Creating a state: a Kleinian reading of recognition in Zimbabwe's regional relationships

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Abstract

This article contributes to recent debates about mutual recognition between states, and more broadly to discussions of the role of emotion in IR. It challenges ‘moral claims’ made in some of the literature that inter-state recognition leads to a progressive erosion of difference or a pooling of identity; and underlying assumptions that recognition constitutes a stage in the development of states that have already established internal coherence. Instead it claims that processes of recognition are fractious and unstable, characterised by aggression and self-assertion as well as affection and the creation of a ‘we-feeling’; and that such processes are an enduring feature of state identity. Using the case of Zimbabwe – a state that is clearly fractured, with an apparently insecure collective identity – the article explores how recognition both challenges and reinforces state selfhood through dynamics that are bumpy, intense and unstable. It moves on to develop a theoretical interpretation of these dynamics drawing on the work of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, showing links between individual psychic anxiety and collective needs for a state that exists uneasily but inextricably in relation to others. The article concludes that international recognition works as a way both to establish and challenge state coherence.

Key words: statehood, recognition, object relations theory, Melanie Klein, Zimbabwe
Introduction

Recognition – an idea adopted from Hegel – is understood as a way for members of a group to establish collective selfhood through their relation to, and difference from, other groups. In IR, recognition has been discussed in terms of formal, legal arrangements that confer statehood or group rights. But it has also been brought into IR as part of the ‘affective turn’, as a way to explore how emotional wellbeing is secured through collective identities. This article makes a contribution to this second use of recognition by exploring the way in which statehood becomes meaningful through the emotional attachments of citizens between each other and their state, through relations to the communities and states around them.

Notes

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This branch of the literature focuses on the mechanics of recognition between states (Fabry, 2010, 2013; Reus-Smit, 2011). This focus fits more closely into wider IR work on sovereignty (Jackson, 1993, for example) and international society (Bull, 2002; Buzan, 2004; Clark, 2005; Watson, 2009).

On the ‘affective turn’ in IR see Crawford, 2000; Ross, 2006; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; Mercer, 2010.
Specifically, the article challenges the ‘moral claims’ made in some of the literature that recognition between states leads to a gradual erosion of difference. It argues that recognition is fractious and unstable, built on a dialectic between desires for oneness and separation. Because of this, recognition brings about a sense of identity that is ambiguous and complex, rather than certain and assertive. In making these arguments, I challenge progressivist understandings of recognition that suggest that it can or is somehow driving the world towards more peaceful relations between states or a postmodern pooling of sovereignty.

I begin my argument with a discussion of state subjectivity in Zimbabwe, partly to underscore my rejection of the progressivist argument. Like others in Africa, Zimbabwe is a relatively new, post-colonial country seeking to develop coherence and construct a community. In recognition terminology, it is a country trying to establish a collective subjectivity – a ‘we-feeling’ – in relation to external others. This is a challenge because, as in many post-colonial states, Zimbabweans have relatively shallow attachments to the country, seeing their identities in terms of smaller ethnic groupings, or wider regional ones. As Vale (2003) argues, states in southern Africa are foreign creations, and have a weak hold on people who, in pre-colonial times, moved freely about the region. Today, languages and cultures straddle state-boundaries rather than fitting neatly within them.

Zimbabwe might appear an odd place to start, as it seems to be pulling in the opposite direction to a substantial strand in recognition literature which takes state identity as already firmly defined, and looks beyond it to trends that erode
boundaries through recognition between different state-communities. In this approach, recognition within states has already brought about collective identity – a ‘we-feeling’. Now, driven by inter-state conflict and a further desire for recognition, established societies look beyond themselves for recognition from other groups. Such recognition promotes elements of shared identity between groups, widening the ‘we-feeling’. For Strombom (2014), such processes might resolve conflictual relationships, or deepen ties and solidarity between states; for Wendt (2003), this is the route to a Weberian-style world state.

This suggests a situation in which some countries are trying to dissociate from their neighbours in order to establish a stronger state-centred identity, while others are trying to dissolve boundaries and forge closer connections with their neighbours. It could be a description of a world populated by different forms of state. Cooper’s (2003) typology, for example, sets up distinctions between pre-modern, modern and post-modern states: the first (most African countries) without much empirical sovereignty; the second (the newly-emerging economies) jealously protecting and asserting their sovereignty; and the third (mainly European countries) prepared to pool sovereignty to create transnational organisations that enhance security, further economic growth and entrench shared values.

In theoretical terms, the differences between these types and their international relationships can be understood through ideas about negation and recognition that draw on Hegel. For states in search of sovereignty and selfhood,
mechanisms of negation are employed in order to create and entrench difference. Negation is the tendency to project nastiness, inexplicability and chaos onto others in the international system in order to cement internal goodness, clarity and coherence. Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe’s demonisation of Tony Blair and Britain in the early 2000s might be viewed in such terms: descriptions of the ‘British monster’, the ‘unnatural practices’ of Blair’s cabinet, the way in which Blair himself revived the ‘spirit of Cecil Rhodes’ were contrasted with a narrative of a heroic patriotic nationalism at home (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Tendi, 2010).

In contrast, for states that are apparently certain of themselves, international relations are often described in terms of a struggle for recognition which, even if initially violent, establishes a mutuality which creates and embeds a collective identification, potentially erasing difference. Recognition in international relations, according to Honneth (2012), is about involvement in the affairs of another, moves towards a firmer sense of a collective. The European Union with its pooling of sovereignty on economic, legal and social areas is an exemplar.

My argument is that these are not distinct processes, each belonging to a different type of state or even a different type of relationship. Both moves to differentiate from, and identify with, other groups are inherent to struggles for and experiences of recognition between states – and they are found within different ‘types’ of state. Because they are new, because collective selfhoods are uncertain and in flux, with tensions and anxieties much closer to the surface,
African states are particularly active in their search for a sense of self and other. However, they are not exceptional in how or why they do it. An African example therefore is instructive for an exploration of state subjectivity more generally.

The theoretical basis of my argument is a Kleinian interpretation of Hegel. Here I am contributing to a tradition of reading Hegel through psychoanalytic theory (see for example Fanon, 1986; Honneth, 1995; Kojève, 1996; Benjamin, 1996; Zizek, 1989), extending it by introducing it to the object-relations theory of Melanie Klein. She suggests that individual egos develop through relationships, and she stresses the ambivalence of such processes in a way that complements Hegel’s ideas about negation and recognition. Klein’s work thus provides a theoretical underpinning for how relationships reify the individual who realises herself through the projection of internal onto external objects, and through their reintrojection. In a process of piecing together objects, and differentiating between the internal and external worlds, the individual develops mature relationships. However, these are complex, bringing ambiguity rather than clarity, and engender an acknowledgement of division rather than a dispersal of it. For Klein, mature relationships establish a sense of the separation and mutual dependence of self and other; but they do so in a partial, fractured and unstable way. This makes Klein’s theory a fascinating and compelling basis for understanding why groups underwrite individual wellbeing and how they do so through differentiation from other groups. For IR scholars, it provides rich potential insights into inter-state relationships.
Building on the case of Zimbabwe and the theory of Klein, I draw conclusions about international relationships of recognition. This account of recognition, built on empirical and theoretical foundations, leads me to refute both the ‘moral claims’ made for them by Wendt, Strombom and others, and realist or communitarian arguments about the predominantly conflictual nature of international relationships. I argue instead that relationships between states are both constructive and destructive. Through often turbulent and unstable relationships, states are able to establish and maintain a sense of subjectivity.

In arguing against the ‘moral claims’ made for recognition I am not making a claim to be normatively neutral. My argument rests on those of Hegel and Klein who both make normative claims about individual fulfilment achieved through relationships of recognition. For Hegel these are ‘ethical’ and for Klein they are ‘mature’. Individuals become more fully realised in such relationships, and therefore they are to be seen as richer than relationships that rest purely on negation or projection. In IR terms, as Honneth argues, individual wellbeing is enhanced by international relationships of recognition which help people develop a heightened sense of themselves. In my argument, there is also a benefit to the collective understanding of the community within which a more complex and ambiguous sense of self is fostered through recognition of and by other communities. Relationships of recognition are therefore to be viewed as a ‘good thing’. However, the normative angle is limited in the sense that such relationships cannot be engineered, and where they do exist, they remain unstable and full of tensions. They therefore do not necessarily bring some of the
material benefits claimed for them, such as peace, as Abizadeh (2005), Wolf (2011) and Strombom (2014) suggest.

**Recognition and IR**

In a time-honoured IR tradition, theorising on the struggle for recognition draws analogies between the subjectivity of individuals and the subjectivity of states. However, it begins from a critique of the realist assumption that interests are the primary drivers of international relations, making the case that an emotional need to be recognised – emanating from political elites and/or addressing popular pressures – can explain state behaviour (Lebow, 2010; Lindemann, 2013). Just as relationships between individuals enable each to explore and establish themselves through their encounters with others, states in the state-system follow similar processes. This understanding is based on the Hegelian notion that the creation of selfhood is dependent on the ability to grasp the reality of a separate other. It is closely tied to literatures on identity in IR, the claim made being that state identity is relational and evolves, and that states' drive for selfhood gives rise to aggressive struggles for recognition by others (Agne, 2013; Lindemann, 2012). Greenhill puts it this way: ‘recognition matters to international politics because it represents the process through which actors come to exist as actors within the international system and take on a particular identity within that system’ (Greenhill, 2008: 344). So, recognition confers statehood, establishes a basis for identity and thus fulfils a fundamental human need.
Hegel himself denied the possibility of substantial relationships of recognition between states. As Williams explains, for Hegel the key difference between free individuals and sovereign states-as-individuals is that the former comes into being only through recognition, whereas for the latter, sovereignty already exists and the state later turns outwards to look for recognition – a thinner form he calls negation which entails a positing of the otherness, the strangeness and difference of other states, defined essentially against or in opposition to the self. Sovereignty is rooted in internal coherence, the recognition of individuals within and with the state (Williams, 1997: 349). It depends only on its content, ‘its constitution and [present conditions]’, in other words, the state as a unit is real by virtue of its internal mechanisms; it is largely self-sufficient (Hegel, 1991: 367).

However Honneth, who has played a key role in explaining and building on Hegel, makes the case for the importance of recognition between states. He argues that there is a common desire for recognition within nations – as in any group – and that citizens’ wellbeing depends upon it. The population desires that its selfhood is recognised by other states and peoples, ‘the challenges it has overcome in the past, its power to resist authoritarian tendencies, its cultural achievements’ (2012: 142). For Honneth it is the job of the state to elicit international recognition, which it does symbolically or indirectly, and it does so not simply by projecting itself, but also by recognising other states, occasionally
even by making reparations for historical wrongs (2012: 144). All state actors do this, he suggests, because it is part of the way they shore up internal legitimacy.

Honneth distinguishes between Hegelian negation and real recognition in his comparison of nationalism and the desire for recognition which is ‘fundamentally directed towards the involvement, and not the exclusion, of other states... it neither demonises other peoples nor necessarily praises one’s own democratic constitution’ (2012: 142). It is this involvement that changes the quality of the relationship, acknowledging the idea of mutual shaping and dependence that the Hegelian model denied to international relations. Thus, adding to his largely positive account of recognition – characterised by love, respect and esteem (Honneth, 1995) – comes a rather gentle account of the struggle for it between states.

In a similarly positive understanding of recognition, authors such as Wendt (2003), Abizadeh (2005), Wolf (2011) and Strombom (2014) have discussed the potential for recognition in eventually overcoming difference and thus conflict. It can establish a ‘shared identity’ (Wendt, 2003) or at least a mutual empathy (Strombom, 2014) that, even if begun as a violent struggle, has the potential to establish a better understanding of the other and so of a more harmonious world. This view that recognition can drive the world towards more peaceful outcomes is what Bartelson calls its ‘moral claim’ (2013).
Wendt makes arguably the strongest claim for the transformative potential of struggles for recognition (although his approach is teleological rather than moral). He argues that struggles between individuals, groups and states will gradually transform multiple egoistic identities into larger and larger collective identities. In asserting the differences between individuals and groups recognition ‘paradoxically’ brings about solidarity between them: ‘When recognition is reciprocal, therefore, two Selves in effect become one, a ‘We’ or collective identity’ (Wendt, 2003: 512). As individuals establish mutual recognition they form groups which turn outwards to demand recognition from others. Wendt argues that, driven by technological advances in warfare, and the enduring emotional need for recognition, struggles between groups will establish recognition between them, forming larger groups. Eventually ‘the subjectivity of all individuals and groups [will be] recognized and protected by a global Weberian state’ (Wendt, 2003: 506).

Three significant challenges can be made to moral and progressivist claims for recognition. The first is that in positing the ability of recognition to erode difference and separation in IR, these authors underestimate the extent to which recognition between some groups can only be achieved at the expense of the misrecognition of other groups. This critique has been admirably made by Neumann (1999), Markell (2003) and Bartelson (2013), who argue that an awareness of others beyond the group is necessary for group cohesion and identity – in-group identification needs a sense of an out-group to hold the group together. Thus closer cooperation and recognition within a group of states – the
European Union, for example – relies on the continuing ‘strangeness’ of other parts of the world – the Third World, the Islamic world or Eastern Europe (Bartelson, 2013). This suggests that there are limits to how far recognition can bring about a universal increase in harmonious relations, and provides a serious challenge to Wendt’s view that recognition will eventually establish a Weberian-style ‘world state’.4

The second challenge is that some of the claims made misunderstand the enduring dialectical nature of relationships of recognition and therefore overestimate their stability. This is a key concern of this article. Such relationships are more complex, fluid and problematic than is often assumed, comprising both positive emotions (such as affection, admiration, respect, esteem) and negative ones (such as aggression and competitiveness). Some work has been done in this direction. Greenhill, for example, highlights the cross-cutting nature of groups and identity. Their ability to bind people together is only ‘half the story... Just as recognition of the “other” can be thought to affirm a sense of common identity, so too can we think of it as highlighting the key differences between “self” and “other” – and thereby accentuating their separateness without necessarily invoking any meaningful sense of shared

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4 Wendt partially acknowledges this problem, suggesting the idea of a ‘temporal other’: ‘history becomes the Other in terms of which the global Self is defined’ (2003: 527). Similarly, Abizadeh argues that the lack of an external ‘Other’ can be made up for by mutual recognition between the state’s constituent parts (2005).
identity’ (Greenhill, 2012: 352). Neumann’s account of the work of Bakhtin and Levinas also points to a more complex understanding of otherness within groups (1999). Both Greenhill and Neumann see the ‘we’ created by recognition as at best partial and contested, often at odds with the assertion of individuality and minority-group identities within the wider collective. In other words, the ‘in-group’ is a messy entity, containing internal contradictions as well as a sense of common identity.5

The third challenge, which stems from the first two, is to the inherent sense of progress carried in this literature: in it, world history is tending towards a pooling of identity and an erosion of difference. This echoes a European philosophical tradition – from Aristotle, Rousseau to Mill, Marx and Hegel himself – that explains politics through ideas of historical stages. As Jahn (2005) has argued, such conceptions of progress were built on encounters with ‘primitive’ people beyond Europe who apparently provided examples of early human development. This sense of human development was reinforced in links made between human history and Darwinian evolution. It is an idea that underpins conceptions such as Cooper’s ‘premodern’ states. Here, ‘progress’ is

5 Shilliam (2006) has explored a similar idea in a discussion of the way Hegel’s theory evolved as a response to the French Revolution. Hegel’s ideas about difference, he argues, rested on differences within Europe – between Germanic evolutionary reform and French Revolution – and demonstrate complex and internally ambiguous ideas about in-groups or a European ‘self’.
built on the idea of a European development and history that leaves other parts of the world far behind. However, a closer reading of an example from Africa challenges this idea. Most of Africa’s states came about through external colonial engineering rather than immanent processes. Their search for a sense of selfhood is troubled by these origins, as they attempt to assert selfhood and mutuality with neighbouring countries at the same time. Their experience of struggles for recognition therefore disrupt progressive notions of state formation, challenging the idea of a natural trajectory from state coherence through to a pooling of identity.

In the following section I draw on Zimbabwean experiences to flesh out the second and third of these challenges.

**Zimbabwe’s neighbourly relations**

6 This part of the article draws on extensive qualitative research carried out in Zimbabwe between 2011 and 2014, in which Zimbabweans were asked to talk about their country’s relationship with the people and governments of the countries in the region. The people I interviewed were drawn mainly from residents’ associations, church groups and trade unions. They were from the cities of Harare and Bulawayo, the dormitory cities of Chitungwiza and Old Pumula and the northern rural area of Mashonaland Central. Most were middle class (who were or had been employed in the formal sector) or urban poor (who didn’t finish school and mostly now make a living through petty trading).
In creating their state, Zimbabweans continuously attempt to understand it as both part of the region and individual within it. These attempts are messy and fraught – sometimes mutually reinforcing and sometimes mutually destructive – underlining an ambiguous sense of the state and its others. Like many African countries, Zimbabwe’s borders and state institutions were created, relatively recently, by foreign powers. The country’s population is diverse, comprising groups whose members speak several languages and see themselves as ethnically different, some expressing a close affinity to people on the far side of the country’s borders with whom they share cultural, linguistic and historical ties. Moreover, in recent years, relationships between the Zimbabwean state and large parts of the population have been poor, with state-organised violence, disputed elections, a collapsed economy and extensive emigration. Since 2008 the country has lost many of the signifiers of sovereignty – the national airline is grounded, the national post office and train system are all but defunct and the currency has been suspended (the US Dollar and South African Rand are used instead). After much-disputed elections in 2008, in which violence against supporters of the opposition MDC party forced leader Morgan Tsvangirai to withdraw from the presidential run-off, a government of national unity was engineered by the neighbouring states. Privately, many Zimbabweans are financially reliant on travel and trade in the region and remittances from abroad.

Interviewees were recruited through a snow-balling method, beginning usually with grassroots civil society organisations, and working out to the people they worked with. Names of organisations and individuals have been changed.
Within difficult political and economic conditions at home, and an array of intense and often fraught international relationships, Zimbabwean citizens have developed their own ways of understanding and defining themselves in relation to the rest of the region. As a result, their relationships are complex and ambivalent, resting on a mixture of affection, support, competitiveness and aggression. These express a double and contradictory set of characteristics. On one hand there is a desire to be the same as, to be subsumed in, the other, and this might be viewed as a hangover of pre-state identities, or a reaction to a state that has alienated parts of the population. On the other hand there is a powerful assertion of difference which looks more like the projection or othering found in negation. This shapes powerful attachments to a collective Zimbabwean identity that can encompass state and society as a unit within or against the immediate region. Anxiety accompanies the ambivalence occasioned by these contradictory characteristics, leading the sense of self in relation to other to be tense and unstable.

Finding the self and the other

Since the very early days of independence, Zimbabwe has been characterised by fractures between different groups, largely reflected in their relative proximity to the ruling ZANU(PF) party (Muzondidya, 2009). Geographically, those living on the edges of the country – particularly the largely Ndebele populations in the
southern and western, and the people living in the far east of the country – have felt
least connected to and represented by the Shona-dominated ZANU(PF)
government which has attempted to define Zimbabwean identity around a patriotic
history rooted in Shona myth and culture (Ranger, 2004).

People living in different parts of the country relate to neighbouring countries in
different ways. Many Ndebele people are liable to express a strong sense of
connection with South Africa. They emphasise the common history, language and
culture they share with Zulus, coupled with their persecution and exclusion by
the Shona-led government, and argue that this has led many Ndebele-speaking
Zimbabweans to claim South Africa as their ‘real’ home. People will talk of feeling
‘comfortable’ in South Africa, of it being like a ‘second home’, where people ‘are
more like our family than people from Mashonaland’. They say: ‘In South Africa I
can speak Ndebele freely, more than in Zimbabwe where I am forced to speak
Shona… When we go there, we are not Zimbabweans.’

This very idealised sense of the connection of Ndebele Zimbabweans to South Africa suggests an
eradication of difference altogether.

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7 Civil society activist, Bulawayo, 27 May 2012.

8 Sometimes people admit that this is a fantasy. One civil society activist based in
Bulawayo told me: ‘People in Matabeleland often do idealise South Africa – but
they get a shock when they go there.’ Interview, 11 November 2013
However, equally strong feelings of aggression and competitiveness also shape Ndebele understandings of their relationship with South Africa. People are just as keen to detail the differences and tensions between Zimbabweans and their neighbours. For example, Zimbabweans talk about the way in which the neighbours watch, profit from, and even enjoy, their declining fortunes. Here, competition seems a zero-sum-game: as people migrate and Zimbabwe empties, the neighbours fill themselves up. This competition depletes Zimbabweans’ sense of self. It cannot be shared because of difference: there is no ‘we-feeling’ to be gained as a result of this migration. Only the other gains. In a discussion with a group of religious leaders in Bulawayo – a group that had expressed feelings of comfort and fit in South Africa moments before – the attitude of the surrounding governments and people was described as one of reaping the benefits of Zimbabwe’s decline:

They are buying time to use our people as cheap labour. They benefit from Zimbabwe’s problems. Zimbabweans are hard workers and well-educated. The most successful companies in South Africa and Botswana are run by Zimbabweans. Even Mozambique and Zambia are being changed by Zimbabweans. Yes, they are getting the cream of our people who are running away. And also, we support their industry, and we buy from them. Our people are going [to South Africa] to teach. All our schools are brain-drained because many of our best people go, even to Malawi. We train [them] and they go.
Maybe the neighbouring countries are taking our situation as a case study.

We’re like a sacrificial sheep for the civilisation of Africa.⁹

The inconsistency in this group’s approach to South Africa could be viewed as an appreciation of the difference between the experience of individuals and the wider effects on Zimbabwe. Even if an individual can be subsumed by South Africa – looking and feeling South African while living in Johannesburg – and the homes of their families can benefit from the remittances they send, the wider Zimbabwean collective is depleted by this abandonment. Well-kept individual homes are still surrounded by a fragile and failing public infrastructure; individual incomes are enhanced at the expense of Zimbabwean industries and schools. It conveys an ambivalence about Zimbabwe’s relation to the wider region: themselves sometimes an inseparable part of South Africa, and sometimes in danger of losing possession of a Zimbabwean coherence through their submersion.

In other parts of the country Zimbabweans have less heightened attachments to neighbours, although they too express ambivalence. People talk with gratitude about the understanding and sympathy offered by Africans throughout the region: people understand the painful situations many Zimbabweans experience, often because they have been through similar experiences of political repression

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⁹ Group of religious leaders, Bulawayo, 29 May 2012
or economic deprivation. Such empathy is seen in the acceptance that Zimbabweans need to live and work in South Africa and Botswana; that they need to use the South African currency; that they need to travel to Zambia to buy basic foodstuffs. These countries are often described as ‘life-lines’ or ‘havens’; the people who live there offering sympathy because ‘they know what ... [Mugabe] is like’.

However, competitiveness and aggression are never far from the surface. There is a sense expressed by Zimbabweans who live in the north of the country of disquiet about the ways in which Zambia and Mozambique, once viewed as particularly backward and unmodernised, have now apparently managed to enjoy widespread, reliable electrification. While much of rural Zimbabwe remains without electricity, and supplies to urban areas are frequently suspended, Zimbabweans wonder bitterly at the ability of their neighbours to keep the lights on.

More overtly aggressive feelings are expressed towards South Africans. Elements of projection or negation often creep in here, with references to South Africans' averred propensity for violence and greed. There are many stories of the violence and intimidation directed at Zimbabweans who try to survive in what is sometimes described as a nightmarish, crime-ridden country. Feelings of disgust are expressed towards ‘unnatural’ South African food (suspicions abound over genetic modification, stories about double-yoked eggs and alien-tasting chickens), which seem to explain the preponderance of fat, lazy or even drunken
South Africans. Zimbabwe’s neighbours are described as having different personalities: Zambia and Mozambique shabby, poor and badly educated; South Africa fast and loud, violent and vulgar.

The awareness of dependence on the neighbours, and the ambivalence produced by the accompanying sense of competitiveness and aggressiveness, is frequently expressed through anxiety over loss. This relates most concretely to the perception of the loss of people, but also in relation to the loss of capacity, culture and political autonomy. In thinking about relationships with neighbouring countries, Zimbabweans from across the country wonder and worry about the further fragmentation such loss brings about. Most concretely anxiety is conveyed in comments made by parents whose children are living and working in foreign countries. They express a sense of the depletion of family and country; elders are left without support while the Zimbabwean economy rots away, abandoned by the exodus of educated, energetic people. One young man described the situation very clearly:

I have been thinking about South Africa but so many youths go there and their families here don’t benefit. It’s not much good for our country. It has made so many people relax, people say, even if I don’t go to school, I will go to South Africa. South Africa is not the solution. The solution lies within us Zimbabweans... If you take a young person from Zimbabwe and compare with South Africa you will see a difference, even in reasoning capacity... I think it has become a problem because we have become like a basket case
because we expect others to give us things and we no longer have the idea of doing things on our own.¹⁰

On another level there is a more general unease that Zimbabweanness is being ‘taken over’ by South African culture. Food insecurity has left them dependent on imports. And their state-controlled media provides increasingly unreliable and unpalatable news, leaving many to rely on news from South Africa. As they become more dependent, many fear their identity is being lost.

Our culture has been invaded. Everyone watches the South African Broadcast [Corporation]. Our culture has changed but we are proud to be Zimbabweans. We love our country.

It’s true: we eat South African foods. The Zimbabwean foods are hidden.¹¹

And finally, anxiety is expressed about political involvement. The region's states – collectively the South African Development Community (SADC) countries – have become deeply involved in Zimbabwe's domestic politics.¹² While many

¹⁰ Lovemore, Old Pumula, 30 May 2012

¹¹ Group of religious leaders, Bulawayo, 29 May 2012

¹² The SADC countries are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
welcome interventions – arguing that the regions’ leaders are the only actors with the authority to keep Mugabe in check – others express disquiet at the erosion of Zimbabwean sovereignty. As one civil society activist pointed out:

A lot of political decisions are now made at SADC and not in this country. If this government makes a mistake we can only turn to SADC, not to ourselves. SADC is dealing with the political parties, not ordinary people. SADC must decide on elections. The country is now depending on external, regional bodies – up to the AU and even the UN... So yes, there is a gap between the people and the government. Now you see diplomats in front at the opening of Parliament.\textsuperscript{13}

Anxiety about the weakening of the state thus leads to assertions of Zimbabwean identity in the form of its culture, industrial capacity and state-society relations. Evidence of difference and competitiveness with neighbours lends urgency to the desire to hold Zimbabwe together. This sense of a whole Zimbabwe is further reinforced by the ways in which otherness can be turned around and applied to Zimbabweans as they are seen by their neighbours. For example, otherness is also understood in terms of the way in which Zimbabwean migrants damage the life-chances of poorer communities amongst the neighbours. It is recognised that large numbers of undocumented Zimbabweans undercut South African workers, fuelling resentment and leading to violent attacks. During a group interview with

\textsuperscript{13} Group of informal workers, Harare, 6 September 2011
trade union representatives from around Zimbabwe, there was a discussion about these difficulties:

You knew they felt that when we go to South Africa, they felt as though we bring in money to buy in South Africa and the more we go, the more prices go up because of us, so we see a lot of Zimbabweans being targets; xenophobic attacks were targeted at Zimbabweans. Even ... [in] Botswana, they don’t like the Zimbabweans. There’s a lot of harassment.

It’s like when a lot of people migrated to South Africa [because] there was no food here, the Zimbabweans took lower wages and that’s when the South Africans initiated those attacks [against us].

In Botswana Zimbabweans were submitted to kangaroo courts and public whippings.

With Zambia it’s different. They went through this during Kaunda’s time. They would sympathise but they said, we told you that this was what [would happen], we told you. You used to laugh as us for coming to buy margarine in your country.14

14 Group of trade unionist activists, Harare, 1 September 2011
This is an example of a ‘personalising attitude’ (Ikaheimo and Laitinen, 2007) an ability to view the effects one has on one’s neighbours through personal experience. It suggests a resonance between the communities – it is possible to put oneself in the other’s shoes, to draw on a shared repertoire of experience, and the history of mutual shaping, in order to understand both oneself and one’s neighbours. It also lends Zimbabweans powerful ideas of their own coherence: the sense of themselves, seen from other perspectives, as a distinct national entity.

Ultimately, a key characteristic engendered by these relationships is the sense of internal ambiguity. The way Zimbabweans understand themselves in relation to their neighbours can be self-assertive, rooted in negation or projection. Examples include the ‘fat’, ‘lazy’ or ‘violent’ South Africans and the ‘backward’ Zambians and Mozambicans. But there is also an awareness of a more complex relationship brought about by other feelings about the relationships. There is the sense that both sides can prosper at the expense of the other, and this dynamic is seen from each side of the relationship. However, alongside this is the sense of a resonance of experience, of something shared that has engendered the idea of a mutual understanding. The dialectic between separation and mutual dependence infuses a painful self-awareness into both the relationship and into self-understanding.15

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15 I have argued elsewhere that the ambiguity of Zimbabwean self-understanding was played out in the 2013 elections, in which Mugabe and ZANU(PF) won a
This discussion of Zimbabweans’ understanding of their neighbours points to the ways in which international relationships can both challenge collective selfhood and reify it. A powerful ‘we-feeling’ is created by the sense of a common history of colonial and post-colonial problems, of shared culture and language, and of mutual support and understanding. It is an outcome of history and a response to recent events. This ‘we-feeling’ can work to reinforce a sense of the fragmentation of Zimbabwe, as the neighbours’ affinity with Zimbabweans exacerbates their sense of alienation from their state, or other Zimbabweans. ‘We-feeling’ can lead to a sense of Zimbabwe melting into the surrounding countries, losing itself in the region. Running counter to this is the way in which relationships with neighbours entrench a self of Zimbabwean selfhood. Difference personalises other states, highlighting apparently varying characteristics. It is reinforced by mutual competitiveness between them, the zero-sum sense in which one country’s gain is another’s loss. The resulting landslide majority. Where once electoral politics was a polarised game between political parties that appeared to represent unambiguously distinct programmes and visions of Zimbabwe, the return of many thousands of voters to ZANU(PF), including in Matabeleland which has steadfastly supported opposition parties since independence, demonstrates an ambivalence towards the ruling party, the state and the country that encompasses an acknowledgement of the outrages and frailties of each alongside a sense of belief in the ruling party to represent authentic Zimbabweaness (Gallagher, 2015).
anxiety about internal coherence leads Zimbabweans to feel protective about themselves, and to attempt to assert valued differences. The ability of Zimbabweans to see difference from both their own and their neighbours’ perspectives also helps reinforce their coherence as they see themselves as an entity through their neighbours’ eyes.

Zimbabwe offers a picture of contradictory processes which might be seen as giving way to the dominance of one set over another. Could it be that, if state coherence develops, Zimbabweans will stop identifying so closely with their neighbours, and come to see themselves less complicatedly as part of a single Zimbabwean group? I suggest not, and in the next section of the article I use a theoretical approach to explain why Zimbabweans’ neighbourly relationships are – if particularly heightened and apparent – in fact typical of relationships of recognition. This will underline the over-arching point of the article: that recognition describes relationships that are continuously shaping state selfhood in shifting and contradictory ways.

Struggles for recognition: a Kleinian view

Hegel outlines the evolution of the self-conscious individual in a short passage on ‘Lordship and Bondage’ in Phenomenology of Spirit, but, as Williams argues, the theme of how people become properly human and free through relationships is a ‘deep structure in Hegel’s account of ethical life’, and permeates all his work (Williams, 1997: 2). Hegel describes the evolution of the individual from the first
stage of isolation, through early encounters with an other, negation, struggle and subjection of one by the other; through eventually to forgiveness and the mutual recognition that enables individual self-realisation and freedom. In negation, we see a rudimentary realisation of self and other as different because alternative, but here, the other is only what the self is not. In other words, it is still defined by the self. Recognition is much more difficult and complex, and it involves an acceptance of a radical otherness that is not defined purely by negation to yourself. But at the same time, the self that is realised through recognition is inseparable from the other, because true self-realisation and freedom are enabled and maintained by this relationship to the other. The individual develops a new consciousness, one that ‘is not purely for itself but for another’ (Hegel, 1977: 115). In *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Hegel describes how, on a number of different levels (family, civil society and state), the individual only achieves a fully ethical life through relationships; ultimately, only by belonging to a collective that represents and embodies ‘the universe of human life’ (Taylor, 1979: 51).

In developing his own take on struggles for recognition, Honneth explores the resonances between Hegel and psychoanalytic object-relations theory which explains ego-development as brought about through relationships. He argues that there are strong resonances with Hegel’s concentration on early family relationships at the core of individual development and the basis for ethical life: ‘For it is only this symbiotically nourished bond, which emerges through mutually desired demarcation, that produces the degree of basic individual self-

Drawing on the work of Winnicott, Honneth traces the way in which infants become aware of the world around them through constantly testing their ideas and fantasies (internal objects) with the people they encounter (external objects). This is how the infant begins to differentiate itself, principally from its mother, to realise itself as an individual (Honneth, 1995: 98-9). In particular, the infant employs destructive fantasies in relation to its world, testing the mother to see if she is objectively ‘real’. Only after the object survives the infant’s (imagined) attack, can she become for the infant a properly external object, beyond its control, but now able to contribute to the baby ‘according to its own properties’ (Winnicott, 1971: 90). Honneth likens this process to Hegelian struggles. The attempt to destroy the object makes it real and clearly separate – beyond the destructive control of the infant – and enables recognition by the subject.

Like Winnicott, Melanie Klein details the role of aggression in object relations and the formation of the ego. Unfortunately, her work is relatively neglected in social theory (but see Alford, 1989; Segal, 1997), possibly because she made little attempt herself to address broader political themes. However, it includes a number of elements that add substantially to an understanding of recognition, and for this reason it is worth exploring her contribution to theories of how the self emerges.
Klein and recognition

Klein was a psychoanalyst who built on Freud's theory and worked, largely with children, in London from the 1920s until her death in 1960. Kleinian object relations theory posits an idea of the self as shaped through relationships. The individual is engaged in a constant comparison of her internal objects with the external objects she encounters in the world. Bowlby describes internal objects as 'internal working models'. 'Each individual builds working models of the world and of himself in it, with the aid of which he perceives events, forecasts the future, and constructs his plans' (Bowlby, 1973: 203). For Klein, this constant comparison of objects is a process that gradually builds the ego, creating individuality. Her theory suggests that individual identity is embedded in, and created by, relationships.

Klein describes object relations in the first months of life as 'manic-schizoid' (1997a). It is impossible to distinguish external from internal objects; all objects are fragmented and, as they stem from the life and death drives, viewed as wholly good or wholly bad. Klein used the terms 'good breast' and 'bad breast' to illustrate this, a formulation meant to describe the infant's complete separation of good and bad: sometimes the breast – or mother – is ideal, nurturing and loving while at others it/she is withholding and persecutory (Klein, 1997b: 180). The child reciprocates, fostering violent feelings of hatred for 'bad' objects and idealising, loving feelings towards 'good' objects. For Klein this state of affairs reflects the infant's conceptualisation of the world around her as completely
dominated by her own internal fantasies, projected onto objects that are really external, and reintrojected to become part of herself. Early life is thus ‘characterized by a sense of losing and regaining the good object’, not only a connection to an external good object, but the sense of containing an internal good object (Klein, 1997b).

As she grows and develops a more complex understanding of the world and her own separation from the objects in it, the child should become better at encompassing complex, ambiguous objects. She is able to acknowledge a sense of guilt as having (in imagination) hurt loved external objects, she makes reparative moves towards them and towards other objects (Klein, 1998b) and she develops a sense of gratitude to the people in her life who have survived her hatred and continue to represent goodness for her (Klein, 1997b). She also relinquishes her idealisation of objects, recognising that they are complex and ambiguous. Her relationships become more mature – characterised by love rather than idealisation – and her sense of herself reflects this: she can live with internal as well as external ambiguity.

Healthy development should mean an increasing ability to see the world in this nuanced way, but relationships continue to be shaped in part by extreme or manic projections and introjections. In particular, imagination and fantasy – the projection of extremes – continue to allow the individual to conceive herself through her relations to the external world, particularly in times of stress or anxiety. As is the case throughout psychoanalysis, the psyche is never whole or
complete, but continues to draw on a repertoire of ways of functioning in, and relating to, the world. But this is particularly the case for Klein. Unlike Freud, who thought that human development progressed through a series of ‘stages’ (oral, anal, Oedipal and so on), each one being resolved before giving way to the next, Klein saw it in terms of ‘positions’ (manic schizoid, depressive) which could be adopted and reverted to throughout life. For Klein, selfhood is less firmly established through development, but continually subject to a variety of constructive and destructive relational positions.

Klein adds to the model developed in important ways. In terms of the struggle for recognition, she views the projection of ideal love as also part of the object-relations dynamic. For Klein, it is the splitting of external objects into ideally good and bad objects that is the key characteristic of the projection and introjection that enable very young babies to make sense of the external world. The desire to connect to an ideal good object is not discussed in the literature on negation and recognition, but, as I have argued elsewhere, it too plays a key role in social and political relationships (Gallagher, 2009; 2014). This idea is not at odds with Hegel’s struggles for recognition. Several of his most vigorous proponents have emphasised the struggle and its aggressive nature (Koveje, 1996; Sartre, 1955; Fanon, 1986), and these tend to overlook the subtlety of his understanding of the contradictions within relationships and his interest in love. But Hegel writes very persuasively about love, particularly in his discussion of relationships within the family; and his concentration on ethical life within the state also contributes to this more positive aspect of mutual recognition. A
Kleinian take on recognition might thus enable more of a sense of its dialogical as well as its dialectical nature.\(^{16}\)

Moreover, Klein makes an important contribution to understanding the imperfections and instability of recognition once achieved. Her theory shows how splitting and the projective/introjective processes are gradually but never completely replaced with better-integrated, whole objects. Like Hegel, who emphasises the role of forgiveness in the transition from aggressive struggle to recognition (Williams, 1997), Klein discusses the role of the acceptance of guilt and reparation in the development of more mature relationships (Klein, 1998b). It is important to emphasise here that neither Hegel nor Klein suggest that forgiveness or reparation overcome the aggressive element of relationships. Hegel’s understanding of forgiveness is, in my interpretation, a necessary and ongoing element of recognition as part of its imperfection, rather than a resolution of it.\(^{17}\) And as Kristeva points out, Klein’s reparation never overcomes

\(^{16}\) On the important but neglected dialogical nature of processes of recognition, see Guillaume (2011) and Neumann (1999).

\(^{17}\) In this I differ from Pippin (2007) who argues that Hegel treats forgiveness as a spiritual release or resolution of social division, an account he feels is at odds with Hegel’s more nuanced understanding of the fragility of human relations engendered by their mutual dependence. I would read ‘spiritual release’ more in the spirit of Catholic forgiveness which is predicated on the inevitable and ongoing transgressions that all humans are subject to because of original sin.
This is very much in tune with Klein’s understanding of the depressive position within which reparative acts are an acknowledgement rather than an overcoming of aggression.

**Bibliography**


the ‘psychic discomfort’ occasioned by aggression, but is merely ‘tolerated as a
source of pain relating to the Other and a source of guilt about having taken
pleasure in hurting him’ (Kristeva, 2001: 89).

A Kleinian view of recognition would see it as an unending process, containing
both idealisation and aggression, as well as the partial ability to integrate these
extremes. This would mean that the complexity of external objects (of others)
could be grasped, enabling a more grounded sense of self; but both would
continue to be subject to extremes and idealisations too.

Relationships of recognition are thus complicated and contain contradictions:

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the self and other are separate and autonomous, yet mutually constitutive and dependent; they are different, yet find resonances within each other. Hegel describes this in the relationship of love within the family: ‘The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right and that, if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person, who in turn gains recognition in me. Love is therefore the most immense contradiction’ (Hegel, 1991: 199). In other words, we both lose our individual identity in the other, and realise their fundamental otherness which affirms our individuality. Benjamin also describes recognition as dialectical and unstable, pivoting between the desire to destroy the other (through complete control and denial of his separation) and the need for recognition and love from a separate other (Benjamin, 1996: 209). Because of this, relationships remain fluid and frequently contentious, and the sense of a ‘We’ created through recognition is likely to come and go rather than remain stable.

**From individual to state**

The discussion has so far dealt with recognition on the individual level, where the individual is created by and through her relationships to the people, institutions or objects around her. Psychoanalysts deal with early familial relationships, and how these enable or inhibit the formation of the ego or self. The way in which an individual fits into a group is thus an essential part of her sense of self, and the group’s survival and status is of the utmost importance to her. Wilfred Bion, who carried out pioneering work on groups in the 1970s,
argued that ‘the group is essential to the fulfilment of a man’s mental life – quite as essential to that as it is to the more obvious activities of economics and war’ (1974: 53). Bion also suggests that the unconscious dynamics within and between groups can lead to forms of group idealisation or denial in ways similar to those developed by individuals. In other words, the group identity becomes an embodiment of the individual writ-large, explaining her to herself through the ways in which she fits into the group, and through the ways the group is different from other groups.

Building on similar insights, Hegel too discussed how individual subjectivity developed within in the context of family relationships of love, the looser connections in civil society and the ultimate ethical relationship of the individual to the state. This underpins why much of the work on recognition has dealt with the struggle for recognition of groups – minority groups within states, for example (Taylor, 1994), or national groups that have been colonised (Fanon, 1986), and it is why more recently it has been taken up in IR to understand the ways in which states become states.

As I outlined in the empirical part of this article, the individual citizens that make up the collective that is represented by and embodied in the state also experience relationships of recognition. If citizens are realised through their relationship to the state, the state’s recognition by other states engenders subjectivity which reflects importantly on their sense of themselves, both collectively and individually.
However, even if groups can help affirm the individual’s sense of herself, they still cannot provide a settled sense of selfhood. To explore this further, we need to return to the issue of progress raised in the introduction. There has been a long tradition of transplanting individual processes of ‘growing up’ onto the evolution of politics – seen in much European political theory, as already suggested. This was underlined by Freud (2002) in *Civilization and its Discontents*, in which his understanding of individual development is described as a series of stages to be worked through and left behind as the individual moves towards the next. In his work on civilisation he transplants this idea of development as progressive onto society: individuals join society as a way of repudiating the pressures and discomforts of what he terms ‘primitive’ desires. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud (2005) adopted a European tradition of viewing ‘primitive’ societies as examples of early human development.

Klein’s idea of individual development is less dogmatically progressive. Although individuals may become better at piecing together part-objects, they remain subject to schizoid relations; we never transcend our early tendency to split the world and ourselves into bits, even if many of us are able to envisage ourselves and others as more complex objects as we mature. For Klein, then, there is never a complete self: selfhood is always emerging, a becoming through the unending shaping achieved through relationships. The ego remains susceptible to extreme splitting and projection of wholly good and bad objects, particularly in times of stress (Klein, 1998c).
For Klein, as I have argued, this leaves the individual in an uncomfortable position; uncertainly incomplete, and prone to regular anxiety about the contradictory nature of relationships that appear to both subsume the self and reify its difference. For her, maturity is an ability to tolerate anxiety and to live with incompleteness, never an ability to transcend them. Groups can help by expressing a sense of completeness and containment; they can also enable an acceptance of ambivalence by their ability to express complexity and internal contradiction. In the same way, states can become more substantial in the way they understand themselves within their region. The state absorbs and so contains individual anxiety by expressing a more confident, coherent selfhood in its relationships with other states.

However, recognition between states also challenges certainty; it rests on both competitive difference and mutual dependence, and in doing so it reflects and expresses individual ‘psychic anxiety’. Recognition is therefore ambiguous and uncomfortable. As we have seen, Zimbabweans are caught in ambivalent relationships with their neighbours, expressing the complexities and anxieties of recognition.

**Conclusions and the conditions of recognition**

Recognition as I have understood it, is not the stable pooling of identity suggested by Wendt and other scholars who make ‘moral claims’ for it. Neither is
it a stage in the development of states that have established internal coherence as the orthodoxy claims. Using the case of Zimbabwe – a state that is clearly fractured, with an insecure collective identity, I have shown how recognition both challenges and reinforces state selfhood; that it is dynamic, bumpy, intense and unstable. Further, I have used Kleinian psychoanalytic theory to provide a theoretical interpretation of Hegel to create a way to understand how recognition works as a way to establish and challenge collective identity.

In this final section, I draw the empirical and theoretical parts of the argument together to define the characteristics of recognition in IR. I argue that mature, what Hegel called ethical, relationships – those that involve mutual recognition – are rooted in three conditions, which are realisations about self and other. The first is that the subject and object realise that they are separate and autonomous; the second is that the subject and object realise that they create and shape each other; and the third is that the subject finds herself (partially) in the object. These three constitute a dense and unstable set of conditions reflecting the complexity of the way relationships shape selfhood, and I use them here as a basis for defining relationships of recognition.

First, for the object and subject to be separate and autonomous means that recognition entails a move well beyond the object as a creation or negation of the subject. Projection and introjection are both predicated on the idea of the self in relation to an other, but they are realised in the way in which the other is shaped purely by the self. Hegel’s idea of negation expresses the sense in which the other
is defined as what the self is not. Likewise, Kleinian introjection pulls an idealised other – also created through projection – into the self. In recognition, it is clear that the other is much more than a reflection of what comes from the self. When there is mutual recognition, the object has a life, feelings, a personality, ideas that are beyond the control of the subject: the object is a totally other subject. As Ikaheimo and Laitinen put it: 'Having a cognitive attitude towards someone is relating to her as to a person, or having a “personalizing attitude” towards her' (2007: 40). From a Kleinian perspective separation involves the acknowledgement of aggressive feelings towards the other. Difference is thus painful: it rests on envy and a sense of loss, both of omnipotence and of the ideal object.

Second, at the same time that the object and subject recognise each other as apart and autonomous, each also understands the ways in which they create each other. For the autonomous, separate object and subject to create each other, they must accept their mutual dependence (Pippin, 2007). The subject is shaped by the object rather differently through projection and introjection. Even though the self may be altered by the other, it is altered only to the extent that the other is defined by the self: the other is the repository of the self’s projected idealisation or aggression; the self is depleted by this projection, or draws it back in to affirm parts of the self. In recognition, mutual creation can be understood as a form of mutual dependence. Psychoanalytic object-relations theory describes this well, as Honneth has observed. Winnicott (1971) sums it up as an acceptance that the subject sees herself altered by her relationship with the
object *because of what the object is*; Benjamin (1990), working a similar vein, describes it as the subject’s awareness of her vulnerability to, and dependence on, the object. Recognition thus means an acceptance that the self is alarmingly shaped by a separate being with a mind of its own. To this, the Kleinian understanding adds ideas about reparation and gratitude: it is possible to mend objects and the relations between them by putting split objects back together again, and by acknowledging the ambiguity of the objects and being able to love them.

Third, for the subject to fully realise herself, she must recognise something resonant between herself and this real, wider world constituted by other subjects. She realises that she makes sense in it. Hegel expresses this as being at home with yourself in an externality; Honneth describes it as finding yourself within a world whose structure is an expression of your own will (2012: 22). The Hegelian approach rests ultimately in the state which Hegel described as an organism made up of the constituent parts of all the individuals within it. For Williams, this is a delicate balance between the individuality of its members, and their commonality, their connection and creation of a ‘we’ in the state: ‘The task is to divide the powers while retaining their functionality as a whole. This can be the case only if the whole is present throughout all its members in spite of their differences... Each part is expressive of the whole organism, and the whole is present in each of its members’ (Williams, 1997: 342). The state, or the real world, although separate and beyond my control, gives back to me a sense of myself as belonging to it, not alien. This is not a coincidence but a result of the
mutual shaping between state and individual: the dependence works both ways. Thinking about this idea in relation to Klein, I suggest that her emphasis on psychic discomfort – the tension between hating and loving external objects, of feeling connection to them but realising that they are separate – helps represent this sense of resonance as embodying the way in which the individual is affirmed by her relationship with the whole.

The case of Zimbabwe, understood in these terms, is an example of recognition. Difference even within close relationships of recognition is competitive and even aggressive. It can enable the subject to see an alternative perspective, but also contains elements of more aggressive projection and negation. Dependence, or the idea of mutual shaping, is about a taking in of otherness in the making of the self. In recognition, it is seen to work both ways. Dependence can also shade into a sense of being subsumed, apparently becoming one with the other, part of an idealising fantasy, but one that can also give rise to anxieties about the loss of self. And, as we have seen in Zimbabwe’s case in southern Africa, resonance encapsulates the difficulties in balancing the opposing impulses of difference and dependence. It is expressed in the idea of understanding and being understood by an other, but like the other two conditions of recognition, it can also become too dominant becoming more like sameness than an occasional ‘walking in step’.

We have here an example of intense relationships that are rooted in a sense of mutual dependence and understanding. This is seen from both sides – part of the closeness and maturity of these relationships is their establishment of the other
as a subject, independent from the self, with each implicated in the fortunes of the other – and the ability to view the relationship from both perspectives. And yet, alongside the awareness of mutual dependence and sympathy, is an assertion of separation. This is seen in this case in an anxiety at the thought of becoming subsumed in the other, of losing selfhood altogether. It spills over into more aggressive projection and rejection of the other as alien as the ambivalence felt about the other gives rise to tension and instability.

As the empirical section of the article shows, recognition matters to Zimbabwean citizens. What their neighbours make of them – from governments to citizens in the region – impacts quite profoundly on Zimbabweans’ sense of wellbeing. They engage with their neighbours; they puzzle about how they look to the neighbours and how the neighbours feel about them. They constantly compare themselves against the neighbours, and they assess how each shapes the other. Recognition, by this account, is not simply of concern to elites, but is closely connected to citizens’ sense of themselves and their country in the wider world. This supports Honneth’s argument that recognition is part of national wellbeing, and opens up new ways to think about what drives political elites to pursue recognition in foreign policy.

However, this relationship of recognition is very different from one of respect or tolerance. It is denser, involving an attitude of judgement of the other rather than a looser, more agnostic attitude. It might therefore be thought of as an emotional attachment and sense of ‘our’ implication in the life and fortunes of the other,
and the other's right to be implicated in our life and fortunes too. This conclusion contradicts Hegel's assertion that recognition between states is limited and characterised only by negation; instead, it can be an important part of national subjectivity. Such a finding challenges tendencies in communitarian IR to neatly split thick domestic and thin international political relationships (Walzer, 1994). It certainly calls for a more nuanced understanding of difference in IR.