ESTATES AND PLANTATIONS IN JAVA

1812 - 1834

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ABSTRACT.

In the early nineteenth century there was a great deal of discussion in Dutch colonial circles as to the role which might be played by private European landowners and planters in the exploitation of Java's resources. Until the end of Dutch East India Company rule in 1808 there were few private estates owned by Europeans and few private European planters operating in the colony. However, large-scale land sales between 1808 and 1813, a more permissive attitude towards the settlement of European planters, and the high price paid for colonial produce on the European market at the close of the Napoleonic wars combined to alter this situation in a radical fashion. By the eighteen twenties private European landowners and planters were engaged in growing coffee, sugar and indigo, and there appeared to be a prospect that their efforts would provide the answer to the need of the Dutch colonial authorities to make Java productive of exportable produce.

However, many of these private ventures ran into difficulties. In the case of coffee, the European landowners and planters encountered a formidable rival in the Indies government, which ran extensive coffee plantations itself, and which saw its position threatened by
private competition. In the case of sugar and indigo, it was falling prices and a shortage of both capital and labour which combined to undermine the commercial basis of such ventures. By 1830 the private estates of West Java had largely gone over to growing rice for sale in the island itself. In the East Java littoral European planters continued to grow sugar and indigo for the export-market, but were faced with increasing difficulties. There is room for a variety of opinion here, but it may at least be suggested that they were only able to stay in business because of the help which they received from the Indies government and from the semi-official Netherlands Trading Society. It was against this background that in 1830 the government itself began to organise the large-scale production of exportable produce. The private estates and plantations, temporarily at least, moved into the background.
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PREFACE.

In writing this study of the estates and plantations of Java in the period 1812-1834 what I have tried to do is to give a broad picture of the situation in terms of the Europeans involved, the crops grown and the difficulties encountered. Historians such as Reinsma have already commented in a general way on the situation of the private estates and plantations in the earlier nineteenth century before the development of the Cultivation System after 1830. As far as I am aware, however, no attempt has so far been made to discuss the situation in detail, such as is attempted here. My treatment of the subject, nonetheless, has no claims to be definitive. Limitations imposed by the available source material and by my own limited understanding mean that this is a study of a highly provisional nature. On the other hand, I hope it will serve to throw a little more light on European colonial activities in Java in the nineteenth century.

My greatest debt is to Dr. J. S. Bastin and Professor C.D. Cowan, both of the School of Oriental and African Studies, for much advice and help during the preparation and writing of this thesis. I am particularly grateful

to Professor Cowan for taking over as my supervisor after Dr. Bastin's departure for Singapore in January of this year. For the errors which remain in this study, of course, I alone am responsible.

My research has taken me to a number of libraries and archives in both the Netherlands and Great Britain, and it is to the staff of these that my thanks must go. In particular I wish to thank the archivists and reading-room and library staff of the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague and the Koninklijk Instituut Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde in Leiden, where by far the greater part of my work was done.

I am grateful to the Earl of Harewood, the Trustees of the Harrowby MSS and Brigadier H.R.H. Greenfield, C.B.E., for permission to quote from documents in their possession. I should also like to take this opportunity of thanking the Earl and Countess of Harrowby and Brigadier and Mrs H.R.H. Greenfield for their kindness and hospitality during the periods in September 1966 and 1967 when I was at Sandon and Fascadale working on their respective family papers.
A glossary of weights, measures and currency will be found at the back of this book, between the Conclusion and the Bibliography, as will a list of abbreviations used in the footnotes for periodicals, newspapers and other miscellaneous publications. Books are referred to for the first time by their full titles and thereafter by their short titles, by which they can be found in the Bibliography.
INTRODUCTION.

Until late in the nineteenth century Java may fairly be characterised as a colony the exploitation of whose agricultural resources was for the most part sponsored and controlled by the government. It was not until the eighteen sixties and seventies that, with the withering away of the government-run Cultivation System or Cultuurstelsel, privately owned and European controlled estate and plantation agriculture began to develop on a significant scale. Nonetheless, the rudiments of such a development already existed in Java in the opening decades of the nineteenth century. This was in the period before the Cultivation System got under way, but after the close of the period of East India Company rule in the island. It is the estates and plantations of this interim period which form the subject of the present study.

They existed at a time when European colonial rule in Java was going through what may justifiably be termed an

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1 Significant, that is, in terms of agricultural output expressed as a percentage of the total exports from Java of five major export-crops, coffee, tobacco, tea, sugar and quinine. In 1840 the production of private estates and plantations accounted for 17% of such exports, in 1868 for 45% and in 1873 for 72%. See R. Reinsma, *Het Verval van het Cultuurstelsel*, The Hague 1955, p. 157. General accounts of the plantation system in the later nineteenth century will be found in G.C. Allen and A.C. Donnithorne, *Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya*, London 1957.
important transitional state, and when there was a great deal of debate as to the way in which the colony should be run. In this debate the question of the role which was to be played by 'private European' estates and plantations assumed considerable importance. The situation is one which calls for a certain amount of preliminary explanation.

The Dutch, or rather, the Dutch East India Company, first established itself at Batavia in 1619, and it was this town which remained the seat of Dutch government in the Indies down to the end of the colonial period. It was only gradually, however, that the Company extended its control beyond the area immediately surrounding Batavia. Nonetheless, by the close of the eighteenth century the Company was in effective control of more than two-thirds of Java. It had whittled down the once-powerful Javanese empire of Mataram to two Principalities, Surakarta and Jogjakarta, situated inland in the central part of the island, where they enjoyed a quasi-independence under the Company's protection.

The method of government which the Company adopted in those areas of the island which it did control, however, could scarcely be described as one of direct rule. The local Indonesian rulers, whom the Dutch called Regents, were left undisturbed under Dutch suzerainty, at least as far as administrative matters were concerned. Only in
the coffee-growing Preanger area of West Java was the Company's interference in the administration at all pronounced. The system of indirect administration had its counterpart in the economic sphere. The Company obtained the supplies of agricultural produce in which it traded not from the direct organization of production, but from a system of contingents and forced deliveries. Sometimes paid for and sometimes not, these were deliveries of agricultural produce made to the Company warehouses by the local Indonesian rulers of the areas under Dutch control. In part at least they had the character of tribute paid to a recognized suzerain – in this case the East India Company – by a vassal. By the close of the eighteenth century contingents and forced deliveries together consisted of rice, sugar, indigo, coffee and several other lesser items.

At the end of 1799 the Dutch East India Company, which had been in difficulties for many years, was formally dissolved and its possessions taken over by the Dutch state.

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2 In the Preanger Regencies "a fairly effective political control was exercised by the Dutch Commissary for Native affairs" and the appointment of district heads was controlled by the Company. J.S. Bastin, The Native Policies of Sir Stamford Raffles in Java and Sumatra, Oxford 1957, p.26-7.

3 On the system of forced deliveries and contingents, see Bastin, Raffles in Java, p.3-4.
By this time, however, Java was effectively cut off from the metropolitan country because of the conflict in Europe and on the High Seas. Moreover, there appears to have been some resistance by vested interests in Java itself to any change in the existing system. As a result it was not until the arrival there of Governor-General Daendals in 1808 that the period of Company rule in Java really came to an end. Daendals had been sent out by the French king of Holland to reform the Indies government and to strengthen Java’s defences to meet a possible British attack. For the hostilities in Europe and the position of Holland as a French client state by this time threatened the security of the Dutch as well as the French colonies in the East. Daendals was recalled early in 1811 and there followed in August of that year a successful British invasion of Java, prompted by the formal incorporation of Holland into the Napoleonic empire in the previous year. A British East India Company regime was set up, headed by Lieutenant-Governor Stamford Raffles, which remained in control of the island until 1816.

The events of 1808-1816 had an importance far beyond that of the mere change of colonial power. Between them, Raffles and Daendals brought about far-reaching changes in
the system of European rule in Java. In the administrative field they were responsible for the setting up of what had at least the semblence of a centralised governmental machine. In particular, they sought to reduce the power of the Regents, many of whose functions were taken over by European officials. What is of especial interest for the purposes of this study, however, is the new revenue system introduced by Raffles in 1813, the Land Rent System.

The Principle of this system was that the local cultivators of Java should be left free to cultivate their fields as they wished. Forced deliveries and contingents and the system of forced cultivation which went with them were abolished. In their place the colonial government sought its revenue through the imposition of a regular land tax or rent. To begin with, assessment was generally made at the village level and the village in effect leased to the village headman on an annual basis. Later, however, a so-called 'detailed settlement' was instituted, according to which the land was leased directly to the individual cultivators. Rent was to be paid in either cash or produce.

4 There has been a good deal of disagreement among historians as to the degree to which the plans of Daendals and Raffles were ever put into practice. On Daendals's reforms see Bastin, Raffles in Java, p.15-16. For a hostile view of Raffles's reforms, see J.S. Ottow, De Oorsprong der Conservatieve Richting, Utrecht 1937, p.54-64.
although the aim was that cash should eventually be the sole medium of rent.\(^5\) Despite the new system, some vestiges of Company rule remained. In the coffee-growing Preanger area, for example, the forced cultivation and delivery of coffee was untouched by Raffles's reforms. By and large, however, the Company system was defunct in Java when the colony was handed back to the Dutch in 1816 after a British occupation which had lasted for five years.

The restored Dutch rulers were faced with a serious problem. On the advice of such senior Indies officials as H.W. Muntinghe, the Dutch Commissioners-General of 1816 decided to retain Raffles's land rent and to persevere in its

\(^5\) The idea behind and introduction of the land rent have been dealt with in detail in Bastin, *Raffles in Java*, and Raffles' Ideas on the Land Rent System in Java and the Mackenzie Land Tenure Commission—*Verh. T.L.V.*, 1954. The same author's, The working of the early Land Rent System in West Java, *B.K.I.*, 116, 1960, p.300-312, gives an insight into what actually happened in a particular province where the land rent was introduced, and concludes that "defective administrative machinery" crippled attempts to impose the rent, and that vestiges of forced cultivation remained.

\(^6\) The Commissioners-General, C.T. Elout, G.A. Baron Van der Capellen and Rear-Admiral A.A. Buijskes arrived in Java in April-May 1816 and took over from the last British Lieutenant-Governor John Fendall in August of that year. Their regime continued until January 1819, when Elout and Buijskes returned to the Netherlands leaving Van der Capellen as Governor-General, a post which be continued to hold until the beginning of 1826.
implementation. *(Like many of Raffles's reforms, the land rent led a better existence on paper than in practice.)* However, from the point of view of the colonial power, the land rent left something to be desired.

The theory behind its introduction was that, freed from the dead-weight of the Regents' arbitrary rule and the Company's system of forced deliveries, the cultivators would follow the promptings of self-interest and would grow of their own accord the sort of crops which would fetch them a good profit on the open market. Among these, it was hoped, would be sugar and coffee and other products suitable for export to Europe. *(For although the restored Dutch government at Batavia was shorn of many of the mercantile functions which had characterized previous colonial regimes in the Indies, it was committed nonetheless to a policy of encouraging the expansion of Dutch private trade between the Indies and Holland, and this could hardly be expected to take place in the absence of exportable produce.)*

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8 See, for example, the views of H.W. Muntinghe, the man whose advice was instrumental in influencing Raffles to introduce the land rent and the Commissioners-General to retain it, printed in S.v. Deventer, *Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Landelijk Stelsel op Java*, Zalt Bommel 1865-6, p.287-91.
The trouble was, however, that despite the predictions of its originators, the Land Rent System does not appear to have led to the stimulation of the growing of exportable crops by the local cultivators. Freed from the obligation laid upon them to grow something else, they tended to concentrate their attention upon the cultivation of rice. The situation no doubt varied a great deal from one part of the island to another and it is highly misleading to suggest that the Indonesian peasantry as a whole would only cultivate other crops than rice if they were compelled to do so. What can be said with some degree of certainty is that the land rent was not found to be an easy or swift answer to the problem of obtaining supplies of exportable produce. The land rent was in many areas no more than a

9 In May 1817 the Dutch official Lawick v. Pabst reported from the large East Java Residency of Surabaja that the problem of getting the peasantry to cultivate some other crop on their fields after the rice had been harvested was not one to which the land rent in its present form could offer any solution. Lawick v. Pabst's Report on Surabaja, 15.5.1817, p.36, Schneither Coll 96. On the other hand, the Resident of the West Java province of Bantam reported a few years later that a variety of crops including pepper were grown by the local cultivators in his area. It is difficult, however, to say whether such activities represented free cultivation. Probably government 'encouragement' was behind it. See Annual General Report Bantam, 1823, p.22-4, Schneither Coll 83, and a general statement on the tendency to fall back on rice growing in Bastin, Raffles in Java, p.57-8.
rice-levy carried out by the government, and where coffee was
grown by the Indonesian cultivators it was generally coercion
from the side of the authorities which ensured its 'free' culti-
vation.\(^{10}\)

This situation, however, was particularly worrying for the
Dutch, since their position was almost the reverse of that of
their British predecessors. The latter were at least as much
interested in what they could sell in Java as in what agricultural
produce they could take from the island. The Land Rent System
itself had been conceived on the basis of creating in Java a
money economy and thereby a market for British cotton goods.
The Dutch, on the other hand, had nothing to sell, and their
interest in the production of things such as coffee and sugar
which could be sold profitably in the West was accordingly that
much the greater. In these circumstances, it was not altogether
surprising that the restored Dutch rulers of 1816 soon began to
look round for some way of stimulating the production of the sort
of crops which were suitable for export.

The solution which was eventually arrived at, some fourteen
years after the restoration of Java to the Dutch in 1816, was the
Cultuurstelsel or Cultivation System, which was put into operation
by Governor-General Van den Bosch and his successors in the
eighteen thirties. Although a great many questions remain

\(^{10}\) See, for instance, Kemp, *Landelijk Stelsel*, p. 163-5.
unanswered about Van den Bosch's system, it may be generally characterised as a scheme for the large-scale exploitation of Java's agricultural resources by the Colonial government itself. The administration intervened to enforce the production of the desired crops, and where processing of the raw material was necessary - as was the case with sugar - this was done by European manufacturers working on contract to the government, by whom they were supplied with both funds and labour.

However, the introduction of the Cultivation System in 1830 was preceded by almost two decades of debate in Java and Holland as to the best way of running the newly-restored colony. It was a debate, moreover, in which a great deal of attention was paid to the role which might be played not by the government but by private estates and plantations in developing the agricultural potential of the colony and, more particularly, in making the island productive of the sort of crops which would find a ready market in Europe. It was this which made the private estates and plantations question such an important issue in the debate over Dutch land policy in Java in the first third of the nineteenth century.

On the one hand there were those who felt that the best way of exploiting the colony's resources lay in the promotion of a system of private estates and plantations, owned or leased by Europeans. A number of private European estates and plantations already existed in the island when it was returned to the Dutch
in 1816, and the number of private plantations of one sort or another increased considerably in the years immediately after the restoration. It was developments such as this, so the advocates of an estate and plantation system argued, which fore­shadowed the future course which the development of the colony should take. It was the business of the government to promote the expansion of private European agricultural enterprises.

Among the most prominent advocates of such a policy was Willem van Hogendorp, secretary to Commissioner-General Du Bus (1826-30), and compiler of the so-called Du Bus Report on Colon­isation of May 1827. Van Hogendorp rejected the view held by the promoters of the Land Rent System that, left to themselves and freed from arbitrary demands, the Indonesian cultivators would naturally set about the cultivation of profitable export-crops. On the contrary, some sort of positive European intervention was necessary if crops such as coffee, sugar and indigo were to be produced at all, and if the Indonesian peasantry was to be stim­ulated into greater agricultural activity. However, this inter­vention was not to take the form of state direction of agriculture. Instead, the necessary stimulus was to come from the settlement in the interior of the island of European planters or entrepreneurs.

The Du Bus Report of May 1827 is published as an appendix in D.C.Steijn Parve, Het Koloniaal Monopoliestelsel getoetst aan Geschiedenis en Staatshuishoudkunde, Zalt Bommel 1851. A summary of the main points of the 1827 Report is to be found in J.S.Furnivall, Netherlands India, Cambridge 1939, p. 100-103.
Such planters were envisaged as individuals who had money to invest, and who should be encouraged to invest it in agricultural enterprises productive of exportable produce. Accordingly, regulations affecting the arrangements which might be made between European planters and Indonesian cultivators were to be kept to a minimum, and the government was to actively encourage the settlement of private European planters by granting them long leases on areas of hitherto uncultivated and unpopulated ground. Such ground, according to Van Hogendorp, would then be worked by labourers freely hired in the adjacent villages.

Behind this lay the assumption that it was self-interest rather than outside pressure which was to ensure that the planters who were granted uncultivated land would be able to find enough people to work them. This emerges clearly from Van Hogendorp's statement that his scheme would "provide an opportunity, at present

12Van Hogendorp was careful to point out that the European planters whom he envisaged as leasing land would not be "fortune-hunters" as some critics of a land-concession policy alleged, but men of some substance, who "had a certain standing in society." Steijn Parve, Monopoliestelsel 1851, Appendix Du Bus Report, p. 72.

13The greater part of Van Hogendorp's recommendations concerned the leasing of hitherto uncultivated land. However, as far as the existing private estates were concerned, he advocated that the prevailing restrictions on the demands which could be made on the peasantry by the landlords should be lifted. Steijn Parve, Monopoliestelsel 1851, Appendix Du Bus Report, p. 67 and 120.
lacking" for the Indonesian peasantry to find profitable work and that not only was it envisaged that the landless peasantry of the villages would be hired by European planters but also that those village cultivators who only had a little land to work would also find in the wages offered by the European planters "a more certain, a more care-free, a more ample and a better existence" than they had hitherto found in their villages. 14

The views of Van Hogendorp on the role which should be assigned to private landowners and planters in the development of Java were not shared by all his contemporaries, though they did find support within the Colonial office in The Hague. In particular, the policy of land concession to European planters was strongly resisted by G.A.G.P. van der Capellen, Governor-General from 1819 until 1826, and by his prominent advisors H.W. Muntinghe and

14 Van Hogendorp also made it quite clear that he expected the European planters who leased land to obtain workpeople "by fair and entirely voluntary arrangements" Steijn Parve, Monopoliestelsel 1851, Appendix Du Bus Report, p. 54-8.

15 H.W. Muntinghe, 1773-1827, was already a highly experienced government official when Java was returned to the Dutch in 1816. Under Governor-General Daendals he was an Extra-Ordinary Member of the Council of the Indies, and a full Member of the same council under the Raffles regime. After 1816 he held a variety of posts, again including that of Member of the Council of the Indies, a post which he finally vacated a few months before his death. For more information on this controversial and highly talented Indies official, see De Haan, B.K.I., 92, 1935, p. 614-7, where further references are also given.
Muntinghe, it will be remembered, was the man who advised Raffles on the introduction of the Land Rent System and who, as early as 1817, had submitted a report to the Dutch Commissioners-General advocating the retention of the Land Rent System and arguing against the adoption of a policy involving the sale or leasing of lands to Europeans. It was this same man who probably wrote the so-called Van der Capellen Report on Colonisation of 1822, which might be described as the major policy statement of those who opposed the spread of private estates and plantations in Java.

As did Van Hogendorp five years later, the author of the 1822 Report accepted the view that Java should be expected to produce crops suitable for the European market - coffee, sugar and indigo amongst them. The only question was whether this was best achieved by government or by

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16 H.J. van de Graaff, 1782-1826, arrived in the Indies for the first time in 1816 and quickly came to occupy very senior posts in the government, among others, that of Vice-President of the Inspectorate of Landed Income, the body which was responsible for dealing with land policy. From 1820 until a few months before his death in 1826 he was a Member of the Council of the Indies.

17 The Van der Capellen Report on Colonisation of July 1822 is printed in Ottow, Oorsprong, p. 212-301. The question of its authorship is discussed by Ottow on page 122 of the same work.
private enterprise. It was, that is, not only a question of whether private European enterprise would help promote the development of the colony, but of whether it would promote it any better than the government was capable of doing. It was this last point which the author of the 1822 Report was inclined to doubt. It was argued that the great strength of the private landowners lay less in their entrepreneurial skills, less in the financial resources at their command, than in the obedience of the population of their lands and the consequent willingness of that population to work for them. The obedience of the local estate population, however, stemmed from the European landowner's position (in the eyes of the Indonesian population) as appointed representative of their ultimate feudal lord, the Governor-General. In this sense, there was no difference between private European landlords and government officials: both appeared as the representative of the overlord. This being so, and the obedience of the local estate population being the major advantage of landownership, it followed that the private landowners were possessed of no major advantages which did not also accrue to government officials. There was no reason, therefore, to assume that European landlords could make any greater contribution to the development of the island's agricultural
resources than could the Indies government and its officials.

This was nowhere more true than in the cultivation of coffee, which in the eighteen twenties was by far the most valuable of Java's exports. This cultivation, it was argued in the 1822 Report, needed no great outlay of capital because the peasants who were involved in the cultivation of coffee still had time to grow enough rice with which to feed themselves. Moreover, it needed the application of no skills such as the indigenous population did not already possess. Europeans involved in coffee growing in Java in the early nineteenth century learnt their skills from the Indonesians, and not the other way round. The organisation of labour which was called for could come as well from the officials of the Indies government as from private landlords. Indeed, the latter had neither cash nor skill to contribute to coffee growing: "far from bringing benefit to it, the great European landlords could justifiably be compared to a parasitic plant," which fed itself at the expense both of the indigenous population and the revenues which the government would have derived from coffee had it grown it itself. 18

18 The main arguments against a policy of land-concession appear in Ottow, Oorsprong, p. 231-45.
Moreover, it was not only from the angle of the unnecessary diminution of the government's revenues that the private estates were attacked. It was also alleged that the spread of private estates and plantations could only take place at the cost of oppressing the indigenous population of the areas concerned. Contentions of this short appeared not only in the 1822 Report, but also in the correspondence of Van der Capellen's advisor, H.J. van de Graaff, who wrote to his friend Fabius in July 1823 that a policy of land concessions to European planters was a highly illiberal one, and that it meant the handing over of the indigenous population of the island into the hands of entrepreneurs just as if they were "Polish serfs or ... African negro-slaves."¹⁹

On the other hand, the author of the 1822 Report, at least, was prepared to concede that there were some cases where private European enterprise did have a role to play in the promotion of agriculture. Such a case was the sugar industry, where the indigenous population had neither the aptitude nor the capital necessary if the cultivation and manufacture of the crop was to be carried

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out successfully. Nonetheless, although some theoretical justification could be made out for the presence in Java of European sugar manufacturers, it was alleged in the Report that those Europeans who had taken up sugar manufacture were in such serious difficulties that some form of government support might soon be necessary if the industry was to survive. Other opponents of a land concession policy, however, appear to have had even fewer reservations than the author of the 1822 Report. Governor-General Van der Capellen himself wrote in 1822 to the future Minister of Colonies J.C. Baud, that "the longer I remain here and the more I know of affairs... the more I am convinced of the harmfulness of private landownership. For a long time... I have hesitated over this, but my mind is now made up, and I heartily wish that, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the large towns, not a single private landowner existed in Java."  

In attacking the view that Java's economic future lay with the spread of private estates and plantations, Van der Capellen and his advisors appear to have been suggesting that things should carry on much as before.

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20 Ottow, Oorsprong, p. 242-3.
21 Van der Capellen to J.C. Baud, 18.11.1822, Baud Coll 87.
The implication, at least, of the 1822 Report was that the government should continue to run its own coffee plantations and that the Land Rent System should continue in operation. In this sense, their criticism of a policy of land-concession was a negative one. At the close of the 'twenties, however, and with direct reference to the Van Hogendorp proposals of 1827, a positive critical attack was mounted against a land-concession policy by Johannes van den Bosch, the man destined to become Governor-General of Java and Colonial Minister in the following decade.

Van den Bosch had been in Java in the early years of the nineteenth century, and between 1827 and 1828 was Commissioner-General in the Dutch possessions in the West Indies. He was also the writer of a book on colonial theory in which he had made clear his hostility to the 'liberal' ideas of Raffles and his followers. His

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22 Five years previously, in 1817, Muntinghe had recommended to the Dutch Commissioners-General that the Land Rent System be retained as the main method of raising government revenue. As has already been pointed out, it was also Muntinghe who advised Raffles on the adoption of the land rent in the first place. See the Report of the President and Council of Finance (Muntinghe was the President) of 14.7. 1817, in Deventer, (ed) Landelijk Stelsel, 1, p. 279-356.

23 On Johannes van den Bosch, 1780-1844, see the brief biography in Furnivall, Netherlands India, p. 109-10.
criticism of a policy of granting land in Java to private European planters was based far more on considerations of the practicability of such a scheme than was that of Muntinghe, Van der Capellen and Van de Graaff. They had argued that private European landowners were unnecessary for the successful promotion of coffee growing, coffee at that time being the island's most profitable export. Van den Bosch, however, based his argument less on the question of coffee than on that of the cultivation and manufacture of sugar. In doing so, he chose to focus attention on the difficulties facing an industry which, though not new in Java, was experiencing in the eighteen twenties relatively novel problems arising from the need for mechanisation and large-scale production. It was not possible, he argued, for private European estate owners or planters to produce sugar cheaply enough for them to compete successfully with the sugar producers working with slave-labour in the West Indies. As former Commissioner-General in that latter area, he claimed to have first-hand knowledge of the situation. The West Indies, he contended, were placed at an advantage not only because labour was cheaper there, but also because transport costs were lower and the ground more fertile.

In these circumstances, Van den Bosch advocated a policy which harmonised with neither the Van der Capellen
Report on Colonisation of 1822 nor with that of 1827 in which Willem van Hogendorp had outlined a scheme for land-concession. A policy based on the granting of land to European planters would not work, Van den Bosch argued, because planters who had to hire day-labourers as Van Hogendorp suggested would be in no position to produce sugar cheaply enough to sell on the European market in competition with that of the West Indies. Neither would the mixture-as-before as advocated by Van der Capellen and his advisors suffice to solve the pressing problem of how to make Java productive of exportable produce. Instead, Van den Bosch recommended that the local cultivators of the island should be made to use part of their land for the cultivation of exportable produce. In effect, that is, he proposed to substitute the compulsory cultivation of specified crops for a system under which land rent was payable by the cultivators in rice or in cash.\(^24\) It was, as we have seen, this system -

\(^{24}\) Van den Bosch's criticism of the policy of land-concession together with his positive proposals for developing Java in a way profitable to the metropolitan country appear in his: Advice on a System of Colonisation, 6.3. 1829, printed in Steijn Parve, Monopoliestelsel 1851, Appendix p. 294-328. Especially noteworthy is his explanation of why he thought that the private planters of Java were unable to compete with the West Indies in the production of sugar, p. 297-303. On Van den Bosch's schemes, see also, H.R.C. Wright, Free Trade and Protection in The Netherlands 1816-1830, Cambridge 1955, p. 205.
known as the Cultivation System - which was eventually adopted when Van den Bosch took over from Commissioner-General du Bus as head of the Dutch government in Java early in 1830.

The historiography of the period of Dutch rule in Java between the restoration of 1816 and the introduction of the Cultivation System in 1830 has tended to polarise around the issue of land-policy and around that of the private estates and plantations in particular. The differing standpoints of Governor-General Van der Capellen and his advisors, of Willem van Hogendorp and of Van den Bosch have been the object of considerable critical attention. As may be imagined, historians of the late nineteenth century liberal school, as exemplified by Clive Day, were bitterly critical of Van der Capellen for his refusal to allow land to be sold or leased to Europeans and for the steps which he took against those estate owners and planters who had already gained a foothold in the island at the time of the commencement of his tenure of office. Van der Capellen's repurchase of several of the largest of the private estates of West Java and subsequent orders prohibiting Europeans from leasing land in the Principalities of the central parts of the island were felt to merit a great deal of hostile comment. Moreover, Day and those like him were even more
antipathetic to Van der Capellen because they took the view that in preventing the development of estates and plantations as a means of exploiting the resources of the colony, the Governor-General had paved the way for the introduction of the hated Cultivation System.

"Van der Capellen," wrote Day, "made the introduction of the system easy if not inevitable by the reactionary policy which he pursued, and he bears more responsibility than any other of the Dutch rulers of Java up to that time for the evils of the following period."  

Day's account appeared in the early years of the present century and more recent writers have found more to praise than to censure in the policy of Van der Capellen. Indeed, his chief modern apologist, J.S. Ottow, went so far as to claim that it was thanks to the enlightened policy of Van der Capellen and his advisors that the Indonesian peasantry were not transformed into a pauperised, landless labour force through the over-hasty

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25 Clive Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java*, New York 1904, p. 257. I have taken Day as being typical of the 'liberal' school of Dutch colonial historians, though he, of course, was an American. As far as his treatment of Java in the nineteenth century is concerned, he summarises and extends earlier 'liberal' Dutch criticism of the Cultivation System and of the regimes which preceded it.
implementation of a policy of granting land to European planters.\textsuperscript{26} Nor was Ottow the only twentieth century writer to attempt to show Van der Capellen's land policy in a favourable light. For Walderen Rengers, whose book, \textit{The Failure of a Liberal Colonial Policy}, appeared in 1947, it was Van der Capellen who, almost alone among his contemporaries, saw that true liberalism lay in the protection of the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{27}

However, while there is a fairly rich historiography surrounding those aspects of the history of private estates and plantations in Java in the earlier nineteenth century which are connected with high-level policy making, there has been very little attempt to examine the history of the estates of the period from the less-elevated standpoint of the crops grown, the methods evolved for the organisation of production, and the problems encountered in, for example, the realms of estate finance. The older writers, such as Day, were content to assume that it was hostile government policy which accounted for any difficulties which the landowners

\textsuperscript{26} Ottow, \textit{Oorsprong}, p. 157-8.

and planters may have encountered. "From 1819 to 1826," wrote Day, "the European planters or entrepreneurs received no encouragement whatever... the culture of sugar, of indigo and of everything that requires the application of capital for its manufacture was ruined."28 More recently, and in the absence of all but a few short studies of particular estates,29 such writers have felt it necessary to deal with the estates and plantations of the period before the Cultivation System, have

29 Examples are R. Broersma, De Pamanoeckan-en-Tjiassem Landen, Batavia 1912 and W.H. Daukes, The P&T Lands, (London) 1943. Both these books deal with the history of the vast Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate in West Java, one of the group sold by the Raffles government in 1813. Broersma, an historian who visited the estate c. 1910, appears to have compiled his general account of the estate's history without being able to consult such estate archives as then existed. As far as the early nineteenth century is concerned, his account is little more than a list of owners together with a mention of some of the crops grown. His account is mainly valuable for what he has to say about the condition of the estate in the early years of the present century. Daukes was a former managing director of Anglo-Dutch Plantations of Java Ltd., the Company which bought the estate in 1911. He appears to have had access to some surviving mid-nineteenth century account-books, but makes it clear that for the period of British ownership which ended in 1838-40 no records could be found on the estate.
had to make do with fairly general statements about the difficulties experienced by the private estate owners and planters in getting adequate funds and about the way in which private agricultural enterprises did not appear to be flourishing during the eighteen twenties. 30

In these circumstances, therefore, there is at least room for the sort of study of the estates and plantations of early nineteenth century which is attempted here. First and foremost, the object is to bring together and analyse what information there is available concerning estate and plantation agriculture in the period 1812-1834 and the financial and labour problems associated with it. Secondly, and by way of conclusion, an attempt will be made to evaluate contemporary theorising on the role to be played by private estates and plantations in the development of Java in the light of the findings of the main body of the thesis.

30 The only recent writer to deal with the private estates and plantations of Java is R. Reinsma, whose Het Verval van het Cultuurstelsel appeared in 1955. As the title suggests, Reinsma's main interest is with the period from the middle years of the nineteenth century until the eighteen seventies. He nonetheless devotes a few pages to the private estates and plantations of the pre-Cultivation System period, and points out, for example, that they were hampered in their efforts to grow crops such as sugar by a lack of capital. See p. 11-19.
At the same time, an attempt will be made to suggest how these findings illuminate the general course of Dutch land policy in the Indies in the earlier nineteenth century.

There are, however, certain major difficulties standing in the way of such a project which need to be made clear from the start. The foremost of these concerns documentation. Ideally, what is required for writing the history of the estates and plantations are the papers, letters and account books of the men who owned and ran them. Unfortunately, as far as early nineteenth century Java is concerned, only fragments of these appear to have survived. The general framework of the following account, therefore, has had to be constructed from official rather than from private sources. It has been necessary to rely to a great extent on material from the archives of the Dutch Colonial Office in The Hague, which include not only the Minutes of the Colonial Office, but also the Minutes of the Commissioners-General who ruled Java between 1816 and 1819 and the Proceedings both in and out of Council of subsequent Governors-General. In addition it is possible to draw upon the large body of archive material relating to provincial affairs in Java which is to be found in the Netherlands State Archive's so-called Private Collections. These
collections are for the most part the papers of senior Netherlands-Indies officials, and they frequently contain copies of reports - many of them dealing with local conditions - which in the normal course of events were never forwarded to The Hague by the Batavia authorities. In particular it must be doubted whether this thesis could have been written at all but for the bundles of Residents' annual reports and other quasi-statistical information to be found in the Private Collection of G.J. Chr. Schneither, one-time secretary to Governor-General Van der Capellen.

Of course, the main drawback of this Residency and central-government material is that it only allows us to see the estates and plantations from, as it were, the outside. This is not so bad as might initially appear. The Indies government did not regard the estates as autonomous units whose internal affairs were outside the purview of the colonial administration. Residents' and other government reports took note of agricultural developments which took place in the private estate and plantation sphere of the colony's economy. They listed such things as the number of sugar mills on a particular estate, the number of workpeople employed in particular branches of estate agriculture, and in some cases the arrangements made between planters or estate
owners and local cultivators for the growing of a particular crop.

Moreover, the peculiar circumstances of the 1816-1830 period created a great deal more official documentation than would otherwise have been the case. In the early years of the Dutch restoration, newly appointed provincial governors or Residents with no precedent to follow in their relations with European planters and estate owners, gave the Batavia authorities from whom they sought advice much more informative accounts of the situation in their particular areas than they might otherwise have done. In the earlier 'twenties clashes between the government and estate owners and planters had a somewhat similar effect.

Nevertheless, there is no point in pretending that source material of this kind does not create its own peculiar problems. The estates were an object of violent contemporary controversy, and some allowance has to be made for this when dealing with the documentation created by clashes between landowners or planters with the Indies government. However, as it is sometimes impossible to check one source against another, it has often been necessary simply to indicate to the reader that there are reasons for considering such and such a source to be rather suspect. However, this is not the prime
drawback of being forced to rely to a great extent upon source material of a predominantly official nature. This lies elsewhere, in the limitations thereby imposed on our insight into the way in which a particular estate or plantation was run. What would emerge from a careful study of estate and plantation records, were they available, is quite simply not to be drawn from government documents. Such problems as these, however, are best discussed when and where they arise in the course of the following account.

Finally, a word needs to be said about the choice of terminal dates for this study of the private estates and plantations of early nineteenth century Java. The dates of 1812 and 1834 were chosen less because they signify any particular events than because they make it possible to carry this study both forward into the early years of the Cultivation System and backward into the period of the British occupation. For it was this latter period which saw not only the creation of many of the largest of the private estates but also the birth of some of the problems which were to beset relations between the private landowners and planters and the Indies government for more than a decade to come. Moreover, the definitive abandonment of the Company system and the introduction of the Land Rent System during the British
period created the very situation in which the issue of the private estates and plantations came to the forefront of the debate on land policy in the Indies. As to the closing date of 1834, it allows us to take note of the position of the estates and plantations in the early years of the Cultivation System - at a time, that is, when the dominant theme of colonial land policy swung away from its earlier emphasis on agricultural enterprises run by private Europeans towards those run by the state itself.
1. PRIVATE EUROPEAN LANDHOLDING IN JAVA, 1812–1834

By far the greater part of Java in the first quarter of the nineteenth century was either claimed as government land or was still administered by its indigenous rulers in alliance with the Dutch. Such private European landholding as there was fell into three main categories. In many respects the most important and substantial of these was that of the private estates, the *particuliere landerijen* of Dutch Colonial historiography, which were found almost exclusively in the western parts of Java, more especially in the ommelanden, the hinterland of the town of Batavia. A second category of private lands was formed by the estates leased from members of the Javanese nobility in the up-country principalities of Jogjakarta (Jogja) and Surakarta (Solo). A third and final category was made up of the numerous agricultural undertakings based on village and waste ground in the government lands of coastal East Java, stretching from Tjeribon eastwards to Banjuwangi.

The West Java Estates.

The estates of West Java came into existence as the result of sales and gifts of land to private individuals by successive European governments at Batavia. Their
establishment was gradual, and took place over a period of more than one hundred and seventy years. Nevertheless, there were in this process several clearly defined stages.

The first stage was the development of the estate system up to the end of the period of East India Company Rule. Although the Company itself was wound up in 1799, its system remained effective on Java until the arrival there of Governor-General Daendals in 1808. It is this latter event which has been taken here as the terminal date of the Company era. Land sales or grants began soon after the Company established itself at Batavia in 1619, but made little progress until the peace with Bantam in 1659 removed the immediate threat to the countryside around the town. As conditions in the hinterland grew quieter, more and more land was alienated by the Company, for the most part territory which was sparsely populated and possessing little in the way of indigenous social or political organisation. Only in the mid-eighteenth century, when the lands around Buitenzorg in the foothills to the south of the hinterland were sold, did European landowners come into contact with anything resembling organised indigenous authority.

Moreover, even there the population was only sparse. In this way Batavia came to be surrounded by a network of some hundred or more small estates by the end of Company rule. According to an account dating from the last decade of the eighteenth century, some eighty to ninety of these were owned by people who bore European names, the rest by Chinese and other Asians. Many of the estates retained or adopted Indonesian names, such as Sukapura and Pondok Gede. The names of others, such as Kampong Melayu, revealed a rather different origin. Only a few names were more redolent of the metropolitan country than of the East, among them Amstelveen, Vredelust and Zorgwijk.

The extent of territory occupied by these estates was not very considerable. To the west the estates spread as far as Tenjerang, some thirteen Java miles from Batavia, and to the east some fifteen Java miles in the direction of Bekasi. In a southerly direction, the estates extended as far as Buitenzorg, some twenty miles from Batavia. Most of these estates lay, therefore, in the flat lands surrounding the town of Batavia. Only the Buitenzorg estate sold

in the mid-eighteenth century included some of the foothills to the south. This estate, however, hardly fell into the same category as the other properties. It existed in effect as the ex-officio possession of successive Governors-General until the time of Daendals. Few of these concerned themselves directly with the property. For much of the time it was rented out to the Regent of Kampong Baru, from whom it had been taken by Governor-General Imhoff in the mid-eighteenth century. Elsewhere on the island little or no land was sold to private individuals in the Company period, except in the neighbourhood of the towns of Semarang and Surabaja. Even here only one of the estates, near Surabaja, was at all extensive.

The second stage in the development of the estates was the land sales which took place between 1808-13, under the regimes of Governor-General Daendals (1808-11) and Lieutenant-Governor Raffles, appointed after the conquest of Java by the British in 1811 and in office until a few months before the

6 Questions and Answers - Surabaja Land Sales 1812, Mackenzie Coll (Private), 35, p.59.
island's return to the Dutch in August 1816. Between them Raffles and Daendals disposed of more land in the space of five years than the Company had disposed of during the whole period of its tenure. It was their land sales, rather than those of the Company, which put the private estates on the map. Daendals's most spectacular sale was of the Buitenzorg lands which he had bought on taking office in 1808. Divided into lots, this netted him personally a profit of f.900,000. This was far from being the full extent of his land sales. Between 1809 and 1811 he proceeded to sell areas of the Krawang district, on the east side of the Batavia hinterland, while on the western side of the hinterland he sold areas of what had once been parts of Bantam. In this latter area Daendals also sold the former Tanjerang Regency. Among the large estates created at this time were Jassinga, Kuripan and Tagal Waru and Sumandangan. These West Java lands were sold for the most part to Europeans. In East Java, however, Daendals sold huge tracts of land to the Chinese, including the entire Oosthoek district of Probolinggo. The evidence

7 De Haan, Priangan, 1, p.476-8.
8 H. C. Pennink, Het Reglement van 28th February, 1836 voor de Particuliere Landen, Groningen 1885, p.21-4.
also suggests that he was contemplating further sales of property in the vicinity of Surabaja. In 1810 the official J.A. van Middelkoop was arranging for the land in this area to be measured up as a preliminary to sale. Of this land, at least some was sold before Daendals's departure.¹⁰

Raffles's land sales, which took place early in 1813 quite eclipsed those of the years 1808-11. A number of small estates were sold around the towns of Semarang and Surabaja, but it was in the Krawang and Preanger districts of West Java that the most considerable sales of land occurred. Huge tracts of territory were involved. Along the coast from Batavia towards Tjeribon the districts of Pamanukan, Tjiassem, Indramaju and Kandanghauer were all sold to Europeans. Pamanukan and Tjiassem, sold as two separate lots in 1813 but later united, stretched forty two miles up country from the coast, and at its widest part was twenty four miles across.¹¹ The population was estimated at the time of sale to be in the region of 10,000.¹² As a later

and resentful Dutch Governor-General remarked, it was less an estate than a principality.\textsuperscript{13} The population of the slightly smaller districts of Indramaju and Kandanghauer was said to be in excess of 15,000.\textsuperscript{14} Large estates were also carved out of the hill districts around the present day town of Bandung, in the Preanger district to the south of Buitenzorg and the hinterland. This was the area which had been preserved both by the Company and Daendals as the centre of the government's own lucrative coffee cultivation. The sale of land there by Raffles was thus a new departure, and the estates which sprung up were destined to be an endless source of dispute in the years which followed. These estates were not on such a grand scale as those in Krawmang, but were probably rather better populated. The total population of the lands sold in this area was said to be about 20,000.\textsuperscript{15}

The sales of Daendals and Raffles, it is scarcely necessary to point out, involved the removal of territories from the power of local rulers. They also involved the

\textsuperscript{13} Ottow, Oorsprong, p. 229.
\textsuperscript{14} Bastin, Verh. T.L.V. 14, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{15} Bastin, Verh. T.L.V. 14, p. 81.
handing over to European landlords of areas where, as had probably not been the case in the hinterland, the indigenous social and power structure was already old established. Raffles's sales in the Preanger removed so much land from the control of the local authorities that it was thought best to allow the ruler concerned, the Regent of Tjiandjur to keep an estate to which he had only a dubious legal right, "in compensation for any further losses which he might sustain in the sales."16 As was remarked in 1836 by J.I.van Sevenhoven, at that time a member of the Council of the Indies, these early nineteenth century land sales brought European landowners into contact for the first time with established indigenous populations and institutions.17

The sales of the 1808-13 era which resulted in the great expansion of the land area of West Java under private European control proved to be the last of their kind, or almost so. The sale of Tjikandi Ilir and Tjikandi Udek in 1828-9 to interested parties who had long laid claim to them and occupied them was an exceptional case with a peculiar background of promises, encouragement and abortive

negotiations which went back to the last days of the British regime. The general trend of Dutch land policy after 1816 was against the sale of more lands. After some initial hesitation, the restored Dutch authorities decided to accept the land alienations of the previous British government as irrevocable if ill-considered. However, despite considerable pressure for further land sale, the Commissioners General who re-established Dutch rule in Java between 1816 and 1819 reached no firm conclusion on the matter. The Regulations of Government promulgated by them in December 1818 envisaged the drawing up of plans for more land sales, but shortly before the Commissioners returned to Holland early in 1819, it was decided to remove the land sale question from the competence of the Batavia authorities and to refer it back to the Netherlands for the King's decision. For a variety of reasons, no such decision was ever made.

In the absence of instructions from The Hague, Governor-General Van der Capellen, who had himself been one of the Commissioners, refused to sanction any more sales of land.

18 J. Faes, Geschiedenis der Tjikandi Landen, Batavia 1895, Gives an account of negotiations 1816-29 from official sources.

His policy, which was much criticised at the time, was nonetheless never reversed. The Governor-General, however, was not satisfied with the prohibition of future land sale. He set about repurchasing the lands which had already been sold. Under the Commissioners-General an exceptional case of repurchase had taken place in 1817, when the Tjabang Bungin estate of L.Z. Veekens, sold by Daendals in 1810, was bought back by the Indies government. Under Van der Capellen, however, repurchase took place on a grand scale. All the lands sold in the Preanger by Raffles in 1813 were successively bought back between 1820 and 1823. It also appears that an attempt was made by the government to buy back the Pamanukan and Tjiasssem lands about 1820-1. No attempt was ever made by subsequent Indies regimes to restore the Preanger estates to private hands. On the other hand, the policy of estate repurchase was not resumed again after 1823 until the early years of the present

20 Ottow, Oorsprong, p.73 and 77-80; P.H.v.d. Kemp, Mr.C.T. Elout als Minister van Kolonien in zijne veroordeeling van het belied der Regering van Governor-Generaal Van der Capellen, B.K.I. 1909, p.1-475.
21 Kemp, Landelijk Stelsel, p.268.
22 De Haan, Priangan, 1, Personalia, p.297-305.
century, despite the fact that during the eighteen twenties several of the great estate owners offered to sell out to the government. Among them were the proprietors of Pamanukan and Tjiasessem and of Indramaju and Kandanghauer.\textsuperscript{24}

The Changing Character of the West Java Estates in the Early Nineteenth Century.

The contrast between the estates of the Company period and those which came into existence as a result of the 1808-13 land sales was not just a matter of land area. The transformation which took place was a qualitative as well as quantitative one. In the two decades after 1813 the estates came to play a far more important role in Java's economy than had ever been the case in the eighteenth century.

The best guides to the situation on the private lands of West Java at the close of the Company period are Teissiere's account, which has already been cited, and the studies of the early twentieth century historian of the Indies, P.de Haan, especially his \textit{Oud Batavia} and \textit{Priangan}.\textsuperscript{25} De Haan, who was chief archivist at Batavia for more than thirty years, drew heavily on the Company and private records\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{25} Teissiere, \textit{V.B.G.} 6, p.1-107.
of which he had charge. The work of the late nineteenth century writer J. Faes on the subject of the early estates is, characteristicly, mainly concerned with the formal aspects of estate development, and with the legal position of the landlords vis-à-vis the Company and the peasantry.\footnote{26}

From such accounts it appears that the typical European owned estate in West Java in the late eighteenth century was a country seat for active or retired Company officials who wished to avoid the unpleasantness of Batavia. The business side of the property, such as it was, was usually looked after by Chinese. According to De Haan it was common for the owners to live on their estates only for a few weeks in August, when the town was more than usually unhealthy.\footnote{27}

Many of the estates had pig farms, rice fields and fishponds surrounding the almost invariably stone built Landhuis, the country house.\footnote{28} Some of the estates had sugar mills and markets, and some owners made quite an income from market tolls. But these were the mere trappings of an estate, and the European owner had little direct concern with them. The sugar mills were generally leased out to Chinese, as

\footnote{26}{De Haan, \textit{Oud Batavia}, Batavia 1935, and see note 5 above.}
\footnote{27}{De Haan, \textit{Oud Batavia}, p.340.}
\footnote{28}{See illustration p.52.}
LEGENDA


De tusschen haakjes ingevoegde plaatsaanduidingen dienen ter oriënteering.

WEST JAVA ESTATE 1780. From De Haan, Oud Batavia, p. 315
were the pastures. In such circumstances, many of the private lands took on a neglected and disordered aspect at the close of the eighteenth century. The profits from such establishments, moreover, were generally modest. The richer pickings of colonial society were to be had elsewhere, "The advantages which... the landowners have from their estates," wrote Teissiere in 1792, "is that with little difficulty and supervision most of them are able to draw an annual ten percent interest... on the initial capital outlay on the property. Over and above this they have the additional pleasure of being able to retire thence for a few days once or twice a year, as their occupation and the proximity of their lands allow, either for relaxation, or for recuperation, or to enable them to devote themselves to written work, or to avoid other diversions. For such purposes most of the estates are well suited, having good roads, fine stone houses, out-buildings and gardens." The Tanjong Oost estate of the senior Company official

29 Teissiere, V.B.G. 6, p.1-107; De Haan, Oud Batavia, p.340. Further descriptions of the old estates will be found in Oud Batavia p.288-348.
30 Ottow, Oorsprong, p.38-41. A discussion of contemporary allegations about the estates.
31 Teissiere, V.B.G. 6, p.9.
W.V.H. van Riemsdijk was fairly characteristic of such properties, although it was one of the largest in the hinterland. It lay some four and a half hours travelling time from Batavia, and had a large and costly landhuis. A market was held every week, and the estate revenues, according to Teissiere, came in part from rice and peanut fields, in part from the rent of fruit trees but above all from the thousand or more pigs which were pastured there.\textsuperscript{32} Van Riemsdijk, who also owned estates elsewhere in the hinterland, was a great sugar maker, "or rather, he possessed sugar mills which he leased to the Chinese," and he was noted as a landowner for the neglect which he bestowed upon his many properties.\textsuperscript{33} Teissiere's own estate at Kebong Jerok to the west of Batavia was a similar though smaller establishment, possessed of a good stone house, adorned by a grove of Mangusteen trees. According to its owner, the estate's revenues came mostly from rice and from a herd of eight hundred pigs.\textsuperscript{34}

It was in the grain and meat supplied to the tables of Batavia that the primary economic importance of the estates

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\textsuperscript{32} Teissiere, \textit{V.B.G.} 6, p.38.
\textsuperscript{33} De Haan, \textit{Priangan}, 1, Personalia, p.70-2.
\textsuperscript{34} Teissiere, \textit{V.B.G.} 6, p.57.
\end{flushleft}
lay during the Company period. Coffee, by that late eighteenth century one of the Company's most important exports to Europe, was little grown on the estates by that time. This was a question of the unsuitability of the ground and of shortage of labour rather than a result of the harmful effects of the Company's coffee monopoly. Although the hinterland had been the first area in Java where coffee had been introduced, the land was really too low for great success, and its cultivation there on a large scale was abandoned after about 1763. The question of the sugar production of the estates needs further clarification. Some at least of the sizeable sugar output of the hinterland in the eighteenth century came from mills on the European owned estates. Such mills, however, were almost invariably rented by Chinese, and the role played by the Europeans was not that of manufacturers but of money lenders to the sugar industry, as De Haan pointed out in the case of the big sugar mill owner Van Riemsdijk. It was not sugar production but usury which was their main interest, and for which purpose, in their role as Company officials, they manipulated the sugar monopoly, often, though incidently,

35 De Haan, Priangan, 1, p.130.
36 De Haan, Priangan, 1, Personalia, p.70.
to the detriment of the sugar industry itself. 37 Sugar apart, the Company relied for the produce which it exported not on the estates but on the system of forced deliveries from native cultivators beyond the hinterland. 38

There is of course no question but that estates which conformed to the late eighteenth century pattern continued to exist well into the following century, especially in the hinterland, where small size tended to preclude any very ambitious agricultural undertaking. On the larger estates of Buitenzorg, Krawang and the Preanger, however, as well as on some of the hinterland properties, a new and more commercial approach to estate ownership and exploitation became discernable around the time of the restoration of Java to the Dutch in 1816. A new style of landownership began to emerge, as contemporaries were quick to note. The Resident of Buitenzorg reported in 1823 that the landowners in his province were men of a quite different stamp than had been the case some years earlier. In the stead of government officials whose duties prevented them from exercising a close supervision of their estates had come a new breed of owners for whom the revenues of their estates formed the greatest part and in some cases the sum total of their

37 De Haan, Oud Batavia p.325; Van Klaveren, Colonial System, p.75.
38 J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India, Cambridge 1939, p.37.
incomes, and who administered their lands in person. 39

The estates took on a quite different character than that which they had previously possessed. They were "no longer bought by rich people ... so that they might have a reasonable rate of return on their money," wrote J.I. van Sevenhoven, member of the Council of the Indies, in 1836, " ... most of those who buy lands ... at present do so with the hope of deriving great benefit from them, and even of making their fortunes thereby." 40

The estates as they existed in the period of which Van Sevenhoven and the Resident of Buitenzorg were writing are described in some detail in the chapters which follow. It is only necessary here to point the contrast between the situation in the eighteen twenties and that which had prevailed some thirty years before. This transformation in the character of private European landownership was not, however, limited solely to the private lands of West Java.

40 Nota J.I. van Sevenhoven 15.2.1836 in Kemp, Wordingsgeschiedenis, p. 88.
European Estates in the Principalities.

The growth of private European landownership in West Java took place under the auspices of the Indies Government. In the Principalities of central Java, however, an equally striking increase in European landholding occurred between 1816-22, of which the Batavia authorities knew little until it had been accomplished. The Principalities, though shorn of the westerly province of Kadu in 1812, were still far more extensive at the time of the Dutch restoration in 1816 than was the case some fifteen years later after the large scale cession of their territory which followed the Java war of 1825-30. The prewar borders stretched from the vicinity of the town of Salatiga in the north as far east as the Dutch provinces of Pasuruan and Surabaja and as far west as the Tjeribon and Preanger Residencies. Although European influence and power had gradually established itself in the area so that by the later eighteenth century there were Dutch Residents and Garrisons at the two princely courts of Solo and Jogja, there was in the restoration period no European administrative machine such as existed in the provinces

directly controlled by the Dutch. Needless to say, the Land Rent system had not been introduced in the Principalities. The land was entirely in the hands of the Javanese Princes and nobility who, during the course of the eighteenth century if not earlier, formed the habit of leasing some of their lands to Chinese farmers. By the close of the century some Europeans, including the Dutch Residents, participated in this system.\(^4\) It is of some importance, in view of later developments, to ascertain the number and character of these early European land holders. Those lease or Piagem books which are available indicate that landleases to Europeans were relatively few, and that the sort of people involved were mostly retired Company soldiers or officials.\(^5\) Some of them may also have been the European moneylenders who were present at the Courts in the eighteenth century.\(^6\) They do not appear to have formed an important element in the situation in the Principalities even as late as 1812. When John Crawford, the British Resident, reported to Raffles in that year on the newly subjugated Jogja, he made no reference to European landholding in his agricultural survey which is

\(^4\) Rouffaer, Encyclopaedie, 4, p.627.
\(^5\) Piagem Books of late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Leiden MSS 616, 1, No. 5-6.
\(^6\) Van Klaveren, Colonial System, p.98.
presumably a reflection on its insignificance at that time.  

Insignificant, however, was not an adjective applicable to European landlease in the area in the years immediately after the return of Java to the Dutch in August 1816. The new Dutch Resident at Jogja, Colonel Nahuijs, believed that the future economic development of Java depended on the settlement in the interior of Europeans possessed of capital and of entrepreneurial spirit. He also saw a chance to make his own fortune. With his encouragement a great many more lands than ever before were leased to Europeans by the Javanese nobility. By 1822 there were more than two hundred such estates scattered throughout the Principalities, more of them in the Solo than in the Jogja lands. It was in Solo that Nahuijs took over in 1819 following the suspension of Resident Van Prehn for corruption. From then until the arrival of Resident De Salis at Solo in 1822, Nahuijs remained the sole senior Dutch official in the Principalities. He was not over-scrupulous in the use he made of his position to foster the growth of landlease. Rouffaer

45 Report Sultan's Country by Mr. Crawfurd 1812, Mackenzie Coll (private), 21, p.61-151.
points out that it was Nahuijs who was responsible for putting land lease on a more regular legal footing at the courts of Sultan and Susuhunan. Moreover, the Resident made no secret of the help which he gave to particular European planters so that they might be able to develop estates. Even the sympathetic Willem van Hogendorp, compiler of the Colonial Report of 1827, concluded that it was the hand of the Resident that lay behind the great increase in the number of lands leased-out after 1816.

A hint of the degree to which Nahuijs was instrumental in this can be seen from a letter of his about a projected lease of land to the French born A. Nogues in 1821. "The matter of the estate for Mons. Nogues," he wrote, "cannot be taken up before my return to Solo..." Moreover, not only did Nahuijs help others to estates, but he himself had a stake – probably the controlling interest – in a group of estates in Jogja which he leased in conjunction with J.D. Boudet and P.S.R. d'Infraville. Of this connection there is little trace to be found in Nahuijs's own

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49 Rouffaer, Encyclopaedie, 4, p.627-8.
50 Nahuijs to Willem I, undated c.1828, Van den Bosch Coll 353.
51 D.C. Steijn Parve, Het Koloniale Monopoliestelsel gevest aan Geschiedenis en Staathuishoudkunde, Zalt-Bommel 1851, Appendix p.78.
papers, which were edited for posterity by him preparatory to being handed over into public keeping after his death. In the surviving papers of J.D. Boudet, however, there is ample evidence of Nahuijs's involvement.\(^5\) This involvement not only lowered his standing with the hostile Batavia authorities, but also poses some problems for the historian of the period. It means that Nahuijs's many contributions to the bitter debate about the landlease system have to be treated with particular care. His pocket and his principles were at stake. Some of his factual statements about the leases do not stand up well to examination, as will be indicated below.

As for the lease system itself, the most readily accessible evidence is the lists of leaseholders and lease conditions printed by Louw in the first volume of his work on the Java war of 1825-30, written at the close of the last century.\(^5\) Louw's lists, which are in turn based on data sent from Solo and Jogja to Batavia in the early eighteen twenties, unfortunately give a rather misleading impression about the true nature of the leases which they record. The lists, divided under various heads such as 'duration of lease' and 'amount of rent', imply a certain regularity which is quite absent from the lease contracts from which

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\(^5\) See List of MSS.

the lists were presumably drawn up, and of which some copies were sent to the Governor-General by Nahuijs's successor at Solo, Resident De Salis, in June 1822. What does not emerge from a reading of the lists, but is made clear by the copies of contracts sent to Batavia by De Salis, is that many of the leases were granted by way of payment of debt. There are several statements by contemporaries, both officials and planters, to the effect that the Javanese nobility was sinking into penury in the second decade of the nineteenth century. William Cotes, planter at Solo in the early twenties, wrote of the "native princes and landlords, who have already individually but little left to support their rank and families," and concluded that it was the poverty of the aristocracy which was forcing them to lease lands to Europeans and others. Europeans were preferred, he added, because they were prepared to pay more than the Chinese. There are frequent references to the prevailing poverty of the nobility of the Principalities in the report submitted by the Special Commissioner in the Principalities, W.H. van Isseldijk in 1816. A decade later comments of a similar nature occurred in a report to

56 Note Cotes on Landlease in the Principalities, undated c.1821, Van Hogendorp Coll 189.
the Batavia Government submitted by the acting Resident of Jogja, J.I.van Sevenhoven. Van Isseldijk, in particular, knew what he was talking about and was in a position to make a knowledgeable comparison. He had been Dutch Resident at Jogja from 1786 to 1799. He saw the cause of this distress in the cession to the British of the fertile province of Kadur in 1812. Others were inclined to assign responsibility to the growing taste for luxury goods amongst the nobility, tastes which they were unable to satisfy out of their usual incomes. So that they could have money to buy such goods, reported the official G.F. Meylan in July 1825, the nobility "readily take to the idea of leasing villages or districts to the Europeans or to the Chinese..." In these circumstances, debt was easily entered into, and was, as his chief advisor Van de Graaff informed the Governor General in 1823, one of the main reasons why leases were granted by the nobility.

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58 Rouffaer, Encyclopaedie, 4, p.601.
60 Note G.F.Meylan 15.7.1825, Schneither Coll 109.
61 Van de Graaff to Van der Capellen, 21.4.1823, Verbaal Min. v.Kol. 17.11.1826 no.56. Min.v.Kol. 531; of course, the treatment here has no pretentions to completeness. There is as yet no thoroughly researched analysis of the situation in the Principalities in the decades immediately prior to the war of 1825. Louw's analysis imposes an essentially western
One year previously De Salis informed his superiors that the leasing of villages by way of settlement of debt was very common in the Principalities, and at the same time implied that such a practice was scarcely a novel one. The 1818 lease between Ingeby Wiroprodjo and the Solo resident S.K. Coenraad was fairly typical of such arrangements. According to De Salis' copy, it read as follows:

"...I, Kiay Ingeby Wiroprodjo place this contract in the hands of the Heer Sebastiaan Karel Coenraad, as proof that I recognise my debt to him of the sum of 450 Spanish dollars, such having occurred with the fore-knowledge of the Resident. Seeing that I am in no position to make a lump sum repayment of my debt, I make over by this my village called Nyladjer, four djoonks in extent, each producing annually 100 Spanish matten [dollars] and 28 dubbeltjes, which rent [pachtgelden] shall serve to the reduction of my debt, and that for the time of 8½ years.

I hand over by this the aforementioned village and its revenues to the Heer Coenraad, who within the stipulated period can do as he desires with the same, and after the expiry of which period the aforementioned village must be returned to me.

pattern of explanation. There appears to be considerable evidence of growing poverty at the Courts of Jogja and Solo. It remains an open question, however, if this was the result, in one way or another, of contact with Europeans, or if the causes were inherent in Javanese society.
Written on Monday the 19th Redjep of the year wawoe 1745 or 27th August 1818."

The debt settlement character of this lease is not indicated in the lists printed by Louw, nor is the similar character of several other leases of which copies were sent to Batavia by De Salis. The lease agreement between Radeen Maas Rio Jayanningrat and the Solo resident Jan Jacobs differs somewhat from that of Coenraad, but it appears to mean the same thing. Several villages were leased to Jacobs in return for a lump sum prepayment of the rent for the ten years for which the lease was to run, a sum amounting to 2640 Spanish dollars. Although prepayment of one year's rent was standard practice in the Principalities among the Javanese themselves, the contract cited here appears to be a concealed form of debt settlement. Some lands were leased not to pay off debt, but merely to pay the interest accruing on the capital. De Salis, whose hostility to the land lease system was well known, alleged that such leases were common, and cited those between Dipo Kerti and J.A. Dezentje which dated from 1817. Not all contracts involved a cash obligation. The lease granted to J.F. van Stralendorf by the Susuhunan of Solo in 1821 stipulated that in return for the

63 Roffaer, Encyclopaedie, 4,p.630.
use of twenty two villages, Van Stralendorf should supply a specified amount of rice annually.  These are examples of what appears to have been happening in the Principalities in the decade after 1816. The situation is clearly one on which the last word has not been said. Together with this great increase in the extent of European landlease went a transformation of the character of such ventures. The retired soldiers and officials were still there, but so too were a dozen or more Europeans of quite a different stamp, men in the prime of life, many of them recent arrivals on the island, and quite plainly not in the Principalities so that they could make their pensions spin out further. Like the estates of West Java, the Solo and Jogja leased lands became commercialised, and took on a quite different character from that which they had possessed in the Company period. This was not just a question of the influx of a new type of European, but of a revised attitude towards the agricultural exploitation of the leased lands. The majority of the estates leased by Europeans were made up of wet rice fields, but some at least of the newcomers were not content to rely on their rice rents. Instead they

64 See note 62 above.
65 See Ch. 2. p. 126-33 and 146-50.
aimed to make their fortunes as coffee planters, and between about 1818 and 1822 laid out extensive coffee gardens on their lands. It is of course true that coffee had been cultivated in the Principalities in the Company period, but never on a large scale and it appears to have either declined or stopped altogether after 1793. In the early 1820's the talk was of an expected production of some 200,000 pikuls annually, as opposed to the 20,000 pikuls allowed for by the Company in 1790. It was not unjustly that Van de Graaff reported in 1822 that not only had there been a manyfold increase in the number of lands leased to Europeans, but that such enterprises had "taken on an appearance which they had not possessed before."

The full extent of the leaseland situation as it had developed by the time that De Graaff was writing is difficult to estimate. Once again the main source of information is the lists printed by Louw, to which reference has already been made. Once again, supplementary sources show

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66 See Ch.3. p. 162-5.
67 De Haan, Priangan, 1, p.135-6.
68 See Ch.3. p. 162-5.
70 Louw, Oorlog, 1, p.604-14.
that these lists cannot be taken as a satisfactory guide to the situation. The lists printed by Louw, together with those forwarded by De Salis to Batavia in June 1822, show that there were some three hundred and twenty four different lands leased in the Principalities, one third of them to Chinese, the remaining two thirds to people who were either European by birth or by descent. These two hundred and fifteen leaselands were held by seventy-one individuals, who were named in the lists. However, this is not a complete reckoning of the number of Europeans involved, nor is it an accurate one. According to the lists, for example, the French born planter Medard Louis leased the Melambong estate in Solo from Pangeran Buminotto in 1820. What the lists do not show, however, is that two years later the estate was in the hands of a syndicate which may have included Louis, and which certainly included the Batavia merchant Gillian Maclaine, his firm, Maclaine and Company, and another Batavia house, MacQuoid Davidson and Company. Gillian Maclaine did not arrive in Java until the end of July 1820, and not at Semarang, the port of disembarkation for the Principalities, until January of the

71 De Salis to Van der Capellen, 30.6.1822 and appendices, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 17.11.1826 no.56 Min.v.Kol. 531.
72 Louw, Corlog, 1, p.613.
following year. This, together with a letter of late 1821 in which Maclaine speaks of "alterations in my plans since I arrived in Java," and of his being "now situated in the interior of the island planting coffee," tends to support Campbell's statement that Maclaine bought Melambong from Louis in 1821.74

How widespread this practice of buying leases from third parties was is difficult to say. Another case involving the transfer of a lease to other persons not named in the lists was cited by Resident De Salis in 1822. According to him, the records revealed that Nahuijs had leased the Sempu lands in Jogja in February 1820, that the lease had been transferred to P.S.R.d'Infraville in December of that year, and a share in it further transferred to J.D.Boudet in May 1821.75 On the evidence of the lists alone, D'Infraville was the only person connected with Sempu.76 This is a small point, but not entirely unimportant, if only for the light it throws on the otherwise obscure subject of how the leases between Javanese noblemen and European planters came to be made. This case appears

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74 B.O. 5.8.1820 no.32 and 27.1.1821 no.4; Gillian Maclaine to Mrs Gregerson, 12.9.1821, Ardtornish Papers; Campbell, Java, 1, p.648.
75 See note 71 above.
76 Louw, Oorlog, 1, p.611.
to be an example of Nahuijs using his influence at the Courts to secure a lease which he subsequently transferred to his friends.

The shortcomings of the lists are not limited to the registration of leaseholders. They do not pretend to give any indication as to the population of the leased lands, but nevertheless do purport to show how much land was held in lease by each planter. This varied in 'extent' from one quarter to ninety six jungs (Djoengs). The great majority of the estates consisted of between one and thirteen jungs.77 The difficulty is that the use of the term jung conveys little in the western sense of land measurement when applied to the Principalities in the early nineteenth century. According to Nahuijs, the term was understood in the Principalities to mean less a measurement of land in terms of area than in terms of productive capacity, this depended less on the amount of land involved than on its fertility and the number of people available to cultivate it. Moreover, still according to Nahuijs, a jung tended to be a larger unit at Jogja than at Solo.78 None of Nahuijs' contemporaries contradicted him on this point. Of recent authorities, Rouffaer does indeed provide a conversion of jungs into western terms of measurement. In

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77 Louw, Oorlog, 1, p.604-14.
78 Nahuijs to Van der Graaff, 10.5.1821, Schneither Coll 109.
the context of landlease in the Principalities in the eighteen seventies, however, he remarks that the amount of land involved expressed in jungs says little certain about the actual land area concerned. It appears therefore that it is not enough to know the jung measurement of an estates to assess even its potential importance. Indeed, this sort of measurement can be downright misleading. Maclaine's Melambong estate at Solo has already been refered to. According to the lists in Louw it was one jung in extent, a presumptive indication that it was one of the lesser estates. In fact, whatever its land area may have been, it was one of the most heavily planted coffee estates in the Principalities, with an estimated 422,201 coffee trees in 1824-5. A better estimate of an estate's importance might well be provided by coffee planting and production figures. These unfortunately are only fragmentary. An assessment of them will be made in a later chapter. It is enough here to establish how slight is our knowledge of the landlease situation in the Principalities in the early nineteenth century. It seems that in this respect, however, we are little worse off than were the contempory Dutch authorities.

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79 Rouffaer, Encyclopaedie, 4, p.617 and 632.
80 Report Commission for winding up leases, 20.5.1825 appendix 0, Schneither Coll 109; Louw, Oorlog, 1, p.613.
81 See Ch. 2 p. 146-50 and Ch.4 p. 162-5.
Nahuijs himself admitted that there was no map of the estates, and that he had never surveyed them. Although Nahuijs had every reason to try and fog the issue, his successor, the anti-estate De Salis was able to offer his superiors at Batavia no greater enlightenment, being forced to admit that the Resident's Office had but a scanty knowledge of the areas involved. This ignorance extended to fairly simple matters of how the land lay. When the planter J.A.Dezentje applied for permission to lease the Gagatan territory in 1827, nobody in the administration knew even the true extent of the land involved, nor the size of its population, a circumstance of which, it was suspected, Dezentje was not above taking full advantage. Nahuijs certainly did just that. His statement that most of the estates lay in the neighbourhood of the Resident's house was, to say the least, equivocal. Dezentje's Ampel estate lay twenty Java miles across country from Jogja, astride the main road between the Principalities and the coastal town of Semarang. The Simo and Wallen estate

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83 De Salis to Van der Capellen, 6.3.1823, *Schneither Coll* 108.


85 Nahuijs to De Graaff, 10.5.1821, *Schneither Coll* 109.
leased by the planter W (?) Blekman lay fifteen Java miles across country from Solo.\(^6\) Indeed, there can be little doubt that it was precisely the uncharted nature of the hill country around Solo and Jogja, together with the distance from hostile Dutch officialdom, which constituted one of the chief attractions of the area for European planters. If, however, they hoped by settling there to avoid for good the attention of the Batavia administration, they were sadly disappointed.

It was not until 1821 that the Indies government began to take a serious interest in what was happening in the Principalities. Up till then the planters were left alone, possibly because the government was aware of their existence only imperfectly. Governor-General Van der Capellen visited the Principalities in 1817 and again in 1819. On the first of these occasions he saw the Beddio estate leased by Nahuijs himself, and at the time of his second visit, as he later informed the Colonial Ministry in The Hague, the leasing of land to Europeans which had then taken place was limited to that necessary for setting up an indigo factory and to that used for the cultivation of other crops which deserved to be encouraged.\(^7\) How much truth there is in Van

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\(^6\) Carnbee, Atlas.

\(^7\) Van der Capellen to Falck, 4.6.1823, in Steijn Parve, Monopoliebestelset 1851, Appendix p.155.
der Gapellen's version of events is difficult to estimate. The planters and their supporters alleged that the government knew a good deal more about what was going on than they later cared to admit, and that their 'ignorance' was merely a pretext for a radical shift of policy. Nahuijs pointed out that the government had provided the money for a lease to be taken out on behalf of the Dutch political exile Bouwens van der Boijn, an allegation which is substantiated in other accounts. Nahuijs also asserted that Van der Capellen had seen coffee as well as indigo estates in the Principalities in 1819, and the planter J.D. Boudet claimed that the Governor-General had wished him all success in his plantation venture in 1818.

Whatever had been its earlier attitude, the Indies Government determined in mid-1821 to obtain a full account of the extent to which European landholding had spread in the Solo and Jogja areas. There followed an exchange of letters between Resident Nahuijs, Van der Capellen and his chief advisor Van de Graaff, in which the former did his utmost to defend the planters, while the Governor-General

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89 Nahuijs to Schimmel-Pennink, 9.2.1831, Van den Bosch Coll 353.

90 Boudet to Willem I, undated c. 1825, Min. v. Kol. 3195 item 184.
and Van de Graaff pressed him for more details.\footnote{Nahuijs, Verzameling, 1, p.282-324.} At the close of 1821 the Indies government gave orders that no more land should be leased by Europeans for the time being.\footnote{Louw, Oorlog, 1, p.50-1.} In March 1822 Van de Graaff submitted a long and hostile report on the leasing of land by Europeans in the Principalities;\footnote{Report De Graaff 23.3.1822, Tijd N.I. 41, 1890.} which was followed in June of the same year by an equally unfavourable account from the newly installed Resident of Solo, De Salis.\footnote{De Salis to Van der Capellen, 30.6.1822. Shortened and without appendices in Louw, Oorlog, 1, p.59-69. In full with appendices, see note 55 above.} In November Nahuijs left Jogja and some months later departed for the Netherlands. Early in the following year the government decided that all leases, other than short term ones made before 1821, should be declared null and void, and that the lands concerned should be returned to their original holders.\footnote{G.G. buiten Rade 14.1.1823 (Extract), Schneither Coll 109.} This decision, kept secret for nearly five months, was finally made public on 6th May 1823.\footnote{G.G. in 'Rade 27.1.1824 no.29 Min.v.Kol. 2781.}
The system of European landlease was not destroyed entirely by the Decree of 6th May. Although, as was intended, most of the big coffee planters were driven out of the Principalities, many of the less substantial lease holders remained. Even some of the most prominent planters contrived to remain in charge of their estates, by the expedient of getting themselves appointed administrators of their former plantations when these were taken over for a time by the government. The great landleases J.A. Dezentje and William Stavers, who held estates at Ampel and at Singosari, both came into this category. It is a matter of speculation whether their actual position on the estates was much altered by this change of role. As to the other planters whose leases were terminated in 1823, the Decree of 20th May of that year put considerable obstacles in the way of their continued residence in the Jogja and Solo areas. Whether they lost contact entirely with their former plantations, however, is a question which it would be possible to answer only if more planter's papers were available. A number of them lived at Salatiga, on the northern fringe of the Principalities, and contact with the

97 G.G. in Rade 27.1.1824 no.29 Min.v.Kol. 2781.
99 See Ch. 2 p. 102.
Solo and Jogja lands cannot have been difficult from such a base. Many of the substantial coffee planters either were themselves merchants, or had merchant connections, and doubtless the coffee trees continued to grow even though the planters had gone. In these circumstances it would be rash to conclude without better evidence that no illicit connections were maintained. The Decree of 6th May was anyway withdrawn in 1827 under Van der Capellen's successor, Commissioner-General Du Bus, and between then and 1839 the leasing of land in the Principalities was again allowed.

Nevertheless, a severe blow had been struck in 1823 against the system of European landlease from which, despite the reversal of policy four years later, the system took many years to recover. Some of the substantial planters were undoubtedly ruined, among them William Gotes, who had leased lands in Solo at Kadisono and Kabattan, and had had a share in two other estates, Ampel and Melambong. On the strength of these he had entered into extensive commitments with merchants in Batavia and Bengal, which the termination of the leases left him unable to meet. He went

100 Staatsblad 17.5.1827 no.53.
mad and died at Buitenzorg in October 1826. Other planters left Java, including Harvey Thompson, J.D. Boudet, and C.E. Hoff. Although the first two returned, only Boudet settled again in the Principalities, and then only for a short time. The Java war too took its toll on estates and planters alike. The planter F.A. Brandt died in a skirmish with the rebels in 1825, though outside Semarang, and not in the Principalities themselves. Some of the plantations escaped damage in the war. J.A. Dezentje's Ampel was still flourishing at the end of 1827. Many of the other estates appear to have suffered, however, although the evidence for this is not always too reliable coming as it does from the planters themselves. Maclaine's partner at Melambong, M.J. Louis, wrote that the property had been damaged and neglected by the time that they regained possession of it in 1826. The likelihood is that the damage was not substantial.

104 B.G. 24.7.1824 no.30.
105 B.G. 4.9.1824 no.36.
107 Campbell, Java, 1, p.438.
109 M.J.Louis to Willem I, 12.4.1826, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 17.11.1826 no.56 Min.v.Kol. 531.
According to Willem van Hogendorp, William Stavers' plantations were laid waste and his house burnt down in 1826, and by the following year Nahuijs's Kalitan estate was in ruins. Nahuijs, together with his business partner J.D. Boudet, suffered losses elsewhere. Their Sempu estates were said to have been burnt and the coffee trees destroyed in the early stages of the war. Moreover, some estate staff were killed. Boudet's overseer Alexander was reported murdered by the rebels in 1825. In some other cases, plantation workpeople were dispersed by the rebels. The Java war was not the only disadvantage which faced potential planters after leases were allowed afresh in 1827. The high prices paid for coffee in the years immediately after the European peace of 1814 fell sharply in the 'twenties, and one of the greatest stimuli of European agricultural speculations in the interior of Java vanished.

111 Van Hogendorp, W.v.H., p.177.
112 MacQuoid Davidson and Company to Boudet, 1.10.1825, Inst. T.L.V. H788.
113 Bosquet and Merkus to Van den Bosch, 29.4.1831, Van den Bosch Coll 353.
114 See Ch. 3, p. 160.
In these circumstances some planters refused to accept reinstatement, even with an extended lease as an appropriate compensation for their losses. Instead, like Boudet and Nahuijs, they continued to press for payment of cash compensation. On the other hand, many planters did return in or after 1827, among them P.H. de la Brethonierre, J.F. van Stralendorf, J.G. Doppert, J.A. Wener, F.H. van Vlissingen, and E.H. Kuhlo. There are no complete lists available of Europeans who leased lands at Jogja and Solo in the late twenties. As far as it is possible to ascertain from those records which are available, however, no newcomers established themselves there in the period up to the arrival of Van den Bosch in 1830. All the people listed above had been in the Principalities in 1823 or before.

115 Boudet's Petition undated c.1828, Min.v.Kol. Verbaal 5.5.1829 no.92 Min.v.Kol. 673; Elout to Van den Bosch, 30.4.1829, Van den Bosch Coll 353.
The European Planters in East Java.

In the coastal regions from Tjeribon eastwards to the most easterly tip of the island, the Oosthoek, the only European estates in the 1812–34 period were to be found in the vicinity of the main towns of Semarang and Surabaja. They were neither large nor numerous, and with the exception of the Semarang estate of the Armenian merchant Joseph Johannes, they were of little agricultural importance. The remainder of the area was government land, and as such was brought under the workings of the Land Rent System after 1813. This did not mean, however, that there were no European planters in the area. On the contrary, between the beginning of the nineteenth century and the arrival of Governor-General Van den Bosch in 1830, European planters established themselves in the area in increasing numbers, for the most part as growers and manufacturers of sugar and indigo. As they were not themselves landowners, it was necessary for them to arrange for the crops which they required to be grown on the fields of the government-land villages which were adjacent to their factories.

117 See Ch. 3. p. 201.
118 See Ch. 3. p. 201-6 and 222-6.
Arrangements of this nature had a long history. Under Company rule it had been customary for the Chinese sugar makers to take over a group of villages and their land for the use of their mills, in return for a lump payment to the authorities. The system remained unaltered until the time of Daendals, and although in 1808 he forbade village lease in general, the leasing of villages to sugar makers was excluded from this prohibition. In theory at least the system was disrupted under the British regime, for the basis of the Land Rent System then introduced was that the land should be rented to the local people themselves, and not handed out en bloc to other interested parties. In several places in his statements on land policy Raffles demonstrated his hostility to the principle of renting land to the Chinese, and when dealing with the introduction of his System in Pekalongan Residency cited with approval the action of the resident in taking away from the Chinese land which they had previously controlled. There are also

120 D. J. P. Oranje, Het Belied der Commissie Generaal, Utrecht 1936 p.84.
indications that in Japara province the old arrangements under which villages were handed over to the sugar makers were upset during the British period. In 1817 the Japara Chinese complained to the restored Dutch authorities that under the British the villages which they had formerly hired had been let instead to the Javanese, by which they meant, presumably, that the villages had been brought under the Land Rent System. According to Raffles, the land in Japara was rented to the village headmen in 1814. Subsequent events in Japara will be discussed below. The British appear in practice however to have taken no firm line on the question of the hiring of villages. In the early months of 1816 Raffles authorised the lease of some land in Banjuwangi to the government official John Hunt, an arrangement which came into force in May of that year and subsequently involved Hunt in a clash with the Dutch. The land included rice fields and, presumably, villages, though there is some doubt whether this important point was brought to the notice of the British authorities in distant Batavia. The indigo planter Charles Dupont also claimed

123 Raffles, Substance, p.40.
to have hired land from the British authorities, in this case in the Pekalongan Residency.\textsuperscript{125}

In the course of 1816-7 the Dutch Commissioners-General received many requests from the Chinese sugar makers of Kadu, Japara and Tagal, asking that the 'old arrangements' might be restored. The sugar makers wanted to be allowed to hire villages again for the use of their mills. These requests were either rejected outright, or a decision on them postponed.\textsuperscript{126} There followed in 1818-9 a general prohibition of village hire, either by Chinese or by Europeans, contained in the Government Regulations promulgated by the Commissioners in December of that year.\textsuperscript{127} This did not mean that entrepreneurs were totally prohibited from using village land to grow their crops of cane and plant, but it did mean that they could only do so in conformity with certain regulations laid down by the Batavia authorities. These stipulated that fields and labour could only be hired by contract with the individual cultivators concerned, and not by contract made with the village headmen or other indigenous authorities. Such contracts, moreover,

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  \item[125] Verbaal C.G. 1.11.1816 no.26 \textit{Min.v.Kol.} 2366.
  \item[126] Verbaal C.G. 12.12.1817 no.32 and 27.11.1817 no.46 and 29.10.1817 no.8 \textit{Min.v.Kol.} 2370; Verbaal C.G. 16.8.1817 no.8 and 1.10.1817 no.61 \textit{Min.v.Kol.} 2369.
  \item[127] Oranje, \textit{Belied}, p.278.
\end{itemize}
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were only valid when approved by the Dutch Resident of the province in which they were made, and they could only be drawn up, to cover one growing season, and not for an indefinite period of years. This meant for instance that indigo makers could only contract for supplies of plant on an annual basis, which, as the Resident of Pekalongan observed in 1821, left the manufacturers entirely at the mercy of the whims of the local cultivators. The effect, he feared, would be the utter ruin of the indigo industry of East Java.\footnote{Kemp, Landelijk Stelsel, p.293-4; Staatsblad 5.1.1819 no.10; Statistics of Pekalongan 1821 Lett. F. no.1. Schneither Coll 90.} Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the regulations varied considerably from province to province. In Japara Residency it appears that they were circumvented until the arrival of Resident Van Haak in 1823. Although in 1817 the Batavia government had refused to hire villages to the Japara Chinese, it was alleged by Van Haak that what had subsequently occurred was that the villages wanted by the Chinese sugar makers had indeed been included in the paper assessment of the land rent. In flat contradiction of the spirit of the Land Rent System, however, the villages concerned had then been handed over to the mill owners in return for a fixed cash payment. The sugar makers, that is, had paid the land rent \textit{en bloc} for the villages which
they required.\textsuperscript{129} A more detailed survey of the practical effectiveness of the regulations against village hire, especially in so far as they concerned the provision of labour, will be found in a later chapter.\textsuperscript{130} It suffices to note here that although there may have been sporadic attempts to enforce them in the early twenties, the regulations dealing with the individual nature of the contracts were effectively side-stepped by the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{131}

The number of European planters operating on village land in East Java in our period was never large. Most of them were to be found in either the province of Pekalongan, mid-way between Tjeribon and Semarang, or in the Oosthoek areas of Pasuruan, Probolinggo and Besuki, to the east of Surabaja. These were, respectively, the main indigo and sugar manufacturing areas of East Java. Their activities were frequently of a more ephemeral nature than were those of their West Java contemporaries, and their numbers varied a good deal from year to year. In 1829 there were in Pekalongan not more than half a dozen European indigo makers, and in the Oosthoek scarcely more than that number of sugar manufacturers. In the whole of East Java there were far

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{129} Annual General Report Japra 1823 p.75-6, Schneither Coll 93.
\textsuperscript{130} See Ch.4. p. 310-15.
\textsuperscript{131} See Ch.4. p. 304 and 317-18. See also Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 17.
\end{flushleft}
more Chinese than European sugar makers.\textsuperscript{132}

During the regime of Commissioner-General Du Bus (1826–9), however, the use of village land ceased to be the only recourse open to entrepreneurs in search of somewhere to grow cane or plant. From 1827 until 1840 the government made uncultivated land available to planters on long leases. The terms on which this lease-land was given out varied considerably, but a common feature was the exclusion from the grant of all villages or village land. Some leases made provision for a periodically increasing rent over a twenty-five year period. This seems to have been the maximum length for which leases were to run. In some leases it was also stipulated that the planter was obliged to have the ground cleared and brought under cultivation within a specified time.\textsuperscript{133} The amount of rent paid varied. In some cases it was fixed at ten percent of the revenues,\textsuperscript{134} but in others it was rather more complicated. The Surabaja land-lease planter C.F. Bohl, who took over a lease first negotiated by M. von Franquemont in 1829, paid a rent amounting to two fifths of the produce of the sawah and one third of the produce of the dry rice fields.\textsuperscript{135} The lease

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[132] See Ch. 3, p. 183.
\item[133] Landlease contract J.A. Faissier 7.3.1829, Verbaal Min.v. Kol. 20.8.1829 no. 78 Min.v. Kol. 696.
\item[134] Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p. 127.
\item[135] Assistant Resident Modjokerto to Resident of Surabaja, 31.1.1845, Inst. T.L.V. H. 713 item LC.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
granted to J. Watson of waste ground in the Pasuruan district in 1829 stipulated that coffee should be grown there, and that two fifths of the harvest should be delivered to the government as rent.\textsuperscript{136} The Dutch authorities were anxious that vast estates should not be created in this manner. In 1828 the East Java sugar maker Charles Etty was refused a grant of uncultivated land, because the area he wanted was considered to be too large.\textsuperscript{137} Some of those who obtained grants of uncultivated land were sugar or indigo manufacturers already established in the area, such as the indigo maker Louis Petel, who was allowed a twenty-five year landlease in Pekalongan in 1827. The terms of the grant in this case, incidently, were that no rent should be paid for the first five years, and that for the subsequent five years a rent of one tenth of the produce should be paid. The rent for the remaining fifteen years was to be settled by further negotiation.\textsuperscript{138}

The Du Bus government used its existing powers to promote land-lease, but issued no special \textit{staatsblad} to formalize the system. Each applicant was considered

\textsuperscript{136} G.G. in Rade 14.4.1829 no.47 Min.v.Kol. 2824.
\textsuperscript{137} G.G. in Rade 10.7.1829 no.27 Min.v.Kol. 2827; G.G. in Rade 7.8.1829 no.28 Min.v.Kol 2828.
separately by the Council at Batavia. The theoretical basis of the system was set out, however, in the Du Bus Report of 1827, the major policy document issued by the regime. The idea was that European planters would lease uncultivated ground and, working with labour hired in neighbouring villages, use it for the cultivation of export crops. There is some evidence to suggest that things did not quite work out that way. "In general there are few people to be found in the vicinity of waste ground," the Resident of Pekalongan reported to Van den Bosch in 1830, and added that it was difficult to find workpeople who would agree to work such land. This being so, planters preferred to use village land. One planter who had taken a lease on waste ground in Pekalongan, Houtman, had only been able to hire one hundred workpeople, and these only for one year and in return for one kati each of rice and salt a day. The planter also had to make a cash payment to free the people who worked for him from government services, and pay them in addition two and a half guilders a month.

Elsewhere, however, the Europeans who obtained a land-lease were able to induce cultivators to settle on their

140 Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830 p.3, Van den Bosch Coll 411.
territories. C. Coolen, who leased land from the government in Surabaja from 1829 onwards, had a settled adult population of 223 on his lands six years after he began operations there. There remained nonetheless a great difference between what was supposed to take place and what did take place on these lands. In one division of the Surabaja Residency there were three Europeans leasing land in the early thirties, Coolen, M. von Franquemont and J. Hunt. By 1835 only the first of these had made any progress towards clearing the area assigned to him. The other two lands remained little cultivated and were a refuge, as the Assistant Resident put it, for 'suspect persons'. Von Franquemont, this official went on to report, had not been seen on the lands for two years, and the place was left in charge of a native mandoor.

After the departure of Du Bus at the beginning of 1830 and the arrival of Van den Bosch as Governor-General, there was a marked change of attitude toward the leasing of uncultivated land. The new Governor-General reported to Baud that there was little enthusiasm in Java for such a system, and that he did not think that the road to great

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142 Assistant Resident Modjokerto to Resident Surabaja, 3.7.1835, Inst. T.L.V. H713 item VIII G.
agricultural productivity lay in that direction.\textsuperscript{143} Grants of waste land continued to be made until forbidden by the Ministry of Colonies in The Hague in 1840, but a recent historian, highly sympathetic to the private sphere of the Indies economy, concluded that the amount of land made available to planters in this way during the 'thirties was not considerable. Only around the mid-century did this form of land-holding revive and begin to play an appreciable role in the exploitation of Java by the Europeans.\textsuperscript{144}

The planters who rented village land were rather a different matter. Many of them abandoned their 'private' character and went over to the government from the early months of 1830 onwards as Cultivation System contractors. In the Oosthoek three of the six European sugar-makers operating in 1830 had become government sugar contractors by 1834.\textsuperscript{145} As has been pointed out recently, Van den Bosch was aided considerably in setting up the Culture System in East Java by the presence there of a number of already

\textsuperscript{143} Van den Bosch to Baud, 12.3.1830, in J.J. Westendorp Boerma (ed.) Briefwisseling tussen J. van den Bosch en J.C. Baud 1829-36, Utrecht, 1956, 1. p.51.
\textsuperscript{144} Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p.128-31.
\textsuperscript{145} See Ch. 2. p.150 and List of sugar contracts 11.9.1834 Min.v.Kol 3203.
already established European planters and manufacturers.\textsuperscript{146} Initially at least the remaining private planters were encouraged by the government, which helped them by extending the period for which field and labour contracts with the villages could be made. In 1840, however, government policy took a hostile turn, when collective contracts with the villages such as had existed in practice since at least the mid-twenties, were partially banned. Agreements of this nature were only allowed in future if the interests of the private planters did not clash with those of government organized cultivation. Subsequent developments in this field after 1840 have already been described elsewhere.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{146} R. van Niël, Considerations on the introduction of the Cultivation System in Pasuruan, Java, Papers given to The International Conference on South East Asian History, Hongkong 1964 no. 27 p. 2.

\textsuperscript{147} Reinsma, \textit{Cultuurstelsel}, p. 125-72.
II ESTATE OWNERS AND PLANTERS.

The origin and background of the estate owners and planters of Java is a major issue, discussion of which here is limited to two important aspects. The first is that of the nationality of the men who owned and ran the estates and plantation of the period 1812-1834; the second that of how these men were related to other colonial groups such as merchants, officials and soldiers. The question of why these people went out to the Indies is one which is, for the most part, left unanswered here.

As in the previous chapter, a contrast may be made between the situation as it existed at the close of the eighteenth century and in the eighteen twenties. Accounts such as that given by the landowner Andries Teissiere in the seventeen nineties of "a part of the Omme-en-Bovenlanden surrounding this capital" show that most of the landowners of the Batavia hinterland were the bearers of either Dutch or German names.\(^1\) A similar listing of landowners and planters settled throughout Java some thirty years later would show a very different result. For among them were a large number of people of obviously non-Netherlands origin.

Just how large a number is difficult to estimate with any precision. From government and other sources it is possible to arrive at an approximate number of two hundred and thirty six Europeans active between 1812 and 1834 as private landowners, planters, estate administrators and estate or plantation overseers. However, as the main source from which these figures are derived covers the years 1819-1827 rather than the whole period 1812-1834 it must be recognised that some estate owners or planters may well have been missed out.

The breakdown of this group of two hundred and thirty six in terms of nationalities is of some interest. Ninety four were Europeans who were born elsewhere than the Netherlands, the people whom the Indies government usually referred to as 'foreign Europeans.' As to the people classified as Dutch, a further distinction may be made, the importance of which will emerge later in the chapter. Of a total of one hundred and forty two Dutch landowners and planters, slightly more than half had been born either in Java or in other of the Dutch settlements in the East Indies.

2 These calculations are based primarily on the Registers of European Population and their Descendants, Min.v.Kol. 3106-3145, supplemented by other government records.
The largest group of foreign Europeans, not entirely unexpectedly, was the British. The word needs to be used with some care, for most of them were Scots. It was Greenberg who remarked in the course of his study of the China trade that "it is a remarkable characteristic of the expansion of Britain's Eastern trade, that it was largely developed by family and clan groups. The reader will notice the preponderance of Scottish among the partners of the great East India Houses. The lesser 'private English' engaged in the Country Trade were equally North British." A similar comment might well be made about the British among the landowners and planters of Java in the earlier nineteenth century. Half of them had been born in Scotland, and rather more than half were the bearers of Scots names. North and South British together numbered about fifty, or rather more than half the total number of foreign Europeans. As will be argued in detail later in this chapter, British

the Registers list is the name and occupation of Europeans and Eurasians settled in Java between 1819 and 1827. Where appropriate, they also give details of date of arrival in Java and of date of departure from the island if this took place before the mid-eighteen thirties. They also give the age, though not the year of birth, of the persons listed. This is why most of the dates of birth in the notes below are given as approximations.

3 M. Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-1842, Cambridge 1951, p.37-8. In a letter to his partner Henry Trail of January 1814 the Calcutta merchant John Palmer makes a comment on the Scots in the East which is at once amusing and penetrating. He says that one Fraser,
influence and importance among the landowner-planter
community was somewhat greater than numbers alone suggest.

The presence of large numbers of foreign Europeans
among the landowners and planters was a feature of the
situation which dated from the opening decades of the
nineteenth century, and was to some extent the result of the
British occupation of Java between 1811-1816, which brought
large numbers of British personnel in its wake. The
soldiers who formed the invading force came from Bengal and
Madras: the civil servants were either covenanted officials
from the British East India Company's establishment, or
uncovenanted servants taken on during the course of the
expedition. Many of these people, soldiers and officials
alike, stayed on after the British withdrawal in 1816 as
landowners, planters and, of course, merchants. Nonethe­
less, as will be demonstrated in more detail below, it
would be a mistake to suppose that the large number of
British among the landowners and planters settled in Java
in the period 1812-1834 can be ascribed entirely and
directly to the British occupation of 1811-16.

just set up in business in Calcutta "is a prating,
conceited but bustling and sufficient chap, and has all the
clans at his back....." Palmer to Trail, 18.1.1814, Eng.
Lett.c.83, p.300.
It appears, for instance, that some at least of the landowners and planters arrived in Java by way of trade rather than as officials or soldiers. It scarcely needs to be said that this was particularly true of the non-British among the foreign Europeans. This is best illustrated by example. The Frenchman J.D. Boudet, a prominent coffee planter as well as merchant in the Principalities during the 'twenties, came out to Java as supercargo of the brig *La Legere*, from Nantes in 1817.\(^4\) One of the Scots planters in the Principalities at the same time as Boudet, Gillian Maclaine, arrived in Java in 1820, having set out from London early in that year along with a cargo of goods sent to Batavia by the London East India house of D. and P. McLachlan. Maclaine had worked for them in London for about three years previous to his departure for the Indies.\(^5\)

How much the influx of foreign Europeans was influenced by government policy at Batavia is difficult to assess. In the treatment of the whole subject of the European estates and plantations and their owners it is necessary to guard against the assumption that the policy of the colonial government was the prime determining influence on the course

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of events. It is an assumption, frequently made in the older books, which is not always warranted. Nonetheless, the point seems worth making that between 1816 and 1834 the policy Indies Government was fairly liberal with regard to the permission given to private Europeans, non-Netherlanders amongst them, to settle in Java.

In this the Indies government of 1816 appears to have departed from the policy of its predecessors. The Dutch East India Company had been hostile to the settlement in Java of Europeans other than its own employees.\(^6\) So, it seems, were the successors-regimes of the Company down to the period of the Dutch restoration in 1816. Although in his later period in the Indies Raffles came to take a more favourable view of European settlers,\(^7\) it appears that while he was Lieutenant-Governor of Java between 1811 and 1816 he accepted British East India Company policy that Europeans who were not its employees should be kept out of its territories. On the face of it, there was some contradiction here, for it was, after all, Raffles who sold far more land to private individuals than any previous colonial government of Java had done. The most likely explanation

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\(^6\) De Haan, Priangan, 1, p.479. The 'private' Europeans at Batavia, the 'free Burghers' were "mostly recruited from time-expired merchants, clerks, soldiers and sailors..." C.R.Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800, London 1965 p.217.

is that he sold lands in Java in 1813 out of necessity, rather than because he believed in wholesale European settlement in the island. As his most recent historian concluded, land sales were a "somewhat drastic expedient" resolved upon in order to "overcome the grave financial crisis which threatened the colonial treasury."\(^8\)

How many Europeans other than Company employees did in fact manage to settle in Java during the British period is another matter. A government proclamation of 1815 announced that not only did permission have to be sought from the Company before Europeans came to Java in the first place, but that special permission was also necessary for people wishing to proceed beyond the hinterland of Batavia. However, the wording of the proclamation suggests that more than a few unauthorized Europeans had arrived in Java since the beginning of the British occupation.\(^9\) On the other hand, an Indies government report of 1823 alleged that the influx of Europeans into Java had been relatively slight during the British period.\(^10\)

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\(^10\) Report De Kock, De Graaff and Wappers Mellis, 17.3.1823, *Schneither Coll. 80*. 
The enactments of the restored Dutch rulers with regard to the residence of foreign Europeans in Java, however, were highly liberal. The terms of the regulations issued in 1818 by the Commissioners-General allowed Europeans of any nationality to move about Java much as they wished, after they had completed certain formalities of a none too rigorous nature. "We proclaimed a greater freedom than had ever been known in the Indies," wrote the senior government official Willem van Hogendorp in 1826, and the result, according to an unsympathetic government report of 1823 was that "the flood of Dutchmen as well as foreigners of diverse nationalities... was greater than it had ever been in Java, while a number of fortune-hunters from all lands... found here a wider field for their operations than could be sought in any other foreign land."  

In the mid-twenties, however, the Indies government began to revise its attitude toward the foreign Europeans among the colonial community. As has already been mentioned in a previous chapter, Governor-General Baron Van...
der Capellen (1819-26) was no friend of the private European landowners, amongst whom the foreigners figured so prominently in the 'twenties. His attitude, as summed up in the Colonial Report of 1822, was that while Europeans whose skills were essential to the economy, such as sugar or indigo makers, were to be encouraged, most of the landowners and planters, the coffee-plantation owners in particular, were nothing less than parasites who had no contribution to make to the development of the colony. He commented bitterly on the way in which the British owners of the vast Pamanukan and Tjiassesem estate referred to their 'principality' in Java.\textsuperscript{14}

This attitude was reflected in the government's policy towards incoming Europeans, though it ought to be added that in this matter little differentiation was made between foreign and Netherlands-born Europeans. In 1823, it was decided to tighten up the regulations concerning European access to Java's interior, and in particular to try and stop Europeans from settling in the Principalities.\textsuperscript{15} How effective such attempts were is, of course, open to question. The impression given by the government's Registers of

\textsuperscript{14} Van der Capellen's Colonial Report of 1822 is printed in Ottow, Oorsprong, p.212-301. The passages most relevent to what I say here are to be found on p.229-245.

\textsuperscript{15} Staatsblad 20.5.1823.
European Population, which do not go beyond 1827 is that there was a falling off in the number of Europeans, especially foreign Europeans, arriving in Java from the mid-twenties onwards. However, it may be that this is better ascribed to a number of other influences, among them the fall in coffee prices and the outbreak of war in the Principalities in 1825, than to the government's attempts to restrict immigration which made Java less attractive to merchants and planters. According to Van de Graaff, chief advisor of Governor-General Van der Capellen and prime mover behind the restrictive policy of 1823, the new regulations of that year were not applied firmly. It was not until the mid-thirties that the Indies government effectively closed Java to the inflow of foreign Europeans and attempted to reserve at least the agricultural exploitation of Java for the Dutch alone. Under the new regulations drawn up by the Van den Bosch government in January 1834, foreign Europeans were only allowed to live in Java on a temporary basis, for which permission had to be given

16 A detailed description of the Registers appears above, note 2.

17 Coffee prices, which were very high in the early years of the Dutch restoration began to fall after 1821. (See Ch. 3. This, together with the serious revolt which broke out in the Principalities in 1825, tended to make Java look less attractive to European planters than had hitherto been the case.

afresh each year. Even these regulations only applied to the hinterland and Buitenzorg areas of West Java (areas entirely made up of private lands). Non-Dutch Europeans might live elsewhere only with the government's express permission. Between 1839 and 1851 this permission was granted, on average, in only twelve cases per year.\textsuperscript{19}

However, this is to advance beyond the terminal date of the present study. For most of the 1812-34 period, as we have seen, Java was effectively open for any Europeans who wished to settle, regardless of nationality. It is debatable however, whether many of these people really were settlers in the exact sense of the word. Before continuing with an analysis of the estate-owner and planter community in terms of national and occupational background, it is of some relevance to consider for a moment the ambitions of the people with whom we are dealing.

The first point to note is that there had previously been various attempts at true European settlement in Java. True settlement, that is, in the sense of the establishment in the island of families who were intended to make their permanent homes there, and whose descendents were intended to stay on and to regard Java rather than the Netherlands

as their home-land. The most important of these schemes had been those of Governors-General Van Imhoff and Mossel in the middle of the eighteenth century. The people involved were Europeans of peasant stock, who were established as small farmers in several communities in the hilly districts of West Java. Little became of these projects. Some of the farmers were killed, others disappeared, as did almost all the settlements.20

Ideas such as these, however, still enjoyed a certain currency in the eighteen twenties. The West Java landowner Andries de Wilde, part-owner and administrator of Sukabumi, suggested to the authorities in The Hague as late as 1821 that he should return to Batavia with at least two hundred peasant families who should then be settled on government land in West Java. He made it quite clear that he envisaged these people as small farmers, who were to cultivate the ground themselves, and who were not to be allowed to hire local labour.21 A rather similar scheme submitted by a retired Indies government employee, A. de Raadt, was given what appears to have been serious

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20 On these settlements, see De Haan, Priangan, 1, p.266-76. The wider question of colonization in the East Indies during the Company period is discussed by Boxer, Seaborne Empire, p.215-27.

21 De Wilde to Elout, 31.5.1821, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 21.10.1829 no.75, Min.v.Kol. 531. De Wilde was thinking of settlers from the mountainous districts of Germany.
consideration by the Colonial office in The Hague as late as 1828.\textsuperscript{22}

The second point is that the Europeans actually in the Indies at that time were not colonists or settlers in this sense at all. The indications are that many of the estate owners and planters active in Java during our period set out with the idea of making their fortune and returning to Europe. This was argued to have been the case by the senior government official De Graaff in the course of his 1823 report on colonization and the issues linked with it.\textsuperscript{23} Of course, De Graaff was an opponent of the spread of private European landholding in Java and may have expressed himself in a manner as hostile as possible to the estate owners and planters. Nevertheless, the same concept of European colonists as people who came out to Java for a few years, made their fortunes and then returned home found expression in the writings of Willem van Hogendorp, a senior government official who was a strong supporter of

\textsuperscript{22} Elout to Van den Bosch, 31.8.1829; De Raadt to Ministry of Colonies, 2.10.1828, 26.5.1828 and 14.7.1828, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 31.8.1828 no.50, Min.v.Kol. 699. De Raadt's scheme was for sending out poor farming people from the Maastricht area, where he himself was living in retirement.

\textsuperscript{23} De Graaff Report 23.3.1822, ed. Kemp, Tijd N.L. 41, 1890.
the cause of private European landholding in Java. "If I were twelve or so years younger," he wrote to his father in 1828, "I would take a wife in Holland, bring my funds over to Java and set up as a planter in the interior... and then, when I had spent fifteen years in the most beautiful land in the world, ... I would return home with a capital doubled or trebled." 25

Van Hogendorp's and De Graaff's opinions appear to be confirmed from what few collections of landowner's private papers are available. The desire to secure a fortune and return home to live the life of a gentleman is a frequently reiterated theme in the correspondence of the merchant and planter Gillian Maclaine. On the eve of his departure for Java in 1820 he informed his brother Angus that "it certainly would be fully desirable in certain respects, that I should remain in Britain, but by doing so I fear that my chance of

24 Willem van Hogendorp, son of the Dutch elder statesman G.K.v.Hogendorp, was secretary to Commissioner-General Du Bus (1826-30) and compiler of the Commissioner's Colonization Report of 1827 which advocated the concession of land in Java to European planters as being the policy most likely to further the development of the colony's economy. A short summary of the report in J.S.Furnivall, Netherlands India, Cambridge 1939, p.100-103.

securing an Independence would not be so good..." Sixteen years later, the identical theme recurs in a letter written by Maclaine from Batavia to his mother in Argyll. "I am not ambitious of great wealth," he wrote, "and am only protracting my stay abroad to gain an Independence." The precise nature of Maclaine's object appeared in subsequent letters to his brother. His wish was "to become a proprietor of lands in the Highlands," and, more specifically, to purchase the lease of the Scallastle property on the island of Mull, "in fact, the old tenement as held by our grandfather." Moreover, throughout twenty years in the Indies, Maclaine's links with his family on Mull and at Ardtornish on the adjoining mainland remained very strong. He himself returned home for a long visit in 1830–31, and it is clear from his surviving letters that whenever his Java friends returned home, they were all furnished with introductions to Maclaine's relatives in the western Highlands. A letter from Gillian to his uncle John Gregerson of Ardtornish written from Batavia in

26 Gillian to Angus Maclaine, 28.1.1820, Ardtornish Papers.
27 Gillian Maclaine to his mother, 12.2.1836, Ardtornish Papers.
28 Gillian to Angus Maclaine, 15.2.1836 and 30.1.1837. Ardtornish Papers. Maclaine's family (Maclaine of Scallastle) came from the Island of Mull, Argyll. His father died when Gillian Maclaine was very young, and he appears to have been brought up by his mother and his uncle, John Gregerson, not on Mull but on the mainland at Ardtornish. Scallastle is almost directly opposite Ardtornish across the Sound.
February 1826 introduced the returning merchant Thomas Miln, then back in Europe "with a very independent fortune acquired after fifteen years hard flogging in this island."29 Eight years later Maclaine's Batavia business partner Edward Watson, "a perfect stranger to Scotland," was furnished with a similar introduction. As it happens, however, Gillian Maclaine never returned to Mull; he and his family together with the ship Regina in which they were returning home from Batavia in 1840 disappeared at sea, somewhere between Java and the Cape.30

However, as has already been remarked, very few collections of planter's or estate owner's papers are available, and in these circumstances it would be unwise to base far-reaching generalisations on those few letters and papers which have come to light. As will be seen from the biographical details given below, a substantial number of the estate owners and planters, many of the British among them, ended their days in Java.

How substantial the number was, however, is difficult to estimate. It is not possible to say how many of the

29 Gillian Maclaine to John Gregerson, 5.2.1826, Ardtornish Papers.
30 Gillian to Angus Maclaine, 23.10.1832; Gillian to Angus Maclaine, 8.10.1839; John Gregerson to ?, 8.10.1840, Ardtornish Papers.
two hundred and thirty six planters and landowners who were settled in Java between 1812 and 1834 either died in Java or returned to Europe, as this is not something on which the Registers of European population give adequate information. What can be shown, however, is that despite the tendency - possibly stronger among the newcomers and the British in particular - to regard Java as a place of only temporary settlement, some of the landowners of West Java were genuine colonists. To use Boeke's terminology, there were blijvers (permanent settlers) as well as trekkers (transients).⁴¹ Most of the former, moreover, were Dutch, some of whom had been in Java for two or more generations by the eighteen twenties. Foremost among these were the Riemsdijks and the Senn van Basels. The Riemsdijks were particularly old established, having first come to Java in the late seventeenth century.⁴² These families, moreover, were linked by marriage to many of the other old-established Dutch landowners in West Java. W.H. v. Riemsdijk, for example, was the father-in-law of the Buitenzorg landowners General Holsman and W.A. Senn van Basel.

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as well as of the hinterland landlord J.M. van Beusechem. The Senn van Basels, in turn were related by marriage to the Buitenzorg landowner Nicholas Engelhard and to H.W. Muntinghe, owner at one time of the great Indramaju and Kandanghauer estate.

How much Indonesian blood ran in the veins of these old families is difficult to say. Willem van Hogendorp, who had no time for these essentially old fashioned landed proprietors, described them as a "wretched class of men... standing below our nationality in all respects," by which he may have meant to imply that they were Eurasians. According to the usually reliable De Haan, however, W.H. van Riemsdijk was pure European, rather surprisingly in view of the century or more that his family had been in the East.

On points of this nature, the Registers of European Residents kept by the government are of no help, as they make no distinction whatsoever between Europeans and Eurasians. In the Principalities some of the Java born

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33 On the relationships between these families, see De Haan, Priangan, 1, Personalia, p.67-74 and B.K.I., 92, 1935 614-7.
34 Willem van Hogendorp to G.K. van Hogendorp, 22.10.1826, p.31 and 27.3.1828, p.11, Van Hogendorp Coll 91.
35 See note 40.
Dutch planters were certainly Eurasians, among them the greatest of all the landleasers, J.A. Dezentje. Dezentje, the Solo-born son of a former Company soldier, leased land in Solo from about 1816 until 1823, and again from 1827 until his death in 1839. His case is one which calls for some reversal of the usual theme of the impact of the Europeans on Java, for it was clearly a matter of the impact of Java on the Europeans. According to one of the accounts, "his style and mode of living... was almost equal in magnificence to the Emperors the [Susahunan of Solo] and he dispensed hospitality with a royal and lavish hand... he entertained the princes, even the emperor himself... Ampel [his estate-residence] was in fact a small royal palace." 36

36 D.M. Campbell, Java Past and Present, London 1915, 1, p.438-40. I find no proof of Campbell's statement that Dezentje married the Susahunan of Solo's sister. Indeed, according to J.C. 3.6.1828 no.67 he married H.v.d. Bergen at Ampel in May 1828. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of an earlier or later marriage. The rest of what Campbell says seems to fit with, for instance, Nahuijs's statement that Dezentje had his own private army during the Java war period, 1825-30. G.G. in Rade 18.12.1827 no.1, Min.v.Kol. 2808. On Dezentje, see below.
The national and occupational background of the estate owners and planters.

As has already been indicated, most of the estate owners and planters in the 1812-1834 period were either Dutch or British. There were however several other groups of foreign Europeans among them other than the British. There were also those Europeans who were born east of the Cape. Before discussing the two main groups involved, therefore, it is to the smaller minority groups that we now give some attention.

First the French. It is hardly surprising to find that the majority of the French-born individuals among the landowners and planters were, like the British, relative newcomers to Java in the early nineteenth century. Of the total of seventeen French, only six, according to the Indies government's population registers, had appeared in Java earlier than 1816. Some of this latter group appear to have been one-time soldiers in the service of the Dutch East India Company, among them Francois Deux, born in Angouleme, who first came to Java in 1783 aged about seventeen. He was one of a group of French-born planters

37 Min.v.Kol. 3125 and 3131. Francois Deux was illiterate. See his account of his estate sent to Nahuijs, 3.7.1823, which is signed with a cross. Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.
established in the Principalities in the early eighteen twenties. Others were P.N. Douvet, A. Nogues, J.A. Tassier, J.M. Tissot and J.D. Boudet. The two latter, at least, were men of some substance.

Boudet, who arrived in Java in 1818 as supercargo of the brig *La Legere*, began a career as a coffee planter in the Solo area about 1820 in partnership with Resident Nahuijs of Jogja. In 1823 their plantation was one of the largest in the area. Boudet, like many of his contemporaries, combined the roles of merchant and planter, and his business interests extended to Samarang, Batavia and even as far afield as Mauritius. At Batavia his connection was with the merchant J.F. Arnold, and the trade which he conducted was of a very general nature, ranging from watches and velvets to cheese, wine and olive oil. At one period he was engaged in trading in cattle and horses from Solo down to Samarang.39

References to his trading activities will be found scattered through his surviving correspondence, *

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Until about 1822 his main business associate in the Principalities was a fellow Frenchman, J.M. Tissot, who was also a landleaser at Solo. Like Boudet, Tissot also had commercial connections with Mauritius and Bourbon and spent much of his time between 1816 and 1822 in travelling back and forth between those islands and Java.

Most of Java's French were settled in the Principalities, and only a few were found in West Java, where none of the great estates belonged to them. Among the smaller estate owners of the hinterland was the French indigo manufacturer Louis Petel, proprietor of the Bergzigt estate from about 1808 until 1823. He was said to have arrived in Java aged about twenty seven in 1804. The French seem to have had a strong association with the manufacture of indigo. In Pekalongan province, along the coast between Tjeribon and Semarang one of the indigo makers operating in the early part of our period was the Charles Du Pont, born


in Rouen, who had come to Java in 1809. Petel himself moved to Pekalongan about 1823, and was later joined there by his son-in-law N. Cezard, who had been born in Paris.

Next of the minority groups to be considered are the Germans. It had long been the policy of the Dutch East India Company to recruit Germans as well as Netherlanders for its service, and this was reflected in the presence in the landowner-planter community of a number of people born in the German and Baltic areas who had first come to Java in the seventeen eighties or even earlier. Among these were the hinterland estate owner General-Major Van Lutzow, who had been born in Berlin and begun his career in Java in 1784, as had the Lithuanian J. Polonis, another of the hinterland landlords. In the Principalities, too, there were some German planters, among them P. Julian, who was described in the population registers as a sergeant in 1819.

None of these men could be described as substantial landowners, but the same cannot be said of two other of the

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45 P. Julian, b. Germany c. 1767, Java 1788, Min.v.Kol. 3124.
German planters resident in the Principalities in the eighteen twenties, E.H. Kuhlo and F.A. Brandt. Both were large-scale coffee planters and both were post-1816 arrivals rather than retired soldiers. Brandt’s arrival in Java dated from 1818 and Kuhlo’s from two years earlier. Brandt was also a merchant as well as planter, as were J.E. Banck and Pieter Jessen, both of whom were born in Schleswig-Holstein. Jessen was a member of the hinterland sugar-making firm of Jessen Trail and Company between 1816 and 1825. Banck, who arrived in Java in 1820 and who was a merchant at Surabaja for most of the following decade, moved into sugar manufacture in East Java around 1830.

The last of these minority groups was that composed of those Europeans or Eurasians who had been born East of the Cape, but outside the Indies. These were a class of colonists who were neither born in the colony in which they were later settled, nor in one of the metropolitan countries concerned, but had simply moved on from one colony to

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another. As far as early nineteenth century Java was concerned, most of these second-stage colonists came from Penang, mainland India, Mauritius or Bourbon.

A. De Marchand, cotton and sugar planter at the Tjikandi Ilir estate was born on Bourbon, while Robert Scott, member of the firm of Deans Scott and Company and sugar promoter in the Samarang and Japara areas around 1820, was Penang-born. Presumably he, like the several other Penang-born Scotts in Java during our period, was a scion of the famous Penang merchant house of Scott and Company. T.B. Hofland, who was a merchant and sugar maker in East Java in the late 'twenties, was born on the Coromandel coast, and was, presumably, a son of the "captain of the Country service" George Hofland who died aged fifty four at Samarang in 1818.

50 De Haan, B.K.I., 92, 1935, p.643. According to De Haan, Robert Scott was son of a Country Trader of the same name. Scott and Company were the main business house established at Penang in the early years of the nineteenth century.
51 Min.v.Kol. 3135; Campbell, Java, 1, p.478. Hofland, together with his brother Pieter was a sugar contractor for the government in East Java in the 1830's and by 1840 was part owner of the West Java Pamanukan and Tjiasssem estate.
Many of these people had amazingly varied careers, of which their landowner or planter period was only a relatively small part. John Hunt, for example, who at the end of his career was a land-lease planter in the Surabaja Residency, was born in Bengal. He arrived in Java on board an English East India Company ship in 1812, aged about thirty two. He was employed by the Raffles regime first as a Commercial Agent and later as assistant to the Resident of Pekalongan. Early in 1816 he succeeded in leasing from the government some land in the Oosthoek province of Banjuwangi, from which he was evicted by the Dutch soon after they resumed control of Java in 1816. Biographical details relating to the following stage in his career are lacking. In 1824 he formed a partnership at Surabaja with the American George W. Abbot "for the purpose of transacting commission business." Hunt meanwhile was employed by the Indies government to bring back cinnamon plants from Ceylon, from which mission he returned in February 1826. Four months later the firm of Hunt and Abbot was dissolved, presumably because of "the determination of my partner to proceed to America," as Hunt informed Willem van Hogendorp. However, Hunt himself continued in business, a further partnership with H.R. Spencer being dissolved in July 1827. He appears to have retained some interest in agriculture throughout this period; at least, the government appointed
him to the Sub-Commission for Agriculture in the Surabaja Residency in January 1827. Two years later he was allowed to lease uncultivated land in that Residency, where he died in 1835\textsuperscript{52}

The British estate owners and planters

"All sorts of foreigners," wrote the authors of a government report of 1823, "but in particular the English... have hastened to make use of every opportunity...to install themselves as landowners in even the remotest corners of Java...."\textsuperscript{53} The truth of the observation was undeniable. The English (or rather, the British) figured prominently among the landowners of West Java and the landlease planters of the Principalities. Only in East Java were they rather less well represented.

In West Java the situation was that the greatest in extent of all the Java private estates, Pamanukan and Tjiassem, was British owned and administered for the entire

\textsuperscript{52} De Haan, B.K.I., 92, 1935, p.584-6. G.G. in Rade 3.3.1826 no.4, Min.v.Kol. 2792; G.G. buiten Rade 12.1.1827 no.9, Min.v.Kol. 2500; B.G. 8.1.1825 no.2, 1.3.1826 no.9, 3.6.1826 no.22 and 21.7.1827 no.60; Hunt to Willem van Hogendorp, 31.5.1826, Van Hogendorp Coll 190.

\textsuperscript{53} Report De Kock, De Graaff, Wappers Mellis, 17.3.1823, Schneither Coll 80.
period 1813-1834. Also British owned for most if not all of the years with which we are concerned were the Buitenzorg area estates of Jassinga, Kuripan and Bolang, and, to the west of the hinterland, the Bantam province estates of Tjikandi Ilir and Tjikandi Udek. Moreover, from 1827 until the end of our period the Krawang province estate of Tagal Waru and Sumadangan was also partly British owned, as was Sukabumi estate in the Preanger during the ten years in which it was in private hands between 1813 and 1823. All these estates were large, varying in size between about seventy square miles (Tjikandi Ilir) to one thousand square miles (Pamanukan and Tjiassem).

The British owners and their administrators may be divided roughly into three groups. The absentees, the ex-officials and soldiers of the Raffles administration and the post-1816 arrivals, mostly men who began their careers as private merchants rather than as servants of the English East India Company.

The most prominent of the absentee landowners were the proprietors of Pamanukan and Tjiassem, the foremost of whom were Sir Charles Forbes, W.T. Money, General J. Skelton and J. Stewart. The history of the early ownership of Pamanukan and Tjiassem is rather complicated and it suffices here to

54 According to Alexander Loudon, administrator of the estate in 1825, the complete list of owners was as follows.
say that it was bought by Skelton and Company of Batavia in 1813, partly for themselves and partly for their Bombay connections, Forbes and Company. Of the owners listed above, General Skelton appears to have inherited his share in the lands from his brother, the merchant Philip Skelton of Batavia who died in 1821. Forbes was head of the house of Forbes and Company and Money a one-time partner in that firm. J. Stewart, who appears on the ownership records until the estate changed hands in 1838-9, was presumably a business partner of Forbes and Money. Both Forbes and Money were Members of Parliament, the former soon after his return to England in 1812 until 1832 and the latter from soon after his return to England in 1816 until the mid-twenties, when he left England for the continent. In addition they were both one-time directors of the East India Company. In all probability, neither ever set foot in Java. The only other absentee owner of note was the

Sir Charles Forbes, W.T. Money, J. Stewart, General J. Skelton, M. Forbes, L. Stewart, J.R. Turing, A. Loudon. The first four were said to have a two-twelfth share each, the remaining four to have a one-twelfth share each. The last three on the list all lived in Java at the time. The rest were absentee owners. G.G. in Rade 15.11.1825 no.15, Min.v. Kol. 2791.

Both Forbes and Money had been out at Bombay in the earlier stages of their careers. Money b. Walthamstow 1771 d. Venice 1833, was Captain of an East Indiaman in the 1790's and later Superintendent of the Marine at Bombay, from which post he resigned in 1810. Money withdrew from the Bombay
Calcutta merchant John Palmer, owner of Tjikandi Ilir, of whom mention will be made in later chapters.56

The second group of landowners and planters, those whose career in Java began with civil or military positions in the Raffles administration, is not as large as might be supposed. According to the information supplied by the Indies government's population registers, only fourteen of the fifty British active in landowning and planter roles between 1812 and 1834 arrived in Java before 1816.57 It is impossible to discuss in detail all this group of fourteen; a full listing of them is provided by De Haan.58 The most

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56 John Palmer, b. Bengal 1763 d. Calcutta 1836, prominent Calcutta merchant, member of various firms there from the 1780's onwards. By our period was head of the firm of Palmer and Company. See 'Death notice of John Palmer' in Eng.Lett. d. 107, p.207-8. On his connections with Java see also Ch. 5, p. 355-6 and 359-61.

57 See note 2 above. On the other hand, it should be noted that the registers are not completely accurate in the matter of giving the date of arrival, and that the number of late comers is swollen by employees (overseers etc.), brought out from England by the owners of such estates as Pamanukan and Tjiassem.

prominent of the West Java landowners amongst them were Thomas MacQuoid, Robert Addison, John Deans and Alexander Loudon. All but the last were also merchants.

Under the British regime, MacQuoid, an Irishman, held a variety of posts including that of Resident of the Preanger. Before coming to Java, he had worked for the English East India Company at Penang, where, presumably, he had met Raffles. With Raffles he became part owner of the Preanger Sukabumi estate in 1813 and was still part-owner of that estate at the time of its re-sale to the Indies government in 1823. His post-1816 interests, however, extended far beyond this. He did not leave Java when the Dutch took over in 1816, and by 1819 was a member of the Batavia firm of Skelton and Company, and this brought him into contact with the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate, for which Skeltons were the agents, (Philip Skelton was part-owner). Between 1819 and 1822 MacQuoid was administrator of Pamanukan and Tjiassem, and from 1821 onwards a partner in the Batavia house of MacQuoid Davidson and Company. From 1823 onwards however, after a break with the British owners of Pamanukan and the sale of Sukabumi, his interests appear to have been purely commercial.  

59 A miserable entry in registers (Min.v.Kol. 3109) fails to give details of place of birth or age. The best reference is De Haan, B.K.1, 92, 1935 p.605-8. According to De Haan, MacQuoid was still at Batavia, after several trips to Europe, in 1830. I have no idea what became of this once
Like MacQuoid, Robert Addison, who was part owner of the Kuripan estate and owner of Jassinga (both in the Buitenzorg area) during the eighteen twenties, was a merchant as well as a landowner. At one time in the employ of the East India Company, he arrived in Java in 1813. It is not clear whether he found a job under the British regime. In 1814 he set up in business at Batavia and was successively a member of the firms of Addison and Ainslie, Addison and Williams and, finally, Addison and Company. He appears to have retained his land-owning interest throughout our period, and in the mid-thirties was a government sugar contractor under the Cultivation System. John Deans, who was connected with the Tjikandi Ilir estate, to the west of the hinterland, from about 1816 until 1828, was one-time assistant Resident at Jogja under the British regime. His interests, however, were primarily commercial, and he was a member first of the large Batavia and Semarang firm of Deans Scott and Company and, after that enterprise closed down in 1823, a partner in Deans and Company.


John Deans, b. Scotland c. 1787, Java 1811, Min.v.Kol. 3106 his career, see De Haan, B.K.I., 92, 1935, p.534-5.
The career of Alexander Loudon, deputy collector of customs at Semarang under the British regime and administrator of Pamanukan and Tjiasssem from 1825 until 1829, will be discussed in detail below.62

The same strong connection between landowning and trade is characteristic of those estate owners who first came to Java after the Dutch restoration of 1816. As far as West Java was concerned, the foremost of this group was David Alexander Fraser, who was said to have been born in London and who came out to Java for the first time in 1818. He was twenty-eight at the time, and whether he had a previous career in the East behind him it is not possible to say. At Batavia he joined the firm of Skelton and Company and was subsequently a member of MacQuoid Davidson and Company until the firm's closure in 1827. He then became part-owner of the large Tagal Waru and Sumadangan estate in Krawang province, which he also administered. He died there in 1834.63

The British planters who leased land from the Javanese nobility in the Principalities form a group which is also conveniently divisable into pre-1816 arrivals and those who

63 D.A. Fraser, b. London c. 1790, Java 1818, Min.v.Kol. 3106, B.G. 20.3.1819 no.12; B.C. 5.8.1826 no.81; Willem van Hogendorp to G.K.v.Hogendorp, 27.3.1828, p.11, Van Hogendorp Coll 91.
first came to Java after the end of the British occupation. As in West Java, the former tended to have been one time employees of the English East India Company, while the latter where of more varied origin. In all there were about eight to ten planters of British origin active in the Principalities at one time or another between 1816 and 1834. Three of these, William Cotes, Harvey Thompson and William Stavers were pre-1816 arrivals.

Thompson arrived in Java in 1811, but in what capacity does not emerge from the records. He was born in Aberdeen, and appears to have been trained as a doctor. He stayed on in Java after the British left, becoming a landleaser at Jogja in 1818. He was an indigo maker and coffee planter there until 1824, when, forced to leave his coffee plantations as a result of the government decree of May 1823, he left Java for Europe.

His subsequent career is of some interest for the light it throws on the ambitions of this kind of individual. He appears to have returned to Europe with the fixed intention of staying there. By the latter part of 1825 he was back in Aberdeen, writing to an old Java friend that he was "quite pleased to think that Scotland was such a fine country after all, for never having seen much of it before, I had formed a very different idea of it." Before returning to Scotland, moreover, he appears to have spent
some time in London, "a famous place, where everything is
to be seen, and where one can do just what one likes with­
out being exposed to the tittle-tattle of his neighbours.
You may recollect how disagreeably we were situated at
Djogja with regard to that, where everything was reported
to the Resident forthwith." He had money from a cargo of
coffee which he had shipped back to Europe, and appears to
have been in comfortable circumstances. He wrote to the
same friend that he was looking round for a job and that
"if something does not turn up in way of mercantile
business, I think I will commence practising my profession."
A year later, however, in a letter to former Resident
Nahuijs of Jogja, (then on the point of returning to the
Indies) the tone is very different. "I really do not see
that anything in the way of my profession can be done here,"
he wrote, "as there are many already before me, and I must
do something to enable me to support a large and increasing
family." He added that he would have "little hesitation
in my present circumstances" about going back to Java.
No further letters are on hand to document subsequent
events; Thompson arrived back in Java in February 1828,
and by the following year was established as an indigo
maker in the Pekalongan Residency.64

64 Min.v.Kol. 3124 and 3144; Thompson to Boudet, 7.6.1825
and 8.10.1825, Instit. T.L.V. H788; Thompson to Nahuijs,
26.9.1826, Leiden MSS 616, 9, no.10; J.G. 19.2.1828 no.22;
G.G. in Rade 27.2.1829 no.6, Min.v.Kol. 2822.
Both Cotes and Stavers came to Java initially as soldiers, and Cotes later took civilian posts. In the closing months of the British occupation he was Resident of the East Java province of Gresik. Of Scots birth, he appears to have made his way to Java via Bengal. However, he did not return to Bengal in 1816, but stayed in Java, becoming a landleaser in the Principalities in 1820-1. He not only had a coffee plantation of his own there, but also had a share in the coffee plantations of Gillian Naclaine and J.A. Dezentje. At the same time he carried on a general merchants business at Salatiga, a town on the borders of the Principalities on the road between Solo and Semarang. After 1823 he was forced to give up his coffee plantations in the Principalities, and he died, aged thirty six, at Buitenzorg in 1826.65

William Stavers is a figure whose movements before he became a coffee planter at Solo in the 'twenties are rather more difficult to trace. According to the population registers, he arrived in Java in 1811, and by 1815 was already in the Solo area, though there is no mention of what he was doing there. Possibly he was a Company soldier

for it appears that he began his career in the East as a soldier in Bengal. He appears to have remained in Java after 1816, for in 1820 he was busy trading in cattle between Solo and Semarang, and in the same year leased an estate in the Solo area, on which extensive coffee plantations were established by 1823 when that estate had to be given up as a result of the government Decree of May of that year which effectively prohibited Europeans from leasing land in the Principalities. This was far from being the end of Stavers's career in Java, however, for he proceeded to become intendant-general of all the lands of the Javanese prince Hanco Negoro, and in 1829 leased the Solo estate of Blitar in partnership with Resident Nahuijs. His later career took him beyond the Principalities; in 1833 he was a government sugar contractor in East Java and in 1842 was again a sugar contractor.  

It was by no means the case that all the British planters in the Principalities were former civil or military

employees of the East India Company or were otherwise involved with the British occupation of Java between 1811 and 1816. Among them, Gillian Maclaine, James and Robert Shand, Andrew Davidson and J.A. Maxwell all arrived in Java for the first time after the British period had come to an end.

Some aspects of Gillian Maclaine's long career in the Indies have already been discussed. Like so many of his British contemporaries, he was a merchant as well as a planter, for besides the coffee estate in Solo which he leased from 1821-1823 and again from 1826-33 and the estate in West Java of which he was part owner during the 'twenties and early 'thirties, he was also partner successively in the


68 Andrew Davidson, b. Aberdeen c.1800, Java 1816, d.1831. Min.v.Kol. 3114 and 3131.

69 J.A. Maxwell, b. Scotland c.1792, Java 1821, Min.v.Kol. 3126.

70 Gillian Maclaine, b. Argyll 1798, Java 1820, d. 1840

See also above, p. 107-10.
Batavia firms of Gillian Maclaine and Company and Maclaine Watson and Company. After 1833-4 his interests appear to have been almost exclusively mercantile. It was trade which brought him to the Indies in the first place.

Before he left London for Java in April 1820 he worked in the office of the London East India house of D. and P. McLachlan, and it was with one of their cargoes that he arrived at Batavia, with the intention of either setting up in business there or of going on to Calcutta to join McLachlan's correspondents there. In the event it was not until September 1822 that Maclaine finally set up business at Batavia, in association with McLachlans. The sole 'explanation' of what had happened in the meantime comes from a letter to his aunt, Mrs. Gregerson, written by Maclaine from Solo in 1821. "You will no doubt have been informed by my mother and uncle of all the alterations in my plans since I arrived in Java," he wrote, "and also of my being now situated in the interior of the island engaged in planting coffee." 71

71 This account is based on B.C. 21.9.1822 no.38; B.C. 21.4.1827 no.22; Gillian to Angus Maclaine, 6.3.1820, and Gillian Maclaine to Mrs Gregerson, 12.9.1821, Ardtornish Papers. An account of the various lands in which Maclaine had a share appears in Campbell, Java, 1, p.654-6. Campbell was a relative of the Maclaine family and in the early years of the present century worked for Maclaine Watson and Company in Batavia.
Maclaine and the other British planters in the Principalities between 1816 and 1834 were, of course, only a small minority. Of a total of seventy or more European planters leasing land from the Javanese nobility of the courts of Solo and Jogja during the period with which we are concerned, not more than ten were British. As has been remarked in the previous chapter, it is not at all easy to establish satisfactory criteria of judgement for who were and who were not 'substantial' planters in the Principalities area. However, working on the basis that 'substantial' planters were ones who created extensive coffee plantations,\textsuperscript{72} it appears that out of a total of seventy planters there were scarcely a dozen such men, amongst them at least three of the British, Maclaine, Stavers and Cotes. If this conclusion is accepted,\textsuperscript{73} it may be seen that the position occupied by the British planters in the Solo and Jogja areas was out of all proportion to their numbers.

In East Java, among the planters and manufacturers of indigo and sugar who hired village land and labour, the British were almost as well represented, especially by 1830.

\textsuperscript{72} For a definition of 'substantial' coffee planters, see below, p. 146.

\textsuperscript{73} The argument in full appears below, p. 146-50.
In the two main areas where planters and manufacturers of this type operated at that time four of the twelve entrepreneurs were British, two of them indigo makers and two of them sugar makers. They were Harvey Thompson, Felix Hall, Donald McLennen and Charles Etty. Both Hall and McLennen appear to have arrived in Java after the British left, the former by way of Singapore, and they both of them had at one time been merchants. Beyond that, not much more about them is tractable. Etty's varied career is rather better documented. He was born in York about 1791 and first appeared in the Indies about 1817 as captain of the brig Aurora. Eight years later he still appears to have been engaged in the country trade, this time as captain of the ship Recovery. In the late twenties, however, he settled in East Java as a sugar maker, and in the following decade was a government sugar contractor. He died in East Java, at Probolinggo, in 1856.

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74 Hall was presumably British, but I find no trace of him in the registers of residents etc. My reference comes from Campbell, Java, 2, p. 929, according to which Hall came from Singapore to Java in the mid-twenties.


76 On Etty see Min.v.Kol. 3132; B.C. 25.10.1817 no.43; G.G. buiten Rade 21.9.1825 no.4, Min.v.Kol. 2487; Campbell, Java, 1, p.501-4.
Etty was not the only former sea-captain among the British landowners and planters settled in Java between 1812 and 1834. Joe Drury, owner of the Bolang estate in the Buitenzorg area of West Java during the 'twenties, was a captain in the Royal Navy. He was an Irishman and possibly a relative of Vice-Admiral William O'Brien Drury who died as Commander-in-Chief of the British naval forces in the East Indies in March 1811. Joe Drury himself participated in the invasion of Java in August and September of that same year, possibly as Commander of the sloop Samarang. In 1814 he became Captain of the frigate Volage, on the East India Station, and was still Captain of the same vessel in August 1816. Sometime between 1818 and 1823, however, he settled on Java both as merchant and landowner. As appears from the latter's letter-books, he was a friend of the great Calcutta merchant John Palmer. He died in Java in 1835.77

77 Joe Drury, b. Cork c.1791, was a Captain R.N., as appears from Marshall, who lists him as a Post Captain of 1814. He had already obtained the rank of Commander in 1812. John Marshall, Royal Naval Biography, London 1823, Supplement, part 3, p. 224. Another Drury, Henry, also born at Cork and also serving in the East Indies in 1811 as Captain of the frigate Akbar was nephew of Vice-Admiral Drury, Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies. William O'Byrne, Biographical Dictionary, London 1849, p. 309. I have been able to find no confirmation that Joe and Henry Drury were related, though birth place and career make this a reasonable supposition. On Drury see also, De Haan, B.K.I. 92, 1955, p. 509; E.G. 29.8.1816 no. 3 and 8.3.1823 no. 10 and below p. 151-2.
The Dutch Estate Owners and Planters

In West Java the great majority of the petty landowners of the Batavia hinterland were either Netherlands- or Java-born Dutch. The situation in the western parts of the island outside the hinterland was that the Dutch controlled the vast Indramaju and Kandanghauer estate in Krawang province, eastwards along the coast from Batavia, which had been sold by Raffles in 1813. Of the other lands sold by the British government in that year, the Sukabumi estate in the Preanger was also partly Dutch-owned during the ten years that it was in private hands, between 1813 and 1823. Elsewhere in West Java the Dutch continued to own most of the estates which Deandals had carved out of the Governor-General's old Buitenzorg property in 1808. In Krawang, too, the Tagal Waru and Sumadangan estate, also sold by Deandals, remained in Dutch hands until 1827, when part of the ownership passed into British control.

If a generalization may be made about this group of landowners, it was that they were mostly old men who had spent many years in the Indies in the service of the Company, or their Java-born sons. W.H. van Riemsdijk, the greatest landowner in the hinterland, who died at the age of sixty-six in 1818, was born in Java and had been in the service of the Company for most of his life. Between 1776 and 1784
he was Commissioner for Native Affairs, and at the close of the eighteenth century was a Member of the Council of the Indies.78

Landowners of a rather similar stamp were Nicholas Engelhard and W.J. Cranssen. Engelhard, who was owner of the Buitenzorg estate Pondok Gede and part-owner of the Sukabuni estate in the Preanger had been Governor of Java's North East Coast in the early years of the nineteenth century, from which post he had been removed by Daendals in 1808. Unlike Van Riemsdijk, who was Java-born, Engelhard was born in the Netherlands, but he came out to Java very young and had been employed there by the Company as Onderkoopman as early as 1778. He remained out of office from 1808 until his death at Buitenzorg in 1831, with the exception of a short spell as Commissioner in the Moluccas in 1817-18.79

Cranssen was owner of the Krawang estate of Tagal Waru and Sumadangan during the earlier part of our period. Like Engelhard and Van Riemsdijk he was also an old Company man. Born in the Netherlands, he came to Java in 1780 aged about seventeen, and twenty eight years later was

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78 See note 32 above.
79 Nicholas Engelhard, b. Arnhem 1761 d. Buitenzorg 1831. On his career, see De Haan, Priangan, 1, Personalia, p.77-87.
removed by Daendals from the post of Governor of Amboina. Under the British administration, however, he became a Member of the Council of the Indies. He died in 1821 and was succeeded as owner of Tagal Waru by his Java-born son, W.L. Granssen, who died six years later.

Landowners of this type, Oudgasten, individuals of a traditional frame of mind, with a long career in the Indies behind them, were little interested in commercializing their estates in the manner which has already been touched on in the previous chapter. They were of the same type as the hinterland estate-owners, who were prepared to draw what revenues they could from their lands, but who were not prepared to commit themselves to heavy capital investment in order to develop them. In this sense the difference between them and the British owners of such estates as Pamanukan and Tjassem and Tjikandi Ilir was far more than one of nationality; it was one of attitude as well. W.J. Granssen, for instance, unlike his neighbours further eastward in Krawang at Pamanukan, was quite prepared to leave to the Chinese the manufacture of sugar on his estate in a manner typical of any of the eighteenth century

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hinterland landlords who were described in the previous chapter.\textsuperscript{81} W.H. van Riemsdijk also leased his sugar mills to the Chinese, and was generally notorious for the neglect of his estates. As De Haan observed, "It seems to have been a sort of mania with our man, to be continually expanding his properties, without paying proper attention to their exploitation."\textsuperscript{82}

Of course, not all the Dutch landlords in West Java during the 1812-1834 period were men of quite the same stamp as the Riemsdijks and Cranssens. Though the owners of the great Indramaju and Kandanghauer estate during the 'twenties and early 'thirties had all three arrived in Java between 1794 and 1804, they were scarcely classifiable as Oudgasten, even though they were appreciably older than many of their contemporaries among the British landowners.

Jan Tiedman was a former government official who had held the position of Government Secretary under Daendals and who, for a short time in 1816, was a member of the Council of Finance. This was far from being the sum total of his career, for in the second and third decades of the century he was a prominent Batavia merchant, and it was these

\textsuperscript{81} Statistics of Buitenzorg 1821, Lett.F. no.1-2, Schneither Coll 35.

\textsuperscript{82} De Haan, Priangan, 1, Personalia, p.72.
business interests which forced him to leave the Batavia administration in 1816.83

His partner in Indramaju, J.C. Romswinkel was also a man who, although his early career in the Indies had been with the Company, later developed important private business interests in Java. He was not only a landowner, but also the veteran of several Batavia commercial houses, including Romswinkel and Brandt and A.E. Soesman and Company. This latter was wound up in 1823.84 Only the third partner in the estate, Gerrit Vriese, appears to have had no private commercial experience. Vriese was born in the Netherlands, arrived in Java in 1804 and was employed by the Company in various minor posts. Under the British he was an overseer in the Preanger, and under the Dutch after 1816 was sometime warehouse keeper at Indramaju and Assistant-Resident of the Preanger. At the latest, he

83  
Jan Tiedeman, b. Netherlands c.1783, Java 1803, Min.v.Kol. 3144. See also Kemp, Herstel, p.161 and 223. According to De Graaff, Tiedeman was "one of the richest private individuals at Batavia... a great landowner and merchant who enjoyed an almost unbounded credit." Kemp (ed), De Graaff Brieven, 2, p.280.

84  
J.C. Romswinkel, b. Netherlands c.1772, Java 1794, Min.v. Kol. 3106. Under Daendals Romswinkel had been Director of the General Payments Office and under the restored Dutch regime he was General Receiver at Batavia. He left government service for good in 1819. Kemp, Herstel, p.146 and Verbaal C.G. 15.1.1819 no.1, Min.v.Kol. 2383. References to his private commercial career in B.G. 6.2.1819 10.4.1819 no.15 and G.G. in Rade 9.9.1823 no.29, Min.v.Kol. 2779.
Andries de Wilde, part-owner and administrator of Sukabumi from 1813 until 1823 was a man of rather similar background to Vriese. He was born in Amsterdam and he went out to Java in 1802 as a surgeon in the service of the Company. He was subsequently government overseer of the coffee cultivation in the Buitenzorg area, and later occupied a similar position in the Preanger. It was no doubt this experience, in the same area as that from which the Sukabumi estate was carved out by Raffles in 1813, which made him so useful to his co-proprietors.

Not surprisingly, long residence in Java and a background of Company employment were highly characteristic of most of the Dutch landowners in West Java. Nevertheless, there were exceptions to this pattern, the foremost of whom was Candidus ten Brinck, part owner of the Tegal Waru and Sumadangan estate from 1827 onwards, and even before that owner of several other smaller properties in the hinterland. Like the British landowners Gillian Maclaine and D.A. Fraser,

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86
A. de Wilde, b. Netherlands 1781, Java 1803, d. Netherlands 1865. The best biography of the most famous of all the early nineteenth century landowners (famous because of his clash with the government, on which see Ch. 3.) is in De Haan, Priangan, 1, Personalia, p.284.
he was one of the new type of landowner who had never been in government employment. Like them also, his background was exclusively that of private trader. A Dutchman, the young Ten Brinck went out to Java in 1822 to set up a firm in Batavia to act as Java agents for the Rotterdam merchant house of Van Hoboken and Company. He remained in Batavia as member of the firm of Ten Brinck and Reijnst throughout the 'twenties, returning to Europe in 1829 and was back again in Java in the early 'thirties. His case, however, was a highly exceptional one among the West Java landowners, and even among the Dutch landowner-planter community as a whole. For as we shall see, very few of these arrived in Java after the end of the Company period.

Indeed, it was not only a question of many of the Dutch planters and landowners having a long period of residence in Java behind them. A large number of them were born there. Slightly less than half the Dutch landowners and planters active in Java between 1812 and 1834 were Netherlands-born. The rest had either been born in Java itself or in one of the other Dutch settlements in the East Indies. How many of these were Eurasians is difficult to

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87 Ten Brinck's age is not indicated in the register of residents, Min.v.Kol. 3144. See Ch. 5, for further information on his landowning interests and his relations with Van Hoboken, p. 366-8.

88 For the source of these figures, see note 2, above.
say. As has already been observed, the registers of the period make no distinction whatsoever between 'pure' Europeans and their descendants.

Among the Dutch planters who leased land from the Javanese nobility in the Principalities, the predominance of the Java-born was especially remarkable. According to records kept at Jogja and Solo there were approximately seventy individuals bearing European names leasing estates at Jogja or Solo between 1818 and 1822. Of these, some sixty can be traced as to country or birth in the registers. About eighteen were foreign Europeans — those who had been born in Europe but outside the Netherlands. Of the remaining Dutch planters, only eleven were Netherlands-born, and six of these arrived in Java in the very early years of the nineteenth century or earlier. The great majority of the Dutch planters settled in the Principalities between roughly 1816 and 1823, therefore, were Java-born. For the most part, they were either themselves old Company soldiers, or else the sons of old soldiers usually born at Solo or Jogja.

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89 To avoid undue complications I have counted as Java born Dutch all those Europeans who were born in Java, whatever the nationality of their fathers. This has meant the inclusion of a few Java born sons of German colonists among those classified as (Java born) Dutch.
Some picture of the sort of people involved can be obtained from the government records and registers and from the obituary notices in the newspaper. We have no private letters or papers originating with this group of people. As the Solo lists of landlease planters show, there were, for instance, several members of the Smith family of Solo active as landlease planters in the Principalities at the beginning of the eighteen 'twenties. At least three of the elder members of the family appear to have been Company soldiers, which is, presumably, the explanation of how the family came to be settled in Solo in the first place. Caspar Joseph Smith, according to his obituary notice, was a retired Lieutenant Colonel, who had been in Java since 1788, while Frederick Smith, who had been born in Pomerania, was a retired sergeant and Johan Hendrik a retired Lieutenant. As it happens, the list of landlease planters does less than justice to the number of members of this family who were landlease planters. Other government records show that at least six of them were, including Caspar Joseph, Johan Hendrik and three younger members of the family, all born in Solo, Johan Wilhelmus, Caral Frans and Gustav Frederick. Another older member of the family, Caspar Frederick, was employed for some time in the 'twenties by
Resident Nahuijs

This sort of situation was far from exceptional in the Principalities. J.A. Dezentje, already mentioned as the most celebrated of the Solo landleasers, was the son of another retired Lieutenant who died at Jogja in 1826. Some of the other leaseholders were individuals who were also employed in one way or another by members of the Javanese nobility. For instance, C.D. Killian, who had been born in Solo and who leased land there from 1820 onwards, was an Orderly (Ordanans) to prince Manko Negoro in 1823. All the Moerkerken brothers, one of whom appears to have leased land in Jogja in 1818, were in the service of the Sultan five years later. A final example of this type of landleaser is provided by the large Portier family, one of whose members leased land at Solo in 1818. One of the elder members of the family was a retired soldier, and two others were in the service of the prince Manko Negoro. A further two were clerks at Solo, one of them in the

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90 Details of the Smith family come from B.C. 21.5.1825 no.21; Min.v.Kol. 3143; Min.v.Kol. 3125 and G.G. in Rade, 27.1.1824 no.29, Min.v.Kol. 2781.
Resident's office there. Yet another was in the service of the Resident, while a seventh was in the service of an unnamed private employer. All were Java-born, all but one at Solo itself.\footnote{Details of the Portier family from Min.v.Kol. 3141.}

As far as it is possible to tell from the inconsiderable body of evidence at present available, few of those planters who, like the Smiths or the Portiers, were either born in the Principalities or had been settled there for many years, could be classified as substantial planters—substantial, that is, in the sense of being large scale coffee growers and of being well-connected in commercial circles. Or, to put it the other way round, substantial in the sense that they were not in the Principalities just because they happened to have been born there or because it was a good place to eke out their military pensions.

Of course, there are exceptions to such a generalization. Some of the Indies-born planters settled in Solo in the early twenties do appear to have been substantial at least in the sense of owning considerable coffee plantations. The Frenchman Francois Deux and his son F.T. Deux, who had been born at Solo, claimed to have 100,000 coffee trees planted on their estates by mid-1823.\footnote{The Deux family are included here because the son, F.T. Deux, was Java born. Min.v.Kol. 3125. The father, Francois Deux was French born, see above, note 37. The} This is a considerable
number, if it is realised that even the largest coffee plantation existing in the Principalities at that time - Dezentje's Ampel - had no more than 600,000 trees. Another planter who had been born in the Indies - at Palembang in Sumatra - was J.M. Kuiper and he was said to have 250,000 trees planted on his coffee plantations in the Principalities in 1823. J.A. Dezentje and P.H. de la Brethoniere, both of whom were Eurasians and both of whom were born in Solo, were the owners of the two largest of the coffee plantations established on leased land in the Principalities after 1816.

However, while there is no indication that La Brethoniere, son of a former overseer of forests who died at Salatiga in 1821, was anything other than a planter who ran the estates which were leased in his name, the case of Dezentje is a highly peculiar one. Something has already been said about his princely and apparently Javanese style of life. The admittedly rather thin evidence suggests that in fact his claim that there were 1000000 coffee trees on the estate comes from the father and son's report on their estate, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3. I have been unable to find any way of checking this report.

96 Report Commission on winding up the leases in the Principalities, 20.5.1825, Appendix 0, Schneither Coll 109.
97 J.M. Kuiper, b. Palembang, Java 1795, d. Java 1831, Min.v.Kol. 3137 Kuiper to Nahuijs, 9.5.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.
98 P.H. de la Brethoniere senior, b. Turenne c.1754, Java 1782,
lands were looked after for him by others. The Solo coffee planter and merchant William Cotes appears to have taken a hand in the management of the Ampel coffee plantations, while it also appears that in the 'twenties the Batavia merchant Gillian Macclaine was entrusted with the arrangements for selling Dezentje's coffee. In 1837, according to his own account, he was given carte blanche to settle Dezentje's financial affairs.99

It does appear, however, that coffee planters like Kuiper and La Brethoniere were exceptional individuals rather than typical examples of that group of European planters in the Principalities who were either born in the Indies or else had a long career in the Indies behind them. According to official sources, for instance, there were scarcely 5,000 coffee trees on all the lands leased in Solo by members of the Smith family, while on the lands leased by Daniel Portier there appear to have been no coffee trees at all.100 On the lands leased at Jogja by another old soldier,
Willem van Ghent, there were said to be a total of two hundred coffee trees planted in 1823.101

Apart from the Java-born planters already mentioned, the only other Dutch planter settled in the Principalities in the early 'twenties who can be classified as substantial was the Resident of Jogja, Colonel Nahuijs, who had been born in Amsterdam. His estates, which he ran in partnership with J.D. Boudet, were said to have coffee plantations amounting to more than 350,000 trees.102 In the later 'twenties another of the substantial coffee planters was the Dutchman F.H. van Vlissingen, who had a plantation said to consist of more than 400,000 trees in 1829.103

The remaining substantial coffee planters were British, William Cotes, William Stavers and Gillian Maclaine. Between them the latter two were said to have plantations amounting to more than 705,000 trees.104 The British and the other foreign European planters, it may be concluded, played a far more important role in plantation ventures in the

103 Van Vlissingen arrived in Java in 1817. Min.v.Kol 3144.
104 See note 102 above.
Principalities than their numbers initially suggest.

Among the planters or entrepreneurs who planted and manufactured sugar and indigo on hired village land in East Java, the Dutch were rather better represented, at least among the sugar makers, by 1830. In that year the two best equipped sugar mills in East Java belonged to the Dutchman C. Vos and A.G. de Roock. Vos who was born in Doordrecht, had a long career of government and Company service behind him before he took up sugar making in Pasaruan province in the late 'twenties. In 1808 he was Resident of Pasaruan, and held that position again for a short time in 1816. He was later Resident of Pekalongan. In the mid-thirties he was a government sugar contractor in Pasaruan and died there in 1847, aged 63.

A.G. de Roock, born in Gelderland, arrived in Java (according to the population registers) in 1811, and seven years later was living in Surabaja, apparently unemployed. In 1823, however, he was said to be a merchant, again at Surabaja, and in the following year, according to his own account, took up sugar making in the Besuki area of the

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105 Best equipped, that is, in the sense of having modern, imported sugar-making apparatus. For details see Ch.3.

Oosthoek. He was still there in 1830, and subsequently became a government sugar contractor in the Oosthoek. He left Java, possibly for good, in 1835.107

As most of this analysis of the estate owner and planter group has been in terms of differing nationalities, something may be said by way of conclusion about the extent to which the various nationalities tended to intermingle in Java.

"The Dutch and English inhabitants did not then ... mix together so much as would ... have been agreeable," wrote the East India merchant G.F. Davidson, remembering Batavia as it had been in the eighteen twenties, when as a young man he had gone out to the Indies for the first time.108 Davidson's comment notwithstanding, however, there appears to have been a definite tendency among the British who had been settled there for any length of time to identify with the Dutch, either through marriage or in exceptional cases, even through naturalisation as Dutch citizens. Several of the prominent British landowners of West Java made very good marriages into Dutch colonial society. Joe Drury, for instance, Captain of the Royal Navy, merchant of Batavia...

107 Min.v.Kol. 3117 and 3142. De Roock's own account of his career in a note of 29.5.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 413.
and owner of the West Java Bolang estate, married the widow of J.A. van Braam, née A.W. van Rijk, in 1821. Van Braam, who had died in the previous year, was a former member of the Council of the Indies and son of the famous Dutch Admiral J.P. van Braam. Through his marriage, Drury came to be related, among others, to the later Governor-General ad interim J.C. Baud.109

Another of the British landowners and merchants to marry well was Gillian Maclaine, owner of estates in West Java, planter in Solo and member of the Batavia firm of Maclaine Watson and Company. In August 1832 he married Catherine van Beusechem at Batavia. He had met her on his return voyage to Java earlier that year, and the marriage brought him into what may be described as the highest circles of Dutch colonial society. Catherine's uncle was a senior official at Batavia and an old friend of Yan den Bosch, Governor-General of Java, 1830-34.110 Moreover, J.C. Baud, who succeeded Van den Bosch in the Governor-

109 G.G. in Rade 6,5.1821 no.10, Min.v.Kol. 2776. The presumption is that A.W.v.Rijk was a rich widow. Van Braam was certainly a very wealthy man who had done well in the Daendals period. See De Haan, B.K. III, 92, 1935, p.507-9. It was U.S. van Braam, Drury's step-daughter, who became J.C. Baud's second wife in 1833.

110 See Angus Maclaine to John Gregerson, 1.12.1832; "... her father's brother is the President of the Council of Justice ... when Gillian wrote, they were on a visit to the Governor, their uncle's particular friend." See also, Westendorp Boerma (ed) Briefwisseling, 2, p.244.
Generalship, was a relative by marriage of Maclaine's wife, so that, as Maclaine put it in a letter to his mother in 1833, "my influence consequently at Court is just as great as a merchant requires." 111

However, by far the most spectacular example of the newly-arrived British making good was the case of Alexander Loudon. He was born at Aberdeen in 1789 and arrived in Java on board a ship of the Royal Navy in 1811, eventually becoming deputy inspector of customs at Semarang under the British regime. There he married a Dutch girl, S.G. Valck, in 1815, and it was with his Dutch wife and his mother-in-law that he returned to the Netherlands in 1817. In 1824 he became a naturalised Dutchman, and in the following year returned to Java as administrator of the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate. A protegee of J.C. Baud, he was a very successful government sugar contractor in the Semarang area in the eighteen thirties. He had, said Baud, "a Dutch heart." He died at Rotterdam in 1840, aged fifty one. His son James, however, went on to become Minister of Colonies in The Hague and later, in the eighteen seventies, Governor-General of Netherlands India. 112

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111 Gillian Maclaine to his mother, 1.5.1833, Ardtornish Papers.
III AGRICULTURE 1812-1834.

As we have already noticed, there were three main spheres of private European agricultural enterprise in Java between 1812 and 1834. These were the private estates of West Java, the leased-lands in the Principalities, and the plantations run by European planters and manufacturers on hired village land in the coastal provinces of East Java from Tjeribon to the Oosthoek areas of Probolinggo, Pasaruan and Besuki. On these estates and plantations the main crops which were grown during our period were coffee, sugar, indigo and rice. Cultivation of the latter crop was limited to the estates of West Java and the leased-lands of the Principalities. In East Java the European planters only hired land for the cultivation of crops such as sugar and indigo. Most of the rice grown on the European controlled lands was intended for sale in Java or for markets elsewhere in the East. Rice was exported from Java in the 'twenties and early 'thirties, but only a very small proportion of those exports were destined for Europe.  

1 A detailed discussion of the various forms of European land-holding/land-control will be found in Ch.1.
2 In 1832, for example, of the 23,072 koyangs of rice and padi exported from Java, only 694 koyangs went to the Netherlands. More than 8,000 koyangs, however, went to China and Macao, and 13,129 koyangs went to the Great East. G.F. de Bruijn Kops, Statistiek den Handel en de Scheepvaart op Java en Madura, Batavia 1857-8, 2, p.176-181.
Coffee, indigo and sugar, however, were grown with a view to selling them in the West. Of these crops sugar and indigo were cultivated and manufactured on European estates and plantations throughout the island. Although coffee, too, was extensively grown on the government lands of East Java, there were no private coffee plantations in that part of the island. Private European coffee growing was limited to the estates of West Java and the leased-lands of the Principalities. This cultivation of crops for the export market on the various types of private European estates and plantations is worth emphasising, if only because as far as the great estates of West Java were concerned, it was something of an aberration in the pattern of their development. As the authors of Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya remarked a few years ago, the West Java estates "continued to be cultivated by native tenants who used them for growing rice and other food crops. Their owners... regarded them mainly as a source of rent rather than as a basis for new large-scale enterprise." In the earlier part of our period, as we shall

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3 Of course, the authors were careful to exclude from this generalization estates like Pamanukan and Tjiasssem, where non-food crops were grown extensively until the close of the colonial period. G.C.Allen and A.G.Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya, London 1957, p.68.
see, a number of large-scale, capital-consuming enterprises were launched on the estates of West Java, with the aim of producing crops for the European market. It was only after a series of set-backs in the 'twenties and later that many of these producers turned their attention elsewhere or gave up altogether.

The materials for a study of estate and plantation agricultural productivity are very imperfect. Fragmentary statistics make it impossible, for instance, to demonstrate in figures the rise and fall of the estates as producers for the European market. Nor can such things as the increased attention paid to rice in the later 'twenties be illustrated statistically, or the production of any other crop than coffee be shown on a comparative basis as a proportion of the production of the entire island.

This is only part of the difficulty. For when it comes to explaining either why one crop was abandoned in favour of another, or, more generally, why it was that the estates turned away from the cultivation of export crops, the almost complete lack of estate papers and account books is an almost insuperable obstacle. With the evidence at present available it is not possible to show how much a particular crop on a particular estate cost to produce.

What we know of market prices and of the general levels of agricultural productivity in Java does make it possible
to discuss the degree to which a correlation exists between the two. It must be remembered, however, that in the case of coffee, sugar and indigo the market envisaged was a European one. Communications between Northern Europe and the East Indies could take six months or even more, and in such circumstances, rumour was luxuriant. Moreover, in the case of sugar it took about eighteen months from the beginning of planting to the completion of manufacture, and in the case of coffee it was four or more years after planting that the trees began to bear fruit in large quantities. A rise or fall in the European market price of sugar, therefore, might well take more than two years to have a marked effect on the Java sugar producers.

Moreover, as hardly needs pointing out, market prices were only one of the factors which influenced the level and profitability of agricultural production in what may be called for convenience the private European sphere of Java's economy. What is aimed at in this chapter is a detailed account of agricultural production in this sphere between 1812 and 1834, together with a listing of the markets reached by that agricultural output, and of the prices obtained for it over a twenty year period. Consideration of why agricultural developments on the private European estates and plantations took the course which they did, in so far as this was not determined by market fluctuations,
forms the subject of discussion in the two following chapters.

As most of what follows concentrates on the cultivation either of crops for the Western market or of rice, it is necessary to point out at the beginning that these were not the sole sources of agricultural revenue on the estates, though they were the most prominent. At the Sukabumi estate in the Preanger, for instance, Arenga sugar, sometimes known as 'java sugar' was widely made by the peasantry with the encouragement of the owners, who drew a considerable profit from its sale. At Pamanukan and Tjassem, timber was a great source of wealth. In 1824 the estate was equipped with an iron saw mill, imported from England in that year, which was driven by a steam engine. The neighbouring Indramaju estate also drew revenues from its teak forests.

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Coffee cultivation in West Java.

Coffee growing held out the most tempting prospects of profit, and often of unexpectedly quick profit. Although coffee trees took about four years to come to maturity, many of the estates were already heavily planted with coffee when they were sold between 1808 and 1813. The purchasers of Sukabumi, for example, took over sizeable coffee gardens planted in the early years of the century. Production on the estate in 1812, a year before sale, was claimed to be 4-500 pikuls. In addition, coffee demanded none of the expensive machinery such as was needed for sugar making, and it was a crop with which the Indonesian cultivators of West Java had long been familiar. Above all, however, the attractiveness of coffee lay in the high prices paid for it as soon as the end of the Napoleonic wars made possible a renewal of the trade to Europe.

At Batavia coffee prices had been derisory at the time of the British take over in 1811, but began to rise sharply as the war drew to a close. By 1818 coffee fetched f.44 per pikul there, and stocks were not enough to satisfy

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A later coffee planter and merchant, William Gotes, attested that anyone who had any capital at that time was quick to invest it in shipments of coffee to Europe. Three years later, in 1821, coffee reached its peak price at Batavia of 54 per pikul, and it was not until 1824 that Batavia prices fell markedly below this high level to 31 per pikul.

Such prices appear to have been high enough to encourage coffee growing on many of the estates, in West Java and on the lands leased by Europeans in the Principalities. Among the West Java coffee producers were many of the estates in the Hinterland and Buitenzorg areas, the Preanger estates of Sukabumi, Udjong Bron and Tjiputri, the Krawang estate of Pamanukan and Tjiassam, and the Tjikandi Ilir estate in the eastern part of Bantam. The full extent of private coffee production in these areas is difficult to estimate, but, the Principalities apart, the following table (Table A) gives some idea of it for the

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11 See note 8.
12 See table A: Coffee production on the private lands of West Java compared with the output of the Indies Government's Preanger coffee gardens and with total coffee exports from Java, 1814-22. The sources on which this table is based appear at the foot of the table. See page 161.
TABLE A: Coffee Production on the Private Lands of West Java compared with the Output of the Indies Government's Preanger Coffee Gardens and with Total Coffee Exports from Java, 1814-22.
Weight in Pikuls of 125 Dutch pounds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Private Lands</th>
<th>Govt. Lands</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preanger</td>
<td>P&amp;T</td>
<td>Buitenzorg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>11,610</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4,146</td>
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<td>1818</td>
<td>12,132</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7,608</td>
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<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>8,242</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>1820</td>
<td>6,420</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,406</td>
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<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>10,862</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>7,516</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

years 1814-1822, and enables a comparison to be made between the output of the government-controlled coffee plantations in West Java and that of the private estates in the same area. The statistics for the whole of the Preanger district are more or less complete, as are those for the group of nine estates in Buitenzorg sold by Daendals in 1809. Other figures are only fragmentary. Coffee planting at Tjikandi Ilir did not begin until about 1822\(^{13}\) and its production does not appear in this table. The records of coffee exports which serve as a further basis for comparison, do not begin until 1819.

Large-scale cultivation of coffee by European planters in the Principalities did not begin until about 1818, and although by 1823 there were a dozen or more substantial European coffee growers established there, few of their plantations can have been at a mature state of development by then. In May 1823 the Indies government ordered the termination of most of the leases held by Europeans in Solo and Jogja, and the confusion caused by this event, taken together with that caused by the outbreak of the Java war two years later, (which led to the devastation of many of

\(^{13}\) Palmer to Abbot, 13.2.1823, Eng. Lett. c.95 p.99.
the plantations in the Principalities) occasioned a great deal of difficulty in collecting coffee production statistics for the Solo and Jogja areas. Indeed, such statistics as are available are of potential rather than actual coffee production.

The Batavia government's growing interest in what was happening in the Principalities in the early 'twenties led to some discussion within the administration as to the amount of coffee which the European leased-lands in Solo and Jogja might be expected to produce when the newly established plantations arrived at maturity. The amount fixed on was 200,000 pikuls annually. This figure was originally suggested by the pro-planter Resident of Jogja, Colonel Nahuijs, and it was accepted as just by his bitterest critic within the administration, De Graaff, chief advisor to Governor-General Van der Capellan and

14 The enforced termination of most of the leases held by European planters in the Principalities as a result of the Indies government's Decree of 6.5.1823 is dealt with in Ch.1. A revolt against the Dutch led by Prince Diponegoro broke out at Jogja in 1825 and continued until 1830. In the main, the conflict was confined to the Jogja and Solo areas, though some of the neighbouring government provinces were marginally effected.
moving spirit behind the 1823 prohibition of land-lease.\textsuperscript{15}

In terms of production elsewhere in Java this was a very large amount of coffee. It was, for example, more than twice the amount of coffee produced by the government's own Preanger coffee plantations in 1821.\textsuperscript{16}

On the other hand, there is a strong case for arguing that this was no more than a guess, and a not very inspired one at that. Resident Nahuijs freely admitted that he had never surveyed or even seen many of the coffee plantations concerned.\textsuperscript{17} An ardent supporter of land-lease to Europeans, he was probably given to exaggerating that system's achievements. De Graaff, for his part, was only too ready to seize on a piece of information which served so well to underline the supposed threat to the government's coffee monopoly.\textsuperscript{18} In 1825 an official commission entrusted with

\textsuperscript{15} In March 1822 De Graaff produced a long report highly unfavourable to the system of European landlease in the Principalities. This is printed by V.d.Kemp (ed) in Tijd.N.L., 14, 1890. Nahuijs's enthusiasm for land-lease was demonstrated as early as 1817 in a report to the Commissioners-General. See V.d.Kemp, Vertrek, p.25. Nahuijs's views, and those of De Graaff and Governor-General Van der Capellen, found full expression in their correspondence of 1821-2. This is printed by Nahuijs in Verzameling, 1, p.282-324.

\textsuperscript{16} See Table A: Coffee production etc.

\textsuperscript{17} Nahuijs, Verzemeling, 1, p.304.

\textsuperscript{18} On the role of the Indies government after 1816 as a planter and monopolist of coffee, see below p. 165-7.
sorting out the confusion arising from the enforced termination of the leases at Solo and Jogja reported that on six major coffee plantations in the Solo area, the lands of J.A. Dezentje, Gillian Maclaine, P.H. de la Bretoniere, William Stavers, J.D. Boudet and Resident Nahuijs himself included, the estimated coffee harvest when the trees reached full maturity would be in the region of 20,000 pikuls. Of course, this survey did not cover all the major plantations, but it did cover the lands of what appear to be the most prominent coffee planters. This being so, it is difficult to imagine how a figure even half as high as the Nahuijs-De Graaff estimate of 200,000 pikuls could have been reached. Nonetheless, anticipated coffee production in the Principalities was still considerable.

Unfortunately for those Europeans engaged in private coffee growing speculations in West Java and in the Principalities, they encountered a formidable rival in the Indies government itself. Although the restored Dutch rulers of 1816 had abandoned most of the former East India Company's mercantile functions, the Batavia government

19 Report on the leased lands, Appendix O, Schneither Coll 109. A listing of the people I believe to be the major coffee planters of Jogja and Solo between 1818 and 1823 appears in Ch.2. p. 146-50. Of the major planters, only Cotes and Kuiper appear to be missing here.
remained a planter as well as a ruler throughout our period. In West Java the government ran large coffee gardens (inherited from the Company and extended by Daendals) in the hilly Preanger regions, to the south of Buitenzorg. In the coastal Residencies of East Java, moreover, a system of what amounted to compulsory cultivation for the benefit of the government existed in many areas.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, the financial solvency of the Indies government was tied closely to the revenues it drew from its coffee plantations. In theory after the introduction of the Land Rent System in 1813, the government was supposed to draw its revenues from the renting of the land and not from the old source of forced deliveries by the local people of agricultural produce suitable for export. In fact, a very high proportion of the government's revenue came from the proceeds of forced coffee cultivation in the Preanger, and from what amounted to the same thing in various parts of East Java. In 1818 one-half of all

\textsuperscript{20} A detailed description of the forced cultivation of coffee on the government's behalf of the Preanger district of West Java will be found in V.d.Kemp, \textit{Landelijk Stelsel}, p.175-230. In East Java the coffee gardens were supposed to be rented from the government and freely cultivated by the local villagers. In fact, as a former Resident of Pasaruan described it, the local people "were driven with sticks to the coffee gardens" and what amounted to a forced cultivation prevailed in many areas. More details of this in V.d.Kemp, \textit{Landelijk Stelsel}, p.163-75.
government revenue came from this source, and in 1823 almost one-third.21

These coffee profits, either actual or potential, had not been forgotten by Daendals or Raffles when they sold land between 1808 and 1813. These land sales were hedged with conditions allowing the government to retain some form of control over the coffee cultivation of the newly created estates. As a result, the renumerativeness of coffee to the landowners was often illusory. In the case of the lands sold by Daendals in 1809 which had formerly been part of the Governor-General's old Buitenzorg estate, the new owners were compelled to continue the cultivation of coffee, and the whole area was supposed to deliver 10,000 pikuls of coffee annually to the government at a low and fixed price.22 In the case of the lands sold in 1813, the cultivation of coffee was not obligatory, but the sale conditions were so interpreted by Raffles and subsequent Dutch regimes as to mean that any coffee grown on those lands had to be delivered to the government at the fixed rate of six Spanish dollars per pikul.23 These sale conditions, written in 'oracle language' as one later writer put it,24 were the

21 W. Ph. Coolhaas, Het Regeering Reglement van 1827, Utrecht, 1936, p. 18-22.
subject of intense controversy from soon after the sale until the government relaxed its demands in 1829. The main areas involved were Krawang, Buitenzorg and the Preanger. In theory at least similar regulations applied to the coffee plantations of the Hinterland and Tjikandi, but they remained unenforced, probably because the size of the plantations concerned did not make their enforcement worthwhile. On the estates which were affected, however, the government's insistence on deliveries of coffee had an important influence on the pattern of agriculture. As it became clear that the government had no intention of relinquishing its supposed rights, and as the price of coffee on the open market came to bear an ever diminishing relation to the price offered by the government, the crop was either abandoned on the estates, or the owners sold out to the government.

At Pamanukan and Tjiassem, the hilly Batu Sirap and Segala Serang areas were fairly heavily planted with coffee before the lands were sold in 1815. The annual coffee harvest under government control had been about 2,000 pikuls. Under private ownership, however, a great reduction in the scale of coffee growing took place, so that by 1818 coffee

production had sunk to a mere 20 odd pikuls.\(^{26}\) Although some renewal of the plantations did take place in 1821-2, when 250,000 more trees were planted,\(^{27}\) the failure of the owners to get free disposal of the crop led to the decay of the coffee gardens and concentration on sugar production.\(^{28}\) In 1824 coffee output amounted to only fifty pikuls and the surviving accounts make it clear that this was the result of deliberate neglect by the owners, and not a consequence of the unsuitability of the Panamukan and Tjiassan uplands for the coffee cultivation. A government report on the state of coffee cultivation in December 1824 remarked that parts of the estate were very suitable for coffee.\(^{29}\) This observation receives confirmation from one of John Palmer's letters to the estate's co-owner W.T. Money. According to Palmer, who visited the estate during one of his visits to Java in the early 'twenties, Money's "vast possessions would be invaluable if excepted from the forced delivery of coffee, but that hateful restraint precludes the possibility of extending the culture, as well as denying


\(^{27}\) Annual General Report Krawang 1823, p.121, Schneither Coll 87.


you any substantial advantage from the existing gardens; these were, however, of great beauty and promise..."30

It was, however, a beauty and promise which remained unexploited until the government relaxed its demands for coffee delivery in 1829. Until that time, as far as government sources show, coffee production at Pamanukan and Tjiassem remained low or non-existent. The accuracy of government figures and the possibility of coffee having been smuggled off the estate are, for obvious reasons, rather difficult to check. With its long, indented coastline, the estate was admirably situated from the point of view of the potential smuggler, and in 1827 accusations on this score reached the ears of the Council in Batavia.

As shown by exchanges between administrator Loudon and the owners, the financial position of the estate in the later 'twenties was desperate enough for the management to contemplate smuggling31, but nothing was ever proved by the Dutch.

31 In 1828 a major row broke out between the British owners of Pamanukan and Tjiassem (among whom were J. Stewart, Sir Charles and Mitchie Forbes) and their administrator Alexander Loudon, who had been appointed three years earlier. According to Loudon, the estate was deeply in debt, and to cover this he drew bills amounting to several thousands of pounds on the European owners. See letters of J. Stewart and C. and M. Forbes to Loudon, 31.12.1828 and 2.2.1829 in Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 30.9.1829 no.110, Min.v.Kol. 705.
Indeed, the Dutch local and central authorities appear to have been less concerned with verifying the substance of their allegations than with the 'impolite and uncivilized' things which the Scots-born administrator said to the Assistant Resident of Krawang when the latter accused him of smuggling.32

In the Buitenzorg area the government's demands for coffee deliveries met with increasing restiveness after 1816.33 Nonetheless, they appear to have been complied with, although the statistics indicate that nothing like the anticipated 10,000 pikuls annually was ever squeezed out of the district.34 It was in the Preanger, however, that a direct clash between the government and the private coffee growers took place. Andries de Wilde, co-owner and administrator of the Sukabumi estate, attempted to circumvent the coffee regulations by appealing over the head of the Indies government to the King himself. As the Sukabumi affair has been dealt with in detail elsewhere, it must suffice here to point out what appear to be the essentials of a situation which was as complex as it was obscure.35

34 See table A: Coffee Production etc.
35 A detailed account of the Sukabumi affair based on Batavia archive material will be found in De Haan, Priangan,
The greater part of the revenues of Sukabumi came from coffee. In 1821 some 34,000 Spanish dollars worth of the total gross profits of 48,000 Spanish dollars were accounted for in this manner. The profits would have been all the greater, however, if only the owners had been able to sell their coffee freely on the open market, or had been able to get a better price for it from the government. With this latter end in view De Wilde returned to Holland in 1819 and convinced the authorities of the justice of his cause. Without further reference to the Indies government, De Wilde was authorized by the Royal Decree of July 1821 to receive ten Spanish dollars for each pikul of coffee delivered to the government instead of the previous six. This arrangement was to operate from 1821 until 1823, after which a new price was to be fixed, fairly related to the then current market value of coffee.\(^3\) Governor-General Van der Capellen's reception of the news, and for that matter of the returning De Wilde, was cool. In a stormy interview he told the landowner that for all he cared all the coffee trees on the estate could be uprooted.\(^3\) He refused to implement the Royal Decree. This

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2. De Haan, Priangan, l, Personalia, p.293 and 299.
3. De Wilde to Elout, 22.7.1822, Min.v.Kol. 3195.
was 1822. Early in the following year De Wilde and his co-owners Nicholas Engelhard and Thomas MacQuoid sold their property back to the Indies government. The circumstances surrounding this development were the subject of some controversy, assiduously kept alive by De Wilde, whose Sukabumi petitions continued to arrive at the Colonial Office in The Hague as late as 1838. His allegation that the sale had been forced on the owners, however, may have been little more than a debating point in the long drawn out battle for more compensation money. The inquiry conducted some years later by the Du Bus government concluded that De Wilde had sold the estate freely, a conclusion which was shared by De Haan, the most knowledgeable historian to given an account of the affair. On the other hand, it can hardly be doubted that the government was very anxious to repossess itself of the entire Preanger district, and was prepared to go to some lengths to reach this end. The Resident of Krawang, H.A. van den Broek, claimed that he had been warned off by the Governor-General himself from bidding for the Udjong Bron estate when it had been put up for sale in 1821.

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39 See note 35.
The estate was subsequently bought by the government.\textsuperscript{40} Whatever were the rights and wrongs of the Sukabumi affair, the result was that with the purchase of that property only the Tjiputri estate remained in private hands. With its repurchase some months after Sukabumi,\textsuperscript{41} the whole of the Preanger coffee plantations returned to government control, and the main centre of private European coffee cultivation in West Java disappeared.

In the Principalities as well as in West Java the coffee planters experienced the effects of government hostility. There were a number of reasons why the government came to take a hostile view of the expansion after 1816 of the system whereby European planters leased land from the Javanese nobility of the courts of Solo and Jogja. In part this was a result of the frustration of the Batavia authorities' own plans for future Dutch relations with the Principalities. What was being proposed at Batavia from at least 1819 onwards was a scheme for the back-door annexation of the Principalities, the main idea of which was that the government itself should lease lands from the Javanese nobility until the latter's authority had been

\textsuperscript{40} Van den Broek to Nahuijs, 25.10.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8 and 9.

\textsuperscript{41} Van der Capellen to Falck, 9.9.1823, Schneither Coll 116.
undermined. The long leases taken out by private Europeans made this difficult if not impossible.\textsuperscript{42} In part too, government hostility originated in its fear that through the medium of lease-hold in the Principalities, a large number of non-Dutch Europeans of doubtful loyalty were succeeding in establishing themselves in the interior of the colony, in places where it was difficult to keep them under observation.\textsuperscript{43} As we have already seen, non-Dutch Europeans were prominent among the most substantial group of planters, the British particularly so. Whether these

\textsuperscript{42} The government's designs on the Principalities are stated clearly in Van der Capellen's letter to Colonial Minister of 4.6.1823, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 27.11.1826, no.56, Min.v.Kol. 531. The same theme is reiterated in greater detail by De Graaff in a report of April 1825. "The aim is straightforward," he wrote, it is "to transfer to the government the administration of justice, the powers of policing, and the control of the treasury. Above all, the object is to gain control of the raising of taxes on agricultural produce." The means, initially at least, was to be the leasing of land by the government from the Javanese nobility. Report De Graaff 26.4.1825, p.17, Schneither Coll 109.

\textsuperscript{43} As the Indies government saw it, the danger was that in the event of an outbreak of war in Europe and the spread of hostilities to the East, the British planters would form a serious threat to Dutch security in Java. The assumption was that The Netherlands and Great Britain would be on opposing sides. A statement of these views in De Graaff report 23.3.1822, in Tijd N.L., 41, 1890 (off-print p.21-2). A similar line of reasoning occurs in the preamble to the decision taken by the government in January 1823 to act against the planters established in the Principalities. Extract G.G. buiten Rade 14.1.1823, Schneither Coll 109.
latter really formed a potential threat to Java's security is another matter altogether.\textsuperscript{44}

There remains, however, a strong case for arguing that it was the coffee question which lay at the root of the position taken up by the government. The planters and their supporters had no doubts at all on this score. The Indies' administration 'cast a longing eye' on the coffee gardens of the Principalities, wrote a correspondent of the absentee landowner W.T.Money, and seized them just when they were coming to maturity.\textsuperscript{45} This is a rather crude interpretation of government motivation. Nevertheless, whatever else the Van der Capellen regime may have had in mind, it can hardly be doubted that its intention was to drive the most substantial European coffee planters out of Solo and Jogja. It was not the planters which mattered as much as what they grew. This emerges clearly from the way in which lesser planters with few coffee trees were allowed

\textsuperscript{44} Nahuijs argued that there were so few British planters in Jogja and Solo that the role which they were capable of playing was minimal. This is a typical Nahuijs half-truth. The British were few, but, as has already been argued in a previous chapter, their importance was out of all proportion to their numbers. They were amongst the most substantial planters in the Principalities. Nahuijs, Comments on the De Graaff Report, 7.5.1822, p.22. Leiden MSS 616, 7, no.9.

\textsuperscript{45} W.T.Money to George Canning, 25.12.1824, Appendix—Extract letter from "a gentleman long resident in Holland and now settled at Batavia," undated c.1825, Canning papers 99A.
to continue their leases despite the prohibition of May 6th 1823.\textsuperscript{46} It also emerges from the government's dealings with the Jogja planter Harvey Thompson. The administration only objected to his continued presence in Jogja in his role of coffee planter. They were, on the other hand, prepared to go to considerable lengths to encourage him to stay in the area as an indigo planter and manufacturer, provided, of course, that he ceased to grow coffee.\textsuperscript{47} What the government were worried about was shown in the Council meeting of 14th January 1823, when it was decided to prohibit the leases. The threat with which they felt themselves to be faced was that of a flood of coffee from the Principalities, over which they had no control and from which they could draw little advantage. On the contrary, it was believed that this new supply would have a positively adverse effect on government finances by depressing the price of coffee on the Batavia market, thus reducing those profits which formed such an 'important and indispensable part of government revenues.'\textsuperscript{48} As a result of government action, private European coffee cultivation was brought to a premature if temporary end in 1824.

\textsuperscript{46} G.G. in Rade 27.1.1824 no.29, \underline{Min.v.Kol.} 2781.
\textsuperscript{47} G.G. in Rade 18.11.1823 no.19, \underline{Min.v.Kol.} 2780.
\textsuperscript{48} G.G. buiten Rade 14.1.1823, Extract, \underline{Schneither Coll} 109.
However, it was not government hostility alone which resulted in so few of the European coffee growers making good. The collapse of the post-war high coffee prices after 1823 played its part in this process. Nor was it the only difficulty facing estate coffee growers in the 'twenties. Some of the coffee growing speculations were ill-advised in the purely agricultural sense. On the low-lying Tjikandi Ilir lands in Bantam 260,000 coffee trees were planted in 1822, but the whole coffee scheme had to be written off by 1830. The annual harvests had never exceeded fifty pikuls. The same dismal picture held good for many of the Batavia Hinterland estates. The senior official Lawick van Pabst reported to his superiors in 1822 that in comparison with the Preanger, the coffee growers of the Hinterland and even of Buitenzorg had to struggle with ground of poor quality, as well as with ill-planting and careless management of the gardens. As a result, a great number of trees had had to be written off since 1816. Two years after Lawick's report, a commission of inquiry into the state of the West Java coffee cultivation in general reported that of fifty-six estates in the area,

49 Palmer to Deans, 10.7.1827, Eng.Lett. c.106 p.259;
twenty did not cultivate coffee at all, and on the remainder attempts to grow the crop had failed either in part or entirely. Several estate owners reported to the Commission that their land was either unsuitable or exhausted. In these circumstances ambitious planting, such as high prices after 1816 had encouraged, was followed by the death of the young trees. The owner of the small Goudrong estate said that of the 1,500 trees planted there, only 300 had survived. Where the trees did take hold, many owners complained, there were not enough workpeople available to keep the plantations in good condition. The owner of Bergzicht, where the 620,000 coffee trees produced 2,491 pikuls in 1824, claimed that only half of his trees were in well tended condition, because he could only find one third of the workpeople needed. The owner of Salapadjang estate reported that his coffee plantations were full of weeds, because he could not obtain workpeople from Cheribon. In common with many of his contemporaries, the proprietor of Simplicitas complained of the high wages which had to be paid to attract workpeople. This theme of the shortage and expense of labour in the Hinterland is one that will be returned to in a later chapter.

52 See Ch. 4, p. 264-84.
With the decay of coffee growing in the lowlands of West Java, its abandonment on the private lands in Krawang, the government takeover of the Preanger estates and the suppression of those in the Principalities, not much of the island's coffee production remained in private hands after 1824. This is demonstrated as far as possible in the following table (Table B).\(^5^3\) As in the previous table, the available statistics allow a comparison to be made between the output of the remaining private coffee plantations, that of the now entirely government-controlled Preanger, and the total amount of coffee exported in the years concerned.

In the Principalities, where the land-lease system was revived by Du Bus in 1827, coffee was again being grown on lands leased by Europeans by the end of the 'twenties. No production statistics are available before 1829, when, according to the High Commission for agriculture, 25,000 pikuls were harvested from the plantations around Solo.\(^5^4\) No production figures for Jogja were given in that year. Elsewhere, however, private European coffee growing was of little account.

\(^5^3\) See Table B: Coffee production on the private lands of West Java compared with coffee production on the Government plantations in the Preanger and with total coffee exports, 1827-9. Sources for this table at foot of the table, p.181.

\(^5^4\) Agriculture Commission 1829, p.4, Du Bus Coll 371.
TABLE B: Coffee Production on the Private Lands of West Java compared with the Coffee Production of the Government's Plantations in the Preanger and with Total Coffee Exports from Java, 1827-1829. Weights in Pikuls of 125 Dutch pounds.

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<th>Exports</th>
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<td>11,020</td>
<td>123,074</td>
<td>399,558</td>
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<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>94,000</td>
<td>416,172</td>
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<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>6,260</td>
<td>64,996</td>
<td>281,662</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Landbouw Verslag 1828, Appendix 2; Report High Commission for Agriculture 1829, Du Bus Coll 371; Table of Java's Foremost Exports, 1823-32, Baud Coll 413.
Sugar Production.
The Java sugar industry in the early nineteenth century.

The history of the European sugar industry on Java in the period 1812-34 differs in many important respects from that of the cultivation of coffee. There was no government-sponsored or controlled cultivation of sugar until after 1830, and so there were none of the clashes between private and governmental interests such as were frequent in the coffee growing sphere of estate agriculture. Until the Cultivation System got under way, sugar manufacture was an entirely private sector of the island's economy. The only major source of friction was the issue of labour recruitment on behalf of the sugar mills, a topic which will be examined in detail in a later chapter. From 1816 onwards, and probably before, the manufacturers were free to make and sell sugar as they wished. The monopoly of the sale of sugar, instituted by the Company in the later eighteenth century was abolished by Daendals in 1810.

55 Much of the labour used in the West Java sugar industry was recruited elsewhere, mostly in Tjeribon province, to the east of Krawang. For this system of labour recruitment and its attendant difficulties, see ch. 4 p. 273-84.

56 De Haan, Oud Batavia, p. 325.
Under Raffles some limited attempts were made to revive this old monopoly, causing one merchant to fear that "scarcely ... a grain of sugar" would be obtained from Java, "the government ... having monopolized it for the disguised and degrading project of intercourse with Japan." With the failure of the Japan mission, however, the British regime appears to have relinquished its bid to dominate the sugar trade.

The European sugar industry was not concentrated solely on the estates of West Java and the Principalities, as was the private cultivation of coffee. European sugar makers were to be found in several of the coastal Residencies, from Tjeribon eastwards, especially in the Oosthoek areas of Pasaruan, Probolingo and Besuki, all to the east of Surabaja. The salient characteristic of the industry as a whole, however, was that it was Chinese rather than European dominated. In the Batavia Hinterland, for example, only four of the thirty-six sugar mills operative in 1824 were European owned. In East Java in the late 'twenties

the numerical inferiority of the Europeans was still more pronounced. Of the hundred or so sugar mills, scarcely more than a dozen can have been in European hands.  

The nature of the available sugar production statistics, moreover, makes it impossible to differentiate between the European and Chinese sectors of the industry in terms of production. Compared with those available for coffee, sugar production statistics are in any case rather bad for most of our period. Before the early 'twenties a statistical breakdown of production, Residency by Residency, is, for the time being at least, unobtainable. Unfortunately those Residency reports which are available for the years 1820-4 are not complete for the whole of Java for any one year, with the result that it is not possible to give more than a roughly estimated figure for the total sugar production of Java during the early 'twenties.  

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60 Agriculture Commission 1829, Appendix 2, Du Bus Coll 371. On the other hand, numerical superiority conveys nothing in terms of backing and machinery. The small number of European sugar producers may have been better financed than their Chinese counterparts, and some of them were certainly the owners of sugar mills of far more advanced design. These and similar technological matters will be dealt with below.  

61 These reports form volumes 83-99 of the Schneither Coll.
In 1827, however, sugar output statistics again become available, in a Residency-by-Residency breakdown, from the annual reports of the High Commission for Agriculture. The most immediately striking thing about the statistics of agricultural production contained in these reports, however, is that they give a level of production for sugar which is consistently twice as high as the level of sugar exports in the years concerned. The explanation of this disparity may, of course be the perfectly innocent one that the difference between sugar exports and sugar production represented the consumption of that product on the island itself. It is virtually impossible to prove this either way. There were several grades of sugar produced during the several stages of manufacture and refinement, and this in itself tends to bedevil the collection of sugar statistics. At the same time the Commission, which was set up by Commissioner General Du Bus in 1826 with the aim of encouraging the production of crops for export, was interested less in accuracy than in presenting a picture of a rapid expansion of agricultural output taking place under the auspices of the Du Bus administration. In these

63 Java's foremost exports 1823-32, Baud Coll 413.
64 Staatsblad 29.3.1826 no.13.
circumstances it may well be wise to treat the statistical compilations of the commission with some caution. Du Bus's successor, Governor General Van den Bosch, described the reports as "works of fiction,"\(^65\) which was probably an exaggeration meant to serve his own interests - which were to emphasize the importance of his own role in the stimulation of agricultural production. Nevertheless, in one or two instances where records other than the export figures can be compared with the agricultural production figures compiled by the High Commission, some serious disparities remain. According to the High Commission, the total sugar production in Japara province amounted to 10,000 pikuls in 1828 and to 12,000 pikuls in the following year. However, according to another official statistical compilation made in the mid-thirties, only 836 pikuls of sugar were exported from Japara province in 1828, and only 508 pikuls in 1829.\(^66\)

\(^{65}\) Van den Bosch to Baud, 26.5.1830, in Westendorp Boerma (ed) Briefwisseling tussen J.v.d. Bosch and J.C. Baud, 1829-1832 en 1834-1836, Utrecht 1956, 1, p.60. It is scarcely necessary to point out that as Du Bus's ambitious successor, Van den Bosch had a strong interest in belittling the achievements of his predecessor.

\(^{66}\) Report Van Beusechem on Japara, c.1834, p.12 Min.v.Kol. 3059. This was one of a series of compilations based, it appears, on the Annual General Reports of the Residencies of Java which did not, as a rule, find their way to The Hague.
Clearly, we are dealing here with different categories, those of production and those of export. Nonetheless, it scarcely needs to be pointed out that the presumption is that if the sugar was not exported it was consumed in the spot. Sugar does not stockpile well in tropical conditions and the low level of duty hardly suggests smuggling. It cannot of course be ruled out that the mid-thirties statistics were wrong and those of the Commission right. Nonetheless, unless we assume that this vast amount of sugar was consumed annually in Japara province, a certain degree of disquiet must remain in regard to the reliability of sugar production statistics in the earlier nineteenth century period.

Such production statistics as are available will be discussed in detail below. Here it is enough to outline the general pattern of sugar exports and market prices between 1812 and the early eighteen thirties. Records of sugar exports from Java begin in 1821 when a total of 90,000 pikuls was exported. This level of exportation was not kept up in the years that followed. In 1825 exports had declined to 16,357 pikuls of sugar, and only began to rise significantly in 1828. It was not until 1830 that the 1821 level of exports was reached again.\(^\text{67}\) The mid-

\(^{67}\) See note 63.
twenties, fairly obviously, was a period of severe recession for the Java sugar industry. Between 1821 and 1827, for instance, the number of sugar mills in the Batavia hinterland (one of the two main sugar producing areas of Java) which were in operation fell from sixty to twenty-four.68

The varying fortunes of the Java sugar industry in the 'twenties may in part be explained in terms of an industry stimulated by high prices, and then adversely effected by a sharp fall in prices. The Indies government's agricultural advisors remarked that around 1819 high prices encouraged a great deal of investment in sugar cultivation and manufacture,69 and what we know of the market price of sugar seems to confirm both this initial enthusiasm for investment and the subsequent recession. The main market for Java's sugar was in western Europe. In 1829, for instance, the main destinations of exported sugar were Holland, (55,318 pikuls) Japan, (7,499 pikuls) and the Great East, (3,949 pikuls).70 In Europe the price commanded by sugar, in common with many other colonial products, was very high in the 1814-5 period. These high

68 Report Loudon and Teissiere, 8.5.1827, Van den Bosch Coll 404.
69 See note 68.
70 Bruijn Kops, Statistiek, 2, p.186-90.
prices, however, declined sharply from 1818 onwards, and by 1821-4 the price fetched by sugar on the London market was only half what it had been at the close of the Napoleonic wars.71

However, this explanation in terms of market prices appears to be far less valid for the recovery of the Java sugar industry in the late 'twenties. For although sugar prices in Europe began to rise in 1825, the improvement can only be described as marginal. In 1814, at the height of the boom, sugar fetched seventy-five shillings per hundredweight on the London market. This had fallen to thirty-one shillings by 1822, and the rise which took place in 1825 was only of five-shillings, to thirty-six shillings per hundredweight. Sugar prices remained at this level until 1829, after which they began to fall again. In 1830 sugar was sold in London for only twenty-four shillings per hundredweight.72 At best, prices only offer partial explanation of what was happening to the sugar industry in the twenties. This is a theme, however, which is best dealt with reference to particular areas of sugar growing, and with reference to the other aspects of estates and plantation agriculture, such as labour availability and finance.73

72 See note 71.
73 See below and subsequent two chapters.
Output was but one aspect of Java sugar production in the years 1812-34. Another was the manner of production. In comparison with the sugar industry of the West Indies and even of Mauritius, that of Java was technologically backward in the early nineteenth century, as even the High Commission for Agriculture was prepared to admit. The sugar mills in most common use on the island throughout the period were those of the Chinese type. These mills, sometimes large and permanent, sometimes so small that they could be carried from one cane field to the next, were basically made up of two stone or wooden cylinders set up vertically, between which the cane was crushed. The power came from a pair of oxen, which worked in teams right round the clock at the height of the sugar making season. There was a great deal to be said against this method of operation. It was above all else slow and wasteful. The cane had to be passed through the crushers at least twice, and even then a good deal less than the maximum amount of juice was extracted. Chinese mills were not well adapted to large scale production. The best of them produced no more than ten pikuls of sugar per day. Grouped, such mills demanded

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74 Agriculture Commission 1829, p.4 Du Bus Coll 371.
a large and costly number of oxen to work them. Mills of advanced design, which allowed more cane to be crushed with greater efficiency, and which had been introduced on the West Indies sugar plantations in the course of the eighteenth century, were slow in coming to Java, at least in significant numbers. The most important of these advances was the evolvement of a metal three cylinder horizontal-set mill, usually referred to in contemporary accounts as mills constructed in the 'West Indian' or 'American' manner. According to De Haan there was a mill at Tanjong West in the Batavia Hinterland built in the American style but with stone instead of metal cylinders as early as 1785. A report of 1812 mentions a mill in the Japara Residency, said to have been built by Resident Dirk van Hogendorp in the seventeen-nineties, which was "constructed after the West Indian manner, with brass ...
cylinders and put into motion by water." These appear to have been isolated examples. As late as 1829 the High Commission for Agriculture reported that there were only five sugar works on the whole island which used horizontal-set three cylinder mills, two of them in West Java and three in East Java. Another improvement which was only slowly introduced was the replacement of ox-power by water or steam power. As early as 1779 it had been recommended that water-power should be used in the Hinterland, but even by the eighteen-twenties there is little evidence of its widespread use. In some cases local circumstances made the introduction of water-power difficult. The Indies government were informed in 1819 that the water-mill which the East Java sugar makers Poulter and Grieve proposed to erect in the Besuki area could only be operated to the detriment of the adjacent irrigation system. There was not enough water for both. As for steam-driven mills, there were only two operating in Java on the eve of the Cultivation System. Working in conjunction with 'West Indian' cane crushing equipment, they were said to be capable of

80 Hoyman, V.B.G., 1, 1779, p.260.
81 Verbaal C.G. 12.6.1818 no.21, Min.v.Kol. 2374.
of triple the output of the best Chinese mills.\textsuperscript{82}

Sugar Production on the West Java Estates.

Sugar was cultivated and manufactured in West Java on the great estates of Tjikandi Ilir, Pamanukan and Tjiassem, Indramaju and Kandanghauer and Sumadangan and Tegal Waru. It was also produced by the firm of Jessen Trail and Company on their lands at Bekasi, in the Hinterland, and at Tjikandi Udek on the borders of Bantam, as well as by a number of smaller Hinterland landowners.

At Tjikandi Ilir, to the west of the hinterland, sugar was produced between 1819 and 1823, after which it appears to have been abandoned.\textsuperscript{83} The sugar-making equipment on the estate was imported and included a sugar mill, (presumably of the horizontal-set, three cylinder variety) boiling pans and other unspecified apparatus. According to the importers, this machinery came from Mauritius on the ships Lady Sophia and Rosalie in the course of 1820. Whether it was second-hand and formerly used in the sugar industry of that latter island is not made clear.\textsuperscript{84} This was not

Tjikandi Ilir's only connection with Mauritius. One of the two Europeans operating the sugar works in 1820, Antoine Le Marchand, had arrived in Java from Mauritius in 1816. A rum distillery was also set up. No record appears to exist of how much sugar was produced at the Tjikandi Ilir works, but according to the report of the Resident of Bantam the total output of this mill and that at the neighbouring Tjikandi Udek, the only other sugar mill in his Residency, was in the region of 2,500 pikuls in 1820. At Tjikandi Udek, the Batavia firm of Jessen Trail and Company started to make sugar in 1819, and were still doing so ten years later in 1829, when production amounted to 6,000 pikuls annually. The equipment at the works arrived on the English ship Stirling in 1819, and included "one set of cylinders for a large sugar mill," as well as "one complete set of Sutherlands sugar pans, with all that belongs to them." As at Tjikandi Ilir, this machinery came from Mauritius where it had either been in

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81 Antoine Le Marchand was said to have been born on Bourbon (Reunion), but came to Java in 1816 from Mauritius. Min.v.Kol. 3107.
88 Agriculture Commission 1829, Table 2, Du Bus Coll 371.
use or had been trans-shipped. According to another source it had been sent out from London. When the senior government official Willem van Hogendorp visited the Tjikandi area in 1826 he found that the mills at the Udek works were operated by oxen, although there was some talk of introducing steam power there. The High Commission for Agriculture, however, made no mention of one having been installed there in their report of 1829, although they did classify the works as one of the three largest on Java.

In the eastern part of the Batavia Hinterland sugar was also manufactured in the neighbourhood of Bekasi by the same firm, Jessen Trail and Company, who later operated under the name of Trail and Company and later still under that of Trail and Young. Their Bekasi works, which included an arak distillery, was said to be the most important in the whole Hinterland. It was capable of producing

90 See note 87.
93 Annual General Report Batavia 1824, 1, p. 195, Schneither Coll 84.
up to 6,000 pikuls of sugar annually\textsuperscript{94} and its output was claimed to be of a superior quality to that manufactured elsewhere in the Batavia locality\textsuperscript{95}. In the technological sense the works was in the forefront of the Java sugar industry. The machinery included an iron sugar mill which was imported from England in 1824. It was of the three cylinder horizontal-set type\textsuperscript{96} and operated with steam power. The firm imported a steam engine from London in 1823\textsuperscript{97}, the first of its kind to be used in Java's sugar industry. More equipment of an unspecified nature was imported in 1827\textsuperscript{98}.

Elsewhere in the Batavia Hinterland a number of lesser European sugar manufacturers operated at various times between 1812 and the early 'thirties. Among them were J.F. Arnold at Berzicht, Koster and Boekhoff at Babakang and Levenius Heukevlugt at Udjong Minting and elsewhere\textsuperscript{99}.

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\textsuperscript{94} Willem van Hogendorp to G.K. van Hogendorp, 2.10.1828, Van Hogendorp Coll 91.
\textsuperscript{95} G.G. buiten Rade 2.11.1826 no.3, Min.v.Kol. 2498.
\textsuperscript{96} G.G. buiten Rade 24.5.1824 no.2, Min.v.Kol. 2476.
\textsuperscript{97} G.G. buiten Rade 29.3.1823 no.4, Min.v.Kol. 2468.
\textsuperscript{98} G.G. buiten Rade 13.8.1827 no.8, Min.v.Kol. 2507.
\end{flushright}
All the available evidence suggests that they did not use imported equipment, but were satisfied instead to continue to make sugar with Chinese mills in the Chinese manner. Most of them went out of production in the recession of the mid-twenties. By 1829 the only prominent European sugar makers in the Hinterland, apart from Trail and Company, were the firm of Engel and Beynon, who began sugar manufacture at Kedong Gede in 1826 and three years later claimed to be making some 6,600 pikuls of sugar annually. They had four mills, all of the Chinese type, and were building a fifth in the course of 1830.100

These sugar works, at Tjikandi, Bekasi and elsewhere were either on the fringes of the traditional centre of sugar making in Java, or actually in it, European participation in the sugar industry, however, was not limited to this area, and sugar was tried at one time or another between 1812 and 1834 on many of the great estates beyond the Batavia Hinterland, particularly on those which lay in Krawang province, eastwards along the coast from Batavia. On the most distant of these, Indramaju and Kandanghauer, an attempt was certainly made to grow sugar, but what very little information there is about the venture suggests that it was

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100 Engel and Beynon to ? , 27.6.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 415.
not a success. There are no details available about either the method of manufacture or about the amount of sugar produced. At the latest, sugar was abandoned there by 1826-7. On the Sumadangan and Tagal Waru estate, which was part of the Buitenzorg Residency until transferred to Krawang in 1823, there were two Chinese mills built in 1818, and leased to Chinese sugar makers, an arrangement that probably continued until the estate changed hands in 1827. Production amounted to an annual 1,600-2,000 pikuls in 1821, though it was said to have risen to 3,700-3,900 pikuls two years later. In 1828, when the mills were still reported to be of the Chinese type and worked by oxen, annual output was estimated at 3,000 pikuls.

At Pamanujan and Tjiassem, in Krawang province and the larges of all the private estates on the island, sugar was produced throughout the 'twenties, and for that matter was still being produced in the eighteen-sixties. Cultivation of the cane in the Subang area of the lands began in 1819.

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101 Petition owners of Indramaju to Willem I, 23.12.1829, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 10.2.1830 no. 31/7, Min.v.Kol. 728.
104 Willem van Hogendorp to G.K. van Hogendorp, 2.10.1828, p.2. Van Hogendorp Coll 91.
and between then and 1823 the works had an average annual output of 2,000 pikuls of sugar. By 1824 production had risen to 5,000 pikuls, and 100 leggers of rum were also produced. This level of productivity was not maintained, however, and by the closing years of the decade annual output was running at the level of about 3,000 pikuls.

The sugar works at Subang, the only ones on the estate at that time, were very elaborate. The estate's administrator, Thomas MacQuoid, informed the Indies government in July 1820 that he was in the process of erecting a works which comprised a water mill, a cattle mill, boiling houses and distilling plant. At the end of 1818 the property's Batavia agents and part-owners, Skelton and Company, imported from London three iron sugar mills destined for the estate. There are indications, moreover, that the proprietor's intention at one time had been to elaborate the works even beyond this level. In November 1820 Skeltons imported a steam engine specifically for the Subang sugar works and

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108 Agriculture Commission 1829, Table 2, Du Bus Coll 371.
109 MacQuoid to Muntinghe and Merkus, 22.7.1820, Leiden MSS, 6, no.10.
a further reference to its existence was made in a petition sent by one of Pamanukan and Tjiassem's owners to the King of The Netherlands in 1824. There is no evidence however of the steam engine ever having been put to work at Subang, and in fact several indications to the contrary. When Willem van Hogendorp visited the estate in 1828 he found the Subang sugar mills worked by a large iron water wheel, twenty-seven feet in diameter and four feet across, which had been imported from England. This accords with accounts given by the Resident of Krawang in 1823 and by the estate's one time administrator Alexander Loudon several years later. The fate of the steam engine seems to have been that it was used, if at all, for the cutting of timber, and that it never reached Subang at all. In 1828 it was offered for sale. According to Loudon's advertisement, it was a ten horse-power engine, and was lying at the Mura of Tjiassem, on the coast some thirty miles from the up-country Subang.

114 Annual General Report Krawang 1823, p.72-6, Schneither Coll 87.
115 Some Remarks on the Sugar Culture of Java by Mr Loudon, Undated, Baud Coll 949.
116 J.C. 25.11.1828, no.41.
European sugar makers in East Java.

In the coastal provinces eastwards from Tjeribon to the Oosthoek there were only a few private estates in the neighbourhood of the towns of Semarang and Surabaja. The merchant Johannes of Semarang was one of the few sugar makers in the area who was also an estate owner. His sugar works were equipped with three-cylinder horizontal set mills by 1829.\textsuperscript{117} The rest of the sugar manufacturers, European and Chinese alike, were dependent for a supply of cane and labour on arrangements with the surrounding villages.\textsuperscript{118} The Europeans constituted a small minority as compared with the Chinese who dominated the sugar industry of the area, and the information available concerning European activities is a good deal sparser than that for estate sugar cultivation in West Java. Production statistics are on the whole poor. What follows therefore is little more than a listing of manufacturers, with an indication of when they began operations and of when they closed down.

It appears from reports of the early years of the nineteenth century that some few Europeans were active in

\textsuperscript{117} Agriculture Commission 1829, p.4. \textit{Du Bus Coll} 371.
\textsuperscript{118} On labour arrangements in E. Java, see ch. 4 p.295-310.
the East Java sugar industry during the Company period. In Tjeribon, for instance, a sugar mill was owned at the turn of the century by the Resident, "who rented the land for the sugar plantation for a mere trifle from the Sultans." Most of the private European sugar makers appear to have arrived at a rather later date however, in the early years of the Dutch restoration. At Semarang in 1820 the Batavia firm of Deans Scott and Company were given permission to erect an arak distillery on the edge of the town, though it is not clear that they availed themselves of this permission. What is certain is that the firm, which had been refused permission to lease or buy land for sugar cultivation on its own account, financed a number of Chinese sugar makers in Semarang and the neighbouring Japara province. Robert Scott, who was a partner in the firm from its inception until 1823, claimed that between 1817 and 1820 he had "taken a great share in the promotion" of sugar cultivation in the area. Apart from

122 Robert Scott's note of 19.2.1828, Van Hogendorp Coll 153H.
this, and from the possibility that other firms took up a promotional role similar to that of Deans Scott and Company, there is otherwise little trace of further European participation in the sugar industry of the Semarang-Japara area. Europeans were to be found in greater numbers further to the east.

At Surabaja in 1820 two of the twelve sugar mills then working were European owned. They both dated from 1818 and were of the Chinese type. One of them was on the estate of the retired official J.A. Middelkoop, where there was also an arak distillery. In the adjacent Oosthoek areas of Pasaruan, Probolinggo and Besuki, there were a handful of European sugar makers working in 1820. The Surabaja firm of Poulter and Grieve erected a sugar mill in Besuki in 1818, which was still working two years later. In 1824 it was managed by Poulter's one time partner, Charles Brodie. J. Brust and P. Davidson were other Oosthoek sugar makers of the early 'twenties. At Pasaruan at the beginning of that decade there were thirteen sugar mills, two of which were European owned. Of these, one had been built

123 Statistics of Surabaja 1820 Lett.f. no.1, Schneither Coll 96.
126 G.G. in Rade 20.4.1824 no.26 Min.v.Kol. 2782.
between 1797 and 1802, the other in 1818. Both of them were of the Chinese type, but one was said to be water-driven.  

European participation in the sugar industry of East Java tended to be of a more ephemeral nature than was the case in the western parts of the island. Few or none of the names of the early twenties are encountered at the end of the decade. Many of these essentially small-time speculators appear to have fallen victim to the recession of the mid-twenties. Their exact fate is hard to determine in the absence of records for the middle years of the decade. On the eve of the introduction of the Cultivation System, the main European sugar makers, almost all in the Oosthoek, were T.B. Hofland, John Davidson, Charles Etty, Felix Hall, M.C. Vos, and A.G. de Roock.  

Vos, of Pasaruan, and De Roock, of Besuki, appear to have been the foremost sugar-makers of this group. They both had three cylinder horizontal-set mills at their sugar works. Vos's mill was described by a former Resident of Pasaruan as being operated by a large water wheel and as having an annual productive capacity of 3,000 pikuls. The

machinery was said to have been imported by Vos from England.\textsuperscript{131} De Roock, who had begun manufacture at Besuki in 1824, was hoping to be able to produce 2,850 pikuls of sugar in 1830.\textsuperscript{132} There is no indication of how much sugar was produced by the mills owned by John Davidson, T.B. Hofland, Etty and Hall. Davidson appears to have been long established in East Java,\textsuperscript{133} and Hofland was listed as a merchant of Pasaruan in the eighteen twenties. 1830 appears to have been the first year in which he took up sugar manufacture himself. Previous to that, he had promoted the production of sugar by the Chinese manufacturers of the Pasaruan area.\textsuperscript{134} Hofland, Etty and Hall all became government sugar contractors in the early years of the Cultivation System.

\textsuperscript{131} H.I. Domis, De Residentie Pasoeroeang op het Eiland Java, The Hague 1836, p.54-5 and 177-8. Domis was Resident of Pasaruan (Pasoeroean) in the later 'twenties. According to the account given by another one-time Dutch Resident, C.S.W. v. Hogendorp of Batavia, Vos had a steam engine at his Pasaruan works c.1830. Van Hogendorp, Java, p.156.

\textsuperscript{132} A.G. de Roock's note of 29.5.1829, Van den Bosch Coll 413.

\textsuperscript{133} One J. Davidson was the owner of two sugar mills at Probolinggo in 1823, according to De Haan, B.K.I., 92, 1835, p.531. However, as De Haan implies, there were several J. Davidsens living in Java 1812-1830, and identification cannot be entirely certain.

\textsuperscript{134} Domis, Pasoeroeang, p.55; Min.v.Kol. 3119.
In the coastal provinces of East Java the main area where sugar was grown outside the Oosthoek was Japara province, to the east of Semarang. Before 1830, however, there appear to have been no European sugar makers operating there. Elsewhere outside West Java, the only other sugar growing area of importance was the Principalities, where sugar production was said to have amounted to 7,200 pikuls in 1829. No production statistics are available for the earlier part of our period, nor is there any indication in the surviving records of whether sugar output in the Principalities in 1829 came from European or Chinese owned mills.\textsuperscript{135} There are some indications that before European land-lease in the Principalities was brought to an end by the Indies government in 1823-4, unspecified amounts of sugar had been grown on some of the estates leased there by Europeans.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{135} Agriculture Commission 1829, appendix 2, Du Bus Coll 371.

\textsuperscript{136} For a passing reference to the cultivation of sugar on the lands leased by European planters in the Principalities before 1823, see Nahuijs, Verzameling, l, p.297. I have been able to find no further details relating to sugar-growing at Solo and Jogja in the earlier part of our period.
The State of the Java Sugar Industry by 1830

It is impossible to advance an estimate for the total production of European as opposed to Chinese owned sugar mills in East Java in 1830. No statistics exist which differentiate between the two sectors of the industry. Total East Java production (excluding Principalities) in 1829 was said to be 45,911 pikuls. That of the Oosthoek alone — where most of the European manufacturers were established — was said to be 19,226 pikuls.\footnote{137}

It is much more feasible to advance an estimate of the amount of sugar produced on the West Java estates at the close of the eighteen twenties. Counting production at Tjikandi Udek, Sumadangan and Tagal Waru and Pamanukan and Tjiassem, together with that of Trail and Company's and Engel and Beynon's works in the Hinterland, the total in 1829 can hardly have been more than 24,000 pikuls.\footnote{138} According to the High Commission for Agriculture's figures, total sugar production in West Java in that year was 66,302 pikuls. This was probably a rather liberal estimate. In

\footnote{137} Agriculture Commission 1829, appendix 2, Du Bus Coll 371.  
\footnote{138} This calculation of private European sugar production in West Java is based on the individual estate production figures listed in the West Java section of this chapter.
the same year only 73,780 pikuls were exported from the entire island. In perspective, however, the results of European intervention in the sugar industry between 1812 and the beginning of the Culture System were far from impressive. It was what had not happened rather than what had happened which was important. In the early years of the nineteenth century, before the arrival of Daendels, sugar production in the Batavia Hinterland was said to have amounted to 45,000 pikuls, and in 1818 it was estimated to be in the region of 120,000 pikuls. Even when allowance is made for fairly substantial inaccuracies in such statistics, they demonstrate that, for one reason or another, a decade of sugar growing on the West Java estates had failed to have any positive influence on the sugar production of West Java as a whole. The experience of the West Java estate sugar growers was disappointing, a sequence of abandoned ventures, curtailed speculations, and never-achieved production levels. As compared with the export statistics at least, the figures of West Java sugar growers were disappointing, a sequence of abandoned ventures, curtailed speculations, and never-achieved production levels. At Tjikandili Illir, despite 139 Java's exports, 1825-32, Baud Coll 413. 414. Van Hogendorp, Java, p.153; De Haan, Oud Batavia, p.324.
heavy capital outlay on equipment, sugar was given up for good in 1823. At Indramaju, too, it was a failure, while at Tagal Waru the owners, who were well connected in the business world and by no means old-style owners\(^{141}\) contented themselves with the restricted production of their Chinese mills, arguing that imported equipment did not repay its cost\(^{142}\). The Pamanukan and Tjiassem sugar works at Subang never produced the 10,000 pikuls which had been anticipated in 1820, and in 1828 an attempt was even made to sell off some of the more elaborate equipment, including a Graham and Buxton still which was lying "new and unused" at the Lagoon of Pamanukan, where it had presumably been landed\(^{143}\).

It is reasonably clear that as far as the owners were concerned, the attempt to turn Pamanukan and Tjiassem into a sugar estate had failed by 1830. When in that year they appointed a new administrator to succeed Loudon, the continued importance of sugar cultivation was pointed out in his instructions. At the same time, however, the owners

\(^{141}\) Old style owners were those owners, mainly old East India Company servants, who were content to develop their lands as little as possible and to live off their rice rents. As often as not, they only saw their estates once or twice a year, being otherwise occupied in Batavia. They are discussed at length in the first two chapters of this study.

\(^{142}\) Willem van Hogendorp to G.K.v.Hogendorp, 2.10.1828, enclosure, p.2. Van Hogendorp Coll 91.

\(^{143}\) See Loudon's advertisement in J.C. 25.11.1828, no.41.
forbad him to spend any more money on developing the cultivation.\textsuperscript{144} Whatever illusions may have existed in the early twenties, whatever "visions of rum and sugar" may have flourished,\textsuperscript{145} they had fled by the end of the decade. The estate owners of West Java began to look elsewhere for their profits.

The position of the East Java sugar industry at the end of the twenties, however, calls for further comment. This sector of the island's sugar industry, if not exactly flourishing, was doing much better than that of West Java. According to De Haan, the total sugar output of Java, excluding the hinterland amounted to 20,000 pikuls in 1815.\textsuperscript{146} Most of this sugar may be assumed to have come from the coastal provinces running from Tjeribon to the Oosthoek. In 1820 this same area, on a very rough calculation based on what production records are available, produced about 25,000 pikuls of sugar.\textsuperscript{147} According to the statistics provided

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{144} W.H. Daukes, \textit{The P & T Lands}, London 1943, p.13.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Palmer to Brownrigg, 28.2.1823, \textit{Eng.Lett.} c.95, p.136.
\item \textsuperscript{146} De Haan, \textit{Oud Batavia}, p.325-6.
\item \textsuperscript{147} This figure has been calculated from the relevant Residency Annual Reports and Statistics in \textit{Schneither Coll} 88-99. It must be stressed that because complete sugar production statistics are not available for any one year this figure in only an approximate one. Sugar production may be said with some degree of certainty to have exceeded 20,000, but
\end{itemize}
by the High Commission for Agriculture in the late 'twenties, sugar production in these same coastal provinces from Tjeribon through to the Oosthoek amounted to 16,300 pikuls in 1827, rose to 38,700 pikuls in the following year and stood at 45,911 pikuls in 1829. By 1829, that is, East Java appears to have been producing more than twice as much sugar as in 1815, while in West Java production in 1829 was only half the 120,000 pikuls which it was said to have been in 1818.

Now, how is this phenomenon to be explained? Even allowing for some exaggeration in the High Commission's production figures, some explanation is certainly necessary. The High Commission for Agriculture's own explanation of but was probably below 30,000. I have compromised between the two. Production in the important sugar growing province of Pasaruan was said to be 6,000 pikuls in 1820, of which 5292 pikols was exported from the province, variously to Batavia, the Moluccas and Surabaja. Statistics of Pasaruan 1820, Lett.C. no.2. Schneither Coll 97.

Agriculture Commission 1829, appendix 2, Du Bus Coll 371; Landbouw Verslag 1828, appendix 3. These figures include those for the sugar production of Japara 1827-9, on the accuracy of which doubts have already been cast. See above p.186.

De Haan, Oud Batavia, p.325-6. I know of no way of checking the accuracy of De Haan's sugar production figures. All that can be said is that he is usually an historian of great reliability, and that, over a period of more than thirty years, he had unrestricted access to the Batavia archives.
the increased productivity of the sugar industry after 1827 was firstly in terms of government financial help to the industry and secondly in terms of the higher prices fetched by sugar in the later twenties. This assertion, several times repeated since, that the Du Bus regime made money available to the sugar industry remains something of a mystery. If what is meant is the loans made to manufacturers in return for deliveries of sugar for the government's own Japan trade, then it has to be pointed out that this was no innovation of the Du Bus regime, but had been going on more or less continuously since 1816 and earlier. If some other loan scheme is meant, then references to it in government records are singularly elusive. In any case, the sum of f.150,000 mentioned by the High Commission in this connection is a paltry amount. In 1827 the Netherlands Trading Society lent an identical sum to one prominent firm of West Java sugar makers alone. Indeed, the 'government support' mentioned by the High Commission may be precisely this loan, in which case it was the Society's and not the government's money!

150 Landbouw Verslag 1828, p.15.
151 A modern instance in Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p.17.
152 On the financial-backing aspect of the estates and plantations, see ch. 5.
153 Hansveldt, N.H.M., 1, p.185.
As for the explanation in terms of the rising price of sugar, this appears to be open to at least two fundamental objections. In the first place, as has already been observed, although the price of sugar did improve in the later 'twenties, it was only a marginal improvement.\(^{154}\)

Far more to the point, however, was that the increased productivity of the East Java sugar industry was not paralleled by a similar increase in the sugar growing areas of West Java. If the rise in prices had been the sole stimulus to production, it seems reasonable to suppose that the increase in productivity would have been spread evenly throughout the Java sugar industry. As it was, the increase only occurred in East Java. Indeed, between 1818 and 1829, as has already been shown, there was an absolute decline in the productivity of the West Java sugar industry. In these circumstances it has to be concluded that price was neither the sole nor the primary influence on the success of sugar growing ventures in Java. However, before going on to discuss the other influences at work, it is necessary to consider the other crops grown on the private estates and by private European planters in the pre-Cultivation System period.

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154 For sugar prices in the late 'twenties, see above p. 188-9. Sugar prices at Batavia, however, fluctuated rather more than European prices levels would suggest. Between 1823 and 1832 - according to the export statistics - prices fluctuated by as much as six guilders per pikul. Baud Coll 413.
Indigo Cultivation.

Before the early 'thirties indigo was one of the lesser cultivations in which European estate owners and planters were involved. It is necessary to begin by making a distinction between the several methods by which the dyestuff indigo was manufactured from the plant indigo. The plant was grown widely in Java, and the preparation from it of a simple, wet form of the dye was practised by the local people in many parts of the island. Presumably this method of manufacture varied from place to place. The essentials of it, however, were that the leaves were plucked from the indigo plant and thrown into a jar of water. Lime was then added, and the mixture left to steep until the liquid was of the desired colour. The dye was then used, still in its liquid form.

What is of interest here, however, is the dry form of the dye, manufactured, to a high enough quality to enable it to compete with that of Bengal on the European market. In this complex method of manufacture, the cut plant was submerged in vats of water, where it fermented. After between ten and fifteen hours the liquid was drawn off from the first into a second vat, where it was aerated until the now oxidized elements in the liquid were precipitated. It
appears that in early nineteenth century Java this was achieved by the use of paddles placed in the vats. A considerable degree of judgement was called for in the various stages of this method of manufacture, and great speed was necessary in bringing in the cut plant from the fields, as its vital constituents decayed rapidly after cutting. The promotion of indigo cultivation for this purpose, and the subsequent processing of the plant appears to have been an exclusively European field of activity throughout our period.

It was, moreover, a field of activity in which the government played no direct part. The cultivation and manufacture of dry indigo on behalf of the government did not begin until the Culture System got under way in the early 'thirties. In this respect the European indigo manufacturers had far more in common with the sugar makers than with the coffee planters. To a considerable extent they could rely on the sympathetic attitude of the Authorities at Batavia, from whom they received financial assistance well before 1830.

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155 A description of indigo and its manufacture will be found in Burkhill, Dictionary, p. 1234-6. The description given here is based on that account.

156 On the financial backing of private European indigo manufacturers by the Indies government in the 'twenties, see Ch. 5, p. 370-2.
Unfortunately there is very little statistical information available with regard to either the production or the exportation of indigo before about 1825. Under Company rule unstated quantities of the dyestuff were produced in East Java, where factories were set up in Japara and Rembang with the purpose of manufacturing indigo of an exportable quality.\textsuperscript{157} In Daendals time dry, export-style indigo was made in the Batavia Hinterland.\textsuperscript{158} The first year for which export figures survive is 1825, when 5,818 pounds were exported, an amount which was almost doubled in the following year. From 1827 onwards, production as well as export figures are available. However, as the former derive from the reports of the High Commission for Agriculture, they need to be treated with some caution. According to the Commission, indigo production, which was 42,000 pounds in 1827, rose to 79,600 pounds in the following year and fell back to 57,000 pounds in 1829. This makes a total production of 178,711 pounds of indigo in 1827-9. The export statistics for the same period, on the other hand, show that only 78,236 pounds left Java. In these circumstances it is

\textsuperscript{157} Java indigo was quoted on the Amsterdam market from 1719 onwards. N.W. Posthumus, \textit{Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland}, Leiden 1946, I, p.413.

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Landbouw Verslag} 1828, p.21-2
necessary to accept either that more indigo was made than
could be sold in those years,\textsuperscript{159} or that a large quantity of
dry indigo was used in Java. Alternatively, it may be
suspected that the Commission's statistics are not very
reliable. This is very hard to prove, however.

Most of the indigo which was exported in the later
twenties went to Europe. In 1825, for instance, of the
total of 5,818 pounds exported, 3,993 pounds went to The
Netherlands, and 1,250 pounds to Great Britain. Although
Europe remained the major market for Java indigo down to
the end of our period, significant quantities were occa-
sionally exported to the Great East. In 1831, for instance,
of a total export of 42,841 pounds, one quarter went to the
Great East. There were no other outlets for indigo else-
where in Asia of anything like comparable importance.\textsuperscript{160}

As was seen to be the case with sugar, so with indigo,
fluctuations in production do not appear to correlate at all
exactly with the rise and fall of prices. Indigo prices
fell steadily between 1825 and 1831, so that in the latter

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Landbouw Verslag 1828}, appendix 4; Agriculture Commission
\textit{1829}, appendix 2, \textit{Du Bus Coll} 371; Java's foremost exports
\textit{1823-32}, \textit{Baud Coll} 413.

\textsuperscript{160} De Bruijn Kops, \textit{Statistiek}, 2, p. 120-3.
year they were only half what they had been six years earlier. Yet, if the statistics provided by the High Commission for Agriculture are to be trusted, indigo production in 1828 was almost twice as much again as it had been in the previous year. This general upward trend of indigo production in the late 'twenties appears to be confirmed, moreover, by the export statistics. Almost four times as much indigo was exported from Java in 1829 than had been exported in 1827. Only in 1830 was there a marked fall in indigo exports. Even allowing for a strong speculative element in indigo growing - the hope that next year's prices would show an improvement on current ones - it can scarcely

161 Calculations based on the export figures show that indigo was selling at Batavia for an average f.5.31 per Dutch pound in 1825, and that by 1831 this had fallen to f.2.31 per Dutch pound. Baud Coll 413 gives the export figures. The downward trend of prices as shown by these calculations appears to be confirmed by the statistics in Posthumus, Prices, 1, p.418-20. Between 1828 and 1832 the price of Guatimalo indigo fell from f.7.71 to f.4.75 per half Dutch pound. Posthumus supplies no prices for indigo between 1818 and 1828, and I have been unable to make good this deficiency. In 1818 Guatimalo indigo was fetching f.6.38 per Dutch pound at Amsterdam. In Bengal, one of the main indigo production areas of Asia, the price of indigo rose sharply in 1821-22 and from then until about 1827 there was something of a boom in indigo in Bengal. For details see S.B.Singh, European Agency Houses in Bengal, Calcutta 1966, p.211-249.

162 As Singh observes, "no other article of commerce was subject to so frequent fluctuation of prices as indigo". Agency Houses, p.237.
be doubted that there were influences at work here other than purely commercial ones. This, of course, is a negative conclusion. What were these 'other influences'? Clearly, the ability of the indigo manufacturers to obtain financial backing and the degree of co-operation which they received from the Dutch officials and Indonesian hierarchy of the areas concerned were both matters of some importance. Discussion of them, however, will be postponed until a later chapter. Here it is enough to establish the general pattern of estate and plantation indigo production during the 1812–1834 period.

Indigo in West Java

The main indigo works in West Java, at least in the earlier part of the period was that of Louis Petel at Bergzicht in the Hinterland. Production of indigo began there under Petel's direction in 1808, with equipment erected in what was described as the European manner. The works were taken over by Petel's creditor, the mercant J.F. Arnold, about 1823 and were still operating in 1828, three years after the latter's death. The existing accounts give little

\[163\] Landbouw Verslag 1828, p.21-2.
\[164\] Annual General Report Batavia 1824, 1, p.176, Schneither Coll 84.
\[165\] G.G. in Rade 9.4.1828 no.16, Min.v.Kol 2812.
idea of the extent of indigo production at Bergzicht. Under Arnold's management the factory was said to be producing between thirty and forty pounds of indigo per day. By Arnold's time, however, indigo was no longer the main crop grown on the estate. In evidence to a government commission, he declared that since 1817 coffee had been the property's foremost crop. In the Buitenzorg area, to the south of the Hinterland, Nicholas Engelhard had an indigo factory on his Tjidjeruk estate. This had gone out of production by 1823. By that time the output of exportable indigo was on the decline throughout the island; its recovery did not begin until about 1827. In that year there were three indigo works operating in the Hinterland, and another seven had been built by 1829. According to the High Commission for agriculture, production in the Hinterland and Buitenzorg areas together amounted to 15,000 pounds in 1828 and rose to 45,000 pounds in the following year.

169 G.G. in Rade 14.2.1824 no.8, Min.v.Kol. 2781.
170 Landbouw Verslag 1828, appendix 4; Agriculture Commission 1829, appendix 2, Du Bus Coll 371.
Beyond the Hinterland and Buitenzorg, the only other major indigo-manufacturing venture was that on the Tjikandi Ilir estate in Bantam province. The cultivation and manufacture of indigo was first projected there in 1823, when it was proposed to convert some of the abandoned sugar works into indigo vats.¹⁷¹ The owner's letters which form the main source of information for what happened at Tjikandi in the 'twenties, say nothing more about this venture, which must therefore be presumed to have been given up. In 1829 a fresh start was made and indigo seed sent from Bengal by the owner.¹⁷² Cultivation of the plant was tried for three successive years, without notable success. Total production between 1829 and 1831 amounted to no more than 7,500 pounds,¹⁷³ which was of such poor quality that it was feared that it would hardly realize costs.¹⁷⁴ There is no record of the dyestuff having been manufactured at Tjikandi Ilir after the beginning of 1832.

Indigo in East Java and the Principalities.

The manufacture of dry indigo was not limited to the estates of West Java, but was practised as well in the coastal provinces of East Java and in the Principalities. In the latter area the planter Harvey Thompson (who also grew coffee) ran an indigo factory at Rudjo Wingangan in the Jogja district between 1818 and 1824. Previous to that, he had tried to make indigo in Bantam. There is no record of the output of the Jogja works, which Thompson himself claimed was not a great success. He left Java in 1824 and did not return until four years later, when he set up an indigo works in Pekalongan.

It was the province of Pekalongan, on the coast mid-way between Tjeribon and Semarang, which was the main centre of indigo manufacture on the island outside the Hinterland. In the early years of the Dutch restoration there were several European indigo manufacturers there, including Robert Scott Douglas, who took his factory over from the government in the last years of the British regime, from whom he appears to have had some financial support. As was the case

175 G.G. in Rade 18.11.1823 no.19, Min.v.Kol. 2780.
176 G.G. in Rade 27.2.1829, Min.v.Kol. 2822.
with the East Java sugar manufacturers, Douglas was dependent for his supplies of raw material and for his labour force on the neighbouring villages.\textsuperscript{178} Although he was allowed to lease some land by the Resident of Pekalongan in 1818, it was said to be for the purpose of growing maize rather than indigo.\textsuperscript{179} The works closed down in the following year. Douglas himself died in 1822, still at Pekalongan.\textsuperscript{180} According to the Resident, his works had never been a success, and annual output had been only a mere 60 pounds of indigo.\textsuperscript{181} Other Pekalongan indigo makers operating at the same time as Douglas were Charles Du Pont.\textsuperscript{182} and W.E. Edwards.\textsuperscript{183} There is little which can be said about their factories. Neither of them were still manufacturing indigo in 1821, when the Resident reported that indigo making had entirely ceased in the area.\textsuperscript{184} Pekalongan seems to have shared to the full in that recession in the indigo industry which has already been remarked upon in the

\textsuperscript{178} Verbaal C.G. 17.5.1818 no.10, Min.v.Kol. 2375.
\textsuperscript{179} Verbaal C.G. 30.1.1818 no.5, Min.v.Kol. 2371.
\textsuperscript{180} B.C. 27.4.1822 no.17.
\textsuperscript{181} Statistics of Pekalongan 1821, Lett.F. no.1, Schneither Coll 90.
\textsuperscript{182} Verbaal C.G. 9.4.1818 no.4, Min.v.Kol. 2374.
\textsuperscript{183} Register European Residents, Min.v.Kol. 3113.
\textsuperscript{184} See note 181.
Hinterland. By 1827, however, some sort of revival had begun to take place. Production in Pekalongan in that year was said to amount to 4,334 pounds, and in 1828 19,441 pounds were exported from the Residency. 185 This figure, derived from a statistical compilation made in the early thirties, clashes with that given by the High Commission for Agriculture, according to whom 45,000 pounds of indigo were produced in that year. 186

There appears to have been rather more European indigo manufacturers at work in Pekalongan in the late twenties than had been the case in the period immediately after the restoration of Dutch rule in 1816. The veteran Louis Petel, who moved there from Batavia c.1824 187 was one of them. Like Douglas before him, Petel contracted with the neighbouring villages for a supply of plant 188 although in June 1828 he also arranged with the Indies government to lease some uncultivated ground in the Pekalongan area for a period of twenty-five years. 189 In 1825 when the government agriculturalist Diard visited Petel's works, the machinery there

185 Van Beusechem’s Report Pekalongan c.1835, Min.v.Kol. 3050.
188 G.G. in Rade 1.6.1824 no.22, Min.v.Kol. 2783.
189 List of Land-Leases 1826-9, Min.v.Kol. 3098.
consisted of two large vats with water powered paddles some twenty feet long and twenty feet across. According to Diard, productive capacity was upwards of 12,000 pounds annually.\textsuperscript{190} The factory was still in operation in 1828, though by the end of that year ownership was no longer vested in Louis Petel's hands but in those of his two sons Auguste and Henri and son-in-law N. Cezard.\textsuperscript{191} Another Frenchman, A. Le Marchand, set up an indigo works in the same Residency in 1825\textsuperscript{192} but sold it two years later to R. van Goidsnoven,\textsuperscript{193} who was allowed to lease some uncultivated land in the area in the same year.\textsuperscript{194} Permission was given for another indigo mill to be built in Pekalongan in 1827 by J. C. Noort.\textsuperscript{195} His return to the Netherlands in November of that year, however, put an end to that project.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{190} Diard's report on Petel's Pekalongan indigo works, 21.2.1825, Leiden MSS 616, 9, no.1. A general description of indigo manufacture appears at the beginning of this section on indigo cultivation.


\textsuperscript{192} G.G. buiten 7.6.1825 no.1, Min.v.Kol. 2484.

\textsuperscript{193} G.G. in Rade 31.8.1827 no.5, Min.v.Kol. 2804.

\textsuperscript{194} G.G. in Rade 5.9.1827 no.12, Min.v.Kol. 2805.

\textsuperscript{195} G.G. in Rade 1.5.1827 no.5, Min.v.Kol. 2801.

\textsuperscript{196} B.C. 6.11.1827 no.106.
The remaining indigo maker in the Pekalongan province was Harvey Thompson, already mentioned in connection with indigo manufacture in the Principalities before 1824. He set up an indigo works in Pekalongan after his return from Europe in 1828.\textsuperscript{197}

In East Java, outside Pekalongan dry indigo production was of little or no account down to the beginning of the Cultivation system. This is made clear from the High Commission for Agriculture's figures. The Residency where indigo production approached nearest to that of Pekalongan was Besuki, in the Oosthoek. The total output of 800 pounds there in 1829, however, was far below that of Pekalongan.\textsuperscript{198} Who produced this Besuki indigo is not clear; the only other East Java European indigo maker traceable outside Pekalongan is Donald Maclennen, who set up an indigo works in Pasaruan in the course of 1830.\textsuperscript{199}

\textsuperscript{197} De Sturler to Van den Bosch, 17.4.1830, \textit{Van den Bosch Coll} 417.

\textsuperscript{198} Agriculture Commission 1829, appendix 2, \textit{Du Bus Coll} 371.

\textsuperscript{199} Resident of Pasaruan to Van den Bosch, 4.6.1830, \textit{Van den Bosch Coll} 414.
Rice Cultivation on the Estates

Despite the attempts made to cultivate coffee, sugar and indigo on a large scale, it was rice which remained the foremost agricultural production of almost all the private estates. From the standpoint of the landlord it was a crop which had many advantages. Rice was an old established cultivation which, in contrast to the heavy capital outlay demanded by sugar, could be extended very cheaply. In West Java, where crop failure was rare in the early nineteenth century, the risks involved in growing it were slight. Most important of all, the landlords, whether European or Indonesian, were traditionally entitled to take a considerable percentage of the annual rice harvest from the cultivators by way of rent. It was the rice levy, rather than the landlord's corvee rights which constituted the greatest single advantage of landownership. This advantage, though not enjoyed by the sugar and indigo making entrepreneurs in East Java, was common to both the West Java estates and to the leased lands in the Principalities.

The amount of rice which could be levied by the landlords varied considerably in different parts of the island. In the Principalities almost all sources agree that the landlords, whether European or otherwise, were entitled to
take one half of the rice grown on the irrigated sawah lands and one third of that grown on the non-irrigated, dry tegal lands. The Europeans who leased the estate of Ampel in Solo, for instance, reported to ex-Resident Nahuijs in 1823 that they provided the cultivators with rice for seed and took half the rice from the sawahs. In addition they claimed one third of the rice grown on easily worked tegal land and one quarter or one fifth of that cultivated on difficult or bad ground. The statement by Willem van Hogendorp three years later that the owner of Ampel levied only one fifth of the entire rice harvest of his lands appears to be erroneous. Even Nahuijs, whose own intention was to present the European planters in as favourable a light as possible, informed the Batavia authorities that the European landholders in the Principalities took one half of the sawah rice and one third of the tegal rice.

In West Java the size of the landlord's rice levy was regulated, in theory at least, by the Indies government.

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200 Gotes' and Dezentje's report on Ampel, 3.7.1823. Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.
201 Van Hogendorp, W.v.H., p.83.
202 Nahuijs to De Graaff, 10.5.1821, Schneither Coll 109.
The permitted amount and the manner of its collection varied a good deal between the end of the Company period and the arrival of Governor-General Van den Bosch. As this complicated issue has been dealt with in detail elsewhere, it is only necessary to give a summary here. Under Company rule, the statutory amount of the rice crop which could be levied by the landlords was limited to one fifth, a restriction which was abolished by Daendals in 1809 and re-asserted by the Dutch Commissioners-General eight years later. The one-fifth-of-the-crop ruling remained in force until the end of our period, and was incorporated into the Regulation for the Private Lands issued by the Indies government in 1836. It would appear, moreover, that the Dutch authorities attempted to enforce these regulations, though the extent of their success is quite another matter. Several complaints that landlords were claiming more rice than was their legal due came before the Council at Batavia during the 'twenties, though it is not possible to determine how many similar cases were settled at the Residency level. In 1822, for example, complaints reached the Indies government that the owner of the Buitenzorg province estate of Jassinga,

203 Kemp, Landelijk Stelsel, p.299-330.
204 Kemp, Landelijk Stelsel, p.314 note 1 and 319; Ottow, Oorsprong, p.49-50; Pennink, Reglement, p.177.
William Crozier, had taken one half, three quarters and even the total amount of the rice harvest, and in the following year the Resident of Buitenzorg reported that he had received complaints about the excessive rice levy by the owner of the Kampong Baru estate. What appears to have happened in this latter case was that the owner, J.E. Doornik, had attempted to replace the usual levy on the standing crop by a rent based on a survey of the rice lands and fixed in advance of the harvest. He was ordered to desist by the Batavia authorities, whose attempts to enforce the 1817 regulations also emerge from their action in stopping L.Z. Veekens, owner of the Kampong Bugis estate, from levying one quarter instead of one fifth of the rice crop in 1820. According to Willem van Hogendorp, however, complaints continued to arise in the later years of the decade on the score of attempts by the landlords to take more than one fifth of the rice.

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205 G.G. in Rade 17.7.1822 no.17, Min.v.Kol. 2777.
208 G.G. in Rade 7.1.1820 no.27, Min.v.Kol. 2772.
Rice formed an important element in the economies of even the largest and most venturesome of the estates, including those more commonly associated with other crops. On the 'coffee' estate of Sukabumi the area under rice was steadily extended after 1813, when the owner's one fifth share of the crop amounted to 2,396 tjaengs of 1,000 katis. The reports sent to his fellow owners by the estate's administrator, Andries de Wilde, show that he was frequently engaged in extending the irrigation system at Sukabumi.\textsuperscript{210} Even the Resident of the Preanger, who was otherwise contemptuous of De Wilde's so-called improvements, was compelled to acknowledge the considerable irrigation works which had been accomplished while the lands were in private hands.\textsuperscript{211} Much of this was done, no doubt, with a view to attracting new population onto the estate, so that the coffee plantations would have a larger labour force. The extension of the sawah area, however, was not simply commensurate with the increase in population. According to official sources in 1822, some 989 tjaengs of the total 3,605 tjaengs which constituted the owner's share of the rice harvest were surplus to

\textsuperscript{210} De Haan, Priangan, I, Personalia, p.292.
\textsuperscript{211} Annual General Report Preanger 1823, p.42, Schneither Coll 86.
requirements and were sent to Batavia and Buitenzorg. At Udjong Bron, also in the Preanger, little coffee at all was produced in 1821. Surplus rice production, on the other hand, was immense. Of the 4,900 tjaengs which made up the owner's share, 4,372 tjaengs were said to be available for sale elsewhere. Taken together, the coffee estates of the Preanger were very considerable producers of rice, at least some of which had to be bought by the government to feed the coffee cultivators in its own areas of the Preanger. In these circumstances, the benefits which would accrue to the government from the repurchase of the private estates in the Preanger can hardly have escaped official attention. It was not only by the removal of the threat to its coffee monopoly that the Indies government stood to profit by regaining control of

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212 In speaking of rice 'surplus to requirements; I am quoting the language of the various government reports, including those of Lawick v. Pabst 24.8.1822, Schneither Coll 26 and of the Resident of the Preanger - Annual General Report Preanger 1823, p.9, Schneither Coll 86. The first of these reports speaks of the private owners of Sukabumi and Tjiputri sending rice from the estates to be sold at Buitenzorg and Batavia and the second of the surplus rice of Sukabumi being used to feed coffee cultivators in other parts of the Preanger after Sukabumi had been repurchased by the Indies government. The implication of this is that at least some of the owner's share of the Sukabumi rice crop was surplus to the requirements of the local population which grew it.

the entire Preanger. At the end of 1823 Resident Robert Van der Capellen was able to report that the scarcity of rice in the government coffee gardens had been much alleviated by the supplies available from the former private estates.\textsuperscript{214}

The Principalities, too, a good deal of attention was paid to the rice cultivation even by those planters who grew coffee on a large scale. It was claimed on behalf of the planter Bernadus Lammers, for instance, that he excavated a five mile water course on the lands which he hired in Jogja, and thereby turned a great deal of tagal land into sawahs.\textsuperscript{215} Another planter, D'Abo, asserted that under his tenure and through his efforts the landlord's half share of the sawah-grown rice increased from twenty-three to sixty hangmatts.\textsuperscript{216} Other planters such as J.A. Dezentje and J.M. Kuiper claimed to have either created new irrigation systems or brought old and decayed systems back into operation.\textsuperscript{217} It is difficult to be certain how reliable such accounts were, however, as most of them date from the period immediately after the government's attack.

\textsuperscript{214} Annual General Report Preanger 1823, p. 9, Schneither Coll 86.
\textsuperscript{215} Thompson to Nahuijs, 8.7.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no. 3.
\textsuperscript{216} D'Abo to Nahuijs, 25.7.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no. 3.
\textsuperscript{217} Ootes' and Dezentje's report on Ampel, 3.7.1823 and J.M. Kuiper to Nahuijs, 18.6.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no. 3.
on European landlease by the Decree of 6th May 1823.\textsuperscript{218} The accounts were written on Nahuijs' express request\textsuperscript{219} and their polemical character should not be lost from sight. They are, unfortunately, very difficult to check from government records. From official calculations made in 1825, it appears that the revenues of most of the big coffee estates in Solo (by that time no longer in private hands) were made up of coffee money rather than rice rent. It was estimated, for example, that in 1825 the Sempu estate formerly belonging to Nahuijs and J.D.Boudet would bring in as net profit f.13,200 from coffee and only f.1,452 from rice.\textsuperscript{220}

It was not only on the coffee estates that attention was paid to rice growing. Although in many ways the most significant development at Pamanukan and Tjiassem under private ownership after 1813 was the erection there of an elaborate sugar works between 1819-24, rice remained a very

\textsuperscript{218} The Decree of 6.5.1823 led to the termination of most of the leases held by European planters in the Principalities. The issue is dealt with in detail in ch.1.

\textsuperscript{219} This point is made clear by the opening of Thompson's letter to Nahuijs of 8.7.1823. "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the first inst., requesting information from individual planters regarding the benefits derived to land and people under their administration." Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.

\textsuperscript{220} Report Commission for winding up the land leases 20.5.1825, Appendix 0, Schneither Coll 109.
important crop on the lands from the point of view of the owners' revenues. A conclusive statement of that importance, however, is ruled out by the lack of surviving accounts or financial statements concerning that estate. There are, nonetheless, indications which point to such a conclusion. According to Resident Van den Broek, who was on good terms with the owners, the sole sources of revenue on that estate in 1819 were rice and timber. Before such a practice was forbidden by the government in 1817, the owners had been accustomed to take one third instead of one fifth of the rice crop from the cultivators. On the evidence of an official survey made in the early years of the century, the Pamanukan and Tjiassem districts were well suited to rice growing, and the irrigated area was capable of considerable extension. Such advantages notwithstanding, the owners appear to have done little to increase the area under wet rice until at least 1824. In two reports dating from that year the newly appointed successor of Resident Van den Broek compared the irrigation

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system on the estate very unfavourably with that which existed on the adjacent government lands, and implied that no new works had been undertaken at Pamanukan and Tjiasssem since the lands had passed into private ownership.\(^\text{223}\) Between then and the end of the decade, however, the sawah were extended considerably, apparently on the initiative of the owners. In 1829 the government sponsored High Commission for Agriculture remarked that the administrator had been occupied recently with the excavation of a canal, thanks to which land for twenty miles around would be irrigated. The landlord's one fifth share of the rice, which had previously been 6-7,000 koyangs annually, rose to 8,000 koyangs in that year.\(^\text{224}\) Some of this activity was doubtless designed to encourage and accommodate an increasing peasantry. Population at Pamanukan and Tjiasssem, which had been put at less than 10,000 in 1813 had risen to 50,411 by 1832.\(^\text{225}\) On the other hand there are positive signs that the owners were deliberately fostering rice cultivation with a view to transforming their property into a predominantly rice estate. An indication of the direction in which events were moving was given by Administrator Loudon's importation

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\(^{223}\) Annual General Report Krawang 1824, p.11, Schneither Coll 87.
\(^{224}\) Agriculture Commission 1829, p.2, Du Bus Coll 371.
of two rice mills in 1827 on the English ship Cynthia. The mills were presumably of European origin. One year previous to this Loudon wrote to one of the estate's owners, then in Europe, informing him of the profits that might soon be expected from the estate and the produce from which they would be drawn. Significantly it was rice and timber which headed his list, rather than sugar. It is fairly clear from this that not only was the rice production of the estate on the increase, but that its commercial possibilities were fast coming to dominate the attentions of those in charge of the property. The tendency amongst estate owners to concentrate on rice growing, evident in the development of Pamanukan and Tjiassem, was much more marked at Indramaju and Kandanghauer to the east of Pamanukan. There had been an unsuccessful attempt to grow sugar on that estate sometime before 1827. It was rice, however, which remained the main crop from the purchase of the property in 1813 through to the early 'thirties. In 1819 the owners of Indramaju were already exporting rice to Batavia from their lands, and the agriculture of the estate was said to be

226 G.G. in Rade 29.11.1827 no.18, Min.v.Kol. 2510.
228 G.G. buiten Rade 8.2.1819 no.14, Min.v.Kol. 2445.
confined entirely to rice.\textsuperscript{229} The owners evidently paid considerable attention to that crop, both then and in the years which followed. In his annual reports of 1823-4 the Resident of Tjeribon remarked on the large scale irrigation works which were taking place at Indramaju and Kandanghauer, and with which the proprietors had been occupied for several years past\textsuperscript{230} As is the case with Pamanukan and Tjiassem, it is necessary to rely on fragments of information from elsewhere in the absence of estate account books or papers which would otherwise throw light on the cultivation of rice at Indramaju. According to a note left for his successor by the outgoing Resident of Krawang in 1823, the rice revenues of Indramaju and Kandanghauer had increased in a spectacular fashion during the course of the preceding decade. In 1814 the landlord's share of the rice harvest had amounted to 300 tjaengs, whereas by 1823 it amounted to 1,000 tjaengs\textsuperscript{231} Six years after that the High Commission for Agriculture estimated the estate's rice levy at the even higher level of 1,000-1,290 tjaengs annually\textsuperscript{232}

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\textsuperscript{229} Report Resident of Krawang 31.12.1819, p.8. Schneither Coll 87.  \\
\textsuperscript{230} Report Resident of Tjeribon on Indramaju 1823, p.2-3, and Annual General Report Tjeribon 1824, p.7. Schneither Coll 88.  \\
\textsuperscript{231} Van den Broek to Valck, 30.8.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.9.  \\
\textsuperscript{232} Agriculture Commission 1829, p.2, Du Bus Coll 371.
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Rice was, it may be concluded, an important crop on a
great many of the estates for the entire 1812-34 period.
Nonetheless, it was only during the last ten years of that
period that it came to play the predominant role in estate
agriculture which, as far as the West Java lands were
concerned, it was to continue to play until the last days
of their existence. The increased attention paid to rice
at, for example, Pamanukan and Tjiwassem during the later
'twenties was symptomatic of a more general turn of events
throughout West Java. Estates which had devoted most of
their resources to sugar, coffee or indigo during the
earlier years of the Dutch restoration had reverted by the
early 'thirties to an agricultural pattern dominated by
rice. Amongst the several reasons for this was probably
the increasing population of West Java, some proof of which
is afforded by the Residency population statistics, however
unreliable these may have been. This served to encourage
landowners to concentrate on growing rice which, as the
proprietor of the Tjikandi Ilir estate observed in 1832,
could "never want a market with an increasing population..."
The major influence, however, seems to have been the steep rise in rice prices in the second decade of the century, and the effect which this had on other branches of estate and plantation agriculture.

The general impression gained from the available Residency reports and statistics is that the price of rice began to rise markedly throughout Java from at least 1812 onwards, though to an extent which varied considerably from one part of the island to another. In Bantam, for instance, rice was said to have cost f.90 per koyang in 1815 and to have risen almost forty percent to f.120 in 1820.235 Two years later the senior government official Van de Graaff remarked upon the extraordinary dearness of grain on the island, a conclusion confirmed by price figures derived from the export statistics for rice which begin in the following year. These indicate that the average price of rice sold for export at Batavia was f.139 per koyang in 1823, and that only after 1826 did prices begin to fall from that level in a steady decline which continued until the end of the decade.236

The effect of this price rise on estate agriculture was two-fold. As rice was the most common medium of payment for work done in coffee gardens and sugar fields, it followed that the production costs of those crops rose in direct proportion to the increase in the cost of rice. They rose, moreover, on what has already been shown to have been a falling market. The sugar manufacturers in particular were put in a position of great difficulty by this sequence of events. At the Tjikandi Ilir sugar works the European entrepreneur Joseph Abbot was forced to overspend in buying rice for his workpeople in 1821-2, and to close down altogether in the following year, at least partly because the falling price of sugar taken together with the high price of rice undermined the economic basis of the whole venture. In 1823 the Resident of Bantam, in whose province the Tjikandi works lay, reported that sugar production had declined considerably over the past few years, because the high price of rice had caused sugar fields to be returned to rice cultivation.

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237 For labour in West Java see Ch. 4 p. 269-75.
238 For sugar and coffee prices, see above p. 159-60 and 188-9.
It began to appear more profitable to concentrate on rice than to risk disaster by staking all on the production of crops whose market value was falling while production costs were rising. In East Java this was not the case, for there the European planters, who had no land of their own, could do little more than continue to produce either indigo or sugar. If there was any alternative for them, it was simply to go out of business.

On the estates of West Java, however, the matter was otherwise. These extensive properties could be and were turned into rice estates. The High Commission for Agriculture reported in 1829 that a massive extension in estate rice cultivation had taken place in recent years. Two years previously the Commission had already commented on the expansion of the sawah area which was taking place on the estates of the Batavia Hinterland and Buitenzorg areas. This development, they pointed out, was taking place at the expense of the coffee cultivation of those lands.

It is unfortunate that the Commission were unable to make available rice production figures for those estates. The reports sent to the central government by the Residents of

242 Report of Agriculture Commission on advice received, 4.7.1827, Van den Bosch Coll 371.
of the provinces concerned do throw some light on what was happening. In 1823, for instance, the Resident of Buitenzorg reported that on the Kedong Badak, Kampong Baru, Tjampea and Kuripan estates the irrigation system had been greatly extended recently. A partial index to such developments is furnished by requests submitted to the Council at Batavia for permission to draw off additional water from existing water courses, actions which frequently brought one landowner into conflict with his neighbours. In 1826, for example, the co-owner and administrator of the Kuripan estate in Buitenzorg province William Menzies sought permission from the government to draw water from an adjacent river to further irrigate his lands. More indications of the increasing importance of rice on the West Java estates are provided by installation of rice mills of an improved type, such as would produce a better quality of husked rice. The rice mill at Pamanukan and Tjiasssem has already been referred to; other mills were erected on the estates of Jassinga, Kedong Badak and Bekasi in the late 'twenties.

244 G.G. buiten Rade 5.2.1826 no.2. Min.v.Kol. 2490.
There is nothing, however, which quite compensates for lack of estate papers which could be drawn upon to illustrate this process. Only in the case of Tjikandi Ilir is anything approaching such documentary coverage available. Between 1820 and 1832 both sugar and indigo were tried there, with varying degrees of ill-success. As the hopes of renumeration from the latter crop faded in the course of 1830–2, so emphasis on the advantages of rice cultivation came to dominate the owner's letters to his Java agents and to his administrator at Tjikandi. Attention to rice alone and perhaps a little areen sugar was the advice urged by the owner on his agents in 1830.\textsuperscript{246} Two years later his recommendations were even more emphatically in favour of rice. "I consider it to be good economy," he wrote, "to bring all the better soil areas under padi culture, ... I doubt if, even vigourously supported, it were advantageous to cultivate indigo, coffee or sugar..."\textsuperscript{247}

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IV. ADMINISTRATION, POPULATION AND LABOUR.

The following account seeks to explain the way in which the estates of West Java and the Principalities were run, and how the European planters of East Java operated. The issues raised are not only those of labour provision and relations between the landlords and the estate populations, but also those of the impact made by the Westerners on the indigenous power structure of the districts which they took over. It is in the nature of things that these issues raise more questions than can be answered from the existing source material. Some of what follows is, there, of an avowedly speculative character.

On the big West Java estates and in the Principalities the indications are that what was essentially the superimposition of European landlords had little effect on the traditional administration of the lands concerned, whereas in East Java the activities of the European entrepreneurs may have had rather more disruptive consequences. Nor was this the only regional difference in the situation. The problems encountered in finding workpeople varied markedly in the three areas of East and West Java and the Principalities. For these reasons, the historiographical and contemporary problems of administration, population and labour are grouped here on a regional basis. The scope of the
chapter is not limited, however, to a statement of management systems and labour difficulties. The analysis of the previous chapter is continued, in that an attempt is made to relate administrative and labour problems to the relative failure of export crop cultivation on the estates, more especially to the failure of sugar.

West Java Estates: Management.

Most of the larger estates in Buitenzorg, the Preanger and Krawang were not managed directly by their owners, but were looked after by European administrators. There was, however, no clear cut division between owners and administrators. Some of the latter, like Andries de Wilde of Sukabumi, were part-owners of the estates which they managed. Others, like Thomas MacQuoid, administrator of Pamanukan and Tjiassem in 1819, were members of Batavia

1 Report Resident of Krawang 31.12.1819, p.9, Schneither Coll 87 Thomas MacQuoid, on whom there is an extensive entry in De Haan, B.K.I., 92, 1935, p.605-8, had been Resident of the Preanger and the holder of other high offices under the British regime. In 1819 he was partner in the Batavia firm of Skelton and Company, the house which managed the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate, in which the senior partner, John Skelton, also had an interest.
firms which managed estates for absentee owners. Moreover, MacQuoid and his successors, Ludowick Stewart\(^2\) and Alexander Loudon\(^3\) were also registered themselves as part owners of Pamanukan and Tjiassem. This sort of arrangement in which administrators had a stake in the property they managed, appears to have been fairly common. The Buitenzorg province estate of Kuripan, owned from about 1824 onwards by a syndicate of Batavia merchant houses including Maclaine Watson and Company, Thompson Whiteman and Company and Addision and Company, was managed for them by a member of one of those houses, William Menzies.\(^4\)

There is no indication, however, that I.A.Buijn, administrator at Indramaju and Kandanghauer for much of the eighteen twenties,\(^5\) or Alexander Sutherland, administrator of J. Drury's

\(^2\) G.G. buiten Rade 29.10.1823 no.5, Min.v.Kol. 2472; G.G. in Rade 19.4.1825 no.22, Min.v.Kol. 2788. Ludowick Stewart was partner in the Batavia firm of Stewart Turing and Company. B.C. 10.3.1827 no.10.

\(^3\) G.G. in Rade 15.11.1825 no.15, Min.v.Kol. 2791. On Loudon's Career in Java, which began at the time of the British occupation and covered estate administration and sugar-contracting under the Cultivation system, see Ch.2 p.153.

\(^4\) G.G. in Rade 15.11.1825 no.13, Min.v.Kol. 2791; G.G. in Rade 13.5.1828 no.32, Min.v.Kol. 2813.

\(^5\) Register European Residents, Min.v.Kol. 3129.
Bolong estate in 1828, also participated in the ownership of those properties. At Panamukan and Tjiassem the administrator appointed to succeed Loudon in 1829-30 appears to have had no stake in the estate either. Whether the putting in of an administrator was the most effective way of running an estate is open to doubt. The Calcutta merchant John Palmer appears to have found his administrator at Tjikandi Ilir, James Newland (1828-36), fairly satisfactory, but the British owners of Pamanukan and Tjiassem parted with Alexander Loudon on very bad terms in 1828-9, alleging that he had run the property deeply into debt. Concerning Loudon, Willem van Hogendorp wrote to his father in strict confidence that he knew little about the property which he was supposed to be looking after, though he was much given to boasting about it. The anglophile Van Hogendorp can hardly have been a hostile witness, for he added that he had enjoyed hospitality from Mr and Mrs Loudon on several occasions, and asked his father to keep his strictures to himself. A similar

7 Daukes, P & T, p.13.
criticism of the way in which the same estate was run in the early nineteenth century was made by the mid-century traveller J.W.B. Money, who wrote that "this Principality formerly belonged to an English merchant firm of Bombay... the members of this firm followed the usual practice of putting their sons into professions, instead of sending them out to Java to look after and improve their magnificent property. Their impoverished descendants, some years back, sold the neglected estate much below its value ...." 11

Below the level of European owner or Administrator many of the hinterland estates appear to have been managed by Chinese. This had certainly been the case with the predominantly small estates of that area in the late eighteenth century, and there is little reason to suppose that things had changed much by the eighteen twenties. Even somewhere like the major sugar making establishment of

11 J.W.B.Money, Java, or How to Manage a Colony, London 1861 2, p.190. J.W.B.Money, who appears to have been no relation of W.T.Money, part owner of Pamanukan and Tjiassem in the 'twenties, could hardly have been expected to know that his namesake did indeed try to get his son out to Java to look after the estate, but was foiled in the attempt by the Colonial office in The Hague. See W.T.Money to Willem I, 9.2.1825, and the Colonial Office advise thereon, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 16.6.1825 no.16k, Min.v.Kol. 451.
Jessen Trail and Company at Bekasi was worked exclusively by Chinese as late as 1828. At the Bergzicht indigo and coffee estate, however, there was a European opziener or overseer in 1826.

Elsewhere in West Java, on the big estates beyond the hinterland, European staff were more numerous and the Chinese less all-pervasive. At Jessen Trail and Company's Tjikandi Udek sugar works there were about half a dozen Europeans in 1826. Five years before that the firm had applied for residence permits for eight European employees, all of them British-born. The residence registers kept by the Indies government from 1819 to 1826 indicate that other of the big estates had European employees below the level of administrator. There were, for example, two Dutchmen "in the service of the owners of Indramaju and Kandanghauer" in 1823. On the Tagal Waru estate, administered from about

13 Register European Residents, Min.v.Kol. 3147.
16 Register European Residents, Min.v.Kol. 3138.
1827 until his death in 1834 by the part-owner David Alexander Fraser, there was also a Dutch overseer in the late 'twenties. It was Pamanukan and Tjiassem, however, which had the largest number of European employees. According to the owners, several technicians were sent out from Europe to operate the sugar making machinery installed on the estate in the early 'twenties. During the whole of the 'twenties it is possible to trace at least fourteen European staff on the estate. Among them were Robert Webster Baird, Evan Campbell and James Newland. According to his death notice the Perth-born Baird was superintendent at the Subang sugar works. Campbell was also at the Subang works, while Newland worked in an unspecified capacity until 1828, when he left to become administrator at Tjikandi Ilir. The estate also had a surgeon of sorts,

17 Register European Residents, Min.v.Kol. 3147; Campbell, Java, l, p.656; J.G. 22.3.1834 no.24. David Alexander Fraser had been a partner in the Batavia firm of MacQuoid Davidson and Company which had closed down in 1826. B.C. 5.8.1826 no.31.
20 G.G. buiten Rade 12.10.1825 no.10, Min.v.Kol. 2488.
the Dalkeith-born Peter Hardy. There were some Chinese on the estate, at the Subang works, brought there it was said, from Batavia. Further details about them, however, are lacking. The Chinese were also active on the neighbouring Indramaju and Kandanghauer estate in an unspecified role.

At Tjikandi Ilir, on the other hand, there appear to have been no Chinese settled at all as late as 1829, when the owner had occasion to remind his Batavia agents of the advantages which would be gained if some of them could be induced to come onto the estate. On the big estates of the Preanger the Chinese were much more in evidence. Nicholas Engelhard, part-owner of Sukabumi, informed the Resident that there were about twenty Chinese there in 1820, acting as cultivators, oil-pressers and workmen. They were, he claimed, 'indispensable' for the running of the estate. On the neighbouring Tjiputri estate the

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22 Register European Residents, Min.v.Kol. 3135. Hardy was described in this as a Churgijn (surgeon). Several other of the Scots-born settlers held or claimed to hold medical qualifications, among them the Jogja indigo maker Harvey Thompson, as appears from his wife's obituary notice in the Batavia Courant of 1827 and from his correspondance with the fellow planter J.D.Boudet. Thompson to Boudet 7.6.1825, Instit. T.B.V. H788.


26 Nicholas Engelhard to Robert Van der Capellen, 30.3.1820.
Chinese operated the rice mill, and the Arenga sugar revenues of the estate were farmed out to them. It may be observed that the functions of the Chinese on the big estates appear to have been specialist entrepreneurial rather than managerial.

Indeed, it appears unlikely that management by either Europeans or Chinese penetrated the organisation of the estates to any great depth. The peculiar demands made by large-scale sugar growing may well have resulted in more profound changes, a theme which will be resumed later in the course of the discussion. As far as the cultivation of rice and coffee were concerned, however, it appears that in the matter of the organisation of production the European estate owners and administrators worked within the framework of the traditional indigenous organisation. They left the existing power structure of their lands substantially intact, and ran them through the existing administrative machinery of district chiefs and village headmen. In short, they were White Regents. It must be allowed from the start that the evidence for such an assertion is somewhat slender. On present reckoning there is

little surviving source material in the way of letters or descriptions indicating the channels of authority through which the European administrators of the estates operated. This tends to rule out a study in depth. Of the evidence available, much the best concerns the Sukabumi estate. Most of that, moreover, survives as a result of the row between the owners of that estate and the Indies government, and is hence a source particularly susceptible to partisan distortions.

At Sukabumi, in the words of the historian Yan Klaveren, the administrator De Wilde "reigned as formerly the Regent had done" before him. The Regent of Tjiandjur, whose authority was supposed to cover Sukabumi even after the sale, certainly sensed a rival in De Wilde and, according to the latter's testimony, conducted a feud with the European owners for several years. There were only seven Europeans

29 Yan Klaveren, Colonial System, p.94. De Wilde was administrator and part owner of Sukabumi from 1813, when the estate first passed into private hands, until 1823 when it was sold back to the Indies government. Before 1813 he had been an overseer of the coffee cultivation first at Buitenzorg and later in the Preanger.
30 De Wilde to Willem I, 13.6.1827, Appendix A, Verbaal Min. v.Kol. 29.9.1829 no.98, Min.v.Kol. 704 It should be added that De Wilde's statements about Sukabumi, many of which it is impossible to check, should be treated with care. He was not above giving false or misleading evidence, as De Haan demonstrates appropos the alleged 'improvements'
on the entire estate, including De Wilde's half brother Steitz de Wilde. The estate was run, it appears through the intermediary of the district chief Demang Dano Redjo, who was the brother of the Regent of Buitenzorg and had the title of Radeen Ramja Ardja. He was, according to a Commission of investigation appointed by Commissioner-General Du Bus in 1827, De Wilde's right-hand-man. Steitz de Wilde's surviving letters to Engelhard during 1820-21, when the estate's administration was under pressure from the government, again reveal the extent to which the European owners ran the property through the existing Indonesian channels of authority. "Without the chiefs the administration cannot be kept going," wrote Steitz in March 1820.

On the estates in Krawang, there are a number of indications concerning the relationship between the European administrators and the local rulers and headmen, but nothing unfortunately, emanating directly from estate records. In 1819 the Resident of Krawang remarked that the estates of that province - at that time Pamanukan and Tjiasssem and Indramaju and Kandanghauer - were administered in much the

[De Wilde claimed to have made at Sukabumi. De Haan, Priangan, Personalia, p.289-309.
32 Steitz to Engelhard, 28.3.1820, Appendix B of De Wilde to Willem I, 13.7.1827, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 21.10.1829, no.75, Min.v.Kol. 709. Steitz was Andries de Wilde's step-brother and looked after Sukabumi in the latter's absence in Europe 1819-22.]
same way as the government lands in the area. That is, they were run through the local village and district headmen. The only difference was that on the estates these people were paid by the Landowners instead of by the government. Payment took the form of a share in the rice levy. This situation still appears to have prevailed five years later, when the Resident commented that at Pamanukan and Tjiassem the Indonesian local authorities were reasonably paid by the owners, although the same was not true on the Sumadangan and Tagal Waru estate, which had recently been brought into the Krawang administrative area.

It was only when new crops which made novel demands on land and labour were introduced that the status-quo was in danger of being undermined by new methods of organizing labour and supervising cultivation. Of course, the lack of satisfactory source material means that much of this is little more than conjecture. In the case of sugar, however, it does appear that locally novel methods of organizing production were introduced on some of the estates. In part this was a response to the peculiar problems of sugar growing, especially to the necessity of having a large full-time workforce, and in part to the difficulties posed by the

sparsity of population in West Java. Sugar production could not be organized on the same lines as rice or even coffee production. Instead, it was to a certain extent grown and entirely manufactured by a workforce made up of landless labourers brought from beyond the boundaries of the lands concerned. In addition, the sugar estates tended to employ more European staff than the other private lands, possibly with a consequent deepening of the penetration of non-Indonesian labour control. To what extent this led to an undermining or merely to a by-passing of the existing local power structure on the sugar estates is difficult to determine.

West Java Estates: Population.

Compared with East Java, most of the Western parts of the island appear to have been only sparsely populated in the early nineteenth century. This was of the utmost importance because it was the number of hands available

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35 The bringing in of outside labour will be discussed below.
36 In 1821 the Resident of Buitenzorg commented that the population of his province was inconsiderable in comparison with the provinces of East Java, where the population was of a far greater density. The Buitenzorg Residency it may be pointed out, lay in the centre of the private estate network of West Java. Statistics of Buitenzorg 1821, Lett.B. no.1, Schneither Coll 85.
rather than the amount of land held which was, as the owner of Tjikandi Ilir put it, "the criterion of value."\textsuperscript{37}

The Krawang area in particular, where the greatest of all the estates were situated, was especially short of population. In 1808 a government commission reported that not only was the whole area thinly populated, but also that it was so little irrigated that for part of the year the people were forced to subsist on roots because of the shortage of rice.\textsuperscript{38}

Fifteen years later the Resident described the situation in Krawang in a somewhat similar fashion. He said bluntly that he considered the province to be one of the most backward and poverty stricken on the island. For the most part the province was cut off from the hinterland by dense forests, and its irrigation, such as it was, was poor. On average only half of the rice fields were irrigated, and even then the so-called irrigation works were dependent

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\item \textsuperscript{37} Report Commission for Inspection of the Jacatra and Preanger Regencies, 29.1.1808, p.130, Min.v.Koophandel en Kolonien 147.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Annual General Report Krawang 1823, p.16 and 46, Schneither Coll 87. The lack of irrigation works, taken together with the sparsity of population suggest that the area was one of shifting cultivation or of what Geertz calls swidden agriculture. In conditions of tropical vegetation, it was possible for the cultivators to move around the countryside cutting and burning the vegetation so as to provide a rich, if temporary milieu for crop growing. A discussion of this form of agriculture in its Indonesian setting appears in C.Geertz, Agricultural Involution, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1963, p.12-28.
\end{itemize}
mainly on floods and rain. Much of the land area of Pamanukan and Tjiasssem and Indramaju and Kandanghauer was given over to forests. In the case of the former estate in particular the disparity between population and land area was very striking. A population said to number about 38,000 in 1824 was scattered over an area of roughly one thousand square miles. That is, there was an average population density of 38 people per square mile. The position on the somewhat smaller Indramaju estate was little better. The population there was estimated at 34,000 in 1823. On the estates to the west of Batavia the position appears to have been a little better. At the Tjikandi Ilir estate in Bantam province the population was said to amount to 12,680 in 1826 and the extent of the estate to be about seventy square miles. Assuming that these figures are reasonably correct, this gives a population density of about 181 people per square mile, that is, an average population per square mile four-and-a-half times as great as that at Pamanukan and Tjiasssem. This

40 See Note 39.

was only a relative improvement, however. In the correspondence of the owner, the Calcutta merchant John Palmer, there are frequent references to the sparsity of the population of Tjikandi. In 1831 he instructed his Batavia agents that "where population is so great a desideratum, it should be courted and won by all means possible." Letters of a few years earlier reveal that one of the gambits of this courtship was the leasing of oxen to cultivators who would come and settle on the estate. Palmer was even prepared to allow temporary sacrifices of the revenue if cultivators could be induced thereby to establish themselves on his land. "A little delay in the collection of the rents," he advised his agents in 1831, "will do no harm, as indulgence to the people, discreetly manifested, must ensure their good faith and industry." 44

Moreover, the population of such estates as these was far from stable. The Resident of Buitenzorg remarked that population movement from one estate to another or away into Bantam to the west was not uncommon in his province, where the cultivators were much less firmly attached to the ground than was the case in East Java. 45 The reasons for this were

presumably the same as in Krawang, where the Resident pointed out that the lack of a proper irrigation system meant that the cultivators had little inducement to stay in one particular place.\textsuperscript{46} It is difficult to say whether we are dealing here with the normal movements of swidden cultivators\textsuperscript{47} or with population flight properly described. In 1824, to take an example of such population movements as were large enough to be reported, an unspecified number of people left Pamanukan and Tjiassem for the neighbouring government lands. The Resident told the Batavia authorities that he believed this was because of the better irrigation system then being developed in the latter area. In the same year, however, there was a considerable influx of people into the upland Batu Sierap areas of Pamanukan and Tjiassem from government territory.\textsuperscript{48} Whatever was the cause of such shifts of population, however, it must be noted that the general conditions in West Java facilitated population flight should it be necessary, a circumstance which the landlords had to bear in mind in making demands for labour. "The limit of oppression," as H.R.C. Wright remarked, "was determined not by custom but by the point at

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\textsuperscript{46} Statistics of Krawang 1824, Lett. B. no.1. Schneither Coll. 87.
\textsuperscript{47} For the concept of swidden agriculture, see note 38 above.
\textsuperscript{48} Annual General Report Krawang 1824, p.2. Schneither Coll. 87.
\end{flushright}
which the cultivator was likely to run away."  

Population flight or a traditionally shifting population were not the only factors which had to be taken into consideration by the estate owners. On some of the estates, particularly those on the borders of Tjeribon, the population was far from docile. Major risings against landlords were rare, but did happen. In 1826 Willem van Hogendorp reported that the owner of an estate in the western part of the hinterland had been murdered by his peasantry, "as a result of too great firmness, so they say."  

The most disturbed of the estates, however, was Indramaju and Kandanghauer, to the east of the hinterland on the borders of Tjeribon. The people of this estate, as on the neighbouring Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate to the west, had been drawn into the rebellion which had smouldered in Tjeribon province for most of the first decade of the nineteenth century.  

The effects continued to be felt for some

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50  Willem v. Hogendorp to G. K. v. Hogendorp 20.10.1826 p.30
Van Hogendorp Coll 91.
51  A short description of events in Tjeribon between the time that the province first came under Dutch 'protection' in 1681 and the Raffles period will be found in Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis, The Hague 1925, 2, p.274. Another good short account in Encyclopedie, 1, p.344-6. In the late eighteenth century there were two Sultans ruling simultaneously in Tjeribon, and much of the land was leased to Chinese. In 1802 a general revolt broke out in the province, which was only partly ended when in 1806 the East India Company sent in troops. Disorders continued there, though
years afterwards, when the lands passed into private hands and the people of Indramaju and Kandanghauer in particular were described by the Dutch as not being of the best character.

The Tumengung of Kandanghauer, according to Dutch officials, had at one time made common cause with the Tjeribon rebels, and though he had subsequently made his peace with the Dutch, it was felt that he remained a 'dangerous subject' of whom the owners of Indramaju and Kandanghauer would be glad to be rid. In addition the Tjeribon rebel leaders Bangus Rangin and Bangus Serrit had found considerable support in the area of the estate. It was a nephew of the former who became one of the leaders in the 1816 rebellion which effected the private lands in Krawang province. A nephew and adopted son of Bangus Serrit, Bangus Kondor, turned up at Indramaju in 1819, refused to contribute to the owner's rice levy and murdered a village headman who refused to support him. He was on a lesser scale, both under Daendals (1808-1811) and Raffles (1811-16). The last outbreak of trouble occurred in 1818. The period appears to have been one of the extension of European power in the area. The Sultans of Tjeribon had been vassals of the Company since the late seventeenth century. Under Daendals they were declared to be government officials and under Raffles removed altogether and the area incorporated into the Batavia government's domain. There is no recent account of events in Tjeribon pre-annexation. According to the accounts cited, most of the trouble came from the oppression of the Chinese landleasers. It was also notorious that the Company made very heavy demands on the Tjeribon area for forced deliveries of produce and for the supply of labourers for the hinterland.
subsequently killed while attempting to murder another village headman in the area. Although no further disturbances were reported after that date, the population was still described by the Dutch in the early eighteen thirties as being of an "unpeaceable disposition."  

West Java Estates: Provision of Labour.

The theoretical, legal position of the landlords vis-a-vis the population of their estates, particularly with reference to the labour demands which they might make, was the subject of considerable government deliberation in both the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Apart from the rice levy, which has already been discussed, the main advantage enjoyed by the landowners was the right to demand the performance of what are variously called feudal services (Heerendiensten), corvee or requisitioned labour services.

On the lands sold before 1813 corvee amounted to the exaction from the peasantry of one day's unpaid labour.

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52 The 1816 rising at Indramaju is described in detail in Kemp, Herstel, p.283-99 and Vertrek, p.39-60. The rest of this account, which merely touches on the interesting and unexplored topic of events in Tjeribon in the first decade of the nineteenth century, is based on the following sources. Statistics of Krawang 1824, Lett B. no.1, Schneither Coll 87; Report of Resident of Krawang 31.12.1819, p.9. Schneither Coll 87; Note of Resident of Krawang to his successor, 30.6.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.9; Report Van Beusechem on Tjeribon 6.1834, Min.v.Kol. 3048.
services per week. On the lands sold by Raffles in 1813, however, the exaction of such services was expressly forbidden, but this prohibition seems to have been ignored fairly generally. The important question, however, does not concern the theoretical position over corvée, but the use which was made of it in the running of the estates. There is some evidence which suggests that the ends for which it was utilised were of a very limited character. For instance, J.I. van Sevenhoven, a member of the Council of the Indies, alleged in 1836 that "on most of the estates at the present time no further use was made of this [corvée] than for the keeping of a guard on the owner's house, the carrying of grass and other small services." Although work on canal digging also fell into this category of labour, such "work proceeds but slowly, the workers come and go as they wish." It is clear, however, that some owners exacted labour from their peasantry of a good deal more substantial nature than this. The Resident of

53 Pennink, Reglement 1836, p.18 and 27. Statements of this general, legal character are based on East India Company enactments of the later eighteenth century. As will be indicated below, they probably bear little relation to what happened in practice, nor do they indicate what sort of labour was supposed to be provided under the rubric of corvée. Bastin, Raffles in Java, p.63-4.
54 Note J.I.v.Sevenhoven 15.2.1836, in Kemp, Wordingsgeschiedenis, p.89.
Krawang pointed out to the Batavia authorities in 1821 that on the Pamanukan and Tjiasssem estate the administrator Macquoid had been having timber carried down to the coast, and heavy iron sugar machinery transported up-country to Subang. "MacQuoid will never dare claim that he asked, or allowed anyone to ask the people... if they wanted to do such work," the Resident remarked, "on the contrary he will have to admit that he repeatedly ordered the native headmen to raise the necessary people for this work, and it cannot have escaped his notice that these latter do not wait for a yea or nay... but simply issue firm orders."^55

It may be suspected that what happened on the estates with regard to labour services performed by the peasantry bore little relation to the few government enactments on the subject. As a commission of inquiry remarked in 1835, such regulations as there were had mostly fallen into decay.^56

Exclusive concentration on the corvee or requisitioned labour aspects of the way estates were run, however, can be highly misleading. It is true that on some estates, particularly those in the Preanger, it is very difficult

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55 Report Resident of Krawang 8.5.1821, in Kemp, Wordingsgeschiedenis, p.50.
to tell what happened, so partisan and conflicting is the evidence. There are indications that the coffee cultivation at Sukabumi and the other private lands created in the Preanger in 1813 was kept going by requisitioned labour, just as it was on the neighbouring government-run coffee plantations. The Indies government, whose object was to blacken the character of the owners of Sukabumi, claimed that they used forced labour to run the coffee gardens on the estate. This was not quite the way in which Nicholas Engelhard, one of the owners, described the way in which the estate was run in a report to a government commission in 1820. According to his testimony, the administrator arranged to take coffee instead of rice as rent if the cultivators so wished. Steitz de Wilde, who looked after the Sukabumi lands between 1819 and 1822 in the absence of his half-brother Andries De Wilde, claimed several years later that under his administration thousands

57 Bastin, Raffles in Java, p.63-5.
58 Secret Report Batavia June 1822, p.143, Verbaal Min.v.Kol 16.6.1825, Min.v.Kol 451. One of the objects of this government report was to justify the action of the Van der Capellen regime in refusing to pay De Wilde more money for Sukabumi's coffee after Willem I had ordered them to do so. More details of De Wilde's quarrel with the Indies government will be found in Ch. 3 p. 171-3.
of Spanish dollars were given out to the cultivators by way of advances. 60

On several other big estates, where coffee was either not grown or was of little importance, there was no question of the use of corvee for the cultivation of other crops, such as sugar and indigo. At Tjikandi Ilir between 1829 and 1832 the cultivation of indigo was carried out on the basis of advances to the cultivators, as emerges from the letters between the Calcutta owner, his Batavia agents and the administrator of Tjikandi. Unfortunately, what is not apparent from these letters is exactly how the system worked. All that can be said with certainty is that a system of advances was operated which Palmer, the owner, thought hazardous "with the seasons so precarious," preferring that "plant might be the medium of rents for the tenants" instead. The system did not work, probably because of crop failure, and the owners lost a considerable amount of money because the advances could not be made good. 61

60 Steitz's report 16.12.1827, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 21.10.1829 no. 75, Min.v.Kol. 709. Presumably these advances were made in return for deliveries of coffee, but the document does not make this clear.

On the Pamanukan and Tjiiassem estate it is again fairly clear that requisitioned labour from the villages did not provide the workforce for the elaborate sugar works at Subang. Most of the employees there listed by the Resident in 1824 were "koolies" or labourers, some four hundred of whom received a monthly wage of between three and four-and-a-half guilders, together with four-and-a-half gantangs of rice, as well as salt and oil. The Resident's observations were born out by Alexander Loudon's own account of the Subang mills, made a few years later. According to Loudon, there were three hundred and eighty workpeople employed at Subang, paid three-and-a-half guilders per month. The annual wage bill also included 45,865 gantangs of rice and thirty bottles of oil. At other sugar works similar arrangements appear to have been made. At Tjikandi Ilir and Tjikandi Udek, where two sugar mills operated in the early 'twenties, a total workforce of between two and three hundred men was paid with

62 Statistics of Krawang 1824, Lett. F. no. 2, Schneither Coll 87. The oil appears to have been for cooking.
63 Some Remarks on the Sugar Cultivation of Java by Mr Loudon, undated c. 1830, Baud Coll 949. Loudon, friend of the acting Governor-General and later Colonial Minister, J. C. Baud, was administrator of Pamanukan and Tjiiassem from 1825-9. This 'remarks' are based on his experiences with sugar cultivation and manufacture at Subang. On his career, see Ch. 2 p. 153.
rice, oil and one Spanish dollar per month per man.\textsuperscript{64}

Most of these paid workpeople did not come from the estates on which the sugar works were situated. On the contrary, most of the sugar mills (and probably the sugar fields as well) were worked by labour brought in from the more populous provinces to the east of Krawang, above all from Tjeribon. At both the Tjikandi's it was noted in 1820 that the sugar mills were partly provided with labour from Tjeribon province, as the owners could get very few people from the surrounding villages to work for them.\textsuperscript{65}

In 1822 the administrator of Pamanukan and Tjiassem recruited one hundred and fifty labourers for the Subang sugar works in Pekalongan, through the intermediary of the old indigo maker R.S.Douglas. The workpeople contracted to stay at Subang for six months.\textsuperscript{66} As the full planting,

\textsuperscript{64} Statistics of Bantam 1820, Lett.F. no.2. Schneither Coll 83.
\textsuperscript{65} Statistics of Bantam 1820, Lett.F. no.1, Schneither Coll 83.
\textsuperscript{66} The situation at Tjikandi was highly peculiar for most of our period, in that the government claimed control over the villages of the area, and took rent from them. Only in 1828-9, when the entire Tjikandi area, villages and all, was sold by the Du Bus government, did full control of the area pass into the hands of the claimants, Palmer and Company of Calcutta and Trail and Company of Batavia. The whole complex business is dealt with in Faes, Tjikandi.

growing, cutting and manufacturing season for sugar was about eighteen months, the implications of this are several. Either this was not the entire number of hired non-estate workpeople at Subang, or some of the estate people had been induced to plant and cut the cane. Alternatively the six-month contract may have been window-dressing, designed to conciliate the Indies government. According to Alexander Loudon's account of the works, of the four hundred and fifty hired workmen at Subang, only ninety one were required for the actual work of sugar manufacture. The rest, it may be assumed, were needed for the cultivation and transportation of the cane. Loudon makes no mention of arrangements for growing the cane made with the cultivators settled on the estate. In these circumstances it is tempting to conclude that the growing as well as the manufacture and transport of the cane was in the hands of hired workpeople, most of whom, according to Willem van Hogendorp who visited Subang in 1828, came from the Preanger district beyond the borders of the estate. An unspecified number of hired workpeople were also used at the sugar works on the Tagal Waru and Sumadangan estate in

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67 See note 63 above.
the mid-twenties. Whether this continued to be the case when the estate changed hands in the later 'twenties is not certain. D.A. Fraser, one of the new owners, told Willem van Hogendorp that he had forced the local people to work for him by getting them into debt, foreclosing on the harvest, and compelling them to either work for him or starve.

Recourse to labour brought in from elsewhere for one purpose or another was common enough on the big estates of West Java. In the hinterland itself the indications are that the sugar producing estates were completely dependent on such labour. The sugar mills of that area, many of which were in Chinese rather than European hands, had been worked with labour brought in from Tjeribon and elsewhere to the east since at least the mid-eighteenth century.

As Andries Teissiere's 1790 treatise on the Batavia sugar industry shows, the indispensable pre-requisite of successful sugar cultivation was a supply of what he called Javanese Boedjongers or labourers from the districts to the

east of the hinterland, beyond the forests of Krawang. Nor was sugar the only crop to be cultivated in this way in the hinterland. Shortly before his death in 1825 the indigo maker J.F.Arnold, whose works were at Bergzicht, appealed to the government for help in the recruitment of one hundred to one hundred and fifty labourers from the eastern Residencies. It appears, however, that the Bergzicht works also relied for the cultivation of plant on a number of Chinese cultivators in the surrounding districts, to whom advances were made.

Workpeople from Tjeribon.

Most of the hired workpeople in the hinterland came from Tjeribon, where they were recruited by agents or mandoors of the Batavia sugar makers. In some cases they appear to have made their way to the hinterland without the intervention of the mandoors. In 1824, for instance The Resident of Tjeribon, who was no friend of the recruiting agents, reported that one hundred and thirteen labourers had been recruited by the mandoors, but that another one

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72 Teissiere, V.B.G., 5, 1790, p.129. In Teissiere's day, as more occasionally in the early nineteenth century, the word Java was used to designate not the whole island, but those parts of it which lay along the coast from Tjeribon eastwards.
73 G.G. in Rade 8.2.1825 no.36, Min.v.Kol. 2787; Report of High Commission for Agriculture on Advice received, 4.7.1827, Du Bus Coll 369.
hundred and sixteen had gone to Batavia of their own accord. How many were involved annually in this migration is difficult to establish from the existing sources. 1824 was a bad year for sugar in the hinterland, and presumably less workpeople than usual were needed. Much larger numbers were probably recruited in years of greater productivity, especially when the government began to lend the weight of its authority to the business of recruitment from 1825 onwards. (see below) In 1833-4 the firm of Trail and Company alone recruited about four hundred labourers in Tjeribon. Few of these workpeople appear to have gone to West Java on a permanent basis. At the Subang sugar works on the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estates, the labourers usually stayed for six or twelve months and then returned home.

Few of these workpeople appear to have gone to West Java on a permanent basis. At the Subang sugar works on the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estates, the labourers usually stayed for six or twelve months and then returned home. Teissiere remarked on the necessity of a timely paying-off of the homeward-bound labourers, without which precaution it was difficult to get workpeople in subsequent years. In his time it appears to have been customary for the

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74 Annual General Report Tjeribon 1824, p.2. Schneither Coll
75 S. van Deventer, Bijdragen tot de kennis van het Landelijk Stelsel op Java, Zalt-Bommel 1866, 2, p.317.
76 Statistics of Krawang 1824, Lett.F. no.1, Schneither Coll
labourers to stay in the hinterland for only five months. Some of the hired labourers, however, who left their homes with wives and children, did not return, but settled permanently in the hinterland.

Once there the workpeople appear to have been paid in rice and possibly cash. The system of payment in rice is no doubt what lay behind the frequent complaints of the sugar makers in the twenties that the high and increasing cost of rice was making their operations impossible. There are few references in detail to cash payments in the hinterland evidence. According to Teissiere in 1790, it was necessary to supply each labourer with a bottle of oil and half a gantang of salt per month, as well as a cash payment reckoned in stuivers, and, of course, rice.

Some explanation of the migration of workpeople from Tjeribon to Batavia was offered by the Resident of the former province in 1824. He rejected the view that it was poverty which forced the village people of his province to seek employment elsewhere, and alleged that in the past

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77 Teissiere, V.B.G., 5, 1790, p.63 and 130.
79 Reference has already been made (above note 51) to the disturbed state of affairs prevailing in Tjeribon in the early nineteenth century. Between 1808 there were three Sultans reigning in Tjeribon instead of the normal two. The third, appointed by Daendals, was dismissed in 1811.
migrations had been caused by the oppressions, which he did not specify, of the former Sultans of Tjeribon.®

The cardinal point which emerges from his account, however, is that the recruiting agents sent out from Batavia were only one element in a complex situation. The mandoors, with their promises, bribes and what the Resident described as "intrigues", certainly played an important role, but so did the family ties which had built up over the decades between the villages of Tjeribon and migrant labourers who had settled permanently in the hinterland.® It is, however, about the more or less enforced aspects of this labour migration on which the sources are most forthcoming.

It appears that a system of administrative pressure, and as far as the Indonesian local authorities at least were concerned, corruption, was responsible for at least part of the annual migrations. Teissiere explained in 1790 that the recruiting agents got their men by passing a

80 Teissiere, V.B.G., 5, 1790, p.130-2.
81 Annual General Report Tjeribon 1824, p.2-5, Schneither Coll 88. There may have been an element of population flight in this situation. Possibly, it is not entirely co-incidental that the area most effected by immigration to Batavia, the Galu Regency of Tjeribon, was also the major coffee growing district of that province, where the government ran a Preanger-style enforced coffee cultivation. Report 1824 p.5 and Van Beusechem Report Tjeribon, c.1834, p.42, Min.v.Kol. 3048.
"certain sum of money to the headmen of the villages ... to which the people belonged." It is not easy to demonstrate how pressure was applied inside the village. A case quoted by the Resident of Tjeribon in which thirty inhabitants of a particular village sought permission to go with their families to Batavia throws some light on this matter. Persistent questioning of the would-be migrants produced the explanation that they had been excluded from the division of the village fields by the headman, and having no other means of support, they had decided to go to Batavia. Fresh forms of pressure were brought to bear in the mid-twenties, when the Batavia government, alarmed at the decline of the sugar industry, began to lend its support to the recruiting agents sent by the sugar makers. The Resident of Tjeribon was ordered to lend the necessary help and support to such of those sugar maker's mandoors as should be recommended by the Batavia authorities. Hints of this kind were interpreted as orders by the provincial authorities. In 1833-4

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82 Teissiere, V.B.G., 5. 1790, p.129. See also Van Klaveren, Colonial System, p.57.
83 Annual General Report Tjeribon 1824, p.4, Schneither Coll.
84 At the close of 1824 the Indies government gave permission for the agents of the hinterland sugar makers to recruit workpeople in Tjeribon, Tagal and Pekalongan. The Residents of those provinces were ordered to give the "necessary help and support" to the recruiting agents. G.G. in Rade 16.11.1824 no.29, Min.v.Kol. 2785.
the recruitment for Trail and Company's mills was, in his own words, "arranged" by the Resident of Tjeribon. In the circumstances, it became possible for those chosen to go to the hinterland to send replacements instead. By the early 'thirties, at the latest, a regular procedure appears to have developed to cover this eventuality. A cultivator who was reluctant to go to the hinterland for fear of losing his share in the village fields could find a substitute for a cash payment of thirty guilders. It was more usual, however, to make a smaller cash payment, but to add an oxen, a quantity of rice and a piece of white cotton cloth. Other villagers, presumably the less substantial, fled after they had been recruited. In 1834 it was said that about half the four hundred labourers recruited for Trail and Company's sugar works fled either on the journey, or on arrival in the hinterland.

Government support for the recruiting agents did not continue, however, after 1834. The acting Governor-General J.C. Baud, disapproved of the involvement of the government.

85 Van Deventer, Landelijk Stelsel, 2, p. 317.
86 Van Deventer, Landelijk Stelsel, 2, p. 318.
in the pressing of workpeople in Tjeribon and utilised the case of Trail and Company's recruitment to withdraw government support altogether. The grounds for doing so were given by the Indies government as the ease with which the hinterland sugar makers could make their own recruitment arrangements, without the necessity of recourse to the administration. The uncharitable might suspect that what also worried the regime was the effect of labour recruitment on the government's own Cultivation System.

Continuing Labour Problems of the West Java Sugar Industry.

Despite the provision for bringing in labour from Tjeribon and elsewhere to the east, there are numerous indications that labour shortage, particularly in the sugar industry, was endemic in West Java. This held good for the great estates as well as for the smaller private lands of the hinterland. The closing down of the sugar works at Tjikandi Ilir in 1822-3 had at least something to do with the difficulty in getting a labour force. Shortage of labour remained a problem at the neighbouring Tjikandi Udek

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88 Extract Baud to Min.v.Kol., 23.8.1834, Baud Coll 446.
89 Van Deventer, Landelijk Stelsel, 2, p.318-20.
90 Cotes's note of 15.8.1826, Van Hogendorp Coll 91.
works throughout the 'twenties. Similar difficulties were encountered at the Subang works on the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate. The Resident of Krawang reported in 1821 that even for what he described as generous wages, the owners could get scarcely fifty men to work for them. Three years later, despite the presence of workpeople hired in Pakalongo, Tjeribon and elsewhere, cane was left to rot in the fields because there were not enough hands available to bring it in to the mills. It is this labour shortage which appears to have played a major role - perhaps even the primary role - in undermining the sugar speculations of the big estates during the 'twenties.

In the hinterland the position was no better. According to contemporary analyses, the expense and scarcity of labour had a great deal to do with the decay of the sugar industry of that area. A petition of the Batavia sugar makers in 1824 alleged that the cause of decay was to "be sought in the first place and chiefly in the existing lack

92 Report Resident of Krawang 8.5.1821, in Kemp, Wordings-gescheidenis, p.50. Sugar was a labour intensive industry, and the sparse population of Pamanukan and Tjiassem appears to have militated against its success from the start.
93 Annual General Report Krawang 1823, p.72-6, Schneither Coll 87.
of workpeople...", an allegation which was reiterated by the veteran landowner and one-time Governor of North-East Java, Nicholas Engelhard. Moreover, the scarcity of workpeople was naturally accompanied by a marked rise in the wages which had to be paid for hired labour. According to the Resident of Batavia in 1824, the cost of hiring workpeople had doubled, though this statement was not linked to any time sequence. A similar analysis of the sugar industry's problems in part, though not entirely, in terms of labour shortage was offered by the writers of an agricultural report: of 1827. They suggested that the problem would be eased if workpeople could be brought over from the Outer Possessions to the hinterland. This idea

94 G.G. in Rade 16.11.1824 no.29, Min.v.Kol. 2785. Nonetheless, this was not cited as being the sole difficulty. High on the list was the scarcity of oxen, needed for ploughing the fields and operating the cane-crushers of most of the mills in the area.

95 Engelhard to Elout, 13.3.1825, Min.v.Kol. 3195 item 139.


97 Report Loudon-Teissiere, 8.5.1827, Van den Bosch Coll 404. The Outer Islands were those parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, other than Java and Madura, over which the Dutch had only very nominal control in the early nineteenth century, by virtue of treaties signed with their rulers. As early as c.1822 the landowner De Wilde had proposed to bring labour over from unspecified parts of the Outer Islands to work on his coffee plantations at Sukabumi. As the Indies government pointed out at the time, such workpeople, obtained by bribing their rulers, would be little
seems to have had fairly general currency at the time. The Batavia merchant and one-time sugar promoter Robert Scott advocated the recruitment of workpeople in Bali in a note submitted to Willem van Hogendorp in 1828.98

If it is accepted that contemporaries were correct in their conviction that workpeople were becoming harder to get, the reasons for this are not at all easy to disentangle. One difficulty must be cleared out of the way to start with. Labour shortage was not a problem which could be ironed out simply by government intervention, though doubtless a sympathetic attitude at Batavia did help. Sympathy, however, was no guarantee of success. The Batavia sugar makers Trail and Company were given permission in 1825 and again in 1826 to send their agents into Tjeribon to recruit workpeople.99 In 1827 however, only one year later, labour shortage was still said to be impeding the expansion of the area under sugar at Bekasi, and meant that the firm's mills had to work well below their capacity. At the close of the decade the firm began to negotiate with the government for the transportation of workpeople from Bali.100

98 Scott's note of 9.2.1828, Van Hogendorp Coll 153H.
100 G.G. in Rade 5.6.1829 no.26 Min.v.Kol. 2836.
This is scarcely an indication that Trail and Company's labour problems had been solved by government support. The reason advanced by the government's agricultural advisors to explain the shortage of hired labour in the hinterland was that of the detrimental effects of the introduction of the Land Rent System in the areas of recruitment. According, for instance, to Loudon and Teissiere in 1827, the Residents of such areas were hostile to recruitment because it drew away cultivators and reduced the revenue drawn from the Land Rent.\textsuperscript{101} No doubt there was something in this, but as has already been observed, the Galu division of Tjeribon, where most of the hired labourers originated was scarcely a Land Rent area at all. Instead the government operated there what amounted to a forced coffee cultivation in the Preanger manner.\textsuperscript{102} Of course, this may have given the provincial authorities equally good reason to try to stop people leaving, but it is inaccurate to describe this process as the results of the introduction of the Land Rent. Moreover, the growing shortage of labour, in an industry which does not appear to have been expanding was something which had been noted for some time before the

\textsuperscript{101} Report Loudon-Teissiere 3.5.1827, Van den Bosch Coll 404.

\textsuperscript{102} See note 81 above.
introduction of the Land Rent System in 1813. In 1809, for example, the government-employed sugar expert J.C.O'Brien reported to the authorities on his return to Holland that the shortage of workpeople in the hinterland of Batavia was increasing from year to year, and was causing the sugar mill owners the gravest difficulties. At that time, however, parts of Tjeribon province were in a state of rebellion, which may have had some effect on the usual migration of labour. The situation was obviously a highly complex one, in which, for example, the attitude of the indigenous authorities in the main areas of recruitment and the possible effects of the extension of direct European rule in Tjeribon province after the deposition of the Sultans in 1813 - all need further investigation. In 1826, for instance, the Regent of the Galu district of Tjeribon appears to have opposed the recruiting agents sent from the hinterland.

104 Van Deventer, Landelijk Stelsel, 2, p.317.
The Administration and labour situation on the leased lands in the Principalities.

The leased estates in the Principalities were run with the minimum of European staff. The planter in whose name the lease was taken out usually managed the property in person. Planters like J.D. Boudet and James Shand were closely concerned with the day-to-day running of their plantations. In August 1821, for instance, a letter from Shand to Boudet informed the latter that 30,900 coffee trees were being sent to his lands by Shand, who apologised for their small size. Even a planter like Gillian Maclaine, who also ran a major business house in Batavia, spent several months each year on his estates in the Principalities. There are indications that a number of either Europeans or Eurasians were employed in a subordinate capacity on some of the estates. The Scots-born William Cusky

105 James Shand to Boudet, 14.8.1821, Instit.T.L.V. H788
Boudet was Resident Nahuijs's partner in several estates in Jogja-Solo area, including Sempu. Shand, a young Scotsman who arrived in Java about 1819 and died at Solo in 1822 was partner in an estate there with Bouwens v.d. Boijn. For details on Shand see Ch. 2 p. 131.

was overseer at Maclaine's Melambong estate in 1826,\textsuperscript{107} and on Dezentje's Ampel coffee plantations the Solo-born F.F. Darlang was overseer in 1827. Darlang had been a planter in the Principalities himself before 1823 and, given his Solo birthplace, was probably a Eurasian.\textsuperscript{108} So too in all probability was the overseer at Boudet's Sempu estate, Alexander.\textsuperscript{109} No doubt there were other such European and Eurasian staff on the estates, but the indications are that in comparison with somewhere like Pamanukan and Tjiassem in West Java, their numbers were few. Although there were many Chinese in the Principalities, some of them land-lessees, it is difficult to find evidence what they were much involved in the plantations leased by the Europeans. In general and with the proviso that the evidence on this point is very thin indeed, it seems fair to say that as far as the settled population of the estates was concerned, the European planters did little to disturb the indigenous power structure of the lands which they took over. The indications from the surviving letters written by the Jogja planter Harvey Thompson to Ex-Resident Nahuijs, for instance, are that the planter ran his lands

\textsuperscript{107} Register European Residents, Min.v.Kol. 3130.


\textsuperscript{109} The few surviving letters written by Alexander to Tuan Boudet are a romanised Malay script. Instit.T.L.V. 1788.
through the local bekel or headmen. Nahuijs commented that on the estates leased by European planters, the revenues of a fifth part of the land remained in the hands of the bekel.\textsuperscript{110} As in West Java, the effect on the local status-quo of the bringing in of labour from outside the estates is a matter for speculation.

Compared with West Java, the Principalities appear to have been well populated. According to calculations made by the Raffles government in 1815, the total population of the Jogja and Solo areas was in the region of one-and-a-half million. In the same year the total population of the whole island was four-and-a-half million. In comparison the population of West Java, excluding Tjeribon, was said to be rather less than 900,000.\textsuperscript{111} As far as the Principalities were concerned, the Dutch were able to make little improvement on Raffles's guess work. In 1826 the Jogja Resident J.I. van Sevenhoven reported that the population was somewhere between one and two million, there was really no way of telling.\textsuperscript{112} The implication of

\textsuperscript{110} Thompson to Nahuijs, 2.10.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3; Nahuijs, Verzameling, p.297.

\textsuperscript{111} Raffles, History, 1, p.63.

\textsuperscript{112} Report Van Sevenhoven, July 1826, Schneither Coll 109. The land area of the Principalities before the large scale cession of territory at the end of the Java War in 1830, was considerably greater than was the case in the later nineteenth century. Very approximately, one third of the island was controlled by the Susuhunan and the Sultan before 1830.
these doubtful statistics, that the Principalities were more densely populated than West Java, is supported by at least some of the other types of evidence that can be brought to bear on the question. The accounts given of their lands by the planters themselves suggest a picture of extensive sawah cultivation and of a widespread if somewhat neglected irrigation system. The implication at least of such descriptions is that the area concerned was thickly populated.113 Another pointer in this direction is the comment made by the Colonial Minister Elout that labour was cheaper to get in the Principalities than in the western parts of the island.114 In all the information available on the subject of the arrangements for working the plantations on the leased lands, there is little reference to difficulty in finding workpeople.115 Many of the planters claimed

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A description of the irrigation works on the lands leased by Europeans in the Principalities will be found in Ch. 3, p. 233-4.


115 Nevertheless, these are only indications of a high population density, and not positive proof. There is evidence that relations between the European land-leasers and the peasantry were not as harmonious as the former were inclined to suggest. The Resident of Pekalongan reported in 1823 that one hundred and fifty families had fled from the lands leased by the planters Kuiper and Abigeils and had settled in his Residency along with others from the Jogja area. Three years earlier the Residents of both Rembang and Surabaja reported people fleeing from the Principalities onto government land, "so that they could live in peace,"
that the population of their lands had increased appreciably during their period of tenure. Thompson, for instance said that the number of people on his lands at Jogja doubled between 1818 and 1823. 116

As was the case with the European landlords of West Java, the European land-leasers in the Principalities exacted corvee from their peasantry and made a substantial levy on the rice crop. According to Nahuijs, from whose account these details are taken, these demands were of a traditional character. Corvee, in Nahuijs's words, amounted to the free use "of one, two, three four or more labouring Javanese daily, according to the extent of the land" involved. The rice levy amounted to one half of the crop of the sawah grown rice, and one third of that grown on non-irrigated fields. 117

However, although some of the land-leasers were satisfied with the proceeds of the rice rent, the more ambitious among them were interested in growing coffee on their lands. For this latter cultivation it appears that corvee services

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Thompson to Nahuijs, 8.7.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3. 117
Nahuijs, Verzameling, 1, p.298.
were not used, but that other arrangements were made. Nahuijs contended that the cultivators were frequently allowed to keep the whole of the rice harvest, in return for work in the coffee plantations. This account of operating methods was accepted by the hostile De Graaff, and according to Rouffaer such arrangements were common on the lease-lands in the Principalities throughout the nineteenth century.

Nonetheless, on those early nineteenth century plantations of which some accounts are available, recourse to the hiring of day labourers seems to have been far more common. These labourers sometimes came from the estate concerned or more frequently were brought in from elsewhere. Nicholas Engelhard told Willem van Hogendorp after a visit he had made to Solo in 1826 that the great land-leaser J.A. Dezentje ran his coffee plantations with freely hired day labourers. The settled population of his lands was not involved. They were left free to cultivate rice, of which the landlord used his share to attract labourers onto the plantations. With

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118 Nahuijs, Verzameling, 1, p.297.
119 Report De Graaff 22.3.1822, ed. Kemp, Tijd N.1. 41, 1890. De Graaff was Governor-General Van der Capellen's chief adviser and one of the foremost opponents of private European landholding in Java. As such he clashed with Resident Nahuijs in a series of exchanges in 1821-2. The subject is treated in more detail in Ch. I. See also Rouffaer, Encyclopaedie, 4, p.629.
the incentive of a plentiful supply of cheap rice at hand, reported Engelhard, Dezentje was able to get as many workers as he required to cultivate his coffee. Where these workers came from in 1826 was not stated; three years earlier, however, the Resident of Semarang had reported that the labour force for Dezentje's Ampel estates came from the government lands across the border around the town of Salatiga. In the same year, 1823, the planter William Cotes, who was associated with Dezentje at Ampel, informed Nahuijs that 1,083 "coolies" were employed to clean and maintain the coffee gardens on that estate. Cotes provided one of the most detailed accounts at present available of how a coffee plantation in the Principalities was run. According to him the coffee plantations, which were on previously uncultivated ground were laid out by workpeople paid twelve to thirteen duiten per day. Loans were

120 Willem v.Hogendorp to G.K.v.Hogendorp, 20.10.1826, p.72, Van Hogendorp Coll 91. It is not altogether clear from this account whether Dezentje paid his labourers in rice, or simply made rice available to them at a cheap rate. According to Nahuijs, the European planters had to grow rice to pay the labourers they needed to grow other crops such as coffee, "because they could not always be certain of getting workpeople in return for cash payment." Nahuijs, Verzameling, l, p.297.

121 Annual General Report Semarang 1823, Appendix C, p.8, Schneither Coll 91. Dezentje's Ampel estate lay on the northern fringes of the Principalities, not far across the border from Salatiga.

122 Cotes to Nahuijs, 3.7.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.
made to them and housing provided for them, another indication that they were not estate people. In the beginning, reported Cotes, workpeople were recruited by specially employed Indonesian headmen (inlandische hoofden), with great difficulty and expense. Eventually, however, workpeople came unsought and in great numbers. Sometimes as many as 2,000 were employed. In the early days of the plantation, which must have been around 1818-20, a fixed day wage had been paid. Later, however, the European landlords had found it preferable to pay a rate which varied with the number of trees cleaned. On this system wages varied between fifteen and forty duiten per day, according to Cotes's account. According to the Resident of Semarang in 1823, however, the wages paid at Ampel were one dubbelje (eight duiten) per day. Whatever the wage, Cotes claimed that with the new system "I get more work done at present with four hundred than previously with fifteen hundred or even two thousand workers, and the coolies show more enthusiasm for their work because they can earn more."

123 Cotes and Dezentje's Report on Ampel 3.7.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no. 3.
125 See note 123 above.
Similar arrangements to those at Ampel were in force on other estates. The labour force for both Gillian Maclaine's Melambong estate and P.H. de la Brethoniere's Assinan estate came from the government lands around Salatiga in 1823. According to the Dutch officials at Salatiga, moreover, this arrangement had a gravely detrimental effect on the government coffee gardens around the town. At Assinan, La Brethoniere claimed that he paid his workers five stuivers (twenty duiten) per day. At Melambong, as at Ampel, the settled population was left free to grow rice, the owners share of which was used to attract labourers from outside the estate. It is not clear whether the labourers hired by the Solo planter J.M. Kuiper came from outside the boundaries of his lands. They were said to be paid three-and-three-quarter stuivers (fifteen duiten) per day. C. Nolte and J. Versteeg, both

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126 Annual General Report Semarang 1823, Appendix A, p.6 and Appendix C, p.7-8, Schneither Coll 91. Both Maclaine and La Brethoniere were big coffee planters.  
127 La Brethoniere to Nahuijs, 7.7.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.  
128 See note 120 above.  
129 J.M. Kuiper to Nahuijs, 9.7.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.
planters in Solo in the early 'twenties, paid workpeople from their own lands to work in their coffee gardens.\textsuperscript{130} According to Nahuijs, there were plenty of people in the villages of Solo and Jogja who had no share in the rice fields and were willing to work for fair day wages.\textsuperscript{131}

Coffee was not the only crop to the cultivated in this manner. The indigo cultivation carried out on leased land at Jogja by the planter Harvey Thompson between 1817 and 1823 was run, according to government sources, by workpeople from other lands and villages, who were paid four guilders per month.\textsuperscript{132}

From this evidence it is not possible to make out whether wages were reckoned and paid in cash, or reckoned in cash but paid in rice and other foodstuffs, or in part in such things as cotton goods. The second alternative would seem the more probable in the circumstances where the European landlords had a large amount of rice on their hands. There is no indication that the European landlords took their rent in cash rather than rice, and, as has already been suggested in the case of J.A. Dezentje, several

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\textsuperscript{130} G. Nolte to Nahuijs, 30.6.1823, \textit{Leiden MSS} 616, 8, no. 3. \\
\textsuperscript{131} Nahuijs's Comments of the De Graaff Report 1822, dated 7.5.1822, \textit{Leiden MSS} 616, 7, no. 9. \\
\textsuperscript{132} G.G. in Rade 18.11.1823 no. 19, \textit{Min.v.Kol.} 2780.
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indications to the contrary. At least one other of the big coffee planters, P.H. de la Brethoniers, made it explicit in his description of his lands that he took the rent in rice. He claimed, however, that previous to his tenure of the lands in question, the Padjak or rice rent had been paid in cash while the crop was still standing. 133

Labour arrangements made by the European planters and manufacturers of East Java.

The conditions under which the European sugar and indigo manufacturers of East Java worked differed in many important respects from those which prevailed in the western parts of the island and in the Principalities. Whereas, to take but one example, much of West Java was only sparsely populated, the coastal provinces from Tjeribon eastwards to the Oosthoek were probably the most densely peopled on the island. 134 On the other hand, the sugar and indigo manufacturing entrepreneurs who operated in these provinces did

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La Brethoniere to Nahuijs, 7.7.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no. 3.

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The area ruled by the Dutch in East Java before 1830 was only a little larger than that of the area under their control in the west of the island. The total population of the coastal provinces from Tjeribon eastwards to the Oosthoek, according to Raffles's calculations of c.1815, numbered more than 1,750,000. On the other hand the total population of West Java was scarcely 900,000, according to the same calculations. Raffles, History, 1, p.63.
not have the same control over the local population as their contemporaries elsewhere in Java. All the land in these eastern, coastal districts was government-controlled territory, and the European manufacturers, and with them the Chinese, were dependent for both raw material and labour on arrangements with the local cultivators in the villages which surrounded their factories. Such villages, of course, were on government land, and the Dutch authorities, not the entrepreneurs, were their landlords.

The materials available for a study of this situation are only fragmentary, and come almost exclusively from official sources. Typical of these are the records of the Council of the Indies, and a number of Resident's reports and material of a similar nature. What are not available are letters and descriptions written by individual entrepreneurs and not intended for official eyes. This gap in the source material is especially unfortunate, as it makes it virtually impossible to be certain of the true character of the difficulties encountered by the planters and manufacturers when they set out to secure a supply of labour, sugar cane or indigo plant. It also makes it impossible to penetrate far into the day-to-day mechanics of contracting.

135 After 1818-19 what was legally permissible was that contracts for a supply of raw material or for the use of land or labour could only be made with individual village cultivators. They could not be settled between village headmen, district chiefs or Regents and the Chinese or
for labour and produce.

What the source material does allow of, however, is some description of the size of these East Java sugar and indigo manufacturing establishments, and of the system adopted by their owners. R.S. Douglas, the Pekalongan indigo maker whose works closed down in 1819, was said to have employed as many as two hundred people at the height of the manufacturing season. Wages paid at his works were twelve duiten per day to the workmen and between ten and fifteen stuivers (forty to sixty duiten) per day to the overseers, who appear to have been local people rather than Europeans. In addition, according to a Residency report written several years after Douglas had gone out of business, two villages were employed to grow the indigo for his factory. A total of two hundred and seventy-six families were said to have been involved. However, other and more immediately contemporary sources indicate that as many as thirty lurah or village headmen were affected by Douglas's indigo growing operations in the course of 1818.

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136 European entrepreneurs concerned. Details of government enactments on this score will be found in Ch. 1, p. 85-6.
137 Resident of Pekalongan to Meylan, 22.12.1823, Schneither Coll 31; Verbaal C.G. 17.5.1818 no. 10, Min.v.Kol 2575.
similar amount of detailed information survives concerning the other European indigo and sugar makers either in Pekalongan or at Probolinggo in the Oosthoek. At two sugar mills in Pekalongan run by Chinese in the early twenties, a total of two hundred and ten people were employed at the height of the manufacturing and planting season between April and November. They received between ten and twelve duiten daily. The sugar boilers, and those who cut the cane, were paid at the rate of five guilders per month.\textsuperscript{138} Arrangements of a similar nature may well have held good at the Probolinggo sugar works of Poulter and Grieve and Charles Brodie. As no information relating to either the size of the workforce or the amount of payment is available, however, this remains a matter for speculation. In the Pasuaran district, bordering on Probolinggo, the sugar mills were evidently somewhat smaller in 1820 than those already referred to in Pekalongan. According to Pasaruan's Resident, the two water driven mills in that area each employed a workforce of between eighteen and twenty-five men, who received a daily wage of about twenty-five duiten. The remaining smaller, ox-driven mills employed between six and

\textsuperscript{138} Statistics of Pekalongan 1821, Lett. F. no. 2, Schneither Coll 90.
ten people each, and these employees were paid twenty duiten per day.\footnote{Statistics of Pasaruan 1821, Lett.F. no.1-2. Schneither Coll 97. It seems probable that the Resident omitted from his calculations such workpeople as cane-cutters and field workers as were included in his sugar mill figures by the Resident of Pekalongan.}

There is no statement of how many cultivators or villages were employed in growing cane for these Pasaruan mills. Nor are such data available for the sugar mills owned in the Oosthoek area of Besuki by A.G. de Roock in the later 'twenties. It appears, however, that there were seven Chinese on his staff, as well as two European overseers.\footnote{A.G. de Roock's note, 29.5.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 413.} In Pekalongan in the late 'twenties the indigo maker Harvey Thompson was said to have had four thousand local people working for him, though in what capacities was not stated. Presumably this total includes indigo growers as well as those employed in Thompson's factory. His fellow indigo maker, R. van Goidsnoven, also of Pekalongan, had one thousand labourers working for him in 1830. This workforce, however, appears to have been in part of a seasonal nature.\footnote{Resident of Pasaruan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 411.} In 1825 the veteran indigo manufacturer...
Louis Petel, who had moved to Pekalongan from Batavia in the previous year, employed forty labourers at his works, and another three hundred in bringing the indigo plant down to his factory every morning. Of these, one half were then employed there for the rest of the day.\textsuperscript{142} In mid-1824 Petel arranged for nine villages in the surrounding areas to grow indigo for him.\textsuperscript{143} It is evident that many of those employed in the sugar and indigo industries of East Java did not constitute an all-the-year-round workforce. In his description of the sugar mills of that province in 1822, the Resident of Semarang made a distinction between those who were employed on a more or less permanent basis in the mill, and those who worked for the sugar makers for only part of the year, as cutters of cane and the like.\textsuperscript{144}

As for the arrangements made for growing the raw materials needed in the European or Chinese owned factories, the most common seems to have been that whereby the manufacturer agreed to pay part or the whole of the land rent for those cultivators who grew cane or plant for them. This was evidently what was happening in Pekalongan in 1817.

\textsuperscript{142} Diard's Report on Petel's Pekalongan works, 21.2.1825, Leiden MSS 616, 9, no.1.
\textsuperscript{143} G.G. in Rade 1.6.1824 no.22, Min.v.Kol. 2783.
\textsuperscript{144} Statistics of Semarang 1822, Lett.F. no.2, Schneither Coll 91.
Resident Lawick van Pabst reported in that year that the indigo maker R.S. Douglas made several types of agreement with local cultivators for growing indigo, and that "for the one he paid the whole of the land rent, for the other only part of it. Those for whom he paid only part of the rent planted indigo as a second crop, after the rice had been harvested, while those for whom he paid the whole of the land rent planted indigo immediately as the first crop on part of their land. In addition they received a small payment." 145

In the earlier part of the 1812-34 period, however, it appears that this sort of system was not universal. In 1818 for instance the Probolinggo sugar makers Poulter and Grieve contracted for supplies of cane on the basis of advances to the local cultivators, although whether these advances took the form of cash, rice or some other product is not made clear in the sources. 146 Nonetheless, a system

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145 Lawick van Pabst's Report of Surabaja 15.5.1817, p.38, Schneither Coll 96. Douglas's system was apparently unusual in that it was general practice at the time (the second decade of the nineteenth century) to grow indigo only as a second crop in the rice fields. Resident of Pekalongan to G.F. Meylan, 22.12.1823, Schneither Coll 31.

146 Verbaal G.G. 12.6.1818 no.21, Min.v.Kol. 2374. Poulter and Grieve was a Surabaja firm operating at the close of the second decade of the nineteenth century. Poulter himself appears to have died, bankrupt, at Surabaja in 1822 or possibly earlier. G.G. in Rade 21.8.1822 no.12, Min.v.Kol. 2777
of remuneration for sugar and indigo cultivation based on the payment by the manufacturer of the grower's land rent appears to have been the standard manner of procedure throughout the coastal provinces of East Java by the late 'twenties. So too was the arrangement whereby the manufacturer bought-off the labour services demanded of the peasantry by the government in its role as landlord.\textsuperscript{147}

The Probolinggo sugar maker A.G. de Roock not only paid the land rent of those cultivators who grew cane for him, but also provided them with rice, which was valued at almost twice as much as the land rent payment.\textsuperscript{148} Details of the arrangements entered into by other European entrepreneurs also survive. According to the information reaching the government, the Pekalongan indigo maker Harvey Thompson, who set up there in 1828-9 after a previous career as indigo maker Jogja which had terminated in 1824, paid the amount of the land rent for which their sawah were assessed to the contracting cultivators themselves. In return, the latter planted four-ninths of the sawah area with indigo after the rice had been harvested, and kept the growing plant free from weeds. The cultivator was also expected to cut the

\textsuperscript{147} A.G. de Roock's note, 29.5.1830, Van Den Bosch Coll 413.

\textsuperscript{148} Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 411; G.G. in Rade 27.2.1829 no.6, Min.v.Kol 2822; G.G. in Rade 24.3.1829 no.21, Min.v.Kol 2823.
plant and take it to Thompson's factory. For his part Thompson also took half of the rice crop produced on the four ninths of the sawah area before indigo was planted, but also had to buy-off the government labour services for those who agreed to grow indigo for him. Another of the Pekalongan indigo makers, R. van Goidsnoven, operated in a slightly different way. He paid some of the local people who grew plant for him twice the sum of the land rent in return for all-the-year-round cultivation of indigo on their fields. The contracting cultivators were in this case responsible for planting the indigo and for keeping it free of weeds, but for the cutting and carrying of the plant labourers were employed by the manufacturer. Other contracts made by Van Goidsnoven were of a similar pattern to those made by Thompson, in that the fields were used for only part of the year, after the rice crop had been harvested. In this case, however, the manufacturer had to make separate arrangements for the cultivation and cutting of the indigo. Sometimes the cultivators who had hired their land to Van Goidsnoven undertook to work in the fields themselves. For this they received a daily payment of twelve duiten. Louis Petel also paid the land

149 Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 411. I can offer no explanation as to why four-ninths of the sawah were set aside for indigo.
rent of the local cultivators who grew indigo for him. In his case, moreover, it is fairly clear that he made such payments direct to the Dutch authorities and not to the individual cultivators. At least, in 1828 he was said to be far in arrears with such payments. Petel also bought-off government labour services for those who agreed to grow indigo for him. In return the cultivators planted indigo as a second crop after the rice, and received ten duiten daily for work in the fields. Petel took one third of the rice produced by the contracting cultivators.

Further indications that arrangements for hiring land were not always inclusive of labour come from government reports concerning Pekalongon Residency in the early 'twenties. It was reported that the workpeople for the sugar fields hired by the Chinese manufacturers came "of their own accord from the villages to which the fields belonged," and were paid a daily wage of between ten and twelve duiten for their labour.

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151 Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 411.
If in many respects a great deal remains uncertain about these contracts for growing indigo plant and sugar cane, there are at least indications that the effects of such arrangements on the indigenous power structure of the areas concerned were considerable. In some cases the contracts for indigo growing led to the replacement of the existing Indonesian authorities by the nominees of the European planter. In organizing and supervising the cultivation of indigo, the manufacturer R.S.Douglas did not work through the existing village headmen, but through the agency of specially appointed overseers of the indigo cultivation, known as kapalla toms. The result was that the existing pattern of authority in the village was undermined, as the kapalla toms began to take over the functions of the village headmen or lurah. According to the Dutch authorities, the kapalla toms took upon themselves the distribution of land in the villages which were involved in indigo growing, excluded those villagers who did not contract to supply indigo to Douglas from a share in the sawah, and handed over sawah to outsiders, non-villagers, who were

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153 Kapalla (Kepala) is the Malay word for head. Tom is a word in common use in documents of the period to describe indigo plant. Possibly a westernized (?) version of the Malay word Tarum, used to describe any species of indigo. For this latter term, see Burkhill, Dictionary, 2, p.1238.
prepared to grow indigo. Charges of a rather similar nature were substantiated against the overseers of the indigo cultivation appointed by another Pekalongan indigo maker Charles Dupont. In both cases it appears that the overseers were local people and not Europeans. In the case of some of the Chinese sugar makers, it is clear that sugar growing arrangements with local cultivators led to a thorough-going penetration of village life by the sugar makers. According to the Dutch officials in Pekalongan the tools, oxen, ploughs and carts used in the villages where sugar was grown for the Chinese manufacturers remained the property of the latter, who also bore half the cost of buying the seed-rice and took half the rice crop at harvest time. In Japara the Chinese sugar makers again paid the landrent of the villages which grew cane for them, and generally behaved as if the villages belonged to them. According to the Resident of that province, they took half the rice crop of the villages concerned, carried over old

154 Verbaal C.G. 20.5.1818 no.2, Min.v.Kol. 2375; Verbaal C.G. 30.6.1818 no.21, Min.v.Kol. 2376. Kemp, Landelijk Stelsel, p.290-1, deals with the incident and in regretably typical fashion misses the significance of what was happening and dismisses the village headmen as 'complaining boobies.'

155 Verbaal C.G. 17.7.1818 no.37, Min.v.Kol. 2377.

debts from one year to the next, and, on at least one occasion, used village labour to clear a wood so that the ground could be turned into sugar fields.\textsuperscript{157}

In circumstances such as these, it seems a fair assumption that there was little place left for either the village headman or for his Indonesian superiors. There is certainly evidence of clashes between European and Chinese manufacturers and planters and the indigenous authorities over cane and plant cultivation. Some thirty lurah or village headmen complained to the Resident of Pekalongan in 1818 over the diminution of their authority brought about by Douglas's indigo growing,\textsuperscript{158} while the relations between the Probolinggo sugar maker Charles Brodie and the Regent of that district were very bad indeed in the early 'twenties. In 1822 Brodie complained to the government about the "opposition which he was meeting from the native chiefs ... in his efforts to obtain workpeople," and it is evident that his difficulties extended to the supply of raw material for his works. Brodie, and other of the sugar makers established in Probolinggo in the early 'twenties, was opposed in his

\textsuperscript{157} Annual General Report Japara 1823, p.75-6, Schneither Coll. 95; G.G. in Rade 26.8.1823 no.43, Min.v.Kol. 2779.

In Japara, if not in Pekalongan as well, some sort of covert, old-style village hire still appears to have been going on in the early 'twenties. For more details see Ch. 1 p.86-7.

\textsuperscript{158} Verbaal C.G. 17.5.1818 no.10, Min.v.Kol. 2375.
venture by the Regent Notto Dinigrat, who was said to be a sugar grower himself. The archives of the province concerned would no doubt throw more light on what appears to be a most interesting episode; all that emerges from the records of the Council at Batavia, however, is that the "sugar mill owners of the Probolinggo Regency had complained repeatedly that although fires often broke out in the sugar fields cultivated by the villagers who contracted with them, the Regent's own sugar fields remained untouched by this form of sabotage." 159

Similar themes of the opposition encountered by European entrepreneurs from the side of the local hierarchy recur in the agriculturalist Diard's account of his visit to Louis Petel's Pekalongan indigo works in 1825. Diard remarked that Petel had to contend with the "influence of some chiefs who, naturally fearing to loose part of their authority through the proximity of European settlers ... attempt by their biased advice to awake in the natives a repugnance for working for any European enterprise whatsoever ...." According to Diard, Petel had found it necessary to smooth his way in the area by distributing "presentes et... encouragements" to the local headmen and cultivators,

159
G.G. buiten Rade 1.4.1822 no.1, Min.v.Kol. 2465.
so as to allay the dislike which, as Diard expressed it, always arose when a new venture was started. It appears from a report written five years after Diard's that Petel was fully alive to the necessity of compensating the village authorities for what they lost through his activities. Each year he paid headmen one guilder and under-headmen half-a-guilder for each cultivator in their villages who grew indigo for his factory.  

Clashes between indigo makers and village headmen were still a feature of the Pekalongan scene in 1830, however, when the Resident informed Van den Bosch that the European entrepreneurs would like to put those cultivators who contracted with them under a separate headman, who would be dependent on the entrepreneurs, and be paid by them. Part of the trouble, according to this same official came from the way in which the European manufacturers tended to destroy the delicate compromise which existed in the provinces between the Dutch administration, the Indonesian Regents and the district and village headmen. The essence of this working arrangement was that the Resident and his subordinates turned a blind eye to the continued (and illegal) exactions and depredations of the local headmen and

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160 Diard's report on Petel's Pekalongan works, 21.2.1825, Leiden MSS 616, 9, no.1; Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 411.
their superiors. The manufacturers, who, in the short run at least, had no interest in maintaining this situation, encouraged "their" cultivators to complain to the Dutch authorities about the illegal but time-honoured demands of the village headmen.\textsuperscript{161}

The role played by the Dutch authorities in the provision of labour in East Java.

One of the factors affecting the success of the private European sugar and indigo industry was the attitude of the colonial government at both the central and local levels. In West Java, as we saw in the previous chapter, it was the hostile policy of the Indies government which, it may be argued, was responsible for the failure of the private estates to make good as coffee producers. The attitude of the government was, superficially at least, one of even greater importance in East Java, where the European (and Chinese) entrepreneurs were in the position of having to negotiate for the hire of land and labour from within the government domain. This being so, there is some evidence to suggest

\textsuperscript{161} Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, \textit{Van den Bosch Coll. 411}. Under the Land Rent System the Regents, district chiefs and village headmen were supposed to be salaried officials, and as such were not allowed to demand goods and services from the local population. For evidence from Pasaruan province that the old ways were slow to die out, see Van Niel, \textit{Hongkong Conference}, 1964, p.3.
that, for example, the 1818-19 government enactments regulating the way in which entrepreneurs contracted with the indigenous population for the use of land and labour had an adverse effect on the sugar and indigo industries of East Java.

From Pekalongan province, centre of the dry indigo industry of East Java throughout our period, comes what appears to be clear evidence that the 1818-19 regulations against certain forms of land-hire had a disruptive effect on the indigo manufactuary of the area. In 1823 the Resident of Pekalongan reported to Batavia that the regulations were making it difficult for the indigo manufacturers to be sure of a supply of indigo and workpeople from one year to the next, because of the provision in 1818-19 enactments that land and labour contracts could only be made for one growing season. In the same province, and again according to the Resident, the sugar industry had decayed in the early twenties because of the "lack of the

162 These regulations are dealt with in detail in Ch.1. In brief, according to the 1818-19 regulations, contracts between European or Chinese entrepreneurs and the local growers could only be made for one growing season. Moreover, such contracts might only be made with individual cultivators. They could not be made at the village-headman level; old-style village hire was forbidden.

163 Resident of Pekalongan to Meijlan, 22.12.1823, Schneither Coll 31. The Resident recommended that 5-7 year contracts be allowed.
hired villages and of the lands which belonged to the mills in the old days, and the difficulties in getting workpeople which flowed from this, for now... the manufacturer is entirely dependent on the arbitrary decision of the Javanese to hire out his fields or not. 164

There is, however, some reason to suppose that what was said to have happened in Pekalongan was not entirely typical of East Java as a whole. As has already been suggested, the extent to which the 1818–19 regulations were ever enforced in some areas remains debatable. 165 In Japara province, for instance, it appears that the old system of handing over villages to the sugar makers continued in disguised form until 1823–4. Consultation of the Residency archives for the relevant period ought, obviously, to supply a good deal more information on this point. As it is there remains a very real danger of assuming that events were crucially effected by a policy that was never properly enforced. In the case of the recession in the sugar industry in the early twenties, there are positive indications that influences other than the land and labour policy

164 Annual General Report Pekalongan 1823, p.20, Schneither Coll 90. I far as I can tell, all the sugar makers in Pekalongan in the 'twenties were Chinese.

165 A discussion of the evidence for this in Ch.1, p. 86–7. It must be stressed that until the local archive material is consulted (it is in Jakarta, not The Hague) these conclusions can be little more than hypothetical.
of the Indies government was involved. The recession is roughly coincident with the sharp fall in sugar prices, beginning c.1819, which has already been observed. At the most, government intervention between the European entrepreneur and the local grower can only have made a very difficult situation somewhat worse. Some Residents, far from pointing to the ill-effects of the 1818-19 regulations on the sugar industry, explained the recession in their areas straightforwardly in terms of the fall in prices between 1820 and 1823.

166 Sugar prices are discussed Ch.3 p. 188-9.
167 Annual General Report Japara 1823, p.27 and 37, Schneither Coll 93. In Japara all the sugar makers were Chinese, but some of them appear to have been backed by European merchants from neighbouring Semarang. One of these latter was Robert Scott, member of the firm of Deans Scott and Company c.1814-1823. According to Scott the collapse of the Japara sugar industry occurred because the Dutch authorities in the area were unwilling to compel the local people to adhere to sugar growing contracts made with the Chinese manufacturers. Scott claimed that "one of the causes of this leaning toward the Javanese is found in the desire of the Residents to at least keep their land-rent at the same standard if they could not increase it. Thus, if they adjudged damages against the Javanese, in favour of the Chinese, which in most cases must have amounted to more than one years rent, they disabled the Javanese from paying up the rental, and thus the particular amount of the land-rent in that Residency would have shown a grand deficit." "Note of Robert Scott, 19.2.1828, Van Hogendorp Coll 153H. Scott's account, if referring to the period 1820-23, clashes with that of a later Resident of Japara, according to whom the sugar makers had effective control of the cultivating villages in that Residency until 1823. For reference see note 165.
The case of indigo is even more curious. In Pekalongan production for instance dry indigo stopped in 1819, an event which can scarcely have been a result of government policy formulated at the end of the previous year, though it may have been the result of localized government action against the main indigo maker in the area, R.S. Douglas. This last point remains speculative, however. According to official sources, Douglas's difficulties sprang from his own incompetence as an indigo maker and from the unsuitability of the ground around his mill for the cultivation of indigo. Moreover, according to a report compiled by the Inspectorate of Landed Income c.1823, the then current recession in the indigo industry was less a matter of reluctance among the local people to grow indigo plant than of the inability of the manufacturers to find the money to finance cultivation. According to the Inspectorate, indigo was still widely grown, but its use was restricted to the manufacture of wet indigo which was not suitable for export. The implication of such findings is that it was difficulties of a commercial nature which were holding up private indigo production in the

early 'twenties, rather than the attempts of the government to regulate the relations between the indigo makers and the local cultivators.

When we come to consider the recovery of the sugar and indigo industries of East Java in the later 'twenties, however, it appears that an explanation is purely commercial terms ceases to be viable. The average annual market price of indigo declined steadily from 1825 until the end of our period, though within that general pattern the demand for indigo fluctuated markedly. Sugar, however, was a more clear cut case. Prices, which fell sharply between 1818 and 1824, did begin to rise again in the later 'twenties, but the improvement was only marginal and only short-lived. As has already been pointed out, it can hardly be sufficient to explain the expansion of the sugar industry which began around 1827 - the more so because this expansion was limited to East Java alone. If the stimulus had come solely from better prices, production ought to have increased eventually throughout the island.170

Of course, in the case of sugar, this expansion may in part be explained in terms of the peculiar local circumstances of East Java. Sugar was a crop which had to be

170 Sugar and indigo prices, and some of the implications arising from a comparison of prices and production levels are dealt with in Ch. 3 p. 188-9, 213 and 217-19.
grown on the sawah or wet rice fields. There were far more of these irrigated fields in East than West Java; accordingly, it may be argued, sugar was far more likely to succeed there than elsewhere in the island. This is a long term rather than short term consideration, however, and does not go far toward explaining the pattern of expansion-recession-expansion which appears to form the dominant pattern in the East Java sugar industry between 1815 and 1830. The last phase of this developmental pattern, (the expansion of the late 'twenties) as well as the revival of the East Java indigo industry at roughly the same period appears to have been, in part at least, a result of government encouragement.

The Dutch authorities were certainly in a position to make things very difficult for the entrepreneurs. Demands for labour services from the peasantry, to which as landlord the government was entitled, could easily upset arrangements for growing indigo or sugar in a particular locality. There are indications, moreover, that

The full argument for the mutualistic relationship between sugar and rice in Geertz, *Involution*, especially p.56 and 75. What he says about the connection between rice, sugar and population expansion may well be valid for a later period. We would have to know more about sugar growing in E. Java in the eighteenth century before it would be possible to say whether this mutually promoting process was already going on in the 'twenties.' My impression is that the sugar makers were attracted to East Java because there was already a relatively dense population there and because the wet-rice fields were more extensive there than anywhere else in the island.
many cultivators would only agree to grow these crops if their freedom from liability to labour services was first bought from the government by the manufacturers. According to the Resident of Pekalongan, the local cultivators had "absolutely refused" to make contracts with the indigo maker Harvey Thompson until the latter had agreed to buy-off their labour services.\footnote{172} In this matter co-operation between manufacturers and provincial administrators was of vital importance. Such incidentals as firewood for the sugar boilers could also be a serious problem for the landless manufacturers of East Java, and there is evidence that here too some of the Residents were proving helpful by the later 'twenties. The Besuki sugar maker A.G. de Roock commented on how his difficulties over firewood had been eased by Resident Domis.\footnote{173} In Pekalongan, and probably elsewhere by the end of the 'twenties, the Dutch officials and their subordinates actively supported the European manufacturers in seeing that contracts were adhered to by the local cultivators.\footnote{174} It was this co-operation between the indigo

\footnote{172} Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 411.
\footnote{173} A.G. de Roock's note, 29.5.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 413.
\footnote{174} Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 411.
industry and officialdom such as existed in Pekalongan by the opening months of Van den Bosch's Governor-Generalship which caused him to write back to Holland soon after his arrival in Java, appropos the indigo cultivation, that it was "only through the co-operation of the government that things stand as they do ..." 175

Nonetheless, the doubt must remain that this analysis of the situation was over-simplified and neglected important elements such as the need to arrive at some arrangement with the indigenous authorities. Some reference has already been made to this necessity; the evidence is, admittedly, rather flimsy. But it is only to fall into the heresy of the colonialist historians to suppose that the key to the problem of labour provision lay solely with Dutch officialdom. Indeed, there are some few indications that this was positively not the case. The Besuki sugar maker De Roock stated that when he set up in business there in 1824 he was unable to get local people to grow cane for him, even though he enjoyed the full support of the Resident. It was only after what he described as "unceasing sacrifices,

175 Van den Bosch to Baud, 12.3.1830, in Westendorp Boerma (ed) Briefwisseling, 1, p.51. To support his contention, Van den Bosch forwarded to Baud the letter from the Resident of Pekalongan 25.1.1830, which has been extensively quoted above. I have used a copy in the Van den Bosch archive.
fair words and prompt payments" that he eventually succeeded in procuring a supply of sugar cane. The implications of these somewhat speculative conclusions are that there were several elements at work in determining the availability of land and labour to the European entrepreneurs of East Jaya. Pressure from Dutch officialdom at the centre and in the localities no doubt played a part, but so did the necessity of convincing somebody in the Indonesian power structure of the worth of co-operating with the sugar and indigo makers. If the incentive to this was an economic one, moreover, it follows that the question of the prices obtained for agricultural produce was one of considerable importance in determining whether land-hire in some form or another took place. Of course, it would be naive to assume that such economic incentive worked directly on the individual cultivators; it seems more likely to have operated at the level of village headman, district chief or even Regent. All the same, it is a point which can

176 A.G. de Roock's note, 29.5.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 413.
177 Van Niel, Hongkong Conference, p.4-5, argues that "it would be wrong... to assume that pressures applied through the traditional native elite were the only form in which the government achieved its aim of having sugar cane grown." Although he is writing of the Culture System after 1830, what he says appears to have equal relevance to the nature of government pressure before 1830. He goes on to say that it is not possible to talk of economic incentive "without raising the question of who within the village, and within the indigenous social structure, was most stimulated."
hardly be ignored. The decay of the sugar industry in East Java in the early 'twenties, for example, at a time when sugar prices had tumbled from their high level of the previous decade, may have had less to do with the enforcement of government enactments against village-hire than with the inability of the manufacturers to provide sufficient financial encouragement to the Indonesian hierarchy, in the cane growing areas.
So far in this study we have been primarily concerned with discussing the crops grown on the private European estates and plantations, and with the administrative and labour difficulties encountered in running an estate or plantation in early nineteenth century Java. Accordingly, we have attempted to explain the course of events within the 1812-1834 period at least in part in terms of the market prices of agricultural produce, the availability of labour and the varying policy of the Indies government towards the private European sector of the colonial economy.

The factor in the situation which has until now remained largely outside the discussion is that of estate and plantation finance – finance, that is, in the sense of the sources upon which the estate owners and planters could draw both for the purchase or lease of land and for cash for subsequent development of that land. Unfortunately this important subject cannot be described as very promising field of investigation. Too many of what might well be considered the essential materials for such research have either disappeared for good, or are not currently available – at least to the researcher confined to Western Europe.

The Notarial Archives of the town of Batavia are a case in point. Following Dutch practice, these would be the
place where any financial arrangements between European planters and their creditors were registered. If they still survive for the early nineteenth century period, a study of them would provide a much better indication of the extent and nature of planter-creditor relationships than can be drawn from the sources on which it has been necessary to rely here. Another important archive, not consulted for this study, would be that of the Java Orphan Chambers, the Weeskamers - which in the 1812-34 period were the mortgagees of many estates in the western part of the island. Again, it is only possible to speculate about its survival and to point to it as a possible source for the amplification or radical revision of some of the conclusions arrived at in this chapter. Of the lack of surviving or available records of firms interested in Java trade or plantation, more will be said below. It is scarcely necessary in these circumstances to point out that the account given here of estate finance is of a markedly provisional nature.

By way of introduction something must be said about the problems of estate finance. These were mainly ones of debt. Most estate owners of the period appear to have had

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1 For details of the Orphan Chambers, see page 327.
to borrow the money which they needed to buy an estate. Moreover, if they wished to develop their lands, in the sense of establishing large coffee plantations or setting up modern sugar or indigo factories, then more money had to be found. Unfortunately we lack the estate books and accounts which might show us whether it was possible to finance such developments out of existing revenues.

There are a few indications that far from this being the case, the mainly rice-levy revenues of some undeveloped estates were scarcely enough to pay the interest on the money borrowed to buy the estate in the first place. The Resident of Buitenzorg informed the Batavia authorities in 1825 that on his reckoning the revenues of the Kuripan estate in his province, "not withstanding all attempts made to develop the estate, were not enough even to cover the interest on the loans secured on the property." 2

Moreover, whatever the extent of the revenue, the style of life kept up by many landowners made financial solvency a highly unlikely eventuality. The careful and solvent Scot Gillian Maclaine wrote on one occasion to his family in Argyll that, "We live very quietly and, I am happy to add, economically for this country, where our moderate establish-

2 The estate was owned by a group of Batavia merchants. G.G. in Rade 15.11.1825 no.13, Min.v.Kol. 2791.
ment consists of fifteen servants, eight horses, carriages, gig, etc...." 3

In these circumstances it is not surprising to find that most estates were heavily mortgaged. When the Buitenzorg landowner W.N. Servatius died in 1827 there were in all three mortgages on his lands. The first was held by the one-time Preanger estate owner Andries de Wilde and the second by Servatius's fellow Buitenzorg landowner and relative Nicholas Engelhard. Together they amounted to 130,000 guilders. The third mortgagee was the senior government official H.W. Muntinghe. 4 Moreover, the financial indebtedness of some estates was very widespread. Those who had put up money for the Buitenzorg Kuripan estate in the mid-twenties included the Batavia firms of MacQuoid Davidson and Company, Gillian Maclaine and Company, the London house of McLachlan Brothers and Gillian Maclaine's uncle, John Gregerson of Ardtornish in Argyllshire. 5

How many officials there were like Muntinghe who invested their money in estates remains a question that has

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3 Gillian Maclaine to Mrs Gregerson, 25.10.1833, Ardtornish Papers.
4 Willem van Hogendorp to G.K.v.Hogendorp, 2.11.1828, Van Hogendorp Coll 91.
to be left open for lack of evidence. It is necessary at the start to make a distinction between officials who were also landowners and those who sunk their capital in estates other than their own. Resident Nahuijs of Jogja belonged to the latter group. Not only did he lease lands in the Jogja area himself, but he also afforded financial support to other planters in the area such as Harvey Thompson. According to Nahuijs, moreover, other government officials, and army officers did exactly the same thing as himself. These included officials like Lawick van Pabst and several officers of the garrison at Jogja. Resident Smisseart, also of Jogja, lent large sums of money to the planter Bouwens van der Boijn in 1824-5, and although Bouwens was a political exile from the Netherlands and as such in receipt of some government support, these loans by Smisseart appear to have been of a private nature. The correspondence of officials and army officers, together with the relevant notarial archives would no doubt furnish more examples of the same type of thing. The rest of this chapter, however, is devoted to tracing other and probably more important sources of private agricultural credit.

6 Nahuijs, Herinneringen, p.136.
7 List of Bouwen's creditors, 19.3.1826, Du Bus Coll 466.
The Bank van Leening and the Orphan Chambers.

There were in early nineteenth century Java two institutions which lent money to estate owners in the usual form of mortgages on their property. These were the Orphan Chambers which were established in the three main towns of Batavia, Semarang and Sourabaya, and the Bank van Leening at Batavia. The Bank had been founded in 1746 and lent money on the security of landed property. Within the limits of the town of Batavia it might advance up to two thirds of the value of the property concerned, outside those limits only one half. It remained an important agency of estate finance until closed down in 1818. While it is not possible to compile a complete list of the estates which had loans from the Bank, some examples may be cited. In March 1814 M.W. Muntinghe, at the time part owner of the Indramaju and Kandanghauer estate, negotiated a loan of 20,000 Spanish dollars on the security of that property, and it is clear that this was in no way an exceptional transaction. At the time of the Dutch restoration in 1816 the Udjong Krawang

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estate of J.C. Hillebrink was mortgaged with the Bank for 15,000 Spanish dollars, while in the same period the landowner W.H. van Riemsdijk was indebted to it for the sum of 20,000 guilders. On the Banks’ being wound up in 1818, some of its remaining mortgages were taken over by the Orphan Chambers.

In the sphere of estate finance it was the Orphan Chambers which occupied a more important position than the Bank van Leening and which continued to function throughout our period. The Chambers had the function of administering the property of individuals who died intestate on Java, on behalf of their widows and children. The Orphan Chambers appear to have settled at an early date for a system whereby their funds were lent to landowners on the security of their estates, the loan to be repaid with interest over a period of years. The Orphan Chamber at Samarang, for example, appears to have been lending money on this basis since before 1777.

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10 Verbaal C.G. 7.2.1817 no.23, Min.v.Kol. 2368.
11 Verbaal C.G. 12.2.1818 no.9, Min.v.Kol. 2372.
12 See note 8.
13 Verbaal C.G. 12.2.1818 no.9, Min.v.Kol. 2372.
14 G.G. in Rade 6.2.1823 no.13, Min.v.Kol. 2779.
Failing access to the Orphan Chamber archives, it is necessary to rely on references to Chamber loans in government records, and though it is obvious that no complete account of the Chambers as an agricultural credit institution can be gleaned from this source, it is possible nonetheless to present a fairly clear picture of the scope and nature of the Orphan Chamber mortgage system as it had developed by the early nineteenth century. By that time, the relationship between Chambers and estates was an extensive one. Even allowing for the incomplete nature of the evidence, it appears that a great many estates, both large and small, were mortgaged with the Chambers at one time or other between 1812 and 1834. The following are cases in point, selected to show the comprehensive nature of the system. The Orphan Chambers held mortgages on the lands of the sugar makers Jessen Trail and Company and Engel and Beijnon, on the properties of the prominent landowners A. Michielsz, Nicholas Engelhard, J.C. Romswinkel and D.J. Papet, as well as on those of such lesser owners as J.T. Reijnst and J.F. Arnold. Nevertheless, it appears that the Chambers did

not hold mortgages on all estates, including such important ones as the Pamanukan and Tjiassen lands in Krawang. Despite this, the Orphan Chambers were the most prominent land investment agency on Java before 1830 according to Willem van Hogendorp, senior advisor to Commissioner General Du Bus. If they refused to advance the necessary funds, he wrote, it was hardly possible to purchase an estate. As an agricultural credit institution, however, they suffered from several grave limitations.

In the first place they were not free to lend money as they wished, nor could they lend it on any sort of security. Both these matters were governed by administrative regulations. Until 1818 these permitted the Orphan Chambers to advance up to two thirds of the taxable value of the property concerned, and two individuals also had to stand surety for the eventual repayment of the loan. In 1818, however, these rules were tightened up so that only one half of the taxable value could be advanced by the Chambers, and the total amount that could be lent to any one landowner might not exceed 40,000 guilders. Four Sureties were now required instead of two, though this regulation was relaxed in 1822.


17 Staatsblad 23.10.1818 no.72 and 24.10.1822 no.46.
In practice these rules were not followed to the letter, and even without recourse to the Chamber archives, it can be shown that some loans were considerably in excess of f.40,000. The sugar manufacturers Jessen Trail and Company obtained a mortgage on their lands amounting to 120,000 guilders and in 1825 the officials of the Batavia Orphan Chamber pointed out to the government that at least eleven of their loans were for more than 40,000 guilders. Although the government was prepared to accept the irregularity of the Jessen mortgage, it was not disposed to consider the revision of the system as a whole. The retention of the limitation meant that estate owners were deterred from seeking to mortgage their lands with the Chambers.

Moreover, the regulations stipulated that the funds of the Orphan Chambers could only be borrowed on the strength of landed or other forms of immovable property, a stipulation which had the effect of making it impossible for the planter-manufacturers working on village land in east Java to enjoy the benefits of a Chamber mortgage. Such benefits could only accrue to the estate owners of west Java. Hence an important group of European agriculturalists, many of

18 G.G. buiten Rade 27.6.1825 no.12, Min.v.Kol. 2484.
19 See note 17.
whom were working for the export markets, were denied access to the most regular way of obtaining funds available on the island.

This was far from being the only drawback of the Orphan Chambers as a source of estate owner or planter credit. The Chambers were an old established institution with what appear to have been limited funds which they were only allowed to deploy in certain approved ways. As such they were little suited to the changing conditions of Java in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century. The amount of credit which they could offer was no doubt well fitted to the old-style manner of estate owner-ship which had been described earlier, in which a landowner had little interest in developing his land once it had been bought and where his paramount concern, therefore, was simply with finding the money to buy the land in the first place. The Chambers lent their money at, $\text{\textsection}$ for the East, the very modest rate of nine per cent per annum, an interest which contemporaries reckoned could be met easily from the rice and others rents drawn, without much trouble, from the estate in question.

As a means of financing large-scale and costly agricultural enterprises on the estates, however, the Orphan

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20 A description of the old-style estates will be found in Ch. I. p. 50–6.
Chambers were completely inadequate. The assets of the most important of the Orphan Chambers, that of Batavia, were said to be in the region of 450,000 guilders in 1828\(^{21}\) and, as has already been remarked, the largest amount which the Chambers were allowed to advance on any one security was 40,000 guilders. All this compares very unfavourably with what we know about the sort of sums of money which were needed to set major agricultural developments going on the estates. In the early years of the Cultivation System, for instance, the European entrepreneurs who agreed to contract to supply the government with sugar each received an interest-free twelve year loan of 200,000 guilders\(^{22}\). In 1827 the Netherlands Trading Society agreed to a loan of 140,000 guilders being made to the Batavia and Bantam sugar manufacturers Trail and Company\(^{23}\). Presumably it was advances

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21 Van Hogendorp said that the assets of the Batavia Chamber amounted to four-and-a-half ton, i.e., 450,000. I assume that he was talking in terms of guilders. If Spanish dollars were meant (the other most usually referred to currency at this time) then multiply by two-and-a-half, i.e., 1,125,000 guilders. The main point of my argument remains the same. W.v.Hogendorp to G.v.Hogendorp, 22.12.1827, p.153 Van Hogendorp Coll 91.

22 Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p.138.

23 Mansveldt, N.H.M., 1, p.185.
on this scale which come near to reflecting the true needs of those landowners and planters who wanted to do something more enterprising than sitting back and enjoying their rice-rents.

Some doubts exist, moreover, as to the continued viability of the Orphan Chamber mortgage system by the end of the eighteen-twenties. There is some indication that the Chambers were in considerable financial difficulties by that time, though the evidence is somewhat conflicting. In 1825 and again four years later the officials of the Batavia Chamber claimed that they had funds to spare. On the other hand, Willem van Hogendorp alleged that the Chambers were insolvent and their investments dangerously exposed. They had been seriously embarrassed, he informed his father, by the sharp fall in property values on the island during the twenties. Many of their loans had been made on high valuations of the properties concerned dating from the earlier years of the nineteenth century. Such valuations had even originally been rather on the high side, and by the late twenties no longer bore much relation to the market value of the estates concerned. This meant that the sums lent by the Orphan Chambers were

24 G.G. in Rade 17.5.1825 no.15, Min.v.Kol. 2788; G.G. in Rade 7.4.1829 no.64, Min.v.Kol. 2824.
often greater than those which could be realised by the sale of the properties on which they were supposedly secured. The Chambers could of course continue to draw interest on their loans, but their capital had been placed in jeopardy. "In point of fact," concluded Van Hogendorp, "they are in a state of complete bankruptcy." While some allowance must be made for Van Hogendorp's habitually gloomy view of affairs, government records suggest that there was some truth in what he said. In 1826, for example, the Batavia Orphan Chamber sold the Kampong Melayu estate of A.L.P. de Serriere in an attempt to recover money lent to him on the security of that property. The estate was valued at 110,000 guilders, and the Chamber held a mortgage for 54,000 guilders. At the sale the property fetched a mere 24,000 guilders, or rather less than half of what it was mortgaged for, and the Batavia Chamber became involved in lengthy proceedings against those who had stood surety for De Serriere's loan.

If Van Hogendorp's analysis of their position is accepted as even in part correct, it follows that by the

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25 W.v.Hogendorp to G.K.v.Hogendorp, August 1827, Van Hogendorp Coll 91. On the other hand, it is best to treat Hogendorp's remarks with some caution. In 1825, for instance, the officials of the Batavia Orphan Chamber claimed that 200,000 guilders of their funds remained uninvested. G.G. in Rade 17.5.1825 no.15, Min.v.Kol. 2786.

26 G.G. in Rade 31.1.1826 no.21, Min.v.Kol. 2792.
eve of the Cultivation System the Orphan Chambers were no longer in a position to continue to play their old role as estate financiers. By that time, moreover, the number of applications for Chamber loans had fallen off sharply²⁷

Finance from Private Commercial Sources.

Between the beginning of the British period in 1811 and the mid-thirties there was a substantial increase in the number of private trading firms operating at Batavia. In 1815, for instance there were thirteen of these commercial houses, of whom to judge by the British names of several of them, seven had been established in 1811 or later. The number of such houses rose to twenty-six in 1824 and to thirty-two in 1831.²⁸ It would be rash, given the present state of knowledge, to make too many generalisations about commercial houses of this sort. Many of them did business as import-export houses; some of them, like Deans Scott and Company, for instance, were large concerns with many members

²⁷ G.G. in Rade 7.4.1829 no.64, Min.v.Kol. 2824.
²⁸ These figures are taken from the Java Almanac for 1815, 1826 and 1831. Of course, such figures give no indication of the type of business involved, though a check with other records (for instance, with petitions of specific merchants to the Indies government) suggests that most of the firms listed in the Almanac were engaged in the import-export trade at one time or another.
and branches in Samarang and Surabaja. Others appear to have been one man concerns with a very short life. They were often referred to as Agency Houses which presumably means that they received consignments of goods from other merchant houses elsewhere which they then sold on a commission basis. Some of the Java commercial houses of our period were certainly set up by European or British India firms to act as agents in this sense. Stewart, Turing and Company, set up in Batavia in 1822 by the Bombay firm of Forbes and Company, are an example.

All this leaves a lot of questions unanswered, including the one of how these houses operated from the point of view of capital. The suggestion of various contemporary commentators was that these firms had little capital of their own and that, in the words of the Resident of Batavia in 1824, they were seldom other than commission agents (Commissionarissen) for their principals in Europe, and

30 Here I am following M. Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-1842, Cambridge 1951 p.142-74. "The main type of business carried on by the agency houses was selling and buying for others on Commission." (p.148)
31 See notice in B.C. 24.8.1822 no.34. Stewart Turing and Company set up "under the patronage and support of Messrs Forbes of Bombay and Messrs Smith Inglis and Co." The latter were Forbes's London connections.
bought and sold goods on a percentage commission basis. Comments of this nature need to be looked into a lot further, before they can be accepted. In 1825, for instance, the Batavia firm of Thornton and Company were able to lend the Batavia government a considerable sum of money to defray the costs of fighting the Java war. Was this the firm's own money, or somebody else's?

It was firms such as these, however, who together with what may be variously described as their principals, connections and correspondents in Europe and British India who were an important source of estate and plantation finance in the 1812-1834 period. Just how important is, unfortunately, difficult to tell, because a great deal of the intricate financial relationships which existed between Java estate owners and planters, and commercial houses of one kind or another in Java itself, British India and Europe are impenetrable one hundred and fifty years later.

They seem, moreover, likely to remain so, because so

32 In his report on the Java trade of 15.9.1823 the Batavia official J. Kruseman says, "...it is generally well known that the capital invested in trade by the commercial houses of Batavia does not belong to them, and that this is the reason why the trade at Batavia is restricted to the purchase of goods from the interior and the sale of goods from abroad." Schneither Coll 78; see also Annual General Report Batavia, 2, p.30, Schneither Coll 84.

33 See note 71.
few collections of commercial papers relating to the Java trade have survived or have been made available to the public. Of the few exceptions, the private letter books of the great Calcutta merchant John Palmer, 'Prince of Merchants' and head of the house of Palmer and Company, serve to fill some of the gaps in our knowledge. For the rest it is a matter of relying on scraps of private correspondence and on references to private agricultural investment in government records. This is far from being a satisfactory way of covering the subject, but in present circumstances it is difficult to see what more can be done.

The initial consideration here is the support given to estates and planters by business houses on Java itself. As Reinsma remarked in the course of his survey of private agricultural speculations in mid-nineteenth century Java; these houses, at Batavia, Semarang and Surabaja, lent money to estate owners and planters in return for consignments of present or future agricultural produce. How widespread such a system was between 1812 and 1834, and how effective it was as a stimulus to estate agriculture is not easy to estimate. The observations of contemporaries on this point tend to be vague. The Dutch Resident Nahuijs, for example, claimed that 'much money' had been lent to the

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34 Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p.18.
planters in the Principalities by private individuals, merchants and others, on the security of future crops.\textsuperscript{35} By correlating a variety of contemporary sources it is possible, of course, to provide examples of this sort of thing happening. But they are only examples. The interesting question of whether or not they represent anything like the sum total of such investments is one which has to remain unanswered.

It is clear, however, that from the early days of the Dutch restoration if not before, a number of Batavia houses in particular entered into financial engagements with estate owners and planters. Between about 1816 and 1821 the major Batavia firm of Deans Scott and Company supported the cotton and sugar planters Joseph Abbot and Antoine le Marchand in the Tjikandi district of east Bantam. The existing evidence, unfortunately allows of no more than a general statement about this.\textsuperscript{36} In the case of the widespread agricultural interests of the Batavia firm of MacQuoid Davidson and Company, however, it is possible to go into considerably more detail.

\textsuperscript{35} Nahuijs to Van der Capellen 2.3.1823, Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 14.11.1826 no.126, Min.v.Kol. 529.

\textsuperscript{36} Brownrigg to Palmer, 12.8.1821, Eng.Lett.d.105 p.74.
The senior partner in that firm, Thomas MacQuoid, had a large stake in the Sukabumi estate in the Preanger until the sale of 1823, and a lesser one in the Pamanukan and Tjiasssem lands between approximately 1819 and 1823. MacQuoid Davidson and Company was the successor firm of Skelton and Company, a house which had been operative on Java since 1814, and the agents there for the Bombay firm of Forbes and Company. At Batavia the firms traded in a variety of goods including tin, coffee and, it may be presumed, cotton piece goods. In 1822 MacQuoid Davidson and Company were also the opium farmers for the Bantam, Batavia, Buitenzorg and Krawang provinces. By that time, however, the connection with Forbes of Bombay had been terminated. The firm was also connected with the Singapore house of A.L. Johnstone and Company.

37 De Haan, Priangan, I, Personalia, p. 297.
38 B.G. 15.9.1821 no. 37; De Haan, B.K.I. 1935, p. 647.
40 G.G. in Rade 12.8.1822 no. 1, Min.v.Kol. 2777.
41 B.G. 20.7.1822 no. 29.
The most interesting part of MacQuoid Davidson's business, however, was that which concerned the Principalities, where the firm appears to have had a considerable interest in a number of European plantations. In January 1820 John Davidson, at that time still a member of MacQuoid Davidson's predecessor, Skelton and Company, set up an office at Semarang, the main port of outlet for the Principalities, and the place from which the main road ran up into the interior via the border town of Salatiga.\textsuperscript{43} He remained there after the business at Batavia changed name after Skelton's death in 1821,\textsuperscript{44} and continued to do business with several of the planter-merchants of the Principalities, including J.D. Boudet and J.M. Tissot. This trade extended to cotton goods. At the close of 1819 he had already sent Tissot a 'trunk of striped Nankeens',\textsuperscript{45} and the Tissot connection was still alive two years later when Davidson sent the latter's business partner J.D. Boudet a memo of Tissot's current debts to him, which amounted to the sum of 712 Spanish dollars.\textsuperscript{46} Boudet's plantation partner Resident Nahuijs also appears to have been connected with Davidson,

\textsuperscript{43} J. Davidson to Boudet, 27.12.1819, Inst.T.L.V. H788.
\textsuperscript{44} Inst. T. L. V., H788.
\textsuperscript{45} J. Davidson to Boudet, 27.12.1819, Inst. T. L. V. H788.
\textsuperscript{46} J. Davidson to Boudet, 13.7.1821, Inst. T. L. V. H788.
to whom he arranged for 7,000 Spanish dollars to be sent in September 1821. Davidson was evidently a well known figure on the Semarang-Salatiga-Solo circuit. In 1824 the planter and merchant William Cotes referred to him to Nahuijs as 'our worthy friend Davidson,' a man who had to be consulted on the subject of Cotes's business difficulties. Nor were Cotes, Nahuijs, Boudet and Tissot the only planters with whom he was connected. In March 1822, together with the planters Harvey Thompson and Bouwens van der Boijn, he acted as the executer of the late James Shand, a young Scots planter who had settled at Solo two years previously. Between 1823-6 Davidson's firm, MacQuoid Davidson and Company, were prominent again, this time as the attorneys of several of the planters who were dispossessed as a result of the Decree of 6th May 1823. These included Nahuijs himself, Cotes and Boudet. The firm were also in correspondence at this time with another of the dispossessed planters, Harvey Thompson, then in Scotland.

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48 Cotes to Nahuijs, 24.6.1824, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.
49 B.G. 2.3.1822 no.10; G.G. buiten Rade 14.1.1820 no.4, Min.v.Kol. 2452.
50 Thompson to Nahuijs, 2.10.1823, Leiden MSS 616, 8, no.3.
51 Thompson to Boudet, 7.6.1825 and 8.10.1825, Inst.T.L.V. H788.
It is, of course, one thing to establish connections between planters and a substantial business house, and quite another to be able to point to clear evidence of financial support resulting from such a connection. The planter Bouwens was lent the considerable sum of 5,000 Spanish dollars by MacQuoid Davidson in the early twenties, and according to Campbell the firm had a stake in Gillian Maclaine's Melambong estate in Solo during the same period. Of their stake in other plantations it is possible to produce no conclusive evidence, but from the connections enumerated above, the probability is that the firm was not interested in Melambong alone. In this context of estate investment, it is not perhaps entirely insignificant that MacQuoid Davidson failed spectacularly in 1826, when most of the plantations in the Principalities had either been closed down by government action, or badly damaged by the revolt which had broken out in Jogja and Solo in 1825.

MacQuoid Davidson and Company were not, of course, the only Batavia firm to have connections in Solo and Jogja. The firm of Ten Brinck and Reijnst also appears to have

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52 Nahuijs to De Kock, 17.11.1825, in Kemp, B.K.I., 62, 1909, p.444.
53 Campbell, Java, 1, p.654-6.
54 B.C. 5.8.1826 no.31.
55 In May 1823 a Decree of the Indies government virtually prohibited Europeans from leasing land from the Javanese...
been connected with the Principalities. In 1827 the firm claimed 13,426 guilders from the estate of the late F.A.Brandt, who in life had been part owner of the Simo and Wallen coffee plantation in Solo. However, as Brandt was also a merchant at Semarang, this debt to Ten Brinck and Reijnst may have originated in his business rather than in his plantation concerns. The Batavia house of Gillian Maclaine and Company, subsequently Maclaine Watson and Company, whose links with Jogja and Solo will be discussed below in more detail, were part owners of the Melambong coffee estate in Solo, as well as the selling agents for the coffee from the plantations of the great Solo landleaser, J.A.Dezentje. It is not clear, however, if this arrangement, which dated from 1823, extended to Maclaine Watson and Company advancing money on the strength of anticipated harvests.

Investment by merchants in the agricultural speculations of other Europeans was not limited to the Principalities. The Batavia merchant J.F.Arnold appears to have

nobility of the Principalities. Most of the lands so leased had to be given back. The issue treated in detail Ch. 1  p. 74-6.

56 G.G. in Rade 15.2.1827 no.7, Min.v.Kol. 2810.
57 Campbell, Java, 1, p.440.
supported the indigo maker Louis Petel at his works at Bergzicht in the Batavia Hinterland. It was Petel's inability to repay his debt which led to the transfer of that property to Arnold in about 1823. Petel also appears to have been indebted at a slightly later date to the Batavia firm of Colville Jutting and Company. The surviving partner of that concern, John Colville, brought Petel to court in 1827, apparently for the recovery of debt. A better documented instance of business support for planters is the case of Thompson Roberts and Company and several Pekalongan indigo makers at the close of the twenties. By that time this Batavia house was acting as the sale agents of two indigo makers established in the East Java province of Pekalongan, one of them Harvey Thompson, formerly of Jogja and apparently no relation of the William Thompson who was partner in the Batavia firm. The firm not only sold the indigo produced by these manufacturers; their support extended to the lobbying of Commissioner-General Du Bus in their favour. In such circumstances there is a strong probability that money was being

58 Petel to Du Bus, 30.10.1827, Du Bus Coll 467.
59 G.G. buiten Rade 12.5.1827 no.1, Min.v.Kol. 2504.
60 G.G. in Rade 13.2.1829 no.29, Min.v.Kol. 2322.
advanced to the planters by Thompson Roberts and Company. There is however no proof of this in the correspondence preserved in the government's records. After the establishment of the Java Bank in 1828, an institution which itself was not allowed to lend money to planters, it became common practice for the agency houses to borrow money from it on short term, which they then used to promote agricultural ventures.\(^{61}\)

The connection between Thompson, Roberts and Company of Batavia and several of the Pekalongan indigo makers in the late twenties raises a further point of interest. As we have already seen, there was a considerable expansion in the private European sugar and indigo industries of, respectively, the Oosthoek and Pekalongan areas of East Java, in the later twenties.\(^{62}\) Tentatively, we have concluded in a previous chapter that this had a lot to do with a greater degree of collaboration between the European entrepreneurs and the government than had hitherto been the case. For this sort of expansion, however, money was needed for both equipment and for advances to the cultivators

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62 For sugar and indigo cultivation in East Java, see Ch.3. p. 201-6 and 222-6.
and this the government only partially provided. The question remains, therefore, of where this money came from.

Some of it, as we shall see, came from the Netherlands Trading Society, the N.H.M. It is a reasonable supposition, however, that part of it came from private commercial sources, from, that is, the merchants and commercial houses of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaja. There is some scanty evidence of this. At the close of the twenties the Resident of the Oosthoek sugar growing province of Pasaruan remarked that the European merchants T.B.Hofland and Donald McLenen were making financial backing available to some of the Chinese sugar makers of that area. The pity is that further research in this direction is made difficult if not impossible by the lack of any of the records of the firms concerned.

However, it was not only as the backers of others that the commercial houses of the three main towns were involved in agricultural ventures in East and West Java and the Principalities. Many of the houses had members who were themselves actively engaged in estate management. Gillian Maclaine, head of the Batavia firm of Maclaine Watson and

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63 On government finance of agriculture, see below.
64 Domis, *Pasoeroeang*, p.55. By 1830 both these merchants had become planters and manufacturers themselves.
Company, also managed a coffee estate which was partly owned by his firm in Solo. Thomas MacQuoid, successively of Skelton and Company and MacQuoid Davidson and Company, was the administrator of the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate for several years, a property in which both these firms and MacQuoid himself had a stake. A later administrator of the same estate, Ludowick Stewart was also partner in the firm of Stewart Turing and Company. William Menzies, member of several Batavia houses during the eighteen twenties, was at the same period the administrator of the Kuripan estate in Buitenzorg province, a property in which his and other Batavia firms had a stake.

The importance of the role played by the business houses of Batavia and elsewhere on the island in financing the development of estates and plantations is difficult to estimate both because, as has already been indicated, we have none of their books and papers, and because we are far from sure what sort of commercial concerns we are dealing with. Something has been said earlier in this chapter with respect to the unanswered questions about the business

65 G.G. in Rade 10.11.1826 no.12, Min.v.Kol. 2797.
67 B.G. 10.3.1827 no.10.
68 G.G. in Rade 15.11.1825 no.13, Min.v.Kol. 2791;
G.G. in Rade 13.5.1828 no.33, Min.v.Kol. 2813.
houses which were established in Java between 1812 and 1834 and this is a matter which can conveniently be touched on again here. It seems reasonable to suppose that, relations between the landowners, planters and business houses being what they were, the fortunes of the latter were not without bearing on the development of the private estate and plantation sphere of Java's economy.

According to John Deans, who was active as a merchant in Java from 1813 until 1829, the commercial houses of the island were inclined to engage in speculations on their own account and not just in commission business in the period around the time of the Dutch restoration in 1816. By the mid-twenties, however, according to the same account, when hard times forced several of the houses out of business, speculative activities of this nature were curbed, and the commercial houses restricted themselves increasingly to the safer but less potentially remunerative commission trade.

Information of this character obviously has to be treated with some reserve. Merchants were always trying to convince the government that business was bad. There are indications, moreover, that some firms had rather more capital than would appear from Deans' gloomy analysis.

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69 Note of John Deans 1.9.1825, enclosed in Willem van Hogendorp to G.K. van Hogendorp, 8.3.1827, Van Hogendorp Coll 91.
When the Java Bank was set up in 1828, a number of Batavia houses including Thompson Roberts and Company, Ten Brinck and Reijnst and Gevers and Company were bullied by the government into depositing sums of between f.20,000 and f.36,000 with the new institution. In 1825 the Batavia firm of Thornton and Company were able to lend the Indies government considerable sums of money with which to defray the cost of fighting the rebels in the Principalities. Nevertheless, most of what Deans said was probably true. The Batavia merchant Gillian Maclaine informed his brother in 1827 that "my late losses have been extremely severe, and annihilate my prospects of joining you soon in Argyllshire." His case was far from unique. A year earlier the prominent firm of MacQuoid Davidson and Company was forced to close its doors and its fall was followed by that of Stewart Turing and Company. Other merchants, calculating that there was no more money to be made on Java, withdrew before it was too late.

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72 Gillian Maclaine to Angus Maclaine, 25.10.1827, Ardtornish Papers.
73 B.C. 5.8.1826 no.31.
74 B.C. 10.3.1827 no.10.
them was Eliza Thornton, head of the firm of Thornton and Company after the disappearance of her brother Robert in the Eastern seas, and the American merchant John Shilla
ber. Considering the relations which had existed hitherto between merchants, estate owners and planters, a crisis of this nature must have had a highly detrimental effect on private agricultural developments in Java.

However, the growing financial difficulties of the Java agency houses during the eighteen twenties were not the only obstacle which stood in the way of the development of extensive and remunerative connections between private commerce and private agricultural ventures, such as came to exist at the same period in Bengal, where the agency houses of Calcutta supported a great number of indigo factories, or even ran and owned factories themselves.

The agricultural situation as it existed in Java for at least a decade after the Dutch restoration militated against the growth there of a system in which the import-export houses of the main towns supported private European planters.

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76 Van Hogendorp, W.v.H., p.72.
Although many merchants did indeed finance estates and become otherwise involved with crop growing speculations, there was no overwhelming incentive for them to do so. The risk involved was not really necessary. The most lucrative export crop was coffee, and this could be obtained without recourse to private European producers from the sales of its own coffee production held by the government at Batavia. Most of this coffee came from the government's coffee plantations in the Preanger. Alternatively, the Batavia firms could get their coffee by contract with Indonesian cultivators of coffee on government land outside the Preanger. It was not until the late twenties, when the Netherlands Trading Society began to take larger and larger deliveries of produce from government lands that this system began to break down, and not until 1833, when the sale to private merchants of coffee produced on government land was forbidden, that it collapsed completely. Before then, and especially in the early years of the Dutch restoration, large firms like Deans Scott and Company had entered into extensive coffee contracts with the Indonesian village cultivators. In 1818

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78 Mansveldt, H.H.L., 2, p.10.
the firm arranged for the delivery to its warehouses of the entire coffee crop expected in the Tegal Residency in that year. In the same year they also contracted with the village people for supplies of coffee in Rembang province. They were far from being alone in such ventures. In July 1820 the Batavia firm of Van de Kaa Haste and Company were in trouble with the government over their coffee contracts in Pasaruan. This of course was the major drawback of making contracts with villagers on government land, and even if difficulties with the administration were avoided, there remained the possibility of upsets with the local Chinese, such as caused Deans Scott so much trouble in Tegal. Difficulties like these may well have inclined merchants looking for exports to turn to the estates and plantations run by private Europeans. Hence, presumably, the marked interest shown by Batavia firms in the coffee estates in the Principalities. This, however, is only speculation. It remains an important point, none-theless, that the European estates were by no means the sole

79 Verbaal C.G. 12.6.1818 no.9, Min.v.Kol. 2376.
80 Verbaal C.G. 27.3.1818 no.3, Min.v.Kol. 2373.
81 G.G. in Rade 29.7.1820 no.35, Min.v.Kol. 2773.
82 See note 79.
or even the major source of Java's most exportable products. This held good for sugar as well as for coffee. An agency house on the look out for supplies of sugar could and in some cases did support Chinese as well as European sugar makers. Robert Scott, partner in the firm of Deans Scott and Company, was a financier of Chinese sugar makers in the Semarang area for sometime between 1816 and 1823. The Chinese remained the predominant element in the sugar industry until at least the early days of the Cultivation System. It was only the production of dry, export quality indigo which was solely in private European hands until 1830.

It was not, however, the agency houses of Java alone which made credit available to estate owners and planters. Some of the British India agency houses did the same thing, through the intermediary of their Java correspondents. How many of these firms, mostly established at Calcutta or Bombay, were involved in the financing of estate development on Java is hard to estimate. It can be shown with certainty that one house at Bombay, Forbes and Company,

83 Note of Robert Scott, 19.2.1828, Van Hogendorp Coll 91 153H.
84 On the role of the chinese in sugar manufacture in Java 1812-1834, see Ch. 3.
85 On European indigo making, see Ch. 3.
and another at Calcutta, Palmer and Company, were deeply involved in one way or other for most of the 1812-34 period. The probability is that there were others, whose connections remain as yet undiscovered. John Palmer, head of the Calcutta house of Palmer, lent money to several European planters in the Principalities, including Harvey Thompson and William Cotes. Among Cotes's other creditors in Bengal was the Calcutta merchant Rogoram. As his letters show, Palmer had a number of friends on Java, and there is at least a possibility that Cotes and Thompson were not the only planters to whom he lent money in the decade or so after the British take-over of Java in 1811. On the other hand, Palmer's ability to lend money was curtailed in the late twenties, and in 1826 for instance he was unable to provide any capital for the East Java sugar maker Charles Etty. Loans to individual planters, however, were not the full extent of Palmer's Java investment. He was first financier and later part-owner of the Tjikandi Ilir estate in West Java. The European planters there, Antoine le Merchand and Joseph Abbot, had originally been supported by

86 Palmer to Thompson, 12.2.1823, Eng.Lett.c. 95, p.90-1.
Deans Scott and Company, Palmer's Batavia correspondents, but in the course of a visit to Java in 1821 Palmer took over direct responsibility for the Tjikandi plantations and arranged for 40,000 guilders to be advanced to Abbot.  

Between then and 1824 he was said to have sunk some 300,000 guilders in the property, inclusive of interest. The manner in which the money was spent was entrusted to John Deans, senior partner in Deans Scott and Company, who paid out regular instalments to the planters and kept in close touch with Palmer about developments on the estate.

On the eastern side of the Batavia hinterland in the Krawang province the Bombay firm of Forbes and Company had an interest in the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate, one of the group sold by Raffles in 1813. They put up at least some of the original purchase money through the intermediary of their Java connections, the Batavia firm of Skelton and Company, and increased their stake in the property on the

93 Daukes, P & T p.10.
winding up of that firm after the death of the senior partner John Skelton and the withdrawal of their interest in Skelton's successors, MacQuoid Davidson and Company. The transference of the majority holding to Forbes and his partners appears to have been completed by 1823, when Palmer wrote to MacQuoid that he trusted Forbes would not repent the bargain. There is little reliable evidence of how much was spent on Pamanukan and Tjiassem by its Bombay owners. What information there is comes for the suspect source of exchanges between Forbes and his partners and the Netherlands Indies government. According to this, the partners spent two million rupees on the estate between 1813 and 1828. In 1829 Forbes and Company of Bombay held a mortgage on the property for 500,000 rupees.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that many of these investments from British India were unprofitable. Palmer lost considerable though unspecified sums on the Tjikandi venture, as even the Indies government was prepared to admit, and told his Java agents in 1824 that he

94 B.G. 5.5.1821 no.18.
95 B.G. 20.7.1822 no.29.
96 Palmer to MacQuoid, 23.3.1823, Eng.Lett.c.95, p.319.
98 Daukes, P & T p.12.
99 Paes, Tjikandi, p.85.
would spend no more on that estate.\textsuperscript{100} Apart from the money that he put up three years later to buy the freehold of Tjikandi,\textsuperscript{101} there is no indication in Palmer's letters that he diverted any more of his funds into the concern.

Indeed, that source makes it quite plain that he was only too anxious to be rid of the property, if he could obtain a price for it which would compensate for his losses. As early as 1823 Palmer wrote to Deans that he would "cheerfully confirm the sale of Tjikandi if anything exceeding a lac of rupees can be squeezed out of the government,"\textsuperscript{102} while four years later he was even led to contemplate its abandonment,\textsuperscript{103} as the only viable alternative to sale. Pamanukan and Tjiassem hardly seems to have been more rewarding. Even allowing for the calculated element of gloom in the owner's letters to the Indies government, it seems reasonable to conclude that Pamanukan and Tjiassem was hardly bringing in the returns expected from it. Under the administration of Alexander Loudon from 1825-9 the estate fell so deeply into debt that Loudon found it necessary to draw bills on Forbes and his partners for amounts

\textsuperscript{100} Faes, Tjikandi, p.42.
\textsuperscript{101} Faes, Tjikandi, p.98.
\textsuperscript{102} Palmer to Deans, 30.11.1823, Eng.Lett.c.99, p.186.
\textsuperscript{103} Palmer to Deans, 12.8.1827, Eng.Lett.c.107, p.46.
totaling more than £4,000 sterling.\textsuperscript{104} As the partners somewhat euphemistically put it in the mid-thirties, "the administration of these estates has been conducted hitherto in a manner more calculated to increase their future capabilities, than [the] immediate income to the proprietors."\textsuperscript{105}

Not enough is known about the business affairs of Forbes and Company to enable an estimate to be made of the firm's ability to finance large scale agricultural speculations on Java. They certainly spent a great deal of money on the sugar works erected on the estate between 1819–24. On the other hand, as Willem van Hogendorp remarked, no capital could really be great enough to develop a property as large as Pamanukan and Tjiasssem.\textsuperscript{106} In the case of Palmer and Company and Tjikandi Ilir our information is a good deal better. Although this house was the most substantial in Bengal,\textsuperscript{107} its financial position was shaky from the early eighteen twenties onwards. This emerges clearly from exchanges between Palmer and other members of the firm. In 1821 the new partner Captain Brownrigg felt it necessary to

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\textsuperscript{105} Forbes, Stewart and Skelton to Van den Bosch 13.11.1834 Verbaal Min.v.Kol. 15.2.1834 no.6 Min.v.Kol. 951.
\textsuperscript{106} W.v.Hogendorp to G.K.v.Hogendorp, 27.3.1828 Van Hogendorp Coll. 91.
\textsuperscript{107} Singh, \textit{Agency Houses}, p.241.
\end{flushright}
point out to Palmer, then in Java and proposing further investment there, that the firm had lost all its own money, and that if more money was lost it would be that of other people.\textsuperscript{108} Subsequent disagreement between Palmer and his associates about the advisability of continuing the firm's connection with Java meant that whatever enthusiasm Palmer himself may have retained, his ability to make funds available for agricultural speculations on the island was considerably circumscribed. Brownrigg gave a cool reception to the news of the arrangement entered into with Abbot at Tjikandi. While Abbot's debt was to Deans Scott and Company, he wrote back to Palmer, "there was a good and sufficient check on him on the spot. This will now be removed, and our only security is the character and trust of the individual, a nature of security I would only take if I could get none else."\textsuperscript{109} As the twenties progressed, the financial position of Palmer and Company became worse, so that they were in no position to advance more money for Tjikandi's development. Indeed, by 1829 Palmer had begun to look to Tjikandi to pay off his debts elsewhere on Java.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{108} Brownrigg to Palmer, 8.7.1821, \textit{Eng.Lett.d.105} p.63.
\textsuperscript{110} Palmer to Watson, 9.7.1829, \textit{Eng.Lett.c.110} p.186.
The failure of his house early in 1830 brought the whole matter of investment in Tjikandi to a close.¹¹¹

Palmer's failure was only one of a sequence of events which resulted in the virtual elimination of the Bengal agency houses from the field of investment in Java. The commercial houses of Calcutta had been in difficulties for several years before 1830, mainly for reasons which had to do with their involvement in Indigo speculations in Bengal. Several lesser houses failed in 1827 and between January 1830 and the same month of 1834 all the main agency houses at Calcutta failed one after the other. These included, besides Palmers, Scott and Company, Alexander and Company and Mackintosh and Company.¹¹² After this, there could be little hope in Java of recourse to Bengal for funds for agricultural speculations.

So far the avenues of investment that have been examined have been confined to the East. Several estates, however, counted amongst their backers either commercial houses in Europe or else individuals living in Britain or the Netherlands. The precise nature of this connection is not entirely clear. In most instances it appears to have

arisen as a consequence of the links between firms in Europe and firms in Java who in turn had estate interests on the island. In these circumstances, the form which the investment seems to have taken was that money which in the normal course of events would have been remitted to Europe by Batavia agency houses was channelled instead into financing estate development on Java. In the absence of the necessary private commercial records this is hard to prove conclusively, but it appears that this 'European' investment consisted for the most part of capital which had been accumulated, mainly through trade, in the East itself, rather than of money which was sent out from Europe. At least, the available indications point this way. For example, W.T. Money, the part owner of Pamanukan and Tjassem, lived in Europe from about 1815 onwards. His share in the estate and subsequent expenditure on it was paid out of money which he had made in the East and which he had left there, presumably in the hands of his business associates, Forbes and Company of Bombay. "My funds at Bombay are swallowed up by the Java estate," he wrote in 1827.\(^{113}\) When the London firm of Cockerill Trail and Company

put up half the money for buying the freehold of Tjikandi Ilir in 1828, the sum was to be paid in the form of Achterstand Certificates of the Netherlands Indies government, that is, with funds which the firm already held in Java.114

The extent of such investment is difficult to judge, but from available sources a number of instances may be cited. For much of the twenties the London East India house of McLachlan Brothers had a stake in the Kuripan estate in Buitenzorg province and in the Melambong coffee plantation in Solo.115 Their interest in these properties, it would appear, originated in their connection with the Batavia merchant Gillian Maclaine, who managed the Melambong estate and himself had a share in Kuripan. In the earlier twenties (and possibly until c.1830) he was the Java agent of McLachlans for whom he had worked in London between 1817 and 1820, immediately before his departure for Java.116 He had come out to Java with one of their ships, and been set up in business by them at Batavia in April 1822.117 Other estate connections with Europe were not as

115 Campbell, Java, I, p.654-56.
116 Gillian Maclaine to Angus Maclaine, 18.7.1817 and 28.1.1820 Ardtornish Papers.
117 Batavia Courant 21.9.1822 no.38.
straightforward as this, but were effected indirectly, through Bengal. Cockerill, Trail and Company’s connection with the West Java Tjikandi Ilir estate grew out of their relationship with Palmer and Company of Bombay. Palmers were the owners of Tjikandi and Cockerill Trail their London correspondents on whom they succeeded in unloading some of the burden of that unprofitable investment.118 A similar explanation seems to hold good for the way in which the London house of Inglis Forbes and Company became connected with the Pamanukan and Tjiassem lands. That estate was owned for the most part by Forbes and Company of Bombay, connected through the head of that house Sir Charles Forbes and his son Mitchie with the Inglis Forbes business in London. It was in favour of the London house that a mortgage for a large but unspecified sum was executed on Pamanukan and Tjiassem in May 1829.119 Further evidence of the involvement of unnamed London merchants in private agricultural investment in Java comes from a letter written by the Jogja planter William Stavers, then in London, to former Resident Nahuijs in October 1823. Stavers told Nahuijs that ‘rumours ..... were current in the

that the Indies government had seized the European plantations in the Principalities of Java, and that although he himself believed such rumours to be false, it would "relieve the minds of several individuals here" if Nahuijs could write back as soon as possible to either confirm or deny the reports.\textsuperscript{120} This is not the sole indication that London houses were involved in the Principalities. The connection between the McLachlan Brothers, Gillian Maclaine and the Melambong coffee plantations has already been mentioned. When the Dutch minister Falck arrived in London at the end of 1823, the McLachlans, "for selves and others concerned on Java," petitioned him for redress of the grievances of the planters who had been dispossessed by the Indies government.\textsuperscript{121}

As may be seen, most of this European investment in Java estates came from Great Britain rather than from the metropolitan country. As a recent writer has remarked, there was no Dutch private capital invested in Java at the close of the Napoleonic wars.\textsuperscript{122} This was in marked contrast to the situation which prevailed in the West Indies sugar

\textsuperscript{120}
Stavers to Nahuijs, 17.10.1823, Leiden MSS 616 vol.8

\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{122}
colonies of Guiana where many of the plantation owners were merchants and others domiciled in the Netherlands. This disinclination amongst the merchants of Holland to risk their funds in estate investment in Java appears to have continued in the decades that followed the peace of 1814. By the mid-thirties a change of attitude is noticeable, but any developments which took place in this field before then appear to have been of a very limited nature. Dutch commercial interest, which was by and large the essential prerequisite of agricultural investment, was mainly directed towards the West Indies and North America rather than to the East Indies. Some few merchants did trade spasmodically with the East Indies, but the only one to do so with any consistency and on any scale was Antony van Hoboken of Rotterdam, who was the first Dutch merchant to send a ship to the Indies after the restoration of the Dutch state in 1813. This was only the beginning of Van Hoboken's extensive commercial connections with the East. In 1822 his house established as their agents on Java the firm of Ten Brinck and Reijnst. A partner in the latter firm, Candidus ten Brinck, was Van Hoboken's personal

123 Zappey, Goldberg p.127; List of Dutch proprietors of estates in Demerera etc. Goldberg Coll 181.
representative on the island for a decade after that date. It is fairly obvious therefore that if any Dutch firm was making its funds available to estate owners and planters, it would have been Van Hoboken and Company of Rotterdam. Their agent Ten Brinck had a share in the large Tagal Waru and Sumadangan estate from about 1827 onwards, and two years previous to that had purchased three properties in the Batavia hinterland. Whether any of Van Hoboken’s money went into these ventures is hard to say. The papers of the firm would be the obvious reference here, but although they were still extant in the earlier years of this century and were used for the firm’s commemorative volume in 1924, they appear to have been destroyed in the Rotterdam blitz of 1940. The Notarial Archives of Rotterdam, while containing a series of agreements between Van Hoboken and Ten Brinck, throw no further light on the matter of possible estate investment. All that can be concluded on present evidence is that Van Hoboken were certainly interested in the possibility of investing capital in agricultural concerns. After the sale of

125 Papendrecht, Van Hoboken p.138.
126 Hogendorp, Willem van Hogendorp, p.190.
Pamanukan and Tjiassem by its British owners in 1838, the firm informed the Dutch government that for some years previously they had been in continuous correspondence with the proprietors of that estate with a view to buying it themselves, but that their plans had come to nothing.\textsuperscript{129}

Financial Support from the Indies Government and from the Netherlands Trading Society.

During the later years of the period of Company rule it was not unusual for the Batavia authorities to provide financial backing for the 'private' sugar industry of the Hinterland. Under Daendals the system of government loans and the official supervision which accompanied it came near to transforming the sugar manufactury of Batavia into a government cultivation.\textsuperscript{130} After the restoration of the colony to the Dutch in 1816 the government continued to provide some sort of financial support for the hinterland sugar industry, although of a very short term kind. Most of the sugar required for government trading voyages to Japan and the Persian Gulf area was obtained by contracting annually for it with the Batavia sugar makers, who in turn

\textsuperscript{129} Van Hoboken to Van den Bosch, 22.10.1839, Verbaal Min.v.Kol 25.10.1839 no.11, Min.v.Kol. 1261.

\textsuperscript{130} De Haan, \textit{Oud Batavia}, p.326.
received a government loan on the strength of the forthcoming deliveries. The government was naturally anxious to have its sugar as cheaply as possible, and the total amount of sugar involved did not represent any considerable part of Java's total exports of that product, except during the very bad years of 1824-6. In 1826 the government agreed to take for its Japan trade a total of 9,000 pikuls, in a year when the total sugar exports of Java amounted to less than 20,000 pikuls. In better times government contract sugar formed a much less significant portion of the island's total exports. In 1820, a good year for sugar in which exports probably exceeded 90,000 pikuls, the government took 12,000 pikuls for the Japan trade. Only a few of these government sugar contracts, however, involved European sugar makers. Most of them were made with the hinterland Chinese, although the important sugar cultivating and manufacturing firm Jessen Trail and Company did tender occasionally for a Japan trade contract.

131 Verbaal G.G. 18.7.1817 no.13, Min.v.Kol. 2369; G.G. in Rade 24.7.1829 no.4, Min.v.Kol. 2827. The Dutch East India Company had been accorded the privilege of making an annual trading voyage to Japan (Decima). This was inherited by the restored Dutch regime after 1816. A description of this government run trade will be found in Kemp, Geldmiddelen, p.278-87.

132 G.G. buiten Rade 14.7.1825 no.1, Min.v.Kol. 2485; G.G. buiten Rade 7.3.1820 no.9, Min.v.Kol. 2453.

133 G.G. buiten Rade 16.7.1822 no.9, Min.v.Kol. 2460.
Contracts were sometimes made outside the hinterland and with a less specific intent than those hitherto described. In 1821 the government agreed to a £10,000 loan for the east Java sugar maker P. Davidson, on condition that the debt was repaid in sugar, which was to be delivered to the government at the rate of £12 per pikol over a three year period. As it happened this contract never came into effect, because Davidson changed his plans and returned to Europe.\textsuperscript{134} The sum involved was not a large one, and the available government records suggest that Davidson's was an isolated case. No more contracts of this nature appear to have been entered into with sugar makers before 1830. At best, the government's Japan trade sugar contracts enabled the manufacturers concerned to continue in operation for just a little longer. By no stretch of the imagination can they be considered as of a kind sufficient to finance expansion in the sugar industry,

Government support for indigo manufacturers falls into a rather different category. There is some evidence that Raffles's administration helped finance the Pekalongan indigo maker R.S. Douglas,\textsuperscript{135} and from 1824 onwards the

\textsuperscript{134} G.G. buiten Rade 30.4.1822 no.7, Min.v.Kol. 2465.
\textsuperscript{135} Report on Surabaja, 5.5.1817, p.37-8, Schneither Coll 96.
Netherlands Indies government made funds available to the indigo makers Louis Petel, A. le Marchand and R. van Goidsnoven, all of whom were working in the Pekalongan Residency. Of these, Goidsnoven had a loan of 4,000 guilders which he took over from Le Marchand, along with the latter's indigo works. Le Marchand himself had been advanced sums totaling 10,000 guilders. Petel was originally lent 27,000 guilders but he was subsequently allowed more. His case is especially interesting because his chronic inability to stay solvent led to his financial ties with the government coming to resemble those which were to exist later between the administration and the contractors under the Cultivation System. In theory Petel's credit from the government did not put him in the same position as later contractors, whose output had to be delivered to the government for a considerable period of time. In practice, however, it came to mean much the same thing. He was to use the money to build an indigo works "on his own private account," and the debt was to be paid off by 1827, three years after the loan had been granted. Petel's indigo was to be delivered to the government

137 G.G. in Rade 11.7.1826 no.27, Min.v.Kol. 2794.
warehouse at Pekalongan and to "remain there each year until the debt had been paid." It is something of a curiosity that the indigo thus delivered appears to have been considered as still being the property of Petel; it was to be sold and the money thus raised used to settle his debts to the government. At the same time, the continuation of government advances to him was directly dependant upon the amount of indigo he delivered to their warehouses. From 1826 these advances were made at the rate of three guilders for each pound of indigo delivered. By 1829, with Petel still very much in debt, such niceties of procedure seem to have disappeared. The indigo from his Pekalongan works was then simply made over to the government by way of continuing repayment of the loan.

Under Commissioner-General Du Bus, between 1826 and early 1830, some further attempts were made to provide funds for private European agricultural producers, particularly for those who fell outside the estate owning category. It is doubtful, however, if they were of much significance.

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138 G.G. in Rade 14.2.1824 no.8, Min.v.Kol. 2781.
139 G.G. in Rade 21.3.1826 no.8, Min.v.Kol. 2792.
140 G.G. in Rade 9.1.1829 no.36, Min.v.Kol. 2821.
In September 1827 it was resolved to set aside a sum of money to provide loans for the "support maintenance or extension of such private undertakings... the importance and usefulness of which might suggest that their owners should be provided with the most suitable means to develop their resources in the most advantageous manner." What this carefully worded declaration meant in practice is hard to discover. It certainly did not lead to large scale loans to planters.

The statements made in some of the older literature on the subject and repeated since by Reinsma among others that Du Bus "encouraged the cultivation of indigo and sugar through a system... of loans," are true up to a point. Du Bus continued to make those loans to the European indigo makers settled in Pekalongan province, which, as we have just noted, began under the administration of Governor-General Van der Capellen. The Commissioner-General also continued to make annual loans to sugar makers who were prepared to deliver sugar for the government's Japan trade. This too was a system which had begun before he took office in 1826. That he did more than this seems highly doubtful.

141 G.G. in Rade 11.9.1827 no.8, Min.v.Kol. 2305.
142 Reinsma, Cultuurstelsel, p.17.
143 I can find no trace of any government-sponsored loans to sugar and indigo makers other than those mentioned in the text here.
Du Bus had been sent out to Java to balance the books, not to add to the burdens of the already overstrained government resources. In the circumstances, his interest in agriculture was somewhat limited. The so-called Du Bus Report of 1827, which advocated the establishment of some sort of credit institution to finance European planters, was not the work of the Commissioner-General himself, but of his adviser Willem van Hogendorp, who claimed that Du Bus, after having signed the document, took no further interest in it. Under his regime there was certainly a relaxation of government restrictions on planters controlling land, but it was not until the arrival of Van den Bosch in 1830 that large amounts of money were made available by the government for agricultural development.

Much more important than the government itself as a source of planter credit in the years from 1825 onwards was the Netherlands Trading Society, the N.H.M. Created in 1824 to wrest the Java trade from the hands of the British, the N.H.M. had the same sort of interest in promoting the

146 On the government attitude to the control of land by European planters, see Ch.1, p. 87-9.
production of exportable crops as had the agency houses. In 1827 it lent the hinterland and Tjikandi sugar makers Trail and Company (successors of Jessen Trail and Company) the sum of 150,000 guilders at a nominal interest rate of one percent. The backing it could give, however, was seriously hampered before the early thirties by a shortage of funds. It was as a result of this that the N.H.M. had to refuse a loan to the Pekalongan indigo maker A. Le Marchand in 1826. Some short term advances to indigo manufacturers were made in the late twenties, however, including one to Louis Petel in Pekalongan province. He contracted to supply indigo to the Batavia factory of the N.H.M. in 1826 and the arrangement was still in force two years later. It appears that a great deal of money was not involved. In 1828 Willem van Hogendorp reported that Petel was one of those European entrepreneurs who was suffering especially severely from a want of capital.

It is clear, moreover, that his was no exceptional case. Even the authorities in The Hague were aware of the shortage

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150 G.G. in Rade 20.10.1826, no.8, Min.v.Kol. 2796.
151 Reinsma Cultuurstelsel, p.163.
of working capital on Java, the high rate of interest prevalent there and the consequent depressive effect on private agricultural ventures. The investment and credit situation was not improved by the outbreak in 1825 of the Java war and its continuance for five years. Although confined in the main to the Principalities, it served to discourage further investment in Java generally, and caused great anxiety amongst those who already had a stake in agricultural speculations on the island. "I wish that all your property and mine on Java were realised," wrote Palmer to the merchant Robert Scott in 1826, "for its depreciation and even insecurity are inevitable." Worse still, the expenses entailed by the war absorbed capital that would otherwise have been available for commerce and agriculture. "Money is becoming scarce in consequence of the heavy outlays for the war," the merchant and planter Gillian Maclaine wrote home to his brother in the middle of 1828. Other merchants, including Robert Scott, echoed his complaint. "There is no credit and the money market...

154 Steijn Parve, Monopoliestelsel 1851, appendix p.254.
156 Gillian Maclaine to A. Maclaine, 14.6.1828, Ardtornish Papers.
is almost entirely engrossed by the government," wrote Scott, "the monied men thus refuse to circulate their capital and there is no way of raising pecuniary aids to help the sinking planter ... in fact, everything is reduced to the lowest ebb of decline."  

CONCLUSION.

There are several respects in which the first three decades of the nineteenth century were an important period in the history of the development in Java of a system of private estates and plantations controlled by Europeans. As was argued at the beginning of this study, such privately owned European estates as existed in Java in the late eighteenth century were, for the most part, the country retreats of officials of the Dutch East India Company. They were limited in extent to a small area around the main Dutch town of Batavia. Exploitation of their agricultural resources was generally in the hands of Chinese. The economic significance of these estates was limited to their role as suppliers of food for the market of Batavia. In addition, however, they manufactured some of the sugar which was exported by the Company. With regard to the sugar manufacture which took place on the private estates at the end of the eighteenth century, however, three points have to be noted. Firstly, the sugar mills on the estates were mostly leased to Chinese and therefore only indirectly
European-controlled. Secondly, this sugar industry was in no way comparable in the technological sense with that of the West Indies or even with that of Mauritius or Bourbon. As has already been remarked, sugar was produced in the Batavian hinterland with ox-driven mills of low productive capacity. Thirdly, there is evidence that the European estate owners who had sugar mills on their lands were not prepared to make the sort of capital investment which was necessary if the sugar industry was to develop. On the contrary, they regarded the sugar industry in general merely as a fit subject for usurious transactions with the Chinese who ran it. Their sole interest, that is, lay in lending money to the Chinese sugar makers at as high a rate of interest as possible.

Sugar production apart, the European private estates of the late eighteenth century period played a minimal role in the cultivation or manufacture of agricultural produce of a kind suitable for export. Such products - coffee and indigo among them - the Company obtained by arrangements with the local Indonesian rulers of those parts of Java under Company control beyond the hinterland.

As has been indicated in some detail in the preceding chapters, this situation, in which the few private European estates played a minimal role in the colony's economy, was
radically transformed by the eighteen twenties. Extensive sales of land in West Java by the colonial governments between 1808 and 1813 caused a great increase in the number and size of the European private estates in that part of the island. In other areas of Java, especially in the neighbourhood of the principalities of Solo and Jogja and in the East Java littoral, there was a great increase in the number of private European planters active in the production of sugar, coffee and indigo on land which they leased or hired for that purpose from the Indonesians themselves.

Moreover, the increase of one form or another of European landholding was not merely quantitative, but also qualitative in the sense that, in the ten years which followed the restoration of Java to the Dutch in 1816, there took place a considerable change in the character of the private estates and plantations. The owners, more often than not, were active private merchants as well as landowners or planters. They ran their estates themselves, and, in the words of a critical official of the Indies government, did so not only in the hope of getting a reasonable return on the money sunk in the purchase of the property, but also in that of "deriving great benefit from them and even of making their fortunes thereby."1

1. Kemp, Wordingsgeschiedenis, p.88
To this end many of the estate owners and planters of the period, unlike their eighteenth century counterparts, concentrated their attention on growing crops suitable for export to Europe, where the prices obtained for such colonial produce as coffee and sugar were exceptionally high in the years immediately after the termination of the Napoleonic wars. To begin with, ventures such as these showed signs of prospering. The overall picture has already been described, but the broad outline may conveniently be indicated here.

Between 1816 and 1822 a considerable amount of coffee was produced on the private estates of West Java, though it must be pointed out that much of it represented the production of plantations which were established before the areas concerned passed into private hands. In the Principalities, however, a number of extensive coffee plantations were laid out by private European planters after 1816, and it was predicted that an annual output of as much as 200,000 pikuls of coffee might be expected from this source once the trees arrived at maturity.

It was in the private European sugar industry of West Java and of the East Java littoral, however, that the greatest advances were made, at least in the technological

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2. See Ch. 3, where a detailed discussion will be found of coffee, sugar and indigo growing on the estates and plantations between 1812 and 1834.
sense. On some of the West Java estates elaborate, West-Indian style sugar works were erected, with modern apparatus of high productive capacity, imported from Europe. In one case, a steam engine was also brought in as the means of power. In East Java, particularly in the Oosthoek areas of Pasaruan, Probolinggo and Besuki, several similar European-owned sugar works had come into existence by 1830.3

What is of particular interest for present purposes is less the general developments in this sphere between 1812 and 1834 than the situation of the private European estates and plantations as it stood in 1830, in the year in which Governor-General Van den Bosch arrived in Java and began to introduce his Cultivation System. This system, as has already been described, emphasised the role of the government rather than that of the private estates and plantations in the promotion of the cultivation of crops which would be suitable for export to Europe. It is, therefore, of some interest to try and evaluate the degree

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3. It must be remembered, of course, that Europeans were only a minority among the sugar makers of early nineteenth century Java, the majority of whom were Chinese. More details will be found in ch. 3 p. 183.
of success attained by the private estates and plantations as producers of export crops on the eve of the introduction of the Cultivation System⁴ — under which the primary responsibility for the cultivation of such produce was taken over by the state.

It is with the private estates of West Java that a start can best be made. As we have seen, there is a strong case for arguing that in this private European sector of the colony's economy the attempt to grow crops suitable for export to Europe had already been largely given up by 1830. By that time private estate coffee production was negligible and few of the sugar works established on the estates at the beginning of the 'twenties

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⁴. For present purposes the estates of West Java and the plantations of the East Java littoral will be considered, though they were not the only forms of private European agricultural enterprise to be found in Java in the early nineteenth century. The estates run by Europeans in the Principalities (discussed in detail in Ch. 1) may conveniently be left aside. The main crop grown there was coffee, and this cultivation was effectively stopped by the action of the Indies government in terminating the leases in May 1823. Coffee cultivation did not begin to revive there until the later years of our period.
or even earlier, answered to expectations. In some cases sugar works were abandoned altogether as on the Tjikandi Ilir estate in Bantam province, to the west of the hinterland. On others, though sugar was not given up entirely, the owners curtailed further capital expenditure on its cultivation and manufacture. Indeed, as has been argued in an earlier chapter, by the early eighteen thirties and contemporaneous with the beginning of the Cultivation System the estate owners of West Java had diverted their attention away from such crops as sugar and coffee towards crops such as rice which found a ready sale in Java or in other Asian markets.\(^5\)

In our attempt to offer an explanation of this pattern of events we are hampered, as has already been pointed out, by the lack of surviving private archives of the estates

\(^5\). On the rice cultivation practised on the West Java estates, see Ch. 3, p. 227-44.
themselves. In their absence, however, certain tentative lines of explanation may be advanced.

In part the attempts to grow crops like coffee and sugar on the estates of West Java during the eighteen twenties failed because the high prices obtained for these goods in the early years of the Dutch restoration were not maintained. In the case of sugar in particular, the manufacturers were caught between the falling price of sugar after about 1820 and the rising price of the rice with which they paid their workpeople. This matter of prices and their effect on production in an industry like the sugar industry of West Java is, however, a highly complex one. The market for most of Java's sugar exports was in Europe, and there the price fetched by sugar fell rapidly between 1819 and 1825 after which it rose slightly until 1829 when it again began to fall. However, it took between four to six months and possibly longer for news to reach Java from North-West Europe and about eighteen months from start to finish of the cultivation and manufacture of sugar. Moreover, such factors as the availability of cargo space no doubt influenced the price paid for sugar at Batavia. In these circumstances it is not surprising to find that the price of sugar fluctuated rather more wildly at Batavia than the general trend of
market prices in London would suggest. Falling prices in Europe, it may be concluded, only affected the West Java sugar industry at several removes, and they were only one of the difficulties afflicting that industry in the eighteen twenties. An important difficulty no doubt, but the degree of its importance remains difficult to assess in the absence of so much private estate documentation.

A great deal of contemporary complaint, however, is couched less in terms of falling prices than in terms of growing difficulty in getting workpeople. This is a point which has been dealt with at length already and which may conveniently be summarised here. Sugar was a labour-intensive crop and West Java was only sparsely populated. Hence the sugar industry of the area was dependent for its supply of labour on workers brought from other parts of the

6. The general question of sugar prices during our period is dealt with in Ch. 3 p. 188-9. The average price for which sugar sold at Batavia between 1823 and 1832 varied as much as six guilders per pikul between 11.5 guilders per pikul in 1832 and 17.6 guilders per pikul in 1828. The latter, it may be noted, was an exceptional year. These figures are based on Table of Java's Foremost Exports, 1823-1832, Baud Coll 413.

7. See Ch. 4 p. 279-84.
island on a temporary basis. The main area where such labour recruitment as this took place was Tjeribon province, eastwards along the coast between Batavia and Semarang. However, possibly because of the acute state of unrest prevailing in that province in the earlier years of the nineteenth century, there is evidence that the recruitment of labourers there was becoming more difficult - possibly progressively so - during the period 1812-1834 with which we are concerned.

From the comments of some well-informed contemporaries, it appears that it was labour shortages of this sort which meant that the sugar industry of the hinterland and of elsewhere in West Java was unable to expand, despite the introduction of modern equipment such as West-Indian style sugar mills and even, in one case, of a steam engine to power the cane-pressing machinery. Although in 1825 the government stepped in to 'encourage' the recruitment in Tjeribon and elsewhere in eastern Java, there is some doubt as to how effectual this intervention was. At least, as has been shown in a previous chapter, the major West Java sugar-making firm of Jessen Trail and Company continued to experience labour difficulties throughout the 'twenties, despite government support for their attempts to recruit
Indeed, it would appear that even such problems as those of financial backing - formidable as they were - were nonetheless subsidiary to those concerning the provision of labour. After all, several of the estates were able to find the money to equip themselves with modern sugar-making machinery between 1819 and 1824. The Tjikandi Ilir estate, for instance, had a West-Indian style mill at its sugar works by 1819, and the Pamanukan and Tjiasssem estate and the sugar works run by the firm of Jessen Trail and Company at Bekasi in the Batavian hinterland were both similarly equipped by 1824. It would appear, therefore, that in the earlier part of our period capital was not entirely wanting for investment in private estate and plantation agriculture. It would appear that it was only when the backers saw what meagre results were being obtained that they became wary of further investment. Falling prices certainly cut the

8. Jessen Trail and Company's case is discussed in Ch.4 p.282.

9. Details of this and other machinery used for sugar manufacture in West and East Java between 1812 and 1834 will be found in Ch. 3 p.190-200.
profits, but it was the cane rotting in the fields because there were not enough hands to bring it to the factory which sealed the fate of the sugar-growing speculation.\textsuperscript{10}

Nonetheless, the difficulty of finding financial backers was certainly a serious one, particularly in the later 'twenties. An attempt has already been made to analyse the various sources from which the planters and estate owners of the 1812-1834 period drew financial support. As far as the surviving documentation allowed, it was concluded that by 1830 the several agencies which had hitherto made funds available to estate owners were either no longer capable of doing so or had at their command a supply of funds totally inadequate to meet the demands of the new, commercially-minded estate owners.\textsuperscript{11} Several important

\textsuperscript{10} As, for instance, happened on the big West Java estate of Pamanukan and Tjiasssem in the early 'twenties.

\textsuperscript{11} A discussion of the sources from which the estates and plantations drew financial support will be found in Ch. 5.
aspects of this situation remain unresolved, however, among them that of the amount of support being given to private estate owners and planters by the private commercial houses of Batavia around 1830.

So far attention has been centred on the sugar industry which was carried on between 1812 and 1834 on the West Java estates. The problems of the contemporaneous coffee plantations were of a rather different nature, and, arguably, had less to do with fluctuating prices and labour difficulties than with the hostile attitude of the Indies government.

The position was that, as has been remarked in an earlier chapter, the Indies government was itself a large scale planter of coffee, and in its role as planter was inclined to view with suspicion the activities of private European coffee producers. Moreover, the post-1816 Dutch regimes inherited a very profitable arrangement, whereby all coffee grown on the private estates of West Java had to be delivered to the Indies government's warehouses at a price which, for most of our period, was far below that which the beans would have fetched on the open market. In itself, this tended to discourage landowners whose estates were well suited to coffee from paying much
attention to the crop. The government's demand for the
delivery of privately grown coffee, however, had more far-
reaching effects than this. In the Preanger area of West
Java, where between 1813 and 1823 private coffee-growing
estates existed side by side with the government's coffee
plantations, the demand for the delivery of privately grown
coffee at a low, fixed price led to a serious clash between
the private landowners of the area and the Indies govern­
ment, a clash usually referred to as the Sukabumi Affair.
The Affair itself has been discussed above; the upshot was
that, with the probable aim of making certain of its
continued control of coffee cultivation in West Java,
between 1820 and 1823 the regime of Governor-General Van
der Capellen repurchased all the private estates in the
Preanger, which at the time was the most important coffee-
growing area in the whole of the island. In 1823, more­
over, the Indies government decreed that Europeans should
cease to lease plantations from the Javanese nobility of
the principalities of Solo and Jogja. It thereby succeeded
in suppressing the only other major source of 'private
European' coffee production remaining in Java. In this
sense, therefore, it was the hostile policy of the Indies
government rather than commercial disappointments which
accounts for either the disappearance during our period
of privately owned coffee estates, or for the virtual cessation of coffee-growing on those private estates which remained. 12

In East Java, the position of the plantation sugar and indigo industries differed in many important respects from that which prevailed on the estates of the western part of the island. The European planters in this area worked on land which was hired from the local village people rather than on land which they owned, as was the case in West Java. By 1830, however, the most important difference between these two spheres of 'private European' agricultural enterprise was that while the West Java estates were moving away from the production of crops which were suitable for export to Europe, the European plantations of East Java continued to produce increasing quantities of sugar and indigo, both of which were destined for the markets of the West.

On the European plantations of the East Java littoral the three years before the arrival of Governor-General Van den Bosch in 1830 were a period of considerable expansion in both the sugar and indigo industries. The latter was concentrated in Pekalongan province, mid-way between Tjeribon and Semarang, and the former in the Oosthoek areas

12. On coffee production on the private estates in West Java and on the plantations leased by Europeans in the Principalities, see Ch.3. p.159-81.
of Pasaruan, Probolinggo and Besuki. It is the situation in 1830 of the sugar industry, the most important of the two in terms of amount and value of output, which may be considered first.

The history of the sugar industry during the period 1812-1834, it will be remembered, was one of expansion, recession and then of renewed expansion beginning around 1827. As with the sugar industry of West Java, the question again arises of how far this general pattern of events is explicable in terms of fluctuations in the price paid for sugar on the European market. The recession which affected the industry in the earlier eighteen twenties may well bear some relation to the sharp fall in sugar prices in Europe which began in 1819, though there were certainly other important influences at work, such as the effects on sugar cultivation of the very severe cholera epidemic of 1821-2.13

13. A very severe epidemic of Cholera affected Java in 1821-2. It appears to have been especially bad in the Eastern parts of the island and in the Principalities. In his report of 1823 the Resident of Semarang commented on the virtual cessation of agriculture in that area in 1821, which had been caused by the cholera, and of the depopulation of whole villages. Annual General Report, Semarang 1823, p.9, Schneither Coll 91.
Moreover, though this is far from certain, the government regulations of 1818-19 concerning the contracts which might be made between European planters and Indonesian cultivators may also have had a deleterious effect on the plantation sugar industry of the East Java littoral.  

It seems doubtful, however, whether the recovery and expansion of the sugar industry between 1827 and 1830 can be linked primarily with improvements in the price fetched by sugar on the European market. Though sugar prices there rose somewhat after 1825, this improvement was little more than marginal and would not appear to be sufficient to spark off, by itself, a renewed interest in the cultivation and manufacture of sugar. On the other hand, as has

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14. This is a matter which has been discussed before, notably in Chapters one and four. In 1818-19 the Dutch Commissioners-General issued regulations prohibiting planters from hiring villages from their headman or from others in the Indonesian hierarchy. Instead, land and labour were only to be hired with the agreement of the individual cultivators. It is rather doubtful to what extent these regulations were actually enforced.
already been suggested, the sugar-price question is far from straightforward, and the price paid for sugar at Batavia in the later 'twenties varied a good deal more than a study of European price levels alone would suggest.

In general, however, there appear to be three main points to be made by way of explanation of the expansion of the East Java sugar industry in the late eighteen twenties. The first is that although this industry was a private one, it was by that time the recipient of a certain amount of government help. This was of an administrative rather than a financial character. The East Java sugar makers had to arrange with the local village people both for the use of fields for growing sugar cane and for a supply of labour for their factories. The villages concerned, however, were government villages and the land - government land - both of which were ultimately under the authority of the Dutch Resident and his officials. There is some evidence, though not a great deal, that in some important sugar-growing districts of the Oosthoek, the Resident and his officials lent the weight of their authority to the arrangements made between sugar makers and local cultivators for the growing of sugar cane. For instance, the Besuki sugar maker A.G. de Roock wrote that in 1829 ha had contracted with neighbouring villages for
the cultivation of 95 bouws of sugar cane, "in consultation with the Resident Lawick van Pabst." 15

The second point to be made is that the East Java sugar industry expanded while that of West Java conspicuously failed to do so, because it was cheaper and easier to grow sugar in the East Java littoral than anywhere else on the island. Sugar needed wet rice fields (aawah) and a large labour force for its successful cultivation and manufacture, and these conditions came nearer to being fulfilled in the Oosthoek than in West Java. It would appear that by the eighteen twenties such Oosthoek areas as Pasaruan were already more heavily populated and better irrigated than many other parts of the island.

However, it would be unwise to assume that it was necessarily cheaper to produce sugar in East than in West Java. It is very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory estimate as to what it cost to produce a pikul of sugar in Java around 1830 - for one thing, the lack of estate and plantation archives stands in the way of such an inquiry. Some information is available, however. In October 1830 Governor-General Van den Bosch calculated that it cost at least fifteen guilders to produce one pikul of sugar in

15. Note of A.G.de Roock, 29.5.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 413.
the Batavian hinterland, though against this has to be set the statement of one prominent firm of hinterland sugar makers that it cost them around twelve guilders. In East Java it was estimated by one of the major European sugar makers operating in the Oosthoek that in 1829-30 it cost him about twelve guilders to produce one pikul of sugar. Against this, in turn, must be set the contemporary statement of the Resident of Pasaruan (also in the Oosthoek) that the cost of manufacturing one pikul of sugar there lay between nine and twelve guilders. Of course, such figures as these are scarcely comprehensive, though they do serve to suggest that the difference between the cost of producing sugar in West and East Java was not so great as might initially be supposed. On the other hand, if the estimates of cost made by the Indies government and its officials are correct, it would explain why private

16. These figures come from the following sources; Van den Bosch to Baud, 10.10.1830, in Westendorp Boerma (ed), Briefwisseling,1,p.66; Engel and Beynon to (person unknown),27.6.1830,Van den Bosch Coll 415; Note of A.G.de Roock,29.5.1830,Van den Bosch Coll 413; Resident of Pasaruan to Van den Bosch,4.6.1830,Van den Bosch Coll 414. As far as I can tell all these prices are given in terms of copper currency, which was the medium in which most cash transactions in the island were reckoned. The position as regards currencies in the Indies was rather complicated. Under the new currency system introduced by the Commissioners-General after 1816 copper currency was supposed to be on a par with silver currency. However, silver soon virtually disappeared from circulation and a considerable disparity developed between the copper and the silver currencies. In 1834 the Indies government accepted that silver was worth 20% more than copper, and it is on this basis that this and subsequent calculations are based. See Encyclopedie,2,p.611-15.
merchants as well as the Netherlands Trading Society (the N.H.M.) thought it worthwhile to finance the sugar industry of East Java in the later 'twenties.

It is this matter of financial backing which forms the third and final explanatory point. As has already been remarked in a West Java context, it is particularly difficult to trace the connections between private commercial houses and plantations or estates. According to the Resident of Pasaruan there were several European merchants engaged in backing the Chinese sugar makers of the Oosthoek in 1829, though the full extent of their involvement is nowhere stated. By 1830, however, most of the backing for the plantation sugar industry of Pasaruan itself came from the N.H.M. According to the Resident, such support had begun as early as 1827. Three years later the N.H.M. contracted for the delivery of 17,500 pikuls of sugar with the sugar makers of Pasaruan, no mean amount when it is considered that this was rather more sugar than the total amount exported from the Residency in the previous year. 17

Many of the same points can be made about the plantation indigo industry of East Java as have been made about sugar. The indigo industry, which was mainly confined to Pekalongan province and entirely in European hands, received a great deal of support from the Dutch administration in the

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later 'twenties - so much so indeed, that Governor-General Van den Bosch wrote to Holland, shortly after his arrival in Java in 1830, that it was only through the co-operation of the government that the indigo industry of Pekalongan was able to succeed. The full extent of this co-operation has been dealt with elsewhere. It included the connivance of the local Dutch administration in the making of indigo-growing contracts at the village level rather than at that of the individual cultivator, even though this latter course was the only one which was legally open to the European indigo manufacturers. Moreover, the local administration also co-operated with the indigo makers in arranging for them to buy-off the services which the government demanded of the peasantry in its role as landlord.

What must also be taken into account in explaining the expansion of the plantation indigo industry of Pekalongan in the late 'twenties is the question of how far that expansion was the result of rising prices for indigo on the European market - the market, that is, for which most of the indigo manufactured in Java was destined. As was the case with the sugar industry, the question is not one to which any straightforward answer can be given.

18. Van den Bosch to Baud, 12.3.1830, in Westendorp Boerma (ed), Briefwisseling, 1, p. 51.
Indigo prices in particular were subject to violent annual fluctuations, though the general trend of indigo prices in Europe was downward in the later eighteen twenties. In these circumstances there appears to have been a certain amount of private commercial capital behind the expansion of the East Java indigo industry which began about 1827. How much it is impossible to say, but some examples can be given. The Batavia firm of Thompson, Roberts and Company provided some financial backing for the Pekalongan indigo maker Harvey Thompson in 1828-9. Moreover, some financial support was forthcoming from the Indies government itself and from the N.H.M. How large the latter's investment was by 1830, however, is difficult to assess on present evidence. The indications are that it was not substantial.

As we have seen, by 1830 the private estates of West Java were well on the way to relinquishing their role as producers for the export market. What remains, however, is to assess the position on the eve of the introduction


20. Details of the arrangements under which the indigo manufacturers found financial support from the government and the N.H.M., see Ch.5, p. 370-2.
of the Cultivation System of the other main field of private European agricultural enterprise in Java — the plantations of the East Java littoral. We have already seen that both the main crops grown on these plantations — sugar and indigo — were grown with a view to selling them in Europe, and that the cultivation of both crops was on the increase in the later eighteen twenties, roughly from 1827 onwards. Nonetheless, several important reservations must be made with respect to the position of the sugar and indigo plantation industries in 1830.

The first concerns costs. It has been remarked before that it is very difficult to arrive at a reliable estimate of what it cost to produce sugar in East Java in 1830. There appears to be little or nothing surviving of the private papers or account books of the Europeans who ran the sugar plantations and mills, and this means that what can be said on the subject of costs may be misleading and is certainly only of a provisional nature. However, if we accept the Resident of Pasaruan’s estimate that in 1829-30 it cost between nine and twelve guilders to produce one pikul of sugar on the European and Chinese sugar plantations of his province, then certain conclusions may be drawn.21

First, the question of market prices and their relation to production costs. In 1828 the price for which sugar was sold at Batavia was about twenty-one guilders per pikul, an exceptionally high price which for some reason bore little relation to the generally falling prices paid for sugar on the European market in the later 'twenties. By 1832, in line with prices in Europe, the price paid for sugar at Batavia had fallen to thirteen and a half guilders per pikul. Of course, these prices are only average and a comparison between them and production costs (said to be nine to twelve guilders per pikul) leaves many questions unanswered, such as that of the size of profit margin necessary if the manufacture of sugar was to remain an attractive commercial proposition. The implication of the imperfect figures presented here, however, is that the position of the private plantation sugar industry of the East Java littoral was far from healthy at the beginning of the eighteen thirties. With sugar costing up to twelve guilders per pikul to produce and selling at thirteen and a half guilders, the profit margin would appear to have been slight. A comparison may fairly be made with what it cost to produce sugar under the government-sponsored Cultivation System. In 1832 this was said to amount to no more than
The second point about the private sugar and indigo plantations of East Java around 1830 concerns the arrangements made by the planters for hiring land and labour. As has already been pointed out, by the late 'twenties help from the side of the administration played some part in this, and in this sense at least there was less an antithesis between governmental and private agricultural enterprises than co-operation between the private Europeans and the government for the attainment of a common end - the production of exportable produce. How far this co-operation had progressed by the time that Van den Bosch arrived in Java is rather difficult to judge, but it is worth noting that the Resident of Pekalongan province - the centre of the indigo industry - reckoned that it would be more profitable for the Indonesian

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22. The prices of sugar sold at Batavia have been converted into terms of copper currency on the basis of that currency being valued at 20% less than silver (see note 14). They are based on Table of Java's foremost Exports, 1823-32, Baud Coll 413. The figure for the cost of sugar production under the Cultivation System, again in terms of copper, comes from Van den Bosch to Baud, 15.6.1832, in Westendorp Boerma (ed), Briefwisseling, 1,p.154.
cultivators of the area to grow rice rather than indigo as a second crop after the first crop of rice had been harvested. The implication, at least, of such a statement is that indigo was only grown at all in Pekalongan because pressure was brought to bear on the cultivators to do so — pressure, that is, which presumably came from the side of the Dutch administration. The evidence is slender, but at least provides a basis for the suggestion that government intervention in the provision of land and labour was an essential condition for the success of the plantation indigo industry of East Java by 1830.

It may be tentatively concluded, therefore, that on the eve of the introduction of the Cultivation System the apparent success of the private, European-controlled plantations of East Java was in a certain sense illusory.

23. Resident of Pekalongan to Van den Bosch, 25.1.1830, Van den Bosch Coll 411. In dealing with the question of the role played by the Indies government and the N.H.M. in fostering the growth of the indigo and sugar industries of the East Java littoral, reference should be made to the general discussion in Ch. 4, p. 310-20.
The sugar industry, it may be suggested, was in danger of being undermined by falling prices, while indigo was dependent for its success on the close collaboration of the Indies government and its provincial officials. Both industries, moreover, were partially dependent on either the government or the semi-official N.H.M. for the necessary supply of funds.

Of course, it has to be admitted that such conclusions as these are based on flimsy evidence. If more information comes to light – from the old Dutch archives in Jakarta for example – they may well have to be revised or reversed. As it is, however, it is difficult to resist the suggestion that much of what was happening in East Java in the late 'twenties was in some respects a trial-run for the Cultivation System of the following decade. Several elements of what was later to be called the Cultivation System were present in the 'private' sugar and indigo industries of East Java before 1830.

The intervention of the provincial administration to ensure that the required crops were grown by the Indonesian cultivators was one of the essential features of Van den Bosch's system, and some traces of it, at least, appear in the relations between local cultivators, European manufacturers and government officials in the plantation indigo
industry of Pekalongan in the late 'twenties. The same foreshadowing of the Cultivation System is also to be seen in the financial arrangements entered into by some of the private indigo and sugar makers with the Indies government or with the N.H.M. Typical of Cultivation System arrangements was that whereby a loan was made to a European manufacturer on condition that it was to be repaid in produce. As we have already seen, the loan made to the Pekalongan indigo manufacturer Louis Petel by the Indies government in 1824, although not following these lines precisely, did work out in practice very much like a Cultivation System loan, in that Petel ended up repaying his debt by deliveries of indigo to the government warehouses. 24

In the light of these conclusions about the situation of the private estates and plantations of Java on the eve of the Cultivation System it is possible to attempt a reappraisal of contemporary theorising on the role which might or might not be played by private European agricultural enterprise in the exploitation of Java's resources. It is, moreover, possible to comment on some subsequent interpretations of Dutch land policy in the colony between 1816 and the early 'thirties.

24. Details of the loan made to Petel by the Indies government will be found in Ch.5, p. 371-2.
Reference has already been made in the Introduction to the theories of colonial development advocated during the period with which we are concerned. It will be remembered that, for differing reasons, both Governor-General Van der Capellen and his advisors H.W. Muntinghe and H.J. van de Graaff, together with Johannes van den Bosch, were inclined to reject the contention that a policy of granting land to European planters was the best way of exploiting the resources of the colony. On the other hand, just such a policy was put forward by Willem van Hogendorp in the Du Bus Report on Colonisation of 1827.\(^{25}\)

Muntinghe, the probable author of the Van der Capellen Report on Colonisation of 1822, was primarily concerned to demonstrate that private land owners, and in particular private landowners who grew coffee, were superfluous to the development of the Colony's agriculture,\(^ {26}\) and that their

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25. A more detailed treatment of the colonial theories referred to here will be found in the Introduction.

job could as easily be done by government officials. This is a contention which is very hard to discuss, since between 1821 and 1823 the Indies government virtually eliminated all the major private European coffee growers, first by the repurchase of those private estates in the Preanger area where a great deal of coffee was grown and secondly, in 1823, by the prohibition which it placed on the leasing by Europeans of estates in the Principalities. It was this latter area which, along with the estates in the Preanger, was the main centre of private European coffee production at the time. Hence there was, so to speak, no control experiment which might have enabled us to draw some parallels between the progress of coffee cultivation on government and private lands.

The second major argument used by Van der Capellen and his advisors against the private estates and plantations was, as has already been mentioned, that of the dangers of oppression which arose when populated lands fell into private European hands. This is again a very difficult matter to prove either way. In the first place, it is not at all easy to say exactly what constituted oppression in the context of early nineteenth century Java, or whether

27. This allegation is dealt with in detail in the Introduction, p. 25.
the indigenous cultivators were likely to be better off under a private European landlord than under the rule of the Indies government. If the use of compulsion to ensure that the required crops were grown is taken to mean oppression, then it has to be pointed out that the government were at least as guilty of this as were the private landlords. The government, for instance, ran coffee plantations with forced labour in the Preanger and in parts of East Java for almost the whole of our period. Moreover, what little we know of the way in which production was organised on at least some of the West Java estates suggests that the implied comparison made by Van der Capellen's advisor Van de Graaff between the slave plantations of the West Indies and the private estates of Java was rather wide of the mark.  

28 It is noteworthy, for instance, that the owners of the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate, which had a population of more than thirty thousand in the eighteen twenties, were unable to run their sugar works with local labour, but were forced to rely on recruiting workpeople beyond the borders of their vast estate. More generally, it may be suggested that the

sparsity of population in West Java, taken together with the resultant ease of flight, made any new or unusual oppression by the private landowners of that part of the island unwise if not impracticable. Whether such practical limitations on the action of European entrepreneurs held good in East Java, where the land was more heavily populated, it is difficult to say on present evidence.

However, the most striking result of a comparison between the arguments used by Van der Capellen and his advisors Van de Graaff and Muntinghe against the spread of the estates and the actual pattern of estate development during the period concerned, is the confirmation given to what a careful reading of the 1822 Report itself suggests. In their correspondence both Van der Capellen and Van de Graaff might indulge in wholesale condemnation of any policy of land-concession and of all estates without distinction. However, whoever wrote and approved the 1822 Report was far less concerned to attack private land-ownership in general than to attack privately owned coffee
estates in particular. As has already been pointed out in the Introduction, although the general conclusions of the 1822 Report was uniformly hostile to a policy of land-concession, it was conceded that in such branches of agriculture as sugar manufacture private European capital and skills were to be welcomed. This is an important point, and one which tends to have been overlooked by both the critics and the apologists of Van der Capellen's estate policy. The view, exemplified by Day, that Van der

29. This concentration on the question of coffee-growing on the private estates is explicable in terms of the origin of the 1822 Report. It was not only a general statement of policy, but also a justification of the standpoint of the Indies government in its row with the estate-owner Andries de Wilde. De Wilde was part-owner and administrator of the Sukabumi estate in the Preanger area of West Java between 1813 and 1823. As will be remembered, the coffee output of that estate had to be delivered to the government's warehouses at a low and fixed price; it could not be sold on the open market. In an attempt to remedy this situation - which cut his profits - De Wilde went to Holland and persuaded the Colonial Office to order the Indies government to pay him a substantially higher price for his coffee than he had hitherto received. The subsequent refusal of the Indies government to obey this order was what the writer of the 1822 Report was concerned to justify. On the Sukabumi Affair, see Ch. 3, p. 171-3.


Capellen was indiscriminately hostile in theory and in practice to the private estates and plantations does not bear close examination. Of course, as has already been remarked, there is no denying that the Van der Capellen government effectively discouraged private European coffee cultivation by continuing to prohibit the free sale of coffee grown on the private estates of West Java, by repurchasing the foremost private coffee estates of that area and, finally, by prohibiting Europeans from leasing plantations in the Principalities. By this last act, in particular, the regime brought to a premature end an important and privately-run European coffee growing enterprise.

On the other hand, it may be observed that Van der Capellen's government encouraged rather than discouraged other branches of private European agricultural enterprise. In 1824, as we have seen, the administration began to make loans to private European indigo manufacturers and in the same year reverted to the old East India Company practice of lending government support to the attempts of the private sugar makers of West Java to recruit workpeople in Tjeribon and elsewhere in the better-populated areas of the island to the east of the Batavian hinterland and Krawang. There are not really enough facts at our dis-
posal to prove this conclusively, but it at least appears that the policy of the Van der Capellen government towards the private estates and plantations was in certain important respects markedly less hostile than has sometimes been alleged.\textsuperscript{32}

Such a conclusion as this is not only significant in itself, but also has a certain relevance to any reappraisal of the land-concession policy advocated by Willem van Hogendorp in the \textit{Du Bus Report on Colonisation} of May 1827. When considered in the context of the actual pattern of private estate and plantation development during the eighteen twenties, Van Hogendorp's advocacy of a policy whereby uncultivated and unpopulated land should be leased to European planters is open to a number of objections.

In the first place, it may be suggested Van Hogendorp - together with other advocates of a land-concession policy - failed to ask himself what were the real obstacles in

\textsuperscript{32} It would be necessary to have access to the archives of the various Residencies concerned before it could be established whether the attitude of the Van der Capellen regime was as relatively sympathetic as these indications suggest. For further reference to help given to indigo and sugar makers from 1824 onwards, see Ch. 5, p. 368-75 and Ch. 4, p. 227.
the way of the success of such a system. On the evidence assembled in previous chapters, much of which, it must be admitted, is of an imperfect nature, it would appear that the difficulties faced by the private estate owners and planters during the 'twenties were by no means solely the result of ill-will on the part of the Indies government.

In the sugar manufacture carried on by the private estate owners of West Java, for example, labour was hard to obtain and, in the later 'twenties at least, so was capital. Planters and estate owners who had been encouraged to enter the field of export-crop production by the high prices which prevailed in Europe for colonial produce at the close of the Napoleonic wars, found themselves in serious difficulties when these prices began either to fall or to fluctuate sharply after 1819–20. Yet in the Du Bus Report of 1827 there is little attempt to come to grips with the complex problems which faced and would continue to face private landowners and planters working to cultivate export-crops for the European market. On the contrary, it was assumed all too easily that the relative lack of success which had hitherto characterised private agricultural ventures could be ascribed to the hostile policy of the Van der Capellen regime which had run the colony from 1819 until the arrival of Commissioner-General Du Bus.
As we have seen, this sort of argument was probably valid as far as private coffee cultivation was concerned. However, it loses a great deal of its validity when used to explain the problems facing the indigo and sugar makers, both of whom appear to have received sympathetic treatment from the Van der Capellen government. This suggests, at least, that whatever the sugar and indigo industries were suffering from in the early years of the Du Bus administration, it was not from the heavy hand of the previous administration. In this sense Van Hogendorp's proposals for a policy of land-concession appear to be based upon a superficial analysis of the existing situation. It was not only the government which was responsible for the ills of the private estates and plantations in the later 'twenties, and the failure to appreciate this tended to undermine the practicability of the scheme of land-concession which Van Hogendorp advocated.

It is considerations of the practicability of these proposals when placed in the context of what we know of the

33 On pages 95 and 96 of the Du Bus Report, Van Hogendorp touches on the difficulties in which private landowners and planters found themselves in the mid-twenties, but he is inclined to see the origin of such difficulties in the hostile attitude of the Van der Capellen regime. On page 96 he specifically fails to analyse the difficulties facing the West Java sugar manufacturers in the mid-twenties. Steijn Parve, Monopoliestelsel 1851, Appendix Du Bus Report, pp.95-6.
estates and plantations of the later 'twenties which form the second point in our reappraisal of the 1827 Report. It will be remembered that in the proposal to lease hitherto uncultivated and unpopulated land to European planters, it was envisaged that this ground would then be used for growing export-crops and that the necessary labour would be hired in the adjacent villages. The planters to whom land was leased, moreover, were not to be 'fortune hunters' but men possessed of a certain capital which they were prepared to invest in agricultural ventures. These proposals appear to side-step two of the most important problems facing the expansion of private European agricultural enterprises in Java in the eighteen twenties.

In the first place, it was no answer to the problem of the growing shortage of funds experienced by many landowners and planters in the later 'twenties to argue that what was called for were entrepreneurs possessed of capital. To be fair, Van Hogendorp did recommend that some agency to provide credit for planters would have to be set up, but

34. Van Hogendorp was very specific about this. He advocated a "colonisation, less of men than of capital." Steijn Parve, *Monopoliestelsel 1851*, Appendix to Du Bus Report, p.54.

this again begs the question of where the capital was to come from in the first place, and in a sense conflicts with the idea that the planters were to be monied men anyway. In this matter it is not necessary to rely on pointing in a general way to the practical difficulties facing Van Hogendorp's scheme. Under Commissioner-General Du Bus some uncultivated and unpopulated land was leased to planters, and in some cases it is possible to trace both to whom the land was leased and its subsequent history. The result, though only illustrative and not analytical, does not throw a favourable light on Van Hogendorp's theorising. John Hunt, to whom land was leased in the Surabaja Residency in 1829 was a veteran of the British period and had subsequently found employment as a small merchant in the town of Surabaja itself. He was already about fifty years old, and hence an old man by the standards of his day, when the lease was granted. There is no indication that he had much money, and when he died in 1835 the land which had been granted to him remained undeveloped.36

Even where the planters who leased uncultivated land were rather more successful, as was Coenraad Coolen who leased land in the Surabaja Residency between 1829 and 1850,

36. On the career of John Hunt, see Ch.2, p. 119-20.
there is every indication that the situation was hardly one envisaged by the writer of the Du Bus Report of 1827! From official sources, it appears that Coolen enjoyed no outside financial backing and that he had cleared with his own hands some of the land on his plantation. He had, on the other hand, introduced some form of Christianity among the local cultivators who settled on his land, and in the process attracted to himself what the Assistant-Resident described as a "certain fanatical following." The picture emerges not of a westernising entrepreneur with plenty of capital to devote to the production of exportable produce but of an impecunious minor prophet of the padi-fields, whom the Dutch authorities considered removing from his lands because of the damage he was said to be doing to European prestige. Rice was the main crop grown on the plantation, although some tobacco was also cultivated.37

Nor is this the only way that a critical approach may be made to Van Hogendorp's advocacy of a policy of land concession to European planters. A crucial feature of his scheme was that the ground leased by European planters would be cultivated by labourers hired from the adjacent

37. Assistant-Resident to Resident of Surabaja 25.8.1850 and 17.4.1844, Institut.T.L.V. H713, items XLIX and XCIII.
populated areas. He appears to have failed to consider whether this could be done on terms which would make the cultivation of indigo or sugar a profitable speculation for European entrepreneurs. It was on these grounds that Van den Bosch was particularly doubtful of the viability of Van Hogendorp's plans when he arrived in Java to begin his term of office as Governor-General at the beginning of 1830. As the man who was set on introducing a different system for exploiting Java's resources, Van den Bosch may well be supposed to have had a certain bias against the ideas of the previous regime. On the other hand, what we know of the difficulties in organising production encountered by both estate owners and planters in the eighteen twenties and what little we know of what it cost to produce particular crops during that period, suggests that Van Hogendorp was probably mistaken in supposing that labour could be obtained either easily or cheaply. In West Java the sugar manufacturers operating on the private estates had continual difficulty in finding enough workpeople, even when, after 1824, the Indies government lent its support to their attempts at recruitment of labour. In the East Java littoral, where the private European indigo and sugar

industries expanded somewhat in the later 'twenties, the land and labour which in part made this possible was obtained by agreements between the village headmen and the European planters concerned - agreements in which, it may be argued, the hand of the Dutch local authorities was not entirely absent. Such arrangements as these were several removes away from the voluntary day-labour agreements foreseen by Van Hogendorp, and their relative success is no indication that planters working on uncultivated, leased land would find it easy to get people to work for them. Indeed, there are indications to the contrary. Surabaja was not the only province in which areas of uncultivated land were leased by the Du Bus administration between 1826 and 1830. Similar leases were granted in Pekalongan province, the area from which most of Java's exportable indigo production came. According to the Resident of that province, however, those planters who had agreed to lease

39. The Dutch administration was involved in such contracts in two ways. Firstly, European planters who hired land and labour had to arrange with the Resident to buy-off the labour services which the government, as landlord, demanded from the Indonesian cultivators. Secondly, the European planters paid the land rent of those local cultivators who agreed to work for them; in some cases directly to the government. In this latter case, at least, it would appear that a certain amount of cooperation between government and planter was called for. A detailed treatment of this subject will be found in Ch. 4, p.295-320.
land found great difficulty in getting people to work for them. One European planter had found himself able to hire only one hundred workpeople, and even then they would only agree to work for one year. By way of comparison, one of the major indigo manufacturers of the Pekalongan area - who worked on village land - had a total labour force of four thousand working for him in 1830.

Some specific details of Van den Bosch's criticism of a policy of land-concession to European planters have already been mentioned. It is his theory of the need for the government to take upon itself the function of organising the production of exportable produce which appears to have a greater relevance to what was actually taking place between 1812 and 1850 than do the Colonisation Reports of either Van der Capellen or Du Bus. Of course, the decision to adopt his system was not based exclusively on a careful weighing up of the case for and against the private estates and plantations. By the close of the eighteen 'twenties both the government of the Indies and that of the metropolitan country were facing large financial deficits. In the circumstances,

41. Between 1826 and 1828 the Dutch government had to make a series of loans amounting to more than f.37 million to cover the budgetary deficits of the Indies government. By 1830, moreover, "the Home government like the Indian government was threatened with bankruptcy, and it was expected that Java should pay its way." Furnivall, Netherlands India, pp.106-8.
it may be suggested that the urgent need for cash was the foremost consideration in The Hague when it was decided to send Van den Bosch to Java with a mandate to implement his ideas. In short, the primary appeal of Van den Bosch's system was that it promised quick and substantial returns.

On the other hand, what we know of the position of the private estates and plantations at the time of Van den Bosch's arrival in Java in 1850 tends to substantiate his argument that it was unlikely that private landowners and planters would be successful in cultivating crops for the export market. Moreover, the evidence which it has been possible to assemble in previous chapters gives substance to the suggestions made recently by both Reinsma and Geertz that by the time of the introduction of the Cultivation System in 1830 it was obvious that the private estates and plantations were not providing an answer to the need of the colonial power to make Java productive of exportable produce. As we have seen, by 1830 the great

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42. A short survey of Van den Bosch's ideas will be found in the Introduction.

43. Reinsma, *Cultuurstelsel*, pp.11-19 and Geertz, *Agricultural Involution*, p.63. It must be pointed out, however, that, as the analysis given in Ch.3-5 suggests, the difficulties faced by private landowners and planters were not solely financial in character, as Geertz and Reinsma tend to suggest. In the sugar industry of West Java, for instance, labour shortage impeded expansion, and it is by no means clear that this shortage was the result of a lack of funds experienced by the manufacturers.
estates of West Java were increasingly being developed as producers of rice for the internal market. In so far as large-scale sugar manufacture had been attempted on these estates, by 1830 such ventures had either been abandoned or greatly curtailed in their scope. In the East Java littoral, on the other hand, private European planters continued to operate in the sugar and indigo industries. It may be suggested, however, that such success as they enjoyed by the close of the 'twenties was at least in part the result of the support which they received from the Indies government and from the Netherlands Trading Society.

As has already been remarked, several of the developments in the 'private' sugar and indigo industries of the East Java littoral in the late 'twenties foreshadowed the Cultivation System of the following decade. There is evidence that by 1830 the Indies administration was already beginning to support private European planters in their efforts to make contracts with the local cultivators for the use of land and labour. It was, presumably, intervention such as this which led Van den Bosch to conclude, soon after his arrival in Java early in 1830, that "the system of Colonisation such as I have proposed" was already in operation in parts of the colony.\(^4\) This is not

\(^4\)Van den Bosch to Baud, 1.2.1830, in Westendorp Boerma, (ed) Briefwisseling, 1, p. 37.
entirely clear, however. On the other hand, what does appear to be fairly certain is that by 1830 the private estates of West Java had largely withdrawn from the field of export-crop cultivation and that in the East Java littoral the success of the private European planters, limited though it was, was in part the consequence of government support.

In these circumstances it may be suggested that at least as far as the inadequacies of the private estates and plantations as producers for the export market were concerned, Van den Bosch's analysis of the situation was more to the point than those of either Van der Capellen and Muntinghe, or of Du Bus and Willem van Hogendorp. Moreover, what may also be suggested is that in this context it is probably a mistake to over-emphasise the dichotomy between governmental and private exploitation of Java's resources. The introduction of the Cultivation System in 1830 did not represent a decisive break with previous practice. As we have seen, it was the co-operation of the Indies government and the semi-official Netherlands Trading Society which, in part at least, made possible the expansion of the private sugar and indigo industries of the East Java littoral in the late eighteen 'twenties. Furthermore, it was the former 'private' European planters
of the 'twenties who formed by far the greater number of
government contractors in the early years of the Cultivation System. In this sense there was a very marked continuity
of personnel between the 'private' system of the 'twenties
and the government-organised agricultural ventures of the
following decade. It was Geertz who remarked, with
reference to the partial dismantling of the Cultivation System in the eighteen sixties and seventies, that the
System was less the antithesis of privately owned estates
and plantations than a necessary stage in their development.
He argued that the Cultivation System "represented an
attempt to raise an estate economy by the peasantry's
bootstraps... its gradual replacement by the Corporate
Plantation System was largely self-generated, because its
success in establishing a serviceable export economy infra­
structure made private entrepreneurship, originally so

45. A couple of examples may be cited here. William Stavers,
who was a coffee planter in the Principalities in the
'twenties became a government sugar contractor in the
following decade. Alexander Loudon, administrator of
the Pamanukan and Tjiassem estate between 1825 and 1829
was subsequently a government sugar contractor in the
'thirties. On the careers of these men, see Ch.2,
p. 129-30 and 153.
hampered by lack of capital, progressively more feasible."\textsuperscript{46} A similar sort of argument may be advanced with reference to the events of 1830. By that year the private estate and plantation sector of the colonial economy was, as we have seen, in difficulties, at least as far as the production of exportable produce was concerned. If the analysis given in an earlier chapter is correct, capital was in short supply by the later 'twenties and, as we have seen, there proved to be no easy solution to the problem of labour-provision, especially in West Java, where existing sugar works were greatly hampered by a shortage of workpeople. In the circumstances it may at least be suggested that Van den Bosch's scheme, however it may have looked to some contemporaries, was less a break in a previous line of development than a further and necessary step in the general pattern of the exploitation of Java's resources by the Europeans.

\textsuperscript{46} Geertz, \textit{Agricultural Involution}, p.65.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almanac</td>
<td>Regierungsalmanak voor Nederlandsch-Indie, Batavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.C.</td>
<td>Bataviasche Courant, Batavia 1816-1828.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gids</td>
<td>De Indische Gids, Batavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.C.</td>
<td>Javaasche Courant, Batavia 1828-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staatsblad</td>
<td>Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie, Batavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tijd. N.L.</td>
<td>Tijdschrift voor Nijverheid en Landbouw in Nederlandsch Indie, Batavia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.B.G.</td>
<td>Verhandelingen van het Batavaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, Batavia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY OF TERMS OF WEIGHTS, MEASURES AND CURRENCY.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kati</td>
<td>1.25 Dutch pounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pikul</td>
<td>125 Dutch pounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gantang</td>
<td>one-eighth of a pikul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koyang</td>
<td>Between 27 and 30 pikuls when referring to rice; varies somewhat from one area to another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tjeang</td>
<td>2,000 kati or 20 pikuls, according to Milburn, Oriental Commerce, p.380. Evidence cited in text here suggests a Tjiang of 1,000 kati was in use in the Preanger area of West Java.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangmatt</td>
<td>200 kati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legger or Leaguer</td>
<td>Approximately 169 gallons or 393 Dutch Kannen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouw or Bahu</td>
<td>Varied considerably, but in mid-nineteenth century was standardised at 70,965 sq. metres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jung</td>
<td>equals four Bahu, but as is indicated in the text, refers less to land area than to productive capacity of land. As with the Bahu varied considerably in the earlier nineteenth century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java mile</td>
<td>1506, 943 metres.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CURRENCY

4 Duiten = 1 Stuiver
2 Stuivers = 1 Dubbelje
12 Dubbeljes = 1 Guilder or Gulden
£1 sterling = 10 Guilders
1 Spanish dollar = around 66 Stuivers or rather less than 2½ Guilders

These calculations are based on the article Maten en Gewichten in Encyclopaedie, 2, p.370-4; Milburn, Oriental Commerce, p.387-8; and Heinsius, Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal, vol.8, pt.1, p.1450.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangus (Bagus)</td>
<td>Title given to people of good class who did not belong to the nobility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekel</td>
<td>Village official; village headman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boedjongers (Budjang)</td>
<td>Landless agricultural labourers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demang</td>
<td>District headman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingebij</td>
<td>From the context in which it is used, in the Principalities, it appears to be the title of a nobleman or substantial landholder. However, I have been unable to find any further reference to this title.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiay (Kiai)</td>
<td>A high official; possibly a religious dignitary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lurah</td>
<td>Village headman.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A nobleman.

Foreman.

Farm or monopoly. In Java it came to mean taxation.

Title given to a member of the high nobility.

Title given to members of the lower nobility.

Irrigated rice field.

High official of the Sultanate in Bantam in West Java.

Title generally given to Indonesian local rulers or Regents under Dutch rule.

I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

What is given here is no more than a short guide to enable the reader to identify the MSS sources referred to in the footnotes. Reference may be made to Graham Irwin, Nineteenth Century Borneo. A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry, Verh.T.L.V., 1955, p. 218-20, where a very full treatment of Dutch Colonial Office archives will be found.

Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague.

As was pointed out in the introduction, it is the Colonial Office records deposited in this archive which provide by far the greater part of the documentation of this study of the private estates and plantations. In the footnotes documents from the Colonial Office records are referred to as Min.v.Kol. Under that general heading there are a number of sub-categories, which may be explained as follows.


b. Verbaal C.G. refers to the Minutes of the Commissioners-General who restored Dutch rule in Java 1816-19.
c. G.G. in Rade, refers to the Proceedings of the Governor-General (or Lieutenant Governor-General) in Council, 1819-1834.


In addition there are a number of miscellaneous documents from the Colonial Office records, which appear simply as Min. v. Kol. in the footnotes. A number of collections of the papers of senior government officials and others connected with the Indies, all deposited in the Algemeen Rijksarchief, have also been consulted. They are as follows.

e. Baud Collection

f. Van den Bosch Collection

g. Du Bus Collection

h. Goldberg Collection

i. Van Hogendorp Collection

j. Schneither Collection

India Office Library, London.


b. *Instit. T.L.V. H788*. Letters and papers of the merchant and planter J.D. Boudet, active in the Principalities between 1819 and 1831.

Gemeente Archief, Rotterdam.


Bodleian Library, Oxford.


Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden.

a. *Leiden MSS 616*. The papers, mostly of an official nature, of H.G. Nahuijs van Burgst, who was Resident of Jogja between 1816 and 1822.

Papers in Private Possession.
a. **Ardtornish Papers.** Unclassified collection of the letters of the merchant and planter Gillian Maclaine, who was active in Java between 1820 and 1840. Most of the letters are from Maclaine to his mother and brother who lived on the Island of Mull. These papers are in the possession of Brigadier H.R.H. Greenfield, C.B.E., Fascadale, Ardrishaig, Argyll.

b. **Harrowby MSS 596-600.** Letters, papers and journals of W.T. Money, absentee part-owner of the estate of Pamanukan and Tjiassem, 1813-1833. In the possession of the Harrowby MSS Trust, Sandon Hall, Stafford.

c. **Canning Papers 99A.** Letter and several enclosures from the landowner W.T. Money to George Canning, 30.12.1823. These papers are in the possession of the Earl of Harewood, and are lodged in Leeds Public Library.
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The title in brackets refers to the short title used in second and subsequent references to books in the footnotes.


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III. PRINTED SOURCES — ARTICLES ETC.


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Kemp, P.H. van der, (ed), Rapport van Mr. H.J. van de Graaff, 23 Maart 1822, *Tijd. N.L.*, 41, 1890. n.b. References here are to the off-print, Batavia 1890.


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