THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT IN INDIA, 1919-1924

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to examine the ferment among Indian Muslims consequent to the threatened dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, which for six years dominated the political scene of the Sub-continent. It essentially analyses the various cross-currents which converged to make the Khilafat movement so turbulent.

The Introductory Chapter discusses, in the light of contemporary events, the gradual involvement of Indo-Muslim sentiment with the Ottoman Khilafat and with the ideal of pan-Islamism until the Armistice of December 1918. Chapter II (December 1918–July 1920) studies the demand for the preservation of status quo ante bellum for Turkey as the Allied Powers begin to re-draw her map, the formation of the Central Khilafat Committee, the approaches to the Indian and the Allied Governments, and the search for an effective formula in concert with the Hindus resulting in the scheme of non-co-operation. Chapter III (May 1920–November 1920) discusses the voluntary withdrawal (hijrat) in the classical Islamic tradition of between fifty and sixty thousand Muslims from India to neighbouring Afghanistan. Chapter IV (August 1920–March 1922) examines the course and failure of the non-co-operation experiment, together with other attempts to force a revision of the stringent Treaty of Sèvres. Chapter V (February 1922–June 1923) deals with the aftermath of non-co-operation, the break-up of Hindu-Muslim entente and the effects on the Khilafat movement of the developments in the Near and the Middle East. Lastly, Chapter VI (July 1923–December 1924) discusses the weakening of the movement after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, and its final collapse as a result of the abolition of the Khilafat and the expulsion of the Sultan from Turkey in March 1924. It also examines the re-emergence of the All-India Muslim League as a force in Muslim politics and briefly looks into the phase when the movement, at the time of the Hedjaz crisis, begins to acquire an increasingly academic character which lingers on into the 1930s.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

The impending dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after her defeat in the First World War threw the larger portion of the world of Islam into confusion and dismay. In Muslim India (see Table I and Diagram I) it caused even greater tremors. Turkey, as the only surviving Muslim empire, ruling large Christian populations and seemingly capable of resisting Europe, had been the pride of the Muslims, especially those under foreign domination. As a symbol of the worldly power of Islam and the seat of its 'universal' caliphate, Turkey had provided them with a rallying-point. In India she had also given them a feeling of security in the midst of the Hindu majority. But, since the latter half of the nineteenth century, a fear had haunted the Indian Muslims that if Turkey was to disappear they 'would become like unto Jews - a mere religious sect whose kingdom was gone'. Thus, Turkey was to them 'the last hope of Islam'. Naturally, the threatened spoliation of her empire at the end of the War in November 1918, combined with other factors, engulfed the greater part of India in an intense agitation for the preservation of Turkey's integrity and sovereignty. It took an anti-British character because, of all the Allied Powers, Britain was held to be chiefly responsible for Turkey's as well as India's misfortunes.

1 For a study of its effects on the Muslim world see Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, Duniya-i-Islam aur Masala-i-Khilafat, Bombay, 1922.
2 This fact was acknowledged even by the British administrators in the East. See Mark Sykes, 'Asiatic Turkey and the New Regime', POAS, Dec. 1908, pp. 2-5.
5 See the views of Tassaddaq Hussain Khan, D.S.P., C.I.D., FSD, 2765/18.
The Indo-Muslim involvement in the ideal of Islamic fraternity or 'pan-Islamism' - the term coined by a German in the 1870s and popularised by a Frenchman in the 1880s - and with the Ottoman Khilafat was a phenomenon not peculiar to the Indian sub-continent. Basically, it reflected the desire for that ideal universal socio-political order under one leader which had always been the cherished dream of the Muslims. But this ideal state had 'never had more than


Muslim jurists have not only interpreted the shariat - the Quranic text and the Traditions - as the basis of the Khilafat but with some exceptions have consensus as to the religious necessity of the institution. The recognition of and submission to the Khalifa or the Olul Amr ('Those in authority' - Quran, 4:83) was considered binding on the Faithful except when the former deliberately flouted the shariat. See Abul Kalam Azad's religio-political treatise Masala-i-Khilafat wa Jazira-i-Arab, Calcutta, 1920. Some other comprehensive discussions on the institution of the Khilafat are: M.H. Abbas, All About the Khilafat, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 2-78; Ameer Ali, 'The Caliphate, a Historical and Juridical Sketch', CR, CVII, June 1915, pp. 681-94; Muhammad Ali, Khilafat in Islam, Lahore, 1920; Anon., 'The Sultan of Turkey and the Caliphate', CR, CX, Aug. 1916, pp. 199-205; T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate, London, 1924; —, 'Khalifa', EL, II, pp. 881-85; G.C. Badger, 'The Procedents and Usages Regulating the Muslim Khalifate', NC, II, Sept. 1877, pp. 274-82; H.A.R. Gibb, 'Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the
a brushing contact with reality'. But barely two decades after Prophet Muhammad's death in 623 AD, its basis was being questioned by the Shi'as as well as by the Khawarij. By 750 AD there was no longer any one universally recognized caliphate. Independent rulers in the 'core' and on the 'fringe' of the Islamic Empire appropriated to themselves the titles of Amir-ul-Mominin and Khalifa. So much so that at one time there were as many as three caliphs in the Muslim world, each claiming the allegiance of the Faithful. Yet, in spite of the impotence of the 'central' Khilafat, the fiction of its authority, under an hieratic cloak and exalted by jurists like Al-Mawardi (974-1058) and Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), still survived and lingered even after the disappearance of the Baghdad Caliphate at the

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E.g., the Ummayad rulers in Spain and North Africa (756-1492), the Fatimid rulers in Egypt (909-1171) and Qutb-ud-din Mubarak (1316-20) in India.
hands of the Mongols in 1258 A.D.¹¹ Large portions of the Sunni Muslim world continued to submit to the Abbasid Caliphs at Cairo and later to the Ottomans at Constantinople.¹²

Thus, India had been somewhat accustomed to the fiction of the 'central' Khilafat since the very early days of the Arab conquest of Sind in 711 A.D.¹³ Practically throughout the pre-Mughal period the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad, and later their faineant successors in Cairo, were regarded as the source and sanction of the Sultans' legal authority.¹⁴ Some of the Sultans — Mahmud of Ghazna (998-1030), Shams-ud-din Iltutmish (1211-36), Muhammad bin Tughluq (1325-51) — had especially sought and obtained the caliphal investiture.¹⁵ Even the few Sunni provincial dynasties, which assumed independence from Delhi, did so in the name of the Abbasid Caliphs, whose names appeared on the coins.¹⁶ This practice continued until the advent of the Mughals in 1526, whose rule coincided with the 'transfer' of the


¹² Sharif al-Mujahid, op. cit., p. 91.

¹³ For details see Syed Sulaiman Nadvi's commendable research pamphlet Khilafat aur Hindustan, Azamgarh, 1921.


¹⁵ Arnold, The Caliphate, pp. 82-105; and Nadvi, Khilafat aur Hindustan, pp. 9-24.

¹⁶ Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture, p. 10.
Khilafat from Cairo to Constantinople. Though the diplomatic exchanges between the two Empires continued up to the chaotic days of the Mughal rule in the late eighteenth century, the Mughals, like other independent rulers (e.g., Shia Persia), never conceded the Ottoman claim to the 'universal' Khilafat.

The position, however, changed gradually when the Mughal rule began to totter. There is evidence — though it is scant — to suggest that by the second half of the eighteenth century, as a consequence of the political decline and religio-ethical disintegration, the Muslims in India were developing some kind of attachment to the Ottomans. Because, when in the 1760s the Porte was projecting an alliance with France, the British ambassador in Istanbul, (Sir) James Porter, endeavoured to oppose the treaty lest it should affect the British interest among the Indian Muslims as rivals of the French in India.

Even Shah Wali Ullah (1703-62), the famous divine of Delhi, who apparently showed disconcern for the Ottoman Khilafat, twice referred to the Turkish Sultan as Amir-ul-Mominin in his Tafhimat-i-Ilahiyah. Later, in 1789, the gesture was reflected in Tipu Sultan's endeavour to obtain an investiture from the Ottoman Caliph Abdul-Hamid I. However, it was not until the 1840s that the position of the Indo-Muslim orthodoxy with regard to the Ottoman Khilafat began to crystallize. Shah Muhammad Ishaq (1778-1846), the grandson of Wali Ullah, was probably the first Indian alim to

17 It is said, though writers disagree (e.g., Arnold, The Caliphate, Chapters XI and XII, pp. 129-58), that when Sultan Saleem I conquered Egypt in 1517 the last Abbasid Caliph Al-Muttawakkil transferred the Khilafat to him by a formal deed of assignment. See Ameer Ali, 'The Caliphate', pp. 693-4.

18 F.W. Buckler, 'The Historical Antecedents of the Khilafat Movement', BR, CXXI, No. 677, May 1922, p. 606. Also see Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture, pp. 22-47.


21 Azad, Masala-i-Khilafat, p. 83.

22 M.H. Khan, History of Tipu Sultan, Calcutta, 1951, pp. 132-38. Also see J.H. Qureshi, 'The Purpose of Tipu Sultan's Embassy to Constantinople', JIH, XXIV, 1945, pp. 77-84.
support the Ottoman political policies when he migrated to Mecca in 1841. From then on, the inclination of the ulama, at least of the Wali Ullah school, was to recognise and actively to proclaim the Ottoman title to the 'universal' Caliphate.

By the early 1850s, the Ottomans were themselves reported to be pushing the Sultan's claim as Caliph in India through their emissaries. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1854 Lord Dalhousie (1812-60), the Governor-General of India, found among Muslims considerable interest and sympathy for the 'Sultan of Room' or the 'Commander of the Faithful' as he was considered to be. When the Crimean War broke out in that year, 'great interest and excitement' was reported to be felt 'by all the Mussulman population in India, especially on the western frontier'.

Links with Constantinople became more intimate with the disappearance in 1858 of the last vestiges of Muslim rule in India. In their search for a 'centre' and to escape British reprisals, not only did the Indian ulama turn to the Ottoman Caliph, but also, in a number of cases, notably those of Rahmatullah Kairanwi (1818-91), Haji Imdadullah (1817-99), Abdul Ghani (d. 1878), Muhammad Yaqub (b. 1832) and Khairuddin (1831-1908), they migrated to Mecca and some even visited Constantinople. Even those ulama, like Karamat Ali Joumpuri

25 The information was supplied to the British by Abbas Pasha of Egypt. See PRO, F.O., 78/1316, 78/851, 78/860 and 78/887. In fact one consular report hints at such activity as early as 1835/36. See 78/1316.
27 Ibid., p. 295.
28 Buckler (op. cit., p. 608), George Birdwood (The Times, June 12, 1877) and Abdul Ghani (Thoughts on Caliphate, Karachi, 1919, p. 10) wrongly consider 1857/58 as the starting point of Indian Muslim interest in Turkey.
(1800-73), who pleaded for loyalty to the British did so on the basis of the 'friendship that exists between the British Nation and the acknowledged Head of our Religion, the Sultan of Turkey'.

To some extent the British were themselves responsible for strengthening the Indian attachment to Turkey—though it is not clear whether the encouragement given to pan-Islamism was a well-defined policy or the work of a few officials. Nevertheless, the British had bolstered Turkey in the eyes of Indian Muslims ever since the Crimean War and exploited the Sultan's image as Caliph for reasons of political expediency. A significant example, during the fatal days of 1857—as also in 1799 in the case of Tipu Sultan—was the procurement from Sultan Abdul-Mejid I (1839-61) of a proclamation advising Indian Muslims to remain loyal to his allies, the British. The advantages of the Caliph's position

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31 Birdwood's communication to The Times, July 9, 1877. Also see V. Chirol, India, London, 1926, pp. 217-18.


33 Mustafa Kamil Pasha, Nasala-i-Shariyya, Cairo, 1898, translated into Urdu from Arabic by Niaz Fatehpuri, Pindi Bahawuddin, n.d., p. 10. Also see Nadvi, Khilafat aur Hindustan, p. 82; and Syed Mahmud, Khilafat aur Inglistan, Patna, /1921/, p. 68. The Sultan also gave free passage to British reinforcements to India through Egypt. When the British finally reconquered Delhi from the Mutineers in 1858, the Porte complimented the British and as a further gesture of good-will the Sultan contributed towards the Mutiny Relief Fund. The Sultan's pro-British attitude was primarily the result of the help he had received from the British in the Crimean War. Partly, it was due to his conviction, despite the efforts of the Russian ambassador to the contrary, that the Indian Revolt was not a war between Islam and Christianity. See PRO, F.0., 78/1271, 78/1272, 78/1274, 78/1288 and 78/1331.
were such that in 1877 the British tried to use his name in Afghanistan to disarm the Amir's hostility.  

Whatever the reasons for its inception, pan-Islamism in India, which had almost coincided with similar waves among the Muslims of Central Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, did not become a movement until the early 1870s. It was in this period that the Ottomans themselves, under various pressures, began to emphasise more strongly their ecumenical authority over Muslims under the political suzerainty of other governments. The first ideologists of pan-Islamism in Turkey were the Young Ottoman intellectuals though Sultan Ahmed III in 1727 and later Mustafa III in 1774, in treaties with the Persians and the Russians (Kuchuk Kaynarja) respectively, had each pushed his claim to be 'Caliph of all Muslims'. The Young Ottomans, particularly Namik Kemal (1840-88), inspired a union of Islam under Ottoman leadership as a reaction against the Tanzimat doctrine of Muslim-non-Muslim fusion. The growth of the pan-Islamic ideal had

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34 In the summer of 1877, the British manoeuvred the Sultan into sending a mission to Afghanistan whose purpose was to make an appeal for Muslim solidarity against Russia and for friendly relations with Britain. This had been made possible because the Sultan himself was anxious to create 'a real unity between the Muslims'. The mission, however, was unsuccessful. See Basbakanlik Arsivi, Istanbul, Trade 1294, Hariciye, 16642 and 16873. The writer is indebted to Mr. Mehmet Saray for this reference. Also see Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed Khan, ed., The Life of Abdur Rahman Amir of Afghanistan, II, London, 1900, p. 267; Dwight E. Lee, 'A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877', JAH, XIII, Sept. 1941, pp. 335-56; and Edmund Ollier, Cassell's Illustrated History of the Russo-Turkish War, II, London, 1879, pp. 430-31.


39 Lewis, The Middle East and the West, pp. 101-2; ---, 'The Ottoman Empire', p. 293; and Berkes, op. cit., pp. 267-68.
been stimulated, apart from the intellectual activity, by the Russian occupation of the Central Asian Khanates and the movements of unification among the Germans and the Italians in the 1860s and 70s. The Government of Sultan Abdul-Aziz (1861-76), in the strict tradition of Ahmed III, propagated this sentiment through press and emissaries; it was carried to perfection by his successor Abdul-Hamid II (1876-1909).

The underlying idea in mobilising the forces of Islam was to strengthen the position of the Ottoman Government and to save it from European encroachments. Partly, it seems, the mobilisation was intended to divert the attention of the Turkish people from internal unrest and that of the Arabs from any nationalistic aspirations. The pan-Islamic orientation was also actively encouraged by the Germans, particularly in the 1880s and 90s, to advance their own political and economic interests at the expense of Britain, France and Russia. The German Emperor, Kaiser William II (1859-1941), himself came to Turkey twice on state visits and cemented a friendship which eventually dragged Turkey into the Great War on the side of the Central Powers. For the present pan-Islamism seemed to

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40 Lewis, The Middle East and the West, p. 101; and ----, 'The Ottoman Empire', pp. 292-94.


43 The desperate state of affairs in Turkey can be followed in Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War, New Haven, 1930, pp. 26-27 and 34.


enhance Turkey's position and the Sultan came to be regarded by the European Powers as a kind of Muslim 'Pope' having 'spiritual' authority over all Muslims. The Sultan's claim was acknowledged in subsequent treaties by Austria-Hungary (1908), Italy (1912) and Greece and Bulgaria (1913) - errors which the Allies later strove to undo in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and the definitive Treaty of Lausanne (1923).

The accumulative effect of these factors on Indian Muslims had been that already by the early 1870s the claim of the Ottoman Sultan was widely accepted and his name read in the Friday khutba. Some of the middle-class intelligenstia actively encouraged the popular notions. Even Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-98), whose ideas later changed with the turn in the British policy towards Turkey, eulogised 'the Caliph' and popularised the Turkish fez. The diligent encouragement of the pro-Turkish sentiment by both Muslim intellectuals and British administrators had been so effective that when in the summer of 1876, as a result of a rather ruthless suppression of the Bulgarian revolt by Turkey, public opinion in Britain turned hostile towards the Ottomans, the Indian Muslims began to bring pressure to bear upon the British Government to remain friendly with the Sultan. In September of that year Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India (1876-80), frankly told Queen Victoria that Muslim loyalty 'would be rudely shaken' if Britain was forced into war against Turkey by Gladstone (1809-98) and his supporters. When the Russo-Turkish War broke out in April 1877, considerable excitement was

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PSM, B. 307.

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It began with Gladstone's pamphlet Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London, 1876), but in fact was a logical outcome of the policy of opposition to the continuance of a Muslim Power in Europe, initiated by the British Liberal Party in 1836. See Cobden's pamphlet Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer, Edinburgh, 1836.

51
Lytton to Queen Victoria, Sept. 28, 1876, LP. Also see Lytton to Disraeli, Sept. 18, 1876, LP.
generated in India, particularly in Bengal and Delhi, and large sums of money were remitted to Constantinople.  

An interesting feature of the situation, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, was that Shias joined Sunnis in demonstrating their support for the Ottomans, regarding the Khilafat as capable of unifying the Muslim community. The lead given in this direction by the Anjuman-i-Islam (Bombay) of the Bohra leaders Badruddin Tyabji (1844-1906) and Mohammed Ali Rogay, was later sustained by Cheragh Ali (1844-95) of Hyderabad (Deccan), and still later by Ameer Ali (1849-1928), the Aga Khan (1877-1957), M.H. Ispahani, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) and others.

In the years that followed the Russo-Turkish War, the pro-Turkish feelings of the Indian Muslims rapidly increased in intensity. Until recently the historians of Islam had been prone to credit this growth to Jamal-ud-din 'Afghani' (1838-97), the legendary Iranian philosopher-statesman. Recent research has, however, exploded this myth. Jamal-ud-din's impact on contemporary India (or even contemporary Turkey) was limited. The pan-Islamic movement had

52 The Times, June 5, 13 and 19, 1877. Also see M. Williams in The Times, June 11, 1877; Lord Salisbury's speech in the Lords, June 15, 1877, PP, 1877, Hansard, H.L., CXXXIV, cols. 1835-36; and Lord Lawrence's speech in ibid., cols. 1836-37. For Hindu sympathy, see S.R. Mehrotra, The Emergence of the Indian National Congress, Delhi, 1971, p. 122.

53 Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, p. 130.


55 For Cheragh Ali's views see his The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammedan States, Bombay, 1883.

56 See below, Chapters II-VI.


58 See, e.g., Berkes, op. cit., pp. 269-70; Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968, pp. 22-58; Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography, Berkeley,
developed in India even before Jamal-ud-din arrived in the sub-continent and it was only later that symbolic importance was increasingly attached to his role in the escalation of the movement. Although his name became legendary from the early 1890s onwards through the works of Shibli Numani (1857-1914) and Abul Kalam Mohyuddin Ahmed Azad (1888-1958) and later of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938), it can be argued that Jamal-ud-din's actual influence on India was slight. In fact, it would be a fair conjecture to argue that Jamal-ud-din developed his own anti-British feelings and pan-Islamic tendencies as a result of, and not prior to, his earlier visits to India in the late 1850s and early 60s.

Thus, it is obvious that, quite apart from the 'Afghani' legend, there were some other factors responsible for the growth of Indian pan-Islamic sentiment in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The primary factor, it seems, was the increased European pressure on the dar al-Islam. The spoliation was such that, apart from India and the Central Asian Khanates which had already been devoured by Britain, Russia and China between 1850s and 70s, there remained not a Muslim state on the 'fringe' - from Algeria in the West to the Malaysian Archipelago in the East - which did not pass under European domination. The only segments of the dar al-Islam left seemingly independent were the territories in the 'core' and they too were threatened. Between 1878 and 1882 a number of Ottoman territories and dependencies - including Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tunisia and Egypt - either became independent or were lost to various European Powers. This continuous pressure of Christendom, exerted under one pretext or the other, gave rise to a feeling among Indian Muslims that the maintenance of the power and independence of the last great Muslim Power was not only the most pressing problem but also the concern for the entire Muslim world.


Ibid. Thus when in 1912 Ameer Ali maintained that to the Muslims of India the name of Jamal-ud-din was scarcely known (Margoliouth, 'Pan-Islamism', p. 20), he was not exaggerating.

See Table II. Also see M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923, New York, 1966, pp. 178-220.
Another factor in this connection was the anti-Turk fervour of the British statesmen like Gladstone and Rosebery (1847-1929) and the mounting campaign in the 1890s against the Ottoman treatment of the rebellious non-Muslim subject nationalities. The Armenian question, which began in the 1870s as a humanitarian protest, had by the 1890s, with the support of the ecclesiastics, assumed an anti-Islamic character. An appeal was made to the British public to help 'win Mecca' and eventually the whole Muslim world for Christ. For a long time a section of the British press assailed the Turkish race, Islamic faith and its Prophet. The controversy as to whether the Sultan had any rightful title to the Khilafat, which had been started in the 1870s by retired Indian civilians, was revived and his claim rejected.

In turn, the encroachments on the dar al-Islam and the 'narrow-minded' Christian scholasticism touched a sensitive chord in India and coupled with the exhilaration felt at the Turkish victory in the Greaco-Turkish War (1897) resulted in considerable

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61. G.W. Bury, Pan-Islam, London, 1919, p. 203. The missionaries were more especially angered at the successful spread of Islam in Africa, the Balkans and Asia as a result of Muslim missionary activity. L. Stoddard, The New World of Islam, London, 1921, pp. 49 and 52. Also see Colquhoun, op. cit., pp. 916-17.

62. Rafiuddin Ahmad, 'A Moslem's View of the Pan-Islamic Revival', NC, XLII, 1897, pp. 517-18. For European scholasticism against Islam also see P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge, 1972, p. 175.


unrest among the Muslims.\textsuperscript{65} It also contributed to a serious anti-British uprising among the Frontier Tribes\textsuperscript{66} and the Mujahidin.\textsuperscript{67} An even greater concern was engendered in India when the Powers intervened and deprived Turkey the fruits of her victory. The question came to be represented as one of Crescent versus the Cross and the reaction was conspicuously reflected in the Muslim press.\textsuperscript{68} Consequently, in August 1897, the Government of India convicted or deported the editors of a number of Muslim papers, banned Turkish and Cairene journals, and took action against those suspected of spreading disaffection.\textsuperscript{69}

But if the growing effervescence of the Muslims had moved the Government to action, it also caused anxiety to some Muslim leaders, notably Rafiuddin Ahmad (1865-1954) and Syed Ahmed Khan, lest this enthusiasm should damage the community's position without effectively helping the Turks. Therefore, in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War they took pains to show that pan-Islamism was not a movement for conquest or aggression but 'an assertion of the natural feeling of self-preservation and self-respect'.


\textsuperscript{68} Memo, on the pan-Islamic movement, 1899, above, n. 65.

\textsuperscript{69} McLane, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 57.
Nor was the British raj in danger. The Sultan of Turkey was not their ruler who could claim their temporal or spiritual allegiance. Their religious duty was plain: 'to obey our rulers and remain quite loyal to them'. The most they could do was to pray for friendly relations between the British Government and the rest of the Muslim world. A more overt effort was that of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908) of Qadian, the head of the Ahmadiyya community. While trying to disseminate feelings of loyalty he attempted to uproot the very idea of the jihad. Most surprisingly of all, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828-1905), the co-founder of the Deoband and one of the alim who is said to have taken part in the Revolt of 1857, also issued a fatwa in 1898 that 'Indian Muslims were bound by their religion to be loyal to the British Government even if it were engaged in war with the Sultan of Turkey'.

But such endeavours seem to have had no effect. During the first decade of the twentieth century the Indian Muslim involvement with Turkey became even deeper. No mean part was played in this by the Indian Muslims residing abroad, especially in Britain. They sought to combat anti-Islamic anti-Turk propaganda. As early as 1886, a pan-Islamic society called the Anjuman-i-Islam had been established in London with branches in India. In 1903, an Indian barrister, Abdulla al-Mamun Suhrawardy (1875-1935), revived this almost defunct society under the new name of 'The Pan-Islamic Society of London'. Mushir Hosain Kidwai (b. 1878) of Gadia, another Indian barrister, became its secretary and Mahmud Shairani (1880-1946), an Indian orientalist, was elected its joint

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70 Rafiuddin Ahmad, 'A Moslem's View', p. 517; and his, 'Is British 'Raj' in Danger?', NC, XLII, Sept. 1897, pp. 493-5.
71 Syed Ahmed Khan, Akhiri Mazamin, pp. 32-33 and 54-55.
72 A list of 44 works, containing prohibition of jihad and supporting the Government, by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is appended in his Jehad and the British Government, Qadian, 1900.
73 ICHPP, Jan. 1919, Proo. No. 206.
secretary. The Society, apart from establishing direct contact with Turkey, rendered valuable service in focussing, especially through its journal Pan-Islam, the Muslim feelings on questions effecting Turkey and Islam. No wonder that when in 1906 renewed excitement was witnessed in India over the British ultimatum to Turkey following the Turko-Egyptian border dispute and Cromer's repression of Egyptian nationalists, the British Government deprecated the suggestion to question the validity of the Sultan's title to the Khilafat. The opposition to the Ottoman pretensions, as in Syed Ahmed's days, came from within. Nawab Haji Ismail Khan (b. 1852) of Datauli and Mohsin-ul-Mulk (1837-1907) attempted to dispute the Ottoman claim with arguments borrowed from Syed Ahmed. But their reasoning achieved nothing except sharp rebukes. It was this 'undesirable prospect' of the pan-Islamic movement in India that, among other factors, induced the loyalists like Mohsin-ul-Mulk and the Aga Khan to agree to the formation of the All-India Muslim League in May 1906, in order that they might channel the feelings of their co-religionists.

For a few years after the formation of the Muslim League the Indian Muslims appeared to take increasing interest in domestic affairs and were able to secure separate representation by the Indian Councils Act 1909. But the pan-Islamic fervour was never

77 In 1906, Kidwai and Shaikh Abdul Qadir (another member of the Society) visited Constantinople and were honoured by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II with Nishan-i-Usmani. See Shaikh Abdul Qadir, Maqam-i-Khilafat, Delhi, 1907, pp. 228-29. For the aims and objects of the Society and its work see Kidwai, Pan-Islamism; and Majid Khadduri, 'Pan-Islamism', EB, XVII, p. 227. Later, in 1907/8, the Society's name was changed to 'Islamic Society' and Ameer Ali succeeded Suhrawardy as President. See Kidwai, Pan-Islamism, p. 1.
forgotten. This is evident from the hearty manner in which the Indian Muslims contributed towards the expenses of the construction of the Hedjaz Railway. Moreover, the Hindu agitation against Curzon's (1859-1925) administrative measure of partitioning Bengal in 1905, the gradual spoliation of Persia by Britain and Russia following the Anglo-Persian Convention (1907), the French aggression in Morocco, and the misfortunes of Turkey in the Balkans had weighed heavily upon them. Thus when in September 1911, Italy, with the connivance of the British and the French, made a buccaneering raid upon Ottoman Tripoli the indignation of Muslim India was widespread. Public meetings were held in major towns of the country condemning the unprovoked Italian aggression and beseeching the Indian and British Governments to support 'our sacred Khalifa the Sultan of Turkey against the most unrighteous and wicked war'. The London Muslim League even threatened to raise volunteers for the assistance of Turkey. The Muslim press was full of denunciation of the 'Italian brigandage'. Like the Italians who dubbed the War a

85 For numerous telegrams and representations to the Govt. of India and the India Office see PSSF, 4327/11, I. Also see Roos-Keppel to H. Wheeler, Sept. 6, 1912, R-KP.
86 Directors of Juma Mosque, Bombay, to the Prime Minister and the King Emperor, Tel. Oct. 7, 1911, PSSF, P. 4392 with 4327/11, I.
87 M. Kazim Hosain to USSI, May 10, 1912, PSSF, p. 1804 with 4327/11, III.
88 See, e.g., Namai Muqaddas Habiul Matin (Calcutta), Oct. 2, 1911, BNNR 1911; Watan (Lahore), Dec. 22, 1911, PNNR 1911; and Zamindar (Lahore), Dec. 27, 1911, ibid.
crusade and even implicated the Pope's name, a Muslim journal depicted the Christian Powers as 'individually and collectively' projecting the ruin of Islam.

In order to render financial assistance for the relief of the Tripolitan sufferers a Red Crescent Society was established in Calcutta, but the material assistance came mostly from Upper India where Muhammad Inshaullah of the Watan (Lahore) and Zafar Ali Khan (1870-1956) of the Zamindar (Lahore), remitted large sums of money to Turkey. The contributors included Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum of Bhopal (1858-1930). Ameer Ali organised from Britain a medical mission to Tripoli for the relief of the Ottoman sick and wounded. The funds were again provided by Inshaullah and Zafar Ali Khan, with the Madras Muslims also contributing liberally. In order to bring pressure to bear upon the Government, some of the Muslim leaders encouraged the boycott of the Italian goods which, with the Muslim League's blessings and the active support of such prominent businessmen as Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy (b. 1872) and Ibrahim Rahimtoola (1862-1942), gained some measure of success in Bombay, the U.P., the Punjab and Bengal. With the Tripolitan issue was merged the Persian question, and Sunnis joined Shias in condemning the Russian occupation of northern Persia and the bombardment of the shrine of Imam Ali Raza in Meshhed. A Persian Red Crescent Society was

90 Vakil, Feb. 21, 1912, PNNR 1912.
91 Pioneer Mail, Oct. 6, 1911.
92 Civil and Military Gazette, April 2 & 25, 1912.
93 Zamindar, Sept. 4, 1912, PNNR 1912.
94 Civil and Military Gazette, Jan. 12, 20, 24 & 25, Feb. 10, 14 & 20, March 10, and April 2 & 25, 1912.
96 Civil and Military Gazette, Jan. 6, 16 & 31, 1912; and The Times, Dec. 16, 1912.
formed in Calcutta to which the Aga Khan alone subscribed five thousand rupees.\(^97\) The British Government was called upon to persuade Russia to stop oppression and remove her troops from Persia.\(^98\)

These representations to the British Government, however, had no effect\(^99\) except that the Foreign Office secured from the Italian Government an assurance of non-interference with the \textit{hajj} pilgrim traffic.\(^100\) Opinion prevailed in Whitehall that 'we do not intend to let our policy be influenced by Moslem agitation'.\(^101\) But from the Indian Muslim point of view the significance of the crisis had been the rallying together of the Muslims from all parts of the country. Thus, when in October 1912, the Balkan States launched a combined attack on Turkey, which eventually deprived her of her European provinces except Eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the Straits, the Indian Muslim indignation was still more spontaneous and bitter. In spite of the efforts of the loyalists like the Aga Khan 'to stem the flow from within',\(^102\) there were numerous demonstrations.\(^103\) A section of the Muslim press was extremely outspoken.\(^104\) The ulama of the principal religious seminaries of the country, excepting Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921) of Bareilly and his associates, patched up their differences in order to

\(^{97}\) \textit{Ibid.}, Jan. 4, 1912.
\(^{98}\) \textit{Ibid.}, March 30, 1912.
\(^{100}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., March 1, 1912, \textit{PSSF}, P. 770 with 4327/11, IV; Marquis di San Giuliano to Sir R. Rodd, March 4, 1912, P. 1237 with 2672/12; and S/S to V, Tel. P., March 12, 1912, P. 872 with 4327/11, IV.
\(^{101}\) See Sir A. Hirtzel's note of May 21, 1912, in \textit{PSSF}, P. 1804 with 4327/11, III.
\(^{102}\) The Aga Khan to Hardinge, Dec. 11, 1915, \textit{PSSF}, 748/16, I & II. This refers to the Balkan events.
\(^{103}\) See various telegrams and copies of resolutions in \textit{PSSF}, 4287/12.
\(^{104}\) \textit{Afghan}, Sept. 19, 1912, \textit{FNNR} 1912; and \textit{Zamindar}, Oct. 11, 1912, \textit{iibid.}
concentrate on the issue. The Deoband ulama made it incumbent on Muslims by a fatwa to give money to the Red Crescent Society and even declared that the diversion of the zakat money was permissible. The poet-theologian Shibli Numani, repudiating his earlier stance on the Ottoman Khilafat, raised the cry of 'Islam in Danger' and his young protégé, Abul Kalam Azad, went a step further and proclaimed that the time for jihad had come. Shaukat Ali (1873-1938), the U.P. journalist, issued an appeal in the Comrade to organise a volunteer corps 'to fight against the filibustering gang of dacoits in the Balkans'. His brother Mohamed Ali (1878-1951), the Oxford-educated editor of the Comrade, advocated that the funds collected for the Aligarh University should be handed over to Turkey on loan.

As a practical proof of sympathy Mohamed Ali organised an all-India medical mission under Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1860-1936), a former resident medical officer to the Charing Cross Hospital in London. The Indian mission, which was one of the other half-dozen

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105 Murtaza Hassan to Ahmad Raza Khan, Oct. 31, 1912, Nuquah (Lahore), CIX, April/May, 1966, pp. 113-14. Also see M. Ahmad to Abdul Bari, Nov. 10, 1912, ibid., p. 119.
106 Paisa Akhbar, Nov. 5, 1912, PNNR 1912.
107 For Shibli's views and writings see Kulliyat-i-Shibli, 4th ed., Azamgarh, 1954, pp. 53-60; and K.A. Khan, ed., Magalat-i-Yaum-i-Shibli, Lahore, 1961, pp. 7-17, 27-45 and 122-29. Earlier Shibli had held that only a Qureshi could be the rightful Caliph of Islam. See Magalat-i-Shibli, I, Azamgarh, 1930, p. 184. For Azad, see Zamindar, Nov. 5, 1912, PNNR 1912.
108 Comrade, Oct. 12, 1912, PNNR 1912.
109 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1912. This was prevented by the Aga Khan's intervention. See the Aga Khan to Hardinge, Dec. 11, 1915, above, n. 102. Though Hardinge and several officials expediently contributed to the funds raised for Turkey, the C-in-C instructed his officers to discourage such collections. See The Autobiography of General Sir O'Moore Creagh, London, 1924, p. 287.
mercy missions including Ameer Ali’s Red Crescent mission from London and a Muslim mission from Bombay, reached Constantinople at the end of December 1912, and rendered valuable service to the sick and wounded soldiers. But, ‘the most important result of the mission’, according to Dr. Ansari, ‘was the formation of a bond of union between the Turkish nation and the Indians’. During their sojourns in Turkey the mission was able to establish contacts not only with Enver Pasha (1881-1922) and other Young Turk leaders, but also with the Egyptian nationalists, notably Shaikh Abdul Aziz Shawish. Early in 1913, in collaboration with Shawish, Ansari and Zafar Ali Khan (who was also visiting Constantinople at that time) propounded a scheme for a rehabilitation colony in Anatolia for Muslim refugees from Macedonia, a university in Medina, an Islamic bank and a co-operative society. The project was actively supported by the Comrade which also encouraged the Indian Muslims to purchase Turkish security bonds.

But perhaps the most important development of pan-Islamism in India was the foundation in May 1913, of a society called the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba (Society of the Servants of the Kaaba), Qayyam-ud-din Mohamed Abdul Bari (1879-1926), the influential alim of Farangi Mahal seminary in Lucknow, was its President and Mushir Hosain Kidwai and the Ali brothers its other promoters. The

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112 PSM, B. 267.

113 For details see Ali Bradran, pp. 274-320.

114 See Dr. Ansari’s letter to Comrade, June 6 and 16, 1913, and Nawab Vigar-ul-Walik’s article in Comrade, June 29, 1913, ibid., pp. 274-76, 318-20.

115 P.C. Bamford, The Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements, Delhi, 1925, p. 113.

The ostensible object of the Anjuman was religious, i.e., the protection of Mecca and other Holy Places of Islam from non-Muslim encroachments. But there is reason to believe that the real object of the promoters, despite their strong denial, was to further the political programme of pan-Islamism. Evidence suggests that the Anjuman derived its inspiration from Ottoman sources. But the factor which had moved the promoters to action was the realisation that Turkey was weak and no longer in a position to ward off effectively the dangers threatening the dar al-Islam. Thus, as a remedy they decided on a two-fold plan: first, to organise the Muslims so that they could oppose any non-Muslim invasion, and, secondly, to strengthen Turkey as the one powerful Muslim power, capable of maintaining 'an independent and effective Muslim sovereignty' over the sacred places of Islam. For this purpose the Anjuman undertook to contribute half its income and bound its members by oath to protect the Holy Places, absolving them of any obligation to temporal allegiance to the Government of India. The dastur-ul-amal directly appealed to the Muslim communities under non-Muslim rule to unite for the purpose of maintaining the 'effective sovereignty' of a Muslim Power.\footnote{Ibid.}

Soon the Anjuman acquired a reputation and, despite a lack of co-operation from Deoband and Bareilly, achieved the remarkable feat of bringing the ulama, especially those of Farangi Mahal connection, into the field of practical politics. This was the beginning of that union between the ulama and the western-educated leadership which later helped them to launch the Khilafat movement. Within a year or two of its establishment, the Anjuman's branches were established in London, Constantinople, Cairo and Singapore. The Society's emissaries actively encouraged disaffection against non-Muslim Powers, attempted a Turco-Arab integration and later during the War tampered with the Indian troops stationed in the Middle East.\footnote{See M.M.Y. Chiriakoti, Attanqid Alal Khilafah, Gorakhpur, \textcopyright1927, pp. 67-68; and Abdul Bari, Knutba-i-Sadarat, Erode, 1921, p. 10.}

With the cry to 'save Islam' began a reorientation of Muslim politics. In spite of Britain's declared neutrality in the trials
and tribulations of Turkey, a belief had gained credence, and rightly too, that she was no longer the safe custodian of Muslim interests. The suspicion was strengthened by the revocation in December 1911, of the partition of Bengal, all along proclaimed as a 'settled fact'. The resentment felt at this 'betrayal', together with the non-fulfilment of the demand for an affiliating Muslim university at Aligarh, led to the conviction among Muslim leaders, even of loyal stamp, that to protect their rights they must depend upon themselves. Thus, Nawab Vigar-ul-Mulk (1829-1917) began to impress on the Muslims the necessity of relying on their own strength instead of having blind faith in the promises of the Government. Abdul Halim Sharar (1860-1926) decried the 'policy of mendicancy' of the League leaders. And Shibli Numani, supported by Zafar Ali Khan, advised the community to shun the 'old-gaurds' and resort to political agitation.

The same trend was reflected in the Muslim press. The Vakil of Amritsar, in particular, urged the community to emulate the Hindu methods of agitation which had borne such solid results as the unsettling of the partition of Bengal. They should even join the Hindus and make a common cause with them. The 'extremist' Hindu press also seemed to reciprocate these feelings, though somewhat suspiciously, and taunted the Muslims that they had been abandoned by the Government. The Muslims had themselves tasted the fruits


120 Zamindar, Feb. 2, 1912, ibid.

121 Moslem (Poona), By.NNR 1912.

122 Chaudhavin Sadi (Lahore), May 1, 1912; and Zamindar, April 9, 1912, PNNR 1912.

123 Vakil, Jan. 6, 1912, ibid.

124 Rajput Gazette (Lahore), Jan. 6, 1912, ibid., Indu Prakash (Bombay), Jan. 9, 1912; Dayan Prakash (Poona), Jan. 10, 1912, By.NNR 1912; Raat Guftar (Bombay), Aug. 11, 1912, ibid.; Tribune (Lahore), Jan. 8, 1912, PNNR 1912; Gujarati (Bombay), May 26, 1912; and Sind Journal (Hyderabad), July 18, 1912, By.NNR 1912.

125 Reference in Millet, Oct. 11, 1912, PNNR 1912.
of agitation over the demolition by the Cawnpore Municipality of an annexe of a mosque in the summer of 1913. Indeed some died in the police firing and went to jail thus successfully turning an insignificant local incident into a serious all-India affair.

Khwaja Syed Muhammad Ali Hassan Nizami (1878-1957) of Delhi even proclaimed that India was dar al-harb. The ulama and the politicians arrayed themselves against the Government - Abdul Bari in Lucknow, Mohamed Ali in Delhi, Azad in Calcutta, Mazhar-ul-Haque (1886-1930) in Patna, and Zafar Ali Khan in Lahore - and compelled it to come to terms with them.

Thus, the strength of Muslim agitation was discovered at Cawnpore. The expansion of what one recent writer calls the Muslim 'ideologico-dynamic' political consciousness, supercharged by Islam's humiliation abroad and plights within, had transformed the Indian Muslims from a body of petitioners into assertive agitators. Self-government 'suitable to India' became the plank of their politics, and conservatism and ultra-loyalism stood condemned. The Hindu-Muslim rapprochement, towards which the leaders had been gradually moving since the 1890s, was struck and finally sealed at Lucknow.

For fuller details see Ali Bradran, pp. 328-412; and vols. 58, 59 and 86 of HP.

See Hassan Nizami, Kaho Takbir, Meerut, 1913; ---, Cawnpore ki Khuni Dastan, Meerut, 1913; and Bamford, op. cit., p. 114.


Ibid., pp. 83-86.
in December 1916, in a 'pact' in which Jinnah, the young Bombay barrister, played a leading role.\footnote{132}

During the post-Cawnpore period the unrest seemed to subside owing to the Turkish reoccupation of Adrianople in the summer of 1913. However, the pan-Islamic sentiment was sustained by the Comrade, the Al-Hilal and the Zamindar.\footnote{133} This was also encouraged by a number of Turkish emissaries who visited India in early 1914, ostensibly to thank the Indian Muslims on behalf of the Turkish Government for their help in the Tripolitan and the Balkan Wars and to obtain funds for the Ottoman Red Crescent Society.\footnote{134} During their sojourns these Turks made contacts with Dr. Ansari, the Ali brothers and other well-known pan-Islamists.\footnote{135} There were also many other suspicious Turkish visitors, well-supplied with cash, who were reported to have been sent to stir up trouble in India.\footnote{136} It was also reported about this time that the Turkish Government was negotiating with a German firm in Hamburg for the purchase of rifles for the purpose of arming the Indian Muslims.\footnote{137} Turkey was also known to be spreading pro-Turkish sentiment through her press and Ottoman officials in India and such of her Indian contacts as the Delhi barrister Shaikh (Sir) Abdul Qadir (1874-1950), formerly of Suhrawardy's Pan-Islamic Society of London.\footnote{138}

Thus, in July 1914, when war broke out between Serbia and Austria, Indian Muslim sympathies went with the latter, because Serbia had been one of the Balkan confederates in the recent


\footnote{133} Memo. by the Director of Criminal Intelligence, Sept. 15, 1914, PSSF, F. 4265 with 4265/14, I.

\footnote{134} Memo. by the Director of Criminal Intelligence, Sept. 23, 1914, ibid.

\footnote{135} Ibid. Also see ICHPP, Jan. 1919, Pro. No. 206.

\footnote{136} Some of them were arrested or deported by the Govt. of India. For details of Turko-German activities see PSSF, 3443/14.

\footnote{137} Memo. prepared in the Foreign and Political Dept., Govt. of India, Sept. 17, 1914, PSSF, F. 4265 with 4265/14, I. Also see PSSF, 3443/14.

\footnote{138} PSM, B. 267.
hostilities with Turkey. Subsequently, when Germany and Russia
also became embroiled, they championed Germany's cause on account
of the memories of the Russo-Turkish War. Many thought that the War would
lead to the downfall of Christendom and the revival of the Islamic
power. Yet, when in August 1914, England joined too on the side
of Serbia and Russia, the Muslim sympathies, in spite of their pro-
German leanings for her supposed Turkophile tendencies, paradoxically
veered round to her side. Mass meetings of Muslims were held
throughout the country offering prayers for the success of British
arms and pledging their services as a mark of 'unswerving allegiance
and unflinching devotion to the British Crown'. At some places
over-enthusiastic maulavis went so far as to declare that those who
fell in the War for Britain would be shuhada. Efforts were also
made to organise a Red Crescent mission of Muslim volunteers to
assist the British troops and the equipment of Ansari's Balkan
medical mission was handed over to the Government. Huge subscriptions
were made towards the War Relief Fund.

Except for the comrade of Mohamed Ali and the Al-Hilal of Abul
Kalam Azad, the tone of the Muslim press too was on the whole pro-
British. Even the traditionally anti-British papers like the Zamindar

139 Bamford, op. cit., p. 116.
140 Memo. Sept. 15, 1914, above, n. 133.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 See extracts from the fortnightly reports on the internal
political situation in several provinces in PSSF, 4265/14, I.
144 Report on the internal political situation in the N.W.F.P.,
Sept. 26, 1914, PSSF, P. 4266 with 4265/14, I.
144 India's Contribution to the Great War, Published by the Govt.
of India, Calcutta, 1923, passim; also see Muhammad Ali: His Life,
Services and Trial, p. 43; Bamford, op. cit., p. 117; and PSSF,
P. 4455 with 4265/14, I.
and the Muhammadi (Calcutta), urged loyalty and assistance to the Government.\(^{145}\) The reason for this unexpected pro-British outburst seems to have been the result primarily of the declaration of neutrality by Turkey.\(^{146}\) Partly, it was the successful British propaganda that Britain's cause was righteous and that she had been forced into the War.\(^{147}\) But with the educated classes of Muslims the expression of loyalty was generally a political expedient\(^{148}\) bound up with the expectation of the fulfilment of India's 'natural rights' after the War,\(^{149}\) and the necessity to India of Britain's tutelage 'in her present stage of national and communal growth'.\(^{150}\)

But this Muslim loyalty, unlike that of the Hindus, was at best conditional on Turkish neutrality,\(^{151}\) except on the part of a few who thought that Indian Muslims had no concern with Turkey.\(^{152}\) In general, Muslim opinion was deeply anxious about the possibility of Turkey ranging herself on the side of Germany and Austria. 'Jihad' leaflets of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society appealing for funds were already in circulation in India.\(^{153}\) Tewfik Bey's letters to Mazhar-ul-Haque and Shibli Numani written from Constantinople in August 1914, betrayed the intention of Turkey to support the Central Powers.\(^{154}\) Similar indications came from the letters written

145 Memo. Sept. 15, 1914, above, n. 133.
146 See, e.g., Nawab Fateh Ali Quizilbash to F/SV, Tel., Sept. 16, 1914, PSSF, P. 4265/14, I.
147 Ibid.
149 Zamindar, Oct. 16, 1914, PSSF, P. 4561 with 4265/14, I.
150 Comrade, Aug. 12, 1914, memo. Sept. 15, 1914, above, n. 133.
151 Habibul Matin, Aug. 3, 1914, ibid.
152 Paisa Akhbar, Aug. 30 and Sept. 6, 1914; Behar Standard (Muzaffarpur), Sept. 14, 1914; and Sind Journal, Sept. 17, 1914, PSSF, 4265/14, I.
153 Memo. by the Director Criminal Intelligence, Sept. 23, 1914, above, n. 134.
154 Ibid. Also see ICHPP, Jan. 1919, Pro. No. 206.
by the Indian pilgrims in Mecca to their relatives in India, which described big troop mobilisation by the Turks. Thus, the Indian Muslims were extremely worried at the delicate situation. Their predicament was that if Turkey did join the War against Britain how were they to reconcile their pan-Islamic sentiments with their declared loyalty to the British Crown. Mazhar-ul-Haque tried to provide an answer when he stated at a public meeting at Bankipore in September 1914: 'We are Musalmans and we are Indians and we have to perform our duty in this double capacity. I am happy to believe that these two interests do not clash, but are entirely identical.' Clash in fact they did as would be seen later, but presently the educated class realised that Turkey would gain nothing by joining the War and might lose much. The ulama on the other hand were more worried about the threat to the Holy Places. Thus, there was a genuine desire that Turkey should remain neutral. Accordingly, Mohamed Ali and Dr. Ansari, like the Russian Muslim leaders, sent a joint telegram to Talaat Pasha (1894-1921), one of the triumvirate then ruling the Ottoman Empire, pleading with him to keep Turkey neutral. Abdul Bari in his telegram to the Sultan begged him either to remain neutral or side with Britain. At the same time he pleaded with the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge (1858-1927), that Britain should adopt such attitude towards Turkey as might help maintain such

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155 Report on the internal political situation in Bengal, Oct. 26, 1914, PSSF, P. 4763 with 4265/14, I. Also see note by the Director Criminal Intelligence, Oct. 27, 1914, PSSF, P. 4561, ibid. In fact Turkey had already entered into alliance with Germany, See J.C. Hurewitz, ed., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, II, Princeton, 1956, pp. 1-3.

156 Beharee, Sept. 8, 1914, above, n. 148.

157 See Abdul Bari to Hardinge, Tel., Oct. 1, 1914, PSSF, 4265/14, I.

158 See the reports of various public meetings in PSSF, 4265/14, I.

159 Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 125.

160 Muhammad Ali: His Life, Services and Trial, p. 74.

161 Report on the internal political situation in the U.P., Sept. 14, 1914, PSSF, P. 4265 with 4265/14, I.
a neutrality. The Ottoman Consulate in Bombay which was approached on the subject, also conveyed to Constantinople the deep anxiety of the Indian Muslims and their sincere desire for Turkey's neutrality, frankly confiding that 'all the Mohammadans are for the British'.

The Government of India was nevertheless anxious. Reports from some provinces had indicated that in the event of a rupture with Turkey they would find the Muslim community passively hostile. Yet the Government, assured by the loyalists and the ruling chiefs, convinced itself that 'nowhere in India is there any sign that a Turkish jihad would induce Indian Mahomedans to give really serious trouble'. In order to deal with the anti-British section of the pan-Islamists, the Government brought out its long arm and set the Press Act in motion to gag some of the Muslim papers and ban those imported from Turkey. Abul Kalam Azad was daily harassed by the Press Censor to 'improve' the tone of the Al-Hilal. Zafar Ali Khan was interned in his native village and soon Mohamed Ali forfeited security of the Comrade for spelling out grievances against the Allies in a rejoinder to The Times' leading article 'The Choice of the Turks'. These methods were successful, and,

162 Abdul Bari to Hardinge, Tel., Oct. 1, 1914, above, n. 157.
163 H.M.D. Abdul Aziz Badsha, Imperial Ottoman Consulate, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ottoman Empire, Constantinople, Oct. 29, 1914, PSSF, P. 4918 with 4265/14, I.
164 Memo. Sept. 15, 1914, above, n. 133. Also see PSSF, 4265/14, I. For Hardinge's anxiety see his letters to Bayley, Carmichael, Willingdon and Pentland, dated Aug. 18, 24 and Sept. 10, 1914, respectively, in HP. For the views of provincial Governors see vol. 88 of HP. For British efforts to secure Turkey's neutrality through the Aga Khan see his Memoirs, London, 1954, pp. 132-33.
165 Memo. Sept. 15, 1914, above, n. 133.
166 Islamic Mail, Sept. 27, 1914, ibid.
167 Report on the internal political situation in Bengal, Oct. 12, 1914, ibid.
169 Mohamed Ali, My Life: A Fragment, pp. 62-64. The article was published in Comrade, Sept. 26, 1914
by the end of October 1914, though excitement still prevailed, it was obvious that little if any active sympathy would be displayed with Turkey should she take the field against Britain.

Thus, when Turkey did join the War against the Allies on November 1, 1914, it caused no sensation. What excitement there was, was soothed by the Government's assurance about the immunity of the Holy Places in Arabia and Mesopotamia from Allied attack. Not surprisingly, when the news of the proclamation of jihad by the Sultan reached India early in December, it failed, as in the rest of the Muslim world, to create much flutter. The moderates - Nawab Sir Salimulla (1884-1915) of Dacca, A.K. Fazlul Haq (1873-1962) and Abul Kasem in Bengal, Rafiuddin in Bombay, Raja Mohamed Ali Mohammad Khan (1877-1931) of Mahmudabad in the U.P., and Muhammad Shafi (1869-1932) and Fazl-i-Husain (1877-1936) in the Punjab - moved first and by their overt expression of loyalty made it difficult for the 'extremists' to take an opposite line effectively. Subsequently, for reasons of expediency and tamed by Government repression, they too seemed to realise that the Muslim interests were bound up with the British Government. Thus, men of every class and shade of opinion, Sunnis, Shias and Ahmadis, came forward to attest their unswerving loyalty to the Crown - a feeling which had remarkable similarity with the attitude adopted by the Muslims in


171 See the provincial reports in PSSF, 4265/14, I. Also see Abdul Bari to Hardinge, Nov. 4, 1914, PSSF, P. 4762 with ibid. For Govt. of India's proclamation with regard to the Holy Places see Times of India, Nov. 3, 1914.

The All-India Muslim League and its branches, like the Indian National Congress, hastened to assure the Viceroy that the participation of Turkey in the War in no way affected their loyalty.\textsuperscript{174} Nizam Mir Usman Ali (1886-1967) of Hyderabad, the Begum of Bhopal, Nawab Syed Hamid Ali Khan (1875-1930) of Rampur and other Muslim ruling chiefs, vied with one another in reaffirming their allegiance.\textsuperscript{175} But most important was the expression of fealty issued under the signatures of sixty-nine leading Delhi Muslims, including the Ali brothers, Dr. Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan (1864-1927), Obeidullah Sindhi (1872-1944) and Hassan Nizami, advising Muslims to remain compliant to the Government and do nothing which might cause their loyalty to be suspected.\textsuperscript{176} The ulama of Nadva and Deoband and various anjumans in the country followed suit.\textsuperscript{177} Even Abdul Bari, after some hesitation, demanded from the Muslims the sacrifice of their lives for the British raj.\textsuperscript{178} Similar declarations of loyalty in unequivocal terms were issued by the Chief Mujtahid of the Shias\textsuperscript{179} and by Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad (1889-1965), the head of the Qadiani wing of the Ahmadiyya community.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{173} Zenkovsky, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 125-26

\textsuperscript{174} Wazir Hassan to Hardinge, Tel., Nov. 3, 1914, PSSF, P. 4762 with 4265/14, I. Also see tels. from the provincial branches in \textit{ibid.}, I & II. For the Congress attitude during the War see C.F. Andrews and G. Mukerji, \textit{The Rise and Growth of the Congress in India}, London, 1938, pp. 241-52

\textsuperscript{175} PSSF, 4265/14, I & II. Also see vol. 88 of \textit{HP}.

\textsuperscript{176} English translation of the notice in W.M. Hailey, C.C. Delhi, to H. Wheeler, Secy. Home Dept., Govt. of India, No. 8273-Home, Nov. 22, 1914, PSSF, P. 5058 with 4265/14, II.

\textsuperscript{177} PSSF, 4265/14, I & II, especially P. 4265, 4947, and 945/15. Also see Habibur Rahman Deobandi's article in \textit{Mashriq} (Gorakhpur), Aug. 22, 1916, in which he advised loyalty to the British and maintained that only the Quresh were suitable for the Khilafat. See Chiriakoti, \textit{op. cit.}, Appendix, pp. 44-48.

\textsuperscript{178} Islamic Mail, Nov. 8, 1914, PSSF, 4265/14, I.

\textsuperscript{179} Translation of the leaflet produced by Aga Saiyid Hasan, Mujtahid, Lucknow, in PSSF, P. 4947 with 4265/14, I.

\textsuperscript{180} See M.B. Mahmud Ahmad to O'Dwyer, n.d., PSSF, P. 5061 with 4265/14, II.
The Muslim press though bitter and sullen at the 'calamity' nevertheless accepted the position that Muslim India would render unto Caesar that which was Caesar's.181 The four leading pan-Islamic journals, the Comrade, the Al-Hilal, the Islamic Mail and the Musalman, also shared this opinion, though they did not hesitate to point out to the Government that the Indian Muslims were deeply concerned about the Sultan-Caliph and that it should avoid any action which might affect their attitude.182 It was also suggested that in order to remove apprehension, Britain should declare that even if the Allies succeeded in vanquishing Turkey, her integrity would be maintained after the War.183 Here were the germs of the future Khilafat movement.

The enthusiasm for loyalty, however, varied from province to province (depending on the influence of the moderate men) - from an expression of intense spontaneity in Poona to lukewarmness in the U.P. and its total absence in Assam. In Bengal there was actual difference of opinion and the Al-Hilal argued for suspension of judgement on Turkey's action.184 But behind this manifestation of loyalty there was more than a mere gratitude regarding the promised protection of the Holy Places. It was the political expediency so truthfully characterised by the Aligarh Institute Gazette (November 4, 1914) that 'with the stability of the British Government our welfare and prosperity are bound up, in its weakness and destruction we see our own weakness and ruin'.185 No doubt, therefore, that in advising loyalty Mazhar-ul-Haque reminded the Muslims that 'on our present attitude depends our future destiny';186 the Raja of Mahmudabad equated the achievement of Muslim political rights in future with their attitude 'at this critical juncture';187 and

181 Nadul Matin, Nov. 4, 1914, and Observer, Nov. 4, 1914, PSSF, P. 4947 and P. 4763, ibid.
182 PSSF, 4265/14, II.
183 Akhbar-i-Islam (Bombay), Nov. 11, 1914, and Islamic Mail, Dec. 1, 1914, ibid.
184 PSSF, 4265/14, I and II, especially P. 5057 and P. 4945.
185 PSSF, P. 5058 with 4265/14, II.
186 Englishman, Nov. 5, 1914.
187 Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow), Nov. 6, 1914, PSSF, P. 4918 with 4265/14, I.
Fazlul Haq harped on the peace and security that the Muslims were enjoying under the British rule. It was perhaps this expedient which led Dr. Suhrawardy, the pan-Islamist, and Professor Khuda Bukhsh (1877-1931), the historian, to change their views and deny that the Sultan of Turkey was the rightful Caliph.

The Government wisely refrained from rushing the Muslim community into condemning Turkey and let the excitement take its own course. However, it obtained its end by suppressing the 'extremists', as it did later with the Ali brothers by interning them in 1915, and by encouraging the moderates to be more vocal. In addition, it whipped up support from a section of the ulama which was traditionally opposed to Abdul Bari and Mahmud Hassan (1851-1920) of Deoband and thus, too willing to help. Fatwa to the effect that the war with Turkey was political and not religious and that the jihad against the British was religiously unlawful, were secured from Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly, Abdul Haq of Calcutta, the brothers Abdul Hamid and Abdul Majid of Farangi Mahal, Pir Mihr Ali Shah of Golra (Punjab), Maulavi Abdul Aziz Samdani and Maulavi Syed Muhammad Razvi. Abdul Bari and Mahmud Hassan not only refused to sign but openly opposed such attempts. The pro-British fatwa, however, lost much value when one of the sponsors disclosed that the Government had engineered the move.

188 Amrita Bazar Patrika, Nov. 4, 1914, ibid.
189 Dainik Chandrika (Calcutta), Nov. 15, 1914, ibid., and Statesman, Nov. 7, 1914.
191 The moderates, with the consent of the Govt., established vigilance committees for pro-British propaganda. See the reports on the internal political situation in Bengal and Bombay, Nov. 23, 1914, in FSSB, 4265/14, I. Also see memo. by Muhammad Shafi, July 7, 1920, enclosure, MP.
193 Ibid.
Sultan's name omitted from the Friday khutba. A Deputy Collector of the U.P. even suggested that the Muslims should collectively request the Government to become the Khadim-i-Haramain-i-Sharifain and establish its direct control over the Hedjaz. Such attempts were, however, strongly resisted. In Bengal, for instance, when Nawab Salimulla of Dacca and his group attempted to delete the Sultan's name from the khutba, they got a thorough trouncing from the press.

As the War progressed Indian Muslims began increasingly to apprehend the probable disappearance of the last independent Muslim Power. Already inflammatory leaflets had made their appearance, including an updated version of a well-known qasida originally composed about the time of the Revolt of 1857, purporting to prophesy exact events leading to the final triumph of Islam. In certain pan-Islamic circles the prospects of the jihad was discussed in private meetings. The encouragement had perhaps come from the activities of several hundred Indian pilgrims in the Hedjaz who had stayed back under the influence of two members of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba to fight for Turkey. A controversy also arose whether it was obligatory for true Muslims to perform the hijrat. Mahmud Hassan was reported to have given a fatwa to the effect that the hijrat was incumbent on Muslims 'who could free themselves from family and other ties'.

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195 Mohamed Ali to Abdul Bari, Dec. 21, 1914, Nuqush, CIX, p. 16.
196 Islamic Mail, Dec. 1, 1914; and Masawat, Dec. 3, 1914, PSSF, 4265/14, I and II.
199 Report on the internal political situation in the U.P. for the second fortnight of Nov. 1914, PSSF, P. 5057/14 with 4265/14, II.
200 Bamford, op. cit., p. 120.
201 ICHPP, Jan. 1919, Pro. No. 206.
202 'Third Note on the Silk Letter Case', by Cleveland, Sept. 26, 1916, and the statement of Maulavi Muhammad Masud of Deoband in PSSF, 4260/16. This refers to earlier events.
The first practical result of this propaganda appeared in February 1915, when, instigated by the Mujahidin agents, a group of Lahore students (later joined by some from the Frontier) crossed into Afghanistan, with the object of proceeding to Turkey and fighting for the Caliph. Some of these students later played a significant rôle in the Turko-German and pan-Islamic revolutionary schemes. The 'extremists' among the pan-Islamists aligned themselves with the German-assisted Indian revolutionaries in Batavia and the Ghadr Party based in San Francisco, and stretched the plot to the Tribal area, Afghanistan and several other parts of Asia and Europe. The propaganda also penetrated the Indian army. First, there was trouble at Bombay with the 10th Baluch Regiment who shot some British officers when they were embarking the ship for active duties overseas. Later, the Indian units at Rawalpindi and Lahore too were involved and there were defections of Muslims from the Indian Expeditionary Force which had landed in France. But a much more serious incident took place in February 1915, among the Muslim infantry posted at Singapore. Thinking that they were going to be sent to fight the Turks, they mutineed, shot eight officers, gave a pitched battle and escaped into the hinterland. Again, early in 1916, several killings and desertions were reported from among the Afridi units.

202 For details see the autobiography of one of the runaways, Zafar Hasan Aybek, Ap Biti, I, Lahore, [1964].
204 'Russia; The Bolshevik Blue Book on India', enclosure No. 29, P3D, P. 3784/19 with 2888/18.
206 Butler to Kitchener, Feb. 18, 1916, BP.
More ambitious was the bid of the pan-Islamists, spearheaded by the ulama of Deoband, to overthrow the British rule in India in league with the Frontier tribesmen and with the assistance of Turkey and Afghanistan. Mahmud Hassan, who had been developing his anti-British scheme since 1905 in collusion with the educated element and the Mujahidin, had skillfully promoted it in India and spread it secretly to Central Asia, the Hedjaz, and Mesopotamia, through emissaries and cypher letters. At the outbreak of the War he became convinced that success was out of the question unless supported by a foreign Muslim Power. Therefore, he despatched Obeidullah Sindhi, his former colleague and the then Principal of the Nazarat-ul-Muarif, Delhi, to Kabul in the autumn of 1915, and himself proceeded to Constantinople via the Hedjaz with a view to arriving finally in the Tribal area on the Indian frontier.

In Kabul, Obeidullah, with the connivance of the Afghan Government, brought into his sphere the runaway students, the Mujahidin agents and other Indian residents, established contacts with the Turko-German Mission in Kabul and the German-supported Indian revolutionaries Mahendra Pratap (d. 1886) and Professor Barkatullah (1859-1927), and eventually joined their 'Provisional Government of India'. Among the various plans that he prepared was the establishment of a 'Junud Allah' (Army of God) with the headquarters at Medina and with subordinate commands at Constantinople, Tehran and Kabul. In the Hedjaz Mahmud Hassan established contacts

207 PP, 1918, Cd. 9190, pp. 72-75.
208 Madni, op. cit., II, pp. 137-43. Also see O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 178.
212 PSSF, 4260/16.
with the Turks and obtained from Ghalib Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of the Hedjaz, a declaration of *jihad* against the British for circulation in India. The document, known as the 'Ghalib Nama', was smuggled into India by a trusted follower of Mahmud Hassan, photographed and distributed.\(^{213}\)

But the whole plot was unravelled by the Punjab C.I.D. with the accidental capture of the 'Silk Letters' - the letters written by Obeidullah and Maulavi Ansari of Deoband from Kabul to Mahmud Hassan, containing reports of their progress in Afghanistan and India.\(^{214}\) As a result, a number of arrests were made in India. Mahmud Hassan was himself arrested along with his associates by Sharif Hussain (1856-1931) of Mecca and handed over to the British. He was interned at Malta where he remained till his release in 1920.\(^{215}\) For a time the *Mujahidin*, along with the Tribes, continued their raids on British India under Haji Fazal Wahid (1856-1937) of Turangzai, an *alim* associate of Mahmud Hassan, and others but the plot in fact fizzled out under British punitive measures.\(^{216}\)

The uncovering of the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy' enabled the Government to take necessary preventive measures. Shortly afterwards Azad was externed by the U.P. and the Punjab Governments and in April 1916, he took up residence at Ranchi under surveillance.\(^{217}\) Fazl-ul-Hasan Hasrat Mohani (1878/80-1951), the journalist of the *Urdu-i-Mualla* repute, was interned by the U.P. Government at Lalitpur in Jhansi and, on refusing to comply, he was imprisoned for two years.\(^{218}\) However, the Kabul wing of the pan-Islamists was


\(^{214}\) PSSF, 4260/16

\(^{215}\) Madni, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 231-34.


\(^{217}\) Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

able to continue its activities. But despite their attempts to win over Amir Habibullah (1872-1919) of Afghanistan, the British were able to obtain his neutrality.\footnote{Adamec, op. cit., pp. 83-107; Hardinge of Penshurst, My Indian Years, pp. 131-32; and W.K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, London, 1950, p. 194.} Turko-German plots to subvert the Indian masses and the ruling chiefs were also discovered and made ineffective.\footnote{The Turko-Germanic-Indian Mission under Hentig which reached Kabul about the middle of 1915 had brought with it letters signed by the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg for the Nizam of Hyderabad and other Indian Chiefs. But most of these letters, inviting the addressees to rise against the British, fell into the hands of the British. Only one of these reached its destination - the Maharaja of Nepal. For the original documents and copies see Mss. Eur. E. 204, 209, 247 and Photo. Eur. 33. For the newspapers and pamphlets designed to foment trouble in India and other Eastern dependencies, see the list prepared by M.I.5 of the War Office, Mss. Eur. E. 288/1, 1-220. A list of the publications proscribed by the Indian authorities is attached in the bibliography of the present thesis.} However, what made a more serious dent in the ideal of pan-Islamism and the 'universal' Khilafat, was the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Government in June 1916, under Sharif Hussain of Mecca, resulting in his seizure of Mecca, Jeddah and Taif.\footnote{For details see PSSF, 53/15, I-VI; and PSM, B. 236, B. 250 a, B. 251, and B. 267. Recently opened documents at the Foreign Office and the India Office and George Antonius (The Arab Awakening, London, 1938) and more recent works by S. Mousa (T.E. Lawrence: An Arab View, London, 1966) and Phillip Knightly and C. Simpson (Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia, London, 1969) give a balanced view of the Arab Revolt. Also see H.Z. Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, Ithaca and New York, 1956; and Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism, Beirut, 1956.}

The Hedjaz revolt, which was in the beginning unaccompanied by any general Arab uprising in other territories due to the tight Turkish control, appeared to the Muslim world at first as completely devoid of a nationalistic spirit.\footnote{Antonius, op. cit., pp. 201-7.} Thus, to the Indian Muslims the rebellion was a British engineered stab in the back of the millet. They were particularly alarmed by the non-Muslim threat to the Holy
Great indignation was, therefore, caused when the British and Anglo-Indian papers alleged that the Indian Muslims had welcomed the revolt. Demonstrations were held all over the country in order to express abhorrence at the Sharif's action. On June 26, 1916, the Council of the All-India Muslim League met at Lucknow and passed a resolution condemning the 'outrageous conduct' of Hussain which it thought had jeopardised the safety of the Holy Places. Abdul Bari dubbed Hussain and his sympathisers as the 'enemies of Islam' and Ajmal Khan frankly told the Viceroy that the British policy of aiding Hussain was a serious blunder and ought to be remedied.

Little did the Indian Muslims know that the spirit of Arab nationalism was very deep, that the revolt had been initiated by the Arabs themselves, that Hussain was working in his own and not British interests except in so far as they furnished his particular schemes, and that the British by their help, were only utilising his services against an enemy. Hussain and the Arabs generally were as suspicious of the Allied designs on Arabia as the Indians were. The British too, despite the temptation and clamour in certain quarters to support an Arab caliphate, refused to be involved in the Khilafat question.

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227 Times of India, June 29, 1916. The Govt. of India took steps to counter the propaganda. See memo. by Sir James Meston, enclosure, Chelmsford to Chamberlain, July 7, 1916, CP.
228 Bamford, op. cit., p. 127.
230 PSSF, 53/15, I-VI. Also see The 'Politics in Mecca', memo. prepared by T.E. Lawrence for the Director of Intelligence, Cairo, PRO, F.O., 142/461; D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, London, 1950-56, IV, pp. 1802-3.
231 PSM, B. 287.
simply for fear of the consequences in India. Far from establishing a direct influence in Arabia, which they knew was dangerous and impossible, the British endeavoured to prevent any other non-Muslim power from obtaining any control over the Holy Places. But even by their help to the Arabs, the British had been able to abolish, as T.E. Lawrence (1888-1935) had once desired, 'the threat of Islam, by dividing it against itself, in its very heart.'

For the Government of India the Arab revolt and its effect on Muslims in India was the chief worry. Therefore, its policy as a whole was conciliatory. In August 1916, Lord Chelmsford (1868-1933), the new Viceroy, explained to Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937), the Secretary of State for India, thus:

We in India have no sympathy whatsoever with the Turk and have no desire to see him let down lightly. At the same time, as administrators of an enormous Muslim community, we cannot but sympathise with the predicament in which they are placed by this war between their temporal and spiritual leaders, and for this reason we desire to deal gently with their feelings, while subscribing in the fullest and most loyal manner to the policy of His Majesty's Government.

Though the Muslim excitement and the Turko-German intrigues continued, necessitating the Government to tie up a good many

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234 Lawrence's memo., above, n. 230.

235 Chelmsford to Chamberlain, July 7, 1916, CP.

236 Chelmsford to Chamberlain, Aug. 25, 1916, CP.

troops, some of them European, the bulk of the community not only remained loyal to the British Crown but contributed materially to the defeat of their Caliph. Indian Muslim soldiers, despite some desertions, fought and died in different theatres of the War, and without their aid, Prime Minister Lloyd George (1879-1941) later admitted, 'we should not have conquered Turkey at all'. But all through the War the community was confronted with the difficult and distracting dilemma of reconciling the conflicting demands upon its loyalty. Thus, whilst the Indian Muslim soldiers were fighting the troops of their Caliph in the Near and the Middle East, prayers were being offered for his welfare in the Indian mosques. At times there had been reassuring pronouncements from the Government, in part due to the vulnerability of the British position in and out of India. On January 12, 1915, Hardinge had given an assurance for the independence and integrity of Turkey. Edwin Montagu (1879-1924), Chamberlain's successor at the India Office, had made a pronouncement on August 17, 1917, for the 'progressive realization of responsible government in India'. And Lloyd George, on

238 M. Larcher, Commandant, La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale, Paris, 1926, p. 528, cited by Emin, op. cit., p. 177. Also, see Stoddard, op. cit., p. 61.


240 PP, 1920, Hansard, 125 H.C. Deb. 5S, col. 1964. India's material contribution had been colossal. Apart from a very large number of troops (total up to the end of Nov.1918: 739,936 including 241,224 Muslims) and huge financial contributions, India supplied vast quantities of foodstuffs and other material for the purpose of the war. Total Indian casualties as compiled up to the end of Dec. 1919, were 121,598. Out of the 700 Indian Officers killed 242 were Muslims. See India's Contribution to the Great War, passim; PSM, D. 235; and JAP, 2437/1920.

241 See, e.g., the All India Muslim League Presidential address 1915 quoted by G.T. Garrat, An Indian Commentary, London, 1928, p. 142.

242 The Indian Peace Delegation memo. dated Feb. 5, 1919, enclosures, Montagu to Chelmsford, March 31, 1919, CP.


January 5, 1918, had pledged the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty once the War was over. 245 The last named pronouncement had been rendered particularly necessary as the Bolshevists, after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and a separate peace with Germany, had started to expose the secret Allied treaties aiming at Ottoman dismemberment. 246

On January 5, 1918, Lloyd George, with the full consent of the British political parties, unequivocally declared in his famous war-aims speech that they were not fighting 'to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race'. 247 The Indian Muslims took this as an unalterable pledge and tenaciously clung to it. But they conveniently forgot that nowhere had the Premier indicated a willingness to restore to Turkey any of the territories in which Britain was interested. Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia could not be exposed once again to the 'tyranny of the Sultan and his pashas'. 248

Yet the unbearable strain occasionally erupted in the form of sporadic violence as in the case of the Calcutta riots of September 1918, sparked off by the publication of insulting remarks about the Prophet in an Anglo-Indian paper. 249 Such outbursts were clearly symptomatic of the disturbed state of the whole Muslim body politic and indicative of the presence of a strong pan-Islamic sentiment -

245 The Times, Jan. 7, 1918.
246 For the secret treaties see below, pp. 49-50. Also see W.W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War, London, 1957.
247 The Times, Jan. 7, 1918.
248 Ibid.
though the Muslim leaders were prone to dismissing it as a mere Western shibboleth.250 The Turkish reverses in the War had thus only heightened the existing tension. It was in this background that the War came to an end in November 1918.

CHAPTER II

THE INCEPTION AND GROWTH OF THE MOVEMENT

The Armistice between the Allies and Turkey was signed at Mudros on October 30, 1918. The unconditional surrender of Turkey, followed on November 11 by a quick German capitulation, brought the European War finally to a close. The advent of peace was greeted in India with much relief. The future of Turkey, no doubt, caused some anxiety but in view of the repeated pledges of the Indian and the British Governments, the Indian Muslims hoped that the Sultan-Caliph would be presented with a lenient treaty, safeguarding the prestige of the contracting parties. Some even believed that as a reward for the Indian Muslim loyalty and services in the War, Britain would treat her fallen foe with commiseration and generosity.

To their great disappointment, the Indian Muslims discovered that whereas the Armistice had left the territorial readjustment to the Peace Conference, any suggestion of the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the 'liberated' territories would be viewed with utmost disfavour by the Allies. From the outset the latter strove to make the Muslim world realise that Turkey had been beaten completely and that the Armistice was not 'merely a suspension of hostilities pending amicable negotiations'. With remarkable celerity, the Entente Powers had begun to secure their respective spheres of economic and strategic interests in the Ottoman Empire. Britain moved in to control the Straits, Mesopotamia and Arabia.

1 For the terms of the Armistice see PP, 1919, Cmd. 53.
3 See Bombay Samachar, Nov. 4, 1918, BNNR 1918. Also see Mufid-i-Rozgar, Nov. 3, 1918, ibid.; Sanj Vartaman, Nov. 2 and 6, 1918, ibid.; Akhbar-i-Islam, Nov. 16, 1918, ibid.; Vakil, Nov. 6, 1918, PNNR 1918; Leader, Nov. 16, 1918, ibid.; and Political Bhumiyo, Nov. 29, 1918, BNNR 1918.
4 Akhbar-i-Islam, Dec. 9, 10, 11 and 12, 1918, BNNR 1918.
5 S/S to V, Tel. P., Nov. 16, 1918, CP.
generally, which, besides strengthening the defence of her rich Indian Empire, was to furnish her with the possible oil deposits of Mosul and necessary cotton fields of Diala. France was manoeuvring to preserve her privileges in Syria. Italy was intent on holding on to the Dodecanese and the vilayet of Adalia. America, though unwilling to accept any territorial reward, was, nevertheless, advocating the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. 6

Secret treaties and other war-time arrangements had committed the Allies to a policy of 'the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilisation'. 7 In the main three secret agreements spelled the death of the Ottoman Empire: first, the Treaty of London between the Entente Powers and Italy, April 26, 1915; secondly, the Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement between Britain, France and Russia, April 26-October 23, 1916; and thirdly, the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne between Britain, France and Italy, April 19-September 26, 1917. 8 Besides, there were two other agreements


between the Powers about the Straits, Constantinople and Asia Minor, as well as the pledges given to the Arabs for their complete independence and those to the Zionists for a separate homeland in Palestine. According to these treaties, the Allies contemplated to strip Turkey not only of her entire European possessions, including the imperial capital, Constantinople, but also to deprive her of her eastern territories of Mesopotamia, Palestine, Arabia and Syria. In this way Turkey was to be left with practically nothing, not even an important access to the sea, and what was more important, was also to lose her sovereignty. Thus, while a complete dismemberment of Germany, the principal enemy, was not contemplated, Turkey was to be saddled with a much harsher peace treaty.

With the past history of Western encroachments on the Muslim kingdoms of Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Persia, the impending dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire came like a shock to the Indian Muslims. Turkey's downfall was felt deeply 'for with it was closely interwoven the question of the Khalifate and of the guardianship of the holy places of Islam'. Related to the sad plight of Islam abroad was also the question of its possible effect on their position in India. Being in minority, the Indian Muslims had an unmitigated fear that 'the collapse of the Muslim Powers of the world is bound to have an adverse influence on the political importance of the Musalmans in the country'. Besides, a feeling had been growing


10 See the British and the French declarations of policy in Hindu, Nov. 15, 1918. Also see PSM, B. 310 (a); and Tamperley, op. cit., p. 28.

11 Curzon was willing to leave Turkey as an independent Asiatic state, but Lloyd George, who exercised an unusual degree of control over foreign policy after the Armistice, insisted not only on a total destruction of the Ottoman Empire but also Turkey's extinction as a sovereign country. See Earl Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, III, London, 1928, pp. 259-68.

12 Fazlul Haq, All-India Muslim League Session, Delhi, Presidential Address, Calcutta, [1912], p. 2.

13 Resolution xxi, All-India Muslim League Session, Delhi, Dec. 1918, J&F, 2272/19.
among the educated Muslims that, in spite of their loyalty to the British during the War, their community had not been treated with sympathy, and that their views carried little weight with the Government. As evidence, they cited the recent outbursts of Montagu and Chelmsford against the separate electorates, 'which is the life and soul of all our political activities of the present day' - an opinion which was shared equally by the ulama. The latter were particularly exasperated over the omission from the Reform scheme of any mention of their representations to the Secretary of State in 1917 wherein they had pleaded for the preservation of Muslim rights and privileges. Added to this was a deep feeling of resentment over the Press Act and the Defence of India Act which had been frequently used to impede the publication of Muslim journals like the Comrade, the Hamdard, the Al-Hilal, the Al-Balagh and the Zamindar. But what they felt most acutely was the continued detention of some of their leaders, especially Mahmud Hassan, the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad and Hasrat Mohani.

At such a juncture when the Muslims were uneasy, the Government of India inaptly gave them another cause for concern. It nominated a Hindu, Lord Sinha of Raipur (1864-1928), instead of a Muslim, to represent India at the Peace Conference. The Muslims feared that a non-Muslim, however able and judicious, could not fully comprehend and represent their views on questions affecting

14 These views were expressed by leading Muslims to Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal. See Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, Sept. 11, 1918, OP.
16 See A.M.M. Sajjad to Abdul Bari, Dec. 4, 1918, Nwaush (Lahore), CIX, April/May 1968, p. 93.
17 Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, Sept. 11, 1918, OP. For the ulama's representations to Montagu see PP, 1918, Cmd. 9178, Addresses Presented in India to His Excellency the Viceroy and the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, pp. 8-10; and E.S. Montagu, An Indian Diary, ed., V. Montagu, London, 1930, p. 45.
18 Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, Sept. 11, 1918, OP.
19 New Times (Karachi), Dec. 20, 1917, EBNR 1918; Punjab (Lahore), Jan. 5, 1918, EBNR 1918; Maharashtra (Poona), Jan. 6, 1918, EBNR 1918; and Sind Moslem (Sukkur), April 6, 1918, ibid. For full details of the internments see ICHPB, June 1919, Pros. Nos. 440-525. Mohani had been released in May 1918 but the restrictions on him were still in force.
Islam. The nomination was interpreted as a calculated move on the part of the Government to injure Muslim interests. The Muslims were in a predicament.

Among the prominent leaders who had escaped internment during the War only a few - Abdul Bari, Dr. Ansari, Ajmal Khan and Mushir Hosain Kidwai - were still politically active. Kidwai was based in London, running the principal pan-Islamic propaganda organisation called the Islamic Information Bureau, and Ansari's and Ajmal Khan's activities were confined to Delhi and some places of Upper India. Abdul Bari was the only leader who enjoyed a position of pre-eminence in Muslim India. He was not only revered for his piety and learning, but, since the Cawnpore Mosque affair of 1913, had come to acquire great hold on the Muslim masses. Moreover, because of his position as the foremost pir with thousands of followers all over India, most of the important pan-Islamists - Hasrat Mohani, the Ali brothers, Kidwai, Jan Muhammad Chotani, Shah Sulaiman Phulwari (1859-1935), T.A.K. Sherwani - were either his disciples or close friends. This personal conclave of ulama and the educated élite with anti-British leanings was remarkably important in fostering the movement for lenient treatment for Turkey.

Abdul Bari had been in constant touch with most of his associates, including the Ali brothers and Azad who were still in detention. A campaign for the release of the Muslim internees, headed nominally by 'Bi Amman' (1853-1924), the mother of the Ali brothers, had

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20 Paisa Akhbar (Lahore), Nov. 16, 1918, FNNR 1918; Aftab (Lahore), Nov. 22, 1918, ibid.; Nasrat (Amritsar), Nov. 24, 1918, ibid.; Watan, Dec. 13, 1918, ibid.; and Wafadar (Navasir), FNNR 1918, pp. 19-20.

21 The writer is indebted to Maulana Jamal Mian, the only son of Abdul Bari, for this information, which he supplied in an interview in London in Aug. 1969. Also see Kulliyat Hasrat Mohani, Maktaba Ishaat-i-Urdu, Delhi, 1959, pp. 57-58; M.S. Shaheed Farangi Mahali, 'Khadam-i-Kaaba Maulana Shaukat Ali', Ali Bradran, ed., Rais Ahmed Jafari, Lahore, 1963, p. 88.

22 See letters to Abdul Bari from Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Mohani, Kidwai, Zafar Ali Khan and others in Nuqush, CIX, passim. For the Ali brothers see ibid., pp. 18-19 and 56-65, and Ali Bradran, pp. 436-501. In this case the intermediaries were Shoaib Qureshi, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, Iqbal Shaidai, Khaliquzzaman and Ghate, the Ali brothers' lawyer. Interview with Jamal Mian, Nuqush, CIX, p. 58; and Imroze (Lahore), Jan. 12, 1969. For Azad see Nuqush, CIX, p. 36 and ICHPP, June 1919, Pro. No. 490.
already been underway since early 1917. Abdul Bari, Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Jinnah, Raza Ali (1882-1949) and other Muslim leaders were active in this connection and in the winter of 1917 K.K. Gandhi (1869-1948) had also been persuaded to support the campaign. The latter, while in Britain, had gauged the depth of Muslim feeling over the Turkish question. He quickly perceived that here was an opportunity to foster his friendship with the Muslim leaders. He already knew the Ali brothers and after their internment had maintained the 'hot-line' with Chhindwara. Through Dr. Ansari the circle of his Muslim friends widened and eventually included Abdul Bari, the man he wanted most to befriend. However, it was not until April 1918, that Gandhi expressed his sympathy publicly when, at the Delhi Imperial War Conference, he forcefully presented the Muslim point of view with regard to Turkey. He followed it up by an appeal to the Vicoroy, requesting him to issue 'definite assurances about Mahomedan States'. 'As a Hindu', he reasoned, 'I cannot be indifferent to their cause. Their sorrows must be our sorrows'. By associating himself with the Muslim cause, Gandhi had earned the gratitude of the Muslim leaders. Their friendship blossomed into an unwritten pact to help each other for the promotion of Hindu-Muslim unity, an amicable solution of the constitutional problems and, most important, the Turkish issue.


Gandhi's participation was the result of his meeting with 'Bi Amman' at Calcutta in Dec. 1917. See Bombay Chronicle, Jan. 1, 1918. For Gandhi's efforts in this regard see Gandhi to Maffey, Jan. 1, 21 and April 27, 1918, and Gandhi to Shoaib Qureshi, Feb. 27, 1918, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [hereafter referred to as CW/], XIV, Delhi, 1958, pp. 141-42, 161-62, 373-74 and 220.

O.S. Ghate and Shoaib Qureshi were the intermediaries. See Gandhi to Ghate, Aug. 6, 1918; Gandhi to Shoaib, Sept. 24, 1918, CW, XV, pp. 4-5 and 51-52. He also wrote directly to Mohamed Ali. See Gandhi to Mohamed Ali, Nov. 18, 1918, ibid., pp. 63-64.

Bombay Chronicle, Jan. 1, 1918.

It immediately earned him the gratitude of Abdul Bari. See Abdul Bari to Gandhi, (April 1918), Nujush, CIX, pp. 14-15.

Gandhi to Chelmsford, April 29, 1918, CW, XIV, p. 377.

See below, pp. 58-60.
But for the time being nothing tangible emerged and the Muslims were left to themselves to develop their agitation.30

The Ali brothers had been egging Abdul Bari to action. When, in December 1918, they were granted permission on parole for three weeks to visit their sick relatives in Rampur,31 they visited Abdul Bari at Lucknow and discussed with him the Turkish question.32 Shaukat Ali, with a view to launch a systematic agitation, pressed Abdul Bari to recall Kidwai to India.33 Kidwai, the brain behind the agitation in its embryonic stage, had kept Abdul Bari well informed about the political developments in Europe and used to supply him elaborate briefings.34 When the War ended, he was himself anxious to return to India35 but the Government of India, sensing the implication, had refused him permission.36 However, his absence from India was more than compensated by the resourcefulness of Dr. Ansari and Ajmal Khan who sought to work up a demonstration of popular sympathy for the Khilafat cause before the Peace Conference had begun its deliberations at Paris.37 The forthcoming session of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi in December 1918, afforded an excellent opportunity. Special invitations were sent out to a number of ulama and other Indian leaders, including many Hindus, to take part in the deliberations.38

30 Dr. J.N. Brown, in her book Gandhi's Rise to Power (Cambridge, 1972, Chapter VI), argues that it was Gandhi who spurred the Muslims to action and organised the Khilafat movement when their own leaders were lukewarm about it. On the contrary there is plenty of evidence to show that it was the Muslim leaders who initiated and developed the agitation without any inspiration from outside. Indeed they themselves pulled Gandhi into the Khilafat movement.
31 ICHPP, Poll.—Jan. 1919—189-203—Part B.
33 Ibid.
35 ICHPP, Poll.—Jan. 1919—20-23—Part B.
38 Ibid. Also see J&F, 1424/19.
Thus, the first public expression of the anxiety over the fate of Turkey after the War was given at the Muslim League session. The meetings held on December 30 and 31, 1918, under the chairmanship of Fazlul Haq of Bengal, were attended by many prominent Hindu and Muslim leaders, including a large number of the ulama representing various seminaries and schools of thought in the country. Besides Abdul Bari and his Farangi Mahal group, there were Mufti Kifayatullah (1875-1952), Ahmad Saeed and Abdul Latif on behalf of the Anjuman-i-Ulama of Delhi, Sanaullah (1869-1948) representing the ulama of the Ahl-i-Hadis school, and Abdul Kadir Azad Subhani (1882-1957) attending on behalf of the ulama of Cawnpore. The ulama of Deoband, who had become cautious since the discovery of the Silk Letter Conspiracy and the internment of Mahmud Hassan, did not attend. They also found it hard to revise their views on the Khilafat question or to disown the loyal war-time stance. But in order not to look entirely aloof, Hafiz Ahmad, the Nazim, wrote cautiously supporting the League resolutions. 39

Dr. Ansari’s address as the Chairman of the Reception Committee, written by Abdul Ghaffar (1894-1956) of the Jamhur in consultation with Abdul Bari, 40 was a strongly-worded exposition of the Muslim case. He emphasised that every government, howsoever strong, had responsibility towards its subjects which it could not ignore. The time had come when the ministers of the Crown must do their duty by the Muslims of India: the war-time pledges must be honoured and the temporal power of Islam saved from further dismemberment. All non-Muslim control must be removed from the Jazirat-ul-Arab (Arabia, Palestine and Mesopotamia) and the territories restored to Sultan-Caliph Vahid-ed-Din Mohammed VI (1861-1926) of Turkey. Ansari maintained that no other person could claim the Caliph’s ‘rightful’ authority and that Sharif Hussain of Mecca, who had rebelled against him, was ‘actuated by his personal ambitions and selfish interests’, and thus, deserved to be killed. Ansari went on to criticise not only the British Government for its anti-Turk policy but also lashed at the British Indian authorities for their alleged ill-treatment of the Indian Muslims, recounting a long list of grievances against the Government, including the internments, gagging of the press, and slow pace of constitutional reforms. 41

39 ICHPP, March 1919, Pro. No. 251. Also see J&P, 1424/19.
41 Ibid.
The aggressive spirit of Dr. Ansari's address, which was later proscribed by the Government, was reflected in the speeches which followed. Fazlul Haq in his presidential address dwelt on the alleged evil effects of the British rule in India. Abdul Bari was so worked up that he objected to the display of Union Jack flags in the hall and Azad Subhani justified the proclamation of jihad. The excited tenor of the proceedings unnerved the more cautious League leaders— not because they were unconcerned about the fate of Turkey but because they disputed the use of the League platform for ventilating Muslim grievances in such language as was used by Dr. Ansari and others. In the Subjects Committee meeting at Ajmal Khan's house, Jinnah, Nabiullah and Seiyyid Wazir Hasan (1874-1947) unsuccessfully tried to impress upon the delegates that nothing which might compromise their national position should be done at that particular juncture. But Ansari, Ajmal Khan and others by playing upon the religious feelings of the Muslims carried the majority with them.

A medley of resolutions was passed though their tone was temperate. One of these pointed out the 'great resentment and ill-feeling among the Musalmans' that would result from any departure from the declared British policy of non-interference in the Khilafat question. Another resolution protested against the occupation of Jerusalem, Najaf and other Muslim sanctuaries by the British forces and urged their immediate evacuation. Yet another, requested the British representatives at the Peace Conference to use their influence in maintaining the territorial and political sovereignty of the Caliph and his full suzerainty over the Jazirat-ul-Arab and other Holy Places in accordance with 'the requirements of the Islamic law.'

The Muslim League session is of great political significance. It marked the beginning of that campaign for the lenient treatment for Turkey which had been simmering all through the War. It also registered the emergence of young pan-Islamists as the new leaders of Muslim India, who, in concert with the Congress, were cut to change the whole perspective of Indian Muslim politics. It was not

42 Fazlul Haq, All-India Moslem League 1918 Session, Presidential Address, above, n. 12.
43 J&P, 1424/19.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. Also see Fazlul Haq to Lloyd George, Tel. Jan. 2, 1918, PSSF, P. 360/19 with 380/19, III.
insignificant that the League resolved to confer with the Congress on the question of the Reforms \(^{46}\) and the Congress allowed its platform to be used by Ajmal Khan to attack the Government's policy towards the Khilafat. \(^{47}\) Another significance of the Delhi session was the presence of a group of leading ulama who were willing to put the seal of religion on the Khilafat demands. It was the beginning of an open estrangement from the Government and for the first time the session of the League closed without the usual cheers for the King Emperor. \(^{48}\)

The moderates like the Raja of Mahmudabad and Wazir Hasan, jolted by this sudden change in Muslim politics, found it impossible to remain in the League any longer and in March 1919, at the instance of Sir Harcourt Butler (1869-1938), the Lt.-Governor of the U.P., both of them resigned from the League. \(^{49}\)

Despite the divisions in the Muslim camp, the trend of Muslim opinion with regard to the Khilafat question was giving anxious moments to the Government of India. On January 31, 1919, Chelmsford frankly warned Montagu that failure to voice Indian views would exacerbate feelings already sore. \(^{50}\) Three weeks later he reported again:

> There is no doubt that Moslems generally are much exercised and anxious as to the future of Turkey and a small irreconcilable section is steadily endeavouring to work up fanatical feelings. The religious aspect of this movement makes it difficult to cope with. It cannot however be ignored that it contains the seed of possible dangerous developments. \(^{51}\)

With the concurrence of the India Office, the Government of India tried to reassure the Muslim community that the British Government still adhered to its pronouncements and pledges and that due consideration would be given to their views at the Peace Conference. \(^{52}\) But this had no effect; the discontent spread rapidly.

\(^{46}\) J&P, 1424/19.

\(^{47}\) Report of the Thirty-Third Session of the Indian National Congress held at Delhi on the 26th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st December, 1918, Delhi, 1919, pp. 12-14.

\(^{48}\) J&P, 1424/19.

\(^{49}\) See Butler to Earl Richards, March 5, 1919, BP.

\(^{50}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 123, Jan. 31, 1919, CP.

\(^{51}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 185, Feb. 18, 1919, CP.

\(^{52}\) ICHPP, March 1919, Pro. No. 254.
Since the Peace Conference had already started its deliberations at Paris in January 1919, Abdul Bari decided to strengthen the Khilafat demands by a formal sanction of the ulama. Early in the year, he circulated a fatwa to the effect that all Muslims were bound to assist in re-establishing the authority of the Khilafat. Sixty-six ulama affixed their signatures to the fatwa but some politically cautious ulama, particularly those from Allahabad, Cawnpore, Delhi and Bareilly, refused to do so. But in spite of this set-back the pan-Islamists did not relax their efforts. They were thus able to produce a spurt of activity among the educated Muslims. Soon telegrams and memorials from various individuals and associations all over the country, entreating that Turkey be spared the humiliation of dismemberment, started to pour into the Viceregal Lodge in Delhi and Whitehall in London.

In spite of the hectic activity, the movement still lacked a coherent all-India character. The agitation was mostly centred in the larger towns of the U.P., Bengal, the Punjab, Bombay and Sind where the work was organised by local leaders through the existing network of the Muslim League organisations. A chance to widen the scope of the movement was, however, presented in March 1919, when Gandhi turned to Abdul Bari for support in his Satyagraha or 'passive resistance' campaign against the unpopular 'Rowlatt' Bills. Originally, Abdul Bari had strong objections to uniting with Hindus as he considered this to be harmful for the Muslim community. But with...
his changed outlook on a Hindu-Muslim rapprochement, he at once seized
the opportunity and after an interview with Gandhi at Lucknow he
declared his support for the Satyagraha campaign.\footnote{58} In return Abdul
Bari obtained a promise of Hindu support for the Khilafat cause.

It was agreed \cite{59} that when the agitation was at its height there would be
a large meeting of Ulemas, Maulvis and
Mahommedans generally, at which Abdul Bari should
be elected Shaikh-ul-Islam and the Muslim demands
regarding the Khilafat, the holy places, etc.,
should be formulated. The Hindus would support
these demands which should be submitted to His
Excellency the Viceroy with the warning that non-
acceptance of them would mean jehad. In return
for the assistance of the Hindus, Abdul Bari, in
his capacity as Shaikh-ul-Islam, was to issue a
fatwa declaring that the animal originally
sacrificed by Ibrahim was a sheep and not a cow,\footnote{59}
and that cow-sacrifice was prohibited in future.\footnote{59}

Evidently, Gandhi and Abdul Bari were both utilising each other
and the issues they stood for to their own advantage. Gandhi
exploited the Khilafat issue to gain Muslim support and through them
the leadership of a united India. Otherwise, he himself admitted that
he 'cared nothing for Turkey as such, but the Indian Mahommedans did
... and \cite{59} felt justified in championing it'.\footnote{60} The high sounding
moral reasons which he gave for his joining the Khilafat movement\footnote{61}
were merely for public consumption. Moreover, by his help to the
Khilafat movement Gandhi wanted 'to enlist the Musalman's sympathy in
the matter of cow protection'.\footnote{62} Indeed he made the attainment of
swaraj, and even the survival of Hinduism conditional on the protection
of cow.\footnote{63} Whether it was this aspect or whether it was to bind the

\footnote{58}{Owen, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 76; and Brown, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 195-96.}
\footnote{59}{Government of Bombay, \textit{Source Material for a History of the Freedom
Movement in India (Collected from Bombay Government Records)}, \textit{here-
after referred to as \textit{HMI}}, III, Part I, Bombay, 1958-65, p. 139.}
\footnote{60}{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 280-81.}
\footnote{61}{Gandhi held that it was 'a sense of moral responsibilities which
has made me take up the Khilafat question and to identify myself
entirely with the Mahomedans'. He could not be, he declared, a party
to a broken pledge of Lloyd George. See \textit{Young India, 1919-1922},
Madras, 1922, pp. 152-54.}
\footnote{62}{\textit{Young India, 1924-1926}, Madras, 1927, p. 1047.}
\footnote{63}{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 1323.
Hindu support for the Muslims that Gandhi treated the Khilafat as a 'Kamadhuk', the mythical cow that gave whatever one asked of her. For Abdul Bari, Gandhi's support meant the strengthening of the Khilafat movement and perhaps personal fame as the 'Shaikh-ul-Islam' of the sub-continent. For this he was prepared to modify his earlier stance and preach cow protection.

Consequently, Muslim support was built up by rumours that the 'Rowlatt' Bills were 'intended to enable the Government to coerce the Mohammedans and prevent them from giving trouble so as to facilitate the dismemberment of Turkey'. Steps were also taken, mainly at Kidwai's prompting, to organise an agency to concentrate solely on the Khilafat issue. Wealthy Bombay Muslim businessmen of Farsangi Mahal connection responded first and towards the middle of March 1919, the Bombay Khilafat Committee was established under Seth Mian Muhammad Hajee Jan Muhammad Chotani. The Committee proved the embryo of the much powerful Khilafat organisation of the future but for the present its orbit was confined to the Bombay Presidency.

Thus, the Khilafat movement and Gandhi's 'Rowlatt' Satyagraha turned into a forceful agitation - more forceful because it was marked by an extraordinary fraternisation of Hindus and Muslims.

64 CW, XX, p. 192. Later Gandhi admitted: 'I have been telling Maulana Shaukat Ali that I was helping him to save his cow i.e. the Khilafat, because I hoped to save my cow thereby'. Young India, 1924-1926, p. 1327.
65 See below, p. 75.
66 HFMI, II, p. 750. Also see pp. 739 and 790.
67 Madras Mail, June 25, 1923.
69 In a moment of extreme camaraderie Muslims admitted Hindus to mosques and Hindu speakers, such as Shradhanand, Gandhi, Mrs. Naidu, B. Chakrabarti and others, addressed the congregations at Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore and other places. See PP, 1920, Cmd. 681, Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab, etc., pp. 5 and 37. Also see Owen, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
But the Khilafat movement was the very antithesis of Satyagraha; the Muslims were unwilling to adopt non-violence and instigated the Hindus to do the same. The agitation quickly became violent. Early in April 1920, about half a dozen Europeans and some Indian police were coldly murdered and considerable damage was done to railway and telegraph lines besides other Government property. The outbreaks were ruthlessly suppressed. Hundreds perished in police and military firings. The most serious tragedy was the massacre on April 13 at Amritsar when a prohibited but peaceful public meeting was broken up by shooting without warning by the orders of Brigadier-General Dyer (1863–1927) killing, according to the official count, approximately 379 and wounding 1200. It was followed by Martial Law, punitive measures and humiliating orders, incorporating a racial element.

The pang over the severity of measures did not come immediately but twinged much later when the Congress and the Hunter Commission reports revealed the real extent of Government repression. For the present, through a policy of effective repression, the Punjab had been

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71 PP, 1920, Cnd. 681, Appendices II and III.
72 Ibid., Chapter III. Sir Valentine Chirol called it 'a black day in the annals of British India'. See his *India Old and New*, London, 1921, p. 177.
73 Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History*, Michigan, 1961, p. 346. These included public whipping, crawling and saluting orders, compulsory military roll-call for students miles away from the town which O'Dwyer called 'a useful bit of discipline'. At Gujranwala aeroplane bombing and strafing was resorted to. Fines amounting to half year's revenue were imposed in certain villages near Lahore. See PP, 1920, Cnd. 681, Chapter III; O'Dwyer to Chelmsford, April 16 and 21, 1919, CP; V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 423, April 23, 1919, CP; and Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress, 2 vols., Lahore, 1920.
cowed and the rest of India forced into quiescence. But though the Rowlatt agitation was a political failure, the eruption had convinced the Viceroy that the source of the trouble was the Muslim discontent, which had been aggravated by the 'unusual fraternization between Hindus and Mahomedans, undoubtedly fostered by Mahomedans.' It is striking that at places where Muslims were not much disturbed, as in Madras, things remained quiet, and apart from Ahmedabad and other places where Gandhi's influence remained supreme, the chief centres of the trouble were those areas where Muslim feelings ran high. Of course factors common to Muslims and Hindus such as the Distrust of the Reforms, racial tension, economic distress, famine and disease, industrial strife, restlessness of the disband soldiery and the repressive policy of the satraps like Sir Michael

See the manifesto issued on April 18, 1919, under the signatures of Shafi, Quzilbash, Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan (1873-1933) and several other Muslims in Hindu, April 24, 1919. Also see expressions of loyalty issued on behalf of the Shias and Ahmadis in ICHPP, Poll. - May 1919 - 305-306 - Part B; Poll. - May 1919 - 29 - Deposit; and Poll. - May 1919 - 476 - Part B.

V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 370, April 15, 1919, CP.

See Syud Hossain's article in Young India, Aug. 4, 1918, PNRR 1918.

The racial tension was due not only to the arrogance of the Europeans towards Indians generally but also to the humiliating treatment meted out to the Indian settlers in various parts of the Empire, especially in South and East Africa.

Soaring high prices of food stuffs and commodities of all kinds and of the cotton cloth so largely worn by the poor classes, were the reasons of the hardship. The situation was made worse by the failure of the monsoon of 1918. See PP, 1920, Cmd. 681, p. 62.

In 1918, the influenza epidemic toll was 6,000,000 and cholera claimed 9,589. See V to S/S, Tel., No. 117, Feb. 21, 1919, CP. Also see The Times, March 11, 1919.


Chelmsford to Montagu, April 16, 1919, CP.
O'Dwyer (1864-1940) of the Punjab had all inflamed the situation, but the Khilafat issue was at the bottom of the eruption. This is fully supported by contemporary evidence. For instance, in the Frontier Muslim politics played a more important part than the 'Rowlatt' Bills in the demonstrations. Reports from the Punjab indicated that city mobs were generally composed of Muslims under the direction of pan-Islamic and Hindu agitators. Sir Harcourt Butler was of the opinion that 'It is chiefly the Muslims'. In Bengal too it was mostly Muslims and Marwaris who were prominent with almost a total exclusion of Bengali element. Montagu's assessment based on the provincial reports was also the same: 'Moslem feeling is the real cause of the trouble'. Gandhi was himself positive about this and considered the Khilafat question to be the chief factor of unrest. In a letter to Maffey, the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, on April 14, 1919, he wrote:

The ferment among the Mahomedans is too great to be checked for ever. It may burst like a torrent at any moment and behind the present disturbances are to be traced the results of extreme Moslem dissatisfaction. It is not confined to classes, but most decidedly permeates the masses.

The Punjab was treated quite differently from other provinces, the policy being based on the assumption that stern rule had long been a practice and that the Province had become accustomed to it. See Chelmsford to Montagu, April 30, 1919, CP.

V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 390, April 17, 1919, CP.

V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 394, April 19, 1919, CP. Also see the chronological statement of the Punjab Govt., in PP, 1920, Cmd. 534.

Butler to Earl Richards, April 22, 1919, BP.

V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 357 and 363, April 13 and 14, 1919, CP.

Montagu to Willingdon, April 16, 1919, MP.


CW, XV, pp. 219-20.
A fair idea of the hardened feelings of the Muslims can be drawn from the letter which the Ali brothers wrote to the Viceroy from Chhindwara towards the end of April 1919. The letter recounted at length the wrongs alleged to have been perpetrated on the Muslims by the British Government, making wildest demands for the restoration of Egypt and all other occupied territories of the former Ottoman Empire to the Caliph. The letter declared that the Government had no claim on the allegiance of Muslims who must, if their legitimate demands were not satisfied within a reasonable time, declare jihad or else perform the hijrat.\(^{91}\) The demands, as Gandhi put it, were 'extravagant' and the language in which they were presented 'inflammatory', but even his cautious counsel, that they should be redrafted in 'a reasoned and logical statement',\(^{92}\) was not accepted. Status quo ante bellum was for the Muslim leaders their irreducible minimum and they presented it as a purely religious requirement.

The Viceroy had already in a secret letter to the heads of the Local Governments warned that the peace terms were likely to be harsh and that they ought to be prepared for any Muslim ebullition.\(^{93}\) On May 3, 1919, the warning was repeated and the Local Governments were instructed 'to do whatever is possible beforehand to alleviate the shock and to discount its effects'.\(^{94}\) The information received from the Local Governments confirmed that the question of the Khilafat was one on which the Muslims were generally very greatly exercised.

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91 Memorial dated April 24, 1919, J&P, 3915/1919 with 1451/1919. The letter was proscribed by the Govts. of the Punjab, the U.P. and Bombay.


93 Circular dated April 19, 1919, CP.

and harsh terms were likely to stir up trouble. But if the shadow at least of the Turkish Empire was retained with Constantinople and Anatolia forming part of it and the Caliph exercising nominal suzerainty over Arabia, in order to 'save the face of Islam', the Indian Muslims would ultimately acquiesce. Even a staunch British ally like the Nizam of Hyderabad had some time ago warned the Viceroy that the British Government 'should treat this subject with the greatest gravity and delicacy it deserves'.

Thus, the fear of serious repercussions drove the Government to take precautionary measures and to adopt an attitude of understanding and conciliation towards the Muslims in regard to the Khilafat issue. The Viceroy repeatedly impressed upon the British Government the importance of taking some steps to soothe the Indian Muslims, 'whose attitude was becoming daily more significant'. Montagu, who was also convinced of the necessity of conciliating the Muslims, tried to represent their case sympathetically. But he found Lloyd George violently pro-Greek and anti-Turk and Balfour (1848-1930) another redoubtable opponent. Milner (1854-1925) was his only supporter in the Cabinet. Nevertheless, the Indian

95 ICHPP, May 1919, Pros. Nos. 362-76.
96 Memo, by the Nizam, dated March 27, 1919, enclosure, Nizam to Chelmsford, March 27, 1919, CP.
98 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 364, April 14, 1919, CP.
99 See Montagu to Chelmsford, June 25, 1919, CP.
delegation to the Peace Conference, consisting of Montagu, Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner (1880-1943), attempted to acquaint the Allied statesmen with the Indian Muslim view on the future of Turkey. On May 17, 1919, through the efforts of the Aga Khan, they were able to present their case before the Council of Four at Paris. The Aga Khan himself and two other prominent Indian Muslims, Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan (1867-1930) and Yusuf Ali (1872-1953), accompanied the delegation. In the interview, the deputationists passionately pleaded for leniency to Turkey, laying particular stress on the Allied pledges, especially Point Twelve of the American President Wilson's (1856-1924) Fourteen Points which called for a 'secure sovereignty' of the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire. But, in the context of the policies to which the Allied Powers had already agreed in principle, the delegation's interview was merely an eyewash. Lloyd George pretended that he at least had been converted to their cause but in fact the delegation was never treated seriously.

The intractable attitude of the British Government and their allies dismayed the Indian Muslims. Though prominent Indian Muslims in Britain, such as Kidwai, M.H. Ispahani, Ameer Ali, Yusuf Ali, Shaikh Abdul Majid, Nawab W.H.M. Jung and Khwaja Kamal-ud-din (1870-1923),

100 See memoranda dated Feb. 5 and April 1, 1919, enclosures, Montagu to Chelmsford, March 31, 1919, CP.
101 See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, June 4, 1919, Nqush, CIX, p.85
103 Ibid.
104 See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, June 4, 1919, above, n. 101.
105 Montagu to Curzon, Aug. 28, 1919, FSSF, P. 4995/19, I & II.
kept up the pressure through the London Muslim League, the Islamic Society, the Woking Islamic Centre and whatever support they could get from the British Turkophiles, much depended on the course of the movement in India. The chance to step up the agitation came about the middle of May 1919, when the Afghans launched a sudden attack on British India. The pan-Islamists lost no time in coquetting with the Ameer's agents. Since the Afghan machinations had left the provinces nearer the Afghan border more excitable it made the dissemination of the Khilafat propaganda much easier. Abdul Bari circulated an 'inflammatory' leaflet and a lengthy jihad pamphlet appeared in the U.P. which, on the basis of numerous quotations from the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, emphasised the necessity of a religious war. Similarly in the Punjab the prophecy of Shah Neamatullah, originally made several hundred years before, and in Bengal a prophecy based on a well-known collection of the Ahadis, predicting the downfall of Christianity, the ultimate triumph of Islamic power and the reappearance of the Mahdi or Messiah, were gaining wide currency.

A further fillip to the movement came from the British and the French decision to authorise the Greek troops to occupy Smyrna, deep in the heart of Turkish

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106 The Central Islamic Society Series, No. 13, PSSF, P. 4105/19 with 380/19, III.
108 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 564, May 21, 1919, CP.
109 Bamford, op. cit., p. 141.
110 Report by the Chief Civil Intelligence Officer of the Punjab, May 27, 1919, enclosure, Chelmsford to Ronaldshay, May 31, 1919, CP. Also see Cleveland to Hignell, May 30, 1919, enclosure, ibid.; and Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, May 22, 1919, CP.
Anatolia, on the assertion that the Greeks constituted a majority in population. When on May 15, 1919, the Greeks carried out the landings in Smyrna with inexplicable brutality, it aroused immediate indignation in India. Protest meetings were held all over the country and resolutions were telegraphed to the India Office and Downing Street entreating leniency towards Turkey. The telegrams also contained threats of serious repercussions if their demands were not accepted. The intensity of excitement was such that Sir George Roos-Keppel (1866-1921), the Chief Commissioner of the Frontier, reported:

The people of the Punjab and N.W.F.P. are frankly hostile to us ... I have got the Peshawar people down just in time or we should have had an organised rising here ...

Terrified, the Local Governments mobilised their resources to counter the agitation. Sir Harcourt Butler, for instance, tried to influence Abdul Bari through a number of people on whom the latter relied for financial support. He also manipulated from the Nawab of Rampur an advice to the Indian Muslims to remain loyal to the British. Similar attempts to contain the agitation were made by other local authorities. In Sind Khan Bahadur Nabi Bakhsh, an Assistant Commissioner, launched an anti-Khilafat campaign with the help of certain obscure

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111 Tamperley, op. cit., VI, pp. 25-26. Also see Tilley's minute of April 10, 1920, PRO, F.O. 371/5141.
112 Bikaner, as the Indian representative to the Peace Conference, at once protested to the Supreme Council on behalf of the Indian Muslims. See ibid., p. 26.
113 See various telegrams in PSSF, 380/19, I, II & III.
114 Roos-Keppel to Butler, June 12, 1919, BP.
115 Butler to Chelmsford, April 20, 1919, BP.
116 Butler to Chelmsford, May 10, 1919, BP.
maulavis.  But such counter activities in effect gained little and instead raised a storm of protest.

In June 1919, one more attempt was made to move the British Government. A memorial was prepared by Ameer Ali for the Prime Minister. But unfortunately a difference of opinion developed between the Shia and the Sunni signatories on the contents of the memorial. Ameer Ali's Shiite emphasis on the 'spiritual' rather than the temporal side of the caliphal question was disapproved by the Sunnis, notably Kidwai and Yusuf Ali. They believed that its emphasis in the memorial had weakened their case. Nevertheless, the memorial was signed by prominent Indian Muslims in Britain and their British supporters and was sent to the Prime Minister. The All-India Muslim League also gave its full support to the memorial. In addition to it, at the request of Chotani, the League delegation headed by Jinnah and consisting of Yakub Hasan (1875-1940), G.M. Bhurgri (1878-1924) and Hasan Imam (1871-1933), which had arrived in London in May 1919 to give evidence before the Reforms Committee, laid before Lloyd George a memorial setting out the Muslim case. Jinnah also approached the Prime Minister for a private interview in order to present the Indian Muslim point of view properly but does not seem to have had one.

117 Soleman, op. cit., p. 3. A pamphlet was published and distributed free which condoned the appointment of Sharif Hussain of Mecca as caliph and contained a declaration of Muslim loyalty to the British Government. See Maulana Faizul Karim, Facts about the Khilafat, Karachi, 1919.
118 PSSF, P. 186/20 with 380/19, IV.
119 See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, June 4, 1919, above, n. 101.
120 PSSF, P. 1972/20 with 380/19, IV.
121 Hindu, July 31, 1919.
122 Chotani to Yakub Hasan, May 14, 1919, enclosure, Yakub Hasan to Lloyd George, July 1, 1919, PSSF, P. 3908/19 with 380/19, III.
123 Jinnah to Lloyd George, Sept. 4, 1919, and enclosure, PSSF, P. 5889/19 with 380/19, III.
124 Ibid.
But in spite of the efforts in London and the agitation in India no tangible results were produced. Some newspaper reports suggested that the fate of Turkey was almost sealed. Abdul Bari became worried and wished that the Ali brothers were free to lead the agitation.\footnote{Since June 1919, the Ali brothers had been imprisoned in the Baitul jail for deliberately breaking their internment orders. See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, May 18, 1919, \textit{Ali Bradran}, p. 150; Mohamed Ali to Azad, May 10, 1919, \textit{ICHPP}, June 1919, Pro. No. 490; \textit{ICHPP}, July 1919, Pros. Nos. 2-32; B. Robertson to Chelmsford, April 19 and 23, 1919, \textit{CP}.} He solicited Gandhi's support in obtaining their release and in sounding the Viceroy on the feelings of the Muslims.\footnote{Abdul Bari to Gandhi, Aug. 4, 1919, \textit{CW}, XVI, p. 70, n.1.} But Gandhi, though he agreed that the time for joint and firm action had arrived, offered no solace and insisted that non-violent Satyagraha was the only remedy for the future of Islam, the future of India and parenthetically, the future of the Ali brothers.\footnote{Gandhi to Abdul Bari, Aug. 27, 1919, \textit{ibid.}, p. 70.} Such a solution did not commend itself either to Abdul Bari or to other Muslim leaders who, therefore, decided to hold an all-India Muslim conference in order to give a more united expression to their feelings than they had done hitherto.\footnote{Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, \textit{Hayat-i-Ajmal}, Aligarh, 1950, p. 210.}

The All-India Muslim Conference was eventually held at Lucknow on September 21, 1919, despite the attempts of the disgruntled moderate faction of the Raja of Mahmudabad to disrupt it. Nearly all the important Muslim leaders of different shades of political opinion in the country came to attend - about 400 coming from outside the U.P. and about 600 from out-stations in the province. At its two sessions, the Conference was presided over by Abdul Bari and Sir Ebrahim Haroon Jaffer (1881-1930), the
Two significant decisions were taken by the Conference; first, the establishment of a central co-ordinating body and, secondly, the fixing of October 17, 1919, as the 'Khilafat Day' - a day of prayer and protest for the safety and integrity of the Khilafat.

The need for a central body had arisen because the agitation, which had hitherto been conducted on provincial and district levels, had lacked proper organisation, co-ordination and direction. No doubt on Kidwai's suggestion, 'Khilafat Committees' had already sprung up at some places, but there was no central supervisory body which could effectively guide and direct the entire movement. The Muslim League, which had so far conducted the agitation, was reluctant to shoulder the responsibility because of the increasingly aggressive nature of the agitation. Therefore, it was thought necessary to bring into temporary existence an organisation which could concentrate all its efforts solely on the Khilafat question.

Thus, the Lucknow Conference passed a resolution which recognised the Khilafat Committee of Bombay as a central body and recommended the formation of branches all over the country. Consequently, at a meeting held on November 11, 1919, the Bombay Khilafat Committee changed its title to 'The Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay' (hereafter referred to as the CKC).

129 Madras Mail, Sept. 23, 1919, Also see Choudhry Khalliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, Lahore, 1961, pp. 47-8.
130 For the resolutions see E.H. Jaffer to Montagu, Tel. Sept. 22, 1919, PSSF, P. 598/19 with 380/19, III.
131 Its 'temporary' feature was disclosed by Ajmal Khan in his presidential address at the Muslim League session at Amritsar in Dec. 1919. See J&P, 900/1920.
133 Bamford, op. cit., p. 144.
A draft constitution was subsequently framed and in accordance with the resolution of the Second Khilafat Conference held at Amritsar in December 1919, was circulated among the various district and provincial Khilafat committees for their opinion. This constitution was approved with various amendments at the Third Khilafat Conference held at Bombay in February 1920. New provincial Khilafat committees were established and, those already in existence, were affiliated to it.

According to the constitution, the objects of the CKC were:

To secure for Turkey a just and honourable peace; to obtain the settlement of the Khilafat question; also of the holy places of Islam and the Jazirat-ul-Arab in strict accordance with the requirements of the Shariat; to secure the fulfilment of the pledges of Rt. Hon. Mr. Lloyd George, given on 5th January, 1919, and of Lord Hardinge, regarding the preservation of the integrity of the Turkish Empire; for the above purpose to approach the British Ministers, the Viceroy of India and the British public; to carry on propaganda work in and out of India; to take such further steps as may be deemed necessary.

The CKC with its headquarters at Bombay consisted of 200 members - later increased to 250 in 1923. Bombay was given 54 seats, Sind 20, Madras 15 and the remaining seats went to other provinces. The office-bearers of the Committee consisted of one President, two Vice-Presidents, four (later increased to six) Secretaries and a Treasurer. For the ensuing year Chotani was elected President, Sir

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135 Manley's note on the Third Khilafat Conference, Bombay, PSSF, P. 2591/20 with 380/19, VI.
The provincial Khilafat committees, about which no comprehensive information is available, were required to work in affiliation with the CKC and where no such committees existed the central body was to do the work. The central and the provincial committees were to collect funds. The CKC was required to maintain proper accounts, to have them examined by a Chartered Accountant, and on the 15th of each month to publish a statement of its accounts. The CKC was also entrusted with the arrangements of holding Khilafat conferences and was empowered to frame bye-laws, affiliate and disaffiliate provincial committees and fill up vacancies.

Subsequently, the Jamiyat-i-Khilafat-i-Hind, as the Khilafat set-up was known, grew into a vast organisation, overshadowing its parent body, the Muslim League, as well as the Congress. With a hundred odd local committees and a vast membership, the Jamiyat-i-Khilafat was the most powerful Muslim body until the re-vitalisation of the Muslim League in the late 1920's. The enlarged CKC itself became the Jamiyat's high-powered committee, charged with the realisation of its fundamental objectives, one of which was the attainment of swaraj for India. At one time the CKC controlled five departments - General Department, Accounts Department, Books and Pamphlets Department,
Receipts and Clothes Department and Propaganda Department. In all there were fifteen men working in these Departments, besides a private secretary to the Honorary Secretaries and another private secretary to 'Bi-Amman', the mother of the Ali brothers. The propaganda work was at first entrusted to the provincial organisations, but because of the lack of co-ordination it was later taken over by the Propaganda Department of the CKC, with Abdul Bari as its head. A weekly bulletin, edited by Marmaduke Pickthall (1875-1936), was also published by this Department.\(^\text{139}\)

Once the organisational side had been taken care of, efforts were made to draw in the Hindus still closer. The experience of the previous April had exhibited to the Khilafatists the unbounded advantages of a Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. But for the majority of the Hindus the religious and even the political aspects of the Khilafat movement had little appeal. Among their leaders, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861-1946) was perhaps the chief sceptic. In December 1918, as the President of the Congress, he had ruled out the plea of C.R. Das (1870-1925) to lend support to the Khilafat issue.\(^\text{140}\) Sankaran Nair (1857-1934) was openly critical of the Khilafatists' motives.\(^\text{141}\) B.G. Tilak (1856-1920) was another sceptic\(^\text{142}\) though in May 1919, he had attended a Muslim meeting on the Khilafat issue in London.\(^\text{143}\) Two other prominent Maharashtrians, Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1950) and Indulal K. Yajnik, exchanged 'many unholy jokes and laughs over the sacred cause of the Khilafat'.\(^\text{144}\) B.C. Pal (1858-1932), who had

\(^{139}\) See the Khilafat Funds Report in \textit{Statesman}, March 17, 1923.

\(^{140}\) \textit{Indian Annual Register}, 1923, II, Supplement, pp. 184-85.

\(^{141}\) C.S. Nair, \textit{Gandhi and Anarchy}, 2nd ed., Madras, 1923, pp. 30 and 33-34.

\(^{142}\) D.G. Tendulkar, \textit{Mahatma}, I, Bombay, 1951, p. 351.

\(^{143}\) P. 4105/19 with 380/19, I.

always dreaded 'the virus of pan-Islamism', was also hesitant to lend his support. Motilal Nehru (1861-1931), coming from a province well-known for its pan-Islamic traditions, considered that there were 'many things nearer home than the question of the Khilafat which we have to attend to'. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri (1869-1946) advised even Gandhi to stay clear of the Khilafat movement for 'we have no right to embarrass the Government of India'. There were others who gave only verbal support and yet others attached conditions of cow protection before they joined the Muslims.

Abdul Bari was prepared to do anything within the limits of the shariat to placate the Hindus. Already, as a friendly jesture he had abandoned cow killing at Farangi Mahal and advised his co-religionists to do the same, irrespective of Hindu co-operation. Apparently Gandhi, who had by this time been definitely pulled into the Khilafat movement by Abdul Bari, was also disinclined to lay down conditions as precedent to Hindu co-operation. He impressed upon his co-religionists that 'unconditional co-operation means the protection of cow'. His writings and speeches were consequently profuse with appeals for Hindu support to the Khilafat movement. So when the Khilafat Day approached, Gandhi pleaded with prominent Hindu and other non-Muslim leaders, as well as the Hindu masses, to join the Muslims in their demonstrations so

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147 Quoted in Brown, op. cit., p. 198.
150 Young India, 1919-1922, p. 142.
151 Ibid., p. 141.
152 This can be followed in CW, especially vol. XX, p. 90.
as to 'put a sacred seal on the Hindu Mahomedan bond'.

But in spite of Gandhi's efforts and his earlier claims that twenty-one crores of Hindus were ready to help Muslims dictate to the Government whatever terms they wished, the Khilafat Day (October 17, 1919) inaugurated no big Hindu-Muslim entente. Only at Dacca, Bombay, Lucknow, Hyderabad (Sind), Sukkur and a few other places did the Hindus join the Muslims in demonstrations and observe hartals. The Muslims were themselves divided and the observance of the Khilafat Day was mostly confined to larger towns. This lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Muslims was perhaps because of the fact that their leaders who commanded a hold over the community were still interned. However, the significance of the Khilafat Day lies in the fact that if the Lucknow Conference had imparted an all-India character to the agitation, October 17 gave it the semblance of an organised movement.

Despite the agitation there was no certainty about the final outcome of the peace settlement. On the contrary Lloyd George's crusading spirit evidenced by his speeches in and outside the Parliament and news from

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The circular dated Oct. 10, 1919, was sent to twenty-nine non-Muslim leaders including Rajagopalachari, Kasturi Ranga Ayengar, Joseph Baptista, Shraddhanand, Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, J.B. Kirpalani, Rajendra Prasad, Pandit Kunzru, C.F. Andrews, Deshpande, Khadilkar and Harkaran Nath Mishra. CW, XVI, pp. 228-29. Also see Hindu, Oct. 16, 1919.

154

V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1001, Oct. 15, 1919, CP.

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Bombay Chronicle, Oct. 18, 1919. At Lahore the Day was not observed at all, perhaps because of the strong influence of the moderates. An interesting record of the proceedings in Sind is found in Abdoola Haroon, The Khilafat Day in Sind, The Secretary, Sind Provincial Khilafat Committee, Karachi, 1919. Also see Brown, op. cit., pp. 199-202.

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other sources foreshadowed the adverse nature of the peace
treaty. In Britain Kidwai and his associates, with the
financial backing of Seth Abdoola Haroon (1872-1942) of Karachi
and the Aga Khan, were trying to reach the British public
through a journal of Muslim opinion. The CKC decided to
supplement these activities and to approach the British
Government directly. At a meeting at Bombay on November 14,
1919, the CKC resolved, probably on the advice of Jinnah
who had returned from Britain that very day, to despatch
an all-India Muslim deputation to Britain early the next
year. But the militants under Abdul Bari were not
satisfied with the moderate approach of the Bombay men
and favoured an open clash with the Government. As a
token of their opposition they advocated a boycott of the
forthcoming victory celebrations in December 1919. A
move in this regard, which had the support of Gandhi, had
already been afoot in Bombay, the Punjab and the U.P. But
the CKC under Chotani, which was against any open
clash with the Government, wished to adopt a middle course:
agreeing to celebrate peace with Germany and Austria, but
abstaining from the festivities should they be extended
to include victory over Turkey. The rift widened when
the militants refused to accept this compromise. However,
a complete deadlock was averted when the CKC agreed to
accept the militants' contention on the condition that

157 In Aug. 1919, Lloyd George had publicly eulogised Lord
Allenby in the Parliament for having fought and won 'the
last and most triumphant of the crusades'. See PP, 1919,
Hansard, II9, H.C. Deb. 58, col. 418. For other speeches
see The Times, Oct. 18 and Nov. 10, 1919. Also see
Jinnah's interview to the press on his return from England
on Nov. 14. Times of India, Nov. 17, 1919. For the press
telegrams on the subject see Madras Mail, Nov. 25, 1919.
158

See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, June 4, 1919, above, n. 101.
Also see Abdoola Haroon to Abdul Bari, Jan. 11 and 13,
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PSSF, P. 186/20 with 380/19, IV.
160

V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 1048, 1101 and 1119, Oct. 28,
Nov. 17 and 25, 1919, CP, Fazlul Hassan to Montagu, Tel.
Nov. 4, 1919, PSSF, P. 380/19, II; HFMI, III, Part I, pp.
211-14; and Hindu, Nov. 6, 1919.
161

V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1119, Nov. 25, 1919, CP.
they postpone the operation of the proposed boycott until such time as a Khilafat Conference had been convened to decide the issue.  

When on November 23, 1919, the first session of the All-India Khilafat Conference opened at Delhi under Fazlul Haq's presidency, Abdul Bari's group from the U.P., aligned with the Punjabis and other militants, dominated the proceedings. Religious emotions ran high and anger towards the British Government was manifest. Those who favoured joining the peace celebrations were denounced as kafirs. But the difference of opinion in the subjects committee was not pressed in the open session and the Conference unanimously decided in favour of the boycott as a religious duty. The provincial and other local Khilafat committees were asked to render all possible help to the Anti-Peace Celebrations Committee set up under Dr. Ansari's chairmanship.  

The peace celebrations question settled, the Conference went on to formulate a definite line of action: they were to despatch a deputation to Britain and if necessary to America, to lay the 'true sentiments of the Muslims before the responsible British Ministers'. In the event of the settlement with Turkey not being concluded to their satisfaction, they were to launch a progressive boycott of British goods. If this were to happen, they were to initiate a gradual cessation of co-operation with the Government. A committee consisting of Ajmal Khan, Fazlul Haq, Abdul Majid Sharar, Raza Ali and four others was appointed to chalk out a programme for this purpose.  

162 Ibid.  
163 V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 1115 and 1118, Nov. 24 and 25, 1919, CP; Madras Mail, Nov. 24, 1919; and HPML, III, Part I, pp. 237-41. For Fazlul Haq's presidential address (written in fact by Abdul Ghaffar) see Khutba-i-Sadarat, Delhi, 1922.  
164 See Fazlul Haq to Lloyd George, Tel. Dec. 2, 1919, PSSF, P. 380/19 with 380/19, II; and Indian Annual Register, 1920, I, P. 252.
The Delhi Khilafat programme was, however, the result of a heated debate. Particular subject of controversy was the boycott of British goods, proposed by Hasrat Mohani as an extension of the anti-peace celebrations resolution. Mohani was supported by Abdul Ghaffar, Mumtaz Hussein, Maulana Fakhir (U.P.), Sanaullah and Daud Ghanavi (Punjab). Encouraged perhaps by the boycott of Italian goods during the Tripolitan War in 1911/12, they argued that the only way to force Britain to accept their demands was to injure her trade. Gandhi, Chotani, Syud Hossain, Raza Ali and Abdoola Haroon opposed it on the grounds of its impracticability. Gandhi laid special stress on his being an expert on boycotting. But Gandhi and his supporters were overruled. Abdul Ghaffar in particular scouted Gandhi's expose and demanded a total boycott. The resolution was finally carried. It was a clear defeat for Gandhi and the moderates.

There was, however, one consolation for Gandhi. The gradual withdrawal of co-operation ('non-co-operation') which he had devised to circumvent Muslim inclination for boycott and violence, was accepted without opposition. At this time non-co-operation was so vague a concept that perhaps Gandhi himself did not know what he meant by it. Even Abdul Bari, who was later to doubt its efficacy and dispute the non-violent aspect, accepted it without demur when Syud Hossain interpreted 'non-co-operation' as the Islamic *tark-i-gawalat* (and not *adm-i-taawun*) in contradistinction to *ishtirak-i-amal* which has no religious overtones. But however vague the scheme

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165 HFMI, III, Part I, pp. 239-40. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1118, Nov. 25, 1919, CP.


may have been, it was a momentous decision and a landmark in the history of the Khilafat movement and indeed of India.

In order to obtain the Hindu approval to the Conference decisions, a special joint meeting of Hindu and Muslim delegates was held the following day (November 24). Overnight the moderates had recovered their lost ground by skilful manoeuvring. The militants also realised that if they persisted in following an aggressive course they would lose Gandhi's support and Hindu sympathy. Diplomatically, they offered the chair to Gandhi. As a further concession to him, Fazlul Haq's proposal, which had the support of Shradhhanand (1856-1926), Hasrat Mohani, Shankarlal Banker (1889-) and others, to combine the Punjab 'wrong' with the Khilafat issue in order to ensure Hindu co-operation, was rejected beforehand. Similarly, the resolution on the boycott of British goods which he had opposed was not repeated. Instead a resolution was passed thanking Gandhi and Hindus for their sympathy. Once Gandhi had been placated, the resolution on the boycott of the peace celebrations was passed amidst great enthusiasm.  

Another significant outcome of the Delhi gathering was the formation of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, the religio-political body of the ulama which played so important a role in the Khilafat movement.  

It was at Abdul Bari's initiative that the ulama, at a meeting held immediately after the Conference, decided to close their ranks and launched the Jamiyat with Kifayatullah as its president and Ahmad Saeed as the secretary. So far the ulama's participation in the movement had been on an individual basis and mostly the result of Farangi Mahal

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169 For the aims and objects of the Jamiyat see Muhammad Miyan, ed., Jamiyat-ul-Ulama Kia Hai, Delhi, 1946, p. 16. Also see Mufti Kifayatullah, ed., Musawadah Dastur-ul-Amal Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, Delhi, 1922.
170 Abdul Bari had been trying for a long time to secure the support of the ulama to form an organisation. See FSSF, P. 2626/19 with 390/19, III; and Khaliquzzaman, op. cit., p. 46.
influence. But now the ulama joined the movement collectively. With their enormous prestige and following amongst the Muslim masses, the ulama infused new life into the agitation. Despite the opposition from the Bareilly school and the Bahr-ul-Ulum faction of Farangi Mahal and the neutrality of Deoband, the Jamiyat, within a short time of its inception, became the nucleus of the Indian ulama and imparted a sense of direction to the Khilafat movement.

With the backing of the Jamiyat, the Khilafatists were in a position to launch the boycott of victory celebrations.\textsuperscript{171} Abdul Bari's fatwa declaring the participation in the celebrations as sinful and unlawful,\textsuperscript{172} forced even the unwilling to coalesce. The Muslim League lent its support to the boycott\textsuperscript{173} and Jinnah resigned from the Committee of the Bombay Peace Celebrations to which he had been appointed without consultation.\textsuperscript{174}

When the peace celebrations were finally held on December 13, 1919, and the following days, the Muslim community in most of the larger towns of the Northern India stayed away.\textsuperscript{175} Even though the Nizam of Hyderabad and other Muslim rulers had participated in the celebrations, the boycott was extremely successful.\textsuperscript{176} It was the first trial of strength between the Khilafatists and the Government.

\textsuperscript{171} Hindu, Dec. 4 & 11, 1919. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1149, Dec. 10, 1919, CP.

\textsuperscript{172} Summary of Indian papers in PSSF, P. 73/20 with 380/19, IV. The fatwa was issued in the name of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama.

\textsuperscript{173} See Jamiyat-ul-Ulama Kia Hai, II, pp. 5-6. Zahur Ahmad to P/S to V, Dec. 10, 1919, PSSF, P. 814/20 with 380/19, IV.

\textsuperscript{174} Jinnah to Montagu, Tel. Nov. 28, 1919, PSSF, 380/19, II; and Hindu, Dec. 11, 1919.

\textsuperscript{175} Bombay Chronicle, Dec. 16 & 17, 1919. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1170, Dec. 23, 1919, CP.

\textsuperscript{176} V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 1149 & 1163, Dec. 10 & 19, 1919, CP. But some over-zealous local officers did interfere. See Bombay Chronicle, Dec. 16 & 17, 1919.
The success with which the Khilafatists had used the issue unmistakably revealed that the peace terms when announced would not be passively accepted. This became even more evident when the leaders gathered at Amritsar towards the end of December 1919, to attend the Second Khilafat Conference and the annual sessions of the Muslim League and the Congress.

The Amritsar proceedings were extremely lively because, as a result of the Royal Proclamation of December 23, 1919, accompanying the enactment of the Government of India Act 1919, most of the political detenues had been released. The presence at Amritsar of the Ali brothers, Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew (1884-1963) and other released leaders (Abul Kalam Azad was not released until January 1920) imparted vitality to the deliberations, ushering an era of militant mass politics. The leadership of the Khilafat movement passed from the moderate Bombay businessmen to reckless politicians and ulama. Chotani remained the president of the CKC with its headquarters still in Bombay but Shaukat Ali became the virtual dictator. Under the leadership of the Ali brothers, the CKC emerged as a completely independent body. The Muslim League was now definitely pushed aside. Instead, Indian Muslims looked for a lead from the CKC and the recently established Jamiyat-ul-Ulama. It was also at Amritsar that an understanding was arrived at between the Muslim and Hindu leaders which enabled them to organise the Khilafat movement jointly. Earlier hesitation of many of the Hindu leaders like Motilal, B.C. Pal, Lajpat Rai (1856-1928) and even Tilak vanished and they began to pledge Hindu support to the

177 For the text of the Govt. of India Act 1919 and the Royal Proclamation see PP, 1920, Cmd. 610. The Govt., though initially reluctant to release the Ali brothers, had included them in the amnesty concession when it was realised that their continued detention, when contrasted with the release of Hindu detenues, would embitter the Muslims still further. See V to S/S, Tel. p., No. 82, Feb. 2, 1920, CP.
Khilafat cause. The Congress which had hitherto stood aloof, also cautiously lent its support.

The Khilafat Conference, which opened under Shaukat Ali's presidency on December 31, 1919, was clearly disappointed at the disregard shown by the British Government to repeated Muslim representations. But still it followed a constitutional course and decided to send forthwith the delegations to Britain and America. Another delegation was to visit Turkey the ostensible purpose of which was to tender on behalf of Indian Muslims 'sentiments of Islamic brotherhood' to the Caliph.

Shortly after the Conference, on January 19, 1920, an influential deputation of Indian leaders led by Dr. Ansari and representing cross-sections of Hindu-Muslim communities, waited on the Viceroy at Delhi in order to obtain permission for the delegations to proceed to Britain and America. The deputationists, in an address prepared by Mohamed Ali and signed by twenty-seven prominent leaders, repeated the Khilafat demands, declaring that no Muslim could accept or acquiesce in an unjust


179 Report of the Thirty-Fourth Congress, p. 157. But, the Hindu support for the Khilafat cause, as the Hindu (Madras) admitted, was 'not a religious sympathy but a sympathy born of common political ideals, a growing national solidarity and of the conviction that Mahomedan and Hindu interests are identical and inseparable'. Hindu (Daily), Nov. 27, 1919.


Those who were unable to come but telegraphed their support: Raja of Mahabobad, Motilal Nehru, M.M. Malaviya, M.A. Jinah, Aqa Hasan, Raja of Jahangirabad and Fazlul Haq. See The Khilafat Settlement and the Muslim and Indian Attitude, Indian Khilafat Delegation Publication No. 1, London, 1920.
settlement 'without jeopardising eternal salvation'. Even if the Ottoman Turks were made to accept such a settlement, warned the signatories, 'it would remain unacceptable as ever to every believing Musalman'.

The Viceroy, 'though not at all happy about it', had agreed to receive the deputation 'so that they might give vent to their feelings'. But he fully recognised that the Indian Muslims felt very deeply on the Turkish issue. He promised to extend certain facilities to the delegation but was in no position to give any assurance about the fate of Turkey. Nevertheless, Chelmsford tried to pamper the deputationists with sympathetic words, though he was equally emphatic that Turkey, when she had her choice, deliberately drew her sword against the Entente Powers and must be prepared to pay the price. The ultimate decision lay not with Britain but with other Great Powers. He, however, hoped that whatever the decision, the Indian Muslims would remain staunch in allegiance and loyalty to the King Emperor. But empty words of sympathy carried little weight with the Khilafatists. The following day they issued a rejoinder in which they openly declared that if the peace terms were unfavourable to 'Muslim religion and sentiments', it would be impossible for them to give the assurance of loyalty which the Viceroy had hoped for.

In the circumstances, the Khilafatists hurriedly despatched the delegation to Europe, especially as the Peace Conference at Paris had not yet taken a final decision with regard to the future of Turkey. In the meantime, an all-India Khilafat Conference was held at Bombay from February 15-17, 1920, under G.M. Bhurgri's presidency, to devise ways and means for strengthening the hands of the delegation. The Conference reiterated the Muslim demands and issued a manifesto arguing its case and warning the Imperial and

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182 The text of the address in ibid.
183 V to S/S, Tel. P., Jan. 8, 1920, CP.
184 V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 30, Jan. 20, 1920, CP.
Also see Bombay Chronicle, Jan. 20, 1920.
the Allied Governments of 'the likely consequences of a wrong decision'. The Conference also decided to raise a sum of thirty lakhs of rupees for the expenses of the delegation and the Khilafat work generally. But when it came to the important issues of policy, such as the proposed non-co-operation with the Government, combined with the boycott of British goods and the propaganda in the army, the cleavage between the militants and the moderates again came to the surface. It was perhaps for this reason that many prominent leaders - Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Hasan Imam, Fazlul Haq, Gandhi, C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru - had stayed away from Bombay. The militants under Abdul Bari and supported by Nur Muhammad of Sind and Daud Ghaznavi of the Punjab, pressed for the immediate adoption of non-co-operation along with the connected items. On the other hand the moderates, consisting mostly of the Bombay delegates under Chotani, who was himself under Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola's moderating influence, were not prepared to adopt such a course. At the end of the heated discussion the militants almost succeeded in carrying the motion in the Subjects Committee. But at the intervention of Bhurgri, who had been detached from the militants by Sir George Lloyd (1879-1941), the Governor of Bombay, a compromise was accepted. The militants agreed to shelve the proposals of non-co-operation until the result of the Khilafat delegation to Britain was known. For the time being the champions of extremism were safely side-tracked.

But there was enough fuel to hearten the militants. Hardly had the Conference ended than a wave of discontent spread amongst the Indian Muslims as a direct result of the agitation in Britain for the expulsion of the Turk from

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186 For the manifesto see Appendix on pp. 310-11.
187 Manley's note above, n. 135.
188 Chelmsford had asked Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, to get Sir Ibrahim to use his influence with Chotani and persuade him to adopt a moderate course. See Chelmsford to Lloyd, Feb. 9, 1920, CP. Also see Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 265, Feb. 14, 1920, CP.
189 See Manley's note above, n. 135.
190 Ibid. Also see Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. No. 605, April 27, 1920, CP.
Constantinople and the 'redemption' of the 'Church' of St. Sophia to Christianity.\textsuperscript{191} The British public opinion, nurtured for almost a century in hatred and contempt for Turkey, had always been anti-Turk.\textsuperscript{192} But the immediate cause of the furore was the decision of the Supreme Council at its London meeting on February 14, 1920, in the teeth of opposition from Lloyd George, to allow the Sultan provisionally to retain his capital.\textsuperscript{193} Annoyed and agitated by the decision, the Turkophobes arranged several protest meetings under Lord Robert Cecil (1864-1958) and Lord Bryce (1838-1922), the two most vehement critics of Turkey.\textsuperscript{194} On February 26, 1920, a debate was forced in the House of Commons where Sir Donald Maclean (1864-1932), Robert Cecil, T.P. O'Conner (1848-1929), S.F. Omsby-Gore (1863-1950) and Sir Charles Oman (1860-1946), relentlessly attacked the Allied decision and vigorously advocated the expulsion of the Turk from Europe.\textsuperscript{195}

The campaign also received sustenance from a number of prominent orientalists and intellectuals, including Professor D.S. Margoliouth (1858-1940), at one time the tutor of Mohamed Ali at Oxford, and historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-).\textsuperscript{196} The British press,

\textsuperscript{191} The Times, Feb. 17, 1920.
\textsuperscript{192} K.K. Azis classifies the anti-Turk opinion in Britain into eight well-defined groups. See his Britain and Muslim India, London, 1963, pp. 109-11.
\textsuperscript{194} For the views of Lord Robert Cecil see PP, 1920, Hansard, 123 H.C. Deb. 58, col. 730. For Lord Bryce see his article 'The Settlement of the Near East', CR, Jan. 1920, p. 1.
led by The Times, lent its active support. To reinforce their demands the Turkophobes magnified the alleged Armenian massacres during the War and later in Cilicia by the Nationalists Turks. An exceedingly vigorous propaganda was conducted on behalf of the Armenians through such media as the cinema, the theatre and the press. A powerful support came from the Church dignitaries headed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and the Bishops of London and Manchester who felt robbed of their plan of making Constantinople the seat of the united Anglican and the Greek Orthodox churches. Thus they deliberately gave the agitation the semblance of a struggle between the Cross and the Crescent.

Powerful sections of the business community joined the campaign because of their vested interests. Kidwai and other Indian Muslims in Britain, with the help of their Turkophile British friends, tried as usual to stem the tide, but a mere mention of the word Armenia in a British gathering was enough to defeat the Turkish case.

G.A. Nallino's pamphlet (Notes on the Nature of the Caliphate, issued by the Italian Foreign Ministry in 1919), disputing the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat was in wide circulation in Britain. Copy of the pamphlet in PSSF, P. 3344/20 with 3344/20.

197 See, e.g., The Times, Jan. 7 and Feb. 21, 1920.


200 Vályi, op. cit., p. 39.

201 The main propaganda work was again done by the Islamic Society and the London Muslim League through Kidwai's Islamic Information Bureau and its journal, the Muslim Outlook. They were ably assisted by the British Muslims like Marmaduke Pickthall, Umar Flight and Khalid Shadrake and the British Turkophiles such as Col. Wedgwood, Brig.-Gen. Sarreens, Lt.-Col. Aubury Horbert, Lt. Comm. Kenworthy and Sir J. D. Rees. Among other well-known sympathisers were Earl Winterton, Earl Abingdon, Lord Ampthill, Lord Carmichael, Sir Theodore Morison, Sir George Rose-Keppel and Prof. Browne, who had been connected with India in one way or the other. The Anglo-Ottoman Society of Lord Mowbray and Strouton also gave its full support. See PSSF, 380/19, I, III & IV; Bamford, op. cit., pp. 142 & 145; The Times, May 26 & Sept. 10, 1919, and Feb. 2, 1920; Barid-i-Farang, CR, July 1919, p. 116; and PP, 1919-20, Hansard.

202 Hamid, op. cit., p. 137.
These fanatical outbursts of the clergy and the statesmen in Britain, produced a counter fanatical furore in India. To make matters worse Lloyd George, while defending the Allied decision on Constantinople, had admitted in the House of Commons that his pledge of January 5, 1918, was after all a solemn pledge, a 'specific, unqualified, and deliberate' declaration, made with the consent of all parties in order to reassure the British people and the Indian Muslims. This led the Khilafatists to argue that if he was committed to Constantinople he was equally pledged to Thrace and 'the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor'. A Khilafat Conference was held from February 28 to 29, 1920, at Calcutta which, because of the recent release of Abul Kalam Azad, had become the political storm-centre.

At Calcutta the Khilafatists went wild. The proceedings of the Provincial Khilafat Conference were more militant and anti-British than any yet known. The resolutions were supported 'with speeches of great violence offering sacrifices of life and property in the cause of Islam'. Two of the delegates, Fazlul Haq and Abul Kasem, placed letters of resignation from their seats in the Provincial Legislative Councils, with the President of the meeting, for use when needed. Azad, the President, stretched Syud Hossain's definition of non-co-operation as the Islamic tark-i-mawalat and recommended it to the Muslims as the only remedy left open to them.

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204 PP, 1920, Hansard, 125 H.C. Deb. 55, cols. 660-62. In private talk he had always contended that it was not a pledge. See Montagu to Lloyd, April 14, 1920, MP.

205 Reference his pledge of Jan. 5, 1918. See The Times, Jan. 7, 1918.

206 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 219, March 7, 1920, CP.

207 Azad maintained that the shariat was positive that any mawalat (co-operation) with the non-Muslim 'enemies of Islam' (he was careful to exclude Hindus from this category) was a sin. Muslims must not accept honours or hold service under the Government. Those, who, in spite of this injunction, co-operated with the Government were great sinners. See his Masala-i-Khilafat wa Jazira-i-Arab, Calcutta, 1920, pp. 141-45.
The main resolution of the Conference, moved by Abdul Bari, went even further and threatened to 'cease all relations of loyalty' with Britain and to assist the Caliph 'by all possible means' if his dominions were not kept intact as they were before the War. The Conference decided that a general hartal should be observed throughout the country on March 19, 1920, in order to disprove the assertion of Lord Bryce that the Indian Muslims were not concerned at the expulsion of the Turk from Constantinople.  

The indignation at the 'machinations' of the 'new crusaders' and the attempts of the British statesmen 'to misrepresent and misinterpret the Moslem feelings' was so intense that it not only disturbed the moderates like Bhurgri, but also alarmed certain members of the British community in India. Crum and Paton, the representatives of the Bengal and Bombay Chambers of Commerce respectively in the Imperial Legislative Council, impressed upon the Viceroy the necessity of continued pressure on the British Government to 'avoid interference with Moslem religious beliefs and scruples'. Similarly, Colonel Gidey, on behalf of the Anglo-Indian and the domiciled European community in India, requested the Viceroy to inform the Prime Minister and the British Parliament of their strong feelings in favour of the retention of Constantinople by the Sultan of Turkey and his recognition as the 'head of the Moslem religion'.

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208 Englishman, March 1, 1920. Also see Azad to Lloyd George and Montagu, Tel. March 1, 1920, PSSF, P. 1894/20 with 380/19, IV.  
209 President, Anjuman-i-Attibba, Bombay, to Montagu, Tel. March 2, 1920, PSSF, P. 1785/20 with 380/19, IV.  
210 Chotani to Lloyd George, Tel. March 6, 1920, PSSF, P. 2246/20 with 380/19, IV.  
211 See Bhurgri's telegram to Lloyd George and Montagu in Englishman, March 1, 1920.  
212 PSSF, P. 2960/20 with 380/19, IV.  
213 V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 216, March 6, 1920, CP. Crum tried to approach the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to persuade them to give up the agitation. See his message to one Ellison of London in V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 228, March 10, 1920, CP.  
214 ICHPP, Poll.- March 1920 - 28 - Part B.
The Government of India was perturbed at this state of affairs. On March 7, 1920, the Viceroy reported to the Secretary of State:

... the open expression of disloyalty although conditional is danger signal and may at any rate lead to local disorder. Bengal and other Local Governments have been consulted by us as to the measures to be adopted to deal with the situation and to check further extension of campaign of violence recognising on the one hand the danger that fanaticism of masses may be excited to disorder point by unchecked agitation, and on the other hand the danger that action against individuals may precipitate trouble.

But, fortunately for the Government of India, as the volume of excitement increased the moderates began to withdraw their support from the increasing militancy of the Khilafat movement. They looked upon the Calcutta resolutions with deep alarm and detected in them a preparation for violence. Even Gandhi was unnerved and declared that he would co-operate with the Muslims only if they acted with 'sufficient restraint' and did not resort to violence. He frankly told the Muslims that he would cease to co-operate and would advise every Hindu to do the same 'the moment there was violence actually done, advised or countenanced', though he admitted that 'my argument today against violence is based upon pure expedience, i.e. its utter futility'.

The Khilafatists realised that the moment was not yet ripe for a display of violence. Fear of losing moderate support and Hindu co-operation and Gandhi's restraining influence made them to change their tactics. On March 9, 1920, the CKC issued a manifesto

215 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 219, March 7, 1920, CP.
216 Reference in Gandhi's manifesto of March 7, 1920, CW, XVII, pp. 73-6. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 260, March 25, 1920, CP.
217 Ibid. Also see his telegram to the Bengal Khilafat Committee, March 7, 1920, ibid., p. 77.
218 See Gandhi's Tel. to Shaukat Ali, March 6, 1920, asking him to use moderation, ibid., p. 70.
urging the people to observe the hartals peacefully.\footnote{219} Shaukat Ali, however, warned that it was their last appeal to the British Government and in case no positive response was forthcoming, they would be forced to implement the Calcutta resolutions.\footnote{220} Thus, when on March 19, 1920, the Second Khilafat Day was observed, in spite of the news of the Allied occupation of Constantinople on March 16, there was no violence or intimidation. The demonstrations were peaceful and the fairly successful hartals were voluntary. At some places, particularly in Patna and Bombay where the Local Governments had been able to split the Muslims into two camps, the Calcutta resolutions were not accepted. Hindu participation on the whole was sparing and half-hearted. In particular, few attended public meetings, as at Lahore, Cawnpore and Assam, because the Muslims would not drop the Calcutta resolutions. Even at a place like Bombay, the Hindu element constituted only four per cent. of the total number reported to have been present at the mass meeting. However, the 'extremist' Hindu leaders, except for Tilak and his party, whole-heartedly co-operated with the Muslims.\footnote{221} But, these demonstrations and protests had little effect as the British policy towards Turkey had remained unchanged.

Meanwhile, the Khilafat delegation led by Mohamed Ali and consisting of Syud Hossain, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi (1884-1955) and Hassan Muhammad Hayat (joined later by Abul Kasem and Kidwai)\footnote{222} had arrived in London on

\footnote{219} \textit{Times of India}, March 10, 1920. \\
\footnote{220} \textit{Ibid.}, March 18, 1920. \\
\footnote{222} Abul Kasem left India on April 4 and Kidwai on June 20, 1920. \textit{ICHPP}, Sept. 1920, Pro. No. 100; and Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 22.
February 26, 1920, amidst great anti-Turk commotion. They managed to have two interviews: one on March 2 with H.A.L. Fisher (1865-1940), Secretary for Education, who received them on behalf of the indisposed Montagu, and the other on March 19 with Lloyd George. In answer to the Khilafatists' 'irreducible minimum' demand for the restoration of the Caliph's territorial status quo ante bellum and his control over the Jazirat-ul-Arab with wardenship of the Holy Places, Fisher was non-committal and Lloyd George obdurate. With his anti-Turk bias, the Premier told the delegation that in dealing with Austria-Hungary they had applied the principle of self-determination and the same must apply to the Ottoman Empire. Turkey was not being treated severely because she was Muslim and Indian Muslims must get this well into their minds. The Turk had been an intolerant and inept ruler and the interests of civilisation demanded the imposition of some control over him. Therefore, Asia Minor must be supervised by the Allies. Arabia should belong to Arabs who had no wish to be ruled by the Sultan of Turkey. Thrace should go to Greece as reliable census had shown the Muslim population 'in a considerable minority'. The same applied to Smyrna where 'a most careful investigation by a very impartial Committee' had revealed a preponderance of non-Turk population and that

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Sulaiman Nadvi to Abdul Bari, March 4, 1920, Barid-i-Farang, p.14. At that time there were no less than six different delegations in Britain representing the Near and the Middle Eastern countries, besides the Greek delegation whose propaganda the Indian delegation had to counter. Hisabat-i-Wafd-i-Khilafat-i-Europe, published by Ahmed Hajee Siddick Khatri, Hon. Secy., CKC, Bombay, 1923, pp. 7-8. Also see Rais Ahmad Jafari, Sirat-i-Mohamed Ali, I and II, 2nd. ed., Lahore, 1950, p. 333.

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For the minutes of the interviews see PSM, B. 370 and B. 371.

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Thomas Jones suggests (Lloyd George, London, 1951, p. 197) that Lloyd George's anti-Turk attitude was the result of his Gladstonian Liberalism, his romantic admiration for ancient Greece and his personal liking for Venizilos, the then Greek Premier. But perhaps, the imperial consideration of a policy of expansion played as much part in the formation of his anti-Turk views.
the Greek Muslims preferred Greek rule to that of the Turks. 226

Lloyd George remained unmoved by the delegation's arguments and refused to concede a single demand. 227 All through the interview he was impatient and avoided being drawn into discussion. 228 He touched and emphasized only those aspects which suited him and refused any discussion on the Palestine question and the massacres of the Turks in Smyrna. He made no reference to his own pledge of January 5, 1918. His arguments were one-sided and he drew wrong analogies. 229 His statistics on Thrace and Smyrna were defective 230 and overwhelmingly Muslim majority areas were handed over to Greece which had not been even at war with Turkey - a decision which was thoroughly detested by Montagu, 231 strongly opposed by the British High Commissioner in Constantinople 232 and disapproved by the General Staff. 233 The settlement of Asia Minor was based on an incident (Armenian massacres) the fundamental responsibility for which had not been established. 234

228 Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, May 6, 1920, enclosure, Chelmsford to Montagu, June 3, 1920, MP.
229 E.g., his analogy of the loss of the temporal power by the Pope to that of the Caliph.
230 See Tilley's minute of April 10, 1920, PRO, F.O., 371/5141. Also see Admiral Sir F. de Robeck to Curzon, March 9, 1920, PRO, F.O., 371/5106.
231 See Montagu's minute of Nov. 11, 1920, in PSSF, P. 8039/20 with 4995/19, II.
232 de Robeck to Curzon, March 9, 1920, above, n. 230.
233 See the General Staff memo. on situation in Turkey, March 15, 1920, PRO, F.O., 371/5044. Also see the General Staff memo. on the Turkish Peace Treaty, April 1, 1920, PRO, F.O., 371/5046.
234 See de Robeck to Curzon, March 9, 1920, above, n. 230.
there seems to be no basis either to his claim that not merely had the Indian Muslims been heard but the settlement was very largely affected by their opinion. The Indian delegation at the Peace Conference to which he referred, was never seriously treated and as for the Constantinople decision, the credit goes to M. Millerand (1859-1943) (the French Premier) and Signor Nitti (1868-1953) (the Italian Premier).

But, then Lloyd George's attitude precisely reflected the feelings of some prominent British statesmen and the vocal British public which had no soft corner for the Indian demands. The Khilafat movement was dismissed as nothing but a well-organised, lavishly financed, artificial agitation with no sound religious basis and unrepresentative of the world Muslim feeling, engineered from England by Kidwai and his Muslim associates, and rendered formidable by the 'shocking weakness' of the Government of India. Therefore, no weight should be given to Indian Muslim feeling when dealing with Turkey.

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235 See Montagu to Curzon, Aug. 28, 1919, PSSF, P. 4995/19, with 4995/19, III.


238 See T.W. Arnold's minute of March 17, 1920, in PSSF, P. 2012/20 with 380/19, IV.


241 See Curzon's minute in PRO, F.O. 371/5141. Hardinge thought that the Govt. of India was paying too much attention to the Muslim feelings. See his undated minute (presumably May 19, 1920) in PRO, F.O., 371/5142.

242 See Hardinge's note in PSSF, 380/19, XI.
No wonder Lloyd George's firmness won him the gratitude of many in Britain,\textsuperscript{243} though it most certainly disappointed the Indian Muslims and their sympathisers.\textsuperscript{244}

The refusal of the British Government to accept any of the Khilafatists' demands called for action. The militants, particularly Abul Kalam Azad, who ridiculed the 'methods of begging', pressed for 'some means of exerting direct pressure'.\textsuperscript{245} Naturally, therefore, when on March 22, 1920, the Khilafatists met at Ajmal Khan's house in Delhi to consider how best the Calcutta resolutions of the previous month could be followed up, the question of non-co-operation received the first priority.\textsuperscript{246} Gandhi, who had been trying to take the sting out of the Calcutta programme by disputing such items as the boycott of British goods and advice to the soldiers to refuse to serve,\textsuperscript{247} made yet another attempt. As an alternative to violence or jihad, he again insisted that non-co-operation should be absolutely non-violent.\textsuperscript{248}

The majority of the Muslim leaders was loath to accepting non-violence as a principle. Particular objection to it came from Abdul Bari who preferred jihad.

\textsuperscript{243} See The Times, March 22, 1920. Orientalist Margoliouth also praised the firmness of the Premier. See his 'The Caliphate', NE, XIV, No. 182, pp. 294-300.

\textsuperscript{244} Major-General Lord Gleichen (1863-1937), for instance, wrote a very bitter letter to Lloyd George accusing him of vengeance against Turkey in marked contrast to the treatment of Austria and Germany. Letter dated March 22, 1920, PRO, F.O., 371/5141. For the comments of the Indian papers see PSSF, P. 3885/20 with 380/19, V. Also see T.L. Vaswani, The Spirit and Struggle of Islam, Madras, 1921, pp. 52-61.

\textsuperscript{245} Azad had been pressing since Jan. 1920. Quoted in Tendulkar, \textit{op. cit.}, I. p. 344.

\textsuperscript{246} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 260, March 25, 1920, CP. Prominent among those who attended were: Dr. Ansari, Abdul Bari, Ajmal Khan, Azad, Kidwai, Shaukat Ali and the Nawab of Dacca. Among the Hindus were Gandhi, Lajpat Rai, Patel, Malaviya, Khaparde and Tilak.

\textsuperscript{247} \textit{CW}, XVII, pp. 73-76.

or hijrat because other methods would take years to yield any result. In the end, however, the line suggested by Gandhi was generally accepted. At this stage the organisers were vague as to what form the scheme would take but eventually the four-phased non-co-operation contemplated, in its first stage, the renouncing of Government titles and the relinquishment of honorary posts. In the event of a negative response from the Government, they were to proceed with the second stage of persuading Government servants to tender their resignations. In the third stage those in the armed services were to be asked to resign and finally payment of Government dues and taxes was to be withheld. The organisers also agreed to implement the scheme progressively in slow stages. In fact the last two stages were remote and distant steps.

The Khilafatists had agreed to modify the original scheme of non-co-operation mainly because of their desire to conciliate Gandhi and not for any intrinsic liking for a non-violent programme. Therefore, when Gandhi learnt of this from Hasrat Mohani, he remonstrated to Ajmal Khan that if the Muslim leaders were not enthusiastic about the scheme 'at least they should get rid of a man like myself'. The Khilafatists could ill-afford to lose Gandhi. Dr. Ansari and Ajmal Khan hastened to reassure Gandhi that 'violence (even if it could be practiced) ought to be scrupulously avoided'. They further informed him that most of the Khilafatists would be with him though they were not sure about people with vested interests. In order to give a

249 Ibid. Azad in his autobiography India Wins Freedom (Bombay, 1959, p. 9) mistakenly attributes the proceedings of March meeting to Jan. 1920. It was after the March meeting that the leaders proceeded to the Meerut Khilafat Conference.

250 CW, XVII, pp. 380-90. Also see V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 260 and 271, March 25 and April 2, 1920, CP.

251 Gandhi to Razmia (Ajmal Khan's Secy.), March 27, 1920, CW, XVII, pp. 293-94.

252 Letter dated April 1, 1920, quoted by Gopal Krishna, op. cit., p. 47.
practical demonstration of Muslim sincerity, Ajmal Khan proceeded with his personal non-co-operation. Early in April 1920, he renounced the title of Haziq-ul-Mulk, conferred upon him by the Government, and returned his Kaiser-i-Hind and Coronation Durbar medals.253

But not all the Khilafatists reciprocated these feelings. Apart from the Abdul Bari group, which was still reluctant to accept a non-violent programme, there was a considerable body of opinion within the Khilafat organisation which opposed non-co-operation for completely different reasons. They, like Gandhi, viewed some of the items - tampering with the army, the Government services, and the refusal to pay taxes - as extreme measures. The chief dissentients were Mirza Ali Mohammed Khan and Badruddin Abdulla Koor, both Honorary Secretaries of the CKC. Other detractors were Suleman Cassim Mitha, Suleman Abdul Wahib, (Sir) Rahimtoola Chinoy (b.1882), Sheriff Dewjee Canjee and G.M. Bhurgri.254 Chotani himself was hesitant to support the programme. He had privately promised George Lloyd that he would 'do his best to get the clauses refering to the tampering with troops or Government servants eliminated from the non-co-operation programme.'255 Chotani kept his word and when the CKC met at Bombay on April 11-14, 1920, he tried his utmost to that end.256 But, Chotani was overruled and the CKC decided in principle to introduce non-co-operation after the publication of the peace terms.257

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253 For the text of his letter to the D.C., Delhi, see Ghaffar, Hayat-i-Ajmal, facing p. 221.
254 ICHPP, Sept. 1920, Pro. No. 100, Appendix II.
255 Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 605, April 27, 1920, CP.
256 Intercepted letters between Chotani and Kidwai bear testimony to this. See Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 688, May 13, 1920, CP.
257 ICHPP, Sept. 1920, Pro. No. 100, Appendix II. J.M. Brown (op. cit., pp. 207-8) thinks that this meeting took place in March 1920. F.O.R. Robinson (op. cit., pp. 374-75); while citing Brown, seems to have made the same mistake. In fact no such meeting of the CKC was convened in March of that year. It was held a month later in April 1920.
As one final effort to move the British Government, Shaukat Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and others put pressure upon Gandhi to proceed to London and plead the Khilafat case before the British ministers and public. But Gandhi was reluctant and looked for an excuse. His hesitant attitude created misgivings among the Khilafatists, particularly Azad, as to his motives. It was whispered that he never really intended to go. However, since the opinion in the CKC was divided and neither the Viceroy nor the Secretary of State were favourable to the idea, the matter was dropped.

Nevertheless, Mohamed Ali's delegation, which had stayed on in Britain despite the disheartening conditions and suggestions for its recall made two attempts to secure a hearing before the Peace Conference. But it met with no success. Its two interviews with Montagu also yielded nothing beyond an assurance of his continued personal support. Montagu complained of the delegation's uncompromising attitude and the extreme nature of demands 'obviously put

258 Gandhi to Montagu, Tel. April 22, 1920, PSSF, P. 3255/20 with 380/19, V.
259 Gandhi to Chotani, Tel. April 18, 1920, CW, XVII, p. 322. Also see pp. 345-46.
261 CW, XVII, p. 346. Also see Gandhi to Hignell, June 12, 1920, enclosure, Chelmsford to Montagu, June 23, 1920, MP. The India Office did not want to encourage 'another talker'. See Hose's minute in PSSF, P. 3255/20 with 380/19, V. Also see HFMI, III, Part I, pp. 272-73. But later, Montagu regretted his action. See Montagu to Reading, June 8, 1921, RP.
262 Even Ameer Ali and other Indian Muslims in Britain seemed reluctant to give much further support to the delegation. They were particularly embarrassed by the Prime Minister's argument regarding the Khilafatists' objection to the Arab desire for independence. See James A. Malcolm to Sir John Tilley, March 24, 1920, PRO, F.O., 371/5141; and Ameer Ali to Sir William Duke, March 25, 1920, PSSF, P. 2410/20 with 380/19, IV.
263 A.M.M. Sajjad to Abdul Bari, July 2, 1920, Nuqush, CIX, p. 96.
264 See Mohamed Ali's letter to Nation, May 29, 1920, p. 279; and Indian Annual Register, 1921, Part I, p. 184(b).
forward in the knowledge that they cannot be met. Nor was the delegation able to enlist the support of the British political parties. To combat the press propaganda, the delegation undertook to pay the entire cost of the *Muslim Outlook*, subsidised *India*, and contracted the *Daily Herald* to publish their news in a favourable manner. But in the final analysis the delegation's work in Britain was fruitless.

Disappointed, the delegation first thought of going to America and Japan but later turned to the European Powers, especially France and Italy, which were known to be sympathetic to Turkey. In France they met with some success in influencing public opinion but failed to win over the French Government. Millerand, the French Premier, gave no encouragement. In Italy Premier Giolitti (1842-1928) promised all help to the delegation. He even allowed Mohamed Ali to use the Italian diplomatic bag at Rome to correspond with Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) and the Turkish

265 For this information see Montagu to Chelmsford, April 1 and June 23, 1920, MP; Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, May 6, 1920, above, n. 228; and Sulaiman Nadvi to Abdul Bari, May 6, 1920, *Barid-i-Farang*, pp. 66-67.

266 Their meeting with Asquith (1852-1928), the former Prime Minister and a believer in Gladstonian policy of 'bag and baggage', came to nothing. See *PP*, 1920, *Hansard*, 127, H.C. Deb. 58, cols. 640-41. Their contacts with the Labour Party yielded nothing beyond a brief statement of their case at the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Party at Scarborough. See *Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Labour Party*, Scarborough, 1920, pp. 144-45. Also see *The Times*, June 24, 1920; and Afzal Iqbal, ed., *Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali*, 2nd. ed., Lahore, 1963, p. 49. For interview with Toynbee see 'Q', 'Self-Determination and the Turkish Treaty', *FA*, special supplement, July 1920, p. xxiii; and Toynbee's article 'The Indian Moslem Delegation', *NE*, XV, No. 185, pp. 56-60.

Nationalists. The delegation also met the Pope, flirted with the Arabs, and re-established contacts with Talaat Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress Turks in Territet (Switzerland). But it failed to obtain a lenient peace treaty for Turkey.

The fate of Turkey was sealed at San Remo (April 19-26, 1920) when the Allied Prime Ministers approved the framework of the peace treaty. Montagu and other representatives, who knew of the secret undertakings, were left aghast. They had tried their best to plead clemency for Turkey and just before the Conference Montagu had demanded the right to send a memorandum to the Powers in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for India. But Lloyd George had had enough of his irritating colleague. 'In fact throughout the Peace Conference', he rebuked Montagu, 'your attitude has often struck me as being not so much that of a member of the British Cabinet, but of a successor on the throne of Aurangzeb!' Montagu contemplated resignation but swallowed the bitter pill and chose to stay on in the belief that he might avert trouble in India when the peace terms were finally announced.

Meanwhile, in India, as the expected announcement of the Turkish peace terms drew nearer, Muslim restlessness began to mount rapidly. The Government of India was not oblivious to the possibility of violent outbreaks. But

For the delegation's activities in Britain and on the Continent see the following interesting documents: PSM, B. 361; PSSF, 1229/20, II; PSSF, 4995/19, I; and PSSF 380/19, V; PRO, F.O., 371/141, 5142 and 4558; Barid-i-Farang; Muhammad Ali: His Life Services and Trial, Madras, 1922, pp. 128-50; Hisabat-i-Mafid-i-Khilafat-i-Europe; and Iqbal Shaidai's memoirs in Imroze (Lahore), May 25, 1969.

S/S to V, Tel. P., April 27, 1920, CP.
Montagu to Lloyd George, April 15, 1920, LGP.
Montagu to Chelmsford, May 20, 1920, MP.
it was well prepared to meet the situation and had alerted the military authorities. However, expediency impelled the Government of India to avoid, as far as possible, any interference with the movement. It preferred 'not to make martyrs of fanatical leaders or precipitate trouble by prosecution or executive action'. This moderate course of action was evidently dictated by the belief that the movement would die out, or, if it became aggressive, would be defeated by its own violence. Therefore, proceedings were confined to local agitators. Action against Gandhi was avoided as it was likely to focus public attention and provoke outbursts of violence. Similarly, in the case of Shaukat Ali, no immediate action was proposed, though the legal possibilities of a prosecution were being examined. Montagu fully supported the Government of India's policy for he wished not in the least to interfere with the Viceroy's discretion in the maintenance of law and order. But at the same time he did not hesitate to point out, as a general proposition, the dangers of anyone governing 'a la O'Dwyer'. Chelmsford, whose policy of moderation was always qualified, had been equally emphatic that 'in matters of law and order and of the safety of Englishmen and women there can be only one policy and that is the indisputable supremacy of the British raj'. He was prepared for prompt and drastic action if necessary. The Punjab affair of the last year was for him no hindrance: 'we are confident here that what we did last year was necessary and we are prepared to act

273 See Chelmsford to Montagu, March 17, 1920, CP.
274 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 320, April 25, 1920, CP.
275 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 379, May 7, 1920, CP.
276 See, e.g., Butler to Vincent, April 26, 1920, BP.
277 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 320, April 25, 1920, CP.
278 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 379, May 7, 1920, CP.
279 S/S to V, Tels. P., Nos. 641 and 699, May 3 and 13, 1920, CP.
280 Montagu to Chelmsford, April 1, 1920, CP.
again if any similar occasion arises'.

But the optimistic confidence of the Viceroy was soon disturbed by the announcement, on May 11, 1920, of the peace terms which aimed at destroying any semblance of Turkish independence and stripping her of her empire. According to the proposed treaty, Turkey was to cede Thrace to Greece almost to the Chataldja Lines and Izmir. She was also to cede Tenedos and Imros to Greece. A large area in Asia Minor, comprising Smyrna and certain other portions, was to be formed into a separate autonomous unit under Greek administration but Turkish suzerainty. After five years it was to decide its own future by a plebiscite. Turkey was compelled to recognise the independence of Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and the Hedjaz, and the autonomy of Kurdistan. She was also to recognise the British protectorate over Egypt and Sudan, the British sovereignty over Cyprus and a British mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia. Similarly, Turkey was to recognise the French protectorate over Syria and Tunisia and a French Zone in Morocco, and Italian sovereignty over Libya and the Dodecanese. Turkey was also to renounce her rights secured by the Suez Canal Treaty of 1888 in favour of Britain. The Straits and the Dardanelles were internationalised and a zone of the Straits was created which was to be controlled by a commission appointed by the League of Nations. The Turkish Army was to be reduced to only 50,000 men including 2,500 officers whose tenure of service was also restricted. The Navy was to be abolished with the exception of a few small vessels for police duties. The Turkish Air Force was to be completely disbanded. The proposals also contained stringent financial clauses. Even the power to impose taxes was withdrawn from the Turkish Government and vested instead in a commission composed of Britain, France and Italy. Capitulations were also re-established.

281 Chelmsford to Montagu, April 28, 1920, CP.
283 Ibid.
The peace terms were published in India on May 15 with a message from the Viceroy who, in view of their severity, found it difficult to assuage the feelings of the Indian Muslims. His assurance to them that the settlement had been greatly influenced by their representations, bore little comfort for the heartbroken Muslims. The attitude of the Anglo-Indian press, which lamented that Turkey had been let off lightly, added to their disappointment. The nationalist papers - the Bombay Chronicle, the Independent, the Tribune, the Hindu, the Amrita Bazar Patrika - were bitter at the contemptuous disregard shown to Indian remonstrances. Even the moderate papers like the Leader and the Bengalee recognised the severity of the terms.

Indeed the Muslim disappointment over the 'outrageous' peace terms was profound. From Paris the Khilafat delegation telegraphically entreated the Sultan of Turkey to summarily reject the terms as the whole Muslim world was behind him. Shaukat Ali fumed that the Government of India's communique and the Viceroy's message were 'an insult to our intellect'. He asked the Muslims to brace themselves for a life-long struggle and commence the non-co-operation campaign which 'must be given a full and fair trial'. Gandhi, still worried about the possibility

286 For their comments see the extracts in Bombay Chronicle, May 17, 18 and 22, 1920.
288 See the statements of Abdul Bari and Kidwai in Bombay Chronicle, May 18, 1920.
289 Copy of the telegram in Rear-Adm. Webb (Constantinople) to Curzon, May 14, 1920, PRO, F.O., 371/5142. The India Office looked into the possibility of prosecuting the members of the delegation for having addressed themselves to 'an enemy sovereign'. But the idea was dropped as the Legal Advisor did not think that a case could stand against them. See PSSF, P. 3828/20 with 380/19, V.
290 Bombay Chronicle, May 18, 1920.
of Muslims getting out of control, entreated with them to exercise restraint. But agreed that non-co-operation was 'the only effective remedy both for avoiding violence and for healing the wound inflicted on Mohammedan India'.

In fact the CKC, anticipating harsh peace terms, had already decided on May 12 - three days before the terms were published in India - to start the non-co-operation campaign. The decision, however, had been secured after a good deal of pressure from Kidwai, who threatened to resign from the CKC. The dissenters were further softened by Shaukat Ali and Gandhi who coaxed them into accepting the non-co-operation programme in all its four stages. A committee consisting of Shaukat Ali, Chotani, Gandhi, Abul Kalam Azad and Khatri, was formed to draw the details of the scheme.

On May 28, 1920, the CKC issued a manifesto announcing its policy. It declared that there was 'no question of compromise in this matter [i.e., the Khilafat] of life and death with millions of Musalmans'. The remedy was simple. The Muslims and Hindus must 'withdraw co-operation from the Government and continue to do so till justice is done'. Should non-co-operation fail, Muslims reserved to themselves 'the right to take such other and further steps as may be enjoined upon them by their religion'. But the policy outlined in the manifesto was much restricted

291 Ibid.
292 See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, May 18, 1920, Ali Bradran, p. 515. Also see Shaukat Ali to Abdul Ghafoor of Peshawar, May 13, 1920, which was intercepted by the authorities. C/C, N.W.F.P., to P/S to V, Tel. No. 467, May 14, 1920, CP.
294 Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 688, May 13, 1920, CP. Also see Lloyd to Montagu, May 21, 1920, MP.
295 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 413, May 19, 1920, CP.
296 ICHPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 19.
in its scope and constituted a virtual reversal of the decision arrived at earlier on May 12, which had proposed a much harder line. Only a few items - surrender of honorary offices and titles, stoppage of all voluntary financial support and surrender of civil employments under the Government - were selected for implementation.\(^{297}\) The moderation was obviously an attempt to accommodate the waverers. But the adoption of even this moderate programme brought the rift into the open. Those members of the CKC who passionately believed that the programme was unconstitutional and positively dangerous to the best interest of the Muslims, or that Gandhi had given a wrong lead to them, realised that they could no longer stay on the Committee. The first to resign was B.A. Koor.\(^{298}\) He was followed by Mirza A.M. Khan, G.M. Bhurgri and Syed Rifai.\(^{299}\) The moderate Khilafatists were not the only sceptics of non-co-operation. Even the militants among them, Azad and Abdul Bari, were reported to be dissatisfied with a mere passive step and were doubtful of its success.\(^{300}\) Azad in particular favoured Muslims reorganising themselves by electing an Imam (to which office he himself aspired) and obey his orders implicitly regardless of consequences.\(^{301}\)

Gandhi and Shaukat Ali had to work hard to keep unity among the leaders. At one stage Shaukat Ali was so disgusted with Chotani and his Bombay group for their attitude towards non-co-operation that he tried to move

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\(^{297}\) Ibid.
\(^{298}\) Ibid. Also see Amrita Bazar Patrika, May 24, 1920.
\(^{299}\) Ibid.
\(^{300}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 461, June 4, 1920, CP.
\(^{301}\) Ibid. Also see Ronaldshay to Montagu, June 23, 1920, ZP; Qazi Abdul Ghaifar, Aasar-i-Abul Kalam Azad, Bombay, 1949, pp. 67-8. Azad had also persuaded Abdul Bari to support his candidature but the plan never materialised. For details see M.U. Haq, Muslim Politics in Modern India, Meerut, 1970, pp. 88-104.
the headquarters of the CKC from Bombay to Lucknow. Chotani himself wished the transfer to take place for in that case he could discreetly dissociate himself from the CKC. But in the end, through the efforts of Gandhi and Shaukat Ali, the differences were patched up. Chotani agreed to support the campaign and resigned his honorary magistracy. Azad's doubts about the non-co-operation scheme also vanished and Abdul Bari was prevailed upon by Shaukat Ali to give an honest trial to 'Gandhi's prescription' for at least four or five months and in the event of its failure 'we shall do what God will command'. Clearly it had been a victory for Gandhi and Shaukat Ali.

The leaders, however, were cautious. They strongly deprecated any action which might precipitate a collision with the Government and thus afford it an opportunity to smash the movement prematurely. An appeal was issued by Gandhi that none should act without instructions from the CKC. Those who appeared over-enthusiastic, were quickly reprimanded by Shaukat Ali. The Khilafatists seemed to be of the opinion that before embarking on non-co-operation they should try to extract last minute concessions from the Government. Because of this the implementation of the non-co-operation programme was delayed.

Another hurdle in this connection was the hesitancy of the Congress leaders. Most of the Hindu leaders had

303 Ibid.
306 CW, XVII, p. 446.
307 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 425, May 20, 1920, CP.
308 This opinion was held by Kidwai, Gandhi and Mazhar-ul-Haque. Ibid. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 442, May 28, 1920, CP; and CW, XVII, p. 446.
no faith in the non-co-operation scheme either because it was the programme of the Khilafat Committee or because of its anarchistic nature. Apart from the moderates, the sceptics included such men as Tilak, Khaparde (1854-1938), Motilal, C.R. Das, Lajpat Rai, B.C. Pal, I.K. Yajnik and the Patel brothers - Vithalbhai (1873-1933) and Vallabhbhai. In order to resolve the differences, the Khilafatists, in consultation with Gandhi, decided to invite Hindu-Muslim leaders, regardless of opinion already expressed on the policy of non-co-operation, to discuss the issue at a special meeting of the CKC at Allahabad in the first week of June 1920. In the meantime, the AICC, which was meeting at Benares on May 30 and 31, was given an opportunity to examine the question. But in view of the extreme divergence of opinion among the Congress leaders the Benares meeting ended in a stalemate. The consideration of non-co-operation, or any other suitable course of action, was postponed for a special session of the Congress at Calcutta to be held in the beginning of September 1920.

As arranged, the meeting of the CKC took place at Allahabad on June 1 and 2, despite the absence of most of the moderates and some 'extremists' like C.R. Das, Tilak and Joseph Baptista (1864-1930), who had declined


312 Madras Mail, June 2, 1920.
the invitation\textsuperscript{313} After the preliminary session on June 1 under Chotani's presidency, where considerable resentment was expressed against the Congress attitude on non-co-operation, a joint Hindu-Muslim meeting was convened.\textsuperscript{314} Nearly 300 delegates attended. Azad Subhani and Muhammad Ali of Kasur made a fervent appeal to the Hindus to support the non-co-operation programme in order to bear political pressure on the Government. But most of the Congress leaders were strongly against non-co-operation or were hesitant to accept it. Mrs. Besant (1847-1933) and Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875-1949) opposed the scheme vehemently. Chintamani (1880-1941) declared that the plan was unrealistic, and Malaviya and Motilal expressed their doubts about its practicability. Only B.C. Pal and Satyamurti (1887-1947) seemed to support the Muslims in their ordeal.\textsuperscript{315}

Further differences developed on the second day of the joint meeting when Hasrat Mohani, the most militant of the Khilafatists, suggested joining any Afghan army that might invade India to drive out the British. Such suggestions, in the context of the hijrat campaign then in progress, were bound to cause apprehension among the Hindus. Malaviya at once raised strong objections and Lajpat Rai warned the Muslim leaders that at the first sign of any Afghan involvement 'Hindus would not only cease to help, but would actively oppose them'. Shaukat Ali, Azad Subhani and Zafar Ali Khan assured the Hindu leaders that they would fight to a man any invader who wanted to conquer India, but the plea made little impact for they also appeared sympathetic to the idea of any invasion which was undertaken to uphold the prestige of Islam. Kidwai also indulged in some sophistry but

\textsuperscript{313} The account of the Allahabad meeting is based on: Hindu, June 10, 1920; ICHPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 19; HFMI, III, Part I, pp. 282-86; V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 477 and 497, June 9 and 19, 1920, CP; and Young India, 1919-1922, p. 194. For Tilak's non-participation see D. Keer, Lokamanya Tilak, Bombay, 1969, p. 435.

\textsuperscript{314} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid.
could not pacify the Hindus. Even Gandhi's reiteration of support to Muslims provided they did not resort to violence, failed to save the situation. The meeting ended in a fiasco without agreement on the non-co-operation issue.

Thus, when on June 2 the CKC held its second session at Zahur Ahmad's house, the disappointed Khilafatists decided to go ahead with non-co-operation without Congress sustenance. All that they had secured was a reaffirmation of Gandhi's personal support in the 'war between false Christianity and Islam'. On his advice they agreed to approach the Viceroy first and to give him one month's notice to see if the peace terms were revised. In the meantime an internal committee, consisting of Gandhi, Shaukat Ali, Abul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Ali of Kasur, Khatri, Kitchlew and Hasrat Mohani (Chotani refused nomination), was appointed to work out the details.

The interesting feature of the Allahabad meeting was that it revealed the extent of Hindu apathy towards the Khilafat movement and its programme. Fear of an Afghan invasion, real or imaginary, was trumped up to cloak the real issues. Yet in public, both Shaukat Ali and Gandhi played down the differences. Shaukat Ali also preferred not to give much publicity to Gandhi's proposal to transpose the third and the fourth stages of the non-co-operation programme already accepted. As regards Gandhi's claim to 'dictatorship' and Muslim acquiescence therein, the whole show was a deliberate stage act by the Khilafatists. Evidently, they were exploiting Gandhi's weakness for power and leadership and pretended to play his game. Otherwise, Gandhi's position in the Khilafat movement was, and remained, that of primus inter pares. For his leadership Gandhi was dependent on the Khilafatists.

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316 Ibid.
317 Ibid.
and without them he had no status, at least among the Muslims. He could maintain his shaky hold only by his continued support to the Khilafat cause and by guaranteeing Hindu co-operation.

Shortly after the Allahabad meeting, the members of the Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC, with the exception of Azad who had been taken ill, assembled at Bombay and decided to push the non-co-operation scheme. A letter to the Viceroy was drafted and circulated for the leaders' signatures. Eighty-two leading Sunni Muslims from every province of India signed the letter. Important abstentions were Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Ansari. Azad refused to sign because in his opinion the letter did not correctly indicate Muslim demands. Ansari was angry that the powers delegated to the Non-Co-Operation Committee at Allahabad had been disregarded and objected to inviting signatures from outside the Committee. Nevertheless, on June 22, the memorial, couched in a moderate but firm tone, was sent to the Viceroy with a covering letter from Gandhi.

The signatories, claiming to represent the largest body of Sunni Muslim opinion, informed the Viceroy that the Turkish peace terms were 'in direct violations of the religious sentiments of Mussalmans' and contrary to the pledges of the British ministers. In certain respects, they contended, 'Turkey had been treated worse than other powers' and the Indian Muslims could not 'bear the thought of the temporal power of the Sultan being adversely affected'. Therefore, they requested the Viceroy to ask the British Government to secure a revision of the peace terms and to warn them that on their failure to do so, he (Viceroy) would make common cause with the Indian people. 'If unfortunately', the signatories declared, 'Your Excellency will not adopt

319 Ibid., p. 284
320 ICHPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 22.
321 Enclosure, Gandhi to Hignell, June 22, 1920, CP.
our humble suggestion, we shall be obliged, as from the 1st August next, to withdraw co-operation from the Government and to ask our co-religionists and Hindu brethren to do likewise'. They expressed the hope that such a serious step as non-co-operation would not be necessary and assured the Viceroy that 'we shall strive our utmost to avoid violence'. They would take up non-co-operation in progressive stages 'so as to cause the least necessary dislocation or embarrassment to the Government and so as to enable us to control and discipline popular feeling'.

The memorial was followed the same day by a separate letter from Gandhi to the Viceroy in which he explained his reasons for associating himself with the Khilafat movement. He claimed that, by patient reasoning, he had been successful in weaning away the Muslims from the hijrat and violence, but confessed that he did so not on moral but on purely utilitarian grounds. He declared that non-co-operation was 'the only dignified and constitutional form of such direct action' open to the Muslims. The escape from non-co-operation was possible if the Viceroy himself led the Khilafat movement. He admitted the risks attending the practice of the campaign by the masses, but maintained that the fear of 'risks now will be to court much greater risks, if not virtual destruction of law and order'.

The non-co-operation campaign was to be inaugurated formally on August 1. The items for the first stage finally agreed upon were announced on or about June 25. These were: the surrender of all titles of honour and honorary offices; opposition to Government loans; suspension by lawyers of practice and settlement of civil disputes by private arbitration; boycott of schools by parents; boycott of the reformed Councils; non-co-operation in Government social parties and similar other functions; refusal to accept any civil or military post in Mesopotamia or to offer for service in the Turkish territories under

322 Ibid.
323 Gandhi to Chelmsford, June 22, 1920, CP.
Allied control; and swadeshi. The last two, i.e., refusal of civil and military service and swadeshi, as well as the refusal to take Government loans, could be started immediately. But for the rest the commencement date was August 1.$^{224}$

The boycott of the reformed Councils and that of the educational institutions and the law courts were innovations in the non-co-operation programme and had been incorporated after a careful re-appraisal of the situation. In the matter of the Council boycott, the CKC was in fact preceding Lajpat Rai's declaration to the same effect$^{325}$ by almost a week. The only difference was that while the CKC proposed the boycott on the Khilafat issue, Lajpat Rai advocated it on the basis of the Punjab 'wrong'. But then the Khilafatists, especially Mohamed Ali and his delegation in Britain, were already exploiting the Punjab issue.$^{326}$ After the publication of the Hunter Report in May 1920, the Government's exoneration of O'Dwyer and other Punjab officials and the inadequate punishment meted out to Dyer and his glorification in European circles in India and in Britain, had considerably affected the attitude of the Indians.$^{327}$ Even the moderates were not wanting in their condemnation of the Government.$^{328}$ The Punjab had provided Jinnah and some Bombay Liberals with a peg on which to hang the Khilafat grievances.$^{329}$ Gandhi,

324 ICHPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 25.
325 Lajpat Rai, India's Will to Freedom, Madras, 1921, pp. 103-6.
326 The Case for Turkey and the Khilafat, Indian Khilafat Delegation Publication No. 4, London, 1920; Justice to Islam and Turkey, Indian Khilafat Delegation Publication No. 6, London, 1920; and Montagu to Chelmsford, June 16, 1920, MP.
327 See Furneaux, op. cit., pp. 142-3 and 156-60; PE, 1920, Hansard, 131 H.C. Deb. 5 S, cols. 1705-1814; and H.L., XLI pp. 222-278.
328 See the resolutions of the National Liberal Federation at Calcutta, June 12, 1920. Madras Mail, June 15, 1920.
ever ready to seize on others' ideas, quickly changed his previous stance and tackled the Punjab issue with the Khilafat as a bait to attract the Hindus to the non-co-operation campaign.330

Meanwhile, on June 25, the CKC had despatched a secret letter to various provincial committees throughout the country urging each of them to send to Bombay a special representative and a complete provincial census of persons prepared to act up to the non-co-operation manifesto.331 The provincial committees were not very optimistic about the campaign. Hindus as a community were standing aloof. Its reception among the various classes of the Muslim community was also uncertain. The return, in June 1920, of the venerable alim, Mahmud Hassan, from a long internment at Malta, and his unequivocal support for the non-co-operation campaign, had spurred the Deoband ulama into joining the Khilafatists,332 but this did not materially alter the situation. It was still doubtful whether the Taluqders, Zamindars, titleholders and the people holding high civil appointments would respond favourably. Men like the Nawab of Dacca, the Raja of Mahmudabad, the Chiefs of the Punjab and other moderates had long dissociated themselves from the Khilafat movement.333 The Shia Mujtahids had instructed their followers to stand aside334 and the All-India Shia Conference held in Nagina (U.P.) in April 1920, had dutifully accepted the decree.335 The


331 ICHPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 25.


333 V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 62-C and 379, April 15 and May 7, 1920, CP.

334 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 260, March 25, 1920, CP.

335 Pioneer Mail, April 9, 1920.
Qadiani Ahmadis under the direction of Bashir-ud-din Mahmud, Ahmad, despite the ostracism by the Khilafatists, had refused to join the campaign. Loyalty to the Crown had always been their motto and they faithfully lived up to it. Among them, only the Lahori group of Maulavi Muhammad Ali (1874-1951) joined the Khilafatists.

Even among the Khilafatists there was no unanimity. Yakub Hasan, for instance, objected to specific items like the proposal to boycott the educational institutions and the reformed Councils. He specifically came down to Bombay in the hope of securing the abandonment of these proposals. K.B. Kuddus Badshah and Abdul Majid Sharar of Madras did not think that the province was ready yet. Similarly, leading Nagpur Muslims declined the CKC’s injunction to test public feelings on non-co-operation. The Bihar Provincial Khilafat Committee reported that there were hardly ten or twelve people willing to adopt non-co-operation in that province. In the U.P. also there were serious difficulties. The Secretary of the Meerut Khilafat Committee informed the CKC that only two lawyers in the U.P. were willing to give up their practice, and that the public opinion was opposed

336 M.B. Mahmud Ahmad, Muaida Turkiyyah aur Mussalmon ka Ainda Rawyya, Qadian, 1920, pp. 4-16.
337 See the address presented by the Community to Sir Edward Maclagen, Lt. Governor of the Punjab, on Dec. 17, 1919, at Lahore. The 58 signatories included Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan (later the Foreign Minister of Pakistan). PSSE, P. 2562/20 with 380/19, IV. Also see F.M. Sayal and A. Nayyar to I.O. in ibid.; and Agha Mohd. Sultan Mirza, An Essay Towards a Better Understanding of the Caliphate, 2nd ed., Delhi, 1920, p. 22.
338 Khwaja Hassan Nizami, Government aur Khilafat, Delhi, 1920, p. 7. For Maulavi Muhammad Ali’s pro-Turkish views see his Hukumat aur Khilafat, Delhi, 1920.
342 ICHPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 27.
to the boycott of the Christian Mission schools and colleges.\footnote{344} The Punjab also appeared to be strongly opposed to the non-co-operation programme.\footnote{345} In Delhi Khwaja Hassan Nizami and his supporters were disgruntled at the rejection of their proposal to extend non-co-operation to the Indian States.\footnote{346} On the whole, the provincial reports indicated that many local leaders preferred to postpone the operation of the non-co-operation campaign until after the special Congress in September 1920.\footnote{347} But the CKC went ahead with the preparations. It probably hoped to carry the public opinion once non-co-operation was underway.

The policy of the Government of India, in spite of the fact that anxiety had caused Chelmsford neuralgia,\footnote{348} remained unchanged. Even when the Nizam, who had in his own dominions clamped down restrictions on the Khilafat activity,\footnote{349} coaxed him that 'time for preventive measures has surely come',\footnote{350} and strong provincial governors rattled at him,\footnote{351} he preferred to wait at least until after August 1. In any case the Government of India's hands were tied by the joint opinion of the Advocate General and the Standing Counsel, Bengal, that it was doubtful whether a case would stand against Gandhi and Shaukat Ali under ordinary criminal law before the Khilafat movement had reached its second or third stage, i.e., relinquishment of civil appointments or withdrawal from the army or the police.\footnote{352}

\footnote{344} Ibid., p. 291.
\footnote{345} Ibid., p. 291.
\footnote{346} Ibid., p. 291. Also see Khwaja Hassan Nizami, Desi Riyaston men Khilafat Agitation aur Non-Co-operation ke Khilaf Mahatma Gandhika Faisla, Delhi, 1920.
\footnote{347} Ibid., p. 291.
\footnote{348} Chelmsford to Montagu, June 9, 1920, MP.
\footnote{349} See the Nizam's Farman of May 19, 1920, in PSSF, P. 5313/20 with 380/19, VI. Also see the translation of his extraordinary Jarida No. 48 of May 30, 1920, in ibid.
\footnote{350} Nizam to Chelmsford, June 13, 1920, CP.
\footnote{351} See, e.g., Lloyd to Montagu, July 23, 1920, MP.
\footnote{352} ICHPP, Sept. 1920, Pro. No. 102.
All through the month of July 1920, Gandhi and Shaukat Ali, accompanied by Kitchlew, Agha Safdar, Saraladevi Chaudhrani (1872-1954) and others, went up and down Northern India to explain the non-co-operation programme and to win support for it. Towards the end of the month, the Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC issued instructions advising full hartal on August 1. Mill hands were not to participate without the employers' permission, nor were persons engaged in essential services - hospital workers, sanitary men and dock workers - required to abstain. The Day was to be devoted to prayers and fasting. Meetings were to be held throughout the country where resolutions urging revision of the Turkish peace terms were to be passed and sent to the Viceroy for transmission to the Imperial Government. The Committee made it clear that since the campaign was not civil disobedience, there were to be no processions or unrestrained speeches of any kind. All police and Government instructions and regulations, such as the Seditious Meetings Act, were to be 'strictly and scrupulously obeyed'. The Committee expressed its hope that all title-holders, Honorary Magistrates, Justices of Peace, Members of the Legislative Councils, 'who feel about this important question affecting the well-being of millions of Muslims', would renounce their titles and honorary posts on that day.

Such was the situation in India at the end of July 1920. From a limited protest of the educated classes the Khilafat movement, despite the divisions among the Muslims, had become a mass agitation. It drew its support both from the illiterate masses and the educated elite, though initially the latter were more vehemently vocal. Its centre of gravity, which of course shifted from time to time was both in Muslim minority and majority provinces - the U.P., Bombay, the Punjab and Bengal. The religious appeal was the most dominant, but it was not the only reason which attracted all that sustenance for the movement.

354 CW, XVIII, pp. 78-79. Also see the posters in ibid., pp. 87-88 and in HFMI, III, Part I, pp. 294-97.
In fact the agitation ran at two different levels. Whereas, with the illiterate it was mostly a religious issue, for the politically-minded it was both religious and political in as much as they could whip the Government with it. The traditionally moderate politicians and the propertied elite were apprehensive too, but they were not prepared to go to extreme lengths in making the Government accede to their demands. The significance of the Khilafat movement lies in the fact that it drew into its fold the whole galaxy of Muslim leadership, counting in its ranks some of the most influential politicians, ulama, financiers, journalists, and professional men from all walks of life. The participation of the Hindus, though on a very limited scale, also added to its strength. The CKC itself became the most powerful political body in India, even more comprehensive than either the Muslim League or the Congress.

But the Khilafatists, inevitably, were heading towards a clash with the Government. The failure of the British Government to accede to any of their demands had turned despair into reckless emotionalism which was held in check only by the restraining influence of Gandhi, Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Chotani and other leaders of their stance. But their hold was precarious. The situation could have been saved by a sympathetic attitude of the British Government but unfortunately the interests of the imperial policy clashed with those of the subject people. Thus, for the Khilafatists non-co-operation seemed to be the only alternative. The stage had been set for the opening of a new chapter in the history of Indian nationalism.
CHAPTER III

THE HIJRAT

In the summer of 1920, when the Khilafatists were still considering the final course of action, thousands of Indian Muslims, under severe emotional stress, began to emigrate to the neighbouring Muslim country of Afghanistan. Believing that India was no longer safe for Islam they had sought refuge in the hijrat\(^1\) or voluntary withdrawal as the only course left open to them.

In a country like India, where the rulers were Christian, the whole matter according to the Sunni ulama hinged upon the question whether India was \(\text{dar al-harb}\) or \(\text{dar al-Islam}\). The controversy began with the famous \textit{fatwa} of Shah Abdul Aziz (1748-1824) declaring India under the British \(\text{dar al-harb}\);\(^2\) it had continued to raise its head

\(^1\) Voluntary exodus is not peculiar to Islam. Other notable examples are those of the Plebeians to secure rights from the Patricians of Ancient Rome, the planned flight of the Israelites, the withdrawal of the Puritan Fathers from England and the emigration of Doukhobors from Russia. For the \textit{hijrat} of 1920 see Map I.

\(^2\) What had disturbed the Delhi alim was the progressive interference by the British with the inherited tradition and practice of the Islamic law. Shah Abdul Aziz issued his ruling on the ground that the country was being ruled not by the orders of the '\textit{Imam-ul-Muslimin}' but those of the Christian rulers. His attitude becomes clearer when his ruling is contrasted with his approach towards the Hindu Marathas under whom India was \(\text{dar al-Islam}\), as they had not replaced the Islamic legal system by one of their own. With regard to India under the British, the ruling of his disciple, Abdul Haiy (d. 1828), was even more specific: it was 'the country of the Enemy', for 'no recourse is made to our holy law'. Both Abdul Aziz and Abdul Haiy, believed in encouraging the \textit{hijrat}, should it become necessary. But these rulings were mere angry protestations of academic theologians trying to satisfy the religious qualms of those forced to live under Christian rule. For Shah Abdul Aziz's \textit{fatwa} see \textit{Fatawa-i-Azizi}, I, Calcutta, 1906, pp. 32-35. For his approach towards the Marathas see Aziz Ahmad, \textit{Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964}, London, 1967, p. 19. Abdul Haiy's ruling is quoted in W.W. Hunter, \textit{The Indian Musalmans}, London, 1871, p. 140. For their views on the \textit{hijrat} see Aziz Ahmad, \textit{Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment}, London, 1964, p. 215. For the analysis of Abdul Aziz's \textit{fatwa} also see P. Hardy, \textit{Muslims of British India}, Cambridge, 1972, p. 51.
over the years. Most often the solution had been sought in the classical interpretation of the Islamic tenets which prescribe jihad or hıjrât. Classically, the dar al-harb includes those countries where the Muslim law is not in force in the matter of worship and the protection of the 'Faithful' and the zimmis. When a Muslim country does become a dar al-harb, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to withdraw to a dar al-Islam and reconquer the

3 Rashid Ahmad Gangohi is reported to have fought against the British in 1857; but by 1898 he was preaching loyalty in their favour (See above, p. 19). In the collection of his fatwā published later in 1924, he, however, appears non-committal. See Fatwā-i-Rashidiyya, I, Muradabad, 1906, pp. 76 & 87. The opposite views were more explicitly expressed during the revived Mūjahidin excitement of 1870s by Karamat Ali Jounpuri, Syed Ahmed Khan and Obeidullah Obeidi Suhrawardy, who denied that India was dar al-harb. See Abstract of the Proceedings of the Mahomedan Literary Society of Calcutta. Lecture by Maulvi Karamat Ali (of Jounpore) on a question of Mahomedan Law Involving the Duty of Mahomedans in British India towards the Ruling Power, Calcutta, 1871; Syed Ahmed Khan, Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Muselmans, Benares, 1872; and Sir Hassan Suhrawardy, 'India', in A.J. Arberry and R. Landau, eds., Islam To-day, London, 1942, p. 204. Also see Maulvi Cheragh Ali, The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammadan States, Bombay, 1885, pp. 23-25; Abdur Rahim, The Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, London, 1911, p. 397; Maqalat-i-Shibli, I, Azamgarh, 1930-34, pp. 182-87; and Shams-ul-Ulama Syed Muhammad Nazir Hussain Muhaddis Dehlavi, Fatwā-i-Naziriyya, II, Delhi, 1918, pp. 39, 41, 47 and 472-73. For Shia views see Hunter, op. cit., pp. 115-19; and for Ahmadi views see Khwaja Kamal-ud-din, Attitude of Muslims of India Towards British Government and other Muslim and non-Muslim Powers, Lahore, 1912, pp. 10-11. It is interesting that the controversy still exists in India to-day. The known opinion of the ulama, especially of Maulana Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi of the Aligarh University, is, however, in favour of regarding India dar al-Islam. Their argument is that Muslims share in the running of the government and that they enjoy religious freedom. As a corollary, Pakistan's war with India, as in 1965 and 1971, is not considered a jihad. See 'Jihad', Aj Kal (Delhi), XXX, No. 6, Jan. 1972, pp. 8-10.

4 Notable examples of jihad and hıjrât in India were the Mūjahidin movement of Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly, the Faraizi movement of Haji Shariatullah (1781-1840) of Bengal, the participation of the ulama in the Revolt of 1857, and the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy' of 1915-16. For a legal and religious discussion of the jihad see M. Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, Lahore, 1945, pp. 150-59; and Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore, 1955, pp. 51-82.
When in 622 A.D. the Prophet performed the *hijrat* to Medina with his followers, he returned to Mecca eight years later as a conqueror. The supporters of the *hijrat* of 1920, in advocating emigration to Afghanistan, had this very end in view.

The question arose whether in the circumstances, when their rulers were endangering the Khilafat, Muslims should leave the 'unholy country' of India and go to some other land under Muslim rule. Such views had already been expressed by the Ali brothers in their memorial to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, in April, 1919:

> When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only two alternatives, *Jehad* or *Hijrat*. That is to say, he must either make use of every force God has given him for the liberation of the land and the ensuring of perfect freedom for the practice and preaching of Islam, or he must migrate to some other and freer land with a view to return to it when it is once more safe for Islam....In view of our weak condition, migration is the only alternative for us....This step, which we shall now have to consider with all the seriousness that its very nature demands, will be perhaps the most decisive in the history of our community since the *Hijrat* of our Holy Prophet.

Other Khilafatists held somewhat similar views. Abul Kalam Azad, for instance, believed that *Hijrat* was an important constituent of the five pillars which firmly held the structure of the Islamic society, i.e., *jamaat* or adherence to the Caliph, *assama* or rallying to his call, *taat* or obedience to him and *jihad* or religious war. To him the *Hijrat* was a sacrifice of inferior gains for nobler objectives. It was noble because it inculcated a spirit of sacrifice. Though the Khilafatists in general held the same opinion, the Ali brothers were the principal

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6 V to G/S, Tel. P., No. 667, Aug. 13, 1920, CP.
7 Memorial dated April 24, 1919, J&P., 3915/19 with 1451/19.
advocates of an actual exodus. Their speeches at the Amritsar Khilafat Conference in December 1919, and later during their tour of the Northern India in January and February 1920, bordered closely on calls to *jihad* and *hijrat*.

If any incitement was needed, it was provided by Amir Amanullah Khan (1892-1960) of Afghanistan, who had been trading on the excited state of the Indian Muslims. In the call for *hijrat*, the Amir found an excellent opportunity to embarrass the British. In a speech delivered at Kabul on the anniversary of the murder of his father (February 20/21, 1920) the Amir undertook to welcome all those Muslims and Hindus who intended to migrate. He even offered to sacrifice his own life for the Faith and for the defence of the Khilafat, vehemently opposing any suggestion for the settlement of the Khilafat question by 'infidel powers'.

A further weight to the earnestness of the Amir's offer was lent by the professed support for the Khilafat movement and Turkey by the Afghan delegation, which had arrived in India in April 1920, for negotiations with the Government of India on the resumption of friendly relations. Mahmud Tarzi (1866-1935), the Afghan Foreign Minister who was heading the Mission, was reported to have remarked on April 16 in a speech after the Friday prayers at the Landour mosque near Mussoorie, that the principal object of the delegation in coming to India was to secure just and favourable treatment for Turkey. He referred to the Amir's speech of the preceding February reassuring his audience that the Amir would welcome Muslims who felt compelled to leave India.

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12 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 426 - S, April 12, 1920, *FSSF*, P. 7020/20 with 1061/19, XI.
13 For the Anglo-Afghan Conference see *FSSF*, 1061/19.
14 *The Times*, May 1, 1920.
The gesture was in fact never meant seriously by the Afghan Government. Their motive in encouraging the hijrat was to embarrass the British and thereby to strengthen their own bargaining position at the Mussoorie talks.\(^{16}\) But the 'invitation' evoked great response in India. The Indian Muslims were led to believe that the Afghans would welcome them with open arms. The asylum given by the Afghans in the past to Indian pan-Islamists, revolutionaries and runaway students\(^{17}\) had further encouraged them in this belief. Impressed by the attitude of the Afghan Mission, a number of Khilafatists got in touch with the delegates.\(^ {18}\) The Khilafat Workers Conference which was being held at Delhi at that time welcomed the Afghan offers and emphasised the necessity of jihad or hijrat.\(^ {19}\) Even the CKC, not realising that the Afghan overtures were merely a propaganda stunt, released to the press a summary of the Amir's promises.\(^ {20}\) The speech received wide publicity and considerable enthusiasm was exhibited for the hijrat in various parts of the country.\(^ {21}\)

In the furore that followed, the ulama were approached to express their views on hijrat and thus give a lead to those who were planning to migrate. But the ulama were divided. The


\(^{17}\) A member of the Afghan delegation confided to Sahibzada (Sir) Abdul Qaiyum (1866-1937) that his Government could easily get rid of the Indian revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks 'if it were made worthwhile'. See PSM, A. 190, p. 7.

\(^{18}\) See above, pp. 39-40.

\(^{19}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 337, April 30, 1920, CP.

\(^{20}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 390, April 25, 1920, CP.

\(^{21}\) Extract from Bombay fortnightly report, Jan. 16 \textit{\textcircled{sic}}, 1920, PSSF, P. 7020/20 with 1061/19, XI.

\(^{22}\) Siyasat (Lahore), May 21, 1920, \textit{PNNR} 1920, p. 107.
protagonists of the hijrat argued that religious injunctions were absolutely clear on the point: the countries under non-Muslim domination fell under the category of dar al-harb and those under Muslim rulers were dar al-Islam. Moreover, the Prophet had already set an example and the Muslims should follow it. The hijrat from India could be easily managed as there were sympathisers abroad who could look after the muhajirin. The emigration of a few lakhs out of a population of several crores would cause no calamity. The chief supporters of this argument were Muniruzzaman Islamabadi of Bengal and Azad Subhani of Cawnpore, but others like Abdur Razzaq of Malihabad (1895-1959), Pir Mahbub Shah of Sind, Ahmad Ali (1877-1962) and Zafar Ali Khan of Lahore, Mohyuddin of Kasur, Muhammad Abdul Abu Turab, Ataullah (1891-1961) and Daud Ghaznavi of Amritsar and Muhammad Ishaq, Muhammad Irfan (d. 1939) and Abdul Ghafoor of the Frontier were more or less of the same opinion.

On the other hand, there were those who were disinclined to launch a mass migration, even though they believed that the unfriendly attitude of the British towards the Khilafat question had made India uncongenial for Islam. Even Abdul Bari, who had recently debated with Azad in favour of jihad and hijrat, thought it more expedient to regard India as dar al-Islam and to reject the idea of an exodus. He maintained that though Shah Abdul Aziz had declared India dar al-harb, he had not pronounced the hijrat to be mandatory. In any case, he preferred to wait until such time that the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama had given its verdict. Even when the supporters of the hijrat accused Abdul Bari of fickleness and

23 The information is based on: Muniruzzaman Islamabadi to Abdul Bari, n.d., Nogush (Lahore), CIX, April/May, 1968, p. 198; Sokhta, op. cit., pp. 3-4; A.H. Khan, ed., Mard-i-Momin, Lahore, 1964; J&P, 5259/20, 5446/20, 6728/20 and 6882/20; ICHPP, Aug. 1920, Pro. No. 71; and various other documents in CP and GP.
24 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 260, March 25, 1920, CP.
26 Muhammad Anis to Abdul Bari, June 24, 1920, Nogush, CIX, p. 220.
brought pressure to bear upon him to revise his views he remained firm. All he would do was to advise reflection and deliberation before embarking on the hijrat. The ulama of Deoband too remained cautious and those of the Ahl-i-Hadis, especially Sanaullah, tried to wriggle out of the difficult situation by making non-committal pronouncements. Others still maintained a mysterious silence.

The hesitancy on the part of the majority of the ulama spurred those who liked to strike at the British from abroad. When in April 1920, over an appeal from Delhi to the intending muhajirin, Abdul Bari issued his advice they deliberately misinterpreted it as a fatwa enjoining the hijrat with a view to freeing India and the Khilafat. As a matter of fact Abdul Bari had repeatedly rejected the idea of the hijrat. But since the excitement had reached fever pitch, he hesitated to correct the interpretation put upon his statement. When he eventually got round to do it, thousands had already left for Afghanistan.

About the same time, Abul Kalam Azad, who a short time before had argued that the hijrat was not possible as Muslims had no place to go to, now issued a fatwa advocating the hijrat. He declared

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28 Sokhta, op. cit., p. 3. For the views of Farangi Mahal also see Raza Ansari, ed., Fatawa Farangi Mahal, Farangi Mahal, 1965, pp. 81 and 175-76.
29 Sokhta, op. cit., p. 3.
31 See Abdul Bari, Khutba-i-Sadarat, p. 26. Also see Gandhi to Ghate, May 8, 1919, CW, XV, p. 290.
33 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 260, March 25, 1920, CP.
that for the Indian Muslims there was no shari alternative to hijrat. Before the War the hijrat was commendable, but now it was mandatory. But Azad admitted that it was neither possible nor desirable for the entire Muslim population in India to migrate. Those staying behind were advised to take part in the struggle for the Khilafat and to non-co-operate with the Government. He suggested that the exodus should be planned and organised in a proper way and that hijrat be performed before embarking on the venture. He, therefore, advised those 'seeking righteousness' to get in touch with him or obtain instructions from Abdul Qadir and Mohyuddin of Kasur, Daud Ghaznavi of Amritsar and Abdur Razzaq of Malihabad.34

The pro-hijrat Khilafatists, thus armed with the fatwa and emboldened by the Afghan overtures, worked up an active hijrat campaign.35 Hijrat committees were set up at a number of places in the country to provide facilities to the intending muhajirin. Corps of volunteers were enlisted to assist in the work. Efforts were also made to familiarise the masses with the religious aspects of the hijrat and jihad. The propaganda was launched in those provinces where the response seemed to be visibly strong or the organisers themselves enjoyed considerable influence - the U.P., Sind, the Punjab, and later the Frontier. Propaganda leaflets were widely circulated and preachers appointed to spread the campaign. Mosques were frequently utilised for this purpose. The maulavis preached from the pulpit that the Muslims who did not

34 The exact date of the fatwa is not known. But from internal evidence it appears that it was given in April or May 1920. The fatwa was published by the Ahl-i-Hadis (Amritsar), in its issue of July 30, 1920. See Ghulam Rasul Mihr, ed., Tabarkat-i-Azad, Lahore, 1959, pp. 203-6. For a convenient English translation of the fatwa see Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan, Washington, 1963, pp. 343-44.

35 The information on the propaganda methods is based on the following sources: V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 379, May 7, 1920, CP; Grant to Carter, No. 1420 - R, May 21, 1920, PSSF, P. 7020/20 with 1061/19, XI; Extract from Bombay fortnightly report, No. 506, June 16, 1920, above, n. 20; J&P, 6726/20 with 5703/20; ICPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 45; The Times, Aug. 16, 1920; Sokhta, op. cit., pp. 3-4; and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, Hayat-i-Ajmal, Aligarh, 1950, p. 222.
migrate would become infidels. Writers stirred popular emotions through prose and poetry. The vernacular press published rosy accounts of life in Afghanistan. The people were told stories of red carpet receptions which awaited the mahajirin; that the Amir had promised them a tract of fertile land in Jabal-us-Siraj; that they would be helped and fed by their Afghan co-religionists; and that for three months they would have to do no work at all. The other aspect of this propaganda was more sinister, although the Khilafatists do not seem to have been directly responsible for this. Through the inventiveness of scandal-mongers, wild rumours were spread that Mecca and Medina were in British occupation and that the Kaaba had been destroyed; that the study of the Quran was being prohibited in India; and that Sunday, and not Friday, was to be fixed as the day for prayers. This had great effect on the simple-minded peasantry and the illiterate.36

But though the appeal to the hijrat was based primarily on religious injunctions, other factors had combined to make it effective. Among these was the desperate economic condition of the Indian peasantry. There were some people who were attracted by the prospects of improving their lot in Afghanistan.37 The hijrat was thus most widely accepted in those areas - the U.P. (in the early stages), Sind and the Frontier - where the economic condition of the peasantry was particularly bad. In the Punjab, where their lot was comparatively better, the rural areas were much less affected. There were also some militant Muslims who wished to go to Turkey via Afghanistan in order to fight for the Caliph.38 Yet others found in the hijrat an opportunity to go abroad and, with the help of a friendly foreign power, find some way of striking at the British power in India.39 Thus, not unnaturally, the 'extremists' among the hijrat leaders encouraged the venture with the ultimate view of

36 Ibid. Also see Haji Ahmad, Dard-i-Khilafat, Aligarh, 1921 (in fact composed in 1920); Nala-i-Khilafat, published by the Anjuman Islah-ul-Muslimin, Lahore, 1920; M. Badr-ud-Din, Aina-i-Ibrat, Muradabad, 1920; and Syed K.A. Jafari, Khilafat aur Musalmanon ka Farz, Allahabad, 1920.
37 V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 521, June 26, 1920, CP.
39 Ibid., p. 16. Also see Shaukat Usmani, Peshawar to Moscow, Benares, 1927, p. 1.
overthrowing British dominance in India by paralysing the Government.\textsuperscript{40}

Whatever the reasons, the hijrat received a fair impetus.\textsuperscript{41} The Zamindar of May 7, 1920, announced that 1338 persons, corresponding to the number of the Muslim hijra era, were ready to proceed at once to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{42} Consequently, a number of the muhajirin began to arrive in Peshawar, mostly from Delhi and Lahore and a few from Bhopal.\textsuperscript{43} And already some enthusiasts had secretly started crossing the border.\textsuperscript{44} Early in May 1920, the Political Agent, Khyber, reported that forty persons had reached Jalalabad through routes other than the Khyber.\textsuperscript{45} But the hijrat as an organised exodus may be said to have begun on May 15, 1920, - the day the peace terms with Turkey were published in India - when the first qafila of some eager muhajirin crossed the border for Kabul 'with great happiness and success'.\textsuperscript{46}

But the exodus was slow. Though large numbers had enrolled themselves, the number of the actual emigrants was small. By the end of June 1920, only about 133 persons, mostly from the central Punjab districts, Delhi, Bhopal, Bikaner and Peshawar, had emigrated to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{47} Earlier that month, the Viceroy, giving his reasons

\textsuperscript{40} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 497, June 19, 1920, CP.
\textsuperscript{41} In Delhi, people were so worked up that they sent a telegram to the Viceroy that 'it is impossible for the faithful any longer to remain under the British rule peacefully'. Another was addressed to the Afghan Envoy at Delhi thanking him for the hospitality offered by the Amir. Col. C.E. Yate, 'Unrest in India: the Question of the Khaliphate', AR, XVI, 1920, pp. 379-80.
\textsuperscript{42} Grant to Carter, No. 1420 - R, May 21, 1920, above, n. 35.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} The early muhajirin crossed secretly for fear of chastisement by the police. See Iqbal Shaidai's memoirs, Imroze, March 2, 1969. Also see Musaffar Ahmad, op. cit., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{45} Grant to Carter, No. 1420 - R, May 21, 1920, above, n. 35.
\textsuperscript{46} Muslim Outlook (London), Aug. 5, 1920, PSSP, p. 6755/20 with 380/19, V.
\textsuperscript{47} V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 521, June 26, 1920, CP.
for this slow progress, had reported to the Secretary of State:
'...the prospect of the hijrat is not attractive; there is to be no return from emigration and those wishing to emigrate cannot receive any financial help. But the more important factor in this connection was the reluctance of the CKC and the Jama'at-ul-Ulama to patronise the hijrat. At their meetings at Allahabad, in the first week of June 1920, both the organisations, despite Azad's fatwa and Shaukat Ali's pleadings, had pronounced the hijrat optional and decided that there was to be no emigration en masse. Only the common people were to embark on the venture, the real workers staying behind to carry on the work. Primarily, the reason for this decision was the preoccupation of the CKC and the Jama'at with the proposed inauguration of the non-co-operation programme. Until that had been launched and practised they could not think of taking up another venture like the hijrat. Besides, the hijrat was encountering strong opposition from prominent Khilafatists and moderates like Ajmal Khan, Kitchlew, Jinnah, Shafi, Fazl-i-Husain, Iqbal and others. They honestly believed that the venture was not in the best interest of the community and did all in their power to stem its tide. Similarly, Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad of Qadian strongly protested

48 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 461, June 4, 1920, CP.
49 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 497, June 19, 1920, CP.
50 Ajmal Khan considered the hijrat as the negation of the true spirit of nationalism and maintained that the struggle for freedom must be waged from within the country. See Ghaffar, Hayat-i-Ajmal, p. 222.
51 Sokhta, op. cit., p. 4; and ICHPP, Aug. 1920, Proc. No. 71.
52 Jinnah is reported to have regarded the campaign as a 'political stunt'. L.F. Rushbrook Williams's letter dated Oct. 11, 1968, to the present writer.
against the venture. Even Mahmud Hassan, after his return to India, did not seem to be enthusiastic about it.

A more important influence on the CKC was the opposition from the Hindu Press and Hindu leaders. Gandhi himself was utterly opposed to the hijrat though he did not venture to condemn it publicly. He argued that Muslim withdrawal from India was not a practical step as 'we cannot think of bringing pressure on the Government through it'. Therefore, he pressed for the hijrat being held over until the last stage of non-co-operation had been gone through. The Khilafatists had realised that if they were to retain Hindu support, they must remove the fear of an invasion from the North-West which the hijrat campaign seemed to have encouraged. Thus, it is not surprising to see Shaukat Ali agreeing to the decision of the CKC to discourage the hijrat. In a statement issued in the first week of July 1920, he reaffirmed that so long

55 M.B. Mahmud Ahmad, Muaida-i-Turkiyya aur Musalmanon ka Ainda Rawaya, Qadian, 1920, pp. 8-9. Also see his Tark-i-Mawalat aur Ahkam-i-Islam, Qadian, 1920, pp. 9, 47-53.


57 Hindu, June 2, 1920; and Sindhi (Sukkur), May 28, 1920, By.NNR 1920.

58 Gandhi has been wrongly accused of starting the hijrat by writers like A.B. Rajput, Muslim League: Yesterday and To-day, Lahore, 1948, p. 32; and P.S. Briggs, 'The Indian Hijrat of 1920', MW, XX, No. 2, April 1930, p. 164.

59 Gandhi to Shraddhanand, May 2, 1920, CW, XVII, p. 381. Also see HFMI, III, Part I, p. 307. Such views he had expressed as early as June 1919, J&P, 4695/19 with 1451/19. Strangely enough, in the late 1920s and 1930s, the hijrat (minus 'jihad') became an important item in Gandhi's satyagraha action. See G. Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, 2nd ed., Ahmedabad, 1951, p. 278; and H.B. Sarkar, 'Non-violent Non-cooperation in World History', JIH, XLVIII, Part I, No. 142, April, 1970, p. 72.

60 ICPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 45.
as non-co-operation was not pushed to its logical conclusion, it would be unwise to take up the hijrat as it was likely to divide attention and mar the unity of action.  

But the set-back to the hijrat campaign was only temporary. As the Muslim Deputy Commissioner of Hissar (Punjab) had observed: 'Whatever may be the fate of the emigration movement, the hijrat of men's mind towards Kabul has commenced.' From early July 1920, as a result of fresh efforts, the enrolment of the muhajirin increased and more and more began to proceed on the hijrat. But it was in Sind that the hijrat activity was most conspicuous. The Bombay Government, which was anxious not to precipitate trouble by provoking the excited Muslims, allowed a special train to be arranged through the railway authorities. Eventually, in the first week of July 1920, about 750 muhajirin, far fewer than the twenty-five thousand originally announced, accompanied by their families, left for Peshawar under Jan Muhammad Junejo (d. 1920), a leading Sind barrister. Attempts to stop them at the behest of Abul Kalam Azad did not succeed.

The news about the Sind contingent produced a wave of excitement in Upper India and gave a fillip to the hijrat, particularly in the Punjab. Their arrival in Peshawar spurred the campaign in the Frontier, since the province was already sullen over the killing of a muhajir by a British soldier in a fracas at Katcha Garhi, a small railway station between Peshawar and Jamrud.

61 Hindu, July 8, 1920.
62 Report on the Political and Economic Situation in the Punjab for the fortnight ending 15th June, 1920, TP.
63 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 541, July 2, 1920, CP.
64 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 609, July 24, 1920, CP.
65 Iqbal Shaidai's memoirs, Imroze, April 20 and 27, 1969.
66 The Times, July 14, 1920.
The official communiqué on this tragedy, which had laid the entire blame on the muhajirin, had inflamed feelings still further. By the end of July 1920, the hijrat had become fairly intensive in the Frontier. Most seriously affected were the rural areas in the Peshawar and the Mardan districts, particularly the Doaba and the Hashtnagar tracts of the Charsadda sub-division. The peasants gave up their agricultural pursuits and abandoned their lands in anticipation of joining the hijrat. Crafty landlords and speculators, mostly Hindus, exploited the ignorant and encouraged them to emigrate in order to buy up cheaply the property and crops of the intending muhajirin. As a result, the poor peasants were forced to sell their belongings at very low prices. At some places in the Frontier land valued at Rs. 10,000 could not fetch even Rs. 100. Cow buffaloes worth Rs. 200 were offered at Rs. 40. Crops and houses were similarly undervalued.

Gradually, the whole of the Frontier came under the surging tide of the hijrat. The excitement spread to Kohat, Hazara and the Tribal areas. The hijrat of large numbers, particularly through the Mohmand country, produced an unsettling effect on the Afridis and the tribes north of the river Kabul. The maulavis used this opportunity to stir up anti-Government feelings. Twice in August 1920, the tribesmen attacked the British post at Oghi but they were repulsed. In retaliation the Government resorted to aerial bombardment; but it took time before the situation returned to normalcy, especially because of the adamant attitude of the

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68 Englishman, July 12, 1920.
69 Vakil (Amritsar), July 16, 1920; Tribune (Lahore), July 18, 1920; and Muslim Outlook, Aug. 19, 1920, J&P, 1676/20. Also see V to S/S, Tel. R., No. 845-5, July 9, 1920, CP.
72 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 624, July 30, 1920, CP.
73 V to S/S, Tel.s P., Nos. 205 and 207, Aug. 6 and 19, 1920, CP.
74 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 207, Aug. 19, 1920, CP.
75 Grant to Chelmsford, Sept. 2, 1920, CP.
tribesmen.76

The hijrat propaganda, combined with the non-co-operation campaign, had also penetrated the services. Its effect on the army was specially disturbing to the military authorities.77 Most of the muhajirin came from areas from where recruits were drawn. Muslim soldiers, already agitated over the rumours of the desecration of the kaaba, now were extremely disturbed by alarmist letters from home reporting that some of their near relations were emigrating.78 The Punjabi battalion serving in the Khyber was considerably alarmed by the propaganda.79 The military detachment in Sukkur was also affected.80 A serious situation developed among the 127th Baluchis at Multan; General Woodyatt, the brigade commander at Ferozepur, had to rush to the scene.81 By early August, the number of Muslim soldiers who had proceeded on the hijrat was equivalent to one complete company with its Indian officers.82 One qafila of the muhajirin included a havildar and six sepoys.83 More were still resigning and desertions were also reported.84

The Government of India and the Local Governments, which had been following a policy of cautious watchfulness, now became extremely apprehensive, particularly in view of the close historical connection

76 Grant to Chelmsford, Oct. 30, 1920, CP. Also see The Times, Sept. 22, 1920.
80 ICHPP, Feb. 1921, Pro. No. 352.
83 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 661, Aug. 13, 1920, CP.
84 Sokhta, op. cit., p. 12.
between the *hijrat* and *jihad*. As a precautionary measure Zafar Ali Khan's entry into the Frontier was prohibited. In order to check the concentrated flow of the *muhajirin*, the Government of India, at the recommendation of the Frontier and the Punjab Governments, withdrew the facilities of providing special trains to the *muhajirin* and attempted to persuade the Muslims to drop the campaign altogether. But instead of taking any overt action, the Government encouraged the local officers to dissuade people from going. Care was also taken through publicity officers to let the Muslims know that Hindus were profiting at the expense of the *muhajirin*. As regards the government servants intending to proceed on the *hijrat*, the Frontier authorities had, as early as May 1920, warned them that they would be refused re-employment if they decided to return. Efforts were also made to check disaffection in the army. But no restrictions were put on persons wishing to resign lest it should be interpreted as an interference with their religion. Short leave was liberally granted to the soldiers whose families were proceeding on the *hijrat* to enable them to put their home affairs in order, for if leave were to be refused this would have provoked discontent without stopping desertions. The disaffected units were posted away from the Frontier.

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85 Chelmsford to Montagu, Aug. 11, 1920, MP.
87 J&P, 6728/20, Also see V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 609 and 667, July 24 and Aug. 13, 1920, CP.
88 Rushbrook Williams' letter to the writer, above, n. 52.
89 Chelmsford to Montagu, Aug. 11, 1920, MP. Also see Edmund Candler (Publicity Officer), *Masala-i-Khilafat Par Azadana Bahs*, Lahore, 1920, pp. 30-31.
90 Rushbrook William's letter to the writer, above, n. 52.
91 Grant to Carter, No. 1420-R, May 21, 1920, above, n. 35.
92 Wazirforce, Dera Ismail Khan, to OGS, Tel. P., No. 2254 - C.L. - 9, Aug. 12, 1920, above, n. 78.
For the time being. To forestall panic among Muslim soldiers serving abroad their military commanders were directed to pacify them.

Meanwhile, endless streams of intending muhajirin kept descending on Peshawar from various parts of India, as far as Bhopal and South India, but mostly from the Frontier, the Punjab and Sind. In many cases whole families, and in some, whole villages had set out for the hijrat. By August 3, 1920, the number of the muhajirin who had crossed into Afghanistan, had reached 13,000. Less than a week later, it shot up to over 20,000 and more were still crossing the border. At the outset, the Frontier muhajirin came from humble classes, but as the excitement increased, some wealthy Khans of good landowning families also began to emigrate in large numbers. The more wealthy financed the passage of their poorer companions. The Sind muhajirin, like those of the Frontier, also came from the poorer classes with a sprinkling of well-to-do people. Most of the leading men, however, did not go beyond Peshawar and then returned - except for a few, like the barrister, Jan Muhammad Junejo, who migrated with a large party of supporters. Unlike those from the Frontier and Sind, the muhajirin from the Punjab were mainly from towns, owning no land and included no men of prominence. The rural areas of the Punjab seem to have been affected but little, due perhaps to the powerful influence of the loyal landowning classes

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94 CGS, India, to GOC, Baghdad and repeated to other GOCs abroad, Tel. P., No. 1435 - 7 M.O. 3., Sept. 18, 1920, J&P, 6882/20.
96 Ibid.
99 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 661, Aug. 13, 1920, CP.
and because of the efforts of the moderates like Shafi and Fazl-i-Husain.  

The procedure adopted by the Peshawar Hijrat Committee for the onward transmission of the muhajirin to Afghanistan was quite effective. On arrival in Peshawar, the muhajirin were met by the representatives of the local hijrat committee who took them to various sarais which had been set up for their stay. During their stay in Peshawar, the muhajirin were supplied board and lodging by the committee. A corps of two hundred volunteers had been raised to look after their needs. The intending muhajirin then registered their names with the committee which sent the list to the Afghan Agent for the issue of the passes. This having been arranged, the muhajirin then proceeded to Jamrud, some miles from the Afghan border. They stayed at Jamrud on Thursday nights preparatory to their departure to Afghanistan through the Khyber pass on Fridays. They proceeded weekly and only on regular caravan days.

The majority of the muhajirin being poor, they set out either on foot or in bullock carts and tongas all the way to Kabul, a distance of nearly 200 miles from Peshawar. To their economic misery were added the hazards of the journey. The muhajirin had to pass through barren mountainous country in the heat of Indian summer. Food and water were scarce. Once they left the Indian territory their trek turned into a nightmare. Jalalabad was the first major Afghan town on way to Kabul, where the tired muhajirin could stop for some time. But Jalalabad was a small town and had no facilities to offer. In spite of the Amir's promises to furnish the muhajirin with the necessaries of life and to recompense them with concessions in land and in revenue, very little was done.

100 See above, p. 128.
General Nadir Khan (1880-1933), the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, had appointed officials at Kanur, Dakka and Jalalabad to look after the *muhajirin*, but he did not have enough resources to cope with the increasing numbers.

In Kabul the *muhajirin* were accommodated in a few tents as were available at the Chaman Hazuri. No suitable arrangements being available for all, the majority of them were left at the mercy of the Afghans and had to undergo incalculable hardships. The leading Indians in Kabul like Obeidullah Sindhi and Dr. Abdul Ghani did all in their power to help them. An unofficial welfare committee, the *Anjuman-i-Muhajirin*, was formed to look after the immigrants' interests. But in view of the sheer numbers and the unsympathetic attitude of the Afghan Government the *Anjuman* could not make much headway.

The *muhajirin* themselves were disunited politically and ideologically. The main groups were two in number: the pan-Islamists and the Bolshevik sympathisers. Obeidullah Sindhi and his pan-Islamic associates, supported by the Afghan Government, encouraged the *muhajirin* to move on to Jabal-us-Siraj and take up residence there. In this way the Afghan Government wished to relieve Kabul of congestion and at the same time hoped to control the *muhajirin* effectively. Among the pan-Islamists themselves, a group led by Maulvi Abdul Haq (d. 1925) was in favour of proceeding immediately to Turkey to fight for the Caliph. On the other side, Abdur Rab Peshawari, an Indian revolutionary who had come over from Russia, encouraged the young *muhajirin* to go to Bolshevik Russia. But because of the explicit orders of the Amir, a large number of the *muhajirin* had to proceed to Jabal-us-Siraj, where they went through another round of hardships. Many died through disease or the rigours of climate. Others became

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105 Aybek, *op. cit.*, I, p. 213.
weary of the idle life. They held meetings in Kabul and delivered an 'ultimatum' to the Afghan Government to provide them with jobs or else face the consequences.\textsuperscript{110}

Alarmed by these developments the Afghan Government tried to contain the discontent. But, by early August 1920, the number of the \textit{muhajirin} in Afghanistan had grown to more than 40,000.\textsuperscript{111} Even this estimate was not accurate, as large numbers of the \textit{muhajirin} had been emigrating without the assistance of the \textit{hijrat} committee and many had not even bothered to notify the Afghan authorities. Besides, a number of the \textit{muhajirin} had wound their way through routes other than the Khyber, notably through the Mohmand country and the Tochi pass. On top of this, the \textit{hijrat} was still in progress and the \textit{muhajirin} were pouring in at the rate of seven to eight thousand a week. Quite justifiably, the Afghan authorities panicked and decided to stop further emigration. They manoeuvred the \textit{Anjuman-i-Muhajirin} into petitioning the Amir to issue orders to that effect.\textsuperscript{112}

On August 9, 1920, the Amir issued a \textit{farman}, promulgating that only after the previous \textit{muhajirin} had been absorbed, would any fresh emigrants be allowed into Afghanistan. In future the \textit{muhajirin} were to be admitted piecemeal on a fixed quota. They were first to obtain passports from the Afghan officials at Peshawar and on entering the Afghan territory, they were to become Afghan subjects. If they wished to go out of Afghanistan, they could do so only on the Afghan passport. A new colony for the settlement of the \textit{muhajirin} was to be set up in Katghan in the Afghan Turkistan. The Afghan Government promised financial assistance to those \textit{muhajirin} who were keen to start vocations in trade, industry and education. Those who wished to serve in the army were free to do so, but on the condition that they could be stationed to any place the Afghan Government chose. At Kabul three regiments of the

\textsuperscript{110} Sokhta, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 33-34.
\textsuperscript{111} Enclosure to the Sarhaddar, Dakka, to the Political Agent, Khyber, Aug. 12, 1920, \textit{J&P}, 6882/20.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ibid.}
muhajirin were to be enlisted in the regular army and were to be governed by its rules and regulations. The young muhajirin of good families ('Khansadas') were to be allowed to enter the military college and, after the completion of their training, were to be appointed in these regiments. Military training to the muhajirin was to be given in their respective colonies (such as Jabal-us-Siraj and Katghan) by Afghan instructors, but they were to be considered as volunteers and entitled to no pay. Teachers, doctors and skilled workers were to be employed according to the requirements of the various departments. Those who desired to proceed to Anatolia 'for the purpose of Islam and in the interests of India', were allowed to send an enquiry party to explore the possibilities of an eventual emigration to that place.\footnote{113}

These were commendable arrangements, but were never implemented. The whole scheme had been in fact devised to stop the immigration completely. The Amir sent a message to the muhajirin that they were at liberty to proceed onward or return to India\footnote{114}, implying that they were not wanted any longer in Afghanistan. The Afghan attitude was a direct result of the Anglo-Afghan talks at Mussoorie in the early summer of 1920. When the Anglo-Afghan relations seemed to be improving, the Afghans became indifferent to the muhajirin.\footnote{115} Moreover, economically it was impossible for a poor country like Afghanistan to stand the influx of such a multitude of unskilled and destitute people; especially when she had not been able to settle her own people, the powindas, who were forced to emigrate to India every winter in search of subsistence.\footnote{116}

\footnote{113}{Ibid.}
\footnote{114}{C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. No. 877 - P., Aug. 20, 1920, J&P, 6682/20. Also see Sokhta, op. cit., p. 34.}
\footnote{115}{Sokhta, op. cit., p. 34.}
\footnote{116}{A curious side-light of the hijrat was that some Afghan residents of Khost, who had been deprived of their lands in favour of the muhajirin, asked the D.C. Bannu to be allowed to migrate to India, see C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. No. 326 - P.N., Aug. 10, 1920, J&P, 6728/20.}
The Afghan Government took immediate steps to publicise the postponement. Copies of the farman were sent to the Afghan Agent at Peshawar for transmission to Muslim leaders in India. On August 12, 1920, the Amir's decision was officially communicated to the British authorities. To his embarrassment Sir Hamilton Grant (1872-1937), the successor of Roos-Keppel in the Frontier, found it very difficult to get the farman promptly communicated to the public. For if he had done so it would have been at once discredited as a Machiavellian device of the Government to stop the hijrat by exploiting the Amir's name. So he chose to make the contents known through the provincial Khilafat committee. On their part the officials of the committee were reluctant to invite the wrath of the intending muhajirin. However, on August 14, under Grant's pressure, they reluctantly sent telegrams to all the Frontier Khilafat committees informing them of the Amir's decision. Copies of the proclamation were also printed and distributed. The CKC too advised the intending muhajirin to wait and not make hurried preparations till further notice.

In spite of the precautions, rumours spread that the Government had paid a large sum of money to the Amir as a bribe to stop the hijrat; that the Frontier Hijrat Committee had been bribed too; and that the Amir's farman was a forgery. Nevertheless, the Committee managed to persuade the majority of the newly-arrived muhajirin in Peshawar to return to their homes except for a qafilah of over seven thousand which had already left for Jamrud on August 12. They refused to turn back when asked by the Peshawar Hijrat Committee and became violent. The Afghan Agent at Peshawar, who himself proceeded to Jamrud to try persuasion was stoned and had to return. The Afghan officials though determined to stop this new influx, if necessary by force, were unnerved by the overwhelming number and

118 Grant to Chelmsford, Aug. 15, 1920, GP.
119 Ibid.
120 Bombay Chronicle, Aug. 27, 1920.
121 Grant to Chelmsford, Aug. 15, 1920, GP.
the threatening attitude of the *muhajirin* and were forced to admit
them on the condition that they should bear their own expenses.\textsuperscript{122}

The incident is indicative of the alarming heights to which
passions had been aroused. The postponement order was either
disbelieved or ignored and several thousand more *muhajirin*, mainly
from the Frontier and Sind, had in the meantime gathered in
Peshawar.\textsuperscript{123} With difficulty the authorities were able to send
them all back except for fifty emigrants from Sind who said that
they were fleeing because of the Government's interference with
their religion and the suffering caused by the alleged stoppage of
the canal water.\textsuperscript{124} Similarly, another two thousand *muhajirin*
had assembled at Bannu and pressed to go to Afghanistan via the Tochi
pass. They agreed to disperse on the condition that their
deputation should be allowed to go to Khost to enquire into the
possibility of immigration there.\textsuperscript{125} This, however, does not seem
to have materialised.

It took some time before the Afghan postponement order had
its effect. Already, the *muhajirin* had started to return. They
consisted chiefly of *muhajirin* fromCharsadda, Swabi, Sind, Amritsar,
Gujranwala, Sialkot and Lahore.\textsuperscript{126} Some of them had returned from
Kabul while others from Jalalabad and included some of those who
had emigrated as late as August 13. They were extremely incensed
at their cold reception and bad treatment in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{127} But
their sympathetic reception in India and the news that they would
be resettled on their lands relieved them of their anxiety. Those

\textsuperscript{122} C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. No. 853 -

\textsuperscript{123} C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. No. 875-

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. A denial was later issued by the Sind authorities.

\textsuperscript{125} C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. No.

\textsuperscript{126} C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. No.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
who had held back for fear of punitive measures now returned too.\(^{128}\)

The flow of the returning muhajirin increased and reached approximately to two hundred per day.\(^{129}\) In order to stem fresh emigration, the British authorities delayed the returning muhajirin at every large halting place long enough so that they could tell their hardships to those who were still thinking of emigrating.\(^{130}\) Among the notable muhajirin who returned were Ahmad Ali,\(^{131}\) President of the Lahore Khilafat Committee and a nephew of Obeidullah Sindhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1891-) of Utmanzal\(^{132}\) and Jan Muhammad Junejo of Sind.\(^{133}\) According to Junejo about five thousand muhajirin were still stranded in Afghanistan due to the non-availability of transport and money and were anxious to return.\(^{134}\)

Help was, however, forthcoming from the Government. Free food shops were opened for the immediate relief and free railway warrants were issued.\(^{135}\) Special efforts were made to publicise that the Afghans were turning back the muhajirin at the point of gun and bayonet.\(^{136}\) The authorities also made arrangements for safeguarding the property rights of the muhajirin and settling land disputes speedily under Frontier Crimes Regulations rather than under the ordinary law.\(^{137}\) In the worst affected areas special officers were appointed to look


\(^{129}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 210, Sept. 9, 1920, CP.

\(^{130}\) Briggs, op. cit., p. 167. Also see Hindu, Sept. 16, 1920; and Englishman, Sept. 11, 1920.

\(^{131}\) Aybek, op. cit., I, p. 214.


\(^{133}\) Officer in charge, Special Bureau, to Secy., F. & P. Dept., Tel. P., No. 189 - B., Sept. 28, 1920, CP.

\(^{134}\) He also stated that all except 25 of the muhajirin who had enlisted in the Afghan army had deserted. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 214, Oct. 7, 1920, CP. Also see The Times, Oct. 15, 1920.

\(^{135}\) Mard-i-Momin, p. 58.

\(^{136}\) Rushbrook Williams' letter to the writer, above, n. 52

after the interests of the soldiers and their families.\(^{138}\) An unofficial relief fund was instituted to facilitate the re-settlement.\(^{139}\) *Takavi* advances were given where required.\(^{140}\) This sympathetic manoeuvre on the part of the authorities was intended to help restore normal conditions quickly and prevent a recrudescence of the campaign.\(^{141}\) But some difficulty was experienced in the re-settlement work as most Hindus would not return the property they had acquired so cheaply.\(^{142}\) Nevertheless, hard hit as the returning *muhajirin* were, they expressed genuine gratitude at the relief measures undertaken by the Government.

But, the *hijrat*, though discredited, had not yet died down completely. There were renewed efforts in Delhi, Bihar and Orissa and the Frontier to revive the venture.\(^{143}\) The CKC also decided to step in and, despite some opposition from Chotani, it resolved in the middle of August 1920, to control, supervise and finance the *hijrat*. A sub-committee was recommended to take up the matter.\(^{144}\) Subsequently, the CKC corresponded with the Afghan Envoy in India asking him to obtain from the Amir clear and definite instructions as to the number and class of men whom shelter could be offered in Afghanistan.\(^{145}\)

The patronage of the *hijrat* by the CKC at this late stage was, however, a cover for something more stupendous. When Mohamed Ali

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\(^{139}\) C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. No. 875-P., Aug. 19, 1920, above, n. 123.

\(^{140}\) C/C, N.W.F.P., to P/SV, Tel. P., No. 382-N., Sept. 2, 1920, CP.

\(^{141}\) C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. No. 875-P., Aug. 19, 1920, above, n. 123.


\(^{143}\) V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 698, 716 and 211, Aug. 21 and 28 and Sept. 15, 1920, CP.

\(^{144}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 698, Aug. 21, 1920, CP.

went to Europe at the head of the Khilafat delegation, he met Talaat Pasha, the former Turkish minister, at Territet in Switzerland early in August 1920, and there they prepared a plan for the invasion of India. According to the scheme, the invasion was to be carried out by an army raised in Afghanistan from amongst the Afghans, the muhajirin and the tribesmen on the Indian frontier. Funds for the organisation of this army and for stirring up the tribes on the Indian frontier were to be provided, among others, by the CKC. But, since Turkey was weak, the organisers were to rely on a concerted action of the Afghans and the Bolshevists who were believed to have promised independence to India. The Bolshevists were expected to make peace with the Poles, knock out General Wrangel of the White forces, and then mass their armies for an offensive in Asia. The projected invasion of India was to synchronise with a rising within the country. For the proper execution of the plan, Talaat Pasha was to move to Moscow; Enver Pasha, another fallen hero of pan-Islamism, was to go to Tashkent; and Jemal Pasha (1872-1922), the former Turkish general, was to raise the army of invasion in Afghanistan. Mohamed Ali was expected to 'try to start a revolution' in India (See Chart I).

Thus, when towards the end of August, 1920, Junejo returned from Afghanistan, he was reported to have brought the news that

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This information is based on Iqbal Shaidai's memoirs, Imrooz, May, 25, 1969; PSM, B. 350 and B. 361; and Aybek, op. cit., pp. 221-22, 147

Jemal Pasha was on his way to Kabul. The Khilafatists were anxious to form a direct liaison with Jemal and the Indian revolutionaries and pan-Islamists in Kabul, such as Mahendra Pratap, Barkatullah, and Obeidullah Sindhi. But in order to cover up their real object, the Khilafatists invented the excuse of reviving the hijrat. Early in October 1920, Shaukat Ali approached the Afghan Envoy at Simla requesting him to obtain facilities from the Amir for the resumption of the hijrat. The Envoy agreed to receive Yakub Hasan and Abul Kalam Azad in Kabul but when the Government of India took a strong exception to the Envoy's 'gross impropriety', the Afghans became cautious. The Government of India directed the Baluchistan and the Frontier authorities to prevent the delegation from crossing into Afghanistan. When in December 1920, Shaukat Ali tried to revive the matter, the Government of India instructed Sir Henry Dobbs (1871-1934), the Secretary of the Foreign and Political Department, who was then in Kabul in connection with negotiations for a treaty of friendship, to press Mahmud Tarzi to cancel the Amir's invitation to the CKC. But since the Afghans were unwilling to withdraw the invitation, the Government of India chose not to accord the necessary permission to the delegation to proceed to Afghanistan.

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149 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1177-S., Oct. 8, 1920, CP.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 20-S., Jan. 5, 1921, CP.

153 Ibid.


Despite these hurdles, the plan was not dropped. Jemal Pasha established himself in Kabul and, aided by the Bolshevists and to some extent by the Afghans, started to work in collaboration with the Indian revolutionaries. Enver Pasha set himself up in Bokhara for similar anti-British activities. Funds were secretly despatched from India. The Bolshevists, on their part, despatched M.N. Roy (1886-1954), a member of the Central Asiatic Bureau of the Communist International, to Tashkent in the winter of 1920, to supervise the raising of the 'Army of Liberation' from amongst a residue of several hundred disaffected muhajirin which had arrived in the capital of the Russian Turkestan from Afghanistan. Mohamed Ali was back in India from Europe, fervently intensifying the non-co-operation campaign. He had already been in communication with the Bolshevists through Chadhopadhaya (1883-1937), the revolutionary brother of the Indian leader Mrs. Sarojini Naidu (1879-1949), and was reported to have received funds from them. He was also reported to be under offer of money from Mustafa Kemal for propaganda work in India.

But, owing to various factors, the project fell through. A significant reason for its failure was the collapse of the hijrat.

In the meantime, the revival of the hijrat in Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and other places had collapsed. Out of 600 recent muhajirin, 200 came back to India. See V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 819 and 859, Oct. 9 and 24, 1920, CP.

Aybek, op. cit., I, pp. 222-25.


The Punjab Khilafat Committee alone provided Rs. 250,100 to Enver Pasha and Rs. 51,000 to the Mujahidin. Interview with Malik Lal Khan, ex-Secy. of the Punjab Khilafat Committee, at Lahore in Sept. 1966.

M.N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 420-26. The muhajirin were given military and political training at the military school known as Indusky Kurs. See p. 470. It was here in Tashkent that in October 1920, the communist muhajirin, in concert with their revolutionary friends, founded an Emigre Communist Party of India and later affiliated it to the Communist International. For details see Muzaffar Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 56-97; and Adhikari, op. cit., pp. 55-60 and 215-33.

FSM, B. 361.
About seventy-five per cent. of the muhajirin had returned to India. Others had either chosen to stay in Afghanistan or moved on to Baku and Tashkent or had perished through exhaustion or disease. From among those who remained in Afghanistan, about five hundred were enlisted in the Afghan army. Others were driven off by the Afghan Government towards Panjshir, Katghan, Badakhshan and the Afghan Turkestan and were reported to be in dire straits as they had no means of subsistence. \(^{161}\) Those muhajirin, who had gone to Baku in Azerbaijan to fight for the Turkish Nationalists, were dismayed to find themselves unwanted and slowly trekked back to India. \(^ {162}\) From amongst those who had gone to Tashkent, a large number found Bolshevism unpalatable and returned to India at the first opportunity. \(^ {163}\) Another reason was that the Bolshevists, on whose support the project largely depended, were not really interested in 'liberating' India by armed action. \(^ {164}\) Indeed, it has been suggested that the Bolshevik help to M.N. Roy and other Indian revolutionaries was nothing more than a device to strengthen Soviet Russia's bargaining position against the British. \(^ {165}\)

Whether or not the Bolshevists had ever been serious, it is a fact that by the middle of 1921, they had no intention of military conquest and had decided instead to infiltrate India with underground movements and secret

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\(^ {161}\) V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 211 and 212, Sept. 15 and 23, 1920, CP. Also see The Times, Sept. 22, 1920; and Aybek, op. cit., I, p. 213.

\(^ {162}\) Muzaffar Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 54-55. Also see the note wherein the writer has cited from the memoirs of muhajir Pazle Elahi Qurban.

\(^ {163}\) They were returning as late as Oct. 1921. The Govt. kept them under surveillance and took measures to prevent driving their activities underground. See C/C, N.W.F.P., to Foreign Secy., Govt. of India, Tel. P., No. 590-P., Oct. 29, 1921, RP.

\(^ {164}\) Dr. Imam (op. cit., p. 147) maintains that in 1920, no responsible Soviet leader, except perhaps Trotsky, seriously thought of doing so by force of arms.

\(^ {165}\) Ibid., p. 147.
agents. Furthermore, though the Afghans had toyed with the idea of invading India, they were suspicious of the Bolshevists and in the end refused to play their game. In March 1921, Jemal Pasha was compelled to leave Afghanistan for Moscow. Anglo-Afghan relations had also improved, and, as a consequence, in October 1922, Obeidullah Sindhi and his associates were forced to leave Kabul for Russia and other countries. The project also suffered because of the disappearance of its chief leaders. Talaat Pasha fell victim to an Armenian assassin in Berlin in March 1921; Jemal Pasha was assassinated by an Armenian nationalist in Tiflis in 1922; and Enver Pasha died fighting against the Bolshevists in August 1922.

In retrospect the hijrat of 1920 remains a curious phenomenon. In a way it reflects the depths of Muslim frustration. The Khilafat movement had made the Indian Muslims desperate and the hijrat was the result. But in spite of the fact that the object of the campaign was clearly anti-British and the excitement ran high, the muhajirin played an important role in the Communist Party of Pakistan and Shaukat Usmani (b. 1900), Shafig Ahmad, Ghulam Husain and Rafiq Ahmad became foremost leaders of the Indian communism. See Madras Mail, Nov. 27, 1922; the experiences of muhajir Abdul Qadir in The Times, Feb. 26 and 27, 1930; the narrative of a muhajir in Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah, The Tragedy of Amanullah, London, 1933, pp. 150-56; Communist in India, 1924-1927, pp. 9-10 and 70; Muzaffar Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 34-35 and 90-91; Shaukat Usmani, I Met Stalin Twice, Bombay, 1953, pp. 21-22; and Druhe, op. cit., p. 35.

The information was supplied by a nephew of Dr. Abdul Ghani to Grant. See Chelmsford to Montagu, Aug. 25, 1920, CP. Also see the The Times, Aug. 17, 1920; Aybek, op. cit., I, pp. 226 and 228-33; and M.N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 403 and 443-44.


See The Times, March 16 and 17, 1921 and Oct. 22, 1922; and Aybek, op. cit., I, p. 226.
remained completely non-violent. The whole campaign looked artificial. No doubt the hijrat, in the context of classical Islamic juristic interpretations and Indian political developments, was neither illogical nor an isolated event, but it was ill-conceived, miscalculated and ill-organised. It ignored all economic and political realities. The advocates of the hijrat were in fact tricked into involvement by the machinations of the Afghan diplomacy. Once the Afghan relations improved with Britain, they disowned any responsibility. The ulama who made the hijrat mandatory and the leaders who encouraged it, in a moment of extreme anti-British temper, closed their eyes to its consequences. In theory, it was all very well that Muslims should leave India and then reconquer it; but accomplishment of this in practice depended largely on the assistance of the Bolshevists, the Afghans and the Turks. However pious the organisers' intentions may have been, they unconsciously pushed the Indian Muslims into a disastrous adventure.

The hijrat caused considerable disruption for large numbers of people in a number of areas. In addition to the 40,000 muhajirin estimated by the Afghans, over 7,000 had emigrated after the Amir's postponement order. Besides, small parties had gone to Khost as late as September 1920, and a large number of the muhajirin had wound their way to Afghanistan through routes other than the Khyber. The total numbers involved may safely be estimated at between fifty and sixty thousand.\footnote{171} The areas most affected, from which the bulk

\footnote{171} The number of the muhajirin has been variously estimated between 18,000 and two million. A muhajir in his account states that at one time in Kabul alone, the number had reached 1,25,000 and more were coming. Another muhajir puts the total at 23,000, while a third believes it was 36,000. According to the Govt. of India's estimation approximately 30,000 muhajirin had emigrated to Afghanistan, PP, 1921, (202), Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the year 1920, Fifty-sixth Number, p. 52; Briggs, op. cit., p. 165; Sokhta, op. cit., p. 31; Abdul Qadir's memoirs, The Times, Feb. 25, 1930; Usmani, Peshawar to Moscow, p. 2; Met Stalin Twice, p. 2; V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 698, Aug. 21, 1920, J&P, 6882/20. However, the figure 50,000/60,000 seems more plausible.
of the muhajirin came, were the Frontier, especially Peshawar
district, followed in turn by the Punjab, Sind and other places of
India. Personal suffering was enormous. The road from the Frontier
to Kabul was dotted with graves of the muhajirin, not to mention
those who perished in Afghanistan or in Russia. According to an
eyewitness the Khyber pass was littered with corpses. It took
a long time for the people involved to recover from the disaster.

172 The Times, Nov. 30, 1920.
174 Years later, Husain Ahmad Madni compared the sufferings of the
hijrat with the hardships undergone by the Muslim refugees in
1947 as an argument against the partition of India and the creation
of Pakistan. See Madni to M. Siddique, n.d., in Najmuddin Islahi,
The hijrat fever was still gripping the North Indian Muslims when on August 1, 1920, no revision of the Turkish peace terms having been announced, the CKC formally launched the non-co-operation campaign by observing a Khilafat Day - the third since the inception of the movement. Those among the Khilafatists who honestly believed that the launching was premature or that they should wait for the Congress verdict, also decided, at the last moment, to abide by the CKC's order. Fairly complete hartals were observed in many parts of the country, with Hindus, especially in the Punjab and the Frontier, generally participating unwillingly. Public meetings advised non-co-operation and resolved to continue it until a modification of the peace terms, consistent with Muslim sentiments and Islamic law, was secured. On the day of the inauguration and subsequently, a number of leading Muslims and Hindus returned their medals, renounced titles and resigned from honorary posts, seats in the legislatures and law practices. The Khilafat movement, fused with the Punjab 'wrong', emerged through non-co-operation, as a forceful drive towards the political reconstruction of India.

1 J&P, 72/20.
2 See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 635, Aug. 6, 1920, CP.
Following the inauguration of the non-co-operation campaign, the CKC made a determined effort to organise propaganda in the districts with the help of the provincial committees. But in order not to afford the Government an excuse to smash the movement prematurely, the CKC instructed its subordinate organisations to maintain non-violence in speech and action in the campaign. The main task of campaigning fell on the shoulders of Shaukat Ali who, since his release in 1919, had emerged as the most powerful leader among the Khilafatists. Chotani, the President of the CKC, was merely a figurehead. Abdul Bari, his preceptor, was no propagandist and had chosen to remain unobtrusively behind scenes. Mohamed Ali was still in Europe with the delegation. Abul Kalam Azad, Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Mohani and others who were leaders in their own right had to be content with a second place. At Shaukat Ali's side was also Gandhi, who, after Tilak's death on August 1, and the powerlessness of the Congress leaders to oppose him, had been left the chief figure among the Hindus. Both Shaukat Ali and Gandhi were conscious of their power and influence and also that the Government was afraid to touch them, and used these advantages with remarkable skill. Their own interdependence was extraordinary. None could do without the other. Shaukat Ali pretended to follow Gandhi and his non-violence and called him Bapu - though the age difference was only four years. Gandhi owed much of his power to the Khilafatists under Shaukat Ali and could not afford to forsake him. In order to lead he had to follow. No wonder that when Malaviya appealed to Gandhi to suspend the campaign till the Congress had given its verdict, the latter declined to 'prove untrue to the Mussalman brethren'. With them, he said, non-co-operation had become a religious duty and they could not wait for the Congress decision: 'In matters of conscience the Law of Majority has no place'.

5 At some places in Northern India individual agitators were getting out of hand. In Lucknow, for instance, Hakim Abdul Qavi, in a speech on Aug. 1, even justified the declaration of jihad 'in order to make the world safe for Islam'. Haqigat (Lucknow), Aug. 20, 1920, UPNNR 1920, pp. 501-2.


7 CW, XVIII, pp. 112-13 and 123.
All through the month of August 1920, Shaukat Ali and Gandhi, accompanied by their entourage, went about their whirlwind tour of the country, particularly parts of the Madras Presidency, which had been the stormy petrel of politics in recent months. But in spite of their efforts, the outcome of the non-co-operation experiment was still uncertain. The pockets of resistance even among Muslims were quite strong. There were still many who objected to the specific items of non-co-operation like the boycott of professions, services and Councils. In Madras, for instance, Kuddus Badshah, the President of the provincial Khilafat committee, and his brother Abdul Aziz Sahib were refusing to renounce their titles. In the U.P., Syed Zahur Ahmad of Lucknow insisted that these specific boycotts amounted to 'political suicide of backward minority community particularly when non-Muslims [were] not boycotting them'.

In Bombay Mirza Ali Mohammed Khan was actively working to make the Reform Scheme a success. In the Punjab Fazl-i-Husain and Iqbal were leading the resistance. And in Bengal Fazlul Haq's enthusiasm against the triple boycott led him to take up his 'crusade' in the press. There were others who rejected the entire non-co-operation scheme. They no doubt regretted the Allied decision over Turkey and the British attitude towards the Punjab affair, but were against resorting to an extreme measure. Among them the Raja of Mahmudabad, Umar Hayat Malik, Shah Nawaz Bhutto (b. 1868) and Sir Abdur Rahim (1867-1952), along with several other Hindu-Muslim Members of the Imperial Legislative Council, publicly dissociated themselves from the non-co-operation campaign. Others like Syed

10 Ibid., p. 306.
11 Times of India, Aug. 23, 1920.
12 Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, Bombay, 1946, p. 106; and A.H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, Lahore, 1950, p. 177.
14 Times of India, Aug. 30, 1920.
Nawab Ali Chowdhuri (1863-1929), Maulana A.L. Ahmed of Cossipore and Nawab Habibollah of Dacca objected to the scheme on personal, religious or political grounds.\(^\text{15}\)

The CKC was not at all complacent about the Muslim dissident groups, but the Hindu attitude concerned it more. Without the support of the majority community the Khilafatists felt insecure. Since the Allahabad Conference of June 1920, there had been hardly any change in the attitude of the Congress leaders. Rather, their hostility towards non-co-operation had increased after the inauguration of the scheme. The moderates in particular, saw it as 'bizarre in its conception and utterly impracticable'.\(^\text{16}\) Specially distasteful to them was the boycott of the Reformed councils, which not only threatened to deprive them of any share in the enhanced power and prestige, but also endangered the early realisation of Home Rule for India. Understandably, Mrs. Besant called it 'a National suicide'.\(^\text{17}\) Sir P.S. Sivaswami Aiyer (1864-1946) considered it an 'ill-advised' campaign 'fraught with disaster to the country'.\(^\text{18}\) V.S. Srinivasa Sastri thought it was illogical and harmful.\(^\text{19}\) Srinivasa Iyengar (1874-1941) pronounced the third and fourth stages as definitely illegal and unconstitutional.\(^\text{20}\) The same was the opinion of


\(^\text{16}\) Dinshaw Wacha to Chelmsford, Aug. 21, 1920, CP.

\(^\text{17}\) Annie Besant, ed., Gandhian Non-Co-Operation or Shall India Commit Suicide?, Madras, 1920, p. v.

\(^\text{18}\) S. Aiyer, 'The Khilafat Situation', ibid., pp. 7-8.


\(^\text{20}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 667, Aug. 13, 1920, CP.
Malaviya. Some like Narayan Chandavarkar (1855-1923) and Jammadas Dwarkadas (1890-) questioned it on grounds of religion and practicability. Others dubbed it as 'a weapon of revenge and retaliation'. About a dozen non-official Members of the Imperial Legislative Council issued their public disapproval - they included Surendranath Banerjea (1848-1925), Sunder Singh Majithia (1872-1941), R.D. Tata and were joined later by Dinshaw Wacha (1844-1936), S.M. Chitnavis (1863-1931), and S. Sinha (1871-1950). The moderates were so strongly opposed to non-co-operation that when invited to attend the forthcoming Special Congress at Calcutta in September 1920, Banerjea reacted by explaining the uselessness of attending a Congress where the acceptance of the scheme was a foregone conclusion.

The 'extremists' too were still divided. In July 1920, Lajpat Rai had advocated the boycott of the reformed Councils, but though the Non-Co-Operation Committee had quickly incorporated his suggestion in its programme along with the boycotts of schools and courts, the Punjab leader himself had proved undecided. Motilal Nehru was concerned about, among other things, the spread of violence as exhibited by the murder of R.W.D. Willoughby (Deputy Commissioner of Kheri in Oudh) by a Muslim fanatic in August 1920. The Bengalis

26 Indulal K. Yajnik, Gandhi as I knew him, Bombay, 1933, p. 110.
27 Ibid., pp. 111-12. Also see CW, XVII, p. 13.
and the Maharashtrians - C.R. Das, B.C. Pal, Byomkesh Chakravarty (1855-1929), G.S. Khaparde, N.C. Kelkar, Vithalbhai Patel and others - were as sceptical as ever. They agreed that non-co-operation was a perfectly constitutional weapon in a political struggle against the Government, but were loath to its extension to the new legislative bodies, which they believed needed to be boycotted from within. They were also against its application to schools and law courts. Besides, their personal rivalry with Gandhi and a sense of deep-seated cultural and temperamental differences with him prevented them from making a tame submission to the non-co-operation scheme.

No less important was the reluctance of the Hindu leaders to support an essentially Muslim campaign. True, non-co-operation had been the brain-child of Gandhi, but it was an item of the Khilafat programme, formulated solely to redress the Khilafat 'wrong'. In its final workable form it had been shaped and developed by the Khalifatists themselves, with a religious overtone imparted to it first by Syud Hossain and Azad and then by Abdul Bari and Mahmud Hassan. No doubt the Punjab issue had been yoked with it to make it more acceptable to Hindus, but the direction of the campaign, despite Gandhi's efforts to the contrary, had remained in the hands of the Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC of which Gandhi was just one member. It must have been even more disconcerting to the Hindus to find Gandhi claiming himself to be a Khilafatist and

31 See, e.g., the Bengal leaders' antipathy towards the Khilafatists. Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 157; and Al. Carthill, op. cit., p. 277.
33 See above pp. 79 and 88. For Abdul Bari see Naqush, CIX, p. 13; and for Mahmud Hassan see Hazrat Shaikh Mahmud-ul-Hassan /sic/ ke ek Zaruri Khat, issued by Masud Ali Nadvi on behalf of the Khilafat Committee, Azamgarh, n.d.
touring the country on the finances provided from the Khilafat funds. Such being the case, the majority of the Hindu leaders, despite the inclination of some provincial Congress committees to accept the non-co-operation principle, preferred to wait a decision by the Special Congress.

The policy of the Government of India was generally one of watchfulness, with isolated attempts at repression. Except in the case of Pir Mahbub Shah of Sind, Zafar Ali Khan of the Punjab and a few others who were jailed, the action was confined to insignificant local agitators. The contemplated action against the Executive of the Non-Co-Operation Committee was dropped when the Advocate-General of Bombay advised that the case would not stand against it. Some provincial governors, particularly Ronaldshay (1876-1961) of Bengal and Willingdon (1866-1941) of Madras, reeled at the Government of India's 'masterly inactivity' and had wished to proceed against Shaukat Ali and Gandhi but Chelmsford, taking an all-India view of the situation, bided his time. He was optimistic that 'this most foolish of all foolish schemes' would be repudiated by the 'thinking people'. If not, he maintained, 'the Government is bound to and will use all the resources at its disposal'. On September 4, 1920, the Government of India issued a circular letter to the Local Governments explaining its position and justifying the policy of

34 CW, XX, p. 523.
35 For the attitude of the Congress leaders and the provincial Committees between August 1 and the Special Congress see J.M. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 251-61.
36 J&P, 5446 and 5259/20. Action against Zafar Ali Khan was prompted no less by the Nizam's coaxing than by his political activities. See the Nizam to Chelmsford, July 8 and Aug. 12, 1920, and Chelmsford to the Nizam, July 19 and Sept. 4, 1920, CP.
38 See Ronaldshay to Montagu, Aug. 17 1920, MP. Also see Willingdon to Montagu, Aug. 8, 1920, MP.
40 PILC, LIX, 1920, pp. 4-5. Also see ICHPP, Aug. 1920, Proc. No. 128.
caution. The pith of the argument was that it was expedient to wait and see rather than risk escalation by hasty repression. But the Government of India agreed that the Local Governments should take vigorous action and prosecute all incitements to violence.\footnote{J&F, 6763/20.}

Early in September 1920, the Khilafatists, aided by Gandhi, descended upon Calcutta to capture the Special Congress. Special Khilafat trains were arranged to take the delegates to Calcutta;\footnote{Speeches and Writings of M.K. Gandhi, introduction by C.F. Andrews, Madras, 1922, p. 46.} The opposition too, came determined to give a concerted battle. But Motilal Nehru, the man who had counselled the opposition to put up a united front, himself paused and reflected, and coaxed by his son Jawaharlal (1889-1964), went over to the other side.\footnote{Kanji Dwarkadas, Gandhiji Through My Diary Leaves, 1915-1948, Bombay, 1950, p. 25. Also see B.R. Nanda, The Nehrus, London, 1962, pp. 183-85.}

In order to show their strength to the Hindus, the Khilafatists held their Conference (September 5) before the Congress took up the discussion on non-co-operation. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders were also invited. In the absence of the indisposed Mahmud Hassan of Deoband, the presidential chair was occupied by Abdul Majid of Badaun. Amidst wild enthusiasm, the Khilafat Conference unanimously reaffirmed its stand with regard to non-co-operation as an absolutely binding religious obligation and resolved to continue incessant agitation against the Turkish peace terms until Muslim demands were accepted. The Conference appealed for at least thirty lakhs of rupees and urged the provincial Khilafat committees to organise volunteer corps.\footnote{Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 7, 1920.} Under extreme pressure from Shaukat Ali and other Khilafatists the Muslim League also felt that it could not stand aloof. In spite of Jinnah's advice 'to weigh pros and cons of the question before you arrive at a decision',\footnote{Englishman, Sept. 8, 1920.} the League decided to follow the CKO.\footnote{Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1920.}
When the proposition of non-co-operation was brought before the Congress it was debated for three days in the subjects committee before being finally accepted by a narrow majority: 144 votes to 132. The Muslim dominance had swung the balance in favour of non-co-operation. The discussion in the subject committee was so heated that at one point 'Shaukat Ali threatened to lay violent hands on Jinnah', the solitary Muslim opposing the motion, and 'was only prevented from doing so by the physical intervention of other delegates'. The opposition subjected Gandhi to considerable heckling, but he resisted all pressure to abandon the campaign.

When he found that the feeling was running high against him, he threatened to go ahead with it whether or not the Congress accepted it.

When the resolution was moved in the open Congress on September 8, Gandhi refused to admit that non-co-operation would lead to violence or bloodshed, maintaining that if it were adopted and practised in the manner he had presented it 'you can gain your Swaraj in one year'. B.C. Pal of Bengal tried delaying tactics by proposing that before embarking on non-co-operation they should approach the British Prime Minister by a delegation with regard to their demands. In the meantime they should re-examine the question of non-co-operation and participate in the elections. Pal was supported by Malaviya, Jinnah, C.R. Das and Baptista, but, in the end, his motion was thrown out. Gandhi's resolution, managed by a juggler and toned down with regard to the boycott of schools and

47 Ronaldshay to Montagu, Sept. 22, 1920, MP.
48 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 789, Sept. 26, 1920, OP.
49 Ibid.
50 Englishman, Sept. 9, 1920.
51 Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 9, 1920.
52 The voters were asked to vote either for Gandhi's motion or Pal's amendment and those who were totally opposed to non-co-operation were given no chance to express their opinion. Moreover, Omar Sobani and Shaukaratal added over a hundred 'delegates' from the streets on the day of the voting. See Kanji Dwarkadas, Gandhiji Through My Diary Leaves, p. 25.
courts, was accepted on September 9 by 1826 votes to 884.

Thus, the Congress was compelled to adopt the whole programme of the CKC, even though the character of its decision had been advisory and not mandatory and the acceptance due more to estrangement from the Government and to the personal influence of Gandhi than to the intrinsic soundness of the programme. Partly, the acceptance was due to pressure from the Khilafatists who successfully swung the balance in the subjects committee and then influenced the decision in the open Congress. The Muslim dominance was so visible that at one point Joseph Baptista accused Gandhi of 'handing over the Congress to the Mahomedans'. How deeply the Congress was committed to the restoration of the Khilafat is a matter of conjecture, but the Calcutta decision gave the Khilafat movement the semblance of being a truly national movement. The acceptance of non-co-operation a month later by the Sikh League made the movement even more widespread. The opposition was gradually pushed into the corner, the most prominent victory having been the capture of the Home Rule League. Jinnah, with eighteen others, resigned his membership and refused to come back 'for I am fully convinced that it [non-co-operation] must lead to disaster'.

The CKC and the Congress now pooled their resources for a vigorous campaign for non-co-operation. When early in October 1920, Mohamed Ali returned from Europe with the delegation, he took upon himself the larger share of the burden. He and the other members of the delegation were now fully convinced that real work

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53 A third adjective, 'gradual', was added to the clause recommending 'non-violent' and 'progressive' non-co-operation.

54 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 747, Sept. 10, 1920, CP. The voting figures are, however, divergent in various sources. See, e.g., CW, XVIII, p. 260; Englishman and Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1920; and Hindu, Sept. 16, 1920.

55 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 789, Sept. 26, 1920, CP.


had to be done in India itself. In the areas, such as the Eastern Punjab where the Sikhs were numerically strong, the task was shared by the Central Sikh League. The activity was not limited to urban areas but the rural areas were also involved. More or less the same pattern was followed in all the provinces. Particular attention was paid to opening branches in important mufassil centres and to conducting the campaign through deputations and social and economic ostracism. In larger cities effort was directed towards industrial labour. The wide-spread economic discontent due to the widening gap between prices and wages and the industrial unrest were just ideal for the non-co-operators to exploit. Within the span of a few months there had been over a dozen strikes in different parts of the country, ranging from the Post and Telegraph strike in Bombay to the Police strike in Bengal. The CKC appointed paid itinerant lecturers, coached by its Propaganda Committee, to disseminate propaganda. There were also a number of other secret workers and emissaries spread all over the country for the same purpose.

Another instrument for gaining control of the movement was the corps of volunteers, recruited by the provincial Khilafat, Congress and Sikh organisations. Volunteer organisations were not new to India. They had been fairly conspicuous during the 'revolutionary'

60 V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 836 and 859, Oct. 16 and 24, 1920, CP.
61 As early as May 1919, Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, had expressed the opinion that 'if serious trouble occurred the fate of the Caliph might be the excuse, but the price of food would be the real cause'. Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, May 22, 1919, CP.
62 V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 836 and 859, Oct. 16 and 24, 1920, CP.
For a specimen of lectures for the preparations of preachers issued on behalf of the Propaganda Committee of the CKC, see Abdul Majid Badauni, Dars-i-Khilafat, I, Badaun, 1920.
63 Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan of the Punjab, Maulavi Muhammad Ishaq of Mansehra and Maulavi Laqaullah of Panipat were a few among them. Interview with Malik Lal Khan, ex-Secy. of the Punjab Khilafat Committee, at Lahore in Sept. 1966.
activities in Bengal between 1905 and 1908. But the new volunteers assumed a somewhat different character, developing a tendency to initiate military methods with identical ranks. Every evening Muslim volunteers drilled and paraded in the streets of major towns in Turkish military uniforms and incorporated the Egyptian and Irish militancy in their methods.\(^{64}\) The results were not comparable with those in Ireland, but the non-co-operators were able to utilise the volunteers quite effectively as a potent instrument of social boycott against those who refused to subscribe to non-co-operation.\(^{65}\) Particular targets of ostracism were the Qadiani Ahmadis against whom feelings ran very high.\(^{66}\) This militant attitude of the volunteers afforded the Government an opportunity to ban the volunteer organisations.\(^{67}\) But even then these corps remained operative in most parts.

Equally important in the propaganda campaign was the utilisation of the press media. Every day the nationalist newspapers and journals carried a number of articles in favour of the non-co-operation campaign. Marmaduke Pickthall was especially brought out from Britain and entrusted with the editorship of the \textit{Bombay Chronicle}. \(^{68}\) Later, the \textit{Khilafat}, the official organ of the CKC, was also handed over to him. Part of the propaganda appeared in the form of an endless


\(^{65}\) \textit{J&P}, 570/21. Even Hajee Ismail Sait (1859-1934), a wealthy and influential merchant of South India who had amply donated for the Khilafat Fund, could not escape intimidation. \textit{Hindu}, Jan. 13, 1921. The ugliest instance in this regard occurred at Delhi when the volunteers obstructed the burial of a dead-body of a Muslim title-holder for having refused to renounce his title when alive. See Chelmsford to Montagu, Dec. 8, 1920, \textit{MP}.


\(^{67}\) \textit{J&P}, 570/21.

number of pamphlets, poems and polemics (besides magazine and newspaper articles) by writers of all sorts. The bulk of this material, both in the vernacular and in English, was meant to arouse public feelings by exploiting the usual theme of 'Islam in Danger' or the 'machinations' of the Christian Powers and directly preached non-co-operation with the Government until their demands were met. Some of the pamphlets were so inflammatory that they were proscribed and confiscated by the Government.

Attention was also paid to collecting huge subscriptions for the national funds. The public collections for the Khilafat funds had begun from January 1920. Previous to that most of the items of expenditure were borne personally by Chotani. The Second all-India Khilafat Conference at Bombay in February 1920, fixed the target as thirty lakhs of rupees. The funds were classified under two heads - the Khilafat Fund and the Smyrna Fund. The first was utilised for the movement in India. Some provision was also made for the assistance of those who were willing to give up Government services under non-co-operation, and were anxious to seek private employment. The families of the Khilafat workers, who were subjected to official repression and went to jail, were given some financial support. At one stage it was contemplated to support national education and new trades and industries. The Smyrna Fund was meant for the aid of the Turks. Eventually in September 1921, a third fund, known as the Angora Fund, was started to help Mustafa Kemal and his Turkish Nationalists. For all practical purposes the Smyrna Fund was then merged with the Angora Fund. Besides, the provincial Khilafat committees had their own funds, part of which was regularly surrendered to the CKC. The collections were normally placed as trust with dependable men and never deposited in the banks.

69 A list of the pamphlets in the India Office, including those proscribed, is appended separately in the bibliography of this thesis.

70 See the third and the fourth statements of income and expenditure of the CKC. For this reference the writer is indebted to Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Advocate-General of Pakistan, Karachi.

71 Hindu, July 12, 1923.
for fear of the funds being frozen by the Government. 72

Apart from direct appeals for funds, the CKC issued 'paper currency' in the form of one-rupee receipts resembling a one-rupee note in shape and size but superscribed in Urdu with quotations from the Quran. The 'currency' obtained a considerable circulation, reaching as far as Rangoon in Burma. 73 Its success prompted the Khilafatists to propound schemes for the provision of minting Khilafat rupee, professing to be of slightly greater value than the standard rupee. They were to be banked at the Khilafat offices and issued in exchange for note issues. 74 The Congress too had resolved in October 1920, to start a national fund of one crore rupees called Tilak Swaraj Fund and invited the provincial Congress committees to make arrangements for the collection. 75

In the fund raising campaign the major donations came from the wealthy Indian commercial community which was incensed at the Government for fixing the rupee exchange rate at a ratio (10 rupees to a gold sovereign) unfavourable to Indian interests. 76 Within a few years the rupee exchange had shot up from 1s. 4d. in the beginning of 1917 to 2s. 4d. in December 1919. 77 As the new rate had synchronised with a marked fall in the American rate for sterling, within few days of its announcement the exchange advanced from 2s. 4d. to 2s. 1ld. and continued to rise. 78 The Indian market was

72 Interview with Malik Lal Khan, above, n. 63. At the end of 1920, the total receipts were Rs. 6,43,766 and expenditure Rs. 4,73,688. The total receipts during 1921 were Rs. 20,99,789 out of which Rs. 5,34,057 were remitted to Smyrna and Rs. 3,75,231 to Angora. See Report by Col. Kaye of the C.I.D. dated May 24, 1922, Home Pol., May 1922, No. 741. The writer is indebted to Dr. R.A. Gordon for this reference.
73 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 908, Nov. 23, 1920, CP.
74 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 991, Dec. 22, 1920, CP.
75 Bombay Chronicle, Oct. 8, 1920.
78 The Times, Feb. 9, 1920.
demoralised and business seriously handicapped. A belief became current that the policy was designed 'to sap the prosperity of India, and to stimulate Britain's export trade'. No wonder the Indian commercial classes poured huge amounts into the anti-British nationalist movement. It was this combination of the fall in exchange and in rupee prices which later intensified the swadeshi campaign.

In order to strengthen religious appeal to the non-co-operation programme already formalised by Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari, the CKC mobilised the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. In their support for non-co-operation, the ulama generally had been attracted by the same 'tactical' reason as the politicians, i.e., to press the Muslim demands on the Government. But there was more to it. The ulama also wished to use non-co-operation against the growing secularism: the legislative bodies would be replaced by a committee of ulama, the 'infidel' law courts by shari courts and Government schools by dar-ul-ulum. Consequently, the Jamiyat met at Delhi on November 19-21, 1920, under the chairmanship of Mahmud Hassan, and drew up a fatwa mainly on the lines of the one issued in October by the chairman himself. The fatwa, attested unanimously by about 120 prominent ulama, supported the entire non-co-operation programme, item by item,

79 Ibid.
on the basis of the Quranic text and the sayings of the Prophet.\textsuperscript{84} But the proceedings of the Jamiyat were kept secret for the time being and it was not until the following year that the Muttafigqa Fatwa, as the decision came to be known, was published. In the meantime, the leaders concentrated their energies on achieving such amount of success as would compel the forthcoming Congress at Nagpur in December 1920, to confirm the acceptance of the non-co-operation policy.

Meanwhile, in spite of Gandhi's claim that the campaign had passed 'the stage of ridicule',\textsuperscript{85} the success, particularly in the field of titles and honorary posts, was nominal. (See Table III). Later in February 1921, it was calculated that only twenty-one out of a total of over 5,000 title-holders had renounced their titles,\textsuperscript{86} whereas each half-year there were at least a hundred ready acceptances of new titles. But the non-co-operators were themselves not treating this aspect very seriously.\textsuperscript{87} Their shock came with regard to the lawyers. Litigants had been urged not to go to the law courts for the redress of their grievances.\textsuperscript{88} Alternatively, a well-graded system of national arbitration, with the age-old institution of the panchayat as its basic unit, was proposed to decide the cases.\textsuperscript{89} Some efforts were made to put it into practice and lawyers were directed to induce parties not only to refer disputes to arbitration but also to withdraw the pending cases from the Government courts and

\textsuperscript{84} For the text of the fatwa see Ulama-i-Hind ka Muttafigqa Fatwa, leaflet issued by Muhammad Mobin, Nazim, Jamiyat-i-Khilafat, Deoband, n.d.; and P.C. Bamford, The Histories of Non-Co-Operation and Khilafat Movements, Delhi, 1925, Appendix G, pp. 251-55.

\textsuperscript{85} CW, XVIII, p. 358.

\textsuperscript{86} PP, 1921, (202), Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1920, Fifty-Sixth Number, p. 57, n.

\textsuperscript{87} Mohamed Ali to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said, [May, 1921], enclosure, Montagu to Reading, Dec. 22, 1921, RP.

\textsuperscript{88} Muhammad Ibrahim, Girah Katon ka Photo, Badaun, 1922, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{89} For details see M. Asaf Ali, Constructive Non-Co-Operation, Madras, [1921].
to submit them to the national courts.\textsuperscript{90} Even sanads were granted to counsels and petition-writers on payment of an annual fee.\textsuperscript{91} Financial aid was offered to those lawyers who were affected by the loss of their legal practice.\textsuperscript{92} But the experiment of national courts was a failure. The cases brought before them were few and mostly pertained to divorce or the recovery of lost women.\textsuperscript{93} Failure to enforce their decisions was the chief hurdle and the remedy of social boycott was never effective. Most often the findings were ignored. Therefore, hardly any cognisable cases were dealt with by them.\textsuperscript{94} Some barristers, vakils and mukhtias, counting such prominent names as Rajendra Prasad (1884-1963), T.A.K. Sherwani, Asaf Ali (1888-1953), Motilal, C.R. Des, Khaliquzzaman (1889-1973), did suspend their legal practices, but few could discontinue for an indefinite period. The official figures show that up to February 1921, only 99 lawyers throughout India had given up their practices.\textsuperscript{95} (See Table IV).

The only striking outcome of the boycott was the refusal of the non-co-operators to defend themselves when tried in the Government courts.

Having failed to achieve much in the spheres of titles and boycott of law courts, the non-co-operators directed their attention to the boycott of Government-aided and -controlled schools and colleges. They had been quick to perceive that the educational institutions were best-suited for disseminating non-co-operation doctrines. In order to win support the non-co-operators launched an attack against the entire educational system. They argued that the system was alien and irrelevant\textsuperscript{96} and that it was degrading to accept

\textsuperscript{90} Report on Draft Instructions for Congress Organisations, CW, XVIII, p. 282.
\textsuperscript{91} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 836, Oct. 16, 1920, CP.
\textsuperscript{92} Report on Draft Instruction, CW, XVIII, p. 281.
\textsuperscript{93} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 859, Oct. 24, 1920, CP.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Initially, Hindu lawyers were reluctant to give up practices. See Masud Ali Nadvi to Abdul Bari, July 28, 1920, Nuqush, CIX, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{96} Jayakar, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 368-9; and T.L. Vaswani, \textit{The Gospel of Freedom}, Madras, 1921, pp. 31-50.
it after the Khilafat breach and the Punjab 'wrong'.

Though there was difference of opinion among the non-co-operators as to how a new system was to be instituted, the campaign was facilitated by the readiness of the student community to breakaway from the Government system. By doing so they imagined to be helping the national cause in some obscure way. Besides, there was among the students a steady recognition that the course of education imparted to them was not helpful in terms of career. Thus, the political appeal was strengthened by the economic factor. Added encouragement came from a fatwa to the effect that in such matters filial disobedience was not contrary to the Islamic religion. At a time when the whole system was reacting to the political unrest the economic discontent of the low paid teachers rendered the position particularly vulnerable.

The first target of the educational non-co-operation was the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh in the U.P., planned and established by Syed Ahmed Khan in 1877. The College, though not a Government institution, was dependent on the Government for its sustenance and its patronage for appointments. Encouraged by firebrands among the Aligarh students, the Ali brothers and Gandhi descended upon Aligarh on October 11, 1920. A letter signed by the Ali brothers and six other Trustees was addressed to the general body of the Trustees and the students of the College, advising them to undo

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97 CW, XVIII, p. 307.
100 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 678, Nov. 11, 1920, CP. Also see Hazrat Shaikh Mahmud-ul-Hassan /sic/ ka ek Zaruri Khat, above, n. 33.
101 The salaries of the teachers bordered on the minimum necessary for existence. The U.P. report observed - and it was common throughout India - that in many districts teachers' unions were being formed to enforce their demands for better pay. See Indian Education in 1920-21, Bureau of Education, India, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 2-3.
102 Abdul Ghaffar Mudholi, Jamia ki Kahani, Delhi, 1965, pp. 19-20.
Government interference and transform their institution into a National University by renouncing Government grant, disaffiliating the College from the Allahabad University, and refusing the expected charter of the Muslim University. The non-co-operators called upon the students that if by October 29 the demands were not accepted by the Trustees they should withdraw themselves from the College. The students were persuaded to pass a similar resolution. Gandhi too addressed a letter to the Trustees advising action against the 'satanic' Government.

The Trustees were compelled to approach the parents and the Old Boys of the College to intervene and save the only Muslim institution of repute from being destroyed. The Government also mobilised its forces to counter the Khilafatists who had gathered at Aligarh. Butler, the Lt.-Governor of the U.P., 'whipped up' a number of Trustees to reach Aligarh. The Begum of Bhopal, who was one of the principal financial supporters, despatched her son, Nawabzada Hamidullah Khan (1894-1960), himself an Old Boy of the College and a Trustee, 'to do his bit'. She, like the Nawab of Rampur, also temporarily withdrew the Bhopal students and even threatened to stop the grant-in-aid to the College if the Trustees succumbed to the Khilafatists' demands. Dr. Zia-Uddin Ahmad (1879-1947), the Principal, pointed to the possibility of losing over one and a half lakhs of rupees annually in case the Government grants were refused. He also warned that the land on which the

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103 Report submitted by Nawabzada Hamidullah Khan, Chief Secy. Bhopal Govt., to the Begum of Bhopal, Oct. 31, 1920, enclosure, Begum of Bhopal to Chelmsford, Nov. 3, 1920, CP. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 875, Nov. 4, 1920, CP.
106 Dr. Zia-Uddin Ahmad to Chelmsford, Oct. 26, 1920, CP.
107 See Butler to Vincent, Nov. 10, 1920, BP.
108 Begum of Bhopal to Chelmsford, Nov. 3, 1920, CP.
College building stood would revert to the Government if the institution was nationalised.\textsuperscript{110} As a result, the opposition to the non-co-operators grew strong. A number of parents and Trustees arrived in Aligarh to help the College authorities.\textsuperscript{111}

On October 27, 1920, a crucial meeting of the Trustees was held at Aligarh. The Ali brothers and their fellow signatories of the 'ultimatum' were also invited. After a heated discussion, the Trustees successfully resisted the non-co-operators and rejected their demand by a majority of 48 to 11.\textsuperscript{112} But the non-co-operators, refusing to admit defeat, occupied part of the College building and on the expiry of the 'ultimatum' on the 29th announced the establishment of the National Muslim University. The College authorities called in the police and ejected the Ali brothers from the premises. The latter, with a hundred and fifty students, moved out and pitched their camp in the immediate vicinity of the College in a couple of hired bungalows and some tents.\textsuperscript{113} The inaugural ceremony of the 'National University', or the Jamia Milliya Islamiya as it was called, was performed on October 30, 1920, by Mahmud Hassan of Deoband.\textsuperscript{114} Ajmal Khan became the Amir-i-Jamia and Mohamed Ali, on Iqbal's refusal, the Shaikh-ul-Jamia. A Foundation Committee of 100 members and a Syndicate of 16 were nominated and educationists from different parts of the country offered their services to teach at the new institution. The CKC sanctioned a sum of Rs. 10,000

\textsuperscript{110} Bhatnagar, op. cit., pp. 342-3
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., p. 342.
\textsuperscript{112} Hamidullah Khan's report above, n. 103. Also see Pioneer, Oct. 29 and 30, 1920.
\textsuperscript{113} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 875, Nov. 4, 1920, CP. Also see Hindu, Nov. 4, 7 and 11, 1920; and Bombay Chronicle, Nov. 4 and 6, 1920
\textsuperscript{114} Hindu, Nov. 4, 1920. Also see Mahmud Hassan, Khutba-i-Sadarat, Vanyambadi, 1921.
annually for the upkeep of the Jamia.\textsuperscript{115}

Contrary to popular misconception the attack on Aligarh was not intended to wreck the College. In fact the idea was to involve the pre-eminent Muslim institution in the nationalist movement\textsuperscript{116} and thus break the official hold over the Muslim community through their acolyte.\textsuperscript{117} The establishment of a separate national university was, therefore, intended to be a temporary measure. The idea was to reunite the Jamia ultimately with the Aligarh College when it was finally captured.\textsuperscript{118} Therefore, there were no clear-cut aims and objects of the National University except that it ventured 'to fuse three ideals into a unity - Western Education, Islam, and nationalism.'\textsuperscript{119} For the present, therefore, on Mohamed Ali's suggestion, all educational activities were suspended and the Jamia was turned into a school for propagandists. The students were given, along with those from other colleges - 200 to 300 in all - practical training in propaganda techniques and then in batches were spread all over India to further the Khilafat movement and to preach non-co-operation.\textsuperscript{120}

To counter the non-co-operators as well as to prevent the Aligarh funds from falling into their hands, the Government decided to speed up the grant of university status to Aligarh.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[$\textsuperscript{115}$] Mudholi, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 31-5 and 479-82.
\item[$\textsuperscript{120}$] See Mohamed Ali to Dr. Said, above, n. 87.
\item[$\textsuperscript{121}$] V to S/S, Tel. F., No. 878, Nov. 11, 1920, CP.
\end{footnotes}
University Act had already been passed in the Assembly in September 1920, but owing to administrative slowness its enforcement was delayed. The timing was now used as a calculated political weapon. The writ was declared operational on December 1, 1920, with the Begum of Bhopal as the Chancellor and the Raja of Mahmudabad as the Vice-Chancellor. Ironically, it was the non-co-operating Khalifatists who had hastened the achievement of a Muslim university.

At other places also, attempts were made to influence the students. Gandhi turned towards Benares the moment he realised that some Muslims were suspecting him of destroying Muslim institutions without touching the Hindu University. But here too the possibility of a success was remote owing to the influence of Malaviya, the Vice-Chancellor. As expected the attempt was successfully resisted by the University Court and Gandhi was compelled to abandon it. On October 20, Gandhi went to Lahore and conferred with the students. As a result students from many colleges came out on strike. Dr. Kitchlew with some squatters occupied a part of the Islamia College and demanded that the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam, the body governing the College, should join the non-co-operation campaign. But the Anjuman was able to weather the storm. At Amritsar the non-co-operators fared better. The students of the Islamia School and Dayanand Anglo-Vedic and Khalsa Colleges went on an all-out strike. The managing committee of the last named was also in favour of doing away with Government control in the management but, when it failed to renounce the Government aid, twelve professors resigned en bloc as a protest. The campaign was also strong in Bombay. At Nadiad one aided school and at Ahmedabad three unaided but recognised

124 V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 878 and 916, Nov. 11 and 27, 1920, CP. Also see CW, XVIII, p. 378; Maulavi Abdul Hakim, Mr. Gandhi Musalmonon ke Hargiz Khairkhan Nahin, Lahore, 1921, p. 3; and Mian Sir Muhammad Shafi, Some Important Indian Probleme, Lahore, 1930, p. 10.
126 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 905, Nov. 20, 1920, CP.
127 Ibid.
schools renounced connections with the Government. At the latter place a national college was opened in the middle of November with Gandhi as Chancellor and Gidwani as Principal.\(^\text{128}\) Another national school, called Tilak Mahavidyalaya, was opened at Poona. A strike was also reported in the Calcutta Madrassa.\(^\text{129}\) Elsewhere, the campaign was not much of a success and few students left their institutions.

Meanwhile, preparations were underway for the elections to the eight Provincial Councils and two Chambers of the Indian Legislature. As the elections approached, the non-co-operators intensified their pressure on the candidates to withdraw their candidature and the voters to abstain from voting. Every kind of tactic - from gentle persuasion to coarse ostracism - was used to achieve the object and the appeal was taken right into the villages.\(^\text{130}\) Leaflets were circulated warning Muslims that anyone standing for Councils or voting for them would cease to be a Muslim.\(^\text{131}\) Hindu mendicants were reported to be going up and down the country warning the Hindus that failure to boycott the elections was equal to killing one hundred kine.\(^\text{132}\) Gandhi issued a manifesto to the voters that they should sign a declaration that, until the Khilafat and the Punjab 'wrongs' were righted and swaraj obtained, they did not wish to be represented.\(^\text{133}\)

The Government countered the boycott by rallying together the moderates, the communalists, the landed aristocracy and the Europeans. To guard against the intimidation by the non-co-operators it publicised widely the penal sections providing penalties for undue pressure on voters or candidates.\(^\text{134}\) But in spite of these precautions,

\(^\text{128}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{129}\) Hindu, Nov. 4, 1920.
\(^\text{130}\) V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 871 and 952, Oct. 30 and Dec. 13, 1920, CP.
\(^\text{131}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 952, Dec. 13, 1920, CP.
\(^\text{132}\) PP, 1921, (202), Statement Moral and Material Progress, 1920, p. 65.
\(^\text{133}\) Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 25, 1920.
\(^\text{134}\) V to S/S, Tel. P., No. - Nov. 8, 1920, CP.
the non-co-operation propaganda was fairly effective. Finding that the CKC and the Congress were unyielding, few nationalists could dare to stand for elections. Others who had wished to contest stepped down out of deference to these bodies. Yet others who had little chance of success at the polls were glad to retire with dignity.\footnote{135} (See Table V).

The result was that out of 774 contested seats 239 went uncontested and, in six cases, there were no candidates at all and the seats had to be filled through bye-elections.\footnote{136} However, the position varied considerably from province to province, the largest number of uncontested seats and the smallest total number of candidates being in the C.P. It is significant that in all the provinces the absence of candidates was most conspicuous in Muslim constituencies, particularly in the urban areas, more especially in the Punjab and Bombay.\footnote{137} The same variation existed in the voting pattern, though non-co-operation was not the only reason. Other factors, such as the floods in Madras and the widening of the franchise generally, had also affected the turn-out. In any case, the pattern of voting varied from constituency to constituency - from 8 per cent. in Bombay City, where the non-co-operators were most successful, to 70 per cent. in some urban constituencies of the Madras Presidency.\footnote{138} Here again the lowest polls were generally recorded in the urban rather than in rural constituencies and, more particularly, in Muslim constituencies.\footnote{139} In some constituencies - in about half a dozen to

\footnote{135} V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 819 and 836, Nov. 9 and 16, 1920, CP. Also see Rajendra Prasad, \textit{At the Feet of Mahatma Gandhi}, London, 1961, p. 91.
\footnote{136} PP, 1921, Cmd. 1261, \textit{Return Showing the Results of Elections in India}, p. iii.
\footnote{137} Ibid., p. iii.
\footnote{139} PP, 1921, Cmd. 1261, pp. iii-iv. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1008, Dec. 29, 1920, CP. The smallness of vote was also confirmed by a later enquiry into the working of the Reforms, see PP, 1925, Cmd. 236, \textit{Report of the Reform Enquiry Committee, 1924}, Minority Report, p. 174.
a dozen cases - the non-co-operators were successful in throwing ridicule at the Government by electing to the Councils men of straw, like an illiterate coolie in Madras, a sweetmeat-seller in Delhi and a mochi in the Bengal Presidency. But the non-co-operators failed to prevent the Councils from being filled. In all there were 1,718 candidates for the 535 contested seats - an average of over three per seat. There were still many Indians who had come to the rescue of the Government. The more important among those who sought the elections successfully were: Pandit Hridayanath Kunzru (b. 1887), C.Y. Chintamani, Syed Raza Ali and the Raja of Mahmudabad in the U.P., Sardar Mehtab Singh, Umar Hayat Malik, Chaudhri Shahab-ud-din (d. 1949), Sikander Hayat Khan (1892-1942), Feroz Khan Noon (1893-1970) and Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daulstana (1896-1948) in the Punjab, Surendranath Banerjee, Nawab Ali Chowdhuri, the Nawab of Dacca and Abdullah al-Mamun, Hassan (1884-1946) and Husayn Shaheed (1893-1963) of the Suhrawardy family in Bengal, C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer (1889-1966), Sivashwami Aiyer, Srinivasa Sastri, K.V. Ranga Swami Iyengar (b. 1886) and R. Srinivasa Iyengar in Madras, S. Sinha in Bihar and Orissa, Dr. H.S. Gour (1866-1949) and G.S. Khaparde in the C.P., and Sir C.H. Setalvad (1866-1947), Jamnadas Dwarkadas, G.M. Bhurgri, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Ebrahim Haroon Jaffer and Ghulam Husain Hidayatallah (1878-1948) in Bombay and Sind.

In its policy, the Government of India was still cautious. It believed that the people would themselves realise the 'folly' of non-co-operation. At any rate, it was anxious to keep things quiet until after the elections. Then if the Government used force 'it will have at least the acquiescence of the Moderates' who would be in possession of the Councils. The lesson of the Punjab 'wrong' had also made the Government more cautious. Therefore, Chelmsford,

PP, 1921, Cmd. 1261.
Chelmsford to Montagu, Oct. 27, 1920, CP.
Chelmsford to Montagu, Oct. 19, 1920, MP.
Ignoring all pressure, hesitated to proceed against Gandhi lest it should alienate the moderates. As regards the Executive of the CKC, the proposed prosecutions were once again negatived by the advice of the Advocate-General, Bombay. However, in view of the unexpected spread of the non-co-operation campaign, the Government had felt it necessary to make a fresh declaration of its policy. On November 6, 1920, the Home Department issued a resolution which declared that although the campaign was 'unconstitutional' they had hitherto refrained from taking proceedings against those of its promoters 'who have advocated simultaneously with non-co-operation abstention from violence'. However, action was to be taken against those who had 'gone beyond the limits originally set up by its organisers and have by speech or writing openly incited the public to violence or have attempted to tamper with the loyalty of the army or of the police'. At the same time, the Government called upon those who had 'the good of India at heart' to organise themselves and 'assist the cause of law and order by active opposition to the non-co-operation movement'.

Indeed, there was in existence a strong body of opinion which was frightened by the increasing militancy of the non-co-operation campaign. The moderates had kept up a fairly constant fusillade in the press: R.P. Paranjpe (1876-1966), C.R. Ramaswami Aiyer and Mrs. Besant in the Servant of India; A.C. Mozumdar, Sir A. Chaudhuri (1860-1924), S. Bose, J.N. Roy, J. Chaudhuri (1895-) and B.C. Chatterji in the Bengalee; G.A. Natesan (1873-1949) in the Indian Review; and N.M. Samarth in the Asiatic Review. The opposition to non-co-operation even among Muslims was still quite strong. Men like Jinnah, Hasan Imam, Bhurgri, Raza Ali, Fazlul Haq, the Nawab of Dacca, Nawab Ali Chowdhuri, Mirza Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad of Qadian, the Taluqdas of Oudh and certain Muslim associations, were as usual,

145 Ibid. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 917, Nov. 24, 1920, CP.
147 Gazette of India, Nov. 6, 1920, Resolution 4484, J&P, 8442/20.
actively opposing the campaign.\textsuperscript{149} There would have been even stronger mobilisation of the anti-non-co-operation elements to the side of the Government if a bridge had been provided in the form of a reasonable modification of the Treaty and a more emphatic pronouncement regarding the Punjab legacy. Mrs. Besant, Setalvad and other moderates, in an attempt actively to combat non-co-operation propaganda, tried to strike a bargain with the Viceroy through George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay.\textsuperscript{150} But the terms for a compromise which they advanced\textsuperscript{151} were turned down by Chelmsford as 'disappointing'\textsuperscript{152} and thus he lost the opportunity of playing his cards.

During December 1920, the focus of attention was the Congress session at Nagpur, for on its outcome depended the future attitude of the bulk of the Hindu community towards the Khilafat movement. The majority of the moderates chose to stay away from Nagpur and, instead, decided to meet hundreds of miles away in Madras under the maternal care of Mrs. Besant.\textsuperscript{153} The 'extremists' among the opponents of non-co-operation, the Bengalis and the Maharashtrians in particular, came determined to reverse the Calcutta Special Congress decision of September 1920. The non-co-operators had not been sitting idle either. They had been concentrating on the opposition, especially


\textsuperscript{150} See George Lloyd to Chelmsford, Nov. 12, 1920, CP.

\textsuperscript{151} Enclosure, Lloyd to Chelmsford, Dec. 10, 1920, CP. The proposals were drafted by Setalvad.

\textsuperscript{152} Chelmsford to Lloyd, Dec. 16, 1920, CP.

\textsuperscript{153} For the proceedings of the National Liberal Federation see Bombay Chronicle, Dec. 31, 1920, Jan. 1 and 3, 1921.
the Bengal contingent. The Bengal Provincial Khilafat Committee had even provided a special train for the delegates' trip to Nagpur.\textsuperscript{154} Mohamed Ali successfully used his personal influence with C.R. Das and 'proselytised' him to non-co-operation.\textsuperscript{155} A compromise was reached in the subjects committee between the opposing factions and Gandhi agreed to whittle down the boycott of schools and the surrender of practice by lawyers.\textsuperscript{156} The boycott of the Councils was already a dead issue after the elections. Das himself then moved the non-co-operation resolution in the open Congress on December 30. Other opponents were silenced without much difficulty. The moderates of Nagpur were not heard, Jinnah was howled down, Malaviya's efforts were nugatory, G.S. Khaparde and Dr. Moonje (b. 1872) were brushed aside and Lajpat Rai wobbled and then became silent.\textsuperscript{157}

The resolution was passed with an overwhelming majority which reaffirmed the Calcutta Congress advice on non-co-operation with intention to enforce whole or any part of the programme at a time to be determined by the Congress or the AICC.\textsuperscript{158} At Motilal's insistence, the Congress creed was remodelled to harmonize it with the spirit of the new movement. The object of the Congress now became the attainment of swaraj 'by all legitimate and peaceful means' with or without British connections.\textsuperscript{159} The more militant among the Muslims wanted to go even further and, with the full sympathy of the Ali brothers, tried to introduce proposals such as complete independence and the establishment of a republic, but were checked by Gandhi.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{154} V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 40, Jan. 15, 1921, CP.
\textsuperscript{155} Mohamed Ali to Dr. Said, above, n. 87.
\textsuperscript{156} Hindu, Jan. 6, 1921.
\textsuperscript{157} Sir Frank Sly to Chelmsford, D.O. No. G.C./1, Jan. 1, 1921, CP.
\textsuperscript{158} For full debate on the non-co-operation resolution see Report of the Thirty-Fifth Session of the Indian National Congress, held at Nagpur, on the 26th, 28th, 30th and 31st December, 1920, Nagpur, pp. 46-70.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., pp. 46-70.
\textsuperscript{160} V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 40, Jan. 15, 1921, CP.
With the Congress solidly behind them and the Muslim League firmly under their control, the Khilafatists' position was remarkably strong. The proceedings of the Khilafat Conference which opened on December 29, 1920, under Abul Kalam Azad, were defiantly uncompromising. Sir Frank Sly (1866-1928), the Governor of the C.P., reported that the Muslim delegates at Nagpur were exceedingly bitter and their speeches 'considerably more violent than even those at the Congress' and those of the Ali brothers were 'practically veiled threats of rebellion'. The Khilafat Conference reiterated its previous stand and refused to modify its original demands.

The Khilafatists had been able to capture the vast machinery of the Congress and all its funds, including the Tilak Swaraj Fund, for the cause of the Khilafat. A period of intense campaigning followed the Nagpur sessions. In the beginning of the new year, Chotani addressed a letter to the Congress and the Muslim League leaders in which he urged 'the necessity of these two bodies ceasing to be merely deliberative and of forming themselves into executive organisations'. He suggested the appointment of standing committees with sub-committees or boards to control finance, national education, national industries and commerce, and propaganda. It is not known what response Chotani got on these specific proposals but soon a massive drive towards non-co-operation was underway. On January 23, 1921, the viceroy gloomily reported to the Secretary of State for India that the situation had 'undoubtedly worsened' in

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161 On Dec. 30, 1920, the Muslim League session at Nagpur, under Ansari's chairmanship, had reaffirmed its faith in non-co-operation and changed its creed to incorporate the attainment of self-government with or without British connection. Madras Mail, Jan. 1, 1921; Times of India, Jan. 3, 1921; and Bombay Chronicle, Dec. 31, 1920, Jan. 1 and 3, 1921.

162 Frank Sly to Chelmsford, D.O.s Nos. G.C./1 and G.C./4, Jan. 1 and 14, 1921, CP.

163 Bombay Chronicle, Jan. 1 and 3, 1921.

164 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 40, Jan. 15, 1921, CP.

165 Ibid.
many parts of the country.\textsuperscript{166}

The first result appeared in the form of renewed non-co-operation among the students. The activity was fairly strong in the Punjab, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa and the C.P. At some places, like Nadiad and Ahmedabad, even the Municipalities renounced Government grants for education.\textsuperscript{167} But it was most intensive in Bengal, due mostly to the personal influence of C.R. Das\textsuperscript{168} At his bidding practically all the students in Calcutta deserted the schools and colleges, but mostly private. University examinations were also interfered with and out of 600 law examinees only about 150 sat.\textsuperscript{169} But though the whole of Bengal was affected, the campaign was more intense in Hindu-majority Western-Bengal than in Muslim-dominated Eastern-Bengal.\textsuperscript{170} In Rajshahi and Chittagong in particular, the Muslims resisted the non-co-operators. Perhaps the experience of 1906-1908 agitation had made them wiser.

But before long the storm blew itself out. The closure of the institutions was to a great deal responsible for defeating the boycott. The Government also tried to solidify the anti-non-co-operation feelings of the parents, roused as a result of the closure of the schools and colleges.\textsuperscript{171} The more serious among the students themselves began to realise the effects of the boycott on their careers.

As regards the number of students actually withdrawn, the Report on Indian Education for 1920-21 shows a marked decrease in the total number of students in the public institutions. The percentage of decrease in English arts colleges and high and middle schools were 8.6, 5.1 and 8.1 respectively against increases of

\textsuperscript{166} V to S/S, Tel. P. & \textit{En Clair}, No. 79, Jan. 23, 1921, CP.
\textsuperscript{167} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 198, Feb. 21, 1921, CP.
\textsuperscript{168} For his appeal to the students see C.R. Das, \textit{India for Indians}, Madras, 1921, pp. 164-75.
\textsuperscript{169} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 67, Jan. 20, 1921, CP.
\textsuperscript{170} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 301-Edu., Feb. 24, 1921, CP.
\textsuperscript{171} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 105, Jan. 27, 1921, CP.
3.3, 2.4 and 2 of the preceding year. The total loss was 1.7 per cent. as compared to 1919-20. But it is almost impossible to establish a precise numerical figure because the fall in attendance, though primarily due to non-co-operation, was also affected by various other factors, particularly the high cost of living. Moreover, the girls schools were almost entirely unaffected. However, an assessment can be made from Table VI. The position becomes even clearer when one compares these figures with the improved attendance in 1922-23 which signifies a sharp recovery from the effects of non-co-operation. (See Table VII).

So far as the national schools are concerned no exact assessment of their number or financial position is possible. But some idea can be formed from Table VIII which shows the number of the national schools and colleges, the number of students in attendance, and the approximate effect of non-co-operation on certain recognised institutions. The CKC, besides supporting the Jamia Milliya, financed a number of schools and colleges throughout the country. So did the Congress and a number of individual wealthy businessmen. One Bengali enthusiast was said to have collected Rs. 1,000 by begging in the streets of Calcutta. Though the number of political resignations among the educationists was relatively small, a number of teachers, professors and professional men like lawyers and doctors offered themselves to lecture in the national colleges. The attempt was not altogether unsuccessful as the Government was compelled to recognise the defects of its own education system and to suggest improvements. But the practical difficulty of effectively replacing the 'imported' system of education contributed, to a large extent, to shattering the non-co-operators' dream. They had been able only to

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172 Indian Education in 1920-21, p. 1.
174 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 301-Edu., Feb. 24, 1921, CP. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 908, Nov. 23, 1921, CP.
175 Indian Education in 1920-21, pp. 6-7.
make a dent and cause some financial loss to the Government, but otherwise they were themselves disappointed with the unsatisfactory results.

The increased political activity in the early months of 1921 was not limited to the students. The non-co-operators showed great astuteness in exploiting the genuine economic grievances of the peasantry. The lot of the kisan in India had never been good but in Malabar and Oudh it had been particularly desperate. Here zamindari oppression—burdensome rent, high exactions and exorbitant nazranas—was present in its worst form. Half-hearted attempts by the British, as in 1912 and after, to improve the system and protect the tenant, had foundered as the Government was reluctant to antagonise the zamindars, the only class that was solidly behind them. In some provinces, as in the Punjab, the situation had been rendered worse by, among other factors, the return to villages of a large number of disband ed soldiery. Crop failure, plague and disease were other contributory factors. Thus, besides a general desire for tenancy reform, there was considerable unrest prevailing among the rural masses which had led early in 1920, to the establishment of Kisan Sabha s or peasant associations.

Though young Jawaharlal Nehru had been taking interest in the Kisan Sabhas since the summer of 1920, it was not until the end

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176 The Calcutta University alone estimated a loss of examination fee income of Rs. 2,63,000. The C.P. Govt. had to pay a sum of Rs. 18,000 to a comparatively small number of schools as a compensation for the loss of income. See ibid., p. 4.

177 Mohamed Ali to Dr. A.H. Said, above, n. 87.

178 For Malabar see J. Dacosta, 'The Moplahs and the Land Tax in India', India, June 1896, p. 169. For Oudh see note by J.W. Hose, Feb. 8, 1921, enclosure, Montagu to Chelmsford, Feb. 16, 1921, CP. Also see S.J. Singh, 'The Agrarian Problem in the United Provinces and Oudh', Pioneer, April 10, 1921.

179 See Hose's note of Feb. 8, 1921, above, n. 178.

180 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 143, Feb. 8, 1921, CP.

181 See Hose's note of Feb. 8, 1921, above, n. 178.

of that year that the non-co-operators had turned their attention towards the rural masses. Consequently, they were reported to be working up anti-Government feelings with exaggerated promises, such as, free railway travelling passes, rent-free land, cheap clothes, and cheap food.\textsuperscript{183} Gandhi and the Ali brothers themselves visited the U.P. a number of times to stir up the Sabhas. The Sabhas were at first divided about non-co-operation, but their failure to get their representatives elected to the Councils had made them more receptive.\textsuperscript{184} The Kisan Congress which was held in December 1920, accepted non-co-operation and pressed for the complete deletion of the ejectment laws from the Statute Book, repeal of mortgage and sole right in peasant holdings.\textsuperscript{185} This was the first significant attempt to turn the kisan movement into political channels.

The strength of the revolutionary agrarian movement was fully demonstrated in the post-Nagpur period when at many places the Government servants, while on tour, were socially boycotted and refused supplies.\textsuperscript{186} The trouble culminated in the violent anti-zamindar and anti-Government riots in Bareilly and Fyzabad in the U.P.\textsuperscript{187} The provincial authorities answered the riots by repression and countered non-co-operation by launching an active anti-non-co-operation campaign with the help of the zamindars and the Liberals. Aman Sabhas or 'anti-revolutionary leagues' were established to whip up support for the Government against the non-co-operators.\textsuperscript{188} But the experiment was short-lived and before long the Liberals

\textsuperscript{183} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 155, Feb. 9, 1922, RP. This refers to earlier events.
\textsuperscript{184} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. Nov. 8, 1920, CP.
\textsuperscript{185} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1008, Dec. 29, 1920, CP.
\textsuperscript{186} V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 202, Feb. 24, 1921, CP.
\textsuperscript{187} J&P, 275/21.
withdrew their support as a protest against the Government's repressive policy. On the other hand, the success of the non-co-operators was exhibited from the fact that an anti-zamindar movement was turned into an anti-Government movement. The non-co-operators' success is also evident from the fact that the Kisan Sabhas established their own panchayats and, except in a few cases, settled the disputes themselves. More important than that, the zamindars and the Government were compelled to recognise that they would have to make concessions to the kisans and to revise the Oudh Rent Act of 1886.

Equally probing was the attempt of the non-co-operators to win the industrial workers whose importance they fully realised and who, unlike the April 1919 agitation days, seemed quite responsive. A little more effort could evoke an enthusiastic support. The rank and file of the labour movement were led by their own leaders - Fabians N.M. Joshi (1879-1955) and Joseph Baptists and committed communist S.A. Dange (1899-1941) - but the non-co-operators like Lajpat Rai had also taken a leading part in organising the All-India Trades Union Congress (hereafter referred to as AITUC) in July 1920. As early as October 1920, the Bombay Government had reported that it was likely that the labour disputes would be utilised by the non-co-operators and that a lead in this direction was expected from the

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189 Ibid., pp. 270-74.
190 Fatawa were issued to counter the Aman Sabhas. See, e.g., Liberal League aur Aman Sabhaon ke Mutaliq Islami Fatawa, issued by Muhammad Mobin, Nazim, Jamiyat-i-Khilafat, Deoband, n.d.
191 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 202, Feb. 24, 1921, CP.
192 See Hose's note of Feb. 8, 1921, above, n. 178.
194 Zafar Imam, Colonialism in East-West Relations, Delhi, 1969, pp. 63-65.
AITUC at the end of that month. Consequently, the AITUC, in order to counter the effect of the business community in the reformed Councils, had pressed for the claim of the labour to have representatives in the Councils.

Then came the utilisation of the labour unrest for political purpose. Early in 1921, the Government received a joint ultimatum from the Indian Telegraph Association and the Railway Workmen's Association stating that unless their demands for fresh revision of pay were accepted by February 28, they would not be responsible for the resulting disorganisation of the services. Similarly, the Tramway workers decided that in order to obtain the recognition of union men they would, if necessary, go on general strike. The Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway workmen went on strike. The one at the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway resulted in disorders. There was also trouble in sugar mills in Samastipur in Bihar leading to a riot in Giridih. In Assam, the non-co-operators excited the labour in the tea gardens.

There is no direct evidence to show as to how far the non-co-operators were helped by the Bolshevik agents in their efforts to arouse the labour movement. The Communist muhajirin, like Shaukat Usmani, who were sent by Moscow for this purpose, reached India when the non-co-operation experiment was already failing. No doubt some of the front rank Khilafatists and Congressmen, like Hasrat Mohani

196 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 819, Oct. 9, 1920, CP.
197 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 881, Nov. 14, 1920, CP.
198 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1745, Feb. 26, 1921, CP.
199 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 202, Feb. 24, 1921, CP.
200 Ibid.
201 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 112, Jan. 29, 1921, CP.
202 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 202, Feb. 24, 1921, CP.
and B.C. Pal, were serious Bolshevik sympathisers, but the middle-
class Khilafat/Congress leadership was on the whole inimical to
communism. In the final analysis, therefore, the Indian nationalist
movement, during the period under review, seems to have 'remained
largely unaffected in its actual policies and progress by the October
Revolution'.

The non-co-operators also exploited the Akali Sikhs who were
incensed at the Government for supporting the hereditary Mahants in
their dispute over the control of Gurdwaras. The Punjab Government
had reported dissemination of political propaganda amongst the rural
classes, particularly in the recruiting areas. A committee with
Lajpat Rai as president had been entrusted with this job. But
the militant spirit of the Sikhs did not remain confined to anti-
British channels. They also clashed among themselves over the
Gurdwaras, resulting in such tragedies as at Nankana Sahib later in
February 1921, when about 130 Akali 'Reformers' were butchered and
burnt to death by the rival group.

The rapid progress of the Khilafat movement with its multi-
pronged non-co-operation campaign had already begun to stagger the
Government of India. Its anxiety was enhanced by the fact that the
movement had penetrated the lower strata of the Muslim population
which had hitherto been apparently uninterested. From this the
Government of India concluded that the army and the police must also
be ultimately affected by the 'virus' of the Khilafat movement.

Besides the depressing situation in India, some external factors
too were causing anxiety to the Government. Particular factors of
disquiet were the activities of the Nationalist Turks and the
reported suggestion at the recent Baku Conference (September 1920)

For Pal see PSSF, P. 1847/20 with 1229/20, II. For Mohani see
Abdul Shukur, Hasrat Mohani, 3rd ed., Lucknow, 1954, pp. 22-23; and

Zafar Imam, op. cit., p. 83.

V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 143, Feb. 8, 1921, CP.

See the report of the Punjab Govt. dated March 2, 1921, in
V to S/S, Tel. R., No. 227, March 4, 1921, CP.

V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1347-S., Nov. 23, 1920, CP.
to offer the Khilafat to a ruler, like the Amir of Afghanistan, who would be less amenable to European pressure. The Government of India apprehended that the bitterness of the Khilafatists was such that they might accept the Amir's selection as caliph. But one hopeful sign for the Government was that there was evidence that if the freedom of the Holy Places was secured and King Hussain was persuaded to accept the Caliph's suzerainty over Arabia, even the ulama would be willing to make peace with the Government. There were also signs that the ulama, particularly of Deoband, were at variance with the political leaders for the latter's supposed subordination of religion to Hindu-Muslim unity.

Compelled by these multiple developments, and perhaps by the militants' boycott of the visit of the Duke of Connaught (1850-1942) early in January 1921, the Government of India opened fresh

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Ibid. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1276-S., Nov. 2, 1920, CP. The Nationalists were suspected of collusion with the Arabs and Kemal was even reported to have addressed King Hussain as Caliph. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 2550, Oct. 14, 1920, CP. For the Bolshevists' attempts to stir up the Muslim world against the Allies see above, p. 143. Also see Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958, Seattle, 1959, especially pp. 64-81; and D.L'O'Leary, Islam at the Cross Roads, London, 1923, pp. 183-86. For the treaty of friendship between the Nationalists and the Bolshevists (March 16, 1921) see Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I, London, 1951, pp. 237-42.

Mahmud Hassan and Habibur Rahman (former's successor at Deoband after his demise in Nov. 1920) had been among them. See the accounts of their interviews with the Collector of Saharanpur (U.P.), Note by C.A. Silberrad, Nov. 1, 1920, enclosure, Chelmsford to Montagu, Nov. 17, 1920, CP; and Silberrad to Pert, Jan. 16, 1921, enclosure, Chelmsford to Montagu, Feb. 2, 1921, CP.

They particularly disapproved of Shaukat Ali's wearing of the Hindu tilak mark, as at Madras, and the proposal to abandon qurbani. See enclosure 'A' to Silberrad to Pert, Jan. 16, 1921, above, n. 210. For the reaction of other ulama see, e.g., Abul Kamal Muradabadi, Farman-i-Islam, Benares, 1921, pp. 4-6; and M.M. Qadri, Khutba-i-Sadarat, Varanasi, 1922, passim.

For the Duke's visit to India for the inauguration of the Reformed Councils and his boycott see PP, 1922, (171), Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1921, Fifty-Seventh Number, pp. 46-49; Hindu, Jan. 13 and Feb. 3, 1921; and Marquess of Zetland, 'Essaye', London, 1956, pp. 135, and 138-39.
discussions with Whitehall for a revision of the Turkish Treaty. An opportunity still existed as the ratification of the Treaty had not yet taken place. Recent efforts in this regard had failed, but when the rise of the Turkish Nationalists under Mustafa Kemal forced the Allies to call a conference in London in the last week of February 1921, Chelmsford lost no time in pressing Montagu to secure permission for a small delegation of non-official Indian Muslims at Government expense to place their views before the Peace Conference. The Viceroy's intention was, as he later explained to Montagu, to prompt 'a split between the Extremist Mahomedans and Gandhi. The former would then find themselves isolated and detested by both their Hindu allies and all Moderate and sensible Mahomedans.'

Montagu at once obtained Lloyd George's consent and hurriedly on February 19 a delegation, consisting of Hasan Imam, the Aga Khan and Chotani, was despatched from India. Dr. Ansari accompanied Chelmsford had repeatedly urged upon Montagu for a modification of the Treaty. See V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 1276-S., 1347-S., and 96, Nov. 2 and 23, 1920, and Jan. 26, 1921, CP.

The British Govt. had come to realise that if the Peace Treaty had any meaning the Angora Nationalists and not the Sultan were to be a party. Even the British General Staff was pressing for a revision of the Treaty. See Curzon's memo., Oct. 7, 1921, PSSF, P. 4634/21 with 4995/19, II; and PSSF, P. 945/21 with ibid. The rise of the Turkish Nationalists can be followed in E.D. Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919-1923), Washington, 1959; and Halid Edibe, The Turkish Ordeal, London, 1928.

On the suggestion of Ibrahim Rahimtoola and the Aga Khan, George Lloyd, pleaded with Chelmsford to send him to London as India's official delegate or ambassador in addition to the non-official delegation. Lloyd argued that he had enough personal influence with the Prime Minister 'to make him see reason on the Eastern Question'. It would also afford a dramatic proof of 'their best co-operation with the Indian feeling on a matter affecting them so deeply - and a complete answer to non-co-operation'. But the viceroy was disinclined to spare Lloyd at an anxious time and despite the latter's pressure did not agree. See Lloyd to Chelmsford, Feb. 13, 1921; Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 235, Feb. 17, 1921; V to Governor of Bombay,
the delegation as Chotani's advisor and interpreter and Abdul Ghaffar as his secretary. Later, Ansari too was given official status and made a full member of the delegation in order to eliminate the Shia majority of two to one. Kidwai also joined to assist them. The British Government's consent to receive a delegation was viewed by the Khilafatists as a victory. They increased the pressure to drive home their advantage. A series of Khilafat conferences were held at several places emphasising that if the settlement was inconsistent with their demands it would be unacceptable to them. At Fyzabad, Mohamed Ali even threatened to sever connections with the British Government. This may have been a hollow threat but on the Turkish issue the Khilafatists were fully supported by, besides Hindus, the loyal and moderate Muslim opinion. The matter was raised in the Council of State by Bhurgri and a joint representation of the Muslim members of the two Houses of the Central Legislature was conveyed to the British Prime Minister. Deputations of the Muslim members of several provincial legislatures waited upon the authorities and

Tel. P., No. 186, Feb. 18, 1921; V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 169, Feb. 15, 1921; and V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 183, Jan. 18, 1921, CP.

Since the delegation was sponsored by the Govt., the Khilafatists allowed Chotani to proceed with it only on the condition that either Mohamed Ali or Ansari accompanied him as his advisor. See Mohamed Ali, My Life: A Fragment, ed., Afzal Iqbal, Lahore, 1942, pp, 149-50; and Gandhi to Chotani, Tel. n.d. /before Feb. 18, 1921/; text in Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 243, Feb. 18, 1921, CP.

P/S to Governor of Bombay to P/S to V, Tel. P., No. 244, Feb. 18, 1921; V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 200, Feb. 23, 1921; and S/S to V, Tel. P., No. 310, March 4, 1921, CP. This was done in view of Bhurgri's objection in the Council of State. See CSD, 1921, I, p. 199.


Ibid., p. 54

CSD, 1921, I, pp. 197-206 and 376. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 354-Pol., Feb. 23, 1921, CP; and Montagu to Lloyd George, Feb. 25, 1921, PSSF, P. 1196/21 with 4995/19, II.

V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 5-C, Feb. 25, 1921; V to S/S, Tel. P. & Em Clair, No. 224, March 3, 1921, CP; and PSSF, P. 1592/21 and P. 1874/21 with 4995/19, II.
the Shias expressed their solidarity with the Sunnis.\textsuperscript{225} The Begum of Bhopal also urged on Chelmsford the importance of dealing with the Khilafat question in accordance with the wishes of the Muslim community.\textsuperscript{226}

The Indian delegation arrived in London on March 7, 1921, when the Conference was nearing its end.\textsuperscript{227} Nevertheless, it was given the opportunity to present its case to the British Government. The delegation met Montagu at the India Office on March 11 and, on March 12, had an interview with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street. Lloyd George was impressed by Hasan Imam's presentation of the case but the interview did not last longer than 45 minutes. However, the delegation was asked to furnish the Prime Minister with a memorandum explaining the objections to the Treaty which they wanted to put before the Supreme Council of the Allies.\textsuperscript{228} But the fact of the matter is that the proposals for the modification of the Treaty had already been approved by the Allies on March 10 and were handed to the Turkish and Greek delegations at St. James's Palace on the very day the Indian delegation had its interview with the Prime Minister. The London Proposals were substantial concessions, especially with regard to capitulations, finances and armed forces,\textsuperscript{229} but unfortunately they did not at all cover the points by which alone the Muslims of India could be satisfied, i.e., restoration of Smyrna and Thrace to Turkey and the Sultan-Caliph's suzerainty, no matter how nominal, over the Holy Places in the Hedjaz. Of the last two not even a mention had been made. On the other hand, the French scored a diplomatic point by almost simultaneously announcing the evacuation

\textsuperscript{225} PSSF, P. 1637/21 with 4995/19, II. Also see Pamphlet Minjanib Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Atabat-i-Aliyat, S. Mohammed Nawab, Lucknow, 1921.

\textsuperscript{226} Begum of Bhopal to Chelmsford, March 6, 1921, CP.

\textsuperscript{227} Islamic News, March 10, 1921.

\textsuperscript{228} For the official report of the interview with Lloyd George see F/172/1/10(b), LCP. Montagu and Bonar Law were also present. For the text of the belated memo. see Islamic News, April 21, 1921.

\textsuperscript{229} For the London Proposals see PSSF, P. 4634/21 with 4995/19, II.
of Cilicia in vivid contrast to the failure of the British to fulfil their pledges.

Naturally, the Indians were not at all happy and at a dinner at the Savoy Hotel in London on March 15, Hasan Imam bitterly attacked the proposals. The position could have been retrieved if Angora had been inclined to accept them. But she was not. The proposals were not considered as coming anywhere near her expectations. However, the matter had not been closed. Montagu flew his kite for a compromise but Hasan Imam would not agree to any surrender of their demands. Nevertheless, on March 24 the Indian delegation was given another opportunity to explain its case to the Prime Minister. Lloyd George appeared to be sympathetic but was totally unyielding on any point with the possible exception of the evacuation of Constantinople. He talked about the pledges to the Jews but conveniently forgot his own pledges to the Indian Muslims.

The delegation was utterly disappointed and considered the visit futile. They were even more bitter when King Hussain's son Emir Faisal (1883-1933) pretended to them that the Arabs were quite willing to accept Turkish suzerainty over the Holy Places but Lloyd George would not agree to it. Ansari and Hasan Imam returned to India and the Aga Khan went to the Continent. But Chotani and Kidwai, in spite of the disappointing result, stayed on in Britain to continue the pressure. With the help of Ispahani, Jinnah and other Muslims in Britain, as well as the British Turkophiles, they launched a vigorous propaganda campaign. Chotani, a businessman by profession, established

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230 Hindu, March 24, 1921.
231 Ibid.
232 S/S to V, Tel. P., No. 496, April 12, 1921, RP.
233 For the minutes of the interview see F/172/1/10 & 10(a), LGP.
234 See Chotani's telegram to Khatri in Hindu, March 31, 1921; and the delegation's letter to Montagu dated March 26, 1921, in F/172/10 (e), LGP. Also see Islamic News, April 21, 1921.
235 See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 321, April 25, 1921, RP; and Islamic News, May 26, 1921.
contacts with the business community in Britain and sought to enlist its support. In effect, however, these efforts were nugatory.

The failure of Chotani’s mission falsified the intentions of the Government of India to effect a split between the Khilafatists and Hindus by detaching from the agitation the amenable section of the Muslim opinion. On the contrary, it increased the bitterness. The Khilafatists did not conceal that the acceptance of non-violence by them had been a matter of policy and were impatient to take up jihad. The ulama were restless because the threat of non-Muslim control in the Hedjaz still existed. This had left no room for compromise, which only a short while before seemed so feasible. The Jamiyat-ul-Ulama drove the last nail and at a meeting at Bareilly on March 24 and 26 declared for the complete independence of India. It resolved to concentrate all efforts to achieve this object and to punish the opponents of non-co-operation through religious tribunals. The Government, on its part, increased the repression. The Local Governments, in response to the Government of India’s instructions of January 1921, were resorting to a more vigorous action. Section 144 was frequently used to prohibit public meetings. The police and military were often used to break up processions and moveable columns of the army were paraded through towns to strike terror. The nationalist press was gagged and leaders were put in jail or threatened with prosecution.

In this atmosphere of repression and agitation ended the term of office of Lord Chelmsford, one of the most unpopular viceroys of India. The feeling against him was so intense that few Indians were

236 Islamic News, April 21 and May 5, 1921; PRO, F.O., 800/151; and Bombay Chronicle, June 22, 1921.

237 See the weekly telegrams from V to S/S for March and April 1921, in CP and RP.

238 Hindu, March 31, 1921.

239 The day to day record of the cases instituted against the non-co-operators was published by the nationalist press, particularly the Independent (Allahabad) under the daily heading 'Tide of Repression'. Also see V to S/S, Tels. P. & En Clair, Nos. 228, 259 & 285; March 6, 17 and 29, 1921, CP.
prepared to give him a public farewell. Dejected and heart-broken,\textsuperscript{240} Chelmsford left India on April 2, 1921. The same day Lord Reading (1860-1935), the new Viceroy, arrived in India. Despite the Government repression and, notwithstanding the desire of the more desperate Muslims to offer active resistance, the non-co-operation leaders decided that time was not yet ripe for civil disobedience. This, it seems, was motivated as much by the state of unpreparedness as by the expediency of giving the new Viceroy time to evaluate the situation.\textsuperscript{241} The AICC which met at Bezwada on April 1, and the Khilafat Conference, which was held at Meerut on April 7-10, both seemed to agree to this viewpoint. As an alternative to civil disobedience they decided to concentrate on the task of strengthening the movement before the end of June 1921. The new programme included the enlistment of ten million members each for the Congress and the Khilafat organisations, the collection of ten million rupees for the national cause, and the introduction of two million \textit{charkhas} into Indian homes.\textsuperscript{242}

But with the change in the Viceroyalty there was no obvious change of policy. Reading's assessment of the situation was based on the assumption that the agitation was largely concentrated upon the demand of complete \textit{swaraj} and that it was 'an attempt to create a spirit of nationalism which will make for independence'.\textsuperscript{243} His policy, therefore, as he had explained to Montagu, was 'to detach

\textsuperscript{240} See Lloyd to Montagu, March 18 and April 8, 1921, MP.
\textsuperscript{241} Mohamed Ali to Dr. A.H. Said, above, n. 87. In some circles opinion existed that Reading had been sent to India presumably to effect a Round Table Conference. Bomanji and Raza Ali were already urging Gandhi to suspend non-co-operation for some months in order to let Reading assess the situation. Shaukat Ali had even instructed the CKC not to enforce any \textit{hartals} or counter demonstrations on Reading's arrival. See \textit{Hindu}, March 31, 1921; \textit{Times of India}, April 5, 1921; \textit{Englishman}, April 4, 1921; and V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 330, April 28, 1921, RP.
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Madras Mail}, April 2, 1921; \textit{Hindu}, April 7, 1921; and Bamford, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{243} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 330, April 28, 1921, RP.
the more reasonable of the non-co-operationists and to weaken the movement.\textsuperscript{244} It was basically the same as Chelmsford's. The Khilafatists, who were expecting a change of heart with the coming of the new Viceroy, approached Reading to call a Round Table Conference for a suitable settlement.\textsuperscript{245} But Reading did not agree. He thought that such a conference would lead to nothing unless the non-co-operators made very substantial changes in their programme.\textsuperscript{248}

The leaders were disappointed. They decided to redouble their activities. Consequently, the reports from the provincial governments for the months of April and May showed a marked increase in agitation, leading to a stampede of many thousands of oppressed coolies from the tea gardens of Assam and a simultaneous strike in the Assam-Bengal Railway.\textsuperscript{247} But this increased activity often resulted in outbreaks of mob violence, as at Malegaon in Bombay and Giridih in Bihar, causing great racial bitterness.\textsuperscript{248}

The Government retaliated by increasing repression and gave carte blanche to the officials to fight non-co-operation and rally the moderates to their side.\textsuperscript{249} But the Viceroy was extremely worried about Muslim attitude and the leadership of Mohamed Ali whose growing influence was very disquieting to him. As he later informed Montagu:

\begin{quote}
It is idle to underrate the importance of Mahomed Ali's position as the head of the Khilafat movement; it is useless merely to denounce him as a braggart and a wily unscrupulous politician and a hater of the British. He is a real factor in the situation; he is
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{244} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 36-C, April 19, 1921, RP.
\textsuperscript{245} The suggestion was conveyed to Reading by Mohamed Ali through Hasan Imam who with his wife was going to Simla as the Viceroy's guest. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 321, April 25, 1921, RP.
\textsuperscript{246} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 330, April 28, 1921, RP.
\textsuperscript{247} See the fortnightly reports for April and May 1921, in RP Vol. 10. Also see Hindu, May 19 and 26, and June 2, 1921.
\textsuperscript{248} J&P, 2778/21 and 2941/21.
\textsuperscript{249} V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 339, April 30, 1921, RP. Consequently, a number of 'Reform Conferences' were stage-managed under prominent moderates and district officials.
the ostensible link between Mahomedan and Hindu. If trouble comes between him and Gandhi it means the collapse of the bridge over the gulf between Hindu and Mahomedan...My survey of the position on my own behalf and as the result of advice is that he is at the moment a far more dangerous factor to peace than Gandhi...I prefer the power to be in his [Gandhi's] hands to the hands of Ali brothers.  

In order to create rift between Gandhi and the Ali brothers, or in general terms, between Hindus and Muslims, the Government exploited the Hindu fear of an Afghan invasion. Efforts in this direction had already been afoot under Chelmsford when Sir William Vincent (1866-1941), the Home Member, started the Afghan hare by digging up the old accusation that the Ali brothers wanted Afghanistan to invade India and desired a Muslim rule in the sub-continent. In reply Mohamed Ali, with Gandhi's approval and in his presence, tried to clarify his position in a speech at Erode in Madras on April 2, 1921. But in doing so he muddled up the whole thing. Whereas he offered to oppose an Afghan invasion if it was intended to subjugate India he was also willing to assist the invaders in every possible way, including the use of force, if the purpose was a jihad against the British.  

It was the reflection of that familiar issue of primary loyalty to India or to Islam which had been recurring during the Khilafat movement. But taken in conjunction with the declared objectives of the hijrat, the mounting 'jihad' raids of the Tribes on the Indian territory, the slow progress of the Anglo-Afghan talks on the treaty of friendship and the increasing Bolshevik and Turkish influence in Afghanistan, the speech created alarm in some Hindu circles. Speculation arose as to what might happen if the Afghans really invaded India. A section of the Anglo-Indian and the moderate press took pains to spread alarm and suspicion.  

250 V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 414, May 19, 1921, RP.  
251 LAD, I, Part II, p. 1525.  
252 Zamindar, April 29, 1921, PNNR 1921, pp. 190-91. Also see Daily Telegraph, May 2, 1921.  
253 Leader, April 30, 1921, UPNNR 1921, pp. 232, 245-46; Daily Pratap
of a story by Shraddhanand about an alleged Afghan spy meeting the Ali brothers and getting from them an assurance of support in case the Afghans invaded India. In spite of Mohamed Ali's assurances that he had not meant what had been insinuated, and despite Gandhi's explanation that the speech had been misunderstood, some of the Hindu leaders like Malaviya, B.C. Pal and Lajput Rai were not satisfied. Even C.F. Andrews (1871-1940), who defended the principle of non-co-operation, thought that Gandhi was unwittingly inviting the Afghans to invade India and condoning violence.

As soon as signs of rift appeared, the Government decided to prosecute Mohamed Ali. Harcourt Butler was persuaded to 'bell the cat'. But Shafi, the Education Member, advised Reading that the proposed action was 'entirely inopportune', likely to start a chain of violent disturbances in the country and that they should wait for a psychologically suitable moment. All the three Indian Members of the Viceroy's Council - Sapru, Shafi and Sarma - counselled Reading that there was just a possibility that Gandhi might be desirous of coming to some arrangement. Reading agreed. Gandhi

(Cawnpore), May 7, 1921; Ali (Benares), May 8 and 11, 1921; Swadesh (Agra), May 9, 1921; Oudh Aakhbar (Lucknow), May 13, 1921, ibid., pp. 247-48. Also see Paisa Aakhbar (Lahore), May 11, 1921; and Pratap (Lahore), May 5, 1921, PNNR 1921, p. 203.

Shradha (Kangri, Bijnor), April 29, 1921, UPNNR 1921, p. 232; and Hindu, May 19, 1921.

See his interview to Independent, May 11, 1921, UPNNR 1921, p. 246; and his speech at the Allahabad District Conference on May 12, 1921, in Pioneer, May 13, 1921.

CW, XX, pp. 59-60 and 100-3. Also see Bombay Chronicle, May 15, and 17, 1921.

Bombay Chronicle, May 26 and June 2, 1921; CW, XX, pp. 155-58; and Bande Matram, May 17, 18 and 19, 1921, PNNR 1921, pp. 213-16.

CW, XX, p. 108.

Reading to Montagu, May 12, 1921, RP.

See Shafi's memo., dated April 30, 1921, enclosure, Shafi to Reading, April 30, 1921, RP.

Reading to Montagu, April 28, 1921, RP.
was persuaded through Malaviya to come to Simla.\footnote{262}

Beginning with the first on May 13, there were in all six
interviews which altogether lasted about thirteen hours.\footnote{263} During
the discussion the Viceroy brought up the subject of the Ali brothers
and the proposed prosecutions. Gandhi was emphatic that he had never
heard Mohamed Ali urge violence in any form, otherwise he would have
confronted him with it. Reading told Gandhi that he was determined
to proceed with the prosecutions, which could be withheld if a
satisfactory assurance was given that speeches inciting to violence
and defying authority would not be repeated, and an expression of
regret was also tendered by them for having made them in the past.
Gandhi found himself in a dilemma. He had risen to his present
heights through the Khilafatists under the Ali brothers. He could
ill-afford to lose the Ali brothers unless he was going to give up
the movement entirely and with it his leadership. On the other hand,
if he had secured a pardon for them in return for an apology it was
certainly to be held suspect as Simla-inspired. But this was the
only alternative for him. Gandhi promised Reading that he would get
an assurance from the Ali brothers. But, in order to make his task
easier, Gandhi drafted the proposed statement in the form of a
declaration of the non-co-operation policy. Reading at once objected
to the draft, emphatically demanding a document intended as a public
expression of regret and a promise of good conduct for the future.
Thereupon, Gandhi redrafted the statement without qualifying sentences
in accordance with Reading's wishes and took it to the Ali brothers.\footnote{264}

The Ali brothers accepted Gandhi's advice and signed the
document with some minor alteration. The 'apologia' appeared in the

\footnote{262} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 362, May 5, 1921; and V to S/S, Tel.
P., No. 366, May 6, 1921, \textit{RP}.
\footnote{263} The account of the interviews is based on: V to S/S, Tel. P.,
No. 404, May 14, 1921; V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 409, May 19, 1921;
V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 414, May 19, 1921; V to S/S, Tel. P., No.
433, May, 25, 1921; and V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 444, May 29, 1921,
\textit{RP}.
\footnote{264} \textit{Ibid}.}
national newspapers on May 30, 1921. The same day a Government communiqué announced that in view of the 'apology' the prosecutions pending against the Ali brothers had been suspended. Should the undertaking be flouted, the Government of India would be at liberty to prosecute them for their past speeches. The same evening, the Viceroy, at a dinner given in his honour by Shafi at the Simla Chelmsford Club, gloated over his achievement in securing the 'apologia'. The Anglo-Indian press made the most of the incident and advertised it as the Ali brothers' surrender and collapse.

It is not known what Gandhi had told the Ali brothers when he got them to sign and issue the statement. The evidence, however, suggests that he had accepted Reading's interpretation of the 'apologia' as an unconditional apology but played it down to the Ali brothers. The latter had definitely taken the document in a light different from that intended by Reading. They held that they had accepted Gandhi's advice 'without accepting his interpretation of even unintentional incitement' and that the document was intended merely to allay the 'unwarranted' suspicions of certain Hindu leaders. Therefore, when

The statement declared: 'Friends have drawn our attention to certain speeches of ours which in their opinion have a tendency to incite violence. We desire to state that we never imagined that any passages in our speeches were capable of bearing the interpretation put upon them, but we recognise the force of our friends' argument and interpretation. We, therefore, sincerely feel sorry and express our regret for the unnecessary heat of some of the passages in these speeches, and we give our public assurance and promise to all who may require it that so long as we are associated with the movement of non-co-operation, we shall not directly or indirectly advocate violence at present or in the future nor create an atmosphere of preparedness for violence. Indeed, we hold it contrary to the spirit of non-violent non-co-operation to which we have pledged our word.' Bombay Chronicle, May 30, 1921. The italics in Gandhi's original draft did not appear in the press. See CW, XX, p. 93.

265

Ibid. Also see J&P, 2533/21.

266

Englishman, June 1, 1921.

267

Madras Mail, May 31, 1921; Englishman, June 1, 1921; and Pioneer, June 1, 1921. For the comments of other papers see extracts in Pioneer, June 3, 1921.

269

See the sources mentioned above in n. 263.

270

Mohamed Ali to Dr. Abdul Hamid Said, July 23, 1921, enclosure, Montagu to Reading, Dec. 22, 1921, RP.
the news of the Viceroy's speech reached Mohamed Ali at Baroach, he immediately repudiated the 'apology'.

The repercussions were far reaching. For weeks together the Indian press was full of articles and references to the incident. Gandhi's position became extremely difficult. On the one hand he was sneered at by Hindu leaders like C.R. Das and Motilal for his interviews with the Viceroy as being a direct negation of the principle of non-co-operation, and on the other, he was assailed by Muslims for giving away their leaders. The anger in Muslim circles over Gandhi's 'betrayal' was so intense that, at a secret meeting of the CKC at Bombay in June 1921, the motion was proposed that the Committee should part company with Gandhi and the Hindus. It was with great difficulty that the Ali brothers succeeded in preventing the resolution from being passed. Gandhi knew that he had landed himself in trouble and did his utmost to regain his position. He even repudiated the 'apology' and began to support the Ali brothers' interpretation of the document. The volte-face was puzzling to Reading and to Malaviya, who had acted as intermediary, but if Gandhi were to save his position as a leader and keep the Muslims at his side he had to do it. Nevertheless, Reading's manoeuvring nearly succeeded in splitting the Khilafat/non-co-operation leadership. A contemporary opinion regarded the incident as the first break in the non-co-operation solidarity. Mohamed Ali himself admitted that for some time Reading's plan of discrediting them had

271 Bombay Chronicle, June 4, 1921.
273 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 533, June 23, 1921, RP.
274 See Lloyd to Montagu, June 24, 1921, MP.
275 CW, XX, pp. 159-61, 188 and 216.
276 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 533, June 23, 1921, RP.
277 CW, XX, p. 285.
278 K. Natranjan, Mahatma Gandhi and Non-Co-Operation, Bombay, 1923, p. 15.
succeeded and it was with difficulty that the people were convinced of 'the pettifogging lawyer's chicanery'.

One result of the Gandhi-Reading talks had been that Gandhi was mellowed. His subsequent speeches were despondent and without a reference to the 'satanic Government'. As promised to Reading, he directed his attention to completing the Bezwada and Meerut programmes before the end of June. But Reading, inexperienced in Indian affairs as he was, negatived his advantage by pressing his victory too hard. This prevented any further attempts for a compromise. Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, who were expected to meet Reading decided not to do so. Further, the repression that he had unleashed hardened the opponents. But what stirred the Khilafatists most was the rumoured possibility of the British Government rendering military assistance to the Greeks against their hero Mustafa Kemal in the renewed Graeco-Turkish hostilities. Opinion was expressed by the ulama, notably Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari, that it had become religiously imperative to help save the Kemalist party. Non-violent non-co-operation was a useful weapon, but they had never committed themselves to adhere to this principle for all time. They must reconsider and revise their policy. Evidently, the ulama and the militants were getting weary of the irritating condition of non-violence.

This encouraged the CKC to action. On June 16, 1921, it met at Bombay and directed its standing Non-Co-Operation Committee to submit

Mohamed Ali to Dr. A.H. Said, July 23, 1921, above, n. 270.
Ghaffar, Hayat-i-Ajmal, p. 245.

A stir was also created by the capture in Anatolia of Mustafa Saghir, an Indian Muslim secret agent said to be in the pay of the British Foreign Office and Military Intelligence, which revealed that foreign spies had penetrated the Nationalists' stronghold. See Morning Post, May 13, 1921; Islamic News, June 9, 1921; and Bombay Chronicle, June 11, 1921.

See the statements of Azad and Abdul Bari in Bombay Chronicle, June 10 and 13, 1921, respectively. These views were echoed by other Khilafatists like Ajmal Khan and Mohamed Ali and repeated at several meetings and conferences at various places. Bombay Chronicle, June 13, 1921; Bamford, op. cit., p. 168; and V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 517, June 21, 1921, RP.
a report at the Khilafat Conference at Karachi early next month on the steps to be taken in the event of the British involvement in the war.\footnote{283}{Islamic News, July 21, 1921. This refers to June events.} In the meantime, some efforts were made in Britain by Chotani, Jinnah and other Indian and British sympathisers to dissuade the British Cabinet from helping Greece.\footnote{284}{Ibid., June 30, 1921; Bombay Chronicle, June 22 and July 22, 1921. For Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan’s services to the delegation see Habib Ullah Khan, \textit{Hayat-i-Aftab}, Aligarh, 1948, pp. 206-9.} Reading, whose intervention had also been solicited by Chotani,\footnote{285}{Text of Chotani's telegram to Reading dated June 21, 1921, in \textit{V to S/S, Tel. P. & R.}, No. 532, June 23, 1921, RP.} in view of the forthcoming Karachi Conference, lost no time in urging on the Home Government the necessity of avoiding involvement. 'For then', he warned, 'we should have to face very troublesome agitation!'\footnote{286}{V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 531, June 23, 1921, RP.}

Apparently, the British did not help the Greeks. Nor was the Non-Co-Operation Committee able to furnish its recommendations in time. But, as planned, the Karachi Conference took place on July 8, 1921, under Mohamed Ali's presidency. It was generally expected that the Ali brothers would do something reckless in an attempt to rehabilitate themselves in the public eye. Therefore, Gandhi, with the more cautious Khilafatists like Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, had chosen to stay away. As expected, the proceedings of the Conference were wilfully uncompromising. On Mohamed Ali's motion, the Conference on July 9, passed the fateful resolution emphatically declaring that it was religiously unlawful for any Muslim to serve in the army or help or acquiesce in the recruitment. It further decided that 'if the British Government directly or indirectly, openly or secretly fight the Angora Government, the Muslims of India will start civil disobedience and establish their complete independence at the next sessions of the Indian National Congress to be held at Ahmedabad and hoist the flag of the Indian Republic'.\footnote{287}{\textit{Hindu}, July 14, 1921.}
The declarations in the resolution, contingent as they were on the reopening of hostilities by the British against Angora, had already been voiced at Belgaum and at Bombay less than a month before. The clause on the army was just a repetition of the Muttafikqa Fatwa issued as early as November 1920. But its acceptance by the Khilafat Conference, at a time when Gandhi and the cautious Khilafatists were unwilling for a confrontation with the Government, was a victory for the militants. It was the first of a series of attempts to revoke non-co-operation on strictly Gandhian lines. Gandhi was unnerved. He was also under pressure from certain Hindu sections to give an assurance that there would be no departure from the policy of non-violence. Gandhi did issue a re-assurance but bided his time. His chance to channel Muslim fury came when the Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKU met to consider the adoption of civil disobedience. He took advantage of the loophole that the Committee had been appointed to deal with non-co-operation matters only and that it had no authority to consider any other means outside it. Consequently, he was able to prevail upon the other members of the Committee - Shaukat Ali, Kitchlew and Khatri - to await a decision by the AICC, where he hoped easily to circumvent the issue.

And it happened exactly like that. When the AICC met at Bombay in the last week of July 1921, it obediently postponed, under Gandhi's instructions, the initiation of civil disobedience until after the successful completion of the programme of boycott of foreign cloth and swadeshi. However, as a concession the AICC allowed the right of individual civil disobedience, provided the Working Committee approved of it.

288 R.V. Thadani, ed., The Historic State Trial of the Ali Brothers and Five Others, Karachi, 1921, Appendix 'A', pp. 52-3; and Bombay Chronicle, July 5, 1921.
289 See letter from 'an esteemed correspondent' in CW, XX, p. 354.
290 Young India, July 13, 1921, in Ibid., pp. 354-55.
291 Bombay Chronicle, July 18, 1921.
292 Ibid., July 30, 1921.
If the militant section of the Khilafatists was angry at Gandhi's retarding manoeuvres, it did not express its feelings in public. For the moment, the cautious counsels seemed to have prevailed and the attention was diverted to the crusade against drink and boycott of foreign cloth. All other items of non-co-operation were relegated to the background. Partly, the diversion had been the result of a realisation that the campaign of non-co-operation was failing. Several non-co-operating lawyers, including Kidwai, had resumed practice. Arbitration courts had almost vanished. Attendance at Government schools and colleges was also returning to normal. But a positive impetus to the swadeshi campaign had come from the successful collection of over a crore of rupees for the Tilak Swaraj Fund before the target date of June 31, 1921.

The boycott of the foreign cloth was already underway but officially it was launched on August 1, the first anniversary of the non-co-operation campaign. An appeal was issued to the merchants to give up trading in foreign cloth and take to selling khaddi, the Indian spun and woven cloth. But they were given two months to clear stocks of foreign cloth and cancel purchase orders, after which their shops were to be picketed. The Indian piece-goods merchants, who had incurred heavy losses as a result of the fall in the exchange rate eagerly joined the campaign.

For the course of the temperance and swadeshi campaigns see Bombay Chronicle, July 13, 14, 15, 18 and 20, 1921.

Some of the contributions had been especially earmarked for swadeshi or temperance.

V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 677, July 27, 1921, RP. Also see Hindu, July 14, 1921.

Since the Indian contributing centres were already overstocked the shipments of goods purchased at high prices seriously worsened the situation. The leading piece-goods merchants' associations hoping that the rupee would still rise to a two-shilling level, refused to
It is difficult to establish the extent to which non-co-operation affected the imports, as a number of other factors were responsible for the general depression in trade. But the importation of foreign cloth fell considerably. The consumption was limited almost entirely to minimum clothing requirements and even there the bulk of the goods bought was of grey (unbleached) variety. (See Table IX). The total imports of cotton manufactures decreased in value from Rs.102 crores in 1920-21 to Rs.57 crores in 1921-22. The decrease and its subsequent recovery in the following year are shown in Table X and Graph I. On the other hand the campaign for swadeshi, helped by the seriously reduced purchasing power in the country generally, spread swiftly. This aspect was also reflected in the increased importation of the type of yarn more suitable for hand weaving than yarn spun from Indian cotton. Though the effect of swadeshi and boycott of foreign cloth was felt throughout India, the campaign was more successful in Bombay, Madras, Bengal and the U.P. A feature of this campaign was the 'sacrificial fires' of foreign cloth wearing apparel and piece-goods all over the country 'as a token of our determination never to touch foreign cloth'. The Muslims were, however, allowed to collect foreign cloth and, instead of making bonfires, send it to the Smyrna sufferers. Gandhi agreed that the purpose would be served even if the Hindus handed over their stock to be sent along with it. He was confident that the campaign was 'the sole remedy for the Khilafat, for removing evils and for helping Angora'. But like other items

299 Review of the Trade of India in 1921-22, p. 2.
300 Bamford, op. cit., p. 101. The progress of swadeshi can be traced from: Khaddar Work in India, published by the All-India Congress Khaddar Department, Bombay, 1922; and Khaddi Bulletins, issued by the Director, All-India Khaddi Information Bureau, Sabarmati, 1923.
301 CW, XX, p. 458.
302 Ibid., p. 382.
303 Speech at Lucknow on Aug. 7, 1921, ibid., p. 477.
of non-co-operation it could not achieve the desired target. Its effect on Lancashire was not very deep.\textsuperscript{304} The burning of imported cloth before India was able to replace it by local manufacture had considerably reduced the campaign's chances of success.

In their impatience, the militants once more demanded an immediate initiation of civil disobedience by the CKC and the Congress. A particular pocket of hardliners was in Lucknow where Salamat Ullah of Farangi Mahal voiced the public feelings that the British attitude over Angora was becoming unbearable.\textsuperscript{305} Gandhi admitted the force of the argument but retorted that swaraj was the quickest method of righting the Khilafat 'wrong'. Any thoughtless outburst of violence might give vent to pent-up rage but could bring no relief to Turkey, while repression might arrest the success of the movement. He was convinced that the country was not yet ready for the adoption of civil disobedience on an extensive scale. They must first work for a complete boycott of foreign cloth and promote swadeshi.\textsuperscript{306} It was partly to check this impatience and partly to eliminate all political organisations in the country other than the Congress, that Gandhi had been trying to transfer the control of the non-co-operation campaign and the swaraj movement from the Khilafat Committee to the Congress.\textsuperscript{307}

Already, the Bengal Congress leaders had attempted a merger of the Khilafat committees with the district Congress committees but the Khilafatists had refused.\textsuperscript{308} Gandhi's manoeuvre failed. On the contrary, the Congress was compelled to acquiesce in the Khilafatists' organised campaign of tampering with the Indian army.

The Khilafatists had been busy in this connection for quite some time. As early as summer 1920, intercepted letters from Indian Muslim

\textsuperscript{304} See Montagu to Reading, Aug. 3, 1921, RP.
\textsuperscript{305} \textit{CW}, XX, p. 522.
\textsuperscript{306} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 522-24.
\textsuperscript{307} The proceedings of the AICC at Bombay on July 28-30, 1921, clearly point towards it. \textit{Bombay Chronicle}, July 30, 1921.
\textsuperscript{308} Broomfield, \textit{Elite Conflict}, p. 207.
soldiers serving in Mesopotamia written to Chotani and Shaukat Ali had revealed that the propaganda was not limited to India.\textsuperscript{309} Reports had also suggested that the troops had apparently responded to the campaign.\textsuperscript{310} The record book of the CKC, seized by the police in September 1921, showed that the copies of the Muttafikqa Fatwa, declaring service in the army haram, had been secretly distributed during the months from February to May 1921.\textsuperscript{311} Now this proscribed Fatwa was reissued in the form of leaflets with the signatures of 425 ulama\textsuperscript{312} and distributed among many units of the Indian army. The Local Governments tried to stop their circulation and in August the offices of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama in Delhi were searched and over 800 copies confiscated.\textsuperscript{313} It was also reported that a huge amount of the Khilafat Fund was being utilised for bribing the soldiers.\textsuperscript{314} There were indications that at certain places the Indian troops were displaying their sympathy with the non-co-operating mobs against the police.\textsuperscript{315} The Government was forced to deploy British soldiers more often and even to shelve the reduction of the British troops as

\textsuperscript{309} ICHPP, Sept. 1920, Pro. No. 100; Nov. 1920, Pros. Nos. 19, 27 and 29; and Feb. 1921, Pros. Nos. 341-45.

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{311} Statement of P.A. Kelly, D.C. Police, Bombay, during the Karachi trials. See Thadani, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 52-3.

\textsuperscript{312} Appendix 'A' in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1-9. Also see \textit{Tark-i-Mawalat par Ulama-i-Karam Deoband, Saharanpur, Farangi Mahal Lucknow, Dehli wa Badaun Waghera ke Fatwe}, published by the Propaganda Department of the Agra and Meerut Provincial Khilafat Committees, 1921.

\textsuperscript{313} V to S/S, Tel. P. \\& En Clair, No. 891, Sept. 9, 1921, RP. Even then the \textit{Fatwa} found its way to the soldiers in one form or the other. At the Karachi trials some Indian soldiers testified that they had received the copies of the \textit{Fatwa} during July and August 1921. See Thadani, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 49-50.

\textsuperscript{314} The information was supplied to the Bombay Govt. by Billimoria, the Parsi Chartered Accountant, whose firm were the auditors to the CKC. See Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 1195, Aug. 27, 1921, RP.

\textsuperscript{315} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1397, Aug. 3, 1921, RP.
recommended by the Military Requirements Committee.\textsuperscript{316}

The Khilafatists did not leave the matter there. Apart from attempting to dissuade Muslim soldiers from fighting Angora in any future war, they tried, on Chotani's instructions from London, to raise a loan of about 3 crores of rupees to purchase arms for Mustafa Kemal.\textsuperscript{317} The scheme had been prompted by the Supreme Council's decision in Paris on August 10, 1921, to lift the arms embargo on the Turkish and Greek belligerents.\textsuperscript{318} The realisation of such a colossal amount was out of question;\textsuperscript{319} but, nevertheless, a regular Angora Fund, ostensibly for the relief of Turkish sufferers, was created. Eventually by early 1923, the remittances to Angora amounted to about £160,000 apart from other articles,\textsuperscript{320} most of which was utilised to pay the Nationalist army.\textsuperscript{321}

The British and the Indian Governments were disinclined to interfere with the arms purchase scheme\textsuperscript{322} but they could hardly ignore the tampering with the Indian troops even though the number of disaffections had been small - 30 in 1920 and 62 in 1921.\textsuperscript{323} Early in August 1921, the Bombay Government, in consultation with the Government of India, decided to push the prosecutions of the Ali brothers along with Dr. Kitchlew, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid, Husain Ahmad

\textsuperscript{316} Ibid. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 709, Aug. 3, 1921, RP.

\textsuperscript{317} The substance of the telegram from Chotani, the Aga Khan, Kidwai and Ispahani to Shaukat Ali in V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 890, Sept. 9, 1921, RP.

\textsuperscript{318} The Times, Aug. 11, 1921. Also see Lloyd George's announcement in the House of Commons on Aug. 15, 1921, allowing British firms to supply arms to Turkish forces. PP, 1921, Hansard, 146 H.C. Deb. 5S., col. 937.

\textsuperscript{319} Even Mohamed Ali was doubtful about its collection unless the ruling chiefs contributed. See Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, Tel. Sept. 1, 1921, in V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 906, Sept. 11, 1921, RP.

\textsuperscript{320} Hindu, July 12, 1923.

\textsuperscript{321} Lord Kinross, Ataturk, London, 1964, p. 298. His figures are, however, incorrect.

\textsuperscript{322} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 890, Sept. 9, 1921; and S/S to V, Tel. P., No. 1350, Sept. 27, 1921, RP.

\textsuperscript{323} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. - Jan. 22, 1923, RP.
Madni (1879-1957), Nisar Ahmad and a Hindu called Shankar Achariya of Shradharpidh, for their support of the resolutions passed at the Karachi Khilafat Conference declaring enlistment or service in the Indian army haram. Consequently, Mohamed Ali was arrested at Waltair in Andhra on September 14 when he was heading for Malabar with Gandhi to pacify the Mappilla rioters, who had nearly wrecked the Hindu-Muslim entente. On September 17 he was released but at once re-arrested by the Bombay police who had, in the meantime, arrived with a proper warrant. The other accused were rounded up at different places and by the 20th all were in custody at Karachi.

Sapru, the Law Member, especially went down to Bombay to consult the Local Govt. and its legal advisors. Rahimtoola and his other Indian colleagues in the Council, as well as the Indian Ministers, opposed the prosecutions. They did not think that it was the right moment. But these objections were overruled and on Aug. 28, 1921, the Viceroy's Council unanimously approved the decision. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 736, Aug. 9, 1921; Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 1171, Aug. 22, 1921; Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 1190, Aug. 26, 1921; and V to Governor of Bombay, Tel. P., No. 835, Aug. 29, 1921. For the background, the causes and the course of this agrarian cum religio-political uprising in South India see: Correspondence on Moplah Outrages in Malabar for the Year 1849-53, Madras, 1863; W. Logan, Malabar, I, Madras, 1887, pp. 190-99; ---, ed., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Other Papers of Importance Relating to British Affairs in Malabar, 2nd ed., Madras, 1891, p. 151; J. Decosta, op. cit., pp. 168-70; Mappillas or Moplehs, class handbook for the Indian Army compiled by Major Holland-Pryor, Madras, 1904; E. Thurston, Castes and Tribes of Southern India, IV, Madras, 1909, pp. 455-501; PP, 1921, Cmd. 1552; J&P, 7247/21; LAD, 1921, II, pp. 131-55, and 1923, III, Part VII, p. 4792; CSB, 1921, II, pp. 86-110; V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1088, Nov. 8, 1921, RP; CW, XXI, pp. 121 and 356; The Times, Aug. 29 and Sept. 8, 1921; Civil and Military Gazette, Aug. 26, 1921; Englishman, Aug. 24 and 26, Sept. 8 and Oct. 28, 1921; Madras Mail, July 14, 22, 26 and 28, Aug. 22 and 30, and Dec. 7, 15 and 22, 1922; Hindu, June 15, 1922; K.C. Choudari, The Indian Political Craze, Bezwada, 1922, p. 37; K.K. Nair, 'Malabar Land Tenure', Madras Mail, Aug. 10, 1922; K.M. Nayar, Tenancy Agitation in Malabar, Calicut, 1922; C.G. Nair, The Moplah Rebellion, 1921, Calicut, 1923; R.H. Hitchcock, A History of the Malabar Rebellion, 1921, Government of Madras, Madras, 1925; A.C. Mayer, Land and Society in Malabar, Bombay, 1952.

Hindu, Sept. 22, 1921. Also see Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 21, 1921.
The arrest of half a dozen front-rank Khilafat leaders for endorsing the Fatwa of the Ulama was a tactical error on the part of the Government. Apprehensions arose in Muslim circles that the Government which had so blatantly disregarded and proscribed the Fatwa, subscribed by nearly five hundred ulama, could also one day invent an excuse 'to suppress the Quran itself'. When on September 21, 1921, the CKC and the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama met at Delhi in camera, angry speakers led by Hasrat Mohani demanded an immediate adoption of civil disobedience as the only course left open to them. Ajmal Khan, who was always inimical to taking any action independent of the Hindu compatriots, pleaded with the militants to await the Congress decision. He successfully reasoned with them that action by one community was bound to fail unless it was supported by the other. If they were to achieve success then they must first secure the Hindu support.

The Congress, however, was in no mood to run the risk. Gandhi had made up his mind that civil disobedience had better be postponed and should be adopted only 'when we are ready to carry it to the bitter end'. On September 24, 1921, he issued an appeal to the Muslims that they should remain patient and non-violent, though not passive, and maintained that boycott of foreign cloth and swadeshi could yet achieve swaraj within the year. But anxious as he was to satisfy Muslims that he stood by the Ali brothers, Gandhi arranged a meeting of Hindu-Muslim leaders at Bombay on October 4, where, in spite of some Hindu opposition, a manifesto, supporting the Karachi resolution, was drafted and issued the following day under 48 signatures. But it was evident that the Congress was not prepared

327 The opinion was expressed at the meeting of the Punjab Khilafat Committee on Sept. 20, 1921. See Indian Annual Register, 1922, ed., H.N. Mitra, Calcutta, 1922, I, p. 269.
328 Bamford, op. cit., p. 177; Times of India, Sept. 23, 1921; and S. Muhammad Tonki, Yad-i-Raftgan, Medina, 1965, p. 3.
329 Gandhi to V. Patel, Sept. 5, 1921, CW, XXI, p. 59.
330 Hindu, Sept. 29, 1921.
331 Bombay Chronicle, Oct. 5, 1921. The signatories included Gandhi, Abdul Bari, Azad, Motilal Nehru, Dr. Ansari, Ajmal Khan, Yakub Hasan, Lajpat Rai, Chotani, B.S. Moonje, Stokes, Rajagopalachari, Kidwai,
to agree to the launching of civil disobedience, except individual civil disobedience under the strict supervision of the provincial committees.\textsuperscript{332} Thus, the CKC was prevented from taking action, even though the provincial Khilafat committees were pressing for permission to launch civil disobedience.

The trial of the Karachi accused, which had begun on September 26, ended on November 1 with the conviction of all of them except for Shankar Achariya who was acquitted. All were given two years' rigorous imprisonment.\textsuperscript{333} With various other Khilafat leaders already in jail, the trial and conviction of the Ali brothers embittered the Muslim feelings still further.\textsuperscript{334} They were particularly angry at Gandhi for remaining free while their leaders were in jail.\textsuperscript{335} To satisfy Muslims and Hindu hot-heads Gandhi had to do something. On November 4 and 5, 1921, a meeting of the AICC was convened at Dr. Ansari's house in Delhi. After a heated debate in which Gandhi's hesitancy and timidity to launch civil disobedience was questioned, the AICC passed a resolution, hedged round with various conditions, allowing the provincial committees to undertake restricted civil disobedience, including non-payment of taxes, on their own responsibility.\textsuperscript{336}

Azad Subhani, Kelkar, Mrs. Naidu, Abbas Tayabji, V.J. Patel, V. Patel, Jayakar, Omar Sobani, Rajendra Prasad, Hasrat Mohani, Jamnalal Bajaj, Khaliquzzaman, Jawaharlal and Deshpande. For the meeting also see Jayakar, \textit{op. cit.}, I, p. 449.

\textsuperscript{332} See the resolutions of the AICC passed at Bombay on Oct. 5, 1921. \textit{Bombay Chronicle}, Oct. 6, 1921.

\textsuperscript{333} For details see Thadani, \textit{op. cit.}; \textit{The Historic Trial of Ali Brothers}, Dr. Kitchlew, Shri Shankaracharya, Maulana Hussain Ahmed, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid and Maulana Mirza Ahmed, Part I, Karachi, 1921; and Abdul Aziz Siddiquil, ed., \textit{Mawazna Mazhab wa Qanun}, Delhi, 1922.

\textsuperscript{334} Jinnah and Shafi, independent of each other, pressed the Viceroy for an effective settlement of the questions than agitating the Indians. But Reading categorically declined to commit himself in any shape or form, save an expression of sympathy with the Muslims on the Turkish question. See the account of Jinnah's interview on Nov. 1, 1921, and Reading's reply in V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1061, Nov. 2, 1921. For Shafi, see his memo., enclosure, Reading to Montagu, Nov. 5, 1921, MP.

\textsuperscript{335} See Lloyd to Montagu, Nov. 5, 1921, MP.

\textsuperscript{336} Hindu, Nov. 10, 1921.
The watering down of civil disobedience was liked neither by the militant Khilafatists under Hasrat Mohani, nor by the Congress 'extremists' like the Maharashtrians.\textsuperscript{337} But the fact that Gandhi had announced his intention of starting civil disobedience under his own direction at Bardoli Taluk of the Surat District in Bombay Presidency for others to imitate, helped ease the situation.\textsuperscript{338} Fortunately also for Gandhi, the Khilafatists who were guiding the affairs of the CKC after the Ali brothers' imprisonment - Chotani, Ajmal Khan and Ansari - were cautious men and they managed to keep the militants under restraint. The Government of India, for its part, bound by the advice of the Standing Counsel and the Advocate-General, Bengal, was withholding action until a definite move was made by one or more of the parties of the civil disobedience resolution.\textsuperscript{339}

In this charged atmosphere Edward (1894-1972), the Prince of Wales, later King-Emperor Edward VIII, came to India on a visit. Since May 1920, the Khilafatists had been threatening to boycott the Prince's visit.\textsuperscript{340} They thought that it would make the authorities 'more nervous than other forms of non-co-operation, for they [the British] are very touchy where the King's son is concerned'.\textsuperscript{341} The Government did not postpone the tour lest it should be taken as a victory by the non-co-operators.\textsuperscript{342} But it had endeavoured through Maharaja Madho Rao Scindia (1876-1925) of Gwalior and other influential men to obtain from Gandhi a promise that he would not bring the visit in the domain of non-co-operation. Gandhi refused any undertaking. He was adamant, and quite justifiably, that the Prince was being used by the Government as a political weapon 'for

\textsuperscript{337} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{338} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{339} J\&P, 7797/21.
\textsuperscript{340} See Kidwai to Montagu, Tel. May 5, 1920, PSSP, P. 3713/20.
\textsuperscript{341} Yakub Hasan to Shaukat Ali, May 23, 1920, ICHPP, Nov. 1920, Pro. No. 19.
\textsuperscript{342} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 456, June 3, 1921, RP.
\textsuperscript{343} See Gwalior to Chelmsford, July 2, 1920, CP; and V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 581, July 6, 1921, RP.
advertising the "benign" British rule in India.\textsuperscript{344}

On November 17, 1921, the Prince landed at Bombay. His arrival was heralded by complete hartals not only in Bombay, but also in several other important cities of India.\textsuperscript{345} At Bombay it resulted in a collision between the co-operators and the non-co-operators, who were mostly Muslims, and led to many casualties.\textsuperscript{346} Gandhi, who never really wanted to launch civil disobedience, found in the Bombay riots an excuse to suspend his projected inauguration of the campaign in Bardoli.\textsuperscript{347} Hurriedly, he called a meeting of the AICC at Bombay on November 23 and manoeuvred it into accepting the postponement.\textsuperscript{348} The Khilafatists were left high and dry, but realising the futility of going ahead on their own, acquiesced in the decision of the majority community.

But in spite of the decision to call off civil disobedience, the situation remained tense. On November 23, Butler, the Governor of the U.P., reported to Reading:

I think it is quite clear that non-co-operation movement will not die down. Gandhi has no doubt called off civil disobedience; but the matter is now largely in the hands of Musalmans, and they are determined to go through with it....My ministers think that a Musalman rising is imminent.\textsuperscript{349}

Even Gandhi lamented that he could wield no influence over the

\textsuperscript{344} OW, XXI, p. 350. There is no doubt that the Govt. used the Prince to further their political ends. For instance, the opening of the Shivaji Memorial by the Prince at Poona was designed to encourage the Marathas to breakaway from Gandhi. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 49-C., Oct. 28, 1921, RP. Also see Lloyd to Seton, Jan. 13, 1922, SP.

\textsuperscript{345} Hindu, Nov. 24, 1921.

\textsuperscript{346} Times of India, Nov. 18, 19& 21, 1921. For details of the Prince's visit see L.F. Rushbrook Williams, The History of the Indian Tour of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, 1921-22, Calcutta, 1922; Sir Herbert Russell, With the Prince in the East, London, 1922; and The Duke of Windsor, A King's Story, London, 1951.

\textsuperscript{347} See his statement in Times of India, Nov. 19, 1921.

\textsuperscript{348} Bombay Chronicle, Nov. 24, 1921.

\textsuperscript{349} Butler to Reading, Nov. 23, 1921, RP.
Muslims and acutely felt the absence of Shaukat Ali. His own co-religionists, C.R. Das and the Maharashtrian leaders in particular, were chafing under his dictatorship and were angry at his apologies and tergiversations. They were reported to be manoeuvring a collision with the Government which would compel Gandhi either to retire or to be arrested by the Government. They would thus be free to recast the whole Congress policy, adopting Tilak's 'violent co-operation' by entering the Councils and making the Government impossible from within: Here were the germs of the future Swaraj Party, though for the present the faction was suppressed under Gandhi's overwhelming power.

In spite of this apparent change of tactics on the part of the leaders, the Government was not satisfied with the trend of the events. Specially irritating to them were the volunteer organisations which had imparted to the movement a cohesion and discipline. Their power had been demonstrated by the success with which they had effected the hartals on November 17, especially in Calcutta. The humiliation felt by the Government at the non-co-operators' success and the outcry in Anglo-Indian and European circles for severe action convinced Reading that the time had come 'when we must really exert a firm hand to maintain authority'. The Local Governments were accordingly given a free hand. The Bengal Government had already reacted by declaring unlawful the volunteer associations of the Khilafat and Congress. The police swooped upon the provincial Khilafat offices in Calcutta and made hundreds of arrests.

The Congress resolution of November 23 regarding the welding of all volunteer corps - Khilafat, Congress and Akali - into one

350 CW, XXI, p. 479.
351 See Lloyd to Montagu, Dec. 3 and 23, 1921, MP; and Lloyd to Reading, Dec. 8, 1921, RP. Also see Jayakar, op. cit., I, pp. 472-85.
352 Reading to Montagu, Nov. 24, 1921, RP.
353 See the Govt. of India's letter to the Local Govt., No. 1223, Nov. 24, 1921, J&F, 7797/21.
354 Englishman, Nov. 21, 1921. Also see J&F, 570/21.
National Volunteer Corps, though accidental, had come quite in time. The Bengal leaders decided to defy the Government notification and to continue the volunteer corps and thus force the Government to make arrests in access of jail accommodation. Appeals were issued to the public to enrol as volunteers. The Government answered by increasing the repression. Hundreds were arrested each day who, in turn, were replaced by others pledged to disobey Government orders and to court arrest.

Following Bengal's example the Governments of the Punjab, the U.P., Bihar and Assam (and later the Frontier) issued similar restrictions on the volunteers and when challenged, reacted angrily. People were arrested on flimsy charges. Wearing of Khaddar became an offence. Then began the weeding out of all tall poppies - Abul Kalam Azad, Akram Khan and C.R. Das in Bengal, Asaf Ali and Shankarlal Banker in Delhi, Salamat Ullah, Harkishan Nath Misra, Mohanlal Saksena and Khaliquzzaman in Lucknow, Motilal, Jawaharlal, Abdul Halim Sharar, Purshottamdas Tandon (d. 1962) and George Joseph in Allahabad, Muinuddin and Abdullah in Ajmer, and Lajpat Rai, Agha Safdar, Dr. Satyapal, Malik Lal Khan and S.E. Stokes in Lahore. In Calcutta even ladies were arrested but, because of the tumult this created, were quickly released. There were cases of abuse of power, of 'regrettable action', of ill-treatment by the military and the police. Even Reading admitted that 'the tendency is to swing the pendulum too far in the direction of enforcing law'.

356 CW, XXI, p. 514.
357 Bombay Chronicle, Dec. 3, 1921.
358 This can be followed in the nationalist papers.
360 CW, XXII, pp. 1-21; and Ronaldshay to Montagu, Nov. 24 and Dec. 1, 1921, ZP.
361 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 97-C., Dec. 15, 1921, RP.
362 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 106-C., Dec. 17, 1921, RP.
last half of December 1921, the total number of arrests since November 17 had reached 3,230 in Calcutta alone, out of which 1,515 were effected in the week ending Christmas Day.  

The repression had just the opposite effect than that intended. Instead of strengthening the hand of the Government it weakened its position. Many moderates shocked by the repression placed themselves in opposition to the Government. On December 10, 1921, Syed Raza Ali made a strong protest to the Viceroy against his policy and advised him to use conciliation. Reading's own Indian Councillors - Shafi, Sapru and Sarma - were pressing him to stop prosecutions and call a Round Table Conference. Similar pressure came from other prominent moderates and several Liberal organisations.

The Viceroy was staggered at the outcry which his policy had evoked in Indian circles. He was also bewildered at the success with which the non-co-operators had organised the boycott of the Prince of Wales' tour in the U.P. In Allahabad in particular, the Prince had been greeted by 'shuttered windows and ominous silence along the troop-lined deserted streets'. Reading was bitter and depressed and almost had a nervous breakdown. He became desperately anxious to stop all trouble while the Prince was in Calcutta. An unpleasant reception here was likely to affect the public mind in Britain and in India far more than the Allahabad incident. He started a two-way effort. On the one hand he begged Montagu to secure a definite announcement of British intentions towards the Turkish problem

363 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 23, Jan. 12, 1922, RP. Also see Indian National Congress, Report of the Enquiry Commission on the National Volunteers in Lahore, Lahore, 1922.
364 Englishman, Dec. 12, 1921.
365 V to S/S, Tel. P. 111-C., Dec. 18, 1921, RP.
366 Statesman, Dec. 21, 1921; and Hindu, Dec. 22, 1921.
367 V to Local Govts., Tel. P., No. 115, Dec. 19, 1921, RP.
368 The Duke of Windsor, op. cit., p 170.
in order to detach the Muslim element from the agitation, and on the other, he started a hectic bargaining with the non-co-operators. He himself moved to Calcutta. Sapru was directed to bring the 'extremists' to the conference table. If they agreed to call off the boycott of the Prince's visit, the Viceroy would withdraw the notifications against the volunteers and release all the prisoners convicted under that order. He was also said to have made a verbal promise to concede considerable constitutional changes.

Sapru, with Reading's full authority, elicited the help of Mrs. Besant and Malaviya. They then despatched Jamnadas Dwarkadas and Hridayanath Kunzru to Ahmedabad to Gandhi either to persuade him to attend a conference with the Viceroy at Calcutta on December 21 or at least to find out his conditions for taking part in the discussions. But the plan misfired. Gandhi first agreed but later, under pressure from some ulama and such Hindu leaders as Motilal, Lajpat Rai and Vithalbhai Patel, he became impervious.

370 See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 108-C., Dec. 17, 1921, RP. He wired: 'The Moslem religious fervour is what the Hindu is playing upon, and always with success, and it is this instrument we must take out of the non-co-operators' hands'.


372 V to Governor of U.P., Tel. P., No. 127-C., Dec. 23, 1921, RP.

373 See Ronaldshay's speech in the Bengal Legislative Council.

374 Kanji Dwarkadas, Gandhiji Through My Diary Leaves, p. 27. Also see Jayakar, op. cit., I, p. 504.

375 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 106-C., Dec. 17, 1921, RP.

376 See Mrs. Besant to Reading, Dec. 17, 1921, RP.

377 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 111 - C., Dec. 18, 1921, RP.


379 CW, XXII, p. 124.

380 Gandhi to Malaviya, Tel. Dec. 19, 1921, ibid., p. 54.
Perhaps the lingering bitterness of the Simla talks with Reading was a sad reminder. He refused to suspend non-co-operation or to waive the hartal until the fatwa prisoners, including the Karachi ones, were released. Malaviya and Jamnadas Dwarkadas were bewildered at Gandhi's volte-face and pleaded with him to come to terms. But Gandhi declined to give any undertaking and declared that non-co-operation could cease only after a successful conference.

The Viceroy's position, as he himself later admitted, was very difficult. When on the morning of December 21 a deputation led by Malaviya waited on him he made no promise of a conference. However, the negotiations continued and when Malaviya met the Viceroy again on the 22nd, he had with him a document signed by C.R. Das and ten other leading Bengal non-co-operators making reasonable terms for a settlement. But by this time the Cabinet had vetoed Reading's idea of a conference and the majority of the Local Governments had also advised against it. On the pretext that Gandhi had rejected the overtures, Reading broke off the negotiations. Attempted clandestine arrangements between the Bengal non-co-operators and

381 Gandhi to C.R. Das and Azad, Tel. Dec. 19, 1921, ibid., p. 55.
382 See Malaviya to Gandhi, Tel. Dec. 20, 1921, CW, XXII, p. 59, n. 1; and Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Tel. Dec. 21, 1921, ibid., p. 60, n. 2.
383 Gandhi to Malaviya, Tel. Dec. 20, 1921, CW, XXII, p. 59; and Gandhi to Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Tel. Dec. 21, 1921, ibid., pp. 60-1.
384 Reading to Montagu, Private Tel. Dec. 24, 1921, RP.
385 Statesman, Dec. 22, 1921.
386 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 131-C., Dec. 24, 1921, RP.
387 S/S to V, Tel. P., No. 1838, Dec. 20, 1921, RP.
388 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 131-C., Dec. 24, 1921, RP.
389 Ibid. It is said that Gandhi's telegram to Shyam Sundar Chakravarti of Dec. 21, 1921, or after (CW, XXII, p. 60), showing inclination to agree for a conference was delayed in transit. See Malaviya's statement in Jayakar, op. cit., I, p. 516. But even if the telegram had reached in time it would hardly have achieved anything.
Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, also proved abortive.\footnote{390}

In the meantime, the Government's position had improved. The Viceroy's assurances to the moderate deputationists at Calcutta on December 21, had steadied their slide towards the non-co-operators. When the Prince arrived in Calcutta on December 24, the Government managed to secure a reasonable reception.\footnote{391} This made Gandhi's position extremely delicate as he was assailed from many quarters. C.R. Das, in particular, was furious at losing 'the chance of a lifetime'.\footnote{392} Gandhi displayed signs of an irritated man under pressure but his firmness was undoubtedly prudent. The conference was negative in purpose, intended to hear arguments only and would have achieved nothing. The viceroy was not prepared to recommend any immediate advance for political concessions.\footnote{393}

Towards the closing days of the year 1921, the scene shifted from Calcutta to Ahmedabad where the Khilafat Conference, the Congress and the Muslim League were holding their annual sessions. The militants among the Muslims and Hindus led by Hasrat Mohani, came to Ahmedabad determined to force a clash with the Government. Thus, the chief worry of the more cautious leaders was to try to pacify the militants. When the Khilafat Conference opened on December 26, Ajmal Khan, the President, made a determined effort to catch the moderate support.\footnote{394} Here he found himself completely out of tune with the majority. The defiance was exhibited when the subjects committee adopted, by a majority, Mohani's motion urging all Muslims and other communities to endeavour conjointly 'to destroy the British imperialism' and obtain complete independence 'in order to secure permanent safety of the Khilafat and the prosperity of India'.\footnote{395}

\footnote{390} Ronaldshay to Reading, Dec. 26, 1921, RP.
\footnote{391} See Ronaldshay's report to King George V, Jan. 1, 1922, ZP.
\footnote{393} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 111-C., Dec. 18, 1921, RP.
\footnote{394} See Ajmal Khan's Presidential address. \textit{Bombay Chronicle}, Dec. 27, 1921.
\footnote{395} \textit{Ibid.}, Dec. 29, 1921.
Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari endeavoured to defeat the motion in the open session. During the night, when the Conference adjourned, they manoeuvred to muster support. When the conference reassembled the next morning, they managed to effect a split with the help of Gandhi and other Hindu leaders. When Mohani stood up to move his resolution, a member of the subjects committee, as arranged, raised an objection that, according to the constitution, no motion which contemplated a change in the creed could be taken as adopted, unless it was voted for in the subjects committee by a two-third majority. Ajmal Khan at once upheld the objection and ruled the independence motion out of order. Mohani was furious and protested without avail that the President had disallowed a similar objection by the same member in the subjects committee, while he had upheld it in the open session. Ajmal Khan’s ruling created angry scenes and accentuated such bitter criticism that he left the pandal. When the Conference concluded Mohani appealed to the delegates to stay and pass his resolution. About half the number stayed and declared their full support for complete independence.396

The mooting of the independence question and the support it aroused indicates the depth of Muslim feeling. Mohani did not leave the matter at that and alternatively tried to get his resolution accepted by the Congress and the Muslim League.397 But in this he failed. The Congress was also hedging in to win the moderates and was, therefore, hesitant to take an extreme step.398 The Muslim League did not wish to take a step which the Khilafat Conference and the Congress had rejected.399 The fact, however, remains that Mohani

396 Ibid. When the attempt failed the anger turned against Ajmal Khan. Some Muslim papers wondered whether he had become a moderate. See Medina, Jan. 5, 1922, and Al Aman, Jan. 7, 1922, UPNNR 1922. Also see Ghaffar, Hayat-i-Ajmal, p. 263.
397 Mohani had a formidable group of 52 with him which comprised mostly of delegates from Andhra, Bengal, the C.P., the U.P., Bombay and the Sikh representatives.
398 Report of the Thirty-Sixth Indian National Congress held at Ahmedabad on the 27th and 28th December, 1921, Ahmedabad, 1922, pp. 48, 50-60.
399 See the proceedings of the Fourteenth Session of the All-India Muslim League in Hindu, Jan. 5, 1922. Also see Madras Mail, Dec. 31 1921.
carried many with him and the resolution, even in the Congress, was rejected, not for its inherent unsoundness, but on the ground of its being inexpedient. A good number of leaders was evidently tired of non-violence and wished to precipitate a direct clash with the Government. But with the militant section defeated, the Khilafat Conference and the Congress confined themselves to reaffirming their previous policies - the continuance of the agitation to the bitter end, the enlistment of volunteers and collection of funds. But they did allow the initiation of civil disobedience provided the provincial and the central organisations were satisfied that there would be no likelihood of breach of peace.\footnote{Hindu, Dec. 29, 1921; and Madras Mail, Dec. 30, 1921.}

As the year 1921 closed, swaraj was as distant as ever and most of the prominent leaders, except Gandhi, Abdul Bari, Chotani, Ajmal Khan, and Dr. Ansari, were in jail. Yet the progress of the movement had been beyond the expectations both of the nationalists and the Government. At the dawn of the new year the agitation stood at its zenith. Its main achievement, from the nationalists' point of view, had been the removal of fear of the Government and the inculcation of a national self-respect among the Indians.

In the early days of 1922, the non-co-operators concentrated their energies on executing the Ahmedabad resolutions. The main activity was centered round the recruitment to the outlawed volunteer corps and the picketing of liquor shops, as it was almost the time for the annual auction of excise licenses. Side by side, they attempted to secure a unity of action in view of the impending arrests of the leaders. The Congress had already vested Gandhi with the full powers of the Working Committee.\footnote{Report of the Thirty-Sixth Congress, pp. 31-48 and 114.} When the CKC met at Bombay on January 12 and 13 it also decided to empower its Working Committee, of which Gandhi was a member with five others, to exercise in urgency, all the powers of the CKC, in addition to those already vested in it.\footnote{Bombay Chronicle, Jan. 14, 1922. Only in matters concerning the change of creed or settlement regarding the Khilafat, Jazirat-ul-Arab and the Holy Places, was a prior sanction of the CKC essential.} A manifesto issued about this time under the
signatures of Chotani, Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Dr. Syed Mahmud (1889-1971) and Khatri, advised the Muslims to remain unshaken in their endeavours. Together with 'our Hindu brethren', 'we will win Swaraj - a Swaraj that will enable us to secure justice for Islam'. Until such time, they must concentrate on the collection of fifty lakhs of rupees for the Angora Fund, court arrest, preserve non-violence and Hindu-Muslim unity, and follow Gandhi 'unflinchingly'.

But the militants, though temporarily overshadowed at Ahmedabad, were not inactive. Early in January 1922, Butler had warned Reading that: 'Gandhi may relent and avoid the final plunge. But Mussalman fanaticism will not be held back by any political considerations'. In fact, the feelings against the British at this time were at their worst. The exacerbation was, partly, the result of the facilities which the British Government was reported to be giving the Greeks for floating a loan in Britain and the rumoured British intention of controlling or purchasing the Hedjaz Railway. The Muslim press became more bitter than ever and constantly harped on its favourite theme of the destruction of the 'enemy of Islam'. The Muslim ladies, notably 'Bi Amman', Begum Mohamed Ali and Turkish-born Begum Atiya Faizi (1881-1966), also became prominently active, adding strength to the movement - so much so that even the CKC, under militant pressure, began to threaten the Government with abandoning non-violence and repudiating loyalty.

403 Bombay Chronicle, Jan. 12, 1922.
404 Butler to Reading, Jan. 5, 1922, BP.
405 Hindu, Jan. 5, 1922.
406 See the statement issued on behalf of the CKC in Hindu, Jan. 12, 1922. The Govt. of India later issued a denial. See ibid., Feb. 2, 1922.
407 See Mansur (Bijnor), Jan. 16, 1922 and Najat (Bijnor), Jan. 15, 1922, UPNNR 1922.
408 Hindu, Jan. 26, 1922. Also see Bamford, op. cit, pp. 187-88.
409 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 177, Feb. 12, 1922, BP.
It was disquieting for Gandhi to see the movement slipping out of his control. The local Khilafat and the Congress committees were the only ones that counted, but their restraining influence was uncertain. It became almost impossible to preserve non-violent atmosphere. The Governor of the U.P. reported that the assassination of Europeans was openly preached and they were afraid of invasion by night. The European Superintendent of Police at Hardoi was shot at but escaped with a flesh wound. 'There is no doubt', Butler had concluded, 'that the Musalman rowdy element is out for murder and any kind of violence'.\footnote{Butler to Heading, Jan. 12, 1922, BP.}

Noisy demonstrations had become a daily occurrence and, at some places increased to a hundred a week. The spirit of defiance led to collisions at various places between the mobs and the police, especially in the U.P. and Bengal. Police stations and other government buildings became special targets of attack.\footnote{V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 177, Feb. 12, 1922, RP.}

Though there had been as yet no systematic inauguration of civil disobedience in any definite area, preparations were afoot in many parts of the country. The most likely places were Chittagong, parts of Assam, many districts of South India, notably Guntur, and more especially Bardoli in Surat, where Gandhi was personally supervising the preparations. Non-payment of taxes was openly preached. In Assam the swaraj programme placed before the villagers in Kamrup, included abolition of all taxes except land revenue which was to be reduced by 75 per cent.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the U.P. assurances were given to the people that under swaraj peasant families would have to pay no tax whatever.\footnote{V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 212, Jan. 28, 1922, RP.}

Naturally, the collection of revenue became a matter of great difficulty for the Government. In Bengal the campaign against Chaukidar and non-payment of chaukidari tax was a serious feature of the situation in the mufassil and three districts reported that their police could not be relied upon in an emergency.\footnote{V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 88, Jan. 26, 1922, HP. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 212, Jan. 28, 1922, RP.
Amidst the mounting excitement, Jinnah and M.R. Jayakar (1873-1959), following their abortive attempt at Ahmedabad, tried once more to bring the non-co-operators and the Government to the conference table. Gandhi also seemed receptive. But the attempt did not succeed. The Government, convinced of a moderate support, was in no bargaining mood. Moreover, the Cabinet had left Reading with no other alternative and most of the provincial governors, particularly Lloyd, were pressing against the holding of such a conference. Gandhi, disappointed by the Government and pushed by the militants, reluctantly decided to go ahead with civil disobedience. On January 30/31, 1922, the AICC, under the presidency of Ajmal Khan, at its Surat meeting, authorised Gandhi to start the campaign.

On February 1, Gandhi sent an 'ultimatum' to the Viceroy couched in

415 Madras Mail, Dec. 29, 1921.
416 Jayakar, op. cit., I, p. 517.
417 Ibid., pp. 518-19.
418
On Jan. 14, 1922, a leaders' conference was held at Bombay 'to open wide the door to an honorable settlement'. Gandhi and other non-co-operators attended only as 'observers'. Nevertheless, a compromise was reached whereby the non-co-operators agreed to attend a Round Table Conference on their own conditions. As a concession, Gandhi agreed to suspend contemplated civil disobedience and other obstructive activities, including hartals and picketing, till January 31st, and if a conference was called, till the negotiations came to a close. The Congress Working Committee also condoned the compromise and consequently, on Jan. 28, the Secretaries of the Conference approached the Viceroy for a Round Table Conference. But the negotiations with the Viceroy broke down. Interesting material in this regard exists in Jayakar, op. cit., I, pp. 517-57.
419
The conviction was the result of the defeat in the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State of resolutions recommending immediate abandonment of the policy of repression and calling of a Round Table Conference. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 49, Jan. 20, 1922, RF.
420 Hignell to Secys., Bombay Conference, Jan. 26, 1922, RF.
421 See above, p. 216.
422 See, e.g., Governor of Bombay to V, Tel. P., No. 187, Feb. 3, 1922, RF. Also see Lloyd to Seton, Jan. 13, 1922, SP.
423 Bombay Chronicle, Feb. 1, 1922.
minatory terms that, if within seven days of the publication of the manifesto the Government did not retract its policy, he would launch civil obedience. At the request of Jayakar, Gandhi waited for three days before releasing it to the press.424

In reply, the Government of India issued on February 6 a communiqué explaining its position and maintaining that the contemplated civil disobedience was an alternative between lawlessness on the one hand and the maintenance of law and order on the other.425

On February 7, Gandhi issued a rejoinder from Bardoli that the alternative was not, as the Government maintained, between lawlessness and repression but 'between mass civil disobedience with all its undoubted dangers and lawless repression of lawful activities of the people'.426 But hardly had the rejoinder been despatched to the press when the dreadful news was received of violent collision between the police and the mob on February 4 at Chauri Chaura, a small district in Gorakhpur in the U.P., which resulted in the death of 21 police and chaukidars.427

424 The letter was published on Feb. 4, 1922. See Madras Mail, Feb. 4, 1922. Also see Jayakar, op. cit., I, p. 556.
425 Statesman, Feb. 7, 1922.
426 Hindu, Feb. 17, 1922.
427 On Feb. 4, 1922, following a period of police intimidation and provocation in the district, a mob of villagers and national volunteers between three and five thousand strong marched in protest to the police station. In the collision that took place the mob brickbatted the police who first fired blank and then into the crowd. When the mob realised that the police were running short of ammunition it rushed the police and forced some to flee into the fields and some into the building. The thana building was set on fire. In all 21 police and Chaukidars were killed. A little boy servant of the Sub-Inspector was also murdered. Only one constable and one Chaukidar managed to escape. Enquiry by the I.G. of Police showed that most of the policemen were battered to death with sticks and brickbats and many dead bodies bore marks of spear thrusts. Most of the bodies were found at varying distances from the police station, one being found a mile away from the thana. Only one body was found actually in the police station. After the tragedy the mob tore up the railway line between Chauri Chaura and Gorakhpur, cut the telegraph wires and fled and scattered, deserting the town. See the Statement of the escaped constable and the report on the enquiry held by the I.G., police in Hindu, Feb. 17, 1922; Joint Report of Enquiry held by
The Chauri Chaura massacre and, to a lesser extent, the serious rioting that occurred in Bareilly on the following day, shocked the opinion in the country. Azad Subhani and Jagat Jivan Lal, who had hastened to Gorakhpur, at once disbanded the volunteers and stopped all non-co-operation activities elsewhere in the district. Kidwai telegraphed to Gandhi urging him to postpone mass civil disobedience or else be prepared for more violent outbreaks. Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari and Devdas Gandhi (1900-1957) were also reported to have wired Gandhi to the same effect. The civil disobedience was to start on February 12 when the 'ultimatum' to the Viceroy expired. With all the news that Gandhi had received from different parts of the country about the violent attitude of the people, the Chauri Chaura news acted as a final straw. Gandhi had always hesitated to take the final plunge and when he was driven into it, he immediately pulled back and called off the projected civil disobedience sine die. Probably he had felt that the response was not strong enough to make it succeed. The matter was referred to the Working Committee. The AIOC met at Bardoli on February 11 and 12, 1922. Opposition to Gandhi was strong but, with Malaviya's help, he was able to persuade the Committee to suspend mass civil disobedience, courting of arrests and other negative activities and to substitute a 'constructive programme' of spinning, temperance and social and educational work.


At least three rioters were killed and the District Magistrate was injured. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 329, Feb. 9, 1922, RP. Also see Hindu, Feb. 17, 1922.


See Gandhi's confidential letter to the members of the Congress Working Committee dated Feb. 8, 1922, OW, XXII, pp. 350-1.

Statement, Feb. 14, 1922.
The Bardoli decision accentuated feelings of extreme resentment against Gandhi, who was assailed from all sides by civil disobedience enthusiasts, especially the younger people. Their disappointment was really great.\(^{435}\) The Executive of the Cawnpore Khilafat Committee unanimously resolved on February 17, 1922, to urge the CKC to adhere to the non-co-operation programme, irrespective of Gandhi or the Congress decision, until a satisfactory settlement of the Khilafat question was secured.\(^{436}\) The Bengal and the Maharashtra leaders were also reluctant to accept the decision.\(^{437}\) Lajpat Rai and Motilal sent Gandhi angry letters from prison for taking action on the basis of a single incident.\(^{438}\) The intensity of the criticism grew so strong that it was felt that the Bardoli decision might be thrown over. But Gandhi remained unshaken and summarily dismissed the criticism of his action.\(^ {439}\) As always, when in a tight corner, Gandhi sheltered himself behind a penance fast of five days. To his good fortune many leaders came forward to his rescue. On February 17 Ajmal Khan issued a statement declaring that the Bardoli decision was in the best interest of the country.\(^ {440}\) The Ali brothers and Dr. Kitchlew, who were in jail, declared their full support for the


\(^{436}\) \textit{Hindu}, Feb. 24, 1922.

\(^{437}\) \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{438}\) See Lajpat Rai's interview from jail published in \textit{Bande Matram} and reported in \textit{Hindu}, March 3, 1922. Also see his letter to the members of the Congress Working Committee in V.C. Joshi, ed., \textit{Lala Lajpat Rai. Writings and Speeches}, II, Delhi, Jullundhar, 1966, pp. 88-96.

\(^{439}\) Gandhi to Devdas, Feb. 12, 1922. He wrote: 'To start civil disobedience in an atmosphere of incivility is like putting one's hand in a snake pit.' See \textit{CW}, XXII, p. 397. Also see Gandhi to Jawaharlal, Feb. 19, 1922, above, n. 432; and Gandhi's interview in \textit{Hindu}, March 3, 1922.

\(^{440}\) \textit{Hindu}, Feb. 24, 1922.
postponement. From Calcutta jail Abul Kalam Azad advised the Muslims to adhere loyally to the lead given by Gandhi. The provincial Khilafat and the Congress committees had also decided to issue orders to stop all activities (such as public meetings and picketing) except swadeshi. When the AICC met on February 24 and 25 at Ajmal Khan's residence in Delhi, opposition to Gandhi was strong. But, in the end, the Bardoli resolutions were confirmed, though Gandhi had to make a compromise and allow the right of individual civil disobedience. Non-co-operation was, however, to continue unabated. The CKC, which met at Delhi on February 25 and 26 under Chotani's presidency, also accepted the fait accompli and reaffirmed its adherence to non-co-operation as being the only means of securing the Khilafat demands. In a bid to preserve Hindu-Muslim unity and save the Khilafat movement from collapsing, the CKC advised the Muslims to work in co-operation with the Congress and fixed a line of action. Henceforth, the CKC was to confine its activities to the 'religious duty' of upholding the Khilafat. The emphasis was to be on the collection of the Angora Fund, the enlistment of Khilafat members, the boycott of British goods, and if possible, to revive the hijrat in consultation with Mustafa Kemal.

The Government of India had so far been withholding action against Gandhi for reasons of political expediency. But it could ill-afford indefinitely to ignore public outcry in England and

441 Bombay Chronicle, Feb. 20, 1922.
442 Ibid., Feb. 28, 1922. Also see Abul Kalam Azad, Paigham-i-Azad, Bijnor, 1922, pp. 16-18.
443 Hindu, Feb. 24, 1922. Also see Bombay Chronicle, Feb. 17, 1922.
444 Bombay Chronicle, Feb. 27 and 28, 1922. Also see Hindu, March 3, 1922.
446 See, e.g., Reading to Montagu, Jan. 5, 1922, RP. Reading was waiting for secure and sure evidence to prosecute Gandhi, such as civil disobedience, which he regarded as 'the best battleground for us'. See V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 73 and 186, Jan. 25 and Feb. 14, 1922, RP.
Anglo-Indian circles. Nor could the Viceroy disregard his senior Governors, Lloyd and Willingdon in particular, who were threatening to resign if Gandhi was not arrested. The India Office and the Cabinet were anxious too. The Delhi decisions of the leaders to continue the programme of non-co-operation had rendered it quite easy for the Government of India to proceed against Gandhi. Consequently, on March 10, Gandhi was arrested at Ahmedabad and on March 18 he was sentenced to six years' simple imprisonment. With Gandhi safely in jail, the Government of India instructed the Local Governments to institute proceedings without hesitation against other leading non-co-operators, if prosecutions could be secured. In this way it expected to see an immediate collapse of the agitation. The prospects in this direction were, however, still remote.

In the final analysis the non-co-operation experiment, as envisaged by its prophets, was a political failure. The Treaty of

447 For the comments of the British papers see Hindu, Feb. 9, 1922. The hardening of the British public opinion was partly due to the treatment of the Prince of Wales. See Lord Islington's speech in the House of Lords on Feb. 8, 1922. PP, 1922, Hansard, H. L., I, cols. 61-62. Also see the debate on India in the House of Commons on Feb. 14, 1922. PP, 1922, Hansard, 150 H.C. S., cols. 865-972. For the European opinion in India see the proceedings of the European Association at Calcutta on Feb. 14, 1922, and the proceedings of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta on Feb. 28, 1922. Englishman, Feb. 15 and March 1, 1922.


449 S/S to V, Tel. P., No. 198, Feb. 6, 1922, RP.


451 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 315, March 24, 1922, RP.
Sevres remained unchanged, the Punjab 'wrong' was still unrighted, and swaraj nowhere near realisation. Nothing could be a more befitting epitaph than what Mrs. Besant wrote sometime in 1922: 'It is the queerest Revolution that ever was,...has had the queerest leader, and has now the queerest collapse'. The reasons for the failure lay partly in the negative bearings of the programme and partly in the diversity of a plural society. To be successful against a Government which was so firmly entrenched, the programme required the united support of the whole country. This was never gained. Opposition, either to the whole programme or its specific items, was strong and persistent. First, the Hindus stood aloof and had to be coaxed and manoeuvred into acceptance. Then there was a constant tussle between Gandhi and the militant Khilafatists over violence and non-violence, as well as over the question of civil disobedience. Furthermore, the Khilafatists utilised Gandhi as much as Gandhi utilised the Khilafatists. There was no inherent unity of purpose. The only thing which bound them together was a combination of mutual consent and the synchronisation of other interests. These circumstances could not last. The Government of India first watched and waited, then capitalised on the nationalists' mistakes, and, finally, by a policy of repression, brought them down. But, in spite of all their drawbacks and failings, the Khilafatists and Gandhi had been able to build up an agitation never before experienced in India.

452 Annie Besant, The Future of Indian Politics, Adyar and Benares, 1922, p. 259.
CHAPTER V

THE DECLINE OF THE MOVEMENT

The Congress decision of February 1922, to postpone the contemplated civil disobedience, took the sting out of the non-cooperation campaign and weakened the Khilafat movement; but there was no immediate Hindu-Muslim breakaway or cessation of political activities. The CKC still professed the same course as the Congress and Hindu-Muslim unity was still the basis of the nationalist struggle for swaraj. But there is no denying the fact that disappointment was general. The reports from various provinces for the month of February showed that the people, Muslims in particular, were sullen and discontented. The despondency was not limited to the 'extremist' section. Even the moderate and loyal Muslims were equally agitated over the Turkish question and wanted the British Government to set things right in this connection.

The fluid political situation in the country, together with the worsening Graeco-Turkish relations in the Near East, had been causing grave anxiety to the Government of India. The provincial reports had indicated that the recurring violent disturbances in the country were 'largely attributed to the fanatical and turbulent element among the Mahomedans'. Of the total political prisoners, at least 75 or 80 per cent. had been Muslims. This was enough to convince Lord Reading that the Muslim attitude in relation to the Treaty of Sèvres was of the utmost importance. Therefore, he was anxious to impress upon them that his Government was doing all in

1 See the weekly telegrams on the internal political situation in India from the Viceroy to the Secy. of the State for India for February and March 1922 in RP.
2 This was evident even in the outlying areas of Baluchistan. See PSSF, P. 1695/22 with 4995/19, IV. Also see J.T. Gwynn, Indian Politics, London, 1924, pp. 19-20.
3 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 282, March 13, 1922 (for the Prime Minister), RP.
4 See Reading to Peel, June 8, 1922, RP. This refers to earlier events.
its power to present their views to the Home Government as forcibly as possible.\footnote{V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 282, March 13, 1922, RP.}

Early in February 1922, when Reading learnt that an Allied foreign ministers' conference was to be held at Paris next month, he at once suggested to Montagu that a joint representation from his and the Provincial Governments about a 'reasonable' modification of the Treaty might strengthen his hand.\footnote{V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 162, Feb. 9, 1922, RP.} Accordingly, on February 28, 1922, with the concurrence and support of the Provincial Governments,\footnote{For the views of the Provincial Govts. see PSSF, P. 1695/22 with 4995/19, IV. All of them except Burma concurred.} Reading sent his fateful telegram to Montagu formally requesting the British Government for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. The grounds of his request were the prevailing intensity of Muslim resentment and the services they had rendered during the War. With due provisions for safeguarding the neutrality of the Straits and the security of the non-Turkish population, Reading urged for the evacuation of Constantinople, the recognition of the Sultan's suzerainty over the Holy Places, and the restoration to Turkey of Smyrna and Thrace, including Adrianople. With this representation the Viceroy added a stern warning that 'the bitter and sullen resentment, which has already led to serious disorders and bloodshed, will be intensified by failure to allay Muslim feeling over the revision of the Treaty and will lead to dangerous results in India'.\footnote{V to S/S, Tel. P. & R., No. 266-S., Feb. 28, 1922, RP.}

The telegram reached Montagu on March 1. At once he sent it to the Cabinet for circulation as Reading had asked for permission to publish parts of the despatch. Unfortunately, however, the telegram was not circulated until March 3. To make matters worse, on March 4, when Montagu was out in the country for the week-end, he received another telegram from the Government of India pressing for an early reply.\footnote{V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 265-S., March 4, 1922, RP.} Little did he know that the Home Department, worried as it was about the possibility of a Muslim outbreak at
Gandhi's imminent arrest, had sent this telegram without even the Viceroy's knowledge. Montagu, convinced of the urgency of the matter, authorised the publication of the despatch without consulting either Lloyd George or any other member of the Cabinet.

When the pro-Muslim despatch was published in India on March 8, it won the Government of India the gratitude of many but it embarrassed the British Government in its conduct of negotiations at the forthcoming Paris Conference. The French Government was already pro-Turkish and the parading of the divergent views of the British Government and the Government of a part of the Empire could make the Turks unduly intractable. Curzon was embarrassed and rightly annoyed. In fact the Italian Government lost no time in protesting to the British for this indiscretion. Lloyd George was furious. Montagu was compelled to resign, though Reading was spared.

The Indian Muslims were shocked by the unexpected exit of Montagu and did not wait to protest very strongly against his alleged sacrifice.

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10 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 292, March 15, 1922 (for Lord Privy Seal), RP.
11 Montagu alleged that in the meeting that took place on March 6 in the absence of Lloyd George, he had privately informed Curzon of his authorisation. But the latter maintained silence and the matter was not discussed at all. Thus, an ample opportunity was lost, deliberately or otherwise, of stopping the publication. See The Times, March 13, 1922.
to anti-Khilafat intrigues. Because of Curzon's anti-Turkish outburst they also feared that their interests at the Allied Conference would not be fully represented. They therefore, brought further pressure to bear upon the British Government. But at the same time the Indian Muslims fully realised that the Government of India was earnest in its advocacy of their views. The moderates were particularly delighted because it seemed to vindicate their faith in the policy of co-operation with the Government. As a result a feeling grew among Muslims generally that there was much to be gained by supporting the Government.

Some of the Khilafatists too felt gratified. Abdul Bari and Mushir Hosain Kidwai in particular were full of appreciation for the Government of India's efforts with regard to the Turkish Treaty. This made them to reflect on the relative merits of non-co-operation. In fact Abdul Bari, like Hasrat Mohani, had already begun to question the advantages of continuing the non-co-operation programme with the result that Gandhi, shortly before his arrest, had to rush to Ajmer to beg him to reconsider his position. The publication of the Government of India's despatch hastened that process of separation between the Muslims and Gandhian programme. Abdul Bari and Kidwai pleaded with Chotani and the CKC to drop the agitation and achieve

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13 See the statements of Fazlul Haq and Dr. A. Suhrawardy in Statesman, March 11, 1922. Also see the extract from the Mohammedan in ibid.; and the protest telegram from the Muslim Members of the Indian Legislature to Lloyd George, dated March 11, 1922, in Englishman, March 14, 1922.

14 See the proceedings of a protest meeting at Delhi on March 19, 1922, in Englishman, March 20, 1922. Also see the telegram from the Members of the Bombay Provincial Council to S/S, dated March 18, 1922, in FSSF, P. 1206/22 with 4995/19, IV; and memorial from the official Members of the Punjab Legislative Council in FSSF, P. 1672/22 with ibid. The signatories included Muharram Ali Chishti, Feroz Khan Noon (later the Prime Minister of Pakistan) and Ahmad Yar Daulatana.

15 Note by Sir Muhammad Shafi, April 20, 1922, enclosure, Reading to Peel, April 26, 1922, RP.

16 Ibid.

17 Hindu, March 24, 1922. For Mohani see IMFII, III, Part I, p. 466.
their demands through 'constitutional methods'.

The CKC was, however, less appreciative of the Government of India's efforts. In its opinion the despatch fell far short of their irreducible minimum for Reading had not committed himself in respect of Arabia, Palestine and Mesopotamia. The CKC was also anxious about the mandates and the status of Egypt, and it demanded the evacuation of Constantinople and Adrianople before the Turks were asked to sign a new peace treaty. Thus, when on March 26 and 27, 1922, the Working Committee of the CKC met at Bombay to consider the situation, it confirmed its previous policy and advised the completion of the Bardoli-Delhi non-co-operation 'constructive programme' by the end of May 1922.

There was, however, in spite of the decision, no resurgence of active agitation. The disorganised state of affairs following the imprisonment of some of their important leaders and the despondency felt at the failure of the non-co-operation campaign had negatived any possibility in this direction. In the event, the Khilafatists' strategy was confined to sustaining such propaganda as would exert enough useful pressure on the Government. Thus, when the Paris Peace Proposals (published in India on March 29), in spite of their being an improvement on the Treaty of Sèvres, came nowhere near the declared Muslim demands, there was an immediate protest. Chotani, in a telegram to Lloyd George, repudiated the Proposals as being in

18 Shafi's note above, n. 15. Also see Kidwai's letter to the Leader quoted in P.C. Bamford, Histories of the Non-Co-operation and Khilafat Movements, Delhi, 1925, pp. 193-95; and V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 373, April 30, 1922, RP.
19 Bombay Chronicle, March 21, 1922. The CKC's statement was issued in amplification of the one issued earlier by Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari. See Bombay Chronicle, March 20, 1922.
20 Bombay Chronicle, March 31, 1922.
21 For the Paris Proposals see PP, 1922, Cmd. 1641, Pronouncement by Three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs Respecting the Near Eastern Situation, Paris, March 27, 1922.
22 Hindu, April 6, 14 and 20, 1922.
direct variance with Muslim 'religious obligations' and all war-time promises. The Working Committee contemplated despatching another delegation to Europe to represent the Indian Muslim view, but it never materialised. However, the CKC, in a statement issued on April 18, 1922, indicated that as the British policy was still anti-Turk it would not drop the agitation. For the Khilafatists the outstanding grievances had remained unsolved.

But though the situation in April and May of 1922 remained fluid, there was no fresh spurt of active agitation. However, events soon favoured the Khilafatists. Provocation came from the renewed official repression in several provinces. By midsummer the number of political prisoners in India, exclusive of Mappillas, had reached 3,815. Among the convicted were such prominent names as Dr. Mahmud, Hasrat Mohani, Jawaharlal Nehru, Shoaib Qureshi (1891-1962) and many others. This was enough to force the leaders to devise some means to counteract Government repression. A meeting of the CKC was convened at Lucknow from June 7-9, 1922.

The majority of the delegates present at Lucknow were intent on taking up civil disobedience immediately. But the difficulty was that

23 Chotani to Lloyd George, Tel. March 31, 1922, FSSF, P. 1419/22 with 4995/19, IV.
24 Hindu, April 6, 1922.
25 Ibid., April 20, 1922.
28 Hindu, July 20, 1922.
29 Ibid., April 20, June 15 and 22, 1922. Also see V to S/S, Tels. P., Nos. 164, 338 and 489, Feb. 10, April 12 and May 5, 1922, RP.
the AICC, owing to a very sharp difference of opinion in the Congress ranks on this question, had already postponed the matter until its next meeting in August 1922. In the meantime, at the instance of Moonje, it had appointed a seven-man Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee to ascertain the opinion in the country. Therefore, Ajmal Khan reasoned with the militant Khilafatists that, without the Hindu support, Muslims alone would not be able to take up civil disobedience successfully. This subsided the excitement and the CKC adopted a resolution similar to that passed by the Congress. Accordingly, a Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, consisting of Chotani (President), Ashfaque Ali (Secretary), Abdul Majid Badauni, Sulaiman Nadvi (who was later replaced by Nawab Ismail Khan of Meerut), Abdul Qadir of Kasur, T.A.K. Sherwani, Moazzam Ali and Zahur Ahmad, was appointed to tour the country with the Congress deputation and submit its report on or before August 15, 1922.

The Lucknow decision, however, did not satisfy the supporters of violence who lamented the inaction of the Congress and the CKC. Two of the maulavis were reported to have put forward a proposal to the Jamiat-ul-Ulama that fidais or secret assassins should be appointed on the system of Hasan-i Sabbah of the Ismailia sect in Alamut (Iran) in the late 11th and early 12th centuries. An unconfirmed report from the Punjab also told of a suggestion for a similar Muslim society in that province. Such proposals, however, did not materialise. The front rank Khilafatists, and not many had escaped imprisonment, were restrained in their criticism fearing

30 Bombay Chronicle, June 9 and 10, 1922. Also see Pioneer June 10, 1922 and Hindu, June 15, 1922. The members of the Committee were: Ajmal Khan (Chairman), Motilal, Rajagopalachari, Ansari, Vithalbhai Patel, S.K. Iyengar and Chotani (who was unable to take part).

31 Hindu, June 15, 1922. Also see Bamford, op. cit., pp. 201-3.

32 Hindu, July 6 and 27, 1922. Ajmal Khan and Ansari, who had been appointed to the Congress Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, were also requested to take part in the deliberations of the Khilafat Enquiry Committee.

33 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 522, July 3, 1922, NP.

34 Ibid.
that civil disobedience might develop into a suicidal policy. Yet, some of them seem to have been completely disillusioned with the Gandhian non-co-operation. They were partisans of Gandhi so long as his programme promised some results. When it failed they joined his critics and condemned him. The truce of the preceding March between Gandhi and Abdul Bari had by now broken down.

By means of Non-co-operation wrote Abdul Bari to Chotani in June 1922, we cannot prevent the Allies from giving help to the Greeks.... So far no impression has been created on the Allies.... As far as I can make out the Non-co-operation movement is dying down. Many people think the same thing.... Let us see whether we have still to cling to this movement or some other way is found out of the difficulty.55

Kidwai's disillusionment was even greater. He ridiculed charkha and attacked the inaction of the Congress-Khilafat leadership. 'If such coldness is shown towards the Khilafate', he declared in a letter to Chotani in August 1922, 'I will shortly raise a standard of revolt against the Khilafat Committee and the Congress. Even if the Hindus do not stand by us we would not give up the Khilafate.'36

But since the dissident Khilafatists considered a Muslim breakaway from the Congress as harmful to the community, they joined that section in the Congress whose ideology also sprang from a dissatisfaction with the Gandhian programme after Bardoli. Already, C.R. Das had expressed the need of a new approach, a change of tactics, and canvassed for the policy of applying non-co-operation from within the Councils.38 Lajpat Rai too was of the opinion that absolute non-co-operation was an impossibility.39 Similarly, among

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55 Quoted in Bamford, op. cit., pp. 204-5.
37 See Abdul Bari's letter to Chotani and Kidwai's to Ansari in Bamford, op. cit., pp. 204 and 206.
38 Dr. V.P.S. Raghuvanshi, Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought, 2nd ed., Agra, 1959, p. 173.
the Maharashtra leaders, a powerful group led by N.C. Kelkar was openly favouring Tilak's policy of 'responsive co-operation'. The idea caught on and many, including Motilal Nehru, began to lend their support. Prominent among the Khilafatists, besides Abdul Bari and Kidwai, were Sulaiman Nadvi, T.A.K. Sherwani, Zahur Ahmad and later Ajmal Khan. Some like Khwaja Abdul Majid joined because they thought that the boycott of the Councils by the Muslims alone might injure the interests of the community. The 'pro-changers' were quick to discern that the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama's fatwa of 1920, prohibiting Council entry, was the main hurdle for most Muslims seeking elections. So they proceeded to bring pressure to bear on the Jamiyat to secure a revision of the fatwa. For this Motilal solicited Abdul Bari's support. The latter agreed that theologically a revision was possible. But the 'pro-changers' preferred to bide their time, until at least the result of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committees was known.

August 15, 1922, came and passed but the Enquiry Committees, owing to the insufficient time at their disposal, were unable to finish their reports. The delay was inevitable. But they were, during their tours, able to stir up some public enthusiasm. However, it was the events in the Near East rather than the affairs at home that brought about the revival of the agitation. Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy was primarily responsible for this. His assurances of support had led the Greeks to launch on the night of August 18/19, a fresh attack on the Nationalists. But the plan backfired. The

41 Their views were more clearly expressed after the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committees submitted their reports.
43 Motilal to Abdul Bari, Sept. 23, [1922], Nuqush (Lahore), CIX, April/May, 1968, pp. 45-6.
hostilities resulted in a complete rout of the Greek forces who were driven across the Straits into Europe. Within a fortnight Greece was begging the Allies to negotiate an armistice. By September 8, Mustafa Kemal's forces occupied Smyrna and their pacification of Anatolia was practically complete. The news of Mustafa Kemal's victory was received in India with great jubilation. In spite of the perfunctory participation of the Hindus and their complete aloofness in the Punjab, celebrations were held throughout the country with great enthusiasm. Muslims of all shades of opinion flocked in together and vied with one another in lauding the services of Mustafa Kemal, 'a hero at the head of a band of heroes', who had saved the Khilafat from ignominy and shame.

But very soon the rejoicings turned into despair when news arrived of a possible British intervention on behalf of the Greeks. What had happened was that the Nationalists' pursuit of the retreating Greek forces had brought them to the 'neutral zone' (protecting Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) at Chanak which was held by the British troops. An Anglo-Turkish clash became imminent. The British Cabinet issued a strong warning to Mustafa Kemal, drawn up mainly by Winston Churchill (1874-1965) with the assistance of Lord Birkenhead (1872-1950), asking him to respect the 'neutral zone'. At the same time an appeal was addressed to the Dominions to render assistance. The French, refusing to be drawn into the conflict, withdrew their forces from Chanak and the Italians assured the Turks of their neutrality. Peace hung on a


46 See V to S/S, Tels. P. & En Clair, Nos. 781, 796 and 872, Sept. 28, Oct. 5 and 17, 1922, RP; Times of India, Sept. 20, 1922; and Hindu, Sept. 28 and Oct. 5, 1922. Kemal's stature increased among Indian Muslims in the following months. See e.g., M.A.W.Q. Badauni, ed., Salam, Badaun, 1923; and Samarah-i-Shujaat urf Fatih Smyrna, Lucknow, 1923. The Afghan Govt., which was in liaison with the CKC, probably encouraged these pro-Kemal feelings. See PRO, F.O., 371/8080. Also see F.O., 371/8084.
The threat of British intervention in the Graeco-Turkish conflict infuriated the Khilafatists and the moderate Muslims alike. But since they were conscious of their inability to put an effective restraint on the British policy they attempted to forestall the use of Indian troops against Angora in any impending Allied operations.

On September 20, 1922, Abul Kasem, the ex-deputy leader of the Khilafat delegation to Europe in 1920 and now enjoying the confidence of the Viceroy and his Government, tabled a motion in the Imperial Legislative Assembly that the Indian forces should be removed from the territories that were formerly within the Turkish Empire. However, he withdrew the motion a few minutes before the Assembly opened its deliberations and instead decided as a more expedient course to take a deputation to the Viceroy. The same evening a twenty-five-member deputation of the Muslim Members of the Indian Legislature met Reading at Simla and discussed with him informally.

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48 In a speech at Calcutta on Sept. 19, 1922, Fazlul Haq declared: 'We cannot tolerate Mr. Lloyd George or his policy any longer.... If England takes any part in the disintegration of the last Muslim Empire she will be taking the position of the enemy of Islam. She will then have to face the angered onslaughts of the whole Muslim world fighting the last battles of the faith'. Statesman, Sept. 20, 1922

49 See Abul Kasem's interview on Sept. 20, 1922, with the correspondent of Hindu. Hindu, Sept. 28, 1922. According to the figures made available by the Govt. of India in Feb. 1921, approx. 74,700 Indian troops were still serving in Mesopotamia and Persia and approx. 23,000 in Egypt and Palestine. See Lad, I, Part I, 1921, p. 310.

50 Hindu, Sept. 28, 1922.
the Near Eastern situation. But Reading expressed his inability to do anything except lay their views before the British Government. The deputationists well understood his predicament and in spite of their anxiety preferred to exercise restraint. Among the moderates only G.M. Bhurgri went to the length of resigning his seat in the Council of State.

The militants were not so restrained. They forged a plan to raise a corps of Muslim volunteers to fight for the Turkish Nationalists. An appeal was issued in the nationalist press for the formation of an 'Angora Legion'. Chotani lost no time in hinting to Lloyd George the possibility of volunteering unless Constantinople and Thrace were immediately restored to Turkey. The CKC too authorised the organisation of the Angora Legion and appealed to the country in general and Muslims in particular to join it as a 'sacred national and religious duty'. But all enthusiasm evaporated when the Government of India took recourse to the Foreign Establishment Act of 1870 which viewed such volunteering as illegal.

To the great relief of all, the events in the Near East took a turn for the better and hostilities were prevented. The Nationalists

51 Times of India, Sept. 21, 1922.
52 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 955, Sept. 21, 1922, RP.
54 Times of India, Sept. 20, 1922.
55 The reference is in Vincent's letter to M. Faiyaz Khan, published in Madras Mail, Oct. 30, 1922. It refers to an earlier date.
56 Hindu, Oct. 12, 1922.
57 Times of India, Oct. 20 and 21, 1922.
58 Vincent's letter to Faiyaz Khan, above, n. 55. Afterwards the CKC was reluctant to take up the matter. See Karwai Ijlas Jamaat-i-Amila, held on 27th February, 1923, at Allahabad, issued by the Hon. Secy., CKC, Bombay, 1923, p. 3.
59 The Dominions refused to help. Only New Zealand and Australia expressed lukewarm enthusiasm. Curzon, who had since become soft on Turkey, was angry at the Cabinet decision which had been taken in his
were at long last persuaded to agree to a conference at Mudania which took place on October 3, 1922. After several breakdowns Angora accepted the Allied terms and an Armistice was signed on October 11. Under the terms of the agreement the Greeks were to evacuate Thrace but the Turks were not to occupy it until a final settlement. A conference for the negotiation of a treaty to replace the Treaty of Sèvres was then proposed to be held at Lausanne in November 1922.

Prospects from Indian Muslim point of view brightened still further when on October 19 Lloyd George resigned and the Coalition Government fell apparently as a result of the final debacle of the Premier's Near Eastern policy. For four years he had mismanaged the foreign affairs. The educated Muslims were frankly jubilant at his humiliation. They saw in his fall signs of the end of British pro-Greek policy. The Khilafatists especially, welcomed the news as promising the termination of 'British pan-Hellenism'.


Hindu, Oct. 26, 1922. Also see Gwynn, op. cit., p. 228.
were largely negatived. It ruled out the possibility of compromise between the Khilafatists and the moderate Muslims (towards which Shafi had been striving) to end the agitation and further Muslim interests by more constitutional means and co-operation with the Government.\textsuperscript{63} The Viceroy was terribly disappointed. 'Had we had no Near East crisis at the moment', he had ruefully wired to Montagu's successor Lord Peel (1867-1937) on September 21, 'we might have expected a definite split between Mahomedan and Hindu extremists and difference of opinion among the former which would have weakened their potentialities for mischief'.\textsuperscript{64}

The expected collapse of the Khilafat movement did not come. But fortunately for the Government the Khilafat-Congress leadership was too tangled in its own schismatic squabbles to take advantage of the situation. This was revealed rather more glaringly when in late October and early November 1922, the Congress and the Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committees issued their respective reports.\textsuperscript{65} On the immediate issue of civil disobedience both the reports were tamely unanimous: that its introduction was premature. But as a face-saving tactic they were constrained to leave the right of individual and restricted mass civil disobedience to the discretion of the provincial committees. They also seemed to adopt more or less an identical hard-line attitude with regard to the boycott of British goods, law courts and schools. But then these items had already been tried, found not very successful and had been relegated to the background. It was the more important issue of Council entry which let loose bitter factionalism.

In the Congress report a group of three, consisting of Ajmal Khan, Motilal and Vithalbhai Patel, was of the opinion that the non-co-operators should contest the election on the issue of the redress of the Punjab and the Khilafat 'wrongs' and immediate\textsuperscript{swaraj}, and

\textsuperscript{63} Shafi's note, above, n. 15.
\textsuperscript{64} V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 756, Sept. 21, 1922, RP.
\textsuperscript{65} For the Congress report see\textit{Hindu} (Special Supplement), Nov. 5, 1922, and for the summary of the Khilafat report see\textit{Times of India}, Nov. 13, 1922.
oppose the Government from within the Councils. On the other hand, Dr. Ansari, Rajagopalachari (1878-1972) and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar (1859-1923) maintained that the frittering away of energies was useless and hence there should be no change of the Congress programme in respect of the boycott of the Councils. In the Khilafat report also there was a note of dissent by Zahur Ahmad in favour of Council entry, but in this case, unlike the Congress, the report tried to cover up the differences. It declared that the Council controversy was rather premature as long as the leaders were in jail, and therefore, it postponed the matter for the present lest it should distract public attention.

But the matter did not rest there. The Enquiry reports had opened the floodgates of incessant controversy among the leaders - almost all the old guards of the Congress, the CKC and the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama on one side and the 'pro-changers' on the other. The latter were also joined by leaders like S.E. Stokes, M.S. Aney (1880-1968), M.R. Jayakar and Malaviya who stood for co-operating where beneficial and obstructing where desirable. Jinnah also lent his support though he was opposed to the 'purely destructive programme' of obstructing the Councils. The 'pro-changers' were emboldened by the support they had won. Through Abdul Bari and Sulaiman Nadvi they renewed their pressure on the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama to revise its fatwa. Initially the Jamiyat was not prepared to oblige, but in order to prevent a further split, it agreed to effect a compromise. On November 12, 1922, the Working Committee of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama met at Delhi and permitted the contesting of the elections on the condition that the elected members, in conformity with the principle of non-co-operation and the policy of wrecking the Councils, would

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67 Indian Annual Register, 1923, II, p. 52.  
vacate their seats without taking the oath of allegiance.69

This was not exactly what the 'pro-changers' wanted; but it encouraged them to continue their efforts. Towards the end of November 1922, the CKC and the Congress met at Calcutta to consider the reports of the Enquiry Committees. They were unable to reach a decision on Council entry and the matter was deferred for the Gaya sessions in December 1922. They did, however, accept the other recommendations of the Enquiry Committees, and postponed the re-introduction of civil disobedience. The younger leaders recently released from jail made impatient pleas for stronger measures, but these were lost in the controversial exchanges of the 'pro-' and 'no-change' factions.70

Thus, the revival of the agitation in autumn 1922 proved to be short-lived. In effect, it had been dampened by the failure of its own leaders to sustain it. An equally damaging blow was delivered by external factors over which the Khilafatists had no control. During the time when the Khilafatists were trying to find some effective means to fight for the Khilafat, the Turks in Angora were busy depriving the institution of its temporal power. There had been a prolonged friction between the puppet Sultan Vahid-ed-Din Muhammad VI at Constantinople and the de facto Government of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal at Angora, and the latter finally decided to deprive the Caliph of his potentially menacing temporal power. The matter had been precipitated by the Allied action in extending separate invitations to Constantinople and Angora to attend the forthcoming Peace Conference at Lausanne. This gave Kemal his long awaited chance to settle the old score with the Sultan. On November 1, 1922, he forced the Grand National Assembly to appropriate the ultimate powers of the Government of the country. The Khilafat still remained in the House of Osman, but the right to select a Caliph was invested with the Assembly. Thus, the Turkish Government was made to act as the chief bulwark of the

69 Hindu, Nov. 16, 1922.
70 Bombay Chronicle, Nov. 28, 1922; Pioneer, Nov. 29, 1922; and Hindu, Nov. 30, 1922.
More concerned about his safety than the loss of power, the Sultan, through the help of General Sir Charles Harington (1872-1940), the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople, took asylum on board a British battleship, H.M.S. Malaya, and was escorted to Malta. On the contention that the fugitive monarch had forfeited his position by taking refuge with a non-Muslim power, the National Assembly on November 18, on a fatwa from the Commissar for Religious Affairs, proclaimed the deposition of Muhammad VI as Caliph and elected his cousin Abdul-Mejid (1868-1944), a 54 year old son of the late Sultan Abdul-Aziz, as his successor with 'spiritual' powers only.

The Angora law of November 1, 1922, may be defensible from the Turkish Nationalists' point of view, but it was misleading theologically as it suggested a dualism which does not exist in Islam. Politically it was risky, and, though in the end the gamble came off, it provoked strong reaction among the Indian Muslims and brought into focus the extreme contradiction between the Indian and the Turkish points of view on the question of the Khilafat. The demands of the Indian Muslims, the terms in which they were formulated and the grounds on which they were based, were in complete disharmony with the Turkish National Pact of January 28, 1920. The three-fold claim which the Khilafatists had formulated for the redress of the Khilafat 'wrong' was based apparently on the religious necessity of

73 Ibid. The investiture took place on Nov. 24, 1922.
preserving an institution which united in itself both temporal and spiritual powers. The Turks on their part were fighting not for any higher religious principles but for their existence as a nation. To achieve their objective, they had renounced the claim over the Jazirat-ul-Arab and the Holy Places which formed an essential part of the Indian demands. Again, after 1920, the Nationalists were fighting not to restore the temporal power of the Caliph but to establish the national sovereignty of the Turkish nation against all enemies, including the Sultan-Caliph Muhammad VI alongside the Allies and the Greeks.

Complications arose when in their enthusiasm the Indian Muslims presumed that the Turks were inspired by the same religious zeal as themselves. They could not believe that the Turks who appeared to be fighting for the elevation of the Khilafat could be instrumental in destroying it. Therefore, not unnaturally, the idea of depriving the Khilafat of its temporal power was received with consternation by the orthodox Indian Muslim opinion. From the theological point of view, their objection was not to the election of a new Caliph - rather they welcomed the introduction of the elective principle which to them symbolized a return to the days of the first four Caliphs but to the election of a Caliph without temporal power which they thought was repugnant to Islam. The consensus of opinion required the Caliph, the Defender of the Faith, to be in his person not only

75 PSM, B. 370 and B. 371.
78 See Abdullah Suhrawardy’s statement in Madras Mail, Nov. 6, 1922.
79 See the reports from the Provincial Govts. in PSSP, P. 3740/23, P. 3822/23, P. 3920/23 and P. 4013/23 with 3344/20.
80 See the views of Khwaja Hassan Nizami and Bburugri in Statesman, Nov. 10, 1922; and Madras Mail, Nov. 13, 1922.
81 See the views of Ahmad Ali, Abul Kasem and Abdul Majid Sharar in V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 907, Nov. 15, 1922, RP; and of Dr. Hassan Suhrawardy in Madras Mail, Nov. 6, 1922 and Statesman, Nov. 7, 1922.
the 'spiritual' leader, but also a strong and independent monarch, powerful enough to safeguard the prestige of Islam. 82

The Angora action was especially embarrassing to the Khilafatists because its religious and political implications had touched the professed basis of the Khilafat movement. Therefore, they secretly tried to persuade the Nationalists to reconsider their action. Abdur Rahman Siddiqui and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar were sent to Lausanne (Switzerland) with a message for Ismet Pasha (1884-), then attending the Lausanne Conference, for transmission to Angora. 83 But as a quarrel with the Nationalists over this issue would have benefited none but their opponents, the Khilafatists quickly forged arguments to prove that the Angora action in no way affected the prestige of the Khilafat as such but rather would enhance it. To satisfy the conscientious qualms of the devout Muslims they took the line that the Sultanate had not been abolished because the temporal power was still vested in the Caliph, as the Assembly had announced that the Turkish Government would be the chief bulwark of the Khilafat. 84 In other words the change was not at all inconsistent with the aims of the Khilafat movement and they should tamely accept the decision. 85

The Khilafatists' volte-face is an example of undisguised political opportunism - indefensible, because only a few days before the Angora decree the CKC had expressed alarm at the reported speech of Refat Pasha (1881-) suggesting deprivation of the temporal power of the Khilafat. 86 Critics denigrated them in exaggerated terms, 87 and the Khilafatists' only justification can be that all along their real aim had been the maintenance of a strong Turkey as a bulwark of Islam. Moreover, they had, since the rise of Mustafa Kemal, committed

82 See Dr. Abdullah Suhrawardy's view in Statesman, Nov. 7, 1922.
83 PRO, F.O., 141/587.
84 See the views of Maulavi Abdul Wahed Khan, Vice-President of the Khilafat Committee, Calcutta, in V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 907, Nov. 15, 1922, RP.
85 Statesman, Nov. 14, 1922.
86 Times of India, Oct. 27, 1922.
87 S.A. Ahmed Rizvi, Mustafa Kemal Pasha aur Khilafat ki Bewaqat Maut, Sitapore, 1922, p. 12.
themselves so deeply to the policies of Angora that they could not now withdraw their support. This attitude was confirmed by Chotani in his interview with the Associated Press: 'What the National Assembly at Angora decided must be conclusive for the Muslim world at large.'

Thus, in spite of the Turks' departure from the traditional concept of the Khilafat, the CKC and the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama not only unreservedly endorsed the Angora decision but strained every nerve in reassuring and reconciling the Indian Muslims to the present or any future action of the Angora Nationalists with regard to the Khilafat. The CKC directed all subordinate Khilafat committees to arrange the substitution of Abdul-Mejid's name in the Khutba along with the customary titles.

In spite of the fact that the orthodox opinion was reluctant to abandon the traditional doctrine and to accept the divorce of the Sultanate from the Khilafat, the instructions were carried out. The reports from the Provincial Governments indicated that Abdul-Mejid II was accepted as the new Caliph with his new status. Only in Bombay did the CKC face temporary defiance. Those who interpreted the shariat in stricter terms, while not raising any specific objections to the election of the new Caliph, overcame the difficulty by omitting the name of the Caliph from the Khutba; reference was made to the head of the Faith by his title only, i.e., Khalifat-ul-Muslimin. On the

88 Madras Mail, Nov. 7, 1922.
89 See the proceedings of the meetings of the CKC at Calcutta (Nov. 21, 1922) and the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama at Delhi (Nov. 12, 1922). Bombay Chronicle, Nov. 24, 1922; V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1717, Nov. 24, 1922, RP; and Indian Annual Register, 1923, II, p. 61. Also see Chotani's telegrams to the new Caliph and Mustafa Kemal assuring on behalf of Indian Muslims devotion to the former and every possible support to the latter. Times of India, Nov. 23, 1922.
90 PSSF, P. 3822/23 with 3344/20. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 970, Dec. 2, 1922, RP.
91 See V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 971, Dec. 4, 1922, RP.
93 PSSF, P. 3822/23, above, n. 90.
94 Ibid.
whole the Angora decision was accepted in India as a fait accompli, as in the rest of the Muslim world (except perhaps in the Hedjaz, Syria and Persia)^95 and on December 8, 1922, the accession of the new Caliph was formally celebrated with enthusiasm. Religious objection had been to a great extent subordinated to political expediency.

The annual sessions of the Khilafat Conference and the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama opened at Gaya alongside the Congress in the last week of December 1922.97 Not surprisingly, in the context of the Turkish developments, they were tame affairs. The Jamiyat refrained from giving any theological exposition. It merely contented itself with expressing full confidence in Mustafa Kemal and the Angora Assembly, hoping that in future 'along with safeguarding Turkey, Islam and Islamic nationalities from personal and bureaucratic rule, [they] would keep intact the real prestige and power of the Khalifa as enjoined by the Shariat'.98

The Khilafat Conference closely followed the Jamiyat in recognising 'Sultan' Abdul-Mejid II as the new Caliph and reiterated its previous stand of full confidence in Mustafa Kemal and the Angora Assembly.99 But in the midst of these devotional expressions there arrived, on December 30, the news of the impasse at Lausanne. The negotiations between the Turks and the Allies, which had started on November 20, were suddenly on the point of breaking down. The news caused such consternation in the Khilafat camp that all other controversies were dropped and the leaders assembled to discuss some effective means of assisting the Turks. Several speakers delivered highly emotional speeches, warning the British Government and demanding practical steps to demonstrate their sympathy for the Turkish cause:100

95 PRO, F.O., 371/9135 and 371/9136.
96 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 1717, Nov. 24, 1922, RP.
97 The Muslim League decided to meet at Lucknow.
98 Hindu, Jan. 4, 1923.
99 Ibid. Kemal was bestowed the titles of Saif-ul-Islam and Mu'addid-i-Khilafat.
100 Ibid.
Though Hindu and Sikh speakers assured the Muslims of their support and though the Congress did call for a united action, the excitement was not fully reciprocated by the Congress leaders. Opinion prevailed in Congress circles that the victory of Mustafa Kemal had changed the entire aspect of the Khilafat question. Some of the Khilafat demands had already been fulfilled and the others would be realised by the time the Lausanne Conference had finished its deliberations. The moderates of the National Liberal Federation too were of somewhat similar opinion. They held that the grounds for agitation against the Government, namely the Khilafat and the Punjab, were no longer valid. The first because of the Lausanne Conference and the second because of the 'punishments' meted out to the guilty officers. Moreover, the Khilafat movement lacked justification since the Angora Turks had themselves shorn off all the powers of the Khilafat. Therefore, the agitation must stop. Further agitation would only be a pretence to defend the power and prestige of the Angora Government.

The Khilafatists were obviously unwilling to accept these prudent arguments and before the Khilafat Conference adjourned on January 1, 1923, a resolution was passed which stated:

That in the event of war with Turkey due to the unjust attitude of the Allies, particularly British, the Muslims of India would immediately launch civil disobedience with a programme which would include spreading their propaganda among the Police and Army, stoppage of fresh recruitment, refusal to subscribe to war loans, recruitment to the Angora legion, picketing of foreign cloth and liquor shops and preventing export of food grains.

101 Ibid.
102 Report of the Thirty-Seventh Indian National Congress held at Gaya on the 26th, 27th, 29th, 30th and 31st December, 1922, Patna, 1923, pp. 2-3.
103 See C.R. Das's address, ibid., pp. 32-33.
104 See Sir Maneckjee Dadabhoi's address as the Chairman of the Reception Committee at the fifth session of the All-India Liberal Federation at Nagpur on Dec. 27, 1922. Indian Annual Register, 1923, I, pp. 980-81.
105 Hindu, Jan. 4, 1923.
Such resolutions were, however, hollow threats. It is doubtful whether in the event of a war in the Near East the Khilafatists would have been able to render any active assistance to Turkey. The Khilafat movement had come to be confined to academic discussions and unproductive resolutions. Energies were being frittered away in factionalism, particularly on the question of Council entry. Nevertheless, the CKC, the Jamiyat and the Congress continued to treat the Councils with contempt. The Jamiyat even vetoed the November compromise of its own executive and reimposed a total ban on Council entry. This unbending attitude forced out the 'pro-changers' - on New Year's Day 1925, they formed themselves into a Congress-Khilafat Swaraj Party, though they did not dissociate themselves completely from the parent organisations. C.R. Das was elected president, Motilal Nehru general secretary and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman and Sherwani additional secretaries of the new party.

The rise of the Swaraj Party with an active programme and the subsequent tug of war between it and the majority parties within the parent bodies complicated the situation still further. Abul Kalam Azad, after his release in January 1923, tried to bring about a settlement between the factions, but his efforts failed to have any permanent effect. The result was that during the whole of the first half of 1923, little attention was paid to the Khilafat issue. The movement was at its lowest ebb. Some half-hearted attempts were made to follow up the Gaya resolutions by appeals for a million rupees and 50,000 men for the volunteer corps, but there was no revival of organised agitation. Meetings were few and ill-attended. Fund raising

106 Pioneer, Dec. 29, 1922. The compromise was not considered worth the trouble. See Maulana Habibur Rahman, Khutba-i-Sadarat, Gaya, 1923, pp. 40-41.
107 Madras Mail, Jan. 2, 1923. For the programme of the new party also see PP, 1923, Cmd. 1961, Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1922-1923, Fifty-Eighth Number, pp. 290-91.
108 Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, Lahore, 1961, p. 66.
109 Hindu, March 8, May 3 and 31 and July 12 and 19, 1923; and Indian Annual Register, 1923, II, pp. 143-88.
activities also met with little success. And irreparable damage was done to the movement by the acute Hindu-Muslim disunity.

The Hindu-Muslim entente to which the political agitation owed much of its strength was essentially a combination of parties whose real aims were divergent. It had never been more than superficial and cracks had appeared even in the midst of the non-co-operation fervour in 1921. Causes such as the Hindu fears of an Afghan invasion and a possible Muslim domination, the Muslim apprehensions of Hindu domination after the attainment of swaraj, the unfortunate Mappilla excesses of 1921, the ever-disputed question of cow-killing, clashes during the religious festivals and celebrations, playing of music before the mosques, all combined to widen the breach. But it was the reaction, consequent upon the failure of the non-co-operation experiment, that really tore the communities apart. The religious overtones of the Khilafat movement and the policy of 'Hinduising' the Congress espoused by Hindu leaders like Malaviya, Moonje, Shraddhanand, Lajpat Rai and others, had unwittingly laid the foundations of Hindu-Muslim discord.

The Hindus and Muslims were united so long as their aims seemed attainable. But when the promised swaraj remained as distant as ever and the Khilafat issue unsolved, the entente broke down. The Hindus began to question the wisdom of supporting a professed religious movement and the Muslims grumbled that they had made greater sacrifices without deriving any corresponding advantage. The feeling of distrust spread. The Hindus resurrected the Mappilla issue and complained that the Muslim leaders had not expressed enough sympathy.

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110 V to S/S, Tel. P. & En Clair, No. 92, Feb. 6, 1923; and V to S/S, Tel. P. & Word Code, No. 121, Feb. 22, 1923, RP.


112 This is evident from the perfunctory Hindu participation in the Turkish victory celebrations early in Sept. 1922. See above, p.238.

113 Haarat Mohani was the more prominent among those holding such views. See Englishman, March 10 and 14, 1922.
for the Hindu sufferers. The Muslims attacked Hindu sincerity and the motives of their co-operation and alleged that they were out to destroy Islam in India. Old fears reappeared - the Hindus apprehending the increase in the Indian Muslim power and prestige as a result of Turkish victories, and Muslims fearing that if they did not protect their communal and political rights against the Hindus they might be 'swept out of existence'. Cow question again became prominent.

The bitterness between the communities was further accentuated by disputes among Hindu and Muslim co-operators over 'the loaves and fishes of office'. This was most acute in the Punjab. There the policy of the Education Minister, Fazl-i-Husain, regarding the Hindu...

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114 Hindu, Jan. 5 and July 20, 1922. Also see Dastan-i-Zulm, the Malabar Hindu Sahaik Sabha, Amritsar, 1922; U. Balakrishna Nair, 'The Moplah Rebellion', Indian Review, Feb. 1922, pp. 105-8; and Civil and Military Gazette, June 26, 1922.

115 See Bashir Ahmad Khan's (President, Anjuman-i-Islamia, Gurdaspur) open letter to Ajmal Khan in the Civil and Military Gazette, Aug. 27, 1922. Also see his letters in ibid., July 27, 1922, and May 10, 1923.

116 This sentiment found expression at the time of the Near Eastern crisis of Sept. 1922, when war between Turkey and Britain seemed imminent. Dr. H.S. Gour proposed to Reading that he could bring a deputation representing Hindu Members of the Legislative Assembly and the Hindus in general offering their services to the Government if that be necessary. The Maharajas of Patiala and Holkar also came forward eagerly to offer their services to the Viceroy. See V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 758, Sept. 22, 1922. Also see the Maharaja of Patiala to Reading, Tel. Sept. 19, 1922, RP.

117 See the communication from a Muslim to Paisa Akhbar, March 26, 1922, PNNR 1922.


119 PP. 1924, Cmd. 2311, Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1923-1924, Fifty-Ninth Number, p. 248.
redistribution of posts in local bodies and other spheres, aroused the 
bitterest opposition from urban Hindus - opposition which culminated 
in an unsuccessful censure motion against him in the Council in March 
1923.120 Other incidents, which would have passed unnoticed in normal 
times, enhanced common distrust. Mutual recriminations led to communal 
riots, some of them very serious, especially those in the Punjab and 
Bengal on the occasion of the Moharram mournings of 1922. The most 
terrible was the one that took place in Multan in the Punjab where 
arson and looting were accompanied by desecration of temples and 
mosques. The tension that was bitter in 1922, increased to a 
lamentable extent in 1923. In March and April there were serious 
riots in Amritsar, Multan and some other places in the Punjab. These 
were followed by a further riot in the same province in May and 
another in Sind. The next two months witnessed riots in Muradabad 
and Meerut as well as in the Allahabad district of the U.P., and a 
serious riot at Ajmer. Fanned by the vernacular press the communal 
hatred created by the riots spread over an area far more extensive 
than that involved in the actual outbreaks.121

Additional provocation to heighten the tension was provided by 
the religious propagandists of both communities who in their reforming 
zeal surpassed the limits of moderation. Especial bitterness was 
caused by the militant Sangathan movement of Dr. Moonje, aiming at 
binding together the Hindu community,122 and the so-called Shuddhi 
movement of Shraddhanand, launched to reclaim to the Hindu fold certain 
communities which had passed to Islam.123 This led to the Muslims

120 Syed Nur Ahmad, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, Lahore, [1936], pp. 80-81. 
Also see Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, Bombay, 1946, pp. 177-90.
121 PP, 1924, Cmd. 2311, above, n. 119. Also see An Indian Mahomedan, 
122 An idea of the movement can be formed from Bhai Parmanand's book 
Hindu Sangathan, Lahore, 1936. Also see I.H. Qureshi, The Muslim 
Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, the Hague, 1962, p. 280.
323-24; Shraddhanand Sanyasi, The So-Called Shuddhi Movement, Delhi, 
1923; and Ben Misra, 'Hindu and Moslem Renew Strife in India', CH, 
XXVI, 1926, pp. 78-82. The Shuddhi campaign was actively conducted
forming their counter organisations of Tanzim and Tabligh. Preachers of both religions then started to raise funds in the Punjab and the U.P. and elsewhere to combat each other. Tension was accentuated still further by the emergence, after April 1921, of the Hindu Mahasabha, the militant communal organisation with its emphasis on physical culture.

The growing Hindu-Muslim discord and the recurring communal riots set the nationalist leaders to find a way to resolve the differences. An attempt in this direction was made at Gaya in December 1922, when Dr. Ansari proposed the drawing up of a 'National Pact', defining swaraj, safeguarding the rights of the communities, and providing for a settlement of the questions leading to communal strife. Ansari argued that real unity was impossible unless both communities decided to adjust their differences in a frank and liberal spirit. The Gaya sessions failed to arrive at a definite decision but the leaders met again at Lahore in the middle of April 1923, and entrusted the question of a 'National Pact' to a smaller committee, consisting of the Presidents of the Congress, the CKC, the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee of the Sikhs, with two members each from the three among the Malkana Rajputs near Agra and in the Punjab where Hindu 'missionaries' made efforts to convert various classes of Muslims to Arya tenets. See Qureshi, The Muslim Community, p. 281.

For the aims and objects of Tanzim see Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Tanzim: Its Scope and Objects, issued by the Tanzim Committee, Amritsar, 1925. For its Urdu translation see Khutba Sadarat, Amritsar, 1925. For an account of the Tabligh see Maulana M.Y.B. Raghib, Khutba-i-Sadarat, Badaun, 1925; and Ghulam Bhik Nairang to Syed Mumtaz Ali, June 28, 1926, Naqush, Nov. 1957, LXV, pp. 407-8.

The 'All-India Hindu Sabha' was founded in 1915 though 'Hindu Sabhas' were in existence in the country since the 1890s. Later in April 1921, its name was changed to 'All-India Hindu Mahasabha'. See N.N. Bannerjee's foreword to Indra Prakash, Hindu Mahasabha, its Contribution to India's Politics, New Delhi, 1966.

See Dr. Ansari's presidential address at the Gaya Khilafat Conference on Dec. 27, 1922. Hindu, Jan. 4, 1923.

Ibid.
communities. Prominent among those appointed were Ajmal Khan, Abul Kalam Azad, Abdul Qadir, C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru and Sirdar Mehtab Singh. But apart from this, no effective agreement was reached due to divergent interests and the talks lapsed into a stalemate. The situation remained one of extreme inter-communal hostility.

No less important a factor contributing to the decline of the Khilafat movement was the dissensions within the Khilafat organisation. Apart from personal recriminations, the difference of opinion among the Khilafatists had first developed over non-co-operation and then took shape over the question of the attitude which the CKC should maintain towards the Congress. There were not wanting sections of Muslim opinion to express the fear that the CKC was subordinating itself to the Congress. This question which came up for discussion time and again manifested itself in the frequent arguments that took place over certain issues like that of the Mappilla excesses and the cow killing. Another deflection, as already seen, had occurred shortly after the publication of the Government of India's dispatch of February 1922, when certain Khilafatists, notably Abdul Bari and Kidwai, had temporarily adopted a friendlier attitude towards the Government. The anti-Turk policy of the British Government had, however, prevented any serious split among the leaders. No less instrumental in creating dissensions was the discovery that the various Khilafat funds, amounting to several lakhs of rupees, had been mismanaged.

Allegations of misappropriation of the Khilafat funds had appeared as early as 1920 when Mohamed Ali, owing to his pre-occupations, was delayed in submitting the accounts of his delegation.

129  Madras Mail, April 17, 1923.
130  E.g., between Kidwai and the Ali brothers (see Kidwai to Abdul Bari, Aug. 11, 1922, Nuqush, CIX, pp. 81-83) and between the latter and Azad (see Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, 2nd ed., Lahore, 1968, pp. 68-70).
131  See the proceedings of the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama at Lahore, Nov. 1921. Hindu, Nov. 24, 1921.
132  Shafi's note, above, n. 15.
to Europe. Anti-non-co-operationists pounced upon the opportunity and the charges against the Khilafatists in this connection increased in the following year. This moved Abdul Bari to write to Shaukat Ali asking him to state the facts. Then in summer 1922, rumours spread of serious deflections not only in the CKC but also in various provinces. Between 40 and 50 thousand rupees were said to have been embezzled in the Punjab alone. This prompted enquiries and when in July 1922, the Working Committee of the CKC learnt that a balance of over 16 lakhs of rupees of the Angora Fund was still lying with Chotani, whose firm acted as treasurer, it demanded that he remit ten lakhs of rupees immediately to Angora. But, even after repeated requests, Chotani did not comply with the order. Suspicions of misappropriation of funds prompted reprimands to Chotani from Ajmal Khan and Abdoola Haroon who also solicited Abdul Bari's intervention. But Chotani was still evasive and in October 1922, he issued a statement to the press unsuccessfully attempting to refute the allegations which had excited public controversy.

In spite of Chotani's denial, feeling against him ran exceedingly high. In the middle of October 1922, the CKC constituted a sub-committee to hold enquiries and report on the state of various

134 See Khaliluddin Hasan, Taqir-i-Nazm Badih, Pilibhit, 1921, p. 5.
135 See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, Jan. 29, 1921, denying any embezzlement. Nuqush, CIX, p. 73.
137 Hindu, July 12, 1923. The Statement of the CKC refers to the earlier period.
138 See Abdoola Haroon to Abdul Bari, Aug. 19, 1922, Nuqush, CIX, p. 111. Also see V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 756, Sept. 21, 1922, RP.
139 Madras Mail, Oct. 3, 1922.
Khilafat funds. The report was submitted to the CKC at the end of 1922. The contents were kept a secret. But it was established that Chotani had diverted the balance of Angora Fund to his business in order to make good the serious losses he had suffered owing to his being deprived of all Government contracts through official vindictiveness. The Working Committee pressed Chotani to settle the matter. But while this was being arranged the CKC's position was rendered untenable by the mysterious publication in March 1923, in the columns of anti-CKC journal, the Aligarh Gazette, and the Statesman (Calcutta), of a funds report of the CKC allegedly revealing extravagance and mismanagement.

The scandal caused such a stir in the country, especially in Bengal, that the CKC had to make a feverish effort to retrieve its position. First it issued a denial that there had been any misuse of funds and then persuaded three out of the five signatories of the Funds Committee report to disown the contents that appeared in the press. Dr. Syed Mahmud, one of the Secretaries of the CKC, rushed to Calcutta, loaded with two big trunks full of account books, files and vouchers, and invited leading Calcutta journalists to interview him and examine the papers.

Though the journalists and the auditors who examined the papers found the accounts quite in order the scandal hastened the fall of Chotani. Clearly he was guilty - at least technically -

The belated reference is in Madras Mail, April 5, 1923. The excitement at the meeting was further increased by the circulation of a poster published in Bombay which accused Khatri of using the Khilafat funds for 'the purpose of satisfying his unnatural practices'. Bamford, op. cit., p. 208.

Hindu, July 12, 1923. Also see Afzal Haq, op. cit., p. 68.

Statesman, March 17, 1923.

Ibid., March 21, April 5 and 21, 1923.

Ibid., March 21, 1923.

Madras Mail, April 5, 1923.

Ibid., April 24, 1923.

Ibid.
of embezzlement of funds. There ensued a protracted correspondence and conversations between the representatives of the Working Committee and Chotani, who finally came to terms and accepted valuation of his property made by Omar Sobani. By the agreement Chotani transferred to the CKC his two saw mills together with their machinery plants, tools and the stocks. He also agreed to pay all costs incidental to the CKC. The value of the property offered was insufficient to cover the amount due to it, but the CKC, taking into consideration all circumstances, accepted the settlement. A board consisting of Omar Sobani, Dr. Ansari, Maulvi Muhammad Ali, Moazzam Ali and T.A.K. Sherwani, was appointed to take charge of the property. Chotani, who once enjoyed the honorific title of Nasir-ul-Islam for his services to the Khilafat cause, was compelled to resign from the Presidentship of the CKC, and was succeeded by Shaukat Ali.

The effect of the scandal was that the recriminations among the Khilafatists increased manifold. The CKC fell in disrepute. M.H. Kidwai, on whose suggestion the Khilafat committees and the Khilafat funds had been started, appealed for the abolition of both. He alleged that the funds and the organisation were 'being exploited for personal and Party purposes, ignoring the vital interests of Islam'. In so far as the Khilafat was concerned it was 'safe in the hands of the militant Turks' and 'the Indian Muslims will do well now to turn their attention away from the Khilafat and Angora to their own home'. But Kidwai only earned the ill-will of the militant Khilafatists who dubbed him as a 'disappointed and irresponsible individual with defective understanding and mean intellect'.

The net result of these deflections was that the Khilafat movement, which had already suffered considerably owing to the Hindu withdrawal and the communal tangle, received a serious blow.

148 Hindu, July 12, 1923.
149 Madras Mail, June 25, 1923.
150 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 578, July 14, 1923, RP. Also see Kidwai to Abdul Bari, June 2, 1922 /sic. 1924/, Nuqush, CIX, p. 89.
The CKC, and with it, the provincial and local organisations, ceased to command public respect or even much attention. Subscriptions to the Khilafat funds fell considerably. Only the shadow of the Lausanne Conference, where the negotiations for a peace settlement were proceeding with alternate gusts of hope and despair, prevented a collapse of the movement.

In conclusion, it appears that the Bardoli fiasco had no immediate effect in disenchanting the Muslims generally with either the Congress or the non-co-operation programme. Most of the Khilafatists had accepted the postponement of civil disobedience and the few sceptics, that there were, had been prevailed upon to tone down their opposition. The CKC and the Congress still professed to follow a joint course of action until swaraj was attained for the country. The possibility of a split occurred in March 1922, when the Government of India deliberately published its pro-Muslim feelings on the Turkish issue. But whatever advantages the Government obtained by publishing the fateful despatch were negatived partly by the repression it unleashed in the summer of 1922 and partly by the threat of British intervention in the renewed Graeco-Turkish conflict. But though the Khilafatists were able to sustain some public enthusiasm, the movement had been gradually on the decline. The disorganised state of affairs following the arrest of some prominent leaders and the increasing squabbles among those still free, especially over the questions of Council entry and civil disobedience, had obviated any possibility of rejuvenating the waning agitation. A crucial factor in the process of decline was the failure of the Khilafat-Congress leadership to give a vigorous lead to the country when it was most needed. Equally significant was the Angora attitude towards the Khilafat which, in spite of the Khilafatists' explanations, had dampened the Muslim enthusiasm.

In these circumstances, the reappearance of communal disharmony and the
dissensions within the Khilafat organisation dealt a severe blow
to the movement. But even then the agitation, though much reduced
in intensity, still lingered on, with intermittent spells of
activity, when the Government resorted to repression or the situation
in the Near and the Middle East became provocative.
CHAPTER VI

THE LAST PHASE

The Khilafat movement entered its final phase when the Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey was signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923. By this Treaty, Turkey retained Constantinople and Thrace upto the Meritza line with the control of the Straits, subject to certain restrictions. Capitulations were abolished, humiliating economic clauses modified, and the disputed question of Mosul was left to separate negotiations between her and Britain.\footnote{For details of the Treaty of Lausanne see PP, 1923, Cmd. 1928, XXV. 533.} Though Turkey had lost her vast empire yet by this Treaty she managed to emerge once more as the chief power in the Near East.

The conclusion of the Peace Treaty brought a genuine exhilaration to Muslim India. The occasion was enthusiastically celebrated all over the country on July 26, 1923, as the victory of the Turkish arms. Despite the strained relations between Hindus and Muslims, the leaders managed to whip up a reasonable fraternisation. There were processions, illuminations, displays of fireworks and special prayers in mosques and temples. Resolutions were passed at public meetings congratulating the Caliph and Mustafa Kemal, and reiterating demand for the freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab from non-Muslim control.\footnote{Times of India, July 27 and 28, 1923.}

But in spite of all the enthusiasm, the Treaty of Lausanne marked the final descent of the Indian Muslim agitation against the British until the abolition of the Khilafat by Angora in March 1924, took the wind out of its sails. On July 26, 1923, Reading observed to Peel:

I have a feeling of profound satisfaction that we have at last made the peace which will enable us to recover the lost ground with the Mahomedans in India, and, indeed, elsewhere.... Now I believe that among the vast majority there will be a desire once
more to associate themselves with the Government, to seek their protection and give them support.... From purely Indian considerations, I have no hesitation in saying that the peace will assure us of the support of all but the extremists among the 60 or 70 million Mahomedans in India and will help materially to strengthen the British position in India.  

Reading's observations were prophetic. Influential sections of Indian Muslims were indeed inclined to accept the Peace Treaty as the final solution of the Turkish problem. They were grateful to the Government of India for placing the Indian Muslims' views before the British Government and bringing the Turkish peace negotiations to a successful conclusion. On July 26, 1923, a delegation of twenty-five Muslim Members of the Indian Legislature specially waited upon the Viceroy at Simla to express the community's gratitude. Similarly, the Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Ali Nawaz Khan (1884-1935) of Khairpur and the Members of the Indian Legislative Assembly conveyed their appreciation and satisfaction to the Viceroy. The Aga Khan in a statement emphasised the desire of the Allies to establish friendly relations with Islam and urged the Indian Muslims to help the new state of Turkey. The Peace Treaty was also gratefully received by the Indian Muslim communities in Rangoon, Durban and throughout South, East and Central Africa. The only question about which Muslims were still concerned was the

3 Reading to Peel, July 26, 1923, RP.
4 PSSF, P. 3162/23 with 4995/19, VII. Prominent among the deputationists were: Abul Kasem, Syed Raza Ali and Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan.
5 The Nizam to Reading, Tel. Aug. 4, 1923, RP.
6 The Mir to Reading, Tel. July 11, 1923, RP.
8 Madras Mail, July 26, 1923. He followed it up with an advice to the British Govt. to adopt a policy of friendship towards the Muslim world. The Aga Khan, 'The New Moslem World', ER, CCXXXVIII, No. 486, Oct. 1923, pp. 230-36.
9 Times of India, July 28, 1923. Also see PSSF, P. 3015/23 and P. 3280/23 with 4995/19, VII.
freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab from non-Muslim control, but its solution was considered simply a question of time. The continuance of the agitation, therefore, seemed to them totally absurd. After the Treaty they were also less inclined to join the Hindus against the British. In fact they decided to counteract the hartals at Lahore, Amritsar and Lucknow, proclaimed for August 27, 1925, to mark India's indignation and sense of humiliation by reason of the Kenya decision.\textsuperscript{11} On the whole the tendency of the Muslims seemed to be to range themselves more and more on the side of the Government.\textsuperscript{12}

With the majority of the Muslims gradually becoming disinterested in the Khilafat movement, the Khilafat leaders found the ground was cut from under their feet. But even then they were determined not to make peace with the Government for they believed that the Treaty had solved the Turkish problem only partially. Until the complete freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab was secured and India had attained her swaraj the agitation must be continued.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, they desperately groped to rouse Muslim feelings on the cognate questions of the Jazirat-ul-Arab and Palestine.\textsuperscript{14} The problems facing the Khilafatists were, however, enormous.

The faction-ridden Khilafat organisation, like the disorganised Congress, was struggling hard to preserve unity in its ranks. Though the OKC still paid a lip-service to the Gandhian brand of non-violent

\textsuperscript{10} See the address presented to the Viceroy by the Muslim Members of the Indian Legislature on July 26, 1923. \textit{Times of India}, July 27, 1923.

\textsuperscript{11} See Reading to Peel, Aug. 30, 1923, RP. In July 1923, the British Govt., in spite of the Govt. of India's pleadings, had decided to maintain the disabilities of the Indian settlers in Kenya. For details see PP, 1923, Cmd. 1922, Indians in Kenya.

\textsuperscript{12} Reading to Peel, Aug. 30, 1923, RP.

\textsuperscript{13} See the manifesto issued in the middle of July 1923, under the signatures of about 150 Hindu-Muslim leaders. \textit{Madras Mail}, July 19, 1923.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
non-co-operation, the Khilafat movement had come to be the concern mainly of the Muslims. And Khilafat work had suffered a set-back. Some of the notable Khilafatists like the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad and Kitchlew were still in jail. Others like Ajmal Khan, T.A.K. Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman were mainly interested in the politics of the newly established Swaraj Party. Still others had either dissociated themselves from the organisation or were thinking of leaving it. Khilafat funds were almost non-existent, and the salaries of the Khilafat workers were in arrears. There was little co-ordination between the CKC and its subordinate branches. However, as Shaukat Ali later recalled, 'the bonds had loosened but the links yet remained.' A semblance of unity was somehow preserved as both the central body and its branches were still in existence.

In August 1923, when Mohamed Ali was released at Jhansi on earning remission of his sentence, it fell to him to grapple with the problem of reorganisation. The difficulty was that those Khilafatists who had joined the Swaraj Party far from dissociating themselves from it, as has been claimed, were determined to carry out their plan of Council entry. This was being done in open defiance of the fatwa of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama and the accepted policy of the CKC. Mohamed Ali regarded this as a betrayal of the cause, especially in view of the religious obligations entailed by the Jamiat's fatwa. But in order to maintain unity he glossed over their action. In September 1923, supported by Dr. Ansari, Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. Mahmud and Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohamed Ali played a leading part in bringing about the Delhi Congress compromise which he regarded as 'a necessary evil'. This compromise allowed such

16 The Times, Aug. 30, 1923.
18 Mohamed Ali to Kitchlew, Sept. 30, 1923, enclosure, A. Langley to Sir Malcolm Hailey, March 26, 1925, HyP.
19 Hindu, Sept. 20, 1923.
21 Mohamed Ali to Kitchlew, Sept. 30, 1923, above, n. 18.
Congressmen, as had no religious or conscientious objections, to stand as candidates or to exercise their right of voting.\textsuperscript{22}

Among the Khilafatists some of the ulama - Abdul Bari, Sulaiman Nadvi and Husain Ahmad Madni - had been themselves trying to secure a revision of the Jamiyat's \textit{fatwa} against Council entry.\textsuperscript{23} But the Jamiyat, instead of taking a prompt decision, referred the matter to a sub-committee for further investigation.\textsuperscript{24} This, however, did not deter the Swarajist-Khilafatists from contesting the elections and consequently a good number was returned to the Councils.\textsuperscript{25} In these desperate conditions, there was hardly any hope for reorganising the Khilafat work and, despite Shaukat Ali's pleadings for 'a clear and forward and brave policy',\textsuperscript{26} the matter had to be shelved until the Khilafat Conference at Coconada in December 1923. In the meantime the Khilafatists were confronted with fresh complications.

When the Turkish Nationalists had separated the Khilafat from the Sultanate in November 1922, the Indian Khilafatists had expediently accepted the \textit{fait accompli}.\textsuperscript{27} Muffled protests both in Turkey and India had since been ignored.\textsuperscript{28} But one step led to another. On October 29, 1923, Turkey, striding along the path of

\textsuperscript{22} Hindu, Sept. 20, 1923.

\textsuperscript{23} See above, p. 237.

\textsuperscript{24} Madras Mail, Sept. 24, 1923. Also see Pioneer, Sept. 26, 1923.


\textsuperscript{26} Shaukat Ali to Jawaharlal Nehru, Nov. 29, 1923, in Jawaharlal Nehru, ed., \textit{A Bunch of Old Letters}, Bombay, 1958, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{27} See above, pp. 244-49.

new nationalism, declared herself a republic with Mustafa Kemal as the President. This resulted in the loss by the Caliph of all his secular powers and administrative functions. It also rendered his status completely anomalous. At first this momentous decision attracted little notice in India and the Khilafatists continued to press for the restoration of the Jazirat-ul-Arab to Turkey. The Bombay Chronicle was perhaps the first to point out that agitation for the Jazirat-ul-Arab was useless, as its evacuation by non-Muslim troops was only a matter of time. In order to satisfy those demands, the Caliph's rights must first be re-established and clearly defined.

But the Khilafatists were not prepared to embarrass Angora particularly when the question of the Jazirat-ul-Arab was still unsettled. They had supported the Nationalists so consistently that an open rupture with them would have looked ridiculous. This, however, did not deter those who had been following the events in Turkey with apprehension, from speaking out their minds. The Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were among such people. On November 24, 1923, they addressed from London a joint letter to General Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister of Turkey, entreat ing the Turks to reconsider their decision with regard to the Caliph and maintain 'the religious and moral solidarity of Islam' by re-establishing the powers of the Sunni Khilafat-Imama.

Through an oversight of the Aga Khan's secretary the original letter and its copies to the Turkish press were despatched simultaneously. Thus, the letter appeared in the Constantinople press on December 5, 1923, before it was placed on Ismet Pasha's table in Angora. The manner of publication and the mystery that surrounded it alarmed the Angora Government. It was hinted in some quarters, Ismet Pasha reportedly among them, that a British intrigue...

29 Reference in Madras Mail, Nov. 8, 1923.
32 Ibid. The process of translation took longer in the Angora Foreign Office than in the newspaper offices which explains its publication in the press before its receipt by Ismet Pasha. See Toynbee, Survey, 1925, I, p. 58, n.
was behind the letter and its publication. The Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were described as 'the heretics of heretics' and pawns in the hands of the British. On December 8, the National Assembly was convened in a secret session and a 'Counter-Revolutionary Court' constituted to deal with the reported 'intrigues'. Consequently, some prominent journalists were arrested along with Lutfi Fikri Bey, a reputable lawyer-politician, and Ekram Bey, second military A.D.C. to the Caliph.

Though, in the public trial which began on December 15, the journalists were acquitted and only Fikri Bey got penal servitude, the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were appalled at the Angora insinuations of their being 'the real criminals'. The Nationalists were justifiably concerned about the safety of their nascent state because there was in existence in Constantinople an opposition party with the Caliph as the rallying-point, but they misconstrued a friendly letter as a sinister plot on the non-proven assertion that the British were the instigators. In confusion the Nationalists ignored all the past services rendered to their cause by these two stalwarts and, without any regret, scarred for ever a long-standing friendship.

The Khilafatists were embarrassed by the letter incident. But since they were intent on continuing the agitation whether or not the Caliph's status was certain, they quickly disowned the action.

33 Henderson to Curzon, No. 827, above, n. 31.
34 Ibid. Also see The Times, Dec. 10, 1923; and Henderson to Curzon, No. 846, Dec. 19, 1923, PRO, F.0., 371/9133.
35 He was charged for advocating a principle that ran counter to the Law of Nov. 1, 1922. See Henderson to Curzon, No. 12, Jan. 2, 1924, PRO, F.0., 371/10171.
37 The authors emphatically denied 'any wish on their part to interfere in the politics of Turkey, or to have any association with any of her parties or factions', or that any British intrigue was working behind the letter. See Ameer Ali's statement in Pioneer, Jan. 16, 1924. They were right. In fact the British Foreign Office had absolutely no knowledge of the letter and had to ask the India Office for information about its contents. See F.O. to I.O., No. E 11672/199/44, Dec. 12, 1923, FSSF, P. 4778/23 with 3344/20.
of the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali. At the Cocanada Conference which opened on December 27, 1923, Shaukat Ali, the President, strongly condemned the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali for being completely out of touch with the Indian situation and reaffirmed confidence in Angora. Shaukat Ali warned the Muslims that any slackening of the movement 'will prove our cowardice, fickle-mindedness and stupidity'. 'Our enemies will laugh at us'. His brother, Mohamed Ali, took the opportunity to defend the retention of the Khilafat committees whose raison d'être after the Lausanne Treaty had been under public criticism for some time. He argued that the Treaty had only given the Turks their 'swara,j'; it had not solved the real Khilafat issue which was the freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab. For that the need of the Khilafat organisations was greater than ever. He admitted that the Khilafat funds had not been well-managed but argued that the affairs should not deter Muslims from subscribing for a rightful cause. Mohamed Ali made a frantic appeal for the continuance of agitation until the Khilafatists had achieved their purpose.

The Ali brothers carried the day. The Conference laid down that the original Khilafat demands were four in number, i.e., complete freedom of the Turkish Empire; restitution of Thrace; restitution of Smyrna and the coast of Asia Minor; and freedom and safeguard of the Jazirat-ul-Arab. While the Lausanne Treaty had decided the first three demands, the fourth, 'which from the religious point of view of the Mussalmans is the most important clause of the Khilafat demands', still remained to be solved. Therefore, the Conference, with the full support of the Jamiyat, 'in clear terms and for the last time', declared that unless the whole of the Jazirat-ul-Arab was freed and was safe in the real sense, the Islamic world 'shall continue the

38 On Dec. 18, 1923, the Constantinople press published a telegram from the CKC, which assured Mustafa Kemal of their devotion to the Turkish cause, acclaimed the establishment of the republic and denounced 'the senders of any messages in a contrary sense'. See Henderson to Curzon, No. 848, above, n. 34.
39 Indian Annual Register, 1923, II, p. 171.
40 Author's italics.
41 Hindu, Jan. 3, 1924. Also see Hindu, Jan. 10, 1924.
42 Ibid.
struggle with all its might. A resolution embodying the future programme of the organisation was passed. This involved: entrusting the Working Committee with the work of reorganisation of the Khilafat Committees; appealing for funds; and reorganising the corps of Khilafat volunteers under the CKC. Another resolution reiterated that the attainment of swaraj was 'not only a political and national but the foremost Islamic duty'.

But before this programme could be implemented the inevitable happened. When the republic was born the Khilafat had lost its reason to exist. And, indeed the Aga Khan-Ameer Ali letter of the preceding November had the unintended effect of precipitating the disappearance of the institution. In the context of Turkish national politics the Khilafat had come to mean an 'anomalous and anarchonistic' institution, which Mustafa Kemal regarded as a constant nuisance and a perpetual danger to the Turkish republic. Turkey, he argued, was no longer in a position either to afford military adventure or to claim the power to defend the rest of Islam. The Khilafat and religious institutions, therefore, must be dealt with in a radical manner. By abolishing the Khilafat the Angora leaders also hoped to allay British suspicions of pan-Islamism and thereby soften their attitude towards the question of Mosul.

By February 1924, the Angora leaders had definitely decided to abolish the Khilafat and expel the Imperial household from Turkey.

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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 D.A. Rustow thinks that the real turning-point, 'the watershed between a religious past and a secular future', was the Shaikh-ul-Islam's fatwa (1920) against the Nationalists. See his 'Politics and Islam in Turkey' in Richard N. Frye, ed., Islam and the West, Harvard, 1957, p. 77.
46 Daily Telegraph, March 4, 1924. Kemal's views were supplied to the journal by a leading Nationalist.
47 Lindsay to Ramsay MacDonald, No. 166, Feb. 27, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10217.
48 This was confided by Ismet Pasha to the generals assembled at Smyrna. See ibid.
49 Ibid.
On February 26 Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha had long consultations with Mustafa Fevzi, the Minister of Religious Affairs. On March 2 the draft laws on the abolition of the Khilafat were considered and endorsed by the Peoples' Party (Halk Firkasi), which was determined to go through with its professed philosophy of nationalism and secularism.\(^{50}\) The bills as approved by the Party were finally passed by the Assembly on March 3, 1924, after a heated discussion in which a small opposition was shouted down.\(^{51}\) In its final form the law of abolition was a compromise between the Government proposal simply to declare the caliphal office abolished and the counter-proposals to declare it vested either in the National Assembly or in the Presidency. The material clause concerning the abolition maintained that since the idea of the Khilafat was contained in the meaning and significance of the words 'Government' and 'Republic' the institution was superfluous. The office of the Caliph was, therefore, abolished and the Caliph deposed.\(^{52}\)

Within hours of the decision the Caliph was asked to leave the country. In the small hours of March 4 Abdul-Mejid II,\(^{53}\) tears in his eyes, accompanied by a son, a daughter and two wives, was first bundled off in a motorcar to the Chatalja and then placed on a train

\(^{50}\) For the aims and objects of the People's Party see George Lenczowski, _The Middle East in World Affairs_, Ithaca, 1952, p. 120.

\(^{51}\) Lindsay to MacDonald, No. 188, March 5, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10217. Said Bey, the Minister of Justice, maintained that the Khilafat was an administrative and political problem and had no sanction in the Quran. See Lutfy Levonian, _The Turkish Press_, Athens, 1932, pp. 22-25.

\(^{52}\) See Lindsay's Tel. to Cairo, No. 9, March 8, 1924, addressed to the F.O., No. 49, PRO, F.O., 371/10217. Also see Toynbee, _Survey_, 1925, I, Appendix II, pp. 572-75.

\(^{53}\) The Nationalists did everything in their power to humiliate and belittle the popular Caliph. For instance, the Passport was issued to him simply as 'Monsieur Abdul-Mejid fils d' Abdul Aziz' and the Italian Embassy was informed that it was not a case for a diplomatic visa. They also took special measures to ensure the omission of his name from the Friday khutba and substituted it with a prayer for the Republic. See Lindsay to MacDonald, No. 224, March 12, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10217.
The abolition of such an old institution as the Khilafat once more brought to the fore the fundamental differences between the Turkish Nationalists and the Indian Khilafatists. By their action the Nationalists had challenged and then eliminated ideologically the political power of the Muslim ummat as an instrument of solidarity. The news came as a rude shock to the Indian Muslims who could hardly believe that the Khilafat could be done away with by the very people who had added to its strength in the past. Abul Kalam Azad called the abolition a great blunder. He held that the Turks alone were not competent to do away with the Khilafat; it was a question for the entire Muslim world to decide. Mohamed Ali's condemnation of the Angora action was even stronger. In anguish he declared that there could be no sympathy 'with such irreligious people as may want to break the ties of Islam ... and hanker after Europe's recognition of their progressiveness'; some were angry that the Indian Muslims, who had made so many sacrifices for Turkey and were responsible for extracting from the Entente Powers favourable terms for her at Lausanne, had been so ungratefully ignored. Others asserted that the Indian Muslims had sympathised with Turkey because

54 The Times, March 5 and 6, 1924.
57 Englishman, March 6, 1924.
58 Hindu, March 13, 1924.
59 See the statements of Sait Moosa and Abbas Ali Khan, Members of the Madras Legislative Council in Madras Mail, March 8, 1924.
of their attachment to the Caliph: the Khilafat gone, they had now no interest left in Turkey.60

The indignation was by no means limited to the politically-minded. Even the illiterate appear to have been moved, for it was the Caliph as a temporal ruler that had appealed to them and they could not bear his disappearance. People were actually seen weeping. The commonly-held view was that the Angora Assembly or any other Government, had no right, jurisdiction or power to abolish an institution which, during the past fourteen centuries, had become an integral part of the religious institutions of the Sunni world. The action was arbitrary, sacriligious and ultra vires and one against which the Indian Muslims had every right to protest.61

To evaluate the Indian Muslim reaction to specific developments in Turkey, it is essential to keep in mind their peculiar attitude towards the breakdown of old ideas and customs that had long been considered indispensable for Islam. Plainly the Indian Muslims, excepting a few, were practically unaware of the intellectual life of modern Turkey, reinforced and broadened by modern philosophical ideas and concepts even in the Ijtihad.62 Thus, the CKC, in spite of the advice of some prudent men like Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan that the Angora action was based on prudence and foresight,63 decided to plead with the Turks. On March 7, Shaukat Ali sent a cable to Mustafa Kemal begging him 'to do your utmost to uphold the Khilafat and Islam'. But for Mustafa Kemal the Khilafat had ceased

60 Pioneer, March 13, 1924.
61 Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, Lahore, 1961, p. 74.
62 See the statements of Ameer Ali (The Times, March 5, 1924), Ghulam Husain Hidayatallah (Times of India, March 10, 1924), and Ali Ahmad Dehlavi (Pioneer, March 14, 1924) and the extracts from Bombay Chronicle (Pioneer, March 6, 1924), Khilafat (Pioneer, March 9, 1924) and Zamindar (PNRN 1924, p. 102).
64 Leader, n.d., UPNNR, No. 13 of 1924, p. 1. Also see Al-Khalil and Hind Jadid, n.d., Ibid, Nos. 11 and 12 of 1924; and M.S. Azim, Kinayat, Gorakhpur, 1924.
65 Pioneer, March 8, 1924.
to be a potent instrument of Turkish foreign policy. His reply was firm: the Khilafat meant Government which meant State. The existence of a separate caliphal office with the Turkish Republic had proved disturbing to the foreign and internal political union of Turkey. Moreover, the original idea of the Khilafat had fallen to the ground and, therefore, there was nothing contrary to Islam in the action taken. The real bond between Muslim nations lay in the significance of the Quranic verse innamul mominun ikhwan (all Muslims are brothers in Faith).

Though Mustafa Kemal had made it particularly clear that the caliphal office had ceased to exist, the Khilatists were not satisfied. On March 9, 1924, a special joint meeting of the Working Committees of the CKC and the Jamiyat was convened at Aligarh. It was decided that the Presidents of the two bodies should jointly make another representation to the National Assembly through its President. The Shaukat Ali-Kifayatullah telegram apprehended that the abolition 'would open the door to the mischievous ambitions of hosts of underserving claimants' and begged the Assembly to reconsider their decision and give an opportunity to an Indian delegation which desired to make fuller representation on the subject.

The telegram had implied that the Khilafatists would gratefully welcome a decision by Mustafa Kemal himself to assume the Khilafat. An influential section of Muslim opinion, including Azad and some other ulama, strongly favoured this, and it was also supported by a section of the Muslim press. Even Mohamed Ali later declared

66 Ibid., March 13, 1924.
67 Ibid.
68 See Azad's letter to Haqiqat, n.d., UPNNR, No. 20 of 1924, p. 1. Again in a series of seven well-reasoned articles in the Zamindar he maintained that the Islamic Khilafat was still existent and that the Turks had done away with only that office which they had created in November 1922. The President of the Republic was in fact the Khalifat-ul-Muslimin. See Ghulam Rasul Mihr, ed., Tabarkat-i-Azad, Lahore, [1957], pp. 214-60. For the views of Subhanullah of Gorakhpur and Fazlur Rahman of Patna see Pioneer, March 19, 1924 and Mansur, n.d., UPNNR, No. 21 of 1924, p. 2.
69 See, e.g., Zamindar, March 8, 1924, PHNR 1924; Ziafat Punch, March 11, 1924, ibid; and Muslim Outlook, March 14, 1924, ibid.
that he would not oppose Mustafa Kemal becoming 'Caliph should he so desire'.

The Turks had no such intention. To them the Khilafat had become useless and obsolete. Thus they had completely undermined the Khilafatists who were faced with the unpleasant dilemma of having to disown either the Angora Nationalists, with whom they were in political sympathy, or the Khilafat, 'whose defence they had declared from scores of platforms for the last five years to be their most sacred religious duty'. Their position was untenable. The critics like Fazlul Haq derided them, and perhaps rightly too, that although they knew that Mustafa Kemal and his followers cared nothing for Islam, still they were continuing the Khilafat movement, 'an agitation hollow and unnecessary', and 'a dishonest propaganda' against the British. For some it seemed that the event should 'serve as an eye opener', but the Khilafatists, still under the illusion that things would settle ultimately their way, decided to adopt face-saving tactics.

On March 12, 1924, the CKC and the Jamiyat issued a joint statement which urged the Muslims to pursue the agitation with greater energy and determination rather than be upset by the abolition: 'for on the continuance of our efforts depends the realisation of national and Moslem hopes and aspirations.' The future course of action depended on their communications with Turkey and in the event of unsatisfactory result their first step would be to convene a general conference of the Muslim world at some suitable centre to discuss and find a solution.

An exchange of telegrams between the Ali brothers and the deposed Caliph had already taken place - the brothers conveying personal devotion and allegiance and an assurance on behalf of Indian Muslims that they were determined to maintain the sacred

70 Madras Mail, Sept. 4, 1924
71 Englishman, March 5, 1924.
72 Pioneer, March 6, 1924.
73 Englishman, March 22, 1924.
74 Pioneer, March 14, 1924.
Khilafat, and the ex-Caliph conveying his 'fatherly appreciation' of the co-operation of Indian Muslims in defence of the Khilafat.  

Now Sahukat Ali, in spite of his serious illness and other family mishaps, issued a circular that, pending a settlement with Angora, Abdul-Mejid's name should continue to be mentioned in the Friday Khutba. Abdul-Mejid was also banking on the Indian support and the Turkish flag still fluttered on his Territet hotel. But the ex-Caliph's appeal to the Muslim world that the Angora decision was 'incompatible with the spirit of Islam' and, therefore, an inter-Islamic conference should decide the issue, appears to have fallen flat, except in India. The dejected ex-Caliph had to spend the rest of his life on a stipend from the Nizam of Hyderabad, donations from Indian Princes and magnates and funds from Ameer Ali's Red Crescent Society.

Despite the Khilafatists' insistence that the continuance of the Khilafat, both from religious and political points of view, was essential, there was no concrete proposal as to how this was to be achieved. Moreover, an influential section among Muslims, Iqbal and Khuda Bukhsh included, was defending the action of the Turkish Assembly. Among the various suggestions, ranging from forcing Angora to restore Abdul-Mejid to electing as Caliph the

75  Ibid., March 8 and 13, 1924.
76  At the time his mother was also ill and Mohamed Ali's daughter Amina had died on March 11, 1924, after a prolonged illness. See Mohamed Ali to Abdul Majid, April 14, 1924. Abdul Majid Daryabadi, ed., Khutut-i-Mashahir, I, Lahore, 1944, pp. 282-87.
77  Pioneer, March 15, 1924.
78  Daily Telegraph, March 10, 1924.
79  Pioneer, March 12, 1924.
80  Ibid., March 14, 1924.
81  PSSF, P. 2456/24 with 1135/24 II.
Amir of Afghanistan or the Nizam of Hyderabad or even Mohamed Ali, a suggestion for a conference of the Muslim world appealed to an overwhelming majority. The despatch of a Khilafat delegation to Angora was, therefore, considered imperative. But the proposal for a delegation was undermined by the Government of India and the India Office who, thinking that the personnel would include men of extreme views, refused to grant the passports.

Fresh complications arose when towards the middle of March 1924, news arrived that King Hussain of the Hedjaz had proclaimed himself Caliph. Hussain, who had never forgotten the assurances of an Arab Khilafat once given him during the War by British representatives, had unsuccessfully tried his luck in the winter of 1922/23. For some time nothing happened. But a secret campaign for his recognition as Caliph was already underway in Trans-Jordania since September 1923. When in March 1924, the Turks abolished the Khilafat, Hussain could resist no longer. He at once manipulated a request from leading Arabs at Amman that he should accept the Khilafat and then instructed Mecca to stage-manage a

86 The assurances had come from Lord Kitchener in Oct. 1914, and from Sir. A.H. McMahon in Aug. 1915. The British Govt. later withdrew from this stand. See PSM, B.292. Also see PP, 1938-39, Cmd. 5957.
87 He had tried to persuade the ex-Caliph, Muhammad VI, to 'transfer' the Khilafat to him. But the ex-Caliph's visit to Mecca proved a fiasco. See memo by E.G.F. Adam, Jan. 12, 1923, FSSF, P. 344/23 with 3344/20; and Madras Mail, May 7, 1923.
88 Early in 1924 he declared that he had no desire to become a Caliph. See Pioneer, Feb. 9, 1924.
89 Daily Telegraph, Sept. 7, 1923.
similar demand. He accepted the assumption on March 5 and was officially proclaimed Caliph on March 11 at Shuneh. He was recognised in Jeddah, Syria (despite the French opposition), Damascus and Beirut. But in Egypt his assumption was disapproved and attributed to British intrigues. However, it was in India that it encountered the strongest disapprobation.

With few exceptions, the Indian Muslims condemned Hussain's action and refused to accept his assumption of the caliphal office. A vast majority detested him for his alleged dependence on the British, his betrayal of Turkey in the War and his mismanagement of the hajj pilgrimage. The press were relentless. The Zamindar went so far as to suggest that if Hussain laid claim to the Khilafat it would be lawful for Muslims to kill him. Only a few important Indian Muslims, Abdul Bari and Kidwai included, lent him support. Disgusted with the Angora attitude towards the Khilafat, Abdul Bari

90 Bullard, British Consul, Jeddah, to MacDonald, No. 25, March 10, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10218.
91 Toynbee, Survey, 1925, I, p. 64.
92 The Times, March 14, 1924.
93 Bullard to MacDonald, Tel. No. 8 (R), March 5, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10217.
94 Russell (Alleppo) to MacDonald, Tel. No. 2, March 11, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10217.
95 H.M.'s Consul, Damascus, to MacDonald, Tel. No. 2 (R), March 7, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10217.
96 N.E. Satow, Consul General, Beirut to MacDonald, No. 32, March 13, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10217.
97 Allenby to MacDonald, No. 64, March 11, 1924, PRO, F.O. 371/10217.
98 PSSP, P. 1919/24 with 1135/24, I.
99 PSSF, P. 2150/24 with ibid.
100 PSSF, P. 1146/24 with ibid.
101 PPNR, No. 5 of 1924, p. 39.
102 M.H. Kidwai, 'The Khilafat Question', TR, XXV, No. 3, March 1924, pp. 151-52. Also see Pioneer, March 12, 1924.
even sent a telegram to his old friend\textsuperscript{103} Hussain congratulating him on assuming the Khilafat, 'which office you so deservedly assumed'.\textsuperscript{104} But this support did no good either to the pretender or to his supporters, and instead exacerbated feelings\textsuperscript{105}

In this confused situation when the special Khilafat Conference opened at Calcutta on March 19, 1924, opinion prevailed that the abolition of the Khilafat did not in the least affect the Indian Muslims, whether judged by the canons of the Islamic law or those of sound policy.\textsuperscript{106} Nevertheless, they would try to find a solution in consultation with the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{107} But Hussain's assumption was unacceptable. He was 'a traitor to his predecessor and to the Defender of the Faithful', 'a friend of the British', and unfit for the high office.\textsuperscript{108} The agitation for the freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab from non-Muslim control was not only religiously essential but also nationally important in order to keep up the movement for swaraj. In turn the attainment of the swaraj, apart from being the goal of every Indian, was the best weapon for the Indian Muslims to secure the restoration of their holy land and the safeguard of the Khilafat.\textsuperscript{109}

Thus it would be seen that the agitation for the Jazirat-ul-Arab was no longer a subsidiary question but had become the principal aspect of the Khilafat movement. In his presidential address Mohamed Ali clearly stated that the restoration of the Jazirat-ul-Arab to Muslim control was a pre-requisite before the Khilafatists could make

\textsuperscript{104} Abdul Bari to Hussain, Tel. March 13, 1924, enclosure, Abdullah to the Chief British Rep., Amman, March 15, 1924, PSSF, P. 1951/24 with 1135/24, I.
\textsuperscript{105} UPNRR, No. 14 of 1924, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{106} Englishman, March 21, 1924.
\textsuperscript{107} See Mohamed Ali's speech in Pioneer, March 23, 1924.
\textsuperscript{108} Englishman, March 21, 1924.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
their peace with the Government. 'It may seem', he justified his contention, 'that we are more Arabian than the Arabs and more Turkish than the Turks, but if our Islamic obligations are understood, it will be apparent that all that we are is Moslems. As Moslems we who are not Arabs cannot let the Arabs hand over the dominions of the Island of Arabia to non-Moslems, and as Moslems we cannot countenance the section of the Turkish nation disconnecting its national Government from the Khilafat'.

There is, however, no doubt that one great plank in the Khilafatists' programme had rotted away. The contemptuous indifference shown by the Turks had dampened their enthusiasm for Turkey. The agitation for the Jazirat-ul-Arab was only a face-saving device. In fact the Khilafat movement now possessed no reality. Indeed the agitation, which had been progressively on the decline since the Treaty of Lausanne, was already in a steep fall. Kidwai's advice of summer 1923, to abolish the Khilafat committees and funds, was revived in certain Muslim quarters. The Hindu vernacular press keenly encouraged the suggestion arguing that it would serve as an incentive for the Muslims to join the Congress and would create friendly relations between Hindus and Muslims.

As in 1923, Mohamed Ali once again tried to defend the retention of the Khilafat committees as being far more necessary than ever, but his advocacy for a strong Khilafat organisation met with little approval. There were among Muslims political realists who honestly believed that India had nothing to do with the question of the Khilafat, that the Khilafat committees were irrelevant and that there were other more pressing problems, such as the constitutional reforms and Hindu-Muslim relations, which required

110 Pioneer, March 21, 1924.
111 See a correspondent's view in Haqiqat, n.d., UPNNR, No. 8 of 1924, p. 1.
113 Madras Mail, June 9, 1924.
immediate attention. There was also a growing realisation that the
reform scheme had not worked to the advantage of the Muslims as a
community, and that, in order to safeguard their political rights,
they must reorientate their national programme. But the difficulty
of the situation was that the Muslim League, which in the past had
fought for Muslim rights, was lying dormant, having been pushed into
the background by the exuberance of the CEC. It had declined both
in its prestige and importance. Its provincial branches were
practically non-existent. Its membership had dwindled and the
attendance, even at the annual sessions, was usually meagre. Out
of the 1,093 members in 1922 only 23 had paid their annual
subscription.\footnote{116} Already a suggestion had been mooted by Abbas
Tayabji (1853-1936) that the League may be dissolved or merged with
the Congress.\footnote{117} Thus, in the early days of 1924, the problem
before the League leaders, as Jinnah later explained, was to
organise Muslims not for a particular question, such as the Khilafat,
but with regard to the subjects relating to the internal politics
of the country.\footnote{118} The solution was sought in the reorganisation of
the moribund League.

But already, in February 1924, after some earlier failures and
opposition from the Khilafatists,\footnote{119} the League leaders had decided
to reassert their position. On February 27, 1924, a meeting of the
Muslim members of the Legislative Assembly, including Jinnah, Abul
Kasem, Kidwai, Nawab Ismail Khan and Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, was
held at Delhi. They moved that the League President should call a
meeting of the Council at an early date.\footnote{120} Consequently, on March 16,

\footnote{116} Mazhar Ansari, Tarikh-i-Muslim League, Delhi, 1940, p. 300; and

\footnote{117} Hindu, Jan. 5, 1922.

\footnote{118} Madras Mail, March 15, 1924.

\footnote{119} In March 1923, at the several informal meetings that took place
at the Aga Khan's residence in Bombay, it had been agreed to
reorganise the Muslim League with a political programme acceptable
to the whole community. But when the League met at Lucknow in April
1923, the Khilafatists disrupted the proceedings and managed to
secure an adjournment. See Madras Mail, March 10, 1923; and Pioneer,
April 4, 1923.

\footnote{120} Hindu, March 6, 1924.
the Council of the League met at Delhi under Jinnah's presidency. Many Khilafatists, including Mohamed Ali, Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Azad and T.A.K. Sherwani, also attended. The militant Khilafatists, realising that it was the beginning of the end of their hegemony, attempted to capture the League by inducing it to accept their own programme. This, however, was successfully resisted. After a sharp argument with Jinnah, Mohamed Ali voluntarily withdrew from the meeting. The Council then decided to hold the League session at Lahore in May 1924, in continuation of the last session at Lucknow which had been adjourned sine die.  

The revival of the Muslim League confronted the Khilafatists with the dilemma of having either to accept the defeat and surrender the leadership of the community or to fight back. An effective come-back for them, however, seemed difficult as the revival of the League had been generally well received and in certain quarters it was demanded that the Khilafat committees should be abolished and their funds handed over to the Muslim League. In desperation some Khilafatists alleged that the hand of the Government was visible in the revival of the League. But the Khilafatists had realised that in order to survive they must reorientate the Khilafat organisations with a new and more dynamic programme. A few days before the opening of the Lahore session of the Muslim League Dr. Kitchlew called upon the CKC and the Jamiyat to meet in a special session and consider the situation and decide on the advisability or otherwise of continuing without alteration the present programme of the Khilafat movement. As a suitable basis for future work, Kitchlew again outlined his socio-economic

1.22 Indian Daily Telegraph, n.d., UPNWR, No. 21 of 1924, p. 3. Also see Medina, n.d., ibid., Nos. 20 and 22 of 1924, p. 3.  
1.24 See Siyasat, May 16, 1924, PNNR 1924.
Tanzim programme embracing the whole phase of the life of the community from volunteer corps to Muslim banks and cooperative societies. And from Delhi Asaf Ali suggested the advisability of consolidating different Muslim organisations in India with identical or reconcilable aims into one organic body working in co-operation and harmony with the Congress for the speeding attainment of full Dominion status.

Hurriedly, a meeting of the Working Committee of the CKC was convened at Bombay about the middle of May 1924, to consider the future of the Khilafat organisations in India in the light of the new developments. The CKC unanimously agreed to extend the scope of the Khilafat organisations and to make all communal work its province. The CKC and the Jamiyat were asked to meet at Delhi in the last week of June 1924, to thrash out the details.

But these antics did not deter the Muslim Leaguers. The Lahore session of the League, organised by the Punjab leader Fazl-i-Husain, was held on May 24 and 25 under Jinnah's presidency. A large number of the Khilafatists and the Congressmen also attended. In the very first speech of the session a proposal was mooted by Agha Safdar, the chairman of the Reception Committee, that the Muslim League and the CKC should be amalgamated. Though the suggestion was not taken up the tendency of the delegates generally was to divert attention to domestic issues. Jinnah appealed to his countrymen 'to unite and organise all the resources of our immediate goal - that is, freedom of India', but held that the issues of paramount importance were Hindu-Muslim unity and the amendment of the constitution of the Government of India. The latest trend in Muslim political thinking was clearly exhibited in the League's resolutions: that communal representation in the legislatures and other elected bodies should be strictly on population basis; that 'the Muslim majority of population in the Punjab, Bengal and the Frontier Province should not be interfered with in any territorial redistribution'; and that the

125 Hindu, May 22, 1924.
126 Ibid.
127 Hindu, May 29, 1924.
Frontier Province should be placed 'in a position of equality' with the major provinces of India. The question of separate electorates was left open. A committee of sixteen was appointed to frame and place before the next session a scheme of the constitution of the Government of India in consultation with the committee or committees that might be appointed for the purpose by other political organisations. Another Committee was appointed to confer with the working committee of the CKC to frame a scheme for the purpose of organising various public activities of the Muslim community.

The revival of the Muslim League brought to the fore the fundamental differences between the two sections of the Muslim opinion - one represented by the Muslim League believing in constitutional fight with the bureaucracy through the Councils, the other represented by the militant Khilafatists having faith in a policy of obstructionism. These differences emerged not only in the conflict of personalities of the two Alis, but also in a struggle for Muslim leadership. The Khilafatists were indeed indignant at the prospect of the leadership slipping out of their hands. The Zamindar lamented that the League had relapsed into the hands of the 'loyalists' and after four year's struggle for freedom Muslims were again being asked to resort to obsolete constitutional methods. The Khilafatists decided to act at once.

128 Times of India, May 26 and 27, 1924. Also see Syed Nur Ahmad, Martial Law se Martial Law Tak, Lahore, 1965, pp. 40-47.
129 Hindu, May 29, 1924.
130 See, e.g., the speeches of Jinnah and Mohamed Ali in Bradlaugh Hall, Lahore, on May 24, 1924. Times of India, May 26, 1924.
131 This is evident from Mohamed Ali's statement to the press deriding the League and its new leader, and Jinnah's retort that the Khilafat as a word commanded the respect of every Muslim but that Mohamed Ali's organisation did not. See Bombay Chronicle, June 15, 1924 and Madras Mail, June 16,1924. This conflict is even more clearly evident in the proceedings of the Dec. 1924 Muslim League session. See Hindu, Jan. 8, 1925.
132 PNNR, No. 22 of 1924, p. 1917.
On June 25, 1924, a meeting of the CKC was held at Delhi. It is perhaps one of the most important turning points in the history of the Khilafat movement. After long deliberations, which were not open to the press, the CKC decided to concentrate all its energies on reorganising the Muslim community and accepted the proposals of the Working Committee of the previous month. The long-standing proposal of transferring the headquarters of the CKC from Bombay to Delhi was postponed sine die and the CKC resolved to undertake the entire responsibility of re-organising the political, social and economic life of the community by acquiring the services of full-time workers and corps of volunteers in every city. The scheme involved the organisation of the Juma and other congregational prayers; the opening of primary schools, night schools and technical and commercial colleges; supervision of the Waqf, Sadaqa and Zakat, and the proper administration of the proceeds on such undertakings as the training and education of Muslim orphans and the help of the Muslim widows; and the popularisation of the Khaddar. For the material improvement of the community, the CKC considered it essential to establish Muslim co-operative credit societies and a Muslim bank for which purpose it invited the rulings of the experts of Muslim law whether their establishment was permissible under the shariat.\(^\text{133}\)

To finance the project the CKC entrusted its Working Committee with the raising of funds. The Working Committee was also authorised to establish liaison with the Jamiyat-ul-Ulama and the Muslim League and such other Muslim associations as it might choose. Another resolution expressed the CKC's determination to maintain the National Muslim University at Aligarh, as a permanent university and to improve and enlarge it.\(^\text{134}\)

Clearly the CKC had shifted its emphasis - the Khilafat issue no longer figured prominently in its policy. But the Khilafatists' latest ruse encountered strong disapproval in some Muslim circles and active hostility from the Hindus who had been none too happy at

\(^{133}\) Times of India, June 25 and 26, 1924.

\(^{134}\) Ibid., June 26, 1924.
the revival of the Muslim League either.\textsuperscript{135} The Muslim objection was that the widening of the scope of activities would jeopardise the very existence of the Khilafat committees. Instead, they advised the strengthening of the existing committees.\textsuperscript{136} The Hindus under Shraddhanand's spell, who had been advocating since October 1923 a complete severance of the Congress connection with the Khilafat organisations,\textsuperscript{137} alleged that the ultimate goal of the committees was proselytism. Therefore, Gandhi should emphatically protest against the decision and all the Hindu members of the CKC should resign en bloc unless the new programme was scrapped.\textsuperscript{138}

Looking objectively, the shift in the Khilafatists' policy, quite apart from their anxiety to retain the community's leadership, was the result of a growing disillusionment with Hindu communalism. The militancy of the Shuddhi and Sangatham campaigns and the failure of the Congress leaders to condemn these activities had disappointed not only the League leaders\textsuperscript{139} but also the Khilafatists. In fact relations between the two communities, which had already been badly strained in the first half of 1923, had now worsened to a lamentable extent. Riots and arson had taken the place of amity and good-will. Unscrupulous journalism played on public hysteria and made it worse. The situation was so bad that Dr. Ansari, in a letter to Gandhi, observed in disgust: 'Blind fanaticism and a reprehensible desire to run the other community down by every means has to-day become an essential part of the life of a vernacular paper of Northern India'.\textsuperscript{140} The Government tried to discourage communal polemics and took action.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Alj}, n.d., UPWNR, No. 20, 1924, p. 3; \textit{Leader}, n.d., \textit{ibid.}, No. 21 of 1924, p. 3; \textit{Pratap}, May 31, 1924, \textit{PNNR} 1924; and \textit{Akasvani}, June 15, 1924, \textit{ibid.}


\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Madras Mail}, Nov. 1, 1923.


\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Young India, 1924-26}, Madras, 1927, p. 16.
against some of the journals; but this had no effect. As time passed, riots increased in their frequency and intensity. In July 1924, there were serious Bakr 'Id riots in Delhi. In the same month there was another outbreak at Nagpur and in August at Panipat. Then there was a crop of riots at Lahore, Lucknow, Muradabad, Bhagalpur, Rurki, Agra, Hanpar, Jampur, Meerut, Ahmedabad, Pili Bhit, Shahjehanpur, Hardoi, Kalpi, Allahabad, Jhang, Gujrat and even at Gulburga in the Nizam's dominions. In September 1924, Sir Frank Sly, the Governor of the C.P. remarked to Reading:

> During my long service I have never known such acute tension of feeling between Hindus and Mahomedans ... Each community feels that with the advance of responsible government, they can no longer rely on an impartial governing authority, but must each fight for their own interests."

The leaders tried in vain to restrain the fanaticism of their co-religionists and a committee of three - Dr. Ansari, Lajpat Rai and Sirdar Mehtab Singh - attempted to draft a 'National Pact'. But the document which it produced was only a tentative agreement seeking to safeguard the religious liberties of the communities and recommending arbitration in cases of discord. Some of the vital questions splitting the two communities, particularly that of the communal representation in local bodies and Government service, remained unsolved. The more realistic, towards which the CKC was much attracted, was C.R. Das's well-known 'Bengal Pact' that laid down specific proportional representation in all spheres for the

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141 E.g., against Guru Canthal, Shaitan and Lahaul. See J&P, 3393/24 and the Supplement to PNNR, No. 25 of 1924. To name a few polemics which appeared at this time: Mahasha Fazal Hussain, Aryan Shuddhi ki Haagat ya Kafiyyat Vad, Qadian, 1924; Mahasha Gian Indar, Men ne Islam kyun Chora, Delhi, 1925; and G.M. Dharampal, Jar Mar, Lucknow, 1925.

142 Sly to Reading, Sept. 19, 1924, RP.

143 For the text of the 'National Pact' see Hindu, Dec. 27, 1923.
two communities. However, the Pacts, particularly the latter, aroused strong hostility from the Hindus of all shades of opinion including the Congress, and instead of improving the situation increased the bitterness.

The breaking-point in Hindu-Muslim relations was, however, the harrowing riot of Kohat in the Frontier that took place in September 1924, over the circulation by the Sanatan Dharam Sabha of an anti-Islamic polemic containing especially a very objectionable poem. The magisterial enquiry which the Government of India held weighed heavily upon the Hindus. The Hindu press and Hindu leaders like Malariya, Lajpat Rai and the Members of the Legislative Assembly started a systematic campaign of representing the Hindus as the aggrieved party. Attempts were also made by them to instigate the Kohat Hindus to reject any settlement. Gandhi and Shaukat Ali also fell out with each other on the point as to which community was responsible for the riot. Gone were the days when

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144 PP, 1924, Cmd. 2311, Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1923-24, Fifty-Ninth Number. For the text of the 'Bengal Pact' see Indian Annual Register, 1923, II, pp. 127-28.


146 J&P; 3714/24 and 4173/24.


149 V to S/S, Tel. P., No. 150-C, Dec. 20, 1924, RP. Also see Reading to Olivier, Oct. 14, 1924, RP.

Gandhi was held in the highest esteem by Muslim leaders.151 Kohat led to a dramatic twenty-one day 'penance' fast by Gandhi, who had been released on medical grounds in February 1924,152 and to a 'Unity Conference' of the leaders. But the Conference, which took place at Delhi on September 26, 1924, achieved little.153 Its resolutions remained pious wishes for, as soon as the Conference adjourned, the old rivalry reappeared. Before Gandhi could end his fast, a serious riot took place at Allahabad, another at Jubbulpore and yet another at Madras.154 Communal strife had now become a permanent feature of Indian political life. The fine edifice of Hindu-Muslim unity which had so assiduously built up the Khilafat agitation into a mass all-India movement had crumbled down like a house of cards. The Khilafat movement already affected by a series of internal and external events was now wholly a Muslim concern. The Hindus, as a community, had long ceased to be a party to it.

With the Hindus standing aloof, the Khilafat non-existent and the Turks determined upon a 'quasi-secularism', the natural

151 Only a few months earlier Zafar-ul-Mulk had gone so far as to say that: 'If the prophethood had not ceased Mahatma Gandhi would have been a Prophet'. Quoted in Nawab S.A. Hussain, Waqaiq-un-Nabuwat-wal-Khilafat, Lucknow, 1924, p. 4.

152 Gandhi's approach to the Hindu-Muslim question remains enigmatic. On the one hand he would resort to a self-denying 'penance' fast, on the other he exhorted the Hindus to shed their alleged cowardice against the Muslims. In his analysis the Hindu 'cowardice' and Muslim 'bullying' lay underneath the Hindu-Muslim tension (Young India, 1924-26, pp. 26 and 176). In inter-communal relations Gandhi was certainly not the Gandhi of 1919-22. He had ceased to be an impartial leader of India.

153 For details of the Conference see Young India, 1924-26, pp. 138-73.

154 Daily Telegraph, Oct. 9, 11 and 13, 1924.

155 In F. Rahman's opinion the Turkish attitude in breaking with the traditional conception of a politico-religious state was 'quasi-secularism' because in spite of the separation of the state from religion and the dethronement of canon law, Islam had remained as the term of reference. See F. Rahman, 'Internal Religious Developments in the Present Century Islam', JWH, II, No. 1, 1954, p. 876.
tendency of the CKC was to push through the programme of
reorganisation. But its progress was arrested by the developments
in the Hedjaz in autumn 1924, which led to the expulsion of King
Hussain by his old rival and adversary Ibn Saud (1880-1953), the
Sultan of Nejd.156 Ibn Saud's success changed the whole aspect of
the Khilafat question. The CKC, which was still struggling for the
resuscitation of the Khilafat, began to dream of establishing in
the Hedjaz a republic on the pattern of the early days of Islam.157
Ibn Saud, pretending to agree with the Khilafatists, sustained and
encouraged their optimism.158 But unfortunately the Ikhwan iconoclasm
and puritanic zeal led Ibn Saud to order the removal of all domed
structures from the graves of Muslims held sacred by the generality
of the Muslims. This affected seriously Ibn Saud's popularity in

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Though the Nejdi's attack on the Hedjaz would have materialised
any way, as Hussain's assumption of the Khilafat had provided them
with an excuse for 'jihad', Ibn Saud had been encouraged a good deal
in his designs by the Indian Khilafatists' support. Ibn Saud himself
acknowledged this fact. See Daily Telegraph, Sept. 22 and Nov. 12,
1924; and Madras Mail, Nov. 26, 1924. Ibn Saud's success was instant.
Hussain, dejected by his defeat and bitter at the British for disowning
him, abdicated in favour of his eldest son Ali on Oct. 3, 1924, and
retired to Aqaba. But Ali was also unable to hold the Nejdis and
Mecca fell in the middle of Oct. 1924. He continued to rule at
Jeddah until the fall of Medina in Dec. 1925, when he too abdicated
the throne of the Hedjaz and renounced the title of the Khilafat and
went to take up residence in Baghdad. See PP, 1924, Hansard, 177 H.C.
Deb. 5 S., cols. 141-42; MacDolad to Bullard, Tel. No. 35 (R), Sept.
28, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10014; H.C. Iraq to S/S Colonies, Tel. No.
2113, Oct. 13, 1924, PSSF, P. 4156/24 with 3665/24, I; A.L. Kirkbird's
report in PSSF, P. 4549/42 with ibid.; J. Benoist-Méchin, Arabian
Destiny, London, 1957, pp. 156-58; Daily Telegraph, Dec. 21, 1925 and
Jan. 1, 1926; and Tonbee, Survey, 1925, I, pp. 296-308.

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See the CKC's cable to the Hedjaz National Party, Madras Mail,
Oct. 8, 1924. Also see Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Mohamed Ali: Zati Diary
ke Chand Warq, I, Azamgarh, 1954, p. 226; and Abdoola Haroon,

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See Appendix B. of the enclosure, Bullard to MacDonald, No. 102,
Oct. 20, 1924, PRO, F.O., 371/10015. Also see Daily Telegraph, Nov.
5, 1924; Gaffar, Hayat-i-Ajmal, pp. 362-66; Daryabadi, Mohamed Ali,
pp. 227 and 326-28; and Haroon, Khubba-i-Sadarat, pp. 10-12.
India and, despite his assurances, divided the Khilafatists into pro- and anti-Ibn Saud factions.

It is difficult to classify these groups strictly since their religious and political affiliations mostly overlapped. But generally speaking, the supporters and detractors of Ibn Saud, motivated as they were by divergent and apparently irreconcilable opinions, aligned themselves to the main opposing factions - the Ghair-Muqallids and the Muqallids. The pro-Ibn Saud group included such stalwarts as the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad, Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Zafar Ali Khan, Dr. Kitchlew, Sulaiman Nadvi, Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Ataullah Shah, Daud Ghaznavi, Habibur Rahman Ludhianvi and the ulama of the Nadwah and the Ahl-i-Hadis. Among the detractors of Ibn Saud the main attack was led by the ulama of Frangi Mahal (under Abdul Bari) and of Bareilly. The anti-Ibn Saud group also included Sajjadah Nashins, sufis and Shias, who were opposed to the Muwahhidun or the Ikhwan discipline and iconoclasm. Prominent among these were Shah Sulaiman Phulwari, Shah Muhammad Jaffar, Shah Ghulam Hussain, Hassan Nizami, Hasrat Mohani, Abdul Majid Badauni, M.H. Kidwai, Raja Ahmad Ali Khan of Salimpore and Raja Nawab Ali Khan of Akbarpore.

The press took a leading part in the controversy, which developed into a vigorous conflict. The antagonism between the two factions, the full force of which was exhibited in the next two years, reached such a pitch that both sides called each other heretics. Polemics and counter-polemics made their appearance and public meetings were even more frequent.

159 So much so that Shaukat Ali had to ask Ibn Saud not to do anything to hurt Muslim feelings. See his telegram to Ibn Saud in Bombay Chronicle, Sept. 18, 1924.

160 The classification is based on various speeches, writings and statements of the leaders concerned, as well as on other sundry sources.

and processions became almost a daily occurence. Former friends became irreconcilable opponents. A war of wits and pens between Mohamed Ali and Hassan Nizami surpassed all limits and became personal. Differences arose between Mohamed Ali and the Raja of Mahmudabad and others of his friends like Abdul Majid Badauni, Nisar Ahmad of Cawnpore and most surprisingly Abdul Bari, his religious preceptor. This was not all. A new organisation, known as the Khuddam-i-Haramain, sprang up to oppose the CKC's pro-Ibn Saud policy.  

But the CKC, though pro-Ibn Saud and anti-Hussain, was nevertheless uneasy about the fratricidal war among Muslims and bloodshed in the most revered places of Islam, i.e., Mecca and Medina. Therefore, in the middle of December 1924, a Khilafat delegation, consisting of Sulaiman Nadvi, Abdul Majid and Abdul Qadir, was despatched to the Hedjaz to try to mediate between the belligerents. The delegation reached Jeddah towards the end of the month and conferred with King Ali (1871-1935), the son and successor of Hussain who was still holding out at Jeddah and Medina, and corresponded with Ibn Saud. But it failed to effect a settlement. The Belgaum


Times of India, Dec. 19, 1924.

The Times, Feb. 10, 1925.
Khilafat Conference, which had opened on December 24, 1924, under Dr. Kitchlew, had also preferred to leave the settlement of the Khilafat question to a world Muslim congress. But the lingering trouble in the Hedjaz enabled the Khilafatists to justify the retention of the Khilafat organisations, for which they had been arguing so desperately. However, in view of national exigencies, the emphasis of their policy shifted further towards domestic issues. There was a steady realisation on their part that the Khilafat movement was after all dead. A complete regression was only a question of time.

In the decade after 1924, the CKC gradually declined into impotence. For a few years its attention was continued to be absorbed in the Hedjaz affair during which it endeavoured to enhance Ibn Saud's popularity in India by organising successful pilgrimages to Mecca. But Indian Muslim feelings against the latter had much hardened. So much so that when in January 1926, Ibn Saud proclaimed himself the king of the Hedjaz, even the CKC turned against him. Nevertheless, when in summer 1926, two separate world Muslim congresses were held at Cairo and Mecca to settle the Khilafat question, the CKC accepted Ibn Saud's invitation and not

165 Hindu, Jan. 1, 1925.
166 Ibid.
167 Once in summer 1925, Shaukat Ali had to be rescued from an infuriated mob for applauding Ibn Saud as the champion of Islam. Morning Advertiser, Aug. 29, 1925, PSSP, P. 2964/2968 with 3665/24, IV; and Daryabadi, Mohamed Ali, p. 240.
168 Ibn Saud's Indian detractors, particularly Hasrat Mohani and Syed Habib Shah of the Khuddam-ul-Haramain, had previously criticised him for having entered into treaty relations with Britain. See Hindu, Dec. 31, 1925; and Sir Gilbert Clayton, An Arabian Diary, ed., R.O. Collins, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, p. 188, n. 31. Texts of the Bahra and the Hadda Agreements (November 1 and 2, 1925, respectively) between Ibn Saud and the British have been reproduced by Collins on pp. 271-279. Both Agreements were signed by Sir Gilbert Clayton on behalf of the British Government at the Bahra Camp of Ibn Saud.
that of the Cairo ulama.\textsuperscript{169} The Mecca Conference, which opened on June 6, 1926,\textsuperscript{170} was, however, a failure. Ibn Saud had cleverly excluded from the agenda any discussion of the Khilafat issue or even of international and Islamic politics.\textsuperscript{171} The Indian Khilafat delegation, consisting of Sulaiman Nadvi (leader), Shoaib Qureshi (1889-1962) and the Ali brothers, returned to India disappointed and empty-handed.\textsuperscript{172}

With the Khilafat bogey already non-existent, the attitude of Ibn Saud only confounded the already confused situation. The Ali brothers and the CKC became involved in a bitter conflict with Zafar Ali Khan and other pro-Saudists.\textsuperscript{173} But at the same time the process of the CKC's withdrawal from extra-territorial interests was hastened.\textsuperscript{174} The situation in the country was also making a different demand. The balance of power after 1924 had shifted

\textsuperscript{169} The reason was that the Khilafatists suspected the Cairo Conference, and with some justification, to be an attempt of the Egyptian royalty to assume the caliphal office. They feared that a British vassal as the Caliph of Islam would indirectly enhance Britain's 'power of mischief' in the Muslim world. (Allama) Inyatullah Khan Mashriqi (1888-1963) of the Khaksar Movement fame, who unofficially attended the Conference, vehemently opposed King Fuad's candidature for the Khilafat. See The Times, Feb. 5 and May 14, 1926; Madras Mail, May 12, 1926; Hindu, May 20, 1926; Elie Kedourie, 'Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-1946', JRAS, Parts III & IV, 1963, pp. 208-48; and Le Congrès du Khalifat et Le Congrès du Monde Musulman, Paris, 1926, pp. 29-122.

\textsuperscript{170} Approximately seventy-five delegates representing Muslim communities in India, Russia, Java, Syria, Palestine, Nejd, the Hedjaz, Asir, Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Yemen came to attend. The Jamiyat-ul-Ulama and the Ahl-i-Hadis sent their separate delegates. For full details see Le Congrès du Khalifat, pp. 125-219. Also see Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, 'The Mecca Conference', CR, CXXXI, Sept. 1926, pp. 304-11.

\textsuperscript{171} The Times, June 17, 1926. Also see The Times, June 10, 1926; and Toynbee, Survey, 1925, I, p. 312.

\textsuperscript{172} Muhammad Sarwar, ed., Maulana Mohamed Ali, Lahore, 1962, pp. 246-47.

\textsuperscript{173} Arshi Amritsari, 'Mohamed Ali ki Nazar', Ali Bradran, pp. 51-52.

\textsuperscript{174} This reflected the mood of the more realistic Khilafatists. See, e.g., Abdul Halim Sharar, Miyar-i-Zindagi, Lucknow, 1926, pp. 7-8.
from the CKC to the Muslim League and the political struggle had moved from public platform to the legislative assemblies. Moreover, the communal strife had by this time spread over the whole field of Indian politics and constitutional issues had become much more important, leading to the Muddiman investigation of the scope for improvement within the existing Act. Already, the Khilafat Conference which was held at Delhi in May 1926, had changed its creed and had assumed responsibility for and trusteeship over all Muslim interests. The Khilafatists' plea was that the Khilafat movement had worked for Islam abroad and it must protect their religion when it was threatened in India by the 'high-handedness' of the neighbouring communities. The Conference had stipulated such actions that may be deemed necessary to safeguard the interests, lives and property of the Indian Muslims.

By early 1927, the CKC had definitely given up its pan-Islamic stand, though many Muslims continued to cherish this romantic sentiment and some do even to-day - twenty-five years after the

175 For the Muddiman investigations see PP, 1925, Cmd. 2360, Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924. The members of the Committee were: Alexander Muddiman (Chairman), Muhammad Shafi, Maharaja of Burdwan, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Arthur Froom, Sivaswami Iyer, H. Moncrieff Smith, M.A. Jinnah, R.R. Pranjpye and H. Tonkinson (Secy.).

176 See Sulaiman Nadvi's speech in Hindu, May 13, 1926. For the growing antagonism between the Khilafatists and the Hindus also see Irwin to Birkenhead, May 5, 1926, BdP.

177 The new creed was devised, among other things, to safeguard the religious, educational, social, economic and political interests of Indian Muslims. In this connection the Khilafat Conference directed the Khilafat committees to try first to remove Hindu-Muslim tension and achieve an 'honourable compromise'. If efforts at compromise failed, the committees were to do everything in their power to protect Muslim rights and interests and to employ the Khilafat volunteer corps for this purpose. The committees were authorised to raise special funds and, if required, to apply for aid to the provincial and the Central committees. The Provincial committees were advised to see that their subordinate committees carried out these instructions and were also asked to render them every possible help. See Hindu, May 13, 1926.
establishment of a separate 'Islamic' homeland, i.e., Pakistan.  
In the period under review, such people were encouraged to pursue their ideal by joining a body called the Motamar or the World Muslim Conference Indian Branch.  The Motamar was, however, a non-starter and was never heard of again. But the Ali brothers were not discouraged. In the autumn of 1928, they made another attempt to settle the Khilafat issue with the Turks. Mohamed Ali visited Angora on his way back from Europe, but, like Ansari in 1925, was disappointed with Mustafa Kemal's attitude. The Ali brothers simply would not compromise their own ideal with the secular nationalistic pull in other Muslim lands.

Yet, after 1927, on important Indian issues of Muslim concern, the majority of the Khilafatists, including the Ali brothers, found

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As late as 1937, Kidwai believed that the Muslim states could prosper only through a pan-Islamic outlook with the Khilafat as its rallying-point. Similarly, in the 1940s, Chowdhari Rahmat Ali's Cambridge 'Pakistan' movement aimed at uniting the new state ultimately with an undefined pan-Islamic 'Pakasia'. The sentiment found expression in a more defined way after the establishment of Pakistan when the 1956 Constitution adopted the promotion of 'the bonds of unity among Muslim countries' as one of the 'Directive Principles of State Policy'. A number of Islamic conferences convened since 1949 at Karachi, Cairo, Mecca and at other Muslim centres (the most recent having been held at Mecca from Feb. 29 to March 4, 1972) depict an anxiety to co-ordinate the activities of the Muslim world. But the neo-pan-Islamism does not aim at the unity of the Muslim peoples under one central authority but only their co-ordination within the international community. See M.H. Kidwai, Pan-Islamism and Bolshevism, London, 1937, p. 88, 238-9; Chowdhari Rahmat Ali, The Millet and the Mission, Cambridge, 1942, pp. 1-18; Aziz Ahmed, Islamic Modernism, p. 169; The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Ministry of Law, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1956, Part III, Article 24, p. 17; W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, Princeton, p. 83, n. 71; and Majid Khadduri, 'Pan-Islamism', EB, XVII, p. 227.

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See Ansari's letter to Irfan from Lausanne, July 5, 1925, Nuqush (Lahore), LXV, Nov. 1957, p. 405.

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themselves on the same side as Jinnah. First they fell in line with him in formulating the March 1927 Delhi proposals and later in boycotting the Simon (Statutory) Commission, from which the Indians had been excluded. But the Khilafatists had lost much of their appeal. Already riddled by factionalism, they split irreparably when in the summer of 1928, the Nehru Report tried to determine the principles of a constitution for India in answer to Birkenhead's challenge. On the question of the system of electorate and Muslim share in the Punjab and Bengal legislatures, a strong group consisting of Abul Kalam Azad, Akram Khan, Zafar Ali Khan, Abdul Qadir Kasuri and others, was in favour of compromise with the Congress. The Ali brothers who wanted to have a solid support against the Report, could not bear to see the provincial Khilafat committees adopting a different attitude than the CKC. At their instance, the Working Committee of the CKC met at Calcutta in December 1928, and suspended the provincial Khilafat committees of the Punjab, Bengal and the Frontier. The action, to some extent, was the result of personal recriminations between the Ali brothers' party and the Abul Kalam Azad group - a legacy of the Khilafat Funds scandal of 1922/23.

In essence, the proposals agreed to abolish separate electorates in response to Hindu overtures over joint electorates, provided Muslim demand of one-third seats in the central legislature by a joint electorate was not disturbed; seats were reserved according to population in the Punjab and Bengal; Sind was constituted into a separate province; and reforms were introduced in the Frontier and Baluchistan on the same footing as any other province. Times of India, March 22, 1927

See the proceedings of the Khilafat Conference at Madras in Dec. 1927, in Indian Quarterly Register, 1927, II, pp. 329-30. An account of the visit of the Simon Commission and its activities can be found in Edward Cadogan, The India We Saw, London, 1933.

The suspension of the three important Khilafat committees led to a permanent split among the Khilafatists. As a protest against the Working Committee's action forty-five members of the executive led by Ansari and including Dr. S.M. Alam (b. 1887), T.A.K. Sherwani and Mujibur Rahman, who passionately supported the Nehru Report, dissociated themselves from the executive. They nominated their own members to represent the CKC at the All Parties Conference, which was then taking place at Calcutta. In this way the CKC came to be divided into two parallel sections, each claiming to be its real voice.187

But if the Nehru Report split the CKC for ever, it also had the effect of unifying the various wings of the Muslim community. The Khilafat majority party led by Mohamed Ali closed its ranks with the conservative and constitutional schools of Muslim thought, represented by Shafi, A.K. Ghuznavi (1872-1939) and others. From Calcutta they rushed to Delhi to join the All Parties Muslim Conference under the Aga Khan and there on January 1, 1929, Mohamed Ali, in collaboration with his former rival Shafi, moved the famous resolution formulating Muslim demands on India's future constitution in answer to the Nehru Report. The resolution urged a federal constitution with complete provincial autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent provinces.188 The January 1 declaration is one of the most important and unanimous pronouncements by the Muslims on the constitutional problems and for a long time remained a bed-rock of their attitude.

After 1929, the CKC remained but no Khilafat conference appears ever to have taken place. Instead, the disunited and disorganised Khilafatists withered and scattered into various groups. The 'nationalist' Muslims - Ansari, Azad, Dr. Mahmud, Sherwani, Kidwai, Asaf Ali, Akram Khan, Kitchlew, Dr. Alam and Khaliquzzaman - formed

187 Indian Quarterly Register, 1928, II, pp. 121-22 and 405-7.
188 Report of the All-India Muslim Conference held at Delhi on 31st December, 1928, and 1st January, 1929, Aligarh, n.d.; The Main Resolutions of the All-India Muslim Conference, Patna, /1930/; and PE, 1929-30, (170), Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1928-29, Sixty-Fourth Number, pp. 36-38.
themselves into a Muslim 'Nationalist Party', meeting as the All-India Nationalist Muslim Conference. In their political outlook they subscribed, like the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, to the Congress scheme of a comprehensive and strong central government even at the cost of Muslim interests. Others like the Ali brothers, Shafee Daoodi (1879-1946), the new President of the CKC, Hasrat Mohani and Azad Subhani, formed the All-India Muslim Conference in association with the Muslim Leaguers. Yet others hovered uneasily between the Muslim League and the Congress.

During the 1930s the CKC slumped into inertia. As it was no longer a popular organisation, there were not enough subscriptions even to keep it going. The publication of the Khilafat magazine had also to be stopped. Shaukat Ali, who was the binding link between different factions within the CKC on the one hand and between the CKC and the already ineffective subordinate committees on the other, continued to manage the affairs with the financial help of the Aga Khan and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. In 1931/32 an attempt was made by Shaukat Ali to revive the pan-Islamic enthusiasm when he visited the Middle East before and after the Round Table Conference in London. In concert with al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini (1893-), the Grand Mufti of Palestine, a World Muslim Congress was arranged in Jerusalem (December 7-17, 1931) to discuss certain subjects and projects which appealed to the interests of the Muslims in general. But owing to the international implications of the Congress, the question of the Khilafat, and with it other


political matters, were excluded from the agenda. For a time the Congress revived some pan-Islamic interest in India and other Muslim countries but this did not last very long.\footnote{191}

Some attempts were made in 1933/34 to put the CKC's matters right and the Khilafat magazine was also revived,\footnote{192} but things had gone beyond repair. The disappearance from the scene of some of the main leaders who had nurtured the CKC, also deeply affected the organisation. Abdul Bari had died in January 1926 and Ajmal Khan in December 1927. Mohamed Ali breathed his last in January 1931 while in London in connection with the Round Table Conference. Dr. Ansari died of a heart attack in May 1936. Shaukat Ali dragged the carcass of the Khilafat organisation for some years more till his death in November 1938, but the organisation, which had had a meteoric rise in 1919, first disintegrated and then disappeared. Only the Khilafat House in Bombay survives.

\footnote{191}{PSSF, 1449/1931; PRO, F.O., 371/15282, 15283 and 15284. Also see H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931', in A.J. Toynbee's Survey of International Affairs, 1934, London, 1935, pp. 99-109; and J. Edwards, 'From Panarabism to Panislamism', CR, CXLI, March 1932, p. 350. The exclusion of the question of the Khilafat and other political matters was due to the fact that Turkey viewed with the utmost apprehension the revival of the Khilafat agitation, especially if the ex-Caliph was brought to Jerusalem. The Turks were also prone to suspect in Shaukat Ali's activities a design to link-up the ex-Caliph with the Indian Princes, especially through the proposed marriage between Abdul-Mejid's daughter and the Nizam of Hyderabad's son. The Hedjaz-Nejd Govt. regarded the Congress as obviously anti-Ibn Saud. Italy resented it because it might criticise her action in Tripoli and generate anti-Italian propaganda. Yugoslavia and Spain also viewed the Congress with great misgivings. Similarly, the Zionists, who feared a mobilisation of Muslim opinion against their cause, voiced a strong opposition. See PSSF, 1449/1931; and PRO, F.O., 371/15381.}

\footnote{192}{Jafari, 'Shaukat Ali', p. 131.}
EPILOGUE

The Khilafat movement was clearly the result of the strong pan-Islamic sentiment and propaganda, reinforced by a century of political developments and socio-cultural consciousness among Indian Muslims. Viewed in this context, their involvement with Turkey and the Ottoman Khilafat, despite its disputed content, was thus a natural phenomenon. But, the symbolic adherence to the archaic fiction of a 'central' Ottoman Khilafat aside, the ferment of the 1920s inevitably fits into the total pattern of earlier Islamic movements - from the Wali Ullah revivalism in the eighteenth century India to the Sarekat Islam and the Muhammadiyya in the early twentieth century Indonesia. Originally, the Khilafat issue was raised by a small body of individuals well-known for their pan-Islamic sympathies. It was quickly seized by politicians of advanced views with the avowed object of rendering the existence of the British Government in India impossible. The delay by the Allies in settling a peace treaty with Turkey gave the Khilafatists a godsent opportunity to build up widespread support in their favour. In this, the Indian Muslim residents of Britain and their European Turkophile friends also played an important part. With the entry of the ulama the movement acquired strength. Gandhi's participation widened its scope because it was through his influence that the Hindus were drawn into the Khilafat movement. The non-co-operation experiment and the hijrat witnessed a new phase of popular involvement in the political agitation. Never before had the Indians demonstrated such enthusiasm and capacity to suffer and sacrifice for their cause. The Khilafat movement was indeed a curiously remarkable agitation.

But in spite of its wide support and many-sided activities, the Khilafat movement failed to achieve its ostensible objectives, i.e., the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and the institution of the Khilafat. Secret war-time treaties, a strong anti-Turk bias of the Allied Governments, and the inherent weaknesses of the complex

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The vast expanse in between was filled in by the jihadis of Bareilly, the Farraris of Bengal, the Revolt of 1857, the Mujahidin of Sittana, the Senus of Libya (from 1881), the upsurges in the Central Asia (from 1850s), the pan-Islamic activism of Jamal-ud-din 'Afghani' (from 1880s), and the Irani movements of the 1890s. This is an extension of W.G. Smith's argument. See his Islam in Modern History, Princeton, 1957, p. 52.
movement itself, had combined to cause this failure. The demand for swaraj, the other objective of the movement, too, did not materialise. To add insult to injury, the Turks, in March 1924, abolished the Khilafat which to them had become an anomalous institution in a nationalistic Turkey. In these circumstances, the tenuous Hindu-Muslim entente, which had been under considerable strain, broke down completely. Old rivalries reappeared and the movement collapsed in due course.

Behind these apparently simple events, however, dwell issues of great complexity and significance. To begin with, the Khilafat movement, though born of pan-Islamic ideology, was not just 'an adventure in altruism' or merely 'the concomitant of romanticism'.

True, pan-Islamism as an ideal had romantic attraction for many, but the Indian Muslim involvement with the Ottomans was both a psychological as well as a political phenomenon. In fact, pan-Islamism in India had come to acquire a nationalistic character—a means for the continuance of Islam as a national entity. What the Khilafatists were after was the salvation of Muslim sovereignty and power abroad and with it the security of the Muslim community in India. This dual concern became obvious when the Muslim League, at its Delhi session in December 1918, expressed its 'unmitigated' fear at the adverse influence the collapse of the Muslim Powers would have on the political importance of the Muslim community in India. It was to avert this situation that the Khilafatists claimed status quo ante bellum for Turkey and swaraj for India as prerequisites of a satisfactory solution of the Khilafat question.

In order to provide a mass base to the political agitation, the Khilafatists used religion. 'We can reach mob only through religion', Mohamed Ali is reported to have once remarked. In beating the 'big drum ecclesiastic' the ulama played a significant rôle. Their doctrinal submission to the ideal of a 'universal' caliphate was passionately sincere and classical in tradition. But whereas the politicians used religion to 'reach mob', the motive force of the ulama's action was inherently intertwined in the two spheres of religion and politics. Basically, the Indian ulama were moved, as in the

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2 This reverses the arguments of I.H. Qureshi (The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, The Hague, 1962, Chapter XIII) and Moin Shakir (Khilafat to Partition, New Delhi, 1970, p. 64).
3 J&P, 2272/19.
nineteenth century, by a threat to the nomocratic ideal of Islam and a challenge to their own power within this system. They had tried in 1917 to assert the role of the shariat in the administrative activity of the Government, but the attempt had been a failure. This convinced the ulama that if they were to save Islam (as they understood it) and salvage their position, they must share the political leadership of the community. This point was calculatedly expressed by Abdul Bari, to whom goes the credit of imparting religious concept to a political movement, and was enthusiastically supported by other ulama, one of whom agreed with him that:

...until the ulama take the reins of politics in their own hands and cross their voices with those in authority, it will be difficult for them to establish their religious supremacy. Moreover, the fulfilment of their higher aims (i.e., the protection of Islam) will remain merely an empty dream.

It was this motivation which drove most of the ulama to make common cause with the political elite, and it was the same motivation which led them to dream of an hierarchy of their own—a sort of a 'religious and jurisprudential imperium in imperio' under a shaikh-ul-Islam or Amir-i-Hind directly responsible to the Ottoman Caliph. But though this combination between the ulama and the politicians was formidable, it failed to rise above the immediate issues or to give a clear and definite lead to the Muslims of India. And yet, in spite of their failures and the follies like the hijrat, the ulama and the politicians together imparted to the Khilafat movement a strength which turned it into one of the most eventful periods of Indian history.

The role of the Indian Muslim residents of Britain has never been properly appreciated or even assessed. The fact is that the Khilafat movement in its embryonic stage was nurtured by these very people. In the first place it was Mushir Hosain Kidwai who had urged Abdul Bari to action and had kept him informed of the trends of events in the European capitals. The Central Information Bureau and other Muslim

5 See above, p. 51.
6 Mualana A.M.M. Sajjad to Abdul Bari, Dec. 4, 1918, Nuquash, CIX, p. 91.
7 P. Hardy, 'The Ulama in British India', paper read at the Centre of South Asian Studies, SOAS, London, July 1969. Also see his Partners in Freedom and True Muslims, Lund, 1971, pp. 32-35.
organisations such as the London Muslim League, the two Islamic Societies and even the Woking Mission of the Lahori Ahmadis, supported by the British Turkophiles, did the difficult job of highlighting the Indian feelings on the Turkish issue. The secret and confidential files of the British Foreign Office and the India Office testify to the efforts made by these bodies in this connection. It was only after the tempo of the Khilafat movement became increasingly militant that the moderates among them, the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali in particular, began to take a cautious course.

As for the measure of support which the Khilafatists were able to win from the rest of the Muslim world there is no evidence of any overt expression. Indian pan-Islamism seems to have been largely a one-way process. In any case, since the last war, the Arabs and the Turks had been involved in their own immediate problems and could ill-afford to look askance in a changing world. Above all, the professed aims of the Khilafat movement were in direct contradiction of the nationalistic aspirations of the Arabs and the Turks. On the contrary, the Turks tried to exploit the Indian agitation to their own advantage as an instrument of their foreign policy. So did the Afghans. Their attitude during the hijrat is a good example of their real intentions. The Bolshevists, too, exploited the Khilafatists though initially the Khilafatists themselves had invoked the Russian help for their grandiose anti-British scheme. At best the Bolshevik aid was illusory and was never given and the Khilafatists, except perhaps a few like Hasrat Mohani who sympathised with certain aspects of communism, were unenamoured of any ideological trappings. Even those few who got to Russia during the hijrat and renounced the religion of Muhammad in favour of Karl Marx (1818-83) were unable to influence the course of the Khilafat movement in India.

The Khilafat movement had also the co-operation of the Hindus for an ostensibly religious movement. But the process of unity was slow and it took almost a year before the Congress was finally persuaded to bless this collaboration. Gandhi, who had joined the movement at an early stage, was the key-man in this affair. However, the final Congress approval did not come until the Khilafatists had tacked the Punjab issue with the Khilafat question and had promised to observe strict non-violence in the campaign. But quite apart from the 'Punjab' as a bait for the Hindu co-operation, the Khilafat issue had come to acquire a nationalistic significance. The Hindu leaders who collaborated with the Khilafatists in the struggle for swaraj were also moved by a desire to advance India's political interests. It was this
synchronisation of political interests and political dependence on each other that more than anything else tied the two communities together. In other words, it was a marriage of convenience and not a genuine rapprochement.

But in spite of the remarkable response which the movement evoked, the Khilafatists were unable to mobilise the whole of India. Apart from the elusive support of the masses, large and influential sections even among the Muslims had kept themselves aloof or gave only verbal support. Some like Shafi, Fazl-i-Husain, Raza Ali, the Raja of Mahmudabad and others, rejected extremism of any kind and worked for a 'reasonable' settlement of the Turkish question through co-operation with the Government. Some others questioned the Khilafatists' intentions or had strong ideological differences. The Shias and the Qadianis in particular questioned the Ottoman right to the Khilafat. Yet others, like Khan Bahadur Nabi Bakhsh, not only opposed the movement but with the help of some maulavis even launched a counter campaign.

The attitude of the Hindu-Muslim moderates was reflected even more clearly in their stance towards the methods employed by the Khilafatists in extracting concessions from the Government. The particular subject of controversy was non-co-operation which they feared was too extreme a step. But then the 'extremists' themselves were not unanimous on this point, especially in regard to its extension to the educational institutions, professions and the Councils. Even within the Khilafat organisation a powerful group led by Chotani was constantly at loggerheads with the militants. This cleavage was especially witnessed at the Bombay Khilafat Conference (February 1920) over the question of subversion in the army and still later in the summer of that year when the Khilafatists decided to push the non-co-operation scheme with all its four stages. As time passed the differences widened and spread to such other issues as civil disobedience, Council entry, and, more important, to the question of violence and non-violence. The divisions among the leaders, in the end, spoiled disaster to the movement itself.

With the house divided, the Khilafatists failed to influence the British policy. The British Government of Lloyd George displayed no compassion for the Indian Muslim case. The Khilafat movement was summarily rejected as a 'fictitious' agitation. But then the Turkish problem involved the clash of interests of the Allied Powers. It also had some inherent contradictions – the conflicting ambitions of the Turks, the Arabs and even the Greeks. On top of this Lloyd George pursued his own anti-Turkish policies, constantly disregarding the
Indian Government and the India Office, overriding the Foreign Office and ignoring the General-Staff. No doubt he allowed the Indian Muslims to represent their case to himself and to the Peace Conference, but in the final settlement with Turkey the Muslim pressure had little effect. Even when the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, it was the Turkish arms rather than the Indian memorials that accomplished the feat.

But this did not mean that there was no concern in the official circles about the Indian Muslim attitude towards the Khilafat issue. In fact the Muslim unrest was the chief worry of the Government of India and the India Office. Therefore, in spite of the narrow grooves of the Imperial policy within which they had to manoeuvre, the India Office under Montagu (and later under Peel) and the Government of India under Chelmsford and Reading, for reasons of expediency, tried their best to exert sympathetic influence in any final settlement with Turkey. The same tactical reason moved them to adopt, as far as the agitation was concerned, a policy of non-interference where it was useful and a policy of repression where it was effective. The majority of the Local Governments would have preferred to use stronger measures — and often did so — but the Government of India, in search of uniform all-India policy and checked by its legal advisors, exercised a restraining influence on its satraps. But where the Provincial Governments exceeded limits, as in the Punjab in summer 1919 and in Bengal in winter 1921, it invariably upheld their actions, even if the measures employed had been unusually stringent.8 The India Office exercised but an exiguous control over the policies of the Government of India. It generally did not criticise it either as going too far in the direction of non-interference, or as being unduly repressive.9 But the important factor is that the Government of India managed to come out relatively unscathed from the six troubled years of the Khilafat movement.

8 The policy pursued by the Government of India in relation to the Khilafat movement can best be followed from the instructions which it issued from time to time to the Local Governments; more appropriately if they are studied in relation to the chronological background of the main stages of the movement they were defined to deal with. For details see J&F, 5273/20.
9 See ibid.
The last phase of the Khilafat movement was marred by scandals, political factionalism, personal squabbles and, worst of all, Hindu-Muslim dissensions. As the famous Turkish author Halide Edib (1883-1964) points out, the Khilafat movement had 'two curiously contradictory results in India: that of uniting the Muslims and Hindus around a common activity; and that of dividing them'.

Human failings, diversity of interests, inability to sustain a common effort and above all a reaction consequent to the collapse of the non-co-operation experiment had ended an entente which had been resting on weak foundations. But contrary to popular misconception the break-up was a slow process. Even the Mappilla excesses had had no widespread communal repercussions. Nor did Gandhi's action to postpone the projected civil disobedience in February 1922, result in any immediate Hindu-Muslim parting. In fact both the communities continued to profess and follow the same course for quite some time. It was towards the middle of 1922 that relations began to worsen. It took a full year before the gulf widened and yet another year before it finally became unbridgeable.

Another very important point which emerges is that the Khilafat movement did not end with the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, which was the natural culminating point of the Turkish crisis. On the contrary the agitation continued on the secondary, and in fact flimsy, issue of the freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab from non-Muslim control. Even when the Turks abolished the caliphal office in March 1924, the movement, though greatly reduced in intensity, did not terminate. The Khilafatists simply would not accept the fait accompli. This naturally takes one back to the earlier contention that the defence of the Khilafat was only a façade. The real issue was the defence of the Muslim power abroad and with it the security of the Muslim position in India. But this was what the Khilafatists failed to achieve. Their failure lies in the fact that they were unable to find a synthesis between pan-Islamism and Indian nationalism, and to work out the community's exact position in a future multi-national state. After the abolition of the Khilafat the Khilafatists did try to divert their attention from extra-territorial matters to domestic issues, but they had no solution for the new situation. Besides, the Khilafat organisation was now so faction-

ridden that it had lost its credibility. The All-India Muslim Conference and later the All-India Muslim League under Jinnah, seemed to be more suited to take up the new challenge.

But in spite of its failure, the Khilafat movement has left its mark on the history of the Sub-continent. The movement was the first all-India agitation of the Indian Muslims with a central organisation to guide its course. It trained them in political agitation and made them conscious of their potentialities. It gave birth to new political alignments. Provinces hitherto lagging in political experience, such as the Punjab, Sind and the Frontier, responded side by side with Bombay, Bengal and the U.P. which had established political traditions. It brought the Hindus and the Muslims on one platform for the first and the last time. It also produced a leadership which though concerned with the immediate issues was able, with varying fortunes, to sustain the agitation for more than six years. The Khilafat organisation which led the movement was more militant than either the Muslim League or the Congress and it acquired such importance and influence that at one stage even Dr. Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), the Zionist leader, was anxious to win its support in his relations with the Arabs. The CKC's influence, even at the fag end of the movement, was evident from the part it played in the Hedjaz affair and the anxiety of Ibn Saud to please it.

In the final analysis, one can say that though the movement failed, it unwittingly left a pattern of politics which the Muslims of India later tried to follow. After a few more years of experiments and frustrations they finally realised that the solution of their

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11 Years later, in Jan. 1931, Shaukat Ali disclosed to the British High Commissioner in Palestine that during the Khilafat movement Dr. Weizmann had sent his brother to India to see Mohamed Ali. Weizmann had made an offer to the effect that the Jews would agree to the Muslims having Jerusalem and a corridor from Jaffa to Jerusalem if the Indian Muslims would agree to the Jews having the rest of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and in fact, the whole of Arabia except the Hedjaz and Nejd. If such an agreement could have been made, the Jews would have agreed to finance Turkey, which was then in great straits. Note of the interview dated Jan. 24, 1931, in R&J (S), 1212/31.

12 See Report Numaindagan-i-Majalis Khilafat-i-Hind, Central Khilafat Committee, Bombay, [1926/].

13 K.K. Aziz is of the opinion that the Khilafat movement provided a base on which Muslim nationalism was strengthened. See his 'Some Thoughts on the Indian Khilafat Movement', Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, III, No. 4, Oct. 1966, p. 121.
problem lay neither in narrow nationalism nor in doctrinaire 'universal' Islamism, but in some kind of an Islamic 'League of Nations'. "It was within the concept of this multi-national neo-pan-Islamism", writes Aziz Ahmad, "that Iqbal evolved the theory of Pakistan. 14 It is in this same concept that the national motives to-day in Pakistan are still deeply imbedded though the basic contradiction between the classical and the modern nationalistic concepts remains somewhat unresolved. 15


15 The existence of a 'World Muslim Congress' with its headquarters in Karachi, and branches and affiliations in 42 countries in all five continents, reflects the unrealisable dream of a world-wide Islamic polity. For information about the 'World Muslim Congress', see Year Book of International Organisations, ed., R.A. Hall, 13th ed., Brussels, 1971, p. 751.
I.-The Moslem Claim

The claim on behalf of Muhammadans of India in connection with the Turkish Peace Terms may be divided into two sections:-

(1) regarding the Khilafat; and
(2) regarding what is called "Jazira-tul-Arab" and the Holy Places of Islam.

The claim regarding the Khilafat consists in leaving the Turkish Empire as it was at the time of the war, with such guarantee being taken by the League of Nations as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of Non-Moslem races living within the Turkish Empire, consistently with the dignity of a sovereign state.

The second section of the claim consists in the sovereignty over "Jazira-tul-Arab", i.e., Arabia as defined by Moslem religious authorities, and the custody of Holy Places of Islam. Arabia as thus defined is bounded by the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates and the Tigris. The Holy Places include the three sacred Harams, namely, Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, and the Holy Shrines, namely, Najaf, Karbala, Sammarra, Kazimain and Baghdad. In reality this claim is included in the first, but it is distinguishable from it in that custody of the Holy Places has ever since the establishment of Islam been under the Khilafat and unlike the boundary of the latter, which has fluctuated from time to time, has never suffered any diminution whatsoever. This claim does not exclude genuine Arab self-Government, but it does exclude the present arrangement because those who know, understand the unreality behind it. The claim now said to be made by Sheriff Hussain and by Amir Feisul is inconsistent in fact with their acceptance of even the spiritual sovereignty of the Khalifa.

II.-Argument

The claim is primarily based upon the religious requirements and the sentiments of the Muhammadans of India in common with those of Muhammadans all the world over, and is supported, so far as the Khilafat, the Harams and "Jazira-tul-Arab" are concerned by testimony from the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet, and for the rest by other religious authority. It is further supported regarding the Holy Places by the deliberate declaration of the Government of India on behalf of His Majesty's Government as also the Governments of France and Russia of 2nd November 1914, which says:- "In view of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey which to the regret of Great Britain had been brought about by the ill-advised, unprovoked and deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, His Excellency the Viceroy is authorised by His Majesty's Government to make the following public announcement in regard to the Holy Places of Arabia including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the post/sic/ of Jeddah, in order there may be no misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty's Government in this war in which no question of religious character is involved. These Holy Places and Jeddah will be immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy Places and Shrines in question. At the request of His Majesty's Government, the Governments of France and Russia have given them similar assurances". The great regard paid in this declaration to the sentiments of His Majesty's most loyal Moslem subjects is especially noteworthy. On the 5th January 1918, Mr. Lloyd George, claiming to speak in the name of the whole Empire, made the following remarkable pronouncements- "We are not fighting to deprive Turkey of
Constantinople or the rich renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which were predominantly Turkish racially. President Wilson's 12th point in his message to the Congress dated 8th January 1918 is in equally emphatic term, viz., that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured of secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities now under Turkish Rule should be assured security of life and autonomous developments.

Thus the reduction of the Muhammadan claim by hair's breadth will not only be a violation of the deepest religious feelings of the Muhammadans, but will also be a flagrant violation of the solemn relevant declarations and pledges made or given by responsible Statesmen representing Allied and Associated Powers and given at a time when they were desirous of enlisting the support of the Muhammadan people and soldiery.

III.-Consequences

It is necessary to state the likely consequences of a wrong decision on the part of the Imperial Government or the Allied and Associated Powers. The claim is supported by practically the whole of the Hindu population of India. It has assumed therefore an Indian National Status. The population of the British Empire is predominantly Hindu-Muhammadan, as will appear from the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>435,000,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>243 millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslems</td>
<td>(In India) 72 millions and (outside India, but within the Empire) 30 millions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The policy of the British Government has been definitely stated to be that of making India an equal partner. Recent events have awakened India to a sense of dignity. In these circumstances the British Empire as one consisting of free nationalities can only hold together by maintaining an attitude of absolute impartiality among the three chief communities - the Hindus, the Muhammadans and the Christians. It is therefore urged that the British Ministers are bound not merely to press the Muhammadan or rather the Indian claim before the Supreme Council but to make it their own. If, however, for any reason whatever they fail to do so and the Supreme Council also fails to perform the elementary duty of giving effect to the declarations that brought about an Armistice, it is futile to expect peace in India, and the Khilafat Conference will fail in its duty if it hesitated to warn His Majesty's Ministers that an affront put upon the 7 crores of Muhammadans in India supported by 23 crores of Hindus and others will be incompatiable with the expectation of blind loyalty. Beyond that, it is impossible for the conference to foresee the results. It may be added that even if the members of the Conference attempted seriously to passify the Muhammadan mind, it is futile to expect that they would succeed in healing the wound that would be made in the heart of Muhammadan India by the denial of justice and breach of pledges in matter of vital importance to that community.
### TABLE I

**PROPORTIONAL STRENGTH OF THE MUSLIMS IN EACH PROVINCE AND IN THE STATES AND AGENCIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1881</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ajmer-Merwara</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andamans &amp; Nicobars</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>1,731</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>2,896</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>2,689</td>
<td>2,710</td>
<td>2,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>8,731</td>
<td>9,106</td>
<td>9,150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>5,399</td>
<td>5,274</td>
<td>5,158</td>
<td>5,108</td>
<td>5,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar &amp; Orissa.</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>1,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>1,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P. &amp; Berar.</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coorg</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>5,533</td>
<td>5,485</td>
<td>5,325</td>
<td>5,136</td>
<td>5,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>9,162</td>
<td>9,286</td>
<td>9,221</td>
<td>9,230</td>
<td>9,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>1,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States &amp; Agencies</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>1,331</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total for India (1921 figures):**

- **Total population:** 318,942,480
- **Muslims:** 68,735,233

**Total Muslim population of the world (1906 figures):**

- **Asia (including Russia):** 170,623,181
- **Africa:** 58,864,587
- **Europe:** 3,410,402
- **Australia and America:** 68,000

**Total:** 232,966,170

**Sources:** Census of India, 1921, I, Part I, pp. 6, 40–43 and 122–23; and S.M. Zwemer, et al., The Mohammedan World of To-day, New York, 1906.
TABLE II

TABLE SHOWING TERRITORIES PASSED FROM MUSLIM RULE TO NON-MUSLIM CONTROL BETWEEN 1799-1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country or Province</th>
<th>To Whom Ceded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I. Caucasus and Transcaucasia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>Georgia from Persia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813</td>
<td>Darband, Shirwan, Baku, Karadagh from Persia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813</td>
<td>Sovereignty of Caspian Sea from Persia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>Erivan, Nakhchivan, etc., from Persia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>Poti, Anapa, and Circassian Coast from Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Batum, Kars, Ardahan from Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Central Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Samarkand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>Khokand and Bukhara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>Khiva</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>Merv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>Part of Khorasan from Persia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Southern Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>Nizam’s Dominions, India</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1803</td>
<td>Mughal Empire, India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>Straits Settlements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Dutch Rule consolidated</td>
<td>Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>Aden and Arabian Coast</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Sind, India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>Punjab and Kashmir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Oudh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Baluchistan Protectorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>Greece and Serbia granted independence</td>
<td>Rumania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Wallachia and Moldavia from Turkey</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Bessarabia from Turkey</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (annexed 1908)</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania enlarged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Bulgaria formed from Turkey</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>East Rumelia from Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Crete autonomous from Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Crete annexed</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Aegean Islands from Turkey</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Islands</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Parts of Macedonia, Albania</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Parts of Macedonia and Thraco.</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Parts of Albania</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Continued on the next page).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>Egypt (annexed 1914)</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884-89</td>
<td>British East Africa</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884-89</td>
<td>German East Africa</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-90</td>
<td>Eritrea, Somaliland Coast</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884-98</td>
<td>Sahara and Western Sudan</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Eastern Sudan</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Wadai</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Morocco, part to</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Tripoli and Cyrenaica</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN THE DIFFERENT PROVINCES WHO RENOUNCED TITLES, RESIGNED PUBLIC OFFICES AND PUBLIC SERVICES UPTO THE END OF DECEMBER 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>Honours</th>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar &amp; Orissa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coorg</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 18 8 121 253

Source: *India Confidential Home Political Proceedings, January 1921, Proc. No. 234.*
TABLE IV

STATEMENT SHOWING OFFICIAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE NUMBER OF THE PLEADERS WHO SUSPENDED THEIR PRACTICE IN PURSUANCE OF THE NON-CO-
OPERATION RESOLUTION UPTO THE FIRST HALF OF 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar &amp; Orissa</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coorg</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administered Areas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE V

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN THE DIFFERENT PROVINCES WHO WITHDREW CANDIDATURE FOR ELECTION IN THE ASSEMBLY AND COUNCILS UPTO THE END OF DECEMBER 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar &amp; Orissa</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.P.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>No candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 160

Sources: India Confidential Home Political Proceedings, January 1921, Pro. No. 234.
## TABLE VI

**Statement Showing Withdrawal of Students from Government and Aided Schools and Colleges**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arts Colleges</th>
<th></th>
<th>Secondary Schools</th>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Scholars</td>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td>Scholars</td>
<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td>Scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>52,482</td>
<td>2,113</td>
<td>632,032</td>
<td>6,595</td>
<td>649,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>48,170</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>600,583</td>
<td>6,739</td>
<td>653,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>45,933</td>
<td>2,248</td>
<td>594,910</td>
<td>6,739</td>
<td>644,614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table VII

#### Attendance at Government and Aided Schools and Colleges in British India during 1922-23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arts Colleges</th>
<th></th>
<th>Secondary Schools</th>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Scholars</td>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>47,632</td>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>595,402</td>
<td>6,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>52,639</td>
<td>2,312</td>
<td>632,943</td>
<td>6,732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VIII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>National Schools and Colleges in 1921-22</th>
<th>Approximate effect of Non-Co-operation on certain recognised institutions up to March 1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>92*</td>
<td>5,072*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>17,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>14,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>137*</td>
<td>8,476*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>8,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>16,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar &amp; Orissa</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>17,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Provinces</td>
<td>86*</td>
<td>6,338*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>120*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Administrations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Opened till 31st July 1921.
†There was a general tendency to return.
‡Till January 1921.

TABLE IX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grey (unbleached) Million yards</th>
<th>White (bleached) Million yards</th>
<th>Coloured, printed or dyed Million yards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>1,534.2</td>
<td>793.3</td>
<td>831.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-15</td>
<td>1,320.2</td>
<td>604.2</td>
<td>494.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-16</td>
<td>1,148.2</td>
<td>611.4</td>
<td>358.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>847.0</td>
<td>589.8</td>
<td>454.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-18</td>
<td>625.5</td>
<td>502.3</td>
<td>395.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>583.4</td>
<td>286.6</td>
<td>227.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>533.3</td>
<td>322.0</td>
<td>208.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>580.2</td>
<td>421.8</td>
<td>489.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>635.6</td>
<td>306.2</td>
<td>138.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-23</td>
<td>931.0</td>
<td>402.5</td>
<td>243.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commercial Intelligence Department, India, Review of the Trade of India in 1922-23, Calcutta, 1924, p. 4.
| PARTICULARS OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF COTTON MANUFACTURES AND THEIR VALUES DURING 1920-23 AND THE PRE-WAR YEAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Imports | 1913-14 | 1920-21 | 1921-22 | 1922-23 |
| Twist and yarn | R(lakhs) | R(lakhs) | R(lakhs) | R(lakhs) |
| 1920-21 | 13,58 | 11,51 | 9,26 |
| 1921-22 | 11,51 | 9,26 |
| 1922-23 | 9,26 |
| Piece-goods: | | | | |
| Grey (unbleached) | 25,45 | 26,45 | 22,65 | 30,44 |
| White (bleached) | 14,29 | 21,90 | 12,67 | 15,01 |
| Coloured, printed or dyed. | 17,86 | 34,57 | 7,59 | 12,60 |
| Goods of all descriptions. | 54 | 86 | 25 | 46 |
| Total piece-goods. | 58,14 | 83,78 | 43,16 | 58,51 |
| Hosiery | 1,20 | 1,91 | 63 | 80 |
| Handkerchiefs and shawls | 89 | 47 | 10 | 16 |
| Thread | 39 | 91 | 72 | 70 |
| Other sorts. | 1,52 | 1,47 | 82 | 70 |
| Grand total. | 66,30 | 1,02,12 | 56,94 | 70,13 |

Source: Commercial Intelligence Department, India, *Review of the Trade of India in 1922-23*, Calcutta, 1924, p. 3.
DIAGRAM I

DIAGRAM showing the proportion of the population of India following each religion, 1921.

Per 10,000 of the population

Hindu 6856
Muslim 2714
Buddhist 366
Tribal Religions 309
Christian 150
Sikh 103
Others 42.

Source: Census of India, 1921, I, Part I.
Chart illustrating German-Bolshevic-Asiatic 'Intrigue', 1920.

Source: Political and Secret Memorandum, B. 350.
Variations in the values of cotton manufactures in the Import Trade of British India during 1920-23 as compared with averages of the pre-war and war periods.

Source: Commercial Intelligence Department, India, Annual Statement of the Sea-Borne Trade of British India with the British Empire and Foreign Countries for the fiscal year ending 31st March, 1923, I, Calcutta, 1924.
GLOSSARY

adm-i-taaawun; to annul or rescind co-operation.

Ahl-i-Hadis: in the sub-continent, the school of theology which professes to follow the Prophetic tradition in preference to the canonical interpretation of the four conventional schools of Islamic jurisprudence, i.e., the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Hanbali, and the Shafi.

Ahrars: the mainly Punjab-based political party which emerged in the wake of the Khilafat movement.

Amir-i-Hind: the 'chief' or 'lord' of India; a title of the proposed religious dignitary.

Amir-i-Jamias: a vice-chancellor.

Amir-ul-Momineen: 'the Commander of the Faithful'; a title of the Sunni caliph or a sultan.

Anjumans: a Muslim association.

baism: the act of swearing allegiance; submission, homage, fealty; initiation as a disciple of a saint or a religious guide; to take the oath of allegiance.

Bohra: the mainly Shia trading community of Western India.

Bapu: 'father'; also a term of respect used for an elderly man among Hindus.

Chaukidar: a watchman, a police or custom peon.

Chaukidari: a tax levied to defray the cost of a town or village watch; the fees or wages paid to the town or village watchman.

crore: one hundred lakhs or ten millions.

dar al-harb: 'the land of war'; country not under Islamic rule or law.

dar al-Islam: 'the land of peace'; country under Islamic rule or law; classically, a properly constituted or functioning Islamic state.

dar-ul-ulum: 'the house of learning'; a Muslim establishment for higher learning.

dastur-ul-amal: rules of practice, regulations.

farman: an order, a command, a decree of ruler.

fatwa (pl. fatwas): a ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a mufti or a learned alim or a body of ulama (q.v.).

fez: a red, brimless felt hat with or without tassel worn in Egypt and Turkey.

fidai: one who devotes himself or sacrifices himself for a cause, one who volunteers or risks his life in any perilous service.

Gurdwaras: a Sikh temple.

Ghair Muqallids: a term commonly applied to the Ahl-i-Hadis (q.v.) in the sub-continent.

hajj: annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

haram: forbidden by religion.
hartals: closure of shops and markets as a gesture of protest.

hijrats: voluntary withdrawal on religious grounds from a dar al-harb to a dar al-Islam.

Id: a Muslim festival, especially Id-ul-Fitr, celebrated to mark the end of the month of Ramazan, and Id-ul-Azha, to commemorate the sacrificial tradition of Prophet Ibrahim.

Ijtihads: in Islamic jurisprudence, the use of individual reasoning.

Ikhwan: the brotherhood founded by Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, an intensified form of Muwahhidun (q.v.).

Imam: a supreme leader of the Muslims; in Shia doctrine the hereditary claimant to the headship of the community through the Prophet's daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali.

Ishtirak-i-amal: co-operation in governmental or professional activity.

Jamaats: a party, a group, a community or an association.

Jamiyats: an association, or a body of people.

Jannat: a landholder, the original owner or proprietor by hereditary right.

Jihad: 'the utmost endeavour', mainly used for taking up arms in a religious cause or in the defence of the dar al-Islam; a holy war.

Jumma: Friday, the day of congregate prayer for Muslims.

Jumud Allah: 'Army of God'; name given to the projected pan-Islamic 'army' in the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy'.

Kaaba: the supreme Muslim shrine at Mecca, enclosing the famous black stone kissed by all pilgrims.

Kafirs: unbeliever, used for non-Muslims, especially not the 'people of the Book'.

Khaddar or khadi: a kind of a coarse hand-spun and -woven cotton cloth.

Khalifas: a successor, a vicegerent, or deputy; the supreme head of the Muslim community, the Imam (q.v.), as vicegerent of the Prophet he is vested with absolute authority in all matters of state, both civil and religious, as long as he rules in conformity with the laws of the Quran and hadis (q.v.).

Khalifat-ul-Muslimin: 'the Caliph of the Muslims'; a caliphal title.

Khilafat: the office of the Khalifa (q.v.).

Kisang: a peasant, a cultivator.

Kisan Sabha: an association of the cultivators.

kia: one hundred thousand.

Madrassas: same as dar-ul-ulum (q.v.) but means especially a collegiate mosque.

Mashid: the Messiah of the Muslims whose reappearance is expected just prior to the end of the world.

Marathas: in a general sense, inhabitant of Maharashtra.
Marwari: natives of Marwar in Rajputana, but scattered throughout India as business communities.

Mualana: title applied to scholars of Islamic religious sciences.

Maulavi: title applied to a Muslim scholar.

Millet: a community, especially the religious community of Islam.

Motamar: congress, conference.

Muhajirin: pl. of Muhajir, one who performs the Hijrat (q.v.).

Mujaddid-i-Khilafat: 'the renewer of the Khilafat'; title given to Mustafa Kemal by the Indian Khilafatists.

Mujahidin: pl. of Mujahid, one who is engaged in jihad (q.v.).

Mukhtiar: an agent, an attorney, as employed in legal affairs.

Mujallid: one deeming himself bound by the established doctrines of the four conventional schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

Muttahida Fatwas: 'unanimous decision', as the Jamiat-ul-Ulama's fatwa on non-co-operation was known.

Muwaahhidun: orthodox Sunnis of the Hanbalite school, the strictest and the least followed among the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. They regard the cults of saints and tombs and the interjection of the saints to intercede with God on behalf of the worshipper, as idolatrous. The Muwaahhidun were called Wahhabis by the opponents of community after its founder Muhammad son of Abdul Wahhab (1703-87).


Nawab: pl. of Naib, 'deputy, vicegerent'; a style assumed by the governors of the provinces in later Mughal period and continued by the British.

Nazrana: a gift, a present, especially from an inferior to a superior; a contribution in excess of usual revenue; a payment levied on peasants in professed cases of emergency.

Panchayat: an Indian court of arbitration consisting of five or more members.

Pandav: marquee.

Parsi: a Zoroastrian of Persian origin chiefly settled in Western India.

Pir: a Sufi (q.v.) teacher, a spiritual guide or a religious preceptor.

Powindas: migratory Afghan tribesmen.

Qafila: a caravan.


Raj: sovereignty, rule, dominion.

Sabha: an assembly.

Sadqa: voluntary alms, alms properly dedicated to pious uses.

Saif-ul-Islam: 'the Sword of Islam'; title given to Mustafa Kemal by the Khilafatists.

Sajjadah Nasim: an incumbent of a religious endowment.

Sanad: a grant, a diploma, a charter, a patent.

Sangathan: 'binding together'; the movement to knit the Hindus into a strong community.

Sarai: a building for the shelter and accommodation of travellers, an inn, a caravanserai.

Sarkar: the state, government, supreme authority.

Seth: honorific title of a merchant, a banker, or a trader.

Shaikh-ul-Islam: an honorific title of a jurist per excellence, applied especially to the Mufti of Constantinople—the chief religious dignitary and fatwa-giver of the Ottomans. The office was later abolished by the Nationalists in March 1924, along with the Khilafat.

Shaikh-ul-Jamia: a principal of an educational institution.

Shariat: holy law of Islam.

Shia: general name for the Muslims who regard Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, and his descendents as the only legitimate Imams (q.v.) of the Muslim community after the Prophet.

Shuddhi: 'purification'; the name of the movement to reclaim Hindus from Islam.

Shuhada: pl. of shahid, a martyr in the cause of religion fighting against unbelievers.

Sufi: a Muslim mystic.

Sunnī: the Muslim who is held to be conforming to orthodoxy in Islamic beliefs and practices.

Swađesi: lit. 'of one's own country', the name given to the boycott of goods not made in India.


Takāvi: advances or loans of money made to the cultivators at the time of sowing or in bad season or to enable them to extend their cultivation, to be repaid when the crop is gathered.

Taluk: a subdivision, in Bombay, of a district, in the U.P., an estate.

Talukdar: officer in charge of a taluka (q.v.); the holder of a proprietary estate.

Tanzim: 'organisation'; the name of the movement to organise Muslims in all aspects of life as a reaction against the Hindu movements of Sangathan and Shuddhi (q.v.).

Tark-i-mawalat: 'to withdraw co-operation'; Urdu (q.v.) equivalent of the term 'non-co-operation'.

Thana: a police-station.

Tilak: coloured mark on the forehead used by Hindus.

Tonga: a horse-drawn carriage.

Ulama: pl. of alim, a man of Islamic religious learning.

Ummat: Muslim community.

Urdu: language of Muslim India (to-day of Pakistan) formed by a mixture of Arabic, Persian and Turkish words, upon a basis of Hindi and Sanskrit, written in Arabic characters.

Vakil: a pleader in a court.

Waqf: a pious foundation.

Zakat: alms, alms tax.

Zamindar: landholder, paying revenue directly to the government.

Zimmi: protected non-Muslim subject of an Islamic state.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ABDUL BARI, QAYYAM-UD-DIN MOHAMED: b. 1879; leading pir and pan-Islamist alim from Farangi Mahal, Lucknow; educ., Farangi Mahal and the Hodjas, where he developed friendship with Hussain ibn Ali, later Sharif of Mocca and King of the Hodjas; travelled extensively in the Ottoman Empire before returning to India in 1908; same year founded the Madrassa Nizamia, Farangi Mahal; President, Majlis-i-Mulid-ul-Islam, Lucknow, 1910; came under the influence of M.H. Kidwai, 1912; President, Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1913; involved in the Cawnpore Mosque affair, 1913; took leading part in organising the Lucknow Muslim Conference and the Jama'at-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, 1919; founder-member, CKC, 1919-26; opposed the hijrat, 1920; mellowed towards the Govt. of India after the Telegram incident, 1922; supported Hussain's assumption of the Khilafat, 1924; opposed Ibn Saud during the Hedjaz crisis, 1924-26; d. 1926.

AGA KHAN, AGA SULTAN SIR MAHOMED SHAH: b. 1877; 3rd Head of the Nizari Ismaili sect of Shia Muslims; succeeded his father, 1885; educ., privately; M/ember/ I/mperial/ Legislative/ C/cil, 1902-4; led Muslim (Siala) delegation to Lord Minto, 1906; President, A/ll/India/ Muslim/ L/egacy, 1906-13; granted salute of 11 guns in recognition of loyal services during World War I; pleaded Indian Muslim case re the Khilafat before the Council of Four at Paris, 1919; opposed the non-co-operation experiment; member, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921; d. 1957.

AHMAD, MIRZA BASHIR-UD-DIN MAHMUD: b. 1889; Head of the Qadiani wing of the Ahmadiyya Movement and son and 2nd successor of its founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmed; educ., Qadian; succeeded, 1914; disputed the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat and opposed non-co-operation; d. 1965.

AHMAD, SHAHID ZAHUR: barrister and politician from Allahabad; founder-member, AIML; Joint Secy., London Muslim League, 1908; member, Council of AIML from 1910; member, CKC, 1919-28.

AHMAD, SYED ZAHUR: vakil and politician from Lucknow; founder-member, AIML; member and Secy., Council AIML, 1919-26; member, CKC, 1919-28.

ALI, ASAF: b. 1888; Delhi barrister and politician; educ., Stephen's College, Delhi, and Lincoln's Inn, London; took leading part in the Khilafat movement, gave up legal practice and went to prison; travelled extensively in Europe; d. 1953.

ALI, MAULVI MUHAMMAD: b. 1874; Punjabi alim, journalist and Head of the Lahori faction of the Ahmadiyya Movement; educ., Kapurthala, Govt. College, Lahore (M.A., 1895) and Law College, Lahore (1897); taught at Islamia College, Lahore, 1897; same year accepted Ahmadiyya doctrine; taught at Oriental College, Lahore, 1897-1900; editor, Review of Religions (Qadian), 1902; left Qadian over the question of succession and the doctrinal issue of finality of the prophethood of Muhammad, 1914; same year took up residence at Lahore and, in association with Khwaja Kamal-ud-din and Dr. Yaqub Beg, formed a new organisation under the name of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat-i-Islam with himself as the President; supported the Khilafat movement, d. 1951.

ALI, MOAZZAM: barrister and politician from Rampur; brother-in-law of the Ali brothers; educ., Rampur, M/ohamedan/ A/nglo/ O/riental/ College, A/gra, and London; set up legal practice in Patna and then shifted to Muradabad, 1920; took leading part in the Khilafat movement and resigned
practice, 1920; succeeded Shaukat Ali as Secy., CKC, after the latter's arrest, 1921; member, A/T India Congress Committee; member, Khilafat Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922.

ALI, MOHAMED; b. 1878; leading pan-Islamist journalist and politician from Rampur and younger brother of Shaukat Ali; educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and Lincoln College, Oxford; graduated, 1902; Chief Education Officer, Rampur, 1902-4; Opium Officer, Baroda, 1904-10; founder-member, AIML; founder-editor of the English weekly Comrade (Calcutta - later shifted to Delhi), 1911-14; followed it up by an Urdu newspaper Hamdard, 1913; took part in the Cawnpore Mosque affair and led a two-member delegation to London, 1913; interned for pro-Turkish activities, 1915-1919; member, CKC, 1919-26; led the Khilafat delegation to Europe, 1920; interned for the famous Karachi Resolutions, 1921-23; President, Indian National Congress, 1923; delegate of the CKC to World Muslim Congress, Mecca, 1926; d. 1931.

ALI, SHAUkat; b. 1873; pan-Islamist journalist and politician from Rampur and elder brother of Mohamed Ali; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; Sub-Deputy Opium Agent in Opium Dept. till 1912; founder-member, AIML; helped found Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1913; interned with Mohamed Ali, 1915-19; Secy., CKC, 1919-21; interned for supporting the Karachi Resolutions, 1921-23; President, CKC, with two interruptions, 1923-38; delegate of the CKC to World Muslim Congress, Mecca, 1926; d. 1938.

ALI, (SIR) SYED RAZA; b. 1880; Muradabadi Shia lawyer and politician; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; started legal practice in Moradabad, 1906; Member Legislative Council, U.P., 1912-20; moved to Allahabad to practice at High Court, 1916; took part in the Khilafat movement but opposed non-co-operation; became independent in politics, 1920; Member Legislative Council of State, 1922 & 1923; President AIML, Bombay Session, 1924; d. 1949.

ALI, SYED AMEUR; b. 1849; Calcutta barrister and judge; educ., Hoogly College, Calcutta, and Inner Temple, London; called to Bar, 1873; Lecturer on Mahomedan Law at the Presidency College, Calcutta, 1873-76; Magistrate and Chief Magistrate, Calcutta, 1878-81; MLC, Bengal, 1878-83; MLC, 1883-85; Judge of High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, 1890-1904; settled in Britain, 1904; helped found London Muslim League, 1906; Member, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 1909-28; d. 1928.

ANSARI, DR. MUKHATAR AHMAD; b. 1880; leading medical practitioner and politician from Ghazipur settled in Delhi; educ., Muir Central College, Allahabad, Edinburgh and London; after graduating in medicine, admitted as a Resident Medical Officer at Charing Cross Hospital and as House Surgeon to Lock Hospital; returned to India, 1911; became intimate with Ajmal Khan and the Ali brothers at Delhi; led Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey, 1912-13; member, AIML Council; founder-president, Home Rule League, Delhi, 1917; Chairman Reception Committee, AIML Delhi session, 1918; member, AIOC for eight years from 1919; member, CKC, 1919-28; led Khilafat deputation to the Viceroy, 1920; member, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921; President, Khilafat Conference, Gaya, 1922; member, Khilafat and Congress Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committees, 1922; d. 1936.

AZAD, ABUL KALAM MOHTUDDIN AHMAD; b. 1888; leading alim and pan-Islamist journalist settled in Calcutta; was born of an Arab mother at Mecca where his father, Khair-ud-din of Delhi, had taken refuge after the Revolt of 1857; returned to India with his father, 1890; educ., Dars-i-Nizamia, Calcutta, and Nadwat-ul-Ulama, Lucknow; travelled in the Middle East, 1906-7; editor, Vakil (Amritsar), 1907; editor, An Nadwa (Lucknow), 1911.
started weekly Al-Hilal (Calcutta), 1912; and on its suppression, Al-Balagh (Calcutta), 1913; interned for pro-Turkish activities, 1916-20; member, CKC and Jamiyat-ul-Ulama; supported the hijrat, 1920; member, Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC, 1920-21; interned, 1921-23; President, INC, 1923; President, CKC, 1925; supported Ibn Saud, 1924-26; d. 1958.

AZAD SUBHANI, ABDUL KADIR: b. 1882; pan-Islamist alim and politician and Head of Madrassa Al-Haya, Cawnpore; came to notice in connection with the Cawnpore Mosque affair, 1913; founder-member, Jamiyat-ul-Ulama; pressed for complete independence along with Hasrat Mohani, 1921; an exponent of 'no-change' policy, 1922-23; d. 1957.

BAPTISTA, JOSEPH: b. 1864; Home Ruler and Trade Union leader from Bombay; President, Indian Home Rule League (founded by Tilak); went to Britain, 1907; later became engrossed in Labour questions; Chairman Reception Committee, A-ITUC, 1920; President, Indian Seamen's Union, Bombay, 1923; represented Indian Labour at International Labour Conference, Geneva, 1924; President, Municipal Corporation, Bombay, 1925; d. 1930.

BESANT, (MRS.) ANNIE: b. 1847; British theosophist who lived and worked in India; headquarters, Madras; President, Theosophical Society and editor, New India and Commonweal; educ., privately in Britain, Germany and France; took honours in Botany at London University; joined the National Secular Society, 1874; worked on Free Thought and Radical Movements led by Charles Bradlaugh, M.P., and for various other social and liberal societies, 1889; became a devoted pupil of Mme. Blavatsky; founded the Central Hindu College at Benares, 1898, and the Central Hindu Girls' College, Benares, 1904; helped found the Hindu University and was at its Court, Council and Senate; d. 1933.

BHOPAL, NAWAB SULTAN JAHAN BEGUM, THE BEGUM OF: b. 1858; eighth in lineal descent from the famous Dost Mahomed Khan, founder of the dynasty; educ., privately; succeeded, 1901; received a salute of 21 guns within, and 19 guns outside, the limits of her dominions; abdicated in favour of her only surviving son, Nawabzada Hamidullah Khan, 1926; first Chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1920; d. 1930.

BHURGRI, GHULAM MUHAMMAD: b. 1878; barrister and politician of a rich zamindar family settled in Sind from the Punjab (Bhur Garh in Dora Ghazi Khan); educ., Sind Madrassa, Karachi, M.A. College, Aligarh, and London; called to Bar, 1908; set up practice in Hyderabad (Sind); MLC, Bombay, 1910-19; Gen.-Secy., INC, 1917; member, AIML deputation to Britain re Reforms and Khilafat, 1919; President, Bombay session of the Khilafat Conference, 1920; opposed non-co-operation and successfully contested elections of 1920; later resigned his seat in the Council of State as a protest against the Govt. policy with regard to the Khilafat question; President, Lucknow session of the AIML, 1923; Member Legislative Assembly, 1923-24; d. 1924.

'HU AMMAN', ABADY RANO BEGUM: b. 1853; mother of the Ali brothers; nominally headed the campaign for the release of her sons, 1917-19; pulled in Gandhi to support the campaign, 1917; took part in the Khilafat movement and organised propaganda among women and raised subscriptions to the Khilafat Fund; d. 1924.

BHUKANER, GANGA SINGH BAHADUR, MAHARAJA OF: b. 1880; educ., Mayo College, Ajmer; succeeded, 1887; assumed full ruling powers, 1898; military service and campaigns, 1900-14; World War I, 1914-15; one of the three Reps. of India at the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference, 1917; and one of the two Reps. at the Imperial Cabinet and Peace Conference, 1919; d. 1943.
BUTLER, SIR (SPENCER) HARCOURT: b. 1869; Governor of U.P.; educ., Harrow, and Balliol College, Oxford; entered Indian Civil Service, 1890; Lt.-Governor of Burma, 1915-18; Lt.-Governor of U.P., 1918-21; Governor of U.P., 1921-23; Governor of Burma, 1923-27; d. 1938.

CHELMSFORD, FREDERICK JOHN NAPIER THESSIGER, 3rd BARON & 1st VISCOUNT: b. 1868; Viceroy of India; educ., Winchester, and Magdalen College, Oxford; called to Bar, 1893; Governor of Queensland, 1905-9; Governor of New South Wales, 1909-13; Viceroy of India, 1916-21; First Lord of Admiralty, 1924; d. 1933.

CHOTANI, SETH MILAN MUHAMMAD HAJEE JAN MUHAMMAD: millionaire timber merchant and pan-Islamist from Bombay; rendered signal service to the Allies during the World War I by his gift of millions of tons of timber and contributions to war effort; closely associated with Abdul Bari through his (Chotani's) piri Syed Ibrahim Saif-ud-din, a friend of the former; helped form the Bombay Khilafat Committee, 1919; made huge contributions to the Khilafat funds; President, CKC, 1919-23; member, Congress Working Committee, 1920-21; member, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921; President, Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922; resigned from the Presidency of the CKC owing to the funds scandal, 1923, and retired to live a secluded life with virtually no money.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON, GEORGE NATHANIEL CURZON: b. 1859; Secy. of State for Foreign Affairs; educ., Eton, and Balliol College, Oxford; M.P. for Southport, 1886-98; Under-Secy. of State for India, 1891-92; and for Foreign Affairs, 1895-98; Viceroy of India, 1899-1905; Secy. of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919-24; d. 1925.

DAQODI, SHAHEEN: b. 1879; zamindar and lawyer from Patna; educ., Calcutta University; took part in the Khilafat movement and suspended legal practice in 1920; sentenced for one year, 1921; MLA since 1924; President, CKC, 1928; d. 1946.

DARYABAD, ABDUL MAJID: b. 1892; prominent alim and journalist from Daryabad; educ., Canning College, Lucknow, MAO College, Aligarh, and St. Stephen's College, Delhi; worked in Translation Bureau, Osmania University, Hyderabad, 1913-18; Fellow, Osmania University, 1919-23; member, GOC until 1928; was associated with Hamdam (Lucknow) and Mohamed Ali's Hamdam; editor, Sique (Lucknow), an Urdu journal of religion.

DAS, CHITTA RANJAN: b. 1870; Bengali lawyer and politician from Calcutta; barrister of Calcutta High Court; entered politics, 1917; first opposed and then allied himself with Gandhi, 1920-22; President, INC, 1921; leader of the 'pro-change' faction and formed with Motilal Nehru, T.A.K. Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman the Swaraj Party, 1923; d. 1925.

DWARKADAS, JAMNADAS: b. 1890; Liberal politician and Home Ruler of the Besant school from Bombay; educ., Bombay University; member, Bombay Corporation, 1917-21; member Council of Indian Merchants' Chamber, 1918-25; President, Bombay National Home Rule League; MLA.

FAZL-I-HUSAIN, Mian (SIR): b. 1877; barrister and politician from Lahore; educ., Govt. College, Lahore, and Christ's College, Cambridge; called to Bar, Gray's Inn, 1901; practiced law at Sialkot, 1901-5; moved to Lahore and practiced at High Court and Chief Court, 1905-20; Minister of the Punjab Govt. with short interruptions, 1921-30; d. 1936.

FAZUL HAQ, ABUL KASEM: b. 1873; Muslim lawyer and politician from Barisal in Bengal; educ., Calcutta University; practiced law for some years; Govt. servant for seven years but resigned to resume practice; MLC, Bengal, 1913-
20; President, Bengal Muslim League, 1916-21; Gen.-Secy., INC, 1918; President, AIML Delhi session, 1918; opposed non-co-operation, 1920-22; Minister of Education, Bengal, 1924; d. 1962.

GAIT, SIR EDWARD ALBERT: b. 1863; Lt.-Governor of Bihar and Orissa; educ., University College, London; entered ICS, 1882; career in Assam and Bengal until appointed Member, Executive Council, Bihar and Orissa, 1912-15; Lt.-Governor, Bihar and Orissa, 1915-20; Member, Council of India, 1922-27; d. 1950.

GANDHI, MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND: b. 1869; Gujarati Banya barrister, journalist and politician; editor, Young India; educ., Rajkot, Bhavnagar and London; called to Bar, 1889; practiced as barrister in South Africa for seventeen years; gave up practice to lead 'passive resistance' campaign on behalf of Indian settlers, 1908; returned to India, 1915; leading figure of INC till his assassination in 1948.

GAHFFAR, QAZI MUHAMMAD ABDUL: b. 1888; journalist and politician from Moradabad; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; for some time in Govt. service; resigned to join Mohamed Ali’s Hamdard; founded Jamhur (Calcutta), and after its suppression, Subah (Delhi), and later, Payam (Hyderabad); Gen.-Secy., AIML, 1918; editor, Akhbarwat, 1919; Secy. to Chotani during his visit to Britain with the non-official Khilafat delegation, 1921; special Rep. of the OKC to Ismet Pasha in Switzerland to plead for the restoration of the Caliph’s temporal power, 1922; d. 1955.

GOUR, (SIR) HARI SINGH: b. 1866; barrister and politician from Nagpur, C.P.; educ., Nagpur, Downing College, Cambridge, and Inner Temple, London (LL.D., 1905); leader of the opposition, 1921-34; d. 1949.

GRANT, SIR (ALFRED) HAMILTON: b. 1872; Chief Commissioner of the Frontier; educ., Fettes College, Edinburgh, and Balliol College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1895; career in the Frontier until appointed Foreign Secy. to Govt. of India, 1914-19; negotiated Peace Treaty with Afghanistan, 1919; Chief Commissioner, N.W.F.P., 1919-21; d. 1937.

HAQ, MAZHAR-UL-HAQ: b. 1886; Bihari barrister and politician; called to English Bar, 1891; practiced at Calcutta and Bankipore; founder-member, AIML and its President, 1915; organised Khilafat movement in Bihar, 1919-24; d. 1930.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST, CHARLES HARDINGE, 1st BARON: b. 1858; Viceroy of India and later Under-Secy. of State for Foreign Affairs; educ., Harrow, and Trinity College, Cambridge; entered diplomatic service, 1880; Ambassador at Petrograd, 1904-6; Permanent Under-Secy. of State for Foreign Affairs, 1906-10 & 1916-20; Viceroy of India, 1910-16; British Ambassador to Paris, 1920-23; d. 1944.

HARCOM, SETH HAJI (SIR) ABDOOLA: b. 1872; leading businessman and politician from Karachi; organised the Khilafat movement in Sindh; made huge contributions to the Khilafat funds; President, All-India Muslim Conference; member, Council AIML; d. 1942.

HASAN, YAKUB: b. 1875; journalist and politician from Madras; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; came to Madras from Bangalore in 1901; conducted an Urdu weekly journal Kaumi Halchal and an English weekly journal Muslim Patriot for few years; visited Europe, 1912; nominated Member of Madras Corporation for several years; member, AIML deputation to Britain re Reforms and Khilafat, 1919; conducted Islamic Information Bureau and its journal, Muslim Outlook (London), along with Kidwai and Isphahani; returned to India, 1920; twice went to prison; d. 1940.
HASSAN, (SHAIKH-UL-HIND) MAHMUD; b. 1851; leading pan-Islamist alim and Principal of Deoband; educ., Deoband; on graduation joined its teaching staff, 1873; became its Principal, 1890; launched an unobstructive anti-British pro-Turkish political activity, 1911; moved to the Hedjaz with his associates to avoid arrest, 1915; arrested by Sharif Hussain at the instance of the British, 1916; interned at Malta, 1917-20; returned to India, June 1920; joined the Khilafat movement and gave sanction to the non-co-operation experiment; d. Nov. 1920.

HASSAN NIZAMI, KHWAJA SYED MUHAMMAD ALI; b. 1878; Sajjadah Nashin, Sufi pir and journalist from Delhi; educ., privately at Delhi and Gargosh; became pir after baish with Pir Mihir Ali Shah, 1908; founded the journal Nizam-ul-Masheikh; travelled in the Middle East, 1911; took part in the Cawnpore Mosque affair, 1913; went to Meemut and founded Tauheed, 1913; returned to Delhi after the suppression of his journal by the Govt., but was kept under police surveillance, 1914-17; took part in the Khilafat movement and the Hedjaz affair, 1919-26; d. 1957.

HASRAT MOHANI, SYED PAZL-UL-HASAN; b. 1878/80; pan-Islamist journalist, poet and politician from Mohan, Dist. Unao, U.P.; sttled at Cawnpore; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; founder-editor, Urdu weekly Urdu-i-Mualla, 1903; interned for political activities, 1908-9 & 1916-19; closely associated with Abdul Bari who was his preceptor; member, CKC, 1919-28; member, Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC, 1920-22; President, AIML, 1921; opposed CKC's pro-Ibn Saud policy, 1925-26; d. 1951.

HOSSAIN, SYUD; journalist and politician from Calcutta; the youngest son of Nawab Syed Mohammed of Dacca and Calcutta; was on the staff of Bombay Chronicle, 1917-19; editor, Independent (Allahabad), 1919-21; married Motilal Nehru's daughter (Vijaya Lakshami) but forced to divorce her at Gandhi's intervention; member, Khilafat delegation to Europe, 1920; settled in America and did not return to India until 1946.

IMAM, SYED HASAN; b. 1871; Bihari lawyer and politician; educ., Patna and England; called to Bar, Middle Temple, 1892; practiced at Patna and Calcutta until 1911; Judge of Calcutta High Court, 1911-16; resumed practice at Patna; President, INO, 1918; President, All-India Home Rule League; member, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921; d. 1933.

IQBAL, DR. (SIR) MUHAMMAD; b. 1876; poet-philosopher, barrister and politician settled in Lahore; educ., Govt. College, Lahore, Trinity College, Cambridge, and Munich University; joined staff of Oriental College, Lahore, 1904; qualified Bar from London; joined staff of Govt. College, Lahore; resigned to practice law at Lahore High Court; MLC, Punjab, 1926; d. 1938.

IYENGAR, S. KASTURI RANGA; b. 1859; journalist and politician from Madras; editor, Hindu (Madras) since 1905; educ., Presidency College, Madras; practiced law at Coimbatore and at Madras, 1885-1905; member, AICC and President of Madras Provincial Congress Committee; d. 1923.

IYENGAR, S. SRINIVASA; b. 1874; Advocate from Madras; educ., Madras and Presidency College, Calcutta; Advocate and member, Bar Council, Madras, 1912-16; member, AICC; MLC, Madras; Advocate-General, 1916-20; d. 1941.

JAFFER, KHAN BAHADUR SIR EBRAMLIM HAROON; b. 1881; Memon landlord, businessman and politician from Poona; educ., Deccan College, Poona; President and Trustee of various anjumans; Special Magistrate, 1906-18; organised Bombay Presidency Muslim League, 1908; MLC, Bombay, 1916-19; President, All-India Muslim Conference, Lucknow, 1919; MLC, 1919-20; MCS, 1921-25 and 1926-30; d. 1930.
JAYAKAR, MUKUND RAMRAO: b. 1873; Bombay lawyer and politician; educ., Elphinstone High School and College, Bombay; practiced as barrister at Bombay High Court; entered politics, 1916; leader of the Swaraj Party in Bombay Legislative Council, 1923-25; resigned from the Congress, 1925; MLA, 1926-30; d. 1959.

JINNAH, MUHAMMAD ALI: b. 1876; barrister and politician from Bombay; educ., Mission School, Karachi, and Lincoln's Inn, London; called to Bar, 1896; practiced first at Karachi and then enrolled as Advocate at Bombay High Court, 1897; MLA, 1910; joined AIML, 1913; principal negotiator of Lucknow Pact with the Congress, 1916; President, AIML, 1916, 1920 & 1934-48; President, Home Rule League, Bombay, 1917-20; leader, AIML delegation to Britain re Reforms and Khilafat, 1919; first Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-48; d. 1948.

KHALIQUZZAMAN, CHOUDHRY: b. 1889; lawyer and politician from Lucknow; educ., Lucknow, and MAO College, Aligarh; came under the influence of the Ali brothers, 1909; member, Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey, 1912-13; took his law degree, 1916; started legal practice at Lucknow, 1917; member, AICC, 1917; Joint Secy, AIML, 1918; gave up legal practice, 1920; interned, 1921-22; re-joined AIML, 1924; d. 1973.

KHAN, HAKIM AJMAL: b. 1867; leading practitioner of unani system of medicine and pan-Islamic politician from Delhi; educ., privately; founder-member, AIML; helped strengthen political alignment between politicians and ulama, 1906-19; President, AIML, 1919; Vice-President, CKC, 1919-25; President, INC, 1921; member, Congress and Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committees, 1922; travelled in Europe, and Near and Middle East, 1925-26; d. 1927.

KHAN, NAVAB ISMAIL: barrister and politician from Meerut but settled in Aligarh; favourite son of Nawab Ishaq Khan, Socy., MAO College, Aligarh; educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and London; organised Khilafat movement in U.P.; President, U.P. Khilafat Committee; member, CKC, 1919-28; member, Khilafat Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922; d. 1958.

KHAN, SAHIBZADA AFTAB AHMAD: b. 1867; Kakarzai Pathan barrister and politician settled in Aligarh; educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and Cambridge; called to Bar, 1893; started practice at Aligarh, 1894; joined staff of MAO College, Aligarh, 1897; founder-member, AIML; MLA, U.P., 1909-12; opposed the Lucknow Pact, 1916; pleaded Indian Muslim case on the Khilafat issue before the Council of Four, 1919; Member, India Council, 1917-24; Vice-Chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1923-27; d. 1930.

KHAN, ZAFAR ALI: b. 1873; Punjabi journalist and politician; editor, Zamindar (Lahore); educ., Wazirabad, Patiala, and MAO College, Aligarh; for some time worked on the staff of Times of India (Bombay); afterwards served in Hyderabad state; visited Britain and Constantinople, 1913; interned at Kamtabad for pro-Turkish activities, 1914-19; revived Zamindar, April 1920; supported the hijrat, 1920; sentenced to five years' imprisonment for 'seditious' speeches, Nov. 1920; after release was involved in the Hedjaz affair and Hindu-Muslim factionalism, 1925-27; d. 1956.

KHAN (OF BAREILLY), AHMAD RAZA: Head of the Bareilly School of ulama; educ., privately; completed his studies, 1869; did beist at the hand of Shah Ali-Raouf Mahravi, 1877; visited Mecca and other sanctuaries, 1878; opposed the Khilafat movement and its non-co-operation experiment; d. 1921.

KHAN (TIWANA), MALIK MOHAMMED UMAR HAYAT: b. 1874; prominent Muslim landholder of the Punjab (Shahpur Dist.); educ., Chiefs' College, Lahore; served World War I, 1914-15 (Despatches six times); Afghan War, 1919; MLA,
Punjab for two terms; Member, Viceroy's Council since 1910; opposed the non-co-operation experiment and successfully contested election for Council of State, 1920; d. 1944.

KIDWAI (OF GALIA), MOSHIR HUSAIN: b. 1878; zamindar, barrister and pan-Islamist politician from Barabanki (U.P.); educ., Lucknow and London; Secy., Pan-Islamic Society of London, 1903-7 and later of the Central Islamic Society, 1907-20; awarded by Sultan Abdul Hamid II the 'Usmania' medal for his services to pan-Islamic cause, 1906; closely associated with Abdul Bari through his pir Haji Waris Ali Shah, a friend of the former; helped establish Anjuman-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1913; conducted the Islamic Information Bureau and managed Muslim Outlook (London); advised the establishment of the Khilafat committees and funds in India; returned to India, 1920; President, Oudh Khilafat Committee since 1920; called for the abolition of the Khilafat committees after the funds scandal, 1923; supported King Hussain's claim to Khilafat, 1924.

KIFAYATULLAH, MUFIT: b. 1875; prominent alim of Ahl-i-Hadis and Head of Aminya Madrasa, Delhi; first President of Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind, 1919; took leading part in the Khilafat movement and went to prison; d. 1952.

KITCHLEW, DR. SAIF-UD-DIN: b. 1884; barrister and politician from Amritsar; educ., India, Cambridge and Germany (Ph.D. Munster University, 1912); started legal practice at Rawalpindi, 1913; moved to Amritsar, 1915; took prominent part in 'Rowlatt' Satyagraha, 1919; sentenced to life imprisonment by Martial Law Commission but released under Amnesty, Dec. 1919; took leading part in the Khilafat movement and gave up practice, 1920; member, Non-Co-Operation Committee of the CKC, 1920-21; interned for supporting the Karachi Resolutions, 1921-23; conducted the Tanzim campaign, 1924-27; d. 1963.

KUNZRU, PANDIT HARIDAYANATH: b. 1887; Liberal politician from U.P.; MLC, U.P., for several years; President, National Liberal Federation.

LLOYD, SIR GEORGE AMBROSE (later 1st BARON LLOYD OF DOLOBRAN): b. 1879; Governor of Bombay; educ., Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge; Hon. Attache, Constantinople; served World War I, 1914-18 (Despatches six times); Conservative M.P., 1910-18; Governor of Bombay, 1918-23; M.P., 1924-25; d. 1941.

LLOYD GEORGE, DAVID (later 1st EARL LLOYD GEORGE OF DYWFOR): b. 1863; Prime Minister of Britain; educ., Llanystumdwy Church School and privately; solicitor, 1864; Liberal M.P., 1890-31; President of the Board of Trade, 1905-8; Minister of Munitions, 1915-16; Secy. of State for War, 1916; Prime Minister, 1916-22; d. 1945.

MACLAGAN, SIR EDWARD DOUGLAS: b. 1864; Governor of the Punjab; educ., Winchester, and New College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1885; Secy. to Govt. of India, Revenue and Agriculture Dept., 1910-14; and of Edu. Dept., 1915-18; Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, 1919-21; Governor, 1921-24; d. 1952.

MAJNI, HUSAIN AHMAD: b. 1879; Deobandi alim and an associate of Mahmud Hassan; educ., Deoband, 1891-99; joined its teaching staff on graduation; emigrated to Medina in the Hejaz and acquired Ottoman citizenship, 1902; joined Mahmud Hassan in his pan-Islamic schemes, 1915-16; arrested along with his leader and three other associates, 1916; interned at Malta by the British, 1917-20; returned to India, 1920; joined the Khilafat movement and interned for supporting the Karachi Resolutions, 1921-23; d. 1957.

MAHMUDABAD: SIR MOHAMED ALI MOHAMMAD KHAN, RAJA (later MAHARAJA) OF: b. 1877; rich Shia landlord and politician from Lucknow; educ., privately; entered politics, 1909; MLC, 1909-20; President, AIML, 1913-18; Home Member, U.P., 1920-23; first Vice-Chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1920-23; d. 1931.
MALAVIYA, PANDIT MADAN MOHAN: b. 1861; U.P. lawyer and politician with pronounced Hindu feeling; educ., Muir Central College, Allahabad; enrolled as vakil at Allahabad High Court, 1892; MLC, U.P., 1902-12; MLC, 1910-20; President, INC, 1909, 1918 & 1932; MLA, 1924-30; President, Hindu Mahasabha, 1923-25; d. 1946.

MONTAGU, EDWIN (SAMUEL): b. 1879; Secy. of State for India; educ., Clifton, City of London School, and Trinity College, Cambridge; Liberal M.P., 1906-22; Parliamentary Under-Secy. of State for India, 1910-14; Financial Secy. to Treasury, 1914-16; Minister of Munitions, 1916; Secy. of State for India, 1917-22; d. 1924.

NADVI, SYED SULAIMAN: b. 1884; pan-Islamist alim and journalist from U.P.; educ., Phulwari, Madrassa Imdadiyya, Darbhanga, and Nadwat-ul-Ulama, Lucknow; graduated, 1906; influenced by Shibli in his literary style and political ideas; edited An Nadwa, 1912; founded Dar-ul-Musannifin, Azamgarh, 1914; joined staff of Deccan College, Poona, 1915; member, Khilafat delegation to Europe, 1920; and of delegation to the Hedjaz, 1924-25; d. 1953.

NEHRU, PANDIT JAWAHARLAL: b. 1889; Allahabad barrister and son of Motilal Nehru; educ., Harrow, and Trinity College, Cambridge; called to Bar, Inner Temple, 1912; Advocate, Allahabad High Court; Secy., Home Rule League, Allahabad, 1918; member, AICC since 1918; imprisoned on several occasions for political activities; d. 1964.

NEHRU, PANDIT MOTILAL: b. 1861; lawyer and politician from Allahabad and father of Jawaharlal Nehru; educ., Muir College, Allahabad; practiced as vakil, 1883-95; enrolled as Advocate, Allahabad High Court, 1895; President, INC, 1919 & 1928; suspended legal practice in pursuance of non-co-operation, 1920; imprisoned for six months, 1921-22; formed with C.R. Das the Swaraj Party, 1923; MLA, 1923-24; resumed legal practice, 1925; d. 1931.

NIZAM OF HYDERABAD, NAWAB MIR SIR USMAN ALI KHAN BAHADUR: b. 1886; considered to be one of the richest men of the world; educ., privately; succeeded, 1911; granted title of 'Faithful Ally of the British Government' and hereditary style of His Exalted Highness, 1918; Chancellor of the Muslim University, Aligarh; d. 1967.

O'LYONER, SIR MICHAEL: b. 1864; Lt.-Governor of the Punjab; educ., St. Stanisians College, Tullamore, and Balliol College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1885; career in Northern and Central India until appointed Agent in Central India, 1910-12; Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, 1913-19; d. 1940.

PAL, BIPIN CHANDRA: b. 1858; Bengali journalist and politician and editor of Bandh Matram; educ., Presidency College, Calcutta; joined Brahmo Samaj, 1877; joined INC, 1886; imprisoned for 'sedition', 1911; opposed—supported—opposed the Khilafat movement and its non-co-operation experiment; d. 1932.

PATEL, VALLABHBHAI JHAVERBHAI: b. 1875; Patidar Gujarati lawyer and younger brother of Vithabhai Patel; educ., Nadiad and Bardwan; called to Bar, Middle Temple, 1913; practiced law at Allahabad; entered politics, 1916; Gandhi's confidant in Gujarat; d. 1950

PATEL, VITHALBHAI JHAVERBHAIS: b. 1870; Gujarati barrister and elder brother of Vallabhbhai Patel; practiced law at Bombay High Court; MLA, Bombay, 1914; MLA, 1923; President, Legislative Assembly, 1925-30; d. 1933.

PEEL, WILLIAM ROBERT WELLESLEY PEEL, 1st EARL and 2nd VISCOUNT: b. 1867; Secy. of State for India; educ., Harrow, and Balliol College, Oxford; called to Bar, Inner Temple, 1893; M.P., 1900-12; Under-Secy. of State for War, 1919-21; Minister of Transport (unpaid), 1921-22; Secy. of State for India, 1922-24 & 1928-29; d. 1937.
PHULWARI, SHAH MUHAMMAD SULATMAN: b. 1859; leading Qadariyya pir and pan-Islamist alim from Phulwari and a close associate of Abdul Bari; educ., Farangi Mahal, Lucknow, and the Hedjaz (1885-86), where famous Indian emigré alim Haji Imdadullah was one of his teachers; visited Mesopotamia, 1920; took leading part in the Khilafat movement and non-co-operation; d. 1935.

PICKTHALL, MARMADUKE WILLIAM: b. 1875; English Muslim pan-Islamist; son of Rev. Charles Grayson Pickthall, Rector of Chillesford in Suffolk; educ., Harrow-Neuchatel; studying French; unsuccessfully tried to get into the British Foreign Office; travelled in Near and Middle East several times; conducted the Islamic Information Bureau with Kidwai and others until 1920; same year went to India to conduct propaganda at the invitation of the CKC; editor, Bombay Chronicle, 1920-24; entered Nizam's education service, 1925; managed Islamic Culture (Hyderabad), 1926; d. 1936.

QURESHI, SHOAIB: b. 1891; journalist and pan-Islamist politician from U.P.; educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and Oxford; member, All-India Medical Mission to Turkey, 1912-13; was a link between Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers during the latter's internment, 1915-19; took part in the Khilafat movement and went to prison, 1921; editor, New Era (Lucknow), and Young India; member, Khilafat delegation to the Hedjaz, 1924-25; and to the World Muslim Congress, Moscow, 1926; d. 1962.

READING, RUFUS DANIEL ISAACS, 1ST MARQUESS OF: b. 1860; Viceroy of India; educ., University College, London, and Brussels and Hanover; Bench of Middle Temple, 1904; M.P., 1904-13; Solicitor-General, 1910; Attorney-General, 1910-13; Lord Chief Justice of England, 1913-21; Special Envoy to Washington, 1917; & Ambassador to Washington, 1918-19; Viceroy of India, 1921-26; d. 1935.

RAHMTOOLA, SIR IBRAHIM: b. 1862; Bombay businessman and politician; elected Member of Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1892; became its President, 1899; MLC, Bombay, 1899-1909; MLC, 1912; Member, Education and Local Self Govt., 1918-23; President, Fiscal Commission, 1921-22; President, Legislative Council, Bombay, 1923-28; d. 1942.

RAI, LALA LALPAT: b. 1865; Punjabi lawyer, Arya Samajist and politician; deported from India, 1907; returned to India, 1920; joined the non-co-operation campaign, 1920-22; President, INC (Special session), Sept. 1920; joined communal politics, 1923-28; d. 1928.

RAJAGOPALACHARI, C.S: b. 1878; Tamil Brahmin lawyer and politician from Salem; educ., Central College, Bangalore, and Presidency College, Madras; participated in 'Rowlatt' Satyagraha, 1919; Secy., INC, 1920; and later member of its Working Committee; led the 'no-change' faction in support of Gandhi's policy, 1923-26; d. 1972.

RONALDSHAY, LAWRENCE JOHN LUMLEY DUNDAS, LORD (later 2ND MARQUESS OF ZETLAND): b. 1876; Governor of Bengal; educ., Harrow, and Trinity College, Cambridge; extensive travels in the East, 1898-1907; M.P., 1907-16; Governor of Bengal, 1917-22; d. 1961.

SANAULLAH AMRITSARI, ABUL WAF\: b. 1868; leading Ahl-i-Hadis alim from the Punjab and a pupil of Mahmud Hassan; educ., Deoband and Madrassa Faiz-i-Aam, Cawnpore; graduated, 1892; founded Ahl-i-Hadis (Amritsar), 1903; member, CKC, 1919-28; founder-member, Janiyat-Ulama-i-Hind; and its President at the Calcutta session, 1925; d. 1948.

SASTRI, V.S. SRINIVASA: b. 1869; Madras politician; educ., Govt. College, Kumbakonam; joined Servants of India Society, Poona, 1907; MLC, Madras, 1913; MLC, 1916-20; elected to the Council of State, 1920; opposed non-co-operation; d. 1946.
SHAFI, KHAN BAHADUR SIR MUHAMMAD: b. 1869; Lahore barrister and politician; educ., Govt. College, Lahore, and Middle Temple, London; called to Bar, 1892; practiced law at Allahabad and Lahore High Courts; President, AIML, 1913 & 1927; MLC, Punjab, and MLGC, 1909-19; Educ. Member, Viceroy’s Executive Council, 1919-22; Vice-President of the Council, 1922-24; Law Member, 1923-24; Pro-Chancellor, Delhi University, 1922-25; d. 1932.

SHERRWANI, TASSADUQ AHMAD KHAN: leading barrister and politician from Aligarh; educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and London; Home Rule Leaguer, 1917; member, AICC, 1919; Councilor, AIML; member, OKC, 1919-28; gave up practice in pursuance of non-co-operation, 1920; courted imprisonment, 1921; founder-member and Additional Secy., Swaraj Party, 1923.

SIDDIQUI (SINDHI), ABDUR RAHMAN: journalist and politician originally from Sind but spent his life-time in Calcutta and Delhi; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; member, Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey, 1912-13; sub-editor, Comrade; editorial Board, New Era (Lucknow), 1916-17; and Muslim Outlook (London), 1920-21; special Rep. of CKC to Ismet Pasha to plead for the restoration of the Caliph's temporal power, 1922; involved in business in Britain in 1920s and 1930s.

SIDDIQUI, OBEIDULLAH: b. 1872; prominent alim associate of Mahmud Hassan and emigre pan-Islamist revolutionary; born of Sikh parents he became a Muslim in 1887; educ., Deoband; worked for Jamiat-ul-Ansar of Mahmud Hassan; left Deoband for Delhi to start Nazarat-ul-Muarif with Ajmal Khan and Nawab Vigar-ul-Mulk, 1912; hijrat to Kabul, 1915; joined Mahendra Pratap's 'Provisional Government of India', 1915; 'Silk Letter Conspiracy', 1916; member, Kabul Hijrat Committee, 1920; left Kabul for Moscow, 1922; reached Turkey, 1923; visited Mecca, 1926; allowed to return to India, 1937; d. 1944.

SINHA OF RAIPUR, SIR SATYENDRA PRASANO SINHA: 1st BARON: b. 1864; educ., Presidency College, Calcutta; called to Bar, Lincoln's Inn, 1886; Standing Counsel, Govt. of India, 1903; Advocate-General, Bengal, 1907-9 & 1915-17; a Rep. of India in Imperial War Conference, 1917; Member, Imperial War Cabinet, 1918; Under-Secy. of State for India, 1919-20; Governor of Bihar and Orissa, 1920-21; d. 1928.

SLY, SIR FRANK GEORGE: b. 1866; Governor of C.P.; educ., Balliol College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1885; career in various capacities until appointed Chief Commissioner, C.P., 1919; Governor of C.P., 1921-25; d. 1928.

TILAK, BAL GANGADHAR: b. 1856; leading Brahmin journalist and politician from Poona; opposed Govt. intervention in Hindu social practices; leader of extreme wing of INC; jailed for 'sedition', 1897-98 & 1908-14; supported war effort, 1914; rejoined INC after exclusion by Moderates, 1916; d. 1920.

VINCENT, SIR WILLIAM HENRY HOARE: b. 1866; Home Member, Govt. of India; educ., Christ College, Brecon, and Trinity College, Dublin; entered ICS, 1887; served in various executive and judicial capacities until appointed Member of Viceroy's Council, 1917; Vice-President of the Council, 1921; Member, India Council, 1923-31; d. 1941.

WILLINGDON, FREEMAN FREEMAN-THOMAS, 1st MARQUESS OF: b. 1866; Governor of Madras; educ., Eton, and Trinity College, Cambridge; Liberal M.P., 1900-6; Lord of Treasury, 1905-12; Governor of Bombay, 1913-19; Governor of Madras, 1919-24; delegate for India at the Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1924; Governor-General of Canada, 1926-31; Viceroy of India, 1931-36; d. 1941.
UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

(i) PRIVATE PAPERS:


Curzon Papers. Papers of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919-24. PRO, F.O. 800.


Hardinge Papers. Papers of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst as Viceroy of India, 1910-16; and Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1916-20. Cambridge University Library MSS.

Lloyd George Papers. Papers of David Lloyd George (later Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor) as Prime Minister of Britain, 1916-22. Beaverbrook Library (London) MSS.


(ii) OFFICIAL PAPERS:

(a) India Office Records:

Records of the Government of India and the India Office:

Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received from India (L/P&S/7);
Political and Secret Subject Files (L/P&S/10); Political and Secret Department Regular Series Files (L/P&S/11); Political and Secret Memoranda (L/P&S/16);
Political and Secret Department Library Series; Judicial and Public Department Files, 1919-24; India Confidential Home Political Proceedings, 1918-21; and Record Department: Native Newspaper Reports (L/R/15).
(b) **Public Record Office:**

Records of the British Cabinet and the Foreign Office:

- **Cabinet Files, Series CAB:** 23 (Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions); 27 (Cabinet Committees: General Series); 29 (War Cabinet: Allied and International Conferences); and 42 (War Cabinet: Papers of the War Council, Dardanelles Committee and War Committee).

- **Foreign Office Files, Series 78 (Turkey: General Correspondence); 141 (Egypt: Embassy and Consular Archives); and 371 (General Correspondence: Political).**

(iii) **MISCELLANEOUS:**

(a) **Sundry Manuscripts:**

Letters, written during the 1914-18 war, to the Nizam of Hyderabad and other Indian Princes by Theobald von Bethman-Hollweg, the German Chancellor. Also letter from Raja Mahendra Pratap to Indian Princes. I.O. MSS Eur. E. 204, 209, 247 and Photo Eur. 33.

List of newspapers and pamphlets designed to foment disturbances in India and Egypt and in other oriental dependencies of the Allies, to incite mutiny in their native armies, to foster pan-Islamism or to create pro-German sentiments in oriental countries. Compiled in the War Office, M.I. 5. I.O. MSS Eur. E. 288/1.


(b) **Theses:**


(c) Seminar Paper:

(d) Interviews:
Interview with Malik Lal Khan, ex-Secretary, Punjab Khilafat Committee, at Lahore in September 1966.
Interview with Maulana Jamal Mian, the only son of Abdul Bari, at London in August 1969.

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