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LEE NGOK

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The Chinese Communist Bases (ken-chü-ti) in North
China, 1938-1943 : A Study of Their Growth and
Anti-Japanese Activities, with Special Reference to
Administration and Mass Mobilization Programmes
at the Village Level,

submitted for

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

the University of London

by

LEE Ngok,

1968.

Abstract

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established behind the Japanese lines four bases in north China which eventually became the main source of strength for the Communist victory over the KMT in 1949. In these bases the party played the leading role in uniting all anti-Japanese forces, and bringing the army under control, while good coordination was also maintained between the party headquarters in Yen-an and the sub-bureaux behind the Japanese lines.

The thesis shows that up to 1940 was a period of expansion, when the Communists succeeded in extending their control into the village, putting tenants and poor peasants in key positions to counteract the influence of the landlords. Mass mobilization programmes were also successful. In 1941-1942, the bases suffered a recession, however, as a result of tremendous Japanese military and economic pressure. In face of this threat, the CCP adopted a policy of retrenchment. With the launching of the Rectification Campaign in February 1942, the Communist position in the bases was strengthened, and reform programmes made the party better equipped to reassert its leadership. Mass mobilization was emphasized and the village became the base for the launching of important campaigns like those for the reduction of rent and interest, which succeeded by 1943 in arousing peasant political consciousness and effecting tremendous expansion in the organization of the people's armed forces of various descriptions, and the production teams. Japanese setbacks in the Pacific contributed further to Communist expansion, and by 1945, the CCP had become the dominant power in rural north China.

CONTENTS

| Chapter | | |
|---------|---|-----|
| | Abstract | i |
| | Contents | ii |
| | Abbreviations | iii |
| | Acknowledgements | iv |
| I | Introduction | 1 |
| II | A General Survey of CCP Bases in North China | 28 |
| III | Village Administration and Mass Mobilization in the Pre-Cheng Feng Period (1938-January 1942) | 62 |
| IV | Japanese and Puppet Measures against the CCP Bases, Especially at the Village Level, 1938-1942 | 119 |
| V | Party Leadership at the Upper Level, 1942-1943 | 178 |
| VI | Party Leadership at the Village Level, 1942-1943 | 216 |
| | Conclusion | 277 |
| | Appendices | 286 |
| | Bibliography | 291 |
| | Glossary | 329 |

Abbreviations

| | |
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| CCP | Chinese Communist Party |
| CCPCC | Chinese Communist Party Central Committee |
| <u>IMTFE</u> | International Military Tribunal for the Far East |
| KMT | Kuomintang |

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I am indebted to Professor W.G. Beasley , my supervisor, and Professor S.R. Schram, for valuable advice and needed criticism. I am also grateful to the library staff of the School of Oriental and African Studies for procuring microfilms from the United States of America.

LEE Ngok

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The period 1937-1945 in Chinese political history is both interesting and intricate. Basically, the period was dominated by Japan's invasion of China from the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which marked the beginning of eight years of undeclared war between China and Japan. Thereafter the political situation inside China was complicated by the actions of the various parties involved in the war.

Japan as the invader in China set up various sponsored governments headed by Chinese politicians in the occupied area during the period 1937-1940. In March 1940, she succeeded in securing the cooperation of Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛, who had been the second most important figure in the Chinese government since the 1920s. Wang's National Government, set up on March 30, 1940, in Nanking, claimed central control in the occupied area, and his relations with Japan, especially in bargaining for self-government and autonomy, represent a fascinating and controversial aspect of the history of the occupied area

during the period under discussion.¹ In addition to this, Chinese resistance to Japanese invasion presented a picture of intriguing party politics, internal strife amongst the Chinese, and heroic defence against the invaders. It was Chiang Kai-shek's National Government which bore the brunt of the war in the first few months of the war, gradually retreating into the hinterland until it took shelter in Chungking in late 1938. In the meantime, negotiations with Japan were undertaken by Chiang's Government in 1937-1940² and contacts with Wang Ching-wei's government were also reported to have been maintained throughout the war.³

To add further complications, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emerged from the dark, grim days of the Long March (October 1934-October 1936) to play a decisive role in the anti-Japanese resistance movement. By July 1944, the CCP claimed control over

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1. Ngok Lee, The Later Career of Wang Ching-wei with Special Reference to His National Government's Co-operation with Japan, 1938-1945, (M.A. thesis, University of Hong Kong) 1966, 59-203.
 2. Ibid., 26-29, 88-110.
 3. Ch'en Kung-po 陳公博, Ch'en Kung-po tzu-pai shu chi ta-pien shu, 陳公博自白書及答辯書 (The Affidavit and Defence Document of Ch'en Kung-po), n.p., (private document, own pagination), 32-36. Ch'en Kung-po became president of the Nanking Government in late 1944 after the death of Wang Ching-wei.

one-fifth of the population and one-eighth of the total area of China. In addition, the CCP armed strength was put at 470,000 men, with a militia force of over 2,000,000, engaged in resisting 60% of the Japanese troops and 90% of the puppet troops.⁴ Although these figures may be exaggerated, they do not alter the fact that this tremendous expansion during the war contributed directly to the CCP's ability to challenge the authority of the KMT after the war and to take over the government in China in 1949.

There are two aspects to the study of the CCP's past role in the war. First, the CCP's direct role in the war involved resistance organizations and programmes against the Japanese and the puppets. In addition, the CCP was involved with the KMT in relations which ranged from an anti-Japanese alliance to open armed clashes during the whole span of the war. This thesis concentrates on the role of the CCP as the leader in organizing various nationalistic, anti-Japanese resistance programmes, which inevitably also contributed to

4. K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-k'uang 抗戰日華戰爭時期其日華解放區情況 (The State of the Liberated Areas during the Anti-Japanese War), Peking, jen-min ch'u-pan-she 人民出版社, 1953, I-4.

Communist expansion as a territorial power in China during the war. CCP-KMT relations will be dealt with only briefly. Investigations into CCP activities will be confined territorially to north China, where the area to be discussed will be referred to as the CCP bases, or ken-chü-ti 根據地, a term which needs to be distinguished from the general term guerrilla base, yu-chi-ch'ü 游擊區, which in CCP terminology refers to a region not as well established in armed strength and administrative position. Ken-chü-ti embodied guerrilla bases, in addition to a well-defined stronghold. In terms of time, the thesis will be limited to the period up to the end of 1943, as this year marked a well-defined turning point in the war situation in north China, with the CCP well on the way to undertaking the counter-offensives, which finally culminated in its being the master of north China territorially at the end of the war.

In regard to written work in English on the development of the CCP bases, there are some accounts by eye-witnesses during the war, like

Professor George Taylor, who has written The Struggle for North China (1940),⁵ and Michael Lindsay, who was in the bases 1942-1944, and wrote his North China Front in 1945.⁶ These works provide valuable information but by no means give a complete picture. In 1951, two additional works appeared. Boyd Compton in his introduction to Mao's China, Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944 gave a concise account of the bases against the background of party reforms.⁷ Professor Mary Wright has also written on the Chinese peasants and Communism, emphasizing the CCP's success in mobilizing and rallying the support of the peasantry, and its role as the leader of a peasant revolution.⁸ The most serious and recent work on the development of the CCP bases is

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5. George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940.
 6. Michael Lindsay, North China Front, London: H.M. Stationary Office and the China Campaign Committee, 1945.
 7. Boyd Compton (trans.), Mao's China, Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1952, xv-111.
 8. Mary C. Wright, "The Chinese Peasant and Communism", Pacific Affairs, XXIV (1951), 258-259.

Chalmers A. Johnson's Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, published in 1962.⁹ Heavily documented from Japanese military archives, Johnson's work investigates Mao Tse-tung's success in mobilizing the patriotic sentiments of the Chinese masses against the Japanese. In commenting on Johnson's work Professor S.R. Schram has said:

"He [Johnson] would have us believe that the acute consciousness of China as an historical and political reality ... [has] little or nothing to do with modern Chinese nationalism, which was somehow born ex nihilo in 1937. On the other hand, he maintains that resentment by the peasants at the economic injustices perpetrated on them by the landlords and the tax-collectors played only a marginal and negligible role in their decision to support the Communists..."¹⁰

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9. Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962.
 10. S.R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung: Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century, Penguin Books, 1966, 203.

Apparently it was insufficient research into the original CCP archives and documents, which led Johnson into arguing that Communist success in rallying popular support during the war was due more to the CCP's working with the peasantry in opposition to Japan, than to its acting on the peasantry's behalf as a champion against landlord exploitation.¹¹ One of the main themes of this thesis is to examine the importance of CCP leadership in the north China bases in rallying the support of the peasantry, and in championing the cause of its protégés, i.e., the tenants and the poor peasants. Whilst it cannot be denied that Japanese brutality during the war played a decisive

11. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 19: "... the Communists achieved their greatest popular following precisely during the period in which their unity policy was in effect. Clearly, their acting on the side of the peasantry --- i.e., their successful opposition to the Japanese invaders --- had become more important than their actions for the sake of the peasantry ...".

part in arousing peasant nationalism, it has to be emphasized that it was the CCP which directed such nationalistic sentiments into political channels through elaborate mass mobilization programmes and organization. It was the CCP's perseverance in championing the peasantry against the Japanese, and eliminating at least in part economic injustices suffered by the poor peasants, that were mainly responsible for its success with the masses. This phenomenon became especially apparent in the period 1942-1944, when the CCP reforms effected great progress in mass mobilization in the bases of north China.

The Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government and the Formulation of the United Front.

Before tracing the origin of the CCP bases in north China established in early 1938, it is necessary to examine the position of the CCP in 1935-1937, mainly because the bases in north China derived their source of strength and inspiration from the CCP Central Committee.

After dreary months making the trek of 6,000 miles, pursued by KMT troops, Mao and other CCP

military commanders arrived in Yen-an in northern Shensi with their Red Army contingents from October 1935 to October 1936,¹² and began to set up a base in northern Shensi. A point to note here is the significant position of northern Shensi as the CCP headquarters in relation to north China. Although Yen-an was by no means close to the eastern part of north China, it still had accessibility to most parts of the region, especially the western parts of Shansi. Had the CCP decided to make their trek further west during the Long March to Szechuan and Sikiang, then it would never have been able to conduct any effective anti-Japanese resistance movement in north China, or central China. This is because the CCP headquarters would then have been not only remote from, but also practically inaccessible to north China. It was in May 1935 at Mao Erh Kai 毛兒蓋, Szechuan, that the CCP at its last stage

12. Mao's contingent arrived at Yen-an in October 1935, whilst other contingents got there later on in 1936, and as late as October in that year. For details, see Jerome Ch'ên, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, Oxford University Press, paperback, 1967, 195-200.

of the Long March was confronted with an internal split over the decision as to where it should set up its headquarters. Mao commanding the First and Third Front Armies, making up the main strength of the CCP forces, favoured north-west China which was close to Mongolia and the U.S.S.R.. Chang Kuo-t'ao 張國燾 and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien 徐向前 commanding the Fourth Front Army preferred to make for the far west in Szechuan and Sikiang.¹³ Had Chang been able to

13. Miu Ch'u-huang 繆楚黃, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang Chien-yao li-shih 中國共產黨簡要歷史 (Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party), (First draft), Peking, Hsueh-hsi tsa-chih-she 學習雜誌社, 1957, 95-96; Hu Hua 胡華, Chung-kuo hsien-min-chu chu-i ko-ming-shih ts'an-k'ao tsu-liao 中國新民主主義革命史參考資料 (Reference Sources on the New Democratic Revolution in China), Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1951, 334-335. On the split within the CCP at Mao Erh Kai, the above accounts accused Chang Kuo-t'ao of cowardice in under-rating the strength of the CCP and in overestimating the KMT threat. Moreover, the CCP censured Chang for illegally setting up another central authority on the Szechuan-Sikiang border after the Mao Erh Kai split. For Chang Kuo-t'ao's explanation of the above split, see Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Chang Kuo-t'ao's letter to the people), K'ang-chan kuo-ts'e hsia chih chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang 抗戰國策下之中國共產黨 (The CCP during the period of Resistance), Kweilin, 1941, 27. Chang explained that Mao insisted on marching north to Shensi, believing that the Long March had been a success. On the other hand, Chang believed that the March had been a failure, and thought the Red Army needed time for recuperation, hence the necessity to retreat to Szechuan and Sikiang. According to Chang, this was the cause of the major dispute.

prevail upon Mao, then the anti-Japanese resistance movement in north China later on would not have achieved the same result.

As it was, Mao's Red Army contingents arrived in Yen-an in October 1935, where they joined forces with CCP commanders Kao Kang 高(嵩), and Liu Chih-tan 劉志丹, who had been fighting guerrilla war with local warlords, and championing the tenants and poor peasants since 1931.¹⁴ This rendezvous marked the beginning of a tremendous growth of CCP power which blossomed during the later years of the anti-Japanese resistance from 1943 to 1945. To re-establish party strength, the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government was set up with policies similar to those enforced in the period of the Kiangsi Soviet 1931-1934. Peasants were freed of all debts whilst land was re-distributed at the expense of landlords. The area was divided into four regions, namely, Shen-pei Shang 陝北省 (Northern Shensi province), Shen-Kan Shang 陝甘省

14. For a contemporary biography on Kao Kang, who joined the CCP in 1925 at the age of nine, see Chieh-fang jih-pao 簡報方文日報 (Liberation Daily) November 9, 1941. For activities of the CCP in the north-west before the arrival of the Red Armies from the south in 1935, see Mark Seldon, "The Guerrilla Movement in Northwest China (Part II)", The China Quarterly, No. 29, (January-March), 1967, 61-81.

(Shensi-Kansu province), Kuan-chung t'è-ch'ü
 關中特區 (The Special Region of Kuan Chung),
 and Shen-fu t'è-ch'ü 神府特區 (The Special
 Region of Shen-fu).¹⁵ The threat from the KMT
 still existed as Chiang Kai-shek organized in
 October 1936 his headquarters for the "exterm-
 ination of bandits" in Sian, the capital of
 Shensi, engaging his own Central Army, Chang
 Hsueh-liang's 張學良 North-eastern Army
 (Tung-pei chün) 東北軍, and Yang Hu-ch'eng's
 楊虎城 Shensi Army in attempts to strike
 at Yen-an. The assistance of Yen Hsi-shan 閻錫山,
 the governor of Shansi, and his army, was also

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15. For a short history of CCP activities in
 north-west China, see Kao Kang, Pien-ch'ü
tang-ti li-shih wen-ti chien-t'ao 邊區黨的歷史問題
 本區討論 (An examination of Questions concern-
 ing Party History in the Border Region),
 n.p., (CCP), 1943. This short work is a
 speech delivered by Kao at a high-level
 cadres' meeting in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
 Border Government, on November 17-18,
 1942. The Border Region assumed the
 official name of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
 Border Government, with approval from Chiang
 Kai-shek's government, in September 1937.

sought to complete the blockade of the CCP.¹⁶
 However, by the end of 1936, Mao and his Red Army had succeeded in setting up a permanent base in northern Shensi, from which he could strengthen CCP power, propagate Communist ideology, and inspire Communist insurgence in different parts of China. During the war 1937-1945, Yen-an became the vital centre of ideological inspiration and the brain for the formulation of party policies, providing uniform leadership for the anti-Japanese movement in north China, especially from 1942 onwards.¹⁷

16. Wang Chien-min 王健民, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang shih-kao, 中國共產黨史稿 (A draft History of the Chinese Communist Party), Taipei, 1965, II, 658 (Supplementary chart); Kao Yin-chu 高蔭祖, Chung-hua min-kuo ta-shih chi, 中華民國大事記 (A Chronology of Major Events in the Republic of China), Taipei, 1955, 409, 412. A detailed chart of the KMT troops employed against the CCP in October 1935 was given in Wang's work. Also see J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 202.

17. From February, 1942 to 1944, the CCP launched the Rectification Movement, having as one of its objectives party reforms, thus Yen-an became the centre of a campaign aiming at effective party leadership. For details, see chapters five and six.

As if fortune was beginning to smile on the CCP, the months December 1936 to April 1937 saw drastic changes in the political situation in China which turned out to be in the CCP's favour. During these few months, the CCP succeeded in prevailing upon Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his campaigns against Yen-an, and join with it in forming a United Front against the Japanese who had been encroaching upon north China since their occupation of Manchuria in September 1931. As early as January 1933, the CCP had already been advocating an anti-Japanese United Front, but Chiang Kai-shek was then all intent on attacking the Communist base in Kiangsi.¹⁸ On August 1, 1935, the CCP in a proclamation again called upon the people in China to form an anti-Japanese National Salvation Front.¹⁹ Later on, in the summer of 1936, Mao told Edgar Snow, the veteran journalist, of his

18. For the Communist advocacy of the United Front Policy in January 1931, see Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the New Democratic Revolution in China, 318; and John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1966, 351. For a summary of Chiang Kai-shek's five "CCP-extermination campaigns" 1930-1934, see Hu Hua, op. cit., 314-333.

19. For a full text of the August 1, 1935 declaration, see Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the New Democratic Revolution in China, 263-269.

willingness to cooperate with Chiang in order to resist the Japanese.²⁰

In view of the increasing threat from Japan by 1935 and 1936, and the resultant nationalistic sentiment aroused in China, the CCP appeal for a United Front began to get a good response from the public, especially since Chiang had implied in November 1935 that his government favoured compromise and toleration towards Japan.²¹ Demonstrations were launched and National Salvation Associations established in different parts of China aiming at active resistance against Japan.²² The situation became tense when military commanders began to respond to the prevailing national consciousness. From June to September, 1936, the military forces in Kwangsi and Kwangtung, south China, launched a campaign not only

20. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, Grove Press, New York, (first Black Cat Edition) 1961, 96-98.

21. In a report to the Fourth Plenary Session of the 5th KMT National Congress on foreign policy, Chiang made the following statement: "Peace is not to be given up unless there is absolutely no hope, and no sacrifice is to be made unless the final stage is reached". See Kao Yin-chu, Major Events in China, 412.

22. Shen Chün-yu 沈金鈞, et. al., T'uan-chieh yu-wu ti chi-ko chi-pen t'iao-chien yu tsui-ti yao-chiu (團結抗日的幾個基本條件與最低要求) (Several Basic Terms and Minimum Demands in the

against Japanese aggression, but also against the government's inert attitude. This amounted to a secession movement when the United Anti-Japanese National Salvation Army was formed in July, with Ch'en Chi-t'ang 陳濟棠 of Kwangtung as Commander-in-chief, and Li Tsung-jen 李宗仁 of Kwangsi as deputy. Pai Ch'ung-hsi 白崇禧, Li's close military colleague from Kwangsi, also took an active part. The whole coup only lasted for three months, with the secessionists coming to an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek in September.²³ The most important result of this coup was that military leaders who were dissatisfied with the central government, and were keen on active resistance against Japan, were encouraged to

22. (cont.) United Effort against Aggression, n.p., 1935. The Anti-Japanese National Salvation Front became active by November 1935, with the publication of its weekly journal Ta-chung sheng-huo 大眾生活 (Life of the Masses) in Shanghai. Shen Chün-yu, Soong Ch'ing-ling 宋慶齡, Ho Hsiang-ying 何香凝 and Chang Nai-ch'i 章乃器 were some of the important leaders of the movement. A typical article in the journal is: "Min-chu chieh-fang yün-tung ti hu-sheng" 民方英角平放運動的呼聲 (An appeal of the National Liberation Movement), Ta-chung sheng-huo I, No.9, (Jan.11, 1936), 231.
23. Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 432; Kao Yin-chu, Major Events in China, 420-423.

take active measures to realize the United Front, in which the cooperation of the CCP was to be sought.

It was under these circumstances that the dramatic Sian Incident began on December 12, 1936. This turned out to be a victory for the CCP in securing Chiang Kai-shek's agreement to the formation of a United Front. The initiator of the Incident was Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the Bandit Extermination Campaign for the north-west in October 1936. Chang is from Tung-pei 東北, (Manchuria), and ever since the occupation of Manchuria in September 1931, he and his army had had to live in exile. Naturally, Chang was more interested in fighting the Japanese in order to return to Manchuria rather than fighting the Communists.²⁴ On December 12, 1936, Chang "kidnapped" Chiang Kai-shek in Sian, with the latter having arrived earlier to promote new campaigns against the CCP and attempt to check pro-CCP sympathies for the formation of a United Front. On the same

24. E. Snow, Red Star Over China, 433-434; also see Hsi-an shih-pien chen-shih 西安事變珍史 (Important Documents on the Sian Incident) I, Ch'un-chiu tsa-chih-she, Hong Kong, 1965, 1-2, and J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 202.

day, Chang and Yang Hu-ch'eng (Commander of the Shensi Army) sent a telegram to Lin Shen 林森, chairman of the National Government, laying down an eight-point programme. In essence, it called for a cessation of the civil war. There was to be a reorganization of the Nanking Government to admit other parties for the purpose of securing national salvation against the Japanese.²⁵ To put it another way, Chang demanded an end to the campaigns against the CCP, and the realization of a KMT-CCP cooperation against Japan.

Chang Hsueh-liang had actually been establishing contacts with the Communists as early as July 1936, and there seemed to be some understanding between the CCP and Chang, especially when CCP delegates were

25. For the text of the telegram, see Kung Hsiang-hsi 孔祥熙, "Hsi-an shih-pien hui-i-lu" 西安事變回憶錄 (Memoirs of the Sian Incident), Important Documents of the Sian Incident, 95-96; also see Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the New Democratic Revolution in China, 346-362. Of the various books on the controversial Incident, the following three can perhaps provide different angles of approach: J.M. Bertram, Crisis in China: The Only Story of the Sian Mutiny, Macmillan, 1937; E. Snow, Red Star Over China, 431-471; and Chiang Mei-ling, Sian, a Coup d'Etat, The China Publishing Company, Shanghai, 1948 (For Chiang Kai-shek's own account of the Incident, see 109-115).

immediately sent to Sian from Yen-an after the Incident.²⁶ The delegates were Chou En-lai (周恩來), Ch'in Pang-hsien (秦邦憲), and Yeh chien-ying (葉劍英), and negotiations with Chang and Chiang Kai-shek took place. Chiang was eventually released on December 25, 1936, with Chang Hsueh-liang, the "repentant" general, accompanying him back to Nanking.²⁷

The decisive outcome of the Sian Incident was Chiang Kai-shek's agreement to the formation of an Anti-Japanese United Front based on KMT-CCP cooperation. From February 1937 onwards, KMT-CCP negotiations took place with Chou En-lai as the CCP delegate at Nanking. The results of negotiations can be traced from declarations proclaimed by

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26. H.H. Kung, "Chang Ting-fu ta-shih ssu-fan mi-pao" (蔣廷黻大使四番密報), (The four secret reports from Ambassador Chiang Ting-fu), Important Documents of the Sian Incident, 112-113. In his fourth report dated December 17, 1936, Ambassador Chiang, who was then residing in Moscow, told the Soviet Government that Chang Hsueh-liang definitely had connections with the CCP before the Incident. Also see J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 202-203.
27. E. Snow, Red Star Over China, 445, 456-464; also see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 198. Chiang Hsueh-liang is still under house arrest in Taiwan.

both parties in February, 1937. On February 10, the CCP sent a telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the 5th KMT Central Executive Committee. In it were CCP demands for the cessation of civil war to concentrate all resources on efforts against Japanese aggression; the release of political prisoners; and the guarantee of basic human rights. In return, the CCP made concessions to the KMT on certain issues. The Red Army was to be renamed the National Revolutionary Army (Kuo-min Ko-ming chün) 國民革命軍 under the command of the central government. The CCP base in northern Shensi was to be renamed the Special-region Government of the Chinese Republic (Chung-hua min-kuo te-ch'ü cheng-fu) 中華民國特區政府. Democratic practices based on universal suffrage were to be adopted in the CCP administration and the confiscation of landlords' properties stopped.²⁸

The KMT officially accepted the above conditions on February 21, 1937 in the resolutions of the Third Plenary Session, which were worded in KMT phraseology, expressing its generosity

28. Wang Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 102-103; J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 231.

in accepting the "surrender" of the CCP.²⁹ Chiang Kai-shek's statement on February 24 clarified the situation further, when he expressed conditional approval of the three major issues, that is, freedom of speech, full utilization of man-power from all parties, and the release of political prisoners.³⁰

It is perhaps necessary to mention here that the CCP advocacy of the United Front was not without opposition from within the party. Both Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i 劉少奇 in their later works pointed out that some CCP members, especially the leftists, were against a peaceful solution to the Sian Incident, and it is not improbable that some extremists might have contemplated taking the life of Chiang Kai-shek as revenge for his attacks on the CCP. Indeed, Chang Kuo-t'ao, who arrived at Yen-an with his Fourth Front Army just before the Incident, observed that "... with the outbreak of the Sian Incident, the various high officials of the CCP central authority at Yen-an could not help

29. Ibid., III, 103-105.

30. Ibid., III, 105-107.

having temperamental and impulsive plans ...".³¹
 On the other hand, Mao accused Chang of being a leftist favouring an attack on T'ungkuan 潼關, the strategic point between Yen-an and Sian, during the Sian Incident.³² In 1942, Liu Shao-ch'i also spoke of the Sian Incident, and pointed out that some comrades then believed that the KMT-CCP co-operation could have been brought about through an alternative solution, or even without a solution to the Sian Incident. Liu added that these comrades only committed individual errors which were therefore easily corrected later on.³³

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31. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "Chang Kuo-t'ao's letter to the people", The CCP during ... Resistance, Kweilin, 27-28. Also in an interview with Chang, Wang chien-min of Taiwan was told that CCP members, who wished to do away with Chiang Kai-shek, were stopped by Stalin's telegram from Moscow, see Wang Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 728, n.27.
32. "Wei cheng-chü chien-pa-wan chün-chung ch'in-i k'ang-Jih min-chu tung-i chan-hsien erh tou-cheng", 為爭取千百萬青年進入抗日民族統一戰線而鬥爭 (To struggle for the sake of winning hundreds of thousands of people to join the Anti-Japanese National United Front), Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi, Peking, (1961), I, 270, n.5.
33. Liu shao-ch'i, Lun tang-nei tou-cheng, 言論黨內鬥爭 (On Intra-party Strife), n.p., n.d., Su-chung-she 蘇中社, 23, cited from Wang Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 98. Liu Shao-ch'i was then making a speech in the Party Central School on March 2, 1942, when he revealed the above party differences during the Sian Incident.

Once the United Front began to come into shape in early 1937, visible changes in CCP policy on its immediate objectives were evident. This can be seen in the "Letter to all CCP comrades from the CCP Central Executive Committee", dated April 15, 1937. The opening passage reads:³⁴

"Ever since the peaceful settlement to the Sian Incident and the holding of the Third KMT Plenary Session, the Chinese Revolution has entered a new stage. The duty at this stage is to consolidate the internal peace already secured, to fight for democratic rights, and to realize the anti-Japanese war...".

In the same letter was the reiteration of the CCP's determination to follow Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three Principles of the People.³⁵ An earlier statement by the CCP to the same effect was made in August 1936.³⁶ In an interview with Agnes Smedley, the American journalist, in March 1937, Mao made it clear that the CCP's ultimate goal was

34. Wang Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 107.

35. Ibid., III, 109, Dr. Sun's three Principles were Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood.

36. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 200-201.

still Communism, but before achieving that, it had to save China from destruction.³⁷ The specific and immediate aims of the CCP became all the more explicit with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937. In the report to the Sixth Plenary Session of the CCP Central Executive Committee (October-November, 1938), Mao emphasized that the ideals of Socialism and Communism would not be given up, but these ideals could only be brought about after the success of the "democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie" (tzuch'an chieh-chi min-chu ko-ming) 資產階級及民主革命. Moreover, the war of resistance against Japan was defined as a stage in the democratic revolution which had as its guide the Three Principles of the People, and that there was no basic clash between Communism and Dr. Sun's principles.³⁸ Mao also argued that the Principle of People's Livelihood (Min-sheng chu-i) 民生主義, was in fact Communism.³⁹

37. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 201.

38. Mao Tse-tung, Lun hsien chieh-tuan 論新階級 (On the New Stage), Chungking, Hsin-hua jih-pao-kuan, 1939 (January I), 75-77.

39. Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang 中國共產黨, Kang-chan wen-hsien, 抗戰文獻 (Collection of Articles during the War of Resistance), Shanghai, Hung-mien ch'u-pan-she 新民主出版社, 1946, 38. This is an interview of Mao by reporters on February 2, 1938, in which the former stated that the Principle of People's Livelihood was in fact Communism.

This realization of the democratic revolution embodied not only a political rapprochement with the KMT on a United Front, but also an alliance with the bourgeoisie with particular reference to economic policy. Ch'en Po-ta 陳伯達, the CCP's theoretician, wrote in 1944 of the necessity for the CCP to ally with the national and petty bourgeoisie, because of the changing economic situation.⁴⁰ In another work, Ch'en quoted from Mao, who maintained that a united economic front with the national bourgeoisie was essential because of the backward economic situation in China,⁴¹ which had indeed particular relevance in the CCP context, as northern Shensi was an unproductive area. The same applied to CCP bases behind enemy lines, where economic hardship resultant from the war made an alliance

40. For details of Ch'en's thesis, see Ch'en Po-ta, Kuan-yu shih-nien nei-chan 關於三十年內戰 (on Ten Years of Civil War), Peking, 1953, 43-45.

41. Ch'en Po-ta, Mao Tse-tung lun chung-kuo k'o-ming 毛澤東論中國革命 (Mao Tse-tung on the Chinese Revolution), Peking, 1953, 38-39.

with the bourgeoisie absolutely necessary.⁴²

This revised CCP ideology on an economic alliance with the bourgeoisie in effect formed a much broader United Front during the war than the political cooperation between the CCP and the KMT. With the deterioration of relations between the two parties by January 1941, military cooperation was diminished,⁴³ but the broader economic united front with the bourgeoisie remained the guiding principle for Yen-an and the bases behind the Japanese lines. By 1943, another change within this frame work of the economic united front was evident in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and the bases in north China and other parts of the country. The CCP then began to come more into the open in championing its protégés, that is, the tenants and poor peasants, against landlord exploitation, and thus could be considered as having swung to the left. This swing brought about significant support for the CCP in

42. Economic hardship suffered as a result of Japanese pressure in the north China bases will be discussed fully in chapter 4.

43. For the deterioration of KMT-CCP relations in January 1941, see chapter 2, 37-38.

north China, the details of which will be discussed in chapters five and six.

CHAPTER II

林彪, the 129th

A General Survey of CCP Bases in North China

With the outbreak of the undeclared Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937, the United Front between the KMT and the CCP began to take a definite shape, both politically and militarily. On August 25, 1937, CCP forces were renamed the 18th Army Group under the command of the Military Commission of the Chinese National Government, comprising the Eighth Route Army stationed in north China, and the New Fourth Army in central China. Chu Teh 朱德 was commander in chief and P'eng Te-huai 彭德懷 the deputy of these Communist forces.^I Thus a KMT-CCP military alliance came into being in face of the Japanese invasion. In north China, the Eighth Route Army comprised three divisions, namely, the 115th Division commanded by Lin Piao 林彪, the 129th Division commanded by Liu Po-ch'eng 劉伯承, and the 120th Division under Ho Lung 賀龍. These forces were all put under the Second War zone covering Shansi under the command of Yen Hsi-shan, with

I. Kao Yin-chu, Major Events in China, 437.

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Chu Teh as deputy, and their total strength was specified to be limited to 45,000 men.²

This KMT-CCP military merger was inevitably spurred on by the rapid advances made by the Japanese after July 7, 1937. On July 28, the Japanese occupied the then Peiping, and on August 13, Japan attacked Shanghai, which eventually fell on November 12. In north China, the Japanese advanced westward along the Peiping-Suiyuan railway and southward along the Peiping-Hankow line after the fall of Peiping. By the end of 1937, the majority of large cities in north China had been occupied by the Japanese.³ To join KMT troops in resisting the advancing Japanese, the Eighth Route Army then stationed around Yen-an crossed the Yellow River, and moved into Shansi in early September, as the Japanese closed in on Shansi from Hopei, and

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2. Chu Teh, Lun chieh-fang-ch'ü chan-ch'ang 論解
放區戰場 (On the Battle Fields of the Liberated Areas), n.p., chieh-fang-she, 1949, 13; S.R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 204-205. For a list of commanders and political commissars of the Eighth Route Army, see Johnson, Peasant Nationalism . . ., 96.
 3. Kuo-fang-pu shih-liao chü (KMT), (ed.) 國防部史
料局, Pa-nien k'ang-chan ching-kuo kai-yao 八年
抗戰經過概要 (A General Description of the
Eight Years of Resistance), n.p., 1945, 10-11;
also see maps 1 and 2 in the appendices in the
same work for the major battles fought.

Changchiak'ou 張家口, in Chahar.⁴ In the meantime, the CCP on September 22 reiterated in a declaration that its troops would take orders from the Military Commission of the KMT Government in a United Front.⁵ The 115th Division had then advanced towards Wut'aishan 五台山 in the mountainous area of north-east Shansi, and participated in a united effort with KMT troops against the Japanese advance in northern Shansi. The 115th Division claimed a major victory over the Japanese in this operation at P'ingsingkuan 平型關, a few miles north of Wut'ai, on September 25, 1937.⁶

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4. Chu Teh, On the Battle Fields ..., 13; K'ang-Jih Chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti chung-kuo jen-min chieh-fang-chün 抗日戰爭時期的中國人民解放軍 (The People's Liberation Army during the Anti-Japanese War), Peking, jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, 10.
 5. Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang k'ang-chan wen-hsien 中國共產黨抗戰文獻, 1, Hong Kong, Hung-mien ch'u-pan-she, 1946, 8.
 6. For a detailed description of the battle at P'ingsingkuan, see The People's Liberation Army ..., 11-22. J.M. Bertram, who was with the 120th Division in the beginning of the war, quoted from Wang Chen 王震, commander of the 359th Brigade, 120th Division, who said that CCP forces arrived at P'ingsingkuan too late, and therefore was unable to hold the pass against the Japanese for too long in spite of the initial success, see J.M. Bertram, North China Front, Macmillan, 1939, 396-397, and Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1944, 135.

In late October, the major forces of the 115th Division left Wut'ai to assist in the defence of T'aiyuan 太原, the capital of Shansi, and Hsink'ou 忻口, to the south-west of Wut'ai along the Tung-pu 同蒲 (Tatung-Fengningtao) line running north-south across Shansi. Nieh Jung-chen 聂荣臻, the deputy commander, stayed behind with about 2,000 men, and set up the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei military region behind the enemy lines after the fall of Hsink'ou and T'aiyuan in early November.⁷

Ho Lung's 120th Division advanced towards north-west Shansi in September 1937, and the Communists claimed that Ho's troops played an important part in resisting the Japanese at Yenmenkuan 雁门关 and Hsink'ou, and even after the fall of T'aiyuan, they still undertook guerrilla activities around the capital. Ho Lung's position in north-west Shansi was most strategic as it served the useful

7. The People's Liberation Army . . ., 26-28; 32-33.

function of linking up the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Government with the various CCP bases in north China.⁸ Liu Po-ch'eng's 129th Division moved towards south-east Shansi into Liao Hsien 遼縣, Hoshun 和順, and Yushe 榆社 in the mountainous area of T'ai Hang 太行 and T'ai Yueh 太岳. In December 1937, Liu's troops were able to repel Japanese attacks on their base in south-east Shansi, and therefore managed to establish their stronghold in that area.⁹

Thus by the end of 1937, the three divisions of the Eighth Route Army had succeeded in entrenching themselves in different parts of Shansi, contributing directly to the establishment of the four major bases in north China from 1938 onwards. These bases were the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base centred around Wu'taishan, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base with headquarters

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8. Lin Feng 林楓, "Chien-ch'ih ti-hou k'ang-chan ti Chin hsi-pei ken-chü-ti", 堅持敵後抗戰的晉西北根據地 (The north-west Shansi base persisting in the war of resistance behind enemy lines) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 8, 1944. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism . . ., 95. For a vivid description of Ho Lung and other officers of the 120th Division, see J.M. Bertram, North China Front, 312-317.
9. "I-erh-chiu shih yu Chin-Chi-Lu-Ju pien-ch'ü", 一二九師與晉冀魯豫邊區 (The 129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region), Chieh-fang jih-pao, August 14, 1944.

at T'ai Hang, the Shansi-Suiyuan base centred at north-west Shansi, and the Shantung base characterized by scattered guerrilla activities at the beginning of the war. It must also be mentioned that another major CCP base was set up in central China around Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anwei, where the New Fourth Army from 1938 onwards fought against the Japanese and later on Wang Ching-wei's puppet troops as well.¹⁰

In regard to the four bases in north China, they varied in nature, strength and development in the period 1938-1943. The most exhaustive account in English of these bases is given by Johnson,¹¹ who bases his work heavily on Japanese military archives, and therefore tends to fail in identifying the important role played by the party as the controlling force within these bases. This party strength was in fact particularly apparent from February 1942 onwards, when the party launched the Cheng Feng Yün-tung 整)風(運軍力 (Rectification Movement).

10. For a comprehensive account of the CCP base in central China, see Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the History of the New Democratic Revolution in China, 435-441.

11. See Johnson, Peasant Nationalism . . ., 92-122.

The purpose of this chapter is to give a comprehensive survey of the bases up to 1943, whilst later chapters will be devoted to special aspects. In particular, CCP administration and mass mobilization programmes at the village level will be dealt with in detail, and investigations into party leadership during the Cheng Feng period up to the end of 1943 will be discussed in chapters five and six.

Before examining each of these four bases, it is convenient here to mention certain general patterns with which they conform in spite of their varied nature. First, in the early years of the war, regular units of the Eighth Route Army rather than guerrilla forces constituted the main military strength in resisting the Japanese. The Shantung base was an exception as the resistance programme there was shouldered by local party cadres and guerrillas rather than the Eighth Route Army, as will be shown later. Second, a more stable CCP administration was generally established when civil organizations took over from army units as the local government body in the bases. Civil organizations in particular were the channels by which the Communists could establish contacts with the local people, especially in conducting various

mass mobilization programmes. Third, the civil government in the bases formed a hierarchy in itself. At the top was the border government, under which were the sub-region administrative office (Hsing-cheng kung-shu) 行政公署, the prefectural commissioner's office (Chuan-yuan kung-shu) 專員公署, the hsien, the district, and the administrative village (Hsing-cheng ts'un) 行政村.¹²

However, it must be mentioned here that not all the bases in north China had a border government established as the top-level administration.

Geographically, the strongholds within the bases were set up in mountainous areas, many of which had been military headquarters of CCP troops since late 1937. As the bases expanded in territory and population, adjacent plain areas were included, but here anti-Japanese resistance was easily subjected to severe Japanese attacks, in view of inferior military strength and equipment in the practically indefensible flat terrain.

12. See appendix 3, 290, section on the administrative structure of the bases.

From 1938 to the end of 1940 was a period of expansion in territory and population, marked at its climax by the "Hundred Regiments' Offensive" in August-December, 1940, in which over 400,000 troops of the Eighth Route Army were said to have attacked the Japanese simultaneously in five provinces in north China.¹³ This extraordinary CCP strength was demonstrated at a time when pessimism prevailed in Chungking, with the possibility of a compromise being concluded with Japan.¹⁴ It has been suggested that the Hundred Regiments' Offensive led to Japanese reprisals in 1941-1942 when relentless mopping-up campaigns were undertaken against the bases,¹⁵ resulting in the shrinking of CCP territories, and the adoption of the policy of "cut troops and simplify the administration" (Ching-ping chien-cheng) 精兵簡政, a retrenchment measure to face Japanese attacks. At the climax of Japanese attacks in early 1942, the CCP

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13. For a detailed description of the Hundred Regiments' Offensive, see The People's Liberation Army ..., 108-118; Chu Teh, On the Battle Fields ..., 16, and J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 246; for discussion on the strategy involved in this CCP operation, see chapter 3, 107-109.
14. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 217; for preliminary talks between Chungking, Japan, and Wang Ching-wei's government in 1939-1940, see Lee Ngok, Later Career of Wang Ching-wei ..., 87-110.
15. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 58.

also launched the vigorous Cheng Feng Movement which proved to be an effective weapon in strengthening the resistance programme.

If one considers the Japanese-CCP feud in north China during the war as a struggle for territorial power, then one must not forget the role played by KMT troops fighting guerrilla wars against the Japanese, although their part was relatively minor in north China. The relevant role of the KMT to be dealt with in the present thesis was its armed clashes with the CCP in north and central China from 1938 onwards. These clashes generally involved relatively light casualties with up to as many as a few hundred men killed, but there were also a few serious incidents, and these cases will be dealt with in discussing the individual bases. Nevertheless, the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941 in Kiangsu, central China, must be mentioned here since it represented a severe deterioration in KMT-CCP relations. Basically, a KMT-CCP agreement made it necessary for the New Fourth Army to move north of the Yangtze River before December 31, 1940. For some unknown reasons, a CCP force of 9,000 still remained south of the river after the deadline, and on January 4, it was surrounded by KMT

troops and almost wiped out in a ten-day battle. Hsiang Ying 項英, the deputy commander, was killed and Yeh T'ing 葉挺, the commander, was captured.¹⁶ Johnson believes the Incident marked an end to the existence of the United Front,¹⁷ but it may be argued that the United Front was a much broader alliance between the CCP and the bourgeoisie represented by the KMT, in economic and political terms, in addition to the military entente. Thus despite the armed clashes, Mao's ideology of a United Front with the bourgeoisie remained the guiding principle for the party in the bases.¹⁸ In political terms, the United Front was demonstrated in the three-thirds system, which specified that Communists should only occupy one-third of the administrative posts in the bases, with the other two-thirds comprising KMT and non-aligned members, and great elaborations were taken in

16. For the CCP version of the Incident, see Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 20, 1943; also see Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1953, 191; J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 251-252, and Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 136-140.

17. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 13.

18. Mao's ideas about the economic United Front with the bourgeoisie have been discussed in chapter I, 24-26.

the bases throughout the war to observe this principle.¹⁹ As Johnson indicates, the system was a CCP attempt to win over all possible support from non-CCP leaders, landlords, rich peasants and prominent local personnel, though he thinks that it was not the device for rallying peasant support.²⁰ In other words, the system did demonstrate the existence of a United Front, which therefore did not terminate as Johnson suggests with the New Fourth Army Incident. To press this point further, the following is a CCP survey of the practice of the three-thirds system in the bases in 1942:²¹

In the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government Assembly, only 46 of the total 134 members were indicated to have come from the CCP. In the Shansi-


19. Tung Pi-wu 董必武, Chung-kuo chieh-fang-ch'ü shih-lu 中國解放區實錄 (A True Account of the Liberated Areas in China), San Francisco, Ho-tso 1946, 17; Compton, Mao's China ..., xxv. R.C. North points out that the party controlled the administration in spite of the three-thirds system. Nevertheless, it remains true that the system was a means of rallying support from non-CCP elements. See R.C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 92-93.

20. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 13-14.

21. Wang Yüeh-fei 王若飛, "Wo-men tsen-yang tsai ti-hou ken-ch'ü-ti chien-she hsin-min-chu chu-i cheng-ch'ih", 我們怎樣在敵後農村建立新民主主義政權 (How we establish new democratic rule in the bases behind enemy lines) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 7, 1942.


Chahar-Hopei Administrative Committee, CCP members were reported to have constituted only 10% of the total with KMT members occupying 30%. In the northwest Shansi Sub-region Office, CCP members comprised 33.8% of the total.

CCP RESISTANCE IN NORTH CHINA IN EARLY 1938



● Main CCP-held centres
 ▨ Main area of CCP resistance activities

CCP BASES IN NORTH CHINA TO 1943



- 1 NORTH - WEST SHANSI BASE
- 2 SHANSI - HOPEI - SHANTUNG - HONAN BASE
- 3 SHANSI - CHAHAR - HOPEI BASE
- 4 SHANTUNG BASE
- Main CCP-held centres

The Four Bases

a). The Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Base

Having set up his headquarters in late 1937 in mountainous south-east Shansi, Liu Po-ch'eng and his 129th Division began expanding their area of control behind the enemy lines. In December 1937, a contingent under the leadership of local party leader Li Ch'ing-yü 李青玉 and commander Ch'en Tsai-tao 陳再道 was

sent^s In early 1938, Sung Jen-ch'ung's 宋仁窮 cavalry reg- X
southern Hopei, where guerrilla warfare was conducted.

In early 1938, Sung Jen-ch'ung's 宋仁窮 cavalry reg- X
iment, and in May 1938, forces under Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, then deputy commander of the 129th Division, also undertook guerrilla resistance in southern Hopei.²²
Hsu's activities also coincided with the battle at Hsüchou 徐州, the important railway junction in northern Kiangsu, where the Japanese and KMT troops were engaged in a fierce battle.²³ Further organization

22. Ting Ling 丁玲, I-erh-chiu-shih yü Chin-Chi-Lu-Ju pien Ch'u 一二九師與晉冀魯豫邊區 (The 129th Divisions and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region), Shanghai, Hsin-hua shu-tien, 1956, II.

23. An excellent map of the battle of Hsüchou is given in Kuo-fang-pu shih-liao chü (KMT), (ed.), A General Description of Eight Years of Resistance, 12 and map 4 in appendices.

was undertaken in southern Hopei later by Teng Hsiao-p'ing 鄧小平, then political Commissar of the 129th Division, and Yang Hsiu-feng 楊秀峰, commander of the western Hopei guerrilla contingent. The 129th Division also went further eastward, and by July 1938 was able to establish a military base on the Shantung-Hopei border under the leadership of Hsiao Hua 蕭華, commander of the 343rd Brigade, who cooperated with local patriots and party cadres.²⁴ Up to the end of 1940, in spite of Japanese attacks on the base, was a period of expansion and consolidation for the 129th Division, and its most renowned achievement was participation in the Hundred Regiments' Offensive, which Liu Po-ch'eng claimed had succeeded in crushing Japanese designs to advance further towards Sian, Chungking, and Kunming.²⁵

The setting up of administrative organizations followed in the wake of military establishment. The earliest upper level organization in the base was the setting up of the sub-region administrative office in southern Hopei in August 1938 with Yang Hsiu-feng as director, and

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24. "The 129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region", Chieh-fang jih-pao, August 14, 1944. For details of Yang Hsiu-feng's activities, his work in mass mobilization, see chapter 3, 97-98.
25. Liu Po-ch'eng, "Ti hou k'ang-chan ti chan-shu wen-ti", 敵後抗戰的戰術問題 (Tactical problems concerning resistance behind enemy lines), Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 7, 1943.

Sung Jen-ch'iuung as his deputy. In August 1940, the combined administrative office for southern Hopei and T'ai Hang (Chi-t'ai lien-ho pan-shih ch'u) 冀太聯合辦事處 was established with Yang Hsiu-feng as director.²⁶ The base obtained border government status on July 18, 1941, with Yang as chairman, under which were the two sub-region offices of southern Hopei and the Hopei-Shantung-Honan plain, claiming control over 15 prefectural offices and 115 hsien.²⁷ These figures seem exaggerated as the CCP included areas where only guerrilla activities were undertaken as being under its jurisdiction. However, the setting up of the border government represented a stable administration characterized by the three-thirds system with only 46 CCP members in the Assembly out of a total of 130. The United Front policy was thus maintained in spite of the New Fourth Army Incident being only six months earlier. Moreover, leading KMT commanders were also elected to the presidium.²⁸ Nevertheless, CCP control became obvious in the inaugu-

26. Ting Ling, The 129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region, 14, 35.

27. Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1941 (On the Provisional Assembly and administrative divisions in the Shansi-Shantung-Honan border region).

28. Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 12, 1941 (On the Provisional Assembly).

ation of the border government, as the latter was urged to observe the fifteen principal policies formulated by the CCP Northern Party Bureau.²⁹

During the climax of the Japanese offensives in 1941-1942, the plain areas of the base were particularly vulnerable to Japanese attacks, and the general policy of retrenchment, namely, to cut troops and simplify the administration, was observed. Intense party reforms in the Cheng Feng Movement were mainly responsible for recovery in 1943.

As for KMT-CCP clashes in this base, they began in late 1938. Trouble started when KMT commander Lu Chung-lin ^{鹿鍾麟}, under Chungking order was appointed governor of Hopei, and set up the Hopei-Chahar war zone behind the Japanese lines. The CCP was then ordered to abolish the CCP sub-region office in southern Hopei.³⁰ In June 12-16, 1939, in reprisal for KMT attacks on CCP troops in central Hopei in December 1938, the 129th Division in southern Hopei attacked KMT troops under Lu Chung-lin and his lieutenant Chang Yin-wu ^{張蔭梧}. A

29. Chieh-fang jih-pao July 25, 1941, (On the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government).

30. Lu chu-hsi yu Lo hui Chi chi ^{鹿鍾麟由洛回冀記} (An Account of Governor Lu's return to Hopei from Loyang), n.p., n. pub., 1939?, 4, 11, 19-21. This is a KMT account of Lu's activities in Hopei.

similar clash occurred in the same area in January-March 1940, and the CCP seems to have had the upper hand.³¹ Another source of tension between the two parties was the stationing of KMT troops in northern Honan, south of the Yellow River, to the south of the CCP base. These troops were commanded by P'ang Ping-hsun 龐炳勳, and Sun Tien-ying 孫殿英, who eventually defected with their forces to the Japanese in 1943.³² In south-east Shansi, a bitter clash took place in December 1939. It originated from the New and Old Army Incident of December 1939 in western Shansi where troops loyal to Yen Hsi-shan clashed with Yen's own pro-CCP New Army, and the First and Third pro-CCP Dare-to-Die Corps in south-east Shansi were attacked by KMT troops in the same month. The Communists suffered heavy losses, as four regiments of the Third Corps were

31. Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 20, 1943. (On KMT-CCP clashes since 1938). Also see "Lu Chung-lin wei-fan kuo-ts'e", 鹿鍾麟違反國策 (Lu Chung-lin acting against national interest) Chieh-fang, 70, (May I, 1939), 5; and Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 121-122.

32. For the location of the KMT troops see map in Headquarters, Tada Corps, Kyōsantō Jōkyō Sono Ta ..., Senji Geppō Shiryō 共産黨狀況その他... 戦時月報資料 (State of Affairs of Chinese Communist Party, ... War-time monthly report, March, 1941), R 115, T 1008, F 26532-26540.

wiped out.³³

b) The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base

Of the four bases in north China, this one appeared to be the best developed in terms of civil administration, as the border government was established as early as February 1938, at P'ingshan 平山, in Hopei at the foot of Wut'aishan. Nieh Jung-chen was elected chairman, with Sung Shao-wen 宋劭文, then in charge of administration in north-east Shansi, and Hu Jen-k'uei 胡仁奎, the magistrate of Tinghsiang 定襄 hsien, Shansi, as deputies.³⁴ At Pei-yueh 北嶽 itself in the Wut'ai mountain, four military regions were set up under Nieh's direct command with a force of 12,000.³⁵ In April 1938, a sub-region administrative office was set up in central Hopei when two battalions under Lü Cheng-ts'ao 呂正操, the former KMT regiment commander, wiped out some puppet organizations in that area. From

33. "129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region", (continued), Chieh-fang jih-pao, August 15, 1944. For further information on the Incident, see 54, n. 49 in this chapter, and chapter 3, 97.

34. See appendix 2, 286 and Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 100.

35. Sun Yuan-fan 孫元範, "Pa nien ch'êng-kang ti Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-ch'ü", 百鍊成鋼的晉察冀邊區 (The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region becoming like steel after numerous tests) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944.

May 1938 to December 1939, Ho Lung's detachment of the 120th Division also entered central Hopei, to give Lü the needed assistance to defend CCP-held territory against the Japanese in flat terrain advantageous to the latter. From central Hopei, detachments under Sung Shao-wen and Teng Hua 滕華 advanced eastward into eastern Hopei in June 1938, whilst Hsiao K'e 蕭克, deputy commander of forces in the base, advanced into areas north and west of Peiping in the spring of 1939.³⁶ These activities were guerrilla in nature rather than attempts to set up stable administrations, and Johnson points out that the importance of military activities around Peiping was, that they gave the Communists control of that strategic area in the immediate post-war period.³⁷

In Pei-yüeh, Japanese troops under Lieutenant-General Abe Norihide 阿部規秀 advanced towards

36. Sun Yuan-fan, "The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region ...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944. With reference to Lü Cheng-ts'ao's activities, see Taylor, The Struggle for North China, 102-103; and chapter 5, 198-199.

37. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 115.

Fouping ^{阜平}, the CCP stronghold in November 1939, but failed to crush Nieh's forces, and Abe was killed.³⁸ Nieh's forces also participated in the Hundred Regiments' Offensive. The period 1941-1942 saw intense Japanese mopping-up campaigns, especially in central Hopei where Lü Cheng-ts'ao's forces bore the brunt, but the Communists began to recover by 1943, and Japanese sources reckoned there were five main CCP military regions in the base in the period September 1943 - June 1944, namely, in western Hopei, central Hopei, eastern Hopei and areas to the west and north of Peiping.³⁹

In regard to civil administration after the inauguration of the border government in February 1938, various administrative committees were set up at different levels. The general objective in 1940 was democratically elected administration at all levels, and the CCP claimed that village elections

38. The People's Liberation Army ..., 78-80; and Nieh Jung-chen, "Lun ti-hou ti k'ang-chan" ^{言論敵後之抗戰} (on resistance behind enemy lines), Chün-chung, (The Masses) ^{群眾}, V111 no. 17, (October 16, 1943), 498.

39. Appendix 1, 286.

were successfully held in 1940 with village chiefs chosen by the people.⁴⁰ Party control of the civil administration also became apparent in 1940, with the CCP Northern Sub-bureau issuing twenty principal policies to be followed by administrations at various levels.⁴¹ Democratic practices were elaborately observed with the evident purpose of gaining non-CCP support. In July 1942, it was claimed that the percentage of citizens taking part in local elections was 78.3% at hsien level, 81.4% at district level, and 83.9% at village level. In addition, the three-thirds system was said to have been observed with CCP members occupying only 10% of the posts in the administrative committee of the base.⁴² In view of the intense Japanese pressure 1941-1942, the border government assembly was not convened till January 1943, when 288

40. Mu I 慕伊, "Chin-Ch'a-Chi chieh-fang-ch'u ti min-chu chien-she", 晉察冀解放區的民主建設 (Democratic achievements of the Shansi-Chahar-Hepei Border Region) Chün-chung, IX, No. 13 (July 15, 1944), 553.

41. Ibid..

42. Wang Yüeh-fei, "How we establish new democratic rule ...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 7, 1942.

members were elected to the assembly.⁴³ By the end of 1943 and early 1944, the CCP had established four sub-region administrative offices in Pei-yueh, central Hopei, the region north of Peiping, and eastern Hopei. The first two regions were much more significant, with 82 of the total of 98 hsien the CCP claimed to control.⁴⁴ At the same time, the CCP admitted that in these hsien, apart from Foup'ing, none of the hsien cities were in Communist hands.⁴⁵

Serious KMT-CCP clashes in the base began with KMT governor Lu Ching-lin's arrival in Hopei in the summer of 1938, although Lü Cheng-ts'ao and Lu did cooperate for a short period of time.⁴⁶ In December 1938, Lü Cheng-ts'ao's headquarters was attacked by KMT troops under Chang Yin-wu, and some CCP cadres were captured and executed. In Pei-yueh, the CCP reported that KMT troops under Pai Chi-i 白志沂 surrounded the CCP hsien of Kwangning 廣寧 and Ningwu 寧武.

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43. Mu I, "Democratic achievements ...", chün-chung IX, No. 13 (July 15, 1944), 553; and "Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-ch'ü tsan-i-hui ti ch'eng-kung", 平津邊區人民參事會的成功 (The success of the assembly in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region), (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, March 10, 1943.
44. Mu I, "Deomocratic achievements ...", Chün-chung, IX, No. 13, 553.
45. Sun Yuan-fan "The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region ...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944.
46. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, 167.

in October 1939, whilst the Japanese were attacking the Communists, and shot a number of CCP cadres.⁴⁷

c) The Shansi-Suiyuan Base

With his force entrenched in north-west Shansi at the beginning of the war, Ho Lung expanded his area of activities in September 1938 by sending a detachment into eastern, southern, and central Suiyuan, as well as the Chahar border to conduct guerrilla activities. Thus the CCP included parts of Suiyuan in this base although the main area was really confined to north-west Shansi. Another detachment was sent to central Hopei between May 1938 and December 1939 as seen in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base.⁴⁸ As has been mentioned earlier, the main function of this base was to provide a channel of communication between Yen-an and the bases in north China, and being situated

47. For Lü Cheng-ts'ao's clash with KMT troops, see Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 20, 1943. For clashes in Pei-yueh, see Sun Yuan-fan, "The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region ...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944.

48. Lin Feng, "The North-west Shansi base ... behind enemy lines", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 8, 1944; The People's Liberation Army during the ... War, 47-48.

relatively further away from large concentration of Japanese forces, it was generally true that Japanese attacks on this base were relatively less severe.

The establishment of civil administration was started directly as a result of the New and Old Army Incident in western Shansi. Yen Hsi-shan's New Army was commanded by Hsü Fan-ting 續範亭, a KMT member, but was in sympathy with the Communists. The CCP had by 1939 also been organizing the Dare-to-Die corps within Yen's camp under the United Front. Reacting to this intense CCP infiltration, KMT troops in Yen's camp in December 1939 suddenly turned on these pro-CCP forces stationed in western and south-east Shansi.⁴⁹ As a result of this clash, Hsü's New Army and the Dare-to-Die Corps went over to the CCP camp. Hsü was also elected director of the north-west Shansi sub-region administrative office on February 15, 1940.⁵⁰

49. C.A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 105-106; G.E. Taylor, Struggle for North China, 166. For further information on the New and Old Army Incident with reference to CCP mass mobilization programmes, see chapter III, 95-97.

50. Lin Feng, "The north-west Shansi base ... behind enemy lines", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 8, 1944; also see "Chan-tou chung ch'ang-ch'eng ti Chin-sui pien-ch'ü", 戰綫中長成的晉綏邊區 (the Growth of the Shansi-Suiyuan border region amidst combats and struggles) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 17, 1944.

The years 1941 and 1942 in this base were devoted to organizing village elections as a preliminary to electing a north-west Shansi provisional assembly, which came into being in October 1942. The usual three-thirds system was said to have been observed in the composition of membership in the assembly, which had 145 members. Party influence was obvious as the assembly adopted the principal policies laid down by the party Sub-bureau for Shansi-Suiyuan.⁵¹ By the end of 1943 and early 1944, the CCP claimed to be in control of six hsien cities in north-west Shansi, the two main centres being Lin Hsien 臨縣 and Hsing Hsien 興縣.⁵² The CCP forces then were mainly composed of Ho Lung's 120th Division, Hsü Fan-ting's Anti-Japanese New Army, and the Second and Fourth Dare-to-Die Corps.⁵³

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51. For the inauguration of the provisional assembly and its relations, see "Chün-chün hai-nai lin-ta'ien-hui" 祝晉西北臨興會 (Congratulations to the north-west Shansi Provisional Assembly), (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, November 4, 1942; 2; Chieh-fang jih-pao, November 17, 1942, (on north-west Shansi). For the directions given by the party bureau, see Chieh-fang jih-pao, October 31, 1942.
52. The State of the Liberated Areas during the Anti-Japanese War, 94.
53. See appendix 1, 287.

d) The Shantung Base

Situated farthest from Yen-an, this base was also the only one in which the Eighth Route Army regulars did not arrive till the late spring of 1939. Thus in the initial period, CCP activities were confined to cooperation with local guerrilla units organized by local Communist cadres. After the outbreak of the war, the Japanese advanced south from Peiping along the Tientsin-Pukow line. Techou 德州 was occupied in late September, but further advance towards Tsinan 濟南, the capital, was put to a temporary stop because of negotiations between Japan and Han Fu-ch'ü 韓復榘, the governor of Shantung. This bargaining eventually failed to reach an agreement, and the Japanese Second Army occupied the capital on December 24, 1937, and marched through Tsining southwards to T'ai-er-chuang 台兒莊 on the southern border. Earlier, Han had ignored the Chinese National Government's order which commanded him to defend the provincial capital. Instead, Han fled with his army to the south, whilst at the same time ordering the majority of his administrators in the province to retreat. He was eventually sentenced to death and

executed for his cowardly behaviour on January 24, 1938, in Hankow.⁵⁴ His exodus from the province created a vacuum which encouraged the organizations of local resistance against the Japanese. This was especially so in Shantung, which historically was famous for the organization of secret societies, and where people were used to the idea of arming themselves for local defence. The mountains in the province, especially T'aishan 泰山 in the central part, also provided good shelter for guerrilla activities.⁵⁵

In December 1937, the first resistance organized by the Communists appeared. In the eastern part of Chiaochou 膠州 peninsula, Li Ch'i 李琪, secretary of the party area committee there, and seventeen cadres

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54. For an account of the general advance of the Japanese in Shan-tung, September-December, 1937, see C.A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 109-110; T.A. Bisson, Japan in China, Macmillan, New York, 1938, 336-337. Taylor also believes that Han Fu-ch'u's refusal to fight the Japanese was no better and no worse than the other warlord Yen Hsi-shan, see G.E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, 167.
55. Hou shen 侯森, "Hsin Shan-tung ti ch'ang-ch'eng", 新山東的長成 (The Growth of new Shantung) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944.

organized over a thousand peasants. Li Ch'i was later killed in action. In central Shantung, Li Yü 黎玉, the Shantung party secretary, and about forty cadres, formed the nucleus of guerrilla resistance in the T'aishan area.⁵⁶ The most active non-CCP resistance was organized by Fan Chu-hsien 范楚先, a former district official in Han's government, who rallied a force of 1,600 comprising peasants as well as young patriotic students in western Shantung on the border with Hopei. The resistance activities were complicated by the presence of KMT troops under Shen Hung-lieh 沈鴻烈, appointed as governor for Shantung to organize resistance forces. Fan was killed in battle against the Japanese in November 1938 at Liaoch'eng 聊城, when the latter launched a major offensive against guerrillas. The Communists accused KMT troops of being responsible for the death of Fan, whose supplies were cut off by them.⁵⁷

56. Hou Shen, "The growth of new Shantung", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944; Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the History of the New Democratic Revolution in China, 433.

57. Hou Shen, "The growth of new Shantung", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944; Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., III-II2.

The arrival of Ch'en Kuang's 陳光 Eastern Advance Detachment of the 115th Division in the late spring of 1939 strengthened the position of the CCP in the province. Ch'en's headquarters was in Ichou 沂州, southern Shantung. In the meantime, Hsiao Hua's detachment of the 129th Division had already been active on the Shantung-Hopei border since the summer of 1938. Uniform command of CCP forces in the province was maintained in April 1939, when Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, then deputy commander of the 129th Division, was put in charge of the 115th Division in Shantung, as well as the newly created Shantung Column (Shan-tung tsung-tui).⁵⁸ By the end of 1943, Hsü was in command of all CCP forces in the Shantung-Kiangsu-Honan border region with headquarters in central Shantung.⁵⁹

The establishment of civil administration at the upper level did not materialize till August 1940, when the Shantung war-time administration committee

58. For the location of CCP forces in Shantung, see Headquarters, Tada Corps, State of Affairs of CCP, March 1941, R 115, T 1009, F 26532-26540.

59. See Appendix 1, 287.

was set up south of Chü Hsien 莒縣 in southern Shantung, with Li Yü, the pioneer of CCP resistance, as chairman. A provisional assembly was also elected.⁶⁰ By 1943-1944, the Communists claimed to have established five independent regions within the base with seventeen prefectural offices in control of ninety-six hsien organizations.⁶¹ This estimate obviously included areas with only guerrilla activities. The main centre of CCP strength was in fact in mountainous central Shantung, southern Shantung, and in the eastern part of Chiaochou peninsula, that is roughly coinciding with areas where CCP forces were stationed.

CCP clashes with KMT troops in 1938 described earlier became more intense in 1939. In April that year, KMT forces under Ch'in Chi-yung 秦啟榮 killed three hundred of the Shantung Column of the Eighth Route Army, including seventy officers, cadres, and the director of the political department. This was known as the T'aiho 太和 Incident at Poshan 博山 in central Shantung. In August, 1939, CCP troops were

60. See Appendix 2, 289.

61. Hou Shen, "The growth of new Shantung", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944.

again attacked by Ch'in's forces,⁶² but a KMT source also shows that the CCP was not merely on the defensive as Ch'in himself was eventually killed in clashes with the Communists.⁶³

62. Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu 魯中行政公署 ,
Lu-chung-ch'ü k'ang-Jih min-chu cheng-ch'üan
chien-she ch'i-nien lai ti chi-pen tsung-chieh
chi chin-hou chi-pen jen-wu 魯中區抗日民主政權建設
 七年來的基本總結及今後基本任務 (A Summary
 of the Reconstruction of the Anti-Japanese Dem-
 ocratic Regime in Luchung in the Last Seven
 Years and Its Future Tasks), n.p., same, 1945,
 2-3; also see Hou Shen, "The growth of new
 Shantung", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944.

63. C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, III, 362.

CHAPTER III

Village Administration and Mass Mobilization in the Pre-Cheng Feng Period (1938 - Jan. 1942)

Having given a general survey of the CCP bases in north China in the period 1938 - 1943, it is now necessary to examine Communist contribution to village administration and mass mobilization during the war. The present study concentrates on the pre-Cheng Feng period, that is, from 1938 to January 1942. It may be said that up to 1937, governments in China could exercise direct control only as far down as the hsien (county) level, and this applied without exception to the authority of the KMT government. The administration of local governments below the hsien level was to a large extent in the hands of the landlord-gentry class.^I As early as the 1920s, the CCP with its peasants' associations had experimented with the disruption of hsien as a barrier to effective central control by organizing peasants

I. For a comprehensive explanation of how the landlord-gentry class controlled the local administration, and acted as a barrier to effective mass mobilization at the village level, see Kuo Ping-chia, China New Age and New Outlook, Penguin Books Ltd., England, 1960, 34-35, 63.

from below at the village level, where the administrative power was often taken over from the landlords who were purged and persecuted.² However, these early CCP attempts to exercise influence over the villages and organize the masses were comparatively small-scale operations, as the Communists themselves were then hotly pursued by KMT troops and they were fighting bitterly for their own survival.

With the setting up of the four major bases in north China covering extensive areas behind the enemy lines, the Communists by 1938 were given a good chance to organize the masses from below, that is at the village level. To a large extent, these CCP efforts proved to be a success in the period 1938-1945 and contributed a great deal to the rise of

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2. For a detailed account of the anti-landlord movement led by the peasants' associations in Kiangsi, 1926-1927, see Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti li-shih tzu-liao 中國共產黨的歷史資料 (A collection of Historical Material on the Revolutionary struggle in Kiangsi under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party), Kiangsi, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1958, I, 242-255. Chang Kuo-tao, the leading CCP figure in the 1920s and 1930s, also gave a critical account of the history of the peasants' associations in his memoirs: Chang Kuo-tao, "Wo-ti hui-i" 我的回憶 (my reminiscences) Ming Pao Monthly, Hong Kong, III, No. 3, 95-98. Also see John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition ..., 61-64, 101-103, 161-165, and 259-260.

Communist power after the Second World War. In addition, this success in mass mobilization and direct control of the villages meant that the Communists had successfully disrupted the hsien as a barrier to effective central control down to the villages.

It must be explained in the first place that Communist local administration in the bases was to a large extent controlled by geographical position. The series of Japanese military campaigns against the Communists, and the building up of Japanese communication lines linking strategic points which were in turn well defended by fortresses, necessarily broke up the CCP bases into isolated positions no more than a few villages in size, especially in territories adjacent to the occupied area.³ The situation was most acute for the Communists in 1941-1942, when the Japanese and their puppets launched

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3. Many Communist sources described how Japanese troops blockaded and isolated CCP bases, especially in the period 1941-1942: The People's Liberation Army during the Anti-Japanese War, 119-120, 137-145; Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the New Democratic Revolution in China, 454-455. Some aspects of the Japanese pressure on the CCP bases are also dealt with in Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 5,41, 54-56. Japanese pressure on the bases in the period 1941-1942 will be dealt with in full detail in chapter four.

a series of four mopping-up campaigns in the Ch'iang-hua chih-an yün-tung 強化治安運動 (The movement to Reinforce Law and Order), and an average of 10,000 to 20,000 troops was employed every time in attacking the various CCP bases.⁴

Although these mopping-up campaigns did not bring about results as fruitful as the Japanese would have expected, they definitely caused a recession in the strength of the CCP bases in north China. This effect on the Communists can be seen in the following statistical excerpt from a report by Yeh Chien-ying, the chief-of-staff of the 18th Army Group which comprised the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army:⁵

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4. For details of the four mopping-up campaigns in 1941, including the report of unsatisfactory progress of the campaigns by Wang I-t'ang 王揖唐, then chairman of the puppet regime of the North China Political Council, see chapter 4, I34-I37.
 5. Yeh Chien-ying, "Chung-kung k'ang-chan i-pan cheng-k'uang chieh-shao", 中共抗戰一般情況介紹 (An introduction to the general situation of CCP's resistance) Chieh-fang jih-pao, August 10, 1944.

| | <u>8th Route Army</u> | <u>New 4th Army</u> | <u>Total*</u> |
|------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| 1940 | 400,000 | 100,000 | 500,000 |
| 1941 | 305,000 | 135,000 | 440,000 |
| 1942 | 340,000 | 110,960 | 450,960 |

* CCP armed strength included guerrillas as well as regulars.

1940 actually marked the climax of CCP power, but 1941 and the first half of 1942 were times of adversity, when the Japanese military pressure was the heaviest ever since the start of the war. This can be illustrated in the ratio of war casualties reported:⁶

| | Enemy* | : | CCP |
|-------------------------|--------|---|-----|
| 1937 (Sept.)-1938 (May) | 1 | : | 1 |
| 1940 (June)-1941(May) | 1.2: | : | 1 |
| 1941 (June)-1942(May) | 1.3: | : | 1 |

*Enemy included both Japanese and puppet troops.

As far as the administration of local governments is concerned, the CCP in 1941 found it necessary to reduce the number of offices at the hsien and

6. Ibid.

ch'ü (district) levels in order to meet the challenge of the Japanese onslaughts. For instance, at the 12th administrative conference of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government in December 1941, it was decided that the offices of some hsien should be incorporated into one, whilst some others were to take over the administration of districts under them. In addition, small size hsien were not to administer districts and the number of districts was in turn reduced by 40% of the original.⁷ This was in actual fact part of the programme to cut troops and simplify the administration which became necessary in view of the growing Japanese pressure since the beginning of 1941. The effect of the above on the local administration, as illustrated in the examples of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government, was that it made the administrative village⁸ virtually the unit directly under the hsien in the graded levels

7. Chieh-fang jih-pao, January 27, 1942.

8. The administrative village (hsing-cheng ts'un) 行政村, was the basic CCP unit of local administration, consisting of several tzu-jan ts'un 自然村, or ordinary village.

of local government, as district administration was considered uneconomical to run.

Furthermore, the functioning of the administrative village became all the more important and fundamental where CCP controlled hsien were either too small or situated in marginal areas, where CCP influence could only be extended to part of the hsien, the other part being either in the hands of the Japanese or the KMT. Statistics compiled from contemporary Communist sources, illustrating the number of villages per hsien and the population per village in the CCP bases, also indicate the emergence of the village as a significant local unit:⁹

9. Sources were compiled from Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1941, March 23, 1942, April 12, April 20, 1942, and July 10, 1944. It must be emphasized that figures shown in the chart may vary slightly from month to month, in view of the tremendous number of military operations engaged in by both sides during this period.

North-west Shansi base Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Shansi-Hopei-
base Shantung-Honan
base

| | | | |
|---|-----------|------------|------------|
| Population | 1,400,000 | 18,300,000 | 12,850,000 |
| No. of hsien # | 18 | 108 | 115 |
| No. of administrative villages | 200 | not known | 35,361 |
| Average administrative villages/hsien | 11* | not known | 300* |
| Average population/administrative village | 7,500* | not known | 3,600* |

≠ the total number of hsien-cities held by the CCP in north China was about 30.

* approximate calculations.

(Sources on Shantung were not available, probably because activities there tended to be more guerrilla than administrative in nature).

A few points from the chart on page 69 are worth examining. In north-west Shansi, where the terrain was mountainous, villages far apart, and the base closest to the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Government (separated only by the Yellow River), the administrative village became a very realistic local authority, especially when each hsien comprised only an average of 11 administrative villages. As for the average population per administrative village, the figure 7,500 was surprisingly high.¹⁰ In the case of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan region, the average number of administrative villages per hsien stood as high as 300, but each village was again an independent, basic, administrative unit, especially in the sub-region of the Hopei-Shantung-Honan plain, where one administrative village was cut off from another by the numerous Japanese fortresses, strategic points, blockades and communication networks.¹¹

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10. Activities of the administrative village in north-west Shansi are given in Mu Hsin 穆欣, Chin-sui chieh-fang-ch'u min-ping k'ang-Jih tou-cheng san-chi 晉綏邊同敵區民兵抗日鬥爭實況 (Random Notes of the Militia's Anti-Japanese Struggle in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area), Shanghai, jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1959, 1-8.
11. Tao Chu 陶鈞, "Lun mu-chien ti-hou chan-cheng ti t'e-tien", 論目前敵後戰爭特點 (On the characteristics of the present war behind the enemy lines) Chieh-fang jih-pao, May 3, 1943. Tao in his article explained how CCP bases in the plains were blockaded.

Having seen the emergence of the administrative village as a practical and realistic local unit, the next step is to analyse the various administrative organizations at this local level, especially the work of mass mobilization. At the head of the administrative village was the chu-jen tai-piao 主任代表 or chief representative, with the village administrative office (ts'un kung-so) 村公所 as his headquarters. Under him might be several heads of the village as each of these administrative villages might comprise as many as ten ordinary villages.¹² The chief representative was generally assisted by a village committee; for instance, in 1941, in the CCP sub-region of southern Hopei, there were as many as 743 of these committees in the administrative villages.¹³

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12. A survey was done in north-west Shansi in which over 100 administrative villages comprising 1,000 ordinary villages were involved, that is, an average of nearly 10 of the latter to each of the former. See Chieh-fang jih-pao, April 20, 1942. For a chart illustrating the administrative structure from the hsien to the village level in north-west Shansi, see Research Section, Central Committee for the Extermination of Communism, Sanseishō Sei-hokubu Hijō Chōsa Hōkoku 山西省西北部匪情調查報告 (Survey of Banditry in Northwest Shansi Province), July 1940. R 114, F 26116-26118.
13. Leng Ping 冷冰, "Chieh-shao Chin-Chi-Lu-Ju pien-ch'ü", 介紹晉冀魯豫邊區 (To introduce the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region) Chieh-fang jih-pao, March 23, 1942.

The term chief representative itself suggests elections, and indeed the CCP went to great length of elaboration to organize the villagers' conference (ts'un-min ta-hui) 村民大會, with the purpose of electing these representatives, and the well-publicized three-thirds system was also observed as far as possible to ensure CCP members did not appear to have dominated the situation.¹⁴

After the establishment of the various bases in north China, the Communists were intent on introducing village elections and wanted as many people participating in these elections as possible. For instance, statistics for village elections in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Government showed that in 1938, 40-50 % of the population participated in these elections, whilst in 1940, it rose to 70 %, and in central Hopei, it reached 80 %; and the Communist strongholds in the mountains of ~~Shansi~~, like P'ing-shan and Ningshou 寧壽, nearly 90 % of the population in the village voted in 1940.¹⁵ Apparently, the method of

14. Tung Pi-wu, A True Account of the Liberated Areas in China, 17,22.

15. Figures were from Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944, August 11, 1941, July 7, 1942; also The State of the Liberated Areas during the Anti-Japanese War, 31.

election was crude, and the show of hand method was very often preferred to voting by ballot because of the high percentage of illiteracy. Furthermore, the Communist cadres played an important part in guiding election procedures and the inert masses very often had to be encouraged to take part in these elections. It is interesting to note here that the CCP did attempt to evolve a method akin to voting by ballot for the illiterate villagers, although its many drawbacks prevented it from becoming the prevailing practice in elections. Ballot baskets were attached to the back of seats occupied by candidates in elections, and a voter cast his or her vote by putting a bean into the relevant basket.¹⁶

To understand CCP enthusiasm in fostering village elections, and in fact at higher local levels as well, it is necessary to survey the situation of the countryside when the Communists set up their bases. Apart from the Japanese military pressure, it was local influences in the villages that stood in the way of effective CCP administration, and the CCP found that the best way to overcome these hindrances was to evolve these elections, so that undesirable elements in the local government could be eliminated and

16. Tung Pi-wu, A True Account of the Liberated Areas in China, 22.

Communist orientated people could take their place. These local influences which the Communists wanted to get rid of could be divided into three categories, namely, the secret societies, local bullies who were locally entrenched elements able to exert influence over local villagers, often through intimidation and illegal means, and lastly, the landlords, with the last being the most formidable opponent.

Superstition had for centuries established its roots in the countryside amongst peasants in China, hence the popularity of secret societies as exemplified in large scale rebellions like the White Lotus Rebellion at the end of the 18th century. In the Communist bases of Shantung and the Hopei-Shantung-Honan plain, secret societies seemed most active and their influence definitely infiltrated into the local administrations, utilizing superstition as the cementing force amongst peasants. For instance, the Liu Li Society 六離會, the Pai Chi Society 白極會, and the Red Spear Society 紅槍會 were particularly active and influential in the Hopei-Shantung-Honan plain.¹⁷

17. Leng Ping, "To introduce the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region", Chieh-fang jih-pao, March 23, 1942; Sun Hsueh-lu 孫學魯, "Chi-nan tung-hsin", 冀南通訊 (News from southern Hopei) Ch'un-chung, 華新 II, No. 14, 641-642. Also see Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944.

C.A. Johnson points out that the Communist Army advised cadres to adopt a hands-off policy toward secret societies in the various bases. This perhaps represented CCP policy in the late 1930s,¹⁸ but with Communist organizations established on firmer ground by 1942, actions against secret societies were taken in the north China bases. For instance, in early 1942, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government decreed that participations in secret societies would be considered as traitorous behaviour.¹⁹

The influence of local bullies was also apparent as Communist sources revealed that many of them managed to establish themselves in the village admin-

18. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 88. Johnson's information on the activities of the secret societies in north China was quoted from Japanese military archives of 1939: see n. 56 (chapter 3), 217.

19. "The decree of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government", Chieh-fang jih-pao, March 30, 1942.

istration as deputy chief representatives,²⁰ but perhaps they did not offer as much resistance to the Communists as the landlords, whose influence prevailed over Communist-controlled villages. This was mainly because of the CCP adoption of the United Front policy,²¹ which in essence tolerated the lesser landlords and sought the cooperation of the national bourgeoisie, especially in the CCP bases in north China, where the good will and cooperation of the landlords and rich peasants were even more needed because of the intense Japanese military and economic pressure, particularly in the years 1941 and 1942. In spite of the good work done by the Communists in safeguarding the interest of the poor peasants, landlords still had a great say in the economic life of the villages, mainly because of the great acreage of land they held and which they let to

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20. For accounts of participations by local bullies in village administration, see Sun Yuan-fan, "The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border region becoming like steel ...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944; The State of the Liberated Areas during the Anti-Japanese War, 31; and Research Section, Central Committee for the Extermination of Communism, Kichū-ku Chūbu Chihō Ni Okeru Chūkyō No Minshū Kakutoku Kōsaku Jitsujō Chōsa Hōkoku, 冀中区中部地方における中共の民衆獲得工作の實情調査報告 (Field Survey of Chinese Communist Efforts to Win Support of People in Central Hopei), May, 1940. R 114, T 999, F 26300.
21. The need for the CCP to seek the cooperation of the bourgeoisie in the United Front Policy was explained in chapter 1, 25-26.

their tenants. The following chart relating to north-west Shansi in early 1942 illustrates this point:²²

| | landlords | rich peasants | middle peasants | poor peasants |
|--|-----------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|
| % in the class structure* | 2.85% | 5.5% | 31.6% | 51% |
| % of land held | 14.6% | 12.5% | 45 % | 25.5% |
| land held per head (in Mou, or 1/6 acre) | 88.2 | 33.38 | 23.8 | 9.58 |

* minor figures representing the merchants and intellectuals are omitted as they bear no significance here.

Investigations in north-west Shansi on the renting and letting situation in December 1941 reveal the following facts. In the two villages of Hsin Ts'un Pao 新村堡, in Ningwu hsien, surveys indicate that landlords did not rent any land from others, but

22. Wei Wen 韋文, "Chin hsi-pei ti tu-ti wen-ti", 晉西北的土問題 (Land problem in north-west Shansi) Chieh-fang jih-pao, April 20, 1942. This survey was taken from 18 hsien in north-west Shansi, with figures from 100 administrative villages and nearly 1,000 ordinary villages.

only let it to tenants. On the other hand, five-sixths of poor peasants' land, and two-thirds of middle peasants' land were rented, in most cases, from landlords.²³ This means that landlords could therefore exercise tremendous influence over tenants because they had the right to take back the rented land if they wished. This right was known as "ch'ou ti" 抽地 or land repossession,²⁴ and it was not until 1943 that the Communists were able to safeguard the interest of the tenants and poor peasants against the exploitations of the landlords.

As it was, the landlord-class up to the period late 1941 and early 1942 had great power to dictate the economic situation in the villages. The pao-chia system for instance was very much under the sway of the landlords. To offset the landlords' influence, the CCP utilized the election and re-election of

23. Ibid.

24. For details of how land repossession offered the greatest threat to the tenants, see 116-117.

village heads and chief representatives as the means to elevate the position of its protégés, the poor and middle peasants. This was evident in north-west Shansi in the percentage of class-composition of elected village leaders in 1941. The figures were taken from 55 administrative villages selected from II hsien:²⁵

| | poor peasants, tenants and labourers | middle peasants | landlords and rich peasants |
|---|--|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Chief represent- atives (of ad- ministrative villages) | 38% | 44% | 16% |
| village heads | 53% | 32% | 14% |

The cadres were mainly responsible for getting the village elections moving and they were in the best position to see that their protégés were nominated

25. "Chan-tou chung ch'eng-ch'ang ti Chin-sui pien-ch'u", 單戈(平)中成長的晉魯邊區 (The Shansi-Suiyuan border growing up from combats) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 16, 1944; and The State of the Liberated Areas during the Anti-Japanese War, 104.

for elections. The whole democratic experiment was in fact quite paternalistic, but even so, it was unprecedented in the history of village administration. The important role of these cadres who acted as the pivot in villages can be seen in eager efforts on the part of the Japanese to eliminate them. During the climax of the Japanese pressure in 1941 and 1942, thousands of cadres were reported to have been killed as they were regarded as the root of the problem by the Japanese, and the heaviest casualties were in the plain of central Hopei, where defence was difficult, and in the strategic, mountainous areas of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base.²⁶

The general principle of democratic centralism can also be seen at work in the villages. Whilst elections symbolized limited democracy, cadres who were mainly responsible for supervising these elections took orders from seniors at levels above them as well as observing directives and instructions from above. Hence power was traced back to the respective

26. The State of the Liberated Areas ..., 32-33, and Sun Yuan-fan, "The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region becoming like steel ...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944.

highest administrative organizations in the bases. In addition, the party kept a close watch on the administration with the setting up of party sub-bureau (fen-chü) 分局, in each of the four bases in north China.²⁷ These four party sub-bureauX in turn received orders from the Northern Party Bureau (Pei-fang Chü) 北方局, which was directly under the CCPCC. The power of the party central was felt through the issuing of party directives which were to be observed down to the village level, at least theoretically, and cadres were to see that they were carried out. A typical example can perhaps illustrate how it worked. On August 13, 1940, the CCP Northern Party Bureau issued according to the principles of the CCPCC an outline policy which applied to and was to be observed by the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base. It specified that the Border Government must not levy any additional tax in the base, and stricter measures were to be introduced to get rid of corruption, and to stop unnecessary expenditure. This particular policy was then passed by the Border Region Assembly concerned,

27. For details of the four party Sub-bureauX in the north China bases, see chapter 5, 181.

and the programmes were to be carried out throughout the base down to village level.²⁸

In view of the isolated position of the villages, one would hardly expect the directives of the Northern Party Bureau to be observed to the letter in the villages, and a great deal of flexibility in fact existed in the execution of orders and directives, which was in the hands of the cadres at the different local levels. Before going into the difficulties of CCP efforts to maintain centralism at the villages, it must be pointed out that CCPCC directives and resolutions very often were carried out right down to the villages. For instance, an important CCPCC directive on August 1, 1941, laid down that there were to be scientific and statistical investigations and surveys into the different class structures, land problems and local condition in the various villages.²⁹

28. Hsiang Sheng ^{學生}, "Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-ch'ü ts'ai-cheng chien-she chung ti chang-ch'ü", ^{觀察冀邊區財政建設} 中的 ^{觀察} (Spectacular progress in the financial reconstruction of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region) Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 7, 1941.

29. "Chung-kung chung-yang kuan-yü t'iao-ch'a yen-chiu ti ch'ieh-ting", ^{中共中央關於調查研究的決定} (CCPCC's resolution on investigations and research) Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 8, 1941. (The resolution was passed on August 1, 1941).

By February 1942, detailed reports of the various land problems in the bases were already published with detailed statistics of landlord-tenant relations at the village level.³⁰ An even more detailed report of the background and intellectual level of the various heads and chief representatives in the villages of north-west Shansi was published in March 1942 according to the instructions of the central directive mentioned above.³¹

Whilst central authority could sometimes be felt as far down as the villages, defects in this machinery of democratic centralism were also inevitable, and the determining factor rested with the cadres. In the first place, there was often insufficient liaison between cadres at different levels because of the growth of regional isolation resultant from the acute Japanese pressure. The result was senior cadres were

30. The report was on the situation of the rent-reduction programme in the CCP bases: Huang Wei-wen 黃韋文, "Kuan-yu ken-chü-ti chien-tsu chien-hsi-ti i-hsieh ts'ai-liao", 關於根據地減租減息的一些材料 (Some sources on the reduction of rent and interest in the bases) Chieh-fang jih-pao, February II, 1942.

31. North-west Shansi Commissioner's Office, "Hsing-hsien ts'un-ch'ang ts'e-yen", 興縣村長選訓報告 (Tests on village chiefs of Hsing Hsien) Chieh-fang jih-pao, March I, 1942.

unable to extend to village cadres sufficient guidance and leadership which the latter definitely needed.³² In addition, the lack of liaison also led to long delays in the passing on of party directives. For instance, in north-west Shansi, regulations governing services rendered by villagers in the war of resistance were released at top level in October 1941, but it was not until January 1942 that chief representatives of the administrative villages received these directives.³³ As far as central control was concerned, this time-gap meant that village administration was often left to the discretion of the cadres in the absence of central directives, producing greater flexibility and less central control. The disadvantage of this flexibility was sometimes evident because of the inadequacies of

32. For accounts of these defects, see "On party leadership", (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, October 24, 1942; Ying Yung 應甯, "luh-lun Chin hsi-pei ssu-ch'ü cheng-ch'üan kung-tso ti chüeh-tien", 西北四區政權工作的缺點 (A brief talk on the defects of the administration in the Fourth District of north-west Shansi) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 2, 1942; and Sugiyama Corps, Pacification Unit, Sanseishō Wajunken chihō kyōsan chiku jōkyō hōkokusho 山西省平順縣地方共產黨二區調查報告 (Report on Communist Areas in Hoshun Hsien, Shansi), August 8, 1939, R 113, T 944, F 24502.

33. Ying Yung, "A talk on the defects in the Fourth District ...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 2, 1942.

village cadres, and the Cheng Feng Movement of 1942 therefore particularly saw that these mistakes be corrected.³⁴ The main weakness of local administrators was their low standard of education which often impeded the smooth functioning of the administration. The majority of cadres were of peasant or working-class origin, and were therefore hardly expected to be able to read and write. A survey in early 1942 on the education level of the best 18 village heads from Hsing Hsien in north-west Shansi had the following results: of the 11 newly elected village heads, 2 had three years of education, 6 had two years, and 3 were illiterate. Of the seven re-elected village heads, one had three years of education, one had two years, and one was an intellectual, and four were illiterate. In addition, out of these 18 administrators, 10

34. Ying Yung, "A talk on the defects in the Fourth District . . .", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 2, 1942. Also see Nieh Jung-chen 聶榮臻, "Ch'uan-mien chan-k'ai cheng-tun san-feng ti hsueh-hsi yu chien-ch'a", 全面展開整頓三風的學習與檢查 (To Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, pointed out the inability of local cadres in the execution of orders) Chieh-fang jih-pao, Aug. 27, 1942.

answered their questions put to them in writing, but the other 8 had to answer orally. Twenty questions covering different aspects of local administration were put to them and the resultant scores revealed some conclusions which throw important light on the weakness of the village administration. The test shows that village cadres were not able to understand central directives and instructions correctly, hence their personal interpretation of rules and regulations might tend to impede the local administration. An example of such weaknesses was the inability of cadres to understand the new programme of rent-reduction enforced in 1941.³⁵

Up to the period ending early 1942, village administration in the bases was further complicated by the diversities of the various local organizations which were headed by different types of cadres, e.g., those attached to the army, the party and the locally elected bodies. Criticisms of the Cheng Feng Movement in 1942 indicate that there was a lack of coordination

35. North-west Shansi Commissioner's Office, "Test on village chiefs of Hsing Hsien", Chieh-fang jih-pao, March 1, 1942.

amongst these different cadres in the village, and they also implied that in the pre-Cheng Feng period, the local party headquarters failed to take up uniform leadership of all party, army, administrative, and mass organizations.³⁶

Having indicated some of the outstanding problems of village administration, it must also be emphasized that village cadres were far from failing to perform responsibilities entrusted to them. In the first place, although these cadres received little or no education, they were mostly experienced mechanics well versed in the mentality of the peasants, and therefore were tremendously useful in mass mobilization. Many of them might even have a history dating back to the dark desperate days of the Long March when their survival

36. "Tang ti ling-tao pi-sui i-yuan hua" 黨的領導必須一元化 (There must be uniformity in party leadership), (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, October 24, 1942. In view of party's inability to assume uniform leadership in the bases, the party central passed a resolution on September I, 1942, reasserting the importance of uniform party leadership over the various local organizations relating to the party, the army, the administration and the people.

depended so much on the good will of the local peasants. The main functions these village cadres had to perform could be divided into two categories, namely, work involved in the various mass mobilization programmes, and the day-to-day administration of the village, both of which were closely linked together. Whether the village in the bases could withstand the Japanese onslaughts depended a great deal on the progress of the above mentioned work which cadres had to perform.

Mass Mobilization

With the launching of the Japanese mopping-up campaigns in 1941, the CCP found that the administrative villages became all the more isolated. The interval of time between military engagements became shorter, and the Japanese blockades tighter. This acute situation made the cadres, the Eighth Route Army and the guerrillas all the more dependent on the villages they were in, and it became all the more urgent for the cadres to organize the people in the locality to help the Communist cause against the Japanese. The deterioration in KMT-CCP relations in the second half of 1939 resulted in KMT blockades on the CCP bases, whilst the Chungking Government eventually resolved on terminating all financial and

military support for the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies.³⁷ Consequently, Communist troops had had to depend economically on the villages they were stationed in.

Tao Chu 陶铸, who was then working in the chief-of-staff office in Yen-an and eventually became chief secretary of the office in 1944, calculated the extent to which the local people could support the troops in economic terms. Using CCP sources and investigation results, he reckoned that it needed one hundred people in the CCP bases to support two soldiers or cadres who were economically non-productive because of their responsibilities, and in areas adjacent to the occupied area, the ratio is even less favourable than 100:2.³⁸ It must also be mentioned that Tao Chu's calculation was based on the assumption that the local people in the villages were willing to help, and were fully awakened to their sense of responsibility and patriotism

37. Chu Teh, On the Battle Fields in the Liberated Areas, 58-59.

38. Tao Chu, "Tsai-t'an cheng-ping chien-cheng", 再言談精兵簡政 (A further talk on the policy to cut troops and simply the administration) Chieh-fang jih-pao, June 25, 1942.

in the war of resistance.

In order to rally the support of the people in the villages, cadres therefore had to undertake various programmes of mass organization. Perhaps the best description of the functions of mass mobilization was an article written by Tung Pi-wu 董必武, the veteran and one of the founders of the CCP, in July 1939, in which he listed the various responsibilities which people in the Communist bases behind enemy lines should perform. Near areas of military operations, Tung specified that the local people were expected to help the army, or guerrillas, by acting as scouts, agents, or doing the work of an orderly or medical assistant. In areas more remote from the battle field, people were expected to organize themselves for transport purposes, or against air-raids and enemy agents. In addition, they should look after the spouses and dependents of soldiers who were in active service in the front line. In terms of military organizations, the power of the people was to be fully utilized in such organizations as the tzu-wei-tui 自衛隊 (self-defence corps) or better still, the militia.³⁹ The

39. Tung Pi-wu, "Wo-kuo k'ang-chan erh-nien-lai ti min-chung yün-tung", 我國抗戰兩年來的民衆運動 (Two years of the mass movement) Chün-chung, III, No. 10, (July 23, 1939), 272-274.

specific duty of these people's armed bands was clearly specified in Teng Hsiao-p'ing's article on problems of armament in May, 1939.⁴⁰ Teng asserted that mass operations should aim at demolishing Japanese military installations like communication lines and telegraph wires, whilst constructively, self-defence corps and the militia were trained to perform work like transport, carrying stretchers, or acting as sentries. Within the villages, they received political and military education and kept an eye on enemy spies. The following is a chart giving a clear picture of the extent and scope of the mass organizations as they stood in late 1941 and early 1942:⁴¹

40. Chieh-fang, No. 72 (May 30, 1939), 9.

41. Wang Yueh-fei, "How we establish new democratic rule in the bases behind enemy lines", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 7, 1942. For a general classification of the various National Salvation Associations, also see Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 89-90.

| Organizations | Peasants' National Salvation Associations | | Workers' N.S. Associations | | Youths' N.S. Associations | | Women's N.S. Associations | | Children's N.S. Associations | | Self-defence corps | | Militia | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|--|------------------------------|--|--------------------|--|---------|--|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Shansi - Chahar - Hopei | 875,961 | 214,682 | 280,954 | 710,535 | 628,817 | 3,812,991 | 619,961 | | | | | | | |
| Shansi - Hopei - Shantung - Honan | 1,678,001 | 123,625 | 273,960 | 834,673 | 1,077,000 | 1,387,510 | 356,318 | | | | | | | |
| North-west Shansi | 127,000 | 55,000 | 7,000 | 387,000 | 14,567 | 200,000 | not known | | | | | | | |
| Shantung | 107,000 | 222,000 | 420,000 | 302,000 | 216,222 | 1,256,000 | not known | | | | | | | |
| Central China | 1,222,000 | 432,000 | 252,000 | 400,000 | not known | 62,797 | not known | | | | | | | |
| Total | 4,97,962 | 763,307 | 1,474,914 | 3,414,608 | 1,981,222 | 6,272,382 | | | | | | | | |

Chart Showing the Number of People in the Mass Organizations of CCP bases, 1941-1941

* Where a question-mark appears, it indicates the figure in the original source was blurred.

The different mass organizations listed on page 92 were not of equal importance. The militia and the self-defence corps obviously were the sources of resistance against the Japanese,⁴² whilst the peasants' association with its history dating back to the 1920s played the leading role in recruiting the local people in the villages for military purposes. Considering the fact that the strength of the total Communist armed forces and guerrillas in China was then about 440,000,⁴³ it can be said that the army regulars were well supported by the auxiliary forces in the villages. However, it should be pointed out that the Communists were very fond of using statistics and figures to publicize the size of their organisations, and it is not uncommon for the size and scope of the mass organizations to have been exaggerated. Nevertheless, it is without doubt that the CCP had up to this period been able to develop the mass organizations successfully

42. Michael Lindsay observed in 1942-1944 that membership for the self-defence corps was practically compulsory for able-bodied men in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base. In other words, the CCP was aiming at maximum mobilization in resisting the Japanese; M. Lindsay, North China Front, 15.

43. See first chart on p. 66.

against the Japanese.⁴⁴

The origin of these war-time mass organizations dated back to early 1938 when various CCP bases were being set up in north China. In fact, at that early stage, there was no "chih ho jen-wu", 抗日根據地民眾團體 (抗日根據地民眾團體) organizations and the nature and responsibilities of these organizations in anti-Japanese bases), Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 29, 1942.

local CCP cadres be up CCP strength behind the enemy lines from almost nothing. The Communists set up mobilization committees in the locality as a preliminary step leading towards the founding of local administrations. These committees had different names like "lin-shih tung-yuan wei-hui" 臨時動員委員會 (Provisional mobilization committee) or "chan-ti tung-yuan wei-hui" 戰地動員委員會 (battle-front mobilization committee) and formed the solid Communist foundation and the means to attract anti-Japanese elements to join their camp, no matter whether they were KMT members or neutral elements. As far as the mass organizations were concerned, the mass mobiliza-

44. "K'ang-Jih ken-chü-ti min-chung t'uan-ti hsing-chih ho jen-wu", 抗日根據地民眾團體性質和任務 (The nature and responsibilities of mass organizations in anti-Japanese bases), Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 29, 1942.

tion committees were responsible for the growth of the self-defence corps and the militia. The most successful armed resistance programme organized by these committees at the early stage of the war was perhaps in Shansi, where the Communists had set up a military base in north-west Shansi, and the south-east Shansi region which came under the Shansi-Hopei Shantung-Honan Border Government.

"
Hsu Fan-ting, the pro-Communist KMT member, ⁴⁵ organized a battle front mobilization committee in Shansi on the principles of the United Front. With the cooperation from Yen Hsi-shan, then KMT commander for the Shansi region, Hsu was able to organize the First Provisional Division in Shansi, then known as

45. After the conclusion of the Sian Incident in December 1936, Hsu Fan-ting represented Yang Huch'eng, Chang Hsueh-liang's partner in the Sian Incident, and made a report of the Incident to the people of Shansi and Yen Hsi-shan. With the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War in July 1937, Hsu became one of Yen's senior staff officers, but with the KMT-CCP clash in Shansi in December 1939, Hsu sided with the Communists in founding the north-west Shansi base in early 1940. For a biography of Hsu, see Nan Hsin-shen 南新申, Hsu Fan-ting ti ku-shih 胡範廷的過去 (Biography of Hsu Fan-ting), Shanghai, wen-i ch'u-pan-she, 1960, 130

the New Army.⁴⁶ Also in Shansi was organized the Sacrifice League (Hsi-meng hui) 犧盟會, which was founded earlier on September 18, 1936, with the objective of mobilizing the people in resistance to Japan. With the invasion of Shansi by the Japanese in late 1937, Yen Hsi-shan sought the assistance of the League by arming it with 30,000 rifles. Thus the Dare-to-Die corps (chueh-ssu-tui) 決死隊 was formed with immense control by the Communists who became officials, political commissars, and commanders. The most prominent of these figures was Po I-po 薄一波, who was commander of one of the contingents of the Dare-to-Die Corps. In addition, the Labour Defence Corps (kung-wei tui) 工衛隊 and the Political Defence Corps (cheng-wei tui) 政衛隊 were also organized, and all these forces operated in the various

46. Hsu Fan-ting, "Chih Shan-hsi tu-huang-ti Yen Hsi-shan ti i-feng wu-chien-yen shu", 致山西土皇帝國錫山的一封信 (A five-thousand-word letter to Yen Hsi-shan, the local tyrant of Shansi) Chieh-fang jih-pao, August 24, 1944; Lin Feng, "The North-west Shansi Base which stands firm in the war of resistance behind enemy lines", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 8, 1943.

bases in north-west, north-east, and south-east Shansi.⁴⁷ Unfortunately, this boom of mass mobilization in Shansi under Communist patronage suffered a heavy set-back in December 1939, when the New and Old Army Incident broke out, with troops loyal to Yen Hsi-shan attacking the Communist-inspired Dare-to-Die Corps and the First Provisional Division.⁴⁸

In southern Hopei, the mobilization committee was set up in December 1937, and operated under the leadership of Yang Hsiu-feng, the former university

47. For activities of the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-Die Corps, see Kê Han 克寒, "Chien-ch'ih Hua-pei k'ang-chan shu-niu ti Chin-Chi-Yu k'ang-Jih ken-chü-ti", 晉冀魯豫抗日救國軍第一師 (The Shansi-Hopei-Honan anti-Japanese base, the key to sustaining the war of resistance in north China) Chün-chung, III, No. I, (May 21, 1939), 842; "The 129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region", Chieh-fang jih-pao, August 14, 1944; Taylor, The Struggle for North China, 165; and Johnson, Peasant Nationalism . . ., 100.

48. The Incident has been discussed in chapter 2, see 54.

professor from Peking,⁴⁹ who then became the commander of the western Hopei guerrilla contingent. He had with him a band of intellectuals, mostly students and some teachers, and they contributed a valuable part in leading the various national salvation organizations, which went under the usual sub-divisions of peasants, workers, women and youths. There was an emphasis on educating the local people because of the large number of intellectuals Yang had with him. The self-defence corps was also organized into units according to village, district, and hsien levels, but the basic training centre was at the village level.⁵⁰ The important function of the self-defence corps as reserves for army regulars was also demonstrated in southern Hopei, as reports by the Japanese troops indicate that

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49. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Yang Hsiu-feng gave up his teaching post to join the army attached to the Paoting 保定 Headquarters in Hopei. However, when Chinese troops retreated from Paoting, Yang decided to stay in western Hopei and led the guerrillas against the Japanese. See Ting Ling, The 129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region, 9.
50. Sun Hsueh-lu, "News from southern Hopei", Chün-Chung, II, No. 14, 641; Yang Hsiu-feng's report to the border government assembly is in chieh-fang jih-pao, July 26, 1941. Also see Teng Hsiao-p'ing 鄧小平, "Chien-ku fen-tou ti Chi-nan", 苦奮鬥的冀南 (Southern Hopei in a bitter struggle) Chieh-fang, No. 71, (May 15, 1939), 14.

these people's armed bands in six hsien of southern Hopei were elevated in 1941 to regular army units.⁵¹

In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, mass mobilization was organized according to proximity to the occupied area. In areas adjacent to Japanese-held territories, the mobilization committee took up responsibilities of assisting regular troops in combats, and its chief duty was to organize the self-defence corps. In areas further away from the battle field, the emphasis was on educational and political work.⁵² When this region was set up, Nieh Jung-chen as deputy commander of the 115th Division had only 2,000 men, but by 1939, the good work of the mobilization committee had succeeded in convincing the local people that it was to their advantage to assist the guerrillas. For instance, reports in 1939 indicate that the Communists were able to mobilize as many as 23,000 people during guerrilla combats in just one single hsien, namely the CCP stronghold of P'ingshan. Other main centres

51. Headquarters, Tada Corps, State of Affairs of Chinese Communist Party ... War-time Report, March, 1941. R115, T 1008, F 26504, p.5.

52. Lu Ting-i 陸定一, "Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-ch'ü fên-sui ti-jen ch'in kung ti chi-ko chung-yao ching-yen", 晉察冀邊區半游擊商工人進口的幾個重要經驗 (Some important experience in crushing enemy's attacks in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region) Chieh-fang, No. 67, (March 20, 1939) 29-30; and Sun Yuan-fan, "The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region becoming like steel", Chieh-feng jih-pao, July 10, 1944.

like Chüyang and Foup'ing also had reports of favourable assistance from the people.⁵³

In the central Hopei plain under the leadership of Lü Cheng-ts'ao, mass mobilization programmes were most necessary to oppose the frequent Japanese attacks. At the basic level, the village committee was the centre of mass mobilization, supervising the various national salvation associations, as well as the road-demolition unit.⁵⁴ The demolition of communication lines became a very relevant work for the mass organizations here, as the plain was traversed by important railways, especially the Shihchiachuang-Techou line which ran east-west across the region.

A typical example of mass mobilization programmes in the central Hopei plain in 1940 was in Yungch'ing Hsien 永清縣, situated in the central part of the region. The two important objectives here were the conducting

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53. Lu Ting-i, "Some important experience in crushing enemy's attacks in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region", Chieh-fang, No. 67 (March 20, 1939) 29-30; and The People's Liberated Army during the Anti-Japanese War, 34-35.
54. Research Section, Central Committee for the Extermination of Communism, Field Survey of Chinese Communist Efforts to Win Support of People in Central Hopei, May 1940, R 114, T 999, F 26292.

of the road-demolition campaign, and the collection of economic resources, especially basic necessities like cotton cloths and army boots. In addition, local defence was shouldered by the three graded forces, namely, the self-defence corps and militia, the guerillas, and the regular army units. To support these forces the collection of revenue in kind also became the major work of mass organizations in Yungch'ing, which was responsible for collecting 20% of the revenue of the fifth-region of central Hopei.⁵⁵ To indoctrinate the people, special efforts were devoted to the preliminary step of teaching villagers how to read and write, whilst undesirable social practices like foot-binding were done away with. Party cadres in the whole hsien also attended political lectures so as to make themselves well equipped with the task of indoctrinating the people.⁵⁶

In the early stages, mass mobilization programmes were closely associated with developments of the local government, but by the end of 1941, the CCP

55. Ibid., R 114, T 999, F 26301-26302.

56. Ibid., R 114, T 999, F 26310.

tended to emphasize mass mobilization as an independent movement which aimed at allowing maximum participation from the people and minimum interference from the local government. In the Cheng Feng Movement of 1942, the party criticized local cadres for too much supervision over mass organizations, as such supervision made the local people think that these voluntary bodies were no more different from other government institutions. What the CCP wanted was to attract active elements in the villages so that they could take up positions formerly occupied by cadres in supervising these voluntary organizations.⁵⁷ To the Communists, this was the basic means to evolve a positive and active mass mobilization programme, and they kept a constant check on defects and weaknesses so that progress could be made.

57. The voluntary nature of the mass organizations was emphasized by Liu Shao-ch'i in his "Lun chu-hsi min-chung ti chi-ko chi-pen yuan-ts'e", 論組織民衆的幾個基本原則 (Several basic principles regarding organizations amongst the people) Chieh-fang, No. 70, (May 1, 1939), 10-12. For the idea of attracting active elements to participate in mass organizations, see Nieh Jung-chen, "To launch a full-scale study and review ..." Chieh-fang jih-pao, August 27, 1942.

As early as 1939, the party realized one serious drawback to the mass mobilization programme. This was due to the result of an unexpected effect of the Communist tactics of "ch'ing-pi k'ung-yeh" 清壁空野, or literally "clear the walls and empty the fields". The main purpose of these tactics was to off-set Japanese military offensives by moving both the population and supplies from a whole village, probably to nearby hills, in the face of an imminent Japanese invasion of the village. Unfortunately, this tactics had repercussions on the Eighth Route Army and the guerrillas who depended on villagers for supplies, and they very often found themselves deprived of assistance expected when villagers all fled to the hills with their food supplies.⁵⁸

For various reasons, the CCP failed to achieve as positive and satisfactory results as they wished to have in so far as mass mobilization was concerned, although steady progress had already been made. A

58. Tung Pi-wu, "Two years of the mass movement", Chün-chung, III, No. 10 (July 23, 1939), 272-274. For an example of the effect of "Ch'ing-pi k'ung-yeh", see Lung Ting-i, "Some important experience in crushing enemy's attacks ...", Chieh-fang, No. 67, 34.

closer look at the peasants' associations, the source of strength in the mass organizations, may perhaps explain the situation further.

Detailed reports from Hoshun Hsien in south-east Shansi reveal that as early as 1938, peasants' associations there covered 80% of the population, and their chief responsibilities were two-fold. First, they formed the chief source for the recruitment of self-defence corps and the militia, hence performing all the relevant work of assisting the regulars in combat against the Japanese. Second, the association gave its patronage to the tenants and poor peasants in attempts to improve their standard of living, hence the organization of cooperatives which assisted the peasants, mostly in the purchasing of daily commodities and farming tools. In addition, loans were given to them at low-interest rates.⁵⁹ These peasants' associations certainly did a good job for the poor peasants, but they were not as militant as their predecessors of the 1920s which were in the real sense the champions of the poor in launching struggles and

59. Sugiyama Corps, Pacification Unit, Report on Communist Areas in Hoshun Hsien, Shansi, August 8, 1939. R 113, T 944, F 24457-24463.

purges against the landlords. Thus, whatever benefits and welfare schemes the war-time peasants' associations up to this period had planned for their protégés were in a relative sense moderate and definitely not militant. These peasants' associations had not been able to challenge the authority of the landlords in the village whose economic control over the poor was considerable. The work of the peasants' association and in fact the whole programme of mass mobilization could only be considered as effective and positive if the poor peasants could free themselves of landlords' control. The most realistic way of doing this was for the peasants' association and the local village cadres to undertake a genuine rent-reduction programme. It was by so doing that the CCP could hope to rally maximum support from the masses. As a matter of fact, this issue involved the whole problem of landlord-tenant relations and the rent-reduction programme which will be dealt with below.

There were two major CCP policies operating in this period which were mainly responsible for Communist inability to mobilize the masses fully to their advantage. The first was the military tactics employed by Communist regulars and guerrillas, and the second dealt with land problems and landlord-tenant relations.

The Effect of CCP Military Tactics on Mass Mobilization

Up to the end of 1941, the CCP employed as its major military tactics Yu-chi yün-tung chan 游擊運動戰 (Operational-guerrilla warfare). In essence, this did not rely entirely on guerrilla warfare, but made operational combats involving a great number of regiments an essential part of military engagements with the Japanese. In other words, the CCP still relied on the Eighth Route Army regulars rather than guerrillas and militia as the major strength in resisting the Japanese. Mass organizations, especially the more military ones like the self-defence corps and the militia, only played a subsidiary role in assisting the regulars in the operational-guerrilla warfare. The crucial point to note here is that the adoption of total guerrilla warfare was the only means of fully utilizing self-defence corps and the militia to bear the main burden of CCP resistance against the Japanese. Had that been the case, the various mass organizations at the village level would have found it unnecessary to give economic support to the regulars, as the people themselves would have taken over the defence of their own villages. The advantage of this kind of defence was that villagers could carry on economic production at the same time, whilst regular troops up to this period could not.

As it was, CCP military commanders up to the end of 1941 still pursued the operational-guerrilla warfare which stood in the way of mobilizing the people to the fullest capacity. In 1939 and 1940, Chu Teh as the commander-in-chief of the 18th Army Group, and his deputy, P'eng Te-huai, had made it explicit that the CCP would not give up the idea of engaging the Japanese in major battles should circumstances be favourable. In an interview with reporters on May 20, 1939, P'eng emphasized that in the defence of bases in Hopei, not only guerrilla, but also operational warfare must be employed. To elaborate his point, P'eng held that the Eighth Route Army should, whenever possible, take the initiative in amassing armed strength with the purpose of undertaking flexible and yet positive combats.⁶⁰ Lin Piao, who was then commander of the 115th

60. P'eng Te-huai, "shih-pa chi-t'uan-chün P'eng-fu-chung-ssu-ling t'an chien-ch'ih Hopei k'ang-chan yu kung-ku t'uan-chieh", 十八集團軍並多高以總全放發對時河北抗戰九週年誌(四) (P'eng Te-huai, deputy commander-in-chief of the 18th Army Group, on the war of resistance in Hopei and the way to strengthen unity) Chieh-fang, Nos. 75-76 (July 7, 1939), 20. P'eng's ideas were actually in conformity with Mao Tse-tung's policy of guerrilla warfare upheld in the period up to 1941. Mao believed that in the protracted war against Japan, Chinese troops should aim at developing from guerrilla combats to operational warfare. See "Hsiang yün-tung chan fa-chan", 向運動力戰發展 (Developing towards operational warfare) Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi (1961), II, 423-425.

Division stationed in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region wrote as early as December 1937 that whenever possible, the Eighth Route Army should muster its major forces in the defence of strategic points.⁶¹ This tactical emphasis on operational warfare in which mass organizations played only a subsidiary role was fully applied by the Communists in their major engagement with the Japanese, from August to December, 1940. This battle was the Hundred Regiments' Offensive which the CCP claimed to be a major success against the Japanese.⁶² In order to disprove the KMT's accusation that the CCP's success in this battle was a fake, Chu Teh quoted the address to the Japanese Diet by

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61. Lin Piao, "K'ang-Jih chan-cheng ti ching-yen", 抗日的戰爭的經驗 (Experience of the Anti-Japanese War) chieh-fang, No. 28, (January 11, 1938), 11.
62. P'eng Te-huai, "Pa-tuan ta-chan chih i-i", 百團大戰之意義 (What the Battle of the Hundred Regiments meant) Chün-chung, V, (October 30, 1940) Nos. 9-10, 204-205. P'eng gave a comprehensive description of the extent of the combat. The main CCP forces taking part included Ho Lung's 120th Division, Liu Po-ch'eng's 129th Division and Nieh Jung-chen's Chin-Ch'a-Chi regional forces. P'eng emphasized the battle was a major CCP victory. Also see chapter II, 44.

Tojo, then war minister in Japan, in which Tojo admitted that CCP troops in north China had launched a relatively large-scale offensive in August 1940.⁶³

In spite of CCP's claim of success in operational warfare as exemplified by the Hundred Regiments' Offensive, the reliance on a concentration of regular troops to bear the brunt of war caused the Communists heavy casualties. It is interesting to note that with the commencement of the Cultural Revolution in China in August 1966, the Hundred Regiments' Offensive which was once regarded as a historical monument of CCP military success, was revalued as a blunder and a major risk, and both Chu Teh and P'eng Te-huai were fiercely attacked by the Red Guards for undertaking the battle against the wish of Mao Tse-tung. The basis of argument was that the success was off-set by the heavy casualties in the battle.⁶⁴

On December 7, 1941, the first indication of a public announcement of a major change in CCP military

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63. Chu Teh "Pa-lu-chün hsin-ssu-chün k'ang-chan ti ssu-chou-nien", 八路各軍第四軍抗元戰事第四週年 (The fourth anniversary of the war of resistance undertaken by the 8th Route Army and the New Fourth Army) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 7, 1941.
64. "Ta-chün-fa ta-yeh-hsin-chia Chu Teh ti t'ao-t'ien ta-tsui", 大軍閥大野心家朱德的天大罪 (The unforgivable sin committed by Chu Teh, the big warlord and ambitious man) Chan Pao 華北戰報, No. 6, (February 24, 1967) cited from Ming Pao Monthly, II, 6, 33.

tactics was made in Chieh-fang jih-pao,⁶⁵ and guerrilla warfare was proclaimed more suitable than operational combats. It was then realized by the military commanders that in the face of heavy Japanese onslaughts, the best answer to effective defence was the adoption of guerrilla warfare.

The idea of major operational combats had to be given up as the Communists could not afford to suffer any heavier casualties, since the Japanese (with puppets): CCP casualty ratio from June 1941 to May 1942 stood at 1.3 : 1.⁶⁶ Consequently, CCP directives specified that armed forces should avoid unnecessary sacrifices and casualties. The significant change was the reliance on the armed strength of the local

65. "Ti-hou yu-chi chan-cheng ti hsin jen-wu", 敵後游擊戰爭的新任務 (The new duty of guerrilla tactics behind enemy lines), (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, December 7, 1941. Also see Liu Po-ch'eng, "Tactical problems concerning resistance behind enemy lines", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 7, 1943. Liu traced the change in CCP tactics, quoting Mao Tse-tung's writings to explain how the earlier tactics of operational combat was later changed over to total guerrilla warfare.

66. Second chart, 66.

people, who were relieved of a greater part of the economic burden imposed on them by the army regulars. The participation of the self-defence corps and the militia in active guerrilla warfare by the beginning of 1942 not only boosted up the activities of the mass mobilization programme, but it also enabled the CCP to pursue the policy of "cut troops and simplify the administration". Once the local people could take the place of regulars in the defence of their villages, the CCP could afford to cut down the number of troops so as to ease off the acute economic situation which resulted from intense Japanese pressure.⁶⁷

In so far as the mass mobilization movement was concerned, the crucial point to notice was therefore the changing CCP military tactics which came about at the end of 1941. By the beginning of 1942,

67. "The new duty of guerrilla tactics behind the enemy lines", (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, December 7, 1941, and Liu Po-ch'eng, "Tactical problems concerning resistance ...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 7, 1943.

villagers in Communist bases found that they were given heavy responsibilities, and to them it was a sense of mission entrusted to them in defence of their mother country, hence the CCP was able to arouse what was termed peasant nationalism amongst the villagers.

Mass Mobilization and the Problem of Landlord-tenant Relations

The most significant factor which impeded the Communists from effecting maximum mass mobilization in the period 1938-1941 was problems concerning land, landlord-tenant relations and the reduction of rent and interest. It has been mentioned previously that economic control of landlords in the villages still persisted in Communist-controlled bases, and it was responsible for the absence of any genuine rent-reduction programme. Until such reduction took place, the CCP could not possibly convince its protégés to participate whole-heartedly in the mass organizations.

In the first place, contemporary Communist sources indicate that under Communist administration which fostered a campaign to reduce rent and interest on land, the economic burden on tenants and poor

peasants did become much lighter. For instance, in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region, the average rent for the period 1937-1941 was 33.3% of the produce from the harvest, a great deal less than that of the pre-1937 period, which averaged 54%.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that rent-reduction programmes in this region were exceptionally successful, and such progress was by no means a common phenomenon in the other bases in the pre-Cheng Feng period. In the Shansi-Hopei-Honan region, it was calculated in June 1941 that there was an average rent reduction of 31% in seven hsien. In north-west Shansi and Shantung, there were similar reductions in rent, some as much as 60% less.⁶⁹ However, these cases were by no means common and the policy of rent-reduction had not been well observed by landlords in general.

68. Hsiang Wei-wan, "Some sources of the reduction of rent and interest in the bases", Chieh-fang jih-pao, February 11, 1942.

69. Ibid..

A report of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government indicates that rent-reduction was by no means widespread.⁷⁰ Thus, in the Shansi-Hopei-Honan area, figures in October 1940 showed that of the 1,982 villages in the Third Sub-region, only 601 undertook rent reduction, and 911 households were given reduction in interest. In the Hopei-Shantung-Honan plain, of the 8,000 villages there in May 1941, only 620 had rent reductions carried out. The poorest results were from the Second Special District of western Shantung, with a return of only 2% of villages having rent reduced.

The absence of a general rent-reduction programme had a great deal to do with CCP central policy. A CCPCC resolution on land policy in the bases dated January 28, 1942, reveals some important

70. Ibid., also see The State of the Liberated Area ..., 64. In tracing the history of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan border region, this Communist source admitted that up to 1941, mass mobilization had not been fully utilized, and the rent-reduction programme was not making satisfactory progress.

clues.⁷¹ First, the resolution reasserted the CCP's policy of toleration for the landlord class, at least the nationalistic, if not the capitalistic ones, and its alliance with the petty and national bourgeoisie. The rich peasants were considered the bourgeoisie in the villages whose support for the CCP was crucial in the anti-Japanese war. The above was actually a reiteration of Mao Tse-tung's United Front policy enforced since the beginning of the war in 1937.

The second principle of the resolution mentioned above stated that the CCP was there to help lessen the "feudalistic" exploitation of the poor peasants, but it had no intention of eliminating all "feudalistic" exploitations. In other words, although the Communists strived for rent reduction on behalf of the poor peasants, they also aimed at ensuring the

71. "Chung-kung chung-yang kuan-yu k'ang-Jih ken-chü-ti tu-ti cheng-ts'e ti chüeh-ting", 中共中央關於抗日根據地土地政策的決定 (CCP Central's resolution on land policy in the anti-Japanese bases) Chieh-fang jih-pao, February 6, 1942.

rights of the bourgeoisie in view of their important role in the war of resistance.

The unfortunate effect of the above CCP principles was that for fear of losing the support of the bourgeoisie, the CCP could not afford to formulate positive and specific regulations and rules to see that the landlords did reduce the rent imposed on their tenants. Any reduction made was more by persuasion on the part of the local cadres, or voluntary offers on the part of the landlords, which were rather rare. The tenants were still very much under the grip of the landlords because of one vulnerable point, and that was the lack of specific protection against landlords' claiming their land back from the tenants. This lawful right of the landlords became their trump card in evading rent reduction. This was because tenants who wished to claim their rightful reductions had to approach landlords, but if they did so, they would very likely be subjected to retaliations from the landlords, who would find various excuses to exercise their right of repossession (Ch'ou-ti).

The result was the poor peasants and tenants would then be robbed of their land. In the villages

of Hsing hsien and Lin hsien in north-west Shansi for example, there were reported complaints from tenants and poor peasants of how landlords "illegally seized their land" and defied CCP instructions on rent reduction.⁷² In some cases, although rent had been reduced, the tenants dreaded the landlords so much that they decided to return to the latter the amount of produce, which they should have been entitled to because of the reduction.⁷³

In actual fact, if the Communists were to realize a genuine rent-reduction programme, they had to first of all promulgate specific regulations guaranteeing the rights of tenants against the threat of repossession, and second, the CCP had to train cadres to take up special responsibilities of guiding and organizing active elements amongst peasants to enforce the rent-reduction campaign. Specific CCP programmes aiming at genuinely enforcing rent and

72. Chieh-fang jih-pao, October 31, 1943, and January 14, 1944.

73. Huang Wei-wen, "Some sources on the reduction of rent and interest in the bases", Chieh-fang jih-pao, February 11, 1942.

interest reductions appeared by the second half of 1942, and by 1943, important results were brought about. In fact, village administration and mass mobilization in the Communist bases also began to undergo significant changes by the second half of 1942 as a result of the CCP's introduction of the Cheng Feng Movement in February 1942. Details of this important evolution will be discussed in chapters five and six.

CHAPTER IV

Japanese and Puppet Measures against the CCP Bases, Especially at the Village Level, 1938 - 1942.

The expansion of Communist power in rural north China in the early years of the war represents the first phase of the territorial struggle between the CCP and the Japanese. By the end of 1940, especially with the successful record of the Hundred Regiments' Offensive, it can be said that the Communists were in a better position than the Japanese in rallying the support of the rural population and in exercising control over the rural area in north China. The CCP's efforts and organizations in the villages in the pre-Cheng Feng period described in chapter three provide an explanation for the growth of Communist power. However, attention must also be paid to anti-CCP activities undertaken by the Japanese as they inevitably affected the development of the Communist bases throughout the war.

Indeed, in so far as the initial period of 1938-1940 in the development of the CCP bases was concerned, Japanese policy as applied to rural north China contributed indirectly to the expansion of Communist power. Anti-CCP measures undertaken then had a strong emphasis on the employing of political manoeuvres

rather than military actions, hence the slogan of "ch'i-fen cheng-chih, san-fen chün-shih" 七分政治 三分軍事 (seven-tenths of effort on political manoeuvres and three-tenths on military actions). This particular Japanese policy did not bring about as satisfactory results as Japan would have expected, whilst on the other hand it contributed to the expansion of the CCP bases. However, in 1941-1942, Japanese anti-CCP policy took a sharp turn with new emphasis on severe military pressure on the CCP bases, resulting in a recession of CCP power in rural north China, although the Japanese also succeeded in alienating the local population in launching the various mopping-up campaigns.

The purpose of this chapter therefore is to examine in detail the various anti-CCP measures undertaken by the Japanese in 1938-1942, in order to provide a complete picture to an understanding of the development of the CCP bases. The emphasis of the study will also be on the actual application of elaborate Japanese measures in the village rather than

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1. Ti Hua 邱華 and Hsüeh Hui 雪光軍, "Ti-k'ou tsai Hua-pei ti ch'iang-hua chih-an yün-tung", 敵寇在華北的治安運動 (The enemy's movement to reinforce law and order in north China) Chieh-fang jih-pao, January 15, 1942.

explanations for the formulation of various Japanese policies.

Whilst the Communists were busy setting up their bases behind the Japanese front lines in 1938, the Japanese Army made its advance towards Wuhan 武漢 in Hupei, from the lower course of the Yangtze. By late October, 1938, both Wuhan and Canton, the capital of Kwangtung, were occupied by the Japanese, and it could be said that a stalemate had been reached in the Sino-Japanese war. In general, the Japanese were in control of the main urban centres and strategic points, as well as the major communication lines. On the other hand, KMT and CCP troops were still able to control a major part of the rural area. Thus the Japanese were said to have been able to control the points (tien) 點, and the lines (hsien) 線, whilst the Chinese could still dominate the rural area (mien) 面.²

As the Japanese North China and Central China Expeditionary Armies began to consolidate their pos-

2. Mao Tse-tung, On the New Stage, 37-39. After fifteen months of war, Mao argued that the Chinese who were in control of the rural area, could still defeat the Japanese who were dominating the urban centres in China.

ition in 1938-1940, the Japanese policy in the administration of the occupied area concentrated on the employing of various political manoeuvres rather than high-handed military actions. To the Japanese at that time, it seemed to be the answer to the rising threat of Communism, the best means of maintaining law and order, and preserving intact the economic resources in China. North China was in particular valuable to Japan, and the Japanese Economic Planning Board, which was in charge of the economic aspects of the realization of the New Order in East Asia,³

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3. On November 3, 1938, the Japanese Government made a statement which crystalized the aim of the New Order in East Asia: "What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will ensure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign. The new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and coordination between Japan, Manchukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defence against Communism and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia". Quoted in H.S. Quigley, Far Eastern War 1937-1941, (Boston, 1942, 114-115.

defined north China as within the Japanese "sphere of self-defence" and an integral part of Japan in economic terms.⁴ From north China she drew a major supply of cotton, coal and iron, and her economic ties with this region was therefore closer than with any other part of China.⁵

In view of the menace from the Communists, the Japanese realised they needed a more sophisticated policy to reinforce the strength of Japanese troops stationed in north China. The policy of "setting Chinese against

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4. Military Affairs Section, Army Ministry, Nichi-Man-Shi keizai kensetsu yōkōdan ni kansuru ken 日滿經濟建設要綱案 = 綱案 (Outline of Proposal for Economic Development of Japan, Manchuria and China), Sept. 4, 1940, R 109, T 798, F 18997-18998.
5. As early as March 1937, the Japanese had already had reports from North China as to estimates of economic resources which the Japanese could exploit in the coming war, see Various Army Officers, Hokushi oyobi Manshūkoku shisatsu hōkoku 北支及滿洲州(國)視察報告 (Inspection Reports on North China and Manchuria), Oct. 6-18, 1937, R 108, T 767, F 18261, 18458-18459. Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japanese ambassador to Wang Ching-wei's Nanking Government in 1942, and later Minister of the Greater East Asia Ministry, described three phases of Japanese control during the Sino-Japanese War. Coal and iron, to be followed later by cotton and salt were the main products and minerals sought. For details, also see Lee Ngok, The Later Career of Wang Ching-wei, with special Reference to His National Government's Cooperation with Japan, 1938-1945, University of Hong Kong, (M.A. Thesis), 1966, 138-139.

Chinese" was thus evolved, aiming at the establishment of puppet administration from the top to village level, and the need for Sino-Japanese cooperation was especially emphasized. From October 1938 to March 1940, the Japanese went about setting up a Japanese-sponsored Central Government in the occupied area. Lieutenant-General Doihara Kenji 土肥原, the Japanese intelligence chief in China, and others like Colonel Kagesa Sadaki 影佐貞昭, Chief of the Military Affairs Section, the Ministry of War, began their search for a leading Chinese statesman who might be persuaded into heading the puppet government⁶.

T'ang Shao-i 唐紹儀, a veteran cabinet minister of the early republican period, was approached, but his assassination in late 1938 put an end to the attempt. Wu Pei-fu 吳佩孚, the famous warlord of the Chihli Clique in the 1920s, was almost persuaded into heading a central government, but finally turned down the Japanese offer in

6. For the activities conducted by Lt.-General Doihara and Colonel Kagesa in China 1938-1939, see Lee Ngok, op.cit., 53-54, 60-61, 63.

late 1939, mainly because of disagreement over the extent of military power Wu could exercise and the strength of Japanese troops to be withdrawn from China.⁷ Japan's offer was finally accepted by Wang Ching-wei, one time heir-apparent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the early 1920s, and the second most important KMT statesman in Chungking in 1938. Wang left Chungking on December 18, 1938, for Hanoi and finally set up the Japanese sponsored Nanking Government on March 30, 1940.⁸

As far as North China was concerned, the North China Political Council took the place of its predecessor, the North China Provisional Government, from March 30, 1940, onwards. The chief collaborators of the North China Provisional Government, namely, Wang I-t'ang 王揖唐,

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7. For further information on Wu Pei-fu's negotiations with the Japanese, see R.P. Soter, Wu Pei-fu: Case study of a Chinese War-lord, Harvard University, (Ph. D. Dissertation) 1959, 232-247.
8. For Wang Ching-wei's escape from Chungking in Dec. 1938, and his motives in cooperating with Japan, see Lee Ngok, op. cit., 39-40, 51-53; and for the establishment of Wang's Nanking Government, see 66, 82-83.

Wang K'e-min 王克敏, Chi Hsieh-yuan 齊燮元, and Chu Shen 朱森, all cabinet ministers of the early republican period, remained in office in the new Council, with Wang I-t'ang, Wang K'e-min, and Chu Shen heading the new body at different times from 1940 to 1943. In fact the governmental change in north China on March 30, 1940, was but in name, mainly to satisfy Wang Ching-wei's forlorn hope of claiming control over north China. The North China Political Council was independent of Wang's Nanking Government, as the former had its own currency, the Federal Reserve Bank notes, its own "Peace-maintenance" Army, its own customs and revenue offices and its own flag.⁹ However, both the Council and Wang's government had one common aim of expelling the Communists from the rural area, and as far as Wang Ching-wei was concerned, his determination to tackle the Communists was evident in his government motto, which was "Peace, Anti-Communism and National Reconstruc-

9. Chinese Year Book, 1940-1941, Chungking, 262-264;
Tao Chu-yin 陶菊隱, Wang Cheng-ch'uan Tsa-lu
之王政權言論錄 (A Collection of Notes on the
Wang Regime), Macao, 1963, 28-29.

tion"¹⁰.

With the setting up of the North China Political Council which became the chief political institution in north China to counteract Communism, the Japanese began to concentrate on the innovation of various political measures and doctrines in attempts to compete with the Communists in winning the support of the people, especially in the rural area, where the Communists were most influential. Thus in 1938, the Hsin Min Hui 新民會 (New People's Society) came into being in north China. It was a publicity organ aiming at the propagation of an oriental ideology based on Sino-Japanese cooperation and the realization of the New Order in East Asia. Pin-pointing Communism and western Imperialism as major targets of attacks, the Society criticized Individualism and Liberalism as ideas borrowed from the West. Marxism was also regarded as an imported product. Confucianism with its emphasis on loyalty was exalted as the ideology on which Sino-Japanese cooperation was based. Japan was depicted as a country which had attained the Kingly Way or "Huang-tao" 皇道,

10. Ministry of Publicity, Kuo-fu huan-tu ti-erh-nien kuo-min cheng-fu shih-cheng kai-k'uang (或) 國民政府施政概況 (General Description of the Work of the National Government on Its Return to the Capital), Nanking, 1942, 217 and 223; China Annual, (Nanking), 1943, 1200.

and the Heavenly Sanction, or "Tien-tao" 天道 ,
 2,600 years ago through sincerity, or "Cheng" 誠 ,
 and virtue, or "Te" 德 , as described in the Golden
 Mean and the Great Learning. Thus it was only natural
 for China to cooperate with Japan in pursuing the Kingly
 Way and attaining the Heavenly Sanction. In fact the
 doctrine of the Kingly Way preached by the New People's
 Society was based on the Japanese belief of Kodo 皇道 ,
 which maintained that the cause of the Emperor was divine
 and higher than the law of the land.

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11. Kawamura Munetsugu 川村宗嗣, Tung-fang ching-shen yu Hsin-min-hui 東方精神與新社會 (The Spirit of the Orient and the New People's Society), 1st collection, Peking, Hsin-min-hui, November, 1938, 1-30.
12. A detailed description of Kodo ha (faction) is given in Hillis Lory, Japan's Military Masters: the Army in Japanese Life, New York, the Viking Press, 1943, 178-179. For activities of the Kodo ha, representing the extremist faction in the Army, see Richard Storry, The Double Patriots, a study of Japanese Nationalism, London, Chatto and Windus, 1957, 136, 138, 243, and 282; W.G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962, 240-1, 249-50, 252, and 260.

The majority of the North China Political Council officials were educated in the old Confucian school of thought, and people like Wang K'e-min, Wang I-t'ang and Chu Shen might have been expected to be taken in by this Japanese-orientated Confucian Ideology. However, for the general public in the occupied area, these ideas could not possibly have any far-reaching effect, especially when set against the background of anti-Japanese Nationalism generated in the first instance in September 1931 with Japan's invasion of Manchuria. By 1935-1937, there was a surge of anti-Japanese national salvation campaigns which must have overshadowed whatever the New People's Society attempted to preach during the ¹³ War.

Perhaps more practical than the high sounding ideology was the actual anti-CCP work done by the New People's Society at Peking and the various local branches. First of all, the Society was defined as one of "China's" institutions in close cooperation with the government, and yet not a part of the government, acting as the medium between the people and the administration. Its specific

13. Anti-Japanese activities in China in 1935-1937 has been discussed in Chapter I, 15-18.

duty was to educate and assist the people with a view to promoting good relations between the people and the authorities.¹⁴ Under the leadership of Miu Pin 繆斌, the President and concurrently a Councillor, as well as the Japanese authorities, the Society took positive steps in attempts to gain the support of the rural population. Experimental areas were set up in villages in which various welfare centres were set up, namely, clinics, youth training centres, cooperatives and autonomous village organisations.¹⁵ Through these welfare schemes, the Japanese hoped to seek the cooperation of the people under the slogan of "Kuan-min ho-tso" 官民合作 (Cooperation between the people and officials) against the Communists, who were depicted as criminals and demons standing in the way of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Directed towards the same end was Japanese attempts to seek the cooperation of secret societies. The Ch'ing-hung Society

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14. Hsin-min-hui 新民主會, Hsin-min-hui shou-tu chih-tao-pu kung-tso kai-k'uang 新民主會首都指導部工作概況 (A General Description of the Work of the Capital Guidance Department of the New People's Society), Peking, September 1938, 82.
15. Hsin-min-hui, A General Description of the Work of the Capital Guidance Department ..., especially 225, 244-258. G.E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, 70-76. Details of Japanese-sponsored rural organizations will be dealt with later in the chapter.

青島幫 in southern Shantung, and the Huang-sha Society 黃沙會 in Hopei, for example, were approached by the Japanese.¹⁶

As to the effectiveness of the various Japanese measures in rural control in 1938-1940, puppet reports often indicated that only a limited control could be exercised in the countryside. For instance, the puppet Shansi provincial report in May 1939 reckoned that of the 55 hsien in Shansi said to be under control, only 60-70% of the villages in 19 of these hsien were in fact under effective puppet administration, whilst in thirteen other hsien, only 30-40% of the villages were under control.¹⁷ Whilst the Japanese made little progress in the countryside, the period up to 1940 had been one of

16. Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, "The enemy's movement to reinforce law and order in north China", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan. 15, 1942, and Chieh-fang jih-pao Feb. 12, 1942. It is interesting to note the CCP's attitude towards secret society activities which were considered as a hindrance to its administration in the village, see chapter III, 75 : n, 18 and 19.

17. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi Provincial Government, Min-Cheng Chi-yao 民政紀要 (Compendium of Materials on Civil Affairs) II, 1940, (Appendix: report by Sung Ch'e 宋清文, head of the bureau of civil administration), I-2.

expansion for the CCP bases in north China, as has been seen in chapter three. Thus it became apparent that the Japanese policy of concentrating seven-tenths of their efforts on political manoeuvres and only three-tenths on military actions had proved to be far from effective in counteracting Communist power.

It was therefore not surprising that a major revision in Japan's anti-Communist policy was evolved in the beginning of 1941. From early March, 1941, to the end of 1942, the Japanese North China Expeditionary Army launched the Movement to Reinforce Law and Order which covered the occupied area as well as the CCP bases. Various mopping-up campaigns were directed against the Communist bases, employing as many as 10,000-20,000 men in each of the major military offensives. The effect was definitely felt in the bases.¹⁸ The main characteristic feature of these Japanese campaigns had been described as the "three-all" policy, that is, "Kill all, burn all and destroy all" (sankō-seisaku) 三光政策.¹⁹ The application

18. See Chapter III, 66. The effect of the Japanese military pressure was felt as shown in the Japanese (including puppets): CCP casualty ratio, which was 1.2: 1 (June 1940-May 1941), and 1.3: 1 (June 1941-May 1942) respectively. In the earlier years of the war, CCP casualties were much less than those of the Japanese according to Communist sources.

19. C.A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism..., 55.

of this tremendous military pressure can be considered as the alternative policy after the failure of political manoeuvres as the means of effective rural control. In addition, various circumstances in late 1940 in north China also contributed to Japan's determination to launch the Movement to Reinforce Law and Order. It has been mentioned that the CCP's victory against the Japanese in the Hundred Regiments' Offensive, August-December 1940, contributed to Japanese retaliations in 1941-1942.²⁰ Indeed, this demonstration of Communist military strength made it necessary for the Japanese Army to take drastic action in order to prevent further major CCP offensives. This is especially so when Japanese plans of expansion into south-east Asia, which had been drawn by late 1940, made it essential for the Japanese Army to maintain military supremacy over the Chinese troops, especially the Communist forces, so that Japan could devote her attention to the southward expansion.²¹ Politically, late 1940 also saw the end of hope for a possible peace

20. See Chapter II, 36.

21. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism..., 57; for Japan's plans of southward expansion, see International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit No. 3656, Defence Document No. 2813, (Tojo's Affidavit), 36280.

settlement between Japan, Chungking, and Wang Ching-wei's Nanking Government. By the end of November, Japan therefor committed herself to a closer alliance with Wang Ching-wei by signing the Japan-Wang Treaty of Basic Relations on November 30, 1940²². With the end of hope for a possible settlement with Chungking, which also meant the end of a possible Japan-Chungking joint effort against the Communists, Japan therefore found it necessary to take independent action against the Communists, hence tremendous military pressure was applied to the CCP bases. In 1941-1942, major mopping-up campaigns were launched in north China, each representing specific plans to be achieved by the North China Expeditionary Army.

The initial campaign lasted from March to late June, 1941, and was known as the "defensive" period in which

22. From Spring to September 1940, constant contacts between Japanese and Chungking agents were made in Hong Kong and Shanghai in attempts to bring about a proposed triangular talk between General Itagaki, the Chief-of-Staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek, and Wang Ching-wei. However, the proposed talk failed to materialize. These secret contacts were recorded by Chou Fu-hai (周福海), Wang Ching-wei's finance minister, in his diary: Chou Fu-hai jih-chi 1940 (周福海日記) (The Diary of Chou Fu-hai, 1940), Hong Kong, n.d., June 22, 23 (104-105); June 27 (107); July 18 (117); Aug. 18 (134); Aug. 20 (135); Aug. 30 (141); Sept. 10 (146); and Sept. 15 (149). Also see International Military Tribunal..., Exhibit 3305, Defence Document No. 1979, 30151. For a full text of the Japan-Wang Treaty, see The American Journal of International Law, XXXV, (Supplement), 1941.

the principle was to seek cooperation from the local populace and eliminate undesirable characters in the locality. The second campaign from July to late October went one step further, utilizing strategic points along communication lines as bases to set up blockades against the CCP bases²³. By the time the third campaign was launched from early November to December 25, the tremendous pressure on the CCP bases was obviously being felt. This period covered harvest time and one of the main objectives of the Japanese Army was to concentrate on the procuring of economic resources, especially food and commodity crops. Another objective was to set up economic blockades between CCP bases and the major centres of economic supply.²⁴ Details of the elaborate measures undertaken, and the organization of self-defence forces with a view to establishing these economic

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23. Fourth Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China, Geppō, 5 Gatsubun, 月報(五月分)(Monthly Report for May, 1941), R. 115, T.1011, F.26700, p.I; Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, "The enemy's movement to reinforce law and order.....", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan. 15, 1942.
24. Fourth Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China, Geppō, 9 Gatsubun, 月報(九月分) (Monthly Report for September, 1941), R 115, T 1015, F 26857-26859, pp.7-11; also see Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, "The enemy's movement to reinforce law and order....", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan.15, 1942.

blockades will be discussed later on in the chapter.²⁵
 The fourth campaign covered 1942 from April 1 onwards. By then, the Pacific War which began on December 8, 1941, had already lasted for four months, and the aim of this campaign was therefore to bring the war in north China to a successful conclusion. Another specific objective was to bring home the good work done in the third campaign in putting economic pressure on the CCP bases.²⁶

From the specific objectives to be achieved in the four phases of the Movement to Reinforce Law and Order, it can be seen that the Movement was a gradual tightening of pressure on the CCP bases in north China, and Japanese brutality in the process was inevitable. Contemporary Communist sources give the fullest details of such brutality inflicted on the Chinese population by the Japanese.²⁷ Evidently, these Japanese activities alienated

25. See 165-177.

26. Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, "The enemy's movement to reinforce law and order...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan. 15, 1942. Also see Chieh-fang jih-pao, April 1, 1942.

27. The People's Liberation Army during the Anti-Japanese War, 119-122; 142-145; Chu Teh, On the Battle Fields of the Liberated Area, 17. For specific cases of the intensity of the Japanese mopping-up campaigns in Hopei, see Johnson, Peasant Nationalism..., 55; The People's Liberation Army..., 143-144.

the rural population whose national consciousness was consequently aroused and support was therefore given to the Communists in resistance to the Japanese. Rather than going into details of the scope of Japanese anti-CCP campaigns, the present purpose concentrates on a study of Japan's application of her military propaganda, and political machinery to challenge the rising CCP power in rural north China, especially in the villages and particular attention is paid to the period 1941-1942, when the Japanese military pressure on the CCP bases reached its climax.

The Road-protection Campaign and the Associated Ai-hu village organizations.

Having occupied the major urban centres and communication lines in north China by the end of 1937, the Japanese army began to use these strongholds as their bases not only to defend the occupied area against CCP attacks, but also to launch attacks against the Communist bases in the adjacent rural area. This campaign was known as hu-lu yün-tung ^{護路運動} (road-protection campaign), and associated with it was the organization of the Ai-hu (care and protection) villages ^{愛護村} and the application of economic pressure on the Communist bases. Territorially, this anti-CCP movement could be regarded as an encroachment by the

Japanese from their so called "orderly" areas upon the
 CCP bases, which were described as the "disorderly" areas. ²⁸

The important railway network in north China inevitably ran through almost the whole of the rural area and the Japanese had the difficult task of protecting it against CCP sabotage. The Japanese also understood very well that the railway network was the only effective means of maintaining economic and military control over north China. As early as 1936, even before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Government had already drafted plans to specify how railways in north China should be guarded. It was estimated that about 5,000 guards were needed to protect the five major lines, but in war-time, 9,000 men were needed.²⁹

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28. The Japanese classified territories in China into three categories, namely, "orderly", "semi-orderly", and "disorderly". The "orderly" territories were obviously Japanese strongholds, whilst the Communists claimed that what the Japanese called the "disorderly" areas in fact corresponded to CCP-held territories. See The People's Liberation Army..., II9-II20; and J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 246-247.
29. Commander in Chief, Japanese Expeditionary Force in China, Hitmitsu shorui chōsei no ken : Shōwa II nendo kita shina senryūchi tōchi keikakusho 機密資料調査の件: 昭和十一年度北支那佔領区統制(Compilation of Secret Documents Concerning Administration of Occupied Territory of North China for 1936), Sept. 23, 1936, appendix 3b, R 109, T 784, F 18825.

Needed for the Road-protection Contingents along

Railways in North China, 1936

| Railways | | Pei-ning | Chao-tsi | Ping-sui | Tsin-pu | Ping-han | Cheng-t'ai | war time reserves |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------|----------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| from | to | no. of guards | no. per Km. | average | ratio war time to peace time | no. of guards needed during war-time. | shortage in no of guards during war-time | Total no. of guards needed as reserves. |
| Peiping- | Tsingtao- | 2,000 | 4.7 | 750 | 3/4 | 1,500 | + | 4,000 |
| Shanhaikuan | Fengm ^{en} | 1,840 | 5.0 | 1,880 | 2/3 | 1,200 | - | |
| Tientsin- | Peiping- | 750 | 1.8 | 750 | 1/2 | 370 | -1,130 | About 4,000 |
| Hanchuang | Yellow River | 2,000 | 3.0 | 2,000 | 1/2 | 1,000 | - 500 | |
| chuang-T'ai- | yuan | 96 | 0.4 | | 1/2 | 50 | -1,450 | |

With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, this road-protection campaign began to come into full operation. Closely associated with it was the setting up of Ai-hu villages along strips of rural areas on both sides of the railways lines.³⁰ The specific duty of village heads in these villages was to see that the section of the railway running through the village be well guarded against damage. The Japanese went to great lengths of elaboration in organizing these villages with a view to mobilizing the support of the rural population for the protection of railways, as well as for the founding of bases against the Communists. Naturally the Japanese method in going about mobilizing the rural population was very different from that of the Communists. Whilst the CCP made full use of peasant nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment, the Japanese took advantage of every means from persuasion to coercion and intimidation. The result was the local people either willingly or unwillingly had to serve under the Japanese

30. Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, Special Economic Investigation Office (KMT), comp. and pub., Lun-hsien-chü chih ti wei hu-lu cheng-ts'e 淪陷區之敵偽保路政策 (The Enemy and Puppet Road-protection Policy in the Occupied Area), Chungking, April 1943, 18 double pp. This KMT source gives analytical and unbiased information on the Japanese road-protection campaign and the Ai-hu village organizations.

in the promotion of the road-protection and anti-CCP campaigns. In 1941 and 1942, when the Japanese scored successes in their mopping-up campaigns, there was also a boom in the development of the Ai-hu villages, which, well supported by the Japanese Army, stood as the greatest resistance to CCP mass mobilization programmes in the villages. It must be emphasized that the extent of rural organization undertaken by the Japanese was on a much smaller scale than that of the CCP; but even so, the many successful aspects of the Ai-hu village organizations can be regarded as a unique feature in the history of the Sino-Japanese War. This is because they demonstrate some degree of Japanese success in rural control, no matter however limited in scope, against the strong tide of peasant nationalism. By early 1942, even the CCP admitted that the Japanese successfully occupied some extent of the "mien" or rural area, stating that puppet authorities could exercise control over an area 5-10 li from the "points" and "lines"³¹. The Japanese method of rural organization in these Ai-hu villages thus deserves further study.

31. Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, "The enemy's movement to reinforce law and order", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan. 15, 1942.

Ai-hu villages were set up along the major railway lines and occupied an area about 10 li on either side of the tracks, an area known as the Ai-hu District. To make sure the terrain was suitable for operational purposes, an order from the headquarters of the North China Expeditionary Army on February 12, 1939 specified a ban on the growth of kaoliang, maize, and any other crop of 5 feet or over in height in areas 500 kilometres on either side of the railway. In the case of motor-roads, the area was 300 ³² km wide.

In north China, about ten railway lines served the east-west and north-south traffic and Ai-hu villages were set up at strategic points along these lines. The condition of protection along these lines can be classified into three categories. First, there were the lines which were almost free of guerrilla activity or banditry. Here Ai-hu villages prospered and it was not difficult to secure the support of local villagers. These lines included the Ching-shan line 京山線 (Peking Shanhaikuan) and the Ching-ku 京古 line

32. Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China, Tokumu Kikanchō kaigi ni kansuru ken 特別情報課附屬長官部開示件 (Reports on Meeting of Chiefs of Special Intelligence Bureau), Oct. 31, 1939, R 114, T 967, F 25264, p.7. Also see Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, The Enemy and Puppet Road-protection Policy, I; Chieh-fang jih-pao, Aug. 11, 1941.

(Peking--Chengte). Second, there were lines which traversed areas geographically favourable to guerrilla activities. In this case, the The Cheng-t'ai 正太 (Chengting-Taiyuan), the T'ung the lines agai (Tat'ung-Fengningtao) and the Shih-te lines 石德 was given heavy responsibilities. These lines included the Ping-sui line 平綏綏 (Peking-Suiyuan) which ran in an east-west direction from Peking to Inner Mongolia across mountainous terrain, the Peking-Hankow line as far south as Hsin-hsiang on the north bank of the Yellow River, the northern section of the Tientsin Pukow line, the Lunghai and Chao-tsi 月灣濟 (Chaochou Bay - Tsinan) lines running east-west in the southern part of north China, and the Pien-hsin line 汴新 綏綏 (K'ai-feng-Hsinhsiang)³³. The third type of railway lines ran within close distance of CCP guerrilla bases and in many cases, these areas were mountainous, thus favouring demolition and sabotage activities. Ai-hu villages here became the testing ground for the effectiveness of Japanese rule. The Cheng-t'ai 正太 (Chengting-Taiyuan), the T'ung-pu 司蒲 (Tat'ung-Fengningtao) and the Shih-te lines 石德綏綏 (Shihchiachuang-Techou) were in this category. The Cheng-t'ai line ran west-east from central Shansi to central Hopei with bases closing on to the line from north and south. The T'ung-

33. Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, The Enemy and Puppet Road-protection Policy..., 4-5; 7-8.

pu line was the main communication between north and south Shansi, whilst the Shih-te line traversed central Hopei and at the same time connected the Peking-Hankow and the Tien-³⁴tsin-Pukow lines. The present purpose is to examine the organizations of Ai-hu villages along the three railway lines in the third category mentioned above.

It was in Shansi that the Japanese came into close conflict and clashes with the Communists. The T'ung-pu and the Cheng-t'ai lines either actually passed through or were within striking distance of CCP-held territories. Communist bases in Shansi included the north-west Shansi base, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, and the sub-region of south-east Shansi within the Shansi-Hopei -Shantung-Honan base.³⁵ Thus it was not surprising to find sabotage activities were more frequent here than on other lines in other areas. Rural areas in Shansi through which the lines ran became the focus of attention for both the CCP and the Japanese, who were both anxious to gain control over the local populace, and it was not surprising that in marginal areas villages changed hand several times over a relatively short period, for while the Japanese sought to extend their hold on the "mien", the CCP wanted to strike at the railways which were the artery of Japanese economic and military

34. Ibid., 5-8.

35. See maps on 41 and 42.

control in north China.

Thus the Japanese paid special attention to the organization of Ai-hu villages in Shansi. In the 61 hsien which the North China Political Council could claim at least partial control in 1940, Ai-hu villages totalled 3,356 with 123,487 men guarding the railway lines. These villages were situated mainly along the Cheng-t'ai and T'ung-pu lines, which served as useful means of transporting the economic resources away from Shansi. Fortresses for the posting of villagers as sentries were set up along the lines only several li from each other, and armoured cars and cannons were on the alert at night. Statistics of Ai-hu villages in Shansi in 1940 indicates that there was an exceptionally large number of these villages in three hsien, which were all situated along the T'ung-pu line. Yutzu 榆次, 25 Km. south of T'aiyuan, the capital of Shansi, was strategically situated where the Cheng-t'ai line crossed the T'ung-pu, and therefore had its 65 Ai-hu villages heavily guarded by 15,839 men. Yang-chü 陽曲, about 25 Km. north of T'aiyuan on the T'ung-pu line, had 71 Ai-hu villages guarded by 11,195 men. P'ingyao 平遙, 100 Km. south of T'aiyuan, had 15,564 men guarding its 143 Ai-hu villages.

36. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi Provincial Government, Compendium of Materials on Civil Affairs, 1941, III (Chart V), 2-6.

37. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium of Materials on Civil Affairs, 1941, III (Chart V), 2.

It was in Ai-hu villages like these in the above three hsien that the Japanese could challenge the CCP in rural control. If the CCP was less open in admitting Japanese success along such line, at least KMT sources in 1943 revealed that guerrillas along railway lines found that in view of the Japanese rural organizations, villagers tended to refrain from giving Chinese guerrillas the needed support, and instead acted as agents for the Japanese.³⁸

Theoretically, the Ai-hu villages were under the Tao 道 (prefecture) and the province in the ascending order of puppet local administration starting from July 1939. However, superimposed on this was control by the railway authorities and the Japanese Expeditionary Army.³⁹ There were three main railway authorities in north China under the North China Transport Company, located along the Peking-Tientsin line, and in Peking and Tsinan.⁴⁰ These railway

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38. Central Bureau of Investigation, Enemy and Puppet Road-protection Policy, 17.
39. Bureau of Civil Affairs; Shansi, Compendium, Civil Affairs, 1940, II, (Central legislation), I.
40. For the three main railway authorities, see Headquarters Japanese Expeditionary Force in China, Senden Oyobi minshū kakutoku kōsaku ni kansuru chōsa hōkoku 宣傳及大眾工作に関する調査報告 (Survey Report on Effectiveness of Propaganda in Winning Favour of Chinese Masses), Feb. 24, 1940. R 114, T 981, F 25486. According to Central Bureau of Investigation, The Enemy and Puppet Road-protection Policy, 3, the North China Transport Company was set up in April, 1939.

authorities functioned as the nucleus of operations, directing the administration of the villages whilst keeping in close contacts with the Japanese Army.⁴¹

They had under them the road-protection department (Ai-lu k'o) 愛路課, the road-protection bureau (Ai-lu chü) 愛路局, in charge of the main lines, and the road-protection section (Ai-lu hsi) 愛路系, set up in each of the main-line stations. The main-line station-master was in charge of the road-protection district (Ai-lu ch'ü) 愛路區, covering about 10 li on either side of the track. Under the district were the various Ai-hu villages where chiefs were appointed by the Transport Company.⁴² Specific duties and schedules were assigned to these villages, in most cases by the railway authorities, and in return certain privileges were given to the villagers. The principal policy of the Japanese was to make the daily life of the local populace inseparable from the road-protection campaign. Villagers were expected to report any damage to railroad tracks to the nearest Japanese garrison or security forces. They were also to render assistance to the authorities concerned in the reconstruction of damaged tracks and other precautionary

41. Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China, Report, Chiefs of Special Intelligence Bureau, Oct. 31, 1939, R 114, T 967, F 25278

42. Central Bureau of Investigation, The Enemy...Road-protection Policy, 3.

measures against Communist sabotage.⁴³

For a successful operation of the different programmes in the Ai-hu villages, the recruitment of man-power was evidently the determining factor. The bare truth is both the Japanese and the Communists had to depend on the local population for the recruitment of local forces like the self-defence corps and the labour units. As invaders in a foreign country, the Japanese could not be expected to employ persuasive measures to recruit their men. In fact they had to use force, and the climax of the press-gang activities coincided with the launching of the Movement to Reinforce Law and Order in 1941 and 1942, when the increased Japanese military pressure facilitated the rounding up of villagers, very often at gun-point, for military and labour service. If CCP sources can on the whole be relied upon, then they indicate a sharp rise in the Japanese recruitment of men in north China in 1941:⁴⁴

43. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium, Civil Affairs, 1940, II, (Central legislation), 2.

44. Chung-Ch'ing-she 中青社, "Hua-pei ch'ing-yün tung-t'ai" 華北青運動態, (Activities of the youth movement in north China), Chieh-fang jih-pao, Feb. 3, 1942.

Japanese recruitment of men in north China, 1938-1941

| | |
|------|-----------|
| 1937 | 323,696 |
| 1938 | 501,686 |
| 1939 | 954,882 |
| 1940 | 1,020,000 |
| 1941 | 2,480,257 |

CCP sources give detailed reports of the activities of Japanese press-gangs for obvious reasons, that is, to let the local populace realize they could not expect any mercy from the Japanese. These sources indicate the Japanese rounded up from a few hundred to a few thousand men at the hsien level at any particular period over a few months' span.⁴⁵ Whilst CCP figures might have been exaggerated, it stands to reason that the Japanese, especially in 1941, were really concentrating on recruiting maximum man-power to support their mopping-up campaigns so as not to let the CCP benefit. Any surplus of man-power would not have been overlooked by the Communists, who also needed reinforcements badly to

45. At the climax of the Japanese mopping-up campaigns in 1941, the Japanese press-gang activities were most intense in Shansi : from late April-late May, 1941 in Pu hsien 蒲县, north-west Shansi, 2,000 men were rounded up; in August 1941, 500 men were rounded up in T'aichü and Yutzu, south of T'aiyuan, 1,500 men from Ch'angchih and 3,434 men from the Shansi-Hopei-Honan border area: See Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 11, and Sept. 2, 1941.
 Honan border area: See Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 11, and Sept. 2, 1941.

resist the Japanese in their bases. It is interesting at this point to compare the above CCP figures with contemporary Japanese records on the recruitment of Chinese in north China. For instance, the North China Expeditionary Army in August 1941 revealed its plan for such recruitment in the period August-December. ⁴⁶ A total of 4,000 men from the Ai-hu villages in north China was to be sent to Manchuria for temporary labour. The figures were :

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------|------|-------|----------|----|-----|----------|---------|---------|
| 2,000 | from | Ai-hu | villages | of | the | Tientsin | Railway | Bureau, |
| 1,000 | ,, | ,, | ,, | ,, | ,, | Peking | ,, | ,, |
| 1,000 | ,, | ,, | ,, | ,, | ,, | Tsinan | ,, | ,, |

The above Japanese information verifies the fact that although the CCP accounts might have been exaggerated, they were by no means fictional propaganda.

The next step is to examine the various activities of men recruited by the Japanese for local service in the villages. In the first place, these men were divided into two groups. Those within the age group of 17-35 were the main strength of local defence, and they received military training in the villages so as to cope with the task of protecting the railway lines. Those of the age group 36-45

46. Fourth Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China, Geppō, 8 Gatsubun, 同報(八月)(Monthly Report for August, 1941), Oct. 1941, R 115, T 1012, F 26739, p.II.

had lighter work, mainly acting as sentries or messengers. The Japanese concentrated on the training of young men, and centres were set up in great number in north China, located in almost all the major hsien cities and strategic points. In Ch'angchih $\frac{F}{K} = \frac{L}{D}$, south-east Shansi, for example, the number of young men trained totalled 4,500 in 1941-1942, and the duration of the training programme ranged from 1-2 weeks to 1-2 months. In centres like this, young men were indoctrinated with ideas like those of the New People's Society and the emphasis was placed on the extermination of the Communists and the realization of the new Order in East Asia based on Sino-Japanese cooperation. Military training also covered part of the course with drills, exercises, and speeches delivered by instructors. Graduates from these centres either served in the puppet forces or acted as anti-CCP agents. Many naturally returned to their respective Ai-hu villages, where they took up responsible posts in the road-protection campaigns, and became leaders of the self-defence corps.

The North China Expeditionary Army believed that the Chinese were apt to organize themselves into local defence

47. Chung-ch'ing-she, "Activities of the youth movement...", Chieh-fang jih pao, Feb. 3, 1942; also see Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium, Civil Affairs, 1940, II, 18.

corps for security reasons, especially in rural areas, so much so that it had become a national characteristic.⁴⁸

Thus the Japanese considered the strength of the local defence force as one of the chief means to repel Communist infiltration in rural China. In Hopei, self-defence corps were subdivided into the Eastern CCP-Extermination Contingent, the CCP-Extermination Youth Contingent, and the National Reconstruction CCP-Extermination Contingent, whilst in north-west Shansi, the Eastern Self-defence Corps⁴⁹ comprised regular and reserve contingents.

Under the leadership of the head of a Ai-hu village, men from the self-defence corps were posted along the section of the railway running through the village. In the initial stage of the road-protection campaign, thatched-roof huts were built for sentry purposes. Later, small fortresses took their place. This not only enabled the sentries to be better situated at vantage points, but also

48. Headquarters, Japanese-Expeditionary Force in North China, Kita Shina Hōmengen jōkyō hōkoku 北支那方面軍狀況報告書 (Report on State of Affairs of Japanese Army in North China), March 18, 1941. R 114, T 1005, F 26424, p.14.

49. Huang Chien-t'ao 黃劍樞, "Jih-k'ou tsai Hua-pei tsui-chin ti tung t'ai", 日寇在華北最近動向 (Recent activities of the Japanese bandits in north China), Chieh-fang jih-pao, Feb. 13, 1942; and "Chin-ti ch'iang-hua chih-an", 晉商敵寇化治安 (The reinforcement of law and order undertaken by the enemy in Shansi) Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 26, 1941.

made it possible for the Japanese troops to station small garrisons in these fortified bases for anti-CCP purposes.⁵⁰ By 1940, the Japanese railway authorities discovered the most effective protection against Communist sabotage of railway tracks was to dig deep and wide trenches on both sides so that the tracks became inaccessible. These trenches were normally about 12 feet deep and 12 feet wide, but depth and width depended on the liability to CCP attacks so did the number of fortresses built along a particular section of the railway. Thus it was not surprising to find the Cheng-t'ai and the T'ung-pu lines in Shansi were most heavily guarded. In the case of the Tientsin-Suiyuan and the Peking-Hankow lines, the trenches in 1941 were twelve feet wide and twenty-four feet deep, whilst the fortresses⁵¹ were closely linked, only five li from one another. Heavily guarded trains also went on patrol at night to inspect the railway tracks.

A point worth noting is the average strength of the self-defence corps in each of the Ai-hu villages. About 3-5 men kept watch on day and night shifts in each of the fortresses under the administration of the village.⁵²

50. Central Bureau of Investigation, The Enemy...Road-protection Policy, 3.

51. Ibid., 4-6, 16.

52. Ibid., 5, 7.

Statistics published by the puppet Shansi provincial administration in 1940 indicated that out of the 61 hsiens, there was a total of 3,356 Ai-hu villages with 123,487 men guarding them, that is, an average of just over 36 men in each village. However, in the case of the three specially heavily guarded hsien in Shansi mentioned earlier, the average number of guards per village was much higher.⁵³

Average number of guards per village

| | |
|----------|----------|
| Yutzu | over 243 |
| Yangchü | over 157 |
| P'ingyao | over 108 |

The very nature of these Ai-hu villages was to entrust local defence to the villagers, and the Chinese heads of village were in most cases held responsible for seeing that the road-protection campaign was operating satisfactorily. Perhaps the exception to this was at strategic points along the Cheng-t'ai and the T'ung-pu lines where Japanese troops also participated actively in the campaign.⁵⁴ One might sometimes wonder how the Japanese were able to maintain control over these villagers who were likely to be sympathetic towards their fellow countrymen, the Communists. In

53. See 145, n.37.

54. Central Bureau of Investigation, The Enemy...Road-protection Policy, 10.

the first place, the Japanese kept a strict control over the village heads who had to report instantly any damage to the tracks to the nearest railway authorities or Japanese garrison. Very often telephone communication was available to speed up the repairing process. Failure to report could result in severe penalties to the guards and the heads of villages. For the purpose of detailed reports on the condition of the railway tracks, a log book was kept in each Ai-hu village, and once every month, the village head had to present the log book to the security forces at the relevant railway-station for examination and approval, after which the log book would be stamped. For fear of Japanese retaliation, and because of this strict supervision, village heads very often found it to their advantage to cooperate if they wanted to stay alive.⁵⁵

Apart from intimidation and coercion, the Japanese railway authorities and the Army also innovated beneficial schemes in these Ai-hu villages. They must have had a good knowledge of the mentality of the rural populace. The living standard of an average peasant in north China was very low,

55. Central Bureau of Investigation, The Enemy...Road-protection Policy, 2,4; also see Headquarters, Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China, Survey Report on Effectiveness of Propaganda in Winning Favour of Chinese Masses, Feb.24, 1940, R 114, T 981, F 25497 197 (Remark).

hence the greatest attraction to him was material aid, and the Japanese did not hesitate to invest on these villagers to seek their support and cooperation. Under the North China Transport Company's supervision, a programme consisting of eight items was drawn up to render aid to the villagers, comprising assistance in the agricultural, technical, medical, educational and recreational field.

The first concern was agricultural assistance. Special agricultural training centres were set up in major cities like Peking, Tientsin, Tsinan, Tsingtao, T'aiyuan, Hsuchou, Anyang 安陽 and Paoting. About 250 young men from 18 to 25 years of age from the Ai-hu villages were trained for three months in each of these centres, the courses provided including a wide range of training from stock breeding and farming techniques to weather-forecasting.⁵⁶ Along the T'ungpu line, the programme of agricultural aid was best organized. In terms of technology, the railway authorities from T'aiyuan sent men to the Ai-hu villages to advise on irrigation and drainage, on the improvement of fertilizers, farming implements and the quality of seeds. Virgin land was also allotted to villagers for cultivation. Some form of systematic financial management was also introduced. For the poorer peasants, loans were stated as being available although there was no detailed information as to the amount

56. Central Bureau of Investigation, The Enemy...Road-protection Policy, 8-11.

and whether interest would be charged. The most basic form of cooperatives for the sale of daily necessities also rendered services to the villagers. To encourage active participation in village affairs, organized tours for village heads were held every year when they would have the opportunity to visit major cities for observation and inspection purposes.⁵⁷

Perhaps the kind of assistance best appreciated by the local people was medical aid. In the rural areas of north China in the late 1930s and early 1940s, it could well be assumed that hospitals and clinics and the service of qualified doctors were a novelty. The railway authorities established a major hospital with branches along each of the major lines. Ai-hu villagers could receive treatment free of charge, whilst touring vans visited the villages with medical supplies and vaccination was made compulsory. The following is a table showing the distribution of hospitals along the major lines.

| Location of railway bureau | Peking | Tientsin | Shihchiachuang | T'ai-yuan | Changchiak'ou | Tsinan | Taiwan |
|----------------------------|--------|----------|----------------|-----------|---------------|--------|--------|
| No. of hospital branches | 4 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| No. of touring clinics | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | nil |

57. Ibid., 6.

To make villagers satisfied with their home environment, schools were set up for the education of the next generation or even for the present generation in the "Ai-lu hui-min yen-chiu-so" 愛路惠民研究所 (People's Road-protection Welfare Institute). Recreation centres known as "Ai-lu chih Chia" 愛路之家 (Road-protection home) were set up along major lines with libraries, canteens, bath rooms, recreation rooms and lecture halls open to the villagers. Other benefits included special trains at fixed time-schedule catering for Ai-hu villagers who could travel free of charge, thus facilitating communications between villages along the railways. Such transport must have been much more convenient to the villagers than the traditional means of transport they were used to. In addition, awards in the form of money were available for good performances in the road-protection campaigns and casualties and deaths resulting from these campaigns would be compensated.⁵⁸

As far as the administration of the Ai-hu villages was concerned, the various Japanese welfare schemes and the use of coercion and intimidation served the same purpose as Communist nationalistic propaganda in mobilizing the rural population. KMT intelligence reports in 1943 admitted that because of the various welfare schemes the Japanese were able to render to the Ai-hu villages, the local people were

58. Ibid., 9-11.

willing to cooperate with the Japanese, and this was especially so in north China, where Ai-hu villages were better organized than those in central or south China, so much so that Chinese guerrillas found villagers refused to help and instead acted as Japanese agents.⁵⁹ This phenomenon reveals the bare truth that in as much as one cannot neglect peasant nationalism as a determining force in the Sino-Japanese War, attention to the daily, basic economic needs of the rural population was just as important if either the CCP or the Japanese hoped to exercise rural control in north China.


The Model Districts.



Another Japanese means of expanding from the "orderly" areas to adjacent territories with CCP guerrilla activities was the setting up of "Mu-fan ti-ch'ü" 模範地 (model districts), embodying at least one important urban centre and one railway line in each district. The following is a map marking the various model districts as located by the North China Expeditionary Army in October, 1939:⁶⁰

59. Ibid., 17.

60. Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Report, Special Intelligence Bureau, R 114, T967, F 25259-25262.

MODEL DISTRICTS IN NORTH CHINA UNDER THE JAPANESE, 1939



 Major model districts
 Minor model districts

A study of the relative positions of the model districts and the CCP bases reveals one significant point.⁶¹ In terms of the territorial struggle in north China, the model districts represent Japanese efforts to strengthen territories held by them, and signify a response to the growing threat from the Communists who had been intensifying their guerrilla activities since 1938. On the other hand, the CCP bases tended to engulf the model districts in a movement to encroach upon the Japanese-held urban centres, many of which were included within the model districts. A typical example of this Japanese-CCP confrontation can be seen in Shansi and central Hopei, where the Japanese model district centred round Shihchiachuang was surrounded by the Communist Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base in the north, and the sub-region of T'ai Hang and southern Hopei in the south. It was in marginal areas that the struggle for rural control was most intense.

For the Japanese, the model districts were each allotted funds up to ¥ 560,000, although Japanese sources did not make it clear whether the subsidy was on a yearly basis. In addition, the Army had regular garrisons there to share the

61. The relative positions of the Communists and the Japanese can be studied by comparing the maps on 41 , 42 and 160 .

burden of anti-CCP campaigns with the local defence corps.
The following is a chart illustrating the extent and the
strength of these model districts:
62

62. Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Report, Special Intelligence Bureau, R 114, T 967, F 25257.

Model Districts in the Japanese Occupied Area

| Model District | Peking | Manchou | Ts'angchou | Pao ting | Shi- chi-a-chuang | Shun- te | Chang- te | Hsin- siang | Ts'ayuan | Lin- fen | Linchi- eng area |
|------------------------------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|----------|-------------|------------------------|
| No. of hsien per model district | 7 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 5 |
| Expenditure per model district | ¥ 20,000 | ¥ 130,000 | | ¥ 390,000 | | ¥ 60,000 | | ¥ 250,000 | | ¥ 560,000 | |
| Garrison* | 15th B | 27th D | | 110th D | | 35th D | | 1st A | | 12th A | |

* A stands for Army, B for brigade and D for division.

In these model districts, apart from the participation of the Japanese garrison, the pao-chia system in its various modified form also operated in the maintenance of law and order. Basically, 10 households formed one Chia^甲, and 10 Chia one Pao^保 in accordance with the traditional Chinese security organizations. Sometimes, several villages with a total of over 100 households were incorporated into one, and this was known as "ping-ts'un"^{併村} (incorporating villages). Elaborate measures and regulations were drawn up to check the movement of each household. In Shansi, for example, a placard had to be nailed in front of the house and residents were required to make known their names, profession and age in it. Identity cards or citizen cards were also issued with finger prints and photographs in them for easy identification.

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63. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium, Civil Affairs, 1940, II (central legislation), 14. It is interesting to compare the pao-chia system enforced by the North China Political Council with that in Central China under Wang Ching-wei's government. There is a great deal of similarities, mainly because they had the same objective of "exterminating the Communists" in their rural pacification campaigns. See Lee Ngok, op.cit., 168-179, and J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 247.
64. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium, Civil Affairs, 1940, II, (central legislation), 8-10; 1941, III, (Shansi legislation), 4. Also see "Chin-ti ch'iang-hua chih-an yin-mou", 一百萬又三千餘人治安陰謀 (The treachery of reinforcing law and order undertaken by enemy in Shansi) Chieh-fang jih-pao, Aug. 11, 1941 and "Tsui-chin Hua-pei ti-wei cheng-chih tung-t'ai"^{最近華北敵偽政權之政治動向}, (Recent Political activities of the enemy and puppets in north China) Chieh-fang jih-pao, Nov. 19, 1942.

The whole pao-chia system in the villages was in fact under the supervision of the police commissioner at the hsien level, and in case the Commissioner was absent, the head of the hsien, who might be the magistrate, or the chief of the "wei-chih hui" 維持會 (maintenance society), a temporary organization for the maintenance of law and order, would take over the supervision.⁶⁵

It is generally true that the effectiveness of the Japanese-sponsored pao-chia system depended on the extent of support it had from the Japanese Army. Thus, the closer the particular rural area or model district was to urban centres and strategic points, where one would expect a concentration of Japanese troops, the better organized would be the pao-chia system.

The Economic Pressure.

Another important aspect of anti-CCP measures that needs to be discussed is the Japanese economic pressure on the CCP bases, especially in 1941-1942. In terms of the territorial struggle for power in north China, both the Communists and the Japanese employed various means to restrict the out-flow of economic resources from their own area. On the part of the Communists, who were fighting guerrilla wars and whose bases were often raided by the Japanese Army, the economic tactics employed had been "to

65. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium, Civil Affairs, 1940, II (central legislation), 14.

clear the walls and empty the fields" as described in chapter three. As for the Japanese, their economic war on the CCP was most elaborate. By 1939-1940, they realized the vulnerability of the Communists, who had to live off the land they were stationed in. This not only applied to the Eighth Route Army, but also to people's armed bands, i.e., the self-defence corps and the militia, whose livelihood also depended on the economic production of their particular locality. Thus the most effective and positive measure for use against the guerrilla was to exercise control whenever possible over economic supplies in both the occupied area and the CCP bases. The way to achieve this was to set up economic blockades and enforce rationing and commandeering.

The first point to note in discussing Japanese attempts at economic control of the rural area was the value of food and cash crops which were far more significant than paper bank notes issued by different banks, puppet or CCP alike. In the villages of north China then, the barter system was often preferred to money transactions. To tighten the control over CCP bases, the Japanese therefore aimed at preventing the export of crops and goods of economic value from the occupied area to the Communist bases. Hence, the setting up of economic blockades became necessary. In addition, in marginal areas where the guerrillas could possibly get support from the people in spite of blockades, the

Japanese introduced rationing and commandeering so as to minimize the economic support the guerrillas could possibly get. Whilst Japanese troops in rural China in face of CCP embargoes and economic blockades, could depend on the better developed urban centres for supplies and reinforcement, the CCP guerrillas and regulars faced with a similar situation were in a much worse situation, as they had to be self-sufficient with no possible help from outside, especially from 1940 onwards, when what little supplies there were from Chungking were also stopped.⁶⁶ We turn, then, to a detailed study of the Japanese methods of economic control

Economic Blockades.

Support rendered by the North China Expeditionary Army was apparent in the establishment of economic blockades. For instance, in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan region, it was no coincidence that the committees directing economic control and blockades were set up in November-December, 1941: that was the period when the third mopping-up campaign in 1941 was launched with the specific aim of tightening the economic control over CCP bases. The blockaded areas inclu-

66. "K'ang-Jih Shih-ch'i ti ching-chi wen-ti ho ts'ai-cheng wen-ti", 抗日時期的經濟問題和財政問題 (Economic and financial problems during the Anti-Japanese War) Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi, (1961), III, 893-894.

ded T'aihangshan in Shansi, the Yellow River area, and the Liao Ho 遼河 area. The pao-chia system was utilized extensively to establish liaison between villages. Check points were set up on major roads between villages and on the periphery of areas blockaded. These check points were known as "chien-ch'a so" 檢察所 or "t'an-wen so" 探問所⁶⁷ where goods and commodities were checked.

In general, Japanese-controlled rural areas were economically better developed with access to urban centres and industrial towns. Therefore in these areas daily commodities and manufactured goods were usually available. These goods were badly needed by the less developed CCP bases where goods of economic value were mostly raw material like hide, or medicinal herbs. Thus the main purpose of the Japanese blockade was to ban the export of specified goods from the occupied area. These included ammunition and firearms, food, medical supplies, cotton in its raw or manufactured form, wool, and ink as well as the all important iron, coal and salt.⁶⁸ Of particular interest was cotton

67. CCP news on Japanese economic blockades was given in Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec.8,15 1941, especially on the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region. Also see Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, "The enemy's movement to reinforce law and order...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan.15, 1942.

68. Chieh-fang jih pao, Dec.15, 1941.

and salt. Cotton was essential as raw material for making clothes, whilst salt was important to CCP bases in the different parts of Shansi where transport difficulties and the tremendous distance from salt producing areas made the product most needed. The fact that Communists during the Sino-Japanese War tried to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of salt, and in the growth of cotton indicated that the Japanese economic blockade must have achieved some results. The CCP could not depend in any way on the Japanese-controlled areas for supplies.⁶⁹

Rationing, Market-control, and Commandeering.

The basic principle in the enforcement of rationing, market-control and commandeering by the Japanese was to restrict the supply of economic resources to villagers, so that there would hardly be any surplus which the guerrillas could obtain from the villagers. In enforcing rationing, the productivity and yield from crops were assessed at harvest time in the villages and an annual budget was drawn up to determine how grain and food supplies were to be rationed, sometimes on the basis of supplies per head,

69. For a specific case of CCP attempts to maintain self-sufficiency in the growth of cotton in north-west Shansi, see Tsu-chi ch'i-lai 組織
起來 (Let Us Organize), n.p, Chin-sui, 1944, 29.

70
per day. CCP sources give detailed descriptions of how the Japanese undertook rationing in the marginal areas, and although these sources might have exaggerated the severity of the case, for example, in the rationing of salt in terms of ounces per head per year, it could be assumed that they do give a general picture of the positive economic measures undertaken by the Japanese against the Communists.

In north-west Shansi from 1941 to 1942, rationing was enforced on an annual basis. Just prior to the autumn harvest, villages in the proximity of Japanese-held strategic points were surveyed and assessed according to the acreage of land, population and annual production. After the harvest, each household was allowed only one to two months' supply of food and grain, supplies for the rest of the year being sent to store houses. The head of the household had to go to these store houses every ten to fifteen days for supplies, which were distributed at the average of about 20 ounces of grain per head per day. As to villages further away from Japanese strongholds, village heads or pao-chia organizations normally supervised the rationing of supplies, which were concentrated in one centre

70. General information on Japanese measures in economic rationing, commandeering, and market-control in Chieh-fang jih pao, Aug. 11. 5; Dec. 8, 15, 1941; Feb. 13, 1942.

for home consumption rather than for sale. In one extreme case of rationing, CCP sources reported that in the Chiao-ch'eng 交城 Conference of October 1941, held in Japanese north-west Shansi, it was decided that 25 households were to share only one flour-mill, and the others were to be destroyed in three weeks from then.⁷¹

In other parts of Shansi, the annual consumption of food supplies required was assessed and listed by each household rather than by the Japanese authorities. Hence the severity of rationing might have been less than in the case of north-west Shansi. The annual estimate was then presented to the authorities for approval. Supplies were then sold on a rationing basis and purchasing cards were required.⁷² In Shansi in 1941, a special economic police force, generally known as Ching-chi ching-ch'a 經濟警察 察 was organized to supervise rationing. In addition, it was also assigned the specific duty of checking excessive rises in the price of daily commodities, especially when the stock in the market became scarce. As in the case of other measures of economic control, the Japanese Army

71. For economic control enforced by the Japanese in north-west Shansi, see Chieh-fang jih pao, Nov. 5, 1941 and Feb. 13, 1942.

72. Chieh-fang jih pao, Aug. 11; Dec. 8, 15, 1941.

rendered the necessary military support needed by the economic police force.⁷³

It may perhaps be worthwhile at this stage to go into details of how daily necessities like salt and cotton were rationed in the occupied area. Both the CCP and the puppet authorities in the marginal areas of rural north China endeavoured to control the production and the trade in salt. On the part of the Japanese, the north China Salt Company in the Tach'ing River area of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan border region possessed in late 1941 about 300 mou of salt pans. The CCP claimed that a total of 700 mou of salt pans was believed to have been taken away from the Chinese by the Japanese in the above area, and therefore complained that it resulted in great scarcity of salt and the local people suffered. Another CCP account from the same area estimated that salt was rationed at 4 ounces per head per month, and the penalty for excess purchasing included the amputation of the arm for any purchase over half a catty, and execution in the case of purchase exceeding one catty. The economic police force played

73. Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Report, Special Intelligence Bureau, Oct. 1939, R 114, T 967, F 25271, p.30. Also see North China Political Council, Hua-pei Cheng-wu wei-yuan-hui shih-cheng chi-yao, 華北政務委員會施政紀要 (Summarized Record of the Administration of the North China Political Council), Second Anniversary Commemorative, Peking, March 1942, (section on Shansi Province), 14-15.

its part to see that the rationing order was effectively carried out.⁷⁴ In north-east Shansi, daily commodities were rationed on a yearly basis, and the local people were entitled to one sack of coal and about 14 feet of cotton cloth, but the use of coal-gas was not permitted. A contribution of five dollars to cooperatives was necessary to entitle individuals to the right of purchasing these rationed goods. Travellers from one village to another were allowed to take one catty of food, ten ounces of salt and three packets of matches.⁷⁵

Cooperatives organized by the Japanese not only supervised the actual distribution of rations, but also served useful functions in controlling the marketing of economic resources like cotton and salt. Cooperatives were organized at the hsien level and were mainly in the hands of big merchants. The Japanese favoured this monopoly arrangements because supplies and commodities could then be concentrated in major centres in the hsien and were therefore easy to control.⁷⁶

74. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 8, 18, 1941.

75. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 15, 1941.

76. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Aug. 11, Dec. 8, 15, 1941. Also see Fourth Section, Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China, Monthly Report for Sept. 1941, R 115, T 1015, F 26859, p.10.

Another way of controlling the grain market was to purchase grain in large quantity from the people at harvest time. Each village had to contribute to the Japanese authorities an average of about 10-20 shih towards these purchases, and as many as 80 shih in some cases in north-west Shansi.⁷⁷ Consequently, there was a scarcity of grain in the free market and the only alternative left for the villagers was to obtain rationed supplies from the store-houses.

The CCP also described how the Japanese resorted to commandeering and even plundering food supplies in the villages of marginal areas to prevent Communist guerrillas from benefiting. These requisitions naturally became at least in part supplies for the Japanese Army. In some villages where the Maintenance Society was set up as the temporary puppet authorities, it was estimated that each village had to contribute without getting any money in return an average of 10 shih.⁷⁸ The CCP also accused the Japanese of plundering peasants' harvest⁷⁹ In fact, it

77. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Sept. 24, 1941.

78. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Feb. 13, 1942.

79. CCP sources gave great publicity to Japanese plundering at harvest time in north China, some accounts can be found in Chieh-fang jih-pao, Nov. 15, Dec. 4, 26, 1942; Feb. 13, 1942.

was apparently a battle between CCP guerrillas and the Japanese Army at harvest time with each side trying to forestall the other in requisitioning the grain. In defence of their crops in their bases and in marginal areas, CCP guerrillas, the militia, and the self-defence corps were very often faced with the problem of having to engage in combats with Japanese regulars who were better trained and equipped. In these circumstances, guerrilla tactics involving swift manoeuvring and mobilization could not work satisfactorily as the guerrillas were pinned down in the harvest area in defending their crops. On the whole, for the Communists, the extent of success in reaping their harvest depended on whether they could forestall Japanese attacks by mobilizing the maximum number of people to gather the crops in the shortest time possible. In addition, it was relatively easier to defend the harvests in hilly terrain like the Pei-yueh area of north-east Shansi, where the Japanese Army would find little advantage over the guerrillas. However, in the plains of central Hopei and the Shantung-Honan border, it was difficult indeed for the guerrillas to defend their crops, and the only possible solution was to amass military strength capable of resisting Japanese onslaughts, especially since that particular area was of considerable economic value.

The great pressure from the Japanese on the CCP bases was fully felt by 1942, and the various mopping-up campaigns of 1941-1942 definitely caused a shrink-⁸⁰ing in CCP territories and military strength. However, the various Japanese-sponsored political organizations, administration and measures of economic control, when backed up by the Japanese Army, proved to be an even greater menace to the CCP. The road-protection campaign, the Ai-hu villages, and the setting up of the Model Districts also indicate Japan's determination to build up her strength in rural north China in the hope that she would be able successfully to challenge the CCP for rural control there in the near future. The Japanese measures of economic control also revealed that the CCP bases were especially vulnerable in economic terms. Indeed, had the Japanese been able to put on greater pressure on the CCP bases even after the period 1941-1942, the Communists might have found it necessary to retreat from north China back to Yen-an in the North-west. However, the

80. In 1941-1942, the north China bases were reduced by 1/6th in size and the population down by 1/3rd. See The People's Liberation Army..., 122.

changing international situation in the second half of 1942, and the CCP Rectification Movement which started in February, 1942, created new hope for the Chinese Communists, and their bases in north China began therefore to assume a positive and active role against the Japanese.

CHAPTER V

Party Leadership at the Upper Level, 1942-1943

With the intense Japanese military and economic pressure on the bases in north China in 1941-1942, the Communists experienced the greatest crisis since the beginning of the war, and it became apparent that drastic changes were necessary if the bases were to survive the intense Japanese attacks. Thus the Rectification Movement came not at all as a surprise when it was launched in February 1942, with Mao Tse-tung delivering his lecture on "Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature" at the opening day ceremonies of the Party School, in Yen-an, on February 1.¹

As to what the Cheng Feng campaign was aiming at, Boyd Compton in his Mao's China states that there was too little information on what transpired during the Cheng Feng period 1942-1944, but quoted from eye-

1. For the text of Mao's lecture, see Chieh-fang-shé 解放方文士, Cheng-feng Wen-hsien 整風文獻 (A Collection of Rectification Documents) n.p., 1946, 6-25. This work also contains other speeches by Mao, CCP central directives and resolutions, as well as speeches by Liu Shao-ch'i, Ch'en Yün, Stalin and others.

witnesses, one of whom unsympathetically described the Rectification Movement as a reign of terror, whilst another more objective view considered it as an educational movement.² Professor S.R. Schram believes the Movement was launched for two purposes. First, it was to strengthen the unity and discipline of the CCP in difficult circumstances. Second, it represented Mao's attempts at 'sinification' of Marxism, and with it the need to undertake intra-party struggle against Wang Ming's Comintern faction.³ The present purpose is to examine the development of the Cheng Feng Movement in the bases of north China, viewing it as the means by which Mao could ensure the

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2. Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944, xxxv-xxxvi.
 3. S.R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 220-222. Wang Ming 王明, also known as Ch'en Shao-yu 陳紹禹, based his power on his connections with Russia and the Comintern, and the support given him by Russian trained CCP members. Wang's Comintern faction was in power in the CCP from January 1931 to 1935, and Wang himself remained prominent in party circles until 1940. For Mao's struggle against Wang from the early 1930's to the Cheng-feng period, see John R. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927-1935, 174-176; 254-57; 277-85.

support of the bases in his intra-party struggle and by which the party could reassert its position of leadership over the army and the administrative organizations.

The source of party strength in the bases obviously came from the four party sub-bureaux under the Northern Bureau, whose secretaries were the exponents of CCPCC policies and executors of CCP central directives and instructions. In view of the tremendous distance separating the bases from Yen-an, and the frequent combats between the Communists and the Japanese, contacts between Yen-an and the sub-bureaux took a matter of months to be established, and the CCPCC therefore could not expect to exercise as direct and immediate control as it might have wished. Nevertheless, party leadership in the bases operated through CCPCC's delegating power to the sub-bureaux. The pre-condition for success in this process was evidently that party secretaries and senior party cadres of the sub-bureaux had to be trusted disciples of the CCPCC. During the Cheng Feng period, the majority of these cadres proved themselves to be not only trusted followers of the CCPCC, but also faithful disciples of Mao, in his bid for supremacy in the intra-party struggle against Wang Ming's Comintern faction, which insisted on the application

of a strong Bolshevick line in China. The four party sub-bureau secretaries were P'eng Chen 彭真 of the Northern Sub-bureau with its headquarters in the Pei-yüeh area, Teng Hsiao-p'ing 滕小平 of the T'ai Hang Sub-bureau, south-east Shansi, Lin Feng 林楓 of the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-bureau, and Chu Sui 朱瑞 of the Shantung Sub-bureau.⁴

The strongest indication of their being Maoists in the Cheng Feng period was that three of them were elected to the CCPCC in the Seventh CCP Congress held in April-June 1945, and the Congress itself signified Mao's triumph over Wang Ming, and his supremacy as leader in the party.⁵ P'eng Chen seemed highly favoured

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4. Headquarters, North China Special Patrol Garrison, Dai ikki sakusen sentō shōhō 第一期工作報告及詳報 (Detailed Report of Military Operations of Japanese Garrison against Chinese Troops in North China) September 20, 1943 - June 9, 1944, R 134, T 1252, F 52713, pp. 43-44. The location of the party sub-bureaux is marked in the map given here. For a list of the sub-bureau secretaries see F 52743-52744.
5. Speeches and reports by Communist leaders at the Seventh CCP Congress, a list of the members of the Central Committee and two editorials from the Liber-tang ti-ch'i tz'u tai-piao ta-hui yuan-shih ts'ai-liao hui-pien 中國共產黨第七次代表大會原始材料彙編 (Collected Primary Sources of the Seventh Congress of the CCP), n.p. (CCP), 1945. Also see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 232-234, and Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the New Democratic Revolution in China, 391-399, 489-492.

as he was placed 18th amongst the 44 committee members, whilst Teng and Lin ranked 28th and 36th respectively. Wang Ming and Ch'in Pang-hsien as leaders of the Comintern faction barely managed to remain in the committee, and were placed in the last two positions.⁶ P'eng, who is a native of Shansi, in fact symbolized the ascendancy of local party cadres in the bases. Under his leadership, the Northern Sub-bureau scored success in land administration and mass mobilization, and the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, which came under the control of his sub-bureau, became one of the most progressive bases.⁷ P'eng's support for Mao in the intra-party struggle was evident in his article "On Understanding the Spirit and Substance of the 22 Documents" published on May 14, 1942, in which he stressed party policy must be formulated objectively to allow modifications according to changing circumstances. He quoted from Mao's

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6. For a list of the members and alternate members of the CCPCC elected at the Seventh Congress, see Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 154-155. Also see Wang Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 166.
7. For P'eng Chen's biography, see Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 163; C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, III, 168; of the various works on the biographies of leading CCP figures, the most accurate and reliable source is evidently Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, as it was originally published by the CCP itself in 1945. For P'eng Chen's achievement in land administration, see chapter VI, 242, 244-245.

"On the Protracted War" to emphasize the need for changes in the CCP's resistance against Japanese Imperialism.⁸ In other words, he supported Mao's policy of aiming at a national-democratic revolution and sinification of Marxism in opposition to Wang Ming's dogmatic interpretation of Marxism.

Mao's support in the bases was not confined to the sub-bureau secretaries. Political commissars who acted as the party watch-dog over the army, also played a leading rôle in conducting Cheng Feng indoctrination in the various divisions and contingents of the Eighth Route Army. For those who survived the war up to the Seventh CCP Congress, many were elected to the CCPCC as a reward for their staunch support for Mao. Kuan Hsiang-ying 關向應 as political commissar of the North-west Shansi Army ranked 10th in the Committee, and Lo Jung-huan 羅榮桓 as director of the political department of the field-forces (yeh-chan pu-tui) 野戰部隊 in the 18th Army Group in 1940, and later as political commissar of the 115th Division in Shantung, ranked 16th. Lu Ting-i, head of the publicity department of the 18th Army Group, and concurrently the head of the party newspaper committee in the Northern Party Bureau, was also elected member of the Central Committee in the Congress. Two alternate

8. Chieh-fang jih-pao, May 14, 1942.

members elected were Ch'eng Tzu-hua 程子華, political commissar of the Central Hopei Army, the best organized contingent in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, and Lo Jui-ch'ing 羅瑞卿, director of the political department of the field-forces in the 18th Army Group as successor to Lo Jung-huan.⁹ A list of the political commissars of the leading divisions and army units in the bases is given in Appendix I.

Support to Mao in fact was given not only from locally trained cadres like P'eng Chen, but also from Russian trained senior party cadres who might have been thought to have more reasons to align with Wang Ming. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lu Ting-i were examples of support from this quarter. Liu, who as early as 1920 was sent by the CCP Central to Russia for training,¹⁰ became Mao's chief exponent and theoretician on party policy in the Seventh Congress. In his report on the

9. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 154-155; biographies of these political Commissars are given in 161-163, 165, 170, 172. Also see C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, III, 168-69, 173.

10. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "My reminiscences", Ming Pao Monthly, I, No. 6, (June, 1966), 59. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Liu Shao-ch'i was one of the eight members of the youth corps sent to Moscow in the winter of 1920.

revision of the party constitution on May 14, and 15, 1945, he made it clear that the correct party line was a sinification of Marxism under Mao's leadership, and praised Mao not only as the greatest revolutionary and statesman in Chinese history, but also its greatest theoretician and scientist.¹¹ Up to at least 1942, Liu was chief of the party bureau in central China,¹² and although he did not hold any office in the bases of north China, his numerous articles and theses written during the war and especially in the Cheng Feng period, had virtually become the directives and guidance for senior party cadres in the bases. The most representative of his writings were "On the Intra-party Struggle" and "The Liquidation of Menshevik Thought in the Party",

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11. Liu Shao-ch'i, Kuan-yu hsiu-kai tang-chang ti pao-kao (關於修改黨章的報告) (The Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution), Chung-kuo ch'u-pan-she, Hong Kong, 1949. For comments on Liu's attitude in the Seventh Congress, see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 232-234.
12. In July 1940, Liu was reported to be in northern Kiangsu with the New 4th Army. After the New 4th Army Incident in January 1941, he was appointed political commissar of that Army and also held the post of secretary of the party bureau in central China. It was also in 1941 that he delivered his famous speech "On the Intra-party Struggle" in the party school of central China. In 1942, he was reported to have returned to Yen-an from Founing 阜平. See Who's Who in Communist China, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1965, 410-411. For Liu's work in reorganizing the New Fourth Army in 1941, see Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 140-141, J. Ch'en Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 252.

which had as the common theme attacks on Wang Ming's faction as deviationists.¹³ Lu Ting-i was sent to Russia for training in 1928 where he took part in the 6th CCP Congress held in Moscow, and remained there as delegate to the Comintern and did not return until 1930.¹⁴ In spite of his former association with the Comintern faction, his support for Mao in the Cheng Feng campaign was clear-cut, as can be seen in his article "The Reason Why the Rectification of the Three Unorthodox Tendencies is an Ideological Revolution in the Party" released on May 13, 1942.¹⁵ Lu supported in his article Mao's belief that China was undergoing a bourgeois-democratic revolution which had to be realized before a socialist revolution could be achieved. He therefore maintained that the party should emphasize

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13. For a full text of the two articles, see Chieh-fang-she, Rectification Documents, 166-222; Chieh-fang jih-pao July 6, 1943. For the translated text of the two articles, see Compton, Mao's China, 188-238, 255-268. Liu's specific attack on Wang Ming's faction is discernible in his article "On the Intra-party Struggle". See Rectification Documents 175-176, 198.
14. For Lu's biography, see Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 165; C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, III, 169; and Who's Who in Communist China, 432.
15. Chieh-fang jih-pao, May 13, 1942.

democracy and nationalism, and attacked deviationists who claimed to be true disciples of Marxist-Leninism, but had actually erred in being too dogmatic, and fussing over words and sentences. Lu's target of attack was in fact Wang Ming's Comintern faction which favoured a dogmatic application in China of lessons learned from the Russian revolution. Finally, Lu supported in his article Mao's United Front policy which he thought had proved to be the correct party line in the five years of resistance.

Apart from their role in the intra-party struggle in the Cheng Feng period, senior party cadres in the bases played an even more important part in efforts to maintain party leadership under the most difficult circumstances since the war, and to strengthen party unity and discipline. On September 1, 1942, the CCP Central Politburo passed resolutions on the need for uniform party leadership in the anti-Japanese bases.¹⁶ In essence, the resolutions pointed out that various unorthodox tendencies and deviations had arisen in the bases, and they were accentuated by the acute condition of the war. Subjectivism and sectarianism were pinpointed as the main deviations which resulted in discord in the relations between the party, the army,

16. Chieh-fang-she, Rectification Documents, 135-144.

the administration and the people.¹⁷ The above problems became the greatest obstacle to uniform party leadership, and senior party cadres had to shoulder heavy responsibilities in overcoming these obstacles.

Party-Army Relations

The most formidable obstacle to uniform party leadership was the immense power embraced by the army in the bases. In the senior cadres' conference held in October 1942 - January 1943, in Yen-an, under the auspices of the North-west Party Bureau, Jen Pi-shih 任弼时, secretary of the CCPCC Secretariat, made his attack in January 1943 on Warlordism tendencies in the army and maintained that the senior cadres' conf-

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17. Chieh-fang she, Rectification Documents, 135. It may be noted that subjectivism and sectarianism mentioned here, together with party formalism, were denounced throughout the Cheng Feng period as the three principal unorthodox tendencies developed within the party. Mao's speech "On Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature" was directed against subjectivism and sectarianism.

erence must see that this deviation be corrected.¹⁸ In actual fact, warlordism as defined by the Communists can be of two kinds. First, there was the rising military strength of local commanders which tended to result in independent military actions in opposition to party instructions, and inevitably appeared in some regions in the CCP bases. On March 4, 1943, the editorial of the Liberation Daily on the role played by the senior cadres' conference pointed out that warlordism, particularism (pen-wei chu-i) 本位主義, and independent tendencies still existed.¹⁹ The second kind of warlord tendencies refers to the old-fashioned way veteran commanders treated their soldiers, like flogging, and their arrogant attitude towards other party and government cadres. Mao Tse-tung in his speech "Let Us Organize" delivered November 1943 referred to this kind

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18. Chieh-fang jih-pao, January 31, 1943. Also see Ch'en Po-ta, On Ten Years of Civil War, 62. The senior cadres' conference which was attended by the majority of leading CCP figures dealt with three major issues. They were, first, lessons learned from party history; second, the problem of uniform leadership, and third, current duties to be performed. Concerning the anti-Japanese bases, an outstanding problem as Jen Pi-shih pointed out was warlord tendencies.
19. Chieh-fang jih-pao, March 4, 1943. Particularism refers to deviations amongst army commanders who were self-centred and cared nothing about other army units.

of warlord tendencies, which he claimed had on the whole been corrected, although isolated cases still existed in the various CCP bases.²⁰

Apparently, both kinds of warlord tendencies were found in the CCP bases in the period 1942-1943, and in order to study them closely, it is necessary to examine the different major units, which tended to vary tremendously in origin, nature and organization. On the whole, three types of army units are discernible. First, there were Mao's loyalists with history dating back to the Long March and the period 1930-1933, when the Red Army withstood the five KMT campaigns aiming at CCP extermination. Second, there were commanders who had the same long history but did not serve under Mao's First Front Army in the early 1930s. Lastly, there were the local military leaders with their local recruitments emerging as the vital strength against the Japanese. Independent tendencies generally sprang from the second type of army units, but even more so

20. "Tsu-chi ch'i-lai" 組織起來 (Let us organize), Mao Tse-tung hstian-chi (1961), III, 937-938.

from the last type. The Chart in Appendix I indicates the major armed forces in the bases.

Out of the commanders in the four border regions, Nieh Jung-chen and Liu Po-ch'eng were Mao's loyalists. Nieh was Lin Piao's deputy when the latter was commander of the 115th Division at the beginning of the war. Lin in turn had served under Mao in the First Front Army during the Long March. The fact that Nieh in 1937 also held the concurrent post of political commissar of the 115th Division meant that he was probably the military commander most closely connected with the party.²¹ Liu Po-ch'eng had been Mao's chief-of-staff in the Long March, and naturally was a most trusted follower of Mao. During the war, Liu was commander of the 129th Division stationed in south-east Shansi in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base.²² In fact, this

21. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 166. Also see Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 35, 97. For Nieh's pre-1937 career, see C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, II, 637 and Who's Who in Communist China, 463.

22. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 164. Also see C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, II, 637, and Who's Who in Communist China, 408, for Liu's career in the early 1930's. For the location of Liu's troops in south-east Shansi, see Second Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force in North China, Senji geppō shiryō, I gatsubun, 單月時局及資料(一月分) (Monthly Wartime Report for January, 1941), R 114, T 1002, F 26385, p.7.

region was particularly the source of loyalist strength, as Chu Teh's troops were stationed there from 1941 onwards. ²³

The second type of military commanders, who were also veterans of the 1930-1933 period, were mainly stationed in the other bases. Ho Lung, as commander of the 120th Division in the north-west Shansi base, had been commander of the Second Front Army in October 1934. ²⁴ Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, as commander of the Shantung-Kiangsi-Honan Border Region, had been the commander of the Fourth Front Army in the early 1930s. ²⁵ It can be assumed that in spite of Hsü's long military career, he was the least trusted amongst the former commanders of the Red Army Corps because of his close association with Chang Kuo-t'ao, the leader of the Fourth Front Army, who left the CCP camp in April 1938 for the KMT

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23. For the location of Chu Teh's troops, see map in Headquarters, Tada Corps, Kyōsantō jōkyō sono ta, senji geppō shiryō 共產黨狀況見学の他...戦時月報資料 (State of Affairs of Chinese Communist Party ...), March 1941. R 115, T 1008, F 26532-26540.
24. For a biography of Ho Lung, see Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress. For his career in the early 1930s, see Who's Who in Communist China, 201.
25. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 161; Who's Who in Communist China, 237-239, and Second Section, Japanese Expeditionary Force, Monthly Report for January 1941, R 114, T 1002, F 26385, p. 7.

held Sian in Shensi.²⁶ Hsü's headquarters was in southern Shantung, where another commander from the second type also had his troops stationed there. He was Ch'en Kuang, the former divisional commander of the Fifth Front Army, who commanded the 115th Division in 1943.²⁷

The Shantung base was indeed the most likely region for the army to act independently of the party, not only because it was the headquarters of non-Maoists like Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien and Ch'en Kuang, but also because of the unstable situation which favoured a particular type of armed resistance against the Japanese. As described in Chapter II, before the arrival of the Eighth Route Army in the late spring of 1939, resistance in Shantung was mostly guerrilla in nature, with local party cadres organizing guerrilla units. Constant attacks from the Japanese also made the setting up of regular and stable administrative organizations difficult.²⁸

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26. Since March 1966, Chang Kuo-t'ao has been writing his memoirs in Hong Kong. The issue in June 1968 in the Ming Pao Monthly deals with his career in 1928 when Chü Chiu-pai was in power in the CCP: "My reminiscences", Ming Pao Monthly, III, 6, 91-94.
27. For the location of CCP troops in Shantung, see Tada Corps, State of Affairs of CCP, March 1941, R 115, T 1008, F 26532-26540.
28. Hou Shen, "The growth of new Shantung", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944.

Before August 1940 the highest CCP authority in Shantung was in the form of a provisional committee for the promotion of war-time work. Even the Shantung War-time Administrative Committee set up on August 15, 1940, was not on the same parallel as the other three bases which had their administrative organizations termed either as border government or sub-border government.²⁹ The absence of a stable CCP government in Shantung also meant that military commanders were often denied a permanent base where they could station their troops. Consequently, combats with the Japanese became guerrilla in nature even for regular troops. CCP documents indicated that long-term guerrilla warfare practised by regular troops was most conducive to independent tendencies.³⁰ It was also in Shantung that the old fashioned way of treating soldiers was evident. For instance, in the eastern part of the Chiaochou peninsula, Hsiao Hua, director of the political department of the 115th Division, complained that commanders of different units often neglected the people, insulted and beat up common soldiers, and thus were

29. See the Shantung section in Appendix 2, 289.

30. "Chia-ch'iang tang-hsing ti tuan-lien", (To strengthen the training of party characteristics), (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 6, 1941.

guilty of subjectivism and bureaucratism. Hsiao added that warlordism had also been responsible for the absence of good liaison between the officers and common soldiers.³¹

The third type of military units was led by commanders who derived their strength from local support, including the recruitment of their troops. Some of them had been CCP members from the start, but many had only been associated with the CCP since the beginning of the war, being either Communist sympathizers or men who found common ground with the CCP in the war of resistance. Whilst their support in expansion and anti-Japanese activities was needed, the CCP also found it necessary to pay special attention to the checking of independent and warlord tendencies in army units of this type. The way for senior party cadres to control these locally entrenched leaders was to absorb them gradually into the party, and acknowledge their ascendancy by placing them in important party positions. The fact that many of them were elected to the CCPC in the Seventh Congress is a good indication of this party policy.³²

31. Chiao-tung chün-ch'ü, cheng-chih pu 冀東軍區, 政治部 (ed.), Liang-chung tso-feng 兩軍作風 (Two Styles of Work), n.p., same, 1945, 1-2.

32. See 200 and n. 38.

Another significant method of containing these commanders in the Cheng Feng period was to make full use of political commissars' role as the party watch-dog to check warlordism and the growth of localism. Before going into further investigations of these party measures, it is necessary to refer to some of the more prominent figures amongst these locally entrenched military commanders. The most renowned non-CCP figure in this group was Hsu Fan-ting, who was involved in the famous New and Old Army Incident in Shansi in 1940 as described in Chapter II. After joining the CCP camp, his forces were then renamed the Anti-Japanese New Army with its headquarters in north-west Shansi.

33. Chapter II, 54 . Also see Appendix I, for Hsu's position held in the CCP Army.

Party indoctrination and organization within the New Army therefore had only a very short history, counting even CCP efforts before the outbreak of the incident. Hence Hsu's army units naturally became a suspect as a potential breeding ground for independent tendencies.

The most outstanding figure destined to rise in the CCP was Po I-po, who joined the party as early as 1926, and had been secretary of the Sacrifice League, and commander of the Dare-to-Die-corps before the outbreak of the New and Old Army Incident. After the Incident, he became chief commander of the Dare-to-Die corps, and was stationed in south-east Shansi under Liu Po-ch'eng.³⁴ In the Hopei region, there were three influential figures. In southern Hopei, Sung Jen-ch'iung who had served under Lin Piao in the early 1930s, was commander of the eastern detachment.³⁵ Yang Hsiu-feng,

34. For Po's biography, see Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 168; for the location of Po's troops after the Incident, see Headquarters, Shinozuka Corps, Kamai hijō yōzu 各師內團行營要圖 (Rough Sketch of Banditry within Jurisdiction of Shinozuka Corps), Feb. 1941, R II4, T 1003, F 29400-29401.

35. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 171, and Who's Who in Communist China, 525-526

who had virtually founded the anti-Japanese base in southern Hopei in late 1937, was chairman of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government. His influence with the military units was tremendous as he was mainly responsible for organizing the armed resistance since the beginning of the war.³⁶ In central Hopei was Lü Cheng-ts'ao, who held the post of commander of the Central Hopei Army. His association with the CCP only dated back to 1937-1938 when he joined forces with Nieh Jung-³⁷ chen and established himself in central Hopei.

36. For Yang's role in mass mobilization programmes in southern Hopei, see chapter III, 97-98.

37. For Lü's biography, see Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 172; C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, III, 173. For Lü's military coalition in central Hopei, see Research Section, Central Committee for the Extermination of Communism, Field Survey of Chinese Communist Efforts to Win Support of People in Central Hopei, May 1940, R 114, T 999, F 26332.

The contribution of Sung, Lü and Yang in the war of resistance was immense as they were the architects in sustaining the fierce Japanese attacks, which had as their main target the plains in Hopei in the period 1941-1942.

The power of these commanders was further augmented by the fact that many of them also held concurrent administrative posts, thus wielding both military and administrative power. The chart in appendix 2 gives a list of leading administrators in the bases, and when it is compared with the chart in appendix 1 indicating the leading military commanders in the bases, it can be seen that many of these locally entrenched leaders held both military and administrative power. In north-west Shansi for instance, Hsü Fan-ting was concurrently director of the north-west Shansi sub-region office. In the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base, Po I-po was deputy-chairman of that border government, whilst Sung Jen-ch'ung was director of the southern Hopei sub-region office. In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, Lü Cheng-ts'ao was director of the central Hopei sub-region office. These frequent examples of evident subordination

of administrative organizations to military power meant that the key to party control over the administration also depended on the extent of success the party had in containing the army. As these leaders contributed tremendously to the war of resistance, what the CCP expected of them was cooperation rather than down-right and unquestioned obedience to party discipline. Of the five figures mentioned, Po I-po was elected member, and Lin Cheng-ts'ao and Sung Jen-ch'iung alternate members of the CCPC in the Seventh CCP Congress.³⁸ Hsu Fan-ting and Yang Hsiu-feng were not included, most probably because they were not CCP members from the start, especially when Hsu had been a KMT member. By placing these men in important party positions, the CCP hoped they would follow in spirit if not in letter the various party principal policies and directives. In other words, the CCP was after harmony with the army in the bases, rather than total demand for party discipline to be maintained to the letter within the army, hoping in so doing that warlordism could be minimized.

38. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 154-155

Another major CCP measure to control the army was to introduce Cheng Feng reforms into the army units through the existing party means in checking the army. The chart in appendix 3 illustrates how the party built itself into the army. It can be seen that party control came from two quarters. In addition to the actual party organizations in the army units, the political commissar was in charge of the conduct of the party affairs and the checking of warlordism. As the representative of the party, the political commissar was placed in the same rank as the military commander of the same level, serving as a check on the latter, and also on commanders of the lower levels. A typical example was from the Shansi-Chahar-Hepei base where Nieh Jung-chen was the commanding officer. Nieh, who had been concurrently deputy-commander and political commissar of the 115th Division in late 1937, was in fact the party watch-dog in the base throughout the war. Under his command in western Hopei was Yang Ch'eng-wu 楊成武, commander of the First Independent Division, who rose from the rank of regiment commander which

39. For detailed responsibilities of the political commissars in the CCP army, see C.A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism..., 81-82.

he held in October 1937.⁴⁰ Japanese sources quoting Ch'en Kuei-jen 陳貴仁, deputy head of the Intelligence Bureau of the Independent First Division captured by the Japanese, revealed that Nieh had wanted to keep Yang Ch'eng-wu in check, therefore he sent his henchman and party cadre Kao P'eng 高朋島 to be Yang's deputy. According to Ch'en Kuei-jen, real power in the Independent First Division was not in the hands of Yang, but Kao P'eng, who took orders from Nieh.⁴¹ Perhaps Yang's personal background had also made the party think the above check necessary, as he was of rich peasant origin and an intellectual, being a graduate of the Anti-Japanese University.⁴² It is also interesting to note the same Japanese source reported that

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40. See appendix 1, 286, and Research Section, Central Committee for the Extermination of Communism, Dokuritsu dai ichishi ni tsuite; Kisei hōkokusho no ni 獨立第一師(ニ於テ) 西軍及共軍の(ニ) (Report on 1st Independent Division of Communist Army in West Hopei), July 1940, R 114, T 996, F 26226, p.1.
41. Research Section Committee for Extermination of Communism, Report on 1st Independent Division..., R 114, T 996, F 26232, p. 13-14.
42. Ibid.

many intellectuals in the division were ousted by party members of poor peasant origin, and the latter were then elevated as cadres.⁴³ This in fact represented class-consciousness on the part of the poor peasants, which was encouraged by the party as the means to counteract the influx of bourgeois elements in the army resultant from military expansion. To the CCP, bourgeois tendencies were the root of deviations.⁴⁴

As for the actual party indoctrination programme during the Cheng Feng period, the political commissars and party cadres took the lead in holding various study sessions and discussion groups in the army units, with the purpose of examining the principal Cheng Feng

43. Ibid., R 114, T 996, F 26235-26236, pp. 20-21.

44. Lu Ting-i believed that bourgeois deviation was one of the main reasons for warlord tendencies in the army. See Lu Ting-i, "K'ang-chan san-nien-lai wo-chün cheng-chih kung-tso ti chien-t'ao", 抗戰三年來我軍政治工作的檢討 (A review of the political work in our army during three years of resistance) Chien-hsien yueh-k'an (前線月刊) (The Front Monthly), No. 6, (Dec. 1940), 28.

documents published since February 1942. The twenty-two documents, mainly comprising CCP directives, the works of Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i, as well as translated work by Stalin, became the text book for cadres. Articles by K'ang Sheng 康生, Lu Ting-i, P'eng Chen and others were also included. Army cadres were divided into the senior, intermediate and junior sections according to rank. Cadres of the brigade level and above joined the senior section, whilst they in turn gave guidance to junior groups. The intermediate section was designed for cadres from the company level upwards, and the junior section for company level cadres of low education standard. For cadres

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45. Most of the twenty-documents are translated in Compton, Mao's China.
46. K'ang Sheng was head of the Intelligence Bureau and Minister of the Social Department during the war, and wrote numerous articles during the Cheng Feng period in support of Mao. In the present Cultural Revolution, he is one of the leading supporters of Mao against Liu Shao-ch'i.
47. Wang Kuang-wei 王光美, "I-erh-ling-shih cheng-feng hsüeh-hsi pao-kao", 一二〇師整風學習報告 (Report on Cheng Feng studies in the 120th Division) Chieh-fang jih-pao, Oct. 30, 1942.

at the senior level, notes were expected to be taken during discussions, and the most important part of the study-sessions was on self-criticism, and the examination of weaknesses and failings amongst comrades. The Cheng Feng documents served as the guidance for the correction of all deviations. 48

As a rule, specific programmes and time-tables were set for the discussion groups and study-sessions to do research on specific documents. For instance, in July 1942, cadres under the direct command of the 120th Division were set the specific programme of examining the central resolution of April 3, 1943, Mao's lecture on "Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature", and articles by K'ang Sheng, Lu Ting-i and P'eng Chen. According to the report by the 120th Division, the study of those documents helped to pacify comrades who felt restless, and a good attitude towards learning was generally maintained. 49 However,

48. Li Chen ^{李貞}, "I-erh-ling-shih shih-chih i-ko-yüeh cheng-feng wen-chien hsueh-hsi chung-chieh", 一二〇師師直一個月整風文件學習總結 (A report of one month's study of Cheng Feng documents by the divisional staff of the 120th Division) Chieh-fang jih-pao, Nov. 9. 1942.

49. Ibid.

mistakes and weaknesses in the study groups were also pointed out and suggestions for improvements made. It was also realized that emphasis should be given to the role of senior cadres from the battalion level upwards as leaders in the Cheng Feng Movement.⁵⁰ Many senior cadres were consequently sent down to lower levels to conduct reform programmes. For instance, from June to October 1942, the 120th Division sent two working teams headed by six cadres from the divisional political department to supervise Cheng Feng studies in the 5th and 8th sub-regions of the north-Shansi base.⁵¹

It must also be pointed out that Cheng Feng campaigns undertaken in the bases were not as frequent and intense as those undertaken in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government, in view of the constant military engagements, and study sessions could only be held at intervals between combats. In the 120th Division, cadres working in offices spent four hours studying Cheng Feng documents daily, whilst combating cadres spent an average of two

50. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Sept.27,1942,(on army Cheng Feng programmes in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base).

51. Wang Kuang-wei, "Report on Cheng Feng studies in the 120th Division", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Oct.30, 1942.

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hours per day.

A further indication of CCP intention to strengthen the party Cheng Feng programme in the army was evident in the CCP Central Politburo resolutions on party leadership in the bases passed on September 1, 1942. The third resolution specified that members of the party committee at the sub-bureau and regional levels, and the party secretary at the area level, were to hold the concurrent posts of political commissar in the military region (chün-ch'ü) ¹ ₁ and sub-region (fen-ch'ü) ² ₂ (either divisional or brigade level) respectively. ⁵³ By the end of 1943, it was without doubt that the Cheng Feng programme in the army had reached its climax, and the party was doing the best it could to seek the cooperation of the army, whilst simultaneously keeping it in check against all deviations.

52. Ibid.

53. Chieh-fang-she, Rectification Documents, 137. Also see North China Special Patrol Garrison, Kiehü chiku Dai ikki sakusen sentō shōho 冀中地区第一集团军政治工作部工作报告 (Detailed Report of Fighting in Phase 1 of Operations against Chinese Troops in Central Hopei Area), Sept. 1943 - June 1944. R 134, T 1255, F 52935.

Party indoctrination undertaken in the Cheng Feng period in the army in fact represented only one part of the programme which aimed at strengthening the unity and discipline within the CCP. It was realized by the party that success in resistance against the Japanese, and in expansion depended on leadership on the part of cadres in conducting and supervising the army units, and the administrative and mass organizations. The Cheng Feng programme in the army mentioned earlier can represent a cross-section of party work in these various organizations, but it remains to be seen what rules and principles were laid down by the CCP as specific methods of leadership to be followed by all cadres.

Methods of Leadership

In the various resolutions and editorials in the Liberation Daily during the Cheng Feng period, two CCP themes on the methods of leadership were discernible. They were the way to establish good relations with the people, and the attitude towards work and specific programmes. The first prerequisite in mobilizing the people

was that cadres must not keep themselves aloof from the masses, and consider themselves superior, or else contacts with the people would have been lost. Cadres who erred on this path were guilty of bureaucratic deviations.⁵⁴ As to the actual method of mobilizing the people, it was based on the CCP concept that Chinese society comprised the active, neutral and inert elements, with the first and last in the minority, and the second forming the main bulk of the community. To mobilize the people, cadres should align themselves with the active elements to form a nucleus, aiming at attracting the neutral elements, whilst the inert elements were not to be neglected.⁵⁵ Tremendous responsibilities were shouldered by junior cadres in mobilizing the people, as contacts with the latter were made mainly at the basic village level.

54. "Fan-tui kuan-liao chu-i" 反對官僚主義
(In opposition to bureaucratism), (editorial),
Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec.18.1942.

55. "CCP central resolution on the method of leadership", (passed by the Central Politburo on June 1.1943), Chieh-fang jih-pao, June 4.1943. Also see "Kuan-yu ling-tao fang-fa ti yueh-kan wen-ti" 關於領導方法的若干問題 (Some problems on the method of leadership), Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi (1961) III, 900.

Detailed methods and problems involved in all these important mass mobilization programmes will be dealt with as a specific topic in chapter six on party leadership at the village level.

On the attitude and specific methods towards work, Mao Tse-tung specified that there should be only one central theme in any project at any particular time, and cadres therefore had to decide at their own discretion the most urgent work to be done, and other projects had to be set aside as subsidiary. This also applied to directives from senior to junior cadres in which should be a distinction between the major project and other minor ones.⁵⁶ By 1943 and 1944, this general principle was on the whole observed in the bases. For instance, in 1943, the most significant theme of work for cadres was to reinvigorate the rent-reduction campaign and to safeguard the rights of tenants against landlords' exploitation, whilst in 1944, the emphasis was shifted to the launching of an economic production campaign.⁵⁷ On a smaller scale, especially at the

56. Mao-tse-tung, Kuan-yu ling-tao fang-fa (關於領導方法) (On the method of leadership), Peking, 1953, 8-9.

57. On the rent-reduction campaign and the economic production drive, see chapter six, 237-255, 263-268.

local level, it was also realized that the major project for cadres should vary with the season. For example, during harvest time, the major theme should be the collecting of revenue, which in practice was the collection of grain, as revenue was paid in kind. ⁵⁸

On specific methods of leadership, senior cadres were reminded constantly that as leaders, they should not involve themselves too heavily in daily routines to neglect their vital duty in formulating policies, or else they would have fallen into the trap of routinism (shih-wu chu-i) 事務主義. ⁵⁹ For directions to junior cadres, senior cadres were warned against the

58. Chieh-fang jih-pao, November 16, 1941 (On the collection of revenue and party instructions).

59. "Kai-ch'in ling-tao tso-feng ti i-tien chien-i", (Leadership), (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, Sept. 28, 1942; and "Ti-kao ling-tao kai-tsao tso-feng", 提高領導改造作風 (To improve leadership and reform attitudes), (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, Nov. 10, 1942. Routinism refers to senior cadres' involving too much in routine works like checking minor details, meeting everyone who approached them, instead of leaving such work to junior cadres.

danger of formalism. Criticisms were directed against directives and instructions which were too formal, routine, and carried no substantial content at all. In drafting these directives, senior cadres were also reminded that full considerations should be given to the actual situation of the particular area in which the directives were to be carried out. For instance, in the Pei-yueh area of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, the party instructed that distinctions should be made between the well-established regions and guerrilla areas in the application of directives.⁶⁰

In general, the CCP realized the importance of applying different rules in guerrilla areas, where its authority was not well established, and where the people suffered a great deal as a result of constant military engagements. Thus the CCP allowed more flexible policies to operate in these areas. In the Shantung base where CCP rule had not been so well established, the CCP refrained from insisting on rent being reduced to under

60. Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 11, 1942, (On party formalism in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base).

37.5 % of the yield at harvest, and was satisfied with a general reduction of 25 % on the pre-1937 rent.⁶¹

In order that senior cadres could understand the actual situation at the local levels better, the CCP also directed that important research and investigations be made into local conditions, with respect to the social and economic situation as well as class-structure.⁶² In March 1942 for instance, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei party headquarters directed its cadres to investigate the economic situation in the villages, and to focus their attention on the relationship between the party, the administration, the army, and the people.⁶³ In north-west Shansi, details of the social and economic conditions

61. Detailed explanations in chapter six, 237-255.

62. "CCPCC's resolution on investigations and research", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Sept. 8, 1941. The resolution itself was passed on August 1, 1941. Also see Chieh-fang-she, Rectification Documents, 57-60, for the same text.

63. "Directives of the CCP Sub-bureau in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base", Chieh-fang jih-pao, March 18, 1942.

in the villages were investigated in early 1942.⁶⁴ The resolution of June 1, 1943, promulgated by the Central Politburo on methods of leadership further reiterated the importance of thorough investigations into specific party organizations, schools and military units, in order to understand their characteristics, history,⁶⁵ and experience.

The same resolution also indicated the party's determination to see that improvements in the method of leadership would ensure greater party strength and unity, so that the CCP would therefore be better equipped in extending its control over the bases against Japanese attacks.⁶⁶

By the end of 1943, the effect of the various Cheng Feng programmes was evidently being felt in the

64. Chapter three, 76-78.

65. For CCP instructions on the method of investigations in the resolution, see Chieh-fang jih-pao June 4, 1943, and the English translation in Compton, Mao's China, 176-177.

66. Chieh-fang jih-pao, June 4, 1943.

various bases. Whilst Mao was able to enlist the support of the senior party cadres, the CCP itself was in the best position since the beginning of the war in maintaining leadership. Warlordism still existed but it had been greatly reduced through the persevering party efforts at controlling the army commanders. The Cheng Feng indoctrination of cadres in the party, the army, the administration, and mass organizations further strengthened the position of the party as the leader in the bases. Furthermore, the sum total of the above achievements contributed directly to a change in the situation of the anti-Japanese war. Before examining this change, it is necessary to investigate how the CCP operated during the Cheng Feng period at the basic village level, where it placed tremendous emphasis on working through the people from below.

CHAPTER VI

Party Leadership at the Village Level, 1942-1943.

In studying CCP leadership at the village level in the CCP bases, the first evident principle seen operating was democratic-centralism. The party-branch (tang chih-pu) 黨支部 representing party authority at the village level received orders and instructions from the party sub-bureaux, with the party committee at the area level (ti-fang tang wei) 地方黨委 serving as the operation centre for the transmitting of CCP central directives to the villages.¹ However, because of geographical isolation and frequent combats, it was difficult for the party-branch to establish constant contacts with party committees at high levels. Consequently, cadres in the party-branch very often had to interpret directives and instructions at their own discretion, and there was a great deal of room for initiative. Democratic

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1. For the position of the party-branch in relation to other organizations in the village, and the whole hierarchy of the CCP, see appendix 3. For the role of the party committee at the area level as a liaison centre, see Tang ti chien-she 黨的建設 (The Party's Reconstruction) Taipei, Yang Ming, 1951, 26-27; this work is the third reprint of a CCP document made by the KMT for its own reference, and contained revealing methods of CCP party strategy.


practices under cadre supervision were noticeable in village organizations and the CCP proved that this policy was most effective in mobilizing the people from below.²

The general aim of party cadres in the village was to organize the peasants who formed the main bulk of the population so that peasant consciousness against landlord exploitation and national sentiment against the Japanese could be aroused. To achieve the above in practical terms, the responsibility of village cadres was to mobilize all available economic resources to support the armed resistance programme, and to organize all available man-power into the people's armed bands and active Anti-Japanese National Salvation Associations, especially the peasants' association. In so doing, the party branch would also have built up party strength in the village in rallying mass support for the CCP cause. Japanese sources gave a clear, diagrammatical analysis of how the CCP mobilize local resources in the village.

2. The various democratic practices in the village have been discussed in chapter III, 71-73.

Chart Showing the Collection and Supply of Economic Resources

at the Village Level³



3. Compiled from Headquarters, Tada Corps, Kyosanto jokyō sono ta, senji geppo shiryō 大座黨, 状況之他, 戦時情報 (State of Affairs of Chinese Communist Party, Wartime Monthly Material for March, 1941), R II5, T IO08, F 265IO-265II.

The party-branch itself comprised at least three members forming a committee headed by the secretary, and under it were party cells which were generally attached to village organizations. The leaders of mass organizations and the people's armed bands were normally in the party committee, thus explaining the source of party control at the village level.⁴ Mass mobilization programmes, which formed a significant part of the work undertaken by the party-branch, have been discussed in general terms with reference to the pre-Cheng Feng period in chapter three.⁵ However, the present purpose is to examine party leadership in mass mobilization programmes during the Cheng Feng period up to the end of 1943.

The general method adopted by the party-branch in mobilizing the people was the same as the one adopted at higher levels, and in accordance with CCP central directions, that is, the party should ally itself with the active elements in order to win over the neutral elements who formed the main bulk of society.

4. The Party's Reconstruction, 20; Lun Kung-ch'an tang
論共產黨 (On the Communist Party), Huapei, Hsin-hua,
 1940, 369-375.

5. See chapter III, 88-118.

As for supervision over village administration and organizations, the party branch kept a close watch over the village chiefs. According to a KMT analysis, the CCP party-branch gave full support to village heads if they were party members, who would therefore take orders from it. In the case of non-party members being village heads, the party-branch would supervise and assist those who were active elements or intellectuals. For those whom the party thought undesirable, various village meetings, administrative committees and peasants' associations would be mobilized to get them out of office.⁶ Party control over village chiefs and their administrative organizations was most essential because to the ordinary people, the latter appeared to be the authority in the village. Thus the party worked through the village administrative office, the various committees, and the representatives' conference to have village legislation and orders promulgated, and elections and mass rallies held.⁷ In other words, the village administration became the medium through which the party-branch could contact the people.

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6. Chung-yang kai-tso wei-yuan hui, ti-lin tsu (KMT) 中央改造委員會, 第六組 (ed.), Hu@-kuo ts'an-min ti kung-fei chün-shih 禍國殃民的共匪軍爭 (Betrayal of the Nation and Suppression of the People by the Communist Bandits' Army), Taipei, Chung-yang wen-wu, 1952, 24. This work deals with CCP politics and party-army relations as well as political activities in the army and militia.
7. For village administrative organizations, see chapter III, 415.

During the Cheng Feng period, the party began to pay special attention to improving the mass mobilization programmes. Various problems and difficulties involved were discussed and attempts at solutions sought with a view to maintaining party leadership in the village. In May 1942, Lo Jui-ch'ing, director of the political department of the field-forces of the 18th Army Group, pin-pointed the main difficulties of party control at the village level. In his article on party relations with the people published in the Liberation Daily,⁸ he emphasized that the party-branch was the best contact point between the party and the people, but then he went on to criticize the failings of cadres, who divided themselves into different factions, and committed bureaucratic deviations. Lo pointed out that cadres should not undemocratically take over the entire running of mass organizations. Instead, they should work through the people with the right kind of publicity, and patience was needed in explaining party policies to the people whose education level was inevitably low. Lo believed that the way to win the people's support was to help the latter solve practical problems, which might most likely be financial or economic.

8. Lo's article, "on party-masses relations," is given in Chieh-fang jih-pao, May 24, 1942.

Examples of success on the part of model contingents in the early 1930s in the Kiangsi Soviets, in winning the support of the people through the solving of petty economic and financial problems, were quoted. Finally, Lo made it clear that the opinion of the people must be heard so that the party could identify itself with the people, who would then confide in the former. This article practically represented the policy of the party in its attempts to improve relations with the people during the Cheng Feng period.

A major problem within the party which stood in the way of mass mobilization programmes was the different standard and varying quality of the cadres. This was actually a problem faced by the party at all levels, but especially so in the village, where cadres often had to act on their initiative without directions from above. On the whole, there were the veteran, experienced cadres dating back to the early 1930s, and then there were the young intellectuals who joined the CCP camp during the war. Disputes between these two groups were often reported because of their difference in education and experience.⁹

9. "Yen-mi tsu-chi tsun-shou fa-chi" 嚴密組織遵守法紀 (To tighten organization and observe discipline), (editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, April 7, 1943. The editorial in particular pointed out that experienced cadres tended to work as if they were still in the formative years of the early 1930s in guerrilla environments, whilst the young and newly trained cadres erred on the path of liberalism, i.e., failing to submit themselves to discipline.

During the Cheng Feng period, the party took special care to maintain harmony between the two groups, whilst at the same time it aimed at improving the standard of the cadres. For the veteran cadres, for instance, the CCP called upon them to improve their standard of education and get themselves into the good habit of studying the Cheng Feng documents.¹⁰

In order to rally maximum support from the people, the party-branch realised that undesirable elements like local bullies, obstinate landlords¹¹ and party deviationists had to be dismissed from the offices they held in mass organizations whilst every means had to be resorted to, in order to encourage voluntary participation of the people in various organizations ranging from the national salvation organizations to the militia. A typical example of Cheng Feng reform in the peasants' association, the most active of all mass organizations, was in a village near Lin I 臨沂 in southern Shantung. The village comprised about 500 households, with only five of them of rich peasant background, whilst the rest were either poor or

10. In August 1942, K'ang Sheng pointed out the necessity for cadres of peasant and proletariat background, i.e., mostly veterans, to improve their standard of education. His article appeared in Chieh-fang jih-pao, Oct. 4, 1942. P'en Chen wrote an article of similar nature which appeared in Chieh-feng jih-pao, Jan. 16, 1943.

11. Undesirable local influences in the village have been described in Chapter III, 73-74.

middle peasants. During Cheng Feng investigations in early 1943, district cadres at Lin I discovered many faults with the peasants' association in this particular village. Under a certain Chang 張某, membership was found to fall to only about sixty, because Chang dismissed all members who failed to attend meetings. Bribery was also practised and bureaucratism in leadership evident. Consequently village cadres failed to establish good contacts with the people. To remove Chang from office, district cadres therefore conducted a thorough investigation with the support of active elements in the village. The truth was revealed during the second investigation and Chang was removed and cadres offending the law were arrested. According to this CCP report, the peasants' association was reorganized, the mass mobilization programme rejuvenated, and rapid expansion of the association achieved.¹²

To encourage voluntary participation of the people in mass organizations, the party employed new policies in the Cheng Feng period, and the party-branch became the faithful executor of these plans. For instance, in CCP strongholds where the party had a comfortable control over the village,

12. "Lin I i-ko ts'un chuang chün-chung kung-tso ti cheng-li",
 五品所一個村莊群眾工作的整理：1943。
 (Reforms in the work of mass mobilization in a village
 in Lin I), Chieh-fang jih-pao, June 13, 1943.

the people were given some extent of genuine power in administration, not only in elections within the democratic superstructure, but also in important decisions like judicial matters. Available CCP documents indicate that at least in the T'ai Hang area of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base under the leadership of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the people were given unprecedented judicial power.¹³ In this area, the Cheng Feng period up to the end of 1943 coincided with the transitional period in the judicial administration of the region, when many laws were found no longer suitable for the existing situation, and bureaucratic irregularities apparent with the judicial staff, who in turn were too small in number to cope with the increasing number of cases.¹⁴ To deal with the changing circumstances, the CCP evolved a system of public courts and trials in which the people made the final decision in the passing of sentence. The important cases entrusted to the hands of the people were tenant-landlord disputes and divorces in civil cases, and theft, burglary, and treason committed as enemy or puppet agents, in criminal cases.¹⁵ Party directions specified that village party cadres must play the leading role in these trials,

13. An official report on the judicial work in T'ai Hang revealed that the CCP entrusted to the people judicial power of no small degree: T'ai hang ch'ü hsing-cheng kung-ssu 太行區行政公署, T'ai-hang ch'ü ssu-fa kung-tso kai-k'uang 太行區司法工作概況 (Judicial Work in the T'ai Hang Area), n.p., same, 1946.

14. Ibid., 1-2.

15. Ibid., 18-19.

first by explaining in mass rallies the whole case to the people before the witnesses were called. Second, cadres had to make sure the people did not come to a wrong decision. For example, in Wuhsiang ^{武乡}, a case of homicide was found wrongly returned by the people as suicide.¹⁶ Thus cadres were reminded of the need to provide the necessary guidance to the people. In any case, under the direction of the village cadres, witnesses concerned were called to attend mass rallies so that the people could listen to views put forward by both the plaintiff and the defendant. The latter in particular was said to be given the chance to present his or her case.¹⁷ The judicial report in T'ai Hang made it clear that the people participating in the trial of puppet and enemy agents, local bullies, and bribery suspects should be allowed to pass the sentence on the spot, as the report claimed that defendants in these cases were given a fair, public trial.¹⁸ To settle minor disputes in the village, conciliatory committees were set up in the T'ai Hang area comprising village cadres, leading village personalities and above all, labour heroes and active elements.

16. Ibid., 23.

17. Ibid., 16.

18. Ibid., 18, 30. The report claimed that in many instances, the people were proved to be better judges than the judicial courts.

In other words, the people here were encouraged to settle their own disputes under the guidance of party cadres. The most common cases dealt with in this way were land and marriage disputes.¹⁹

In justifying this practice of public courts and trials, the T'ai Hang judicial report also revealed the primary purpose of this unprecedented and unorthodox judicial practice. The report claimed that the whole practice represented consciousness amongst the people to demand democracy in judicial matter.²⁰ Such consciousness was above all believed to be a signal for the launching of a mass movement against the oppression of landlords, the bourgeoisie, the puppets and the enemy. The impact of this judicial power given to the people was dynamic, as can be envisaged in landlord-tenant disputes, in which tenants must have been intent on getting even with their landlords, especially when the CCP principle in the Cheng Feng period tended to side with the poor peasants in their demand for rent reduction.²¹

There is no doubt that this unprecedented judicial practice in T'ai Hang contributed tremendously to the

19. Ibid., 11 .

20. Ibid., 14 .

21. For details of the rent and interest reduction campaign and its role in mass mobilization programmes, see 237-255.

progress of CCP mass mobilization programmes, with the "oppressed", i.e., the tenant and poor peasants, rendering their unflinching support for the CCP cause of expansion and resistance against the Japanese. What had been described in the T'ai Hang area in fact indicated part of an overall CCP policy in the Cheng Feng period to take a more progressive course in championing the tenant and poor peasants. Whilst the United Front policy in seeking alliance with the bourgeoisie was still maintained, various revised policies showed that the CCP had come out more into the open in defending the interest of its protégés. The most significant movement which indicated conspicuously the above CCP principle was the invigoration of the rent and interest reduction campaign. The campaign was directed against landlords' exploitation and had the inevitable and dynamic effect of arousing the enthusiasm of tenant and poor peasants which culminated in a vigorous mass movement. To crown the success of the mass mobilization programmes, the CCP also revised its military strategy in the war of resistance and concentrated on guerilla warfare rather than operational-guerilla warfare, thus relying heavily on the people's armed bands, which represented the highest organized form of all mass organizations, for the defence of local

areas. The invigoration of the rent and interest reduction campaign, and the expansion of the people's armed bands as a result of CCP concentration on guerilla warfare, were in fact indicative of the climax of the mass mobilization programmes and of the success of party leadership in the village. However, before further investigations into these two achievements, it is perhaps necessary to pause and examine party-army relations at the village level, so as to provide a complete picture of relations between the party, the army, the administration and the people.

Party-Army Relations.

At the village level, the party-branch not only aimed at control over the company units²² which were stationed there, but also gave necessary guidance to these army units in order to effect active resistance against the Japanese. In addition, the party-branch wanted to establish good personal contacts with common soldiers in the companies and platoons so that the latter too could assist in mass mobilization programmes and the maintenance of good relations between the army

22. A standard CCP company (lien) 連 had about 130 men, and usually three companies formed one battalion. Under the Company were three platoons (p'ai) 排, and each platoon contained three squads (pan) 班 of 13 to 16 men each. See Johnson, Peasant Nationalism, 78 and 215 (n.17).

and the people.

The nucleus of party work in the company was the political adviser (Cheng-chih chih-tao yuan) 政治指導員 political adviser (Cheng-chih chih-tao yuan) 政治指導員 commander on the principle of division of power and mutual checks. The former was in charge of political work whilst the latter concerned himself with military affairs. The party-branch within the company assisted the political adviser, with its secretary very often holding the concurrent post of deputy political adviser.²³ Close liaison between the party-branch headquarters in the village, the party-branch in the company units, and the political adviser must have been maintained, especially from 1943 onwards when the posts of political commissar in the military region and sub-region (either divisional or brigade level) were

23. For details of the relations between the company commander and the political adviser, see Chung-yang kai-tsao wei-yuan hui, ti-liu tsu (ed.), Chung-Kung chün-shih, 中共軍事 (The Chinese Communist Army), Taipei, Same, 1951, 27-28; Chung-yang wei-yuan hui...., Betrayal of the Nation ... 46-48. Also see Appendix 3, for the Chart illustrating party control in the Company. A description of the role of the company political adviser is available in Johnson, Peasant Nationalism... 82-83.

held concurrently by the party chiefs at the equivalent levels.²⁴ Although there was no indication of a similar merger at the village level, the CCP's intention to tighten party control in army units had already been demonstrated. Under the political adviser were other party members and cadres at the company and platoon levels, who were mainly responsible for making the CCP army live up to its name of an army under the control of the party, i.e., i-tang chih-chün 以黨治軍. Their basic objective was to maintain as far as possible a 30% party membership in the combat-platoons, and potential party members were mostly hand-picked from active elements and young men.²⁵

As for the specific work of the party in the company units, it was evidently to boost the morale of the soldiers, especially during combat conditions, and to prevent desertion.²⁶ During the Cheng Feng period,

24. This important merger in the CCP has been mentioned see n.53 in chapter V, 207.

X 25. Wang Shou-tao 王首道, "Pa-lu chün chung kung-ch'an-tang ti kung-tso", 八路軍中共黨的工作 (The work of the CCP in the Eighth Route Army) Cheng-chih kung-tso lun-chung 正文治軍工作論叢 (Political Work in the Army), Pa-lu chün, 1941 57-58.

26. Wang Shou-Tao, loc.cit., 57-59; and The Party's Reconstruction, 176-178.

a reinvigorated campaign was launched under the leadership of the company political adviser to boost army morale. Discussions and study-groups were organized and self-criticism made. A useful tool for publicity purpose was the wall-newspaper with articles contributed by common soldiers under the guidance of party cadres. These articles, written in the simplest possible form of the Chinese language, also served indirectly as the means of educating soldiers whose standard was appallingly low.²⁷ The Cheng Feng spirit was manifested in study-groups and discussions as soldiers were given the opportunity to make known their grievances against their company or platoon commanders.²⁸ The general principle of democracy from below was therefore practised.

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27. Wang Chia-hsiang 王稼祥, "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang yu k'o-ming chan-cheng", 中國共產黨與革命戰爭 (The CCP and the Revolutionary War) Political Work in the Army, 21. Wang stressed the importance of wall-newspapers, and criticized cadres for being too formal with the issues of these wall-newspapers.
28. Chiao-tung chün-ch'u, Two Styles of Work, 21-22.

A report of the political department of the 359th Brigade in Shantung during the Cheng Feng period illustrated how political work under party leadership progressed in the company units. In order to counteract bureaucratism, company commanders were instructed to listen to the grievances of the soldiers, especially in regard to mess conditions. The report criticized company commanders who were opposed to the general opinion and demands of the soldiers.²⁹ What the party was driving at was to gain the entire confidence of the soldiers through good relations between commanders and soldiers, and it hoped that army morale could thereby be boosted, and desertion prevented. In the 359th Brigade, officers were instructed to adopt the principle of persuasion rather than the application of sheer discipline in winning over the backward elements, who were described as either uneducated or too obstinate in their deviated bourgeois beliefs. Officers at the platoon level, where the closest contacts with soldiers were possible, were particularly instructed to care for the welfare of those under

29. Ibid.

their command in regard to food, supplies of clothing, health, and financial conditions.³⁰

As in other CCP organizations, models and heroes were created within the company units to publicise the importance of good officer-soldier relations. Yü Lo-ting, 于樂亭, a platoon commander of the 359th Brigade in Chiaotung, Shantung, became the hero of army units in Shantung during the Cheng Feng period. Yü's merits were said to be his care for soldiers and the people, his ability as a competent military commander and political cadre, and his good relations with his superiors.³¹ The general policy of the party was to create similar heroes based on Yü's model in a morale-boosting campaign. By late 1943, it was reported that in Chiaotung, indications of some improvements in officer-soldier relations were evident.³² The party-branch also held inter-platoon and inter-company competitions to increase the number of soldiers in the

30. Ibid., 26-36.

31. Yü Lo-ting joined the Eighth Route Army in Sept. 1941 and became a CCP member in March 1943. For his biography, see Pa-lu chün, Shantung Chiao-tung chün-ch'ü, Cheng-chih pu, 八路軍山東膠東軍區政工部 (ed.), Hsüeh-chan pa-nien ti chiao-tung tzu-t'ing (Chiaotung Soldiers in the Eight Years of a Bloody War), n.p., Hsin-hua, 1945, 194-204; and Chiao-tung chün-ch'ü, Two Styles of Work, 10-13.

32. Chiaotung Chün-ch'ü, Chiaotung Soldiers..., 204.

units through campaigns to recall deserters, and to attract new recruits.³³ By late 1943, reports from Shantung also indicated that the number of deserters returning to camp was increasing. For instance, in the central Shantung area, 3,000 deserters returned to their camps after a well-publicized campaign in which the Shantung provincial war-time committee ordered a general mobilization for that particular purpose.³⁴ Whilst this campaign illustrates some Communist success in recalling deserters to their camp, it also points to the fact that the CCP army, like other armies, was faced with the common problem of desertion, which definitely affected the morale of the soldiers. In 1941-1942, when the Japanese military pressure on the bases was most intense, it must have been most trying for cadres in the political departments of the various CCP units in their efforts to prevent large scale desertion. However, as the campaign to recall

33. Shu Tung (舒桐) (舒桐) "Chün-ch'ü, wu-chuang tung-yuan kung-tso ti chüng-chieh", 军区武装动员工作的总结
A summary of work in military mobilization in the military region, Political Work in the Army, 168-169.

34. Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu, A Summary of the Reconstruction of the Anti-Japanese Democratic Regime in Luchung in the Last Seven Years and its Future Tasks, 27.

deserters in Shantung indicates, political work within the CCP army had by late 1943 begun to score success in boosting the morale of the various units.

It can be seen from the above that the main concern of the party-branch in the company units was to maintain high morale and good officer-soldier relations. Although deviationist tendencies amongst company commanders needed to be corrected in Cheng Feng programmes, they were not as serious as those at higher levels, which amounted to warlordism, in view of the much greater military strength involved. Finally, it may be mentioned that the strongest tie of the company units with the people in the village was that the former depended on the latter for economic supplies,³⁵ and the CCP therefore realized that good relations between the army and the people must also be maintained. Thus the political department of the Eighth Route Army specified that army cadres should assist the party-branch in promoting mass mobilization programmes.³⁶ Harmony and good relations

35. The Chart on 218 clearly indicates the army's dependence on the village for economic supplies.

36. Wang Chia-hsiang, "The CCP and the Revolutionary War", Political Work in the Army. 23. In regard to the various political work among rural civilians undertaken by the CCP army, see Johnson Peasant Nationalism ..., 85-89.

between the various organizations in the village were the ultimate objectives of the CCP, in order to facilitate its mass mobilization programmes and to build up military strength. It was therefore not surprising that in October 1943, a full scale campaign was launched to promote good relations between the party, army, administration and the people.³⁷

Having surveyed the army-party relations at the village level, it is now convenient to examine the two greatest achievements of mass mobilization programmes, i.e., the reinvigoration of the rent and interest reduction campaign, and the expansion of the people's armed bands.

The Rent and Interest Reduction Campaign.

It has been indicated in chapter three that although the rent and interest reduction campaign had been launched almost at the beginning of the war, the main obstacle to a vigorous programme was the genuine fear on the part of tenants that landlords might retaliate by exercising their right of land re-possession if the former claimed reductions which they were entitled to.³⁸ With the launching of the Cheng Feng

37. For more information on the campaign, see 268 and n.92.

38. Chapter three, 116-117.

Movement in February 1942, various laws were promulgated by the CCP Central Politburo, and the various sub-bureaux in the bases aimed at achieving a genuine rent reduction programme. The climax came in October, 1943 when the Central Politburo issued a directive on principal policies in the border governments. One of them specified that rent and interest reduction must be realized in all areas by the end of 1943.³⁹

Varying results were achieved in the reinvigoration of the rent and interest reduction campaign up to the end of 1943, being most fruitful in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base and the least in the Shantung base. The new impetus of the campaign was provided by the CCP's determination in siding more openly with their protégés, the tenant and poor peasants. A Shantung report on land administration in 1944 contained a precise description of CCP policy, which summarizes the reinvigorated party attitude. It described the rent and interest reduction campaign as a revolutionary

39. "Chung-kung chung-yang cheng-chih-chü kuan-yu chien-tsu sheng-ch'an yung-cheng ai-min chi hsuan chuan shih-ta cheng-ts'e ti chih-shih" 中共中央正統局關於減租且生產擁政愛民及富農十大政策的指示 (The directive of the CCP Central Politburo on rent reduction, economic production, support for the administration and care for the people, and the ten principal policies on publicity), Chieh-fang jih-pao, Oct. 1. 1943.

movement in transforming the village and the class structure. In other words, the CCP encouraged poor peasants to rise in social status through economic improvement at the expense of the landlords, so that the "feudalistic", economic structure existing could be weakened and eventually transformed into a pre-dominantly peasantry economy.⁴⁰ Reiteration along the same line in this period was reflected in the October 1, 1943 directive, in which it was specified the party and government legislation should stand on the side of the people and peasants' associations in their struggle for rent and interest reduction.⁴¹ Although the United Front policy was still maintained, there was no more mention of the need for tenant and poor peasants to pay their rent and interest to landlords should they owe them to the latter.

Bearing in mind the above party policy prevalent in the Cheng Feng period, party cadres began their work of mobilizing the peasants in their fight for rent and interest reduction. The whole campaign inevitably involved complicated economic problems

X 40. Tu-ti (chung-chieh pao-kao) 土地總結報告 (A Summary Report on Land Reform), n.p., n.pub., (1944?), 2.

41. See the CCP Central Politburo directive on Oct. 1, 1943, section on rent reduction, in which it was specified that the party should side with its protégés: Chieh-fang jih-pao, Oct. 1, 1943.

of land administration and legal rights in disputes between landlords and tenants, which are beyond the scope of the present thesis. The main concern in this chapter, therefore, is to examine how far rent was reduced in percentage, and to investigate the guarantee given to tenant and poor peasants against landlords' exercising their right of land re-possession in the four major bases of North China. It is hoped that this survey will help indicate how mass mobilization programmes were given new incentives as a result.

Two types of rent reduction were enforced in the bases. First, in the initial land reform programme in the early years of the war, it was specified that there should be a general reduction of 25% on the rent which had been fixed in the pre-1937 period. Second, in the Cheng Feng period, the Party went further to ensure as far as possible that rent should not exceed 37.5% of the yield at harvest. This action was necessary because rent after a 25% reduction might still exceed 37.5%

of the yield at harvest.⁴² For instance, a reliable Communist investigation into the percentage of rent paid by tenants in the pre-1937 period had the following data. In the various parts of Shansi, especially in the eastern, central, and south-eastern parts, as well as in western Hopei, it was reported that the pre-war rent ranged from 40% to 72% of the yield, or an average of 54%.⁴³ Thus when the CCP enforced the 25% reduction in these areas, rent would still average 40.5%. Hence the Communists found it necessary in the Cheng Feng period to specify that rent should not, whenever possible, exceed 37.5% of the yield.

In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan bases, the party was able to enforce in stable regions reduction on the basis of ensuring

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42. P'eng Chen, "Comrade P'eng Chen on land policy in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region", given in Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang, Chin-Ch'a-Chi chung-yang chü, Hsuan-ch'uan pu 中國共產黨, 晉察冀中央局, 宣專部, T'u-ti cheng-ts'e chung-yao wen-chien hui-chi 土地政策重要文件彙集 (Collected Important Documents on Land Policy), n.p. same, 1946, 46. In discussing land administration in the Shansi-chahar-Hopei base, P'eng also gave a survey of the general situation in rent reduction in the bases of North and Central China.
43. Huang Wei-wen, "Some sources on the reduction of rent and interest in the bases", Chieh-fang jih-pao, February 11, 1942.

that rent did not exceed 37.5% of the yield.⁴⁴ In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base especially, the rent-reduction campaign was well organized under the leadership of P'eng Chen, the party sub-bureau secretary.⁴⁵ In the Shantung and north-west Shansi bases, the general rule was to enforce a 25% reduction of rent without pressing for further concessions from the landlords, mainly because mass mobilization had not been as well organized as in the other two bases.⁴⁶

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44. For details of the percentage of rent-reduction in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base, see "Provisional regulations on land utilization", Nov. 1, 1941 (articles 25,28) given in Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu pien-ch'ü cheng-fu 晉冀魯豫邊區政府, Fa-ling hui-pien 法令彙編 (Collected Laws and Ordinances), n.p., same, 1942; for details in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region, see "Regulations on rent, tenancy, loans and interest in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region", Jan.21, 1943 (Article 5), Collected Documents on Land Policy (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base), 64.
45. The good work done by P'eng Chen was evident in his report on land administration in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, see P'eng Chen, "Comrade P'eng Chen on land policy...", Collected Documents on Land Policy, 44-45.
46. For the percentage of rent-reduction in North-west Shansi, see Ying Yung, "A short commentary on the defects of administrative work in the fourth district of North-west Shansi", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 2, 1942. The article criticized cadres for being too ambitious in the rent-reduction programmes, and insisted that rent-reduction should be conducted on the 25% basis. For the percentage of rent-reduction in Shantung, see Summary Report on Land Reforms (Shantung), 37.

In the Shantung base in particular, the unstable situation and the relatively weak CCP administration gave landlords the chance to exercise their influence in counteracting the rent-reduction drive there.

In areas where greater reductions were obtained, more guarantees against landlords' re-possessing land were also ensured. Thus more laws were enforced in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan and Shansi-Chahar-Hopei bases against land re-possession, whilst the Shantung base had difficulties in combating the landlords. The first guarantee against random land repossession appeared in the CCPCC resolution on land policy on Jan. 28, 1942. Whilst article 2 specified that the CCP aimed at minimizing rather than eliminating "feudalistic" exploitation of the peasants, it was also in the appendices of the same resolution that checks against land re-possession were specified.⁴⁷ Peasants with the right of permanent tenancy were guaranteed against landlord intimidation. In cases where permanent tenancy was not specified, landlords had

47. For the CCP resolution on land policy passed on Jan. 28, 1942, and the accompanying appendices, see *Chung-kuo kung-ch'antang*, 中國共產黨 (ed.), *Chung-yang shu-chi chu* 中央書記處 (ed.), *K'ang-chan i-lai chung-yao wen-chien hui-chi* 抗戰以來重要文件彙集 (Collected Important Documents since the outbreak of the sino-Japanese War), n.p., n.pub., 1942, 188-191.

the right to re-possess their land, but could only do so on the expiration of the contract. Moreover, they were encouraged to renew their contract with the original tenant on a long term basis of, say, five years or more, because of the economic hardship suffered during the war of resistance. In the case of a change in ownership of land, the tenant was to retain his rights until the expiration of the contract.⁴⁸

In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan bases, the party continued to press for further concessions on behalf of the tenants. On February 4, 1943, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Sub-bureau promulgated new laws governing rent, tenancy and interest on loans.⁴⁹ Further to tenancy rights guaranteed in the resolution of January, 1942, the new law defined hereditary tenancy as permanent tenancy;⁵⁰ and in cases where landlords who had re-possessed land, re-let the same land again after a lapse of under one

48. Ibid., 190-191.

49. "Regulations on rent, tenancy and interest...", Collected Documents on Land Policy (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base), 63-68.

50. Ibid. (article 17) 66.

year, the original tenant had priority in renting on the same conditions previously agreed upon in the original contract.⁵¹ The success of the rent-reduction programme in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base can indirectly be seen in P'eng Chen's article on land policy published in November 1944, in which he warned against left-wing tendencies amongst peasants, who went to the extent of confiscating landlords' properties in their struggle against landlord exploitation.⁵² As regards the subsidiary campaign of interest reduction on loans, the general principle adopted by the CCP in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, as in other areas, was that interest should not exceed 10% of the loan. However, P'eng Chen pointed out that in view of the shortage of cash and the acute economic and financial situation in the bases, interest of up to 15% should be allowed, or else peasants would not be able to secure the loans so essential to their livelihood.⁵³

51. Ibid., (article 13), 65.

52. P'eng Chen, "P'eng Chen on land policy...", Collected Documents on Land Policy, (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base), 53-55.

53. Ibid., 52.

The efforts of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base on rent-reduction were based more or less on the same pattern as those of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, but perhaps less ambitious.⁵⁴ In the Shantung base, laws against illegal re-possession by landlords were also based on a similar pattern,⁵⁵ but the CCP had difficulties in enforcing the relevant laws there because of counteractions by landlords. For instance, it was reported that landlords as late as the spring of 1943 were still in a position to resist the rent-reduction drive in Shantung. However, by winter 1943, the drive was again re-invigorated as a result of the new impetus provided by the CCP resolutions of October 1, 1943.⁵⁶ As for north-west Shansi, no official

54. For details on the rent reduction regulations, the rights of tenants, see articles 18-24 in "Provisional regulations on land utilization", Collected Laws and Ordinances (Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base), 24-25.

55. See articles 22-30 in "Draft of Provisional regulations on rent and tenancy in Shantung province", Summary Report on Land Reform (Shantung), 41-42.

56. Summary Report on Land Reform (Shantung), I.

government report on land administration seems available, but it is certain, from information in the Liberation Daily, that by late 1942, great attention was being paid to the rights of tenants and by late 1943, positive action on the part of peasants was taken against landlords in their demands for rent reduction.⁵⁷

The actual securing of rent reduction in the bases was conducted under the leadership of party cadres in the village, but they played only a supervisory role behind the scene, applying the familiar method of mobilizing active elements in the locality. The headquarters for the rent-reduction campaign was the peasants' association, symbolizing the strength and voluntary nature of mass organizations. Rent reduction societies were then organized by the peasants' associations with the special duty of calling mass rallies in which both tenants and landlords attended, and very often the latter were requested or advised to go. The climax of this type of demand for rent reduction in mass rallies began from October 1943 onwards in response to the CCP resolutions of October 1,

57. A detailed study of the rent-reduction campaign in October-December 1943 in north-west Shansi is given in 248-255.

1943. On October 18, 1943 for instance, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Sub-bureau issued a special directive emphasizing the importance of self-consciousness on the part of the people, who should mobilize themselves under party leadership, centring their strength in the peasants' associations, which should also be expanded, or restored in cases where they had been dissolved.⁵⁸

In north-west Shansi, reports indicated tremendous activities of rent reduction under the supervision of the peasants' associations in October - December, 1943. The following is a chart compiled from available sources in the Liberation Daily illustrating the extent of the rent-reduction campaign in north-west Shansi:

The Extent of the rent-reduction campaign in⁵⁹
north-west Shansi, October - December, 1943.

| Name of hsien | name of district | No. of administrative villages | No. of tenants | No. of landlords |
|------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Lin hsien (Oct) | 1st, 2nd 3rd, 5th | 18 | 1,529 | over 30 |
| Linnan 臨南 (Oct) | 3rd | 4 | 151 | unknown |
| Linnan (Dec) | X | 10 | 1,309 | over 17 |
| Hsinghsien (Dec) | 1st, 2nd 3rd, 4th | over 10 | 1,300 | unknown |
| Ningwu (Nov) | 2nd | unknown | unknown | unknown |
| K'olan 崞嵐 (Nov) | several | 13 | unknown | unknown |

58. Collected Documents on Land Policy (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base), 86-87.

59. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Oct. 28, 31; Nov. 22, 25; Dec. 16, 18, 1943, and Jan. 14, 1944.

It must be mentioned here that this rent-reduction campaign was not as successful as that in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base. Thus it is not surprising to find from the above chart that the campaign was undertaken in scattered districts in various parts of the base, rather than in the majority of the districts. However, in areas where rent-reduction activities did occur, there was tremendous enthusiasm and peasant consciousness was definitely aroused. The familiar pattern of CCP organisation in north-west Shansi was to include tenant peasants into peasants' associations. In the village, the ordinary, illiterate peasants evidently needed guidance from cadres in their demands from landlords for rent reduction, mainly because a great deal of mathematical calculations would be involved in the process. For instance, in village X in the first district of Kolan, leaders of units under the peasants' association often consulted district cadres in the evenings in order to familiarize

themselves with the situation before their confrontation with the landlords.⁶⁰ It was also in village X that a most vehement way of demanding the return of rent⁶¹ (t'ui-tsu) 退租 by tenants from landlords took place. Here, twenty-eight tenants were organized into two units, and carrying bags with them, they approached landlords for the return of rent in kind. Apparently, these two units were well organized and supported by the local peasants' association and CCP cadres, as it was reported that 30 shih were returned within seven days. The two most active members in the units, Wang Ssu 王四, and Ai Chang-ta 艾掌大 were also elected chief representative and deputy of the village.⁶²

In regard to benefits gained by tenant peasants in north-west Shansi in this period under discussion, they can be divided into first, the reduction of rent; second, the return of rent; third, the securing of land formerly re-possessioned by landlords (shu-ti) 贖地;

60. Chieh-fang jih-pao, December 16, 1942 (on rent-reduction in Kolan).

61. As many landlords in north-west Shansi refused tenants the reduction of rent in the earlier period, mostly since early 1942, the latter in Oct.-Dec. 1943 began to demand from landlords the return of parts of the rent they were entitled to ever since CCP legislation specified that rent reduction should be enforced.

62. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 16, 1943

and fourth, the signing of new land-contracts on a relatively long term basis ranging from two to ten years. The second and third categories were tenants' efforts to settle old scores with landlords, and therefore represented a ^{more} progressive move than merely demanding a reduction in rent. The signing of new contracts was another security measure on the part of tenants to check possible landlord retaliation^s in the future. In addition, these new contracts guaranteed tenants long enough time to devote full attention to their land with less threats from landlords.⁶³ The following is a detailed description of rent reduction activities undertaken in the various villages of north-west Shansi in October-December, 1943.

In Linhsien in October 1943, out of the 16 ordinary villages, 530 tenants had their rent reduced, and their land covered an area of 7,875.5 mou . In the second district of the same hsien and in the same month, a most effective mass rally was held. Tenants who rented land from the same landlord, a certain Kao ^高 _某, managed to hold a mass rally with the latter attending. The tenants' advantage in this

63. Chieh-fang jih-pao, October 28, October 31, November 22, November 25, December 16 and December 18, 1943.

case was they had the same common interest against Kao, and therefore were successful in inducing the landlord to return rent equivalent to 20 shih out of the 1,000 mou of land he let to them. In addition, over 30 new contracts were signed on the spot in the rally, and land re-possessed by Kao in the spring of 1943 was returned to tenants.⁶⁴

In the four villages in the third district of Linnan ~~臨南~~, October 1943, 68 tenants had their rent reduced from a total of 73,254 shih to 47,256 shih, i.e., 25,998 shih less. Seventy-one tenants had their new contracts signed with terms ranging from two to ten years.⁶⁵ In December, the Communists employed a well-organised tactics in ten villages in district X in Linnan. Three centres were established with district cadres supervising discussions and plans for rent reduction. In villages where peasants' associations existed, leaders of units under the associations conducted door-to-door investigations in order to get accurate data in the rent-reduction campaign. This method evidently required careful planning and patience, but the results reported seemed most successful. After one and a half months,

64. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Oct. 28, 1943, (on rent reduction in Linnan and Linhsien).

65. Ibid.

1,309 tenants in the district were reported to have 288 (shih) of rent reduced, and 134 shih returned from 17 landlords. Land formerly repossessed by landlords, but was returned to tenants, amounted to 1,898.2 mou. Confessions by individual landlords of their mistakes in a mass rally were also secured.⁶⁶

In the second district of Ningwu, November 1943, the most constructive step was taken to guarantee the rights of tenants. New contracts signed were kept in triplicate, with the landlord, the tenant, and the village administrative office having one copy each. The last party acted as the arbiter to see that contracts were kept, and also mediated in landlord-tenant disputes. In exercising the rights of repossession in Ningwu, landlords had to apply to the village administrative office and the peasants' association for approval, and tenants were to be notified in good time.⁶⁷

It may be concluded from the above activities that where the CCP conducted the rent-reduction campaign in north-west Shansi, it succeeded in bringing

66. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 18, 1943 (on rent reduction in Linnan).

67. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Nov. 1943. (on rent reduction in Ningwu).

home its objective of winning the support of the tenant peasants. Moreover, there were also indications of Communist success in mobilizing these tenant peasants to work for specific objectives after peasant consciousness was aroused as a result of the rent reduction campaign. For instance, in village X in the first district of K'olan, the Communists organized the active elements into units within the peasants' association, with Wang Ssu and Ai Chang-ta as the leaders. The target set for these units, besides demanding rent reduction from landlords, was to concentrate on economic production in 1944, and each individual was assigned in the coming year the task of cultivating 6 mou of virgin land, and increasing 30% efficiency in the collecting of dung in winter.⁶⁸

Indeed, it is no coincidence that the Communists launched a large-scale economic production campaign in 1944 right in the wake of the boom in the rent reduction drive. Realizing the tremendous enthusiasm amongst the peasants as a result of the rent reduction campaign, the party immediately directed this peasant consciousness to support an economic production campaign,

68. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec.16, 1943.

the success of which depended on the effectiveness of mass mobilization. Thus Mao Tse-tung on November 29, 1943, reiterated the urgent need for a full scale economic production campaign in the bases in his speech, "Let Us Organize", delivered in Yen-an. Mao's instruction to the bases was "Do it yourself and overcome difficulties" as the slogan for the economic production campaign. Mao specified that the slogan could be and had to be followed, and predicted that the economic production campaign could result in a full scale mass mobilization movement in 1944.⁶⁹

Thus it may be concluded that by the end of 1943, the re-invigoration of the rent and interest reduction campaign had resulted in triumph for the CCP, in the sense that the latter could then make full use of the peasant consciousness thus aroused to promote further drives and mass mobilization programmes.

69. Mao Tse-tung, "Tsu-chi ch'i-lai",
(Let us organize)
Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 2, 1943.

The People's Armed Bands.

The general activities of the people's armed bands in the village and how their progress was retarded by the CCP military policy of operational-guerrilla warfare have been mentioned in chapter three.⁷⁰ The present purpose is to examine the tremendous expansion of the people's armed bands in the Cheng Feng period. It was the CCP adoption of a policy of total guerrilla warfare from early 1942 onwards, which made it necessary for the Communists to rely on the self-defence corps and the militia, which constituted the people's armed bands, rather than regular troops, for the defence of the villages. The advantage of this change was that it helped lessen the economic burden on the CCP in the village, because unlike regular troops, the people's armed bands were self-sufficient economically, meaning that they carried on economic production whilst fighting the Japanese and puppet troops at the same time.⁷¹ This also meant that the

70. See chapter three, 106-112.

71. For the change in CCP military strategy in early 1942 see Chapter III, 109-112, for the self-sufficiency of the militia see "Chu-li yu min-ping", 主力與民兵 (The main strength and the militia) Chieh-fang jih-pao Nov. 2, 1942.

CCP could therefore afford to continue the policy of "cut troops and simplify the administration" in reducing the number of regular troops, so that the economic burden could be lessened, and the party be in a better position to cope with the Japanese economic pressure.

In the Cheng Feng period, new responsibilities were given to the people's armed bands. Increased supplies of ammunition, firearms and weapons left over as a result of the cutting of regular troops were given to the militia, and the CCP believed this to be very effective in strengthening people's confidence against the brutal Japanese attacks, especially in 1942, and in marginal areas, where Japanese and puppet retaliation made local defence absolutely essential. These supplies, which inevitably made the people's armed bands better equipped, were welcome to the people.⁷² As for the activities and operation of the people's armed bands, they were mainly localized at the village level. Although these organizations formed in

72. Kung-lun ch'u-pan-she 公論出版社 (ed.), Chung-kung chih pi-mi chün-shih kung-tso 中共之秘密軍事工作 (The Secret Military Work of the Chinese Communists), n.p., same, 1941, 7-8; also see "The main strength and the militia", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Nov. 2, 1942

themselves a hierarchy extending from the border region to the village level,⁷³ the very nature of guerrilla warfare and the need for independent and mobile action made it necessary for the people's armed bands to operate from the local level, especially the village, as the base of resistance against the Japanese.⁷⁴

Militia organizations in the village were nominally under the people's committee of armed resistance, which was elected by the people in the village representatives' conference. The committee itself was sub-divided into the combat, training, and explosion sections.⁷⁵ Within the militia itself, there were anti-Japanese youth vanguard contingents, comprising members 16-23 years of age, and the

73. For a chart of militia organizations from border region to the village level, see Li Chan 力軒, Chan-tou chung ti chieh-fang ch'ü min-ping 戰鬥中的解放區民兵 (The People's Militia of Liberation Areas in Combat), Hong Kong, Chung-kuo ch'u-pan-she, 1947, chart between 29 and 30, no pagination.
74. Tou Fu 竇府, "Chieh-fang ch'ü yu ho fa-tung chün-chung chien-ch'ih k'ang-chan", 解放區如何發動群眾堅持抗戰 (The way to mobilize the masses to persist in the war of resistance in the liberated areas), Chün-chung, X, 1, (Jan. 15, 1945), 14.
75. Li Chan, The People's Militia...in Combat, chart between 29 and 30, no pagination.

model contingents, with members 24-35 years old. The nucleus of the militia was the guerrilla unit, or yu-chi hsiao-~~隊~~su ^{游擊隊}, sometimes known as the model platoon, comprising youths and active elements of the militia; this was the best trained and equipped, resembling to a great extent the proper guerrilla forces.⁷⁶ CCP control was greatest in these guerrilla units where the party-branch went beyond filling these units with 30% party members. In the villages of Hsien hsien ^{獻縣}, for example, 21 of the 23 men in a guerrilla unit were party members. Constant combats undertaken by these units also made it necessary for the Communists to provide them with some economic supplies rather than leaving them on their own productive efforts. To promote class consciousness, the CCP also ensured that party members in the units were mainly composed of tenants and poor peasants supported by a minority of middle peasants, and the best weapons

76. Ch'eng tzu-hua ^{程子華}, "Chi-chung ping-yuan shang ti min-ping tou-cheng", ^{冀中平原上的民兵鬥爭} (The struggle of the militia on the plain of central Hopei) chün-chung, X, 13, (July 10, 1945), 448

and equipment were entrusted to these protégés.⁷⁷
 In fact, this policy of control was sometimes seen operating even in the self-defence corps. For instance, in the 5th contingent of the self-defence corps in Ting hsien 定縣 in the southern part of central Hopei, of the 35 cadres there, the majority of them were poor peasants, supplemented by some middle peasants.⁷⁸

True to the Cheng Feng spirit, the CCP did not hesitate to point out weaknesses inherent in the militia and the need for the party-branch to strengthen these units. The first obvious drawback mentioned was the poor quality and inadequacy of supplies in arms and equipment, and it became, therefore, all the more important for the militia to make the best use

77. Ibid., 446.

78. Research Section, Central Committee for the Extermination of Communism, Kihokuku seinabu homen ni okeru Chukyo no minshu kakutoku kōsaku no jitsujō chōsa hokoku, 冀北区西南部方面に於ける中共の民衆獲得工作の实情調査報告 (Field Survey of Chinese Communist efforts to Win People in South-west Portion of Hopei Area), May, 1940, R 114, T 995, F26202-26203, pp. 27-29. A detailed survey of the economic, social background of the cadres is available here.

of all available supplies.⁷⁹ Second, there had to be good co-ordination between the militia on the one hand, and the guerrillas and army regulars on the other. Ch'eng Tzu-hua, political commissar of the Central Hopei Army, pointed out the danger of misplacing the militia during combats in positions which should have been occupied by better armed units.⁸⁰ Finally, experience in Hsien hsien had shown that a concentration of the militia on a large scale would make it impossible for members to carry on economic production whilst fighting the Japanese at the same time, because they would then have to leave their local villages. Thus militia units must be localized in the villages. In addition, they should also avoid attracting too much attention from the enemy as it would result in Japanese retaliation and unnecessary sacrifice as had happened in Kao-chia-chuang^{高家庄} in Hsien hsien.⁸¹

79. Tou Fu, "The way to mobilize the masses ...", chün-chung, X, I, (Jan. 15, 1945), 14.

80. Ch'eng Tzu-hua, "The struggle of the Militia", chün-chung, X, 13 (July 10, 1945), 447.

81: Ibid., 448-449.

By the end of 1943, the CCP policy of shifting its strength of resistance against the Japanese from regular troops to the people's armed bands began to show fruitful results. First of all, CCP figures released in 1944 indicated a rapid expansion of the militia in the period late 1943 and early 1944:

Strength of the militia in North China.⁸²

| | |
|---------------------------|-----------|
| Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base | 630,000 |
| Shansi-Hopei-Honan Base | 320,000 |
| Hopei-Shantung-Honan Base | 80,000 |
| Shantung Base | 500,000 |
| Shansi-Suiyuan Base | 50,000 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total | 1,580,000 |

In addition, the fierce Japanese mopping-up campaigns which had caused CCP territories to shrink in the period 1941-1942 had passed their peak, and the militia began to succeed in establishing themselves firmly in local villages in the defence of their own home, so much so that the party was then ready to mobilize them as a vital weapon in launching a new counter-offensive against the Japanese by the second half of 1943.⁸³

82. Chung-cheng hsuan-ch'uan pu 總政宣傳部, "Huo-yueh yu ti-hou chan-chang ti min-ping", 活躍於敵後戰場之民衆 (The militia who are active in the battle field behind enemy lines) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July, 8, 1944

83. For details see 274-275.

The expansion of the militia also contributed to improving the economic condition in the bases, and helped solve some of the difficult economic problems faced by the CCP. Many areas within the bases, especially the mountainous regions like Pei-yueh and T'ai Hang in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei and Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan bases respectively, were mostly unproductive areas.⁸⁴ To worsen the situation, natural catastrophes were frequent during the war up to 1943. For instance, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base experienced drought, flood, and locust pestilence whilst the T'ai-Hang area was also preyed upon by locusts, in 1942 and 1943, resulting in bad harvests.⁸⁵

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84. For a full report of economic difficulties in the T'ai Hang area, see Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu pien-ch'ü tiao-ch'a yen-chiu shih 晉冀魯豫邊區調查研究室, Kuo-min ching-chi tiao-ch'a ch'u-pu yen-chiu 國民經濟調查初步研究 (Preliminary investigation of the People's Livelihood and Economy), n.p. T'ao-fen, 1944, 24. The report indicates income in Tai Hang per capita was very low, and in the second, fifth and sixth administrative districts, people had to live for half of a whole year on the husks of grain.
85. Shih Ching-tang 史尚文 et, al., (ed.), Chung-kuo nung-yeh ho-tso-hua yün-tung shih-liao 中國農業合作化運動史料 (Source Material of the Chinese Agricultural Co-operative Movement), Peking, 1951, I, 304, 473-475.

To counteract these economic setbacks, the militia was mobilized by the party to co-operate with the peasants in economic production. It has already been mentioned that the people's armed bands did not normally draw supplies from the government, but relied on their own resources for food supply. To go one step further, a general campaign was launched in 1943 calling for close co-operation between labour and armed forces, i.e., Lao-wu ho-tso ^{勞武合作}. Basically, this was a movement to utilize maximum man-power in the economic production of the village, especially during harvest, and it was practised throughout the four major bases in North China.⁸⁶ During the whole agricultural season, the militia contributed in two ways. First, they were posted as sentries, and kept a close watch on the nearby enemy, especially those stationed in fortresses near communication lines. In addition, they also took part in economic production in areas closest to the enemy lines, as they were more capable of fighting the enemy than ordinary peasants. As for farms and land owned by the militia, the labour forces in the village took over production on their behalf. To deal with this complicated co-operation

86. Li Chan, The People's Militia ... in Combat, 28.

between labour and armed forces, the people in the village were organized into different mutual-aid teams, which had varied forms in the different bases.⁸⁷ The most common mutual-aid teams were the pien-kung tui 變工隊 (labour-conversion team), and the Cha-kung tui 扎工隊 (organized labour team). The pien-kung tui can generally be divided into three types. First, in areas where labour hands were insufficient, people were organised to help each other at a particular period. Second, where draught animals were insufficient, two labour hands could be exchanged for say, one bullock. Third, knowledge and techniques in farming like sowing and harvesting could be exchanged to supplement inadequacies. Cha-kung tui took the form of an organized team working in a particular farm for a short period of time, normally during the busy seasons. Various complications like pay, food supply, and leadership in the team were involved and organization varied from place to place.⁸⁸

87. Ibid. Also see "Let us Organize", Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi. (1961), III, 934-935.

88. Shih I 石毅, Shen-mo shih pien-kung ho cha-kung", 什麼是變工和扎工 (What is pien-kung and cha-kung?) Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan. 23, 1943

These mutual-aid teams in their formative stage had actually developed in the village in China for generations, but it was the Communists who took positive steps to turn them into highly organized economic production teams in the period 1943 onwards, as an essential step against Japanese economic pressure and the various kinds of natural catastrophes. They were in fact the forerunners of the co-operative farms and the practice of collectivization developed in the post-1949 period.⁸⁹ As for the promotion of co-operation between the labour and armed forces, the CCP utilized the conventional method of creating models and heroes, so that their examples could be followed by all. In 1943, the model example of such co-operation was in North-west Shansi and the hero was Chang Ch'uyuan 張初元. Chang was the commander of a militia detachment and also secretary of the peasants' association in a village in Ning-wu, a guerrilla area frequented by the Japanese. He organized his militia into thirteen units with each of them having at least one cadre, who most likely came from the peasants' association. With these units as the nucleus, Chang began to absorb the rest of the labour hands into

89. See preface of Shih Ching-tang, et.al., Source Material...Agricultural Co-operative Movement, I, 1.

mutual-aid teams. By harvest time 1943, it was claimed in Chang's village that 1,500 pieces of work which would have been required to be done by labour hands at other times, were saved, and only 2 shih of grain were taken away by the enemy, as against 50 in 1942.⁹⁰

The efficiency and success of Chang Ch'u yuan's village was by no means common phenomena in the North China bases in 1943, but results of the co-operation between labour and armed forces had convinced the CCPCC of the practicability of undertaking a full-scale economic production campaign in the front line., i.e., in the bases. Thus when the CCP Central Politburo promulgated the all important directive specifying a ten-point programme for 1944 on October 1, 1943, it stipulated the urgency and necessity to launch a full-scale economic production drive.⁹¹ It was progress made in the rent and interest reduction campaign, in which peasant consciousness was aroused, together with the achievements in the organization of the various people's armed bands, which prepared the

90. Let Us Organize, (Chin-Sui), 129-132

91. For the directive, see Chieh-fang jih-pao, Oct. 1, 1943.

way for various campaigns and ambitious programmes in 1944 and 1945. Apart from the launching of the economic campaign, the CCP also promoted from early 1944 onwards a movement to further good relations between the army, the administration, and the people, with the party playing the role of leader in maintaining harmony between the various organizations concerned.⁹²

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92. For details of the launching of this movement in
- a) the Shansi-Suiyuan area, see Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan. 2, 1944
 - b) the T'ai Hang area see Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 31, 1943
 - c) the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, see Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan. 8, 1944
 - d) the Shantung base, see Chieh-fang jih-pao Jan. 9, 1944.

The Changing Situation in North China, 1943.

The Cheng Feng Movement up to the end of 1943 had made it possible for the CCP and its cadres to maintain leadership in the various bases of North China. At the top level, although there might still have been scattered cases of independent tendencies like warlordism, it could still be said that the party had on the whole persuaded senior army commanders to co-operate according to the principle of the army under the party. More important still, the party had succeeded in allying itself with peasants in the village in various mass mobilization programmes. Instead of being the mere prey of Japanese attacks, the village by the end of 1943 became the base from which the CCP, with the staunch support of its protégés, could launch counter-offensives against the Japanese and the puppets.

By the second half of 1943, obvious changes were visible in the war between the Japanese and the Communists in North China. The Japanese Army began to feel the effect of a two-pronged CCP offensive aiming at political and military counteractions. Before going into these new CCP manoeuvres, it is necessary to survey Japan's fate in the Pacific war, and her relations with the puppets in China by the end of 1942 and early 1943, as they played an important role in

accounting for the changing war situation in the latter half of 1943.

In the summer of 1942, Japan's advance in the Pacific was checked, and in June, she experienced her first defeat at Midway. By the end of the same year she was beginning to be forced back from some of the Pacific islands.⁹³ This had two important effects on the development in North China. First, it became apparent that the Japanese had to withdraw troops from North China to sustain the counter-offensives launched by allied troops in the Pacific. Japanese military reports in the period September 1943 - June 1944 indicated that there was a partial withdrawal of Japanese troops from North China.⁹⁴ Second, Japan's changing fortune in the Pacific war made it necessary for her to depend more on her sponsored governments in China for moral and military support (military in the sense that puppet troops could relieve Japan of some

93. The Japan Biographical Research Department, The Japan Biographical Encyclopaedia and Who's Who, Tokyo, the Rengo Press, 1958, 205.

94. Headquarters, North China Special Patrol Garrison, dai ikki sakusen sentō shōho 第一其月作戰詳報 (Detailed Report of Military Operations of Japanese Garrison against Chinese Troops in North China), Sept. 20, 1943 - June 9, 1944
R 134, T 1252, F 52708, 52726.

responsibilities in local defence in the occupied area). This new Japan-puppet relationship was evident in January 1943. On January 9, Japan made Wang Ching-wei's National Government, which claimed central control over all occupied China, declare war on Britain and the United States of America. In return, Japan relinquished her extraterritorial rights and Concessions in China.⁹⁵ In addition, Wang Ching-wei obtained further concessions in a secret agreement with Japan made in December, 1942.⁹⁶ The final effort on Wang's part at autonomous rule under Japan, was the conclusion of the Pact of Alliance between Japan and his government on October 30, 1943, which extended to him further rights and future promises.⁹⁷ The sum total of this new Japan-puppet relationship was greater participation of the puppets in the administration of the occupied area. When applied to North China, it meant that the North China Political Council was given a freer hand

95. Nan-hua jih-pao (Hong Kong), Jan. 10, 1943; also see International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit No. 2610, Defence Document No. 643, 22387-22389.

96. For the secret agreements, see Lee Ngok, The Later Career of Wang Ching-wei ... 185-186.

97. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit No. 566, Prosecution Document No. 1451-E, 22398.

in local defence, especially after the partial withdrawal of Japanese troops in 1943. This withdrawal, which might have been welcomed by the puppets at other times as further concessions on Japan's part, turned out to be disadvantageous to the North China Political Council, as it became an easy prey of the expanding CCP.

What happened in 1943 was that the CCP did take advantage of the receding Japanese strength in China, and launched political and military offensives. In the political offensive, the main target was the puppets, and party cadres leading the militia in propaganda campaigns aimed at the defection of puppet troops in the different bases.⁹⁸ The partial withdrawal of Japanese troops meant that puppet troops were not given sufficient military support, and Japanese military reports indicated an obvious deterioration in puppet morale. In addition, people in the occupied

98. The CCP political offensives in 1943 had in fact been started since the second half of 1942. The editorial in Chieh-fang jih-pao on July 22, 1942, for instance, announced the launching of a political campaign to win over the puppet troops. A report in T'ai Hang in October, 1942 indicated that it was the party bureau and the political department of the army which provided leadership for the militia in the launching of political offensives. See Chieh-fang jih-pao, October 28, 1942.

area were aware of the changing situation, and therefore began to lose whatever faith they had in the puppet regimes. By September 1943 onwards, Japanese military reports admitted of extensive CCP success in persuading puppets to defect to the Communist camp.⁹⁹ It is interesting to note that whilst the CCP was scoring success against the puppets, KMT troops fighting guerrilla war with the Japanese in North China defected in 1943 in the greatest number since the war to the Japanese and the puppets. For instance, Pang Ping-huan, KMT deputy-commander of the Hopei-Chahar war-zone, and Sun Tien-ying, commander of the Fifth Army, defected to the Japanese together with their troops in April 1943, after being captured by the Japanese.¹⁰⁰

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99. Headquarters, North China Special Patrol Garrison, Detailed Report of Military Operations of Japanese Garrison Against Chinese Troops in North China, September 20, 1943 - June 9, 1944. R 134, T 1252, F 52701-52703, 52708, 52722, and 52726. The above account especially described the defection of puppet troops in Central Hopei, the Hopei-Shantung border region and the T'aiyuan area.
100. For a summary of KMT commanders who defected to the Japanese 1941-1943, see Chieh-fang jih-pao Aug. 13, 1943.

The political offensives definitely contributed to further CCP military counter-action against the Japanese. The model districts set up by the Japanese, the road-protection campaign, and the founding of the Ai-hu villages, which caused so much CCP hardship in 1941-1942,¹⁰¹ began to give way to the rising tide of CCP expansion in 1943. Tremendous activities were particularly undertaken by the CCP against communication lines, with the people's armed bands performing their duty in sabotage work.¹⁰² Military reports of the Japanese Army in September 1943-June 1944 recorded an upsurge of CCP military offensives, extending from Shantung, and eastern Hopei eastward across the Hopei-Shantung border, central and western Hopei,

101. See chapter four, 137-165.

102. For sabotage activities undertaken by the militia in Hopei and Shansi see Second Company, 1st Patrol Regiment, North China Special Patrol Garrison, Kahoku-sho Ranken shuhen chiku dai ikki sento shōho 河北省深县同造地区第一期战绩 (Detailed Reports on Fighting in Luanhsien Area of Hopei), Sept. 6, 1943 - June 10, 1944 R 134, T 1251, F. 52636-52637; and Headquarters, North China Special Patrol Garrison, Detailed Report on Military Operations... in North China, Sept. 1943 - June 1944, R 134, T 1252, F. 52703.

to the T'aiyuan area in Shansi. 103

The purpose of this chapter has been to indicate that whilst Cheng Feng reforms had strengthened unity and discipline within the party in the bases, CCP leadership had also succeeded through its many persevering efforts, mass mobilization programmes, and Cheng Feng indoctrination, in organizing effective resistance against the Japanese. The crucial point to note here is the CCP also succeeded in directing its anti-Japanese programmes into channels best suited for its own aggrandizement. In other words, the CCP not only mobilized the peasants under the anti-Japanese front, but also indoctrinated them according to principles of the national-democratic revolution, which by 1945 amounted to Mao's sinification of Marxist-Leninism. Undoubtedly, peasant nationalism was the most dynamic force in the war of resistance, and the relentless Japanese economic and military pressure on the CCP bases in the period 1941-1942 described in chapter IV clearly indicated how Japanese

103. For Japanese report on the expanding CCP military strength in North China, see Headquarters, North China Special Patrol Garrison, Detailed Report on Military Operations ... in North China, Sept. 1943-June 1944, R 134, T 1252, F. 52701-52705, 52708, and 52722-52726.

brutality must have won the hatred and contempt of the peasants. However, it is one thing to have peasant nationalism aroused and quite another to organize this dynamic force effectively against the Japanese or for other purposes. This is where the CCP came in to play the important role as the organizer and champion of the peasantry. The various CCP programmes described in this chapter indicated how the Communists directed peasant nationalism, and peasant resentment of landlord exploitation, into Communist orientated channels, thus succeeding not only in mobilizing the peasants to withstand the Japanese attacks, but also in winning over the peasantry as the staunch supporters of its cause of expansion in the bases of China. Consequently, the CCP had by the end of 1943 placed itself in a strong position in terms of mass support in anticipation of its future feud with the KMT, which came in 1945-1949.

Conclusion

The explanation of CCP success in expanding the four bases in north China during the Sino-Japanese war is effective party leadership based on the principle of democratic-centralism. The staunch support of the CCP army for the party also constituted an important factor. Whilst the party at the top level was responsible for the direction of orders and general principles to be followed in the party hierarchy, the party-branch in the village undertook the difficult task of mobilizing the people from below. It was the party sub-bureaux in the four bases with power delegated from Yen-an which united all anti-Japanese forces, from the poor peasants to the bourgeoisie, while keeping the army under control at the same time. Independent tendencies within the various army units were inevitable, especially when they were relied on for the conduct of the war of resistance, but the party's efforts to reassert its authority and leadership in the Cheng Feng period had on the whole succeeded in keeping these independent tendencies in check, as was described in chapter five.

It was the maintenance of good relations between Yen-an and the top level authorities in the various bases which facilitated the success of the party leadership. The majority of the leaders behind the enemy lines, especially the sub-bureau secretaries, political commissars and military commanders of the former First Front Army, consistently looked to Mao Tse-tung for leadership and inspiration, and loyally worked for the realization of the national-democratic revolution. In addition, there was no indication of any significant influence exercised by Wang Ming's faction in the bases. This means that during the Cheng Feng period, reform programmes there were basically different from those enforced in Yen-an, in that they were mainly concentrated on the strengthening of party leadership in resistance to Japan, without the emphasis on the removal of non-Maoists which was seen in the Communist headquarters.

The delegation of power by the party central in Yen-an to trustworthy senior cadres and administrators in the bases also meant that the latter had good opportunities for exercising their talent and initiative in strengthening Communist power in particular regions. For instance,

P'eng Chen in the Pei-yüeh area and Teng Hsiao-p'ing in T'ai Hang demonstrated their capability in mobilizing the peasants to support the Communist anti-Japanese cause. Similarly, military commanders like Liu Po-ch'eng in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base and Nieh Jung-chen in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base built up a seasoned peasant army which gained tremendous experience from the eight years of war. The discipline and morale of the CCP army proved to be much superior to its KMT counterparts in the civil war in 1946-1949, mainly because of the successful indoctrination of the political departments attached to the army units, especially in the Cheng Feng period. It is not surprising to find that most of the leading CCP figures in the bases are to be found among the chief architects of the Chinese People's Republic after its establishment in 1949. The ascendancy of P'eng Chen, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Lu Ting-i and others in the party, and the military prowess of commanders like P'eng Te-huai as demonstrated in the Korean War, are some examples. With the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in August 1966, most of these CCP leaders

who had fought bitterly against the Japanese behind the front lines remained in the limelight, no matter whether they were Maoists, or supporters of " the Chinese Khrushchev " .

In practical terms, CCP leadership in the bases achieved some crucial results : it amassed the support of the peasants under the banner of the United Front, aroused national consciousness in the countryside, and more important still, organized the population for the purpose of Communist expansion in China. In the first phase of development in the bases, up to 1940, the CCP had successfully broken through the hsien barrier to establish effective control in the administrative village. Here the party-branch established its strength and authority . Village elections were held extensively in 1940 in the four bases in north China with a view to entrusting greater local power to the CCP's protégés, that is, the tenants and poor peasants, as was seen in chapter three. The mild land policy in this period proved to be a prudent measure, as by securing cooperation from the rich peasants and landlords in a United Front it contributed to greater Communist strength in resistance

to Japan. The drawback to this policy was that the absence of struggles against landlords meant that the CCP had not yet been able to arouse fully the political consciousness of tenants and poor peasants, which was crucial to the success of mass mobilization. Another difficulty in this period was the low standard of education of village cadres, which tended to impede coordination with the party and the administration at higher levels.

The initial success up to 1940 was challenged by the Japanese in 1941-1942, when tremendous military and economic pressure from the latter caused a reduction in the strength and territories of the CCP bases. The Japanese in these two years fully realized that the effective means of counteracting Communist power was to strike at the CCP source of strength, that is, the countryside. Military operations and economic blockades against the Communists were highly localized, with elaborate organizations set up in villages in attempts to counteract CCP success at this basic level. These were described in chapter four. As long as these efforts were well supported by the army, the Japanese did score some success in their rural struggle with the Communists, who

suffered losses in 1941-1942. However, the fact that the Japanese Army could not afford, for reasons explained in chapter six, to continue to apply effective pressure against the CCP bases, proved eventually to be disastrous to Japan. First, she lost the chance of challenging the authority of the Communists in the village. Worse still, her punitive campaigns against the bases inevitably alienated the Chinese peasants. In addition, the Communists who had become fully aware of the Japanese menace began to strengthen their position through the introduction of the Cheng Feng Movement, with a strong emphasis on full-scale mass mobilization.

During the Cheng Feng period, the various party reforms in the bases were concentrated on the training of cadres and the maintenance of party discipline, thus making the Communists better equipped to launch major campaigns from late 1942 onwards. The greatest incentive to peasant consciousness was provided by the CCP revision of land policy, starting from 1942, which resulted in reinvigorating the rent and interest reduction campaign. The CCP began to side with the tenants and poor peasants in their struggle against the landlords, although the seizure and redistribution of land were not

yet allowed. Peasant consciousness thus aroused was also directed into specific channels. Peasants attracted to the Communist cause were organized into bodies like the mutual-aid labour teams and people's armed forces of various descriptions, which expanded tremendously in 1943. The latter in particular had both military and political significance, as the CCP could not only strengthen local defence, but also mobilize the armed peasants to support specific political campaigns.

It must be emphasized again that the village occupied a unique position in the bases throughout the war as the basic level at which the elaborate process of rallying support from the peasants was actually undertaken. In regard to the impact of the Cheng Feng Movement on the village behind the enemy lines, it should be noted that the ideological reorientation as represented by Mao's sinification of Marxism-Leninism had no significant relevance at this level. The party-branch in the village mainly devoted itself to the introduction of Cheng Feng programmes which concentrated on the supervising of mass organizations, rent-reduction campaigns, the production drive, and the maintenance of control over and good relations with the company units, as was indicated in chapter six.

The fact that the expansion of the CCP in terms of territory, as well as military and political strength, during the eight years of resistance contributed to the Communist triumph over the KMT in 1949 is well known. It is hoped that this thesis has contributed to a deeper understanding of how the CCP succeeded in allying itself with, and organizing, the peasants behind the Japanese lines, thus achieving a position from which it could control the countryside in north China. This rural control indeed proved to be vital to the Communists in their civil war with the KMT in 1946-1949. First, the various CCP bases offered the Communists convenient access to strategic regions in north China immediately after the surrender of Japan. For instance, troops under Lin Piao marched into Manchuria, whilst Liu Po-ch'eng's forces moved into areas north of the Yellow River in Honan. Furthermore, the Communist peasant army emerged from its eight years of apprenticeship, having been indoctrinated and disciplined by the party, and proved its mettle in the ensuing civil war. In the same way that they had succeeded in leading the peasant army to triumph over the Japanese, so the party, and for that matter, Mao, also directed the four newly organized CCP field armies to their final victory over the KMT in 1949.

Lastly, it should be noted that many programmes and policies enforced in the CCP bases during the war of resistance offered valuable experience to the new People's Republic in later years . Perhaps it is sufficient here to quote two examples. First, the organization of the mutual-aid teams was in fact a step preparatory to collectivization and the organization of communes. Second, the reinvigoration of the rent and interest campaign, which succeeded in amassing a tremendous peasant following, must have given the CCP confidence in enforcing the revolutionary policy of redistributing land after 1947 and in the early years of the new People's Republic. Thus a knowledge of the CCP wartime bases is significant for the understanding of later Communist policy, as well as for the study of the processes by which the CCP came to power.

Appendix I

The Location of Leading Military Commanders and Political Commissars in the North China Bases, 1943-1944*

A. The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region:

Commander:

Nieh Jung-chen
聶榮臻

Deputy Commander:

Hsiao K'ie
蕭克

Political Commissar:

Ma Tsun
馬尊

The Western Hopei Army

The Central Hopei Army

The Ping-hsi Army

The Ping-pei Army

The Eastern Hopei Army

Commander

Li Cheng-ts'ao
李程

political com.

Cheng Tzu-hua
程子華

8 detachments (chih-tui)
Leading figure: 1st detachment Com. Yang Ch'eng-wu
楊成武

about 11 regiments

B. The Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region:

Commander:

Liu Po-ch'eng.
劉伯承

The Hopei-Shantung-Honan military region:

Yang Te-chih
楊德志

(commander)

Su Chen-hua
蘇振華

(pol. com)

about 4 brigades; leading commanders: Sung Jen-ch'ung
宋仁躬 of the Eastern Detachment; Po I-p'o
薄一波 of the Dare-to-Die Corps, south-east Shansi.

* Simplified from Headquarters, North China Special Patrol Garrison, Dai ikki sakusen sentō shōho 第一期作戰門詳報 (Detailed Reports of Military Operations of Japanese Garrison against Chinese Troops in North China), Sept. 20, 1943- June 9, 1944. R I34, T I252, F 52748-52749.

Appendix I (continued)

C. The Shantung-Kiangsu-Honan Border Region:

Commander : Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien 徐向前
(H.Q. in Shantung)

The 115th Division (Shantung
detachment)

Commander: Ch'en Kuang 陳光
Political Com.:
Lo Jung-huan 羅榮桓

Director, pol. dept.: 蕭華
Hsiao Hua 蕭華

strength: I brigade

D. North-west Shansi Border Region:

Commander : Ho Lung 賀龍
Political Commissar: Kuan Hsiang-ying 關向應
Dep. command.: Hsu Fan-ting

The Anti-Japanese New Army
Commander: Hsu Fan-ting 胡範亭

Appendix 2
The Administration in the Four Bases of North China, 1943-1944*
The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base

Border Government : _____
 (founded on 15th Jan., 1938
 at P'ingshan , Hopei)
 Chairman: Sung Shao-wen 宋劭文
 Deputy Chairman : Hu Jen-k'uei 胡仁奎

Central Hopei | Hopei-Jehol
 Sub-region | Sub-region
 Director: | Director:
 Li Yün-ch'ang 李運昌

The Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Base
Border Government : _____
 (founded on July 18, 1941)

Chairman: Yang Hsiu-feng 楊秀峰
 Deputy Chairman: Po I-po, Jung Wu-sheng 戎伍勝
 Members: Li I-ch'ing, Sung Jen-ch'ung.

T'ai Hang | Southern Hopei Sub-region
 Sub-region | Director: Sung Jen-ch'ung

*Simplified from Headquarters, North China Special Patrol Garrison, Detailed Report of Military Operations... , Sept. 20, 1943-June 9, 1944. R I34, T I252, F 52755-52758.

Administrative Committee : _____
 Chairman : Sung Shao-wen
 Dep. Chairman: Hu Jen-k'uei
 Members: Nieh Jung-chen,
 Li Cheng-ts'ao.

Assembly : _____
 Chairman: Ch'eng Fang-wu 成方武
 Dep. Chairman: Yu Li 于力

Administrative Committee : _____
Assembly
 Chairman : Yang Hsiu-feng
 Dep. Chairman: Po I-po, Jung Wu-sheng.
 Members: Li I-ch'ing, Sung Jen-ch'ung.

Appendix 2 (Continued)

Shantung Base

Shantung Wartime Administrative Committee
(founded on Aug. 16, 1940,
south of Chn hsien)

Chairman: Li Yu 黎玉

Administrative

Committee

Chairman :

Li Yu

Assembly

Chairman:

Li Ch'ing-chih 李青池

Deputy Chairman:

Li Chu-yu 李竹坡

Hopei-Shantung Sub-region

Director : Wang Chn'eh-yu 王卓如

North-west Shansi Base

Office of North-west Shansi Sub-region
(founded on 15th Feb. 1940)

Director : Hsu Fan-ting

Administrative Committee


Chairman:

Lin Feng 林楓

Deputy Chairman:

Liu Pai-shao 劉白少

Appendix 3
Party Relations with the Army, the Administration and the People in the
Bases of North China, 1942*



* Simplified from Anti-Communist Research Squad, Staff, Kō 1800 th Corps, Hokushi ni okeru Chugoku Kyōsantō soshiki keitōhyō 北支に於ける中国共産党組織系統表 (Organizational Chart of Communist Party in North China), Aug. 20, 1942.
 R 115, T 1022, F 27042-27046.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

I. Primary Materials

- A. Chieh-fang jih-pao
- B. Other Communist Sources
- C. Japanese Army Archives

II. Other Chinese Sources

III. Western Works

I. Primary Materials

- A. Chieh-fang jih-pao 解放日報 (Liberation Daily) Yen-an, May 1941 - August 1945.

This newspaper represents the mouthpiece of the CCP during the Sino-Japanese war. It began publication in 1941 as a continuation of the Chieh-fang Weekly 1937-1941. The latter contained mostly important speeches and articles by leading Communist figures and declarations of the CCP, but its scope was certainly limited by the fact that it was only a weekly periodical. On the other hand, its successor, the Daily, was during the greater part of its publication a four-page paper. It is the most authoritative source available in tracing the development of the CCP movement in the period 1937-1945, both in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border government and the various bases in north and central China. Being the party mouthpiece, it is inevitable that a great deal of coverage was given to propaganda. However, careful examination of the newspaper makes it possible for one to differentiate between serious party policies, directives, investigations and organizational instructions from anti-Japanese news aiming at boosting the morale of the army and the people. In the Cheng Feng period in particular, the Daily gave a great deal of attention to directives and special investigations aiming at achieving intra-party reforms rather than propaganda. As far as information extracted from the Daily as source material for this thesis is concerned, it can be generally divided into three categories:

- i). Official CCP directives and policies, and articles by leading CCP figures.

The editorial, very often drafted by CCP leaders, was where important CCP policies and laws were drafted and published. Important directives of the CCP Central

Politburo and the various party bureaux and sub-bureaux also appeared as headlines. About equal emphasis was given to news on the development of the Shen-Kan-Ning border region and the other bases in north China, and publicity was inevitable in reports given. When the different movements and campaigns were launched by the CCP, the Daily became the main organ to rally the support of the people, and a great deal of publicity was also given. Significant articles by leading Communists like Chu Teh, K'ang Sheng, Nieh Jung-chen, Lin Piao, P'eng Cheng, and of course, Mao, were also published, normally with a specific objective, e.g., on Cheng Feng programmes, or guerrilla tactics in specified areas.

ii). Specific and detailed investigations

Coverage was given to reports of investigations on special aspects and problems in the north China bases. Emphasis was given to land problems and landlord-tenant relations, especially in the Cheng Feng period. Detailed statistical surveys of the class structure in special areas, and the percentage of land held by the different classes were also published, with information provided by the various border governments in north China. Some of these reports were representative in nature in that surveys were taken from a cross-section of villages or hsien in a certain region. Senior party cadres like P'eng Chen also contributed articles on topics like problems involved in the rent-reduction campaign and landlord-tenant relations. Information of this kind contributes tremendously to the understanding of the economic situation in wartime China, especially in north China.

iii). Propaganda materials

As the party mouthpiece, the Daily inevitably published a great deal of propaganda material, with the obvious objective of maintaining good morale in the

armed forces, strengthening the confidence of the people, and discrediting the enemies. Anti-Japanese campaigns, especially victorious ones, no matter how minor, were given detailed descriptions. This is especially so from 1943 onwards, when CCP troops were beginning to launch offensives against the Japanese. When CCP-KMT relations deteriorated, the Daily kept denouncing KMT actions. For instance, in July 1943, when skirmishes between the Shen-Kan-Ning garrison and the KMT troops under Hu Tsung-nan took place in Shensi, the Daily devoted a great deal of space to anti-KMT propaganda throughout the months July to September.

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June 4, 1943.
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戰鬥中成長的晉綏邊區 (The Shansi-Suiyuan
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^{治局關於減租且生產擁政愛民之宣傳十大政策的指示}
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Glossary

(A list of terms often referred to in the thesis)

- Ai-hu village " care and protection" village
- Ai-lu chih-chia Road-protection home
- Catty 1¹/₃ lb.
- Cha-kung tui organized labour team
- Cheng-chih chih-tao yuan political adviser(company level)
- Cheng Feng yün-tung Rectification Movement
- Ch'iang-hua chih-an yün-tung The Movement to Reinforce Law and Order (launched by the Japanese from 1941 onwards)
- Ch'i-fen cheng-chih san-fen chün-shih seven-tenths of effort on political manoeuvres and three-tenths on military actions
- Ching-chi ching-ch'a economic police force
- Ching-ping chien-cheng " To cut troops and simplify the administration"----CCP retrenchment policy in the face of Japanese pressure
- Ch'ing-pi k'ung-yeh " To clear the walls and empty the fields"---- a CCP measure to prevent economic supplies from being seized by the Japanese
- Ch'ou-ti landlord's right of repossessing land let to tenants
- Chu-jen tai-piao chief representative (chief of the administrative village)
- ch'u district
- Chueh-ssu tui Dare-to-Die corps

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|-------------------------------------|--|
| <u>Chün ch'ü</u> | military region |
| <u>Fen-chü</u> | sub-bureau (party) |
| <u>Fen-ch'ü</u> | sub-region (military) |
| <u>Hsi-meng hui</u> | Sacrifice League |
| <u>Hsien</u> | county |
| ,, | line (communication lines) |
| <u>Hsin-min hui</u> | New People's Society |
| <u>Hsing-cheng ts'un</u> | administrative village |
| <u>Huang Tao</u> (kodo in Japanese) | Kingly Way |
| <u>I-tang chih-chün</u> | party control over the army |
| <u>Ken-chü-ti</u> | Communist base with a well-defined strong- hold, but also embodied areas with guerrilla activities |
| <u>Kuan-min ho-tso</u> | cooperation between the people and the officials |
| <u>Lao-wu ho-tso</u> | cooperation between labour and armed forces |
| <u>Mien</u> | surface area (referring to rural area) |
| <u>Mu-fan ti-ch'ü</u> | Model District |
| <u>Pei-fang chü</u> | Northern Bureau (party) |
| <u>Pen-wei chu-i</u> | Particularism |
| <u>Pien-kung tui</u> | labour-conversion team |
| <u>Ping-ts'un</u> | incorporating villages |
| <u>Sankō-seisaku</u> | Japanese "three-all" policy: kill all, bur all and destroy all |

- Shih-wu chu-i Routinism
- Shu-ti the action taken by tenants to retain
land formerly repossessed by landlords
- Tang chih-pu party-branch (village level)
- Three-thirds system The system in which Communists
occupied only one-third of the total
number of members in government and
elected bodies
- Ti-fang tang-wei party committee at the area level
- Tien point
- Ts'un kung-so Village Administrative Office
- Ts'un-min ta-hui Villagers' Conference
- T'ui tsu special reference to tenants' demands
for the return of rent from landlords
- Wei-ch'ih hui maintenance society---Japanese-sponsored
local organizations
- Yeh-chan pu-tui field-forces
- Yu-chi ch'ü regions with guerrilla activities
- Yu-chi hsiao-tsu guerrilla units---the best organized
units in the militia
- Yu-chi yün-tung chan operational-guerrilla warfare---
basic military tactics undertaken by
the CCP in the anti-Japanese war up to
1941