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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN 'ABBĀS HILMĪ

AND LORD CROMER

by

Mohamad Gamal-El-Din Ali Hussein El-Mesaddy

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'Abbas Hülmê II came to power after about nine years of British Occupation, during which Tawfîq was almost completely submissive to the British policy. At the beginning of that period the nascent nationalist movement seemed almost defunct. Towards the end, however, it began to show faint signs of life.

The importance of 'Abbas's reign between 1892 and 1907 is that, contrary to his father, he followed mainly a policy of resistance towards the Occupation and Cromer, and sided with the nationalist movement, thus bringing to the battlefield a new force. This force was dependent on the Khedive at first, but it ultimately acquired strength and began to stand on its own feet. The Khedive and the Nationalists were, however, aware of the necessity of co-operation.

The battlefield was not an isolated one, and the struggle was not confined to the three combating forces. Turkey, and some European powers, had their interests in Egypt. This, together with the weakness of the Egyptian side, introduced an external factor which affected the situation.

The external support was not of very much help to 'Abbas and the Nationalists, and the period shows steady increase of British domination, and constant diminution of the Khedive's authority. This trend was accelerated by the Sudan reconquest.
The period witnessed also a change in the aims of 'Abbās. At first he resisted the Occupation in general, while at the end he was mainly struggling against Cromer's domination.

The purpose of this thesis is a study, through the relations between 'Abbās and Cromer, of the Anglo-Egyptian relations during that period. Care is given to the different elements which affected these relations, especially the nationalist movement. The effect on the nationalist movement is also explained.
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Abbreviations

B.M. Blackwood's Magazine
D.D.F. Documents diplomatiques Français
E.R. Empire Review
F.O. Foreign Office
F.R. Fortnightly Review
G.PP. The Gladstone Papers
I.R. Independent Review
J.M.H. Journal of Modern History
M.M. Macmillan's Magazine
M.PP. The Milner Papers
M.R. Monthly Review
N.C. Nineteenth Century
P.D.D. Parliamentary Debates
Q.R. Quarterly Review
R.M.M. Revue du monde Musulman
S.E.E.R. Slavonic and East European Review
S.G.M. Scottish Geographical Magazine
S.PP. The Salisbury Papers
W.PP. The Wingate Papers
W.R. Westminster Review
Transliteration

For Arabic names and words, the system adopted by the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., is followed with the exception of the _DIGITS___ which is represented by the j; the q is also used for the _DIGITS_. Some Arabic names and words which have a form generally accepted in English are used in this form.
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INTRODUCTION

The defeat of 'Urabi at al-Tall al-Kabir in 1882 caused a vacuum in Egypt as far as Egyptians were concerned. The Khedive's and government's authority had been undermined, the army was disbanded, and the Nationalists, through special commissions and courts-martial, were executed, exiled, imprisoned, or unemployed.¹ All power rested in the hand of the British Consul-General and the British forces. The problem then facing Britain was where authority and power must ultimately rest, and how they would be applied. Blunt, Newman, and Young lamented the fact that Britain did not return these to the Nationalists. The same idea is implied by Travers Symons.² This, however, was impossible at the time. The idea in Britain was that 'Urabi's was a military coup, and military intervention was against it in this sense, and in favour of the Khedive, who had asked for British intervention.³

Retaining an unpopular Khedive meant prolonged British occupation. This, together with the need to make an almost bankrupt country pay the bondholders and the administration expenses, and to justify the Occupation before European powers, made it necessary to establish a stronger and re-organized government. At the same time the international situation prevented the establishment of a protectorate and an overt British administration. Britain, however, wanted enough freedom of action to carry out the necessary work. These were the factors which influenced Dufferin in drawing up his proposals for the re-organization of the government.

Dufferin's proposals, which were carried out, and Lord Granville's despatch of 3 January 1883 to the powers, amounted to putting the real power in British hands. This is the origin of the distinction later drawn by Ahmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid between the "legitimate authority" and the "actual authority", or what Milner called the "veiled protectorate". The British government was to give "advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established should be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress". The British element was to be introduced in the administration: the new army was put under a British sirdar assisted by British officers, the police under a British inspector-general, a British
subject was appointed prosecutor-general, another inspector-general of irrigation, while the Dual Control was abolished, and a financial adviser appointed.¹

The relations between the two authorities were not clear at first, but the British government defined them when Sharīf Pasha refused to comply with British advice to evacuate the Sudan. Granville's instructions to Baring on 4 January 1884 were that it was "essential that in important questions affecting the administration and safety of Egypt, the advice of Her Majesty's Government should be followed, as long as the provisional occupation [continued]. Ministers and Governors must carry out this advice or forfeit their offices."² This assertion was as serious as the pressure for the evacuation of the Sudan; it actually meant the transfer of real power in Egypt to the British. Sharīf, finding no support from the Khedive, resigned, and protested that the new principle announced by Britain was against the Rescript of 28 August 1878 by which a council of ministers


and ministerial responsibility were established.¹

From the resignation of Sharíf, until the ministry of Muṣṭafā Pasha Fāhmid in 1891, resistance to the British was mainly confined to the ministers. It was against this principle of British advice, especially in the administration. Nubar Pasha was in favour of the military occupation, but he was against administrative control, and resented British advice.² During his ministry (1884-1888) his resistance to British encroachment was strong in the Interior, and especially in the police, where the authority of British inspectors tended to remove the police from the direct control of the mudīrs. Nubar gained some success. His resistance extended also to other parts of the administration. The success he achieved, modest as it was, checked what Young called the tendency of some Anglo-Egyptians to develop an Anglo-Indian bureaucracy.³

When he came to power, Riyāḍ Pasha faced the same situation. The struggle this time was mainly in the Ministries of Finance and the Interior. He failed, and was obliged to appoint


Milner under-secretary for finance, and Eldon Gorst director-general of accounts. He was further induced to accept a scheme which put the Ministry of Justice under British control. The scheme included the appointment of a British judicial adviser, and two British judges to the National Court of Appeal.  

Riyāḍ shortly afterwards resigned in May 1891, and was succeeded by Mustafā Pasha Pahmī, who willingly accepted British advice.

These ministers received little local support in their resistance. Nubar’s partial success was due to the international situation which was unfavourable to Britain, and to the priority given to the Sudan problem and financial difficulties. These difficulties had been settled when Riyāḍ came to power; hence he failed.

The Khedive was not in a position to give support. In fact, he was in a very weak position. He was unpopular in Egypt, in bad relations with the Sultan, and in constant fear of his father and Prince Ḥalīm (Abd al-Ḥalīm); both aspiring to the khediviate. Cromer used to remind him that Ismā'īl’s return to Cairo was not politically impossible.  

1 Milner, op.cit., pp. 161, 162.

2 S.P.P., vol. A/55/17, E.B. to Gerry (Barrington to Portal), 5 August 1887; Mustafa, A. A., The domestic and foreign (cont.)
however, sided with Nubar in 1888, when the latter was engaged in a tough struggle with Cromer over the police. But the Khedive withdrew immediately it was hinted that Britain might stop giving support to him against external enemies, meaning Isma‘īl. Riyāḍ tried, with less success, to enlist Tawfīq's support in his resistance to British encroachment in the Ministry of Justice.¹

Tawfīq repeatedly expressed his friendship for Britain, and his gratitude for British help in his time of need, ² but he was unhappy at his loss of power, and chafing, if not frightened, under Baring's tutelage.³ He had, however, to submit. When he had high spirited prime ministers, he very cautiously offered a little resistance, but not for long. Muṣṭafā Faḍlī's advent to power put an end to any resistance, and when 'Abbas Ḥilmi succeeded his father, complete cooperation between both legitimate and actual authorities was already in existence.

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²Comanos Pacha, Mémoires du docteur Comanos Pacha, Cairo,
During most of Tawfīq's period the nascent nationalist movement of 'Urābī's time seemed dead. It had not struck deep roots, and since its main manifestation was military it was much affected by the defeat. The behaviour of 'Urābī and his collaborators after al-Tall al-Kabīr did not favourably inspire the people. Late in that period, however, there were faint beginnings of nationalist revival. These were shown in the groups clustering round Latīf Pasha Salīm, and Rīyāḍ Pasha, who, in spite of his previous attitude against 'Urābī, was then symbolising resistance against the Occupation. Resistance was also manifested in al-Mu'ayyad which was established in 1889 by the help and instigation of Rīyāḍ. It was to this group of Latīf Salīm that Muṣṭafā Kāmil was introduced at the beginning of his nationalistic activities.  

(cont.) 1920, p. 228; Guerville, A. B. de, New Egypt, London, 1905, p. 107; Shafiq, Ahmad, Mudhakki пит fi niṣf quarn, part 1, Cairo, 1934, p. 279.

3 Storrs, R., Orientations, London, 1943, p. 45; Bell, C. F. M., Khedives and pashas; sketches of contemporary Egyptian rulers and statesmen by one who knows them well, London, 1884, pp. 38, 39; Beaman, A. H., The dethronement of the Khedive, London, 1929, p. 28.

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1 Infra, p. 125.
Chapter I

FIRST CONTACTS BETWEEN 'ABBAS HILMI II
AND LORD CROMER

Opinion about 'Abbās Hilmī differed as it did not differ on any other Egyptian ruler in modern times, except Ismā'īl. Unlike his father, 'Abbās took an active part in political life in Egypt, and clashed with different forces there, to the extent that few contemporary writers took an objective attitude towards him. The Nationalists, for instance, praised him at first, and some of them cursed him later. The British were divided: some praised him when he was friendly towards British rule, others thought that he was not treated fairly and was rightly claiming his legitimate authority, and a third group were very critical of him. This was partly due to the fact that 'Abbās was not always consistent, since his policy was formed under difficult circumstances, and he was not standing on the solid ground of real strength.

At his accession in January 1992 'Abbās was under eighteen, fresh from school, immature and inexperienced. The political situation was not clear enough to help such a ruler to follow a steady clear policy, and he fell under
pressure from different interests.

The Entente of 1891 had been newly reached between France and Russia, but the alliance between the two countries had not yet been reached.\(^1\) Turkey, on her side, had denied any wish to join the new Entente, and expressed her inclination to follow a neutral policy,\(^2\) after having threatened to throw herself into the arms of Russia when her efforts had failed to negotiate the evacuation of British troops from Egypt.\(^3\)

On the other side the Triple Alliance powers, especially Austria and Italy, were trying to draw Britain to their side. The international situation, then, tended to enable France and Russia to give Britain much trouble in the Egyptian question, but they could not give Turkey effective help in a clash with Britain.\(^4\) That clash was imminent as the Khedive's young age, and the idea that he was even a minor, set off competing


\(^2\) F.O. 141/290, Salisbury to Baring, No. 15, 29 January 1892, and enclosure.

\(^3\) F.O. 141/263, F.O. to Baring, No. 187 secret, 13 November enclosing White to Salisbury, No. 462 secret, 5 November 1891.

\(^4\) Russia was prepared to give France moral support only; her interests there were secondary as compared to that of France. See Documents diplomatiques Français (1871-1914), 1re série, tome IX, Paris, 1939, No. 91, (D.D.F.)
influences in Egypt.\(^1\) The existence of two claimants for the khediviate in Constantinople, Prince ʿAlīm Pasha and the ex-Khedive ʿIsāʾīl, aggravated the situation which had already been complicated by the bad relations between Tawfīq and the Sultan.

The race to impose tutelage on ʿAbbās, and the Firman Incident

The young Khedive found himself, at his succession, in the centre of a political whirlpool. France and Britain were convinced that the British grip on Egypt would be more tight with so young a Khedive.\(^2\) Turkey, instigated and supported by France and Russia, and Britain, supported by the Triple Alliance, entered into a race to impose tutelage upon ʿAbbās. With the support of Russia, France advised the Sultan to delay the recognition of ʿAbbās as khedive, so that he might be able to interfere in Egypt and combat British influence through a regency council, with the Ottoman High Commissioner, Mukhtar Pasha, as member.\(^3\) But Britain and Turkey

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\(^1\)ʿAbbās was born on 14 July 1874, and the age of majority was eighteen, consequently, at his father's death ʿAbbās was still a minor. But it was decided that he had attained his majority according to the Hijrī Calendar. See Cromer, Abbas II, London, 1915, p.2.

\(^2\)The idea was expressed in the House of Lords on 9 February 1892, see Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, vol. 1, column 8 (P.DD.); D.D.F., tome IX, Nos. 129, 131.

(cont.)
were so suspicious of each other's intentions on the occasion that they hastened to install 'Abbas in the khediviate. The Sultan almost immediately recognised him as Khedive, and Baring soon prepared for the public reading of the Irada to prevent any retreat on the part of the Sultan. Then the struggle started.

The Sultan tried to gain the first influence on 'Abbas. He pressed the Khedive to go to Constantinople to pay homage before going to Egypt. It seems that the Austrian authorities had expected such a move, and the Emperor, and Count Kálnoky, advised 'Abbas to go straight to Egypt. Others gave the same advice. This removed any hesitation on the part of 'Abbas. Although he wished to go to Constantinople

(cont.)

3 Even after the appointment of 'Abbas had been known, the two powers advised that Nukhtar should be appointed counsellor to the Khedive, but the Grand Vizir was apprehensive of British reaction. See D.D.F., tome IX, Nos. 129, 132, 135, 140, 159; F.O. 141/290, Salisbury to Baring, No. 11 conf., 22 January, enclosing Fane to Salisbury, No. 26 conf., 18 January 1892.

1 Turkey feared that Britain might annex Egypt or announce a protectorate on her, and Baring was afraid of Turkish or French intrigues in favour of Prince Muhammad 'Abd al-Ḥalim, known as Ḥalim. See F.O. 78/4455, Baring to Salisbury, tels. No. 5, 7 January, Nos. 14 and 18, 9 January, and No. 31, 14 January 1892.

2 F.O. 78/4455, Baring to Salisbury, tel. No. 21 secret, 10 January 1892; F.O. 141/290, Salisbury to Baring, No. 12 conf., 22 January, enclosing Paget to Salisbury, No. 16 most conf., 18 January 1892; D.D.F., tome IX, No. 185. 'Abbas received the Sultan's demand to go to Constantinople in Trieste,
to have the advice of his grandfather, Ismā'īl, he felt helpless against the crafty Sultan. Nothing could illustrate his fear of the Sultan at that time better than the fact that he refused to allow the Captain of the chartered ship to put into any Turkish port when she ran into a storm. The invitation was repeated early in February 1892, and pressed about the end of that month through the Russian Consul-General in Cairo, but 'Abbas excused himself, following Baring's advice. Baring and Salisbury were afraid that 'Abbas might be detained in Constantinople, and that, once there, the Sultan and the French and Russian Ambassadors would have control over him, and would extract from him some promise or admission embarrassing to Britain. Their fears went so far as to think of sending 'Abbas on a British warship, or escorted by a British squadron and accompanied by

(cont.) before embarking to Egypt.

1 "Mudhakkirāt al-Khidīwī 'Abbas Hilmī", Al-Migrā, 6 April 1951, ('Abbas, "Memoirs").
2 F.O. 78/4449, Baring to Salisbury, No. 12, 17 January 1892.
3 F.O. 78/4455, Baring to Salisbury, tels. No. 48 secret, 2 February, and 79 secret, 26 February 1892.
a high British official, such as Kitchener or Baring.\footnote{F.C. 78/4455, Baring to Salisbury, tel. No. 100 secret, 3 April 1892; F.C. 78/4454, Salisbury to Baring, tel. No. 41 secret, 5 April 1892.}

The homage visit was important to the Sultan. He considered it a matter of prestige, and did not wish what had happened with Tawfiq to be repeated.\footnote{Tawfiq did not visit the Sultan to pay homage, and suspicion and bad relations prevailed between them. See Mustafa, A. A., The domestic and foreign affairs, pp. 14, 304, 306.} To press 'Abbas for the visit the Firman of Investiture was delayed, and Mukhtar stated that 'Abbas could not confer decorations and military ranks before receiving it.\footnote{F.C. 78/4386, Hardinge to Salisbury, No. 187, 9 August, and No. 189 conf., 13 August 1891.}

This was how the Firman Incident began. It was aggravated when the Sultan, suffering from a loss of dignity because of the situation in Egypt, took the opportunity to put forward the whole Egyptian question and settle his relations with Egypt and Britain once and for all. The dispute raised over Sinai was not caused by the Friedmann affair only, but it was also due to the continual efforts of the sultans to encroach on khedivial privileges and territory, and to return Egypt to where it was when Muhammad 'Ali first became wali.\footnote{F.C. 78/4455, Baring to Salisbury, tel. No. 56 secret, 7 February 1892.}
On 8 February 1892 the Turkish Ambassador told Salisbury that the opportunity was suitable for resuming negotiations on the question of the Occupation. A few days later the Grand Vizir proposed sending a high official to London to help the Turkish Ambassador in the proposed negotiations. The Sultan opened the question again in March. These efforts were discouraged, and eventually the British Ambassador in Constantinople found a good excuse for postponement in the approaching general election.¹

In his efforts to restore his influence in Egypt the Sultan did not receive full support from France and Russia. They tried hard to reconcile him with 'Abbās, pressing the latter to pay the homage visit before the Sinai question had been settled, as a means of forming a strong front against

(continue)

⁴ It was called the Firman Incident because the main feature was the delay of the Firman of Investiture until April 1892. Cromer said that the delay was due to the efforts of a German called Friedmann to establish a Jewish settlement on the eastern shore of the Gulf of 'Aqaba. These efforts aroused the suspicion of the Sultan, who decided to return Sinai to Turkish administration. Britain pressed for the status quo in Sinai to be maintained. But the firman sent to 'Abbās, dated 26 March 1892, defined Egypt's eastern frontier as in the early days of Muhammad 'Alī, thus returning Sinai to Turkey. Under British pressure, however, an irāda, contained in the Grand Vizir Jawad (Djevad) Pasha's telegram of 8 April 1892, returned it to khedivial administration. The Incident, then, could be called the Firman and Sinai Incident. See Cromer, Modern Egypt, pp. 267-9.

¹ F.O. 407/113, Salisbury to Fane, No. 31, 8 February; Fane to Salisbury, No. 51 secret and most conf., 14 February; Ford to Salisbury, No. 89, conf., 12 March, and No. 182 conf., 2 June (continue)
Britain. They advised the Sultan to introduce such modifications into the Firman of Investiture as to increase his influence in Egypt. But it is clear that they were in favour of modifications to allow the increase of the Egyptian army as a step towards British evacuation, rather than to return Sinai to Turkey, which the Sultan did without consulting them. They were not willing to give the Sultan a free hand to modify the Firman without reference to the powers. De Giers' instructions to the Russian Ambassador

(cont.) 1892. Negotiations between Turkey and Britain on the Egyptian question were on and off during 1890 and 1891, without any success. Turkey wanted a date fixed for the evacuation of British troops, and the recognition of the Sultan's suzerainty. Salisbury was prepared to accept the latter demand only. Germany tried to mediate, pressing Turkey to drop the point of evacuation and accept a convention in which the Sultan's suzerainty would be confirmed. The idea was to secure British help for the protection of the Ottoman Empire, and to prevent Turkey throwing herself into the arms of France and Russia. See Dugdale, E.T.S. /German diplomatic documents 1871-1914, vol. II, London, 1929, pp. 59-61, 64-69, 72-93.

D.D.F., tome IX, Nos. 185, 198, 245, 259.

F.O. 407/113, Fane to Salisbury, tel. No. 46 secret and conf., 1 February 1892.


F.O. 633/6, Baring to Salisbury, No. 177, 15 April 1892.
in Constantinople were to co-operate with his French colleague in Egyptian affairs, but to avoid everything which might arouse the danger of a conflict. With these instructions the two powers could not give the Sultan strong support, but even if they could, they were probably unwilling at that time, as it might have helped the Sultan to reach an agreement with Britain on Egypt behind their backs. They were aware that this was what the Sultan was trying to do. So, although the two powers sent their squadrons to Alexandria, it was more of a demonstration showing their mutual co-operation, and a tacit threat to the Sultan, than an act of support to Turkey. To that Britain and Italy replied by sending their squadrons. Eventually the Sultan capitulated, and the status quo in Sinai was maintained.

The Sultan lost much in his relations with the new Khedive. Abbás was frightened by the Sultan's attitude, and was furious at Mukhtár's behaviour, especially when the latter collaborated with the French consul-General, de Reverseaux, to incite a

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press campaign against the policy followed in the Firman and Sinai issue,¹ and to demand the resignation of the weak and Anglophile prime minister, Muḥṭafā Fahmī. ‘Abbās reacted sharply, by complaining to the Sultan of Mukhtar’s attitude, and summoning the latter to an audience where he read him the complaints before the ministers.² The Sultan soon understood his mistake and changed his policy: the Turkish envoy bearing the Firman behaved in a courteous and conciliatory manner, the Grand Cordon of the Osmanīah was conferred on ‘Abbās with a promise of the Intiṭārah decoration on his visit to Constantinople, Ismā‘īl began to be used to conciliate his grandson, and the Sultan wrote to ‘Abbās assuring him of his feelings and calling him his son.³ This could have cleared the air but for the clumsy handling of some minor problems which kept their relations strained. The Sultan conferred titles and decorations on persons not in khedivial favour, such

¹F.O. 407/113, Baring to Salisbury, tel. No. 122, 15 April 1892; F.O. 78/4450, same to same, No. 72 secret, 16 April 1892, and encl. See also al-Aḥram and al-Mu‘ayyad during February-April as representing the French, Islamic and nationalist attitudes.

²F.O. 78/4450, Baring to Salisbury, No. 66, 12 April 1892, and encl.

as the Taqlās and Shaykh al-Bakrī, and when 'Abbās asked for titles for other shaykhs, his request was refused. The Khedive was denied the use of a private cypher with his agent in Constantinople. 'Abbās was so irritated that he ordered the celebrations during the anniversary of the Sultan’s accession to be held with less than the usual pomp. Although their relations had improved towards the end of 1892 in different circumstances, the breach was never completely healed, and mutual mistrust continued.

The first contacts between 'Abbās and Baring followed a reverse course, beginning very friendly, and deteriorating to a conflict. From the beginning, Baring took the opportunity of the friction between suzerain and vassal to gain the Khedive to his side by supporting him. With a friendly Khedive the existing régime might have a chance to be continued, and Baring might maintain his domination. At 'Abbās's

1 F.0. 78/4455, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 134, 28 June 1892; F.C. 78/4452, Hardinge to Rosebery, No. 152 conf., 10 September, and No. 165 conf., 2 October 1892. The Taqlās were the proprietors of the French-inspired al-Ahram. Shaykh Muḥammad Tawfīq al-Bakrī was the head of the Ashrāf (descendants of the Prophet), and the Grand Shaykh of the dervish orders in Egypt. He had disapproved of the policy followed in the Sinai and Firman Incident.

2 F.0. 78/4452, Hardinge to Rosebery, No. 176 secret, 13 October 1892.

3 Ibid., Hardinge to Salisbury, No. 135 conf., 14 August 1892.
accession Baring asked that mention should be made in the speech from the Throne of the hope that 'Abbās should follow his father's loyal policy towards Britain.¹ He obtained British support for 'Abbās against Mukhtar Pasha, to enjoy his rights and prerogatives before receiving the Firman.² He urged Salisbury to give 'Abbās full support in the Sinai and Fimman dispute. The former preferred the matter to be negotiated between 'Abbās and the Sultan in Cairo, as the British had no lever on the Sultan, who might ask for concessions.³ However, Salisbury eventually concurred with Baring's opinion that, if 'Abbās were not effectively supported he might throw himself into the arms of France and Russia, and that the negotiations should be carried on in Constantinople through British mediation.⁴

²F.O. 407/113, Baring to Salisbury, tel. No. 56 secret, 7 February, and Salisbury to Baring, tel. No. 21, 7 February 1892.
³Ibid., Salisbury to Baring, tel. No. 29, 18 February 1892.
⁴Ibid., Baring to Salisbury, tel. No. 62, 10 February 1892.
Baring's aims were not only to help 'Abbas and to secure for Britain the right to approve beforehand any modifications of the firmans - as he stated - but also to separate 'Abbas from the Sultan, to impose tutelage over him, and to associate the Occupation with both khedivial rights and nominal Turkish suzerainty. He wished further to eliminate the remains of Turkish influence by forcing the Sultan to submit, and by having Mukhtar Pasha removed without being replaced by another Turkish high commissioner. Indeed, Baring was alarmed by the sympathy shown towards the Sultan in the Arabic press and in Muslim circles. Baring gained some points, but Mukhtar stayed, and Baring's relations with 'Abbas turned out to be a difficult question.

The Khedive's real policy and the Ministerial Crisis

Baring's impression about 'Abbas at first was favourable. The only fault he found in him was that he could not

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1 Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, p.269. Lord Salisbury followed the same policy with Turkey. When the Turkish Ambassador spoke to him in February about negotiations, he warned him against a movement for independence in Egypt after evacuation. See F.O. 407/113, Salisbury to Fane, No. 42 secret, 16 February 1892.

2 F.O. 78/4450, Baring to Salisbury, No. 72 secret, 16 April 1892, and encls.
make of 'Abbas a good Muslim who would form a rallying-point for Muslim opinion and a link between western and eastern civilizations, affording a screen between the British authorities and the Egyptians, as his father had done. This defect was made clear during the Firman and Sinai Incident, when Mukhtār and the French managed to influence Muslim opinion, and the Khedive and his ministers were unpopular. Baring did not believe that 'Abbas had any hostile feelings towards Britain, though he was warned against the Khedive's Anglophobia and asked to assert himself. On the contrary, he thought that 'Abbas would always be ready to listen to reasonable advice. 1 He said that he was taking the line of non-interference in all small things, and waiting to be asked his advice rather than proffering it. 2 He hoped, when all the troubles about the Firman had come to an end, to begin the education of the young Khedive. 3 By that policy Baring hoped and believed that 'Abbas would fall into his hands and would, by

1 F.O. 78/4449, Baring to Salisbury, No. 17 confidential, 20 January 1892.
2 F.O. 633/6, Baring to Salisbury, No. 174 private, 21 February 1892.
3 Ibid., Baring to Salisbury, No. 177 private, 15 April 1892.
degrees, acquire genuine personal confidence in him and in British policy. He thought of 'Abbas as a piece of clay which he was sure to shape in the form he wanted.

When Cromer returned to Egypt from his leave in November 1892, and found that the Khedive had assumed a hostile attitude, he attributed the change to Gladstone's advent to power, 'Abbas's sensitivity about his prerogatives, slights to his person or to the Egyptians committed by British officers and officials, and to the instigation of his entourage. He thought that 'Abbas was trying to pose as a patriot, but that his patriotism was not genuine. Gorst, the Under-Secretary for Finance, thought that the change was due to the free hand which 'Abbas was allowed in the administration during Cromer's absence, which made him unable to grasp his real position. He did not think that 'Abbas went to Egypt with any preconceived idea or policy.

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1 S.P., vol. A/54, No. 91, Baring to Salisbury, private, 12 February 1892.

2 Cromer, Abbas II, pp. 15, 16. Cromer simplified matters and omitted some important points of friction, such as the speech-derogatory to the Egyptian government - which John Scott, the Judicial Adviser, delivered in Wigan (P.O. 78/4455, Harding to Rosebery, tel. No. 148, 24 September 1892), and the insult of a British inspector of irrigation to his Egyptian colleague (Shafiq, Mudhakkiratī, part 2, section 1, p.48).

3 M.P.P., box 10, Gorst to Milner, conf., 3 February 1893.
Some of these assumptions were correct, such as the influence of the entourage which was very strong at the beginning. Soon after his accession 'Abbās made great changes in his household. Old people, accustomed to the submissive attitude towards the Occupation under Tawfīq, were replaced by younger energetic and self-assertive courtiers, such as Ḍāmād Mağlūm Pasha, Ḍāmād Shafīq Bey, Abd al-Raḥīm Aḥmad, and some young princes. Some of them were more friendly towards France, like Mağlūm or towards Turkey, like Maḥmūd Shukrī Bey, but they were Anglophobes at heart, and could not have passively tolerated the old régime. 'Abbās's teacher of history and political science at the Theresianum in Vienna, Rouiller, was appointed secretary to the Khedive. He was strongly anti-British and a Turcophobe, and had a strong influence over 'Abbās. Other influences, however, existed. The Khedive's mother was pro-Turk, Rouiller was pro-French, the Italian de Martino Pasha, the head of the Khedive's European Bureau, was pro-British, and the Greek Comanos Pasha, the

1 For these changes see Shafīq, Mudhakkiratī, part 2, section 1, pp. 16–24.

2 D.D.F., tome IX, Nos. 185, 198.
Khedive's private doctor, was strongly Anglophile.

However, Cromer and Gorst missed a major point. At his accession, 'Abbās was imbued with real patriotic feeling, and had some vague preconceived policy and a fixed attitude towards the Occupation. In the summer of 1891 he expressed to Ahmad Shafīq his disappointment with the submissiveness shown by his father and the high officials of the Court to the Occupation.\(^1\) On his way back to Egypt in 1892, Rouiller kept speaking to him about the opulence that was Egypt under the Pharaohs, and under Muhammad 'Alī, and the means of emancipating and regenerating Egypt. 'Abbās appointed him as his secretary to have his help for that purpose.\(^2\) When he went to visit the Sultan in 1893 he managed to have the crew of the ship all Egyptians. Rouiller, who as his teacher could speak with authority about 'Abbās's inclinations, told the French Ambassador in Vienna early in 1892 that 'Abbās was determined to defend his rights, and had no other idea but to emancipate Egypt from the British.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 16, 17.

\(^2\) Ibid., p.52; 'Abbās, "Memoirw", al-Migrī, 7 April 1951.

\(^3\) D.D.F., tome IX, No. 185.
This attitude was modified at the outset by the need for British support against Turkish encroachment. But, in the long run, it was strengthened by Cromer's attitude and policy, and by the position of the ministers. The former made 'Abbas more conscious of British pressure and of Cromer's domination. 'Abbas complained that Cromer began from their first meeting to give him advice, and reminded him that he and his father were indebted to Britain for keeping their throne. His pressure on 'Abbas not to go to Constantinople after the Firman Incident had been settled did not please the Khedive, who was still more irritated when Cromer sought to delay the public reading of the Firman, for no other reason than to put on record the participation of Britain in the arrangement which had been reached. 'Abbas and the ministers, under pressure from the Sultan and attack in the press, were anxious to have the Firman read as soon as possible. Even when Cromer went on leave, Palmer and

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1 'Abbas, "Memoirs", al-Migri, 4 April 1951. This is confirmed by Baring when he reported about his first audience, although he thought that 'Abbas was listening willingly to his advice; see F.O. 78/4449, Baring to Salisbury, No. 17 conf., 20 January 1892.

2 F.O. 407/113, Baring to Salisbury, tel. No. 111, 8 April 1892.

3 Ibid., Baring to Salisbury, tel. No. 114 secret, 9 April 1892.
Hardinge interfered in 'Abbās's household affairs, repeating to his face accusations of Anglophobia and French or Turkish tendencies among the entourage.

As for the ministers, 'Abbās complained not only of Muṣṭafā Pasha Fahmī's extreme Anglophilia, but also of Muṣṭafā's weakness and his habit of turning to the British Consul-General and asking for support, whenever he disagreed with 'Abbās. He complained of the weakness of four other ministers, one of whom was eighty years old, and of their ignorance of the work in their ministries. They used to ask for time to contact Palmer whenever 'Abbās asked them about anything. Thus, 'Abbās was obliged to transact business with Palmer, a course which he disliked. In his memoirs, 'Abbās complained bitterly that he did not receive any help from any Egyptian of distinction in his early days as khedive, and that it was only ordinary officials who offered their help and gave him information.

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1 Elwin Palmer was Financial Adviser in Egypt, and Arthur Hardinge was Cromer's locum tenens.

2 F.O. 78/4452, Hardinge to Rosebery, No. 176 secret, 13 October 1892; Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 32, 33.

3 Ibid., Hardinge to Rosebery, No. 180 secret, 16 October 1892; Abbas, "Memoirs", al-Migrī, 8 March 1951.

4 M.P.P. box 10, Malortie to Milner, private, 27 January 1892. Cromer agreed with 'Abbās on the weakness of the ministers; see F.O. 78/4451, Baring to Salisbury, No. 75, conf., 19 April 1892. Baron de Malortie was then Director of the Press Bureau.

His annoyance with the ministers reached its height in October 1892, and he contemplated a change. Rumours spread about the appointment of a new ministry of younger men with anti-English views under Tigrane Pasha. But Hardinge got wind of the rumours and, acting under instructions, warned 'Abbas against what might be regarded as indicating a policy unfriendly to Britain. The Khedive retreated and denied the truth of the rumours, but at the same time spoke about the weakness of the ministers and the desirability of a change by one means or another. This may be considered a first ministerial crisis.

'Abbas was trying to assert himself, but being aware of his weakness, he was feeling his way cautiously, and trying to avoid any clash with the British. Since he had been denied the right to change a weak ministry, he exercised control over the administration by communicating his wishes direct to the governors and subordinate officials over the heads of the ministers, and by receiving reports which were published in the

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2 F. O. 78/4452, Hardinge to Rosebery, No. 176 secret, 13 October 1892.
official journal. During the time of the high flood, 'Abbās cruised the Nile in his yacht to supervise the work of the Irrigation Department. It is significant that the members of the Legislative Council, probably inspired by the Khedive, were unwilling to pass the Budget for 1893, including the expenses of the army of occupation. Not feeling strong enough to say so openly, they refused to discuss the Budget on the grounds that they were not allowed enough time.

At the same time, when 'Abbās's anti-British tendencies became known, especially after the rumours of ministerial changes, discontented and nationalist elements began to rally around him, and the Sultan contacted him through Isma'īl Pasha. French documents concerning the period before the Ministerial Crisis show that de Reverseaux was then very intimate with 'Abbās and his favourite Minister Tigrane, and was one of a small clique which was encouraging 'Abbās in his new policy of resistance. The publication of Milner's England

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1 F.O. 78/4453, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 194 secret, 11 November 1892; Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, p.52.
2 F.O. 78/4453, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 210 conf., 18 December 1892.
3 F.O. 78/4455, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 166 secret, 5 December 1892.
4 D.D.F., tome X, Nos. 83, 85, 94.
in Egypt, which revealed the nature of the "veiled protectorate", also came in time to expose Cromer's policy and increase the Khedive's popularity. Consequently 'Abbas felt himself stronger, although he remained cautious.

So, when Cromer returned to Egypt in November 1892, he found the Khedive more popular, unfriendly to the British, and sensitive in matters of rights and dignity. He was much disturbed by the bad relations between 'Abbas and the British officials, the Khedive's indisposition to be guided by British advice, and his tactic of communicating his wishes direct from the Palace to subordinate officials. This Cromer regarded as a revival of khedivial personal rule; it was also a challenge to Cromer's domination. He was afraid that it would shake confidence in the stability of British control. Cromer did not think of conciliating 'Abbas, whom he considered as a headstrong, impulsive, inexperienced boy, and he "lectured him plainly" against those tendencies.¹

Thus the long hard struggle between the two men began. 'Abbas tried to assert himself more by visiting schools and

¹F.O. 78/4453, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 194 secret, 11 November 1892; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 178 private, 12 November 1892.
departments, and by secretly encouraging the Arabic press, especially al-Ustadh which, from October 1892, began to take a stronger attitude towards the Occupation and other papers inspired by the British. Relations between the two men grew more strained, and Cromer began to think of giving the Khedive a sharp lesson if he continued to ignore British advice. But he was not sure of the support he might receive from Gladstone's government, so he avoided bringing matters openly to a head, and began to pave the way through the British press.

In The Times of 23 November, its correspondent in Cairo, expressing Cromer's opinion, wrote about the discontent which existed there because of the new arrangements for the Khedive's audience, and because of the interference of the Court in the administration. He mentioned also the irritation of the British officials. The Egyptian Gazette which, though a British organ, criticised what appeared in The Times, was later warned by Cromer that its subvention might be stopped, although some other

reasons were mentioned for that. ¹ Cromer's own criticism of 'Abbas's behaviour, as given in his despatch No. 194 of 11 November 1892, later changed to the idea that 'Abbas was impossible and had to be given a lesson, as well as a serious hint at his deposition. ² The Khedive was represented in both cases as being unpopular and incapable of governing. 'Abbas tried to conciliate Cromer, and in December he allowed his secretary, Rouiller, to go and discuss the situation with him. Each of them expressed his views, but with no result. ³

To make a bad situation worse, the Acting Inspector-General of the Police, Charles Coles, resumed the struggle for the absorption of authority in the Interior. He sent a circular to the governors of the provinces asking them to address most of their communications to the Inspector-General, thus depriving the Ministry of much responsibility. The circular, which should have been countersigned by the Under-Secretary, was sent behind his back, signed by Coles only. The Arabic

¹ F.O. 633/5, Cromer to Philip, No. 452 private, 31 December 1892. The arrangements for the audience had commenced in February, and mentioning it in November gives the attack a deliberate character; see F.O. 78/4450, Baring to Salisbury, No. 46 secret, 27 February 1892.

² F.O. 78/4513, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 10 conf., 9 January 1893. Rosebery made this despatch private due to its strong language.

³ Shafiq, Mudhakkirât part 2, section 1, pp. 52-55.
press was furious; 'Abbas interfered and the circular was withdrawn.  

Matters concerning authority and rights which had not been definitely settled in Tawfiq's time were brought into question. Cromer was trying to confirm what had already been gained, and to resume British encroachment, especially in the Interior, while 'Abbas was trying to assert himself and to regain what had been lost to the British under his father, but both parties were cautious.

The serious illness of Mustafa Pasha Fahmi brought matters to a head rather sooner than either side wished. In the Ministerial Crisis of January 1893 the main point from the beginning was how to impose British advice against the Khedive's resistance. It was not Tigrane's or Fakhri's Anglophobia or their faith, and it was not an unexpected revolt of 'Abbas on 15 January 1893 which forced a conflict on Baring, who was following a policy of studied moderation.  

It was the culmination of a long struggle which began with the first ministerial crisis in October 1892.

On 29 December 1893 Palmer, acting under instructions from Cromer, called 'Abbas's attention to the advisability of

See also F.O. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, No. 123, 2 February 1893.

2 This is implied in Cromer's version of the Crisis in Abbas II, pp. 18-27. For the Crisis see also Shafiq, Mudhakkirat, part 2, section 1, pp. 57-75; Zetland, the Marquess of, The life of Lord Cromer, being the authorized life of Evelyn Baring, first earl of
consulting about Muṣṭafā's eventual successor. The Khedive tried to avoid the trap, saying that he did not see the use of consulting beforehand. Two days later Palmer pressed the point again and 'Abbās, finding himself cornered, mentioned Tigrane's name. On the two following days Cromer tried to persuade 'Abbās not to insist upon Tigrane, and, receiving no strong support from his government, he mentioned that any Muslim would do, although he preferred Riyāḍ Pasha. 'Abbās remained firm, and mentioned the difficulty of finding a suitable person. Cromer found no other way than to warn Tigrane against his nomination. He advised 'Abbās to introduce into the ministry a Mohammedan who would ultimately replace Muṣṭafā Fahlī. Finding no response, he understood that 'Abbās was unwilling to follow British advice, and was trying to assert his independence. He feared the collapse of the existing régime, and wrote to Rosebery discussing the means of pressure to be exerted including the threat of deposition which should be carried out if no result was reached. In a stormy audience with 'Abbās on 11 January 1893, Cromer insisted that the greatest

deference should be paid to any advice tendered by Her Majesty's Government. ¹ De Reverseaux stated, probably on the Khedive's authority, that Cromer warned 'Abbas that resistance to British advice might endanger his authority and his person. ²

'Abbas found himself in a difficult position. Mustafa Fahmi had passed the danger mark, but needed five or six months convalescence. It was difficult to manage for such a long period without a prime minister and a minister of the Interior, because of the fear of a repetition of something like the Coles incident. On the other hand, Mustafa's illness was a chance, which might not recur, to get rid of a weak Anglophile ministry and assert khedivial authority.

'Abbas consulted de Reverseaux and Mukhtar. The latter advised him to continue his policy of resistance, and said that the Khedive could not be deposed without the consent of the Sultan. De Reverseaux advised the nomination of Fakhri Pasha, a Muslim, to comply with Cromer's advice and avoid a clash.

¹F.O. 78/4455, Cromer to Rosebery, tels. No. 175 conf., and 177 conf., 29 and 31 December 1892; F.O. 78/4513, same to same, No. 10 conf., 9 January 1893; F.O. 78/4517, same to same, tels. No. 2 conf., 1 January, No. 4, 2 January, and No. 6, 3 January 1893; F.O. 78/4517A, Rosebery to Cromer, tels. No. 1 secret, 1 January, and No. 2 secret, 2 January 1893.

²D.D.F., tome X, No. 85.
Later, after Muṣṭafâ had been dismissed, the Sultan promised his support, but this did not materialise. Meanwhile, 'Abbâs tried to face Cromer with a fait accompli. On Sunday, 15 January 1893, he dismissed Muṣṭafâ Fâhmi and appointed Fâkhrî, hoping that he had found a loophole in nominating a Muslim, instead of Tigrane. But Cromer was not deceived. He took the opportunity of the change to assert what he considered the right of Britain to have her advice followed by seeking to reinstate Muṣṭafâ.

In his version of the Ministerial Crisis in Abbas II, Cromer tried to show 'Abbâs as aggressive, and to conceal his own part as far as possible: he omitted to mention his warning to Tigrane, he failed to mention his audience with the Khedive on 11 January, and he attributed to himself a moderate policy during the incident. This presentation does not agree with the facts. His proposals to Rosebery, if 'Abbâs refused to reinstate Muṣṭafâ, included the following: the forcible exclusion

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1D.D.F., tome X, Nos. 85, 94, 116; M.P.P., box 10, Malortie to Milner, private, 27 January 1893; Shâfiq, Mudhakkirâtî, part 2, section 1, pp. 58, 75. Nazlum Pashe was Grand Master of Ceremonies before being a minister under Fâkhrî.

of the new ministers from their offices, the placing of
their ministries, as well as the Telegraph Office, under
British military possession, and the operation of their
ministries by British officials under his own guidance.\(^1\)
He ordered the Anglo-Egyptian officials not to recognize
the new ministers.\(^2\) Through Hardinge, Cromer promised
Mustafa his support.\(^3\) He even thought of putting the
Egyptian army under direct British control.\(^4\)

With the British Cabinet divided between Liberal
Imperialists and Radicals, these excessive measures could
not have passed. The ministers would not allow the Khedive's
action, but Gladstone and some other ministers considered
Cromer's proposals a breach of international law which would
bring about intervention of the powers, and refused them, an
attitude against which the Queen protested.\(^5\) They might have
been influenced by French protests.

The weak support which Cromer received from the British
government and the stubborn resistance of 'Abbas, which amounted

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\(^1\) F.O. 78/4517\(^B\), Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 22, 17 January 1893.
\(^2\) Ibid., Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 21, 16 January 1893.
\(^3\) M.PP., box 10, Malortie to Milner, private, 27 January 1893.
\(^4\) F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel/\(^{\text{Ed.}}\), 23 January 1893.
to a threat of abdication in spite of the lack of real support from the Sultan and the friendly powers, forced Cromer to accept the compromise of the Riyāḍ ministry. It was a half victory. Although 'Abbas undertook to follow British advice, he was under no obligation to keep in his Cabinet ministers whom he did not want.¹

Cromer did not believe in half measures with orientals, and he was furious when 'Abbas and the Arabic press worked to make the incident appear as a complete victory for the Khedive,² while Fakhrī Pasha received the Grand Cordon of the Osmanieh, and was offered the post of Grand Master of Ceremonies. The popular support which 'Abbas received made Cromer apprehensive of the situation. He exaggerated the material danger of the agitation and anti-British feeling after the Crisis, and asked for an increase in the strength of the British garrison.³ His real purpose was to counteract


²F.O. 78/4513, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 17, 20 January 1893, and encls.

³The exaggeration is admitted by Gorst and by Francis Adams, a
his partial defeat, to exert more pressure, and, as he said, to show in a practical way that he was supported by the British government, and there was no point in resistance.\(^1\)

Some members of the British Cabinet rightly understood that he wished to reduce ‘Abbas to immediate and complete subserviency.\(^2\) For this reason, and probably because of French protest against British action in Egypt, the Cabinet refused to sanction the reinforcement. It needed strong pressure from the Queen and Rosebery, a request from the Officer Commanding in Egypt, and a change in Cromer’s strong language, to secure their ultimate approval.\(^3\)

**Resistance during Riyad’s ministry**

Cromer came to the conclusion that the old régime had collapsed, as the young Khedive would not lend himself to it,

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\(\text{cont.}\) journalist who was staying in Egypt at that time; see M.P.P., box 10, Gorst to Milner, conf., 3 February 1893; Adams, F., *The new Egypt, a social sketch*, London, 1893, pp. 124-127. The exaggeration is also clear in Cromer’s report that Riyad had a religious turn and might unite with ‘Abbas against Britain when Riyad had been only about twenty four hours in office.

\(^1\) F.0. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 288, 24 January 1893.

\(^2\) Ibid., Rosebery to Cromer, tel. No. 287, 23 January 1893.

\(^3\) Buckle, *op.cit.*, vol. II, pp. 209-215. See also Cab.41/22/28, Gladstone to the Queen, 20 January 1893.
and wanted actually to rule. He again hinted at the de-
position of 'Abbas. It is clear that the idea of his de-
position was common among the British officials in Egypt,
and they, together with Rosebery, believed that the
Crisis was the beginning of the struggle with 'Abbas, and
other clashes were soon to follow, as the snake had been
"scotched and not killed". Rosebery even thought that
the chief danger threatening his Egyptian policy was the
Khedive, not French policy.\(^1\) Cromer thought of other ways
to assert British influence and keep the Khedive in order,
by an appeal to the powers to renew the British mandate,
or by seeking the Sultan's co-operation.\(^2\)

Rosebery thought that deposition was impossible, and
the machine should be kept going without the least sign of
friction. He hinted to the German Ambassador that the Egyptian
question might be referred to the powers, and he was confident
that the Triple Alliance would side with Britain, but he was
discouraged. He was also anxious to conclude some arrangement

\(^1\)M.PP. box 10, Gorst to Milner, conf., 3 February 1893; Wingate
to Milner, 30 January 1893; W.PP., box 255, Wingate to
Colonel Everett, 12 April 1893; Cab.37/33/10, Harding to
Rosebery, 22 January 1893; Buckle, op.cit., vol. II, p.209,
Dugdale, op.cit., vol. II, p.188.

\(^2\)F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 183 private, 4 February 1893.
with Turkey which would flatter the Sultan without including the evacuation clause of the Wolff Convention; that is, he wished to have the Occupation legalized in return for an acknowledgement of the Sultan's suzerainty. At the end of January contacts began between Rosebery and the Turkish Ambassador for the resumption of negotiations on the Egyptian question, and Muktār Pasha hinted to Cromer that Egyptian affairs should be arranged between Britain and Turkey on the basis of an Anglo-Turkish occupation. Rosebery took the opportunity, and consented to Cromer's suggestion of giving a hint to Tigrane and Riyād that the British were likely to come to their own terms with the Sultan, and that an Anglo-Turkish occupation was not impossible. They thought that holding the Turkish threat over them might keep matters quiet. At the same time, to help Anglo-Turkish contacts, Cromer avoided any cause of friction.

1 F.O. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, No. 125 private, 14 February 1893; Dugdale, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 182, 183.

Lord Rosebery was contacted for negotiation in August, but he declined. In October 1892, the Sultan tried to enlist the good offices of Austria for the same purpose, but with no results. Contacts were resumed at the end of January 1893. See F.O. 407/114, Rosebery to Ford, No. 182, 25 August 1892; Paget to Rosebery, No. 103 conf., 5 October 1892; F.O. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, tel. No. 295, 7 February 1893, and private letter No. 127 24 February 1893.

2 F.O. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, No. 125 private, 14 February 1893.

3 F.O. 78/4517, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 64 conf., 6 February 1893.

4 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tels. No. 293, 6 February, and No. 300, 13 February 1893.
This strengthened a line of outward moderation which 'Abbās had begun to follow. Immediately after the Crisis he tried to exploit the popularity which he had gained by the forcible language he used to congratulatory deputations and during his receptions. But the increase of the garrison, and Rosebery's despatch No. 40 of 16 February 1893, made him revert to his previous cautious policy. He expressed to Cromer his wish to work in harmony with him and with the British officials. When it was rumoured that Mukhtar Pasha would be replaced by another Ottoman official, the Khedive hinted to Cromer that if this were allowed to happen the principle of the presence of a Turkish high commissioner would be affirmed.

This moderate line may also have been encouraged by a change in the Sultan's attitude and tactics. After the Crisis 'Abbās received messages of encouragement from the Sultan, and a present of horses. The Sultan expected that any local com-

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1 The despatch is in F.O. 141/296, and was published as C.6956. It contains a warning of more rigorous action in case of the continuation of a hostile policy, hints on the permanent nature of the European control, and threats of co-operation with Europe and Turkey against 'Abbās. It is partly published in Cromer, 'Abbās II, pp. 39-41.

2 F.O. 78/4317, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 66, 15 February 1893.

3 Ibid., Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 71 conf., 21 February 1893.

4 Ibid., Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 29, 18 January 1893.
plications in Egypt might help his efforts to begin negotiations with Britain on the Egyptian question. But, after the increase of the British garrison in Egypt, and the failure of the Sultan to get sufficient support from the powers to challenge it and to raise the Egyptian question, the Porte instructed Mukhtar Pasha that he and the Khedive should not take any steps which might cause troubles when it was trying to overcome difficulties in commencing fresh negotiations with Britain.\(^1\) Isa‘il Pasha, probably at the demand of the Sultan, sent to the Khedive advising him to keep on good terms with the British Agent. At the same time, he advised 'Abbas to inform the public that he suffered from British tyranny, to make religious leaders preach discreetly hatred of the British, and to visit Constantinople. Briefly, discreet resistance was advised.\(^2\)

\(^1\) F.O. 407/119, Ford to Rosebery, tels. No. 22 secret, 31 January and No. 23 secret, 1 February 1893. At that time the Sultan's advisers were divided as to the Occupation: the Arabic group were for an active policy of evacuation, the Turkish group were for a moderate attitude towards Britain to save the rest of the Empire. In a report to the Sultan, his A.D.C., General Shakir Pasha, expressed the second view and condemned the strong policy followed by Mukhtar Pasha. See F.O. 141/296, Ford to Rosebery, No. 83 secret, 13 March 1893, encl. in Rosebery to Cromer, No. 70 conf., 24 March 1893.

\(^2\) F.O. 141/296, Ford to Rosebery, No. 84 secret, 17 March, encl. in Rosebery to Cromer, No. 66 conf., 17 March 1893. For further reference to contacts between 'Abbas and the Sultan through Isa‘il; see Chafik, Ahmed, L'Egypte moderne et les influences étrangères, Cairo, 1931, p.170.
It seems that the policy of resistance after the Crisis was, to some extent, agreed upon among 'Abbas, Riyāq, and Mukhtar. In May 1893 Mukhtar wrote to the Grand Vizir saying that 'Abbas and the Egyptian government:

"have pledged themselves to promote and assist by every means in their power any steps which may be taken by the Porte. We have further agreed and decided that His Highness should visit Constantinople..... It is clear that the Khedive will, when in Constantinople, model his actions on the verbal and categorical instructions which His Imperial Majesty will give him as to the course he should follow in order to expel the British intruder from Egypt".1

This sounds like an agreement for mutual help on the matter of evacuation, in exchange for a confirmation of the Sultan's suzerainty. It seems to be the answer of 'Abbas and Riyāq to the threat of an Anglo-Turkish occupation.

With Riyāq as prime minister, 'Abbas had not to worry about British encroachment in the administration. The former was practised in resistance, especially in the Interior, and he was helped by the attitude of the Anglo-Egyptian officials during the Ministerial Crisis, which their Egyptian colleagues

1F.O. 407/119, Ford to Rosebery, No. 79 secret, 17 May 1893.
resented. So, 'Abbas left him this side of the struggle. At first Cromer was deceived by the new policy. He thought that the Khedive had learnt his lesson and that he had only to deal with Riyad's resistance. He tried to separate Riyad from 'Abbas, and to establish indirect contact with 'Abbas through Schäfer, the head of the Secret Police. 'Abbas told Schäfer that he had been very badly advised and that he was resolved not to get into the same sort of difficulty again. But Cromer soon began to understand the policy of 'Abbas and Riyad.

Riyad carried on his traditional resistance in the Interior, trying to assert the authority of the Minister and of the governors against that of the British Inspector-General. He pursued resistance in other spheres, but in most cases Cromer was able to compel him to give way. This irritated Cromer to the extent of hinting at the dismissal of Riyad and an agreement

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1 F.C. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tels. No. 298, 16 February, and No. 300, 18 February 1893.

2 Ibid., Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 303, 4 March 1893; F.C. 633/6, same to same, No. 188 private, 31 March 1893. Colonel C. Schäfer, of Luxembourg, served in Egypt in military intelligence, then in the secret police. His last post was the head of the Bureau for the Suppression of Slave Trade.
with the Turks.  

"Abbas knew that Cromer's policy was not fully supported by the British Cabinet and the government party. He had his sources of information, and he understood the importance of making his case known to the British government and the British public, and fighting Cromer in Britain. He invited Lord Charles Beresford to an audience and expressed his distress at his very difficult position as the ruler of Egypt acknowledged by Britain and Europe, but without authority. Blunt, who was in contact with 'Abbas and sympathised with him, attacked Cromer's policy in the Pall Mall Gazette, saying that he proclaimed the absolute authority of the Khedive and manipulated the latter to his will. In the Nineteenth Century Blunt explained the background of the Ministerial Crisis, and attacked Cromer's policy and the British officials. The

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1 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 185 private, 17 March 1893. Cromer, in Abbas II, pp. 44-45, explained resistance and surrender by a confusion in Riyad's mind, but it was Cromer's pressure which always obliged Riyad to give way.

2 'Abbas had, in his household, a Translation Department which used to provide him with what the foreign press wrote about Egypt. He was in contact with Blunt, and he was informed of the Radicals' attitude through Dr. 'Uthman Qalib; see Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 1, pp. 40-43.

3 F.O. 141/296, Admiralty to F.O., 15 February 1893, encl. in Rosebery to Cromer, No. 44 conf., 17 February 1893. Lord Charles William Beresford was the Captain of the warship "Undaunted" at Alexandria. He took part in the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, and was charged with the protection of Tawfiq, with a
two articles were favourable to 'Abbas. In March 1893 a British journalist, who was then resident in Egypt, had an audience with 'Abbas. In his remarks, which were published in the Westminster Gazette,¹ 'Abbas expressed his appreciation of the reforms made in Egypt by the British, but complained that only Cromer's point of view was known in England. He stated also that the Egyptians were not allowed to express themselves, which was contrary to the idea of preparing them for autonomy. The importance of what the reporter said lies in the very favourable opinion he expressed about 'Abbas's personality, attitude, and maturity. The paper commented that the estimate of 'Abbas current in Britain required revision.

That estimate emerged out of the campaign which most English papers waged against 'Abbas. He was represented as young, vain and fanatical.² The Morning Post warned 'Abbas that if he persisted in his policy he must involve his country

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¹Pall Mall Gazette, 8 February 1893.

¹Westminster Gazette, 3 March 1893. The journalist was Francis Adams. The comment of the paper was in the editorial of the same issue.
²This was said first by Joseph Chamberlain in the Commons (P.D.D., 4th series, vol. VIII, column 280) and then taken up by the press. The Army and Navy Gazette, however, took a favourable attitude towards 'Abbas, as shown in the 21 and 25 January numbers.
and his dynasty in a common ruin. There is a noticeable similarity of thought and attitude between what The Times correspondent reported and Cromer's despatches and telegrams.¹

Cromer had his share in the campaign too. An interview with Francis Adams appeared in the Westminster Gazette in which he dwelt on the danger of Muslim fanaticism, the grave results of evacuation, and 'Abbās's despotic character and inexperience.²

The press in Egypt shared in the campaign. Al-Muqattam, The Egyptian Gazette, and Le Progrès Égyptien attacked the Egyptians and the Khedive's policy, showing how useless and ungrateful it was to resist Britain.³ Al-Mu'ayyad, al-Ahram, and al-Ustādž praised 'Abbās's policy. Al-Ahram said that the country was "aroused under the impulse of the Khedive".⁴ Al-Ustādž attacked the Occupation, but at the same time kept warning the people against agitation. There followed a long and bitter controversy between al-Ustādž and al-Muqattam, during

¹See the Morning Post, 21-25 January 1893, and The Times, 17-25 January 1893.

²Westminster Gazette, 21 February 1893. It shows Cromer's dealings with the press that he sent to Adams protesting against the publication of this interview on 13 March only, after 'Abbās's audience appeared in the same paper.

³Al-Hadidi, op.cit., p.455; Shafiq, Muhakkarati, part 2, section 1, p.64; The Egyptian Gazette, 17-20 January 1893.

⁴Quoted in The Times, 25 January 1893.
which careful attacks were levelled at the Occupation too.
The most bitter of these attacks was the article "This is my
hand, in whose hand shall I lay it?" in al-Ustadh of 7 May
1893, after which Cromer interfered and the paper was warned.
Although it almost ceased attacks on the Occupation after
that, the paper was warned again on 29 May, after Cromer had
exerted very strong pressure on Riyâd. Ultimately an arrange­
ment was reached with the editor 'Abd Allah Nadîm that he should
stop the paper and leave Egypt. It seems that Cromer exerted
pressure because Nadîm openly stated that he was supported by
'Abbâs. Cromer wanted to frighten the other papers, and he
feared that the controversy might keep up the feeling against
the Occupation. The press campaign was one of the weapons of
the struggle between 'Abbâs and Cromer. It developed later,
and helped the nationalist movement during its infancy.

The resistance of Riyâd, and the press campaign, made
Cromer think that 'Abbâs was "as hostile as he can possibly
be, although outwardly he is extremely polite. His main aim
and object just now is to get rid of me... for good and all."
He believed that 'Abbâs was calm because Riyâd was doing his

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1 F.O. 78/4514, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 59, 13 March 1893;
F.O. 78/4517B, same to same, No. 91 private, 26 May 1893;
al-Ustadh, pp. 507-532, 539-548, 555-563, 695-699, 705-720,
921-948.
work for him, and because he knew of the division in the Liberal Party and was waiting for the triumph of the Labouchere sect. Other people — Sir John Scott, the Judicial Adviser, Arthur Hardinge, and Baron de Malortie — thought that 'Abbas had a strong dislike of Cromer. De Malortie said that 'Abbas had expressed his willingness to co-operate with Britain provided that Cromer was recalled, and that Anglophobia was then directed more against Cromer personally than against Britain. At first Cromer did not mind the actions of 'Abbas and Riyaq, since he found that he could always compel them to accept his demands, as happened in the struggle in the Interior and al-Ustadh affairs. But other developments made him, and Rosebery, change their policy for some time.

Ismā'īl, Mukhtar, the French and Russian Consuls-General, and probably the Turcophile section of the entourage, had been pressing 'Abbas to visit the Sultan. Even without them, after the Ministerial Crisis and the Sultan's friendly overtures since the Firman Incident, it was logical that 'Abbas should

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1 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 191 private, 15 April 1893.
2 M.P.P., box 10, Scott to Milner, 26 February 1893; Malortie to Milner, conf., 24 July, and private, 16 August 1893.
have gone to Constantinople to find out what support he could expect. The visit took place in July 1893. The Sultan gave the Khedive a warm and magnificent reception, and conferred upon him the promised Intiyāz decoration in brilliants.

There are different views about the political side of the visit. British sources show that ‘Abbās appealed to the Sultan for help, and asked for Turkish troops or a Turkish bodyguard. The visit was considered a failure, as the Sultan was said to have counselled ‘Abbās to resign himself to his fate and trust to time, keeping on good terms with the British. It was further said that he warned Tigrane not to follow a policy which might create difficulties.¹ According to the French ‘Abbās stated that the Sultan and the Grand Vizir avoided speaking about the Occupation. German documents prove that politics were not excluded.² It is unlikely that ‘Abbās invited any Turkish interference in Egypt's internal affairs, but he certainly wanted political support against British domination, and to secure evacuation. It is probable, however, that Ismā‘īl was prompted by the Sultan, and advised ‘Abbās to keep on good terms

with the British for the time, to leave diplomacy to the
Sultan and concentrate on administration, and to resist
British encroachment without raising problems. The Sultan
was trying to negotiate with Britain a settlement of the
Occupation problem, and had sent a draft convention to
London before the visit. He was anxious to avoid any action
which might annoy Britain and hamper his efforts.

The visit was a failure in the sense that ‘Abbas did
not get the political support he needed, although he was
sure of moral support. But it was a success in other as-
pects. It removed the existing misunderstanding, and estab-
lished personal contact between ‘Abbas and the Sultan, a
contact which was lacking under Tawfiq. It gave the Khedive
more influence among the Egyptian Muslims and increased
his popularity. It enabled ‘Abbas and Tigrane to visit the
embassies in Constantinople, including the British, explaining
the origins of the Ministerial Crisis, and complaining of
British domination in the administration to the extent that
Egyptian ministers were deprived of any initiative and freedom

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1 F.O. 407/120, Nicolson to Rosebery, tel. No. 138 secret, 20
July 1893; F.O. 78/4515, Hardinge to Rosebery, No. 133 secret,
3 August 1893; D.D.F., tome X, No. 321.

2 F.O. 407/120, Rosebery to Nicolson, No. 179 conf., 12 July
1893, and encl.; Nicolson to Rosebery, No. 336 secret, 15 July
1893.

of action. Tigrane repeated the complaint to Hardinge in Cairo. The visit enabled 'Abbâs to make a correct assessment of the political situation. He could not have stayed ignorant of the negotiations between Britain and Turkey. Therefore, apart from the political support which he did not get, there was the danger of an agreement between the two countries at his expense. Before leaving Constantinople he made a friendly approach to the British government. Although he complained of Cromer's policy to the British Charge d'Affaires, he said nothing about the military occupation, and expressed his wish to maintain cordial relations with the British government, and said that he was anxious to visit Britain the following year to have a frank exchange of views.

These reports reached Rosebery together with other reports about the Sultan's efforts to incite a press campaign in Egypt against the Occupation. With the weak support he was receiving in the Cabinet for his Egyptian policy, and the

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2 F.O. 407/120, Nicolson to Rosebery, tel. No. 139, 21 July 1893.

difficulties in the international situation following the
Siam Crisis,¹ Rosebery thought that a discontented Khedive
co-operating with the Sultan in Egypt would be troublesome.
'Abbas's overtures opened the way for a change of policy
and of the British Agent. Rosebery consulted Cromer, then
in Britain on leave, about his successor. Two vacancies soon
due to occur were the viceroyalty of India and the Embassy
in Constantinople. Rumours began there and in Cairo about
the possibility of Cromer's removal.²

It is clear that Rosebery reached an understanding
with Cromer about a more friendly policy towards the Khedive,
to prepare the ground until Cromer reached a decision on
the new post and the new agent. Before 'Abbas left Constantin-
ople Arthur Nicolson, the Chargé d'Affaires, told him that "no
one had a warmer desire than [his] Government to co-operate
cordially with him for the good of his country", and 'Abbas
repeated his intention to visit Britain the following year.³

¹The Crisis was caused by French encroachments on Siamese terri-
tory, which Britain considered as a buffer state between Burma
and the French colonies in Indo-China. In July 1893 France
submitted to Siam an ultimatum claiming the cession of the left
bank of the Upper Mekong, and imposed a blockade. Lacking Brit-
ish support, Siam accepted the ultimatum. Cf. Langer, op.cit.,
pp. 43-45.

²F.O.633/6, Rosebery to Cromer, secret, 27 October 1893; Cromer
to Rosebery, private, 4 November 1893; D.D.F., tome X, No. 421.

³F.O. 407/120, Nicolson to Rosebery, No. 350, 26 July 1893.
An article, probably inspired by Cromer, appeared in the *Spectator* of 12 August 1893, praising the Khedive's qualities, hinting at the failure of his visit to Constantinople, and advising him to accept the situation in Egypt and throw in his lot with the British as the only way towards independence, preserving his rights before the Sultan, and enriching himself. The article was shown to 'Abbas by his private doctor, Comanos Pasha, a friend of the Agency. The Khedive expressed his willingness to co-operate. The new policy took another formal step in the shape of an invitation to 'Abbas from the Queen to visit Britain.

However, it seems that the new policy was understood differently on either side. To Cromer it meant some personal and superficial concessions to 'Abbas, while maintaining the substance of British domination. To 'Abbas it meant an end to open clashes, and co-operation on the basis of more power for him and the Egyptians in the administration, as a step towards evacuation. This virtually amounted to Isma'il's advice, which was outward conciliation, covert resistance to

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1 F.O. 79/4516, Hardinge to Rosebery, No. 158 conf., 4 September 1893.
administrative domination, the avoidance of clashes. In fact, 'Abbas could not then have completely co-operated with Cromer, at least before the visit to London. He was keen to maintain his newly acquired popularity, and even with this moderate policy he began to receive threatening anonymous letters complaining of his conciliatory attitude towards Britain. The French and the Turks strongly opposed his visit to London, and friction began between him and Riyādj, especially when the latter wanted a ministerial change, including the nomination of his son, Ḥāfīz Pasha Riyādj, as minister of the Interior. Cromer took the chance to flatter 'Abbas and separate him from Riyādj, whom he considered the remaining source of resistance. It was the same policy which he had followed with Tawfiq during the previous Riyādj ministry. In November 1893 difficulties arose about some administrative arrangements, including the proposed appointment of a British inspector-general for the Sanitary Department, and the abolition

1 The Times, 25 September 1893.
3 M.PF., box 10, Malortie to Milner, private, 16 August 1893. Ḥāfīz Pasha Riyādj was then under-secretary for the Interior. In his memoirs ‘Abbas complains of the father’s favouritism to his relatives, v. al-Migri, 4 May 1951.
of the Bureau for The Suppression of Slave Trade. Riyaḍ insisted on the latter proposal in particular. Cromer sought 'Abbas's interference, and the Khedive advised Riyaḍ to make some concessions. 1 Although the crisis passed, Riyaḍ was on the point of resignation, 2 feeling that he was not adequately supported. Cromer was keen to confirm the right which he had recently gained during the Ministerial Crisis, and when he understood that a ministerial change was impending he warned Tigrane that nomination of new ministers implied consultation. 3 The matter was dropped.

The Khedive's new policy took the shape of trying to undermine foreign control by the appointment of selected efficient Egyptian officials to key posts in the administration. 4 A judge was appointed as governor of Alexandria, to be able to deal with the international complications of

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2 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 320, 8 November 1893.
3 F.O. 633/5, Cromer to Tigrane, No. 557 private, 17 October 1893.
4 F.O. 78/4516, Hardinge to Rosebery, No. 176 secret, 30 September 1893.
its Municipality, and Muḥammad Mahir Pasha was appointed as under-secretary for War, to try and stop the absorption by the Sirdar of the whole authority in that ministry.

The latter appointment, together with the Legislative Council incident, were the two serious points of conflict which led eventually to open hostility.

As early as the end of October 1893 Cromer began to report on the intention of the Legislative Council, encouraged by Riyāḍ and ‘Abbās, to adopt a hostile attitude towards the British Occupation. The original intention was to register disapproval of the continuance of the British Occupation. But strong pressure was exerted by Cromer, under instructions from Rosebery, on Riyāḍ, and by British officials on the members of the Council. On the other hand ‘Abbās, according to Blunt, exerted his influence to overcome the apathy of the members. The result was a report by the Council on

1The new governor was Ibrāhīm Pasha Najīb, ex-Chief Judge of Cairo National Tribunal of first instance. He received his law education in France. See Ilyās Zākhūra, Kitāb mirʿāt al-ʿasr fī tārīkh wa rusūm akābir al-rijal bi-Mīr, vol. II, Cairo, 1897, pp. 175-178.

2F.O. 78/4517, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 126 conf., 30 October 1893. Blunt said that he urged ‘Abbās, Riyāḍ, Tigrane, and Mukhtar, to act through, and with, the Legislative Council; see Blunt, W. S., My diaries, being a personal narrative of events, 1884-1914, part 1, London, 1919, pp. 114, 116, 119, 120. Blunt’s statement is confirmed by a letter, which fell into Cromer’s hands, from Blunt to Mukhtar in the same sense; see F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 309, 5 April 1893.

3F.O. 78/4517, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 143, 2 December 1893. (cont.)
the Budget, in which the members deplored the poverty of
the fellahen, and recommended reductions in some items of
expenditure. These included reduction of the high salaries
paid to European officials, and the abolition of the Bureau
for the Suppression of Slave Trade. The economies so
affected were to be applied to the reduction of taxation
and to education. But the most serious point was that they
did not approve the expenses of the army of occupation,\(^1\)
thus declaring indirectly their resentment at the Occupation.
Pressure and threats were again exerted on Riyád, and he was
obliged to draft a comparatively moderate reply to that point
of the report, saying that "... it is to be hoped that it will
be possible to diminish it [the expenses] progressively until
it will finally disappear by the realization on the part of
Great Britain of the assurances which have been given us".\(^2\)

(cont.)

\(^1\) F.O. 78/4517\(^B\), Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 152, 15 December 1893;
F.O. 78/4516, same to same, No. 214, 24 December 1893.

\(^2\) F.O. 78/4517\(^B\), Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 155, 24 December 1893.
By this answer, the government also actually asked for evacuation.

Two other points arose from this incident which led to more complications and friction. The first was that the ministers drafted their reply to the report without consulting the Financial Adviser. The latter drafted a separate reply and Cromer enforced its publication in the official journal with the ministerial answer. The second was that two members of the Council were reported by Le Bosphore Eρyptien to have visited Cromer to explain, or to excuse, the intended attitude of the Council respecting the army of occupation. The matter was raised in the Council and the two were accused of a breach of faith. The president of the Council, 'Ali Pasha Sharif, was delegated to ascertain the real facts from Cromer. Cromer was angry, refused to give him any information, and under instructions from Rosebery sent a stiff letter to Tigrane protesting against the action of 'Ali Sharif, and asserting the freedom of any individual to visit him, and his right to decline giving any information about the visit.¹

That incident gives good examples of Cromer's methods and attitudes, the readiness with which Rosebery used to respond to him, and the not very strong position of Rosebery in the Cabinet

¹F.O. 78/4517, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 145, 6 December 1893; F.O. 78/4516, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 207, 9 December 1893 and enclosures.
and in Parliament regarding Egyptian affairs. At the beginning of the incident Cromer was anxious about the effect on public opinion in Britain and on Parliament, and he did not like the British press to write on the subject in strong terms.¹ Under private instructions from Rosebery, Cromer sent him an official telegram hinting at the attitude of the Council, and stating that they belonged to the privileged classes and were practically nominated and manipulated by the government.²

The idea was to strengthen Rosebery's hand and to remove any effect caused by the Council's attitude. Cromer's pressure on Riyād in the last stage of the incident consisted of the mere threat of the unknown consequences of resistance, without doing or saying anything of importance. He also asked Rosebery, who was married to a daughter of the Rothschilds, to make them send to their agent in Egypt, Ambrose Sinadino, a telegram calculated to frighten the ministers. Cromer thought that Sinadino was "sure to show it to Tigrane".³

¹F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tels. No. 323, 1 December and No. 336, 20 December 1893.

²Ibid., Rosebery to Cromer, tel. No. 324 private, 1 December 1893; F.O. 78/4517B Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 143, 2 December 1893.

³F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 337 private, 21 December 1893.
Cromer was sure that Riyâd was responsible for the attitude of the Council, and that 'Abbas and the French were also behind it. He wanted mainly to impress that the Council and the ministers had exceeded their authority, as the question of evacuation was the Sultan's affair. He wanted also to separate Riyâd from the Khedive, and from what he called the patriotic party, by forcing him to contradict the Council's report.

Cromer felt the gravity of the situation. For the first time, the Egyptian government, backed by a council really representing some influential classes, had publicly and officially declared that they wanted the British to go. Because of the French attitude, he thought it risky that the Egyptian question should be raised at that time. Cromer was willing, on official and personal grounds, to accept Rosebery's offer of the Constantinople Embassy.

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1 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 333, 13 December 1893; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 196 private, 17 December 1893.
2 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 334 private, 19 December 1893; M.FP., box 10, Gorst to Milner, private, 25 December 1893. The patriotic party, as then defined by The Times on 16 February, was composed of all those who had real or fancied grievances against the existing régime.
3 It was after the Siamese Incident in July 1893 and the visit of the Russian fleet to Toulon in October, and just before the Franco-Russian alliance of 4 January 1894.
Political developments, however, made him hesitate. But the turn the Legislative Council incident took, coupled with the international complications, made him decline to go, and caused Rosebery to consider him "for the present" indispensable in Egypt. Staying, in this case, meant stronger policy, and the situation reverted to where it was after the Ministerial Crisis, when it was thought that the snake (meaning 'Abbas) was scotched and not killed, and that a sharper lesson would be needed before long.

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1 Supra, p. 60; F.0. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, private, 4 and 20 November 1893. In his two letters Cromer expressed his opinion that, as circumstances changed in Egypt, a change was desirable in the system of British control, and that, as he was identified with that system, his presence tended to create rather than to allay friction, so a change of person was desired.

2 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. very private, 19 December 1893, and Rosebery to Cromer, tel. private, 21 December 1893.

The Sultan took the opportunity of the Legislative Council incident to try again to begin negotiations with Britain, but the Frontier Incident interrupted his efforts. The incident, besides raising the anti-British feeling, was taken by Mukhtar and Isma'il as an opportunity to press the Sultan to start negotiations in order not to alienate the Egyptians. See F.0. 407/126, Nicolson to Rosebery, No. 603 conf., 26 December 1893, and tels. No. 1, 4 January and No. 3, 9 January 1894.

The Frontier Incident and its background

Friction on military affairs, and the behaviour of some junior British officers and officials, increased the irritation on both sides. Some of them used to abuse 'Abbas before their Egyptian subordinates and in public, and this did not fail to reach him.¹ The most serious of this misbehaviour was the incident concerning Major Judge about the end of November 1893.²

The main clash, however, was on power in the War Office.

'Abbas was afraid that the spirit of the 'Urābi revolution might be only latent, and he was anxious to have a hold over the army. As early as February 1892, he showed his interest in army affairs. He used to attend and sometimes participate in army manoeuvres, and to receive visitors wearing uniform. He had received at the Theresianum in Vienna an adequate military education, which gave him some confidence in his judgment on military matters. He began to enquire into army affairs, and was soon convinced of the inefficiency of his troops, particularly the officers. They did not receive adequate instruction in the Military School; 'Abbas called it primitive

¹ M,PP., box 10, Malortie to Milner, private, 16 August 1893.
² Judge was a British officer in the Egyptian army. He passed the Khedive without giving the due salute. An A.D.C. stated that he was drunk. The case was brought before a court-martial, but Cromer obliged 'Abbas to express to the Sirdar his satisfaction with the general behaviour of the British officers in his service.
instruction. This is why, when Sir Francis Grenfell, the Sirdar, returned to Britain, 'Abbās interfered and wrote directly to the Queen to have Kitchener appointed as Sirdar. Judging from Kitchener's ability and skill, 'Abbās hoped that the army would be raised to a better standard.

But in one respect he was disappointed in Kitchener. He complained bitterly that Kitchener had systematically deceived and misinformed him regarding the army, particularly about the salaries of British officers, which were included with other salaries as a lump sum. Good relations were replaced by mistrust between the two men. Nevertheless, 'Abbās established his private contact with the army through other mediums, and obtained the information he wanted through some officers and officials, and through the imāms of the battalions. He said that he had his men even in the Sirdar's house.

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1 'Abbās, "Memoirs", al-Migrī, 4 May 1951. About the standard of the Military School and the officers, see al-Rafi'ī, 'Abd al-Rahmān, Migr wa'l-Sūdan fī awḍ'îl 'ahd al-iḥtiṣāl, 2nd ed., Cairo, 1948, pp. 14-17; Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 91-92. Wingate held the same idea about the Egyptian officers; see W.PP., box 255, Wingate to Colonel Everett, 21 May 1893.


The increase of the British garrison in January 1893 annoyed the Egyptian officers, and they rallied more around 'Abbas, unburdening their grievances to him. They complained that they could not be promoted above the rank of Colonel, that they received very low salaries compared with those of the British officers, that the officers promoted from the ranks should, according to regulations, be equivalent in number to those who had graduated from the Military School, and that the officers who did not join the British Masonic Lodge (over which the Director of Intelligence presided) could not hold any command. 'Abbas said also that he received information that the War Office funds were not properly spent, and that large sums were spent on intelligence and propaganda serving British interests only.¹

The British domination of the War Office did not escape 'Abbas's notice. Even a compromise reached with 'Abd al-Qadir Pasha Filmi, the War Minister in 1896, which left some authority to the Egyptians, was ignored, and the policy which was subse-

¹ 'Abbas, "Memoirs", al-Misri, 4, 5 May 1951. In 1893 Kitchener was Warden, and Wingate was Master, of the English Masonic Lodge, Grecia Lodge of Cairo No. 1105, E.C., see The Egyptian Gazette, 6 January 1893.
quently followed was to reduce the work of the War Minister and the Under-Secretary to a minimum. They became mere cyphers, and the Sirdar absorbed all authority. By the appointment of Muhammad Mahir Pasha, in September 1893, as under-secretary for War, Abbas tried to loosen the British grip over the army.

Mahir began to wrench some authority from the Sirdar. He inspired the Minister, Yusuf Shuhdi Pasha, who drafted some new regulations in November establishing a line of demarcation between the Sirdar's duties and those of himself and Mahir. The friction which followed was referred to both Riyād and Croner. The former, still suffering from his recent defeat, and expecting another quarrel with Croner over the Legislative Council's report, was reluctant to enter into further controversy, and referred the matter to Croner as arbiter. It was ultimately settled on the basis of the 1886 agreement.

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1 M.P.P., box 255, Wingate to Colonel Everett, private, 27 November 1893; M.P.P., box 11, Jackson to Milner, 29 January 1894.
3 M.P.P., box 11, Jackson to Milner, 29 January 1894.
The second move of Mahir was a dangerous one. He began to contact the Egyptian officers, inspiring them with loyalty to the Khedive, and trying to find out those who were more loyal to the British. He also contacted other officials in the War Office, in order to get information. His movements were discovered and reported by the Intelligence Department. The question arises, what the Khedive's intentions really were. It is highly improbable that he was fomenting a mutiny in his army against the British officers, as implied in Cromer's version of the Frontier Incident, and repeated by Zetland. He could not have been blind to the fact that in the state of the Egyptian army, as it then was, it could not face the forces of the Mahdiyya in the south and the British troops in Egypt. The naval demonstration at his accession, the reinforcement of the British garrison, and the strong squadron which was sent to Alexandria after the Ministerial Crisis, should have convinced him of British might and British determination.

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1F.O. 78/4516, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 182 secret, 28 October 1893.

2Cromer, Abbas II, pp. 50-55; Zetland, Cromer, pp. 208-209.

3The army was composed of about 14,000 men, badly officered, scattered on two fronts, and in almost constant contact with the enemy in minor clashes. Kitchener had stated in 1892 that it was incapable of performing its duties and asked for its increase.
Internationally ‘Abbas could not have gained by a mutiny in the army; he might even lose by frightening sympathetic powers and putting them at a disadvantage for discussing the Egyptian question. A policy of inciting mutiny was incompatible with the policy of avoiding serious clashes, which ‘Abbas was following. In his memoirs, written in the 1940’s, ‘Abbas said that "the army is the only organisation capable of achieving the freedom of the fatherland", but he did not say how to use it.

The real struggle, in fact, was for the loyalty of the Egyptian army. With an army which would not allow itself to be used against him or against the people, and with the more politically conscious population in Cairo, Alexandria, and some provincial towns, ‘Abbas could have more room for political manoeuvres.

The British were quite aware of the danger. At first, they thought that the Egyptian army was loyal to its British officers and would follow them. But they were undeceived


2 F.O. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, No. 122 private, 27 January 1893. Punch had the same idea. In its number of 7 January 1893 there is a picture of a British officer looking kindly at an alert fellah soldier, and beside the picture there are some lines of poetry praising the soldier and asking him what he said about the people who wanted Britain to evacuate.
during the Ministerial Crisis, and Cromer reported that the sympathies of the Egyptian army were with the Khedive.\(^1\) It was clear that it would take his side even against the British officers. The idea of placing the army directly under British control was contemplated, but dropped,\(^2\) and Rosebery considered the situation grave.

This explains the gravity attached in London to the activities of Māhir Pasha in the War Office, especially his efforts to win the loyalty of the army for the Khedive. General Sir Francis Grenfell, former Sirdar of the Egyptian army and then at the War Office in London, to whom the latter efforts were reported by both Kitchener and Wingate, considered that it would be a great danger to British supremacy in Egypt if the Khedive got hold of the army in any way. He contacted Rosebery and his Under-Secretary, expressing his opinion about the extreme gravity of the situation, then he informed Wingate and Kitchener that Rosebery was "quite prepared should any crisis arise, under the recommendation of Cromer, to thoroughly support the Sirdar and his officers".\(^3\) By this

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\(^1\) F.O. 76/4517\(^3\), Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 32, 19 January 1893.
\(^3\) W.P.F., box 255, Grenfell to Wingate, 5 November 1893.
assurance Rosebery had in fact put the fate of relations between 'Abbas and Britain completely in the hands of three persons: Cromer, Kitchener and Wingate.

This promise of unreserved support seems outwardly incompatible with the conciliatory policy Rosebery was urging towards 'Abbas, and with the invitation to visit Britain. Rosebery attached much importance to this visit, and in January 1894 he wrote to Cromer saying that the keynote of his policy had been to smooth things over until the visit took place, and that it was the capital point.¹

A visit by the Khedive could have proved the success of Rosebery's policy, and strengthened his hand against the "Little England" section of the Liberal Party, who caused him much trouble throughout the parliamentary session.²

But, at the same time, any rash action taken by 'Abbas in the army would have justified a strong policy in the eyes of the British public, and also strengthened Rosebery's hand.

¹F.O. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, No. 132 private, 7 January 1894.

The people on the spot had a different attitude. As Wingate mentioned, there never was much love lost between the Khedive and the Sirdar, and the appointment of Māhir Pasha and his activities made the relations even less cordial. When Kitchener knew that the Khedive was going to take Māhir with him on his visit to the frontier, he tried to persuade him to take Shuhdī Pasha instead. While on leave in Britain in 1895, Kitchener used very strong and strange language about the Khedive, probably he spoke about the deposition of 'Abbās, at which his more fluent colleague, Wingate, frequently hinted. Wingate hated 'Abbās and Māhir. He suspected that the former was trying to communicate secretly with the Sudan, and that he intended to enter into negotiations when he went to the frontier. He thought that the British would have no peace in the War Office as long as Māhir was there, and that the best way was to get rid of him and to abolish his post. When Māhir was appointed governor of the Suez Canal after the Frontier Incident, Wingate said that he would have been more pleased.

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1 W.P.P., box 257, Wingate to Colonel Everett, private, 10 February 1894.
2 T.O. 78/4574, Wingate's table of comparison, encl. in Cromer to Rosebery, No. 30 conf., 18 February 1894.
3 W.P.P., box 257, Dr. W. H. Russell to Wingate, 26 February 1894. Dr. Russell was the editor of the Army and Navy Gazette.
4 W.P.P. box 255, Wingate to General Chapman, 3 December 1893. General Chapman was Director of Military Intelligence in London.
had Māhir been removed from the government altogether. Wingate considered that a climax must be reached sooner or later which would lead to a split, that the army was quite the best rock on which to split, and that no weakness should be shown on the British side and the Khedive might be given such a severe push as almost to knock him off his pedestal. He thought that the British might be only waiting until 'Abbas was thoroughly involved in some irretrievable impasse. Indeed, ever since the Ministerial Crisis, Wingate had thought that 'Abbas was impossible, and that the best method of proceeding would be an agreement with Turkey on the basis of more emphasis of Turkish suzerainty, the retention of British control, the deposition of 'Abbas, and the appointment of a new wali, preferably his friend Mukhtār Pasha.

This was the attitude towards 'Abbas and Māhir of the two persons on whose judgment about the Frontier Incident Cromer relied, and to whom he gave his full support.

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2 W.P.P., box 255, Wingate to General Chapman, 23 July 1893; Wingate to Colonel Everett, 12 April 1893. Wingate even sent Everett the Khedivial genealogical tree in April, saying that he might have to refer to it soon.
About the end of December Cromer, too, was as exasperated as he had been on the eve of the Ministerial Crisis, and wrote to Rosebery saying that the situation was even more difficult. He was irritated by the Legislative Council incident, and by the hostile spirit displayed towards the Occupation, which he attributed to the instigation of Riyāq and 'Abbās. Gorst, the Under-Secretary for Finance, summed up the situation saying that "the slightest difference of opinion may produce an incident now-a-days. Both sides are more or less in a permanent state of irritation and on the lookout for grounds of offence". But Rosebery advised moderation. Cromer, too, was persistently hostile to Māhir. On the very day of the Frontier Incident, before receiving the news, Cromer wrote saying that so long as Māhir remained in the War Office there would always be friction, together with a risk that the friction might become serious, and he trusted that some opportunity

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1 P.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 197, private, 25 December 1893.
2 M.P.P., box 10, Gorst to Milner, private, 25 December 1893.
3 Infra, p. 75.
might arise for getting rid of him.1

On the Egyptian side, to gain the loyalty of the army, 'Abbās had to look into the grievances of the officers and to satisfy them. Some officers from the Second Battalion of the frontier forces had complained to him of the inefficiency of their British commanding officer, and of his maltreatment of them. 'Abbās intended to look into their complaint during his visit to the frontier, and to support the Egyptian officers and give them prestige.2 It seems that his intentions were reported to the British,3 who were prepared for 'Abbās and hostile to Māhir.

As early as 14 January 1894, when 'Abbās had only visited Aswān and seen a single battalion, Wingate wrote that 'Abbās had taken upon himself the role of dissatification with everything directly under English control, and has spared no pains to convey this impression to both English and native officers.... to the latter in order to imbue them with his own feelings [Anglophobia], and to throw difficulties in the way of their English superior officers".4 Other British

1F.O. 633/5, Cromer to the Duke of Cambridge, No. 563 private, 19 January 1893.


3Ahmad Shafīq suspected that the information escaped through one of 'Abbās's household who was a friend of Kitchener; see Mudhakkirāt, part 2, section 1, pp. 127-8. Cf. Arthur, C., (cont.)
and Egyptian sources, and 'Abbas in his version of the incident, did not give this impression. Captain Jackson, the Secretary for the War Office in Egypt, and Ahmad Shafīq, who was in the Khedive's suite during the visit, said that 'Abbas expressed his satisfaction in Aşwan and Kūruskū, and that he displayed his displeasure only at Wādī Ḫafīfā.¹

Even according to Wingate's diary, it was the Second Battalion, mentioned above, which 'Abbas bitterly criticised. Wingate in his diary, and Kitchener in his report and telegrams, represented 'Abbas and Mahir during the visit to the frontier as trying to incite the Egyptian troops against the British officers, and even as trying to force the latter to resign. Then Kitchener exaggerated the excitement created among the troops by 'Abbas's remark, hinting at the possibility of a mutiny. Cromer, in 'Abbas II, took the same line. But the resignation of the British officers would have created a political issue, as 'Abbas said to Kitchener. This he was trying to avoid. It is also hard to see how a mutiny could have taken place when the criticism was delivered in private,

(continuation)

¹ About Kitchener and Wingate's version of the Incident see Wingate's diary and Kitchener's report enclosed in F.0.78/4574, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 20 conf., 28 January 1894; Cromer to Rosebery No. 30 conf. 18 February 1894. The latter encloses also the Khedive's version of the Incident.

¹ M. PP., box 11, Jackson to Milner, 29 January 1894; Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 122-125.
far from the troops, against the British officers only, and in agreement with the Egyptian officers. The exaggeration is made clear by the fact that the troops were not good on parade at Wādī Ḥalfā. Lloyd Pasha, the Commander of the frontier forces, asked Kitchener to allow the arrest of the bandmaster for beating too quick time, which threw the troops into confusion. When the Second Battalion returned to Cairo the Sirdar ordered more drill for it, and attended its drill, expressing his dissatisfaction.¹

Certainly actions of the Khedive and Māhir exasperated the prejudices of Kitchener and Wingate. Māhir dominated everything, and the Sirdar was put in the shade. He took the position of a minister during the visit, and the Khedive consulted him when he conferred robes of honour and gave grants to some shaykhs, without referring to the Sirdar and the Governor of the Frontier, as his father had done on his last visit. Māhir was in constant contact with the shaykhs and with Egyptian officers, and influenced the Khedive in favour of certain shaykhs who were unfriendly to the British. Wingate suspected that any khedivial

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¹Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, p.130.
contact with the Sudan would be through them, either Bashir Bey Jibrān or Munshāṭṭīb Bey. He thought if 'Abbās acquired any control over the army, he might attempt to meddle in the Sudan, and that should be prevented. It seems that there was mutual suspicion over the Sudan affair. Blunt thought that 'Abbās suspected Kitchener's activities among the tribes in Nubia, which were kept secret from him. 'Abbās might have some idea about the contacts between the Ja‘āliyyīn of the Sudan and the Sirdar. These culminated in a demand by the Ja‘āliyyīn for help to rebel against the Khalīfa, and for the subsequent provision of British, not Egyptian, administrators. This might explain the Khedive's attitude towards some of the shaykhs during the visit.

It is significant that Cromer, when he received the Sirdar's telegram about the Incident, recommended only the removal of Māhir from the War Office. But Rosebery took a stronger line

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1 W.PP., box 275, Wingate to Captain Fairholm, 5 February 1894.
2 Blunt, Diaries, part I, pp. 155, 156.
3 F.C. 78/4575, Kitchener's memo., enclosed in Cromer to Rosebery, No. 91 secret, 20 January 1894.
and asked for an order of the day laudatory to the British officers. In settling this matter British policy aimed, beside forcing the Khedive to submit to British demands, at widening the split between Abbas and his ministers, which had existed since November, and separating him again from the Sultan.

To achieve the former end, and to avoid an open clash with Abbas before his expected visit to England according to Rosebery’s advice, Cromer tried to have the Incident settled through the ministers before Abbas’s arrival in Cairo. He brought the strongest possible pressure on Riyad and Tigrane: Lord Rosebery’s ultimatum included in his telegram No. 5, a telegram from the Rothschilds to their agent which he showed to Tigrane, saying that the British government would not yield on the two points they demanded, and instructions were sent from the War Office, at Cromer’s demand, that all the complaints against British officers in the Egyptian army should be referred to the

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1 F.O. 78/4577, Rosebery to Cromer, tel. No. 5, 21 January 1894.
2 F.O. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, tel. No. 343, 21 January 1894.
3 F.O. 78/4577, Rosebery to Cromer, tel. No. 5, 21 January 1894.
Officer Commanding the army of occupation.\(^1\) Ahmad Shafiq even said that Cromer mentioned the threat of deposition.\(^2\) Cromer pointed out to Riyād the danger of tampering with the army, reminding him of his own experience with ‘Urābī. He also pointed out to Riyād and Tigrane their responsibility and their duty to advise the Khedive.\(^3\) Riyād promised to follow Cromer’s advice. Cromer wrote to Rosebery that it was probable there would be a desirable split between the Khedive and the ministers, and Rosebery said that it would be much appreciated.\(^4\)

When Riyād did not receive a favourable answer from ‘Abbās, Cromer pressed him to go up the Nile to meet ‘Abbās and to persuade him to accept the British demands.\(^5\) He expected to receive their answer before a fixed time.\(^6\) This ultimatum explains the issue of the required order of the day at al-Fayyūm, which is only some few hours by train from Cairo.

\(^1\) F.O. 407/126, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 17, 23 January 1894.
\(^2\) Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, section 2, part 1, p.125.
\(^3\) F.O. 78/4578, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 13, 23 January 1894.
\(^4\) F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 348, 23 January 1894; Rosebery to Cromer, tel. No. 349, 23 January 1894.
The pressure which Riyāḍ exerted on 'Abbās was strongly resisted. 'Abbās observed that the Incident was much exaggerated, and suggested that they should wait until they arrived in Cairo. There they could explain matters and see the representatives of other powers. He commented that he could not be judged without being heard. But at the end of two days' discussion, 25-26 January, he was obliged to yield when Riyaḍ told him that he had seen the French Consul-General, and that the latter would not interfere. 'Abbās reserved for himself the right of making his version of the facts public. He was in a very critical position, which might have become impossible had Riyāḍ resigned at that time. He felt his hand forced, and he spoke with feeling in his memoirs, condemning the weakness of Riyāḍ, who, he said, had not met the French Consul-General. So, the split between Riyāḍ and 'Abbās was complete.

But 'Abbās was not justified in his accusation of Riyāḍ. De Roeveraux stated that he had advised the ministers to

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2 Ibid., 5 May 1951; F.O. 76/4574, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 16, 26 January 1894.

publish the demanded order of the day without delay, but avoid sacrificing Mahir. The real facts are that France was not then willing to help 'Abbas, both because of the nature of the Incident, and because France could not depend upon strong support from Russia in the Egyptian question. She had also been trying since the advent of Gladstone to power in 1892 to reach an agreement with Britain on Egypt.

It was the same with Turkey. The efforts of the Sultan to persuade Britain to begin negotiations were resumed on 9 January 1894, and he wanted to smooth matters over. In spite of that, Rosebery was not as successful in his efforts to separate the Khedive from the Sultan as Cromer was in separating 'Abbas and Riyaḍ. Rosebery sent to Nicolson, the Chargé d'Affaires in Constantinople, saying that the Khedive's observations at Wādī Ḫalfa were at variance with the highly favourable opinion which the Turkish High Commissioner had expressed when he visited the frontier forces some few weeks before.

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2. D.D.F., tome X, Nos. 37, 153, 156, 224, 274.
before, and that he put Nicolson in possession of that
information "in case the Sultan should think fit to vin-
dicate the authority of his Representative as against
the Khedive". 1 But the Grand Vizir remarked to the
Austrian Ambassador that he did not think Mukhtar Pasha
had gone beyond the usual courteous observations, 2 and
the Sultan answered the rumours that he was badly disposed
towards the Khedive by sending 'Abbas a telegram assuring
him of his support, and presenting him with a palace on
the Bosphorus. 3 The British Ambassador continued to
point out the anti-Turkish tendency of the Khedive's
actions, but the Sultan refused permission for Prince
Halím's son to visit Alexandria. 4 This shows that the Sultan
was afraid lest 'Abbas, under pressure and humiliation,
might throw himself into the arms of Britain.

It is clear that after the Incident the attitude of
Rosebery towards 'Abbas changed completely. Up to the first

1 F.O. 407/126, Rosebery to Nicolson, tel. No. 4, 23 January 1894.
2 Ibid., Nicolson to Rosebery, No. 63 conf., 30 January 1894.
4 F.O. 633/7, Currie to Cromer, tel. No. 371, 12 March 1894.
days of the crisis he advised Cromer not to come into open conflict with 'Abbās before his visit to London. But immediately after its close he wrote to Cromer saying that they must contemplate the removal of the Khedive: "He is a hopeless fellow, and his hatred of us, as well probably of all Europeans, is ineradicable. I suppose it would have to be negotiated with the Sultan, and I have already tried to impress on the Porte... that the insult of his late behaviour is levelled as much at the Sultan, through Mukhtar, as it is at ourselves through our officers", and he asked Cromer to consider, with Kitchener, the necessary arrangement in case of another outbreak by 'Abbās.¹ At the same time the threat of setting the British press on 'Abbās was fulfilled, probably with a view to frighten him, as he was known to be sensitive on this point, and to prepare for his deposition if necessary.

The British press was furious. The main theme was that 'Abbās had exhausted the patience of his guardians. The Egyptian army was represented as being highly efficient, thanks to the efforts of the British officers. All the officers, British

¹F.O. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, No. 133 secret, 26 January 1894.
and Egyptian, were angry at the Khedive's remarks. His action was described as irresponsible, boyishly petulant, and impetuous, and he was represented as a youthful oriental ruler who lacked elementary wisdom, and who should be taught something for his peace. The threat of deposition was stressed clearly.¹ Punch represented 'Abbas as a manikin in uniform, shouting hysterically at some Sudanese soldiers, with two British officers smiling discreetly behind the line.² Even the arrangements for referring the complaints against British officers in the Egyptian service to the Officer Commanding the British forces, which were meant as a means of pressure at first, were established. The strong colour given by Kitchener and Wingate to the Incident helped Rosebery to do away with the opposition to his Egyptian policy in the Cabinet and adopt a strong line.

It seems that this strong colour is the reason why Cromer strongly pressed that 'Abbas should not make public his version

¹ *The Times*, 23, 25, 27, January 1894; the *Morning Post*, 24, 27 January 1894. Cocheris mentioned that the idea was to replace 'Abbas by his brother Muhammad 'Ali. See Cocheris, *op. cit.*, p.259.

² *Punch*, 3 February 1894.
of the Incident. 1 'Abbas found no other means of doing so than by leaking it through a Syrian called 'Abd al-Malik, to the press. 2 When Cromer heard that the Khedive might try to contact persons in high position in Britain through 'Abd al-Malik, he wrote to Rosebery to warn him against the latter's activities, and sent him a further letter, disparaging the man's character. This was to show to anybody 'Abd al-Malik might try to contact. 3 Cromer's information, if true, shows another effort of 'Abbas to gain direct contact with British authorities in London.

In these circumstances, 'Abbas kept quiet to let the storm pass, and spoke again of his intention to visit Britain.

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1 F.C. 78/4574, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 24 conf., 2 February 1894, and encl.
2 Ibid., Cromer to Rosebery, No. 30 conf., 18 February 1894, and encls.
3 F.C. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, Nos. 201, 202, 18 February 1894.
Chapter II
GENERAL POLICY AND TACTICS

Part I
General Policy

After the Frontier Incident 'Abbas and Cromer began to assess the situation, each of them counting his gains and losses, examining the means at his disposal, and contemplating his future policy accordingly.

Cromer had gained much. He felt that he was strongly supported by the British government, especially after Rosebery's accession to power. He was delighted at the failure of 'Abbas to get any substantial support from Turkey or other European powers. But he had a discontented and sulky Khedive, the attitude of the Legislative Council irritated him and resistance in the administration worried him. He thought that the Council's hostility should be checked, and began to minimize it in his annual reports. His opinion about the Khedive's real attitude varied according to the political barometer, but it was unfavourable all the time. After the Frontier Incident he said that 'Abbas was as hostile as ever, and continued till April 1894 to hint at the possibility of his deposition.¹ Cromer thought that the

¹F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 203 private, 25 February 1894; same to same, No. 211 private, 20 April 1894.
Khedive's entourage was very hostile, and gave him the worst advice. In May he said that he did not lose hope of working with the Khedive, but the obstacle was the entourage. However, in June 1894 he returned to the old tone, saying that 'Abbas was very hostile, extremely deceitful, and a capable intriguer. Then late in 1894, and early in 1895, he came to the conclusion that 'Abbas and his friends, having lost hope of getting any efficient help from abroad, and finding that the British meant to have their own way, had found out that they had better manage to get on with them, though they were not in the least friendly. To Cromer 'Abbas was then a boy, irresponsible, very bad and incorrigible, who would never run really straight, and who could - like most orientals - be frightened into behaving well. In 1896 he said that he included 'Abbas in the more ignorant and foolish portion of the population. Some British high officials in Egypt, such as Wingate, Dawkins, Kitchener and Rodd, held the same views.

1 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 215 private, 18 May 1894.
2 Ibid., Cromer to Kimberley, No. 219 private, 9 June 1894.
4 F.O. 633/8, Cromer to Barrington, 13 April 1896.
5 W.P.P., box 257, Wingate to Fairholme, private, 10 February, and Wingate to Milner, private, 12 February 1894; M.P.P., box (cont.)
They were consequently shared by Rosebery, Kimberley, and Salisbury.¹

This estimate of the Khedive, and the general situation, together with the fact that the British garrison had to be small for financial reasons, had serious effect on Cromer's policy towards 'Abbas and the nationalist movement. Whenever a line of action was taken it must be followed, with no retreat whatever happened, until the British came out victorious. Whenever an incident took place, the reparation or the punishment must be effected immediately and on the spot. Briefly, British prestige must be maintained at all costs. It was the policy of giving lessons and intimidation, not of conciliation and compromise based on efforts to understand the other point of view.

A strong and firm line, with the aim of tightening British grip and crushing opposition, was consequently to be followed. British control of the administration was to be strengthened and completed by increasing the Anglo-Egyptian officials and giving them more authority. What remained of the Khedive's authority was to be undermined. He had been forced to agree to previous consultation before nominating his ministers, but three other steps remained. First to induce him actually to consult with Cromer before dismissing

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¹F.O. 633/7, Kimberley to Cromer, No. 146 private, 20 April 1894.
his ministers. During the negotiations for the settlement of the Ministerial Crisis Cromer tried to extract from ‘Abbās an engagement on these lines. Although he failed, this was in fact implied in the final agreement they reached, but clear confirmation was needed. The second step was to seek the appointment of submissive ministers, and the third was to force ‘Abbās to follow Ismā‘īl Pasha’s Rescript of 28 August 1879, by which the Khedive was to follow his ministers’ advice. In ‘Abbās’s case it was British advice. Briefly, the target was to transfer authority completely to Cromer through dummy ministers, who were to work as buffers between him and ‘Abbās.

The Khedive, in his turn, found that he had lost much to Cromer: the obligation to consult in important matters, the official ratification of the attendance of British high officials in the Council of Ministers, the removal of Māhir from the War Office, and a loss of prestige in the army and among his people. The threat of deposition frightened him. He learnt the dangers of an open resistance, and perceived the strong support on which Cromer could count. He feared

that his actions would be watched carefully and any false step would offer a chance to destroy the remains of his authority, or even to depose him. The Khedive's policy towards the British, then, was that of conciliation and cautious and secret resistance. He tried to keep what ground he still held, avoiding the creation of any serious crisis. Besides the reasons mentioned above, this policy was a result of the weak support 'Abbas received, or expected to receive, either from within, or from abroad. In his memoirs, he said that it was essential to make the Egyptians aware of their right to independence, to make Europe more interested in the liberation movement in Egypt, and to obtain support and guidance from foreign political quarters." This shows the two main trends in his policy: trying to win foreign support, and helping to arouse the nationalist movement.

Seeking European support

'Abbas understood the international character of the Egyptian question. Egypt's position, in spite of the Occupation, was regulated by the London Convention of 1840 and the imperial

firmans, and Britain was acting as the delegate of Europe in occupying Egypt until order was restored. At first he thought that he could emancipate Egypt by the help of Turkey and Europe, but he soon learnt that any support from them could not be strong enough to erase the British peril, but it might defer it, at least for some time until a favourable change of circumstances. So, ‘Abbas tried to get whatever help he could raise from France, Austria, Germany and Italy. He could not get much help from Italy, and said that the French Consul-General, de Reverseaux, helped him and gave him valuable advice. He helped ‘Abbas through the French Secret Committee for the Independence of Egypt to raise patriotic feeling in the country and to propagate her cause in France. The growing friendship between Germany and Turkey, and the gradual estrangement between the former and Britain, gave ‘Abbas a false hope of German help. He continued also his efforts to win support in Britain against Cromer’s policy, especially after what he considered

2 Ibid., 8 May 1951.
3 Ibid., 10 May 1951; Shafiq, Mudhakkiratī, part 2, section 1, pp. 269-70.
5 Supra, pp. 51, 53; infra, pp. 141-42.
as misrepresentation of his behaviour in the Frontier Incident by Kitchener and Cromer to the Foreign Office. For the same purpose, he began to show more friendliness towards some Anglo-Egyptian officials, such as Palmer, Scott, and Settle, and towards other members of the Agency. This attitude towards Britain is the policy which triumphed in the end, and contributed to Cromer's resignation.

Relations between 'Abbas and the Sultan

The Sultan was always advising 'Abbas to resist the Occupation. 'Abbas thought that the Khedive and the Sultan should unite at least against British encroachment, and the French and Russian Consuls-General often interfered to achieve that end. But real co-operation was difficult where suspicion and clashing interests existed. Internationally, the Sultan had not much power to influence Egyptian affairs, but he could be an important factor if he secured strong French and Russian support. He could not drive the British out of Egypt, but he could prevent further deterioration in her status to a protectorate. Internally the Sultan was a force to reckon with. It is

1 W.P.P., box 257, Wingate to Milner, 12 March 1894; M.P.P., box 12, Dawkins to Milner, 21 July 1895.

true that the Egyptians were jealous of their autonomy and disliked any return of direct Turkish authority. But as Caliph, and as head of the most powerful Muslim state from which help was expected against foreign occupation, the Sultan had the sympathy of the majority of the population, the Muslims. The Turkish High Commissioner in Egypt, Ghāzi Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha, and the Turkish inspired papers, were actively trying to strengthen feelings of loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph, even to the extent of attacking the Khedive if necessary.1

The Sultan was taking every opportunity to undo the work of Mūhammad ʿAlī and Ismaʿīl, and to reassert Ottoman power and suzerainty more firmly, as we have seen in the Firman and Sinai Incident in 1892. This is why the Sultan, internationally, was not the good ally to the Khedive and the Egyptians against the Occupation that he might have been. His influence internally was feared and resisted, and his efforts to settle the Egyptian question, though welcomed, were feared, and his intentions were rightly suspected. If the Sultan had asked Britain to evacuate Egypt,

1 F.O. 141/373, Lansdowne to Cromer, No.124, 1 July 1903, and enclosures about attacks on the Khedive by al-Sūdān, al-Tamthīl, al-Mirṣaq, and al-ʿAjaʿib.
it was mainly to have a chance to step in. When he saw a chance to get a convention signed in 1894, he proposed an article providing for joint measures with Britain against those who attack his sovereign rights in Egypt. This meant attacks from within Egypt, and from without. 1 When he failed, he began to ask for a share in the occupation by Turkish troops, or Turkish officers. 2

At that weak point Britain, which was anxious to prevent co-operation between the two sides, worked hard to separate them. In London and Constantinople the British kept telling the Sultan that the Egyptians were becoming affected by nationalism, giving the example of 'Urâbî, that the British had no leanings towards the independence of Egypt, or towards diminishing the connections which existed between her and Turkey, and that so long as they were in occupation of the country the Sultan's existing prerogatives would not be retrenched. 3 He was told also that if the British troops were withdrawn, the small Turkish ruling class would probably disappear soon after.


2Infra, p. 103, and footnote 2.

He was further told of some suspicious steps alleged to have been taken by 'Abbas which might show that the Khedive was intriguing against him for the caliphate and for influence in Arabia.¹

In Cairo, Anglophile papers were telling the Egyptians that the Sultan would do nothing to alter the status quo in Egypt. By the Occupation, his suzerainty was guaranteed against a hostile revolution in Egypt, and he would not suffer from any internal or external threats there.² Cromer told the Khedive that he could go anywhere in Europe without permission from the Sultan.³ He was threatened with the possibility of an agreement between Britain and the Sultan at his expense, if he continued his hostilities.⁴ Later 'Abbas was shown, confidentially, the Sultan's suggestions in 1896 about the government of Suakin. The Sultan had suggested a convention by which the administration of that area should revert to him, that it should be garrisoned by Turkish troops under British officers in his pay, and that


²Al-Mu'ayyad, 2 November 1897; al-Muqattam, 10 August 1892.


a British political agent (also in his pay) might be appointed to control the administration. \(^1\) Briefly, another Egypt with 'Abbas's authority and Egyptian troops excluded. In 1900, the Khedive was informed, through Ahmad Shafiq, the head of his European Bureau, that the Sultan had expressed himself ready to send Turkish officers to replace the Egyptian officers who had mutinied in the Sudan, and to send Turkish troops to replace any British troops which might be sent from Egypt to South Africa. \(^2\)

This helped to maintain the deep suspicion between 'Abbas and the Sultan which had developed since the Firman and Sinai Incident in 1892. But suspicion always existed between khedives and sultans, particularly about the caliphate, and domination in the Arab world.

'Abbas Hülmî I was thought to be aspiring to the caliphate. \(^3\) It is also probable that Isma'il Pasha subsidized papers, in Naples and London, which denounced the usurpation by the Ottoman sultans of the title or caliph, and propagated the idea


\(^2\) Shafîq, Muhakkirât, part 2, section 1, p. 327. This was what the British Ambassador at the Porte told Shafîq. But the Turkish proposal in fact was to raise in Egypt new troops to replace the British garrison. Those troops should be officered by Turkish and British officers. See F.O. 407/155, O'Conor to Salisbury, tel. No. 9 conf., 13 Feb. 1900.

\(^3\) Hekèkyan Papers, Add. MS. 37454, ff. 359-60, despatches on 20 July, 1894.
that the khedives of Egypt were more worthy of it.¹

There is evidence that the propaganda for an Egyptian, or Arab, caliph was continued in the time of 'Abbās Hilmi II, who encouraged it.² Some of his friends, and his enemies in Egypt mentioned openly that he aspired to the caliphate.³

This is not mere allegation in view of the fact that 'Abbās tried to have the name of the Caliph omitted from the Friday prayer in Egypt and, when he failed, he had it omitted in the Palace mosque.⁴ At the same time the Khedive tried to strengthen his influence in other Arab countries. Emissaries came and went between him and the Hijāz, and Ibn al-Rashīd in Najd. This infuriated the Sultan.⁵ In 1902 and 1903 there were agitations in Tripoli for annexation to Egypt, and a khedivial partisan was promoting it, and trying to get the signatures of the notables there for this purpose.⁶


³ His aspiration was mentioned in the derogatory poem with which al-Manfalūṭī received him on his return to Cairo in November 1897. (cont.)
It is unlikely that ‘Abbas was trying to break down the Ottoman Empire, and to establish an Arab empire or caliphate, for which he did not have the means. He understood the discontent with the Ottoman administration among some Arabs and their aspiration for an Arab caliphate, and since the Armenian crisis in 1895 he saw the possibility of a partition of the Ottoman Empire. It is likely, then, that ‘Abbas wanted to ride the wave, and prepare himself for the future. By gaining for himself prestige and influence in Arab countries, he was making himself indispensable to Britain, or any other power, to whose share these countries might fall. At the same time this policy was useful as a means of pressure on the Sultan, but it increased his suspicion.

The relations between ‘Abbas and ‘Abd al-‘amīd were actually a struggle. Several means were used, besides the threat of an Arab caliphate: the Young Turks, the island of Thasos, the

(cont.) In an ode published in al-Mu’ayyad of 27 November 1901, the poet Aḥmad al-Kašīf, who was devoted to ‘Abbas, advised him to call the people to the caliphate, thus "uniting the spiritual and the temporal in the right path". See F.O. 78/4864, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 145, 19 November 1897, and encls.

4 Blunt, Diaries, part 1, p.272; F.O. 78/4864, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 132, secret, 12 October 1897.
5 F.O. 78/4864, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 132 secret, 12 October, and No. 135 secret, 23 October 1897; F.O. 141/350, Wratitzlaw (Consul in Basra) to O’Conor, No. 53 conf., 30 November 1899, encl. in Salisbury to Cromer, No. 7 conf., 12 January 1900.

6 F.O. 78/5227, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 101 secret, 7 July 1902; F.O. 107/604, same to same, No.70 secret, 3 June1903, encl. in Lansdowne to Bertie, No. 145, 24 June 1903.
Khedive's visit to Constantinople, and the Sultan's prerogatives. This often gave Cromer a chance to interfere and subjugate 'Abbas more and more to his influence. If we follow 'Abbas's relations with 'Abd al-YNAMId we find several examples.

The clash between 'Abbas and the Sultan at his accession made him remain friendly with Cromer. His friendly relations with the Sultan in 1893, 1894 enabled 'Abbas to try to resist British domination openly. After his clash with the Sultan in 1895,1 'Abbas took a more conciliatory attitude towards Cromer. His antagonism towards the Sultan after that clash put him more in the hands of Cromer. When the Sultan in January 1896 asked that Murad Bey, the Young Turk leader who went to Cairo in 1896 and published the Mizan, should be sent to Constantinople, 'Abbas was glad to hide behind the British advice to refuse the Sultan's request.2 He continued to help the Young Turks in Egypt and appointed some of them, including their leader, Ahmad Rashid Bey, in his palace. They were encouraged by his protection and attacked two editors of the Sultan's organ al-Nil, detaining one of them for more than two days in the Khedive's palace. For this 'Abbas got a snub from

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1 The clash was mainly due to the Sultan's refusal to allow 'Abbas to visit Thasos, and the latter's policy of helping the Young Turks. See infra, pp. 199-200.

Cromer, who obliged him to dismiss Rashid Bey, told him that he would not be supported if the Sultan took any step against him, and reported the incident and his disapproval to Constantinople. When French and Russian help was offered to conciliate the Sultan over this incident, 'Abbas was told that, to side with them, would be the very way to make Britain and the Sultan come to terms.

This, together with his critical position when the reconquest of the Sudan was announced, and his fear that the Sultan might reach an agreement with Britain, made 'Abbas start a policy of conciliation with the Sultan. The Graeco-Turkish war in 1897 gave him a chance to show his sympathies by subscribing to, and encouraging the collection of, funds to help the Turkish army, and by encouraging the expression of friendly feelings towards the Sultan. This resulted in demonstrations on the anniversary of the Sultan's accession in the end of August 1897 and a threat by Rennell Rodd, acting for Cromer, to take "more radical measures".

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1 F.O. 78/4762, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 74 conf., 6 June 1896.
3 F.O. 78/4866, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 43, 16 March 1897; Shafiq, Mudnakkirati, part 2, section I, p. 241.
4 F.O. 78/4864, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 116 conf., 4 September 1897. By the radical measures he meant despatching British troops to the provinces at the cost of the local authorities.
By the end of 1897 he started a campaign against Young Turks and Ottomans hostile to the Sultan, using his influence to suppress their societies, buy off their newspapers, and to persuade them to go to Constantinople. The most remarkable of these manoeuvres was that of tempting Dāmād Jalāl al-Dīn Māḥmūd Pasha, brother in law of the Sultan, and his two sons, to go to Egypt in 1900, and then pressing them hard to go to Constantinople.1 They were liberal leaders fighting ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd’s despotism. But ‘Abbās was not always consistent in this policy.

In his efforts to please the Sultan he suffered two very serious clashes with Cromer. The first was the Leon Fahmi affair in 1901, in which ‘Abbās was actually interrogated by a British officer working in the Ministry of the Interior, and his Palace was about to be searched. That incident was so serious and alarming to ‘Abbās that, according to his Second Master of Ceremonies’ story told to Harry Boyle, he had a nervous attack, and changed all his arrangements to visit Europe and went straight to Constantinople, to see the Sultan.2 The second

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1 F.C. 73/5090, Rodd to Salisbury, tels. No. 101, 17 September, and No. 104, and private, 25 September 1900. Several other examples can be found in Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section I, pp. 268, 269, 299, 328, 353–360, 362, 365–67. The Khedive’s activities against the Young Turks were affected by his policy towards the Sultan, not just a retaliation against Murād’s behaviour towards ‘Abbās as stated in Ramsaur, E.E.Jr., The Young Turks, prelude to the revolution of 1908, Princeton, 1957, p. 39 and footnote No. 68.

2 In 1901 Leon Fahmi was detained in the Khedive’s Palace in Alexandria to be sent to Constantinople, according to the
clash was in 1902 when 'Abbas tried to get, from the 'Uthmaniyya Printing-House, where the Young Turk paper Kanun-i Essasi used to be printed, certain papers compromising the Young Turks, to give to the Sultan. Cromer interfered; he ordered the police to break the seals of the tribunal affixed to the place and took the papers to the Agency. Besides protecting the Young Turks, he hoped to find something compromising 'Abbas.  

Cromer's policy in protecting the Young Turks, besides helping them against the Sultan in general, was to eliminate the Sultan's prestige and influence in Egypt at a time when the Sultan was winning sympathy because of the pressure put on him by European Christian powers during the Armenian and Cretan questions and the Graeco-Turkish war. At the same time pan-Islamism was gaining ground in Egypt, and was being used as a weapon against occupation by a Christian power.  

(continues) Sultan's demands. Cromer knew of this and sent an Anglo-Egyptian official who interrogated the Khedive about the incident. 'Abbas denied that the man was in his palace, and Leon was put on board a ship sailing to Europe. See F.O. 78/5156, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 81 secret, 1 July 1901; F.O. 78/5159, Hohler to Lansdowne, tel. No. 65, 7 July 1901; F.O. 78/5367, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 121 secret, 5 November 1904, and encl. memorandum by H. Boyle; Cromer, Abbas II, pp. 77-79; Shafiq, Mudhakkirat, part 2, section 1, p. 368. 

1 F.O. 78/5230, Cromer to Lansdowne, tel. No. 42, 11 April 1902; F.O. 78/5226, same to same, No. 59. conf., 14 April 1902. See also Shafiq, Mudhakkirat, part 2, section 1, pp. 394-395; Cromer, Abbas II, p. 79.  

2 Besides the Young Turk papers incident above mentioned, Cromer interfered in January 1896 to prevent Murad Bey being expelled (continues)
He wanted also to damage the Khedive's prestige and popularity in Egypt, by letting the Young Turks, and others, under cover of a free press, abuse him in their papers, thus making him look powerless before the Egyptians. Cromer wanted to gain influence and prestige for himself and his country among the Egyptians as the real power in Egypt, and "the protectors of security, justice and freedom", as al-Muqattam said. He further thought that this policy would put an end to spurious patriotism expressed by Egyptians who were afraid that they would not be protected if they expressed an anti-nationalist feelings. This made Cromer sensitive to the relations between 'Abbās and the Young Turks, and to any cooperation between the Khedive and the Sultan.

(cont.) from Egypt. See F.O. 78/4761, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 13, 31 January 1896. When the Sultan wanted in 1901 to deliver, through the Egyptian government, an ultimatum to the Turkish refugees in Egypt to return to Turkey, Cromer interfered to prevent it. See F.O. 78/5159, Cromer to Lansdowne, tel. No. 26, 24 March 1901; F.O. 407/157, Lansdowne to O'Conor, tel. No. 24, 25 March 1901.


1Al-Muqattam, 12 April 1902. For Cromer's policy towards the Young Turks see S.PP., vol. 109/5, Cromer to Barrington, private, 30 January 1896.
Since the clash of 1895, Thasos island was always behind the Khedive's policy towards the Sultan. In 1901 there were negotiations between 'Abbās and the Sultan in which the Khedive hoped to get a mining concession in Thasos, a palace on the Bosphorus, and an estate in Anatolia, as a reward for the surrender of the Young Turks.

It seems that two things happened after 1895. First, the interests of the waqf began to clash with the interests of the inhabitants. Secondly, the Sultan, since the raids in Macedonia in 1896 and the Graeco-Turkish war, had realized the strategic importance of Cavalla and Thasos for his communications with Macedonia, and had become afraid of the frequent raids.

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1 Thasos is an island off the shores of Cavalla in Greece. Most of its income was given to Muhammad 'Ali Pasha by the Sultan as waqf. In his turn the former made that income, together with the income of Kafr al-Shaykh estate in the Delta, a waqf to be spent on a school and other charitable institutions in Cavalla, his birth place. On the death of Isma'il Pasha, 'Abbās became trustee of the waqf. The sultans retained the customs, leaving the administration of the island to the mudirs (managers) of the waqf appointed by the khedives. See 'Abdin Archives, Turkish section, box 535; there is an Arabic translation of the document; F.O. 407/159, A. Biliotti (Consul-General at Salonica) to O'Connor, 8 May, encl. in O'Connor to Lansdowne, No. 216, 10 May 1902; Sa'id Pasha, Said Pagānīn Hātirātī, vol. II, İstanbul, 1328 A.H. (1910), pp. 361-363.


3 'Abdin Archives, Arabic section, box 130, file 2/2,3; Shāfiq, Muddakhkhirātī, part 2, section I, pp. 395, 396. The clash was mainly over the rights of wood-cutting, over the damage done by the inhabitants' goats to the trees, and over taxes levied on goats.
movements of British warships near the island;\(^1\) so he decided to take back the administration of Thasos. The \textit{wali} of Salonica and the \textit{kaimakan} of Cavalla played on the discontent of the people.\(^2\) Riots broke out in April 1902, and some people were killed. The Turkish government took the chance to take over the administration completely, leaving nothing to the Khedive but the collection of the \textit{waqf} revenue. The Khedive, who was still hoping to go to Thasos and build a house there, and who had been negotiating to have the mining concession in the island, faced the possibility of losing everything. The Turkish point of view was that the Khedive had the ownership (\textit{malikane}), not the sovereignty (\textit{idare-i mülkiye}) so he had no right to complain, while ‘Abbās thought that about ninety years of actual khedivial administration gave him the right to keep the \textit{status quo}. Each side stuck to its view and negotiations failed.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Langer, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 355, 372. For the movements of British and Russian warships see \textit{Abdīn Archives, Arabic section, box 130, file No. 2/3; F.O. 141/366, Lansdowne to Findlay, No. 111, 28 June 1902, and encl; Al-Mu’ayyad, 29 September 1895.\(^2\) \textit{Abdīn Archives, Arabic section, box 130, file No. 2/3, 3; F.O. 407/159, Vice-Consul Picchiolet at Cavalla to acting Consul-General Shipley at Salonica, No. 22, 29 May 1902; Shipley to O’Conor, No. 92, 1 June 1902.\(^3\) Shafīq, \textit{Mudhakkirāt\textbar\textbar}, part 2, section I, pp. 396-403; Sa’Id Pasha, \textit{op.cit.}, Vol. 2, pp. 361-363; F.O. 407/159, A. Biliotti to O’Conor, 8 May 1902, encl. in O’Conor to Lansdowne, No. 216, 10 May 1902; \textit{ibid.}, de Bunsen to Lansdowne, 22 July 1902; \textit{ibid.}, Findlay to Lansdowne, No. 113 conf., 5 August 1902; F.O. 141/366, O’Conor to Lansdowne, No. 461, 21 October 1902.\(^4\)
The Thasos problem shows another kind of reaction on the part of Cromer and the British government to the relations between 'Abbas and the Sultan. The British Ambassador in Constantinople encouraged 'Abbas to guard his rights in the island. Cromer most probably hinted to the Khedive, or to Mustafa Fahmi, that British help would be forthcoming if he wanted. In May 1902 Cromer even consulted O'Connor, the Ambassador in Constantinople, on the advisability of sending a warship to Thasos. O'Connor and Lansdowne thought that, for political and other reasons, there was some advantage in asserting Egyptian rights and establishing a lien over the island, on condition that 'Abbas would ask for British help. But 'Abbas did not ask for help. Although he spoke to Cromer, Corst, and Wingate about his intention to do so the following year, he never did. It could have alienated the Sultan completely.

(cont.) 1902, encl. in Lansdowne to Cromer, No. 209, 31 October 1902.

1 Shafiq, MudhakkiratI, part 2, section I, pp. 397-399, 401-403, 411-412; F.O. 407/159, Cromer to Lansdowne, tels. No. 53 and 54, 11 and 12 May 1902; F.O. 78/5230, Cromer to Lansdowne, tel. No. 79, 16 October 1902, and Lansdowne's minute on it. Later, on 29 November 1907, the Tribune mentioned the importance of Thasos to Britain saying that it was on the way to Constantinople, controlling the entrance to Cavalla, which might be as important as Salonica one day, and which was in the part of Macedonia where British officers were organizing the police force. The paper mentioned the mining concessions which the Germans had secured in Thasos and the importance of the establishment of a German naval station there.
There are two other examples following the same pattern. The first is the affair of the Grand Qādī of Cairo. According to an agreement between Ismā'īl Pasha and the Sultan in March 1876 the Khedive secured for himself the right to designate a Deputy Grand Qādī, resident in Cairo, who would be appointed by the Sultan, and for this the Khedive would pay three thousand Ottoman pounds a year to the annually appointed Grand Qādī resident at Constantinople. Both positions were filled by Turks. When the Deputy Grand Qādī in Cairo was seriously ill in October 1900, 'Abbas intended, in the event of his death, to submit to the Sultan the name of an Egyptian as successor. He contacted Cromer to know the support he could get, but he was discouraged. So, on the Qādī's death in January 1901, 'Abbas submitted to the Sultan the names of two Turks, but the Sultan appointed another person, against the agreement of March 1876. Strong British interference failed to help 'Abbas. This did not mean, as Cromer said, that 'Abbas was trying to shake off one of the last vestiges of Turkish control in Egypt,² as the Egyptian Grand

1 'Abdîn Archives, Turkish section, box 529, file Mısır Qâdi avrâkî, tel. from the Sublime Porte, 4 Şafar 1293 (2 February 1876).

² F.O. 78/5088, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 170 conf., 18 October 1900; F.O. 78/5159, Cromer to Lansdowne, tel. No. 15, 18 February 1901; F.O. 407/157, O'Conor to Lansdowne, No. 74, 20 February 1901, and encl. Probably the Khedive's action was mainly to have a more obedient Egyptian qādî.
Qādi would still have been nominated by the Sultan. In fact, 'Abbas resisted the pressure put on him in 1899 by Cromer and the Egyptian ministers to dismiss the Grand Qādi and appoint an Egyptian, when the former strongly opposed new regulations drawn up for the mahkama sharīyya (the Muslim religious courts) by the Judicial Adviser. 'Abbas, then, maintained that appointing the Grand Qādi was the Sultan's prerogative.¹

The second example is the Khedive's visits to Constantinople and Europe. According to tradition, 'Abbas had to obtain the Sultan's invitation to visit Constantinople, and his permission to visit other parts of the Ottoman Empire. To visit Europe, 'Abbas used to obtain permission from the Sultan, who used to give it on condition that the Khedive would not meet kings or politicians, or occupy himself with politics.

'Abbas conformed with these obligations as long as he was in good relations with the Sultan. But after 1895 he became anxious to be free of restrictions on his visits to Europe. This gave Cromer a chance, since the cancellation of an obligation towards the Sultan with British help meant the establishment of an obligation towards Britain. In 1896, when 'Abbas was anxious to go away during the summer, but

¹Sharaīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section I, pp. 279-280; al-Muṣayyad, May and June 1899.
afraid that the Sultan might take strong measures against him, Cromer told him that he could go anywhere he liked in Europe without asking the Sultan's leave, and that, so long as the British had no strong ground for complaint, he need not fear deposition.

Cromer expected that the Khedive's new attitude would offend the Sultan and thought that this would be "rather advantageous", and would prevent the Khedive and the Sultan from plotting mischief against us. The British Ambassador in Constantinople used nearly the same language to Ahmad Shafiq in 1899 as that used by Cromer to 'Abbas in 1896. The result was that 'Abbas had the courage to visit London in 1900, 1903 and 1905. He paid a visit to the Austrian Emperor when he visited Vienna in 1899. In the same year, when the Khedive's relations with the Sultan were at their worst stage, 'Abbas was invited to go with his family to Cyprus for the summer. He used the invitation at first to force the Sultan to allow his family to go to Rhodes, but when the Sultan ordered him to leave Rhodes and

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2Shafiq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section I, pp. 309-312.
go back to Egypt at once, he went to Cyprus, where he was received with the utmost consideration and courtesy. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, was even prepared to authorize the grant of a suitable site free of cost to the Khedive to build a residence there.1

The Khedive's behaviour was a snub to the Sultan. The following year 'Abbas paid an official visit to London and refused the Sultan's invitation to visit Constantinople on his way back.2 But on other occasions 'Abbas was keen to secure an invitation, especially when his relations with Cromer were tense. He even tried to appear as if it was he who did not want to go, when he could not get an invitation, so that the British would not know that he was completely at their mercy.3

All this shows the policy of Cromer, which was to separate 'Abbas from the Sultan and win him to the British side. But the Khedive saw the trap. He mainly followed a policy of conciliation towards the Sultan after 1896. Although

1 F.O. 78/5026, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 150, 13 July 1899; F.O. 141/341, O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 341 conf., 28 July 1899, encl. in F.O. to Rodd, No. 165 conf., 11 August 1899; Salisbury to Cromer, Nos. 252 and 255, 1 December 1899; F.O. 78/5024, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 137, 13 October 1899.


it failed to benefit him in the affair of Thasos, he continued to follow it, as in the Tāba incident in 1906, when he secretly sided with the Sultan. This is due to several reasons. Although ‘Abbās became less hostile towards the Occupation after 1898, he continued to detest Cromer’s domination, and did not wish to put himself completely in his hands. ‘Abbās wanted to gain more independence from the Sultan, even with British help, but he wanted also to keep a minimum of the Sultan’s suzerainty as a shield against British hostility, against a British protectorate over Egypt, and as a means of pleasing the Muslim majority in Egypt who sympathized with the Sultan-Caliph. At the same time ‘Abbās felt himself caught in Cromer’s web after the nomination of Muṣṭafa Fāhmi, with no authority left to look to in time of crisis except the Sultan.

‘Abbās’s conciliatory attitude towards the Sultan, in itself irritating to Cromer, meant an encouragement to pan-Islamism. This made his attitude more irritating and did not fail to draw sharp reactions from Cromer.

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1 *Infra, pp. 332–334.*

2 When he discussed the Thasos affair with Wingate in 1902, he told him that he feared that the British might encourage him against the Sultan and then leave him in the lurch. See Shafīq, Muhammad al-Shafīq, 3. **Shafīq, Mudhakkirāt al-Shafīq, part 2, section I, p.412.**
The nationalist movement

In his memoirs 'Abbas was very critical of the Egyptians. Describing the situation at his accession, he said that their nationalist feeling was immature, mixed with religious feeling, and suffering from the abortive 'Urabi revolution and the defeat at al-Tallal-Kabir. There was no disciplined organization or powerful press to foster a nationalist movement. He complained bitterly of the statesmen, the notables and the aristocracy for failing to support him, and even accused the latter of betraying secrets of nationalist activities to the British as a means of furthering their interests. 'Abbas further complained that the statesmen were timid and lacked fibre, and that he had to depend on himself and his alertness to avoid any false step which might shatter his hopes for the country.

'Abbas had more confidence, however, in the educated class, and in the masses—by which term he probably meant the masses in the towns—who had escaped degeneration and were imbued with the sacred fire of patriotism. His policy, then, was to co-operate with the educated class, to make the people aware of their merits—and their right to independence, and to make them work for the national unity.¹

¹ 'Abbas, "Memoirs", al-Misri, 6, 8 and 11 May 1951; Blunt, Diaries, part 1, p.206.
This is how the alliance between the Khedive and the
Nationalists against the Occupation originated. The Khed-
ive's help to the nationalist movement during its infancy
was so great that Ahmad Shafik considered him the founder
of the Patriotic Party, later formed by Mustafa Kamil.¹
He maintained this policy, in general, during Cromer's
period in Egypt.

Cromer reacted in different ways, but the main line
was to separate the extreme Nationalists from both the
Khedive and the moderates. He achieved this end before
Dinshaway, when the nationalist movement was divided into
three factions: Mustafa Kamil's group, the Khedive's group,
and Muhammad 'Abduh's group.

Each of the two opponents used different means to
achieve his ends, and to gain influence and popularity.

Part II

Tactics

The propaganda machine of 'Abbas and the emergence of
Mustafa Kamil

Constant efforts to win support in Egypt and abroad,
especially through the press, were the main features of the

¹Chafik, L'Egypte moderne, p. 172.
the struggle. The Khedive's first efforts in Europe were in Britain, through Blunt and Francis Adams, after the Ministerial Crisis of January 1893. In France 'Abbas worked through several channels, including Henry-François Boucard, a Suez Canal vice-president, who tried to win support for 'Abbas. He met the French Prime Minister, other ministers, and high officials for that purpose. He started a press campaign in *Le Journal des Débats* and the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and published a booklet under a pen-name on Egypt's independence. The Khedive conferred the second class Osmanieh on him.

After the Frontier Incident Rouiller went to Vienna on leave to start a press campaign supporting 'Abbas. He met the Minister for Foreign Affairs Count Kálnoky and other high officials, and explained to them the Egyptian point of view on Egyptian affairs. He sent reports to 'Abbas and to Ahmad Shafiq, in which he pointed out that Europeans learnt about Egypt only from prejudiced reports, and suggested more efforts in the European press to explain and defend Egypt's

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1 Supra, pp. 52, 53.

2 The press campaign was carried in collaboration with two other French writers: Patinot and Gabriel Charmes. The latter was the correspondent of *Le Journal des Débats* in Egypt in 1881, before the Occupation. See Shafiq, *Mudhakkirati*, part 2, section 1, pp. 69-70, 135-138, 175.
These activities were the prelude to more organized work by a secret committee formed to defend Egypt against the British by writing under pen-names in French papers, in Egypt and France, and by talks in Egypt and Europe. It was formed of highly educated Egyptians, some of them members of the Khedive's household, and of Europeans, mainly French. The sources give no indication of the date when it was formed. Shafiq wrote about its formation in his memoirs for 1895, and said that 'Abbas formed it in agreement with Musṭafā Kāmil. The latter wrote to a friend on 4 February 1895 that, although he had been registered as a lawyer, he would not take any case, and that if his hopes were realized, the fatherland would be saved. It is probable that the committee was formed before that date, early in 1895. In his memoirs, 'Abbas called it the French Secret Committee for the Independence of Egypt, and said that Yusuf Siddiq was the only Egyptian member.

This question of membership, date of formation, and previous activities of the European element, makes it more

1Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 132-134.
2Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 190-192.
For the members see infra, p. 124, footnote No. 1.
probable that two secret committees existed. In fact
'Abbas helped in forming several secret committees in
that period. We know of two others: one formed by Mahir
Pacha among the army officers before the Frontier Incident,
and the other formed with the help of Mustafa Kamil in
1896, of which Lu'fi al-Sayyid was a member. The French
Secret Committee was formed first, either in 1893 after
the Ministerial Crisis, or early in 1894 before de Re-
verseaux left Egypt. Yusuf Siddiq was admitted because
of his close relations with the Europeans. He was the
only Egyptian member of the Committee of the Bourse of
Alexandria. Rouiller was the link between them and
'Abbas, and through the French Consul-General, de Re-
verseaux, they kept in contact with official France. This
Committee managed to obtain the help of Havas News Agency.
They even succeeded in substituting a more sympathetic and
energetic agent in Cairo for the old one. They secured for
Egypt the support of some members of the French Parliament,
Francois Deloncle and Eugene Etienne in particular, who
later formed the Egyptian committee in the French Parliament.
It is probable that Deloncle's visit to Egypt in 1895 was
arranged by the French Committee.

Other activities were exerted in Egypt outside the
French Committee, but late in 1894, the need was felt to
strengthen the propaganda machinery, and to establish some sort of co-ordination, after the Frontier Incident. The other large secret committee mentioned by Ahmad Shafiq was formed, probably early in 1895.¹ This was done by re-forming the old one, admitting more Egyptians into it.

The relation between 'Abbas and Mustafa began before 1895. Shaykh 'Ali al-Laythi, the poet, introduced him to the Khedive in March 1892.² Mustafa greeted 'Abbas with a patriotic speech when he visited the School of Law in the same year. His name began to be known in 1893 by his contributions to al-Ahram and by the publication of his monthly magazine al-Madrasa. In the same year, his political energy and his political thought began to take shape. He made the acquaintance of 'Abd Allah Nadim, who influenced

¹Shafiq, Mudhakkirat, part 2, section 1, pp. 190-192;
²Rashad, Ahmad, Mustafa Kamil, hayatuh wa kifahuh, Cairo 1958, p.38.
him by what he said about the 'Urabi revolution, and the causes of its failure. He joined what was then known as the patriotic party (al-ḥizb al-waṭani) which gathered around Latif Pasha Salim, with al-Mu'ayyad as its organ. There he made the acquaintance of the leading members of the educated class, including Maḥmūd Pasha Shukri, head of the Khedive's Turkish Bureau. In August 1894 Muṣṭafā celebrated the anniversary of the Sultan's accession in Paris. He invited Deloncle, and sent a telegram to the Khedive, telling him of the event.

This energy could not have passed unnoticed by the Khedive, who was seeking allies against the Occupation, especially among the educated class. Over the extent of Muṣṭafā's dependence on the Khedive at this juncture, there are differences of opinion. Haykal said, in general terms, that 'Abbas helped Muṣṭafā to follow his study. Aḥmad Shafīq said that the Khedive supported Muṣṭafā's visit

1 Kāmil, 'Alī Fahmī, Muṣṭafā Kāmil fī arba'a wa-thalāthīn rabi'a part 1, Cairo, 1908, p.184.


3 Kāmil, 'Alī Fahmī, op. cit., part 2, pp. 133-134.

4 Haykal, Muḥammad Yūsuf, Tarajim miṣrīyya wa gharbiyya, Cairo, 1929, p.144.
to Toulouse, which does not necessarily mean financial help.¹

Al-Rāfi'ī and Ahmad Rashād said that it was a brother who helped Muṣṭafā, but they differed about the name.² In interviews with al-Rāfi'ī and with Ḥasan ʿUsānī, Muṣṭafā Kāmil's brother, both said that it was Muṣṭafā's elder brother, ʿUsāyn Waṣīf, who helped him.³ The fact that ʿUsāyn Waṣīf went with Muṣṭafā to Italy in his first journey to France, that Muṣṭafā said that he was happy at his success in the last examination only because it would please his brother, ʿUsāyn, and that the latter wrote to him after that examination asking him to stay in Paris for some time to restore his failing health,⁴ makes it more probable that it was ʿUsāyn Waṣīf who helped Muṣṭafā.

Shafiq said that when Muṣṭafā returned from France in December 1894 'Abbās helped him financially, used to meet him secretly in al-Tībrī mōsque near Qubba Palace, and that they undertook to liberate Egypt from the Occupation.⁵ He is sup-

¹Shafiq, Mudḥakkirātī, part 2, section 1, p.190.
²al-Rāfi'ī, Muṣṭafā Kāmil, p.22; Rashād, op.cit., p.49. Landau said that a relative helped Muṣṭafā, but he failed to identify which relative, and omitted to state his sources. See Landau, J. M., Parliaments and parties in Egypt, Tel-Aviv, 1953, p.107.
³The writer interviewed both separately in October 1963 in Cairo.
⁴Kāmil, 'Alī Fahmī, op.cit., part 2, pp. 46, 144, 145.
⁵Shafiq, Mudḥakkirātī, part 2, section 1, p.190.
ported by the fact that while in November 1894 Muṣṭafā intended to work as lawyer, by 4 February 1895 he had decided to take no case but his country's case.\(^1\) He began his campaign against the Occupation by two strongly worded contributions to al-Aḥrām. The second, on 28 January 1895, was his well known conversation with Colonel Baring, Cromer's brother.\(^2\)

So, early in 1895, the propaganda machine of ʻAbbas was complete. Its efficiency was made clear during the campaign which Muṣṭafā Kamīl waged in France in 1895. He was sent by order of the Khedive, who paid his expenses.\(^3\) ʻAbd al-Raḥīm Aḥmad was the medium of communication between Muṣṭafā and ʻAbbas. Muṣṭafā did not receive any programme; he was to be guided by Deloncle.\(^4\) The articles, interviews, and speeches delivered by Muṣṭafā were sent by him to al-Aḥrām or al-Muʻayyad.\(^5\) He, or Gavillot, sent them to Havas Agency and to Le Journal Égyptien.\(^6\)

\(^1\) al-Rāfīʻī, Muṣṭafā Kāmil, pp. 41-44.

\(^2\) For the conversation see Shāfīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, p.192-195.

\(^3\) Anīs, Muḥammad, Ṣafāḥāt maṭwiyya min tārīkh al-zaʻīm Muṣṭafā Kāmil, Caiρo, 1962, pp. 56, 57; Muṣṭafā to ʻAbd al-Raḥīm Aḥmad, 15 August 1895; ibid., p.77, report by Muṣṭafā to the Khedive, dated 19 September 1895.

\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 27-29, 31, 57; Muṣṭafā to Aḥmad, 8 June and 15 August 1895; Aḥmad to Muṣṭafā, 17 June 1895.

(cont.)
It was a successful campaign, during which Mustafa delivered four speeches in France, gave three interviews to journalists, wrote two articles and three letters, which were published, to Gladstone and Salisbury, and published a pamphlet on the dangers of the British Occupation. The pamphlet and some of his speeches were printed and sent to known politicians and papers in Europe. Mustafa visited Berlin and Vienna and thought of visiting St. Petersburg. He made the acquaintance of some politicians and journalists, the most important of them being Madame Juliette Adam, and the editors of the German Berliner Tageblatt and the Austrian Extrablatt. The main points which he made during the campaign were as follows: Britain was undermining French influence in Egypt, and was not acting according to her commitments to Egypt and Europe; the British Occupation threatened European interests in Egypt; the British were making the Egyptians less capable of governing their country by filling offices with British, Levantines, and incompetent Egyptians; British policy tended to tighten their

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6 Anis, op.cit., pp. 37, 39, Mustafa to Abmad, 27 June, 6 July 1895.
grip on the country and to further their own interests; the Egyptians were capable of managing their own affairs and paying their debts; they were ready to accept international control; the Egyptians were not fanatics; Britain was hostile to the Sultan and to Islam; she raised the Armenian question to distract attention from the Egyptian question. Muṣṭafā sent articles, from Paris and Vienna, to al-Muʿayyad and al-Aḥrām attacking the Occupation, and blaming the Egyptians for their timidity and their failure to make Europe aware of their hatred of the Occupation.¹

This same campaign showed the defects of the organization. The Egyptian and French members did not work smoothly together. Deloncle wanted Muṣṭafā to work as his Arabic secretary, following whatever instructions or advice he gave.² He was annoyed when Muṣṭafā took an independent line, contacted Frenchmen from different parties, and began to have his own separate prestige. The difference was on personal grounds, and on grounds of principle too. Muṣṭafā thought that a Frenchman would always defend French interests in

¹Kamil, 'Alī Fahmī, op. cit., part 3, p. 53 to part 4, p. 80; Rashād, op. cit., pp. 61-68; al-Rafiʿī, Muṣṭafā Kamīl, pp. 47-64.
²Shafīq, Mudhakkīrātī, part 2, section 1, p. 203.
Egypt, that the French were not real friends and, like the British, were after their own interests, that it would be politic to try to secure their help, but the cause of Egypt would be more effectively defended by Egyptians.¹ Deloncle complained to his countrymen in the Committee and began to obstruct Muṣṭafā’s work.² At the same time it seems that the strong language which Muṣṭafā used in his campaign, and his criticism of French policy in Egypt in *Le Journal* of 2 July 1895, might have embarrassed the French government at a time when they were not happy at the drift of Russia towards the Berlin orbit, and were trying to reach an agreement with Britain on Egypt and the Upper Nile. Deloncle and the French members in the Committee pressed for the return of Muṣṭafā. ‘Abbas was not ready to sacrifice French help for Muṣṭafā’s sake, although he resisted the pressure for some time.³ But he could not resist any longer when this pressure was coupled with strong British pressure.

¹ Anīs, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70, Muṣṭafā to Ṭāh, 18 September 1895. This showed that Muṣṭafā was not a French tool, as Waliyy al-Dīn Yakan and others said. See Yakan, *Walīyy al-Dīn, al-Maʿlūm, wa l-maḥfūl*, part 1, Cairo, 1909, p. 25.

² Anīs, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 31, 50, Ṭāh to Muṣṭafā, 17 June, Muṣṭafā to Ṭāh, 4 August 1895.

The British suspected that Muṣṭafā was sent by 'Abbās. They treated his brother ʿAlī Fāḥmī Kamīl badly, and refused to allow him to be transferred from the army to the khedivial guard. They pressed for a stop to Muṣṭafā's activities. ¹

When Cromer returned from leave in 1895, 'Abbās was not in a position to resist. The failure of his visit to Constantinople in the same year, the weakness of the Sultan before the powers in the Armenian question, and his wish to change Nubār's ministry forced him to give way in October 1895. He ordered Muṣṭafā, through Gavillot, to return² and stopped sending him money to meet his expenses.³ However, Muṣṭafā did not return then, and continued his activities.

When Muṣṭafā did return in January 1896, it seems he wanted to explain his policy to 'Abbās, to reach some agreement as to their future relations, and to go back to Europe. He threatened to go back and to work independently when 'Abbās was slow to give him a private audience.⁴ This problem was

¹ Anīs, op. cit., pp. 80, 86-87, Muṣṭafā to 'Abbās, 19 September 1895, and 16 January 1896.
² Ibid., pp. 86-87, Muṣṭafā to 'Abbās, 16 January 1896.
³ Ibid., pp. 65, 71, Muṣṭafā to Aḥmad, 14 and 18 September 1895.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 90-93, Muṣṭafā to Aḥmad, 25 January, 11 & 19 February 1896.
soon settled, and Muṣṭafā returned to Europe and received more help from ‘Abbās. But he tried to be less dependent on the Khedive. Other people were willing to help Muṣṭafā financially. Muḥammad Farīd was one of them. In 1898 Muṣṭafā asked Farīd for money and did not ask ‘Abbās when he met him in Paris, although his tours in Europe were proving expensive. This shows the nature of the relation between the two men. Muṣṭafā maintained his independence although he received the Khedive’s help. His main object was to secure the evacuation, and he was ready to co-operate with whoever worked against the Occupation.

What happened to the Committee after the difference between its Egyptian and French members is not clear. It is probable that the European members remained in it, and continued their activities up to Fashoda. Some of the Egyptian members probably joined a new secret committee, or patriotic party (hizb waṣāni) as Luṭfī called it, formed by ‘Abbās and Muṣṭafā in 1896. It was composed of Luṭfī al-Sayyid, Muṣṭafā Kamīl, and some of his friends. In 1897 Luṭfī

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1 Farīd, Muḥammad, Memoirs, book 1, p.2.
2 Anis, op. cit., p.53, Muṣṭafā to Ahmād, 9 August 1895.
3 Farīd, Muḥammad, Correspondence, file 2, Muṣṭafā to Farīd, 22 July and 5 August 1896. For the parts omitted in al-Ḳāfī ḵalq compare the second letter with what is in al-Ḳāfī ḵalq, Muṣṭafā Kamīl, p.338.
4 Shafīq, Mudhakkīrātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 272, 288.
was sent to Geneva on behalf of this Committee to obtain Swiss nationality, to enjoy the protection of a capitulatory power, and to edit an Anglophobe paper when he returned. The project failed because the Sultan refused his approval to the matter of nationality, and Luṭfī did not co-operate with 'Abbas when he returned.

The press-war

This mission of Luṭfī shows the importance of the press in the struggle. It was a weapon which 'Abbas used freely against the Occupation. It was also used by the Nationalists, the British, the French, and the Turks. The press-war which took place contributed to the rapid development of Egyptian journalism. The Arabic papers and magazines published in Cairo and Alexandria during a period of twelve years from 1892 to 1903 were ten times as numerous as those published between 1880 and 1891 (495 to 49). The circulation also greatly increased, judging by the increase in the number printed of al-Muʿayyad, and in the number of newspapers posted in Egypt. The effect of this progress was much

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1 Other members were Muhammad Farīd, Labīb Moḥarram, Muḥammad ʿUthman, and Sayyid al-Shīrī, an A.D.C. of 'Abbas. See al-Sayyid, Aḥmad Luṭfī, Qīsṣat hayātī, Kitāb al-Rāḥil, No. 131, February 1962, pp. 35, 36.

2 See the list of papers' titles in Tārzāt, op. cit., part 4, pp. 160–312. In 1892 Fraser Rae stated that 48 papers and magazines in different languages were published in Egypt. (cont.)
increased by the fact that the illiterate fellahaen used
to gather around the literate villagers who read the papers
to them. The result was a real political awakening, and
a growing nationalist movement, which itself helped ‘Abbas to
resist the Occupation. It took his place in this resistance,
and attacked him, when he followed a policy of submission
towards the Occupation.

This rapid development of journalism could not have
been achieved without a degree of press freedom, which did
not exist under the Press Law of 21 November 1881. This law
allowed the Minister of the Interior to confiscate, suspend,
or suppress any paper on the third offence, if it had been
warned twice for previous offences. It empowered the Council
of Ministers to inflict these penalties even if the paper had
not been previously warned.

(continuation)

3 Al-Mu’ayyad used to print 800 copies in 1889, 4000 in 1895,
6000 in 1896, and 8000 after that year. See Hartmann, M., The
Arabic press of Egypt, London, 1899, p.12; Zakhura, op.cit.,
part 3, pp. 542, 3; Tarrazili, op.cit., part 3, p.38. In 1897
Edward Dicey said that during the previous fifteen years the
number of newspapers posted in Egypt increased from two to seven
millions. See Dicey, E., "Egypt, 1881 to 1897", F.R., new series,
vol. LXIII, 1898, p.694.

1 Gibbons, H. A., "Egypt under the last of the Khedives", in his
The new map of Africa (1900-1916), a history of European colonial

2 For the Press Law see ‘Abduh, Ibrahim, Tjawwur al-sahafa
The capitulations enabled foreign papers in Egypt to enjoy freedom, especially after the Le Bosphore Égyptien incident in 1885. The last effort to intimidate foreign papers was in 1894, when Italy was pressed to expel Pietro Guarieri, the Italian editor of Le Journal Égyptien for violent attacks on the Occupation, but he was soon replaced by the more hostile French editor Isaac Picard.

It was a different matter with the Egyptian papers against which the Press Law was applied up to August 1896. (cont.)

(1) That French paper was very hostile towards the Occupation and Nubar's ministry. In 1885 it published a translation of a proclamation by the Mahdi in the Sudan challenging the Egyptian and Ottoman governments and inciting revolution against them. When the paper was suppressed and its printing-house closed, a serious political crisis followed. The French government considered the action as infringing the privileges enjoyed under the capitulations, and threatened to sever relations with Egypt, together with other measures. The printing-house was consequently re-opened, and Nubar officially apologised. See 'Abduh, Ibrahim, op.cit.., pp. 145, 146. For full details see al-Shinnawi, 'Abd al-'Aziz, "Hadith jarīdat al-Busfur Ijibsayn", al-Majalla al-Tarikhiyya al-Miqriyya, vols. IX, X, 1960-1962, pp. 117-215.

2 F.C. 78/4576, Rodd to Kimberley, No. 120 conf., 19 August, and No. 133, 15 September 1894.

3 Al-Mu'ayyad was warned in February 1892 and September 1894, and al-Ustadh was warned in March and May 1893. Al-Munir and al-Waqt were suppressed in August 1896. See al-Mu'ayyad, 22 February 1892, and 8 September 1894; F.C. 78/4765, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 111 conf., 24 August 1896.
Some of them, al-Ahrām and al-Falāḥ for instance, learnt their lesson and sought the protection of a capitulatory power. This, together with other reasons, inclined Cromer to ignore the Press Law, although it was not cancelled, and instead to apply the Penal Code of 13 November 1883. As he told Grey in 1906, he was sure that if he ordered a paper to be suppressed or its editor exiled, it would reappear under the editorship of a foreigner, or its printing-press would be established in the house of a foreigner.

Among other reasons which made Cromer change his policy towards the press were its increasing circulation, and its growing influence on public opinion. But more important was the fact that Cromer gradually acquired more means to take an increasingly vigorous share in the press-war. Many factors helped him. Many Young Turks, and other discontented with the rule of ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, went to Egypt and established their papers. They were always critical of the Sultan, and of the Khedive when he joined ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd against them. In this way they helped to undermine the Sultan’s and the Khedive’s prestige in Egypt. For this reason Cromer gave

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1 F.O. 407/169, Memorandum by Lord Cromer on the present situation in Egypt, 8 September 1906.
them, and their papers, the protection they needed against
expulsion or suppression, and they repaid in furthering
British interests. One of these papers, al-Muqattam, became
an important Arabic organ of the Occupation. It was "ex-
clusively paid by the English".

The Egyptian Gazette, which was regarded as the semi-
official journal of the Occupation, was subsidized by the
British Agency. It is probable that other organs were also
subsidized. The result was political control from the Agency.
In 1896 £300 of the secret service money at Cromer's disposal
was mainly assigned to newspapers.

1 Muhammad Bey Murad and Salim Sarkis, and their papers Mizan
and al-Mushir respectively, received that protection. Other
papers of the same tendency were: Lisan al-'Arab, Baghir al-
Sharq, al-Nibras, Ijttihad, al-Indhar, and Juhayna. See
S.P.P., vol. 109/6, Cromer to Barrington, private, 30 January
1896; W.P.P., box 262, Wingate to Milner, 21 February 1896;
F.O. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 185, 28 June 1896;
Tarrai, op.cit., part 4, p. 219 footnote; Zakhura, op.cit.,
part 3, p. 251; Yakan, op.cit., part 1, pp. 66-71.

2 Other British organs in Arabic were: al-Tayims al-Migri and
al-Zaman (1882), al-Jarida al-Migriyya (1888), and al-Ra'y
al-Am (1893). Le Progres Egyptien (1893) in French, and The
Egyptian Gazette (1880) in English, were also British organs.
See Hartmann, op.cit., pp. 24, 46; Tarrai, op.cit., part 3,
pp. 21, 22, and part 4, p. 164; 'Attara, Qusayri Ilyas, Tarikh

3 Hartmann, op.cit., p. 11. See also al-Mu'ayyad, 3 October 1893,
and 31 July 1895.

4 F.O. 673/5, Cromer to Philip, No. 452 private, 31 December
1892; F.O. 673/8, same to same, 20 October 1896; Cromer to
Sanderson, private, 24 February 1898; Wood, H.F.W., Egypt
under the British, London, 1896, p. 118; Philip was the editor
of The Egyptian Gazette.
Cromer's growing control of the Egyptian administration gave him access to other means of helping the Anglophile papers, and fighting the anti-British press. Government advertisements, more access to sources of news, and protection against suppression or expulsion, helped the former. Al-Muqattam translated and published in Arabic Cromer's annual report. It printed also circulars and pamphlets of the Police Department, as the nationalist papers alleged, against regulations and at high prices. They even accused the Interior of pressing 'umdas and shaykhs of villages to subscribe to it.¹

Intimidation and temptation were exerted against the Anglophobe papers in different ways. Al-Mu'ayyad was not allowed the official news during 1891-1892.² Together with al-Ahram, it was again refused the news, and banned from the Sudan, during the Sudan campaign.³ Secret funds at the disposal of Baron de Malortie, the head of the Press Bureau, helped to persuade Nadim and to compensate him when he dis-

¹Al-Mu'ayyad, 27, 38 June, and 4, 7 July 1895. Al-Ahram, al-Watan and other papers joined in the attack.

²Tarrazi, op.cit., part 3, p.38.
³W.PP., box 261, Milhem Shakoor to Wingate, 8 May 1896; F.O. 78/4956, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 75, 20 May 1898.
continued al-Ustādh and left Egypt in 1893.¹ The extremely
Anglophobe French organ Le Bosphore Égyptien was bought out
in 1894, and turned into a moderate journal. The proprietor,
Octave Borelli, was satisfied when the Egyptian government,
under pressure of Cromer, offered him, for a sewage under-
taking in which he was the principal partner, a higher price
than it was really worth.² Isaac Picard, the Anglophobe
editor of Le Journal Égyptien, and Paul Campana, formerly sub-
editor of the Anglophobe Sphinx, were also tempted to cross
to the other side, and to publish in Paris an anti-colonial
Anglophile paper called La Presse Libre.³

Nevertheless, 'Abbas was in a better position in this
aspect of the struggle. He was at home among his people,
with his full prestige and influence as Khedive. He could
confer titles and decorations, which mattered much at that
time. He had his mother's and sister's money at his disposal,
and was trustee of some of the khedivial family waqfs. The

¹Supra, p. 55; M.P.P., box 10, M. Ratché to Milner, Conf., 24 July 1893.
²F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 228 private, 2 December
1894.
³S.P.P., vol. 108/12, Rodd to Barrington, 15 September 1895.
General Awqāf Department was also under his personal control. He did not fail to avail himself and his favourites of some of these finds. This helped him to win support in the press, and to have his organs.

Nationalist papers, such as al-Ustād, al-Mu’ayyad, al-Barq, al-Ahālī, and Muṣṭafā Kāmil’s papers afterwards, supported ‘Abbas. Al-Mu’ayyad in particular was his organ, as he stated in his memoirs. ‘Alī Yusuf, its editor-proprietor, was an agent of ‘Abbas, whom he served in financial and political matters, as well as in journalism. ‘Abbas established French papers to defend his cause. He was supported by French and French-inspired papers, such as al-Ahrām, Le Bosphore Égyptien, and Le Journal Égyptien. Turkish-inspired papers took his side, especially when he was in good relations with the Sultan. Among these papers we can count al-Munīr, al-Waqt, al-Sādiq, al-Mabrūsa, al-Falāḥ, and al-Salṭana. The editors of these papers received subsidies and decorations from the Sultan.

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1 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 240 private, 21 April 1895; Farid, Mémoires, book II, p.59.
3 He paid Eugène Clavel to establish Courier d’Orient in 1898. See Shafiq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 274, 275; ‘Abduh, Ibrahim, op.cit., p.297.
The press-war crossed the sea to Britain. Cromer was always anxious to have British public opinion on his side and used the British press for the purpose. Through it he used to pave the way before taking strong measures in Egypt. Reuters News Agency received an annual subvention of £1,000 from the Egyptian government. The Spectator was a faithful ally of Cromer, who also obtained the support of The Times through Valentine Chirol, its correspondent, and through Moberly Bell, its manager. Both were much interested in Egyptian affairs. To express his gratitude to The Times, Cromer pressed Kitchener very hard in 1898 to accept two correspondents of The Times to accompany the expedition in the Sudan. It was an exception which Kitchener had not allowed to other papers. ‘Abbas had his cause defended through his British supporters. Blunt was strong in defending the Khedive's and the Nationalists' cause by articles and pamphlets. Sometimes he wrote on the authority of the Khedive. Benjamin Mosley, an ex-judge in the Egyptian national courts, was the

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2 M.P.P., box 12, Dawkins to Milner, 18 February 1895. For the attitude of Moberly Bell and The Times in Egyptian affairs see Blunt, W.S., Mr. Blunt and The Times, London, 1907.

3 S.P.P., vol. 111/56, Rodd to Barrington, tel., 27 July 1898; vol. 113/78, Barrington to Rodd, tel. 30 July 1898.
the Khedive's adviser and agent in these affairs. He secured for him the help of some M.P.s and politicians. Some papers were sympathetic towards the Khedive's and the Nationalists' cause. The most important of them were the Manchester Guardian, and the Tribune.

Other means of popularity and influence

Another means of gaining popularity sometimes drew sharp response from Cromer when his relations with 'Abbas were strained. In November 1897 'Abbas paid a visit to the Delta provinces where he had a very warm reception. Immediately on his return to Cairo the Anglophile Aḥmad Fu'ād circulated a broadsheet containing a poem, abusing the Khedive, which began:

A return; I do not call it a happy one.

A reign; which will vanish in the long run.

The Khedive decided against Cromer's advise that the man should be prosecuted, and the case, known in the Arabic press as the Scurrility Case, was started. It transpired that Shaykh al-Bakrī was the author of the first verse, and that the rest were by Muṣṭafā Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī, a famous Egyptian writer. When the Prosecutor General, who was Egyptian, insisted upon

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1 Beaman, A.H., op.cit., p.20; 'Abbas, "Memoirs", al-Migrī, 10 May 1951; supra, pp.62. The Liberal M.P. John M. Robertson was among the politicians whose help Mosley secured.
searching al-Bakrī's house, against the wish of the Judicial Adviser, Cromer forced 'Abbās to appoint a British Prosecutor General. In this way he slighted 'Abbās, gained al-Bakrī's loyalty, and secured another important post for the British. When the Khedive visited the Buḥayra Province in October 1898, a shadow was cast on the visit from the start, as the madīr was accused of forcing the people to pay for the decorations made on that occasion, and was prosecuted.

Religion and its servants, both Egyptians and foreigners, were used in the struggle for influence and popularity—to propitiate Islamic feelings, and ultimately to mould public opinion. Cromer used to visit the ulema of importance on Islamic occasions. He had friendly relations with some of them: Muḥammad Tawfīq al-Bakrī, 'Abd al-Khāliq al-Gādār, Muḥammad Bayram, Muḥammad 'Abduh, and some rectors of al-Azhar for instance. He helped some of them, even against the Khedive,

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1 F.O. 78/4864, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 145, 19 November 1897; al-Mu‘ayyad, 4-23 November 1897. See also infra, pp.244-245.
2 Al-Mu‘ayyad, 20, 27 October, 5 November 1898.
3 Boyle, Clara, A servant of the empire, a memoir of Harry Boyle, London, 1938, pp. 42, 43.
4 Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, pp. 175, 177, 178, 180, 181.
when they were in trouble. But Abbās was in a stronger position. He conferred robes of honour, and controlled the waqf funds which provided for allowances to be given to the mosques and to the ulama. He was the Muslim ruler, second to the Caliph.

The struggle can be best shown by the relations between Muhammad 'Abduh and both 'Abbās and Cromer. At first 'Abduh was on good relations with 'Abbās, who helped him in carrying out a part of his scheme to reform al-Azhar in 1895. According to Blunt, 'Abduh sometimes led the Friday prayer in the Qubba mosque in 1896, omitting to mention the Sultan's name. 'Abbās used to consult him on important matters, as in the Leon Fahmi affair in 1901. But it seems that the Khedive's attitude towards 'Abduh began to change after 1897, when he was angry with

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1 Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, footnote pp. 180, 181. Bayram published an Anglophile paper called al-A 'lam in 1884. When it was discontinued in 1889, he was appointed judge in the national courts. A son of his was appointed private secretary to the Financial Adviser, then he became sub-governor of Cairo. His death in 1899 was considered by Harry Boyle, Cromer's Oriental Secretary, an irreparable political loss. The family was from Tunisia. See Bayram, Muhammad, Safwat al-i 'tibar bi-mustawda' al-amār wa l-aqīf, part 5, Cairo, 1311 (1893-1894), pp. 130-131. Boyle, Clara, op. cit., p. 76. Cromer also helped al-Bakri against 'Abbās in the Scurrility Case. Supra, p. 142-143.

2 Rida, Muhammad Rashid, Tarikh al-ustadh al-imam, al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh, part 1, Cairo, 1350 A.H., p. 561. As the Muslim ruler, and deputy of the Sultan, 'Abbās was general trustee of the waqfs and the Awqaf Department was under his direct control.

3 Blunt, Diaries, part 1, p. 272. (cont.)
Luṭfī al-Sayyid for fraternising very much with 'Abduh in Switzerland.¹ When the Rector of al-Azhar, Shaykh Ḥassūna al-Nawārī, was dismissed in 1899, 'Abduh hoped to take his place. At that time the Rector was also the Grand Muftī of Egypt. To 'Abduh's disappointment the two posts were separated and he was appointed muftī only. When the new Rector died a month later, another shaykh was appointed,² and 'Abduh was more disappointed. This change of attitude had several reasons. As a member of al-Azhar Council (formed in 1895 to organize the reforms) 'Abduh began to obstruct the Khedive's efforts to use the waqf funds for al-Azhar to further his own ends and to gain the loyalty of the ulama, thus undermining the Khedive's influence. The law reforming al-Azhar gave its Council the right to redirect any monthly or annual allowance or robe of honour, set free by the death of its holder, to the ulama they chose. 'Abduh managed to make the Council practice this right against the will of 'Abbas and the Awqaf Department. He even refused to allow

(continuation)

¹Suṣra, p.108; Riqa, Tarikh, part 1, p.579.
²Miṣna, Ahmad, Zu'amā' al-īṣlah, fi'l 'āṣr al-ḥadīth, Cairo, 1948, p.325.
a robe of honour to be given to the Khedive’s own imam.¹

In 1897 al-Azhar Council got a verdict against the Awqaf Department to pay Zawiyat al-‘Imyan funds held from it for years. To overcome difficulties and to have the verdict properly executed ‘Abduh sought the help of Cromer and the Judicial Adviser.²

The friendly relations between ‘Abduh and Cromer annoyed ‘Abbas.³ These started when ‘Abduh returned from the exile imposed after the ‘Urabī revolution and submitted to Baring a project to reform education, hoping to be appointed a teacher, or even headmaster, to a higher school.⁴ In 1896 ‘Abduh submitted to ‘Abbas a report on the then needed reform of the mahkama shar‘iyya, but nothing was done. When the Judicial Adviser in 1897 thought of introducing some new regulations for the mahkama, ‘Abduh drew his attention to that report for his guidance.⁵ ‘Abbas probably thought that

¹Riṣā, Tarīkh, part 1, pp. 432-35, 484-36, 573.
²Ibid., pp. 466-67. Zawiyat al-‘Imyan was a part of al-Azhar where the blind students lived.
³Ibid., p. 575, Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 2, p.35.
⁴Riṣā, Tarīkh, part 1, pp. 419, 892.
⁵Ibid., pp. 609-610, 622.
'Abduh was forcing his hand. In 1899 Cromer considered substituting an Egyptian judge for the Turkish Grand Qādi of Cairo, who opposed the new regulations for the mahkama. 'Abbās resisted Cromer's pressure. At that time the press mentioned 'Abduh as a probable nominee, which could not have pleased 'Abbās. Cromer sometimes used to consult 'Abduh on government affairs. He gave him a letter of recommendation to the British Ambassador when he visited Constantinople in 1901.

By his friendship with Cromer 'Abduh hoped, as Riǧā said, to get British help to carry out his reforms and to escape khedivial tyranny. He agreed with the British view that the powers of the Khedive should be restricted. In January 1896 he said to Blunt that 'Abbās should not be trusted with power, and that "the Ministry should be independent of him as far as possible, and supported by some sort of Constitution...... The ministers ought to be irremovable as long as they have the support of the Chamber of Deputies". He talked to his friends in this sense, and it could not have failed to reach 'Abbās. In his mouthpiece, al-Manār of 7 June 1902 'Abduh wrote - under the pen-name Muʿarrikh

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1 Al-Muʿayyad, 31 May 1899.
2 Shafiq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, p.379.
3 Riǧā, Tarīkh, part1, pp. 575, 891-92.
4 Blunt, Diaries, part 1, pp. 263- 64.
that is, historian - an article on the occasion of the centenary of Muḥammad ‘Alī coming to power in Egypt. He attacked Muḥammad ‘Alī’s policy and tyranny. In May 1904, after the Entente Cordiale, ‘Abduh wrote to Blunt saying that if the khediviate stayed in the family of Muḥammad ‘Alī the Khedive should have no authority at all to interfere in the administration.\(^1\) It was no wonder that the Khedive saw in ‘Abduh an anti-khedivial tool, used by Cromer to undermine his authority in the Awqāf Department and in al-Azhar; two very important institutions until then left completely under his control. ‘Abbās consulting ‘Abduh on Leon Fahmi affair in 1901 did not mean friendly relations as, in 1900, he appointed as rector for al-Azhar Shaykh Salīm al-Bishrī who began to obstruct ‘Abduh’s reforms, and in 1901 ‘Abbās was angry with Aḥmad Shafīq for the help he gave to ‘Abduh when he was in trouble with the police in Constantinople.\(^2\)

‘Abduh’s power to obstruct the Khedive’s spoliation of the waqf funds became more effective when he was appointed muftī in 1899, and consequently became a member of the Higher

\(^1\)Blunt, Secret history, p.625.

\(^2\)Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 377-82.
Council for the Awqaf. The tension in their relations grew, and consequently 'Abduh became more reliant on Cromer's support. A vicious circle developed, and in the end hostilities became open after two major clashes in 1903. The first was over a robe of honour which 'Abbas ordered the Rector of al-Azhar to give to the Khedive's own imam, and 'Abduh influenced his fellow members of al-Azhar Council to give it to another shaykh, according to regulations. The second was the Mushtuhur affair, which caused 'Abbas a loss of fifty thousand pounds. Mushtuhur was an estate of 'Abbas which he wanted to exchange for waqf land on the Giza-side of Cairo. He wanted the Awqaf Department to pay thirty thousand pounds as difference in value. When the deal was discussed in the Higher Council for the Awqaf, 'Abduh influenced the members to refer it to experts to assess the value of each area. The result was that the Awqaf Department received £20,000 difference.

The Khedive could have dismissed 'Abduh, but Cromer interfered in January 1904, telling 'Abbas that he would not allow the Mufti to be dismissed. ‘Abbas tried to induce 'Abduh to

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1 That Council was formed in 1895 under Cromer's pressure to prevent the Khedive's spoliation of the waqf funds. See infra, pp. 152-3.

2 Rida, Tarikh, part 1, p. 573; Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 2, pp. 54-55.

3 Rida, Tarikh, part 1, pp. 497-8, 562; Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 2, pp. 45-46.

4 Rida, Tarikh, part 1, p. 564; Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 2, p. 39.
resign. He instigated some ulema of al-Azhar against him, and tried to make some members of al-Azhar Council resign to enable him to appoint more loyal and stronger people in their place. He instigated a strong press-campaign against 'Abduh. Finally, 'Abduh and two of his supporters resigned their membership of al-Azhar Council in March 1904. But 'Abduh remained mufti until he died in July 1905. 'Abbas reproached Ahmad Shafiq bitterly for attending the funeral.

On the Christian side the struggle was as active. Part of it was between the British and the French. The latter were running the whole Catholic machinery in Egypt, religious and educational, on Anglophobe lines. Their influence was predominant in the Vatican. In 1895 the Catholic Archbishop became very ill and was about to be replaced. Cromer wrote to Kimberley asking him to intimate to the Vatican the importance of appointing someone who would be friendly to Britain. The Vatican promised not to name an Anglophobe. Cromer followed different tactics with the Egyptians. Muslim papers had always been critical of

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2Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 2, pp. 71-73.
3F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 231 private, 12 January 1895; F.O. 633/7, Kimberley to Cromer, No. 157 private, 25 January 1895; No. 158 private, 1 February 1895.
the activities of British missionaries who were not over scrupulous. Pamphlets were distributed in 1893 in al-Azhar propagating Christianity. In 1895 missionaries attacked Islam in their pamphlets and the ulema of al-Azhar protested.¹ When the reconquest of the Sudan began in 1896 missionaries increased their activities in Egypt and tried to extend it to the Sudan. In 1899 they preached Christianity in the streets, and some of them went so far as to preach inside a mosque in Tanṭa. A tract entitled "Which of them, Christ or Mohamed?" was sent by mail to the ʿumās, the ulema, and the head of al-Azhar. Tracts derogatory to Islam were again distributed in 1903, and a monthly missionary review Bashāʿir al-Salām (precursors of peace) published an article so grossly insulting to Islam and the Prophet Muḥammad that the Legislative Council asked the government to prosecute the editor, and a deputation of the members went to Cromer for this purpose. Cromer saw the danger of providing ʿAbbās and the nationalist movement

¹Al-Muʿayyad, 27 May 1894 and 15 April 1895.
with a means of rallying Islamic opinion. His irritation was so strong that he asked permission to have the missionaries responsible prosecuted. In this he failed, but he succeeded in restricting their activities in the Sudan.¹

Cromer's support of Muhammad 'Abduh in resisting the Khedive's application of the waqf funds was one side of a policy of depriving 'Abbas of means of strengthening his influence, winning support, and helping the nationalist movement. In 1895 the Higher Council for the Awqaf was established under Cromer's pressure. Its membership included the Mufti, the head of the

¹Cromer to Salisbury: F.O. 78/5026, tel. No. 112, 26 May 1899; F.O. 78/5086, No. 81 conf., 27 April, No. 91, 12 May, and encl. No. 97 conf., 26 May 1900, and encl.; F.O. 407/155, No. 36, 21 February 1900; Salisbury to Cromer; F.O. 78/5025, tel. No. 71, 31 May 1899. For the protests of Muslim papers see al-Mu'ayyad, 27 May 1894, 15 April 1895, 16 November 1896, 27 November 1898, 30 April 1900; al-Liwa', 2, 23, 24, April 1900, 10-12 April 1901, 2, 4, 16 April 1904.
Khedive's Arabic Bureau, and a Muslim member representing al-
each of the Domains and al-Da'ira /Sanîyya administrations.
The Council had the right to approve the expenditure of the
Awqaf Department. At the same time a system of audit and
control of its accounts was established by the Ministry of
Finance. But the Department continued to be under the
personal control of 'Abbâs, and he continued to use the funds
for his own ends. In his memoirs for 1913 Muḥammad Farīd said
that 'Abbâs took thirty thousand pounds to pay back a loan
to a bank, and that this was why Kitchener caused the Depart-
ment to be put under a minister. In 1897 'Abbâs sent some
of his bodyguard to the island of Thasos to keep order and to
secure the execution of a contract. The ship conveying them was
captured by a Greek warship. When 'Abbâs asked for British
help, Cromer did not recommend any effective help, saying that
this would deprive him of some money.

Titles and decorations were another means to strengthen
loyalty and to get money to spend on Anglophobe propaganda.

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1 F.O. 78/4669, Rodd to Kimberley, No. 96, 22 July 1895; Riğâ,
Tarîkh, part 1, p. 571; al-Mu'ayyad, 25 June and 1 July 1895.


3 F.O. 78/4863, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 77 conf., 26 May 1897.
At that time there was war between Turkey and Greece. For
Thasos, see supra, p. 111.
Abbas had agents for the trade in titles and decorations. Alī Yusuf, Muṣṭafā Kamil, Ibrahīm Bey al-Muwaylahī, and the poet Aḥmad Shawqī Bey were among them. Cromer complained to the Foreign Office, and sometimes obliged Abbas to cancel what he had conferred. In 1906, Abbas was deprived of the initiative in conferring titles and decorations, and could do this only according to government recommendations.¹

¹Infra, p. 374.
Chapter III

CAUTIOUS RESISTANCE

1. Conciliation and Secret Resistance

The Khedive was frightened and discouraged by the developments of the Frontier Incident, and the threat of deposition in the British press. The immediate issues for him were how to conciliate the British, to keep his prestige in Egypt by putting all the blame on the ministers, and to get rid of them. He accepted Kitchener's nominee, the Armenian Edward Zuhrab Pasha, to replace Mahir Pasha in the War Office. He also expressed to Palmer and other British officials his intention to accept the Queen's invitation to visit London.¹

Turning Riyāḍ out

'Abbas thought that Riyāḍ had co-operated with him in resisting the Occupation and then left him in the lurch, that the situation was not as grave as Riyāḍ had told him, and that it could have ended in a better way had Riyāḍ stood by him, thus saving him unnecessary humiliation.² He thought

¹ F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery, tel. No. 365, 27 February 1894.
² Shafīq, Mudbakkirātī, part 2, section 1, p. 138.
that Riyaḍ was weak, that his patriotism was empty verbiage, and that he should be changed. He expressed his lack of confidence in the ministers by showing less interest in work, and keeping away from Cairo; going to Alexandria, or for a long trip in the desert. Meanwhile, French and Palace organs, especially al-Ahram and Le Journal Égyptien, waged a strong campaign against the ministry, and against the usurpation of the Khedive's authority. Al-Ahram said that because of the ministry's behaviour, the army had come to regard the Sirdar as the only military authority, and Cromer as the only civilian and political authority in Egypt, and advised the ministers to resign. The attack continued till late in March 1894, after Kimberley had asked Cromer to express to 'Abbās his unhappiness at the articles which had appeared in Le Journal Égyptien "which has the reputation of receiving its information direct from the Palace..." "

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2 Al-Ahram, 29 January 1894.
3 F.C. 633/7, Kimberley to Cromer, tel. No. 372, 14 March 1894.
On 25 February Cromer, during his first audience with 'Abbas after the Frontier Incident, understood that he wanted to change his ministers. He told him that a return to the regime of personal rule was undesirable, and reminded him of Ismā'īl Fāsha's Rescript of August 1879, by which he was bound. Cromer thought that the British could not let the ministry fall because the ministers had followed British advice in the Frontier Incident. A change of ministry at that time would look as a triumph for 'Abbas, and would strengthen his power over the ministers. Cromer said that it was a good thing to have a ministry that would fall by its own weight the first time he withdrew his support. He even thought that the question of deposing 'Abbas would be forced upon them on the next serious clash, and that it should not be impossible to force the Sultan to accept it.

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1 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 203 private, 25 February 1894. When Kimberley came to the Foreign Office he instructed Cromer to avoid complete split with 'Abbas, then Currie, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, sent privately to Kimberley and Cromer, explaining the difficulty of removing 'Abbas. See F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 378, 22 March, and Kimberley to Cromer, No. 145 private, 30 March 1894; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 209 private, 8 April 1894.
These warnings, and the fear of a clash with Cromer under threat of deposition, made 'Abbas approach his end indirectly. During an interview on 3 March with Chiral, The Times special correspondent, 'Abbas expressed his wish to change his ministers.¹ Through Comanos Pasha, his private doctor, he sought the help of his cousin, Princess Nazli Fa'il, who was a great friend of the British, for the same purpose.² In an article sent from Cairo on 8 March to The Times Chiral attacked the ministers severely. He said that they should share the responsibility of the Frontier Incident with 'Abbas, that the Khedive wanted to get rid of them, and that they had - by Cromer's support - been retained in office long enough for their service during the Incident. He thought that they would not be allowed to draw upon it any longer.³ But Cromer was not moved, and Kimberley instructed him to let it transpire to 'Abbas that a change of ministry "is extremely objectionable", and that "another conflict might have most serious

¹ F.O. 533/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 369, 4 March 1894.
² Comanos, op.cit., pp. 77, 78.
³ The Times, 23 March 1894.
consequences".

But a ministerial change was expected on 2 April 1894. It seems that Riyāḍ smelt in Chirol's article an agreement between 'Abbāṣ and the British to get rid of him. On 2 April he expressed to the Khedive his wish to resign if he wanted a change of ministers. On the same day the Palace mouthpiece, Le Journal Égyptien, came out with a list of ministers headed by Maglīum Pasha. Because of the British warning, 'Abbāṣ expressed to Riyāḍ his confidence in his ministers, but he was still determined to change them. The Egyptian Gazette of 2 April found the episode a chance to say that "His Highness will be reminded that his acceptance of the present Premier's resignation is subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government of his proposed successor". It was a hint, from the British mouthpiece, which made 'Abbāṣ think of a minister acceptable to the British.

'Abbāṣ invited Nubar to lunch on 5 April, and received

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1 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 382, 31 March, and Kimberley to Cromer, tel. No. 383, 1 April 1894.

2 The Times, 3 April 1894; The Egyptian Gazette, 2 April 1894; F.O. 407/126, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 47, 2 April 1894.
him in private audience on 7 April. On the same day, 7 April, Cromer wrote to Kimberley saying that he was given to understand that 'Abbas would accept Nubar Pasha, with Muṣṭafā Fāhmi as one of the ministers, and a tightening of British hold over the Interior. It is probable that Cromer received this information from Nubar, either directly or through Gorst, who was a friend of Nubar, and was advising Cromer to allow the Khedive to change his ministry. But it is doubtful that it precisely represented the Khedive's opinion, as he offered some resistance later.

Cromer was ready to accept the arrangement for several reasons. 'Abbas would not look victorious, as the conciliatory character of the ministry would be clear. Cromer began to understand the difficulty of maintaining the ministers in office any longer against the Khedive's wish. Their position would be more damaged, and any conflict with 'Abbas might raise the issue of deposition, while

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1 The Egyptian Gazette, 9 April 1894.
2 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 386, 7 April 1894.
3 M.FP., box 11, Gorst to Milner, private, 14 April 1894.
4 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 386, 7 April 1894.
the international situation was unfavourable.\textsuperscript{1} The Germans had begun to show hostility towards Britain in colonial affairs, an attitude which became clear by their Protocol with France of February-March 1894.\textsuperscript{2} Cromer and Kimberley wanted to have a British under-secretary for the Interior appointed as part of the bargain, but the international situation made them prepared to accept Nubar and Muṣṭafā Fahmi only.\textsuperscript{3}

Flirtations between 'Abbas and Nubar, and between the latter and the British Agency, made Riyāḍ smell a rat, and his tense relations with 'Abbas made him offer his resignation on 14 April. 'Abbas called Cromer for consultation according to his undertaking after the Ministerial Crisis. Cromer advised him to accept the resignation. By this he was feeling his way to secure a new right, which was really implied in the settlement of the Ministerial Crisis, to be consulted before a ministry's resignation could be accepted. Cromer proposed Nubar or Muṣṭafā Fahmi, and 'Abbas proposed

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\textsuperscript{1}F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 209 private, 8 April 1894.


\textsuperscript{3}F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 362, 13 April 1894, and Kimberley to Cromer, tels. Nos. 393 and 394, 13 April 1894.
Fakhrī or Mazlūm, but in the end the Khedive accepted Nubar. Cromer insisted that Muḥammad Fāhmi should be minister "in order that the Khedive should publicly show a conciliatory spirit", and certainly to strengthen the position of the Anglophiles. The Khedive resisted, but presently agreed, and gained an equivalent point by appointing Fakhrī Pasha as well. Cromer agreed with Nubar to let the question of appointing a British high official in the Interior rest for some time, in order not to discredit the ministry from the beginning.¹

A submissive ministry and a helpless Khedive —

the reorganisation of the Interior

Nubar's ministry was supposed to be one of conciliation. He told de Reverseaux that the situation had faced the British with two alternatives only: evacuation, or a protectorate over Egypt. To prevent the latter alternative, and help them to change their strong policy, he would follow a friendly attitude towards them, and persuade the Khedive to do likewise.² But neither 'Abbas nor Cromer was

¹F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tels. No. 396, 14 April, and No. 398, 15 April 1894; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 211 private, 20 April 1894; F.O. 407/126, same to same, tels. No. 58, 14 April, and No. 60, 15 April 1894; Blunt, Diaries, part I, p.169.
²D.D.F., tome XI, No. 96.
always inspired with a conciliatory spirit, and there were ups and downs in their relations from the beginning. ‘Abbās accepted Nubar, who was known to be against British administrative domination since his previous ministry, hoping that he would offer some resistance to British encroachment. But he was doomed to disappointment. Nubar followed a policy of submission to the Occupation, and ‘Abbās sometimes had to resist, with consequent clashes.

When ‘Abbās was obliged to accept Mustafā Fahmī as minister, Le Journal Égyptien attacked Mustafā severely on 16 April, calling him a master in shamelessness and villainy. It received, at the demand of Cromer, an official warning on 18 April. This was a useless action, as the paper enjoyed the protection of the capitulations, but it was meant to strip it of any prestige acquired by posing as the organ of the Palace, and to show ‘Abbās as being unable to protect it. These two first minor clashes drew an indirect threat of deposition from Chirol in The Times of 17 April 1894, and Cromer wrote to Kimberley saying that ‘Abbās was as hostile as ever, and that a Khedivial issue was not at all improbable. He

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[F.C. 78/4578, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 62, 19 April 1894.]
even hinted at the desirability of having a programme in store for a change of Khedive. But Kimberley pointed out the difficulty of removing the Khedive, and 'Abbas again expressed his wish to visit London. Cromer soon calmed down and said that it was extremely difficult to depose 'Abbas. It was better to get on with him, and he hoped the visit would make him more friendly. When he saw 'Abbas on 17 May, and found him determined to visit Britain, he said to Kimberley that he had not abandoned the possibility of working with 'Abbas.

Cromer was anxious that the visit should take place and be a success. He took much pain to ascertain that the Khedive would be lodged in Buckingham Palace itself, rather than a secondary one, and to explain how he should be amused and treated with great personal courtesy and consideration. But he was not quite easy at the Khedive's intentions. He warned Kimberley against any attempt of the Khedive to get rid of Kitchener, as he thought that this might be one of his main

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1 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 211 private, 20 April 1894.
2 F.O. 633/7, Kimberley to Cromer, No. 146 private, 20 April 1894.
3 Ibid., Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 404, 23 April 1894; F.O. 633/6, same to same, No. 213 private, 28 April 1894.
4 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 419, 17 May 1894; F.O. 633/6, same to same, No. 215 private, 18 May 1894.
reasons for the visit, and asked that a very quiet and firm attitude should be taken on all political questions.¹

This time 'Abbās actually wished to visit London. On 17 April 1894 he asked Blunt to find out for him the line which would be taken there about his reception. In answer he was assured of a warm welcome.² He may have thought of trying to get rid of Kitchener, but certainly he wanted to clear the air and to remove the bad effect created by what he might have considered as misrepresentation of his behaviour during the Frontier Incident.

But the visit was not to take place. The French and the Sultan opposed it from the beginning.³ The Sultan tried to persuade 'Abbās to abandon the visit. When he failed, he asked him, through Mukhtār Pasha, in the interest of the political balance, not to fail to visit Paris, and on his return to pass by Constantinople. Then he turned to Britain and strongly urged that 'Abbās should not be encouraged to go to London as "the Sultan would be deeply grieved should the British public treat the Khedive as a Prince or Sovereign".

¹F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 212 private, 27 April, No. 213 private, 28 April, No. 215 private, 13 May, and No. 217 private, 2 June 1894.
and as the visit was contrary to the interests of the empire. He asked Isma'il to persuade 'Abbas not to visit Europe.¹

Neither Cromer nor Kimberley were prepared to give way. But in June 1894 both Turkish and French attitudes hardened. The Sultan ordered 'Abbas to abandon his visit to Europe and to go to Constantinople, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs gave 'Abbas the same advice, and stated that he should not count on French support if he disobeyed the Sultan's orders. The German Consul-General advised 'Abbas that it was safer for him to offend Britain than Turkey.²

Cromer thought that the Khedive's omission to visit London would seem to the Egyptians like a political defeat to Britain, with a consequent loss of prestige. He pressed 'Abbas to go to London, and Kimberley even promised to support the Khedive against contrary pressure.³

'Abbas decided to obey the Sultan, for fear of that pressure, and due to other reasons. At that time the Anglo-

¹F.O. 407/126, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 66, 14 May 1894; Currie to Kimberley, tels. No. 60, 19 May, and No. 64, 23 May 1894; F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Currie, tel. No. 426, 21 May, and Currie to Cromer, tel. No. 427, 22 May 1894; F.O. 800/113, report No. 43, 15 May 1894.

²F.O. 407/126, Cromer to Kimberley, tels. No. 77 Conf., 9 June, and No. 82, 12 June 1894; F.O. 633/7, Currie to Cromer, tel. No. 459, 26 June 1894.

³F.O. 407/126, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 79, 10 June 1894; Kimberley to Cromer, tel. No. 36, 12 June 1894.
Italian Treaty of 5 May 1894 concerning Somaliland and Harrar, the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of 12 May 1894 about the Upper Nile, and the occupation of Wadelai by Major Owen in February, became known. Arabic papers in Egypt wrote about British encroachment upon Egypt's rights on the Sudan. A visit to London in these circumstances would have harmed his prestige in Egypt. He must presumably have been annoyed by the Anglo-Congolese Agreement. It seems that Cromer hinted at this to Kimberley, who answered that their agreement with Leopold was more important than the Khedive's visit.

The Khedive was aware of the bad impression created in London by abandoning the visit, and was profuse in his apology later to Rumbold in The Hague. But Cromer was very angry, and complained that 'Abbas was very hostile and very intimate with de Reverseaux.

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1 Langer, op. cit., pp. 130-134.

2 See al-Mu‘ayyad of May and June 1894; 7 and 13 June in particular.

3 F.O. 633/7, Kimberley to Cromer, tel. No. 445, 13 June 1894.

4 F.O. 141/302, Kimberley to Rodd, No. 124, 30 August 1894, and enclosure.

5 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 219 private, 9 June 1894.
Cromer's irritation was caused partly by the failure of the visit, and partly by a change in the local political atmosphere as a result of a turn in the French and German attitudes. German hostility against Britain in colonial affairs — which showed itself in the Franco-German Protocol of March 1894 concerning West Africa — joined with the then latent French hostility and both were flurried up by the beginning of June 1894 against the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of 12 May 1894, and prevented the Khedive's visit to London.¹ This new German hostility worried Cromer, and the Khedive's combination with de Reverseaux made him furious. He saw this combination in severe attacks on the Occupation by Le Journal Égyptien and al-Mu'ayyad. It seems that the members of the French Secret Committee for the Independence of Egypt were then exerting themselves under the instigation of de Reverseaux and 'Abbās. The Italian occupation of Kasala, which was known to have British sympathy, added fuel to the fire. Meanwhile, 'Abbās went to Constantinople to try

¹The Agreement leased to King Leopold parts of the Upper Nile, and secured to Britain a corridor in central Africa connecting territories under her protection, and separating the Congo from German East Africa. This enraged the Germans. They co-operated with France, not only to prevent the Khedive's visit, but also to secure the abrogation of the corridor clause of the Agreement. Britain had yielded under threat of a European conference on Egypt in which Germany would side with France. See Sanderson, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 409,428-474
once more to win the Sultan's help for evacuation.

The Khedive had three aims in this visit: to urge the Sultan to secure the evacuation of British troops, to obtain the ex-Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz's daughter in marriage, and to get the Sultan's permission to visit Europe for health reasons. He secured permission with difficulty, on medical pretexts, and undertook to make his visit unofficial, not meeting kings or statesmen, and not occupying himself with politics. As for the marriage affair, it was originally proposed by the Khedive's mother and accepted by him. Perhaps as a means to secure Turkish support. The Sultan was enthusiastic at first, and even promised his own daughter for the Khedive. He thought it a chance to have the Khedive, and the khediviate later, under his thumb. But on second thoughts, after taking the advice of his influential adviser and astrologer, Shaykh Abu 'l-Hudā al-Ṣayyādī, he went back on his promise. He perceived a danger to the continuation of the caliphate in the Ottoman dynasty, in a future Khedive, under British protection, and having Ottoman blood. "Abbas tried to discuss

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1 Comanos, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-69; Shafîq, *Mudhakkirâtî*, part 2, section 1, p. 152; Abdîn Archives, Turkish section, file mutaffarriqat (diverse), box No. 524, 'Abbas Gîlmi to Maḥmûd Shukrî Pasha, 4 August 1894, enclosure to No. 4. The document is in Arabic.

the question of evacuation with the Sultan, and even submitted a memorandum on the subject to him. He was told that the Sultan would shortly enter into communication with Britain on the question of evacuation, and that he should be careful to avoid serious clashes with the British, although he might cautiously resist their encroachments. 'Abbās was not convinced by this reply, and he told Blunt later that it was impossible to do anything with the Sultan.

In fact, 'Abbās could not reach any results with the Sultan. His attitude during the London visit affair must have reminded the Sultan of the Firman and Sinai Incident in 1892, when 'Abbās sided with the British. During his stay in Constantinople, 'Abbās was closely followed by spies and the atmosphere was heavy with suspicion.

The failure of the visit must have showed 'Abbās once more the wisdom of caution in resisting the British, but he maintained his policy and minor clashes recurred. When he went to Lucerne in August 1894, Rouiller Bey, then

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1 F.O. 407/126, Currie to Kimberley, tel. No. 89, 28 June 1894; F.O. 407/127, Currie to Kimberley, tel. No. 101, 7 July 1894; same to same, No. 351 conf., 25 July 1894; Comanos, op. cit., p.50.

2 Blunt, Diaries, part 1, p.205.

in his suite, was interviewed by the correspondent of the Parisian Le Journal. During the interview, which was published on 5 August, Rouiller said that the Khedive was forced to endure a situation contrary to all engagements, without being allowed to complain. He criticized French policy for failing to help the Sultan in the Egyptian question, and said that "a day will come when France will understand precisely wherein lie her real interests". When Rodd, acting for Cromer, raised the question, Nubar instructed the Press Bureau to state that the interview had never taken place.

An opportunity soon offered itself to the British to take revenge on 'Abbās, on the Legislative Council, and on 'Ali Pasha Sharīf the President of the Council. The opportunity was used to discredit the Council and to intimidate the members. Their criticism of the Budget late in 1894 shows that they were not intimidated. The

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1 Shafīq, Mughakāriṭi, part 2, section 1, pp. 164-66; The Egyptian Gazette, 30 August 1894.

2 The Council had criticised the Budget for 1894, and recommended the abolition of the Bureau for the Prevention of the Slave Trade. 'Ali Sharīf had taken an active role in the case of the two members who visited Cromer in 1894. See supra, pp. 65, 66.
Bureau for the Prevention of the Slave Trade received information about the sale of slave girls to ‘Ali Pasha Sharif, Muhammad Pasha al-Shawaribi, Fussayn Pasha Wasi, and ‘Abd al-Yamid Bey al-Shafi‘i. Al-Shawaribi was as important as ‘Ali Sharif. He was a prominent Anglophobe member of the Legislative Council, and managed one of the Khedive’s estates. Orders were issued for the arrest of the traders and the buyers on 28 August 1894, and soon powerful forces and strong currents began to affect the case.

The Arabic press waged a strong campaign against Schäfer Bey, the head of the Bureau, and against the Occupation. They said that the whole thing had been planned by Schäfer and the British to discredit the Legislative Council and its President. ‘Abbas told Blunt later that it was a trap laid by Schäfer. The sources do not justify his assertion, but they show that the British did not let it pass without political gain.

When Cromer, then on leave, was consulted, he said that he hoped the pashas would be convicted, and that the episode would discredit the Legislative Council, which thoroughly deserved being discredited. The Legal Counsellor
advised that according to the Egyptian law, there should be no preliminary arrest for the buyers, they should not be tried on the same footing as the traders, and they should be tried before the ordinary courts. The Judicial Committee approved the advice. But Schäfer issued the orders of preliminary arrest and Rodd, acting for Cromer, insisted upon their trial before a special court-martial, on the same footing as the traders. He threatened that any change would be a violation of the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of August 1877 for the prevention of the slave trade. When 'Ali Sharif claimed Italian nationality to escape arrest, the Italian government was pressed to refuse it to him. At the demand of 'Abbas, Nubar tried to delay the formation of the court-martial and its summons, but Rodd threatened that any delay would have serious effects, and invited Kimberley's intervention. Rodd agreed with the Acting Sirdar to "secure reliable senior native officers" for the court-martial, the Judge Advocate only would be British. Indeed, the affair was managed on political basis. Rodd sent to Kimberley asking if public opinion in Britain would "condemn light sentence, or partial remission by Sirdar of
severe sentence? as the Judge Advocate's advice would
"probably be followed as to sentence by the Court Martial..."

But Rodd was disappointed when Shawaribi and Wāṣif
were acquitted and he wrote disparaging the judges. Then
he turned round and wanted to prosecute 'Alī Sharīf, who
had by then been denied Italian nationality. But Rodd,
and the British government, found that they could not rely
on the court-martial, and that public opinion in Egypt had
been much excited by the trial and the press campaign. In
fact, this campaign was so strong that pressure had to be
exerted for the expulsion of Guarizi, the Italian editor
of Le Journal Égyptien. Meanwhile, a way to retreat with
credit was found after 'Alī Sharīf had resigned the presi-
didency of the Council. By arrangement, which was previously
agreed upon between Rodd, Cromer, and Kimberley, two British
doctors from the Egyptian army examined 'Alī Sharīf and
reported that he was not fit to undergo a trial, and it was
decided to drop his prosecution accordingly. 1

1 Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 168-72;
F.O. 78/4578, Rodd to Kimberley, tels. No. 97, 28 August,
No. 99, 29 August, No. 102, 2 September, No. 103, 3 September,
No. 104, 4 September, No. 114, 22 September, No. 116, 23
September; and Nos. 117, 118, 24 September 1894; F.O. 78/
4577, Kimberley to Rodd, tels. No. 52 conf. 21 September,
and No. 54, 24 September 1894; note from F. Bertie to
Kimberley, 19 September 1894; F.O. 141/302, Edwardes to
(cont.)
During the later part of 1894 and the early part of 1895 events led to a relative tension in the relations between 'Abbās and both Cromer and Nuban. The way Britain yielded to Germany and France in the Anglo-Congolese Agreement affair showed her weak position. This seems to have encouraged more Franco-Egyptian press attacks on the Occupation, probably instigated by the Secret Committee and by 'Abbās. Guarneri was replaced at Le Journal Égyptien by the more Anglophobe French Isaac Picard. Le Phare d'Alexandrie and al-Watan joined al-Ahrām and al-Mu'āyyad. Even British rule in India came under fire.¹

Because of Britain's weak position, when Cromer was on leave in London in 1894, Kimberley advised him to "let matters slide".² This was against Cromer's policy, but when he returned to Egypt he managed to avoid serious

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¹ Al-Mu'āyyad, 25 July, 23 December 1894.

² F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 223 private, 3 November 1894.
and direct clashes with 'Abbas, and to get what he wanted through Nubar. It seems that by then Nubar had been more or less won to the British side. He was physically weak and aged (almost seventy years old), and he knew that it was probably his last ministry. He saw what had happened to Riyāḍ and appreciated the difficulty of resisting the Occupation. His views then are made clear by an interview which he gave to the correspondent of the Parisien Le Journal in April 1895. In it Nubar said that what existed in Egypt was an administration—not a government—controlled by the British who held the absolute power in the country, that the Khedive had resisted the Occupation at first but in the end he found resistance useless, and that foreign high officials were essential to the Egyptian administration.¹

In the early autumn of 1894 the Armenian question assumed a more serious aspect with the Sassun massacres, and the Armenian organization moved to London.² Armenians looked to Europe, and to Britain in

¹Al-Mu'ayyad, 14 April 1895; Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 196, 197.

²The Armenian, like similar movements in the Balkans, was a nationalist movement struggling for reform and self-government. Like them, it enjoyed European sympathy and help. It started in the sixties of last century, and gained strength in the nineties after revolutionary organizations (cont.)
particular, for help. It seems that Nubar had been involved in
the movements against the Turks in the Ottoman Empire in Isma‘īl's
time, and it was said that he had ambitions to be ruler of auto-
nomous Armenia one day.¹ He must have been grateful for the help
Britain was giving to the Armenians. He certainly was pleased and
grateful for the help he received in the Basandīla affair.² With
a friendly prime minister Cromer could get his way, supporting
him only when support was needed. This new tactic had the ad-
vantage of separating 'Abbās from his ministers. It was
a step to a ministry of complete cyphers through

whom Cromer could be the sole predominant power in Egypt.

(cont.) had been formed. Among their means of struggle was
to organize risings among the Armenians, with the resulting
Turkish reprisals, and intervention of European powers. After
the Sassum massacres, British, French and Russian delegates
drew a scheme of reforms for Ottoman Armenia; but it did not
materialize. Similar disturbances and massacres were repeated
in 1895, and the Sultan failed to apply the reforms. Ultimately
Britain, Italy and Austria sent warships to Lemnos and the
eastern Mediterranean in November 1895, with almost no result.

²Basandīla was a vast Domain estate of about one-eighth million
feddans. It was put to public tender in April 1894. An Egyptian
company offered the higher price, but the estate was given to
the British Buḥayra Irrigation Company in May. Nubar had a large
interest in the latter company, and his son Bughus Nubar Pasha was
managing director. This action caused a furor in the press and
was considered a public scandal. See The Times, 9 and 10 May
1894; The Egyptian Gazette, 8-10 May 1894; al-Mu‘ayyad, 3-16 May
1894.
The main issue in that period was the reorganization of the Interior. This Ministry was the centre of gravity in the Egyptian administration. Through its agents - the mudīrs of the provinces, the ma'mūrs of the districts, and the 'umda of the villages - the Interior had control over the entire administration of the country, including matters which concerned other ministries. At first the British controlled the police through a British inspector-general, but the mudīr control over that body was maintained. By the end of 1883 Clifford Lloyd reorganized the police, actually taking the control from the mudīrs and putting it completely in the hands of the Inspector-General. In January 1884 Lloyd was appointed under-secretary for the Interior, to have control over the whole ministry from the top. Nubar, then Prime Minister, complained that divided responsibility in the provinces undermined the authority of the mudīrs, and contributed to the increase of crime. He did not like having a strong man at his elbow in the ministry. He succeeded in getting rid of Lloyd in May 1884, and an Egyptian under-secretary was appointed in his place. He restored to the mudīrs authority over the police in 1887.
The struggle was resumed when Kitchener was appointed inspector-general of the police in 1890. He reorganized the police more or less on the same lines as Lloyd, appointing resident British inspectors in the provinces, and making the commandants of the police responsible only to the inspectors and the Inspector-General. Kitchener's activities in the Interior were among the causes of Riyād's resignation in 1891. The Coles circular was at the background of the Ministerial Crisis of January 1893, and when Riyād returned to power he issued a circular in February 1893, with the effect that the mudīr was the responsible official for all branches of the administration in the province, and that the police came under his control. But it seems that this did not materialize, and that the police remained in practice under the sole control of the Inspector-General.\(^1\) It was a pitched struggle, fought inch by inch, and the two sides changed position.

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When Nubar came to power in 1894 he did not like the position of the police, as creating the hated divided responsibility in the provinces. Nubar, as perhaps most of the Egyptian ministers, by then, had become resigned to the presence of British advisers, but he disliked seeing them "going out into the provinces". It was a matter of prestige, of keeping British officials from direct contact with the people, and of keeping the provinces out of British control.

At the same time Cromer began to see that this police affair was causing more friction and more trouble than it was really worth, especially after the Parquet had asserted its authority in the struggle with the police over criminal investigation. But he was also of opinion that a hostile khedive and prime minister could stir up the country against the Occupation through the mudirs, the ma'murs, and the 'umdas. In his opinion this was what 'Abbās and Riyād had done after the Ministerial Crisis of January 1893. His difficulties, he thought, were "in no small degree due to the fact that the English officials

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1 Milner, op.cit., p.110.
2 Coles, op.cit., p.77.
have no control over the appointment of natives". They held power in the Local Government Board, and the departments of the Police, Public Health, and Prisons. But the more important authority over the mudirs and other personnel, which could lead to ascendancy over the whole country, was left to the Arabic Bureau, which was under the Minister's direct command. Cromer was prepared to please Nubar by concessions in the police affair in exchange for a general control, through an Englishman, which would bring the Arabic Bureau and the mudirs under British sway. An agreement of this sort, probably on the very general lines, was reached between Cromer and Nubar while the ministry was being formed in April 1894. In a letter to Nubar in June 1894 Cromer mentioned that what he wanted was "a sufficient amount of English supervision" without any "undue amount of English interference". Cromer had proposed such a compromise to Nubar in 1884, but it was then rejected.

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1 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 392, 13 April 1894.
2 Coles, op.cit., p.78.
3 F.4 F.O. 633/5, Cromer to Nubar, tel. No. 576 private, 6 April 1884.
When Cromer returned from leave in 1894 he discussed the reorganization of the Interior with Nubar. The main points of the agreement reached were that the post of the Inspector-General of the police would be abolished; the British inspectors of the police would be withdrawn from the provinces; the police would be put under the control of the mudīrs; three British officers were to be attached to the ministry as muʿāwīns, or assistants, to help in investigations or any other missions to the provinces. A British adviser, Gorst, was to be appointed to the Interior. To make the appointment more palatable it was stated that he would have no executive functions, that his correspondence with the departments would be through the Minister, and that his appointment was temporary. But this was understood to be nominal. Other concessions were made: the appointment of Mahir Pasha as governor of Cairo, and a promise to allow the retirement of Schäfer, the head of the Bureau for the Prevention of the Slave Trade.

Cromer made Nubar submit the project to ʿAbbās in his own name. ʿAbbās was opposed to it, and the French and

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1 F.C. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 479, 12 October 1894; F.C. 78/4576, Cromer to Kimberley, no. 159, 6 November 1894, and enclosures; and no. 160 conf., 8 November 1894 and enclosure.

2 F.C. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, private no. 223, 3 November 1894.
Russian Consuls-General were against it. Most of the French and Arabic papers severely criticized it for more than a month. They pointed out that it was a final blow to Egypt's liberties and institutions, that the adviser would return to the British whatever concessions they were giving, that he would control the whole Ministry including the Minister himself, and that if Nubar was unable to govern the country he should resign. But French opposition was very weak. They advised 'Abbās to resist, putting detailed criticism and raising objection, in order to give time for the press campaign to have effect, and for friendly powers to help him. He was also advised to avoid a crisis. Nubar hesitated, but Cromer hastened to get him a promise of support from Kimberley, and made it known that the British were determined to have their own way. Nubar stiffened his back. He did not mind French and Russian opposition, and let the Khedive know that he would resign if his project was not accepted. Al-Muʿayyad stated that 'Abbās

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1 F.O. 78/4578, tel. No. 123, 19 October 1894; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 223 private, 3 November 1894; D.D.F., tome XI, Nos. 250, 252.


4 F.O. 633/7, Cromer to Kimberley, tels. No. 484, 19 October and No. 485, 21 October 1894; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 223 private, 3 November 1894.
asked the ministers to study the project before accepting it, and that he would not have refused the project once it had been accepted. ¹

It is hard to believe that an old statesman as Nubar did not realize the implication of such arrangements, and it is not easy to find another explanation for Nubar's behaviour than that given above.² Still, in an interview with the editor of al-Mu'ayyad, probably in October 1894, Nubar expressed his confidence that he would be able to prevent the Adviser assuming all authority in the Interior.³ This was probably his intention, but he was doomed to disappointment. The inspectors returning from the provinces were all appointed to posts in the central office in Cairo, and later they were sent to the provinces to inspect and report to the Adviser.⁴ A new inspectorate on the Parquet was created and some of them were appointed to it.⁵ The Adviser himself began to visit the provinces to contact the

¹ Al-Mu'ayyad, 27 October and 4 November 1894.

² Supra, p. 176, 177.

³ Al-Mu'ayyad, 22 February 1899.


⁵ Al-Mu'ayyad, 17 March 1895.
In March 1895 Gorst had the 'Umdas Law passed. The last word in their appointment or removal was left to the Minister. It defined their responsibilities, gave them certain powers to deal with suspicious and dangerous characters, and judicial powers to deal with minor offences and minor civil questions. At the same time it gave them some advantages and made them liable to punishment by administrative tribunals for neglect or abuse of position. Thus, they were put more under the Minister's (that means the Adviser's) mercy. The project underwent several alterations and oppositions from January till it was passed as law in March 1895.² By it, British control over the Interior became complete and tight.

The Khedive's weak resistance shows the true nature of his policy. He was reluctant to offer strong resistance without being sure of real support. He wanted the ministers themselves to offer open resistance, leaving for him secret resistance through the nationalist movement. In August 1894

¹ Al-Mu'ayyad, 24 January 1895.
² The Times, 9 January 1895; Al-Mu'ayyad, 6 January, 18 February, 5 March 1895; The Egyptian Gazette, 4-19 February 1895. Mahmud Hilmi Mustafa, op. cit., pp. 253, 266-271.
Nubar was pressed by Kimberley to appoint a British headmaster to the Khedivial School. He sent to the Khedive in Europe for instructions. The answer was that the Khedive "hoped that Nubar Pasha will settle that matter according to his well-known patriotic tendencies". A British headmaster was appointed. Commenting — rightly — on the Khedive's attitude, Cromer wrote to Kimberley after the Interior affair saying that he greatly doubted whether the Khedive's real feelings towards the British had in any way changed, that the Khedive and his friends began to understand that they could not expect any efficient help and the British were determined to have their own way, and that this rendered them more amenable to reason. It was a change which Cromer liked to promote, even at the expense of sacrificing Nubar to please 'Abbas. But he kept saying that 'Abbas was not in the least friendly, although he was not so actively hostile as he had been.

The Khedive's third collapse

Indeed, the Khedive was not pleased. The Basandila affair, the Khedivial School headmastership, and the Interior

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1 Shafiq, Mudhakkirat, part 2, section 1, p. 166; F.O. 78/4577, Kimberley to Rodd, tel. No. 41, 10 August 1894.

2 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 224 private, 9 November, and No. 230 private, 24 December 1894.
affair, made 'Abbās disappointed in Nubar and distrust him. He began to complain of Nubar's insincerity and untruthfulness. Cromer expected a change of ministry before long, and the papers hinted at this in November.¹ But the dark cloud passed for the moment. After the appointment of Gorst, a new wave of British encroachment in the administration began, mainly in the Interior and the Ministry of Justice.

When 'Abbās found the ministers submissive to it, he began to exert himself with the purpose of resisting the encroachment, and possibly of getting rid of Nubar in the end. He followed a twofold policy: instigating in the press strong attacks on British encroachment and on submissive ministers, and encouraging more resistance and obstructions through the Legislative Council and the Cabinet. The latter point was dangerous and ended in a clash with Cromer.

In November 1894 Cromer complained of the press. In December he became aware that an Anglophobe press campaign was being organized, promoted by the French.² Complaints

¹F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 224 private, 9 November 1894; al-Ahram, 14 November 1894.
²F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, 3 November 1894; F.O. 633/7, same to same, tel. No. 494, 2 December 1894.
of press attacks and of being inspired by 'Abbās, in al-Ahram, al-Mu'ayyad and Le Journal Égyptien in particular, were repeated in February 1895 by Cromer and other high British officials in Egypt. We already know that on 16 December 1894 Muṣṭafa Kamīl returned from France and began co-operating with 'Abbās against the Occupation, in Egypt at first, then he extended his campaign to France. But the attacks in Egyptian papers continued, with varying intensity, till October 1895. The clashes which took place during the campaign helped to strengthen it and to raise the political thermometer to the boiling point.

The main points of the attack were the prolonged British Occupation, British and Italian intentions in the Sudan, British encroachment on the administration and administrative policy in Egypt. The need for reduction of taxation was pointed out. This point made the attack serious, as it touched a real reason for discontent. There was a heavy fall in prices in 1894 coupled with a further

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1 M.P.P., box No. 12, Wingate to Milner, 11 February 1895; Dawkins to Milner, 18 February 1895; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 233 private, 17 February 1895.

2 Supra, pp. 126, 127.
heavy fall in cotton prices. Complaints arose against the heavy burden of taxes and the fallah indebtedness, asking for a reduction of taxation. A group of Legislative Council members met Nubar on 2 December 1894 for the same purpose. At the same time the British government insisted that the expenses of the army of occupation paid by the Egyptian government should be raised to meet the increase of the garrison in 1893. Nothing can better show Cromer's apprehension of the situation than his reluctant consent to the reduction of the garrison by one battalion as preferable to the increase of the expenses. The obstruction in the Caisse de la dette enabled him to do no more than suspend £265,000 of taxes.

In their report on the Budget for 1895, the members of the Legislative Council repeated much of the criticism of the year before, probably again inspired by 'Abbas.

1F. O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 225 private, 18 November 1894.

2Ibid., Cromer to Kimberley, No. 229 private, 9 December 1894; al-Mu'ayyad, 20, 22 November, 8 December 1894; al-Ahram, 3 December 1894.

3F. O. 633/7, Kimberley to Cromer, No. 151 private, 2 November 1894, and No. 152 private, 15 November 1894.

4F. O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 224 private, 9 November 1894.

5F. O. 78/4576, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 172, 28 November 1894.
They pressed for a reduction of taxation, and of foreign officers in the Egyptian army; and they did not approve the army of occupation's expenses. Their report drew a strong and unfavourable answer from the Minister of Finance.\(^1\) Cromer was irritated and expressed his anxiety. He wondered if the French grip over the conversion economies could be lifted to ease the financial situation.\(^2\) Rosebery could not do this, but he offered him the G.C.B. to affirm "the policy of a firm hand in Egypt".\(^3\)

After the appointment of Gorst, 'Abbas presided over nearly all the Cabinet meetings.\(^4\) He tried to influence the ministers to resist British encroachment. The Legislative Council was probably worked up for the same purpose. Some measures were not sanctioned, and others were delayed and modified several times. These were mainly regulations in the Judiciary, giving the Minister and his adviser more control over the judges, and the ‘Umdas Law in the Interior. The ministers were be-

\(^1\) F.C. 76/4668, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 1, 2 January 1895, and enclosure; al-Mu'ayyad, 19 December 1894 - 3 January 1895.

\(^2\) F.C. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 230 private, 24 December 1894. A part of the Egyptian debt had been converted to a new debt at a lower rate of interest. The Egyptian government was not allowed to take the resulting economies, which accumulated at the Caisse de la dette.

\(^3\) F.C. 633/7, Rosebery to Cromer, No. 135 private, 21 December 1894.

\(^4\) Al-Hugaitam, 30 November 1895.
tween two forces, and they could not yield to either.

'Abbas became dissatisfied with the ministers concerned, and Cromer became irritated.

Matters came to a head when Isma'il Pasha became seriously ill with cancer in January 1895, and expressed a wish to return to Egypt. The Khedive wanted to grant it, but the ministers disapproved for fear of political complications. Probably they were influenced by Nubar, and pressed by Cromer, who opposed Isma'il's return.

'Abbas brought the matter before his ministers several times, with the same result. This increased the Khedive's irritation and press attacks grew in violence. 'Abbas was trying to force his ministers to resign.

Feeling himself torn between pressure from both

'Abbas and Cromer, and not completely approving Gorst's actions in the Interior, Nubar intimated to the British that he was going to be turned out because he was supporting their policy. He hinted that he preferred resignation. When he was told that he would be supported at all hazards, he declined this, but he was persuaded to stay. It seems

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1 F.O. 78/4670, Cromer to Kimberley, tels. No. 3, 5 January, No. 4, 6 January, No. 6, 7 January, No. 8, 10 January, No. 17, 22 January 1895; Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 1, pp. 180, 181.

2 F.O. 78/4670, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 18, 6 February 1895; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 232 private, 9 February 1895.

3 M.P.P., box 12, Dawkins to Milner, 18 February 1895.
that he wanted the British either to relax their pressure on him and make some concessions to 'Abbas, or to put some mild pressure on the Khedive to facilitate his own work. When Cromer saw 'Abbas on 9 February 1895, the latter denied any intention of changing his ministers.¹

Nevertheless, the press attacks were continued, and the papers pointed out that the ministers had lost the confidence of 'Abbas, and that the natural consequence should be their resignation.² Nubar began to complain again, and Cromer wrote to Kimberley privately that to allow a change of ministers would show the Egyptians that unless they worked with 'Abbas against the British, they could not be maintained in office. He thought the best way was to let 'Abbas know that "unless his present Ministers remain in office, and are supported by him, he will be responsible, and that his personal position will have to be considered". He thought that the Khedive's deposition was sooner or later inevitable, and that it was not impossible.³

¹F.O. 78/4670, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 19, 9 February 1895.

²For that part of the press campaign see al-Mu'ayyad, al-Ahram, and Le Journal Egyptien between 20 December 1894 and 20 February 1895.

³F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 233 private, 17 February 1895.
On the same day he began to set the English press to work for a forward policy in Egypt through Chirol, and Moberly Bell. *The Times* of 18 February 1895 published a telegram by the former and an editorial by the latter, which contained clear threats of deposition, enlarged on 'Abbas's Anglophobia, and pointed out the necessity of supporting Nubar. Yet, Cromer was not sure of the support he could get for a drastic policy with the existing dissensions in the British Cabinet. It is probably at the demand of Cromer that Dawkins, whom he knew as being Milner's man, wrote to Milner pointing out that Cromer was thinking seriously of deposing 'Abbas, and asking for some light "as to the support which could be got out of the Ministry for vigorous policy, ..." In Egypt, Cromer said that the Khedive could not change the ministers without his consent. Milner answered Dawkins on 1 March that people in Britain were thoroughly sick of

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1*M.P.P., box 12, Dawkins to Milner, 18 February 1895.*

2*Ibid., Dawkins to Milner, 18 February 1895.*

3*D.D.F., tome XI, No. 386.*
'Abbas, but it was hopeless that the Foreign Office should sanction beforehand any decisive action. The lead should come from Cromer, who had immense prestige and would have nine-tenths of British public opinion behind him, and the British ministry would not dare fall behind public opinion. All this provided that "there should be, or seem to be, a state of things sufficiently critical to justify [the action]." ¹

It seems that Cromer was too exasperated to wait for the result of these preparatory steps. On 19 February he telegraphed to Kimberley officially about the situation, saying that any change of ministers was most serious, and asked for general instructions.²

Kimberley's answer was strongly worded. Cromer was to tell 'Abbas that the British government saw no grounds for a change in the ministry, that any change would be considered as practically directed against Great Britain, and that if a change took place, 'Abbas "must be prepared to take the consequences, which may be of a more

¹ M.P.P., box 7, Milner to Dawkins, 1 March 1895.
² F.O. 78/4670, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 24 conf., 19 February 1895.
serious nature than he imagines..." Cromer was asked to let the Khedive understand that "he has to deal with the British Government, and not with his own Government only, and that, if the necessity arises, Her Majesty's Government could not hesitate to adopt any measures which may, in the circumstances, appear to them to be required".¹

‘Abbas denied any intention to change his ministers,² but he was frightened and ceased obstruction. He could not get any help from France, who was then trying to reach some agreement with Britain on the Upper Nile question, and to start talks on the Egyptian question. Hanotaux instructed Cogordan to point out to the Khedive that they were not prepared to support his "boutades".³ Cromer got what he wanted. The decree establishing a special tribunal to deal with assaults on members of the army of occupation and of the British Navy was passed on 25 February 1895.⁴

¹F.O. 78/4670, Kimberley to Cromer, tel. No. 15, 21 February. F.O. 141/308, Kimberley to Cromer, No. 26a, 21 February 1895.
²F.O. 78/4670, Cromer to Kimberley, tel. No. 27, 26 February 1895.
⁴That tribunal was composed of the Minister of Justice as president, the president of the national tribunal of Cairo or Alexandria, the British Judicial Adviser, a British (cont.)
the 'Umdas Law was passed on 16 March, and an inspectorate of the Parquet was established in the same month. Cromer was pleased, although the press campaign continued, because he had got what he wanted, and had discovered that 'Abbas could be frightened into behaving well. The main result of that clash was a confirmation of two principles: 'Abbas could not dismiss his ministers independently, and he had to follow their advice. Consequently, the ministers were completely separated from 'Abbas, and became more reliant on British support. It was the last but one step by Cromer to have a ministry of complete cyphers, and to pose as the sole and absolute ruler of Egypt.

Milner called that clash 'Abbas's third collapse.

From that time until the reconquest of the Sudan was decided,

(cont.) judge of the national court of appeal, and the Judge Advocate of the army of occupation as members. It could pass any sentence regardless of the ordinary Penal Code and there was no appeal against its sentences. It was established after a quarrel in February 1895, between two British marines and a stoker on one side, and some Egyptians on the other, in a quarter of ill-repute in Alexandria. According to British reports, the trial was fair, and the Egyptians received adequate punishment. Yet, as a result of tense relations with 'Abbas Cromer pressed for a modification of the Penal Code to increase the punishment for such crimes, and the creation of the Special Tribunal was established. F.O. 78/4668, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 17, 14 February, No. 19, 16 February, and No. 21, 19 February 1895, and enclosures.

1Al-Mu'ayyad, March, April 1895.

2F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 232 private, 9 February 1895.
'Abbas ceased making resistance in the administration, even when Cromer, to deprive him of a source of income he used to finance anti-British propaganda, had a draft law introduced establishing the Higher Council for the Awqaf, and a control over the accounts of the Awqaf Department. But his propaganda campaign and the activities of the Secret Committee were continued. Deloncle visited Egypt late in March 1895 and stayed there about three weeks. He was welcomed by young Nationalists and members of the Committee such as Muṣṭafā Kamīl and Yusuf Bey al-Shīmī. He gave many speeches against the Occupation, assuring the Egyptians of French support. His speeches were published in Le Journal Égyptien, and translations were published in Arabic papers. The Khedive received him in audience. In May 1895 Muṣṭafā Kamīl was sent by the Khedive to France where he launched a strong anti-British campaign, asking for French support for Egypt.

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1M.PP., box 12, Dawkins to Milner, 21 July 1895; Garstin to Milner, 19 April 1895; supra, pp. 152, 153.

2F.O. 78/4668, Cromer to Kimberley, tels. No. 38, 29 March, and Nos. 43, 19 April 1895; al-Muʿayyad, 1-12 April 1895, Shafīq, Mudhakkirāt, part 2, section 1, pp. 197-200.
Clashes with 'Abd al-Hamîd

In July 1895 'Abbâs went on his third visit to Constantinople. He made it known that he was going yachting among the islands in the Archipelago, and that he wanted to visit the island of Thasos and have a summer house built there.¹ His aim in going to Thasos was to save himself the humiliation of having either to go to Constantinople, or face difficulties in obtaining the Sultan's permission to visit Europe in summer. He had suffered that humiliation in the previous year. 'Abbâs told Blunt that he had no intention to do politics with the Sultan.² But it is more probable that he tried again to square matters with the Sultan, especially after British threats of deposition and the rumours in February 1895 of an Anglo-French accord on Egypt.³ There were other rumours, later, of France and Russia raising the Egyptian question.⁴

¹S.F. P., vol. 108/2, Rodd to Salisbury, private, 14 July 1895.
²Blunt, Diaries, part 1, p. 255.
³W.F. P., box 261, Wingate to Gleichen, 1 March 1895.
⁴F.O. 633/7, Kimberley to Cromer, no. 166 private, 21 June 1895.
'Abbās's reception was extremely cordial. The Grand Cordon of the Khanedan-al-Osman was conferred on him, and the Grand Vizir was instructed to pay him a first visit. But 'Abbās could get no more, after a stay of about two months: no permission for a visit to Thasos, or for yachting among the islands, and no talk on business. It seems that 'Abbās lost his temper and dropped some remarks on the Sultan and his policy. Cordial relations changed to a quarrel, and he was ordered to leave Constantinople immediately.

'Abbās became sure once more that he could not get any help from the Sultan, and was furious for being denied what he thought was his right to visit Thasos. He expressed himself openly against the Sultan even to the British. When the squadrons of the powers threatened the Sultan in November 1895 during the Armenian crisis,

1 F.O. 78/4669, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 99, 1 August 1895.

2 Ibid., Rodd to Salisbury, No. 120, 15 September, No. 121 conf., 19 September, and No. 122 conf., 21 September 1895; Blunt, Diaries, part 1, pp. 255-256. About the sudden departure of 'Abbās, see also al-Mu'ayyad, 11, 13, 14 September 1895.

3 F.O. 78/4669, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 121 conf., 19 September 1895.
'Abbas told Cromer that he hoped that the powers would depose the Sultan, and was even enthusiastic about the possibility of the Sultan being assassinated.\textsuperscript{1} He tried to omit the Sultan's name from the Friday prayer in Egypt and when he failed, he made his own imām omit it from the Friday prayer in the Palace mosque.\textsuperscript{2} He began to help the Young Turks in Egypt, and employed Ahmad Rashīd Bey, the editor of the Young Turks paper Bāgīr al-Shārq, and other Young Turks, in the Palace.\textsuperscript{3}

Besides what happened during the visit, the Khedive's behaviour was due to his wish to flatter the British, and to be more friendly with them. He was probably frightened at what was taking place at Constantinople during the acute stage of the Armenian crisis. He saw that if a partition of the Ottoman Empire took place, Egypt would fall to the British, and he would be at their mercy. He could not hope to get any effective help from France.

\textsuperscript{1} F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No.246 private, 23 November 1895.

\textsuperscript{2} S.P.P., vol. 108/33, Cromer to Barrington, private, 27 December 1895; Blunt, Diaries, part 1, p.256.

\textsuperscript{3} F.O. 78/4762, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 74 conf., 6 June 1896; Yakan, op.cit., pp. 66-67.
Cromer was actually turning over in his mind what would happen if a drastic change in Egypt's position took place. He was hesitating between two policies: a radical policy of reducing the Khedive to the position of the most controlled Indian rajah, and of suppressing the native ministers and letting the British officials control ostensibly as well as practically; and a policy of maintaining the status quo, leaving the Khedive a nominal share in the government. Cromer was inclined towards the latter policy.\(^1\) This may have been due to the very friendly attitude of 'Abbas, which made Cromer say in November 1895 that the political calm was almost oppressive.\(^2\) Press attacks had calmed down, and 'Abbas had ordered Muṣṭafā Kamīl to return from France. The Legislative Council's report on the Budget for 1896 was not as hostile as their reports in the two previous years. They noted that the government had met their views on certain points, and merely drew attention to the remainder of the observations made in past years.\(^3\)

\(^{1}\)M.FF., box 12, Dawkins to Milner, 23 November 1895; Cromer to Milner, private, 5 December 1895.

\(^{2}\)F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 245 private, 15 November 1895.

\(^{3}\)F.O. 78/4669, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 146 conf., 2 December 1895, and enclosure.
The return of Muṣṭafā Fahmi

So, under international political situation, 'Abbās stopped nearly all resistance to the Occupation. The Khedive's wish to get rid of Nubar was the only thing which interrupted political calm. Since his return from Constantinople, the Khedive's relations with his ministers were not good. But Cromer did not want any change, as it "upsets people's minds".1 Shafīq said that, to get rid of Nubar, 'Abbās intimated to Cromer in November 1895 that he wished to make Muṣṭafā Fahmi prime minister, that in this case Cromer found no reason for keeping Nubar against the Khedive's wish, and when Nubar understood the situation, he tendered his resignation on 11 November 1895.2

But the documents tell another story. Late in October 1895, Nubar wrote to Cromer from France, where he had been nursing his health after an accident the year before, asking "whether he ought not to resign on the score of old age and health".3 On 5 November Nubar arrived in Alexandria, and

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1 F.O. 78/4669, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 121 conf., 19 September 1895; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 242 private, 7 October 1895.


3 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 243 private, 30 October 1895.
was in Cairo the next day. On 8 November he told Cromer of his wish to resign on grounds of broken health.\textsuperscript{1} On the next day Cromer arranged with him "seeing the Khedive and without absolutely giving in his resignation, that he should intimate his wish to retire if arrangements can be made of a nature calculated to obviate any break of policy".\textsuperscript{2} On the same day Cromer asked Salisbury to send him a telegram expressing hope that the new Ministerial arrangement would be of a nature "to guarantee a continuance of the policy of conciliation which Nubar Pasha has successfully carried out... it might be as well to add a few words of warning which I can use or not as occasion depends as to the unwisdom in the Khedive's interest of creating any Egyptian difficulties just now in view of the general situation of Oriental politics".\textsuperscript{3}

Cromer could not have needed all these precautions and warnings had 'Abbās told him that he would accept Muṣṭafā Fahmī. It seems also that the post was first offered to

\textsuperscript{1}F.O. 78/4670, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 75, 8 November 1895.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 76, 9 November 1895.

\textsuperscript{3}S.P.P., vol. 108/18, Cromer to Salisbury, private tel., 9 November 1895.
Maşlûm Pasha, but he declined.\(^1\) Cromer had his eye on Maşlûm as a possible successor of Nubar since May 1894.\(^2\)

However, Cromer did not need that "little bottle of thunder". The Khedive's attitude was friendly. He tried first to get Tigrane, but when he found that would create difficulties, he accepted Muşafa Fâhî.\(^3\) With the British squadron gathering at the island of Lemnos as pressure on Turkey, 'Abbâs had not much space for manoeuvre. Different reasons were mentioned for Nubar's resignation. Wingate thought that Nubar resigned because Gorst was too much for him in the Interior, which had slipped out of his hands.\(^4\) Nubar's wish to resign when he was in France, and the repetition of his wish two days only after he had arrived in Cairo, proves that the real reason for his resignation was failing health, as Cromer said.\(^5\)

The fact that Nubar asked Cromer's permission to resign, and arranged with him not to tender his resignation

\(^1\)M.P.P., box 12, Dawkins to Milner, 23 November 1895.

\(^2\)F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Kimberley, No. 215 private, 18 May 1894.

\(^3\)Ibid., Cromer to Salisbury, No. 244 private, 13 November 1895.

\(^4\)M.P.P., box 12, Wingate to Milner, private and conf., 21 December 1895.

\(^5\)F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 244 private, 13 November 1895.
officially before a proper successor had been chosen, is another proof that Nubar’s ministry was one of submission, not of conciliation, as it was supposed to be in the beginning.

Since Muṣṭafā Fahmī in January 1893 had said that he would not resign before consulting Lord Cromer, events now turned full circle, and brought Muṣṭafā back to power. His return shows the growth of Cromer’s authority and the diminishing authority of the Khedive. With a ministry of cyphers headed by Muṣṭafā Fahmī, a big quarrel with the Sultan, the prospects of a partition of the Ottoman Empire, and with the absence of French help, ‘Abbās was completely powerless.

The international situation which mainly caused that complete collapse of ‘Abbās soon changed. Turkey survived the Armenian crisis and no partition took place. In March 1896 the reconquest of the Sudan was decided and France returned to the scene of her struggle with Britain with more vigour. ‘Abbās gained strength, and a new phase of his relations with Cromer began.
Chapter IV

CAUTIOUS RESISTANCE

2. The Relations Between 'Abbas and Cromer
During the Sudan Campaign

The general situation

About the end of 1895 and the beginning of 1896 some changes in the international situation concerning Egypt took place. Some of them gave 'Abbas hope, others were not helpful to him, but in general they gave him more freedom of action in his struggle with Cromer than he had in November 1895.

By the end of 1895 the Armenian crisis calmed down without the Ottoman Empire being partitioned, and the Sultan's position was strengthened by his safe emergence from that crisis, and later by the victory over Greece in 1897. A stronger Sultan could be of some help to 'Abbas against further British domination, but a difficulty was presented by the bad relations between 'Abbas and the Sultan after the Constantinople visit of 1895, aggravated by the Khedive's help to the Young Turks later.

The worsening of Anglo-German relations after the "Krüger telegram" of 3 January 1896 gave new hopes to 'Abbas and to the Nationalists of a favourable solution to the Egyptian question. These were false hopes at that time,
however, as Germany's main aim was closer relations with Brittain and they soon changed their attitude, especially when British help was needed to make a diversion in favour of the Italians, after their defeat in Ethiopia. The old cordiality of the Anglo-German relations was, however, lost. This gave more space for political manoeuvre. Whatever the real policy of Germany was, 'Abbas, and the Nationalists, held fast to these hopes, especially when French resistance to the Occupation broke down in 1897. Muṣṭafā Kāmil directed a good part of his campaign abroad to Germany, and 'Abbas invited Emperor William to visit Egypt in 1898, hoping to win his help against Britain, and to cause a rapprochement between France and Germany on the Egyptian question.

With France the situation was different. Salisbury was ready to give concessions to improve his relations with France and Russia, and the French were earnestly trying to reach an agreement with Britain on the Egyptian question. French suggestions were intimated to Salisbury by de Courcel

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2 D.D.F., tome XIV, No. 261; Shafīq, Mudhakkiratī, part 2, section 1, p.269.

3 Langer, op. cit., p. 255.
on 19 February 1896. They amounted to evacuation, retention of British officers in control of the Egyptian army, and an Anglo-French condominium in which Britain would play the senior role. Salisbury thought of the possibility of evacuation if they kept a garrison at Cyprus and secured the right of re-entry. News about the French intentions, and the reopening of the Egyptian question, kept coming to Cairo from London and Paris from January 1896. It caused a stir, and a good deal of anxiety. Nationalist papers attacked those intentions saying that, although the Egyptians did not object to financial control and the employment of competent foreign employees, they should have a true Egyptian government. Conciliation between France and Britain was a weak point on the Nationalists' and the Khedive's side. What they really wanted was a confrontation between the two powers which would put an end to the Occupation. But French


policy changed later to take a comparatively more active part against Britain in Egypt during the Sudan campaign.

The internal political situation, already bad as far as the Khedive was concerned, grew worse. The ministry was weak and submissive to Cromer, and composed mainly of cyphers. 'Abbās complained that the ministers failed to support him, although some of them, such as Ahmād Maṣlūm Pasha and Buṭrus Ghālī Pasha, were his creation.¹ Muṣṭafā Fāhmi, the Prime Minister, had his prejudices since his dismissal in 1893. He followed an Anglophile Turcophobe policy. Not only did he omit to help the Khedive in his struggle, but sometimes he incited the British against 'Abbās, when he tried to gain more independence for his ministry from the Khedive, or in his endeavour to escape responsibility before Cromer for any deterioration of the situation in Egypt.² More important was the attitude of Cromer himself. He was convinced that evacuation was practically impossible, and was waiting for the chance to "move forward" and consolidate Britain's position in Egypt.³ The chance slipped in 1895 when Rosebery did not

¹ D.D.F., tome XIV, No. 197.
³ F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery, No. 205 private, 12 April 1895.
approve an advance in the Sudan, and again when Turkey sur-vived the Armenian question. In 1896 the Dongola expedition gave Cromer another chance to strengthen the British position in Egypt, and he was keen not to let it slip again. So, ‘Abbas had to face a British agent determined to impose stronger British domination. On the other hand, ‘Abbas had an ardent nationalist leader back from France and with an increasing popularity. Muṣṭafā Kāmil was dissatisfied at being recalled from France, and angry at the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Khedive for the nationalist cause. He threatened to go back to Europe and work independently.1 This would have weakened the Khedive’s hold upon the nationalist movement, and his position in the country ultimately.

All these circumstances probably together with a knowledge of what was going on as regards creating a diversion in favour of Italy on the Sudan front, and a desire to take hold of the situation before it was too late, explain the change in the Khedive’s attitude late in February 1896. He started, with the help of Russia and France, to improve his relations with the Sultan.2 Probably at the same time, he settled his relations with Muṣṭafā Kāmil, who soon started

1 Anīs, op.cit., pp. 90-93, Muṣṭafā to Ahmad, dated 25 January, 11, 19 February 1895.

2 F.O. 633/7, Currie to Salisbury, tel. No. 500, 22 February 1896; Al-Mu’ayyad, 22 March 1896.
campaigning against the Occupation, and for the Khedive.\(^1\)
It was a return to the policy of cautious resistance. The
Dongola expedition, however, soon followed. It radically
changed the situation, and forced different elements in the
political situation to more action. 'Abbas had to offer
some open resistance to the Occupation, but he was not in
a position to follow it either strongly or for long.

Resistance during the Sudan campaign

'Abbas was against the expedition for three reasons.
First, he resented the way he and the Egyptian government
were treated, as if they did not exist. Cromer had received news
about the Dongola decision late on 12 March 1896, Kitchener
had received orders at 3 a.m. on 13 March to prepare to
move the Egyptian troops, and the news about the expedition
had appeared in The Times of the same day, before the decision
was brought to the Khedive's knowledge through his Prime
Minister in the evening.\(^2\) Secondly, as 'Abbas told Blunt, he
objected to Kitchener's proposal of withdrawing the Egyptian
troops from Suakin to reinforce the army in the Nile valley,

\(^1\) After long silence since his return to Egypt in January,
Mustafa started his campaign by a speech delivered on 3 March
1896 in Alexandria.

\(^2\) F.O. 78/4764, Salisbury to Cromer, tel. No. 17, 12 March
1896; Arthur, C., op.cit., vol. I, pp. 187, 188; Rodd,
op.cit., pp. 86-87; Blunt, Diaries, part 1, pp. 273, 274.
and handing Suakin over to British troops. He threatened to ask the Sultan to send Turkish troops to occupy Suakin. But the main point was that 'Abbas was against the expedition at that particular time, not against the reconquest of the Sudan as such. He thought that it was decided simply to help Italy, and not for Egypt's sake. He further thought that it was not in Egyptian interests, as it would prolong the Occupation, and it was not the proper time of the year to start it.  

'Abbas refused to give his approval to the expedition before it was discussed in the Council of Ministers, and he told the Prime Minister of his opposition. Probably he wanted to gain time, to incite the ministers to opposition, and to see if the Sultan could do anything. In the Council, on 14 March, he objected to the use of British forces, and Kitchener withdrew his proposal about Suakin, but 'Abbas could do nothing but approve London's decision. He further expressed his views openly, and the Palace organ, al-Mu'ayyad, opposed the expedition from the first moment. Cromer apologised for the manner in which proceedings were conducted, and at the same

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1 Blunt, Diaries, part I, p. 274.

time threatened that should the Khedive continue his overt opposition, he might be obliged to report to Salisbury, asking the matter to be put before Parliament, which 'Abbas always dreaded. The Khedive had to keep his mouth shut.¹

Actually 'Abbas was powerless. With the Triple Alliance on the British side, and with the policy of rapprochement between France and Britain, the former could not be expected to do much. France pressed Britain to allow the opening of the Egyptian question in return for her allowing the Egyptian government to draw £2500,000 from the reserve fund for the expenses of the campaign. When she failed and the majority in the Caisse de la dette allowed Egypt to draw the needed sum, France resorted to her favourite way of obstruction by taking the matter to the mixed courts. France gained a sterile victory in December 1896, when the mixed court of appeal ordered the Egyptian government to pay the £2500,000 back to the Caisse. This victory was worse than defeat, as it helped Britain to strengthen her hold upon Egypt and the Sudan by lending Egypt the money for the expedition. Russia, who was soon to start building the Trans-Siberian railway, and who was disturbed by Japanese military and

naval expansion since 1895, was anxious about the free passage through the Suez Canal, and resented Britain's reservation on the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 concerning the neutrality of the Canal. She opposed the Dongola expedition and the use of the reserve fund. Together with France, she urged the Sultan to protest to Britain about the expedition, and later, about sending Indian troops to Suakin. But in the end, they left the Sultan in the lurch. The two powers were contemplating, during the spring and summer of 1896, to convene an international conference to discuss the Egyptian question and the guarantees for the Suez Canal neutrality. But they lacked the support of Germany; and Russia, who was then concentrating on the Far East, was unwilling to start a struggle, which would divert her attention to the Near East.¹

¹About the Dongola expedition, the conference on Egypt and the Suez Canal and Russia see F.O. 407/136, Goschen to Salisbury, No. 18, 22 March, and No. 51, 25 March; Dufferin to Salisbury, tels. No. 7, 16 March, No. 10, 19 March, and despatch No. 83, 19 March 1896; F.O. 407/137, Currie to Salisbury, No. 256 conf., 1 April, and tel. No. 121, 4 April; O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 60, 4 April; Lassèlles to Salisbury, No. 22 most secret, 5 May; Herbert to Salisbury, No. 405 secret, 25 May 1896; F.C. 633/7, Salisbury to Cromer, No. 177 private, 24 June 1896; F.O. 141/315, Gosselin to Salisbury, No. 213, 4 July, encl. in Salisbury to Cromer No. 109, 17 July 1896. For Suakin see F.O. 407/137, Herbert to Salisbury, tels. No. 161 secret, 29 May, and No. 216 secret, 19 June 1896. For the conciliatory attitude of France and her endeavours to
This international situation made the Sultan's protests half-hearted and without any real result. About the decision to advance in the Sudan, he merely asked Britain about the nature and purpose of the expedition. He was contented with a British assurance that it would not alter the political position of Egypt.\textsuperscript{1} His attitude towards 'Abbas was different. He protested that the decision had been made without consulting him and without his permission. Since it was against Muslims, it was impossible to sanction it. It is clear that the Sultan wanted revenge against 'Abbas, to throw the responsibility on him, and to remind him of his suzerain authority.

The Khedive found himself falling between two stools. He wanted to tell the Sultan that he did not approve of the expedition, putting him face to face with Britain. But he changed his answer according to Cromer's advance. After a British assurance that "should any attempt be made by the Sultan, in connection with the proposed operation, to encroach on the rights and liberties granted by Firman to the Egyptian Government, Her Majesty's Government will protect His Highness

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against such attempt", 'Abbās said that the expedition was a result of agreement with the views and proposals of the occupying power.  

This interrupted the line of conciliation which 'Abbās had started to follow towards the Sultan by the end of February, and forced him to be more conciliatory and more dependent on Cromer.

The Sultan repeated almost the same policy when more British officers were sent to Suakin, and when Indian troops were landed there in May 1896 to replace some Egyptian forces which were to be sent to the Nile Valley. He tried to strike a bargain with Britain, and take over the administration of Suakin. When he failed, he protested against the landing of Indian troops and made a formal reservation of his rights, but he sent to the Khedive saying that if the Egyptian forces were insufficient to protect Suakin, Ottoman troops would be ordered to proceed thither. Cromer, afraid that 'Abbās might be intimidated by the Sultan, or that the French might succeed in effecting a coalition between 'Abbās and the Sultan.

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2 Supra, pp. 402-3; F.O. 407/137, Salisbury to Herbert, No. 156, 3 June, No. 169, 17 June 1896.
on the Suakin affair, let 'Abbās know about the Sultan's efforts to take back the administration of Suakin. He also asked for authority to guarantee 'Abbās against any hostile action by the Sultan. The Sultan protested to 'Abbās in June against the landing of Indian troops there, pointing out that it was against the firmans and his suzerain rights, and asking for explanations. At the same time the Khedive received information that the British represented him to the Sultan as responsible for the despatch of Indian troops to Suakin. 'Abbās became irritated and answered the Sultan that the dispatch of those troops had not taken place with his knowledge, but was decided by the British government, and that he had not appointed their commander. Al-Mu'ayyad commented that it was then the duty of the Porte to prevent the danger of an occupation of Suakin which might cause it to meet the fate of Zeyla and Harar.¹

This continued nagging by the Sultan put 'Abbās in the critical position of either relying on British support, in which case he would have to alienate the nationalist movement and the Sultan, or conciliating the Sultan and continuing

his cautious resistance. He chose the latter.

Although 'Abbās was obliged, under Cromer's threats, to keep quiet, other means of opposition worked. The nationalist press, led by the Palace organ al-Mu'ayyad, carried on a strong and bitter campaign against British intentions in Egypt and the Sudan, and the sacrifices imposed on Egypt for British and Italian interests. The campaign revealed the bitter feeling in Egypt against the expedition. It lasted until the end of the expedition, but there was more concentration up to June 1896.¹ 'Abbās told Blunt his views about the expedition, asking him to write about it in the British press, which Blunt did by stating the facts as given to him by 'Abbās in an article in the Nineteenth Century.² In April the Legislative Council criticised the government for disposing of the half-million pounds for the expedition without consulting the Council or the General Assembly. Cromer suspected that the members were inspired by 'Abbās.³ Again, in December, the Council criticised the Budget for 1897. They regarded it as an uneconomical Budget,

¹See al-Mu'ayyad and al-Ahali in March–June 1896.
²Blunt, Diaries, part I, p. 275; N.C., vol.XXXIX, 1896, pp. 739–745. It is a detailed account of the statement of 'Abbās as it appeared in Blunt's diaries, with some additions.
³F.C. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 110, 16 April 1896.
and advised cutting some items of the expenditure, including the army of occupation's expenses, and using the sum thus saved for the development of education and the welfare of the society.¹

It seems that at that time, the spring or early summer of 1896, Muṣṭafā Kamīl formed in co-operation with 'Abbās the secret society which Luṭfī al-Sayyid called a "patriotic party" (al-ḥizb al-waṭani).² The co-operation between the two was now complete. During four months - March to July - Muṣṭafā delivered two speeches, one of them in French before an audience of foreign residents. In the first one, the audience unanimously agreed to a motion asking for evacuation. He also wrote some articles in Egyptian and French papers, and published a book containing his speeches and articles of 1895. The main points which he raised were that the Egyptians should unite behind their Khedive who was working for the emancipation of Egypt, to ask for the rights of their country and to secure the evacuation. The Dongola expedition was a danger to Egypt, as it would delay evacuation, and the British command of the expedition would create a grave breach between the Sudanese and the Egyptians; the Egyptian question was a threat to world peace and should be solved on the bases of evacuation;

²Supra, p. 132.
there was no fanaticism or hatred of the Europeans who were treated cordially and generously.¹

Muṣṭafā carried his campaign to Europe during the following three months. He visited Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, and ended by visiting the Sultan in Constantinople on his invitation. During this tour he delivered a speech in Paris, wrote letters to Mr. Gladstone and to the Austrian M.P., Joseph Popawski, and gave seven press interviews: to the Parisian La Libre Parole and L'Eclair, the German Berliner Tageblatt, Die Post, and Frankfurter Kurier, the Austrian Extra Tageblatt, and to the New York Herald. In Paris he pointed out the failure of French policy in Egypt, the deterioration of her prestige there, and the fact that the Egyptians were losing hope of getting any help from Europe. In Berlin and Vienna he stressed that the Egyptians hated the Occupation, and hinted at a revolution which would affect European interests should the Occupation be continued. He hoped for German support to secure the evacuation, or at least the neutrality of the Triple Alliance. In Constantinople

¹Kamil, 'Alī Fahmī, op.cit., part 4, pp. 132-149, part 5, pp. 7-72; Kamil, Muṣṭafā, Miṣr wa l-ḥiṭalāl al-īnjlīzī, aw majmu'at a'mal Muṣṭafā Kamīl muddat 'am wahid min Mayy 1895 ila Mayy 1896 (collected by Maḥmūd Maṣūd), Cairo, 1896. Muṣṭafā's speeches were published in nationalist papers. See al-Muṣayyad, 4 March, 14 April 1896.
he spoke about the relations between Egypt and Turkey, saying that Turkey was much concerned about the Egyptian question, that the Egyptians were keen to promote good relations with Turkey, and that the British were working to separate the Sultan from the Khedive, but he thought that the Khedive's policy would spoil their efforts. He spoke of the British attacks on the Caliph and on Islam. During the audience Muṣṭafā expressed to the Sultan the hope of all the Egyptians that he would do something for a favourable solution to the Egyptian question.

In general, Muṣṭafā stated that the British were working to undermine the Khedive's authority and European influence in Egypt, to take over the administration, to fight Islam and education in the country, and to turn the Sudan into a British colony.1 Cromer was sure of the intimate relations between 'Abbās and Muṣṭafā, and knew about the formation of the secret society with the Khedive's help.2

The importance in Egypt of this European campaign was that Muṣṭafā's speeches and interviews were translated and published in nationalist papers.3 This strengthened the press campaign against the Occupation and the Dongola expedition. Other factors also tended to strengthen this campaign and to make it effective on public opinion, at the same time it

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1 Kamīl, 'Alī Fahnī, op. cit., part 5, pp. 96-170.
2 F.O. 78/4763, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 131, 29 October 1896; M.PP., box 13, Dawkins to Milner, 24 August 1896.
3 See al-Mu'ayyad of the period, especially on 16-31 October, 17 November 1896.
sharpened the friction between 'Abbas and Cromer.

The war in the Sudan and the sacrifices and burdens it imposed on the people were a source of dissatisfaction. Furthermore Cromer, in 1896, took some steps which irritated the Khedive, raised a storm of protest in the nationalist papers, and affected religious feeling in a manner which he was usually anxious to avoid. Prince 'Aziz Ḥasan secured a judgment to deprive his mother Princess Khadija (called Princess Ḥasan in British documents) of the management of her estates because of her reckless extravagance. The Princess complained to Queen Victoria, and Cromer was asked to interfere. He put unusually strong pressure on 'Abbas. The first judgment was cancelled, then a trustee of Cromer's choice was appointed. The papers deprecated it as interference in Islamic courts.\(^1\) In November 1896 a new Higher Court of Appeal for the Majlis al-Ḥasbā', an Islamic court dealing with cases concerning the management of minors and handicapped people's property, was established. Some members were to be appointed by the Khedive subject to the proposal of the Ministers of Justice and the Interior.\(^2\) This was considered

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2. F.O. 78/4763, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 137, 8 November, and No. 142, 24 November 1896.
as subjecting that Islamic court to the interference of the British advisers of the two ministries, and was opposed by the Legislative Council.

The step which was more deprecated in the press, and resisted and resented by 'Abbās, was the creation of a system for amalgamating the accounts of all the waqfs and creating a reserve from the surplus. It was a step to put the Awqāf Department, which was under the direct control of the Khedive, more under the control of the Ministry of Finance, and hence of the British Financial Adviser. 'Abbās delayed his approval, resisted, and offered amendments. Al-Mu‘ayyad attacked the project severely as a British encroachment on an Islamic institution. But in the end 'Abbās was forced to accept it.¹

As a response to these press attacks, news of the Sudan was not allowed to nationalist papers, which were also prevented from circulating in the Sudan.² Then, when al-Mu‘ayyad published a secret telegram, sent by the Sirdar to the Egyptian War Office stating the effect of the cholera on the army at the front, the chance was taken to give a lesson to other papers. 'Alî Yusuf was prosecuted, but he was acquitted in the first instance and in the appeal. This "telegram case", instead of pouring cold water on press campaign, roused it

²W.P.P., box 261, Milhem Shakoor to Wingate, 8 May and 5 August (cont.)
even more. It then became a matter of defending what freedom
the press had.\(^1\) This was serious, as the press was the re-
mainning means of resistance.

Another factor made the situation more serious. New
disturbances in Crete and Armenia in 1896 caused a crisis
in Turkey's relations with European powers. The crisis tended
to grow more serious until it reached its height late in July
and during August. The Sultan was then obliged to accept the
powers' demand eliminating his authority in Crete. Late in
August the Armenians attacked the Ottoman Bank, and retaliatory
massacres followed in Constantinople. The powers again inter-
fered threatening most disastrous consequences, and the Sultan
was actually threatened with deposition. Britain played
a leading part against the Sultan, and attacks on him and de-
mands for his deposition were strongly expressed in newspapers
and meetings there throughout September and October.\(^2\)

The reaction in Egypt in sympathy with the Sultan was
much stronger than that during the Armenian crisis in 1895.

\(^1\) See al-Mu'ayyad August-November 1896. Among the papers which
attacked the government's action were al-Ahali, al-Ahram, al-
Watan, al-Fayyum, al-Ra'id al-Misri, Mifsis, and La Reforme.
On 14 and 27 October al-Mu'ayyad stated that the Parquet did
not think that prosecution was justifiable, but Johnson Pasha,
the head of the Parquet Inspectorate, insisted on it.

There are two main reasons for this. An agent of Abu'l-Huda, Shaykh Kamal al-Din al-Dimaqhi, was sent from Constantinople to Egypt late in 1895, mainly to strengthen feelings of loyalty towards the Sultan-Caliph against foreign domination, by exciting Islamic feelings and gaining more adherents to his master's sect, the Rifaiyya. He published al-Qahirah, a weekly paper, to propagate his views. Editors of some others papers were decorated or subsidized to join the campaign.\(^1\) With the changed attitude of the Khedive, now trying to improve his relations with the Sultan, the Palace organs joined in the campaign against Christian Europe in general and Britain in particular.\(^2\) This trend is also clear in Mustafa Kamil's campaign in Europe.

It was natural that Islamic feelings would be excited against Britain by this campaign with its religious overtones. A new symptom of this attitude in August 1896 was the retaliation in al-Munir and al-Waqt to attacks on the Sultan in the Anglophile papers, al-Muqaddam and al-Mushir, by very strong and quite indecent personal attacks on Queen Victoria.\(^3\)

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1. F.O. 78/4669, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 149, 17 December 1895; F.O. 141/315, Ferris to Cunningham, Aden 30 December 1895, and note, encl. in F.O. to Cromer, No. 96, 3 July 1896; W.P.P., box 261, note of a conversation with Kamal al-Din, secret; Yakan, op.cit., pp. 95, 96. It seems that after the Armenian crisis in 1895, the Sultan tried to strengthen his position in the empire by sending these emissaries to some countries.

2. See al-Mu'ayyad, August-October 1896.

3. F.O. 78/4763, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 111 conf., 24 August 1896; (cont.)
Late in October 1896 Cromer reported that the attitude of the Muslim population was disquieting. Many people had withdrawn their subscriptions to al-Muqattam, a wave of anti-Christian sentiment was passing over them, the conduct of the Sultan was generally commended, and any political opposition against Britain had become "distinctly more Islamic in character", as pan-Islamism had been "grafted on to Anglophobia". He considered the "head and front of the whole offending" to be the Khedive, who exerted pressure to create that state of discontent, and encouraged Anglophobe journalists. He proposed to speak very seriously to 'Abbas, and to threaten to take vigorous measures, including the use of the British troops.1

October-November 1896 marked the peak of a crisis in 'Abbas-Cromer relations. The "telegram case" was still pending, and 'Abbas was believed to be influencing the judge to acquit 'Alī Yusuf.2 The interest which the public showed

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1F.O. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 261, 26 October 1896; F.O. 78/4763, same to same, No. 132 conf., 31 October 1896; F.O. 633/6, same to same, private No. 265, 31 October 1896. About 'Abbas encouraging Anglophobe papers see also S.PP., vol. 109/91, Cromer to Barrington, 26 August 1896.

2The Times, 21 November 1896, from the special correspondent in Cairo.
in the case was an evidence of the growth of nationalist feeling and the awareness of the press as a means of struggle. 'Abbās was still opposing the new regulations for the waqf accounts. This was as serious as the changed attitude of the Muslim population. The ministers were unanimous in accepting the new regulations, and Muṣṭafā Fahmi complained to Cromer that the position of the ministers would be very difficult if the Khedive was allowed to set aside proposals on which they were unanimously agreed. It was again the long-drawn out struggle on the same question, which was of first importance to Cromer. Reliance on British support would put the ministers more under his hegemony and isolate the Khedive.

What made the situation even more serious was Cromer's intentions about the Sudan. Up to July 1896 Cromer thought of waiting for two or three years, after capturing Dongola, before resuming the reconquest. At the same time the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hicks-Beach, suggested that if Britain advanced money for the expenses of the campaign, the reconquered land ought to be mortgaged. In this case the British would administer it, and control its revenue and expenditure, until

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1 Supra, p. 223.

2 P. O. 78/4763, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 138 conf., 11 November 1896.
Egypt repaid the money advanced. Cromer opposed this plan, on the grounds that it involved serious complications with the Caisse, and would saddle the British Treasury with the expected Sudan deficit. He further thought that the Sudan should be administered by Egypt under British control, and that it would be unfair and impolitic to take everything from Egypt and give nothing.¹

It is probable that Hicks-Beach was instigated by Milner who, together with his friend Clinton Dawkins the Under-Secretary of Finance in Cairo, was trying to propagate the idea of a presumption of the campaign the following year. They pressed the idea of Britain advancing money to Egypt (should the Egyptian government lose the Caisse lawsuit and have to repay the £350,000) and taking a mortgage on the Sudan, which would be administered by the British. During their leave in Britain Cromer and Palmer, the Financial Adviser, fell under Milner's influence. Palmer was converted to Milner's ideas and later helped, together with Dawkins, to convert Cromer.² The result was that in October 1896 the latter

¹F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 262 private, 4 July and No. 264 private, 30 October 1896; F.O. 633/7, Hicks-Beach to Salisbury, memo encl. in Salisbury to Cromer, No. 177 private, 24 June 1896; S.P.P., vol. 109/72, Cromer to Binnington, 29 July 1896.

²M.P.P., box 13, Dawkins to Milner, 17 July, 16 August, 25 September 1896; Palmer to Milner, 27 September 1896; Milner to Balfour, 19 September 1896.
recommended an advance the following year up to Abu Hamad or Berber, and said that if they lost the Caisse lawsuit Britain should advance the money and control the administration of the Sudan.\(^1\) When the lawsuit was actually lost in December, and Britain undertook to advance the needed money, Cromer suggested that Dongola and any further territory acquired should be administered by the Sirdar in the name of the British government until the advance was repaid. He further suggested that a proclamation should be issued in the Sudan in this sense. Besides separating the Sudan finances from those of Egypt, and thus putting them out of the Caisse de la dette's control, the idea was also to consolidate the British position in Egypt and in the Sudan, and they could "arrange for the slow or rapid extinction of the debt" as it might seem best to them.\(^2\)

To carry out this policy of advance Cromer knew that he would face opposition from the Khedive on the grounds that Britain would "secure a hold over the Sudan".\(^3\) He tried to

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\(^1\) F.O. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tel., 21 October 1896; F.O. 633/6, same to same, No. 264 private, 30 October 1896.

\(^2\) F.O. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tels. No. 275 and No. 276 secret, 4 December 1896.

\(^3\) S.F.P., vol. 109/106, Cromer to Salisbury, private tel., 17 November 1896. It is probable that the Khedive's expected opposition, together with other reasons, made Cromer refuse the Vienna Embassy when it was offered him during his short leave in Britain. Rodd's reports about the state of Islamic (cont.)
intimidate ‘Abbas beforehand, and the existing tense situation gave him the chance.

As a first move, The Times special correspondent wrote from Cairo about the press attack, characterised by a strongly Islamic tone, on British administration. He hinted that it was favoured by ‘Abbas, and said that the Khedive’s influence should be controlled. Then Cromer met ‘Abbas. He told him that he could not acquit him of the responsibility for the state of feeling in the country, pointing out ‘Abbas’s well known relations with Mustafa Kamil and the editors of the Anglophobe papers. Any “positive disturbance”, as Cromer phrased it, would lead to an immediate increase of the British garrison. Cromer warned ‘Abbas against his ignorant advisers who were imbued with ‘Urabiist ideas, and said that he would incur grave responsibility and place himself in a position of serious embarrassment if he did not use all his influence on the side of order and good government. Then he raised the matter of the waqf accounts proposals. He reminded ‘Abbas of Isma’Il’s Rescript of 28 August 1878, by which the ex-Khedive undertook to govern with and by his Counsel of Ministers.

(cont.) opinion and the Khedive’s responsibility for it kept pouring into the Foreign Office at that time. This adds a personal grudge which made Cromer prepared for a policy of intimidation towards ‘Abbas. For the Vienna offer see M.PP., box 13, Dawkins to Milner, 16 August 1896.

1 The Times, 2 November 1896, from their own correspondent in Cairo on 31 October 1896. On this same day also Cromer sent his
Cromer insisted that the Khedive would incur grave responsibility if he rejected the unanimous advice of his ministers, and threatened that the system of personal government was one of the causes of Isma'il's downfall. But Cromer tried also to conciliate 'Abbas and persuade him to co-operate, especially as Anglo-German relations were becoming less cordial. He said that 'Abbas and the British government had the same object at heart, that is, the freedom and independence of Egypt. The difference between the two sides was only that of means. He invited 'Abbas to abandon his overt and latent hostility, to co-operate with the British officials, and to throw all his influence on the side of order and good government. Cromer said that this was the only way by which 'Abbas could hope to attain that object, hinting that the Khedive should not put much hope on France, with whom it was possible for Britain to reach an arrangement at his expense.¹

The result was that the new regulations for the waqf were passed by the Council of Ministers, and 'Abbas was again obliged to accept the validity of ministerial unanimity. This rendered

( cont. ) despatch No. 132 conf. about the growth of pan-Islamism and the Khedive's responsibility.

him psychologically prepared when the critical moment came and the mixed court of appeal decided on 1st December that the Egyptian government should pay back the £500,000 to the Caisse. The British government declared itself ready to advance whatever the Egyptian government would be unable to pay, and Cromer started to apply his scheme. The Egyptian government immediately paid back the money to the Caisse, and Cromer proposed that the Sirdar should issue a proclamation in the Sudan, announcing that he had undertaken the administration of the Dongola Province on behalf of the British government until Egypt repaid the money advanced. Salisbury, however, refused to give the money before parliamentary authority had been obtained, rejected the idea of the proclamation, and considered that the Sudan should be administered by and for Egypt, at least in theory. He even suggested to de Courcel in January and February 1897 that if France allowed the release of the sum from the conversion economies kept by the Caisse, the British loan would be paid back. He was also willing to accept the French counter proposal of a loan by the Caisse to pay off the British

1 F.O. 78/4764, Salisbury to Cromer, tel. No. 121, 2 December 1896; F.O. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 273, 3 December 1896.

2 F.O. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 276 secret, 4 December 1896.

3 M.PP., box 13, Dawkins to Milner, 6 and 9 December 1896.
loan. Salisbury was influenced by a desire to conciliate France, who was strongly against the British loan. He was further influenced by an apprehension of less cordial relations with Germany and probably an apprehension of having to pay for the Sudan deficit. Cromer opposed Salisbury's proposals to France as putting the Egyptian finances and the Sudan campaign at the mercy of the Caisse and France, and turned to a more cautious policy to achieve his ends. He proposed to act with the Egyptian government by avoiding any public statement about Britain administering the Sudan, and by signing an agreement with it, which would put the Sudan outside the Egyptian financial system, and pledge the Sudanese revenues to the repayment of the British loan, thus securing a lien on Dongola. Dawkins was sent to London to discuss the proposed arrangements. 1

In Egypt the Khedive and the Nationalists were against accepting the British loan. The nationalist press attacked it from the start, revealed its political implications, and preferred a loan from a bank or from the Caisse. The opinion

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1 F.O. 78/4764, Salisbury to Cromer, tel. No. 112, 5 October 1896; F.O. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 283 secret, 7 December 1896; F.O. 633/6, same to same, No. 270 private, 11 December 1896, No. 275 private, 17 January, and No. 278 private, 19 March 1897; F.O. 633/7, Salisbury to Cromer, No. 181 private, 12 March 1897; S.PP. vol. 113/43, same to same, 12 February 1897; D.D.P., tome XIII, No. 77,100. See also Sanderson, G. N., op.cit.,vol. II, pp. 717-718, 915-916.
was that leaving Britain impose the loan on Egypt meant that Europe left her completely to Britain.  

Cromer, however, got his loan agreement accepted on 3 February 1897, after a little struggle with the Khedive. It gave Britain a hold over the Sudanese and Egyptian surplus. Cromer tried to have it phrased in such a way as to make the character of a loan less evident. In fact, the motion in the Commons on 5 February to authorize the loan described it as "a Grant in Aid". By this Cromer got a good deal of what he originally wanted, that is, more hold upon Egypt and the Sudan.  

The agreement may be considered as the first actual step in realizing the British imperialists' ambitions in the Sudan.

The behaviour of 'Abbas may be explained by several reasons. He was timid and apprehensive after Cromer's threats in early November. Any help from the Sultan was certainly excluded at that time. French diplomatic inaction after winning the Caisse lawsuit discouraged 'Abbas and made him suspicious.

Their intentions in the Upper Nile, and their attempts to reach an agreement with Britain on the Egyptian question, on the bases of a condominium, were repeatedly mentioned and 


discussed in nationalist papers.\(^1\) The judgment of the mixed court of appeal, which was known to be influenced by the French, was thought of by the Nationalists to mean separating the Sudan from Egypt, in the sense that it considered that the Egyptian government had abandoned Dongola completely, and the reconquest was a political, not an administrative, affair.\(^2\) This led to more suspicion of French intentions. Probably Abbas felt that if he sided with France, he might help her to reach an agreement with Britain at Egypt's expense, and he would gain nothing but more alienation of himself from the British. At the same time, after a recent quarrel with his ministers, Abbas found himself exposed to the British, without ministerial support.

During and after that British loan crisis 'Abbas suffered much pressure, not only from Cromer, but also from the

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\(^1\) D.D.F., tome XIII, No.61; Al-Mu'ayyad, 1 June, 9 and 10 December 1896. For the earlier months see supra, p.108 footnote 2. Probably al-Mu'ayyad, on 9 December, was expressing the Egyptian views in hoping that a collision between France and Britain might provide a solution to the Egyptian question. After de Courcel's conversation with Salisbury on Egypt on 19 February 1896, he discussed with him nearly the same French demands in March, June, and December 1896. See F.O. 407/136, Salisbury to Dufferin, No. 99, 23 March 1896; F.O. 407/137, same to same, No. 214, 11 June 1896; F.O. 407/139 Salisbury to Monson, No. 506 B, 10 December 1896. The Sultan was in a weak position after the Armenian crisis in August 1896, and the beginning of the Cretan crisis in January 1897.

\(^2\) Al-Mu'ayyad, 14 December 1896. See text of the judgment encl. in F.O. 407/139, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 148, 6 December 1896.
Nationalists, represented by the nationalist press and some of his entourage and advisers. The latter advised him to change his submissive ministers. Unless he acted, they never said, friendly powers would/help him against British encroachment. The result was tense relations between ‘Abbas and his ministers, and a continuation of his covert resistance.

‘Abbas tried to change his ministers. At the end of February 1897 there were rumours of a ministerial crisis. Throughout February and March Cromer was apprehensive of a crisis, and kept dropping warnings of serious consequences. In May the attacks against the ministry in nationalist papers became stronger, and Cromer was afraid that ‘Abbas might be tempted by the change in Germany’s attitude, and the military success of the Sultan in the Graeco-Turkish war, to dismiss his ministers and force the Egyptian question on the British. In fact, Cromer thought that ‘Abbas was more master of the situation than he knew, and the only guarantee against a crisis was the Khedive’s timidity. He resorted to threat, and let it be known that if a crisis occurred it would “almost certainly be Khedivial, not Ministerial”. Another factor

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1. F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 274 private, 6 February 1897.

2. Al-Ahram, 27 February 1897.

3. F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 274 private, 6 February, No. 277 private, 26 February and No. 283, 28 May 1897; F.O. 78/4863, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 79 secret, 28 May 1897.
added to the force of these threats. It was the speech in the Commons of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hicks-Beach, on the vote for the loan on 5 February 1897. He stated that paying the advance was "rather likely to prolong the Occupation", and that Britain would not "be worried out of it by hindrances and difficulties...." By this he showed the determination of the British to have their own way in Egypt and the Sudan, and the complete failure of the French policy in the Egyptian question. This was enough to keep the ministers in their places, but it did no more. The situation deteriorated with 'Abbās's continued support of the nationalist opposition and his advances to the Sultan.

Muṣṭafā Kāmil carried on a stronger campaign in Europe in 1897, making two tours which lasted for more than five months. He visited Constantinople once, and visited Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, and Paris in each tour. The main purpose of the campaign was to get support for a favourable solution of the Egyptian question during the settlement of the Graeco-Turkish dispute. The increased attention which Muṣṭafā gave to Germany and Austria, and the stronger response in the press in the two countries is clear. Besides raising the points he made the previous year in his attack on the Occupation, he pleaded in Berlin for a favourable and active policy, not neutrality, in

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1 P.D.D., 4th series, vol. XLV, columns 1444, 1446. For the effect of the speech in convincing the people that the British intended to stay see F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 278 private, 19 March 1897.
the Egyptian question. In Paris he lamented the weak policy followed by France and Europe towards the Occupation, and stressed the need for an active French policy in Egypt itself, supporting the nationalist movement and the Khedive. He refuted press attacks accusing the Egyptians of anti-European fanaticism. In Berlin and Paris he praised the Khedive and his part in awakening the nationalist movement, regarding him as the symbol of the people's rights. In Egypt, a big audience attending a speech of Muṣṭafā Kamīl passed a resolution protesting against the continued British Occupation, and asking the Sultan to urge the powers for a settlement to the Egyptian question. Muṣṭafā even asked the Sultan to make the evacuation of Turkish troops from Thessaly conditional on the evacuation of the British troops from Egypt.¹

The bid for German help in Muṣṭafā's campaign represents a trend in the nationalist movement in 1897. The Nationalists and the Khedive had realized by then that no effective help could be expected from France, and were encouraged by the lack of cordiality in Anglo-German relations about the end of 1896, and the distinctly friendly German attitude towards the Sultan during the Greek war. In January 1897 Muṣṭafā Kamīl addressed

¹Kamīl, 'Alī Fāhīm, op.cit., part 5, pp. 198-232; part 6, pp. 6-108.
himself to the German nation asking its help for Egypt, several telegrams were sent to the Emperor for the same purpose. An Anglophobe German paper was restarted, probably the one started in 1896 in German and French by the German Hans Resener, in collaboration with Muṣṭafā, Muḥammad Farīd and Mahmūd Labīb Muḥarram.1

Cromer was convinced that ‘Abbas was behind these activities, and that Muṣṭafā represented the views of the Khedive. His reaction was to try to prevent ‘Abbas helping the Anglophobes or decorating them, and to cut his sources for help. He interfered to prevent ‘Abbas appointing Muḥammad Farīd in the Awdāf Department.2 When a ship was captured by the Greeks on its way to Thasos conveying some of the Khedive’s bodyguard, ‘Abbas asked for British help to restore it. Cromer did not recommend any effective help, saying that this would deprive ‘Abbas of some money.3

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1 Kamīl, ‘Alī Fāmī, op. cit., part 5, pp. 198-204; F.O. 78/4863, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 79 secret 26 May 1897; Al-Rafīʿī, Muḥammad Farīd, 2nd ed., Cairo, 1948, pp. 32, 303. Hans Resener also published "Egypt sous l’occupation anglaise et la question égyptienne", Cairo, 1897, which was also published in German, the year before and translated to Arabic. The three Egyptians were founders of the secret society called al-hizb al-watani, formed in 1896, under the Khedive in co-operation with Muṣṭafā Kamīl. Farīd succeeded Muṣṭafā in the leadership of the Patriotic Party in 1908. Their friendship began in 1895. In 1896 Farīd, as member of the Parquet, attended as spectator in the seats of the Parquet the trial of Shaykh ‘Alī Yusuf in the telegram case. He applauded when ‘Alī Yusuf was acquitted. This annoyed the British who wanted

(cont.)
The Graeco-Turkish war in 1897 was another important factor which contributed to worsen the situation and stir feelings. The victory of the Sultan filled the people with hope, and the poor fruits of victory he got filled them with resentment against the European powers, especially Britain, who sided with the Greeks.\(^1\) Their resentment was increased by the practical neutrality imposed on Egypt during the war, while Greek volunteers were allowed to march with their flag in Alexandria on their way to Greece.\(^2\)

The attitude of 'Abbās did not help matters, as he was too anxious to improve his relations with the Sultan. He was in favour of strong measures against Greek nationalists, encouraged a movement to raise money to help the Turkish army, and exchanged very friendly letters with the Sultan on the occasion of Turkish victories.\(^3\)

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(\(^{cont.}\) ) 'Allū Yusuf to be convicted, and Farīd's behaviour was considered as against discipline. He was transferred to Upper Egypt, but he resigned. See al-Rafī', Farīd, pp. 28, 29, 32; al-Mu'ayyad, 21 November 1896. His son 'Abd al-Khaliq Farīd provided the extra information during an interview in September 1893.

\(^2\) F.O. 78/4863, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 79 secret, 28 May and No. 86 conf., 12 June 1897.

\(^3\) Supra, p. 153.

\(^1\) Al-Mu'ayyad, March-May 1897. About Britain's attitude during the war see Langer, op.cit., pp. 375-377.

\(^2\) F.O. 78/4865, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 55 conf., 22 April 1897; Salisbury to Cromer, tel. No. 44, 23 April 1897; The Times, 5 April 1897.

\(^3\) F.O. 78/4866, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 43, 16 March;
The result was strong demonstrations in some provincial capitals on the anniversary of the Sultan's accession on 31 August 1897, and the threat of Rodd to move British troops to the provinces. Rodd, then acting for Cromer, considered 'Abbas responsible, for his constant encouragement to "the fomenters of disturbance in the native press", and his open hostility to Britain. Muṣṭafā Fāhmi held 'Abbas responsible for opening the doors to Turkish intrigue and intervention, complained, and asked for British backing.¹

Other factors also tended to increase the tension, and to make the situation appear to be getting out of hand. The death of an Egyptian in Alexandria, shot by a British soldier who was acquitted by the British Consular Court, caused a stir in the nationalist papers and among the population.² A similar situation was created later in August in Alexandria when an Italian killed an Egyptian fruit-seller in a dispute over a water-melon, and demonstrations broke out. Rodd was afraid that the Egyptians, feeling that they would not secure justice, would take the law into their own hands.³

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¹ F.O. 78/4964, Rodd to Salisbury, 116 conf., 4 September 1897; 3. PP., vol. 110/58, same to same, private, 5 September 1897.
² Shafīq, Mudhaşıkirātī, part 2, section I, pp. 245, 246; al-Muḥayyad, 6, 13, and 26 July 1897. Cromer called the
³ (cont.)
When an Englishman was killed later in September not far from Alexandria, probably for theft, Rodd reported that the fact that "natives,... should have dared to commit the murder of an Englishman,... has produced a great impression", and that it would have "a very sinister effect throughout the country unless prompt justice is dealt out to the culprit, or unless,... some retaliatory measures are enforced..." He thought that a remarkable change was coming over the spirit of the population, and that the British no longer imposed as they used to. He asked to be supported in any immediate action, which it might seem advisable to take. ¹

The worst was still to come, and Rodd had the chance which he wanted to impress the Khedive and the people "that the British Occupation remains something more than a mere historical tradition". ² On 17 September, while a body of

(cont.) case "a scandalous miscarriage of justice" and said that "an Anglo Egyptian jury would never convict a soldier of an offence committed against a foreigner or native". F.0.633/8, Cromer to Edward O'Malley, 18 November 1898.

³F.0. 407/144, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 111 conf., 20 August 1897.

¹F.0. 78/4864, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 117, 4 September 1897; S.PP., vol.110/58,60; Rodd to Salisbury and Rodd to Cromer, private, 5 September 1897.

²F.0. 78/4864, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 116, conf., 4 September 1897.
British mounted infantry were passing by the village of Qalyūb (Galioub in the documents) on their way to Cairo, a group of young men threw stones at them. They disappeared in the village before the soldiers could catch them. A body of British troops were sent to the village, they surrounded it before daybreak, and prevented anybody going in or out before the aggressors were arrested. The case was put before the Special Tribunal established in 1895 for trying Egyptians who attacked the army of occupation. The judge substitute for the Judicial Adviser, Mr. Cameron, consulted Cromer beforehand about the judgment to be delivered. Cromer advised six months hard labour in the Sudan, and the offenders were sentenced accordingly. He was using the traditional dread, which existed at that time, of banishment to the Sudan as a deterrent against further outbursts.¹

These severe measures were taken for two purposes. First, to suppress the rising wave of ill feeling against Britain. Secondly, as Muṣṭafā Fāhmi told Rodd, Qalyūb was in the middle of the Khedive's estates, and as the killing of the Englishman had been also committed near the Khedive's Palace, al-Muntazah near Alexandria, it was "desirable to give

¹F.O. 78/4864, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 121, 19 September; Cromer to Salisbury, No. 122, 24 September 1897; F.O. 78/4866, Rodd to Salisbury, tels. No. 99, 20 September, No. 100, 21 September 1897. For Egyptian protest see al-Muʿayyad, 24-26 September 1897.
a tangible proof that there was a greater power in the land
than that of His Highness" the Khedive.¹

The British military authorities in Egypt were not less
irritated. A programme for marching British troops from
Cairo to Alexandria and back through the Delta, and station-
ing some of them for some time in Ṭanṭā and Damanhūr, was
started at the end of September.² It was a demonstration
of force. It is most probable that as reaction to these mea-
ures, and to keep the nationalist feeling high, the Khedive
spent a week on his way from his summer resort at Alexandria
to Cairo, visiting the provinces in the central and western
Delta, where he was received warmly. Al-Muʿayyad described
the reception in detail.³ A war of broadsheets broke out.
One appeared with poems eulogizing ʿAbbas, and some verses
hostile to Britain. Another had on it poems highly abusive
of ʿAbbas and the dynasty of Muhammad ʿAlī, deprecating his
aspiration to the caliphate, praising British rule, and in-
viting Britain to check the Khedive's tyranny and annex Egypt.⁴

¹S.PP., vol. 110/61, Rodd to Salisbury, private, 20 September
1897.

²F.O. 78/4864, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 122, 24 September
1897, and encl. No. 6.

³Shafīq, Madhakkirātī, part 2, section I, p. 252; al-Muʿayyad,
4–6 November 1897.

⁴Supra, p. 142.
The authors and publishers of the second broadsheet, Shaykh al-Bakrī, Muṣṭafā Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī, and Āḥmad Fuʿād, were probably instigated by the British. This is confirmed by the fact that al-Bakrī was on good relations with the British Agency, and he was one of the two Legislative Council members who visited Cromer in 1893 and were thought to have informed him about the intentions of the Council to criticise the Budget. Āḥmad Fuʿād was an extremely Anglophile journalist. It is further confirmed by the attitude of the British when Ābbās wanted to prosecute the offenders. The Judicial Adviser and Cromer advised no prosecution. When Ābbās insisted, they interfered in the enquiry to shield al-Bakrī, although his two partisans confessed that he had written part of the poem, and was the financing partner. His arrest was prevented, the Juge d'Instruction was changed, the Egyptian General Prosecutor was removed, and the papers which were seized in al-Bakrī's house were disregarded by the new British General Prosecutor. It is clear that this was also part of the policy to minimise Ābbās and to show that there was a greater power in the land than the Khedive.

1 Supra, p. 66.
The Sorrilility Case - for this is what it was called in the nationalist press - was also a chance for Cromer to strengthen Anglophilia and the British grip on the administration, and to deprive 'Abbas of his means of propaganda. The Egyptian General Prosecutor was replaced by a British one, Mr. Corbet, an Anglophile employee was returned to his work after being dismissed, and the unofficial section of the official journal, where poems eulogizing 'Abbas were published, was discontinued. During a stormy audience on 18 November 1897 Cromer forced these demands on the Khedive.

This strong policy, started by Rodd in September, was maintained by Cromer because of the general situation, his wish to establish stronger British hold upon Egypt and the Sudan, the Khedive's relations with the Sultan, and the problems which Cromer had to face. These problems made him nearer to exasperation and more willing to intimidate 'Abbas and to do away with his resistance. The growing antipathy, or even enmity, between the two men strengthened this tendency.\(^2\)

\(^1\) F.O. 78/4864, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 145, 19 November 1897, and encls; al-Mu'ayyad, 11 November-4 December 1897, especially 20-23 November and 4 December, stated the development of the case and expressed indignation. There is a French translation of the poem enclosed with Cromer's despatch, and the Arabic text was published in al-Sa'iga, 7 November 1897.

\(^2\) In 1898 the French Consul-General, Cogordan, wrote about Cromer's "raideur, sa dureté, ... ses sentiments hostiles, devenus presque haineux, ... contre Abbas Hilmi." (D.D.F. (cont.))
The Khedive, especially after Cromer's threats in November 1897, increased his efforts to get on better terms with the Sultan by sending an agent to Constantinople to strengthen the relations with 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, and by buying up Young Turk papers. Among Cromer's problems at that time were the Italian evacuation of Kassala, and the need to garrison it with Egyptian troops, the resignation of the Sirdar, a financial problem, and a flow of British capital accompanied by concession hunters. This last was caused by increased confidence in the stability of the Occupation after the British loan, the Hicks-Beach speech, and the resumption of the advance in the Sudan. These problems dominated the political scene in 1898.

The financial problem concerned the provision of cash for the Egyptian Treasury from April until October 1898, when a great part of the revenue would be received. On previous occasions, when there was not enough cash in the special

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1 F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 290, private, 11 December 1897.

2 Ibid, same to same, No. 285 private, 23 October 1897.

(cont.) tome XIV, No. 11). Writing of his experience in 1907 when he was Consul-General in Egypt, François Charles-Roux mentioned the "antipathie mutuelle" between Abbas and Cromer which "n'était d'ailleurs un secret pour personne". See Charles-Roux, F., Souvenirs diplomatiques d'un âge révolu, Paris, 1956, p. 180.
reserve fund (the only fund at the disposal of the government), the government had borrowed from the Caisse, or a bank, on current account, and repaid at the end of the year. But, by the Law of Liquidation, Egypt's power of temporary borrowing was limited to a million pounds, and the British advance had nearly exhausted it, while the special reserve fund had been showing a debit balance. To solve this problem Cromer thought, in November 1897, of selling the Sudan railways, which he thought were worth about £750,000, to a British company with a concession to construct others. Cromer had other ends besides solving the cash problem. He wanted to introduce British interests in the Sudan, and to exclude others, even those of the Egyptian government and residents in Egypt. He told Salisbury that the operation was of great importance and desirable "in itself", and he urged him to speak to Lord Rothschild to give it a fair hearing. When negotiations with the Rothschilds, and later with Ernest Cassel, failed, he did not put it to public tender, although he confessed that some residents in Egypt would take it on much easier terms. The cash problem was not really serious. Cromer stated in the annual report for 1897 that at the end of December the special reserve fund showed a deficit of about £571,000. But there were about £260,000 of the fund, which although authorized for expenditure, had not been incurred,
and the British Loan of about £8780,000 was discounted. So, the cash state of the fund in fact showed a balance of about £3437,000. However, whatever cash difficulties existed then, should have been made easier when Cromer was able to get from the Caisse a grant from the reserve of £8954,000 for different purposes, and to sell the Khedivial Steam Packets early in 1898. But Cromer continued to persist on the sale of the Sudan railways. 1

This attitude of Cromer is due to his general attitude on the Sudan question since late 1896. He could not then get a mortgage of the reconquered provinces for the British advance. 2 By this railways affair he was still trying to increase his hold upon the Sudan. This trend was strengthened by developments in the Sudan campaign late in 1897. In October of that year Cromer came to the conclusion that the Egyptian army then was unable to take Khartoum unaided, that

1 F.O. 635/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 286 private 12 November, and No. 288 private, 20 November 1897; F.O. 633/8, Cromer to Revelstoke, 2 February 1898; S.P.P., vol. 113/59, 60, Salisbury to Cromer, private tels., 30 November and 7 December 1897; vol. 113/63, Francis Bertie to Cromer, private tel., 31 December 1897; vol. 113/70, Barrington to Cromer, private tel. 21 January 1898; vol. 111/13, Cromer to Barrington, 27 January 1895; F.O. 407/146, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 37 (the annual report), 27 February 1898, p. 68. By the residents, or to use his term "the local people", Cromer meant the Levantines and the Jews.

2 Supra, pp. 228, 229, 232, 233.
they should stop at Berber for the time being, and that so long as Britain possessed no more than a leasehold of Egypt, and had no great interests in the Sudan, it was not worth sacrificing valuable lives and incurring heavy expenditure by sending a British expedition. He thought that by holding Berber they could go to Khartoum before any one else, and they could command the trade outlets of central Africa — through Uganda, Suakin, and Alexandria — and that was what they really wanted.¹

The news about the Dervish advance in December 1897 changed the situation, and the Sirdar asked for British troops. To follow Cromer’s reasoning, this meant the sacrifice of British lives and money, and Britain should have the reward in firmer grip on the Sudan and Egypt. He insisted on the sale of the railways and proposed, to provide for the expenses of the new campaign, and to return to Egypt the power of borrowing, the remittance of the British advance of February 1897.² By this he could have a strong claim on the Sudan. It was a stronger scheme than that preached by Milner and Dawkins in 1896; a partnership has a more permanent character than a mortgage. In fact, there was no compelling need for the sale

²F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 293 private, 25 December 1897.
or the remittance of the advance. By the Decree arranging for the sale of al-Dāʿira al-Saniyya (Dāira Sanīsh), the buyers would pay £E500,000 to the Egyptian Treasury on 1st August 1898 as deposit to be discounted from the government's profit of the deal at the end of the contract in 1905. This was enough to cover the rest of the Sudan campaign expenses up to Khartoum and, in fact, Cromer asked for £E500,000 only for this purpose. The Egyptian papers said that the money would be used for the campaign.1 But when the contract was signed on 21 June 1898 the £E500,000 was put as deposit and not used. On 27 June the Commons passed a motion remitting the payment of the British loan to help Egypt to pay for the rest of the campaign, and to regain the borrowing power. This measure was proposed by Cromer in December 1897, and received Salisbury's approval in January 1898. The unnecessity of all these financial measures was later shown in the accounts for 1898.

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1S.P.P., vol. 113/66, Salisbury to Cromer, private tel. 8 January 1898; vol. 111/7, 8, Cromer to Salisbury, private tel., 15 January 1898; al-Muʿayyad, 7 May 1898; Shafiʿ, Mudhamkirati, part 2, section 1, p. 256. Al-Dāʿira al-Saniyya was part of Ismaʿil's estates mortgaged for loans contracted in 1865 and 1870. According to the Law of Liquidation it was put under an international commission. In June 1898 it was sold to a company of English, French, and resident financiers for the remaining amount of the loan. The company was to re-sell it by 1905, and to share the profit with the Egyptian government. The contract is enclosed in F.O. 78/4957, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 112, 14 July 1898.
Although the Sudan railways had not been sold, £8500,000 was lying as deposit, and the special reserve fund showed a cash balance of about £8478,000.¹

'Abbas, who was timid after Cromer's intimidation in November 1897, offered no real direct resistance to the sale of the Khedivial Steam Packets to a British company by the end of January 1898. But other means of resistance were exerted. ʼAl-Mu'ayyad, as usual, attacked the sale vigorously. The Khedive pressed some Egyptian notables to buy it, with no success. In the General Assembly which was convened in February, the members criticised the transaction and passed a motion that any such sale or concession in the future should be put to public tender.²

'Abbas took the same passive attitude towards the sale of al-Dā'ira al-Saniyya, and the establishment of the National Bank of Egypt, and the same press attacks attended the transactions.³

With the sale of the Sudan railways it was different. Cromer was touching a very sensitive part of the Sudan question,
the presence of Egypt in the Sudan. This sensitivity had been shown earlier in 1896 when Indian troops were about to be sent to Suakin to relieve the Egyptian battalions which were to be sent to the front. ‘Abbas, in spite of his weak position then, insisted that at least one Egyptian battalion should remain in Suakin, and it remained there.1 After the British loan of 1897, the reinforcement by British troops, and the rumours about another British loan in January 1898, the Egyptians became highly suspicious and apprehensive of British intentions in the Sudan.2 A sale of the railways appeared to them then as though everything was being sold in the Sudan. The railway symbolized the link between Egypt and the Sudan, and was to them, after all, a military railway built by their own soldiers under trying conditions. The language used by the nationalist papers on the subject was extremely bitter.3

The issue was raised when the Financial Adviser was about to leave for London and wanted authority to treat for

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1 F.0. 78/4765, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 125, 26 April 1896; supra, pp. 3, 23, 24.
2 Al-Mu‘ayyad, 2, 6, 11, 15 January 1898.
3 Ibid., 6-18 June 1898. There are extracts from other papers in the 11 June issue.
the sale of the Sudan railways. On 12 May 1898 'Abbas refused to sanction the unanimous agreement of his ministers to authorize Palmer, and frankly said that he objected to the railway passing into British hands. This, again, raised the long disputed point of ministerial responsibility. Cromer wrote home asking for support, putting much stress on that latter point and the importance of not allowing 'Abbas to get the better of his ministers.¹

Cromer was authorized to tell the Khedive that the British government desired him:

"to remind His Highness that the rebellion of Arabi Pasha deprived his father of the power conferred upon the Government of Egypt by the Firmans. That power was wrested from Arabi by the British victory at Tel-el-Kebir, and the rights which that battle gave to this country have never been parted with. Great Britain, having then acquired by conquest complete control over the action of the Government of the Khedive cannot allow that control to be disputed. Moreover, you should remind the Khedive that it is largely by English troops, wholly by English offi-

cers, and under English guidance that the railway has been made, and the Sudan so far been reconquered. Her Majesty's Government have still to determine how far and under what conditions or limitations the Sudan, so conquered, should be reunited to the dominions of the Khedivial Government.¹

This was a denial of any power for the Khedive, a claim of complete control over Egypt by right of conquest, and a threat to decide the future relations between Egypt and the Sudan unfavourably if 'Abbas continued his resistance.

On delivering this serious warning, Cromer again put much stress on the obligation, on the part of the Khedive, to accept the views of his Council of Ministers. 'Abbas did not swallow this point easily, but he promised to approve any future arrangement for the sale if it was accepted by the Council of Ministers and the British government.²

The opposition, however, was continued in other ways. The nationalist papers attacked the sale and the ministers, urging them to support the Khedive in his opposition.³ 'Abbas told the French and Russian Consuls-General of the whole situation, with no result.⁴ He appealed to the Sultan for

¹P.O. 407/146, Salisbury to Cromer, tel. No. 41, 15 May 1898.
²Ibid., Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 150, 18 May 1898.
³Supra, p. 263, footnote 3.
⁴Ibid., tome XIV, No. 197.
help, but the help came in a weak and curious way. The Grand Vizir telegraphed to 'Abbās expressing his approval of the Khedive's opposition, saying that the sale could not be permitted. 'Abbās passed it over to Cromer through Muṣṭafā Pahmā, but the Sultan was told that the sale was a question on which Britain could not yield, and Cromer insisted that the Sultan's opposition would not change British views.¹

He even returned to his old arguments about the possibility of being faced with the necessity of deposing 'Abbās, who would really be affected only if his personal position was threatened.² Also, as a sort of pressure on 'Abbās, he mentioned the idea of hoisting the two flags on Khartoum when it would be taken, and even suggested a statement in Parliament about Britain reserving her liberty of action as regards the

¹F.O. 407/146, Cromer to Salisbury, tels. No. 155, 23 May, No. 158, 27 May 1898; Currie to Salisbury, tel. No. 110, 24 May 1898; Salisbury to Currie, tel. No. 75, 25 May 1898. In fact the Sultan could not offer any significant help. He was then in a difficulty about the choice of a governor for Crete, especially after Germany and Austria had lost interest and withdrew their forces, leaving him face to face with his opponent, Britain, and with Russia who proposed Prince George of Greece. He was trying to conciliate Britain and to secure her help in Crete. See Langer, op.cit., p.377; F.O. 78/4956, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 85 conf., 5 June, and No. 95, 19 June 1898.

²F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 300, 5 June 1898; S.P.P., vol. 111/36, same to same, private telegram, 29 May 1898.
future of the Sudan.¹

Outwardly it seemed that he was too much absorbed in the struggle for the railways and throwing into it all his reserves which should have been kept for the final battle over the future of the Sudan. But, as he described it, the Sudan railways business was just a flare-up of the sparks which had for long been smouldering.² They were the sparks of the Khedive's covert resistance and of Cromer's trying to remove it by following the stronger policy initiated by Rodd. However, the railways were not sold, not because of 'Abbas's or the Sultan's opposition, but because the financiers insisted on unacceptable conditions: securities and a guaranteed high profit. They were not sure it would be remunerative and were afraid of an intervention by the Caisse, as in the £E500,000 loan affair of 1896. Cromer was keen to make this known to the public.³ It was the last strong stand of 'Abbas in his struggle with Cromer, before the final battle in 1906-1907. Cromer wanted to show that the Khedive had scored no

²F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 299 private, 14 May 1898.
³S.P.P., vol. 113/63, Bertie to Cromer, private tel., 31 December 1897; vol. 113/70, Barrington to Cromer, 21 January 1898; F.O. 407/150, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 36, 26 February 1899 (the annual report. An Arabic translation used to be published).
victory. Nor in fact had Cromer.

This did not deceive ‘Abbas of the strength of Salisbury’s warnings and threats, and of his own helplessness and the Sultan’s weakness. Still, he tried to make an effort to enlist German and French help. He invited the Emperor to visit Egypt in 1898. During his visit to France in the summer and autumn of that year, ‘Abbas was in contact with some members of the French Secret Committee for the Independence of Egypt, and other French politicians. It seems that there was close collaboration between ‘Abbas and Mustafâ Kamîl in these attempts. The latter, who was carrying on his propaganda campaign in Europe at the same time, concentrated on Paris and Berlin. In Paris, he met some politicians, and Delcassé, whom he urged to help the Khedive. In Berlin, he was much concerned with the projected visit of the Emperor. ‘Abbas also wanted to square matters with the Sultan. In spite of their bad relations, he took the unusual course of writing to the Sultan in August expressing his wish to visit Constantinople. The Sultan had to invite him.

These efforts were due to be disappointed. The Emperor apologised, and Mustafâ could not get from Delcassé more than an assurance that France would not allow Britain to depose the Khedive.¹ The shattering blow was, however, the Fashoda

¹ Shafîq, Mudhâkkirâtî, part 2, section 1, pp. 269, 270; Farîd, Correspondence, file 2, letters from Mustafâ to Farîd 19, 22 July, 5, 10 August and 4 September 1898.
fiasco, which put any substantial French support definitely out of question. What made it more effective was that it came after the Sultan had failed to act when the British flag had been hoisted side by side with the Ottoman flag over Khartoum in September 1898, in spite of the fact that the incident had been notified, under instructions from ‘Abbās, to the Grand Vizir, together with the substance of the British note claiming the right to have a predominant voice and to have their advice followed in all matters connected with the Sudan, on grounds of their substantial military and financial co-operation.

The Khedive's visit to Constantinople lasted from the end of September till 11 October, a critical period of the Fashoda crisis. He tried to improve his relations with the Sultan, and to see what support he could get in the Sudan affairs, which actually touched the Sultan's suzerainty on that country. ‘Abbās received nothing but a decoration and marked attention. With the outbreak of disturbances in Crete in September, and the clash with some powers led by Britain, the Sultan was helpless. He had been trying for some time to improve his relations with Britain to soften

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1 Muṣṭafā Kāmil wrote to Juliette Adam in June 1900 saying that Fashoda had made the Khedive profoundly despair. Kāmil, Muṣṭafā, Egyptian-French letters, (English and Arabic translations), Cairo, 1909, p.66.

2 F.O. 407/146, note to the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs (cont.)
her hostility on Crete. Cromer even received some reports that the Sultan was anxious to reach a compromise: to have his way in Crete, to give Kitchener two high Turkish officers to assist and advise him in the Sudan, and in return to close his eyes on the continuation of the British Occupation of Egypt.¹

All this finished the Khedive’s resistance. He was left completely exposed without a shadow of support. When he returned to Egypt, Cromer resumed towards him the policy of bullying and intimidation, probably because of the Khedive’s visit to Constantinople, and with an eye on imposing a settlement of the Sudan question. The prosecution of the governor of the Buḥayra Province at the end of October 1898, during the Khedive’s visit to that province,² was a blow aimed in fact at ‘Abbās, to intimidate and minimize him. Reporting to Delcassé, Cogordan said that there was very strong irritation among the British against ‘Abbās. He thought that Cromer “ne cherche qu’une occasion pour prendre contre [‘Abbās] les mesures les plus graves”.³

(continues)
These circumstances explain the timidity and submission with which 'Abbas accepted the Sudan Agreement of 19 January 1899. But there were other reasons. 'Abbas was aware of the Sultan's attempts to reach an agreement with Britain and to interfere in the Sudan affairs behind his back. Had he refused to approve the Agreement, he might have had to face the possibility of an agreement between Britain and the Sultan on the Sudan at his expense. There was also the problem of the ministers. They were either compliant with Cromer's wishes, or too weak to stand by the Khedive's side. They accepted the Agreement, and if he did not approve it, he would have also raised the long disputed point of the validity of the unanimous agreement of the ministers.

Ahmad Shafīq, and al-Mu'ayyad agreed on the point that 'Abbas and the ministers did not know anything about the Agreement until 17 January, and that they had to accept it on the following day. Shafīq said that the ministers accepted

(cont.)

2Supra, p. 143.

3D.D.F., tome XIV, No. 543.

1Supra, pp. 102, 103.

2Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section I, p. 295.
the Agreement while the Khedive was against it. But in fact there were negotiations between Cromer and Buṭrus Paša Ghālī, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, probably between 14-17 January 1899, and some modifications were made in the Agreement. ‘Abbas should have been acquainted with the results as he had accepted the Agreement on 17 January, before it was referred to the Council of Ministers and officially accepted the following day. He accepted it, however, reluctantly and with apprehension, and after Cromer assured him of British protection against any serious harm done by the Sultan.2

However, although the period of submission to the Occupation may be said to have been started after Fashoda, the signing of the Sudan Agreement marked the practical start of it.

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1 Ṣafīq, Mudḥakkarātī, part 2, section I, pp. 294-295; al-Ḥu’ayyad, 9, 22 January 1899.
Chapter V

THE PERIOD OF SUBMISSION

(1898 - 1906)

The general situation and policy

During the period of submission the Khedive, although still resenting British domination, especially that of Cromer, had to stop resistance. The signing of the Sudan Agreement caused a very sharp deterioration in his relations with the Sultan, and a decline of his prestige and popularity in Egypt.\(^1\) His weak position made him even ready to co-operate with the Occupation if he could have a share in the government. The ministers lost much in public esteem after the Agreement, and were in need of his support to bolster their position.

The nationalist movement became weak and divided. Despair of European support and of khedivial help drove the extremists to more reliance on the Sultan, and to more attention to the home front.

Up to the signing of the Agreement Cromer had achieved much in Egypt: strong British domination, the Khedive's sub-

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\(^1\) *D.D.F.* tome XV, No. 47. The Khedive's unpopularity made al-Mu'ayyad anxious to defend his submission by putting the blame on the ministers, and on the Porte's inaction when it was informed that the British flag had been flown over Khartoum. It also blamed the Porte for its delay in action after the Agreement had been signed. See op.cit., 21, 22, 28 January, 26 February 1899.
mission, and his separation from the Sultan. His aims after
the Agreement were to strengthen and consolidate British
domination in Egypt, and to implement the Agreement so as
to secure absolute British supremacy in the Sudan from
the start. His means were to overcome the nationalist move­
ment by separating it from the Khedive, and to win the latter
to the British side and induce him to throw his influence
on the side of the Occupation and the ministers.

It was not an easy task. Much of the Sudan had yet to be
conquered, and boundary-disputes started with neighbouring
powers, mainly Ethiopia and the Congo Free State. The situation
was not settled yet in the Sudan: the Khalifa was still at
large, and some of his adherents rebelled here and there, even
after his death.¹ As Cromer believed that the Sudan could
not be held by a British army, because of the climate and the
cost, he had to rely on the Egyptian army to meet his needs, which
was a discontented army, loyal to the Khedive only.²

¹Reference is made to 'Abd al-Karīm and his adherents, called
the Millenniumists, in March 1900, and to Muḥammad al-Amīn who
proclaimed himself mahdī in Kordofan in 1903.

²S.PP., vol. 112/27, Cromer to Salisbury, private, 26 March 1899.
a deficit in the Sudan of nearly half a million pounds. Cromer could not, and did not want to, get assistance from the British Treasury. First, because the pressure for more expenditure on defence was causing financial uneasiness in Britain itself; secondly, because Cromer was afraid that the growing expenditure might produce a sharp reaction by the British taxpayers, leading to the evacuation of Egypt.¹ So, Egypt had to meet the whole deficit, although it was a serious strain on her finances, and although she was not allowed any power in the Sudan administration. It was not easy to make this situation acceptable to the Egyptians.

The home authorities and the missionaries made the difficult situation even more troublesome for Cromer. The War Office kept asking for an increase of Egypt's contribution to the expenses of the army of occupation: a demand which Cromer rejected, pointing to the injustice of Egypt meeting the whole deficit of the Sudan. The missionary activities were another worry to Cromer. They were carrying on their work in Egypt in a way offensive to Muslim feelings, and pressing to be allowed to go to the Sudan. Cromer deprecated their attitude, saying that they were affording the weakened nationalist movement with its

¹F.O. 633/7, Salisbury to Cromer, No. 188 private, 12 April 1899; F.O. 800/123, Cromer to Lansdowne, 4 March 1903.
pan-Islamic attitudes a dangerous weapon.¹

The serious turn which the war in South Africa took during December 1899 and January 1900 affected the situation in Egypt, lowering British prestige, and raising hopes of salvation in case Britain was defeated.

All these circumstances offered the then weak nationalist movement a battlefield; a serious factor, with public opinion agitated after the Sudan Agreement. Cromer was apprehensive, not because he felt he could not cope with the situation, but because he feared that the new policy he was following after the Agreement would be upset. It was the policy of providing a calm atmosphere to assert stronger British domination in Egypt and the Sudan. As he put it later, in 1902, his main object was "to stir up as little mud as may be, so as to give the various shrubs we have been planting a chance of taking root".² The Khedive's conciliatory attitude after Fashoda, and after the Agreement, encouraged Cromer to use him as a calming factor. This is one of the reasons which made Cromer change his attitude towards 'Abbas; he became more conciliatory, and more helpful to the Khedive. This conciliatory

¹Supra, pp. 151, 152.

²F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 338 private, 26 November 1902.
policy lasted for more than two years.

The period of conciliation (1899-1901)

The tense relations between 'Abbas and the Sultan helped the application of the new policy. The signing of the Agreement was a contravention of the Sultan's suzerainty and a breach of firmans regulating the status of the Khedive. The way the governor general of the Sudan was to be appointed or dismissed, his authority, the British control over the Sudan's foreign relations – by acquiring the right to sanction the appointment of consular agents,¹ and later by signing agreements with other powers in the name of the Sudan² – suggested that Britain had practically assumed the suzerain position of Turkey in the Sudan. This is among the reasons why 'Abbas approved the Agreement reluctantly, and asked that the Sultan should be informed. Salisbury however refused, and 'Abbas was tempted by the idea that he would occupy a stronger position, and be more independent, if he did nothing, but left the Sultan to raise objections.³ This helped widen the gap

¹ Articles No. 3, 4 and 10 of the Agreement. The firmans prevented the khedives from relinquishing any of the privileges or to cede any territory given to them to another power.

² F.O. 141/350, Salisbury to Cromer, No. 186 conf., 5 October 1900, and encls.

between 'Abbas and the Sultan and make it unbridgeable.

The Sultan did raise objections, but they were to Britain, ignoring 'Abbas completely. He mentioned his rights over the Sudan, said that the Khedive was his minister and mandatory, that by his action 'Abbas was betraying his master and behaving independently, that Britain should unite with the Sultan in punishing him and in inducing him to abandon his illegal attitude, and that it was with the Sultan that a convention should be concluded. It seems that the Sultan was alarmed at the idea that the Agreement was the first step to a movement for independence, and that his suzerainty over Egypt might be repudiated. Although Salisbury answered that the Khedive had acted within the area of his independent rights under British advice, the Sultan expressed his great satisfaction, and even decorated his Ambassador in London, when Salisbury assured him that Britain had not desired to, and did not, diminish his sovereign rights.¹

The Sultan went even further in ignoring the Khedive and in trying to deal direct with Britain. He told the British Ambassador that 'Abbas was a silly youth whose actions did not matter to him, that what really mattered were the action and

¹F.O. 407/150, O'Connor to Salisbury, 5s. 5, 29 January, No. 15, 3 March 1899; Salisbury to O'Connor, No. 28, 3 February No. 48, 22 February, and No. 52, 2 March 1899.
language of Britain, and that as long as she was in occupation of Egypt it was of little importance who was khedive. He complained too of the actions of the Young Turks in Egypt, and of the Khedive's instigation and support given to them. He said that the Khedive should be brought to book and his activities stopped, and asked the British government to take immediate action against the papers Kanun-i Esasi and al-Manār.¹

But the Sultan gained nothing from his efforts, he was told that Mukhtār Pasha was acting against Britain in Egypt as the Young Turks were acting against the Sultan, and the Ambassador's despatch containing the Sultan's complaints and derogatory statements about 'Abbās was shown to the Khedive.²

Other factors tended to worsen the relations between 'Abbās and the Sultan. In August 1899, Muṣṭafā Fāhmi refused to comply with a message from the Porte to suppress the papers which attacked the Sultan. He took the more serious step of saying that he reserved the entire independence of Egypt in such matters, and did not recognize Mukhtār Pasha's authority to convey such a communication.³ Al-Kawakibī also arrived in Egypt

¹F.O. 407/150, O'Connor to Salisbury, No. 101, 4 March 1899; F.O. 141/341, same to same, No. 159, 30 March 1889, encl. in Salisbury to Cromer, No. 84, 7 April 1899.
²F.O. 78/5023, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 73, 13 April 1899; F.O. 78/5026, same to same, tel. No. 102, 22 April 1899; D.D.F., tome XV, No. 147.
³F.O. 78/5024, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 153 conf. 15 August 1899.
early in 1899, and started his campaign for an Arab caliphate, supported by the Khedive.\(^1\) A first edition of his book, *Umm al-Qurā*, was published in Port Said in 1899, with the appeal to ‘Abbās to help in furthering *Umm al-Qurā*'s aims, and to protect this imaginary society; an appeal which was later omitted when the book was republished in instalments in *al-Manār* in 1902-1903.\(^2\) The first edition of the book was known to the Turkish High Commissioner in Egypt,\(^3\) and he must have informed Constantinople. We find traces of all this in a message from the Sultan to the British Ambassador on 13 September 1899 which said that "Some ill disposed and wicked persons in Egypt had formed themselves into a secret committee, and were engaged in plotting against him as Caliph", and that they were sending emissaries to the Ḥijāz.\(^4\) In November the Sultan issued orders to the *walī* of Basra and other Turkish


\(^2\)A copy of this early edition is in the library of the Oriental Institute, Oxford. The title-page shows the place and the year of publication; Port Said, 1316 A.H. The year was engraved with the title, which was used in its original form for later editions. Port Said may not have been the real publishing place. Al-Kawakibi may have been trying to give the story of his society an appearance of reality by mentioning the place where the imaginary society had decided to make its temporary headquarters. The date, 1316, suggests that the book was published before June 1899. See *Umm al-Qurā*, pp. 175, 186, 190, 191; *al-Manār*, 14 February 1903, vol. V, p. 860.

\(^3\) *al-Manār*, vol. V, 1902, p. 279.

officials to arrest certain emissaries whom the Amir of Najd had
sent, or was about to send, to the Khedive.¹

At the beginning 'Abbās sent his secretary, Ahmad Shafīq,
to Constantinople in April 1899 to attempt conciliation, drawing
the Sultan's attention, at the same time, to the Porte's
inaction when the hoisting of the British flag over Khartoum
had been reported.² But the Sultan was not conciliated. He
ceased to request and issued orders to the Khedive,³ trying
to assert his authority over him. When the Anglo-French de-
claration of March 1899 about spheres of influence in Central
Africa was known, he sent to 'Abbās directing him to take all
measures to safeguard and affirm the imperial rights as regards
Egypt, and to report proceedings.⁴

When 'Abbās wanted to go with his family to Rhodes in July
1899, he was refused permission, and ordered to send his family

¹F.O. 141/350, Consul Wratislaw in Busseorah to O'Connor, No. 53
conf., 30 November 1899, encl. in Salisbury to Cromer, No. 7
conf., 12 January 1900.

²Shafīq, Mudhakkiratī, part 2, section 1, pp. 299, 303, 307.

³F.O. 78/5026, Rodd to Salisbury, tel. No. 177, 27 September
1899.

⁴F.O. 78/5026, Cromer to Salisbury, tel. No. 128, 17 June 1899;
'Abdīn Archives, Turkish section, box No. 525, file Maqam
Șadārat, the Grand Vizier to the Khedive, 3 Muharram 1317 (14
May 1899). A translation of the letter is encl. in F.O. 407/151,
Cromer to Salisbury, No. 111, 17 June 1899.
to Constantinople instead. Cromer obtained an invitation for him to go Cyprus, and pressed that if he went there he should be treated with the utmost consideration and courtesy. Under changed circumstances ‘Abbās was allowed to go to Rhodes, but later, when he wanted to prolong his stay, and went from the island to the mainland without permission, he was ordered to return to Egypt at once. He then accepted the British invitation and went to Cyprus.\(^1\) In fact ‘Abbās became bolder than before. When in Europe in 1899, he visited the Austrian Emperor in Vienna without the Sultan’s permission. Later, he accepted the Queen’s invitation to visit London, the following year, and deliberately paid Cromer exceptional civility at the ceremony for unveiling the statue of De Lesseps at Port Said.\(^2\)

The tension in the relations between the Sultan and ‘Abbās in 1899 was so serious that the latter prevented his brother, Prince Muhammad ‘Alī, from visiting Constantinople that year, and when the Sultan summoned the Khedive’s uncle, Prince Ḫusayn Kāmil, to Constantinople, there were fears that the Sultan was meditating on some action against ‘Abbās. Muṣṭafā Fahlī urged Cromer to take the chance to strengthen the disposition towards

\(^1\)F.O. 78/5026, Cromer to Salisbury, tels. No. 150, 13 July, No. 191, 20 October 1899; Rodd to Salisbury, tel. No. 155, 18 July 1899; F.O. 78/5024, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 187, 13 October 1899, and encl. See also supra, pp. 115, 116.

greater friendliness to Britain which the Khedive had recently displayed, and he was told to give the Khedive "most positive assurance that so long as His Highness's conduct recommends itself to Her Majesty's Government he need fear nothing from any action of the Sultan".¹ In November Cromer obtained for 'Abbas an invitation from the Queen to visit London the following summer, to keep him "in his present friendly frame of mind".² Later, he urged that during the visit the Khedive "should be treated with the utmost possible civility and that in political matters he should not have any semblance of a threat made to him" in order not to "unsettle his political equilibrium".³ Another friendly gesture was British support to 'Abbas in 1901 in the Grand Qadi's affair, although it was unsuccessful.⁴

The Sultan, however, began to conciliate 'Abbas by the end of 1899. This was probably under the influence of the French Ambassador, who warned him that he would be in trouble if the Khedive renounced his allegiance, and of Muṣṭafā Kāmil

³Ibid., vol. 112/105, Cromer to Barrington, private, 16 March 1900.
⁴Supra, p. 274.
who, during his visit to the Sultan in August, urged that the Khedive should receive some direct encouragement to persevere in his loyalty to the Sultan.¹ In spite of this, other clashes occurred in 1900 and 1901.²

We should bear in mind, however, that in May 1899 ‘Abbās refused to replace the Turkish Grand Qādī by an Egyptian, in spite of pressure from Cromer and the Egyptian ministers.³ In 1901 ‘Abbās returned to his policy of pleasing the Sultan by sending Young Turks to Constantinople.⁴

This shows the Khedive’s policy at that time. He became aware of the possibilities opened to him by his independent action concerning the Sudan Agreement, and decided to strengthen his position towards the Sultan. At the same time he did not have a strong desire to alienate the Sultan, and tried to keep a balance, in his relations, between the Sultan and Britain. But this does not mean that he was friendly towards the Occupation or Cromer. In fact he was, as Cromer said in 1902, unfriendly though inactive,⁵ resentful though submissive. This

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¹ F.O. 78/5024, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 176 secret, 16 September 1899; F.O. 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 318 private, 16 December 1899; Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 302, 316, 317.

² When in 1900 ‘Abbās met Dānād Jalāl al-Dīn Māhīm Pasha in Europe, the Sultan urged him to return to Egypt. ‘Abbās disregarded the request, and refused the Sultan’s invitation to visit Constantinople on his way to Egypt. F.O. 78/5088, Rodd to

(cont.)
judgment is true of the Khedive's attitude up to the Taba incident in 1906.

'Abbas also managed, in spite of the setback in his popularity, to maintain good relations with the Nationalists. Muṣṭafa Kamīl excused the Khedive's submissive attitude because of Fashoda, and as he wrote to Juliette Adam in June 1901, he believed that 'Abbas was and would be always patriotic. Fashoda was a serious blow to the Nationalists, and with the loss of French support, the apathy of the Sultan, and the ambiguity of German sympathy, they could not afford to alienate the Khedive. It seems that Muṣṭafa Kamīl was even trying to improve the relations between 'Abbas and the Sultan whenever there was tension, to keep against the Occupation a solid front on which the nationalist movement could rely. But Cromer was able to separate the Khedive from the extreme Nationalists in 1904.

In fighting the nationalist movement Cromer followed the same discrete policy: avoiding open clashes. Muṣṭafa Kamīl pursued,


In 1901 the Sultan appointed a Grand Qādi of Cairo of his own choice, regardless of the Khedive's proposals. V. supra, p. 114.

3 Supra, p. 115.

4 Shafīq, Mudhakkirāt, part 2, section 1, pp. 353-355, 365-367.

5 F.O. 78/5225, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 1 secret, 2 January 1902; F.O. 78/5226, same to same, No. 75 conf., 23 May 1902.

1 Kamil, Muṣṭafa, Egyptian-French letters, pp. 66, 74. (cont.)
during 1899 and 1900, his usual activities in Europe and Egypt, and established al-Liwa' in January 1900. Muṣṭafā Pasha Pahmī urged Cromer that it was time to take severe measures of repression against Muṣṭafā. Cromer refused, as he considered that a policy creating political martyrs would defeat its ends. He preferred, instead, to deal with officers or officials interested in Muṣṭafā's agitation under the ordinary code of discipline, which prevented them from carrying on political activities.1 Cromer interfered in 1899 to prevent the renewal of contract for two Egyptian judges in the mixed courts, because of their expressed Anglophobia.2 They were Yusuf Siddiq and Ismā'īl al-Shīmī, two supporters of Muṣṭafā Kamīl, and members of the secret committee formed by him and the Khedive in 1895.3

( cont. )

2 Besides his efforts in 1899 mentioned above Muṣṭafā was also connected with other efforts exerted by his friend Luṭfī Bey, the Ottoman Consul at Budapest, in 1902 for the same purpose. See F.O. 407/159, Plunkett to Lansdowne, No. 181 most conf., 12 July 1902, and encl.


2 F.O. 78/4957, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 193 conf., 18 November 1898; F.O. 78/5022, same to same, No. 36, 26 February 1899. For nationalist criticism see al-Mu'ayyad, 5, 31 January, 2 February 1899.

3 Supra, p.124.
More important in fighting the nationalist movement, were the efforts to separate 'Abbas from it, and to gain him, openly and with publicity, to the British side, in order to encourage the Anglophiles and dishearten the Nationalists. Two important events helped this policy. The first was the mutiny of two battalions of the Egyptian army at Omdurman in January 1900. Wingate suspected that the Khedive was sympathizing with the mutineers, and together with Cromer, thought that his previous attitude and utterances were to some extent responsible for what happened. Salisbury instructed Cromer, on his demand, to tell the Khedive that the British government:

"have observed with pleasure that His Highness' acts and demeanour have recently been of a friendly character, but they cannot conceal from themselves that his previous conduct has on many occasions been of a nature to encourage mutinous designs, and that the present difficulties owe their origin to this fact.

1 Ammunition was withdrawn from the troops because of discontent in the army. The two battalions took it back by force, turned their British officers out and put the barracks in a state of defence. The mutiny was caused by discontent among the Sudanese soldiers, and their fear that the withdrawal of the ammunition was a step before sending them to fight the Boers. There was also discontent among the officers concerning pay, pensions, promotion, and treatment. See Cromer, Abbas II, pp. 82, 83; F.0. 78/5086, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 24 conf., 7 February, No. 27 conf., 10 February 1900, and encls.; F.0. 78/5087, same to same, No. 55 secret, 16 March 1900, and encl.
They feel it their duty to warn His Highness that they must consider him personally responsible for the results of his action, and that unless his influence is exercised to the utmost for repairing the trouble thus caused and order and discipline are quickly restored, the consequences to His Highness may be very serious.\textsuperscript{1}

Thus 'Abbas had to sanction the judgment by the High Court-Martial against seven Egyptian officers although in his memoirs he stated that they were innocent. They were dismissed from the army, deprived of their ranks and decorations, and sent back to Egypt. The Sirdar wrote to Cromer from Khartoum that the mutiny was

"in a great measure due to the fact that a very general ..... impression existed that the mutineers would meet with a certain degree of sympathy from His Highness ..... many persons at Cairo have been making a very improper and unauthorized use of His Highness name..... The senior native officers here ..... have openly expressed to me their abhorrence of the unscrupulous methods adopted by hostile persons;.... to upset the good relations between the British and Egyptian

\textsuperscript{1}S.PP., vol. 112/89, Cromer to Salisbury, private tel. 20 February 1900; F.0.78/5089, Salisbury to Cromer, tel.No. 12, 22 February 1900.
officers..... they have urged me..... to re-present to His Highness the Khedive the im-
mediate and absolute importance of cleaning
the army of these most baneful influences."

Cromer used this letter to urge 'Abbās to receive
the dismissed officers and to read to them, on 15 March
1900, a strongly worded speech, drafted by Cromer, con-
demning their behaviour and pledging his support to the
Sirdar. 'Abbās claimed in his memoirs that he murmured the
speech in a way as to make it incomprehensible to the officers
and other officials attending, but the speech was gazetted as
a special army order, to be read out on three successive parades.
Cromer said that he followed this course to make the Khedive
publicly dissociate himself from the "somewhat dangerous pro-
ceedings of the ultra Mohamedans who, whether in or out of the
army, virtually constitute one party..." and that the effect
had been decidedly good.¹ Besides trying to separate the
Khedive from the Nationalists by this action, Cromer actually
separated him from the army, especially from the senior Egyptian
officers. This isolation was strengthened when during the in-
quiries an Egyptian officer tried to save himself by disclosing the
existence of a secret society for the officers. He disclosed
the names of about forty of its members, amongst whom were the

¹F.O. 78/5087, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 55 secret, 16 March 1900,
enclosing Wingate to Cromer, private, 26 February 1900; 'Abbās,
"Memoirs", al-Migrī, 6 May 1951.
dismissed officers. Thus 'Abbas lost the army.

The second event which helped Cromer's policy was the Khedive's official visit to London in the summer of 1900. It gave 'Abbas a chance to meet British politicians and members of the royal family, and to fulfill his old wish of establishing direct contact with them. He was impressed by the friendly and magnificent reception, and was anxious to express his gratification, and give the impression that he had learned to know the British better, and that "the epoch of misunderstanding is over". De Martino Pasha, the Director of the khedivial private estates (al-Khāṣṣa), speaking for the Khedive's suite, said that their eyes had been much opened by all they had seen, and that they were returning with new ideas. This may be true as one at least of the Khedive's confidents in the household (al-Mā'īyya), Ahmad Shafīq, had suggested in 1899 that the Khedive might visit the European sovereigns, who would like to meet him, in retaliation for the Sultan's stiff attitude towards the Khedive during that year.²

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¹F.0.78/5067, Wingate to Cromer, tel. No. 71, 19 February 1900, encl. in Cromer to Salisbury No. 38 conf., 25 February 1900; 'Abbas, "Memoirs", al-Migri, 6 May 1951. 'Abbas mentioned the number as 75 officers.

²S.PP., box "Baring, E.", Rodd to Salisbury, 5 July 1900; Shafīq, Muhhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, p.306.
More significant of the Khedive's attitude, was what he said to Faris Nimr, one of the proprietors of the extremely Anglo-
phile paper al-Muqattam, during an interview, which was pub-
lished in that paper between 2-4 August 1900. Giving allowance
to exaggerations by al-Muqattam, the Khedive expressed a hope
to repeat the visit to Britain to renew ties of friendship which
had an influence on the welfare of Egypt. He said that he re-
spected Cromer, understood him and found it easy to work with
him. It was desirable to him that Cromer should stay in Egypt.
He added that in dealing with affairs directly and personally
with Cromer, matters went smoothly and difficulties vanished,
and that "Only when others have come between us and matters were
openly discussed, they have not gone so smoothly..... I have
convinced myself that those who intervened were only endeavou-
ing to create difficulties between us. This has however come to
an end. There will be no room for their intrigues in the future."
This last statement of 'Abbas shows another side of his new
policy: the price he wanted for his co-operation. It carries
a covert attack on the ministry, and conveys a wish to share in
the management of affairs and deal with Cromer directly instead
of through the ministers. This is confirmed by the fact that in
February 1900, the Khedive's mouthpiece al-Mu'ayyad urged
Britain to reach with 'Abbas (not with the Sultan) an agreement,
on the basis of evacuation and a guarantee of British interests
by 'Abbās, and in October 1900, after the visit, Cromer had to drop a few words of warning when he suspected that 'Abbās might try to change his ministers.\(^1\)

The effect of the London visit on the Nationalists was bad. Muṣṭafā Kamīl wrote in al-Liwā' expressing his regret and advising the Khedive that the highest hope of the Egyptians was to see him loyal to the Sultan-Caliph. He wrote to Juliette Adam in June expressing his feeling, "as well as the national feeling", that the visit was painful for them.\(^2\) But the effect of the Khedive's talk with Fāris Nīmru was worse. It was an open confession by the Khedive in person of a change in his policy. No less disturbing to the Nationalists was the selection of the Occupation's Arabic mouthpiece, al-Muqattam, to be the medium of communication. This talk, and this publicity, were embarrassing and weakening factors to the Nationalists who relied on the Khedive's prestige and support, and on the Egyptians being aware that they enjoyed it. Even al-Mu'ayyad, which defended the Khedive's visit to London and his new policy towards the

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\(^1\) Al-Muqattam, 3 August 1900; al-Mu'ayyad, 20 February 1900; F.0.78/5088, Rodd to Salisbury, No. 134 conf., 7 August 1900; a translation of the interview is enclosed; F.0.633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 326 private, 19 October 1900. For another translation see The Egyptian Gazette, 10 August 1900.

\(^2\) Al-Liwā', 31 May 1900; Kamīl, Muṣṭafā, Egyptian-French Letters, p.64.
Occupation, could not stomach the idea of al-Mu'ayyad as a khedivial mouthpiece, but it put all the blame on the inaccuracy of Faris Nimr.\(^1\) Cromer was then anxious to give publicity to the Khedive's new attitude towards the Occupation. In his annual report for 1899, which used to be translated and published in Arabic, Cromer extolled the Khedive's "cordial co-operation" with the British.\(^2\)

Cromer's policy of using 'Abbas as a calming factor began to bear fruit late in 1899. Al-Mu'ayyad, the Khedive's mouthpiece and the paper which used to lead Anglophobe agitation, after a hot campaign following the Sudan Agreement, started gradually to tune down its Anglophobia until in the summer of 1900 it defended the Khedive's visit to London and his attitude towards the Occupation. Muṣṭafā Kāmil edited the paper during 'Ali Yusuf's absence in October 1898, but, when policy changed, the latter refused to publish articles by Muṣṭafā in 1899, and this prompted Muṣṭafā to establish his paper, al-Liwa', later.\(^3\) Actually, from 1900 until the resumption of the struggle between 'Abbas and Cromer, al-Mu'ayyad took the role of moderate opposition.

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\(^1\) Al-Mu'ayyad, 7 July, 4 and 5 August 1900.

\(^2\) P.0.407/155, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 34, 20 February 1900, p.57.

resuming its severe attacks only when something touching the Khedive happened, like the affairs of Leon Fahmi, the ‘Uthmāniyya Printing-House, and the Minshāwī case. Sometimes it even went to the extent of praising Cromer and Wingate, and their policies.

Cromer was pleased with these results, and dreamt of a complete success. He wrote in December 1899 saying that in the absence of instigation on the part of the Khedive, "Anglo-phobe agitation may be said... to have almost ceased". In May 1900 Harry Boyle, the Oriental Secretary, wrote a memorandum about what he called the patriotic party (meaning Mustafā Kāmil and his collaborators) and pan-Islamism. He said that the party might be considered as defunct, that the Khedive had broken away from their web, and that if he afforded them any pecuniary support, it was given grudgingly and in small sums, for fear of "chantage".

There is some exaggeration in this. The patriotic party was weak, but not defunct. The Khedive was trying to improve his relations with the British, but he was seeking to maintain

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1 For the ‘Uthmāniyya v. supra, p.109; for the Minshāwī v. infra, p.292.

2 F.0.633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 318 private, 16 December 1899.

3 F.0.78/5087, memorandum by Harry Boyle, encl. in Cromer to Salisbury, No. 97 conf., 26 May 1900.
friendly relations with the Nationalists at the same time. Although 'Abbās was "patriotically" less enthusiastic, he was and would always be a patriot, as Muṣṭafā Kamīl wrote in June 1901. Muṣṭafā and his followers, although detesting the Khedive's new attitude, were considerate and tolerant. Muṣṭafā wrote in June 1900 about the London visit, saying that with Fashoda and with the attitude of Europe in the Transvaal affair "who could counsel the Khedive to seriously resist England?" 2

We find the explanation to their policy in Muṣṭafā's book, al-Mas'ala al-Sharqiyya (the eastern question), which was published in 1898. It said that dissension led to the Occupation: dissension between 'Urābī's party and Khedive Tawfīq, and dissension between the Khedive and the Sultan. This was why all Egyptians should be strongly attached to the Khedive, and defend his throne with their lives, and they should stick fast to their ties with the Sultan. 3 Rashīd Riḍā threw more light, on the authority of Rafīq Bey al-‘Āzm, 4

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1 Kamīl, Muṣṭafā, Egyptian-French letters, p. 66.
2 Ibid., p. 66.
a friend of Muṣṭafā and Farīd. Rafiṣ Bey told him that these two leaders were using the Khedive as a means to rally the Egyptian nation to resisting the Occupation. Once they achieved the evacuation, the Khedive would not have the smallest part in the government of the country. Another friend of Farīd told Rashīd Riḍa that Farīd had told him that they were trying to attract the Egyptians to the nationalist movement through the Khedive, to whom the people were attached.\(^1\) This may be partly confirmed by a conversation between Muṣṭafā and Blunt in December 1906, during which Muṣṭafā attacked the Khedive and his branch of the khedivial family, saying that they were all worthless and should be eliminated from the succession.\(^2\)

The hard attitude Muṣṭafā and his party took towards the Khedive was, however, a late development, after Muṣṭafā had severed his relations with 'Abbās in 1904. So, Boyle's assumptions, and consequently Cromer's, in 1900 were not accurate, as Cromer found out in 1902. This with other reasons, as will appear, made Cromer revert to his policy of humiliating and bullying 'Abbās.

\(^{1}\text{Riḍa, Tarīkh, part I, pp. 593, 594.}\)

\(^{2}\text{Blunt, Diaries, part II, p.169.}\)
A return to the strong policy (1901-1904)

As 'Abbas's attitude towards the Occupation changed, he evinced a growing desire to enrich himself; partly, perhaps, as an outlet for his frustrated political ambitions, and partly to finance his political activities, and to ensure himself against poverty in case of deposition. In 1901 he tried to get from the Sultan some concessions in Thasos and elsewhere. He also became angry with Cromer who, though personally conciliatory, took a strong line in the Leon Fahmi incident in 1901, by sending an Anglo-Egyptian official to make enquiries with the Khedive in person about it. 'Abbas complained about this to the British Ambassador at the Porte. For these two reasons together with the fact that his expressed desire to have his share in the government of the country had been overlooked, his policy changed, as well as his attitude towards Cromer.

'Abbas tried to improve his relations with the Sultan. This coincided with a desire on the part of the Sultan to improve his relations with 'Abbas, in order to get Damād Mahmūd and the Young Turks out of Egypt, and as a result of the loss of face he suffered because of the Khedive's visit to London and his

1 Supra, p. III.

2 P.407/157, O'Connor to Lansdowne, No. 255 conf., 9 July 1901; Supra, p. 108.
refusal to visit Constantinople the year before. 1 'Abbās visited Constantinople twice in 1901, and was very cordially received and decorated. 2 It was reported to Cromer that on the second visit the Sultan said to 'Abbās that "from now on, we must work together as friends for the common cause". This, together with the Khedive's attempts to have Leon Fahmī kidnapped and other Young Turks returned to Constantinople, to please the Sultan, and the Ma'iyya's interest in the 'Uthmāniyya Printing-House affair, an interest which was clear since November 1901 and which Cromer was then watching closely, made him suspect that 'Abbās had resumed active opposition. 'Urābī had returned from exile in 1901 with an Anglophile attitude, and was still popular with the masses. The possibility of using him against 'Abbās was contemplated. 3 

All these circumstances were more complicated in 1902 by the Khedive's attitude towards Blunt and Mustafa Kamīl. In July 1901 some officers of the army of occupation, fox hunting, trespassed in Blunt's garden near Cairo and had a quarrel with the guards. The guards were tried and convicted, and Blunt, then

1Supra, p. 274, note 2.
2Shāfiq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 1, pp. 371-376.
3F.0.407/157, Rodd to Lansdowne, No. 130conf., 5 October 1901.
in London, bombarded the Foreign Office with protests and carried a minor press campaign against what he considered as a miscarriage of justice.¹

When Blunt went to Egypt, the Khedive, during an audience in November 1901, told him of two other examples. The first was the Muntazah incident, in which two officers of the army of occupation in plain clothes trespassed in the Khedive's gardens at al-Muntazah near Alexandria in June 1900, and had a quarrel with the guards. The guards were convicted. The second was an assault by drunken British soldiers on the 'umda of a village near Cairo in October 1899. The 'umda died some few weeks after the assault, and no action was taken against the assailants. 'Abbas asked Blunt to bring these facts forward so that the British government's attention would be drawn to those extravagances and a check would be put on them.

When Blunt went back to Britain he started another and wider campaign, from February to May 1902, through correspondence with Lansdowne and Salisbury, and through letters to the press (the Daily News, the Standard, the Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle, and the Daily Mail). It was a general attack on the administration of justice in Egypt, accusing British officials there of

¹F.0.141/358, letters from Blunt to Lansdowne, encl. in Lansdowne to Rodd No. 153, 9 August, No. 158, 16 August, No.163, 17 August, and No. 187, 27 September 1901. For the incident and Rodd's answers see F.0.78/5156, Rodd to Lansdowne, No.88, 25 July, No. 92, 5 August, No. 103, 19 August, and No. 109, 25 August 1901.
interfering prejudicially in its course for political reasons, and to screen the bad behaviour of the army of occupation. He accused Cromer of concealing all these facts. It was also a direct attack on Cromer's management of affairs in Egypt in general, speaking of a usurpation of the functions of government through Cromer's young British nominees, and describing Cromer as strong-willed, authoritative, intolerant of opposition, and heedless of others' rights or legality. Blunt quoted his conversation with 'Abbas and mentioned the Khedive's request that those facts might be made known. The force of the campaign made the Foreign Office issue a Blue Book in 1902. The Khedive instigated this campaign for two of the above mentioned reasons: to revenge himself on Cromer for the Leon Fahmi incident, and because his desire to have his share in the government of the country was overlooked.

At the same time the relations between Mustafa Kamal and 'Abbas looked stronger in 1902. Al-Liwa' stood by the Khedive from the start, and called the people to rally around him and give

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1F.0.78/5226, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 42, 21 March; Cromer to Sanderson, not numbered, 11 May 1902; F.0.141/366, Blunt's letters to Lansdowne, encl. in Lansdowne to Cromer No. 67, 11 April, No. 104A, 27 May 1902; Cd. 796; Blunt, Diaries, part 2, pp. 15, 24. For his letter to Salisbury see the above mentioned newspapers on 21 May 1902.
him support. In May 1902 a celebration was held on the centenary of Muhammad 'Ali's arrival in Egypt. It was Muṣṭafā Kāmil who called for it, and gave a speech in praise of the Khedive and the khedivial family, severely attacking the Occupation. Later, when the Khedive visited Europe and Constantinople, Muṣṭafā was either near him or in his company, and Cromer received full reports of their relations. Again, when 'Abbās visited Constantinople in 1903, Muṣṭafā was there.

As a result of all these circumstances, Cromer reverted to his strong policy towards 'Abbās. In January 1902 he reported that the Khedive's friendship could not be relied upon. In May he wrote that what had been said of the Khedive's friendship was untrue, that 'Abbās was encouraging Muṣṭafā Kāmil, that al-Liwa' was notoriously supported by khedivial

1 Al-Liwa', 8 January, 9 February 1900, 9 January 1901.


3 F.0. 78/5225, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 1 secret, 2 January 1902.

funds, and that the Khedive's real motive was a strong desire to regain his personal power. In September Cromer reported that 'Abbas was travelling about in Europe with a set of the most violently Anglophobe Egyptians, Muṣṭafa Kāmil amongst them, and drew the conclusion that 'Abbas was quite incorrigible.

There were, however, other practical results. The affair of the 'Uthmaniyya Printing-House, which took place in April 1902, was intended against the Khedive, to prevent him from getting the papers, and to get any proof from the papers compromising 'Abbas. In April also, a well known notable in Egypt, al-Minshāwī Pasha, was arrested. He was loyal to the Khedive, and helped al-Khassa to recover a stolen prize bull and to identify the thieves, but he resorted to illegal methods. He was imprisoned under security, and was badly treated. The pasha's counsel, al-Mu'ayyad, and the Khedive, believed that this was done on political grounds, because of his relations with the Palace, to disparage the Khedive. The Daily Telegraph

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1 F.0.78/5226, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 75 conf., 23 May 1902. There is not enough evidence about the Khedive's financial help to Muṣṭafa after 1898. In 1898 Muṣṭafa wrote to Farīd that he had not asked the Khedive for money, in order to be more independent of him. See Supra, p. 32.

'Alī Fāmil Kāmil was keen to deny any extra-ordinary relations between 'Abbas and Muṣṭafa, and to give exaggerated figures for Muṣṭafa's profits from the publication of his first book in 1896. See Kāmil, 'Alī Fāmil, op. cit., part 3, p. 10, and part 5, pp. 64-66. During an interview in 1963 with Ḥasan Bāsnī, Muṣṭafa's brother, he also denied any financial help from 'Abbas to Muṣṭafa, and said that his brother borrowed
of 25 February 1902, and Blunt, said that Cromer personally interfered in the case.¹

Cromer's attitude was not modified by the fact that the Khedive quarrelled with the Sultan over Thasos late in 1902, and mentioned his intention to ask for British help. The fact that 'Abbas did not actually do so may have confirmed Cromer's conviction. Thence a more serious result was that Cromer, who in 1895 had dismissed the idea of suppressing the Egyptian ministers and reducing the Khedive to the position of the most controlled Indian rajah,² returned to this idea in August 1903. In a memorandum submitted on the occasion of the negotiations for the Entente Cordiale, Cromer proposed that a time must come when "the position of the British Consul-General will have to be defined. Possibly it may be necessary to provide that he should attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers, and that no Khedivial Decree should be issued without his sanction".

(cont.) the money he needed to establish al-Liwa' from a rich maternal uncle. Even Muḥammad Farīd's memoirs are of little help. He stated, in general terms, that Muṣṭafa confessed to him of taking much help from 'Abbas (see book 1, p.2), but this can refer to the period before 1898.

²F.O. 800/122, Cromer to Lansdowne, private, 27 September 1902.

³Shafiʻ, Mudhakkiratī, part 2, section 1, pp. 391-2. Al-Muʻayyad criticized the procedure and the treatment of al-Minshawi, see the 1, 3 April 1902 numbers.


²Supra, p. 201.
He also thought that all the Anglo-Egyptian heads of departments should have seats at the Council, and that the Council should be turned into a real governing body.\textsuperscript{1} This showed a complete change of policy. If applied, it would change the political status of Egypt. It showed also that Cromer was content with nothing less than ‘Abbās’s complete submission and support for the Occupation. There is nothing in the documents to show why Cromer’s scheme did not materialize.

The tense relations between ‘Abbās and Cromer showed in the latter’s annual report for 1903. In explaining British policy, he slighted ‘Abbās by saying that the system of personal government had received a blow "from which it can never recover and from which, I hope and believe, it will never have a chance of recovering".\textsuperscript{2} It also showed itself, on the Khedive’s part, in a proposal submitted in February 1904 by Shaykh ‘Alī Yusuf to the General Assembly and passed by it, asking for a real parliament (a representative council with constitutional power). This was a way to embarrass the government and the Occupation, and al-Muqattam retaliated by saying that the proposal should

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}F.O. 78/5302, memorandum by Cromer, 7 August 1903.
\item \textsuperscript{2}F.O. 407/163, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 15, 26 February 1904.
\end{itemize}
have been submitted to the Khedive. A controversy between the two papers continued till late in March. ¹

The Khedive, however, tempted by the success of his first visit in 1900, visited London again in 1903. His proclaimed purpose was to attend Gorst's wedding, but his real aim was to renew direct contact with British politicians, with the object of convincing them with his goodwill, and his willingness to co-operate. The ultimate end was probably to win support against Cromer. 'Ali Yusuf accompanied him and through Benjamin Mosley, the khedivial partisan, made the acquaintance of journalists and politicians. He spoke to them, calling for co-operation between Egypt and Britain, the spread of education, and an Egyptian parliament.²

Although the visit was unofficial, 'Abbås was very warmly received by the press and the King, who showed very friendly feelings and urged him to repeat the visit. 'Abbås was impressed by the reception and appreciated the efforts made to gain his friendship. He also left a good impression.³

¹See al-Mu'ayyad and al-Muqattam. 29 February to 19 March 1904.
²Al-Mu'ayyad. 8, 9 July 1906.
³Shafîq, Mudhakkirât, part 2, section 2, pp. 14-21.
The political implications of the visit could be understood in the light of the fact that Cassel, the Khedive's host, was a personal friend of the King. He had big financial interests in Egypt (of which 50% of the capital of the Daira Sania Company and the National Bank of Egypt), and was then looking for more concessions. All these transactions passed through Gorst, then Financial Adviser. Blunt said that Cassel gave ‘Abbas a loan of half a million pounds at $2^{1/2} \%$ interest, and that Gorst was playing into the Khedive's hands financially: he helped ‘Abbas to buy his large estates in Maryut (the fertile northern strip of the Western Desert) for a trifling sum, and in other ways to make money, all at the government's expense. Blunt went so far as to say that Cromer quarrelled with Gorst because of his help to Cassel and ‘Abbas, and that consequently Gorst had to leave Egypt. He also said that about 1902 the King was not pleased with Cromer, and was in favour of his leaving Egypt, and Gorst taking his place. These last assertions are confirmed by the fact that in August 1903 Cromer suggested that the Financial Adviser - then Gorst - occupied too predominant a position amongst the Anglo-Egyptian officials,

1Blunt, Diaries, part 2, pp. 80, 88, 90-1, 98.
and that other British heads of departments should have seats at the Council.\(^1\) In the autumn of 1902 the King told Cromer that he thought that his work in Egypt was ended.\(^2\)

Elated by the success of his second visit, 'Abbas went further in his relations with Muṣṭafā Kāmil and the Anglophobes than Cromer could tolerate. Early in 1904 he invited Juliette Adam to visit Egypt, though outwardly she was said to have been invited by Muṣṭafā. She arrived in January, was present at the Khedive's annual ball, and visited Upper Egypt. Throughout her visit, which lasted about six weeks, she was accompanied by Muṣṭafā Kāmil and his friends, and the Khedive gave a dinner in her honour, to which Muṣṭafā and other Nationalists were invited.

Cromer was irritated, especially because of the publicity given to the Khedive's attitude, which he considered as an encouragement to Anglophobia. He wrote home saying that 'Abbas was persistently unfriendly. In accordance with his demand, Cromer was instructed to represent to the Khedive:

\(^1\) F.O. 78/5302, memorandum by Cromer, 7 August 1903.

\(^2\) F.O. 800/122, Cromer to Lansdowne, 27 September 1902. Cromer did not approve the King's idea and decided to stay in Egypt. When he was offered the Foreign Office in 1905 he declined. See F.O. 633/8, Cromer to Strachey, 3 April 1906.
"the importance of avoiding any action calculated to provoke comments of the kind which have been freely made upon the incident that the Khedive's attitude was unfriendly to Britain....

British influence in Egypt is likely to increase rather than to diminish, and it is of the utmost importance not only that the relations between His Highness and His Majesty's Government should be inspired by feelings of mutual goodwill and confidence, but that His Highness should govern himself in such a manner as to leave no room for doubt upon the subject in the minds of those who observe his conduct".¹

This was an official warning, and a demand that 'Abbas should forsake the Nationalists and throw his influence on the side of the Occupation.

Then, in April 1904, came the consummation of the Entente Cordiale, followed by Russia's approval of the Khedivial Decree implementing the financial part of the Entente. Germany, Italy, and Austria approved in June the Decree and the part of the Entente which gave Britain a free hand in Egypt

¹F.O. 78/5366, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 20 conf., 9 March 1904; F.O. 141/380, Lansdowne to Cromer, No. 48 conf., 23 March 1904; Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 2, pp. 41, 42.
and gave up any intention to ask her to fix a time limit for the Occupation. Thus, any hope of European help was lost, and complete British domination commenced. The other two sources from which support could be expected were doubtful. The Sultan himself was in need of help after the start of the Macedonian Crisis in April 1903, and Russia's concentration in the Far East since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war early in 1904. When he knew of the Entente he asked for explanations, and remarked that he ought to have been informed about the negotiations. But he did not push the matter when his attention was drawn to Britain's undertaking not to change the political status of Egypt. At the same time the Khedive was on bad relations with the Sultan, because of the former's criticism of the administration of the Hijāz and the hardships to which the pilgrims were exposed, and because of press attacks on the Sultan.


2 F.O. 407/162, note from the Turkish Ambassador, 22 April 1904; note from Lansdowne to the Turkish Ambassador, 27 April 1904.

3 Shaffiq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 2, p.48. About the hardships which the pilgrims met, see 'Abdīn Archives, Turkish section, box No. 528, file mutafarrīgāt, the Khedive to the Porte, 18 Zu‘l-Ḥijja 1321 (5 March 1904).
The other source of support was the nationalist movement, but the ignorance and apathy of the people made it powerless. Nothing could have shown the disappointment of 'Abbas in the people and the low esteem with which he held public opinion in Egypt at that time than his remark when Muṣṭafā Kamīl indicated in August 1904 that public opinion was against 'Alī Yusuf in the Marriage Case, "which public opinion are you talking about? Nobody will utter a word if I put on a hat and walk about in the country". This extreme view might have been expressed in the heat of the conversation, but it revealed the trend of his thought, and his despair.

Complete submission (1904-1906)

Under these circumstances, 'Abbas had to follow a more submissive policy. He made concessions to Cromer in the administration, in his household, and in his relations with Juliette Adam and Muṣṭafā Kamīl.

When 'Abbas visited France in 1904 he failed to visit Juliette Adam as he had promised, though he promised to visit her the following year. This was probably deliberate, but circumstances were partly responsible for severing his relations

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1 Farīd, Memoirs, book I, p.1. For the Marriage Case see infra, pp. 301, 302.

2 Kamīl, Muṣṭafā, Egyptian-French letters, p.158.
with Muṣṭafā Kamīl. The value of Muṣṭafā to ‘Abbās was his leadership given to the extreme Nationalists, and his ownership of al-Liwā‘. But ‘Abbās saw how dearly his relations with Muṣṭafā were costing him in his relations with Cromer. At the same time he found in ‘Alī Yūsuf, and his organ al-Mu‘ayyad, a more faithful and obedient ally, at the head of a small and less extremist section of the Nationalists.

Rivalry arose between Muṣṭafā and ‘Alī Yūsuf, probably on personal as well as political grounds, to monopolize the Khedive’s sympathies. This made ‘Abbās ready to take a strong attitude towards Muṣṭafā if circumstances arose.

The opportunity came when ‘Alī Yūsuf married the daughter of al-Sayyid ‘Abd al-Khāliq al-Ṣadāt, a high religious dignitary, without her father’s knowledge. The father brought a case against ‘Alī Yūsuf, asking for the annulment of the marriage. The mabkama decided in July 1904 to separate them as a preliminary step to judging the validity of the marriage. When the government did not execute the judgment there was an outcry in the press, and the mabkama decided to suspend the case until the judgment was executed. The government had to give way. Eventually the mabkama annulled the marriage, though the father’s consent was later obtained, and the couple were
remarried. Throughout the case, and afterwards, 'Abbas and the British took a very lively interest, and put very strong pressure on the mahkama and the father in favour of 'Ali Yusuf. 'Abbas, then in Europe, sent his brother, Prince Muhammad Ali, to Egypt to use his influence. Findlay, then acting for Cromer, and the latter when he returned from Britain, together with Harry Boyle acting as a kind of mufti, managed to reach favourable compromise. 'Abbas interfered to save his ally, and the British to help a moderate, and to gain him more to their side.

The khedivial and British interference had far-reaching results in exciting Muslim public opinion. It was regarded as tampering with the religious courts and the Shari'a, and touching a most sensitive part of their family life: the father's control over his daughter. It was natural that Muṣṭafā Kāmil would take the chance to attack his rival, whom he considered as a traitor to the nationalist cause. When he met the Khedive in Divonne in August 1904, he advised him that his interference in the Marriage Case would prejudice his popularity. 'Abbas was furious, refused to accept the advice, and left the place.

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angrily. Muṣṭafā refused to see the Khedive before leaving Divonne, and when he returned to Egypt in October he sent the Khedive a letter, severing their relations, and published it in his paper the following day.\(^1\) At first it was thought, even by Cromer, that the difference was temporary and due to purely personal reasons.\(^2\) But this underestimated the changed policy of ‘Abbas. The incident, however, eased the tension between ‘Abbas and Cromer.

Although the breach did not lead at first to open hostilities, which were no part of Muṣṭafā's policy, he started a harassing campaign. The main points touched were the awqāf funds, which were under the Khedive’s control, and the advisability of using it in charitable projects which government funds could not cover; the dismissal of Ḥasan Pasha ‘Aqīm - the head of the Khedivial Bureau - after the Mushtuhur affair; the Khedive's attendance at the parade of the army of occupation in November 1904. A hint was also given in 1905 that Britain was using the Khedive to establish an Arab caliphate.\(^3\)

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\(^2\)P.O. 78/5367, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 118 secret, 26 October 1904.

\(^3\)See in al-Liwa‘: "Al sha'b wa'l-awqāf wa'l-ḥukūma" (The people, the awqāf and the government), 26 October 1904; "Min Miṣr ila al-Miṣriyyin" (From Egypt to the Egyptians), 12 November 1904; "Ra‘īs al-Dīwan al-Khidiwī" (The (cont.)
The breach between the Khedive and this extremist and active section of the nationalist movement was bound to further weaken the Khedive's general position with regard to Cromer. The return to Egypt of Leon Fahmi late in 1904 made 'Abbas more submissive to Cromer and at his mercy. Late in October or early in November Leon lodged a complaint with the Parquet against two of the Khedive's men for kidnapping him in 1901. Had the prosecution taken place it would, in reality, have been directed against the Khedive, and have shaken his position seriously. But Cromer, with the approval of Lansdowne, advised the Egyptian government not to prosecute. ¹

Cromer did not do the Khedive this service without exacting a high price in the shape of a public demonstration of his co-operation with, and submission to, the British by attending the parade of the army of occupation in 'Abdin Square, and standing under the British flag. This took place on 9 November 1904 on the occasion of the King's birthday.

¹F.O. 78/5368, Cromer to Lansdowne, tel. No. 95 secret, 14 November 1904, and Lansdowne minute on it. For the early part of Leon Fahmi affair v. supra, p. 105.
To Lansdowne and to Knollys Cromer said that the Khedive attended the parade entirely on his own initiative, and that the only thing he pressed was that the Khedive should attend in the Square, not by standing on the Palace balcony as his father used to do.¹

The Khedive, however friendly and appeasing he wished to be, could not have willingly, not on his own initiative, taken a step which he must have known quite well would damage his prestige seriously, the more so since al-Liwa' was added to the list of his critics; and he was extraordinarily sensitive to press criticism. We should also have in mind that Cromer wrote for the information of the King, who was then very friendly towards 'Abbās. ʿAbdāl Shafīq wrote a more accurate account, on the authority of Buṭrus Pasha Ghālib who was in the confidence of both 'Abbās and Cromer. He said that Cromer hinted to Muṣṭafā Pasha Fahmī the desirability of the Khedive attending the parade, and then through Buṭrus he pressed that 'Abbās should attend it in the Square. Shafīq mentioned that the Khedive was reluctant, and apprehensive of criticism.²

¹ F.0.800/123, Cromer to Lansdowne, private tel., 3 November 1904; Cromer to Knollys, private, 10 November 1904.
² Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 2, pp. 55-57.
This was not the only concession which 'Abbas had to make. He had to accept more encroachment in the administration: a new influx of British officials, and the creation of high posts for them, such as a second under-secretary of state and an adviser for the Ministry of Public Works in October 1904, and an under-secretary of state for War in 1905. He had to accept Cromer's advice on purely religious matters, such as the nomination of Amīr al-Hajj in the same year, and when the Muftī died in July 1905 Cromer wired from Britain to his locum tenens that "the place should 'of course not be filled up till I return", and it waited till he returned and chose the candidate.

Cromer crowned his complete domination by posing openly as the de facto ruler of Egypt during his visits to the provinces of Upper Egypt in February 1905, and Abbas completed his submissive attitude by appointing in the same year as his A.D.C. a British officer, Colonel Watson. He visited Britain again in 1905 where he had a warm reception, and when he returned

1 Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 2, pp. 57, 58.
2 Ibid., pp. 75, 76; F.O. 78/5432, F.O. to Findlay, tel. No. 36, 17 July 1905.
3 Al-Rāfi'i, Mustafā Kāmil, pp. 183-184.
4 F.O. 141/388, O'Connor to Lansdowne, No. 664, 27 September 1905, encl. in Lansdowne to Cromer, No. 187, 13 October 1905.
he attended the parade as in the previous year.

In spite of this submission 'Abbas was anxious to maintain the appearance of friendly relations with the Sultan, probably to show Cromer that he was not completely at his mercy. This was a result of Cromer's policy which made the Khedive feel insecure. When 'Abbas failed to get an invitation to visit Constantinople in June 1904, he pretended that he did not want to go. He managed to be invited later, in the autumn, and was cordially received. When the Sultan told the Khedive in 1904 that he intended to recall Mukhtar Pasha, 'Abbas urged him to make no change, as Britain would not recognize the successor, and he, 'Abbas, would not be able to exercise any influence.1

'Abbas paid another visit to Constantinople in 1905 and when he returned to Egypt he disclosed, before the ministers and some British officials, a confidential conversation which he alleged to have taken place between him and the Sultan, to impress on his hearers that he was on friendly relations with the Sultan.2

1F.O. 407/162, Townley to Lansdowne, No. 800, 12 October 1904; Shafiq, Mudhakkiratî, part 2, section 2, pp. 48-55.

2F.O. 78/5341, Findlay to Lansdowne, No. 103 secret, 29 September 1905, and enrol.; Shafiq, Mudhakkiratî, part 2, section 2, p.74.
'Abbas thought that he could find in 'Ali Yusuf a substitute for Mustafa Kamil, but the Sultan's sympathy was indispensable to avoid dethronement or formal British protectorate, and to gain the sympathy of Muslim public opinion in Egypt.

The attitude of the Legislative Council completed the picture during the period of submission. Except for a weak remark on the Budget for 1900 about the Sudan being an integral part of Egypt, and a wish for more expenditure on education, the Council cordially approved the Budgets throughout the period. They went even further. Contrary to their attitude against the two members who had visited Cromer in October 1893, a delegation of five members of the Council visited Cromer in October 1903 to discuss with him the course to be pursued in connection with missionary publications which were insulting to Islam. They accepted his advice against prosecution. In December 1904 the Council approved the Budget for 1905 and the Accounts for 1904, and thanked the government for complying with some of their recommendations. In January 1906 the members were delighted to be invited to accompany Cromer in his visit to the Sudan for the inauguration of Port Sudan. Cromer was careful to have them round him in his tent during the celebrations. They did not utter a word of protest.

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1 F.O. 78/5302, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 124, 28 October 1903, and encl. infra, pp. 381, 382.

2 W.P.P., box 278/1, R. Owen to Wingate, 3 January 1906.
against the Dinshaway judgment in 1906. In his report for 1905, Cromer praised the Council's co-operation with the government and said that their advice was frequently sought and readily given.

The Nationalists

With the Nationalists, the situation was different. Some of them lost hope, discouraged by the reconquest of the Sudan, the Fashoda fiasco, the Sudan Agreement, and the Entente Cordiale. 'Ali Yusuf's refusal to publish in his paper articles written by Mustafa Kamal in 1899 is significant. The breach of relations between 'Abbas and Mustafa Kamal weakened the nationalist movement still more.

Expressing his first reaction to the Entente, Mustafa wrote to Juliette Adam that all his old friends, Egyptians and French, who had fought the Occupation with him, were either converted to the British friendship or in despair. He continued to give similar expressions during 1904 and early in 1905, adding that he was the only militant patriot, and his paper was the only organ

1 Al-Rafi`, Mustafa Kamal, p.359.
2 F.0.407/165, Cromer to Grey, No.26, 8 March 1906.
3 Supra, p.283.
of patriotism.1

This picture of the situation was true, but only partly so. A trend began after the Khedive's defeat before Cromer in 1893-1894, and grew stronger during the period of submission. The political situation tended to crystallize more and more, with different elements, British, khedivial, and nationalist, taking a more definite stand, and their strong points or limitations becoming clearer. The Khedive's popularity diminished with growing evidence of his weakness, his despotic character, and his efforts to enrich himself. When Muṣṭafā broke off his relations with 'Abbas in 1904 the nationalist movement became practically split into three sections. The moderates, or the "patriots" as Cromer later called them, of whom Muḥammad 'Abduh was the most prominent, were for co-operation with the Occupation. They were also afraid of the Khedive's despotic character, and against his authority. The "khedivials", with Shaykh 'Alī Yusuf as leader, thought that no alternative was left but to co-operate with the Occupation on the basis of autonomy and strengthening the khedivial authority. They continued, however, to criticize Cromer's policy in a moderate way. This is why they

were called the "moderate opposition" in the British press.

The third section was Muṣṭafā Kamīl and the extreme Nationalists, who carried on a strong resistance throughout. These are the origins of the three Egyptian parties which were to emerge formally in 1907 and 1908, but had actually existed before.

Muṣṭafā Kamīl and al-Liwa', then, were not the only voices raised against the Occupation during the period of submission, but they were the strongest. Besides al-Liwa' and al-Mu‘ayyad, Muṣṭafā and 'Alī Yusuf attacked Cromer's policy and expressed their grievances through European publications. In *L'Angleterre en Égypte*, Juliette Adam expressed Muṣṭafā's views, and in *Letters from an Egyptian to an English Politician upon the Affairs of Egypt*, the Liberal M.P., John M. Robertson, expressed 'Alī Yusuf's complaints. In fact 'Alī Yusuf expressed the same complaints to the Tory M.P. J. Henniker Heaton probably in 1905, the same year in which Robertson received the information on which he based his book. ¹ This was part of the efforts exerted by Muṣṭafā to win support in Europe against the Occupation, and by the Khedive and 'Alī Yusuf in Britain to fight Cromer's policy.

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In their organs, the two parties attacked the Occupation and Cromer's policy on several points.

The Anglo-Egyptian officials. The employment of British officials in the Egyptian government's service was strongly criticized. Their increasing number was deplored as being at the expense of educated Egyptians. It was pointed out that higher posts were gradually being filled with young British officials who, in spite of their lack of experience, were absorbing all authority in the administration. This was lamented as being against administrative efficiency, and as eliminating Egyptian initiative.¹

British control of the administration through committees in which Europeans, especially British, were in the majority, was also resented.² Attention was drawn to the special treatment given sometimes to Anglo-Egyptian officials against the regulations, together with the attitude and behaviour of some individuals, or their maltreatment of the Egyptians.³ Al-Mu'ayyad repeatedly complained that not only British but also Syrians were preferred to the Egyptians in the Sudan civil service.⁴

² Al-Mu'ayyad, 16 June 1901.
³ Ibid., 7 October 1899, 24 January, 13 March 1900, 3 February, 9 March 1901; al-Liwa', 15 November 1904.
⁴ Al-Mu'ayyad, 4 March 1902, 19 April, 9 May, 14 June 1906.
Educational policy. This policy came under heavy fire. The early teaching of English in primary schools, and its gradual adoption as the medium of instruction in secondary and primary schools, were said to be at the expense of time allotted for Arabic, the Qur'an, and the principles of Islam. It was further regarded as a means of extinguishing Arabic and the nation's personality. It was also asserted that the teaching of history, and the development of patriotic feeling, had been neglected. For these reasons education in government schools was considered defective, and the people were advised to establish private schools.

The general educational policy was strongly criticised. The main points raised were that education was deliberately starved to leave people ignorant and submissive. The abolition of free education, and the increase in school fees, made it hard for the poor to have adequate education. The provision of elementary education in the village schools (the kuttab) was considered inadequate and superficial; their main purpose was to divert attention from the neglect of higher education. It was pointed out that the Minufiyya Provincial Council had suggested an edu-

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2 Al-Mu’ayyad, 25 July 1899.
3 Ibid, 3, 12 March 1900; al-Liwa’, 14 February 1901.
cation tax of 5 milliemes per feddan, but it was not approved.\footnote{1} The Legislative Council criticized the neglect of primary, secondary, and higher education, and the inadequate funds allotted in the Budget.\footnote{2}

**Economics.** In economics, the main theme was that Egypt was being exploited financially and economically to the detriment of her people. It was indicated that although Egypt and Britain were partners in the Sudan, the latter enjoyed all the authority and the benefits, and the former paid the costs (providing the army, money for developments and deficit) while reforms were starved in Egypt proper.\footnote{3} It was further mentioned that foreign companies were favoured and helped in Egypt at the expense of the Egyptians. The grant of monopolies was deprecated, together with the greedy exploitation of existing companies, government help to them, and the lack of supervision over the application of their contracts.\footnote{4} The prohibition on growing tobacco was condemned as being against Egypt's real interests,

\footnote{1}Al-Mu'ayyad, 2 January 1900, 25 June 1901, 22 May, 9 July 1906; al-Liwa, 10 February, 28 April 1901, 19 July, 2 November 1904, 2 August 1906.

\footnote{2}Al-Mu'ayyad, 19 December 1901, 8 April 1906.

\footnote{3}Ibid., 7 January, 7 October 1899; al-Liwa, 24 March, 12 and 13 April 1904.

\footnote{4}Al-Mu'ayyad, 18 March, 12, 14, 22 August, 3, 7, 11 October 1899, 25 April, 19 July 1900, 10 April 1906; al-Liwa, 2 July 1904.
and in favour of growing cotton for export to Britain. The 8% excise duty on the produce of the local weaving industry, imposed in 1901, was denounced as a means of stopping the growth of Egyptian industry in favour of British goods.\textsuperscript{1}

Taxation was said to be heavy, as new taxes were established in place of those abolished or reduced.\textsuperscript{2}

The Sudan. The Sudan Agreement, British domination there, and Egypt's share in the administration, were strongly criticised. The hardships which the army faced during the campaign, and the building of the Sudan railway by military labour, were mentioned. It was also pointed out that the levelling of Khartoum and the building of the governor-general's palace were done by military labour. The grievances of the Egyptian officers which led to the mutiny at Omdurman in 1900 were brought forward. There were financial claims concerning pay and pensions. Chances for promotion were limited, owing to the large number of British officers employed in the higher and middle ranks, and the Egyptians were not given adequate share in the Sudan civil service. They complained of maltreatment by British officers. The efforts of the Sirdar to recruit more Sudanese troops were seen in a very serious

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Al-Mu'ayyad}, 5, 13 June, 4 July 1901.
\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Al-Liwa'}, 13 April 1901, 13 April 1904.
light. It was declared that he intended to raise the number of Sudanese troops to 20,000 and to promote Sudanese officers from the ranks to replace Egyptian officers in Sudanese battalions. This was deplored as leading to the creation of a separate Sudanese army, which might later be used against Egypt.¹

Nothing could be more bitter than the articles in al-Liwa' and al-Mu'ayyad when the Agreement was announced. It was considered a great injustice for Britain to be a partner, and the senior one, in the Sudan, because of the little help she gave, which moreover had not been asked for. The right of the Egyptian government to sign the Agreement was challenged. The injustice of Egypt's paying in the Sudan and yet having no authority was pointed out, and Britain was asked to contribute half the forces and the expenses needed. The main idea was that Egypt had paid, and would continue to pay, for the Sudan which had already been appropriated by Britain, and that the Sudan had become a danger to Egypt.²

The judiciary. British control over the judiciary through the Judicial Adviser, and inspectorates and committees, was repeatedly

¹ Al-Liwa', 5 February 1900; al-Mu'ayyad, 14, 15, 22 March 1899, 3 January 1900. There are some translations from the two papers enclosed in S.FP., vol. 112/21, Cromer to Salisbury, 17 March 1899, and F.0.78/5086, same to same, No. 25, 8 February 1900.

² Al-Mu'ayyad, 7, 9, 21, 25 January, 7 October 1899; al-Liwa', 20 January 1900, 1 February 1903, 13 April 1904, 16 July, 2 August 1906.
criticized. It was indicated that this control was exerted in a way prejudicial to the course of justice. Examples were given during the period of submission: the removal of two Egyptian judges from the mixed courts, the Minshawi case, and the 'Uthmaniyya Printing-House case.¹

Attempts to interfere in Islamic courts (the mabhama) were very ticklish. When a scheme for the re-organisation of the mabhama in 1899 contained the delegation of counsellors from the national courts to its higher court, the whole scheme was attacked as a means to subjugate the mabhama to the Judicial Adviser, and later to abolish it. An ensuing attempt to replace the Turkish Grand Qadi by an Egyptian caused flurry in the press.²

Muslim opinion. Other circumstances irritated Muslim opinion and gave the Nationalists opportunities to fan the flames against Britain. The Armenian disturbances in 1895, the Graeco-Turkish war, and the Cretan question, kept Muslim opinion in sympathy with the Sultan and against Britain up to 1899.³

¹ Supra, pp. 109, 276, 292.
² Al-Mu'ayyad, 8, 16, 24 April 1899; supra, p. 115.
³ Supra, pp. 224, 225, 240, 241, 259.
Other factors worsened the situation. An increase in missionary activities after the beginning of the Sudan re-conquest was strongly attacked and deprecated.\(^1\) Muslim feeling against Britain rose further because of the Macedonian disturbances in 1903,\(^2\) and the subsequent interference by European powers, including Britain, which culminated in the joint naval demonstration in November 1905. During the acute stage of the crisis, the Sultan hinted at the possibility of a general rising of Muslims in his defence. Nationalist papers, especially al-Liwa', strongly condemned European pressure, and called upon Muslim rulers to protect the empire. Al-Liwa' said that it was Britain which incited the other powers. It stated that Britain's enmity towards Turkey dated back to the Occupation. Al-‘alam al-Islami, also edited by Muṣṭafā Kamīl, joined in the attack, saying that Britain was working for the destruction of the empire and the Sultan's religious authority. Public opinion was much agitated in December 1905, while Cromer alerted the British forces, and asked a warship to be retained at Alexandria.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Supra, pp. 151, 152.

\(^2\)F.O. 78/5303, Findlay to Lansdowne, tel. No. 28, secret, 23 September 1903.

\(^3\)F.O. 141/388, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acting Agent and Consul-General, No. 155, 18 August 1905, enclosing a translation of an article in al-‘alam al-Islami of 9 June 1905; F.O. 78/5431, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 132 conf.; 5 December 1905, and the enclosed translation of articles in al-Liwa' of 25, 26, 29 November 1905.
We must keep this situation in mind in order to understand the attitude of many Egyptians during the Taba incident early in 1906.

**Internationalization and Anglicization.** In his report on 1904, Cromer put forward the broad lines of a scheme by which the capitulatory powers would transfer to Britain their powers of intervention in legislation affecting their subjects in Egypt. A European legislative council would be established, and the mixed courts would be substituted by other courts.\(^1\) This prepared the ground for the more detailed project, which was published in Cromer's annual reports for 1905 and 1906, and which the Nationalists strongly opposed.\(^2\)

In explaining his scheme, Cromer revealed his attitude towards the Egyptians as a nation. He mentioned the desirability of "complete assimilation between Egyptians and Europeans", and his approach suggested that the term "Egyptian" should cover every dweller in Egypt.\(^3\) This strengthened the bad impression created by an address he had delivered at a farewell party to Gorst in 1904, in which he said that "Egypt for the Egyptians" did not imply

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\(^1\)Cd. 2409, pp. 6-9, 94-96.

\(^2\)Cd. 2817, pp. 1-8; Cd. 3394, pp. 13-25; infra, pp.344-47.

\(^3\)Cd. 2409, p.6.
that "Egypt is to be governed wholly by native Egyptians, but it does imply that the touchstone to be applied to every Egyptian question is to enquire how far this or that proposal is in the true interests of the dwellers in Egypt, of whatsoever nationality or creed they may be." Al-Liwa protested against this conception.\footnote{The Egyptian Gazette, 22 April 1904; \emph{al-Liwa}, 23 April 1904. Cromer later elaborated on this point, saying in his report on 1906 that "the only possible Egyptian nationality which can ever be created must consist of all the dwellers in Egypt, irrespective of race, religion, or extraction". This raised a furore in the press. See, Cd. 3394, p.7; \emph{al-Mu'ayyad}, 22 April 1907.}

Representative government. To the Nationalists the question of the Anglo-Egyptian officials was not only a question of employment or authority, but it was also a question of being trained to manage their own affairs as a step to evacuation and autonomy.\footnote{\emph{Al-Liwa'}, 19 October 1904; \emph{al-Mu'ayyad}, 7, 8 November 1906.} For this reason they were also sensitive to the government's policy towards the provincial councils, the Legislative Council, and the General Assembly. Al-Mu'ayyad pointed out that the provincial councils were neglected, and the Organic Law of May 1883 was broken, as the Legislative Council was not allowed to discuss the laws of education, and the General Assembly was not consulted before duties were imposed on local manufactured cotton-goods. It further indicated that half a million pounds were taken from the Caisse in
1896 without consulting the Assembly, and in the same way railway lines and irrigation projects crossing more than one province were executed.  

Demands for a parliament started early. In 1892 ‘Alî Yusuf asked for a parliament (a representative council with constitutional power). He repeated his demand in 1894. In 1898 he tabled a motion at the General Assembly asking for a representative council. A similar motion was carried by the Assembly in 1904, and on this occasion al-Mu‘ayyad published eleven articles in which it pointed out that the Legislative Council did not represent the people, that Egypt was more eligible for a parliament than Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and that a parliament would not constitute any danger either to the Occupation or to the capitulations, as its powers could be restricted in these respects.

Mustafā Kāmil asked for representative institutions in 1900 and repeated his demand in 1902 and 1904. The same demand was repeated throughout 1906.

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1 Al-Mu‘ayyad, 5, 13 June 1901, 6 November 1906; supra, p.218. For the Organic Law see Od. 3733, pp. 2-6.

2 Al-Mu‘ayyad, 20 October 1892, 16 May 1894, 3 March 1898, 29 February to 19 March 1904.


Some of these grievances were expressed not only by the extremists and the "khedivials", but also by the "patriots". Al-Manar, for some time the organ of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and his group, bitterly criticized British policy concerning the Sudan.¹

It condemned the system of education in government schools,² and deprecated the rush of foreign capital, fearing that foreign companies would monopolize the country's resources and render the people poor.³ Early in 1905 Muḥammad ʿAbduh condemned the policy of education almost as strongly as the extremists. He said that British control of the administration deprived the Egyptians of all initiative and turned them to dummies.⁴

The importance of that campaign was that some of the complaints were new and serious, such as those concerning the Sudan and the rush of foreign capital. These, together with the apprehension of Cromer's new scheme concerning the capitulations, and the increase of Anglo-Egyptian officials and their authority, gave much importance and effect to the demand for a constitutional representative government.

⁴Guerville, A. B. de, New Egypt, pp.158-162.
This made a favourable situation for nationalist propaganda. There were other favourable factors. Muṣṭafā called upon the people to rely on themselves in the struggle against the Occupation, and his call was soon strengthened by the victory of Japan over Russia. He seized the opportunity to publish in 1904 his book on Japan, al-Shams al-Mushriqa (The rising sun), as a means of boosting Egyptian morale. The increase in the number of the papers and their circulation helped the Nationalists. Muṣṭafā also gave much attention to the students since 1898, and this gained for him the support of an active element against the Occupation. The establishment of a club for the higher schools and the graduates at the end of 1905 gave the extremists a more effective hold over the students’ movement.

In this way the weakened nationalist movement survived the period of submission, in spite of all the odds against it. It was ready for a come-back when the Dinshaway incident provided the opportunity.

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1Supra, pp. 133, 134.

The Taba Incident and its consequences

The irritation felt by Muslim opinion in Egypt against Britain in December 1905 had not subsided when the Taba incident (sometimes called 'Aqaba incident) occurred in January 1906, and this increased it.

Several factors caused the incident. The most important was the mutual suspicion between Britain and Turkey concerning their intentions towards Arabia and Egypt. The Turks suspected British intrigues against the Caliphate, and British aid to the rebels in the Yemen. In 1903 British Military Intelligence obtained information of a proposed branch of the Hijaz railway from Ma'an to 'Aqaba, and possibly from 'Aqaba to al-'Arish. They thought that the only apparent object in building the latter section would be to enable Turkey to concentrate troops over land within striking distance of the Suez Canal and the Delta.¹ In December 1905 Cromer drew attention to the danger facing Egypt by the proposed line. He mentioned that Mukhtar

¹F.C. 141/373, Director of Military Intelligence to Under-Secretary of State for F.C., 14 October 1903, encl. in F.C. to Cromer, No. 183, 30 October 1903. Suspicions existed before that time. In 1902 a group of financiers drew up a scheme to construct a railway line between Egypt and Palestine. When Cromer was approached he said that the line ought to run along the coast, within a striking distance of the fleet. See F.0.78/5226, Cromer to Salisbury, No. 40, 14 March 1902.
Pasha was saying that with the twelve army corps ready in Syria, and the German army at Turkey's back, it should not be difficult for the Turks to turn the British out of Egypt. Cromer concluded that there was a popular belief that combined action on the part of Germany and Turkey against Britain in Egypt was not a remote possibility.¹

As apprehension of Turkish intentions grew more attention was given to Sinai. An Anglo-Egyptian inspector, Jennings Bramly, was appointed to Sinai late in 1904, then a scheme was drawn up to organize a camel corps, construct a telegraph line or a motor road from Suez to Nakhil (an administrative centre in Sinai), and establish posts on the border.² It is probable that late in 1905 information of this leaked out to the Turks, and to some Cairene papers. Consequently the Ottoman authorities in Syria were instructed in December to anticipate the Egyptians by erecting a guard-house. On the other hand the Inspector of Sinai was instructed to occupy Naqb al-'Aqaba, which commanded both 'Aqaba and the roads to the interior of Sinai.³ This race

¹F.O. 371/59, file 857, Cromer to Grey, No. 146 secret, 29 December 1905. Later, during the Taba incident, the Turks confessed that they intended to construct a branch railway to 'Aqaba, and to extend it eventually to Suez and Port Said. See infra, p.328.

²Cd. 2817, p.15; Correspondence respecting the Turco-Egyptian frontier, R.C.R.Owen to Jennings Bramly, secret, 2 January 1906, p.8.

³Cd. 2817, p.15; Cd. 3066, p.20; W.PP., box 277/6, Owen to Wingate, 31 December 1905; F.O. 407/165, O'Conor to Cromer, secret, 26 December 1905, encl. in O'Conor to Grey, No. 20 conf., 16 January 1906.
ended in the Turks (who had a considerable force at 'Aqaba)
occupying Taba, Naqb al-'Aqaba, and some other points. The
inspector was practically isolated with a little force in a
small island off the coast, called Pharaon island.

This was how the incident started. It extended from
10 January to 14 May 1906, and developed to a serious crisis.
At the height of it Britain sent an ultimatum to the Sultan
on 3 May, asking for the appointment of a Turco-Egyptian
committee to delimit the frontier on a line running approxi-
mately straight from Rafāḥ to the head of the Gulf of 'Aqaba.
A British fleet was moved to Phalerum, ready to seize Mitylene
and Lemnos after ten days grace, some warships were sent to
Egyptian waters to defend the Canal, the British garrison in
Egypt was reinforced, and further measures of coercion were
decided on.¹

Many factors contributed to the serious turn the incident
took. From the beginning, Findley, temporarily acting for
Cromer, thought that the Germans were backing the Sultan. While
there was danger of a Franco-German war over Morocco, and Britain
was to some extent committed to the French side, Findlay sus-
ppected that Germany was using the Sultan to divert British at-

¹P.C. 371/65, file 18734, extract from minutes of the 87th
meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 11 May 1906.
For more details on the incident see Cd. 3006; Shafīq,
Muḥaẓẓikirātī, part 2, section 2, pp. 77-92.
ention in case of European complications. At first Cromer did not completely endorse the idea, but other factors later convinced him that the Turks were inspired by the Germans. The same suspicions existed at the Foreign Office, and, according to the Annual Register, the "belief was widely entertained that the Porte was acting under German instigation, official or unofficial". The British government suspected also Turkish intentions to interfere in the Suez Canal and Egyptian affairs.

Cromer, however, was much worried about Turkish intentions in Sinai and the Suez Canal and saw in the incident a chance to settle the question of the eastern frontier once and for all. From the outset he asked, through the Khedive, for the appointment of a Turkish commissioner to delimit the frontier with an Egyptian delegate, and persisted in this demand throughout the crisis, in the face of Turkish refusal. This formed a major obstacle to negotiations, and forced the Turks to disclose their intentions. At first they ignored the Sultan's İrāda, expressed in Jawad Pasha's telegram of 8 April 1892, which left the administration of Sinai to the Khedive. They protested that

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2 F.O. 407/165, Cromer to Grey, tel. No. 30, secret, 7 February 1906; F.O. 407/166, same to same, tel. No. 112, 24 April 1906. The developments which convinced Cromer included the intended visit of a German Military Attaché to Sinai in February 1906; a German Oriental Secretary was, during the crisis, in constant contact with Mukhtar Pasha, and it was said that the Germans were going to establish a coal depot at 'Aqaba. See F.O. 407/165, Cromer to Grey, tels. No. 39, 17 February, and No. 51, 28 February 1906; F.O. 407/166, Bertie to Grey, No. 140, 2 April 1906, and encl. (cont.)
Taba belonged to the district of 'Aqaba, and that Sinai, which was a sort of depot confided to Egypt, was the absolute property of the Sultan, who had the right to recover it. They further stated that Egypt was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and there was strong objection to defining frontiers between it and the rest of the empire. Ultimately, they claimed the right to interpret Jawād Pasha's telegram, giving Egypt the western half only of Sinai. They disclosed also their intention to build a railway line from 'Aqaba to Suez and Port Said. Cromer saw the danger of these schemes to the Suez Canal and Egypt, and to the route to India, if the Turks fortified the narrow entrance to the Gulf of 'Aqaba.

Throughout the crisis the Sultan tried hard to avoid British interference by reaching a direct agreement with 'Abbas. Mukhtar Pasha was instructed to avoid contacting Cromer on the incident, and to start negotiations with the Khedive. The latter was asked not to afford a foreign power occasion to interfere in a question of internal administration. Grey protested to the

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3bid., Bertie to Grey, No. 140, 2 April 1906, and encl.; Cromer (cont.)
Turkish Ambassador against the persistent attempt to ignore the position which Britain held in Egypt, and threatened that it would be upheld by the entire force of Britain. The Porte had ultimately to acknowledge Britain's right of intervention.¹

The Sultan took the opportunity of the crisis to press for a solution of the whole Egyptian question. In March he expressed his interest in the Suez Canal, and his readiness to co-operate with Britain in its defence. In May he proposed a convention in which Britain would recognize his suzerainty in Egypt, and the Sultan would recognize all conventions and firmans relating to Egypt, and undertake to defend the territory of Egypt and the Suez Canal conjointly with Britain. An agreement on the frontier question would be reached after that convention. Grey saw no objection to renewing recognition of the Sultan's suzerainty, provided it was combined with recognition of the British Occupation, the withdrawal of Mukhtar Pasha from Egypt, and the removal of the Sultan's veto upon the

(Continued.) to Grey, tels. No. 87, 5 April, and No. 147, 9 May 1906; Shafîq, Mudhakkirâtî, part 2, section 2, p.85.

¹F.O. 407/166, Grey to O'Conor, tel. No. 87, 13 May 1906; O'Conor to Grey, tel. No. 120, 14 May 1906.
borrowing powers of Egypt. The proposals were dropped, and the Sultan had ultimately to comply with British demands. A British fleet was lying at Phalerum, and there was no international support against its coercive action. France, Russia, and Italy supported Britain. Austria and the United States were sympathetic. Even Germany denied any encouragement to the Sultan.

The stubborn resistance of Turkey, with all the resulting complications, carried the two countries very near to the point of war. In the absence of any foreign support, this resistance was largely due to the internal situation in Egypt. Egyptians, then, especially the Khedive, were held responsible for the serious developments.

During the first stages of the incident 'Abbas co-operated with Cromer, communicating with the Porte according to British advice. Besides other factors, he probably seized this opportunity to revenge himself on the Sultan for a cold reception in Constantinople the year before, and the Sultan's attempt to ignore his prerogatives by changing the Grand Qadi of Cairo in December 1905 without any reference to him.

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1 F.O. 407/165, O'Connor to Grey, No. 150, 5 March 1906; F.O. 407/166, same to same, tel. No. 85, 5 May 1906; Grey to O'Connor, tel. No. 76, 11 May 1906.


4 F.O. 141/388, O'Connor to Lansdowne, No. 664, 27 September 1905, (cont.)
Things, however, changed later. Cromer ordered the dispatch of a company of Egyptian soldiers, on an Egyptian cruiser, to occupy Taba, late in January. 'Abbās was neither consulted nor informed until he received the news from Constantinople, together with a protest. He felt that he was put in a false position, complained of being kept in the dark while "ordered" to telegraph to the Sultan, and informed the Porte that he had no knowledge of the despatch of troops. 'Abbās became suspicious of Cromer's intentions, and when the British attitude towards the Sultan stiffened, he feared being implicated in a serious clash between Britain and Turkey. Late in February, at a critical stage of the incident, two Turkish commissioners were expected in Cairo to examine the problem, and Britain pressed the Sultan to accept a joint delimitation committee. 'Abbās put himself out of reach by going to his Maryūt estates, and staying there until the commissioners had left. After this, Cromer suspected his attitude.

(cont.) encl. in F.O. to Cromer, No. 187, 13 October 1905; F.O. 78/5432, Cromer to F.O. tel. No. 97, 6 December 1905.

1 W.PP., box 278/2, Matchett to Wingate, 5 February 1906.


3 Ibid., Cromer to Grey, tels. No. 52, 1 March, and No. 55, 5 March 1906; O'Conor to Grey, tel. No. 31, 2 March 1906.
The Sultan took advantage of this weak point. He put more pressure on the Khedive, and shifted the negotiations to Cairo, between 'Abbas and Mukhtar, thus eliminating British interference. Cromer would have preferred the communications to be directly between himself and Mukhtar. He thought that there was some risk in using 'Abbas as an intermediary, because he could not feel any confidence as to his attitude. However, he pressed 'Abbas not to meet Mukhtar without Mustafa Fahmi and Butrus Ghali being present, and stated that whatever arrangement they might reach would not be final without the assent of the British government.¹

¹P.O. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, tels. No. 87, 5 April, and No.89, 6 April 1906.
preted as giving the Khedive the administration of the western half only of Sinai. This was against the British view, expressed in Cromer’s letter of 13 April 1892 to the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Sinai administration was bounded by a line running in a south easterly direction from a few miles east of al-‘Arish to the head of the Gulf of ‘Aqaba. When the situation became more critical, ‘Abbās sent Ahmad Shafīq, then the head of his Arabic and European Bureaux, to Constantinople, bearing secret papers and pleading his cause. At the same time the Khedive tried to maintain friendly relations with Cromer.

This double game could not last for long. As the ten days grace given in the British ultimatum came near to an end, the Khedive had openly to take sides. The Porte wanted to strengthen its position by securing from ‘Abbās an answer accepting the Turkish view, while Cromer pressed hard for an answer supporting his view. ‘Abbās resisted Cromer’s pressure to the point of threatening to abdicate, but he had to give way in the end, and sent the Porte the answer which Cromer had demanded. As a last

1 Shafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 2, pp. 82-87; F.0. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, tels. No. 97, 11 April, No. 110, 24 April 1906.

2 F.0. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, tel. No. 130, 3 May 1906.

3 Ibid., same to same, tels. No. 147, 9 May, and No. 151, 12 May 1906.
manoeuvre, the Porte sent to the Khedive, accepting the evacuation of Tāba and the establishment of a joint commission with vague terms of reference. The Khedive unilaterally hastened to accept, but the British were not satisfied. They demanded as the basis for any settlement, the telegram of 8 April 1892, and an approximately straight line from Rafah to a point at least three miles to the east of 'Aqaba. The Khedive had to retrace his hasty steps, and wrote to the Porte on these lines.\(^1\) This put an end to the Sultan's resistance.

Cromer complained that at the beginning the Khedive had promised to follow his advice, but he broke his promise. He added that the Khedive, although he denied it, was in contact with Mukhtār behind his back, and in secret communication with Constantinople by cypher telegrams through the Turkish Telegraph Office at al-'Arīsh. He further thought that the idea of excluding British intervention from the settlement of the question was the result of an arrangement between 'Abbās, Mukhtār and the Porte. Cromer considered that this attitude of the Khedive delayed the settlement of the problem, and expressed his fears that, unless telegraphic communication between Cairo and Constantinople by way of al-'Arīsh was stopped, a settlement of the dispute might

\(^1\)F.O. 407/166, O'Connor to Grey, tels. No. 111, 11 May, and No. 117, 13 May 1906; Cromer to Grey, tels. No. 153, 12 May, No. 157 and No. 160, 13 May 1906; Grey to O'Connor, tel. No. 82, 12 May 1906. For an exposition of the Khedive's attitude during the incident see P.R.O. 30/57/36, JJ/5.
not be reached. Cromer's suspicion of the Khedive's attitude in general, and his desire to control his movements, were so strong that when 'Abbas went to visit Constantinople, after the dispute had been settled, Cromer advised him to be strictly guided by the British Ambassador's advice.

The attitude of the Egyptians was another important factor during the crisis. As in many cases, most of the Arabic press either took the British side, like al-Muqațtam, or the anti-British side, like al-Līwā' and al-Mu'ayyad. The latter group took the unexpected stand of supporting Turkish allegations and attacking Britain. Al-Mu'ayyad denied Britain's right to interfere in the problem. It minimized the importance of Taba, gave ample space to the Turkish view, stated that Germany supported Turkey, and threw doubts on Egypt's right to Taba. Cromer complained that the language of the Turcophile press was violent, and that it was inspired by Mukhtār Pasha and the German Oriental Secretary, Baron Oppenheim, who were in constant contact with Muṣṭafā Kāmil. He complained also that some preachers in the

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1 F.O. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, tel. No. 151, 12 May 1906; F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, private, 13 May 1906.
3 Al-Mu'ayyad, 14, 25 February, 7, 11 March, and 8 May 1906; The Times, 14, 23 April 1906.
mosques, who were in contact with Mukhtar, were using very inflammatory language in their sermons to excite Muslim sentiment, and repeatedly asked Grey to press for Mukhtar's removal from Egypt. Cromer stated that the letters he was receiving from Egyptians showed sympathy with the Sultan on religious grounds. ¹

There is much truth in Cromer's statements, and there is no doubt that Muslim opinion was stirred, and a feeling of unrest existed among some sections of the town population. This feeling was less evident in the countryside, while even some of the enlightened class and the Turco-Circassians were opposed to the Turkish allegations. ² To Cromer this was serious enough. He asked for an increase of the British garrison, for other reinforcements to be ready, and for a free hand to deal with the press in case of need. He thought that there was a possibility of serious trouble if the Turks made any signs of an advance into Sinai, and was apprehensive that disaffection might spread to the Egyptian army. ³

¹F.O. 407/165, Cromer to Grey, No. 23 secret, and tel. No. 51, 28 February 1906; F.O. 407/166, same to same, tels. No. 102, 104, 109, on 13, 16, 22 April, and No. 141, 7 May 1906.

²F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, private, 16 and 26 May 1906; The Times, 11, 14, 26 May 1906.

³F.O. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, tels. No. 104, 111, 114, on 16, 24, 25 April, and No. 143, 8 May 1906. Cromer's apprehension was shared by Colvin, a well-informed source (Colvin, A., "Egypt to-day", N.C. (and after), vol. LXI, 1907, p.526), and Weigall, an Anglo-Egyptian official (Weigall, A.E., A history of events (cont.)
It is probable that Cromer was painting the dangers in strong colours to hasten the despatch of delayed reinforcements, and silence all unfavourable expressions, in order to obtain a quick settlement of the question. But his fears were genuine. He repeatedly urged a quick settlement because of the unrest the problem was causing, and was ready to make concessions. He urged that anything in the nature of a crisis ought to be delayed until the arrival of the reinforcements, and warned Grey against any action which could be regarded as threatening the Holy Places from the direction of the Red Sea, for fear of its effect on Muslim opinion. Cromer considered that the unrest caused would continue for some time, and asked for a permanent increase of the British garrison, bringing it back to its strength before the reduction of 1904. His demand was accepted.

The attitude of some sections of the population, then, was a hindrance which delayed British action against the Sultan, and limited the scope of the measures of coercion decided upon. Cromer was aware that to excite Muslim opinion might have been precisely


1 F.O. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, tels. No. 111, 114, on 24, 25 April 1906.

2 F.O. 407/165, Cromer to Grey, tel. No. 80, 27 March 1906; F.O. 407/166, same to same, tels. No. 118, 120, 126, on 26, 27, 30 April 1906.

3 F.O. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, tel. No. 165, 17 May 1906; F.O. 407/167, the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence to F.O., 20 July 1906.
the purpose of Mukhtar's efforts.¹ But he did not consider
Mukhtar only responsible for the serious situation which de-
veloped; he regarded the Khedive as responsible in the first
place, and this made him the more bitter against 'Abbās. Be-
sides the unforgivable affront of resisting his advice, and
communicating with Mukhtar and Constantinople behind his back,
the Khedive was responsible for the anti-British campaign.
Some of the preachers mentioned above were connected with the
Awqaf Department, which was under the Khedive's direct control,
and al-Mu'ayyad was known as the Palace organ. Cromer complained
that 'Abbās had been fomenting pan-Islamism for fourteen years.
He attributed the Khedive's attitude to his hostility against
Britain, his desire to win the support of Muslim opinion, and
to the property he owned in Turkey.²

The Khedive's attitude was damaging to the good im-
pression he had created, and the good relations he had estab-
ish ed during his previous visits to Britain. His friendship
with the King was affected, and he had to abandon a return visit
to Britain in the summer of 1906 which he had promised the Prince

¹F.O. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, tel. No.126, 30 April. 1906.
²Ibid., Cromer to Grey, tel. No. 109, 22 April 1906; F.O.800/45,
same to same, private, 7 April, 13 and 26 May 1906.
of Wales. But he visited Constantinople to put right his relations with the Sultan.

The Taba incident was a turning point. It marked the resumption of the struggle between ‘Abbas and Cromer, a struggle which lasted until Cromer resigned. It coincided with other political, politically-inspired, and journalistic exertions, and helped to intensify them. Those Egyptians who had been smarting under the Entente Cordiale, and the air of authority which Cromer had assumed, found outlets for the expression of their feelings. In January 1906 Port Sudan and the new railway line linking Khartoum to the Red Sea were officially opened.

Some Egyptian papers declared that the day should be considered a day of mourning in Egypt, as that railway was to sever commercial ties between Egypt and the Sudan, and ultimately rob Egypt of that territory. During the early stages of the Taba incident the students and graduates of the higher schools were busy founding their new club, which was later opened in April, while the students of the School of Law, followed by those of the School of Agriculture, staged their first strike on 26 February against new disciplinary regulations for the schools.

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1 Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 2, pp. 91, 92; Blunt, Diaries, part 2, p.147.
Prince of Wales visited Egypt late in March 1906. The members of the Legislative Council, during a meeting with the Prince, mentioned the government's neglect of primary and secondary education, and expressed their wish that the funds allocated to them should be increased. They caused one of their number, Shaykh al-Bakrī, to address an open letter to the Prince, reminding him that Egypt had had a representative constitution before the Occupation, and asking for the fulfilment of the British promise to help Egypt to regain one, by turning the Council into a fully representative body. A press campaign was consequently started in the Arabic press and some European papers in favour of these demands. It was continued throughout 1906.1

This state of affairs reacted on the attitude taken towards the Tāba incident. The representatives of two sections of the nationalist movement, Mustafā Kamīl and ‘Alī Yūsuf, were against the role of protector, which Britain assumed in the Tāba incident. It touched Turkey's suzerainty over Egypt, and they probably feared that it was a step to challenge that suzerainty and proclaim an actual protectorate. They suspected British intentions in Sinai.2 At the same time some of the Arabic press spread the idea that the Turkish move was a means of re-opening the Egyptian

1 Šafī'īq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 2, pp. 92-95; al-Mu'ayyad 1, 3-14 April, 9 July, 13 August, 20 October-6 November 1906.

question.\(^1\) This contributed to the strong and outwardly illogical sympathy which Turkey enjoyed in Egypt during the incident. It was a natural culmination to the idea, long propagated by Muṣṭafā Kamīl and others, that Britain was taking a leading role among European powers against the Sultan in the Armenian, Cretan, Greek and Macedonian questions, to make a diversion from the Egyptian question, which Turkey was always trying to raise.\(^2\)

The sympathy towards Turkey in Egypt was not because of Muslim feeling only, but also due to resentment against the Occupation and the policy followed by Britain in Egypt. The latter aspect of the Egyptian attitude did not appear in Cromer's reports to the Foreign Office, and the former one was exaggerated and presented as the only reason for unrest, with all the alarming terms of fanaticism and pan-Islamism.\(^3\) This became Cromer's

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1. Besides the first two references in the previous note, see F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, private, 17 March 1906. The Sultan did actually try to open the Egyptian question, v. supra, p.329.

2. In the same vein Duse Muḥammad stated that an opinion "had gone abroad that England wanted to get possession of the Damascus-Baghdad railway [sic], and so seize upon the Holy Places, thus making her stay in Egypt permanent." See Mohamed, Duse, In the land of the Pharaohs, a short history of Egypt from the fall of Ismail to the assassination of Boutros Pasha, London, 1911, p.328. He obviously alluded to the Hijaz railway and the project of a branch to 'Aqaba. Britain was thought to be against that project and the fortification of 'Aqaba; v. al-Mu'ayyad, 10 February, 12 March 1906; Gibbons, "Egypt under", p. 406. Gibbons's authority was Egyptian politicians of the time.

3. V., for instance, F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, private, 28 April, 5, 16 May 1906; F.O. 407/166, same to same, tels. No. 141, 143, 165, on 7, 8, 17 May 1906; Cd., 3394, p.5.
war-cry against the nationalist movement, and criticism of his policy in Britain. Because of the noticeable tranquility in Egypt for the few previous years, a hope had been entertained in many quarters in Britain that Cromer's rule in Egypt was a complete success and the Egyptians had at last become reconciled to foreign control. These marked signs of renewed unrest crushed these hopes, and criticism of Cromer's policy began to appear in the press and among the members of Parliament. 

Cromer started to become anxious. He took the opportunity of a demand that papers should be presented to the Commons on the Taba incident to insert what was actually an apologia. It was bearing the date the despatch of 11 May 1906, published / 17 July 1906 in Cd. 3006, enclosing the often-quoted letter of an anonymous Egyptian to Lord Cromer. The purpose of the two documents was to show that the Egyptians were thankful for the benefits conferred on them by the Occupation, that they did not like the Turks or any Turkish control, but because of strong fanatical and pan-Islamic feeling Egyptian Muslims would side with Turkey against Britain, and some of them would even gladly exchange Turkish rule for British control. Cromer told Gorst, then at the Foreign

1Colvin, A, "Egypt to-day", p. 526. The Khedive's visit to London in 1900 and 1903, the influx of British tourists to Egypt in the period of submission and the image of Egypt they carried back to Britain, and several publications in the period, established these ideas in Britain and helped propagate the idea of a protectorate over Egypt. Among the publications were:

(cont.)
Office, that the despatch was meant "not so much for the Foreign Office as for the benefit of the British and Egyptian public", as that department would eventually have to publish a blue book.¹


²See P.D.D., 22 March to 15 May 1906, some M.P.s hinted that the Taba dispute might be referred to arbitration. Between 9 April and 25 June 1906 there was correspondence between Grey and Henniker Heaton, M.P., concerning criticism 'Ali Yusuf expressed to the latter of Cromer's policy. It ended with a question in the Commons on 16 July 1906. See F.O. 371/65, file 12495. The Manchester Guardian of 5 May 1906 published an article by Blunt criticizing Cromer's policy towards the nationalist movement, the Khedive, and the Sultan in the Taba incident. In May Edward Dicey criticized Cromer's policy of Anglicisation and his capitulations scheme in his "Our position in Egypt", E.R., vol. XI, 1906, pp. 322-338. These clashes - together with Cromer's despatch mentioned in the following note, and The Times' telegrams and comments on the attitude of the Egyptians during the Taba incident - were the first shots in the struggle, further developed by the Dinaflaw incident, which ultimately involved 'Abbas, the Nationalists, and their sympathisers in Britain, in one side, and Cromer and his supporters in the other side. That struggle continued till Cromer resigned.

³Cd. 3006, pp. 32-36. The original despatch was No. 69 on 11 May 1906, see F.O. 407/166. The authenticity of the letter is open to question, judging by the circumstances, and by Clara Boyle's statement about a bogus letter composed by Harry Boyle to be sent to the Foreign Office, v. Clara Boyle, Boyle of Cairo, a diplomatist's adventures in the Middle East, Kendal, 1965, pp. 62-63.

¹F.O. 371/65, file No. 17159, Cromer to Gorst, 12 May 1906.
Cromer's scheme for modifying the capitulations system

Late in April 1906 Cromer's annual report was published, and the criticism it received further raised tension. It included, in more detail, Cromer's scheme which appeared in outline the year before for modifying the capitulations system.¹ This meant the creation of an international legislative council, composed of an appointed minority and an elected majority of subjects of the capitulatory powers. The British and the Egyptian governments would nominate the appointed members, who would include four of the Anglo-Egyptian advisers, and judges of the national and mixed courts. The council would have the power to pass laws concerning foreigners introduced by the two governments, who would jointly promulgate, and have the right to veto, them. The consular and mixed courts would ultimately be abolished. Both would be replaced by new Egyptian courts with a large enough number of foreign judges and magistrates to ensure that any subject of a capitulatory power would be tried by Europeans, or a European majority. A larger European element would be introduced into the police for the same purpose.²

Cromer proposed no alteration in the functions and power of the existing Legislative Council and Assembly.³

¹Supra, p. 3/19.

²Cd. 2409, pp. 6-9, 94-96; Cd. 2817, pp. 1-8; Cd. 3394, pp. 13-25.

³Cd. 3394, pp. 3, 4.
Foreigners in Egypt, including the British colony, opposed the scheme through their press and chambers of commerce. Disapproval was expressed in some European countries. It was felt that the scheme amounted to abolishing privileges enjoyed by foreigners, who would be put at the mercy of the British.¹ Edward Dicey, a British expert on Egyptian affairs, opposed the scheme as destroying the remaining obstacle in the way of Cromer's despotism.²

A contemporary Anglo-Egyptian official, writing of Egyptian reaction to the scheme, said that it "embittered public feeling. It was a severe blow to the national pride. Educated men now laid aside their mask, and declaimed against the sentence of perpetual political servitude. Their conscience suddenly awoke to this supreme indignity."³ The Nationalists strongly opposed and attacked the scheme. Al-Mu'ayyad called it "the great coup", and explained the reasons for opposing it in five articles published between 13 and 19 May 1906. It pointed out that the transfer of legislative power from the capitulatory powers to Britain,

¹Cd. 3394, pp. 10, 11, 101-103; The Times, 6 April 1906, and 28 April 1906 reporting on what appeared in Le Temps of 27 April; F.O. 371/65, file No. 15496, Bertie to Grey, No. 196, 6 May 1906, enclosing an article in Le Dépêche Coloniale of the same day.

²Dicey, "Our position in Egypt", pp. 322-338.

³Elgood, Transit, p.137.
and the role she would be taking beside the Egyptian government in promulgating or vetoing laws passed by the new councils, were new rights to be assumed by Britain to the detriment of the khedivial authority and Turkish suzerainty. The British would also control the new council and the new courts, and the whole scheme would greatly increase British domination. The paper further stated that the scheme would much increase European influence and employees nearly to the extent of forming a European government inside the Egyptian one. For all this, the Egyptians were given nothing. The foreigners' privileges under the capitulations would be maintained, and the existing Legislative Council and Assembly would remain powerless, while the new European council would have real power. In short, the Nationalists saw in the proposed system a means of removing the last obstacle in the way of Cromer's despotism, and an alliance between forces working for the Anglicization and internationalization of Egypt, for more domination in the country. In 1907 the poet Ṣafīz Ibrāhīm expressed Egyptian feeling when he said, addressing Cromer:
You tried to give the foreigner a standing,
Which would cause us eternal humiliation and disaster.
Woe to Egypt! when she would suffer having a legislature,
In which the foreigner would be master.¹

The very serious light in which Cromer saw this opposition can be adequately estimated when we know Cromer's purpose behind the scheme, and the importance he attached to it.

In spite of all the opposition Cromer continued to press his scheme, even after his resignation. In 1906 he wrote to his friend, St. Loe Strachey of the Spectator that he considered the scheme as his last and completing contribution to Egyptian regeneration, after which the matter ought to be taken up by some younger man.² His views on regenerating Egypt were certainly quite different from those held by the Egyptians. In 1913 he revealed, also to Strachey, the real purpose behind his scheme. He hoped for Britain to obtain a position in Egypt similar to that held by France in Tunis, and was sure that circumstances would lead to that dénouement, and that the moment would come to hoist the British flag in Egypt, and annex her. At that time there would be a clash between the personal rule of the British Agent and the desire of the Euro-


²FO. 633/8, Cromer to Strachey, 18 May 1906.
pean "colonists" to have some share in the government of the country, with public opinion in Britain and on the continent on the side of the colonists. There would be also the danger of a cry for the creation of a mixed chamber of Egyptians and Europeans, which, he believed, would infallibly prove an unmanageable legislative machine. His scheme, then, was designed to anticipate the consequence of annexation, and to keep the British Agent's personal rule over the Egyptians, while the European residents would be satisfied with a share in the government.¹

Thus, on the eve of the Dinghaway incident, Cromer was faced with serious circumstances, and with the possibility of an alliance of the Sultan, the Khedive, and the Nationalists. Through this grim situation, Cromer saw a glimpse of hope in the group of enlightened, upper-class Egyptians who disapproved of their countrymen's attitude on the Taba incident.² Many of them were Muhammad 'Abduh's disciples. He encouraged that group by all means, short of pecuniary aid, to take a more active attitude and express their views publicly by establishing a paper to counteract the Nationalists' activities.³ This

¹ F.O. 633/22, Cromer to Strachey, 3 July 1913.
² F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, private, 28 April and 16 May 1906.
³ F.O. 407/169, Memorandum by Lord Cromer on the present situation in Egypt, 8 September 1906. Al Mu'ayyad of 16 July 1906 stated that the founders of al-Jarida had sought (cont.)
eventually led to the establishment of al-Jarida and the Umma Party. Cromer hoped that this group would also help him against pan-Islamism, working together with the Christians in general and the Europeans in particular, whom he tried to rally by exaggerating the dangers of pan-Islamism. He thought that this would help him to secure European approval of the capitulations scheme.\(^1\) At the same time he attempted intimidation and a show of force. With the arrival of reinforcements he resumed an old practice of marching detachments of British forces between Cairo and Alexandria through the Delta. Under these circumstances, it was serious that a detachment performing

(cont.) an interview with Cromer and explained to him the paper’s policy of co-operation with the government. This must have been before Cromer left for Britain in June 1906, as the founders held a meeting on 23 June 1906. In another meeting on 23 July the founders agreed upon the programme of the paper. The Deputy President of the Umma Party said later that the last meeting was the actual foundation of that party, which formally took place in September 1907 (v. al-Jarida, 21 September 1907). In his memorandum Cromer said nothing about his encouragement of the foundation of the party, but other sources mentioned it. Al-Mu‘ayyad of 15 July 1906 published what it claimed to be an article by Lord Milner in an English paper. In the article Milner said that Cromer was trying to found an Egyptian party loyal to the government and strong enough to counteract the influence of the fomenters of troubles in Egypt. I could not trace the English source of the article. The following day the paper said that that party was the group of al-Jarida, and called them "Lord Cromer's party". Lloyd, and some contemporary writers, confirm this view. See Sharif, Mudhakkirati, part 2, section 2, p.129; Elgood, Transit, p.145; Lloyd, op.cit., part 1, p.50.

\(^1\)Cd. 2817, pp. 8, 9; Cd. 3394, pp. 4, 5; P.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, private, 16 May 1906.
such a duty lost one of its officers, and others were wounded after a clash with the peasants at Dinshaway on 13 June 1906.

The Dinshaway Incident and its consequences in Egypt.

The line taken by the Anglo-Egyptian and British authorities in Egypt in the Dinshaway incident cannot be fully understood without this background. Otherwise, it was an ordinary case the like of which, excluding the death of an officer, had happened before without similar developments. 1 It is also better understood in the light of Cromer's general policy of keeping British prestige and establishing lessons and exemplary punishment.

The facts were simple. When the detachment reached Minuf on 12 June 1906, they asked the mā'mur to make arrangements for a shooting-party at Dinshaway the following day. The latter contacted a notable at another village to provide the transport for the party. The following day a message was sent to the 'umda of Dinshaway to make arrangements for keeping local order, but it reached the village after the officers had arrived and started shooting, and the 'umda was away attending a meeting at the capital of the province. Thus, the

1 Reference is made to a quail-shooting case in 1887 in which a man was accidentally shot dead and others peppered with shots near the pyramids by another shooting-party of British officers. Some villagers were flogged in public and received various terms of imprisonment. See the Standard, 29 March to 1 April 1887.
villagers had no previous knowledge of the shooting party, and the officers actually broke the army regulations by shooting without the agreement of the local 'umda, who they took for granted had been informed. Except for a warning not to shoot near the village - a warning which was justified by general regulations, and which they ignored - nobody interfered with them when they started shooting. After some shots, fire broke out in a threshing-floor close to where two of the officers were shooting. The villagers around thought that fire was caused by the shots, and proceeded to disarm the officers. During the scuffle the gun of one of the officers went off, injuring a woman, the head shafir, and two other men. At that time the villagers, and even the officers, thought that the woman was dead. This gave the incident a serious turn, and the villagers began to attack the officers. An attempt to pacify them by surrendering the guns failed, and two officers ran to their camp for help. Meanwhile, the shafirs succeeded in restoring order and protecting the officers until the police arrived. One of the two escaping officers, Captain Bull, collapsed at Sirsina, after running about five miles. He ultimately died, as medical examination proved, of sunstroke, to which he had been made susceptible by concussion of the brain caused by blows received during the affray. The patrol
which went for help found Bull in this state, and saw some villagers running away. They concluded that he had been beaten there, and followed and attacked the villagers, killing a man.¹

There was panic on the British side. Captain Porter, whose gun went off and injured the villagers, stated that he thought the villagers' attack was preconcerted, without producing any valid proof.² The Adviser to the Interior took the matter up. He followed the wrong course of making his Ministry circulate to the press a report he had drawn up on the incident. This was highly prejudicial to the villagers, although the preliminary inquiry had not been concluded or the court convened.³ Cromer repeated to the Foreign Office the charges of preconcerted attack, and asked the Egyptian government to refer the case to the Special Tribunal according to the Decree of 25 February 1895. The legality of this act was later questioned by the Nationalists and by British critics. It was pointed out that the Special Tribunal was to try cases in which the attacked were performing their duties, and that this applied to the only case in which the tribunal was convened, while other cases were

¹ F.O. 407/167, Findlay to Grey, No. 122 and encl., No. 123 conf., 15 July 1906, and encl. ; No. 133, 28 July 1906, and encl.; F.O. 371/66, file 20302/32224. Some of the witnesses gave evidence that the woman was injured when the officers shot at pigeons on the threshing-floor, and that they fired at the villagers when the affray started, injuring many men.

² See enclosure to despatch No. 122 in the previous note. Gorst considered that the argument provided in support of the preconcerted action view was "not as strong as could be wished", see his minute on F.O. 371/66, file No. 20302/23844, Findlay to Grey, tel. No. 217, 13 July 1906.

(cont.)
referred to the ordinary tribunals.

Meanwhile, the inquiry was taken from the hands of the Parquet, which had started it, and entrusted to the muḍīr of Minūfīyya,¹ who was under the direct control of the Adviser to the Interior. All these extraordinary arrangements show the serious view which was taken of the incident. Cromer actually reported that the fact that the officers were in uniform and that the attack was apparently perconcerted gave a very serious aspect to the incident.² An Anglo-Egyptian official expressed this state of panic when he said that "it was generally felt that a rising was imminent".³

The panic showed itself in the excessive sentences which the villagers received: four were condemned to death and nine to imprisonment with hard labour for terms from seven years to life, three to imprisonment with hard labour for a year and fifty lashes, and five received fifty lashes each. It also showed itself in the way sentences were executed: in public, on the site of the affray, and at the same hour of the day.

(cont.)

²F.O. 407/166, Cromer to Grey, No. 98, 17 June 1906.
³W eigall, op. cit., p.203. Weigall was an alarmist, but so were many Anglo-Egyptian officials then, especially Findlay Cromer's locum tenens, judging by his despatches.
It is probable that the sentences were decided by Cromer before he left for Britain on 19 June. The sentences were political, intended to strike fear, thus suppressing a prolonged unrest which showed no signs of subsiding, and preventing the spread of the nationalist movement to the villages. British authorities in Egypt were so determined to give a lesson that when Grey, under pressure in the Commons, asked to know the facts before the sentences were executed, and pointed out the desirability of considering the sentences before they were carried out, Findlay, then acting for Cromer, objected. He stated that the sentences should be executed immediately according to the decree, that neither the Egyptian government nor the British Agency possessed any legal power to interfere with the execution, and that "interference on the government..."

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1 There is no material evidence, but many facts point to this conclusion. The preliminary inquiry was concluded on 18 June, on 19 Cromer left for Britain, and on 20 June the Daily Chronicle's correspondent in Egypt telegraphed that "Lord Cromer is convinced of the bad faith of the natives. They will be severely dealt with, and the sentences will be carried out with military severity.... those condemned to death being shot in public. There will be no appeal." On the same day al-Mu'aqared quoted The Egyptian Morning News as saying that the gallows had been tried at the police depot. Al-Rafi'i (in Mustafa Kamil, p.199) confirmed this by saying, on the authority of al-Muqattam of 16 June, that orders had been issued for preparing the gallows. All this before the tribunal was convened on 24 June. Weigall (op.cit., p. 204) stated that Cromer insisted on the sentences. There is also the precedence of Cromer deciding beforehand the sentences given on the one previous case before the Special Tribunal, v. supra, p.243. The composition of the tribunal with a minority of judges as against laymen and military, and of Egyptians as against British, made it susceptible to British political pressure.
part of His Majesty's Government is earnestly to be deprecated.

In the present state of the country, dangerous results might be brought about by such interference." Grey accepted the argument of the man on the spot. 1

It is most important to follow the effect of Dinshaway in both Egypt and Britain, as it was the main factor which ultimately drove Cromer to resign. 'Abbās Ǧilmī played a very important part in the manoeuvres which influenced the situation.

At first the Egyptians, as shown by the Arabic press, reacted mildly as they considered the case an ordinary one. However, the sentences, and the way they were executed, had a strong and lasting effect. 2 Qasim Amin voiced the feeling of resentment and despair after the executions. In 1920 Valentine Chirol wrote that, "The lamentable Denshawi incident is not forgotten to the present day. The extreme severity of the judicial retribution that followed... was honestly regarded by most Egyptians, and not only by Egyptians, as vindictive. No Englishman can read the story of the wretched men's execution without a qualm of compunction... it is Denshawi that

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1 F.O. 407/166, Grey to Findlay, tels. No. 96, 97, on 27 June 1906; No. 100, 28 June 1906; Findlay to Grey, tel. No. 197, 28 June 1906. G. C. Trevelyan (Grey of Pallodon, London, 1937, p. 198) stated that Cromer, then in Britain, pressed that the sentence should be executed. Besides executing the sentences in public at Dinshaway, one man was executed and left hanging while two men were being flogged, and the procedure was repeated. The purpose was to make the utmost impression on the people. A few days after the executions, a British inspector of irrigation was insulted and stoned not far from Dinshaway. The relations between the British forces and the population of Cairo and Alexandria were strained.
rankled in the memory of the fellahin".¹ According to an Anglo-Egyptian official² the capitulations scheme was the first time in 1906 that the Egyptians felt their national pride seriously injured, and were brought face to face with the indignity of their situation under foreign control. The Dinshaway affair was the second time they had the same feeling. Any faith they had in British justice was seriously shaken. They could not stomach the fact that four Egyptians had been executed for one British officer, a victim of sun-stroke, while an Egyptian had been killed at Sirsinā, and the authorities failed to find the murderer among a patrol of ten British soldiers.

These feelings were expressed in different ways which, in their turn, strengthened and spread the feeling of resentment, and greatly increased the power and popularity of the Nationalists. It was Dinshaway which put new life in the then weakened nationalist movement.

A strong press campaign was waged, with al-Liwa', al-Mu'ayyad, al-Minbar, and al-Zahir in the lead. Some local papers


²Elgood, Transit, pp. 137, 138.
in European languages, as L'Egypte, took part in it. The campaign lasted till Cromer's resignation, and was strengthened by translation of articles and speeches by Muṣṭafā Kamīl in Europe, and by European sympathisers, especially in Britain, together with questions and answers in the Commons concerning Egypt. The idea was to show the Egyptians that their cause received sympathy in Europe, especially in Britain, and more particularly in the Commons among supporters of the ruling party. This would allow hope for a change of policy in Egypt, encourage opposition, and ultimately undermine Cromer's position.

The critics denied the competence of the Special Tribunal and denounced the sentences and the way of execution. Egyptian grievances and aspirations were again discussed, and Cromer's despotism in particular was attacked. Grey's statement in the Commons on 5 July about the existence of fanaticism in Egypt caused a furore in the Arabic press which denied it, and found it unfair to insult the whole nation because of the action of some individuals. Al-Liwa' asked the Regent, Fakhrī Pasha, publicly to deny the accusation, and al-Mu'ayyad recognised in Grey's statement Cromer's voice. The feeling was so strong that the Manchester Guardian's correspondent thought that it would diminish Cromer's prestige in Egypt. Grey's difficulties in Parliament drew attention in Egypt, and the idea was expressed that the Egyptians should try to obtain respect for
their point of view among the British by two means: the publication of a newspaper in English, and acquiring direct or indirect representation in Parliament. These actually were the two lines on which the Khedive and the Nationalists acted.

The press propagated other literary and artistic expressions. A novel entitled *The virgin of Dinshaway* was published in one of the newspapers, but *al-Babaghallâ al-Mîfârâ* was suppressed for *caricatures* and inflammatory articles on *Dinshaway*, and an opera on the same subject was banned. Poetry was a popular medium. Hâfiz Ibrâhîm published his first ode on *Dinshaway* a few days after the executions, and other poets followed. He returned to the subject in another ode in October 1906, on Cromer's return from leave. He was most expressive of the effect of *Dinshaway* on the nationalist movement when he said in October 1907, on the appointment of Gorst:

The sunstricken officer gave us life,
And awakened the dormant people.
I wish Cromer would have stayed,

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1 *Al-Mu'ayyad*, 8, 9 July 1906; *al-Liwa',* 8, 10 July 1906; the *Manchester Guardian*, 24 July 1906. For the establishment of the paper, see infra, pp. 379, 380.


3 *Diwan Hâfiz Ibrâhîm*, 2 parts, Cairo, 1937, 1939. For the first ode see part 2, pp. 20-22, and for the second one see pp. 22-25. There is an English translation of a part of the first one in *Ahmed, J. M.*, op. cit., p. 63.
Putting chains round every neck,
And presenting Egypt now and then,
With a flogged, and a hanged martyr.
Then, we might emerge from these coffins,
And have our resurrection.¹

These odes were often recited at meetings of students
and religious societies which were frequently held to discuss
Dinshaway, the necessity of unity in the nation, the inaction
of the people, and the submissiveness of the ministers. Some
preachers frequented their meetings and were obnoxious to
the British authorities as they visited the provinces as well,
and it was feared that they might spread discontent among the
peasants.²

The situation caused 'Abbas and the extreme Nationalists
to forget their differences and close ranks. Their weak position
since 1904 had prevented these differences being carried to
the point of no return, and indirect compliments and efforts
for conciliation were exerted behind the unyielding facade.³
Both saw in Dinshaway a chance of dealing a strong blow to
Cromer and his regime, and both understood the necessity of
coopération. Muṣṭafā wanted to extend the campaign against
Cromer to Europe, and to Britain in particular. He needed the

¹Diwan Ḥāfiz, part 2, pp. 33, 34.
²F.O. 407/169, Memorandum by Lord Cromer on the present situation
in Egypt, 8 September 1906, annex No. 1(B).
Khedive's help in the latter field, with which 'Abbās was more familiar. Contact through Ahmad Şafīq secured the Khedive's co-operation.¹

In his article in Le Figaro of 11 July 1906, "A la nation anglaise et au monde civilisé", Mustafā told the story of the Dinshaway incident, and condemned the Special Tribunal, the trial, the sentences, and the executions. He attacked Cromer's policy and despotism, denied Grey's accusation of fanaticism, and stated the nationalist demands for more education, a constitution, and independence. He wrote to Blunt expressing his wish to visit London, and the latter urged him to go, as the moment was "most propitious for a National Egyptian demonstration".² During his short stay in London, Mustafā distributed a translation of his article in Le Figaro, had an interview published in the Daily Chronicle of 20 July, and delivered speeches at a party held in his honour by the London Islamic Society, and at another for members of Parliament, politicians, and journalists whose acquaintance he had made. He followed in these speeches the main lines of his article,

¹ Şafīq, Mudhakkirātī, part 2, section 2, pp. 101, 102; Farīd, Memoires, book 1, p.1.
² Blunt, Diaries, part 2, pp. 154, 155.
with stress on the denial of fanaticism, the attack on Cromer's policy, and the appeal for support for Egyptian aspirations. Muṣṭāfā kept in contact with the Radicals, and with Blunt, who gave him much help.¹

Repercussions in Britain

Muṣṭāfā's presence in London helped to explain matters to sympathisers, but the campaign in Britain against the Dinshaway blunder, which later developed to be against Cromer's policy in general, had started earlier in the Commons and the press. It continued with varying force and tactics till Cromer resigned, and even for some time after, to obtain the release of the Dinshaway prisoners. The struggle in the Commons was between Grey on one side, and the Irish Nationalists and some Radicals on the other side. The latter received some support from the Labour Party.² The extreme Nationalists and Blunt were behind the Irish, through Dillon.³ 'Abbas and his partisans, the moderate Nationalists, such as 'Alī Yusuf and Hāfiz 'Awaḍ, were behind the Radicals through Benjamin Mosley and Robertson.⁴

¹Blunt, Diaries, part 2, pp. 156-158; Kāmil, Muṣṭāfā, Egyptian-French letters, pp. 246-257. For an Arabic version of Muṣṭāfā's activities concerning Dinshaway see Kāmil, Muṣṭāfā, Dīfā' al-Mīgrī 'an bilādih, Cairo, 1906. There is a French version of his second speech in Adam, J., op. cit., pp. 160-172. In this book J. Adam stated also that Muṣṭāfā Kāmil had an interview with the British Prime Minister; see pp.172-174, 179-180.

²(cont.)
But the two parties co-operated, and Robertson often consulted with Blunt, who was a driving force behind the scene, and took an active part in the press and propaganda campaign.

The Irish Nationalists were following a policy of obstruction to achieve Home Rule. The Radicals were irritated and embarrassed by what seemed to be a wave of atrocities.

The Dinshaway incident coincided with atrocities against the Zulus during disturbances in Natal, at a time when the Radicals were raising an outcry against atrocities in the Congo. Blunt, as an old champion of Egyptian aspirations, found a chance to help the nationalist movement in Egypt, and to denounce Cromer's policy.

Between 18 June 1906 and the adjournment on 4 August Dinshaway and Egyptian affairs were raised in the Commons on 16 days. When efforts failed to save the accused villagers, doubt

(continuation)

2 The Irish M.P.s were: John Dillon, J. MacVeagh, J.S. MacNeill, M. Reddy, T.N. Healy, and W. Redmond. Dillon took the lead, while J.M. Robertson and Dr. V. Rutherford led the Radical part, which included W.P. Byles, H.W. Paul, H. Myer, J.D. White and P. Molteno. The Labour sympathisers were Keir Hardie and J.G. Weir.

Dillon was in constant consultation with Blunt, who was in contact with Mustafa Kamil, see Blunt, Diaries, part 2, pp. 149, 152-154, 162-163.

4 For the early contacts, arranged by Benjamin Mosley, between 'Ali Yusuf and both Liberals and Tories in 1903 in London, see supra, p. 295. The contact continued, and when the Liberals came to power there was more concentration on the Radical part of the ruling party. It was also Mosley who, acting for Abbas, made the first contact with Robertson, and it is probable that the Khedive invited Robert-
was thrown on the officers' behaviour, and the procedure during the preliminary inquiry and the trial. Suspicion was also expressed that the Egyptian government had tried to influence the court by the early press-release of the Interior, and that efforts were exerted to influence the press in Britain. Grey was asked about the result of inquiry in the Sirsina murder, and whether the officers were going to be tried for their behaviour. The brutal method of the execution was condemned, and flogging was strongly denounced. Other measures taken against the population of Dinshaway, the chaferis, and the policeman who had accompanied the officers and given evidence against them, were disclosed and questioned. A date for a debate was urged, and papers concerning the incident were demanded.

Grey refused a debate, and postponed the answer to some critical questions until he had received information and the papers had been submitted. When he was pressed hard, he stated that fanatical feeling in Egypt had been on the increase.

(cont.) son to visit Egypt in January 1907 through Mosley. Hafiz 'Awad accompanied Robertson and acted as his interpreter during that visit. See Farid, Memoirs, book 1, p.2; 'Abbas, "Memoirs", al-Migri, 11 May 1951; F.O. 633/13, part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 12 January 1907.

1Blunt, Diaries, part 2, pp. 155, 171.
appealed to the House not to weaken the authority of the Egyptian government by questioning the decisions of the Special Tribunal, and seriously warned the members against the results.¹ In this, he was acting also under pressure from Findlay who warned him of "the deplorable effect which is being produced in Egypt by the fact that Members of Parliament have seriously called in question the Dinshaway sentences."² This fact .... supply the lever which has .... been lacking to the venal agitators who are at the head of the so-called patriotic party.... should the agitators in this country find support at home.... the necessity will arise for bringing in a press law and for considerably increasing the army of occupation."² To impress the House and support his appeal, Grey tabled the long-delayed papers on the Taba incident, which included Cromer's despatch about the dangers of fanaticism and pan-Islamism.³ He tabled the promised papers on Dinshaway a week before the adjournment, and refused

¹For this part of the campaign in the Commons see P.D.D., 4th series, vols. No. 159-162. For Grey's statement see vol. 160, columns 288, 289.


³Cd. 3006, pp. 31-34. It was tabled on 13 July 1906.
a debate.  

The pressure exerted in Parliament and by the campaign in the press, however, drew some minor concessions. Although on leave, Cromer was busy writing a lengthy memorandum, which was published with the Dinshaway papers. It was actually an apologia. He dwelt much on the reforms carried out under his guidance, and proposed modifications to the Decree of 25 February 1895 instituting the Special Tribunal, so that it would administer punishments sanctioned by the Penal Code only, and its decisions would be confirmed by a superior authority. At the same time he considered the Dinshaway sentences just though severe, and justified the severity by the need to check lawlessness caused by the fact that the judicial system was half a century in advance of the people. In the end, he deprecated the effect in Egypt of the discussions of the incident in Britain, and advocated that the policy of gradual reform should be maintained.

In the Commons, Grey stated that from any court there should be an appeal to the prerogative of mercy, and that public execution and flogging should never be resorted to. He approved

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1 Cd. 3086 on Dinshaway was tabled on 27 July 1906; the adjournment on 4 August.

2 P.D.D., 4th series, vol. 162, columns 1832-34.
Cromer's proposals to modify the Decree of 25 February 1895, and described the state of feeling in Egypt as restlessness, not fanaticism.¹

The press campaign in Britain was started very early by Blunt. On 21 June 1906 the Manchester Guardian published his article "The shooting affray in Egypt", in which he mentioned similar previous incidents and the injustice usually dealt to the Egyptians, and warned against possible repetition. In an editorial the paper commented very favourably on the article. It maintained the same attitude throughout the campaign, attacking the Dinghaway blunder, and supporting Egyptian aspirations. It was followed in this attitude by the Tribune, and to some extent by the Review of Reviews.

Their main theme, as shown in the editorials, was an attack on the officers' behaviour, the Special Tribunal as not deserving respect, the sentences as unjust and unnecessarily excessive, and their execution as an outburst of savagery. Grey's warning against fanaticism was repudiated, and only the existence of discontent was acknowledged. His appeal that members should cease raising the question in the Commons was disapproved and his responsibility for Cromer's policy in Egypt was pointed out. Furthermore, the right of Parliament to supervise that policy

¹Cd. 3086, pp. 20-25.
was asserted because what happened had proved that "there is disease in our rule in Egypt". The cure was self-government for Egypt. The Review of Reviews went so far as to advise some kind of representative government, and said that Cromer had been in Egypt for too long. The first two papers gave ample space to extracts from Mustafa Kamal's article in Le Figaro and his speeches in London, with favourable comments. Blunt's influence is evident in these two papers.

Other Liberal organs took a different stand. The Daily Chronicle at first was sympathetic to the Dinshaway peasants, but changed its attitude immediately Grey expressed his policy, and supported it. The Daily News took a middle course between the two previous policies. The Times, The Pall Mall Gazette, the Spectator, and the Standard supported the government's policy. The second and the last of them rabidly attacked the Radical and Irish critics in the Commons.

The press, then was divided. The Tory and some Liberal organs supported the policy followed on Dinshaway, but other

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1The Manchester Guardian, 21, 28, 29 June, 6, 17, 27 July 1906; the Tribune, 5, 12, 27, 28 July 1906; the Review of Reviews, 1906, vol. XXXIV, pp. 10, 125, 226, 229.
Liberal organs strongly attacked it, together with the general policy followed in Egypt.

Freelance writers had their say also. Besides Blunt's earlier article another appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* on 2 July in which he stated the Egyptian version of what happened at Dinshaway, put all the blame on Cromer, and asked for a full public inquiry. A third article appeared in September defending the nationalist movement, attacking Cromer's policy and explaining Egyptian grievances, and advising a change of policy. In the same month Blunt published his pamphlet, *Atrocities of Justice Under British Rule in Egypt*, in which he condemned Cromer's prejudicial interference in the course of justice for political reasons. It ran to two editions before the end of 1906.

George Bernard Shaw, who was in contact with Blunt, addressed an open letter to the editor of *The Times*, bitterly criticizing the Dinshaway sentences and executions and Grey's policy, and advising that he should be transferred to the Home Office. This was in addition to his introduction to *John Bull's Other Island*, and other political activities mentioned below.

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H. R. Fox Bourne, Secretary of the Aborigines Protective Society, published in December 1906 his pamphlet, *Egypt Under British Control*, in which he stated the failures of Cromer's regime, enlarging on important points such as self-government and education, and ending with an appeal to the British government and Parliament against Cromer's "benvolent despotism". His other pamphlet *Lord Cromer's Supremacy* appeared early in 1907 showing how Cromer had acquired all power in Egypt, including that of the Khedive, and filled government posts with an increasingly British hierarchy, which took all authority, so that the Egyptians there became "automatons bound hand and foot".

H. N. Brailsford, a leader-writer in *Tribune* and *Daily News* and a member of the Independent Labour Party later, denied the existence of fanaticism in Egypt, and mentioned what he called the programme of the "Egyptian Party", seeing no harm in it.¹

Edward Dicey, then an authority on Egyptian affairs, expressed his views in the *Daily Telegraph*,² and in his book *The Egypt of The Future*, which appeared early in 1907. Although


²See for instance the number of 7 July 1906.
he was a champion of a protectorate, he strongly criticized
Cromer's regime, ascribing all the evils to his policy of
Anglicization, his autocracy, and lack of control from the
government at home.

The importance of these articles, pamphlets and books
was not confined to their effect in Britain, for they were also
translated and published in nationalist organs in Egypt.

**Cromer's policy after Dinshaway**

Meanwhile, Cromer continued, while on leave, to watch
the development of affairs in Egypt, and to draw his conclusions.
Findlay continued to report about unrest in Egypt. In July,
he objected to any reduction of the garrison, and asked for
a warship to be stationed temporarily at Port Said. In Sept-
ember he objected through fear of serious troubles to Mustafa
Kamil's holding an open-air meeting, and asked that the de-
parture of the forces over the permanent strength of the
garrison might be delayed.¹ He thought the unrest was caused
by students, some shaykhs, the sympathy expressed in Britain,
and the violent local press campaign on which large sums of
money had been spent. At the head of all this he saw the Khedive,

¹F.O. 407/157, Findlay to Grey, tels. No. 209 conf., 9 July,
No. 254 conf., 15 September, and No. 262, 19 September 1906;
F.O. 571/67, file 23820, same to same, tel. No. 226, 24 July 1906.
who had made his peace with Mustafa Kamil and was financing the campaign. He advised that, were any repressive measures to be taken, the leaders only ought to be dealt with not the rank and file. The Khedive had abused his prerogatives of conferring titles and decorations, and in future they should only be conferred on government recommendation.\(^1\) He reported also the formation of a company to establish al-Jarida.\(^2\)

Having the British and the Egyptian situations in mind, Cromer outlined his future policy in a memorandum to Grey, dated 8 September 1906. To his mind the main features of the situation were that there existed a nationalist movement and a pan-Islamic one. The two were merged with each other; the latter being the predominant partner. Thus he considered that there actually was a pan-Islamic movement cloaked under the specious title of nationalism. He confessed that there existed other elements of discord, which had been dormant, but were spurred into action by pan-Islamism.

Cromer discarded as useless several suggestions for the fight against pan-Islamism: no considerable development of free institutions was possible, the capitulations barred the way for


\(^2\)Ibid., Findlay to Grey, No. 140 conf., 5 August 1906.
further development of municipal and provincial institutions, no repressive measures could be taken against the press because of the capitulations and the attitude of the British Parliament, no change of the educational policy was advisable, and no change towards a policy of more Anglicization or the reverse was approved of. He considered that co-operation with the Khedive was made impossible by the general attitude of 'Abbas, and that the pan-Islamists (meaning the Nationalists) were irreconcilable.

Cromer, however, had some remedies for the situation. The small coterie of 'Abduh's friends and disciples (al-Jarīda group) were, to him, the best elements of the nationalist movement in its healthy form. They ought to be encouraged to take the British side as a counterpoise to the pan-Islamists. He was inclined to take an early opportunity to bring some of them into the Egyptian Cabinet. He saw in the capitulations scheme another means of fighting pan-Islamism by rallying the Europeans of all nationalities, and showing them that their interests were identical with British interests. Instead of loosening his grip on the administration, as an answer to accusations of autocracy and despotism, he decided on the reverse, thinking that a certain amount of centralization was necessary. He in-
tended to bring the various heads of departments "more frequently and more systematically into contact with each other and with myself".

As for the Khedive, Cromer thought that his powers ought to be limited, to prevent him using his influence against the British. He proposed to prevent him conferring titles and decorations except with the consent of his Council of Ministers, and putting the Awqaf Department (then under the control of the Khedive) under a responsible minister. It was possible that these two measures might drive 'Abbas to abdicate, but Cromer thought that the British should go on to the bitter end.

Cromer saw the difficulty of carrying out this strong policy, because of Parliament and British public opinion, but he thought that no effort ought to be spared to instruct and enlighten British public opinion as to the real danger of pan-Islamism. He had, however, one concession to give. He would recast the Decree of 25 February 1895 in the manner previously mentioned, but for this he would tighten up the ordinary Penal Code in some respects.¹

Cromer, then, had not learned much from the events of

¹F.O. 407/169, Memorandum by Lord Cromer on the present situation in Egypt, 8 September 1906. For the proposed changes of the decree see Cd. 3086, p. 24.
1906, or if he had, he did not see his way to any thorough remedies, and was determined to hold on and use the old palliatives: a heavy stick for the Khedive, and divide and rule for the nationalist movement.

Grey was not unwilling to support this policy, in spite of the fact that he had received all the papers concerning the preliminary inquiry and the trial on the Dinshaway incident, and found, as he later told Cromer, that his statements on the subject were hardly substantiated by facts, and his defence of all that had been done was without qualification.\(^1\)

Grey was influenced by two considerations. First, as he mentioned in the above quoted letter, the policy of supporting the authority of the men who made bona fide mistakes but had otherwise done well, while guarding against the repetition of similar mistakes. Secondly, the attitude of the Radical M.P.s. Since July 1906 these Radicals had developed their campaign in a way less embarrassing to the government. They concentrated less on Dinshaway and more on general administration: education, sanitation, Anglo-Egyptian officials, etc. The idea was to keep Egypt before the Parliament, to establish Parliament's

\(^1\)F.O. 633/13, part 1, Grey to Cromer, private, 9 March 1907.
supervision over Cromer’s administration in Egypt, and thus to affect the policy followed, and enforce the necessary changes. By the beginning of the session they organised themselves into an Egyptian Committee, to watch Egyptian affairs and ask questions about them, with Robertson and Dr. Rutherford as the active members. At the beginning, however, they were not very active. Grey said that they were asking inoffensive questions, and he was encouraging this quiet spirit. He was trying to capture them by moderation, advising them to visit Egypt and see Cromer, and recommending them to Cromer’s care. He spoke very highly of Robertson. It is probable that in this easy atmosphere Grey reached an understanding with the Radicals to forget about Dinshaway, and look forward to a policy of reform in Egypt, giving them hints about Cromer’s proposals in his memorandum. The Irish, however, continued to inquire about Dinshaway.

Difficulties started when Cromer returned to Egypt in October 1906, and began to apply his policy. He soon fell

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1 F.O. 633/13, part I, Grey to Cromer, private, two letters dated 9 November 1906; private, 1 December 1906.

2 This is borne out by the fact that when Parliament reconvened the Radicals put no questions on Dinshaway. They privately complained to Grey of the severity of the sentences, and when he refused any remittance, they did not protest, and even promised to dissuade Dillon from putting question on Dinshaway. See F.O. 633/13, part I, Grey to Cromer, private, 9 November and 1 December 1906. Blunt expressed the same views in his strong way in his Diaries, part 2, p.165.
under the influence of the Anglo-Egyptian officials. The judges, their integrity under attack after Dinshaway, stated that they would not again sit on the Special Tribunal. The military, in their turn, would not accept the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and insisted upon special treatment. In this case Cromer retracted his promise to modify the Decree of 25 February 1895, and strongly recommended the abolition of the Special Tribunal and the reference of the cases under its jurisdiction to military courts to be established by the army of occupation. In spite of Cromer's persistence, Grey refused to approve this, as it was difficult to defend, and suggested instead that the British forces should receive the same protection as that given to the Egyptian army. He further thought that, to meet pressure in the Commons, he would state that the Special Tribunal would not be resorted to before its decree was modified.¹ Cromer did not accept the compromise, and the matter was referred to the Law Officers of the Crown.

Other measures taken by Cromer increased the hostility of the Khedive and the Nationalists and threw 'Abbas more into

¹F.O. 407/168, Cromer to Grey, No. 186, 24 October, and private, 19 November 1906; F.O. 633/13, part II, same to same, 24 October 1906; part I, Grey to Cromer, 9 November 1906.
the arms of the latter. The kind of persons Cromer began
to introduce to higher posts annoyed both. The appointment
of Sa’d Zaghlūl as Minister of Education in October 1906 was
welcomed by the Nationalists at first, but was later criticized
when Sa’d supported some strongly criticized aspects of Cromer’s
educational policy. This appointment irritated ‘Abbās and
he was reluctant to approve it. Sa’d was hateful to him from
the start, as a disciple of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, because of his
strong personality and opposition to the Khedive in the Cabinet,
and a suspicion, which later proved correct, that he was a
secret founder and promotor of al-Jarīda and the Umma Party. It
is probable that Sa’d’s appointment, besides other
reasons, was a reward for that latter role. His brother, Ḥāfīz
Pathī Zaghlūl, was appointed in February 1907 as under-
secretary at the Ministry of Justice, for the same reason,
after playing a part in the Dinshāwī trials. His appointment,
der these circumstances, caused much irritation. Thirty-one
well known Egyptians telegraphed to Grey protesting against what
they considered an evident intention of Cromer “to wound Egyptian

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1 After his appointment Sa’d resigned from the committee for estab-
lishing an Egyptian university. This action was thought to have
been taken under British pressure. In the General Assembly of
March 1907, he defended the policy of using English as the medium
of instruction in government schools, and opposed proposals for
submitting all regulations respecting public education to the
Legislative Council. The Nationalists thought that he was ap-
pointed to shield the extremely unpopular British educational
policy. This was not far from the truth. Sa’d was appointed
as an answer to the criticism of excluding the Egyptians from
higher posts, because of his standing as a leading representative
(cont.)
national honour*, and asked for Grey's intervention. Besides bitter protests in the press, Ahmad Shawqi expressed their resentment when he wrote refusing the invitation to attend a reception in honour of the new Under-Secretary:

Would you decide to give the Under-Secretary something precious,
Give him a rope by which a man was unjustly hanged,
The drawers of a flogged man, and a prisoner's fetters.
But do not read him my poem at Shepheard's,
Enough for him the sentences he wrote, read to the sad people of Dinshaway. 2

The bad relations between Cromer and the Khedive, and the political situation, prevented 'Abbas attending the army of occupation's annual parade in November, as he had done the

(cont.) of 'Abduh's group of moderates, and the keen interest shown by Egyptians in educational affairs. Later, Cromer expressed his satisfaction with the experiment, but thought that reasonable concessions would be made to Sa'd, or he would "lose his usefulness". See Ahmad Shafìq, Muhakkarati, part 2, section 2, pp. 109, 110; Elgood, Transit, pp. 143, 147; al-Rafì'I, Mustafa Kamal, pp. 405-407; F.O. 371/245, file 882, Cromer to Grey, No. 42, 8 March 1907; F.O. 407/168, same to same, No. 196 conf., 2 November 1906; F.O. 800/45, Cromer to Gorst, 22 November 1906.

2 Shafìq, Muhakkarati, part 2, section 2, pp. 102, 112, 129, 142-143. In his "Memoirs" in al-Miṣrī of 11 May 1951, 'Abbas said that Sa'd was the active brain behind al-Jarīda and the Umma Party at the beginning.

1 F.O. 371/247, file 8009.

2 Al-Rafì'I, Shu'ara', p. 79. Shepheard's was the hotel where the reception was held. It was Fathi Zaghul who wrote the Dinshaway sentences.
two previous years, and Cromer reported that 'Abbas was as hostile as ever, and "the head and front of all/offending". But he was reluctant to start his coercive policy until he saw the mood of Parliament.\(^1\) The moderate attitude of the Egyptian Committee encouraged him to take the opportunity of an attack on the Khedive in The Times of 27 November to bring 'Abbas to book. The paper accused the Khedive of supporting Mustafa Kamal, helping to finance his new organs, and of the sale of titles and decorations. The article contained an indirect threat to the Khedive. Cromer reproached 'Abbas with the former accusation, and suggested that in future titles and decorations should be granted only with the consent of the ministers. He did not press the point then, but waited until the Christmas recess and renewed his pressure, achieving his end.\(^2\) Later, in January 1907, he prevented 'Abbas from selling his Maryut railway.\(^3\)

These serious clashes raised the temperature of the struggle between the two men and every possible weapon was used. After the preliminary contacts through Ahmad Shafiq, 'Abbas and Mustafa

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\(^1\)F.O. 633/13, part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 27 October, 2 November 1906.

\(^2\)F.O. 407/168, Cromer to Grey, No. 210 conf., 29 November 1906; F.O. 407/170, same to same, No. 237 conf., 29 December 1906. With Cromer's intention about titles and decorations in mind, the timing of The Times' attack is remarkable.

\(^3\)F.O. 371/246, file 2636, Cromer to Grey, No. 7 conf., 22 January 1907.
met in Egypt, in October 1906, and agreed upon the formation of the Patriotic Party and the establishment of the two nationalist organs: The Egyptian Standard, and L'Étandard Égyptien. The Khedive instigated some notables and princes to help in raising capital for the two papers. Although Muhammad Farīd was not sure whether 'Abbas had contributed, Cromer said that he had paid £4,000.1

At the same time 'Abbas secured the help of H. R. Fox Bourne, and secretly invited Robertson and H. N. Brailsford to visit Egypt in January 1902.2 This was the preliminary to a climax of the struggle when Parliament reconvened in February, and the Egyptian General Assembly met in March 1907. Robertson tried to introduce an amendment to the Address, asking for an inquiry into Egyptian affairs. It did not come about,3 but numerous questions followed from Robertson and Rutherford. Between 21 February 1907 and the announcement of Cromer's resignation there was an average of nearly a question a day in the Commons.4

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3 F.O. 633/13, part 1, Grey to Cromer, private, 27 March 1907.

4 Between 21 February and 11 April 1907 there were 43 questions. But the intensity of the campaign and its extraordinary nature will be seen by the fact that 134 questions were asked between June 1906 and April 1907, as compared with 11 between June 1903 and April 1904, and 19 between June 1904 and April 1905.
In Egypt, the claims for a representative government, which were renewed in October and November 1906, were repeated in January and February 1907, with the accompanying criticism of Cromer's personal rule, British administrative domination, educational policy, and other grievances. This was the preliminary to the demands which the Nationalists managed to have put before the General Assembly, which convened on 2 March 1907. The Assembly passed, and communicated to the government, 54 proposals, and referred to the Legislative Council other proposals for further study. The most important of the first category were the demand for a constitution, the increase in the power of existing institutions till this was achieved, teaching of the science in Arabic, the establishment of more schools, free education for the poor and reduction of school-fees, help for the creation of a university, and the establishment of a municipality for Cairo and a ministry of agriculture.1

Cromer felt, and proved, unequal to this coalition of the Khedive, the Nationalists, the Radicals, and the Irish. He was disturbed by the many questions in Parliament which caused "a great deal of trouble to myself and others, who have already about as much work as we can manage on our hands".

17.0. 407/170, Cromer to Grey, No. 22, 5 February, No. 42, 8 March 1907, and encls. For the press see, for instance, al-Mu'ayyad, 20 October-7 November, 4-10 December 1906, 12, 13 January, and 27 February 1907.
To the last moment he kept modifying the text of his annual report, and adding to it, inserting answers to questions and to criticism of his policy. This, however, was not his real worry, neither was the early part of the campaign in Egypt. He thought he could deal with the local situation, were he left alone. What worried him was the effect in Egypt of parliamentary questions, as "if the agitators here are to get into their heads that by continual worrying and by misrepresenting things to members of Parliament at home they could have their own way, the whole machine of Government here would really become almost unworkable." It is evident that he feared that this would strengthen the Khedive and the Nationalists, and kill in the bud the rising group of moderates, whose cooperation he had secured.

The remedy, to his mind, was to impress upon the Egyptians that there was no change of policy, that the Occupation was permanent, that Egyptian aspirations commanded no sympathy in Britain, and that Robertson and his like were a few individuals lacking support from the Liberal government, which completely backed Cromer's policy. This was a natural development of the strong policy he was following.

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1 F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Gorst, 22 November 1906, 1 and 9 March 1907. Grey used to send the questions to Cromer to provide him with necessary information.
Late in November 1906, when Cromer had assessed the effect in Egypt of the campaign in Britain, he asked the British government for a note, to be inserted in his annual report, stating clearly that the Occupation was to be permanent. He asked also to be allowed, before the report appeared, to speak to people in the same sense. He said that this "would do more than anything else to counter the never-ending and ever-increasing intrigues of the Khedive and the Opposition generally".  

Cromer got the note after some effort. But Grey was neither prepared, nor free, to go further and approve extreme measures, or to take a strong line towards the Radicals' questions in the Commons, as Cromer wanted. A Liberal Imperialist himself, Grey appreciated the fact that the Radicals were a majority in the Cabinet. He found it difficult to comply with Cromer's recommendation that Findlay should be awarded a C.B. in November 1906, probably because of responsibility in mismanaging affairs during the Dingshaway incident. Under pressure, Grey seemed not unwilling to give some con-

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1 F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Gorst, 22 November 1906.
3 F.O. 633/13, part I, Grey to Cromer, private, 1 November 1906. The opposition came from the Prime Minister.
sessions to Cromer concerning his proposal to refer to
court cases under the jurisdiction of the Special
Tribunal. He referred the problem to the Law Officers of
the Crown for their views. But, although they approved the
measure in certain cases, Grey sent word to Cromer that
"unless and until it is clearly established that no other
measure can provide efficiently for the protection of the
Army of Occupation", His Majesty's Government was opposed
to "a system under which the whole civil population would be
perpetually liable, in certain cases, to the application of
martial law. .... they are of opinion.... that the time has
come when an endeavour should be made to try the offences in
question by the ordinary Law Courts of the country."\(^1\) It is
clear that opposition cropped up in the Cabinet, and Grey was
not prepared to defend the measure.

It is evident from some hints Grey dropped to Cromer, that
he was not having an easy time in the Cabinet about Egypt.\(^2\)

It is clear also that the campaign of the Radicals and Irish
about Dinshaway in Britain was having a strong effect on Liberal

\(^1\) F.O. 407/170, Grey to Cromer, No. 84, 15 March 1907.

\(^2\) In December 1906 Grey told Cromer that he had to put everything
before the Cabinet, and in March 1907 he told Cromer that in
Cabinets, as in everybody composed of individuals, there was always
some inevitable tendency to compromise. See F.O. 633/13, part 1,
Grey to Cromer, private, 21 December 1906, and 9 March 1907.
and Labour supporters, and others, supported as it was by facts revealed in parliamentary papers published in July and September 1906. In the autumn of 1907 a group (including G.B. Shaw, G.M. Trevelyan, H.G. Wells, and Ramsay MacDonnell) addressed a memorial to Grey condemning the Dinshaway sentences and asking for the release of the prisoners. The New Reform Club expressed themselves very strongly on this point, and stated that the continued imprisonment of the Dinshaway convicts was putting a strain on the loyalty of the Liberal Party's supporters, which could not fail to be injurious to the solidarity of the Party.

The West Herts Liberal association in Watford, urged the revision of the sentences, and the Forest of Dean Liberal Association urged the immediate release of the prisoners. The Explosives Branch of the Woolwich Workers Union condemned "the Government for its callous behaviour with regard to the Dinshawai incident, and calls upon them to do their utmost to make amends, by ordering the release of the prisoners now undergoing punishment, and also to arrange some compensation, both for them, and the dependents of those who were wrongfully hanged".¹ Pressure was exerted on Grey in the Cabinet, and the Lord Chancellor's opinion about the

¹F.O. 371/248, file 15049/33800, 37266, 37577, 32066, 38380.
undue severity of the sentences was exceedingly strong.¹

The division among the Liberal organs completes the picture, and shows how difficult was Grey's position.

So, when Cromer urged the avoidance of any debate, or a very firm stand in Parliament,² his appeal fell on deaf ears. Grey continued his conciliatory attitude towards the Radical members, and told Cromer that they asked questions about administrative matters without animosity, or raising the events of the summer before.³ This disagreement actually touched a matter of principle. Cromer had had a free hand in Egypt for so long that he hated being subjected to detailed Parliament supervision.

Meanwhile, Grey, though ready and willing to support Cromer to some extent, was troubled with questions in the Commons up which, "cropping in the middle of all my other work, are a great nuisance",⁴ and became annoyed at Cromer's inflexible attitude.

¹F.O. 800/46, Grey to Gorst, private, 6 and 15 November 1907.
²Ibid., Cromer to Gorst, 22 November 1906; F.O. 633/13, part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 27 October 1906.
³F.O. 633/13, part I, Grey to Cromer, private, 1 December 1906.
⁴Ibid., Grey to Cromer, private, 1 March 1907.
He wrote to Cromer about the pressure put upon him by members of Parliament for the remittance of the Dinshaway sentences, but Cromer insisted that the subject should be left alone. Questions in the Commons provided Grey with information about the prosecution before a court-martial, of the policeman who had accompanied the officers to Dinshaway. During the trial he gave evidence against the officers, saying that they had fired on the peasants, and he was subsequently prosecuted for perjury. Grey told Cromer that it was indefensible to try a man by court-martial for perjury committed before a civil court, and that if it came again before the Commons it would be very difficult to explain or defend. Although Cromer acknowledged the irregularity, he was not willing to remit the sentence, as the man would have to be reinstated and pressure for the release of the Dinshaway prisoners would increase. Grey had to write again in February asking for something to be done before Parliament met.

In the circumstances in Egypt and Britain, the irritation of both men with the Radicals' campaigns in the Commons, and the approaching meeting of the General Assembly, a clash was inevitable.

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1 F.O. 633/13, part I, Grey to Cromer, private, 9 November, 1 December 1906; part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 15 November 13 December 1906.

2 Ibid., part I, Grey to Cromer, private, 1 December 1906; part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 7 January 1907; F.O. 800/48, Grey to Cromer, private tel., 2 February 1907.
To a question in the Commons on 21 February about the rachat militaire system (payment of money for exemption from military service), and the desirability of its abolition, Grey answered that this matter was engaging attention. Cromer considered the answer as a half pledge that the matter would be considered. Grey and Gorst were actually against the system. To other questions on the use of Arabic as medium of instruction in Egyptian government schools, Grey mentioned the lack of competent teachers and the absence of scientific textbooks, but he added on 28 February that "as Arabic is the native language of the country, I should depurate, when instruction can be efficiently given in Arabic, the use of other languages to the exclusion of Arabic." Commenting on the protest of the thirty-one Egyptians against the appointment of Ahmad Fatālī Zaghlūl, he told Cromer on 1 March that it would appear that the effect of the Dinshaway trial had been mischievous in Egypt, and suggested that if the severity of the sentences had been felt as an injustice, some act of clemency towards the prisoners might do good.

Cromer maintained his inflexible attitude. He stated that he could not lose the revenue from the rachat militaire, and that the wisest thing was to leave the Dinshaway prisoners
for two or three years, and then remit some of the sentences. He protested against Grey's answer in the Commons concerning Arabic, which came when the General Assembly was about to meet, under strong pressure from Khedive and press, to discuss the proposals they would make to the government. This would materially add to the difficulties of the local situation, about which Cromer was very anxious, and which had been caused by Robertson's visit and the parliamentary agitation. He doubted whether the government at home thoroughly understood the hollowness of Robertson's policy, or whether there was no intention of supporting that policy. The difference between his policy and Robertson's was that the latter advocated quick advance in the direction of Egyptian autonomy, while he was for gradual development, a policy which he had been following successfully for years, without much help from London which had no definite Egyptian policy, either in the past or at that time. Any quick pace would cause serious financial embarrassment, and a breakdown of the anomalous system of government he was working in Egypt, a system which he doubted could be worked much longer, either by himself or by anybody else. He added that the main reasons why he was staying in Egypt were to carry through the capitulations scheme, that he did not like to see the work of his lifetime wrecked, were Robertson's policy supported. He
hated the appearance of being driven out by the Khedive, the Musṭafā Kamīl, the Robertsons, and the Diceys. The difficulties of the situation were not local. They arose from the supposed sympathy in Britain with the ultra-opposition in Egypt. The only method of avoiding a crisis was that Grey should abstain from pledges of any kind as regards the special direction reforms should take, and that he should, in the name of the government, dissociate himself "in the strongest and most emphatic terms, from Robertson and his crew" or else they would land him in difficulties greater than he realised.

Grey reminded Cromer of the support he had received from the home government the year before. Grey had then taken a very strong line on the Dinshaway business, and made some statements, which could hardly have been substantiated when he received full information afterwards, and had defended all that had been done without qualification. His policy was that so long as mistakes were bona fide ones, made by men who had otherwise done well, the proper thing was to support their authority, and to guard against the repetition of similar mistakes. He added

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1 P.D.D., 4th series, vol. 169, columns 1035, 1036, 1402; vol. 170, columns 241, 242; F.O. 300/46, Cromer to Grey, 28 February 1907, tel., 3 March 1907; F.O. 635/13, part II, same to same, private, 3, 7 and 8 March 1907; Part I, Grey to Cromer, private, 1 March 1907.
that to hit out because of inoffensive questions, which were best dealt with by patience, would be unreasonable. If, however, things were challenged, or there was a determined attempt to upset Cromer's administration, he would take a strong line.\(^1\)

It was firm, though conciliatory language. A few days later, Radical members of the Egyptian Committee saw Grey and discussed some Egyptian grievances, especially education. Grey was not unsympathetic, though he gave no promises.\(^2\) At the same time he informed Cromer of the government's decision about the Special Tribunal.\(^3\)

Under all this pressure Cromer thawed slightly. He was ready to spend a larger sum on education, abolish or modify the date-tax the following year, and accept some increase in the powers of the provincial councils. Although he was against a commission of inquiry as proposed by Robertson, he was not unwilling to accept individual competent experts to report on matters like education or the judicial system.\(^4\) He accepted the

\(^1\)F.O. 633/13, part I, Grey to Cromer, private, 9 March 1907. In 1908 Grey complained that the Dinshaway sentences "erred grossly on the side of severity, and he had for two years to defend them in public", See Trevelyan, op.cit., p.197.

\(^2\)F.O. 633/13, part I, Grey to Cromer, private, 15 March 1907.

\(^3\)F.O. 407/170, Grey to Cromer, No. 84, 15 March 1907.

\(^4\)F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Gorst, 28 February 1907; F.O. 371/245, file 882/847\(^8\), Cromer to Grey, No. 42, 8 March 1907; F.O. 633/13, part II, same to same, private, 15 March 1907.
British government's decision about the Special Tribunal, and would do his best to devise some plan for an alternative with the minimum of harm.

Cromer's resignation

Up to 22 March 1907, Cromer was prepared to serve under the new conditions, and had not decided to resign. But on 28 March, he wrote privately to Grey about his intention to do so because of failing health. His decision was not definite, and he waited to consult a leading physician before he formally sent his resignation on 4 April. Findlay confirmed that Cromer was really ill, and not fit for work.

Cromer, then, resigned because of failing health as Zetland and Harry Boyle stated. The Nationalists' allegations that he was actually asked to resign as a result of their campaigns, and the British government's disapproval of his policy and his late blunders, especially on Dinshaway, were not true.

There is some over-simplification in all these statements. It is true that Cromer was then sixty-six years old, and his health

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1 F.O. 633/13, part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 22 March 1907.
2 Ibid., Cromer to Grey, private, 28 March 1907; F.O. 800/46, same to same, tel. private and conf., 4 April 1907; Findlay to Hardinge, private and conf., 30 March 1907.
3 Zetland, Cromer, p.289; Boyle, Clara, Boyle, p.149.
4 Shafić, Mudhakirati, part 1, section 2, p.117; Boyle, Clara, Boyle, p.150; Seigal, Boyle, p.209.
was failing, especially under the much increased pressure of work and anxiety since Taba and Dinaheyy. But he could have stayed, as he was actually determined to do, had he received the full support he wanted from the home government and been able to relax. Under pressure from their Radical wing, the government could not give the support required. The system of absolute personal rule he had developed, especially since 1904, and the fact that all the Anglo-Egyptian officials then were departmental in the narrow sense, put the whole burden and responsibility on his shoulders, and there was no chance for relaxation.

Failing health, therefore, was the immediate cause for his resignation, but behind it were the Egyptian Nationalists, the Radicals, and the Irish campaign, and behind most of their efforts was ‘Abbas Šimalī. During the crucial week, 22-28 March, when Cromer was hesitating between staying and going, ‘Abbas gave him some last tokens of his determined resistance, which might have helped him to make up his mind, and which, with other reasons, explain Cromer’s open hostility towards ‘Abbas during the last audience, and in his farewell speech

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1 F.O. 633/13, part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 28 March 1907.
and his Abbas II. Cromer received confirmation of his suspicions that 'Abbas was trying to create an incident between Britain and Turkey by arousing the latter's suspicions as to Britain's intentions on the western frontier. There were already clashes between bedouins on both sides of the frontier. With an agitated political situation at hand, and the results of the Fāba incident and the Khedive's role then still fresh in mind, Cromer saw the Khedive's attitude in a very serious light. Then, on 24 March Le Temps published an account of an audience which the Khedive gave to its special correspondent. 'Abbas denied that the national aims were either anti-foreign or fanatical, and thought that it was time to make every possible effort for the satisfaction of the intellectual and moral needs of the Egyptians, not for their material needs only. He said that he had never opposed a measure, or refused a counsel, useful to Egypt, and was ready to co-operate with anybody for the good of the country. He added that he did not want to establish personal authority, that despotism did not suit him, and that he believed in co-operation between the sovereign and the people for the welfare of the country. The interview was widely publicized in Egypt.

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It was a direct attack on Cromer's policy, and British organs considered it a profession of faith favourable to the Nationalists and in support of the General Assembly's decisions.¹

Cromer spent his remaining days in Egypt - he left on 6 May 1907 - in trying to ensure that his policy would be maintained. During his last audience of the Khedive he told 'Abbas that he was responsible for the existing serious situation, and that if any disorder occurred, which involved calling in the aid of the British garrison, events of a very serious nature might occur and circumstances might arise which would endanger the Khedive's own position and that of his dynasty. He reproached him for his interview with the correspondent of *Le Temps*, and concluded by advising 'Abbas that he then had an opportunity of changing his attitude and conduct, else he would run serious risk.² In his farewell speech on 4 May Cromer attacked 'Abbas, speaking about what he called the scandals of the *waqf* administration, the need for reform of the Muslim courts.

¹It is significant of the nature of the Khedive's resistance at that stage that when Gorst succeeded Cromer 'Abbas reversed his policy on the two points: he heartily co-operated with Gorst on the western frontier's affairs (see F.O. 800/46, Gorst to Grey, private, 10 June 1907), and during an audience given to Edward Dicey he stated that the Egyptians could only appreciate a personal sovereignty, that the wheels of the administrative machine would move far more smoothly if the *de facto* and the *de jure* governments in Egypt worked in cordial co-operation, and that he preferred British occupation to that of any other country. See the Daily Telegraph, 21st May 1907.

²F.O. 407/170, Cromer to Grey, No. 72 conf., 27 April 1907.
and the proceedings of the self-seeking irresponsible advisers
who generally cluster round an Oriental Court. He attacked the
Nationalists and praised the "Patriots". Cromer affirmed that the
British Occupation was to continue indefinitely, and added that
he would continue to take interest in Egyptian affairs, and
would use his influence in the direction of progress on the
lines already laid down.¹

These were efforts to maintain the status quo. Cromer
tried even to pledge the British government and his successor
to his policy. He suggested Gorst as his successor because he
was his "pupil", and tried to make Gorst publicly pledge himself to follow his policy. He asked his resignation to be
announced in the Commons with the strongest emphasis that
there would be no change of policy. He again pressed that
the Prime Minister should make the same statement in the Commons.²

Grey made the desired statement on 11 April, and Gorst
wrote privately to Cromer that he would follow his policy. But
this was probably to stop a further deterioration of the situation
in Egypt, and to please the old man in his moment of distress.
Gorst actually followed a more flexible policy, especially towards

¹The Egyptian Gazette, 7 May 1907.
²F.O. 633/13, part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 28 March,
13 and 19 April 1907.
the Khedive. The authority for the new policy has not been defined, but there was a tendency among some writers to consider that it was dictated by the new Liberal government which was eager to "shake things" out of their grooves,"¹ and which thought that with the end of Anglo-French rivalry, the Egyptians might be admitted to a larger share of the administration.² Some even thought that Gorst had noted the omens of the time, and modified his beliefs as to the policy to be followed in Egypt to suit the wishes of the party in power.³ Cromer's opinion was that Gorst was acting under Radical inspiration in Britain, and controlled by the Foreign Office.⁴

There is no doubt that Gorst was, in general, following his own convictions. As early as 1894 he had expressed his opinion that the Khedive should have his share in the government by being given a free hand to choose his ministers, on condition that he would answer for their co-operation with the British.⁵

¹ Lloyd, op.cit., pp. 59, 66, 67; Storrs, op.cit., p.66; Duse Mohamed, op.cit., p.335; Zetland, op.cit., p.309. Zetland described the role of Grey as general direction.
² Newman, op.cit., p.159; Elgood, Egypt, pp. 25, 26.
³ Elgood, Transit, p.184.
⁴ F.C. 633/22, Cromer to Strachey, 26 March 1913.
⁵ M.P.P., box 11, Gorst to Milner, private, 14 April 1894.
Up to July 1904, he was in favour of local self-government, and good relations with the Khedive.\textsuperscript{1} According to Cromer, when Gorst succeeded him, he "had rooted in his head the idea that it was possible, not only to work with the Khedive, but to make use of him against the Nationalists in Egypt".\textsuperscript{2}

Gorst's policy, then, happened to agree with the government's policy. Judging by Gorst's ambition, as expressed in 1895, to succeed Cromer after distinguishing himself somewhere else,\textsuperscript{3} it is not improbable that he even influenced that policy and was fulfilling his programme.

Putting aside the doctrinaire or sentimentalist attitude of the Radicals, the attitude of the Liberal government towards Cromer, and the policy followed after his resignation, were the logical result of events. After 1893 Cromer was kept in Egypt as a check on the Khedive's resistance, and according to his own wish. After the reconquest of the Sudan and the Khedive's submission, Cromer was left because he wanted to stay. But it began to be felt that his work in Egypt was complete and a change of policy would do good, as the King told Cromer in 1902.\textsuperscript{4}


\textsuperscript{2} F.O. 633/22, Cromer to Kitchener, 30 July 1913.

\textsuperscript{3} H.PP., box 13, Dawkins to Milner, 9 January 1896.

\textsuperscript{4} F.O. 800/122, Cromer to Lansdowne, 27 September 1902.
attitude grew after the Entente Cordiale had put an end to
Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt, and Gorst began to be looked on
as Cromer's successor. 1 In December 1905 Campbell-Bannerman
offered Cromer the Foreign Office, but he refused. The develop-
ments in 1906, however, showed the British government the short-
comings of Cromer's policy. It revealed the weakness of Cromer's
regime, and the strong opposition, supported by the Khedive,
to his policy. Continued alliance between the Khedive and the
nationalist movement might prove dangerous. The Khedive's
visits to London, his attitude and utterances on some occasions,
and 'Ali Yuṣuf's visit in 1903, convinced them that 'Abbas,
and even some Nationalists, were willing to co-operate under a
new policy. It began to be seen that Cromer's strong and rigid
policy towards 'Abbas had lost its raison d'être, and was doing
more harm than good, and that Egypt could be better pacified
through another policy. This, besides the Radicals' efforts,
is why the Liberal government would not give Cromer the complete
support he wanted. It is not improbable that Cromer's resignation
was expected and desired.

1Storrs, op. cit., p.65.
Conclusion

The struggle between 'Abbas and Cromer was part of the main struggle which had started under Khedive Isma’il between the khedives and their ministers, trying to defend their legitimate authority, and some European powers, interfering in Egypt to protect or to further their interests in the country. At 'Abbas's accession the situation had developed in a way to create duality in the government, with the actual authority in the hands of the British side. The difference between the period of 'Abbas and that of his predecessor was that 'Abbas led or instigated resistance to the Occupation. The two combating sides changed in attitude and the nature of the fight changed during the long struggle. Some forces were released, and strongly influenced the situation.

At first Cromer took a friendly, though patronizing, attitude towards 'Abbas. But when the latter wanted real power Cromer started browbeating him to the extent of using the show of military force and threats of deposition, and the struggle between them assumed a personal character. In the face of the challenge Cromer decided in 1893 to stay in Egypt. This was one of his most important decisions. His tenure of office for about a quarter of a century developed his autocratic character.
and helped him to acquire all power, and dominate every political and administrative aspect, till he became almost an institution, without which the whole regime would lose its main features. Another important change took place in 1895–96. By that time Muṣṭafā Kāmil had emerged beside ‘Abbās, and this, together with other signs, helped Cromer to foresee the future resistance of ‘Abbās and the opposition in Egypt. At the same time the Sudan campaign began, and the permanency of the Occupation became more certain. Cromer, then, imposed more British control on the administration by a gradual increase of Anglo-Egyptian officials and their powers. This tendency increased later to the extent that Cromer thought of sitting in the Egyptian Cabinet, and he began seriously to pave the way for annexation or a protectorate after the Entente Cordiale.

It appears that Cromer was confirmed in this policy by his belief that the Khedive was incapable of governing the country, that the Egyptians were not a nation, and were not prepared for self-government. But it is significant that he did not try to prepare them for it, and assumed the Khedive’s authority for himself. Cromer was so committed to this policy, and convinced that it was the right one, that no real change
was possible before he had resigned. Besides Cromer's convictions, the large number of Anglo-Egyptian officials, and their resistance to any decrease of their powers, were serious difficulties in the way of change.

It is difficult to recognize the intelligent, frank, straightforward, patriotic, and popular youth of 18 in the astute, wily, despotic, and capricious 'Abbās ʿIlmī of later years. He changed much under the hardships of an intolerable situation, where he had no solid ground to stand on, and was always faced with the threat of deposition. He could not get any real help either from Turkey or from France, as he first hoped. He was even apprehensive of an agreement between Turkey and Britain at his expense. The Egyptians could not give adequate support. 'Abbās had no alternative, then, but to give way to Cromer now and then, and encourage all elements of opposition to the Occupation. This was a long term policy which could not help him in the short run, and he was extremely discouraged by Fashoda and the Entente Cordiale. So, when the nationalist movement acquired some strength 'Abbās had lost heart and succumbed to Cromer's pressure, and to pursuits of idle rulers — gathering wealth, and lust for power of which he had long been deprived. Any insignificant resistance he offered at that time was in fact against Cromer, not against the Occupation or Britain.
The Khedive and the nationalist movement, then, began to take different roads, but he continued to help it, or some sections of it, in order to combat Cromer.

'Abbas was usually accused of helping the nationalist movement to divert it from constitutional demands. It is more likely that at first he helped it out of conviction, and to use it against Cromer. Later, when he had to take a moderate, or submissive, line towards the Occupation he was attacked by the nationalists. It was then natural that he would oppose constitutional demands, for fear of losing control. In other words constitutional demands had not become a burning question before the Khedive's despotic tendencies had been developed during his struggle with Cromer, and his alienation from the larger section of the nationalist movement. The first expression of the Khedive's opposition to those demands was made to Cromer in March 1907.¹

The nationalist movement always gained from the struggle in the dual government. It was Riyāḍ who, while resisting the Occupation during Tawfiq's reign, helped to establish al-Mu'āyyad, the first important nationalist paper of the period. 'Abbas helped

¹F.O. 633/13, part II, Cromer to Grey, private, 30 March 1907.
the Nationalists so much that Ahmad Shafiq, rightly, said that he could be considered the founder of the Patriotic Party.¹

The nationalist movement of 'Abbas's time was different from the movement which 'Urabi led. The latter was mainly a movement of the fellaheen and the landowners, stimulated and led by the army, against misrule and European intervention, and for representative government. It did not strike deep roots, and almost vanished with 'Urabi's defeat. The former was a movement of the intelligentsia and town population, strengthened by the spread of education, influenced by more contact with Europe, and spread by the growing power of journalism. The fact that it depended on a small section of the population explains its weakness and reliance on khedivial help, and Turkish and European sympathy, especially French and German.

This situation exposed the nationalist movement to splits, and sometimes caused it to adopt policies alien to its real nature and aspirations. Alliance with the Sultan to secure his support, and for fear of an agreement between him and Britain at Egypt's expense, gave some sections of the movement a false colour of pan-Islamism. This was strengthened when, in its

¹Chafik, L'Egypte moderne, p.172.
endeavour to enlist the support of the less enlightened peasantry
and town population, the movement resorted to religion to bring
nearer to their understanding the more sophisticated aspirations
of nationalism. At the same time they expressed their sympathy
with the poor. These factors, together with the Khedive's de-
feat before Cromer, and his changed policy, caused a split in
the nationalist movement. Muṣṭafā Kāmil and the extreme Nation-
ists were for evacuation and representative government. The
great land-owners, afraid of khedivial despotism and possible
prevalence of the extremists and their supporters among the
poorer sections of the population, were for gradual progress
towards self-government, and ready to co-operate with the Occu-
pation. The Khedive had his supporters among moderate Nationalists,
who desired co-existence with the Occupation,¹ and reliance on
British pledges, and for representative government within the
limits of the khedivial prerogatives. This was the origin of
the three parties which, though formed after Cromer's resignation,
did exist before as separate groups.

Against these elements of weakness in the nationalist
movement, however, there were other elements of strength. Time,

¹ 'Ali Yusuf's expression was, "neither submissive nor resistance
to the occupation".
with continued spread of education, and growth of journalism, was on its side. The educational policy, the increased number of Anglo-Egyptian officials and their dominant authority in the administration, and the failure to take any step in the direction of self-government, were common causes of discontent, besides others which affected certain sections of the population.

But the movement could not have constituted a serious danger to the Occupation so long as it was confined to the urban population. The danger seemed imminent when the Dinahaway incident angered the fellaheen and appeared as if it was going to propel them into the arms of the Nationalists. This is what alarmed the British authorities, and made the change to Gorst's policy necessary.

The new deal actually aimed to unite the two sides of the dual government against the much more important and more active section of the nationalist movement, but it ended, nevertheless, in failure, since the strength of that movement was underestimated.
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