SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE

IN

TWO EAST AFRICAN KINGDOMS

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The problem investigated in this thesis concerns the part played by systems of economic, status and political stratification in processes of political change. It is demonstrated that two major variables required in explanation are (1) the nature of actors' perceptions of power structures in the society; (2) the differential capacities for political organization in different strata. The cases for study are the East African kingdoms of Buganda and Rwanda during the period, ending in 1962, when they were subject to colonial overrule.

In parts I and II, I analyze the processes of change in structures of power in the two kingdoms along the three dimensions indicated. These processes were themselves the product of interplay between those taking place in the precolonial kingdoms and those introduced by the colonial powers. The kingdom governments retained some 'traditional' forms, with changed functions. Their offices were virtually monopolized by the most powerful economic classes and elite status groups - 'elite classes' - in each case. In the later colonial period, the legitimacy of the existing political systems was threatened as the colonial powers allowed parties to be formed which exploited structural conflicts of interest.

In part III, I examine how the 'elite classes' attempted to deal with the potential challenge to their political domination. In each case they tried to mobilize the whole kingdom in structural opposition to outsiders, and to articulate unity through intensified use of distinguishing cultural forms, in a 'neotraditional' cultural strategy. I examine the internal structural context of success in organizing the Baganda as a political group, and contrast it with the context of failure in Rwanda. Explanation takes the form of examining whether pre-requisites of political group organization could be fulfilled by neotraditional forms in the context of processes of structural change analyzed in parts I and II.
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A fundamental problem in sociology, defined by the 'classical' sociologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is the explanation of the inter-relations of systems of stratification in a society, as a means to provide models of institutional change (Davies, 1970, chapter 1). Weber provided the most satisfactory basic classification of systems of stratification (cf. Runciman, 1968), by analyzing the processes in which distinct types of strata arose as persons sharing a common 'situation' in relation to persons in other 'situations' in the same institutional order. (1) The economic processes of production and exchange distribute unequally among roles "the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods and skills for the sake of income in a given economic order" (Weber, 1970, p.181), thus creating 'class situations'. The term 'class' refers only to an economic category of roles or persons, although it might provide a basis for group organization. (2) The cultural processes of differential evaluation of roles create 'status situations', occupied by what Weber called 'status groups' although he pointed out that sometimes these are more like 'categories' than 'groups' (ibid, p.186; cf. Frankenberg, 1968, p.18). (3) Both economic and cultural processes give rise to types of power, but power itself is formally regulated by a distinct order of institutions in the "house of power" (Weber 1970, p.194), or politics. Each political institution, including the forms which preceded the state,

"is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence...it is understood that, in reality, obedience is determined by highly robust motives of fear and hope- fear of the vengeance of magical powers or of the power - holder, hope for reward in this world or in the beyond - and besides all this, by interests of the most varied sort" (ibid, pp.78-79)

However, we should note that it is not only the institutions which are formally political in a particular society that are involved in political processes (Cohen, 1969a). Institutions ostensibly concerned with other matters notably kinship and religion, have often been intimately involved in political processes, in an 'informal'way. Informal as well as formal means will affect the "structure of domination". Political stratification arises from the power, or lack of it, to dispose of the means of administration in a society for the purpose of carrying out policy; this is what parties compete for (ibid, p.195) Often there is a dominant stratum monopolizing the means of administration and maintaining itself in power "chiefly by virtue of being an organized minority confronting the unorganized majority"(Bottomore, 1964, p.42). As with status strata, a minimum degree of corporate is implied among the members of a dominant political stratum but its solidarity as against the sectional interests of its members can only be determined empirically. The validity of Weber's three dimensions - of class, status and power - has
recently been "conceptually and empirically" reaffirmed by Runciman (1968), and Davies points out that while

"it should be noted that many sociologists have gone some way beyond Weber...and have classified ranks by education, religion, race, income, occupation, political affiliation, sex, age, and other characteristics—all of these can be shown to be in some measure indicators of status"(ibid, p.47)

within a particular community. Stratification will be analysed within these three dimensions here.

The term 'political change', which has no clearly defined and accepted definition (Gould, 1970, p.421), will refer here to change in the forms and functions of the means of administration in a society, for maintenance and change of such forms and functions is the object of political competition and conflict.

At the most abstract level, then, the problem for study in this thesis is how such forms and functions of the means of administration are related to the systems of stratification in a society; and, more particularly, how do changes in either of these variables affect the other? Weber himself investigated two major processes in this field, at a high level of abstraction, - the formation of parties on the basis of economic and status strata, and the effect on stratification systems of the administrative staff pursuing their sectoral 'rationalizing' interests. At a more empirical level, a major focus of study in recent British social anthropology is relevant.

Particularly under the influence of Professor Gluckman and his associates this focus has been on the use of traditional cultural or 'symbolic' forms (see below) in processes of political and economic change, and the effect of the latter processes on traditional forms. The classic statement of this interest is in Gluckman (1948), and a recent systematic presentation is found in Cohen (1969b). In the main, such studies have concentrated on showing how, in the process of differentiation out from precommercial 'tribal' society of an economic institutional order (cf. Gluckman, 1965, p.68; Fallers, 1967) - notably in the urban situation (cf. Gluckman, 1960; Mitchell, 1966; Epstein, 1958) -, and in the process of radical change in the legal-political order - notably in the encapsulation of tribal and other traditional communities within modern state organizations (cf. Cohen, 1969a; Bailey, 1960, 1963) -, there occur changes in the kind of status groups of categories to which persons belong and on the basis of which political groups are formed. The argument is that a new political or economic category of persons and groups of various kinds which shares a common situation in structurally-generated conflicts (I use Lloyd's definition (1968, p.30) rather than Gluckman's (1965 p.xxii)) will tend to develop common cultural forms which symbolize its solid-
arity and help it to organize as a political group. This involves cultural processes of the development of new symbolic forms and a change of function for old forms which are retained. Two polar processes have been particularly studied in Africa: 'detrabilization' and 'retribalization' (Mercier, 1965; Cohen, 1969a) The former refers to the emergence of economic classes and occupational status groups as the basis for political groups. This has been qualified by studies of 'retribalization', which point out that where the 'tribal' status group also constitutes an economic organization (cf. Cohen, 1969a) and where it is competing for "particularistic" advantages in the new state (cf. Gulliver, 1970), there may be a new emphasis on the traditional symbolic forms.

Studies of 'retribalization' have shown how the process arises out of new and more intensive contact and interaction between ethnic status groups and categories, but they have given relatively little attention to these functions in regard to the internal power structures of such groups, beyond showing that certain prerequisites of political group organization can be fulfilled in this way (see chapter 7). I suggest that this aspect is equally important in 'retribalization': as Gulliver points out:

"Symbols of whatever kind though 'merely representational' of more concrete interests, have an autonomy and a force of their own. People can become so affected by them that they will even act against their own interests in furtherance of the symbols. Leaders, who may have a more or less conscious perception of the economic and political interests involved, use these symbols not only in an expressive, emotive manner, but to gain the support of followers who may not at all see clearly what the interests are. Leaders' interests may in any case differ from those of followers..." (ibid, pp.33-34)

It is on this neglected aspect of 'retribalization' that I intend to concentrate. The most satisfactory material for its study is provided where the 'traditional' group displays a relatively high degree of role differentiation and stratification beyond the 'universals' of age, sex and personal characteristics (cf. Sahlins 1958, p.1) In East Africa these conditions are best fulfilled by the larger kingdom organizations.

'Retribalization' has been seen as a cultural strategy in the organization of political groups in particular structural circumstances. Besides examining more closely the internal power structures of the 'retribalizing' group, I wish to test this hypothesis by demonstrating its explanatory value in a case where 'retribalization' was not successful as well as in a case where it was. Moreover, it will be shown that the reasons for failure lay with the internal rather than the external structural context. Finally, I
intend to isolate the crucial variables which account for the differences between the two cases.

In order to avoid the implication that I am referring only to those structural situations already examined in studies of 'retribalization', and to focus attention on the claim to 'traditional' authority (I am writing here of a claim, and not referring to Weber's typology of authority), I refer to this type of cultural strategy as 'neotraditionalism'. By this I mean the use of old symbols for new functions. I include, as an aspect of this definition, their use in a new structural context. I specifically do not mean the use of new symbols for what are held to be traditional functions — as, for example, where writers attempt to explain sociocultural change as the expression in 'modern' terms of structures morphologically analogous to 'traditional' structures (e.g. Lloyd, 1965, p. 108). While my usage is in some respects similar to Apter's (1961, pp. 27-195), it differs (1) in recognizing that neotraditionalism might take more than one form in any particular case, and be used by both sides in a conflict; and (2) in referring only to a cultural process, i.e. not to structural characteristics. In the case of Buganda, for example, writers have often used the term 'neotraditionalist' only for the most uncompromising opponents of British overrule through the Baganda chiefs (Apter, 1961; Low, 1962) — and this tends to discount the significant uses made of traditional symbols of authority by the chiefs and the British.

By a 'symbol' I mean any element of 'culture', or 'ritual' in Leach's definition (1964, p. 10ff), which can be isolated analytically or empirically. The sociological significance of symbolism and ritual is fundamental; Turner's comment, that it "actually creates, or re-creates, the categories through which men perceive reality — the axioms underlying the structure of society and the laws of the natural and moral orders" (1968), need not be restricted to the particularly systematic and highly charged form of which he was writing. Ritual in "everyday reality" legitimates particular forms of social order by linking them with cosmic order (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). These statements, however, while useful as definitions are only a starting point for the analysis of empirical social processes. Statements about the place of cultural factors in determining political and economic structures can only be generalized and speculative unless we can also demonstrate the place of structural factors in determining cultural form. For some social anthropologists this involves reduction to the 'natural' structures investigated by ecology, biology and psychology; but I refer to structures of institutionalized social relations,
while avoiding reductionism by examining such structures historically as
dialectical and diachronic processes.

This thesis, then, investigates the symbolic organization of political
and economic inequality in the two East African kingdoms of Rwanda and Buganda
during a period of rapid social change. A brief introductory description of
the two kingdoms will be appropriate here. It is not intended to be more
than a location of the two kingdoms in broad geographical and historical terms.

The country of Rwanda, independent since 1962, is located in eastern
central Africa and has an area of about 10,000 sq. miles. It borders on
the Congo-Kinshasa, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi. With the latter it formed
the colony of Ruanda-Urundi under German (1900-1916) and Belgian (1916-1962)
overrule. The Belgians held Ruanda-Urundi in mandate from the League of
Nations and the United Nations. Topographically, Ruanda is distinguished
as a highland country which is broken up by deep river valleys into its
characteristic hill-features. The population totalled 2,452,737 in 1957,
and was divided into three caste-like groups: Tutsi (16.6%); Hutu (82.7%);
Twa (0.7%) The latter did not play any significant role in the stratification
systems or in political change in our period, living as isolated hunters and
gatherers in the northern forests or being employed as jesters and police
agents by political officials. They are largely excluded from the analysis
in this thesis. Until the revolution of 1959-61, Tutsi had been politically
and militarily the dominant caste. Ideologically, and to a considerable
extent in practice, they possessed a distinct life-style characterised by a
monopoly of political administration and cattle pastoralism. Crop culti­
vation and the rearing of other animals was carried out by Hutu. Except for
the production, from the 1930s, of a small amount of coffee under Belgian
compulsion, and the growth of a tiny sector of commercial cattle goods, pro­
duction was devoted almost wholly to subsistence. Cash incomes were sporad­
ically acquired by labour migration. There was virtually no industrial sector
and very few European commercial enterprises. The largest town, Kigali, had
a population of only 4,000 in 1957, when Kampala in Buganda had a population
of approximately 60,000. Hutu paid tribute in labour and goods directly and
indirectly to the Tutsi during the precolonial period, and to a variable extent
during the colonial period. All political officials were Tutsi until the
1950s, and in 1959 only 2% of chiefs were Hutu. Clientship was a pervasive
informal political institution, in which Tutsi sought advancement and the
Hutu sought security of their lives and property usufruct. The monarchy of
the mwami was of the patrimonial type described by Weber. It was abolished
by a referendum of 1961 under U.N. supervision.
The kingdom of Buganda made up the Buganda province of the Protectorate of Uganda, in eastern Africa, which was formed in 1894 and became an independent state in 1962. In the process of the British establishing overrule in the 1890s, Buganda acquired an enlarged area mainly at the expense of its northern neighbour, the kingdom of Bunyoro. In 1962, the area of Buganda was 17,295 sq. miles. It occupied the northwestern shore of Lake Victoria from the River Nile, its eastern boundary, to the Tanzanian border, and extended inland to the southern tip of Lake Albert and the western shore of Lake Kyoga. It was bounded by the Ugandan kingdoms of Ankole and Toro in the west, Bunyoro in the north, and Busoga in the east. In 1959, the African population of Buganda was 1,834,128, of whom 1,006,101 were members of the Baganda tribe as established by membership of one of the approximately fifty recognised clans. Forms of political and status stratification were not closed, as in Rwanda, by descent and endogamy. Private property in land, under the "mailo" system, was introduced in 1900. Commercialization of crop production (mainly cotton and, later, coffee) and development of urban industry and commerce took place early, rapidly and on a large scale by comparison with Rwanda. The precolonial monarchy of the kabaka was of the patrimonial type. Like that in Rwanda it was used by the colonial power, after some 'rationalization', in a form of indirect rule. Definition of its position in the Protectorate and in any future independent Ugandan government were major issues in the politics of Uganda in the decade before independence. The monarchy retained much of its power and authority into the period of Independence.

I reinterpret much of the available evidence on the kinds of structural change which took place during the period in which both were subject to colonial rule. Study of the processes of structural change shows that ritual behaviour is not simply the expression of political and economic structures, but plays an active part in determining the form they take. Particular symbolic systems legitimate particular power structures and may be superceded as the latter change, and they may hold up change. On the other hand, the existing symbolic forms may acquire new functions in terms of the power structures which they legitimate. But while the particular forms of symbolism which have potency in a society are not simply determined by its power structures, neither is their use arbitrary.

The symbolism used in the organization of social order must provide a 'blueprint' (cf. Cohen, 1969a) through which potentially conflicting groups and categories of persons can articulate and justify their cooperation (Evans-Pritchard & Fortes, 1940). In particular, it must justify inequality of power,
ensuring the authority of the superordinate. The dominant group or groups in a society constantly seek legitimation of their power by symbolic means in order to organize their own members, minimize the need to use military violence, and to maintain continuity of social order. This is a continuous process as internal and external conditions change; but in periods of rapid change such as occurred in East Africa under colonial rule, in the first half of the twentieth century, it can be seen most clearly; Buganda and Rwanda provide particularly good cases for the study of this process, and comparison of the effectiveness of a neotraditional cultural strategy under different conditions. (1) Both kingdoms were formally subjected to colonial rule in the same period, from about 1900 to 1962. (2) Both were in the immediate pre-colonial period expanding state organizations of approximately the same scale and complexity. (3) In both cases there were, at the end of the colonial period, dominant but informally-organized political groups which attempted to prevent the economic, status and political mobility of other groups and categories, which appeared imminent, by appeal to neotraditional symbols which upheld both their dominance and the solidarity of the widest group. (4) While the dominant group in Buganda retained its position into the first years of Independence, that in Rwanda was overthrown in a social revolution of the last years of colonial rule. It is possible, then, to examine in cases of both success and failure the cultural strategy of neotraditionalism adopted by the dominant political groups in the two kingdoms as a means of dealing with problems of political organization in their different structural situations. It will be shown that the most satisfactory explanation of the forms of political change which occurred requires analysis of the 'feedback' between symbolic processes and political and economic processes.

Where I can show that it is appropriate, I refer to the dominant political groups in the two kingdoms as 'elite classes'. I have borrowed this term from Fallers, (see chapter six), but I use it in a different way (see chapter 6). I find it useful for expressing the idea of an economic class, which is an analytical category, whose constituent persons have considerable awareness of their mutual, diffuse and often exclusive interest because they also constitute a status group - in this case, the elite status group. Other possible names and definitions would not only be less precise, but would be confusing because of a failure to distinguish the 'objective' and 'structural' aspects of stratification from the 'subjective' and 'cultural' aspects. For example, a definition of the ruling class' such as that given by Lloyd (1965. p.78) says too much and too little; it refers to

"the whole group from which the political elite... (the actual officeholders (ibid,p.64)... are drawn... members of which do not carry out political duties".

It is saying too much to assume that the category from which the political
elite is drawn is a group, defined by mutual recognition of rights and duties, and too little to assume that if such a category is not a group then it might not in some sense worthy of investigation be a 'ruling class'. I suggest that whether officeholders are recruited from a single economic class, and whether they form a group, is a matter for investigation and not definition (cf. Southall, 1966, p. 347).

Although my main purpose in this thesis is to examine the functions of neotraditional cultural strategies in respect of the internal power structures of Buganda and Rwanda, analysis of the structural contexts in which the strategies were adopted cannot be made simply by drawing up a model of 'the social structure' in each kingdom "as if it were in a state of equilibrium" (Gluckman, 1965, p. 279) for the time at which political parties began to be organized to challenge the existing power structures. For such a model by definition holds 'in balance' and thereby obscures the internal processes leading to change (Barth, 1967; Lloyd, 1968, p. 27), which are precisely those I wish to analyse. If structural models may be constructed which show the integrative functions of social institutions (including the accommodation of variations and exceptions, as in the case study method) it is no less legitimate to construct structural models which show the main processes of change taking place within a society. These are necessarily historical models of structural processes, which are unlikely empirically to be well-integrated since conflict and contradiction are major sources of change, and not synchronic models of a structure in which integration must be an assumption (or a 'pluralism' of integrated structures). It is in this sense that I agree with Worsley when he argues that social anthropology is a "comparative and historical science" (1957, p. 259). In such models it is possible to fill the requirement recently insisted on by several social anthropologists that structural analyses be tested against historical data (Evans-Pritchard, 1951; Lewis, 1968, p. xx).

In parts I and II of the thesis I analyze the processes of change in structures of power in the two kingdoms along the three dimensions isolated by Weber. These processes themselves were the product of an interplay between those already taking place in the precolonial kingdoms and those introduced by the colonial powers. At the end of the colonial period the legitimacy of the existing political systems was placed in doubt as the colonial powers allowed parties to be formed which exploited structural conflicts of interest. In part III I examine how dominant groups which had appeared in the colonial period attempted to deal with this challenge to the legitimacy of their regulation of power in the society. In each case they attempted to mobilize the whole king-
dom in structural opposition to outsiders – as in the process of 'retribu-
alization' – and to articulate this new unity through special emphasis on the
cultural forms which distinguished them from others. These same cultural forms
legitimated the power of the dominant groups and enabled them to define as
sectional and selfish (cf. Evans-Pritchard & Fortes, 1940) the aims of politi-
cal groups being formed along internal lines of stratification. I examine
the successful use of symbolism in the organization of the Baganda as a
political group, and contrast it with the failure in Rwanda. Explanation
takes the form of examining whether the prerequisites of group organization
could be fulfilled by appeal to neotraditional symbolism in the context of
processes of structural change which I have analysed in parts I and II.
The purpose of this chapter is an analysis of the power structure discernible in economic relations between persons and groups in Rwanda towards the end of the colonial period. In order to do this, it is necessary to examine the question of whether the institutional changes of the colonial period accentuated or alleviated conflicts of 'objective' interests (cf. Lloyd, 1968, p. 31) between groups and persons in the power structure. For it has been suggested by many writers (see below & chapter 3) that there was in the precolonial kingdom a 'traditional balance' of interests, from which the colonial period brought inevitable decline. This has important implications for the study of political change at the end of the colonial period, for it suggests that the mere appearance of conflicting interest between the ruling Tutsi caste and themselves was enough to ensure that the subordinate Hutu caste should rise in revolt, as they did in 1959; moreover, it suggests that the sources of conflict can be found in the way that institutional changes by the colonial administrations upset the 'balance' of the 'traditional' system. In contrast, I will show that there were at all times major conflicts of 'objective' interest between the castes and their members, but that the institutional control (cf. Davies, 1970, p. 11) exercised by the Tutsi was such that Hutu could not organize effectively to alter the power structure. Much of the data I use is taken from studies of the precolonial kingdom, and so when I discuss social relations in the colonial period (for which relevant data is scarcer) I explain to what extent and in what ways the nature of those relations changed and remained constant over time. During the colonial period the Tutsi largely retained effective institutional control, and in some fields increased it, despite changes or abandonment of specific customary institutions. Nevertheless, economic processes - and particularly the emergence of a differentiated economic order of institutions, participated in by only a tiny proportion of the population but including Hutu as well as Tutsi - enabled a small number of Hutu to acquire economic power which gave them a certain degree of autonomy from Tutsi control. It was this new aspect of the power structure which was crucial in political change at the end of the colonial period, (as I shall show in chapter 7). However, its importance cannot be assessed unless economic aspects of the total power structure are examined in the whole period from the years immediately before the establishment of colonial overrule to the 1950s. I should stress that I intend here to examine only one particular analytical relationship, and not to write a conventional history of the causes of institutional change.
At the beginning of the colonial period the population of Rwanda was probably about 1½ million (Czekanowski, 1906; Louis, 1963 pp 108-9). In 1957 it was 2,452,737 (Ruanda-Urundi A, 1960, p. 40) at an average density of 227 persons per square mile. The main population increase came after 1949 for which the Ten-Year Plan recorded 1,808,776 persons; but even before this there was land shortage at times in many areas. There were extensive famines in the precolonial and early colonial periods; as late as 1916 and 1943 there were two famines which officially caused 50,000 and 36,000 deaths respectively. In heavily populated areas Tutsi control of the access to the land was in part responsible for the effect of the famines — for example, they refused to allow Hutu to cultivate areas which they needed themselves for dry season pastures, notably the fertile marsh-bottom land (Frankenberg, unpubl.) After 1943, the Belgian Administration protected marsh-bottom cultivation as a measure against famine.

Lacking mineral resources and with little incentive to develop, Rwanda had very largely a subsistence economy at the time of Independence in 1962 (Gravel, 1968, pp. 51—52), and was one of the poorest countries in Africa. Coffee was the only important cash-crop, introduced compulsorily in 1932 and attaining a production of under half of the mere 33,629 metric tons totalled by Rwanda and Burundi in 1961 (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 14). It did not provide an adequate income to most cultivators to cover cash needs. Cash needs were generated by (1):

"a relatively large head-tax — 420 Fr. p.a. in 1961 — upon every adult male" (Gravel, 1968, p. 107)

which increased by 270 Fr. for a second wife, and by 420 Fr. for a son old enough to go on labour migration; (2) by the process of labour migration itself. Need to pay the head-tax accounted for the labour migration of the majority (ibid, p. 112), but some desire for cash goods was probably also acquired. In the main this refers to "essential" items, such as hoes, machetes, clothing and, to a lesser extent, salt, kerosene, palm oil and soap. A few migrants acquired enough cash for items like school fees and bicycles, though these would normally only be available to those with jobs in the colonial administration. In Remera, the hill community in eastern Rwanda studied by Gravel, which had a total population of 1,462 in 1960 (353 Tutsi, 1,109 Hutu), these occupations were as follows: 1 subchief, 1 policeman and 1 secretary to the subchief, 3 agricultural assistants, 1 judge, 1 medical assistant and 1 road worker (ibid, p. 108). These were the only wage-earners. Elsewhere there might be a few petty traders and housebuilders, often working in their spare time (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 479)
Thus while labour migration reached huge proportions for short periods by 1960 - 300,000 Banyarwanda a year went to Uganda for the cotton-picking season (ibid, p.15) - it had not encouraged movement away from subsistence production to cash-cropping to meet persistent cash demands, as in some other parts of Africa, despite land shortage. One reason was that wages in Uganda, where all migrants went, were very low (cf. Gulliver, 1960). Gravel estimated that a man with one job

"cannot possibly start saving before (his) third month's work. Yet some of them do not remain for more than two or three months in Uganda" (1968, p.113)

While Gravel found that 12.7% of Remera men were absent at any time, 80.3% of all migrants went for less than a year. Banyarwanda mostly went on labour migration to meet immediate cash needs, returning when this was done, or they moved away permanently into Uganda. The most important effect of labour migration on economic and political change was in providing the opportunity for a few Hutu to become petty traders, mechanics, truck drivers, builders etc. - occupations which permitted them to think of success in terms other than increased favour from a Tutsi patron (see chapter 7).

Coffee was only reluctantly adopted in Rwanda, and the Belgian Administration had to enforce care of the trees (ibid, p.66). This may have been because sale prices were fixed very low by the Administration, and incomes were low - an average of about 1000 Fr. in 1960 in Remera. (Note: Average Baganda incomes were seven times higher from coffee - see chapter 4) Some 50% of Tutsi and 25% of Hutu at Remera did not cultivate coffee at all. The staple crop was "year-round" Plantain, supplemented with soya. The other main crops were, in order of importance: sweet potato, sorghum, peas and maize. There was relatively little division of labour between men and women, even in agricultural production. Both worked in the fields, with division of tasks limited to men doing the seeding. Otherwise, women looked after the household and children while men did the heavier tasks, raised cattle, sheep and goats, and did some part-time craft work. Until the abolition of ubuhake, in 1954, men had to give a considerable amount of time to serving their patrons, in labour and attendance.

There was a significant difference between the parts played by members of the Hutu and Tutsi castes in the processes of agricultural production which leads Maquet (1964, p.557) to write of them as "authentiques classes sociales". This definition of Hutu and Tutsi as "Social classes" has been accepted by other recent writers on Rwanda, Gravel (1968, p.21) and Lemarchand (1970, p.6 & p.478), though both stress that they do not accept that
these "social classes" were "economic classes" in Weber's sense (1970, p.405) or "classes" in either of the two senses which Marx uses (1962, p.334). But, as I will show, use of the term "social class" begs some important questions — in particular, that of the nature of the relationship between economic and status orders here. It is my intention in this chapter to trace the analytical relationship between "economic class" and "status group" — the two concepts submerged in "social class" — in Rwanda more fully than has either of these writers. It will be shown that while economic classes which cut across the Hutu/Tutsi status division were emerging in Rwanda, they did so too slowly to make this an overt theme of the political changes before Independence. Cultural changes occurred still more slowly, and the conflict of 1959-62 took place in terms of caste not class. Nevertheless, the emergence during the colonial period of an elite class (wholly recruited from the Tutsi caste) did affect the nature of political change in the decade before Independence, as they attempted to create an organization and the ideology and ritual to legitimate their position. To begin like previous writers by defining Hutu and Tutsi as social or economic classes, with a note that neither definition adequately fits the facts, would be to miss the significance of the interaction of developments in the status and economic orders. During the colonial period, important changes occurred in the nature of economic stratification within the Tutsi caste, so that it is essential in the explanation of political change that specification is made of the changed function of the ideological category "Tutsi", and of why it was retained in use — particularly as some Tutsi tried to abolish it formally in 1958 (see chapter 7).

When I refer to Hutu or Tutsi as a caste, it is in the specific sense used by Weber (1970, p.405)
"a closed status group. For all the obligations and barriers that membership in a status group entails also exist in a caste, in which they are intensified to the utmost degree".

Maquet argues that all Banyarwanda had access to land for agricultural production, but that cattle distribution was controlled by Tutsi. In his argument, cattle were a sort of capital, since a herd was both a saving and produced interest in the form of its offspring and "rent" in goods and services. Tutsi alone 'owned' the capital, only lending it out to Hutu. In return, Hutu supplied the Tutsi with food crops and labour services which freed them for military and governmental activities as a ruling class. In this model it is the Tutsi control of cattle as the supreme economic good through the ubuhake patron-client relationship that gives them power over the Hutu. Heusch (1966) argues the same, in a more historical framework,
i.e. that the Tutsi institutionalized in the ubuhake the supremacy they had acquired in the past by military conquest. However, I shall show that:

(1) economic factors were relatively insignificant in cattle transfers;
(2) Tutsi dominance did not derive from a monopoly of cattle ownership, i.e. it was not a primarily economic form of domination; (3) the Tutsi and Hutu castes were not also economic classes.

Elsewhere in the same article, Maquet indicates the true source of inequality between the two castes:

"Dans cette société où coexistaient deux strates de statut inégal, tout membre de la couche supérieure avait, indépendamment de sa situation personelle et de ses qualités individuelles, un pouvoir fort étendu d'infliger différents dommages à n'importe quel membre du niveau inférieur (p.556).

A member of the lower caste, a Hutu, could only obtain security through a patron in the higher caste, a Tutsi. The patron-client relationship took several forms in Rwanda, the most prominent of which was ubuhake. In the sociological literature on Rwanda, including Maquet's, ubuhake has usually been seen as in itself comprising the patron-client relationship, and as the source of inequality between the castes since Hutu accepted an inferior position, it is said, in order to obtain cattle. However, Gravel (1967, passim) has shown conclusively that cattle were not sought as ends in themselves but merely acted as "tokens" which recorded relationships having other ends in view.

Cattle had very little economic value in Rwanda, except in the last decade of colonial rule when they could be owned as private property; even then they were seen as primarily an economic good only by the few Tutsi who acquired large, viable herds in the reallocations after 1954. They were not draft animals, their meat yield was low (Gravel, 1968, pp 90-93) and according to the Ten-Year Plan (1951, p.417) only one cow in seven yielded milk at any one time. The economic value of cattle to a Hutu was much less than the value of the services he had to give in order to obtain them. I conclude that Gravel is correct in stating that

"the transfer of cows as an institution in Rwanda was a mechanism for recording relationships between various corporate groups normally represented by individuals" (1967, p.325)

Cattle were used to record relationships such as marriages, but their predominant use was in recording patron-client relationships.

The ubuhake relationship was initiated by the prospective client approaching his prospective patron, and serving a trial period for him (ubuhange), to prove his loyalty and obedience. For a Tutsi this might last one or two months; for a Hutu it was more usually two or three years.
(Bourgeois, 1958, p.5; Gravel, 1968, p.167). At the end of the trial period the new client (umugaragu) received a cow accepting the relationship (inke y’umunyafu) from his patron (shebujja). While a Hutu client served his patron with labour and agricultural tribute which provided the basis for the latter’s subsistence and more leisureed life-style, a Tutsi client served his patron with political support (see chapter 2). Cattle received by a Tutsi client were distinguished from those received by a Hutu (i.e., the relationships were distinguished), as ingabane and inkazibiti respectively.

The client had the rights of usufruct over the cow(s) he received. He could consume as he pleased: (1) milk (2) male cattle (3) cattle which died. He had the usufruct of any female offspring of the original cow(s) in milk or further transfers, but they remained at the patron’s disposal. A client could use the cow or its female offspring for his bridewealth. Until recent years only Tutsi gave cattle in bridewealth (Gravel, 1968, p.134). When the bridewealth cow was provided by the patron this gave him considerable control over his client’s marriage alliances (ibid, p.173; see chapter 2). A cow received by a client could be used to record a relationship in which he acted as ubuhake patron. This did not affect his clientage to the patron from whom he had obtained the cow.

The ubuhake could in theory be terminated by either party, and usually the failure of the other to fulfill his obligations was given as the reason. The client was, however, subject to the same pressures which had made him seek patronage in the first place. The patron was not subject to any sanctions, and he received back the cows given to record the ubuhake, plus any which had been born to them, and often plus all the rest of the client’s cows (see below). Despite Maquet’s description (1961, p.132) of how a client could avoid these problems, there is no direct evidence of the effectiveness of recourse to an army chief or other possible protectors. According to Maquet, the control of Tutsi patrons over any cattle possessed by Hutu increased during the colonial period, though we should note that he expresses this argument in speculative form (ibid). He claims that until the 1920s a patron who took back his cattle because an ubuhake relationship was being broken off had claims only on the original cows and their offspring. The client kept his (non-ubuhake) imbata cattle whether they were acquired before or after he had entered into the ubuhake relationship. However, in the late colonial period patrons were able to stake successful claims to all the cattle of a client, including imbata acquired before the relationship was entered into. Maquet’s explanation for this apparent change is that the administrative officials, the mwami
and the army chiefs, who had previously been available for appeals against this kind of extortion, had been undermined or abolished by the colonial administrations (see chapter 3). So the remaining administrative officials, who were the leading patrons, were no longer subject to restraint in their exploitation of Hutu and lower status (see chapter 2) Tutsi - the Tutsi bahozi or bitimpanza, whom Lemarchand calls the "lesser gentry" (1970, p. 130).

That such a change took place in the 1920s is essential to Maquet's argument about the traditional "balance" of the system (1961 passim), for if Hutu could not break off their relations with a patron and change to another without losing all their cattle, then the theoretical freedom of Hutu to manipulate competing individuals in the dominant caste and so prevent "over-exploitation" is effectively lost. It is more likely that at all times when there was a division of cattle at the end of an ubuhake relationship each side took as many cattle as possible. This is born out by the case reported by Gravel in Remera (see chapter 2). It is also clear in that case that, although the argument took place in terms of cattle, what was really in dispute was whether the ownership of a particular cow by a Hutu meant that he was the client of a Tutsi. Furthermore, even if a patron could not, normatively, lay claim to his client's imbata cattle, he could always claim that his client had failed in his obligations and demand recompense in the shape of some imbata cows as well as the return of his own inkazibiti. As I will show, only Tutsi effectively had recourse to powerful Tutsi patrons who might be willing to support their case (chapter 3). Hutu clients' chances were unaffected by the existence or otherwise of the traditional powers of the mwami or army chief.

Political protection by a patron centred on support of the client in lawsuits (kulengera). For Tutsi who took cases before the mwami it was essential to have a very high-ranking patron in accompaniment. Patrons of poor Tutsi and Hutu were also involved in paying their fines and compensation, or in gaining revenge for their murder either from the political authorities or by their own action (kumuhorera). A patron might give some economic assistance; for example, providing meat and milk for ritual occasions when the primary lineage was unable to do so, or hoes to a poor cultivator. He might help the surviving dependents of a dead client if there was no one else - this was normatively recognised in the concept of kumuremera. But none of these services was contractual, and their fulfillment by a patron depended on the political expediency of keeping the relationship alive.

Similarly the client's obligations were not absolutely fixed. But
a client had to observe certain expected behaviour, besides less formal gifts to ensure the moral obligation of the patron to give continuous protection. A client had to give personal service to his patron: giving his time (guwata igihe) to the patron's service, maintaining his household (kubaka inkike), and in the precolonial period accompanying him on military expeditions (kumutabaraho). Guwata igihe involved, for a Hutu, menial tasks requiring about half a day's labour in the patron's manor. For a Tutsi it involved supervisory tasks in the administration of the manor (Gravel, 1968, p. 164; chapter two). Tutsi also spent much time in attendance on their patron, amusing and advising him. There was thus a major difference between Hutu and Tutsi here, and it can be seen particularly well in the important service of kubaka inkike (which means maintaining the fabric of the patron's house and was thus a physical measure of whether the client fulfilled his obligations). Unlike Hutu, Tutsi never did such work themselves (until after 1954). They sent their Hutu servants to do it (ibid). Moreover, even after the formal abolition of labour services and dues in kind, patrons continued to demand the kubaka inkike because it was the main act of recognition by the clients. Gravel reports a court case on this subject in 1956 (ibid).

Ubuhake relationships were more stable than would appear from the discussions of their manipulation by clients. They often extended over more than one generation. A patron's heir inherited all the dead man's clients, so long as both sides agreed and the clients retained the cows. However, when the client died his heir was only recognised by the patron if he was suitable to him. If he was not, the patron could designate another man of the same lineage to succeed the dead man - both as his client, and as the lineage leader where this was applicable. Thus Tutsi patrons could control recruitment to Hutu leadership. It was not possible for a man to be the client of more than one patron. Gravel (1968) explains that a client might in theory send out one of his sons to find a different patron, stronger than his present one. But this tactic was rare, and open only to Tutsi in practice (pp. 166-7).

The relationship of the ubuhake institution and the political structure of Rwanda must now be considered. Cattle were passed up the latter, through the tribute system (see chapter 3), and passed down the former in recording patron-client ties. However, van der Meer (1969, p. 213) has argued that the role-relationships patron/client and Chief/subject were essentially different despite their interconnections. The chief and patron were almost invariably the same person because of the access which office gave to protective powers and to the cattle with which to signify patronage
Van der Meeren states that the main difference was that the *ubuhake* relationship could be ended, while the chief/subject tie could not (1969, p. 213). But the difficulties which faced a client who wished to change his patron (see above) usually forced him to take the same action as was available to him if he wanted to escape his chief: to move to another area. And at the level of abstraction at which it is said that a subject must always have a chief (ibid), it was no less true that in Rwanda a man always had to have a patron. The practical difficulties, even for a Tutsi, in attempting to change patrons is well illustrated by a case reported by Gravel (1968, p. 165) from the second half of the colonial period. A Tutsi refused allegiance to Rwambyogo, the hill chief of Remera. The latter forced him off the hill by "treating me like a Hutu", but he could not find another patron and returned to Remera. He had to give 1 cow to Rwambyogo to make peace, before becoming his client. It is probable that the ability to [transfer clientage!], which most writers assume guaranteed Hutu a certain freedom from exploitation, in fact refers to such situations where they were forced to transfer their clientage from an old hill chief who died or was dismissed or transferred, to his successor - i.e. transference was an expression of exploitation, not a guarantee against it.

Another difference is said to have been that *shebuja* and *umugaragu* were not mutually exclusive statuses (ibid, p. 214, Mair, 1961, pp. 322-323) and therefore cannot be used as the basis for an analysis of stratification in Rwanda society. But there were clear differences in the way in which the statuses were distributed and operated in the two major status categories, Tutsi clients were distinguished from Hutu clients both conceptually, in the different classifications of their ubuhake cattle, and their role-behaviour. And while Tutsi were both patrons and clients, Hutu were never patrons to Tutsi. In the north, Hutu *abakonde* were land patrons to Hutu clients (*abagererwa*) of different lineages. Apart from this, few Hutu were patrons even to each other in any sense except to members of own lineage (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 37). So although the terms *shebuja* and *umugaragu* did not designate distinct strata in the population, the social processes in which the empirical meanings of the terms were defined stressed the boundaries between the castes and their differential access to political power, which was the basis of patronship. For Hutu, patron and client were mutually exclusive statuses like those of chief and subject; for Tutsi, patron/client statuses were not mutually exclusive, and neither were the chief/
subject statuses. Within the Tutsi caste, nobles had a greater statistical possibility of becoming chiefs as well as subjects than the Tutsi b'imponge. But the exclusive difference here is that between Tutsi and Hutu, involving a different type of patron-client relationship in each case.

Several writers speak of the 'mutual advantage' which patron and client receive from their relationship, and go on deliberately to analyse this without concern for whether the benefits were unequal or not. In fact, by definition they must be unequal, and to ignore this is to present an inadequate picture of the relationship itself, and its place in processes of change. Everything which Maquet or van der Meer en says about the mutual advantages of patron and client must be set within a context of Tutsi military domination in which, as Gravel's definition of the ubuhake puts it,

"The patron grants protection (most often from himself as well as from other rapacious notables) and the client renders homage, paying services and goods according to his own station in life" (1968, p. 162)

The patron-client relationship provided political support in both directions, in a particular environment. In the struggle for power among noble Tutsi, they could not rely on the lineage alone — although, as we will see in chapter 2 they did try to mobilize kinship links informally — because the lineage was not localized, there was competition within the lineage, and support was required from a wider group if an individual was to be successful. In this situation, cattle were used to symbolize linkages ramifying through the whole society which may be considered sociologically as personal networks with a political exchange content (of, J. Clyde Mitchell, ed., 1969, pp. 20-22, 212) & (Mayer, A., 1966). Unlike Mayer's example, in which many different kinds of service passed out from the patron and only one kind passed in (political support of a very specific and limited kind, a vote), the noble Tutsi politician needed more permanent support of a diffuse kind. The linkages in his personal network needed to be as ritualised as those in a corporate group so that they were continuously ready to be mobilized and were always visible to potential rivals. This was achieved by the use of a very specific, institutionalized and symbolic kind of service passing outwards, i.e. cattle usufruct. The Rwanda politician who received cattle as a direct client of the mwami was able, by further transfers of cattle to record an extensive network through three or four links by the most efficient distribution of patronage. I suggest that it was the pressure to wards the most efficient use which both maintained the Tutsi status category as a mobilizable political force, and maintained the stability of the noble Tutsi ruling group over a long period despite their very strong competition
amongst themselves.

By 'most efficient distribution', I mean that the most powerful Tutsi politicians had in their "primary star" (Barnes, 1968 & 1969) the most powerful persons who were prepared to be clients. As I explained above, although 'patron' and 'client' were relative terms in the Tutsi category this did not lead to 'anomalies' in the power structure such as a man's patron also being the client of one of his own clients, as happened in feudal Europe in respect of fief-holding. The process of 'most efficient distribution' was thus repeated in the secondary and tertiary "zones" (ibid.) In empirical terms this means that a Tutsi chief would seek out as his clients those persons who already had the largest number of clients. The network could be very extensive and yet fairly "intense" (Mitchell, 1969) because the same symbols established the relationships throughout (i.e. cows,) and so directly linked the furthest client in the network to the patron in the middle by readily mobilizable ties.

In Rwanda there was also a clearcut-off point between Hutu and Tutsi in this political aspect of the total network. This came where a Tutsi pastoralist exchanged protection for the clientage services of a Hutu cultivator. The latter gave political support at the local-level of the hill, but his main services were the provision of consumption goods: and he usually retained the ubuhake cow for his own consumption purposes and could not use it to record clientage because he could not give protection. This clearly supports Gravel's argument that the transfer of cattle did not create clientage but was a token of the relationship created by power—for here the Hutu with a cow could not obtain clients by virtue of that fact alone (contrary to Mair, 1961, p.324), and so normally he had to use the cow for economic purposes as he did not have the power to act as a patron. It has been argued that Tutsi patrons did not demand much from their cultivator clients because they had many of them and could not store a surplus in produce (van der Meeren, 1969). But this ignores both the extensive redistribution made by the great patrons to their many Tutsi clients, and the situation of the Tutsi b'impange with only one or two clients. These 'lesser gentry' (see above) did not have direct access to consumption goods which went with political office, and so relied heavily on obtaining as much as possible from their clients, who were all Hutu.

For these reasons they were often felt by Hutu to be worse exploiters than the great patrons, and Bourgeois (1958, p.39) states that it was this category who tried hardest to maintain ubuhake relations after the abolition in 1954, and from whom Hutu were gladdest to escape. The patron-client relationship was fundamental to Tutsi domination for these reasons, not
because it was part of a system of 'balancing structures' or because of abstract or ideological mutual advantages which it brought to the Hutu as well as the Tutsi. Van der Meeren's remark that: "Because of the ubuhake system, the ruled participated in the power structure and this made for integration" (1969, p.218) begs a question of the nature of that participation or else must be taken to apply only to the Tutsi caste. For the ubuhake relationship was extremely important in maintaining the cohesion of the Tutsi in their position of privilege. It may not be possible to define them absolutely by the criterion of patronage but their differences from the Hutu in this respect are clear. The institution, and the symbolism of the pastoral way of life, enabled noble Tutsi to keep the allegiance of the majority of poor Tutsi even at the end of the colonial period. Basically, in relationships of patron-client, Hutu gave agricultural and labour tribute. Tutsi gave political support in either role.

Under colonial rule the noble Tutsi had less need of this extensive network of the army's support since political strategies were more oriented to obtaining the Germans' or Belgian's favour, and thus office. They came to want their herds for economic purposes. The lesser Tutsi however, still needed to maintain their contacts through ubuhake with politically powerful persons. Most Hutu wanted to dispose of their obligations, and while they still needed protection the main danger came from their own patrons (Gravel, 1968, p.162). For the colonial administrations reduced the chances of other Tutsi exploiting the Hutu, but recognised the right of the patron in ubuhake to demand services (ibid). As we have seen, the Hutu sought in ubuhake not cattle possession but security of their persons and land tenure. In so far as it is possible to write of an economic aspect of patron-client relations in Rwanda, it concerned the usufruct of land rather than cattle. A Hutu sought land or, more usually, confirmation of his right to that which he occupied and inherited, from the local hill chief. To retain security he had to pay tribute to (1) the mwami (ikoro tribute); (2) various categories of chiefs - see chapter three; (3) the hill chief or one of the latter's clients who had been granted limited political rights (amarembo) as a favour (Gravel, 1968, pp.160-161). It should be noted that the patron-client relationship here, between a Hutu, and, directly or indirectly, his local political chief does not necessarily involve the establishment of ubuhake ties. In other words, ubuhake was only one form of the patron-client relationship, which can be seen conclusively here to have derived from inequalities of political power. Except in some parts of the north and north-west which were still in process of being conquered by Tutsi from petty Hutu kings in 1900 (and gradually
in those areas too as the process was completed during colonial over-
rule, see chapter 3); only political chiefs could allocate land. Even
disputes within a Hutu lineage were formally decided by the Tutsi hill
chief. At a more general level, Tutsi militarily controlled Hutu access
to land. Vansina (1962, p. 57) mentions that the Tutsi conceived the
whole area under their military control as blocs of potential pasture
land on which there happened to be some Hutu cultivators, who could
supply tribute in labour and crops. All Hutu had a Tutsi patron in at
least this minimal sense. However, for any Hutu who could persuade
the Tutsi hill chief to take him as a client in return for political
support in struggles against other Hutu at hill level, there was consider-
able advantage in doing so — and this involved the recording of special
relationship by ubuhake cattle transfer: In fact, this is a rather
schematic description — direct or indirect ubuhake relations with the
hill chief were a political necessity if a man and his lineage were not
to fall behind their competitors. Except when a lineage had incurred
the hill chief's displeasure, or in a special circumstances like those in
Gravel's case-study (see chapter 2) when a Hutu lineage head tried —
and failed — to make himself independent under the colonial administra-
tion's protection, the head of each Hutu lineage had an ubuhake relation-
ship with the hill chief on behalf of the lineage (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 38)
Finally, it might be argued that land, if not cattle, monopoly made the
Tutsi an economic class. However, I will show that the right to distribute
land was an aspect of political office, which meant it could not be in-
herited or in any other way built up as an independent source of power —
i.e. it was not a 'capital' — and could not therefore give rise to
economic classes (Vansina, 1963, p. 354). This situation changed very
slowly during the second half of the colonial period, as an economic order
was differentiated out to a limited degree (see below).

Where the Tutsi had institutionalised their military control, there
were two kinds of land holdings: ibikingi (actual pasture) and amasambu
(agricultural) holdings. Hutu occupied the latter, though some might
keep cattle on their patrons' ibikingi. In both cases they had only
usufructuary rights. The differences between the two kinds of holding
were not so great as appears in a schematic presentation: much amasambu
was liable to become ibikingi during the dry season as Tutsi often had
rights to pasture on agricultural land (igisigati rights). But the
differences became important during the colonial period, when they were
'rationalised' by the Belgians.
Land was distributed, like cattle, from the mwami, who in theory owned it all (Wensin, 1963, p. 354). The whole of central and eastern Rwanda was divided among the direct clients of the mwami in ibikingi, symbolised by cow transfers. These direct clients received political rights (amarembo) in their ibikingi. Amarembo were rights over objects and labour (Gravel, 1968, pp. 160-161). The whole complex of these rights was available to the political chief. He could distribute the usufruct of this amarembo to his Tutsi clients. The mwami's direct clients were usually army chiefs, although some were hill chiefs or favourites directly chosen by the mwami. The army chiefs distributed ibikingi to their own direct clients, who were confirmed with the amarembo of office by the mwami. These were the ordinary hill chiefs, some of whom were also land or cattle chiefs. The areas ruled by hill chiefs were often called their ibikingi, as an alternative to the administrative term umusozio.

The hill chiefs used part of their ibikingi for their own cattle. They allocated parts of it that they did not use themselves in several ways. First, they gave pasture to Tutsi (i.e. ibikingi) who were kin or were their ubuhake clients.

Exceptions to this rule were few, and arose from the situation created when a hill-chief was transferred, dismissed or died. His clients might not wish to transfer clientage to his successor. But as the case I quoted above illustrates, the hill chief always had adequate force available to make his Tutsi subjects his clients (see also Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 37-38). His often the hill chief also transferred to his Tutsi client some of his labour and produce rights (i.e. amarembo) over the Hutu settled on part of his hill, such as the right to corvee labour (ubuletwa) and dues in agricultural goods (ibihunikwa). He continued to collect ikoro from such Hutu. Other poor Tutsi clients received only small ibikingi with few or no amarembo, and sometimes combined pastoral and agricultural activities. Before 1954, even such very poor Tutsi participated in exploitation of the Hutu as a whole, for they received privileged redistribution from their patron, who had expropriated part of the Hutu production in his capacity as hill chief, (see Academia Praha, 1968). Even after 1954, many Tutsi remained clients to powerful patrons, either by choice or the economic necessity of obtaining land.

In part this accounts for the solidarity of the Tutsi as a political group during the pre-Independence decade, and for the Hutu failure to discriminate
between noble Tutsi and Tutsi *b*limupangi - some of whom had no cattle by 1959, and lived by cultivation (Gravel, 1968, p. 74) - in their attack on the group as a whole from 1957 onwards.

Hutu clients were quite different from the poor Tutsi who supplemented their 'pastoral' income with agricultural production, in that they never received *ibikingi* holdings and always had to graze their cattle on their patron's *ibikingi*. Even the poorest Tutsi seemed to have security on his *ibikingi* until 1954, provided he fulfilled his *ubuhake* obligations. It is probable that the question of which cows a Tutsi patron claimed back from Hutu clients can be explained partly by the problematic status of a Hutu's *imbata* cattle which were grazing with his patron's herd. Inability to obtain *ibikingi* or *amarembo* distinguished Hutu absolutely from all Tutsi, who had access to such rights.

Secondly, the hill chief would allow Hutu to settle on part of his *umusozi* which was designated as agricultural land (*amasambu*). He gave these Hutu minimal protection unless the relationship was supplemented with an *ubuhake* agreement. He exercised full *amarembo* rights over them, and collected *ikoro* for the mwami.

The land tenure system in northern Rwanda was somewhat different except in so far as the Tutsi chiefs, imposed there in the late precolonial or early colonial periods, attempted to adapt it to the system of central Rwanda. They also tried to enforce much heavier obligations, notably *ubuletwa* and *ibihumikwa*, than had been paid there previously, and which included some which were only 'customary' in the eyes of the Belgians. (Lemarchand, 1966, p. 607). The more traditional *ubukonde* or *ingobylt* system was paralleled rather than replaced by the Tutsi clientage system (Pauwels, 1967, pp. 295-299; Lemarchand, 1970, p. 104). Thus a distinction was made between the 'traditional' clients (*abagererwa coutumiers*) of the 'traditional' Hutu rulers (*abakonde*) and the new clients of the Tutsi chief, who were called *abagererwa politiques*. The *abakonde* were heads of local Hutu ruling clans. They had allowed client clans and lineages the usufruct of their estates (*ubukonde*), and ideologically they were the first settlers of the land. They paid only nominal tribute to the mwami until Rwabugiri came on his great campaign in the 1880s (Pages, 1933, pp. 690-691). They and their clients were expelled from their holdings by the Tutsi political chiefs, who replaced them with *abagererwa politiques*. The expropriators and expropriated formed competing political groups between whom hostility broke out into violence in 1959 as a significant element in the northern beginnings to the Hutu revolt (ibid, p. 184).
The distinction between Hutu and Tutsi roles in patron-client relationships is thus clearer in rights concerning land than cattle, though the two are aspects of the same relationships. Like cattle transfers, transfers of rights in land symbolized certain power relationships; but at the point in the hierarchy of transfers at which a Tutsi patron transferred some rights to a Hutu cultivator, the economic element was more important than with cattle. As Maquet and Naigiziki state (1957, p. 355):

"le groupe Tutsi était parvenu à contrôler l'utilisation de la terre arable en sorte que les cultivateurs n'étaient plus que les tenanciers précaires de leurs champs".

This, rather than the ubuhake, was the economic institutionalization of Tutsi military power, mentioned by Heusch. Through their dependence on Tutsi for land, Hutu were forced to participate in the power structure in a subordinate position, having no autonomous sources of power.

The landlord/tenant relationship was essentially the same as those of chief/subject and cattle patron/client, in that all three represented different aspects of rule by noble Tutsi, supported by lesser Tutsi, through a monopoly of state power. A Tutsi's cattle patron was also his landlord, for as Gravel shows

"The benefice, land, was the measure of service and the cow recorded the grant of benefice" (ibid, p. 32).

He was also invariably the chief (see above). The ubuhake secured the Tutsi client both protection and favours from his patron; and the amarembo he received over his igikini land ensured his supply of consumption goods and labour from Hutu cultivators.

The land tenure system was officially reformed between 1930-1950, though much of it remained in informal use. Firstly, the Tutsi system was extended over the peripheral areas. In 1932 a decree prohibited further opening up of ubukonde on uncultivated ground, and so consolidated Tutsi control. In the same year, universal adult male taxation was introduced for the first time for ubukonde holders. Hutu continued to pay dues to amarembo holders as well as the tax.

Secondly, after the Second World War, Hutu were given security of tenure on their amasambu holdings. This did not entirely free them from obligations to the hillchief, aside from any ubuhake relations which were still legally enforceable, but it made it easier for them to resist illegal demands. Lemarchand (1970, p. 131) considers amasambu holders had de facto freehold tenure; but I suggest while this might have been a result in theory, in practice hill chiefs were able to continue
to demand services legally and illegally: the ubulatwa for example was not commuted for a money payment until 1949, and it is unlikely that it ceased immediately. The Hutu Manifesto of 1957 claimed it was still being demanded.

Thirdly, the ibikingi tenure system was "rationalised". In 1924 it had been decided to treat ibikingi holders as private landlords but, though ibikingi rights were abolished in 1929, nothing was done officially to enforce change until the abolition of ubuhake in 1954, and the old system continued to operate. But because of the conflicting claims, no such de facto peasant freehold (with qualifications) as had emerged on the amasambu land could be applied to ibikingi land. In the period between 1929 and 1954, the noble Tutsi were informally consolidating their position as great ibikingi holders through their control of, or access to, political office. When the ubuhake was abolished, Hutu and poor Tutsi were unable to find pasture for their now privately-owned cattle since it was all owned by their former patrons. They rarely had enough agricultural land to spare for pasture. They therefore sold their cattle to the landlords or, in return for the right to continue grazing their cattle on the ex-patron's private land, served him in whatever way he demanded. Lemarchand refers to this as a process of "reinfeudation" (1970, p.131). Tutsi landlords were thus in the late 1950s continuing to receive services from Hutu and poor Tutsi, and were benefiting by buying up cheaply the cattle which many ex-clients were forced to sell.

The introduction of cash in the colonial period was not extensive (see above). But it did alter the nature of the patron-client relationship. A cash value could now be put on the dues paid in labour and kind. At the same time, demand for these dues by chiefs increased in the peripheral areas which previously had escaped them. Increasingly, clients everywhere were less ready to pay; in 1941 the great Tutsi patrons complained of this to the mwami. Already, from about 1926, final divisions of cattle were taking place between patrons and clients, with the former often taking everything since he was the sole judge. In 1938 the Resident expressed the Administration's fear that the political order, which seemed to rest on the ubuhake might be undermined. From 1941 divisions were to be by equal shares, and the mwami's court soon took over their administration: for example, decreeing that the umurundo gift of a cow to a new chief should continued to be paid by clients. This situation clearly favoured the great patrons, and in 1945 they supported the mwami in his declaration of the abolition of the ubuhake institution for Jan. 1. 1946. The Resident postponed abolition until
after the Plan Decennal had been drawn up in 1950. When the Plan came, its provisions directly harmed the great patrons' interests. It aimed at de-stocking by about half, introducing price controls on cattle sales, and improving quality by enforced sale of unhealthy animals — and patrons had to replace any such animals their clients might lose. However, these measures were not put into effect: they were rejected by an extraordinary council of the great Tutsi patrons with the mwami. Instead the council proposed a free market in cattle and the dissolution of the **ubuhake**. The latter process was to give $\frac{1}{3}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$ of the cattle to the patron, depending on whether it was he who failed to fulfill his obligations, or the client. The Belgian Administration accepted these proposals. In 1952, the mwami decreed that no new **ubuhake** could be made, and in 1954 that the institution should be ended, according to certain conditions. Articles 2 and 3 of the 1954 decree (see Bourgeois, 1958, pp.12–14) established that the division should be made, if possible, by agreement between the two parties, but that if it was not then either of them could take the matter to court. Article 4 established that the division should be as follows: to the patron, $\frac{1}{3}$ if the umurundo had not been paid, $\frac{1}{2}$ if it had. This division gave a great advantage to the great patrons with many clients. They were able to build up viable and profitable herds from their shares. But the lesser Tutsi patrons with only a few herds with one or two cows stood to lose by the dissolution, as the services they received were still worth more than their share of the cattle. These lesser patrons often tried to avoid the dissolution as long as possible. Article 5 established that non-**ubuhake** cattle were to be excluded from the dissolution; otherwise the client's whole herd was to be divided. This left much room for dispute, and it seems that patrons were often able to have the excluded categories of cattle included in the division (Maquot and d'Hertefelt, 1959, p.29). The excluded categories were supposed to be registered by special tribunals, though these failed to recognize some traditional means of acquiring cattle outside **ubuhake**— such as bridewealth.

By December 31, 1956, there had been 80,000 divisions: 97.4% by agreement, 2.6% in court. Of the former, 40% were at the client's request, and 40.9% at the patrons'. But these figures underestimate the degree to which it was the clients who wanted the relationship ended, for the figures for the patrons includes those who introduced a very great number of cases, with each case counted. As I showed above, it was these great patrons who wanted **ubuhake** ended.
The division took place before a tribunal in each chiefdom. The herd was presented, each head of cattle valued, and the total divided by three or four (see above, Article 4). The client chose one animal. Then the patron made his first choice out of those that were left, and so on. At the end the discrepancy between the value of the share each man was entitled to and the value of the share he had taken was adjusted by a cash payment. This was immediate, with the cattle being auctioned off and the cash divided if the man could not pay.

In the areas longest dominated by Tutsi, 32%-70% of cattle had been shared out by 1957; in the peripheral areas only 13%-24%. This reflects the much greater proportion of imbata cattle in the latter areas, and the semi-nomadism of many Tutsi there. In so far as in the latter areas, ubuhake involved mainly Tutsi, it also indicates the degree to which Tutsi organization through patron-client ties were maintained.

For some Hutu the abolition of ubuhake meant the end of a major source of oppression. But for others, as we have seen, it was only the prelude to 'reinfeudation'. And for still others, who were clients of poor Tutsi 'lesser gentry' who profited more from the ubuhake than they would from private ownership of the cattle, it was very difficult to secure the dissolution, as their patrons employed effective delaying tactics (Bourgeois, 1958, pp.39-40). After the initial rush in 1954-55, there was a considerable fall-off in the rate of dissolution (ibid.) in 1956. Ubuhake clearly did not end immediately on its formal abolition, but the great patrons - who were also the great landowners (see above) - were able to 'recover' their herds of cattle.

The great landowners' desire to end the ubuhake did not presage an end to the political domination of the Tutsi as a caste. In the period after 1954 some of the great landowners, who were afraid of land reform on ibikingi land, as there had been on amasambu (see above), were among the least prepared to make political or symbolic concessions to the Hutu (see chapter 3). They wanted dissolution because they stood to gain the economic value of their land and cattle, which were being lost to the persons with usufruct. Subsidiary reasons were: (1) economic wealth was an increasingly important component of social status; (2) clients were increasingly losing the legal obligation to fulfill services; (3) cattle patronage was no longer the major criterion for political office. Kinship ties were still important, but were linked with educational achievement.

I began this chapter by criticising Maquet's analysis of the Hutu and
Tutsi as "authenti-ques classes sociales" on the grounds that, besides its inaccurate basis on Tutsi cattle ownership, this formulation hid the changing nature of the relationship between economic and status stratification, and of economic and status relationships within their analytically separable orders. That is to say that, in Rwanda the concept of "social class" begs more questions than it helps answer, for if Tutsi and Hutu were "social classes" they were not the same kind in 1959 that they were in 1900. A summary of the changes is now necessary.

Economic classes, in Weber's sense, cannot be isolated in precolonial Rwanda because of the absence of a market mechanism. Economic relations were determined by political rather than economic processes. The Tutsi constituted a political group or "estate" in Weber's terms, i.e. a "political association in which the means of administration are autonomously controlled, wholly or partly, by the dependent administrative staff", though in Rwanda the "patrimonial" lord, the mwami, had managed to keep the "decentralization of authority" to a minimum, and was nearer to "pure" than "decentralized" patrimonialism. (Weber, 1970, pp.81-82). In Rwanda the tension between the two types was represented by the two main factions at the mwami's court throughout the precolonial period: the favourites and the great Tutsi lineages. The economic context for such Tutsi rule was a type of basic organization which was, as Weber points out, very frequent in patrimonial systems (1964, p.354): the "budgetary unit of a lord, an oikos" (ibid, pp.229-231). "where needs are met wholly or primarily in kind in the form of contributions and compulsory services" (p.354).

and where the development of markets is obstructed. It is easy to recognise here the unit which Gravel described, referring to the hill chief's umusozoi as a "manor":

"The manor in Rwanda was characterised by a quasi total self-sufficiency. (except that)... in the eyes of the community (the hill-chief) was the representative of a centralized administration. Even in 1960 the amount of goods produced for market was minimal" (1965, p.324).

The hill chief was a member of the ruling estate, and Weber's analysis of the "financing" of such a group is relevant here:

"The most direct connection between the economic system and primarily non-economic corporate groups lies in the way in which they secure the means of carrying on their corporate activity as such. Permanent financing may be based on the existence of a productive organization under the direct control of the corporate group... (such) as an oikos or feudal domain (ibid, pp.310-312)

Directly or indirectly, all Tutsi belonged to a corporate group through the
patron-client system, which was merely symbolized by cattle transfers, and the substance of which was political protection. The political dominance of the Tutsi did not simply reflect their economic dominance, as Maquet claims, but was a prerequisite of it and itself the result of superior Tutsi organization. The Tutsi were a status group, the Hutu a status category defined by their masters (cf. Bailey, 1960).

During the colonial period, the introduction of private property in land altered these power relations. However, the process was de facto and unsystematic from its beginning, in about 1924, to its legal recognition in 1954, and in this period power relations altered little at the local level (Gravel, 1965, p. 323). The change came dramatically in the period after 1954 when the consequences of private property in land were realised. The corporateness of the Tutsi group was threatened, as only the nobles were recognised as Landowners and poor Tutsi faced the loss of their cattle, much of their land, and the few Hutu clients they might have by the ubuhake or their patron's amarambo gift. This would mean their loss of Tutsi status and, if the change had been fully realized, would have left only an elite class as Tutsi. However, such possible consequences were not fully realized by 1959 for three main reasons: (1) poor Tutsi continued to share a corporate interest in Tutsi status; (2) many of them had managed to avoid dissolution of their ubuhake relations by even that late date; (3) others were 'reinfeudated' — but we should note that these no longer had Hutu clients of their own or, legally, amarambo rights over them; they were more dependent than before on privileged treatment by the landlord to maintain their status. Often they had very few cattle and agriculture became their main occupation. By the end of the colonial period, the Tutsi were not a "social class" but a status group whose members were of two separate economic classes: landlords and tenants. The status group of nobles within the Tutsi caste had used its monopoly of political office to constitute itself as an economic class by de facto expropriation of other ibikingi claimants, as emerged in 1954. But expropriated Tutsi retained their ties of clientage to the landlord. For example, Chief Kamatari of Ruhengeri territoire still had, in April, 1959, 258 head of cattle which were leased to a dozen Tutsi subchiefs who were his clients (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 130n.). What Maquet's formulation hides is that most Tutsi were excluded from the politically dominant landlord class within that group. However, their misfortunes seemed to have been arbitrarily imposed by the Belgian authorities, apparently acting, as their
patrons' propaganda emphasized, in alliance with Hutu agitators (see chapter 7).

The Tutsi were maintained in their monopoly of office by the Belgians because they provided the most efficient means to maintain order. As administrative skills of a more modern kind came to be required the Tutsi monopoly was retained by the reservation to them of the necessary educational skills. Education was almost exclusively provided by the missions, which were overwhelmingly Catholic: until 1948, only Catholic schools qualified for government subsidies (van der Meeren, 1969,p.259). By the end of the first decade of colonial rule, during which it was mainly Hutu who joined the missions and took up the new roles as catechists and employees of the Europeans, Tutsi realized the advantages of the new religion. From then on, it was mainly Tutsi who became converted, and central Rwanda where Christianity spread, rather than the peripheral areas where the first missions were established, but where they had become associated with the colonial governments' suppression of local autonomy. The number of Hutu converts more than doubled after 1949, when it was announced that conversion would entail some exemption from corvee labour (ibid.); but the failure of the missions to attract them is reflected in the 1962 religious census: about 45% of the population were nominally Christian (37.5% Catholic; 7.5% Protestant) (ibid). Most of these were only nominally converted in order to obtain the educational facilities which were reserved to Christians. In 1958, when there were 160,000 children at primary school, only one such school was not run by missionaries. All three secondary schools were run by Catholics, and at least until 1956 academic education was obtainable only by joining the priesthood (Lemarchand, 1970,p.140); many left soon afterwards (Maquet, 1964,p.560)

Those educated to secondary level entered the colonial administration or such European private commercial enterprises as there were in Rwanda. Maquet considers them as becoming a new class of *évolus* or a *bourgeoisie noire*, since they were distinguished by their cash incomes and their more *western* life-styles from ordinary Tutsi and Hutu. However, they did not develop any class-consciousness, despite the efforts of the few Hutu among them to create it, such as the pamphlet by S.Naigiziki in 1954, justifying marriage between Hutu and Tutsi, which was suppressed by the mwami as revolutionary.

Most of the persons in this category were in fact Tutsi: in 1959 only 12% of the lower cadres of the colonial administration were Hutu (Lemarchand, 1970,p.125), and until the 1950s government policy virtually
excluded Hutu from post-primary education. Even in 1954, there were only 3 Banyarwanda Hutu at the main school for chiefs (5%), the Groupe Scolaire at Astrida (ibid, p.138). From the start the missions believed in Tutsi superiority possibly even more than the administration (ibid, p.73). By 1925 there were four government schools which had formally taken over the functions of the chiefs' courts in educating future chiefs, as at the Nyanza Ecole pour Fils de Chefs, and only Tutsi were admitted. In 1929 the Groupe Scolaire school at Astrida was founded, and became the main recruitment channel for chiefs as it was specifically designed for that purpose. In the immediate pre-Independence period the most conservative group of Tutsi chiefs, who would not even make ideological concessions to the Hutu or base their 'superiority' anew on possession of modern skills, were associated with education at Nyanza and Ruhengeri schools. The 'progressives' who were prepared for the changes, were often referred to as 'les anciens d'Astrida' or 'les Astridiens' (ibid, pp.134-135).

These schools also provided the Tutsi 88% of the colonial administrative cadres mentioned above — monopolizing the higher positions as 'secrétaires indigènes'. The result was that even at the end of 1959 (Nov.1), the Tutsi occupied 100% of the chiefships (4342 vacancies) and 549 of the 559 subchiefdoms. These Tutsi, through the mode of recruitment and use of their offices, were of the elite class of landlords.

In 1959, an elite class of Tutsi ruled a Hutu peasant class who occupied amasambu land in de facto freehold but still paid informal tribute intermittently and acknowledged the general patronage of the local subchief (see Gravel, 1965, passim). They also ruled Hutu and Tutsi peasants who were more fully and regularly dependent on the landlordship of the local subchief or chief, and could be loosely said to be 'reinfeudated'. Class divisions in the Tutsi category were overlaid by the continuance of patron-client ties.

Few Hutu were not simply of the peasant class. But the expansion of education in the 1950s (note: before 1955, even the facilities I have described above hardly existed; between 1950 and 1958 the number of teacher-training schools rose from 1 to 10, for example) and the return of labour migrants with enough cash to set up as petty traders, or with skills that, at least as a sideline, could command cash, did make some differentiation of roles possible (see chapter 7). It was only the most highly educated Hutu who made any impact on the political system before parties were formed in 1958, and whom I shall discuss here. I shall call
this group the Hutu 'intelligentsia' - not 'elite' as others have called them, for it is doubtful whether ordinary Hutu saw them as a reference group (cf. Southall 1966), and they were educated persons seeking professional occupations.

Most of the Hutu intelligentsia were educated at seminaries (see above), and the leaders of the Hutu movement were recruited mainly from those at Kabgaye and Nyakibanda. Until 1955 very few went on to the Groupe Scolaire at Astrida, or to the Centre Universitaire at Kisantu in the Congo. The first Hutu graduated from Kisantu in 1955, and there were only 18 Hutu enrollments at the Groupe Scolaire from 1945 to 1954 inclusive. However, by 1959 there were 143 Hutu there, and 279 Tutsi. The Hutu intelligentsia was thus extremely small, but increasingly qualified in the 1950's to compete with the Tutsi for higher administrative posts. The Tutsi retained their monopoly, and the Hutu could obtain only minor clerkships. Even in the Catholic church, which had radically revised its policy in the 1950's, all the higher African posts were occupied by Tutsi.

It seems to have been the process of rejection which made the Hutu intelligentsia revolutionary. For example, the first Hutu graduate of Kisantu was A. Makuaa, who later became President of the National Assembly in the PARMEHUTU government of the republic. When he returned to Rwanda in 1955, with a degree in political and administrative sciences, he was prepared to fit the pattern of the rare Hutu who joined the Tutsi (see chapter 3). He went first to pay

"a visit to Mwami Mutara to explore with him the possibility of employment in the administration. As was to be expected, his request was turned down" (Lemarchand, 1970, p.139).

He eventually became a typist at 750 Fr. per month (about £6). As Belgian policy changed rapidly, in 1957 he became an administrative assistant but still could not compete with less qualified Tutsi. Other Hutu intelligentsia members achieved positions from which they had more freedom of political action, as assistants to European Catholic leaders at a time when Catholic policy was changing rapidly to a pro-Hutu position, notably under the Apostolic Vicar from 1955, Mgr. Perraudin. Two of the seven signatories of the Hutu Manifesto were at some time his personal secretaries: G. Kayibanda, the future President of the Republic, and C. Mulindhabi, the future secretary-general of PARMEHUTU and Minister of Armed Forces. It was this category of Hutu intelligentsia who came together as the first self-conscious Hutu political group, to agitate against their exclusion from the Tutsi elite class.
CHAPTER TWO
THE SYMBOLISM OF INEQUALITY IN RWANDA
1. KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE

The institutions of kinship and marriage play an important part both in the maintenance of status group boundaries, by focusing moral relationships within particular categories of persons, and in breaking down those boundaries by providing ties which cross them. Such institutions provide the means by which political and economic groups can maintain their corporate activities against tendencies for individuals to lose sight of the common long term interests of the group in the hope of immediate and sectional gains (cf. Evans-Pritchard & Fortes, pp. 16-22). In highly stratified political systems, the organization of political and economic groups within the different strata will be formally different in certain ways - suited to the pursuit of power at the available level. In this chapter I shall relate the different forms of kinship and marriage in the different castes of Rwanda to the unequal distribution of power between them. At the same time it will be shown that there were also different status groups within the castes, though not cross-cutting them.

The Tutsi, Hutu and Twa status groups, which may be called castes (see chapter 1) were ranked in that order by Tutsi, with themselves highest. Ideologically, the largest descent category, the patriclan (ubwozo), contained members of each of these castes. However, the patriclan was not a corporate group: it was dispersed, non-exogamic and there was no observance of mutual obligations of even the most superficial kind, between those in different castes who used the same clan name (Maquet, 1961, p.48). Even within the caste, the clan was not a corporate group except in certain of the peripheral northern and western areas, like Bushuru, Buzuzo, Bukunsi and Mulera, where the Tutsi were very few in numbers and exercised only sporadic control over Hutu petty kings until installed there by German and Belgian military campaigns (Pauwels, 1967, p.259: see below). In Tutsi-dominated areas of central Rwanda and Gisaka the common clan name did not signify special relations between groups of Hutu and Tutsi, even at the local level. A map of the distribution of households in Remera, a Hill in Gisaka, shows that although Hutu of the same clan tend to cluster together, and Tutsi to do the same to a lesser extent, those in the different strata do not. I should point out that the reason for the cluster-
ing concerns the corporate activities of lineages and not the clan. Thus
in one example, we find that Hutu of the Abasindi clan are found mainly at
the top of the Hill, Tutsi of the same clan are found at the bottom. (Gravel
1968, p.39)

There were fifteen clans in Rwanda, according to Pauwels (1965, p.280).
Maquet (1961) gives thirteen, but his informants were taken almost entirely
from the central region, unlike Pauwels. Their main functions are best
seen as the delineation of status within the wider caste groups. Within
the Tutsi caste, the highest status was held by lineages of the royal clan,
Abanyiginya; secondly of the Abashambo and Abahondogo clans - which were
acknowledge as 'brothers' of the Abanyiginya, and could not provide Queen
Mothers; thirdly, of those clans which had provided Queen Mothers.

The most important of these was the Ababega clan, which had provided the
Queen Mother for four of the last six reigns of the pre-colonial period.
(Vansina, 1962, appendix; Pages, 1933, p.96). There seems to have been
a process of assimilation to Ababega status, since the other two clans
known to have provided Queen Mothers historically, the Abakono and Abaha,
both claimed to be Ababega segments. (Pauwels 1965, p.273). There were
three other clans claiming to have provided Queen Mothers in the early
period of the kingdom, the Abasinga, Abazigaba and Abagesera. Only the
last of these had provided a historical Queen Mother. The recognition of such
claims at any time would clearly depend on the clan's power. It is in
such terms that the explanation for the considerable differences in the
proportions of Tutsi claiming to belong to the different clans must be
sought, since Tutsi pursuing political power had to attach themselves to
high status clans. Thus d'Hertefelt & Coupez (1964, p.483), in discussing
the various uses of the category 'Abanyiginya', mention that it
could refer "to any rich and successful Tutsi elevated to the rank of the..
clan". Both the Abanyiginya and the Babega, the other most powerful clan
were over 90% Tutsi in membership. The three clans mentioned above as also
claiming high status through having provided Queen Mothers were over 90%
Hutu. (Pauwels, 1965 pp.260-262). This need not have prejudiced the caste
status of their Tutsi members, but it indicates their weakness as political
bases in the intra-caste competition. Competition for power took place
between the Tutsi lineages of the clans of highest status - as d'Hertefelt
says:

"Il semble que le strate proprement politique comprenait
anciennement quelques milliers d'individus...appartenant a
un nombre beaucoup plus restreint de lignages" (1960a, p.455).

It seems that in the immediate precocolonial period political office was
virtually monopolized by Tutsi lineages of seven clans - the Abanyiginya and its
'brothers', and the 'Ibikenda' clans (Abega, Abakono, Abaha and
Abagesera) who could provide Queen Mothers (see d'Hertefelt & Coupez, p.512) and I suggest that these were the 'noble' Tutsi to whom earlier writers referred - i.e. those who were not Tutsi b'imanga or bahozi. Nobility was attached to political office. (see below).

This is not to say that high status could not be achieved. Tutsi b'imanga were occasionally raised to power (d'Hertefelt, 1960a, p.455). M.C. Smith has also pointed out the difficulties of using the model of ascribed and achieved roles in a dichotomous way. (Smith, 1966). It is clear that even Hutu and Twa could be ennobled by appointment to political office (Pauwels, 1967, p.227). The precolonial mwami most concerned with centralizing the kingdom, Rwabugiri, is known to have appointed several Twa as chiefs in newly conquered and peripheral areas (see chapter 3). Pauwels gives an example of the Tutsi chief of Kingogo in the early Belgian period, who was said by his enemies to be lying in his claim to belong to the Babega clan, and whose children by Hutu mothers also claimed Babega clanship. Since the clan did not involve multiplex relations between its members, changes were relatively easy for Tutsi who built up their political and economic power by other means. But although we cannot speak of rigidly ascribed status delimiting those who might compete for political office, those whose 'noble' Tutsi status was actually ascribed were much better situated to manipulate the moral relations which were so important in that competition, and to acquire the necessary political skills by training at the courts of the mwami or the greater chiefs. 'Noble' Tutsi symbolized their higher status by avoiding commensality (see below) or marriage with the Tutsi b'imanga or bahozi, that is, the low status Tutsi. These were often suspected of having ennobled Hutu and Twa among their ancestors. (Pauwels, 1965, p.260). Such ideas were current enough in 1956 to be repeated by a European settler (see letter of M.A. Maus, 25/4/56, p. 14 R.P.)

The clan was only important as a status category among Tutsi, maintaining the boundary between the political elite and those who had some ideological claim as Tutsi to join it. Hutu and Twa were excluded by more general caste categories from competing for power at the level of the kingdom. At the level of competition between Hutu, the Hill, status was allocated to descent units according to different criteria - chiefly, length of time established there. Hutu political processes centred on gaining the favour of Tutsi patrons. Clan status was immaterial since Tutsi did not recognize any differences between Hutu of the different clans, not even of the royal clan. Only in those peripheral areas where the Tutsi did not have regular political control, mainly in the north and west, was the clan an important unit for Hutu. The dominant clans in some of these areas
claimed to be the first settlers, and had established petty kingdoms whose kings were called abahinza in the north and abami in the south-west. (see chapter 3). The ruling Abagesera clan of Bushuru, described by Pauwels, is one example. The clans of these areas were often localized groups involved in feud. The patron-client relationship was absent, except in so far as the 'first settlers' were able to secure recognition of their political authority from other clans in exchange for the right to settle. Even after the Tutsi had established their chiefs in these areas, backed by the colonial governments, they were unable fully to supplant the Hutu authorities who continued to function unofficially, (Pauwels, 1967, p.288). Lemarchand (1966a pp. 609-610) has even argued that in the peripheral areas the revolt against the Tutsi of 1959-62 was not the social revolution that it was in central Rwanda, but part of a longer pattern of rebellions against centralization in favour of local clan and lineage authorities. The clan here was clearly much more than the informal, interstitial (cf. Wolf, 1966 p.2) category in the political structure which it was in central Rwanda. But it involved only Hutu in its corporate activities.

The most corporate (c.f. Lewis, 1966p,109) descent group in Rwanda was the primary lineage (cf. Maquet, 1961) (insu, pl. amazu, in all Rwanda except Gisaka, where it was called umulyango, pl. imilyango - this is not to be confused with the central Rwandan secondary patrilineage of the same name). The different organizational forms of the insu in the different strata may be related to their unequal access to political power at different levels. These forms helped to maintain unequal relations, by limiting the organizational range of the lower strata. The term insu might be used for Hutu descent groupings of varying depth, tracing their links agnatically to a common ancestor, who was usually not more than four or five generations ascendant from the oldest living generation. This "transitory group about six generations deep" (Maquet, 1961) is usefully referred to as the "primary" lineage, since it was the smallest politico-jural unit. The context in which such terms as insu are used determines their meaning. Thus Gravel describes the primary lineage in Gisaka as being very shallow, of only three generations. The group thus formed is known as umulyango, and there is no group corresponding to the insu. However, Gravel mentions that the term umulyango can refer to a deep lineage, and has no great precision (1968, p.118) It seems that the unit to which Gravel is referring is a localized group, while that which Maquet describes is not - being rather the most immediate group which is politically significant in some way. The different processes of segmentation which Maquet and Gravel
describe for the two units support this argument. Gravel's umulyango segmented automatically with the growth of each new generation; Maquet's inzu segmented only if it was politically relevant to do so. As Maquet describes it, even if a political group descended from ancestor B decides to ignore its links with other persons through B's father A, the descendants of B's brothers might well continue to recognize A as their focal ancestor for several generations, i.e. as long as it is politically relevant. There is evidence in the case study, to be given below, that 'deep lineages could be of importance in political competition in Gisaka, since higher status and a certain amount of authority were allocated among Hutu to those lineages which could establish a claim to be longest settled on the Hill. This would require the retention in genealogies of politically significant focal ancestors, although these might not be the ones which a localized segment used in order to explain its diffuse corporate activities. Furthermore, Maquet's evidence for his description of the inzu relied heavily on Tutsi informants; and it is clear that Tutsi lineages were deeper than Hutu ones. Pauwels says that Hutu lineages could reach five or even six generations before segmenting but:

"Habituellement cepandant, surtout de nos jours, des scissions peuvent se produire au sein de la parentèle avant qu'elle ait atteint ce développement" (P;301, 1965)

For these reasons I suggest that the organization of primary Hutu lineages in central Rwanda (Maquet) and Gisaka (Gravel) was not essentially different as first appears. This is an important preliminary step in establishing that the form of Hutu lineage organization was determined by the distribution of power between the castes and helped to maintain that distribution. For central Rwanda and Gisaka were both areas where Tutsi control was best established and Tutsi were most numerous - though not, of course, more numerous than Hutu.

Three generations were conceptually important in the Hutu primary lineage, and indicate the ease with which ancestors were forgotten. An Ego referred to all males and females of his own generation as his abavandimwe, of his parents' as his ababyeyi, and of his children's as his abana, (Pauwels, 1965 p.313-315; Gravel, 1968, p.119). These terms referred to each generation as a group, within the primary lineage. There were certain role-expectations, stressing solidarity between members: economic co-operation was expected between males of the abavandimwe, and exchange of wives was recognized in the form of rights of access (ideologically, referring to the past) and first refusal of widows. The boundaries of the primary lineage was also symbolized by the joking relationships and avoidance between a person and the occupants of those roles in his ego-oriented kinship network which were not lineage members, i.e. those potentially hostile persons with whom co-operation was

The affairs dealt with by the primary lineage were of two main kinds; the internal allocation of economic resources; and the policies to be adopted in relation to patrons, political officials and other lineages. Communication of decisions took place through the lineage head. The latter, called umutware w'insu in central Rwanda, and umukungu in much of the north, did not stand in a simple administrative–hierarchical relationship to lineage members, although he did gain a certain amount of power from his intercalary position between the lineage and the state system. The lineage head was responsible for assigning individual contributions both to military service and the tax levied on each insu, with both functions enforceable by the political authorities. He was also responsible for representing lineage members in their dealings with outsiders, except in the case of criminals, whom he was supposed to turn over to the state. On the other hand, lineage members had several sanctions which they could operate against overbearing leaders. Succession to the position was allocated by the incumbent from amongst his sons, and was usually the eldest. The heir received his father's wooden stool, lances and bow; and also his wives, which he might marry himself or distribute among his abavandimwe. However, he had to be approved by the political authorities, and in cases where the lineage members themselves disapproved of the choice they could appeal to the patron of the dead man (see chapter 1). This sort of appeal was available in other circumstances, like dispute-settlement or the punishment of offenders, and severely limited the powers of lineage heads.

The organizational differences of Tutsi lineages from these patterns lay in the greater depth of Tutsi genealogies, with the relative unimportance of the shallow lineage. (My data in the next three paragraphs are found in Gravel, 1968, especially in chapter nine). Moreover, they had wider geographical connections, and were less oriented to economic co-operation. Here there were considerable status distinctions within the Tutsi caste, reflecting political and economic power. Poorer Tutsi lineages had little more genealogical depth or geographical spread than Hutu ones, which can be correlated with the need for economic co-operation and localized political concerns. On the other hand, there were certain noble Tutsi lineages of great genealogical depth, though still unsegmented. These did not function at the level of the Hill, being, rather, important in linking political officials at the mwami's court and scattered throughout the provinces. At this level genealogical depth established these lineages
as belonging to the higher status group among Tutsi, while the lack of segmentation reflects the control of the mwami over political appointments, with the goals competed for lying outside the lineage itself. The leaders of such lineages were those who held political office and the best opportunities for patronage, and the abaami did not weaken their position by allowing lineage heads to institutionalise any special claims for themselves. Furthermore, the use of these lineages as informal sources of support in the central political struggle for office meant that segmentation was not in anybody's interest, in these circumstances.

It is clear then that the advantages of maintaining as large a group as possible fell off among poor Tutsi, and still more so with Hutu lineages, when balanced against other factors. Tutsi competition for power required agnostic links to as many people as possible, in order to mobilize as much support as possible in intrigues and to increase the chances of ties with the most influential persons. Tutsi moved around the country much more than Hutu — with appointment to new offices, following their patrons, or visiting the mwami's court — and their life-style was adapted to these conditions so that lineage solidarity did not depend on economic cooperation to the same extent. These remarks apply more to noble Tutsi than to the Tutsi b'imanga. The inability of Hutu and poor Tutsi to organize extensive political groups was an important factor in their continued subjection, and was itself a function of the patron-client relationship which militated against allegiance to wider kinship groupings. In the northern areas where the ubuhake relationship was unknown, where the lineage often had extensive land holdings (ingobyi or ubukonde), and where the feud was uncontrolled by central political authorities until the second half of the colonial period, kinship groupings were much larger than in areas where the Tutsi dominated militarily (Lemarchand, 1966a, p.605).

But even at the level of the hill, there were considerable differences between Hutu and poor Tutsi life-styles. Within the lineage, the household (ruco) might be composed of various categories of persons, though typically it was made up of the nuclear family. In many cases there were also some of the father's brother's children. The members of Hutu lineages tended to live in contiguous households, and to cooperate economically. They also cooperated in groups of neighbouring lineages. Tutsi, on the other hand, settled around their patrons.

As Douglas has pointed out, women are the symbolic 'gates' of entry to many status groups (1966, p.144), and some form of endogamy is important in maintaining a status hierarchy. Marriage was not completely unknown between Tutsi and Hutu, and Maquet's bald statement that neither
would ever marry Twa must refer to ideology, since there are cases of politically successful Twa being accepted in about two generations as Tutsi (Pauwels, 1967, p.227). But such marriages were extremely rare, concerning only those who managed to dispose of their Twa status by the special favour of the mwami. Hutu and Tutsi gave different answers to Maquet (1961, appendix) as to whether marriages between the castes were frequent or not; Tutsi claimed that their so-called Hutu wives were in fact concubines. For Tutsi such marriages clearly involved a loss of prestige, and noble Tutsi avoided even those Tutsi clans which were suspected of contracting them (see above). Wealthy Tutsi patrons traditionally gave their sons "Hutu temporary concubines, wives or daughters of their clients" (Maquet, 1961, p.77). It is almost impossible to say to what extent the ideology of caste endogamy was breached pragmatically, except to say that the number of pragmatic exceptions never threatened to establish a new rule (cf. Bailey, 1969, pp 205-6). Such exceptions were overcome, if a Tutsi father was involved, by forgetting the mother's origins, provided the father was powerful enough to enforce this. If he was not powerful enough his children, and perhaps even himself, would be de-Tutsi-ized! (Gravel, 1968, p.23) by being treated as Hutu by the other Tutsi - in the same type of process as that described by Bailey (1969, p.98) in which caste-climbing in India through securing the services of an appropriate ritual specialist is foiled by the higher castes avoiding the latter. On the other hand, some abaami found it expedient to appoint a few Hutu and Twa chiefs during the nineteenth century (Pages 1933), and these had the power therefore to 'Tutsi-ize' themselves by acting as patrons to Tutsi. Often they consolidated this position by taking Tutsi wives, if they could (Pauwels 1967 p.227). Well-educated Hutu sometimes attempted this strategy in the late colonial period (see chapter 1), but these cases were very rare as well. Caste endogamy remained in practice as well as ideology. It is significant that Gravel, who surveyed several aspects of marriage in Remera hill, does not attempt to investigate incidence of intercaste marriage, and seemingly assumes it did not occur in Remera at least, except in the one case mentioned below.

There were differential marriage patterns in Remera, correlating with caste membership. This may be ascribed to the differing functions of marriage alliances at the levels of political competition available to the different castes. Hutu lineages could participate in politics only at hill level (see below), and were concerned with marriage alliances in their mutual competition for the hill chief's favour - to make themselves
more attractive as clients. In the colonial period, there was an attempt at Remera (1939-1958) to unite the Hutu lineages against the Tutsi hill chief. Even though the latter could not use formal sanctions the attempt failed (see below), and there is no direct evidence for Gravel's assertion (1968, p.179) that this strategy sometimes succeeded in the precolonial period and led to some Hutu becoming Tutsi. The suspected examples of caste-climbing concern the peripheral regions where there were few Tutsi, and where the abaami sometimes exploited Hutu clan rivalries rather than import a Tutsi governor (cf. Lemarchand, 1970, p.104). Gravel also ignores the control of appointment exercised by the mwami.

Poor Tutsi lineages living on a Hill avoided marriages with Hutu, seeking to maintain the status boundaries which gave them a privileged access to political and economic patronage. The political considerations in their marriages were much more oriented to patron-client relationships than to the lineage alliances sought by Hutu. This is seen in the notable differences between Hutu and Tutsi in the categories of persons who sought the bride on their behalf, and made the betrothal gifts of calabashes of beer. In Gravel's survey of 40 Hutu and 19 Tutsi first marriages (p.134) 85% of the former had their brides sought out by their fathers, and only 5% by their patron. In contrast, 37% of the Tutsi had their brides sought out by their fathers, and another 37% by their patrons. Even more significantly, it is clear from another survey of "The distribution of 182 Remera wives according to class and distance from their place of origin" (p.135), that Hutu seek marriage alliances locally, while a much greater proportion of Tutsi seek theirs in a wider area offering better political rewards. Thus in the category of wives from contiguous hills we find 72.1% of Hutu and 31.6% of Tutsi; in the category of those from 2-14 miles away, there were 26.6% of Hutu and 18.8% of Tutsi; in the category from over 15 miles away, there were 30% of Tutsi and only 5.6% of Hutu. Because of the number of Tutsi wives from unlocated hills, i.e. not contiguous at least, this is probably an underestimation of the proportion of Tutsi seeking marriages beyond 15 miles away, by about 10% (Gravel, p.135). That is; to say, not only did Tutsi marry at a greater distance than Hutu but 'noble' Tutsi also tended to marry further away than the Bahodzi. Whether this is true or not, it is clear that as late as 1960 there were significant differences between the castes in the patterns of marriage alliances which they sought to establish, and these may be related to the levels at which political goals were available to them. At the same time the marriage patterns themselves helped to maintain that distribution of power.
Marriages followed the acceptance of betrothal gifts or elopement. Bridewealth was usually paid after the birth of the first child, consisting of hoes — in the case of most Hutu, or cloths or a cow in the case of most Tutsi. Following the end of the ubuhake relationship in the 1950s, more Hutu had access to cows and tended to pay bridewealth in this form. "Divorce is easy" (Gravel 1968, p.131), and only the first marriage had the minimal degree of ritual described above. Often the bridewealth was not repaid, when the divorce took place after the payments had been completed, and the father's lineage retained possession of the children. The mother's lineage only retained the children in the case of elopements not ratified by the lineage councils. Two factors are relevant to stratification here. Firstly, "The rate of divorce among the Hutu seems to be much higher than among the Tutsi" (ibid, p.132), and most Hutu made several marriages in a lifetime. Gravel found that the reasons for divorce were mostly 'personal'. However, we cannot presume that Hutu found simply less personal satisfaction in their marriages than Tutsi. Tutsi marriages were involved in political alliances at higher levels than Hutu, as we saw above, and it is likely that: (1) more weight was on each individual marriage to maintain an alliance; (2) political alliances at these levels were decided rather less by economic factors involved in a marriage. Secondly, within the Tutsi category the status of the man who provided the betrothal gift was in inverse relation to the number of calabashes he gave, so that the hill chief of Remera gave only one. This is one example of the way in which exchange in Rwanda was unbalanced, stressing status differences without even the redistributive effects seen, for example, the *hpaga* payment among the Kachin of Highland Burma (Leach, 1954, p.154). It seems also that relations between marriage allies within the Tutsi category were more hierarchical than those between Hutu, a fact which corresponds to the greater importance of the patron-client tie among the former.

A Hutu was dependent on his lineage for his power and status. The weaker his lineage and his position within it, the less valuable he was as a potential client to a Tutsi patron, and the less likely it was that he could use the women of the lineage to create advantageous marriage alliances. At the level of the hill, Tutsi did not depend so heavily on their lineages, as their tendency to marry at a distance illustrates. Their status depended on their capacity to act as patrons, and this in turn depended on their relations of clientage to patrons outside the hill. For Hutu this relationship was possible only in the exceptional cases where there were
no Tutsi competitors - in some peripheral areas of northern and western Rwanda; or where Hutu became absorbed as Tutsi, through political office. Where Tutsi had firm military control as in Remera, these possibilities were precluded. How a Hutu in even the most advantageous circumstances could not establish a power base through kinship and marriage to challenge Tutsi powers of patronage is clear from the following case (Gravel, 1968, chapter XII).

The Abavuna lineage had a higher status than other Hutu lineages in Remera, being at least ideologically one of the longest established on the Hill (ibid, p.170). The lineage head in 1939, A, was well placed to capitalize on this prestige since (1) he had a strong core of supporters, composed of two brothers and three matrilateral allies, (2) his seven surviving children were all daughters, (3) he possessed cattle in his own right as spoils of war (umuheto). His father, however, was a client of the hill chief of Remera. When his father died, A tried to free himself from this relationship by refusing to acknowledge that the hill chief had given his father a cow, and he had to be forced to admit it in a court case. Following this A consolidated his support among his matrilateral allies by marrying one of his own, and one of his brother's, daughters to them. He then married three more daughters to three different lineages of high status among Hutu (expressed in terms of length of residence in Remera), which had themselves avoided marriage alliances with "long-standing, faithful" (ibid, p.173) clients of the hill chief. Ties between these high status lineages were strengthened by further inter-marriages in the next generation. In the meantime, the hill chief had been succeeded by his son, Rwamabyogo. A's prestige had reached a height at which he was able to win away by marriage alliances the loyalty of two of Rwamabyogo's Hutu clients, one of whom (K) had the important position for a Hutu of being his patron's cowkeeper. A forced K to give up this position by threatening to take his daughter away.

Against this growing threat to his prestige, Rwamabyogo manipulated his patronage ties to great effect. First he secured influence in the Abavuna lineage, and broke its corporate opposition to himself by tricking A into giving him a daughter in marriage. A was trying to secure an alliance with another high status lineage by marrying his daughter to a man who also happened to be Rwamabyogo's client, and the hill chief paid the bridewealth. Within a few days the husband died in suspicious circumstances (ibid, p.173) and Rwamabyogo exercised his right, as the payer of her bridewealth, to marry the widow, despite the fact that she
was a Hutu. This manoeuvre illustrates the extent to which A represented a threat. Secondly, he prevented his cowkeeper from getting a cow to pay the bridewealth for A's daughter by becoming another Tutsi's client. The latter was Rwamabyogo's client, and it was twice upheld in court that Rwamabyogo as patron had the first claim on the cow. Thirdly, having broken the solidarity of the Abavuna lineage, he secured as his client A's brother's eldest son, who was the probable (later, the actual) heir to the lineage headship. When this man supported Rwamabyogo against A in an important court case it was clear that the Abavuna lineage was no longer a viable support for A's attempt to secure autonomy from Tutsi patronage. Fourthly, the court case itself was the result of Rwamabyogo's inheriting his father's claim to be A's patron, which A had acknowledged in the 1939 court case, and deciding to pursue it. In his conclusion to this case, Gravel remarks that Hutu lineages must have been able to limit Tutsi power by this process of building marriage alliances. I suggest that on the contrary, the inability of Hutu to create extensive patron-client ties, and their reliance on ties of kinship and marriage, ensured that they were unable to limit Tutsi power. Gravel also says: "A play for power was necessary to reach some sort of equilibrium... such incipient 'rebels' among the Hutu lineages appeared regularly. It is possible that the history of their resistance overlapped each other in time, in order that a balance of power should be kept within the community". Such teleological arguments are redundant, as Hutu attempts to avoid Tutsi exploitation were limited by their lack of resources to organization through kinship and marriage, which were vulnerable to patron-client organization. As a Hutu proverb said: "let a Tutsi into your house and he will soon crowd you out". (ibid, p.122).

Besides the primary lineage, there was also a secondary patrilineage called umulyango. It should not be confused with the primary lineage of the same name in Gisaka. It was the result of the flexibility in the system of descent which I described above. It was a group tracing agnatic relationship through an ancestor ascendant from the recognized inzu ancestor, and who had been, or might have been, an inzu ancestor. It was again subject to the process of forgetting ancestors as they no longer were relevant to sought relationships. It enabled wider groups than the inzu to establish these links if necessary, though it had less scope in terms of corporate obligations (Maquet, 1961).

The Tutsi umulyango was a functioning entity, with considerable authority, while the Hutu seldom organized in this way. It was particularly important among noble Tutsi because of the influence it gave at
court. Among Hutu, at least by 1916 when the Belgians took over the colonial administration, the authority of umulyango heads varied inversely with the effectiveness of Tutsi occupation. Particularly in areas like Bushiru where Hutu abahinza ruled, the umulyango head was an important figure. But after the Belgian military forces installed Tutsi administrators in these areas, the office was reduced to a dwindling 'moral' authority. (Pauwels, 1965, p.320).
2: IDEOLOGY AND RITUAL IN RWANDA
(a) STATUS IDEOLOGY AND RITUAL

Maquet has provided data on Tutsi status ideology in 1952 which indicate the symbolic lines on which the differentiation of status groups was made in Rwanda, even if we cannot accept his conclusion that individual Hutu and Twa necessarily accepted the Tutsi evaluation of their position (1961, passim; cf. Berreman, 1961; Gravel, 1968, pp. 191-2). I have already indicated that Tutsi political domination did not depend on their monopolizing cattle possession and avoiding cultivation. The occupational distinction was valid only in ideology, although this does not necessarily reduce its significance.

Tutsi control of cattle was stressed as a symbol of their superior life-styles as patrons, not as a mundane need. They claimed to consume only liquid foods, mainly milk, which they held to be proof that they were a different, 'purer' sort of 'race' from Hutu and Twa. Amidst all the references in the royal ritual complex to liquid foods, reference to basic solid food occurs only once (d'Hertefelt & Coupez, p. 17). There were clear stereotypes of the Hutu and Twa as phenomenally greedy, and generally governed by the vulgar emotions (see below). These corresponded to the physical stereotypes — the Twa were seen as ape-like, and the Hutu as somewhere between this and the Tutsi aesthetic ideal of slenderness and light skin-colour — and the moral stereotypes. The few Hutu in Maquet's survey agreed with the Tutsi that a Hutu educated as a Tutsi might improve his character somewhat, but could never attain equality because the differences were 'natural! The ideology of dietary differences had the latent function of integrating the Tutsi caste: 'noble' Tutsi avoided commensality with the bahozi, but all were ritually concerned in efforts to avoid 'impurities' in milk — which were believed to harm the cattle. The control of cattle, and the ritualized pastoral lifestyle, were a sort of 'open secret' (cf. Worsley, 1957) of Tutsi superiority. There were magical sanctions to prevent the Hutu servants from revealing that their masters sometimes ate solid food.

The virtual endogamy of each of the 'racial' categories, with its clear implications for status distinction (see above) was supported
by a functionalistic schema of ideal marriage partners in each category which shows the Tutsi view of a 'good Hutu' or a 'good Twa'. For a Tutsi, the ideal man was rich in cattle and good at political intrigue; the women were good at commanding servants. A Hutu man should be a good labourer and client; a woman should be a hard worker in the fields. A Twa man should be a good craftsman, hunter or bufoon, liked by a Tutsi patron; women should be skilled potters.

Distinct life-styles were indoctrinated from an early age, and the behaviour of other status categories could not be easily acquired as in precolonial Buganda. The Tutsi were educated by specialists for a superior, leisurely life at the court of the mwami or one of his chiefs. This system continued officially until after the Second World War, and still went on surreptitiously in 1960 (Gravel, 1965, p.326). The ideal picture of a Tutsi man was composed of military courage; the quality of manhood, which meant trustworthiness, moral courage, generosity to friends and to the poor Tutsi; and self-mastery, in contrast to the vulgar Hutu and Twa. The latter learned their more mundane skills within the family.

Gravel provides data on ritual behaviour concerned with status distinction, in his description of "Life on the Manor in Gisaka" (1965). Although he writes here of 'nobles' rather than 'Tutsi', it is clear, as he says explicitly in (1968, p.21), that he uses these terms interchangably. The hill-chief in Rwanda is likened by Gravel to a medieval lord of the manor: the lord and the surrounding community were bound together under the former's personal dominance:

"The manor in Rwanda was characterised by a quasi-total self-sufficiency, in the sense that it could subsist alone rather than in the sense that it did. The manor house was the centre of activities, and the fortunes of the community were made and undone here, headed and arbitrated by the lord-chieflet. In a very real sense, therefore, the chieflet, as head of the manor, was the community, and represented the community to the world at large. But in the eyes of the community he was also the representative of a centralized administration" (1965, p.324)

Thus the social relationships of the community were focused on the hill-chief's 'manor'-court. Frequent visits had to be paid there, and 'gifts' brought to him. By 1960, when Gravel was there, many 'gifts' and compulsory services were officially abolished:

"Nevertheless, there were 'gifts' given sub rosa and very widely - the still not forbidden gift of banana wine" (ibid, p.325)

The hill-chief used part of these 'gifts' for his own tribute to his patron part to entertain his clients and part for his own consumption. Even after
the abolition of clientage, some Tutsi tried to enforce purely symbolic
duties, acknowledging their superiority, by taking defaulting Hutu
clients to court (Gravel, 1968, pp. 180-181).

The hill-chief determined status-ranking within his community, and
the daily processes of his administration reinforced and indoctrinated
the Tutsi status ideology. Representatives of the lineages of the
community competed at his court for his favour. As his clients they
were allocated duties according to their status and rank. Hutu clients
provided manual labour such as guard duties and going on errands, besides
providing 'gifts'. Tutsi clients served the hill-chief more by way
of accompaniment, political advice and discussion. They formed a
retinue as the hill-chief carried out his daily administrative tasks,
such as dispute settlement. Usually they held the court offices of
higher prestige (and thereby acknowledged their patron's superiority),
and this was one way the Tutsi b'imanga were attached to noble Tutsi.
All Tutsi lineages on a hill were attached to the lord in what Gravel
(1968, p. 158) calls the "nuclear feudal cluster". In Remera, the major-
domo who ran the administration of the hill-chief's domain was a poor
Tutsi client of his (ibid., p. 327), though here the client supervising
the distribution of land among Hutu was himself a Hutu.

The hill-chief held court each evening, and was attended by both
Tutsi and Hutu household heads. The ritualised behaviour of paying court
indoctrinated the ideology of the status hierarchy. The chief was
usually the only man seated on a chair; the others sat on the floor.
He could only be addressed in an extremely flattering manner, and men
gained favour by their skill in this art. The flattery was very formal
and "each client tried to outdo the others in telling of his devotion
and fidelity" (ibid., p. 329). It usually followed a period in which
Tutsi clients advertised themselves, each reciting in turn their ibyivugo
- poems with special rules and vocabulary which they had composed them-
selves telling of their bravery, skill in intrigue, and past successes.
(cf. Vansina, 1962, p. 33). Joking was a significant element in relations
between castes present, as one might expect between potentially hostile
persons (cf. Mitchell, 1956). Twas were always present as court enter-
tainers, and there were no limits to the insults and home truths they
might make to their patrons. Occasionally there was joking between
Hutu and Tutsi, in which the latter were accused of tyranny and greed.
But these joking relationships were much more difficult than those with
the Twa: there was constant emphasis on the fact that they were joking. Normally it was unthinkable that a Hutu should insult a Tutsi. (Gravel, 1965, p.328)

(b) RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY AND RITUAL

All Banyarwanda recognised a creator god, Imaana, who had entrusted Rwanda to the mwami. It is significant that there was no cult organisation devoted to Imaana — the name referred more usually to the flow of mystical life-force than to any personification — so belief in the creator god did not offer any opportunity to challenge the mwami in his name. On the contrary, the belief helped to legitimate the mwami's rule because he was held to be the supreme possessor of Imaana, even by many of the Hutu of the peripheral areas. According to d'Hertefelt and Coupez:

"le rituel royal n'est autre chose que la description des techniques qui permettant d'en diriger les effets bénéfiques sur le pays entier" (1964, p.460)

The ideologies and ritual legitimating the rule of the mwami had an essentially religious content; by contrast, religious symbolism was only one relatively minor element in the legitimation of the kabaka's rule in Buganda. Extensive royal ritual activity was regularly necessary to maintain the religious welfare of Rwanda; this both required the participation of the mwami as a guarantee of cosmic order in times of danger, and gave him the religious power on which his position partly depended. (ibid, p.3) The significance of these religious rituals was shown by their frequency and regularity, in strong contrast to their virtual absence in Buganda. Moreover, the religious welfare of the whole country was identified with that of the mwami as its incarnation: the death of the mwami was referred to as a "return to normality" because the health of the country was believed to decline as did that of an aging mwami (ibid, p.4).

Most of the royal rituals were highly esoteric, both in knowledge of the forms to be followed and in performance. The abiru who possessed this knowledge were from the noble Tutsi lineages, and could only be replaced by others of the same lineage. Each mwiru had knowledge of only a fragment of the whole complex, except that, in order to prevent this giving each one a strong lever of persuasion, the four most important abiru knew the whole ritual complex. Since the lineages they represented were in competition for political office, it was virtually impossible for the abiru to unite in opposition to the mwami and control
him through their monopoly of special religious powers. On the other hand
the necessity for the performance of the rituals united the competing
lineages under the mwami. The abiru lived under threat of extreme material
and metaphysical sanctions if they forgot or divulged any of their secret
knowledge. They carried out their rites without public witness, and popular
participation was limited to ritual acknowledgement of the fact that rites
were taking place. The religious powers of the mwami and his specialists
remained mysterious and absolute. The population therefore depended wholly
on the mwami as the source of cosmic welfare. For instance, a crucial
periodic ritual indoctrinated this dependence of the whole kingdom. It
took place at a time when maximum danger was about to be faced, just before
the start of the dry season, when food was at its scarcest and disease at
its height. The ritual lasted from the disappearance of the moon in May
(gicuraasi) until the reappearance of the new moon. In this period, all
other ritual activity, including the playing of drums and marriages, was
forbidden throughout the kingdom. After the mwami had performed his secret
ritual and the new moon appeared, the renewal of life was celebrated and
drums were played all over Rwanda to echo the royal drums. As the ritual
instructions say:

"A ce moment il n'est personne/qui n'ait de bière dans le
Rwanda/On dit: 'Efforcez-vous d'aller voir les cérémonies de
sicuraasi,/de peur que cette lune ne reste dans vos enclos"'
(ibid, p.75)

This period of maximum ideological unity was also the time for the collection
of important taxes.

D'Hertefelt (1964) distinguishes five main themes in the Rwandan
myths or origin. Firstly, the Tutsi are of divine origin, being
descended from the two sons (Kigwa and Mutuutsi) created for a sterile
goddess by Imaana. Secondly, unalterable natural differences existed between
Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. These were recounted in many myths in which stereotypes
of each caste were established (see above). In one myth, Imaana gave a pot
of milk to a member of each category to guard for the night. The Twa showed
his gluttony by drinking his pot. The Hutu showed his incapacity and
clumsiness by falling asleep and knocking his pot over. Only the Tutsi
carried out this task successfully, and for this reason was put in command
of the others by Imaana. It is unlikely that Hutu told this type of myth
to each other. There was a thriving popular Hutu literature in which
Tutsi domination was recognised and satirised (Maquet, 1964, p.559).
However, Hutu probably often heard such myths at their patron's courts,
where the clear ritualization of existing inequalities of power would
preclude total cynicism - which may account for the 'resignation' which
d'Hertefelt detects in popular Hutu literature (1960b, p.118).
Thirdly, the Tutsi brought civilization to the Hutu and Twa, who then
recognised their right to rule over them. Either Kigwa and Mutuutsi or Gihanga, the mythical founder of the royal dynasty, were said to have brought fire, iron, cattle, pottery and the arts of hunting, agriculture and pastoralism to Rwanda. Fourthly, the myth of Kigwa states that revolt against the Tutsi would bring down divine wrath on the Hutu. Fifthly, in the elaborated dynastic poems of the abami they were presented as the eyes and face of Imaana in Rwanda, metaphorically or as an aspect of Imaana himself. Some of these myths functioned in uniting the Tutsi group under the mwami, and were unknown in the general population; others, particularly those concerning inequality between the categories and the supreme goodness of the mwami, were well-known by all and used by Tutsi conservatives as an argument against caste equality in 1958 (see chapter 7).

It has been argued that the fact that a Christian was made mwami in 1931, by non-traditional means, and that he did not initially keep up the ritual practices, undermined the kingship and the ideology it was associated with (van der Meeren, 1969). However, we should remember that (1) mass participation in religious rites extended to little more than recognition of the mwami's activities, except in the case of the cult of Kubandwa (see below). I should note briefly that the propitiation of malevolent ancestors involved no corporate obligations between kin (Gravel, 1968, pp.144-5), and was sought instead from local or national heroes, the imandwa (Pauwels, 1957, p.112) by individuals through diviners. (2) The symbolism of kingship and the special education of young Tutsi were retained in the 1950s, the mwami emphasized strongly his role as channel of the life-force, and Christian symbolism did not at all supplant traditional royal symbolism. (d'Hertefelt, 1964). (3) The ideological efforts of Tutsi after 1945, and of one Hutu party in 1958, centred on encouraging belief in the mwami as the 'father of Rwanda' (d'Hertefelt, 1960b). (4) The main means of communication of the ideology of the Tutsi and the royal lineage within the caste was the cult of Kubandwa, particularly of Ryangombwe (Vidal, 1967), not the esoteric rites themselves.

Ryangombwe was by far the most famous of the imandwa, and his cult was joined by most people (Maquet, 1961). They were believed to go to a special place when they died, where they lived much more pleasantly than other spirits. Heusch (1966,p.172) argues that the myth of Ryangombwe, and the process of initiation, provided a periodic mystical negation of the stratified social order. The argument is that it may have acted as a safety-valve for accumulated hostility between the castes (cf. Turner, 1969). Thus, in the myth, Ryangombwe's followers included Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, and they were so loyal that they could not bear to be parted from him even in death, committing suicide when he was killed.
Initiation in the cult involved the use of phrases like 'We are all Twa' and 'I don't like cattle' (Arnoux, 1913, p.765). The validity of Heusch's argument is difficult to test. Within the context of Banyarwanda cosmology, the statements reported by Arnoux might well simply indicate the liminality of the ritual of initiation (cf. Turner, 1969). Vidal has argued that the cult of Kubandwa was the means by which royal ideology was popularized— not by the 'word' of the royal dynastic secret rites, but by contact with the 'shrine' (cf. Gellner, 1969, pp.7-8). Royal ritual remained secret but it was 'copied' in the initiation rites of the cult (Vidal, 1967, pp. 153-5). Vidal disputes Heusch's interpretation and concludes that Kubandwa "rêvèle, au contraire, l'assujettissement, joué dans un ritual, de toutes les castes à la royauté" (p.151).

The ritual itself took place within the lineage and so did not bring Tutsi Hutu and Twa together. Membership of the cult was widespread, but did not involve recognition of any corporate rights and duties, propitiation being made individually. (Pauwels, 1957, pp.128-9)

The Nyabingi cult which was found in the north (ibid, p.235) and spread to the east in the early colonial period at the time of resistance to Tutsi rule, did have an ongoing organization. Nyabingi had various mythical identities, but the main point was she had somehow managed to succeed her father as king of Mdorwa. She was a Tutsi, but the mwami of Rwanda had her murdered and then annexed Mdorwa under loose military control. According to myth Nyabingi was invisible, not dead, and was a very powerful protector of her people (ibid, p.236). Her protection was obtained through the mediation of male and female spirit mediums. The latter were hereditary and had much political power, since they received large payments for their services and used this to create extensive military retinues of clients (ibid, p.242). The formal organization of the cult was suitable for co-ordinating resistance to the mwami among the small political groups of the north, and was utilised in several rebellions (d'Hertefelt, 1962, p.36; Pauwels, 1957, pp.245, 253; Lemerchand, 1970 pp 59-60 & 100-102).

The abami attempted to stamp out the cult by executing its leaders (ibid, p.245 & list of names on pp.253-254). After its use in the early period of colonial rule, the Belgian Administration officially banned it in 1922. It continued to exist illegally, and Gravel met members in 1960 (1968, p.147). What is clear, both in the north and in Gisaka, was its adoption as a 'blueprint' for organizing the disparate groups opposing the mwami and the Tutsi of central Rwanda in the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, the period when the conquest of the
peripheral areas took place. However, it did not play any documented part in the Hutu revolt which began in 1959. I suggest that this was the result of the struggle of Hutu against Tutsi rule, which it represented, taking a 'secular activist' form (cf. Worsley, 1957, p. 255).
CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF INEQUALITY IN RWANDA

The purpose of this chapter is the provision of a model for understanding the political institutions through which unequal relations between the castes were practised, and for the preservation of which the dominant political group tried to ensure the observation of the symbolic boundaries of the supportive status hierarchy. As in other chapters, it will be a model in the sense that the data will be analysed to elucidate the sociological sources of the unequal distribution of power, and it is not intended to provide a historical reconstruction of the Banyarwanda political system at any particular stage or series of stages. Thus I will lay more stress than have other writers on the position of the army in maintaining stratification in the precolonial period, even though this structure was formally abolished by the Belgian Administration in 1926. In this way I hope to show the significance of the dialectical interaction of cultural and structural processes, which change at different rates (Cohen, 1969b). A straightforward historical analysis of the relationship between the army; structure and the status hierarchy cannot show both their interdependence and the historical existence of the latter without the former after 1926. Nevertheless, the model seeks to show processes of change, and historical data will be used to analyse the interaction of the structural and cultural variables, as these have been isolated by the model.

Before 1926, in the areas where the Tutsi had institutionalized their military control, every Munyarwanda was assigned to an army company (umutwe, Vansina, 1963, p.349) from birth. However, only Tutsi could carry arms and form the warrior's section (ingabo). There were several armies at any time since each new mwami organized one at the beginning of his reign, and authorised army chiefs (umugabe, or umutware w'ingabo) to raise others to meet various exigencies (Vansina, 1962, p.57). My data on army organization in Rwanda is found mainly in Maquet, 1961.

The core of each ingabo was made up of the young Tutsi men 'who were chosen' (intore) to have military training to be warriors, at the court either of the mwami or the army chief. They were all sons of the direct clients of the king, the bagaraga b'ibwami bakuru (Lemarchand, 1970, p.154). They formed companies of about 150 to 200 men, and several such companies were formed in each reign. They were trained in warfare by an army chief and indoctrinated in the Tutsi ideology and life-style of superiority. Around this company of intore was formed the rest of the army, unarmed and
recruited in inzu groups under their inzu head (see below). The intore companies of armed warriors at the king's command did not represent any regional or lineage-based interests within in the country as a whole or within the status group of noble Tutsi. They were well-placed to maintain discipline in Rwanda's political organization without threatening the corporate interests of the status group from which they were recruited.

The border regions were occupied by the intore companies, and the new ones formed by a new king replaced the old ones as soon as their training was completed. The old intore did not disappear, but withdrew to the central regions. The military functions of the army consisted of conquest and raiding rather than defence, for Rwanda was in a process of expansion throughout the nineteenth century. Its armies constantly undertook campaigns against her neighbours, from base camps in the border regions. Usually these were raids lasting only a few days, on the army chief's initiative, with the purpose of bringing back cattle. But the kings did sometimes undertake more extensive campaigns, like Rwabugiri's in the north and west of Rwanda (Pages, pp. 193-5). Raiding in border areas was frequent before 1900, and tax collection there was little distinguished from raiding.

There was also a herdsman's section (umushumba), tending the herds of cattle attached to each army. The army chief was responsible for these cattle, and had under his command several chief herdsman. The cattle were classified according to the rights in them held by different persons. Ownership in an absolute sense was not a concept used; the nearest to it was the ideological ownership of all cattle ultimately by the mwami (Gravel 1968, p. 24) - thus all cattle held by other means than clientage were known among other things, as inka z'umwami (the mwami's cattle). The important rights were those enabling a person to use the cattle to record a relationship of patronage to another person (see chapter 1). Thus the army cattle were classified as: (1) those which only the mwami could use, the nyambo and mabara. Nyambo were rare long-horned cows associated with the kingship, and all belonged to the mwami; they had considerable symbolic importance. Mabara were ordinary cows used by the king to record clientage. (2) those which the army chief could use, some of which were attached to his office and some of which were his personally. (3) those which an intore could use. (4) those which a herdsman could use. A man holding cattle as a client might have the usufruct of them, and be able to use them himself to record clients of his own. Cattle which were not obtained from a patron were of several kinds: those obtained by exchange (impahono), or bridewealth (indogoranyo), war booty (umuheto) or gift (inka z'ubuntu).
All these classes were known as imbata, or as the mwami's cattle (see above). However, the imbata of herdsmen were taxed, while those of the intore were not.

The intore were recruited on an individual basis, as the sons of the mwami's clients, and they were all Tutsi. Other Tutsi, who formed the herdsmen's section, and Hutu and Twa who acted as carriers for the intore, were recruited through their primary, or sometimes their secondary, lineages. The political and army chiefs dealt with the inzu heads and not with individual members. The inzu head, who had to supply a certain amount of tribute or a number of men to the army, decided which individuals within the group should supply these demands. Maquet argues that this "integration into one single structure of two systems which embodied different principles of grouping" - i.e. the recruiting of intore on the basis of personal loyalty to the mwami without regard to kinship or regional groupings; and the kinship base of the recruitment of the other sections - contributed considerably to social cohesion. (1961, p.119). This formulation is simply tautologous, and ignores the more important question of the mode of integration. Kinship groupings were clearly subjected to armed groups of the mwami's clients, and had no autonomous resources of military power. Social cohesion in these circumstances may be ascribed less to mechanisms of the social structure than to physical constraint.

The kinship groupings were also limited in their autonomy by the dependence of their leaders on the army for powers of enforcement in the discharge of their responsibilities for taxation and recruitment. This took the form of confiscation, for the army and not the inzu head, of all the property of a man who refused to pay. Some writers (Maquet 1961, van der Meeren 1961, Lemarchand 1970) claim that appeal to the army chief was possible against inzu head's over-exploitation or victimisation of his political rivals. Success in this venture was probably more successful than other types of appeal (see below), since it was generally to the army chief's advantage to break up the unity of lineages which, in the Tutsi category at least, might be used to organize informally against his incumbency of the office. On the other hand, the inzu head had to be supported in his efforts to secure tribute; and van der Meeren (1969) mentions that the inzu head was the normal channel of appeal to the army chief.

The army was one means of taxation in Rwanda, and this took several forms. Firstly, there was the indabukirano gift of a cow to the mwami by each lineage of the army at his accession. At the same time, there was a ritual called murundo, at which all the army cattle in Rwanda were counted
and classified, and presented to the mwami, who then took some of them for his own use. Thirdly, certain of the cattle taken in raids were said to belong to the king. Fourthly, the Tutsi in each army were responsible for the upkeep of a part of the royal residence. Fifthly, each army had to keep some of its cows near the royal court in order to supply the mwami with tribute in fresh milk. These cows formed a special herd called intamara, and again they were taken only from those of Tutsi in the herdsman section. They had to supply the court daily with the milk tribute and slaughter animals; and with cattle used for divination purposes. All these taxes could only be paid by those who had cattle, mainly Tutsi. But Hutu and Twa also paid taxes through the army structure, in agricultural produce and craft products (see below).

Like the mwami, the army chief received an indabukirano to recognise his authority when he took office, and he also took umurundo cattle if the mwami granted him the favour of a numbering ritual. The army chief could also use the cattle attached to his office through taxation. He had rights over certain of the cattle taken in raids. Less formally, he often received a cow from a subject in his army who wanted to secure his intervention in a dispute. It is here that we can see the reality of the freedom of subjects to appeal to the army chief against over-exploitative patrons and lower chiefs, on which Maquet and other writers lay so much stress. It seems that Goderei's description, so strongly criticised by Lemarchand (1966a, p.604), of the 'protection' offered in this way as being not of the type offered by Chicago gangsters (1962, p.86), is broadly accurate.

The main function of the army taxation system was to re-distribute wealth in favour of the noble Tutsi, first of all, and then of the whole Tutsi caste. It channelled labour and consumption goods to the mwami. Secondly, it re-distributed cattle with the result that status and political roles were congruent. By the means described above, cattle were channelled to the mwami. Almost all these cattle were used to record ubuhake relations with his army chiefs. They in turn could grant the usufruct of the same cattle to their own clients. However, this did not give them any opportunity to build up an autonomous power-base, for instance in a border region, from which to challenge the mwami: the army chief was a client of the king, and instantly dismissable from the office which gave him the ability to act as a patron. The mwami had several armies at his 'disposal' to enforce these relationships in any one of them, as can be seen from the fate of the Tutsi first governor of Bushiri under Rwabugiri (Pauwels, 1967, P.287).
Cattle were thus transferred from lesser Tutsi and Hutu to the noble Tutsi and this difference corresponded to the relative positions in the hierarchy of political administration. The Hutu and poor Tutsi obtained their cattle principally by clientage, but also by bridewealth and looting the enemy after the army's share had been captured by the special section of drivers, the abakoni. Cattle acquired by these means were constantly brought under the control of political officials through taxation. They were then redistributed from the top in the recording of patron-client relationships, through which the clients gained their usufruct. Control was thus maintained over the symbols of power, and no opportunity for independent patronage given.

Many writers have stressed the protection which an army is said to have afforded its members. Political struggles often took place through judicial processes. It was essential to have an influential patron supporting the case, since decisions were determined by the relative political powers of the contestants (Gravel, 1968, p.166). Maquet and van der Meeren write that the army chief could not refuse to help one of his subjects. Their evidence for this statement is highly questionable, consisting of (1) a statement by Kagame (1952; p.38) - a leading Tutsi politician and ideologist (see chapter 7), who, according to Vansina (1962, pp 5-9), made extensive use of historiography as propaganda - that three army chiefs were dismissed by Rwabugiri for such refusal; (2) answers to a questionnaire given by Maquet to informants who were almost exclusively Tutsi (Maquet, 1961, p.179 appendix 2). Furthermore, Maquet himself mentions that the army chief could refuse assistance if the subject had in any way been disloyal - a question which he himself judged. A tutsi who was in dispute with his army chief might theoretically seek the patronage of another, but this was a risky business, as I showed in chapter 1.

There is no evidence that Hutu had access to the army chief or the mwami, and considering other aspects of stratification it is most unlikely. The army was the instrument of Tutsi domination and I suggest it maintained the social order less by its 'protective functions' than by preventing the organisation of Hutu political groups larger than the lineage. In the north and west, where such Hutu groups existed, Tutsi had only sketchy control and were subject to constant rebellions. It was only an increase in the military force at their disposal, provided by the German and Belgian Administrations, which ultimately enabled the Tutsi to establish their administration over all modern Rwanda (Vansina, 1962, p.96ff.)

The army administration fitted in with the territorial administration, which should be seen as its more institutionalised form (see Vansina 1962, p.57). Each army had a pasture area, within which all hill chiefs were
appointed by the army chief, with the approval of the mwami. The Hill chief in Tutsi-controlled areas administered the pasture lands of his hill (igikungi, pl. ibikingi), on which all army cattle except the royal inyambo were grazed. The inyambo had to graze on the army chief's hill. The hill chief did not allocate ibikingi from those under his control without permission from the army chief. The Tutsi holder was secure so long as he paid tribute. He could reserve some of it for his cattle, and grant the usufruct of the rest to his Hutu clients who provided the food products which he needed (see chapter I).

Not enough attention has been paid in the anthropological literature on Rwanda to the considerable differences in the forms of political administration in the diverse regions. The proportion of the dominant Tutsi category in the population varied considerably in different regions of Rwanda, from under 5% to over 40%. There were two main areas of difference in the 1950s: central Rwanda (over 1 million inhabitants), and the eastern and western areas - in all of which the Tutsi population averaged about 20%; and the north and north west (about 600,000 inhabitants) where they were never more than 10% (d'Hertefelt, 1960a, pp.452-3). Administrative differences corresponded with these different degrees of Tutsi settlement. And even in the recently-conquered eastern and western areas, where the administrative structures were the same as in central Rwanda, there were revolts at the end of the nineteenth century when the centre was weakened by civil war. In the north, some Hutu petty kings kept a considerable amount of autonomy until the 1920s. In these areas, such Tutsi administration as there was, was overtly military, as in the taxation campaigns. In the central area, taxation was more regular and institutionalized; but it was also administered by chiefs who were tied to the mwami or to an army chief.

There were three main categories of local political structure in the peripheral areas of Rwanda, where there were relatively few Tutsi, by 1900 (Vansina, 1962, p.68): (1) the military provinces under army chiefs, where the administrative systems of central Rwanda were being slowly introduced; (2) the areas ruled by petty Hutu kings, the abahinza; (3) the areas ruled by Hutu clan heads, the abakonde (note: category 2 sometimes were referred to by this name, cf. Pauwels, 1967, p.210). The areas in which these structures were found - listed by Pauwels (1967, p.209) - describe a wide arc around central Rwanda from the north-east to the south-west through the north-west. Tutsi rule was established over all this region in the colonial period, but some abahinza and abakonde survived informally to play an important part in the Hutu revolution of 1959 (Lemarchand, 1970, p.104).
The abahinza ruled petty Hutu kingdoms, within which they had considerable powers. Ideologically, these powers rested on their claims to descent from the original settlers of the country, and were associated with the maintenance of its fertility and welfare: abahinza were rainmakers and essential participants in harvest rituals. The abahinza received tribute from clan heads. Like the mwami, they established their wives as politically reliable agents on estates throughout the country. (Vansina 1962) Generally, they accepted the sovereignty of the mwami of central Rwanda, and paid him tribute.

The abakonde were considerably less powerful than the abahinza both internally and externally. They were lineage heads, controlling small areas in a state of considerable political flux (Maquet & d'Hertefelt, 1959, p.9) Like the abahinza they paid a token tribute to the mwami of central Rwanda (Pages 1933, p.690-691).

The political administration of the central and eastern regions of Rwanda has usually been described schematically as consisting of units at different levels, and this does in part reflect the taxation system. But as I argued above this was not a neat hierarchy through which the orders of the mwami were executed. The terms for the different areas administered were as flexible as those for kinship groupings of varying size and scope. Rather than signifying abstractly conceived administrative areas such terms refer to the relationship between a ruler and the person who appointed him. Furthermore, different officials had authority over the same area in different spheres. Boundaries between administrative areas were altered at the convenience of the mwami to meet new situations, particularly at the provincial level. (Vansina, 1962, p.57).

There were 70 to 90 'districts' in Rwanda in the late nineteenth century (Maquet, 1961, p.104). At this level there were two sorts of chiefships. They were independent of each other except in the rare cases where they were held by the same individual. Several factors were operative in their appointment, which perhaps accounts for the disagreements in the sources over who did appoint them. But while patrons of different kinds might recommend them, only the approval of the king was decisive. Both chiefs were principally concerned with taxation: the land chief (umunyabutaka) with agricultural tribute, and the cattle chief (umunyamukonke) with that from cattle. Thus the land chief was responsible for organising the payment by Hutu of tribute in labour, harvest produce (uguhunika) and bananas for beer (amavu).
He might use any of the lower officials to assist him—hill chief, neighbourhood head, or lineage head. The cattle chief was responsible for tribute from cattle-holders, who were mostly Tutsi, in jars of milk and cattle (inkuku). These taxes (ikoro, Pagès, 1933) were collected at the local royal residence which existed in each district, administered usually by one of the mwami's wives, or a concubine. Both district chiefs took a proportion of the tax which they collected. Estimates of how much they took can only be conjectural, since the method of collection was that the land chiefs were responsible for a certain amount and then collected as much for themselves beyond that as they could. Even Maquet's Tutsi informants said that land chiefs took about one-third of the total amount collected. In theory, cattle chiefs could not take anything for themselves, which may point to a further difference in the treatment of Tutsi and Hutu.

Within the district there was a more or less permanent administrative area corresponding to Rwanda's most notable topographical feature, the hill (umusosho). The hill chief became in 1926 the colonial 'sub-chief'; as most personnel and many aspects of the role remained unchanged, I follow Gravel in retaining the same term for the whole period, specifying changes as relevant, and referring to 'sub-chiefs' only in regard to official statistics and documents from the later colonial period. Maquet states that the hill chief was subordinate to the district chiefs, but produces no evidence for this statement (p.140), and Gravel (1968, p.24n) considers that he has overestimated their power. The appointment of hill chiefs was determined largely by the army chief, with the mwami's approval (Lemarchand, 1970, p.37). They assisted the district chiefs in tribute collection, and themselves appointed agents as heads to neighbourhood clusters of families on the hill. These heads were known as umukoresha, and together with the insu heads they did the actual collection of the tribute. Hill chiefs also took a certain amount of tribute—perhaps as much as the land chief if Maquet (1961, p.102-103) is right. District chiefs were themselves also hill chiefs, on their own hills. Not all the hills in a district were subject to the ordinary hill and district chiefs. There were always several hills held by direct clients of the mwami, or persons bound to him by categorical moral ties: (1) ibikingi b'ibwami, held by personal clients of the king; (2) estates of the abiru (see below); (3) estates of the army of provincial chief; (4) royal residences, managed usually by one of the king's wives or concubines; there were 21 of these in Rwabugiri's reign, and another three held by the queen mother (Kagame, 1952 p.124); (5) royal
burial places, of which the most famous was Rutare, near Kigali. All these were exempt from tribute to the district chiefs. Thus the more bureaucratic administrative system was cross-cut by the estates granted to favourites, relatives, and the abiru. This provided the mwami with an efficient 'alternative Staff', in the sense used by Weber in his discussion of the growth of patrimonial government. It is here rather than to the administrative and military structures that we should look for the competition of staffs (cf. Maquet, 1961—see below), though it still should not be overstressed. The estates were integrated in the army administrative system as far as the cultivators who lived on them were concerned; but their holders did not have always to pay the same tribute to the mwami as on the ordinary hills.

The usefulness of structural models of the 'territorial', 'military' and 'patron-client' institutions in Rwanda should not lead us to regard them as empirically separate entities, as do many writers (e.g. Maquet, 1961, p.154; d'Hertefelt, 1962; Gluckman, 1965, pp.156-7; Lemarchand, 1970, p.273). For these writers, the key to understanding the precolonial political system in Rwanda lies in the 'cohesion-producing conflict' (cf. Gluckman p.xxii) of the "several structures" (Maquet) or "parallel hierarchies" (Lemarchand). Firstly, this enabled the small group of Tutsi to retain their unity under the mwami, despite their intense struggle for power, for purposes of ruling the Hutu and Twa. Membership of the "parallel hierarchies" cross-cut each other, so that the formation of interest groups which might change the system was impeded. Secondly, the Tutsi did not provoke the Hutu and Twa to revolt, by going beyond "moderate and intelligent exploitation" (Maquet), because their own struggle for power enabled the lower castes to play off one Tutsi patron against another. In my view, these theories of 'balancing structures' are inaccurate and misleading as regards Rwanda.

I have already dealt with the argument that army membership and, in particular, appeal to an army chief afforded any protection to Hutu, and concluded that it did not. Secondly, the playing-off by Hutu, of one Tutsi patron against another, particularly in judicial processes, was not practicable: this is clear from the conclusions of Reisdorff's survey of legal cases in precolonial Rwanda (1952, p.148, quoted by Codere, 1962, p.62):

"Le recours du (shebuja) était possible à condition qu'il s'intéresse au sort de son umugara et que l'adversaire de celui-ci ne soit pas de ses amis... ou un personnage trop influent pour être mis en accusation... De toute manière un procès durait plusieurs années".

This assessment is supported by Gravel (1968, p.162), and we should remember that the probation period for a Hutu seeking a new clientship
to a Tutsi was 2-3 years (chapter 1). Even Maquet's hypothetical illustrative case (1961, p.154) admits that gifts would be required to persuade an army chief to act against a man's patron - and a priori reasoning suggests the latter would be in a better position to offer such gifts; I have already shown that such a course was open only to Tutsi. No evidence from a non-Tutsi source has ever been given to suggest that the playing off of patrons occurred or was possible, or that district, hill and army chiefs ever confronted each other over their Hutu clients' interests. Thirdly, the district 'chiefs' were tax-collecting officials, without formal authority over other hill chiefs. They were rewarded with the right to collect what they could beyond the mwami's ikoro for themselves, i.e. this process was a type of tax-farming; I suggest these offices were distributed as a favour to his most loyal hill chief clients by the army chief or the mwami. A more plausible process than appeal to army or district chiefs as alternative patrons would be appeal by a man to his hill chief against their exploitation; whether this would produce any result or not would depend on the factors mentioned by Reisdorff (above). Hutu could expect advantage from patronage by Tutsi only in their struggles against other Hutu, and as the best available chance of security of life and landholding (chapter 1). Fourthly, the patron-client system derived from the political system and did not constitute a separate or parallel power structure which might cross-cut it (chapter 1). Most hill chiefs in a province were ubuhake clients of the army chief; those who were not, were direct clients of the mwami, the queen mother and the abiru (Gravel, 1968, p.24) - this type of clientage did act against an army chief building a regional base, as did the mwami's practice of moving hill chiefs at will, and employing Twa as police spies. Finally, I have shown that the 'territorial' administration was only a more institutionalized form of the army administration.

The same type of argument is brought forward to explain the power of the mwami - i.e. that he could play off competing chiefs against each other and prevent the formation of large groups and factions (see also van der Meeren, 1969; d'Hertefelt, 1960a). However, this is contrary to the historical data provided by Vansina (1962, p.72ff.) 

"Depuis Rujugira (d.circa 1768) au moins .. il y eut deux factions à la cour. L'une était représentée par le favori du roi, qui tentait de faire distribuer des fiefs et des richesses à ses partisans, l'autre était formée de lignages, qui tentait de perdre le favori aux yeux du roi et de le faire remplacer par un de leurs. Cette lutte des factions était toujours favorable à la royauté parce qu'elle empêchait une coalition
des vassaux contre le roi et qu'elle affaiblissait chaque parti, puisqu'elle le rendait de plus en plus dépendant de lui.

Vansina's own explanation here is open to doubt, since succession wars were very frequent (he himself suggests open war followed the deaths of one in every two kings), despite such devices as co-ruling heirs. The mode of succession (see below) means there were usually several possible heirs and, as in Buganda (cf. Southwold, 1966), I suggest that the victor was the one who could secure the best military-political support through his matrilateral alliances (see role of queen mother, below) and patronage. This is born out by the struggles which followed Rwabugiri's death, in 1895-7 (see below).

Since a mwami was usually installed by the most powerful group of nobles, whether he was their 'puppet' or not depended on his ability to use the institutions they had put in his hands. In the late nineteenth century, the mwami's power was at an unprecedented height, built up by two exceptionally able and long reigning abaami (cf. ibid.): Rwogera (c. 1830-60) and Rwabugiri (c. 1860-1895). But the succession of a young, inexperienced mwami in 1895 was followed by a revolt and the installation of a boy as the Abanyiginya 'puppet' of the Abega clan (Lemarchand 1970, p.57).

The mwami was formally an arbitrary monarch, in the technical sense of this description; he was the "source and symbol of all authority" (ibid. p.27). That is, he was not limited by custom - in fact, Rwabugiri had the power to alter customs on his own initiative (Vansina, 1962, p.71) - in his control of persons and property in Rwanda. He was not accountable for his actions, and as a judge his decisions were final. This was the theory of the administrative process (cf. M.G. Smith), and it was supported by extensive ideology and ritual. The limitations on his power were those of the political process, for he had always to ensure the support of his own Abanyiginya clan and not to range all the noble Tutsi lineages against him.

The position of the mwami as hypostatised by the colonial powers was, in fact, the product of a recent process of rapid expansion begun by Rwogera and achieved particularly by Rwabugiri (1860-1895). Besides his extensive campaigns in the north and west, which were fairly successful, and those in Congo and Burundi, which were not, Rwabugiri extended his power over the noble Tutsi lineages by preventing hereditary succession and centralized further the authority of local chiefs. He reorganized territorial units, altering their boundaries to prevent the growth of local loyalties, and increased the number of provinces to 21 (Vansina, ibid.) But the power of the mwami was still not uniform throughout Rwanda, even after the colonial Administration had enforced Tutsi rule in the peripheral areas by 1925-30.
Succession to the kingship, symbolised by the royal drums (kalinga) was by the mwami's choice from among his own sons. In theory, the choice was not announced but entrusted to three of the abiru called "the keepers of the secret". But this practice was not exclusively followed at least by Rwabugiri, (see below). As a method, it facilitated succession disputes, which Vansina concludes were frequent (see above). The formal powers of the mwami may be summarised as follows. He appointed the provincial army and district chiefs, and his approval was required for the appointment of hill chiefs. He fixed administrative boundaries and raised new armies, or allowed them to be raised by a few trusted clients. There was no form of administrative or political process of which he was not the head. He had complete control over individual rights (cf. P.C. Lloyd, 1965, p. 90) in that he could order the arbitrary execution of any person, or reverse executions determined by the courts. That he exercised this power can be seen from the list of noble Tutsi executed by Rwabugiri given by Pagès (1933, pp 190-192). He was able to retain control of recruitment, and even Tutsi of the highest rank were individually insecure in office.

The role of queen mother (umugabekasi) had a certain amount of patronage to dispense, and this, together with her influence with the mwami, made it a target of noble Tutsi competition. The role had always to be occupied. When the mwami's own mother died she was replaced by an 'official' mother appointed by the king. She travelled everywhere with him, and she had her own court. Pauwels gives one example of her patronage powers: Rwabugiri's queen-mother gave Kingogo to a favourite and he raised an army to assert this right (1967, p.221). However, her power was entirely dependent on the mwami's, and when he died she became once again a commoner. Most writers state that in the nineteenth century the queen mother was always chosen from the Abega clan. But Pagès (1933, p.96) states that Rwabugiri's queen mother was an Abakono, and that the queen mother of his designated successor, Rutalindwa, was also from that clan. If this is true it gives some insight into the long-term political processes involved in the succession struggle immediately before the German occupation. By custom, an 'official' mother could not be the genetrix of one of the king's sons; this would have created a dangerous rivalry. Rwabugiri violated this rule by appointing one of his wives, a Mwega, who had already born him a son called Musinga, as official queen mother to his designated heir, Rutalindwa. Lemarchand suggests he did this to keep Abega loyalty while he edged them out of power (1970, p.57). But when Rutalindwa succeeded in 1895, the Abega clan rallied behind Musinga and put him on the throne after the palace murder of Rutalindwa.
As a result of Musinga's installation with a Mwega favourite, Kabale, the Ababega benefited at the expense of the Abanyiginya, who had been monopolising the provincial chiefships (Pages, 1933, p.201) but were divided by Musinga's revolt (ibid. p.189). In these struggles the position of the queen mother was clearly crucial in gaining access to office and, in this case, to the kingship itself. The historical evidence suggests a process in which the Abanyiginya royal clan was seeking to decrease its dependence on various clan allies, as Rwogera and Rwabugiri played off the Abega and Abakono against each other in the competition for the queen mothership. It was in their reigns that the power of the mwami increased considerably in Rwanda (see above). Finally, it is clear that, as in Buganda, the queen mothership gave clans other than the royal one access to the kingship, thereby increasing its legitimacy. In Rwanda it ensured the ability of noble Tutsi to act as a political group vis-a-vis other units in the society, despite their internal struggles.

Few offices were hereditary even within the clan in Rwanda; besides the mwami, there were only the abiru (Lemarchand, 1970, p.32). These were very important officials concerned with the preservation of correct ideology in the kingship and the kingdom. This knowledge was esoteric and they were charged with its practice in ritual. Each of them had a specialised part in the whole ideological complex, and their co-operation was essential to the mwami's authority. They were ranked in a fixed hierarchy. They were not wholly independent of the king, despite being exempted from tribute and having a hereditary element in their appointment, for he could dismiss them for disloyalty. But the abasami had not been able to dispose of them or create a rival hierarchy of ritual experts. It may be that the ideological functions of the abiru were too important or, more likely, any attempt to remove them completely would have produced conflict with the noble Tutsi lineages, which had vested interests in the offices since the incumbents were drawn from them, and they were a means of exercising some control over the mwami's behaviour. This control should not be exaggerated, and they declined very much under Rwabugiri (Vansina, 1962, p.72), but it was at least significant that when a mwiru was dismissed his successor had to be appointed from the same lineage.

The duties of the abiru, of whom there were ten (Vansina, 1962 and d'Hertefelt, 1962, p.71) to twelve (Maquet, 1961), consisted of memorising the secret rules for the various rituals, and for the succession of abasami and abagabekasi. The three most important abiru were the 'Keepers of the Secret', who were responsible for announcing the name of the king's
heir after his death. The *abiru* had assistants, also from their lineages, whom they trained to succeed them. This necessary training must have limited the ease with which the abaami could replace them. Each lineage was responsible for a part of the complete ideological complex, and this constituted an important property emphasizing the corporateness of the noble Tutsi lineages. The *abiru* were also said to have decided the order in which queen mothers were taken from the noble lineages (Maquet, 1961, p.127). However, in the nineteenth century this does not appear to have been effective, (see above).

The most important chiefs were irregularly consulted by the mwami in council. The council had neither regular membership nor corporate authority (Lemarchand, 1970, p.29).

The introduction of colonial rule in Rwanda reduced the political system from its autonomous position to one of a sub-system. The colonists were concerned principally with maintaining order, and they consistently supported the existing authorities. The first civil resident of Rwanda wrote:

"Our political and colonial interests demand the support of the king and the maintenance of Tutsi domination which goes together with a strong dependency of the great mass of Rwanda" (quoted in d'Hertefelt, 1960a, p.452).

The Belgians consciously followed the Germans' practices, as was declared in a report of 1921; especially in order to

"Assurer la paix et l'ordre public en maintenant l'équilibre qui existait entre les groupements indigènes" (ibid, p.459).

Naturally, such 'indirect rule' did not prevent the colonial Administration dismissing individual chiefs who were 'inefficient', but they kept the Tutsi caste in power. This was the keystone for future policy. An administrative report of 1938 declared that the government was still certain that:

"il doit s'efforcer de maintenir et de consolider le cadre traditionnel de la classe dirigeante des Tutsi, a cause des grandes qualites de celles-ci, de son indeniable superiorité intellectuelle et de son potentiel de commandement." (ibid, p.459).

Even when there was a minor attempt to redistribute power, in the decree of 14th July, 1952 introducing councils, it only did so within the Tutsi caste; and it gave even more control over the appointment of chiefs and subchiefs in the Supreme Council to the mwami (see below).
The colonists not only supported the existing authorities, they also helped them to extend their power over the whole country. The Germans began expeditions into Rwanda in 1898, at a time when a violent succession struggle was not resolved, and Tutsi pre-occupation with power at the centre gave the peripheral areas the opportunity to assert their independence. This was not unusual activity; rather the expansion achieved by Rwogera and Rwabugiri was unusual. Continual revolts under these kings are described for the north by Maquet (1964, p.559), Pauwels (1967, passim) and Lemarchand (1966a), and for the west by Vansina (1962, p.94). Even in the east, the conquest of Gisaka was only achieved by Rwogera. The wars of succession of 1897–1900 were ended by German intervention, but the revolts which they facilitated continued to focus on this issue until the Belgian conquest of the north.

The victor in the succession struggle, Yuhi V Musinga, was only 13 or 14 when he came to the kingship in 1897. He was, in fact, the puppet of the leader of the Abega faction, Kabale. The Tutsi themselves dealt with the initial revolts in northwestern areas like Busigi and Bugoyi, where abahinza took advantage of Musinga's minority to stop paying tribute. But after the German occupation, it was they who led the suppression of more serious revolts in the east and north. In 1900, a rebellion in Gisaka was led by Tutsi of the old royal clan; and again in 1909, a rumour that the Germans were about to depose Musinga led Hutu in eastern Rwanda to revolt against their Tutsi chiefs. Several writers have argued that the revolts in the peripheral areas were parochial, directed against the centre by local Tutsi leaders, rather than attempts by Hutu to rid themselves of the Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1966a and van der Meeren, 1969). Yet the evidence does not seem to bear this out. It is true that the great northern revolt of 1912 was led by Ndungutse, a brother of Rutalindwa. But he was supported by the Hutu because he promised to free them from the obligation to work for Tutsi (Maquet, 1964, p.559). And the German resident reported in 1914 that the recent first tax collection in the north was a great success, with the Hutu paying willingly because they believed the Germans would thereby protect them against "the despotism and injustice of the Tutsi". Clearly, the line between parochialism and social revolution would be hard to establish for this area where Hutu so greatly predominated in the population. But whatever the cause, the opposition of Hutu peasants to Tutsi chief's continued throughout the colonial period. German askaris suppressed the revolts of Ndungutse (1912) and Rukara (1909). The Belgians had to conduct military campaigns there in 1924–26 in order to install Tutsi chiefs in some areas, and it was only in 1926 that the first Tutsi chief appointed to administer
Bushiri dared live there, though officially it had been Tutsi-administered since Rwabugiri’s reign. (Pauwels, 1967, p.288).

My extensive use of data from the precolonial period is justifiable not only because the colonial period has been so little studied by anthropologists, and other students have been concerned with formal administrative changes, but also because the sociological studies of the immediate pre-Independence years (notably Gravel’s) reveal that the institutional structures through which power was exercised relatively little altered. Either they were preserved, formally or informally (see Lemarchand, 1970, p.64), or if they were abolished and not preserved informally (as, for a time, with the army organization) the power relations which they maintained were embodied in new administrative institutions. Thus military support for Tutsi rule was now provided by the colonial powers, and it was only when they withdrew from this commitment that the Hutu revolution became possible (see below; Lemarchand, pp.109-111, 170-171, 197). At the time when the army organization was abolished, Belgian-led military forces were extending Tutsi rule over all Rwanda.

The Germans did not alter the character of the power structure they found in Rwanda. They went little further than giving the Resident judicial power over the mwami, and renaming the hill and army chiefs as ‘police’ and ‘government’ chiefs respectively (Louis, 1963, pp.110-111). More important, they recognized Musinga as mwami, and secured the Abega revolt. Moreover, they suppressed further revolts, and began the consolidation of Tutsi power in the peripheral areas (see above).

From 1916-26, the Belgians used the same system of military administration as their predecessors. They stated to the League of Nations in 1929 that their mandate in Ruanda-Urundi from 1924

"had been set up in a country which had for practical purposes never really come under European supervision — where there was but an embryo of an administrative occupation and no European business interests at all, the mandate experiment was not influenced by any colonial past"

(quoted by Lemarchand, 1970, p.65)

It will be seen that I rely heavily on Lemarchand for data on the administrative changes of the 1920s and 1930s.

From 1926-30 the Belgian Administration made certain formal administrative changes, whose effect was to increase Tutsi power. They had already ‘rationalized’ along German lines — replacing Hutu rulers in the north and west with Tutsi governors. The offices of army, land and cattle chiefs still existed in 1926, but had been misunderstood by the two colonial administrations who tried to use them interchangably — resulting in "protracted chaos" (ibid. p.71).
The district chiefs were finally abandoned, as the Germans had tried to do just before losing the territory (see above), and the army chiefs replaced by "chiefs". Hill chiefs were renamed "sub-chiefs", and in 1930 some of the smaller hill chiefdoms were amalgamated, though this was exceptional.

According to the Tutsi ideologist, Kagame (1952, p.7), the abolition of the army chief upset the traditionally harmonious relations of Hutu and Tutsi. Lemarchand (1970, p.72) considers this overdrawn, but represents many anthropologists with his view that "it is entirely plausible to assume that, by destroying the pre-existing balance of forces on the hills, the 1926 reform prepared the ground for the emergence of a more starkly authoritarian system, centred on the rule of a single and virtually omnipotent chief".

I have already argued against this view, but it is interesting to note that Gravel, in the only study of a hill unit that we have, found a balance of forces still operating there in the 1950s and up to 1961 (1968, pp.198-200) - in his analysis, precisely "because the administration - wittingly or not - had reinforced the established authority". I suggest that balance is an analytical device that may be plausibly assumed, with varying usefulness, in explanation of any situation. But is should not be taken for an empirical process; its use in the case of Rwanda is misleading. Tutsi exploitation probably increased (Lemarchand, 1970, p.123) after 1930 because the Administration and Roman Catholic hierarchy in Rwanda deliberately set out to make new sources of power available only to Tutsi. Colonial over­rule meant that the Tutsi no longer monopolized armed force, but so long as the Administrations supported their rule their dominance could not be militarily challenged.

Under pressure from the Catholic hierarchy (ibid. p.73); the Administration decided to commit their bureaucratization of indirect rule to the Tutsi alone, by formally institutionalizing Tutsi political hegemony. Lemarchand describes Belgian measures as follows:

(1) "a rigorous control over all educational opportunities"
as I described in Chapter 1, and

(2) "the introduction of a judicial machinery designed to perpetuate the subjection of the Hutu caste" (ibid, p.73)

Bureaucratization depended on the use of a new category of Catholic mission-educated Tutsi, and the removal of unco-operative conservatives led by Musinga - whose use of colonial overrule for his own purposes had enabled precolonial patterns of Tutsi rule to be preserved. However, the chaos of Tutsi intrigue was unsuitable for the Belgians' conception of bureaucracy; and Musinga was implacably hostile to the reforms, the Catholics and their
converts. In 1931, Musinga was dismissed and exiled in Shangugu. He was replaced by an 18-year old son, Rudahigwa, who took the dynastic name Mutara III. Mutara was a mission-educated Catholic, nominated by the Church, though later he became deeply 'traditionalist'. His court was bureaucratized; a 'conseil du roi' of 4, later 6, great Tutsi nobles advised him; and the abiru lost formal recognition, though they survived informally to play an important role in the monarchist coup d'état of 1959 (see chapter 7). Appointments continued to be made formally by the mwami until 1943, when it was recognised that approval was required formally from the Governor (for chiefs) or Resident (for sub-chiefs).

The bureaucratization of the chiefly hierarchy led to an increase in exploitation of the Hutu, both in the process of Tutsi chiefs satisfying Belgian demands and through illegal use of chiefly powers. Thus in Bushiru the Tutsi chief, Nyangezi, was appointed by the Belgian Administration (Pauwels, 1967, pp. 290–298); in 1950 he had fourteen subchiefs, later reduced to eleven. All were Tutsi. The well-reported difficulties of intercalary roles (e.g. Gluckman, 1955; Fallers, 1966) were multiplied by the opposition of Hutu to Tutsi overlords, so that they were doubly intercalary. Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs were charged with new duties by the Belgian Administration: the Hutu were to be forced to grow new crops like coffee, to improve cultivation methods by such methods as antierosive terracing which required corvee labour; taxes had to be paid regularly, even in the peripheral areas; roads had to be kept in good condition. Not only were many such functions not 'traditional' as the Belgians claimed, but in many areas the Tutsi chiefs had no legitimacy other than appointment by the Belgians. Financial incentives, by which chiefs received supplements to their salaries - or were fined - according to the Administration's estimation of their efficiency, were designed to ensure loyalty to bureaucratic obligations (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 121). Nevertheless, they were seldom able to mobilize the peasants for increased production, and many chiefs were dismissed by the Belgian Administration for 'demagoguery', that is, failing to execute orders because they could not do so without provoking a violent response (Lemarchand, 1966). However, their new powers of coercion enabled them to increase their exploitation of the Hutu (see evidence to U.N. Mission (1948) quoted Lemarchand, 1970, p. 123). Pauwels describes how Nyangezi extorted cattle and hides in Bushiru. The subchiefs, in particular, made what they could from office as quickly as possible since they were unpaid by the Administration. They were frequently dismissed for corruption by Nyangezi, who found this an easy way to win popularity by seeming to oppose the colonialists. The Belgians allowed chiefs and subchiefs to take what fields they needed for subsistence, which enabled them to take much more, and of the best.
Pauwels sums up the situation by stating: (1) there was no formal limit to the tribute in goods and services which the chiefs could demand, (2) Hutu who complained were prosecuted and deprived of their lands, (3) all the officials to whom complaints could be made were Tutsi, who supported each other.

The Belgian Administration made some legislative attempts to reduce Tutsi exploitation, though in practice this meant little as they would not listen to complaints brought against chiefs (Lemarchand, 1970, p. 120) and made dismissals only on the bureaucratic grounds of inability to execute orders ("demagoguery" - see above) until the policy changes of the 1950s. In 1917, they tried to deal with famine conditions by ordinances requiring Tutsi who took a Hutu's goods to restore double the amount, and another ending igisigati rights (see chapter 1); in 1923, "domestic slavery" was abolished; in 1924, the abuletwa labour tribute was reduced from 2 days in 5 to 2 days in 7 (Pauwels, 1967, p.299), and in 1927 to 1 day in 7 (Gravel, 1968). In 1932 it was decreed that the chief was entitled to only three days tribute per year from every adult man, and the subchief, ten days. However, chiefs continued to call out women and children as well (Pauwels, p.299). So in 1952 the services were commuted to a money payment, fixed each year by the mwami and his supreme council. But abuses continued, and in 1955-57 when Belgian policy changed, 152 chiefs of both ranks were dismissed (ibid.)

In 1924, there were other dues in kind abolished, including imponoke which was the tribute in cattle taken by a patron from his clients if his own herd was lost, and indabukirano which was paid not only to the mwami and army chief (see above), but also to the hill chief - and paid in agricultural produce by Hutu just as in cattle by Tutsi (Gravel, p.150). In 1933 some types of tribute in labour and kind were commuted, for higher status categories, for cash; though the corvee was retained for the rest because it supported the subchiefs' authority. Between then and 1949 the commutation was extended gradually to the whole population, though some forms of compulsory labour still remained in 1959, according to Lemarchand (1970, p.146).

Moreover, the new judicial system of "native tribunals" introduced in 1936, far from correcting abuses

"became the instruments through which the ruling Tutsi oligarchy not only retained but abused its privileges. Their function was not so much to dispense justice as to legitimize abuses and wrong-doings (ibid. p.76)

All tribunals were headed by Tutsi chiefs. Appeals to the mwami's tribunal were theoretically possible, but met only delaying tactics; only 60 cases per year were tried; by 1949 there was a backlog of about 900 cases (ibid.).
Tutsi continued to monopolize political office after the reforms of the 1920s. The situation on Nov. 1, 1959, when the Hutu revolution began, and several years after the Belgian Administration began to reverse its pro-Tutsi policy, was as follows: 43 of the 45 offices of chief were at that time occupied, all by Tutsi; there were 559 subchiefdoms, of which 549 (over 98%) were occupied by Tutsi. Of auxiliary governmental personnel, such as judges, assessors, agricultural assistants etc., 88% were Tutsi; given their educational advantages, it is likely that they occupied a much higher proportion of the higher posts. (ibid., p. 125).

It is only by understanding the informal maintenance of precolonial forms of Tutsi rule that we can understand why the Hutu revolted against the whole Tutsi caste, without differentiating noble Tutsi, or Tutsi chiefs, from the Tutsi b'impanga. Otherwise we are left with a question-begging answer like Lemarchand's (ibid.)—that Tutsi officeholders attracted hostility as agents of colonial domination (which they did) and that this "was bound to reverberate, sooner or later, on the Tutsi as a group". I will show that Tutsi domination still depended on their superior organization in the caste as a whole, by informal means. The colonial period added to Tutsi exploitation the analytically separable problems of satisfying the demands of the "bureaucratic-colonial" state (cf., Apter, 1961), but it did not supplant (or even formally change very much) the precolonial forms through which it was organized.

In 1946 the U.N. renewed the Belgian mandate, with provisions for the liberalization of Rwanda's political institutions and increased participation by its inhabitants (Agreement of 13 Dec. 1946). In 1952 the Belgian Administration confirmed the existing councils (decree, 14th July) and added provisions for "conseils de territoire" and "conseils de sous-chefferie". According to the department of demographic enquiries (ENDMORU), there were in 1956: 9 "territoires; 46 "chefferies"; 603 "sous chefferies". The average number of registered adult men (H.A.V.) per chiefdom was 9,339; per sub-chiefdom it was 712. However, the actual numbers varied considerably: 19 chiefdoms had over 10,000 H.A.V., while 4 had had under 5,000.

Article 28 of the 1952 decree set up the following provisions for the councils: (1) the sub-chiefdom council was to consist of 5-9 members at a rate of one member per 500 inhabitants, and to be presided over by the sub-chief; election was to be by an electoral college of "notables", numbering not less than twice the number of councillors, each approved by the chief and the Belgian "administrateur du territoire" after selection by the sub-chief. (2) The chiefdom council was composed of 10-18 members,
5–9 being sub-chiefs elected by the other sub-chiefs and 5–9 being 'notables'; these 'notables' were chosen by an electoral college itself chosen by the subchiefdoms councils from among their members. The total number of chiefdom council members was decided according to the size of tax-paying population, but the numbers of 'notables' and sub-chiefs was always exactly balanced. (3) The chiefdom council was composed of the following: (a) the chiefs, (b) an equal number of sub-chiefs, elected by the other sub-chiefs, (c) a number equal to the sum of both these categories, of 'notables'; these were elected by an electoral college of 'notable' chiefdom councillors from among their number. It was presided over by a President and vice-President elected by itself from among its chiefs. (4) The Supreme Council was composed of these Presidents; 6 chiefs elected by all the chiefs; a 'notable' from each territorial council, elected by their 'notable' members; 8 co-opted 'educated notables'. It was presided over by the mwami. All councils were elected for 3-year terms, and members were eligible for re-election. All councils had only advisory powers, (Maquet & d'Hertefelt, 1959b, p.65).

Maquet and d'Hertefelt (1959a, p.21ff.) calculated that in 80% of the chiefdoms the 'notable' electors to the sub-chiefdoms councils were less than 5 times more numerous than the persons to be elected, and never more than 7 times. They conclude that "Le décret ne semble point vouloir éliminer les possibilités de pression" (1959, p.25). Furthermore, since the councils at the bottom were effectively chosen by the sub-chief, the elaborate system based on them could not be representative. The aim of the Belgian Administration was clearly to diffuse power from the mwami and chiefs, but only among the Tutsi status category (ibid. p.26). This can be seen in the proportions of persons from the different status categories who made up the councils (see table below). In particular, from the chiefdom up, Tutsi made up about 90% of the council members.

By a letter of 4th August 1956, the governor of Ruanda-Urundi made new provisions for the 1956 elections. In the place of nomination of the notables of the electoral college by the sub-chief himself, there was to be direct "election" by secret ballot of all adult men. However, the persons elected still had to be approved by the chief and the Belgian territorial administrator, and the sub-chief could himself nominate any persons not chosen by the ballot. As Maquet and d'Hertefelt comment: "Il s'agit... d'une consultation populaire et non pas d'une élection proprement dite" (ibid, p.31).
The results of the 1956 elections are relevant to the consideration of the effects of values associated with social stratification on political change.

Firstly, it is clear that Tutsi retained control at the chiefdom level and above. It was only at these levels that councils had any executive power at all (in a few specified instances). Secondly, Hutu elected as notables or as members of the subchiefdom councils did not use their majorities where they had them to elect Hutu notables to the higher councils, on which Tutsi retained 85%–95% membership. This does not, however, necessarily indicate Hutu dependence on Tutsi rulers. It seems rather to reflect better Tutsi political organization in the chiefdom-wide arena: it is noticeable that there is a sharp rise in Tutsi membership proportions from 45.6% at the subchiefdom level to 84.8% at the chiefdom level. Tutsi political groupings had always covered a much wider area than had Hutu political groupings (see chapter 2), with such symbolic patterns of organization available to the former as kinship and marriage alliances at this level. Beyond the Hill or group of Hills, comprising the sub-chiefdom, such means were not available to Hutu. There was only the category 'Hutu' to unite them, and in 1956 this had not yet been made a positive political symbol.

Thirdly, 'popular consultation' in the choice of the sub-chiefdom electoral college 'notables' had the effect of increasing the Hutu representation, though not to the point where it would be equal to the Hutu proportion of the population (note that this point is of analytical interest only – the fact that the Hutu had a potential majority in almost every constituency means that they could have prevented any Tutsi at all from being elected, if they had acted as a political party and voted en bloc).
We may follow Maquet and d'Hertefelt in assuming that this means that many Hutu must have voted for Tutsi. These writers believe that the 1956 results indicate an apparent contradiction, after comparison with the 1953 results (when there was no 'popular consultation'):

"d'une part, certains votes hutu manifestant un désir d'émancipation de leur caste; d'autre part, des résultats indiquent une attitude de dépendance et de soumission des hutu à la caste supérieure" (ibid, p.208). "Par conséquent, on sera porté à dire des hommes appartenant au groupe reconnu depuis des générations particulièrement apte à gouverner, doué de prestige de la puissance et de la richesse et qui a joué le rôle de 'protecteur féodal de la masse socialement plus faible" (ibid, p.209).

If this argument were correct one would expect to find that in the peripheral regions, where Tutsi rule had only been intermittent and partial in the precolonial period - and only established by the colonial administration - there was a much lower vote by Hutu for Tutsi than in the central regions. And indeed, Maquet and d'Hertefelt find that this was so, though their mode of analysis is in this case highly disputable.

They base their claim on the fact that in the north-west (Ruhengeri and Kisenyi territories), the proportion of Tutsi 'notables' in 1956 had fallen 50% - and up to 70% in some areas - compared to 1953; while in central Rwanda (Kigali, Nyanza and Astrida territoires) the proportion fell only about 10% on average, and in some areas showed an increase in the Tutsi share (ibid, p.212). But these figures indicate only proportions of change in proportions: it is possible by this means to obtain meaningless figures, such as that the proportion of Hutu in the Supreme Council fell by 67%, because the actual number fell from three to one. Moreover, these figures tell us nothing about the distribution of anti-Tutsi feeling among Hutu, or the latter's degree of 'dependence', for the base-line of the caste composition of 'notables' in 1953 is a false one. That is to say, in 1953 this composition may have been less representative of the caste proportions in the population in the peripheral regions than it was in central Rwanda, and the 1956 elections merely redressed this imbalance somewhat. Other figures given by Maquet and d'Hertefelt support this suggestion. If we examine the degree of 'notable' representation of the caste proportions in the population, we find that in 1956: in both the north-west and in central Rwanda the proportion of 'notables' elected from the Tutsi category was just over twice as high as the proportions of Tutsi in each regions' population. In Ruhengeri and Kisenyi: 14.2% av. of 'notables' were Tutsi; 7% of the population. In Kigali, Nyanza and Astrida: 41% av. of 'notables' were
Tutsi; 18.5% of the population. (Calculated from Table 10, ibid, p.120). In the face of this evidence, Maquet and d'Hertefelt would need better and more direct evidence than they actually produce if their explanation of Hutu voting for Tutsi were to be validated. Indeed, that the Tutsi of Kisenyi, commanding only 5.6% of the potential vote (approximately, since this was their proportion of the population of the territory), captured any 'notable' positions at all, let alone the 15% which they did get in 1956, suggests explanation in terms of their organization as a 'party', i.e. voting en bloc for a few agreed candidates, or in terms of considerable Hutu voting for them. Hutu 'dependence', if it was such, would not seem to have been less significant here than in Astrida (central Rwanda, and one of the two territories where the Tutsi proportion of 'notables' actually rose in 1956), where the Tutsi were 22.3% of the population and captured 45.9% of the 'notable' positions.

Nevertheless, it remains true that Hutu had potentially enough votes in all areas to oust the Tutsi from the electoral colleges for the subchiefdom councils, and their failure to do so might seem to bring us back to the hypothesis of Hutu 'dependence' for lack of better explanation. I have already shown that this hypothesis rests on the assumption of equilibrium processes among 'balanced structures' which is not historically or empirically convincing. Furthermore, to analyze the 1956 elections as a contest between Hutu and Tutsi castes, without any evidence that both regarded it as such, is to make an unwarranted assumption. There was a remarkably high turn-out for the elections (by comparison with, e.g. Tanzania 1965) at between 70-75%, but not even Maquet and d'Hertefelt take this as a sign of fervent participation and conflict (ibid, p.70). They comment:

"Les habitants ont.. pris l'attitude habituelle vis-à-vis d'initiatives émanant des autorités européennes qui est l'accomplissement assez passif et sans enthousiasme de ce que l'on demande" (ibid, p.71)

In some areas, sub-chiefs used threats to get voters out (ibid, p.70). The elections were very indirect, with much weighting to ex officio (and thus almost completely Tutsi) members at the levels with even minor executive control. Thus it would not be surprising if Hutu did not regard the elections as an opportunity to end Tutsi domination - they were not. And in 1956, enough Hutu were closely tied to Tutsi patrons for a symbolic vote against them to be an unprofitable luxury (note, the secret ballot was hardly secret at all, since most of the population was illiterate and their means of voting was then with the aid of a scribe (ibid, photo 10).
Above all, Hutu were not organized as a political party, and were not able to register any resentment they might have felt against Tutsi (cf. Marx's famous description of the nineteenth century French peasantry failing to take collective action, despite their common economic interests, because they lacked any sense of 'community' or political organization (1962, p. 334; see also Weber, 1970, pp. 183-184). The Hutu had a more developed sense of (status) community, but still lacked the means of political communication. At a more abstract level, the Hutu caste was not prepared for action in the legal-political order (cf. Weber), while the Tutsi were. The latter could communicate both formally through the hierarchy of government offices, and informally through kinship and patron-client ties.

I suggest that the Hutu failure to realize their electoral potential at the 1956 elections occurred principally because of their lack of organization for that purpose, and not because of some psychological dependence on Tutsi leadership, particularly in view of the fact that less than three years later - having acquired some political organization - the Hutu began their successful social revolution by violent overthrow of Tutsi rulers (see chapter 7).

Four factors in the 1956 elections, mentioned briefly by Maquet and d'Hertefelt, are relevant here. (1) The period between the announcement and holding of the elections was much too short to allow the necessary propaganda and organization: it varied from territory to territory from a maximum of 27 days to a minimum of 6 days (1959a, p. 34). Even these short periods were not used for propaganda or organization purposes. (2) Although there is no precise information, for obvious reasons, about the pressure exerted on Hutu by individual Tutsi: "Il n'est cependant point douteux qu'il en y en ait eu" (ibid, p. 42). (3) In several areas, the purpose of the election and its secrecy were openly doubted; it was suspected as a new means of census taking, or to decide whom to send on forced labour in the Congo (p. 48). (4) Very few Hutu and no Tutsi raised the issue of Tutsi domination. Elections were completely new in Rwanda, and regarded as simply an activity required by the Europeans in the process of administration (see above). They were not regarded as even a minor political change which could be capitalized on to bring major political, social and economic change - as Maquet and d'Hertefelt seem to assume in their concluding discussion (ibid, pp. 216-222). No Hutu political organization existed which could express, and make credible, such potentialities as aspirations in the form of a program. To satisfy a patron, avoid taxation, and other immediate concerns were of major importance in elections which did not offer any tangible power or seem to have more general bearing on personal futures.
The purpose of this chapter and the methodology used are the same as for the complementary chapter on Rwanda. The major problem with the literature on Buganda is a failure to analyze the structure of economic relations, and a consequent overemphasis on cultural aspects. Thus Wrigley and Faller discuss the increasing differentiation of social roles in terms of changing evaluations of status, as if the status hierarchy was identical with the structure of economic relations. This is the result of their conception of 'class', as they use it to discover how one's occupation determines one's place in the stratification system. Thus Faller considers 'class' as referring to:

"broad groups of occupations similarly evaluated in the stratification system and sharing similar subcultures" (1964, p.120).

Wrigley's "economic classes", based on an assessment of income, are literally an analyst's classification:

"If the population of present-day Buganda is to be classified in economic terms... it is only in a very limited and abstract sense that any such classification is now possible" (1964, p.52).

On the other hand, Worsley considers that the figures for class-differentiation given by Wrigley (in Hunter, 1962, see below) are the "statistics of latent revolution" so obviously that they "hardly require(s) comment" (1967, p.220). In this chapter my main purpose will be to comment on the economic aspects of the question which Worsley correctly poses: what kind of property-based classes were there, and what were their power relations? As before my model includes relevant historical data from different periods of time.

The natural environment of Buganda was much more suitable for agriculture than most other areas of East Africa. (Richards, 1954, p.221). Its soils were deep and fertile and it was supplied by an unusually regular rainfall. (Mukwaya, 1953, pp 3-4). There were roughly two areas of settlement: the 'long' - or 'elephant' - grass area of south and east Buganda, and the short-grass areas of the north and west. The former was excellent for bananas, sweet potato and cassava, and carried a more dense population than the less fertile short-grass area. Agricultural production was based on the banana grove, which yielded a year-round crop, and very seldom needed to lie fallow. It required relatively little heavy labour after it had been opened up for cultivation. The average population density in 1953 was 77 persons per square mile, with
a total population of about 1.4 million. Thus there was, as the Agricultural Productivity Committee reported the following year: "land to spare for the expansion of the human population" (ibid. p.13), though much of this would be in the less fertile regions.

In the precolonial period, these conditions permitted a clear division of labour between men and women, with the latter doing most of the routine work of subsistence food production. Hunting and fishing, done by men, provided only a minor element in subsistence. There were relatively few cattle in Buganda, compared to neighbouring kingdoms, and herding did not have the symbolic significance attached to it in the latter. The division of labour between the sexes remained important in the colonial period after cash-cropping had been widely adopted: in the main, men produced the cash crops. During the precolonial period, men employed their time 'freen' from subsistence production in the service of a patron chief.

The domestic unit was composed of a man, his wives and children, and sometimes one or two other kin. Each such unit was independent in food production, with its own banana grove and fields for other crops. Each unit of land was held by an individual client of the chief, and there was a lack of cooperation between households in cultivation (Wrigley, 1964, p.22). However, the extreme measures taken to preserve the individual client's land rights - such as the death penalty for attempts to steal land - probably reflect less the idea of "private property" as Wrigley thinks (ibid.) than the chief's assertion of his power to allocate holdings and discipline or protect his clients.

Besides the role of women as cultivators, the most important occupational distinctions lay between (1) men without political office, whose role included principally military and labour services (in fields other than cultivation), and (2) political officials, who organized these activities and redistributed wealth (see below) which they received as clients of the king (kabaka). Apart from beer, goods produced by women lay outside the tribute system (ibid. and p.109-110); when I write of 'wealth' I refer to goods produced by men or gained by raiding, and the ability to dispose of labour - this refers to rights attached to political office, and to slaves taken in war. It should be stressed that 'wealth' in this sense was neither convertible nor a form of capital; the power to distribute wealth and land was attached to political office (see below). Receiving wealth and land from a patron chief was a benefit of clientship, not merely a 'token' of the relationship like cattle in Rwanda, though it served that function as well. Relative wealth was an important component of the distribution of prestige, which was thus also to some extent under political control. Men
appointed to political office were thereby 'appointed' to high status and wealth, and lost it on dismissal. There was no differentiated economic order of institutions in precolonial Buganda, nor a power structure of economic classes. Distinctions between persons in the field of wealth did not derive from economic processes.

The most comprehensive and reliable data available on the precolonial patron-client system in Buganda is found in Falters (ed. 1964), and it is on this source that I rely mainly in the following analysis.

The patron lived with his wives and immediate retinue within his own enclosure, marked off by a reed fence from his surrounding clients' residences. An 'ordinary man', bakopi (Falters, p.68), made himself client (omusajja; musense) to such a patron chief or lord (mukama; mwami) (ibid, pp.121-2; Southwold, 1964, p.212-4). The lowest-ranking political officials, entitled to receive a share of the kabaka's tribute (Falters, p.160), were those in the 'village' (kyalo) - the village chief and, in some cases, his assistants (batongole). A mutongole had at least five clients, according to Kagwa (1952, p.165, quoted by Falters, p.160). But Southwold (quoted ibid, note 7) stresses that this was the minimum figure, with an average number of around twenty clients for each mutongole. A chief's subjects were his clients through receiving an allocation of the land under his jurisdiction. They served as his warriors and political supporters, and benefited from his distribution of goods received in war or from the kabaka. The patron gave his clients a means of contact with the higher-ranking chiefs, and thereby the possibility of political advancement. In particular, a patron might introduce a client's children in the court of his own patron, and even that of the kabaka. This meant the possibility of the child becoming one of his wives, or being trained for political office. A chief received many services from his clients besides their following him in war: they provided labour for his person and enclosure, and on other construction work for which he was responsible, like the obligatory road from his enclosure to the kabaka's court; they paid him tribute from their wealth and labour. All these demands were substantial, particularly with the increase in military campaigning as the nineteenth century went on.

Falters estimates that:

"bakopi men probably contributed as much to the support of the nonproductive superstructure as they did to their own households" (1964, p.83)

But neither they nor their wives ever laboured in the patron's banana groves, or otherwise provided for his subsistence - this was done by his own wives. Moreover, they differed from clients in Rwanda in two crucial respects.
Firstly, they were not members of a "closed status group" — i.e. one with "status by descent" (Weber, 1970, p.405) — or caste which was excluded from acting as patrons to members of a higher caste, as were Hutu in Rwanda (see chapter 1). Their situation was structurally the same in this respect as that within the Tutsi caste in Rwanda — any client could, in ideology, attain political office and become a patron, or a patron lose office and become a client. However, there was a difference in that Baganda clients who were not also patrons (i.e. those without political office, mostly the bakopi) did not, like Tutsi clients who did not act as patrons to the other Tutsi, have a subordinate caste to patronize. Secondly, in notable contrast to the Hutu in Rwanda, the Baganda client could leave his patron (a named process — 'kusenguka') without great difficulty and, apparently, was ready to do so (Southwold, 1964, pp.213-4). In order to satisfy their superiors' demands and avoid dismissal, village chiefs had to be careful not to alienate their clients (ibid, p.214). Chiefs competed for clients. As Southwold says, in the resulting situation

"The musenze lacked constitutional checks, not because his position was too weak to obtain them, but because it was too strong to require them" (ibid.)

This was the reverse of the position of the Hutu in Rwanda, who were too weak to obtain them.

Land was the most important of the goods redistributed by the chief. A man who wished to cultivate and settle on the land under a chief's jurisdiction had to become his client (kusenga) by the same process of rendering goods, services, obedience and military support as did the chief to his own patron. Land was more than a token of the patron-client relationship because, unlike cattle in Rwanda, it was essential in itself for the subsistence of the client; but it did have the aspect of a token as well. A Mukopi could not be the client of any other patron than the one from whom he held his land, and the latter was necessarily his political chief. The right to allocate land, and thus to establish a clientage, was exclusively limited to political authorities. A man who was dismissed from political office also lost his land and clients. The land grant can be seen in its aspect as a token in that the chief had no interest in the economic activity carried out on it, and exercised no supervision, so long as the client paid his dues and services.

It has been pointed out by Mukwaya (1953, pp.6-7) that the most useful analytical approach to land tenure in precolonial Buganda would examine the distribution of several different kinds of rights among persons and categories of persons, with allowance for overlapping. This is in contrast
to the analytical approach of Mair (1934) which only examines rights as attached to incumbency of particular statuses, or membership of corporate groups, giving an overly-uniform and static picture. In Buganda persons might achieve rights of different kinds by combining roles, and there was much variation because of the insecurity of those rights and the kabaka's frequent intervention. So Mukwaya isolates four main kinds of precolonial rights over land: (1) obutaka (clan rights) (2) obutongole (rights of the kabaka and his chiefs) (3) obwesengeze ("individual hereditary rights") (4) abihanja (peasant rights of occupation).

Firstly, lands held by clan rights were places where ancestors were buried. This established the clan's claim either that the land was held from before the arrival of the first kabaka, or that it was a grant from an earlier kabaka. Clan lands were never contiguous blocks larger than a few villages, and often much smaller than that. They were scattered throughout Buganda, though there tended to be a concentration around the original nucleus of the kingdom (Fallers, 1964, pp.85-87). Their inhabitants were rarely composed in the majority by members of the clan claiming the obutaka rights, because the political power of the state had made mobility possible within a wide area, and made ties of clientage more important than those of descent - so that if a patron was transferred to another chiefship his clients usually went too (see above). Furthermore, the kabaka sometimes made heritable grants to favourites who were then buried there by their families, establishing rights similar to those of the central or 'original' clan lands. Clan or lineage (siga) heads tended to be more powerful patrons in the areas furthest removed from the kabaka's capital, for there was less competition from other types of chiefs. Their power was also increased greatly if they were appointed as higher administrative chiefs.

Secondly, the kabaka and his chiefs held estates attached to their offices, the number increasing with the importance of the office. This applied not only to the administrative chiefs, but also to officials of the palace. The point here is that these lands were granted personally by the kabaka, and not attached in any formal or hereditary way to the official. All these grants included political rights, but only at the lowest level could they be delegated by anybody other than the kabaka. They were instantly revocable by the kabaka, and returned to him at the holder's death. The holders had the same power over the officials they appointed on the lands (with the kabaka's approval). The more important estate-holders were not taxed, but expected to present gifts to their patron.
Thirdly, the kabaka might give permanent, hereditary rights of tenure of a small holding to a favourite; most of the chiefs received such land, which carried no political rights and was free of labour obligations by its peasant occupants to the chief.

Fourthly, all peasants could hold land from a political chief as their patron, with a marginally better chance of favour if a kinship link could be established - it was not necessary to seek this (see above); good patrons were followed by their clients as they were transferred around the kingdom. The rights of the client were to security of tenure and inheritance; and certain common rights to pasture, water and fuel, so long as he paid his dues in beer, food, labour and military service to his patron. The tenure to which a client sought security was under the political and social protection of the patron; his actual holding might move from one part of the patron's land to another.

Thus the kyalo, was the basic political unit (Southwold, 1964, p.212) under its chief who was usually directly appointed by the kabaka, (Fallers, 1964, p.175). The inhabitants of the kyalo comprised neither a localized kin-group, nor a group of persons bound to that particular piece of ground. They were the chief's clients, bound by ties of political allegiance. But the introduction of the mailo system of land tenure (see below) in 1900 and fragmentation of the estates later, turned the kyalo into a "collection of independent peasant families each owning its own piece of land" (Southwold 1965, p.95). By the 1950s many landlords, great and small were absentees - a survey of 685 landlords in 2 subcounties in Busiro and 1 in Kyagwe found respectively 26%, 28% and 18% were absentees (Richards, 1966, p.105).

The economic function of the chiefs as redistributors of tribute and war booty was formally ended in 1900. From 1888, groups of the kabaka's chiefs had competed for power in a civil war which was only settled in 1897. The settlement was consolidated under British overrule in the Agreement of 1900, in a way that institutionalised the power of the victorious groups of chiefs against rivals and against the kabaka - mainly by creating private property in land (mailo tenure) and distributing it to reinforce the new political power structure (Fallers, 1964, p.163).

In the 1900 Agreement the kabaka, his close kin and the great chiefs received the ownership of 1,003 square miles of land (clause 15; see Low and Pratt, 1960, pp.359-60) Initially, about a thousand lesser chiefs and clients of the kabaka, chosen by the great council, the Lukiiko, received another 8,000 square miles (ibid.). However, many other chiefs and clients managed to establish a claim to a mailo allotment, since they were the clients of those who already had them (ibid. pp.115-122); and in the end, 3,945 chiefs of all
ranks shared the total 9,000 square miles (ibid.). The British Protectorate Government took the remaining 10,500 square miles of forest, waste and uncultivated land (ibid, p.359).

It was only over a long period that political rights and duties were differentiated out from land ownership; after the mailo allotments the landowner continued to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, the collection of taxes and the political representation of his tenants at the lower councils. These duties required attendance on the estate or, where the holdings were not contiguous, the appointment of stewards (abasigire). Mailo was different in other ways, specified in the 1908 Land Law, from ordinary English freehold: (1) mailo land could only be leased or transferred to another person of the Uganda Protectorate, unless there was special permission from the Governor, (2) customary rights of way and access to water had to be maintained, and in the absence of a will customary procedures of inheritance and succession followed. Despite these limitations, up to 30 sq. miles of land might be held in individual ownership very close to freehold. Mailo land was given to a small category of office-holders, but mainly in perpetual economic ownership dissociated from political office. Thus the kabaka did not have overlordship of all estates any longer, and the 1908 law specifically stated that mailo owners did not have to pay any dues to 'a chief who is superior to him'. Their tenants paid them dues as landlords, and were not thereby exempt from taxation through the political system. Nevertheless, for at least the first generation, the personal biographies of mailo holders provided, as intended by the British, a continuing association of land and power.

The ownership of mailo land was increasingly efficiently defined by law, by registration ordinances in 1908 and 1922, and a land law of 1939. Thus legally enforceable rights in land became much curtailed in respect of the number of claimants - although this development will be exaggerated if we forget how limited the claims of the peasantry were in practice in the precolonial period. Much more important was the creation of economic classes in different relations to the means of production, i.e. landlords and tenants (see below also). The position of the peasants settled on the mailo owners' land was not legally defined until 1928. In the intervening period, mailo owners continued to act as patrons - though now as economic rather than political protectors. However, this meant that they had considerable political power over their own estates, which they used to extract tribute in goods and labour. With the introduction of a cotton cash-crop, and the rising world price in it after the First World War, this 'tribute' had an economic value. Landlords tried to increase their demands, and the
structure of power between the economic classes began to be reflected in political relations.

Besides the ordinary mailo holdings, there were also the lands held by the Crown and the kabaka. Because Crown lands were largely uncultivated, and not administered differently from mailo land, tenants did not move to them in any numbers, as can be seen from the small proportions of the population there in 1950 (Mukwaya, 1953, p. 17). In the 1900 Agreement the kabaka received 350 sq. miles of mailo land attached to his office and 150 sq. miles as a private person. Over half the official mailos were in the one county of Kyagwe, and much of the rest in Kyadondo, Bulemesi, Busiro and Buddu. Like the other 416 sq. miles of official mailo attached to other political offices, the kabaka had only their usufruct while in office. They were held in trust by the minister of finance of the Buganda government, but they were administered in all matters except finance by a special servant of the kabaka, the katikkiro we byalo bya kabaka. It seems that the kabaka's private estates were administered in the same way, and also could not be sold. The kabaka's tenants (31,000 on his private estates in 1950) had the same rights and obligations as elsewhere except for paying an extra tribute of a bunch of plantains each month, and leaves and fibre as required (ibid.).

The original allotments, even aside from the special amounts received by the kabaka, his close kin and the great chiefs, were large. At first, mailo was allotted in units of one square mile, and no original allotment was for less than a quarter of a square mile. This is reflected in the survey of 1935 (by E.A.I.S.R. - see Richards, 1954) of two areas in Busiro and Buddu counties. At the time of first registration in about 1920, when some fragmentation had already taken place, the bulk of mailo land was held in estates of one sq. mile or more (see Mukwaya, 1953, p. 29): in the Busiro area, where there were a great many different claims and some difficulty in securing contiguity of estates, 71.24% of mailo land was held by 17 estates in this way (with 32.05% in two estates of more than two sq. miles); in the Buddu area, where mailos more often began as single estates, fragmentation was about the same as in Busiro, and 84.42% was held in 23 estates of over one sq. mile (with 38.23% in two estates of over two sq. miles). In both areas together, there were 98 estates held by 78 persons, and this accounted for 1,620% of all estates in Buganda in 1920 (Mukwaya, 1953, p. 29). By 1950 there had been considerable fragmentation of holdings, and there were 487 estates held by 687 registered proprietors. In Buganda as a whole the 6,050 estates of 1920 had become shared by about 50,000-60,000 persons (ibid; Wrigley, 1964, p. 49), though Fallers estimates...
that 60% of these persons owned less than 10 acres (1964, p.144).

The apparently startling fragmentation of the estates should not lead us to imagine a loss of power by the original mailo elite or a widening of the power group. To return to the sample areas: while there was a considerable increase in the number of owners of the smallest mailo holdings (in 1950 there were 415 estates of under 21 acres; in 1920 there had been only 19), the numbers of the larger estates were little, if at all, reduced (in 1920 there were 21 estates of more than 600 acres, 31 of more than 300 acres; in 1950 these were respectively 14 and 32 estates). The proportion of land held in the category of estates over 600 acres declined considerably from 57.62% to 33.8% but that in the 300-600 acres category remained constant at 26.33% (1920) and 26.42% (1950). These figures support Mukwaya's statement (1953, p.32) that the great estates did not disappear dramatically; rather small pieces were sold, and the estates tended to stabilize at a large size in each generation. The sales did not necessarily indicate declining economic power, often being the means of raising cash for investment in more rewarding sectors of the economy (see below). And as land owning became relatively less directly important in mobilizing political support, as it became available to a larger number of people and as economic criteria took on greater importance, the amount owned was an important element in social status and the distinctiveness of the elite. This can be seen in the behaviour of the owners of the larger estates. In 1950 in the sample area, 75.3% of the land was owned by 13.2% of owners, at an average of 427 acres each; while 24.7% of the land was owned by those with less than 100 acres (86.8% of owners at an average of 21.4 acres each).

Among the larger landowners there was a greater hereditary element in the means of acquisition of their estates: only 15.6% of those estates over 100 acres had been acquired by sale, as against 64.25% of those under 100 acres. Most of the larger estates were acquired by first registration or inheritance, and there were only 2 cases of transfer by gift as against 123 cases in the smaller estates category. (Mukwaya, 1953, p.30-31).

Inheritance itself did not lead to the fragmentation of the larger estates because of the widespread practice of leaving the whole, or most, of the estate to a single heir. This applied to half the estates in the sample which had changed hands since 1920, i.e. 40 out of 80, with 18 unchanged. On 20 of these estates the main heir received more than two-thirds, and the rest was shared among 53 other heirs. Multiple ownership drawn from a single dynasty was also very common in Buganda (Richards, 1966, p.102). But it appears that below a certain size of estate there was roughly equal division among heirs. Thus in so far as inheritance led
to fragmentation of estates, it did so mainly among the smaller holdings.

Gifts of small holdings of mailo were made to clients and close kin, just as traditionally the higher chiefs had distributed lesser political rights to their following, with the kabaka's approval. Thus gifts to close relatives probably helped to maintain the main estate for a single heir. All gift-acquired estates were politically tied closely to the interests of the larger estates, which acted against a polarization of their interests emerging as political conflict (ibid.).

Most land transfers in the category of estates under 100 acres were by sale. Among the more important motives of the great landowners for sale were those involving some kind of long-term investment, as in raising capital for commercial and construction investment, or for educating the children. Land was also bought as an investment, in higher social status, greater political opportunities (Richards, 1963, p.273) and to some extent, profit from rent, (Wrigley, 1959, p.52), rather than from agricultural production. In Richards' 1954 sample, landlords on average cultivated only 6 acres as against the average tenants 2½-3 acres (p.37). Thus those who bought land were not an aggressive, entrepreneurial class challenging the dominance of a landlord class, but rather the latter's imitators. Nor did they buy land simply in token quantities while their main economic interests were elsewhere, for the normal method of buying was to acquire as much as possible with the money available (Mukwaya, p.35). There were even very few entrepreneurs exploiting the difference between land prices as charged to different categories of kin, and the 'economic' value of the land; perhaps only eight such speculators in Buganda, according to the Registrar of Titles (ibid, p.40).

The British Administration also limited the commercial exploitation of landownership by prohibiting the mortgaging of mailo to non-Baganda, unless rights of foreclosure or sale were excluded. Thus only 1.5% of the land in the 1954 sample was mortgaged, about half each to the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank and to Indian businessmen.

Ownership of land failed to remain the basis for an economic class principally because the Busulu and Enuvojo Law of 1927, passed under strong British pressure, (Low & Pratt, 1960), virtually ended the economic content of the landlord-tenant role relationship. This legislation and the interest in ownership for social and political, rather than economic, reasons reinforced each other in limiting conflicts of economic interest between landlord and tenant. The dues paid by a tenant were fixed, and soon had only 'nominal' value (Southwold, 1964, pp.215-6). They consisted of: a busulu of 10 sh.p.a., and an envujo of 25h per brewing of beer,
plus a scheduled payment on cotton and coffee cash crops of 2Sh. per acre in
five of the counties and 4Sh. per acre in the others. There was little scope
for economic exploitation of landlordship. As long as a tenant had a
ticket to show he had paid his busulu he could only be evicted by a court
order for failing to cultivate for over six months; the court could grant
compensation for improvements by the tenant; the tenant had rights to trees
and pasture; tenancies were heritable; changes in the ownership of the
mailo could not affect the tenants' standing. Few landlords could live
from rent alone, or use their land as capital, and most landlords did not
hold fundamentally different positions in economic processes from most
Baganda tenants. But wherever landlords attempted to exploit their position
the conflict emerged (Richards, 1954; Gutkind, 1963, p.179). Non-Baganda
could not establish rights to cultivation by living on vacant or rented
land, as Baganda could. They only had security of tenure in their huts,
so long as they paid the rent (which was not fixed). And in areas where
landowners could see the value of exploiting the land themselves, particu-
larly in the best coffee regions and those around towns, conflicts emerged
between Baganda over such issues as boundaries; the growing practice of
landlords of demanding an entry fee for a holding; their keeping some holdings
for migrant cotton cultivators who, as temporary residents, were not protected
by the Busulu and Envujo Law from high rents (up to 50Sh. an acre); attempts
by the tenants to avoid the landlord's right of reversion if they moved.

While the main reasons for the acquisition of land were thus political
and social, its value in these fields also declined. The owners of smaller
mailo holding of less than 100 acres (86.8%) had little chance of capitalizing
politically on the association of power with landholding, except at the village
level, for they were unable to fill the patron's role adequately. Mukwaya
estimates (p.74) that the most such a landlord could earn from rent would
be about equal to an unskilled labourer's wages - about 500Sh. pa. A
landlord could not increase his income by farming all the land because the
tenancies were protected; nor could he raise the rents fixed by law.
He could only resort to unpopular pressure: by renting land to immigrants,
demanding entry fees or trying to enforce reversionary rights even in
temporary absences. These measures were too irregular to ensure an
income. Southwold found that by the 1950s the muluka chiefs (the lowest
level officially recognised - see chapter 6), were receiving authority and
income from office and not landownership, and few could live off their estates;
that their unpaid assistants, the batongole, were increasingly difficult to
mobilize; and that

"the distinction between chiefs and peasants, which was formerly
made on the basis of the ownership of land, is disappearing as more and more people acquire land; and consequently even at the lowest levels the authority of the chiefs is becoming more purely bureaucratic". (1956, p.95)

In other words, the top status (see below) group had ceased to rely purely on landholding to legitimate its status and political power. Following the land reform of 1927, landownership ceased to define an economic class. More slowly, it lost its "traditional"function, reinforced in the early years of the mailo system, of indicating high status. Richards (1954, p.173) considers batongole still had much power and authority over their tenants, if they were landowners, but it is clear that their actual authority would depend on how they interpreted their role (cf. Southwold, 1964, pp.229-30; chapter 7). At the local level, holders of mailo land could claim somewhat higher status than customary tenants, (Richards, 1963, p.274).

Here it is necessary to examine briefly a question which I take up further in chapters 5 and 6: the part played in the economic power structure by symbolic patterns of group organization. I have emphasized the extent to which access to the capacity to act as a patron was controlled by political rather than economic or cultural processes in the precolonial kingdom. It is necessary to qualify this in respect of status stratification, while emphasizing that this was not 'closed' by descent as in Rwanda either in ideology or to anything like the same extent in practice. There was an element of inheritance, nsikirano (Fallers, 1964, p.169) in accession to some political offices - mainly the bataka offices (see chapter 5) and the kingship itself. But such succession did not go automatically to a particular person, and even quite distant collaterals were eligible - though this latter ideology may not have been extensively practised, at least in regard to the kingship (Southwold, 1966), there were invariably several possible claimants among close agnatic kin. Moreover, the kabaka had to approve all successors to political office. It remains, though, that there were strong elements of agnatic linkage in succession to political office - it was one relevant factor. Fallers refers usefully to "dynasties" of chiefs, such as that to which Sir Apolo Kagwa belonged (1964, p.171). The chances of a man of bakopi status becoming even one of the lowest-level chiefs were very limited, although they always existed (ibid, p.175). Fallers considers that;

"throughout the nineteenth century..there had existed an elite class of persons with great power and wealth - an elite class in Marx and Weber's sense of a category of persons occupying an 'objectively' advantageous political and economic position" (ibid, p.176-7).
While I find the term 'elite class' extremely useful (see Introduction), I think that Fallers' use of 'class', in reference to a situation in which no differentiated economic power structure (in, as I see it, Weber's sense) can be analysed, begs important questions about the sources of power in precolonial Buganda. And although there was "throughout the nineteenth century" an 'elite' status group (not class - and essentially 'subjective') it did not use its own symbolic pattern of organization, occupation of political office, to control recruitment. It lacked non-political symbols, a subculture giving a sense of common identity (ibid, p.163), which could become more important than status distinctions between political officials. This 'problem' was overcome when some political officials took up the 'new religions' of Islam and Christianity in the later n-ineteenth century (see chapter 5).

The convert elite which seized power from the kabaka Mwanga in the civil war, under protection of the British, established itself as an economic class of landowners after 1900. It had already acquired symbolic organization through Christianity and, to a lesser extent, Islam (Wrigley, 1959; Gee, 1958). But with the spread of these religions, the elite had to find other ways of maintaining distinctiveness (cf. Cohen, 1969a). This was achieved by the adoption of a 'British' life-style, including 'gentlemanly' manners and status-symbolic goods such as brick houses, tea-drinking, wearing watches etc. (see chapter 5). The educational system, beyond the reach of most of the non-elite, played a vital part in the indoctrination of this new form of distinctiveness and ideology. As Richards says (1963, p.272):

"The first Ganda landowners began feverishly to realize their assets in order to secure a quasi-European standard of living as to housing, furniture, clothing and education. They sold parts of their new estates....Peasants began to buy land...but the great landowners had about 20 years' start. The first landowners also used their money to acquire access to European boarding schools for their sons and daughters and even to send them overseas to be educated. Their sons thus became specially fitted to fill posts in the Protectorate or Buganda Government as clerks, supervisors or chiefs."

In the precolonial period there was a specialized form of education for potential chiefs, who went as pages (bagalagala) to the kabaka's court. They were recommended by the existing chiefs, and very largely consisted of their sons and other kin (Fallers, p.171). There is no evidence given by Fallers, in his discussion, to make us consider the stories of slaves being sent in the place of their own sons by chiefs, because the latter feared the kabaka's harsh treatment of his pages - which Fallers considers a significant element in traditional mobility (p.176) - were more than ideological statements by political enemies or those who wished to emphasize
the mobility in the traditional system, like Kagwa from whom the data was obtained. In the absence of more convincing evidence we must regard this mode of recruitment of the political class as ensuring a considerable hereditary element in the sense discussed above. This pattern of education was reproduced at each chief's court for recruitment to lower-level posts.

After the landlordship was established in 1900, (see below), its predominance was ensured by the creation of new schools for the education of the elite, modelled on the English boarding school. There were no scholarships, and the fees restricted entry informally to the kin of chiefs, who alone had access to the amounts of cash required, as intended by the missionaries (Fallers 1964, p.183). The leading schools of each denomination were Mengo High School (Anglican) and Namilyano (Catholic); later they were, respectively, King's College, Budo and St. Mary's college, Bwibuti. Recruitment to the political elite was restricted by this mode of entry (Low, 1962, p.22). Places were fewer than those offered by the old chiefs' courts; and the missionaries encouraged the chiefs to send only their own sons (and often only those by their 'ring' wives). However, chiefs continued to finance kin other than their own sons, so that in the elite sample of 1957-8 (Fallers 1964, p.201), it was found that 81% of those who had had only primary education were neither sons nor grandsons of original mailo allottees; 66% of those with secondary education; 63% of those with higher education.

In the absence of other evidence, it is curious that Fallers should take this as evidence of the openness of his 'elite' category through education. That about one third of a very broadly defined category (of doubtful relevance, see chapter 6), were the direct descendants (sons or grandsons) or original mailo allottees speaks of a considerable inheritance factor, particularly in a society in which equality of collaterals was such a strong value and not entirely removed by the Christian emphasis on the 'ring' wife (ibid, p.202). The inheritance factor was probably considerably higher in what I would call the elite - the group, not Fallers' status category (see chapter 6). The elite of 1900 remained a distinct status group, and passed its status to its children.

Educational opportunities remained limited. In 1956, there were about 300,000 children of school age in Buganda: there were school places for 70,000 (primary); 4,000 (secondary and technical); and 200 (post-secondary); a few persons studied abroad (ibid, p.139). Even in the 1957-8 elite sample of 298 'elite' members, nearly half went to King's College, Budo or St. Mary's, Bwibuti; and in certain political categories the proportion was much higher: 9 out of 10 party leaders; 4 out of 7 nominated Lukiiko members;
7 out of 8 Legislative Council members; 15 out of 19 county chiefs; 37 out of 56 Buganda civil servants; 12 out of 15 Uganda civil servants; 5 out of 6 ministers.

I want now to analyze the structure of economic power relations during the colonial period, in order to show what conflicts of 'objective' interests there were, and how they were related to perceived conflicts — to which the preceding part of this chapter will be seen to be relevant. The Agreement of 1900 established two economic classes with different relations to the means of production: (1) landlords, living by tribute (rent) and sales — they lacked a way to exploit the land directly, apart from its use as a capital asset through sales, until cotton became established as a cash crop; (2) tenants living by 'peasant production (cf. Wolf 1966; p.10; Stinchcombe, 1967, p.185).

With the introduction of the cotton cash crop the opportunity for the landlords to establish a new base in the processes of production by exploiting their holdings seemed to be available (Richards, 1963, p.272). However, they did not have the political or economic power to turn their client-tenants into plantation labourers, as happened in the Eastern Province of Uganda (Wrigley, 1964, p.35), although they did try to divert the new corvee (kasanyu) demanded by the British to their own estates (Powesland, 1957, p.20). Tenants could too easily move or find other employment. Land was not scarce: in 1921 there was only an average population density of 45 per square mile on fertile land. Conversely, labour was scarce, and there were relatively many employment opportunities outside cultivation, as for example small traders and cotton-buyers, clerks, carriers, labourers, drivers, artisans. Without the means to compel their tenants to work on their behalf, landowners remained essentially unproductive (Richards, 1963, p.272) it was only from the 1920s that this was offset to some degree by immigrant labour. Their tenants individually cultivated a small amount of cotton and, later, coffee besides the subsistence crops grown by women. Other Baganda did not rely on landownership or cash-crop cultivation alone, and took advantage of the growing variety of non-agrarian employment opportunities.

This situation is often analysed as the background to the distinction which developed between landowning and political office holding. The number of landowners grew considerably (see above), and possession of a large estate was no longer necessarily associated with political office. Wrigley states:

"A clearer distinction could now be drawn between the official
hierarchy of administrators and the economic class of landed proprietors. The aristocracy as a whole had gained new administrative functions which to some extent replaced its old role of leadership in war, but it had lost its former direct control over the production and distribution of wealth" (1964, p.37-38).

Such an analysis fails to recognize the extent to which the larger landowners used their land as capital for acquiring the means to retain political power and take advantage of the new elite employment opportunities. Land ownership, as I showed above, did not offer the means to control production and distribution of wealth. It could only be a resource in the pursuit of political power if converted into cash to pay for education or commercial investment.

The great landowners retained their economic situation, and even in the 1950s some Baganda could afford to live from fixed dues (Wrigley, 1964, p.50) - which is not to say that they limited themselves to this. Except in their case, the amount of land actually cultivated became a more significant element in economic power than the amount of land owned, or whether it was held in ownership or tenancy. Cotton developed rapidly as a cash crop after its introduction in 1904, with the value of the total crop in Uganda rising from £1,089 in 1905-6 to £165,412 by 1910-11, and over £4½m. by 1924-5 (of which Buganda produced about one third). (Wrigley, 1959, pp.15 & 47). After the second World War the value continued to rise fast, though production fell in the 1950s (ibid. p.68). Coffee was later developed as a cash-crop. After the Second World War it became even more valuable than cotton, with high prices on world markets until the second half of the 1950s. Most coffee was produced in Buganda - over 85% of the 1956 crop, for example (ibid. p.74). At about this time, cash incomes in the Mmengo region of Buganda were about 700-1000 Shs. per year, (Southwold, 1965, p.110). There was generally a rapid increase in the real income of cash-crop cultivators, which ensured a market for locally-manufactured goods. The rise in urban population as local industries became established, provided a more diversified market, in food, for cultivators. This upward economic spiral is in notable contrast with the precolonial 'vicious circle' of low income and productivity described by Ehrlich (1956). Cash was used to pay taxes (from the Hut Tax of three rupees made as part of the 1900 Agreement), rent, and sometimes hired labour for construction or the fields. A cash income became necessary for setting up a household, with a plot and a wife, and most young Baganda had to find wage-employment at some period of their lives.

While most cultivators held only two to three acres of food crops, and one to three acres of cash crops (Mukwaya,1953, & Southwold, 1965, p.110), there now existed after the second World War much larger cash farming units
of up to 150 acres, with the bulk of such holdings in the 10 to 30 acres range. Analytically, we may distinguish three economic classes. Firstly, those capitalists who lived by rent or employed labour on a regular basis in commerce and industrial and agricultural production. Richards (1954) restricts the use of the term 'agricultural capitalist' to those farming with hired labour on 100 acres or more. This quantitative criterion gives too static an analysis of economic relationships and its relevance to empirical processes is not clear; I do not use it. Secondly, those farmers who produced cash crops with their own labour, while their women cultivated subsistence crops. They might irregularly employ an extra labourer. Stinchcombe (1967) would call them 'small-holders'. Thirdly, landless labourers.

Although there may have been overlapping and marginal cases, as one would expect in a situation of relatively high economic mobility, these three 'ideal' relations to the means of production represent the significant discontinuities. Even Wrigley, who considers that there was a continuum between categories two and three of mine, admits that by 1956 there was a class who owned little more than their banana grove, and depended considerably on wage-earning for their cash income. By this time land had ceased to be a 'free good', and there were high initial payments for tenancies. (1959, p.79). Professionals, traders, skilled and semi-skilled workers form significant economic categories but cannot be seen as distinct classes because they were cross-cut by differential property relations, or formed only part of a wider class (cf. Bottomore, 1964, chapter IV).

Baganda traders comprised more than half the African traders of the Protectorate in 1953 (6,683 African traders were resident in Buganda - Fallers 1964, p.145), while Baganda were only a quarter of the total population. But only 20% of these traders made £249 or more net profit, and almost an equal proportion (18%) made a loss (ibid.). As Fallers says: "Shopkeeping remains largely a side-line". Thus most traders fall into the second or third categories as outlined above. Only a few were themselves employers, and thus 'commercial capitalists'. There were 85 Baganda directors of 36 limited companies in a variety of activities, including publishing, food processing and marketing, and construction. The leaders of the bigger co-operative societies for processing and marketing should be considered as salaried professionals. There were 379 societies in 1954 (ibid. p. 147).

The profession-als varied greatly in their class affliations. Religious officials and teachers were recruited from all classes, with
a noticeable tendency for the more prestigious and well-remunerated jobs to be held by those with more capital to invest in extended education (ibid, p.139), i.e. those from my 'capitalist' class. This applies to all the 'professions'. Those from 'capitalist' class families were much more significantly represented in those occupations requiring the greatest capital investment: the law, and western medicine. Top politicians and journalists were drawn from the foregoing professional occupations together with direct recruitment from the landlord and agricultural capitalist class. Thus in 1956 the leaders of the three main existing parties whose occupations were known were: six teachers, six merchants, three landowners and 'gentleman farmers', three doctors, three journalists, a lawyer, a building contractor, a printer and a 'professional politician' (Fallers, 1964, p.154). The major journalists were politicians as well (ibid.).

Landless labourers were principally African immigrants - overwhelmingly so in agriculture (Richards, 1954). There were about 100,000 wage-earners in Buganda in 1956 (Fallers, 1964, p.147). Industrial employment was only a small part of urban employment, which consisted mainly of public and municipal services - about a quarter of all Kampala employees - commerce, transport and domestic service (Elkan and Fallers, 1960, p.243). Because of their better education and strategic position in their own homeland, such Baganda as were wage-earners tended to be in the better-paid jobs, as white-collar and skilled workers (Elkan, 1960, Table 7, pp.44-47) But though they form the most stable labour-group (Elkan, 1956), they tend to regard the town and wage-labour as temporary phases, and to retain their links with rural areas. Elkan and Fallers comment:

"Many Baganda town workers 'commute' daily from rural holdings, where their wives cultivate both food and cash crops. Others maintain an urban lodging for use during the week but return every weekend to a rural home many dozens of miles away" (1960, p.249).

Thus Baganda wage-earners do not simply fall into the class of the landless, as most of the immigrants do. In 1950 between 55-75% of immigrants worked in agricultural labour, and most of the remainder went to unskilled urban labour, which Baganda avoided (Richards, 1954 p.94).

We may arrive at a crude estimation of the proportions of the rural population in the different classes by examining carefully the descriptions of the characteristics of his five categories of agriculturists, divided analytically by wealth, given by Wrigley (n.d., quoted by Hunter, 1962 p.99). His categories are (a) Larger Farmers: 2% (b) well-to-do Peasants:
19% (3) Middling Peasants: 27% (4) Poor Peasants: 32% (5) Landless Labourers: 20%. Large Farmers may employ as many as 100 labourers, though 12-20 is more common. The Well-to-Do Peasant "generally employs one or two porters (labourers) fairly regularly, and 1 or 2 more occasionally, but he nearly always does some manual work himself".

The Middling Peasant "rarely employs hired labour". Thus we find at most 21% in my first economic class (and many of these will undoubtedly be much more like the second class); 59% in my second class (comprising Wrigley's 'middling' and 'poor' peasants, and, I suggest, many of the 'rich' peasants); and 20% in my third class of landless labourers.

Wrigley himself attempts to identify "economic classes" in Buganda in the late colonial period (1964, pp. 52-60), and concludes that: "there is very great economic differentiation but hardly any clear-cut stratification" (p. 60). There are two analytically distinct points confused here. (1) There were economic classes in the sense used by Marx, and elaborated by Weber (see above), (2) Consciousness of class was inhibited by the existence of cross-cutting status groups. These have often been referred to as 'objective' and 'subjective' criteria for class, respectively. However, they should not be confused in an attempt to analyze a single scale of stratification. Weber has made a clear distinction between 'class' in the economic order of institutions, and 'status group' in the social order (1970, p. 193). Wrigley fails to recognize this distinction when he identifies 'economic classes' in Buganda by different levels of income, and possession of certain critical items such as a car. He is, in fact, thereby analyzing one aspect of social status in Buganda - which is, as he says, not clear-cut. The lack of clarity in the system of status stratification, and its not being coextensive with the economic class system, is significant in the study of political change in Buganda. It is particularly so if we are to explain the apparent identity of political interests perceived by persons in the different economic classes in the decade before Independence, (see chapter 7). Classification into strata on the basis of wealth does not provide us with significant variables unless it is demonstrated that each stratum was conscious of corporate interests in status, or that its members had similar economic interests.
Much of the same criticisms must be applied to Fallers' model of stratification in modern Buganda (1964, p.187). He describes an occupational elite of about 10,000 out of the 360,000 adult male taxpayers of 1956. The criterion for inclusion are those of status evaluation and not those of economic class: "1,076 Protectorate government civil servants; the Buganda government civil servants who made 500 Shs. or more per month; the 3,354 teachers, 289 Christian priests and Muslim sheikhs, and 54 doctors and lawyers; the 85 company directors, some 1,200 traders who made more than £250 per year net profit, and the 2,500 (more or less) owners of more than 10 acres of mailo land with five or more tenants. (ibid.). Fallers admits the arbitrariness of this grouping - even so, it is difficult to see its value in analysis. The first category includes drivers, carpenters, a cobbler, different grades of clerks and jailers besides senior officials (1964, pp.132-4). Most of the teachers, priests, traders and landowners would be part of local rather than national elites. More than half these teachers taught in vernacular grades (Apter, 1961, p.372). Between the top status grouping and the mass of about 300,000 peasants and unskilled workers, Fallers places about 50,000 persons in a 'middle group' comprising about 20,000 'substantial' farmers and landowners, 25,000 skilled workers, and about 5,000 lesser traders. Again, this 'hierarchy' has no demonstrated empirical reality in social interaction.

The significant point about the economic classes as I have analyzed them is that from soon after the passing of the Busulu and Envujo Law in 1928, very few Baganda made their livelihood by exploiting the labour of other Baganda. Firstly, only the very largest landowners could afford to live from busulu and envujo, for these fixed dues soon became unrelated to the economic value of the land in production. These landowners and their families often took employment in other sectors of the economy, but were notably unsuccessful in establishing themselves in commerce. According to Wrigley:

"there have been a number of ambitious ventures into wholesale distribution and large-scale produce marketing, mostly led by men drawn from the upper ranks of society, men of property and education...with very few exceptions these have been total failures". (1964, p.50)

Differentiation of economic roles among the landlord class therefore centred on professional and higher administrative careers. Secondly, Baganda without their own land to farm very seldom became agricultural labourers; they migrated to the towns where they worked on their own account as petty traders or as employees of Europeans and Asians in a great variety of occupations (see above). Elkan and Fallers found that Baganda usually worked in town
until they had enough money to buy a substantial plot or set themselves up in a small business; and all assumed that they would eventually become self-employed (1964, pp.248, 250). Landless persons who worked for Baganda employers were mostly immigrants. Thus the development of economic classes in Buganda after 1900 did not, after the initial period in which a landlord class exercised economic power directly at the expense of their tenants, mean that conflicts of 'objective' interests between Baganda in terms of the economic power structure were perceived as more important than other interests — notably in status (see chapter 7; Stinchcombe, 1967, Weber, 1970, p.186). Such conflict did exist between Baganda employers, on one side, and immigrant landless labourers and temporary tenants. Baganda of all classes were strongly united against aliens: the Asian and European employers; the British colonialists; petty Asian trade competitors; competing African immigrant labourers and temporary tenants who also, it was claimed (see Elkan, 1956, p.23), undercut Baganda living standards.

Common Baganda hostility to aliens should not be seen to imply consensus in all fields of social relations, and should be examined in the full socio-economic context of immigration. In 1948 the Baganda population of Buganda was 855,362 which was 66% of the total African population; immigrants comprised 441,339 or 34% of the total. The distribution of the immigrants varied steadily throughout the country from 3.7% in Bungazzi county to 52.3% in Mawogola (Richards, 1954, p.95). Between 1931 and 1948 the African population of Buganda increased 49.6%, but there was a particularly noticeable rise in the immigrant, especially Banyarwanda and Barundi populations. The latter two peoples produced 42.8% of the increase, other immigrants 33.3% and the Baganda only 23.9% (ibid., p.116). By 1959 the Baganda proportion of the Buganda population had declined from 66% to 55% (1,006, 101 out of 1,834, 128: Southwold 1965).

There were four main ways immigrants became involved in the cultivation system: as paid labourers or 'porters' (abapakasi); as tenants under the protection of the Busulu and Envujo law (abafunye bibanja); as other kinds of tenants, mainly seasonal (abapangisa); as land buyers (abalina etaka). A sample of three counties — Busiro, Kyagwe, Buddu — showed that an average of about 60% of immigrants were settled as customary tenants (ibid, p.130), though they probably had to pay a large entry fee and take up previously uncultivated ground (see below). About 12% were seasonal tenants, paying well above the customary sum — much more a real rent. Some became tenants on Crown land, at ten shillings for temporary occupation; or tenants or the plantation on which they worked; or on one of the three ex-soldier
settlements in Buganda. Those who were 'porters or unstated' in the sample varied from 22.6% in Busiro to 44.2% in Buddu (ibid. p.133), whereas most Baganda were landlords or customary tenants. Alien landbuyers were very rare, among other reasons because of Baganda feeling against giving land, associated residually with political rights, to non-Baganda. In 1951, the Great Lukiiko tried to pass an amendment to the 1908 Land Law extending prohibition of land sales to anyone who was not a Muganda.

Hostility between Baganda and the whole category of aliens (abanamawanga) was considerable (ibid, p.222). The main opposition to immigrants came from the Baganda tenants with whom they competed, according to Southall's Alur informants (ibid, p.156), not the landlords who profited from their presence; and in the urban areas the petty traders and landlords clashed over the admittance of competitive but rent-profitable Asians to previously restricted districts (Gutkind, 1963, pp.215, 223,227). The hostility was expressed through the symbolism of distinctiveness (chapter 5). Despite universal Baganda xenophobia, landlords and tenants retained different attitudes because of their different economic situations. Chiefs and landlords continued to give out plots to immigrants because of their increasing difficulty in (1) attracting servants and labourers - work which Baganda would not do; (2) in securing an income from fixed dues of diminishing value. Baganda tenants opposed this competition and demanded the expulsion of aliens who were undercutting their cost of living, though they did not oppose the employment of immigrants as porters alone, i.e. work they were not competing for (ibid, p.197). Thus there remained conflicting class interests as well as cohesion under the symbol of tribal unity among Baganda.

In this chapter, I have analyzed the changing economic power structure in Buganda, in order to show where conflicts of 'objective' interests lay. Unlike Fallers and Wrigley I did not find a growing 'classlessness' - and I showed their finding was the result of conceptual confusion of economic and status forms of power, which Weber showed should be kept analytically distinct. On the other hand, I found that the economic class structure pointed to by Worsley requires a good deal of comment to explain the continuing 'latency' of class conflict. Worsley's assumptions hide the importance not only of the particular nature of an economic class structure - particularly the types of economic processes in which relations are formed - but also of cultural-historical variables in political change. Economic class structure was extremely important in determination of the nature of political change in Buganda, but not in the way suggested by any of these writers (see chapter 7).
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SYMBOLISM OF INEQUALITY IN BUGANDA

PART ONE: KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE

This section examines the relationship between social stratification and the system of kinship and marriage in Buganda. In Rwanda it was clear that the different patterns and functions of kinship and marriage occupied a central place in the maintenance of symbolic boundaries between the major status groupings. In the precolonial period in Buganda status was not ascribed in the same 'closed' degree that it was in Rwanda, and while no doubt chiefs looked for marriage alliances with other chiefs this produced a 'statistical' rather than a 'normative' pattern in the distribution of prestige through marriage (cf. Leach, 1961). There was no strong ideology linking status and the purity of a group's women - thus women were available for creating categorical ties wherever this was politically necessary. A Patron often gave his clients women from his household, as wives as well as concubines (Richards, 1966, p. 20). Descent categories and groups were much more important in ascribing status to persons in Rwanda than in Buganda. Several cultural-historical and structural factors must have been important here, which it would be beyond my scope to discuss and on which the evidence is unclear.

Baganda descent group leaders, the bateka, were mostly excluded from formal political power in the 1900 Agreement - and those who were not were included by virtue of other roles they played simultaneously - and held authority in a well-differentiated field of internal corporate administration. I examine this situation briefly, though the main interest focuses on the formal and informal symbolic uses of kinship and marriage customs to draw boundaries, as in Rwanda, between unequal status, economic and political groups. In the main this concerns the delineation of a boundary between the Baganda of all economic classes, and non-Baganda. Thus we should see how the same patterns of kinship and marriage which directly produced few and relatively insignificant inequalities of status, power and wealth among Baganda were suitable for the symbolic organization of the latter for political competition with all those who did not share them.

At the time of Independence, there were 48 recognized clans (bika) in Buganda (Southwold, 1965, p. 95). This number had grown from the original six of the legends of the first kabaka, Kintu, as the kabakas granted the rights to form new clans to favourites. The clans were agnatic, and each took its name from a different 'totem' which, through the members' ritual avoidance of eating it, symbolized the clan's distinctiveness as a group. The clan was the largest agnatic descent unit; Baganda nationality was established through the production of proof of clan-membership. A person appointed to a chiefship had to recite the details of his clan-membership at the installation...
ceremony, and was dismissed if the clan bataka denied knowledge of him. In
the later colonial period, clan membership was particularly emphasised as
distinguishing Baganda from African immigrants, of whom the former said:
"They are strangers. They have no clans." (Richards, 1966, p.68)

There was an official clan head, known as mukulu or ilala. Heads of
descent groups at all levels were known collectively as bataka. As in the
case of the choice of a kabaka, several principles were involved in the
succession to a mutaka office, of which the most formal were those of nsikirano
and the kabaka's approval. The lower bataka assisted the clan mutaka in a
council which chose from among the legitimate candidates for the office.
This pattern was repeated at the lower levels of segmentation, with the
junyiri (minimal lineage) mutaka being assisted by leading members of the
group. The bataka themselves were always chosen from the senior 'lineage
of the roof', kasolya, at each level (Fallers, 1964, p.71), but clearly this
was only one factor in an actual choice since several persons would have
such qualifications. Moreover, in the period considered here, unilineal
descent groups had little political power (Southwold, 1961, pp.11-14). They
were dispersed, and involved minimal corporate obligations even at local level.
(see below).

Each clan had its own estates. These were relatively small, "usually a
single kwalo" (Southwold, 1965, p.96), and granted inalienably by the kabaka.
None were allodial; they were granted under 'butaka tenure'. Kabakas created
new clans or clan segments by making such grants to favourites and allowing
them and their descendants to bury their ancestors there.

One clan differed from the above descriptions: the "peasant princes'
clan" of lineages formed by descendants of kabakas who were yet too remote
to ensure their inclusion among the 'princes of the drum' who were eligible
for succession to the kabakaship (Fallers, 1964, pp.68-9). This 'clan'
was a status category rather than a group, having no totem and not acting
corporately for political purposes since in that field its members were attached
to competing matrilateral clans. M.C. Fallers (1960, p.54) suggests that in
the precolonial period it was very dangerous to be a royal prince (balangira)
because some kabakas executed those they suspected of potential rivalry; so
many princes 'hid' in their matrilateral clans. In the colonial period it
has been safe, and a "princes clan" has been organized on similar lines to
the clans proper. The failure of the balangira to organize in their own
political interest was reflected in their formal exclusion from office, which
applied even in the colonial period above muluka level. In 1926 a Governor
tried and failed, to have a mulancira appointed to a ggombola chiefship (chapter six). The 'balancira abakoni' were often indistinguishable in wealth from bakoni, though claiming higher prestige. Clans were not formally ranked, though membership of a clan specially favoured by a particular kabaka might bring added prestige.

The clan was an exogamous unit - a man could not marry into his own or his mother's clan - except in a few special cases which Southwold states (1965,p.116n.8) concern large size or 'diverse descent of different sections'. In these cases clans permitted marriage between members of different major lineages. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the effects of such divergencies on the symbolic organization of informal political groups. These might have been particularly important in the case of large clans, or indeed any others, which were politically powerful and might have sought membership restriction. The system would ideally operate to prevent the formation of dominant blocs. However, at the individual level the boundaries between kinship groups were not in practice strongly enforced - Mair (1954,p.79) mentions that marriage between kin in the prohibited categories occurred sometimes when other persons did not know the relationship, and even if it was discovered there was usually no further action than an enforced separation. But this data is from the colonial period. The "princes' clan" was again different in not having a rule of exogamy; again its failure to organize may be seen in the absence of a positive rule of endogamy.

I will discuss in chapter 6 the wider political functions of the clans, both (1) in their formal symbolic linkage to the kabakaship through ritual duties and services, marriages, the possibility of providing a kabaka and queen mother, etc., and (2) informally in organizing political groupings to compete for the kabakaship and the kabaka's favour. I do not intend to review the evidence on, or examine, the question of how the kabakas centralised control of Buganda by extending 'patrimonial' authority at the expense of local descent group authorities, for this process was completed before the end of the nineteenth century, and was not in itself relevant to the colonial period (cf. Cox, 1950; Southwold, 1961). Again, I will discuss there my disagreement with Fallers (1964,p.151) on this point. In the colonial period, at least, the clans concerned themselves formally only with domestic matters; informally their activities were wider-ranging but did not involve opposition to the institution of kingship (chapter 6).

Probably because of its informal functions the clan had a surprising degree of corporate responsibility during the precolonial period in the case of mis-
demeanours by its members. The kabakas might order the execution of such persons, and of their fellow clan-members. Such political exigencies were largely responsible for the considerable movement between clans. This movement was facilitated by certain customs. Firstly, there could be blood brotherhood between members of different clans. Secondly, a man belonged to the clan of his genitor—not his pater—this was claimed to be a different person—which meant that it was relatively easy to change clanship if this was politically expedient. A good example occurs in the personal biography of Mika Sematimba, who was the Nakamba of Busiro from 1892-1952: the Pangolin clan disputed his membership of the Lungfish clan, and within the latter two lineages claimed him—both these disputes continuing throughout his lifetime, and the second was resolved only nine years after his death. (Richards, 1966, p.47n.2) Thirdly, only the bataka had any extensive knowledge of genealogies. Most Baganda forgot ancestors further back than their grandfathers (Southwold, 1965, p.96).

Clan and lineage members recognised few mutual obligations, despite the retention of an ideology of collateral equality within the agnatic descent group, as seen in the nsikirano principles and the extension of kinship terms to all members of the same generation. (Fallers, 1964, p.72): (1) the obtaining of vengeance in the precolonial period (Mair, 1934, p.185) — though only with the kabaka’s permission (Mair, 1962, p.59); (2) hospitality and a limited amount of economic aid. These obligations were of even less importance in the colonial period than previously, though the dispersal of even the lunviriri already made their fulfillment haphazard. The importance of clanship tended, even more, to be symbolic rather than instrumental, although it might be used informally in the formation of political groupings, as in precolonial times, or in emphasizing Baganda identity in the colonial period in the ‘neotraditionalist’ political organizations (chapter 6).

There were several different levels of clan-segments or lineages (Fallers, 1964, p.71) In descending order of segmentation these were: ssiga, mutuba and lunviriri. No segments of the lunviriri were formally recognised. Each segment had its mutaka and lukiiko. Although it was socially approved to live on a butaka of one’s clan or clan-segment, and their dispersal around the kingdom made this relatively easy, and a man had a special right to be given a plot on his clan butaka if there was room, most Baganda did not use the opportunity. It was more profitable to seek good patrons of whatever clan they might be. The bataka acted as ordinary patrons to their clients, most of whom were not of their clan (chapter 4; Fallers, 1964, p.85).

In the precolonial period the clans and lineages had special responsibility for dealing with matters of succession and inheritance (of moveable property,
including wives). A man designated his successor (musika). In the 1950s a musika took about 40% of the property of the dead man (Southwold, 1956, p. 94). He was then usually the eldest son, whether this decision was made by will or by the clan council. Sometimes he was the eldest son of the 'ring wife'. In the case of mailo land, however small, the musika had to be approved by the kabaka. When a man died his musika took his name and position in the matrix of kinship terms, as well as the largest share of the property.

After a decree of Mutesa I in the mid-nineteenth century the preference given to brothers and brothers' sons was abandoned and given to own sons (ibid). Under Christian and Muslim influence this soon became preference for the eldest son. In the colonial period, the clans and lineages continued to exercise their special responsibilities in matters of succession and inheritance, now also including the inheritance of land, in theory. However, they have little real power, being limited by wills and the supervision of a special office under the katikirico: the clan's "function is mainly administrative" (ibid, p. 95). In deciding the many cases where wills were not left, the clan councils usually followed a kabaka's order of 1926 made to regularize the position and which, while not becoming law, "may be said to have the force of custom" (ibid, p. 95). In the distribution of mailo estates after 1900, the lineage bataka generally lost control of their estates, which were given to persons of different clans. The campaign of these lesser bataka to get their share of the mailo spoils provided a symbol for popular opposition to the chiefs to rally around, as in the 1921 Bataka Federation (chapter 6).

The relative unimportance of kinship groups other than the clan in Baganda political and economic relations is indicated by the reluctance with which kinship terms are now used to refer to kinsmen, rather than their personal names. Southwold found that:

"except between parents and children, kinship terms are rarely used in addressing a kinsman... there is, in fact a certain tendency to regard kin relations as an embarrassment."


Residence at marriage always tended to be neolocal, with as much emphasis on relations with remote as close kinsmen. This may be seen represented ideologically in the principles of kusikirana ('to exchange successors' - Southwold, 1966, p. 100). In part this followed from the search for the most advantageous clientship - with such a high degree of geographical mobility a man could still use kinship, however, remote, to guide his behaviour towards other clients of new patron. But it also indicates particularly in the colonial period, the absence of multiplex and constant dependence on kinsmen. Kinship of any sort was valued principally as a means of cementing relation-
ships; while Baganda say: "Friendship is stronger than kinship" (Southwold 1965), the discovery of the latter can formalize the former relationship. Richards (1966) writes of the "loosely-organized bilateral nature of kinship groups" in both the precolonial (p.22) and colonial (p.86) periods, and it seems that what Southall writes of town life in Buganda also applies to rural villages: he also finds

"what might be called in a sense bilateral kinship behaviour; the strength of the fundamental ties is still generally assumed, but rather on a reciprocal basis which precludes long-term parasitism. Other kinsfolk, both consanguineal and affinal, present options which may or may not be taken up for friendship or assistance on a situational basis... such friendship roles are more achieved than ascribed" (Southall, 1961, ed), p.220).

The degree of kinship was relatively unimportant, and a man could find kinsmen anywhere in Buganda. Baganda kinship behaviour might be seen as in some ways analogous to 'tribalism' in the Copperbelt towns of the 1940s and 1950s, involving "categorical" relationships (Mitchell, 1966) which enabled persons migrating into new areas to 'structure' their social interaction with others they did not know. The achievement of friendship roles can be seen in the formation of what Richards (1966) calls "kinship clusters" in the precolonial village, around a successful kinsman. In the colonial period, 'kinship clusters' have been formed rather of close kin, following expectations conforming with the new rules of inheritance and succession. But while this may have helped a landowner dominate a village, the most prominent village and political division arose between the Baganda and African immigrants. These latter were largely excluded from formal political processes except where they predominated numerically (Richards 1954, pp.179-93; 1964,p.315).

Formally, descent groups do not ascribe status in Buganda. The part played by descent in the distribution of prestige is limited to the domestic unit. For bakoni this is composed of the persons occupying a household (meka) under a household head (see Southwold 1965). The meka is an independent economic and residential unit. Larger residential groupings have little definition or significance: a 'village' does not comprise a corporate group in a discrete cluster, and may simply be the term to refer to a mailo estate, of whatever size. Normally the domestic unit comprised the elementary family at some stage of its cycle. Married children almost always had separate households. In the colonial period only about one man in twenty had more than one wife and headed a compound family. Sometimes a man whose wife had left him lived with a sister or unmarried daughter. Many persons
lived alone, bringing down the average household size to only three persons.

The nature of the domestic unit was particularly important because, given the kabaka's control of appointment and the dispersal of descent groups, attachment to a prominent patron's household was the route to political office. It was not possible to acquire political authority, or even much power, as a 'good' lineage member; i.e. authority did not rise in 'pyramidal' form (cf. Southall 1966b, p.126) Kinship ties were utilized to have children sent to the household of a chief, with the hope of their securing special favour and advancement. But even among a chief's own sons the process of progressive exclusion would begin; few would attain the same degree of power as their father, though it was unlikely that none would (Fallers, 1970, p.170). Their advantage was the statistical and not normative one of a better chance to show talent to, or act as pawns in the alliances and favours of, the patrons who had access to power delegated from its single source in the kabaka.

Thus in one example:

"Some time after his son Muxiru had been placed to serve in the palace, Lukaayi Kacococo took another of his children, Kibuka Miti, and gave him to Kaddu, the Musalosolo (a mutongole chief), who introduced him to the kabaka" (Lwanga, 1954, p.3 quoted ibid).

Competition between brothers for their chiefly (or indeed bakopi) father's favour stressed the domestic unit which each represented, at the expense of the lineage group - for, unlike such competition in many 'segmentary lineage systems' the power for which brothers competed was not authorised to their father by the lineage organization or ideology and so they did not need to cooperate in maintaining the latter as the prize for which they competed (cf Bailey, 1969). Instead of lineages tightly organized in corporate possession of political office or offices, we find 'dynasties' (ibid, p.171; Mair 1962, p.176) of kinsmen in office but lacking hereditary rights to them. Such dynasties were not composed of particular categories of kin, and might include remote kin while excluding certain close kinsmen. Membership of certain descent groups gave a better chance of joining such a dynasty, but no more than that. It may be, though I lack the evidence to substantiate the suggestion, that the widespread fostering in Buganda (Richards, 1966, p.19), as in Lwanga's example above, and the correlation of rank with fertility (Fallers, 1964, p.162) - the higher the more - were related to dynasty-building by political officials. The informal linkage of elite domestic units through the language of clanship (see above), without the mediation of lineage corporate political groups, need not then surprise us.

In the colonial period the pattern of prestige distribution centering on the domestic unit has facilitated the distinctiveness of the dominant economic
class on new criteria. In West Africa, the new elites have constantly faced the problem of limiting their obligations, symbolic as well as material, beyond the (often new) domestic unit. (Lloyd, 1966) For Baganda, the fact that a man's prestige did not spread significantly beyond the domestic unit facilitated the reorientation of kinship links towards the creation of solidarity in the economic class and status group, i.e. kinship followed status links, and not vice versa; it was, moreover, only one element in status differentiation. (Apter, p. 201)

At village level, there has often been a dominant group composed of the kin of the original mailo holder (Richards, 1954, p. 174 and 1966, passim), in a similar haphazard 'dynastic' fashion to that described above, and here kinship may positively organize economic and political dominance:

"it is rare not to find some of the children of the original owner in a dominating position in the original village community, and in many cases all the owners of more than ten acres in the village are members of the minimal lineage" (Richards, 1954, p. 174)

But other members of the village are not necessarily (or even often) members of like groups. Again, it is clear that kinship follows and institutionalizes power and status.

The principle significance of the Baganda systems of kinship and marriage in this respect in the colonial period was the distinction of Baganda from non-Baganda. Two major trends of the later colonial period were the growing economic competition from African immigrant labourers and Asian traders, and the effort to mobilize Baganda nationalism against Protectorate Government control (chapter 7). The kinship system, with its appropriate ritual behaviour, provided one means for the symbolic organization of the Baganda as a status group dominating the other groups which it excluded. Members of the other groups, particularly those of the lowest status like the Banyarwanda, often tried to acquire higher status as Baganda by such means as claiming clan membership or attempting to establish 'butaka tenure' by burying ancestors on any land held. The Baganda were well aware of such devices, and ridiculed those caught attempting them. (Richards 1954)

As unilineal descent groupings in Buganda discharged a minimal "range of political and administrative functions" (cf. Smith, 1956, p. 55) there was relatively little concern to protect their symbolic boundaries by forms of marriage (cf. Parkin, 1969, p. 97ff). This is indicated by the fact that a child's genitor, and not his pater, was recognized as his father in cases where these were different persons - in contrast to Rwanda (Gravel, 1968, p. 131). Richards describes marriage in Buganda as "unstable", and in the village she studies, the figures:
"for broken marriages in 1952 were 18% for women and 30% for men, and these figures are certainly an underestimate (1966 p.21);

Southwold notes that

"most people have had several spouses, and have little confidence that the current union will endure" (1965, p.105).

Bridewealth was relatively low, and not a deterrent to divorce (Richards, 1964 p.256). Baganda women were relatively free to form non-marital unions with persons of their choice (Parkin, p.94).

Despite these factors, the long period of immigration, and the marked predominance of males among the immigrants, there was notably little inter-marriage between Baganda and African immigrants to Buganda. The sample villages in the 1948 survey of three counties - Busiro, Kyagwe and Buddu - showed that the following proportions of non-Baganda African men were married to Baganda women: in Busiro, 8.6%; in Kyagwe, 3%; in Buddu, 4%. The following proportions of Baganda men had taken non-Baganda wives: in Busiro, none; in Kyagwe, 4%; in Buddu, 5.7% (Richards, 1954, pp.270, 276, 281). At this time, more than a third of the population of Buganda was made up by African immigrants. Thus there was a significant degree of informal avoidance of intermarriage with foreigners by Baganda of both sexes.

There were clearly good substantive reasons for the avoidance of such marriages on both sides, particularly in the case of those immigrants who came to work at the lowest possible cost of living in order to return home as soon as possible, often to marry. Richards points particularly to the great expense of a Baganda marriage 'of the ring', which Baganda were apparently seldom prepared to lay out on foreign wives, and which immigrant men could rarely meet. Furthermore, Baganda courts did not enforce the father's right to the children in the case of immigrant men leaving Buganda without their wives (ibid). However, much importance must be attached to conceptions of the relative status of different tribes (see below). Parkin reports that in Kampala Baganda much more frequently married members of tribes which they thought most like themselves, i.e. to whom they gave highest status, than to whom they gave low status (1969, p.97). The point is that, whatever the reasons, such patterns of marriage tended to reinforce the symbolic boundaries between Baganda and other Africans.
My purpose in this section is an examination of the part played by ritual and ideology in maintaining existing forms of stratification, or creating new ones. As in the preceding section, I examine the ideas and behaviour which institutionalize boundaries between groups and categories of persons, with particular attention to whether such boundaries follow the lines I have analysed between economic and political strata or cut across them. Thus we can analyze the part played by these symbolic phenomena in increasing or inhibiting awareness of corporate interests among the members of such strata. However, I do not examine other aspects of the involvement of ritual and ideology in politics (see chapters 6 and 7).

**STATUS IDEOLOGY**

The ritual boundaries between status groups in Buganda were insignificant by comparison with those in Rwanda, and the rate of mobility between them relatively high. Individual social mobility, the acquisition of honour (kitiibwa) was itself a value (Richards, 1964, p. 273), as it could not be for Hutu and Twa in Rwanda. These characteristics of Baganda stratification ensured that boundaries between the strata were blurred and there was a large area in which persons assumed different statuses according to the others with whom they were interacting at any time. This reflects the dyadic nature of political relations, which were the almost exclusive locus of kitiibwa in the precolonial period. It may be that the degree of status grouping in precolonial Buganda has been underplayed; if we remember that political status was what counted then the status hierarchy was very clear and its ritual boundaries insurmountable except by the kabaka's decree. There were clear differences in behaviour between tribute and labour paying bakoni and the patrons who supervised these activities. But it remains true that such differences derived from the politico-military sphere, where individuals were subject to the kabaka's favour and mobility in either direction could be rapid.

In the precolonial period, the category embracing most of the population was that of 'bakoni'-persons of no importance (Fallers, 1964, p. 68). It is clear that this only acquires meaning by contrast with those categories of persons who were distinguished in some way. The most important of these, the true opposite of a mukoni, was a mmantu, a man who rules. Fallers (ibid) also mentions the mulangira, prince, as the opposite of a mukoni; however, the existence of many 'balangira abakoni', literally 'undistinguished' princes, requires some qualification to this statement. In the colonial period, when the boundaries between the strata had been hardened by structural differentiation and the creation of economic classes, bakoni was often used to refer to 'peasants'. There even appeared a category of 'peasant chiefs', of whom the katiikko Nnemala was the most famous. But these were unknown
in the precolonial period, and I suggest no conjunction of the terms 'mukopi' and 'mwami' was conceivable. The status of mwami was not normatively ascribed, though the son of a mwami had a statistically greater chance of achieving it than had the son of a mukopi (chapter 4 & 6).

Before the encounter with Arab and European powers, differences of sophistication, ability to act the courtier or 'man of the capital' were not sharp or ineradicable (ibid, p.70). They were determined principally by political fortune, with very little ritual limitation of the recruitment pool for political office. The gradual definition of a status group of up-and-coming young chiefs and pages in the second half of the nineteenth century, starting with the acceptance of the new religions of Islam and Christianity and later including diacritical secular symbolism, precipitated far-reaching changes in the political system. It made organization for collective mobility possible in the place of relatively rapid but insecure individual mobility. When this came it affected first the political system, and then further subsystems (chapter 4).

During the colonial period there was a move away from the direct expression of inequality of terms such as 'mwami' and 'mukopi', which expressed consistent multiplex role-relationships under the clear terms for ruler and ruled. The term 'mwami' became used as a polite form in addressing anybody, and 'mukopi' had a general derogatory usage (thus it was used to describe B. Kiwanuka, leader of the Democratic Party, when he seemed to be setting himself above the kabaka by becoming Chief Minister of Uganda in 1961, though he was neither a peasant nor unimportant). Prestige (kitiibwa) became an attribute of many different roles, as role differentiation increased. Furthermore, it came to attach primarily to occupational roles. Structural differentiation without new institutionalized rankings meant that to a greater extent status evaluation lay in the eye of the beholder. Ideologically, individual social mobility into even the highest ranks remained possible within one or two generations. But as Fallers points out (ibid, p.125), the fact that most Baganda continued to think of status in dyadic terms does not mean that status groups did not exist, or were unimportant. Firstly, in Buganda the persons monopolizing the occupations with the highest prestige were very largely the descendants of the mailo-owning and power holding 'gentry' status group of the early twentieth century (see chapter 6). Secondly, the prestige accorded generally to persons monopolizing certain valued skills may ensure their self-awareness as a group with common interests in other fields than the occupational field in which the prestige was originally accorded. The ritual behaviour through which this group maintains distinctiveness is perceived by others as an attribute of its members' occupations, and
not as an aspect of group organization. Thus they may have the benefit of
diffuse high prestige without their being perceived as a self-perpetuating
group with sectional interests. Likewise, the monopoly of power achieved
for its members by such a form of group organization may be perceived as
acceptable by those excluded, for the political officials are then those per­
sons already allocated high prestige because of their occupations. This
is one aspect of regeneralization of roles at the top of the economic,
status and legal-political orders (noted by Frankenberg, 1966).

The economic class of mailo owners established in 1900 was also a status
group in two distinct ways. Firstly, the persons comprising it were those
who had already acquired the highest prestige in the traditional manner, being
the kabaka's legitimate political officials, while for the first time achiev­
ing a group-consciousness through religious symbolism and struggle with an
unsuitable kabaka. Secondly, they were regarded by the British, and regarded
themselves, as the persons most fitted to rule by virtue of their demonstrated
ability, their recognition of and adaptation to new sources of power, and
their adoption of a distinctive British life-style (see Richards, 1963, p.272).
Kagwa describes his own part in this process (in 'The Book of the Grasshopper
Clan', n.d., quoted p.183 Fallers, 1964, & n.40 ;208-9), and this de­
scription might be matched by other influential chiefs. He was one of the
first to adopt "new customs and work habits...they laughed at me at first..but
later others followed" (p.183). In 1890 he bought a watch, which in itself
implied a different style of life, and went on to acquire other status symbols:
a horse (1892), a brick house with two storeys, in which he ate at a table
and drank tea instead of banana beer (1894), a kerosene lamp (1896) and a bicycle
(1898). Literacy, or service from literate persons, also distinguished the
elite and, like the other aspects of the new life-style, bound them in closely
with the missionaries who provided the education. This educational aspect,
or socialization process, was institutionalized in an elite educational
system (chapter 4). This served both to exclude effectively all but the chil­
dren of the elite from acquiring the means to political office or other de­
sirable roles, and to socialize the children in a distinctive life-style which
would sustain their group-consciousness while legitimizing their political
and economic dominance in the eyes of the British and other Baganda. I have
already shown (ibid) the significance of this educational system, and in par­
ticular the leading Roman Catholic and Anglican schools, in recruitment to the
political elite. At the same time it focused the opportunities and aspirations
for individual mobility on the acquisition of these forms of symbolism. These
forms continued to be valued long after landownership and the possession of
political office ceased to be crucial in membership of the top economic class
and status group. When land ownership became more of an 'ascribed' role because of the creation of private property in land, and a conflict of interests emerged between landlords and tenants, the ideology of rapid individual mobility and 'achievement' of roles was retained in the sphere of prestige acquisition. The later spread of landowning status seemed to support this ideology, while it did not itself alter the hierarchy of economic classes. There was also, as Fallers says, a diffusion of key elements of the gentility culture. Monotheistic religion, literacy and a somewhat Westernized style of household life - features which in 1900 made up the subculture of an elite - have today become part of the common culture of at least a majority of Baganda" (ibid., p. 186).

What he fails to analyze is the extent to which possession of these symbols and the aspiration for more, legitimized the political dominance of those persons who possessed them to the highest degree. The only exception from this process was 'monotheistic religion', the spread of which altered its function from defining the elite status group to assisting in the mobilization of support for factions within that group.

Baganda status conceptions linked clear hierarchical distinctions between individuals, or between individuals and a collection of subordinates, with a strong emphasis on social mobility. The roles of patron and client were well-defined in ritual behaviour, to the extent that there was a term for the 'art of being ruled' (kibwibwa) as well as for the 'art of ruling' (kufuga) (ibid., p. 273). This ideal framework of what was expected of a patron or client was also able to express all the gradations of rank which might be required in any situation. Firstly, the qualities attributed to a patron were all achievable - political ability to protect clients and forward their careers, military ability, hospitality, the dignity and self-assurance appropriate to a man on whom others depend. Showing these qualities without losing face both indicated present rank and might be a factor in mobility. Thus a man who could get away with acting as another's superior thereby made himself superior. Secondly, a patron was in a position to rank his clients by the degree of favour he showed to each. So within a clearcut dyadic framework, gradations of status could be expressed in a clear and flexible system. It persisted in the colonial period at the same time as there appeared new ritual behaviour through which members of the dominant economic class constituted themselves as a status group. They could utilize either or both kinds of ritual according to the situation. It is possible that use of traditional ritual emphasized the super-ordination of its user, while the new 'western' symbolism put forward, in a new context, the ideology of social mobility, thus enabling it to retain its integrative functions in Buganda. An example
may be given from Parkin (1969,p.35), who reports that in the Council Elections for Kampala East Ward, September 1962, one of the successful candidates of the royalist party

"was a sub-county chief and was said to be of the royal clan... officials explained that he had been selected in order to attract the votes of Ganda. He contrasted strikingly with the other candidates in standing aloof from the proceedings. He did attend meetings and rallies, dressed in his kanzu and jacket, the traditional Ganda dress for men, but a younger Ganda, dressed in a lounge suit and speaking impeccable English and Swahili as well as Luganda, addressed the meeting on his behalf. Ganda residents attending explained that they expected a Ganda chief to behave in this manner. There is little doubt that most non-Catholic Ganda voted for him."

This shows how both status systems might be invoked symbolically.

The status group consciousness of Baganda as a whole was much sustained by the ideology and ritual of tribal difference, particularly of superiority over African immigrant workers in Buganda (see Richards, 1954). Such ideology had many aspects. In particular, there was the history of Baganda military success and complex forms of government, which they considered made them superior to immigrants who lacked such history - peoples with Kingdom organization like themselves ranked higher than those without; and there were stereotypes of immigrants relating to their lower standard of living. They were seen, according to Richards, as uneducated, poor and dirty (cf.Douglas, 1967). While Baganda usually wore shoes and a kanzu over shirt and trousers, the immigrant stereotype went barefoot and wore only shorts and rags. Likewise immigrants' housing was more frequently made of grass, while the Baganda normally had houses of mud and wattle. According to Richards it was clear in a village where the immigrants lived - their grass huts would be clustered around the more prosperous houses of their Baganda employers. African immigrants of high socio-economic status were few, and those who could afford not to try to assimilate with the Baganda, despite intending to settle permanently, were limited to Kampala, (Parkin, 1969,p.x). Those who did try to assimilate, by such means as adopting common Baganda names, faced resentment and contempt if discovered (Richards, 1954, pp.167-176). Perhaps most important of all, Baganda "despised" unskilled wage labour, and the "new industries of Uganda..are almost entirely dependent on immigrant labour" (Richards, 1963,p.276); this comment applies even more forcefully to agricultural wage labour (chapter 4). In 1950, only 2.3% of Baganda were in scheduled occupations as wage-earners, making up only 30% of all Africans in such occupations in Buganda, and many of these must have occupied the higher status jobs as semi-skilled, skilled and professional workers (ibid, chapter 4). So unskilled wage labour, which for Baganda had a particularly
low or 'negative' prestige value, was left to the immigrants; Baganda who could not obtain more prestigious wage-earning jobs preferred to remain on their own plots.

While Baganda often expressed their sense of superior status in terms of the values associated with structural differentiation, such as complexity of political organization or life-styles associated with more prestigious occupations - there was a frequently expressed demand that immigrants be admitted only as 'porters', unskilled labourers - their internal cohesion as a status group could not be, and was not, expressed in the same terms. The symbolism of tribal custom served this purpose. Thus there were two quite distinct status hierarchies which overlapped only at the top. First, there was a hierarchy based on tribal membership; and second, there was a hierarchy based on occupational roles and life-styles. The top occupations, under British overrule and with the significant exception of some Asian traders, were held by Baganda of the elite class. The latter benefited by the situational use of the distinct status systems by other Baganda (see above). In contrast to immigrant Africans of other tribes, ordinary Baganda saw themselves as a single group; and they transferred to this selfconsciousness considerations from the other status hierarchy. So they saw Baganda as uniformly wealthy in contrast to the poverty of the immigrants. At the same time it was clear that within the Baganda group some persons were wealthier than others, and these were allocated higher status by virtue of this within the group. But wealth without Baganda birth did not bring higher status. In other words, while the Baganda continued to emphasize achievement in the allocation of status to individuals, collective mobility was conceptually impossible within the tribe because group status was allocated on tribal lines. Religious groups were only a partial exception to this pattern (see below). This had the political significance that the only status group within the Baganda tribal group was formed by members of the dominant class; they were able to identify themselves and act either as an elite group or as tribesmen, according to the situation, while ordinary Baganda identified themselves only as tribesmen and saw collective mobility only in those terms. This 'elite class' was able to maintain corporate activity for its special political interests, without identifying itself as a threat to popular aspirations. The control of political office by its members was in fact legitimized by their defence of Baganda interests against foreigners (chapter 7).

Conflict with the British and the Indians was not expressed in terms of status but of political ideology. Most Baganda had no contact with either except in the single-stranded role-relationships of governor/governed or
exploiter/exploited. The British were colonists, and insofar as the Indians perceived themselves and were perceived as a group they were identified with the rich elite on whom they relied to secure their political and economic interests (Morris, 1968, pp. 146-159). As Morris says (ibid, p. 119): "most of the Indians in Uganda formed one economic class of traders and middlemen"—though I suggest this is how they were seen, rather than that it was true that they formed an economic class. Here it is important to note that the 'racial' terms in which the governor/governed and exploiter/exploited roles were classified by the British Administration—Europeans, Asians, and Africans—did not lead to Baganda self-identification with other Africans. Instead, the sense of Baganda nationality was reinforced, particularly as the British seemed to be trying to force them into the same position as other Africans under the Protectorate (Morris, 1970, pp. 325-6) or an independent Ugandan government. Furthermore, it was mainly Baganda at whose expense the Indian traders and cotton ginners seemed to be benefiting.

RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY

The most striking feature of precolonial religious ideology and practice was its overt control by political authorities. Thus Low (1958) suggests that one reason for the welcome Mutesa I Save to the missionaries was that he thereby emphasized his control over those persons with religious powers. Moreover, the lack of dependence of the kabaka on religious officials for the legitimation of his authority made adoption of the new religions comparatively easy. Religious roles were less a means to political power, or simply undifferentiated from political roles, than they were subject to political roles.

There were two main categories of spirits: (1) the migimu, ancestral spirits, of whom the most important were the former kabakas—the first kabaka, Kintu, was held to have founded the nation—who themselves were not clearly distinguished from the second category (Taylor, 1958, p. 214); (2) the balubaale, national or localized spirits associated with various fundamental concerns such as occupation, war, fertility and affliction. An individual's relationship with the migimu, who were believed to intervene in their descendants' lives, was not mediated by officials of his descent group but by spirit mediums (mumundu), while regular propitiation might be carried out by the individual. The balubaale also possessed mediums. The mediums were 'called' by particular spirits, in the first instance by spontaneous possession and thereafter on the principle that success proves itself. That spirit mediumship should be the central religious activity illustrates that achieved roles dominated this field as in others (Fallers, 1964, p. 104); the kabaka appointed all religious
officials at national shrines throughout the kingdom. Descent group organization was little supported by religious ritual; at most, certain clans may have provided temple officials for particular balubaale with whom they were associated. So belief in ancestral and localized spirits did not provide for contrary loyalties to those of national unity. The most important mediums practised at the most powerful shrines - the mabiro of the dead kabakas and the bigwae of the nationally important balubaale - and these were controlled by the kabaka (ibid). The religious power tapped by the mediums was carefully differentiated from control of the shrines, which were administered by the kabaka's officials (kabona) and so rendered politically harmless. Besides the spirits, religious power was also ascribed to fetishes (jinsba), acting through familiars, and again the kabaka possessed the most important of these (Taylor, p.197). Religious ritual was of little significance in the direct legitimation of the kabaka's rule, which relied far more on the ritual of successful warfare and of the political hierarchy. National rituals such as the succession ceremony of a kabaka, or his reception of a returning army, had little religious content. In sum, insofar as religious ideology and ritual had political implications, the distribution of religious power supported the political structure of the kingdom. The more important spirit mediums were attached to national shrines, themselves administered by ritual officials without religious powers. Traditional religious ideology and ritual did not provide the means of informal status group or political group organization.

Part of the much intensified symbolic stress on Baganda national identity during the Kabaka Crisis of 1953-55 was a revival of traditional religious forms. On occasion this had millenarian overtones: a spirit medium of the war god, Kibuka, prophesied the return of the kabaka and joined this with a recurrent theme of East and Central African millenarianism, that white men's bullets could not harm his followers. He drew great crowds when he spoke at Katundwe, near Kampala, and a policeman was killed. (Fallers, 1964). But the revival did not spread beyond the control of the Buganda Government. It was politically expedient for the kabaka to encourage the renewed worship of balubaale and the cult of his royal ancestors' tombs, which he rebuilt and began to visit regularly. He also adopted traditional prayer (okusamira) in his palace (ibid).

Islam was the first of the new religions to spread at the capital and the great chiefs' courts, after its adoption by Sauna in 1854. Roman Catholic and Anglican forms of Christianity followed during Mutesa I's reign. The adoption of the new religions was politically significant from the outset. It pro-
vided a means of informal organization of much larger political factions than
did the existing symbolic patterns of kinship and clientage, and an alternative
means to rapid promotion for the junior chiefs. All writers seem agreed on
the sociological composition of the converts:

"chiefs and young men who, as pages at the court, were in training
for high position...central ruling and administrative cadres" (Welbourn,
1965,p.5;see also Low, 1958,p.6)

Taylor describes their leaders more precisely as

"sub-chiefs or palace batongole, which is to say they were can­
idates for senior chieftainships...(and) potentially, military
commanders" (1958, p.57).

Under Mwanga II, this potential was realized (see Southwold, 1961). He created
three new batongole departments of soldiers (only young men with guns could
join) under the leaders of the three new religious factions: the Kisololo depart­
ment under the Catholic, Nyan'yintono; the Eggwanika under the Anglican,
Kagwa; and Kimuliriza under a Muslim. Their estates were taken from those
of senior bakungu, batongole and bataka, which clearly marked their political
success. They formed a royal bodyguard:

"The regiments were very large...Most of the senior officers, at
least...were Christians or Muslims" (Southwold, 1961,p.16)

In 1888 they carried out a coup d'etat against Mwanga II. Many writers
have stressed the significance of the three religions in organizing political
factions among the elite, and thereby missed the more important point that the
adoption of new religion in itself marked off a qualitatively different elite,
one which was conscious of its group status. Welbourn points this out, despite
his confusing use of the term 'bakungu' to refer loosely to any kind of admin­
istrative chief or even aspirant to such office (1965, note 5, pp.71-72):

"It was left to the bakungu to grasp the full political potential
of the new religion, they had never yet been able to exercise fully
the power of which they were capable. As a class they had no
religious symbol which was peculiarly their own...In these terms,
you could all - without any very coherent cooperation - have been
aware of the possibilities of the new religion". (p.5 & note 5)

Thus, at the points of radical political change in the late nineteenth century -
the overthrow of a kabaka by his own officials, and the 1900 Agreement - the
members of the three religious groups acted together and shared out the spoils
(chapter 6). It was a Christian alliance which dominated the coalition, and it
is true in this sense that there was a 'Christian ruling class', as Low (1958,
p.12) calls it. But this should not obscure the more fundamental effect of the
new religions, on social mobility and political change, in providing new symbolism
through which a privileged political elite could make itself distinct and organize
informally by realigning its members' informal political ties from clan lines.
Once this elite had established itself politically and economically, the
different forms of the new religions became more important again, as a means of organizing its members' competition for the highest offices, and they began to be extensively adopted in the population at large. By this time new symbols maintained the ruling elite in cooperation as well as conflict, and it could afford the luxury of internal differences organized by religious symbolism.

I do not intend to minimize the significance of political divisions between the religious parties in the colonial period. This was so clear that, for instance, in the 1962 election campaign the initials of the Democratic Party and the Uganda People's Congress were reinterpreted widely in Uganda, as, respectively, 'Religion of the Pope' (Dini ya Papa) and the 'United Protestants of Canterbury' (Welbourn, 1965, p.1). However, these divisions were not fundamental; the K.Y. swept the board against the D.P. in Buganda, despite there being a larger proportion of Roman Catholics in the population. The continuing political implications of religion in Buganda can be traced, like that of the butaka issue, to competition in the elite (chapter 6). The Protestant faction gained ascendancy in 1900, and there emerged a 'Protestant establishment' (ibid, p.12) which kept the lion's share of political office. In the chiefs' local census of 1955, 35% of the population declared themselves Catholics (possibly an underestimate - see Welbourn), 28% Protestants, and 18% Muslims. In the same year the ministries were allocated respectively in the proportions 1:4:1 respectively and the county chiefships in the proportions 8:10:2 (ibid, p.17). Perhaps for this reasons, Catholics were prominent in the leadership of the Bataka movements, and Catholic membership grew slightly faster than Anglican membership during the colonial period (Gee, 1958, p.148). Insofar as we are concerned with the relationship between social stratification and political change, we find that the leaders of the different religious groups, as of the political parties, were recruited from the same economic class and their political aims concerned change of personnel rather than structural change (see Low, 1962, pp.11-17). The conflict of religious groups, like the Bataka movements, offered a means of expression of popular discontent and, at the same time, its disciplining by factions in the political elite who used religious ideology as a support in their competition for office. It may also have been significant that popular perception of a privileged ruling group, when it appeared, often took the form of seeing 'Protestant' or 'Catholic domination', and thus led always back to the support of leaders who were of the same economic and status group as those being opposed.

The sociological patterns of the symbolism of inequality in Buganda, analyzed in this chapter, will be shown in the following two chapters to have been of great significance in the events and nature of political change in the kingdom.
CHAPTER SIX

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF INEQUALITY IN BUGANDA

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the political system from the standpoint of the two major structural processes whose interaction was responsible for its form at any time as it changed rapidly in conjunction with changes in its environment of colonial overrule. The two processes will be shown to be: firstly, the struggle for power between different elements of the political elite (cf. Lloyd, 1965, p.64), and particularly between the kabaka and different groups of his officials; secondly, the maintenance of political dominance by an economic class throughout the colonial period. The former process was continuous with certain pre-colonial conflicts, though not identical, and it will be necessary to trace its full development. The two processes affected each other significantly by each providing the other with a political form and dynamic, and thus each being affected by changes in the other from independent factors. As an illustration, if I may anticipate my argument, the weakness of the kabaka and his struggle against domination by his officials in the early colonial period seemed to align him with popular struggles against the land lord-chiefs. When the popular struggle in the economic order of relations shifted from opposition to landlords to opposition to foreign economic competitors (see chapter 4) the kabaka, who symbolized this struggle, regained the power to dominate his officials. He had no interest in destroying the offices themselves or in changing the mode of recruitment to as genuinely to radicalize the 'populism' (cf. Apter, 1961; Low 1964) of the political system which he headed. Thus persons from the same economic class continued to make policy, under the political domination of the kabaka who was no longer in dispute with them. The position of their class was secure while they participated in and fostered the political expression of hostile economic relations between Baganda farmers and traders, on the one side, and the British, the immigrants, and other Ugandans on the other. They were accepted by the bakoni as the 'king's men' at a time when the kabaka was the dominant symbol under which they organized politically against the colonial power and other aliens. Thus the two major structural processes which I isolate can be shown to have affected the political perceptions and behaviour of actors in the following ways: (1) opposition to the dominance of an economic class of landlords was able to organize behind the opposition in the other process, i.e. elite conflict, and thus to adopt neotraditional forms; (2) the dominant economic class was able to justify its position in the same neotraditional terms when the latter's symbolic functions had changed, after the politico-economic changes of the 1920s and the later struggle against the Protectorate Government. At a further level of abstraction we can see how
political and economic structures determine cultural form, while the latter acts back through the perceptions of actors to determine political and economic structures.

By the time the first European travellers, Speke and then Stanley, visited Buganda in the second half of the nineteenth century, the kabaka ruled an expanding kingdom of about a million inhabitants. Most of the expansion was then taking place in the north and west against the kingdom of Bunyoro. In the south and east multi-chiefdom tribes known respectively as Bahaya and Basoga paid regular tribute to the kabaka. They are estimated to have included probably another million persons (Fallers, 1964, p. 104; Roberts, 1962).

Like the mwami of Rwanda the kabaka exercised "arbitrary" powers i.e. he held powers of life and death, and could not be held formally accountable to anybody. While the enjoyment of these powers clearly depended on his not alienating his political supporters, the kabaka's possession of them made this political task much easier. Only rarely after a succession had been decided could the unsuccessful claimants retain their political influence, and then only so long as it seemed they might rebel successfully. In the nineteenth century the kabakas seem to have prevented this happening by murdering potential rivals (Southwold, 1966, 1968).

The succession was determined by several factors (ibid.), of which inheritance was only one. Only 'princes of the drum' (balangira by'engoma) were eligible - the sons and grandsons of kabakas. One of them would be chosen by the leading commoner chiefs (see below) after consultations held individually by the katikkiro, who announced the decision. There was no royal clan, and the balangira attached themselves to the agnatic clans of their mothers. In the competition for the kabakaship, candidates were backed by their matrilateral allies, and it was the more powerful clans which provided kabakas: Southwold (1966, p. 85, note 8) estimates that only about 2% of the approximately 50 clans ever provided a kabaka, and that those which provided more than one were many fewer than that. However, no clan was able to monopolize the kabakaship, and relatively wide sharing of the office probably reflects the importance of the nsikyenu principles as a banner behind which opponents of any attempt at such a usurpation could rally. According to Nsimbi (1956, quoted by Southwold, 1966, pp. 86-7) even the extremely powerful kabaka Mutesa I failed in an attempt to join a totemic clan (the Lion clan) because of opposition from his senior chiefs. And it seems that in the colonial period, Daudi Cwa was prevented from passing on his mother's totem to his children (ibid). Competition for office therefore had as a major focus
the provision of wives to the kabaka in the hope that the next queen mother (nnamasole) would be from the clan, and thus in a good position to secure its members political favours. Certain offices, forming a kind of bodyguard for the kabaka, were reserved for his matrilateral allies. They also received special favours in appointment to office, though they never achieved a dominant position numerically. The same process ensured that a kabaka had affinal alliances with the most important kinship groups in the kingdom. Moreover, his wives provided links with different areas of the kingdom; each chief was responsible to a particular royal wife for his area's taxation (Fallers, 1964, p.106). An interest in the succession through possible affinal alliance with a future kabaka, as well as the alliance with the contemporary incumbent, probably helped to unite all the clans in preserving the institution of kingship. (see Southold, 1966).

In the nineteenth century there seems to a consistent move by kabakas to lessen their dependence on kinship groupings, and to build up their own independent political and military support, in a personally-loyal staff (see below). In the process by which this staff eventually seized power, and this was then institutionalized by British overrule, kinship was less important than the symbolism of religion and status differentiation. New criteria in appointment to office appeared, and even the kabakaship was decided by the might of the British Administration rather than any dominant kinship grouping. Nevertheless, the position of the queen mother remained as a symbol of the legitimacy of the political system, and the attempt to change the role to allow a widowed queen mother to marry a commoner in 1941 provided an issue around which opposition to katikkiro Nsibirwa rallied successfully. Here we see a clear example of the type of change of symbolic function undergone by traditional symbolic forms in the colonial period.

Like other patrons, but on a much greater scale, the precolonial kabaka gathered his clients around him wherever he moved his capital (kibuga). All his higher chiefs had to attend on him there, not only the permanent advisers like the katikkiro and the kimbugwe, who did not have specific territorial jurisdiction other than their own estates. The military and political nature of the higher chiefs' roles is clear from this. Attendance at the capital was necessary both to avoid suspicion of organizing local forces for rebellion, and in order to compete for the kabaka's favour, particularly as regards the leadership of profitable raiding expeditions (ibid). The mundane business of administration was carried out by deputies (absigire), who did not have the legitimacy of appointment by the kabaka which could make them a political or military danger. The appointment of deputies was found at all levels of authority, as the actual persons appointed by the kabaka to an area found it
necessary to maintain close links with their patrons by attending on them. This again illustrates that control of an estate was useful in exclusively politico-military terms, providing clients and warriors; it could not be exploited economically.

The kabaka's favour was all-important in the competition for political office and prestige. As in Rwanda, the effect of having such an effective arbitrator (i.e. able to impose settlements: Bailey, 1969, pp.32,64-5), was to prevent open warfare between rivals except as succession disputes. Open competition centred on judicial processes, with rivals formally accusing each other of disloyalty before the relevant patron chief. At least in cases before the kabaka, a victorious plaintiff might be given the right to "seize the alleged miscreant's office and property - to 'eat him up' (kumulya)" (Fallers, 1964, p.109). Furthermore, as Bailey points out "an arbitrated decision is not merely a means of keeping order; it is also a means of broadcasting messages that the leader's credit is good" (1969, p.64).

So, as in Rwanda, the actual power of the kingship at any time depended considerably on the use made of the office in particular historical circumstances by the incumbent, in structural conflict with his staff (cf. Lloyd, 1968; Southwold, 1961; and below).

Certain features of the nineteenth century Buganda political system stand out. Firstly, its military nature; secondly, the absence of groups or categories of persons with unequal relations derived from the economic processes of production. Differences in access to wealth were a function of the military-political organization. A synchronic analysis, like that of Mair (1961) might show up a basic distinction between persons who had the right to allocate land, and persons who sought land. However, the former did not comprise a group who owned the land, and land was not capital which could be made to increase itself. It indicated military-political status, for the more land a man controlled the more clients he could settle on it. The clients came not for the land but for the value of being attached to a military-political official. As I explained in chapter 4, war and not the land was the source of differential wealth. Southwold reports Baganda as saying "In the old days the work of the men was war" (1965, p.109). Furthermore, control of the land was allocated according to military and political criteria, and could not be simply inherited, i.e. political office was not 'owned' either.

In a formal system of this type, the capacity to mobilize informal links with high patrons was a person's principal asset. (Mair, 1962, p.148). Stratification centred on privileged access to the means to achieve political office.
Kinship, particularly for a son, with a political official was a useful interpersonal relationship for mobilization, but descent alone did not ascribe political power and status. This is most strikingly demonstrated by the process of succession to the kabakaship. All descendants of kabakas might claim status as princes (balangira); but by a process of progressive exclusion, only sons and grandsons of a kabaka were eligible for the succession (see above; Southwold 1961, pp. 5-6). The other princes were indistinguishable from ordinary Baganda in power and style of life, except that they were excluded from all senior political office and could not be 'guests' or clients of any political official (Southwold, 1966, p. 86). They were known as 'princes who have dropped away' or 'undistinguished princes'. Moreover, as we have seen, formal inequality was virtually limited to dyadic relations (chapter 5), and institutionalized named ranking occurred only among clients of a single patron (Fallers, 1964, pp. 73, 96).

The administrative system under the kabaka may be briefly described (see Richards, 1963, p. 269). Firstly, there were ten provinces (seega) in the late nineteenth century. The seega chiefs were appointed by the kabaka, though one factor in the appointment of three of them was eligibility under broad inheritance qualifications (Cox, 1950). They were responsible for assisting the kabaka's tribute collectors and organizing tribute in the form of labour services (particularly as warriors and in maintaining military resources such as roads). Like all other political officials they settled disputes among their clients. As in Rwanda this was a major channel for political struggle, and it is noteworthy that appeal against a decision took the form of challenging the political chief who made it, in a case before his superior (Fallers, 1964, p. 109). The seega chiefs were assisted in these tasks by hierarchies of lesser chiefs down to kyalo level, for whom they were directly or indirectly patrons and secured their appointment from the kabaka. All these chiefs had their own estates with their particular bakopi clients, and the more important had several such estates.

Secondly, in each province there were many estates under other jurisdictions, and this could lead as Fallers says to

"a veritable jungle of overlapping and interdigitating authorities, the cumulative result of centuries of ad hoc adjustments" (ibid, p. 96)

Such estates may be summarized as: (1) those held by the kabaka in each province (2) those held by members of the royal dynasty; (3) those held by direct clients of the kabaka - who were usually military captains or those giving specialist household services; (4) those held by clans and lineages (the butaka), where
ancestors were buried (Fallers, 1964). These categories are the most useful analytically here. However, Baganda categorized political officials as **bukungu**, **batongole** and **bataka**. These were not necessarily exclusive categories. I shall examine these categories briefly after considering the main functions of all political officials.

The political official was almost invariably a military leader. All adult males were liable to be called out for service in the army under their patrons. And unlike the Hutu, and all but an elite corps of Tutsi, in Rwanda, all Baganda served as warriors - armed with spears. Even specialist functionaries, such as the Lungfish clan who provided naval transport, were not differentiated from the rest by economic class or status group. The fact that all Baganda were warriors was an important factor in determining the nature of social stratification in the kingdom. For little distinction can be made between kingdom and army as organizations; the terms best represent different activities of the same organization in Buganda. The kingdom was effectively an encamped army, and there were no status groups forbidden to bear arms in it. In Rwanda only the Tutsi could be considered as an encamped army, as only they might bear arms (though not all did at any one time), and as they were organized through cattle transfers to preserve a monopoly of military and political power.

Warfare was thus a major activity of all male Baganda. In Mutesa I's reign there were probably more than two important campaigns each year (Fallers 1964,p.83). Men performed military service as part of their roles as clients, making up their patron's troops; but military activity was controlled by the state. Thus men unable to serve as warriors had to pay an extra tax, according to Kagwa (1952,p.163) Wealth, power and higher status could not be achieved by economic production and exchange. Raiding non-Baganda, and receiving a share of the tribute paid by them, were the means to those ends. But only the kabaka could 'give a war' (kugaba olutalo), and he allocated rights to profitable positions and opportunities in this valuable process. Fallers points out the consciousness with which Baganda regarded war as profitable. Thus 'kugaba', as in the phrase above, means 'to distribute largesse' - which indicates the connection of war and political power, which also depended on this capacity. And the chief who was chosen as general was known as the mugaba or 'recipient' of the war (Fallers, 1964,p.111), charged with taking the enemy's wealth. When the wealth in cattle and slaves was brought back, special parts were presented to the kabaka and to royal officials and kin at the court. The rest was redistributed through the patron-client system, as with taxation, and ungenerous patrons were liable to lose their clients. This
was not the only ritual way in which war and political power were linked. Political officials being military leaders, they were required to display prowess and bravery. Failure to do so led to dismissal, and war heroes often received political reward. Warfare and political intrigue provided the best opportunities for upward mobility for Baganda.

The system of taxation in Buganda reveals the crucial importance of the capacity to redistribute goods as a patron to clients, and the kabaka's success in limiting patronage to officials appointed or approved by him. Political officials were not delegated the right to collect taxation, as they were in Rwanda. Instead the kabaka sent out special envoys (babaka) to receive tax payments. According to Kagwa, the amounts due from each household, and due for redistribution to different officials were formally established, and collected regularly (1952, pp. 163-7). Taxation was paid in livestock, on a sliding scale, and other consumption and craft produce, though not apparently in basic foodstuffs. Besides the regular shares of the tax allotted to political officials, accounting for the greater proportion, the kabaka used much of his own share for rewarding favourites unexpectedly. The point here is that the kabaka was not the indirect recipient of the tribute directly received by his local officials, leaving them free to make what they could, economically and politically, from this power. Instead, all paid tribute to the kabaka directly, and depended on his favour as their patron to receive their supervised shares. This was ritually as well as technically important since the role of patronage in Buganda depended on the capacity to bestow rewards, which was thus under the kabaka's control.

These functions of ruling were shared by all three Baganda categories of political officials, and their differences may now be examined. The bataka were the heads of clans and lineages (see chapter 5). As such they had a special responsibility for certain estates where members were buried, the butaka lands. Their recruitment was limited by descent criteria, but they had to be approved by the kabaka. As territorial officials, they acted as patrons to persons of any clan who wished to be their clients and live on the estates with they ruled. Most of a mutaka's clients were not members of his own clan (see chapter 5).

It appears that at one time the bataka had had hereditary rights to certain of the kingdom's offices, and been exempt from the kabaka's control in their own selection. But during the nineteenth century the kabakas centralized authority in the kingdom at the expense of the bataka (Cox, 1950). They removed areas from the jurisdiction of the bataka and put them under their own direct appointees (bakunye and batungole); and they insisted on recognition of their authority as seeabataka, chief of all the bataka, controlling the latter's appointment.
Southwold has built a useful model, for understanding the development of different orders of chiefs, on Weber’s model of the growth of ‘patrimonialism’ in the struggle of medieval European kings against the centrifugal tendencies of feudalism (1961, passim). Thus we see the kabakas, particularly in the nineteenth century, centralizing the distribution of power in Buganda by creating an alternative ‘staff’, more directly under their control, to the hereditary bataka and thereby reducing the latter’s power. The danger was that the new staff might decisively overcome the old one and place the king in a position of dependence again. In this case the king must appoint an alternative and still more dependent staff. While the term ‘batongole’ was used ‘of assistants to any chief, this further stage may to some extent explain the difference between bakungu and royal batongole (cf. Southwold 1966) officials, as the kabakas struggled to gain control of appointment of all levels of their staff and prevent the great bakungu chiefs becoming independent patrons. The kabakas successfully used bakungu officials to reduce the power of the bataka, but then had to deal with the pretensions of over-powerful bakungu like the katikiro to whom Mutesa I is said to have owed his selection as kabaka. Mutesa and his successor Mwanga tried to build up a further staff of royal batongole into a personally-loyal military force – the kiasi department and its successors. Royal batongole were appointed by the kabaka, like the bakungu, but tended to be more directly responsible to him and independent of the bakungu chiefs, acting as his local agents.

It was my argument in chapter 5 that in such a mobile system of recruitment to and dismissal from power and high status a staff tends to seek means of limiting the recruitment pool and stabilizing its position. When this cannot be organized in a formal political group, organization may take symbolic forms. I analyzed the adoption of monotheistic religion by certain powerful Baganda in this way. It is striking that the three departments of military batongole organized by Mwanga as his most dependent staff (see chapter 5) were each headed by a leader of a different monotheistic religious group. I suggest Mwanga was attempting to offset the development of an independent (albeit symbolic) source of patronage among his staff.

I have examined the precolonial political system at some length in order to demonstrate the structural conflict between the role of the kabaka and other elements of the political elite, and among the latter themselves. These conflicts persisted in the colonial period, which may be regarded as beginning with the victory of one segment of the political elite over the kabaka; the victory which was not final. But while the form of these conflicts appears ‘traditional’ the functions were considerably changed. For the political elite was soon
constituted as an economic class which rapidly developed antagonistic economic relations with its political subjects. The latter could not legally organize politically in their own defense and probably lacked the necessary experience, and so they organized behind the 'opposition' faction of the political elite, as in the Bataka movement of the 1920s. This was not a political conflict of the precolonial period emerging in the colonial period. (see Fallers, 1964,p.91; Richards, 1964,p.320). It was only when land became valuable and antagonistic relations appeared between the new economic classes of landlord and tenant that any popular political attachment to the butaka lands or opposition to the hierarchy of appointive chiefs became noticeable in Buganda.

The butaka did not receive popular support when their powers were being reduced by the kabakas in the nineteenth century; they received it when their efforts to receive part of the shareout of land, from which many of them had been excluded in 1900, or take power from the ministers, provided a focus and ideological support for tenants to organize against the landlords.

The civil wars of 1888-97, in which the British enforced a settlement (Low and Pratt, 1960,p.12), were followed by changes in the political system ratified in the Agreement of 1900, between the British and the victorious Protestant-dominated political elite (although the Catholics and, to a lesser extent, the Muslims were also included). Buganda became one of the provinces of the Protectorate of Uganda, under British overrule. Its size was much increased, mainly at the expense of its traditional enemy, Bunyoro, and the number of ssaza increased to twenty. The kabaka's authority was to be recognized "on all questions but the assessment and collection of taxes" (clause 9, quoted p.70,ibid) so long as he and his subjects conformed loyally to "the laws and regulations instituted for their government by Her Majesty's Government" (clause 6,p.353, ibid.). The duties of the chiefs were defined, and a fixed salary established. The kabaka was to receive a private purse. Clause 10 established the ministries of the Katikkiro, Chief Justice and Treasurer, and defined their duties. Clause 11, made the kabaka's council, the Lukiiko, into a permanent body with regular membership (see below). The Agreements also made the changes in land tenure which I discussed in chapter 4.

In the period between the Agreement of 1900 and the British Government's withdrawal of recognition in 1953, under clause 6, the kabaka's authority remained formally supreme in Buganda under British "overrule" (ibid). This was summed up by the Kintu Committee Report of 1955 in reference to the essential "Core" of Baganda traditions, which they felt was essential in any change in their institutions:

"from no other source does any of his subjects derive power except from the Kabaka who exercises through his Ministers and Lukiiko his direct rule over his people"(quoted Apter,p.353).
While this principle was respected throughout the period in theory, in practice the kabaka lost much of his control of appointment, both to his chiefs and to the Protectorate Government. Daudi Cwa, who replaced Mwanga in 1897, was a minor; his regents and ministers acted in his name (cf. Southwold, 1968, p.149). By the time that he played a more decisive part, in consultation with his ministers, the Protectorate Government was extending its control at their expense. This control did not extend to direct imposition - in 1926 a Provincial Commissioner failed to impose a mulangira as ssaza chief against customary practice - but the Protectorate Government’s influence was usually accepted from the 1920s onwards, and incompetent chiefs were directly vetoed. (Low & Pratt, p.223)

The Protectorate Government also controlled policy, so that the kabaka had to follow its ‘advice’ whether he approved or not. The lukiiko was not simply the kabaka’s instrument, even rejecting his proposals on occasion (ibid. p.246). Until 1953 there was constant dispute over policy, with shifting alignments, between the three ministers (and between each other), the kabaka, the Protectorate Government and the lukiiko.

The kabaka was able to retain much informal power, however, as the focus of loyalty to the kingdom; he often appeared to represent Buganda national interests when the Lukiiko of unpopular chiefs and the ministers were prepared to compromise with the British. This is best seen in the lands issue of 1933-5 when the kabaka took up a militant and popular position against the Protectorate Government’s lease of some mailo land to Indians, which the Lukiiko had accepted. He wrote a pamphlet against it and tried to veto the necessary legislation. By such activity the kabaka retained informal support, which was important in different circumstances than this particular issue, although his formal power had declined - he was ‘persuaded’ to pass the legislation eventually. At the same time, Daudi Cwa kept out of the administrative processes of government, leaving them to the katikkiro, and this may have helped avoid his loss of legitimacy (ibid, p.300). The chiefs were extremely unpopular in this period (see below). The Dundas reforms of 1944, removing British officials to a more advisory capacity and leaving direct rule to the kabaka’s government, proved latter too unpopular to be capable of carrying it out and were reversed after the 1945 riots. Despite changes of personnel, the unpopularity of the chiefs increased. In 1948 the ministers and sixteen chiefs petitioned the Protectorate Government for the abolition of the Bataka Party, which was organizing the discontent, and in the 1949 riots popular choice of chiefs was a major demand.

At this time the kabaka Frederick Mutesa, who had succeeded as a minor in
1939 and attained his majority in 1945, lacked the popularity of his father. He had been appointed against the popular candidate, Prince Mwanda, and "was regarded as a dutiful young pro-British Protectorate government-mission appointee". (Apter, p. 213) After the 1945 riots, in which the kabaka had supported an unpopular Treasurer, he was himself so unpopular that the British Administration thought it wise to send him away to study at Cambridge again. The new Bataka Party saw him as under British control, and attacked him personally after his return from England in 1948 (ibid., p. 244). He was popularly regarded as failing to sustain Buganda national interests. In the Bataka Party neotraditional political forms were being used against the kabaka and the chiefs, though the institutions themselves were not under attack. However, considerable limitations of their power were envisaged by the Bataka Party, as in the demand for popular control of appointments.

To summarize his position in the colonial period, the kabaka had until 1955 to act through a staff which had made itself independent in many ways in the 1890s and depended on British backing for its power. His position in the political system was largely the symbolic one of legitimating the rule of this staff and their real 'lord' (cf. Southwold, 1961) the British Administration. The popular opposition to the ruling staff organized itself through one of two potent symbolic patterns, based on either the bataka, a previously-dominant and defeated 'staff', or on the kabaka. (see Low, 1964, for a different use of the idea of patterns of political office). It did this according to the appropriateness of each 'blueprint' to the situation. (cf. Cohen, 1969a, p. 180). The Bataka Federation and the later Bataka Party, though different from each other, both organized popular grievances against the ruling staff when it was perceived as a group having privileged political and economic interests. These struggles dominated the colonial period until the early 1950s. Meanwhile the kabakaship remained as a symbol of all good government of united Baganda, though the incumbents suffered personally from their association with their unpopular staff. Thus there were at least two forms of neotraditionalism available in Buganda - and a third if we include the form used by the colonial administration, the bakungu-batongo form. Although these forms overlapped, with the bataka movement appealing to the kabaka for example, their use had quite different implications. The bataka pattern was relevant only to internal struggle. The kabaka pattern was suitable for organizing all Baganda as a political group.

Other 'traditional' institutions acquired new functions. After 1900 the kabaka's court, in which the political unity of the kingdom had been focused, split up, with some elements retaining symbolic importance only and others being adapted for new political functions.

The Great Lukiiko was one of the latter. Before the 1900 Agreement the Lukiiko comprised simply the chiefs whom the kabaka summoned to a council in
which he heard their reports and issued his instructions. But by clause 11 of the Agreement it was established as a court of appeal from the ssaza chiefs' courts. Furthermore,

"The functions of the council will be to discuss all matters concerning the native administration of.. (Buganda).. and to forward to the Kabaka resolutions which may be voted by a majority regarding measures to be adopted by the said administration. The kabaka shall consult with H.M.'s representative in..(Buganda) before giving effect to any such resolutions..and shall in this matter, explicitly follow the advice of H.M.'s representative" (quoted Low & Pratt, 1960,p.355).

Its membership was established as the 3 ministers, the 20 ssaza chiefs, and three notables from each ssaza, together with 6 'other' persons, all appointed by the kabaka. The katikkiro was its President, the Chief Justice its Vice-President, and the Treasurer its leader (ibid).

Low and Pratt consider that the Lukiiko, thus constituted, represented only its own class. Their analysis of its activities in a typical month in the 1920s (pp.244-5) reveals four categories: (1) action against interference by the Protectorate Government; (2) action on internal Bugandan administration not conflicting with its own interests; (3) action on matters internal to the Buganda Government itself; (4) action on matters advantageous to themselves. It defended its privileges against both the Protectorate Government - when it seemed to be taking a popular, if conservative, line - and against popular reform measures, like the Busulu and Envujo Law. The situation was no different in 1949 when Apter estimates: "Of 32 items dealt with in its two sessions in 1949, none were important". (p.261) This was despite the introduction of directly-elected members in 1945 (31 out of 89 members, raised to 36 in 1947), who with the introduction of 14 ggombolola chiefs and 14 miluka chiefs made up the number left vacant by the abolition of the 60 places for 'notables'.

The two most important of the precolonial kabaka's bakungu chiefs underwent different types of change. They were: firstly, the katikkiro, who acted as the kabaka's chief executive for the whole kingdom, and whose duty it was to negotiate with the chiefs the successor to a dead kabaka; (Southwold, 1966, pp.92-93); secondly the kimbugwe, who had similar responsibilities for the whole kingdom, and was formally a ritual official charged with the care of the kabaka's umbilicus. The latter office retained only symbolic significance after the civil wars. The katikkiro, like all bakungu chiefs, appears to have been increasing his power in the nineteenth century at the expense of the kabaka, though not to such an extent as to challenge any incumbent during his lifetime, until the civil wars. A katikkiro seems to have played a large part in the choice of Mutesa I as kabaka, against a more widely-favoured candidate. But once Mutesa became kabaka, he disposed of this particular official who threatened
to become too powerful (ibid, pp. 95-96). There had always been a danger since Ssemakookiro reformed the system of succession by having possible rivals executed (Southold, 1968, pp. 148-9), and later kabakas nominated heirs apparent from among their sons, that when successors were young and inexperienced — particularly if they were minors — they would depend very heavily on the leading commoner chiefs, especially the katikkiro (ibid). Rebellion was more likely to come from this source than from royal kin, by the end of the nineteenth century. When the commoner chiefs rebelled against the incompetence of Mwanga, the katikkiro became the most powerful office in Buganda. Even after Kagwa's resignation in 1926, katikkiros were the effective heads and leading policy makers in the Buganda Government, while the kabakas stood aside from executive tasks.

The katikkiro and the two new ministers — the Chief Justice and the Treasurer — had a more narrowly defined public responsibility as the Buganda Government that had had the precolonial bakungu and batongole chiefs who were responsible to the kabaka alone. In the colonial period the Buganda Government was still the kabaka's. Thus political offices were shared out among themselves by the bakungu chiefs to secure the interests of the different religious parties — the katikkiro and Treasurer were always Anglicans, and the Chief Justice a Roman Catholic; of the twenty county chiefships eight were considered as Catholic appointments, two as Muslim, and ten as Anglican (Richards, 1960, p. 64) — and the kabaka was constrained by this arrangement. On the other hand, these developments shielded the kabakaship from popular rejection as an office through which the colonialists ruled, as was often said of the ministers and chiefs. The 'populist' struggle for control of these offices, as in the neotraditionalist agitation over the Nammasole Affair (Apter, 1961, pp. 213-14) which brought Wamala to the katikkiroship in 1941, was recognised as conflict with the Protectorate government and not with the kabaka, unless the latter directly intervened on the other side, as Mutesa did in the Kulubya affair in 1944-5. Ministers were no longer simply the kabaka's clients.

The political officials installed under British overrule in 1900 were the same persons who had held office under the last autonomous kabaka, Mwanga. At the time of the change to overrule important changes were already taking place in the political system. As never before, the kabaka's officials constituted a political and status group (see chapter 5). In the 1900 Agreement they were also constituted as an economic class, though the social and political consequences of this did not appear until later when land became valuable as a means of production or as capital. In this section I shall analyze the continuing domination of the political system by this economic class through its successful adaptation to changes in the economy, in status evaluation, and in political institutions.
Initially, the 3,945 chiefs who received mailo allotments were in a much stronger position politically than chiefs under the precolonial kabakas. The creation of private rights in land, and the continued association of economic patronage with political patronage, meant that for the first time power could be derived from sources not ultimately controlled by the kabaka. Wealth could be accumulated, and in the form of land ownership automatically gave political power. Persons outside the first group of chiefs might eventually acquire some power by this means. But for a time, the initial recipients of mailo benefited from a new security and moreover did not suffer from the competition of rivals, since they monopolised the means to power. They formed a dominant political group.

Fallers argues that this group, which he calls 'the gentry' (1964, p.176) and sees as "an elite class (p.186)" (see chapter 4), constituted an oligarchy for the first twenty-five years of the colonial period and then disappeared fairly rapidly when the British Administration found it obstructive, as they assumed more direct responsibility in Uganda, in what Apter calls "the bureaucratic-colonial system" (1961, p.150). Fallers' argument represents something of a consensus amongst the major studies of this period, although different terms are used in the more detailed political-historical studies of Low and Pratt (1960), Low (1964), and Apter (1961), and it may be thus taken as representative:

"the new elite had more than a quarter-century in which to consolidate their position without the intervention of the Kabaka in Buganda Government affairs. Most important, the royal power was not during this period exercised in appointments to office. The cohesiveness of what had now become something very like a gentry reached its peak around 1920-5 and thereafter probably began to recede. One immediate reason for this was that Kabaka Daudi Cwa had meanwhile come of age and begun to assert his traditional authority... More broadly, British officials began during this period to intervene more and more in Buganda government affairs in the interest of what they considered good government... Some of the interventions of the administration, furthermore, served to undermine the foundations of the whole elite class, for by this time British colonial administrators had come to be more interested in promoting the welfare of ordinary folk than in maintaining the power and dignity of their rulers, The Busulu and Envujo Law of 1928, for example... Generally speaking, Uganda Government policy has moved in a similar 'democratizing' direction ever since... The gentry, in short, came into existence in the wrong century. Before it could consolidate its position, it encountered the opposition of 'welfare state' conceptions of public policy of a sort which were threatening the dominance of gentry classes everywhere in the modern world" (p.187).

This argument identifies the elite class as 'gentry', exercising power through the monopoly of land when land ownership carried political rights. Its demise apparently followed the recognition and enforcement of political
rights from other sources, such as the kabaka's favour or administrative ability acquired through 'western' education. However, we should not assume, as Fallers does with his statement about 'democratization', that the domination of an elite class ended at the same time as the "gentry lost their monopoly of power. This would be to confuse cultural and structural factors. From the perspective of analysis of the Bugandan political system over time, the clear-cut domination of the 'gentry' status group does not appear to be discontinuous with the forms of stratification which preceded or came after it. Far from 'existing in the wrong century' it may be regarded as having provided the political conditions within which the 'elite class' could consolidate its position as a privileged economic class, and thereby guarantee its advantage when the criteria for recruitment to political administration altered. This rather reified expression of the analysis may be justified if I point out that the most important political condition provided by the 'gentry' status group (and the 'convert' one from which it sprang) was that it provided subjective consciousness and a mode of organization and agency to the dominant economic class (which is itself only an analytical construct). By the time the 'gentry' criterion became less important in recruitment to major offices the elite class was still objectively advantaged, both in holding office and in access to the new means of recruitment (see chapter 4; Richards, 1963, p.272); and it was made distinctive and disciplined by new status criteria. By the time that bakopu tried to buy higher status by acquiring land, it was of only local significance, no longer providing admission to the highest status group. By then the elite class monopolised the greatest wealth, power and status by other means. I suggest that the prominence of a 'gentry' class in the first quarter of the twentieth century as a dominant political group in Buganda may be traced primarily to the increasingly antagonistic economic relations between its members and their tenants, manifesting themselves in their political relations. While political conflict took this form, and status groups remained so undifferentiated, the dominance of an elite class was clear to all. This clarity, as a factor in political behaviour, disappeared with two developments in about the same period. Firstly, land reforms reduced the immediately-obvious conflict of interests between landlords and tenants (cf. Stinchcombe, 1967, pp.185-7). Secondly, the gentry seemed to lose their monopoly of power - though in my analysis this meant only a differentiation of economic roles within the elite class and the use of new symbolic patterns in its organization (see chapter 4).

In my chapter on 'ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND POWER STRUCTURE' (4) I reinterpreted the available evidence (Fallers, 1964), unsatisfactory as it admittedly
is, as showing that the highest positions in the political administration were recruited very largely from members of one economic class, which comprised owners of the means of production — landowners with an income from rents, and agricultural, industrial and commercial capitalists (the class included persons in other occupational roles, as I explained). Faller's own interests lay rather in estimating the degree of individual social mobility — it is probably the increase he finds on this parameter which he refers to when he writes of 'democratization'. Although I am going to develop my argument of the above chapter by using part of Faller's evidence rather as he has interpreted it, I wish to stress that the point I make is different from his. He is concerned (p.202) with estimating the extent to which the 'gentry' class of original mailo holders gave rise to a hereditary elite. While I do not think this question is the only one relevant to analysis of the part that economic stratification played in political stratification in the later colonial period — since only those who made profitable use of their land successfully made the transition to the period when land alone did not guarantee political power — it allows us to see contemporary genealogical links among persons in the highest political positions (see Fig.18,p.203 & n.64). Thus "chiefs, civil servants, ministers, landowners and leading politicians are much more closely related to the 1900 elite than are..(other categories of his 'modern elite')".

More important, this means that they are related to each other by mobilizable ties of status and kinship, so they tend "to form a relatively cohesive and hereditary inner elite"(p.202) Policy was thus decided by a particular interest group, recruited from a single economic class and status group, i.e. an 'elite class'.

In the 1950s, the political system embodying this form of stratification was supported by most Baganda, from all economic classes, status categories and political strata. For Faller this is not a situation necessarily requiring explanation: he holds the straightforward functionalist view (cf. Davis & Moore, 1945) that a stratification system is "society's way" of organizing rational (cf. Weber) pursuit of "agreed ends" by rewarding the successful with dominance (ibid,p.204). However, if we do not wish to make this assumption of 'agreed ends', we are faced with explaining how an elite class managed to organize support among the non-elite despite perceived struggles over, and unperceived conflicts in, their members' goals. This cannot simply be put down to psychological dependence by Baganda on their 'traditional' institutions, as Faller tries to do. He dismisses the problem of why many traditional forms survived as simply a matter of the irrational legitimation of increased 'rationality' in the society - which means 'modernization', i.e.
role differentiation and increased occupational mobility. In this view, legitimation was necessary because, as a stratified system shows (see above), not all men were equally capable of 'rationality'. The main problem of social order was the maintenance of both the consensus and 'rationality' as historical circumstances changed - to which the answer was political organization on neotraditional lines:

"New men, new religion, the endless new ideas and techniques embodied in Western education - all these could be absorbed and yet the Baganda could believe they were living in the same society, under leaders of a familiar kind. Indeed, the traditional kingdom gained added legitimacy from the sense that it had triumphed over new problems, had successfully put the new men and new techniques to work in the service of traditional goals" (ibid., p.205)

This ignores the fact that the 'traditional kingdom' had changed in more fundamental ways than incorporating some new ideas; and it is not shown in what ways 'traditional goals' differed from the universal pursuit of wealth, power, status and ideological satisfaction. This detour has been necessary in order to explain why it is a central sociological problem that dominance by an elite class should be accepted by the non-elite, whether through expediency, failures of perception, or whatever reason. Failure to examine this question will lead to distortions in the analysis of stratification in Buganda; for the preservation of that which is supposedly agreed on (i.e. the form of the political system) will be seen as an end in itself, as in Fallers' analysis. In such analysis, explanations become circular and ahistorical. It should now be possible to understand that, historically, the neotraditionalism of the 1950s was not simply the continuance of the traditional system throughout 'modernization'.

The clearest demonstration of this can be seen in the long-standing popular opposition to the political officials in the whole colonial period until the kabaka's return from exile in 1955. The hostility was so great that Low characterises the major political struggle in Buganda of 1897-1955 as one between 'Chiefs' and 'People', in what he calls the "Bataka pattern" (1964). It should be emphasized, however, that the actual Bataka movements of the colonial period were not principally concerned with pursuing conflicts of the precolonial period, though the mode of expression of popular opposition was 'traditional' (though not a traditional means of expressing such grievances). The Bataka movements did not oppose increased power for the kabaka, as precolonial bataka are said to have done: one of their main demands was for a return of all mailo land to the kabaka for more equitable distribution.

(Apter, pp.146-8; Welbourn, 1958, p.20) The kabakas, who had also lost power
to the Chiefs in the 1900 Agreement, were seen by the People as saviours who
would lead them in the struggle against 'unjust' Chiefs. In addition to the
hostility resulting from changing economic relations, and the gradual weakening
of the patron-client tie, much hostility to the Chiefs resulted from the new
powers and functions given them as political administrators under British over­
rule.

After the 1900 Agreement a new system of political administration was set
up along more bureaucratic lines, with the creation of a uniform hierarchy in
the place of the different orders of chiefs. In theory, the Kabaka still
controlled appointments, under approval of the British Governor, though his
ability to exercise control was impaired by personal factors, such as Daudi
Cwa's long minority. His katikkiro had gained considerable autonomy during the
civil wars, and this position was institutionalised as a prime ministership.
Two other ministers were created: the omumanya (Treasurer) and omulamusi (Chief
Justice). Under the katikkiro were 20 county (asega) chiefs ruling the ten
traditional units and ten new counties taken from the surrounding areas, mainly
Bunyoro. Responsible to each county chief were 9-10 sub-county (goombolola)
chiefs, some of which ruled areas corresponding to traditional units (Richards
1960, p.55). Both county and sub-county chiefs had 'statutory' courts. After
the kabaka's return in 1955, the number of sub-county chiefs was reduced to 128.
At the same period there were about 900 chiefs at the next level, the muluka,
which was the lowest officially-recognised and salaried level. The muluka
unit, sometimes called 'parish' (ibid, p.58), comprised usually 8-10 byalo and
300-500 taxpayers (Southwold, 1965, p.92). It seldom corresponded to a trad­
itional unit (Southwold, 1964). Like the other chiefs, the muluka chief had
a council (lukiiko), though it was informal until 1951 and never a 'statutory'
court. The muluka chief was assisted by a deputy (musigire), whom he appointed
and paid himself, and about 8 to 15 unpaid batongole, who were the landowners
of his area or their nominees. Batongole received no formal recognition as such
from the British Administration. County, sub-county and muluka chiefs were
responsible mainly for tax collection, law enforcement, and supervision of public
amenities and labour.

Southwold (1964) has shown that the role expectations of bureaucratic
superiors and of the bakopi clashed most seriously in the role of the muluka
chief (1964). There were specific structural reasons why conflict between
political strata should emerge most clearly at this level. Thus (1) the higher
chiefs had the power and wealth which ensured them the fear and respect (kitilwa)
necessary to ruling, while muluka chiefs often did not - often accepting office
in the hope of thus acquiring it. They were seldom even the largest landowners
of their area. (2) They could not be transferred from one area to another like the higher chiefs, and so bureaucratic impartiality was made more difficult.

(3) The job tended to make muluka chiefs remote from their subjects, yet they did not have the executive power to compensate for the resulting lack of cooperation, particularly from the batongole - often the musigire, who was less remote, was better able to secure compliance. (4) They were the executives directly responsible for effecting unpopular administration - tax collection, enforcement of unpopular laws, collecting information, and enforcing agricultural and sanitary regulations including communal labour. (5) They were subject to open reprisals, of which the most popular was houseburning and refusal to recognise their authority, for tax-paying or communal labour, in a way that higher chiefs were not except in very special circumstances. All this does not mean that the higher chiefs escaped hostility, as many examples illustrate: the formation of the Bataka Federation in 1921; the land issue of 1933-5; the formation of the Bataka Party in 1945; the opposition to the Buganda Land Acquisition Act and the murder of the katikkiro who promoted it; and above all, the riots of 1949 in which the rioters petitioned for popular choice of chiefs, more representation on the Lukiiko, and the abolition of the existing government. But the remoteness of the higher chiefs and their recruitment from a particular economic class did not result in class-conscious opposition to them except in the first part of the colonial period, before the 1927 land reform. Hostility to unpopular administration was directed at the muluka chief, who seldom had economic power over more than a few of his subjects.

The higher chiefships were still seen as representing Baganda rule against British rule, and considerable kitṭibwa still attached to their incumbents. It seemed right that they should be wealthy and powerful men. Hostility to them was personal, when it was clear that they had failed to oppose new and unpopular British measures. I have argued that the peculiar nature of economic relations after the Busulu and Enyujo law of 1927 made such political and status relations possible. It was possible for Baganda to retain an ambivalent attitude to stratification in their political system, so that the latter was available for use in organising them as a political group in defence of their common interests. This, in turn, helped to determine their perception of 'common interests' (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1967, Introduction). By contrast in Rwanda, where the political chiefs were clearly part of a political interest group, it was clear to Hutu peasants that their position of economic and political disadvantage was a consequence of the system of political stratification, and not only of colonial overrule.

The desirable higher chiefships had a relatively high salary, with frequent mobility to better paid posts, and they were pensionable. They received many 'perks' - official house, land and rents, and a car loan, for example. They were
not recruited by direct succession, but close kin of chiefs had an advantageous position:

"55% of county and 37% of subcounty chiefs were themselves the sons of chiefs; 20% of county and subcounty chiefs were brothers of other chiefs; and 35% of county and 14% of subcounty chiefs were brothers-in-law of chiefs" (Richards, 1960, pp.65-66).

Allowing for overlapping, there is a significant degree of inheritance of political power here - and clearly, chiefs who did not fall into those categories were not necessarily of a different economic class. Equally high proportions of muluka chiefs were in these categories, but tended to be young men training for rapid promotion or less successful brothers of higher chiefs. (ibid.). Thus much the largest proportion were in the category of 'brother of a chief' (37%) - nearly double the proportion of county chiefs in this category, and 3 times that for subcounty chiefs. Muluka chiefships had little power and were not sought by the wealthy. As Southwold says:

"partly because so many muluka chiefs are now bakopi, there is no longer any great kitibwa to be gained by an educated or upper-class man in serving as a muluka chief; this is part of the reason why it is now so difficult to persuade such men to take on the job". (1964, p.220).

Whatever the reason, I suggest this reluctance functioned latently to prevent an overriding conceptual association of economic dominance with the most unpopular aspects of the political system. The unpopularity of the higher chiefs was relatively indirect, and their obvious economic power individually acceptable in terms of kitibwa.

The institution of direct election of 2 members to the muluka council and to the ggombolola council by all taxpayers over 20 years of age, with indirect election of a representative to the ssaza council, the Lukiiko and the Legislative Council, by the reforms of 1945, 1947 and 1950, did not alter the distribution of power. Southwold (1964, p.238ff.) found that there was little interest in the councils, with under 5% of voters turning out in 1950 and 1955. Probably this was because the councils were not decision-making bodies, and seen as of only limited use in expressing grievances (ibid.). In these circumstances, it is not surprising that councillors are

"very similar in type to the lower chiefs, and not personally representative of the average peasant" (ibid, p.239).

A new feature of the colonial period was the organization of political groups in a differentiated legal order. Clan groupings had provided a degree of informal political organization (Southwold, 1966, p.85), and continued in this function - not only in the obvious case of the Bataka in 1921, but also
in the 'modern nationalist' movements like the Sons of Kintu (see Apter, pp. 214-5).
The new political groups tried to mobilize support by such means as were available, including clan organization, but were 'traditional' only in that sense. The common feature of all of them was the conjunction of disputes in the political elite with appeals, by the "elites manques" (Low, 1964), to popular grievances to drum up support. Thus one of the leaders of the Bataka movement in 1921-2, mobilizing popular opposition to the beneficiaries of the 1900 Agreement and their 'official nationalism' (Apter) which included cooperation with the British, was the Mugema. He had been the leading ssaza chief, as well as clan mutaka of the Grey Monkey clan. He had done well materially from the Agreement (Richards, 1966, p. 60), but in 1911 had lost his role of county chief and retained only clan and ritual roles (ibid, p. 31 n. 6).
The katikkiro, Sir Apolo Kagwa, immediately tried to mobilize his supporters by a similar symbolic appeal, in the "Association of the Bataka which protects the Agreement of 1900 regarding the land of the Bataka" (Richards, 1964, p. 320). In the demands of the Bataka Federation can be read the popular association of their land grievances with rule by the chiefs, and the desire for a new political system under the kabaka (presented as the 'traditionally-correct' form).

With the decline in hostility to the landlord class, and growing competition with Asian traders and non-Baganda African immigrant peasants (chapter 4), popular grievances focused on what was perceived as the threat to Buganda: all aliens, who were seen as the weak protected by the strong, i.e., the British Administration. The anti-ministry chiefs who formed the Sons of Kintu in 1938 gained mass support at muluka level by joining their campaign with opposition to Indian traders and ginners (Apter, p. 206, 246-7). The Sons of Kintu were also closely aligned with radical urban groups who had economic grievances, through the Uganda Motor Drivers' Association. The Bataka Party, founded in 1945, was different in not actually recruiting its leaders from anti-ministry chiefs so much as from the new "elected element anxious to have power in the Lukiko after the 1945 reforms. They sought to end chiefly control of the Lukiko" (Apter, p. 242). They were largely small businessmen and farmers (ibid). This leadership was more radical than previous opposition factions, partly because its members were sociologically marginal to the elite class, and it bid for the same support, in popular grievances, that had sustained opposition elements in the elite class. They made strong efforts to link up with potential supportive groups at the local level - Bataka Party units, voluntary and recreational societies, and the farmers' groups organized by I.K. Musazi (ibid, p. 243). The two main planks of the party program (the five demands of 1949) were (ibid, p. 259): (1) opposition to all the chiefs, since these were seen as loyal to the ministry
and the Protectorate Government after Wamala's 'populist' faction had confronted the latter and been defeated by it; (2) opposition to all who stole the wealth of Buganda - whether their land (i.e. the Protectorate Government, the immigrants) or their profits (i.e. the Protectorate Government which fixed the prices of cotton and coffee, Asian traders and ginners).

Like the Sons of Kimu, the Bataka Party's neotraditionalism was oriented to contemporary conditions, as shown by the demands for elected chiefs under the kabaka, and for economic freedom with their cash crops. The party was closely aligned with the cooperative movement, the Uganda African Farmers' Union, and with traders through informal contacts (Apter,p.252) The Bataka Party was banned after the 1949 riots. The U.A.F.U., also banned, reorganized as the Federation of Partnerships of Uganda African Farmers (F.P.U.A.F.). This organization provided the main means of mobilizing rural discontent behind a new opposition element in the political elite, composed mainly of modernist, educated nationalists who were themselves members of the dominant economic class but who opposed the old chiefly elite (see Low, 1964). They founded the Uganda National Congress in 1952. The U.N.C. fitted into the same pattern as the neotraditionalist parties in Buganda, despite its formal differences. Its leaders still belonged to the elite class of Buganda. The Central Committee of the National Executive in 1958 which made policy decisions, was composed 70% of old pupils of King's College, Budo and: "A high proportion of the members either had land or were related by marriage or descent to important families in Buganda" (Apter,p.317-8). Only three of the approximately twenty members were not Baganda. According to Apter, the main specific grievance of the leadership was discrimination against Africans in the Civil Service - hardly a mass issue in itself (ibid). The U.N.C. at all levels was predominantly Protestant in membership. The rural branches of the party were supported mainly by persons who were both farmers and traders, and whose concern was with excluding Asian and African immigrant competitors from Buganda (ibid,pp.323-4). As before, the elite struggles were being used to express popular grievances, and this division in the party necessitated obscurity of policy on the major issues of the kabaka's position, federalism, and self-government for Buganda. The U.N.C. did not offer or provide fundamental changes in the political system. According to Apter (p.275): "The U.N.C. was in many respects the same organization as the Federation of Partnerships" - the F.P.U.A.F. (above).

The formation of the UNC in 1952 was, however, potentially significant for political structure in Buganda. Though the party was heavily dominated by Baganda of the elite class, and many of its personnel and organizational forms at all levels overlapped with those of the banned Bataka Party, its strategy of mobilizing support outside Buganda in the rest of Uganda was, apart from the minor link up of the Bataka with protest in Busoga, a new one. The UNC's elite
class leaders may not have aimed at anything much more than improving their bargaining position with the Buganda Government and the British (Apter, p. 328). But with the introduction of this new resource into the arena of struggle among factions of the Buganda elite class, I suggest that the IMG leaders had broken the 'pragmatic rules' of struggle in that arena, to use Bailey's terminology (1969, p. 15). Moreover, by doing so they were threatening the monopoly of competition for important political offices held by the elite class. For if they succeeded they would end the 'encapsulated' situation of Buganda in the Protectorate, within which such monopoly was possible (cf. ibid, p. 145).

In 1955 there was a confrontation between the kabaka and the Governor of the Protectorate which led to the withdrawal of recognition of the former under the 1900 Agreement, and his deportation to England. The appearance of IMG was an important factor in the decision-making of the kabaka and his government in the events leading up to this crisis (Morris, 1970, p. 326), though clearly far from being the only one (see Apter, pp. 276-86). I suggest this was because the IMG was a potential and indirect threat to their power, because its leaders had 'broken the rules' of elite competition in Buganda at a time when there was fear that the kingdom's dominant position in the Protectorate was diminishing. Morris considers that

"By 1953...It was clear to the Kabaka and his Government that a positive stand against the growing forces of encroachment upon Buganda's national identity and internal sovereignty had to be made. The resurrection of the old East African federation scare provided an excellent pretext"(ibid, p. 326-7).

Whatever the complex causes of the Kabaka Crisis, one of its latent functions was to reassert the boundaries between Bugandan and Ugandan political systems, while temporarily bringing Uganda-wide support behind the Baganda in the struggle to secure the return of their martyred kabaka, preempting the UNC strategy. The UNC, after its initial reaction attempting to make capital from the kabaka's exile without undue concern about his return (Apter, p. 299), made use of the crisis to extend its popular support. It became one of the leading organizations campaigning for the kabaka's return, and raising money for that purpose. In the process it raised its dues-paying membership to about 50,000 (ibid, p. 332). But it also meant abandoning its Uganda-wide strategy, and its acquiescence in the elevation of the kabaka as the dominant symbol of nationalism in Buganda (see chapter 7). This removed its raison d'etre temporarily, and after the kabaka's return the level of membership dropped to under 10,000 (ibid) Above all, it marked the UNC's leaders' return to the rules of elite competition in Buganda, and precipitated splits in the party.

In this chapter I have built up a model of political structure in Buganda over a period of time from the accession of Mwanga II in 1884 until the deportation of Mutesa II in 1953, which shows that the greatest potential for conflict
of 'objective interests' among Baganda to emerge in political action lay in two fields: (1) conflict between the elite class and the unorganized Baganda who shared common class situations; (2) conflict between members of the elite class - between the offices they occupied, and competition for those offices. The elite class could continue to dominate the political system only so long as it could prevent class-based parties organizing against itself. Its ability to do this depended considerably on the informal discipline that could be exercised over its members to prevent their competition destroying their cohesion. I demonstrated that this analysis could be successfully tested in the history of the colonial period. In the next chapter I show how the nature of political change in the decade before Independence was determined by the posing of these problems in a particularly acute form, and the finding of solutions by members of the elite class.
PART III
CHAPTER SEVEN
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND PARTY FORMATION

In this chapter I attempt to explain the contrasting success and failure, respectively, of the neotraditional cultural strategies adopted by the elite classes in Buganda and Rwanda, in their efforts to prevent political parties forming along the main lines of social stratification in the period before Independence. The problems which are faced by political groups in maintaining their organization in a changing environment have been comprehensively outlined by Cohen (1969a, pp.201-11). These are the problems of (1) distinctiveness; (2) communication; (3) decision-making; (4) authority; (5) ideology; (6) discipline. This typology is an analytical tool of which the value can only be established by the light it throws on empirical processes; I shall not be concerned to demonstrate that it is logically exhaustive. An important variable in the solution of these problems is whether the means adopted are formal or informal (see Introduction), that is to say, in this context, whether or not such means "form part of the official framework of economic and political power within the state" (ibid. p.200).

If the means are informal it is likely that symbolism, ritual and ideologies will be utilised to a much greater extent than if they are formal (ibid.).

I write here of the strategies of 'elite classes' (see Introduction). I emphasize again that when I use this concept it is with the specific meaning of an economic class, that is, a category of persons, which has achieved corporate group organization as the most prestigious status group in a society.

The function of distinctiveness refers to a group's need to define its membership and identity, so as clearly to exclude non-members from corporate rights and to facilitate the mobilization of members in the fulfillment of corporate obligations. We should note further that within a group which defines itself as exclusive by certain criteria there may be a more exclusive group defining itself by additional and different criteria.

The function of communication refers to a group's inability to exchange information and co-ordinate their activity without regular and institutionalized channels of communication between members.

The function of decision-making refers to the need for channels of communication to centre on a co-ordinating person or 'administrative staff' (cf. Weber, 1964, p.146) which can abstract generalizations relevant to the group's activity from the particular messages received, and make
decisions about the group's activity in the light of this information. Although called an 'administrative staff' they might be involved in policy decisions. M.G. Smith's (1956, 1960) distinction between 'politics' and 'administration' cannot always be sustained (cf. Bailey (1965) and Swartz (1968)). Effecting "the order governing the corporate group" (Weber, 1964, p.146) may involve policy decisions.

The function of authority refers to the need for those "whose action is concerned with carrying into effect the order governing the corporate group" (ibid.), i.e. those who make and carry out decisions, to have the legitimate power to do so, and to have their decisions enforced. As Weber points out, it is the ability to enforce decisions which distinguishes the corporate group from other "closed commun- al or associative relationship(s)" (ibid.). The legitimate power of the decision-makers may derive from symbolic as well as material sources.

The function of ideology refers to the process through which powers exercised by decision-makers may be legitimated. The symbols through which such power is habitually expressed, at the "operational" level (Turner, 1962, p.125), are "polysemous" or "multivocal" and may be considered at two other levels of meaning: the "exegetical" and the "positional" levels (ibid.). As Turner points out, the positioning of symbols within a symbolic whole, under a "dominant symbol", reinforces the subjective validity of their "exegetical" meanings, and thereby provides explanation — and thus "legitimation" (Berger and Luckman, 1967, p.110) — for their habitualized "operational" meanings. Without some degree of legitimate power a group has no continuity.

The function of discipline refers to the "habituation characteristic of uncritical and unresisting mass obedience" (Weber, 1964, p.153). Such habitual obedience follows commands which are accompanied by the appropriate ritual behaviour, or such behaviour may itself invoke general commands even when there is no specific order — this is the difference between an order from a military officer to a soldier, accompanied by the appropriate uniforms, saluting, tone of voice etc., and the ritual behaviour of a member of an endogamous group which works against his wishing to marry someone from another group. Discipline can only be maintained by (1) constant reaffirmation of the validity of the 'exegetical' meanings of symbols involved in ritual behaviour, at special reaffirmation ceremonies in which they are 'positioned' within the ideological system; the ceremonies are usually associated with emotionally-charged events, the intensity of which may vary from the beginning of a new day (e.g. children singing hymns and being addressed by the headmaster in an English school)
to that of a life-crisis (e.g. Ndembu Mukanda ritual); (2) the constant reaffirmation of the 'operational' meanings of particular symbols; this takes place in its clearest form at reaffirmation ceremonies, but also occurs every time uncritical obedience takes place.

In this chapter I compare the formal and informal methods adopted by the elite classes in Buganda and Rwanda to deal with these outlined problems in organizing political groups, within a context in which new sources of power were potentially available to the populations outside the elite classes.

It is necessary here to discuss in what sense the 'elite class' may be said to have acted corporately in dealing with the problems of organization. Weber's definition of corporate action enables us to specify agents:

"Corporate action is either the action of the administrative staff, which by virtue of its governing or representative authority is oriented to carrying out the terms of its order, or it is the action of the members as directed by the administrative staff" (1964, p.146).

In Buganda and Rwanda, the persons who acted formally as the administrative staffs of the kingdoms also acted informally as the administrative staffs of the elite classes. This situation developed historically, as I have shown, in the colonial period, fostered by the British and Belgian policies of administration by 'indirect rule'. It was precisely because the administrative staff of the elite class was also that of the kingdom that we may describe the elite class as occupying an 'objectively' advantaged political position. So long as these administrative staffs were supported by the colonial powers, they needed no more legitimation than that provided by their continuity of symbolic form with the precolonial political authority. However, the approach of Independence and the enforcement of constitutional changes by the colonial powers brought the probability that the elite classes would no longer be able to preserve their monopoly of the administrative staff offices of the kingdoms. New resources, such as direct election of officials, could mean that some of the non-elite would find social and economic mobility in organizing the political mobility of their strata, and thus not be amenable to absorption in, and discipline by, the elite class - even where this could be envisaged. Thus it was essential that the administrative staffs of the elite classes in Buganda and Rwanda intensify the moral bases of their rule in the kingdoms, and establish a claim to represent the kingdoms as corporate entities. That is, they had to preempt the transfer of authority to election by the masses, and locate it in the kingdom as a mystical whole. If they could
retain authority into Independence, they would then have the full state apparatus of power at their disposal.
The political parties which were formed in response to the Uganda National Congress (UNC) or by breakaway from it fall into the same pattern of struggle among factions of the elite that I have already identified (chapter 6). The UNC group representing continuity with the Federation of Partnerships (FPUAP) and led by I.K. Musazi, the secretary-general, had been joined in 1955 by a faction of more radical western-educated politicians who hoped to utilize the UNC's comparatively widespread rural branch organization. When their takeover failed, and it seemed that the UNC organization could not be made efficient enough for their purposes (cf. Apter, p.338), many of this faction broke away in July 1957 to form the United Congress Party. But they failed to carry the UNC branches with them, and remained an isolated elite faction: all the Protestants, who dominated it numerically, were from King's College, Budo and six had also been to Makerere or higher education elsewhere (ibid. p.336). The UCP tried to function as an elite faction without popular support; firstly by having its two legislative councillors (who had crossed the floor from other parties) resign in 1957 (ibid. p.430, n.64) as a protest against the non-introduction of direct elections for that body; secondly, by then supporting the Buganda Government in its efforts to keep Buganda out of direct elections. But they failed to attract either popular support or the kabaka's favour, being regarded as untrustworthy and opportunistic (ibid, p.343). Furthermore, they lacked the "social position and economic power" (ibid.), which was only promised in their educational standing and which was indispensable for elite competition. The UCP gradually split up, with some members leaving politics and others joining other parties - most appeared in the Uganda National Movement (UNM) (see below).

Another elite faction was composed mainly of a core of western-educated Protestants indirectly elected to the Lukiiko in 1953, who had effectively negotiated the kabaka's return under the leadership of E.M.K. Mulira. In the process they had acquired a following of about 20 Lukiiko members to their core of 12 (ibid, p.338). They founded the Progressive Party in January, 1955. Its nature as an elite faction can be seen in the composition of its leadership, which again came mainly from King's College, Budo and which made up "a largely Protestant group of schoolmasters, prosperous farmers and African entrepreneurs, who had not found a niche for themselves within the Buganda Government hierarchy".
The PP never achieved much popular support, offered no mass issue of its own, and probably reached a maximum total membership of 1,400. Mulira himself called it a "party of leaders" (Apter, p. 339). Its mild opposition to the chiefs did not bring it popular support because "good chiefs" - the 'King's Friends' - in the populist, and in some respects conservative, tradition of Wamala seemed to have been introduced after the kabaka's return (Low, 1962, p.39); there was no urge to replace them with more efficient bureaucrats (see below). However, the PP did provoke harassment from the Buganda Government, which successfully disrupted its Lukiiko base by judicial tactics against its members. Like the UCP, the PP's lack of a popular following made it impotent, and Mulira's eventual entry into the UNM was a recognition of this (see below).

Some of the radical anti-Musazi faction of the UNC, led by another Muganda, J. Kiwanuka, had remained within the party when the majority left to form the UCP. The UNC slowly extended its support among politicians outside Buganda after 1955 - though this meant the forming of a coalition of local parties rather than any unitary party in which Baganda interests might be overruled - and Kiwanuka's faction sought once again to make it a nationalist party of the modernist, Pan-Africanist type, and to make its organization more effective. In January 1959 the UNC split over these questions, symbolized by the issue of whether or not to have a Foreign Mission in Cairo, disseminating nationalist propaganda and making contacts with other such parties in Africa. The anti-Musazi faction retained most of the party organization, but split again in August 1959 with the expulsion of the secretary-general, A. Mayanja. Both the UNC's Baganda founders had thus been expelled from the party, and the only continuing section was now led by a Lango, A.M. Obote. The Buganda Government had by this time declared itself against political parties, and already made the UNC inappropriate for elite competition in Buganda. The second occasion of the UNC's 'breaking the rules' of Baganda elite competition had put it outside the competition altogether. Many Baganda leaders - like Musazi or the more radical Mayanja, who had been in Kiwanuka's faction of UNC - were not prepared for this. Mayanja became Minister for Education in the Buganda Government. Kiwanuka also split from UNC later and, like Mayanja, became prominent in the KY party (see below and Fallers, 1964, pp.383, 385).

In 1956 the Democratic Party was formed around the Roman Catholic faction in the Buganda Government, largely at the instigation of the Catholic hierarchy. Its first president, M. Mugwanya, had been chief Justice - the Catholic share of ministerial office - but was out of
office after failing in 1955, by one vote in 83 (Apter, p.375), to become the first Catholic katikkiro. The leadership of the party was overwhelmingly Catholic (ibid, p.341); its organization was assisted by Catholic priests and the Catholic Action movement (Leys, p.5, 1967); and its mass support was based on opposition to Protestant 'establishments' everywhere, but especially in Buganda (ibid.). The DP, like the UNC, broke the 'rules' of Baganda elite class competition by adopting a Uganda-wide strategy. Unlike the UNC, it did so uncompromisingly, declaring itself against independence for Buganda and moving increasingly towards preference for a unitary form of government for independent Uganda. It was able to do this while the UNC could not because it was a 'religious', and not 'nationalist', based party and was therefore not so involved in ambiguities and fears about the nature of Independence which would divide it between Buganda and the rest of the country.

Moreover, as Catholics its leaders could not hope to capture the Buganda Government by winning the kabaka's approval, or joining any coalition of elite factions. The DP was the only major Buganda-based party whose leaders kept out of the UNM, and it strongly opposed KY (see below). Both these latter parties supported a 'Protestant establishment'. As a Catholic party with a religious, and so potentially a political, majority in Buganda it could hope to divide or even capture the latter, end division between the Bugandan and Ugandan political systems, and set Ugandan politics on new religious-divided lines with itself as probably the majority party (Richards, 1964, p.380). However, such a strategy still depended heavily on success in Buganda, for in the rest of Uganda Catholics were slightly in the minority, so it could not depend on dominating Buganda from outside (Leys, 1967, p.5). From 1958 its president was a leading Muganda lawyer, B. Kiwanuka. In the long term the DP failed, because the religious division among the Baganda elite was not so strongly matched in the rest of the population – at least not strongly enough to overcome loyalty to the kabaka when this was well-organised.

Apart from those in the DP, whose aim was somewhat different, the elite factions had failed by 1959 to organize mass support in new-style parties as a mobilizable resource in their competition for power in Buganda. They could not appeal over the heads of the kabaka, chiefs and Lukiiko, principally because their mode of political organization, and its modernist symbolism, revealed them for what they were – a western-educated elite who were unlikely to be very different from the old chiefly elite (Low, 1964), which had supposedly been deposed when the kabaka returned from exile and replaced with the 'King's Friends'. The Buganda Government was able to
monopolize leadership on genuinely popular issues (see below) and to destroy
the parties by refusing to allow Baganda to take any part in direct elections.
It was able to continue to claim to 'speak for' the Baganda.

However, soon after the 1958 elections in the rest of Uganda it became
clear that this latter mode of relationship would be inadequate to control
and discipline the expression of popular grievances. From within the new
Legislative Council a new party called the Uganda People's Union was
formed with a platform primarily "in opposition to Buganda and to its
neotraditionalism in particular" (Low, 1962, p.30; see also Apter, p.347).
Its leaders were non-Baganda and they hoped to represent the rest of the
country. The Baganda response to the UPU was not, however, cultivated and
expressed by the Buganda Government but by a new party organization -
the out-of-office elite factions at last had a popular grievance which
was too radical for the Buganda Government to give its official approval.
Moreover, a political party was needed which could mobilize popular support
at a greater intensity than that implied in being 'spoken for', in order to
participate in Uganda's politics enough to prevent plans for Independence
going ahead on UPU's terms (since Buganda was not participating in the
Legislative Council), but without committing the Buganda Government to any
institutionalization on unfavourable terms of such participation.

The elite factions thus had the field clear, and the 'parties of leaders' -
many from the UCP, Musazi of UNC, and Mulira of PP - joined together with
"a number of new, and less 'advanced' leaders of the Buganda populace" (Low,
1962, p.32) in the Uganda National Movement. As a channel for popular
grievances, the UNM "quickly became the most powerful political party which
Buganda or Uganda had ever seen" (ibid.). Low states that the UNM was banned
too quickly for any estimation of whether "the unsuccessful party leaders
had really captured the support of the populace, or vice versa" (ibid. n.1),
though he implies the latter was the case. Anyway, the party leaders
had decided to accept the expression of popular political and economic
grievances, hoping thereby to win support away from Obote's UNC, by
directing them wholly against non-Africans. As I discuss elsewhere, the
attack on non-africans fostered a Buganda, not a Ugandan, sense of nationality,
though in nationalist terms it was a legitimate program. In February 1959,
just after the UNM was founded, it called for a boycott of non-African goods
and transport. This tactic, and the party itself, received support almost
exclusively inside Buganda (Richards, p.372). The boycott was effective
there, and developed with the use of intimidation and attacks on the persons
and property of Asian traders in particular. The Buganda Government
intervened slowly, and seemingly reluctantly, to stop the disorder (ibid.). The movement was banned and its leaders, including Musazi and Mulira, deported by the Protectorate Government in May, 1959. However, the boycott continued, diminishing after an appeal by the kabaka in July but only ending in the following year (see below). Following these events in Buganda, the two major non-Baganda parties, the UPU and UNC, merged in March 1960 in the Uganda People's Congress.

For our purposes, the significance of these events is as follows:

(1) The attempt by elite factions to mobilize mass support in order to force their way into the kabaka's government had finally failed, though in the process some individuals had shown they could be used — for example, Mayanja and Mulira.

(2) The pattern of Buganda politics in which popular grievances sought expression through elite factions had not changed; however, the context of this process had changed. It was now Uganda-wide, and the Buganda Government represented the out-of-power faction within this context.

(3) The UNM had shown that mass support could be mobilized in the new context to great effect, and that neotraditional symbolism could be used in its organization.

(4) The UNM also showed that such an organization required much greater discipline if it was to be useful to the kabaka's government, and not to become too radical in its demands, and activities. For these purposes it would have to be more directly controlled by the kabaka's government.

(5) All the elite factions, except the DP, irrespective of ideology, had recognised the need to work under the dominant symbol of the kabaka. The only cross-cutting loyalties were the religious ties of Catholics to the DP, and these were to prove less intense than those to the kabaka.

(6) The elite class had not been challenged either within the kingdom or by outside political parties. The Baganda peasants, industrial workers and petty traders perceived themselves as a group in economic competition and political conflict with different groups of non-Baganda, who seemed to be working in coalition to subjugate them (chapters 4 & 5; and below).

In this situation, the elite class were seen as their 'natural leaders'. The process of party formation is analogous to that described by Weber for industrial societies:

"Since it is quite a general phenomenon we must mention here that the class antagonisms that are conditioned through the market situation are usually most bitter between those who actually and directly participate as opponents in price wars. It is not the rentier, the shareholder, and the
banker who suffer the ill-will of the worker, but almost exclusively the manufacturer and the business executives who are the direct opponents of workers in price wars. This is so in spite of the fact that it is precisely the cash boxes of the rentier, the shareholder and the banker into which the more or less 'uneared' gains flow... This simple state of affairs has very frequently been decisive for the role the class situation has played in the formation of political parties." (1970, p.186)

Until the success of the UNM, the 'King's Friends' had continued to "monopolize legitimacy" (Apter) in Buganda. After coming to power in 1955 they had gradually secured complete control of the Lukiiko and successfully resisted the efforts of other elite factions to draw away their popular support in Buganda or acquire it elsewhere. Among other tactics ensuring that new-style parties acquired little popular following, the 'King's Friends' insisted to the Governor of Uganda that he deal only with officials of the kingdom; and they secured a statement from the revived council of clan heads condemning any Muganda who belonged to a political party as thereby compromising his loyalty to the kabaka. Above all, they managed to prevent direct elections to the Lukiiko or to the Legislative Council until March 1961. Thus the parties remained 'parties of leaders', and it was of little use to them to secure two or three seats each in the indirect Lukiiko elections of 1959 - the DP, with its exceptional organizational facilities got 19 seats. Although their presence in the Lukiiko led Apter to state that "Whereas party politics had not been characteristic of the previous Lukiiko, it was now an established fact" (1961, p.387), within weeks the Buganda-based parties had merged in an effort to come to terms with the fact that party divisions would have to follow the lines of cleavage between Buganda and the rest of Uganda. The Uganda National Movement was formed in response to the anti-Baganda UPU.

Until the perception of the UPU as a threat to the integrity of the Buganda nation, the 'King's Friends' had thus monopolized the support of most of the Baganda populace, and of the leaders of local political opinion. The latter focused concern on two main issues: (1) economic grievances, popularly associated with African immigration and Asian traders and middlemen - Asian traders were well established in rural areas of Buganda, and dominated their commerce; (2) loyalty to the kabaka - as definitive of Baganda identity, and as embodying the national corporate authority of the Buganda Government and chiefs after 1955.

Unfortunately, the second level of leadership, the category which Low refers to as "the less educated and less 'advanced' men, who were giving
"the populace leadership" (1962, p. 39), and which was crucial to any understanding of party formation in Buganda, has been little studied. Low mentions only a few names, saying that though "popular forces", in some way suspicious of elite politicians and the "King's Friends", clearly were well-organized enough to keep the UNM boycott going independently, "All too little is known, to outsiders, about how the boycott was sustained" (ibid, p. 40). Apter provides some useful data on the UNC rural branches, which provided a formal political medium for some of the second-level leaders after the banning of the Bataka Party (pp. 323-4; & Chapter 6). But many of these leaders' political activities were necessarily informal, and after 1955 they had accepted political direction from the kabaka's 'friends'. Their activities, then, were continuous with those of the small businessmen and farmers who sought to end chiefly domination of the Buganda Government in the 1940s, through the Bataka Party and what I have called 'potential supportive groups' in the local areas — voluntary and recreational groups, farmers' groups and, after 1949, underground Bataka units.

Apter's analysis of Baganda UNC rural branch membership reveals the same characteristics in the leadership, and in the absence of more direct evidence it is this analysis which I am forced to rely on, in an attempt to avoid the greater danger of distortion by omission, in explaining the organization of the UNM and KY parties. It is misleading to explain Baganda nationalism in the usual terms of collective psychology — the Baganda 'thought' or 'felt' threatened by African and other aliens — and it is necessary to specify the institutions through which such ideas were formed and communicated, and responses organized. It is clear from the following statement by Apter that the role played by second-level leaders was not merely passive communication between national leaders and the populace.

"the branch chairmen were not only organizationally important in the (Buganda) Uganda National Congress. They also helped to shape its character. With such a high proportion of them in trade, they were in constant competition with Asians. This gave middle-rank party leaders a more pronounced anti-Asian bias than either the rank-and-file of the senior leadership. Several in interview singled out Asians as objects of special animosity. For them nationalism was to result in the elimination of the Asians as formidable competitors" (p. 324).

What then were the characteristics of second-level leaders, as revealed by Apter's study of Baganda UNC branches? The branches themselves were organized at ggombolola rather than muluka level, and the leaders to whom I refer were more than simply muluka 'big men' (to use a useful term from the social anthropology of Melanesia). Their occupations meant that
they were better placed than most muluka 'big men' for political contacts with the centre; "Almost all important branch members were farmer-traders, that is, people with both occupations" (Apter, p.319) This meant frequent journeys to Kampala on business, and relative ease of contact with national-level leaders at, for instance, the UNC Central Committee in Katwe. They also had close contact with more local areas, leading members of branches being usually also sub-branch leaders, and they had widespread contact in organizations which were not formally political (see above); although dues-paying UNC members were few, much general sympathy was organized through such informal groups. The branch itself was usually patronised by a prominent farmer and mutungole, whose house was used as the head-quarters. The Bataka Party had organized in the same way. But the real leaders were those farmer-traders whom Apter describes as "connivers":

"Behind the 'patron' there was usually a more 'conniving' political person, most often a small shopkeeper with a duka adjacent to several Indian dukas. On the whole, the 'conniver' was financially less successful than the Indian, devoting less time to his shop. While on good terms with the Indian, he disliked him heartily. The 'conniver' typically had a small plot of land in addition to his shop." (ibid, p.320)

on which he produced subsistence, and some cash, crops. The 'conniver' was crucial to party organization because, as I explained above, he made effective contact between the local areas and the centre which the formal party apparatus invariably failed to do. At the same time, he derived much local prestige from his 'personal accounts of contacts with national political leaders.

A most important characteristic distinguishing second-level leaders, or rather the category from which they arose, from other Baganda might be summarised by saying that sociologically, noting the different rates and levels of economic development between Buganda and the U.K., they could be loosely categorized as the Baganda version of "blocked spiralists" (Frankenberg, 1966, p.260). The brokerage role of 'connivers' was often an attempt by "substantial citizens" (Apter, p.320, n.33), who had failed in other attempts at social mobility and had reached their "highest and furthest point" (Frankenberg, ibid.), to prevent downward mobility. The examples given by Apter support this (p.320 n,33): the 'conniving', failing traders; relapsed or expelled Catholics who were relatively wealthy but had lost their high status in Catholic associations; unsuccessful 'progressive' farmers who were losing money on their land; demoted ggombolola chiefs and (more often in the Bataka movements) muluka
chiefs; retired railway employees and clerks; other literate persons with land and "careers of minor prominence". Moreover, Apter noted downward mobility as relatively high among branch chairmen. He stresses their particular status consciousness, and their acute awareness of the limitations on social mobility, as distinguishing them from the rest of the populace. In particular, they were often educated to junior secondary level but found that the jobs they sought were occupied by persons with senior secondary education.

The 'substantial citizens' shared certain political characteristics with the 'blocked spiralists' of the U.K. which were highly significant for a consideration of the interaction of social stratification and political change — although, as I have stressed, the context of their geographical and social 'blockage' was quite different. (1) They shared the 'local' as opposed to 'cosmopolitan' status orientation of the 'blocked spiralists', (Frankenberg, p.262), i.e. they accepted total ascribed status in the local community as Baganda, having failed to achieve occupational status which would be recognised anywhere. (2) They filled local leadership roles. (3) They also "act together because they feel they are a group but do not act to change their basic position in society"(ibid, p.261). That is, in Weber's terms, they develop 'communal' but not 'societal' action.(1970,p.183) This is important because it means that local political leaders in Buganda were peculiarly likely to interpret grievances in ethnic/status and not economic class terms, even when the direct interest of trading competition with Asians was absent. And those who emerged as second-level leaders through successful fulfillment of the 'conniving' brokerage role did not thereby emerge from this context and change their political values, for the role required them to articulate the views of local leaders.

Although this data on the characteristics of local-level leaders, and those who became second-level leaders, is not taken from direct study of the UNM or KY parties, it does give necessary detail on those persons who are usually referred to in some way which does not reveal the full significance of their structural position or specify their active role in generalizing popular grievances and interpreting them in a particular way. They are usually referred to as 'bataka leaders', 'conservative populists', 'less advanced and educated men' and 'leaders of the populace'. Two further justifications for my use of indirect material on these second-level leaders might be given: (1) they played a crucial
role in UNM, when they clearly demonstrated characteristics which might have been predicted on the basis of Apter's UNC rural branch data; (2) Low states (1962, p.40) that the only elite politician who had long-standing links with the 'popular forces' in the UNM, which acted almost independently of the elite factions and the Buganda Government, was Musazi - the chief organizer of UNC's rural branches in Buganda.

My analysis of Apter's data will enable us to understand the potentialities and limitations of the local and second-level leaders as they appeared in the UNM trade boycott of 1959. As they had, partially, in the 1949 riots, they showed a capacity to maintain their aims distinct from those of the elite class leaders with whom they linked up. While the elite factions, including the 'King's Friends', regarded the boycott of non-African trade and transport as means to win away the popular support outside Buganda of the anti-Buganda leaders in the Legislative Council (ibid.) and to mobilise Buganda in a demonstration of strength against them, the second-level leaders, who were linking up the local grievances of the bakopi and generalizing them in a way which suited themselves, saw it as a means to end the Asian traders' economic domination of the rural areas.

Soon after the boycott and intimidation began, the UNM and its brief successors were banned and the official leaders were deported or withdrew. The kabaka then withdrew his government's tacit approval. But the movement continued illegally, and without apparent leaders, for many months and succeeded in driving Asian traders out of the rural areas. However, the second-level leaders who sustained the boycott movement did not institutionalize their independence of the kabaka and the elite class leaders, even though they had achieved it in practice and were supported by what Low describes as popular suspicions of the latter, including the kabaka's government, as "embryonic elite groups" (ibid.). By 1961 the elite class had regained control in a new political party (or 'movement', since they denied it was a 'party'), under the reasserted dominant symbol of the kabaka, called the Kabaka Yekka ('Kabaka Alone'). I suggest that this 'failure' of the second-level leaders can in considerable part be accounted for by the characteristics which I have outlined. Firstly, their ability to link up was based on a communal level of consciousness and was not directed to changing their basic position in society. They demonstrate clearly what Saul (1969) calls the "Janus-faced" nature of 'Populism' - both 'modernizing', in terms of pursuing new and often individualistic modern goals, and 'reactionary', in terms of the communal ideology developed as a defence against failure as capitalist economic relations spread in peasant
society (see also Kilson, 1966, p.61). As we have seen, second-level and local leaders were often those who had pursued modern goals hardest, as traders, and failed in competition with Asians. It was they who were acutely aware of loss of status, and particularly sought to recover it on a communal basis. Secondly, the essence of their local status orientation was membership of the Baganda tribe (chapter 5) which was defined by the institutionalized forms of loyalty to the kabaka. The kabaka was the dominant symbol of their communal ideology.

The second-level and local leaders were thus ready to accept the kabaka's government as their political commanders again, once their economic grievances had been settled by their own action, and once the KY party began to mobilize them to defend communal status as Baganda. In 1960, some of the second-level leaders did attempt to form such groups themselves; for example, the Sikatange Party ('What I have, I hold'); the Marojo ggwa Ggwanga ('Spirit of the People'); and the Amabega ggwa Namulondo ('Behind the Throne'). The founder of the latter was Augustine Kamya, who was one of the few second-level leaders who can be named, because of his prominence in the UMM trade boycott (Low, 1962, p.39; Richards, 1964*, p.383). But these parties were absorbed in the KY when the elite class reasserted control in the kabaka's name, as were supporters of the Bataka movement and its auxiliary groups (ibid., & see below).

Kamya's personal history may be taken as a test-case for my analysis of the failure of second-level leaders. He left KY when he discovered that despite its rhetoric it was being used to secure the position of the Buganda Government by (1) alliance with the UPC, which dominated the rest of Uganda, and (2) by acceptance of other communal groups - the KY did not try to deny that it received financial support from Indians and that immigrants from Ruanda-Urundi had joined (Richards, 1964*, p.382). But he could not transcend his own and his supporters' communal consciousness, and he continued to look to the 'natural leaders' with intensified rhetoric of the same kind. His new party, 'The People for the Lukiiko and the Throne' (Mabega wa Lukiiko ne Namulondo) was annihilated in the 1962 elections, not being authorised by the kabaka.

The strategy of the kabaka's government from 1955, based on the Buganda experience of his exile, had been to reject all party organization, for reasons which I have analysed. Another part of the strategy had been the rejection of participation in direct elections to the Legislative Council. This was itself part of its rejection of any superior authority to the kabaka, which I discuss below. Both elements of this strategy had been highly successful until 1961, and the party organizations which had been
developed at various times when an alternative strategy was considered - the mobilization of clan heads for possible party activity, and the All-Buganda Party and the United National Party which were both at times said to have the kabaka's backing - were not utilized. But by 1961, the strategy was failing, as can be seen from the desperate and 'unrealistic' (see below) unilateral declaration of Independence by the Lukiko (Jan. 1, 1961), after the failure to prevent the Wild Committee setting up direct elections in Buganda as elsewhere for the 1961 Legislative Council. The limitations of even the strategy's successful execution were revealed in the elections of March, 1961. The Buganda Government hoped now for some kind of federal relationship, in which it would represent Buganda in the Uganda government; and so the Lukiko passed a resolution that registration to vote in the election was "treason" against the kabaka (Richards, 1964, p. 363). This was highly successful, with only 24% of those eligible even registering to vote.

But this simply made way for the only elite faction which had consistently pursued a Uganda-wide strategy, the DP, to capture 19 of the 20 seats in Buganda by default. And since in the rest of the country the DP had only 24 seats against UPC's 35 (Low 1962, p. 46), it was those 19 seats which gave it power to form the first Uganda government.

The DP was doubly threatening to the kabaka's government. It was increasingly in favour of a unitary government structure in Uganda; and its power base in the central government gave it the opportunity and resources to consolidate its support, operate more effectively in Buganda and undermine the power of the kabaka. The Buganda Government responded by supporting the growth of an anti-DP movement in Buganda. Moreover, having demonstrated its power in the kingdom, it made an alliance with the UPC at the Constitutional Conference in September-October 1961. With UPC support it secured at the Conference Buganda's right to determine whether or not it should have direct elections to the National Assembly in April, 1962, which would be the last before Independence, like the rest of the country. The decision was to be made by a new Lukiko, to be directly elected in February 1962. The UPC agreed not to contest this election, and so to leave a straight contest of KY and DP.

The anti-DP movement, in which out-of-office elite class leaders like Mulira had again linked up with second-level leaders, as in the UNM, became known as 'Kabaka Yekka' (Richards, p. 382) and had its leadership largely taken over by the kabaka's government (see below). With a further intensification of the moral basis of the Buganda Government's rule (see below), politics was simplified to a single issue - loyalty to the kabaka, represented by a vote for the KY. The potential Catholic vote against the
the Protestant establishment was divided, or at least neutralised (22% of eligible voters did not even register for these crucial elections, while the first direct elections elsewhere in Uganda (in 1958) had brought out over 80% polls in 8 of the 10 constituencies); and the KY took 65 of the 68 seats. The new members represented the "moneyed and landowning class" (ibid, p. 38). The Lukiiko then decided for indirect representation for its 21 seats in the National Assembly. After the April elections in the rest of Uganda, in which UPC got 37 seats to DP's 24, the KY kept its side of the bargain and formed a government with the UPC which took Uganda to Independence in October, 1962. By the final Independence Conference in June 1962, Buganda secured confirmation of its status as "a single federal kingdom in a composite state" agreed at the previous conference (1961), (see Richards, 1964 pp. 376-7). Buganda's representatives in the National Assembly would continue to be chosen by the Lukiiko. The formal political institutions through which all factions of the elite class had 'agreed' to operate, including the kabakaship and a Lukiiko which still allowed seats for the asaza chiefs, were made legally secure. They could be altered only by a two-thirds majority of the Lukiiko. The elite class retained its power into the period of Independence. Those elite factions which had sought their own short-term interests in securing power for themselves in a unitary Uganda, at the expense of the corporateness of the Buganda elite class, had been disciplined or defeated. The Buganda Government had been forced to concede certain powers to the central government, notably as concerned administration of the Crown Lands, income tax collection and external loana raising, and arm and police control. But except for the financial concessions considerable room for political manoeuvre was left. The Buganda Government seemed to be in a strong position in this respect; it had demonstrated its popular support, agreed with the UPC on respective 'spheres of influence', secured a third of the central government ministries and, some time after Independence, the Presidency of Uganda for the kabaka. Problems for the future, however, lay in that the success of the elite class in retaining its corporateness on an ethnic basis precluded its participation in any move towards the formation of a Ugandan elite status group or class, and made it a target for non-Buganda elites.
The Hutu revolution of 1959–61 has never been adequately explained in its specific detail because it has always been treated as a question of individual psychological orientations and ideological change. Explanation need then only refer to possible broad causes of psychological changes among Hutu, away from the premise of inequality (cf. Maquet, 1961, 1964) and dependence on Tutsi governors — and no investigation need be made of different levels of consciousness, internal structural differentiation and the actual process of organization of the caste as a political group. Even Lemarchand, who sees the importance of these questions at later stages of the revolution, accepts earlier writer's explanations of its beginnings as the spontaneous result of individual decisions in a situation of widespread anomie among Hutu, produced by the colonial administrations' removal of institutions which traditionally maintained 'balance' and 'harmony' between the castes (pp. 118, 140ff).

He considers this anomie was triggered by intolerable tensions following the monarchist coup d'état of July 1959 and the formation of an aggressive Tutsi party, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) pressing for immediate Independence while its members monopolised political office. He merely qualifies earlier accounts by pointing out that anomie and "profound psychological disturbance" was concentrated in a particular category of Hutu who, in the process of structural differentiation, had come to stand outside the caste system. (ibid. p. 144)

I have already indicated that equilibrium assumptions are unwarranted empirically and misleading analytically. Besides the choice of explanations for which the only 'proof' is the occurrence of the events they purport to explain, the basic error of these writers is to assume that 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' designated units of the same type. On the contrary, it has been my argument throughout that while the Tutsi were organised as a political group, the Hutu were only a social category defined as a status group by their masters. Tutsi domination was the product of their superior organization, which was kingdom-wide while the widest Hutu group was the lineage operating at no higher political level than the hill. Hutu could not develop consciousness of their common interests so long as their social interaction was principally competitive and their ability to cohere was organised by a Tutsi patron. Hutu did not participate in any political arena at a higher level than the hill even in the 1950s, as the 1956 elections show (chapter 3). Even if Hutu at hill level rose against their patron, Tutsi could mass their kingdom-wide organization with specialised military units (either the intore or colonial police) to
repress them. It was by no means inevitable that Hutu should achieve a
group consciousness, for this would require the development of communication
and other organizational functions at above hill level. And although a
potential organizing body appeared in the Hutu intelligentsia (ibid), which
had support after 1956 from the Catholic European hierarchy and the Belgian
Administration, this had apparently failed by 1959 to raise support at hill
level because Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs could prevent the entry of
organizers, the discussion in any formal body of kingdom level political
issues, and the formulation of problems in caste terms, (Lemarchand, 1970
p.152). UNAR launched a campaign after its foundation in August, 1959,
which appealed in the name of Rwandan nationalism to members of all
castes. This shows that its Tutsi leaders were confident that, as previously,
Hutu participation in the political system could be directed at pleasure because of its lack of autonomous organization.

In the event it was wrong, not because the Hutu peasantry supported
a remote and inadequately protective Hutu intelligentsia directly but
because there existed a new category of Hutu who were (1) aware of the
activities of the Hutu intelligentsia; (2) expecting the latter to gain a
considerable amount of political patronage through reforms which the
Belgians would force the Tutsi monarchy to accept; (3) hoping to utilize
the caste symbolism embraced by the main Hutu party of the intelligentsia
to replace the local Tutsi patrons with themselves; (4) sociologically
speaking, in a position which was independent enough of the local Tutsi
patrons to enable them to act as 'big men' within the Hutu category,
articulating to ordinary Hutu those ideas of the intelligentsia in which
they themselves were interested; (5) thus able to personify, without a
confrontation with the local Tutsi patron for which they were not ready,
a specifically Hutu challenge to local Tutsi rule; and to acquire a following which transcended lineage competition. I suggest that far from being spontaneous the rising of November 1959, which began the revolution, was the result of those Hutu 'big men' or potential 'second-level' leaders (in this context) mobilizing their 'cores' of followers for the seizure of local patronage at a time when it appeared that the Tutsi were beginning a systematic elimination of the Hutu intelligentsia, to be followed by Independence, a process which would deny upward mobility to local Hutu
'big men' indefinitely - and might well lead to their own elimination.

Schematically, it might be said that the latter acted as if there already
were a Hutu government which would give them patronage; the Hutu intelligentsia of the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation des Bahutu (PARMEHUTU)
accepted the role; the Belgians endorsed it; and Tutsi organizational supremacy was irretrievably lost. Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence against which this analysis could be tested and although I shall justify it in terms of (1) the structural characteristics of Tutsi domination and of the new rural Hutu economic category, and (2) the better-documented process of political change which followed the November rising, the major justification must be that the current explanations in terms of mass psychological change or straightforward 'inevitable' class war are quite inadequate (chapters 1 & 3). An attempt is therefore necessary to make better sense of available data on these crucial events which may be regarded as providing an 'experimental situation' in the nature of Tutsi rule in Rwanda. I suggest that, discarding preconceptions of Hutu psychological dependence, the November risings should be seen as an intrinsic part of the revolutionary process of the next two years and not as its analytically separate 'cause'. It is then possible to see one continuous process of Hutu solutions to problems of political organization (which were at the root of Tutsi domination) both before and after November 1959. In this case it is legitimate to speculate that the sudden appearance of Hutu political patrons at the local level, after the risings, required informal preparation - not consciously for revolution but for individual social mobility through politics, which it seemed might soon be possible for Hutu.

I have already dealt extensively with the structural characteristics of Tutsi domination (chapter 3) and it is clear that no explanation of the revolution which does not explain how it might have been organized in the face of such difficulties could be considered even minimally adequate.

The characteristics of the new Hutu category are significant here. Its members were upwardly mobile like the Hutu intelligentsia, though less successfully, and they too found themselves 'blocked' by caste considerations. They possessed skills which tied them to occupations in the rural areas: primary school teachers, clerks in the Administration (plantons) petty traders, inn-keepers, truck-drivers, brick-layers. After the elections of June-July 1961, the occupations of the new Hutu political officials (burgomasters) in Kibuye territoire included

"nine school teachers (moniteurs), one catechist, one judge, one clerk (secretaire de chefferie) and three carpenters. However fragmentary, the evidence available from other areas indicates a somewhat similar breakdown of occupational statuses, with a predominance of primary school teachers" (Lemarchand, 1970,p.187).

The part played by the primary school teachers strengthens my argument that a capacity for patronage had to be demonstrated by local Hutu leaders: as Hobsbawm points out (1962,p.232) it is this occupation which frequently
"represent(s) the ideal of an age when for the first time common men and women looked above their heads and saw that ignorance could be dissipated".

Lemarchand considers that persons in all these occupations, whom he calls a "kind of rural proletariat:" (p.7) or "emergent middle-class" (pp.7,479), became rural revolutionary leaders because they no longer "belonged to the caste system" (p.144) and thus did not share the psychological dependence of most Hutu. He has no doubt that they acquired followings among Hutu:

"they were ideally suited to act as intermediaries between the intelligentsia and the masses. In fact, in many instances they acted as surrogate patrons for those peasants who could no longer expect aid and protection from their traditional overlords" (p.141).

I suggest that they were able to attract a 'core' of Hutu who shared their aspirations even before the November risings, because their occupations reduced their dependence on Tutsi patrons and gave them expectations of further mobility, probably through the political system from which they were temporarily excluded. They would then be in a position to generate and lead a much larger rising against the Tutsi as a caste, which might appear 'spontaneous'. At later stages of the revolution, for which there is evidence that they organized in this way (ibid,p.183ff), the peculiarities of their occupational characteristics are not necessary to explanation of their intermediary role and local patronage, for these went to any political official appointed by the central governement; the prominence of certain types of occupational statuses can only be explained by their significance in the pre-revolutionary situation. I suggest that in November 1959 the possibility of not realizing the intermediary role to which they aspired led them to accelerate the process by seizing power locally. My analysis enables us to see the November risings as an essential part of contemporary political processes - the final stage in Hutu organization, linking national and local - level processes of change - rather an 'act of God' explicable only in terms of general historical trends or mass psychology.

Moreover, in the northern regions there is evidence that the process of local organization by Hutu patrons did precede the November risings, and made them possible. The traditional Hutu patron chiefs, the abakonde, still informally maintained their roles, and had occasionally used them during the colonial period in localized risings against the Tutsi chiefs. There was endemic hostility between the abakonde, supported by their clients (bagererwa coutumiers) who had been dispossessed of political power and land rights, and their dispossessors - the Tutsi chiefs and their clients (bagererwa politiques) Many of the abakonde belonged to the
Hutu intelligentsia, sharing its aspirations from its first organizational efforts and later rising to high political and administrative positions. But even after Independence the sources of their support were neotraditional: men like C. Habamenshi (Minister of Justice) B. Bicamumpaka (Minister of Agriculture, then the Interior) and J. Habyalimana (Minister of Armed Forces and Police) held large areas of land in the north as abakonde. They had secure electoral support from their clients and could even use the 'gifts' they received to become wealthy traders (ibid, p.232). On a much reduced scale they had the same sources of support before November 1959 (Pauwels, 1967). In the November risings it would have been comparatively easy for them to mobilize the Hutu peasantry through their leading clients, who were more local 'big men', by the neotraditional symbolic appeal of their roles, against the Tutsi chiefs and their (merely 'political') clients, whose installation in power was too recent and too much resented for them to have established legitimacy. Pauwels (1967) describes the Tutsi chiefs in Bushiru in the 1930s and 1940s as being figureheads while much administration was carried on informally by a mukonde. But the abakonde also led the Hutu revolution in the north in areas where Tutsi hegemony had been established before colonial rule. Some of them demonstrated considerable independence from PARMEHUTU until the party proved its capacity for patronage in the communal elections of 1960 (Lemarchand, 1970, p.182).

Standard accounts of the Hutu revolution stress the ideological and psychological effects on the Hutu peasantry of the appearance, from the mid-1950s, of a Hutu intelligentsia. I suggest that much more important was its creation of a political group at kingdom-level which, being clearly the protégés of the Belgian Administration and European Catholic clergy — and thereby the beneficiaries of projected electoral reforms — was attractive as a patron to second-level Hutu leaders. In particular, it claimed to speak for all Hutu, and this was accepted by the European authorities. From about 1956, the Administration and Catholic Church began to move rapidly away from their commitment to 'immobilisme' and Tutsi domination. In fact, Lemarchand presents a convincing case that throughout 1959-62 it was only the active intervention of the Administration and Catholic European clergy, neutralising Tutsi political and military counteraction, that allowed the Hutu revolution to take place. But as "resources in the environment of political action" (Nicholas, 1968, p.310) like the United Nations used by the Tutsi, they did not create the revolution or the social and historical processes of which it was part, though they did allow them to develop (see also Southwold, 1966, p.121). The change of policy meant
that Hutu intellectuals acquired the means to meet as a group and formulate self-consciously the awareness that the 1956 electoral reforms were likely only to consolidate Tutsi domination and legitimate it. Of these means, the most important were: (1) Catholic newspapers; (2) the Cooperative Travail, Fidelite, Progres (TRAFIPRO), a consumers' and producers' cooperative. In late 1956 the Hutu intelligentsia acquired almost exclusive expression of their views in the main European weekly, 'Temps Nouveaux d'Afrique', and the only vernacular newspaper, 'Kimanyateka', where G. Kayibanda (the future President of the Republic) took over as editor from the leading Tutsi ideologist, Abbe Kagame. In December, 1956 TRAFIPRO began its activities at Kabgaye near one of the main seminaries; it was initially financed entirely by the Catholic Church. As Lemarchand says (1970.p.148) "TRAFIPRO' served as the basic cell from which the Hutu movement developed", for it enabled the Hutu intelligentsia to solve their own organizational problems, providing an institutional framework for decision-making and communication, in particular, and to link up with some of the Hutu local leaders in the rural areas. It was very closely connected with Kayibanda's Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM) and PARMEHUTU parties, and he was the first chairman of its board of directors.

The limited possibilities of propaganda in achieving reforms seem to have been reached quite rapidly. In March 1957 seven Hutu of the intelligentsia produced the 'Manifeste des Bahutu', although this received no official response from the Belgian Administration to whom it was addressed, or from the Tutsi-controlled Supreme Council of Rwanda for over a year; but through the local press and informal discussion its contents became known all over Rwanda (ibid,p.152-3), and a subject of major interest. The manifesto demanded an end to all forms of Tutsi political, economic and social domination, replacing them with liberal-democratic forms of government; moreover, it claimed this should be done quickly, before the Supreme Council took unilateral action (R.P.pp.20-29). In June 1957 Kayibanda formed the Mouvement Social Muhutu to promote the manifesto and mobilize his contacts in the rural areas. But because of the rigorous opposition of Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs MSM was unable to achieve rural organization except in areas around the main mission stations in Ruhengeri, Gitarma and Astrida, even when it attempted to make informal use of the irregular hill councils of Hutu lineage heads (Lemarchand, 1970,p.153). MSM was further weakened by a split between the ex-seminari-sts, and those who had had further education and tended to be more 'moderate'(ibid.p.234) in their demands. J.Gitera formed his own party with the 'moderates' in November 1957, the Association pour la Promotion de la Masse (APROSOMA). This appealed for the support not only of Hutu but 'menu peuple' of all castes. It never achieved much support outside Astrida. It had affinities with
millenarian movements, using neotraditional and Christian symbolic forms and looking to the mwami, the "father of Rwanda", "the first Christian sovereign" and "A good Tutsi", to extirpate 'pagan' elements — particularly the royal symbolism centred on the drum Kalinga — and return the country to a Golden Age of caste equality (d'Hertefelt, 1960b, p.126). It changed sides opportunistically during the civil war of 1959–61, and after the PARMEHUTU-led coup d'état (see below) it was gradually suppressed. But until the November risings, the MSM (re-organized in 1959 as PARMEHUTU) had little more success than APROSOMA. Its activities were intensified after the Tutsi coup d'état at Charles III Mutara's funeral in July 1959. This event had been rapidly followed by the formation of a monarchist party, the Union Nationale Rwandaise, whose leadership was "largely synonymous with " the Tutsi Supreme Council (which had only one Hutu member: chapter 3) (Lemarchand, 1970,plate 6). This was followed within a month by the reorganization of MSM as PARMEHUTU.

After the coup d'état, UNAR denounced the apparent coalition of the Administration, Church and PARMEHUTU and demanded immediate Independence. This strategy rested on the assumption that Hutu organization and propaganda had not been effective at hill level, and the danger to Tutsi rule lay only in the revolution from above imposed by the Belgians. It aimed to mobilize the population through the traditional structure of authority to reject remote, self-appointed PARMEHUTU leaders. As I have argued above, this could not succeed because there was a new flexibility in the local structure of authority. When UNAR militants began what looked like the systematic elimination of Hutu leaders there was an overwhelming response by Hutu. On November 1, 1959, UNAR militants in Gitarama (central Rwanda) attacked one of the few Hutu subchiefs, a PARMEHUTU leader, and local Hutu immediately retaliated by killing an anti-PARMEHUTU Tutsi subchief and 3 Tutsi officials who were with him. Violence spread immediately in the adjoining northwestern provinces of Ruhengeri, Kisenyi and Kibuye — where armed bands of Hutu attacked a town on November 7. It spread north and finally returned to the rest of central Rwanda. As evidence of 'spontaneity' it is said that Hutu attacked Tutsi indiscriminately — yet by January 1960 it was necessary to replace, by Hutu, 21 Tutsi chiefs and 332 subchiefs who had been killed, forced to flee or could not continue in the face of local Hutu opposition (ibid,p.172). Tutsi reprisals during the rising were clearly directed at Hutu leaders and carried out by commando groups. It is significant that Tutsi used their traditional machinery of repression, which had been informally resuscitated as part of the monarchy's neotraditional campaign in the 1950s: (see below)
"Heavy reliance was placed at the outset on traditional military organization: the traditional army chiefs, the border guards (ababywi) the Twa-led commandos, all played their part in organizing the repression" (ibid, p.165).

The Belgians officially restored order on November 14. By the end of November there were 7,000 Tutsi refugees, with the number rising fast.

From this point on there was intermittent civil war. With the Hutu intelligentsia backed by the Administration many UNAR leaders, including the mwami, left Rwanda and began a campaign to get a reversal of the situation by the UN trustees. Some of them organized guerrilla commandos (inyenzi) of refugees both within and from outside Rwanda; these had little effect other than providing a justification for the violence used by local Hutu leaders in consolidating their support. The Administration took the opportunity of the risings to replace half the Tutsi authorities with Hutu 'interim authorities' (see above).

An Interim Decree of December 1959 provided for a new governmental structure: (1) the subchiefdom was to be replaced by a "commune" with directly elected "councillors" and an appointed "burgomaster"; (2) the chief was to lose executive power, and merely facilitate communication between the centre and the burgomasters; (3) the centre was to be an indirectly elected legislative Council with powers subject to Belgian veto. Elections for the communes took place in June and July 1960. UNAR officially boycotted the elections (communique 20.5.60, R.P. p.240) but some splinter groups contested seats. Tutsi attempted to intimidate Hutu voters, whose retaliation was again overwhelming, continuing long after the elections - which appeared to give them carte blanche. Gravel's account of the impact of these events in Remera, where there had been no violence at all prior to July 1960, shows how the newly-appointed burgomasters consolidated their power locally by terror (1968, pp.190-6).

The results of the elections gave PARMEHUTU 2390 of the 3125 seats (76.5%); the next party, APROSOMA, had only 7.4% of the seats and a share in 6% of the PARMEHUTU seats; UNAR gained 56 seats (1.7%) (R.P. p.272). 210 of the 229 new burgomasters were Hutu, and 160 of these were PARMEHUTU members, soon joined by many of the others. The Administration raised the numbers of the Special Provisional Council, which in February had replaced the Tutsi Supreme Council, from 8 to 48 – dominated by PARMEHUTU now – and allowed a provisional government to be formed by Kayibanda (R.P., pp.207, 315). The latter pressed for direct elections to be followed by Independence, since it was difficult for PARMEHUTU to discipline the second-level leaders whom it was patronising – central leaders could not afford to lose secure votes,
yet were afraid that the extensive use of terror might create disaffection and split the party (Gravel, p. 195).

UNAR secured a postponement of elections by the UN until all parties could compete safely under amnesty, and the mwami return from exile (Resolutions, 20.12.60. E.P. pp. 359-363). But on January 28, 1961 there was a coup d'état by the Hutu in the provisional government (UN Commission report A/4706, R.P. p. 388). All Rwanda's burgomasters and councillors were brought to Gitarama, where they were informed that the monarchy was abolished and a republic proclaimed. After this, 92% of them participated in voting for a President and National Assembly. PARMEHUTU secured the Presidency and 44 of the 48 seats; APROSOMA the rest (official communique 28.1.61, R.P. p. 385). Three days earlier the Belgians had granted internal self-government, and the UN Commission concluded that they had abetted the coup. The UN eventually decided that elections should be held in August, and that there should also be a referendum on retention of the monarchy (Resolutions 2-10, 22.4.61. R.P. pp. 402-3). Meanwhile PARMEHUTU put its internal autonomy into effect, replacing Belgian territorial administrators with its own 'prefects' and gaining greater capacity to discipline local leaders (see Gravel, 1968, p. 195). From its position of strength it won 35 of the 44 seats in the elections, and the monarchy was rejected by 1,006,339 votes to 253,963 (Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 196-7). UNAR had participated, under UN supervision, and secured 7 seats. By the New York Agreements (28.2.62. ibid, p. 197), UNAR was guaranteed 2 ministries and other high offices by the UN. But these did not enable it to create an electoral base, and they provoked a split between its own 'Progressives' and the 'conservatives' (ibid, pp. 203-4). By 1965, UNAR had also tried an intensified guerilla campaign, which failed, and had fragmented. The independent republic of Rwanda was proclaimed by a PARMEHUTU government on July 1, 1962.
SECTION THREE
COMPARISON OF SOLUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

(a) The Problem of Distinctiveness

Defining Baganda group membership was not a process that required organization anew in the 1950s. The neotraditional political structure still linked all Baganda to the kabaka, the living embodiment and point of reference for myths of origin and superiority defining the group's exclusiveness. Tribal custom continued in the colonial period to exclude non-members, particularly through forms of descent – this, I suggest, is the explanation for the continued vitality of descent group organizations after they had lost formal and informal political power, which many writers have found inexplicable in functional terms. The development of economic classes did not bring a decline in the importance of tribal custom in the personal identities of Baganda, or the growth of new symbolic forms, principally because relations between Baganda economic classes were not those of direct conflict (cf. Weber, 1970, p.186, quoted above) after the 1920s, and it was in the interest of the Baganda peasantry, including farmer-workers and farmer-traders, to maintain tribal solidarity as a status group in order to compete effectively against non-Baganda labour and traders. However, stratification within the Baganda group had been reflected in the conflicting interpretations of the meaning of tribal custom (chapter 6), between the Buganda Government and the Bataka, and associated movements. Although it was the 'Bataka' supporters who are usually referred to as 'traditionalists' or 'neotraditionalists', the advocates of both interpretations of tribal custom sought to give new meanings and functions to old symbolic forms. The problems of distinctiveness faced by the elite class were thus those of identity rather than membership. Firstly, the conflicting interpretations of tribal custom had to be transcended, so that they should not become the bases for economic class consciousness and new forms of custom cutting across tribal lines in Independent Uganda. Secondly, intensification of tribal distinctiveness was required so that Baganda should not develop cross-cutting ties to the new political parties, based on Uganda nationalism, religion or, potentially, economic class, which would undermine the authority of the Buganda Government and thereby the corporate organization of the elite class. Intensification of the ritual defining the role 'Muganda' would prevent Baganda forgetting their obligations to the tribal group, and mobilize them in defence of what were conceived to be their exclusive corporate rights – their economic, political and status superiority over other Ugandans. The process of intensification ideally requires the
establishment of a single symbolic pattern which can articulate all aspects of social life (M.G.Smith, 1956, p.55).

As I show in section 1 and below, the Kabaka Crisis provided the opportunity for the establishment of such a hegemonic symbolic pattern, dominated by the kabakaship. But even the indoctrination of this pattern, begun during the crisis itself, and continued after his return (see section 3 (b)), was subject to fluctuating success. There were signs in the UMN trade boycott that not even the existence of an anti-Buganda movement would always sustain loyalty to the kabaka, if the long-standing purposes of the Bataka movements were not achieved. And so, after 1959, a new level of intensity in the indoctrination of the kabaka-dominated symbolic system was projected, and all issues were again reduced to the matter of loyalty to the kabaka (see section 3 (f)). This was successful in maintaining the distinctiveness of the Baganda necessary for their mobilization informally, and then formally in the KY, in such a way that the Buganda Government could not be constitutionally weakened in the transition to Independence because the kingdom was also a strong political party, with the political element in its governmental relations with the central government well distinguished from the administrative element.

Organization through the symbolic pattern dominated by the kabakaship also obscured the existence of an elite class corporately organized by the same administrative staff, distinguishing itself as an elite status group by the new life-styles acquired in the process of structural differentiation, with its own myths of superiority, and forms of moral exclusiveness through the patterns of friendship, kinship and marriage (chapters 4-6).

The Tutsi elite class in Rwanda failed to solve the problem of distinctiveness in two main ways. Firstly, it failed in its efforts to create a distinct group of Banyarwanda focused on the corporate possession of a common culture. Secondly, while it succeeded in obscuring its own existence within the Tutsi group, its privileges were nevertheless perceived by the Hutu masses as those of a corporate group, because of its distinctiveness as 'Tutsi'. As with the tribal categorization in Buganda the caste categorization did not accurately outline the corporate groups of greatest "range" (cf. Smith, 1956) in the society but crucially affected political norms in a rapidly changing situation. In Rwanda, the hierarchical distinctiveness of 'ethnic' status groups, i.e. the castes, made the existence of an elite class more prominent, even though the latter was not co-extensive with the former type of group. In Buganda, the hierarchical distinctiveness of 'ethnic' status groups, where a large majority of the
population belonged to the most prestigious "ethnic" group, obscured the existence of an elite class.

So long as the Belgian Administration's policy was to limit secondary education and recruitment for government offices to Tutsi, it was in the latter's interest to distinguish themselves ever more clearly from non-Tutsi. During the colonial period, an elite class emerged among Tutsi, largely through these policies, distinguishing itself by educational and life-style criteria. Noble Tutsi status was an important element in the identities of these persons, but there were also other reasons why they did not abandon caste symbolism. Principally, their value to the Belgians was that they provided the administrative staff of the group (distinguished by Tutsi status) which was able to maintain order at the local level, preventing political organization among the peasants against colonial rule extremely efficiently and cheaply (see statement by first Resident, 1925 Report, quoted Lemarchand, 1970 p.66). For these purposes, the patron-client system had to be maintained, together with Tutsi distinctiveness which was indispensable to it. We may note that the Belgians showed great anxiety at the prospect of the abolition of ubuhake, which they identified with the total patron-client relationship, and delayed it until 1954.

When the Belgians' policy changed in the mid-1950s, Tutsi control at the local level became even more important for their own purposes. In 1956 it was shown that so long as there was a Tutsi monopoly of political office they could prevent Hutu organizing adequately to end the monopoly by elections. But when the Belgians permitted Hutu parties to appear, and showed they intended to "politicize" the Hutu (statement by Special Civil Resident, 11.I.60, R.P.p.215), with the purpose of holding direct elections before Independence, the Tutsi elite class had to preempt these moves by establishing their own claim to popular authority. They tried to mobilize Hutu, under the control of Tutsi patrons, to reject the Belgian colonialists, direct elections and the Hutu intelligentsia. This involved the use of customary ties, ideologically resystematized by reference to an ideal past, under a relevant dominant symbol, the mwami (see section 3(e)), in which there was caste harmony. The declared aim of this 'political religion' (Davies, 1970 p.59) was a return to harmonious relations by reviving 'traditional' customs. The use of neotraditional ideology and ritual would ensure the failure of Hutu to organize as a group, however often 'progressive' Tutsi leaders declared that the distinguishing features of the castes did not mean they were unequal; the Supreme Council even found it expedient to declare that it was impossible to distinguish clearly
between the castes and the use of caste names in official documents should be stopped (12.6.58, R.P. p.37). However, the strength of caste distinctiveness was shown when conservative Tutsi reaffirmed their myths of 'racial' superiority (see section 3(e)), denying common descent of Tutsi and Hutu.

Neotraditional customs were intended to act as forms of moral exclusiveness, maintaining the distinctiveness of ordinary Banyarwanda from the persons branded as 'enemies' or 'traitors', i.e. the Belgian colonialists, particularly the European clergy, and the Hutu intelligentsia with its modern life-styles and 'western' liberal-democratic ideology. In 1958, the Supreme Council considered that all caste friction could be put down to the activities of "un groupe restreint de types qui eux-mêmes agissent sous une influence étrangère de quelques blancs ou noirs, aux idées communisantes et dont l'intention est de diviser le pays" (R.P. p.37):

Leading Tutsi referred to themselves as 'abatabazi', warrior-heroes who traditionally saved Rwanda from foreign invasion, when they launched their appeal "Enfants du Rwanda, soyez prêts au combat" (R.P. pp.75-76).

The Hutu, then were expected to continue to channel their behaviour through customary institutions, legitimated as 'traditional' and articulating Rwandan unity. Until the mid-1950s the 'exegetical' meaning of these forms always referred to the cosmic rectitude of caste differences. But when it became necessary to seek, in a limited way, the support of Hutu, not even Tutsi relied wholly on the 'premise of inequality'. Instead they sought to maintain customary modes of behaviour while simultaneously legitimizing their rule by a decreed change of exegetical meaning in their ideology - so that Hutu would believe themselves free and equal, yet continue to act through neotraditional forms of which the 'operational' meaning would be their distinctiveness and inferiority. However, in practice the use of traditional symbolism merely emphasized internal divisions between the castes, not the unity of all Banyarwanda. It is possible that the same symbolism might have been used successfully to create a Rwandan nation if the Tutsi elite class had made adequate concessions to upwardly-mobile Hutu who were the political organizers of opposition. But their actual attempt to retain symbolic form and function, changing only the exegetical meanings left the lines of distinctiveness as they were at a time when a considerable shift of power from one caste to another was taking place.

(b) The Problem of Communication.

I have shown that the reforms of the council system in Buganda, in 1945 1947 and 1950, did not encourage popular participation in the formal political
system. It did provide, however, a more efficient means of communication between the Buganda Government and the mass of Baganda peasants. As we have seen, the formal hierarchy of communication broke down between the muluka chief, and the batongole and bakopi. Direct use of the muluka chief in the 'party' organization of the kingdom would be clearly ineffective in mobilizing mass support. But institutionalized channels of communication were indispensable, and the council system informally fulfilled this function at the same time as it was failing in its formal function of increasing popular participation in government.

The muluka unit was not as "intimate" (Southwold, 1964, p.214) a group as the precolonial kyalo, in that the relationship of ruler and ruled was not voluntarily entered into, the ruler was alienated from the people by new administrative tasks, and he did not redistribute goods among them. Nevertheless it was the political unit in which the batongole and bakopi most clearly expressed their grievances, and it was the muluka chief whom they tried informally to control (Apter, pp.245-7). The muluka chief was ineffective as a means of communication of the grievances of the bakopi because he was subject to conflicting role-expectations. The batongole, who were invariably the influential men of the muluka, were in a more advantageous position. The demands on them from above were not institutionalized and they could continue to fulfill their roles according to popular expectations. However, for most of the colonial period the Buganda Government was not interested in two-way communication with the bakopi, and did not take advantage of the potential brokerage of the batongole. Communication of grievances by bakopi or batongole with the higher chiefs went only through the formal channels of judicial complaints against the muluka chief, phrased in terms of the government's bureaucratic demands. Opposition movements, like the Sons of Kintu and the Bataka Party, made effective use of the prominent batongole of a muluka in their rural organization (ibid.). In particular they were able to communicate in both directions. Information on popular grievances was collected from the local meetings, and generalized as common problems. Connections between these problems could be established, and communicated back to the local level through sympathetic batongole. Thus resentment against chiefs and Asian merchants and cotton gimmers could be directed to support for specific anti-goverment and anti-colonialist policies. The effectiveness of their communication enabled the Bataka movements to challenge the power of the higher chiefs and the ministers, who relied on authority from the kabaka and the British to secure unquestioning obedience (Apter, p.247). The council system was largely reformed to secure
better communication of the official hierarchy with the local level, and to bring the expression of popular grievances under control through formal organization. None of the councils below the Great Lukiiko had executive or legislative powers (ibid, p.364).

As we have seen (chapter 6), the persons elected to the muluka and ggombolola councils were "not personally representative of the average peasant", (Southwold, 1964) and were usually batongole. Though, as Southwold points out, their presence in the muluka council did little to convey the views of the bakopi to the muluka chief, their presence at the ggombolola council, together with the co-opted 'men of experience' (hamanyirivu), did enable the views of local 'big men' to be presented to the higher chiefs when these were prepared to listen, as was the case after the 'King's Friends' came to power. The batongole communicated with the bakopi both informally and in the muluka council, and in discussion were able to generalize grievances for the whole muluka in a form that could be conveyed to the ggombolola chief - partially in the ggombolola council but more effectively, I suggest, in informal discussion at the time of council meetings - when batongole from different muluka would also meet each other. Information coming down the hierarchy would be communicated in the same process.

The crucial link in the communication chain which I have outlined was that between prominent batongole and the higher chiefs. Sometimes it might seem to either or both sides to break down when it did not lead to desired results. The UNM trade boycott was one such occasion, when some of the batongole and other 'substantial citizens' found a more effective channel of communication through persons whom I have called 'second-level leaders' to the elite factions who formed the UNM leadership. When the latter were removed, the 'second-level' leaders were able to maintain adequate communication for effective local action against Asian traders. But the second-level leaders failed to develop or institutionalize solutions to other organizational problems, notably in the fields of distinctiveness and ideology, so that they and their supporters were reintegrated with the kabaka's government when the latter, the 'natural leaders', reasserted authority through the KY. The anti-DP movement which preceded the KY proper seems to have utilized the same links through second-level leaders as had the UNM, but once it received the kabaka's approval and became the KY movement, the rapid increase in support noted by Richards (1964, p.382) can probably be ascribed to more intensive use of the communication channels I have analyzed here. These channels reached everywhere in Buganda and were much better co-ordinated than those of second-level leaders. Their
formal character as instruments of the kabaka's government gave authority to messages down the hierarchy, and made them less likely to suffer from local factional rivalries in which second-level leaders would be involved. This is not to say that second-level leaders were not used - that they were is clear from the list of official founding members of KY, and the party's candidates for the 1962 elections (see section 3(c)) - but they worked with the Buganda Government once it was clear it was receiving their messages. There is no doubt in the minds of observers that the chiefly hierarchy was crucial in the electoral success of KY. Richards says that KY's local organization "was probably composed of the staff of district chiefs' offices" (ibid, p.384). Low agrees: (1962, pp.54-55)

"KY was confronted with novel problems of electoral organization such as had never confronted the UNM. But into the breach stepped the now chastened chiefly hierarchy, who...enjoyed the great advantage of being organised already as a functioning political bureaucracy; they were soon in action - despite denials - as KY's electoral machine".

I suggest this could not have happened unless the higher chiefs had found a more effective channel of communication with the populace than the generally unpopular muluka chief.

In strong contrast with the Baganda elite class, that in Rwanda continued to rely heavily on existing channels of communication in a situation, after 1956, when they would no longer suffice. In part this may be ascribed to the efficiency with which these channels had solved the organizational problems of the Tutsi caste over a long period. Hutu could not formulate or generalize problems beyond the hill level because their only 'external' channel was the Tutsi hill chief. On the hill, all meetings of Hutu lineage heads were presided over by the hill chief, being occasions of competition for his favour rather than discussion of common political problems. Thus it is not surprising that until mid-1959, the Tutsi strategy relied entirely on preventing the Hutu intelligentsia creating alternative channels to the local level. But while existing channels were effective in maintaining Tutsi organization, and Hutu passivity, they could not sustain the demands put on them, in the face of Belgian pressure for political reforms, of communicating the new ideology of Rwandan nationality. The contradictions in communicating messages of caste harmony and equality through the Tutsi hill chief were too apparent. This was recognised when UNAR was formed in August, 1959 and the party tried a new form of communication, the mass meeting. The first of these was held at Kigali on 31 September, 1959 and led to the disciplining under retrospective instructions from the Residency of the 3 chiefs who formed the central leadership of UNAR.
I see section 3(d). However, the mass meeting and UNAR itself did no more than supplement the more institutionalized forms of communication through the chiefly hierarchy, which provided the local organization of the party.

(c) The Problem of Decision-Making.

The structure of the Buganda Government in the late colonial period provided a clear hierarchy of decision-makers. In the analysis of decision-making, there are three basic questions:

"who formulate the general problems, who deliberate about these problems, and who make the decisions". (Cohen, p.206).

I am concerned here only with the highest levels of decision-making, for in such hierarchial structures lower units usually make decisions only in the sense that they distort communications to suit their sectional interests; i.e. I deal with the Lukiiko, ministries and kingship, and later with the leadership of KY.

On the kabaka's return, the 1955 Agreement had formally changed the relationships of these bodies to the Protectorate Government. In return for certain constitutional concessions, notably participation in the Legislative Council by direct elections, the Buganda Government received virtual internal self-government (Richards, 1964, p.352). In practice, it fought the concessions in court and by non-cooperation, particularly in regard to direct elections. Its position was made clear in the Lukiiko's plan for independence (ibid, p.386), which established that it regarded its relationship with the central government as political in M.G.Smith's sense, i.e. a power relation between bodies with equal authority (1956, p.54), rather than wholly governmental.

The Agreement also formally changed the internal relations of Lukiiko, ministers and kabaka (see Apter, pp.354-5). The latter was no longer to be directly and personally responsible for the governing of Buganda, though the government was to act in his name. It was to be led by the katikkiro, who was now elected by, and responsible to, the Lukiiko. The latter was to comprise 60 representative members, the 20 ssaza chiefs, a speaker, 6 nominees of the kabaka, and the 6 ministers. Direct elections were not implemented until 1962. The katikkiro chose the other 5 ministers, who comprised the 2 existing ministries, plus new ones for Education, Health and Natural Resources. The chiefs and administrative officials were to be chosen by an Appointments Board, comprising a chairman nominated by the kabaka, the katikkiro's permanent secretary, and 3 nominees of the
ministers from outside political life. Formally, the kabaka had lost many powers, particularly in appointments. However, while the Kintu Committee (Report, pp.31-32) was prepared before the kabaka's return to call him a "constitutional monarch", with certain provisions about his advisory powers, the Kintu government imprisoned Mulira in 1956 for doing the same (Richards, 1964, p.389).

Informally, the kabaka's decision making power grew enormously (see section 3 (d)). His appointment powers were unimpaired since he controlled the Appointments Board in practice - the first permanent secretary was removed because he attempted to resist political pressures (Apter, p.355); the six new chiefs appointed in 1962 were all KY supporters; more informally, the kabaka approved the list of KY candidates for the 1962 elections and the list of Buganda's representatives to the National Assembly. (Richards, 1964, p.368). The kabaka remained at the head of the patron-client system in government (ibid, p.363). The katikkiro, ministers and, by 1957, the Lukiiko were composed of 'King's Friends'. The Kintu governments of the whole post-Crisis period had no autonomous power base, and remained in power because it was known they were the kabaka's choice, making decisions with him (ibid, p.360). The Lukiiko was the formal body in which formulation and deliberation on problems could be seen to take place, and it served mainly to co-ordinate communication and express the political decision-making of the kabaka and ministers informally, as they could not do themselves because such activities clashed with their formal governmental roles (see above.). Richards' analysis of Lukiiko resolutions since 1955 shows that "its meetings were given very largely to discussions of political affairs" (p.365) and that it was heavily influenced by the kabaka through his ministers, nominees and chiefs (p.361). Most of its members were prominent batongole and chiefs (Apter, p.368). Thus the Lukiiko expressed through its resolutions what might be called the 'party line' of the Buganda Government, enabling it to function as a political party without a head-on clash with the British such as had led to the kabaka's deportation. While it always seemed more 'ultra' than the kabaka and ministers - almost to be pushing them towards secession, for example, as in the unilateral declaration of independence and the refusal thereafter to submit resolutions to the Governor's approval (Richards, 1964, p.360) - it was the latter who made final decisions. Thus in the case of the independence declaration no action was taken by the Lukiiko to enforce it and there was no popular demonstration of independence, for it expressed a 'party line' from which the kabaka remained aloof while utilizing it as a support in the enforcement of his decision-making.
The same process of decision-making can be seen in relation to the KY party, which can be seen as a development and intensification of the functions of the Lukiiko in that process. The formal limits of the Lukiiko's party activity had been reached in 1961—it could not compete in elections to itself. The KY also brought second-level leaders more into the highest levels of formulation and deliberation on problems. Just as the Kintu government had incorporated some of the more able elite faction leaders by this time, like L. Basudde, the Chief Justice (ex-PP), and A. Mayanja, minister for education (ex-UNC), the KY leadership as stated formally in its list of founder members (see Richards, 1964, p.383) joined representatives of all potentially significant political groups to the government under the kabaka symbol. The kabaka was represented by his paternal uncle, Prince Badru Kakungulu, who was also head of the Muslims. Four ministers and two county chiefs were actually included in the list, and one, Mayanja, was secretary-general of the party. Besides these 'governmental' members, some elite class leaders from the defunct UNC, UCP and PP parties were included, notably Mulira and D. Lubowa of UNC, who was one of the two unofficial representatives of the Catholics. The other Catholic, F. Walugembe, was elected first party chairman but withdrew in favour of M. Kintu, who had come bottom of the poll, when the kabaka let it be known informally that he favoured the katikkiro (ibid, p.383-5). Moreover, 6 of 27 official founders represented parties in which second-level leaders invested their energies after the UNM boycott (see above, & ibid.), and may have been in this category themselves. The continuance of direction by the kabaka and ministers in KY was clear. The party had no elected officeholders until less than a month before Independence, and there were serious enough suggestions that the kabaka should lead the party, with the Lukiiko comprising the executive committee, for Mayanja to threaten to resign if this happened (ibid, p.394, n.33) - the elite faction leaders did not want to return to the pre-UNM situation, which such a move might have presaged for a post-Independence Buganda with a secure federal position. Another such forewarning was the group in KY which wanted to have no policy except allegiance to the kabaka (ibid, p.385). Nevertheless, the katikkiro became head of the party, despite his poll failure, simply because the kabaka wished it; he had found it profitable since the 1955 Agreement to leave formal power and responsibility in the katikkiro's hands.

In Rwanda there was a clear formal institutional structure for decision-making at the disposal of the Tutsi elite class, from the hill or sub-chief at the local level, to the king, his court and the Supreme Council at the highest level. In the reforms of 1953 and 1956 this hierarchical
structure was more closely defined. The main problems faced by the Tutsi elite class were: (1) the authorisation of decisions, following Belgian withdrawal of approval, and the Hutu intelligentsia's challenge (see section 3(d)); (2) the lack of a clear decision-making structure at the highest level.

The latter problem seriously affected the chances of success in the sphere of ideology, into which the Tutsi elite class put its main organizational efforts. Unlike the situation in Buganda, the mwami's closest supporters and 'friends' had only informal power as his courtiers. The Supreme Council was firmly monarchist but represented the views of the Tutsi elite class as against the merely sectional views of the monarchy (see Lemarchand, 1970, pp.153-4). Its members were much better educated than the mwami's courtiers, possessing the administrative skills required for governing a modern state. Their own sectional interests lay in movement away from the patron-client system of advancement dominated by the mwami and requiring traditional political skills to secure favour, towards a more bureaucratic system (see statement by Tutsi 'evolues', quoted ibid, p.41n.). At the same time they wished to exclude Hutu who possessed the same level of qualifications but whose potential mass support in elections was far greater and could well lead to their own 'ethnic' monopoly. The division within the Tutsi elite class between bureaucrats ('progressives', often from the Astrida school - "Astridiens") and courtiers ('conservatives') was longstanding, though the former had won formal power from the latter as Belgian protégés in 1931 when Musinga, who conducted government by the traditional methods of courtly intrigue, was dismissed (chapter 6). Musinga's successor, Rudahigwa (Charles III Mutara) was a minor and for two decades unable to take an independent position from the Belgians and Tutsi political officials. But the latter's own revival of neotraditional symbolism and elevation of the monarchy as a unifying symbol in the 1950s enabled Mutara to recover some of his power informally, and gave his ultra-conservative courtiers the opportunity to reject even ideological concessions to the Hutu. In Buganda these problems did not arise because the 'bureaucrats' won a definitive victory in 1900 and the 'King's Friends' of the 1950s did not represent a structurally-differentiated sector from that of the "commoner chief" administrators.

Mutara seems to have attempted to play off his courtiers against the Supreme Council during the 1950s, in order to improve his own position in decision-making. However, he did not regain control, and the only result was a lack of agreement on elite class strategy against Belgian and Hutu pressure for political, economic and social reform. This reached its height
in 1958-9, when courtiers and bureaucrats adopted different ideological positions and a few of the latter, led by an 'Astridien', Chief Bwanakweli, formed the Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER). RADER accepted most of the demands of the "Manifeste des Bahutu" and saw the solution to the Hutu/Tutsi conflict in nationalisation of the ibikingi ("Manifeste de RADER", R.P., p.126). We should note that the courtiers formed a pressure group of the great Tutsi landowners against any land reform, and this was a material reason for their ideological opposition to concessions (d'Hertefelt, 1964). RADER attracted very little Tutsi support, and Hutu mistrusted its Tutsi leadership (Lemarchand, 1970, p.160).

Mutara forbade the forming of any monarchist political party, which might have secured a clear decision-making structure at his expense. In this period (1957-9), Tutsi reaction to attacks from the Hutu intelligentsia in the press, and to apparent Belgian approval of such attacks, was formed and led by the most conservative group at Mutara's court, while the 'progressives' were inactive (section 3(d)). But Mutara's sudden death in July 1959 provided an opportunity for the 'progressives', led by 3 chiefs - M. Kayihura, P. Mungalurire, and C. Rwangombwa, to recover the leadership of the Tutsi elite class by installing a 'puppet' as mwami and creating a political party to demand immediate independence. This party, UNAR, gave them control of decision-making. It enabled them to take a clear ideological line, putting the Rwandan nation before caste divisions and conceding 'natural' equality between the castes; and it enabled them to act decisively against the Hutu intelligentsia. However, the solution of this problem while others remained unresolved may have helped to provoke the 1959 risings, as I argued in section two.

(d) The Problem of Authority.

After his exile, the kabaka was increasingly the source of authority in Buganda. The most effective institutions available for its exercise were those of the Buganda Government: ministers, Lukiiko and chiefly hierarchy. During the colonial period, these carried traditional titles, though their functions had changed, and claimed to be the 'neotraditional' heirs of precolonial chiefs. It was through these institutions that the British attempted to exercise authority. But their new functions undermined their legitimacy. The problem was most serious at muluka level (see above). The Bataka Party had shown that it was possible for specific grievances against lower chiefs, and vaguer ones against
higher chiefs to be organized in a political movement in the name of a different pattern of neotraditionalism. This culminated in 1949 in the demand for elected chiefs, which threatened the political monopoly of the elite class and the means of its corporate activity. Moreover, it undermined the ideology of the kabaka's supremacy and might have marked the end of popular hopes in him (Apter, p.279).

The Kabaka Crisis provided the opportunity for a 'rite de passage' for all these institutions, analogous to that of the Chief of the Hausa and the great landlords in Sabo, Ibadan, who, in Cohen's analysis (1969, pp.170-171) passed from "Witch to Hajji" (i.e. became virtuous in their subjects' eyes) by going on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Although the change was personified in Buganda by the kabaka, and it was his new authority which was given to the other institutions, the latter also went through a ritual of re-evaluation in the people's eyes. Initially, they changed personnel as the kabaka changed persona, and the 'King's Friends' came to power.

Prior to the kabaka's return, the chiefly hierarchy was supervised according to the tradition of authoritarian, efficient, 'progressive' katikkiros like Kagwa and Nsibirwa, who sought legitimacy as much in pursuing British criteria of 'progress' as in the neotraditional symbolism of their office. Under the two most recent katikkiros, Kawalya-Kagwa (1945-51) and Kavuma (1951-55) the bureaucracy had been tightened by a remarkably strict system of supervision and inspection by officials of both the Buganda and Protectorate Governments working together (Richards, 1964, p.368). Until 1953, the kabaka had been dominated by the British and not posed the question of the source of authority in Buganda. During the kabaka's exile, Kavuma and his followers continued to meet the demands of the Protectorate Government, albeit reluctantly, as in welcoming the Queen in 1954 despite the Lukiiko's refusal. So the way was open for a 'shadow government' of 'King's Friends' to organize itself informally around the symbol of the kabaka as the sole source of authority.

The 'King's Friends' did not come together as an apparently 'anti-progressive' group, including "Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, as well as chiefs, radical followers of the Bataka Union, and a number of ...younger, educated men" (Low, 1962, p.24) simply because they were more "atavistic" than most, as Low suggests. While other elite factions sought authority mainly by production of specific programs, they sought it through monopolizing the king's friendship and elevating him as the sole source of authority. They succeeded because the kabaka became the dominant symbol for a 'political religion' (cf. Davies, 1970, p.59) in which people with disparate intentions could unite politically.
The programs of the new political parties had no such symbolic power, and did not acquire any from association with groups of western-educated elite politicians. Even 'Independence Now' had little symbolic potency (Low, 1962, pp.40-43), partly because it was known to be coming, and partly because in Uganda its ambiguities were consciously recognised and not contained within the symbol. When the parties tried to attach themselves to the kabaka symbol they were at a disadvantage to those who had no other commitments - his 'friends'. On the kabaka's return, his clear domination of the Buganda Government, the purge of 'disloyal' officials and replacement with 'friends' made way for a reversal of its previous unpopularity and its use in the exercise of the kabaka's authority in Buganda.

I am concerned here with the authority of the higher chiefs and their change of role. Their main function was now the informal 'party' organization of the kingdom; under the katikkiro M. Kintu they no longer sought legitimacy in terms of the formal bureaucratic efficiency demanded by the Protectorate Government. The previous system of intensive inspection and chiefly co-operation with British officials came to an abrupt end. Richards misleadingly analyzes the change in administrative practices in terms of lack of training in British notions of efficiency, and 'reversion' to traditional customs. I suggest that in terms of 'party' efficiency, the following instances of 'inefficiency' given by Richards (1964, pp.368-9) were quite appropriate:

"after the return of the Kabaka a number of county chieftainships have been filled by political appointees. Some seem to have reverted to the traditional custom of sitting in their homes, waiting to be visited rather than going on tours of inspection. They are also said to spend much time in their town houses, engaged in political discussions, Lukiiko meetings or the search for high office. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the standard of county, subcounty and parish administration is generally agreed to have fallen rapidly. In the meantime government has, rather naturally, become more centralized, along traditional lines, rather than less."

It was essential that the chief's role-conflict should be resolved if they were to be used in 'party' (rather than "natural") centralization. The only challenges to the authority of the kabaka's political officials came from outside Buganda and, very briefly, in the UNM boycott. The KY, Buganda's mass party, upheld neotraditional authority organized in this way.

As in Buganda, during most of the colonial period the authority of Tutsi political officials was guaranteed in Rwanda by the Administration, which possessed overwhelming military superiority. They also derived authority from fulfilling traditional roles of patronage at the local level. It was the political organization of the Tutsi caste, making both necessary
and legitimate the role of patron with extensive powers over the persons and property of clients, which made their use for cheap administration attractive to the colonial powers. When the Belgians rapidly withdrew authority from the Tutsi as a caste, the latter were still able to derive the neotraditional authority of patronage from their superior political organization. However, their use of this superiority to eliminate new rivals for authority, the Hutu intelligentsia, was prevented by the continuing overrule of the Belgians.

The Hutu intelligentsia were demanding a new basis for authority in direct elections. Since the Hutu could not be intimidated, such elections would enable the intelligentsia to penetrate the "encapsulated" (Bailey, 1969) hill level with their caste-based party. Tutsi authority, resting on their capacity to act as patrons on the isolated hills, would be destroyed. The adopted solution was to deny authority to the Belgians, and thereby their right to switch protégés. The Tutsi political leaders claimed that elections were unnecessary - indeed, a colonialist plot to delay Independence and divide Rwanda - since the 'traditional' governing institutions already represented and embodied the authority of the people. In particular, they claimed that the mwami was the sole source of authority in Rwanda, and it was only colonialism which had perverted this uniquely Rwandan mode of democracy (see section 3(e)). Thus the Tutsi claimed the authority of an ideal past supposedly embodied in customary modes of ruling as against the "foreign" and "abstract" authority derived from elections.

Like the Baganda elite class, that in Rwanda sought a re-evaluation of its political institutions by an ideological re-systematization of traditional symbolic forms. The monarchy and Tutsi chiefs were to receive popular authority as the quintessential defenders of Banyarwanda custom and identity. In Buganda these processes were made possible by changes in the role-behaviour of political officials after a rite de passage and the sacrifice of persons who had made the roles unpopular by interpreting them 'wrongly', i.e. 'bad chiefs'. Thus 'progressive' chiefs were replaced by 'conservative populist' chiefs (Apter, p.214). But in Rwanda the 'conservative' chiefs were not 'populists', and insisted far more than the 'progressives' on Tutsi distinctiveness and Hutu subordination. Although the Tutsi elite class attempted a rite de passage in UNAR, as defenders of the monarchy and all Banyarwanda against Belgian colonialism, this remained merely a change in ideology. Role-behaviour at hill level could not be altered (even if poor Tutsi, who were afraid of losing status, had allowed it) without endangering the hill chief's control of Hutu mobilization. At the national level, the use of neotraditional symbolism merely re-emphasized the instruments of Tutsi domination - the army chiefs, the education of noble Tutsi at
court, and above all, the royal symbolism. As Gitera pointed out in APROSOMA propaganda, the royal drum (Kalinga), which was said to be the main symbol of the unity of Rwanda, was decorated with the genitals of conquered Hutu petty kings (d'Hertefelt, 1964). Moreover, there was no purge of 'bad' Tutsi chiefs, which might have restored legitimacy to the neotraditional political system. The failure of straightforward appeal to traditional sources of authority in Rwanda, even when they were ideologically reinterpreted, shows that this factor cannot operate independently of the contemporary situation. In Buganda, out-of-office elite factions adopted popular interpretations of traditional custom, and enabled grievances to be expressed in terms of change of personnel—a "rebellion" in Gluckman's terms. In Rwanda, all Tutsi showed great cohesiveness against Hutu—Chief Swankweli being distrusted by Hutu for that very reason—and not one poor Tutsi leader emerged. Popular ideas of the 'good patron' included the requirement of Tutsi caste membership only so long as Tutsi controlled supra-local contacts. When this monopoly was ended it was possible for a change of personnel, to achieve 'good patrons', to be projected to bring in Hutu; then "rebellion" became "revolution".

Nevertheless, there was an attempt by the Tutsi elite class to solve the problem of authority by denying it to the Belgians and mobilizing traditional sources of legitimacy in the monarchy. In July 1959 Mutara died suddenly in circumstances which were easily represented as assassination by the Belgians, supposedly in a plot with Hutu leaders. 'Progressive' chiefs, led by Kayihura, Mungalurire, and Rwangombwa, took the opportunity to install a 'puppet' ruler, thereby commanding authority over the 'conservatives'. Clear opposition to the Belgians on the issue of sovereignty gave much more credibility to their claim to the authority due to leaders of a nationalist, democratic movement. This claim was recognised, even after the Hutu revolution began, by some anti-colonialist countries, particularly in the UN, but had little meaning for Hutu whose local political organization remained under the control of the Tutsi hill chief until November 1959.

Mutara's funeral was the occasion for a Tutsi coup d'état to preempt Belgian authority. Without consulting the Administration, the abiru announced in traditional fashion that Mutara's successor would be another of Musinga's sons, 21-year old Jean-Baptiste Ndagirirwa, with the dynastic name Kigeri V. This had clearly been agreed by the chiefs, and stage-management of the funeral included a speech by Kayihura explaining the customary duty of the abiru, followed by a dramatic 'spontaneous' demand from a Hutu in the crowd for the name of Mutara's successor. The Belgians
ratified the fait accompli and thereby seemed to have been defeated by the Tutsi monarchists. Within three weeks UNAR was founded under the nominal leadership of the Hutu who participated in the coup, F. Rukeba, but was in fact directed by the three Tutsi chiefs mentioned above (Lemarchand, 1970, p.159). As I showed above, UNAR had available the political institutions of the kingdom. A period of intense organisational activity followed the founding of UNAR, which began to act in defiance of the Administration as if authority had finally been won by the installation of Kigeri V. The Administration tried to recapture the initiative gained by UNAR, which was developing rapidly into a millenarian sense of invincibility (ibid, p.161), by disciplining its leaders under a back-dated law for attendance at the Kigali mass rally. The UN visiting Mission saw this as a "decisive turning-point" (quoted ibid, p.162), which only increased the sense of urgency among UNAR supporters. Both UNAR and PARMEHUTU represented the other as insidiously taking over the state authority and stressed the need for urgent counteraction. For UNAR to claim democratic authority against the Belgian Administration it was necessary to remove the Hutu party leaders. The party leaders now thought they had the authority to do this without Belgian interference. I suggest that the November risings of Hutu were provoked by an apparent Tutsi offensive and show that the Tutsi elite class had not solved the problem of authority at the local level by mobilizing neotraditional ties.

(e) The Problem of Ideology

The ideological process which legitimated the Buganda Government, and the kabaka in particular, may be summarised as a re-interpretation of the 'Bataka' ideology and its systematization with the "dominant symbol" of the kabaka (see above; and Turner, 1964). He was seen as the guarantor of the cosmic rectitude of hierarchical order and of all Baganda. This found expression in their politico-military supremacy - which in the 1950s had the proportions of a myth and also seemed immediately true from the kabaka's 'victory' over the British in 1955 (Richards, 1964, p.324) - under his autocratic leadership. From the kabaka's deportation onwards it was claimed that Buganda's supremacy was under attack by foreigners, and his politico-military leadership was necessary.

The symbolism expressing these ideas was neotraditional, employing forms current in the 'precolonial period and recalling the kabaka's authority then. Two main themes were apparent in the 1950s, both expressing the unity of the kingdom in dependence on the kabaka. Firstly, he possessed the legitimate use of terror: he could 'forge' the kingdom as the blacksmith's fire forges iron; at his accession ritual he ritually
conquered Buganda in a board game against his chiefs. He was also
"namunswa", the queen termite that feeds on her subjects (Fallers, 1964,
p.68). This symbol was used in the campaign against the DP, and a
contrast made with the illegitimate use of force - DP members were referred
to as "nnabbe" the red ant which destroys termites (Welbourn, 1965 p.25).
In particular, it was recalled that the life of a subject was at the
military disposal of the kabaka, and that after battle cowards had been
humiliated and killed. Secondly, Richards noted at the time of the Kabaka
Crisis an apparently contrasting theme which emphasized his harmlessness,
innocence and embodiment of pleasurable aspects of family relationships.
Whether or not this was traditional, as Richards says, its attachment to
the dominant symbol of the kabaka accords well with Turner's theory (1964)
that such symbols unify disparate meanings and, in particular, that their
"ideological referents" harshly demanding the sacrifice of sectional
interests to the good of the group are made acceptable by the infusion of
emotion from "sensory referents" like gentleness and pleasurable family
relationships. Both these themes were united in the kabaka alone - for
instance, he was unique in not observing a clan totem (i.e. he was not
ideologically a rival), yet he was head of all the clans (ssaabataka).

The other dominant symbol of the colonial period was the butaka,
the estate on which the ancestors are buried. Indeed, Welbourn argues
that the clans retained much power in the 1950s because of their control
of inheritance (1961, p.29); but Southwold (1956) points out that while
this was formally true, wills and the kabaka's order of 1926 had made the
butaka little more than administrators of clear inheritance rules. Much
more important was the ideological function of clanship in establishing
relationship with the kabaka, particularly since 1953. Thus the butaka
outlawed persons joining political parties (see above) against the kabaka's
wishes, and they organized annual rituals celebrating his return. I
have already dealt with the argument of Fallers and others that the
butaka's use as a symbol by opposition movements in the colonial period
were part of a traditional conflict between bataka and the kabaka.(chapter
6). In fact, Fallers is much more accurate when he analyzes the butaka
as a symbol of a popular "birthright" in the land of Buganda (1964, p.152).
The common element in the Bataka movements was a response to some threat
to this birthright - from Baganda landlords and educated elite, alien
immigrants, the Protectorate Government, or potentially from white settlers or
an African government. The birthright might be extended from land to
other business - rural traders fighting Asian competition were an important
element in later Bataka and Kabaka movements. The butaka symbolized the
absence of an institutionalized hierarchy of groups, and the popular element in the Bataka movements was essentially a defensive, 'communal' response from the bakopi when they perceived the existence of such privileged groups (Low, 1962, p.17). But they did not oppose unequal dyadic relations, and they looked back ideologically to the 'Golden Age' of traditional Buganda, with 'good' chiefs and kabakas.

The Kabaka Crisis enabled these two elements to be systematized. The kabaka became the dominant symbol as the expression of the unity of Baganda, in defence of the birthright and in opposition to privileged groups. After his 'rite de passage' of exile and return as leader, he was the personal guarantee of the legitimacy of his government of 'king's men', because as the focus and source of authority he was guarantor that power relations were 'traditionally' dyadic. The privileged groups were foreigners. And in the words of one Muganda peasant to Richards in 1955 (1964, p.332): "Everything is back as it should be. The Kabaka is giving out government as he used to do". Neotraditional forms were not used because of 'atavism', in a haphazard meaningless fashion; they were directed to specific and systematic meanings, relevant to contemporary grievances and divisions.

Ideology was the field in which the Tutsi elite class made its major effort to organize the Banyarwanda as a political group. Since the other organization problems were to be solved by reliance on existing neotraditional institutions, which embodied great inequalities of power between the castes, much depended on the development of a successful justification for those inequalities, for they were being challenged by the Hutu intelligentsia. The purpose of new ideology was to minimize caste distinctions and unite all Banyarwanda under monarchical institutions which would preserve Tutsi caste privileges de facto, at least until the mwami became the sovereign power in Rwanda.

The ideology of Tutsi 'natural superiority' had been taken up by the colonial administrators in the first half of the colonial period to justify their support for continued Tutsi domination (see Official Report 1938, chapter 6). Yet by 1945 Tutsi intellectuals, composed mainly of clergy led by Abbe Kagame, were giving serious attention to the implications of 'progress' for the power structure and developing an ideology of 'cultural nationalism' which was intended to constrain all modernization within the neotraditional institutions under which all Banyarwanda were said to have enjoyed a precolonial 'Golden Age'. Kagame complained that:

"Certain egalitarian tendencies are advocated in front of those elements who are sometimes referred to as 'childlike grownups!', without proper intellectual formation. The conclusion the masses are likely to draw from all this is
that progress, freedom, in short everything, implies contempt for the traditional authorities. The path of progress cannot stray from our traditional heritage." (quoted by Lemarchand, 1970, p.137)

The ideology stressed 'traditional institutions' rather than 'natural superiority' directly, in part reflecting the growth of a Tutsi elite class, some of whom saw their own superiority demonstrated in educational qualifications and new life-styles which differentiated them from poor Tutsi. Cultural nationalism developed strongly among Tutsi in the 1950s as an ideology which identified the glories of the past, and the existence of Rwanda itself, as wholly Tutsi achievements (d'Hertefelt, 1964). There was no sign that Hutu shared in this cultural nationalism.

Tutsi depended for Hutu acceptance of their dominance in the mid-1950s rather more on traditional cosmology (Lemarchand, 1970, p.159n), in which the dominant symbol was the mwami. First, rule by the mwami and the Tutsi was divinely ordained, and Imaana would punish rebels - less abstractly, anyone declared to be an enemy by the mwami was thereby cut off from the flow of the life-force and could be killed, legitimately. Second, the mwami stood outside the caste categories and could act as a cohesive force by avoiding the stigma of special interest; this belief was potent enough for APROSOMA to base its own ideology on appeal to the mwami against 'bad' Tutsi.

The switch in Belgian policy, and the challenge to cultural nationalism in the 'Manifeste des Bahutu', presented certain ideological problems. The Supreme Council dealt with those raised by the manifesto, building on existing ideas and still aiming at an audience of Tutsi, Belgians and the UN rather than the Hutu peasantry (R.P. p.37). The 'divine harmony' of the traditional political structure was stressed, with emphasis on the counterbalancing forces ideally operating in favour of Hutu, revealing the essential unity of the Rwandan nation. It was claimed that in recruitment to political office all Banyarwanda were equal, as could be seen from common clan membership, and the actual distribution of offices simply reflected differing abilities (d'Hertefelt, 1960b). The Supreme Council further argued that the 'racial' categories were too mixed to have any use in definition, and there was no point in retaining them. They were abolished from official documents in 1958. Such social inequalities as clearly did exist were said to be the result of Belgian interference in 'divine harmony', and they were being exaggerated by a few unrepresentative Hutu politicians motivated by personal ambition. These arguments were set out systematically in J. Mullenzi's "Etudes sur Quelques Problem du Rwanda", which became, according to d'Hertefelt (1964), the 'Bible' of
Tutsi officials. This modernized version of the 'natural superiority' theme was the ideology of the 'progressives' of the elite class who, moreover, saw the need for its dissemination and indoctrination among Hutu.

Mutara would not allow the 'progressives' to form a party organization which might achieve these ends. This also meant they could not discipline the mwami's courtiers who, being also the great landowners of Rwanda (1960b p.229), refused to make ideological concessions which harmed their sectional interests in preventing land reform. In 1958, at the same time that the Supreme council was declaring the irrelevance of the caste categories, a group of courtiers calling themselves the mwami's direct clients, the bagaragu b'ibwami bakuru, issued a very well-publicised statement condemning any land reform and stating that 'racial' differences between Hutu and Tutsi were absolute, entailing the former's permanent inferiority. They recounted the myths of origin demonstrating the distinctive descent of Tutsi from their ancestor, Kigwa, who brought civilisation to Rwanda, making the Hutu his servants, and declared:

"Ceux qui réclament le partage du patrimoine commun sont ceux qui ont entre eux des liens de fraternité. Or, les relations entre nous (Tutsi) et aux (Hutu) ont été de tout temps jusqu'à présent basées sur le servage; il n'y a donc entre eux et nous aucun fondement de fraternité...Les Bahutu prétendent que Kanyarwanda est père de Batutsi, Bahutu et Batwa; or, nous savons que Kigwa est de loin antérieur à Kanyarwanda et trois races Bahutu, Batutsi et Batwa qu'il a trouvées bien constituées" (Letter, p.35 R.P.).

For good measure they referred to Kagame's "Ingaji Kaliinga" for evidence that "nos rois ont tués des Bahinza et ont ainsi conquis les pays des Bahutu" (ibid.). This ideological position tended to undermine the claim of 'progressives' that no problem of caste domination existed - as can be seen in the criticism of "Batutsi manifestoes", as well as Hutu ones, by the 'progressive' Tutsi Bishop of Nyudo-Kisenyi, Mgr. Bigirumwami (R.P.p.40).

The final element in Tutsi ideology, and the formation of UNAR to promote it, came in 1959, when Mutara's sudden death gave the 'progressives' the chance to recover the initiative by linking defence of the monarchy and other neotraditional institutions with the new and democratic symbolism of anticolonialism. At the Kigali meeting, Rukeba summarised this position:

"The whole of Africa is struggling against colonialism, the same colonialism which has exploited our country and destroyed our ancestral customs in order to impose alien ones upon us. The goal of our party is to restore these customs, to shake off the yoke of Belgian colonialism, to reconquer Rwanda's independence. To remake our country we need a single party, like UNAR, based upon tradition and no other ideology. He who does not belong to this party will be regarded as the people's enemy, the Mwami's enemy, Rwanda's enemy" (quoted Lemarchand, 1970,p.159).
Under its 'progressive leadership, UNAR dropped the assertion of Tutsi supremacy, proclaiming "Children of Rwanda...There are no Tutsi, Hutu, Twa. We are all brothers. We are all descendants of Kinyarwanda". (UNAR circular 16.9.1959, quoted ibid, p.161). PARMEHUTU was denounced as the tool of the Belgian Administration and European clergy. The failure of this lay chiefly in the fields of communication and discipline, but it should be noted that, unlike the kabaka symbol in Buganda, the mwami symbolised the existence of a privileged group. The symbolism and mythology of Rwandan unity were, in fact, the royal symbolism and Tutsi mythology which justified those privileges. Many Hutu were made aware of this in Gitera's long campaign against the chief royal symbol, the drum Kaliinga.

(f) The Problem of Discipline

The Buganda Government had formal disciplinary machinery, but it could not easily use this for 'party' purposes; though it did try occasionally, as in the exclusion of Mulira and other opponents from the Lukiiko in 1956. Party discipline therefore required informal organization, achieved by much intensified ritual allegiance to the kabaka, i.e. through re-emphasis and revival of neotraditional forms of discipline.

In the precolonial period the kabaka's chiefs were in almost permanent attendance on him. Every day the kabaka received his courtiers in order of precedence and heard them formally acknowledge his supremacy. He altered the rank order at will. Men saluted him with their faces to the ground, and knelt while they spoke to him. Audience was a great honour and granted, even to those of highest rank, only after acceptance of a request forwarded by the katikkiro or a personal favourite. After the kabaka's exile the use of such forms was given much greater prominence than during most of the colonial period. For example, the form of saluting remained, and the picture of a European KY member and Minister prostrating himself before the kabaka was much publicised, since it clearly showed Baganda supremacy (see section 3(e)); ritual homage was paid to the kabaka by modern bureaucratic officials as well as 'traditional' officials; the kabaka's supremacy was represented by a throne in each minister's office.

(Richards, 1964, p.361). Submission to the will of the kabaka remained an axiom of Baganda ritual behaviour, and was not simply a psychological matter; one minister, and secretary-general of the KY, was A. Mayanja, who explicitly justified his acceptance of the posts and of 'Kabaka-worship' to his radical nationalist ex-colleagues in terms of the "need to play the traditionalist game" (quoted by Welbourn, 1965, p.21).

More widely, the removal of the kabaka in 1953, still formally the symbol of Baganda nationality and capacity to rule themselves, precipitated
an intensification of ritual behaviour through which Baganda could recover
their security of personal identity, which had always been closely bound
up with political ideology (cf. Richards, 1964, chapter 6 & pp.322-33,
on 'traditional' family attitudes and reactions to the news of the kabaka's
deporation), by restoring the kabaka's authority. Tribute was collected
through neotraditional forms of voluntary labour at his palace and in
construction work, not only by peasants but also by industrial and white-
collar workers, and through gifts. These activities became highly
organized on a national scale, with competition between groups and individu-
als in the demonstration of loyalty (ibid, pp.329-331). They provided
the opportunity for informal political mobilization, and organizations of
different kinds built up support by participating in them (chapter 6).
This itself gave a momentum to the indoctrination process from which
such groups could not later escape. There was a revival of clan
activities, not to decentralize power but around the idea of the kabaka
as ssaabataka. Money and support for the kabaka were raised during his
exile by clans and lineages. There was a new interest in clan history
and other symbols of membership. It became dangerous for political officials
to show any collaboration with the Protectorate Government, and the
ideology of military service to the kabaka was recalled to discipline any
Baganda who wavered - the Baganda were presented, through the newspapers
and the mobilization groups, with the picture of themselves fighting the
Protectorate Government in the service of the kabaka (Richards, 1964, p.329
ff.). Opposition to the chiefs (see chapter 6) could here assume a
specific form, and after the kabaka's triumphant return 43 chiefs were
treated in a neotraditional manner as cowards; they were humiliated and
driven out of office. Conversely, those political officials who had
defied the Protectorate Government in even minor ways were hailed as
heroes (bazira). As I have explained, there was a rite de passage
of the Buganda Government. The symbolic system developed during the
Kabaka Crisis, and seen in the often-described triumphal celebrations of
the kabaka's return (ibid.), did not fade in the following period.
Victory (buyinga) had been gained, with Buganda united and placed on the
top rank again, through the kabaka pattern of neotraditionalism;
it continued in intensity so long as 'Buganda' could be made to appear
threatened. No political party could break through the discipline of
allegiance to the kabaka, and the only successful parties were those which
embraced it, the UNM and KY. As I showed above, the transition from
URM to KY was made, and the position of the elite class secured, because
the symbolism available to those who might have effected a radical organi-
zation in Buganda (the later UUM boycott leaders) disciplined them and their supporters, and led them back to loyalty to the kabaka. There could be no revival of the Bataka pattern, because this had been incorporated in the system of kabaka-dominated symbolism. After Independence, the Buganda Government had much freer use of its formal disciplinary machinery.

Denied the free use of formal governmental institutions by Belgian policy changes, the Tutsi elite class (like that in Buganda) relied on the informal discipline of neotraditional ties and cultural forms of behaviour. In the absence of organized opposition, such reliance was shown to be well-placed by the indirect elections of 1956. Problems of discipline raised by the efforts of the Hutu intelligentsia to organize political parties were dealt with by initially successful measures ensuring the continued isolation of the hill unit. Insofar as MSM or APROSOMA propaganda reached the local level, it could not be followed up by party organization and lost much of its effect.

However, until the formation of UNAR, no efforts were made to indoctrinate the new ideology of Rwandan nationality except among Tutsi (in the movement of 'cultural nationalism' which included revival of the army chiefs and courtly education). The Hutu peasantry were called on to reject the traitorous Hutu intelligentsia, and their religious dependence on the mwami was invoked. But there was no intensification of ritual to indoctrinate either the new ideology of nationalism or the old ideology of the mwami's religio-political power. Even UNAR's efforts to do both were made only at the national level, through the political meeting and pamphlets - to a necessarily restricted audience. There is a clear contrast with Buganda, where the intensification of ritual focused on the kabaka indoctrinated the new ideology effectively. Such a solution was not possible in Rwanda, where continuance of Tutsi domination in the multiplex relations of the castes at the local level ensured that the same meanings continued to be expressed in the ritual of social relations. It seems that at this time the poor Tutsi were particularly emphasizing their higher status in interaction with Hutu as economic and social changes had placed it in danger. (Chapter 1). In these circumstances, Tutsi relied excessively on Hutu loyalty to the mwami and credulity over the new ideology. It is likely that their own ideology of cultural nationalism, which modernised their claim to 'natural superiority', led them to expect Hutu acquiesence in their demands for Independence under the monarchy. Thus the Tutsi elite class hardly attempted to deal with the problem of indoctrination and discipline, apparently believing it already solved. Even when a monarchist
political party, UNAR, was formed it attempted to use neotraditional institutions of Tutsi domination to maintain discipline rather than creating new local party organizations involving sympathetic Hutu, or at least exploiting local Hutu rivalries. The failure of adopted forms of discipline has already been analysed as a result of structural differentiation allowing some Hutu to fall outside them, and project their own organization (see section 1).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I wish to set the study of Rwanda and Buganda in a more broadly comparative framework, considering the implications of the typology of interaction between systems of social stratification and political systems advanced by Fallers (1967). This will show the wider significance of the two variables which I have found crucial in analyzing the cases of Rwanda and Buganda.

One variable concerns the symbolic and structural processes affecting the nature of perception of inequality, i.e. affecting what Fallers calls "the secondary cultures of stratification" (ibid, p.145). These processes are revealed most clearly when forms of stratification are changing rapidly as new sources of mobility become available. Structural differentiation has been a major, but not the only, process which provides such a dynamic. Even in this case

"the important issue for the relationship between mobility and political change is the way that differentiation, forms of economic change and historical-cultural features generate perceptions of social structure among the groups affected by differentiation....The way in which...incongruities in role structuring are perceived (and the argument is that the perception is normally derived from the symbolic orders) will affect the impact of mobility on political institutions" (Davies, 1970, pp.107,109).

Structural processes are as important as symbolic processes in determining the nature of perception of stratification, for new lines of conflict between, for example, economic classes, leads to reinterpretations of old symbols or the creation of new ones.

The other variable concerns the symbolic and structural processes affecting the capacity of potentially or actually mobile categories to organize, formally or informally, as political groups to pursue their common interests once these are perceived in some way.

These two variables are closely related in most cases, for not only does unequal distribution of power make it difficult for lower strata to organize, but also power structures tend to be supported by legitimating
symbolism and ideologies which obscure perception of their common interests.

In his discussion of "Social Stratification and Economic Processes in Africa" (1967), Fallers comes to the important conclusion that, in reference to the precolonial period,

"It is perhaps not going too far to assert that the emphasis in African systems of stratification is primarily political. One aspect is a tendency for economic structures and processes to be overshadowed by — or, perhaps better, contained within — political structures and processes" (p. 144).

I have shown that this was broadly true in Rwanda and Buganda. Fallers then points out that colonization by states whose own economic systems were capitalistic meant "an ever-increasing commercialization of land and labour" and the differentiation of an economic order of institutions from the political. However, Fallers does not see that a corollary of the latter process must be economic class stratification, for his conception of stratification is unidimensional. Thus he considers that the encapsulation of economic structures and processes by the political is likely to continue in Africa, principally because the commercialization takes place not through laissez faire capitalism but under a considerable degree of state control. Together with such factors as continuing kinship links between 'elite' and 'masses', this means that 'classlessness' will be a feature of 'modern' as well as 'traditional' African stratification systems (ibid., p. 149).

We might note that recent studies indicate that such kinship links are often abandoned if an elite, local or national, finds that their advantages are outweighed by their disadvantages (see Lloyd, 1966; Long, 1968). However, Fallers considers that structural differentiation will take place without creating economic classes (p. 149). As we have seen, his studies of Buganda are intended to demonstrate this thesis.

However, there are no a priori or empirical grounds for suggesting that political stratification precludes economic stratification, if it can be shown that there is a differentiated economic order. This was the case in colonial Rwanda and Buganda, in differing degrees. I have already shown that Fallers defines class by evaluative, cultural criteria rather than market situation, and so his 'classes' are in fact occupational status groups and categories. This means that when he finds only status categories in Buganda, with no marked ritual or ideological boundaries, he can claim that there are no classes — though much differentiation of power, wealth and prestige. However, economic classes are defined (cf. Weber; see Introduction) not by evaluation
of persons and roles according to the wealth they possess, but by the relative advantages wealth (and different types of wealth) bring in the market situation; i.e. while Fallers is right in saying "In its essential character, social stratification is not an economic phenomenon at all" (p.141), it should be seen that power relations between persons engaged in processes of production and exchange do not depend simply on their cultural evaluations of each others' roles. For example, even if a tenant or debtor has higher prestige than his landlord or creditor, the latter have economic if not status power over the former. Fallers' formulation would obscure study of the political consequences of such role incongruities. Alternatively, in cases where roles are almost ideally congruent this cannot be explained simply by the power of ideology (as on pp.144-5), for the continuous processes of economic and political change foster areas of incongruity both between roles and between power structures and ideology. Thus we have to explain, particularly in periods of rapid change, continuity of forms of political stratification and ideology even if there appears to be no problem of role incongruity between the political, status and economic orders. I have shown that this is the particular form of the problem in study of Buganda, for a precolonial political elite was successful in dealing with structural differentiation in the colonial period and using it to its advantage. Areas of role incongruity were more marked in Rwanda, notably in the economic mobility of some persons who remained in the lower caste and were excluded from formal political power. These changes were, in particular historical circumstances, enough to provide solutions to the organizational difficulties maintaining the powerlessness of the lower caste.

It should be noted that I am not suggesting that there is a natural tendency to role congruity, stasis and balance (cf. Goldthorpe, 1967, pp.650-651), nor that role incongruity is necessarily a stimulus, psychological or otherwise, of political change. Role incongruity as an analytical concept in sociology may, however indicate points in social structure where upwardly mobile persons find that the route to further advancement requires organization for collective mobility of persons in the disadvantaged stratum to which they are indissolubly bound. Here we see the importance of the variable of capacity for organization, to which I referred earlier. I suggest that while the political struggles in Rwanda immediately before Independence took place between castes and not classes it was the appearance of a differentiated economic order, which enabled a few Hutu to achieve economic mobility such that they could begin to compete for market advantages with Tutsi, that enabled the organizational problems
of the lower caste to be solved. Longstanding, but unorganized, intercaste antagonism deriving from the higher caste's political and economic exploitation could be organized by those in the lower caste for whom economic mobility became, in a limited way, possible while political mobility remained impossible. Precisely because neotraditional culture did not recognize a differentiated economic order this block on political mobility also prevented full economic and status mobility. By contrast, in Buganda where structural differentiation had gone much further and economic class relations were far more widespread in the population, the relative absence of directly antagonistic class relations since the 1927 land reform meant that economic stratification did not prevent the Baganda organizing as a political group. Economic stratification did, however, considerably affect the nature of political change: (1) by mobilizing Baganda against the economic mobility of the class of (mainly immigrant) landless labourers, and against the Asians who dominated the trading and middleman sectors; (2) by providing an additional source of power for the political elite of 1900, so that they became and remained an elite class. In Buganda the variable of the nature of perception of stratification in these circumstances is as important in explaining the relationship of stratification systems and political change as in Rwanda.

The differentiation of an economic order, and the formation of classes, was clearly a process which played a major part in determining forms of political change in Rwanda and Buganda. It has been scarcely dealt with in the literature on the two kingdoms, though structural differentiation has been a major theme in work on Buganda. It has been my argument that, having recognized this process, it is not possible to explain the forms of political change in the two kingdoms without examining them in relation to cultural and structural processes affecting the actor's perceptions of social structure and the capacities of different strata for political organization. Moreover, the distinction of cultural and structural processes is clearly not absolute, and in order to understand the political strategies of the two elite classes at the end of colonial rule it is necessary to examine the revival of neotraditionalism as an organizational process. The success and failure, respectively, of the elite classes in Buganda and Rwanda in their efforts to retain political power into the period of Independence can be explained in terms of the same model of political change, involving not only forms of stratification but also the nature of perception of stratification and differential capacities for political organization.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ASA Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth.
Monographs.

1. The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology.
ed. M. Banton.

2. Political Systems and the Distribution of Power.
ed. M. Banton.

4. The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies.
ed. M. Banton.

7. History and Social Anthropology.
ed. I.M. Lewis.


ARSOM Academie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-mer.

CEA Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines.


CSSH Comparative Studies in Society and History.

JAH Journal of African History.
