliteration of Arabic, Dinka, Nuer, Zande and the many other non-English words encountered in any study of the Sudan, I have opted for the use of conventional forms, which I feel will best assist the reader. For place names I have followed the example of the Sudan Survey Department, and for personal names the spelling found most commonly, or used by the people themselves.

It will be appreciated that following such a long period of civil war there <sup>ARE</sup> little reliable statistical data available for the Southern Region, and given the profound difficulties of travel in the area, little opportunity for an individual to collect sufficient data for a meaningful statistical analysis of the economic situation. However I am grateful to the various Regional Ministries for permission to work with what was available.

Part of the fieldwork was made possible by financial assistance from the Central Research Fund of the University of London. I am also indebted to the staff and students of the Department of Geography at the School of Oriental and African Studies, and particularly to my supervisor, Prof. B.W.Hodder, who provided valuable criticism, helpful advice, but most important of all, constant cheerful encouragement. Dr. David Pool kindly read and commented on part of the first draft and in the preparation of the final manuscript I am grateful for the contributions made by Mrs A.F.Hayes and Ms. Wendy Seale.

The University of Khartoum provided me with facilities, and the members of the Department of Geography and the Institute of African and Asian Studies with encouragement and advice, especially Dr. Yusef Fadl Hassan and Dr. Mohammed Omer Beshir. I should also like to record the contributions of the many Government officials in Khartoum and <sup>OF</sup> the many members of the public who patiently corrected mistaken impressions.

It is impossible here to name the many kind people who assisted me in the Southern Region, but I owe a great deal to the members of the Regional Government who gave of their precious time during a period of great pressure of work, particularly Their Excellencies Hilary Logali, Natale Olwak Akolawin, Mading De Garang, Lawrence Wol Wol and Lawrence Lual Lual. A valuable insight into the economic situation in the Southern Region was afforded by a period of employment with the Regional Development Corporation.

A special mention must be made of those friends in Juba who gave me hospitality as well as encouragement at a time when there was little enough to share; Bertram Buth Peat, Jacob Akol, Robin Mills, Duncan Willetts, Alastair Mackie and especially David Benzimra. Finally, for a real perspective on the life of the North and the South I am indebted to Dr. Salih Abdullah El Arifi and His Excellency Bona Malwal Madut Ring, and I would like to thank them for their patience and much valued friendship, and to beg their forgiveness for any errors I may have made in what follows.

Rosemary Ann Squires  
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CHAPTER I

THE NATION STATE AND THE PROBLEM OF DIVERSITY

The Concept of the Nation State

In theory, a nation state is an expression of the relationship between a particular cohesive human group, its political organization, and a specified territory. In this sense a state is the result of a continuous history of the interaction of man and land, where interaction has reached such a level that the human group is capable of maintaining itself, organizing its people and defending its boundaries, to the extent that its identity is universally recognised. In the modern world, however, it is more likely to be the result of the imposition of spatial and political organization by outside forces anxious for world order. In practice none of the three factors in the relationship may be found to be ideal. The human group living within the territory is rarely homogenous<sup>e</sup>; the morphology of the occupied territory may be ill-defined and<sup>is</sup> certainly not universally accepted; and the political organization may vary in its degree of centralization and perceived legitimacy.

The origins of the modern nation state have been the subject of much discussion and not a little confusion over what constitutes a nation and what a state, with many of the arguments being used to buttress a desired foreign policy. Macartney in 1934 saw the nation state as part of a continuum '...reaching back into the misty dawn of pre-history' (1) and Hayes in 1937 described primitive tribalism as '...small scale nationalism' (2) Cobban discounts the importance of a tribal inheritance of common language and culture. To him the term nation state corresponds to some concrete political form and although in many tribal societies certain cultural affiliations formed the basis for the development of a nation '...until it has some permanent institutional embodiment it cannot be regarded as a political fact, or as belonging to the same order of things as the nation state.' (3)

The development of cultural affinity has more often been the result of statehood rather than its cause. In medieval Europe, groups of related or unrelated peoples were welded into political unity by the use of force and the development of military supremacy. Powerful dynasties laid the foundations of the English, French and German nations, but there was no real belief in any necessary connection between politics and culture. The maintenance of political power through a considerable time period encouraged the development of cultural affinities. Different peoples serving under the same yoke began to perceive a common destiny and gradually became a nation. Although the work of the great medieval monarchies was primarily one of political consolidation, the development of political unity naturally stimulated the growth of a common language and culture, and the assimilation of alien cultural elements. People began to identify with broader political unities and by the sixteenth century a number of nation states existed in Western Europe. What Cobban termed the '...perpetual unstable equilibrium on the system of balance of power' permitted the survival in '...geographical contiguity and close association' (4) of a number of states, none having the military capability of uniting the whole continent under its domain. Only in Europe do we find this kind of political pattern continuing over a period of several centuries.

By the end of the eighteenth century the nation state had ceased to be a simple historical fact and had become the subject of a theory, beginning to appear in its modern form with the association between the ideas of the political and the national community. People began to matter. The French Revolution and the War of American Independence were to result in a major change in the political ideas of the Western world. They introduced the concept of government as a manifestation of the democratic will. As Aron has put it 'The case altered after the French Revolution when two new ideas gradually won mens minds: the juridical equality of members of the collectivity; the aspiration of the governed to belong to a community of their choice, a community of their own.' The general concept of the state came to embody three ideas: 'Legitimacy is democratic, the state is neutral

in relation to beliefs which relate to individual conscience, and authority is exercised through the intermediary of a bureaucracy.'(5) In practice the Jacobins and, later, Napoleon replaced the original revolutionary hope of decentralization and participatory democracy with a new centralization of power in Paris. Policies were determined in the capital and only then delegated to the eighty-three departments or units of local government, but a chain of communication between the centre and the periphery was, for the first time, established. By raising the walls of sovereignty and national consciousness with regard to neighbouring nations, while breaking down the former provincial loyalties, France became a relatively homogenous nation.

While the democratic ideals of the French Revolution were discredited during the reign of terror, the conquests of Napoleon strengthened sentiments of nationalism, making it a much more important force in the Europe of 1815 than was democracy. However this was a nationalism which glorified the romantic and the exclusive. In Germany people were taught to reverence the 'Volksgeist' or peculiar national character which was presented as the foundation of all good culture and civilization. The government reorganized the state very much in line with French reforms, with the building of a strong central authority, a truly national army, and a system of national education designed to infuse a common spirit into the whole people: a devotion to the cause of German nationalism. By the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire and the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon paved the way towards greater unification. German nationalism began as a strange mixture of benefits derived from adopting French methods and institutions such as the Code Napoleon, and resentful reactions against French domination. In Italy as in Germany, Napoleon's reduction in the number of states encouraged ideas of ultimate unification. The savagery of the Peninsular War fostered the rise of Spanish nationalism, despite the lack of an important middle class, the characteristic basis for nineteenth century national movements; and in Poland, although the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was to be short-lived, the Code Napoleon, with the ideas of the French Revolution embodied in it, had been introduced. In England, war with France continued the process of national cohesion.

During the nineteenth century the belief in the ideal nation state, that is the ideal relationship between our original three determining factors - the nation, the homeland and the political state - became widely accepted in Europe and, with the rise in European imperial ambitions, both the theory and the practice were widely exported to the rest of the world. But before we can examine the results of this on the morphology of states and on the spatio-political division of the globe it is necessary to consider the principle of self-determination, by the application of which these ideal states were to be created, and which was to become in the twentieth century both a convenience and a thorn in the side of those who undertook to re-arrange the world.

#### The Right to Self-Determination

The principle of self-determination developed from the democratic ideals of the French Revolution, when '...the Divine Right of Kings ...was replaced by the Divine Right of the People. Under the influence of the new national and democratic ideas, the people ceased to be an atomic dust of individuals: it took shape and form, became a whole, was called the Nation, endowed with sovereignty, and identified with the state. The revolutionary theory that a people had the right to form its own constitution and choose its own government for itself easily passed into the claim that it had a right to decide whether to attach itself to one state or another, or constitute an independent state by itself. The effect of revolutionary ideology was to transfer the initiative in state-making from the government to the people. Nation states had formerly been built up from above, by the influence of government: henceforth they were to be made much more rapidly from below by the will of the people. The logical consequence of the democratisation of the idea of the state by the revolutionaries was that nationalism took the form of the theory of national self-determination.' (6)

This theory was to advance to a position of apparent universal acceptance after the outbreak of war in 1914. The general disruption caused by war encouraged minorities throughout Europe, as did the Allies' professed cause of the rights of small states, and similar sentiments expressed in the aims of the Russian Provisional Government of 1917 and the Americans under President Wilson. While the allies deliberated during the closing stages of the war, wherever there was a minority or a subject nationality, national armies were gathering and national governments being established. When the Peace Conference opened in 1919 the Allies were only just becoming aware of the difficulties that would be presented by the attempt to reconcile the principle of self-determination with their realistic and imperial ambitions.

The Italians and the French, being more directly concerned in the ultimate re-drawing of the map of Europe, were the first to retreat from an absolute acceptance of the principle. The Italians discovered that ethnic considerations would effect the security of their northern border, and the French considered self-determination a *carte blanche* for the convenience of any minority group. The major difficulty from Britain's point of view was the existence of a large subject empire; she was uncomfortable in demanding for some people rights which she was not prepared to grant in India, Egypt and Ireland, and was forced to fall back on the argument that the principle could not be expected to apply to all peoples and especially to those firmly under governmental control. The importance of not creating a precedent outside of Europe prompted the following comment from General Smuts: 'The German colonies in the Pacific and in Africa are inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any idea of political self-determination in the European sense.' (7)

The Americans had begun to realize that the situation they had done so much to bring about, was potentially explosive, but Wilson remained firmly committed to the creation of a new international order based on the idealisation of popular democracy, rather than the working out of a modus vivendi for post-war Europe. They were constantly harrassed by petitions from subject peoples. The whole situation was succinctly put by Cobban '....the British and American delegations were anxious to confine self-determination to Europe, while the French and the Italians would have preferred to confine it to Utopia.' (8)

In addition to the ideological inconsistencies, certain practical difficulties presented themselves. In many cases claims had already been made and territory occupied and only military action could have changed the situation. It was often difficult to ascertain which leaders actually represented the true wishes of any one group. In altering frontiers the Allies found themselves creating new minorities as well as the greatest problem of all - one which highlighted the basic shortcomings of the policy. This was - who was to decide, and how, what constituted a nation? And when was the disintegrative process to be halted? Various indicators were tried, among them language. Although in many cases this was a useful criterion, the exceptions were extensive, and states would only permit its use where it suited them. For example, the Poles claimed territory from Germany on this basis but refused to allow the same principle to apply in East Galicia where non-Polish tongues were spoken. On the basis of language, Germany could have claimed the whole of Austria. Similar problems attended the use of the plebiscite, although it could be said to be an implicit part of the whole principle of self-determination. States were wary of the possible outcome and, as in the case of Schleswig, reserved the right to take geographical and economic factors into consideration.

In view of these difficulties it is scarcely surprising that the states created after 1919 were far from embodying the strict principle of self-determination. Instead a rather different set of ideals was put in its place: a belief in the equality of states, the justifiable existence of small states, and a belief in the right of absolute national sovereignty, ideals which were to form the basis for the establishment of the League of Nations. Among public opinion, however, the principle of self-determination still retained its predominance, and when the many failures of the Allies to apply the principle fairly came to light, the peace settlement seemed shorn of all idealism.

The conflict between the principle of self-determination and territorial sovereignty had been institutionalized in the League of Nations, and was to be a major world problem for the next fifty years. Whatever the shortcomings in the 'national' composition of any state, once it had been established, the principle of territorial sovereignty prevented any interference in how it managed its affairs or treated any minority within its borders. As Duchacek put it, 'The right of national self-determination so passionately applied against the former masters, is now to be denied or its cause (polyethnicity) eliminated in one way or another. As both a consequence of and a reaction against the disintegrative effects of the principle of self-determination, the new right to ethnic homogeneity will be evoked by the new elites of the new states.' (9)

The survival of large and diverse minorities in many countries provided ample occasion for the agitation for self-determination, and the new states varied in their response. Minority treaties were meant to apply in the new states to guarantee civil rights and liberties, but in most cases the minority situation steadily deteriorated, as the international community came to realize that nothing could be done to protect the new minorities, or to enforce the guarantees, without encountering all the dangers of intervention. Added to this, the major powers were beginning to suffer from increasing minority unrest, both at home and in their respective empires. The British were threatened by violent nationalist movements

in Egypt, India, Iraq and the rest of the Arab world and, nearer home, in Ireland, Scotland and Wales. American control was being questioned in the Philippines and in Central America. The French saw the rise of problem areas in Alsace and Brittany, and in Spain, Basques and Catalans were increasingly restive.

Two forces, both born of the principle of self-determination, thus began to work against each other, once the ideal identification of 'cultural' nation and 'political' state had been accepted. Nations, and parts of nations, aspired to statehood, while states in their own defence tended to act as though culturally united or, if in fact this was not the case, endeavoured to make the facts correspond to the ideal, regardless of the rights or liberties of minorities within their borders.

#### The Management of Minorities

In the past the state evolved a common national consciousness by a slow and natural process. The modern belief in the identity of nation and state with the idea of the cultural nation, as part of the legitimacy of the state, has provided a strong incentive among newly-created states to hasten the process by governmental action. Irredentist claims are made concerning nationals outside its borders and a variety of means used against subject minorities to hurry their assimilation. The political idea of 'national unity' has usually been a response to a disunity resulting from internal anarchy or foreign domination; it is therefore primarily a means to an end, and that end the maintenance of law and order. The choice of means to this end has varied from state to state. Duchacek cites five measures which have been employed to remove the possible cause of future territorial disintegration - genocide, mass expulsions, boundary changes, the biasing of immigration controls and forcible assimilation. (10) Genocide, an act intended to destroy wholly or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, may be used directly as in Stalin's Russia against the Tartars and Chechens or, indirectly, as government-inspired mob violence towards members of a minority group, as that against the Batutsi in Rwanda in 1963-64.

Mass expulsion was a commonly used method of achieving ethnic homogeneity in post-war Eastern Europe; Poland and Czechoslovakia expelled about ten million people from their old and new territories, and more recent times have seen the mass expulsion of East African Asians. Boundary changes have been few and far between, other than between territories in the same empire. Independent states will back their own irredentist claims (11) with the right to ethnic homogeneity, but are less willing to accord the same right to their neighbours. Immigration controls may be enforced in an effort to maintain a balance or to allow the creation of a desired ethnic majority. Somali nationalists accused France of building up the Afars population in Djibouti in order to obtain a popular vote in favour of continued association with France. (12)

Economic and social considerations tend to result in the eventual assimilation of minorities into the melting pot of capital cities, industrial employment and the national army, where the use of the dominant language and recognition of the majority's social mores have definite economic advantages. But it is occasionally a process carried out by force. Groups may be deprived of the right to use their own language in schools and official communications, the practice and development of their religion may be discouraged, and no provision made in the country's legal framework for their traditional law and custom.

The application of these extreme measures, except where the state machinery is both strong and ruthless, has invariably contributed to the very thing the government wished to avoid: a threat to the state's territorial integrity. This kind of repression will help to change a territorial interest group into a movement for secession.

### Disintegration and Secession

The right of secession is the necessary corollary of the principle of self-determination and, in the same way, its virtues are extolled only when it suits a state's purpose. The difficulty, of course, is that the right to national sovereignty and the right of secession are in inevitable conflict. Furthermore, the universally-held view among governments is that if one secession movement be allowed to succeed, anarchy will threaten. However, secession movements have been successful without resulting in a profusion of similar claims. The reason must be that the mere existence of a territorial minority group is not sufficient in itself to lead to demands for secession. What, then, are the criteria for secession? It could be argued that there are seven:-

- (i) A transference of loyalty
- (ii) A history of bitterness and resentment
- (iii) Economic disparities
- (iv) Social and political disparities
- (v) Racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious motivations
- (vi) A defensible location
- (vii) International support

The rest of this section expands on each of these criteria. A variety of writers (13) have stressed the importance of racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors as reasons behind the formation of secession movements, whereas in actual fact, while they may become significant, they are not always necessary. What is important is that a cohesive human group, within a defined territory, has lost all faith in the state of which it forms a part. Whatever loyalty it ever had to that state has been transferred to the new entity it wishes to create. It sees its future interests, both in terms of material welfare and in the 'quality of life', as being best served by an independent existence in which its destiny is governed by its own

decisions. It wishes to change what it perceives to be a functional unit into a formal unit. How then has the group reached this position? Such a situation does not develop overnight, so the problem is almost certain to have a background with a long history of bitterness and resentment. The Sinn Fein rebellion in Ireland was not against the misgovernment of a twentieth century British Government: it was a revolt in the name of four centuries of history.(14) The historical basis to the claim may rest on a legacy of neglect and repression (that has produced the necessary cohesion) or on the memory of a former glorious independence.

From the material point of view, the supporter of a secession movement envisages a brighter economic future with independence. He feels the state has failed to allot to his group its fair share of the state's prosperity. The area in which he lives may have been neglected or exploited by the centre. He often considers his position to be essentially colonial. He may feel there is prejudice by the centre against the employment of members of his group - their exploitation, or barriers against their admittance to the decision-making process. Alternatively, the economic ambitions of the group may be essentially selfish; in such cases as Katanga and Bougainville, for example, the specific location of valuable resources has contributed to secession movements, where a territorial interest group does not wish to share the proceeds with the disadvantaged majority. Of the sum of factors behind a movement for secession, economic considerations will often be found to be most important.

Social and political disparities must not however be underestimated. A lack of educational opportunities will have a direct bearing on the economic prospects of the group and their chances of influencing national policy. Inadequate representation at the national level may be compounded by a similar situation in local government; there may be no communication between the government and the people. Where the group does possess a common cultural heritage, the state may have circumscribed the development of that tradition.

Here we must re-introduce the racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors in their correct context, as very potent factors, not in the basis of the wish to secede, but in the process of motivating the people. Motivation, and dedication to a cause, over a long period of time is vitally important to the success of an action which, given the aforementioned attitudes of nation states, will be essentially violent, and often violent in the extreme, as is the nature of civil war. It is not necessary for the dissident group to share a common religious, linguistic or racial identity. What they have in common may be not belonging to the majority faith, culture or race.

Strictly geographical factors, such as the location of the area, are obviously important in the development and feasibility of secession movements. The dissident group should, ideally, occupy a compact area, peripheral to the state core, at a distance from the capital, of proven opportunities for defence and presenting problems for attacking government forces. Given the unlikelihood of the movement having the available funds to finance a direct military confrontation with the government forces, guerrilla warfare will provide the greatest chance of success. Remoteness from the state core and difficulty of terrain will harass the government forces, while adaptation to the terrain and local knowledge will aid the guerrillas. While it may be impossible for the movement to claim a decisive military victory, their ability to occupy a large and costly government force for a long period of time will greatly strengthen their bargaining position. This has been the case in the Kurdish, Eritrean and Philippine examples. The defence of a peripheral territory will have other advantages. The existence of a friendly neighbouring population on the other side of the state boundary will obviously assist the movement's supply position and may provide a safe haven from government forces.

It would seem to be appropriate at this point to discuss the contribution of the type and status of boundaries to the problem of a state's ability to maintain its territorial integrity. Both the phenomenological classification system of Boggs (15) and the sequential system of Pounds (16) have proved useful in an analysis of the ways in which boundaries create or avert conflict; what has proved less than useful is the division into 'natural' and 'artificial' boundaries. The expression 'natural boundary' has too many connotations, gives incorrect associations and has far too variable a content and significance during different periods.(17) As Hartshorne has pointed out 'All political boundaries are man-made, that is artificial; obviously they are not phenomena of nature. Consequently man, not nature, determines their location; we must eliminate, therefore, any distinction between "natural" and "artificial" political boundaries.' (18) In the past, those with the power to re-determine boundaries supported their claims or decisions by reference to historical, economic, strategic, or national considerations. Historical considerations have proved to be an essentially dangerous basis for boundary determination, with almost every boundary in Europe embodying two or more irreconcilable historic rights. Economic factors proved less than useful as no state can now aspire to be an economic unit, or avoid close economic connexions with its neighbours. With accelerated technological advance there is really no longer any such thing as a strategic boundary; no strategic frontier can defend a weak country against a strong one. With a degree of international consensus on these facts of life, it is the boundary which divides a nation that is perceived as having the greatest conflict potential. With the creation of many new states following the collapse of colonial empires, and the change in status of many, formerly rather arbitrary, boundaries, a high degree of conflict was expected to result. There have been many irredentist claims made, and a number of movements seeking national unification. However, as will be shown in the case of Africa, the conflict potential of the situation has remained low. Again we find that a single factor such as a disputed boundary is not of itself sufficient ground to threaten the integrity of a nation state. In the cold-war conditions that have prevailed, the majority of states remain committed to the principle of national sovereignty.

One other factor is of great importance. The secession movement must conceive of a fair degree of international support for the new state it seeks to create: it is, after all, a movement to secede, not to commit group suicide. Although almost any such movement in the present climate of international relations will receive some support during its fight for independence, it must be sure that it is capable of running its own affairs and of economic survival in the realities of the world situation, and its initial survival may well depend on continued support from the world community.

While our seven criteria may lead to demands for secession, the necessary sacrifices, the disruption, the violence and the almost mandatory heavy loss of life may persuade many secession movements to withdraw from the brink and accept some form of compromise with the state. In many cases it has always been their intention to do so, their claim to the right of secession having been an extreme bargaining position which they abandon if assured some recognition of their needs, and an institutionalized channel of communication with the central government.

#### Decentralization and Regional Power Sharing Solutions

States have pursued a number of policies other than force, in accommodating territorial interest groups and so maintaining their territorial integrity. These communities may be granted effective political, institutional and constitutional protection through some form of territorial distribution of authority, with the advantages to the central government of a sharing of the burden of administration, a mobilization of local initiative, support and responsibility, the translation of national goals and policies and the proper appreciation of local needs and discontent. The territorial division of authority is but a geographical expression of the core creed of a free society: to make the authority responsive and responsible to the will of the people, the people must be able to participate. A balance may be struck between '...the desire of territorial interest groups to obtain or preserve their autonomy and the need of central authorities to rely on territorial units for local initiative, responsibility and self-rule.' (19)

This process may be termed decentralization -the delegation of a portion of centrally held power to sub-national centres -and may vary in degree from the wide autonomy of some federal systems such as the USA, to a mere observance of local customs. It is a process which is dynamic with a constantly changing relationship between the central and territorial authorities. It may represent a system of power sharing imposed from above by the central government or the decision of formerly separate territorial authorities to pool some of their resources and responsibilities.

Under a unitary system - that is where power is delegated from above - four broad categories of territorial self-rule may be distinguished, showing varying degrees of central control. (i) Agencies and officials at the local level may be appointed by, and be directly responsible to, the central authority. (ii) Alternatively, officials may still be directly appointed, but their appointment may be confirmed by some kind of limited plebiscitary procedure as in the USSR, where only party members selected by the central government may be elected. (iii) In some countries the problem is solved by a combination of centrally appointed officials in charge of local government with locally elected councils. This system, which will be further explained in the case study of the Sudan, is also employed in France. '...in the departements, a prefect, appointed by Paris, is responsible "for the national interests, for administrative supervision, and for seeing that the laws are respected." Besides the prefects as appointed heads of the 95 departements, there is also a network of sub-prefects in charge of departemental subdivisions ....also appointed by Paris ....Although the French Constitution seems to guarantee territorial autonomy, it actually places the civil servant above the locally elected representatives who form the Departemental Council....The whole arrangement illustrates .... the implied confidence in highly professionally trained civil servants.' (20) In other unitary states, such as Japan, there is no system of central appointment, and sub-national government is based on direct popular vote, with constitutional safeguards against territorial discrimination by the centre.

There are, of course, a huge variety of territorial distributions of authority within these four broad categories, varying from country to country and from region to region in their scope of authority and accountability, and varying with time as new balances of power and territorial units reflect changes in population distribution and mobility. Ideally, the system is well fitted to the state that aims at uniform development and progress via a strong central policy assisted by local flexibility, responsibility and initiative; but it essentially assumes a certain degree of confidence in the commitment of territorial interest groups to the state, or the overwhelming potential power of the central government.

Movement from diversity to unity may result in either a loose or a tightly-knit structure. Where this is a forced association the result is imperialism, which is not our concern here. What we are concerned with is an examination of the voluntary association of territorial communities, who wish to co-operate by agreeing to some common goals and some common procedures or machinery. This association may range from a mere informal understanding to a system such as a confederation requiring legal expression. The reasons for such an association may include geographical contiguity, cultural contiguity, commonly perceived functional, economic, military and political interests, or a common external threat. The association will establish some common machinery, usually in the form of a council or assembly of representatives to legislate for the common good, and each member community will accept some limitations on its individual freedom of action. If the individual members perceive the benefits to be sufficient, the alliance may gradually progress towards confederation and eventually to federation - that is the establishment of a new supraterritorial nation state.

Conversely, a former unitary nation state may adopt a federal system as an acknowledgement of a high degree of diversity, so involving a deconcentration of authority in the opposite direction. Evidently, then,

a federation is best described, not in terms of the historical process, but in terms of its content - that is the territorial division of political authority into separate jurisdictions, the national and the provincial both operating directly on the people, and the simultaneous assertion of an indivisible yet composite nation state. Duchacek describes a federation as 'an unfinished nation' (21) in that it admits of the existence of several component territorial communities as yet unready to abandon their entire sovereignty but recognising a common goal in some areas.

Obviously the system is not without its shortcomings. Given a high degree of diversity, not all territorial or ethnic communities can be <sup>FORMALLY</sup> recognised, and some may emerge after the striking of the original federal bargain. The drawing of intra-state boundaries will meet some of the same problems discussed earlier and the reinforcement of a sense of territorial identity may lead to eventual disintegration of the association. One of the greatest dangers lies in the inevitable regional inequalities. This may be in the problem of representation of states of unequal size in the federal legislature, or in their basic inequality of resources and therefore of needs and demands. The principle of equal representation of unequal component units has been adopted by many federations including Australia, Switzerland and the USSR. In others, such as India, less populous states are favoured but not to the extent of equality with the more populous.

The problem of regional inequality has beset the majority of nation states, whether unitary or federal, with inequalities being perceived in terms of size, population, political power, administrative skills, wealth, economic development and strategic importance. The better-endowed areas resent their support of poorer partners and the less well endowed are suspicious of the undue influence of the rich. Similarly, federal assymetry may arise due to the excessive growth of the federal centre, especially where there is a federal capital city, a one-party political system or a military regime. Where economic and political assymetry is compounded by racial, cultural or religious differences, the situation may easily become unmanageable.

From this very brief look at unitary and federal systems we can see that they are essentially a form of compromise to accommodate the principles discussed earlier of national sovereignty and the right to self-determination, within the concept of the nation state. Whether a state be described as unitary or federal, each will surely contain elements of the other. In the following chapters we will see exactly what degree of compromise was necessary in attempting to mould these government forms to the very particular conditions pertaining in Africa at the time of independence, and with what degree of success these essentially European concepts could be exported.

### Conclusion

We have seen that the European or Western perception of the organization of space was based on the concept of territory as property, capable of sale or exchange, and so requiring accurate demarcation. All land must be allotted or owned and the concept was extended to the global level with the division of the world into nation states, each actively defending its boundaries and protecting its exclusiveness. The recognised ideal was that the inhabitants of such a state should be a homogeneous group living in harmony within these boundaries. If this was not the case, the aforementioned variety of means would be employed to produce the eventual coincidence of the functional region with the formal region. With the European imperial expansion, these ideas were imposed on much of the world, and as Soja has reminded us, 'It has become difficult to accept the fact that not all the world's people share this perception of space, that in many societies clearly defined boundaries assumed to have some permanence, were until recently, virtually unknown, and that large areas could and did remain acceptably unorganized and outside the jurisdiction of any group.' (22)

## CHAPTER II

### THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE OF HUMAN DIVERSITY

This chapter will outline the approach to human diversity among traditional African societies and the effect on the processes of incorporation and accommodation of the superimposed political framework of colonialism. It will conclude with an examination of the resultant post-independence situation, in which cultural sub-nationalism has posed such problems. It is not the intention here to discuss the vexed question of the classification of traditional African political systems — a question over which there has been considerable disagreement among anthropologists and political scientists whose concern it more truly is. Suffice it to say that it is becoming increasingly apparent that the range of political systems was infinitely wider than previously imagined, extending from the simplest of hunting bands to what some writers have termed empires. (1) Our concern here is to examine the factors which brought different societies into contact, how the process of incorporation gained momentum, was interrupted, reversed or redirected by an interval of colonial rule, before being resumed in the new atmosphere and situation of independence.

#### The Perception of Space in Traditional African Society

Bohannan has described the African view of space to be '...based on the regulation of social relationships.' Of the Tiv of Nigeria he says 'The idiom of descent and genealogy provides not only the basis for lineage grouping, but also for territorial grouping ...the Tiv map is constantly changing both in reference to itself and in its correlation with the earth.'(2) Soja (3) has described this as a 'genealogical map' changing in response to altered situations — a functional region. There may have been relatively permanent nodal points, such as wells or shrines, but in general there was 'a social definition to territory rather than a territorial definition of society.'

At the simplest level there was little true ownership of land. There were rights to the use of land, but not to its absolute ownership as a form of real estate. With a limited supply of manpower and a low level of technology, only a very limited amount of cultivation could be undertaken, and among the majority of peoples there was no shortage of cultivable land, and therefore no great value ascribed to land. In acephalous societies, the community assumed the right to the use of the area immediate to the village for cultivation and burial. Among the Bemba of Zambia and the Gonja of Ghana, rights to land hardly existed, neither individuals nor kin groups bothering to lay claim to large areas, since land was virtually a free good. (4) A low level of population density coupled with poor soil fertility and shifting cultivation made ownership of land more or less pointless. Few restrictions on the use of land encouraged mobility, contact and incorporation. In more centralized societies the distribution or allotment of land was in the power of the chief, it being his decision as to who should cultivate what land, and where homes and villages should be located.

In some cases the chief was able to demand the unpaid agricultural labour of his subjects for his own personal ends, but in such a system the value lay in the ability to coerce or in the ownership of slaves, not in the ownership of land. Chiefship was the political control of people, not of territory. (5) In Hausaland there was an administrative system known as *bin kanu* or following heads, by which rulers continued their control over nomadic peoples. (6) As Gluckman has pointed out, before the arrival of long distance trade and technological innovation in terms of the production and storage of food, the standard of living of a chief was not a great deal higher than that of his subjects. To this he ascribes the failure, or perhaps disinterest, in the pre-colonial extension of political power. There was little to be gained from it, 'one man can only eat so much porridge.' (7) One is tempted to wonder whether the glorification of obesity among some peoples was an attempt to find a visual expression of social stratification. As long distance trade developed much of it was

channeled through the state machinery, with the chief controlling trading privileges and rights of passage, and in areas where the state did not directly undertake to trade income was raised for the state by market taxes, customs dues and transport charges. In the political control over people, therefore, a sphere of influence was of far greater value, extending as it might over long distances: <sup>the</sup> power of a chief extending in theory as far as his most far-flung subject, although not necessarily encompassing the territory between.

States invariably contained several ethnic communities, owing allegiance to the chief, but having a degree of local autonomy, which might overlap into adjacent states without causing conflict between the two state cores. Paden (8) has noted that in the pre-colonial city-state of Kano a complex system developed to accommodate a variety of communal identities. Despite the assertions of many independent African governments, in only a very few cases, such as Bornu or Rwanda, were special place-names used to identify the land in which the polity was concentrated.

Rarely do African societies seem to have conceived of territorial boundaries in a physical sense as a European might, but rather conceived of a fading effect of control of people with distance. Neither is the European concept of a buffer zone applicable in most cases. A more useful method of description might be a scale of the percentage of the population owing allegiance to the state being at its highest at the state core, and its lowest at the core of the neighbouring state. In most cases, rather than actual physical boundaries there was an area of interaction. This scale can obviously be paralleled by one measuring the decreasing effectiveness of administration over distance. Of course this is not to say that physical features never formed barriers between peoples. Obviously in some cases they did, and in areas of low population densities there would be an unoccupied no-mans-land between the two states. Where population levels were high, customary law usually provided for joint consultation before any necessary demarcation. (9)

Human Diversity in Traditional African Society

A cursory look at the literature on pre-colonial Africa will reveal, therefore, not a pattern of completely separate self-contained societies, but a dynamic situation of economic and therefore cultural and political contact and interchange, happening at varying rates dependent on a variety of factors. At the simplest level, a diversity of environment produced a diversity of economic systems and specializations, and therefore the basis for inter-group trade for which a favourable social atmosphere and occasion, such as a market, had to be initiated. As this voluntary, functional inter-dependence developed, groups had to devise means of ensuring the continuance of mutually beneficial intergroup relations - a situation of trust, making continued specialization permissible. As Cohen and Middleton have noted among many African peoples, a very marked degree of specialization endured until eventually eroded by the introduction of a system of universal education. (10)

Several types of association on a gradient of degree of centralization have been identified in pre-colonial Africa. (11) Intermittent associations across cultural boundaries by either groups or individuals was common among decentralized or acephalous societies. Links were forged by such means as inter-marriage or blood brotherhood, but without any political centralization any closer association was impossible. Small numbers of people could be incorporated by such devices as genealogical fictions, as among the Nuer, but if a decentralized society was subjected to increasing outside pressure the tendency was towards tacit withdrawal, and until the coming of European administration such intermittent associations were the only means by which private trade between distant communities could be established.

A symbiotic relationship, involving societies as a whole, developed as a result of marked differences in ecological conditions or geographical mobility and characterised the relations between sedentary and nomadic groups, such as between the Hausa and the Fulani. Such relationships,

although complementary, were often unequal and involved a degree of tension. A variety of forms of closer association such as the Ashanti Union involved some degree of joint decision making. Such federations arose as a response to a common external threat, or were directed towards peaceful coexistence. At the extreme end of the scale there are examples such as the Lozi, where assimilation had progressed to the need for only a single body of law. (12)

The process of incorporation of minority groups was not however always of a voluntary nature. Environmental factors such as drought, famine, pressure of population as well as invasion and war, brought societies into involuntary contact, and whereas most types of pre-colonial African society seem to have been able to accommodate a certain degree of cultural change, once the 'transaction flow' (13) increased or the numbers of newcomers rose above a certain level, their ability to cope with the situation depended much on their political organization. Generally the more centralized the society, in terms of a single ruler, office holders, and some kind of institutionalized administration, however simple, the better the chance of accommodation with neighbours. Weaker, less organized societies, tended to be subjected, with the invaders becoming the rulers of a society whose resultant culture might include features from both groups. The invaders were not necessarily in the majority. A minority group was sometimes able to conquer the majority by superior military strength and organization, and then change its own cultural practices, for example the Fulani over the Hausa or the Tutsi over the Hutu.

One important effect of this involuntary contact was the introduction of social stratification. A ruling caste might be forced upon a decentralized society which had previously had a high level of social equality, in which leadership was the preserve of the more able, rather than the absolute right of a small minority. However, a stratified society provided more opportunities for further incorporation than did a simple acephalous society; there were subordinate positions available to newcomers. South African warrior groups incorporated subject populations by appointing relatives as local province chiefs. The Swazi attempted national integration by organizing subject peoples into age groups that disregarded local kinship ties, and by the device of diplomatic marriage, wives being selected by chiefs from among many subject groups. (14) In many societies the laws of exogamy forced the seeking of wives from outside the clan.

Cohen and Middleton have stressed the importance of common values between groups. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa status was attached to the ownership of cattle by the cattle-owning and the non-cattle-owning alike. (15) Similarly, value was widely ascribed to strong leadership and ritual effectiveness such as rainmaking, and the invitation to rule by one group to another was by no means uncommon. The existence of such common values facilitated eventual integration, although initial contact between groups may have been violent.

In many ways attitudes to cultural change seem to have been essentially pragmatic, with little of the emotional overtones common to the European experience. There was, for example, a high degree of flexibility regarding language. The imposition of the language of the conquerors on their subjects, as in the case of the imposition of Sotho on the Lozi, was not universal. It was far more likely that the children of conqueror fathers would be taught the language of their subject mothers. There is some evidence to suggest a certain amount of multi-lingualism in pre-colonial Africa. (16)

#### Trade, Technological Change and External Influences

It must be remembered that Africa was involved in a vast network of long-distance trade long before the colonial era. While this trade depended on long term peace between groups it was certainly facilitated by the presence of rulers and very much encouraged the growth of more centralized societies. Profitable trade seems to have been definitely linked with political centralization and incorporation. With their involvement in international trade, the Hausa began to develop a considerable influence through the increasing activity of their traders and the consequent spread of their language and culture. Political control of trade routes facilitated trade which in turn began to finance the machinery of the state.

This was very much the case at the beginning of the slave trade. Organization, and therefore centralization, was required either to participate in the trade or to protect the group against its ravishes. The establishment of an organized slave trade in the immediate pre-colonial period affected the process of incorporation in a variety of ways. For those people unable to organize their own defence, or unprepared to participate in a client-overlord relationship, withdrawal or decimation were the only alternatives. In a later chapter we shall see how an increase in the demand for slaves in the Sudan reversed the former peaceful process of incorporation. The more centralized societies co-operated to exploit the possibilities of slavery, and as a result, with the sophisticated arms the trade made available, were able to bring smaller, weaker peoples under their control.

One of the most important aspects of the slave trade was that it facilitated the growth of states, state machinery and, in some cases, empires, by making available to some societies a kind of wealth previously unimagined. For much of sub-Saharan Africa, economies were based on an agricultural system which lacked the wheel, the plough, significant water control, had only limited manpower, and was not therefore capable of the production of real wealth. Profits from the slave trade enabled the importation of new technology. Among the societies of the Sahel, slaves were exchanged for horses, with a resultant mobility enabling not only further development of the trade, but the extension of administration, the collection of taxes and tribute on a scale never before possible, and therefore the extension and consolidation of power.

Similarly, the introduction of firearms to the peoples of the coast facilitated the growth of states, and of course also their destruction. Such technological innovations were not available to all societies. The utility of the horse extended only as far as the tsetse-free areas, and was therefore confined to the grassland areas. The gun arrived via the sea-borne trade, and some states such as Ashanti and Dahomey restricted its passage through their territories so as to prevent its use upon themselves.

During the pre-colonial period, some traditional African societies were subject to outside influences. As has already been noted, trade in both goods and slaves modified the organization of these societies and therefore their attitudes and procedures for dealing with human diversity. Perhaps the most significant influence in this period was the coming of Islam. On the East African coast, Arabs came initially to trade guns and cloth for ivory and slaves and by these innovations altered the balance of power between the existing African communities. Among the more centralised societies, trade was carried out by negotiation, but among the nomadic acephalous peoples disinterested in trade considerable force was employed. By 1847 Arabs were assisting in the expansion of Buganda, by the supplying of firearms.(17) The Arab presence was initially diffuse, their numbers never exceeding a few hundred, but their influence was extensive as they involved themselves in local politics, accepting office and intermarrying. Their religious influence was essentially selective, conversions being largely confined to the ruling elite, as to convert the masses would have prohibited their enslavement. However, large-scale conversions did take place until countered by the arrival of Christian missionaries. The establishment of the British Protectorate of Uganda destroyed the political power of Islam, but it remained as a permanent legacy to unite or divide traditional African societies.

In West Africa the influence of Islam was very much more extensive and introduced into the pattern of acephalous and centralized societies a further variety, the theocratic. This was a type of society which divided believers and non-believers into distinct religious and political collectivities, where the non-believers were politically excluded and subordinate to the community of the faithful. In addition, adherence to Islam prescribed the organization of believers into a political community in the form of a state with a ruler and a hierarchy of officials, whose legitimacy was based on religion. Therefore in one respect Islam was divisive, but in another incorporative in that religious belief became more important than local kinship ties.

As in all theocracies, the very religion which formed the basis of the state's legitimacy was an abundant source of grounds for conflict. The initial influence of Muslim traders spread the sense of brotherhood in Islam, which coupled with the mobilizing powers of *jihad* resulted in the West African Islamic revolution of the eighteenth century, by which time Islam had ceased to be the religion of courts and kings, a mere public facade, and become the religion of the ordinary man, and in particular that of the nomadic Fulani. The accumulated grievances of the Fulani against the ruling Hausa, coupled with their mobility, transformed what had begun as a movement for reform into a revolt. The Fulani spread the ideology of Islam and the machinery of the theocratic state over much of the savannah zone, reaching as far as Adamawa in the south-east, and the very borders of Oyo to the south. (18) Whether Islam would eventually have unified such a large area is hard to tell. By the late 1880's administrative supervision of the far flung emirates was beginning to be under strain, and the whole basis of the economy, the trans-Saharan trade, was about to be superceded by maritime trade. However, as we shall see in the case of Northern Sudan, the incorporative potential of Islam over large geographical areas and great diversity of peoples was considerable. Throughout pre-colonial Africa, traditional societies had evolved new political organizations to meet the new situations and increasing outside influences and stimuli. The kingdoms of Ashanti and Dahomey, the Oil River States, and the Fante Confederation were all, in different ways, intelligent responses to changing circumstances.

From this necessarily brief examination we can appreciate that in pre-colonial Africa, political development was by no means static. A variety of different factors - environment, location, common values, trade (both domestic and international), technological innovation and outside influences of all kinds assisted the process of incorporation and accommodation of many different ethnic groups at varying rates and with varying outcomes, resulting in a wide range of political systems. While some societies may have disappeared through decimation or complete assimilation, others were developing in terms of both size and complexity into nations, with the submergence of some social and cultural differences to the common good.

### The Colonial Framework

The essentially fluid nature of traditional African society was to be transformed by colonial rule and the imposition of the European concept of spatial organization, with its insistence on the formal definition of space and the elimination of any vacuum. As we have seen in chapter I, this concept demanded not only the rigid formal division of territory, but also recognition of the principle of sovereignty. European attitudes towards the capabilities of the indigenous inhabitants did not necessitate introducing the complication of recognising the right to self-determination.

A quick glance at the political map of Africa will illustrate the effects of this policy. The total land area had to be divided and allotted, regardless of value. Given the limitations of European knowledge of either the physical or the human landscape, geometrically determined boundaries predominated. (19) Where a suitable 'natural' boundary was known to exist, it was seized upon and considered as adding legitimacy to the process. The division of the continent was a process carried out ultimately by negotiation between European powers, to their own ends, and with little reference to the wishes of the inhabitants. In many cases boundaries depended on the location of certain known and valued resources, such as coastal access, rivers, fertile areas and lines of communication. Away from such 'resources' much less attention was given to delimitation.

The claims to territory made by the imperial powers rested either on treaty or conquest: treaty where there was little resistance, conquest where there was. Through the making of treaties, African leaders often participated in the allocation of territories and the making of boundaries, but such participation was often the lesser of two evils. As Allott has noted, it was nothing new for an indigenous ruler to place his community under the jurisdiction of a more powerful neighbour. (20) However, the question of the legitimacy of such treaties rests on whether local chiefs had the right to enter into contracts over land, and whether, given the divergence of attitudes to space between Europeans and Africans, there was not a fundamental misunderstanding over the ownership and use of land. Europeans assumed they were

purchasing permanent ownership of land when traditional African leaders believed they had only granted temporary privileges.'(21) Traditional African spatial organization limited the usefulness of such treaties. In the negotiations between Britain and Portugal over the border between Angola and Northern Rhodesia, agreement had been reached to use the western boundary of the Barotse Kingdom. When this proved impossible to determine, lines of longitude and latitude had to be used. (22) When efforts were made to take notice of ethnic considerations, lack of local knowledge and the undefined nature of traditional spatial organization limited their effectiveness. The basing of European claims to territory on treaty was further complicated by the fact that many treaties had been made by individuals, or chartered companies, rather than by governments. It was the insistence of the participants at the Berlin Conference of 1884 that effective occupation was to be a condition for recognition of annexation that first put many of these treaties to the test, and started the race away from the coastal footholds towards the interior, to ensure control of resources and lines of communication. The boundaries drawn by the imperial powers presented them with few problems, in that export production at minimum cost was their main interest.

In the early colonial period, the boundaries drawn between European possessions created little difficulty for the local population. Only a very small part of such boundaries could be said to be in any sense 'administered', and it was not until relatively late in the colonial period that administration made the lines drawn on a map in Europe into impermeable barriers. Consequently, in many border areas social interaction continued without any real disturbance. However, the drawing of lines within each large territorial possession was to have, in many cases, very far-reaching effects on social interaction and attitudes to human diversity, particularly where boundaries, drawn merely for administrative convenience, were subsequently to become state boundaries.

### Internal Boundaries and Compartmentalization

Boundaries within a territory were, of course, very much less stable than those arrived at by international agreement. They were frequently changed or adjusted in the light of experience and increasing knowledge, but usually at the request and convenience of administrators. Touval has recounted the numerous changes concerning the territory eventually to become Upper Volta.(23) The rate of metropolitan technological change during the colonial period affected the ascribed value to certain resources and therefore territories, and boundaries were changed. There was a general tendency to try to foresee the future and arrange Africa accordingly. Some of these arrangements depended on grandiose schemes, such as the Cape to Cairo railway, which were in fact never to reach completion. In subsequent chapters an examination of the British government's indecision over the future of Southern Sudan will explore the subject more thoroughly.

It was local administrative boundaries which were to prove the most disruptive. The European system of spatial organization was based essentially on order; what the colonialists found in Africa seemed to them to be chaos. So, true to form, they laid down a framework of administrative units. As the prevailing system of administration was necessarily 'indirect' - that is dependent on the surrender of some degree of responsibility to local leaders - the framework reflected the colonialist's ideas of the traditional political pattern. However their knowledge of this pattern was sketchy to say the least, and a great deal has been written about the problems experienced in identifying a legitimate authority and deciding on the physical extent of their powers. (24) These problems do not concern us here. What does is the effect of this policy on the economic and human landscape. Because of the European's lack of knowledge, associated with a need for 'order', the formal region replaced the functional region. As the boundaries of the formal region came to be administered, the traditional interaction and incorporation between societies was dislocated or reversed.

The drawing of local boundaries took little account of African attitudes to land, and caused much enmity and misunderstanding; the African being accustomed to 'rights to use' and a degree of mobility; the European to 'ownership' and therefore permanence. The practice of shifting cultivation added further complications, with boundaries being drawn in areas which the European considered unoccupied, whereas in fact they were lying fallow. Land which might appear unoccupied often formed a tacit buffer zone between two peoples with a history of enmity. Neither were the migratory patterns of pastoralists fully understood. Morgan, in a study on Kenya, has shown how land, traditionally the grazing grounds of the Masai, was allocated in their temporary absence to other peoples.(25) In the case of Kenya there was the added problem of European settlement which was undertaken with little knowledge of local population/land relationships, and what amounted to a determination to remain unaware.

A lack of understanding of the system of land use not only replaced human interaction with tension, but also upset the economy and had, in some cases, far reaching effects on the environment. Middleton and Greenland have discussed the effects of the imposition of European 'order' among the Lugbara of West Nile in Uganda. (26) A high degree of individual mobility had previously meant that there was sufficient land available, of three required kinds - under cultivation, fallow and pasture - to enable the economy to operate. There were no stable boundaries between clans and lineages, the entire society being in a permanent state of territorial adjustment. The colonial administrators fixed boundaries between clans and villages and created chiefs in an effort to stabilize what was a fluid system of social organization. In consequence there was an ever-increasing disparity between the distribution of population and the carrying capacity of the land, with the population density of one village being very much higher than that of a neighbouring village. The period of fallowing had to be severely curtailed in some areas; there was a shortage of grazing, and eventually considerable soil erosion. Land scarcity led to a high rate of labour migration, which seriously threatened the smooth functioning of social organization.

The Concept of the Tribe and Indirect Rule

With the coming of colonialism, for probably the first time over much of Africa, the inhabitants came to adopt a definite 'tribal' identity associated with a precisely defined area. The manner in which this 'tribal' identity was produced by administrators has been demonstrated by Turner in the case of the former Belgian Congo. (27) He explains how the inhabitants of the Congo, the majority of whom spoke similar languages and lived under similar political systems, were separated more by geography than social difference and, with an underlying cultural unity, the result of frequent contact, came to be seen by Belgian administrators as forming 250 different peoples and exhibiting a unique ethnic diversity.(28) Early attempts at ethnographic study, such as that among the Kongo of Van Wing '...contaminated the oral history and aroused ...a sense of Kongo unity ' (29) and produced among administrators a dependence on 'tribal' stereotypes. Ethnic ambiguities were commonplace. A lingua franca among peoples trading on the River Congo was mistakenly thought to be 'Balanga', and so this ethnic category was wrongly ascribed. 'The Balanga identity is 'artificial' in the sense that it had no pre-colonial basis, but most Congolese identities seem 'artificial' to some extent because they have undergone substantial modification since the coming of the Europeans, Some of the European labels stress unity, others stress separateness.' (30)

Administrators favoured some 'tribes' above others; that is, they found them more amenable, better suited to the colonial system, and so supported their leaders and extended their territory and influence - a policy which was occasionally to back-fire as in the case of the Luba who became strong enough to revolt against Belgian rule. (31) The phenomenon of ascribing certain talents to certain 'tribes' was found all over colonial Africa, and resulted in various peoples considering membership of certain trades and professions as a 'tribal' preserve. The division of Africa has often been criticised for not taking account of the human landscape. If the lack of knowledge was generally such as described in the case of the Congo, as seems likely, the employment of straight lines might have been ultimately less destructive than the building of elaborate ethnic fictions.

This 'compartmentalization' of peoples into 'tribes' with 'tribal homelands' was essential to the colonial system of administration. After much discussion as to the merits and demerits of the British and French administrative theories, it has generally been admitted that in practice the differences were not great. (32) In practice the method of administration was largely a response to local conditions and financial constraints. Over much of Africa, administrators were very thin on the ground. One man might be given control of a vast area. His budget would not allow for European assistance, so it was essential that he operate through traditional political authorities, and if they did not exist then he had to create them. The expedience of delegating authority and responsibility may be dignified by the name of 'indirect rule' or 'association', but it was essentially a pragmatic response to local conditions.

However, if there was little practical difference between French and British systems of administration, there was a discernible difference in psychological attitudes to indigenous authorities. The French administrator, often the product of a military training, brought with him a French desire for uniformity, a dislike of the concept of monarchy, and a reluctance to relinquish a control gained by conquest. Although he may have used traditional African forms of organization to facilitate government, he saw them only as a convenience. It was not his wish merely to modify them for his own purposes, but to work towards their eventual replacement. There lingered on a desire, with the concept of the colonies as a part of France, not only to introduce French culture, but actually to create Frenchmen.

To the British, the role of the administrator, in his relationship with traditional leaders, was to act as an adviser who, as long as nothing happened to offend British morality or interests, should interfere as little as possible. The British also believed that their occupation would undoubtedly benefit the African, but not at the French level of conviction, and with no real intention of imparting their whole culture, or offering the ultimate goal of citizenship, political opportunity or equal status. Continued emphasis on the 'native authorities', rather than the educated elite, was to create a tension between the traditional and modern sectors that was to continue into the era of independence.

On balance the attitudes of the French seemed more likely to contribute towards the formation of a unified state, while the British attitude, like the Belgian, by limiting interaction, definitely contributed to the development of cultural sub-nationalism. Problems associated with this development seem to have dogged the subsequent political life in the former British territories to a much greater extent than in the former French possessions.

#### Colonial Administration and the Growth of Cultural Sub-Nationalism

The factors contributing to the growth of inter-group tension and subsequent cultural sub-nationalism were mainly the result of colonial policies. In order to operate a system of indirect rule, centralized local political authorities had to be created in areas where they had not previously existed. In Uganda, the appointment of the favoured Baganda as British 'agents' in this respect resulted in an inevitable resentment among the governed and an over-emphasis on their own importance among the Baganda. (33) The desired coincidence of ethnic group and administrative unit, together with the bureaucratic style of administration, provided an institutional expression for cultural distinctiveness. British support for traditional leaders increased their power by supplanting the traditional checks and balances on their behaviour, and so removing threats to group unity. The success of some stable and centralized societies, in finding the favour of the British and in gaining some control of their own affairs, encouraged other peoples to work towards a similar unity, despite the lack of such a tradition, in the hope of similar treatment.

The importance given to the maintenance of law and order between 'tribes' led to their separation, physically, administratively and legally, so that the legitimacy of local feeling was intensified and peaceful interaction between groups effectively proscribed. Where social development was thought to endanger law and order it was kept at a minimum, as with the Karamoja in north-east Uganda. (34) The keeping of peace was often the administrator's

most crucial role - without peace there could be no production - but it would be a mistake to think of inter-group hostility as something commonly prevailing in the pre-colonial period, controlled during imperial rule, only to re-emerge on independence. In fact most of the ethnic identities, and thus most of the ethnic antagonisms, have arisen or undergone substantial modification during the colonial era. (35)

#### Cultural Change: Religion, Education and Language

The effects of these three factors on the traditional human landscape of Africa cannot usefully be separated. Over most of the continent, responsibility for imparting European culture to the African was entrusted initially to the Christian missionary. Christian principles had been employed in the rationale behind the conquest and occupation of Africa, and having 'been in at the start' the various missionary societies would not be denied the opportunity to save souls and civilize. The colonial administration was quick to realize the advantages and the accompanying saving of money. Consequently, in many areas, permission to operate within a territory depended on the founding of schools. If several different missions offered their services, the administration, true to form, divided them on the territorial principle, allotting each group a 'sphere of influence.' The attitudes of the missionary towards the African had much in common with that of the administrator: they were, after all, products of the same cultural system. As a result we see them bringing to bear very similar concepts: the production of ethnic fictions, (36) 'tribal stereotypes', good natives and bad natives. Their religious teaching reinforced the demands of the administration, by introducing a moral compulsion to the need for law and order and the merits of increased production.

In the French and Belgian territories the spread of Christianity had some unifying effect, in that most missionaries were Roman Catholic. In British territories the religious tolerance and diversity of the metropole had to be mirrored, so that a difference between peoples arose, not only in terms of their traditional culture, but also in terms of their imposed culture.

A disruption of the language pattern was a further result of the arrival of the missionaries. To enter the modern sector some western education was essential; this meant not only the acceptance of Christianity, but also often the adoption of new languages. Mastery of English constituted not merely a status symbol, but evidence of mastery over a whole range of skills wherein, in some way, the colonialists' power and prestige was held to reside; it was therefore a mark of social stratification. (37) For the most part the mission decided on the lingua franca of local education, and a child often had to master a new vernacular to benefit from primary school. Considerable tension arose over the employment of one local language rather than another. Part of the resentment in Uganda towards the Baganda agents of the British was the spread of Luganda at the expense of other vernaculars. The support of some nationalist parties in East Africa for the widespread adoption of Swahili was not so much a regard for its worth as a means of communication as a reaction against the importance given to some local languages by missionaries and subsequently the colonial administration. It might be thought that the imposition of one language throughout a territory, such as French or English, would have had valuable unifying effects. However, as mastery of the language of administration was not universal, but rather confined to the more favoured areas, it became yet another expression of resentment at the inequalities of colonial rule.

The missionary societies spread the Christian religion and therefore education, unevenly. As we have already noted they had their own 'tribal' stereotypes influencing location, but in addition the demands of indirect rule had to be accommodated, with no disruptive influence being allowed into Muslim areas. The results of this policy will be expanded in the case of the Sudan. The effect was to localize modernity. Many conflicts which appeared to have a religious context were in fact more a conflict between modernity and tradition, expressed through religion.

As might be expected, education was more readily available near the capital city and among the more 'receptive tribes'. Kasfir has noted the over-representation of the Baganda in the secondary school and university system in Uganda. Of the 1698 persons who entered Makerere University College, the only university in East Africa before 1954, 40% were Baganda. Educated Baganda demanded education for their children, so that built into the early provision of education to Baganda was a demand for its continuance (38)- a demand met at the expense of the rest of the country. Once an imbalance had been established it showed a tendency to increase. Twaddle has noted that the early establishment of education among the Baganda led to their being trained as teachers and employed in non-Baganda areas, with the expected resentment of other groups. (39)

The demands of indirect rule often decided, not only the location of the school, but also the scholars. Administrators encouraged school attendance among the legitimate heirs of 'tribal chiefs'. They were to be trained, not for the future, but to better maintain the past. For the other pupils, the education also reflected the needs of the administration rather than the community. Schools became islands of academic theory in a sea of agricultural practice. They were designed to produce clerks rather than better farmers. In areas where education provision was minimal, the first few who went to school became, regardless of 'tribe', the ultimate in age-sets. They were as distinct from their home community as are now men who have been to the moon. However, this elite could not act as a corporate modernizing force, because the colonial administration had decreed that political expression must be local, must reflect administrative units, must in the final analysis be 'tribal'. When the educated elite sought employment in the towns they found themselves with two jobs rather than one. They may see themselves as civil servants within an elite corps; but their family, their kin, their 'tribe' saw them also as their representatives, the guardians of their rights and aspirations.

As the manpower requirements of the administration increased, the favoured products of the educational system had to be employed outside their home areas, and were sent to assist in the administration of the less fortunate. In Nigeria in 1947 there were 538,000 primary school pupils in the south, compared with only 71,000 in the more populous north. Sklar has noted the effect of the transfer of thousands of southern clerks and artisans to the cities of the north. (40)

#### Economic Development and Employment

Inequalities in education were compounded by uneven economic development. The resentment over education was paralleled by that felt by the migrant worker, from a disadvantaged area, on arrival in the capital city. Again, distance from the capital was sufficient to provide a rough indicator of the degree of modernity. In the simplest terms, the existence of the city, the demands of the inhabitants, the development of regular markets, all stimulated production and consumption in the surrounding countryside, and encouraged the farmer to enter the money economy. The existence of optimum conditions for the cultivation of cash crops and associated markets was another advantage open to some but not all. Profits could be substantial and permit the purchase of more land, investment in trade and the education of children. Western education meant a greater chance of employment in the infant industrial sector, and mastery of French or English could result in domestic employment by European administrators or settlers, and the adoption of their values. Proximity to the capital city meant greater provision of secondary schools, hospitals and social services. In most territories the dominance of the capital was absolute. Only in the Congo was there multi-polar development. When the growth of the capital city or area of resource exploitation exhausted the supply of local labour, opportunities for migrant workers developed. The obvious comparisons with

their home areas and the fact that in the city they inevitably formed the lowest social strata, increased their resentment. Their migration rarely benefitted their already disadvantaged area, meaning as it did the removal of much of the effective labour force from the agricultural sector. Low wages and an increased cost of living in the cities left insufficient to be remitted to effect any real change. Their labour benefitted mainly either the European, the Asian or the emergent local African entrepreneurial class.

From this brief look at colonial Africa we can see how the three agents for change - the administration, the churches and economic development - combined to compartmentalize the African, to force him into a territorial and ethnic framework, substantially<sup>to</sup> create the concept of the 'tribe'. Having done this, all three proceeded<sup>e</sup> to deal unfairly and inequitably with their creation and produced a deep-felt resentment, not only to their rule, but also to those very few who had benefitted from it. As the British, the Belgians and, to a lesser extent, the French, could not conceive of Africans in central government, when pressure began to be exerted for some kind of African participation it was directed towards local government. As a result, power was shifted from traditional rulers to democratically elected representatives without eliminating the ethnic basis of their power. In much of the subsequent political development, the district rather than the 'nation' was to be the organizing focus. In the last part of this chapter we shall see the inevitable beginnings of cultural sub-nationalism, the efforts of the departing imperial powers to minimize its effects through constitutional safeguards, and its destructive re-emergence in independent Africa. The macro-political framework which the imperial powers bequeathed to Africa was the only one they knew - the nation state. Since their 'scramble' to leave Africa they have attribut<sup>e</sup>ed its mal-function to the inability, inexperience or self-interest of their successors rather than to the human landscape which they, perhaps unwittingly, created.

## Decolonization

The alteration in the world balance of power after World War II brought the principle of self-determination once more to the fore in world political thinking, and for the first time it began to affect future developments in Africa. The increased power and position in the world community of anti-colonialists such as America and Russia, stimulated demands for the implementation of the principle and the dissolution of empires. France, Belgium and to a lesser extent Britain found themselves in a very much weakened position, dependent to some extent on America, and the colonial possessions, once their pride and joy, a considerable source of embarrassment. The African elites, their horizons broadened by education, travel, involvement in the war and the associated supportive economic development, were becoming aware of the independence achievements of the Asians, and of the recognition of the validity of their demands for self-determination in such documents as the Atlantic Charter. New international forums, such as the United Nations, presented opportunities to both anti-colonialists and colonial nationalists to air their views and, with the rising importance of the Arab-Asian group and the beginning of the cold war, world opinion gained increasing importance. As a result, the necessary conditions for a move towards decolonization came to exist: demands for change in both the colony and the metropole.

Post-war changes on the continent of Africa encouraged nationalist parties and hastened the process. Unlike the situation after World War I, 'enemy territories' were not parcelled out to victorious colonial powers, but either granted independence, as in the case of Libya, or attached to independent states (such as Eritrea to Ethiopia) after some consideration of the best interests of the community. Political advancement in one territory tended to engender similar desires in adjoining territories. Once the process had begun the 'preparedness' of the country scarcely affected the issue, as the Belgians were to discover in the Congo. 'The self-confidence of nationalism grew with its success. When mass parties in 'pacesetter' states succeeded in capturing the peoples imagination, leaders elsewhere shared vicariously in the exhilaration.' (41)

As the nationalist movements gathered strength they realized the advantages of forcing the colonial powers to apply their European values to the issue. Much of Europe had been involved in a war in the defence of democracy, and democracy implied that self-government could not be refused in Africa. The use of the principles of equality, political freedom and majority rule made legitimate the claims of the nationalist leadership, and the transplantation of democracy by the colonial powers permitted '...departure with honour..' (42) and satisfied world opinion. However, the willingness of the colonial powers to give up their possessions should not be overstated. Although they appeared willing to bow to world opinion and relinquish direct control, they continued to envisage their former territories as extensions of their influence. France, Britain and, to a lesser extent, Belgium through organizations such as the Commonwealth and the French Community, envisaged their future role as one of directing, if not actually controlling.(43) Having as yet failed to appreciate how limited their strategic role would be in the post-war community, and over-emphasizing the cold-war situation, they wished Africa to be considered as part of the Western defence system. Their thinking in respect of continuing direction was perfectly correct. They realized much better than did the nationalists that the economies of their former possessions were so closely linked to the metropole that the achievement of political independence would, in only a few extreme cases such as Guinea, materially affect the relationship.

Having been, to some extent, forced to relinquish control of Africa, the colonial powers sought once again to adjust its spatial organization. Both the French and the British, after half a century of dividing and compartmentalizing Africa, discovered the need to create viable units and embarked on the formation of large-scale federations. The majority were a failure, for a multiplicity of reasons, not here our immediate concern except in one major respect. The nationalist leaders, having fought for control of a territory, were not prepared to relinquish any hard-won political power to a federal system, which may have some advantages but which they saw as a means for the continuance of metropolitan influence.

Nationalist leaders, as we shall see later in regard to attitudes to post-independence boundaries, accepted fully the Western model of the nation state, allied with the concept of sovereignty.

The conflict arose between the concept of the nation state and the spatial pattern imposed by colonial rule. The localization of African political and governmental participation had resulted in the administrative district and the tribe becoming the power base for the majority of nationalist leaders. Although the fight for independence had been a cohesive force, as soon as independence seemed imminent local issues resumed importance. Uganda provides a case in point. 'All the (District Councils) made it plain that they are bent upon reaching the status of a native state. Their object is to achieve a constitution as like that of Buganda as possible. In short they aim at Home Rule.....Moreover, it seems to them that this is the logical development of past administrative policy. Clan barriers have been broken down, sections have been amalgamated, a tribal organization has been created and a tribal loyalty has been developed.' (44) The greatest problem was in those areas where indirect rule had been most successful, and where neo-traditional ruling groups, such as the Northern People's Congress in Northern Nigeria, and the Kabaka Yekka in Buganda, had added electoral support to historical legitimacy. The greater centralization of French administration and social mobility of elites produced nationalist and anti-colonial movements which tended to transcend administrative boundaries. In the Belgian Congo the severe repression of political activity had resulted in the formation of cultural organisations, such as ABAKO, the Association for the Maintenance, the Unity and the Expansion of the Kikongo Language, which in time became political parties with inevitable tribal associations. Throughout much of Africa 'nationalist' parties developed as coalitions of district political notables, rather than as centralised national organizations. The district became the constituency for the return of elected representatives and therefore, by necessity, the natural unit of party organization. In the Uganda election of 1961, of a total of 185 African candidates, only nine were born outside their constituencies. (45) In some territories, such as Oubangui-Chari, there was also much European interference to prevent the development of larger-scale organizations of an unacceptable complexion. (46)

As independence approached, cultural sub-nationalism intensified. Without the imposed order of the colonial governments, the more favoured tribes sought ways to institutionalize their advantages, and the weak minority tribes feared subjection and an erosion of their rights. The strong invariably favoured the institutionalization of their dominance or advocated secession, as in the case of the Baganda or the Barotse. The weak tended to band together into coalitions which were in effect more 'national' but were based on a fear of dominance rather than on any concrete policy.

A multitude of 'native states' could not possibly have survived in the modern world, and the colonial powers, especially the British, were faced with the problem of creating unitary states or workable federations from diverse units of their own manufacture. Their solutions to the problem were embodied in the various constitutional arrangements they devised. Ideally they would have preferred to establish unitary structures, as in Ghana, but in many cases some kind of federal structure was evolved, as in Libya, Uganda and Nigeria, in an effort to provide a democratic system. The atmosphere tended to be one of mutual suspicion with the federal authority lacking sufficient power to control the member states, or with too great an identification between the federal authority and the dominant ethnic group. In the majority of cases, instead of satisfying the demands of sub-nationalism, the extremely complex political systems tended to exacerbate them. By awarding legitimacy to ethnic demands no coherent national policy could be formulated, and in the majority of these federal arrangements the politicians and their parties were very quickly to lose credibility in the independence era.

Fear and resentment was inevitable, but it must be remembered that for resentment to become cultural sub-nationalism - a reaction against human diversity - some contact with the modern world was necessary. There had to be people who understood the role of organizers and publicists. There had to be supporters who had entered the money economy and could provide some financial backing, as well as those who could negotiate with the central government. This may partly explain the involvement of certain disadvantaged groups, and the non-involvement of the completely neglected.

### Independence and Spatial Organization

Despite some fears to the contrary the concept of spatial organization imposed by the colonial powers - that is the nation state - was to endure into the independence era. The nationalist leaders had fought for control of just those territorial units, however arbitrary or superimposed their boundaries. They were to form successor governments. As they succeeded to the power, so they succeeded to the delimitation of that power. As individuals they had formed their power bases in terms of colonial administrative boundaries and tribal fictions, and so these relics of colonial administration had to be taken into the independence era. The formal regions mapped out during the scramble for Africa had become, at least in the political field, functional regions. Everything that was modern - the administration, the money economy, transport, education, as well as the political organization - post-dated the majority of state boundaries. The African had gained control of twentieth century Africa. It was soon to become evident that however much governments might glorify the idea of the traditional African society, there was to be no going back.

Although much was written about the inherent dangers of upgrading the lines on the colonialists map to the status of international boundaries, their conflict potential has so far been low. There have been exceptions. In the past decade Morocco has advanced territorial claims to large areas of Algeria, the former Western Sahara, Mauritania and Mali. These claims have been supported by the contention that the sovereignty of the Moroccan Kingdom extended to the Senegal River, before the disruption of the nineteenth century Sherifian Empire by the French and the Spanish, (47) and that people in these areas still consider themselves subjects of the Sultan and members of the Muslim community. A policy was adopted soon after independence, as part of a compromise between the King and various political

interests, that it was the duty and the responsibility of the state to reclaim the lost Saharan territories. Similarly, during the dispersal of former Italian colonies between 1945 and 1948, the Ethiopian government argued from history its claim to Eritrea and part of Somaliland. It maintained that before the nineteenth century partition of the Horn area, Ethiopian jurisdiction had extended from the Shoan Plateau to the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In both the Moroccan and the Ethiopian cases, pre-colonial history was used to support territorial claims. It should be noted that this kind of claim, based on historical continuity, was advanced by states atypical in African terms, both at the time being monarchies, both having suffered only short periods of colonial rule and both being able to translate traditional factors into modern foreign policy. As the majority of African states were not in this position, they were unable to advance credible claims on the basis of indigenous political history.

In the case of Somalia, not only traditional political factors are involved but also ethnic and functional considerations. Somalia's conflict concerns both Ethiopia, Kenya and to some extent France, and is over the restitution of traditional grazing grounds in the Haud and Ogaden areas, and the right of Somali people under foreign domination to self-determination. Somalia's boundaries have only become important since the independence of her neighbours, when civil and military administration was brought to the borders, and boundaries became barriers, impeding the free movement essential to a stock-herding economy. The significance of the Somali case is that, alone in Africa, Somalia could truly be termed a nation state with a single language, common Islamic faith, common ancestry and history, and a clear cultural differentiation from its neighbours. The social organization, based on a segmented lineage system, has led automatically to a sense of national identity, and the cultivation of a direct linkage between local and national affairs. Somalia continues to be a threat to the security of her neighbours, and to the development of their border regions, not only because of her increasing military capability, but also because of the large numbers of Somalis outside her borders.

The majority of border disputes have tended to be minor affairs rarely involving any real hostility, and in most cases having their root cause in factors other than boundary delimitation. The primary conflict between governments was often caused by factors such as personal antagonism between leaders, competition in the African arena, support for opposing groups, a chain of mutual suspicion and subversion, or an attempt to apply pressure and so exert concessions in other matters. (48) The following examples will illustrate the greater importance of mutual antagonisms in such disputes, rather than the desire to revise boundaries.

The dispute between Ghana and Upper Volta in 1963/66 appeared to concern the delimitation of the boundary, but in fact reflected a growing antagonism between the two governments, with complaints of attempted subversion on both sides. (49) Similarly, the dispute between Ghana and Ivory Coast reflected the opposed ideologies of their respective leaders, rather than any real attempt at expansionism. It is significant that upon the removal of President Nkrumah in 1966 rapprochement was possible, and it seems likely that a distrust for his Pan-African ideology had been a major contributory factor in boundary disputes involving Ghana during his period of rule. The dispute between Malawi and Tanzania in 1967 exhibits similar characteristics--two leaders pursuing policies in absolute contradiction to each other. On the one hand Nyerere began to be seen as the prime mover against the colonial regimes of Southern Africa, while Banda moved increasingly towards a position of political and economic dependence on those regimes. (50) The close accord between President Maga of Dahomey (Benin) and President Diouri of Niger minimized concern over the ownership of Lete Island in the River Niger, until the fall of Maga in 1963 produced fears of subversion in Niamey over the support by the new Dahomean regime for left-wing Niger exiles. Concern for the status of the boundary diminished following the restoration of confidence between the two governments in 1965. (51)

It would seem, therefore, that despite the earlier claims by many nationalist leaders that Africa's boundaries were 'artificial' and merely relics of colonial rule, there were few determined efforts at any major revision. In fact, of the twenty border disputes listed by Touval, as

opposed to secession attempts, in only seven was there resort to any degree of violence, and in nineteen cases no revision of the boundary resulted from the conflict. In almost all twenty cases, a change in the continental pattern of politics, or the increasing confidence of state governments, resulted in the disputes becoming quiescent. The decision by African states to respect the existing boundaries and to accept the colonial spatial organization of Africa, was based on the fact that they were all equally vulnerable, and that any equitable solution to the problem was virtually impossible. There was also the constant fear of non-African intervention. It was soon realised that the rejection of colonial boundaries would inevitably lead to chaos, and the decision was made at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of 1963 to freeze the existing boundaries and maintain the current position. There has been a general adherence to this policy, and recent exceptions should be considered as individual acts, rather than reflecting any change in general African thinking. There has been general condemnation of Libya's annexation of part of northern Chad (52) and little attention accorded President Amin's claim in 1975 to parts of Kenya and the Sudan.(53) Even in the potentially dangerous situation in the Horn of Africa, given the unpopularity of the Ethiopian regime, there has been a marked reluctance among African states to accord any real support to the expansionist aims of the Somalis, or to be seen to be taking sides.

Having accepted the colonial framework, African governments obviously accepted the morphology of the new states. In many cases they had succeeded to territories never intended to function as independent states, but rather as administrative areas in large-scale colonial territories. Some were fortunate and inherited compact areas with coastal access, while others inherited vast land-locked areas thousands of miles from the sea. In some new states there were abundant resources, if undeveloped; others were little more than desert. Some were inherited as 'going concerns' while others had never had any economic viability and had always been in a dependent position. In several, especially those with a 'white settler'

component, there were the beginnings of a social infrastructure, in others it was non-existent. Some problems were common to nearly all the new states. Capital cities, with a high degree of primacy, were rarely located so as to facilitate administration. Transport systems, where they did exist, joined the point of exportation to the prime areas of production, and areas of modernization were extremely localized.

However dysfunctional the morphology of the state, the independent governments, having established their legitimacy, did set about the transformation of boundaries into borders, to mark by administration, not only the extent of their territory, but also the extent of their power. Over much of Africa, for perhaps the first time, the lines on the map began to affect the life of the ordinary African. The closure of borders limited the social interaction of neighbouring groups, restricted trade and caused considerable loss and hardship among nomadic herdsmen. The slightest disagreement between governments might precipitate a border closure with resultant chaos. In February 1977 Tanzania closed the border with Kenya after the collapse of the jointly owned East African Airways, so marooning hundreds of Kenyans and Kenyan vehicles on the wrong side of the border, and substantially affecting Kenya's important tourist trade. The interior states are obviously in the worst position. During the hostilities on the Kenya-Uganda border in 1976, there were severe fuel shortages in Rwanda and Southern Sudan. In an effort to re-direct trade, states have developed new transport routes which better reflect their alliances rather than the old agreements between colonial powers, for example the Tan-Zam railway, but their utility still depends on continued good inter-African relations.

The creation of nation states introduced the modern concept of nationality, and immigration control, so limiting free movement of manpower. The change in status from French colonial subjects to Dahomean (Benin) nationals, resulted in thousands of civil servants being expelled from Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Congo and Niger. In some cases migration continued, but in most cases the demand was for unskilled labourers. Ivory Coast still permits the immigration of thousands of people from Upper Volta to perform menial tasks.

Of course, immigration control depends on the officials' ability to recognize their own nationals, often no easy matter where ethnic groups may spread over national boundaries. In the Sudan there are considerable difficulties experienced with migrant workers, refugees both political and apolitical, those in search of health services unavailable at home, not to mention pilgrims on their way to Mecca. A lack of ability to control border movements has also produced problems. Different national price policies on cocoa in West Africa and coffee in East Africa have led to widespread smuggling into high-price zones. States have found themselves with huge refugee problems, and have found their efforts at human and animal health control constantly frustrated.

The hopes at independence were that African states would benefit from inter-state economic co-operation, in many cases having inherited the organizational structures (such as the East African Community and the Union Douanière Economique de l'Afrique Centrale. This has not in practice been the case. With national cohesion has grown a parallel economic nationalism, and despite the obvious advantages of economic union, co-operative organizations such as the EAC are now on the verge of collapse.(54) Apart from participation in various United Nations continental health programmes, co-operation across borders has not really been meaningful. Despite the Pan-African rhetoric of the sixties, national development has been the prime motive of African governments.

#### Territorial Disputes and Secession

With the departure of the colonial governments, the cultural sub-nationalism movements whose beginnings we traced earlier in this chapter, came to the fore, and several states were threatened with disintegration. A simple typology can be attempted in terms of the avowed aims of these movements. In addition to the case of Somalia already mentioned, the Sanwi Liberation Movement in Ivory Coast, and the Ewe movement in Ghana, appear to have had ethnic unification as their main aim. Both seem to have

been most active during the Nkrumah period in Ghana, and probably owed something to his somewhat disruptive influence in West Africa. Both movements displayed a low level of popular involvement, and seem now to have been successfully reabsorbed into their respective states. The rarity of claims for re-unification would seem to support our earlier contention that the successor states had become the functional political region. If this had not been so, one might have expected a proliferation of such cases throughout Africa. Significantly, part of the Ewe demand was for the restoration of the 1914 colonial border, rather than the recognition of a traditional Ewe polity.

In the case of the Touareg in Mali, the arabised peoples of Northern Chad, and of the Lozi in Zambia, the aim appears to have been the gaining of greater recognition of their needs and demands within the state, and especially of their economic grievances. Threats of secession may have formed part of the rhetoric, but have never seemed feasible. Absolute independence has not yet been a practical possibility and no neighbouring state has as yet openly offered union. In the extremely complex situation in Northern Chad, in which only a small splinter group has ever aimed at secession, the coming to power of a military regime in 1975 has resulted in a more equitable distribution of power among the different ethnic groups, but does not as yet seem to have resulted in any better understanding with the fragmented rebel factions. In 1975 the situation was further complicated by the annexation of part of Northern Chad by Libya. While the insurgency continues in Chad, the Lozi in Zambia seem to have accepted life within Zambia, although there is still only one Lozi prominent in the Zambian government. The reluctance of the Touareg to succumb to any kind of administration was largely dissipated by the ecological disaster in the Sahel. The Buganda and Ruwenzururu movements had as their major aim a redistribution of power within Uganda, rather than a real desire for independence. Buganda wished to retain its former autonomy and reassert its former dominant status. The Ruwenzururu movement of the Baamba and the Bakonjo peoples initially demanded detachment from the Kingdom of Toro, and only subsequently considered secession. Both movements were suppressed and can be considered as being refrigerated during the current period of Ugandan military rule. These cases substantiate the observation made in chapter I, that the mere existence of a territorial minority group is not sufficient in itself to lead to a continued demand for secession.

Only four cases of cultural sub-nationalism have had as a definite and sustained aim the formation of a separate independent state. These are the Southern Sudan, Katanga, Biafra and Eritrea. Southern Sudan we shall of course, consider in detail in subsequent chapters, However it will be useful here to examine the remaining cases in terms of the criteria for the formation of secession movements suggested in chapter I.

The first criterion was a transfer of loyalty from the existing state to the proposed new entity. In considering African situations, we have already realized that this criterion will require some amendment. Loyalty to the nation state, at the time of the commencement of these movements, had not yet been created in any meaningful sense. People identified and gave their loyalty to human groups and territories, to some extent the creation of colonial administration, and were not yet prepared to combine with other groups and extend their loyalty to the nation state. In the case of Katanga resistance to the idea was an immediate reaction; in Eritrea and Biafra, an initial willingness to participate in a larger unit was subsequently felt to be a mistake. To understand the unwillingness to transfer loyalty from the territorial interest group to the nation, we must introduce the second criterion: the historical background. All three cases have relatively long histories of bitterness and resentment.

In the Nigerian pre-colonial period, the Ibo of Eastern Nigeria were divided into over two hundred independent groups, organized into clans and lineages with a high degree of group autonomy, but strong social and commercial links. Although there was no recognisable central authority, the local style of political organization was common to all groups. Leadership and political office were based not only on lineage ascription, but also on achievement and wealth. Egalitarianism, individualism and achievement were important in the value system with a resultant high degree of popular participation in the decision-making process. Aggressiveness and initiative were rewarded.

It is easily realized that such a group would be in inevitable conflict with the value system of the constitutional monarchy of the Yoruba, and the theocratic dynasty of the Hausa. In the simplest terms, colonial rule tended to entrench these differences, with the Hausa and the Ibo being the extremes. While in the North traditional culture was conserved, and in fact, reinforced, the East was open to all kinds of European influences and innovations, of which the value system of the Ibo enabled him to take full advantage. Although European influence came first to the Yoruba, the Ibo had quickly overtaken them, and the acquisition of new skills resulted in their migration throughout Nigeria, and their increasing domination of the modern sector. The advance of the Ibo, especially in government service, resulted in growing resentment among Yoruba and Hausa and alerted them to the necessity of defending their position within the country. The approach of independence intensified ethnic hostilities and resulted in widespread violence in 1956. (55) The efforts of the various nationalist parties, both to gain power and at the same time to protect the interests of their majority ethnic followings, politicized what had previously been mainly a cultural conflict. The years after independence were characterized by increasing violence, much of it aimed at the Ibo, and with the military take-over tending to introduce a professional element into violent conflict. By 1966 large numbers of Ibo were returning to the East, feeling they could no longer protect their interests within the framework of a federal Nigeria. With the decision to further sub-divide the country into twelve states, they felt their power to be further eroded, and in May 1967 the secession of Biafra was announced.

This is hardly the place for a detailed discussion of the history of Ethiopia. However, for our purposes, the most important factor is that there has been over the past few hundred years a definite policy among successive emperors to re-establish and expand the empire, maintain political unity and independence amid ethnic diversity and fight against Muslim encirclement. (56) The antiquity of the Ethiopian empire gave the country and its leader a degree of influence and prestige unknown among other African states, and a quite disproportionate credibility in the world community. After World War II, the future of the former Italian colony of Eritrea was brought before the United Nations and, despite much local resistance, the credibility of Ethiopia

persuaded the United Nations to approve the creation of a federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In some respects there are similarities with the Biafran case. Here was a more sophisticated, politically aware group being expected to settle down happily with a feudal autocratic regime. Four of the five members of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea, reporting in 1950, agreed that the country should not be added to Ethiopia. They had witnessed the intimidation of Eritreans by Ethiopians and could see no prospect of success for the proposed federation. However by 1952 the General Assembly had accepted the plan, and Eritrea became an autonomous area, with a supposed right to a democratic regime. During the British Administration of the territory, political life had developed rapidly with the growth of a vigorous party system and Eritrean labour movement. To these interests, federation with Ethiopia was a disaster; the political activity of the Eritrean Assembly was in stark contrast to the palace intrigue of Addis Ababa, and many political leaders, noting the increasing Ethiopianization, fled into exile. The increased pressure put on the Eritrean Assembly was not only the beginning of annexation, but also a response to Eritrean democracy. There was the great danger that other parts of the empire might demand similar rights. Expression of democratic rights met with increasing violence, and by 1962 the Eritrean Assembly accepted the end of its autonomy, and Eritrea became Ethiopia's fourteenth province. The majority of Eritrean people did not accept annexation. Neither did they accept the end of their special rights which had been the better part of their colonial heritage. The suppression of labour unions, the banning of political parties, the imposition of increased taxation, and the abolition of the two official languages of Eritrea, combined with a deteriorating economic position to drive political activity underground. The response of the central government was increased repression, and the people of Eritrea realized that they had exchanged one colonial ruler for another that was infinitely worse. The result was the formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front, which became mass movements demanding Eritrean independence.

Perhaps the most complex case history is that of the former Belgian Congo, where the tensions produced during the colonial era caused the almost complete disintegration of the state at independence. The attempted secession of Katanga was enabled by the coalition of two groups, one group feeling themselves to have been for long disadvantaged, and the other wishing to maintain their former advantages. The black 'authentic Katangans' (57) had long felt threatened by the presence of large numbers of 'stranger' Africans in Katanga, and aligned themselves with the white Belgian settlers (58) who wished to reserve for Katanga the fruits of her considerable resources.(59) The resentment of the 'authentic Katangans' had grown with the development of the area, as increasing numbers of Africans from other parts of the Congo had emigrated as labourers to Katanga, and by the 1950's were not only in the majority in some towns, but were both socially and professionally in the ascendant.(60) In Elizabethville in 1957, 53% of employed workers were 'strangers'. (61) The rallying platform proposed by the 'authentic Katangans' was therefore that of self-defence against the 'strangers', and especially against those from Kasai. However, although there was an ethnic factor in the formation of their party CONAKAT (62) there were also broad factors of social competition, as well as cultural and political opposition. CONAKAT felt its members had been unfairly treated by the main employer, the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga, and when unemployment grew severe in 1958/9 the 'authentic Katangans' were again hardest hit.

The resentment of the African was paralleled by resentment among white settlers. They had long been politically organized, to resist pressure from Leopoldville and Brussels alike, and to encourage white immigration into Katanga. Similarly they had long advocated decentralization in the Congo, and real autonomy for the provinces. 'Nothing in the past of the Congolese justifies any rights whatsoever to the whole of the country. They have never created anything, not a wheelbarrow - nothing. We have lifted them out of cannibalism and slavery.'(63) Whites were vehemently opposed to the Brussels policy for the creation of a unitary state in the Congo, and sought to adjust the Katanga boundary to include the Kasai diamond fields and to improve transport links with Rhodesia. Within Katanga they sought a transfer of social tension from the ethnic to the class level, and envisaged the creation of a black bourgeoisie. With Brussels constantly confirming her adherence to the unitary structure, and with the growing power of the mass-nationalist parties, both black and white in Katanga needed support. The white settlers sought African support to legitimize their claims,

and the 'authentic Katangans' sought European support against the 'strangers' and the mass-nationalist parties. Their alliance was inevitable, and together they attempted to present a moderate front against what they claimed to be the increasing 'anarchy' in the rest of the Congo, and the 'dangerous left-wing extremists' of Brussels. Pressure for a federal structure for the new state was successful, and while CONAKAT dominated the group in power in Elizabethville, their position in the central government was much weaker than anticipated. The settler population was much alarmed at the accession of Lumumba as President. The Congo Republic achieved independence in June 1960, but after only five days sections of the army mutinied and, without invitation, Belgium flew in troops to 'protect her nationals'. On 11th July, blaming the breakdown of law and order, the chaos in the central government and fears of its 'communist intentions', Tshombe announced the long expected secession of Katanga.

In all three cases a history of resentment and fear of domination by other groups prevented the growth of any loyalty to the new state, and in fact intensified loyalty to the province. The general feeling was that independence from the proposed larger unit would further the group's interest both in terms of the 'quality of life' and its material welfare. Which brings us to the third of our original criteria - economic disparities. The three secession movements we are considering have had three different economic motives. In Katanga, secession would have reserved the major part of the state's potential and actual wealth to one small group. In Biafra, both the resources and the results of Ibo entrepreneurial skills would have all accrued to the new state, rather than being deployed in supporting the conservative and under-developed Northern Region, and in Eritrea secession would terminate an essentially colonial economic relationship with Ethiopia, and at least permit Eritreans to plan their own development with the maximum benefit of international aid and assistance.

In Eritrea and Biafra economic issues were important, but in Katanga they were paramount. In the discussions prior to independence, CONAKAT had demanded that 'the resources of each province be properly its own.', and that central government machinery be financed by voluntary contributions from the provinces. They also wished primary power over mining matters to be reserved to the province. The 'authentic Katangans' wished to re-inforce their claim to highly paid wage employment and entrepreneurial opportunity, while the white settlers considered the wealth of Katanga to be a purely

European creation, which only their continued involvement could '...put at the disposal of humanity'.(64) Further to this policy that all public bodies should '...reinvest the capital in the regions from which it came', there should be an increased reliance on private enterprise for all public works, and maximum protection accorded local agriculture and industry. Above all, the white settlers desired strong, continued economic links with Belgium. Their attitude was basically a determination not to be forced to share the wealth of Katanga with the rest of the Congo. Their rationale was that the revenue from mining in the province was required for the development of agriculture and industry, against a time when the mining receipts should begin to diminish. However they also wished to reassure Leopoldville that they would never '....act as miserly relatives and (should) always be ready to render assistance in the federal framework to the territories which (were) less favoured.'(65)

Economic considerations were also a factor in the development of the Eritrean secession movement, in that a province that was already poor resented the threat of even greater poverty. The first infusion of capital for development occurred during the brief Italian occupation. Eritrea was developed as a base for the exploitation of the Ethiopian hinterland, and as a result there was a great deal of constructional activity. The building of roads, airports, harbours and settlements provided wage employment for a large number of Eritreans. The British occupation of Eritrea in 1941 continued the process of modernization. In 1941 Eritrea became the British GHQ Middle East and a number of military projects were undertaken, so providing employment, creating a domestic market with some purchasing power, and providing a stimulus for the development of a light industrial economy. The value of exports rose from £494,000 in 1943 to £1,678,000 in 1945.(66) Attention was also given to agricultural development, and between 1939 and 1946 the area under cultivation rose by 500%. Despite this expansion

and the importance of her entrepot trade, there was little improvement in Eritrea's adverse balance of trade. The Italian regime had habitually balanced the budget by grants-in-aid from the Italian government, and the British found themselves committed to maintaining a standard of administration and public services out of all proportion to the territory's resources, at a time when Eritrean expectations were rising. Although the development of Eritrea had been the result of quite exceptional circumstances, and could not be expected to continue, what was important was that large numbers of Eritreans had come into contact with the modern sector as wage earners, clerks in the administration and small traders. Similarly, the rural population, especially on the plateau areas, had benefitted from the Italian's haphazard attempts at land reform, under which the traditional power of the absentee landlords had been eroded in favour of the landless peasants. Both the rural and the urban populations realized that the advantages they had gained under colonial rule were unlikely to continue in a federal relationship with Ethiopia. Since the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia, what little that has been spent on Eritrea has been concentrated on military and strategic projects, and the standard of living of the majority has dramatically declined. In addition the majority of top positions in the administration have been given to Amhara from Addis Ababa.

In the attempts at a federal solution to the problems of post-independence Nigeria, economic considerations have played a part. Again the pattern is one of a part of the country, in this case the south, being federated with a more powerful, but much less-developed, area with which it must share its resources, in this case oil. In the several pre-civil war federal arrangements, Northern Nigeria was in the ascendant in terms of population and therefore electoral power. To its partners in the south, it was a large, conservative and, above all, impoverished area, which they would be called upon to support at the expense of their own development. This was especially strongly felt by the Ibo of Eastern Nigeria, not only because they thought it would inhibit their considerable entrepreneurial skills, but because they had a history of economic conflict with the people of the north. Before the Nigerian civil war, the Ibo had risen to a position of some eminence in the most

coveted sectors of society. They were particularly dominant in the administration and in education, as well as in the army. Although 75% of the infantry was of Northern origin, 60-70% of the technicians and officers were of Eastern origin, mainly Ibo. (67) Feeling against the widespread employment of Ibo was so high that until 1972 it was the policy of the Northern Region to recruit foreigners, rather than southerners, into its public services. (68)

The development of this kind of imbalance in employment and professional achievement cannot really be separated from educational opportunity, and so leads us to the next of our original criteria - social and political disparities. The effect of colonial policy on education in Nigeria has already been noted; where administration tended to be more direct, as in the south, educational opportunities and therefore subsequent employment opportunities were greater. In Northern Nigeria, koranic schools continued, and secondary education was the preserve of the traditional elite. Education in the south was a very much more modernizing force than that provided in the north.

In Eritrea, the British administration reorganised and improved education and by 1952 there were over 14,000 pupils in full-time education. (69) In the Ethiopia of the 1950's education was the monopoly of the Orthodox Church, and what few opportunities there were tended to be reserved for the Amhara elite, and even by 1970 only 2% of the population was in full-time education.(70) The British administration also improved health facilities and by 1950 had provided 1,400 hospital beds, 32 dispensaries, mobile clinics and malaria control, compared with a situation in Ethiopia, where agitation for the provision of some kind of social infrastructure was not to emerge until well into the 1960's.(71)

Although the high rate of urbanization in Katanga -36% in 1959-should have facilitated the growth of social infrastructure, the 'authentic Katangans' felt that as education and health services were largely provided by the mining companies, the favouritism shown to 'strangers' operated against them in terms of education and health, as well as in terms of employment, especially in the rural areas. (72) In all three cases, both in economic and social terms, the peoples of Biafra, Katanga and Eritrea had come to expect a higher standard of living. Closer contact

with Europeans, whether as administrators or settlers, had better fitted them for the modern world, and with modernization came political awareness and representation.

In the development of Eritrean political awareness, the effects of the period of British Administration were particularly important, not only in that it introduced modern ideas, but also in that the British were determined that their administration should be just and, especially, compare well with that of the Italians. Accordingly, they gave considerable attention to the problem of Eritrean political representation. The first step was the removal of the colour bar and the employment of Eritreans as administrative assistants, so indicating British recognition of the Eritrean's right to acquire control of his own affairs. Italian law was replaced by native courts under local chiefs expected to shoulder wide responsibilities and appointed to Eritrean Advisory Councils. Later these councils included those with popular support and became vehicles for Eritrean opinion. The councils not only had power to advise but also the right to be consulted by the administration. In the economic depression which followed the war-time boom, there were many among the disenchanted intelligentsia of Asmara ready to take the opportunity to express their feelings. It was a period of great political uncertainty. There were fears that the country might be returned to the Italians, and Ethiopia was already pressing her claim through a political organization, the Unionist Party, based on the Orthodox Church of Eritrea. Its purpose was to engender fear and resentment of Italians, British, Arabs and Sudanese, and so encourage Eritreans to see union with Ethiopia as their only secure future. The Muslim population had reacted by forming the Muslim League and called for the maintenance of Eritrean territorial integrity and the granting of eventual independence. By 1947 they had the support of both Muslims and the Christian separatists of Tigray province, and the opposition to union with Ethiopia was intensifying.

A Four Power Commission, in an effort to assess the majority view, held a limited kind of plebiscite in 1947, and found that the population divided its support largely in terms of geography and religion, most Christians of the highlands being in favour of unconditional union with Ethiopia, and the Muslim population of the lowlands opting for independence or continued trusteeship. The interest shown in their future by the Commission intensified political awareness. In the vacuum left by the Commission's failure to agree, widespread violence broke out, with the majority of victims being opposed to union with Ethiopia. The problem of the future

of Eritrea was transferred to the United Nations, who in 1949 set up a further commission. Their visit, during three weeks in 1950, coincided with more violence and intimidation by Unionists directed from Addis Ababa in an effort to give an impression of Eritrean disunity. The result was the undermining of the independence cause, already weakened by suspicions aroused by Italian support, and the Muslim League was forced to opt for a federal union with Ethiopia. As soon as negotiations were underway, it became obvious that Ethiopia was determined to gain control of Eritrea. In the short period from 1941 to 1952, political life for Eritreans changed from one of total colonial subjection to one of federal autonomy with their own executive and legislature; however, their lack of experience prevented them from maintaining their autonomy, and the presence of an Ethiopian Governor General, Ethiopian garrison, and a dependence on Ethiopian finance, paved the way for Ethiopian annexation in 1962. However, it also sowed the seeds of the movement for secession that, in the face of continued, harsh, colonial attitudes by Addis Ababa, was to reunite Eritreans of all religions and political persuasions.

In Nigeria, the Biafran secession movement was based on the high degree of political awareness of the Ibo, compared with other conservative elements in the federal structure but, unlike the Eritrean case, the federal centre had insufficient power, rather than assuming too much power. In Katanga, in common with most Congolese, people felt they had had insufficient political representation. When, belatedly, political parties became permissible, to the 'authentic Katangans' there was the added stimulus of their believed domination by 'strangers'. The political chaos in the Congo gave them the opportunity to organize, and the white settlers provided the expertise and the means. Again, as in Nigeria, the federal centre was too weak to control the member states.

In all three cases, entering into hostilities with the federal government required cohesion within the group, and the motivation of people to withstand, not only the resultant violence, but also the associated material hardships. In Biafra a degree of cohesion was already present in the sense of Ibo awareness. The resentment of the elite was easily transferred to the ordinary people of Iboland; an attack on an individual was perceived as an attack on the whole group. Differences of religion were not really significant. What was important was a basic difference in traditional values. In Chapter I we noted how cohesion could be produced by awareness of differences from the ruling group, rather than common religious or ethnic factors. In Eritrea, the movement for secession found support among Christians and Muslims, and cohesion was built upon a sense of being non-Amharic. Eritreans of different creeds, classes and ethnic groups, came to regard Addis Ababa as the common enemy. In both these cases the struggle for secession involved a large part of the population. The Katanga case is somewhat different in not really involving the mass of ordinary Katangans, but being substantially an elitist movement supported by Belgian troops and other foreign mercenaries. (73)

The military feasibility of all three movements was enhanced by their defensible location, the next of our original criteria. All three operated in relatively compact areas, peripheral to the state core. The greater military strength of Katanga and Biafra did not initially make opportunities for defence of such importance, but in Eritrea the rugged nature of the terrain is ideal for the conduct of a long guerrilla campaign. Friendly neighbouring states played an important part in both Katanga and Eritrea. Katanga's communications with the outside world were good, and the movement received supplies, manpower and moral support from Rhodesia and Southern Africa. Eritrea's coastline facilitated support from across the Red Sea, and her border with Sudan provides both supplies and a safe retreat for civilians. In 1977 there were an estimated 100,000 Eritrean refugees in the Sudan. (74)

The last of our original criteria was the expectation of international support, as a precondition for both the success of the secession movement, and the economic survival of the new state. The three movements we have been considering illustrate how attitudes towards secession have changed, both within Africa and the rest of the world community. Some international support for Katangan secession was implicit in its genesis; without Belgian involvement it is unlikely that it would ever have been contemplated. In the 1960's western commercial companies saw their interests as being best served by support for secession. By the time of the Nigerian Civil War this was no longer the case, and they were less concerned with the outcome, having realized that African independence did not adversely affect those interests. In the case of both Biafra and Katanga the control of valuable resources would have guaranteed sufficient international support for the new state. In the cold war climate of the 1960's Katanga's secession was seen as a dangerous situation which might provoke east-west confrontation. By the time of Biafra the climate had changed and the great powers saw nothing to be gained from intervention, and had in any case moved their area of interest to South East Asia. Britain, the former metropolitan power, did not consider intervention, and adopted a traditional position of support for the federation it had largely created. While Eritrea lacks the valuable resources to motivate substantial international support, it does have sufficient strategic importance to generate assistance. Access to the Red Sea has become an increasingly important factor in terms of the Arab/Israeli conflict, and the rebel forces of the ELF and the EPLF have been able to obtain backing from a variety of Arab sources, the majority concerned with the security of the Red Sea and the confounding of earlier American and Israeli efforts to influence developments in Ethiopia. The change of government in Addis Ababa, and the increasing communist involvement in the country over the past eighteen months, has gained increased support for the rebels among more moderate states. Support has also been forthcoming at times from Libya, as a purely religious response to the conflict. Arab involvement in Africa has increased substantially over the past ten years, and attitudes to Eritrea, both in and out of Africa, reflect an unwillingness to offend the Arab World and prejudice Arab investment and fuel supplies.

At the time of secession in Katanga, political opinion and allegiance in Africa was divided between radical and moderate groups. Their reaction to the situation in the Congo was generally one of alarm. At a time when many of them were yet to gain independence, they realized how easily a former imperial power could regain power and reassert influence in Africa. They realized that they were all to some extent vulnerable, and that if the situation were to be repeated they were powerless to prevent intervention, whether it be by a former imperial power or a non-African multinational force such as the United Nations. They also realized that they were individually and collectively powerless to prevent the use of Africa as an arena in any east-west confrontation. As a result the majority of African states henceforth associated secession with potential metropolitan reassertion, and saw their only future in the cold war climate as being among the non-aligned. By the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War, African attitudes to secession had been institutionalized in the charter of the Organization of African Unity, and only four states supported the Biafran secession attempt.(75) There was general African support for the respect of sovereignty and a strict policy of non-intervention. By 1976, with the secession movement in Eritrea gaining increasing strength, adherence to this policy had intensified to such an extent that intervention in the affairs of Ethiopia by the majority of African states was unthinkable, and the Organization of African Unity was becoming increasingly embarrassed over its inability to control the internal conduct of African extremists such as General Amin of Uganda. So in the very short time since independence, African states, with the exception of Somalia, had accepted the Western concept of the nation state; accepted their boundaries; and accepted the principle of sovereignty. In fact, the great majority of African states had totally accepted the Western concept of the organization of space.

### Nation Building

The response to secession attempts by African governments has invariably involved the use of considerable force. They have all begun under a civilian regime, subsequently discredited, and contributed to the imposition of military rule, which while perhaps temporarily exacerbating the situation, has finally brought peace (with the exception of Eritrea) and been in a position to maintain peace. This is surely no coincidence. In every case the corrupt and partisan politicians have been largely discredited and the military has proved the only solution, being in most cases a modernizing force, not immediately exhibiting the old traditional ethnic cleavages. Where civilians have retained control in Africa, it has been mainly under a one party system. Mazrui sees conflict as playing a crucial part in the integrative process, in that the state which has survived hostilities has gained valuable experience in conflict resolution, and is more aware of the dangers inherent in its make up. (76)

In states fortunate in having avoided secession attempts, great emphasis has been placed on the building of national unity and on policies for national integration. The most important factor in such policies is the general awareness of the need for regional balance, and what Kasfir has called 'ethnic arithmetic'. (77) This means that however dominant one ethnic group may be, the need for representation of all groups is recognised. In the same way, the distribution of scarce resources is now affected by regional considerations and efforts are being made to develop the long neglected areas, sometimes at the expense of efficiency and profitability. In some states, such as Tanzania, the proposed re-location of the capital is designed to break the colonial pattern of production, and involve more people more closely with the government and the development process.

While there is an awareness of the need for decentralization in administration, there is also a tendency to centralize control of integrative factors. The education systems of most African countries are currently undergoing changes, not only to better reflect the needs of the community, but also to stress national similarities rather than regional or ethnic differences.

The media tend to be very much under central government control and constantly underline the idea of national unity, using carefully selected national symbols. There have been several attempts to introduce a national ideology such as the Humanism of Zambia, the Negritude of Senegal, the Ujaama of Tanzania. The history of many states has been rewritten to emphasize national heroes rather than tribal leaders. The encouragement of a return to traditional values has also been widespread with emphasis being placed on local co-operation and self-reliance.

Over some matters, such as language policy, extreme tact has been necessary and many states have unwillingly retained a colonial tongue as the national language rather than opt for one with particular regional or ethnic connotations. In Zaire, Lingala seems to be making progress at the expense of Kikongo and Kiswahili; however to attempt to symbolize national unity and liberation from European rule by adopting Lingala as the national language would certainly be premature. (78) In addition to the nation building programmes, the inevitable process of modernization carries its own integrative factors. Increasing urbanization and industrialization are slowly producing a middle class in most African states, and rivalries are gradually becoming broader based. However, for many African countries the nation building programme will not change the monopolization of power by one group, whose policies are interpreted by the disadvantaged as an effort at acculturation and the entrenching of dominance.

## Conclusion

We have seen how the essentially fluid nature of traditional African society was transformed by colonial rule and the imposition of the European concept of spatial organization; how the African continent was divided and compartmentalized, and how a variety of factors produced wide disparities and contributed to the growth of cultural sub-nationalism. At independence the imposed spatial organization produced areas of conflict, from minor boundary disputes to demands for secession. We have traced the development of three such cases in terms of the seven criteria for the development of secession movements that were suggested in chapter I, and found them to be broadly applicable. In the following chapters we will examine more closely the experience of the Sudan and discover how the original human landscape was altered by colonial rule; how independence brought demands for secession and how an eventual solution to the problem was found that could accommodate the realities of the African human landscape, with the European concept of the nation state.

CHAPTER III

THE PHYSICAL AND HUMAN LANDSCAPE OF THE SUDAN


The Physical Landscape

The territory known as the Democratic Republic of the Sudan occupies an area of 967,498 square miles lying between latitudes  $3^{\circ} 45'$  -  $22^{\circ} 0'$  N and longitudes  $21^{\circ} 48'$  -  $38^{\circ} 0'$  E, and is the largest country in Africa. It is about one third the size of Australia, more than ten times the size of the United Kingdom and borders on to eight other African states: Egypt, Libya, Chad, the Central African Empire, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia; it has a short coastline on the Red Sea.

Whiteman (1) distinguished the following dominant topographical features:- (i) the Nile Valley, a drainage system of considerable antiquity; (ii) the erosional scarp that bounds the Red Sea Hills; (iii) the series of great pediplains and prominent inselbergs covering thousands of square miles; (iv) the vast depositional plains and basins; (v) the volcanic uplands of Jebel Marra and Meidob in Darfur; (vi) the southern highlands bordering Kenya, Uganda and Zaire; and (vii) the foothills of the Ethiopian volcanic plateau. High ground is restricted to the periphery of a country best described as a vast shallow saucer dominated by the Nile and its tributaries - the Atbara, the Blue Nile, the White Nile, the Sobat, the Bahr El Arab, the Bahr El Ghazal and the Bahr El Jebel. The most extensive geological formations in the Sudan are those of the Basement Complex (49%), assumed to be mainly Pre-Cambrian, which together with the Tertiary to Quaternary Umm Kuwaba formations (19%) and the Cretaceous Nubian Sandstones (28%) occupies more than 96% of the total surface area. (2)

Barbour (3) describes the climate of the Sudan as wholly tropical and ranging from complete desert north of  $18^{\circ} 0'$  N, through areas of semi-desert with rainfall of varying intensity and duration, passing southwards into a continental equatorial type of climate with a marked dry season. Rainfall is seasonal and over much of the country is related to the position

**SUDAN GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY Fig. I**



### SUDAN CLIMATE




Fig. II

Miles 100 0 100 200  
Kilometres 100 0 100 200 300  
Mean daily temperature

of the inter-tropical convergence zone and the descending easterly jet stream. Precipitation will vary in intensity during the wet season and drought periods between rainfall can be prolonged in the lighter rainfall regions. Temperatures are everywhere high, with a mean daily winter temperature of 60.8F in the north and 84F in the extreme south. The diurnal range in the northern desert is often as high as 40F. Humidity is seasonal but can be very low. Winds often carry fine dust particles that temporarily reduce radiation, which otherwise tends to be high. Evaporation will normally exceed precipitation for 9-10 months of the year.

The country can be divided into four broad ecological zones of desert, semi-desert, savannah and wet savannah woodland. Zonal boundaries are not clearly defined but are a gradual function of the rainfall which decreases from 1,500 mm in the extreme south to a negligible amount in the Sahelian areas of the north.


- (i) The Desert covers the northern third of the Sudan. Rainfall in this area is rare, the winds are consistent dry northerly airstreams, bringing sandstorms in the winter; temperatures <sup>MAY BE AS HIGH AS</sup> 49°C in June <sup>AND AS LOW AS</sup> 1°C in January/February, and precipitation ranges from nil to 50 mm per annum. The area is bisected by the Nile River and the only agriculture is confined to irrigated basins along its banks.
  
- (ii) The Semi-Desert lies in a belt across the Sudan between approximately 14°N and the true desert, and covers some 20% of the country. Rainfall varies from 50 to 400 mm per annum, most of which falls during July and August, but evaporation is high; normal agriculture is precluded and grazing sparse. Temperatures <sup>MAY BE AS HIGH AS</sup> 47°C <sup>AND AS LOW AS</sup> in April - June 3°C in December - February. Northerly winds predominate but the rains come from moist southerly airstreams in June to September.

- (iii) The Savannah zone lies south of latitude 14°N and covers 40% of the land area. The rainfall which increases from 400 mm in the north to 1,000 mm in the south is sufficient to support extensive agriculture and livestock production. The natural vegetative cover of coarse grass, scrub and Acacia, thickens with the increasing rainfall. Within this zone lie the extensive flood plains of the upper Nile. With a lack of slope and heavy soils, they are subject to waterlogging and extensive flooding during the wet season, the gradient of the River Nile in the area being only 1:13,000. A large part of the area is covered by a papyrus swamp. The higher land of the flood plains can be cultivated, but during the dry season there is a shortage of domestic water.
- (iv) The Wet Savannah country of the south and south-west Sudan marks the end of the savannah plains. To the east of the Nile the landscape becomes one of broken hills rising to the highlands bordering Kenya and Uganda, while to the west the change is more gradual as the ironstone plateau rises gently to the Zaire/Nile divide. Annual rainfall averages 900-1,300mm over six to eight months and reaches 1,300 - 1,600 mm with an eight to nine month season in the extreme south west. The vegetative cover is open savannah woodland with some tropical gallery forest along river courses.

As far as geology, topography and climate are concerned, there is no sudden division between the Southern Sudan and the rest of the country, but rather a gradual progression from the absolute desert of the far north to the tropical forest of the Nile/Zaire divide.

The single most important environmental factor is the River Nile and its behaviour. In the Northern Sudan it is relatively well controlled, flowing in a broadly defined course and consequently concentrating settlement along its banks. In the Southern Sudan, the Nile and its tributaries appear to wander at will across a vast flat plain, dividing and sub-dividing, forming lakes and lagoons, flooding thousands of square miles, isolating towns and villages. The Bahr El Jebel, which enters the Sudan at Nimule as a raging torrent, seems, at Jonglei, scarcely to be moving, and to determine the main channel from the air is virtually impossible. Gradually the rivers converge in a vast area of swamp, to emerge as the White Nile near Malakal. The papyrus swamp or *sudd* - in Arabic, barrier - blocks the entrance to this vast river system, which rather than being a highway for the movement of peoples and ideas has contributed to the relative isolation of the Southern Sudan from the north until relatively recently.

The term *sudd* is now used to refer to the whole of the Nile swamps, but it originally referred to the barriers of vegetable matter blocking the river channels. The *sudd* is formed in large shallow lagoons, where reeds, papyrus and other aquatic plants take root. With a rise in the water level, the roots are loosened and large islands of closely tangled vegetable matter float out into the river channel only to be eventually caught by a sharp meander where the island again takes root. With the arrival of other floating material, the channel is soon blocked. The river is forced beneath the barrier carrying fresh masses of *sudd* beneath the original until the channel is eventually plugged and the water spills over into fresh lagoons. In this way dams are constructed that are so substantial as to support the weight of elephants and may be up to twenty or thirty miles long. When the great force of the Nile breaks through a *sudd* it is swept away, but only to reform further downstream. (4)



--- Northern limit of  
tsetse infestation  
& outliers 1975

**Southern Sudan — rivers and marsh**

**Fig. III**

Other associated environmental factors contributed to the relative isolation of this '...dreariest and most hostile environment in the world.' (5) Northern visitors quickly succumbed to malaria, and their transport animals to tsetse and other animal diseases. A horse will not survive long in the Southern Sudan and neither will a donkey. The only way was by foot and small canoe, and a very arduous way it was. Only to the far west, along the ironstone plateau, could the peoples of the north easily penetrate the Southern Sudan.

The Nile and its tributaries not only isolated the north from the south, but also isolated the different peoples living in the Southern Sudan, especially in the flood plain area, where paradoxically there is always either too much water or not enough. Large groups of people, probably originally relatively homogenous, came into the area, and the waters of the Nile splintered them into numerous small tribes, and each tribe into a myriad of small autonomous isolated units. 'Ah, land of whirring wings which is beyond the rivers of Ethiopia; which sends ambassadors by the Nile, in vessels of papyrus upon the waters! Go, you swift messengers, to a nation tall and smooth, to a people feared near and far, to a nation mighty and conquering whose land the rivers divide.'(6)

#### The Human Landscape

Early writers would seem to have over-emphasised the diversity of the peoples of the Sudan. They appear to have gained some satisfaction from merely adding names to the long list of tribal labels; names which were often inaccurate or merely nick-names, and often contradictory and potentially ambiguous, but which they assumed to represent distinct ethnic or political units, stable and unchanging. In recent years, other writers, in an effort to explain the conflict in the Sudan, have gone to the other extreme and divided the population into only two groups. Neither approach is helpful. As the physical landscape changes gradually from true desert to tropical forest, so the human landscape exhibits the same broad spectrum from the Rashaida to the Azande.

Various means of classification have been attempted, (7) though perhaps the most realistic is that of Greenberg (8) in that it divides the population into essentially broad groups, while still demonstrating the currently unexplained inconsistencies. While there have been differences of opinion as to the validity of Greenberg's classification among linguists, for our purposes a simplified version provides a useful framework. (Table 1)

### The Indigenous Peoples

We shall begin with a brief account of the indigenous peoples whose ancestors probably formed the African substratum of the majority of the Sudanese population. Among the '...vast conglomeration of tribal and kinship groups.' in the Southern Sudan, the most numerous are the Nilotics. A tall, slim, very dark-skinned people, they are believed to have entered the area from the west and established themselves in the central Bahr El Ghazal. They were believed to have been originally cultivators who became devoted pastoralists and subsequently spread over much of the upper Nile valley. One group of nilotics who divided to become the Nuer and the Dinka travelled only a short distance to the swampy grasslands bordering the main tributaries of the Nile.

The Nuer occupy a band of grassland stretching from the banks of the Bahr El Ghazal in the west to the upper reaches of the Sobat in the east. They have developed an economy ideally based entirely on cattle, but supplemented by fishing and the small-scale cultivation of grain in times of need. They build semi-permanent villages on the sandy ridges between the rivers, but the demands of their cattle, and the seasonal rise and fall of the rivers, necessitate transhumant movement in search of grazing or, during the dry season, domestic water. Their form of political and social organization has been described as a segmentary lineage system (9) and has none of the institutions normally associated with the European concept of government. True leadership, whether temporal or spiritual, tends only to arise during time of war. Nuer society is egalitarian, land and cattle being essentially held in common, and there being a strong compulsion to share the proceeds of both among the immediate kin. Their simple requirements are almost entirely met by their cattle, with the result that their contact with other



peoples has been minimal. Collective action, in groups larger than the immediate clan, is rare and usually associated with warfare. The need to maintain a balanced man/cattle relationship has always led to the raiding of neighbouring tribes, but the Nuer have no desire for expansion, considering themselves to already occupy the best available grazing land. In cases where 'strangers', usually Dinka, have moved into Nuer society, they have usually been assimilated by marriage and by means of genealogical fictions. (10)

The Dinka, the most numerous of the Nilotic peoples of the Sudan, (11) live on the vast savannah grasslands between the Nile swamps and the open forest of the ironstone plateau. Their country stretches from Bor on the Bahr El Jebel to the south, to Abyei across the Bahr El Arab to the north, with an offshoot to the east of the White Nile between Malakal and Er Renk. Like the Nuer they are pastoralists by choice, but include groups who have lost their cattle and are reduced to fishing and cultivation. However the majority move seasonally across the land in search of grazing, and cultivation is limited to the production of only small amounts of millet, tobacco and vegetables. Cattle satisfy most of the needs of their simple material culture, not only in economic terms, but also in social and spiritual terms, and their acquisition and care are central to Dinka life. Again like the Nuer, there is no individual ownership of land, grazing rights being held in common. Their expansion has been controlled by the Nuer to the east, the climate to the north, and the tsetse fly to the south and west.

Lienhardt describes the Dinka as a congeric of independent and autonomous tribal groups varying in size from under 3,000 people to the 150,000 of the Rek group. (12) A tribal group such as the Rek will then be divided into tribes, with sub-tribes as the largest fully corporate communities. Age sets operate at the sub-tribal level, and sub-tribe members gather to camp together in search of grazing and water. Further segmentation depends on the size of the sub-tribe, segmentation seeming to be a response to ecological factors and the need to maintain man/cattle/land groups of an optimum size. The oral history of the Dinka records a constant tradition of social group growth, tension, division and movement. Dinka society

is further divided into two categories, one having a religious function, and the other a political function, and producing a system of dual leadership. Any tribal group, and in fact the Dinka people as a whole, is not unified, and while the Dinka do not think of themselves as a nation, they are often accused of ethnocentrism and arrogance, dividing the world into Dinka and non-Dinka. Unity among the tribes is very much a response to ecological factors. Sub-tribes, in frequent conflict during the wet season, will more easily co-operate during the dry season when pastures and water are scarce. With no real caste or class system, they can only assimilate strangers by assigning them to clans and so eventually making them Dinka. With a material culture slightly more complex than that of the Nuer, they have produced some specialized groups such as the Manangar iron workers. Few Dinka are aware of the exact size and the many divisions of the Dinka, knowing only that 'their land is vast and their people innumerable.' (13) However some groups are widely known throughout Dinkaland and are ascribed certain characteristics. A Rek informant told the writer that the Twic were commercialists, the Malwal were warriors, the Bor were scallywags and, of course, that the Rek were aristocrats.

Between them the Dinka and the Nuer occupy a very large part of the best land, and have most of the cattle wealth, perhaps the region's most important resource, so it is important to note the relationship between the two groups. Their traditions of contact are traditions of conflict over grazing and the raiding of cattle. With their rather greater ability for collective action, the Nuer seem usually to have fared best in these encounters, leaving a distrust of Nuer among the Dinka which continues to the present day at all levels. Although their cultures have a great deal in common, and in fact they acknowledge a common ancestor, their common pre-occupation with cattle has made them essentially competitors rather than allies.

A second group of Nilotic people crossed the Bahr El Jebel and moved down into East Africa, absorbing Cushite customs en route, and were the forefathers of the Masai, the Nandi, the Jie and the Karamajong. A third group, the Lwo, moved from the Bahr El Ghazal and splintered into several smaller units. The Bor moved to the ironstone plateau south of Wau; those now known as the Anuak travelled to the upper Sobat River, some of them later moving south to become the Pari, the Pajook and the Acholi. The Jur settled finally around Wau, while those who subsequently became the Shilluk moved north to the White Nile.

The Shilluk settled on the west bank of the White Nile in an area centred on Fashoda, and on the east bank near the junction with the Sobat River. They are now primarily sedentary cultivators, keeping only a few cattle. Their pattern of settlement is one of contiguous villages along the banks of the Nile, and perhaps the subsequent ease of communication resulted in the development of the political system, for although the Shilluk do exhibit the same tendency towards social fission as the other Nilotics, they have developed a much more centralised system with a single divine king. The authority of the king is primarily ritual rather than administrative. With a country lying outside the protection of the *sudd* they have been compelled to come to terms with their neighbours and from necessity may have grown the centralised leadership. Like most of the Nilotics, they have procedures for the assimilation of 'strangers', the children of a 'stranger' father tracing descent through their local mother, and so joining a Shilluk lineage. (14) Secure from the Nile floods, the Shilluk have often produced a surplus of grain, and so established trading links with the Dinka and Nuer who overcame their disdain for the cultivator in times of need.

To the south of the Dinka, along both banks of the Bahr El Jebel, settled another Nilotic speaking people, the Bari. (15) They are now mainly sedentary cultivators, but from their oral traditions would seem to have been pastoralists in the recent past. Like most Nilotics, the Bari are splintered into small groups with no single spiritual or temporal leader and no administrative hierarchy. Men in positions of influence are either clan heads or ritual experts such as rainmakers, their influence depending on their achievements, and most decisions are made by local councils of elders. It has been suggested that small groups at some time splintered

from the main Bari group, moving to the east and becoming the Latuka, the Dongotoro, the Lokoya and the Lango, and to the plains around Lake Rudolf where, now as the Topotha and the Turkana, they move between Sudan and Kenya. Others moved south and west and became the Fajulie, the Kakwa, the Nyangbara and the Kuku.(16) They have much the same economic, political and social systems as the Bari, valuing cattle, and keeping them where the absence of tsetse permits.

To the north of the Bari are the Mandari who appear to be an intermediate group between the Bari and the Dinka, being both pastoralists and talented cultivators growing a wide variety of crops. They have come to an accommodation with the Aliab Dinka, who marry Mandari girls and so afford the Mandari access to Aliab cattle and pastures. The social diversity of the Mandari is ascribed by Buxton to their readiness to allow 'strangers' to settle and to be absorbed by marriage into the Mandari clientage system. (17)

From this brief examination of the Nilotic speaking peoples, we can see that a large part of the land area of the Southern Sudan is occupied by peoples having a great deal in common; speaking similar languages, having similar values, sharing a deep interest and concern with cattle, living in essentially egalitarian societies, placing great importance on family ties, and having developed procedures for trade, intermarriage and the control of severe inter-group conflict. However, despite these links, they have shown little tendency to combine or to recognize any central political leadership. Rather their oral traditions constantly refer to the division of groups and their subsequent re-settlement at a distance. Early European writers interpreted this fragmentation as an inherent social instability, but it is perhaps more useful to view it as an intelligent regulation of the man/cattle/land relationship, exacerbated by the divisive environmental factors of flooded rivers and a waterless plain. Similarly, the conflict between these peoples, instead of being considered as '...chaos and tribal anarchy' (18), can be more usefully viewed as ecological adjustment. For example, the ravages of rinderpest among the cattle of the Nuer led to the raiding of Dinka herds to redress the balance. (19) Although the Nilotics are by far the most numerous of the Eastern Sudanic language group, there are others to be found in the Southern Sudan. The Murle, the Logarim and the

Didinga live in the hills and marshes to the east of the Bahr El Jebel; they are predominantly pastoralists and indeed the Murle at one time had the highest man/cattle ratio in the Southern Sudan.(20) The Njangulgule and the Shatt live to the west of the Dinka in the Bahr El Ghazal and are now cultivators, probably having lost their cattle or been pushed out of the main grassland area.

The second language group, in terms of numbers in the Southern Sudan, is the Adamawa-Eastern group, a sub-family of the vast Niger-Kordofanian group, most of whose members are found outside the Sudan, but the eastwards movements of the group have left small groups scattered throughout the Bahr El Ghazal: the Feroqe, the Banda, the Golo, the Ndogo, the Bviri and the Indri, and a large and important group, the Azande, on the Sudan side of the Nile/Zaire divide. The Azande moved into the Southern Sudan sometime in the sixteenth century as a group of small tribes. By the eighteenth century the Avungara, an aristocratic, military dynasty, had subjugated these small groups and created the Azande empire. Unlike other peoples of the Southern Sudan, the Avungara imposed an administrative system on the pattern of scattered groups. This administrative system depended on the availability of land, either unsettled or occupied by small weak tribes. The sons of Avungara kings, rather than remain subjects, moved into new lands and established their own kingdoms with local provincial officials to settle disputes and collect taxes. The conscription of young men into standing armies ensured the swift assimilation of conquered peoples and imposed a moral and intellectual homogeneity across Zandeland. Azande society is therefore rigidly stratified and membership of the ruling Avungara clan can only be obtained by birth.

Within the areas controlled by the various Avungara chiefs, their subjects lived in isolation in the forest, and except during the British period there was no obligation for them to remain in any one area: a man might live in an area supervised by someone who in fact had no authority over him. Homesteads were often miles apart and between the territories of chiefs there were often wide areas of uninhabited forest. (21) The family is still the most important basic unit, living in scattered homesteads and practising a system of shifting cultivation supplemented by hunting, fishing and gathering.

However, as Gray has noted, (22) the expansion of the Azande sprang from rivalry within the ruling group, a rivalry which without constant available room for expansion was essentially destructive, easily exploited and prevented the Azande from presenting a united front to the outside world. However, before the coming of the European, the Azande did expand their empire, moving down the river valleys of the Nile/Zaire divide into the Bahr El Ghazal, and pushing before them a group of small tribes, who were eventually to form a kind of human shatter belt between the Azande and the Dinka. Most of these unfortunate people seem to have belonged to the Central Sudanic language group, and to have come from an area to the south of Lake Chad, (23) many probably being absorbed by the Azande. Their descendants now stretch in a broken line along the rim of the ironstone plateau from the Madi in northern Uganda, through the Kaliko, Moru, Bongo and many smaller groups to the Kreish in the far west. By the nineteenth century they had been smashed into splintered communities of settled cultivators, although according to Beaton many of these peoples had once owned extensive herds. (24)

In the Northern Sudan, Holt identifies four indigenous non-Arab peoples. (25) The Nubians originally inhabited a narrow strip of riverain land between the first and the third Nile cataracts. They had developed a settled life in towns and villages, with a preference for urban life and a high degree of artistic production. They had been subjected to a degree of Egyptian influence, some were literate and several languages were in use at an early date. They were divided into three small kingdoms and until at least AD 1372 were known to be Christians.(26) Exactly how far to the south the influence of Nubia was experienced is still a matter of some conjecture, but Hassan suggests that there was contact with 'negroid tribes' pushing north from Kordofan and the Gezira.(27) These movements, associated with the Egyptian demand for slaves, probably resulted in a fair degree of interaction along the southern borders of the Nubian kingdoms, and Trimingham describes the Nubians as a hybrid type of mixed Caucasian-Negroid stock speaking a Negro language. Greenberg places the Nubian language in the Eastern Sudanic sub-family of the Nilo-Saharan language group. Much of the original homeland of the Nubians was flooded at the creation of Lake Nubia, and a large number were moved to a new irrigation scheme at Halfa El Gedida on the River Atbara. Many Nubians have retained their own language, but their preference for urban life has brought many to Khartoum and other large towns to dominate government and administration.

The Beja were originally solely pastoralists living in the Red Sea Hills and on the plains of Eastern Sudan, from the present Egyptian border down to the Ethiopian marches. Early ethnographers noticed a physical resemblance to the pre-dynastic Egyptian peoples (28) while other writers (29) have noted modifications attributed to negroid blood, while their original system of matrilineal descent and associated customs have suggested links with the cattle owning peoples of East Africa. There has been some intermarriage with Arab immigrants, but the Beja language, which Greenberg classifies as Cushitic, has survived, especially among the dominant Beja group, the Hadendowa. The majority of Beja remain camel nomads but some have settled on the agricultural developments on the Gash and the Tokar deltas.

The origins of the Nuba peoples of southern Kordofan have been the subject of much controversy. They are not a homogenous group, but rather the remnants of several African tribes who appear at some time to have taken refuge in the isolated hills of southern Kordofan that are now known as the Nuba Mountains. They speak a variety of languages which Greenberg divides into five different groups, and places in the Kordofanian sub-family. They are principally agriculturalists with emphasis also placed on hunting and gathering. Some communities own cattle and pigs. Seligman believed that the cultural practises of some groups may have indicated a dependence on cattle at some earlier date. (30) Among the Nuba both patrilineal and matrilineal forms of descent are found (31) and the young men are organised into age sets. Their political organization appears to be based on small autonomous units under the guidance of local ritual leaders. In recent years they have been increasingly influenced by their arabized neighbours and to some extent by the Shilluk. (32)

The last of Holt's indigenous groups are the Fur. Again these are a sedentary group of cultivators living in the mountain massif of Jebel Marra in the far west of Darfur. O'Fahey describes them as a negroid people with an oral tradition that suggests links with some of the tribes of the western Bahr El Ghazal, but Greenberg lists their language under its own sub-family in the Nilo-Saharan language group, rather than in the Central Sudanic sub-family of the Kreish and the Bongo. The early history of the area is very confused, but there is some evidence to suggest the existence of dynasties and petty states. (33)

In his identification of indigenous non-arab peoples in northern Sudan, Trimmingham, unlike Holt, mentions some other groups in the west.(34) The Masalit and the Dajo he describes as sedentary cultivators, also the Berti, the Baiqo and the Mima. The latter he describes as immigrants but does not specify the date of their arrival; all are members of the Nilo-Saharan language group, as are the nomadic or semi-nomadic Zaghawa and Midob.

In the Funj area of Eastern Sudan, between the Blue and White Niles, Trimingham describes other negroid peoples that he ascribes to no definite ethnic unit. (35) While the surrounding Arabised people refer to them as *hamaj* or aborigines, they refer to themselves in terms of the isolated hills that they occupy. They speak a variety of languages which Greenberg classifies under three sub-families in the Nilo-Saharan language group. The Ingassana and the Burun are classed as Eastern Sudanic, while the Koma, Gumuz, Uduk, Ganza and Gule come into the Coman sub-family. The Berta are classed separately. The mountainous territory occupied by these people is a watershed between the tributaries of the Blue Nile and the eastern tributaries of the White Nile and it would seem likely that the hills have provided a refuge for another human shatter belt - perhaps the original inhabitants of the area that came under pressure from the Arabised tribes to the north, the Nilotics to the west and the Galla to the south. Today the people are sedentary cultivators coming under increasing Arab pressure, and increasingly adopting Arabic and Islam.

The area of the Sudan once occupied by the non-Arab peoples has not been conclusively established and must await a good deal more archaeological and anthropological research. It has long been believed that the Shilluk, for example, laid the foundations of the Funj Empire and once lived as far north as Aba Island (37) but there is little hard evidence. Similarly, most of the anthropological study of non-Arab groups has been concentrated on their individual characteristics, rather than on a comparison of groups, and most of the work was undertaken at a time when communities had been subjected to the influences of colonial administration or modern government, and were consequently experiencing a period of change. However some broad, although tentative generalizations might be hazarded. It would appear that a large majority of these people had recently been pastoralists and would be now from choice, if ecological conditions permitted. With the exception of the Azande and, to a lesser extent, the Shilluk, they all lived under essentially decentralized political systems with some kind of ritual leadership. They all ascribe importance to family relationships and family commitment.

### Arab Immigration

Arab influence was first felt in the Northern Sudan in the seventh century, when Nubia was penetrated by small Arab groups who had previously migrated from Arabia to Upper Egypt. (38) Holt divides these people into two groups: the mainly sedentary Ja'ali who intermixed with the Nubians, and the largely nomadic Juhayna.(39)

The Ja'ali claim as a common ancestor an Arab named Ibrahim Ja'ali, a supposed descendent of al-Abbas, an uncle of the prophet Mohammad. They moved gradually along the main Nile and came to dominate much of the riverain land north of the sixth cataract at Sabaloka. From this core area Ja'ali individuals moved out into the rest of the Sudan, mainly as traders or holy men and intermarried with the indigenous peoples. Holt notes the example of Taqali, a small Muslim enclave in the Nuba Mountains founded by a Ja'ali holy man. (40) Trimingham notes that among the Beni Amir Beja, the Ja'aliyin imposed themselves as an aristocratic caste, (41) as did the Kayra clan amongst the Fur. (42)

Many of these Ja'aliyin seem to have gathered around themselves what Holt describes as 'accretions of heterogenous fragments' which were to become 'synthetic tribes'. (43) The process by which the Ja'ali rose to ascendancy over the indigenous population was greatly facilitated by the prevailing system of matrilineal descent. As a result of the wanderings of these traders and holy men, a considerable number of sedentary and riverain peoples of the Northern Sudan came to claim Arab descent and more specifically Abbasi descent although, as Trimingham has noted, they 'have only the minutest proportion of Arab blood.' (44) The claims to a specific descent are, according to Cunnison, the result of 'an ever-increasing accumulation of error' in the keeping of genealogical records, that bear little relation to any kind of historical reality. He considers it unlikely that any real connexion exists between a tribe and its claimed ancestors, except perhaps for a small proportion of the tribe, and thinks it to be more helpful to consider tribal genealogies not as accurate oral records, but as ideologies. (45) Among peoples claiming Ja'ali ancestry are the Jimi'ab, the Jama'ab and the Jamu'iyya, who settled along the Nile, the Bidayriyya of Kordofan, the Shaqiyya, the Manasir, the Rubatab, the Mirafab and the Ja'aliyyin proper.(46)

The Juhayna group includes almost all tribes claiming Arab descent but not asserting a Ja'ali origin. Following the achievements of this successful group, numerous unrelated peoples have claimed Juhayna descent, as others have claimed Ja'ali descent; however, according to Trimmingham the Juhayna have a more legitimate claim to Arab blood.(47) The group includes most of the camel nomads of Kordofan, the Kababish, the Dar Hamid and the Hamar, those of the Butana and the Gezira, the Shukriyya and the Rufa'a, and the cattle-owning Baggara of southern Kordofan and southern Darfur. (48)

The Juhayna travelled to the Sudan from Egypt in search of good pastures and freedom of movement and by the fourteenth century are believed to have penetrated as far as Lake Chad.(49) As they travelled they adapted their way of life to the changing environment. While some, such as the Kabbabish, remained solely dependent on their animals, others such as the Dar Hamid developed a dual system, with sections of the group living a sedentary life. The environment demanded adaptability; the Baggara, probably originally camel nomads, on moving into the wetter lands of southern Kordofan, abandoned the camel in favour of the more suitable cow. Political upheavals disrupted economic life, for example former pastoral groups were to lose their herds during the Mahdiyya. (50) However the greater self-sufficiency among nomads lessened their contact with the indigenous peoples and in general there was less admixture than among sedentary groups.(51) The successful establishment of many of the Juhayna in the Sudan encouraged the immigration of other Arab groups from Arabia by the more direct route across the Red Sea, with the Rashaida and the Zubaydiyya arriving as recently as the nineteenth century.

Gradually both the Ja'ali and Juhayna groups were racially assimilated into the indigenous population.(52) The actual number of Arab immigrants is not known, but it has been suggested that it has been exaggerated because of the cultural ascendancy subsequently attained.(53) Hassan suggests that by the sixteenth century, while a culturally arabized stock was emerging, 'the term Arab was progressively being emptied of nearly all its ethnic significance.' While the Arab immigrants had modified but little the social and economic life of the indigenous people, they had profoundly affected the cultural and religious life. Indigenous peoples had been absorbed into the Arab tribal structure, Arabic was becoming a lingua franca, and Islam was spreading south.

The interaction between the two races was essentially assymetrical both culturally and biologically. Arab culture and the Arabic language may have been modified locally but in general Arabic was a conquering language. In Islam miscegenation was permitted between Arab men and non-Arab women, but not vice versa. The son of an Arab father was recognized as legitimate and as an Arab regardless of the status and race of the mother, so that both cultural and biological contact between Arab and African produced, and could only produce, Arab expansion rather than true interaction.

### The Spread of Islam

Initially the processes of Arabization and Islamization proceeded simultaneously, either by the influence of individual traders or by tribal migration, but it was Islam at its simplest. The nomads were themselves imperfectly islamized and certainly illiterate, but the declaration of the *Shahada* or act of faith was all that was required to create a nominal Muslim. However by the end of the sixteenth century the first of a succession of Islamic scholars had arrived in the Sudan bringing a proper understanding of Islam. During the seventeenth century various Islamic scholars, mainly originating from Cairo, established Islamic schools over much of the riverain Sudan, building mosques, producing jurists and judges, who in turn moved south to carry their learning to the front line of Arab expansion. Perhaps the most important influence of these Egyptian scholars was the founding of the Maliki school of Islamic law in the Sudan.

The second half of the sixteenth century saw the introduction of the *sufi tariqas* or religious orders that led to 'the creation of distinctive factors of Sudanese Muslim culture' (55) and emanated direct from the Hijaz, rather than via Egypt. The importance of the *sufi tariqas* was that they brought an ordered, if unorthodox form of Islam, but one that was also more popular and less exacting, and so more suitable for dissemination in a vast and backward country. The mystical aspect of *sufism* obviously appealed to a population that had, and in fact continued, to attach importance to magical rites. *Sufism* allowed for the accommodation in Islam of many local practices and superstitions, and their position as links

between man and God gave the *sufi* leaders a political importance that they retain to this day. The accommodating nature of the Islam of the *sufis* together with the rather vague genealogies of the Arab tribal structure, permitted the easy assimilation of people into the new cultural society that was being created. A further influence on the growth of Islam in Sudan was to come from the Mahgrib, reinforcing the establishment of the Maliki law among the peoples of Darfur. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, these three external stimuli had laid the foundations of the Islamic faith and the Arab culture over the more accessible areas of the Northern Sudan. However it must be remembered that it remains to this day an incomplete coverage. For example peoples such as the Nubians, the Beja and the Nuba steadfastly retained their own languages; among the majority of the northern Sudanese, who claim Arab blood and membership of Islam, a great deal of local custom and superstition continued into the twentieth century.

#### Sudanese Identity

From what seemed initially to be a very confusing picture, three important factors emerge:-

- (i) With the possible exception of some of the Beja-speaking peoples of the east, and recent Arab immigrants such as the Rashaida, the majority of Sudanese have a very significant percentage of negro blood, either through their original ethnic inheritance, intermarriage or slave ownership.
- (ii) Following the Arab immigration waves dating from the seventh century to as recently as the nineteenth century, the indigenous population of Northern Sudan has experienced to a varying, but generally limited, degree an admixture of Arab blood.
- (iii) Since the widespread adoption of Islam, not only as a religion but also as a unified social system, a greater number of Northern Sudanese have laid claim to Arab ancestry.

So it seems evident that the conflict in the Sudan is not one in which the racial realities play a great part; what is important is the individuals sense of identity. To the majority of Northern Sudanese the acceptable identity is to be a follower of Islam and an Arab, and such claims are made by people regardless of race, colour, knowledge of Arabic or understanding of Islam. James has explained the process of changing identity in the southern Funj where people with no possible claim in reality associate themselves with the 'acceptable identity'. (56) Of course it is easier for some than for others. A man from the Funj may dress as an Arab, move to Omdurman, adopt Islam and be absorbed into the community with relative ease, but for a Nuer, perhaps well over six feet tall who has been *garred* in adolescence, the same opportunity is not available; his racial and therefore his social mobility is restricted. (57) Faced with the racial realities, some Sudanese writers, such as Muddathir 'Abdl Al Rahim, have made the observation that '...the great majority of the population rightly feel that they are Arab and African at the same time, to an equal degree, and without any sense of tension or contradiction.' (58) In the experience of the writer, this is not the case. The majority of Northern Sudanese either deny or belittle their African heritage, place importance on the lightness of skin colour and look towards the Middle East as the focus of their lives. As Lewis has noted, (59) the efforts made to deny an African heritage are considerable. For example a very dark-skinned Northerner is described as *ardha* or green, black being totally unacceptable and reserved to describe non-Arabs, carrying as it does other derogatory inferences unassociated with colour. However, despite the spurious nature of many of the claims, the Northern Sudanese do possess a unifying cultural bond which enables individuals to identify with a larger unit than the immediate family and the immediate location. Despite the broad similarities shared by the Southern Sudanese, there is no such sense of common identity, but there is a definite sense of being non-Arab and non-Muslim.

Conclusion

Each group tends to see the other in terms of a stereotype. To the Northerner the Southerner is an object of disdain, culturally and socially his inferior, an untutored savage being outside the *Dar Al Islam*, (60) of limited capability, and even to many an educated Northerner, an *abid* or slave. However he is also to be feared. To the Southerner, the Northerner is essentially cruel and exploitative, not really to be trusted, disinterested in the South and disdainful of its culture. In the next chapter we shall examine two further important factors: firstly how this mutual hostility was engendered and , secondly, to what extent it was fostered and entrenched by the policies of the British Administration.

CHAPTER IV

COLONIAL EXPERIENCE AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF HOSTILITY

Traditional Contacts

Very little has been written about the pre-colonial contact between the arabised population and the other indigenous peoples. There has been rather a general tendency to imagine the Southern Sudan as being completely isolated behind the *sudd* from all Northern influences.(1) However, this can never have been the case, and contact and interaction must have occurred in the far west where no physical barriers to movement existed and the open forest of the ironstone plateau must have facilitated movement. O'Fahey mentions the trade route from North Africa to Darfur and its continuation into the Ubanghi-Shari Basin. A Ja'ali immigrant, Al Manna Ismail, is recorded as having settled at Hofrat En Nahas in the eighteenth century, and it seems that early contact occurred between the arabised population and the people of the western Bahr El Ghazal. (2) Holt mentions the slave troops of the Kayra Sultanate in Darfur, and similar slave armies in the Funj, with Sennar exporting about 1,800 slaves every year. These slaves were captured during raids on the weaker tribes of the western Bahr El Ghazal and the southern Funj and it seems that both military and domestic slavery were widespread in the Northern Sudan. Certainly slaves were present in sufficient numbers to warrant them taxable by the Turco-Egyptian regime in 1821. (3)

In the centre of the country the barrier between the North and the South was human rather than physical. Until the eighteenth century the Dinka occupied areas well to the north of the Bahr El Arab in Kordofan and the Shilluk controlled the White Nile as far north as Aba Island, in 1684 destroying a number of Muslim schools on the White Nile north of Al Kawwa.(4) It would seem likely that the Arab immigrant groups avoided contact with the Nilotics and continued their western movement, rather than directly confront these militarily accomplished peoples. Trade was limited and contact seems to have been restricted to occasional conflict over grazing, but with relatively long periods of peaceful coexistence. Deng has outlined such a relationship between the Ngok Dinka and the Humr, but has also stressed the degree to which the Dinka retained their own culture although in contact with arabised groups. (5)

Both being fiercely patrilineal peoples, they tended to completely absorb 'strangers' rather than produce any intermediate group.(6) This uneasy balance in the centre, and gradual influence in the east and west, continued until outside influences provided one side with firearms and a reason to use them.

### The Turco-Egyptian Period

The Turco-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan in 1820-21 was to upset this balance. Firstly, it was the avowed intent of the new regime to use the Sudan as a slave reservoir to bolster the army in Egypt. 'You are aware that the end of all our effort and this expense is to procure negroes. Please show zeal in carrying out our wishes in this capital matter.' (7) The second important factor was the iniquitous taxation imposed upon the riverain northern Sudanese. As coin was rarely used, taxes could be paid in slaves, and so, directly and indirectly, the invaders created a huge increase in demand and slave raiding became both a public and a private concern, with black male slaves becoming, for a time, a generally accepted currency. New impetus was given to slave trading in the traditional areas such as the southern Funj, and especially in the west where northern Sudanese *jellaba* (8) operating from *zeribas* (9) near Hofrat En Nahas and Telquana were already penetrating farther and farther into the Bahr El Ghazal. The area was to provide between twelve and fifteen thousand slaves per annum at the height of the trade.(10)

Not only did the newcomers bring a new dimension to the slave trade, but they also provided the means to open new areas to exploitation. Before 1820 firearms were rarely used in the Sudan (11), but by 1827 their use against the Dinka opened the way from Er Roseries to the Sobat, and in 1830 undermined the ascendancy of the Shilluk on the White Nile. These two early expeditions raised together only seven hundred slaves (12) but they marked the beginning of large-scale organized slave raiding in the Sudan, and by 1838 it was (13) estimated that ten to twelve thousand slaves were annually exported to Egypt. In the wake of the government raiders came northern Sudanese operators, having been provided with both the means and the market. Artillery fire had finally pierced the first bulwark of the Southern Sudan - the Nilotic peoples.

Although, with the possible exception of the Shilluk, they were not to suffer as much as many, being able to withdraw to the swamps, the way was now open for an attack on the already weakened and disrupted peoples farther to the south. The second bulwark, the *sudd*, was to be pierced by Captain Selim in 1839 on the orders of the Egyptian Government, and by 1841 he had succeeded in reaching Gondokoro.(14) European merchants and missionaries were the first to settle on the Bahr El Jebel, and although the climate initially defeated the missionaries, a number of European merchants organised regular expeditions, trading cloth, beads and wire for ivory, until by 1863 an annual total of one hundred and twenty boats were travelling between Gondokoro and Khartoum.(15)

Although initial contacts with the Bor Dinka and the Bari were friendly, the difficulties of pursuing the ivory trade were soon to result in what Collins has described as 'a spiral of violence'. (16) Once the supply of ivory close to the river was exhausted, the traders had to relinquish the technological superiority afforded them by their boats, and once on land they were completely dependent on the co-operation of the Africans. As ivory supplies diminished the Bari demanded a higher 'price' and, when it was not forthcoming, refused to co-operate. Added to this was the scornful attitude and hostile behaviour towards the native inhabitants of the Egyptian officials and Northern Sudanese soldiers, mingled with the impatience of the Europeans. By 1849 the original friendly co-operation had been replaced by fear among the local inhabitants and the use of force amongst the traders. The efforts of the traders were hampered by the lack of any centralized authority among the Bari with which to deal, or with whose co-operation to exploit the hinterland. Thus direct expeditions into the interior were mounted to establish permanent, fortified stations or *seribas*, manned by large numbers of armed Northern Sudanese servants.(17)

While the prime reason for the expansion inland remained the acquisition of ivory, the Northern Sudanese and the Egyptian officials soon became involved in slave trading, to which the Europeans acquiesced, the slaves being a product of their violent exploitation of traditional hostility. As the supply of ivory decreased and a growing number of employees became necessary, the viability of the trade could only be assured by indirectly paying these employees in slaves, or permitting them to engage in the trade under the protection of the stations.

Some Europeans were directly involved in the trade and their slaves were sent north, together with those of their retainers to Kaka on the White Nile, at the rate of two thousand per annum by 1860.(18)

Gradually the traders pushed westwards towards the Yei River: from Shambe inland to Rumbek and, after the opening of the Bahr El Ghazal in 1855, down as far as the Luo and the Bongo. It was the small agricultural groups, already subject to the expansion of the Dinka and the Azande, who were to suffer the most, and their lands along the edge of the ironstone plateau were '...occupied at intervals of five to six leagues with settlements of Khartoomers in their palisaded *zeribas*...from the River Rhol north-westwards to the River Lol there stretched a series of more than eighty of these stations.' (19) Expansion to the north was made difficult by the almost universal hostility of the Dinka and Nuer and, using the *zeribas* as secure bases, the traders moved towards the south and the Azande. Initially they were prepared to seek the co-operation of the more powerful and centralized Azande, superimposing the *zeriba* system upon the traditional organization, but only until they discovered that again they could make use of dynastic rivalry and discriminate violence. The security of the *zeriba* system attracted increasing numbers of *jellaba* who exchanged goods with the traders' employees for a few slaves, or acted as agents for wealthy slave traders in Darfur and Kordofan. The more capable were to form a new ruling class in the 1860's, with the most 'successful', Al Zubair Rahma Mansur, as their leader. (20) Gradually the Europeans were driven out by decreasing profits, taxation and disease and their *zeribas* taken over by Copts, Syrians, Egyptians and Northern Sudanese. The power of the new class of slave trader was not confined to the Bahr El Ghazal. A *Dongolawi*, Mohammad Kheir, established control of Kaka and by 1860 was raiding the Dinka and the Shilluk.(21) In one pitched battle with the Shilluk in 1861 he took five hundred captives and some twelve thousand cattle. (22) On the Bahr El Jebel the trade continued but not to the extent reported by Baker, whose exaggeration contributed to an over-estimate of the White Nile trade and a subsequent tendency to underestimate the overland trade via Kordofan and Darfur. In addition to what we might term the private sector, the government, in the form of the Governor-General, frequently conducted 'recruiting raids' to maintain the army at twenty-seven thousand men.(23)

Following the missionaries, European merchants, slave traders and the *jellaba*, came yet a further 'invasion' - that of Egyptian exploration and administration. Initially, administration was confined to the White Nile, where both the Dinka and the Shilluk were to suffer from both its inefficiency and its repression. In 1868 the chief administrator at Fashoda ordered the Shilluk and the Dinka to pay an annual tribute of about £15,000 (24), and their failure to do so resulted in extensive government raiding of both men and cattle. The operations of the river police against the slave trade were rendered ineffective by the corruptability of officials, the fact that the Bahr El Jebel was not a major slave route, and that what little trade had used the route could easily be diverted to avoid the attentions of the police force. Although the importation of slaves into Egypt was banned in 1854, the most valuable slaves - women and eunuchs - were still smuggled into Egypt and Turkey, and the preventive measures taken at Zanzibar increased the demand for Sudanese slaves in Arabia. Merchants from Jeddah established their agents in Northern Sudan and dealt with the *jellaba* and other traders. By 1876 about thirty thousand slaves were being shipped across the Red Sea every year.(25)

While the extensive slave trade in the Southern Sudan was operated with the connivance of some of the local leaders, whether willingly or as the lesser of two evils, the majority of the people remained hostile to all intruders, and to all 'administration'. Not only were the dual tasks of expansion and administration (specifically the cessation of the slave trade) in some senses contradictory, but Egypt's representatives throughout the Sudan were constantly denied the means to fully accomplish either task. There was insufficient logistical support for the expansion of Egyptian influence to the South, and only thoroughly corrupt or ineffective Egyptian and Northern Sudanese officials with which to attempt administration. In attempting to push south from Gondokoro, the various expeditions found themselves having constantly to resort to violent methods, so increasing hostility rather than pacifying the countryside. In attempting to end the slave trade, they found themselves in constant conflict with their own officials and with Northern tribal leaders on whom Egypt's rather tenuous system of indirect rule depended.

Thus rather than extending influence and tightening up administration, the various European officials employed by Cairo, such as Baker, Gordon, Gessi and Emin, found themselves intensifying hostility and fomenting rebellion. Egypt's iniquitous exploitation of all Sudanese had made the slave trade inevitable and essential. It had become the very basis of commercial life, and to call for its abandonment without replacing it with some alternative commercial activity was both unreasonable and unwise. The ravages of the Egyptians in the Northern Sudan, coupled with other factors such as famine, produced ideal conditions for the rise of a *Mahdi*.(26) In the Southern Sudan interference in the slave trade produced widespread opposition to the administration, culminating in open hostility, and although Gessi and, to a lesser extent, Gordon controlled the overt trade in slaves, as soon as the government was attacked in the North, both the traders and the local inhabitants of the South joined the rebellion.

#### The Mahdiyya

The *Mahdists* were the followers of Mohammad Ahmed al Mahdi, who rose against the Egyptian administration in the early 1880's. As Hodgkin has explained, an essential part of *Mahdist* theory was to regard armed revolutionary struggle or *jihād* as a method of establishing a perfected social order, that is, a perfected Islamic state. Of the aspects of the general theory given by Hodgkin, the most significant in terms of this study is the idea that the *Mahdi* had a responsibility to conduct *jihād*, particularly against nominal and backsliding Muslims who rejected his mission, and so to ensure the universal triumph of Islam.(27) The movement in the Sudan was therefore essentially expansionist, and the forces which invaded the Southern Sudan came not only to expel the Egyptians but also to claim the area for Islam.

The *Mahdist* invasion of the Southern Sudan has been described as a series of '...extended raids which upset the traditional pattern of tribal life and left nothing behind but anarchy and fear.' (28) Certainly they were yet another twist in the spiral of violence. Like many before them, the *Mahdists* were too few in number to rule with anything other than the sword.

Merely to maintain their position they had to undertake raid after raid, their methods becoming increasingly violent and indiscriminate. In 1896 over a thousand slaves were sent from their station at Rejaf to the market in Omdurman. (29) The necessity of the use of force largely discredited their religious message. Although it initially appeared that the *Mahdists* had the support of Southern tribes such as the Dinka and the Nuer, their rebellion subsequently proved to be more a reaction against Egyptian rule and the terror of the slave raiders than a support of the *Mahdi*. Having helped to dislodge the Egyptians, their aim was to achieve independence - not merely to exchange one repressive administration for another. The *Mahdist* forces conquered the Bahr El Ghazal in 1884-85 and in 1888 attacked the remaining Egyptian stations on the Bahr El Jebel, becoming involved in a struggle for control with the Belgians and the forces of the Congo Free State, until finally defeated in 1897 at the battle of Rejaf. (30) By September 1898 the *Mahdiyya* was at an end.

All three waves of invaders, the slave traders, the Egyptian administration, and the *Mahdists*, based their relationship with the people of the Southern Sudan on the use of force and widespread violence. Not only did they, directly or indirectly, send many thousands of people into slavery, but they disrupted traditional organization and society to the extent of almost annihilating several small groups. Gordon estimated that during only the four years from 1875-1879 some eighty to one hundred thousand slaves were exported from the Bahr El Ghazal. (31)

In the propoganda war which accompanied the civil war in the 1960's, several Northern Sudanese writers, politicians and academics have attempted to minimize the effects of the slave trade, and the part played by Northern Sudanese; but while making every effort to be objective, it is hard to see how their opinions can be substantiated. In 1965, the then Prime Minister, Sayed Sir Khatim El Khalifa, claimed that the cultural differences in the Sudan would not have led to corresponding differences '...had it not been for the evil colonial policies which were inflicted upon the country by the British administration during half a century and had it not been for the

grotesquely unjust campaign which enormously exaggerated the role of our ancestors both Northerners and Southerners in the slave trade...' He goes on to talk of '...hypocritical European missionaries...' and the '...perversion of education...' and the '...deliberate distortion of the picture of historical relations between the peoples of Northern and Southern Sudan.' (32) Ali, writing in 1972, blamed the Anti-Slavery Society and administrators such as Gordon for interrupting the forced cultural assimilation of the South by the North. (33) The same writer again blames Gordon for initiating the secession movement, 'Gordon was the initiator of what is now called the "Southern Problem". He worked...towards separating what are now the southern provinces from the northern provinces by adopting the policy of dispersing and harrying the northern elements and factors from many parts of the south.' (34) Although he had earlier accused Gordon of failing in his duty to suppress the slave trade, a trade which the writer seems to suggest hardly existed at all, 'by the standards of western slavery, most slaves, if not all, in the Sudan who were categorised by British writers as slaves were not slaves at all.' (35)

Beshir, writing in 1967, places most of the blame on the European traders and states that 'the 'myth' of the rapacious Arab slave trader has been used to embitter relations between the North and the South'. (36) He goes on to recount that during the Mahdiyya 'private slave trading was prohibited by the Khalifa.' (37) while omitting to mention that it in fact became a government monopoly. However he later recounts the continuation of slave trading among Northern Sudanese of the Funj until 1928. (38) As late as 1973 essentially similar views constituted official Khartoum policy. 'Waves of invaders, usually led by treasure-seeking European adventurers or backed by big capital investors, overran the country, robbed it of their strong men and women, and left behind only bitterness and hatred of the outsider. Whatever degree of Northern participation there was in this became distorted and exaggerated by the fact that they were neighbours who symbolized the outsider who was hidden far beyond the reach, even the comprehension, of the Southerner. This was exacerbated by the fact that the South had too hostile a natural environment for the Arabs to settle and integrate with the people on the basis of mutual respect as they had done in the North. As the South witnessed aggression, it intensified its hostile reaction. A chain of cause and effect provided little opportunity for the Northerner to demonstrate alternative bases for interaction.' (39)

Each invasion suffered by the Southern Sudan was actively supported by Northern Sudanese in considerable numbers, if not actually originated by them. Neither European traders nor Egyptians were ever present in the South in sufficient numbers to 'achieve' what they did without many Northern Sudanese employees. In addition, each wave of invaders attracted in its wake thousands of *jellaba* and other northern traders and settlers. (40)

#### Environmental Destruction

While great stress has been placed on the social destruction of nineteenth century Southern Sudan, less attention has been paid to the economic disruption and widespread environmental destruction. All invaders coming from the North had an impossibly long line of supply and all were, either willingly or unwillingly, forced to live off the land, usually at the expense of the local inhabitants. The ravages of the invaders in search of grain caused widespread famine in some areas, but what is perhaps more interesting and very much more fundamental in its long term effects, was their extensive cattle raiding. The confiscation of cattle was necessary to the ivory traders, not only for their own survival, but also as a means of exchange, especially among the Nilotics who prized them highly, and had soon become resistant to the appeal of beads and certainly had no use for cloth. The Syrian trader, Habib, took two thousand head of cattle in a single raid on the Bor Dinka, in order to trade them for ivory. (41) In 1864, Debono collected an immense store of ivory purchased with plundered cattle. (42) In 1864 Baker had noticed the great change among the Acholi where ivory traders had plundered four thousand head of cattle, (43) and in 1872 was forced against his better judgement to resort to cattle raiding against the Bari to support his forces at Gondokoro; and in 1873 relieved them of two thousand five hundred head with which to pay for porters. (44)

The slave raiders used the Nilotics desire to recoup their losses as a means of mobilizing their forces in inter-tribal hostilities which inevitably resulted in opportunities for the capture of slaves. The administration of both the Egyptians and the *Mahdists* used widespread cattle confiscation as a punitive measure against recalcitrant peoples. Even Gessi, who perhaps made more effort than most to come to terms with the local inhabitants, used punitive cattle raids as a means of controlling the Atuat Dinka. (45)

In 1877 hundreds of cattle were taken from the Kalika, a Madi sub-tribe, and when Emin visited them in 1882 they had lost every one. Junker describes how in some districts the raising of cattle had almost disappeared. (46) Even among the stronger Dinka tribes, cattle losses were severe. Among the Agar the bride-price was reduced from 50-60 cows to only 8-10. (47)

A comparison of livestock records of 1948 with the nineteenth century history of the area shows a marked correlation between extensive cattle raiding and subsequent tsetse infestation. The peoples recorded as having lost nearly all their cattle and suffering from the destruction of the environment by tsetse by Beaton in 1948 (48) (the Madi, southern Bari, Acholi, Kalika, Moru, and Nyangwara) were all recorded by Gray as having suffered extensive cattle raids. (49) Tsetse forced the Dinka to abandon dry season grazing areas to the east of the River Gel which had been usable before the Turco-Egyptian period, and one is tempted to equate the Jur River tsetse area with the much used traders' corridor from Meshra Er Reg to the *zeriba* belt.

It would appear that the removal of cattle resulted in the widespread destruction of the environment and areas which had once maintained vast herds of cattle were within a short period rendered unusable. (50) Only by remembering the social value placed on cattle can we begin to realize the significance of this loss.

When one considers both the human and the environmental damage one begins to appreciate the degree of devastation wrought by the invaders of the nineteenth century on the Southern Sudan. 'The *Dongalawi* ... captured our people and sold them. They would go, attack any village, and capture people ....They did not bring order. Nor did they unite the country ...He would attack and destroy an area and when he conquered them he would take the people and add them to his army as slaves. And he would use them to attack the next tribe .... Many sections disappeared. Many Dinkas went into the wilderness and disappeared ....In some sections only thirty or forty remained. A section with fifty people was considered a large one ...It was a destruction in which, if you saw a man, you considered yourself dead....Any man at all, even a black man, if you saw him, you were dead if you had no greater strength of your own. And he would take your things ....Great leaders were left without anything.' (51) To this day the Dinka refer to the period as '....the time when the world was spoilt.' (52)

However the fear and resentment of the Southern Sudanese for the arabised northerner may have subsequently been modified by colonial policies, it was in the slave trade, the Egyptian and *Mahdist* invasions, and the extensive environmental devastation, that it had its genesis.

#### British Administration: Pacification and Compartmentalization

In considering the British administrative policies (53) it is important to remember the widespread destruction of the whole of the Sudan and especially the Southern Sudan, during the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya, as it fundamentally conditioned both the policies and the response of the local inhabitants. (54) The British, with the usual European desire for peace and order, saw around them only disruption and chaos. '...I have seen many unwholesome spots; but for God-forsaken, dry sucked, fly-blown wilderness, commend me to the Upper Nile. A desolation of desolations, an infernal region, a howling waste of weed, mosquitoes, flies and fever, backed by a groaning waste of thorns and stones - waterless and waterlogged. I have passed through it, and now have no fear for the hereafter.' (55) Early British administration in the Southern Sudan, therefore had two basic aims: to keep the peace within the south by ordering, separating and compartmentalizing, in an effort to eliminate conflicts they failed to understand; and to keep the peace between the North and the South, again by ordering and separating.

By 1920 the Southern Sudan was divided into three provinces, Upper Nile, Bahr El Ghazal and Mongalla, but pacification of the area was to take some considerable time. Among the peoples who had suffered the most during the previous century there was an early, if unenthusiastic, acceptance of British administration, but among the more fiercely independent there was a period of considerable resistance. In 1912 the Anuak killed forty-seven soldiers including five officers; in 1919 the Aliab Dinka in Bahr El Ghazal killed the Governor Chauncey Stigand; in 1927 the Nuer killed their District Commissioner, Mr. Vere Ferguson, and as recently as 1941, the District Commissioner of Tonj was severely wounded. Until 1933 the Bari '...still entertained the happy belief that the foreigner who was building Juba would disappear just as his predecessor who built Gondokoro, Rejaf and Mongalla had left Bariland.' (56)

Conflict between the local inhabitants and the administration was readily understood and dealt with, but conflict between different tribal groups was often misunderstood. It was inevitable after a century of disruption that inter-tribal conflict should characterize efforts to regain the original man/land/cattle environmental balance. The efforts to prevent this inevitable conflict resulted in a misunderstanding of the aims of the administration and, with the failure to achieve a balance, the potential conflict was merely refrigerated. The administration, in trying to make some order from the prevailing chaos, endeavoured to do so by building the confidence of the people, and regretted that punitive expeditions, so redolent of earlier invaders, had to be employed. There was, however, little alternative, given the chronic shortage of finance and manpower.

The original British policy for the governing of such a vast country with insufficient men was one of indirect rule. While this met with some success in Northern Sudan, it was not to prove a practical possibility in the South. The administration wanted to utilize the authority of local leaders, but for humanitarian reasons also wished to selectively control those practices which were considered abuses, and by so doing they undermined the very authority they wished to employ. 'Thus, the administrative demands of the conquerors not only undermined traditional prerogatives but reduced the chiefs to servants of the government.....Those who refused to co-operate were broken. Those who abused their position were sacked.....Their successors were chosen by the government to carry out the government's will .....Consequently their influence and prestige decreased.' (57) Among the Nilotic peoples, the administration failed to realize that the traditional political system did not allow for the vesting of such powers in one individual, and Collins recounts the case of a Dinka who was forced to leave his village because the people refused to obey him, and he no longer wished to be held responsible for their behaviour. (58)

Although the declared policy was one of indirect rule, in practice administration became increasingly direct. The response of the Southern Sudanese to all invaders - whether slave raiders, Egyptians, Mahdists or British or, in recent years, Northern Sudanese - has been one of continuing resistance whether passive or active, the mode depending very much on the traditions of individual groups. Faced with this resistance, the limited aims of the early administrators were to maintain peace, build roads and collect taxes where possible. As peace was gradually established, the

authority of chiefs gradually declined; without the necessity for centralized leadership there was a return to the traditional political fragmentation, especially among the Nilotic peoples.

By 1920 the administration was beginning to realize that by undermining what remained of traditional political organisation during the period of pacification, they had made indirect rule an impossibility, and so in the early 1920's they embarked upon the task of re-establishing or re-discovering the traditional authorities, despite the fact that they had little understanding of the manner in which traditional society functioned. 'I take it that it is now clearly realized that the policy of the Government is to get the administration of affairs which are purely native back on to a tribal basis and that the function of the Government is to supervise, guide and mould tribal organization, rather than destroy such systems of customary law, discipline and culture as the natives already possess.' (59)

The first step was the delegation of judicial powers to the local authorities in the form of chiefs courts. This however did little to re-assert the prestige of the chiefs, especially as they were now even more liable to dismissal for failure to interpret local custom in terms of European values, or merely for lacking the necessary bureaucratic skills. 'Our most difficult task at the present moment is to find suitable chiefs with sufficient tribal authority to control those under them and at the same time being capable of appreciating the Government's methods to such an extent as to be able to act as the teachers of the people.' (60) What was in fact to develop was a double standard. Deng has noted that among the Dinka, no shame was attached to conviction or punishment meted out by a court which was to some degree under the control of the government, unless the offence was shameful by traditional criteria. (61) In fact, among all the Nilotic peoples, the government had failed to realize that the individuals in power during the period of resistance were a response to an emergency situation, and were not the traditional dispensers of justice. A letter from the Governor of Upper Nile Province to the Civil Secretary in 1927 concerning the difficulties of administering the Nuer, illustrates this point. 'Cattle cases are only heard by the cattle chief, land cases by the land chief and so on. ....Unfortunately, when we first started administering this province, this ancient system was not known and it has only recently been realized. In our ignorance we presumed that a chief was a dispenser of justice in every case and was generally paramount in the tribe. Undoubtedly in many instances a

kujur or witchdoctor had usurped this paramount right and the old system had fallen into disuse. Through lack of knowledge and inexperience we failed to grasp this point, and jumping over this stage, we appointed chiefs to whom we looked as the responsible head.' (62)

Despite these fundamental inconsistencies, chiefs courts proliferated throughout the Southern Sudan, and the government congratulated itself on laying the foundations for native administration, although the enthusiasm shown by many local people was perhaps more a reflection of their intense love of litigation, rather than any real desire to co-operate with the government.

In order to define the authority of the courts, the colonial administration embarked upon a process of compartmentalization, that is the allotting of peoples to certain defined territorial areas, and within those areas to certain local authorities. If we refer back to the last chapter, we can see that this policy completely disregarded the traditional spatial organization, essentially characterised by a high degree of freedom of movement and a low degree of political affiliation. It restricted not only personal freedom but, especially among the Nilotic peoples, it prevented the employment of the traditional sub-division of groups as a means of environmental adjustment. A spatial organization which had originally been one of dynamic interaction, became one of static co-existence; the genealogical map was replaced by the straight line. 'At the end of time the English will come to you, whose soldiers are called police: they will measure the land even to the blades of the sedge grass.' (63)

As Larken, District Commissioner among the Zande from 1911 to 1932, has recalled, local chiefs were actually made to tour the boundaries of their territories in an effort to define the extent of their influence. '...I fixed arbitrary ones (boundaries) of my own.....I made each chief, and his headmen walk round them with me, if they were physically capable of doing so - a job they detested, being used to the lazy life of chiefs - and at the finish gave each a "map" of his country, showing its newly demarcated limits, and a list of his boundary streams. These they carefully treasured in a hollow bamboo, plugged with a maize cob.' (64) The division of the land reflected

the diminution of the power of rebellion, and Reining notes that five powerful chiefdoms in Zandeland were divided into as many as twenty-eight petty chiefdoms. (65) In the 1920's Zande chiefs complained that while their power might in theory extend to the boundaries demarcated by the District Commissioner, the people who formed their guide to the extent of their influence were moving away from the district and away from their jurisdiction. Again Larken recalls that 'Young men began to show a regrettable tendency to leave their homes for Wau or even Khartoum .... Experience abundantly and clearly showed that no Zande was ever a better man for a course of communal living, and most definitely a worse tribesman .... all manner of criminal instincts being latent in his character .... town life brought them out in him, which his simple tribal life did not ....' He was convinced that should the process of social change '....be hurried or forced in any way, the ruination of a potentially excellent tribe, and chaos in its area, will most certainly ensue.' (66) By 1922 the Zande were forbidden to move from one chiefdom to another, which removed one of the traditional constraints on the power of the chiefs. (67) In 1908 there was fierce conflict between the Dinka and the Nuer of the Zeraf Valley, primarily the result of cattle plague. The response of the government was to cancel all cases between the Dinka and the Nuer prior to April 1908 and to draw a line between them. (68) This drawing of lines was to have environmental as well as political effects. Attempts to reduce wet season conflicts among the Dinka by segregation prevented the traditional dry season co-operation and subsequently resulted in overgrazing in some areas.(69) Gradually this European approach to spatial organization supplanted the traditional African approach.

Having organized and compartmentalized the population of the Southern Sudan into self-contained tribal units, it became essential, if the method of administration was to succeed, to protect those units from outside interference. Not only was each tribe and sub-tribe to be separated as much as possible from each other; they were also to be protected from alien influences other than British. Perhaps in no other area of colonial Africa was British rule quite so paternal.

However there could be no tribal revitalization if there was also contact with Muslim Northern Sudanese, and although not at the time part of official policy, the removal of such influences had already begun as early as 1910. In that year Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor General of the Sudan, approved the formation of a locally recruited force, which by 1917 permitted the withdrawal<sup>a</sup> of Northern Sudanese troops from the South. The recruitment of the Equatorial Battalion not only provided a useful counterweight against the still suspect Muslim armed forces, but it also resulted in the removal of the actively proselytizing Muslims in their ranks. To understand the attitude of British administrators to the propagation of Islam, it is important to recall that memories of the dedication of the followers of the Mahdi were very fresh in their minds. R.C.R.Owen, the Governor of Mongalla Province, who in fact suggested the raising of the Equatorial Battalion also suggested to Wingate the formation of '...a large Christian population which would eventually link up with Uganda and form a substantial buffer or check to the spread of a faith, such as the Muslim, which may at any time break out into a wave of fanaticism.' (70)

Although part of this fear of Islam was based on a concern with the security situation, there was also, <sup>IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN,</sup> a general dislike of the religion and its perpetrators, among British administrators. Extracts from the memoirs of Larkin provide an insight into the prevailing attitude. 'Anything that savoured of the north was discouraged, and the return to Wau of resident Arabs was welcomed. The writer has been called "fanatically opposed" to the infiltration of Arab culture into the country, and with truth: his object being to maintain tribalization until it should have become clear that the Azande had advanced far enough for the substitution of some other social system, without being harmed thereby.' (71) Describing Tambura in 1911 he recalls 'Some Arab settlers had their homes close by, and a definite northern atmosphere hung about the place.....ivory, that was confiscable could have been disposed of to them.....and they could have been a source of supply of cheap wives for the Wau boys.....their wives also probably made a lot of spirit.....I believe the main reason for their presence was to be first in the field when the Government withdrew, for it was thought locally that this would happen.....About 1914 orders came from the Governor that they must accept Tambura as their overlord, and be bound by Zande law, if they wished to remain. Some of them thereupon withdrew to Wau.' (72)

### Christianity and Missionary Education

The growing isolation of the Southern Sudan was also reflected in the policies regarding education and language which had their beginnings in decisions as to the religious future of the territory. Representatives of various missionary societies had followed hard on the heels of the British administration, only to find that the administration was to debar their activities in the Northern Sudan, in order not to offend the Muslim population, and instead direct their attention to the Upper Nile.(73) A system of 'spheres of influence' was formulated and outlined in the 'Regulations and Conditions under which Missionary Work is Permitted in the Sudan' 1905. The Church Missionary Society was to have a monopoly of the Bahr El Jebel Valley and over much of Upper Nile Province and eastern Bahr El Ghazal Province; the Presbyterian American Mission was granted territory from the Bahr El Zeraf to the River Sobat, with the Verona Fathers Catholic Mission having most of the western Bahr El Ghazal Province. None was allowed north of the tenth parallel. In the early years most effort seems to have been expended on domestic quarrels and inter-society rivalry and, with the possible exception of the modest gains of the Americans, little was achieved. During their first five years at Malek, the Christian Missionary Society failed to make a single convert, enroll a single student or even gain the sympathy of the local Dinka, seemingly being more concerned at the territorial gains of the Catholics rather than the 'saving of souls'.

While the individual societies were suspicious of each other, they were doubly suspicious of the role of Northern Sudanese in spreading Islam, and it must be remembered that a large part of their motive in being on the Upper Nile was as much to save it from Islam as to gain it for Christianity. They also equated the use of Arabic with the spread of Islam, and their fears certainly contributed to the subsequent decision by the government to discourage Arabic, and attempt to make English a *lingua franca*.

The initial attitude of the administration had been to see the missionaries as just another problem, but by 1901 Wingate had realized that if he wished to build up a Christian counterweight population in the Southern Sudan he would have to give the societies greater encouragement. (74) However, from the first the religious zeal of the government was underlined by administrative convenience. The missions were expected to train clerks and artisans to staff the bureaucracy, without putting a strain on the government's slender finances. 'The object which the Government has in view is educational. It is for those who voluntarily.....enter this field of work to adapt the secular and educational policy of the Government to the needs of their special religious persuasion.' (75) The government was happy to leave education in the hands of the missionaries, and was to realize only much later that the limited means of the societies were not alone going to produce the literate, English-speaking clerks they wished to utilize in the administration. Of the three main societies, the Catholics were perhaps the most successful in attracting students, but the low standard of education can be imagined, with Italians endeavouring to teach English to Dinka. All three included a varying amount of simple technical training in the curriculum, often in an attempt to make the establishment self-supporting as much as to impart knowledge. These educational opportunities were not much appreciated by the Southern Sudanese and administrators had eventually to force local chiefs to send their children to school.

By 1922 the government was beginning to realize that if a trained class of Southern officials was ever to be produced they would have to play a much more direct part in education. However it was still the intention to do so through the missionary societies, mainly by closer control of schools and a system of grants in aid, and by 1927 a total grant of £E. 3,650 was provided. There were two basic types of school: elementary vernacular schools with a four year course aiming at basic literacy and simple technical skills, and intermediate schools at which the language of instruction was English, with six year courses of study aimed at producing teachers, clerks and minor officials. In 1930 there were thirty-two elementary schools with 2,024 pupils, and three intermediate schools with 177 pupils and by 1936 the elementary schools had increased to 36 with 2,977 pupils and 246 children were attending intermediate schools. In addition there were, by 1936, eighteen girls-schools with 760 pupils and three trades schools with 100 boys. (76)

The question of language in the Southern Sudan had always posed a problem. The administration had been perturbed at the inroads made by pidgin Arabic as a *lingua franca*, especially in the main towns, as this did not accord with their plans for 'Africanization'. However, the problem was to find an alternative, and the government's efforts to find a solution to the problem exposed the contradictions inherent in their administrative policy. The Rejaf Language Conference of 1928 had proposed the use of certain group languages, Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Shilluk, Latuka and Zande, to be used as vernaculars for instruction in elementary schools but, as Collins has noted '...by no stretch of the imagination could forcing the Azande language or English on the Kreish...be called developing the indigenous customs...' (77) Moreover such a small percentage of the population came into contact with missionary education or the administration that for the majority there was no real incentive to learn English. To the ordinary tribesman the only necessity to learn a second language was to engage in simple trading transactions, and for that purpose pidgin Arabic was more than adequate. Despite the efforts of the administration to encourage the use of English, and other even more extreme suggestions such as the imposition of Swahili, pidgin Arabic continued in use, but with official disapproval never developed into a really meaningful vehicle for communication. The discouragement of Arabic removed an adequate means of communication between the North and the South Sudan, and the limited means of the administration prevented the development of any single language to facilitate communication within the South.

As early as 1918, Sunday had become the official day of rest, and by 1921, when it was suggested that English should replace Arabic as the official language, the missionaries were beginning to make some slight impression. However opinion as to the future was still divided, with some administrators such as Larkin doing all they could to remove all Northern influence, while others beset with greater problems condoned it. The more enlightened, such as Woodland, Governor of Mongalla, could foresee the inevitable confusion and gradually demands were made for the formulation of a definite policy.

### The Southern Policy and Isolation

When the Southern Policy was finally decided it was, as we have seen, to render official a process that had already begun. In 1930 MacMichael, the Civil Secretary of the Sudan Government, issued the following memorandum: 'The Policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial and tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.' (78)

To enable the policy to succeed all Muslim and therefore Northern influences were to be gradually removed. The language of administration was to be English and all Arabic speaking personnel were to be replaced. Most Northern traders were to be encouraged to leave, and their places taken by Syrians and Greeks, the permits to trade of the *jellaba* being '.....decreased unobtrusively but progressively.' (79) The British administrators were to familiarize themselves with local languages, customs and beliefs, assistance in this task being provided by such experts as Tucker and Evans-Pritchard. For a detailed account of the Southern Policy see Appendix 1.

The implementation of this policy naturally varied from place to place but, as might have been expected, the more fanatically anti-Arab administrators were to take implementation to extreme lengths, especially regarding the more trivial aspects. While some administrators set deadlines for the abandonment of Arabic names, others appreciated the more farcical elements of the policy. The District Commissioner of Raga, in a letter to the Governor of Bahr El Ghazal in 1932 protested '.....it is not consistent that I should insist on them using their proper tribal names and dropping their foreign (Arabic) ones when the Missions are permitted to baptize them with another foreign (Italian) name.' (80) There were also other areas of confusion. The administrators, who had waged an uphill battle against the unabashed nudity of the Nilotics, found themselves having to actively discourage a form of dress they had previously promoted. The poor tribesman had not only to adopt the seemingly pointless European habit of covering the body, but must now also be aware of what was fashionable. The following

were instructions sent by the District Commissioner to a Greek trader in Raga in 1935. 'I notice that in spite of frequent requests to the contrary, large quantities of 'Arab' clothing are still being made and sold. Please note that, in future it is forbidden to make or sell such clothes. Shirts should be made short with a collar and opening down the front in the European fashion and not an open neck as worn by the Baggara of Darfur.....you are given till the end of February to dispose of your present stock. This order applies to all outside agents and owners of sewing machines.' (81)

Not only were all individual Arab influences to be removed from the Southern Sudan, but active measures were taken to reinforce the area's isolation from the rest of the country. As we have noted earlier, there had long been interaction between the peoples of the North and South in the western Bahr El Ghazal and as a result arabization had been greater there than in any other area. Groups such as the Banda and the Kreish had adopted many Arab customs, and others such as the Feroqe had been partially absorbed into the Arab tribal organization. Throughout the area the majority of chiefs were practising Muslims, and it was obvious that here a more fundamental policy would be required. The British administration decided to solve the problem by creating a 'no-mans-land' between the North and the South. All Arab immigrants, some 3,000 people, were re-settled in Darfur, and the indigenous people were re-grouped and re-settled south of the Raga-Kafia Kingi road. The town of Kafia Kingi was abandoned and destroyed and the administrative centre of Raga was moved to its present location. The only real resistance to the policy came from Isa Ahmad Fertak, chief of the Feroqe, whose case, complaining of religious and linguistic discrimination, became for a time a *cause célèbre* among emergent nationalists in Khartoum. (82)

This isolation of the South was compounded by earlier legislation. The Passports and Permits Ordinance (1922) and the Permits to Trade Order (1925) effectively controlled movement within the country. Not only did they prevent Northerners influencing the South, but they controlled the movement of Southerners to Khartoum and the towns of the North, where they might have realized that the economic development and the emergent spirit of nationalism were passing them by.

The economic aspects associated with the Southern Policy were also to have a profound effect. In essence they allowed a completely unrealistic economic situation to prevail in the South. Locally recruited staff who replaced the Northern minor officials had their scales of pay set artificially low. Newly appointed staff were paid £E 18 to £E 20 per annum, with an annual increase of between £E 3 and £E 6. Local market prices were kept low and the cost of labour fixed at 1 to 2 piastres per day.(83) The preoccupation of the administrators with the maintenance of law and order, had little time or money for any economic development, and at a time when Northern Sudan was witnessing the building of the Sennar Dam and the beginnings of the Gezira Scheme, the South had to be content with a level of development that did not really extend beyond the horticultural experiments of a few District Commissioners. Where cash crops were tentatively introduced, great pains were taken to ensure that the traditional life-style of the people was not disturbed. The administration tried to encourage limited production of suitable crops to enable people to pay their taxes, but at the same time wished to restrict the commercialization of the Southern provinces. The Governor of Upper Nile Province, in his report for 1925, was anxious to keep prices low. 'To provide means for the present generation to acquire sufficient wealth to enable them to obtain all the various luxuries civilization brings, would in my opinion, be disastrous. For this reason I am anxious that the price given for cotton should not be too high.'(84)

The cost of administering such a large area, just in terms of road maintenance and peace keeping, was very high, taxation revenue was always very low and costly to collect, and there was virtually nothing remaining for any kind of real development. It must be remembered that during perhaps the most crucial period of British administration, 1915-1945, the First and Second World Wars and the economic depression of the thirties made any large-scale financial support for the area virtually impossible. In addition, a large percentage of the money available was spent on the provision of medical facilities, and especially on the control of sleeping sickness. (85) In this situation it was as much as the administrator could do to maintain the *status quo*. Accordingly, the Southern Sudan began to fall farther and farther behind, not only its neighbours to the north, but also those to the south in East Africa.

Part of the rationale of the government in Khartoum towards expenditure in the South was the belief that taxation revenue raised in the North should in fairness be spent in the North. The main concern of the government was that peace should prevail in the South, and the economic and cultural isolation resulted in administrative isolation. As early as 1920 it was deemed unnecessary for the governors of the three Southern Provinces to journey to Khartoum for joint meetings; rather they were expected to solve their problems among themselves.(86) The result was a distrust of the Khartoum establishment among Southern administrators, added to which a number of officials were recruited from East Africa and had no knowledge of or interest in the northern part of the country. The attitudes and values of these Southern administrators was initially paternalistic and became more so with time, coupled with the belief that the severe constraint on government spending made progress at any level virtually impossible. The economic and administrative isolation of the South, together with the problems of communications and transport, gave rise to a concentration of development effort in the North, in both the public and private sectors, that to a great extent continues to the present day.

Many Northern Sudanese writers (87) have interpreted the Southern Policy of 1930 as a device by which the British Government intended to detach the southern half of the Sudan, and subsequently to administer it with her East African territories. While the idea was inevitably discussed, it never formed a part of official British policy. What must be remembered is that while the Southern Policy separated the South from the North, it also separated the South from all other neighbouring influences. It was effectively a policy of isolation, and during the 1930's and 1940's the Southern Sudan, while falling behind the rate of development in the North, was also falling behind that of East Africa. Rather than the British Government being blamed for pursuing a policy of separation, it should be blamed for a neglect of the South and a failure to confront the problem of its political future until it was already too late.

Some serious consideration was eventually given to this future as a response to political developments in the North. The formation of the Graduate's Congress in 1938 marked the rise of Northern nationalism, and a growing concern with the future of the whole Sudan. As we have noted in other African states, the demand was that the Sudanese should control the whole of the

territory as demarcated by the colonial powers. In a memorandum to the Civil Secretary in April 1942, the Congress called for 'The issue, on the first possible opportunity, by the British and Egyptian Governments of a joint declaration granting the Sudan, in its present geographical boundaries, the right to self-determination ...' (88) In addition demands were made for the unification of the education syllabuses in the North and the South, for the abolition of the Closed Areas Ordinances and the lifting of restrictions on trade and movement of Sudanese within the Sudan.(89) Informed Sudanese opinion was becoming increasingly concerned with the future of the South and with a policy which appeared to be an attempt to cheat the growing elite of succeeding to control of the whole country.


The response of the administration was to review and to some extent reverse the Southern Policy, and to begin seriously <sup>to</sup> consider the political future of the South. After years of neglect and stringent wartime economies, the most obvious fact was that the South was so appallingly backward as to be unable to either stand by itself, or to be a fit partner to share in a unified Sudan or an East African federation. Suggestions were made to the effect that British administration should continue in the South until the necessary development had been attained, but this proposal served merely to increase the suspicions of the Khartoum nationalists, who began to believe in the existence of a sinister plot, where in fact there had been only confusion and indecision. At last the government realized that something must be done. 'The eyes of Egypt and the Northern Sudanese are on the South, and a Southern Policy (or lack of policy) has been heavily criticised both in Cairo and Omdurman. Parts of the policy will never commend themselves to the Northern Sudanese and some criticisms have been hard to answer. If we are to carry Northern Sudanese enlightened opinion with us at all, over our Southern Policy, it is imperative that we go faster in both educational and material development. We may also have to consider external, e.g. American, opinion after the war and the impression which the present state of the Southern Sudan would give to a Mandate Commission or a Regional African Council.' (90)

The Southern Policy Revised

A combination of pressures resulted in attempts to formulate a revised Southern Policy in 1945, and three alternative futures for the South were suggested: integration with the North; integration with East Africa; or a division of the South between the North and East Africa. The marked lack of enthusiasm displayed by the East African territories helped the Sudan Government to reach a decision. Uganda was '...extremely cool towards any prospect of union with this vast and unprofitable land.' (91) The Khartoum nationalists with their fears of Ugandan irredentism, or British settlement in Zandeland, were in fact fighting hard for something that nobody else wanted, that is except the Southern Sudanese, and at this time it had not occurred to anyone to ask them their opinion.

With integration with East Africa effectively ruled out, the only alternative seemed to be integration with the North, and in 1946 the new Southern Policy was finally stated in a memorandum from the Civil Secretary. 'The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.' (92)

An examination of the memorandum stating the new policy, (see Appendix II) reveals three important factors. Perhaps most significant in light of subsequent developments was that the Government showed their marked distrust of the Northern Sudanese and their ability to deal equitably with the South, and perhaps this very document encouraged the people of the South to feel that they did have something to fear from government by Northerners. It also



**Southern Sudan** 1949-1976  
**Fig. IV**

revealed the extent of the isolation of the Southern Sudan, and the government's realization that this had been a mistake; Arabic, instead of being discouraged, was to be introduced into the intermediate school curriculum; rates of pay were to be standardized; the rules about employment of Southerners in the North were to be changed; and the whole policy of isolation was to be abandoned and in its place economic integration with the North was to be actively pursued. Finally it was as if the government had suddenly realized its earlier follies but had realized that it was already too late to make amends. The memorandum closes with the following warning: '...urgency is the essence of the problem. We no longer have time to aim at the ideal: we must aim at doing what is the best for the Southern peoples in the present circumstances.' (93)

The reactions of administrators in the South, while basically favourable, further revealed the distressing state of affairs in the area, and their fears for the South as part of a unified Sudan. '...misgivings are founded upon a knowledge of the shortcomings of the Northern Sudanese. That they could run Omdurman I believe. That they will soon be fit to govern the Rizeigat and the Hadendowa is possible. That they will in the next two decades be fit to be entrusted with the Zande and the Dinka is not even thinkable .... it is impossible that any parliament or cabal of Northern Sudanese wielding power in Khartoum should guide the destinies of Southerners.' (94) Their comments revealed a distrust not only of the North as a whole, but also of the return of individual Northerners to the South. 'The one legitimate objection to Northern officials is that experience has shown them to be constitutionally incapable of training Southerners.' However they did admit that the Southerner had grounds for legitimate complaint, and suggestions ranged from provision of higher wages, better housing, religious freedom down to the use of '...the courtesy title of Mr.' (95) What they failed to recognise or believe was that urgency was the essence of the problem, and their varied suggestions for periods of trusteeship and twenty-year development programmes showed a complete disregard, or perhaps ignorance, of the speed with which things were moving in the North.

In 1944 an advisory council was instituted in the Northern Sudan, and by 1946 there was agitation for its transformation into a legislative assembly which succeeded with the decision to form such a body in 1947. This progress towards self-government highlighted the problem of representation of the three Southern provinces, and increased the fears of the Southern administrators. Accordingly it was agreed that the matter should be discussed and in June 1947 a conference was held in Juba, attended by British administrators and Sudanese participants from both North and South. The Northern nationalists were of course very anxious that the South be represented in the Legislative Council, as to them it seemed an assurance that the Sudan would not be separated, but eventually pass to them in its entirety. The Southern participants were very much aware of their own shortcomings and doubted that their voices would be either heard or heeded in Khartoum, and frequently repeated their fears of Northern domination. Only after considerable pressure did they agree to send representatives to the council.

There have been many criticisms levelled at the Juba Conference by Southern Sudanese, but they cannot be as readily dismissed as writers such as Beshir would maintain. (96) In a memorandum by the Civil Secretary written in May 1947 and stating the terms of reference for the conference, it is evident that the Sudan Government had already decided on '...the unification of the Sudanese peoples...'. (97) Furthermore, although the Southern participants agreed that the North and South should not be separated, they did envisage, and in fact strongly demanded, both a period of time to make the necessary adjustment, and that sufficient safeguards be embodied in any future constitutional legislation to avoid the domination of the South by the North. As a result of the conference it was decided to establish Province Councils in the South from which representatives would be sent to Khartoum; however, exactly what the desired safeguards would be remained very vague, much to the displeasure of British administrators in the Southern Sudan, who had envisaged the formation of at least some intermediate assembly between Khartoum and the South, and in some cases had advocated a definite federal constitution, or at least a degree of regional autonomy. According to the minutes of the conference, the Southern Sudanese participants appear to have placed far too much importance on the ability of the British personnel to intervene in Khartoum, and certainly do not seem to have foreseen that by 1956 they would have left the Sudan to its own devices. (98)

By the time the Legislative Assembly Ordinance was passed all mention of safeguards had been dropped, there was no specific mention of the position of the Southern Sudan and even the proposed Governor General's veto was diluted to merely an application clause '...empowering the Governor-General to suspend application of any law to any part of the Sudan he might specify .... The Ordinance as now drafted therefore contains, apart from the general reserve powers of the Governor-General, no specific provision which could be called a safeguard to 'ensure the healthy and steady development of the Southern peoples' and we do not consider that any is required'. (99) So wrote the Civil Secretary in February 1948 to the three southern Governors. From that time on the three Southern Provinces ceased to have any particular position, or to be administered in any way differently from the rest of the Sudan. There was no longer any precise Southern Policy. The Legislative Assembly opened in 1948 with only thirteen nominated members for the South out of a total of ninety-five. By 1950 their early experience of the Assembly had determined these Southern members to call for a federal status for the South, within a united Sudan.

#### Early Economic Development

However, although the Sudan Government had failed the Southern people in the political field, by failing to give them any real say in their political future, they did attempt to give the policy of unification some chance of success by instigating a wideranging, if belated, programme for economic and social development.

As early as 1940 the development of the Southern Provinces was being discussed, notably by DR. J. D. Tohill, Director of Agriculture, whose ideas were to form the basis for a proposed investment of £E1 million in the Zande Scheme. Before outlining the scheme it is instructive to consider the basic rationale behind it, and so appreciate the attitude of the government to development in the South. The rationale was explained by the District Commissioner for Zande District as follows:-

'Stated shortly the problem is this, "How to improve the condition of a primitive and backward race living in one of the remotest parts of Central Africa and beyond the reach of outside markets except for a very few

high-priced commodities which have in any case a strictly limited and fluctuating market in normal times"? ....the solution may sound obvious and simple - "Jettison the idea of exporting raw materials: import machinery and export manufactured goods, markets within the Sudan are meant and not overseas....By taking the decision they did, the Sudan Government performed an act of faith as well as an act of commonsense. Faith in that they are trusting the local cultivator to produce sufficient raw material to keep the machinery busy....Commonsense in that without the investment of cash in the scheme there could be no hope of further material prosperity for these people.'(100)

Here again is evidence of the extreme paternalism of the Government and a reluctance to see the operation of what might be termed a realistic economic situation in the South. One is struck by the failure to appreciate the possibilities for export to the equally isolated peoples of the Congo and French Equatorial Africa, or the territories of East Africa. This kind of attitude to the development of the South - that it will never be capable of making a real economic contribution - seems to have been handed over at independence, and to some extent continues to the present day. Perhaps a significant factor is that the scheme was initially implemented by people without a commercial background and, in a sense, responsibility for its success was from the beginning placed at the feet of the Zande.

The basis of the scheme as envisaged by Tothill was local self-sufficiency with just sufficient surplus to enable the purchase of really unavoidable imports. In addition to cotton, already established as a cash crop, oil palms, sugar, coffee and jute were to be grown, and the manufactures were to include cotton cloth, sacking and soap for the Khartoum market, and bricks, timber, iron and charcoal for local consumption. The whole scheme was to be operated as a 'partnership' and to be supported by a general expansion of education at all levels.

In the hands of administrators, the scheme was gradually modified, mainly in response to the need to make immediate economies, and so gradually it was undermined. Existing transport routes were used, rather than the shorter ones originally suggested. Of the original cash crops, only cotton survived the early committee meetings. The sack industry was never discussed. Only antiquated machinery was purchased. Direct compulsion in cotton production was employed rather than the payment of attractive prices, with punishment for defaulters. The average price offered was 40Pt. per 100 lbs, and this was only raised in 1948 to 65Pt. to avoid smuggling to the Congo. In 1952 cotton producers in the Nuba Mountains of the North were paid three times as much as the Zande for cotton of a comparable standard. The educational expansion was never forthcoming, as neither was the participation of the Zande in decision making. As for the commercial aspects of the scheme, the draft charter of the Equatoria Projects Board, established to run the scheme, indicated that there had been no fundamental change in government thinking about the development of the Southern Sudan. 'The general policy of the Board shall aim at the social emergence of the peoples of Equatoria Province, and the purely commercial aspects of its undertakings shall be subordinated to that aim.' (101)

So in a much modified form the scheme went ahead and involved the re-settlement of some 100,000 people- people who had already been uprooted once before to facilitate the control of sleeping sickness. Not until 1950 were the factories completed and in limited operation. Production costs were high and distribution of saleable goods was inefficient, and not helped by the policies of the Board's trading division, which allowed only a 5% wholesale discount and would only supply cotton cloth in bales of 600 yards. Sales were understandably slow and markets were sought in the North, where the cloth was sold more cheaply than in Equatoria. (102) Much the same situation developed concerning cooking oil. Dissatisfaction among the Zande grew. Not only were they paid low prices for the cotton they were forced to produce, but they were also denied access to the finished product.

As dissatisfaction grew, so cotton production fell and by 1954 the Government was forced to raise prices and end compulsion, but to little avail. The Zande had understandably lost interest and much of the crop remained unpicked. A significant factor is that during this period of intense dissatisfaction a considerable number of Northern Sudanese were being employed in both technical and administrative capacities in Zandeland, and were in fact to be the inheritors of this dissatisfaction. The Zande considered them to be '...haughty and lacking in any desire to educate the Azande'. Reinning has noted the amazing paternalism and lack of understanding among the European administrators in their running of the scheme; a paternalism that was passed on to the Northern Sudanese. But while the Zande had no choice but to accept this attitude among Europeans, they were not prepared to accept it from Northern Sudanese.(103) Although Southern Policy had officially come to an end in 1946, from this brief look at the Zande scheme we can see that the same general attitudes continued to prevail. The initial stress on the self-sufficiency of the area and the refusal to apply a realistic commercial structure can be seen as an extension, economically, of the isolation of the previous protectionist policy.

Various other attempts at economic development were made in an effort to bring the South more in line with the North. Saw mills were established at Katire, Gilo and Loka, but the cost of harvesting and transporting the timber was high, and by 1954 it was considered uneconomic to sell timber from the South, north of Kosti. (104) Efforts were made to encourage the people of the Southern Provinces to grow surplus goods for sale, but again the prices offered provided no incentive. Rather than accept this fact, administrators continued to blame the laziness and backwardness of the people for what they saw as a refusal to enter the market economy. To the cultivator the price was not attractive and there was, in any case, a general shortage of consumer goods on which to spend the money, but to the administrator 'The people still suffer from an inflated idea of the value of their own products; many regrettably, still prefer a beerparty to the sale of a few measures of grain.' (105)

Part of the problem was the effect on the South of the wartime period, when a remarkable increase in production in all areas had been accomplished under a system of forced labour and compulsory purchase, in order to supply the North African front. At the end of the period, the people were left with a profound distrust of the benefits of 'increased production' while the government retained an unrealistic expectation of the productive capabilities of both the land and the people. Government revenue from the three Southern Provinces remained distressingly low. (see Table II) Two large development investigations were undertaken. One was the Equatorial Nile Project, a plan for the control of the Nile waters, part of which involved the digging of the Jonglei Canal to by-pass the *sudd* swamps, and the other was the multi-disciplinary research programme undertaken by the Southern Development Investigation Team in 1953-54. In 1977 discussions as to the advisability of the former still continue and many of the suggestions in the latter are still to be implemented. The development programme for 1946-51 indicates that rather than trying to instigate real economic development in the South, <sup>AND INCREASE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION,</sup> the Government was more concerned with the provision of basic services. (see Table III) (106)

Obviously something had to be done about education. One of the main criticisms of the old Southern Policy was that it had failed to produce adequate trained Southern staff. The 1946 Five Year Development Plan provided the money and expenditure rose from £E 18,017 in 1944, only 6.4% of the Sudan total of that year, to £E 30,881 in 1946. But although the plan talked of expansion, what was in fact undertaken was more a policy of consolidation. Education continued to be effected through the missions, but was supplemented by a few government schools and increased supervision. Minimum qualifications for teachers were laid down and two primary teachers' training schools at Yambio and Bussere were opened. However the overall position was not good. Whereas over 64,000 Northern children attended school in 1945, only 15,404 Southern children did so, and of these 95% were at the village or elementary level. (107) The educational replanning proposed in 1946 did little to counter this imbalance and in 1962-63 of the 155,347 elementary places available in the Sudan some 77% were in the North. Neither were educational opportunities evenly spread throughout the South, Equatoria having the lion's share. In 1962-63 places available in Upper Nile represented only 0.62% of the Sudan total. (108)

TABLE II RECURRENT BUDGET FOR THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 1951-1952

REVENUE

On province budget	260,268
On other budgets	24,923
<u>TOTAL</u>	£E <u>285,191</u>

EXPENDITURE

On province budget	788,802
On other budgets	
Health (Est.)	500,000
Education (Est.)	405,000
River Services	242,160
Agriculture	25,000
Public works	35,000
Veterinary	20,000
<u>TOTAL</u>	£E <u>2,015,962</u>

Source: Sudan Government, Natural Resources & Development Potential in the Southern Provinces of the Sudan, London, 1955, p.31.

TABLE III DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES 1946-1951

Building grants to missions	82,000
Capital to establish Equatoria Projects Board	1,000,000
Equatoria oil mill	20,000
Katire & Yei seasoning kilns	13,000
Housing for forestry department staff	11,000
Katire sawmill	11,500
Yambio experimental farm	28,000
Juba: extension to water supply	17,000
Malakal: extension to water supply	8,000
Wau: new water & electricity supply	40,200
Malakal: extension to electricity supply	13,000
Juba: extension to electricity supply	2,200
Telegraph lines: Rumbek-Yirol-Shambe	11,000
Telegraph lines: Wau-Tonj	10,000
Malakal dairy	3,000
Nutrition investigation in Equatoria	2,300
Allotments for roads in the southern provinces	68,654
	£E <u>1,340,854</u>

Source: Sudan Government, Natural Resources & Development Potential in the Southern Provinces of the Sudan, London, 1955, p.31

Part of the new policy was that education in the South be brought into line with that of the North. Accordingly some decision had to be made as to the language of instruction. The Ministry of Education proposals took the matter further, and their report of 1951 states '....an immediate start can be made towards making Arabic the common language of the whole of the Sudan....' (109) The plan was to teach in Arabic from the elementary level, but with the shortage of teachers a start was made by introducing it at intermediate level. The result was an increasing number of Northern staff entering the South, and yet another set-back in the standards of attainment possible for Southern children. Despite the new proposals for education, an examination of some syllabuses still reflects the old paternal attitudes. The Governor-General's report on the Sudan for 1945 praises the new government boys school at Tonj '....in which singing, sewing and first-aid form part of the curriculum....'(110) and the 1951 plans included a proposal for a '..Dinka leatherwork experiment.' (111)

Compared with the North, the health service in the South had received its fair share of finance and personnel, but again they tended to be heavily concentrated in Equatoria, in response to what the Government had seen as the most pressing problems, the control of sleeping sickness and leprosy, and again the service depended a great deal on the efforts of missionaries. Hookworm and bilharzia were widely prevalent. Leprosy had reached 7% among the Zande. Kala-azar was common in eastern Equatoria and filaria in western Equatoria. Malaria accounted for a high infant mortality, as did various alimentary disorders. Smallpox and measles caused occasional epidemics, and tuberculosis was a growing problem. Venereal diseases and yaws affected many people, but perhaps the most common and most significant condition was the widespread malnutrition, resulting in high child mortality, tropical ulcers and general debility. In 1948 the Medical Inspector for Equatoria described the province as '...a medical scientists paradise..' (112) In both fields of economic development and provision of services, the prevailing attitude was that the South was a kind of 'human zoo'. What change was actually initiated was too little too late. And was certainly too little to expect the inheriting Northern Sudanese administrators to operate successfully, or to provide a secure base for the emergent Southern representatives in their forthcoming dealings with the North.

### Towards Independence

Events were moving fast in the North and the nationalists were beginning to scent victory, with disastrous results for the South. Firstly nationalists were determined to gain independence at any cost and therefore to disregard the gradualist approach desired by the South, and secondly each of the Northern political parties was determined to gain support among Southerners. In accordance with the first wish, there was no Southern representation at the Anglo-Egyptian talks in Cairo in 1953, which decided on a three-year transitional period to independence. Northern politicians gave as grounds for this exclusion the non-existence of any Southern political party and as a response the Southern Party, later to be renamed the Liberal Party, was formed. It remained the sole political party in the South until the dissolution of all political parties in 1958. Obviously the Northern nationalists did not want any dissenting voice, or any demand for a gradual movement towards independence, and so the Southern demands for special safeguards were firmly brushed aside.

When it seemed that self-government was imminent, the two main political parties in the North, the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the Umma Party, competed for Southern support.(113) Although writers such as Beshir have tried to excuse the methods employed by these politicians, (114) it must be remembered that this was the first experience of Southerners with the Northern politicians who were going to control their destiny, and their methods cannot have done much to reassure the South as to its future. In the period of preparation for the elections of 1953, the South was subjected to propaganda from Egypt and the Northern parties. Northern politicians were quite prepared to use the historical relationship between North and South to gain support. The NUP reminded Southerners that the Umma leadership were the descendants of slave traders, while the Umma equated the NUP with the hated *jellaba*. In recent years Northern Sudanese have blamed the British and the missionaries for the continuation of what they see as the slavery 'myth', forgetting that the North was quite prepared to use it when seemingly convenient. (115)

While the fact that many votes were openly bought was reprehensible, it was the wild promises made by politicians which were to prove disastrous. They gave the impression that Southern participation in the independent administration of the Sudan would be in relation to the South's share of the population, and the NUP in fact promised forty-seven senior administrative posts for Southerners following the British withdrawal. Participation in elections in the South was very uneven, falling as low as 6% in Bor in Upper Nile, but as high as 70% in Jur River South near Wau.(116) The first real experience for most Southerners of the kind of relationship they were going to have with the North came in October 1954, with the results of the Sudanization Commission. Of a total of 800 posts, only six were given to the South, the most senior being Assistant District Commissioner. Some writers such as Beshir see this result as being in keeping with the standards of the civil service, in which seniority, experience and qualifications were the important criteria, while others such as Albino recount instances of mal-practice.(117) Perhaps the interpretation of qualifications could have been wider; given the prevailing mood of the country, Southerners were obviously better 'qualified' in a general sense to serve in delicate areas that were the majority of Northerners. However the blame for the widespread dissatisfaction in the South can only be laid at the feet of the NUP, who had come to power in 1953, inasmuch as in their 'manifesto' they had explicitly stated 'Our approach to the question of Sudanization shall always be just and democratic. Not only shall priority be always given to southerners in the south, but also shall the employment of the southerners be greatly fostered in the north, especially in the higher ranks of the Central Government service....also membership of the different Local Government institutions, development committees etc. etc. shall be as far as possible in the hands of competent southerners in the Southern Provinces.' (118)

In an atmosphere of growing concern, the Liberal Party met in Juba and unanimously decided to demand federal status for the South. Former Southern supporters of the NUP left and, together with the Liberal Party, decided to form a united Southern bloc. The Government's reaction was a clumsy attempt to discredit Southern leaders. Of the two Southern Cabinet members, one was dismissed and the other resigned, over criticism of the Government's policy in the South. The Liberal Party decided to organize another meeting in Juba, but the Prime Minister's reaction was to warn the Southern

politicians that the Government intended to implement the Self-Government statute. '...the Government must use all its force and strength to execute the Agreement in letter and in spirit; the Government shall not be lenient in this respect, it has its army, its police and all its might.'(119) Several Northern administrators in the South began to meddle in local politics and to intimidate local leaders. A Southern politician was arrested and his trial was followed by mass demonstrations. In the same month, July 1955, the Equatoria Projects Board dismissed some three hundred workers, at a time as we have seen of widespread dissatisfaction in Zandeland over the low prices offered for cotton and the high price of consumer goods. The dismissals also coincided with an increase in the number of Northern officials following Sudanization, and to the local people it seemed that their livelihood was to be taken from them and given to Northerners. Seventy workers in the spinning and weaving sheds then demanded higher wages and threatened to strike if their demands were not met. A mass demonstration attended by 1,000 people took place in Nzara market place, and the Northern Assistant District Commissioner made the fatal error of ordering the Sudan Defence Force troops to open fire on the crowd. Eight people were shot dead, and an unknown number injured. To make matters worse, two Northern merchants had also fired on the crowd. According to the Commission of Enquiry into the Southern Sudan Disturbances of 1955, '...the incident itself had a bad effect on the minds of the Southerners and was regarded by them as the beginning of a war; and if there was some confidence left in the administration, it had then disappeared completely.'(120) After the demonstration, 70 people were arrested, more or less at random.

The culmination of all these factors was the mutiny of the Southern Corps in August 1955. On 14th August orders were given to the No.2 Company Southern Corps at Torit that they were to be transferred to Khartoum for an indefinite period. They were displeased at the news, and after the events of July, not unnaturally fearful. On the 18th August they were told '...if you kill the 24 Northern Officers here, you must remember that there are twelve thousand Northern troops in Khartoum who will come and kill you all. In addition if you mutiny there are five hundred Northern troops in Juba who would come to kill you.' (121) This before the start of any trouble.

When told of the threat of mutiny in Torit, the Officer Commanding Southern Troops insisted that the company must proceed to Khartoum '...for the prestige and dignity of the Army....' (122) Again we find the same arrogance and inflexibility on the part of Northerners. As the Commission of Enquiry Report indicated '...The prestige of the army, as well as the administration in Equatoria, had been lost already and the decision not to alter previous orders and without having or making alternative plans shows a reckless disregard to the life and property of other citizens.'(123)

No 2 Company duly mutinied on the 18th August, broke into the munitions store and attacked Northerners, both military and civilian, in Torit. News of the mutiny soon spread and Northerners and their property were attacked in Kapoeta, Katire, Terekaka, Tali, Yei, Loka, Lainya, Kajo-Kaji, Amadi, Iba, Mundri, Khor Fulus, Fangak, Akobo, Gambela, Meridi, Yambio, Nzara, Malakal and Rumbek. A total of 336 people were killed, 75 of them Southerners, and there was complete disorder for more than two weeks. Throughout the disturbances, no attacks were made on the remaining British personnel. (124) In the first few days of the mutiny, the mutineers showed their misunderstanding of the situation, by repeatedly calling for British intervention, not yet realizing that the British could no longer assist them, and that they would now have to face the realities of their relationship with the North.

The Commission of Enquiry Report listed most of the events leading up to the mutiny already listed here, and in addition it mentioned other factors as contributing to the loss of confidence. The attitude of Northern traders towards the Southern people was generally arrogant and the habit of referring to them as *abid*, or slaves, was widespread. With the introduction of many Northerners to take over from the British, the traders had attempted to interfere with the administration, and the administrators had, in some cases, shown favouritism towards their fellow Northerners, and failed to maintain the exemplary conduct required. In addition many Northern administrators had already tried to change the established practices of the people.(125)

Gradually order was restored, but many of the mutineers had disappeared into the bush, and would later emerge as the nucleus of a guerrilla force. The Southern representatives in Khartoum were powerless to alter the situation and in fact in December 1955 they backed the resolution for the declaration of the independence of the Sudan on 1st January, 1956 on the understanding that the independence government would give Southern demands for federation 'full consideration'. By July 1956 the Government was in the hands of the Umma Party - People's Democratic Party - Liberal Party coalition and one of its first acts was to set up a forty-six man Constitutional Committee, to prepare a draft constitution. The three Southern members of the committee carried no weight, and Mahgoub, the new Prime Minister, declared that the Government had '...given the Southern claim for federation a very serious consideration, and found that it could not work in this country.'(126)

So after only one year of independence, it seemed that the worst fears of the South were being fulfilled. They had found representation in Khartoum to be hopelessly ineffective and Northern administration in the South to be increasingly repressive. In a very short time the North had alienated both the Southern intelligentsia and the Southern people, and both were provided with a reason to oppose and fear the North and Northerners. The Northerners for their part had been amazingly high-handed and irresponsible, in a period that called for tact above all else. Although Beshir apportions the blame to the British, the missionaries and the Southern politicians, the fact remains that the period 1950-1956 provided the Southerners with their first experience of how Northerners would act towards them, and it is hard to find evidence of their actions having been other than dishonest, arrogant and contemptuous. (127)

### Conclusion

The effects of the short period of British administration on the Southern Sudan, and on the prospects for the development of a post-independence integrated state, can be summarized quite simply. Certainly the British had pacified the South, but at the same time they had compartmentalized it and reinforced its traditional divisions. They had put an end to the devastation of the South by forces from the North, but at the same time they had produced a state of isolation far greater than that attributed to purely physical factors. They had conserved, and indeed often re-established, traditional society, but they had also simultaneously superimposed a veneer of European culture in terms of religion, education and language. They had debarred all outside influences which they considered to be harmful, but they had also debarred innovation and therefore the development of receptivity to innovation. They had maintained a completely artificial economy and employed a protective policy to camouflage an unwillingness or inability to invest. They had accepted full responsibility for administration and stultified the development of the simplest forms of modern political expression or competence.

By this policy of isolation, and an overwhelming desire to protect the South, they had entrenched the hostility the Southerners felt towards the North. Instead of permitting contact between the two communities under a system of control, which might have permitted the development of understanding, they had separated them and permitted the resentment to grow and eventually acquire the potency of a legend. In the original Southern Policy they insulted the North and patronized the South, with the result that the North was determined to regain control of the South and that the patronizing attitude to Southerners was legitimized. In misjudging the political climate of the whole of the Middle East, they placed the South in an impossible position and the preparation for independence was a shabby attempt to make the best of a bad situation.

If we refer back to our original criteria in the development of secession movements, we see that by the achievement of independence in 1956 the first five criteria had been fulfilled. The loyalty of the Southerners was only to the South, if in fact for the majority it extended beyond the immediate social group. As in Biafra and Eritrea, there was an initial willingness to participate in a larger unit, but this was very soon felt to be a mistake and was followed almost immediately after independence by an unwillingness to extend loyalty to the new nation state.

There was a history of resentment towards the North that had been entrenched and reinforced by the British administration, and was now exhibited as a fear of domination. There was a sense of deprivation throughout the Southern economy, from demands for higher wages to demands for the large-scale development that had occurred in the North. There was a lack of social infrastructure, both in terms of quantity and quality, which made it impossible for Southerners to compete in a united Sudan; inappropriate education had led to a shortage of qualified manpower and to inadequate representation at the national level. And, as we have seen, there were the very potent factors of race, language and religion to motivate the people.

In the next chapter we shall see how the policies of the military government of Abboud exacerbated an already dangerous situation and resulted in demands for secession and a threat to the territorial integrity of the Sudan.

CHAPTER V

THE THREAT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Early Policies for Nation Building

The military regime of President Abboud, which came to power in 1958, was essentially authoritarian, and was accordingly convinced that the problem of the Southern Sudan could be solved, firstly by a programme of arabization and political repression, and secondly by military might. As part of the programme of arabization and Islamization, both seen as necessary pre-requisites for national unity, a number of Koranic schools were established in the South and Islamic teachers appointed. Six intermediate Islamic institutes were opened in Juba, Kadok, Wau, Meridi, Yei and Raga, and Friday became the official day of rest. Northern administrators and military personnel were expected to further the spread of Islam, and again the Southern people had to be prepared to change their names if they were effectively to deal with the administration. The use of Arabic as the medium of instruction throughout the education system meant that many Southern sub-grade school teachers were to lose their jobs. Many schools were closed because of a subsequent shortage of staff and several schools were bodily transferred and re-sited in the North.

In addition to encouraging the spread of Islam, measures were taken to disrupt the Christian Church in the South. In 1961 all religious gatherings for prayer, except those taking place in a recognized church, as opposed to a school hall, were banned, and an increasing number of missionaries were not allowed to return to the South after home leave. In 1964 the Ministry of the Interior announced the expulsion of all Christian missionaries from the Southern Sudan, with the accusation that they had insisted on breaking the law, despite the super-human patience of the government. 'We have been observing for a long time and with unflinching patience the activities of these foreigners in those areas. Sometimes we forgive and

other times we feel ourselves compelled to warn, but unfortunately they mistook our tolerance for weakness, our forgiveness for hesitation and our leniency for cowardice. We have waited and waited; but there was no hope that they would resort to reason ....it has become very obvious that their disruptive activities might threaten the integrity and stability of the country. It is sad to say that these people were not grateful and did not appreciate the generous treatment and the good opportunities made available to them by this country.' (1) The announcement went on to say that every citizen has the right to religious freedom and that the government would enable Southerners to take over from the missionaries; however, with few native clergy the Christian Church in the South was hard hit and, in addition to losing spiritual guidance, was also to lose the other educational and health services the missionaries had provided. According to the Memorandum of the Southern Front presented to the OAU in 1966, parental permissions for the baptism of all under eighteen years had to be signed in the presence of government representatives, all too often unwilling or unavailable. (2) However in 1961 the Department of Religious Affairs proposed to spend £\$100,000 on the building of mosques in the South. (3) Demonstrations in protest at these measures, whether by children or adults, were met by harsh punishment or imprisonment. Christian missionaries were allowed to continue educational work in the North.

The process of arabization was not accompanied by any real economic development, and even those schemes that had been promised for the South were transferred to sites in the North. The plans for sugar production at Mongalla were abandoned in favour of similar schemes at Guneid and Kashm El Girba. The Malakal fish canning plant was forgotten in favour of one at Jebel Aulia, just outside Khartoum, and plans for a paper factory at Malakal and a meat canning plant in Bahr El Ghazal came to nothing. In fairness it must be remembered that areas in the far west and in eastern Sudan suffered the same neglect. To the central government the Gezira model of large-scale production under irrigation was seen as the successful model, as to some extent it still is now. Expenditure on development and

services was concentrated in the core area around Khartoum, and in addition the politically unpopular resettlement of the Nubians to allow for the building of the Aswan High Dam necessitated increased expenditure on the resettlement areas of Kashm El Girba and New Halfa. However these factors did nothing to allay the fears of Southerners, who saw these chances of development and employment slip from their grasp, at a time when Northerners were gaining an increasing hold in local administration. Many Southern junior government personnel were transferred to work in the North, <sup>h</sup> where they could be better supervised, and recruitment of Southerners into all government departments was severely curtailed. The prevailing attitude was that, after the mutiny, no Southerner could be trusted. There was an almost complete cessation of recruitment of Southerners into the army, the police and the prison services. More than 75% of the police for the Southern provinces were recruited in Blue Nile, Kordofan and Darfur, and in the ten years from 1959-1969 only ten Southerners were recruited into the army.(4) Provincial Councils were introduced to provide a medium for discussion in the South, but the accompanying Executive Councils were completely controlled by Northern administrators and residents.(5)

#### Demands for Secession

To many people in the North the suspension of parliamentary government enabled firm measures to be taken in the South, which the previous political climate would not have allowed, and they readily endorsed the aim of the Abboud government to seek a military solution. However the problem proved to be more difficult than they imagined and the army's repressive measures, instead of controlling the situation, tended to confirm the worst fears of the Southerners, and to intensify the mutual distrust. The policy of repression allied to that of arabization created an ideal climate for the escalation of the conflict. As we have noted earlier, although the racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors are not necessarily central to the problem of secession, they are very potent factors in the process of motivating the people. Without the use of force it seems likely that the arabization of the South would gradually have been completed, over a long period of time. However the policy of arabization, allied to the use of force, determined the Southern people to reject, not only the control and government of the Northerners but also their language, religion and culture.

As a result a high degree of cohesion and motivation to fight against Khartoum was based on the attribute of being non-Arab. Here we must mention that numbers of Southern Muslims, while embracing Islam, were just as fervent in their distrust of Khartoum as were their Animist brothers, and if one examines the oral literature of the Southern people at this time it is evident that the resentment of the Southerners for the Northerner is based more on the treatment of one by another, rather than on a passionate hatred of Islam. (6) Unlike the Northerner, the Southerner shows a much greater degree of religious tolerance, as indeed he must if he is to live happily within his own group, which consists of Animists of various kinds, Christians and Muslims. His prime objection was not to the existence of Islam in the South, but to the government which sought to force Islam upon him. It is also important to note here a very basic difference between the North and the South. In the North politics were unavoidably linked with religion, whereas in the South religion had played very little part in political activity.

The whole of the Sudan was, of course, to suffer from the restrictions on political freedom, but in the South, as Bechtold has noted, the policies of the Abboud regime '...had the effect of coalescing hitherto disunited factions into a relatively common front.' (7) Southern politicians, liberals and intellectuals, faced with the threat of imprisonment, began leaving the Sudan in considerable numbers in the early sixties and in 1962 combined to form the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union, later simplified to the Sudan African National Union (SANU). The immediate aims of the movement were to publicize the situation in the Sudan by petitions to the United Nations and articles in the press, to raise funds, and to organize guerrilla attacks within the South. It was from this group that the first call for secession of the Southern Sudan was heard. They had listened in vain to the promises of successive governments, while the real situation in the South grew steadily worse. Their suggestions for a system of power sharing, consideration of their particular problems, or federation, had been constantly brushed aside since the Juba Conference. They had seen the futility of Southern representation in Khartoum, where Southern politicians became mere adjuncts to the main Northern political parties, and determined that their goal would be nothing short of separation and their means would if necessary be violent.

Accordingly the scattered guerrilla forces became the Anya Nya in 1963, and plans were made for a series of attacks in September of that year. Police and army posts were attacked in Equatoria and Upper Nile, and in January 1964 an offensive was mounted against Wau, the capital of Bahr El Ghazal. Initially there was little coordination of the Anya Nya forces, who tended to be split into small groups supporting a local leader and owing allegiance to no particular political party. Their inability to cooperate across tribal lines was the greatest obstacle to military success, but of course the nature of the terrain contributed to communication difficulties. The Anya Nya cannot be said to have had any overriding political philosophy apart from a general hatred of the North, and in fact they developed an increasing disdain for Southern politicians of all persuasions. In this way a fundamental division of Southern leaders occurred. The exiled politicians disdained those who chose to work from within; those in Khartoum considered those in exile to be hopelessly out of touch with the situation, and those who remained in the South to fight with the guerrillas distrusted all politicians. This division over war-time credibility has continued into the period of peace. To estimate the number of Anya Nya fighting at any one time is difficult, with governments determined to represent them as a small bunch of ill-trained bandits. However, at the end of the conflict in 1972, a total of 15,842 presented themselves as (8) ex-Anya Nya for consideration for absorption into the People's Armed Forces.

In some areas the Anya Nya were actively supported by the local people, and a rudimentary form of administration with an educational system existed, while in others the people lived as much in fear of the guerrillas as of the central government forces. The pattern of war was one of intermittent guerrilla attacks resulting in somewhat indiscriminate retaliation. As one would expect, there were countless accounts of atrocities having been committed by both sides, such is the nature of civil war; however, at this stage it is neither possible nor particularly helpful to try and substantiate such accounts. If one examines the propaganda issued by each side during the struggle one finds the expected extreme positions: the central government maintaining that an irresponsible band of rebels was terrorizing the countryside, while the Southern politicians accused the Sudan Government of genocide. (9) The population of the Southern Sudan was

to suffer a great deal. Not only were many people killed in the actual hostilities, but many others were to die of starvation or disease following the complete breakdown of the economy and the public health system.

#### Guerrilla Warfare and Geographical Considerations

During the 1960's the guerrilla struggle intensified and it will be useful at this stage to consider the war in terms of the sixth of our original criteria for the development of secession movements - the strictly geographical considerations. The single most important factor was the sheer size of the Sudan, nearly a million square miles with thousands of miles of border. To defend such a vast area would put a considerable strain on any military force. In addition to the problem of sheer size there was the problem of communications. Khartoum is more than a thousand miles from Juba, and while one might cover the distance by air in about one hour, the supply route via rail and river could easily take from fifteen to twenty days through inhospitable territory impossible to police. Having completed the journey to Juba, it was still some 194 miles to Kapoeta, 323 to Yambio and 500 miles to Wau. Even after the extension of the railway system to Wau it might still be a journey of several days from Khartoum and the single track was overloaded and very vulnerable to guerrilla attack. Having arrived at Wau, it was still some 190 miles to Rumbek and over 200 miles to Raga.

Once the government forces had left the relatively advanced modes of transport such as air, rail and river, they were very much at the mercy of the guerrillas. It must be remembered that the road system left by the British administration was only rudimentary and had received little attention since 1955. There were no metalled roads in the Southern Sudan and the graded surfaces soon broke up under the strain of heavy military vehicles. Neither were there many bridges. Those across minor streams soon collapsed or were destroyed, and in the 1960's the only bridge across the Nile south of that at Jebel Aulia, just outside Khartoum, was the

antequated bridge at Kosti, nine hundred miles north of Juba. At Wau, Malakal and Juba transportation across the Jur, the White Nile and the Bahr El Jebel was by small inefficient ferry boat. River transport had not been effectively modernized since the 1930's and struggled against the hazards of silting, sharp meanders and the water hyacinth.

All modes of transport were affected by the seasons. In the rainy season the railway track was often washed away, many **landing strips** were unusable and flying was generally hazardous, and the old river boats had to struggle against the high-water current. However the roads were affected most. In Equatoria some roads were all-season, but in some areas of Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile all motor movement came to a virtual halt for up to six months. Even with the capability to forego the use of roads, the terrain was difficult with large areas of flooding; coordination of movement was problematic with bad communications and a lack of accurate maps. With this system of communications the Central Government had to transport men, equipment, food and fuel. The physical difficulties alone were sufficient to keep an army of approximately eighteen thousand men quite literally 'bogged down' in the Southern Sudan. (10) In addition to bad communications and inappropriate technology, the Central Government were faced with other difficulties. To the majority of their forces, raised in the deserts of the North, the terrain was strange and hostile. With little real training in the difficult art of counter-insurgency, they were faced with the task of distinguishing guerrilla fighters from innocent civilians. Perhaps understandably, their morale was low, discipline left a lot to be desired, and they resorted to more and more repressive measures, where what was needed was supreme tact. Unable to effectively police the areas on the ground, they resorted to increasingly indiscriminate air attack.

However, for the Anya Nya, the terrain presented all the advantages of the classic guerrilla situation. It was peripheral to the state core, at the end of a long and difficult line of supply for the government. They had an intimate knowledge of what was their home ground, and its appalling communication system was appropriate to the level of technology at their disposal. As well as local knowledge, they also had local support in terms

of cover, food and family; and the inaccessibility of the swamps of Upper Nile or the forests of the Imatong Mountains provided excellent locations for temporary Anya Nya camps. Their position was surrounded by five states who tacitly supported their cause for most of the seventeen-year war, providing a home for civilian refugees, safe havens for training camps and moral support. The line of supply from Kenya and Uganda was relatively easy, and in Nairobi and Kampala the guerrillas had access to modern methods of communication, social services, markets and media, far in advance of what was available in Khartoum.

Away from the main towns, the Central Government forces were extremely vulnerable. It was relatively easy for the Anya Nya to destroy bridges and mine roads. Initially the guerrillas captured arms from besieged Government forces, but later were able to purchase or confiscate arms from forces fleeing the Orientale Rebellion in the Congo in 1963. With an increase in publicity and outside involvement, arms and training became available and by the late 1960's the Anya Nya could claim to control much of the rural areas. Although it is unlikely that the Anya Nya could ever have claimed an outright victory, the purely geographical factors meant that the war became, and continued to be, one which neither side could win.

At this point it is useful to turn from the attitudes of politicians, intelligentsia and guerrillas, to those of the ordinary people of the South. The reaction of the majority was absolutely clear: they rejected government by Khartoum. As their forefathers had retreated from the slave raiders, the *Mahdists*, and to a certain extent from the British, so they retreated from government administration. An estimated two-thirds of a million people left their homes and villages, many of them moving farther into the bush, away from the roads and the government forces. Others congregated in the main urban areas, in search of food and in a vain effort to avoid being caught in the cross-fire of the conflict. But many 'seceded' from the Sudan and the conflict and sought refuge in neighbouring countries. What had begun as a trickle after the 1955 mutiny grew into a flood and by 1972 an estimated third of a million people were living outside the Sudan. (11) The majority fled to Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia and others to Kenya and the Central African Republic. In some areas they were accommodated in special refugee camps under the management of the

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); in others they moved to join their relatives on the other side of the borders. Conditions in the countryside and in the refugee camps were generally bad with widespread shortages of food, medical supplies and educational facilities. As a result of these population movements the economy of the Southern Sudan was almost totally disrupted. Not only were the majority of modern establishments closed, but the traditional agricultural economy was severely hit. Where crops were produced they were often destroyed by army forces, and the killing or confiscation of cattle was commonplace. The existence of such a large number of refugees necessarily involved a variety of international organizations and the Red Cross, World Health Organization, church organizations and charitable bodies such as Oxfam worked among the refugees.

#### The Return to Democracy and Constitutional Debate

By September 1964 the Abboud government was beginning to recognize the magnitude of the problem in the South and accordingly established a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the situation. The very establishment of the Commission was seen as an admission of the government's failure by the Northern intelligentsia, civil servants, trade unionists and religious brotherhoods who were fast becoming disenchanted with the military regime. Debate at the University of Khartoum grew into mass demonstrations in many urban centres and a general strike paralysed all commercial activity. On 29th October 1964 Abboud was forced to capitulate to the strikers and civilian leaders and the military regime came to an end. However the fall of the military regime was the result of this disenchantment of the Northern elite. The situation in the South was the means and not the cause and, as we shall see, although the following regimes made some concessions to Southern demands, their attitudes remained basically intransigent.

The Transitional Government, empowered to rule until elections could be held, immediately recognised the need to re-establish some measure of confidence in the South, and the Cabinet, under the leadership of Sir El Khatim El Khalifa, included two Southern ministers. In addition the Transitional Government promised rapid 'Southernization' of administration in the South, the release of political prisoners, and negotiation with the exiled politicians. In accordance with this policy a Round Table Conference opened in Khartoum on 16th March, 1965. It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine the workings of the Conference in detail, but rather to describe the main indicators which had an effect upon subsequent events.

What was most evident, even then, was the growing division among Southern politicians and how tenuous were their claims to represent Southern opinion. SANU had long been divided into two rival groups, one wing being prepared to work within the Sudan from 1965, to cooperate with the Central Government, and prepared to accept some kind of regional autonomy or federal solution. The other SANU wing, operating from outside the Sudan, showed continued hostility to successive Central Governments, and worked actively towards independence for the South. The Southern Front was founded in 1965 by civil servants and students within the Sudan, many of them living in Khartoum. Although the Southern Front worked within the country, its cooperation with Central Governments was limited and its demands for self-determination for the South were seen as being in the final analysis the same as those of SANU outside, in that a plebiscite in the South would almost certainly have resulted in a call for complete separation. The Sudan Unity Party was formed in 1964 by a former Southern minister in the Abboud regime. It stood for a united Sudan and was noted for its extreme conservative views. Other veteran Southern politicians either attempted to form their own parties or act as individuals by allying themselves with Northern parties; but none could be said to have had much credibility and certainly none had much active support in the Southern Sudan.

Division continued to characterize the Southern politicians, especially among those outside the country, and the years between 1965 and 1970 saw the formation of the Azania Liberation Front, the Nile Republic Provisional Government, the Anyidi Revolutionary Government, the Sue River Republic and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. The proliferation of parties and governments seemed more to reflect the need for everyone to have an official position, rather than a number of differing policies and viewpoints. SANU (inside) and the Southern Front could claim most support in the Sudan, but both were characterised by severe organizational shortcomings; they did however contribute the majority of the Southern delegates to the Round Table Conference. Together they proposed that the people of the South be given the opportunity to chose between federation, unity with the North, or separation.

The plebiscite was to be held under independent supervision and various security conditions complied with, to make an impartial outcome possible.(12) With the rejection of the plebiscite, the Southern Front and Sanu (inside) proposed as a substitute formula the complete Southernization of the administration, the control by the South of its finance, foreign affairs, armed forces and internal security and the establishment of a system of common services with a council of ministers in which there would be a fifty percent Southern representation. (13)

Compared with the division among the Southerners, the Northern politicians were unanimous in at least one respect: with an eye to the forthcoming elections, none of them was prepared to even discuss the idea of separation. In much the same kind of atmosphere that had prevailed at the time of the Cotran Commission in 1956, the Northerners were mainly concerned with apportioning blame. They blamed the British, the missionaries and, most conveniently, the military regime of Abboud, but were not quite so forthcoming with solutions to the problem

In a proposal to the conference the six Northern parties insisted on the sovereign entity of the country, and while recognising the need for some degree of decentralization, could see '....no place in the Sudan for a federal system of government.' (14) The reasons put forward for the rejection of federation were economic, financial, the fear of regional inequalities, and the danger of separatism and civil war. They proposed a form of regional government under which an executive council would handle the day-to-day affairs. At the centre, parliamentary seats would be available to the South in proportion to the population, with three Southern ministers and, where possible, a degree of 'Southernization' of local government. Commissions would be established to examine the problems of economic development and public service. It was not surprising that the Southern delegates should reject the proposals. They had, after all, been promised as much on various other occasions, never to see the proposals implemented. In addition, the Northern delegates saw as an urgent measure for the implementation of the proposals the cessation of violence, something which none of the participants of the Conference could control. The Northern parties would not countenance the removal of the army from the South, and neither of the Southern parties had any real control of the Anya Nya.

After two weeks, the Conference ended with few concrete achievements. The resolution signed by all participants did admittedly deal with some of the everyday problems, such as the Southernization of the administration, education and religious freedom, but it failed to find a solution to the major problem, the future constitutional and administrative framework of the Sudan. True there was a tacit agreement to reject the two extreme positions - the maintenance of the *status quo* and complete separation - but as the champions of separation (SANU outside) had not been represented, it was in the short term at least a somewhat meaningless agreement, as was the undertaking to '....end hostilities in two months time.' (15) Perhaps the main achievement was that public opinion in the North began to see the problem in its true perspective, as a complex constitutional issue, rather than as simply the control of a few rebellious factions.

A twelve man committee was set up to consider these constitutional issues within a framework that would '...protect the special interest of the South as well as the general interest of the Sudan.' (16) The committee was immediately faced with much the same problems as had confronted the conference. The Southern Front members objected to the presence of the SANU (Inside) members in that they did not consider them representative of Southern opinion. However when a delegate from SANU (Outside) arrived from Kampala the Northern members would not recognize him as long as SANU (Outside) continued with a policy of separation. The Sudan Unity Party applied for representation but was also rejected. It was to take almost two months for the committee to be constituted.

In discussion of the state of security in the South, the representatives of the People's Democratic Party and the Communist Party accused the Southern parties of being responsible for the continued violence and suggested that the committee condemn the activities of the Anya Nya. When this suggestion was rejected they withdrew their members. Both Northern and Southern members condemned the violence but could not agree on where the responsibility lay, and were in any case virtually powerless to control it. The coalition government of Mahjoub, which had come to power in June 1965, refused to implement the resolutions of the Conference until peace was restored, while the Southern parties saw the implementation of the resolutions as the only basis for the restoration of law and order.

The deliberations on a constitutional framework were also beset with problems. Schemes suggested by the Southern Front and the Islamic Charter Front were rejected as demands for the two unacceptable extremes of separation or the maintenance of the *status quo*, but eventually agreement was reached on a scheme for the redistribution of power. National defence, external affairs, currency, communications, foreign trade, nationality, customs and inter-regional trade were to remain the concern of the Central Government. Security, education, public health, antiquities and labour were to be managed concurrently between the Centre and the Region, and certain day-to-day affairs, such as local government, information, tourism, road maintenance and urban planning, agricultural development according to national plans, cultural development, commerce and local industry were to be in the sole power of the Region.

The Regional government was to consist of an elected assembly and an executive council to be headed by an individual appointed through a joint process involving Centre and Region. However the Central Parliament would reserve the right to overrule the Regional assembly in the national interest or to dissolve it in times of emergency.

There was however some disagreement as to exactly what area would constitute the 'Region'. The Northern parties wished to decentralize government to the existing provinces, creating from them nine regions. While the Southern parties were prepared to accept the creation of East, West and North regions in the North, they insisted that the South should remain a single unit composed of three Southern provinces, and that the delimitation of the region should carry sufficient political weight to ensure the effectiveness of the guarantees for the protection of autonomy. Under the Northern scheme, a divided South would be devoid of influence at the Centre.

Although neither the Round Table Conference nor the deliberations of the Twelve Man Committee could be termed a success, they were both to prove very useful exercises. Firstly, many of the delegates gained some negotiating experience, especially the Southerners, and secondly both sides came to realize that despite the continued existence of seemingly unsurmountable differences, there was in fact a good deal on which they could agree. Unfortunately events outside the committee room made either the adoption of the agreed principles or their implementation extremely unlikely.

The period from 1965 to 1969 was one of great confusion in Sudanese politics. Government was shared by a series of coalitions, none of which was able to hold power for very long. With a state of emergency operating over a large part of the country, elections were hardly representative. The degree of political fragmentation that had developed is best illustrated by the 1968 election in which no fewer than twenty-six parties fielded candidates, in addition to those classified as independent or non-identified.

Of these twenty-six as many as thirteen gained one or more seats, and for the first time parties in the North started to reflect purely regional interests, with the emergence of the Beja Congress, the Western Sudan Union and the Nuba Mountains Federation. (17) Southern politicians in the Khartoum Parliament tried a variety of alliances in order to affect government policy on the South, but with little success. Parliament was almost completely pre-occupied with its own internecine strife, and policies towards the South remained much the same - constitutional discussion in Khartoum accompanied by increased military repression in the South. In 1965 Prime Minister Mahjoub had declared that the government would end the policy '....of appeasement and leniency in dealing with the outlaws and those who support them. It will order complete disbandment of arms, and end completely the fanatic bands that play with security. It will order the army to follow the criminals, return the state to law and order, and punish the mutineers.' (18) Increased army action provided even greater motivation for the guerrilla forces, and the conflict accordingly escalated. Not only were no firm proposals for change coming from Khartoum, but suggestions were being made about constitutional reform that served only to increase their fear and apprehension.

In 1967 the National Constitution Commission was established and although it was an all-party commission great pressure was exerted by the more traditional elements for the adoption of an Islamic Constitution with the Sudan as a unitary state based on Islam, speaking Arabic, and subject to Sharia or traditional Islamic law. The only means of protest available to Southern representatives on the commission was the negative gesture of withdrawal. However the Northern parties could not agree on a suitable format and the matter was shelved.

The party infighting during the period 1964-1969 had had disastrous effects upon the whole country. There had been almost total neglect of major national problems. The balance of trade had steadily decreased with reserves falling from £S61 million in 1964 to £S14 million by May 1969, with foreign debts reaching an all-time high at £S91 million. Despite

an increase in the bureaucracy of more than 50% there was widespread unemployment, and the ordinary man suffered terribly from the rate of inflation. While the situation in the capital was bad, that in the rural areas had become critical, and there was widespread shortage of essential commodities. The situation in the South had worsened and merely maintaining the *status quo* was eating further and further into the reserves. The annual cost of the war in 1966 was estimated at about £S20 million. (19) Among the most disappointed and disillusioned were the relatively left-wing and progressive politicians who had welcomed the October Revolution so warmly, and it came as no real surprise that they should combine with a group of young army officers and take over power in May 1969.

#### International Considerations

In common with other African states faced with a threat to territorial integrity, the Sudan maintained that the conflict in the Southern Sudan was essentially an internal affair, but with such a large number of refugees involved the problem was soon to develop an international aspect. In chapter one, the last of our original criteria for the formation of secession movements was stated to be the expectation of international support and subsequent economic survival in the world on independence. In the case of the Southern Sudan, however, this support did not really materialize. The following reasons can be suggested. In the 1960's the Southern Sudan was not considered as being of any real strategic importance, and also presented no prospect of economic gain to any possible participant. The leadership in the Southern Sudan, if such it could be termed, was so hopelessly splintered as to discourage outside involvement. It also lacked any concrete ideological basis with which to attract support and, most important, looked unlikely to gain a meaningful victory.

Accordingly there were present none of the factors likely to precipitate international involvement, especially at a time when both the United States and Russia and the former colonial powers had had their fingers badly burned in Katanga and Biafra, and were in any case concentrating their attention on South East Asia and the Middle East. Compared with our other African examples - Katanga, Biafra and Eritrea - international involvement was minimal, and the Southern politicians were correct in terming the conflict 'Africa's forgotten war.' Rather than becoming the centre of potential confrontation, the conflict was peripheral to the arguments of others, as a result there was little consistent meaningful support, but rather a degree of meddling by other countries, largely for their own ends.

Among non-African states, only Israel provided military support to the South, a small number of Southern Sudanese receiving training in Israel. However Israel was more concerned to keep fifteen thousand Northern Sudanese troops involved in the Southern Sudan - troops which could alternatively have been diverted to the Egyptian front.

Among African states there was, understandably, a desire not to become involved. As we saw in chapter one in the case of Eritrea, by the late 1960's African states had accepted the Western concept of the organization of space, with general support for the respect of sovereignty, and a strict policy of non-intervention. They associated secession, not only with the threat to their own territorial integrity, but with potential metropolitan reassertion or international involvement beyond their control. The relatively low military capability of African states is also a factor to be remembered.

Although some of Sudan's neighbours covertly assisted the Southern Sudanese, it was not so much from a belief in the justice of their cause, but rather as part of their own disagreements with Khartoum. During the 1960's Sudan's relations with Ethiopia had been consistently strained, firstly

over the disputed border, the location of which Ethiopia refused to accept, and secondly over the civil war in Eritrea. Ethiopia accused the Sudan of harbouring rebels in the Eritrean refugee camps in Eastern Sudan, and of allowing the smuggling of arms through the Sudan to Eritrean forces. To counter this situation, Ethiopia supported exiled Southern politicians in Addis Ababa and allowed them to work among Sudanese refugees in the Gambela district. Similarly the Chad Government, faced with insurrection in the north, accused the Sudan in 1966 of assisting Arab rebels and allowing them to operate from Darfur. (20) The obvious counter to Khartoum's involvement in their affairs was to tacitly support the Southern cause. Uganda, Kenya and the Central African Republic, while agreeing with the Sudan not to encourage subversion, were certainly not in a position to control it, and were faced with the not inconsiderable problem of thousands of Sudanese refugees under their care. And in the case of Uganda and Kenya, their own position vis-à-vis ethnic minorities and disaffected areas was and still remains delicate in the extreme.

While there was little active top-level international involvement in the civil war, then, what we might term 'second-level involvement' was certainly present. This second level consisted of the various international agencies and charitable bodies working in the fields of health, education, and religion among the refugees. However, they too had needed to reassess their position following criticism during the Nigerian civil war, and as a result had become very much more circumspect. Neither was there the same kind of militancy in the Christian Church to provide active support of the kind that the Eritreans were able to attract from the world of Islam. In general the rest of the world remained disinterested; there was little or nothing to be gained from involvement. Although Southern politicians toured the Western World in hopes of finding friends and funds, the response was negligible. Few people were really even aware of the existence of the Sudan, never mind its most remote corner.

The implications of the international position of the Northern Sudan were, of course, of great significance, with its strong identification with Islam and Arabism, its membership of the Arab League and flirtations with the idea of federation with Egypt, Libya and Syria. Although Khartoum regimes claimed to be good Africans, their prime loyalty was always to the Arab world, and while they could expect moral and military support from Libya, Egypt and latterly the USSR, they were protected against outside interference by African states' lack of capability and policies of non-intervention.

In chapter one we decided that a secession movement must conceive of economic survival once it gains independence, and although from a European perspective the future of an independent Southern Sudan could certainly not have looked promising in the 1960's, we must rather endeavour to see the prospect from an African point of view. To the Southern politicians demanding secession, the economic situation on independence could not possibly be as bad as it was during the years of neglect and destruction. They were aware of the difficulties afforded by their geographical position, but confident of the co-operation of East Africa. They were also aware of the tremendous agricultural potential of the area, and of course could point to the continued survival of the very much more disadvantaged land-locked states such as Chad, Upper Volta and Niger. As Albino has noted, an independent Southern Sudan would undoubtedly be poor, but at least it would have been able to control its own resources and plan accordingly. (21) The quality of life was considered more important than the purely material aspects.

## Conclusion

We have seen how our seven original criteria affected the situation in the Southern Sudan: how a history of bitterness and resentment developed; how, together with profound economic and social deprivation, it was reinforced and entrenched by colonial policies. With the failure of parliamentary rule and constitutional negotiation and their substitution by policies of assimilation and repression, we have seen how racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors became powerful motivations. We have also seen how purely geographical factors facilitated a guerrilla warfare response to increased repression, and how with only a minimum of international support and very modest material aspirations the people decided that they could no longer tolerate being part of a united country and transferred their loyalty to a future independent Southern Sudan. In the next chapter we shall examine the eventual solution of the problem.

CHAPTER VI

THE MAY REVOLUTION AND THE RECOGNITION OF DIVERSITY

Revolution and the Beginnings of Accommodation

The military coup d'état of May 1969 brought to power new elements in Sudanese life. The young officers concerned did not reflect the old political factions and traditional ideas, and they realized that to govern the country they would have to work with civilian elements. They chose to work with the left-wing intelligentsia and, for perhaps the first time, the government began to include competent, professional individuals, rather than merely the old party politicians. Many of the young intellectuals and academics brought into the government decision-making process had been involved in the policies of the short-lived Transitional Government of 1964; the May Revolution was announced as a continuation of the October Revolution and the aims for which it had stood. Although our immediate concern here is the response of the new military regime of Nimeiri to the problem of the South, the new ideas introduced for the Sudan as a whole are important for any understanding of how the new regime was eventually able to find a solution to the civil war.

As we have seen, the previous fourteen years of political confusion in the Sudan had had an extremely adverse effect on the whole country. The party political wrangling had severely hit the economy and what little development effort there was had been concentrated in the Khartoum area, with much of the countryside having remained unchanged since the turn of the century. Not only was there a concentration of expenditure in Khartoum, but also a concentration of political and executive power in the capital, with growing dissatisfaction in the peripheral areas of the North as well as in the South. The most important new approach of the Nimeiri regime was to suggest the decentralization of power to the provinces, and to aim at a much greater degree of involvement of the Sudanese people at all levels, by the forming of a single political movement. Obviously a regime which was prepared to

consider decentralization of power throughout the whole Sudan was better equipped to appreciate the problem of the South as a constitutional problem of the just distribution of power rather than as a protracted bloody revolt. By its avowed intention to establish a mass political movement, the regime also recognised that the old political system had served only to entrench factionalism and regionalism, and must be replaced if decentralization was to succeed.

From the beginning the regime prided itself on its ability to face the realities of the situation in the Sudan and accordingly immediately turned its attention to the situation in the Southern Sudan; on 9th June, 1969, the new government announced its policy. The June Declaration recognised the difference between the North and the South and affirmed that the unity of the country had to be built on those objective realities: 'The Southern people have the right to develop their cultures and traditions within a united Sudan.' (1) and accordingly the Revolutionary Council resolved to '...recognise the right of the Southern people to Regional Autonomy within a united Sudan.' (2) As a basis for progress towards eventual regional autonomy the following policy was proposed. There would be a continuation and further extension of the amnesty law that had come into force in 1967. Economic, social and cultural development for the South would be initiated through a special economic planning board and a special budget prepared with the appointment of a Minister for Southern Affairs. In addition, training of Southern personnel would enable their greater involvement in administration of the South. There were, however, two additional factors, which the people of the South were soon to interpret as conditions for the implementation of the policy. Firstly, the Declaration called for '...the building of a broad socialist-oriented democratic movement in the South....(as) an essential pre-requisite for the practical and healthy application of Regional Autonomy.' Secondly, it called for peace and security in the South and put the responsibility for its maintenance firmly on the people of the South. (3) The new regime was welcomed by many people in the South, but others were sceptical about the worth of its promises. Similar promises had been made by earlier regimes, but never fulfilled.

However admirable in theory, in practice the proposals for both the Sudan as a whole and the South were to prove difficult to implement. The broad based political movement could not be created overnight, and the regime was to encounter opposition from the right wing and from the extreme left. Neither did the economic situation allow for the implementation of development programmes. The budget of 1970 allotted only £S 4 million for the South, an insignificant amount in view of the widespread devastation. (4) Administrative reforms, including transfer of personnel to the South, minimum terms of service in the South, selection of 'trustworthy' Southern personnel for the technical ministries, and the establishment of a co-ordination council to supervise implementation, had all been proposed, but never functioned. (5) The Ministry for Southern Affairs did not have its own budget, and the Minister came to be seen as something of a rubber stamp for government policies. Again it seemed that Southern politicians were working with the government, but again had no real power to influence events. Neither did the security situation improve. The government had placed responsibility on the people of the South, while neither the people nor the Southern politicians within the country had any real control over the Anya Nya. While small numbers of refugees were stated to have returned, the exiled politicians had little confidence in the amnesty, and pointed to the fact that for all the promises of the government it had not withdrawn its troops and war still raged in the Southern Sudan. The government continued to imprison the veteran Southern politician, Clement M'Boro, and in 1970 Abdalla Deng, the paramount chief of the Ngok Dinka, was reported as having been killed with five close relatives by security forces.(6)

In some areas of the new policy progress was made. By early 1970 over six hundred Southern policemen had been recruited, seventeen Southern officer cadets had entered the Military Colleges and Southerners had been taken into the lower echelons of government, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Department of Christian Affairs had been established and Sunday had been restored as the day of rest in the South. The ineffectiveness of these measures tends, however, to support our original

contention that racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors are not the basis of the wish to secede but rather motivations to involve people in a protracted struggle. The government may have considered that it had made important concessions, but the real conflict was over the sharing of effective power, and in that respect, as far as many Southerners were concerned, nothing had changed, and they saw the concessions as 'Lavish statements with no substance.' (7)

Despite the attraction of some areas of government policy, other areas caused grave concern in the South. The initial close involvement of the Communist Party in government was anathema to the majority of Southerners, and the establishment of a socialist movement as a pre-condition for regional autonomy began to appear as only another attempt by Khartoum to impose an alien system upon the South. Further doubt on the government's credibility was cast by the selection of Joseph Garang, a committed communist, as the first Minister for Southern Affairs. Not only did <sup>Some</sup> ~~Southern~~ people view his appointment with suspicion, but he had no real channel of communication or empathy with the exiled politicians or the Anya Nya, so making negotiation impossible. He had long been dedicated to the concept of a united Sudan and saw the solution to the problem to be an alliance of the working class throughout the Sudan. (8) As early as 1961 during the Abboud regime he was speaking out against secession and in 1970 declared 'The separation movement, as you all know, collapsed and failed because it was ill-conceived...' (9) Again it seemed that the Khartoum government was making the same mistake: of working with Southerners who could not influence events in the South.

In addition to aspects of domestic policy, Nimeiri's foreign policy was also a cause for concern in the South. As we have noted earlier, the Sudan has always identified strongly with the Arab World, and in 1969 feelings over the Arab/Israeli conflict and a deep admiration for the policies of Nasser brought Nimeiri closer and closer to her Arab neighbours and to Pan-Arab socialism. In 1970 Sudan became involved in discussions over a proposed federation with Libya, Egypt and Syria. Southern politicians immediately saw this proposal as threatening their future within a united Sudan, and as a devaluation of the promised regional autonomy. Again they found the Sudan government entering discussions that

would deeply affect the whole constitutional future of the Sudan, without Southern consultation or representation, and indeed the least that can be said is that Nimeiri exhibited a certain lack of tact. He is reported in Al Ahram as having said in Cairo in November 1970, 'Indeed the three countries Libya, Egypt and Sudan could possibly struggle in Africa to defend Arab civilization in Africa which is being encircled and hampered by imperialism in an attempt to stop its influx into the heart of Africa ' (10) and to have implied that the people of the Southern Sudan had no culture of their own.(11) It is difficult to understand the rationale behind such statements, guaranteed to intensify ill-feeling, other than that they do perhaps represent the Arabs' subconscious attitudes towards the South.

In the Northern Sudan there was little support for the idea of federation, while in the South it was widely opposed for the following reasons.(12) According to the preliminary charter of the proposed federation, Islam would become the state religion and basis of law, and Arabic the official language. It was felt that Arab problems and concerns would become paramount, the South would be relegated to a secondary position, and in an Arab community of over sixty million be forever denied any effective political influence. There were fears that Egypt's surplus labour and professional talent would be directed to the Southern Sudan to eventually create a settler problem, and to further delay the participation of Southerners in the economy and the administration. And lastly, it was feared that the proposed union would mean increased military intervention, not only by Egypt and Libya, but also by their masters, the Soviet Union. Since an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1969, the war in the South had intensified, with Soviet pilots flying bombing missions, and by 1971 the number of Soviet officers and advisors in the Sudan had risen to more than a thousand. (13) During the first two years of the Nimeiri regime, the Sudanese army grew from 30,000 to about 50,000 men in 1970, and by the end of that year Sudan had received nearly 180 tanks, 25 MiG fighter aircraft, 6 Antonov bombers, and 10 helicopters from the Soviet Union.(14)

Egypt's military involvement had also increased significantly. In 1969, in response to Israel's ability to strike at her Red Sea installations, Egypt had transferred part of her airforce to Wadi Seidna, just north of Khartoum, and had also been granted naval facilities at Port Sudan. In return Egyptian pilots were employed against the Anya Nya in the South. To the majority of Southerners the proposed federation seemed to herald a further period of political subjugation and an increased use of force, and still the promised regional autonomy remained undefined and as far away as ever.

### Towards Negotiation

Throughout 1971 relations between the military regime and the Communist Party became increasingly strained. Most Communist members were dismissed from the government and the tension culminated in the abortive Communist *coup d'état* of July 1971. The leaders of the attempted *coup d'état*, during their three days of control, had criticised the Nimeiri government for its failure to solve the problem of the South, and on his return to power Nimeiri decided on a fresh initiative. Following the execution of Joseph Garang, a new Minister for Southern Affairs was appointed. Abel Alier proved to be able to command significant support in the South, possessed a degree of respect in the North and, unlike Garang, opened channels of communication with emigré politicians and the Anya Nya. He also began the process of defining the proposed regional autonomy, in terms broadly acceptable to both sides.

There were two important lessons which Khartoum had learned by 1971 that were of major importance to her ability to solve the problem. Firstly, the possibility of a complete military victory in the South was remote. Not only was the war severely hampering the economic development of the country, but the increased dependence on arms supplies and foreign military personnel compromised Sudan's freedom of action, and made her vulnerable to foreign interference. Secondly, the government had to be as good

as its word and recognize the realities of the situation. This meant recognizing the Anya Nya and the exiled politicians as parties to the dispute and exhibiting a willingness to negotiate with them, rather than with those who might be more maleable, but neither represented nor could control the situation. '....the Anya Nya are part of the problem and in prescribing a solution for the problem, we would like to associate them firstly as Southern Sudanese, and secondly, as people, who have left the country for a cause. This is a Sudanese problem and we must involve everyone who has contributed either negatively or positively to it.'(15)

It would appear that most governments faced with similar situations have to go through a similar process. They talk first of disgruntled minorities, bandits, isolated terrorists and claim to have suppressed them, but eventually have to recognize the existence of organized opposition movements and accord them rights as well as responsibilities, if they wish to negotiate peace.

The years 1971-1972 also saw certain re-adjustments in the Khartoum government, with the replacement of hard-line Pan-Arabists such as Khalid Hassan Abbas and Mamoun Awad Abu Zeid who were not convinced of the worth of negotiation, and the inclusion of the more conciliatory Abdel Rahman Abdullah in local government and Dr. Mansour Khalid in foreign affairs.

While the government in Khartoum was becoming increasingly prepared to recognize the realities, the situation in the South was also undergoing changes for the better. There had, in a certain sense, been a military coup d'etat among those actively concerned in the struggle. In July 1970, Colonel Joseph Lagu, Eastern commander of the Anya Nya, united the scattered forces under his command and declared the Anya Nya as the sole authority in the Southern Sudan. In establishing the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) he apportioned political power within the Sudan to his military commanders, but was also prepared to use the talents of those politicians who were prepared to work within his organization, such as Mading De Garang in London, and Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol in Paris. (16) So, for the first time, the Khartoum

government could attempt to negotiate with a unified movement, rather than trying to consider the views and aspirations of a number of individual personalities.

The military success of the Anya Nya during 1971 paradoxically contributed to creating an atmosphere for negotiation, and with the disclosures, however inaccurate, of a foreign mercenary put on trial in 1971, the North became increasingly aware of the capability of the Anya Nya and the degree of foreign involvement. For perhaps the first time the South was able to deal from a position of some strength, even if more apparent than real. In chapter one we noted that the demand for secession may be an extreme position from which a movement will gladly withdraw if some meaningful concessions are made, and in the situation in the Southern Sudan this would seem to have been the case. The Southern movement had to demand separation, and had to constitute a real threat to the integrity of the country, before the central government would respond favourably to its demand for a sharing of power.

The unification of the Southern movement and the increased effectiveness of its fighting force (17) allowed Lagu to respond to Khartoum's negotiation initiatives and accordingly to modify his demands. From a position of demanding complete secession, Lagu was offering to negotiate a peaceful solution by August 1971 (18) and the SSLM was declaring 'We are fighting for freedom; freedom to unite with the North; freedom to federate with the North; freedom to reject the North; freedom for the people of the South Sudan to determine their own future without interference from the Arabs or any other people.' (19) By January 1972, while still retaining complete separation as an option, Lagu was also stating his preparedness to consider a future within a unitary Sudan, on condition that such unity was not imposed by Khartoum, but negotiated with the Anya Nya and the SSLM. (20) A statement by Lagu in 1972 tends to confirm our original contention of the call for secession as an extreme bargaining position, rather than a concrete aim. 'I never was a separatist. I never believed in the secession of the South from the North; I still hold that belief. My only aim was to obtain recognition for Southerners. It was my opinion that such an aim could be achieved through the application of force, but I never intended to use force to achieve separation. I had resorted to force because I concluded that the successive Khartoum Governments were not willing to concede the point.(21)

In the knowledge that the principle of negotiation was acceptable to the SSLM, the government and the constituent committee of the recently formed Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), in consultation with Southern leaders, prepared a memorandum outlining a possible legal expression of the proposed regional autonomy, so that when negotiations did begin they would centre on something definite, rather than founder, as so often in the past, on the rights and wrongs of the situation.

During the same period the Khartoum government began an intense campaign to improve its relations with other African countries. Perhaps most important was a new detente with Ethiopia. Negotiations in early 1971 were followed by a visit to Addis Ababa by Nimeiri in November 1971, and although much of the agreement was expressed in terms of trade relations and cultural exchange, the important factors were preparatory talks for a settlement of the boundary issue, and an agreement by Sudan to terminate its support for Eritrean separatists in exchange for a similar concession by Addis Ababa to withdraw support for Southern exiles. (22) Relations with Uganda had been undermined by Khartoum government forces carrying the conflict across the border into Uganda in pursuit of Anya Nya, but by January 1972 a Khartoum representative was in Kampala for discussions. Uganda agreed to try to prevent subversion among Southern refugees, and detente was established to the extent that President Amin offered Uganda as a venue for peace negotiation between North and South. His severing of all links with Israel in April 1972 set the seal on a new relationship with the Sudan. Agreements reached with the Central African Republic and Zaire resulted in refugee camps being moved back from the border in an attempt to stop subversion. In all these cases the inclusion of Southerners in the Sudanese missions contributed to their success.

As we noted earlier, the existence of such a large number of refugees involved international agencies, charitable bodies and religious bodies, and it was the church organizations which were to play a major part in facilitating negotiations. During the 1960's the situation was closely followed by the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches and, following a visit by their representatives to the Sudan in 1971, they became convinced that a peaceful settlement could be negotiated. These organizations, together with the Movement for Colonial Freedom in London, facilitated preliminary secret meetings, at which it came to be

realized that there did exist a basis for agreement, and at which concessions could be made without the negotiators feeling that they prejudiced their individual political positions. While the degree of secrecy was later to be criticised in some quarters, it undoubtedly enabled positive discussion to begin without the need for unproductive political rhetoric. Knowing little of these preliminary meetings, the majority of the Sudanese people were not optimistic that a settlement would be reached when negotiations began in Addis Ababa in February 1972.

#### The Addis Ababa Agreement

Although individual personalities have not so far figured largely in our appraisal of the problem, a brief look at those personalities involved in the Addis Ababa negotiations will assist an understanding of their ability to succeed. We have already noted the contribution of Abel Alier as an intermediary between the SSLM and Khartoum, and the success of the talks was as much a result of his calm negotiating technique as of his professional legal skills. The other Khartoum representatives were also selected as much for their professional capabilities as for their belief in the possibility of a peaceful settlement. Dr. Mansour Khalid, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had already contributed a great deal to the success of the preliminary negotiations by helping to re-establish good relations with neighbouring countries, and had a breadth of experience that enabled him to formulate for the Sudan a realistic position between the Arab and the African Worlds. Dr. Jaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit made an absolutely essential contribution to the negotiations as a prime architect of the Sudan's policy of decentralization, and we shall see in the following chapter how his legislation for the reform of local government enabled the Khartoum government to bring a fresh approach to the problem of power sharing. Abdel Rahman Abdulla, a career administrator, was then Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform and therefore able to appreciate the day-to-day difficulties that would arise in the implementation of policies, and had been involved with the secretariat of the Round Table Conference and the Twelve Man Committee. Two military representatives

were included to deal with the complicated cease-fire arrangements and replanning of the Sudanese forces, which were to occupy a large proportion of the negotiations, Colonel Kamal Abasher, and Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman Khalil who was to be a member of the Joint Military Commission, and the final Khartoum representative was the First Vice-President of the Sudan, Maj. General Mohammed El Baghir Ahmed, Minister of the Interior, and one-time colleague of Joseph Lagu in the Southern Command.

The SSLM delegation was led by Ezboni Mondiri, a veteran Southern politician, but also someone who had some experience of working with Khartoum. He had been a central government minister in the Transitional Government of 1964, and had suggested a constitutional solution to the problem as early as 1958. Both Mading De Garang, delegation spokesman and SSLM representative in London, and Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol, delegation secretary and SSLM representative in Paris, had played significant parts in the preliminary negotiations, as to some extent had Job Adier De Jok, SSLM representative in Ethiopia and Angelo Voga Morjan, SSLM representative in East Africa. The Rev. Paul Puot had been Minister of Education in the shortlived Anyidi Revolutionary Council and Oliver Albino had held a variety of positions in a variety of Southern organizations. Col. Frederick Brian Maggot was the special military representative from the Anya Nya. The observers underline the involvement of the churches; Leopold J. Niili, World Council of Churches, Kwodo E. Ankrah, World Council of Churches, Burgess Carr, All Africa Conference of Churches and also moderator, Samuel Athi Bwogo, Sudan Council of Churches, with Nabiyelel Kifle as the representative of the host, His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia.

By 26th February an agreement had been reached under which a political, legal and administrative framework had been outlined '...within which regional aspirations can be fulfilled and national interests and sovereignty best preserved.' (23) This became law as the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act on 3rd March, 1972.

The law was issued as an organic law which could not be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly, and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the South. It defined the Southern Provinces as the provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as their boundaries stood on 1st January, 1956, and any other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern complex as might be decided by a referendum.(24) The South would in future be known as the Southern Region, and although Arabic would continue to be the official language, English would be the principal language in the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of other languages that might prove practical.

The central government would reserve the right of legislative and executive power over matters considered to be of a national nature, and they were mostly those one might reasonably expect: defence, external affairs, currency, air and inter-regional transport, communications and telecommunications, customs and most foreign trade, nationality and immigration, economic, social and educational planning and public audit.

Regional legislation in the Southern Region would be exercised by a People's Regional Assembly (PRA), its sixty members to be elected by citizens of the Southern Region by direct secret ballot, although initially the President could appoint additional members under certain circumstances. The assembly was to decide its own rules for procedure and elect its own speaker, and in general terms its function was to legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and cultural, economic and social development,(25) but in most cases in accordance with national plans and programmes. The assembly would be able to request the President to postpone the coming into force of a law which they might consider to be against the interests of the people of the Southern Region, or to ask the President to withdraw from the national assembly any bill for similar reasons. In both cases final discretion would be left to the President. Similarly, President Nimeiri would be able to veto any PRA

legislation he considered contrary to the National Constitution. The PRA would be expected to strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan, and to respect the spirit of the National Constitution.

Executive power would be vested in a High Executive Council (HEC) which would act on behalf of the President in specifying the duties of the various departments in the Southern Region, as long as in matters relating to central ministries it acted with the approval of the President. Its president would be appointed and relieved of office by President Nimeiri, and would recommend to Nimeiri those to be appointed to or relieved of office as members. The president of the HEC and the other members would be responsible to the PRA and President Nimeiri for the efficient administration of the Southern Region. Members of the HEC might also be members of the PRA. The PRA would be able, by a three-quarters majority, to request President Nimeiri to relieve from office either the president of the HEC or any other member, to which request President Nimeiri would accede. The HEC would be able to initiate legislation for the formation of a regional public service to specify terms and conditions of service and any other legislation. The relationship between the HEC and the central ministries would be regulated by President Nimeiri. Juba was to be the regional capital.

Sources of revenue for the Southern Region would be direct and indirect taxation, contributions from People's Local Government Councils, revenue from development projects in the region, funds from the National Treasury for established services, funds voted by the National Assembly, a Special Development Budget for the Southern Region as envisaged in the June Declaration, a variety of taxes, duties and rates on commodities produced or consumed in the Southern Region, projects initiated and personnel employed. In addition to national and local duties and taxes, the PRA would be able to levy regional duties and taxes. (26)

To enable the agreement to be implemented as soon as possible and so avoid mutual suspicions, certain interim administrative measures were proposed. President Nimeiri, the leadership of the SSLM and the SSU in the Southern Region would appoint the president and the members of the HEC so that a regional civil service could be immediately established. The members of the HEC would hold the following portfolios: finance and economic planning,

education, information culture and tourism, communications and transport, agriculture, animal production and fisheries, public health, regional administration, housing, public works and utilities, natural resources and rural development, public service and labour, and minerals, industry, trade and supply. The mandate of the interim HEC would extend for only eighteen months, after which elections would be held for the PRA. The SSLM would supply a list of qualified personnel outside the Sudan so as to facilitate their appointment to both regional and central institutions, and financial provision would be made for them.

The agreement also included fundamental rights and freedoms. All citizens would be guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, unless it was considered a threat to public health or order. All citizens in the Southern Region would be guaranteed equal opportunity in education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession, and such rights would not be prejudiced on the basis of race, tribe, religion, place of birth or sex. Every person would enjoy freedom of religion and conscience, freedom to use their own language and develop their own culture and to educate their children as they wished. They should have equal pay for equal work and not be subject to compulsory labour. In addition there were the usual legal rights to be expected in any modern state. (27)

An amnesty was proclaimed that covered acts of mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region since 18th August, 1955, and promised the discharge of all those imprisoned on such charges within fifteen days of the date of ratification of the treaty. The amnesty would also cover those still outside the Sudan, armed returnees and ex-Anyanya. Repatriation commissions would be established inside and outside the country, composed of regional, central government and UNHCR representatives, and where necessary, Sudanese ambassadors and host country representatives. There would also be a Special Commission for Relief and Resettlement. It would give priority to displaced people within the Sudan, but also aid returnees and provide assistance to Southern students abroad and in providing primary

education within the Sudan. Much of their work would be devoted to the provision of adequate reception centres, shelter, food and medical treatment as well as transport to permanent resettlement areas or places of origin.

An essential part of the agreement was the provision of cease-fire arrangements. It was originally decided that the cease-fire should become effective from the date of the ratification of the agreement on 12 th March, 1972, but it was in fact implemented earlier on 6th March, 1972. Basically it called upon forces on both sides to remain in their present positions and to avoid any possible confrontation. A Cease-Fire Commission was established with representatives from the central government, the SSLM, the governments of neighbouring African states, the Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches and the UNHCR.

Finally there were agreements to deal with the military situation, both in 1972 and in the future. In the long term Southern citizens would constitute a sizeable proportion of the People's Armed Forces corresponding to the population of the Southern Region, and the use of such forces in the Southern Region would be controlled by President Nimeiri on the advice of the president of the HEC. In the short term, to cover the first five years of the agreement, the People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region would consist of a national force known as the Southern Command, which would be made up of 12,000 men, of whom 6,000 would be citizens of the Southern Region. Although the actual wording of the temporary arrangements does not specify that these 6,000 would be recruited from the Anya Nya, a letter from Lagu to the people of the Southern Region calls on the Anya Nya to remain in their positions until '...arrangements for their recruitment into the national army, had been made.(28) Recruitment and integration would be determined by a Joint Military Commission, with initial separate deployment of troops to ensure smooth integration in an atmosphere of peace and confidence. Three senior officers from each side would serve on the commission.

The Sudan Government proceeded to implement the agreement as soon as possible. Abel Alier was appointed president of the HEC with the following Southerners holding the various portfolios in 1972. Hilary Logali - finance and economic planning; Luigi Adwok - education; Dr. Toby Maduot - health; Samuel Aru Bol - regional administration. These four men had worked closely with the Nimeiri regime in the search for a solution and had previously been members of the Southern Front or SANU Inside. The veteran political group, who had worked for so long outside the country, were represented by Joseph Oduhu - housing and public utilities; Ezboni Mondiri - communications and transport; Elia Lupe - public service and administrative reform; Michael Tawil - co-operation and rural development, and the younger generation by Mading De Garang - information and culture; Michael Wal Duany - presidential affairs and Gamma Hassan - agriculture. Their selection also represented most areas of the South and more than eight tribal groups. These members of the HEC came to be known as Regional Ministers. In establishing their various ministries, perhaps the greatest difficulty was a shortage of trained personnel. Many Northerners returned to the North, and many posts were left vacant. Southerners were also appointed as province commissioners in the South, local government officers, police commissioners, and to the various commissions established by the agreement. Clement M'Boro, the veteran Southern Front politician, became chairman of both the Commission for Repatriation and that for Resettlement, Relief and Rehabilitation, and Peter Gatkuoth became the director-general of the Special Fund. At the centre, Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol became Minister of Planning, and Bona Malwal Madut Ring and Samuel Lupai became State Ministers for information and local government respectively. Southerners were also appointed to the SSU Political Bureau; namely Abel Alier, Hilary Logali, Dr. Toby Maduot, Luigi Adwok and Joseph Oduhu. (29)

Elections for the PRA were held in late 1973, despite some fears that old animosities would be revived. The sixty available seats were divided between thirty territorial constituencies, nine regional constituencies,

eighteen popular organization constituencies, and three armed forces nominations. The assembly commenced operations rather belatedly in December 1973, and among its first actions were the election of Lubari Ramba as its first speaker, and the confirmation of Abel Alier's position as president of the HEC. There was a reshuffle of Regional Ministers, and some concern that of the four new Ministers, three were Dinka, so giving this group half of the twelve appointments. However by the beginning of 1974 the membership of the HEC had grown markedly younger and markedly more professionally qualified.

According to the agreement, the Commission for Repatriation and the Commission for Resettlement, Relief and Rehabilitation were established, started work in May 1972, and from the beginning worked closely together. By the end of December 1972 a total of 170,000 people had passed through the official repatriation machinery and a large number had returned independently. A further 850,000 had returned to their homes, although a further estimated 100,000 were still displaced in the bush. An estimated 51,000 remained in neighbouring states. (30)

On the 3rd April, 1972 the Joint Military Commission was established, consisting of senior officers from each side - a general staff to aid implementation and a medical team. Following the surrender of all arms, the commission toured the three provinces in order to interview the Anya Nya and select the 6,000 men to be absorbed into the People's Armed Forces and to suggest the employment of others in the police, prison or civil services. A condition of assimilation was recommendation by Anya Nya district headquarters, in addition to the expected conditions, such as health, age, academic standard, military training and length of service. It was to be expected that the main obstacle to immediate integration would be lack of confidence, and to facilitate the process the two forces were brought into rather tentative contact, sharing a commander, living in adjacent accommodation and sharing recreational facilities. A new military administration was established and a training programme initiated. After training, inter-unit transfers would begin, firstly within the provinces and later between provinces. (31)

The commission interviewed 15,842 soldiers presented as ex-Anya Nya during the six month operation. The force had comprised a headquarters staff and three brigades, one in each province. The largest and best armed force was in Equatoria and, like that of Bahr El Ghazal, was well organized. In Upper Nile, forces were more dislocated and had a marked tribal basis. Most units were armed with automatic weapons of Chinese or Belgian manufacture - light machine guns, bren guns, etc. There were also some anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, bazoukas, anti-tank weapons and mines. There had been wireless contact between command and most areas in Equatoria, as well as with headquarters in Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal, but little transport except in border areas. There was no single uniform. The commission considered discipline to be very good with a satisfactory standard of infantry drill and tactics. Forces had been provided with basic three months training, commando training of six months and, in the case of two hundred officers, infantry training in Israel. (32)

Of the 15,842 interviewed, 200 were absorbed into the People's Armed Forces as officers, 867 as NCOs, 5,012 as private soldiers, 1,860 were recommended for the police and prisons service, 5,489 were recommended for the civil service and 2,414 were found to be medically unfit. (33) Absorption of those termed Anya Nya into the police and prison service subsequently increased to 3,579 in 1973 (34) and by the end of 1972 an estimated (35) 14,000 'ex-Anya Nya' had been absorbed into other government departments. A sum of £5 500,000 had been allocated to meet the wages bill for the absorbed forces but was never to reach the Southern Region (36), a problem which characterised the early implementation period. Of the £5 1,410,412 approved in the first 1972/73 Special Development Budget, only £5 560,000 was actually remitted.

Certain other areas of the agreement were not immediately implemented, one of which was the precise definition of the exact area to constitute the Southern Region. As we noted earlier, the agreement described the Southern Region as the three Southern Provinces as their boundaries stood on 1st January, 1956 and any other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern complex, as might be decided by a referendum. However a referendum has never taken place to determine either the future of the Dinka areas of Southern Kordofan or to clarify the position of the copper reserves at Hofrat En Nahas, which lie in

Bahr El Ghazal on maps published by the Sudan Survey Department in 1955, but in Southern Darfur in those published in 1976. The question of rights to the copper reserves and to the widely rumoured oil reserves of the border areas will doubtless not arise as the agreement specifically safeguards the interests of the central government in such an event. However there was some dissatisfaction among the Ngok Dinka of Southern Kordofan, many of whom had been involved in the struggle, and thought of themselves essentially as Southerners, to find themselves excluded from the benefits of power sharing. The agreement also referred specifically to three Southern provinces. In 1976 these three provinces were subdivided into six units, and in the next chapter we shall consider the significance of this as part of an examination of the realities of power sharing.

Neither were Southerners absolutely unanimous in welcoming the agreement. Some, such as Gordon Muortat Mayen, a veteran Southern Front politician and Minister of Works in the 1965 Transitional Government, were quick to denounce it as a sell-out to the North. Mayen has remained in exile since 1972. Others felt that the North, and especially the President, had retained all effective power, and that the Regional Government would be left with all the work. They felt that their opinion was confirmed by the selection for key posts of so many of those Southern politicians who had worked with Khartoum, rather than actively taking part in the struggle. They felt that the Southern delegation to the Addis Ababa talks had been naive, and certainly they did not have a great deal of experience in constitutional matters, and have admitted as much. (37) Together with the pessimists, there were those whose optimism knew no bounds, and who were to be those most deeply disappointed when the realities of the situation became apparent in the first few years after the agreement.

At this point it is useful to summarize the reasons why the proposals which had been largely agreed upon at the Round Table Conference of 1965 were to take so long to become law. From the Northern point of view, the Southern Problem was seen, not in its true perspective, but rather as an adjunct to Northern party politics. There was an unwillingness to see the demands of the South as having any legitimacy and a refusal to believe in the Anya Nya as an organized body or to countenance negotiation with 'terrorists'. And there was a continuing belief in the eventual efficacy of a military solution. In the South the greatest drawback was the profound division of Southern leadership and the lack of a single overall political philosophy. In addition, the foreign involvement and assistance provided allowed both sides to persevere in the attempt to find a military solution.

#### Conclusion

While much of the detail of the Addis Ababa Agreement remained to be formulated in practical experience, one factor was beyond doubt. The degree of control by the centre, especially of defense, foreign affairs and nationality, placed the Southerners firmly as Sudanese, expected to show ultimate loyalty to the Sudan. In the next chapter we shall look at the practical experience of the first five years of regional autonomy and examine the socio-economic situation in the Southern Region, the realities of power sharing and the prospects for continued peace.

CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY

The Socio-Economic Situation: Population and Manpower

The seventeen years of civil war, the displacement of a large part of the population and the subsequent virtual cessation of all economic activity, had produced an abnormal situation. As we have seen, much of 1972 was devoted to resettlement, and it was not until 1973 that a beginning was made on the rehabilitation of the area, and the true extent of the devastation assessed.

The effects of the civil war on the demography of the Southern Region was considerable. The 1955-56 census had shown a population for the area of 2.7 million and, with a natural growth rate of 3.3% for the Sudan as a whole, it was believed that by the beginning of the seventies, the population would be between 4 and 5 million.(1) However the preliminary results of the 1973 census gave a total population for the Southern Region of only 2.8 million (2) only 20% of the total Sudanese population living in approximately 30% of the total land area. Population densities for the Region were therefore low, even by African standards. There were less than 5 persons per square kilometer, with densities ranging from 6.1 per square kilometer in Bahr El Ghazal to 3.2 per square kilometer in Upper Nile. Highest densities were recorded in the Gogrial area (20 per square kilometer) along the Bahr El Arab and along the Nile. In parts of Upper Nile Province, towards the Ethiopian border, densities fell as low as 2 persons per square kilometer, with similarly low levels recorded in western Bahr El Ghazal.

There had been a steady movement of the population towards the towns. Many returning refugees remained in the urban areas, having become accustomed to urban life while in exile, and others had lost their homes and cattle during the war. However by 1973 only 5% of the population lived in settlements of over 20,000 people - in Juba (57,000), Wau (53,000) and Malakal (37,000). If semi-urban settlements are included (i.e. those of over 4,000 people) the 'urbanization' rate rises to 10% overall, with the highest level in Equatoria (18.7%) followed by Bahr El Ghazal (9.0%) and Upper Nile (4.8%)


TABLE IV: AREA AND POPULATION: CENSUS FIGURES 1973. PRELIMINARY RESULTS

	<u>Area Sq. Kms.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>%</u>
All Sudan	2,173,000	100.0	14,172,000	100.0
Bahr El Ghazal	214,000	9.8	1,320,000	9.3
Equatoria	198,000	9.1	725,000	5.1
Upper Nile	236,000	10.9	763,000	5.4
<b>TOTAL SOUTHERN REGION</b>	<b>648,000</b>	<b>29.8%</b>	<b>2,808,000</b>	<b>19.8%</b>

TABLE V: URBANIZATION IN THE SOUTHERN REGION: CENSUS FIGURES 1973

	<u>Population</u>
Wau	53,402
Rumbek	18,101
Aweil	17,835
Yirol	13,329
Raga	8,874
Tonj	8,470
Juba	56,723
Anzara	17,230
Torit	14,745
Yei	11,696
Maridi	9,618
Tambura	8,719
Yambio	7,024
Kapoeta	5,325
Source Yubu	4,222
Malakal	37,147
<b>TOTAL SOUTHERN REGION</b>	<b>292,460</b>

ETHIOPIA



-----  
Proposed Jonglei  
Canal

Southern Sudan since 1976

**Fig. V**

In common with the rest of the Sudan the population of the Southern Region was found to be markedly young, 44% of the people being under 15 years, 53% in the working age group 15-64, and only 2% over 65 years. The youngest population was found in Bahr El Ghazal where almost half were under 15 years, and the oldest in Equatoria where the figure was under 40%. The considerable differences at council level (for example, 52% below 15 years in Gogrial and only 27% in Yambio) were the result of differences in the birth and migration rates.

For the population of the Southern Region as a whole, males were in a 46,000 majority; however the distribution varied considerably throughout the region, both spatially and by age group. Below 15 and above 35 years, males were in a definite predominance; but between these two ages they were very much in the minority, with 91,000 fewer men than women. This was most marked in Equatoria, where the province as a whole showed an excess of women. This lack of men in the active age group tended to exacerbate the problem of a predominantly young population with large numbers of children to be supported. The 200,000 adult males and possible 100,000 adult females that appeared to be missing from the expected pattern would probably have produced at least double their numbers of offspring, and their absence may have helped to explain a census result well below that expected.

The 1973 census showed an increase in migratory movement, with the Southern Region showing a net migratory gain. Nearly 70,000 people from the South were recorded in other areas of the country while nearly 100,000 had moved to the Southern Region from the North. The most attractive area for out-migrants was the Khartoum conurbation, accounting for 36%, the remainder moving to the adjoining Northern provinces and the major agricultural scheme areas. In-migration showed its highest rate into Upper Nile 65%, with Equatoria accounting for 20% and Bahr El Ghazal 15%. Many of these in-migrants were probably the children of Southern parents born outside the area, and arriving in the South for the first time.

International migration across the borders with neighbouring states is very difficult to assess. During the period of the civil war, an estimated 200,000 Southern Sudanese lived outside the country, of whom approximately 140,000 were believed to have returned by October 1973. Movement back into the country has continued, although not all are believed to have returned. A considerable number of people of Zairean nationality have moved into the Southern Region, mainly into Equatoria.

For the period 1955/6-1973/4 the three Southern provinces showed a net annual increase of only 0.6%. In Bahr El Ghazal the rate was 1.7%, but in Equatoria and Upper Nile the numbers recorded in 1973 were smaller than in 1955/6. Such a decrease in population can only be explained, apart from under-enumeration, by a net out-migration, higher death rates and lower birth rates. With the prevailing peaceful conditions a sharp rise in natural increase was to be expected. In an unpublished note, the Department of Statistics estimated a 2.5% natural increase rate for the Southern Region in 1973, and estimated a population of 3,894,000 by 1984, and 6,067,000 by 2002.

In the 1973 census, almost half of the population of the Southern Region above 15 years were recorded as economically active. Apart from school children, the old, infirm and retired, most of those listed as not economically active were women, the result of a somewhat arbitrary definition. In a largely subsistence economy it was likely that women were as fully occupied in economic activities as were men. Of a population of 2.8 million the census listed only 850,000 people as being economically active, of whom approximately 127,000 were unemployed, and a further 5,000 were looking for work for the first time. This unemployment rate of 15% of the labour force was high by African standards. Activity rates were highest in Bahr El Ghazal (males 95%, females 25%) and lowest in Equatoria (males 87%, females 9%). Unemployment among women was practically non-existent. Among men over 15 years unemployment rates ranged from below 10% in Equatoria to above 20% in Bahr El Ghazal; however size of settlement was a more important factor with unemployment being shown as primarily a rural problem. For example, the rate for Juba was less than 6%.

In 1973 unemployment in the Southern Region was a serious problem; 127,000 people were classed as unemployed and a further 5,000 were looking for work for the first time. This rate of 15% compares unfavourably with the rate for the whole of the Sudan of 6.5%, and for the Northern provinces of about 4.0%. The problem was most severe among the younger age group, over 30.0% of the 15-19 age group being classified as unemployed. In the 20-24 age group the rate was 23.0%, falling to 15.0% for those between 25 and 29 years. Rates decreased slowly with age to only 4.0% among people over 55 years. The rural nature of the problem was the result of a higher rate of natural increase coupled with the virtual cessation of economic growth in the rural areas. A contributory factor to the high unemployment level was the inclusion of numbers of returnees who had been employed in the modern sector in their country of exile and were unwilling to consider a return to subsistence agriculture on their homecoming.

DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE POPULATION BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 1973 . TABLE VI

	<u>S.Region %</u>	<u>Sudan %</u>
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, & fishing	73.4	66.0
Mining & quarrying	0.0	0.1
Manufacturing	0.9	3.4
Electricity, gas & water	0.2	0.9
Construction	1.1	1.8
Wholesale & retail trade, restaurants & hotels	1.8	4.8
Transport	0.6	3.4
Finance, insurance & real estate	0.0	0.1
Community, social & personal services	9.9	11.1
Activities not adequately defined	12.2	6.3
<b>TOTAL*</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

\*Due to rounding the percentages do not always add up exactly

The above figures indicate the dependence on agriculture in the Southern Region and the lack of opportunities in transport, trade and manufacturing. The disparities would be even more apparent if the rates for the South were compared with those for the Northern provinces, rather than with the national average. However, figures for the Northern provinces alone were not available at the time of writing.

Over the Southern Region as a whole, the 1973 census showed 73% of people as being occupied in the primary sector. This was probably an under-estimate, with a figure of 80% being more likely. In the secondary sector there has been an increase since 1955 from 1.3% to 2.2%. This is more a result of the considerable number of construction projects under way since the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, than any appreciable increase in manufacturing industry. The increase in those employed in the tertiary sector, from 4% to above 12%, reflected the mushrooming of civil service and government employment since the attainment of regional self-government, and the absorption of 14,000 ex-Anya Nya into various government departments. The tertiary sector was inflated by large numbers of educated unemployed, for whom suitable jobs had not been found.

Of those economically active in the Southern Region, 60% were in the self-employed category, 20% were employees, and 15% said they were unemployed. A further 4% were unpaid family workers, and of the remainder 0.4% claimed to be employers. Employment in the modern sector accounted for approximately 198,000 people - almost all males in the 20 - 40 year age group. The numbers involved in paid employment in Bahr El Ghazal being less than half those in Equatoria and Upper Nile, despite a much larger total population. Over the Region as a whole, about 25% were employed in the modern sector not less than two-thirds of these workers were employed by the Government.

Three occupational groups appeared to be most important - service workers, agricultural workers and those in production/transport/labouring accounting for 75% of the modern sector population. In Upper Nile agriculture was most important (40%) while in Bahr El Ghazal the service element was the most important single category (34%). In Equatoria the spectrum was much wider. The most important group was production/transport/labouring followed by service activities. The relatively greater importance of the professional/technical category reflected the concentration of Regional Government activities in Juba: a concentration likely to be gradually dispersed with the sub-division of the provinces and the increasing responsibilities of the local government system.

The self-employed workers in the modern sector were demographically similar to those in the modern sector as a whole; 90% were males and 75% were below 40 years of age. Over the whole of the Region 47% were involved in the retail trade. A further 15% were tailors and 8% were occupied in the manufacture of food and drink. These three occupations involved 70% of all self-employed, whereas for the modern sector as a whole the figure was less than 10%.

The census showed a considerable in-migration in the towns, especially to the then three province capitals, 14% of the urban population having moved in from places outside the province. Urban in-migration was highest in Equatoria and Upper Nile. In Juba more than 25% were born outside the province, in Malakal 18.5%, and in Wau 14.6%. These towns, however, retain an underlying rural nature, more than a third of the population being found in the primary sector in agricultural jobs. The urban areas are highly localized centres of paid employment. Of the 200,000 people in the modern sector, almost 25% were to be found in the towns.

The demographic factors outlined above reflect not only the more severe effects of the civil war, but also the years of economic neglect. Over 75% of people depended on subsistence agriculture, with only a very small proportion involved in manufacturing, construction transport or trade. For most of those outside the agricultural sector, the government was the only employer. Of particular interest for the future development of the area was the very low number of people involved in private undertakings, or self-employed within the modern sector. The high percentage of self-employed within the whole of the economically active population, 60%, again reflected the subsistence nature of the economy rather than widespread small-scale enterprise. The high rate of rural unemployment, although perhaps to some degree a consequence of definition, reflects the neglect of the agricultural sector over many years and the recent high degree of social upheaval in the rural areas.

The very low population figures for the three Southern provinces are evidently not explained by out-migration, and it is unlikely that under-enumeration occurred only in these provinces. While the re-settlement situation may have caused some difficulty in 1973, with people still returning to their homes, it does not explain the low number of adults in the 15 - 35 age group, or the shortage of young male adults. It would seem that the war years took a much greater toll than was imagined. Not only were lives lost during the actual hostilities, but it would seem likely that many died as a result of famine, disease and the virtual non-existence of social services in many areas.

### Health

A very basic form of health service had been established in the Southern Region under British colonial rule, and successful attempts had been made to contain the spread of diseases such as malaria, leprosy and especially sleeping sickness. During the civil war many of the existing hospitals and health centres were destroyed or fell into disuse and much of the disease prevention work came to a standstill. After the peace agreement, with thousands of refugees returning to the area, the situation became critical, and it was to the credit of the repatriation authorities that the process was completed without any major epidemic. Of the 27 hospitals in the Southern Region, only 10 were operating in 1972, with only 2,474 available beds. By the end of 1973 the situation had improved, but the ratio of doctors to patients in Bahr El Ghazal was one doctor to every 70,726 people, despite a great deal of assistance from such agencies as WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, LWF and GLRA. Health facilities throughout the Sudan are generally inadequate. The 171 hospitals in existence in 1975 provided only 104 beds per 100,000 people. There was one health centre, four dispensaries and ten dressing stations per 100,000 people. These ratios are very low compared with most other countries, especially when the sheer size of the country is taken into consideration. Moreover, hospital beds are not distributed evenly throughout the country, ratios ranging from 131/100,000 in Khartoum Province to 56/100,000 in the Western provinces. The ratio in the Southern Region in 1975 was 111/100,000. Dispensaries are more evenly distributed, but of those in the Southern Region in 1975, 50% were not in fact functioning due to a lack of personnel and supplies.(3)

The ratio of doctors to the population for the Sudan as a whole was 8/100,000 in 1974. Although this may appear to be low, it compares well with the majority of African countries. The distribution of doctors is however very uneven with 50.0% of all general doctors and specialists being concentrated in the two provinces of Khartoum and Gezira. In the Southern Region, at the end of 1973, the ratio was approximately 2.5/100,000. Of the Sudanese doctors serving in the South the majority were Northerners. There was some difficulty in encouraging doctors to work in the South, given the very difficult conditions, lack of adequate housing etc. Since the peace agreement, a number of expatriate doctors have been provided by international agencies. Safe water supplies were limited to the province capitals, and were not always adequate with a resultant high incidence of waterborne diseases. (4)

It was difficult to assess the general health situation in the Southern Region. The majority of hospitals and health centres were under-reporting the number of attendances and with the general lack of facilities in the rural areas a large number of cases went unreported, undiagnosed and untreated. The unexpectedly low census returns may show that the general level of health had been lower than the health statistics indicated. The following diseases constituted some of the major health problems in the Southern Region: malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, sleeping sickness, gastro-enteritis, kala-azar, river blindness and general malnutrition. (5) Attempts to improve the situation in the immediate post-war period were bedevilled by a lack of finance and a shortage of qualified personnel. Fuel shortages and transportation deficiencies affected the distribution of drugs and the disease prevention programmes. There was a general unwillingness among medical personnel to work unsupported in the rural areas and in the major towns working conditions were generally very bad with constant shortages of essential drugs and other supplies. (6)

The shortage of medical personnel reflected not only the unwillingness of Northerners to work in the Southern Region, but also the shortcomings of the educational system, which had produced so few qualified Southerners.

### Education

The low level of educational effort in the Southern Region, compared with the rest of the country, was one of the most glaring examples of retarded development in the area. In 1970, the ratio of school enrolment to population, which was 3.1% for the Sudan as a whole, was only 0.7% for the Southern provinces. The situation in intermediate education was equally bad with the South accounting for only 6.5% of all enrolments. Much of the educational system, already deficient in quality and coverage, was destroyed during the period of hostilities and the re-establishment of education proved a major problem to the new Regional Government.

TABLE VII SCHOOL ENROLMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF RELEVANT AGE GROUPS 1971

<u>Province</u>	<u>Primary</u> 7-12 yrs	<u>General Secondary</u> 13-15 yrs	<u>Higher Secondary</u> 16-18 yrs
Khartoum	62.3%	28.3%	20.9%
Northern	53.7%	18.3%	6.5%
Blue Nile	39.4%	11.4%	4.0%
Kassala	28.6%	6.0%	2.3%
Kordofan	16.6%	3.5%	1.2%
Darfur	16.5%	3.5%	1.0%
Bahr El Ghazal	4.5%	1.0%	0.7%
Equatoria	6.8%	0.8%	0.2%
Upper Nile	5.7%	0.8%	0.2%

Source: Ministry of Education.

Primary education was most seriously affected by the period of unrest, with 120 schools being destroyed or badly damaged. Although many were rebuilt in 1972, they remained overcrowded with very large classes. The construction of over 200 Anya Nya schools, mainly in Equatoria, indicated the willingness of people to build and operate their own schools, but the first Regional Government was faced with the decision whether to continue to operate these sub-grade schools or to raise the standard in only a limited number of schools. Secondary school places were very limited and higher education virtually non-existent. At all levels there was a lack of suitable buildings and equipment and a severe shortage of trained teachers.

It is difficult to assess the educational status of the total population of the Southern Region. Data on the highest level of school attended were collected in the 1973 census, but only for the 7-24 years age group. This group accounted for a little over one million people, or 36% of the total population, of whom 20% were attending school or had attended school. There were considerable provincial differences. In Equatoria 44% of the 7-24 year age group were or had attended school, 19% in Upper Nile, and only 6% in Bahr El Ghazal.(7) It was estimated that of the total population of the Southern Region, only 10% had attended or were attending school.(8) A study undertaken in 1974 discovered that the marked differences at council level continued two years after the settlement. For example in 1974, of the children in the 7-13 year age group in Yei, as many as 49% were attending school, while in Fangak the level was as low as 1%.(9) Of those employed in the modern sector, over half (58%) had never attended school. Of the 80,000 who had received at least one year of education, almost all had left at primary level. Only 15,000 people had passed through secondary school and only 4,300 had been to university or some other centre of higher education. Of agricultural workers employed in the modern sector, 75% had never attended school, and among administrative officers 23% had been educated to only junior secondary level. Throughout the Southern Region there was a severe shortage of people with any kind of technical training, especially mechanics, drivers, builders and carpenters.

The shortage of trained personnel affected all sectors of the economy, but was perhaps most marked in the Regional administration. Of a sample of administrative officers considered in 1974, 67% had only two or less years of experience in the administrative service, and as many as 65% were under 35 years of age. As we have noted the overall educational standard of such officers was low, with only 18% being graduates. Not only were there marked differences in educational attainment levels, but also in previous experience. While 10% had some experience of the old administrative service, as many as 48% were recruited from the parallel administration of the Anya Nya.(10) The administration had a broad base of inexperienced new recruits, but was seriously short of experienced personnel capable of organizing and training the new cadres. In the various ministry headquarters in Juba the situation was equally bad. There was a severe shortage of personnel at the highest levels, and for example in the Ministry of Agriculture alone there was a 50% vacancy rate in 1975. Although the level of education among the key decision makers in the Regional Government was high, there was a general lack of administrative experience among Regional Ministers.

#### Transportation

The administration of the Southern Region and the operation of basic social services was severely hampered by the virtual non-existence of any modern transport infrastructure. Deficiencies in transport and communications had contributed markedly to the relative under-development of the Southern Region. The colonial policy of strictly controlled movement hampered the growth of an adequate transport network, and limited interaction between North and South. This policy, combined with the climatic restraints on road and rail building, limited the innovation diffusion from Khartoum. Until the building of the railway to Wau in 1961, the River Nile was the only real surface link with the outside world. The resultant high transport costs inhibited the development of exports from the region; commodities which could have been produced at low cost in Juba became uneconomic when compared with imported goods at Khartoum. The commodity flow, except for a brief period during World War II, has always been heavily incoming.

Intra-regional communications have always been poor, the colonial administration depending to a large extent on river transport. In Equatoria and parts of Bahr El Ghazal some all-weather roads were constructed, but in Upper Nile movement was virtually impossible by land during the rainy season. What transport system did exist was designed for administrative purposes, not as an instrument of development. Bad communications inhibited the growth pole effect of the provincial capitals and the impact of the urban centres was limited to the immediate vicinity. The civil war destroyed much of the existing infrastructure, roads and railway installations being a favourite target of the guerrilla forces. Rail services were restricted to daylight hours, roads were mined and bridges destroyed. The total freight forwarded from Juba, which had stood at 28.7 thousand tons in 1959/60, had fallen to 2.6 thousand tons by 1971/72. At the restoration of peace in 1972, the Regional Government was faced with the enormous task of developing a huge area with virtually no real transport system.(11)

The peripheral position of the Southern Region presented the expected problems. Available transport facilities were more likely to be deployed in the all-important task of supplying Khartoum. Commodities entering the Sudan at Port Sudan were likely to be consumed in Khartoum and the North, instead of a percentage being reserved for the South. Similarly, with Sudan's limited manufacturing industry running at well below capacity, there were insufficient home produced goods to meet northern demands. Food and petrol supplies were often affected by these factors. Organization and communication within the various transport departments was less than ideal: a train loaded with grain would pass areas of shortage such as Aweil, to be unloaded at Wau where there was often a surplus. Distribution to rural areas was often hampered by a shortage of fuel. A large percentage of food suffered from bad handling and storage on route, with a resultant high level of deterioration and loss. There was a need for an increase in handling points along the various rail and river routes. A shortage of local transport meant that very few markets were functioning, and there was little incentive for the production of an agricultural surplus. Lack of transport coupled with few up-country storage facilities made it impossible for the farmer to take advantage of seasonal price rises, or to make any investment in cash crops.

Chronic fuel shortages affected all modes of transport, and until 1975 distribution had to be strictly controlled by the Regional Government, to ensure supplies for emergency services. However electricity cuts and a lack of filtered water were frequent features of life in Juba in 1974/5. Traditionally petrol had been transported by river but, due to the inefficiency of river transport, importation of fuel from East Africa was initiated although at great cost in foreign exchange and subject to the unstable situation in Uganda. Throughout the Southern Region there was a severe shortage of all kinds of vehicles, and where vehicles were made available by the Government or by international agencies the level of maintenance was so low that many relatively new vehicles were off the road as a result of misuse or a lack of spare parts. In almost all government departments, the implementation of development schemes was hindered by a lack of transport and fuel. Similarly affected were the administrative, security and social organization programmes however the most serious result was the government's inability to alleviate the considerable food shortages of 1973/74.

#### Agriculture

As we have seen, a large proportion of the Southern Region population was employed in the production of basic food crops at subsistence level. Agricultural practices were at a very low level with shifting cultivation almost universal. Hand tools were very rudimentary and, with few improved seeds and little knowledge of fertilisers, yields were generally very low. The use of herbicides and insecticides was introduced on only a very limited scale. The average area of cultivation per family was about 3 feddans with sorghum, millet, and maize as the staple food crops. Of twenty-three council areas surveyed in 1974, over 75% reported a severe seasonal food shortage. (12) Mechanised agriculture had been initiated in some areas of Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal, but except in the Renk area it was generally unsuccessful, suffering from the usual shortages of fuel, machinery and technical expertise. Other factors contributed to the low level of production in the agricultural sector. The shortage and low productivity of labour limited the area of cultivation. The necessity for seasonal cattle movements removed men

from the land at crucial times, and their agricultural efficiency was limited by unproductive methods. There was a lack of local capital and self-help schemes were inadequately supported by the government. Without organized marketing there was no encouragement for the production of a surplus. Despite the large numbers of cattle in the area no use was made of them in cultivation or transportation.

What little cash crop production there had been was discouraged by the civil war and by the government confiscation of private enterprises in the early seventies. Because of the security situation and often as a matter of political expediency, cash crop production schemes had been mostly located in the North, and what little had been sited in the South had been under-manned and under-financed. Small-scale cash crop production, as had been common in Zandeland in the 1950's, had been discouraged by the complete breakdown of the marketing system.

Domestic animals are kept by most inhabitants in the Southern Region, with the exception of those in the tsetse belt; however in 1972 there was no real knowledge of the livestock population, the off-take rate was very low and the marketing system virtually non-existent. The major constraints were as follows. There was a lack of grazing during the dry season due to shortage of water supplies, and subsequent overgrazing in certain areas. There were serious losses due to a variety of cattle diseases, control measures having been abandoned during the war years. Traditional husbandry, although being exceptionally skilled in the keeping of cattle in extremely difficult conditions, contributed to high losses and determined selection of breeding animals in terms of appearance rather than in terms of economic considerations. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, traditional attitudes operated against the marketing of surplus animals, with a marked reluctance to sell, especially among the Nilotic peoples, except during times of severe food shortage. As a result the animals offered for sale were either old or diseased. A contributory factor to this situation was a general shortage of consumer goods or services to encourage sales. (13)

Although a beginning had been made in the sixties in the establishment of agro-industry, many of the installations had been destroyed or fallen into disuse during the civil war. Much of the machinery was old or obsolete or not functioning because of a lack of spare parts. There was a chronic fuel shortage, and insufficient trained personnel. In many cases plants had been wrongly located in areas where basic resources proved to be unavailable. For example the canning factory established in Wau could not find sufficient local supplies of meat or fruit and vegetables for processing. In the forestry industry, plantations had been sadly neglected, machinery was obsolete and there was no real information as to the true extent of reserves. In the fisheries industry, despite vast resources, up to a fifth of the annual catch was lost as a result of bad handling methods. Food processing plants could not encourage the production of sufficient supplies from a population that was as yet to produce a sufficiency of basic food crops. All such establishments suffered from a lack of fuel, building materials, machinery, personnel and any real marketing system. In most cases the area of production was far from the potential market, a situation exacerbated by the virtual non-existence of any modern transport infrastructure.(14)

#### Administration and Finance

The new administration in the Southern Region faced considerable difficulties, not least the ill-defined relationship with the Central Government, which we will consider in detail at a later stage. The work of the various departments was complicated by a lack of finance, trained personnel and the relative inexperience of certain high-level decision makers. Administrative infrastructure was generally insufficient, with a shortage of such basic things as suitable office accommodation, telephone communications, transport, fuel and adequate housing. There was no real tradition of work in administration, and little delegation of responsibility. As a result the implementation rate of many ministries was correspondingly low. (15) Financial problems beset all department and development programmes. The financial aspects of the peace agreement provided for

the establishment of two separate budgets. The Regional Government Recurrent Budget was designed to cover recurrent expenditure within the Region with three main sources of revenue: a direct transfer from the Central Government to cover expenditure on established government services within the region; reimbursement by the Central Government of direct and indirect taxes originating in the Southern Region, with indirect taxation on certain commodities such as sugar, tobacco and alcohol accounting for about 70%; and revenue from additional direct or indirect taxation imposed by the Regional Government. While transfers under this budget from the Central Government proved to be satisfactory, the Regional Government met with great difficulties in the collection of taxation locally. The main problems were insufficient personnel and the bad transportation system, in addition to an initial unwillingness to tax people so recently returned to the country. The recurrent budget for 1972/73 stood at £S 7.5 million for administration and services with £S 4.6 million as grant-in-aid to the provinces. Local revenue amounted to only a little over £S 1 million. Although planning for economic and social development is a Central Government function, the Regional Government prepares the second, the Special Development Budget, for which there are three sources of revenue: direct transfer from the Central Government; any surplus from the Regional Recurrent Budget; and any external assistance. Of the approved £S 1.4 million budgeted for in the 1972/73 Special Development Budget, only 40% was remitted. The situation was not to improve significantly in the following year, and of the £S 7.3 million approved for 1973/74, only 2.7% had been remitted by October 1974, rising to only 14% by the end of the financial year. In addition to problems caused by the non-remittance of funds from the Centre, the Regional Government was also forced to divert funds to specifically Central Government projects located in the Southern Region.

The emotional appeal of post-war conditions in the Southern Region stimulated a considerable amount of short-term aid from international agencies. Great efforts were made by members of the HEC to raise funds, and contributions were received from Austria, Denmark, West Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, America and the Netherlands. Despite their former anti-Arab feelings, the reality of the world financial situation forced the Regional Government to direct efforts towards the Arab World, and assistance was received from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar. (16)

TABLE VIII SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGET FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION 1974/75:1975/76

MINISTRY	1974/75		1975/76	
	Approved	% Spent	Approved	% Spent
Agriculture	1,086,687	33.1	1,112,153	28.1
Communications	376,656	40.1	380,648	26.6
Co-operation & Rural Development	525,000	6.2	525,000	31.2
Education	480,694	12.4	390,605	4.8
Finance	900,000	6.8	1,186,178	29.2
Housing	2,074,100	10.3	2,033,600	5.0
Health	400,064	8.9	401,016	2.2
Information	324,275	5.6	325,269	12.8
Commerce & Industry	361,429	2.5	223,031	18.7
Public Service	81,380	8.3	79,300	na
Regional Admin	123,625	10.5	123,631	8.1
Wildlife & Tourism	284,600	18.7	243,825	4.3
Grant in aid to the Provinces	117,000	53.8	140,000	21.4
TOTAL	£S 7,135,510	15.0%	£S 7,164,2 <sup>56</sup>	16.5%

Source: Democratic Republic of the Sudan, *Budget Speech Presented to the People's Regional Assembly, June 1976.* (undated) p.29.

TABLE IX SOUTHERN REGION REVENUE 1975/76

	Approved	Collected	%
Revenue collected by Regional Ministries	2,418,562	519,032	21.46
Revenue collected by Taxation Dept	1,610,200	1,133,489	70.39
Revenue collected by Central Government	1,729,336	64,150	0.04
TOTAL	£S 5,758,098	£S 1,716,671	29.81%

Source: Democratic Republic of the Sudan, *Ibid.*, p.2

### Development Constraints and Policies

From this brief look at conditions in 1972 we can appreciate the gravity of the situation inherited by the new Regional Government. The major constraints on development might be summarized as follows, and are as equally applicable today as they were at the time of the peace settlement.

**Environment.** Of the total area of the Southern Sudan, only a portion is usable. Without hydrological control large areas are either permanently flooded, or lack domestic water supplies. The shortage of accurate information regarding rainfall and soil resources results in wasted crop production efforts. Development of livestock production is limited by a shortage of pasture and the problem of tsetse, which together render unusable 38% of available grazing. Insufficient expenditure on both human and animal disease control has made the area a virtual reservoir of disease.

**Infrastructure and Transportation.** Without major improvements in this sector any real development will be impossible. Electricity and water supplies are unreliable throughout the area. A lack of building materials frequently delays the implementation of building programmes and causes administrative difficulties. There is a chronic shortage of adequate housing with subsequent low morale. Deficiencies in transportation is the greatest single problem within the Region. Bad organization and antiquated systems contribute to food shortages and delay the arrival of the basic equipment for development. Transport costs from the Region inhibit investment in import substitute production. Within the Region, a chronic fuel shortage and poor road system adversely affect administration, the collection of revenue and the provision of social services.

**Manpower.** The high level of adult illiteracy and low standard of general health, throughout what is a relatively small population, effects the efficiency of the labour force. There is no tradition of the use of anything but the crudest of hand tools. A large percentage of the population have no employment experience, and the maintenance of a permanent labour force is often problematic where wage levels are very low and necessitate domestic food production. There is a severe shortage of trained artisans and administrative personnel at all levels.

Traditional attitudes. Insufficient explanation of development programmes has resulted in conflict over agricultural and grazing land. The communal rights in land and cattle limits the effectiveness of the more educated members of the community. A shortage of consumer goods inhibits the production of a marketable agricultural surplus. There is little incentive for many people to join the money economy.

Administrative organization. The division of responsibilities inhibits attempts at overall planning. High level decision makers are relatively inexperienced and all departments suffer from a shortage of qualified staff. Of particular importance is the shortage of agricultural extension workers. The delicate political situation has resulted in the widespread distribution of scarce resources, rather than their concentration in the most productive areas.

Finance. The administration and all development programmes are affected by a chronic financial shortage and the irregularities in the flow of funds from Khartoum. Local revenue is unlikely to show much appreciable increase over the next decade. Foreign assistance has given insufficient importance to infrastructural deficiencies. Any increase in production in the agricultural sector at smallholder level will be impossible without the establishment of some system of credit. There is an urgent need for some effective price control and the development of new marketing systems. With a continued dependence on the Central Government, whose financial position is far from good, financial constraints are likely to continue for some time to come.

The first Regional Government attacked these problems with a great deal of enthusiasm and a sometimes embarrassing honesty, but obviously none of these constraints on development could be removed overnight. Accordingly, towards the end of the first five year period of regional autonomy, a general optimism had been replaced by a more realistic attitude.

This more realistic attitude was outlined by the president of the HEC, Abel Alier, in May 1976, and was in part a reply to increasing criticism of the slow rate of development in the Southern Region. He summarized the task undertaken in 1972 as being '....to ensure harmony, to ensure the growth and enlargement of goodwill among all people resident in the Region and, we hoped, all over the country; to ensure that peace prevailed being good, desirable and necessary in itself and a prerequisite basis for short and long term economic and social progress. I cannot pretend that we succeeded, difficult as the task was and still is. We only tried our best under difficult conditions....'. New policies for the social services were announced which had '....no pretence about our resources....' (17) and aim to take basic services to the 90% of the people living in the rural areas, rather than allowing the concentration of facilities in urban centres. A primary health care programme is to be established in which the emphasis will be placed on preventive rather than curative medicine. (18) Similarly in the educational field Alier stressed the need for self-help programmes to provide equality of opportunity at the lowest level '....we must continue to expand education, not limit it to a privileged few....we have adopted as part of our development strategy provision of basic education and are devising<sup>a</sup> more acceptable distribution of educational opportunity among communities in rural and urban areas....' The educational system was to be in line with development objectives and the policy of self-reliance '....education must prepare a child to be practical and useful to himself and his community. This means when the child completes school....he should have been fully prepared to be useful to himself and to the village or town from which he originally came and above all to his parents on the farm if he comes from a rural area. He should not be educated to become a misfit and more of a nuisance to his community. In our agriculturally oriented society, he should learn the use of the hoe as much as he is required to learn the use of the pen....' (19)

In explaining the agricultural policy, Alier focused attention on the traditional nature of production methods within a basically subsistence economy. However one might wish to change the situation '...the nation is poor, though we sometimes find it painful to admit this, and we sometimes act and speak as if we had everything of material wealth.... it might be potentially rich but it takes considerable resources in terms of in-puts and time to develop potential riches .... we must start with the resources at our disposal ....we have no resources for an immediate and radical replacement of traditional agriculture except the 500,000 families .... whom we must mobilize for agricultural activity.' (20)

The government is prepared to help in the provision of improved seeds, hand tools and extension services, and the eradication and control of major livestock diseases. The president pointed out that where programmes have been more ambitious, results have not always been encouraging, and he cited the mechanized agricultural schemes where '.... only a few citizens get substantial benefits.' In conclusion Alier summed up the policy of self-reliance and self-help as meaning that '....the people must work to produce food and cash crops and provide essential services for themselves. It is primarily they to shoulder these responsibilities ....we have accepted to start modestly on development because the reality of our financial situation leaves no choice ....there is no alternative to patient and painstaking building of the South, and the Sudan for that matter ....our expectations have been unrealistic and misguided. A modest start and full recognition of our poverty would have been more helpful to our progress, than living in a fools paradise.' (21)

This policy statement has been quoted at length to illustrate the attitude of the Regional Government after the first few years of autonomy. Gone are the initial plans for widespread economic and social change, to be replaced by very much reduced expectations. In these first few years

there was certainly an improvement in living conditions. By 1976 food shortages had more or less been brought under control and an increasing number of schools had been opened. The transportation system had been improved and links established with both the North and with East Africa. (22) By 1977 the administrative chaos of the early period had been to a large extent reduced. However, even after five years the real success has been only in terms of rehabilitation rather than in development. A depressing number of projects fail to make any real headway, and many of these were suggested as long ago as 1950, or have been at various stages of construction since the mid-sixties. The Southern Region has so far failed to attract the necessary large-scale investment from either Khartoum or from foreign sources, and is therefore forced back upon its own very limited resources. Part of the reason for the disappointment of both the Regional Government and the Southern people will be explained by a closer look at the realities of power sharing in the five years since the peace settlement.

#### Local Government

To understand the experience of power sharing in the first five years of regional autonomy, it is important first to understand the change in policy introduced by the May Revolution. The architects of the revolution saw as a major part of their philosophy the need for a change in the relationship between government and the people with the ultimate aim of decentralization, with provincial autonomy and self-sufficiency in basic services at every council level, and the break up

of grass-roots support for the old politico/religious factions that had bedevilled government for so long. (23)

The major vehicle for implementation was the People's Local Government Act of 1971, which was designed to integrate grass-roots political representation and administrative decision making and implementation, from the province level downwards. The system is divided into three hierarchies. The professional local government hierarchy is headed at province level by the most important individual in the whole system, the Provincial Commissioner. The commissioner is the chief representative of government in each province and is responsible for general policy, control, co-ordination and supervision of all government departments at work in the province, and for the maintenance of law and order. Although he heads the local government machinery, he is directly appointed by the President, and is more likely to be a politician than a professional administrator. Below the commissioner, there is a complete hierarchy of local government officers, inspectors, administrators and in some areas a native administration, all central or regional appointments.

The Provincial Commissioner works closely with the People's Province Executive Council (PPEC) which heads the second - the representative hierarchy. This council has binding policy-making powers in the maintenance of law and order, the imposition of taxation, the preparation of budgets and the initiation and administration of economic development projects. The council is made up of indirectly elected representatives

# PRESIDENT




FIG. VI THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE OF THE SUDAN 1977

from the subordinate network of people's councils, and nominated officials from government departments. Both these hierarchies stretch down to the grass-roots level of chief's courts (in the Southern Region) and village councils, each body delegating selected powers and duties, and taking responsibility for the actions of their subordinates.

The relationship between these two hierarchies is obviously very important and the pattern tends to be set by the relationship between the Commissioner and the PPEC. The Commissioner is ex-officio chairman and treasurer of the council, and his immediate subordinate is secretary and deputy chairman. The Commissioner is responsible for implementing the decisions of the council but has a staying veto over those with which he may not agree. There are no detailed guidelines in the legislation for the dividing and sharing of over-lapping responsibilities, and, in common with many relationships within the system, much depends on the individual personalities involved.

The third hierarchy in the local government system is that of the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). Again it is designed to complement and parallel the administrative and representative hierarchies, and its main function is to mobilize popular participation in policy making and ensure active support for the government. Again the commissioner heads the SSU hierarchy within the province, and his subordinate officials are also required to shoulder political responsibilities. The commissioners' political role has recently been slightly altered by the appointment of Province political supervisors. They are members of the SSU Executive Bureau in Khartoum, who form a direct link between the local party and President Nimeiri, and tend to be used as channels of information and as trouble shooters. Again their relationship with the commissioner is not really defined, but obviously they usually outrank him. Neither is the relationship defined between the SSU and the more junior echelons of the administration. The unfortunate local government officer can come under fire from three separate directions, and in some cases his relationship with the local SSU has been problematic, in that before 1969 the Sudan local government service had a tradition of political non-involvement. Similarly, the local chief in the Southern Region can

be assailed from all sides, and his position may be extremely difficult, especially in societies with no pre-colonial tradition of centralized leadership. A further factor contributing to the power of the Commissioner is his relationship with the Central Ministries in Khartoum. Personnel from these ministries, while at work in the province, are actually seconded to him, and therefore under his control.

Obviously there are problems associated with such a complex system and, not surprisingly, the main problem is financial. While the aim is provincial autonomy and financial self-sufficiency, most provinces are far from that state and must rely on grants-in-aid from the centre, a source of supply outside their control. There is therefore a very real danger of responsibility without resources. In addition, the province is required to meet the wages of seconded Central ministry personnel, while having no control over Central ministry spending. There is an even greater danger of responsibility without resources at the lower council levels, which have inadequate revenue bases and only tenuous claims to provincial or central government funds. There is hardly an existing rural council which is not substantially in debt. The disparities in revenue-raising capability will also tend to institutionalize the already marked disparities in wealth and development. The massive increase in the number of councils -in the Northern Sudan they have grown from 128 to over 4,000- has severely strained both manpower and infrastructure, and in many cases in the South warrants have had to be withheld from councils which already exist on paper. (24)


Relationships between the province and the Central ministries have become more indirect. Once an official has been seconded to a province, although his work may be inspected, complaints could until recently (1977) be made through the Ministry of People's Local Government. Since mid-1977 the ministry has been closed and such complaints would have to be routed straight to the President.

Despite these obvious drawbacks, the system is gradually being established throughout the country, with power increasingly accruing to the Province Commissioner, at the expense of the Central Ministries, and at the same time his relationship with the President and the SSU Executive Bureau is becoming increasingly direct. In order better to implement the People's Local Government Act, the northern provinces of the Sudan were sub-divided in 1974 into twelve provinces, in an attempt to ensure that each province was capable of becoming an economic and socially self-sufficient unit. The rationale behind the sub-division was the creation of units small enough to be efficiently administered, in which, as far as possible, ecological conditions were sufficiently uniform to allow the adoption of a province development plan for each unit. In addition the sub-division was to reflect the life-styles and tribal affinities of the people, in that they should be sufficiently close to enable local government participation to be representative, and so make people feel that governmental decisions had at the very least taken their personal interests into account. In 1976 the subdivision of the three Southern provinces was announced, and in addition to the original three with their original capitals, a further three new provinces were created: Lakes, sometimes referred to as El Buheyrat with its capital at Rumbek; Jonglei with its capital at Bor; and Western Equatoria with its capital at Yambio. As a result of this sub-division and the increasing importance of the Province Commissioner, the Southern Region is becoming less of an entity and more a collection of six autonomous provinces in direct contact with the Presidency. (25)

However, rather than a very simple model of a central government and eighteen similar provinces, one must see it as a central government and an inner and outer ring of dissimilar provinces. The inner ring, made up of Khartoum, Blue Nile, Gezira, Red Sea, Nile and White Nile provinces, have a variety of advantages. They are physically nearer the centre of power and have a greater share of Sudan's limited transport network. They have the most developed agricultural sectors and a disproportionate share of Sudan's limited manufacturing industry. With better social infrastructure

they produce a larger proportion of the educated people which is reflected in a greater degree of representation in the central government. The dominance of these provinces is also likely to be continued by Sudan's profit-oriented policy for the location of agricultural and industrial projects - a policy which is often insisted upon by foreign investors. In a review of major development projects published in June 1977, 65% of the total concerned these favoured provinces, while their share of infrastructure projects was 68%, rising to 71% of all new manufacturing industry projects.(26)

The outer ring of provinces, namely Northern, Kassala, Northern Kordofan, Southern Kordofan, Northern Darfur, Southern Darfur, Bahr El Ghazal, Lakes, Jonglei, Upper Nile, Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria are generally disadvantaged. While constituting about 79% of the total area of the Sudan, they have only about 59% of the population, with population densities dropping below two persons per square kilometer in Northern and Jonglei Provinces. Their economies are largely based on traditional agriculture with low levels of production the result of large areas of infertile soils, insufficient rainfall or inadequate drainage. They have the added problem of a considerable nomadic population. The transportation network is generally inadequate throughout the Sudan, but provinces such as Lakes and Jonglei have neither a railway link, a major airport nor even a metalled road. The newly created provinces in the Southern Region have additional problems in the creation of new province capitals. In September 1977, more than a year since the subdivision of the Southern Provinces, both Rumbek and Yambio were still awaiting the installation of an electricity service. (27)



Provinces of the Sudan 1976

Fig. VII

## Regional Government

In the previous chapter we outlined the institutional provisions for regional autonomy in the Southern Region. To recapitulate, regional executive power is vested in the High Executive Council whose members are the now fourteen Regional Ministers, and whose president is Abel Alier. They are appointed and relieved of office by President Nimeiri, and are responsible both to the President and to the legislative organ in the South, the People's Regional Assembly, (PRA). While some of the ministers are members of the PRA, and so consider themselves popularly elected, some are straight nominations. Relations between the PRA, soon to have 120 seats, and the HEC are usually very strained, with the Regional Ministers often in an impossible position, between Khartoum and the elected representatives of the Southern people, whose chief aim appears to be the defence of an autonomy which perhaps they have overestimated. The HEC's relationship with the PRA is frequently endangered when ministers have to obey directions from Khartoum. Accordingly they prejudice their individual popularity, which remains a much more important factor in the South than in the North. The members of the HEC do not have a high level of support in the Southern Region, and if the PRA was permitted to decide its membership there would be significant changes. Unlike the members of the National Assembly, who seem to be content with a very secondary role, the members of the PRA, in perhaps their first experience of government, expected a much greater involvement in policy formulation, freedom to criticize the government, and an altogether much more democratic role than has actually been allowed them. Following the failure of their efforts to change policies or to expose government weaknesses, and the imprisonment or voluntary exile of several of their members, they have become generally frustrated or have lost interest, and there is often difficulty in raising a quorum. One main criticism levelled at the HEC by the PRA is the slow rate of development, or perhaps more accurately rehabilitation, of the Southern Region. If we look closely at the realities of power sharing, some of the reasons will become apparent.

The Realities of Power Sharing

Perhaps the biggest problem is the lack of definition of areas of responsibility. Within the Region possible areas of conflict exist.(28) In the relationship between the HEC and the local government system, more of the power of the regional ministries is eroded by the system of secondment of personnel to the province. The relationship between Ministers and Province Commissioners is a possible source of conflict with more and more of the day-to-day administration becoming the responsibility of the commissioner. In fact in Juba, the seat of the Regional Government, and the province capital of Eastern Equatoria, many decisions have first to be referred to the Province Commissioner, with a high degree of confusion over the delimitation of responsibilities.

Having so recently come to power, and being relatively inexperienced, all the different agencies and individuals are exceedingly jealous of their areas of competence, so that instead of co-operation there is a high degree of departmentalization, amounting in some cases to secrecy. Any attempt to liaise between the ministries themselves, or between ministry and province is made very difficult, with widespread suspicion that any attempt at co-operative effort is an attempt to diminish the powers of the individual. With the acute shortage of personnel and the lack of administrative experience, there is a general disinclination to delegate. In addition the 'ethnic arithmetic' policies of Alier have attempted to distribute portfolios and commissionerships between the different ethnic groups, rather than strictly according to merit. This all tends to frustrate the implementation of anything approaching an integrated development policy. The result is a good deal of overlapping and duplication of effort or a complete failure to implement programmes. At the village level, where once there was perhaps only the local chief, there may now be as many as five different agencies operating: the SSU, the native administration, the village council, the Regional member of parliament and the National member of parliament.

Lack of co-ordination has resulted in a great deal of disappointment when, for example, a village has been encouraged by one agency to build its own dispensary, only to find that another agency is not capable of supplying the necessary drugs. Numerous villages have responded to the government's call for greater self-reliance by building their own schools, only to find that the Regional Government cannot supply a qualified teacher, and that if they wish their school to operate, they must somehow find both the teacher and his salary themselves. This duplication is only a problem in the more accessible areas. In places such as parts of Pibor District, accessible for only three months of the year, many people remain largely unaware that much of the organization even exists.

Relationships between the HEC and Khartoum are neither easier nor any better defined. The inexperience and inefficiency of Regional Ministries lays them open to a good deal of criticism, and they can often be over-ruled. If a project is designated as a National project, it remains the overall responsibility of the Central Ministry concerned, although located in the Southern Region. With this kind of overlap, planning for the Regional Ministries is made very difficult. Unilateral decisions taken by President Nimeiri also add to the confusion. In 1976 he announced that Juba would have television by 1977. The Regional Ministry of Information lacked the expertise to contribute to the project and implementation was managed entirely by the Central Ministry; however it is the Regional Ministry that is left with the day-to-day problems of operating the service. Neither do the more defined areas of responsibility facilitate planning. For example, while road transport is the responsibility of the Regional Government, they have no control over the planning of associated air, rail or river services. The Southern Region also tends to be under-represented on the various Central Government planning bodies in Khartoum. For example, an absolutely vital piece of legislation to the Southern Region, the Promotion of Agricultural Investment Act 1976, which governs among other things the location of private investment agricultural projects in the Sudan, has a deciding body of twelve members, of whom only one is from the South. Many Regional Ministers seem not only ill-informed as to what happens in Khartoum, but also fairly pessimistic as to their ability to influence decisions.

Southern representation at the centre has in fact been steadily declining. Although the president of the HEC, Abel Alier, is a Vice-President of the Sudan, of the sixty-eight people who constitute the national leadership only seven are from the South. Of these, six are in the SSU Executive Bureau, one of whom is a cabinet minister, and one is a state minister. Of the two ministers, the cabinet minister is responsible for Culture and Information and the state minister for Foreign Affairs; while nationally important, neither area is of crucial importance to the economic development of the Southern Region. Of the seven Southern representatives at the centre, four are Dinka.

One of the areas in which the Regional Government has, in theory, some freedom of action, is in the initiation of its own development projects, in accordance with national plans. Which brings us to the area of greatest difficulty, finance. From our examination of the situation in 1972 we can appreciate the early financial problems, and during the first five years the situation has not greatly improved. The local revenue raised in 1974/75 was only £S 1.5 million, and so the bulk of financial support must continue to come from Khartoum. The Regional Government has no control over Central Government spending and in 1974/75 only 15% of the promised £S 7 million under the Special Development Budget was actually remitted. (29) Reports of the situation in mid-1977 would appear to be encouraging, with remittances being made regularly, but one would need to be very optimistic to expect the total allocation for the Southern Region in 1977/78 of £S 58 million to be received. Obviously unless the situation changes drastically, little development can be effectively planned or initiated, and neither can the Regional Government provide more than the very simplest of inputs to encourage people to increase production, or to raise the standard of living. The result has been a considerable degree of dissatisfaction as both Regional Government and the people have slowly realized that many of the hopes and expectations of 1972 were wildly unrealistic.

With so much of its possible influence being retained by the Centre or eroded by the development of the local government system and the increasing power of the Province Commissioners, the Regional Government is being increasingly isolated and made ineffective and would seem to have little future other than as a backwater of the main government system. The real solution to the problem of power sharing in the Sudan, and the beginnings of some kind of national unity, seems then to have been in the policy of decentralization outlined in the People's Local Government Act, rather than in the provisions for Regional autonomy. Although the Nimeiri government could offer what appeared to be a measure of self-government in 1972, its decentralization policy ensured the eventual integration of the Southern Provinces within the country as individual units, so ceasing to perpetuate the sense of confrontation between North and South, and also accommodating the desire for a degree of autonomy among other disaffected groups. Dr. Jaafar Ali Bakheit made this quite clear at the time of the Addis Ababa Agreement. At a press conference held on 3rd March, 1972 he stressed the fact that the powers being made available to the Regional Government were in fact already available through the People's Local Government Act of 1971. He explained that there was no basis for the fears of some Northerners at the winning of autonomy by the South, and implied a criticism of people in the North for failing to take the opportunity to exercise the legal powers granted to all provinces. 'This may be a lesson to Northerners to awaken them.'(30)

#### Threats to Continued Peace: Regional Pressures and Military Integration

After the first five years, many outside observers have come to consider peace as something of an established fact in the Sudan, and they can perhaps be forgiven for assuming, on the basis of official information, that the settlement has become institutionalised - that its legitimacy and effectiveness has been widely accepted throughout the country. However, that is not quite the case; the balance of power remains precarious and the continuation of peace is subject to a variety of threats. First, we

shall consider the threats originating in the Southern Region itself. We have already noted the dissatisfaction at the slow rate of economic development and the erosion of the originally assumed powers of the Regional Government by the process of decentralization, and if we look more closely at the composition of the Regional Government we shall discover further areas of potential conflict.

At the time of writing the Regional Assembly has sixty seats representing constituencies of four different types. There are thirty territorial constituencies, evenly distributed throughout the three provinces which may be contested by any citizen of the Southern Region over twentyfive years of age, regardless of sex or religion. There are a further eighteen popular organization constituencies which may only be contested by members of the popular organizations of the SSU; workers alliance, farmers and village development committees, Sudanese Womens Union, intellectuals, Sudanese Youth Union and national capitalists. Candidates for these constituencies are subject to the scrutiny of the SSU secretariat in the province. The organized forces, that is the armed forces, the police and the prison service, have one seat each for which the incumbants are appointed. Finally there are a further nine seats allotted to administrative unit constituencies. Of the sixty members, fifty-one are Christians and nine are Muslims. It is immediately apparrent that the active members of the SSU represent a formidable group within the assembly, especially when one notes that the basic rules of the SSU compel a member to follow the directions of his party superiors.

When the PRA started work in 1973 it reflected, not only the new political consciousness of the SSU, but also most of the old political affiliations and splinter groups that had bedevilled the Southern leadership during the civil war. A fundamental cleavage soon became apparent between what Kasfir has termed the 'outsiders' and the 'insiders' (31), which in effect distinguishes between those who had been hardline advocates of secession and those who had worked with Khartoum towards a compromise solution. With this kind of composition the PRA was bound to look critically at the membership of the HEC.

While the provisional HEC appointed at the time of the agreement was fairly representative of the different interests, it has become gradually less representative, with insiders out-numbering outsiders. More specifically, there were suggestions that the Southern Front was ruling the Southern Region in the name of the SSU. (32) While some ministries, such as agriculture and industry, have enjoyed a degree of stability, others such as housing and regional administration have had as many as four different ministers in five years. There was some dissatisfaction at the number of Dinka in the HEC in 1974 and 1975, when they numbered six out of a total of twelve, but by 1977 this majority had disappeared and they now hold five out of a total of fifteen portfolios.

There is a tendency for the PRA to see many of the members of the HEC as little more than extensions of central government influence, and some have been particularly criticised for their close links with Khartoum. Others have been attacked for conspicuous displays of wealth relative to the general standard of living in Juba, usually manifested in the ownership of expensive motor cars, despite the chronic fuel shortage and the very limited extent of asphalted roads in the Regional capital. Attempts to investigate allegations of mal-practice have often not been satisfactorily concluded. An enquiry into the alleged misappropriation of £S 90,000 had passed through the committee stage in May 1976, but had not been resolved by August 1977. (33) At the end of the civil war there were many who thought themselves deserving of a prominent position in the civilian administration which quite simply had not sufficient posts to go around; as a result, some of the dissatisfaction with the HEC must be interpreted as personal disappointment rather than true opposition.

The distrust between the legislature and the executive dates from the first few sittings of the PRA. The Addis Ababa Agreement stated that the president of the HEC should be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the PRA. Following some criticism in the South of Alier's first year of office as head of the provisional HEC, Nimeiri endorsed Alier's candidature as the nomination of the SSU, in effect presenting a fait accompli to the assembly. Alier had not stood as a candidate in the

elections for the PRA, and so was considered by some to have no popular mandate either within the Region or the assembly. This was the first sign that those in power might bend the rules when necessary.(34) In May 1975 a vote of no confidence in the Speaker of the assembly, following an investigation into alleged mal-practice known as the TECMA affair, and criticism of two ministers, led Alier to invite the assembly to consider his conduct. Again it was made clear that Khartoum would not countenance Alier's removal, and the situation remained confused until the election of Hilary Logali as Speaker, again as a SSU nominated candidate. To ensure that his candidature was successful, a visit to the assembly was made by the Deputy Secretary General of the SSU, who went as far as to suggest that the other candidates for the position should stand down in favour of the SSU candidate. (35) In a Regional Government re-shuffle that followed these events, two Regional Ministers who had supported the original vote of no confidence, were removed from their posts, so confirming the widely held belief that the members of the HEC owed their positions primarily to the support of President Nimeiri and the SSU in Khartoum. The position of Alier and the HEC was not improved by the imprisonment in 1975 of two veteran Southern leaders and former ministers, Joseph Oduhu and Clement Mboro, as well as the Deputy Speaker of the PRA and one of its members. They were accused of sedition and planning against the Regional Government with Sudanese exiles.

It must be remembered that, at the time of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the SSU was in only a very early stage of development, and in fact no mention of it or the part it would play in the organization and implementation of regional autonomy was made in the agreement. In practice it would seem that resolutions are prepared by the HEC and the SSU group within the PRA, and then merely presented to the assembly for its approval. Understandably, many members of the PRA envisaged a role other than that of merely a rubber stamp.

While many people have attacked Abel Alier and the record of the executive over the first five years, others maintain that his policies have been instrumental in maintaining peace, and certainly he has shown a high degree of patience and tact in what has been a very difficult period.

However there is growing criticism that while his policies of appeasement and his careful balancing of the ethnic arithmetic of the situation have facilitated the rehabilitation of the area, he lacks the dynamism to really motivate the people and effect something closer to real development. This criticism is probably both inevitable and necessary, but his contribution should not be under-estimated, both in helping to engineer the peace settlement and in tackling the very difficult task of its implementation. Fundamental changes were expected following the elections for the PRA in November 1977, but these have now been postponed until 1978, and there has been much speculation about a successor to Alier. Certainly an HEC that more fully reflected professional ability rather than rewards for services rendered would perhaps be more effective in the task of developing the area. It will be instructive to see whether the process will be allowed to go ahead without pressure being exerted by the Central Government.

Suspicious that the Central Government has not kept to the letter of the agreement by interfering in the workings of the Regional Government, have been re-inforced by suspicions concerning the implementation of the provisions governing military strength in the Southern Region. As we have seen, it was agreed that the Southern Command should have a strength of 12,000 men, of which 6,000 would be from the established People's Armed Forces (PAF), mainly Northerners, and 6,000 from the Anya Nya. After initial administrative reorganization and training, the process of integrating the two forces would begin. While the operation of the ceasefire and the selection of ex-Anya Nya into the Southern Command was, under the circumstances, remarkably peaceful, the trouble began with the integration of the force into mixed units.

For the purposes of an initial trial, one ex-Anya Nya battalion from Juba and one PAF battalion from Yei were selected for integration in 1973. They were chosen because of their proximity to the Southern Command HQ in Juba, and under close supervision the integration was achieved smoothly. However in September 1974 a unit of the ex-Anya Nya refused to obey an order to join a PAF unit, and normality was only restored by the personal intervention of Joseph Lagu. (36) In March 1975

ex-Anya Nya forces at Akobo in Upper Nile mutinied when PAF forces from Malakal were sent to join them, in the belief that they were to be disarmed. The Southern commanding officer and several soldiers were shot dead. At least thirteen soldiers escaped across the border into Ethiopia.(37) In the subsequent trial a further eight were executed and forty-eight imprisoned.(38) Again peace was restored by the personal intervention of Joseph Lagu and Abel Alier.

As part of the original plan it was thought necessary not only to integrate the ex-Anya Nya with the PAF but also to mix all units in the Southern Region to break down the tribal basis of the Anya Nya units. In early 1976 it was proposed to move troops from Kapoeta in Equatoria to Rumbek in Bahr El Ghazal. However they refused to be moved. By this time the government appreciated that the use of force would result only in desertions and an increasing number of armed men at large in the bush - rather as the situation had been in 1955. In February 1976 a unit of ex-Anya Nya forces deserted the garrison at Wau. Although many subsequently returned, this was not before the Commanding Officer for Bahr El Ghazal, Emmanuel Abur Nhial, had been shot dead. (39) The leader of the mutiny was eventually recaptured in the Central African Empire in 1977. On 2nd February 1977, fifty-seven members of the Air Defence Force mutinied in Juba and occupied the airport for seven hours. During the fighting ten people were killed. According to official sources their aim was to kill the leadership of the Regional Government. (40)

While not all these incidents stemmed directly from attempts at integration, they do indicate a lack of confidence among the ex-Anya Nya forces. Integration has continued, but not without the frequent personal intervention of Joseph Lagu, and the process will continue to necessitate extreme tact and consideration. A report on the military situation made by Abel Alier in May 1976 indicated that there were other areas of disquiet in the Southern Region over the implementation of the peace agreement's military provisions. Alier was at pains to discount rumours that the number of

Northern troops stationed in the South stood as high as 18,000, and had in fact not been substantially reduced since 1972. He maintained that the Southern Command was made up of 6,519 officers and men from within the region, and only 4,545 from the rest of the Sudan. It was also necessary for Alier to counter rumours that the Southerners in the Southern Command were issued with inferior arms and that, together with the strategic positioning of camps, the Northern units enjoyed a stronger military position than the ex-Anya Nya. (41) It is impossible to verify these figures, but the fact that it was thought necessary to clarify the issue indicates the degree of suspicion in the South as to the faithful implementation of the peace agreement. In seeking to explain the series of military incidents in the South over the past five years, the official government spokesman has drawn attention to the timing of the incidents, usually to coincide with the celebration of Unity Day on the 3rd of March when the country celebrates the end of the civil war, and has attributed them to the actions of the opposition to the Nimeiri regime. (42) This brings us to a consideration of the pressures on continued peace emanating from the Northern Sudan.

#### Northern Pressures

The Addis Ababa Agreement is by no means accepted as being institutionalised by the people of the Northern Sudan. While those who can appreciate the advantages that it has brought are not optimistic as to the likelihood of continued peace, others opposing the present regime consider that the whole political and constitutional framework of Sudanese life will be revised, if and when Nimeiri falls from power. They see the agreement as being very much linked to the person of Nimeiri, and they consider that his demise would necessitate, and in fact present an opportunity for a complete reappraisal of the situation between the North and the South. An attack upon the stability of the South is therefore, more often an attack upon Nimeiri himself. While the peace agreement remains his major achievement, it will remain the area most subject to attack.

Over the past five years there have been repeated allegations of attempts made in the North to sabotage the development of the South. These allegations are usually made against the workers in the transport sector, who before 1969 were among the most organised labour forces in the Sudan. In this sense the South retains its old position as an adjunct to Northern politics. There is also a great deal of dissatisfaction in the North about the cost of peace, and it is generally believed that peace has been more expensive than war. In parts of Eastern Sudan and in the far West, conditions are equally as bad in some areas as they are in the South, and the population resents the amount of money it believes has been spent on the South, and the international assistance attracted by the emotional appeal of the situation in the South in 1972. In many conversations with Northern Sudanese the writer was faithfully assured that the Southern leadership was hopelessly corrupt and that the country's money was being wasted in the Southern Region.

What goodwill there is towards the South in the rest of the country is very much more a feature of Nimeiri's continued interest and support than any widespread popular phenomenon. Among certain echelons of the civil service there is some reluctance to assign men and resources to the Southern Region, and often the most trivial matter has to be taken to the highest level. One essential factor to understand is that to most Southerners the agreement is embodied in Nimeiri; they expect fair treatment from him, while a general distrust of the North tends to continue. This respect and devotion to Nimeiri is maintained by his frequent visits to all parts of the Southern Region, and his occasional personal and direct involvement in problem solving. It is not unusual for Nimeiri to personally take over the day-to-day running of a Central Ministry during a period of absence by the minister. He recently described his position as follows '....I am acting within my capacity as a symbol of Sudanese national unity.' (43)

Threats to Nimeiri are threats to the agreement, and during his eight years in power there have been many attempted coup d'etats both disclosed and undisclosed, against Nimeiri himself and his regime. With the virtual demise of the Sudan Communist Party in 1971, the main opposition has come from the right wing, centred mainly on the figure of Saddiq El Mahdi and his followers among the Ansar sect, in co-operation with the remnants of the various political factions outlawed in May 1969. (44) El Mahdi has been prepared to co-operate with the dissaffected within the country, and his alliances have often involved regional interest groups. In the attempted coup d'etat of 1975 he utilized the dissatisfactions of the large Nuba component in the People's Armed Forces, (45) and in many of the military incidents in the Southern Region he has worked through exiled Southern politicians. The political background to the various attempted coup d'etats is not our concern here, but what is important is that one of the consistent aims of groups wishing to overthrow the government has been the reorganization of regional power sharing. The leader of the attempted coup d'etat of September 1975, Colonel Hasan Husayn, a member of an influential Kordofan family, outlined his intentions at his trial in Atbara in late 1975. The Sudan would be governed by four military committees consisting of administrators, army and police officers with responsibility for foreign, economic, security and electoral affairs. The Southern Region was to be governed by purely military committees. (46) In the very much more serious coup attempt of July 1976, again launched by Saddiq El Mahdi with the assistance of Libya and Ethiopia, there was nothing to indicate that the attitude of the opposition had changed, and one must assume that should the right wing ever regain power, they will wish to abandon the Addis Ababa Agreement, or at the very least, to substantially rewrite it.

A further threat to the institutionalization of the agreement and the continuance of domestic peace emerged from the statement of Saddiq El Mahdi after the abortive 1975 coup d'etat. He is reported as saying that one of his major aims would be the establishment in the Sudan of a modern Islamic State with an Arab and Islamic identity. (47)

It is difficult to imagine that the precarious detente between the North and the South would withstand such pressures. While Nimeiri has recently offered a general amnesty to all Sudanese exiles, and Sadiq El Mahdi has returned to the country, it would be foolhardy to imagine that there will not be further attempts to overthrow the regime with a resultant renewal of domestic strife.

As we have seen the agreement has functioned, not because it has become institutionalized, but rather as a result of the personal efforts of Nimeiri, Alier and Lagu, and there must be considerable doubt as to whether it could continue to function without them. Paradoxically, the process of institutionalization is inhibited by Nimeiri's personal style of government, succinctly described by Pool. 'In this Presidential system, Nimeiri stands at the centre of these multiple structures of control (the Cabinet, the SSU, the assemblies) co-ordination and information, none of which is permanently dominant. Through a flexible management of the governmental, administrative and political situations and the personalities heading them, Nimeiri is able to balance, to expand and to limit their respective influence and roles so that there is no continuity of institutional or factional primacy.' (48) While this policy prevents any individual or group within the recognised political framework from challenging Nimeiri's position, it undermines the establishment of confidence in the dependability of the administrative framework.

#### External Pressures

While Nimeiri currently appears capable of balancing the different forces within the state, his susceptibility to military attack and his financial dependence on his Arab neighbours exposes his domestic policies to pressures from outside, which indirectly threaten the detente with the South.

Following the repeated attacks on the Sudan by both Libya and Ethiopia, the Sudan has sought a closer relationship with Egypt, and in February 1977 signed a joint political command agreement with Egypt. (49)

The agreement assured Sudan of military support from the other signatories, but committed her to closer ties with the Arab World, especially with Yemen, Oman, Somalia and Saudi Arabia and the proposals to place the Red Sea under wholly Arab control. While this policy strengthens Sudan's credibility in the Arab World, it may prejudice her position in Africa. For example, the Sudan may now easily be able to support Somalia's actions against Ethiopia, while her own relations with Ethiopia are so bad, but should Somalia turn her attention to reclaiming parts of Kenya, Sudan would be forced to qualify her support. This is Sudan's constant dilemma, to maintain both an African and an Arab credibility. In practice her important foreign relationships are with the Arab World. As far as Africa is concerned, the Sudan attempts to maintain friendly relations with her immediate neighbours, and to be seen as an upholder of the main tenants of African unity, but while African states can pose no real threat to her security, neither can they offer her military or financial assistance. While a pro-Arab stance is obviously acceptable in the Northern Sudan, the people of the Southern Region equate commitment to African ideals as an inherent part of the Addis Ababa Agreement as it encompassed the dignity of the African. Sudan's ability to uphold the tenants of African unity are sometimes compromised by her commitment to the Arab World. While she can endorse the principle of non-intervention and the principle of territorial integrity in respect of Zaire and Chad (50), she is compelled to endorse the Arab position in respect of the conflict in Eritrea and the Ogaden. In the aftermath of the 1976 attempted coup d'etat the Sudan realized that her armaments were woefully inadequate either to defend herself or to make a meaningful contribution to any joint Arab defence pact. Following her complete break with Russia, she was compelled to approach both France and the USA for arms supplies, and Saudi Arabia to finance the purchases. (51)

Closer links with Egypt have been forged in sectors other than the purely military. A Programme of Political Action and Economic Integration was announced in August 1974 and established joint technical committees in political, economic and cultural spheres. In 1975 joint companies were established for irrigation capitalized at £S 1 million, agriculture capitalized at £S 5 million, and for navigation and tourism. Immigration procedures between the two countries were also relaxed. (52) In addition an industrial and mining agreement was signed in 1975 to promote co-operation in a variety of industries and the exchange of expertise.

As well as Sudan's military and technological dependence on Egypt, her financial dependence on the rest of the Arab World, particularly Saudi Arabia, has also increased. In 1974 Saudi Arabia guaranteed a \$200 million loan for the Sudan, and in the following three years Saudi Arabia replaced Kuwait as Sudan's major foreign investor. (53) Both private and institutional Arab wealth is now heavily invested in agriculture, agro-industries and animal production schemes. Abu Dhabi, Qatar and the Arab Emirates are all involved in development projects. The Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Arab Development Fund are participating in a variety of projects. In January 1976, agreement was reached between Sudan and Saudi Arabia on plans for the joint exploitation of the resources of the Red Sea. (54)

While Sudan welcomes the Saudi money, and in fact desperately requires it to finance development in all parts of the country, not least in the Southern Region, the attitudes and requirements that accompany the money are less than welcome, and the Sudan's domestic situation is as yet too delicate to accept Saudi Arabia's extreme Islamic conservatism. The statements of Sudanese leaders while visiting Arab states must cause occasional embarrassment in Khartoum and some alarm in Juba. In June 1977 the head of a Sudanese delegation to Cairo was reported as saying of Sudan

and Egypt 'We are one country, unified by our objectives and interests' (55) and the following report appeared in a Saudi publication: 'President Nimeiri was right when he aptly stated that the fields of co-operation between Saudi Arabia and Sudan transcend their territory into the interior of the African continent. Both countries have a vested interest in the maintenance and spread of Islam as well as opposition to the enforced polarizations formulated by the Marxists.' (56)

On several occasions Nimeiri has tried to comply with the missionary zeal of the Saudis by attempting various social reforms. There have been various morality campaigns and an attempt to prohibit the taking of alcohol by civil servants, but both have met with quiet resistance from Southern politicians, and been quietly forgotten. However, in 1977 there were reports of a proposal before the Council of Ministers that convicted burglars should be punished by amputation of the hand. (57) More importantly, in mid- 1977 a committee was established in Khartoum to review Sudanese law to make it conform with '...the principle of the Islamic tradition'(58) Fears as to the nature of the committee's work were compounded by the composition of the committee, and according to a leading Southern politician '.... membership is characterised by a conspicuous absence of the varying shades of national opinion that this Committee must by necessity consider, while it attempts to tie the future laws of the nation to Islam. The Committee seems to be dominated by certain right-wing, very traditional and very extremist Islamic trends of opinion, whose view of the *Sharia Al Islamiyah* in a modern state would be questionable by many good Muslims. The recent addition of a few very extremist names to the membership of the Committee, although welcomed as part of the national reconciliation effort and therefore necessary, has complicated the public view of the Committee's work, and may indeed have reinforced some people's fears.' (59) Understandably, Southern public opinion is alarmed at the possibility of Sudanese law coming to be based on traditional Islamic practice.

Conclusion

Domestic peace in the Sudan is therefore subject to a variety of pressures - from within the Southern Region, from within the Northern Sudan, from the opposition to the Nimeiri regime, and from the Arab World. Peace has continued for five years due mainly to the personal commitment of the leadership. The continuance of peace must depend on the continued stability and control of the Central Government and an acceleration of the rate of development in the Southern Region coupled with a more meaningful participation in decision making by the Southern people. If these requirements are met there is every hope that the power sharing arrangement may eventually become institutionalised. At the present time the Sudan's policy of unity in diversity is more of an oft-repeated slogan than a political reality, and if anything has been learnt in the first five years it is that the process will take a considerable time and not a little good fortune.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Despite the initial problems associated with the rehabilitation of the Southern Region, and the defining of areas of responsibility, it would be a mistake to underestimate the achievement of the Sudan in finding, largely unaided, a solution to a problem with which many more-favoured states continue to be faced.

We have seen that the criteria leading to a threat to Sudan's territorial integrity have been much the same criteria that resulted in similar threats to other states throughout the world. The loyalty of the Southerners was only to the South, if in fact for the majority it extended beyond the immediate social group. As we have seen in Biafra and Eritrea, there was an initial willingness to participate in a larger unit on independence, but it was very soon felt to be a mistake, and was followed almost immediately after independence with an unwillingness to extend loyalty to the new nation state. There was a history of resentment towards all outside interference and especially towards the Northern Sudan. There was a sense of deprivation throughout the Southern economy, from demands for higher wages to demands for the large-scale development that had occurred in the North. There were social and political disparities and a lack of social infrastructure, both in terms of quantity and quality, which made it impossible for Southerners to compete in a united Sudan. Inappropriate education had led to a shortage of qualified manpower and to inadequate representation at the national level and, as we have seen, there <sup>WERE</sup> the very potent factors of race, language and religion to motivate the people. Geographical factors added physical distance to the socio-economic distance between the two communities and the defensible location of the Southern Region facilitated the development of guerrilla warfare; while neighbouring states provided adequate international support.

In addition there were the peculiarly African factors that we outlined in chapter II: the compartmentalization of colonial rule which entrenched hostility and restricted social interaction; the encouragement of cultural

sub-nationalism as a part of indirect rule; and the localization of early political expression which inhibited the development of truly national organization. Independence revealed the threat of disintegration and brought policies of forced assimilation and insufficient political representation leading to a prolonged guerrilla war and an attempt at secession.

Unlike several other African states, Sudan achieved the negotiation of a peaceful end to the hostilities by a willingness to face the realities of the situation and to overcome the bitterness of seventeen years of civil war. The most important factors were the recognition of the legitimacy of Southern claims to a meaningful share in government; the preparedness to negotiate with political leaders once considered terrorists; the abandonment of a belief in a purely military solution; the courage to incorporate a proportion of all combatants into a national defence force and to proclaim a general amnesty; and the willingness to convert promises into action with the minimum of delay. In the ability to negotiate peace, the nature of the Nimeiri government was undoubtedly a contributory factor. As a military government it was able to enter into secret initial negotiation and so to establish exactly what proposals would be acceptable, and to formulate in advance a legislative expression of agreement for immediate implementation. Secondly, it allowed concessions to be made that would have been considered extremely dangerous by any government in a multi-party state.

Having achieved a cease-fire, the Khartoum government immediately implemented the peace agreement. Within only a few weeks, former guerrillas were being absorbed into the People's Armed Forces, a Southern executive body had been appointed, Northern officials in the South were being replaced by Southerners and Central Government representation increased, refugees were being repatriated and funds for economic development were being remitted.(1)

As we have seen, there remain problems in defining spheres of responsibility, in maintaining peace and in financing both the new institutions and the necessary massive rehabilitation. As might be expected, the first five years have required a high degree of flexibility on all sides, and frequent personal intervention by the prime movers in the agreement, with the continuation of peace still subject to threats both internal and external. However it is important to realize that at the time of the Addis Ababa Agreement the re-direction of government in the Sudan was at a very early stage, and that in the past five years the implementation of the agreement has been against the background of change within the state as a whole.

Earlier we suggested that the Addis Ababa Agreement was being undermined; however it may be that in time the agreement will be seen as having facilitated the peace negotiations, while the policy of decentralization expressed in the People's Local Government Act, will become the real basis for national integration. The Nimeiri regime is gradually developing a decentralised system of government that is essentially unitary. Power is delegated from the central authority to territorial units of self-rule, namely the eighteen provinces. Within the provinces there is a combination of central control - embodied by the Province Commissioner, who is appointed by the central authority - and popular participation, embodied in the locally elected councils. While the Commissioner is responsible to Khartoum, the locally elected bodies are responsible and accountable to the hierarchy of urban and rural councils and to the local electorate. So in effect the process of delegation of power moves in two directions - from the centre to the province, and from the village to the province - which meet in the Province Commissioner and the Province Executive Councils.

The system combines a degree of territorial self-rule with supervision by central appointees, and so represents a fulfilment of four requirements which this study has shown to be necessary in the Sudan, in Africa and in a number of states faced with the problem of human diversity.

First, it maintains and protects the unity of the state. Secondly, it is a positive response to local pressures for a degree of self-rule. Thirdly, it facilitates greater administrative convenience and flexibility, given the size of the country. And fourthly, it satisfies the government's ideological commitment.

The system is also subject to further controls. The military nature and army backing for the Central Government tacitly underlines its authority over the provinces and supports its appointees, the Province Commissioners and the Political Supervisors. The restraint of the one-party system controls representation in the National and the Regional Assemblies, not in that all members must belong to the SSU, but in that they are forbidden to form organized opposition parties. With the very subordinate role of the assemblies, non-SSU representation is therefore permitted but largely paralysed. Popular participation is controlled. While being enthusiastically encouraged at the local level through a wide variety of bodies, people's councils, workers organizations, women's organizations, SSU units and co-operatives, above the province level it is carefully channeled through only two avenues—the National and Regional Assemblies or the single party, the SSU. With the gradual decentralization of the central and regional ministries, a present opportunity for participation in decision making above the province level will eventually be largely removed. The policy is to transfer all relevant administrative responsibility to the provinces, and presumably the only remaining ministries will be those of an undeniably national nature - defence, foreign affairs, interior, finance and planning - so severely limiting what might be termed professional participation above the province level. However, at the national level professional participation will still be possible through the technical planning bodies or the armed forces.

This system of limited delegation of power has definite advantages. The strong Khartoum Government facilitates economic planning and close financial control by the centre, essential in a state both poor and under-

developed. The one-party system allows concentration on economic development. Although the SSU may not yet be sufficiently established to be a real initiating force in this field, the ban on other political parties avoids the disastrous situation of the sixties, when their proliferation represented the only true area of growth.

The choice of the economically small province as the unit of territorial self-rule discourages the subsequent secession that many similarly placed states have feared to be the net result of delegation of power. The prominence of the Provincial Commissioner within the system, and his strong links with Khartoum, make it very unlikely that provinces could combine against the centre, and the system within the province does not allow for the emergence of unapproved local leaders. Although one might describe the sub-division of the provinces in the Southern Region as a kind of divide and rule, the creation of new small provinces and the strengthening of their links with Khartoum will definitely help to blur the line between the North and the South, and help to end the sense of confrontation between the two. The splitting up of the South may therefore hasten the integration of the Southern people into the Sudanese nation. Nothing can be done overnight to remove the provincial inequalities, but by adopting this system of delegation of power with controlled popular participation the Sudan will avoid the dangers associated with the coincidence of disadvantage and ethnic diversity.

The decentralization of ministries, the delegation of power and responsibility and the limiting of popular participation to the province level redirects attention to the countryside and to the agricultural sector. Any future development in the Sudan must depend on the agricultural sector, but for too long Khartoum has been the focus of attention, with employment in the capital as the aspiration of every educated Sudanese. Even among those involved in the more technical ministries, a posting away from Khartoum has been considered a form of exile. Secondment to the

province will re-direct technical expertise away from a theoretical and towards a practical expression. An increase in popular participation at province level will help to mobilize local initiative and to include local knowledge in the decision-making process.

The Sudan has approached a working relationship between the nation, the homeland and the political state. It is certainly far from ideal. The Sudanese people cannot yet be termed a nation, but they are certainly nearer that goal than at any time since independence. Despite continual threats, the Sudan has remained intact, and the people and the homeland have been reconciled through the flexibility of the government which has come to recognize the legitimate rights of all the people to a degree of participation in decision making.

In a sense the Western ideal of the nation state has been adjusted to the post-colonial African reality. We have seen how the dynamic social interaction of traditional Africa was compartmentalised into formal units, defined by arbitrary lines to facilitate colonial rule and how the resultant cultural sub-nationalism undermined the Sudan which emerged at independence as a formal political unit, but in no sense as a functioning political unit. With the decentralization of power and the attempt at real national integration, the formal unit begins to show promise of becoming also a functional unit. The prime interest of the majority of the Sudanese population coincides more and more with the interests of the state, and as a result an increasing number of people express their ultimate loyalty as being to the Sudan, rather than to tribe or local community.

What has been realized in the Sudan is that for the formal unit to have any credibility, to attract any loyalty, it must first be a functioning unit. There must be a degree of peaceful interaction, a community of purpose and at the same time an equitable division of resources. By this process alone will the formal unit gradually encompass the people, the territory and the political state, and so develop a real credibility as a formal and a functional unit: a nation state.

Many African states are faced with a diverse population, and the problem of creating from it a nation, if not with actual secession movements. Although it would be unwise to attempt to apply the Sudanese formula to other states, given the complexity of each individual case, there are surely lessons to be learned from the Sudanese experience. Perhaps the most important of these are that it is dangerous to underestimate the conflict potential of human diversity; that the solution to the problem is unlikely to lie in the use of force or forceable assimilation; and that only by recognizing both the diversity and the legitimate rights of all cultural and territorial interest groups, can all the people be persuaded to transfer their allegiance to the nation state.

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CHAPTER I      THE NATION STATE AND THE PROBLEM OF DIVERSITY

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CHAPTER III      THE PHYSICAL AND HUMAN LANDSCAPE OF THE SUDAN

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- 49 Trimingham, *op.cit.*, p.18.
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- 51 Hassan (1967) *op.cit.*, p.176.
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CHAPTER IV COLONIAL EXPERIENCE AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF HOSTILITY

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- 3 P.M.Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan*, London, 1961, p.26.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p.29.
- 5 F.M.Deng, *Dynamics of Identification: A Basis for National Integration in the Sudan*, Khartoum, 1973, p.49.
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- 7 Attributed to Mahammad Ali, Viceroy of Egypt and quoted in Holt, *op.cit.* p.34.
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- 9 The *zeriba* were originally fenced enclosures, but gradually became more fortified stations and in some cases eventually developed into small towns such as Diem Al Zubeir.
- 10 Gray, *op.cit.*, pp. 66-68.
- 11 Holt, *op.cit.*, p.39.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p.53.
- 13 Gray, *op.cit.* p.5.
- 14 For an account of the difficulties presented by the *sudd* not only to Captain Selim but to subsequent explorers and its effect on the supply lines of both the Egyptian and *Mahdist* administrations, see Collins, *op.cit.*, pp. 20-41.
- 15 Gray, *op.cit.*, p.50.
- 16 Collins, *op.cit.*, p.77.
- 17 Gray, *op.cit.*, p.48.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p.53.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p.61.
- 20 Al Zubeir was a Ja'ali merchant who gained complete control of the widespread chain of trading stations in the Bahr El Ghazal. For an account of the extent of his influence see R. Collins, *The Southern Sudan: A Struggle for Control*, London, 1962, p.15.
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- 23 *Ibid.*, p.85.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p.92.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p.126.
- 26 Muhammad Ahmed was born in 1844 on the island of Labab in Dongola, he became a religious leader with a wide following with its headquarters on Aba Island. The theme of his message was the renunciation of the vanities of this world. In 1881 he declared himself the *Mahdi*. For a detailed account of his career see Collins, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.17-21.
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- 29 Collins, 1962. *op.cit.*, p.177.
- 30 *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.
- 31 Gray, *op.cit.*, p.127.
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- 33 A.I.M.Ali, *The British, the Slave Trade & Slavery in the Sudan 1820-81*, Khartoum, 1972, p.114.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p.130.
- 35 *Loc.cit.*,
- 36 Beshir, *op.cit.*, p.13.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p.16.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p.21.
- 39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Peace & Unity in the Sudan*, Khartoum, 1973, p.63. For an account of northern settlers in Equatoria see Collins, 1962, *op.cit.*, p.43.
- 40 Gray, *op.cit.*, p.67.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p.49.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p.58.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p.83.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p.98.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p.131.
- 46 *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 150.

- 48 A.C.Beaton, *Equatoria Province Handbook 1949*,  
Memorandum, 1949, (h. XI. (no pagination).
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- 50 Beaton, *op.cit.*
- 51 An account of the Turco-Egyptian and *Mahdist* periods given by a leading  
Dinka chief who witnessed both periods. Quoted in F.M.Deng, *op.cit.*, p.29.
- 52 F.M.Deng, *The Dinka of the Sudan*, New York, 1972, p.137.
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Condominium, administrative decisions were made by British officials  
and for the sake of simplicity we shall here refer to British  
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Hunter in directions to officials reminded them 'You should recollect  
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tyrannical rulers....'
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- 56 A.Alier, The Southern Sudan Question, in D.M.Wai, *op.cit.*, p.14,
- 57 Collins, 1971, *op.cit.*, p.166.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p.217.
- 59 Collins, in Diamond & Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 374-375.
- 60 Report by Ferguson Bey on the Eastern District to Civil Secretary  
June 1927. i/13/43, SGA. quoted in Collins, *loc.cit.*
- 61 Deng, 1972, *op.cit.*, p.142.
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Nzara, 1955, pp. 41-42.
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without Rulers*, London, 1958, p.99.
- 70 Collins in Diamond & Burke, *op.cit.*, p.379. Memorandum by Owen, March  
29th, 1911, Mongalla, 1/5/31, SGA.
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- 72 *Ibid.*, p.44 .
- 73 Collins, 1971. *op.cit.*, pp. 281-291.
- 74 *Ibid.*, p.306.
- 75 Cromer to the Church Missionary Society December 23, 1904 quoted in Collins, *Ibid.*, p. 291.
- 76 M.A.Rahim, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-17.
- 77 R.O.Collins, *The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective*, Tel Aviv, 1973, p.56 .
- 78 See Appendix 1 for full text.
- 79 Collins in Diamond & Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 381. Financial inducements were offered to *jellaba* to encourage their return to the north, and of the twenty-three in business in the western Bahr El Ghazal in 1930, none remained by 1932.
- 80 M.A.Rahim, *op.cit.*, p. 10.
- 81 *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
- 82 Collins in Diamond & Burke, *op.cit.*, p.384.
- 83 K.Awad, *The Administration of the Sudan since 1898*, Mimeo, University of Khartoum, 1957, pp. 18-19.
- 84 Beshir, *op.cit.*, p.44.
- 85 For an impression of the extent of the sleeping sickness problem and the re-settlement measures associated with its control, see Collins, 1971, *op.cit.*, pp. 267-271, and Larken, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-60.
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- 88 Ministry of Foreign Affairs,*op.cit.*, p. 27.
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- 90 Letter from the Civil Secretary to the Governor-General's Council, April 3rd, 1944, quoted in Beshir,*op.cit.*, pp. 55-56 .
- 91 Collins, 1966, *op.cit.*, pp. 387-388.
- 92 Appendix II .
- 93 *Ibid.*,
- 94 Beshir, *op.cit.*, p. 127. The reaction of T.R.H.Owen to the revised policy of 1946.
- 95 *Ibid.*, p.128.
- 96 *Ibid.*, p.66.
- 97 Memorandum from the Civil Secretary, CS/SCR/1,C.L./3. 13th May, 1947.
- 98 Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the Political Development of the Southern Sudan, June 1947, quoted in Wai, *op.cit.*, pp. 185-205 .

- 99 Civil Secretary to the Governors of the Southern Provinces, CS/SCR/1.A.9/6, 10th February, 1948.
- 100 Beaton, *op.cit.*, p. 187.
- 101 Reining, *op.cit.*, pp. 151-153.
- 102 *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.
- 103 *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.
- 104 Sudan Government, *Natural Resources & Development Potential in the Southern Provinces of the Sudan: A Preliminary Report by the Southern Development Investigation Team*, (SDIT), London, 1955, p.23.
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- 108 Republic of the Sudan: Ministry of Education, *Educational Statistics: Academic Year 1962-1963*, Khartoum (undated) p. 20.
- 109 Sudan Government, Ministry of Education, *Proposals for the Expansion and Improvement of the Educational System in the Southern Provinces*, Undated, p.22.
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- 111 Sudan Government, Ministry of Education, *op.cit.*, p.13.
- 112 Beaton, *op.cit.*, p. 71.
- 113 P.K.Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan*, New York, 1976, p. 177.  
The Umma Party drew support almost exclusively from the Ansar or traditional supporters of the Mahdi and his descendants living in central and western Sudan. The party stood for complete independence for the Sudan and was seen as relatively pro-British. The NUP drew support from educated members of the modern sector and from members of the Khatmiyya sect, for long the rivals of the Ansar. The party stood for the unity of the Nile valley, and was seen as pro-Egyptian. The People's Democratic Party was forged as an offshoot from the NUP by the Khatmiyya followers in July 1956.
- 114 Beshir, *op.cit.*, p.71.
- 115 *Loc.cit.*,
- 116 Bechtold, *op.cit.*, pp. 178-179.
- 117 Albino, *op.cit.*, p. 118.
- 118 Republic of the Sudan, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan during August, 1955*, Khartoum, 1956, pp. 112-113. Hereafter referred to as the Cotran Report and so named after its chairman T.S.Cotran.
- 119 *Ibid.*, p.87.
- 120 *Ibid.*, p. 102.
- 121 *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.
- 122 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

- 123 *Ibid.*, p. 110.  
124 *Ibid.*, p. 80.  
125 *Ibid.*, pp. 84-91, 112-126.  
126 Albino, *op.cit.*, p. 41.  
127 Beshir, *op.cit.*, p. 73.

CHAPTER V     THE THREAT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

- 1     General Mohammad Ahmed Irwa, Minister of the Interior     Statement to the Central Council, 19th March, 1964, quoted in B.M.Said, *The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa*, London, 1965, p.172 .
- 2     The Southern Front, *Southern Front Memorandum to the Organization of African Unity on Afro-Arab Conflict in the Sudan*, Accra, October 1965, no pagination.
- 3     *Ibid.*,
- 4     A.Alier, The Southern Sudan Question, in D.Wai (Ed) *The Southern Sudan*, London, 1973, p.20.
- 5     R.O.Collins, *The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective*, Tel Aviv, 1975, p.75.
- 6     F.M.Deng, *The Dinka of the Sudan*, New York, 1972, p.150.
- 7     P.K.Bechtold, *Politics in the Sudan*, New York, 1976, p.207.
- 8     Ministry of Information and Culture, *Report of the Joint Military Commission*, Khartoum, 1972, p.38.
- 9     Southern Front, *op.cit.*,
- 10    O.Albino, *The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint*, Oxford, 1970, p.50.
- 11    A.Alier, *Peace and Development: The Tasks of the Four Years from the Beginning of the Peace Accord*, Address to the University of Khartoum, 1976, mimeo, (no pagination)
- 12    M.O.Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, Khartoum, 1968, p.179 .
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#### CHAPTER VIII CONCLUSION

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APPENDIX I

MEMORANDUM ON SOUTHERN POLICY 1930

CS/I.C.I.

Civil Secretary's Office

Khartoum, 25th January, 1930

Copies to:

The Governor: Upper Nile Province, Malakal, Mongalla Province, Mongalla, Bahr El Ghazal Province, Wau.

His Excellency the Governor General directs that the main features of the approved policy of the Government for the administration of the Southern Provinces should be restated in simple terms.

In the strictly confidential memorandum which accompanies this letter an attempt has been made to do this, though it will of course be seen that innumerable points of detail arising are not dealt with seriatim.

Your attention is directed to Part II of the memorandum, and I should be obliged if you would forward, as soon as possible, your comments on the criteria suggested and any suggestions you may wish to make for additions to the list.

The carrying out of this policy as described may lead from time to time to various financial implications, <sup>OR</sup> commitments though it is hoped that these will not be great. It will be convenient that any such foreseen should be notified to the relevant authority without delay for consideration. Application of the policy will obviously vary in detail and in intensity according to locality. It is essential however, that the ultimate aim should be made clear to all who are responsible for the execution of the policy, and the memorandum should therefore be circulated to and studied by all your District Commissioners. Sufficient copies for this purpose are sent herewith. Copies are also being sent to such Heads of Departments in Khartoum as are concerned.

Civil Secretary

CS/I.C.I.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

PART I

The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self contained racial or tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs. The measures already taken or to be taken to promote the above policy are re-stated below.

A. PROVISION OF NON-ARABIC SPEAKING STAFF

a) Administrative Staff

The gradual elimination of the Mamur, whether Arab or black. This has already begun, and it is intended that the process of reduction shall continue as opportunity offers.

b) Clerical

It has been the recognised policy for some years that locally recruited staff should take the place of clerks and accountants drawn from the north and that the language of Government offices should be English. In the Bahr El Ghazal province the change to English has already been made and a large number of local boys are employed. The process has to be gradual. It is recognised that local boys are not fit at present to fill the higher posts in Government offices, and the supply of educated English-speaking boys depends on the speed with which the two missionary intermediate schools in Mongalla Province and the intermediate and Stack Schools at Wau can produce them. The missions must retain a certain number of these boys as teachers for their elementary schools (which are an integral part of the educational system) but since the employment of local boys in Government offices is a vital feature of the general policy every encouragement should be given to those in charge of mission schools to co-operate in that policy by sending boys into Government service. Province officials must aim at maintaining a steady supply of boys for the elementary vernacular schools which feed the intermediate schools.

c) Technical

Generally speaking, the considerations mentioned above apply also to the supply of boys for the technical departments, agriculture, medical, public works, etc., but in certain cases it may not be essential that boys going to these departments should complete the intermediate school course.

B CONTROL OF IMMIGRANT TRADERS FROM THE NORTH

It is the aim of the Government to encourage, as far as is possible, Greek and Syrian traders rather than the Gellaba type. Permits to the latter should be decreased unobtrusively but progressively, and only the best type of Gellaba, whose interests are purely commercial and pursued in a legitimate manner should be admitted. The limitation of Gellaba trade to towns or established routes is essential.

C FUNDAMENTAL NECESSITY FOR BRITISH STAFF TO FAMILIARISE THEMSELVES WITH THE BELIEFS AND CUSTOMS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE TRIBES THEY ADMINISTER

a) Belief and Customs

The policy of Government requires that officials in the South, especially administrative officials, should be fully informed as to the social structures, beliefs, customs and mental processes of pagan tribes. Study on these lines is of vital importance to the solution of administrative problems and, it is with this fact in view that a highly qualified expert has been detailed to work in the South.

b) Language

The R<sup>e</sup> <sub>u</sub> jaf Language Conference recommended the adoption of certain 'group languages' for use in schools. It is clearly impossible to develop all the languages and dialects of the southern Sudan and the development of a limited number of them may tend to cause the smaller languages one by one to disappear, and be supplanted by 'group languages'.

It is of course, true that the adoption of this system carries with it the implication of the gradual adoption of a new, or partly new language by the population of the areas in which the 'smaller languages' are used at present. Such a result is, indeed inevitable in the course of time, for 'smaller languages' must always tend to disappear. It is also recognised that in such places as Wau itself, Arabic is so commonly used that the local languages have been almost completely excluded. Special concessions may be necessary in these places.

The Rejaf Conference did not regard these factors as seriously affecting the policy of 'group languages', and it was held to be a matter of first importance that books for the study of 'group languages' should be available for missionaries and officials and that a specialist should be appointed to study the question. A linguistic expert, Dr. Tucker, has therefore been appointed for a period of two years, and his chief function will be to advise as to the production of suitable books. The Secretary for Education and Health has already circulated a memorandum on his duties. The production of grammars and vocabularies will facilitate the study of the local vernaculars. But this will take time and meanwhile it is the duty of our officers to further the policy of the Government without delay. It cannot be stressed too strongly that to speak the natural language of the people whom he controls is the first duty of the administrator. Arabic is not that language, and indeed to the bulk of the population of the South it is a new, or a partly new, tongue. Officials should avoid the error of thinking that by speaking Arabic they are in some way conforming to the principle that the administrator should converse with his people in their own language.

#### D THE USE OF ENGLISH WHERE COMMUNICATION IN THE LOCAL VERNACULAR IS IMPOSSIBLE

The time has not yet come for the adoption of a general *lingua franca* for the Southern Sudan, and it is impossible to foretell what, if ever that time comes, the language would be. At the same time there are, without doubt, occasions when the use of a local vernacular is impossible, as for instance in the case of heterogeneous groupings such as the Sudan Defence Force or the Police. The recent introduction of English words of

command in the Equatorial Corps of the Sudan Defence Force and their use in the Police Forces in the provinces concerned, is a step in the right direction, but more is required. Every effort should be made to make English the means of communication among the men themselves to the complete exclusion of Arabic. This will entail in the various units the opening of classes in which the men would receive instruction in English, and a concentrated effort on the part of those in authority to ensure that English is used by the men when local vernacular cannot be. It is believed that in a comparatively short time men of these forces could learn as much English as they now know of Arabic. It is hoped that those in charge of mission schools will assist in providing instructors for the classes referred to above. Similarly, an official unable to speak the local vernacular should try to use English when speaking to Government employees and servants, and even if in any way possible, to chiefs and natives. In any case, the use of an interpreter is preferable to the use of Arabic, until the local language can be used.

The initial difficulties are not minimized. Inability to converse freely at first will no doubt result in some loss of efficiency, and the dislike of almost every Englishman to using his own language in conversing with natives is fully recognised; but difficulties and dislikes must be subordinated to the main policy. Apart from the fact that the restriction of Arabic is an essential feature of the general scheme, it must not be forgotten that Arabic, being neither the language of the governing nor the governed, will progressively deteriorate. The type of Arabic at present spoken provides signal proof of this. It cannot be used as a means of communication on anything but the most simple matters, and only if it were first unlearned and then relearned in a crude form and adopted as the language of instruction in schools could it fulfill the growing requirement of the future. The local vernaculars and English on the other hand, will in every case be the language of one of the two parties conversing and one party will therefore always be improving the other.

In short, whereas at present Arabic is considered by many natives of the South as the official language, and as it were, the fashionable language, the object of all should be to conteract this idea by every practical means. Incidentally it may be argued that if a District Commissioner serving in the South is transferred to the North, a knowledge of Nilotic Arabic is more of a hindrance than a help to him in learning the Arabic of the Northern Sudan.

## PART II

### PROGRESS OF POLICY

His Excellency the High Commissioner in approving this policy has suggested the need for criteria by which progress may be measured. With this end in view it is intended to tabulate various important features of the policy and to set down the progress made at stated intervals. It is suggested that the matters to be included in the table should be the following:-

- a) The number of Non-Mohammedans in relation to the total Government staff under headings of administrative, clerical and technical with a report on the use of English by Government employees of non-British origin.
- b) The number of British officials who have qualified in the local languages.
- c) Number of immigrant traders of various nationalities from the North.
- d) Number of mission schools, elementary, intermediate and technical respectively.
- e) Number of Government schools.
- f) The amount spent on education including: subsidies to mission schools, cost of Government schools, cost of supervisory educational staff.
- g) Introduction of English words of command in military or police forces, with a report as to the extent to which Arabic is disappearing as the language in use among the men of these forces.

h) Notes on the progress of the use of English instead of Arabic where communication in the vernacular is impossible.

i) Progress made in the production of text-books in the group languages for use in schools, and grammars and vocabularies for use of missionaries and officials.

It is proposed to give information in the Annual Report under these heads for the years 1924, 1927 and 1930 and for each subsequent year.

Civil Secretary's Office,  
Khartoum. January 25, 1930.

APPENDIX II

MEMORANDUM ON SOUTHERN POLICY 1946

CS/SCR/I.C.I.  
SECRET

Civil Secretary's Office,  
Khartoum, December 16, 1946.

Copies to:

Financial Secretary, Legal Secretary, Kaid, Director of Agriculture & Forests, Director of Economics & Trade, Director of Education, Director of Medical Service, General Manager - Sudan Railways, Director of Veterinary Service, Governor Equatoria Province, Governor Upper Nile Province.

Will you please refer to Khartoum Secret Dispatch No.89 of August 4, 1945, of which copies were sent to you (or to your predecessors in Office) personally under this number.

2. You will see that in paragraph 2 of the despatch there are contemplated three possible political futures for the Southern Sudan. The crucial sentence is - It is only by economic and educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with East Africa (or partly with each).

3 Since the despatch was written, and since the decisions on policy which it records were taken not only have further decisions on policy for the South been taken (of which a list is attached) but great changes have taken place in the political outlook for the country as a whole. Whatever may be the final effect, inside the Sudan, of the present treaty negotiations, it is certain that the advance of the Northern Sudan to self-government, involving the progressive reduction of British executive authority, and public canvassing of the Southern Sudan question, will be accelerated. It is therefore essential that policy for the Southern Sudan should be crystallised as soon as possible and that it should be crystallised in a form which can be publically explained and supported and which should therefore be based on sound and constructive social and economic principles. These principles must not only bear defence

against factious opposition, but must also command the support of Northern Sudanese who are prepared to take logical and liberal points of view: while the relief of doubts now in the minds of British political and departmental staff who have the interests of the South at heart is also pressing and important.

4. You will see from the foregoing paragraph that I do not suggest that the future of the two million inhabitants of the South should be influenced by appeasement of the as yet immature and ill-informed politicians of the Northern Sudan. But it is the Sudanese, northern and southern, who will live their lives and direct their affairs in future generations in this country: and our efforts must therefore now be concentrated on initiating a policy which is not only sound in itself, but which can be made acceptable to, and eventually workable by patriotic and reasonable Sudanese, northern and southern alike.

5. Apart from the recent rapid political development in the North the following conclusions have further emerged since His Excellency's 1945 despatch and enclosures were written:

a) with reference to Appendix I to the despatch, Section 7 last sentence of penultimate paragraph, East Africa's plans regarding better communications with the Southern Sudan have been found to be nebulous, and contingent on the Lake Albert Dam. Whatever the possibilities, we have no reason to hesitate between development of trade between the South and E.Africa and development of trade between the Southern and the Northern Sudan.

b) In Education, I believe that while the South may hope to have a secondary school, it cannot hope to support post-secondary education and I believe that Southerners should get this at the Gordon Memorial College - Arabic is not essential there, but should I think be taught to Southerners as a subject from intermediate school level upwards.

c) The distinctions in rates of pay and other conditions of government service, the artificial rules about employment of Southerners in the North, attempts at economic separation, and all similar distinctions are becoming more and more anomalous as the growing demand for Northerners to be employed in Southern Development Schemes, the rapidly growing communication and travel between North and South, and the very application of the policy of pushing forward in the South, break down the previous isolation of the Southern Provinces and strain these distinctions further.

6. The preceding paragraphs are an attempt to indicate briefly the reasons which have led me to think an important decision on Southern policy must now be taken. The biennial report to His Britannic Majesty's Government is due early next year. Subject to your comments on this letter, I propose to advise His Excellency that in His Excellency's next report he asks His Britannic Majesty's Government to approve that two of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 2 above be ruled out as practical politics at the present time. It may in the future be proved that it would be to the advantage of certain of the most southerly tribes, e.g. of Opari or Kajo Kaji, to join up with their relatives in Uganda. It may be that the feeling which now exists among a few of the wisest Northern Sudanese, that they should not, when self-governing, be asked to shoulder the financial and communal burden which they believe the South will always prove to be, may become an important political policy among them. But we should now work on the assumption that the Sudan, as at present constituted, with possibly minor boundary adjustments, will remain one: and we should therefore restate our Southern Policy and do so publicly as follows: 'The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.'

7. Certain changes of detail, in each sphere of Government activity in the South, would I think have to follow the approval and publication of a policy so defined. You will wish to suggest briefly the major points.

8. Will you please consider this matter carefully, consult the senior members of your staffs upon it (particularly of course those who have experience of the South), and let me have your views as briefly as possible. Those of any individual member of your staff which you wish to forward separately with your comments will also be welcome. The views of the senior Sudanese in whose judgement and discretion you have confidence may also be asked for.

9. Finally I ask you to read again the late Sir Douglas Newbold's note to Council No. CS/SCR/I.C.14 of 3.4.44, reproduced as Appendix 'B'(I) to the despatch, and to bear in mind that *urgency* is the essence of the problem. We no longer have time to aim at the ideal: we must aim at doing what is the best for the Southern peoples in the present circumstances.

J.W.ROBERTSON,  
*Civil Secretary*

APPENDIX III

DRAFT ORGANIC LAW TO ORGANIZE REGIONAL SELF GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution Declaration of June 9th, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people participate actively in and supervise the decentralised system of the government of their country. It is hereunder enacted:

*Article 1:*

This law shall be called the law for Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces. It shall come into force on a date within a period not exceeding *thirty days* from the date of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

*Article 2:*

This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a three-quarters majority of the People's National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.

CHAPTER II DEFINITIONS

*Article 3:*

- i) Constitution refers to the Republican Order No. 5 or any basic law replacing or amending it.
- ii) "President" means the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.
- iii) "Southern Provinces of the Sudan" means the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in accordance with their boundaries as they stood on January 1st, 1956, and any other areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern complex as may be decided by a referendum.
- iv) "People's Regional Assembly" refers to the legislative body for the Southern Region of the Sudan.

- v) "High Executive Council" refers to the Executive Council appointed by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council and such body shall supervise the administration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region of the Sudan.
- vi) "President of the High Executive Council" refers to the person appointed by the President on the recommendation of the People's Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive organs responsible for the administration of the Southern Provinces.
- vii) "People's National Assembly" refers to the National Legislative Assembly representing the people of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution.
- viii) "Sudanese" refers to any Sudanese citizens as defined by the Sudanese Nationality Act, 1957, and any amendments thereof.

### CHAPTER III

#### *Article 4:*

The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3 (iii) shall constitute a self-governing Region within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and shall be known as the Southern Region.

#### *Article 5:*

The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and powers of which are defined by this law.

#### *Article 6:*

Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan, and English the principal language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any other language or languages which may serve a practical necessity or the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the Region.

#### CHAPTER IV

*Article 7:*

Neither the People's Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of national nature which are:

- i) National Defence
- ii) External Affairs
- iii) Currency and Coinage
- iv) Air and Inter Regional River Transport
- v) Communications and Telecommunications
- vi) Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities which the Regional Government may specify with the approval of the Central Government.
- vii) Nationality and Immigration. (Emmigration)
- viii) Planning for Economic and Social Development
- ix) Educational Planning
- x) Public Audit

#### CHAPTER V LEGISLATURE

*Article 8:*

Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a People's Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern Region. The constitution and conditions of membership of the Assembly shall be determined by law.

*Article 9:*

Members of the People's Regional Assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot.

*Article 10:*

- i) For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional members to the People's Regional Assembly where conditions for elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in Article 9, provided that such appointed members shall not exceed one quarter of the Assembly.

- ii) The People's Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of its business in accordance with rules of procedures to be laid down by the said Assembly during its first sitting.
- iii) The People's Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a speaker, provided that the first sitting shall be presided over by the Interim President of the High Executive Council.

*Article 11:*

The People's Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the following:

- i) Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration of the Southern Region
- ii) Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration.
- iii) Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law.
- iv) Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory institutions.
- v) Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development.
- vi) Promotion of local languages and cultures.
- vii) Town and Village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programmes.
- viii) Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders licences and formation of co-operative societies.
- ix) Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals.
- x) Administration of environmental health services: maternity care; child welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centres, dispensaries and dressing stations.
- xi) Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and trade.
- xii) Promotion of tourism.

- xiii) Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organization of trade and cultural exhibitions.
- xiv) Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.
- xv) Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and Prison services in accordance with the national policy and standards.
- xvi) Land use in accordance with national laws and plans.
- xvii) Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases.
- xviii) Development, utilization and protection of forest, crops and pastures in accordance with national laws.
- xix) Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.
- xx) All other matters delegated by the President or the People's National Assembly for legislation.

*Article 12:*

The People's National Assembly may call for facts and information concerning the conduct of administration in the Southern Region.

*Article 13:*

- i) The People's Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority and for specified reasons relating to public interest, request the President to relieve the President or any member of the High Executive Council from office. The President shall accede to such request.
- ii) In case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the High Executive Council, the entire body shall be considered as having automatically resigned.

*Article 14:*

The People's Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President may, if he thinks fit, accede to such request.

*Article 15:*

- i) The People's Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, request the President to withdraw any bill presented to the People's National Assembly which, in their view, affects adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern Region, pending communication of the views of the People's Regional Assembly.

- ii) If the President accedes to such request, the People's Regional Assembly shall present its views within fifteen days from the date of accession to the request.
- iii) The President shall communicate any such views to the People's National Assembly together with his own observations if he deems necessary.

*Article 16:*

The People's National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts to the People's Regional Assembly for their information. The People's Regional Assembly shall act similarly.

CHAPTER VI THE EXECUTIVE

*Article 17:*

The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on behalf of the President.

*Article 18:*

The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departments in the Southern Region provided that on matters relating to Central Government Agencies it shall act with the approval of the President.

*Article 19:*

The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the People's Regional Assembly.

*Article 20:*

The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and relieved of office by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council.

*Article 21:*

The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible to the President and to the People's Regional Assembly for the efficient administration in the Southern Region. They shall take an oath of office before the President.

*Article 22:*

The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings of the People's Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations without the right to vote, unless they are also members of the People's Regional Assembly.

CHAPTER VII

*Article 23:*

The President shall from time to time regulate the relationship between the High Executive Council and the central ministries.

*Article 24:*

The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public Service. These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of service for the Regional public service.

CHAPTER VIII FINANCE

*Article 25:*

The People's Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislations and orders to guarantee the collection of all public monies at different levels.

*Article 26:*

- a) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:
  - i) Direct and indirect regional taxes.
  - ii) Contributions from People's Local Government Councils.
  - iii) Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in accordance with National Plans.
  - iv) Funds from the National Treasury for established services.
  - v) Funds voted by the National Assembly in accordance with the requirements of the Region.
  - vi) The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the People's Regional Assembly for the acceleration of economic and social advancement of the Southern Region as envisaged in the declaration of the June 9th, 1969.
  - vii) See Appendix B.
  - viii) Any other sources.

- b) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to meet the expenditure of regional services, security, administration and development in accordance with National Plans and programmes, and shall submit it to the People's Regional Assembly for approval.

#### CHAPTER IX OTHER PROVISIONS

##### *Article 27:*

- i) Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the People's Armed Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the Region.
- ii) The use of the People's Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national defence shall be controlled by the President on the advice of the President of the High Executive Council.
- iii) Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the People's Armed Forces in the Southern Region are provided for in the Protocol on Interim Arrangements.

##### *Article 28:*

The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions of the National Constitution, provided the People's Regional Assembly, after receiving the President's views, may reintroduce the Bill.

##### *Article 29:*

The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the People's Regional Assembly.

##### *Article 30:*

Any member of the People's Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided that financial Bills shall not be presented without a sufficient notice to the President of the High Executive Council.

##### *Article 31:*

The People's Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect the spirit of the National Constitution.

##### *Article 32:*

All citizens are guaranteed the freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named citizen solely on grounds of public health and order.

*Article 33:*

- i) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession.
- ii) No law may adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.

*Article 34:*

Juba shall be the capital of the Southern Region, and the seat of the Regional Executive and Legislature.

APPENDIX (A)      FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

1.      A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship.
2.      Equality of citizens.
  - i)      All citizens without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sex, economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law.
  - ii)     All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the right to institute legal proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court without delay prejudicing their interests.
3.      Personal liberty.
  - i)      Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be prohibited.
  - ii)     The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty.
  - iii)    Retrospective Penal Legislature and punishment should be prohibited.
  - iv)     The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed.

- v) No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with due process of law, and no person should remain in custody or detention for more than twenty-four hours without judicial order.
  - vi) No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intimidation or torture in order to extract evidence from him whether in his favour or against him or against any other person, and no humiliating punishment should be inflicted on any convicted person.
4. Freedom of religion and conscience.
- i) Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion, conscience and the right to profess them publically and privately and to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations in favour of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.
  - ii) Parents and guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under their care in accordance with their choice.
5. Protection of labour.
- i) Forced or compulsory labour of any kind should be prohibited except when ordered for military or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishment prescribed by law.
  - ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.
6. Freedom of minorities to use their languages and develop their culture should be guaranteed.

APPENDIX (B) DRAFT ORDINANCE ON ITEMS OF REVENUE AND GRANTS IN AID  
FOR THE SOUTHERN REGION

- 1. Profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting products of the Southern Region.
- 2. Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the central list of the Ministry of Treasury.
- 3. Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consumed in the Southern Region.

4. Profits on sugar consumed in the Southern Region.
5. Royalties on forest products of the Southern Region.
6. Royalties on leaf tobacco and cigarettes.
7. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rates Ordinance.
8. Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects, (5% of net profits of factories, cooperatives societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas).
9. Revenue accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern Region provided the Region shall bear maintenance expenses, e.g. Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forms and documents, stamp duties, and any other item to be specified from time to time.
10. Licences other than those provided for in the Peoples Local Government Act, 1971.
11. Special Development tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region, the rate of which should be decided by the Peoples Regional Assembly.
12. Income Tax collected from officials and employees serving in the Southern Region both in the local and national civil services as well as in the Army, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and Political establishment.
13. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project established in the Region but not run by Regional Government, (5% of the initial cost).
14. Contributions from the Central Government for the encouragement of construction and development; for every agricultural project, industrial project and trading enterprise, (20% of the initial cost as assessed by the Central Government).

15. New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any of its Local Government units, and for which funds are allocated, shall receive grants from the National Treasury in the following manner:-

Educational institutions: 20% of expenses.

Trunk and through Road and Bridges: 25% of expenses.

Relief and Social amenities: 15% of expenses.

Tourist attraction projects: 25% of expenses.

Security: 15% of expenses.

Grants for Post Secondary and University education within the Sudan: 20% of grants; outside the Sudan: 30% of grants.

Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural activities: 25% of expenses.

APPENDIX IV

AGREEMENT ON THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

*Article 1:*

This Agreement shall come into force on the date and time specified for the ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

*Article 2:*

There will be an end to all military operations and to all armed actions in the Southern Region from the time of cease-fire.

*Article 3:*

All combat forces shall remain in the area under their control at the time of the cease-fire.

*Article 4:*

Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of violence. Any underground activities contrary to public order shall cease.

*Article 5:*

Movements of individual members of both combat forces outside the areas under their control shall be allowed only if these individuals are unarmed and authorized by their respective authorities. The plans for stationing of troops from the National Army shall be such as to avoid any contact between them and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement combat forces.

*Article 6:*

A Joint-Commission is hereby created for the implementation of all questions related to the cease-fire including repatriation of refugees. The Joint-Commission shall include members from all the countries bordering on the Southern Region, as well as representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, World Council of Churches, All Africa Conference of Churches, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

*Article 7:*

The Joint-Commission shall propose all measures to be undertaken by both parties in dealing with all incidents after a full inquiry on the spot.

*Article 8:*

Each party shall be represented on the Joint-Commission by one senior military officer and a maximum of five other members.

*Article 9:*

The headquarters of the Joint-Commission shall be located in Juba with provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau.

*Article 10:*

The Joint-Commission shall appoint local commissions in various centres of the Southern Region, composed of two members from each party.

APPENDIX V

PROTOCOLS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

CHAPTER 1 INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: POLITICAL, LOCAL  
GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SERVICE.

*Article 1:*

The President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan shall, in consultation with the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and branches of the Sudan Socialist Union in the Southern Region, appoint the President and members of an Interim High Executive Council.

*Article 2:*

The Interim High Executive Council shall consist of the President and other members with portfolios in:

- a) Finance and Economic Planning;
- b) Education;
- c) Information, Culture & Tourism;
- d) Communications & Transport
- e) Agriculture, Animal Production & Fisheries
- f) Public Health;
- g) Regional Administration (Local Government, Legal Affairs, Police & Prisons);
- h) Housing, Public Works & Utilities;
- i) Natural Resources & Rural Development;
- j) Public Service & Labour;
- k) Minerals & Industry, Trade & Supply.

*Article 3:*

The Interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national laws, establish a Regional Civil Service, subject to ratification by the Peoples regional Assembly.

*Article 4:*

The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive Council, determine the date for the election to the Peoples Regional Assembly, and the Interim High Executive Council shall make arrangements for the setting up of this Assembly.

*Article 5:*

In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central and regional institutions, the South Sudan Liberation Movement shall compile and communicate lists of citizens of the Southern Region outside the Sudan in accordance with details to be supplied by the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform.

*Article 6:*

The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform shall undertake to provide necessary financial allocations with effect from 1972-73 Budget for such placements and appointments.

*Article 7:*

The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a period of 18 months.

CHAPTER II TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF UNITS OF THE  
PEOPLES ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

*Article 1:*

These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years subject to revision by the President of the High Executive Council acting with the consent of the Peoples Regional Assembly.

*Article 2:*

The Peoples Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the Southern Command, composed of 12,000 officers and men, of whom 6,000 shall be citizens from that region and the other 6,000 from outside the Region.

*Article 3:*

The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region within the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military Commission taking in to account the need for initial separate deployment of troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. The Commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be such that an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.

*Article 4:*

The Joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior military officers from each side. Decisions of the Joint Military Commission shall be taken unanimously. In case of disagreement, such matters shall be referred to the respective authorities.

CHAPTER III AMNESTY AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS

*Article 1:*

No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil, criminal, shall be instituted against any person in any Court of Law for, or on account of, any act or matter done inside or outside the Sudan as from the 18th day of August, 1955, if such act or matter done in connection with mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region.

*Article 2:*

If a civil suit in relation to any acts or matters referred to in Article One is instituted before or after the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement, such a suit shall be discharged and made null and void.

*Article 3:*

All persons serving terms of imprisonment or held in detention in respect of offences hereinbefore specified in Article One shall be discharged or released within fifteen days from the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

*Article 4:*

The Joint Cease-Fire Commission shall keep a register of all civilian returnees which register shall serve to certify that the persons therein named are considered indemnified within the meaning of this Agreement provided that the Commission may delegate such power to the Diplomatic Missions of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan in the case of citizens from the Southern Region living abroad and to whom the provisions of this Agreement apply.

*Article 5:*

In the case of armed returnees or those belonging to combat forces, the Joint Military Commission shall keep a similar register of those persons who shall be treated in the same manner as provided for in Article Four.

*Article 6:*

Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles Four and Five above, a Special Tribunal with ad hoc judicial powers shall be established to examine and decide on those cases which in the estimation of the authorities do not meet the conditions for amnesty specified in Article One of this Agreement. The Special Tribunal shall be composed of a President appointed by the President of the Republic and not more than four members named by the Cease-Fire Commission.

*Article 7:*

Cases referred to in Article Six shall be brought to the attention of the Special Tribunal by request of the Minister of Justice.

*Article 8:*

The Amnesty Provisions contained in this Agreement as well as the powers of the Special Tribunal shall remain in force until such time as the President after consultation with the commissions referred to in this Agreement, decide that they have fulfilled their functions.

CHAPTER IV REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT COMMISSION

1. REPATRIATION

*Article 1:*

There shall be established Special Commissions inside and where required outside the Southern Region charged with the responsibility of taking all administrative and other measures as may be necessary in order to repatriate all citizens from the Southern Region who today are residing in other countries and especially in the neighbouring countries. The headquarters of the Commission shall be in Juba.

*Article 2:*

The Commissions shall be composed of, at least, three members including one representative of the Central Government, one representative of the Southern Region, and one representative of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees. For those commissions operating outside the Sudan, a representative of the host Government shall be included, plus the central Government representative, who shall be the Ambassador of the Sudan or his representative.

*Article 3:*

The control of repatriation at the borders shall be assumed by the competent border authorities in cooperation with the representatives of the Resettlement Commission.

*Article 4:*

The Repatriation Commission shall work very closely with the Commission for Relief and Resettlement to ensure that the operation and timing of the returning of refugees from across borders is adequately co-ordinated.

II RESETTLEMENT

*Article 1:*

There shall be established a Special Commission for Relief and Resettlement under the President of the Interim High Executive Council with headquarters in Juba and provincial branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau. The Commission, its branches, and whatever units it may deem fit to create in other localities in order to facilitate its functions, shall be responsible for co-ordination and implementation of all relief services and planning related to Resettlement and Rehabilitation of all returnees, that is:-

- a) Refugees from neighbouring countries
- b) Displaced persons resident in the main centres in the Southern Region and other parts of the Sudan.
- c) Displaced persons including residual Anya Nya personnel and supporters in the bush.
- d) Handicapped and orphans.

*Article 2:*

Although resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons is administratively the responsibility of the Regional Government, the present conditions in the Southern Region dictate that efforts of the whole nation of the Sudan and International Organizations should be pooled to help and rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall co-ordinate activities and resources of the Organization within the country.

*Article 3:*

The first priority shall be the resettlement of displaced persons within the Sudan in the following order:

- a) Persons presently residing in overcrowded centres in the Southern Region, and persons desirous to return to their original areas and homes.
- b) Persons returning from the bush including Anya Nya supporters.
- c) Handicapped persons and orphans.

*Article 4:*

The second priority shall be given to returnees from the neighbouring and other countries according to an agreed plan. This plan shall provide for:-

- a) Adequate reception centres with facilities for shelter, food supplies medicine and medicaments.
- b) Transportation to permanent resettlement villages or places of origin.
- c) Materials and equipments.

*Article 5:*

The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall:

- a) Appeal to International Organizations and Voluntary agencies to continue assistance for students already under their support particularly for students in secondary schools and higher institutions until appropriate arrangements are made for their repatriation.
- b) Compile adequate information on students and persons in need of financial support from the Sudan Government.

*Article 6:*

The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall arrange for the education of all returnees who were attending primary schools.

This Agreement is hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the month of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D. in this city, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan on the one hand and the South Sudan Liberation Movement on the other.

It shall come into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the leader of the South Sudan Liberation Movement.

It shall be ratified by the said two Leaders in persons or through their respective authorized Representatives, in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the twelfth hour at noon, on the twelfth day of the month of March, in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D.

In witness whereof, We the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Representatives of the South Sudan Liberation Movement hereby append our signatures in the presence of the Representative of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Representatives of the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the Sudan Council of Churches.

*For the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan*

1. Abel Alier-Wal Kuai  
Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs
2. Dr. Mansour Khalid  
Minister for Foreign Affairs
3. Dr, Jaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit  
Minister for Local Government
4. Major General P.S.C. Mohammed El Baghir Ahmed  
Minister of Interior
5. Abdel Rahman Abdalla  
Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform
6. Brigadier P.S.C. Mirghani Slueiman
7. Colonel Kamal Abasher

*For the South Sudan Liberation Movement*

1. Ezboni Mondiri Gwonza  
Leader of the Delegation
2. Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol  
Secretary of the Delegation
3. E.Mading De Garang  
Spokesman of the Delegation
4. Colonel Frederick Brian Maggott  
Special Military Representative
5. Oliver Batali Albino  
Member
6. Angelo Voga Morjan  
Member
7. Rev. Paul Puot  
Member
8. Job Adier De Jok  
Member

*Witnesses*

1.       Nabiyelul Kifle  
          Representative of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia
2.       Leopoldo J.Niilus  
          Representative of the World Council of Churches
3.       Kodwo E. Ankrah  
          Representative of the World Council of Churches
4.       Burgess Carr  
          General Secretary of the All Africa Conference of Churches
5.       Samuel Athi Bwogo  
          Representative of the Sudan Council of Churches

*Attestation*

I attest that these signatures are genuine and true.

Burgess Carr  
*Moderator.*