RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY IN THE BANGLADESH WAR OF 1971:
A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF EAST PAKISTAN'S ANTI-LIBERATION NEWSPAPERS

KAJALIE SHEHREEN ISLAM

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY AWARDED BY SOAS, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

OCTOBER 2016

CENTRE FOR MEDIA AND FILM STUDIES

SOAS, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses how media was used and functioned as a discursive tool in the legitimisation of violence in the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. It explores the role of the media as an ideological state apparatus used by the Pakistani government to frame religion-based ideology in order to construct nationalism and identities, and legitimise political and sexual violence. Using discourse analysis of two East Pakistani newspapers, the *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* during the nine months of the war between March and December 1971 as well as a number of interviews with eye witnesses to the war, the study examines the media frames which served to construct divisive discourses of nationalism, identity and violence in conflict.

The study shows how the media, acting as an ideological and discursive tool of the state, interpellates or addresses the audience and summons them to action. By representing the nation as sacred and defining identities, in this case, of the good Muslim Pakistani Self posited against the evil Hindu enemy Other, the media discourse justifies the use of violence against the Bangali enemy in the form of jihad represented as mandatory, sacrifice as necessary and martyrdom as desirable, while remaining silent on the issue of sexual violence against Bangali women, and, as such, indicating tacit acceptance of it.

Rooted in archival research, the key themes and methodology of this thesis are highly relevant in an era characterised by increasing religiously-motivated violence in Bangladesh and around the world, and can be applied to the study of both traditional and digital media and their role in serving the purpose of both state and non-state actors in ideological conflicts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research has been made financially possible by the generous funding provided by the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK.

For every other aspect of this research and beyond, I am grateful first and foremost to my supervisor, Dr. Dina Matar. Never have I had to wait longer than a day for detailed feedback on anything submitted. Never has she not had time for me. Never have I left her room without not only more information, but encouragement in what I had accomplished so far and motivation to do even more and better. This dissertation would not have been possible without her inspiring guidance.

I would also like to thank my second and third supervisors Dr. Somnath Batabyal and Dr. Matthew Nelson, Dr. Ali Riaz and my friend Aida Kaisy for their valuable feedback at the later stages of writing.

This study is strongly based on empirical findings. These would not have been possible without the newspapers accessed at the Bangla Academy, Dhaka. I would like to thank the Director-General, Professor Shamsuzzaman Khan for granting me access, and, above all, to Mr. Mobarak Hossain, then Librarian, now Director, in whose room and company I spent over four months gathering the data crucial to this research.

I am grateful to friends, former teachers, colleagues and acquaintances at home and abroad, on Facebook and Twitter, for their thoughts, advice and support throughout my pursuing of this degree.

I would like to thank my family, including my in-laws, Baba and Maa, for their support, and especially my sister-in-law, Shuprova, who was a vital part of my support system throughout, not least of all for the hours of babysitting at the initial stage of the degree as well as the all-important proofreading of the final draft.

I must thank Zafreen Bhabi, for being my second home (literally, for two months) in London and for her support throughout.

I am thankful to Apa and Gudu, my sisters, for their encouragement and support, and for not only tolerating but responding to my every woe and whim. (Thanks to two babies, a PhD and Whatsapp, despite being on three different continents, we have become closer than ever).

I am grateful to Abbu and Ammu, my parents, for everything, always. My mother especially, who has always simultaneously been my biggest critic as well as my biggest cheerleader, is my inspiration.

Finally, the last three years would not have been what they were without my daughter (who went from a lovable three-month-old to a quirky, adorable three-year-old during the course of this degree) and my husband here with me. Thank you, Shudeep, for being here for baby and me, for the binge watching, binge eating and the laughs through it all. And thank you, my Chhotto Little Baby Princess Amaala, for keeping me surprisingly sane, thoroughly entertained and feeling utterly blessed, always.

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION

This study involved a large volume of translation, primarily from Bangla, but also Arabic and Urdu, into English. The majority of translation was of Bangla newspaper content into English quotations and summaries for which I drew upon my own knowledge of both languages in which I am proficient. For key words in Bangla and Arabic as well as Islamic concepts, in order to maintain some semblance of standardisation, dictionaries were used – the Bangla Academy's *Bengali to English Dictionary* for Bangla terms, and the *Historical Dictionary of Islam*, *A Popular Dictionary of Islam* and Penguin's *Dictionary of Islam* for Arabic/Islamic terms, from some of which Urdu words are also derived.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 2016, Bangladesh faced a major terrorist attack, the first of this particular kind in the country. Five young men, armed with swords, guns and bombs, took hostage the staff and guests at an upscale café-restaurant in Gulshan, the capital Dhaka's elite residential area populated by, along with affluent locals, foreign diplomats and expatriates. Twenty hostages – 18 of them foreigners – two police officers, and four of the attackers were killed. According to hostages who were released or rescued, the attackers performed a religious background check of the restaurant's guests, asking them to recite from the Quran. Those who passed were released, except for one 20-year-old man who refused to leave without his two friends, an Indian girl and an American girl of Bangladeshi origin dressed in Western clothes who the terrorists would not release. They claimed that foreigners in their "skimpy clothes" and "drinking alcohol" were influencing locals to do the same and polluting the country with their "un-Islamic" ways.

The attack can be seen as a culmination of the religion-based violence in Bangladesh in the last decade, and particularly in the last three years. Over 40 people, including secular writers, academics and activists, along with members of the minority Hindu, Christian and Buddhist communities and a few foreign expatriates, have been killed allegedly by religious extremists. This is shocking for people who live in or have ever been to Bangladesh, which has always been known for its communal harmony and hospitality to foreigners. Yet the phenomenon of religion-based violence is not completely new.

In 1971, when Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, fought for independence from Pakistan, religion played a significant role, at least for those who opposed liberation, as

this thesis hopes to show. They believed that Pakistan was the homeland of Muslims and its breakup would mean defeat not only of the nation but of Islam. Interestingly, those who were fighting *for* independence were also predominantly Muslim with a sizeable Hindu population; only *their* struggle was for political, economic and cultural emancipation from their rulers who viewed ethnic Bangalis[1] as "lesser Muslims".[2] As such, the West Pakistani government, army and its supporters in the eastern wing framed the battle as a religious war between Muslims and Hindus, Pakistan and India. To this day, the collaborators now under trial for war crimes, while denying their role in war crimes and crimes against humanity, stand by their belief in a united Pakistan.

This study seeks to understand how discourse based on religious ideology is used to legitimise conflict. It critically engages with the relationship between religion, identity and culture and how these may have played a role in the violence around the Liberation War of Bangladesh. The study, thus, is particularly interested in exploring the role of the media in disseminating discourses of nationalism, identity and difference, and violence using an ideology based on religion.

In this context, this dissertation will examine the anti-liberation discourse used in the wartime media of East Pakistan in 1971 and analyse the use of religion-based rhetoric in

a) the construction of the nation and nationalism;

b) the formation of identities;

[1] While most references cited use the term 'Bengali' for both the race and the language, the authentic, Bangla word for the race – Bangali, and the language – Bangla, as used by its native speakers, will be used throughout this paper.

[2] The post-liberation government of Bangladesh in 1972 was quick to enshrine secularism as one of the key principles of its Constitution, along with nationalism, socialism and democracy.

c) the legitimisation of political violence through the tropes of jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom; and

d) the validation of sexual violence through its silent/absent representation.

The research uses an inter-disciplinary approach and discourse analysis of the East Pakistani newspapers *Dainik Sangram*, the mouthpiece of the main anti-liberation religion-based political party in East Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the *Dainik Pakistan*, a government-owned national daily, and will examine the prevailing anti-liberation discourse during the nine months of the war from March to December 1971. The discourse analysis of news, editorials, commentaries and op-ed articles, features, letters to the editor and even poems and songs published in these newspapers aims to provide new knowledge of the political-religious rhetoric of political and religious leaders, the media, as well as their audiences at the time. The research also relies on a brief review of advertisements published nearing the end of the war in the West Pakistan-based daily *Dawn*. A small selection of interviews of eye witnesses to the war will serve to provide a social context to the war as well as support the primary findings.

1.1 Structure of the Thesis

This introductory chapter is followed by Chapter 2 which will provide a historical context, briefly, of the Partition of India and the Language Movement which is seen as the beginning of Bangladesh's struggle for independence, followed by a more comprehensive overview of Pakistani identity politics leading up to the actual war.

Chapter 3 consists of a review of the related literature detailing the main conceptual frameworks of this study. It is pertinent to understanding questions of nationalism and its construction, how identities are formed, religion-based political and

sexual violence, and the role of the media and communication in legitimising these practices. It begins with the general, addressing Stuart Hall's theorisations of identity, Anthony Smith, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner's theories of nationalism and Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities. It then moves on to address the scholarship on gendered violence in wartime. The chapter then surveys the more specific literature on communication, discourse and the rationalisation of violence through propaganda and rhetoric followed by literature on religion-based rhetoric and violence in particular. Running throughout the theoretical framework are Louis Althusser's notions of ideological state apparatuses (ISA) and Michel Foucault's theory of discourse in facilitating all the above in the construction of nationalism, formation of identities and the legitimisation of violence.

Chapter 4 discusses the research methods used for this study, which include archival research and interviews, to be examined through the lens of discourse analysis. Discourse, initially a linguistic concept referring to 'passages of connected writing or speech' was defined by Michel Foucault more broadly as 'the production of knowledge through language' (cited in Hall, 2004: 346). Discourse examines the context of and relationships within communication (Garrett and Bell 1998). Discourse consists of language as well as practice, situating a topic in a particular historical context, defining it and determining what is and is not to be talked about and how people should conduct themselves in relation to it, thus linking power to both the mind (knowledge) and the body (practice) (Hall 2004). Fairclough and Wodak (2004) have shown how discursive practices may have major ideological effects, producing and reproducing unequal power relations, passing off something as common sense, thus making discourse analysis the most useful methodological tool of analysis for this study. Similar to Majid Khosravinik's (2015) study of discourse, identity and legitimacy (in relation to Iran's

nuclear programme), this thesis will attempt to explore how 'conflictual identities and legitimations are substantiated via discourse' (2015: 3) in the case of 1971 Pakistan, religion-based discourse. As such, it will demonstrate how religious ideology was framed in the media which was used as a tool of discourse, by those in positions of power.

This methodology chapter also details the research material used. Of the three broad categories of media – Pakistani, East Pakistani or Bangali, and foreign – circulating at the time, this study examines the discourse about the war in the West Pakistani government owned, controlled or affiliated media. It focuses on the newspaper *Dainik Sangram,* owned and operated by affiliates of the main anti-liberation party in East Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the *Dainik Pakistan,* a Pakistani government-owned newspaper. The chapter outlines the challenges of gaining access to these papers as well as the lack of availability of other material such as television and radio content and posters and leaflets, which was expected at the outset of this research. It also deals with the ethical issues that have arisen, and challenges which had to be or limitations which could not be overcome, for example, in gaining interviews with the victims of sexual violence during the war. Last but not least, this chapter addresses the positionality and self-reflexivity of the researcher as a subject of the pro-liberation discourse researching in 2013-2016 on anti-liberation discourse during the war of 1971.

The subsequent four chapters detail the findings. Chapter 5 is an examination of Pakistani nationalism prior to and during the war. It demonstrates how, in the wartime media discourse studied here, Pakistan and Islam become one and the same, Pakistani nationalism becomes indistinguishable from "Islamic nationalism" – a complex concept blurring the lines between nation and religion. This is evident in the media discourse of the time, making Pakistan out to be the homeland of Islam and Muslims not only in Pakistan but from around the world. Repeated reference is made to the hundreds of

thousands of lives lost during Partition with a call to honour their sacrifice by defending Pakistan and as a result Islam, in 1971. Islamic ideology is categorically defined as Pakistani ideology, its founding philosophy and the only ideology that can hold the nation together.

Following on from this, Chapter 6 deals with identity formation – of the genuine Pakistani, the true Muslim, the Indian Hindu, the Bangali, the enemy – and how the Pakistani media of 1971 examined here contributed to this process, particularly with its focus on the religious. As Stuart Hall articulates, identities use the 'resources of history, language and culture' and arise within 'specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciated strategies' (1996: 3). While identities are most often referred to as being common between people who share it, Hall points out that they also 'emerge within the specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion' (1996: 4). In 1971 Pakistan, too, identities were, as the research will show, constructed through a discourse which used religion to differentiate between "us", the Muslim Pakistani and "them", the enemy, the Hindu Indian. As Husain Haqqani argues: 'The fears of dilution of Muslim identity that had defined the demand for carving Pakistan out of India became the new nation-state's identity, reinforced over time through the education system and constant propaganda' (2005: 14) and this phenomenon was very much in play well into the war of 1971. Analysis of the media shows that those constructed as 'true' Pakistanis were also constructed as Islam-loving Muslims, and those constructed as 'true Muslims' were constructed as those prepared to fight for Pakistan and Islam. The findings of these two chapters provide the basis for the last two chapters which discuss how identity formation and the construction of a religious nationalism can legitimise political violence and how the media can be used as a tool in these processes.

Chapter 7 specifically addresses how religious-based rhetoric in the media implicitly and explicitly sought to mobilise people and incite violence in the name of Allah and religion through the construction of the necessity of jihad as a religious duty, and through the glorification of sacrifice and martyrdom. Jihad, as the research findings show, is portrayed by the media as a test of faith and the only means to defend Islam and Pakistan. Sacrifices made in the battles of Islamic history as well as deaths in the current war are highlighted as events to be proud of, and martyrdom or sacrifice made for a higher cause is depicted as necessary.

Chapter 8 discusses the almost absent discourse on sexual violence in the media, thus underlining how both victims and perpetrators are made invisible through this silencing. Evidence of the mass rape of between 200,000 and 400,000 Bangali women abounded after the war. After the war, the Bangladeshi media carried stories of women who were impregnated and had to terminate their pregnancies or put up the children for adoption, women who felt compelled to leave the country or else live on in silent suffering in Bangladesh, as well as women who had killed themselves (Islam 2012). But as the incidents were taking place, they were strangely absent from the anti-liberation media discourse, the silence itself around the issue discursive, distortive and in a way validating the violence.

The concluding chapter of this thesis consists of a summary analysis of the findings, contributions of the research and a list of limitations which may be seen instead as opportunities for future study. This includes looking at alternative narratives on the war such as that of Urdu, pro-liberation and Indian media as opposed to the Bangla anti-liberation media studied here. It also suggests that the methodology used in this paper can be effectively applied to studies of religion-based conflict and the role of media and communication in a global context today, such as on the widespread use of media and

social media by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, from hereon referred to as IS) and their use of religious rhetoric in the legitimisation of violence.

While the ultimate goal of any study on religion-based violence is to prevent it in the long run through an understanding of why and how it occurs, countering such a historical phenomenon is complex, to say the least, and this research is a mere contribution to the study from a media and communication perspective. Of course it cannot and does not leave history aside, for history is the basis from which it, which anything, arises. This study, then, uses historical analysis in an attempt to understand not only the past but also the present, and to comprehend the complex interplay of politics, religion and culture and the role of communication in it all.

1.2 Religion as War Rhetoric: The hypotheses of the study

The key to understanding the motivations behind religion-based conflict lies in the study of the use of religious rhetoric for different purposes, including for violence during times of conflict. In Bangladesh, in November 2012, when the Jamaat-i-Islami took to the streets in protest against the war crimes trial, leaders of its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, were found sending out text messages encouraging its activists to fight, as "the police brutality and torturous imprisonment and punishment suffered in this life will be rewarded manifold times in the next". In 2014, prior to the execution of one of the convicted war criminals, he told his wife he 'was being "killed" because he was trying to establish Islam in the country… he was sacrificing his life for the cause of Islam and that many more such sacrifices were needed'[3]. In 2015, one of the accused in the killing of a blogger claimed he did not know what a blog was but had been told by his

[3] *The Daily Star* 7 November 2014, online, Available at http://www.thedailystar.net/propaganda-and-the-war-crimes-trial-49149 [Accessed 13 October 2016].

religious teacher that the blogger had written against Islam and the Prophet and that it was his (the accused's) religious responsibility as a Muslim to kill him.

The promise of martyrdom, the glory of sacrifice and violent jihad as a religious duty are common tropes that often run through religion-based conflict and its legitimisation. This study, based on empirical evidence, aims to show how the communication of these tropes was a central strategy in Bangladesh's Liberation War and how a religion-based ideology was used to legitimise the violence.

Bangladesh's struggle for freedom from Pakistan, particularly the extent of atrocities committed, is little known outside the country due to a dearth of solid academic exploration both at home and abroad.[4] In fact, there is little research on the religious aspect of the war and even less on the use of religious discourse as a political tool. What Bangladeshis consider to have been a genocide has not yet been recognised internationally as such and is missing from otherwise comprehensive collections dedicated to genocides perpetrated in the 20th century such as those by Bartov (2001) and Merriman (2009). The year 1971 was an important moment in the history of Bangladesh and Pakistan and for South Asian politics overall.[5]

---

[4] Sarmila Bose's *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War* is one of the first research-based works by a Western author. It is regarded as highly controversial in Bangladesh, for downplaying both numbers – projecting casualties between 30,000-100,000 and rape of even lower numbers – and the philosophy and intensity of the war, terming it a 'civil war' (whereas Bangladeshis regard it as their liberation war), etc. (Bose, 2011). Naeem Mohaiemen (2011) argues that Bose's research, among other things, is methodologically flawed in terms of its bias in source selection of both documents and interviewees. While I would argue that exact figures are not what is important and not the focus of this research, I understand Woollacott's (2011) assertion in reference to the 1971 war: 'The numbers mattered, and matter still, because they make the difference between seeing the war as a tragedy and seeing it as a terrible crime, indeed as a genocide. That in turn is important because it profoundly affects the way in which the peoples of South Asia understand both their separate and their common histories.'

[5] The unrelenting struggle between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is only one of these issues. Ganguly (2007) shows how, with the breaking away of East Pakistan, 'Pakistan's moral claim to Kashmir became hollow. If religion alone could not serve as the basis of Pakistan's unity and territorial integrity, it could not legitimately claim Kashmir on the basis of its Muslim-majority status' (2007: 75). Neither could India,

The following chapter provides a historical context of the political situation and the struggles over national, cultural and religious identities in post-Partition East Pakistan/pre-liberation Bangladesh, before laying out the theoretical framework and methodology of the study and the empirical findings and their analysis in subsequent chapters.

however, on the basis of its claim to secularism, a commitment to which was increasingly weakening (ibid).

CHAPTER 2

SETTING THE STAGE FOR WAR:

CULTURE, IDENTITY AND RELIGION IN EAST PAKISTAN

Bangladesh, a small country in South Asia, has a population of over 160 million. It is the world's third largest Muslim majority country after Indonesia and Pakistan, with almost 89 per cent of its population Muslim. The largest religious minority is Hindu at 9 per cent, followed by a small percentage of Christians and Buddhists. After independence from Pakistan in 1971, under the continuing government-in-exile which was established by leaders of the Awami League (AL) party during the war in April 1971, secularism was enshrined in the Constitution as one of the fundamental principles of state policy, along with nationalism, socialism and democracy. Within three years, however, following the assassination of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other founding leaders in a violent military coup d'etat, the principle of secularism was removed from the Constitution. Under subsequent periods of military rule from 1975-1990[6], 'the state actively encouraged the role of Islam in public life' (Riaz 2010: 45).

Also during this time, under the rule of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the ban on forming political parties based on religious ideology was removed, allowing those who had collaborated with the Pakistani army during the war, namely the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), to participate in national politics (ibid). Ironically, as JI later lent its tacit support first to the BNP, then AL and then again to the BNP in the 1990s, the party – comprised of leaders known to be collaborators, and who are now being tried for war

[6] For a concise summary of the political history of Bangladesh and a comprehensive overview of the interplay of politics and religion between 1971-2008, see Ali Riaz edited *Religion and Politics in South Asia*.

crimes and crimes against humanity in Bangladesh's war crimes trial – came to power in an alliance with the BNP in 2001. The JI secured 12.13, 8.60, 4.28 and 4.6 per cent of the votes in the general elections of 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2008 respectively (ibid).

Although Bangladeshi formal politics is dominated by the AL and BNP, according to political scientist Ali Riaz, voting trends have shown that ideological cohesion among the rightist and Islamist political parties is strong, and that the centre-right coalition (the BNP was in alliance with three religion-based political parties in 2008) was much better organised than its secular counterparts (2010: 54). Riaz notes the general 'phenomenal rise of political parties and organizations with an Islamist agenda… i.e., those which utilize religion as a political ideology and, in some forms, "instrumentalize religion to pursue political objectives"' (Riaz 2010: 55). Also interesting is the fact that it was after the restoration of democracy in 1991, characterised by antagonistic politics between the AL and BNP, that Islamist militancy saw a rise in Bangladesh.[7]

For centuries, although Islam has been an important part of East Bengal, it has evolved into a syncretistic form, a key feature of which is its connection to personal lives and social space but not political ideology (Riaz 2010). Riaz summarises the role of Islam for Bangalis through the Partition and Pakistan movement to Bangladesh's Liberation War thus:

> Even during the movement for Pakistan, emphasizing a Muslim identity did not mean that Bengalis were favouring a heightened role of religion in politics. The rise of Bengali nationalism, not too long after the establishment of Pakistan, is testimony to the fact that Bengalis were uncomfortable with the linkage between national identity and religion. Discrimination, exploitation and marginalization in the name of Islam by the Pakistani

[7] Elsewhere, Riaz (2003) has argued that the rise of Islam as a political ideology and the growing strengths of Islamist parties in Bangladesh were/are due to 'the crises of hegemony of the ruling bloc; and politics of expediency by the "secularist" parties' (2003: 302). He claims that these factors 'created an environment conducive to the rise of religious rhetoric in political discourse and sub- sequently allowed the Islamist parties to become a significant force in the Bangladesh polity' (ibid).

> rulers strengthened the resolve of the majority of the Bengali population that a separation between religion and politics was necessary (Riaz 2010: 57).

This chapter looks at the growing crisis of cultural and religious identity not so much as articulated by the Bangali population as imposed by the Pakistani ruling elite, and how this built up into Bangladesh's struggle for independence and its framing by the two warring sides.

2.1 The Struggle over Identities

National, religious and cultural identity have always been complex issues in Bangladesh, particularly during 1971 and after. The debate over Bangali versus Bangladeshi identity, the struggle over the primacy of ethnic versus religious identity have shadowed the Bangali Muslim throughout history. As Bangali Muslim Pakistanis, this became further complicated with even Muslim identity becoming divided. Social economist Naila Kabeer (2011) notes that the Islam of Bengal and that of Pakistan are very different due to the imprint of very different historical and social forces. She argues that the crisis over identity goes back to the Partition of 1947, with Partition actually heightening the 'problematic nature of the Bengali Muslim identity' which comprised two parallel belief-systems. While both claimed to be Muslim, one was of the 'Orthodox elite' and the other 'more syncretic and personal version' belonged to the 'Bengali peasant' (2011: 141). Differences in the practice of Islam in Bengal and West Pakistan are also argued by other writers such as Ganguly (2007) who states that other than the core elements, there was little in common.

Within these two versions of religious identity loomed even greater differences of ethnicity and culture. As Roy (2006) notes, Bangladesh faces 'the pressures of a dual identity of which Islam is one and vital; the other no less seminal is the local Bengali linguistic-cultural identity' (2006: 219). Historically, Bangalis had been, by and large,

under Hindu domination, economically, intellectually and politically. As such, Pakistan was their chance to 'emerge from Hindu domination and wield power as the majority in their own land' (Oldenburg 1985: 723). Perhaps Oldenburg (1985) put it best in his article on Pakistan as being 'insufficiently imagined'[8]. Referring to the lack of understanding between its two wings, Oldenburg writes how Pakistanis:

> saw the state of Pakistan as inseparable from the Muslim nation of the Indian subcontinent, a nation locked in combat with the Hindus. For the Pakistanis, safeguarding and strengthening the Indian Islamic heritage in which Urdu played a major role was what Pakistan meant above all. Bengalis, on the other hand, viewed Pakistan primarily as a place where Muslims would rule, secure from Hindu domination. Their view of how their Bengali identity and language would contribute to the Pakistan they believed in differed significantly from that of their west- wing compatriots. (Oldenburg 1985: 712)

However, after the formation of Pakistan, 'Bengalis still found themselves dominated, now by Pakistanis whose class background and political and intellectual advancement were similar to those of the erstwhile Bengali Hindu elite' (Oldenburg 1985: 723). Thus, while East Bengal participated in the Pakistan movement leading up to the Partition of 1947,

> the failures, inadequacies, and insincerities of the Pakistan rulers, repeatedly demonstrated in their dealings with Islam, caused a Bengali backlash in its vigorous and chauvinistic affirmation of the Bengali self to the point of almost undermining Islamic relevance to the Bangladeshis (Roy 2006: 219).

This is echoed by others. For example, Alavi (2011) argues that,

> the moment that Pakistan was established, Muslim nationalism in India had fulfilled itself and outlived its purpose. Now there was a fresh equation of privilege and deprivation to be reckoned within the new state. Virtually overnight there were ethnic redefinitions. [These included the] new bearers of privilege, the true "Muslims" for whom Pakistan was created…and the lesser, weaker, Bangalis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluch, whose nationalist movements exploded into view the day after Pakistan came into being (2011: 96).

Riaz (2002) argues, 'what the Indian Muslims asked for was an affirmation of their difference and recognition of their nationhood; what they got was a geographical partition of India and a division of their own "nation"' (2003: 54) and that 'Islam as a

[8] Oldenburg's article contains an array of perspectives and some interesting insights into whether, why and how the secession of East Pakistan was "inevitable".

mobilization tool outlived its purpose as soon as Pakistan was created' (ibid). This was understood by the first generation of Pakistani leaders, argues Riaz, but that their emphasis on the secular nature of the state faced resistance from sources such as the Jamaat-i-Islami which had also opposed the Muslim nationalist movement in India.

> In Pakistan, Islam was then elevated to the pedestal of "national identity" by the ruling regimes, especially after 1954, primarily to contend with the assertion of regional and linguistic ethnic identities by Bengalis, Sindhis, Pathans, and Baluchs. What should have been an open discourse on national identity, and an effort to accommodate the regionally differentiated, economically disparate, and culturally different nations was wrecked by the Punjabi-dominated state machin- ery's insistence that "Islam" was the raison d'être of Pakistan. (Riaz 2002: 55)

While Islam was seen as a binding factor for the nation, differences of sect, language, region, and social class soon arose (Ganguly 2007). Not only difference but also a form of discrimination came to the fore. Ganguly, who premises his argument on the fact that polyethnic states lacking a commitment to ethno-religious pluralism, protection of minority rights and democratic procedures will fall victim to ethno-religious conflict and violence (2007), also finds that Bangalis were viewed with disdain and distrust by their West Pakistani counterparts. According to Wilhelm van Schendel, too, Bangali Muslims were viewed by West Pakistan as not only socially inferior but also 'lesser Muslims' as they did not adhere to all the practices deemed 'properly Islamic' and that 'however passionately Bengalis might think of themselves as Muslims, they fell short of the mark and they could not be fully-fledged Pakistanis unless they shed much of their Bengaliness' (van Schendel 2009: 111). Naila Kabeer (2011), for her part, contends that Pakistan's rulers, 'unable to ignore or unify its dissatisfied minority nationalities…still relied on Islam to keep the nation intact' (Kabeer 2011: 140). She quotes the late president Zia-ul Haq as having said, "Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse" (ibid). This is indeed what happened once religion came to take second place for the Bangalis.

In the absence of a coherent national ideology in Pakistan, Islam has been used throughout its history as a tool by its ruling elite, arguably in vain, to unite its ethnically diverse population (Khan 2006). Khan makes a distinction between Islam as a belief system which is a part of everyday life of the people and as an ideology projected by the state, 'an instrument to deny diversity and difference', going as far as to say that in Pakistan it is 'strategically deployed by the rulers to legitimize their misconduct and to cover their failings' (Khan 2006: 188). He sees Islam as being used to 'justify [the early rulers'] coercive and authoritarian methods in dealing with ethnic, regional, and economic discontent' and presented as a 'symbol of unity' (Khan 2006: 189).

The need to conform to a singular religious identity disregarding ethnic and cultural differences soon after Partition was what ignited the discontent which ultimately led to the declaration of independence over 20 years later. In 1948, Pakistan's Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah proclaimed that Urdu – the language of 3.7 per cent of the population (Khan 2006) would be the lingua franca of Pakistan and that Bangalis – who comprised 54 per cent of the population (ibid) – must learn to speak it. This was based on the fact that Urdu was 'above all a language that more than any other provincial language embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the languages used in other Islamic countries' (as quoted in Uddin 2006). From a collection of his speeches, Jinnah is quoted in Khan (1985) as having said, '…what is the use of saying…we are Bengalis or Sindhis, or Pathans, or Punjabis? No, we are Muslims' (Khan 1985: 25).[9]

The Bangalis saw their ethnicity coming under attack and ethnic difference became a prominent issue (Uddin 2006). Officially, Urdu was viewed as a Muslim

[9] For a more detailed account of the relationship between language and religion in post-colonial Pakistan, see Neilesh Bose's (2014) book *Recasting the Region: Language, Culture, and Islam in Colonial Bengal*.

language and Bangla as a Hindu language, supported by attempts to de-Sanskritise and Arabicise Bangla – such as by introducing Arabic script, the Harful Quran, for the Bangla language and incorporate Perso-Arabic words (Anisuzzaman 1995) in order to purify it of Hindu influences (van Schendel 2009). Soon, anything Bangali was either banned, such as the songs of Rabindranath Tagore on state-controlled radio and television, or looked down upon as Hindu (Kabeer 2011, Khan 2006). Singing the songs of Tagore, wearing *bindis* (decorative marks on the forehead), allowing middle class Bangali girls to train in the arts and perform in public – regarded as expressions of cultural difference between Muslims and Hindus, Pakistanis and Bangalis – all came to be viewed as acts of political dissent (Kabeer 2011). Indeed, 'the cultural and linguistic affinity between the Hindus and Muslims of Bengal was… profoundly threatening to a state which had only Islam to hold together its fragmented and divided people' (Kabeer 2011: 141).

Sufia Uddin (2006), in her exploration of the formation of community identity and the negotiation and contestation of Islam and nationhood in Bangladesh, argues that rather than being a monolithic culture, Islam is regionally informed and in then East Pakistan, too, a uniquely Bangali vision of Muslim community gave rise to a 'Bengali informed' Muslim community. West Pakistan frowned upon this Bangali informed culture and criticised the Bangla language as being foreign to Islam. Bangali Muslims, on the other hand, concluded that 'the common bond of Islam provided an insufficient basis to believe in the success of a nation' (Uddin 2006: 119). Thus, while the basis of solidarity during the 1947 Partition of India and Pakistan was religion, in 1971 East Pakistan, it was 'racial unity based on all the people of its territory, irrespective of faith' (Hossain and Khan 2006). The people fought for a Bangali identity and Bangali nationalism was based on 'ethno-linguistic' and 'ethno-cultural' characteristics based on Bengal's own culture, customs and racial identity. A national consciousness, which

Hossain and Khan define as an attitude with responsibility which develops into a bond or feeling of solidarity, was formed.

Murshid (1993) also talks about the 'switched allegiance from a religion-based Pakistani nationalism founded on the notion that Hindus and Muslims were two nations, to a composite, culture-based non-religious Bangali nationalism' (1993:67). She notes how a non-Bengali, mainly Punjabi-dominated, ruling elite projected itself as the 'defender of the faithful' using religion to maintain itself in power, frequently using the slogan of 'Islam in danger' (Murshid 1993: 68). 'The method of the ruling elite to stay in power was to politicize religion, to establish an equation between the ruling party, which was the Muslim League, and Islam. The two were presented as coterminous, such that any opposition to the Muslim League was treated as an attack on Islam' (ibid). Murshid (1995) contends that 'in the struggle for Pakistan, religion had become a political rather than a personal issue, particularly because religion determined nationhood' (1995: 335), and because Islam did not distinguish between the spheres of religion and politics, religion could acquire a greater political significance and was used by the ruling Muslim League to seek legitimacy. The Bengali nationalists, on the other hand, in order not to frighten the non-Muslim minorities, did not adopt a religious framework for their public utterances (1993:68). But Murshid (1995) shows how while the vernacular intelligentsia represented a secular challenge to the politicization of religion, expressing their economic grievances, this was 'not meant to contradict the earlier demand for a separate homeland for Muslims' or that 'the vernacular intelligentsia had become less religious' (1995: 336). She cites a study conducted in 1963-64 which revealed that 'to the East Pakistani Muslim there was no acute sense of conflict between his identity as a Bengali, a Muslim and a Pakistani' (ibid). Murshid argues:

> The secular opposition was neutral in relation to the personal religiosity of the vernacular intelligentsia. However, it did indicate their disillusionment with successive non-Bengali dominated central governments which constantly invoked Islam to keep them from voicing their legitimate grievances. (Murshid 1995: 336).[10]

Sufia Uddin, on the other hand, argues that construction of a 'single sustainable national culture that bonds people together in a convincingly imagined community' is crucial to the success of nationalism and that 'traditions are created, intentionally sculpted to promote a particular nationalism' (2006: 122-123) and that this nationalism can be based on a variety or combination of common bonds such as secularism, ethnic unity, religious unity, etc. For Pakistan, religion was such a basis. However, as Uddin notes, Bangladesh was founded in direct contrast to the nationalism on which Pakistan was founded – on a 'secular nationalist unity based on Bengali language and ethnicity' (2006: 123). In fact, Bangali nationalism was one of the four fundamental principles of state policy in 1971 – along with secularism, socialism and democracy – all of which were incorporated into the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh. As Uddin notes: 'The religious minority status that inspired the creation of Pakistan is viewed as an insufficient bond when compared with ethnic identity and common language' (Uddin, 2006: 129).

Ali Riaz also maintains that the nationalist movement of the Bangalis leading to the ultimate secession of East Pakistan grew over decades from opposition to the Pakistani rulers' use of religion in politics and that the 'emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation was…seen by the protagonists as a victory over the abominable use of religion' (Riaz 2010: 45).

[10] The complex relationship between religion and politics and clashes between religious and secular ideologies is discussed in depth in Tazeen Murshid's (1995) book *The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Discourses, 1871-1977.*

2.2 The Battle for Independence

The rising discontent of the Bangalis after Partition based on the socio-cultural, political and economic discrimination they faced, could not be suppressed with the lure of a unifying religion. The Language Movement of 1952 in which Bangalis laid down their lives in the struggle for their mother tongue, culminated throughout their thwarted efforts to participate in the decision-making process of the country through democratic electoral processes in 1954 and 1958[11] to the 1970 elections – the results of which would have meant the 'transfer of power from the Muhajir-Punjabi oligarchy to the Bengali majority' (Khan 2006: 185) – into the war of liberation which brought into being the independent state of Bangladesh.

Following the declaration of Urdu as the nation's lingua franca, the Bangalis, who made up the majority population, revolted. In the Language Movement of February 1952, several people, four of them students of Dhaka University, gave their lives. Eventually, Bangla was given the status of one of the state languages along with Urdu in 1956[12], but the struggle for autonomy continued and grew. In Pakistan's first national elections in 1970, East Pakistan's Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won an absolute majority in the National Assembly but the West Pakistani military-bureaucratic elite refused to hand over the reins of power to the East Pakistani leadership. By 1971, it became clear that, other than the religion of Islam, the two wings of Pakistan shared little else. In March 1971, the Bangalis, victims of political, economic, social and cultural

[11] For a more detailed account of the political situation leading up to the war and the phases of the war itself, see Rounaq Jahan's *Pakistan: failure in national integration*.

[12] This did not go unchallenged, however. In a history of the press in Pakistan, Zamir Niazi (2010) describes how the decision to declare Bangla a second language was seen by much of the West Pakistani population and press as 'treason against Pakistan and a threat to the existence of Urdu' (2010: 83).

discrimination,[13] declared independence (Ganguly 2007, Khan 2006, Khan 1985, Thompson 2007, van Schendel 2009).

Not only did the Pakistani government and army rise in bloody battle against the Bangalis, but they also succeeded in recruiting collaborators from the East Pakistani side. A number of right-wing politicians, many of them belonging to the religion-based political party Jamaat-i-Islami[14], formed the Citizen's Peace Committee, later renamed the East Pakistan Central Peace Committee and commonly known as *Shanti* (peace) Committee, in order to 'bring back normal conditions to the country and to eliminate irrational fears from the minds of the people' (Sharif et. al. 1988: 39) but who in fact prepared lists of patriotic Bangalis to be killed and assisted in their killing along with looting and rape (ibid). The committee organised paramilitary forces called the Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams which functioned as their extensions across the country, acting as 'death squads and providers of counterinsurgency intelligence' (van Schendel 2009).

As the newspaper *Dainik Sangram* reports, the anti-liberation forces opposed the war of independence based on the belief that "Pakistan was created as a separate homeland for Muslims in order to free them from Hindu exploitation and persecution" (*Dainik Sangram* 7 May 1971, p. 1) and that "if Pakistan is destroyed then Muslims will

[13] Among other examples, East Pakistan, which comprised 54 per cent of the country's total population, constituted only 11.1 per cent of the civil service (Khan 2006). They made up 3 per cent of the higher ranks in the armed forces and 7 per cent of the higher posts in the central administration (van Schendel 2009). Two-thirds of Pakistan's foreign exchange was earned in the eastern wing but much of it diverted to the western wing, while only a quarter of the nation's budget was spent in East Pakistan, where the majority population lived (ibid). At the time of Urdu being declared the state language of Pakistan, Khan (2006), Thompson (2007) and van Schendel (2009) put the proportion of Urdu speakers at 3.7, 3.5 and 3 per cent and Bangla speakers at 54, 56 and 57 per cent respectively.

[14] Interestingly, the party still manages to have a 3 per cent vote bank in Bangladesh and, in coalition with the then ruling, now major opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), its leaders have held key positions in the 2001-2004 cabinet as ministers and members of parliament, some of whom are also under trial and/or have been convicted. The Jamaat-i-Islami is currently under investigation for having committed war crimes in 1971 as a political party and there is a bid to ban the party in Bangladesh.

lose their separate characteristics and be locked in the chains of Hindu slavery" (*Dainik Pakistan* 27 September 1971, p. 6). In fact, Pakistan was portrayed as the sacred homeland of Muslims around the world. This is also apparent in the statement of the founder of Jamaat-i-Islami, Islamic scholar Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi[15] who declared that,

> Pakistan's security is the security of Islam in the whole world, Pakistan is Islam's strongest citadel, if the enemies of Islam succeed in destroying this citadel then it will not be possible to save Islam and Muslims anywhere in the world. If God forbid, East Pakistan separates from West Pakistan, Islam and Muslims will be finished in East Pakistan. Thus defending East Pakistan means defending Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 9 October 1971, p. 1).

In this way, Pakistan and Islam were depicted as one and the same, and the battle to defend them justified.

On the other hand, the Bangalis of East Pakistan came together as a linguistic and ethnic community (Hossain and Khan 2006, Uddin 2006). As Riaz (2003) argues:

> Bengali language and culture had been portrayed as the unifying point of the entire nation. The conflict between the Bengali political leadership and Pakistani rulers since the inception of Pakistan was explained in terms of a conspiracy against the Bengali nation as a whole. Aspirations of different classes—subaltern, intermediate, and nascent bourgeoisie—were articulated in their own idiom and thus brought together on a common platform under the ideological hegemony of the petty-bourgeoisie against the colonial domination. (Riaz 2003: 306)

These groups formed the *Mukti Bahini* or Freedom Brigade in the struggle for independence (*muktijuddho*). According to many freedom fighters, most of whom said that they were devoted Muslims, the struggle for independence had nothing to do with religion, but that their struggle was for political, economic, cultural and social emancipation. The freedom fighters were provided with support and training from India,

[15] Maulana Sayyid Abu A 'la Maududi was the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, a modern Muslim movement and political organisation. His ideas and writings have influenced a wide circle of Muslim thinkers and their followers who believed in a revivalist vision of Islam, grounded in a view of traditions reflecting idealised norms. He believed an Islamic framework could be used to arrange all aspects of contemporary life and society (Nanji 2008). Maulana Maududi was the Ameer of Jamaat-i-Islami while Ghulam Azam was the Ameer of Jamaat-i-Islami in East Pakistan.

who also housed the countless refugees fleeing East Pakistan and who, in the last days of the war, joined in the battle, largely, argue sceptics, for its own geopolitical interest of weakening Pakistan. Indian "Hindu" support for the Bangali Mukti Bahini served to reinforce the claims of the anti-liberation forces that this was a war between Hindus and Muslims, India and Pakistan and that Indian Hindus were trying to destroy Pakistan and Islam.

In the nine-month-long struggle that ensued, between one and three million Bangalis were killed[16], including the targeted killings of intellectuals and professionals in the capital Dhaka two days before the Pakistani army surrendered, presumably as a last desperate attempt to destroy the future of the Bangalis. Between 200,000-400,000 Bangali women were raped. Over 10 million people were left homeless. On December 16, 1971, the independent nation of Bangladesh was born.

2.3 The Media Landscape of 1971 Pakistan

In the year 1971, there were a total of 138 publications in East Pakistan – 26 dailies, three bi-weeklies and 109 weeklies (Dhar 1985). The two main pro-liberation media which functioned at the time were the Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (Free Bangla Radio Centre) and a newspaper published from the Mujibnagar government-in-exile, but a number of underground papers were published from within Bangladesh as well (ibid) which attempted to publish as often as possible and to uphold the spirit of liberation of the Bangalis.

[16] The official Bangladeshi figure is 3 million, but unofficial claims have been as low as 1.8 million. Official Pakistani figures, however, claim the number of casualties to be at 26,000 (Ganguly 2007, Sharif et al, 1988, van Schendel 2009).

During the war, the East Pakistani press became enemies of the Pakistani government and military. During the very first military crackdown, Operation Searchlight, on the night of March 25, 1971, the military crushed the police and paramilitary East Pakistan Rifles (the only organisations which coud have offered serious armed resistance); set ablaze slums and gunned down fleeing inhabitants; and targeted the students and faculty of Dhaka university, including a dormitory for Hindu students and teachers. On that same night, they also burned down the newspaper offices of major East Pakistani dailies *Ittefaq*, *The People* and *Sangbad*, killed local journalists and confined foreign correspondents inside a hotel in Dhaka (van Schendel 2009).

On March 26, President Yahya Khan under Martial Law Rule 77 restricted the press from publishing anything which directly or indirectly criticised the indivisibility and solidarity of Pakistan; criticised the martial law administration; created fear or disappointment in the minds of the population; criticised the army, police or government; created enmity or hatred among Pakistanis; and insulted Islam or disrespected Qaed-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Dhar 1985). Neither was the press permitted to print anything political without clearance from the government authorities. Within a few days, however, in order to create an impression of normalcy, all newspapers were given an unwritten directive to resume publication. By March 29, *Morning News*, *Purbodesh* and *The Observer* resumed publication, while *Dainik Pakistan* resumed printing on March 30, and eventually *Ittefaq*, the major papers being published from East Pakistan. Dhar (1985) states that research on the 1971 media in later years has shown that most of these newspapers, for various reasons, were aligned with the Pakistani government, though some journalists working with them were pro-liberation. All news to be published was vetted by a censorship house established in Dhaka under the central information office but more than these two bodies, the press was controlled by the Inter Services Public

Relations (ISPR) department. For almost a month, the only news published were from news agencies and not staff correspondents of the papers. The ISPR, led by an army major by the name of Salek, would oversee all the news to be printed, demanded that editorials be written when they were being avoided by some of the Bangla dailies, and often provided "press advice" to the papers (ibid).

The next chapter explores in greater depth the theoretical frameworks relevant to this study – the concepts of ideology and myth, nationalism, identity formation, political and sexual violence in wartime. It then looks more specifically at their relationship to religion and discursive practices of communication in the legitimisation of violence, and the role of propaganda, rhetoric, and the media as a discursive tool in this process.

CHAPTER 3

IDENTITIES AND NATIONS IN CONFLICT: THE MEDIA AS DISCURSIVE TOOLS

Ideology 'expresses a will, a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing a reality.'
–Louis Althusser

This research is a study of how ideology is framed and used in the formation, validation and strengthening of discourse disseminated through the media. It focuses on two newspapers in Pakistan in 1971 and their use of discourse based on religious ideology to construct particularistic identities, difference, particular imaginations of the nation and nationalism, and the legitimisation of violence and sexual violence. Before moving to detail the empirical evidence, however, it is necessary to understand these concepts in their core as well as in relation to the basic theme of this study – religion-based discourse and the role of the media. This chapter begins by unpacking the essential concepts of ideology, identity, nationalism and religiously motivated violence. It then moves to the role of communication, propaganda, media and discourse in formulating and disseminating these ideologies.

3.1 Ideology and Myth

Ideology is difficult to define clearly. It is often associated with Marxism and the notion of "false consciousness", about the power to make people believe in something and act upon that belief. As Szeman and Kaposy (2011) note, addressing ideology as a concept has changed much since its original definition of pre-Enlightenment times 'when eighteenth-century ideologues claimed to unfold the laws of human

consciousness…[with the goal of] prevent[ing] popular use of superstition for political gain and replac[ing] such practices with public, scientific projects in which reason would prevail' (2011: 157). For example, contemporary cultural theorists study how ideologies enable different social classes to coexist despite various inequalities, from religious beliefs which 'provided a comprehensive moral narrative which helped to maintain the social and economic status quo' (Szeman and Kaposy 2011: 158) to conceptions of false consciousness and social determination. This study will draw upon French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser's conceptualisation of ideology, and its production of subjects through interpellation as shown below. Before that, however, it is important to present an overview of the rather complex notion of ideology.

Terry Eagleton writes in his comprehensive examination of ideology in a book by the same name that while it is understandable that people may struggle and even kill for reasons related to their physical survival, it is more difficult to understand why they would do so for 'something as apparently abstract as ideas' (Eagleton 1991: xiii). In his book, Eagleton lists several definitions of ideology popular in the early 1990s, from 'the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life' to '(false) ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power', 'socially necessary illusion' and 'the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality' (ibid: 1-2). Eagleton also notes the contradictions and complications of such definitions, where, for example, not all ideologies may be dominant, or where the word, seemingly pejorative, may not be applied to people's selves but only to others.

In the case of Pakistan, however, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, Islam was framed openly as an ideology, in fact, as Pakistan's national ideology itself, an ideology by which Pakistan was born, by which it should live and based on which it will survive. This assessment may be applied to Eagleton's third issue with the definitions of

ideology and the discrepancy among thinkers who see it as 'illusion, distortion and mystification' versus those who focus on its 'function of ideas within social life than with their reality or unreality' (ibid: 2-3). For Eagleton, ideologies are not nonsense, they 'encode, in however mystified a way, genuine needs and desires' (ibid: 12). Similarly, Islam, the religion of the majority population of Pakistan, was used as the basis of its national ideology. Citing Jon Elster, Eagleton suggests that,

> ruling ideologies can actively shape the wants and desires of those subjected to them; but they must also engage significantly with the wants and desires that people already have, catching up genuine hopes and needs, reinflecting them in their own peculiar idiom, and feeding them back to their subjects in ways which render these ideologies plausible and attractive. They must be 'real' enough to provide the basis on which individuals can fashion a coherent identity, must furnish some solid motivations for effective action, and must make at least some feeble attempt to explain away their own more flagrant contradictions and incoherencies. (ibid: 15)

For Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, however, ideology 'represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence' (Althusser 2011: 213); it is an illusion which makes an allusion to reality. This illusion is needed, according to Althusser, for two reasons, so that 'Priests or Despots' can dominate and exploit people or for people themselves to be able to deal with their material alienation. This alienation occurs, according to Marxist theory, when people become estranged from the products of their own activity, seeing them as material things and their existence as inevitable (Eagleton 2007).

However, Eagleton notes that ideologies often contain false propositions which no rational person would accept, but that there is also an issue of empirical truths and ideological falsehoods as well as ideological affirmations of certain truths and exclusion of others. Willibald Steinmetz (2011), for example, considers the relationship between language and political power through the rise of the communist and fascist regimes in Europe up to the end of the Cold War. He cites Czech playwright and civil rights activist Vaclac Havel's analysis of intellectual immobility and how 'post-totalitarian' states no

longer required crude terror (or what Althusser would refer to as repressive state apparatuses) but relied on the compliance of its citizens to uphold the political system.

This articulation is important for this research which will show that mainstream Pakistani media discourse underlined that Hindus had oppressed Muslims throughout history and killed them during the Partition of India. The media, as this research will show, ignored the role of Muslims in such violence in which Muslims also killed Hindus, and that it was not acceptable to keep killing Hindus and establishing Pakistan as a nation based solely on the religion of Islam. In this way the Pakistani media under study reinforced the ruling ideology. Eagleton suggests that the prevailing understanding of ideology is the legitimating of power of a dominant social group or class and involves six strategies:

> *promoting* beliefs and values congenial to [the group/class]; *naturalizing* and *universalizing* such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; *denigrating* ideas which might challenge it; *excluding* rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic logic; and *obscuring* social reality in ways convenient to itself. (Eagleton 1991: 3, original italics)

This study will show that the Pakistani media under study employed all these aspects to promote, naturalise and universalise anti-liberation discourses through the use of Islam as the only good and true ideology to live by and on which Pakistan, as a nation, should draw. Furthermore, Hindu identity was constructed as 'the Other', as everything Muslim Pakistanis were not – as the enemy, thus confirming Eagleton's argument that 'a successful ruling ideology…must engage significantly with genuine wants, needs and desires; but this is also its Achilles heel, forcing it to recognize an "other" to itself and inscribing its otherness as a potentially disruptive force within its own forms' (Eagleton 1991: 45). Importantly, Eagleton points out that ideology is more to do with discourse than language, which means that one aspect of language may be ideological in one context but not in another. What this means is that any study of ideology must be a study

of discourse, which means placing meanings within words, sentences, grammar, etc., within a larger socio-historical context. In fact, this study agrees with Eagleton that it is important to view ideology 'less as a particular *set* of discourses, than as a particular set of effects *within* discourses' (1991: 194).

Althusser, too, suggests that ideology is 'a particular organization of signifying practices which goes to constitute human beings as social subjects, and which produces the lived relations by which such subjects are connected to the dominant relations of production in a society' (cited in Eagleton 1991: 18). More simply put, it is 'the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or social group' (Althusser 2011: 212). This definition, according to Eagleton, is similar to the broader meaning of culture which, this research will show, is a part, process and product of the other.

Myth is another concept that needs exploring, as it also has interesting parallels to ideology. Just as Eagleton suggests that ideology '*goes to work* on the "real" situation in transformative ways' (Eagleton 1991: 209), Roland Barthes also contends that 'myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but of a statement of fact' (Eagleton 1991: 199). According to Barthes, myth does not evolve from the nature of things but is chosen by history, and, rather than the object of its message, it is defined by the way in which it is uttered. Mythical speech, according to Barthes, is 'made of a material which has *already* been worked on so as to make it suitable for communication: it is because all the materials of myth (whether pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason about them while discounting their substance' (Barthes 2009: 133). For example, Mitja Velikonja (1998) in her study on the role of

mythology in fanning war in the Balkans refers to American religiologist Paul Mojzes' notion of myths common to the collective memory of the Balkan states. These include the "myth of land and blood" in which the native soil is seen as sacred and there is a constant threat from foreigners who are responsible for all the present problems; the "crucifixion and resurrection syndrome", which turns defeats into victories; the "mythological perception of time" which results in the blurring of the past and present, making the current enemy the eternal enemy; and the "glorification of war and violence" as the best way to keep or reclaim one's freedom. All of these myths are rooted in the history of the Balkans, and as we will see in subsequent chapters, it was the similar use of such histories and myths that also contributed to the process of identity construction of Pakistan, Pakistanis and the Other, paving the way for conflict in 1971.

Helen Fulton's discussion of narrative is also reflective of conversations around ideology and myth. Fulton argues that narrative is neither natural nor universal, but is a form of representation that is 'historically and culturally positioned to turn information and events into structures that are already meaningful for their audiences' (2005: 1), with the most natural stories being those which the media have familiarised us with. She discusses the role of narrative as cultural production and in the construction of the audience (though largely as consumers of global capitalism), but more relevant to this work is the parallel function of narrative and myth, 'the stories in which we encode truths about ourselves and our society' (Fulton 2005: 6). In her work, Fulton criticises Barthes' double-layered theory of denotation and connotation as flawed because, as she argues, denotation is ideological. As such, she reinterprets Barthes' notion of myth as 'narrativised ideology, the formulaic articulation and naturalisation of values, truths and beliefs' (ibid: 7). Fulton argues:

> The mythical function of most media narratives is to return us to a stable subjectivity, to remind us of who we are and what reality is… News reporting mythologises, and therefore normalises, the existence of universal truths and an objective reality that can be retrieved and represented without ideological mediation. By constructing these powerful narratives of who 'we' are, the media separate 'us' from 'them', those others who don't share or understand the stories we know and believe to be true'. (Fulton 2005: 7)

In the context of news in particular, Stuart Hall, as quoted in Matheson (2005), also talks about 'cultural maps', maps of meaning or a range of social and cultural identifications within which events and things make sense.

Ideology and myth, of course, function through discourse formed by language, and, as this research will later argue, its absence as well. Languages make meaning and form ideological discourses in several ways.

Ideology in reality is not as abstract as it sounds, but can be seen as a solid, purposefully constructed set of ideas arranged as a discourse to maintain the status quo. As Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci noted, domination can either be direct or through the creation of hegemony, the latter exercised by dominant groups either through spontaneous consent of the population or legally enforced by the apparatus of state coercive power. This approach reminds us of Althusser's notions of repressive and ideological state apparatuses, whereby repressive state apparatuses (RSA) include (as per Marxist theory) the government, administration, army, police, courts, prisons, etc., and the ideological state apparatuses (ISA) include religious bodies, educational bodies, the family, the legal, political, trade-union, communications and cultural ISA. As Diane Macdonnell (1986) puts it, it was Althusser who reorientated the study of ideology, from an approach that supposed its abstract existence and being shaped by consciousness to one that focused on its material existence and the politics of meaning.

Whether through the establishement of ideology through repressive or ideological means, power is an important component, whether it is applied physically or discursively. For French theorist Michel Foucault (1980), power is not only a constraining but also a

productive force, not only saying no but also inducing pleasure, forming knowledge, producing discourse, determining what can/will and cannot/will not be talked about, thus excluding certain voices and ways of talking and being. This study will attempt to unpack the anti-liberation discourse of 1971 Pakistan as reflected in the newspapers examined, and the framing of religion-based ideology in the media in order to construct the nation, identities, and the role and actions of the "true Muslim".

For Althusser, an important part of ideology is not only ideas and illusions, but also action. Ideology makes a subject of everyone, and every '"subject" endowed with a "consciousness" and believing in the "ideas" that his "consciousness" inspires in him and freely accepts, must "*act* according to his ideas", must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material practice. If he does not do so, "that is wicked"' (Althusser 2011: 215). This study will focus on the role of the communications ISA with focus on the press of Pakistan in wartime 1971 and touch upon the cultural, in its analysis of how the ideology of religious nationalism and warfare were put to work through discourse. While traditional conceptualisations of ideology dealt with the workings of capitalist (and later, communist) society, this study will look at its application in the workings of religion, culture and society. It will argue that the wartime media discourse of Pakistan used religious ideology to construct identities and subjects (e.g., Muslim, Hindu), interpellate them and call them to action, i.e., war.

In what follows, I address the other key concepts that underpin this research, namely, identity, nationalism, gender and wartime sexual violence, religion, rhetoric and propaganda. This project will show how basic concepts from various disciplines such as sociology, political science and gender studies are transformed into or used as ideologies and myths with reference to the anti-liberation discourse during Bangladesh's war of independence.

3.2 Nationalism and Identity Formation

3.2a Nationalism as a construction

There has been an overwhelming interest in the study of nationalism beginning from the 1980s and 1990s, with key theorists such as Benedict Anderson, Michael Billig, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith, taking it up in the first decade of the 21st century and relating it to issues of ethnicity and, to some extent, religion. The high interest may be related to the end of the Cold War, break-up of the Soviet Union and the nationalist struggles which in some cases continue to this day in the nations which comprised it as well as the former Yugoslavia. Even more current are nationalist movements in the Middle East and Asia. As Delanty and Kumar (2006) point out, nationalism is both old and new which means that the breadth of the literature, both theoretically and geographically, is extremely wide.

The literature on nationalism in Bengal itself is substantial, though primarily written in Bangla and not highly relevant to this project. More pertinent for this study is Pakistani nationalism after the Partition of India and, later, the rise of Bangali/Bangladeshi nationalism as discussed in the previous chapter. Western literature, on the other hand, while vast, has yet to take into detailed consideration the nationalist struggles of the non-West and even more so in the context of religion. Thus, for the purposes of this research, following a general survey of the concept(s) of nationalism as a construction, the focus will be on its relationship with ethnicity and, more importantly, (what is available on) religion.

Anthony D. Smith, one of the key theorists of nationalism, defines it as 'an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual

or potential "nation"' (Smith 2003: 24) where nation is defined as 'a named human population occupying a historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members' (ibid). Ernest Gellner, another important theorist, includes the conditions of violation of nationalist sentiment, the key one being the separation of 'the power-holders from the rest', that is, where 'the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled' brought on by colonisation or by the 'local domination of an alien group' (Gellner 2006: 1). The key terms here are 'ideological' and 'common'. While the eastern wing of 1971 Pakistan was fighting for the 'attainment' mentioned by Smith, the western wing was trying to maintain it. The basis of both was nationalism but with different rationales. The lack of commonness is brought out by Gellner with the West Pakistani rulers being viewed as an 'alien' group in terms of the differences in ethnicity, language and culture from the Bangali-majority population.

Benedict Anderson, however, regards such commonness, indeed, the entire concept of nation and the struggles of nationalism to achieve it as 'imagined'. According to him, the members of even the smallest nations will never know each other personally because, as he writes, it is only 'in the minds of each [that] lives the image of their communion' (Anderson 1997: 44). The community in which people regard themselves is, in Anderson's view, non-existent. However, as this case study shows, while the nationalist struggle may in some cases be as a community, for example in the way it was for West Pakistan and its collaborators from the eastern wing in their aim to uphold an Islamic nation, it may also be based on individual, albeit ethnic, identity, as was the struggle on the part of many Bangalis, who fought for their right to speak a certain language, practise a certain culture, etc., which they deemed to be their own.

Anderson addresses language as one of the key factors contributing to national consciousness – and indeed it was a vital catalyst in the case of Bangladesh's independence struggle – but this too he sees as a result of capitalism, print capitalism in particular, which brings together people in communities of millions sharing a 'print-language'. Whether or not these are 'limited imaginings', however, Anderson states fittingly that despite actual inequality and exploitation, this is what enables people to kill others and be prepared to die themselves.

Historian and nationalism scholar Eric Hobsbawm, too, sees both nations and nationalism as products of 'social engineering', 'invented traditions' which he defines as 'a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition' (Hobsbawm, cited in Ozkirimli 2010: 94), a strategy employed by the ruling elite of any society to counter the threat of 'mass democracy'. According to Hobsbawm, in the face of social fragmentation and disintegration, the idea of 'national community' can bring social cohesion. This idea is developed and reinforced by primary education, public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments. Thus, contrary to popular understanding, in Hobsbawm's view, it is not the people who rise in nationalist fervour but states which create it (ibid: 95).

Along similar lines, Michael Billig (2001) explores the notion of 'banal nationalism' – 'the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced' (2001: 6) daily. Through this 'flagging', an ideological consciousness of nationhood is naturalised, made to seem like common sense. The media, which routinely addresses its readers as members of a nation, readying them for times of crisis when they may be called upon to sacrifice themselves for the cause of nationhood, is one of the tools used for this purpose. For Billig, there is nothing natural about nationalism, it did not

even exist two centuries ago. Rather, nationalism is 'a way of thinking or an ideological consciousness' (Billig 2001: 10) instilled into citizens. He goes so far as to argue that language, which is widely considered to be a key determinant of national identity, rather than creating nationalism is created *by* nationalism. Both language and religion have always existed in some form, but nationalism as an ideology has not, and in order for any of these factors to contribute to nationalism, one must, again, imagine their identity and themselves as part of a community.

While the abovementioned works focus on the West and rarely address religion except Billig's passing reference to Saddam Hussein's and George W. Bush's use of religious rhetoric during the Gulf War (Smith's later work on nationalism and religion is outlined below), they are relevant to the study at hand in terms of the notion of nationalism as a construction – that it is not primordial, a given or unchanging – and the ways in which this is achieved.

3.2b Nationalism(s) of the West and its 'others'

Most theorisations of nationalism have been in the context of the evolution of European nations, their particular histories and epistemes. Umut Ozkirimli (2010) provides a comprehensive critical introduction to theories of nationalism from the 18th and 19th centuries to the present day, including some of those discussed above. In this, he discusses the (relatively) new approaches to nationalism, influenced by the cultural turn in social sciences, which 'challenges the purported homogeneity of national cultures and identities in the West' (Ozkirimli 2010: 169). According to this, culture is a deeply contested, continually negotiated, revised and reinterpreted concept, and more than what people share on the basis of class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, etc., it is based on what they choose to fight over.

For example, one of the first and most important challenges to the theorisation of nationalism came from feminist writers 'who sought to provide a gendered understanding of nationalism by exploring the various ways in which women contributed to the biological, symbolic and ideological reproduction of their respective nations' (Ozkirimli 2010: 170). While women have figured centrally in nationalist discourse, gender relations have been ignored as irrelevant and nationalism generally regarded as a male phenomenon. Nationalism as a gendered discourse must be understood through a theory of gender power, not added as a missing dimension to discussions of nationalism but integrated into them (Ozkirimli 2010).

Perhaps most relevant to the research at hand is the approach to nationalism in relation to post-colonial theory. One of the most renowned scholars of the Subaltern Studies Group coming out of Indian Marxism which explored the relationship between Europe/the West and its 'others' is Partha Chatterjee, who has studied the 'peculiarities of nation-building in the post-colonial world' (Ozkirimli 2010: 183). Chatterjee argues that nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa has been colonised by the West, with Western theories of nationalism being the reference point. Chatterjee provides a different interpretation of nationalism as a process of three stages – the moment of departure, an awareness and acceptance of an essential cultural difference between East and West; the moment of maneouvre, characterised by the rejection of the "modern"; and the moment of arrival, a passive revolution, 'a discourse of order, of the rational organization of power' (ibid: 185).

The understanding that there is no single process of nationalism is relevant for the study of Pakistan, which was created in 1947 and divided in 1971. Religious nationalism, as this study shows, was used to pull together a nation divided by ethnicity and culture. Indeed, the use of religion as an ideology was in response to existential crises as Pakistan

sought to build a viable state that would bring together divided communities. However, while those supporting Pakistan attempted to legitimise their fight based on an ideology of "Islamic nationalism" as will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters, the pro-liberation Bangalis of East Pakistan claimed to be fighting for their identity and existence based on their language, ethnicity and culture.

3.2c The social psychology of nationalism

What is it that drives people to commit acts of violence in nationalist movements, however? Langman (2006) explores the social psychology of nationalism, the feeling of loyalty to one's nation and its members, although unknown to them, which leads them to commit acts of self-sacrifice as well as brutal torture. She notes that 'most social or cultural explanations allude to social-psychological factors ranging from conceptions of self, identity and Other, to primordial needs for communities, unconscious desires and attachments, passions and emotions' (Langman 2006: 66). Referring to the founder of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud's writings on civilisation, she points out that 'the most important desires, sex and aggression, prompted attachments to some people, desires to hurt or destroy Others' (ibid: 67) where even slight differences with others are exaggerated in order to enhance one's own self-esteem. These identifications and attachments act as a defence against feelings of anxiety and fear that can be traced back to the helpless and powerless infant stage of life and the 'lure of charismatic leaders [functioned as] unconscious parent figures who embodied group values and secured the bonds that held people together' (ibid).

Human desire can purportedly attach itself to symbols and enable attachments to abstract entities such as the nation, which can provide gratifications and assuage fears. Langman finds the use of Freudian theory in the works of Reich and Fromm on character,

repression, authoritarianism, leadership, mass media and propaganda. Fromm suggested that in the face of major social changes, such as World War I, people faced anxiety, powerlessness and meaninglessness and seeking to 'escape from freedom', they submitted themselves to 'powerful, charismatic leaders who promised love in exchange for obedience and compliance' (ibid: 68) such as Hitler. Nationalism, according to Fromm as cited in Langman, 'depended on needs to belong to a group that provided community, pride in membership and a framework of meaning' (ibid). This might explain how nationalism functions at the psychological level, what inner needs and desires it fulfils, which enables it to be used in the constructive process conceptualised by the theorists mentioned above. It may also be argued that religion, whether or not combined with nationalism, can function in the same way and did so in 1971 Pakistan and continues to do so among people around the world, providing them with a sense of belonging to a group for which they are prepared to fight, putting their lives at stake.

3.2d Nationalism and the discursive formation of religious and ethnic identities

While the literature on nationalism is vast, there is relatively less work done on it in relation to religion. Ozkirimli (2010) provides a comprehensive review of nationalism, its historical and contemporary relevance, with passing references to the significance of religion. He cites Anderson's reference to the decline of religion and opposing arguments which find that not only is religion not replaced by nationalism, in some cases, it has reinforced nationalism and that they have actually grown together.

Smith (2003) succinctly summarises this complex relationship in the introduction to his study of the 'sacred sources of national identity'. Examining the works of British historian of the Middle East Elie Kedourie, Smith identifies three main positions – the secular replacement approach, according to which religion is a basic component of

traditional society and eventually disappears while nationalism flourishes; the neo-traditional approach, in which religion is viewed as an ally of nationalism; and the third in which religion and nationalism share a complex relationship, borrowing aspects from each other, with 'an ability to transmute the values of traditional religion into secular political ends' (2003: 14). Smith argues that in Kedourie's view, religion is vital to nations and nationalisms and that nationalists must draw upon the 'very core of traditional religions, their conception of the sacred and their rites of salvation… in fashioning their own ideas of community, history, and destiny' (ibid: 15). Smith himself believes that there is little difference between nationalism and religion, 'for, at the heart of both are the cult and the faith' (ibid: 28).

Smith (2006), in a later work makes a link between ethnicity and nationalism. He argues that rather than dominant perspectives – the first that sees ethnicity as playing a minor role in what is mainly a 'civic-territorial' nationalism or the second that states ethnicity *is* nation and vice versa where 'ethnic' nations emphasise issues such as common descent, language, culture and history – a combination of the two is at work. As such, he proposes three levels of ethnicity, ranging from the least aware and distinguished group characteristics or 'ethnic categories', through 'ethnic networks and associations' to the most developed level – 'ethnic community or ethnie', which he defines as 'a clear conception of not only "who" but "where" and "when" we are,' 'a named and self-defined human population sharing a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and elements of culture (often including a link with a territory) and a measure of solidarity' (Smith 2006: 171-172). Though he discusses issues of religion and ethnicity in separate works, Smith (2003) notes that in practice, the two are rarely divorced from each other. In his 2009 work on hierarchy and covenant in the formation of nations, Smith categorises three principles of 'sacred cultural community' – the hierarchal, the covenantal and the

civic, the first two relevant to the situation in 1971 Pakistan as this study will show. In one version of the hierarchical, 'the ruler is the god's representative on earth, issuing commands in his name' (Smith 2009: 25) and the people, because of the purity of their faith, become a 'chosen people'. In the covenantal, 'the deity chooses a community to carry out his will by separating itself from others and devoting its members to the sacred task of performance and witness entrusted to it… usually involv[ing] regulating the life of the community and the individual through a moral and ritual code that sanctifies the community, and through it, the world' (ibid: 28). The people have God's blessing as long as they abide by His commandments.

Eriksen (2010), in his study on ethnicity and nationalism, maintains that 'nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders' (2010: 10). This was essentially the case with the Bangalis of East Pakistan who came together on the basis of their ethnic and cultural identity despite the religious commonness which they shared with the people of West Pakistan.

Amartya Sen in his book *Identity and Violence* (2006) discusses identity, or rather its use and/or manipulation, in situations of violence. In discussing the religious and cultural divisions of the world, about 'civilizational partitioning', a 'solitarist approach' (which sees human beings as members of a single group, and 'singular identities' which basically transform 'multidimensional human beings into one-dimensional creatures') (2006: 174) is at work and 'nurture[s] violence in the world through omissions as well as commissions' (ibid: p. xiv). For him 'violence is promoted by the cultivation of a sense of inevitability about some allegedly unique – often belligerent – identity that we are supposed to have and which apparently makes extensive demands on us…' (ibid: xiii). For, while identities are plural, they are also in competition for priority through choices

made by individuals. But often, it is an assumption of a lack of choice or a forcible imposition of a singular identity – as seen in the anti-liberation propaganda media of 1971 under study here – that compels people to focus on a single aspect of their identity and act based on it.

In discussing nationalism – whether based on religious or ethnic identity – a discussion of identity itself, and shifts in the predominance of different identities within individuals and nations and the divisions it creates, is needed.

3.2e Identity, difference and the Other

National identity is defined by Smith (2003) as 'the maintenance and continual reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions that form the distinctive heritage of the nation, and the identification of individuals with that heritage and its pattern' (Smith 2003: 25). This idea of 'continual reinterpretation' combined with Billig's notion of banal nationalism as outlined above, suggests that national identity may be like any other identity, such as gender, which Butler (1990) explains as not being fixed but fluid and free-floating, and a result of repetitive performance.

As Stuart Hall also articulates, identity is never unified but rather 'fragmented and fractured, never singular, multiply[ing] constructed across after different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions' and identification as 'a construction, a process that is never completed' and 'constantly in the process of change and transformation' (1996: 2-3). Ferguson (2003), too, claims that local cultural identities are not fixed but 'socially and historically constructed' and 'manipulated for political advantage' (2003: 30). This is apparent in the cases of both the formation and disintegration of Pakistan with the secession of Bangladesh – there was a shift in the

importance of different identities. While India and Pakistan were divided along religious lines with a Hindu majority population in the former and Muslim majority in the latter, the same Muslim-majority population later called for the division of Pakistan along ethnic lines, placing greater significance on their ethnic rather than their religious identity. To quote Hall again, identities use the 'resources of history, language and culture' and arise within 'specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciated strategies' (1996: 3). While identities are most often referred to as being common between people who share it, Hall points out that they also 'emerge within the specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion' (1996: 4). Hall cites Derrida, Laclau and Butler in noting the 'Othering' function of identity – that 'it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks… that identity can be constructed' (1996: 5).

Bruce Lincoln describes the process of Othering in specific relation to religion:

> When social groups constitute their identity in religious terms and experience themselves as a sacred collectivity (the faithful, the righteous, or God's chosen people, for instance), as a corollary they tend to construe their rivals in negative fashion (heretics, infidels, apostates, evil, bestial, demonic, satanic, e.g.) Under such circumstances, the pursuit of self-interest…can be experienced as a holy cause, in support of which any violence is justified. (Lincoln 2003: 94)

In 1971 Pakistan's anti-liberation discourse, too, as this study will argue, Bangalis were posited as the 'Hindu Other' against the Muslim Pakistani.

Eriksen (2010) also highlights 'Othering' in discussing Kapferer's 1988 study on state power, nationalist ideology and the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. Both agree on 'the importance of the Other in the formation of ethnic identity and… the mediating role of symbols in ethnic ideologies' (Eriksen 2010: 135). In order for personal sacrifices to be made, symbols are used to justify the power structure as well as give meaning to people's experiences so as to motivate them, argues Eriksen. As Ferguson (2003) points out,

'political and military mobilization can be much easier and more excitable when there is a clear-cut, personal enemy, a scapegoat' (2003: 39).

Manuel Castells introduces the notion of 'cultural nationalism' which addresses the 'distinctiveness of the cultural community as the basis of a nation' and is also relevant in this regard. In this context, the nation is seen as a product of its history and culture, and arises when a people's cultural identity is perceived to be lacking or threatened' (2004: 17). Castells, who defines identity as people's source of meaning and experience, also makes the 'distinction between self and other, me and they' (2004: 6). Identity, then, seems based not only on commonness as we have seen it unite people on the basis of various factors, but also difference, for example, different religious identities, cultural identities, political identities, etc., which is applicable to the formation of Bangali nationalism. Castells also talks about the plurality of identities and how this causes stress and contradictions in both self-representation and social action. Identities are constructed from 'history, geography, biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory, personal fantasies, power apparatuses and religious revelations' (Castells 2004:7).

Ferguson (2003), too, notes that along with cultural difference or ethnicity, factors such as 'region and rural/urban location, political-economic position, religion, language, caste, race, tribe, clan, gender and age' (2003: 30) are important aspects of identity. Claiming that identity and interest are often fused, he prefers to replace the 'ethnic' labelling of groups and conflicts with the neologism 'idinterest' and distinguishes their four overlapping opening phases – 'formation of a core idinterest group; creation of mutual fears or a "secret dilemma"; polarization and projection of negative attributes; and calculated violence' (Ferguson 2003: 30), which may lead to a full scale war.

Who constructs identity and for what purpose largely determines the symbolic content of its construction. Castells (2004), for example, argues that the social construction of identity takes place in a context marked by power relationships. In terms of the origins of identity building, he categorises three types: legitimising identity (organisations, institutions and social actors introduced by the dominant institutions of society to reproduce, extend and rationalise their domination); resistance identity (constructed by those devalued by the logic of domination who go on to form communities of the excluded which exclude the excluders) and project identity (whereby new identities are redefined through the transformation of social structures) (Castells 2004: 8-9). The processes of legitimising identity and resistance identity are relevant to the current research, first in the examination of the construction of a Pakistani Muslim identity by the dominating institutions and authorities, and second, in that of the Bangali ethnic identity used to resist the former. Castells' theory can be applied to identity-building in 1971 Pakistan – of the Pakistani, the Muslim and the Bangali – and it will be interesting to see by whom, how and for what purposes this was done.

The process of identity construction is part of the wider struggles of power which, as Michel Foucault has pointed out, extend beyond the limits of the state. For one, the state cannot control all power relations, and secondly, it operates on the basis of existing power relations. Relations of power, as Foucault suggests

> permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse… We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. (Foucault 1980: 93)

Althusser (1971) makes a similar argument about ideology, interpellation and the formation of subjects. According to him, individuals are addressed by ideologies similar to the way they address each other, as if saying, "Hey, you there!" 'Ideology "acts" or

"functions" in such a way that it "recruits" subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or "transforms" the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)' (Althusser 1971: 162-163) by interpellation or hailing. Ideology addresses people as subjects, thereby making them feel that they are subjects of the said ideology or discourse. His enunciation of the subject of the Christian religious ideology interpellated by the ideological state apparatus of the Church can be compared to the subject of any similar ideology or discourse, including nationalism – where one is the subject of a nation, and religion – where one is the subject of a faith. The 'Unique and Absolute Subject' (ibid: 168), such as God in Christianity, can as easily be the Supreme Being in any other faith, and even in the context of nationalism, can be used to refer to the nation or the exemplary patriot that one should strive to be. Criticism of Althusser's theory stems from the fact that he does not allow room for resistance, assuming that one always accepts the subject position allocated to them. While this may often be the case, it is not always so. Neither are the readers/audience/receivers of text passive – they may decode messages differently from the meanings intended by the encoders. There is also often not only a single discourse but multiple discourses floating about and these may all provide for the subject, different, even contradictory, positions from which to speak. As Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) note, 'there is a consensus in cultural studies, communication research and discourse analysis that the dominant ideology thesis underestimated people's capacity to offer resistance to ideologies' (2002: 16).

Both ideology and resistance to it are, of course, articulated through language. The next section looks briefly at the little-addressed role of language and language policy in nationalism and conflict.

3.2f Nationalism, language and conflict

While the Language Movement of 1952 was a critical turning point and catalyst in the run-up to Bangladesh's war of independence, the significance of language in nationalist and separatist movements has been important in conflicts around the globe, not least of all in Europe. Colin H. Williams (1984), who is one of the few scholars to have approached directly the subject of language in conflict, describes this form of conflict, at least in the context of nation-state building processes in nineteenth-century Europe, as 'ethnic separatism'. According to Williams, 'the goal of state formation, which was to realise a single citizenry despite ethnic or cultural variety, would be achieved through resolving a series of crises' related to identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution and penetration (cited in Chriost 2003: 150). Language, most frequently, and religion in some cases, are bases of community that 'provide for the basis of separateness and community in the potential nationality' argues Williams (1984: 183). As such, language is a potential marker of ethnicity. According to Williams, language is one of the three factors (along with group customs and institutions and religion) which reflect cultural separateness. Language, argues Williams, is not only a functional means of communication but an instrument for cultural division and often provides the most tangible barrier to assimilation. Williams looks at how minority groups use language promotion not merely as a cultural attachment 'but often a rational and instrumental attempt to reduce socio-economic inequality, to wrest more power from the state and opposition groups, and to determine an increasing amount of the ethnic group's role in the wider political structure' (1984: 215). Language is not only useful as a potential marker of ethnicity but also functions as a tool of group mobilization for ethnic separatists (Chriost 2003: 151). It functions as a political resource with matters of

language in conflict largely relating to the contestation of state policy and the distribution of resources.

In Iran, for example, Kia (1998) in an article on Persian nationalism and language purification, argues that Persian nationalism divided the world of ideas and institutions into the material and the spiritual, where Europe dominated Iran and the world in the material domain and so Iran would have to be superior in its 'inner domain', and preserve the distinctiveness of its spiritual culture and national identity. To do this, Persian nationalism had to battle Islamic hegemony, emphasising Iran's pre-Islamic history and culture as well as the Persian language and its literary heritage, transforming 'history, culture and language into ideological tools for building a modern homogenized national identity which was Persian rather than Islamic, secular rather than religious' (Kia 1998: 9). One of the main ways of doing this was through the 'purification' of the Persian language, which they believed was losing its independence due to the large borrowing of Arabic words, and in order to revive it, it had to be purged of foreign words and terminologies. In the process, however, Kia argues that Persian nationalists ignored the 'multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious reality of the Iranian state', overlooking 'the fundamental fact that Iran was not Persia or Persian but rather a mosaic of diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious groups' (ibid). It may be argued that the West Pakistan government did something similar, ignoring the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversity of the Pakistani population in order to unify it with a common state language but based on religion rather than secularism as in the case of Persian nationalism, and trying to make Pakistan more rather than less Islamic. Language was used as an ideological tool in both cases but to different ends.

While Williams (1984) discusses ethnic separatism in the context of minority groups who felt threatened and vulnerable to assimiliation within nation-states, the

Bangalis of East Pakistan formed the majority of the population of Pakistan overall. In the case of East Pakistan, the Bangalis acted in response to the West Pakistani government attempting to impose Urdu – the language of the ruling elite minority of Pakistan – as the sole state language. Pakistani Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan in the Constituent Assembly in 1948 'linked Urdu to the central role of religion in the division of India and Pakistan, and therefore to Pakistani nationalism and identity' (Hossain and Tollefson 2007: 245). On the other hand, the imposition of Urdu as the state language was met with suspicion and distrust among the Bangalis of East Pakistan, who felt their cultural being threatened (as described in the previous chapter), leading to a political movement which it may be argued gave birth to linguistic nationalism in East Pakistan (Akand 2013).

The political events on the ground were reflected in the media which acted as a tool of interpellation of the audience. This process, and the use of communication and the media in interpellation, identity formation and the legitimisation of violence through the instrumentalisation of religion as 'truth', will be elaborated upon below.

3.3 Communication, Discourse and the Legitimisation of Violence

The role of communication in the creation of bonds, the formation of identities, the framing of ideologies and the legitimisation and possible mobilisation of groups to violent action is key to these processes. As early as the 1950s, Deutsch (1966) theorised on the role of social communication in nationalism, in the ability to communicate effectively over a wide range of subjects with the members of a large group as being key to membership in a people or nation. In the context of conflict, Ferguson (2003) has argued that,

> ideas about violence affect its usage, and its usage is itself an expressive, communicative act that redefines a conflict situation. Ideas of historical origins are also critical in providing lessons and symbols that can be used to define collective identity, and to variably construct understandings of current circumstances and options. (Ferguson 2003: 30)

Simon Cottle too, notes that regardless of their sources, locations and forms of expression

> conflicts are necessarily defined, mobilized and populated by people. Thinking, feeling, sentient, human beings define and engage in disputes, prosecute ideologies and interests, participate in forms of struggle, and wage wars… For the participants, conflicts are made sense of discursively and culturally – they are often high in meaning and affect – and they are invariably pursued purposefully, strategically and practically. (Cottle 2006: 5)

As such, it is important to address the content, form and style of communication that may induce people to kill others and even themselves for what they believe to be a just or legitimate cause. Diverse approaches have considered how ideology is transmitted by various means of communication and how it becomes or is made meaningful for recipients, the most prominent approach being that of propaganda.

3.3a Propaganda, rhetoric and charismatic authority

Propaganda is one of the key tools used for persuasion. French philosopher Jacques Ellul (2006) writes that the characteristics of propaganda are based on scientific analyses of psychology and sociology where knowledge of people – their 'tendencies, desires, needs, psychic mechanisms, condition' – as well as of the environment, is put to use. Any propaganda, according to Ellul, is aimed at both the individual and the masses, partly as it is difficult to isolate the two, and even if this was possible, working on each individual would take too long. More importantly, when part of a mass, the individual's 'psychic defences are weakened, his reactions easier to provoke, and the propagandist profits from the process of diffusion of emotions through the mass, and, at the same time, from the pressure felt by an individual when in a group (Ellul 2006: 4). For him, 'emotionalism, impulsiveness, excess' (ibid) can all be more easily exploited on a group.

But just as propaganda must move the masses, to do so, it must also touch every individual in a crowd.

The mass media has an important role to play in this: it facilitates propaganda. As Ellul argues, while the media consumer is concerned about issues as an individual, they are also concerned, as a group, 'moved by the same motives, receive the same impulses and impressions, find themselves focused on the same centers of interest, experience the same feelings, have generally the same order of reactions and ideas, participate in the same myths… as a psychological, if not a biological mass' (Ellul 2006: 5). Ellul also states that propaganda is most effective when groups are fragmented by psychological means – 'only when very small groups are annihilated, when the individual finds no more defences, no equilibrium, no resistance exercised by the group to which he belongs, does total action by propaganda become possible' (ibid: 6). The fragmentation of identities, as mentioned above by Hall (1996) and fluidity of identities as illustrated by Butler (1990) and Matar (2008), are then perhaps what make way for propaganda to seep into the mind of the individual and, simultaneously, the group. In addition, as Matar points out, 'moments of crises are good opportunities for contestations and redefinitions of identities and communities' which ideologues and leaders use 'to push through and mobilize their own alternative reading of identities' (Matar 2008: 132).

In the context of this research, it may be argued that "religious propaganda" can be used effectively to interpellate the individual and the group, particularly if reinforced by the conviction of the masses and that it can function simultaneously as a divisive factor between people who accentuate difference, while bringing together people who emphasise the similarities between them. For Ellul (2006), propaganda must be total, it must come from all sides and sources, and in the case of media, all media – press, audio-visual media and personal communications – for it to be most effective. It is a matter of

'reaching and encircling the whole man and all men… furnish[ing] him with a complete system for explaining the world, and provid[ing] immediate incentives to action' (2006: 7). Ellul distinguishes between direct and sociological or pre-propaganda, the former 'aimed at modifying opinions and attitudes', the latter 'seeking to create a climate, an atmosphere of favorable preliminary attitudes' (ibid: 9); and covert or 'black' and overt or 'white' propaganda, the first hiding its 'aims, identity, significance, and source', where the people are unaware of the attempts to influence them, the second, the exact opposite, 'open and aboveboard' (ibid: 10). Propaganda must also have continuity and a long duration, he argues. As such, the nature of propaganda has changed from 1850, dealing with beliefs or ideas; now it is about provoking action. In order for anti-liberation discourse to be labelled as propaganda then, it must be tested for the above criteria.

Though it is much too vast a topic to elaborate on in this study, historically, no review of propaganda, whether or not it is based on religious factors, can disregard the Holocaust and the Nazi propaganda against Jews. In fact, Hitler made 'adversaries of different fields appear as always belonging to one category' (quoted in Burke 2006: 151), as a common enemy, and made references to religion similar to those made by the anti-liberation forces mentioned above against Bangalis and Hindus.[17] Burke's analysis of Hitler's "Battle" may prove useful in the study of anti-liberation discourse in terms of the styles and techniques employed by Hitler, such as 'the power of endless repetition', '

[17] 'I am acting in the sense of the Almighty Creator: *By warding off Jews I am fighting for the Lord's work*" (Burke 2006: 151, original italics). In a similar vein, the anti-liberation forces of Pakistan in 1971 declared, 'Everyone of us should assume the role of a Muslim soldier of an Islamic state and through cooperation to the oppressed and by winning their confidence we must kill those who are hatching conspiracy against Pakistan and Islam'. (Manik, *The Daily Star* 26 March 2009, p. 1). Parallels are also apparent in the references drawn to Aryan superiority 'which must be fought for if the laws of God are to be obeyed and any contradictions would only be "Jewish arrogance"' (quoted in Burke 2006: 151) and 'The cowards [freedom fighters] who are against Allah have attacked this holy land [Pakistan]' (Manik, *The Daily Star* 26 March 2009, p. 1).

"curative" unification', 'bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought' (Burke 2006: 164-165) and other techniques.

In their propaganda model, Herman and Chomsky (1994) demonstrate how issues of ownership, wealth and profit; advertising; reliance on official sources and experts; flak or disciplining from the state; and (in its case and period in history) anticommunist (but really any form of) ideology; are used to manufacture consent in society. However, the model's limitations include its focus on the US, its economic determinism, its lack of focus on the finer details of narrative, discourse, meaning, etc., and the belief that the state and media are always in all-powerful, unchallenged cohort with each other. While the 1971 media of Pakistan falls into this model in terms of ownership, the goals of economic profit through advertising are not as relevant. Reliance on official sources as well as flak were factors as the media were "directed" and disciplined by the state. The main factor, however, was ideology, in this case religious ideology, which was the main resource of the media in manufacturing consent. As such, while propaganda theory is certainly worth considering for the case study at hand, this research shows that the discourses in Pakistan in 1971 involve practices and forms of communication that are less organised, less intentional, less theorised; and yet more spontaneously and subtly standing on religion, culture and ideology. These, and specifically ideological state apparatuses as defined by Althusser, are the concerns this research will underline and explore.

Bennett and O'Rourke (2006) distinguish between rhetoric and propaganda – the first, often used in reference to democratic governments, the second to government-controlled media, and the frequent conflation of the two as 'persuasion'. In fact, their reference to Plato's *Giorgas* and *Phaedrus* makes clear the distinction between true rhetoric which is good and consists of passion, sincerity and good intentions towards the

hearers; popular rhetoric, which is effective, commonly accepted, popular but has unacknowledged intentions, e.g., demagoguery; and manipulative rhetoric, which employs highly skilled technique, excludes competing ideas, gives an appearance of reason and hides the real intentions from hearers, e.g., propaganda. Thus, the audience is able to choose and judge the flexible and adaptive content and intentions of true or good rhetoric.

Berger (2011) provides a comprehensive overview of rhetoric, referring to Aristotle's division of rhetoric into public speaking and logical discussion and the modes of persuasion speakers can use. He suggests that while the study of rhetoric was originally used for oratory, it is relevant to conversation and to the mass-mediated culture of today. He refers to Kenneth Burke and Wayne Booth, according to whom 'symbolic communication is inherently rhetorical because it is intended to communicate, and rhetorical criticism is concerned with how symbols communicate' (Berger 2011: 77).

An intriguing combination of propaganda and rhetoric, as well as the figures of authority rendering them, can be traced in Max Weber's notion of charismatic authority. According to Weber, the natural leaders in times of crisis are not professional, educated, trained and paid to be so, but possess an inherent charisma, 'holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit; …gifts… believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody' (Gerth and Mills 1991: 245). These leaders prove themselves and are thus recognised by the people as leaders not through the usual means of attaining leadership such as elections but through their charismatic qualities; their leadership legitimised only by personal strength. They also reject any 'rational economic conduct' (ibid: 247); 'pure charisma' is never about personal, monetary gain. If successful, the charismatic leader takes on the position of a 'God-willed master' (ibid: 249), their power springing from 'faithful devotion' (ibid). This notion of charismatic authority can arguably be found in spiritual

leaders whose authority is most often based on the 'God-given', derived from their spiritual followers. As Marranci (2009) points out, much of the literature on Islamic fundamentalism, extremism and radicalism focuses on the appeal of charismatic leaders, for example Iran's Khomeini, the Muslim Brotherhood's Hassan al-Banna and Hizbullah's Hassan Nassrallah. Though the anti-liberation discourse of 1971 may not fall into these categories, the notion of charisma may still be worth considering in terms of the political players who based their case for opposing liberation and fighting for a united Pakistan as a duty to God and Islam. For example, the speeches and quotes of the charismatic founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, are often used by political leaders and the media to establish their case for the Muslims of both wings of Pakistan remaining united. It may also be applied to Bangali leaders, in particular, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, known as "Father of the Nation" and "Bangabandhu" or friend of Bengal in Bangladesh for having led the independence movement by mobilising the Bangalis through his inspiring speeches and charismatic leadership. However, the line between rhetoric and propaganda is a fine one and the differences highly subjective. While both theories need to be studied for the purposes of this research, it may be difficult to isolate which form was used in the discourses of 1971. Thus it is worth exploring other aspects of communication.

3.3b Religion-based discourse and political violence

Propaganda, rhetoric or charisma are all modes of communication used to mobilise target populations. In this regard, Atef Alshaer, working on the Arab and Islamic worlds, suggests language and culture are important tools for power and political mobilisation which all cultures use to impose particular worldviews. He conceptualises a 'culture of communication' as:

> a communicated compendium of religious, historical, literary and mythological references used by a community as valid tropes for all times and, as such, are acted upon and treated as having authenticity. Authenticity in a culture of communication serves to manipulate language as a residue of resonant power embodied in culture as an anthropological, historical and literary space in which the powerful, the spiritual and the pertinent (to the moment) are drawn on, selectively reproduced, idolized, talked of and visualized. (Alshaer 2008: 104)

Alshaer makes a link between culture and language as mechanisms of control and in the way that 'political groups with specific agendas, cultural underpinnings and outlook, mobilize communicative channels and modes to publicize and reinforce their ideologies' (2008: 102). As such, these channels are similar to Foucault's 'micro-physics of power, the institutions and bodies of regulation and ritualization that include, along with formal institutions, different cultural spaces, such as mosques, churches and the like'… which promote activities of ideological and religious movements, 'reflecting an emerging political culture which banks on the support of the "street"', which is also echoed in Gramsci's idea of 'hegemony as consent', induced not only through state apparatus but similar 'movement-affiliated media' (ibid). As Foucault argued, power is not always and only repressive. It is and can be exercised because 'it doesn't only weigh down on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse' (Foucault 1980: 119). This study will show how religious ideology as a culture of communication was used in the formation and validation of anti-liberation discourse in 1971 East Pakistan.

The relationship between politics, religion and communication, particularly the issue of sacred authority and how it is applied has been discussed by Eickelman and Piscatori (2004), as has the relationship between culture, religion, language and ideology (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994). Eickelman and Piscatori, for example, consider the importance of symbols in discourse and images, maintaining that the symbolic component of politics can be used as instruments of both persuasion and

coercion, but that it is increasingly being used for the former. The tool of persuasion is language, a 'social and political practice' used 'to construct communal identities and promote and defend our aspirations' and 'to affirm and reaffirm hierarchies of power' (2004: 11). In their work on Iran, they cite Iranian revolutionary and sociologist 'Ali Shari'ati, who claimed that the language of religion in general and of the Semitic religions in particular is symbolic, expressing meaning through images and symbols and thus having more permanence than simple language, and give examples of the religious rhetoric of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.

Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) find that, in Iran, more than mainstream media, the role of social communication such as in the bazaar and traditional religious activity such as in mosques is important. These informal networks – ranging from preachers at mosques in Egypt to sports associations in Algeria and shanty-housing and the streets in Tunisia – and their setting the secular, modern, Western 'Other' against conservative Islam, have also been discussed in Ismail's (2006) more recent work on Islamist politics. Wickham (2002), too, describes the *da'wa* or 'call to God' and the Islamist project of ideological outreach in Egypt, ranging from interpersonal to institutional communication, including, again, preachers at mosques and religious classes, as well as Islamic books, pamphlets and cassette tapes.

In the context of South Asia, Zahab (2007) studied the discourse employed by the Pakistani Lashkar-e Taiba[18] and its network of *Al Daawat* schools which use modern technology as well as textbooks to inspire the spirit of jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom in

[18] The Lashkar-e-Taiba, literally "army of God/the righteous", is a terrorist organisation operating mainly from Pakistan. Founded in 1987, it has been held responsible for several terror attacks in South Asia, particularly against India in the form of scores of suicide attacks in the Kashmir Valley, the 2001 parliament attack and 2008 Mumbai hotel attack. Its stated objective is the introduction of an Islamic state in South Asia and the liberation of Indian-administered Kashmiri Muslims.

young children. These tools have been used along with propaganda in the state media depicting atrocities against Muslims, particularly women and children, by Indians in Kashmir, and therefore invoking the horrors of Partition which they want to avenge and mobilising them to rise in defence of the honour of their mothers and sisters in their movement for an independent Jammu and Kashmir. In a related study on the Markaz/Lashkar discourse, Sikand (2007) posits the conflict in Kashmir as not a territorial dispute but 'a war between two different and mutually opposed ideologies: Islam… and disbelief (*kufr*)' and characterization of the Hindu Other as having 'no compassion in their religion', being 'effeminate and cruel', 'oppressive', 'terrorists', 'traitors', 'cowards', 'enemies' (Sikand, 2007: 253-254) echoes the anti-liberation discourse in 1971 East Pakistan.

In other scholarship focusing specifically on rhetoric and politics, Peter Anthony DeCaro's (2003) *Rhetoric of Revolt: Ho Chi Minh's discourse for revolution* pays attention to non-Western discourses of Vietnamese communist revolutionary leader and later prime minister and president of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, which mobilised and sustained revolution in Vietnam. More pertinent to this project, however, is Hoigilt's (2011) study of Islamist rhetoric in contemporary Egypt. Focusing on three prominent Islamic figures in Egypt – Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 'Amr Khalid and Muhammad 'Imara – Hoigilt examines the persuasive tools used to convey their Islamist ideology (along with the social and political roles of the discourses). In this work, Hoigilt examines two points in particular, the use of pronominal reference and mood structures to build relations with readers (the material analysed is all written text), and 'the use of grammatical devices to construct images of Islam, Muslims and the "others"' (Hoigilt 2011: 4). Quoting and translating extensively from the works of his subjects of study, Hoigilt provides a detailed analysis of rhetoric in relation to social reality, ideology, and religious authority, passion

and polemics. While the geographical area of focus is different, the conceptual framework of the work should prove useful for this research.

Jefferis (2010) also looks at the role of rhetoric in the relationship between religion and political violence in the United States and Egypt. In comparing the Christian Coalition and the Army of God on one hand and the Muslim Brethren and al Jama'a al Islamiyya on the other, she argues that the use of religious rhetoric 'quicken[s] the closing of the window of opportunity available to [supporters], forcing religious movements to either move closer to the political center to preserve their waning influence, or further out to the fringes of the political arena to preserve the purity of their cause' (Jefferis 2010: 58). Importantly, she studies ideological framing such as those of violent duty, neglected duty, just war, etc., and concludes that in the case of both the Army of God and al Jama'a al Islamiyya, 'violence has been transformed from an extreme act requiring justification by external events to a moral responsibility whose abdication must be justified' (ibid: 136). As such, the failure to use or even the questioning of the use of violence is seen as a rejection of God. Religion-based actions are committed at the bequest of and not on behalf of a superior being, and the 'ideological frame of religious belief can act as an intangible alternative to the violence-inducing elements of structure' (ibid: 137), casting violence as a responsibility rather than a right.

More specifically relevant to this study, Wright (2009) explores the link between warfare frames and religious violence and suggests that 'the framing of political conflict in terms of a "sacred struggle" elevates violence to a moral imperative' and that in these circumstances, 'violence becomes sacralized as a heroic act and a religious duty' (Wright 2009: 17). Dehumanisation, demonisation and classification of the victim as an inferior species is a part of war framing, claims the author, and 'religion is a dynamic force that is

frequently marshalled to mobilize aggrieved or disenfranchised populations against perceived enemies' (ibid: 21). Matar's (2008) article is useful in this regard in the analysis of Hizbullah's political communication strategies – the mediated charisma, political-religious discourse, communication style and rhetoric used by its secretary-general Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah. Interesting comparisons can be drawn between the mediated images of religious/political leader Nassrallah and similar political players in 1971 who opposed liberation such as Ghulam Azam, who shares his intimacy, credibility, popular reputation as a superior mythical figure as well as being a man of the masses and Delwar Hossain Sayedee, whose language, though ideologically powerful, is accessible and comprehensible; and almost all the members of the religion-based political parties, his style of dressing, which 'projects an asceticism as opposed to conspicuous consumption' (Matar 2008: 131).

How far religious rhetoric in general and the media in particular can cause people to act violently or kill is open to question, but Al-Rasheed and Shterin suggest that the media 'certainly disseminate the poetics by which killing can be made meaningful to an audience' (Al-Rasheed and Shterin, 2009: xxix). In fact, Ghassem-Fachandi (2012), in his study of the anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat in 2002, describes how references to meat consumption, butchering, and bodily mutilation in the media and in conversations among people and particularly political actors, 'played a major role in Gujarati imaginaries leading to and accompanying the pogrom' (Ghassem-Fachandi 2012: 14). In Indonesia, too, a Muslim man was charged with inciting anti-Christian violence in December 1998 using flyers, banners and graffiti (Sidel 2006).

In contrast to all of the above, Cavanaugh (2009) in *The Myth of Religious Violence* challenges the conventional notion that religion has a tendency to promote violence, not by denying the fact that religions can and do promote violence under certain

conditions, but by arguing that 'ideologies and institutions labeled "secular" can be just as violent as those labeled "religious"' (2009: 3). He contends that attempts to separate religious violence from secular violence are 'incoherent'; that such distinctions are a function of different configurations of power and that such attempts to create a 'transhistorical and transcultural concept of religion that is essentially prone to violence is one of the foundational legitimating myths of the liberal nation-state' (ibid: 4).

It is worth noting here that, just as Cavanaugh's work is not a 'defense of religion against the charge of violence' (ibid: 5) but an exploration of the *myth* of religious violence, this study is not an attack on religion as a promoter of violence but an analysis of the *discourse* surrounding violence purportedly rooted in religion. It does not suggest that it is the *essence of any religion* which is used in the mobilisation of violence. Rather, the focus throughout this thesis is on ideological framing – in this case it happens to be that of religion-based discourse – in violence. This is why it demonstrates an almost complete process in which this occurs – through the construction of the nation and identity, followed by the framing of religious justification for violence.

Violence, in times of both war and peace, is not limited to physical aggression but also includes sexual violence, often on a mass scale that can even end up taking the form of genetic imperialism and ethnic cleansing as it did in Bangladesh, Bosnia, Rwanda and Sudan (Card 1996, Goldstein 2001, Sajjad 2009). In 1971 East Pakistan, the mass rape of hundreds of thousands of Bangali women has even been argued as being a form of genocide (Halder 2012). I would argue that in such contexts, sexual violence is a form of wider political violence and merits a similar but focused study of the process of provocations leading to perpetration.

3.4 Sexual Violence in Wartime

While there is ample literature on sexual violence in wartime and its motivations and consequences, how this is mobilised in relation to religion has hardly been studied. This research thus aims to study the ideology and rhetoric, if any, whether nationalist, religious, etc., which might have encouraged such violence during Bangladesh's liberation war. It should be noted, however, that while the mass rape was primarily perpetrated by the Pakistani military, collaborators from East Pakistan also took part by handing over Bangali, many of them Hindu, women to the army as well as committing acts of sexual violence themselves.

Sexual violence is a specific form of violence perpetrated mostly against women. Rape in general and in wartime in particular has historically been used as a weapon of power to humiliate and demoralise the enemy. As Yuval-Davis states, 'women are often required to carry the "burden of representation" as they are constructed as the symbolic bearers of the collectivity's identity and honour, both personally and collectively' (1998: 29) and systematic rape is often targeted, along with the women, at the 'enemy collectivity' (ibid). In fact, 'women are regarded as carriers of culture whose bodies are symbols of the nation to be defended by men' (Islam 2012: 1).

The widespread practice of rape in wartime has been attributed to three primary motivations – winning the enemy women as booty or the spoils of war, humiliating their men, and promoting soldierly solidarity among the perpetrators (Cockburn 2001). Rape is also used to impregnate women with the 'enemy's' children, to make them socially unacceptable or physically unable to bear children and have them ostracised from society for bringing dishonour to their families and communities (Sharlach 2000). As Yasmin Saikia writes with specific reference to 1971, 'Women served the purpose of being

objects for men to carry out the will of terror required by the state for establishing its power' (Saikia 2011: 98).

In the case of Bangladesh, official and unofficial estimates of rape range between 200,000 and 400,000 women (Debnath 2009, Mookherjee 2002). Girls and women from the ages of seven to seventy-five were raped, gang-raped, and either killed or taken away by the military to become sex slaves to officers and soldiers for the duration of the war. Some of them killed themselves. The tragic stories of those who survived are documented in, among other texts, Ibrahim (2007), Mookherjee (2002) and Saikia (2011). Even on the day of surrender, the Pakistani military claimed to be leaving their 'seed' behind in the women impregnated in the mass rape (Sharlach 2000).

Soon after the war ended, the state bestowed upon the women the title of "Birangona" or "war heroines". I have argued elsewhere (Islam 2012) that despite this apparent discourse of honour, the women remained victims of rape in wartime and neglect and dishonour in the peacetime that followed while Bina D'Costa (2011) has argued that the government-sponsored official narrative which glorifies the war, the fiction and non-fiction Bangla literature which touches upon people's suffering, and 'the experiences of survivors as found in their silences' (2011: 104), particularly women and girls who were raped and impregnated or raped and killed, and their families, have all contributed to the general silencing and secrecy of women who endured sexual violence during the war. The perpetration of rape in 1971 necessitates the examination of the role of discourse, whether based on religion or nationalism, in the provocation and justification of such acts. The instrumentalisation of religion in particular, in the formation of national identity and the mobilisation of violence both physical and sexual, and, more specifically, the means, forms and styles of communication used to promote it, are the focal points of this research project. The silence on sexual violence during the

war, the silencing of the Bihari narrative in post-liberation Bangladesh as well as the silence around the entire war in Pakistani history and current narratives have arguably created a 'memoricide' – a term used by Palestinian historian Nur Masalha (2012) in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – the changing, distorting and silencing of narratives, through which a destruction of memory takes place. Silences, absences and memoricide are also thus key issues which need to be explored in this study of the narratives surrounding Bangladesh's liberation war.

The media play an important role in the formation of discourses, making use of both language and the absence of language. This thesis is a study of media discourses based on the print media, that is, two newspapers from 1971 Pakistan and their role in the promotion of an ideology of religious unity over ethnic difference during Bangladesh's independence movement.

3.5 Discourse and Narrative

For Michel Foucault, power and knowledge are closely connected, and it is knowledge that produces discourse. Discourses produce the subjects we are and the objects we have knowledge about (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). 'Truth is a discursive construction and different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and false' (ibid: 13). Foucault studies the infinite ways of formulating statements, of including and excluding voices, of similarity and repetition, and of absence, arguing that '"truth" is embedded in, and produced by, systems of power' (ibid) and so, because it is unattainable, asking what is true or false is pointless, rather, it is the process of how effects of truth are created in discourses, 'the discursive processes through which discourses are constructed in ways that give the impression that they represent true or false pictures of reality' (ibid: 14) that is important. In this context, this study explores

the representation of reality and the construction of the nation and identities through the framing of religion-based ideology in the media during the 1971 war.

Matheson (2005) proposes that media is neither a reflection of the world, nor is it a constructed picture of reality. Instead, 'news makes sense within a social context: if it acts at all as a mirror, it reflects preoccupations within that society, and when it constructs a picture of the world, that picture is often very close to what members of that society already know' (Matheson 2005: 1). In his work on discourses produced by media texts, he shows how reporters and subeditors draw upon and reproduce social reality, re-emphasise social roles, feed fears, etc., and argues that news can only appear as a reflection of society and make sense 'if it adheres to a set of social norms and principles of discourse' (ibid: 2). This is, again, similar to the workings of ideology and myth discussed in the sections above.

According to Matheson, besides journalistic conventions, there are also social conventions on which the news depend, such as 'what people are like, what words mean, what is natural and commonsensical, who gets to speak in society and what is real' (ibid). News discourse, he argues, is the 'coming together of a variety of norms and principles and unstated assumptions' and by analysing news languages, he suggests that the social basis of news can be uncovered and whether news perpetuates or challenges this social basis and its power to convince and manipulate (ibid). However, Matheson shows that 'it is important to see texts within their contexts, and particularly as language in action as part of a social practice, rather than as stand-alone texts' (2005: 5). There is also a need to acknowledge that the same words and language can hold different meanings in different contexts, as part of different discourses, depending on who is using them and how. Thus, for example, the concept of nationalism in 1971 Pakistan specifically meant Islamic nationalism based primarily on religion, both of which were used to mobilise people

against the liberation of Bangladesh, whereas in then East Pakistan as well as Bangladesh today, nationalism was and is strongly associated with Bangali ethnic identity and secularism, based on which the Bangalis fought for independence then and fight religious extremism now.

The literature on news and representation is vast, as is the literature that considers news as narrative (see Jack Lule, Barbie Zelizer, for example). However, Fulton (2005) distinguishes between news as information and news as narrative, though she does suggest that all news is narrativised. In her discussion around the role of narrative as cultural production and in the construction of the audience, she outlines the strategies used to narrativise news – angle, point of closure, individualisation, focalisation and chronology – all of which, through focus on particular events, angles, sources and attributing characteristics to them, often end up telling stories in the style of fiction rather than providing objective information in the form of hard news. As the empirical chapters of this study will demonstrate, the news published in the Pakistani wartime media was largely narrativised. While positioned most often on front pages and given the treatment of hard news, they focused on and were slanted towards anti-liberation discourse, using selective sources, heroising certain characters, and providing opinion and commentary on events and their outcomes. For example, front page news stories went beyond reporting war casualties to "martyrdom" of the Pakistani forces who would be going to heaven, as opposed to the "killing" of Hindu "miscreants" who, judging by the tone of the reports, were getting what they deserved. Not only did editorials and commentaries in the papers examined here take an obvious one-sided stand against liberation, but news itself took the form of storytelling, with characters of Muslim Pakistani brothers, mothers and sisters being killed and violated and thus avenging themselves against Hindu Indian "criminals/goons/oppressors", etc. The news coverage of the war over the nine months,

rather than the reporting of facts, indeed, ignoring important news values such as balance and objectivity, became a story, almost like a film script, that carried a specific message for its target audience.

3.6 Significance of the Study

As this chapter has discussed, while there are many studies on nationalism and identity, politics, violence and religion, the relationship between all these and the role of communication and the media has been less explored, especially in the context of South Asia in general and Bangladesh in particular. The rising violent religious extremism in Bangladesh in recent times – some but not all of it related to the liberation war and the ongoing war crimes trial – and the use of communication technologies by local perpetrators and foreign extremist groups and its coverage in the media makes this study not only relevant but necessary. This research seeks to complement these works, but will focus on the role of ideology/myth/narrative/discourse in the construction of nation, identities, subjectivities and the Other as strategies of legitimisation in purportedly religion-based conflict, that is, using or abusing religion to instigate violence for what are at least not obviously economic class-based reasons. It will look at the role of ideology and power in the formation of discourses that act as representations of reality and truth, invoking history and religion and provoking belief and action.

The following chapter will discuss the methodology, detailing the research methods selected for this study, particularly discourse analysis but also interviews, their use and usefulness in the context of this research, as well as their limitations. It will also address the issue of ethics and the positionality and self-reflexivity of the researcher.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides insight into the methods and significance of this research project, describing the research methods employed, the tools of data collection, selection and analysis, and, in the last section, the issue of reflexivity of the researcher, including, in brief, the limitations of the study. As discussed previously, this study addresses ideology and how it is used discursively, but the study itself is not free of ideology. As Adrian Holliday states, 'The ideological nature of qualitative research, both in its impact on the research setting and the people in it, and in the way it constructs its own realities, makes its writing a highly sensitive task' (2007: 116). In fact, personal narrative, contends Holliday, 'can often help to give a greater insight and a fresh perspective to the data.'

It is from this premise that I begin this chapter – with my own story of how this research came to be. I present a personal account of growing up as a Bangali woman in post-liberation Bangladesh in an era dominated by pro-liberation narratives and the war crimes trial underway. I then lay down the current political situation in Bangladesh which has been characterised, particularly in the last three years, by religiously motivated violence, pointing out the need for this study at this time. I then discuss the practicalities of this research – the process of data collection, the methods of data analysis, and the limitations of the data and methods of analysis.

4.1 Growing up Bangali

After spending a couple of years in Bangladesh as an infant in the 1980s, and then another couple as a teenager in the late 1990s, I really went back home, so to say, when starting university. The University of Dhaka is the country's top public university, with a rich historical legacy of having contributed to the nation's Language Movement of 1952, Liberation War of 1971, and the anti-autocratic movement of the 1980s, in all of which the institution's students, teachers, or both, had lost their lives. Surrounded by monuments dedicated to these movements, and teachers and students with a keen sense of history in general and the country's liberation movement in particular, I, too, became interested in the history, significance and consequences of the war and the principles on which it was based – nationalism, secularism, socialism and democracy. I became aware of the rather intense resentment of Pakistan among those who had fought or lost anyone in the war, but also among many of the pro-liberation younger generation, which, for example, came to the fore during cricket matches where any Bangladeshi supporters of Pakistan were labelled "razakars" (the name of one of the auxiliary forces of the Pakistani army in 1971 but now commonly used in Bangladesh to mean traitor). It was in this context that I myself developed a keen sense of "Bangali" identity. As Castells has shown, identities are the result of a combination of 'history, geography, biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory, personal fantasies, power apparatuses and religious revelations' (Castells 2004:7). As discussed in the previous chapter, whereas legitimising identity is formed by dominant institutions, resistance identities are also formed, by those excluded from the first process.

Interestingly, after the end of a prolonged period of military rule and the end of the 20th century seeing a revival in nationalist sentiment in Bangladesh, the beginning of the 21st century also brought with it a resurgence in religion-based politics and political

violence, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001. Various 'extremist' groups came into the limelight for their militant operations, and whereas their traditional base was in religious schools or *madrasas*, what intrigued me most, as an upper-middle class, English-medium-school-educated, Bangali woman, was the increasing affiliation of young men and women from this very class, born and raised in affluent families and educated in elite schools and universities, to these extremist outfits. Leaving the root causes to be explored by sociologists and political scientists, as a student of communication, I was more interested in how these young recruits were mobilised and convinced to join the cause and, ultimately, engage in violence.

I was born a Muslim; almost all members of my family are believers and many of them practitioners of the faith. Yet killing in the name of religion was not something that seemed acceptable to us or other devout Muslims I knew, and I became interested to study how communication and discourse based on religion, or certain ways of framing religious ideology, could motivate one to perpetrate acts of violence and the role of the media in facilitating this. I decided to start at the beginning, at least in terms of my young country, and began to plan my doctoral research around the use of religion during the Liberation War of 1971.

4.2 Violence in the Name of Religion

In 2010, with the commencement of the war crimes trial in Bangladesh, the discourse around the war and religion gained momentum. This was largely due to the fact that many of those who had opposed and actively fought against liberation and were now being tried, claimed to have done so on the basis of religion, as has been shown in the introductory chapters. In late 2012, just as I was finalising and sending out my PhD proposal and facing scholarship interviews, violence broke out following the conviction

of some of the accused, and the main anti-liberation party in then East Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami's student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir, were sending out text messages to its activists, encouraging them to fight as, according to television news reports at the time which revealed some of these texts, "the police brutality and torturous imprisonment and punishment suffered in this life will be rewarded manifold times in the next".

When sentencing began and the first convicted war criminal was awarded life imprisonment, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in February 2013 around the city's central Shahbagh area, demanding maximum punishment of the convicted war criminals, i.e., the death penalty. What has come to be known as the Shahbagh Movement, was initially organised by an online community of bloggers, but it soon gained momentum as a people's movement, with people from all walks of life gathering there every day in protest, through speeches, chants, songs and the burning of effigies of the war criminals. Tributes were paid to the Liberation War and its martyrs, with people forming Bangladeshi maps with flowers, candles, painting their faces with the national flag, etc. The Shahbagh area and the capital in general seemed to be throbbing with nationalist fervour and pro-liberation sentiment, which was understandable as after over forty years, justice was finally being served.

That very month, however, one of the aforementioned bloggers was killed, hacked to death outside his home, and this incident arguably turned the whole movement around, as suggested in some public spheres. Responsibility for the killing was claimed by religious extremists who claimed that the victim was an atheist and had insulted Islam and the Prophet Mohammed with the writings on his blog. This eventually led to a division in the mass movement, with it now being portrayed as a movement led by atheists, which, in a Muslim majority country, did not go down well with the general population. While people still gather in Shahbagh in protest or celebration every time

another war criminal is sentenced or the sentence is carried out, the mass movement has more or less disintegrated.

Between 2013 and at the time of writing this chapter in July 2016, nearly 50 people had been killed in attacks blamed on Islamist militants, starting with bloggers in 2013 and 2015, and going on to include academics, LGBTQ rights activists and, most recently, several members of religious minority groups and a few foreigners. Some of those arrested in the blogger killings have admitted that they didn't even know what blogs were, but that their religious teachers taught them that these bloggers were "against Islam" and that it was their "religious responsibility" to kill them. Along the same discursive lines, the war criminals being sentenced and punished were also claiming that they were being killed for having tried to establish Islam in the country (in 1971) and that they were sacrificing their lives for the cause of Islam.

What this means is that the use of religion-based discourse did not end with the Liberation War but that it has been gaining strength in the present. The media and other forms of communication play a significant role in facilitating this, and while the relationship between religion and politics has always been an important though inconclusive subject of study, the role of the media, especially in the context of Asia and Bangladesh particularly, has hardly been examined.

For this reason, through this research, I go back to history to study the use of religion-based rhetoric from the very birth of Bangladesh, which is largely at the root of what is happening there today (communal politics obviously goes back to the Partition of India in 1947 and earlier). I focus on the framing of religious ideology in the discursive construction of the nation and nationalism; the discursive formation of identities; the legitimisation of political violence through the tropes of jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom;

and the validation of sexual violence through its silent/absent representation in anti-liberation discourse.

4.3 Collecting the Data

For my primary data, I have relied on the most visible, tangible and permanent form of media – newspapers. In my case, this was also the only feasible data source for information and analysis. Unfortunately, preservation and archiving of historical documents was not one of the first priorities of the post-liberation Bangladeshi government, and not only were other propaganda material which I hoped to get at the outset of this research, such as posters or leaflets used by anti-liberation groups not available, but even television and radio archives of anti-liberation material from 1971 was non-existent. Upon finding nothing but a few CDs of pro-liberation material in the radio archives, and after being informed that the television archives had none, I decided to focus on newspapers backed by interviews of some witnesses to the war.

Fig. 1: Methods



Newspapers from that time were not easy to come by. Only a few institutions such as the University of Dhaka and the Bangla Academy[19] had preserved these crucial documents, and these too were seized by the War Crimes Tribunal for purposes of research for the war crimes trial, but also to protect them from those trying to destroy evidence of the war. The care and security of the newspapers from 1971 was placed upon the Bangla Academy, with the slightly less important, less sought after papers available in the National Archives. Thus, after securing special permission with the help of contacts from my time as a journalist as well as family connections, I gained access to both, though it was kept under wraps due to security reasons.

I spent four months in the room of the Bangla Academy librarian, arriving every morning at around 9:30/10am and staying on until past afternoon, unlocking trunk by trunk the newspapers from 1971, myself locked into the room. I began to feel partly responsible for the preservation of this history, as I went through what were often grimy and torn pages, trying not to destroy them further. In their condition photocopying was not an option, and so, as I went through every frail page, I would scan the relevant items with my handheld scanner, newly discovered through friends and imported from the US for this specific purpose. My notes went into a notebook, and later, all the data into an Excel sheet (see Appendix), in chronological order and colour coded by theme – blue for issues of Islamic identity, green for nationalism in relation to religion, orange for references to the Hindu enemy, shades of pink for sacrifice and martyrdom, deep red for anything with the mention of jihad, and violet for references to women. Without the use

[19] Following the Language Movement of 1952, the Bangla Academy was established in 1955 for the promotion of the Bangla language. The organisation conducts research on Bangla language, culture and history; publishes literary and research work; organises a month-long book fair every February to commemorate the language movement and martyrs; and recognises and awards contributions to the Bangla language through the Bangla Academy Award every year. It is also a repository for newspapers.

of any software such as Nvivo, I did everything manually, but for this reason my confidence in my empirical data is high, I know almost for certain that I did not miss anything. I also went through a few other newspapers from 1971 in the National Archives but did not find anything of very great value to my research.

4.4 Sampling and Selection of Data

My purposive sampling of the newspapers I looked at included, first and foremost, the *Dainik Sangram*. This was the mouthpiece of the main anti-liberation party in East Pakistan, the Jamaat-i-Islami. The editor of the paper at the time was Akhter Faruk, and its publisher Mohammad Shakhi Mia, and though it is not confirmed whether or not they held any official positions in the party, the autobiography of Ghulam Azam, the leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami in East Pakistan, mentioned the paper as being published to give voice to the party which it was not being given by other media.

Due to its importance, I studied the paper from its inception in 1970, doing a random sampling of five issues per month, and examined each page of every issue from 1971. Due to the large volume of data gathered from 1971 itself, however, the papers discussed in the thesis do not include those from 1970, which only serve to set a context. Ultimately, I used 736 items published between March and November 1971, eight of the nine months of the war as the December issues were not to be found with the war ending in mid-December in any case. The *Dainik Sangram* is one of the most important sources of evidence for the War Crimes Tribunal, because whereas the Jamaat-i-Islami can claim that other papers published propaganda against it, it cannot say the same for its own publication, which reflected its own discourse and propaganda. Accurate circulation statistics for newspapers from that time are difficult to come by but it is safe to say that

Sangram was read if not by the general population, then at least by its supporters, i.e., those who opposed liberation.

The second paper I looked at was the *Dainik Pakistan*, later *Dainik Bangla*, a government-owned paper, selected in order to reflect the general media discourse prevalent in the country at the time. According to journalist Saleh Choudhury[20], a reporter with the daily at the time, the content of the newspaper was "directed" by members of the Pakistan army, with the overarching theme being anti-India and giving the impression that peace reigned in East Pakistan (even while it was at war).[21] For this paper too I conducted random sampling of five issues per month and came up with 29 items relevant to my study.

The third paper, *Dawn*, was published in West Pakistan, and while I went through its issues of 1971, for the purposes of this study, I decided to focus only on several advertisements related to jihad that were published towards the end of the war.

The analysis in this thesis covers all issues from March-November 1971 of the *Dainik Sangram*, randomly sampled and selected issues from April-December of 1971 of the *Dainik Pakistan*, and advertisements printed in December 1971 issues of *Dawn*. I use many direct quotes in the empirical chapters – quotes made by political and religious

[20] Saleh Choudhury, journalist. Personal interview. 22 October 2014, conducted at his residence in Uttara, Dhaka.

[21] This was not unusual for the Pakistani press even before as well as during the war of 1971. Niazi (2010) contends that it was this betrayal of 'Jinnah's faith in liberalism, his regard for sanctity of fundamental human rights and the freedom of the press, through the imposition of 'black laws' and the prosecution of publications and members of the press who did not toe the line, that to a large extent led to the war. In fact, with regards to the objectivity of the Pakistani press, Niazi writes: 'The most tragic example of slanted reporting, half truths and naked lies, came to light during the East Pakistan debacle in 1971' (Niazi 2010: 155). The government-controlled press, radio and television 'was busy telling the nation that "everything was under control" and our armed forces had "successfully crushed" the "subversive and disgruntled elements" in the eastern wing' as well as promising '"war till victory" on the western front' (Niazi 2010: 201).

leaders cited in the newspapers as well as quotations from news reports, editorials, commentaries, etc., – followed by my own analysis and interpretation of their meaning and connotations.

One of the key tasks in writing up as well as analysing these quotes was that of translation from Bangla to English and, often, the transliteration of Urdu and Arabic words as well which were frequently used in the East Pakistani press. In order to follow a standard, the Bangla Academy Bengali-English Dictionary was used for purposes of translation, as well as three dictionaries of Islam and Islamic history. Despite this, however, as with all translations between all languages, it is never exact, as not every language has the exact signifiers for all signifieds, but care has been taken to translate words, phrases and their connotations to the closest possible meanings in English. Where there was no other recourse, online sources, including Wikipedia, have also been referred to.

4.5 Analysing the Data

Two methods have been selected for the purposes of conducting this research – discourse analysis of material collected through archival research and interviews. Discourse analysis covers all key aspects of this study – the framing of religious ideology by those opposed to liberation to produce discursive knowledge leading to action in countering Bangladesh's independence movement. Interviews act as a secondary method affirming the findings of the discourse analysis.

4.5a Discourse and its analysis

In recent years, there has been a 'sociologizing of discourse research' (Keller 2013: 1) with social science analysis of discourse growing and the number of approaches expanding. Gumul (2010), for example, in her discussion of ideology, refers to various, modified definitions of ideology to suit its more contemporary use particularly in the context of critical discourse analysis (CDA). She notes the difference between traditional definitions of ideology as a political doctrine or philosophical stance 'with negative connotations denoting overt manipulation and deception' (2010: 95) and those within CDA-oriented approaches where ideology is seen as more neutral and as a reflection of the thoughts, beliefs and values of a society.

Discourse, in everyday English, means 'a simple conversation', as Keller states (2013: 5), while in French and other Romance languages it refers to '"learnéd speech", a lecture, a treatise, sermon, presentation and more besides. Talking of "public or political discourses" in both languages refers to the debates in the public (political sphere), mediated by mass media' (ibid). Initially a linguistic concept referring to 'passages of connected writing or speech', discourse was defined by Michel Foucault more broadly as 'the production of knowledge through language' (cited in Hall 2004: 346).

As Garrett and Bell (1998) note, while text tends to refer to 'the outward manifestation of a communication event' (1998: 3), discourse examines the context – the actors, their motivations, the environment, medium, evolution of different types of communication and their relationship to each other. Talbot (2007) also distinguishes between text – 'the observable product of interaction: a cultural object' and discourse – 'the process of interaction itself: a cultural activity' (2007: 9), creatively referring to text as 'the fabric in which discourse is manifested' (ibid).

Discourse consists of language as well as practice. It situates a topic in a particular historical context – and thus is subject to change – defining it, determining what is and is not to be talked about and how people should conduct themselves in relation to it, thus linking power to both the mind (knowledge) and the body (practice) (Hall 2004). Foucault views discourse as 'the historically specific relations between disciplines (bodies of knowledge) [such as medicine, sociology] and disciplinary practices (forms of social control and social possibility) [and disciplinary institutions of social control such as the prison, school, hospital, etc.]' (McHoul and Grace 2002: 26). 'Discursive practices may have major ideological effects', producing and reproducing unequal power relations, 'passing off assumptions (often falsifying ones) about any aspect of social life as mere common sense' (Fairclough and Wodak 2004: 357). Discourse analysis

> examines patterns of language across texts and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used… the ways that the use of language presents different views of the world and different understandings… the effects the use of language has upon social identities and relations… how views of the world, and identities, are constructed through the use of discourse. (Paltridge 2012: 2)

Stuart Hall analyses discourse in terms of Foucault's main subjects of study – madness, punishment and sexuality – but this analysis can be applied to any form of discourse. In terms of the research at hand, the anti-liberation discourse studied here must be examined for the following elements taken from Hall (2004) based on Foucault's definition of discourse: statements which produce a certain knowledge, in this case, about the division of Pakistan in relation to religion; the ways of talking about it, what is included and what is excluded; 'subjects' who personify the discourse – the Muslim Pakistani as opposed to the 'Hindu Other' freedom-seeking Bangali; how authority is bestowed upon knowledge of the topic, that is, the assertions of political and religious figures opposed to liberation; institutional practices for dealing with the subjects which

would, in this case, include those of the Pakistani government, military and media as well as organisers of the anti-liberation forces in East Pakistan.

The final component of discourse, according to Hall, is an 'acknowledgement that a different discourse or *episteme* will arise at a later historical moment, supplanting the existing one, opening up a new *discursive formation* … new discourses with the power and authority, the "truth", to regulate social practices in new ways' (Hall 2004: 347, original italics). This is apparent in the fact that liberation was achieved through the challenging of anti-liberation discourse which eventually made way for the independence of Bangladesh. Jorgensen and Phillips, drawing on Foucault, describe discourse as 'the rules that determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a particular historical epoch' (2002: 12). As Hall too notes, 'knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of "the truth" but has the power to *make itself true*' (ibid, original italics). and, even if temporary – as all discourses tend to be – the same was true of anti-liberation discourse and those who believed in it.

Fairclough and Wodak (2004) also highlight the characteristics of discourse in reference to a radio interview by Margaret Thatcher. While theirs is a critical discourse analysis, they refer to discourse in general as constituting society and culture, being ideological, historical, a form of social action, to power relations as being discursive, and to discourse analysis as being interpretative and explanatory. Paltridge, too, writes of the importance of 'social, political underpinnings of spoken and written discourse' and the 'ideological thrust of seemingly ordinary, everyday genres' (2012: 32).

Majid Khosravinik, a specialist on critical discourse analysis, describes it in terms of combining '*topic plus attitude* in the recognition of and engagement with a given discourse' (2015: 53). As such, the method is an analysis of the qualities of an

"automatically clear" discourse – religious discourse – where critical analysis of the discourse is 'simultaneously the operationalization and realisation of critique' (ibid: 54).

Khosravinik (2015), in his book *Discourse, Identity and Legitimacy*, refers to the debate between Billig (2008), on the one hand, and van Dijk (2008), on the other, in which Billig expresses concern over the use of technical language in CDA studies as if language is the agent of action, whereas the psychology of language users is also important. However, as Khosravinik, drawing on Fairclough, suggests 'the use of certain linguistic forms is *not* automatically ideological and/or does not *always* create similar effects… power manifests itself *in* language rather than being derived *from* language' (Khosravinik 2015: 64) which means one needs to pay attention to the specific contexts under which language is used.

This study also borrows from van Dijk's (1998) critical discourse analysis of editorials and op-eds. In it, he looks at discourse structures which contribute to discursive formations. Van Dijk also elaborates on the common "us versus them" or Othering strategy, labelling it as the "ideological square", whereby "our" good properties and actions are emphasised, "theirs" mitigated, and "our" bad properties and actions mitigated, "theirs" emphasised.

Particularly useful to this study is Reisigl and Wodak's (2009) discourse-historical approach as summarised by Khosravinik (2015). The strategies of nomination (linguistically referring to people, objects, events, etc.), predication (characteristics and qualities attributed to them), argumentation, perspectivisation, framing or discourse representation, and intensification or mitigation (articulation of the utterances) enable the attainment of objectives such as discursive construction, discursive qualification, justification and questioning claims of truth, positioning of speakers and writers and modifying "illocutionary force". Devices include tropes and metaphors, stereotypes and

comparisons, fallacies, speech and quotations, and other linguistic mechanisms. However, this study does not use a micro-linguistic analytical method, but employs broad frames to analyse the discourses in the media under study.

Marianne Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips in their book *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (2002) offer three practical streams for the use of discourse analysis focusing on discursive struggle, intertextuality and discursive psychology. The first stream, as applied by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, focuses on discursive struggle. Largely based on Foucault's poststructuralist idea that discourse constructs the social world in meaning, it suggests that because language is not fixed, neither can meaning be fixed, but is constantly changing based on different discursive encounters. The second stream draws upon Norman Fairclough's application of critical discourse analysis as outlined above. For Fairclough, discourse is one of many aspects of social practice and language draws upon already established meanings. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe see the process as a struggle, Fairclough sees it as one of intertextuality, where a combination of elements from different discourses can influence individual discourses and the social and cultural world.

For this study, I, analyse media texts and their relation to other discourses, such as religious discourses, beginning with the premise that neither language nor meaning are fixed and as such neither are discourses fixed or constant. In terms of this study, the process *is* one of discursive struggle but I focus on only the one discourse or rather a combination of many as represented in the newspapers examined here. I look at the intertextuality in terms of the relationship between a variety of discourses as reflected in these newspapers and I also use this to analyse the role of discourse in creating and negotiating representations of the world. This research is not a comparative study of the discourses in the struggle but an analysis of the holistic discourse of anti-liberation as

represented in the chosen media. I use the method of discourse analysis as a complete theoretical and methodological "package" as described by Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) who value multiperspectival work for its ability to combine elements from different discourse and non-discourse analytical perspectives in order to produce a broader understanding of a phenomenon. The result is thus an analysis of the overall discourse, its formation and significance in relation to power, ideology and identity construction, rather than a critical discourse analysis of the linguistic and semantic structures and details. I look at the framing of religion-based ideology by those in power in the media which was used as a discursive tool in the formation of anti-liberation discourse during the war.

For Keller (2013), there is a distinction between discourse and theories and analysis of discourse. He writes:

> Discourses may be understood as more or less successful attempts to stabilize, at least temporarily, attributions of meaning and orders of interpretation, and thereby to institutionalize a collectively binding order of knowledge in a social ensemble. Discourse theories or discourse analyses, on the other hand, are scientific endeavours designed to investigate the processes implied here: social sciences' discourse research is concerned with the relationship between speaking/writing as activity or social practices and the (re)production of meaning systems/orders of knowledge, the social actors involved in this, the rules and resources underlying these processes, and their consequences in social collectivities. (Keller 2013: 2)

Discourse theories and analyses are not interested in social-structural formations in linguistic usage or linguistic usage as a form or performance of action but is more 'the analysis of institutional regulations of declarative practices and their performative and reality-constituting power' (Keller 2013: 3). Importantly, Keller notes that discourse theories and analyses:

> are concerned with the actual use of (written or spoken) language and other symbolic forms in social practices; emphasize that in the practical use of signs, meanings of phenomena are socially constructed and these phenomena are thereby constituted in their social reality; claim that individual instances of interpretation may be understood as parts of a more comprehensive discourse structure that is temporarily produced and stabilized by specific institutional-organizational contexts; and assume that the use of symbolic orders is subject to rules of interpretation and action that may be reconstructed. (ibid)

In terms of media discourse, the media, as Khosravinik argues, play an 'active, political role in cultural relations of power… active in the politics of sense-making (Khosravinik 2015: 72), or as Fairclough suggests, the media do not just reflect the preferences of the audience but 'justify, preserve, rationalise, conceptualise and represent the interests of dominant groups' (Fairclough 1993 cited in Khosravinik 2015: 72) thereby 'play[ing] a crucial role in the persuasive production of dominant ideologies' (van Dijk 1988 cited in Khosravinik 2015: 72). As Caldas-Coulthard (2003) suggests, news is 'not the event, but the partial, ideologically framed report of the event' (cited in Khosravinik 2015: 73), providing people with 'a picture of the world which makes the development of one kind of attitude more likely than another' (Hartmann and Husband 1974 cited in Khosravinik 2015: 73).

It is important to note, however, that power is not inherent in discourse, it does not exist in the words or images that make up a discourse. Norman Fairclough clarifies this in *Language and Power* (2015) and his discussion of power in and behind discourse: 'on the one hand that power is exercised and enacted in discourse, and on the other hand that there are relations of power behind discourse' (2015: 98). Power is won, held and lost in social struggles in both cases, with discourse being the site of power struggles as well as the stake in in it, that is, control over orders of discourse (ibid). Media discourse is particularly interesting in this regard as, according to Fairclough, the nature of power relations enacted in the media are often unclear, making it a hidden form of and exercise in power.

4.5b Why media discourse

Fairclough (2015) notes that, while in face-to-face interaction and discourse participants alternate in their roles as producers and receivers/interpreters of text, with

regards to media production and content, this is a more one-sided process, with a sharp divide between producers and interpreters, with 'the media "product" tak[ing] on some of the nature of a commodity, between producers and "consumers"' (2015: 78). Fairclough also argues that in face-to-face interactions people adapt their language and communication use and patterns based on the feedback they receive during the process of interaction, whereas media discourse designed for mass – nameless, faceless, unknown – audiences, is most often targeted to an '*ideal subject*' (ibid, original italics). 'Media discourse has built into it a subject position for an ideal subject, and actual viewers or listeners or readers have to negotiate a relationship with the ideal subject' (ibid). This, combined with the fact that 'producers have sole producing rights and can therefore determine what is included and excluded, how events are represented' (ibid: 79), underlines how media producers exercise power over consumers. It may be argued that modern media technology enabling interaction and instant feedback, for example in digital media, may overcome this to an extent, but especially in the case of the mainstream media, power, including the ability to select and control the flow of feedback even online, remains with the producers.

In the case study here, while the focus is on language and discourse, who produces this discourse – the selection of sources quoted, the particular journalists and writers, the media institutions, their ownership, and their control by the ruling elite must be kept in mind, for it is through this network of relationships that power is exercised. This is ultimately reflected in the language used and discourse that is constructed. It is also important to keep in mind the imagined audience of this discourse, those being interpellated, the process of which will be shown in the coming empirical chapters, not in terms of how it may have impacted them or driven them to action, as this is not a causal study and does not include audience and reception research, but in terms of how the

imagination of the existing or desired audience may have influenced the construction of the discourse.

As summarised by Garrett and Bell (1998), the study of media discourse is useful for several reasons, including the media's being a 'rich source of readily accessible data', but more importantly, the media's ability to convey 'social meanings and stereotypes projected through language and communication' and to 'reflect and influence the formation and expression of culture, politics and social life' (Garrett and Bell, 1998: 3-4). For this study, the media has been a rich, indeed the only accessible, resource of data, providing a reflection of the prevailing discourses of the time and, in turn, insight into the politics, culture and society of that period.

While this thesis has relied almost entirely on newspapers as this was the only medium which has been properly preserved, newspapers provide quite a good idea of the situation in other media. Antonio Gramsci considered the press to be a powerful ideological and political force, indeed, the most dynamic part of an ideological structure (Forgacs 1985). For example, a letter published in the op-ed pages suggests that radio as a medium had an important role to play in upholding and spreading Muslim spirit and national unity. It claims that during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Dhaka Betar (Radio) played an inspirational role for the people, but since then and before the start of the current war, it broadcast content that was not in line with Pakistan's culture and ideology, including the songs of "the Islam-hating Hindu national poet who is a source of national inspiration for Hindus" (referring to Bangla poet Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore). The letter-writer says, however, that despite some "cheap and vulgar" songs being broadcast, "many patriotic songs, discussions, drama, news, etc., are praiseworthy, especially the previous week's drama 'Sultan Mahmud' and some new songs such as 'Wake up, Muslim, bring peace all around you', 'What is Pakistan's origin – *la ilaha illallah*', 'My leader, your

leader, world prophet Mustafa', etc. and poet Nazrul's and deceased poet Golam Mustafa's nationalistic songs such as 'We are that people', 'Pakistan is that Pakistan', the re-broadcast of which has created waves among people." (*Dainik Sangram* 2 May 1971, p. 2). This rather detailed description reflects radio content during the war, where not only did patriotism mean love for Pakistan but also love for Islam, and whereby Muslims were called upon to wake up and defend the nation and the peace.

Newspaper content also reflects its readership. The findings presented above and in the empirical chapters show that the youth were a segment of the population being addressed by political and religious leaders at public meetings as well as through the media. The importance of Islamic education, formation of Muslim identity, the notion of the future of Pakistan and Islam being in the hands of the youth, the specific appeal to madrasa students are all testimony to the fact that the youth were a key target audience. This was probably even more important at a time when anti-liberation groups initially still had the sympathy of much of the older generation, as an interviewee attests to in Chapter 6, whereas the pro-liberation army or Mukti Bahini was made up largely of young people.

Perhaps the most important thing to remember about discourse analysis is that 'reality can never be reached outside discourses and so it is discourse itself [and not reality that is] the object of analysis' (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 21).

Discourse analysis in this study is also supported by interview findings.

4.5c Interviews

To complement discourse analysis, I conducted a handful of qualitative, semi-structured interviews with eyewitnesses to the war, participants in the war and researchers on the war. Alan Bryman (2012) distinguishes between structured interviews

in quantitative research and semi-structured or unstructured interviews in qualitative research claiming that in the case of qualitative research, there is a greater interest in the interviewee's point of view, giving them more time, scope and agency and flexibility, resulting in broader, more detailed and rich answers. There is no schedule and no fixed script. Bryman also lists the type of questions that commonly feature in qualitative interviews, from introductory and follow-up questions to probing, specifying, direct, indirect, structuring and interpreting questions to silence, which allows the interviewee the opportunity to 'reflect and amplify an answer' (Bryman 2012: 476-478). Several advantages of qualitative interviewing which Bryman lists in comparison to participant observation are advantages of the technique in itself – it allows for a reconstruction of events and has a great breadth of coverage but remains focused.

Interviews serve a number of purposes, but they are of particular relevance to this project because they help to understand the social actor's experience, knowledge, and worldviews; enable inquiry about the past; and aid in verifying, validating, or commenting on information obtained from other sources (Lindlof and Taylor 2013). For this study, interviews were a means of taking a second, subjective look into the past and comparing it to the data collected from the more objective and tangible archives.

The nine interviewees for this study included two journalists from 1971, one of whom worked for the *Dainik Bangla* newspaper and one who worked for Dhaka Betar radio; two female human rights activists, one who participated in the war, another who was involved in the rehabilitation of the victims of sexual violence; two Hindu survivors of the war, one of them female whose father, a university professor was killed; and three researchers/historians who have worked extensively on the war and with victims, two of them academics, one a writer/activist who was formerly a member of the Pakistan army

and later worked with Bangladeshi law enforcement and aided in the rescue of war victims.

Five of these interviews took place in the workplaces of the interviewees, one in a home-cum-office and three at the interviewee's homes. Durations varied between one to three hours. The medium of language was both Bangla and English. All the interviews were digitally recorded and later transcribed directly into English. As Bryman (2012) notes, recording and transcribing of interviews is important to correct the natural limitations of memories of both the interviewer and interviewees, as well as allowing for repeated and more thorough examination of what people say while also allowing the data to be reused in other ways in the future.

The questions were open-ended, with the aim of bringing out the respondents' direct or indirect experiences of the war and in relation to religion where applicable. All barring one of the interviewees had lived through the war (one academic was out of the country for the most part); some had lost their loved ones while others had a close call and still others worked for the rescue and rehabilitation of the victims. Thus the interviews were emotionally charged and sometimes difficult. All the interviewees being pro-liberation and several of them practising Muslims, it was also not easy to go in with the question of the war rhetoric being a religious one and care had to be taken to make them understand that the war may not have been based on religion, especially for those fighting for independence, but that religion-based discourse was used to a great extent by those against the liberation of Bangladesh and as a result the break-up of Pakistan. The Muslim respondents who had lost their loved ones had greater difficulty understanding how the war could have been based on religion when their loved ones were also victims. But the religious aspect of the war was felt more keenly by the Hindu respondents, who felt the discrimination against them more acutely.

4.6 Limitations

This research project has been limited to the anti-liberation discourse circulated in 1971 *East* Pakistan only, not West Pakistan, with only a cursory look at the contents of one West Pakistani daily. Thus the focus is limited to the coverage and discourse in two daily newspapers published in *East* Pakistan and the propaganda used by the Pakistani army's auxiliary forces comprising local collaborators in the *eastern* wing. It also focuses on the instrumentalisation of religion in the construction of a Pakistani, Muslim identity, and much less, if at all, on the opposing construction of the Bangali based on ethnicity except to demonstrate the contrast through means of Othering. It will not consider factors other than religion which may also have contributed to the discourse and the resulting war at the time.

While the research considers acts of violence committed by the Pakistani army and its auxiliary forces in East Pakistan, it is beyond the scope of this work to examine the issue of violence against non-Bangali Muslims, commonly known as "Biharis" – most of whom sided with the Pakistani authorities – in East Pakistan during the war and soon after in newly-liberated Bangladesh. And, while I would have liked to have studied the continuation/resurgence of the instrumentalisation of religion in Bangladeshi socio-politics today[22] it will not be possible to do so in this project. Discursive silences are, however, discussed in the fourth empirical chapter of this thesis.

[22] With the war crimes trial underway, such discourses are vividly alive. This is also reflected in the new media. An interesting case in point is the social networking site, Facebook page entitled "Basher Kella" belonging to pro-Jamaat-i-Islami youth which has become a highly popular avenue for social and political exchange centring on the politics of and "against" religion in general and the Jamaat-i-Islami in particular. More importantly, religious politics in Bangladesh today is not limited to the traditional religion-based parties. In the last decade, particularly since 9/11, there has been an increasing affiliation of urban, educated, upper-class youth (as opposed to the traditionally mostly rural, poor, madrasa-educated youth) with relatively new religion-based, even extremist groups such as the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh,

Rao et. al. (2007) note that, along with the often (self-)censored print media and the propaganda of the largely state-owned radio and television stations in South Asia, patriotic feature films, too, have played a role in countries' 'war efforts'.[23] While these products are important, this study is limited to newspapers.

In terms of methods, the main limitation, if it should be called that, of discourse analysis is that, as with any other qualitative research method, it is rather subjective. As Jorgensen and Phillips note, 'the analyst has to work with what has actually been said or written, exploring patterns in and across statements and identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality' (2002: 21). When working with discourses close to oneself, it is difficult to not see them as natural, normal and commonsensical. In this regard, however, I am at an advantage, as the particular discourse I am working with is far removed from me, not only historically speaking, but also in "ideological" terms. There remains instead room for bias against the discourse as an outsider, but objective study of meticulously collected empirical data should suffice to prevent that to a great extent.

With interviews and oral histories too, there always remains the 'possibility of bias introduced by memory lapses and distortions' (Grele 1998 cited in Bryman 2012: 491). However, employment of a combination of the two methods, with primary focus being placed on the former, documented data subjected to careful, rigorous and systematic analysis, should minimise this risk.

Ansar-al-Islam and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (currently banned in Bangladesh), which is what peaked my own interest in the process in the first place and materialised into this research.

[23] Sharif et. al. (1998) cite the Nilima Ibrahim Report which found that certain programmes telecast regularly on Dhaka Television 'hinder[ed] the Bangladesh movement…[and] attempted to engender feelings of communal violence' (1998: 203). These were not preserved in the archives, however, and thus not included in this research.

Also in terms of interviews, I faced two obstacles in terms of gaining access. Firstly, while I spoke to those who were pro-liberation during the war, those who were against it were either under trial and in prison, in hiding or else unwilling to speak to me. This was true even in the case of those who worked for the government's national television and radio networks during the war. Whether due to fear of legal consequences or social stigma, these people refused to talk to me about their wartime experiences.

The other limitation to interviews was that I did not speak with any survivors of sexual violence during the war, whereas the last empirical chapter is centred on the silence of these very women and how this contributes to, even forms, a part of the discourse on wartime sexual violence. First and foremost, it was difficult to gain access to the survivors in question and to get them to speak about their experiences. Secondly, however, because this research focuses on the media representation of the wartime discourse, I did not think it completely necessary to speak to the victims, especially at the cost of dredging up a painful history which they have been keeping buried for the greater part of 45 years. Instead, I refer to works already conducted, stories already written, oral histories already taken down in order to provide an understanding of what happened.

As made obvious at the beginning of this chapter, I as a researcher am not free of a certain predisposition as far as this research subject is concerned. Born into independent Bangladesh, I am influenced by the dominant (particularly since the 1990s)[24] pro-

[24] Under a series of military regimes from 1975-1990, silence surrounded the issue of the liberation war. Only after the restoration of democracy, with the establishment of the Gano Adalot or People's Tribunal – a mock trial of local collaborators in which some of the war-affected related the experiences they had during the war – did it regain momentum in public discourse. In March 1992, thousands of people, including writers, academics, cultural activists, and students, joined the Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Jatiya Samannaya Committee (Committee for the Elimination of the Killers and Collaborators of 1971) led by writer Jahanara Imam, and staged this tribunal. The mock court tried, convicted and sentenced war criminals to death, urging the government to bring them to account. Leading members of the committee were charged with sedition at the time, but these charges were later dropped.

liberation discourse that prevails in the country. Forty-five years after the war, the memory is still raw in the minds of those who lived through it, and the issue rife in public discourse. So much so, that *Meherjaan*, a film depicting the love between a Bangali woman and a Pakistani soldier in wartime had to be withdrawn after only a few screenings in 2011. Sarmila Bose's 2011 book *Dead Reckoning* came under heavy criticism in Bangladesh for downplaying the number of casualties and atrocities committed by the Pakistani forces, as does British journalist David Bergman and anyone else who questions the number of war dead. With regard to Bose's book, some have gone so far as to claim that such distortions of history were a means to influence, if not outright thwart, the war crimes trial which had just begun the previous year. Without giving in to such theories, conspiracy or not, I maintain that a war took place in which gross atrocities were committed for which justice must be done. I also believe it is important to scrutinise why and how these crimes were committed, the motivations behind them translated into action, in order to be able to avoid repetition of such tragedies in the future. Examining the role of communication is only one aspect of the war in an attempt to see how it was waged discursively.

Secondly, I do not endorse the association of politics and religion. Whether or not the two can in fact be separated, however, is open to question. Cavanaugh (2009), for examples, argues that it is impossible to separate religious from economic and politics and that, in fact, the separation of religion and politics is an invention of the modern West. Religion, to me, is a personal issue which may be used by individuals as a guide to living their lives, not an ideology to be used and imposed by the state to make people who are different in many ways, conform. I am personally against the use of religion to political ends, be it for or against liberation or the daily governance of state and society. I believe that religion has the power to influence unquestioning individuals and masses in

ways which nothing else does. And while I think that every religion essentially teaches good, the concoction of such a magical potion with something as volatile as politics which can be good or bad, seems to me ominous. This said, whether or not it is "religion" per se that is used to such ends or ideological constructs which claim to be based on religion is a crucial issue and this study focuses on the latter, not on the use of religion in political violence but the ideological framing of religion as being the cause for which anti-liberation groups fought in 1971 Pakistan.

As Lindlof and Taylor put it, 'the "facts" of research can never be isolated from its values. Research is not – and can never be – "innocent"' (2011: 11). This extends to seemingly objective data as well, for as Adrian Holliday puts it, 'the written study itself takes on an agency of its own' (2007: 91), expressing a reality which distorts the social world from which the data is taken and that unlike culture and society, data can be manipulated. It is, however, not enough to leave data in its rawest possible state, argues Holliday, for example, in the form of quotes and interview transcripts, but that the researcher needs to appreciate the fact that the data is different from the social reality from which it was taken, and that it is the responsibility of the researcher to show, through the workings of the research, how the data has been constructed, and thirdly, when raw data is presented, it must carry with it the argument of the researcher in order to show its meaning and significance.

With that being said, I believe that having worked for over a decade as a journalist and for half of that time also as an academic, I have been trained to look at all sides of any story and I am confident that I have been able to set aside my presuppositions and take an objective, professional approach towards my work. It is true that I had a more or less clear idea of what I was looking for – the use of religion-based discourse in the legitimisation of war. However, at the risk of being too thorough, the nearly 1,000

examples which I have found to support my hypothesis, many of which will be referred to in the empirical chapters that follow, show that it was not unfounded. As Holliday (2007) says, the presence of the researcher in the research is unavoidable and should rather be treated as a resource and that is what I attempt to do here, putting to use not only my academic knowledge and skills, but also my personal, social and cultural understanding of the subject and the society on which I write.

I draw on Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) in their observation that the researcher always takes a position in relation to the field of study, that that position may influence what they view as results and that these same results may look different from another position for it cannot be determined '*who* is sufficiently liberated from the discursive construction of the world to make [the] distinction' (2002: 22) between what is and is not ideological. However, I also draw confidence from their position that 'it is the stringent application of theory and method that legitimises scientifically produced knowledge' and that 'it is by seeing the world through a particular theory that we can distance ourselves from some of our taken-for-granted understandings and subject our material to other questions than we would be able to do from an everyday perspective' (ibid: 22-23).

In the next four chapters I present the empirical findings and their analysis, showing how through the media's discursive framing of religious ideology, the nation and nationalism were constructed and identities were formed in order to legitimise violence on the part of the "good Muslim Pakistani" against the "evil Hindu enemy".

CHAPTER 5

SACRED NATION:

THE RELIGION-BASED DISCOURSE OF PAKISTAN'S BIRTH, SURVIVAL AND UNITY

The chameleon-like beauty of nationalism allows for the creation of a civic religion of the people and aspirations 'to build Jerusalem' in every kind of society, using the sacred legacies and ethnic traditions of their different pasts. –Anthony D. Smith

[A person's] greatest yearning is for an ideology for which he should be able to lay down his life. –Ayub Khan

In 1762, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau introduced the term 'civil religion' in an attempt to understand 'the role of religion within a framework of Enlightenment thinking' (Hvithamar and Warburg 2009: 2). To Rousseau, civil religion meant 'political religion', and may be defined as a 'deliberate justification of citizen's solidarity with their state by referring to higher, unquestionable principles' (ibid) and those who challenge and thus prove disloyal to the state may be punished through violent means, even death, 'not because they are heretics to the religious tenets of Rousseau's civil religion, but because they are subversive to the state' (ibid). While this was never implemented in full historically, Hvithamar and Warburg use one of the first modern definitions of nation as given by Ernest Renan in 1882 – 'a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other is in the present' (Renan cited in Hvithamar and Warburg 2009: 6) – to point out the relationship between nation and religion. Not only are there parallels between the two, such as 'the transcendence of the nation, the imagination of a community with a common past and future and the willingness of individuals to commit themselves to the

nation' (Hvithamar and Warburg 2009: 6), but nationalism also borrows from religious symbols, myths and rituals. Thus it may be said that religion and nation have always run hand in hand, whether in incorporating the first into the second, or else in terms of refusing to do so.

The concept of civil religion suggests a more deliberate, formal incorporation of religion into the idea of the imagined nation. As Cristi (2009) elaborates:

> Civil religion consists of a set of social and cultural principles, values and rituals oriented toward the civil and political order. The religious aspect might be derived from attempts to infuse the civil order with a transcendent purpose and legitimacy by using explicitly religious symbols, often rooted in the dominant religion of the nation. Conversely, the religious dimension might be based in mutually meaningful public rituals and symbols that come to be seen as sacred by members of the group. (2009: 48-49)

Pakistan is a classic case of a nation intentionally using the concept of civil religion in its construction of nationhood. Furthermore, drawing on Anthony D. Smith's categorisation of three principles of 'sacred cultural community' as discussed in Chapter 3 – the hierarchical, the covenantal and the civic – Pakistan could be classified as a combination of the first two.

Cristi (2009) elaborates on the power of civil religion 'to mobilise political support on the grounds of faith' in a number of ways: through leaders employing state machinery such as political speeches and solemn occasions and instruments of coercion such as legislation and education to compel people to be patriotic and support a particular course of action; the manipulation of symbols, rituals and principles of a civic faith to legitimise the political order and inspire loyalty; and the shaping of the understanding of civil religion by political leaders to advance their own agendas.

It is worth mentioning here that, while it is an underlying theme, this study is not *about* "political Islam". Political Islam has been described as a 'modern phenomenon that seeks to use religion to shape the political system' and that 'its origins lie in the perceived failure of the secular ideologies of nationalism and socialism to deliver on their promises

of anti-imperialist prosperity', providing 'a conceptual alternative that was purportedly based on the teachings of faith' (Akbarzadeh 2012: 1). Even though the specific term may not have been used to describe the situation during that time – rather, Pakistani politicians and the press seem to be focused on promoting a unique notion of "Islamic nationalism" as will be shown below – the political situation as reflected in the media studied here is in line with modern-day definitions of political Islam. This and the following chapters will demonstrate how the Pakistani ruling elite and East Pakistan's anti-liberation forces attempted to integrate faith/Islam into all aspects of politics and society in Pakistan through the construction of discourse. It will show how Islam was used a tool of nation-building, in an attempt to unite the population, to strengthen nationalism and patritotism and to act as panacea to all the nation's problems. Indeed, the rallying cry of "Islam is the solution" as described by Akbarzadeh (2012) as capturing the overall mood of political Islam is a key element of this discourse as will be shown below.

This chapter will show how the concept or discourse of civil religion is reinforced by the media in Pakistan as reflected in the *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* newspapers during Bangladesh's war of liberation – not as a state ideology imposed from above where even coercion is legitimised as conceived by Rousseau, but as a 'spontaneous, non-coercive expression of popular self-identity', 'a consensual and cultural phenomenon' (Cristi 2009: 51) as understood by Durkheim. Using two of Louis Althusser's key ideological state apparatuses – religion and media, or as one in the form of religion *in* media, the chapter demonstrates how the state attempts to take hegemonic control over people's belief in the power of their all-important Pakistani Muslim identity and their defence of the united Islamic state of Pakistan.

5.1 Pakistan, Nation and Religion

Husain Haqqani in his book *Pakistan: between mosque and military* writes: 'Since the country's inception, Pakistan's leaders have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan's identity. Under ostensibly pro-Western rulers, Islam has been the rallying cry against perceived Indian threats' (2005: 2). Haqqani says the relationship between mosque and military in Pakistan was built over time, with the 'political commitment to an ideological state gradually evolv[ing] into a strategic commitment to jihadi ideology' (ibid: 3).

From as early on as the 1945-1946 elections, religious rhetoric played a major role, with the rural Muslim masses being made to feel that if a Muslim state was established, they would all become better Muslims (Haqqani 2005). Not only did Pakistan's Father of the Nation Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah make use of religious symbols and slogans in his speeches, but use was also made of religious emotions by the *ulema* (Islamic scholars) and other religious figures and their supporters with a rather simple message: Muslims voted for the Muslim League and would go to heaven, *kafirs* (non-believers) voted against Muslim League and would go to hell (ibid). The 'argument in favor of creating Pakistan [reduced] to a simple question of survival of Islam on the South Asian continent' (ibid: 9) was carried on into 1971, where keeping East and West Pakistan united meant the same thing – the survival of Islam. On the eve of independence, Jinnah had reportedly called to keep religion out of politics, but his contradictory messages pre- and post-Partition apparently left his followers confused or divided and his successors chose to define Pakistani national identity through religious symbolism (ibid). 'The fears of dilution of Muslim identity that had defined the demand for carving Pakistan out of India became the new nation-state's identity, reinforced over

time through the education system and constant propaganda' (ibid: 14) and this phenomenon was very much in play well into the war of 1971.

As Haqqani notes in the context of 1971,

> The Pakistani military projected the conflict in East Pakistan as a counterinsurgency drive, and at home the troops were presented as *mujahideen* fighting the enemies of Islam. Propaganda emanating from West Pakistan also focused on the Hindu influence and the actions of anti-Muslim forces as responsible for the crisis in the eastern wing. (Haqqani 2005: 76)

Interestingly, Haqqani argues that while throughout Pakistan's history the greatest threats to its central authority came from groups seeking regional autonomy, ethnic rights, or political inclusion, 'successive Pakistani governments linked these threats to either an Indian-inspired plan to weaken Pakistan or "communists"' (2005: 16). As a result, 'The civil-military complex adapted the ideology of Pakistan to mean demonization of India's Brahmin Hinduism and a zealous hostility toward India. Domestic political groups demanding provincial autonomy or ethnic rights were invariably accused of advancing an Indian agenda to dismember or weaken Pakistan' (ibid: 37). The media, for its part, as directed by the Information Ministry 'mobilized a propaganda drive to create the spectre of Islam and Pakistan being in danger, polarizing the country between Islam *Pasand* (Islam loving) on the one hand and communists, socialists, and secularists on the other' (Haqqani 2005: 55).

5.2 Religion-based Discourse as a Nation-building Tool

As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the political rationale of the 1947 Partition of India was positioned around a discourse of religion, resulting in the creation of Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. But when Bengal/East Pakistan was neglected politically and economically, the focus of the movement shifted to culture. However, the resistance was given a religious spin. The central government of West

Pakistan claimed it was 'anti-Islamic' and that there was an Indian 'conspiracy to disintegrate Pakistan' afoot (Hossain and Khan 2006: 330, Murshid 1993).

5.2a Honouring the past

Broadly speaking, the anti-liberation discourse of the war of 1971 portrayed the war as one between Pakistan and India, that is, Muslims and Hindus. In order to reinforce this argument, not only was the Hindu-Muslim divide of 1971 emphasised but so was the clash of the two civilisations in general, from as far back as ancient history to as recently as the India-Pakistan wars of the 1960s. Most attention in the media discourses, however, was paid to the Partition of 1947, which gave birth to both India and Pakistan based on the two-nation (based on two religions) theory. In 1971, the Pakistani media studied here made repeated references to the birth of Pakistan as an Islamic state based on Islamic ideology for Muslims and gained through the sacrifice of "lakhs [hundreds of thousands] of Muslims" (specifically 20 lakh, according to news published on August 11 and 14, 1971 in the *Dainik Sangram*) in the 1940s and leading up to Partition.

"We achieved this nation at the cost of the sacrifice of lakhs and lakhs of Muslims. In fact this is why we lost our rule over India. The sacrifice of lakhs and lakhs of souls cannot go in vain" (*Dainik Sangram* 6 April 1971, p. 1). Through this sacrifice Pakistan was gained as a "homeland for Muslims" (*Dainik Sangram* 30 April 1971, p. 2) and "falling prey to the deception" of Indian Bangalis is said to be "disrespectful" to the martyrs (*Dainik Sangram* 20 April 1971, p. 2). The repeated reference to large numbers amplifies the event, the word 'sacrifice' suggests what must be done, and statements such as not letting it go in vain or not falling prey to deception tells the reader how to deal with the situation. Gazi (1971), a columnist for the *Dainik Sangram*, in an impassioned op-ed piece, writes about the reason for the sacrifice of lakhs of Muslims – "for a Pakistan

where Islamic ideology would be the basis of justice and truth, where people wouldn't exploit people, where there would be no torture, injustice and adultery, where Islam's flag of victory would fly forever high" (*Dainik Sangram* 28 May 1971, p. 2). Using such descriptions, the media create an image of a perfect nation that was worth fighting for then and is thus still worth defending now.

The image of the blood of "lakhs of innocent Muslims" that was shed (*Dainik Sangram* 19 June 1971, p. 2) is often invoked, portraying a (correct) image of a bloody war of Partition, but where only Muslims are deemed 'innocent'. Not only blood but "honour" (of women) was also sacrificed (*Dainik Sangram* 18 July 1971, p. 2) making it seem even more imperative to uphold the values for which the sacrifices were made. According to a news published in the *Dainik Sangram* on August 7, sacrifices were made in order to implement an Islamic way of life in a time when humanity was in crisis (*Dainik Sangram* 7 August 1971, p. 3) and, according to another news published on August 14, the crores who made those sacrifices are willing to do so again in order "to uphold Pakistan's ideology and unity" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, p. 1). Yet another news item published on the same day, Pakistan's independence day, quotes the Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami in East Pakistan Ghulam Azam talking about the immense sacrifices made in order to establish a state based on the Quran and Sunnah and that such sacrifices cannot go in vain (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, p. 1). A poem describes the sacrifice in terms of Muslims wanting to uphold God's religion in their beloved holy land (*Dainik Sangram* 20 August 1971, p. 2) while another article talks about defending the freedom of Pakistan gained in exchange for the blood of lakhs of Muslims as a holy/sacred responsibility (*Dainik Sangram* 20 August 1971, p. 4). According to the media discourse then, defending the nation is not only a national or patriotic duty but a holy duty, for the ultimate goal is the establishment of an Islamic way of life.

Other news stories use references from the past in order to inspire the present:

> Lakhs of Muslims were martyred, handicapped, and separated from their homes and their relatives and loved ones. They answered to the call of Islamic brotherhood and rose above self-interest, narrow-mindedness and regionalism, sacrificing their lives and property and Pakistan was gained as a result of this. Remembering that Pakistan was not established due to geographical but ideological reasons, come let us look within ourselves, if we have been able to do what was right by lakhs of sacrifices. Those men and women made sacrifices in order to guarantee that Islamic way of life could be established here throughout the ages. Come, let's re-devote ourselves to implementing Islamic ideology. Islam *zinda hota hain har karbala ke baad.* (*Dainik Sangram* 11 September 1971, p. 1)

The last line comes from an Urdu poem by renowned Urdu poet, philosopher and politician Allama M. Iqbal and means that Islam gains life after every Karbala. It is often cited in the newspapers studied, presumably to remind Muslims of the Battle of Karbala[25] often recounted in Shia Islamic literature in particular but also Muslim literature in general, and to imbibe in them a similar spirit of sacrifice and martyrdom, which will be the subject of Chapter 7. But through this repeated drawing on the past, from Karbala to Partition, links are made to the present suggesting that the current battle may also be viewed as a religious war, thereby justifying violence, sacrifice and martyrdom.

As Islam (1971c), a columnist for the *Dainik Sangram*, writes in an op-ed piece in the *Dainik Sangram* with some finality and seeming logic: "After 200 years of struggle and in exchange for the warm blood of 20 lakh Muslims Pakistan was established, thus the people will not betray the blood of lakhs of martyrs and sell their independence to conspiring Brahmin India" (*Dainik Sangram* 27 October 1971).

[25] Very famous early battle fought in an area South West of Baghdad between the tiny army of supporters of al-Husayn b. Ali and the overwhelming forces of the Umayyads commanded by 'Umar b. Sa 'd, in 680. Al-Husayn and his few companions were defeated and massacred. The circumstances of the night before the battle, and the battle itself, have become invested with much legend. The battle took place on the tenth day of the Muslim month of al-Muharram and this day each year is held to be particularly sacred, especially by Shi' ites (Netton 1997).

5.2b Pakistan: A homeland for Muslims

The Pakistani newspapers analysed here made clear the country was created for Muslims, belonged to them and was a homeland for Muslims, both Pakistani and from around the world, indeed, that it was the home of Islam. This was underlined in a news story in *Dainik Sangram* citing East Pakistan Jamaat-i-Islami Ameer Ghulam Azam as describing the sacrifice of crores of Indian Muslims for Pakistan in which he ends with a prayer to the Almighty to allow its people to always live as true Pakistanis and true Muslims and to keep Pakistan forever as the "home of Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 April 1971, p. 1) and as a "home of Islam for Muslims around the world" (*Dainik Sangram* 26 September 1971, p. 1). In fact, Azam even defends East Pakistanis in a way by saying, "Nowhere in the world are there so many Muslims in one place and neither are there more pious Muslims. Thus it would be wrong to blame East Pakistani Muslims for the situation created by the last 23 years of misrule." (*Dainik Sangram* 14 September 1971, p. 2). Through removing the blame from East Pakistanis, i.e., Muslims, he basically places it squarely on the shoulders of "the Other", Indian Hindus.

Khaleque (1971), a columnist for the *Dainik Sangram,* writes in an opinion piece about the Muslims of Pakistan fighting the "Hitlerish" Hindus to gain Pakistan, sacrificing their lives for freedom, and that Pakistan "belongs to Muslims and as long as there are Muslims here no evil intrigues will succeed" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 April 1971, p. 2). Jamaat-i-Islami leader Farid Ahmed prays to Allah for the security of "the homeland of Islam, Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram* 16 April 1971, p. 1). Another Jamaat-i-Islami leader Solaiman claims that "Pakistan was created as a separate homeland for Muslims in order to free them from Hindu exploitation and persecution" (*Dainik Sangram* 7 May 1971, p. 1) while president of the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) Nurul Amin says "Pakistan was created as a safe and separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent"

(*Dainik Sangram* 13 May 1971, p. 1). It is through this discourse propagated via key political leaders that religion and nation are made to seem as one.

To enhance the point, Mujahid (1971a), a columnist for the *Dainik Sangram*, writes in an op-ed article that Pakistan was not born for the people of any particular language but for the Muslims of the subcontinent (*Dainik Sangram*, 17 July 1971, p. 2). Politician and educationist Abul Qashem says "Pakistan was created so that the Muslims being ruled by the Hindus of the subcontinent could have a separate homeland and so that they could form their lives and society according to Islamic rule" (*Dainik Sangram* 17 August 1971, p. 5) while President of (Pakistan-controlled) Azad Kashmir Khan Abdul Quayyum argues along similar lines: "Pakistan was gained on the basis of two-nation theory, even the Muslims who remained in India voted for Pakistan. Thus if we take the path of socialism and secularism like India did, then there is no meaning in having our separate homeland." (*Dainik Sangram* 28 July 1971, p. 3). In other articles, Pakistan is also referred to as 'Darul Islam' or the house of Islam and those who revolt against an Islamic state are labelled rebels against Islam. (*Dainik Sangram* 24 July 1971, p. 4). For example, in a news item published in the *Dainik Pakistan*, Commerce and Industries Minister Akhtar Uddin, in describing Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims says, "God forbid, if Pakistan is destroyed then Muslims will lose their separate characteristics and be locked in the chains of Hindu slavery" (*Dainik Pakistan* 27 September 1971, p. 6) and in another news around the time when the war was drawing to an end, it is stated rather forebodingly that "No sacrifice will be considered too great to defend Pakistan the homeland of Muslims" (*Dainik Pakistan* 8 December 1971, p. 2).

Using religion-based discourse, the *Dainik Pakistan* and especially the *Dainik Sangram*, constructed Pakistan as a nation borne of the sacrifice of countless Muslims against evil Hindu oppression and as the homeland of Muslims in Pakistan and around

the world. This in turn justifies the defence of Pakistan not only as a nation but as a home of Islam, using whatever means may be necessary.

5.2c Sanctifying the nation

One of the interesting themes that came across in the analysis of the data is that not only is a strong link constructed between the nation and religion, Pakistan and Islam in the media under study, but the two are also made literally inseparable, so much so that the nation itself becomes sacred.

In an article in the *Dainik Sangram*, the author writes that Islamic ideology and Muslim nationalism are said to be the basic foundations of Pakistan (*Dainik Sangram* 2 July, 14 September 1971, p. 2), Pakistan is said to have been gained based on Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, supplement p. 2), in the name of Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 16 September 1971, p. 3, *Dainik Sangram* 2 October 1971, p. 1), that it should be based on Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 24 August 1971, p. 1) and can only survive on Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 16 September 1971, p. 5). President Yahya Khan in his Eid speech prays for the country's strength and solidarity "so that Pakistan can always serve Islam" (*Dainik Pakistan* 20 November 1971, p. 1).

As such, protecting Pakistan is the same as protecting Islam, as Hamidi (1971), a columnist for the *Dainik Sangram* writes in an op-ed article and beseeches God, "Pakistan was created in your name, you protect it, save it from the clutches of the enemy, make it a pillar of light of Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 3 November 1971, p. 2). In this way, there is no separating Islam from Pakistan, thus appealing to all Muslims to defend a united Pakistan as part of their duties as Muslims. As Syed Mohammad Afzal, a member of the Shanti Committee claims, Pakistan was created to protect Islam and "Muslims cannot even think of destroying this country and separating" (*Dainik Sangram*

26 July 1971, p. 3), implying that those who are pro-liberation are either non-Muslim or against Islam.

Broadly speaking, the media discourse elevates Pakistan to a holy nation. The language used refers to Pakistan directly as "holy land" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 April 1971, p. 3, *Dainik Sangram* 2 July 1971, p. 10), "sacred land" (*Dainik Sangram* 11 October 1971, p. 5, *Dainik Pakistan* 18 May, p. 2, 8 December, p. 4) and "holy motherland" (6 September 1971, p. 1). *Dainik Sangram* declares "All areas of Islam's *durgo* Pakistan… are sacred like a mosque… [which] every Muslim of Pakistan must be inspired to defend..." (*Dainik Sangram* 30 November 1971, p. 2). Pakistan is frequently labelled a "*durgo*" (citadel, fort, castle) of Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 19 August 1971, p. 1, 30 October 1971, p. 6, *Dainik Pakistan* 8 December 1971, p. 4) and those trying to destroy it are branded the enemies of Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 17 September 1971, p. 1). The use of the word "*durgo*" conjures up an image of something not only big, strong and invincible but also something to be defended. The news article published in *Dainik Sangram* on October 30, Badr Day[26], again quotes Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam describing Pakistan as a fort for Islam being threatened by foreign and local enemies and that a fitting observance of the day will revive Islamic and jihadist spirit in people. On the occasion of Eid-e-Miladunnabi, the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, the President in his speech describes Pakistan as an ideological state and "a proud and indestructible column of Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 8 May 1971, p. 1).

[26] Badr Day was an observance of the Battle of Badr in 624, the first military victory of the Muslim community of Medina against a superior force of Meccans (Adamec 2009). It is seen as the Prophet Muhammad's first major victory and turning point in his career. Various Quranic verses are associated with Badr, including 8:9-12, in which God promises help for those who fight in His cause, the battle itself portrayed as a sign of God's support (Nanji 2008). Badr Day was celebrated with great fervour by religious parties in Pakistan and frequent reference is made to the battle as an inspiration for the ongoing war, as another war between Muslims and non-Muslims where the former will again be victorious.

The idea of Pakistan being a gift from God or being a legacy of God given to Muslims is also frequently used in "sanctifying" the nation. This comes across in a transcript of a radio programme in the *Dainik Sangram* which states: "Pakistan was established as the greatest Muslim state in the world… This Pakistan is the world Muslims' stronghold. This Pakistan is a gift from God to the whole Muslim world" (*Dainik Sangram* 8 September 1971, p. 3). On other occasions, Pakistan is often referred to as having been created by God's wishes (*Dainik Sangram* 20 May 1971, p. 2) and as Allah's sacred "*amaanat*" (*Dainik Sangram* 27 May 1971, p. 2, 18 July 1971, p. 2, 16 September 1971, p. 2), something placed in the custody of someone, in this case, the Muslims of Pakistan. The paper uses phrases, such as, "The sacred land of divine rule Pakistan", "Allah's home" and that "ungodly cowards have attacked Allah's sacred home" (*Dainik Sangram* 16 November 1971, p. 2).

Slogans used at pro-Pakistan events such as rallies or in speeches by political leaders in 1971 also often employed religious terms. The slogan "*la ilaha illallah*" meaning "there is no deity but God/Allah" is often used as a nationalist slogan for Pakistan, claiming that Pakistan was founded based on this motto, that it is its origin or source (*Dainik Sangram* 1971, 5 May p. 1, 6 July p. 3, 13 August p. 1, 20 August 20 p. 2) while its ideology and foundation is said to be the *kalima*[27] *tayyiba* (*Dainik Sangram* 13 August 1971, p. 1, 17 August 1971, p. 2). The powerful cry of "*narae taqbeer/Allahu akbar*" or "Allah is great" (Aug 4, p. 4, Aug 20, p. 2) is also frequently used, and thus, repeatedly invokes religion in the defence of the nation. This makes the purpose and

[27] The *kalima* is the affirmation of faith in Islam that "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his Messenger." It comprises six texts containing the fundamentals of Islam, memorised and recited by Muslims (Nanji 2008).

motivation of fighting for the nation even more significant and more powerful, which ultimately justifies any means necessary to do so, including the use of violence.

In other instances, the paper suggests that Pakistan, being a sacred nation, means it has to be defended against un-Islamic elements. For example, an editorial terms Pakistan as the world's greatest Muslim nation being conspired against by Christians (*Dainik Sangram* 15 March 1971, p. 2) and by Indian intrigues (*Dainik Sangram* 11 April 1971, p. 2) while Jews are said to be "Muslim-haters trying to eliminate Muslims from East Pakistan and destroying the world's largest Muslim state Pakistan which raises its voice against Israel" (*Dainik Sangram* 8 November 1971, p. 2). "Hyenas" are said to be trying to break up Pakistan into pieces and it must be saved at any cost as the future of 80 crore Muslims of the world depends on it (*Dainik Sangram* 30 April 1971, p. 2). Because the world's largest Muslim nation is about to lead the united Muslim world, conspiring Christians, Jews, Hindus and atheists are said to be trying to destroy it (*Dainik Sangram* 7 July 1971, p. 2). The "world's greatest Islamic state Pakistan is the fruit of countless sacrifices of Islamic scholars" (*Dainik Sangram* 29 September 1971, p. 2) and the Krishak-Sramik League Party's president and a member of the Central Peace Committee, Solaiman, is quoted as saying "the Muslims of Bengal will make every sacrifice necessary to protect the world's largest Muslim nation" (*Dainik Sangram* 7 May 1971, p. 1).

5.2d The ideology that is *Pakistan*

From its very inception Pakistan was promoted as an ideological state, even an ideology in itself, and that ideology was Islam. Indeed, as Haqqani (2005) argues, Islam, hostility to India and the Urdu language were the cornerstones of this ideology. However, the media discourse in 1971, while hostile to India in general, was focused on Islamic

ideology as the mainstay of the nation. The analysis showed repeated references to this in the media of 1971 examined here: Jamaat-i-Islami leader Khan Sabur is quoted as saying, "Pakistan is an ideological state and its ideology is only Islam" (*Dainik Sangram*, 8 June 1971, p. 4). Another political leader Khwaja Khairuddin is quoted as saying, "Pakistan was created on the basis of Islamic ideology and Islam is a complete life guideline. Pakistan's nationality is not based on language and geography. If the ideological values on which Pakistan was gained are not implemented then there is no point in Pakistan surviving" (*Dainik Sangram*, 11 June 1971, p. 1).

Repeated emphasis is placed on the fact that the creation of Pakistan did not centre around any language (indicating Bangla and Bangalis) but was based on Islamic ideology "as a separate Muslim homeland. Thus those who do not like Quran- and Sunnah-based rule should leave this country" (*Dainik Sangram*, 17 July 1971, p. 2). Education minister Abbas Ali Khan says, "Pakistan does not belong to any clan or community, rather, it is the result of consolidated efforts of the Muslims of the sub-continent. When fighting for Pakistan against Hindus and the English, it was made clear that this country was not being gained for Bangali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Beluchi, Pathans, but for Islam" (*Dainik Sangram*, 10 November 1971, p. 1). Haq (1971) writes in an op-ed,

> Hindu India always tried to destroy Muslims. This is why under the leadership of Qaid e Azam, 10 crore Muslims struggled and sacrificed for the security of the honour and faith, wealth and life of Muslims and created Pakistan, the basis of which were separate elections, Muslim nationhood and Islamic ideology and brotherhood. (*Dainik Sangram*, 25 July 1971, p. 2)

Such media discourses leave no room for doubt that Pakistan was founded on and in Islamic ideology and that this is what keeps it together. A quote by Bangali politician Abul Hashim published in the *Dainik Sangram* runs thus:

> Islamic ideology brought together the Muslims of the Pak-India subcontinent to establish Pakistan and this is the life philosophy and spirit that have kept Pakistan's unity and solidarity intact. The foundation of Pakistan's national solidarity and the life force of its state identity is this ideological spirit. (*Dainik Sangram*, 2 July 1971, p. 9)

Sadek, a columnist for the *Dainik Sangram*, in a series of articles on the crisis of culture dedicates a whole article to the subject of ideology. According to him, ideological people do not believe in identifying themselves in terms of nation, language, race, which is a practice of nationalism and is sacrilege, but rather in their religion lies their ideological life system and philosophy. He says that the foundation of Pakistan is not Bangali nationalism but Islamic ideology and it is this ideology, religion, "force of faith" only which unites two parts of a country otherwise separated by language, geography, etc.

In a country that was created on the basis of the two-nation theory, Islam as ideology is made to seem indispensable to the well-being of the nation. Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam is quoted as saying, "The two parts of Pakistan can only be kept united with the ideology with which Pakistan was born" (*Dainik Sangram*, 20 June 1971, p. 1). He writes that those who oppose this ideology are not friends of Pakistan and calls to the government to arm the people who believe in the country's ideology and solidarity. This essentially means that those who believe in Islam, Muslims, should be armed to fight. Governor Rakhman Gul is quoted as saying, "Islamic ideology is an indispensable condition for the existence of the nation. Pakistan was established in exchange for many sacrifices and only Islamic consciousness can unite Muslims as one people" (*Dainik Sangram*, 2 August 1971, p. 3).

Islamic ideology is represented as the foundation of Pakistan's philosophy and culture. For example, Sadek, columnist for the *Dainik Sangram*, in an op-ed piece about Bangla language and the Bangali people of East Pakistan points out that this identity should not be confused with that of "idol-worshippers", i.e., Hindus. Those who live in Pakistan are Pakistani and their identity and ideology should be reflected in their culture based on Islamic philosophy and ideology, he writes (*Dainik Sangram*, 4 July 1971, p. 4). Pakistan's rulers made every effort to disregard differences of culture and ethnicity

among its citizens which could give rise to nationalism and focused on religion as the sole unifying factor of its population, promoting an "Islamic nationalism" instead.

The state of Pakistan is glorified with qualities such as equality and brotherhood (*Dainik Sangram*, 6 July 1971, p. 3); where Islam and the Quran are the basis of Pakistan's ideology (*Dainik Sangram*, 28 July 1971, p. 3) and socialism, capitalism, secularism and communism are presented as opposed to Pakistan's basic ideology (*Dainik Sangram*, 8 October 1971, p. 3). In an article published on Pakistan's Independence Day, Sifatullah (1971), columnist for the *Dainik Sangram*, writes,

> Allah's endless mercy has saved the people from the hands of destruction and is testing the people about the establishment of its ideology. The success of this exam depends on the defence of the people's unity and solidarity… Today every Pakistani must be vigilant in protecting their ideological foundation. Every citizen must be made aware of the ideology. The above has proven beyond doubt that Pakistan was gained only on the basis of Islam and only the implementation of Islamic ideology can keep it alive. (*Dainik Sangram*, 14 August 1971, supplement p. 3)

Letters to the editor also carry the same theme, thus creating a sense of acceptance of ideological interpellation.[28] For example, in a letter to the editor, Shahidul Islam Mollik writes that a non-religious education system has caused the youth to drift from Pakistan's ideology and that "Indian Brahmin imperialist conspiracy will fail in the face of Islamic education, the ideology Pakistan was created upon will be reborn and the country will become strong and prosperous" (*Dainik Sangram*, 27 August 1971, p. 2). Pakistan's ideology is not only the Father of the Nation Jinnah's but also, more importantly, the Prophet Muhammad's ideology (*Dainik Sangram*, 2 May 1971, p. 1), "the complete way of life of Islam as bestowed by Allah" (*Dainik Sangram*, 16 September 1971, p. 2). Sadek (1971c) writes, "The main tenets of our ideology lie in Allah's words, the Quran, and we have seen its practical reflection in the life of the

[28] This study does not include audience research, however, thus making it impossible to judge effects on the audience.

Prophet" (*Dainik Sangram*, 11 July 1971, p. 4). As if references to Islam as the ideology of Pakistan are not enough, it is related directly to the life of the Prophet and the words of Allah, in an attempt to make the ideology and in turn the concept of Pakistan, unquestionable.

In this respect, Pakistani army General Atiq is quoted as saying, "Pakistan will be destroyed if it is removed from its ideology. Its birth was based on ideology and it will survive on ideology" (*Dainik Sangram*, 29 September 1971, p. 3). The people's survival, in turn, depends on the survival of Pakistan: "If Pakistan lives, we will live, we will be able to defend our existence as a people. Our faith, happiness, growth are all dependent on the existence of Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram*, 19 October 1971, p. 3). As such, as the analysis shows, the discursive process is constructed such that, the people's contentment, faith, even existence, depend on Pakistan, and Pakistan's depends on the ideology of Islam, making religion and the nation, or a religious nation, seem indispensable for the people.

5.2e Islam as panacea

Whereas Pakistan's prosperity is dependent on following the ideology on which it was founded, the nation's troubles are seen as arising out of neglect of that ideology, the lack of Islamic policy in the country and to the apathy towards Islam as a whole, according to the media discourse studied here (*Dainik Sangram* 2 July 1971, p. 2, *Dainik Pakistan* 10 August 1971, p. 6).

For example, in a commentary in the *Dainik Sangram*, Jamaat-i-Islami Ghulam Azam says,

> It was with the objective of living life according to the *kalima tayyiba* that Pakistan was created by dividing the subcontinent. But in the last 23 years we have disobeyed Allah and forgotten the leadership of the Prophet and this is why troubles and disaster have

> befallen us and no one but Allah can bring us peace. (*Dainik Sangram*, 21 May 1971, p. 1)

In another news report, he is quoted as saying,

> It is because we have neglected the ideology on which Pakistan was established that such unfortunate incidents have arisen in East Pakistan. The subcontinent's Muslims were not forced but wanted a separate homeland. But our leaders betrayed that ideology. (*Dainik Sangram*, 21 June 1971, p. 1)

Essentially then, not following Islam in a separate homeland created for Muslims is said to be a betrayal of the ideology that is Pakistan and this betrayal is what has brought crisis upon the nation, suggesting that the only way to remedy the situation is by being true Muslims and defending this separate-from-others but united Muslim homeland.

Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana Abdul Jabbar, cited in the *Dainik Sangram*, further claims that Pakistan's current crisis is a punishment from Allah for forgetting the teachings of Islam, voting in leaders who do not believe in the country's indivisibility and ideology and for failing to implement the Quran and Sunnah for which Pakistan was established as a nation. Once these are amended, he says, "normalcy" will return (*Dainik Sangram*, 26 August 1971, p. 5). President of Pakistan National League Ataur Rahman Khan goes so far as to describe the struggle for independence not only as a disaster but as the wrath of God: "All the disaster that has befallen us is because we have defied Allah Rabbul Al-amin and his Prophet Hazrat Muhammad's (swt) rules and regulations. This is why the wrath of God has been unleashed upon us" (*Dainik Sangram*, 19 September 1971, p. 3). This rather terrifying conclusion seems enough to make the believing (and the weak of heart) think that the effects of war being felt in the country is a punishment for the Bangali resistance and that only by putting an end to it will there be any respite.

Islam is constructed as providing the answer to all the nation's problems. The Islamic ideology of Pakistan is said to be the "clear and correct solution to various complex situations and problems of the 20th century" (*Dainik Sangram*, 2 July 1971, p.

3). For example, president of Pakistan-controlled Azad Jammu and Kashmir Sarder Quayyum says,

> The Muslim world is facing a crisis – the only way to face this challenge is by devoting ourselves in our words, work and lives as true Muslims. Our national identity is at stake – if Islamic education is made mandatory, we can face our enemies. The ethical and physical structure of our society must be made in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah and this will bring peace and pride. (*Dainik Sangram*, 21 May 1971, p. 3)

In another commentary, Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam party member Mufti Mahmud advises Pakistanis to "think as Muslims", adding:

> If anyone thinks there is any solution to the country's crisis other than Islam, they are wrong. Islamic education and values are the base on which Pakistan's solidarity and security can be defended. If Islam's fundamental principles are weakened, Pakistan can never be made strong. If in the last 23 years we had followed the basic principles of Islam and Islamic brotherhood, we would not have had to witness these bad days now. It is because we have moved away from these fundamental principles that East Pakistan is facing such crisis today. (*Dainik Sangram*, 28 May 1971, p. 1)

Not having followed Islamic principles is largely blamed on the dictatorships of the past but now is the time to remedy this – by uniting as Muslims to defend Pakistan. Maulana Atahar Ali, warning the people about the "enemies of Islam" and their hatred of Pakistan, Islam and Muslims, calls upon the government to end un-Islamic activities in the country and establish laws based on the Quran and Sunnah because "it is due to our apathy and neglect [of Islam] that we are facing this threat of disaster today" (*Dainik Sangram*, 7 July 1971, p. 6).

Islamic scholar and Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami Maulana Maududi says the crisis may be resolved as follows:

> People should ask God for forgiveness for their neglect and wrongdoings which have brought dangerous internal and external disaster upon the country today. Pakistanis should pledge to God to use all their might to foil all attempts of anti-Islam ideology in Pakistan. This is how God will help us with national compensation but also defend the country from future disaster. (*Dainik Sangram*, 16 August 1971, p. 1)

Jamaat-i-Islami leader Mia Tofael Mohammad says, "Only an Islamic movement can rescue Bangali Muslims from downfall. Allah saved Pakistan from the enemy's

conspiracy. Now it is the responsibility of Islamic movement activists to struggle tirelessly to establish an Islamic social system" (*Dainik Sangram*, 13 July 1971, p. 1).

As such, the media discourse constructs an image of the Muslim world, and not only Pakistan, as in crisis. What is most significant about the situation in Pakistan is not in the turning to God and Prophet which any nation can do and many nations have done in times of crisis, but that the nation is made one with religion, the enemy of the nation as enemies of Islam, that only those on the side of a united Pakistan and thus Islam are regarded as the "true Muslims" and that the war itself is depicted as a battle of faith.

5.3 The Discourse of Religious-national Unity

Haqqani (2005) argues that the 1945-1946 election campaign was based almost entirely on Islamic rhetoric and the final result was an almost total identification of Pakistan with Islam. I would argue that this was just as true in the 1970 elections and the war which followed the year after. This identification comes across clearly in the media discourses during that period as this chapter will demonstrate.

Effectively, the words "Pakistan" and "Islam" as well as "Pakistan, Islam and Muslims/Muslim brotherhood" are put together so that it becomes literally impossible to separate the two or think of them as two separate entities of nation and religion. This comes across in different ways in media language and headlines. Pakistan and Islam are what matter in life (*Dainik Sangram* 30 May 1971, p. 2) and no one should be allowed to rise against them (*Dainik Sangram* 30 May 1971, p. 3). The foundation of Pakistani nationalism is described in an op-ed piece as being "brought alive by Islamic thought/philosophy" (Morshed, *Dainik Sangram*, 22 June 1971, p. 2).

A conference of Islamic scholars held in Dhaka in May 1971 suggested that "Islam is the cure for all diseases and people should follow the ideology of the Prophet

for the brightness/splendour of Islam and Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram*, 20 May 1971, p. 2) and the youth must have "unwavering faith in Islam and Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram* 31 May 1971, p. 1). India can never want the good of Pakistan and Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 29 July 1971, p. 6) and it is obviously a Hindu "conspiracy to erase all trace of Pakistan and Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 11 May 1971, p. 1, p. 3) and a "conspiracy to destroy Pakistan and Islam" (*Dainik Pakistan* 3 September 1971, p. 1, p. 2).

Media discourses also use the Quran to legitimise the twinning of Pakistan and Islam. For example, a commentary in the *Dainik Sangram* declares:

> The Muslims of Pakistan thought the coming of Pakistan on the night of the revelation of the Quran as significant. They thought by giving Pakistan on the same night as the Quran was revealed God was giving a sign that the Quran and Pakistan were being made inseparable like body and soul. Thus a Quran-less Pakistan would be putrid and buriable like a soul-less body. (*Dainik Sangram* 19 August 1971, p. 2)

Only those allied with Islamic ideologies are able to defend Pakistan's national integrity and sovereignty, says one news report (*Dainik Sangram* 10 June 1971, p. 3). In fact, those who profess anything other than Islamic ideology to rule Pakistan are labelled "open enemies of Islam and Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, supplement p. 2). Islam and Pakistan are said to be inextricably linked (*Dainik Sangram* 23 September June 1971, p. 1, 31 October 1971, p. 2).

Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam says, "Pakistan and Islam are intricately linked and only Islamic ideology can keep Pakistan alive" (*Dainik Sangram* 21 June 1971, p. 1) and later on categorically states that for Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan and Islam are one and the same thing (*Dainik Sangram* 26 September 1971, p. 1).

Thus, love for one means love for the other. Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Matiur Rahman Nizami claims that "only those who love Islam are those who love Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram* 24 September 1971, p. 6). Nizami is also quoted as saying,

> If Pakistan survives the Muslims here will survive. Allah gave the responsibility of protecting his beloved land Pakistan to the faithful Muslims but when they failed to solve

> the problem politically, Allah protected his beloved land through the army. (*Dainik Sangram* 5 August 1971, p. 4)

Haqqani notes that, soon after assuming power in 1969, President Yahya Khan 'extended the military's role as the guardian of Pakistan's "ideological frontier," a notion that has prevailed ever since' (2005: 51) and in this way, Nizami justifies the Pakistan army's actions and violence against Bangalis as being the will of Allah.

These ideas are repeated in poems on the page for children. For example, one of them declares that it was "Allah's endless mercy that our fearless army destroyed the conspiracy of the adversaries of Pakistan and Islam and protected Pakistan and Islam" but that in the coming days, the readers/children must protect Pakistan and Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 23 July 1971, p. 4).

"Defending Pakistan's national integrity and protecting Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 September 1971, p. 3), in this case by the al Badr forces, are made out to be one and the same, as is "eliminating Islam and Muslims" with "destroying Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram* 11 September 1971, p. 1).

Jamaat-i-Islami Ameer Maulana Maududi, in a call for self-sacrifice in order to protect every inch of the nation, makes it one with religion:

> Pakistan's security is the security of Islam in the whole world, Pakistan is Islam's strongest citadel, if the enemies of Islam succeed in destroying this citadel then it will not be possible to save Islam and Muslims anywhere in the world. If God forbid, East Pakistan separates from West Pakistan, Islam and Muslims will be finished in East Pakistan. Thus defending East Pakistan means defending Islam. (*Dainik Sangram* 9 October 1971, p. 1)

In a call to the students of East Pakistan, Maududi again says: "If Pakistan is saved then Islam will be saved." (*Dainik Pakistan* 9 October 1971, p. 6). According to Maududi then, Islam and Muslims live and die with Pakistan, making it seem imperative to defend the latter in order for the former to survive.

Unity is constructed as bringing the nation together, and is given further legitimacy through references to Islam and citations from the Quran. For example, in an

op-ed article in the *Dainik Sangram* on national unity, the writer suggests that "unity is important, national unity is important, Islam stresses on the importance of unity – accept Allah's bond of oneness, don't be divided among yourselves, unity is strength, what one can't do alone is easy to accomplish as a group" (*Dainik Sangram* 2 July 1971, p. 5).

Islam is seen as the means to overcome differences of language and race, for example. As an editorial in the *Dainik Sangram* declares:

> Muslims are brothers irrespective of race, language, caste and their nationality is not limited to their geographical boundaries. The strong tie of Islamic ideology has bound the people of two territories as one people and state. Practically speaking, Pakistan is a smaller version of world states as planned in Islam. In a way Pakistan is a unique example in the Muslim world. Thus it not only proves the power of Islamic nationhood, but also inspires the Muslim world to unite in political/state structure according to Islamic nationality. (*Dainik Sangram* 27 July 1971, p. 2)

At an Islamic conference, religious scholars and politicians talk about Muslims being one people regardless of language, race, caste, region, etc. According to various speakers, irrespective of differences in education, language, race, caste, region, Muslims are united by their *kalima*, the foundation of their faith, and by the same purpose (*Dainik Sangram* 18 May 1971, p. 1).

5.3a The denial of difference

The analysis of the material showed there was a clear and repeated effort to undermine cultural differences and highlight the importance of religious similarities. For example, Maulana Maududi was quoted as saying that "one Muslim's life and property has been declared sacred for another Muslim. Thus it is religious our duty to protect the life and property of our Bangali brothers. If Pakistani Muslims identify themselves as Bangali, Beluchi, Sindh and Punjabi, then our belief in Islam as a carrier of unity will be proven untrue" (*Dainik Sangram* 4 May 1971, p. 1). On another occasion he is quoted as

saying, “Under the umbrella of Islam, Muslims rise above race, language and other considerations and are considered brothers” (*Dainik Sangram* 8 July 1971, p. 1).

Jamaat-i-Islami leader Chowdhury Rahmat Elahi says, “Eliminating language and community-based differences is very important right now as these are what have brought disaster upon Pakistan” (*Dainik Sangram* 5 June 1971, p. 1), while another political leader refers to how, 1,400 years ago the Prophet united the people of different languages on the basis of sacred monotheism, and how today too only Islam can end the feelings of Bangali, Sindhi, Beluchi, Pathan and bind the people (*Dainik Sangram* 25 September 1971, p. 3).

Raihan (1971a) cites the ideal of 10 crore Indian Muslims who, “inspired by Islamic nationality, broke the ties of language, race and region and set a great example of unity” against India and created Pakistan. Dr. Mir Fakhruzzaman talks about forgetting “petty differences” and uniting on the basis of the main values of Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 8 September 1971, p. 1). Maulana Thanvi says, “Islam is applicable to everyone irrespective of race, class and region. In our country where there are different cultures and languages, Islam is the greatest unifying tie” (*Dainik Sangram* 24 May 1971, p. 3). At a meeting of the Shanti Committee, it is philosophised, “In unity lies the freedom of Muslims and Pakistan can only survive if we rise above regionalism and unite as Muslims” (*Dainik Sangram* 27 May 1971, p. 3).

Jamaat-i-Islami second-in-command Mia Tufail Muhammad seems a staunch believer in Islamic over regional nationalism, claiming that after Allah has saved Pakistan from the enemy’s conspiracy, only an Islamic movement can save Bangali Muslims from downfall and that “from an Islamic movement perspective, there is no difference between Bangali, Punjabi, Pathan and Beluchis” (*Dainik Sangram* 13 July 1971, p. 1). Importantly, he notes that it is *Hindus* who, after having failed to prevent the creation of

Pakistan, have been trying to destroy it since the day it was born by creating divides between East and West Pakistan by stressing on regional over Islamic nationalism. He also believes that "Education should create Islamic inspiration in students which will create national unity and save them from becoming victims of ideological conflict" (*Dainik Sangram* 31 May 1971, p. 1).

In an effort to reinforce the argument of the Pakistani government and military for a united Pakistan based on religion, the media draws upon the nation's political history and leadership during Partition. For example, it reprints a speech by Pakistan's founder Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah that he gave after Partition in which he emphasised the idea of Pakistanis as Muslims. In the speech, Jinnah had said:

> There is no significance in saying we are Bangali, we are Sindhi, we are Pathan, or we are Punjabi. No, we are Muslim. This is what Islam has taught us. No matter where or how you are, remember you are Muslims, you are part of one nation. And you have gained a huge land. This is all yours, it does not belong to any Punjabi, Sindhi, Pathan or Bangali, remember, it is yours... Your country is Pakistan and you are Pakistanis. Free yourselves from the curse of provincialism... The language issue has been dragged in to create divide and disaster between Muslims. (*Dainik Sangram* 14 September 1971, p. 2)

Matlib (1971), a *Dainik Sangram* contributor, summarises the recent situation in an op-ed article thus:

> Only Islam can save the unity of the country. No identity of Pakistan can be imagined other than Islam. Pakistan won't survive without Islam either. For as long as this ideology is not fully implemented, peace and security will just be words. Defending the country means defending the country's ideology which means defending Islam. Islam and Pakistan are inextricably linked. This is why in this time of crisis Islam-loving, idealist people are being killed, because this is the way to destroy the country. If Pakistan does not survive today it will be proof that establishing a country in order to implement Islamic life philosophy is stupidity and ungodly enemies will be active in eliminating Muslims from the world. (*Dainik Sangram* 31 October 1971, p. 2)

An editorial published in the last weeks of the war states matter-of-factly: "Without Islam there is no logical reason to be joined to a territory 1,500 miles away. No other force in the world can keep this country united" (*Dainik Sangram* 28 November 1971, p. 2).

5.3b Pan-Islamic Pakistan

The analysis showed that the media also appealed to all Muslims to unite in order to protect the Islamic homeland Pakistan, to save Islam and Muslims, and to help establish an Islamic way of life. As Haqqani notes, 'pan-Islamism was more important for Pakistan's efforts to consolidate its national identity than as the mainstay of its foreign policy' (2005: 19). In 1971, it may be argued that it was used towards both ends, with the latter bringing in international Muslim support. The media, for example, used Jinnah's speeches on July 2 to describe Pakistan as "a symbol of Muslim unity."

On this basis, several news stories were published to show the Muslim world's concern for Pakistan, condemnation of the resistance, especially of India, and Pakistan's appeal for international Muslim support. One news item specifically states that "Pakistan's efforts are a part of the establishment of Islamic unity" and that "India tried to weaken a Muslim nation which is playing an important role in strengthening unity of Muslims and establishing world peace". Especially after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Arab countries realised that India is not their friend while Pakistan "proved its sincerity and love towards the Muslim world" (*Dainik Sangram* 3 July 1971, p. 3). Thus Maulana Maududi declares, "Islamic brotherhood and international justice demands that Muslim states should fulfil their responsibility to save the largest Muslim nation from disunity" (*Dainik Sangram* 5 April 1971, p. 1), while President of Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-controlled) Sardar Qayyum says, "God forbid, if one of the Muslim world's states Pakistan is harmed, it will be an irreparable loss for all Muslim people" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 June 1971, p. 1).

Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam Maulana Mufti Mahmud stresses unity of Islamic states to fight the allied enemies. According to him, all the problems of Muslim nations are caused by Western imperialism and in order to solve these problems and defeat the allied

enemy, it is important for Islamic states to be united (*Dainik Sangram* 21 August 1971, p. 3). Justice SA Rahman says that the main objective of Islamic countries should be the utmost unity of the Muslim world (*Dainik Sangram* 16 October 1971, p. 3). Jamaat-i-Islami leader Chowdhury Rahmat Ilahi points out that because Pakistan has always treated the world's Muslims' problems as its own and helped them, "All Muslims should dedicate themselves to establishing the victory of Islam. InshaAllah [God willing] Pakistan's 12 crore Muslims will transform Pakistan into a true Islamic state" (*Dainik Sangram* 9 September 1971, p. 3).

The main justification for the numerous appeals made to the Muslim world seeking support for Pakistan lies in the war being labelled "a conspiracy to weaken the Muslim world by breaking up Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram* 19 April 1971, p. 4). Reference is made to anti-Islamic and Jewish forces conspiring against the Muslim world and the importance of unity and cooperation between Muslim states in this situation. In an editorial printed on May 10, reference is also made to the Prophet's call to the people to forget their Arab or non-Arab identities and to identify themselves as Muslims, in relation to questions of Bangali and non-Bangali identities being raised with a call to follow the ways of the Prophet in personal, social, political and worldly matters.

A poem published on July 2 titled 'Be one, the world's Muslims', goes thus:

> All Muslims are brothers, no differences between Bangalis and Sindhis, Punjabis, Beluchis and Pathans, those who are faithful, those who are Muslims, have a place in the last Prophet's umma, under one Allah's sky, everyone has equal rights... In the troubled days of faith, why are brothers far from each other, those who believe in the *kalima*, be one... (*Dainik Sangram* 2 July 1971, p. 3)

5.4 Media as Discursive Tools

The Pakistani media analysed here not only reported the events and discourse of the time by quoting political and religious leaders, but played a role in these discourses.

The analysis showed that the media chose to publish certain news stories over others and gave prominence to editorials and articles suggesting national unity based on religious unity. Indeed, as the analysis presented above shows, the media played a role of agents of order, or mobilisers of public opinion and manufacturers of consent and national consensus (Watson 2003). This was reflected in their attention to a consistent campaign underlining the importance of a religious state, which was not only apparent in the editorials and commentaries, but also in the news reports. Nationalism was constructed, encouraging religious over ethnic and cultural unity. Identities were formed, portraying the Pakistani Muslim as good and the Indian Hindu as bad, as will be shown in the next chapter. And, as Chapter 7 will show, direction for action was also given.

As Sultana Kamal, a lawyer and human rights activist who participated in the Liberation War at the age of 21, pointed out in an interview[29], "The political parties were not the only ones to be influenced by religion, regular citizens were too, especially the older generation which had lived through the Partition and were also initially wary of Hindus and India. But it was the political parties who actively fought against liberation. When the people saw the atrocities being committed by the Pakistani government, army and its collaborators, led by the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the spirit of the younger generation in fighting for liberation and even sacrificing their lives, they were swayed."

It was this use of the historical animosity between Muslims and Hindus, especially during the time of Partition, that was used during Bangladesh's Liberation War, highlighting the war as one between Muslims and Hindus, Pakistan and India. This is why it was even more important to target the youth who had not experienced Partition and "Hindu oppression" with anti-Hindu/anti-Indian ideology. This was particularly so as

[29] Sultana Kamal, advocate and human rights activist. Personal interview. 11 December 2014, conducted in her office in Mohammadpur, Dhaka.

those enlisting in the Mukti Bahini as freedom fighters were largely young Bangalis in their teens and twenties. This is why madrasa students specifically are called upon as a counterforce to unite "in this time of national conflict when Islamic scholars should be given the key to establish an Islamic society" (*Dainik Sangram* 29 August 1971, p. 1)[30]. At a programme of former madrasa students, editor of a leading Pakistani newspaper *Urdu Digest* Altaf Husein Qureishi stresses on Islamic education and the prompt establishment of an Islamic university in order to defend Pakistan's unity and solidarity and is quoted as saying, "As long as there is any life in the bodies of madrasa students in East Pakistan, they will not let the flag of Pakistan be lowered" (*Dainik Sangram* 2 October 1971, p. 1).

As James Watson explains: 'Hegemony works through ideological state apparatuses (education, religion, the arts, media) and operates best when those apparatuses are speaking in harmony with one another' (2003: 18). In the case of Pakistan, we see the educational institutions, religious organisations and the media working in tandem to promote an ideology of a nation based on religion and to produce an image of a state which is better as an Islamic state and patriotic citizens who are better as "true Muslims". Ideology 'provides the conceptual "cement" that upholds the structures of the powerful, defends their interests and is instrumental in helping to

[30] The reliance of the Pakistan government and military on madrasa teachers and students as a major ally in the war against liberation is interesting, especially where Sen (2006) argues that faith-based schools can actually have the effect of 'reducing the role of reasoning which children may have the opportunity to cultivate and use' (2006: 117). The push for increase in the establishment of madrasas at the time as evidenced in several news items reporting the demand for establishment of madrasas and an Islamic university shows the authorities' inclination towards dogma-led rather than reason-based education, thought and action. It also points to the direct recruitment of teachers and students from religion-based educational institutions onto the battlefield.

preserve the *status quo* – the way things are; the way they are ordered' (Watson 2003: 19).

But, as Watson (2003) also points out, the Gramscian notion of hegemony works best in a society where there is a certain degree of social, economic, political and cultural security, which is probably why the ideological state apparatuses failed to succeed in a society characterised by a high level of social, economic, political and cultural discontent among the majority Bangali population, leading to the use of repressive state apparatuses and outright war between the rulers and the ruled. The 'won consent', as Watson puts it, never came to be. Gradually, the broader, more abstract, milder discourse of the virtues of a religious state and people which prevailed towards the beginning of the war, grew more specific, action-oriented and violent, calling for the taking up of arms against the enemy, promoting violence, sacrifice and martyrdom, in order to protect the holy land of Pakistan.

The following chapter will show how not only the nation, but individual and collective identities – of the Muslim, Hindu, Pakistani, Bangali, and enemy – were constructed by the media during the war. It will demonstrate how this identity construction emphasised on difference and the Other, setting the stage for war between a divided people, the divisions created discursively through the framing of religion-based ideology.

Fig. 2: Discourse of "Islamic Nationalism"



Table 1: The construction of Pakistan and religious-national unity

References to history	• sacrifice of martyrs during Partition • blood and honour of martyrs • sacred responsibility to protect their sacrifice • battles of Karbala and Badr
Pakistan as homeland for Muslims	• home of Islam • homeland for Muslims of the subcontinent • belongs to Muslims • Darul Islam
Pakistan as sacred	• birth and survival based on Islam • pillar of light of Islam • holy land • sacred land • holy motherland • *durgo* (fort/citadel) of Islam • gift from God • Allah's *amanat* (God has put Pakistan in the custody of Muslim Pakistanis) • Allah's home • slogans of *la ilaha il Allah* • founded on the *kalima* • nation born on the night of the Quran's revelation • world's largest Muslim nation • world's greatest Islamic state • those who love Islam love Pakistan
Pakistan as ideology	• ideological state based on ideology of Islam • based on ideological values, not nationalism, language and geography • two-nation theory • Quran- and Sunnah-based rule • Pakistan for Islam, not different ethnicities • Muslim nationhood • Muslim brotherhood • Islamic nationalism • importance of Islamic education • Prophet Muhammad's ideology, ideology based on the words of Allah and life of the Prophet

Islam as panacea	• neglect of Islamic ideology, lack of Islamic policy, apathy towards Islam, betrayal of ideology are the sources of troubles • neglect of Islam has brought about wrath of God • war as punishment for Bangali resistance • Islam is clear and correct solution • system must be in line with Quran and Sunnah • Islamic education and values, Islamic principles and brotherhood • Islamic movement can save the nation
Defending Pakistan and Islam	• ideological frontier • Pakistan army carrying out the will of Allah • protection of Pakistan and Islam • Pakistan's security is the security of Islam in the world • defending and saving Pakistan means defending and saving Islam
Islamic unity	• eliminate differences of race, language, caste, nationality, geographical boundaries • rise above regionalism • unity based on Islamic ideology • Islamic nationality and nationhood • unity based on the *kalima* • in unity lies freedom of Muslims • only Islam can keep Pakistan united
Pan-Islamic Pakistan	• Pakistan a symbol of Muslim unity • Pakistan's role in strengthening unity of Muslims and establishing world peace • Pakistan proved its sincerity and love towards the Muslim world (after Arab-Israeli war) • harm to Pakistan will be irreparable loss to the Muslim world • the war is a conspiracy to weaken the Muslim world by breaking up Pakistan • Islamic states must unite against the Western imperialist enemy

CHAPTER 6

IDENTITIES AT WAR:

THE CONSTRUCTION OF HINDUS AND MUSLIMS IN ANTI-LIBERATION DISCOURSE

We did away with our Hindu names and took Christian names because it was safer to be Christian than Hindu… So there was a total loss of identity for anyone who was not a Muslim. –Meghna Guhathakurta

They wanted to make [us] 'pukka Muslims'. –Sudhangshu Sekhar Roy

The art of constructing hatred takes the form of invoking the magical power of some allegedly predominant identity that drowns other affiliations, and in a conveniently bellicose form can also overpower any human sympathy or natural kindness that we may normally have, the result can be homespun elemental violence, or globally artful violence and terrorism. –Amartya Sen

In his book *Identity and Violence* (2006), Amartya Sen talks about his first exposure to murder as an 11-year-old when a Muslim man was attacked in the riots of the 1940s and came stumbling through the gates of Sen's family home seeking help and water. The young Amartya could not fathom how a person whom the attackers did not even know, let alone have been harmed by, could be killed on the basis of a single identity, that he was "the enemy". In times of war, however, that becomes the predominant identity – the enemy we must fight. How the identity of the enemy is constructed – through the use of language, making of meaning, circulation of discourse and formation of truth based on ideology – and what identities it is set in contrast to through the same process, is the subject of this chapter.

This chapter draws on discourse analysis of the newspapers *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* published in East Pakistan in 1971 as well as some interviews to explore how specific identities were constructed through language and discourse based on religious ideology propagated by the Pakistani state and its affiliates. Whereas

Bangladeshis view the war as one between the Bangali majority population of East Pakistan and their rulers in the western wing, this chapter identifies the main actors in Bangladesh's Liberation War according to the anti-liberation elements as evident in their media. In the discourse of anti-liberation, it was not a battle for freedom but a war of faith, jihad even, between the *khati* Pakistani and the Hindu-inclined Bangali, between the *sachcha* Musolman and the imperialist, infidel Hindu. It was a war between Muslims and Hindus who had apparently proven throughout the centuries that they were civilisations apart and could not coexist. It begins with a brief theoretical introduction in order to set the scene and make sense of the findings, followed by an analysis of the data gathered from the above newspapers divided into categories of how the Pakistani Muslim and Bangali Hindu were represented.

6.1 Identity and Difference

Elaborate definitions of "identity" are much too vast to broach in this work of which identity is only a part. However, the simplest definitions are often the best in terms of being easily understood. Thus, suffice it to say, identity 'gives us an idea of who we are and of how we relate to others and to the world in which we live' (Woodward 2002: 1). Woodward states, crucially to this work, that often, 'identity is most clearly marked by difference, that is by what it is not' (ibid: 2). This marking of difference is achieved through symbolic systems of representation and through forms of exclusion, which are established through classification systems which 'appl[y] a principle of difference to a population in such a way as to be able to divide them and all their characteristics into at least two, opposing groups – us/them (e.g. Serb/Croat); self/other' (Woodward 2002: 29).

As Sen notes: 'With suitable instigation, a fostered sense of identity with one group of people can be made into a powerful weapon to brutalize another' (2006: xv).

The less confrontational features of those in the opposition are minimised to the point of being made invisible, including the fact that they are, if nothing else, human beings. Sen does argue, however, that the choice lies with people to decide the importance of their different identities and affiliations, and they are not just naturally 'discovered' (Sen 2006: 5) and forcibly imposed one fine day. Often, however, choice may be assumed to be absent and the use of reason replaced by 'uncritical acceptance of conformist behaviour' (ibid: 9). He also states that even though *we* may see ourselves in a certain way, other people may not perceive us in that same way.

In his insightful book *Pakistan: Between mosque and military*, Husain Haqqani notes: 'The experience of language riots by Bengalis in East Pakistan had pointed out the difficulty of subsuming ethnic identities into a new Pakistani identity. Religion was an easier tool of mobilization. Making Pakistani synonymous with being a good Muslim was considered the more attainable goal' (2005: 19). Thus, while Hindus in East Pakistan may have considered themselves to also be Pakistani, Bangali, etc., those who opposed liberation on the basis of religion, saw them, and made every effort to make others see them, as Hindus only – similar to the categorisation of people as Hindus and Muslims only in 1940s India as described by Sen. In the Pakistani media of 1971 studied here, Hindus were postulated as Indian infiltrators, and every attempt made to erase all other identities, such as the fact that they were also South Asian, Pakistani, Bangali, and from similar classes, backgrounds, professions, etc., as were many of the people being addressed (in the media and elsewhere), not to mention that they were above all, living, breathing human beings. As such, an overall process of dehumanisation was underway.

Such 'charged attributions', according to Sen, occur through two different but related distortions – 'misdescription of people belonging to a targeted category, and an insistence that the misdescribed characteristics are the only relevant features of the

targeted person's identity' (Sen 2006: 7). In the case at hand then, the only important identity is the Hindu identity, and that is loaded with certain, mostly negative, characteristics. The "enemy" must be posited against someone – the friend, "us", in this case, the Muslim, which again becomes the predominant identity and is attributed positive, even glorifying characteristics. And this 'surgical implantation of a "real me"' or organised attribution, warns Sen, 'can prepare the ground for persecution and burial' (ibid: 8).

The identity divisions between Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971 were strongly linked to language and culture and not to religious differences. As Sen writes: 'Bangladesh's separation from Pakistan was not based on religion at all, since a Muslim identity was shared by the bulk of the population of the two wings of undivided Pakistan. The separatist issues related to language, literature, and politics' (2006: 15). However, for the anti-liberation forces, religion was what they chose to focus on and construct accordingly in their media propaganda. Similar to the situation of the communal riots of the 1940s and the ultimate Partition of India of 1947 where Sen describes people as being 'made to think of themselves only as Hindus or only as Muslims (who must unleash vengeance on "the other community") and as absolutely nothing else: not Indians, not sub-continentals, not Asians, not members of a shared human race' (ibid: 172), the anti-liberation groups of 1971 also drew the great divide between Hindu and Muslim, India and Pakistan, although the war was within Pakistan itself, between Pakistanis, the majority of them Muslims. It was represented as being about fighting 'the enemies who kill us' (ibid).

Stuart Hall defines representation as 'the production of meaning through language' (2001: 16) and refers to two definitions from the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* where representation means to describe or depict something and also to

symbolise, stand for or substitute for something. The representation of the Hindu in Pakistan's media in 1971 is such a dual representation, where the Hindu is no longer only a person belonging to a certain religion but who is described and depicted in such a way as to form a specific picture in the minds of the readers. For example, Hindus were represented as idol-worshippers, infidels and Indian infiltrators, in binary opposition to the monotheistic Muslim. As Hall notes, representation is a systematic process including mental representations translated into language. This involves organising, classifying, etc., and one of the ways to do this is by using the principles of similarity and difference. Our 'mental representations' are more easily categorised in terms of sameness and otherness, often in binary opposites, such as light and darkness, day and night, good and bad, happiness and sadness, and these are then cemented through the use of words assigned. In this way, the Hindu was also depicted as different from the Muslim, they were the Other, and in consequence, the enemy of the Muslim, Islam and Pakistan. Hall argues that meaning is not in the person or even in the word but that 'it is we who fix the meaning so firmly that, after a while, it comes to seem natural and inevitable. The meaning is *constructed by the system of representation*… constructed and fixed by the *code*…' (Hall 2001: 21, original italics). Meaning is a signifying practice that '*makes things mean*' (ibid: 24, original italics). For him,

> it is not the material world which conveys meaning: it is the language system or whatever system we are using to represent our concepts. It is social actors who use the conceptual systems of their culture and the linguistic and other representational systems to construct meaning, to make the world meaningful and to communicate about that world meaningfully to others'. (Hall 2004: 25)

Thus, meaning is never fixed, it can change over time and place, through history and culture, there is no 'single, unchanging, universal "true meaning"' (ibid: 32). Interestingly, whereas the "Razakar" who opposed the liberation war in defence of Pakistan and Islam was a hero in the anti-liberation discourse in 1971, in the pro-

liberation discourse and to this day, the word has come to signify a traitor among Bangalis. Meaning *is* really what one makes of it.

6.1a Discursive identities

The discursive formation of identities has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3. For example, Benedict Anderson conceives of the nation as 'imagined', arguing that it is only 'in the minds of each [that] lives the image of their communion' (Anderson 1997: 44). Eric Hobsbawm (cited in Ozkirimli 2010: 94), too, sees nations and nationalism as products of 'social engineering', or as 'invented traditions', a strategy employed by the ruling elite of any society to counter the threat of 'mass democracy'. In the face of social fragmentation and disintegration, the idea of 'national community' can bring social cohesion, argues Hobsbawm. This idea is developed and reinforced by primary education, public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments. Thus, contrary to popular understanding, in Hobsbawm's view, it is not the people who rise in nationalist fervour but states which create it (ibid: 95). In fact, Michael Billig (2001) argues that nationalism is 'a way of thinking or an ideological consciousness' (Billig 2001: 10) instilled into citizens and that language, which is widely considered to be a key determinant of national identity, rather than creating nationalism is created *by* nationalism.

Wodak et al, too, in their work on the discursive constructions of national identity, assume that national identities are formed discursively and that these discursive constructs 'primarily emphasise national uniqueness and intra-national uniformity but largely ignore intra-national differences' (2009: 4) – e.g., in this case study, the repeated focus on the common religion of Islam between the populations of East and West Pakistan while ignoring the major differences of language and culture. Wodak et al also

argue that there is no single national identity and that different identities are discursively constructed according to the context, making national identity 'malleable, fragile and, frequently, ambivalent and diffuse' (ibid). Similarly, characteristics and as a result, identities too, of East and West Pakistanis, Hindus and Muslims, etc., overlapped. However, the media discourse, as this chapter will show, focused on the differences between the groups, creating clear distinctions between Muslims and Hindus.

The following section draws upon empirical findings in order to illustrate the discursive formation of identities during Bangladesh's Liberation War.

6.2 Identities at War

This section presents the empirical findings on identity construction in the Pakistani media of 1971 as reflected in the *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* newspapers studied here. The four main identities were that of the *khati* or pure Pakistani, the "Hinduised" Bangali, the *sachcha* or true Musolman/Muslim and the Muslim-hating Hindu enemy.

6.2a The khati Pakistani

In the media under study, being Pakistani always comes with a qualifier, either "*khati*", a Bangla word meaning pure, or with some variation of being Muslim, so much so, that Pakistani and Muslim become almost synonymous, similar to the twinning of nation and religion discussed in the previous chapter. In these articulations, the pure Pakistani has a number of qualities.

First and foremost, s/he believes in a united Pakistan. Thus, a member of national assembly (MNA) who has left the banned Awami League, clarifies that he was not involved in the separatist movement and that he will serve the nation as a "*khati*

Pakistani". He stresses that he is a MNA not only from East Pakistan but the whole nation and that he believes in the unity and solidarity of Pakistan and that no one can destroy these, just as this time "the almighty Allah has saved us [from India's ill intentions to break up Pakistan]" (*Dainik Sangram* 11 June 1971, p. 3).

The *khati* Pakistani is also a *khati* Muslim, who discards all ideas of regionalism and works for a better Pakistan based on Islamic ideals, for Pakistan and Islam are inseparable. This understanding is emphasised especially by leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami. For example, the party's acting Ameer, Mia Tufail is quoted in a news report as saying, "We should forget issues of being local or not and be *khati* Muslim and *khati* Pakistani and create an environment of peace and friendship in society and unite in and strengthen our efforts for the Islamic movement" (*Dainik Sangram* 20 July 1971, p. 1). The following day, another Jamaat-i-Islami leader and member of the national assembly, Dr. Nazir Ahmed, is quoted as saying, "Forget differences of local and non-local and stand together as *khati* Muslim and *khati* Pakistani and work tirelessly to come out of this crisis" (*Dainik Sangram* 21 July 1971, p. 1). He also notes that, "The lack of Islamic way of life is the reason for the current crisis. Islam and Pakistan are inseparable. Pakistan's unity, solidarity and progress are dependent on the success of the struggle for the implementation of Islamic way of life" (ibid). The head of East Pakistan Jamaat-i-Islami Ghulam Azam goes so far as to even say, "Those who identify themselves first as Bangalis then as Muslims are not Pakistanis" (*Dainik Sangram* 11 September 1971, p. 1).

This character development of a *khati* Pakistani seems dependent on education and for this the education system requires reform to include and emphasise on Islamic ideals, as is evident from the media discourse. Ghulam Azam, in praising the proposed revisions to the textbook syllabus, is "sure that this syllabus would reflect national ideology and perspective which would help to form the character of future generations as

khati Musolman and *khati* Pakistanis" (*Dainik Sangram* 31 July 1971, p. 1). In a news report titled 'Students must make themselves into *khati* Pakistani and Musolman', the education minister Abbas Ali Khan says that "students should make themselves completely Pakistani, completely Muslim, and this should be their main goal. If they can develop themselves according to Islamic ideology, students will be able to make big sacrifices for the country and people" (*Dainik Sangram* 22 September 1971, p. 1). In another news item, the education minister, referring to a government handout which declared that Pakistan's population should forget "so-called cultural and language-based obstacles" asks students to read the history of Islam and Pakistan and advises teachers to teach students "so that they may grow to become *khati* Islam-loving Pakistani citizens" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 October 1971, p. 1).

Being Islam-loving, then, comes with being a true Pakistani – and not being so is the root of all problems, according to the media discourse. As revenue minister and Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana AKM Yusuf says,

> It is because the youth were not made aware of the main objective of the creation of Pakistan that today they are ashamed to identify themselves as Pakistani and Muslim. Islam and Pakistan are closely interlinked. Thus in order to save Pakistan the people must be revived/infused with new life in Islamic ideology... We are not one based on geographical nationalism but ideology... (*Dainik Sangram* 23 September 1971, p. 1)

Even the army is advised to "think of their responsibilities as including being protectors of pro-Pakistani, Islam-loving people" (*Dainik Sangram* 30 August 1971, p. 3).

In fact, an army major is quoted in the *Sunday Times* of 13 June 1971 as having told journalist Anthony Mascarenhas, that

> This is a war between the pure and the impure… The people here may have Muslim names and call themselves Muslims. But they are Hindu at heart… [W]e are now sorting [them] out… those who are left will be real Muslims. We will even teach them Urdu. (D'Costa 2011: 102)

This emphasis on Islamic ideology for the *khati* Pakistani raises the issue of whether only Muslims can be pure Pakistanis and brings into question what it means to

be Hindu (between 13 and 17 percent of the population in 1971 Pakistan, D'Costa 2011) or belong to other non-Muslim populations of Pakistan at the time. It also causes one to question their safety and security when, for example, the governor AM Malek asks "*khati* Pakistanis who crossed the border to return to their homes" (*Dainik Sangram* 16 October 1971, p. 1) and minister for commerce and industry Akhtaruddin Ahmed, in asking people to defend the national ideology and Islamic rule, says "*khati* Pakistanis have nothing to fear" (*Dainik Sangram* 21 October 1971, p. 4). By including only Muslims as real Pakistanis, the discourse excludes people of other faiths, particularly Hindus, from being Pakistani, which becomes an effective strategy in depicting them as Indian and spies and infiltrators of and from India.

With the classification of the *khati* Pakistani also comes the opportunity to fortify this identity. In an article titled 'Weapon against weapon – not logic' reference is made to the government's enlisting of *khati* Pakistani citizens in al Badr and Mujahid forces (the religious-historical connotations of the names of the forces themselves are suggestive), the auxiliary forces of the Pakistani military in East Pakistan, and that this is an invaluable opportunity for the country's "*khati* Pakistani *Islamponthi* (Islamist) citizens to gain Allah's satisfaction by proving their love for the country and Islam" (Mujahid 1971b, *Dainik Sangram* 15 September, p. 3). This is further reinforced in the commentary titled 'Respond to the call of jihad', where the *Sangram* commentator calls to "the people of Pakistan" to be infused with new life by their jihadi inspiration and that "today, our only identity should be that we are Muslim and Pakistani" (*Dainik Sangram* 28 November 1971, p. 1). Pakistani army General Niazi says, "Whether Muslims wear uniforms or civil dress, they are all *mujahid*[31] and in their own way they will each play

[31] Mujahid in Arabic refers to a fighter in a holy war (jihad). (Adamec 2009)

their role in defending Pakistan's indivisibility and solidarity" (*Dainik Sangram* 17 August 1971, p. 6). This language thus interpellates or hails the Pakistani Muslim readers, as if to motivate them to participate in the war in order to further reinforce their identity as good Muslims and achieve the ultimate reward, the satisfaction of Allah.

6.2b "Hindu-ising" the Bangali

While Bangalis from East Pakistan formed the majority of the population of the whole nation, *being* Bangali was very different from being the *khati* Pakistani as described above. Reference to Bangalis/East Pakistanis in *Dainik Sangram* is interesting in the sense that, in the context of nationality, Bangalis were positively referred to as "East Pakistanis" and, most often, as "East Pakistani Muslims", presumably in an attempt to reinforce the fact that Pakistani and Muslim were in fact their main, if not only, identities [as was the case for (West) Pakistanis in general, as shown above]. News stories, editorials and columns are filled with references to "East Pakistani Muslims" or a variation on this, throughout the time of the war: imperialist India's vile conspiracy to make "East Pakistani Muslims" into "slaves of Brahmin imperialism" (*Dainik Sangram* 6 April 1971, p. 1); the "Muslims of East Pakistan" are called upon to "help the military to eliminate the advocates of so-called 'Bangla-desh'" (*Dainik Sangram* 8 April 1971, p. 1); the biggest need of "Bangali Muslims" is to free themselves from the slavery of Hindus and live in a Muslim state (Rastbaj 1971a, *Dainik Sangram* 6 May, p. 2); "East Pakistan's Islam-loving, patriotic people" should be given military training in order to be able to counter potential Indian attacks (*Dainik Sangram* 5 June 1971, p. 3); "East Pakistani Muslims" would never want to separate from their West Pakistani brothers, they are Islam-loving and *khati* Pakistani for the sake of Islam (Dhumketu 1971b, *Dainik Sangram* 23 June, p. 2); "East Pakistan's devout Muslims are bone tired of the so-called

Bangali sympathisers" (Dhumketu 1971a); the ferocious order to "Hindu hooligans/gangsters to kill East Pakistan's innocent Muslims" (*Dainik Sangram* 1 October 1971, p. 3), etc. The East Pakistani Muslim identity is focused upon rather than the ethnic Bangali simply through the use of a different combination of words.

Being Bangali was frequently, and negatively, equated with Hindu and Indian. Rastbaj (1971c) writes in an op-ed piece that Hindus in India actually mean Hindu when they say "Bangali", and so they are killing Muslims, not Bangalis, and the motto "all Muslims are brothers" has been replaced by "Bangalis are brothers" but which he interprets as actually meaning Hindus are all brothers as is also stated in an editorial (*Dainik Sangram* 22 October 1971, p. 2).

The analysis of the material showed a clear attempt to differentiate between Bangali Muslims and Bangali Hindus, even in terms of language, literature, etc. Ikram (1971) in an article published in the *Dainik Sangram* (2 July, p. 5) argues that Bangla/Hindu literature is not a true reflection of Muslim Bengal, that the Bangla of Muslims is very different from Sanskrit traditions, containing many Arabic and Farsi words; essentially, that the Bangla of West Bengal is Hindu and the Bangla of East Pakistan or East Bengal is Pakistani, influenced by Muslim tradition. A columnist using the pseudonym Pothik (*Dainik Sangram* 26 August 1971, p. 2), in a piece on cultural invasion also in the *Dainik Sangram*, goes one step further and laments the Sanskritisation and de-Islamification of Bangla. This highlighting of difference between Bangali/Hindu/Indian and Muslim/Pakistani is a recurrent theme throughout, justifying the Othering of the former as/into the enemy and legitimising the state and military's actions against them.

Indeed, Bangla, Bangalis and (East) Bengal all seem to be at threat of severe 'Hindu-isation' according to the media discourse. Rahman (1971), a columnist, writes in

the *Dainik Sangram* (18 October, p. 2) on how Bangali Muslim youth think of Hindu thought/philosophy as their own thought/philosophy or culture and as a result they think of themselves more as Bangali rather than Muslim. Bangali Hindu society is said to be influencing Pakistan's Bangla-speaking Muslims towards Bangali nationalism, giving rise to fears of a Hindu state of Bangla *desh* (country), devoid of Muslims, being established (Raihan 1971b, *Dainik Sangram* 9 July, p. 2). In another article, the title of which literally means 'From removing discrimination to the Hindu-isation movement', columnist Rahee (1971b) writes of intrigues by Hindu leaders using the "Bangla desh" slogan to turn Muslims of the Pak-Bangla subcontinent into Hindus (*Dainik Sangram* 23 May, p. 2). The slogan "*Joy* Bangla" (victory to Bengal) is said to have replaced "Pakistan *zindabad*" (long live Pakistan) and to actually mean "*Jai* Hind" (victory to India) in Rastbaj (1971b) (*Dainik Sangram* 24 June, p. 2). In the article 'Mir Jafar[32] *shomipe*', the "*Joy* Bangla" movement is said to have taken "*Allahu akbar'*" (Allah is great) away from the mouths of God's followers and replaced it with "*Joy* Mujibur" (in reference to leader of the Awami League Sheikh Mujibur Rahman); people are being taught to chant "*Joy* Bangla" instead of saying "Bismillah" and "*narae taqbeer Allahu akbar*" (say *Allahu akbar*, Allah is great); in the name of Bangali nationalism, *mushrik*[33]

[32] Mir Jafar Ali Khan Bahadur was the first Nawab of Bengal supported by the British East India Company who betrayed Nawab Sirajuddowla leading to his defeat in the Battle of Plassey and making the way for British rule in India. Commonly referred to as the Wretched Traitor, he has become a legendary villain in Bengal. The name Mir Jafar has come to mean traitor, thus its use in the column 'Mir Jafar *Shomipe*' published in the *Dainik Sangram*, referring to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Bangalis who were fighting for liberation as traitors. In Bangladesh today, however, the term *razakar*, one of the anti-liberation groups in 1971, carries a similar, even worse connotation, also meaning traitor. Both words are interesting examples of how not only words but also names and titles make meaning, and how meanings change with context. A heroic Nawab and a force fighting for the faith have both come to mean traitor in a negative sense in contemporary Bangladesh.

[33] According to the Dictionary of Spiritual Terms (online), a polytheist; literally, "one who falsely associates (something) with God," considering it to be likewise divine. It is most often used in the Qur'ān to refer to

are being befriended and Muslims made into enemies; Muslims are being transformed into Hindus in the name of Bangali culture through various rituals such as the Bangali new year, the identity of Islam and Muslims is being washed away from the "Bangla *desh*" that is being dreamt about (*Dainik Sangram* 30 August 1971, p. 2). It is interesting to note here, however, that slogans about Bangali nationalism are meant to replace Islamic expressions where the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive except in the eyes of those opposing liberation to whom nation and religion are one and the same. Must a nation comprise people of one religion only, i.e., be religiously homogenous, and what about the others then? Similar ideas are expressed in an article reprinted from the previous year, which also says that people are being forced to say "*Joy* Bangla" instead of "Pakistan *zindabad*", sing praises of Laxman Sen[34] instead of Bakhtiar Khilji[35], forget about East Pakistan and root for Bangla *desh*, forget Islamic culture and desire Bangali (Hindu) culture, in short, they are being imparted lessons in Bangali nationalism instead of Islamic nationalism (*Dainik Sangram* 30 August 1971, p. 2). Here the term "Islamic nationalism" is actually used and in opposition to Bangali nationalism, suggesting that Islam is not only a personal religion but a foundation of the nation around which people should rally as a form of nationalism.

Where the pro-liberation Bangali population saw the struggle as one for freedom from the oppressive domination and political, economic, social and cultural discrimination of their Pakistani rulers, the anti-liberation elements portrayed the war as

---

the Meccans and other Arabs who refused to accept the monotheistic vision of Islam. Polytheism or *shirk* is a sin that cannot be forgiven (Adamec 2009).

[34] Laxman Sen was a Hindu king of Bengal.

[35] Bakhtiar Khalji was a Turkic military-general who conquered Bengal, marking the beginning of Muslim rule in the region.

being between Hindu and Muslim, India and Pakistan, continuously and repetitively constructing difference between the two through language and discourse.

6.2c The "sachcha Musolman"

As Amartya Sen (2006) argues, whether seen and shown to be a militant or tolerant, Islam as a religion of violence or peace, it may neither be necessary nor useful or even possible to define the "true Muslim" or Islam. The anti-liberation media of 1971 analysed here, however, found it rather important to construct and focus on this identity. Based on the analysis, some of the qualities of the "*sachcha* Musolman" or true Muslim are similar to those of the pure Pakistani.

Muslims seek Pakistan, and so those who do not want Pakistan are not Muslims, a notion stated openly in a *Dainik Sangram* op-ed piece by a regular columnist going by the pseudonym of Dhumketu (1971a): "Those who want to turn Pakistan, a country for Muslims, into Hindus' Hindustan and breathe freely can at most be Bangalis, we cannot believe they are Muslims" (*Dainik Sangram* 9 June, p. 2). Those who criticise Islam are *murtad*[36], bringing on the destruction of Pakistan, and those who sacrifice in its name are *mard-e-momin* (the perfect man). "If we criticise Islam then not only will the state of Pakistan be destroyed but we will be *murtad* and if we forge ahead in self-sacrifice and forbearance then Allah may bestow upon us the status of *mard e momin*" (*Dainik Sangram* 2 July 1971, p. 4). Even a poem published in the children's page depicts the "*sachcha* Musolman" as forging ahead with the prayer-inscribed flag. "Holy land will remain pure, we the people of this country are all *sachcha* Musolman, we will race

[36] A person born to a Muslim parent who later rejects Islam is called a *murtad fitri*, and a person who converted to Islam and later rejects the religion is called a *murtad milli*. A person is considered apostate if he or she converts from Islam to another religion. (Wikipedia)

forward with the flag of the holy *kalima*…" (*Dainik Sangram* 16 July 1971, p. 4). The president of Pakistan is also labelled a true Muslim, described as a "*sachcha* Muslim, mujahid, *khati* Pakistani" (*Dainik Sangram* 29 June 1971, p. 1).

Indeed, as mentioned above in the sub-section on the *khati* Pakistani, s/he is perhaps most importantly a *khati*, true/pure Muslim, dispensing of issues of race and ethnicity, strong and united in their efforts towards an Islamic movement and to establish an Islamic way of life, who can make sacrifices for the nation and whose main goal is to gain the satisfaction of Allah. Only those who believe in an Islamic way of life should be allowed to join the Rezakar forces (*Dainik Sangram* 23 August 1971, p. 2) and Governor AM Malek, while reminding the Rezakars about their responsibility, asks them to follow tradition like a *sachcha Musolman* in fulfilling their great duty (*Dainik Sangram* 14 November 1971, p. 1).

While Amartya Sen (2006) stresses the importance of seeing (in the post-9/11 world) Muslims as a diverse people with varied contributions to society in the context of their rich history as having been scholars, scientists, philosophers, painters, musicians and more who have contributed to the development of Muslim people and global heritage, the advocates of Pakistan in 1971 repeatedly narrowed identity down only to Muslim identity. For example, the education minister Abbas Ali Khan was quoted as saying the education system should be such that "along with becoming scientists, philosophers, engineers, doctors, economists, they [the students] become *khati Musolman*" (*Dainik Sangram* 23 September 1971, p. 1) and that he would try to introduce such an education system which would create true Muslims and Pakistanis (*Dainik Sangram* 26 September 1971, p. 1). He also says that Pakistan is an ideological state and that its ideology is Islamic ideology. "The foundation of Islamic nationalism is *kalima tayyiba*, not the limits of language, region, geography. We are not just Bangali, we are

Bangla-speaking Muslims... Pakistan is going through a major crisis and every Pakistani citizen must think like a true Pakistani and Musolman" (*Dainik Sangram* 25 September 1971, p. 1). Thinking like and being a true Muslim is what qualifies one as being a true Pakistani in the media discourse. Religion and nationality are integrated in order to legitimise the actions of the state basing them on religion for the cause of the nation.

In order to be made into *khati Musolman*, the youth must be reformed (*Dainik Sangram* 26 August 1971, p. 5). Pakistani soldiers must be given ideological along with military training for only if they win over death as *khati* Musloman will Allah help to end the national crisis. They must fight to establish dominion not over a region but for the supremacy of the *kalima* (*Dainik Sangram* 8 September 1971, p. 1). Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Matiur Rahman Nizami was quoted as saying that the government should train them as "*khati* soldiers" and that "We should all be identified as Muslim soldiers of an Islamic state... we must finish off those who are involved in armed conspiracy against Pakistan and Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 September 1971, p. 3). He also says that those who love Islam are those who love Pakistan and that Pakistan cannot survive without Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 24 September 1971, p. 6). Here, thinking, feeling and acting like a true Muslim is what makes a Pakistani and those who do not love the religion cannot love the country.

In a front-page commentary of the *Dainik Sangram*, the writer addresses his readers by reminding them of their identity:

> Today our only identity should be that we are Muslims and Pakistanis. In order to increase the status of Islam and Pakistan we must move forward to cut the chest of the enemy like a restless sword. Our '*narae taqbeer Allahu akbar*' will be the enemy's death knell. Soldiers should be shoulder to shoulder to bring God's wrath upon the enemy. The fire of faithful inspiration is ablaze in this flow of blood. This blood has been left in our custody by our history, it is our legacy. (*Dainik Sangram* 28 November 1971, p. 1)

With this powerful imagery created through language, the faithful and the patriotic are merged, and the battle for nation is portrayed as a battle for faith.

In several interviews conducted for this research, there was a consensus that Pakistan not only sought to discursively construct Muslim and Hindu identities but that it also attempted to transform Hindus into "pukka" Muslims through a number of procedures and strategies. Sudhangshu Shekhar Roy[37], a Hindu teenager in 1971 whose father was picked up by the Pakistani army towards the beginning of the war, calls it "enforced Islamisation". These strategies are not peculiar to the 1971 war[38], but Roy explained his experience of the process. "First, Hindus were killed, then their houses occupied, the women picked up, so that they would be forced to flee. But how many people could they kill, how many houses could they occupy? When this means did not work, they adopted a new strategy which was to make the Hindus who remained in Pakistan into Muslims. There was a process of enforced Islamisation…They wanted to change the behaviours, rituals and lifestyles of Hindus and make them into *pukka* Muslims. For example, they ordered the *tulsi*[39] plant to be removed from our homes. They did not allow our women to wear *sakha-sindoor*[40]. Men gave up wearing *dhoti*[41] so

[37] Sudhangshu Shekhar Roy, Professor, University of Dhaka. Personal interview. November 3, 2014, conducted at University of Dhaka.

[38] Gerlach (2010) elaborates on the persecution of Hindus in 1971 Pakistan, claiming that it was not new and had happened before not only during the Partition but in the 1950s and 1960s as well. With regards to 1971, he quotes several members of the Pakistan army who gave or had orders to specifically target Hindus and writes about razakars who made it easier to identify Hindus by marking their houses with a big "H". Hindu men were also identified because they were not circumcised. Gerlach also writes about the allegedly millions of forced conversions to Islam in 1971, 'some in reaction to Pakistani army attacks, others involved an ultimatum by local Muslim leaders, or beatings and robberies by razakars' (Gerlach 2010: 146).

[39] Tulsi or Holy basil is a sacred plant in Hindu belief. Hindus regard it as an earthly manifestation of the goddess Tulsi, a consort of the god Vishnu. The offering of its leaves is mandatory in ritualistic worship of Vishnu and his forms like Krishna and Vithoba. Many Hindus have tulsi plants growing in front of or near their home, often in special pots or special small masonry structures. Traditionally, Tulsi is planted in the center of the central courtyard of Hindu houses. The plant is cultivated for religious and medicinal purposes, and for its essential oil. (Wikipedia)

[40] Bangles and vermilion worn by married Hindu women.

that they would not be identified as Hindu. I saw one of my teachers, Hiren Chakraborty, who had worn nothing but a loose shirt on top and *dhoti* below all his life, wearing a pyjama at that time. It was a step-by-step process in an effort to make Hindus into Muslims."

He continues, "They would go to Hindu homes and when offered refreshments they would ask for a big plate and ask the hosts to eat with them in 'jamaat'[42]. This was a form of social transformation, Hindus eating from the same plate as Muslims."

"In the last week of November and first week of December, Hindus *were* made into Muslims. They were made to recite prayers and their names were changed to Muslim names. My father's name was changed from Hiralal Roy to Helaluddin Khan, my mother's from Hemangini Roy to Hamida Begum. They were issued identity cards with their new names. The new Hindus-turned-Muslims were forced to pray. They couldn't monitor women inside their homes but they kept track of the men going to pray at mosques. Hindus did not know how to pray, but they went to the mosques and did what the Muslims did, followed their recitations and imitated their actions." Such accounts show that what the media, in the form of Althusser's ideological state apparatus, was doing discursively, the state and its other apparatuses were also carrying out on the ground repressively, effectively imposing new identities on people.

"Even after this, when they thought the Hindus weren't becoming *pukka* Muslims and strategised about how to make them so, they took a decision. The following Friday, the day of Jumma, after Jumma prayers, the Hindus were to be invited to a great

---

[41] The *dhoti* is a rectangular piece of unstitched cloth, usually around 4.5 metres (15 ft) long, wrapped around the waist and the legs and knotted at the waist, resembling a long skirt. (Wikipedia) It was worn more commonly by Bangali Hindus, as opposed to the *punjabi-pyjama* worn by Bangali Muslims and West Pakistanis.

[42] The Arabic term refers to a congregation or gathering.

luncheon, and the main dish at the great luncheon would be beef. They had occupied the main Kalibari [temple of the goddess Kali] in Tangail town and this is where the feast was arranged. And when this was announced, the psychological trauma to the Hindu society was unimaginable. That day would be a supreme test for them. Recently things have changed a bit," explains Roy, "like in terms of eating habits, some Hindus eat beef, but in 1971 the situation was such that 99 per cent of Hindus did not eat, even touch, beef, they used to religiously hate it, they could not eat it. Any Hindu who ate beef would be made an outcast in Hindu society and this is probably what the organisers of the luncheon wanted. And so when the feast was announced, it caused psychological trauma to the Hindu community. I think some people would have converted just from shock after the event took place. The feast was arranged for the following Friday, which was 17th December. Fortunately, the country was liberated on 16th December. Tangail was freed on the 11th or 12th which was Sunday or Monday. That Friday never came. Otherwise the situation would have been dire."

Meghna Guhathakurta[43], also a teenager during the war who lost her father[44], a Hindu professor of Dhaka University at the beginning of the war, describes the "conflation" of identities: "Hindus were supposed to be Indian infiltrators. It was religion conflated with nationality. We were called Indian infiltrators who could not stay loyal to Pakistan. '*Sachcha Musolmans*' would support Pakistan. Those who were not '*sachcha Musolman*', they were Awami League or pro-liberation forces who wanted independence."

[43] Meghna Guhathakurta, former faculty member, University of Dhaka, Executive Director, Research Initiatives Bangladesh. Personal interview. 27 October 2014, conducted at her office in Banani, Dhaka.

[44] Jyotirmoy Guhathakurta, educator and humanist, Reader in English at Dhaka University, was one of the Bangali intellectuals killed by the Pakistan Army during the Dhaka University massacre on the night of 25 March 1971.

In such a context, it was unsafe to be Hindu, says Guhathakurta. "We did away with our Hindu names and took Christian names because it was safer to be Christian than Hindu. I used to study at Holy Cross School, the sisters there told my mother not to send me to school, they [the Pakistani army] were going through the college register for names of Hindu girls. Out of nine months I didn't go to school for eight months. Later, when they told me it was safe to go, I went. *Maa* and I took shelter at a Christian orphanage once and I was there under the name of Monica Rosario. *Maa* took a Christian name and took shelter at the Holy Family hospital. We had nowhere to stay, because my father was executed the first night. We didn't leave Dhaka but we stayed at friends' places. It was even difficult to stay there. The first place we stayed at was a Muslim family's and in their photo albums where they had pictures of my family with captions with my parents' names, they had to cut out the [Hindu] names of Jyotirmoy Guhathakurta and Bashonti Guhathakurta. So there was a total loss of identity for anyone who was not a Muslim."

Dr. M.A. Hasan[45], a researcher and former member of the Pakistan army who later joined the pro-liberation forces and worked as a coordinator with the law enforcement agencies, relates an even more drastic account of the desecration of identities through rape and forced impregnation. He claims that, along with rape being perpetrated to break the Bangali morale, it was also used for the purpose of creating "true Pakistanis" through the forced impregnation of Bangali women. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8, but suffice it to say, in Dr. Hasan's opinion, Pakistanis who thought themselves racially superior wished to create Pakistanis in Bangali wombs, thereby changing their religion and identity, their genetic makeup. These were not

[45] M. A. Hasan. Personal interview. 19 October 2014 conducted at his medical chamber in Mirpur, Dhaka. A former member of the Pakistan Army, Dr. M.A. Hasan, a doctor by profession, worked as a coordinator with the law enforcement agencies after the war rescuing women victims of sexual violence.

isolated incidents, claims Dr. Hasan, but were widely practised in the Pakistani army. "In the Pakistani army, soldiers are told that they are each equal to 10 *kafirs*/Hindus," he says, claiming that this was done even prior to, during and also after the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971. This is also why members of the al-Badr forces were chosen from religious backgrounds in order to more easily preach Islamic ideals to them and sell the matter of Muslim identity, says Hasan.

Amartya Sen, in arguing against fixed identities and civilisational partitioning in order to avoid vilifying Muslims and Islam in the post-September 11 world, makes the important distinction between *being* Muslim and 'the various affiliations and loyalties a person who happens to be Muslim has' and a person's 'Islamic identity' (2006: 61), pointing out that being Muslim does not determine everything about a person. Muslims can be very different from each other, depending on the idea of *ijtehad* or religious interpretation which, as Sen says, 'allows considerable latitude within Islam itself, but also because an individual Muslim has much freedom to determine what other values and priorities he or she would choose without compromising a basic Islamic faith' (Sen 2006: 65). Where the Indian emperors Ashoka and Akbar, the latter a Muslim, were known to be champions of religious and other forms of tolerance (Sen 2006), Akbar's Din-e-ilahi – a syncretic religion intended to minimise the divide between and merge the best of the religions of the empire – is actually mocked in the *Dainik Sangram* of 1971. Space for interpretation was clearly rejected in Pakistan's anti-liberation discourse, which constructed very rigid categories of who was or was not a "*sachcha* Musolman" and the ways in which one should prove it. As a poem published on the occasion of Pakistan's Independence Day says, Muslims on a path lighted by faith and with the Quran on their chest, can overcome anything (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, p. 2 of supplement).

Being a true Muslim seemed to mean doing anything for the faith, inspired by the faith, including committing acts of violence.

6.2d Hindus, those Muslim-hating Indians

In arguing against Samuel Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilisations and the classification of India as a "Hindu civilization" in particular (as is also often done in the Pakistani media of 1971), Amartya Sen (2006) points out that while 80 per cent of the population of India happens to be Hindu, the country also has a larger Muslim population than any other country in the world except for Indonesia and Pakistan, and a diverse nature and wide range of art, literature, music, film, food, etc., contributed to by both Hindus and Muslims.

Furthermore, Sen argues that 'violence is fomented by the imposition of singular and belligerent identities on gullible people, championed by proficient artisans of terror' (Sen 2006: 3). This 'singular affiliation' assumes that a person belongs primarily to one collectivity only, e.g., as a member of the Hindu religion, devoid of all other political, cultural, social and human affiliations, and, according to Sen is a popular weapon of sectarian activists who do not wish to have any other links or references taming the loyalty of their targeted groups. Construction of the singular identity which serves a violent purpose is quite easily achieved by removing all other associations and affiliations and through selective emphasis and incitement, doing away with the freedom to think and reason and through the use of fragmentary logic (ibid). By this he means that the 'specific identity that is separated out for special action' is actually a genuine identity in most cases – that is, a Hindu is, in fact, a Hindu – and the demands of this '"sole" identity' are then redefined 'in a particularly belligerent form' (Sen 2006: 176). However, in the case of 1971, as this research will show, the anti-liberation groups in order to serve their

purpose labelled those Bangalis who prioritised their ethnic/cultural identity over their Muslim identity, as Hindus.

People belonging to the Hindu religion were vilified in a number of ways in the East Pakistani media of 1971 analysed here – as historical oppressors and present infiltrators, as imperialist in ambition and Muslim-hating in nature and, perhaps most commonly, as the "enemy Other" – at polar opposites to Muslims and forever trying to destroy them. Hindu is synonymous with Indian, implicitly suggesting that Hindus are not true Pakistanis and, whereas Pakistan is a homeland for Muslims, "Hindu India" is "Hindustan", a place for Hindus. The collocation "Brahmin Bharat" or "Hindu India" can be found at least 20 times in just the first two months of the issues of *Dainik Sangram* analysed for this research as well as several times in the *Dainik Pakistan*, presumably to ensure that readers make an association between the two. Often there are other adjectives added, such as "evil schemers of Brahmin India" (*Dainik Sangram* 27 October 1971, p. 2).

The word "imperialist", too, is so often used with Brahmin and Hindu that imperialism becomes the characterising nature of those belonging to the religion and caste. This comes at a time when the wounds of British colonial rule over undivided India are still raw in the minds of Indians and Pakistanis and which the latter use to identify India as the neo-imperialists, who served British colonial interests in the past and are working towards strengthening their own in the present landscape. This ostensibly also necessitates and justifies violent resistance against India and Hindus as it once did against the British. Imperialist India's historical as well as recent conspiracy to destroy Pakistan, especially its eastern wing, and make Pakistani Muslims into the slaves of Hindus/Indians is an oft-recurring theme (*Dainik Sangram* 10 April 1971, p. 2, 16 April 1971, p. 1, 17 April 1971, p. 2). Better still, Muslims can be eliminated altogether and this is "the main

objective of Hindustan" (*Dainik Sangram* 9 April 1971, p. 2). It is interesting to note that, whereas India is referred to as "Bharat" in most news pieces, in editorials and op-ed pieces, possibly because of the availability of space as well as opinion, it is referred to as Hindustan, stressing on it as a "Hindu-*sthaan*" or Hindu place.

6.2d(i) Historical subservience

Several articles in the *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* rehashed the historical differences between Hindus and Muslims, Hindu domination of Muslims and Muslim subservience to Hindus, ranging from the Partition of Bengal of 1905 to the Partition of India in 1947. For example, a news story published in the *Dainik Pakistan* explains the recent crisis as "a new expression of old Brahmin policy", claiming that Hindu mythology is full of examples of powerful Hindu gods repressing people of other faiths and that this is true not only of the Hindu religion but of everyday Hindu society, highly divided and isolated, where one class deprives the others (*Dainik Pakistan* 8 December 1971, p. 2).

Editorials also expressed fears about Bangali Muslims who, "uneasy about Kolkata's *babu*" (Hindu gentlemen), gave their blood to free Pakistan (*Dainik Sangram* 3 March 1971, p. 4) and about "footsteps of Muslims in mosques [becoming] faint compared to the crowds at churches and the sound of bells at Hindu temples" (*Dainik Sangram* 8 March 1971, p. 2). Taher (1971), in a *Dainik Sangram* op-ed piece, 'Pakistan *amader* (Pakistan is ours)' talks about how the history of repression by Hindus makes it obvious that Muslim religion, culture and life is not safe in the hands of Hindu rulers. Hindus never wanted Muslims to be educated and Bangali Muslims do not want to be the "peons of Hindu *babu*" again (*Dainik Sangram* 15 April 1971, p. 3). These articles play on Muslim fears of Hindu oppression as was historically experienced by them. In another

article on the historical oppression of Muslims by Hindus and the struggle to be freed from it, *Dainik Sangram* columnist Mujahid (1971a) suggests that "those who today are supporting free Bengal are clear *munafiq* in the language of the Quran (Sura Nisa 138, 139, 144, 145 *ayat*) because they are helping the Hindu government of the *kafir*[46] and (the enemy) India to conspire to go to war against Muslim Pakistan (*Dainik Sangram* 17 July 1971, p. 2). In this sense, Hindus are referred to as *kafir* or disbelievers, and those who support them, as *munafiq*[47]. In various articles, references are also made to wars between Hindus and Muslims in which Muslims were the victors, inspiring them for the battle in the offing.

6.2d(ii) Difference

As Kathryn Woodward argues, identity is marked out by difference. Referring to the Yugoslav war, she writes that, 'to be a Serb is to be "not a Croat"' (Woodward 2002: 9). Also, 'difference is underpinned by exclusion: if you are a Serb, you cannot be a Croat, and vice versa' (ibid). Similarly, in 1971 Pakistan, being Muslim and Pakistani was constructed in opposition to being Hindu and Indian in the media, as the analysis of the material shows.

The articulation of difference between Muslims and Hindus and the "Othering" of Hindus, the enemy, is common in the media. Shafiullah (*Dainik Sangram* 18 May 1971, p. 2), in an op-ed piece, writes that Indira Gandhi should not try to bring Hindus and Muslims together because of the historical differences between them. *Dainik Sangram*

[46] "Coverer". One who hides, or covers up the truth. An unbeliever, polytheist, and idol worshiper, who is condemned to eternal hellfire. (Adamec 2009)

[47] Derived from the Arabic word *munafiqun*, or hypocrites, referring to opportunists who did not become Muslims by conviction. (Adamec 2009)

contributor Islam (1971b), too, writes that Hindus never wanted Pakistan, never accepted Muslims' identity/existence and nurtured dreams of a "Ramrajyo" (kingdom of the Hindu god Ram) (*Dainik Sangram* 26 October 1971, p. 2). He claims that it has been proven that Hindus and Muslims are two different peoples who cannot coexist which is why India and Pakistan were made into two separate countries. In the same newspaper, Khademun Nabi describes in a letter to the editor (*Dainik Sangram* 26 October 1971, p. 2) the ancient battle between Hinduism and Islam, Hindus and Muslims, India and Pakistan, stressing that there can never be compromise between extremist Hinduism with its militant leaders and Islam, and that Pakistan should prepare for the fourth battle of Panipat[48], underlining what Sen (2006) called a false clash of civilization thesis, which firstly presumes that relations between human beings can be seen as relations between different civilisations and that this then leads to their inevitable clash.

Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam, in an op-ed piece in the *Dainik Sangram*, makes a categorical distinction between Hindus and Muslims:

> The long 800-year history of rule in India has proven that idol-worshipping Hindus and monotheistic[49] Muslims can never become one people. Bangali Muslims never wanted to be one with Bangali Hindus, that's why the contribution of Bangali Muslims to the Pakistan movement is the most. The *dada* of West Bengal are conspiring using the pretext of 'Bangali *jati*' [Bangali race] to confuse Bangali Muslims (*Dainik Sangram* 18 August 1971 p. 2).

[48] Battles in India in which the Mughal and Muslim empires emerged victors

[49] The original word used here is the Arabic *tawhidi*. Habeck (2006) describes 'Abd al-Wahhab's interpretation of the doctrine of *tawhid* in Islam – the belief in one God – breaking it up into three aspects: God's lordship, whereby God has no associates, only He can make rules and laws, no human being can alter the shari'a and anyone who tries is a heretic who can have jihad declared against them; God's worship, making anyone who appeals to any other object or being unbelievers who can be fought and killed; and the oneness of religion, whereby jihadists claim that Islam is the only acceptable form of worship and all other forms are evil. Habeck, however, points out problems with the third based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), shari'a (Islamic law) and the Prophet Muhammad's known tolerance for other religions.

Difference is drawn between idol- and multiple-god-worshipping Hindus – an unforgivable sin in monotheistic Islam and between the Bangali Muslim and West Bengal's *dada* (a term of reference for brother more common among Bangali Hindus).

In a letter to the editor published on 12 April 1971 in the *Dainik Sangram*, a reader named Abdul Kalam writes about the Shaheed Minar (a monument erected in tribute to the martyrs of the Language Movement of 1952) as being a symbol of Hinduism and activities surrounding it as Hindu rituals. He states that the language martyrs were Muslims and did not give their lives to spread Hindu culture, and that in order to honour them one should engage in Islamic activities such as reading the Quran or establishing mosques and madrasas.

Here again we see the claim of Hindu-isation of Bangali culture and a call for Islamisation instead. The Language Movement was and continues to be a proud event for the Bangali people who fought for Bangla (as opposed to Urdu only) to be made a state language of Pakistan in which several people gave their lives. Religion was not at all an issue here except for, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Pakistani authorities trying to portray Urdu as a Muslim language similar to Arabic, and Bangla, because it is derived from Sanskrit, as a Hindu language, thereby imposing as the state language the language of the minority Punjabi ruling elite.

In different ways, Hindus are portrayed as the enemy Other. This is starkly evident in an editorial on "The barbarism of Hindustani soldiers", where these soldiers are reported to drink (alcohol) in the trenches, pick up and torture women, loot and take supplies back to India and Hindus are said to want to victimise innocent, unarmed Muslims (*Dainik Sangram* 2 May 1971, p. 2). Drinking alcohol is *haram* or forbidden for Muslims and so this is a way of showing difference with Hindus. Another news report describes how Pakistan and Bangali Muslims were "saved from the clutches of the

Hindus" and would never destroy Pakistan to re-establish Hindu rule (*Dainik Sangram* 23 June 1971, p. 1). Hindus never accepted Pakistan and are still trying to form "Hindumata Bharat" (India, mother of Hindus) (*Dainik Sangram* 8 May 1971, p. 2). India's Brahmins are even compared to the devil who showed sympathy and confused the first human with sweet words, saying that the sympathy of Brahmins is worse than that of the devil (Ahmed, *Dainik Sangram* 31 August 1971, p. 2).

Furthermore, various derogatory terms are used to identify and describe Hindus and Indians (or Hindus *as* Indians) in news, editorials and op-ed pieces of the *Dainik Sangram* in 1971. Hindus are shown as violent, criminal and faithless. For example, a poem published in the supplement commemorating Pakistan's independence day on 14 August 1971 describes Hindus as "ferocious tigers of the *tulsi* forest" (the tulsi plant being sacred to Hindus) who, "after getting what they want, slaughter Muslims" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, supplement p. 4). Hindus are often labelled "*goonda*" or hooligans/gangsters who violate the honour of Muslim women (*Dainik Sangram* 27, 28 August, 9, 15 September, 1, 19 October, 8, 20 November 1971). In another news report published on 13 April that same year, Hindus are described as "terrorists" and "agents" and on 30 April, "Hindustani infiltrators and spies" as "*naa-paak*" or unclean/impure and as "*beimaan dosyu*" meaning faithless bandits on 1 October. Derogatory references are made such as to "*lengtiwala*" (person wearing a *lengti* which is a tiny piece of cloth covering the private parts) who hate Muslims (*Dainik Sangram* 30 August 1971, p. 3) and to "*tikidhari*" (person having a *tiki* or tufts of uncut hair kept on the head by Hindus) India (*Dainik Sangram* 26 November 1971, p. 2), possibly indicating Hindu priests who tend to have the latter. In a letter to the editor titled 'Hushiyar Musolman (Beware, Muslims)', Hindus are also described as having tortured and killed Muslims (*Dainik Sangram* 17 May 1971, p. 2) and in an editorial published on 8 August, Hindus are

referred to as "bloodsuckers". An editorial even says that the blood of Muslims is said to be the best ingredient for worship by Hindu "*kapalik*" (ascetic worshippers of the goddess Kali) and hints that in the guise of democracy and humanity, Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi's government may be offering 100,000 children at the feet of Bharat Mata (Mother India) to quench the thirst of the "*kapalik*" (*Dainik Sangram* 22 August 1971, p. 2).

The analysis showed that Hindus/Indians are represented as the enemies of Islam, trying to turn Pakistan into Hindustan which means Pakistani Muslims must unite in the cause of Islam and Pakistan. The language is also used by officials. For example, Raisi Begum[50] is quoted as saying that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along with the enemies of Islam, is trying to transform the East Pakistan of 7 crore Muslims into

> Biswanath, Kali and Durga temples and to remove forever Islam's universal culture from the holy land of Pakistan. He replaced the cry of '*Allahu akbar*' with the pagan cry of '*Joy* Bangla'. May Allah give our military the strength to destroy devilish forces... I hope you have not forgotten the persecution of the Hindus against you Muslims... In the name of Allah, be united in your obedience to Islam and Pakistan. (*Dainik Sangram* 3 May 1971, p. 1)

Again, what is simply Bangali or Bangla, such as the slogan "*Joy* Bangla" which literally means victory to Bengal, is depicted in opposition to the Muslim call of "*Allahu akbar*" meaning Allah is great, whereas the two are not mutually exclusive.

Different parts of a song titled "Moushumi gaan" published in the *Dainik Sangram* on several days throughout the months under study make references to Hindus that show them as being inferior to Pakistanis. For example, the common Bangla proverb

[50] Raisi Begum was the only female politician quoted in the media under study. She was president of the Pakistan Jamiatus-silm party but, perhaps more importantly – and this was highlighted in the news items which quoted her – she was the daughter of AK Fazlul Haque, who, prior to his death was a prominent and popular Pakistani politician. Haque served as the Prime Minister of Bengal under British Indian rule as well as Chief Minister and Governor of East Pakistan. He was a lifelong Bangla nationalist, but was also the first to advocate for the Lahore Resolution in 1940 which called for the creation of sovereign Muslim-majority states in eastern and northwestern British India.

"*mashir dorod maayer cheye beshi*" literally meaning that an aunt's love is greater than a mother's and implying that this cannot be so, is used to suggest that India is pretending to have greater love for Pakistani Muslims than Pakistan itself. India is referred to as the "*mashi*" (Bangla term for aunt used more commonly among Bangali Hindus) and called a liar, fraud and cheat, her love is fatal and she will put a noose around your neck if she doesn't get what she wants. The *mashi* makes laws to kill Muslims and using the poison of Hinduism crushes all name and trace of Muslims. The song also talks sarcastically about the activities of "*Bamunbad*" (slang for Brahminism) and its plots being exposed, playing *holi* (Hindu festival of colours) with the blood of Muslims, etc. (*Dainik Sangram* 9 June 1971, p. 2).

6.2d(iii) Hatred

Hatred comes across as a key frame used to describe Hindus' behaviour and attitude towards Muslims and Muslims' attitude towards Hindus. Thus the transcription of a radio show in the *Dainik Sangram* explains how this hatred came to be:

> Behind the veil of secularism, our neighbour is actually a hateful nurturer of Hindu imperialism. In order to live as directed by the father of the nation [Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah] and to be freed from the then Hindu web of intrigue that was growing, this country's Muslims tore down the noose[51] of imperialism and formed a separate homeland. This is what created hatred in their minds for Pakistanis and Indian Muslims. (*Dainik Sangram* 26 July 1971, p. 3)

Other articles describe what they call the hateful deeds committed by Hindus. For example, a satirical column by Apon Bhola (a pseudonym) called '*Nijere harae khuji*' narrates from a Indian/Hindu perspective the train of thought of then Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi, fantasising about ridding India and Pakistan of Muslims and

[51] The Bangla word used is *naagpaash*, meaning a magical noose used in battles in mythology.

praying to the Hindu God Shiva about the dream of establishing the reign of the Hindu god Ram or a "Ramrajya" (*Dainik Sangram* 8 April 1971, p. 2).

This hatred is not limited to Hindu/Indian politicians but often comes across as describing the people and culture as a whole. Several articles on "the Hindu mindset" talk about Hindus not being able to tolerate the good and development of Muslims and always wishing to harm them. Thus: "It is clear that the Hindus of West Bengal hate Muslims the most…" (*Dainik Sangram* 10 April 1971, p. 2) and the writings of Bankim Chandra Chatyapadhyay, known as the father of Bangla prose, are said to contain "glaring examples of how terrible and low the Hindu mentality against Muslims" is. In a long piece titled 'Us in the eyes of Hindu writers – an investigation', reference is made to other writers about their "hatred and enmity towards Muslims" where they reportedly write about Hindus viewing Muslims as enemies and being apathetic towards them, describing Muslim peasants as lower-caste Hindus and domesticated animals (*Dainik Sangram* 11 April 1971, p. 4). Jamaat-i-Islami student wing member Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid actually calls for a ban on books by Hindu authors and "those advocating for Hindus" and calls to "those who believe in the existence of Pakistan… to take a Quran on their chest and forge ahead like *mujahid*" and burn and destroy any such books (*Dainik Pakistan* 8 November 1971, p. 1).

One editorial describes how Hindus ruled Muslims and exploited and sucked their blood and tried to evict them from their lands, but "it is our belief that the Muslims of this country, spiritual descendants of Bakhtiar Khilji, Mahmud Ghaznavi, Ahmed Shah Abdali and Shaheed Titumir[52], will teach the descendants of Shivaji, Laxman Sen and

[52] More commonly known as Mahmud of Ghazna, Mahmud Ghaznavi, son of the founder of the dynasty, Sebuktegin, invaded India and extended his rule there. His successors established Lahore in northern india (now Pakistan) as their capital, making it a major political and cultural centre of Muslim life. (Dictionary of

Prithviraj[53] a lesson" (*Dainik Sangram* 31 October 1971, p. 2). Another editorial actually states that Indians think bathing in the blood of Muslims is as holy as bathing in the Ganges (*Dainik Sangram* 6 April 1971, p. 2) and a news report says that both before and after Partition, "Hindus have played with the blood of Muslims" (*Dainik Sangram* 17 April 1971, p. 4).

Hindus are also labelled outright as "Muslim-hating", further increasing the hatred. Kismati, a columnist for the *Dainik Sangram*, writes in an op-ed piece:

> Muslim-hating India (friends with Israel, the enemy of the Arabs) is trying to destroy the world's largest Islamic state, Pakistan. Hindustani agents and infiltrators have mercilessly killed ulamas [religious scholars], pirs [spiritual guide in the Sufi tradition] and thousands of Islam-loving people and have caused great economic losses to the Muslims of Islamic state Pakistan. (*Dainik Sangram* 23 May 1971, p. 2)

Rahee (1971a, *Dainik Sangram* 10 October, p. 2) another columnist in an op-ed piece writes about the Muslim-hating Brahmin character and how "the blood of Muslims drips from the mouth of Hindustan."

Dainik Sangram contributor Ali in an op-ed article (*Dainik Sangram* 31 July 1971, p. 2), warns Pakistani Muslims against becoming friends with "*kafirs*, who will try to make you [Muslims] one with them" and that "*mushrik*" or idol-worshippers and Jews are the "biggest Muslim-haters". Columnist Nesarabadi also writes that Allah said Jews and *mushrik* are the main enemies of Islam and the way they have harmed Muslims – Jewish Israel in the Middle East and Hindu India against Pakistan – is incomparable to anything else in history and that "it is our [the Pakistani Muslims'] duty to fight the attackers of Islam".

Islam) Ahmed Shah Abdali or Ahmed Shah Durrani is regarded as the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan. Titumir was a Bengali rebel who fought zamindars and British colonialists in British India.

[53] Prithviraj Chauhan was a Rajput king of the Chauhan dynasty defeated and executed by a Muslim ruler.

Hatred against Hindus is reflected in the reporting of the mistreatment of Indian Muslims as well as Pakistani Muslims at refugee camps in India where East Pakistanis took shelter during the 1971 war, for example, the allegation that "Brahmin Indian bandits" are shaving off the beards of Muslims and killing them if they refuse and that they are not allowed to pray but are rather asked to call "Bhagavan" (Hindu Lord or God) in their minds (*Dainik Sangram* 19 June 1971, p. 2). According to a news report published on 30 July, Muslim refugees are said to be forced to take military training and starved if they refuse. Hindus get the big rooms and are comfortable in the "Congress building" while Muslims rot away in the "college *tila* (small hill)" and are given leftovers once the Hindus have finished eating (*Dainik Sangram* 30 July 1971, p. 1). A number of news reports as well as columns report on alleged oppression of Muslims in India as well, including mistreatment, looting of property, rape of women, violence and killing – presumably to stoke the flames of grievance and hatred against Hindus/Indians.

6.2d(iv) The inhuman enemy

Generally speaking, Hindus and India are categorically referred to as "the enemy". The cycle of enmity is based on Hindu identity. Hindus are Indians and thus the enemy, but India is the enemy because it is a Hindu(-majority) nation. The Hindu-Muslim differences and divide is what gave birth to the two nations of India and Pakistan and also what made and makes them enemies historically and in the present. A leader published on 23 July in the *Dainik Sangram* says, "Every East Pakistani must remember that Hindustan is the enemy of Muslims. The blood of their Muslim minority is always dripping from their lips" suggesting that not only is Hindustan the enemy of Muslims in general but also Indian Muslims themselves.

Another editorial states:

> Those who have been killing Indian Muslims at a wholesale rate but their thirst has still not been quenched, and those who are killing Pakistani Muslims today can be called anything but human. The fact that our so-called East Pakistani sympathisers the banned Awami leaders are trying to make us slaves of the savage Hindu Indians is now as clear as day. It is as if East Pakistanis will be gratified if they can offer themselves at the feet of Indian Brahmins and it is the banned Awami League that is arranging for this self-sacrificing service to Hindus. The brutal killing of Pakistani Muslims that Hindu India is carrying out through their hold on the leaders of the banned Awami League is truly unforgivable. (*Dainik Sangram* 12 June 1971, p. 2)

This is one of the ways in which the pro-liberation political party Awami League is linked to India and throughout the war made to seem like a party comprised of Hindus, either born Hindu or influenced by India's Hindus.

Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam is unequivocal: "There is no document to support that Hindus are friends of Muslims. They have always been enemies to Muslims and even after Partition, killing of Muslims is an everyday event" (*Dainik Sangram* 19 July 1971, p. 3). Azam is quoted blaming the Hindus for creating divides between Muslims by raising questions of "Bangali non-Bangali" and appealing to the people to discard the "Bangali non-Bangali" mindset. The discourse suggests that for anti-liberation elements, it was the Bangali identity that united Hindus and Muslims, which is why they repeatedly stressed on Muslim identity over Bangali and often equated Bangali with Hindu. A transcribed radio programme, published in the newspaper, declares that Hindus and Jews are "*malaun*[54]and perpetual enemies of Islam". Also "enemies of Islam and the Muslim *qawm*" are "the cursed who wanted to separate East Pakistan and hand it to Hindu India" and they cannot be spared (*Dainik Sangram* 8 September 1971, p. 3). The basic argument seems to be that India is trying to eliminate Muslims from Pakistan and establish a "Ramrajyo" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 September 1971, p. 2). As columnist Durmukh (1971b) writes, it is the conspiracy of the "*jaatshotru*" (born enemy) (*Dainik Sangram* 16 September 1971, p. 2, 20 November 1971, p. 2) and "*chiroshotru*" (perpetual

[54] The literal meaning is cursed, excommunicated, accused, but is commonly used to refer to Hindus, so much so that it has become derogatorily synonymous with Hindu in Bangla usage.

enemy) (*Dainik Sangram* 10, 28 November 1971, p. 2) of Muslims, the Hindus and Jews, to make East Pakistani Muslims into Hindus. But Muslims cannot do that, they "cannot replace Allah with Hindu gods and the cow-mother". There is a repetitive emphasis on Hindu India (and Jewish Israel) being the enemy of Islam and trying to conquer Muslim Pakistan, the stress on the enmity between the religions, highlighted with the major differences of monotheistic Islam and polytheistic Hinduism, as if to rally support against liberation.

In his articulation about identity, Stuart Hall uses the term identification as 'a construction, a process that is never completed' and 'constantly in the process of change and transformation' and notes that identity is never unified but rather 'fragmented and fractured, never singular, multiply[ing] constructed across after different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions' (1996: 2-3). Resources of history, language and culture are used in discursive formations and practices by specific enunciated strategies (ibid). Similarly, Hindus and Muslims had multiple identities beyond their religious identities, but using the history of Hindu domination of Muslims from ancient times to the more recent India-Pakistan wars of the 1960s, the Hindu was represented as the oppressive enemy during the war of 1971 as well. Ferguson (2003), too, states that local cultural identities are not fixed but 'socially and historically constructed' and 'manipulated for political advantage' (2003: 30). While identities are most often referred to as being common between people who share it, Hall points out that emerging within the specific modalities of power, they are 'more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion' (1996: 4) and that it is in relation to the Other, to what something is not, what it lacks, that identity can be constructed (1996: 5). This is precisely the case as the analysis of the material shows and where the discourse of the media constructs the Hindu as the Other.

This Othering is clear in a report about the freedom fighters or Mukti Bahini – the Bangali civilians who underwent training and joined the war – who are referred to as a "Hindu Bahini" or a Hindu brigade, as forces led by and comprised mainly of Hindus – "90 per cent", according to a news report published in *Dainik Sangram* (13 October 1971, p. 3) – and thus not Pakistani. This implies that (East) Pakistanis do not want independence. Indeed, it is clearly stated, that "Muslims are not interested to join the anti-Pakistan forces formed by India" (*Dainik Sangram* 10 October 1971, p. 2). In fact, as a strongly-worded editorial states, the

> Hindu Mukti Bahini wants to free us [Pakistani Muslims] from our Musolmani/Muslimness. Free us from mosques and imams. Even free us from being *musolli* [Muslim worshippers] and Muslim. That is why today the Muslims of Pak-Bangla must think irrespective of party affiliation, do we want to be freed of our Musolmani by this Hindu *bahini*? (*Dainik Sangram* 30 October 1971, p. 2)

Repeatedly, the discourse reiterates the argument that India is trying to take over Pakistan and, perhaps more importantly, with the goal of eliminating "Muslimness", Muslims and Islam.

Bruce Lincoln describes the process of Othering in specific relation to religion, arguing that social groups constitute their identity in religious terms, viewing themselves as a sacred collectivity and of the faithful, God's chosen people, and their rivals as infidels, evil. 'Under such circumstances,' contends Lincoln, 'the pursuit of self-interest…can be experienced as a holy cause, in support of which any violence is justified' (2003: 94). Using this argument and the analysis, it can be argued that Bangladesh's war of liberation too is depicted as one between infidel Hindus and pious, God-loving Muslims, Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. The issue of the majority of the Pakistani population, the Bangalis/East Pakistanis demanding independence, is brushed aside on the pretext of a war of religions. All other identities of nationality, ethnicity, etc.,

are ignored by the anti-liberation groups and only the religious identities of being Hindu and being Muslim are emphasised. As Amartya Sen notes,

> The illusion of unique identity is much more divisive than the universe of plural and diverse classifications that characterize the world in which we actually live. The descriptive weakness of choiceless singularity has the effect of momentously impoverishing the power and reach of our social and political reasoning. (Sen 2006: 17)

Multiple identities are bound to bring up similarities, such as being Bangali, Pakistani, etc., regardless of whether one is Hindu or Muslim, but focusing only on the overarching Hindu/Muslim identity can only mean difference, especially if it is only the differences in the two religions – such as their history, manner of worship, nature and position in the war – which are repeatedly pointed out.[55]

6.3 The (Re)making of Identities

Central to both the pro- and anti-liberation discourse of Bangladesh's independence struggle was the issue of identity. While pro-liberation elements stressed on ethno-cultural, i.e., Bangali identity, anti-liberation elements emphasised religious, i.e., Muslim identity.

Castells' (2004) concept of legitimising identity – organisations, institutions and social actors introduced by the dominant institutions of society to reproduce, extend and rationalise their domination – is particularly applicable to anti-liberation discourse and the identity "truths" which were circulated by the Pakistani authorities and media, while his idea of resistance identity – constructed by those devalued by the logic of domination who go on to form communities of the excluded which exclude the excluders can be related to the resisting Bangali population. Identities are constructed from 'history, geography, biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory,

[55] See Fig. 3 below.

personal fantasies, power apparatuses and religious revelations' (Castells 2004: 7). Legitimising identity, then, functions similar to ideology.

As John Fiske says, 'communication is a social process and must therefore be ideological' (Fiske 1990: 176). Fiske draws on Raymond Williams' three broad definitions of ideology as being 'a system of beliefs', 'a system of illusory beliefs' and 'the general process of the production of meanings and ideas' (1990: 165) to elaborate on the concept through the use of Marx's key idea of false consciousness.

The circulation in 1971 of a set of meanings about Hindus and Muslims is intended to produce commonsensical responses. Through the framing of a religious ideology drawing upon history, religion and culture, categories of differences between Muslims and Hindus are created. As such, what it means to be Hindu becomes naturalised as an idol-worshipping, imperialist oppressor and what it means to be Muslim as a believer in and fighter for Allah, Islam and Pakistan. Even the *Mukti Bahini* or freedom brigade as a whole is categorically described as Hindu and being made up of "East Pakistani separatists, Hindu youth, Indian agents, escaped prisoners and other anti-social elements such as thieves, robbers and murderers" (*Dainik Sangram* 13 November 1971, p. 2).

These meanings are not simply imposed from the top down by the state but spread through an all-pervasive discursive use of language through the media and other forms of communication. In this process, identity construction becomes central to the wider struggles of power, which, as Michel Foucault has pointed out, extend beyond the limits of the state. For one, the state cannot control all power relations, and secondly, it operates on the basis of existing power relations. Relations of power, as Foucault suggests,

> permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse… We are subjected to the

> production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. (Foucault 1980: 93)

As he argues, power does not come only from the top down and through grand strategies, power is everywhere, working top down, bottom up, in fact, in a cycle, making use of all sorts of strategies and channels or the 'microphysics' of power (cited in Hall 2001).

Analysis of the above findings has shown how the media produced discursive knowledge about identities of the good Pakistani Muslim, the Bangali and the Hindu enemy. The interviews also demonstrate how this was carried out on the ground, intimidating the Hindu population to the point of forcing them to give up their identities as Hindus. Both categories of empirical data show that in order to remain in Pakistan and be considered Pakistani, one must be Muslim as defined by the hegemonic discourse, and a large part of that meant being everything that a Hindu was not. Muslim identity was all-important and all-encompassing.

6.4 Identity, Subjectivity and Discourse

As several scholars have argued, power, truth, discourse, meaning and language are all interlinked, with language helping to construct meaning and discourse which all combine to produce a particular regime of truth and facilitate power. As the empirical findings from the two newspapers studied here have shown, the media played a role in producing a particular regime of truth that was meant to legitimise violence against Bangalis. However, the question is whether there is a single, absolute, fixed "truth" about Bangalis, about Pakistanis, about the country Pakistan and about Muslims? Or was there more than one kind of truth about "Bangali-ness", "Pakistani-ness", "Muslim-ness" depending on by whom and how it was represented?

Foucault has argued that there is no absolute or eternal truth which remains constant over time, place and context, but rather that there are discursive formations which sustain regimes of truth (Hall 2001). 'The concept of discourse is not about whether things exist but about where meaning comes from' (ibid: 45). Thus it was not about *being* Bangali or Pakistani or Hindu or Muslim but what people thought – as a consequence of being made to think – it was to be so. There is no inherent "*khati* Pakistani" who is a "*sachcha Musolman*" or a Bangali who is more inclined towards Hindus – it was the discourse of that time and place that produced this knowledge-translated-into-power-and-put-into-practice through discursive violence followed by physical violence by the so-called Muslim Pakistani against the Hindu and/or Bangali. Just as, according to Foucault, knowledge/power regulate social conduct of the body, the entire knowledge opposing liberation dictated to its followers, i.e., the anti-liberation elements, what to think, how to think and what to do about it. And so, pure Pakistanis were true Muslims and anyone who fought for independence from Pakistan were not Muslims, they were Hindus, making the violence against them in the name of Pakistan and Islam justified.

As Hall (2001) notes, language is a signifying practice which can do a number of things: it can reflect meanings which already exist; it can express what is intended by the communicator; or it can construct a meaning. Meaning and culture are interlinked to 'give us a sense of our identity, of who we are and with whom we "belong"' (Hall 2001: 3) by maintaining identity within and difference between groups. Fiske points out that meaning is not located in the text but 'produced in the interactions between text and audience' (1990: 164). Woodward (2002) also cites Emile Durkheim's idea that organising things into classificatory systems is what produces meaning. Durkheim in fact used religion as an example of symbolic process to show that

> social relations are produced and reproduced through ritual and symbol which classify things as sacred and profane. There is nothing inherently or essentially "sacred" about things. Artefacts and ideas are only sacred because they are symbolized and represented as such. (Woodward 2002: 29-30)

The process of meaning-making into discourse-knowledge/truth-power is a multi-faceted process depending on history as well as the present, on the carriers as well as receivers of discourse, if they can be called that. Discourse is often strongly grounded in history. Woodward (2002) refers to the 'reproduction of the past' in the context of the Yugoslavian war and the construction of Serbian identity, where history and its heroes are elaborately evoked. In 1971, the Pakistan media studied here, too, repeatedly reminds its audience of the Hindu-Muslim wars in the past and glorifies Muslim rulers and warriors. However, as Woodward suggests,

> What appears to be a point about the past and a restatement of a historical truth may tell us more about the *new* subject-position… trying to defend and assert the separateness and distinctiveness of his national identity in the present. So this recovery of the past is part of the process of *constructing identity* which is taking place at this moment in time and which, it appears, is characterized by conflict, contestation and possible crisis. (Woodward 2002: 11)

During Bangladesh's Liberation War, the anti-liberation groups continued to evoke their Muslim roots and history but in the pro-liberation camp, Bangalis both Muslim and Hindu placed greater importance on their cultural identity and similarities rather than their religion-based differences.

The Partition of India of 1947 was based on the divide between Hindu and Muslim with Muslims claiming to gain freedom from Hindu oppression. With this being the situation at the time, Bangali Hindus and Bangali Muslims too became divided. However, in 1971, though the anti-liberation forces continued to focus on the Hindu-Muslim divide, Bangalis of both religions came together to demand freedom from their Pakistani rulers. And from the 1980s to the present day, conflict continues among Bangalis and ethnic minority groups fighting for their rights in independent Bangladesh. But even at the same time and place in history, discourses can be in competition. For

example, whereas in 1971 the anti-liberation elements produced a discourse according to which Hindus were oppressors and Bangali Muslims had to fight against them for Pakistan and Islam in order to be free, the pro-liberation discourse centred on the oppression of the Pakistani government and military which were repressing Bangalis. While the anti-liberation forces focused on religion as the issue around which the war was centred, the pro-liberation forces fought for their culture and ethnicity.

Not only is discourse not fixed but it is also selective – it includes as well as excludes what is or is not talked about, written about, expressed. And so, for example, the Hindu is described only as an oppressor, Indian infiltrator, infidel, and not as also being oppressed in Pakistan, as being Pakistani, as having their own faith system which is not evil but only different from that of the Muslim.

The bearers of discourse are also crucial to the process of truth and power. As Bourdieu articulates, 'authority comes to language from outside… Language at most *represents* this authority, manifests and symbolizes it' (Bourdieu 1992: 109). During the Liberation War of Bangladesh, anti-liberation discourse was spread through a variety of means, the media being a major medium. But "the media" is not some abstract space, it was very much populated by weighty names. Thus we have the president of Pakistan's speeches transcribed in full; we have ministers and other leading politicians of West Pakistan and high officials of the army making statements at various events and to the press. Perhaps equally importantly, we have East Pakistan's local collaborators. They were as, if not more, important for at least two reasons: Firstly, they were local, i.e., East Pakistani, and, most significantly, they were Bangali, a part of the ethnic population demanding independence but suggesting that not all Bangalis did want to be liberated. And secondly, they had a strong religious foundation. Top-ranking leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami, such as Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi and Ghulam Azam were renowned religious

personalities, and student leaders like Matiur Rahman Nizami and Ali Ahsan Mujahid were rising in the ranks. These were the names quoted in news reports, they were the authors of articles in the op-ed pages, they were also the leaders and members of the Pakistan army's auxiliary forces on the ground. Thus not only did they have the authority to promote their chosen discourse, but their identities were meant to legitimise the discourse.

Ideology, as Althusser has suggested, hails its subjects as subjects of discourse. The process of interpellation, or hailing, is, as Fiske states, 'one of the most ubiquitous and insidious ideological practices' (Fiske 1990: 175) and is also very much in play in the Pakistani media of 1971 analysed here. 'Ideology "acts" or "functions" in such a way that it "recruits" subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or "transforms" the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all)' (Althusser 1971: 162-163) by interpellation or hailing. Ideology addresses people as subjects, thereby making them feel that they are subjects of the said ideology or discourse, moulding their actions and contributing to the construction of identities.

The anti-liberation discourse of 1971 Pakistan was produced in a particular historical context. However, it was not defined solely by the 1971 war, and references in the media studied here go back to two previous India-Pakistan wars in the 1960s, to the 1947 Partition of India and the Bengal Partition of 1905. Using this vast history, "truths" were constructed by people in positions of political, social and religious authority about differences between Muslims and Hindus. By positing the two religions as binary opposites and ignoring the similarities between Bangalis of both religions, the case is made for their inability to coexist, Hindu oppression of Muslims and an inherent hatred and inevitable conflict between the two communities, calling to the Muslims of Pakistan to fight for Muslim Pakistan and ultimately, Islam.

Analysis of the findings as presented above shows how the media discourse produced subjectivities. It created distinct categories of Muslim and Hindu identity. The "true Pakistani Muslim" believed in one Allah and His Prophet and it was his duty to fight, kill and even die for Islam by fighting for the Muslim nation of Pakistan. The "enemy Hindu Other" was everything a Muslim was not – idol-worshipping, infidel, archenemy of the Muslim, who in the past oppressed them and at present is trying to conquer Muslim lands and eliminate Islam. The discourse disregards issues of ethnicity, race, culture and focuses only on differences of religion, thereby normalising and legitimising conflict between the two groups.

The following chapter demonstrates, based on empirical findings, how media discourse was used to promote jihad against the Hindu Indian enemy, and glorify sacrifice and martyrdom of oneself among anti-liberation elements. The anti-liberation discourse made jihad seem mandatory, sacrifice glorious and martyrdom desirable for true Pakistani Muslims who wished to appease God by fighting for their faith and nation.

Table 2: Common words and phrases used to describe the Pakistani Muslim, Bangali and Hindu in the *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* newspapers in 1971

The *khati* (pure) Pakistani	• believes in the unity of Pakistan • true, pure Muslim, acts upon Islamic ideals • no regionalism • first and foremost Muslim identity • character formation through Islamic education and ideology
The Bangali as East Pakistani Muslim	• Islam-loving, patriotic
The Hindu-ised Bangali	• Bangla is a Sanskrit-influenced Hindu language • Bangali culture and philosophy influenced by Hinduism • replacing slogan of "Allahu Akbar/Bismillah" with "Joy Bangla" • Bangali nationalism taking the place of Islamic nationalism
The *sachcha* Musolman (true Muslim)	• those who sacrifice for Islam are mard-e-momin • mujahid • pure Pakistani • believe in Islamic way of life • education system must create true Muslims • ideological training (as well as military) • Islamic nationalism based on *kalima tayyiba* • Muslim soldiers of an Islamic state • those who love Islam love Pakistan
Hindus	• oppressor • infiltrator • imperialist • Muslim-hating • belong in Hindu/Brahmin India • evil • goal to eliminate Islam and Muslims • *munafiq* • *kafir* • aim to establish "Ramrajyo" • extremist, militant • idol-worshipping • barbaric

	• drunkards • torturers • looters • rapists • *goonda* • terrorists • agents • *naa-paak* (unclean, impure) • references to *tulsi*, *lengti*, *tiki* • bloodthirsty/bloodsuckers • hateful and hated • the enemy, *jaatshotru* (born enemy), *chiroshotru* (perpetual enemy) • *malaun* • worshippers of cow-mother

Table 3: "Us versus Them" – The marking of difference between Hindus and Muslims as binary opposites using classificatory systems in the anti-liberation discourse of *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* of 1971

Hindus	Muslims
Polytheistic	Monotheistic
Gods have forms (e.g. "cow-mother")	God has no form
Idol-worshippers	Worship only Allah
Kafir, *mushrik*, *munafiq*	Believers
Oppressors	Oppressed
Imperialists	Slaves (what Hindus want to make them)
Unclean/impure	Clean/pure ("paak")
Violent	Peaceful (but will respond to violence with violence)
Bloodsuckers	Victims
"*Joy* Bangla" slogan	"*Allahu akbar*" slogan
Prioritise ethnic identities (e.g., Bangali)	Prioritise Muslim identity
Indian infiltrators	True Pakistanis
Friends of Israel and Jews	Enemy of Israel and Jews
Want to eliminate Muslims from Pakistan and India	Want to save Muslims in Pakistan and India
Want independence from Pakistan	Want to remain with Pakistan

CHAPTER 7

VIOLENCE IN GOD'S NAME:

THE DISCOURSE OF JIHAD, SACRIFICE AND MARTYRDOM 'IN THE PATH OF ALLAH'

Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction. –Blaise Pascal

David E. Apter (1997) distinguishes between violence and political violence: 'Political violence disorders explicitly for a designated and reordering purpose: to overthrow a tyrannical regime, to redefine and realize justice and equity, to achieve independence or territorial autonomy, to impose one's religious or doctrinal beliefs' (1997: 5). Importantly, he points out that political violence 'feeds on divisions, makes them into fundamentals and elevates even trivia to the level of loyalties. It polarizes affiliationally and doctrinally. It feeds on intolerance by making race, ethnicity, religion, language, class, doctrine, nationality, etc., decisive in "re-ordering"… It is the original sin of politics' (ibid). This chapter will investigate the relationship between the media, religion and political violence in relation to the Pakistani newspapers studied in this research, *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* as well as advertisements in the West Pakistani daily, *Dawn*. Using discourse analysis of texts and images, it will demonstrate how religious ideology was framed to produce a discourse which would legitimise violence by the Pakistani government, army and its auxiliary forces in the eastern wing and to mobilise violence against 'the enemy', the Hindus and the Bangali Muslims of East Pakistan.

7.1 The Violent Imaginary

Violence does not just happen, it is a process, it happens in stages, and a key stage in this process is its justification, which occurs largely through the discourse surrounding it. Schröder and Schmidt (2003) outline a four-stage model of the anthropology of violence – conflict, confrontation, legitimation and war, where, significant for the study at hand, legitimation is defined as 'the official sanctioning of violence as the legitimate course of action through the imagining of violent scenarios from the past and their social representation' (2003:19), when questions of direction, timing and framing of violent acts are decided. In the introduction to their edited book *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*, they contend that the motivation for violence 'follows a specific cultural grammar that defines the value and relative importance of material and social benefits (honour, prestige)' (2003: 5). In fact, most of their book relies on the cognitive approach to explain violence as 'culturally constructed, as a representation of cultural values – a fact that accounts for its efficacy on both the discursive and the practical level' (ibid: 17). Citing Julie Peteet's 1994 research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they demonstrate that victims and perpetrators may frame their experiences of violence differently, where the 'victims can take the opportunity to subvert the dominant group's intention to intimidate them through the use of violence by attaching a cultural meaning of their own to the suffering… a meaning that allows them to reclaim agency and political identity' (2003: 6). As Apter quoted above, Schröder and Schmidt (2003) also argue that violence is not accidental and needs to be imagined in order to be carried out.

In this chapter, I address how, based on religious ideology, violence was framed in the media to justify the violence perpetrated in the anti-liberation war in Bangladesh. One of the key strategies was reference to history. As shown in previous chapters, the newspapers under study managed to make a link between the present and the long history

of violence between Hindus and Muslims, especially during the Partition, drawing clear lines of identity and difference between the two groups. Indeed, as Schröder and Schmidt (2003) note:

> War is framed in a code of legitimation that declares the assertion of interests to be related to moral imperatives. The most important code of the legitimation of war is its historicity. The symbolic meaning of prior wars is re-enacted and reinterpreted in the present, and present violence generates symbolic value to be employed in future confrontations. Wars are fought from memory, and they are often fought over memory, over the power to establish one group's view of the past as the legitimate one. From this perspective violence is not only a resource for solving conflicts over material issues, but also a resource in world making, to assert one group's claim to truth and history against rival claims, with all the social and economic consequences this entails. The important question is: how does the discursive link between past violence and present-day violence work? By what means is the legitimacy of violence impressed upon those who are to march into battle and those who are to cheer them on? (Schröder and Schmidt 2003: 9)

In their argument, the authors state that violent imaginaries are represented through narratives which 'keep the memory of former conflicts and past violence alive in stories, either by glorifying one's own group's achievements and benefits or by the perceived injustices, losses or suffering incurred by one's own group'; performances or 'performative representations of violent confrontations [as] public rituals in which antagonistic relationships are staged and prototypical images of violence enacted', for example, war ceremonies and public appearances of leaders in wartime; and inscriptions in the 'cultural landscape as images displayed on banners and murals', in television images, etc. Such violent imaginaries, according to Schröder and Schmidt, create a 'strictly polarised structure of "we:they" leaving no room for ambiguity, are characterised by a principle of totality, form an identification of "our" side of which 'the struggle is of vital importance for the life of the group and the lives of each of its members' and where 'the moral superiority of "our" cause is not affected by the outcome of the struggle' and where 'post-war society is portrayed in dire terms: there can only be complete victory or total defeat' (2003: 10-11). As discussed in earlier chapters, Bangladesh's war of liberation was constructed as a war between Muslims and Hindus, where Muslims were

said to be fighting not only for a moral but a religious cause on which depended their identity and existence, and where losing the war would mean the elimination of Islam and Pakistan and the domination of the Hindu enemy. As Schröder and Schmidt point out,

> Elements of history are decontextualized and reinterpreted as part of a communal legend of confrontation, creating an imaginary of internal solidarity and outside hostility. Antagonistic discourses are not invented or discontinuous with history, but fragments of memory are shifted in order to constitute new definitions of collective identity. (2003: 11)

The analysis of the news stories shows the use of repeated references to historical domination of Muslims by Hindus in general and the violent memories of the Partition in particular. As Schröder and Schmidt (2003) note, in late modernity, 'the most common currency of violent imaginaries are nationalism and/or ethnicity' (ibid), and this is apparent in contemporary conflicts around the world, including the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Both ethnicity and nationalism were major markers in 1971 Pakistan as well, with the Bangalis fighting for the right to practise their language and culture, but the anti-liberation discourse used religious ideology to frame it as a war of faith.

Paul Hollander (2008), in his study of political violence and its legitimation mainly with reference to Soviet repression under communist rule, refers to political violence in other contexts, for example, the Rwandan genocide and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. In his discussion, Hollander addresses the 'actual presence of ideological motivation and fervor spurring on political conflicts' as well as 'the emergence of political propaganda and the mass media of communications that disseminates it' (2008: 7) and outlines a number of factors which legitimise such violence. One is the propagation of the notion of victimhood and self-defence as 'a self-evidently acceptable motive' (ibid: 8). For him, 'the technology of mass communication … made it possible to learn about such violence and to disseminate images of violent behaviour and its consequences.' As such, while media have helped end conflict in some cases, such as the Vietnam War, it has also caused desensitisation and "compassion

fatigue" in others. All these factors are essentially rooted in ideologies, and Hollander argues that 'ideologies, beliefs and their attempted realisation', whether 'political, religious, or secular-religious, [are] capable of providing the necessary legitimation for the acts of violence involved' (ibid: 16).

Hollander notes the distinction between killing in combat and killing civilians in the gas chamber, mass shootings or bombings, with the latter demanding 'unshakeable motivation and persuasive legitimation' (ibid) and argues: 'Elaborate, self-conscious legitimation is always a necessity when the violent actions to be performed may create moral conflicts or qualms in those performing them, or in those ordering, encouraging, or witnessing them' (ibid), underlining the need to justify the violence anyone is perpetrating against the other. As such, it is necessary to have a clearly identified enemy or 'elaborate conceptions of the evil adversary' (ibid) in the process.

In the case study, the media, along with informal social communication networks as discussed in previous chapters, helped the dissemination of an ideology rooted in religion by the state, military and civilian groups opposed to the liberation of Bangladesh. This chapter addresses how this discourse legitimised or justified political violence through the use of the frame of *jihad* as a religious duty, and through the glorification of sacrifice and martyrdom.

7.2 The Discursive Legitimisation of Violence in 1971 Pakistan

For Apter (2007), an important aspect of political violence is its legitimisation through discourse, which, as he notes, constructs 'fictive and logical reconstructions of reality', where 'each inversionary movement generates its own discourse by means of which it defines its principles, goals, and establishes boundaries which give rise to outrage when violated or penetrated' (1997: 6). Discourse serves as a basis for 'more

reasoned interpretation', employing a 'paradigm or example (exemplars), syntagm or propositions, doctrine, systematic organized treatises, myth and theory, magic (or fantasy) and logic, metaphor and metonymy, narrative and text, retrieval and projection' – and makes initially spontaneous violence self-sustaining. 'Fictive truths' derived from the narrative construction of reality 'become the basis for redemptive and transformational projective solutions, a logic is provided' (Apter, 1997: 12). Using discourse, past history is brought alive in the present, argues Apter, and history is converted into purpose, 'purpose into truths, and truths as logic' (1997: 14), which he claims are the main elements of a discourse theory of political violence. Atef Alshaer's work on the Arab and Islamic worlds also demonstrates the importance of language and culture as important tools for power and political mobilisation used to impose particular worldviews. Cultures of communication, as he argues, drawing upon religious, historical, literary and mythological references are used as mechanisms of control to validate the practices of those in power. 'Political groups with specific agendas, cultural underpinnings and outlook, mobilize communicative channels and modes to publicize and reinforce their ideologies' (Alshaer 2008: 102).

In the war of 1971, the prevailing social discourse as reflected in the media studied here, was that Hindu India, constructed as the perpetual enemy of Muslim Pakistan, wanted to kill monotheistic Muslims, conquer Pakistan and make it a Hindu (often referred to as idol-worshipping) homeland. This was evident in many of the editorials in the *Dainik Sangram*. For example, an editorial published on October 14, 1971 states: "Pakistan's *tawhidi* population prefer death to giving up their identity and independence to foreigners. Today it is clear to the people that Hindustan slowly wants to rid East Pakistan of Muslims and make it a Hindu*bhumi* (land)." General Niazi of the Pakistan army and last governor and martial law administrator of East Pakistan, in a

meeting with madrasa teachers, was quoted as saying that "the future of Islam in the subcontinent is closely related to the future of Pakistan" while the madrasa teachers responded by declaring themselves "ready to aid the army in increasing the security of Pakistan and pride of Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 28 September 1971, p. 1). In another news report, Niazi called for unity to evict "the enemies of Islam and Pakistan" (*Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* 9 September 1971, p. 1).

Calling for eviction of the enemy implies anything from driving them out to killing them, they being Hindus and/or Indians, the eternal enemy of Pakistan and Islam. Niazi is also quoted as saying that an independent state for the Muslims of this subcontinent is a gift from God and we must all "defend it at all cost" (*Dainik Sangram* 8 October 1971, p. 1).

Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Matiur Rahman Nizami is even more direct when he proclaims that "we must finish off those who are involved in armed conspiracy against Pakistan and Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 September 1971, p. 3). Fighting the pro-liberation forces in 1971 Pakistan was not just about defending a united Pakistan but the religion of Islam itself, and it is *imaani shokti* or "the power of faith" (*Dainik Sangram* 23 November 1971, p. 1) in the people and the army which is their strength. To justify these actions, the papers used different frames, including jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom, frames made to seem important for good Muslims as defined in the previous chapter.

7.2a Jihad: a test of faith

Definitions, interpretations and uses of the concept of *jihad* vary, from a spiritual inner struggle to armed struggle. While Bonney (2004) in his comprehensive study of the meaning, context, ideology and distortion of jihad 'from Quran to bin Laden' argues that the term may mean 'a peaceful struggle by persuasion and preaching' as referred to in the

Quran, Donohue and Esposito (2007) note that, in recent times, the word has been used to 'legitimate or attempt to justify acts of resistance and liberation as well as extremism and global violence' (2007: 393). Sherman Jackson further distinguishes between "defensive jihad" and "aggressive jihad", and defines the latter, in the context of 7th century Arabia, as a means to 'provide for the security of and freedom of the Muslims in a world that kept them under constant threat' (Jackson 2007: 401). Bonney (2004) refers to scholars who argue that jihad is equivalent to the Western concept of "just war". However, others, such as the Muslim Brotherhood scholar Sayyid Qutb[56], Muhammad Abdel Salam al-Farag[57], and Palestinian scholar and mujahid Abdullah al-Azzam, while acknowledging that Islam does not force its belief on people, suggest that Islam permits, even commands jihad against aggressors and polytheists. Qutb (2007), for example, states the following reasons as being 'sufficient' for the proclamation of jihad: the establishment of God's authority, the arrangement of human society as per God's guidance, the abolishing of all evil or "Satanic" forces, and the ending of domination or "lordship" of a person or group over others as everyone is equal in Islam' (2007: 416). This interpretation was used by Osama bin Laden in his interpretation of an 'offensive, transnational, or even global jihad "in order to establish truth and abolish falsehood"' (Bonney 2004: 14). Bonney cites scholars in this regard who believe that bin Laden's interpretation is not an updated version of the definition but actually a departure from its traditional meaning. In the contemporary world, jihad for IS, for example, has been described as:

[56] Activist and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He was deeply committed to the eradication of tendencies in Egypt that he regarded as bringing secular and Western influences into Muslim society and a severe critic of Muslim societies, which in his view had lapsed into a state of ignorance similar to pre-Islamic times, and believed it was legitimate to overthrow them. He was a strong defender of traditionalist Islam and is regarded by many scholars as being the ideologue of fundamentalism, many of his writings and views being identified with Islamist ideas (Nanji 2008).

[57] An ideologue of Egypt's Islamic Jihad and a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood.

> a fundamental means for change, implementing Allah's command, {And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah} [Al-Anfal: 39]. Its jihad would be based upon hijrah [migration], bay'ah [allegiance], sam' (listening), ta'ah (obedience), and i'dad (training), leading to ribat and qital (fighting), then Khilafah or shahadah [martyrdom]. (*Dabiq*, Issue 1, July 2014 p. 35)

The word "jihad" is used in the Pakistani media in 1971 studied here frequently, particularly in relation to the nine-month war – it is described as a religious duty, as a means of defence as well as of revenge against the enemy and as the road to salvation. The term jihad was first used as early as April 1971, soon after the war began, though at this time it referred to the Partition of 1947, where Indian and Pakistani Muslims are said to have fought a jihad in order to establish Pakistan based on the two-nation theory (*Dainik Sangram* 11 April 1971, p. 2). While this is not a direct reference to the current war as jihad, it laid the foundation for it. By the middle of April, a direct call for jihad was made by a religious leader as reported in a news story in the *Dainik Sangram*, to "imbibe the spirit of jihad in people" in order for them to fight the Indian threat to Pakistan's solidarity and national integrity, while the chairman of Pakistan's Parliamentary Party Maulana Nurani is quoted in the *Dainik Pakistan* as saying that it is the religious clergy's carefully considered opinion that jihad should be declared against India (*Dainik Pakistan* 12 April 1971, p. 2). In other news stories, religious leaders claim that Pakistan's madrasa students think of the country as a holy mosque and will defend it as *mujahid* and they call upon religious scholars to "declare jihad against India's imperialist activities" (*Dainik Sangram* 17 April 1971, p. 2).

By May, audiences were asked to prepare for "unprecedented unity, sacrifice and jihad" in order to counter Indian attacks (*Dainik Sangram* 5 May 1971, p. 3) and, interestingly, listening to the Indian radio station *Akashbani* – "our archenemy, the Hindus' propaganda medium" – is also defined as a religious duty and a part of jihad in order to be "alert to the intrigues of the enemy" (*Dainik Sangram* 1 June 1971, p. 2). In

June, the call to jihad gained further momentum, with religious scholars claiming that, "according to Islamic teachings, if the homeland of Muslims is ever attacked, then it is *farz*[58] for everyone above the age of 15 to embark on jihad. We are calling to our country's conscious Muslim brothers to prepare for jihad" (*Dainik Sangram* 5 June 1971, p. 3). They also advise that in times of national crisis, it is the government's duty to train the people as *mujahid*.

The use of the frame of jihad was intended to legitimise the use of violence by the Pakistani government and military as well as its auxiliary forces, as jihad was constructed as a duty for all Muslims. For example, an editorial published on 13 June 1971 in the *Dainik Sangram*, talks about the duties and responsibilities of the Shanti Committee[59], including inspiring the spirit of jihad among the people:

> Jihad must be fought against those using force to create obstacles in the way of justice and peace... Allah has said to Muslims in the Holy Quran: do not forfeit jihad and push yourself towards destruction. Thus, even if the miscreants do kill one or two people, we should consider it as martyrdom in the path of Allah and work with full force. The Shanti Committee should work to create jihadi feelings to defend Islam, Muslims and the country. If this feeling is enforced in everyone, the miscreants will be eliminated and peace will be established.

In other words, the discourse is exhorting the Shanti Committee to mobilise people against others while using martyrdom as a possible consequence, which will be discussed below.

---

[58] Fard/h, in Arabic, or *farz* as used in Persian and Urdu, refers to a religious duty enjoined in the Quran, the performance of which is incumbent on all Muslims. Fulfilment of such a duty is rewarded and neglect is punished. In the Hanafi school, a distinction is made between fardh as a "duty on the basis of cogent arguments" and *wajib*, necessity, on the grounds of probability. (Adamec 2009)

[59] Several right-wing politicians, many of them belonging to the religion-based political party Jamaat-i-Islami[59], formed the Citizen's Peace Committee, later renamed the East Pakistan Central Peace Committee and commonly known as *Shanti* (peace) Committee, in order to 'bring back normal conditions to the country and to eliminate irrational fears from the minds of the people' (Sharif et. al., 1988: 39) but who in fact prepared lists of patriotic Bangalis to be killed and assisted in their killing along with looting and rape (ibid). The committee organised paramilitary forces called the Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams which functioned as their extensions across the country, acting as 'death squads and providers of counterinsurgency intelligence' (van Schendel 2009).

Similarly, an op-ed article by columnist Durmukh (1971b) in the *Dainik Sangram* states that it is not enough for religious scholars to lead prayers and provide guidance and teach about jihad, but that they must join the battle, for jihad is a "test of faith" and those who do not engage in it are *munafiq*[60]. He writes:

> Today we should rise against Hindustan and its agents in the belief that 'Those who are killed in the path of Allah, do not call them dead but martyrs'. We must also remember Allah's words – 'The death you all are running away from you must embrace.' In order to counter the operation of Hindus to finish Islam in this country, it is not enough to look to the army, after taking the necessary permission from the military authorities, people themselves must choose their path and the path of Islam." (*Dainik Sangram* 13 October 1971, p. 2)

The call to jihad, as seen here, is not simply reference to a concept or belief but an action. Jihad is constructed as a "holy duty", which is apparent in an op-ed piece by contributing writer Md. Tajammul Hossein in the *Dainik Sangram:* "Today we have to be faithful and not only by reading the *tazbeeh*[61] in mosques. If needed we must take up swords to fight those against Islam. Those who want to destroy Pakistan in order to trample on Islamic brotherhood as taught in the Quran-Sunnah, those who want to ruin divine life, it is our holy duty to fight jihad against them..." (*Dainik Sangram* 19 June 1971, p. 2). This is a resounding call to violence, with explicit reference to taking up swords to fight the enemy.

References to "jihadi inspiration" and the role of jihad become more evident as the war progresses. In fact, president of Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir Sardar Quayyum actually says that his government will amend the current education syllabus to be in accordance with Islam, emphasising on creating jihadi inspiration in students (*Dainik Sangram* 18 September 1971, p. 2). Jihadi inspiration is said to come from martyrs in past wars who gave their lives smilingly for the cause of Islam (*Dainik*

[60] The Arabic word *munafiq* refers to hypocrites who outwardly practise Islam but conceal their inner disbelief.

[61] Islamic prayer beads.

Sangram 18 August 1971, p. 1) and a news headline quotes a Jamaat-i-Islami leader saying, jihadi inspiration must be awakened for the sake of defending the country's existence (*Dainik Sangram* 17 August 1971, p. 5). Jihadi inspiration is the key to "breaking the poisonous fangs of Brahminism" (*Dainik Sangram* 27 November 1971, p. 1), the only defence against the "barbaric attacks of imperialist Indian invaders" (*Dainik Sangram* 28 November 1971, p. 3) and the "eternal enemy of Muslims, India" (ibid). The jihadi inspiration based on which the Rezakars are fighting the war will be written down in golden letters in history, claims an editorial published on November 8.

In fact, one of the main purposes of the observance of Badr Day is "to create jihadi inspiration to destroy the Hindu-Jewish conspiracy to break up Pakistan" for "every Muslim must gain jihadi inspiration in order to stand against those evil forces" (*Dainik Sangram* 6 November 1971, p. 1). The al-Badr forces led by the Prophet in Islamic history are often used as an example: "People must forget their differences of opinion and disunity and stand together united as Muslims, and with endless patience and complete faith devote themselves to jihad" (*Dainik Sangram* 8 November 1971, p. 1). Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Matiur Rahman Nizami argues in an op-ed piece that "the national broadcast media intentionally covered up the programmes which in this time of national crisis could have inspired the *tawhidi* population towards jihad, could have created a warlike mindset against internal and external enemies of the Muslim *millat* (faith/nation)" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 November 1971, p. 2). He compares the situation to the al-Badr war and draws inspiration from it for the ongoing war.

In the newspaper discourse, jihad is also constructed as the necessary action to achieve Pakistan's solidarity and national integrity, and as a war to "defend Islam, Pakistan and Muslims against Hindu-Jewish agents" (*Dainik Sangram* 11 October 1971, p. 2). For example, columnist Nesarabadi (1971) in an op-ed article writes about the

"duty" to "fight the attackers of Islam, Muslims and the Islamic state according to the ideology of the Prophet and sahabis" and to train to "fight force with force" (*Dainik Sangram* 2 August 1971, p. 2). According to him, Allah will not listen to prayers not accompanied by action, and this action is jihad, for "Allah said, fight jihad with your life and property in the path of Allah" (ibid). Jihad is invoked as a direct command from God or Allah and thus made beyond question and by September, it is claimed that "people in both wings of Pakistan have had jihadi inspiration awakened in them" (*Dainik Sangram* 10 September 1971, p. 1). Without jihad, the "practical, ethical and religious responsibilities of the people will remain unfulfilled", claims an editorial published in the *Dainik Sangram* on October 7.

Religion, as such, is constructed as a weapon of war. An editorial entitled "Pakistan will survive" describes the war as a "fight for identity as well as a test of faith through jihad as described in the holy Quran" (*Dainik Sangram* 3 August 1971, p. 2). It claims that the Pakistani Muslims' "weapon is '*la ilaha illallah*'", that those who possess this weapon have no death and that their victory is guaranteed. According to the editorial, Muslims consider it their good fortune to be able to give their lives for Islam and that the Pakistani army too comprises *mujahid* inspired by jihad and thus can defeat forces five times stronger than itself. Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana Abdur Rahim specifies that "Only strong believers in Islam and Pakistan's ideology and those who have jihadi mind-set should be recruited in the *mujahid* forces" (*Dainik Sangram* 30 August 1971, p. 3). Religion here is invoked as a very powerful tool, where faith is not only the reason for which people fight, but the weapon with which they do so, a weapon which gives them strength and which makes them immortal. Even the army is not simply a military force but associated with the religious, i.e., *mujahid* or warriors for Islam, with the president of Pakistan Yahya Khan referring to the army's "jihadi strength" in the defence of the

nation's survival (*Dainik Sangram* 20 November 1971, p. 1). Portraying the battle as one not simply for the nation but also for one's faith makes the battle seem more worth fighting for and even giving up one's life for.

In this way, the discourse of war changes from a discourse of a war of secession/liberation of the Bangalis to one that tests the faith of Muslims. Contributing writer Maulana Mufti Amimul Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 9 August 1971, p. 2) writes in an op-ed piece in the *Dainik Sangram* entitled "Jihad in the path of Allah" that pre-emptive jihad, before a Muslim state is actually attacked, is "*farz e kifaya*"[62] for those who are able, but when a Muslim state is attacked by the enemy, it becomes "*farz e ain*" for every Muslim to fight back. He writes: It is *wajib*[63], and that the Prophet has said that Allah rewards those who fight jihad in the path of Allah – either with *sawab*[64] and *ganimat*[65] (if they survive), or with unconditional entry into heaven if they are martyred, with all their sins forgiven. He writes: "Fear Allah and fight jihad for his *din*[66], try everything, even give your life if necessary" and concludes that the Muslims' test of faith will be through jihad in the path of Allah. As such, jihad is constructed as mandatory, and even offered as

[62] *Fardh al-ayn* is an individual duty, binding on all adult Muslims, such as prayer and fasting. *Fardh al-kifaya* is a communal duty, binding on the Muslims as a group, which is fulfilled if a sufficient number perform it, for example, making a pilgrimage, visiting the sick, returning a greeting. (Adamec 2009)

[63] Obligatory or necessary, on the grounds of probability. (Adamec 2009)

[64] *Thawab*/*sawab* refers to spiritual merit or reward that accrues from the performance of good deeds and piety.

[65] The Urdu word *ganimat* is derived from the Arabic word *ghanima* meaning "booty" in the early wars of conquest, which consisted of movable property. When an area, or city, surrendered peacefully, no plunder was permitted, and the new subjects paid only their taxes but, if an enemy resisted until defeat, leaving the decision to God, even the population could become *ghanima*.

[66] Arabic term used in the Quran which has come to signify an encompassing notion of 'religion' as the combination of a divinely ordained direction and obligations fulfilled by human beings, as part of shared commitments expressed through a faith community (Nanji 2008). Muslim theologians distinguish between religious belief (iman) and acts of worship and religious duties ('ibadat), all of which are included in the term *din*.

an inducement to fight by saying that the jihadist will be rewarded in life and, if killed on the battlefield, then in the hereafter. In this way, the media helped transform a human war, which may or may not result in the break-up of a nation, to an otherworldly battle in which the fighters for the *din* will be the victors either way and accordingly rewarded.

Following the death (repeatedly referred to as martyrdom) of a religious leader by the name of Maulana Madani said to be a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, Ghulam Azam declares that his death must be avenged by Muslim Pakistanis and that "Those who have even a bit of love for Allah and his Prophet, it is *farz* for all of them to pledge jihad against those inspired by the death of *Awlad-e Rasul* [children of the Prophet] and to defend Pakistan and Islam against the enemy" (*Dainik Sangram* 12 August 1971, p. 1). An editorial published in the *Dainik Sangram* the following day reiterates the same sentiment, glorifying martyrdom in jihad and calling upon every Muslim to vow to avenge the blood of Shaheed Madani and establish Pakistan and Islam based on it (*Dainik Sangram* 13 August 1971, p. 2). Jihad is also seen as a form of revenge in the way Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana Ashraf Ali calls to the people to "plunge themselves into jihad to fight Indian conspiracy and defend the freedom and indivisibility of Pakistan… and to unite with other Muslim brothers against the Congress rulers and avenge the deaths of lakhs of Muslims in India" (*Dainik Sangram* 24 August 1971, p. 1), while Jamaat-i-Islami leader Mia Tufail Mohammad calls to the people to "vow to go to jihad against all kinds of destructive, narrow and language-based inclinations" (*Dainik Sangram* 12 September 1971, p. 3).

Dainik Sangram contributor Kadduri in an op-ed piece (30 September 1971, p. 2) outlines why jihad is needed, saying that Islam has brought jihad within the purview of both religion and the law. Columnist Mujahid (1971b), also in an op-ed article in the *Dainik Sangram* (15 September, p. 2), claims that Allah and the Prophet have

commanded jihad against and the killing of anyone defying Allah and taking up arms against Islam and Muslims. He says that the *mumin* Muslims who do this, who kill the enemy and are themselves martyred, are guaranteed a place in heaven without any questions about their past sins while regular columnist Durmukh (1971c) says that in the Prophet's time, those who prayed, fasted and submitted themselves to Allah but hesitated to go to jihad were labelled *munafiq* by Allah in the Holy Quran (*Dainik Sangram* 19 October 1971, p. 2). In this way, the piece seems to suggest not only does jihad bring rewards but failing to wage it may result in punishment.

Dainik Sangram contributor Huq (1971) writes in an article published in a special supplement on September 6 about how, in Islam, not only are people permitted, but actually inspired to go to war. He writes, "Battle for Allah should be every Muslim's life's prime accomplishment. Jihad/war is allowed to: spread and establish Allah's *din* on Allah's land; to help the world's persecuted and oppressed Muslims; protect regions of Islamic states from enemy attacks."

Direct and indirect references from the Quran on jihad abound in the Pakistani media under study. An editorial published in the *Dainik Sangram* is literally a command to wage jihad in the name of God. The title itself is "War is the only solution" and the piece expresses the need for jihad as the only "guarantee of freedom and peace for the world's oppressed humanity" (*Dainik Sangram* 5 October 1971, p. 2). Often, references are made to battles in Islamic history led by the Prophet Muhammad, drawing parallels to the ongoing war and the duty of Muslims to fight for their faith. Another editorial states ominously: "We must descend into jihad to defend Islam and Pakistan with the plan of either evicting the miscreants or being martyred like true *mumin*. If not, and if as a consequence any harm comes to Islam and Pakistan, then everyone will have to answer to Allah and His Prophet" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 October 1971, p. 2). Even a letter to the

editor on saving the honour of Muslim women prompts readers to engage in jihad against Hindu "goons". (*Dainik Sangram* 19 October 1971, p. 2). By November, politicians declare that "India has begun attacks on Pakistan's sacred land thus jihad should be declared" (*Dainik Sangram* 13 November 1971, p. 1).

Towards the end of the war, Ameer of the Jamaat-i-Islami Maulana Maududi (1971a) writes an op-ed piece in the *Dainik Sangram* (29 November, p. 2) entitled "If attacked, jihad will become *farz*". In the piece, Maududi talks about war becoming *farz* upon Muslims if their land or people are attacked; about jihad being a "yardstick by which the true faith of Muslims is measured"; how their practice of religion becomes meaningless for those who avoid jihad and they are labelled *munafiq* in the Quran; and that those who go to jihad to protect the Muslim people and nation are not alone, Allah is with them, and if they happen to die in war then there is no greater death than in martyrdom. He also says that the strength of Muslims lies not in their numbers but in their faith, which disbelievers do not have. In the second instalment of the article published the next day, Maududi (1971b) reiterates that jihad could become *farz* if the country "sacred like a mosque, the fort of Islam, *dar-ul-Islam* Pakistan" is attacked, and points out that the battlefield is only one of the fronts of jihad and that Allah in the Quran has asked the people to wage jihad with both life and wealth/property.

News stories published in the *Dainik Pakistan* a week before Bangladesh's liberation reports on a public meeting held the previous day, in which all Pakistanis and particularly those in the eastern wing, are called upon to "eliminate the attackers and defend Pakistan's holy land. People should be inspired by jihad to defend Islam's largest stronghold. With the grace of Allah, the soldiers of Islam will gain victory against the forces of the devil" (*Dainik Pakistan* 8 December 1971, p. 4).

A survey of several advertisements (Appendix) published in December 1971 in the West Pakistani English-language newspaper *Dawn* also illustrate the prevalence of the discourse of jihad in the media. Advertisements for everything from products such as soap to services such as banks extol the virtues of jihad. Quotes from founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah to the then president Yahya Khan are used to describe the glory of Muslims and encourage the audience to "strike at the enemy to the rallying cry of Allah-o-Akbar". People are called upon to donate generously to the defence fund for the cause of jihad, in order for the "warriors of Islam" to be able to "give a crushing defeat to the coward enemy". Even women are told to "rush to join jehad" by donating woollen jersies to the *mujahid*. In this way, jihad was made to seem all-encompassing, with people being asked to participate in any way they could.

7.2a(i) Poetic jihad

Jihad is also invoked in poetry. In a special supplement published on July 2, the poem "*Amra ansar chirodin*" talks about Pakistani Muslims as being bearers of flags of peace, on the battlefield of jihad. Another poem published on the same day entitled "Mujahider *gaan*" meaning "the song of the mujahid", talks about "this life of jihad", no gain without jihad, life and death on the battlefield, and those who are "asleep" i.e., not engaged in battle as committing *haram*, while the "true soldiers of religion" are at war. It concludes: "In this jihad of truth and lies, the sinners will be caught and die in their own traps, truth will find its place." Here, jihad is portrayed as not simply a battle of nations, a battle for land or even of faith only, but of very basic right and wrong, of "truth and lies", compelling people to question their very basic humanity and where Muslim Pakistanis will prevail as they stand for the truth, whereas the (Hindu/Indian) sinners will be punished.

Another poem, roughly translated, runs thus:

We gave our blood to bring this beloved country Pakistan, made our home with lakhs of homes, we Musolmans, to keep God's din, to make our beloved holy land…
They want to break our tawhidi spirit, our soul's right imaan, we won't accept anything [else] as long as we have God's Quran...
We will say loudly the azaan Allahu akbar, this jihad of Islam is Pakistan's unity...
*We Pakistanis are brothers, we sing songs of Pakistan, even if we have to give blood we will keep the honour of Pakistan. (*Dainik Sangram *20 August 1971, p. 4)*

Reflected in this poem is the entire religion-based discourse of Pakistan – the Muslim's sacrifice to create it in order to establish God's *din* or religion; the reference to *tawhid* or monotheism, faith and the all-powerful Quran; the call of *Allahu akbar* or Allah is great, jihad for Islam and unity; and Pakistani brotherhood and the repeating of sacrifice in order to uphold the honour of Pakistan and Islam.

Another powerful poem titled "Call for a New Jihad" compares the war to the Battle of Karbala, refers to the enemy as monsters and atheists and paints an overall bloody picture of the battle in the offing:

Oh, Muslim, don't sleep anymore, listen to the call for a new jihad.
Destruction is coming, death is calling,
a trap to start another Karbala,
monsters are revolting against Allah,
atheists are sharpening their claws,
You're still sleeping, don't you know the news,
Where is the blood of your heart, where is your faith-inspired spirit?
Have you forgotten the message of the Quran or the Hadith, oh you unconscious,
Can't you hear the commander-in-chief give the prayer call for jihad?...
Let's rise today in the spirit of unity
There is still time, still the sun, there is Allah's holy Quran,
There is jihadi blood in the chest, wake up, world's Musolmans,
Draw the name of God with the red blood in your hearts,
*According to His rules, spread His message in the world. (*Dainik Sangram *3 September 1971, p. 4)*

A poem titled "Today's song" by a renowned writer and published in a special supplement, making reference to jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom, runs as follows:

We are all soldiers, vigilant mujahid, we raise flags in the name of Allah…
We will keep this flag of jihad raised forever,

Forever mujahid, soldiers, we will remain tirelessly awake and watchful at night…

In this destructive violent tempest, with martyrs' blood we will paint pictures of freedom…

We are thousands of jihadi soldiers

*We will be sacrificed in the path of Allah... (*Dainik Sangram *3 September 1971, supplement p. 1)*

Atef Alshaer (2014) has argued that poetry is a form of political communication. In his analysis of the poetry of the Lebanese party Hezbollah, he shows how poetry played an important part of the socio-political fabric of the Arab world, 'fused into gatherings, televised speeches, invitations, social meetings and exchanges and public readings' and how it is a 'historical and authentic form of expression' (Alshaer 2014: 122). This is also the case in South Asia, where Urdu poetry is widely read, recited and referred to not only in Pakistan but Bangladesh and India as well. Bangla poetry since the nineteenth century has also made a significant place for itself in Bangla literature. Though much of it is romantic, very political[67] and contemporary political movements such as the Language Movement, the Liberation War and other national protests have also given rise to classic and important poems. In the newspapers analysed here, references to the classic poetry of Urdu poet Allama Iqbal are very common, while renowned Bangali poets such as Farrukh Ahmed are also often featured. Even more so, jihadi poetry in the children's pages was an ingenious way of drawing in young readers to such grave concepts as jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom in the appealing form of rhyme.

7.2b Sacrifice

Michael Billig (2001) has used the concept of 'banal nationalism' to describe what he calls the 'flagging' by the state aided by the media through which an ideological

[67] For more on Bangla poetry, its politics and its role in 'the making of a modern cultural sphere', see Rosinka Chaudhuri's *The Literary Thing*.

consciousness of nationhood is naturalised, made to seem commonsensical. For Billig, who believes that national identity does not create nationalism but that nationalism is in fact what forms national identity, it is the media which routinely addresses its audience as members of a nation, readying them for times of crisis when they may be called upon to sacrifice themselves for the cause of nationhood. As Amilcar Antonio Barreto argues in his book *Nationalism and its Logical Foundations*, 'Sacrificing one's life for the chosen creed is one way to appease divine forces and provide a role model for current and future adherents. It is an example based on articulating faith through action and not just belief or mere words' (Barreto 2009: 120).

The act of sacrifice is frequently used in the media analysed in this research, not to help the construction of an imagined nation, but in the service of religion. Sacrifice is mentioned in reference to the Partition of India of 1947 where 'lakhs [hundreds of thousands] of Muslims sacrificed their lives to create Pakistan', and as the need of the current hour, using, among other things, this history as a justification: "Bengal's Muslims made a huge sacrifice and they will make every sacrifice necessary to protect the world's largest Muslim nation" (*Dainik Sangram* 7 May 1971, p. 1).

The great sacrifice during the Partition is termed a "Muslim renaissance, with the main basis of Pakistan being the establishment of Islamic values" and the president of the East Pakistan Islamic Students' Organisation says that the organisation "will not hesitate to give its last drop of blood to keep Pakistan's identity and ideology intact" (*Dainik Sangram* 31 July 1971, p. 3) while at a council meeting of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the people are called upon to "be conscious of the current conflict and to bring back to life the sacrifices that Muslims have made in various countries over the ages" (*Dainik Sangram* 20 August 1971, p. 1). President Yahya Khan asks the people to look within themselves and see whether they are doing right by the sacrifices that were made, by the men and

women who made sacrifices in order to guarantee that Islamic way of life could be established" and asks them to devote themselves again to implementing Islamic ideology (*Dainik Sangram* 11 September 1971, p. 1). A poem, published on 14 August, talks about the lakhs of martyrs of Pakistan and the "crores [tens of millions] more who will give their lives to uphold its honour" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, supplement p. 3) while another poem claims that the sacrifice of 20 lakh Muslims is unheard of and as their "capable descendants we will keep the respect of their blood, we are Muslims" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, supplement p. 4).

Sacrifice is linked to Islam. Thus Jamaat-i-Islami Ameer Maulana Maududi declares that: "The followers of the great Prophet are completely prepared to defend our regional unity and this homeland of Muslims. If needed, they won't hesitate to sacrifice their lives" (*Dainik Sangram* 30 June 1971, p. 1). Maududi is also reported as being satisfied with the role of Islamic Students' Organisation activists in "inspiring youth at various educational institutions to sacrifice for Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 29 August 1971, p. 1). Sacrifice is not for the sake of the people or the nation, but is constructed as being for religion, Islam. At a discussion on the sacrifice and martyrdom of religious leader Mustafa Al Madani, the speakers "vow not to forgive the killers of Shaheed Madani or their ideology, we will all be ready to sacrifice ourselves" as he "sacrificed his life in the path of Allah" (*Dainik Sangram* 23 August 1971, p. 1). Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam says that for the same "reason that Shaheed Madani gave his life, in order to protect Islam and Muslims in the holy land of Pakistan, we are prepared to sacrifice everything" (*Dainik Sangram* 11 September 1971, p. 1). Anyone who has made such a glorious sacrifice is heroised and set as an example for the rest of the nation to follow. In a speech given on the newly established 'Madani Day', member of the Mohokuma Nezamul Islam party Maulana Manzurul Haque says,

> Madani did not hesitate to give his all, even sacrifice his life in order to establish Allah's *din* in the world. If we follow in his footsteps then we will also succeed. In order to save Pakistan from disaster and make it a true Islamic state, we will need to make more sacrifices and Al Madani's martyrdom is such a sign from Allah. Thus the main significance of observing Madani Day should be to take a vow to make any sacrifice in exchange for making Pakistan a genuine Islamic state. (*Dainik Sangram* 14 September 1971, p. 5)

Any act of sacrifice is glorified in the media and is used to encourage people to make more such sacrifices. An editorial entitled "We are proud" pays tribute to a pilot who gave his life in the war on the side of Pakistan whose sacrifice, "it is hoped, will inspire the rest of the people towards service and sacrifice" (*Dainik Sangram* 31 August 1971, p. 2). The following day, a news story is published with excerpts from the pilot's diary in which he reportedly wrote, "People's lives are momentary so why not give your life for the country? People die only once, but when a life is sacrificed for the country, that is the greatest death" (*Dainik Sangram* 1 September 1971, p. 4).

The poem "Today's song" discussed above also talks about sacrifice: "We are thousands of jihadi soldiers/We will be sacrificed in the path of Allah..." (*Dainik Sangram* 6 September 1971, supplement p. 1), where the people are shown as strong, united, inspired by their faith to fight, kill and even die "in the path of Allah".

In a council meeting of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Ghulam Azam calls for people to "sacrifice their utmost to defend sacred ideology-based homeland Pakistan. Saving oneself, the country and ideology are the same thing. We must come forward to defend Pakistan, this is our *dini* duty, if God forbid, we fail in the duty to defend our nation, then we will not be able to save ourselves and our ideology" (*Dainik Sangram* 4 October 1971, p. 1). Frequent references are made by religious leaders and scholars in the media, to the Quran, Hadith and the life and battles of the Prophet, as a way to authenticate the call to violence. This not only normalises for the good Muslim violence against others

and sacrifice of oneself, but actually demands it of them. The notion of martyrdom is discussed in the following section.

7.2c Martyrdom

The concept of martyrdom is not restricted to religious discourses. It can very well refer to a person's 'sacrificial offering of his/her body to proclaim the justice of a cause' (Pettigrew 1997: ix). As Barreto argues, while traditionally martyrdom has been associated more often with religious causes than with nationalism, the two are not mutually exclusive, with many 'ethnic entrepreneurs' also using religious markers to distinguish between '*us*, the faithful and *them*, the heathens' (Barreto 2009: 18). In fact, Barreto goes as far as to say there *is* no such thing as religious versus linguistic or any other characteristic of nationalism but that what differentiates distinct nationalist movements are the 'cultural features ethnic elites have selected as group boundary markers and manipulated in order to distinguish us from them' (ibid). Similarly, it is these elites who 'promise their volunteers short-term benefits in this life and immeasurable long-term benefits in the afterlife' (ibid). It is also these elites who determine whether such self-sacrifice meets requirements. As Barreto puts it, 'An individual can die, only a community can make a martyr' (ibid: 119).

In modern history, martyrs have been produced by everything from the French Revolution to the Irish "Troubles". Today, due to the enormity of the long-lasting conflict in the Middle East characterised by suicide bombings and martyrdom, however, the term is most often related to Islam and Islamist violence.

As Asma Afsaruddin (2014) in a book chapter on martyrdom in Islamic thought and praxis argues, the Arabic term "*shahid*" or martyr, while today is used largely to refer to military martyrs, was not so in the Quran. The word was used in the Quran to refer to

'a legal or eyewitness', whereas military martyrs were referred to as *man qutila fi sabil allah/alladhina qutilu fi sabil allah* or "those who are slain in the path of God" (Afsaruddin 2014: 41). Referring to the works of various exegetes, Afsaruddin demonstrates that there is even debate regarding whether one has to be slain on the battlefield in order to attain martyrdom or whether the pious who die of natural causes can also do so. Examples from the Quran, various Hadith and exegesis show the ambiguity in defining martyrdom, which can be 'expansively construed as death resulting from any kind of suffering and pain endured by the faithful during their earthly existence' (Afsaruddin 2014: 49) and that even the promised rewards may be the same in the case of both military and non-military martyrdom. Throughout centuries of war, interpretation and re-interpretation of religious texts, however, have caused a 'progressively higher moral evaluation of the military martyr over the non-military', she notes (ibid: 51). Islamist leaders such as Hasan al-Banna of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, for example, have underlined that the 'greatest of martyrdoms and of rewards for the *mujahidin* are reserved for the one who "kills or is killed in the way of God"' (ibid: 56), a discourse that is also evident in the anti-liberation discourses of the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami which was led by Abu al-A 'la Maududi, who was influenced by al-Banna.

It is perhaps important for promoters of sacrifice and martyrdom in the path of Allah to distinguish these from suicide for personal reasons. Suicide in itself is a sin in Islam, thus it must be differentiated from giving up one's life for the cause of Islam. The opinion of the president of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, Shaikh Yusuf al-Qaradhawi published in Donohue and Esposito (2007) distinguishes between suicide as a selfish act of weakness and escape, and martyrdom as sacrifice 'for the sake of a higher goal, for which all sacrifices become meaningless. He sells himself to Allah in order to buy Paradise in exchange. Allah said: "Allah has bought from the believers their

souls and properties for they shall inherit Paradise"' (2007: 471). For advocates of sacrifice and martyrdom, giving up one's life in this world is a means of achieving paradise in the hereafter, the greatest reward.

In the media under study, the word martyrdom was mentioned at the beginning of the war in reference to the martyrs of the past such as the Battle of Karbala. In June, however, *Dainik Sangram* began to use the term differently, making a clear link between martyrdom and the anti-liberation war. In an op-ed article by columnist Durmukh (1971a) the author declares war, asking for jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom of the soldiers: "Today we should rise against Hindustan and its agents in the belief that 'Those who are killed in the path of Allah, don't call them dead but martyrs.' We must also remember Allah's words – 'The death you all are running away from you must embrace'" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 June 1971, p. 2). In this way, death is overshadowed by martyrdom, which is described as something to be welcomed or 'embraced'.

Following the death of the religious leader Mustafa al Madani, the newspapers begin to use the term more. In fact, on 13 August, four different news items in the *Dainik Sangram* refer to Madani as a martyr. Maulana Madani's martyrdom (never death), continues to be invoked in the media for several weeks, described as an "irreparable loss for the Muslim world" and that his "martyr's blood would be the beginning of a renaissance in Muslim society" (*Dainik Sangram* 16 August 1971, p. 4). A statement that begins to be reiterated after this event is "the blood of martyrdom can never go in vain" (ibid). Jamaat-i-Islami student leader Nizami (*Dainik Sangram* 23 August 1971, p. 1) in an op-ed article even quotes Madani as having asked Allah not to deprive one of the fate of becoming a martyr. Speakers at a discussion on Maulana Madani talk about martyrdom as a necessity when a nation is moving towards downfall and that "Muslims never fear death, they do not want to die in their beds but as martyrs on the ground of

jihad" (*Dainik Sangram* 23 August 1971, p. 1). In two poems published in the Independence Day supplement on August 14, reference is made to the lakhs of martyrs who gave their lives for Pakistan and whose martyrdom the people must honour by giving their own lives (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, supplement p. 3), thereby encouraging people to attain martyrdom. Another poem, "*Imaaner bohin jalo*" encourages the "generous pouring/flow of blood" and to "seek the crown of a martyr (*shaheed-gazi*[68])" for "dying as a martyr is better than living like the dead" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 August 1971, supplement p. 4).

"The lives of martyrs are inspiration for *mumin*" claims a *Sangram* Report with the same headline, where the report states:

> Throughout the ages struggling Muslims have done this to end the rule of the ungodly and establish Allah's religion in the world, they have given their lives in struggle, smilingly been martyred. But the revolutionary crusaders did not stop. Inspired by the ideals of martyrs, the Muslim *millat* (faith/nation) has moved forward unstoppably, with the flag of Islam in hand, moved forward in the spirit of a new life… When the Muslims of this subcontinent became vocal in demanding a social system based on Allah-Rasul's rules of rights-justice, many Muslims had to be martyred. (*Dainik Sangram* 18 August 1971, p. 1)

Martyrdom is not only reserved for leaders, but is also talked of when reporting the death of ordinary people. For example, the *Dainik Sangram* re-invokes the story of a young man, Abdul Malek, who was "smilingly martyred in a monstrous attack" when he was demanding Islamic education back in 1969 and how people felt his pain and are warmed by his blood which "inspired them to raise the flag of jihad" (*Dainik Sangram* 19 August 1971, p. 1). The news story is a passionate one, full of imagery of blood still warm and inspiring martyrdom:

> Malek's martyrdom gave new inspiration to the Muslim spirit. Every martyrdom renews the spirit of the Muslim *millat*, making them aware of their responsibility, heating up the

[68] Gazi refers to "one who fights in the way of Allah/for the defence of religion" (Bangla Academy Bengali-English Dictionary 2007). Originally, "one who conducts a raid"; also a veteran, or hero, in a religious war. Ghazi became a title for a victorious leader in a war, but it was also adopted as a family name. It is synonymous with mujahid (Adamec 2009).

> blood of faithful believers. Such a flood of blood will take true Pakistani *mujahid* forward in taking their holy homeland to its destination. That is why they think nothing of hundreds of sacrifices. (ibid)

In this way, the discourse of martyrdom is often used to inspire jihad.

A letter to the editor entitled "We are prepared" reinforces the discourse claiming that, to be martyred in the fight for truth is every *kamil* (one who has attained his end) Muslim's desire. The writer continues, "The people who are taught about martyrdom can be *gazi* too. We want to be *gazi* in Allah's court by finishing the enemies of Pakistan and Islam and raising the flag of Islam on their blood" (*Dainik Sangram* 30 August 1971, p. 2). Another letter published the next day titled "A sad appeal", talks about the martyrdom of Madani as a lesson for all East Pakistanis, about other wars and martyrs in the history of Islam and that the martyrdom of *mard-e-mujahid* Madani cannot go in vain – the people must "come forward to protect Islam and Pakistan… InshaAllah the enemy will be destroyed. *Nachrum minallahe kareeb*[69]" (*Dainik Sangram* 31 August 1971, p. 2).

On National Defence Day, President Yahya Khan says that "Those who were martyred in the war of 1965 and became *gazi* by displaying their bravery, should be examples for the next generation of armed naval and air forces" (*Dainik Sangram* 6 September 1971, p. 1). In a special supplement published on the occasion, the poem "Today's song" graphically describes how "With the blood of martyrs we will paint pictures of freedom…" (*Dainik Sangram* 6 September 1971, supplement p. 1). In these ways, martyrdom is made to seem like the ideal goal to be achieved by true Muslims, downplaying the pain and death of the actual event and physical, worldly consequences and glorifying the act and the promised rewards in the afterlife.

Any death perpetrated by "Hindus/Indians" is termed as martyrdom, as in an incident where Rezakars "finished off" 22 miscreants but where two Rezakars were also

[69] "Help from God and a speedy victory"

"martyred" (*Dainik Sangram* 10 September 1971, p. 1). In an editorial published on Madani Day, martyrs Abdul Malek and Maulana Madani are said to have been martyred ("attaining the deaths they wanted") by "evil conspirators bearing slogans of regionalism, secularism and socialism" (*Dainik Sangram* 10 September 1971, p. 2) and the only way to make good by the sacrifices of the known and unknown martyrs of the province is to come forward in sacrifice for the nation. Martyrdom as something desirable and indeed desired is repeatedly highlighted in the media, for example by consistently stating that Madani "wanted" to be martyred (*Dainik Sangram* 11 September 1971, p. 1) and that his martyrdom can "bring good fortune to East Pakistan" if it can inspire others to give their life for the *din* as Madani did. Madani's martyrdom is described as a "lesson" for the Muslims of Pakistan and the world, his death a "Jewish conspiracy" and his martyrdom "a sign from Allah" to follow his lead in sacrificing everything for the cause of Islam (*Dainik Sangram* 14 September 1971, p. 5).

The months of September and October see the deaths of several "martyrs" being covered in the media, such as "madrasa teachers, students and other *dindaar* (faithful) Muslims" (*Dainik Sangram* 30 September 1971, p. 5) who "fought with their last drop of blood"; descriptions of whose "holy faces" and reports of whose bodies being carried and buried to slogans of "we won't let a martyr's blood go in vain" (*Dainik Sangram* 14 September 1971, p. 2) and news of prayers being held for those "martyred [while] defending Pakistan" (Hamidi, *Dainik Sangram* 3 November 1971, p. 2) are published. In the news of three other Rezakars "martyred by the bullets of miscreants", the *janaza* is announced and "Islam-loving people" are requested to attend (*Dainik Sangram* 8 October 1971, p. 1). The following day, the news of the burial of, again, the "Rezakars martyred by the bullets of miscreants" (*Dainik Sangram* 9 October 1971, p. 1) is also published. It was as if the reports of the killing of Rezakars had to be glorified as martyrdom in order

to justify their going to war in the first place as well as to inspire the spirit of revenge in others.

Two days later, an editorial describes the martyrdom of the three "in the jihad to defend Islam, Pakistan and Muslims against Jewish-Hindu agents", and, while grief is expressed, consolation is also given, especially to the parents, as follows:

> These sacrificing *mujahid* who were martyred in the path of Allah have become beloved to Allah and gained the high status of martyrdom. Martyrs' blood will not ever go in vain, cannot go in vain. Their parents should find consolation in the fact that their deaths were not like that of others', they died as martyrs, about whom the great Allah declared, those who die in the path of Allah are not dead but immortal – they are martyrs, they have passed the final test of faith. The Prophet said, martyrs will go to heaven unconditionally. Their parents have the pride of being parents of martyrs. They must realise that the status of this death is much higher than the deaths of those who were agents of *kafir* or who died while performing some other sin or from natural diseases. (*Dainik Sangram* 11 October 1971, p. 2)

The battle and killing and being killed in it is legitimised to the point where the parents of those killed are urged to choose pride over sadness in the deaths of their children.

Following another incident in November in which five people were killed, an editorial speaks of their martyrdom as an example of how "India has made up the Mukti Bahini of East Pakistani separatists, Hindu youth, Indian agents, escaped prisoners and other anti-social elements such as thieves, robbers and murderers and trained them and armed them and sent them to East Pakistan" and how they have "martyred lakhs of Muslim women-men-children" (*Dainik Sangram* 13 November 1971, p. 2). Another editorial, after describing the "misdeeds" of Hindus, states, "We must descend into jihad to defend Islam and Pakistan with the plan of either evicting the miscreants or being martyred like true *mumin*" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 October 1971, p. 2). Again, the lines are very clear between the murderous enemy Mukti Bahini comprised of all sorts of evil and anti-social elements and the martyred Muslims.

Columnist Rastbaj (1971c) in his op-ed piece writes about someone who believed that instead of dying at the hands of other Bangali Muslims (from East Pakistan) who

sided with the Hindus, it would be better to be killed by actual Hindus (*Dainik Sangram* 22 October, p. 2). He claims that in this way, at least he would achieve martyrdom, for the death of a Muslim at the hands of a non-Muslim is the way to martyrdom as one is fighting against the people of another religion to defend one's own.

History is drawn upon, from ancient Islamic wars to the more recent Partition of India. For example, a front-page commentary in the *Dainik Sangram* talks about the "thousands martyred by the bullets of Hindus" during the Pakistan movement and how now that "Hindu India has again attacked the sacred homeland of the Muslims Pakistan… Every Muslim of this country will paint a picture of freedom with their martyr's blood but will not be bound by the chains of slavery of Hindu India" (*Dainik Sangram* 27 November 1971, p. 1).

Direct and indirect references to the Quran are made and interpreted or used to imply that violence against non-Muslims is justified in order to protect Muslims and their homeland, and that jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom are encouraged.

For example, columnist Mujahid (1971b) in an op-ed piece in the *Dainik Sangram* refers to verses from the Quran where Allah and the Prophet have said, according to the author, "Those *mumin* (believing) Musolmans who will fight those who defy Allah and kill the enemy and are themselves martyred, I have taken their lives in exchange for heaven." This is interpreted by the author of the op-ed piece as "in the Prophet's hadith those who are martyred in the path of Allah are martyrs, and as a reward of their great self-sacrifice, they will be given a place in heaven without any questions about their past sins." It is, apparently, better to die as "hizbullah" (*Dainik Sangram* 15 September 1971, p. 3). At a meeting of Jamaat-i-Islami activists, too, speakers proclaim that "Pakistan's Islam-loving people… think of martyrdom as their greatest reward" (*Dainik Sangram* 29 November 1971, p. 6). The following day, at another meeting, Jamaat-i-Islami leaders

claiming that India did not attack the borders of East Pakistan but the *imaan* (faith) of Muslims, declare, "Muslims are never defeated, they are either martyred, or are victors and become *gazi*" (*Dainik Sangram* 30 November 1971, p. 1).

As previous chapters have shown, first, the media served to construct identities of the Pakistani Muslim, then depict the inseparability of the nation Pakistan and Islam. Eventually, the nation more or less fades into the background and religion takes over. The media analysed here did not portray the war as one between East and West Pakistanis or Bangalis and non-Bangalis, but as a war between Hindus and Muslims, India and Pakistan. As the war progressed, the papers began to construct the battle as one between Muslims and Hindus, and that the war was for the sake of Islam. Besides explicit calls to jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom, the media under discussion also implicitly encouraged violence as a "religious duty" by stating, for example, that it is the religious duty of the people to "aid the government to control anti-social elements" (*Dainik Sangram* 4 May 1971, p. 2), that it is a "*dini* duty" to defend Pakistan (*Dainik Sangram* 4 October 1971, p. 1), that "Islam-loving people [should] help the brave armed forces to counter Indian infiltrators and seditionists" (*Dainik Sangram* 31 May 1971, p. 1), that people should be ready to shed their blood for the unity and solidarity of Pakistan (*Dainik Sangram* 24 May 1971, p. 3), that killing those who create obstacles to the practise of Islamic rituals is *farz* (*Dainik Sangram* 13 May 1971, p. 2).

The call to jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom are evoked during Victory Day celebrations and during remembrance ceremonies and this is then reported in the media. For example, religious-political leaders declare that "People should be prepared to fight any situation as followers of the *kalima tayyiba*. Protecting Pakistan is *farz* like the fight to establish Islam" (*Dainik Sangram* 16 August 1971, p. 1). An editorial in the *Dainik Sangram* dated 31 July states: "There is no doubt that not only every *imaandeepto* (faith-

enlightened) Muslim of Pakistan but the whole world's Muslims will stand behind the Pakistani army against this Jewish-Hindu conspiracy." In this way, aiding the army goes beyond the discursive to actual violent action. In praying for the "bravery and sacrifice" of the army, Jamaat-i-Islami leader Ghulam Azam also justifies the violent actions of the army by saying: "Allah gave the responsibility of protecting his beloved land Pakistan to the faithful Muslims but when they failed to solve the problem politically, Allah protected his beloved land through the army" (*Dainik Sangram* 5 August 1971, p. 4).

At a discussion in remembrance of Maulana Madani, it is declared that "The enemies of Islam have today taken up arms, made martyrs out of many, the history of Islam is not only about martyrdom but also killing the enemy… If we do not all come forward to avenge the killing of the *alem*, we will have to answer to Allah" (*Dainik Sangram* 23 August 1971, p. 1). This ominous statement is an implicit call to violence, not only for the sacrifice and martyrdom of oneself but the killing of others. The battle was thus constructed as a war for Islam in the name of Allah and in which victory is guaranteed.

As Apter (1997) notes with regards to the legitimisation of political violence, 'When death is the measure of devotion to noble causes, even the victims become co-conspirators if they accept it as some historical necessity' (1997: 2).

7.3 The Media as "Deputies"

Judith Butler in her book *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* addresses how visual and discursive fields are part of war recruitment and war: 'we have to understand how popular assent to war is cultivated and maintained, in other words, how war waging acts upon the senses so that war is thought to be an inevitability, something good, or even a source of moral satisfaction' (2016, Introduction to the Paperback Edition, para 1).

Butler's is a perspective on how the Western media use images to mobilise war and states regulate the media to frame reality, but it can be applied as easily to this study in trying to understand 'how the senses are part of any recruitment effort' (ibid: para 6). Butler argues that in the West 'soldiers are recruited with the promise of escaping poverty or acquiring job skills' and do not ask whether or not the war is justified and that 'if soldiers fail to be interpellated by the visual and narrative accounts of the wars they fight, then they start to lose faith in what they do…' (ibid: para 10). This study has shown that in the case of anti-liberation fighters in 1971 Pakistan, this is in fact what it was done. Soldiers were interpellated, given a just cause and made to identify with it, giving them the faith to fight.

Apter (1997) states, 'People do not commit political violence without discourse' (1997: 2) where discourse

> becomes important as a way of connecting moral principle and interests… constitu[ting] a boundary between the acceptable and the unacceptable interest. Those acceptable need to reinforce principle. It is in the mutual reinforcement of principle and interest that discourse becomes both conceptually, and on the ground, self-reflexive, legitimizing, and no matter how reprehensible the act, not a matter of the "event" alone. (1997: 3-4)

As such, while the Pakistani government and military went to war on the battlefield against its Bangali population, its media acted as one of its 'deputies', the intellectuals of the dominant group 'exercising subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government' (Gramsci 2011: 191). The media is a reflection of the battle on the ground, with discursive violence and direct references to jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom increasing as the war progressed and, even more so, as it was drawing to a close, with the defeat of the anti-liberation forces imminent. Jihad was used as a mobilising call, interpellating people to take part in the battle and to give up their lives. Martyrdom was glorified as the ultimate, desired outcome of the life of any good, true Muslim.

It is worth noting, however, that jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom, whether or not these are the exact terms used to refer to such concepts, are not characteristic of only Islam, or even only religious conflicts. While other religious and irreligious wars have been based on the premise of struggle and defensive as well as aggressive violence, the notions of sacrifice and martyrdom have characterised conflicts as far apart geographically as the Czech Republic and Sri Lanka. It should also be noted here that the term '*shahid*' is also widely used in Bangladesh to refer to those killed during the Language Movement of 1952 as well as to the freedom fighters of 1971. In fact, December 14, the last violent attack on the part of the Pakistani army to wipe out the Bangali intelligentsia by targeting university professors, journalists, etc., is nationally observed as "Martyred Intellectuals Day", not because they were killed "in the path of God" as defined in the later and more specific definitions of martyrdom shown above but in the earlier, more general classification of those who died in pain and suffering. Interestingly enough, while the 1971 Pakistani media repeatedly referred to the deaths of anti-liberation forces as martyrdom, especially at the hands of Hindus/the Indian army, the discourse of the *shahid* that prevails in Bangladesh today is of those who fought not a religious war but what they believed was a just war, in the sense of it being a battle for justice. With the recent execution of several convicted war criminals in Bangladesh, there is also some debate over whether they should be allowed to have the word *shahid* engraved on their tombstones as has been done in some cases by their families. As Baretto (2009) referred to earlier in the chapter has said, it indeed takes a community to make a martyr, but it also depends on relations of power and the dominant ideological discourse in circulation at any given time.

The following chapter explores the issue of sexual violence during Bangladesh's Liberation War. It examines the discourse – or its absence – surrounding the mass rape of

Bangali women during the independence movement and the significance of the mis/representation or its complete lack thereof and the implications of such discursive silences.

Fig. 4: Legitimisation of Violence through Discourse



Table 4: The framing of violent discourse in *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* in 1971

Defending Islam and Pakistan	• Hindus want to make East Pakistan HIndu*bhumi* (land)evict the enemies of Islam and Pakistan • finish off those involved in armed conspiracy against Pakistan and Islam • break the poisonous fangs of Brahminism • defend against the barbaric attacks of imperialist Indian invaders • reference to al-Badr war, Karbala • defend Islam, Pakistan and Muslims against Hindu-Jewish agents • use *imaani shokti* (strength of faith)
Jihad	• declare jihad against India's imperialist activities • unity, sacrifice and jihad • jihad as religious/*dini* duty • jihad as holy duty • jihad as *farz* • jihad against those in the way of justice and peace • jihad as a test of faith • battle for identity • words not enough, must join battle • jihadi inspiration, from past martyrs, on current citizens and students • fight with life and property • without jihad, practical, ethical, religious responsibilities will remain unfulfilled • weapon of *la ilaha il Allah* • jihad in the path of Allah • *wajib* • rewarded with *sawab* and *ganimat*, or in event of death, martyrdom with all sins forgiven • jihad as form of revenge • jihad against anyone defying Allah or taking up arms against Muslims • those who hesitate are *munafiq* • jihad is permitted and encouraged • war is the only solution • jihad as yardstick for measuring the

	faith of Muslims • soldiers of Islam against forces of the devil • warriors of Islam
Sacrifice	• embrace death • reference to sacrifice of Muslims during the Partition and in the current war • sacrifice to defend the homeland of Muslims • sacrificing for nation is the greatest death • sacrifice in the path of Allah • sacrifice to defend sacred ideology-based homeland Pakistan
Martyrdom	• reference to battle of Karbala, Partition • those killed in the path of Allah are not dead but martyrs • those running away from death must embrace it • martyr's blood beginning of Muslim renaissance • blood of martyrdom can never go in vain • Muslims would rather die martyrs than in their beds • seek the crown of a martyr • Dying as martyr better than living like the dead • lives of martyrs are inspiration for *mumin* • smilingly martyred • martyrdom as a lessonblood of martyrs will bring freedom • martyrdom is desired • death at hands of non-Muslim leads to martyrdom • martyrs are Allah's beloved • martyrs are immortal • Muslims are never defeated, only martyred • guaranteed entry into heaven • if martyred, all sins forgiven

CHAPTER 8

DISCURSIVE SILENCES: THE ABSENCE OF WOMEN AND OTHER(S) OF THE 1971 WAR

Words alter, words add, words subtract. –Susan Sontag

The idea that language is the 'cloak of thought' used more to conceal and mask than to reveal, was never truer than in the case of the genocide of Bangladesh. – Rubina Saigol

The history of rape in wartime is said to be as long as the history of war itself, but for the longest time, it has been treated as an unfortunate byproduct of war (Baaz and Stern 2013). The causes of increased sexual violence in wartime vary. For example, Wood (2009) cites some causes, including opportunity, individual and group incentives such as revenge, militaristic masculinity, etc. Furthermore, the causes, strategies and forms of wartime sexual violence have varied in different contexts, playing a major role in some, minor in others and none at all in certain conflicts. It was only beginning in the 1990s, following mass rape during the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina that rape as an actual weapon of war started to receive policy, media and scholarly attention, and that the 'systematic use of rape in warfare was defined as a war crime for the first time by the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia' (Goldstein 2001: 1).

However, despite this definition, there remain concerns about the difficulty of addressing such a sensitive issue and especially its impact on victims/survivors. Anna Hedlund (2016) notes that not only do warring parties exploit the global concern over sexual violence but that the focus on rape as a weapon of war may actually overshadow other atrocities that occur in wartime and that even in addressing the issue of rape as a weapon of war, understanding the framework, which includes the historical, political and economic context of a conflict, is important. Wartime rape is not an isolated incident and

neither does it occur symmetrically over all conflicts around the world, it is not limited to women being the only victims and only men being the perpetrators (Wood 2009, Hedlund, 2016). Hedlund (2016) goes further to suggest that in order to gain a more complete understanding of sexual violence in wartime, more ethnographic research based on direct encounters with perpetrators – and not victims, as most work around wartime rape has focused on – is needed.

Finally, as Cohn (2013) points out, "women" are not a monolithic group but vary by age, race, class, ethnicity, religion, etc., and are also influenced by the multiple social, cultural, economic and political forces which structure their lives, and generalising the issue of "women and war" runs the risk of committing 'conceptual violence to the realities of women's lives' (Cohn 2013: 2). It is thus important to bear in mind that violence, too, may affect every woman in every culture and society differently, and that even the lines between sexual violence in wartime and in peacetime are often blurred.

This chapter explores the discursive language as well as silences around the issue of gender violence in particular, and of the absent Other in general, in the anti-liberation media of 1971 Pakistan. Through a discourse analysis of the newspapers *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan*, it examines the language of the media, who it addresses, who it excludes and what significance and implications this may have.

8.1 Sexual Violence in Times of War

Sexual violence in wartime is a complex phenomenon and is now seen by scholars not only as one that occurs during 'war' as opposed to 'peace', but as happening on a continuum (Cohn 2013, Cockburn 2009). Cynthia Cockburn, for example, notes that there are at least three broad warning signs that precede political violence or armed conflict – 'economic distress; militarization; and divisive shifts in ideology in the way

identities are represented' (Cockburn 2009: 158). While all three also occurred prior to the battle of 1971, for the purposes of this study, the third is the most relevant.

Cockburn, in her study of violence as a continuum occurring throughout pre-, during and post-conflict times, argues that a shift in discourse, especially in media representations, can be detected prior to political violence or armed conflict and that this discourse can 'stoke the violence of national patriotism against a rival nation, point a finger at "the enemy within," or deepen the sense of ethnic belonging in opposition to some "other" from whom "we" are different and by whom our culture or our religion, our very existences, is threatened' (2009: 161). This divisive discourse, argues Cockburn, renews the patriarchal familial ideology and 'deepening the differentiation of men and women, masculinity and femininity, preparing men to fight and women to support them' (ibid). As Nira Yuval-Davis has suggested in her discussion of gender and the nation, 'the more primordial the rendering of people and nation, the more are the relationships between men and women essentialized' (cited in Cockburn 2009, ibid) – men by physique and tradition by which they are expected to protect women, children and the nation or "motherland", and women by biology and tradition by which they are to maintain the home, raise children according to the nation's values and sacrifice their men when needed in wartime. Cockburn cites the example of Yugoslavia during the war in the 1990s and the restrictions on the reproductive freedoms of women by urging them to leave employment to tend to their 'natural duties' with the increased strategic importance of birth rates.

Such restrictions manifest themselves in a different way in the case study, especially after the war with an abortion/adoption campaign for the "war babies", but even more relevant prior to and during the war was what Cockburn refers to as an 'ethic of "purity"', legitimising the cleansing of internal enemies of the state as well as aliens on

the land. As she notes in her discussion of Yugoslavia, purity is a particularly dangerous ethic for women, where in extreme forms of patriarchy, men's honour is seen to become dependent on it and, I would argue, the perceived need to protect and/or avenge it becomes more acute. For Cockburn (2009), the most prominent sex differences in war can be found in the brutalisation of the body where, not only because of physical differences between women and men, but also because of the differences in cultural meanings ascribed to the male and female bodies, women and men are abused and tortured differently and die different deaths. In her discussion, she refers to Ruth Siefert's three explanations for this, namely, the booty principle, whereby along with the conquered territory, the victor in any war also wins the right to (violate) the enemy women; secondly, the rape and humiliation of the enemy women which results in the humiliation of enemy men who failed to protect their women; and thirdly, the official sanctioning of rape by officers in order to promote soldierly solidarity through male bonding. While evidence of the latter has been found in various compilations of oral histories (Ibrahim 2007) and memoirs of even Pakistani military officers, the second principle, of humiliation, is particularly pertinent to the Bangladesh war. Similar to Cockburn's notion of bodies being used as "ethnic markers" in the war in Yugoslavia, in Bangladesh too, a prime goal was to impregnate Bangali women with good Pakistani Muslim "seeds" and in the process, humiliate the women and the men who could not protect them.

Of Cynthia Enloe's three categorisations of rape – recreational rape, national security rape and systematic mass rape, the case of Bangladesh in 1971 is most likely to fall under the third, 'as an instrument of open warfare' (Enloe 2009: 240). As she puts it, 'rape in war has been part of a deliberate *policy*, not just ethnicity-run-wild' (ibid: 252, original italics). Bina D'Costa (2011) attributes this to the

> deeply engrained idea that Pakistani Muslims were the vanguard of the nation – that they were born to rule the new state and to 'instruct' the Bengalis on how to become ideal members of the nation – that was largely responsible for the indiscriminate killing of Hindus and the mass rape of Bengali women. In a way, the forced impregnation of women was also meant to instil the ideologies of Pakistan in the Bengali psyche. (D'Costa 2011: 101)

D'Costa proposes that rather than being a vicious act, the killing of Hindus was a strategic policy which the Pakistanis thought would rid the nation of discord. The Pakistani need to "purify" the nation by killing off Hindus or forcing them to go to India "where they belong", for Bengali women connected to a "Hindu" identity resulted in indiscriminate and vicious mass rape by the Pakistani military (ibid) aided by its auxiliary forces.

Following on from Linke and Smith (2009) who, in talking about the relationship between militarism and sexuality, contend that 'the state is embodied in the soldier and the body of the soldier becomes a physical extension of the state' (2009: 219) with rape enforcing masculine visions of power, I propose that the *nation* is embodied in women and that the bodies of women become a physical extension of the *nation*. In fact, the state is the authority with the power to control and direct, practices that become embodied in the male and always "masculine" soldier. In contrast, the nation comprises the people, society, culture, things to be nurtured and thus may be seen as being of/related to woman. As Carol Cohn writes:

> Nationalist ideology frequently symbolizes the nation, the homeland, as a woman; it is the (symbolic) body of the women/mother/land that the male citizen soldier must protect against violation, penetration, conquest. Conversely, physical women and their bodies are seen as the repository and reproducers of national, racial, ethnic, tribal, or religious identity – they are the vessels through which men of the nation or other collectivity can (re)produce new members of the group; thus, their bodies are the territory over which men must have control in order to assure the continuation of their national identities, bloodlines, and their familial and national honor. (Cohn 2013: 14)

The targeting of women in military conflicts results from misogynist practices combined with the fact that women are seen as carriers of culture, and their bodies, as Kelly (2000) suggests, become 'both territory to be conquered and vehicles through

which the nation/group can be reproduced' (Kelly 2000: 50). As such, rape during religious or sectarian conflicts, such as the case in 1971 East Pakistan, becomes a tool of ethnic cleansing, but also as a tool to either impregnate women so that they bear the "enemy's" children, or prevent them from becoming mothers in their own communities by making them socially unacceptable or physically unable to bear children.

Sharlach (2000), in her study on rape as genocide in Bangladesh, Bosnia, and Rwanda, attributes this to dominant perceptions of women as symbols of honour in their role as 'mothers of the nation and transmitters of culture' in some communities that then stigmatise rape victims/survivors doubly for having brought dishonour upon both themselves and the community. The actual rape is followed by a 'second rape': the ostracism of the women from those communities and their own families, where they become pariahs.

8.2 The Mass Rape of 1971

The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 saw the mass violation of Bangali and Bihari women (Brownmiller 1975, Debnath 2009, Mookherjee 2002). According to official and unofficial sources, between 200,000 and 400,000 Bangali women are said to have been raped during Bangladesh's liberation war (ibid). Reflective of the population of Bangladesh, 80 percent of the women reported to have been raped were Muslims, but Hindu and Christian women were not spared and girls aged eight to women aged 75 were sexually assaulted, some raped on the spot, others abducted and held by force in military barracks (Brownmiller 1975). As Brownmiller points out, 'The Pakistanis were also Moslem, but there the similarity stopped. Despite a shared religious heritage, Punjabi Pakistanis are taller, lighter-skinned and "rawboned" compared to dark, small-boned

Bengalis. This racial difference would provide added anguish to those Bengali women who found themselves pregnant after their physical ordeal' (Brownmiller 1975: 82).

Even as the Pakistani forces surrendered in December 1971, some reportedly claimed to be leaving their "seed" behind in the women they had impregnated in the mass rape (Sharlach 2000). Following the war, there were 25,000 documented cases of abortion, as well as a number of "war babies" being put up for adoption in foreign countries (Brownmiller 1975). Apart from this work which had drawn international attention to the Bangladesh case, there has been little academic attention to these crimes. However, in the last ten years, Bina D'Costa (2011), Nayanika Mookherjee (2006) and Yasmin Saikia (2011) have worked on issues of silence, social causes and consequences of these crimes. Among the several works of non-fiction by Bangladeshi writers, however, Neelima Ibrahim's *Ami Birangona Bolchhi* first published in 1998 was one of the first and most detailed collections of the stories of seven "Birangona", as the government labelled the women after the war ended.

Sexual violence in general, and not any less so in wartime, is difficult to talk about for its victims and perpetrators and thus to write about for researchers. It was also difficult to obtain such interviews for the purposes of this research, the focus of which anyhow is not the personal stories of those involved but the media discourse surrounding it. In what follows, I focus on the representation – through both language and its absence – of the issue of gender violence in particular, and gender as well as absent 'Others' in general, in the Pakistani media of 1971 as reflected in the newspapers *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan*. Discourse generally is about what is said, how it is said, by whom, in what context and why. It is, essentially, about language. But the empirical findings of this research show that it can also be about the the absence of language, or silence.

8.3 Discursive Silences

Women have been discussed as secondary in the Liberation War of 1971, talked about as victims of sexual violence, with little mention of their active contribution to the war, as supporters of the freedom fighters and, to an extent, as active combatants. When at the end of the war, the rape victims were given the title of "Birangona" or war heroine, to honour their sacrifice and help with their reintegration into society, stories of the process of their rehabilitation – from a "marry-off campaign" to skills training – were published in the Bangladeshi media. But this process did little to reinstate these women in society (Islam 2012). In fact, as Saikia shows, some women actually claim the Birangona title to be their 'greatest sorrow' (Saikia 2013: 153). Indeed, all documentation related to the rape of the women and subsequent termination of pregnancies were destroyed, supposedly to protect their identities as a part of the process of rehabilitation. For the most part, the war heroines of Bangladesh's Liberation War remained silent in their suffering, and it is only in recent years that they have begun to attract attention of researchers and the media.

There are several ways to interpret silence. Ephratt (2008) writes, 'in cases of nonverbal experience such as absence and loss (death), silence is to be seen as the preferred mode of expression, but in many such cases also as the most authentic and most adequate, hence the only possible way to communicate the emotional experience', which may well be true of the survivors of sexual violence of 1971. Not taking this interpretation into consideration may be inadvertently taking away the agency of these women. Yet, it would also be naïve not to consider the fact that this may have not been a case of agency for at least some of the women, that it may have been a forced silence due to the discourses prevailing in society – those of the ideal Pakistani Muslim, female chastity, social taboos, etc.

This silencing of women is evident in oral histories such as the classic compilation by Nilima Ibrahim (2007), *Ami Birangona Bolchhi* (I am the Birangona speaking). The first story, for example, is that of Tara Banerjee, a Hindu girl aged 18 at the time of the war, later and better known as Mrs. T. Nielsen, who was handed over by a local Razakar to the Pakistani army, kept captive and raped for months until she was rescued at the end of the war. Tara underwent the state-organised skills training as a nurse, had her pregnancy terminated and when her family refused to take her back, she applied for further training in Poland and then later ended up marrying a Danish journalist and settling in Denmark. While Tara says that she will be forever grateful to the Father of the Nation Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for leading the Bangali people to independence and later bestowing the honour of Birangona to the women victims of sexual violence, she still (at least until 20 years later when the book was written) fostered a hatred for the nation and society which, despite the label, did not in reality make possible the reintegration of women like her into society. The fact that she had to change her name, leave the country and start over, shows the need to conceal and dispense of the identity of a raped woman in order to survive.

In writing about the post-liberation government's silencing of a spectrum of voices, especially women who had experienced sexual violence, D'Costa (2011) cites the lack of documentation pertaining to rape camps, the use of rape as a war strategy in 1971 or the testimonies of the rape survivors of 1971, as having been a deliberate destruction or due to negligence. Stories that were told initially, contends D'Costa, were done so strategically to attract international attention and, subsequently, to gain financial and technical support in rebuilding of the new nation-state. Even though international organisations worked for the rehabilitation of war babies in post-conflict Bangladesh, D'Costa argues that their 'actual narratives have been entirely excluded from the official

construction of history-making' which she attributes to 'a complex combination of maintaining traditional norms, strategic silence by the state, and the negotiated survival strategies of women who became mothers through wartime sexual violence' (D'Costa 2011: 80).

8.3a Anti-liberation discourse and absence

In the anti-liberation discourse, as reflected in the media, women were rendered invisible, as the empirical research for this study has found. The few times that they are mentioned are as Muslim women and girls being violated by Hindu men, and, more than anything, as Muslim mothers and sisters, whose honour must be defended by Muslim men. In fact, the archival research showed that in the masculine discourse of the war of 1971, there are only good Muslim men, bad Hindu men, and Muslim women victims. Others – Muslim men who may not be good, Hindu men who may not be bad, Muslim women who are not necessarily victims and non-Muslim women in general, are nowhere to be found. What these absences and silences say about the war will be the subject of analysis of this last empirical chapter of this study.

Yasmin Saikia in her study of an 'inner history of the war' argues that the 'forgotten, hidden memories belong to women who were terrorized, brutally sexualized, and marginalized in the war' and that though they were not directly involved in battle, they 'became the site on which violence and power were inscribed' (2011: 4). This is reflected when comparing historical events and the media coverage at the time. While some stories of rape survivors made it to the newspapers and reports on their rehabilitation abounded in the post-conflict press in 1972, in 1971, women were almost nonexistent in the media and their plight completely absent. In the discourse of a war apparently between Muslims and Hindus, Pakistan and India, there were no reports of

Muslim men raping Muslim women (or for that matter, Hindu women), which was essentially what occurred during the war in frighteningly large numbers as mentioned above.

Women were neither the audience nor the subject of the news of 1971. The media discourse was dominated with references to Muslim men and Muslim "brotherhood". While Hindus in general were portrayed as the enemy, it was only Hindu men who were specifically depicted as justified targets of violence. Women were largely absent from the entire discourse, except for Muslim women as victims. Several news stories reported that Muslim women were being raped by Hindu soldiers in Pakistan, as well as being kidnapped from refugee camps in India and violated. Such reports served at least three purposes – to instil fear, to strike at the ego and honour of Muslim men, and, ultimately, present the protection of Muslim women from Hindu criminals as a prime duty of the ideal Pakistani Muslim man.

For example, the *Dainik Sangram* newspaper plays on the vulnerabilities of parents of young women to instil fear, to create hatred for the enemy and as a result, support for the Pakistani army. It reports, for example, that "Guardians of Muslim girls are living in unimaginable fear and anxiety because Hindu goondas with the help of the Indian army are known to be routinely raping Muslim girls and women" (*Dainik Sangram* 9 September 1971, p. 1). An op-ed piece published on October 19 talks about not only "Hindu goondas" but also peacekeepers in refugee camps in India raping Muslim women.

These stories do not only report "events" but also their consequences if nothing is done. For example, an editorial published in late August in the *Dainik Sangram* recalls warning those "confused by Indian propaganda and getting involved in self-destructive activities against their own country, including violating the honour of East Pakistani

Muslim women and men, that the same will happen to their mothers' and sisters' honour and their life and property at the hands of Hindus" (*Dainik Sangram* 28 August 1971, p. 2). The story describes the "lustful looks" of Hindu goons towards Muslim "mothers and sisters" and reports on Muslim girls being taken away from their parents in the dark of night and turned into objects of consumption of Indian soldiers.

These news stories create a stark polarisation in which Hindus are portrayed as the enemy, particularly as the perpetrators of sexual violence against Muslim women. They not only avoid the role of Muslim men, but also completely exclude Hindu women. In a letter to the editor, the writer claims they "want to save our Muslim mothers and sisters from Indian conspiracy" (*Dainik Sangram* 9 September 1971, p. 2). Another letter published on October 19 and actually entitled "Protect the honour of Muslim women" says that along with all other grievances, "the thought of Hindu goondas playing with the honour of Muslim women is driving us crazy. Hindustani goondas take away young Muslim girls from their families in the evening in trucks and return them after sunrise. The saddest thing is that lecherous Hindu soldiers don't take any Hindu women for this. As Muslims we can't tolerate this scene anymore." This particular letter has a number of implications: Hindus are goons and rapists, even, or perhaps particularly, soldiers of the Indian army. Muslim women are victims. Muslim men should not tolerate this. In saying that Hindu women are not being picked up, it even seems to imply that it would have been more bearable if the alleged Hindu perpetrators were raping Hindu women as well. Also, it seems to say that Muslims (not human beings in general) should not be tolerating such crimes against Muslim (and not all) women. The letter further describes past instances of oppression of Muslims where other Muslims waged jihad against the enemy and the writer beseeches the government to take steps to "save Muslim women from becoming victims of Hindu goondas" (ibid).

Another news report in the *Dainik Sangram* tells the story of a young man who had initially joined the Bangali freedom fighters but who, after witnessing the "Muslim-hating attitude and behaviour of Hindu goondas" returned to Pakistan to work for Islam and the nation. This man was "troubled by the inhuman torture/rape of Muslim mothers and sisters in India by Hindu goondas and by the cruel order to kill East Pakistan's innocent Muslims" (*Dainik Sangram* 1 October 1971, p. 1). He says he witnessed the torment of Muslim women – they were stripped naked, tortured and dishonoured and the sadness in their eyes reflected the severe suffering inflicted on them. First-hand accounts such as these serve even better than straightjacket news and quotes from the authorities in creating emotional turmoil with the objective of inducing action (in support of Pakistan) in readers/the audience.

The authorities also played a part. For example, General Niazi of the Pakistan army and last governor and martial law administrator of East Pakistan was quoted as saying that "defending Pakistan is defending one's own home, when anyone defends their country they defend the honour of their mothers and sisters and secure their children's future" (*Dainik Sangram* 20 October 1971, p. 1). It may be noted here that Niazi himself was said to be a notorious rapist during the war of 1971 as reported in the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, the enquiry commission appointed by the president of Pakistan in 1971 (D'Costa 2011), thus making questionable exactly which women's honour was to be defended, presumably pure West Pakistani Muslim women, for it was Bangali Hindu and Muslim women who fell prey to him.

Women, particularly Muslim women, were portrayed only as "mothers and sisters". In this way, Muslim women are made to feel like one's own by labelling them as family members, who must be protected, whose honour must be defended, by defending the nation. Even if women were mentioned in general, it could have been assumed that it

included all women, from all groups and religions, but by specifying "Muslim" women, the discourse excluded all non-Muslim women. Hindu women, who were a significant proportion of the population, are completely absent from this discourse, as if they do not exist, or, perhaps even worse still, as if their honour does not matter, or that their honour is not the honour of the nation to be defended.

Thus, while there may not be a direct call to sexual violence based on religion in the discursive language of the media, through exclusion based on religious identity, silence around the perpetrating Muslim self and absence of the victimised religious Other, the missing discourse around the mass rape of 1971 can be said to have had religion-based implications.

8.4 The Question of Religion

Just as discursive language creates meaning, so does discursive silence. The silence around the rape of Hindu as well as Muslim women by Muslim men suggests that, unlike violence against Hindus which is justified in the media, sexual violence in general and against Muslim women in particular, is taboo. Does this mean then that it is acceptable for Muslim men to kill and maim Hindus but that violating women is not?

In an interview, Dr. M.A. Hasan[70], the convenor of the War Crimes Fact Finding Committee of Bangladesh, describes the planned and purposive "impregnation of Pakistanis in the Bangali womb". According to him, Bangali women were violated throughout the duration of the war with mini brothels even being set up to serve the soldiers of the Pakistan army. "They [the Pakistanis] thought they were a superior race

[70] Dr. M.A. Hasan. Personal interview. 19 October 2014 conducted at his medical chamber in Mirpur, Dhaka. A former member of the Pakistan Army, Dr. M.A. Hasan, a doctor by profession, worked as a coordinator with the law enforcement agencies after the war rescuing women victims of sexual violence.

like the Aryans and would create Pakistanis in Bangali wombs, that they would change their religion and identity, change their genetic makeup by raping women, and so Brahmin women were especially targeted but also Bangali women who were affiliated with pro-liberation forces. The Pakistanis justified their actions by claiming that women were '*ganimater maal*' (spoils of war) and that this is fair in war. These were not isolated incidents, but widely practised in the Pakistan army."

Dr. Hasan believes that rape was used to break the Bangali morale. "Those who were impregnated were supposed to give birth to true Pakistanis, while other women were confined and used as comfort women, moved from bunker to bunker. Some of the women who were rescued said that after being violated their legs were cut off. The Pakistanis were paranoid, triggered by a wrong sense of identity.

"They raped women in the name of Allah. One victim reported being raped by a soldier who was wearing a *tabeez/tawiz* (an amulet or locket usually containing verses from the Quran or other Islamic prayers and symbols) with 'Allahu' written on it. It was swinging in her face, that's all she could see and that's all she remembers now. This happened across Bangladesh, in the name of religion, in the name of Allah, they said '*Narae taqbeer Allahu akbar*' (a call to God's greatness) before setting fire to houses. Several women in Rajshahi were locked in a room and raped en masse after the proclamation of '*Narae taqbeer Allahu akba*r'.

"Women's breasts were amputated, or had flags stuck on them. It was seen as a symbol of pride, of having eliminated the mother figure. The more they became defeated on the frontline the more they violated women, even women who were running away, they tried to leave a mark on them, wounded them, left an imprint on them, [what they thought was an] imprint of Islam."

These images did not make it to the media. Whether or not these acts were planned and systematic, whether or not they made the perpetrators proud, they were not something to be publicised.

The discourse of the ideal Pakistani Muslim man included the jihadi and the martyr in the path of God, but not the rapist. Yet, as subsequent research has shown, rape was a major weapon of war during the independence struggle of Bangladesh. If nothing else, this contradiction between reality and mediated discourse shows just that – how differently a discourse can be constructed, through language as well as through silence around certain issues, from reality. Interestingly, discourse also seems to vary between different sub-groups even within the same primary group. Thus, while soldiers on the ground seem to have been fed the discourse of raping women in the name of God as shown above, the greater Pakistani population was not privy to this strategy of war and were rather instigated to fight by being told stories of *their* women being violated by the enemy. This then shows that there is nothing inherent, let alone constant, in discourse, and that it can be designed differently for different audiences to suit the needs of the powerful who construct it.

Maleka Khan[71], a social worker who was a part of the rehabilitation process of the victims of sexual violence during the war, argued in a personal interview that religion had nothing to do with the war, often referring to the fact that her brother, who was Muslim, had been shot and killed. The percentage of Hindu women raped was small in total as the majority of the population were Muslim. "Yes, in many Hindu villages, everyone was raped, but so were Muslims in the ten surrounding villages. Most of the women who had abortions were Muslim."

[71] Maleka Begum. Personal interview. 13 December 2014 conducted at her office in Tejgaon, Dhaka.

As Khan continued with her account, it began to become clear as to why it is not easy to attribute the mass rape of 1971 to religion. "It is true they had a target, Hindus were given priority, if they ever caught them they never let them go… but neither did they spare the Muslims. Just as they [the local collaborators] pointed out Hindu homes, so they pointed out the homes of Muslims, Bangalis. Yes, they abused religious propaganda, but if they had not victimised Muslims then I would have said that, yes, religion was at work here, but they killed everyone – Hindus, Muslims, women, young men, freedom fighters. They disrespected religion, they disrespected culture. Their greed was material." This reinforces the idea that religion was not what caused the war or the sexual violence, but that it was abused as an excuse to justify it. This was accordingly reflected in the media in its identification of the Hindu enemy as perpetrators of rape posited against the good Pakistani Muslim man as shown in previous chapters, as well as Muslim women as the only victims.

In Khan's opinion, religion played more of a role after the war, with Muslim women feeling the brunt of it: "I am a person of the field. I saw pain. The pain they got, our Muslim women who were oppressed/tortured, they are still hidden, society hasn't changed. Hindu women are relatively progressive, they have somehow integrated into society and got on with their lives. But the Muslim women are still in hiding. I am asking the government to call them freedom fighters. At least before they die, they will know honour."

It is worth noting that after decades of movement for the recognition of the war heroines as freedom fighters, the Bangladesh government in October 2015 bestowed the title of Freedom Fighter and its associated facilities and benefits, to 41 Birangona/war heroines. The list still remains separate from that of the original list of freedom fighters,

and the process of selecting women for this list – based on the Birangona filing applications which are then scrutinised and approved by local authorities – is ongoing.

8.5 An Incomplete Narrative

Bina D'Costa in her book *Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia*, discusses three parallel narratives about the liberation war in present day Bangladesh – the government-sponsored official narrative which glorifies the war, the fiction and non-fiction Bangla literature which touches upon people's suffering, and 'the experiences of survivors as found in their silences' (2011: 104), particularly women and girls who were raped and impregnated or raped and killed, and their families – all of which, she argues, have contributed to the general silencing and secrecy of women who endured sexual violence during the war. In addition is the silencing of the Bihari narrative of the war – the non-Bengali speaking community which had migrated to East Bengal (later East Pakistan) from India following the assignment of Bihar to India by the British in 1947. D'Costa notes that there is no documentation of the experiences of the Bihari community which in many cases supported the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh during the war and thus after the war faced the wrath of the Bangalis. In fact, based on her fieldwork interviews, D'Costa has found that violating Bihari women was also seen as a way of avenging the wartime abductions of Bangali women during the war.

In this way, it may be said that even in pro-liberation, post-liberation Bangladesh, a certain 'memoricide' of the war has occurred, a term that Nur Masalha (2012) uses to discuss the Palestinian 1948 catastrophe. As he notes, by changing, distorting and silencing narratives, destruction of memory or memoricide takes place. This argument can be applied to the ways in which Pakistan continues to deny that a genocide against

the Bangalis had taken place and that rape was used as a strategy in the battle against them. As Saigol (1995) writes:

> They erase Bangladesh by not telling the tale. There are many ways of not telling. One of these is to tell a different story, to speak half the truth. The story of Bangladesh is silenced between half truths, and full lies. If ever speech is used to create silences, it happens in the case of Bangladesh. One liners and short phrases on Bangladesh at the end of chapters cover up oceans of unspoken horrors. The idea that language is the 'cloak of thought' used more to conceal and mask than to reveal, was never truer than in the case of the genocide of 1971. (Saigol 1995: 1026)

This is, of course, not unique to the case of Pakistan. Ruth Wodak (2011), in her analysis of post-war anti-Semitism in Austria, shows how the nation is mythologized as being the first victim of the Hitlerite regime and thus shifts responsibility of its atrocities on to Germany, followed by a silencing, a taboo of the Austrian past, which if brought forth is met with a discourse of justification.

Memoricide, as this study has shown, began during the war itself through the exclusion of certain narratives, particularly those of women, in the media under study. The media focused on the ideal Pakistani Muslim man, as its subject and as its audience. Non-Muslims were either the enemy or absent, women were either victims or absent. This incomplete story later formed an incomplete history of the war of 1971, and unfortunately, this was not limited to that of the defeated Pakistani side but, as has been shown through the academic works cited above, also by the victorious Bangladeshi side through its erasure of the Bihari narrative, as well as suppression of the authentic plight of the Birangona. Not coming to terms with one's history tends to result in a repetition of it, and this is evident in the case of the oppression of ethnic minorities by the Bangladeshi state and the repression of the Baluch population by the Pakistani state in recent years.

The final chapter of this dissertation weaves together the findings of the thesis and their implications to history as well as the present, and their significance in the current political context of Bangladesh and the world. It also lays out unanswered questions of

this study as possible avenues for much-needed future research on the role of ideology, discourse and the media in religion-based conflict.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, but if faced with courage, need not be lived again. -Maya Angelou

9.1 Key Findings

This thesis addressed the role of media framing of religious-based discourse in the legitimisation of political violence and war and how these frames become naturalised knowledge and tools for mobilisation. Examining the case of Bangladesh during its independence struggle from Pakistan, it has explored the use of religion in anti-liberation discourse during the war. While East Pakistani Bangalis, the majority of whom were Muslims, were fighting for independence based on their ethnic and cultural differences from West Pakistan, Bangali collaborators within East Pakistan sided with the West Pakistani government and military in defending the unity of Pakistan which they considered to be a homeland for Muslims and which they thought should remain united on this basis.

The analysis thus explored how ideology, to paraphrase Louis Althusser, interpellates its intended recipients and helps construct particular imaginations of nationhood which, in this particular case, is based on religious identities rather than national ones. As such, the research examined the media discourses in the *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* newspapers over the nine months of the war between March and December 1971 and addressed how the religion-based ideology was reproduced in the media to construct particularistic and divisive identities and mobilise recruits.

The discourse analysis of the the two newspapers showed the media under study functioned as an ideological status apparatus, which along with other state institutions, was used by the Pakistani government, military and its auxiliary forces in East Pakistan to:

- Construct a discursive imagination of Pakistan as an Islamic state based on "Islamic nationalism".
- Construct imagined identities based on a politics of difference that made distinctions between (Pakistani) Muslims and (Indian) Hindus.
- Legitimise violence against the Bangali population based on these constructions and identity formations, including sexual violence against Bangali women, which, as this research showed, was not discussed in the media under study.

The findings revealed that these discursive constructions selectively used particular quotes from the Quran and Hadith, references to Allah, the Prophet Muhammad and famous battles in Islamic history as well as references to historical animosity between Muslims and Hindus based on Hindu domination and Muslim subservience, especially during the Partition of India. Using these strategies, the media played a role in summoning or interpellating intended audiences, exhorting them to action as a duty demanded from "good, true Muslim Pakistanis" fighting against Hindus by sacrificing their lives and wealth, and embracing martyrdom in exchange for rewards in the afterlife.

Based on the analysis, the study showed that the media were instrumental in the dissemination of this discourse, underlining how media, functioning as ideological state apparatus, not only constructs particular ideologies to interpellate intended recipients, but also seeks to drive them to action. As Althusser has argued, 'ideologies are systems of

meanings that install everybody in imaginary relations to the real relations in which they live' (cited in Macdonnell 1986: 27). While this research does not assume that recipients were indeed interpellated by this discourse, it has shown how the media becomes a discursive tool used by the state in wartime.

The study also showed that the media analysed here were complicit in 'memoricide' (a term Nur Masalha (2012) used to discuss the Palestinian Nakba) of the war of 1971 through suppression of the authentic plight of the Birangona or war heroine as the survivors of sexual violence were named by the post-conflict Bangladeshi state during and after the war, but also through erasure of the Bihari narrative, the violence and sexual violence by the Bangali population against non-Bangalis residing in East Pakistan seen as, and who largely were, supporting the Pakistani state (D'Costa 2011). Thus, discourse was constructed not only through the use of language but also through its absence or silence.

As Antonio Gramsci has noted, supremacy of a social group manifests itself through domination and intellectual and moral leadership, creating hegemony, or '"spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by a dominant fundamental group' (Riaz 2003: 304).

> The intellectual and moral leadership, an important component of hegemony, can be and usually is, elicited by presenting an ideology that on the one hand universalizes the corporate interests of the dominant/prominent class, while on the other hand, apparently representing the interests of the subordinate groups/classes… Thus there exists an intrinsic relationship between hegemony and legitimacy. Lack of hegemony undermines legitimacy. (Riaz 2003: 304)

This is where the role of ideology becomes vital, for without an ideology which appears superior compared to other ideologies, hegemony cannot be established. The findings of this study show how ideology was used discursively in order to maintain the hegemonic rule of the state. This discourse attempted to justify the position of those who

opposed liberation in the belief that Pakistan should remain strong and united as a Muslim nation.

As Philip Oldenburg has written,

> The genocide attempted by the Pakistanis in East Bengal was thus not an excess committed by overzealous battlefield soldiers lusting for revenge; it was a cornerstone of the attempt to keep Pakistan united. Justification went beyond the notion that Hindus should be driven out to where they belonged-to India-leaving East Pakistan "pure". (Oldenburg 1985: 730)

Discourse was used to produce knowledge about national, individual and collective identities, thus producing a particular and selective version of truth during a historical period. It is useful at this point to refer back to Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) who note that the world does not consist of realities and truths but our categorisations of it, that is, of products of discourse and that these are historically and culturally specific, varying with context and changing over time. 'Knowledge is created through social interaction in which we construct common truths and compete about what is true and false' (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 5). This is not to say that reality does not exist or that meanings and representations aren't real, but that they gain meaning through discourse (ibid: 9).

> Language, then, is not merely a channel through which information about underlying mental states and behavior or facts about the world are communicated. On the contrary, language is a 'machine' that generates, and as a result constitutes, the social world. This also extends to the constitution of social identities and social relations. it means that changes in discourse are a means by which the social world is changed. Struggles at the discursive level take part in changing, as well as in reproducing, the social reality. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 9)

Words themselves do not hold meaning, and the meaning of words change from one discourse to another. As Macdonell (1986) suggests, 'meanings are part of the "ideological sphere" and discourse is one of ideology's specific forms' (1986: 45). As such, words find meaning in the context in which they are spoken, by and to whom, and also in the context of what is *not* said. Discourse is the sum of these articulations.

This study has focused on the media's construction and use of discourse, particularly through the framing of ideology. Less emphasis has been placed on specific strategies as such. For example, analysis of the material has shown an abundant use of quotes by political and religious leaders as well as religious texts. As Pecheux has argued, 'words, expressions, propositions, etc., change their meaning according to the positions held by those who use them' (cited in Macdonnell 1986: 24), an argument evident in the quotes used in the *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* newspapers attributed to the president, ministers, army generals, and not least, religious scholars, leaders and activists.

Barbie Zelizer has also shown in her study of presentational practices of public discourse with the ideologies and authority they embody how particular quotes lend authority to unspecified collective sources behind the news, to journalists themselves and 'create a collectivity of news audiences by offering journalists a way of simultaneously connecting different audiences to preferred readings of news' (1989: 369). In this way, the numerous citations and quotes based on religion used in the Pakistani wartime media studied here also serve to authenticate the ideological discourse being disseminated.

The ideological discourse studied in this thesis was only one of many floating about in 1971 Pakistan and practically speaking, the fact that the war was won by the pro-liberation, pro-Bangladesh side is testament to that. However, anti-liberation was a significant discourse, aimed at a specific target group which did function in a certain way. Examination of the media as one of the sites of power, ideology and discourse – though the causal effect is impossible to determine – was thus crucial.

9.2 Contributions of the Research

This research has provided an in-depth analysis of the importance of media frames in conflict during an important time in the history of South Asia. While extensive

research has been carried out on communal violence in South Asia, especially during the Partition, a detailed and critical analysis of media material itself is lacking, whereas this study shows just how important media discourses have always been. This study addresses the gap in terms of the focus on the role of the media and communication of religious discourses which facilitate this violence. In contemporary Bangladesh, for example, the focus on post-liberation and pro-liberation discourse tends to neglect the key themes of the discourses used to oppose liberation in 1971, not in the least, the "iteration until saturation" of religion-based ideology to the point of the war being referred to as jihad.

Thus, in terms of further research, this study lays a replicable approach for related studies on media discourses during Bangladesh's Liberation war, including the West Pakistani media, the East Pakistani media which supported liberation, and the Indian media. The research can also be expanded to audience and reception studies in order to understand the relationship and any consequences of the discourses on the audience.

Furthermore, this study moves attention to the media in the Global South. Indeed, most of the global research conducted on religion, violence and the media focuses on the (mainly Western mainstream) media's coverage of religious conflict and groups after the fact rather than the perpetrators' use of media in representing themselves and in recruiting and mobilising followers to violence before and during their occurrence. This study opens up new and detailed ways of looking at how perpetrators of violence use media as a discursive tool to represent themselves and justify their actions in the name of religion.

The methodology can be replicated in the study of ideology, media discourse, and the complex interplay of the relationship between media and nationalism, identity, conflict, gender and absence. While this particular project may be specific to the case of Bangladesh's war of independence 45 years ago, the methodology can be effectively

replicated to study any conflict-ridden society of the past, present and future, especially conflict purportedly based on religion, around the world. The study can serve as a model for research not only on newspapers but, increasingly relevant today, digital media discourses. It can serve as a model for the study of online and social media and digital discourses used by IS and other groups around the world, something that is becoming increasingly relevant in contemporary conflicts. Its methodology may be replicated in similar research in other contexts, including in relation to IS, Al Qaeda and other groups in the Middle East; Boko Haram, Al-Shabab and others in Africa; and militant groups in South Asia such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Jama'atul Mujahideen, Ansar al Islam and Hizb ut Tahrir in Bangladesh, the radical party Shiv Sena in India, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other rebel groups in both Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir and the Taliban and other extremist groups in Pakistan.

The study has shown the importance of historical context which has not been studied enough, especially in the context of continuing conflicts in South Asia, such as Kashmir. The role of ethnicisation or the construction of ethnicities and religious-ethnic identities do matter, as was demonstrated in the case of the Yugoslav War in the 1990s. The role of myth in this process as outlined by Velikonja (1998) discussed in Chapter 3 is particularly interesting in the context of this study. Also relevant is Cohen's (1998) observation that while religion itself was not a prime factor in the motivation of violence in the Balkans, 'ethnocultural divisions, and especially negative historical memories linked to episodes of religiously-based violence among the various confessional communities… played a significant and indirect role in generating' the war (Cohen 1998: 44). The examination of religious factors in the complex interplay of history, politics and culture has become particularly important with the rise of extremist groups like Al Qaeda and the interest in them after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and, most recently, IS.

This research can also act as a starting point for further investigation into the media's role in creating discursive silences, by looking in greater detail at the issue of gender and sexual violence, and minority or defeated groups, such as the Biharis in East Pakistan.

Theoretically speaking, the dissertation has laid out in great detail the relationship between ideology, discourse and power and how they work together to form identities of the Self, the Other, and map out a plan of action based on these. It has also shown that whereas most studies of ideology are limited to the materialistic, that is, class struggle, ideology is in fact everywhere, for discourse is everywhere, in everything we say and do, and wherever there is discourse, there is some form of ideology at work. Specifically, this study has expanded on the role of the media in this process.

This said, some clarifications are needed. This research did not set out to prove that the media discourse was actually what drove the violence during the war, but only that it contained the discourse which possibly contributed to it. In fact, it was even difficult to get accurate statistics on the readership of the newspapers studied for this dissertation. Audience and reception studies could potentially explain the relationship between the discourse and the action.[72] Such studies could add to the knowledge on identity formation through discursive means but with focus on the receiver/audience rather than the discourse itself.

Having said this, this research can serve as a model to study not only religion-based discourses of conflict but diverse movements of media and media technologies in mobilising conflict and can be taken in several directions in order to understand the

[72] Avalos (2005) points out, causality is difficult to establish as 'historical events are not usually repeatable under exactly the same circumstances' and even apparent causes may be nothing more than a correlation (Avalos 2005: 20). Disentangling religious from other causes such as political and economic is even more difficult. Avalos argues that it is also useful to distinguish between necessary and sufficient causes, where some violence would not occur if it was not prescribed in religion, but then again, religious belief in itself may not be sufficient to cause it either.

various aspects of the phenomenon. Theories of communication and conflict are mostly limited to analysis of Western mainstream media and particularly the framing of terrorism, but with the increasing use of new media by extremist groups such as IS especially, there has also been a rising interest in these. However, again most analysis is restricted to these groups' use of media to engage and recruit members. What remains less studied is the ideology these groups spread about themselves for this purpose and to justify their acts of what they themselves refer to as terrorism.

This research shows that the use of religious-based discourse and its dissemination precedes the digital age, underlining the fact that media had always been part of social and political processes. However, the same methodology can be used to study digital discourses, i.e., how language and discourse are used in the digital world and online media to recruit followers and mobilise them to violence. The use of quotes from the Quran and Hadith, motivational quotes by spiritual leaders, comparison of today's soldiers to heroes in Islamic history, reference to religion as allowing, even encouraging war in its defence, the glorification of sacrifice and martyrdom, and the absence of women except as mothers, daughters, wives and victims of rape, are themes present in both discourses of 1971 Pakistani media and IS today. In addition, due to having modern digital technology at its fingertips, visuals such as images in magazines and social media and elaborate video clips depicting gruesome violence figure largely in IS media. This study can be used to understand discourses used by such groups and their claims to religious authenticity and legitimacy and how these can be countered. Such studies are not only relevant but crucial to understanding how religious ideology, discourse and rhetoric are being used for political gain and power across the world and how this is driving identity formation as well as a new form of globalisation and transnational movements, resulting in these groups gaining strength ideologically through

the use of such discourses and physically through the growing recruitment of followers using these ideological discourses.

Therefore, despite being a historical study, this project does not end with 1971 Pakistan and Bangladesh. It provides important empirical evidence of the use of religion in war, and of the use of media not only as an instrument but as an important element in political and social processes then and now. The methodology can be applied to research on the past, as well as contemporary and future conflicts in which religious ideology plays a key discursive role. The analysis can help to open up questions of not only discursive language and its normalising of the violent imaginary as well as acts, but of silences and their role in memory-making and "memoricide". The study lays the foundation for further research on the important and complex interplay of religion, culture and communication in historical, contemporary and future conflicts anywhere in the world.

9.3 Limitations of the Study

The "limitations" of this study are what I prefer to think of as opportunities – for related, expanded and even completely new studies in the area. In fact, given the dearth of research on the discursive use of religion in Bangladesh's Liberation War, the thesis offers a good starting point for further research. As Althusser suggests, 'no ideology takes shape outside a struggle with some opposing ideology' (cited in Macdonnell 1986: 33). In fact, it is not essential for the ruling ideology to be the dominant ideology, and unlike repressive state apparatuses, ideological state apparatuses are not always homogenous and unified (Macdonnell 1986). That is to say, there are, at any given time a number of ideological discourses in action and often in struggle with each other.

This study focused on the discourse of two Pakistani newspapers, the *Dainik Sangram*, which was a mouthpiece of the main anti-liberation party of East Pakistan, and the *Dainik Pakistan* which was a government-owned newspaper in East Pakistan. Other than some advertisements published in December 1971 in the West Pakistani daily *Dawn*, the study did not include other West Pakistani newspapers or any other media and propaganda material. This was due to the fact that other West Pakistani newspapers relevant to this study were in Urdu, a language in which I am not proficient. This limitation extends to the literature review, which is again limited to English and Bangla sources, whereas there may have been significant – but to my knowledge, not indispensable – Urdu material beyond my scope. However, the volume of material for analysis gathered from the two newspapers studied here was more than adequate for this particular project.

The study did not address the pro-liberation army's use of discourse, its possible construction of ethnic identities and the Other, and any use of religion on its part during the war. As Bangladeshi journalist Kamal Lohani[73] said in an interview, the Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra, the pro-liberation radio station working underground, began daily transmission with a Quran recitation and broadcast a programme titled "The Liberation War from an Islamic Perspective". The study did not address Indian discourses of the war and their construction of Pakistan and Pakistanis and Bengal and its own significant role in the war or the Bihari narrative, i.e., that of the non-Bangali community in East Pakistan who were subjected to violence by Bangalis at the end of the war. Thus, this study does not claim that the Pakistani state-sponsored discourse and its reflection of the

[73] Kamal Lohani, journalist. Personal interview. 29 December 2015, conducted at his residence in Niketan, Dhaka.

relationship between religion, politics and society was the only or even the most important one in circulation, especially in East Pakistan.

Other media material such as television and radio content and other propaganda material such as posters and leaflets used by groups which opposed liberation and which were expected to be found at the outset of this research were unavailable. Again, the material that was available in the form of newspapers was more than adequate for the study.

Interviews were conducted of survivors of the war and those who supported the liberation of Bangladesh. Those who actively opposed it were and are being tried for war crimes and were unavailable for comment. Those who worked for the government such as for state television and radio were unwilling to be interviewed.

Perhaps the most significant absence is the voice of the women survivors of sexual violence during the war, whose absence in the media at the time has been analysed, but who remain absent in this study as well due to the lack of interviews which could have been their form of representation in this case. As mentioned earlier, the difficulty of obtaining interviews combined with the ethics of intrusion and imposition, be they of voice or silence, has resulted in a lack of which I am keenly aware. Yet, the empirical data for this research is the media, and interviews, as in the chapter on identities, serve only to provide context, which, weighed against the sensitivity of the circumstances, can be done without. Because this is a study of media discourse, their voices, while they would have enriched the dissertation, were not indispensable to its primary analysis.

These are all narratives which can be, indeed beg to be, explored further in great detail, if steps are to be taken to rectify the “memoricide” of the Bangladesh war.

9.4 Epilogue

As the "Dhaka/Gulshan Attack" as it has come to be known in Bangladesh of July 1, 2016, finally came to an end after eleven long hours, focus began to shift from the victims of the attack to its perpetrators. To everyone's shock, the attackers, aged between 17 and 28 years, were not the expected madrasa-educated youth from impoverished backgrounds, or even seemingly "abnormal" or isolated individuals, as the recent media discourse of radical youth insinuates. Except for one man who was from outside the capital and educated in a madrasa, the rest were English-medium-educated young men from affluent families based in Dhaka. As their identities began to be confirmed, people who had known them expressed their shock and horror. Photos from their Facebook profiles surfaced in the social media – laughing, party-going, "next-door-neighbour" type of young men who had, according to family and friends, become "religious" and withdrawn in the past two years and had disappeared from home in the last several months. For the nation as a whole, but for the urban elite of Bangladesh in particular, who had previously believed that "extremism" was something perpetrated by people in places faraway, it was a brutal wake-up call.

IS claimed responsibility for the attack and released photos, and two and a half months later, videos, with the men posing with guns and machetes in front of the IS flag, criticising the democratic system and political leaders and justifying their own actions. The Bangladesh government, however, continues to deny the existence of IS in Bangladesh, claiming that the perpetrators of these and other attacks in the past three years were affiliated with local militant groups such as the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh. Either way, religion-based terrorism has become a cruel reality for the country. Globalisation and modern communication and media technologies have served to blur the lines between local and global terror, making it easier to have "soldiers of the

Caliphate" as IS refers to its fighters, waging battle not only in the warzones of Syria and Iraq, but in their own home countries, motivated and mobilised by militant groups around the world.

A Bangladeshi publisher, writer and editor who was targeted by militants in October 2015 and forced into exile in Norway, was selected by author Margaret Atwood for the Pen International Writer of Courage award on 13 October 2016. He was recently quoted in The Guardian as saying, "Anyone who wishes to counter [us] can do so through their writing. But please do not issue fatwas to have me, to have us, killed. Do not dispatch undercover assassins with knives and guns…If [the Islamic fundamentalists] have any logical ground, they can reply logically, by writing. I always think that text and books and writing can be the change in our social structure, in our mentality"[74].

In a similar vein, in order to respond to the discourses of violent militant groups, it is important to have counter discourses, and this can only be made possible by a deeper understanding of the original discourses. This study has been a small step towards enhancing this understanding of one of the most crucial and complex issues of our times.

[74] *The Guardian*, online, Available at https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/oct/13/margaret-atwood-selects-tutul-for-pen-writer-of-courage-award [Accessed 14 October 2016].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adamec, L.W., 2009. *Historical Dictionary of Islam*. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press.

Ahmed, G.F., 1971, 'Agartala sharajantrer rupantor' (The transformation of the Agartala Conspiracy), *Dainik Sangram* 31 August, p. 2.

Akand, S.A., 2013. *Language Movement and the Making of Bangladesh*. Dhaka: The University Press Limited.

Akbarzadeh, S., 2012. The paradox of political Islam. In Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed) *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1-8.

Al-Rasheed, M. and Shterin, M., 2009. Between Death of Faith and Dying for Faith: Reflections on Religion, Politics, Society and Violence. In Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin (eds) *Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World*. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. xvii-xxx.

Alavi, H., 2011. Politics of Ethnicity in India and Pakistan. In Kamla Visweswaran (ed) *Perspectives on Modern South Asia: A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp-87-99.

Ali, M.A., 1971, 'Bortoman shongkot o amader dayitto' (The current crisis and our responsibility), *Dainik Sangram* 31 July, p. 2.

Alshaer, A., 2014. The Poetry of Hizbullah. In Lina Khatib, Dina Matar and Atef Alshaer (eds) *The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and communication*. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 119-152.

Alshaer, A., 2008. Towards a Theory of Culture of Communication: The Fixed and the Dynamic in Hamas' Communicated Discourse, *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication*, Vol. 1 (2008), pp. 101-121.

Althusser, L., 2011. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation 1970). In Imre Szeman and Timothy Kaposy (eds) *Cultural Theory: An anthology*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 204-223.

Althusser, L., 1971. *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays*. London: New Left Books.

Althusser, L., 1969. *For Marx*. London: Verso.

Anderson, B., 1997. The nations and the origins of national consciousness. In Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex (eds) *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, multiculturalism and migration*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 43-51.

Afsaruddin, A., 2014. Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and Praxis: A Historical Survey. In Dominic Janes and Alex Houen (eds) *Martyrdom and Terrorism: Pre-modern to contemporary perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 40-58.

Anisuzzaman, 1995. *Identity, Religion and Recent History: Four Lectures on Bangladesh Society*. Calcutta: Naya Udyog.

Apter, D.E. (ed), 1997. *The Legitimization of Violence*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Avalos, H., 2005. *Fighting Words: The origins of religious violence*. New York: Prometheus Books.

Azam, G., 1971, 'Itihasher drishtite Pakistan' (Pakistan in the eyes of history), *Dainik Sangram* 18 August, p. 2.

Baaz, M.E. and Stern, M. 2013. *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, prescriptions, problems in the Congo and beyond*. London: Zed Books.

Barker, E., 2009. In God's Name: Practising Unconditional Love to the Death. In Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin (eds) *Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World*. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 49-58.

Barreto, A.A., 2009. *Nationalism and its Logical Foundations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Barthes, R., 2009. *Mythologies*. London: Vintage Books.

Bartov, O., 2001. *In God's Name: Genocide and religion in the 20th century*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Bennett, B.S. and O'Rourke, S.P., 2006. A Prolegomenon to the Future Study of Rhetoric and Propaganda. In Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell (ed) *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 51-71.

Berger, A.A., 2011. *Media and Communication Research Methods: An Introduction to Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. London: Sage.

Billig, M., 2001. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Bose, N., 2014. *Recasting the Region: Language, Culture, and Islam in Colonial Bengal*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bose, S., 2011. *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bourdieu, P., 1992. *Language & Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Brownmiller, S., 1975. *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Bryman, A., 2012. *Social Research Methods*. 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burke, K., 2006. The Rhetoric of Hitler's "Battle". In Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell (ed) *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 149-168.

Butler, J., 2016. *Frames of War: When is life grievable?* [Kindle Version] London: Verso.

Butler, J., 1990. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge.

Card, C., 1996. Rape as a weapon of war. *Women and Violence*, *11*(4), pp. 5-18. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810388

Castells, M., 2004. *The Power of Identity*. 2nd edn. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Cavanaugh, W.T., 2009. *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular ideology and the roots of modern conflicts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chaudhuri, R., 2013. *The Literary Thing: History, poetry and the making of a modern cultural sphere*. Oxford: Peter Lang.

Cockburn, C., 2009. The Continuum of Violence. In Uli Linke and Daniel Taana Smith (eds) *Cultures of Fear: A critical reader*. New York: Pluto Press, pp. 158-173.

Cockburn, C., 2001. The gendered dynamics of armed conflict and political violence. In C. Moser & F. Clark (Eds.), *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*. London: Zed Books Ltd, pp. 13-29.

Cohen, L., 1998. Bosnia's "Tribal Gods": The role of religion in nationalist politics. In Paul Mojzes (ed) *Religion and the War in Bosnia*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Cohn, C., 2013. Women and Wars: Towards a conceptual framework. In Carol Cohn (ed) *Women and Wars*. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 1-35.

Cottle, S., 2006. *Mediatized Conflict*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Cristi, M., 2009. Durkheim's Political Sociology. Civil Religion, Nationalism and Globalisation. In Annika Hvithamar, Margit Warburg and Brian Arly Jacobsen (ed) *Holy Nations and Global Identities: civil religion, nationalism and globalisation*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 47-78.

D'Costa, B., 2011. *Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia*. Oxon: Routledge.

Debnath, A., 2009. The Bangladesh Genocide: The Plight of Women. In Samuel Totten (ed) *Plight and Fate of Women During and Following Genocide*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, pp. 47-66.

DeCaro, P.A., 2003. *Rhetoric of Revolt: Ho Chi Minh's discourse for revolution*. Westport: Praeger.

Delanty, G. and Kumar, K., 2006. *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.

Deutsch, K.W., 1966. *Nationalism and Social Communication: An inquiry into the foundations of nationality*. 2nd ed. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press.

Dhar, S.S., 1985. *Bangladesher Sangbadpatra* (Newspaper of the Bangladesh). Dhaka: Bangla Academy.

Dhumketu, 1971a, 'Mirzafar kara?' (Who are the Mirzafars?), *Dainik Sangram* 9 June, p. 2.

Dhumketu, 1971b, 'Purbo Pakistanira desh premik' (East Pakistanis are patriots), *Dainik Sangram* 23 June, p. 2.

Donohue, J.L. and Esposito, J.L., (eds), 2007. *Islam in Trasition: Muslim Perspectives*. 2nd edn. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Durmukh, 1971a, 'Alemder biruddhe Hindu procharona (Hindu propaganda against religious scholars), *Dainik Sangram* 15 June, p. 2.

Durmukh, 1971b, 'Hindu Bahini Proshonge' (On the subject of the Hindu Forces), *Dainik Sangram* 13 October, p. 2.

Durmukh, 1971c, 'Shomoyer daak' (The call of the times), *Dainik Sangram* 19 October, p. 2.

Eagleton, T., 1991. *Ideology: An introduction*. London and New York: Verso.

Eickelman, D.F. and Piscatori, J., 2004. *Muslim Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ellul, J., 2006. The Characteristics of Propaganda. In Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell (ed) *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp.1-49.

Enloe, C., 2009. Militarizing Women's Lives: When Soldiers Rape. In Uli Linke and Daniel Taana Smith (eds) *Cultures of Fear: A critical reader*. New York: Pluto Press, pp. 238-253.

Ephratt, M., 2008. The functions of silence. *Journal of Pragmatics* 40 (2008) pp. 1909–1938.

Eriksen, T.H., 2010. *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. 3rd edn. London: Pluto Press.

Fairclough, N., 2015. *Language and Power*. 3rd edn. London: Routledge.

Fairclough, I. and Fairclough, N., 2012. *Political Discourse Analysis: A method for advanced students*. London: Routledge.

Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R., 2004. Critical Discourse Analysis. In Clive Seale (ed) *Social Research Methods: A Reader*. London: Routledge, pp. 357-365.

Ferguson, R. B., 2003. Violent conflict and control of the state. In R. Brian Ferguson (ed) *The State, Identity and Violence: Political disintegration in the post-Cold War world.* London: Routledge, 1-58.

Fiske, J., 1990. *Introduction to Communication Studies*. 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

Forgacs, D., ed., 1985. *Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Cultural Writings*. London: Lawrence and Washart.

Foucault, M., 1980. Truth and Power. In Colin Gordon (ed) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, pp. 109-133.

Fulton, H., 2005. Introduction: The power of narrative. In Helen Fulton, Rosemary Huisman, Julian Murphet and Anne Dunn (eds) *Narrative and Media*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-8.

Ganguly, S., 2007. The Roots of Religious Violence in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. In Linell E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon (eds) *Religion and Conflict in South and Southeast Asia: Disrupting Violence*. London: Routledge, pp. 70-84.

Garrett, P. and Bell, A., 1998. Media and Discourse: A Critical Overview. In Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (eds) *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 1-20.

Gazi, A.F.M., 1971, 'Attyobisleshon o pauthnirdesh' (Self-analysis and direction), *Dainik Sangram* 28 May, p. 2.

Gellner, E., 2006. *Nations and Nationalism*. 2nd edition. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Gerlach, C., 2010. *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass violence in the twentieth-century world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W., 1991. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. London: Routledge.

Ghassem-Fachandi, P., 2012. *Pogrom in Gujarat: Hindu Nationalism and Anti-Muslim Violence in India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Goldstein, J.S., 2001. *War and gender*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Gumul, E., 2010. Explicitating Political Discourse. In Christina Schaffner and Susan Bassnett (eds) *Political Discourse: Media and translation*. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, pp. 94-115.

Gramsci, A., 2011. Hegemony. In Imre Szeman and Timothy Kaposy (eds) *Cultural Theory: An anthology*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 188-203.

Habeck, M.R., 2006. *Knowing the Enemy: jihadist ideology and the war on terror*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Halder, B., 2012. Rape in 1971 – An Act of Genocide. *Forum*, Vol. 6, Issue 9, pp.

Hall, S., 2004. Foucault and Discourse. In Clive Seale (ed) *Social Research Methods: A Reader*. London: Routledge, pp. 345-356.

Hall, S., 1996. Introduction: Who Needs Identity? In Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (ed) *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London: Sage, 1-17.

Hamidi, K., 1971, 'Pakistan: Bibhinno Muslim chintanayoker drishtite' (Pakistan: Various Muslim philosophers' perspective), *Dainik Sangram* 3 November, p. 2.

Hanieh, A., 2015. A Brief History of ISIS. *Jacobin* December 3. Available https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/12/isis-syria-iraq-war-al-qaeda-arab-spring/ [Accessed 8 Dec 2015]

Haq, A.K.M.M.H., 1971, 'Bortoman poristhitir potobhumi' (The context of the current situation), *Dainik Sangram* 25 July, p. 2.

Haqqani, H., 2005. *Pakistan: Between mosque and military*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Hedlund, A., 2016. Sharp Lines, Blurred Structures: Politics Of Wartime Rape In Armed Conflict. *Focaal Blog*. Online. 22 January. [Accessed 26 Jan. 2016]. Available http://www.focaalblog.com/2016/01/22/anna-hedlund-sharp-lines-blurred-structures-politics-of-wartime-rape-in-armed-conflict/

Herman, E.S. and Chomsky, N., 1994. *Manufacturing Consent: The political economy of the mass media*. London: Vintage Books.

Hoigilt, J., 2011. *Islamist Rhetoric: Language and culture in contemporary Egypt*. London: Routledge.

Holliday, A., 2007. *Doing and Writing Qualitative Research*. 2nd edn. London: Sage.

Hossain, I. and Khan, M.H., 2006. The Rift Within An Imagined Community: Understanding Nationalism(s) in Bangladesh, *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 324-339.

Hossain, T. and Tollefson, J.W., 2007. Language Policy in Education in Bangladesh. In Amy B. M. Tsui and James W. Tollefson (eds) *Language Policy, Culture, and Identity in Asian Contexts*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 241-257.

Hossein, M.T., 1971, 'Musolman mrityunjoyi' (Muslims are immortal/overcome death), *Dainik Sangram* 5 October, p. 2.

Hvithamar, A. and Warburg, M., 2009. Introducing Civil Religion, Nationalism and Globalisation. In Annika Hvithamar, Margit Warburg and Brian Arly Jacobsen

(ed) *Holy Nations and Global Identities: civil religion, nationalism and globalisation*. Leiden: Brill, 1-20.

Ibrahim, N., 2007. *Ami Birangona Bolchhi*. Dhaka: Jagriti.

Ikram, S.E., 1971, 'Pakistani sanskritir oikyo' (The unity of Pakistani culture), *Dainik Sangram* 2 July, p. 5.

Islam, K., 2012. Breaking Down the Birangona: Examining the (Divided) Media Discourse on the War Heroines of Bangladesh's Independence Movement. *International Journal of Communication* [Online] 6:0. Available: http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/874/787.

Islam, M.M.A., 1971, 'Allah'r pauthe jihad' (Jihad in the path of Allah), *Dainik Sangram* 9 August, p. 2.

Islam, M.M.N., 1971, 'Bharater mayakanna: bibeker ekti jigyasha' (India's crocodile tears: a question of conscience), *Dainik Sangram* 26 October, p. 2.

Islam, M.M.N., 1971, 'Bharater mayakanna: bibeker ekti jigyasha' (India's crocodile tears: a question to conscience), *Dainik Sangram* 27 October, p. 2.

Ismail, S., 2006. *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism*. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Jahan, R., 1977. *Pakistan: failure in national integration*. Dacca: Oxford University Press.

Jefferis, J.L., 2010. *Religion and Political Violence: Sacred protest in the modern world*. London and New York: Routledge.

Jorgensen, M., and Phillips, L.J., 2002. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: Sage.

Kabeer, N., 2011. The Quest for National Identity: Women, Islam and the State in Bangladesh. In Kamla Visweswaran (ed) *Perspectives on Modern South Asia: A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp-139-153.

Kadduri, M., 1971, 'Islam er drishtite shanti o juddho' (Peace and war in the eyes of Islam), *Dainik Sangram* 30 September, p. 2.

Kaposy, T. and Szeman, I. (eds), 2011. *Cultural Theory: An anthology*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Keller, R., 2013. *Doing Discourse Research: An introduction for social scientists*. London: Sage.

Kelly, L., 2000. Wars against women: Sexual violence, sexual politics and the militarised state. In S. Jacobs, R. Jacobson, & J. Marchbank (Eds.), *States of conflict: Gender, violence and resistance.* London: Zed Books, pp. 45–65.

Khaleque, H.A., 1971, 'Fascibadi Bharater doroder shorup' (The true face of fascist India's sympathy), *Dainik Sangram* 14 April, p. 2.

Khan, A., 2006. Ethnicity, Islam, and National Identity in Pakistan. In Asim Roy (ed) *Islam in History and Politics: Perspectives from South Asia*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 181-197.

Khan, D.G.A., 1985. *Disintegration of Pakistan*. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan.

Khosravinik, M., 2015. *Discourse, Identity and Legitimacy: Self and Other in representations of Iran's nuclear programme*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Kia, M., 1998. Persian Nationalism and the Campaign for Language Purification, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 9-36.

King, R., 2007. The association of 'religion' with violence: Reflections on a modern trope. In John R. Hinnels and Richard King (eds) *Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 226-257.

Kismati, Z.A., 1971, 'Muslim jahan bibhranto haubena' (The Muslim world will not be confused), *Dainik Sangram* 23 May, p. 2.

Langman, L., 2006. The Social Psychology of Nationalism: To Die for the Sake of Strangers. In Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (ed) *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications, 66-83.

Lessinger, J.M., 2003. "Religious" violence in India: Ayodhya and the Hindu right. In R. Brian Ferguson (ed) *The State, Identity and Violence: Political disintegration in the post-Cold War world.* London: Routledge, 149-176.

Lindlof, T.R. and Taylor, B.C., eds, 2011. *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*. 3rd edn. London: Sage.

Linke, U. and Smith, T.S., 2009. Intimacies of Suffering: Introduction. In Uli Linke and Daniel Taana Smith (eds) *Cultures of Fear: A critical reader*. New York: Pluto Press, pp. 219-221.

Lincoln, B., 2003. *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11*. 2nd edn. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Macdonnell, D., 1986. *Theories of Discourse*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Manik, J.A., 2009. Abuse of religion: old tricks at play. *The Daily Star*, 26 Mar. p. 1.

Marranci, G., 2009. *Understanding Muslim Identity: Rethinking Fundamentalism*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Masalha, N., 2012. *The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising history, narrating the subaltern, reclaiming memory*. London: Zed Books.

Matar, D., 2008. The Power of Conviction: Nassrallah's Rhetoric and Mediated Charisma in the Context of the 2006 July War, *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication.* 1 (2008), pp. 122-137.

Matheson, D., 2005. *Media Discourses: Analysing media texts*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Matlib, M.A., 1971, 'Deshrokkha o jubosamaj' (National defence and the youth), *Dainik Sangram* 31 October, p. 2.

Maududi, S.A.A., 1971a, 'Akranto hole jihad farz hoye jabe' (If attacked, jihad will become farz), *Dainik Sangram* 29 November, p. 2.

Maududi, S.A.A., 1971b, 'Akranto hole jihad farz hoye jabe' (If attacked, jihad will become farz), *Dainik Sangram* 30 November, p. 2.

McHoul, A. and Grace, W., 2002. *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, power and the subject*. London: Routledge.

Merriman, S.A., 2009. *Religion and the State: An international analysis of roles and relationships.* Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC.

Mohaiemen, N., 2011. Flying Blind: Waiting for a Real Reckoning on 1971. *Economic and Political Weekly*. Vol. XLVI (36).

Mookherjee, N., 2006. Remembering to Forget: Public Secrecy and Memory of Sexual Violence in Bangladesh. *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute (JRAI)*, 12(2), pp. 433-450.

Mookherjee, N., 2002. *'A Lot of History': Sexual Violence, Public Memories and the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.* Ph. D. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Morshed, S.M., 1971, 'Pakistani jatiyotabaader bhitti' (The foundation of Pakistani nationalism), *Dainik Sangram* 22 June, p. 2.

Murshid, T.M., 1995. *The Sacred and the Secular: Bengal Muslim Discourses, 1871-1977*. Calcutta: Oxford University Press.

Murshid, T.M., 1993. Bangladesh: The challenge of democracy – language, culture and political identity, *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 67-73.

Muhammad, K.D., 1971, 'Jatiyo oikyo' (National unity), *Dainik Sangram* 2 July, p. 5.

Mujahid, 1971a, 'Itihash kautha baulo' (History, speak), *Dainik Sangram* 17 July, p. 2.

Mujahid, 1971b, 'Austrer biruddhe austro – jukti noy' (Weapon against weapon – not logic), *Dainik Sangram* 15 September, p. 3.

Nanji, A., 2008. *Dictionary of Islam*. London: Penguin Books.

Nesarabadi, M.A.R., 1971, 'Bortomon poristhitite amader kortobyo' (Our duty under the current circumstances), *Dainik Sangram* 2 August, p. 2.

Netton, I.R., 1997. *A Popular Dictionary of Islam.* Surrey: Curzon Press.

Niazi, Z., 2010. *The Press in Chains*. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nizami, A.K., 1971, 'Azaadir toron' (The gateway to freedom), *Dainik Sangram* 22 August, p. 2.

Oldenburg, P., 1985. "A Place Insufficiently Imagined": Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971. *The Association for Asian Studies*, 44(4), pp. 711-733.

Ozkirimli, U., 2010. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. 2nd edn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Paltridge, B., 2012. *Discourse Analysis*. London: Bloomsbury.

Pettigrew, J., (ed). 1997. *Martyrdom and Political Resistance: Essays from Asia and Europe*. Amsterdam: VU University Press.

Philpott, N., 2007. Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 3, pp. 505-525.

Portelli, A., 1998. What Makes Oral History Different. In Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (eds) *The Oral History Reader*. 2nd edn. London: Routledge, pp. 32-42.

Pothik, 1971, 'Sanskritik khetre onuprobesh' (Cultural invasion), *Dainik Sangram* 26 August, p. 2.

Rahee, 1971a, 'Training camp theke polayon' (Escaping from the training camp), *Dainik Sangram* 10 October, p. 2.

Rahee, 1971b, 'Boishomyo durikoron theke Hindukoron andolon' (From removing discrimination to the Hinduisation movement), *Dainik Sangram* 23 May, p. 2.

Rahman, K.H., 1971, 'Shamprotik sankater potobhumi' (The context of the current crisis), *Dainik Sangram* 18 October, p. 2.

Raihan, Ibne 1971a, 'Arabder bhrantite Bangali Musolman' (Bangali Muslims confused like the Arabs), *Dainik Sangram* 8 July, p. 2.

Raihan, Ibne 1971b, 'Arabder bhrantite Bangali Musolman' (Bangali Muslims confused like the Arabs), *Dainik Sangram* 9 July, p. 2.

Rao, A., Bock, M., Schneider, K. and Schnegg, M., 2007. 'Virtual' Discourse and the Creation and Disruption of Social Networks: Observations on the War in Kashmir in Cyberspace. In Aparna Rao, Michael Bollig and Monika Bock (eds) *The Practice of War: Production, reproduction and communication of armed violence*. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 253-284.

Rastbaj, 1971a, 'Tikto holeo shotto' (Bitter but true), *Dainik Sangram* 6 May, p. 2.

Rastbaj, 1971b, 'Jukto nirbachoner aupor naam "Joy Bangla"-"Jai Hind"' (The other name of joint polls "Victory to Bengal-Victory to India"), *Dainik Sangram* 24 June, p. 2.

Rastbaj, 1971c, 'Tikto holeo shotto' (Bitter but true), *Dainik Sangram* 22 October, p. 2.

Riaz, A., 2010. The politics of Islamization in Bangladesh. In Ali Riaz (ed) *Religion and Poitics in South Asia.* Oxon: Routledge, pp. 45-70.

Riaz, A., 2003. "God Willing": The Politics and Ideology of Islamism in Bangladesh, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. Vol. 23, No. 1&2, pp. 301-320.

Riaz, A., 2002. Nations, Nation-state and the Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. Vol. 22, No. 1&2, pp. 53-58.

Riches, D. (ed), 1986. *The Anthropology of Violence*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Roy, A., 2006. Salience of Islam in South Asian Politics. In Asim Roy (ed) *Islam in History and Politics: Perspectives from South Asia*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 212-224.

Sadek, H., 1971a. 'Sanskritir shongkot mukti' (Freedom from the crisis of culture) *Dainik Sangram* 13 June, p. 4.

Sadek, H., 1971b. 'Sanskritir shongkot mukti' (Freedom from the crisis of culture) *Dainik Sangram* 4 July, p. 4.

Sadek, H., 1971c. 'Sanskritir shongkot mukti' (Freedom from the crisis of culture) *Dainik Sangram* 11 July, p. 4.

Saigol, R., 1995. *Knowledge and Identity – Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan*. Lahore: ASR.

Saikia, Y., 2013. War as History, Humanity in Violence: Men, Women, and Memories of 1971, East Pakistan/Bangladesh. In Elizabeth D. Heineman (ed) *Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones: From the Ancient World to the Era of Human Rights*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 152-169.

Saikia, Y., 2011. *Women, War, and the Making of Bangladesh*. Durham: Duka University Press.

Sajjad, T., 2009. The post-genocidal period and its impact on women. In S. Totten (Ed.), *Plight and fate of women during and following genocide*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, pp. 219-233.

Schroder, I.W. and Schmidt, B.E., 2001. *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*. London: Routledge.

Sen, A., 2006. *Identity and Violence*. London: Allen Lane.

Shafiullah, M., 1971, 'Amader protibeshir manosh' (The mentality of our neighbours), *Dainik Sangram* 18 May, p. 2.

Sharlach, L., 2000. Rape as genocide: Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. *New Political Science*, *22*(1), pp. 89–102.

Sharif, A., Nur Uz-Zaman, Q., Chowdhury, S. I., and Kabir, S. (eds), 1998. *Genocide '71: An Account of the Killers and Collaborators*. Dhaka: Muktijuddha Chetana Bikash Kendra.

Sidel, J., 2006. *Riots, pogroms, jihad: religious violence in Indonesia.* Cornell University Press: Ithaca.

Sifatullah, M., 1971, 'Amader azzadi sangram o jatiyo oitijyo' (Our independence movement and national tradition), *Dainik Sangram* 14 August, supplement p. 2.

Sikand, Y., 2007. Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Laskar-e Taiba. In Aparna Rao, Michael Bollig and Monika Bock (eds) *The Practice of War: Production, reproduction and communication of armed violence*. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 215-240.

Smith, A.D., 2009. Hierarchy and Covenant in the Formation of Nations. *Holy Nations and Global Identities: civil religion, nationalism and globalisation*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 21-46.

Smith, A.D., 2006. Ethnicity and Nationalism. In Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (ed) *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications, 169-181.

Smith, A.D., 2003. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. and Mohammadi, A., 1994. *Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, culture, and the Iranian Revolution.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Steinmetz, W., 2012. New Perspectives on the Study of Language and Power in the Short Twentieth Century. In Willibald Steinmetz (ed) *Political Languages in the Age of Extremes*, pp. 3-52.

Taher, M.A., 1971, 'Pakistan amader' (Pakistan is ours), *Dainik Sangram* 18 March, p. 2.

Talbot, M., 2007. *Media Discourse: Representation and Interpretation*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Thompson, H.R., 2007. Bangladesh. In Andrew Simpson (ed) *Language and National Identity in Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Toft, M.D., 2007. Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War, *International Security*. 30 (Spring), pp. 97-131.

Uddin, S.M., 2006. *Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity, and Language in an Islamic Nation*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

van Dijk, T.A., 1998. Opinions and Ideologies in the Press. In Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (eds) *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 21-63.

van Schendel, W., 2009. *A History of Bangladesh*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Velikonja, M., 1998. Liberation Mythology: The role of mythology in fanning war in the Balkans. In Paul Mojzes (ed) *Religion and the War in Bosnia*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Watson, J., 2003. *Media Communication: an introduction to theory and process*. 2nd edn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wickham, C.R., 2002. *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, activism, and political change in Egypt*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wodak, R., 2011. Suppression of the Nazi Past, Coded Languages, and Discourses of Silence: Applying the Discourse-Historical Approach to Post-War Anti-Semitism in Austria. In Willibald Steinmetz (ed) *Political Languages in the Age of Extremes*, pp. 351-380.

Wodak, R. et al. 2009. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. 2nd edn. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Wood, E.J., 2009. War and Sexual Violence. In Uli Linke and Daniel Taana Smith (eds) *Cultures of Fear: A critical reader*. New York: Pluto Press, pp. 222-236.

Woodward, K., 2002. Introduction and Concepts of Identity and Difference. In Woodward (ed) *Identity and Difference*. London: Sage, pp. 1-61.

Woollacott, M., 2011. Dead Reckoning by Sarmila Bose – review. *The Guardian* [Online] 1 July. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jul/01/dead-reckoning-sarmila-bose-review#start-of-comments. [Accessed 05 April 2014].

Wright, S., 2009. Martyrs and Martial Imagery: Exploring the Volatile Link Between Warfare Frames and Religious Violence. In Madawi Al-Rasheed and Marat Shterin (eds) *Dying for Faith: Religiously Motivated Violence in the Contemporary World*. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 17-26.

Yuval-Davis, N., 1998. Gender and nation. In Rick Wilford and Robert L. Miller (eds) *Women, Ethnicity and Nationalism*. London: Routledge, pp. 23-35.

Zahab, M.A., 2007. 'I Shall be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise': The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure). In Aparna Rao, Michael Bollig and Monika Bock (eds) *The Practice of War: Production, reproduction and communication of armed violence*. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 133-160.

Zelizer, B., 1989. 'Saying as Collective Practice: Quoting and differential address in the news. *Text & Talk*. 9(4), pp. 369-388.

APPENDIX

Advertisements published in the daily *Dawn* in December 1971

















APPENDIX

Sample News Reports Scanned from *Dainik Sangram* and *Dainik Pakistan* newspapers

মনিরামপুরে 'মুক্তিসেনা' কৃষ্ণপদ ঋষি গ্রেফতার

বীর রেজাকারদের হাতে ১২ জন ভারতীয় চর খতম ঃ ২ জন বন্দী

মনিরামপুর (যশোর), ১৫ই সেপ্টেম্বর।—সম্প্রতি স্থানীয় রেজাকার বাহিনীর জওয়ানরা এক অভিযান চালিয়ে একজন ভারতীয় চরকে হত্যা ও কৃষ্ণপদ ঋষি নামক একজন চরকে গ্রেফতার করেছেন। এই অভিযানে রেজাকাররা বিপুল পরিমাণ অস্ত্রশস্ত্রও দখল করেছেন। এসব অস্ত্রশস্ত্রের মধ্যে রয়েছে দুটি ...

দুষ্কৃতীকারীদের তৎপরতায় উদ্বেগ প্রকাশ

প্রেসিডেন্ট কর্তৃক সাধারণ ক্ষমা ঘোষণার পর বিভিন্ন স্থানে দুষ্কৃতিকারীদের আস্পর্ধা বেড়ে যাওয়ায় ফরিদাবাদ রিচার্স একাডেমীর মওলানা মোহাম্মদ হারুন বিশেষ উদ্বেগ প্রকাশ করেছেন। ...

12 Indian spies killed at the hands of heroic rezakars, 2 captured – *Dainik Sangram*, 17 September 1971

জুমাতুল বিদা পালিত

পাকিস্তানের ঐক্য ও সংহতির জন্য বিশেষ মোনাজাত

স্টাফ রিপোর্টার

গতকাল শুক্রবার ঢাকাসহ প্রদেশের সর্বত্র যথাযোগ্য মর্যাদার সাথে জুমাতুল বিদা পালন করা হয়। জুমার নামাজের পর সকল মসজিদে পাকিস্তানের ঐক্য ও সংহতি এবং ইসলাম ও মুসলিম বিশ্বের গৌরবের জন্যে বিশেষ মোনাজাত করা হয়।

গতকাল ঢাকা শহরের সকল মসজিদেই জুমার নামাজে মুসল্লীদের ভিড় হয়। মসজিদে অধিকসংখ্যক মুসল্লীদের জন্যে স্থান সংকুলানের ব্যবস্থা পূর্ব থেকেই করা হয়েছিল।

জুমাতুল বিদা দিবসে গতকাল শহরের সবচেয়ে বড় জামাত হয়েছে বায়তুল মোকাররমে। অপ্রীতিকর কোন ঘটনা যাতে না ঘটে তার জন্যে বায়তুল মোকাররম মসজিদে বিশেষ নিরাপত্তামূলক ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করা (৬-এর পৃঃ ৮-এর কঃ দ্রঃ)

জুমাতুল বিদার নামাজের পর মোনাজাত —দৈনিক পাকিস্তান

'বাংলাদেশ' মিশনের অর্থ সংগ্রহের উৎস

রাওয়ালপিন্ডি, ১৯শে নবেম্বর (এপিপি)।—তথাকথিত 'বাংলাদেশ' মিশনের একজন প্রভাবশালী সদস্য পূর্ব পাকিস্তানের বিশ্ববিখ্যাত বিদ্রোহীদের বিপুল পরিমাণ অর্থ সংগ্রহের কৌশল ও তা কোথায় রাখা হয় তা প্রকাশ করেছেন।

ইউরোপস্থ সংবাদদাতা প্রেরিত ও একটি জাতীয় দৈনিকে প্রকাশিত এক খবরে উপরোক্ত তথ্য জানা গেছে।

এই সদস্য জানিয়েছেন যে বাংলাদেশ মিশন বিপুল পরিমাণ অর্থ সংগ্রহ করেছে এবং প্রতি সপ্তাহে সংগৃহীত অর্থের পরিমাণ হচ্ছে আড়াই লাখ পাউন্ড।

যুক্তরাজ্যে যে অর্থ সংগৃহীত হচ্ছে তার পরিমাণ প্রায় ৩৯ হাজার পাউন্ড। কুয়েত ও উপসাগরীয় এলাকার বিভিন্ন দেশে কর্মরত পূর্ব পাকিস্তানীরা প্রথম দিকে যে অর্থ পাঠাতেন, এ অর্থের পরিমাণ তার অর্ধেক হবে।

এই অর্থ লন্ডনের হামব্রোজ ব্যাংক, ব্যাংক অব ইংল্যান্ড ও লন্ডনের অন্যান্য প্রধান প্রধান ব্যাংকে জমা রাখা হয়েছে। এই ব্যাংকগুলো 'বাংলাদেশের' নামে একাউন্ট খুলতে অস্বীকৃতি জানায়। ব্যাংকের একাউন্ট জনাব আবু সাঈদ চৌধুরী, (৬-এর পৃঃ ৩-এর কঃ দ্রঃ)

আটক ব্যক্তিদের কয়েকজন অপরাধ স্বীকার করেছে

নাম প্রকাশ করুনঃ নুরুল আমীনের প্রতি

Prayers for Pakistan's unity and solidarity – *Dainik Pakistan*, 20 November 1971

APPENDIX

Sample Excel Worksheet of Coded Empirical Findings – *Dainik Sangram*

Newspaper	Date	Pg.	Genre	Headline	Author	Notes/Translated excerpts	Theme
Dainik Sangram	05.10.71	1	News	Shashontontro toiri na howa porjonto khomota hostantorer proshno othena: Mia Tofael		Mia Tofael Muhammad said, the country is currently going through a test, that's why, those who believe in Islam and Pakistan, their responsibility is to dedicate themselves to the country's security and okhondota.	Islam and Pakistan
Dainik Sangram	05.10.71	2	Editorial	**Juddhoi ekmatro shomadhan**		War is the only solution. The victory of Muslims does not depend on numbers and arms but on imaan . It is our belief that	Victory of Muslims not from numbers and arms but imaan, jihad, war Is the solution
Dainik Sangram	05.10.71	2	Post-ed	Musolman mrityunjoyi	Md. Tajammul Hossein	Muslims especially don't think death is harmful, they are always prepared for death, they desire death by martyrdom, there are many who buy kafoner clothes from before... Stupid jotthechhachar fascists do not understand there is no use in trying to scare such Muslims (who buy their kafoner clothes from before like the old man cited). Muslims	Muslims want martyrdom
Dainik Sangram	07.10.71	1	News	Islamabad Biswabidyaloy udbodhonkale president - Torun shomajer shamne			
Dainik Sangram	07.10.71	2	Editorial	Rejakar o deshpremikder dayitto		Those patriotic people who are hiding from fear of the miscreants or are in sontrosto situation, in order to defend themselves and to fight the challenge to the country from internal and external enemies should come forward with jihadi inspiration. If not, under the current circumstances of the country, their boishoik, ethical and religious	Jihad is duty

Sample Excel Worksheet of Coded Empirical Findings – *Dainik Pakistan*

Dainik Pakistan	02.12.71	1	News	Sylheter janoshobhae - Shesh roktobindu diye matribhumi rokkhar shongkolpo		Slogan - down with Hindu expansionism. General Niazi said, not only our own country but we have the support and sympathy of the whole Muslim world, because **we are warring for Islam.**	Slogan, war for Islam
Dainik Pakistan	02.12.71	6	News	Shesh roktobindu diye juddho korbo: Ishak		Maulana Ishak advised the people to be true Muslims and to fight the war with their last drop of blood in order to defend the land's marjada and independence. He reminded of the tradition/heritage (oitijhyo) of Muslims during times of war and said **if we fight selflessly in the name of Allah we will be able to defend that tradition and ultimately victory will be ours.**	True Muslims, war with last drop of blood, war in the name of Allah
Dainik Pakistan	08.12.71	2	News	Hindusthan shorbodai pororajyo dokholer bikrito chintae attoniyojito		New expression of old Brahmin policy... Hindu puran is full of examples of how the so-called powerful gods forced others to give in to their probhutto. This is not only in religion but in everyday life one class of Hindus used to deprive the others. Hindu society was very isolated and divided. No sacrifice will be considered too great to defend Pakistan the homeland of Muslims.	Old Brahmin policy, no sacrifice too great for Pakistan homeland of Muslims
Dainik Pakistan	08.12.71	4	News	Dhaka ... shobhae - Matribhumi rokkhae shorboshokti niyoger aobhan		All of Pakistan, especially the people of East Pakistan, called upon to eliminate the attackers and defend Pakistan's holy land. **People should be inspired by jihad to defend Islam's largest durgo. With Allah's grace the soldiers of Islam will gain victory against devilish (shaytani) forces.**	Pakistan's holy land, jihad, Islam's largest durgo, soldiers of Islam will gain victory agains devilish forces
Dainik Pakistan	08.12.71	4	News	Pakistaner adorsho o orthonoitik kathamo okkhunno rakhun: Nawazish Ahmed		Nawazish Ahmed talked about the pre-independence days and described the woes of the Muslims. Muslims were socially and economically persecuted by the majority Hindus. In jobs and other professions Muslims had no future. It was for the honour of Muslims and status of their existence/identity and economic and socio-political necessity that Pakistan was created.	Muslim persecution by Hindus pre-independence