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STAFFING THE STATE: 
THE POLITICISATION OF 
BUREAUCRATIC APPOINTMENTS 
IN PAKISTAN 

SAMEEN ANDALEEB MOHSIN ALI 

Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD 

2017 

Department of Politics & International Studies 
SOAS, University of London
Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis

I have read and understood Regulation 21 of the General and Admissions Regulations for students of the SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

Signed: Xanmeen Fathi Fan Date: 16 February 2018
ABSTRACT

This thesis contributes to the literature on the politics of bureaucracy. I show how politicised bureaucratic appointments in Pakistan ‘get things done’ even beyond the career advancement of a particular patron and her bureaucratic appointee. In order to show this, I trace the politicised appointment of senior and mid-tier bureaucrats by political and bureaucratic patrons using legal, extra-legal, and illegal methods in pursuit of three types of outcomes: (i) bureaucratic efficiency; (ii) electoral gain; and (iii) personal enrichment and protection. I contend that particular combinations of actor ‘objectives’ and ‘methods’ result in particular types of bonds – either strong or diffuse – between the patron and the appointed bureaucrat. It is, in turn, the interaction of these three variables (objective, method, bond) that determines whether or not the patron achieves the outcome she wanted, i.e. ‘what gets done’.

This research is motivated by two questions: What do bureaucrats need to ‘deliver’ and how is this ‘delivery’ linked to bureaucratic appointments? Based on interviews, semi-participant ethnographic observation, and newspaper archives, I find that those in a position to influence bureaucratic appointments are better able to achieve their desired outcomes, not when they undertake formally ‘illegal’ appointments (which introduce higher personal and political costs), but when they exploit loopholes in existing appointment procedures. As such, I stress ‘extra-legal’ appointments. Furthermore, I note that the centralisation of discretion and patronage in the hands of political leaders and their political and bureaucratic allies (here, a provincial Chief Minister’s ‘kitchen cabinet’) has empowered some to make legal and extra-legal bureaucratic appointments more than others. Those excluded from this inner circle are pushed towards illegal methods of appointment to achieve their objectives.

In short, I argue that understanding patterns of bureaucratic appointment facilitates our understanding of governance. Though I focus on appointment practices in one province (Punjab), my conclusions are applicable more broadly—within Pakistan and beyond.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

On 23 May 2017, while I was in London editing this thesis, an employee of the Interior Ministry climbed up to the roof of the Pakistan Secretariat in Islamabad, and jumped.¹ Due to retire soon, he wanted his son to get his job. When he asked the department’s officials about the official policy, he was told that an employee’s relative could only get their job if they died while in service. And so he killed himself.

In the course of my fieldwork, I heard many stories of despair, of men and women wanting something better for themselves and for their children. Few succeeded in achieving it and I could do nothing to help those who did not. This thesis is dedicated to all of them, for their patience and hospitality, their generosity with their time, knowledge, and experience, and their interest in my work.

This thesis would not exist were it not for the inexhaustible energy, encouragement, and patience of my supervisor, Dr. Matthew Nelson. He has read every variant of every chapter, and responded to endless emails and questions. He saw the merit of this project (and assured me of it) long before I did and I cannot thank him enough for his confidence in me. Matt taught me to trust my instincts, write with clarity about complex things, and edit mercilessly. He also provided unfaltering pastoral care as I dealt with various personal and administrative crises. For this, I will be forever thankful.

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My family may not always understand what exactly it is that I do, but without them, completing this thesis would not have been possible. They have believed in me since I was far too young to understand the value of such belief. This thesis is dedicated to all of them. Jean aunty and Humayun were always encouraging, and Nighat and Anwaar have always been my biggest supporters. Naheed has held the fort in the most difficult circumstances, and Nuzhat and Khalid provided me with a home in Islamabad. Saif, Saad and Anushay taught me to go after what I want, and Iram, Shazia, and Neha always remind me of the beautiful things in life. Fatima, Azhar, Sheheryar, and Shehzad taught me the value of perseverance, and Coach (Aisha) taught me to speak my mind. Ayesha wanted for me what she wasn’t allowed to have herself, and Janni nani and Mamma inspired the academic in me. My nani, Attiya Ansari, the strongest woman I know, has always been my staunchest advocate, no matter the circumstances. And my parents, Iram and Mohsin, have always stood by me. My mother never let me think that there was anything I could not achieve, and my father’s trust and encouragement have been crucial to my success. In particular, I have them to thank for a civic education that I have valued more and more every year.

And finally, to home – Lahore, Pakistan – and home away from home, London, for making me who I am today.

Any errors that remain in this work are mine alone.

Onward.
GLOSSARY

**Aaabiana**  
Tax paid for irrigation water

**Awami**  
Of the people

**Baap**  
Father, also sometimes used to refer to patron

**Babu**  
Term used pejoratively for bureaucrats, implying elitism and dominance

**Baildaar**  
Junior (street-level) bureaucrat in the Irrigation Department, responsible for checking and maintaining water channels

**Biraderi**  
Extended family or clan network based on lineage

**Booti**  
Cheat sheet for examinations

**Daala**  
Pickup truck

**Dera**  
Abode. A space maintained by a politician to meet with constituents

**Ghalat**  
Wrong

**Ittehad**  
Unified

**Insaaf**  
Justice

**Jaagirdar**  
Landlord of property granted by the British colonial state

**Jaiz/na-jaiz**  
Just/un-just

**Jamhoori**  
Democratic

**Jamaat**  
Assembly, gathering

**Jamiat**  
Organisation or party

**Jurat**  
Daring

**Kaam**  
Work or job

**Kamzor**  
Weak

**Kharab**  
Bad, faulty, offensive

**Majboori**  
Compulsion

**Majlis**  
Council

**Majlis-e-Shura**  
National Assembly; given this ‘Islamic’ name during Zia ul Haq’s regime

**Markaz**  
Administrative unit used by the Punjab School Education Department. Equivalent to Circle.

**Mistri**  
Mason, an official of the Irrigation Department, in charge of maintaining distributary channels

**Munshi**  
Secretary or personal assistant

**Mutthahida**  
United

**Nazim**  
Local mayor

**Parchi**  
Slip of paper, often used to refer to *sifarish*

**Patwaris**  
Street level bureaucrats, lowest-level official in the Revenue Department

**Pir**  
Saint or spiritual guide, directly descended from prominent Sufi saint

**Quaaid**  
Leader

**Sahab**  
Term of respect; Sir

**Sifarish/sifarishee**  
Seeking a favour through privileged access/person requesting favour

**Taaqatwar**  
Powerful, strong

**Tehreek**  
Movement

**Tehsil**  
Administrative division within a district, comprising towns and villages

**Ulema**  
Group of Muslim scholars

**Wazir**  
Minister, vizier

**Zidd**  
Obstinate; perverse or intransigent

**Zamindaar**  
Landowner, as a category of the occupational castes
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Establishment</td>
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<td>ACR</td>
<td>Annual Confidential Report</td>
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<td>ACS</td>
<td>Additional Chief Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACS-E</td>
<td>Additional Chief Secretary – Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEO</td>
<td>Assistant Education Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>APUG</td>
<td>All Pakistan Unified Grade</td>
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<tr>
<td>BISE</td>
<td>Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoP</td>
<td>Bank of Punjab</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Basic Pay Scale</td>
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<td>BRT</td>
<td>Bus Rapid Transit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Chief Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>COO</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>Chief Minister</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Chief Secretary</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Civil Service of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Central Superior Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Common Training Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<td>District Coordination Officer</td>
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<td>Drawing and Disbursement Officer</td>
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<td>District Education Officer</td>
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<td>Deputy District Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General</td>
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<td>DMG</td>
<td>District Management Group</td>
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<td>DPI</td>
<td>Director of Public Instruction</td>
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<td>EDO</td>
<td>Executive District Officer</td>
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<td>EDO-E</td>
<td>Executive District Officer-Education</td>
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<td>EOBII</td>
<td>Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution</td>
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<td>Executive Engineer</td>
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<td>FIA</td>
<td>Federal Investigation Agency</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>(Army) General Head Quarters</td>
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<td>General Manager</td>
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<td>Government Official Residences</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IJI</td>
<td>Islami Jamhoori Ittehad</td>
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<td>Local Government Ordinance</td>
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<td>MEPCO</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member National Assembly</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Member Provincial Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Quami Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
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<td>NAB</td>
<td>National Accountability Bureau</td>
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<td>National Finance Commission</td>
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<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>NWFP</td>
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<td>OGDCL</td>
<td>Oil and Gas Development Corporation Limited</td>
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<td>OPS</td>
<td>Own Pay Scale</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Officer on Special Duty</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Personal Assistant</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Punjab Assembly</td>
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<td>PAS</td>
<td>Pakistan Administrative Service</td>
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<td>PAT</td>
<td>Principal-Agent Theory</td>
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<td>PCS</td>
<td>Provincial Civil Service</td>
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<td>Pakistan Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>PER</td>
<td>Performance Evaluation Report</td>
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<td>Punjab Education Sector Reform Program</td>
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<td>PHA</td>
<td>Parks and Horticulture Authority</td>
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<td>Punjab Local Government Act</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PMIU</td>
<td>Programme Monitoring and Implementation Unit</td>
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<td>People’s Party</td>
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<td>Provincial Public Service Commission</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Personal Secretary</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
<td>Police Service of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>Primary School Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTI</td>
<td>Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;GAD</td>
<td>Services &amp; General Administration Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Superintending Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>Sub-Divisional Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Section Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SST</td>
<td>Secondary School Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMA</td>
<td>Town Municipal Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal Primary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAPDA</td>
<td>Water and Power Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASA</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Currency – 1 GBP = approx. 135 PKR

(At the time my fieldwork was conducted the rate was approx. 1GBP = 165 PKR)

The use of the term ‘District Coordination Officer’ or ‘DCO’ throughout this thesis reflects the nomenclature for the post at the time fieldwork was conducted for this thesis (2014-2015). Since then, the post has once again been given the title of ‘Deputy Commissioner’.

The use of the term Executive District Officer or EDO, and the titles of other posts at district level reflect the nomenclature at the time fieldwork was conducted for this thesis (2014-2015). Since then, a new local government system has substantially altered some of these posts and titles.

The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010. In sections of this thesis that relate events prior to this event, the term NWFP is used to refer to the province.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

"[W]hat is surprising is that bureaucrats work at all ... rather than shirk at every opportunity...[the answer is that] bureaucrats have preferences ... among them is the desire to do the job".

- James Q. Wilson (1989, 156-159)

Overview

On 25 February 2009, Governor’s Rule was imposed in Punjab when both Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz Group (PMLN) were declared ineligible to contest elections or hold public office by the Supreme Court. With Punjab Chief Minister (CM) Shahbaz Sharif forced to step aside, the Governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), took control of Pakistan’s most populous and important province. His first actions involved shuffling bureaucrats appointed to key provincial posts. The officers that Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif had painstakingly appointed to the Chief Minister’s Secretariat and other senior positions were all made Officers on Special Duty (OSD).1 In their place, the PPP-led federal government introduced its own loyalists to exercise control, through Governor Taseer, over the opposition-ruled Punjab.2 Once the top tier bureaucrats in Punjab had been replaced, the task of reshuffling more junior bureaucrats began. In all, over a thousand officials were moved.3

However, Governor’s Rule only lasted till 30 March 2009 - the Sharifs won an appeal and the Supreme Court suspended its earlier decision. Once Shahbaz Sharif returned to the post of Chief Minister, the bureaucratic shuffle began again – this time bringing back the hand-picked team he had put in place in June 2008 following

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provincial elections. However, this time, CM Shahbaz Sharif was favouring not only his own bureaucratic team, but especially the bureaucrats who had supported the Sharifs during the period of Governor Rule.

The chaos that played out within the Punjab bureaucracy during these few days in 2009 is a good example not only of the weight senior politicians like the CM and his advisers give to the bureaucratic team they assemble, but, as I will explain, also of certain electoral and government performance advantages to be gained by manipulating bureaucratic appointments. In exploring such phenomena, this thesis seeks to answer two research questions: First, how do ‘politically influenced bureaucratic appointments’ impact electoral politics and bureaucratic efficiency in the delivery of services to ordinary citizens in Punjab, Pakistan? And second, how do specific objectives for making politicised bureaucratic appointments, and the specific methods used to make such appointments, come together in patterns that shape the delivery of services?

We often read that the politicisation of the bureaucracy breaks down the neutrality of the bureaucracy, rendering bureaucrats beholden to certain politicians rather than the government as a whole. Politicisation can (and does) ‘target’ the work of bureaucracies. However, through the careful monitoring of service delivery to specific beneficiaries, politicisation may help to tie both formal and informal institutions together in ways that are helpful…for some. This thesis does not address whether or not the ‘targeting’ that results from politicisation is a ‘good’ thing. It does not address how policies ‘should’ be implemented. Instead it simply focuses on what I call ‘outcomes’.


6 See, for instance, Boissevain 1965; R. E. Scott 1974; Grindle 2012; and of course Weber 1978.

7 See Grindle 2012; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984
This concept (‘outcomes’) emerged from my discussions with politicians and bureaucrats – discussions in which the quest to ‘deliver’ came up repeatedly. I was told that bureaucrats with a reputation/record for ‘delivering’ are the ones who advance in the bureaucracy, that there was constant pressure to ‘deliver’ from higher authorities (political and bureaucratic), and that ‘delivery’ was the most important target for bureaucrats. This left me with two questions: First, what do bureaucrats need to ‘deliver’? Second, how is this ‘delivery’ linked to bureaucratic appointments?

‘Delivering’ does not necessarily mean ‘policy outcomes’. In fact, ‘delivering’ may encompass objectives that have nothing to do with policy. As the preferred term of the administration and political elite in Punjab, ‘delivery’ refers to achieving an official, political, or personal goal set by a given patron. Depending on the objectives of the patron, ‘delivery’ might refer to public goods – something that an entire community can (at least theoretically) enjoy, such as a new school or electrification – or private goods – something that only an individual or a specific group will enjoy, such as a job or money or votes.

For citizens, public and private goods are an integral part of their relationship with the state, and in countries like Pakistan and India the enjoyment of these goods is the key expectation citizens have of the politicians they elect. For politicians, furthermore, the provision of public and private goods is the most effective means of winning elections (Piliavsky 2014, 165). It is also the means through which they recoup the resources they have invested in the electoral process: contesting an election is an expensive business, and most politicians say they spend upwards of Rs 2-3 million on their election campaign. Winning, and thereby gaining access to state resources and services, is generally perceived as the only means of ensuring that that money invested is not lost. For bureaucrats, however, resource and service provision is the primary responsibility of the job itself. Delivery can therefore refer simply to bureaucratic efficiency – a bureaucrat must ‘deliver’ targets set by a superior, for example.

For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, I divide patronage-based ‘delivery’ (or ‘outcomes’) into three types:

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8 This was the term used by bureaucrats and politicians alike, and I use it throughout this thesis.
9 A candidate will have to pay for staff, publicity, venues and seating for rallies, arrangements to transport and feed supporters at rallies and on election day, and of course, for the nomination papers and party ticket as well. See Mufti 2011.
(1) **Bureaucratic Efficiency** – appointing the right people to deliver (i) policy or project implementation deadlines (for example, constructing an underpass within six months or developing a policy on banning teacher transfers within two weeks and, then, implementing it in a month); (ii) project monitoring to ensure that targets are met (for example, monitoring student enrolment in a district over six months or cases of water theft in an irrigation zone); and (iii) the managed distribution of state resources (for example, development budget allocations).

(2) **Electoral Gain** – appointing the right people to deliver (i) money for an election campaign; or (ii) votes through targeted service delivery, job provision, or the distribution of state finances.

(3) **Personal Enrichment or Protection** – appointing the right people to deliver benefits for the patron and his family/friends/cronies (e.g. recovering campaign investments) from ‘targeted’ service and resource delivery (for example, a ‘selective’ electricity, gas, or telephone connection, re-surfacing a particular road, a government job); or allowing the patron and his family/friends/cronies to evade disciplinary procedures or criminal legal proceedings.

There are multiple ways to ‘deliver’ these outcomes: through the design of contracts, the design of oversight mechanisms, etc. However, this thesis focuses on a method that precedes and enables these, namely, appointing the right official to the right post. For my purposes, distributing state resources and services is a later objective. The first objective concerns the appointment of a bureaucrat for this task.

In what follows, I trace the production of ‘outcomes’ back to three factors: the objectives of the patron (politician or bureaucrat) to politicise appointments, the method chosen to make bureaucratic appointments (legal, extra-legal, or illegal), and the patterned nature of the resultant bonds between patron and client (strong or diffuse). I use an account of the *interaction* between these three factors to account for specific *patterns* in the ‘delivery’ of outcomes, viz. (a) bureaucratic efficiency, (b) electoral gain, and (c) personal enrichment and protection. I find that, for those with an objective to undertake ‘politicised’ appointments (and the ability to do so by virtue
of their position), the most effective means of satisfying their ‘outcome’ objective is not to make fully legal or fully illegal appointments, but rather to exploit specific loopholes in the rules for bureaucratic appointment, transfer, and promotion. In short, extra-legal appointments are attractive and effective.

This finding has implications for patterns of electoral politics (e.g. politicians enjoy more electoral support – by, for instance, blocking opponents’ campaign events while facilitating their own – from ‘biased bureaucrats’ if those bureaucrats were appointed via loopholes). It also has implications for patterns of bureaucratic efficiency (e.g. projects are more likely to succeed/fail according to the wishes of a patron if the relevant bureaucrat was appointed via loopholes). And, finally, it has implications for the targeted delivery of services to ordinary citizens (e.g. service delivery is more likely to be unequal in ways that benefit the patron – such as spending disproportionate amounts of development funds on the patron’s constituency – if it is managed by bureaucrats appointed via loopholes). In each case, I also believe my findings can be generalised beyond Pakistan.

The following sections of this introduction provide an overview of my argument, tying specific bureaucratic appointment patterns to specific outcomes. Along the way I define various terms that will be used throughout this thesis, including ‘ politicisation’, the ‘objectives’ that patrons pursue, and the strong and diffuse politician/bureaucrat ‘bonds’ that underpin particular outcomes. In Chapter 2, I provide a brief history of Pakistan’s bureaucracy before outlining the legal (regular and irregular) ‘methods’ of appointment, the loopholes within them that allow extra-legal ‘methods’ of appointment, and finally, the illegal ‘methods’ of appointment on which the remainder of the thesis rests.

The Puzzle

The popular perception in Pakistan is that the bureaucracy is deeply compromised, not because of inherent flaws in the training or recruitment of bureaucrats, but owing to ‘political’ machinations that compromise the authority, independence, and integrity of the bureaucracy. This is certainly the view in Punjab where one party, the PMLN, has remained in power throughout most of the 1990s, and again from 2008 to the present, i.e. throughout most of Pakistan’s postcolonial ‘democratic’ history.
Few would argue that bureaucratic appointments, promotions, and transfers are free of political influence. Some officers say that such influence is pervasive to the point that no appointment decision can be made without the direct interference of an MPA or MNA, and that no officer is free of the threat of being transferred to the fringes of the province if she dares to disobey a politician. Others provide a more nuanced account: although there is political pressure to make particular appointments, politicians will usually accept the judgement of the officer (for example, if the officer makes his case with evidence and policy-based rules to back him, the politician will concede). Some insist that there is no political pressure of any kind on appointments (although it is difficult to take these officers seriously: often, contradictions pointing to explicit examples of politicisation came up in their own accounts, or their recollection of recent events was directly refuted by other accounts from the same region or department).

Regardless of where an official, a politician, or an ordinary citizen is situated on this spectrum (between ‘pervasive’ politicisation and ‘no’ politicisation), the concept of politicisation is not new to anyone who has studied the bureaucracy in Pakistan, particularly with respect to appointments. However, when one probes further and asks why and how politicised appointments take place, and with what effect, responses are usually vague, suggesting that ‘politicians and bureaucrats do it to achieve their own ends’ or that politicians manage (mythically, magically) to ‘make it happen’. The implication is that a politician engages in some kind of illegal activity to appoint ‘his man’ in the bureaucracy.

Even as bureaucrats lump all kinds of influence over appointments together into one ‘illegal’ category, however, politicisation is not simply about politicians making illegal appointments to the bureaucracy. Politicisation is also about bureaucrats making illegal appointments. It is also about both politicians and bureaucrats using significant loopholes to make technically legal but entirely unpredictable appointments to satisfy their own goals. This thesis seeks to complicate the picture that has developed of politicians controlling bureaucratic behaviour illegally.

Introducing complexity to the discussion on politician-bureaucrat relationships, and the politicisation of bureaucratic appointments, is important. The

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10 It is important that we see ‘bureaucrats as agents exercising choice in varying degrees of self-awareness and for a wide range of ends’ (Herzfeld 2005, 373).
middle class’s dislike of ‘the political’ and their embracing of organisations that disavow political leanings – ostensibly, the military and the bureaucracy – has meant that political forces sit at the bottom of a clear hierarchy of middle-class preferences when it comes to state institutions in Pakistan. However, it is important to stress that the elected elite are not the only ones to influence patterns of bureaucratic appointment, and thereby patterns of policy implementation (or outcomes), to their own (electoral or personal) advantage. Bureaucratic elites are just as likely to exercise such influence. Therefore, understanding how desired bureaucratic outcomes are achieved (or not) is critical to understanding how Punjab (and Pakistan) is governed.

A bureaucrat’s ‘delivery’ of desired outcomes takes place within a certain local political context and with reference to the accumulation of different types of power (votes, money, administrative prestige, etc.) in the hands of local actors. The bureaucrat is just one actor in the local political economy of personal advancement – others are seeking their own ends. Elite bureaucrats (from the Pakistan Administrative Service) move in the same circles as businessmen, politicians, and the military elite. Armytage (2015) argues that it is through these social and capitalist connections that they maintain their power and influence. However, even the elite cadres of the PAS have become more demographically diverse over the last few years. As the private sector has grown, the bureaucracy is no longer seen as the best career path for the offspring of the Pakistani elite. As a result, at least some of the bureaucrats in the PAS must earn their place amongst the Pakistani elite, and then maintain it, by ‘delivering’ desired outcomes.

Furthermore, the pursuit of these outcomes (whether bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, personal enrichment, or personal protection) through bureaucratic channels requires allies within the bureaucracy, both at the level of the elite cadres and amongst more junior bureaucrats. Mid-tier and street-level bureaucrats lack elite access and connections with them cannot be developed in social settings. At the same time, junior bureaucrats are seeking to develop networks of their own to advance their interests. I argue that, in these circumstances, professional networks often prove most useful in ensuring the ‘delivery’ of desired outcomes.

The failure of numerous programs (funded internally or by international organisations) to improve service delivery in an equal and sustainable fashion has been a problem in Pakistan, even in its most populous, developed, and stable
province, Punjab. For instance, despite significant investment in the school education sector, millions of children remain out of school and learning standards within government schools remain extremely low (Habib 2013).\(^{11}\) Most of all, there is a vast chasm between service provision in northern and southern Punjab.\(^{12}\) One area where this divide is starkly visible is the health sector: despite funding from the World Bank for the Punjab Health Sector Reform Project commencing in 2013\(^{13}\), southern districts, in contrast to northern and central districts, continue to do poorly on key health indicators such as maternal and new-born deaths (Callen, et al 2013).\(^{14}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Distribution of seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Reserved Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Reserved Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from the official website of the National Assembly of Pakistan

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Table 2: Regional and other quotas for recruitment through the CSS examination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merit</th>
<th>Punjab + Federal Capital</th>
<th>Balochistan</th>
<th>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</th>
<th>Sindh Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Gilgit Baltistan/ FATA</th>
<th>Azad Jammu &amp; Kashmir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Within each quota, 10% is reserved for women and 5% is reserved for minorities, and if the reservation is not met, it can be carried forward to the following year.
Adapted from the official website of the Federal Public Service Commission

With the most seats in the National Assembly\(^{15}\) and the federal bureaucracy, Punjab is also the de facto seat of power (elected or otherwise). The province has had relatively stable governments, it has less violence, and it has more money\(^{16}\) than any of Pakistan’s other provinces. Policy failures growing out of bureaucratic weakness are generally thought to be least likely in Punjab. In fact, where they occur, such failures are all the more apparent when compared to failures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (which has been plagued by war), let alone Balochistan (where high levels of poverty and an insurgency have persisted since independence). While flaws in the formulation of policy point to viable explanations for program failures, relatively little time has been spent in understanding (analytically) the people (bureaucrats and politicians) actually involved in implementing policy.

‘Corruption’ is a popular explanation offered for policy failure. However, like Nayanika Mathur (2015), I found that accusations of corruption – a term that remains quite amorphous despite reams of literature on it – often conceal more than they reveal about the state and bureaucratic practice. There is, fortunately, work that goes against this ‘ambiguity’ trend. Robert Wade (1982; 1985), for instance, links frequent bureaucratic transfers to ‘corrupt’ practices in an irrigation department, connecting administrative to political corruption in the process. However, as noted above, this is

\(^{15}\) As the province with the most population, Punjab has the most constituencies, and thereby the most seats in the National Assembly. Both democratic and non-democratic forces are well aware that they cannot control the country unless they control the Punjab.

\(^{16}\) National Finance Commission Awards by the central government divide money amongst provinces on the basis of a formula based largely on population. Despite attempts to make the formula fairer to the less populated provinces, Punjab remains the main beneficiary of state funds.
not a thesis about ‘corruption’.\textsuperscript{17} It simply engages with practices often considered corrupt and ‘the worlds they might produce’ (Anjaria 2011, 62). In particular, it focuses on politicised bureaucratic appointments.

Though there are multiple accounts of how bureaucracies function across a range of countries and time periods (Shefter 1977; Wade 1982, 1985; Wood 1988; Bearfield 2009; Grindle 2012; Gupta 2006), and how politicians control their behaviour\textsuperscript{18}, there is not much literature analysing the political and bureaucratic objectives underpinning bureaucratic appointments. Principal-agent theory (PAT)\textsuperscript{19}, for instance, emphasises politicians’ policy goals, based on the assumption that close political control and oversight will improve bureaucratic performance. In other words, it begins by viewing the relationship between politician and bureaucrat as unidirectional: politicians regulate bureaucratic behaviour. A note of dissent responding to this literature, however, was introduced by Moe (1984, 1990, 2005), who argued that bureaucrats must be studied as agents in themselves (for example, with personal interests and preferences). This is, of course, a note of dissent I support. At the same time, however, academics began applying principal-agent theory to relationships within the bureaucracy (Mitnick and Backoff 1984). Tirole (1986), for instance, introduced the concept of an intermediary between the principal and the agent, allowing PAT to be applied to more complex situations. Waterman and Meier (1998) argued for a more flexible application of principal-agent roles. But, for the most part, it is probably fair to say that PAT remains closely tied to a relatively rigid frame: one party regulates the other’s behaviour to achieve its policy goals. It does not consider in any depth the initial appointment of bureaucrats, i.e. questions of politicised appointments. This thesis turns to a more elastic set of concepts to analyse bureaucratic appointments and the political and bureaucratic objectives underpinning them. It focuses on notions of patronage.

Gilmartin (2014, 128), citing Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), notes that the pre-eminence of patronage in Indian electoral politics has been viewed as ‘an adaptation to India’s own distinctive political history, especially to the history of

\textsuperscript{17} On corruption, see Wade 1982, 1985; Gupta 1995, 2005; Parry 2000; Herzfeld 2005; and Jauregui 2014.

\textsuperscript{18} See for instance, Iyer and Mani 2012; Berenschot 2014; Wilkinson 2014; Fiorina and Noll 1978; Khan 1998; Gulzar and Pasquale 2017. Or see Pollack 2002 and Huber and Shipan 2000 for an overview of some of this literature.

\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, Aberbach 1990; Weingast and Moran 1983; Bawn 1992, 1995; Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast 1989; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; and McCubbins and Schwartz 1984.
colonial bureaucracy, to India’s ethnic and religious heterogeneity, and to the distinctive evolution of its political parties over time’. In other words, patronage is India’s way of conciliating state and society. What most academics have not acknowledged is that, just like politicians and voters, bureaucrats in both India and Pakistan have also adapted. Though much of the narrative around patronage continues to focus on its role in bending or breaking the law, the literature on South Asia tends to overlook the use of patronage to make bureaucracies work (Grindle 2012). More broadly, work on bureaucratic appointments, such as Grindle’s, acknowledges the variety of ways in which patronage can be used without explaining how, precisely, patronage-based appointments are used to achieve desired outcomes.

Though there has been some interest in experimental work on Pakistan’s bureaucracy as it relates to service delivery (Gulzar and Pasquale 2017; Callen, et al 2016), much of the literature on bureaucratic appointments is, if not out-of-date (Braibanti 1966), then rather narrowly focused on one or two key sections of the bureaucracy – typically, the bottom tier (patwaris, for example Nelson 2011) or the top (PAS/DMG, for example Waseem 1989, La Porte 1976, or Kennedy 1987). Alternatively, it has focused on just one side of the appointment equation, either politicians (Mohmand 2011, Shami 2010) or bureaucrats (Hull 2012), rather than the larger picture of politicians interacting with bureaucrats.

Developing this larger picture will allow us to understand how policy implementation works in Pakistan and, especially, how patterns of bureaucratic appointment (influenced by elected and bureaucratic elites) intervene. This thesis contends that an explanation for policy implementation patterns, and thereby of governance, is tied to complex processes of determining (via appointments) who gets to interpret and implement programmes on the ground. Together with senior federal bureaucrats (the PAS/DMG) and senior provincial bureaucrats (the PMS), I argue that the middle section of the provincial bureaucratic hierarchy is critical.20

Appointments to senior and mid-tier posts responsible for (a) implementing policy; (b) distributing state resources; and (c) making appointments to lower tiers of the bureaucracy are crucial for determining policy outcomes and who benefits from them. With this in mind, I focus on appointments to posts that have the power to appoint/transfer/promote juniors, as these are the appointments that allow a patron to

20 Though very relevant to the subject, I do not study the police. For an exploration of patronage and corruption amongst police officials, see Jauregui 2014.
control not only the tasks assigned to that officer, but also the work and fate of bureaucrats who are junior to that official. Despite recent initiatives to improve bureaucratic recruitment through merit-based practices and training at the lower tiers of the hierarchy (considered the most corrupt bureaucrats)—e.g. *patwaris* and teachers (see Nelson 2011; 2014 unpublished manuscript) – I argue that operations at this level remain susceptible to pressure from middle-tier actors. These middle-tier actors lie at the centre of this thesis.

This thesis seeks to unravel the relationships, transactions, and ties between politicians and bureaucrats, or between bureaucrats themselves, to achieve specific ‘outcomes’ (bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal gain or protection) through favoured appointments. In doing so, I do not contend that politicised appointments have made Punjab or Pakistan into a strong state ruling over a weak society (or vice versa), to adopt Joel Migdal’s (1988) categorisation. Instead, I subscribe to Susan and Lloyd Rudolph’s (1987) notion of the ‘weak-strong state’ – the state is omnipresent and regulatory, but it lacks the ‘capacity to meet the demand it generates’ (Berenschot 2014, 200). The state is not the legal-rational entity that Weber (1978), for example, envisioned. It is, instead, ‘the negotiations around the thin lines between the legal and the illegal’ (Das 2007, 177) that matter and deserve our attention.

In what follows, I contribute to the literature in four ways. My first contribution is a criticism of the political-economy literature on Principal-Agent Theory (PAT). I find that PAT oversimplifies and misrepresents the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats as being one of oversight and delegation versus subversion through information control, and it tends to limit itself to the study of senior, elite bureaucratic cadres. In this thesis, I explore the myriad ways (formal, quasi-formal, and informal) in which bureaucrats and politicians – at different levels of their respective hierarchies – interact with each other, not merely via delegation and information control but also exchange or ‘patronage’. Within the political science literature on bureaucratic appointments, I emphasise that the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, and bureaucrats themselves, are curated by these actors to suit their strategic objectives. In effect, I provide further evidence (if more was

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21 A work that does do so is Malik 2011.
needed) that Weber’s ideal-typical vision of a fully rational, rule-bound bureaucracy does not exist in practice.

In order to make the argument above, and as my second contribution, I move beyond the PAT literature to the political science literature on patronage, using it to explain how politicised bureaucratic appointments are made by politicians and bureaucrats. However, departing from an earlier focus on patronage and criminality in South Asia (Piliavsky 2014; Michelutti 2010, 2014) or patronage and electoral politics in Pakistan specifically (Nelson 2011; Mohmand 2011; Javid 2012), this thesis also considers how some of the political science literature on ‘patronage’ helps us understand forms of bureaucratic achievement. In their comparative work on the use of patronage in bureaucracies, political scientists like Grindle (2012) argue that career bureaucracies used patronage to enhance ‘competence’. This perspective has not figured prominently in the literature on bureaucracy in South Asia to date, however, and I fill this gap. In addition, Grindle’s argument addresses the prevalence of patronage either before the creation of a career civil service or early on in the development of a country’s career civil service. As a result, her argument does not explain the prevalence of patronage in countries like Pakistan that inherited a fully formed career civil service prior to establishing a government.

Furthermore, the literature that uses notions of patronage to study bureaucratic appointments and outputs - Grindle 2012, for example – looks at patronage as a means for bureaucrats to move up the career ladder. It does not explore how bureaucrats, or politicians and bureaucrats, engage in (curated, strategic) relationships of patronage to achieve objectives that are more diverse, and more elaborate, than climbing the career ladder (e.g. policy implementation). Neither does it explore the centrality of politicised bureaucratic appointments or provide an explanation for what motivates these appointments. In fact, departing somewhat from the anthropological literature on patronage, I found that a strong political science literature on ‘politicisation’ (as a concept) was lacking, despite the ubiquity of this term in public discourse. The emphasis of this thesis, therefore, is on the behaviour of those operating within and alongside institutional and structural hierarchies (explored in Chapter 2) and the outcomes those actors are able to achieve through politicised bureaucratic appointments. I focus on the relationships between politicians and

22 In the development literature, Levy (2014) refers to a similar approach as ‘working with the grain’.
bureaucrats, and in doing so, I highlight the ways in which these actors interact with each other, or are let down by each other, in pursuit of their objectives. Therefore, I move beyond the study of political and bureaucratic turnovers – i.e. the appointments of fresh bureaucrats after an election (Iyer and Mani 2012; Akhtari, et al. 2017) – to understand the movement of bureaucrats from one post to another whether or not an election has taken place.

Unlike the political-economy literature on PAT (which focuses on senior bureaucrats) and patronage (which increasingly focuses on junior street-level bureaucrats), this thesis considers the objectives and relationships of both these tiers. In addition, I emphasise the crucial role played by mid-tier bureaucrats in ‘delivering’ the bureaucratic outcomes of political and bureaucratic patrons alike. I do not consider bureaucrats as just intermediaries in politicians’ interactions with citizens. I see them as actors in their own right, with motivations and objectives that they endeavour to pursue.

In addition, focusing on Punjab, I note that the centralisation of discretion and patronage has limited access to legal and extra-legal bureaucratic appointments to the CM and those within his kitchen cabinet. Those excluded from this inner circle must employ illegal methods of bureaucratic appointment to achieve their goals. In highlighting this growing centralisation of discretion and patronage in Punjab, for instance, I thus provide crucial insights into how governance works in Punjab and why it does not seem to ‘deliver’ in a consistent fashion for citizens. I show how bureaucratic appointments are used (successfully and unsuccessfully) to help politicians trump their opponents (within and outside their party) and win votes. And I explain how politicised appointments can provide politicians and bureaucrats with personal riches or services, as well as a safety net when it comes to accountability investigations. In short, I contribute to the political science literature on the politics of bureaucracy by showing how politicized bureaucratic appointments ‘get things done’ even beyond the career advancement of a particular patron and his/her bureaucratic appointee.

Work on bureaucracies in South Asia is heavily India-centric (Gupta 2006; 2012, Mathur 2016, Iyer and Mani 2012, Gulzar and Pasquale 2017) and, with this thesis, I bring some balance to the literature on the politics of South Asian bureaucracy. Though some of the conclusions may vary across countries, I believe the
study of politician-and-bureaucrat interactions across South Asia illuminates a number of similarities.

Fourth, I contribute to the literature on Pakistan in particular, and South Asia more generally. Political science literature on the Pakistan bureaucracy takes one of three approaches: 1) newer literature that takes a quantitative approach – regressions, large-N studies, randomised control trials, and experiments (Callen, et al. 2016; Gulzar and Pasquale 2017) (2) older literature exploring the colonial impact on state structures, changes to that structure over time post-independence, and (attempts at) reform of the civil service (Braibanti 1966; La Porte 1976; Kennedy 1987; Shafqat 1999 & 2013) and, 3) literature that sees bureaucrats as intermediaries between politicians and citizens, with an emphasis on corruption and electoral politics (Nelson 2011; Shami 2011; Mohmand 2011; Mufti 2010; Jaffrelot 2014; Martin 2014, 2016) as well as literature that looks at the ways in which paperwork and regulation are used by bureaucrats to confound citizen demands (Hull 2012; Gupta 2012). I move beyond all three. In particular, I use a qualitative approach with 159 interviews, semi-participant ethnographic observation (during visits to the offices of bureaucrats and politicians, the Punjab Assembly, and the court rooms of the Punjab Services Tribunal between September 2014 and July 2015), and extensive research through newspaper archives (online archives of daily English newspapers DAWN, the Daily Times, The Express Tribune, The News, The Nation, and Pakistan Today dating from 2000 to the present, as well as the Herald and The Friday Times magazines from 1988 to the present)\(^\text{23}\), thus providing a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) of the bureaucratic and political landscape of Punjab. I ensured that my research was not limited to a specific party, a specific leader, or a specific regime, but that it provided an overview of the development of bureaucratic politicisation in Punjab (and, to some extent, Pakistan more generally) over the last nearly thirty years.

However, I do not make any definitive claims as to politicised appointments beyond the Punjab. Undoubtedly, the politicisation of bureaucratic appointments takes place across the country. But this thesis focuses on the Punjab and to a limited extent, the federal bureaucracy in Islamabad. The specificity of politician-bureaucrat or bureaucrat-bureaucrat interaction in the other provinces requires further research with

\(^{23}\) My newspaper research involved identifying key events and actors identified both through my interviews and observations in the field and through a snowball technique – using references within articles to identify others.
particular attention to their political and administrative realities. For instance, Punjab’s bureaucratic and political circumstances are very different from Sindh’s, where the PPP has dominated electorally since the 1990s. The results of this dominance have been very different to the PMLN’s recent dominance in Punjab. I would hypothesise that whether the PPP was in power at both the centre and in Sindh, or only in Sindh, bureaucratic appointments have been primarily utilised for personal enrichment and protection. Electoral gain motives may well be present, but I believe them to be a secondary consideration for the PPP in Sindh – for now, there is little chance of them losing their grip over the province. Bureaucratic efficiency has rarely been a visible outcome of political appointments in Sindh, not in the manner of Punjab where the PMLN has invested in very visible development projects. I would expect that, like Punjab, illegal appointments are most likely to take place at the junior levels of the bureaucracy in Sindh. However, unlike Punjab, many of these appointments are, by my estimate, made on the basis of biraderi or family ties (unlike bureaucrats’ emphasis on professional ties in Punjab) – from the relatives of Asif Ali Zardari or his sisters Faryal Talpur and Azra Pechuho, to the ‘ghost’ relatives of bureaucrats given teaching posts in schools in interior Sindh.

Moreover, I do not engage with two features of the formal state architecture that have received significant attention elsewhere: the police and the judiciary. Though the police play an important role in the political economy of the state, I did not expect to find dramatically different bureaucratic appointment practices within the Police Service of Pakistan – as such, I did not expect the inclusion of the police as a third case (beyond the education and irrigation departments) to alter my key findings. And, in any case, I found that I could not do justice, in terms of time or resources, to three separate arms of the bureaucracy in one thesis.

The judiciary is, of course, not a part of the administrative branch of the state; it is a separate branch with entirely separate appointment procedures and, indeed, a separate academic literature on the politics of judicial appointments and judicial decisions (Newberg 2002; Siddique 2013; Waseem 2011b). As a result, I do not focus on the politics of appointments, promotions, and transfers within the judicial branch of the state.

There is no doubt that the police are used to threaten and intimidate, particularly at the district level where the local Station House Officer (SHO) is closely
allied to prominent politicians and bureaucrats. At more senior levels, there can be a
tussle between the centre and a province on the appointment of the provincial
Inspector General Police (as for instance between the PMLN government at the centre
and the PPP government in Sindh throughout 2017). As far as bureaucratic
appointments outside of the police service are concerned, legal appointments do not
involve the police (for obvious reasons) and extra-legal appointments are designed to
avoid the very publicity that police involvement can bring. The involvement of the
police is most likely where illegal appointments are made – to threaten and intimidate,
where an FIR needs to be lodged and arrests made. To this extent, the police are
mentioned in Chapter 5 of this thesis. However, I have not added ‘the police’ as a
separate area of investigation with respect to bureaucratic appointments.

The judiciary is mentioned at various points in this thesis as one of the
avenues through which aggrieved parties have sought justice for appointments they
considered illegal – the district courts, the High Courts, and the Supreme Court. As
such, my research draws a great deal on court judgements, from the high courts and
the Supreme Court, and from observing the activities at the Punjab Services Tribunal
and the Federal Services Tribunal. The role played by the judiciary in the context of
bureaucratic appointments I, therefore, evident at several points in the empirical
chapters of this thesis. The courts were co-opted during the Musharraf era, for
instance, excusing all kinds of illegal practices on the grounds that they were
prevalent (see the Anwar Saifullah Khan case discussed in Chapter 5). Under Chief
Justice Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudhry, the Supreme Court became an activist court that
sought to right all kinds of alleged wrongs, including cases of politicised
appointments (see the Orya Maqbool Abbasi case in Chapter 5).24 But I do not
explore the appointment of judges or the network of patronage ties within the judicial
system or with actors outside it. I acknowledge that, as with police officials, there are
often close ties between district level judges and other judicial employees and local
influentials (see Nelson 2011), stressing that these ties are most likely to be useful
where illegal appointments are involved. However, as noted above, I did not add ‘the
judiciary’ as a separate area of investigation with respect to appointments (i.e. judicial
appointments). in this thesis, I focus strictly on the politics of bureaucratic
appointments within two areas of Punjab’s executive branch (irrigation and education)

24 For more on the role of the judiciary in Pakistan’s politics, see Newberg 2002; Ghias 2010; Cheema
2016.
– two areas where I was able to gain adequate access for my fieldwork, and two areas that, I believe, indicate broader trends within the political economy of bureaucratic appointments as a whole.

It may be a limitation of this thesis that I lacked the access and resources to explore appointment dynamics within the Police Service of Pakistan and/or the judiciary, and explore in any detail their interactions with other actors. This thesis is also limited in terms of its specific focus on Punjab rather than other provinces, as well as its lack of diachronic focus on the impact of various local government systems over the years and their impact on bureaucratic appointments in Pakistan. I believe that further research regarding these additional branches of the state, inter-provincial differences, and historical comparisons may serve to shed additional light on the conclusions reached in this thesis.25

**Politisation**

At ten o'clock I went to the President's house; but the Secretary of War was with him, and in the entry and rooms below and in the chambers above there were eight or ten solitary strollers to and fro, waiting for admission—all, except one member of Congress, wolves of the antechamber, prowling for offices.

- John Quincy Adams26

**Between Formal and Informal Institutions**

Before proceeding further, it is important to define the term ‘politisation’. Peters and Pierre (2004, 2) define it as ‘the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service’. Politicisation is not necessarily a bad thing, and in many countries discretionary (politicised) appointments are legal (the US and Germany, for example). However, as Peters and Pierre (2004, 2) acknowledge, there are cases where politicised appointments are extra-legal in the sense that they involve ‘personal, almost clientelistic, loyalties to ministers and other political leaders’ in

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25 Jauregui 2014 discusses patronage and the police with reference to northern India.
addition to ‘partisan allegiance’ in both the appointment of other bureaucrats and the delivery of services. Such extra-legal politicisation is based on the notion that ‘the best way to gain control over the [outputs of the] public bureaucracy is to have the capability of appointing one’s own faithful to positions that influence or control [here, the implementation of] public policy’ (Peters and Pierre 2004, 4).

My approach expands on the political science contributions of Peters and Pierre. First, Peters and Pierre (2004, 4) limit their attention to the scope of politicised appointments by suggesting that appointments are made ‘to positions that influence or control public policy’. While appointments to such posts would of course be very important in controlling the formulation of policy, this definition limits politicisation to posts at the senior-most tiers of any bureaucratic hierarchy. I take a more inclusive/expansive view, including appointments to posts that influence or control public policy making as well as posts that implement policy, directly redistribute state resources and services, and make their own bureaucratic appointments to lower tiers of the hierarchy.

Second, as political scientists focusing on what might be described as ‘the politics of politicisation’, Peters and Pierre (2004, 2) limit the process of politicisation to an exchange between ‘ministers and other political leaders’, on the one hand, and bureaucrats, on the other. Again, my view is different. In what follows, I see politicisation as an exchange between, not only politicians and bureaucrats, but also amongst bureaucrats. Here, ‘politicisation’ involves complex transactional bonds, but not only with elected elites.

Third, Peters and Pierre use phrases like ‘one’s own faithful’ (2004, 4) and ‘almost clientelistic’ (2004, 2), suggesting a hesitation to think about politicised appointments as transactional or patronage-based relationships. Like PAT, they view politicisation as a process in which politicians have the upper hand and are able to direct ‘faithful’ loyal bureaucrats like pawns on a chessboard. While I agree with Peters and Pierre that politicisation is a process of putting the right people in the right posts, I draw on political science notions of patronage to see it as a strategic transactional relationship. Actors accept politicised appointments because they stand to gain something from doing so. It is not one sided. The bureaucrat is not simply doing the politician a favour because he always likes him (or the party he belongs to). The relationship is situational and strategic.
When an actor joins an organisation, such as a political party or the bureaucracy, her behaviour is subject not only to binding formal rules, but also to informal norms established and enforced by members of the organisation. Formal rules define who can make bureaucratic appointments (politicised or otherwise) without fear of formal sanctions. However, politicisation often reflects the influence of those who do not have any formal powers to influence bureaucratic appointments. For instance, a Member of the National Assembly (MNA) has no legal right to influence teacher appointments in his constituency; however, relationships of patronage with those in charge of making such appointments (that is, mid-tier bureaucrats in the district) allow an MNA to influence – informally – which teachers are allocated to which posts. These appointments reflect transactional relationships developed through membership in informal networks.

Both formal and informal institutions, as formal and informal ‘rules of the game’, shape motivations (or ‘objectives’ as I refer to them throughout this thesis). Formal institutions include the constitution, the form of government (presidential, parliamentary, or hybrid), the division of powers, the party system, and other legal provisions or rules of business. Since this project deals specifically with administrative appointments within the executive branch of the state, the formal (rule-mandated) structure of the bureaucracy is particularly significant, as is the formal hierarchy built into the delegation of power in ministries and districts. Informal institutions involve ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, 727) – for example, informal networks and transactional bonds. Informal institutions often fill the gaps left by formal institutions. In South Asia, biraderi/caste/kinship ties are the most commonly identified informal networks across multiple settings. Though such ties do matter in a bureaucratic setting, I focus on professional networks, and to a lesser extent school, training, or university networks, as well as residential community networks because I found that many bureaucrats emphasised these more than kinship ties.

27 Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 727) define institutions as ‘rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behavior’.
28 See, for instance, Mohmand and Gazdar 2007; Martin 2016; and Javid 2012, Shami 2010, and Mohmand 2011.
Formally, there are three broad ways to make a bureaucratic appointment: legal, extra-legal, or illegal. 29 A legal appointment is one in which an individual is either (a) newly recruited to the service and assigned to a post, or, after completing the required term in office, (b) transferred to a post that is open to someone of his grade, (c) duly promoted to the next grade (in accordance with the seniority list), or (d) transferred to a post that is open to an official of his new grade. There are advantages to making legal appointments when an actor wants to achieve something (i.e. wants something delivered): a legal appointee is automatically on the moral and legal high ground as a ‘Mr Clean’ brought in to ensure that the system works as it should. (For junior officials, a superior who made it to his seat without any undue influence is a man that deserves a measure of respect. Whether s/he earns that respect is, of course, another matter.)

An extra-legal appointment is one that exploits a loophole or a gap in the formal rules. It takes a legal practice and extends it to circumstances outside its usual domain. For example, the designation ‘Officer on Special Duty’ is meant for officials awaiting posting but is often used as a punitive measure. ‘Additional charge’ appointments are meant to allow a bureaucrat to take on a second post temporarily till a suitable candidate can be found to fill it, but they are often held by bureaucrats for years. Extra-legal appointments are primarily about discretion - where the law provides for an ‘irregular’ appointment due to ‘the public interest’, a great deal of discretion lies with bureaucrats, who use it strategically. By walking the line between legal and illegal, such practices produce the most interesting machinations. There is also a degree of flexibility in making bureaucratic appointments without raising any flags for corruption or malfeasance. At the same time, such flexibility allows existing laws to stand so that they can be followed when this suits the actors in question.

Illegal appointments are those that clearly violate the formal rules, beyond mere manipulation. It is important to acknowledge that, although all the methods I categorise in this thesis as illegal break the rules, the form varies. Faking the signature of a senior official is a different form of illegal practice than using physical violence to intimidate.

29 See, for instance, Michelutti 2010, 2014; Gayer 2014; Piliavsky 2014; and Vaishnav 2017 on illegality in electoral politics and in everyday life in South Asia.
I do not categorise ‘extra-legal’ or ‘illegal’ appointments as ‘informal institutions’. Doing so would fall into the trap of treating informal institutions as a residual category in which everything that isn’t legal counts as an informal institution. Instead, I treat ‘extra-legal’ or ‘illegal’ appointments as methods of appointment, and I combine these methods with patronage relationships that exist beyond the state as ‘informal institutions’. These carefully curated transactional relationships are based on, for example, school groups, work networks, kinship, and so on. They shape the objectives that drive actors to make and accept extra-legal or illegal appointments.

Where the political science literature on bureaucracies considers bureaucratic appointments, it tends to concentrate on legal (even if politically motivated) appointments (for instance, a transfer when a new government takes the reigns – Golden 2003; Iyer and Mani 2012; Akhtari, et al. 2017) or on illegal appointments (for example, the sale of transfers – Wade 1984). A further strand of the literature explores bureaucratic performance without unpacking bureaucratic appointments at all (Callen, et al. 2013). This thesis goes further in three ways.

First, I provide a more complex view of legal and illegal appointments. For legal appointments, I argue that their legality does not preclude transactional patronage relationships. And, for illegal appointments, I explain that although junior bureaucrats might try to break the law to get (or make) an illegal appointment, they still turn to the same body of laws – as well as their department’s Efficiency & Discipline Wing (or the Services Tribunal) – to seek justice whenever their attempts are stymied by the behaviour of the other party.

Second, moving beyond both legal and illegal appointments, I identify loopholes in the federal and provincial regulations for bureaucratic appointments in order to show how politicians and bureaucrats exploit these loopholes to make extra-legal appointments in pursuit of their own objectives. In doing so, I focus not just on bureaucratic turnover as a consequence of political turnover (Golden 2003, Iyer and Mani 2012, Akhtari, et al. 2017), but also bureaucratic postings regardless of any change in political leadership. Third, I consider not just the initial recruitment of bureaucrats, but also their transfer, promotion, and patterns of irregular appointment (e.g. additional charge, OSD, etc. – see Chapter 2).

30 I see patronage relationships and objectives as coterminous, co-produced.
Furthermore, moving beyond the extensive focus on biraderi/kinship ties in both the political and the bureaucratic sphere (Nelson 2011; Michelutti 2010, 2014; Mohmand 2011; Martin 2016), I draw on extensive fieldwork to emphasise professional networks (and to a lesser extent, biraderi/kinship, school, training, and residential networks) as key links in relationships between politicians and bureaucrats or bureaucrats themselves.

In making politicised bureaucratic appointments, I find that the method most likely to produce successful outcomes (in light of a patron’s objectives) are extra-legal methods of appointment (as opposed to legal or illegal ones) – making my exploration of loopholes in government regulations a valuable contribution not just to the political science literature on South Asia, but also to the literature on the politics of bureaucracy more generally. That said, I further nuance my contribution by contending that (a) legal (and to some extent, extra-legal) methods are most likely to result in successful bureaucratic efficiency outcomes, (b) extra-legal methods are more likely to result in successful electoral gain outcomes, and (c) illegal (and to some degree, extra-legal) methods – typically involving fraud more than force (and, thus, typically steering clear of any direct engagement with the police and what is more commonly described in the literature on South Asia as ‘criminality’) – are more likely to produce successful personal enrichment and protection outcomes. In sum, I show how politicised appointments ensure the achievement of objectives well beyond electoral gain or career advancement.

A Case of Patronage

‘Patronage systems have been resilient historically in part because they can be impressively responsive to the objectives of those who control them – despots, criminals, modernizers, and progressives alike.’

- Grindle (2012, 38)

A brief note may help to explain why, building on the extant political science literature, I use the concept of ‘patronage’ (rather than ‘clientelism’) in the way I do. Gordin (2002, 516) points out the ambiguity of the term clientelism as it has been used in much of the political science literature, presenting it as an example of what Sartori (1970) calls ‘conceptual stretching’. Hopkin (2006, 2) adds that the term clientelism ‘creates confusion and controversy because of the wide and diverse range
of political exchanges which can be accommodated by the term’. In particular, Hopkin (2006, 3) differentiates between ‘‘old clientelism’’ and ‘new clientelism’, noting that ‘[o]ld clientelism’ ensures continuity at the level of traditional ties between peasants, landlords and politicians (or voters, party representatives and politicians)’ whereas new clientelism is regulated by utility, and, thus, by ‘‘economic’ or ‘market’ exchange” because the client is not entirely subservient to the patron, and, thus, is able to change patrons if it is to his benefit (Hopkin 2006, 4).

Hopkin’s vision of ‘new clientelism’ comes closer to the political science literature I draw on in this thesis. For Hopkin, political clientelism is ‘a form of direct exchange between citizens and holders of political authority’ (Hopkin, 2006, 5). He sees the relationship between the patron (for Hopkin, a political party) and the client (the voter) as mediated by local party representatives. Yet, even as Hopkin comes closer to the transactional understanding I adopt in this thesis, he leaves us with an overly simplistic view of ‘direct exchange’ (Hopkin, 2006, 5). In particular, he leaves us with a focus on delivery of votes in exchange for private, club, or public goods offered by the politician. In short, he that limits our appreciation for the various actors, relationships, and transactions that may be involved in the transactional relationships that interest us.

Though the terms are often used interchangeably, Kopecky (2011, 717) is careful to differentiate ‘patronage’ from ‘clientelism’ by arguing that, as in this thesis, ‘patronage appointments are not inherently clientelistic, since jobs can be handed out in order to control policy formulation and implementation, and not just to buy votes or reward organisational loyalty’. This distinction is crucial to this thesis. Within the political science literature, it is critical to stress that patronage appointments may involve the pursuit of outcomes other than electoral gain – for instance, bureaucratic efficiency, personal enrichment, and protection. Indeed, this distinction helps us to consider relationships that may involve actors other than the citizen (or voters).

However, as I will demonstrate at various points throughout this thesis, it is important to add a qualifier here. Even if an appointment is made to advance a particular policy aim, that does not preclude an interest in winning more votes or rewarding loyalty. In India, as in Pakistan, voting is often less about policy and more about the ability ‘to offer short-term highly specific inducements’ and ‘personal clientele followings’ (Wade 1985, 472). In such a situation, an appointment made with a policy outcome in
mind may also be about offering inducements or building a following. By Kopecky’s (2011, 717) own admission, job allocation (say, appointments) can be ‘used in a clientelistic way’, by placing certain people in positions where they can serve their own interests as well as those of their ‘patron’.

One approach to the distinction between the political science and a socio-anthropological understanding of patronage is addressed by Weingrod (1968, 379-380), who noted that, in sociological or anthropological work, patronage often refers to ‘how persons of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest and friendship, manipulate their relationships in order to attain their ends’. In the political science literature, however, the focus is often narrower – that is, ‘patronage is most clearly enunciated during election campaigns’ (Weingrod 1968, 379-80), for example, in the course of distributing goods in exchange for votes. Bearfield (2009, 66) notes that, as a result of this distinction, ‘acts of patronage that occur outside the context of a political party or machine receive little or no attention’ in the political science literature.

It is this gap in the political science literature, however, that this thesis seeks to fill, adding to the political science literature on patronage by looking at relationships between the political and bureaucratic elites (as well as amongst bureaucratic elites) – relationships in which informal ties between actors within the state and considerations both electoral and non-electoral figure prominently.

This thesis seeks to advance the political science literature on patronage, particularly as it is used in works on the bureaucracy (for instance, Kennedy 1987; Grindle 2012). It does not address the anthropological literature on patronage to the same extent (Scott 1972; Boissevain 1966; Lande 1973, Gupta 2006, 2012; etc.).

For the purposes of this thesis, a patronage relationship is ‘a more or less personalized relationship between [state] actors or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties, involving mutually beneficial transactions’ (Lemarchand and Legg 1972, 151-152). 31 Basically, a patronage relationship is like an employment relationship, but more personalised and, in bridging the gap between formal and informal institutions, not strictly contractual.

31 Piliavsky’s ‘Introduction’ to Patronage as Politics in South Asia (2014) provides an excellent overview of the literature on patronage with an additional focus on South Asia.
It is useful to break this concept down into its component parts and discuss them one by one.

By referring to patronage-based politicisation as a ‘personalized relationship between [state] actors’, I note that the patronage relationship is curated. It is not a natural bond, neither is it socially or officially mandated. Instead, it develops on personal time and due to personal initiative, motivated by the promise and prospect of ‘mutually beneficial transactions’.

The basis of any patronage relationship lies in its ‘conditional loyalties’. It is a transactional bond that is limited by the usefulness of each party to the other. If one party ceases to find the other useful in achieving his ends, the relationship will collapse. The impermanence of the patronage bond is, in part, due to the fact that it is based on ‘unequal wealth, status or influence’ or as Gilmartin (2014, 125) puts it, “unequal reciprocal exchange”. It is important, however, to make two clarifications here. The first is that although patronage ties involve inequality, this does not mean that one party is powerless. Patronage ties always involve transactional relationships of mutual dependence in which both sides of the equation contribute (Piliavsky 2014, 160) and face the implied hazards associated with breaking the bond of dependence. Piliavsky makes this point while exploring ties of patronage between politicians and voters, but it is also of significance in this project, where relationships unfold between state actors (politicians and bureaucrats) with distinct but often substantial powers. Second, the term ‘transaction’ does not mean a rigid contractual exchange that is either achieved or not. Instead, transactions are flexible and adaptable relations of exchange (Piliavsky 2014, 159).

Prior to forming a transactional or strategic relationship of patronage, patrons and clients must first know each other to the extent that (a) they understand what powers are available to the other, and, (b) they trust each other (somewhat). The ‘trust’ underpinning this patronage relationship is achieved through networks and repeated interactions, i.e. informal institutions. These networks/interactions/institutions provide the intervening connection between an actor who has the motivation to make a politicised appointment and a bureaucrat who is motivated to accept it. Though family, kinship, or biraderi networks are often highlighted in the literature (particularly with reference to lower-level bureaucratic appointments), I contend that professional or work networks and old school or training networks are
particularly important for links between politicians and senior or mid-tier bureaucrats, and especially between bureaucrats themselves. In particular, I found that professional ties between senior bureaucrats and their subordinates were central to the formation of intra-state patronage bonds and the exchange of favours between them.

By professional or work networks, I mean relationships formed as a result of working together in the same department or area (e.g. on the same project). Training and school networks refer to a shared past at a training academy, school or college. For example, old Aitchisonians\textsuperscript{32} watch out for each other, while Government College Lahore alumni often maintain close contacts.\textsuperscript{33} These ties are different to familial, kinship, and biraderi ties because people are not born into them. Neither are they members by virtue of belonging to a particular social class. Both work and old school networks require effort to build them up, to establish trust, and to decide which ties will be most useful when making bureaucratic appointments. Consequently, the relationships of patronage (indeed, the ‘informal institutions’) that interest me are strategic – actors curate them in ways that benefit themselves.

**Objectives**

So, what are the objectives that push actors to make bureaucratic appointments? What are the objectives behind bureaucrats accepting politicised appointments? In this section, I explore this question of objectives and note that the desired ‘outcome’ need not be a ‘public good’ with any direct benefit to the citizenry as a whole. It could be a ‘private good’ targeted at a relatively small group of people like the politician’s or the bureaucrat’s own family or colleagues – even the politician or bureaucrat himself.

In this context, an objective is something that motivates an individual to make a particular decision. I argue that the objectives behind making bureaucratic appointments have to do with a desire to ‘deliver’ specific ‘outcomes’. A bureaucrat’s objective in accepting a politicised appointment involve what I call career ‘stability’. Both sets of objectives are shaped by formal and informal constraints on each actors’

\textsuperscript{32} Aitchison College is an elite boys’ school in Lahore, Punjab founded during the colonial era.

\textsuperscript{33} See the work of Soufia Siddique, PhD Oxford
behaviour – that is, (1) the rules (formal or informal) that regulate their behaviour, and (2) the expectations that others (voters, colleagues, citizens) tend to have of them.\textsuperscript{34}

**What Politicians Want**

Like politicians everywhere (Geddes 1994), Punjab’s politicians are preoccupied with winning elections. To do so they adopt a range of measures to insulate themselves from defeat. Specifically, they influence bureaucratic appointments so they can (1) regulate bureaucratic performance, (2) acquire electoral gains, and (3) enrich themselves and their cronies through the targeted distribution of state resources (while protecting themselves and their cronies from any stringent form of accountability; Nelson 2011). For politicians, the objective behind influencing appointments (so as to demand ‘delivery’) is often an electoral one. But of course politicians may be seeking forms of personal benefits as well.

Due to the complex nature of political competition\textsuperscript{35} in Pakistan, involving both party-based and independent candidates, politicians know very well that people do not always vote for them because of their ideological leanings. The poor electoral performance of religious parties, despite the religiosity of the public, speaks to this point. Equally, winning an election is not always dependent on one’s party label (contra Wilder 1999). The remarkable success of candidates who have switched parties a few months prior to election day, and the success of candidates contesting as independents, particularly when their opponent is an established politician, suggests that party labels are not always essential. What then determines who gets the vote, if it is not ideological or party affiliation? I argue that people vote for politicians who offer the best ‘delivery’ of resources (see also Nelson 2011 on the ‘delivery’ of impunity services in the context of local disputes, and Piliavsky 2014 on how politicians woo voters in rural north India). A politician’s ability to influence bureaucratic appointments is crucial to the ‘delivery’ underpinning electoral success. Provincial politicians in Pakistan know that, ideally, their primary objective should be to legislate, but they disproportionately focus on the kind of delivery that is ordinarily the domain of local government. In Pakistan, the most successful politician

\textsuperscript{34} For more on this point, see Geddes 1994.

\textsuperscript{35} For more detail, see Mufti 2016.
(electorally speaking) is not the great legislator, but the one who gets things done with a cooperative bureaucrat on his side.

Keeping this in mind, I divide the objectives behind politicians making bureaucratic appointments into three types: bureaucratic efficiency interests, personal political and electoral gain interests, and personal enrichment (and protection) interests.

**Bureaucratic Efficiency Interests**

The objectives behind influencing bureaucratic appointments while holding a senior public office (for example, as a minister or a state minister) differ somewhat from the objectives of an ordinary constituency politician. A prominent political position brings with it specific responsibilities and risks, including a stake in ensuring that the party as a whole does well, and a great deal of scrutiny from the media. In addition to the concerns of every constituency politician (keeping voters happy and retaining their votes), the priorities of senior office holders include (1) the implementation of policies for which they have been put in charge (including performance management) and (2) maintaining the image of the party and its leadership with regard to governance. These priorities provide the motivation to influence bureaucratic appointments above and beyond the ‘bureaucratic performance’ interests that all constituency politicians pursue when they influence bureaucratic appointments. To sum up, senior politicians politicise appointments to facilitate policy implementation, monitoring, and image maintenance.

**Personal Political and Electoral Gain Interests**

Private political interests can be of two types: votes, or resource delivery to a narrow group not much larger than the politician’s own community. In some cases, the only reason a politician has to appoint a particular bureaucrat is that that bureaucrat will carry the votes of the bureaucrat’s own extended family into the next election. This usually happens in smaller communities for posts at the lower end of the bureaucratic scale where politicians and bureaucrats are deeply rooted in the day-to-day life of a community.
More common are bureaucratic appointments made to achieve private political interests through the regulation of resources within a community. In such cases, the politician aims to win over parts of his constituency (either his strongholds or parts of the constituency where his hold is weak) by ensuring that they (rather than others) get a new road or electrification, or that they (rather than others) are advantaged when teachers are hired, or that they (rather than others) get more funding for the repair of school buildings. The politician will ‘deliver’ these outcomes by making bureaucratic appointments to positions that will influence decisions regarding the distribution of resources. For example, influencing appointments to the post of district budgetary officer for School Education means that the politician can direct funds towards particular schools (to the detriment of other areas). Personal political outcomes of this sort are the concern of local politicians. Consequently, these politicians maintain close ties with district bureaucrats, with substantial motivation to influence their appointments.

**Personal Enrichment and Protection Interests**

Finally, personal interests have to do with the delivery of resources to a narrow section of the population – the politician himself and his family or immediate community. This may involve laying a sewage line in the politician’s own neighbourhood, getting a relative a telephone connection, getting a relative a contract to provide for a local government school canteen, or getting a family member a government job. The bureaucracy tends to give citizens (even elected ones) the run around, embroiling them in endless red tape. The politicians I spoke to expressed annoyance at the number of trips they would have to make to request that bureaucrats fulfil even legitimate demands (the draining of flood water from the politician’s own street, for example). Appointing a trusted bureaucrat in the right post can make these tasks much easier to achieve, thereby providing the politician with a personal benefit from public office.

Personal ‘protection’ interests are the means by which politicians ensure that they avoid the taint of criminal or legal proceedings (for instance, in land or water disputes), accountability investigations (by the National Accountability Bureau [NAB] or the provincial Anti-Corruption Establishment [ACE]) or accusations of any activity that may be considered illegal. It is rare for politicians to actually face any
consequences for their misdeeds, but with the massive growth of the media in Pakistan, even small forms of malfeasance are subject to a 24-hour news cycle and close scrutiny on social media. Though such allegations, even if proven, may only marginally impact a politician’s vote share, they do damage his reputation. Such damage has become more meaningful in the last few years with a political party known as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf providing vociferous anti-corruption opposition and the PMLN demonstrating an increasing awareness of their public image. For instance, a PMLN MNA from Lahore, who was also holding a ministerial post at the time, was investigated for gas theft and found guilty during his term in office (2008-2013). Though the politician won his seat comfortably in 2013, he was removed from his federal ministerial position and never offered one again. Protection from such investigations with the help of a loyal bureaucrat is, therefore, valuable to politicians since it can result in the preservation of perks and privileges.

The growth of the media has introduced some limits on the protection that can be afforded to politicians and bureaucrats. For example, a news channel (ARY) released a video of provincial Minister Rana Mashood allegedly accepting a bribe as NAB initiated multiple investigations against him. The minister then came under immense pressure to resign from multiple ministerial posts. For the moment, Mr Mashood remains Minister for School Education while the cases against him are pending. But, in such cases, even the ability to delay the course of accountability investigations is a valuable form of protection (on such delays, see Nelson 2011).

Appointments to accountability organisations such as NAB and the provincial ACE have been particularly fraught for many years. For the post of NAB Chairman, each successive federal government has sought to appoint someone who is likely to overlook their misdeeds (while pursuing those of their opponents). The provincial ACE has also been hamstrung by a shortage of investigators or the appointment of

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36 For instance, during a fumigation drive in schools in summer 2015, I observed that the bureaucrat in charge was more concerned about whether or not photos had been taken of the process for the CM and the press rather than whether the process had actually been thorough.

37 This video is available online at: <https://tune.pk/video/4488096/rana-mashood-caught-red-handed-while-taking-bribe-leaked-video> [Accessed 25 April 2017].


unqualified and ‘disinterested’ candidates by the provincial Services & General Administration Department (Interview 131).

What Bureaucrats Want

Exploring the motivations of bureaucrats is important because at any given moment, a bureaucrat is being influenced by multiple actors (Moe 1987; 2005)– his family and friends, his departmental superior, his batch mates and professional networks, businessmen, politicians, political fixers, and the courts. Each bureaucrat sets up his own hierarchy of demands depending on his particular motivations and then, he forms bonds with the actors who can help him achieve his goals. Therefore, as with politicians, I divide the objectives bureaucrats have to make appointments into three types: (a) official bureaucratic efficiency and performance interests; (b) personal political and electoral gain interests, and (c) personal enrichment and protection interests.

Though required to be neutral, many bureaucrats (at both the senior and mid-tier levels) have regional (village, constituency, district), political (party or independent), and personal (self, friends, families, cronies) affiliations that they try to service through the appointment of like-minded bureaucrats. Some bureaucrats also have political aspirations (local, provincial, or national government), and these can provide the motivation for influencing appointments. However, more often, the objective behind influencing an appointment is an official one – for example, appointing a skilled bureaucrat to manage a new project.

Bureaucratic Efficiency Interests

A bureaucrat’s job is to ensure that policies, once passed into law (where necessary), are implemented. Often, influencing the appointment of other bureaucrats is a means of ensuring the proper implementation of a policy or the proper monitoring of officials. Such ‘monitoring’ or ‘performance management’ appointments are

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40 Sumra, A. ACE riddled with dishonest, disinterested officials: DG. 2 July 2010. The Express Tribune. Available at: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/25144/ace-riddled-with-dishonest-disinterested-officials-dg/> [Accessed 6 June 2017]. At the departmental level, ministers may seek to influence appointments to posts in charge of department monitoring, discipline, and accountability. Successfully regulating appointments to these posts can allow ministers to make demands of department bureaucrats while protecting them from any investigation or consequence.
common when it comes to senior department posts at the secretariat level (PAS officers) or a department’s district-level posts (mid-tier bureaucrats).

Notwithstanding a move toward higher salaries and benefits commensurate with equivalent private sector postings for senior bureaucrats, the pay and benefits for the bulk of the bureaucracy are not at a sufficient level to drive exceptional performance. Despite that, and in difficult circumstances, many bureaucrats continue to carry out their duties to the best of their ability. This behaviour is explained by Akerlof and Kranton (2005) who contend that those who ‘identify’ with their work or firm (or their bosses) are more likely to put in greater effort to achieve organisational goals.\footnote{See also Wilson 1989; Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole 1999; Prendergast 2007; Benabou and Tirole 2006 and Besley and Ghatak 2005.}

**Personal Political and Electoral Gain Interests**

Though most bureaucrats will not admit it, many have established party affiliations that impact their official behaviour. In the case of senior officials in Punjab, there have been cases of bureaucrats resigning to start political careers or doing so after retirement (for example, one of the sitting MPAs in Rawalpindi retired from the civil service and contested elections; a civil servant who held the post of Chief Secretary Punjab, now retired, is also planning to launch a political party). Such political interests may cause bureaucrats to influence appointments to benefit specific constituencies.

**Personal Enrichment and Protection Interests**

Though bureaucrats are supposed to be neutral in implementing policy, in fact they are embedded in networks and relationships just like other actors. In some cases, bureaucrats have close ties to their home district and, where they are able, they will make appointments to benefit that district or the people in particular parts of it. Personal interests are also at play in appointment decisions for lower tier posts at the district level (for instance teachers, \textit{patwaris}, \textit{baildaars}, etc). Another example is where a bureaucrat owns land and wants to appoint officials who will re-direct water to that land, or fudge the local land records for him (Nelson 2011).
Why Do Bureaucrats Accept a Politicised Appointment?

*Mera too baap aisa nahin hai, mujhe too baap dhoondhna parre ga* (My father is not like that, I will have to search for a father [i.e. a patron]).

- Interview 18, a bureaucrat from a well-connected family, recounting remarks made to her by a colleague

Positions in the bureaucracy are permanent – a bureaucrat can be appointed all over the country or province, but she cannot be dismissed barring exceptional circumstances. So, if the job and pension are guaranteed, what do bureaucrats want? Bureaucrats want stability. They may not lose their jobs, but experiences of serving in the bureaucracy vary immensely depending on specific appointments.

When asked why they joined the bureaucracy, senior officers tend to say what you expect to hear – to make a difference in the country, to bring justice for all, to right the wrongs they saw being committed since they were six years old. Mid-tier officials, however, are more honest. They tell you they joined because they were not sufficiently qualified or connected for private sector jobs, because the civil service means you have a guaranteed job and a pension, and so forth. Still, they want a relatively smooth career, facilitated by a patron, moving from one good post to another, getting promoted on time, and retiring in due course at the top of the bureaucratic ladder. They do not want to be the sort of bureaucrat who fails to adapt (to political and bureaucratic pressure): those bureaucrats find that their promotions are endlessly delayed, they are not regularised (meaning they are not guaranteed pensions), they are transferred with their families to lawless or backward areas, or they are given the status of an Officer on Special Duty (OSD).

As many officials point out, everybody wants coveted appointments, comfortable housing, good schools and colleges in big cities like Lahore or Faisalabad, as well as a reasonable commute to work. The simplest way to ensure such stability is for a bureaucrat to find a patron – either a politician or a senior bureaucrat – who will support them. And, in exchange for delivering the desired ‘outcomes’ of their patron, they want a comfortable life.

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42 However, there are various means of disciplining bureaucrats who are non-compliant – punitive transfers and special duties, for example.

43 Wilson 1989 found that career concerns are primary amongst bureaucrats in the US.
Of course, not all bureaucrats indulge in informal relationships with politicians and bureaucrats to deliver the outcomes desired by their patrons. Some take pride in remaining (or claiming to remain) aloof; they usually differentiate themselves from the hoi polloi in terms of their education and training (engineers, for example). However, even so called ‘principled’ bureaucrats are mired in a system that creates incentives for patronage-based transactional behaviour. Wade (1985, 484) reports something similar – ‘[e]ven within the same person, the sense of propriety and professional integrity, the sense of remorse and shame, are subject to alteration and ambivalence’. Though the person may be unwilling to perform illegal acts, they often turn to extra-legal means as a way to ‘get things done’ without tarnishing their clean image. This disconnect is intriguing. A bureaucrat will in one breath condemn others for bringing in an ‘influential’ to pressure their superior for a transfer and then, call up a senior bureaucrat regarding their housing file and ask if a visit from the minister would be sufficient to move it along faster. I argue that such seemingly contradictory behaviour is the result of knowing that, for all her upright behaviour and honesty, she will not have the career stability she craves if she does not accept a politicised appointment when offered one (using the reciprocal exchange underpinning it to exert a bit of extra pressure where possible).

This is a project that seeks to nuance our understanding of how government works in Pakistan, and particularly in its most prosperous and stable province, Punjab. Thus far I have argued that understanding ‘strategic patronage bonds’ is key to understanding politicised appointments. The nature of these bonds (‘strong’ or ‘diffuse’ as a function of bureaucrats’ and politicians’ objectives as well as the method of bureaucratic appointment) determines the degree to which a patron is able to achieve (or not) the outcomes he seeks.
Bonds

Strategic and transactional (‘patronage’) ties produce important bonds, but these bonds vary in type and strength. And, in this project, I draw special attention to the fact that this variation results from two factors, namely (1) the objective sought in making a politicised appointment (see above), and (2) the method employed to make the appointment: legal, extra-legal, or illegal (see below). In other words, different permutations of patron objectives, and appointment methods produce different kinds of bonds: strong or diffuse. Throughout the empirical chapters of this thesis, I connect expected ‘outcomes’ (bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal enrichment or protection) to (1) the relationship between patrons and bureaucratic appointees that forms the basis of a strategic patronage bond; and (2) that bond’s relative strength or diffusion.

Traditionally discussions of social relations in South Asia have focused on biraderi or kinship, but in the course of my research I found that strategic and transactional patronage bonds between patrons and bureaucratic appointees were most frequently based on professional or work relationships arising out of politicians and

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44 Grindle (1977, 40), in her study of the Mexico bureaucracy, proposes four tools of patronage that allow an individual to move up the bureaucratic hierarchy – trust, lever, team, and clique.

45 The term ‘strong bond’ is used by John Malcolm (1832, II, 52-53) to describe the ties bureaucrats would form with Maratha princes and ministers to avoid being penalised for ‘errors and crimes’ (Guha 2014, 112).
bureaucrats having served in departments or districts together (and to a lesser extent on training, school or university networks). This is not to say that ties of biraderi and kinship do not exist – they do. However, I found them to be less significant than I had expected, with the exception of cases where bureaucrats sought personal outcomes through illegal appointments.

Work relationships produce ties of trust, reliance, and mentorship, particularly when initiated in the formative years of a bureaucrat’s career, and these ties led to the formation of particular bonds. In some cases, it was intriguing to note that relationships were based on a political patron’s perception of (i) a bureaucrat’s attitude toward, or working relationship with, political opponents or (ii) a bureaucrats’ reputation based on experience, merit, or neutrality. The evidence of these ties emerged in bureaucrats’ career trajectories, in the protection, support, and guidance that was offered to them by their patrons, and, then, in the bureaucrats’ interaction with his patron’s opponents.

It is not possible to quantify these relationships. For instance, it would be misleading to claim that bureaucrats serving together in three separate places have a stronger relationship than bureaucrats who have served together in only two areas. This is because the strength or weakness of a relationship is not contingent on the number of appointments held together, but rather on the nature of particular ties. For elite PAS members, for instance, the socialisation that officers undergo during training, the appointments they hold in the early years of their career, and their record of crisis management (or policy and project implementation) is key to understanding their ties with bureaucratic colleagues and with political patrons. Amongst more precarious mid-tier and junior bureaucrats, it is an ability to navigate between political pressures and performance expectations that matters.

The strength or diffusion of the patronage bond is a function of the motivation the appointed bureaucrat has to pursue the patron’s objective, and the method whereby he was appointed. Growing out of these two elements, the bond is a measure of the commitment with which an appointed bureaucrat works toward achieving his patron’s goals. Where the bond is strong, the appointed bureaucrat will pursue the target set by the patron with more determination than where the bond is diffuse. Again, the strength or diffusion of the bond is based on (i) the match between

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46 Trust (and mentorship and reliance) are ‘founded on reputation and knowing who a particular person is’ (Mines 2014, 41).
appointment objectives and method, (ii) the sustainability of the bond, and (iii) its vulnerability to various spoilers.

Figure 2: Patron Objectives and Appointment Methods for Strong Bonds and Successful Outcomes

The reason that legal appointments are likely to produce stronger bureaucratic efficiency outcomes is due to the match between particular objectives and the appointment method – resulting in a strong bond. These legal appointments are made for the ‘delivery of competence’ and the bureaucrat will typically be asked to ‘deliver’ within the ambit of his formal job description (policy implementation, district or department management, and project delivery). In contrast, illegal appointments are a poor choice for improving bureaucratic efficiency due to their inherent risks – scrutiny and reversal. In fact, I could find no examples of an illegal appointment made to achieve a bureaucratic efficiency outcome.

Where extra-legal appointments are made with the expectation of improving bureaucratic efficiency, however, outcomes are usually delivered. They are delivered because, where patrons expend some effort to have bureaucrats appointed to particular posts, the expectation is that (reciprocally) the appointee will expend some effort to achieve the patron’s expected efficiency outcome. The appointee, for example, will be expected to cut a few corners to achieve the target set by the patron in return for his extra-legal (rule-bending) appointment, and this element of exchange makes the bonds between patrons and appointees not only stronger, but in many cases also more
sustainable than in cases of legal appointments. Furthermore, though patrons provide support to legal appointees when necessary for the achievement of expected outcomes, the level of support and protection provided to extra-legal appointees is often greater.

Electoral gain outcomes are also more likely to be achieved when the method of appointment is extra-legal. A patron seeking electoral gain will rely on his professional network to find a bureaucrat who is not just willing to accept an appointment that bends the rules, but who, once appointed, will be ready to reciprocate. This reciprocity would involve going beyond his formal duties and acting in ways that may not be entirely in accordance with regulations, in order to enable his patron to achieve his electoral objectives – for instance, the provision of government jobs for the patron’s voters, supporters, and loyalists. It is the reciprocal exchange inherent in extra-legal appointments that often produces strong bonds of patronage rooted in professional networks between individual patrons and bureaucrats – both sides gain from the relationship.

Illegal appointments made for electoral gain outcomes, on the other hand, tend to produce diffuse bonds. Though these bonds may be based on political loyalty or even kinship, it is often (though not always) difficult for patrons to ensure that their objectives are achieved. Once an illegal appointment is made, the patron has no way of enforcing the appointed bureaucrat’s compliance with his electoral gain outcome. It is, in fact, quite likely that the appointee will not continue to support the patron electorally once he has acquired the (illegal) appointment he wanted. The patron, in turn, cannot compel the bureaucrat, or the bureaucrat’s family, to vote for him, and if the patron tries to report the illegal appointment, he implicates himself in wrong doing. Therefore, illegal appointments made in pursuit of electoral gains can tip the balance in favour of the appointed bureaucrat, potentially leaving the patron at a disadvantage with regard to the outcome he is seeking.

Electoral gain outcomes can also be achieved by making bulk extra-legal or illegal appointments to benefit voters and loyalists, but again these appointments do not establish one-to-one relationships between a patron and an appointee. Here again, the bond is diffuse – the patron is not usually in a position to call upon one of the bulk appointees to ensure they fulfil their side of the bargain; instead, patrons must trust that the appointee will continue to vote for him.
Similarly, where electoral gain and personal enrichment or protection outcomes are sought through legal appointments, ‘delivery’ requires appointees to exceed the requirements of their job description. However, since patrons do not have to go out of their way to (legally) appoint a bureaucrat, they have relatively little leverage to force appointees to ‘deliver’ (should they chose not to do so). Furthermore, in these situations, the bureaucrat always has alternative (legal) avenues open to him, should his patron become too demanding. As such, legal methods are quite unlikely to result in electoral gain outcomes and will only rarely – and at best temporarily – result in personal enrichment or protection outcomes.

Outcomes of personal gain and protection are well-served by extra-legal appointments too. Bonds in these cases are strong. Both parties seek to benefit over a period of time and, thus, a sustainable strong bond is needed to achieve the expected personal gain or protection outcome. Conventionally, illegal appointments are also believed to be very effective in achieving personal gain and protection outcomes. However, where money and employment are the desired outcomes, the story is more complex. Where money is involved, illegal appointments tend to produce bonds that are transactional but short lived: money is exchanged for the appointment and the relationship comes to an end. The bond in these cases is diffuse since it is not a sustainable one that brings long-term gains. Where an illegal appointment is made so that jobs can become available to the patron’s family/friends/cronies (a longer-term outcome), it can produce strong bonds, typically based on kinship. However, the enterprise is inherently risky. One of the parties in the relationship of patronage may renege, for instance, and the risk of discovery is high. If discovered, the illegal appointment will be reversed by the relevant department or court, and the personal gain outcome will fail.

The connections between objectives, bonds, and outcomes laid out above allow us to understand how bureaucratic appointments are used to produce particular outcomes. However, as the following chapters clearly reveal, these patterns are also shaped by a recent centralisation of power within the Punjab provincial government. Increasingly, patrons who are closely connected to the Chief Minister are more likely to be able to make legal and extra-legal appointments (and less commonly, illegal appointments). Mid-tier bureaucrats (while excluded from the CM’s kitchen cabinet)
have sufficient officially mandated powers to be able to make (in limited cases) legal and extra-legal appointments. However, politicians without access to the centre find that avenues of legal and extra-legal appointment are typically closed. They have no official standing to make bureaucratic appointments, and without the CM’s backing and intervention, they do not have the power to bend the rules to make extra-legal appointments either. Therefore, for instance, a politician outside the CM’s kitchen cabinet will not be able to make legal or extra-legal appointments for electoral gain, or personal gain and protection outcomes.

**Figure 3: Patrons without Access to the Centre: Their Objectives and Methods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patron Objectives</th>
<th>Appointment Method</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Efficiency</td>
<td>Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Gain</td>
<td>Extra-legal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal Enrichment</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>&amp; Protection</td>
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</tbody>
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Of necessity, patrons lacking access to the CM’s inner circle must (a) form one-on-one transactional relationships that produce unsustainable bonds and limited or temporary outcomes, or (b) employ illegal methods of appointment. Even employing illegal methods of appointment, however, does not always produce desired outcomes. Where state resources (for example, a sewage line, telephone or electricity connection) are sought as personal-gain outcomes (but on a limited scale, e.g. a few households, a village at most), strong bonds based on kinship or political loyalties may allow the expected outcome to be achieved. This is because it is likely that the illegally appointed bureaucrat and/or his family/friends may benefit, themselves, from the provision of these resources. However, where personal financial gain is the
illegal appointments often produce diffuse, temporary, transactional bonds. The appointment is made on the understanding that money will be exchanged for it, but the risk of discovery is high. It is possible that one party will rat out the other, perhaps to the media or to a more senior bureaucrat, or that someone else will report the illegal appointment in exchange for cash. Therefore, personal financial gain outcomes are not typically achieved through illegal appointments amongst patrons without access to the CM’s inner circle.

To sum up, this thesis contends that the interaction of objective, method, and bond determines whether or not a patron is likely to achieve intended outcomes when making a politicised bureaucratic appointment. Broadly speaking, bureaucratic efficiency outcomes are best served by making bureaucratic appointments through legal methods, and to some extent through extra-legal methods; electoral gain outcomes are most likely when extra-legal methods of appointment are used, and to a rather limited extent, illegal methods; personal enrichment and protection outcomes are most likely when illegal methods are used, and to some extent extra-legal ones. However, these patterns are significantly impacted by the patron’s connections to the CM and his kitchen cabinet. Politicians standing outside the CM’s inner circle have little recourse to legal or extra-legal methods of appointment, and so must depend on illegal methods. Whilst these methods make electoral gain and personal enrichment and protection outcomes achievable (though with substantial risks and potential setbacks), they are not at all useful for bureaucratic efficiency outcomes. For bureaucrats lacking access to the CM and his inner circle, it may still be possible to make legal and extra-legal appointments in pursuit of bureaucratic efficiency outcomes simply due to the legal powers that rest with them. However, these bureaucrats must rely on illegal methods for personal enrichment and protection.

In order to illuminate these patterns (see Figures 2 and 3 above), all three empirical chapters in this thesis are divided into two main sections: Section A deals with the CM and patrons (politicians and bureaucrats) with access to him; Section B deals with patrons (politicians and bureaucrats) who lack this type of access to the CM and his kitchen cabinet.
Research Methodology

Briefly, before concluding, it is important to say just a few words about my research methods and how I collected my data. This thesis is based on qualitative research in Punjabi, Urdu, and English – interviews and semi-participatory ethnography (conducted between September 2014 and September 2015, as well as some follow-up interviews in December 2015 and August 2016), in addition to data-mining from the archives of English-language daily newspapers and court judgements.

In all, I conducted 159 interviews – bureaucrats (serving and retired), politicians, journalists, academics, and political observers. My respondents varied immensely in their age, status, and personality. Politicians were most likely to speak either in whispers or in indirect terms – ‘aap ko pata hi ho ga’ (you must already know) – always wary of being overheard by the media or voters. Amongst bureaucrats, generally, the older they were the more forthcoming I found them to be in terms of sketching out the realities of politician-bureaucrat, and bureaucrat-bureaucrat interaction. Being retired, or close to retirement, gives bureaucrats at all levels (from those occupying large air-conditioned offices to those sitting in small rooms surrounded by files) a certain daring. Though they will rarely admit their own fault in an incident, they will give you an accurate picture of the complexities of the bureaucratic career (see, for example, Interviews 7, 8, 20, 23, 43, 44, 76, and 118). Those who go on leave, quit the service, or are made OSD make interesting interlocutors as well. Their distance from the service allows them to be more introspective and critical – again, such interviews were crucial to this thesis (Interviews 77, 16, and 75 – all PAS officers).

PAS bureaucrats at the height of their career tend to be much more reserved – even when they trusted me enough to admit a certain ‘political economy of bureaucratic appointments’, they did so with a lack of detail to ensured they could not be implicated in any wrongdoing. Some mid-tier bureaucrats were similarly reserved, wary of my intentions, and afraid for their jobs. Others seemed to find relief in telling me about the extra-legal and illegal activities of their peers and seniors, even if they did so in whispers behind closed doors. Street-level bureaucrats were the most forthcoming. It was at this level that intimidation by politicians and members of the armed forces was openly talked about. However, these conversations also took place
behind closed doors, and only after I had provided extensive reassurances regarding my research, intentions, and confidentiality guarantees.

Though the bulk of my interviews took place in Lahore, I also conducted interviews in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Narowal, Hafizabad, and Sargodha. I had very limited contacts amongst my target respondents when I started my fieldwork, so many of my interviews were the result of cold calls to bureaucrats and politicians. Once I got an interview, I used the ‘snowball’ technique to get more, asking one interviewee to refer me to another. Most of my respondents were intensely generous with their time and knowledge, patiently answering my questions about their work and experiences while referring me to colleagues past and present. The interview guides I developed before starting my fieldwork are provided in Appendix 3. I began by conducting some test interviews – interviews with bureaucrats in the training academies who I had not identified as being essential to my research. After these test interviews, I refined my list of questions to make them more targeted. As a result, some questions from the interview guide were condensed or dropped, or only asked where circumstances allowed. For instance, I dropped questions on policy development within political parties as well as questions on the detailed bureaucratic processes involved in conducting elections. Furthermore, though I initially asked bureaucrats open-ended questions about their responsibilities, I soon switched to asking more targeted questions about specific tasks – for example, what is the criteria for determining whether or not a transfer request made by a school teacher will be granted and who determines it? Or who is responsible for checking water outlets from irrigation canals and ensuring they are properly maintained?

My fieldwork revealed that structured interviews were less effective than semi-structured interviews and semi-participant observation (i.e. observation in which I was an evident presence, but played no direct part). There are a couple of reasons for this. The first is that most of my interviews were constantly interrupted – by the telephone, by the interviewee’s staff, and by ordinary citizens. That meant that not only did my interviewees lose the thread of my questions while they dealt with a work crisis or a sifarish, my interviewee also lost the thread of their answer. Furthermore, the interruptions were often interesting in themselves and offered their own line of questioning that I would often pursue. For instance, my interview with the Secretary Higher Education (Interview 42) was interrupted by two men with a sifarish (see
Chapter 5). As I watched the request being made, and the bureaucrat’s response, I changed the tack of my questioning to address what had just happened.

I also found that tactics or strategies I used in interviewing one politician or bureaucrat did not work with another. Some were more willing to accept me and my questions (for example, Interview 17, 41, 45, 89), others required more reassurance (Interview 66, 133, 53). Some would question me before they allowed me to question them (Interview 27, 38). Some were more willing to tell me personal stories (Interview 9, 14, 18, 30, 39, 47, 49, 100), others clammed up without saying much (Interview 3, 37, 50, 52, 88, 128). Finally, I gained the most through my observation of the comings and goings in the offices of bureaucrats and politicians. The proceedings I observed (or expected but did not observe, e.g. the absence of money changing hands in return for favours, as well as the general absence of biraderi relationships in establishing relationships amongst higher-level bureaucrats) helped me to verify/triangulate what I had read and what I had been told in other interviews.

There were two main sites for my fieldwork – the offices of the Punjab School Education Department and the Punjab Irrigation Department in both Lahore and Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Narowal, Hafizabad, and Sargodha. These offices varied immensely in type (size, style, comfort, staff) depending on the status of the occupant. The Irrigation Department’s Secretariat in Lahore is a new building, cool and quiet inside with a number of large halls containing desks for junior officials or stacks for files. Offices in the building for more senior officials (PAS and specialist officers) are large and comfortable. In the other districts, however, Irrigation Department offices are in poor condition, with mismatched furniture, an irregular supply of electricity, dusty stacks of paper on every surface, and paint peeling from the walls. The School Education Department’s Secretariat in Lahore is not like the Irrigation Department’s Secretariat. It is a shabby old building in a complex with other departmental offices. The largest office is occupied by the Secretary. Other offices, with a large desk and a few chairs, are functional rather than luxurious – there is too much traffic for time or money to be wasted in decorating them. In each of the other districts, attempts have been made to set up an ‘education complex’ consolidating all of the education-related offices in one area. Though the buildings seem new, many offices inside are dark and dingy.

47 Details of these interviewees are available in Appendix 1.
Interviews with senior (PAS) bureaucrats were generally conducted in the comfort of air-conditioned/heated, marble-floored offices with massive desks, and numerous staff members available to carry out their boss’s every request. Interview 89, for example, was conducted in the Secretary Irrigation’s enormous, beautifully appointed office. Mid-tier bureaucrats have offices that are far less luxurious – there is no marble, the furniture is mismatched and unpolished, and the office and their staff (if they have any) are often shared between a number of officials. For example, Interview 49, a Section Officer in the School Education Department, shared a tiny, dusty office with another Section Officer; their office was filled with mismatched chairs and piles of paperwork, sharing a tea boy and other staff with all of the other offices on the floor. My meetings with junior and street-level bureaucrats were often conducted in meeting rooms or in large halls where they shared desks, and files, papers, and computers and printers jostled for space with the human beings. Interview 154, an SDO in Sargodha, spoke to me in a meeting room crowded with his colleagues, and Interview 159 (a Section Officer in the Irrigation Department) was forced to lower his voice while speaking to me since only a flimsy partition separated his desk from several others in a large hall. Visits to the smaller districts like Narowal and Hafizabad involved visiting offices that were smaller, more decrepit, and often without electricity for hours on end.

The School Education Department is responsible for primary and secondary education provision and, to that end, employs roughly 400,000 people across the province, including teachers, head teachers, administrative staff, and Class IV employees (peon, guards, etc.). As the largest employer in the province, handling the largest number of appointments, this department was crucial for my research. The sheer number of posts available within the department at any given time make it a primary site for politicised appointments, and the department’s spread makes monitoring difficult. Furthermore, teaching staff often take on responsibilities beyond the school room – they are typically frontline staff during the census and delimitation exercises, and polling staff during elections. This makes appointments in this department even more critical. In recent years, numerous reforms have been introduced, funded by donors such as DFID and under the close monitoring of the CM, to improve access, efficiency, and quality of education provision, including a specific focus on improving appointment processes – making the department an
indispensable source of material for this thesis. If my account helps to illuminate the working of the School Education Department, it goes some way towards illuminating the politics of bureaucratic appointments overall.

However, to generalise, I had to move beyond the School Education Department. The Irrigation Department receives far less attention from an urban-focused CM, despite being responsible for the maintenance of the colonial era irrigation network that supplies the agricultural heartland. Indeed, the Irrigation Department could be described as the department that sustains the provincial economy (and, by extension, many of its landowning politicians). Like the School Education Department, then, but for a different reason, I felt that an understanding of the Irrigation Department was indispensable. Indeed, if my account of politicised bureaucratic appointments could accommodate both the School Education and Irrigation Departments, I felt that I would be able to make a significant contribution to our understanding of politicised appointments overall. I interviewed bureaucrats from elsewhere as well, including DCOs, officers from the Services & General Administration and Higher Education Departments; however, further research is required to expose whether all of the patterns I describe in this thesis extend to these other departments – not only in Punjab, but throughout the bureaucracy of Pakistan.

Though comprised of thousands of employees across the province, the Irrigation Department has a different ethos to that of the School Education Department. Most of its mid-tier and senior staff are qualified engineers, or have specific skills required for their jobs. As a result, they see themselves as being set apart from other, generalist government employees, and hark back to the exclusivity and elite nature of Irrigation Department jobs in the colonial period. For this reason, Irrigation Department bureaucrats resent the appointment of a generalist PAS officer as their Secretary. When the PAS officer arrives, he knows nothing about the irrigation sector, and many make no effort to learn. The result is that senior Irrigation Department employees spend their time educating their superior (only to have him be transferred out) or trying to guide his decision making.

I found that retired bureaucrats – PAS, PMS, School Education, and Irrigation officials – were particularly helpful since they were usually more willing to be honest and engage with the more political aspects of the bureaucracy. Interviews with
journalists and political observers provided a more neutral view of bureaucratic and political behaviour.

And of course, I spoke to a number of politicians, particularly MPAs who tend to be overlooked in recent political science research. Some of these interviews were conducted in politicians’ homes, in rooms that they would typically use to meet party members, party workers, or media personnel (i.e. *deras*, see Nelson 2011). Other interviews were conducted in constituency or party offices, often overseen by large-scale photos of their respective party leaders past and present. These are offices with few frills but a great deal of traffic – this is where citizens come to request favours from their politicians. Conducting some of my interviews with politicians in the Punjab Assembly while the house was in session was also instructive. I got to observe the comings and goings of provincial politicians (e.g. the Deputy Speaker of the house, Sher Ali Gorchani), the conversations that took place in the library, hallways and lobbies of the building, and the activities of officials working for the Deputy Speaker, the heads of committees, and the leaders of the opposition parties (e.g. the PTI’s Mian Mehmood ur Rasheed and PMLQ’s Aamir Sultan Cheema).

A number of my interviews were brief conversations, useful mainly in judging the responsibilities and duties of staff at various levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy (and, if I was lucky, their attitudes toward their work and their juniors and superiors). However, several of the interviews were more extensive and often involved an element of what I like to refer to as ‘accidental ethnography’. Whilst waiting in bureaucratic and political party offices, politicians’ homes, and constituency offices, as well as the provincial assembly, court rooms and hallways, in schools, and even in the elite Gymkhana Club of Lahore, listening as bureaucrats and politicians spoke to others (in person or on the phone) and went about their day-to-day routine, I gained invaluable insight into the workings of Pakistan’s bureaucratic and political system. I recorded my observations in a detailed catalogue of field notes, organised by location, date, subject (named, then anonymised), topic of conversation, and relevance to the argument in my thesis.

Much of my understanding of appointment procedures (extra-legal ones in particular) emerged from the time I spent observing proceedings in the offices of bureaucrats and politicians, and in the Punjab Services Tribunal. In departmental and constituency offices, bureaucrats and politicians would be approached with a request
for a specific post. From that point on, the discussion tended to cover what the regulations said, how they could be circumvented (if necessary), and what the repercussions may be. In case of a dispute between an employee and their department, the Punjab Services Tribunal, ‘deemed to be a civil court’ (Article 5, The Punjab Services Tribunal Act), has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ (Article 3, The Punjab Services Tribunal Act) and is thus the only court of appeal. The Tribunal, however, is often non-functional – the term of the judges appointed to it expire and the Services & General Administration Department forgets to renew them or appoint someone else. When this happens, cases simply remain pending. They cannot proceed to the ordinary civil courts since the Tribunal has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over all service matters (Article 212, Constitution of Pakistan 1973).48 As it happened, the Tribunal was functional during my fieldwork and I was able to sit in to hear proceedings on a number of different cases. Some were cases that had been filed recently; others had been pending for many years. An elementary school teacher, for instance, had filed a case against her transfer order; an EDO-Education from Hafizabad appealed (in 2014) against the withdrawal of her increment (as a penalty for her transfer of another teacher); and several teachers from Bhakkar who had not been promoted since 2012 had filed a case against the district EDO.

A Tribunal judge has dozens of hearings scheduled every day in his tiny, crowded courtroom, and lawyers and petitioners crowd around the bench. Many hearings last only a few minutes – documentation is missing, the department’s representative is missing, and, sometimes, the case is quickly resolved by referring it back to a department’s internal disciplinary mechanisms. In a number of cases though, judges spent considerable time hearing the facts of the case. Those appealing to the Tribunal for relief come from across the spectrum of departments – Irrigation, Communication & Works, Police, Higher Education, etc. – but the issues are broadly similar: increments withheld, delayed promotions and transfers, unjust penalties, and so forth. What was most useful about observing these proceedings was an understanding not just of procedure but where the line is drawn between acts that contravene the regulations and acts that strategically bend them.

A few points regarding my positionality as a researcher in Punjab’s political and bureaucratic environment are also in order. First, I should note that I was an

48 Again, this helps to explain why this thesis does not focus, in any depth, on the judiciary. Cases in the High Court are filed by external parties – for instance, a concerned citizen.
outsider to this domain. Many interviewees asked me who I was – in other words, are my parents (or other close relatives) bureaucrats or politicians? They are not. Possibly as a result, many were suspicious, even paranoid, as to whether I was an intelligence officer, a journalist bent on exposing them, or even a spy sent to check on their work. This air of paranoia was in itself interesting in terms of how centralised power and decision-making has become in Punjab, and the extent to which asking too many questions is regarded as threatening.

Second, there were some obvious markers of my upper-middle-class status – my clothing and my language, for instance. Amongst elite bureaucrats and many politicians, this was not an issue because they are from, or have often risen to, the same or a higher class; in fact, with them, the power balance was often with the interviewee. However, amongst mid-tier and street-level bureaucrats, I was a woman who was clearly better off and better educated. In many cases, this meant that people opened up to me in the hopes that I would be able to help illuminate their plight, or even assist directly (for example, a number of interviewees asked me to find jobs for their children). In the smaller districts (Hafizabad and Narowal), it often meant that I was treated in a more privileged fashion than others waiting to see a bureaucrat – I was asked to walk in past the queue of citizens waiting in the heat to sit in the bureaucrat’s air conditioned office (even though he was still in another meeting).

Third, I was often the only woman in the room, and this made for some interesting observations. On the one hand, being a woman allowed me a number of advantages – I found it useful to have men assume my ignorance on basic points and ‘mansplain’ to me; I found respondents sometimes wanting to help me out and going out of their way to do so. On the other hand, I was also aware that, had I been a man (or even an insider), I may well have received very different responses to my questions. Furthermore, had I been a man, the business of an office would invariably have carried on as usual when I walked into a room. This was not always the case for me – at times, conversation would cease or become stilted until the men would eventually forget I was there and resume their regular routine.

That said, my outsider status, and my identity as a woman, also meant that I was often considered non-threatening. This meant that, though some bureaucrats and politicians remained wary, a number ignored my presence and went about their business till they were ready to speak to me. A prominent example was a district-level
School Education Department official who conducted a frank discussion with his colleagues on the district’s dengue prevention campaign, taking an hour to notice (and then panic at) my presence next to his desk. Also, I found that, as a woman, some of my richest interviews were with women bureaucrats – there was less showboating, less sticking to the party line, and more honesty and nuance.

My desk research involved searching through newspaper reports and court judgements on the activities of bureaucrats and politicians, highlighting incidents and cases that had been flagged as being of interest during my interviews and ethnography. In this manner, I tried to verify what I had been told during interviews, but also used the material gleaned from newspapers to inform my interviews. I focused mainly on the English-language press because these reports were more likely to have been investigated and substantiated before being printed than the more salacious reports in the Urdu press. Furthermore, during my data mining, I realised that the English press was often drawing on reports in the Urdu press, or on television, and verifying them. Therefore, these reports were the most thorough ones available on the activities of politicians and bureaucrats.

A word on anonymisation – where I refer to events recounted in newspapers, I have made no effort to anonymise bureaucrats, politicians, or other actors. However, I have anonymised the names and details shared with me by interviewees to protect their identity.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have introduced the key elements on which the rest of this thesis will rest. I argue that (a) the objectives of bureaucrats and politicians who have the ability to influence bureaucratic appointments and (b) the methods of bureaucratic appointment (which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) come together to form what I describe, filling key gaps in the existing political science literature, as strategic and transactional ‘bonds’ between patrons and appointees. The strength or diffusion of these patronage bonds, underpinned by informal professional, school, and kin networks, determine whether or not a patron’s desired outcome is achieved. A deeper understanding of the factors underpinning these patterns of bureaucratic appointment, I argue, is essential for those seeking to understand specific patterns of governance.
In discussing the objectives of senior politicians and senior and mid-tier bureaucrats seeking to influence bureaucratic appointments, I distinguish between official objectives and personal and political ones. All politicians have constituency demands that must be taken care of if they hope to hold onto their seats. The burden is greater, however, for holders of senior offices; they are responsible not only for keeping their constituents happy, but also for ensuring that the image of their party remains untainted in the eyes of the voting public. Officially, the job of a bureaucrat is to ensure the implementation of policy in accordance with the intention behind its formulation. Though bureaucrats are supposed to be politically neutral, they rarely are. Like every other actor, they have a variety of personal and even political motivations for influencing bureaucratic appointments. Bureaucrats’ acceptance of politicised appointments is, in turn, related to their desire for what I describe as ‘stability’.

To sum up, I seek to illuminate permutations of governance in Punjab by complicating the idea of a ‘politicised’ bureaucracy. Politicisation is not an activity that only politicians indulge in. Bureaucrats, military officers, and others are also involved. Not all politicised appointments are made using illegal means. In fact, this thesis argues that illegal appointments to senior and mid-tier bureaucratic posts are in many cases the least effective means of ‘delivering’ desired results. In certain situations, legal appointments are more effective in achieving objectives. And in almost every case, extra-legal methods that exploit existing loopholes in the formal rules are the most effective method of all. In Punjab, politicians and bureaucrats who build a reputation for ‘getting things done’ need not break existing rules. They often simply bend them. In the following chapter, I present the historical, political, and legal backdrop within which the empirical chapters of this thesis are set.
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND

This thesis seeks to answer the following question – When do politicians and bureaucrats achieve their desired outcomes? This chapter is divided into four parts. The first section presents the history of Pakistan’s bureaucracy, particularly its relationship with both civilian and military leaders, from the perspective of institutional and political change and continuity. I identify turning points in the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, highlight the role military rulers have played in entrenching networks of patronage, provide a brief overview of the structure of the bureaucracy, and explain the persistent insecurity of the political class in the country which underpins the drivers for centralisation under the provincial CM.

The second section briefly outlines the significance of the drive to ‘deliver’ amongst both politicians and bureaucrats in Punjab, linking it to the larger questions explored in this thesis, before moving on to identify the varying ability that politicians and bureaucrats have to influence bureaucratic appointments. And the third section provides an account of regular appointment practices (recruitment, seniority, promotion, transfer, and CM Directives) and irregular appointments (ad hoc appointments, acting charge, additional/current charge, contract appointment, OSD, post upgradation, and OPS) at different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. It concludes with an account of illegal methods of appointment. This discussion sets the stage for the discussion of legal, extra-legal, and illegal appointments, before the empirical chapters to follow (linking specific patterns of appointment to specific patterns of delivering crucial outcomes).

Institutional & Political Change and Continuity in Pakistan

The Indian Civil Service and the Post-Independence Period

The creation and management of the All India Civil Service was arguably one of the British Raj’s greatest achievements. The service was the means through which the British ruled the heterogeneous subcontinent for over 100 years.

The All India Civil Service was based on ‘cadres’ tied to regional classifications (federal and provincial) and occupation (police, health, education, etc.) [see Kennedy 1987 for details on development of the cadre system during British
rule]. The establishment of cadres allowed the British (and subsequently the
government of Pakistan) to create specialist groups while maintaining an elite cadre
of federal and provincial generalists. This structure created a clear hierarchy, with the
elite cadre considered the most capable and the best educated, with a higher social
status than the others.

Under the British, the All India Services were under the control of the British
Government. Near the end of British rule, administrative departments were gradually
shifted from the All India Services to the Central Services (under the Government of
India). By 1947, only two services were still under the control of the British
Government – the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the Indian Police Service (Kennedy
1987, 31). Pakistan, following the same structure, formed the Civil Service of
Pakistan (CSP) and the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP).\(^{49}\)

The British set up a clear administrative structure all the way down to the
district level and ensured that district-level administrators formed close bonds with
local power holders in the area - zamindaars, jaaqirdaars, tribal chiefs, and religious
heads. Colonial rule was a bureaucratic, extractive, and ‘deeply clientelistic’
(Wilkinson 2014, 262) exercise.\(^{50}\) Though such relationships no doubt existed prior to
the arrival of the British - between traditional power holders and representatives of the
Mughal Empire, for example - the ties established during British rule have remained
in place in some form for 70 years (see also Gilmartin 1988; and Shafqat 2011). When
we study present-day patron-clientage in former colonies, we must acknowledge these
roots in the colonial period.

The institutional continuity of patron-clientage can be linked to the relative
continuity of bureaucratic structures between the late-colonial period and the post-
independence period. Immediately after partition, Pakistan continued to use colonial
era laws and regulations.\(^{51}\) Kennedy (1987, 29) provides a number of reasons for the
retention of the civil service structure established by the British. On the one hand, it
was seen as a system that was functioning well, having evolved gradually to meet the

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\(^{49}\) In addition, there were 13 other services that made up the Central Superior Services, including the
Pakistan Foreign Service and Pakistan Taxation Service.

\(^{50}\) The British have a long history of patronage appointments in their own civil service, including the
appointment of a ‘patronage secretary’ whose duty it was to ensure that politicised appointees to the
bureaucracy ‘helped increase party discipline and construct party loyalties’ (Grindle 2012, 53).

\(^{51}\) Though numerous changes were brought to the structure of the civil service during the British period
(see Kennedy 1987 for a detailed account), when the subcontinent was partitioned, Pakistan did not
make any substantive changes to the inherited bureaucratic set up.
needs of the Raj. On the other hand, even if there had been the will to change the system, the new state was too weak to make drastic changes. Because Muslims were only a small proportion of the colonial services, Pakistan simply lacked the officials needed to staff its new bureaucracy. This favoured a small class of elite civil servants who had ‘very sanguine career prospects’ and resisted suggestions for reform (Kennedy 1987, 31).

While Pakistan’s political leadership was weak and fragmented, it was these bureaucrats, with their thorough grasp of the system and its processes, who ensured that the business of the state continued. In fact, Pakistan’s fragmented political leadership was increasingly sidelined by the only two institutions that experienced any continuity - the military and the bureaucracy.

In Alavi’s (1972) opinion, the early years of Pakistan’s existence were marked by the development and dominance of a military-bureaucracy oligarchy. I will not expand on this period, as others have done so extensively (Alavi 1972, Jalal 1995, Jaffrelot 2014). I will instead focus on five subsequent political periods – that of PM Bhutto (1970-77), General Zia (1977-1988), the democratic interlude (1988 to 1999), General Musharraf (1999-2008), and the post-Musharraf era (2008-2016). In doing so, I will highlight various civil service reforms, commission reports, and changes to the division of administrative power. A deeper understanding of reform, I maintain, will help to understand the politicisation of the bureaucracy and its impact on governance over time.52

**Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Administrative Reforms**

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was elected in 1970 on an “Islamic socialist” and reformist platform. Not only was he the first popularly elected leader of West Pakistan, he also came into power after the loss of East Pakistan (as Bangladesh) in 1971. It was therefore, a receptive period for change.

Bhutto was responsible for the formulation of Pakistan’s third constitution - the Constitution of 1973. This Constitution marked the beginning of a new chapter for Pakistan after the loss of half the country, and it remains in force today despite being

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52 Shafqat (2011, 4) points out that the commissions formed over the years to reform the civil service pay no attention to the relationship of bureaucrats to politicians. In his words, the commissions suggest ‘both in perception and reality’ power rests with the civil service (Shafqat 2011, 4). Naturally, my focus on the politicisation of bureaucratic appointments disagrees with this assessment.
temporarily suspended by two martial law administrators (Zia and Musharraf). It has seen a number of amendments over the years, the most comprehensive of which is the 2010 18th Amendment. As the primary source of legal authority, the Constitution of 1973 empowers the Majlis-e-Shura (Parliament/National Assembly) and the provincial assemblies to formulate rules of service and govern appointments to the federal and provincial services, respectively (Art. 240).

Amongst the most prominent reforms introduced during Bhutto’s time in office were the Administrative Reforms introduced on 20 August 1973. Kennedy (1987) highlights four aspects of these reforms, namely: (1) the abolition of the service cadres (e.g. CSP, PSP) and the establishment of ‘occupational groups’ (District Management, Income Tax, Police, etc.); (2) an end to the practice of reserving central secretariat posts for those in the elite Civil Service of Pakistan; (3) changes to the training of bureaucrats with the establishment of an Academy for Administrative Training (and the introduction of the Common Training Program); and, (4) the introduction of ‘lateral recruitment’ to the bureaucracy. In addition, Bhutto introduced evaluations for serving officers (Shafqat 2013, 104), and removed 1300 members of the civil service (Shafqat 2013, 102).

Bhutto’s reforms took a particular sequence (Kennedy 1987, 89-90). First, ‘listed posts’ (i.e. posts earmarked for officers belonging to a particular cadre, usually the CSP, which could briefly be occupied by officers from other cadres) were abolished. It was also decreed that if an officer had taken a listed post, he then became a part of the service in which he held that post, giving up his previous service. Second, the CSP and PSP were dissolved and their officials were made a part of the All Pakistan Unified Grade (APUG), which replaced the All Pakistan Services (APS). Whereas the APS had been made up primarily of CSP and PSP officers, the APUG also included officers from outside these two elite services.

Third, the APUG was divided into four occupational groups – the Tribal Areas group (TAG), the District Management Group (DMG), the Police Group (PG) and the Secretariat group (SG). The DMG was comprised of officials occupying district administration posts in non-tribal areas. Kennedy (1987, 92) notes that, by 1976, most of the officers in the DMG were formerly of the CSP or had been directly recruited post-reforms. Only a few came from the Provincial Civil Services (PCS). The SG was formed in 1975 as an occupational group for officers holding the posts of Deputy
Secretary and above in both the Federal and Provincial Secretariats (Kennedy 1987, 93). There was no entry into the SG except through ‘lateral recruitment…, promotion and/or horizontal movement from other cadres’ (Kennedy 1987, 93-95). Again, most of the members of the SG in 1976 were from the CSP, though they were outnumbered by lateral recruits (Kennedy 1987, 94).

The thrust of the reforms introduced by Bhutto was their egalitarian nature. He reduced the size of the elite CSP and brought them level with their civil service colleagues from other cadres in everything from training to posting. In doing so, Jalal (1995, 82) believes he won support. However, Jalal (1995, 82) also notes that despite these changes, ‘CSP officers continued to wield wide-ranging powers in sensitive spots across the length and breadth of the state administration’. This could be attributed to the fact that although the reforms were wide ranging on paper, they did not translate well in practice. In Kennedy’s (1987, 14) words, Bhutto’s reforms had a two-fold impact – they ‘weakened the dominance of the CSP’ and ‘increased the level of [centralized] political influence’. Though the objective of bringing the bureaucracy under political control was achieved, Shafqat (2013, 102) argues that good governance (i.e. ensuring policy implementation to deliver services) was not the goal.

Under Bhutto, the reform of the civil service was an exercise not in improving the lot of ordinary people, but of strengthening the grip of whoever was in power - civil (partisan) or military (Jaffrelot 2014). The drive toward centralisation under the PMLN in Punjab, in other words, is not unique. Bhutto’s reforms were, of course, hugely controversial. In addition to the damage done to the services via the ‘dismissal of civil servants without due legal process, [and] unwarranted political interference in postings and transfers’ (Shafqat 2011, 5), there was also a great deal of resistance from within the bureaucracy itself, especially owing to (a) the abolition of the elite CSP and its reserved posts; (b) lateral recruitment (seen as bringing the service under political control); and (c) the rampant dismissal of officers. Regardless, a new set of power relations were created.

**Zia ul Haq’s Reforms**

In 1977, General Zia ul Haq imposed martial law, highlighting the misdeeds of the Bhutto government through a series of White Papers. In February 1978, the Civil Services Reform Commission was set up under Chief Justice Anwar ul Haq. The
commission recommended a number of wide ranging reforms, including an end to lateral recruitment, the reinstatement of constitutional protection against removal from service, the dissolution of occupational groups, and the formation of a District Management Branch (merging the DMG and Tribal Areas Group). Unlike Bhutto’s reforms, which focused exclusively on the federal level with only passing reference to local government, however, the Anwar ul Haq Commission dealt with all levels – federal, provincial and local.

Zia chose not to implement all of the changes recommended by Anwar ul Haq. He dissolved the TAG and moved its members to the DMG, and, more importantly, he stopped lateral recruitment to the CSS (i.e. the Office Management Group). Even as Zia abolished lateral recruitment, however, he also increased the number of places reserved for military officials, giving these inductees seniority over officers who had joined through direct (merit-based) competition (Shafqat 1999, 1003). The policy of inducting military officials wholesale and in an institutionalised manner differentiated the Zia regime from that of pre-war military dictators like Ayub or Yahya Khan (Jalal 1995, 105). As a result, there was considerable resentment amongst the federal bureaucracy (Jalal 1995, 104).

In addition, Zia (like previous and subsequent military rulers) used a devolution program focused on non-party district governments (selected through non-party elections) as a means of establishing local control while sidelining provincial political forces. According to a former deputy commissioner who served in the Punjab during the 1980s, “It was during Zia’s period that officers from the DMG and PSP, in particular, became the power base for [non-party] local politicians at the district level” (ICG 2010, 7; see also Jaffrelot 2014). The reason for this was that the non-party nature of local government elections, as well as the 1985 general election, encouraged politicians who had no party loyalties because they did not need them to win.53 Electability in the 1985 election depended solely on providing voters with what they wanted - electricity, sewage, a phone connection, protection/impunity, etc. In fact, by the time elections were held in 1988, the leaders of the contesting parties had come to believe that they did not have a hope without a team of loyal bureaucrats on their side. Political leaders were also aware that the key to winning an election was not to appeal to voters on ideological grounds, but to provide them with ‘access’ to state resources

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or impunity. This amounted to what was effectively a reset of political realities in Pakistan – though the 1970 elections suggested a shift toward a more party-based polity (at least in urban areas), Zia’s policies meant that direct links between politicians and bureaucrats were paramount (Jalal 1995, 105). Zia’s reforms can therefore be considered a break from the institutional set up under Bhutto in two ways, namely: (1) the inclusion of military officers in the bureaucracy in a systematic fashion; and (2) the re-fashioning of local ties between (non-party) politicians and bureaucrats.

Even when Zia’s non-party local government system was suspended in the early 1990s, the bureaucrats who had served under Zia as Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners remained in the bureaucracy, moving to more senior posts. At the same time, local politicians also rose, perhaps to provincial or federal ministries. This further entrenched the patronage relations that had been formed during Zia’s local government years, taking them to the highest levels.

By and large, Pakistan’s bureaucratic structures have remained unchanged since Zia reversed the changes wrought by Bhutto. As noted above, the Civil Services of Pakistan are divided into three groups: the All Pakistan Unified Grade, the Federal Civil Service, and the Provincial Civil Service.

The All Pakistan Unified Grade (APUG) consists of officers who may be assigned to either the Federal or Provincial governments. It consists of three groups: the Secretariat Group (Basic Pay Scale/BPS 19-22), the Pakistan Administrative Service (BPS 17-22), and the Police Service of Pakistan (BPS 17-22). (Officials within the APUG are appointed to the provinces on the basis of a quota, though the majority of APUG posts in Punjab go to the PAS.)

Recruitment to the Federal Civil Service is on the basis of a quota set according to province and region. This branch of the service consists of three sub-groups, namely (a) Cadre services (including the Pakistan Foreign Service, Audit and Accounts Group, Income Tax Group, Customs and Excise Group), (b) Ex-cadre

54 The timing of this varied by province. In Punjab, the system ended in 1993, in Sindh in 1992.
55 Formerly referred to as the District Management Group or DMG
56 For BPS 17 and above, hiring is conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). For BPS 1-16, recruitment takes place through ministry, division and department recruiting committees
57 Also, Railways Group, Postal Group, Commerce and Trade Group, Information Group, Economists and Planners Group, Military Lands and Cantonment Group, and the Office Management Group. The last two groups are to be abolished and recruitment for them has been halted.
officers – senior specialists in a particular field (BPS 17 or above) and, finally, (c) Subordinate services – (BPS1 to 16).

Finally, all provincial civil servants fall under the umbrella of the Provincial Unified Grades. However, once again, the provincial service was divided into three branches, namely (a) the **Provincial Civil Services** (PCS BPS-17 and above) (itself divided into (1) the Executive Branch (PCS-EB) with field postings like Assistant Commissioner; (2) the Secretariat Branch (PCS-SB) with Secretariat posts like Section Officers; and (3) the Judiciary Branch (PCS-JB) appointed as magistrates\(^58\)) as well as (b) **Technical or Professional Services Cadres** (BPS 16 and above), including those serving in School Education, Higher Education, Irrigation, Revenue, Excise & Taxation, and Health, etc. and, once again, (c) various **Subordinate Employees** (BPS 1 to 15).

**The Democratic Interlude**

In 1988, Zia ul Haq was killed in a plane crash. In the 1988 election, Nawaz Sharif, who had been Punjab’s Finance Minister in the early 1980s (then CM Punjab in 1985 under Zia’s patronage), contested as part of the *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (IJI). He won in Punjab, becoming Chief Minister, but the PPP (led by Benazir Bhutto) did well in other provinces and eventually took power at the centre.

For the next decade, power alternated between short-lived governments led by Benazir Bhutto and the Nawaz Sharif. With each change in government, however, the country witnessed ‘large scale postings and transfers of civil servants both at the policy-making level as well as at the district administration level’ (Shafqat 1999, 1008-1009). “Bhutto and Sharif both had their own ‘team’ of civil servants who were patronised and promoted not on merit but on perceived loyalty to their respective political masters”, notes an ICG (2010, 7) report quoting a retired federal secretary who served during the 1990s. At the same time, the administrative machinery remained beholden to non-elected state actors (often referred to somewhat obliquely as ‘the Establishment’).

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\(^{58}\) In 2004, the Government of Punjab decided to merge the Executive and Secretariat branches of the Provincial Civil Services into the Provincial Management Service (BPS 17 and above). The idea was that all officers should have exposure to both field and secretariat postings. This merger took place soon after the implementation of the 2001 Local Government Plan.
The first of Benazir’s governments (1988-1990), accused of massive corruption and legislative sclerosis, was constantly in a battle with the Nawaz Sharif-led *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (IJI) government in the Punjab (Jalal 1995, 110). The IJI, an alliance created and backed by ‘the Establishment’, had an immense advantage over Benazir’s beleaguered national government. This backing was useful in winning support in Punjab. In fact, during the run up to the 1990 election, the bureaucracy worked as it never had before, ‘galvanized to undertake the most rapid road-building, sanitation and electrification exercises ever witnessed in the rural localities, [with] select voters treated with jobs and notes to pull the tricks out of the ballot box’ (Jalal 1995, 110-111).

In the 1990 elections, the IJI won and Nawaz Sharif became PM (1990-93). However, Sharif (like Benazir) soon came up against the will and power of the military and the Presidency when he attempted to exercise control over Pakistan’s economy, particularly with regard to defense contracts (Jalal 1995, 113). The 1993 election was closely contested, with the PPP and PMLN separated by just sixteen seats in the National Assembly. However, Benazir Bhutto eventually succeeded in cobbling together a ruling coalition (1993-96), aided in great part by the PPP’s win in Punjab’s provincial elections. This was the only election since 1988 that a non-PML faction won in Punjab. However, Bhutto’s government was dismissed by her once ally, President Leghari, in 1996, and fresh elections were held in 1997.

Both the Sharif and Bhutto governments set up commissions with the objective of reducing the state’s wage bill. Sharif established the Economy Commission in 1991 (headed first by Brigadier (r) A. Qayum Khan and then by Senator Raja Zafar ul Haq); Bhutto established the Chattha Commission under Hamid Nasir Chattha in 1995. Though both commissions recommended a reduction in departments and other right-sizing proposals, it was not until 1996 that any action was taken. Under the caretaker government of President Farooq Leghari, the process of downsizing through ‘abolition, liquidation and privatization’ (NCGR Report, p. 3) began, but this process was never completed.

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59 Nawaz Sharif was appointed Punjab’s Finance Minister in 1981 and became CM Punjab following the party-less election of 1985.
60 In 1989, Benazir’s government created a Services Reform Commission under Justice Dorab Patel, but a full report was never produced. Justice Patel provided his recommendations in 1991, by which point the PPP was no longer in power.
61 At the time, national and provincial elections were held on separate days (6 and 9 October 1993). This is no longer the case.
The 1997 elections were won by PML (Nawaz) in a landslide, with Nawaz becoming PM and his brother Shahbaz CM Punjab. It was during the 1997-1999 term that the Sharifs developed key alliances and patronage networks in bureaucratic circles, particularly amongst the DMG/PAS. Two new commissions were set up to reform the bureaucracy. The first was formed under Dr. Hafiz Pasha with the same objective as the Economy and Chattha Commissions. (Its proposals, once again, were far reaching but never implemented.) The second was the Commission on Administrative Restructuring under Fakhar Imam. However, this commission’s suggestions were deeply problematic. For example, though it recommended a devolution of administrative power to the provinces, it restricted this to certain subjects while emphasising the need for the centre to retain control of provincial activities.\textsuperscript{62} The recommendations of Fakhar Imam became a moot point, however, when Nawaz Sharif’s government was dismissed by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 (at which point both the Sharifs and Bhutto went into exile).

Throughout the 1990s,\textsuperscript{63} as political power fluctuated between the PPP and the PMLN (independently or in coalition) and attempts at civil service reform stalled, the bureaucracy took sides. Lists of favoured and unfavoured bureaucrats were said to emerge within each party when they won an election, with a slew of transfers taking place after they took office. Bureaucrats in Punjab say that bureaucratic recruitment to provincial departments (teachers, doctors, etc.) were completely politicised throughout the 1990s – lists of names would arrive from political offices, and appointments would be made without any questions being asked. Considering the instability of governments in Pakistan during the 1990s – the result of a tendency within the Presidency, the judiciary, and the military to intervene in political affairs – it was hardly surprising that governments sought to surround themselves with trusted bureaucrats the minute they entered office. In fact, many MPAs and MNAs lobby the government even today to avoid opening investigations into bureaucratic appointments made during these years.

\textsuperscript{62} Devolution of power to the provinces did not take place till the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of 1973 was passed in 2010.

\textsuperscript{63} For more detail on this period, see Jaffrelot 2014.
Musharraf’s Coup and Local Government Reforms

When Musharraf took over in a coup in 1999, most of the PAS officers who had worked closely with the Sharifs were repatriated to the federal government—some were made OSD, others were given insignificant posts. Some realigned themselves to new political realities. Like Ayub Khan and Zia ul Haq, Musharraf also increased military recruitment into the bureaucracy—bringing junior military officers in to supervise and evaluate senior civil servants (ICG 2010, 9). He also introduced local government reforms. However, unlike Zia’s local government plan, Musharraf actually handed substantive administrative powers to locally elected officials, taking them away from the DMG. Apart from criticism that non-partisan nazims (mayors) were introduced to (once again) reduce the power of provincial political parties, there was the belief that the military was ‘colluding with officials in occupational groups such as the police and [the] income tax group to cut the powerful DMG down to size’ (ICG 2010, 8).

When Musharraf passed the Local Government Ordinance in 2001, however, the first few batches of Z. A. Bhutto’s Common Training Program (now quite senior) teamed up with junior DMG officers to oppose the LGO. In fact, even though the LGO was implemented, its unintended consequence was the unification of DMG officers to resist the reduction in their power, seeking support from politicians to do so (Shafqat 2013, 111; Jaffrelot 2014, 347)! This latter point is critical to our discussion regarding politicised appointments—effectively, Musharraf’s devolution program encouraged (senior) bureaucrats to seek out political patrons.

Post Musharraf Democracy

In 2007, Ishrat Hussain reported on the findings of a National Commission on Government Reform (NCGR). The commission had been constituted by Musharraf but very few of its recommendations have been implemented. By the time the report was released, Musharraf was cornered by public protests, including an enormous Lawyer’s Movement in support of deposed Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

President Musharraf called for fresh elections which were held in 2008. Notwithstanding the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the PPP was able to form a coalition government. The PMLN, however, won Punjab and Shahbaz Sharif returned
as CM Punjab – a post he has since retained, barring a short period of Governor’s Rule in 2008-2009 and the caretaker government in 2013. The local government system was wrapped up in 2009, but powers had already been taken away from nazims and shifted to bureaucrats appointed to the district immediately after the new government took over in 2008.

Within the PMLN, the run up to the 2008 election was spent trying to find suitable candidates, judged primarily on whether or not they had remained loyal to the party in the years of military rule. It is perhaps arguable that the Sharifs found the bureaucrats to be more loyal than many politicians. Of the politicians who had once been close to the Sharifs, many of the old guard had jumped ship, to join Musharraf’s party of PMLN defectors (i.e. PMLQ). The bureaucracy, on the other hand, was well aware of the political realities. In fact, most bureaucrats believe that even though the leaders of the PMLN indulge in corruption (favouring certain contractors and certain project bids) or tamper with budgets, and so on, they do at least attempt to deliver something to the people. This is in contrast to their very poor image of the PPP, partly due to Bhutto’s 1973 reforms and partly due to petty bribery and corruption (slicing a percentage off all kinds of contracts).

The general consensus is that, within Pakistan, the PPP government’s biggest achievement between 2008 and 2013 was the passing of the 18th Amendment (2010). The product of a multi-party consensus, this amendment altered a number of constitutional articles. Above all, it removed Article 58(2)b, which had allowed the President to dismiss the government, as well as the condition that politicians must have a Bachelor’s degree to be eligible for election. In addition, it (a) empowered each provincial government to ‘make rules for the allocation and transaction of its business’ (Art 46, Amendment to Art 139 of the Constitution), and (b) inserted Art. 140A, mandating that all provinces must introduce local government systems to devolve ‘political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority’ (Art 48).

The 18th Amendment was a constitutional landmark, but its implementation left much to be desired. In particular, the provinces struggled to take over the powers

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64 Though the 18th Amendment was a landmark in cross party cooperation, the implementation of its devolution clauses has been piece meal at best with the federation reluctant to devolve financial control in particular.
devolved to them, in part due to resistance from the centre\textsuperscript{65}, and in part due to lack of capacity within the provinces. A major concern has been the centre’s hesitation to devolve finances to the provinces, and the struggle of the latter to raise their own funds through taxation. In addition, bureaucratic resistance led to slow progress in the dissolution of federal ministries and the creation of provincial ones (Waseem 2011a). These factors combined ensured that the provinces remained beholden to the centre for the years following the 18\textsuperscript{th} Amendment.

With reference to provincial bureaucratic appointment patterns, the 18\textsuperscript{th} Amendment promised to raise the stakes for decision making at a provincial level – suggesting, in particular that politicised bureaucratic appointments could be useful in ensuring provincial bureaucratic performance (e.g. in increasing tax revenues or improving education provision in Punjab, Chapters 3 and 4). In fact, devolution as envisioned in the 18\textsuperscript{th} Amendment is first and foremost a bureaucratic exercise – departments existing at the federal level must be wrapped up and new ones must be formed in each province. While the former was gradually carried out (despite resistance within the bureaucracy), a lack of capacity within the Provincial Civil Services meant that the devolved provincial departments ended up – yet again – in the hands of elite, federal (PAS) bureaucrats (Waseem 2015). This was not entirely surprising – the amendment itself did not make any changes to constitutional articles related to the civil services. In fact, the onus to bring about reform was on politicians and elite bureaucrats who stood to lose significant power if reforms were introduced. As a result, key civil services reforms that might relate more directly to the focus of this thesis have been stalled. Even today, the Secretaries of the majority of government departments in Punjab are PAS officers; few provincial service officers rise to top-ranking posts or pay scales. Though the appointment of favoured PAS bureaucrats to head the Punjab government’s departments may enhance efficiency and speed up ‘delivery’, it undermines the spirit of devolution promised in the 18\textsuperscript{th} Amendment, systematically undercutting the power, professionalism, and morale of the Provincial Civil Services.

Furthermore, when the local government system introduced by Musharraf was dissolved in 2009, no elected alternative was introduced till 2016/17. Therefore, the influence over appointments briefly held by Musharraf’s elected nazims (2002-2008)

simply reverted back to senior politicians and the senior echelons of the bureaucracy. Initially, the DCO post that Musharraf’s local government scheme created in 2002 to replace the Deputy Commissioner post was envisioned as a coordinator working under and reporting to the elected nazim. But, after Musharraf’s preferred party, the PMLQ, lost the 2008 election (indeed, even before the relevant nazims had officially left office), the DCO post had become, de facto, very nearly the equivalent of its predecessor, the Deputy Commissioner – answerable to no one but the CM’s Office.

In Punjab, PAS officers occupying DCO/DC posts have long reigned supreme, in alliance with the ruling party leadership, encroaching on powers that, constitutionally, should lie with elected local governments. The 18th Amendment may have shifted certain departments and decision-making powers to the provinces, but it has had little impact on how those powers are exercised within each province. In the absence of civil service reform, it is perhaps not surprising that the 18th Amendment has only reinforced the centralisation of bureaucratic appointments, often in the name of bureaucratic ‘performance’ and the ‘public interest’.

Though the PMLN has dominated Punjab since 2008, the central government has changed hands – PPP (2008-2013), and PMLN (2013-present) – broadly affecting the relationship between the federation and the province. Under the PMLQ government (2002-2008, when they held the centre and Punjab, supervised by Musharraf), there was a marked rise in military involvement in the administration of the state, with the bureaucracy playing second fiddle. This period is briefly addressed in Chapter 4 – I focus on the appointment of Hafeez Randhawa– and in the discussion of periods of military rule in Pakistan’s history in Chapter 2. I do not, however, spend a great deal of time on the impact of military intervention on bureaucratic appointments for a few reasons. First, though Musharraf (and other martial law administrators) inserted serving and retired military officers to lead various departments or laterally recruited them into the civil service (ostensibly to reduce corruption and enhance efficiency), patterns of appointment for the majority of posts within the bureaucracy remained the same as those outlined in this thesis – for example, Interview 77’s appointment as DCO Jhang in 2008 was made by his senior recommending him for the post (see Chapter 4). Second, one military ruler’s attempt to co-opt the civil administration was not un-like another’s – Ayub, Yahya, Zia, and

66 For more on Pakistan’s experiments with local government, see Cheema, Khan and Myerson 2010, and Cheema, Khwaja, and Qadir 2006.
Musharraf had similar policies in some ways and these have been covered in detail elsewhere (Kennedy 1987, Shafqat 1999, Chengappa 1999, Rizvi 2000, and Wilder 2010). Third, by 2014/15, when I did my fieldwork, the slate had been wiped clean – most military officials had been removed from the civil services and those who remained were retired military officers who had to compete for posts with civilian officers on a more level playing field. Consequently, though my interviews, observations, and newspaper archives provide some evidence for appointments during this period, I was not in a position to collect data with the same richness as the data I collected for subsequent periods.

Following the departure of General Musharraf, the 2008-2013 central government led by the PPP was marked by significant tension over political control of Punjab, including the trajectory of bureaucratic appointments within it. Punjab is the province with the most National Assembly seats, and therefore, control over it is generally seen as a path to electoral success. The imposition of Governor’s Rule in 2009 (recounted at the beginning of this thesis) was an attempt by the central PPP government to re-establish its party in the Punjab. When Governor Taseer (PPP) took over in 2009, he replaced bureaucrats friendly with the PMLN with bureaucrats who favoured the PPP. And, when Governor’s Rule ended and Shahbaz Sharif returned as CM, this process was exactly reversed.67

This was a situation not unlike that which existed throughout the 1990s – political instability and the threat of a military or judicial coup led to the PPP and the PMLN maintaining lists of bureaucrats who favoured them. When they won an election, one set of bureaucrats would be swept out and replaced by another. In fact, while the PPP and PMLN faced off, PAS bureaucrats were divided into two camps: those who sided with the PPP and sought posts with the centre in Islamabad, and those with the PMLN and sought provincial posts in Lahore. Though each set of bureaucrats had significant powers within their respective domains, their appointments could be checked (at least potentially) by politicians or colleagues from the opposing camp. For example, a senior PAS bureaucrat favoured by the PMLN and serving in the Punjab, seeking a federal secretary post, was dependent on the Establishment Division and PPP-held PM’s Office to appoint him. The PPP-led

67 The period of Governor’s Rule lasted for just one month (see Chapter 1) and therefore, its implications for bureaucratic appointments are necessarily limited. It does, however, reinforce my argument that government’s, and specifically the CM, assemble a team around them who they trust to ‘deliver’, and it reveals the ubiquity of party preferences amongst senior bureaucrats.
Establishment Division, or the PM’s Office, could recall a PAS officer favoured by the PMLN posted in Punjab. However, PPP governments rarely succeeded when they tried such tactics (see, for instance, the case of Anwar Zahid in Chapter 3). And, as I explain, the PMLN’s control over bureaucratic appointments in Punjab meant not only that the PPP government’s ability to make bureaucratic appointments extended only to Sindh and Islamabad (not choice postings in Punjab), but also that the PPP government was hamstrung in the Punjab as well. In fact, the PPP’s PMs (Yousaf Raza Gilani of Multan and Raja Pervaiz Ashraf of Rawalpindi) were often on the back foot when it came to regulating provincial bureaucratic appointments in their home districts within the Punjab itself. In one instance, in 2011, Prime Minister Gilani of the PPP tried to transfer an accountability officer, but the leader of the opposition Chaudhry Nisar (PMLN) countered by threatening to transfer the PM’s chosen bureaucrats from his home district in the Punjab, Multan (see Chapter 5). 68

Often, the biggest problem with bureaucratic appointments by the PPP government in Islamabad between 2008 and 2013 was that the bureaucrats favoured by them indulged in the kind of petty corruption that gave both the party and the bureaucrats a bad reputation and showed them up as incompetent – not just with opposition parties and an activist Supreme Court, but amongst their own colleagues (see Chapter 5). With the expansion of the media sector during the Musharraf years, and the activism of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, appointments that may have been overlooked or perceived as the norm (‘everyone does it’) during the 1990s were actively reported on by the press and, then, reversed by the courts through petitions filed by bureaucrats themselves or through suo moto actions. Chapter 5 discusses one example – the illegal appointment of then-PM Raja Pervaiz Ashraf’s son-in-law to the World Bank. In 2010, the Supreme Court also reversed PPP PM Yousaf Raza Gilani’s promotion of 54 bureaucrats to BPS 22, made in violation of seniority rules. 69 In 2013, the Supreme Court again ordered the government to reverse the promotion of eighty bureaucrats made during PPP PM Raja Pervez Ashraf’s tenure (the Orya Maqbool Abbasi case discussed in Chapter 5). Another example was the PPP’s pick for Chairman WAPDA, who was alleged to have diverted funds between projects ‘at

personal whim’, made nepotistic appointments within the organisation, and caused delays in various power projects.\(^{70}\)

The PPP’s attempts to protect its leaders from corruption investigations by transferring accountability officers also led to clashes with the Supreme Court (see the Hajj scam case discussed in Chapter 4) and provided the fuel for the now-famous Anita Turab case\(^{71}\), where a civil servant appealed to the Supreme Court to prevent politicised bureaucratic appointments. As a result, the PPP’s choice of bureaucrats and patterns of appointments may well have lined a few pockets, but they did not provide the party with any traction vis-à-vis bureaucrats or voters. In fact, amongst bureaucrats, the PPP’s tenure (2008-2013) left an open field for the PMLN in the 2013 election – not just amongst voters, but amongst bureaucrats as well.

**The Sharifs’ Punjab**

Punjab’s contemporary electoral history is in many ways the history of the modern day PMLN, and to some extent, the Sharif family itself. It is impossible to discuss Punjab’s politics or bureaucracy without considering the motivations and actions of the Sharif brothers, Nawaz and especially Shahbaz, and through them the party and its factions.

| Table 3: Electoral Dominance (Seats) 1988 To 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PPP/PDA | PPP/ PDA | PMLN/I JI | PPP | PMLN | PMLQ | PPP | PMLN |
| PPP/PDA | PPP/ PDA | PMLN/I JI | PMLN | PMLN | PMLQ | PMLN | PMLN |

By the time the 2013 election arrived, the PMLN and the Sharif brothers were in a much stronger position than they had been in 2008. The election brought the PMLN another victory with a parliamentary majority, allowing Nawaz to become PM while Shahbaz continued as CM Punjab. It was the first time in Pakistan’s history that

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power passed directly from one party, which had completed its full term, to another via elections.

Once the PMLN won both the centre and Punjab in 2013, any barriers to bureaucratic appointments of the party leadership’s choosing were removed. The PMLN now controlled the Establishment Division and the PM Office at the centre as well as the CM Secretariat in Punjab. Furthermore, where it had previously been possible for bureaucrats to pick a political party – either the PPP or the PMLN – the latter was now the only party worth picking. Central civil service bureaucrats were well aware that if they did not toe the PMLN leadership’s line, they would be transferred to one of the other provinces, shunted aside (for example, to an ombudsman position – as was the case with the Salman Farooqi, a bureaucrat favoured by Zardari), or made OSD. Subsequently, favoured PAS bureaucrats rose to immense power and prominence at both the centre and in Punjab during this time. Most notable are bureaucrats who are given a free hand to make decisions on behalf of their political bosses – for example, I was often told during my fieldwork (and reports in the press reflect this) that the PM Office was being run entirely, including decisions on bureaucratic appointments of PAS officers across the country, by Fawad Hasan Fawad, a senior PAS bureaucrat, rather than by the PM.72

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### Table 4: Distribution of general seats in elections for Punjab’s main parties

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<td>PMLN (includes PML and IJI)</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>44 (PDA)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>PMLQ (2002 onward)</td>
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*does not include January 2003 by-election results

** The PTI boycotted the 2008 election

Table adapted from ‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan’ report by PILDAT, May 2013.
And in Punjab, now serving his third term as CM, Shahbaz Sharif developed a symbiotic relationship with the bureaucracy to the exclusion of all but his most senior political advisers. Bureaucrats whom he trusts implicitly are given charge of multiple posts, allowing the CM Secretariat to consolidate the power of multiple offices into the hands of one bureaucrat (see, for instance, the cases of Ahad Cheema and Jehanzeb Khan addressed in Chapter 3). Most PAS officers I spoke to (from a variety of batches) saw Shahbaz Sharif as an honorary bureaucrat, someone who has a mandarin’s mind.

As we go down the bureaucratic hierarchy, though, the tone shifts to one of awe inspired by fear (of a crackdown, of a removal from a post over trivialities) or resentment (on the basis of exclusion from favoured elite cadres).

The co-optation of the bureaucracy, particularly the elite PAS, has been seen as a persistent problem of the PMLN’s style of doing business. Newspapers often refer to specific bureaucrats as the Sharif brothers’ ‘favourite’ or ‘blue-eyed boy’. An opposition parliamentarian in the Punjab Assembly (PTI, Interview 25) says, ‘The party [PMLN] functions through [favoured bureaucrats], they don’t use party workers. They use bureaucrats, DCOs as party workers but are not accessible to their own MPAs, MNAs.’ A number of bureaucrats who worked closely with the Sharifs between 1997 and 1999, and with Nawaz Sharif between 1988 and 1993 went on to become key players when the Sharifs returned to power in 2008. Some of these appointments to ‘the team’ were legal, and I will discuss them in Chapter 3. Others were not, and I will discuss them in Chapters 4 and 5. I contend that through all three of these methods, the PMLN’s leadership extends its ties to mid-tier bureaucrats (serving in senior district-level posts) via senior bureaucrats who belong to the PAS. And, at a meta-level, it does so in an effort to ‘deliver’ in ways that might ward off both military and political challengers.

While the post-2013 political scene allowed the PMLN a great deal of room to indulge in patronage appointments, it also created immense pressure on the party to ‘deliver’ – particularly with the devolution of departments to the provinces post-18th Amendment. Interviewee 14 (a PAS bureaucrat in a senior post in the Services & General Administration Department) revealed that in early 2014, the CM called a meeting and said, ‘This is my sixth year in office, but I feel that delivery is not
reaching the grass roots level. What is the failure?’ It seems that the CM and his staff had analysed the failure as being one of poor project implementation, poor monitoring, and interference in governance by politicians (even the party’s own). Their response was to centralise power and patronage while micro-managing every aspect of the government’s business. A committee was formed to tackle cases of political interference in the work of bureaucrats (Interview 89, a PAS officer holding a Secretary post in Punjab). In fact, the CM now has an involvement in everything from ensuring motorcyclists wear helmets to the transfer of teachers. Such involvement and monitoring obviously requires that the CM rely on senior bureaucrats to assist him and keep him informed, whilst simultaneously closing off access to politicians demanding extra-legal or illegal favours. He remains surrounded by his favourite PAS officers, including Dr Tauqeer Shah, Javed Mehmood, Fawad Hasan Fawad, and Ahad Cheema. The result is close-knit relationships between the CM, his senior allies within his party, and elite bureaucrats – the Chief Secretary, the CM’s personal staff, departmental secretaries, and secretariat staff.

**Image 1: Cartoon by Jawed Iqbal printed in an unidentified Urdu newspaper**

![Cartoon by Jawed Iqbal](image)

This cartoon depicts bureaucrats in the Civil Secretariat celebrating while the Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif is away on an official trip. The caption reads: ‘CM leaves for 6 day trip to China’. The CM’s absence is depicted by the ‘closed’ video link to the left. The CM is well-known for monitoring bureaucrats and their progress via video link.

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As a result of the unity of purpose of the political leadership and the elite bureaucracy, calls for reform of the civil services remain cosmetic – even after the introduction of the 18th Amendment. For instance, in 2014, the PMLN’s Minister for Planning and Reform, Ahsan Iqbal, called a national consultative meeting to propose civil service reforms. Despite a great deal of fanfare, there was no substantive movement to adopt any of the suggested reforms. The most significant institutional change since 2013 has undoubtedly been the introduction of elected local governments. Debates over devolution as envisioned by the 18th Amendment, however, became much less contentious after the PMLN formed the government in both Punjab and the centre. Still, disputes over the devolution of some departments and the release of funds and data by the federation to the provinces remain.74 In Punjab, the main dispute has been characterised by repeated accusations from opposition parties that the PMLN sought to engineer a new local government system to extend its provincial control.

It was not until 2016 and 2017 that new elected local governments were introduced by each province. Though the advent of this new local government system in Punjab occurred after my fieldwork – and, as such, I do not discuss its impact on politicised appointments – a few observations may be helpful. Punjab passed the Punjab Local Government Act (PLGA) in 2013, and elections to the new local bodies were held in stages between 2015 and December 2016. The PMLN government, however, used key aspects of the local government system to concentrate power in the hands of the provincial government, including (a) the process for electing local government representatives75; (b) the creation of authorities for education, health, etc. headed by appointees (politicians and bureaucrats) of the provincial government76; (c)
the retention of the commissionerate system (Commissioners appointed at the division level by provincial government)\textsuperscript{77} and Deputy Commissioners (at the district level) answerable only to the Chief Secretary\textsuperscript{78}; (d) little headway in financial devolution to the district level\textsuperscript{79}; and, (e) the power of the provincial government to remove local government representatives or dissolve elected local bodies entirely. The design of this new (post-18\textsuperscript{th} Amendment) Punjab local government system makes it even more important to identify and understand patterns of bureaucratic appointment if we wish to understand patterns of governance.

In an op-ed\textsuperscript{80}, Hassan Javid argues that the form of the Punjab Local Government Act will drive the rational person to vote for the provincial ruling party, since it was clear that only those with provincial backing would have any power to ‘deliver’.\textsuperscript{81} Indeed, this rational calculus led to a massive victory for the PMLN in Punjab’s local government elections. In Punjab’s ‘new’ local government system, the balance of power still lies, as it did before, with the provincial government and its closest bureaucratic allies.

**Ability to Appoint**

My investigation into bureaucratic appointments is underpinned by notions of ‘delivery’. To understand this notion, I begin with a hypothetical actor – a politician or a bureaucrat – who wants to achieve something and looks for a means to do this. I include both politicians and bureaucrats as the ‘actors’ in this project because both are (a) motivated to influence appointments and (b) capable of doing so. As mentioned in Chapter 1, both sets of actors have various motivations and methods to achieve their ‘delivery’ goals. However, bureaucratic appointments are a critical step – in fact, the critical step in this thesis – toward actually ‘delivering’. Without the right bureaucrat in the right post, delivery may be impossible.


\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. The DPO will answer to the IGP.


\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
In what follows, I examine two questions. First, amongst those with an objective for influencing appointments, which politicians and bureaucrats have the ability to do so? And second, what are the legal, extra-legal, and illegal means through which bureaucratic appointments can be made?

Figure 1: Objectives, Methods, Bonds, and Outcomes

Amongst those with the objective to influence bureaucratic appointments, the following section differentiates those with the ability to do so from those without. If a motivated actor does not have the ability to influence the appointment process, then that actor must look for alternative means to achieve his goals. This decision path lies outside the scope of my thesis. The last section of this chapter goes on to outline the methods – first regular and irregular, then legal, extra-legal, and illegal – available to those who shape bureaucratic appointments. In subsequent chapters, I link these aspects of the politicisation process – objectives, ability, and methods – to provide a characterisation of the bonds formed between the actors involved, and the possibility of success (or not) in achieving desired ‘outcomes’.

Not all politicians and bureaucrats enjoy the same powers (legally, extra-legally, or illegally), even when they are in the same formal positions. For example, of two bureaucrats recruited to the same cadre, one may be favoured by his colleagues.
Similarly, within a party, one politician may be favoured by party leaders (and bureaucrats). There are three factors that determine where an actor lies on the spectrum of ability, namely: (a) seniority, (b) proximity to the political and bureaucratic centre, and (c) perceived career prospects.

**Seniority**

This is a very simple means of judging the extent of an actor’s ability: what hierarchical position does he occupy? Most bureaucrats will be able to influence the appointment of people to lower-level posts. (Again, it is useful to remember that both senior and mid-tier bureaucrats have the ability to influence bureaucratic appointments.)

However, even in informal settings, political seniority is also an advantage. For instance, party heavyweights are able to influence appointments (using legal, extra-legal, or illegal methods) to the middle tier of the district bureaucracy due to their reputation as being close to the CM. These mid-tier bureaucrats are, in turn, responsible for appointing junior bureaucrats, and it is through them that politicians exercise control over junior appointments in the area. However, junior politicians (e.g. first-time winners) do not carry as much weight as their senior colleagues and may struggle to have even a patwari of their choice appointed.

**The Centralisation of Politicised Appointments**

Apart from seniority, both bureaucrats and politicians have noted that, during the last few years, the ability of a politician or a bureaucrat to influence appointments above the lowest bureaucratic tiers has become dependent on direct support from the centre of the provincial government. Arguably, this can be traced back to the PMLN’s return to electoral politics as General Pervez Musharraf’s power began to wane in 2007. The party won the subsequent provincial election and sought to centralise control over bureaucratic appointments in Punjab. By making strategic

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82 There are a number of factors that have created this new dynamic – the resurrection of the PMLN post-Musharraf and its dominance in the Punjab, an activist and demanding CM, the rise of a viable opposition in the PTI, the mushrooming of the media, and the influx of donor money for specific projects, such as the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program.
appointments to various senior posts (e.g. DCOs and departmental secretaries), the 
party leadership worked to cement its popularity amongst the citizenry by 
emphasising service delivery. These methods also allowed the party to counter nearly 
a decade of military interference in governance.

Using centralized bureaucratic appointments to push forward both policy and, 
in due course, electoral objectives, however, the upper echelons of the PMLN 
leadership loosened ties with the lower tiers of its party membership (who previously 
enjoyed more influence over lower-tier bureaucratic appointments). While party 
leaders argue that they are ensuring service delivery to citizens, party workers and 
junior politicians accuse the leadership of ignoring their concerns. This state of affairs 
has led to considerable resentment amongst constituency politicians in Punjab. 
Though some have come to accept it as part of the Chief Minister’s reform program 
(seeking to improve the functioning of the bureaucracy by making supposedly ‘merit-
based’ bureaucratic appointments), those who are relatively new (e.g. first or second 
time winners), find it more difficult to accept this change. Having made promises to 
supporters, they now have to settle for being seen to be trying to exercise influence 
(e.g. being seen to be well received in the office of a key bureaucrat), regardless of 
whether favours are granted.

The consequences of this centralisation are three-fold. The first is that 
politicians are much more influential with regard to bureaucratic appointments 
(junior, mid-tier, or senior) if they are: (a) also holding an important political post 
(e.g. Home Minister) or (b) a senior member of the party with close ties to the 
leadership. The second is that, due to its nexus with a party that has ruled the province 
for the last two terms and is likely to do so for the foreseeable future, the bureaucracy 
will ensure that appointment demands made by politicians at the centre are the first to 
be fulfilled. The third is that the party leadership tends to side with elite bureaucrats 
over their own junior politicians. In such circumstances, the conventional patron-
client bond between local politicians and bureaucrats is weakened (or reversed). The 
local politician is, in some cases, powerless compared to a bureaucrat appointed by 
the party leadership. In other words, local politicians may become a client of the party

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83 Senior provincial posts are typically held by PAS bureaucrats, and bureaucrats holding them are 
legally entitled to make appointments to various junior posts in their district or department.

92
leadership and the DCO or the department secretary. ‘Appointment politics’, in other words, have become more centralised.\(^{84}\)

**Career Prospects**

Apart from seniority and recent trends pushing in the direction of greater centralisation, the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to influence bureaucratic appointments can also vary on the basis of others’ perception of their career prospects.

Again, the ultimate arbiter of success for politicians is their access to the centre of provincial power, and, come election time, how ‘electable’ they are. Access is a matter of party membership and, to some extent, seniority. Even though party labels often mean little when it comes to casting votes in Punjab, party membership does increasingly matter when it comes to delivering services. Members of the ruling party have greater influence over resources, decision making, and, of course, bureaucratic appointments than the members of other parties (or independents). Furthermore, when it comes to service delivery (of the kind required to retain voter support – electricity connections, sewage lines, roads, etc.), support from the provincial government is crucial. For this reason, even independent candidates who win a seat will typically join the ruling party after the election; they know that they will not be able to ‘deliver’ effectively (via bureaucratic appointments) without doing so.\(^{85}\)

Usually, a politician is ‘electable’ if he: (i) won by a good margin in the previous election; (ii) has enough money to run an active campaign; (iii) has a block of supporters who will vote for him (through a ‘vote bank’, i.e. supporters who coordinate and determine the reliability of the politician’s patronage/protection and therefore his electoral success – see Bjorkman 2014 and Mohmand 2011); and, (iv) has maintained good relations with the ruling party. Of course bureaucrats are well aware of a politician’s reputation, with regard to ‘access’ and ‘electability’. Some politicians who attempt to influence bureaucratic appointments will, therefore, get

\(^{84}\) It is not that political fixers such as those described by Berenschot (2014) no longer exist. They have become part and parcel of the team that surrounds senior politicians – personal secretary or assistant are terms used to describe these people. Those outside the political party’s sphere of senior politicians have become, I would argue, less influential as far as appointment politics is concerned.

\(^{85}\) An exception may arise where a politician who is hard to dislodge from his constituency (due to a substantial personal vote bank) may have influence over local bureaucrats even if he is not a member of the ruling party. However, such cases are rare, and becoming more so as elections become more competitive.
short shrift simply because bureaucrats know there are few rewards to be gained from a political “one-hit wonder”.

Amongst bureaucrats, career prospects are a function of informal ties to ‘electable’ politicians with ‘access’ to the centre, as well as what cadre he or she belongs to. By far the most successful bureaucrats are those recruited to the elite Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS). These officials will, without fail, rise to the highest ranks of the bureaucracy and will exercise great influence on appointments and decision-making, not only over the bureaucratic hierarchy, but also over less ‘central’ politicians.

The Provincial Management Service (PMS), designed as the provincial companion to the federal PAS, does not enjoy the same chances of success. The dominance of the PAS and their occupation of posts that PMS officers were supposed to hold means that the average PMS officer is less likely to secure coveted appointments. As a result, he does not have the same kind of influence over bureaucratic appointments as a PAS officer.

Mid-tier bureaucrats (not PMS officers) are posted mainly at the district level (though they can rise to posts in the provincial capital late in their careers). For example, a school teacher can rise to become a district-level School Education Department bureaucrat, such as a Deputy District Education Officer or Executive District Officer (Education). Though these officials are in charge of making appointments to the lower end of the bureaucratic hierarchy within their department, they are limited by regulations and monitoring from the provincial secretariat. Still, the ability of mid-tier bureaucrats to keep the work of the department moving, their distance from the provincial capital, and the sheer volume of paperwork and activity in district offices means that mid-tier bureaucrats can often be given quite a bit of independence to manage as they see fit. Consequently, mid-tier posts are absolutely central for a politician or bureaucrat seeking to influence outcomes.

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86 See Appendix 2 for department organogram.
87 These officials rise through the ranks from junior posts (for example, teachers or engineers) to mid-tier posts that are mainly administrative. They typically have little training in administration and will often struggle to manage their massive workload.
Bureaucratic Appointments

The essential element underpinning the repeated breaches of procedure [in Italian civil service appointments] were excessively detailed regulations. Because they were inherently unimplementable as written, at least in large measure, they effectively permitted nearly complete discretion.

- Golden 2003, 203

So far, I have been referring to a number of activities using the blanket term ‘appointments’. When legal documents to do with the bureaucracy use the term ‘appointment’, they are referring to a variety of legal practices which are classed as either regular or irregular appointments. Both types are legal in that the law – formulated by the federal and provincial governments over the years based on the 1973 Constitution - provides for the circumstances in which they can be made, and guidelines for the process itself.88

The law on bureaucratic appointments is interpreted and regulated by the Establishment Division at the federal level and the Services & General Administration Department (S&GAD) at the provincial level through the issuance of memoranda, letters, forms, and notifications (collected as the Civil Establishment Code or ESTACODE for the former, and the Rules of Business for the latter). The law cannot account for every circumstance – for instance, the paperwork and procedure for extending an additional charge appointment, or the exact qualifications required for each post in a department’s hierarchy – and this allows these bodies considerable discretion (which is to be exercised in the ‘public interest’)89 when it comes to civil servants’ appointments. It is the Establishment Division or the provincial Services & General Administration Departments (S&GADs) that is responsible for clarifying regulations, establishing precedent, and providing a framework for ministries and departments to issue their own case-specific rules. Consequently, the Secretaries of

89 The Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled in 2012 (Constitutional Petition 23/2012) that such discretion must be exercised in a reasonable, fair, and consistent manner.
the Establishment Division and the provincial S&GADs are important posts to fill for any government. In cases where a decision on appointments involves a change in government expenditure, the Establishment Division must consult the Finance Division, and the S&GAD must consult the provincial Finance Department, before making a decision. This is for the simple reason that the government’s wage bill must remain in line with federal and provincial budgets.

In many respects, federal and provincial laws are similar if not the same. (Provincial laws have been drawn up using the federal rules, and with the guidance of the Establishment Division.) Departments at both the federal and provincial levels are required to follow both the Establishment Division’s and S&GADs’ interpretation of the law, and seek their guidance, when drawing up their own rules for appointments (all the way down to district markaz level). However, there are some differences, and I will point them out along the way.

Though the term ‘appointment’ suggests the initial recruitment and first posting of a bureaucrat, it is, in fact, a term that can refer to a variety of practices at any point in a bureaucrat’s career – transfers, promotions, additional charge, etc. Conventionally, discussions of bureaucratic politicisation in the literature centre on initial recruitment – a politician dispenses patronage by getting his voter a government job, for instance. The focus here is, instead, on the politicised transfer, promotion, and irregular appointment of bureaucrats, and thus the ‘delivery’ of outcomes, at various points in a bureaucratic career. The rest of this chapter will explore regular and irregular bureaucratic appointments – briefly highlighting along the way the loopholes, excessive discretion, and misuse that lead to extra-legal methods of appointment – before turning to illegal methods at the end.

Regular Bureaucratic Appointments

Recruitment

Recruitment to the bureaucracy takes places at three different levels – federal, provincial, and local/departmental. This section will provide a brief overview of the recruitment process at these levels and the laws and rules that regulate it. In doing so, I will highlight areas where legal provisions provide a loophole for actors to exploit.
Despite the intense competition over jobs, initial recruitment is the least contested/controversial aspect of appointment. Recruitment to the federal bureaucracy is regulated by the Civil Servants’ (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, and a series of letters and office memorandums in the ESTACODE. The Federal Public Service Commission is in charge of recruitment to posts in BPS 16 and above, including the PAS. Recruitment to the PAS varies from year to year, between 20 and 40, depending on the requirement for fresh blood and of course, on the candidates available. An examination for the Civil Superior Services is held every year, and candidates who pass the written, oral and medical tests are sorted according to merit amongst the different cadres of the federal bureaucracy. Usually, those at the top of the merit list will opt for the PAS or the Police Service.

The Punjab Public Service Commission is responsible for conducting examinations for initial recruitment to provincial posts in BPS 16 and above (and in BPS 11 to 15 that are ‘notified by the Government’). Appointments to all other posts are to be made by advertising in newspapers and through examinations by the relevant committee or board. Though there are multiple stories of institutional weakness and failure regarding recruitment at these levels, by and large the process is seen to be fair; the accusations that flow easily in other domains of the political system – that there is political interference, nepotism, and favouritism - are surprisingly rare. This is particularly true with the CSS examination; though thousands apply and only a small percentage are admitted to the Central Superior Services, disaffection with the FPSC and its examinations is remarkably limited. Provincial Public Service Commissions have a more mixed reputation, but even against them rebellion is uncommon.

Where the narrative of clean recruitment begins to fall apart is amongst officials who were not recruited by a public service commission examination but through a departmental process. These officials are employed by a department to fulfil that department’s staffing needs – teachers, mid-tier administrators in the School

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90 Junior government jobs are coveted and fought over just as much as posts at a higher pay scale. All government posts come with security of tenure and a pension, and it is almost unheard of for an official to be dismissed from service, no matter how egregious his crimes. Once appointed, a government servant holds the lien to the post - no one else can occupy it while he is performing his duties.

91 These are posts that can only serve in their respective provinces, including the Provincial Management Service and Technical or Professional Services Cadre

92 Art 16, The Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules 1974. These are usually posts that involve the handling of public funds or involve public security, for example, naib tehsildar, Sub-Engineer, Police Inspector, etc.

93 Art 17, ibid.
Education Department, or engineers in the Irrigation Department, for example. For such employees, ministries and departments are expected to develop their own rules and carry out the recruitment process themselves, with the guidance and assent of the Establishment Division or the S&GAD.94 This is a critical point for the forthcoming chapters of this thesis: not only is room to manoeuvre substantively greater at this level, but rules can be either improperly framed, not framed at all, or changed at the discretion of senior department staff (something that can become particularly problematic in cases where the departmental secretary or other senior staff changes frequently).

In an office memorandum dated 14/3/198195, the Establishment Division noted that there was confusion amongst departments, ministries, and divisions in carrying out initial recruitment since officials were being recruited in an ad hoc fashion. Not only would this cause controversy at the time, it also jeopardised the promotion and transfer of these new recruits since their starting point in the service was unclear. New guidelines were issued to clarify the procedure, but two years later, the Establishment Division issued an Office Memorandum96 that seems to suggest the guidelines had borne little fruit: the rules being framed by departments were ‘an increasingly mechanical exercise…now reduced to simply inserting uniform standards (of educational requirements, experience, age limits, etc.) for equivalent posts in various departments’. The rules did not take into account the particular post and its requirements, nor did they account for the future career of the new recruits. For example, the rules did not specify what percentage of posts should be filled through direct recruitment as opposed to promotion. This meant that the officials in charge could exercise their discretion and either refuse to recruit new people or refuse to promote junior officers as it suited them.

The problem with recruitment rules in general, and particularly with those framed by departments themselves, was clearly identified in the Recruitment Policy for the Federal Services/Autonomous Bodies/Corporations issued by the Establishment Division in 1992: too much discretion. In order to make recruitment at the federal level better regulated and monitored, and to emphasise merit, the policy

95 Estt. Division O.M.No.2/9/76.D.III
96 No. 9/1/73-R.5, dated 22-8-1984
increased the powers of the FPSC and introduced oversight of recruitment procedures via Parliamentary Committees for each Ministry.

Though a similar debate is not to be found in the Government of Punjab Rules of Business, the development of a comprehensive new Recruitment Policy in 2004 seems to suggest that the same problem - excessive discretion - plagued provincial recruitment as well. As a solution, the 2004 policy provides extensive regulations for recruitment – whether regular or contractual. Regular recruitment to key departments such as the S&GAD, Finance, Revenue, and Police was placed in the hands of central authorities rather than individual departments. For instance, new recruits to posts in BPS 11 to 15 (and selected other posts including Sub-Engineers in the Irrigation Department) were to be appointed on the recommendation of the highly centralised Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) rather than their respective departments.

**Seniority**

Once an official is recruited, trained, and confirmed, her future in the service is determined by her seniority. The seniority of provincial civil servants is determined on the same principles as federal officials and where an official stands on a seniority list determines if and when she gets a promotion.

In 1973, when the services were re-structured, the system for determining seniority had to be overhauled to reflect the new system of grades, now known as BPS or Basic Pay Scales. The Civil Servants Act of 1973 Article 8 remarks that seniority is a matter relative to the officer’s peers in a service or cadre. There are two kinds of seniority. The first is seniority within grades or pay scales within a cadre or occupational group, and the second is seniority within a batch of recruits.

After sitting all required examinations, new recruits are placed on the seniority list on the basis of their cumulative score on the CSS examination, the training programs, and the final passing out examination. Seniority for the purposes of promotion is determined by when the official was appointed to a post in a specific grade. For example, if A was appointed to a BPS 19 post on 31 May 2014 and B was appointed on 2 April 2014, the more senior official would be B. However, despite

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97 The Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules, 1990 (Art. 7)
98 Where two officials are appointed to the same pay scale on the same date, the person who is older in age will be given the senior rank, provided that he was not junior to the younger person in their previous pay scale.
promotion in this fashion, the official will retain his seniority ranking within his batch (those who were recruited at the same time as he was) as before. Where a post is open to both direct recruitment and promotion (according to a specific percentage division, for example 70% by direct recruitment and 30% by promotion), a 1970 memorandum establishes that those promoted to the post in question from a lower post will be considered senior to officials recruited directly at the same time.99

Though there has clearly been an attempt to establish regulations for any eventuality with regard to seniority, the fact is that a bureaucrat’s place on the seniority list is a contested issue. The primary reason for this is that determination of seniority depends on documentation, making lists, and accurate dates for an official’s birth and appointments. Of course bureaucrats fudge seniority lists, adding names in the top ten on the request of a patron or because they have been bribed to do so. At the same time, more everyday practices can also impact seniority. One of the most common practices amongst officials is entering an incorrect birth date when they apply for the service, or at some later date. Another means of interfering with the determination of seniority is to delay someone’s file, thereby delaying their appointment. These practices may seem trivial, but they can impact appointments and, thus, ‘delivery’.

Promotion

Promotion prospects vary immensely within the civil service – between cadres, services, posts, and departments. At every pay scale, there are posts reserved for initial recruitment and for promotion. PAS officers are the only bureaucrats who are promoted more or less regardless of performance, as a matter of form. Unless they themselves choose to remain on leave and work outside of the hierarchy, all PAS officers will rise through the ranks to BPS 22 and the posts of federal secretaries. These are not necessarily illegal or even extra-legal promotions. They are often perfectly legal, but the fact is that the PAS cadre is the one where the rules for promotion as they are laid out are likely to be followed.

A 1964 memorandum100 establishes a division amongst posts to which promotion is possible – selection posts and non-selection posts. Non-selection posts

99 Estt. Division O.M.No.1/9/74-ARC,dated 12-9-1974
100 Estt. Division O.M.No.18/4/64-F.II, dated 25-7-1964
are those to which promotion is determined on the basis of seniority (‘subject to
fitness’)\textsuperscript{101}. A selection post is one (as a demi-official letter from the Establishment
Secretary\textsuperscript{102} defines it) ‘which no officer can claim as of right’. Departmental
Promotion Committees or Selection Boards determine promotion to these posts on the
basis of merit only.\textsuperscript{103} Seniority amongst aspirants to the post becomes relevant only
when two or more of them are indistinguishable on merit.\textsuperscript{104}

In 1982, a Promotion Policy was issued to deal with specific aspects of
promotion by ‘selection’ processes, perhaps the most problematic being the
While the Establishment Division goes to great lengths to quantify a PER, it is a
complicated procedure that most bureaucrats will not have the time to master.
Therefore, PERs were and still are often filled out solely on the discretion of the
supervising officer. In 1985, however, a letter from the Establishment Secretary\textsuperscript{105}
raises the concern of ‘“Inflated” [sic] reporting’. The division expresses its awareness
that ACR’s are not a reflection of true performance, but are overly ‘generous’ due to
pressure exerted in one form or another on the assessing officer. In order to counter
these problems, the Division revised the marks given to different assessments on the
ACR (reducing the portion allocated to those areas where ‘pressure’ was suspected).
Regardless, the problem of manufactured reports remains. Most bureaucrats have no
qualms in revealing that *everyone’s* reports, their own included, are
unrepresentative of their true skills, capabilities, and work.

In 2007, the Promotion Policy was revised on the basis of the
recommendations of a Committee charged with making promotions better regulated
and fairer. The 2007 policy does not change the length of time in service required for
promotion.\textsuperscript{106} However, it tries to remove a loophole in the promotion process
introduced by a notification\textsuperscript{107} issued in 1975 by the Establishment Division. The

\textsuperscript{101} Also referred to as ‘seniority-cum-fitness’ in various memorandums
\textsuperscript{102} No.F.2(36)/60-EIX, dated 24-4-1968
\textsuperscript{103} As noted by the Supreme Court in the Tariq Aziz ud Din case (2010 SCMR 1301)
\textsuperscript{104} http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/file/hr8340oof2010.pdf
\textsuperscript{105} Estt. Division O.M.No.18/4/64-F.II, dated 25-7-1964
\textsuperscript{106} d.o. Letter No.10(10)/85-CP-1 dated 15-5-1985
\textsuperscript{107} Establishment Division memorandum (O.M.No.1/9/80-R.2 dated 2-6-1983) specifies:
\begin{itemize}
  \item For Grade 18: 5 years in Grade 17
  \item For Grade 19: 12 years in Grade 17 and above
  \item For Grade 20: 17 years in Grade 17 and above
  \item For Grade 21: 22 years in Grade 17 and above
\end{itemize}
\textsuperscript{107} No.1/21/75-D.II. dated 9-7-1975
notification emphasised that the completion of the required length of time in service does not mean that an official has the right to promotion. It is simply one of the conditions for promotion. Even if an official fulfills the required years in service, the promotion will not automatically be his as long as there is an official who is senior to him who has not completed the required years in service. Effectively, this created a loophole in the determination of promotions for bureaucrats – the officer in charge of approving promotions had the discretion to overlook the more senior bureaucrat and promote a junior who has spent the required number of years in service. In an attempt to plug the loophole, the 2007 Promotion Policy (Para 4) develops a quantified measure – the ‘Comprehensive Efficiency Index’. However, the index suffers from the same problems as PERs – bureaucrats usually do not have the time or the motivation to master its implementation.

The Provincial Management Service’s promotion prospects are much less rosy than that of the PAS. In fact, over the last few years, there has been simmering resentment on the part of PMS officers (and other provincial officers in general) against the PAS. PMS officers believe that the PAS, and DMG before them, are usurping posts meant for their service. As a result, PMS officials reach retirement age before reaching the highest pay scales because there are simply no vacancies in the most senior posts.

For the Provincial Management Service, promotions are determined by the Provincial Selection Board and handled by the S&GAD. In 2010, the Punjab government felt that the 1974 Rules needed more substantiation, and issued a detailed Promotion Policy which is in many ways similar to the Establishment Division’s. However, there are some differences. Of particular interest is the distinction between three types of promotion: (a) regular, (b) on acting-charge basis, and (c) on officiating basis.

These terms are of interest for this thesis because they are used in the courts and the media for PAS officers serving in Punjab as well as provincial employees. A regular promotion is one made when there is a ‘clear vacancy’ to be filled (p.2, Promotion Policy 2010). An acting-charge promotion is made when an official who might otherwise be qualified for the promotion has not completed the required time in

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108 The Central Selection or Departmental Promotion Committee (d.o. letter No.1/9/73-F.IV, dated 22-10-1973) and Establishment Division (Letter No. 26/1/80-DV, dated 12-10-1980) must ensure that those recommended for promotion meet the minimum required score.
service (see section on Acting Charge Appointments for more details). An officiating promotion (what the Establishment Division refers to as a temporary promotion\(^{109}\)) is an appointment made when a post is vacant because a suitable candidate cannot be found for a transfer, an official defers promotion, or the incumbent has been posted away or is on leave, suspension or deputation. In these circumstances, the post can be filled by promoting an officer who has the requisite qualifications and length in service. However, an officiating promotion does not imply a regular promotion. Once a suitable candidate becomes available for the post, the official on officiating promotion will revert back to his previous pay scale.

The Promotion Policy 2010 provides a detailed list of conditions that must be met by an official looking for a promotion. Aside from the conditions laid down by the Establishment Division (see above), the provincial requirements specifically point to the person’s position on the seniority list, any penalties that involve a bar on promotion, and the completion of the probationary period. Furthermore, the policy allows for the relevant department to put in place particular requirements related to the job in question. The example the policy provides is that of ‘teachers, whose [students’] results are compared with the results of the Boards/Universities’ (p. 4, Promotion Policy 2010).

Unlike federal posts, all provincial posts in BPS 19 (and above) are selection posts with promotion to them determined by the Provincial Selection Board on the basis of merit determined by an Efficiency Index Score. In addition, the policy suggests that for promotions to posts in BPS 19 and above, Selection Boards consider ‘emotional maturity’ and ‘breadth of vision’ in addition to the regular performance measures (p. 6-7, Promotion Policy 2010). Unquantifiable and certainly not determinable through the PER, the presence or absence of these qualities in a candidate is solely the judgment of the Provincial Selection Board and, potentially, how well the members of the Board know the official. In other words, the granting of such promotions is a discretionary exercise.

Posts in BPS 18 and below are all non-selection posts, with departments developing their own detailed policies (in line with the Punjab Civil Servants Rules 1974 and Promotion Policy 2010). Unlike PAS and PMS officials, departments often

\(^{109}\) It is possible to be promoted to a post on a temporary basis, if the original occupant is on leave or on training for example. A 1997 memorandum (Estt. Div.’s O.M.No.30/2/90-CP-3, dated 18-2-1997) allows for such temporary promotions to be regularised.
do not have ‘time-scale’ promotion policies or, if they do, the time frames specified are not followed. What this means, as many bureaucrats pointed out to me, is that there are either no regulations regarding how much time an official can spend in a post before having the right to be promoted, or if regulations are present, they are completely ignored at the discretion of senior bureaucrats who promote favoured officers within their own professional networks. As a result, all mid-tier bureaucrats I spoke to complained of slow progress up the department’s hierarchy. In the Irrigation Department, for instance, a Sub-Engineer might spend ten or fifteen years without being promoted to Sub-Divisional Officer.\textsuperscript{110} Since the promotion process is in the hands of the department, officials suggest that members of the department close to the Secretary or the department’s district administrator will be promoted first, regardless of seniority.

\textit{Transfer}

A transfer is when an official is moved from one post to another in the same pay scale (BPS). It may entail moving ‘from one functional unit to another’, moving from one province or district to another, or from the centre (Islamabad) to a province (Art 11, 1974 Punjab Civil Servant Rules). A transfer is meant to be an advancement, not in terms of a pay scale but in terms of financial remuneration, as per a Government of India Finance Division letter from 1\textsuperscript{st} February 1928\textsuperscript{111} which is included in the Establishment Code and reproduced as a notification from the Punjab S\&GAD.\textsuperscript{112}

Transfers are by far the most problematic aspect of the bureaucratic set up. Most bureaucrats and politicians I spoke to claimed that recruitment had improved in the last few years and promotions were largely rule bound, but transfers were still a problem. There were no real explanations offered for this beyond saying that it was useful to be able to control transfers - between districts, between departments, and where PAS officers are concerned, between provinces and the federation.\textsuperscript{113} The implication is that those attempting to politicise the bureaucracy may not necessarily

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{110}] See Appendix 2 for department organogram.
\item[\textsuperscript{111}] No. F-452-R.I/27
\item[\textsuperscript{112}] No. SORI (S\&GAD)-9-36/81 dated 3/08/1988
\item[\textsuperscript{113}] Transfers are not possible between groups or cadres. Where an official is appointed to a service or cadre other than his own, he is regarded as being on deputation and a separate set of rules apply.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
care who is recruited (except at the lower level of the bureaucracy). They do, however, care who is posted to a particular office. For instance, Wade (1985) explores the sale of transfers from post to post in an irrigation department, highlighting the existence of an entire corruption eco-system that extends from national politicians to department field staff and voters. This suggests that the desire to politicise appointments is tied to particular posts and the official powers and unofficial influence associated with those posts. In other words, politicisation is not simply about getting some people jobs (as much of the literature seems to understand it). It is about putting certain people who are already serving as bureaucrats in certain jobs and, thereby, regulating bureaucratic performance, gaining electoral advantages, or ensuring personal enrichment.

Though rules exist as to when transfers are permitted and when they are not, they are either (a) vaguer than those for promotion or (b) have simply not been formulated in any substantive fashion. The former means, for example, that the transfer or shuffling of bureaucrats that takes place prior to an election (by the caretaker government114) in order to mitigate their influence on the electoral process is often cosmetic. For example, moving the Lahore District Co-ordination Officer (DCO) to the post of DCO of nearby Faisalabad, both PMLN strongholds, before an election does not reduce the power of the bureaucrat to make promises of appointments to garner the votes a politician needs to win the election, neither does it impact the official’s power to target state services and resources to areas where a patron politician (a constituency politician or a party leader) needs some support, while shutting out the opposition. It simply changes the target (politician) recipients. The lack of substantive rules regarding transfers means that transfers often involve a *quid pro quo* – for instance, support during the election in exchange for a good posting afterwards. The only condition that the 1974 Punjab Rules lays down for transfers is that the official in question meet any qualifications and conditions set for the post he is being transferred to. Though transfers are dealt with in acts of parliament, rules of business, and in the ESTACODE, I have not been able to find any comprehensive policy that provides a blueprint to deal with transfer requests. Instead, transfer decisions are often made simply on tenure. At the provincial level, tenure is established by the Sixth Schedule of the Government of Punjab Rules of Business

114 A caretaker government is put in place for a few months after the end of the incumbent government’s term and is responsible for conducting free and fair elections.
Where an official is to be promoted before the end of his tenure, or where it is necessary to extend the tenure of an official in a post, the (centralised/discretionary) approval of the S&GAD is required.\textsuperscript{115}

Tenure for all federal posts except technical ones is established in a demi-official letter from the Establishment Secretary\textsuperscript{116} which specifies that, typically, an official should remain in a post for three years, and no more than five years. However, in an office memorandum from 1994\textsuperscript{117}, the Establishment Division notes that ministries and departments are not obeying the rules allowing officials to serve for long periods. The memorandum therefore introduces the requirement that any extension in tenure must be approved by the competent authority. In cases where a transfer is being made before the end of the official’s tenure, the Establishment Division must be consulted.\textsuperscript{118}

For PAS officers, transfers can take place at three levels – district, department, or province/federation. In 2000, a letter from the Establishment Division\textsuperscript{119} established that a PAS officer must serve in a minimum of two provinces of the federation, in addition to serving the federal government at the centre. Interestingly, however, the letter also provides that the preference of an official be taken into account when appointing him to a province, alongside of course the posts available in that province. At the same time, the appointment of these officials (to/from Islamabad or a province) is often influenced by politicians and other bureaucrats with the intention of achieving specific outcomes. Within provinces, and particularly Punjab, the appointments of PAS officers to secretariat posts (in the CM Secretariat), department posts (Secretary of a department, for instance) or as the DCO of a district are also political decisions on the part of both the politicians and the bureaucrats concerned.\textsuperscript{120}

The determination of rotational postings (transfers between provinces and the federation), the letter\textsuperscript{121} states, is to be made by the Establishment Secretaries and the Chief Secretaries of the provinces. However, in many cases, PAS officials use their

\textsuperscript{115} GoP RoB 2011, Part D, Para 23
\textsuperscript{116} Nos.27/370-F.1, dated 4-11-1970 and 30-6-1971
\textsuperscript{117} No.10/10/94-R.2, dated 22-3-1994
\textsuperscript{118} Or if the post in question is in a semi-autonomous or autonomous organisation, by its parent ministry
\textsuperscript{119} No.F.9/1/2000-CP-7, dated 22-7-2000
\textsuperscript{120} See Chapters 4 and 5
\textsuperscript{121} No.F.9/1/2000-CP-7, dated 22-7-2000
links with senior politicians and bureaucrats to ensure that they are not posted outside Punjab, or if they are, that they are soon transferred back. Of course, this practice means that the objective of the rotation policy – to give PAS officers as varied a career trajectory as possible, so that they serve in the centre as well as the provinces – is rarely met.

In practice, the lines of authority on transfers are opaque. In line with the trend toward centralisation, decisions on transfers are made in consultation with (or on the advice of) the department secretary, the Chief Secretary, and the CM and his advisers, regardless of who has the official authority to do so. In fact, the relationship between the secretaries of the major provincial departments and the CM Secretariat is symbiotic.

**CM Directive**

It is the legal prerogative of the Chief Minister to issue a directive to a department at any time asking that a policy being implemented be temporarily suspended. Ideally, the power to issue such a directive should be used sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. However, given the pattern of centralisation mentioned earlier, CM Directives are issued frequently with regard to bureaucratic appointments and often for trivial tasks (e.g. allowing a teacher to be transferred while a transfer ban is in place).

**Irregular Appointments**

An irregular appointment is not an illegal appointment or even necessarily an extra-legal appointment. The law and the rules for bureaucrats at federal, provincial, and departmental levels allow for appointments to be made in circumstances that are different from the usual recruitment, promotion, and transfer options. Usually, irregular appointments involve a temporary assignment of some kind, but there are other types as well.

**Ad hoc Appointments**

According to Part IV of the 1973 (federal) Rules and 1974 Punjab Rules, an ad hoc appointment is made where the appointing authority (e.g. the Secretary of a
Ministry or Division) believes it to be detrimental to the public interest to leave a post vacant while awaiting the selection authority’s (FPSC or PPSC) due process and recommendation. In such cases, the appointing authority can appoint an official to the post for no longer than six months (one year for provincial appointments as per a notification issued in 1982\textsuperscript{122}). Once the selection authority nominates a candidate for the post, the ad hoc appointee reverts back to his prior position with regard to seniority and BPS.

As far back as 1962, however, the Establishment Division showed concern that ad hoc appointments were fraught with favouritism and nepotism\textsuperscript{123}, and subsequently, that the standard procedure of advertising, short listing, and assessment was not being followed.\textsuperscript{124} A pre-prepared short list of candidates would be considered for the post or the names of favoured candidates added to an existing list, typically due to the influence of political or bureaucratic patrons. Furthermore, ad hoc appointments were extended repeatedly, because (exploiting a loophole in the regulations) departments and offices would delay placing a requisition for fresh recruitment to the post in question with the FPSC.\textsuperscript{125} As a result, finding someone suitable for the post took time, and the ad-hoc appointee received extensions beyond his initial 6-month term.

The Recruitment Policy enforced in 1992 made ad hoc appointments illegal unless approved by the Prime Minister, but that decision was reversed in 2000.\textsuperscript{126} The Establishment Division permitted ad-hoc appointments provided that a requisition had been placed with the FPSC and (discretionary) clearance acquired from them. By 2002, however, the nomenclature ‘ad-hoc’ seemed to fall out of use and, to bypass these requirements, was replaced by the rather vague concept of a ‘temporary transfer/posting’ made ‘in the public interest’.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{122} Notification No. SOR.III-1-39/78 dated 14.06.1982
\textsuperscript{123} D.O. letter No.2/2/62-D.I, dated 15-2-1962
\textsuperscript{124} Estt. Division’s O.M. No. 2/23/78-D.III, dated 17-4-1978 and Estt. Division’s O.M.No.D-268/74-D.V., dated 29-6-1974
\textsuperscript{125} Estt. Division’s O.M.No.2/9/76-D.III, dated 4-6-1976; Estt. Division’s D.O.letter No.9/2/74-D.V., dated 8-6-1977; Estt Division’s circular No.2/60/87-CP-5 dated 29-9-1987; Estt. Secretary’s D.O. letter No.2/7/77-D.III, dated 15-10-1977
\textsuperscript{126} S.R.O. No.122(I)/2000, dated 15-3-2000
\textsuperscript{127} OM No. 9/2/2002-R.5, dated 28th October, 2002
**Acting Charge Appointments**

Acting charge appointments were given legal cover when the 1973 Rules were amended in January 1981\(^\text{128}\) to add Rule 8-A and B. Rule 8-A mandates that promotion would only be allowed if the required length of service, qualifications, and training needs were met. Where officials did not meet these requirements, acting charge appointments were permitted under Rule 8-B. At the provincial level, an S&GAD Notification\(^\text{129}\) also allowed acting charge appointments.

Again, acting charge appointments are made at the discretion of the appointing authority where he considers that it would be against the public interest to leave the post vacant (Rule 8-B(1), 1973 Rules). In the 1974 Punjab Rules, there is specification as to the qualifications the acting charge appointee must have – ‘at least three fourth [sic]’ of the time in service or experience required for the post, and eligibility ‘for promotion except for the prescribed length of service and the experience’ (Para 10-A(2)). If a suitable candidate cannot be found for a post of BPS 17 or above, the senior-most officer in the group or department can be given an acting charge appointment (Rule 8-B(3) of the 1973 Rules). However, acting charge appointments do not constitute a promotion, nor do they confer seniority on the appointee (Rule 8-B(6-7)).

In 1988, however, the Establishment Division issued a memorandum\(^\text{130}\) noting that ministries, departments, divisions, and provincial governments were not following their instructions with regard to the procedure for the irregular (but legal) appointment of federal employees to posts in the higher grades. This disregard for procedure came to light when junior officials appointed to senior posts without due procedure demanded the salary and allowances tied to the senior post, usually by appealing to the Federal Services Tribunal or the Supreme Court, even though they had not been officially promoted. Interestingly, the memorandum (dated 2/5/1988) itself notes the flimsiness of the typical excuse offered for the violation of relevant procedures: the public interest.

\(^{128}\) Establishment Division Notification No.S.R.O.41(I)/81, dated 12th January, 1981
\(^{129}\) No. SOR.III-1-14/75 dated 26.02.1983
**Additional/Current Charge Appointments**

There seems to be no clear distinction between ‘current’ charge and ‘additional’ charge appointments in the ESTACODE. In places, the terms are used interchangeably, while in others they are used to suggest two separate practices without distinguishing them. After a close reading of the memorandums, I have decided to consider them one and the same. My reason is that, in amendments made in 2005 to memoranda regarding remuneration for additional and current charge posts, the same rate is set for both kinds of appointments. I use the term ‘additional charge’ to refer to both current and additional charge appointments, because this is the term that is actually used by bureaucrats on a day-to-day basis.

‘Additional charge’ appointments are stop-gap appointments when an officer retires, goes on leave or is otherwise unavailable. It is meant as a temporary substitute till the formal process can be carried out to find a replacement officer. A memorandum dated 18/6/1980 provides for additional charge appointments made to posts that would otherwise remain vacant for no more than 2 months, hindering the work of the department. The senior-most official in the relevant departmental unit or district will be eligible for an additional charge appointment provided he meets any requirements for the post and for promotion (except length of time in service). The appointment may be to an identical post to the one the official is holding, or it may be in a higher BPS.

Since officials with an additional charge appointment are responsible for two posts at the same time, they can throw an entire department into disarray. The officer who has additional charge continues to sit in his office of primary charge, but is responsible for the work of another department as well. Therefore, he must divide his time between the two, leading to backlogs, missing files, and much running back and forth by junior officers. There are restrictions on how long these appointments can last - between one and three months, extendable by another 3 months; any extension beyond six months would have to be approved (as a matter of discretion) by the Finance Division. In a move toward centralising bureaucratic appointments,
however, a 2005 memorandum\textsuperscript{136} hands the power to make all additional charge appointments in BPS 17 - 20 to Secretaries. Initial extensions for a further 3 months must be approved by the Establishment Secretary and any extensions beyond 6 months to the Prime Minister. Just as with Acting Charge Appointments, then, bureaucratic and politicised discretion is used to make Additional Charge Appointments frequently and for extended periods, often in posts that deal with paperwork or projects.

Unlike the federal rules, the 1974 Punjab Rules do not use the term additional charge at all, though the Civil Service Rules issued by the provincial Finance Department refer to both current and additional charge appointments (seemingly interchangeably) with respect to pay. As per Para 10-B(1) of the 1974 Punjab Rules, a ‘current charge’ (read additional charge) appointment is made where a post is likely to be vacant for less than a year and the relevant authority does not think it useful to make an ad hoc appointment to the post, i.e. does not think it necessary to go through the process of advertising and short listing candidates, etc. Again, the appointment will go to the senior-most official whom the relevant authority considers (as a matter of discretion) eligible for promotion.

\textit{Contract Appointments}

Contract appointments have been in vogue with the Pakistan government for some years, and with the Punjab government in particular in recent years. In a presentation to the National Commission on Government Reform (NCGR) in January 2007, the Government of Punjab revealed that it was prioritising contract appointments over regular ones. The NCGR report (p. 344) notes that the Chief Secretary of Punjab stressed ‘increased absenteeism, poor service delivery, [the] non-existence of [a] rational performance management system[,] and the increasing pension bill for the regular employees’ as the reasons behind this shift.

The Punjab government’s 2004 Recruitment Policy\textsuperscript{137} (Para 7 i and ii) states that a Contract Appointment Regulation Committee will determine which posts should be filled on a contract basis, though departments can request to have a contract-based appointment made where they wish to offer a different salary than the

\textsuperscript{137} See the Recruitment section above.
one mandated for the post in question by the BPS  Whereas the Punjab government barred retired civil servants from being employed on contracts, however, the federal government did not. In fact, the federal memorandum ends with the following clause:

3. The Chief Executive may allow contract appointment of a retired civil servant or a retired officer of the Armed Forces or a retired Judge of a superior court or any other person on MP pay package in the public interest and merit.

At the time, this clause allowed Musharraf to make practically any appointment he wanted within the federal service. Following the reinstatement of democratic rule, this power now lies with the PM. It is still used to appoint advisers at the highest level of government.

**Officer on Special Duty (OSD)**

Officer on Special Duty (tongue-in-cheek referred to as Officer in Search of Duty) is a categorisation that in theory carries no stigma. It simply means that the officer is available to the federal or provincial government to be appointed wherever they might wish. In effect, it is paid leave.

In a memorandum dated 19/9/1968\(^{138}\), the Establishment Division ponders whether it is necessary to determine a procedure for Officer on Special Duty (OSD) postings and, if so, how an OSD appointment is to be made. Deciding that such appointments are necessary, the memorandum records that OSD posts may be created in circumstances where an officer is awaiting a posting; on deputation or training; assigned a special duty; or ‘for overcoming technical difficulties’. No matter what the reason for doing so, the memorandum specifies that an OSD post cannot be created without the agreement of the Ministry of Finance (or the relevant financial adviser). Though the Punjab rules do not mention OSD, it is likely that the same rules apply. For example, Interviewee 4 gave the example of an official returning from a course abroad – he will be made OSD till a suitable post is found for him. In such circumstances, putting an official on ‘Special Duty’ is a reasonable and legal step. However, the fact is that OSD postings are frequently made for punitive reasons – to shunt a noncompliant bureaucrat to the sidelines and make way for a more accommodating officer at the discretion of senior officers. As Hull (2012, 158) puts it,

\(^{138}\) Estt. Division O. M. No. 5 (I) / 8 / 6 7 - DV, dated 19-9-1968
an OSD appointment means the officer has been ‘prematurely transferred out of his office without a new assignment’.

Post Upgradation

In 1981, the Establishment Division issued a memorandum\textsuperscript{139} regarding appointments made outside the regular channels. Repeating an earlier memo\textsuperscript{140}, the memorandum notes that the appointment of junior officers to senior posts without due process must cease, and that where it was essential to appoint a junior officer to a senior post, the post itself must be downgraded to the officer’s grade after seeking permission from the Establishment Division.\textsuperscript{141}

However, upgrading posts was given legal cover again in a memorandum in 1992\textsuperscript{142} with the requirement that the PM, Establishment Division, and Finance Division approve the upgradation. In a memorandum dated 20/1/2001\textsuperscript{143} the Establishment Division outlined the circumstances in which upgradation would be permitted – mainly when the responsibilities of a post had increased significantly – and outlined the (centralised) process for it.

Though posts were often upgraded during Musharraf’s tenure, bureaucrats told me that this is not a common practice any longer. Though junior officers continue to be appointed to senior posts, this is through other methods such as Own Pay Scale (OPS) appointments (see below).

Own Pay Scale

Unlike additional charge appointments, there is no legal provision whatsoever for appointments made on an Own Pay Scale (OPS) basis. However, it is an often-used irregular method of appointment and the abbreviation ‘OPS’ appears on official documents such as seniority lists. The practice involves giving an officer a senior post without promoting him to the required (higher) BPS, and has become such an open

\textsuperscript{139} O.M.No. 5(1)/81-D.II-R/4, dated 12-12-1981
\textsuperscript{140} O.M.No.2/25/69-C.I., dated July 31, 1979
\textsuperscript{141} In a 1967 memorandum, the Establishment Division (O.M.No.5(1)/67-DV, dated 16-10-1967) explains that upgrading a post means first abolishing it and creating a new one in a higher BPS.
\textsuperscript{142} Estt. Div.’s OM No. 8/130/91-R.I, dated 12th May, 1992
\textsuperscript{143} O.M.No.F.8/36/2000-R.I

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and common practice that what should be an extra-legal practice has come to be considered merely as an irregular method of appointment.

**Illegal Appointments**

Illegal appointments involve a range of methods. In some cases, the appointing bureaucrat has to do very little to allow the appointment to go through – for instance, he simply has to (a) ignore the fact that a candidate has a fake degree or (b) overlook a poor Annual Confidential Report/Performance Evaluation Report. In other cases, more effort (and, at times, risk-taking) is required – for example, having names inserted into merit lists or requesting an interviewer to give someone a few extra marks in an interview.

**Fudging Lists**

A common illegal practice is to add or subtract names from merit, seniority, recruitment, or other lists. Typically, this is done by senior politicians who do not wish to engage with the legal process and do not need to cover their tracks using extra-legal means. They already exert enough influence to simply issue an order regarding appointments to particular posts, expecting it to be obeyed. This behaviour can be observed amongst senior public office holders (for example, the provincial assembly speaker or deputy speaker) and ministerial offices of all stripes. Little pieces of paper will be handed around the offices of the official’s administrative staff with names and posts written in Urdu. These chits are compiled and added to a list by one of the staff. Another practice is to insert officers’ names into the seniority list for promotion.

**Faking Signatures**

Despite a great deal of talk about digitisation and the use of technology (particularly cell phones and applications), most bureaucratic work is still done on paper. Though official documents are typed in English, comments on them are made by hand, in Urdu, starting from the department’s Section Officers all the way up to the Secretary. At each stage, the official must sign off on the document and put down any comments for the record.
There are multiple means through which fake signatures are used to impact bureaucratic appointments. The simplest way, employed by clerks in various government departments, is to ‘lose’ the page which has the signature of the official in charge. This is a common practice when bureaucrats submit transfer requests. Another practice is the use of signatures that are easy to fake. These come in handy when a senior official wishes to disown a document that he did actually sign – a transfer or promotion document perhaps. He accuses a junior official (or the person who applied for the transfer or promotion) of faking his signature.

*Bribery and the Sale of Appointments*

Though bribes are used to aid in achieving all the other methods of appointment listed above, it is quite common for appointments to be made simply on the basis of cash changing hands. The practice continues in the subcontinent today, though it is limited to lower tiers of the bureaucracy.

*Violence, Threats, and Intimidation*

Illegal appointments can also involve harassment, violence, or intimidation by the police, revenue officials, intelligence agencies, and even the media. In order to free up a particular post for a crony, an actor may threaten or actually attack the sitting official so that he applies for a transfer. Alternatively, this tactic may be used simply to send a message to the higher authorities so that they undertake the desired transfer. Equally, these methods may be used to get an official to perform a particular task (such as the transfer of a junior officer).

In recent years, apart from actual physical violence and the threat of it, there are two methods used to force an officer to do something. One involves influencing an intelligence official who will then begin an ‘investigation’ into the bureaucrat being targeted. This involves letting the bureaucrat know that he is being monitored because he has not been ‘compliant’. The other is to use the media to print salacious stories about the bureaucrat. A number of bureaucrats I interviewed mentioned the use of these methods (both male and female officers and at different tiers of the bureaucratic hierarchy), typically those who refuse to give in to political pressure (e.g. refusing to appoint bureaucrats where patrons want them).
Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to provide the historical and political background, as well as the political, legal and administrative structures, that figure in the subsequent empirical chapters of this thesis.

In the first part of this chapter, I discussed changes in the institutional structure of the bureaucracy in light of political changes since independence. Much of the discussion focused on attempts by military dictators to sideline party-based forces through the establishment of entrenched networks of non-partisan patronage at the district level. These efforts were also designed to dilute bureaucratic power by appointing military officials to bureaucratic posts while sidelining powerful cadres of the bureaucracy. However, somewhat ironically, these efforts actually ended up having the opposite effect and furthermore, tied elite senior bureaucrats more closely to political patrons. Consequently, when politicians were in power, they saw politicising the bureaucracy as a means of pushing back the military and holding onto power. At the same time, bureaucrats saw politicians as patrons who could help them retain their hold on power and prevent military infiltration.

Although patrons seek to appoint bureaucrats to ‘deliver’ specific outcomes, not all of them have the ability to do so. Seniority, the centralisation of political and bureaucratic power in Punjab, and specific career prospects mean that some politicians and some bureaucrats are more influential than others when it comes to making appointments. This section lays the groundwork for the claim I make in the empirical chapters of this thesis - that senior politicians and bureaucrats (those with close ties to the party leadership, and in particular the CM) are the ones who are most likely to be able to make bureaucratic appointments that suit their objectives.

The last section of the chapter details the rules and regulations in place at both the federal and provincial (Punjab) level for making legal appointments – regular and irregular. I draw special attention to various concerns, warnings and criticisms periodically issued by the Establishment Division and the Punjab S&GAD as these rules and regulations were introduced. These notifications are indicators of the loopholes in the rules regarding appointments, as well as the discretion bureaucrats have, in defining the ‘public interest’ and bending the rules where necessary to make extra-legal appointments. In tracing attempts to reduce this discretion and plug the loopholes in the rules and regulations, I highlight the increasing centralisation of
power over bureaucratic appointments in the hands of provincial Secretaries and the CM office. The final part of this chapter explored how patrons break the rules to make illegal appointments to the bureaucracy.

In what follows, I draw on the legal provisions outlined in this chapter, and their violation, to link politicised bureaucratic appointments to the pursuit of particular objectives (bureaucratic efficiency; electoral gain; and personal enrichment and protection). In establishing this link, I argue that patterns of bureaucratic politicisation help us to understand patterns of ‘delivery’ and governance.
CHAPTER 3: LEGAL METHODS OF APPOINTMENT

This thesis seeks to understand the underpinnings of governance by untangling patterns of bureaucratic appointment. In this chapter, I begin to apply my analytical framework (Chapter 1) to my findings from the ‘field’ in order to show how legal appointments underpin ‘delivery’ outcomes.

This chapter, and the two subsequent ones, will be structured around five variables: the patron and his ability or power to make an appointment, the objective of the patron in making the appointment (bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal enrichment/protection.), the method of appointment (legal, illegal, or extra-legal), the resultant bonds (strong or diffuse) formed between patron and appointee, and the ‘delivery’ outcome the patron wants to achieve by appointing a specific bureaucrat in a specific post (in practical terms, these may include policy implementation, gaining votes / side-lining opponents for an upcoming election, and avoiding or delaying enquiries or disciplinary proceedings).

Figure 1: Objectives, Methods, Bonds, and Outcomes
Legal appointments are most effective, I argue, when the objective of a patron politician or bureaucrat is to enhance bureaucratic efficiency in order to achieve specific policy outcomes, project targets, patterns of service monitoring, or the maintenance of law and order. In the Pakistani context, many political observers would argue that there are no situations where politicians and bureaucrats would
completely share such an objective, and the reality is that bureaucrats have been simply co-opted by politicians. These observers would argue that the politician’s primary interest lies in electoral or personal gains whereas the bureaucrat’s primary interest lies in his own career advancement. I argue that this view is overly simplistic.

**Legalised Patronage**

In its most basic form, politicisation involves the appointment of favoured bureaucrats to favoured posts to reward one’s self, one’s party, or one’s cronies. The term has a negative connotation to it – the suggestion is that something illegal or at least extra-legal has been done to manage such an appointment. I argue, however, that politicised appointments can be legal as well.

A bureaucrat appointed legally usually (though not always) has a reputation for respecting rules and procedures, resisting political and bureaucratic pressure to violate those rules and procedures, being honest, and (perhaps consequently) having an interest in bureaucratic reform and enhancing the efficiency of his department or section. Particularly in some high profile posts or cases, or at key points in time, such bureaucrats are regarded as key advisers by their superiors (political or bureaucratic). As a result, legal appointments are made keeping in mind the reputation of the bureaucrat.

Legal appointments may be the ideal choice in certain circumstances - for instance when patrons want no cracks visible in the department façade for bureaucratic colleagues or external actors (such as politicians or other influential) to exploit (when a party returns to power after some time in opposition or exile, or when donor pressure is significant). However, such appointments are not common. This is because, regardless of the desired ‘delivery’ outcome’, patrons usually want to appoint a bureaucrat (a) they will have some leverage over (to exert pressure on him at key moments), and (b) who will cut a few corners, when necessary, in pursuit of the desired ‘delivery’ outcome. The patron’s ability to push a bureaucrat to bend or break the rules comes from an exchange between the two parties – the patron goes out of his way to have the bureaucrat appointed (typically extra-legally) and the bureaucrat, in return, bends the rules to ‘deliver’ the outcome.

Why should a patron bother with making a legal appointment at all when he could potentially make an extra-legal or even an illegal one – particularly considering
the difficulty of enforcement (noted above)? There are distinct risks associated with illegal, and even extra-legal, appointment methods. The knowledge that a bureaucrat has been appointed in violation of the rules, even a minor violation, spreads fast in departments. Though those serving in junior posts may not directly disobey an officer appointed extra-legally to a senior post, there will certainly be resentment and a lack of respect. It may not be expressed openly, but references to it will be made in oblique comments regarding the bureaucrat’s connections and work, or anonymously to the media, and cases may be filed with service tribunals or the courts. These disputes can escalate to open rebellion - for instance, the extra-legal appointment of Fawad Hasan Fawad as Secretary Services Punjab in 2008 (assigned to reduce the government wage bill and determine the appointments of other bureaucrats), led to protests by his seniors across the province. He was transferred after just 6 months in the post (see Chapter 4).

Politicians will also take advantage of extra-legal and illegal appointments to forward their own ends – bureaucrats repeatedly told me that politicians interfere more when they are aware that a bureaucrat has benefitted himself from bending or breaking the rules, or has assisted others in doing so. Such knowledge may lead to a mutually beneficial *quid pro quo*, leaving the bureaucrat on the back foot in the face of demands made by the politician.

Though it may be possible to make an extra-legal or illegal appointment, therefore, a patron may choose to make a legal one to better his chances of achieving a stable ‘delivery’ outcome - gaining electorally (for instance, wooing voters by successfully and swiftly constructing a road connecting a village to a market town), personally (channelling government funds for personal use or facilitating impunity from prosecution) or professionally (enjoying an enhanced reputation following the efficient implementation of a donor funded project).

Just because the bureaucrat actually meets the legal requirements does not preclude a relationship of patronage or exchange between him and a patron formed on the basis of professional networks (or other informal ties). The understanding between them involves not only an agreed-upon outcome, but a post that is suitable and desirable for the appointee and promises future choice postings. However, though an exchange may exist between the patron and a legally appointed bureaucrat (‘I will only make this legal appointment if you do x, y, z for me. If you don’t, I will withhold
this legal appointment or make an extra-legal/illega one’), it is an exchange that is difficult for the patron to enforce where the expected outcome is not in the appointee’s job description. The lack of leverage on the part of the patron is what makes the bond between him and the appointed bureaucrat diffuse whenever a legal appointment is made for any outcome other than bureaucratic efficiency. Consider a hypothetical example. A bureaucrat is promoted legally (by the department Secretary) to the post of Principal in a pilot school funded by an important international donor. Within the job description, he is expected to run the school to a high standard of efficiency. A local politician lobbied successfully for the (legal) promotion of the bureaucrat on the recommendation of a trusted bureaucrat (who claimed that the bureaucrat knew how to deal with donors). The politician reached an agreement with the bureaucrat that he would favour the politician’s party workers in distributing school canteen and furniture contracts, thereby diverting donor money into the politician’s supporters’ hands (and, particularly, his own). However, because the appointment has the law on its side, political leverage over the bureaucrat is reduced. Once (legally) appointed, the bureaucrat can renege, or fail to deliver, on the terms of the exchange with the political patron at little personal cost. For example, the bureaucrat could ‘deliver’ on running the school and keeping the donor happy (outcomes he is expected to deliver as part of his job description), but avoid helping the politician in advancing his electoral prospects or personal gains. Furthermore, the bureaucrat has recourse to the courts or service tribunals, the media, and potentially other patrons should his original patron try and enforce the terms of the exchange. Therefore, patrons seeking electoral or personal ‘delivery’ outcomes will be careful when appointing bureaucrats with whom their bond is diffuse and whose behaviour they cannot then regulate.

The greater efficacy of legal appointments in achieving bureaucratic efficiency outcomes is explained by Grindle (2012, 55) who suggests that, historically, countries did not eliminate patronage as their career bureaucracies emerged, but rather ensured that ‘patronage was adapted to competence’. This is in contrast to Golden’s (2003, 208-209) view that the purpose of a patronage appointment is always to allow
political corruption (defined by Golden as kickbacks for businesses and contractors facilitated by politicians and enabled by bureaucrats).  

‘Patronage as competence’ is of particular value in specific political circumstances. Though the Sharif brothers co-opted Punjab’s bureaucracy during the 1990s, it was their return from exile in 2008 that marked a real shift toward bureaucratic appointments made to achieve bureaucratic efficiency outcomes, particularly in the aftermath of the 18th Amendment and the devolution of powers to the provinces. In some cases, these appointments were legal (due to donor pressure and scrutiny or simply because an eligible and desirable bureaucrat was available to appoint legally). In other cases, they were extra-legal or illegal - I will discuss these in Chapters 4 and 5. Across all these methods, however, I contend that PMLN leaders in Punjab extend their ties to mid-tier bureaucrats (serving in senior district level posts) via senior bureaucrats who belong to the PAS, while side-lining local political players. It does this to ward off military and political challengers, centralising discretionary appointments from localities to Lahore. With legal appointments in particular, I argue that political leaders are most successful when they push for bureaucratic efficiency outcomes – the ‘delivery’ of competence, if you will – rather than electoral or personal gain.

The power to make bureaucratic appointments legally, at various tiers of the bureaucratic hierarchy, lies with the Chief Minister (CM), the Chief Secretary, Secretary Services, Departmental Secretaries, DCOs, and EDOs. My discussion of legal appointments is, therefore, limited to appointments made by these actors. For this reason, the bulk of the chapter deals with the activities of political leaders (for example, the CM) and their cronies (i.e. senior party politicians, advisors, and senior bureaucrats such as Chief Secretaries, department Secretaries, and DCOs). In subsequent chapters, this balance between appointments made by the CM and his kitchen cabinet, on the one hand, and junior politicians (or those new to the party) and bureaucrats without access to the leadership, on the other, will shift to the lower end of the bureaucratic ladder.

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144 Golden (2003, 208) differentiates political corruption from bureaucratic corruption - money bureaucrats demand from citizens for performing tasks that are in their job description.
Political Leaders and their Cronies

Bureaucratic Efficiency

Interests related to bureaucratic efficiency are easiest to understand by matching them to different levels of the government/bureaucratic hierarchy since the desired ‘delivery’ outcomes vary at each level. The only politician who can legally engage in provincial bureaucratic management is the CM (and in the federal government, the PM). Though provincial and federal ministers are expected to provide direction and improve performance, they have little *de facto* control or influence over the bureaucrats in their department. It is the Secretary of the department who holds the reins. This section of the chapter is therefore divided into two parts: (i) the CM Secretariat; and (ii) the Provincial Civil Secretariat.

The Chief Minister’s Secretariat

There are circumstances in which the Chief Minister finds that he needs the system of governance to function as it should, without interference, to achieve the outcomes he desires. This happens when the CM starts thinking of his party’s electoral success in the province as a whole, rather than thinking of constituency politics in a piecemeal fashion. The outcomes the CM seeks in such circumstances will generally involve particular policies or projects in which his party (and therefore, he himself as a party leader) has a stake. Therefore, his purpose/objective in making related bureaucratic appointments will be to ensure that the policy or project of his choice is properly developed, implemented, and monitored. At the same time, such appointments ensure that the CM centralises power in his own office, entrenching his own person further in the fabric of the bureaucratic governance system.

The process of making (legal) appointments to key posts begins when a new government takes office. Reshuffles by new governments are, according to Iyer and Mani (2012, 1) writing about the Indian Administrative Service, ‘a hitherto unexplored mechanism’ politicians use to regulate governance. The literature on Pakistan considers such reshuffles only in so far as they reflect attempts by rulers (elected or otherwise) to establish control, not as phenomena of ‘governance’ to be

145 Of course, this requires that he balance the demands of his fellow party members - MNAs and MPAs – with the needs of the electorate.
considered in and of itself. In Punjab’s case, a ‘new’ government (i.e. a change in the party that was ruling) came in 1985 (IJI), 1993 (PPP), 1997 (PMLN), under Musharraf in 2002, and in 2008 when Shahbaz Sharif returned to power.

**Table 3: Electoral Dominance (Seats) 1988 To 2013**

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At each of these points, considerable time was spent in determining who to appoint to key posts such as Chief Secretary and Secretaries of key departments such as (the) S&GAD, Finance, Planning & Development, etc. Some of the appointments made at these junctures were extra-legal. Others involved an agreement between a patron and a bureaucrat as to a desired ‘delivery’ outcome and were, thus, based on patronage but made in accordance with the rules.

The first appointment of consequence by any provincial administration is the Chief Secretary. The role of the Chief Secretary is perhaps the most crucial in a province, even more so than the CM, in ensuring bureaucratic efficiency. It is a key post that shapes the administration of the entire province, manages the appointment of bureaucrats in the province, and handles the policy agenda of the government. The CM relies on the Chief Secretary to aid him in formulating and implementing policy and ensuring that the CM and his party are not made to look bad.

The appointment of each provincial Chief Secretary is made by the federal Establishment Division with the approval of the PM, after consultation with the CM of the relevant province. The CM’s opinion on the appointment is key – while it is theoretically possible to make a CS appointment against the CM’s advice, such tactics have always backfired. Because the CS is one of the CM’s main advisors in terms of bureaucratic appointments within the province, to appoint him in violation of the rules would not only undermine his authority amongst junior bureaucrats, but could

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146 Wade (1982; 1985) provides a much more complex exploration of bureaucratic transfers in irrigation departments in India.

147 See below for discussion on problematic CS appointments by the PPP in the 1990s.
cause factionalisation within the PAS and lead to the Chief Secretary losing some of his clout within the bureaucracy. The Chief Secretary is regarded as a mentor and a father figure by bureaucrats in the province, particularly by elite cadre bureaucrats such as the PAS and Secretariat officers who are likely to occupy the vast majority of Secretary and DCO posts. Therefore, for both the person appointed to the post of Chief Secretary and for the CM, making a legal appointment is important (but by no means essential – extra-legal appointments have been made at times, though they have proven controversial and divisive for the bureaucracy – for example, as discussed in Chapter 4, the appointment of Javed Mahmood as Chief Secretary Punjab in 2008).

Since the stakes are so high for the politician, it is not unusual for a CS appointee to have worked with the CM before (in the Sharif brothers’ case, with one of the brothers). For instance, Javed Mahmood was Principal Secretary to CM Shahbaz Sharif in his 1997-1999 term, and went on to become Chief Secretary in Sharif’s subsequent term as CM (2008-). The bureaucrat’s time in the CM Secretariat during the late 1990s allowed him to work closely with the CM, establishing a relationship between the politician and bureaucrat. This prior relationship, formed through a professional/work network, underpins their trust and reliance on each other, forming the basis of a strong bond between them. The CM trusts the bureaucrat and relies on him to help achieve the policy goals of his government; the CS, in turn, understands the CM’s priorities and methods. Both parties are aware that they would lose, professionally and politically, if they were at odds, and that the province (and its constituents) would suffer.

One such strong bond between CM and CS was initiated when Nawaz Sharif became Punjab CM for the first time after the 1985 non-partisan elections under Zia-ul-Haq. Anwar Zahid, in turn, became Chief Secretary in 1986. When Sharif was elected in the 1988 party-based elections, however, the circumstances had changed. Zia was dead and the PPP had won at the centre. Benazir Bhutto tried throughout her short-lived term to destabilise Nawaz’s government in Punjab. Therefore, Nawaz needed a Chief Secretary who would help him manage the provincial bureaucracy effectively and make the province an example of ‘good governance’ so that the hostile

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148 As it did in the case of Javed Mahmood, see next chapter.
149 Under martial law, the civil service was under the control of Zia and the governors he had appointed.
federal government would see its opportunities to interfere reduced. Zahid and Sharif’s familiarity, arising out of prior work networks, created a strong bond of trust and reliance. Most importantly, the bond between the two parties meant that the CM believed Zahid had his (and his government’s) best interests at heart, so much so that Nawaz Sharif’s governance priorities were actually transformed by Zahid - a talented, legally appointed bureaucrat. The conventional understanding of politics in Punjab would dictate that someone in Nawaz’s situation use extra-legal bureaucratic appointments to dispense patronage to MPAs (and through them, party workers) to keep them loyal. However, Interviewee 7 (then a Deputy Commissioner) recalls that although many MPAs were unhappy with key bureaucrats, the officials would retain their posts. Though Nawaz needed every single MPA of his party to remain on his side due to the PPP’s attempts to poach them, Interviewee 7 maintains that CS Anwar Zahid convinced Nawaz that ‘good officers are assets and, if they are in the field, it brings a good name to the administration.’

The significance of Zahid’s advice that the CM prioritise ‘good governance’ (via legal appointments) over short-term electoral concerns (via extra-legal appointments as a form of political patronage) is cemented by the fact that PM Benazir Bhutto tried to have Zahid removed from his post – once again suggesting strong pressures for extra-legal appointments. CM Nawaz Sharif, knowing that his political opponent was trying to destabilise his government, ordered the legally appointed Zahid (a federal PAS bureaucrat) to refuse to obey the orders of the federal government. In fact, Benazir Bhutto’s focus on Zahid, and the latter’s support of the CM in the face of the federation’s orders, only strengthened the bond (based on professional history) between Nawaz and his CS. Consequently, Nawaz’s government in Punjab weathered the storm, and it was the PPP’s government at the centre that fell in 1990. The subsequent election brought Nawaz to power both in Punjab and at the centre. Zahid went on to become Principal Secretary to PM Nawaz Sharif in 1990 (and, in 1997, after he had retired, Special Assistant to PM Nawaz Sharif).
Legal appointments to senior posts such as that of CS are particularly critical in the wake of controversies involving the person of the CS himself. In appointing a new CS, the CM is looking to distance himself and his government from the controversy. The search for a new CM after CS Javed Mahmood’s car was involved in a hit-and-run accident that led to the death of a retired army officer is a recent example. After Javed Mahmood’s removal from the post of CS, the CM sought to appoint a bureaucrat with whom he not only had a prior relationship via work networks, but who was also uncontroversial\(^\text{153}\). His choice was Nasir Mehmood Khosa, a well-connected\(^\text{154}\) DMG/PAS officer. Khosa had been Deputy Commissioner Lahore between 1997 and 1999 when Shahbaz Sharif was CM, and this was likely the point when a strong professional bond based on mutual trust and reliance was formed.

Khosa had a reputation for resisting pressure. Interviewee 9 (a PAS officer working in the S&GAD Punjab) notes that he ‘used to take a stand and not budge’. Not only was he, therefore, an acceptable appointee for the PPP’s PM Yousaf Raza Gilani, but also for CM Shahbaz Sharif who, in light of a PPP government at the centre (and a period of Governor Rule by the PPP’s Salman Taseer in 2009), was looking to run a tight ship where good governance was prioritised and political pressures (most of all from his own party’s MPAs) were side-lined. Khosa was legally appointed and remained CS for a full 3-year term till a caretaker government took over prior to the 2013 election, helping the CM manage ‘delivery’ in the province. The success of Khosa’s strong bond with the CM in terms of achieving ‘delivery’ outcomes was proven by the PMLN’s resounding success in Punjab during the 2013 election (on a ‘development’ platform) despite challenges from the rising PTI.

Though Khosa’s term as CS came to an end in 2013 when he was just four months short of retirement, Shahbaz Sharif suggested his name to Nawaz Sharif for the post of Principal Secretary to the PM, a post responsible for determining the appointment of All Pakistan Unified Grade bureaucrats (including the PAS, Police,


\(^{154}\) One of his brothers was head of the FIA and the other a judge of the Supreme Court, Asif Khosa, the author of the dissenting judgement in the Panama Case judgement in April 2016. He belongs to the Khosa tribe – same as Zulfikar Khosa who was senior adviser to CM Shahbaz Sharif when Nasir Mehmood Khosa was serving as CS Punjab, and the PPP’s Latif Khosa.
and Secretariat Group). As the PMLN formed a new government in 2013, a bureaucratic reshuffle was initiated. These reshuffles are carried out by all new governments, placing provincial and federal bureaucrats perceived as sympathetic to the ruling party in positions of influence while (legally) transferring or (extra-legally) suspending those who were sympathetic to the previous government. With the PMLN replacing the PPP, it was Principal Secretary to the PM (i.e. Khosa) who was directly in charge of this bureaucratic reshuffle. Consequently, a number of bureaucrats who had previously worked with the PMLN (in Punjab or at the centre) returned to significant postings. Khosa retired in September 2013 and was appointed an executive director of the World Bank – a post much sought after by senior and retired bureaucrats.

As Interviewee 20 (a retired PAS officer and former federal secretary) acknowledges, the CS post has become more accommodating of the needs of the CM over the years (compromising on extra-legal political interference). Interviewee 20 called it ‘the debasement of the post of the Chief Secretary over the last 10-15 years’, stating that the CM’s office has taken on the role of the Chief Secretary’s office. He saw this development as something CS appointees have bought into. Though their appointments are legal, the relationship between the CM and CS has become symbiotic, and the case is no different in the relationship between the PM and his principal secretary. In effect, politicisation during the Shahbaz Sharif era has taken a particular form – limiting avenues for interference from MPAs and MNAs but centralising power in ways that allow the CM and his allies to ‘politicise’ legal bureaucratic appointments through strong bonds of work-related trust and reliance. This politicisation was enhanced after the PMLN’s success in the 2013 election. For one, the election results showed that the methods employed by the Punjab CM to ‘deliver’ had worked and won the PMLN a major victory. These methods were therefore extended to the central government, just as they had been when the PMLN held both the centre and Punjab from 1997 to 1999. Second, the Establishment Division was now in the PMLN’s hands and any hurdles that may have been put in place to hinder the legal appointment of particular bureaucrats in particular posts while the PPP had been in charge were gone. Objections raised against the PMLN’s consolidating power in the hands of a select few bureaucrats were shrugged aside or

155 This reshuffle was key because it was the first time since 1999 that the PMLN had been in power at the centre.
dismissed on the grounds that the government was acting in the ‘public interest’. As
the ties between the PMLN’s leadership and the elite bureaucracy grew stronger, their
dominance extended to Islamabad as well.

In opposition to this model of trust-based appointments to the post of CS,
however, there are also times when it has been necessary to appoint bureaucrats
without particular loyalties to a ruling party or the CM, particularly when the desired
outcome is visible ‘neutrality’ and a break from the way things were being run before.
For example, when General Musharraf overthrew the PMLN government in 1999, he
appointed military officers at various posts in the bureaucracy. Seeking to break the
PMLN’s, and particularly the Sharif brothers’, hold over administrative matters, and
cut the PAS down to size, Musharraf sought someone who did not have any close ties
to the Sharifs for the post of Punjab CS. Hafeez Akhtar Randhawa was (legally)
appointed in 1999. The fact that Randhawa had been made OSD when the PMLN
took over in 1997 suggested that he had no loyalty toward the party or the Sharif
brothers, and this made him the ideal candidate to ‘clean up’ the party’s provincial
stronghold on behalf of the martial law administrator. In this case, the bond between
the patron and the bureaucrat was not formed through a work network. Still it was
formed on the basis of the bureaucrat’s employment history with (and neutrality
toward) the patron’s political opponents. Musharraf relied on Randhawa to ‘deliver’
bureaucratic management in Punjab without political interference from the remnants
of the PMLN and its favoured bureaucrats in the province.  

The Provincial Civil Secretariat

One way of enhancing bureaucratic efficiency is to make legal appointments
to key posts with regard to a specific project or initiative. Legally, appointments at
this level are the decision of either the CM (usually on the advice of the CS) or the
Secretary of the relevant department or authority.

5 March 2016].

157 Randhawa fought to protect the structure of the DMG (now PAS) from the changes proposed by the
National Reconstruction Bureau under Lt Gen Tanvir Naqvi, and his views were respected by then
DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/129603/punjab-chief-secretary-refuses-service-
extension> [Accessed 5 March 2016].
The CM’s interest in a particular project or initiative frames the objective for making politicised appointments – the bureaucrat chosen for the post must (a) understand the aims of the project and agree with its methods and priorities, (b) deliver results despite multiple pressures (official, political, and otherwise), (c) motivate and guide junior bureaucrats in their work, (d) work efficiently with donors and other stakeholders, and (e) represent and protect the broader interests of the government (and particularly the CM) in his work.

Impressing the CM means that the bureaucrat will be set up for choice postings for the rest of his career (unless he later crosses the CM). If he gains a reputation for being a good project manager, for example, he will continue to be posted to similar posts. These projects are often funded by international donors (for example, the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program, which I will discuss in more detail below), meaning not just a lucrative pay package but also the opportunity to work with donor organisations on future (even more lucrative) projects. However, the CM’s attention and donor involvement also brings with it a great deal of scrutiny from opposition parties, the media, and civil society groups. Therefore, bureaucrats appointed to ‘deliver’ these projects will invariably become part of the news story.

The consequences of failure in high-profile initiatives are very real – the media will report on it in detail, the opposition will criticise not just the government’s failure but also question its overall ability to govern, accountability investigations and litigation may be initiated, and the rewards the initiative was meant to bring to voters will not materialise. Well aware of these realities, the CM and CS will be inclined to make a legal appointment to avoid their chosen bureaucrat being tainted by allegations of corrupt appointment practices. Not only does this matter in terms of donors, media, and opposition parties, but also for other, junior bureaucrats working under the legal appointee. The kind of intense pressure senior bureaucrats impose on juniors to deliver in high-profile projects is only viable if the former has the respect of his juniors. Otherwise, leaks to the media, lost documents, delays, and petty corruption will plague the project. Legal appointments of this kind do not preclude extra-legal or illegal behaviour in the implementation of the project. No project of any significance is free of scandal. In legally appointing a bureaucrat to head the project, however, the CM and Chief Secretary seek to dodge one key plank of potential criticism from donors, the judiciary, and the media.
CM Shahbaz Sharif and Reform in the Punjab School Education Department

In 2011, CM Shahbaz Sharif launched a School Reforms Roadmap aimed at enrolling all children of school-going age and providing them with a quality education. The emphasis on education was the result of the introduction of Article 25 to the Constitution of 1973 guaranteeing every citizen the right to a free education by the state, and the devolution of education to the provinces, both under the 18th Amendment (2010). All donor-funded programs for education in Punjab were brought under the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP) which had originally been launched under CM Pervaiz Elahi’s government.

The PESRP’s implementation in the School Education Department is an interesting case of how bureaucratic appointments play out. From the initiation of the reform program till May 2017, the Punjab School Education Department had just two secretaries (an admirable achievement considering that some previous secretaries served for less than a year). Though both were appointed legally by the CM to enhance bureaucratic performance, the outcomes they were expected to deliver, though still within the category of bureaucratic efficiency, were quite different (and required different skills). These differing expectations were associated with strong but distinct bonds between each of these men and the CM. In one case, the bond’s strength was based on the professional skills and education-specific experience of the bureaucrat; in the other, the strength of the bond was based on the bureaucrat’s willingness to sideline local political actors and work closely with the CM Secretariat in past postings.

When the Roadmap was being developed, the Secretary of the School Education Department was Mohammad Aslam Kamboh, appointed (legally) in 2010. He remained in office till June 2013, when Shahbaz Sharif returned to office for his third term as CM. Kamboh’s appointment as the department’s Secretary shows forethought on the part of the CM and the CS. They needed a stable presence in the department while the reform program was developed and launched, someone who had experience with donor-funded projects, an intimate understanding of how provincial school education functioned, and where the gaps were. The CM and CS were also

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158 Malik, M. Two secretaries made OSDs, one transferred. 13 May 2017. DAWN. Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1332824> [Accessed 6 June 2017].
aware that anything but the legal appointment of a capable bureaucrat would result in donor, media, and judicial scrutiny and result in the delay of a high-profile project. Originally a government school teacher, Kamboh took the CSS exam and joined the DMG/PAS. After a number of different postings in KP (then NWFP), he spent five years as Project Director for the donor-funded Girls Primary Education Project in Punjab (2000-2005), then three years as the Project Director for Canada Basic Education Project in Lahore. In 2008, he was appointed Programme Director of the Directorate of Staff Development in the School Education Department Punjab. Unlike the appointments to the post of CS discussed above, Kamboh had not worked with Shahbaz Sharif all that closely, having been posted mainly in KP. Therefore, the strong bond of trust and reliance formed between him, the CM and the CS (Nasir Mehmood Khosa) was different in comparison to the ones discussed above. It was based not on informal work networks, but solely on Kamboh’s formal work experience with the education system and with donors. In other words, Kamboh’s was the ideal bureaucratic appointment: a very rare thing indeed.

By the time Kamboh’s term as Secretary came to an end, the Roadmap was well on its way. When I visited the department in 2014, bureaucrats at every level of the hierarchy spoke of the changes wrought in the rules and procedures of the department over the last couple of years. Most prominent were the changes in recruitment procedures for junior teaching staff, the introduction of a ban on teacher transfers during the school year, and the extensive monitoring carried out by the Programme Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU). Evidently, Kamboh had achieved the bureaucratic efficiency outcome he had been set – developing and initiating the reform program.

The career of the present secretary of the School Education Department presents an interesting contrast to that of Mr. Kamboh. Appointed in 2013, Abdul Jabbar Shaheen served an uninterrupted four-year term. Unlike Kamboh, Shaheen had no prior experience with the School Education Department or any donor organisation. Instead, he was very familiar to the CM through his various appointments in Punjab. Shaheen was Additional Director of the Anti-Corruption Establishment in Faisalabad in 2006 and then Additional Secretary S&GAD before being appointed DCO Kasur in 2008 on the recommendation of CS Javed Mahmood. It was Shaheen’s year and a half

159 His posting as DCO Okara was when Elahi was CM.
as DCO Kasur that brought him to the CM’s attention (Interviewee 6, a PAS officer who had worked under Shaheen). Though he gained the trust of the CM by managing the district in difficult circumstances, the enemies he made amongst the junior politicians of the area – particularly PMLN politicians – resulted in his transfer in 2009 (Interviewee 6). \(^{160}\)

Once upon a time, bureaucrats who were at the centre of such a fraught situation may have been made OSD or transferred to a low-profile post in one of the less relevant districts. But with his reputation for ‘following the rules’ (to the frustration of junior PMLN politicians), Shaheen’s next two postings were made – legally – to prominent posts in Lahore, proving the strength of his bond with the CM. His first posting was as Director General of the Lahore Parks and Horticulture Authority (PHA) in 2010. In 2011, the Lahore Development Authority, another significant organisation in terms of development work in Lahore, became embroiled in a corruption scandal that implicated its Director General. The incumbent was removed and additional charge of the post was given to Shaheen. \(^{161}\) He retained both posts till 2012 when he was appointed Commissioner Gujranwala. \(^{162}\) When Shahbaz Sharif took over as CM in 2013, Shaheen’s name was being considered for Lahore Commissioner. However, when it came to appointing a new Secretary for the School Education Department, Shahbaz Sharif needed a bureaucrat who could handle the pressure every Secretary of the department is subjected to over the appointment, transfer, and promotion of its thousands of employees (teachers, head teachers, administrative staff, peons, cleaners, guards, etc.). The CM knew that his MPAs and MNAs in Punjab would be looking to dispense patronage to their voters through government jobs in the education department. This would damage the reform program instituted (by Kamboh) during the PMLN’s previous term and signal to donors that the government was not serious about the Roadmap. It was therefore important to give the helm of the School Education Department to someone who would be able to resist junior politicians’ pressure. In addition, it was important that the new Secretary be someone who was willing to work closely with the CM Secretariat and acquiesce to

\(^{160}\) See below for more detail on Shaheen’s time as DCO Kasur.

\(^{161}\) Note that Shaheen was the candidate chosen to stabilise the LDA after a scandal shook up the authority.

\(^{162}\) Commissioners are the executive heads of divisions (smaller than a province, larger than a district), responsible for administration, development, revenue, local government matters, and delimitation within their division, and reports directly to the CM.
pressure from the CM. In this way, patronage dispensed through the education department could be controlled directly by the CM Secretariat.

Shaheen was the ideal candidate for implementing the Roadmap in the particular political circumstances in Punjab. He had a strong informal bond with the CM and the Secretariat staff owing to his previous postings in Punjab. He was expected to ‘deliver’ by continuing to implement the Roadmap while shutting off all avenues of junior political interference in the department’s functioning other than those approved/sanctioned by the CM Secretariat. This much was evident not just from speaking to bureaucrats serving in the School Education Department as well as teachers and members of the Punjab Teachers’ Union, but also from observing the activity in the department’s offices. Invariably, bureaucrats would tell me that although detailed policies had been developed for the recruitment and transfer of junior staff in order to prevent recruitment and transfers via parchis and sifarish, orders from the CM Secretariat or the Secretary were often used to bypass them. Meanwhile, MPAs and MNAs outside the CM’s inner circle were frustrated by their inability to influence even the appointment of a teacher in their constituency. They told me that the Secretary simply would not listen, and the CM never had time to meet them. The result is a department that is now run with a degree of efficiency, but is subject to the whims of the Secretary and the CM’s office.

Senior District Appointments

Perhaps even more critical than departmental appointments in Lahore are appointments to the post of District Coordination Officer (DCO). The district is the main administrative unit in the province, headed by a DCO, with each district containing a variable number of constituencies.

Iyer and Mani (2012) found that where politicians at the district level are from the same party as the CM of the state, bureaucratic transfers at the district level are less likely. What this suggests is that for the CM, a loyal local politician is just as useful as a loyal district bureaucrat (Iyer and Mani 2012, 4). In Punjab, however, I found the converse to be true – without a loyal district bureaucrat, a loyal junior politician was hamstrung. For that reason, the CM’s bonds with and reliance on

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163 Typically, through CM Directives or a sifarish that is made directly to the Secretary rather than to the official actually in charge of making the appointment in question.
bureaucrats are often more important than with politicians from his own party (even in districts where constituencies were won by his own party).\textsuperscript{164}

The appointment of DCOs (and departmental secretaries) – posts that are almost exclusively the domain of the PAS – are legally the responsibility of the CM. Though he may consult some of his close allies in his party or take their advice regarding bureaucratic appointments in their districts, he will rarely bypass the bureaucrat to deal solely with the politician on the day-to-day management of the district (or department). Instead, the bureaucrat will typically maintain close ties directly with the CM Secretariat, keeping the CM and CS posted on all aspects of his district’s performance.

While the CM will of course have his own preferences and ideas, however, the CS can play a crucial role in DCO appointments. Beyond shortlisting interviewed candidates, he can cherry pick bureaucrats to serve in significant posts. Well aware of these realities, PAS bureaucrats maintain close ties with key figures such as the CS and the Secretary Services in a province, and with senior bureaucrats within their cadre, to ensure that they can access vacant posts of their choice. Often belonging to well-connected families, kinship ties may come in handy for individual PAS officers, but it is the socialisation they receive during their specialised bureaucratic training that forms the basis of their networks. PAS officers are taught to look out for the interests of fellow cadre members. PAS officers occupying senior posts such as CS, DCO, or departmental Secretary are regarded as father figures by those junior to them. Junior PAS officers are careful to cultivate informal ties to their seniors, particularly because it is through these informal relationships that they develop ties with senior politicians as well. Especially when the PMLN has held the centre and Punjab, favoured PAS bureaucrats in the PM Office, Establishment Division, and CM Secretariat are able to assist their colleagues far more than if the centre is held by a different party.\textsuperscript{165} Strong bonds, rooted in work networks and related

\textsuperscript{164} That said, Iyer and Mani’s original finding that there are fewer bureaucratic transfers in districts where ruling party politicians have won seats may well be true of Punjab, Pakistan as well. This is not because the CM does not rely on bureaucrats in these districts, but because the initial appointment of bureaucrats is either made in consultation with closely allied politicians or is non-negotiable by politicians lacking close ties with the CM.

\textsuperscript{165} While the PPP was in power at the centre, it was only able to assist with appointments at the centre and in Sindh. Since they often made these appointments in pursuit of personal outcomes that brought them the wrong kind of attention from the media, opposition parties, and the courts, junior colleagues looked elsewhere for peer mentors. When the PPP was in power in Sindh alone, prospects for mentorship and assistance with appointments from bureaucrats favoured by them were bleak – the only
recommendations are evidenced by their career trajectories and their success in achieving set targets (with support from the CM Secretariat) in the face of local political opposition.

In Kasur, a poorly developed district neighbouring Lahore that is home to a number of political heavyweights (former foreign ministers Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri and Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, for example), a new DCO had to be appointed when the PMLN provincial government took over in 2008. The CM wanted to appoint a DCO who would be able to limit various demands, particularly from PMLN legislators, without compromising on the bureaucratic efficiency of the district. Just as the Sharif brothers recommend bureaucrats to each other, PAS bureaucrats do too. Each recommendation is the result of a bond formed between two bureaucrats who have trained or worked together and come to trust and rely on each other. The officer making the recommendation considers the other bureaucrat to be ‘sound’, to have the right motivations, values, and beliefs. In the search for an officer to appoint as DCO Kasur, the CS recommended a familiar officer he had worked closely with in the S&GAD - Abdul Jabbar Shaheen (then an Additional Secretary). Their work ties became the basis of a strong bond of mentorship which was exemplified by the close contact Shaheen maintained with the CM Secretariat for support and guidance in the face of political pressures throughout his tenure as DCO Kasur. He would refuse to listen to demands made by junior politicians and would, instead, directly call up the CS to report the politicians. At the time, Shahbaz Sharif’s priority was governance. Shaheen’s attitude toward the demands made by junior politicians was exactly what the CM was looking for.

Two incidents highlight the nature of the bond Shaheen had with the CM and his CS. The first involved the Prisons Minister (and former CM) Dost Muhammad Khosa. The Daily Times reports: “The Kasur DCO phoned the chief secretary really attractive posts they could offer were in Karachi and even those would typically require the consent of the MQM. The PMLQ’s time in power (2002-2007) was marked by discontent amongst the elite bureaucracy – they resented the induction of military officers into the bureaucracy and being placed under the nazims under Musharraf’s local government system. This discontent brought the elite bureaucracy together during this time, strengthening bonds of mentorship and support within the PAS cadre. Shaheen is also discussed above with regard to his posting as Secretary School Education Son of adviser to CM Shahbaz Sharif, Zulfikar Khosa. He served briefly as CM Punjab in 2008. DCOs directed not to succumb to political pressure. 12 June 2008. Daily Times. Available at: <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/12-Jun-2008/dcos-directed-not-to-succumb-to-political-pressure> [Accessed 10 September 2015].
and informed him about the embarrassing situation, over which the secretary 'toned down' the Prisons minister on the phone, after which the minister 'apologised' to the DCO for his attitude," they (sources) said. ’ In other words, Shaheen’s close ties to the CS and, through him, the CM, helped him ‘manage’ even a senior politician like Khosa.

In the second incident, in 2009, DCO Shaheen became involved in a row with a PMLN MNA over encroachments, dividing the district into a pro-DCO camp (PPP, PMLQ workers) and an anti-DCO camp (the MNA and traders who owned the encroaching shops). It was some time before the CM Secretariat stepped in to transfer Shaheen out, despite the charged atmosphere. It seemed that the CM office was willing to compromise on electoral politics to advance the development of the district, perhaps suggesting a belief (at least in this case) in long-term electoral returns from development activity. In late 2009, the CM Secretariat gave Shaheen a dignified exit by sending him for a training course rather than merely transferring him. He went on to hold senior posts in Lahore.

The incidents recounted above, and Shaheen’s career trajectory after his time as DCO Kasur, speak to the strength of the bond that Shaheen had with the CM and CS. Their trust in Shaheen was such that they were willing to back him over the ruling party’s own politicians, on the understanding that he would deliver what they asked of him (regarding ‘development’ and the bureaucratic efficiency required to deliver it), which he did. Kasur benefitted from Shaheen’s tenure as DCO – when he was transferred, the community demanded his return as DCO.169

In the case discussed above, and in other cases of DCO appointments, legally appointed bureaucrats are expected to ‘deliver’. What is to be delivered can be specific – initiate development work in a district – or more general – enforce existing rules in the face of pressure. Regardless, both the patron bureaucrat (the CS or the Secretary Services) and the legally appointed bureaucrat are aware that performing the required tasks, ‘delivering’, will have consequences and will produce backlash. A strong bond between the two parties allows the bureaucrat to be secure in the knowledge that, though local politicians will complain about her to the CM and to the CS, she will be protected (at least in part by her ‘legal’ status). Where the pressure from politicians reaches critical mass (‘Either he goes or I go’ situation, as per

Interviewee 30), the bureaucrat knows that the CS and CM will not let her be the loser for it – she will get an equally good or better posting if she has to be transferred under pressure. This dynamic also tells us something about the way the PMLN conducted itself in Punjab while the PPP was leading a fragile coalition government at the centre – it sought to establish itself as the party that would ‘deliver’ to voters by subsuming political interests, in sharp contrast to the ‘corrupt’, hamstrung, and beleaguered PPP.

**Departmental Employees**

Just like the CS, departmental secretaries are often called upon by politicians or other influentials to appoint particular people in particular posts since they are the appointing or approving authority for most (mid-tier) department employees. However, when the secretary’s priority is to advance the work of the department, legal appointments are often preferred.

When a bureaucrat takes over as Secretary of a department, he will often want to assemble his own team around him, just as politicians do when they form a new government. For instance, when Abdul Jabbar Shaheen became Secretary School Education, he asked a junior bureaucrat from the Provincial Management Service (PMS) – one who had worked with him while he was in the S&GAD – to join his team, appointing him a Deputy Secretary in the School Education department.\(^{170}\) Having worked together previously, the two had a relationship of mentorship and mutual trust. The PMS officer knew that as long as he met the expectations of the Secretary, he would have a stable posting in Lahore, protected by the Secretary in the face of complaints by politicians and bureaucrats alike (while progressing further up the bureaucratic hierarchy on the PAS officer’s coat tails). Senior appointments not supported by such strong informal bonds are, as noted above, extremely rare.

When observing the Deputy Secretary in his office on multiple occasions, I realized that he acted almost as the assistant to the Secretary when it came to handling *sifarish* for teacher appointments – he vetted them before taking them to the Secretary and handled the paperwork for *sifarish* that had been approved. This enterprise, which I observed in the Deputy Secretary’s office (and the wary but accepting attitude of other senior and junior bureaucrats), points not only to the bond that existed between

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\(^{170}\) Such mentorship is common amongst bureaucrats across cadre lines but is much less consistent as compared to the PAS’ internal network.
the Secretary and his mentee, but also to the growing centralisation of patronage and bureaucratic discretion.

The Deputy Secretary’s office was a small square room. Chairs lined the walls on three sides and the fourth was taken by a large desk. No sunlight entered the room so it was lit at all hours of the day by a fluorescent tube light. Unlike the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary’s office seemed to have a revolving door – there were constantly people coming in with requests of various kinds. The door was never closed; no one was stopped from walking in. However, I noticed that he differentiated between the sifarish that crossed his desk. Though he was always unfailingly polite, some of the parchis were crumpled up and tossed under his desk, while some were added to a pile on his desk. A third category was a more sophisticated parchi, a full page, often letter headed, rather than the usual small square of paper. It was this third category that got the most attention and was most likely to be fulfilled. The ones that were tossed away were never even going to be acknowledged, while the small parchis that had been saved must be acknowledged even if later rejected. Establishing this hierarchy of discretion, implemented by legally appointed bureaucrats enjoying strong work-based bonds, allows bureaucrats and departments to ‘deliver’ higher levels of bureaucratic efficiency while still ensuring that the ‘right kind’ of (highly centralised) sifarish – for instance, from a well-connected politician, mandated by the CM office and conveyed via the department secretary – is catered to.

Secretaries can also deliberately make legal but problematic appointments to stymie departmental initiatives they do not entirely support. An instructive example is provided by appointments made to the (three) posts of General Manager (GM) in the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA), appointed by the Managing Director of the Authority – the Secretary Irrigation. When the Authority was formed in 1997, the Secretary Irrigation Suleman Ghani genuinely believed in the model the authority follows – devolving control of irrigation water to farmers’ organisations at the local level. Therefore, he legally appointed General Managers who were likely to aid in forwarding the Authority’s program. However, since 2008, PIDA’s work has come to a virtual standstill. Employees (Interviews 68, 69, and 70) believe this is largely because the last few Secretaries do not believe in the PIDA model and are looking for ways to dissolve the Authority (and the farmers’ organisations it set up). In the meantime, they try to limit the Authority’s efficacy by legally appointing GMs
who are just a few months from retirement. These appointees have no motivation to
understand the work PIDA does or push it forward. Instead, they are parked in the
Authority till retirement. Both the Secretary and the bureaucrat are well aware that the
appointment is designed to prevent the Authority from functioning properly, and
therefore, they could be considered to have a strong bond based not just on familiarity
through work networks, but on an exchange. The Secretary relies on the bureaucrat to
do nothing, and the bureaucrat relies on the Secretary to sign his retirement paperwork
promptly so he can get his pension.

**Electoral Gain**

Electoral gain is conventionally taken to mean gaining votes for an election (or
money for campaigning purposes). The use of state resources to do so makes it an
illegal act. However, the outcome sought need not involve overtly illegal acts. In fact,
Taylor (2004, 215) and Hopkin (2006) both note that, despite a politician’s charisma
and the exchange of ‘votes-for-goods’, she may find it difficult to form sustainable
ties with the citizenry on her own. Here, electoral gain in perhaps its most basic form
involves making politicised appointments to key posts throughout the electoral term
to gain ‘access’ to voters via key bureaucratic actors.

Where a bureaucrat is appointed legally with the patron expending no
significant effort to get him the post, however, the bond between patron and appointee
is diffuse. As such, legal appointments are not the most effective way to achieve
electoral benefits. In fact, legally appointed bureaucrats face very weak incentives to
go out of their way to support their patrons in achieving electoral benefits because the
patron has very little leverage. The following examples will illustrate this dilemma.

*Manzoor Wattoo in Punjab*

Unlike the PMLN’s experience in subsequent years, when Benazir Bhutto
cobbled together a fragile coalition to form governments in the centre and in Punjab in
1993, key bureaucratic posts in the province became the centre of a battle to gain or
retain an electoral foothold. In order to win, Benazir Bhutto had to gain the
cooperation of a number of key players in the province, including Manzoor Wattoo
and Hamid Nasir Chattha (both members of the PML-Junejo party).
Watoo had been a crucial actor in the fall of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1993. He took over as CM by displacing Ghulam Haider Wyne (right after the Sharif government was reinstated by the Supreme Court) and, then, he dissolved the Punjab government. When Bhutto formed her government in 1993, Watoo returned as CM Punjab. Though technically the PPP was in power at the centre and in Punjab, PM Benazir Bhutto saw Watoo’s Punjab as a threat to her fragile government. Bhutto tried to assert herself by appointing PPP MNA Faisal Saleh Hayat as advisor to Watoo. In his new position, Hayat insisted on appointing bureaucrats of his choice to the post of Secretary in the S&GAD and Home departments, but he made the mistake of allowing Watoo to choose the CS (Javed Qureshi) and the Finance Secretary, the two most significant posts in the provincial bureaucracy. As a result, Hayat’s appointments to the S&GAD and Home Departments were hamstrung and Watoo was able to veto any moves on his part.\textsuperscript{171}

Watoo’s choice of bureaucrats for the posts of CS and, after Hayat’s departure, the Secretaries of the S&GAD and Home departments, were legal. Had they not been, the PM could easily have overturned his selection. However, his objective in appointing these officers was not bureaucratic efficiency. Instead, Watoo was looking to cement his own electoral position by setting himself up in opposition to Benazir Bhutto. His bonds with the bureaucrats he appointed were based on their attitudes towards his political opponents. The PAS did not appreciate Bhutto’s attempts to control them through political appointees like Faisal Saleh Hayat.

To some extent the bonds Watoo established with bureaucrats in Punjab ‘delivered’ in an electoral sense – Watoo remained in power from 1993 to 1995. However, the problem was that his objective of cementing his political position was never shared by the PAS bureaucrats. These men knew that, even if Watoo was their current patron, they were finally responsible to the (federal) Establishment Division (controlled by Bhutto’s PPP), meaning that Watoo had limited leverage over the bureaucrats he had legally appointed. Again, his bonds with them were weak, and he had underestimated their ties to the federal Establishment Division. Amidst considerable confusion, bureaucrats wondered ‘whose orders to follow’ (Watoo’s or the PM’s representatives’ – Hayat and later Makhdoom Altaf), and fought off

\textsuperscript{171} As Najam Sethi puts it, Watoo ‘was bound to emerge as the chief power-broker in the province’. Sethi, N. Punjab Potpouri. July 20, 1995. Editorial. The Friday Times. Available at: \<http://www.najamsethi.com/punjab-potpouri/>\ [Accessed 28 September 2016].

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instability by seeking out patrons in a stronger position than Wattoo. Wattoo’s bond with the bureaucrats he appointed was diffuse and the outcome he had expected from them was never ‘delivered’. In September 1995, Wattoo was ousted by a vote in the Punjab Assembly amidst accusations of corruption.

*The Chief Secretary with Political Aspirations*

Geddes (1994, 13) claims that in addition to re-election, politicians are also seeking power within their own party. This is certainly true for Pakistani politicians, where the creation of factions and forward blocs within parties is common. However, the following example shows how bureaucrats seek power within parties to which they are loyal. It is difficult to locate publicly verifiable cases of bureaucrats making appointments for the purpose of acquiring electoral gains. The case recounted below is a rare one involving a senior bureaucrat using his position to make a legal appointment to forward his own electoral ambitions.

Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the legal appointment of Abdul Jabbar Shaheen as DCO Kasur in 2008. As I explained, in part this appointment was made because he was thought to be an officer who could handle the multiple demands that would be made on him in a politically charged district where political interference was high. However, there were other ulterior motives to the CS’s recommendation of Shaheen for this post. CS Javed Mahmood was himself from Kasur and was very aware of the underdevelopment of the district. Having worked with Shaheen before, when the latter was Additional Secretary Administration in the S&GAD, Mahmood was familiar with Shaheen and his work. Therefore, he appointed Shaheen legally and entrusted him with the responsibility of developing Kasur.

During Shaheen’s tenure, Kasur saw a massive influx of development funds. The reason for the CS’s focus on his own village, Roshan Bhela, and the district in general, were his electoral ambitions. In 2009, DAWN\(^{172}\) reported:

Local political analysts believe that the chief secretary or somebody from his family would contest election from the area under the PML-N banner and that is why the top official is so much concerned about development of his area.

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However, though Shaheen and the CS had formed a relationship based on work ties that ‘delivered’ when it came to resisting political pressure, it did not do so in aiding the CS’s political ambitions for a number of reasons. For one, the DCO’s diligence and the ease with which he was pumping money into just one district caught the attention of local media. Though this may not have been enough to damage Mahmood’s electoral prospects, it was enough to raise a series of questions, particularly amongst the political incumbent and other aspirants to the seat.

More crucially, Shaheen’s relationship with the CS paled in comparison as the CM emerged as a credible alternative patron. Though recommended for the job by the CS, it was with the CM that Shaheen developed a working relationship of trust in ensuring development ‘delivery’ (in the face of political pressure). Therefore, despite having worked closely together in the past, Shaheen had little incentive to aid the CS in advancing the CS’s personal political objectives in Kasur. Over time, Shaheen’s clashes with PMLN representatives in Kasur escalated to the point where he had to be transferred out. His next posting was a step up - the head of an authority in Lahore – and Shaheen has since continued to work closely with the CM.

Though Kasur certainly gained in terms of development spending, the CS’s objective of making himself or his family members electable was not achieved. In fact, Shaheen’s refusal to bow to political pressure by PMLN representatives caused the CS’s prospects harm. The CM did not publicly comment on Shaheen’s activities, leaving the CS to bear the brunt of criticism for Shaheen’s aggressive bureaucratic behaviour with politicians. The CS’s perceived close connection to the DCO endangered his or his relatives’ hopes of getting a PMLN ticket since party workers in the district would never support him. As it happened, CS Javed Mahmood never got a chance to test his electoral cache. In 2010, Mr Mahmood’s car hit and killed a retired army officer. The scandal forced him out of the CS’s office and he remained OSD for a year, his political plans derailed.

**Personal Enrichment and Protection**

Legal appointments are rarely employed when the patron’s desired outcome is to enrich himself and his family or protect himself from prosecution. Since both outcomes would generally require operating outside, or at least tangential to, the law,
a legally appointed bureaucrat is unlikely to want to indulge in such practices. Though such a bureaucrat may have an understanding with the patron, he is under no compulsion to operate in anything but a legal fashion, unlike a bureaucrat appointed through bending or breaking the law who has something to hide and has a transactional relationship with a patron. It is, however, possible to find some examples of legal appointments made to protect patrons from prosecution, usually for corruption. It is intriguing to note that these appointments tend not to fully achieve the outcomes desired by the patron, other than providing some temporary relief.

The Bank of Punjab Scandal

Many bureaucrats claimed that the PMLQ government in Punjab under CM Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi (and General Musharraf) was inefficient with no real interest in development. However, a few bureaucrats claimed the opposite – Elahi was deeply concerned about improving Punjab and delegated authority to senior (PAS) bureaucrats to make critical decisions on development works. The truth is likely a mixture of these two claims. While Elahi did delegate to senior bureaucrats, he expected them not only to improve bureaucratic efficiency but to make his personal enrichment possible. The Bank of Punjab is a case (one of many) of such delegation of power to senior bureaucrats. The Bank of Punjab scandal, which centres on millions of rupees granted in fraudulent loans, serves as an example of both personal enrichment and protection as the outcome legally appointed bureaucrats were expected to deliver for CM Elahi.

When the Bank of Punjab first began approving non-performing loans, the bank’s chairman was CS Kamran Rasool. Rasool’s professional ties to the Chaudhries of Gujrat were no secret - he took two years’ leave during the period of military rule under Musharraf and worked at one of Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi’s business concerns.173 When the 2002 elections were held, and Elahi became CM, Rasool returned to the civil service and was legally appointed as CS Punjab and Chairman of the Bank of Punjab (when the incumbent retired in 2003).

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However, when the investigation into the Bank of Punjab scandal began, it became evident that Elahi and Rasool’s work ties were based on a strong bond that could enrich themselves while in office. The investigation revealed that it was Rasool who had appointed Hamesh Khan, a man he met while working at Elahi’s factory, as Managing Director of the Bank of Punjab. Not only did Rasool appoint Hamesh Khan in the face of resistance from the State Bank of Pakistan, the rules of the BoP were then amended to designate Khan as President and COO of the bank, centralising power in his hands. Hamesh Khan went on to approve non-performing loans adding up to roughly Rs 76.178 billion.

The process by which Hamesh Khan became the most powerful person in the Bank of Punjab, and his activities during his time there, suggest that CS Rasool and CM Elahi were complicit in activities designed to enrich themselves and their cronies. In one case, Fareed Mughees Sheikh, the head of a business organisation known as the Colony Group, was appointed as a member of the board of directors by CM Elahi. During Sheikh’s tenure, the Colony Group was given Rs 5.492 billion in credit facilities by the BoP. According to an investigative report instituted by a Supreme Court commission in 2011, much of this money was then used to acquire the Phalia Sugar Mills, which belonged to the family of CM Elahi. Since no action was taken at the time, it would be reasonable to assume that Hamesh Khan approved these loans with at least the knowledge of CS and bank chairman Rasool, and, through that channel, the acquiescence (and benefit) of the CM.

The bond between Rasool and the CM ‘delivered’ on personal enrichment for some time. However, illegal activity (even when carried out by a legal appointee) is fraught with risk. In 2005, CS Rasool was implicated in a controversy over a contract

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with a Malaysian firm and lost his post as CS and Chairman BoP to CS Salman Siddique and a chairman from the private sector, Shahzad Malik.\textsuperscript{179} In October 2007, however, Malik was swiftly replaced as BoP Chairman – the media reported a massive scam in the dealings of the BoP\textsuperscript{180} and Malik had been pushing for an investigation into allegations of loan fraud.\textsuperscript{181} For his troubles, he received a letter from the CM Secretariat, signed by the CM’s Principal Secretary, dismissing him\textsuperscript{182} – evidence that the CM Secretariat had a personal stake in covering up illegal activity in the Bank of Punjab. Malik was replaced by CS Salman Siddique.

Having served in various senior positions (including Finance Secretary), Siddique had developed a close working relationship with CM Elahi. Furthermore, as a director of the BoP prior to his elevation as Chairman, he was familiar with the activities of the bank. In addition to an understanding with the CM (to protect him from the fall out of the BoP’s fraudulent loans), Siddique had a personal interest in ensuring that the bank’s dealings were not investigated – his father had been given a loan by the bank while he was a director of the bank. This was in violation of the bank’s own regulations, which stated that the relatives of directors were not eligible for loans.\textsuperscript{183} By March 2008, Siddique had rescheduled all the loans that Shahzad Malik had flagged as fraudulent and deserving of investigation.

Again, the bond between Siddique and the CM worked for a time - protecting the CM from the fallout of his murky dealings with the BoP. However, after fresh elections in April 2008, the new PMLN government dismissed Siddique and the


\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.

directors of the BoP, alleging massive irregularities in the bank’s business. The investigation that Siddique had succeeded in delaying finally took place.

**Politicians and Bureaucrats Lacking Access to the Centre**

**Bureaucratic Efficiency**

Politicians and bureaucrats who lack access to the centre of power in Lahore have a very different experience of attempting to achieve bureaucratic efficiency outcomes when compared to those in or close to the CM’s kitchen cabinet. Whereas those at the centre can achieve a great deal in terms of project implementation through the legal appointment of bureaucrats to key posts, bureaucrats in the lower tiers of the bureaucracy, and junior politicians of the ruling party (or opposition), have limited success.

**Politicians**

The centralisation of discretion in the CM Secretariat has meant that local politicians feel increasingly alienated from the heart of the ruling party. During my fieldwork, this sentiment was echoed by Punjab MNAs and MPAs from the ruling party (Interviews 59, 61, 78, 81, 82, 83, 90, 93, 106, 138, 139, and 140) and reiterated by opposition party members (Interviews 24, 25, 46, 48, 60, 79, 80, and 109): the PMLN operates not through party workers and members, but through bureaucrats, I was told. These ties between politicians and bureaucrats only expanded after the 2013 election which the PMLN won, NAB and the FIA (FIA initiates probe against Chaudhrys for bank fraud. August 8, 2014. The News. Available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/639643-fia-initiates-probe-against-chaudhrys-for-bank-fraud> [Accessed 17 October 2015]) once again expressed their intent to investigate Elahi’s role in the BoP scam. In other words, despite attempts to use work networks to form bonds with bureaucrats to enrich himself, and then protect him from discovery and prosecution for that enrichment, Pervaiz Elahi has only been temporarily successful in achieving his objectives. He has still not been able to entirely shrug off allegations of involvement in the BoP scam.


185 In 2011, a commission formed by the Supreme Court alleged that the board of directors appointed by then CM Elahi had used their position to have credit facilities and loans approved for themselves, their families, or their businesses. (FBR chief figures in scam report. April 8, 2011. DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/619207/fbr-chief-figures-in-scam-report> [Accessed 17 October 2015] and Javed, A. 40 senior BoP officers sacked. May 8, 2008. The Nation. Available at: <http://nation.com.pk/politics/08-May-2008/40-senior-BoP-officers-sacked> [Accessed 17 October 2015].) But the report absolves the CM, Siddique, and others of any criminal activity, pinning the blame on Hamesh Khan and those who had engaged in defrauding the bank. However, since the 2013 election which the PMLN won, NAB and the FIA (FIA initiates probe against Chaudhrys for bank fraud. August 8, 2014. The News. Available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/639643-fia-initiates-probe-against-chaudhrys-for-bank-fraud> [Accessed 17 October 2015]) once again expressed their intent to investigate Elahi’s role in the BoP scam. In other words, despite attempts to use work networks to form bonds with bureaucrats to enrich himself, and then protect him from discovery and prosecution for that enrichment, Pervaiz Elahi has only been temporarily successful in achieving his objectives. He has still not been able to entirely shrug off allegations of involvement in the BoP scam.
election – when the PMLN was in control of both the centre and Punjab, and seeking to cement its position for the future. The ‘delivery’ demanded of bureaucrats by both PM Nawaz Sharif and CM Shahbaz Sharif, and the timelines set for it, were only achievable through the placement of select bureaucrats to key posts – both at the centre and in Punjab. Not only lines of authority, but lines of communication also ran through these bureaucrats. The consequence of such tactics by the PMLN leadership is that local politicians are sidelined even when they are attempting to improve bureaucratic efficiency. For instance, a PMLN MPA from Gujranwala (Interview 106) told me that water theft is a big issue amongst his voters. He claimed that it was usually carried out by officials of the Irrigation Department, and that he had tried to have the corrupt officials removed and more honest ones appointed by speaking to local Irrigation Department officials, Special Branch, DCO, the Secretary Irrigation, and the CM office. However, he had absolutely no success. As a parliamentarian who is new to the party and a first-time election winner, the MPA lacks the (historical) networks (and thus, strong bonds) within both the PMLN and the bureaucracy that would allow him to influence appointments to ‘deliver’ improved bureaucratic performance.

The classic case of a politician lacking access but seeking bureaucratic efficiency is an opposition party member. Opposition party politicians who win MPA seats face a political and administrative machinery that is calibrated to serve the ruling party (only). A PTI MNA from Lahore (Interview 24) was visibly frustrated as he told me that, although bureaucrats from departments such as WAPDA or the Town Municipal Authorities (TMA) were invariably polite, they were of little practical help when it came to issues faced by the politician’s constituents. As a result, efforts by opposition party politicians to improve bureaucratic efficiency are often stymied either due to bureaucratic disinterest or due to direct intervention from the ruling party leadership. For instance, Liaquat Baloch of the JI was elected in Lahore during the early 1990s and wanted Interviewee 8 (a now retired member of the School Education Department) to lead a pilot school funded by donors in his constituency. Interview 8 had a reputation for honesty and efficiency, and Baloch knew he would run the school well and keep the donors happy (potentially bringing more donor money to the constituency). Baloch therefore lobbied for Interviewee 8’s legal transfer to the post of principal of the pilot school. However, Baloch ran into problems when he came up
against Shahbaz Sharif (then an MNA), who wanted to give the post to a supporter who had once been his son, Hamza’s, teacher. Interviewee 8 lost out even though both Baloch and the department Secretary supported him. In other words, a politician lacking access to the centre will be overruled, even if his desired outcome is to improve bureaucratic performance and he has a bond with the relevant bureaucrats.

**Bureaucrats**

The only bureaucrats concerned with bureaucratic efficiency and able to make legal appointments, but lacking access to the political and bureaucratic elite of the province, are ‘peripheral’ bureaucrats within a department’s district offices. In the School Education Department, for instance, these include Executive District Officers – Education or EDO-Es. EDOs are mid-tier bureaucrats who have risen through the ranks of the department, starting out as teachers and rising to the post of head teacher or principal. During this time, they establish their own professional networks to meet departmental targets in schools and district offices. When they reach the post of EDO, they may legally appoint members of their network to posts under their charge – for instance Assistant Education Officers (AEOs) – or recommend those they have worked with in the past for more senior district-level posts such as District Education Officer (DEO). In theory, amongst appointments made by EDO-Es at the tehsil and markaz level, one might expect a pattern of mentorship similar to that of Secretaries and department employees in the secretariat. However, the reality is that EDO-Es face so much pressure from politicians and bureaucrats regarding who to appoint to these junior posts (most significantly from the School Education department itself in Lahore, which is where decisions are made) that legal appointments are actually quite rare. Furthermore, the EDO-E may not be able to afford to make legal appointments – he may need to make extra-legal appointments to set up a transactional relationship which he can rely on to achieve the targets he has been set by the department (or protect himself from investigations). Senior School Education Department employees are perhaps the only exception – near the end of their careers, they are in a position to stand in the face of political interference and defend the bureaucrats they legally appoint to junior posts. For instance, Interviewee 23 (a now retired School Education Department bureaucrat) refused to give in to pressure on appointments to junior posts.
from Rana Sanaullah in Faisalabad and, therefore, inspired other department employees in the district.

**Electoral Gain**

Moving away from legal appointments, junior politicians with little access to the political leadership, and thus to the bureaucracy, must find alternative methods to make bureaucratic appointment that advance their electoral prospects. Some junior politicians are better entrenched in their own constituencies than others – a politician who has been re-elected, for instance, is in a stronger position than a first-time winner, even if both are unable to reach the CM.\(^{186}\) Still, these junior politicians are often aware that their attempts to meet the CM to request specific bureaucratic appointments will be fruitless, and their visits to senior bureaucratic offices for assistance with bureaucratic appointments will be rebuffed on the grounds of appointment policies instituted by the CM.

So, how have these junior politicians dealt with constituent demands then? Only two options exist: illegal methods such as bribery and violence (discussed in Chapter 5) or legal methods. Though it may seem counter-intuitive, junior politicians can at times use legal methods to their advantage, even when they are shut out by the CM Secretariat and the bureaucracy. For bureaucratic posts within the district – teachers and district administrative officials (e.g. Assistant Education Officers) – junior politicians can assist their constituents, party workers, and supporters in legally applying for jobs in two ways. The first is that politicians tend to receive a measure of respect from bureaucrats that ordinary voters do not. It is for this reason that applicants approach politicians to make a phone call or get a note of support to attach to their application. In the offices of politicians who are not in the CM’s ambit, the politician will make it clear that the decision lies with the bureaucrat. In other words, the politician will have sufficient connections to help supporters get a hearing for a job – no more and no less.

The second form of assistance involves a politician helping supporters get a government job legally by helping them through the application process – checking

\(^{186}\) Some established politicians are disadvantaged by scandals which lead to the political leadership distancing itself from them. For instance, a conviction for gas theft led to a Lahore MNA losing his ministerial post and being sidelined by the party leadership, driving him to focus on ‘delivering’ locally (sewage lines, etc.) for his constituents.
documentation, helping them with attestation, etc. A PMLQ MPA from Sargodha (Interview 109) said that he stationed people at his *dera* to guide people with their application for government jobs. They tell applicants that they must fulfil the requirements for the jobs to which they are applying and encourage them to acquire the required skills.

Politicians deal with hundreds of constituents applying for government jobs. Of course, not all of them get the jobs they apply for. However, those who do get them may well be grateful to the politician for the support he provided, creating a bond of loyalty. This means that politicians are well aware that they must aid as many constituents as possible in order to get a few favoured individuals in key posts – even through legal methods of appointment. These bonds of loyalty may, at times, bring long-term benefits for politicians, in particular where teaching posts are involved. At election time, it is teachers who serve as polling agents. In other words, politicians may call in favours from someone he helped appoint when the election comes around and polling stations need to be manned. However, this method of advancing electoral prospects is hardly fool proof. There is no guarantee that the politician’s constituent will be appointed to the right polling stations. Moreover, appointees who are aware they met the merit requirements for a job are under no compulsion to obey a politician who played only a tangential role (if that) in getting them their job (unless he offers some further incentive).

**Personal Enrichment and Protection**

In general, it is unusual for legal methods of bureaucratic appointment to be deployed to produce personal enrichment or protection outcomes. However, as Schmidt (1974, 429) notes, a bureaucrat at the local level is likely to maintain ‘clientelist relations with his “constituency”’. In making teacher transfers within districts, for instance District Education Officers (BPS 19, responsible for appointing teaching staff in BPS 9 to 16) may have worked in the same school with more senior teachers (BPS 14-16) they are responsible for transferring. But he will be significantly senior to those in BPS 9, making professional networks unlikely. This is where kin or *biraderi* networks may come into play to provide a stable job and a guaranteed pension to a relative. Similarly, EDOs may prioritise *biraderi* connections when transferring junior teachers (BPS 1-10). When two teachers are equally qualified, the
EDO can give one priority over the other only because they are from the same biraderi. Since the appointments themselves are legal, it is more difficult to challenge such decisions. No legal wrong has been done; the EDO simply used his discretion to make a (legal) allocation.

That said, legal appointments made by those without access to the political and bureaucratic leadership can be quite problematic in terms of actually achieving expected personal gains (or protection outcomes). As with legal appointments made for electoral gain, it is difficult to regulate the behaviour of legally appointed bureaucrats unless the bond between patron and bureaucrat is formed on the basis of family or biraderi ties. Often, the best that politicians and bureaucrats without access to the leadership can do is help constituents get jobs at lower levels of the bureaucracy. Most posts at the local level have few merit requirements – for instance, the post of baildaar or patwari in the Irrigation Department do not require a degree qualification – which means that it is possible for politicians to help local supporters (for instance, frequenters of their dera) apply for them. While this situation may allow the bureaucrat to stay under the radar as a legal appointee, it is a tenuous means of achieving personal enrichment outcomes because, as noted above, the patron has little leverage. Therefore, there is actually more incentive for patrons to fill these posts through extra-legal or illegal methods of appointment.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have applied the analytical architecture I developed in Chapter 1 to circumstances where bureaucrats are legally appointed by political or bureaucratic patrons. In circumstances where a well-connected patron seeks an improvement in bureaucratic efficiency or performance, legal appointments often produce sustainable results, as for instance in the Punjab School Education Department. Legal appointments are common amongst senior bureaucratic posts in Punjab and reflect a pattern of centralisation of power on the part of the ruling PMLN and CM Shahbaz Sharif. In the past few years, Sharif (and before him, his opponents), his advisors, and his allies have effectively used legal appointments to the bureaucracy to promote competence, particularly where international donors are involved. With a PMLN government at both the centre and in Punjab since 2013, there is little check on such activities. However, patterns of centralised discretion and
patronage in Punjab have also meant that avenues of legal appointment are closed to those without connections to the CM and his inner circle. As elections near, it is from this avenue – MNAs and MPAs excluded from the CM’s largesse – that pressure will be exerted to accommodate a more diverse set of demands.

Once the objectives become more personal (electoral gain, enrichment, or protection), legal methods of appointment are no longer as effective in getting even well-connected patrons the outcomes they want. This is because of the diffuse bonds that are formed between a legal appointee and a patron who has expended little or no effort in making the appointment. There is little incentive for appointees to take that extra step to achieve the objective they have been set. If it is achieved on the way to bureaucratic targets, excellent, but if not, the bureaucrat will not pursue it separately. In these circumstances, patrons also find it difficult to push the appointee to any meaningful extent – a legally appointed bureaucrat has other (legal) avenues open to him should he wish to avoid the patron’s demands. This is particularly true in situations where patrons are well-connected enough to influence PAS appointments. Elite PAS bureaucrats have sufficient connections and career stability to be able to discard a patron who becomes too damaging or difficult. For those without access to the CM and his kitchen cabinet, however, avenues of legal appointment are often closed, and so their attempts to achieve their objectives are stymied.

In the following chapters, I will continue to illuminate the analytical architecture I laid out in Chapter 1, turning to circumstances where appointments were made extra-legally (Chapter 4) and, then, illegally (Chapter 5).
CHAPTER 4: EXTRA-LEGAL METHODS OF APPOINTMENT

Civil servants like saying, “Hum kia karein? Parliamentarian, wazir kharab hai, hum too seedhay chalney waale hain” (What can we do? Parliamentarians and ministers are bad, we [civil servants] walk on the straight and narrow path). It is the best excuse officials have.

– Interview 14, PAS officer in a senior post in the S&GAD Punjab

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I considered the outcomes achieved when a patron makes a legal appointment. In this chapter, I investigate outcomes achieved when patrons use extra-legal methods to appoint bureaucrats. As discussed in Chapter 1, and again in Chapter 2, extra-legal methods do not dismiss the law entirely or attempt to demolish it. They take some element of a rule and twist, bend, or flex it to suit their own purpose. Extra-legal methods give you a way around cumbersome legal rules while still retaining a space for those rules when they work in your favour. The ambiguity of extra-legal methods is what makes them so effective as patronage resources underpinning the delivery of outcomes for politicians and bureaucrats. The confusion over what exactly the rules say, what they cover and what they don’t, where they can be applied and where they can’t make these methods less likely to draw attention. Where they do draw some interest, the discussion gets bogged down by the intricacy of the law. For an ordinary citizen, extra-legal methods are often the least interesting option (as compared to overtly illegal methods such as force, intimidation or bribery). For this reason, extra-legal methods are the most commonly used for making bureaucratic appointments; they attract much less attention.

I show that the chances of extra-legal appointments producing expected outcomes (whether bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, or personal protection or enrichment) are higher than with either legal or illegal appointment methods, at least amongst those with access to, and strong bonds with, the CM and his kitchen cabinet. Amongst those without access to the CM’s inner circle, extra-legal methods are much less likely to produce expected outcomes.
Political Leaders and their Cronies

Bureaucratic Efficiency

Not all bureaucrats are equal, and this inequality goes beyond their place in the bureaucratic hierarchy or their qualifications. Bureaucrats with project management skills, those able to keep up with the CM and his demands, those willing to cut a few corners here and there to get the job done faster, are automatically more valued than those without. For this reason, governments go out of their way to keep certain bureaucrats in certain posts, and empower them, while removing others who have stood in their way. These valued bureaucrats are transferred from one important department or project to another – sometimes serving only a few months or a year in a post till a crisis has passed or a project has been implemented. In many of these cases, the government uses extra-legal means to get their ‘blue-eyed’ bureaucrats into particular posts.

The PMLN’s years in power since 2008 have been marked by a preference for such bureaucrats. Appointed to posts for which they are too junior, and put in charge of high-visibility policies and projects, these bureaucrats are often marked by a brash, no-nonsense attitude that endears them to few amongst their colleagues. Most of them are from the elite PAS; very few are from the Provincial Civil Services. The preference of PAS officers for postings in urban Punjab makes them natural allies of a CM interested in promoting rapid growth in Punjab’s cities, most notably Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, and Gujranwala. As a result, any attempt by the PPP to reign in these postings between 2008-2013 (via the central government-controlled Establishment Division) would have been fruitless. A federal government that was frequently in turmoil due to coalition politics and corruption allegations was up against two strong lobbies united as one: the main opposition party and the PAS. And once the PMLN controlled both Punjab and the centre after 2013, any chances of objections or challenges to the postings of these bureaucrats from the Establishment Division or PM Office was removed.

In many ways, the men favoured by the PMLN are ideal bureaucrats similar to those discussed in the previous chapter – they have an excellent grasp on the law and government procedure, they are organised and efficient, they push their juniors to work, are goal oriented, and typically see eye-to-eye with the CM Secretariat on what ‘good governance’ means. However, the difference between bureaucrats appointed
legally to improve bureaucratic performance (see previous chapter) and bureaucrats appointed extra-legally is the willingness of the latter to do all of these things while at the same time bending the rules and exerting extra pressure where needed to get the patron what he wants. In the rest of this section, I connect instances of bureaucrats appointed extra-legally (i.e. by bending the rules) ‘delivering’ targeted and enhanced bureaucratic performance. In doing so, I highlight the creation of a small coterie of individuals who, due to their closeness to the CM and his inner circle, are responsible for most major policies and projects in Punjab, and effectively run the province alongside the CM as trusted advisers and managers.

**PAS Officers and the CM Secretariat**

Delivery-oriented bureaucrats at the senior level (PAS officers) are frequent beneficiaries of three extra-legal appointment practices. The first is frequent transfers from one department or project to another.\(^{187}\) The second is additional charge appointments where an officer holds more than one bureaucratic post for an extended period of time (see Chapter 2). The third, and most problematic, is the appointment of junior officers to posts meant for more senior officers – for instance, a BPS 18 officer appointed to a BPS 20 post. This practice became common in Punjab during Shabbaz Sharif’s first government after his return from exile in 2008, when Javed Mahmood was Chief Secretary, most likely due to the CM’s desire to form a team of loyalists to forward his policy agenda. As I explained in Chapter 2, however, acting promotions are legally permitted only where the senior-most eligible bureaucrat has yet to complete the required time in service to be appointed to a post. In other words, a junior official cannot be given an acting promotion if there are other more senior eligible officers available to fill the post.

With bureaucratic efficiency outcomes in mind, the bonds between patrons and bureaucrats appointed extra-legally are immensely strong. The relationship originates in professional networks – the patron and bureaucrat will have worked or trained together in the past, or been recommended to the patron by a trusted colleague. It is this familiarity which breeds the trust required for extra-legal appointments. However, with extra-legal appointments, this trust is backed by an explicit reciprocity

\(^{187}\) For lower tiers of the bureaucracy, frequent transfers are rarely beneficial since they place the financial and organisational burden of moving on the bureaucrat.
– an understanding that since the patron bent the rules to appoint the bureaucrat, the bureaucrat will, in turn and in exchange, bend the rules to deliver the outcome the patron wants. Consequently, extra-legal appointments, made with the objective of bureaucratic efficiency, result in even stronger bonds than legal appointments made for the same objectives.

In addition to matching the careers of bureaucrats and patrons, another indicator of strong bonds amongst senior bureaucrats (with access to the CM and his kitchen cabinet) extra-legally appointed to achieve efficiency outcomes lies in efforts by the CM Secretariat to protect appointees from (a) the repercussions of their extra-legal appointment, and (b) the consequences of the methods they use to achieve expected outcomes. As always, the task of these bureaucrats is to deliver outcomes, but in this case they do cut corners, and at times they get caught up in controversies. This is where the patron’s role comes in – in exchange for delivering outcomes, the CM and CS act as the bureaucrats’ mentors and protectors; advising them, vetoing inquiries, ignoring court orders, and defending them against politicians who might find them unhelpful. Such protection and patronage allows the bureaucrat to continue serving the ‘public interest’ by ‘delivering’ in a succession of posts.

**The Original ‘Honorary Politician’ Bureaucrat**

The bureaucrat who set the tone for the PMLN’s bonds with extra-legally appointed senior bureaucrats in Punjab in 2008 was Javed Mahmood. In March 2008, when Mahmood’s name was put forward as CS, he was in BPS 21. His appointment was heavily criticised since not only had he never held the post of a head of department before, but more importantly, he was considered too junior for the CS post. There were ‘at least 14 DMG [PAS] officers’ serving in Punjab at the time who were senior to Mahmood in terms of batch - for instance, the Secretary Services at the time, Farkhanda Waseem Afzal, was from the 5th Common Training Program, senior to Mahmood who was from the 7th Common, though both were in BPS 21.\(^{188}\)

Therefore, Mahmood’s appointment bent the rules by exploiting a loophole in the


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regulations regarding promotions that allowed junior bureaucrats to be discretionarily elevated above their seniors (see Chapter 2 for more details).

When Mahmood was appointed at the CM’s discretion, Afzal and a number of other officers who had been serving in Punjab sought repatriation to the PPP-held centre to avoid working under a junior officer, including Salman Siddique and Suleman Ghani\(^{189}\) (the two men usually held responsible for any successes of the PMLQ government in Punjab). Not only did Mahmood extra-legally leap frog over his seniors to the post of CS, his appointment factionalised the PAS. Whereas the more senior officers in the cadre considered Mahmood an upstart, juniors who worked in Punjab at the time saw him as a mentor and a father figure.

In ‘Logged On: Smart Government Solutions from South Asia’, published by the World Bank, Mahmood is mentioned specifically as an officer who ‘understood the importance of reaching out to citizens’ and who ‘sat for hours a day outside his office for several weeks during 2008 to receive complaints from citizens’ (2015, 58-59). The book quotes Mahmood as saying, “Accessibility is the most important thing. Enabling easy access is half the job done” (2015, 58). Mahmood’s no nonsense attitude toward service delivery gelled particularly well with Shahbaz Sharif’s vision of his time as a Khadim-e-Aala (servant in chief) to the people of Punjab. This attitude was likely the product of Mahmood’s close working relationship with the Sharifs in the formative period of his career. Mahmood had worked as Deputy Secretary to CM Nawaz Sharif from 1988-90, then Deputy Commissioner Lahore, and then Principal Secretary to CM Shahbaz Sharif during the 1990s.\(^{190}\) The strong bond Mahmood formed with Shahbaz Sharif shaped his understanding of the role of a bureaucrat. Consequently, Shahbaz Sharif’s patronage of Mahmood was based on a bond of trust and mentorship, and in (extra-legally) appointing him as Chief Secretary when the PMLN returned to power in Punjab after their period in exile, CM Shahbaz Sharif strengthened that bond. Mahmood was expected to reciprocate and ‘deliver’.

Mahmood was tasked with managing the bureaucracy and the province so as to ensure that the CM’s agenda was pursued aggressively and delivery of services was


ensured to citizens. The 2008 election was immediately followed by a flurry of activity that was designed to displace the PMLQ and its loyalist bureaucrats and assert the PMLN’s (especially the Sharif brothers’) power. Bureaucratic control over the province was established through the widespread extra-legal appointments of loyal bureaucrats to posts for which they were too junior – for example, see the case of Fawad Hasan Fawad below. By (extra-legal) appointing handpicked bureaucrats who saw ‘accessibility’ as a measure of ‘good governance’, Shahbaz Sharif and Javed Mahmood sought to create a responsive government. Key early initiatives included the launch of a petition cell, a food stamp scheme, and the streamlining of the provincial bureaucracy through an emphasis on ‘merit’ in recruitment of junior bureaucrats.

Strong bonds between accessible bureaucrats like Mahmood and bureaucratic politicians like Shahbaz Sharif blur the lines between politician and bureaucrat to form hybrids – Shahbaz Sharif is an honorary bureaucrat; the bureaucrats he appoints (extra-legal) to achieve official goals are honorary party members. Appointed in violation of seniority to the post of CS of Punjab (at the discretion of a CM who, at the time, was in a strong-enough position to overrule any objection by the PPP-led federal government), Mahmood enjoyed not just the perks and privileges associated with the post, but a great deal of discretionary power (for instance, the allocation of development funds and the appointment of bureaucrats across the province). At the same time, he ensured that the PMLN government kept a tight control over Punjab amidst turbulence in national politics (as the PPP fought to hold together a coalition at the centre). He laid the foundations (particularly through his mentorship of junior bureaucrats) for the PMLN’s forthcoming bureaucratic and electoral dominance of Punjab.

The Firefighter

Fawad Hasan Fawad, a PAS bureaucrat, is referred to by his colleagues as a fire fighter – a tough bureaucrat, abrasive but efficient (Interview 75). He was appointed Principal Staff Officer (PSO) to the Principal Secretary to PM Nawaz Sharif in 1997. About nine months later, he was posted as Principal Staff Officer to the CS Punjab, AZK Sherdil. Javed Mahmood (discussed above) was Principal Secretary to the CM at the time. It was at this time, during his formative years as a
bureaucrat, that Fawad would have come into the Sharifs’ orbit since Sherdil was a close confidant of the Sharif brothers. Unlike a number of other bureaucrats who served with the Sharifs, Fawad was not made OSD or repatriated to the centre when Musharraf took over. Instead, he was posted abroad and was thus never ‘tainted’ by association with the military regime or its PMLQ government.

Between April 2008 and June 2013, Fawad held 6 different posts, all of them for less than 18 months. In all of these posts, Fawad was extra-legally appointed in discretionary violation of (a) tenure rules for these posts as established by the Sixth Schedule of the Government of Punjab Rules of Business 2011 (see Chapter 2) and, (b) seniority rules (see Chapter 2), as he was a BPS 19 officer bypassing those more senior to him in the PAS to BPS 20 and 21 posts. These extra-legal postings were justified by the CM Secretariat as being ‘in the public interest’ (a practice the Establishment Division itself has criticised – see Chapter 2) on the grounds that Fawad was the best man for the job. Fawad was assigned a particular objective (with regard to the department’s efficiency and performance) for each post– reduce the wage bill, tackle corrupt practices, improve service delivery, etc. In each post, Fawad’s discretionary extra-legal appointments (made in violation of tenure rules or to posts for which he was too junior) created a strong bond between him and his patrons (the CM and the CS). In exchange for these choice postings, Fawad (the ‘blue-eyed’ bureaucrat) was expected do whatever was necessary to achieve the target – perform tasks that other bureaucrats would find at best daunting and at worst impossible, and at a rapid-fire pace. In turn, the CM Secretariat provided him with the support he needed (protection from political pressure, his pick of appointees to his department, etc.) to achieve the set target.

For instance, when he was appointed Secretary Services in April 2008, Fawad was assigned the unenviable and unpopular task of shrinking the size of the Punjab bureaucracy - reducing the wage bill and freeing up posts for selected officials to be promoted and transferred, while ensuring that all the right people remained in the right places to push the CM’s policy agenda forward. Fawad’s task was made immensely more contentious by the fact that, as he was too junior for the post of

191 He was working under the guidance and mentorship of then CS, Javed Mahmood, who was determined to remove bureaucrats, army, and police officials who had been re-employed on contract by Musharraf and his PMLQ government. Allegedly, these contracts were issued by the previous (PMLQ) government without the consent of the Re-Employment Board and its chairman, the chief secretary.
Secretary Services, he was deciding the fate of officers senior to him.\(^{192}\)
Unsurprisingly, this led to ‘a dispute with senior officers’\(^{193}\) and eventually to Fawad’s transfer after six months in the posting.

Fawad’s transfer was unexpected because observers thought that the government would ignore complaints against a bureaucrat as powerful and well-connected as he was.\(^{194}\) But Fawad had achieved the target he was set – he did lower the province’s wage bill. As one news report notes, during Fawad’s short tenure as Secretary Services, ‘hundreds of contract or re-employed officials were removed from service and hundreds of others of all ranks were transferred, creating a stir in the administrative system in the province.’\(^{195}\) Consequently, the CM Secretariat made sure that Fawad’s career did not suffer, posting him to a succession of departmental Secretary posts (for which he was too junior and, thus, bypassing his senior colleagues) with specific expected outcomes for each.

Next, Fawad was extra-legally appointed to the post of Secretary Communication and Works. He was still too junior for the post of Secretary, but his extra-legal appointment allowed the CM and CS to make the most of Fawad’s talent for making decisions that were necessary but would be contentious and unpopular. They tasked him to ‘accelerate the pace of work and purge the department of corrupt officials and contractors’\(^{196}\) by dismantling the parallel economy of kickbacks in contracts for construction projects that involved all levels of department staff, politicians, and independent contractors (see Wade 1982 for more on corruption in works projects). Fawad’s actions against allegedly corrupt officials soon had the Communication & Works Department up in arms. Employees and contractors were


soon protesting against Fawad on Lahore’s Mall Road\textsuperscript{197} and going on strike.\textsuperscript{198} Fawad was also allegedly under pressure from disgruntled MPAs whose favoured contractors were facing difficulties in getting government works contracts.\textsuperscript{199} In 2009, matters came to a head when Fawad ruffled the feathers of a senior minister of the PMLN (allegedly from Dera Ghazi Khan\textsuperscript{200}) when he suspended employees on allegations of corruption.\textsuperscript{201} The senior minister told the CM that Fawad had allegedly claimed without proof that the corrupt officials were the minister’s appointees and that, “Either we or the secretary will have to go”.\textsuperscript{202} However, even this ultimatum resulted only in Fawad being sent on leave for six weeks, probably because the CM Secretariat realised that the situation in the department was untenable and was attracting far too much untoward media attention. At the end of six weeks, Fawad returned to the same post at the discretion of the CM, remaining Secretary C&W for a total of a year and a half despite the complaints of contractors, politicians, and employees.

In July 2011, Fawad was (extra-legally) posted Secretary Excise and Taxation and tasked with increasing tax revenues. Again, he was only in BPS 19 at the time of his appointment while the post was for bureaucrats in BPS 20 and above. This time, the extra-legal appointment came in the wake of the removal of the incumbent Secretary under a cloud of corruption allegations, particularly disobeying the instructions of the CM to initiate a third party audit of various projects in Punjab and controversy over a deal worth Rs 550 million.\textsuperscript{203} At the same time, there was a country-wide push to increase tax revenues mostly due to pressure from donor agencies. Fawad was tasked with ensuring that tax revenues showed a substantive

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
increase. Piracha and Moore (2016, 1784) found that property tax collection, for instance, increased as a consequence of the Secretary's desire ‘to make his mark’. According to a newspaper report, the Secretary ‘managed to increase tax revenue by 20% in the province without introduction of any new tax or increase in base rates.’

The reason that the Sharif brothers trust Fawad implicitly, and have done so since their return to power in 2008 despite numerous controversies, is their familiarity with him and his methods. Like the brothers, Fawad believes in assembling around him a team of junior bureaucrats he trusts (Interviewee 41, a provincial services officer who had worked under Fawad). This pattern grows out of Fawad’s close working relationship with the Sharif brothers and their bureaucratic allies in the past (e.g. Sherdil and Mahmood). These relationships underpinned the strong bond of trust between CM Shahbaz Sharif and Fawad. But of course, this bond was catalysed by the extra-legal appointment methods used by the CM Secretariat to achieve targeted bureaucratic efficiency objectives. In appointing him extra-legend, the patron helps to ensure that Fawad will ‘deliver’ expected-but-difficult-to-achieve efficiency outcomes (e.g. increases in tax revenue, reductions in the government’s wage bill, increased checks on C&W contracts, etc.), despite the knowledge that the measures he takes to achieve them will cause controversy and embroil the government in damage control. In exchange, Fawad trusts that the patron will protect his interests in exchange for ‘delivering’ these outcomes. The patronage extended to Fawad was such that when he was posted as the Secretary of the Public Prosecution Department in 2011, he ‘refused to take up the job’ and when the CM was asked about the refusal, he (remarkably) commented: “What can I do if Fawad does not join [the department]?”

Therefore, Fawad’s career is a classic instance of a bureaucrat who is regarded as an equal, an honourary party member by the CM and senior party leadership in Punjab – so much so that his posting to the PM Office (as Secretary to the PM) led Nawaz Sharif to assign his administrative responsibilities to Fawad.

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The Project Managers

Many bureaucrats favoured by the PMLN administration over the last few years self-style as project managers, inspired by the CM’s priorities and the New Public Management (NPM) approach favoured by the PAS. The value these bureaucrats have to the government is evidenced by the lengths to which the provincial establishment goes to protect them from repercussions for extra-legal appointments and controversial decision making.

One such bureaucrat is Ahad Cheema. Cheema worked closely with the CS’s office early in his career while posted as Additional Secretary Welfare (S&GAD). However, he brought himself to the attention of the CS and the CM when he (a BPS 18 officer) was given additional charge of, and soon after regularly posted to the BPS 20 post of Secretary Higher Education Punjab. This type of extra-legal appointment exploits a loophole in the regulations on promotion that allows for discretionary appointments of junior bureaucrats to senior posts, bypassing their more senior colleagues (see Chapter 2). Discretionary extra-legal appointments (made in the name of ‘public interest’ – see Chapter 2) further strengthen the strong bonds that familiarity through professional networks engender, giving patrons the leverage to demand that bureaucrats deliver outcomes that are difficult to achieve. When Cheema took additional charge of the post of Secretary Higher Education, the post had remained vacant for some time after the two previous secretaries had been transferred due to disputes over lecturer transfers with the Minister for Education. In appointing Cheema, the CM Secretariat dug in its heels against the politician’s demands for lecturer transfers and implemented a ‘closed-door policy’ (where department officials were ordered to lock their office doors) to stymie those seeking out-of-turn transfers.

In October 2010, a citizen filed a petition against Cheema’s appointment as Secretary Higher Education on the grounds that he was occupying a post above his

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Cheema was swiftly transferred and appointed DCO Lahore the same month. Cheema’s immediate appointment to a senior and much coveted post, the occupant of which must work closely with the CM Secretariat since the capital city is not only the base of the provincial government but also the Sharifs’ home city, is evidence of the CM Secretariat’s willingness to protect a bureaucrat who had ‘delivered’. PAS bureaucrats often described such protection as a valuable security net that cements the ties of the PAS network, allowing bureaucrats to act against even those who are politically well connected (Interviews 4, 6, 9, 30, 77 – all current or former PAS bureaucrats). For the CM Secretariat, these discretionary extra-legal transfers (made by exploiting the ‘public interest’ loophole in tenure rules) are used to move bureaucrats like Cheema or Fawad to posts where they are needed most.

Cheema’s tenure as DCO Lahore was just eighteen months. During this time, he impressed the CM with his ability to drive his juniors to improve their performance, even in the face of pressure. For instance, in a “grand operation” against encroachments and a drive against city’s drug trade, Cheema refused to give in to political pressure and insisted on pushing his juniors to do the same. However, like his posting as Secretary Higher Education, Cheema’s posting as DCO was also extra-legal – posts of DCO in the larger districts are for officers in at least BPS 20 and preferably BPS 21 while Cheema was in BPS 18 (though he claimed to be ‘acting BPS 19’) and was challenged in the court. In December 2011, despite vociferous opposition in the Punjab Assembly, an amendment was made to the Punjab Local Government Ordinance (2001) removing the requirement that DCO posts be held by officers in BPS 20, thus providing legislative cover to extra-legal appointments like Cheema’s appointment challenged in LHC. October 7, 2010. The Express Tribune. Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/59414/cheemas-appointment-challenged-in-lhc/> [Accessed 20 February 2016].


Cheema’s. However, since the amendment did not apply retroactively, Cheema had to be transferred.

In 2012, Cheema, now in BPS 19, was extra-legally appointed through the discretionary violation of seniority rules (in the ‘public interest’) to the BPS 20 post of Director General (DG) of the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), the body responsible for all planning and development activity in Punjab’s capital city. The timing of Cheema’s appointment as DG LDA in March 2012 was not coincidental. In February 2012, the Lahore Metro Bus project was initiated. This project, set up with the assistance of the Turkish government, was the first state-owned, large-scale public transport project in the country (Sajjad 2014, 10) and the CM’s flagship project going into the May 2013 election. Therefore, the CM needed a trusted bureaucrat to streamline the design phase, land acquisition, and construction of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system. As DCO Lahore, Cheema had been actively involved in the conceptualisation of the project and was therefore the ideal choice to take the project forward. By 2012, Cheema had a well-established working relationship with the CM. Handpicked (and extra-legally appointed) by the CM to ‘deliver’ the Lahore Metro Bus within a year, Cheema ensured that the project was complete by February 2013 (nothing short of a miracle) at a cost of Rs 30 billion, four times the annual provincial development budget for public transport (Sajjad 2014, 10). The success of the project, and the speed of its completion, is credited almost entirely to him – the CM referred to Cheema as the ‘hero of the Metro Bus’ and awarded him the *Tamgha-e-Imtiaz*. However, Cheema could not have achieved this outcome without some assistance from the CM Secretariat. For instance, the speed with which the financing (from

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provincial funds made available by the 7th National Finance Commission Award) came through, the diversion of the majority of available funds for the development of the province to the development of Lahore, and the lack of external oversight (including, for instance, an Environmental Protection Agency assessment) was the result of the CM’s desire to get the bus system up and running in advance of the May 2013 election. In other words, the CM Secretariat and the CM himself ensured that Cheema had everything he required to ensure the expected outcome was achieved.

Ahad Cheema’s reputation as project manager was now well established, and in July 2015, he was appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the private Quaid-e-Azam Thermal Power Pvt. Limited while retaining additional charge of DG LDA, drawing a private sector salary as CEO in addition to the perks and privileges (housing, transport, etc.) he enjoyed as a PAS officer. Additional charge appointments such as these are the easiest, most convenient and least problematic means of putting the right people in the right posts as it allows a bureaucrat to control two key posts at the same time. During Cheema’s additional charge posting as DG LDA, for instance, the LDA was handling two major projects in the city, both of which were extremely contentious and involved extensive litigation – the Orange Line Metro Train initiated in May 2014 (with an expected completion date of late 2019) and the Signal Free Corridor which was completed in December 2015.

Additional charge appointments are a perfectly legal, though temporary, solution to the problem of a vacant seat – according to the rules, additional charge appointments are permitted for 3 months, and can be extended for a further 3 months. However, most additional charge appointments last for many more months (such as


Cheema’s) or even years - for instance, Irfan Elahi held an additional charge as Project Director of the Punjab Land Record Management Information System for 7 years (in addition to his postings as Secretary Food and Irrigation and Chairman of the Planning and Development Board).  

In some cases, the use of additional charge appointments may be a matter of negligence and convenience: it’s just easier to hand a post as additional charge to a vetted officer (for example, Cheema’s retention of the post of DG LDA on additional charge), and perhaps even to someone serving in the same department. Section Officers working on additional charge appointments are not infrequent in departments like School Education or Irrigation. Though this overburdens an already overworked official, it allows a lot of things to slip through the cracks because there is not time for the officer to pursue them (providing a convenient excuse for lost paperwork and delays in the business of the department).

However, additional charge appointments become a great deal more problematic when they allow the lines of authority to converge in the hands of one person, consolidating a number of responsibilities and shortening the time taken for project approval and implementation. Appointments of this kind have become increasingly common under the PMLN, particularly since they won both the centre and Punjab in 2013. Any checks that could have been placed on such appointments were removed once the Establishment Division and PM Office were both in PMLN hands.

Jehanzeb Khan’s additional charge of the post of Additional Chief Secretary Energy for 3 years and counting while being posted regularly as Secretary Finance and then Chairman of the Planning and Development Board is a prime example of this. Effectively, the lines of authority for the development, approval, and financing of energy projects converged in the person of Jehanzeb Khan.

Khan is considered an ally of the CM, having worked closely with him since the PMLN’s return to power in Punjab in 2008. Unlike ‘honourary politician’

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bureaucrats like Fawad or Mahmood, however, Khan had not spent the formative years of his career working with the Sharifs. He had spent some time posted in what was then NWFP, and was then posted abroad for most of the Musharraf era. It was not till he became Secretary Livestock and Dairy Development that Khan got to work closely with the CM. During his tenure, he ‘delivered’ in a department that was not considered all that important by expanding its scope from primarily an ‘animal health department’ to a livestock development and policy department.\(^{224}\) Khan’s work in the department led to international investments being made in the sector to improve facilities, quality control, and marketing to prepare meat for export, as well as improvements in breeding practices.\(^{225}\)

This performance led to Khan being entrusted with more high profile postings. In 2011, he was posted as Secretary Health, taking over the department after Fawad Hasan Fawad’s controversial tenure which left the entire department up in arms. Khan’s mandate was to calm the unhappy employees of one of the largest departments in the province and deal with an ongoing dispute involving the Young Doctors’ Association.\(^{226}\) Just as the department settled down with a less abrasive Secretary, Punjab suffered an outbreak of dengue fever.\(^{227}\) By October, the outbreak was brought under control through initiatives led by the CM personally and a team of trusted bureaucrats (including Khan).\(^{228}\) In 2012, however, the CM made Khan Officer on Special Duty (OSD) following the death of numerous patients due to spurious medication provided for free at the Punjab Institute of Cardiology in Lahore.\(^{229}\)

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Khan’s value to the CM as a bureaucrat who could ‘deliver’, however, became evident when just a couple of months later, he was appointed Secretary Energy, replacing an official who had failed to meet the CM’s expectations with regard to the initiation of new power projects. With energy being the key priority going into the 2018 election cycle (after an anti-PPP wave in the 2013 general election was read as a criticism of the PPP’s inability to handle Pakistan’s energy crisis), CM Shahbaz Sharif began with the re-structuring of the energy department and the upgradation and re-designation of the post of Secretary Energy to Additional Chief Secretary Energy (ACS-E, BPS 21). Khan was the Secretary Finance and would have had considerable input in this process as per the ESTACODE. In fact, he himself was given additional charge of the ACS-E post once it was set up, despite the fact that he had not yet been promoted to BPS 21, and was thus too junior for the post. He has held that additional charge ever since (3 years and counting, again a discretionary violation of tenure rules – see Chapter 2). As a news report notes, the Energy Department did not even request an extension of the additional charge appointment beyond the permitted 3 months.

The CM’s experience of working closely with Khan on projects and crises created a strong bond between the patron and the bureaucrat. Khan’s appointments since 2013, encompassing some of the most senior posts in Punjab, point to the CM and his advisors’ design in consolidating a number of responsibilities in the hands of one person, thus shortening the time taken for project approval and implementation. Enabled by having the PMLN in charge at the centre as well as in Punjab, the success of this design, and the level of ‘delivery’ in terms of bureaucratic efficiency is clear. Public-private partnerships set up through the Punjab Power Development Board have resulted in the establishment of the Quaid-e-Azam Thermal, Solar, and Hydel Power companies. With Chinese investment, the first solar power plant became

231 Ibid.
operational in September 2015\textsuperscript{234} while work continues on various other projects across the province.

Though Khan’s extended additional charge of the ACS-E post was extra-legal, the collection of the powers, responsibilities, and checks and balances of two separate senior bureaucratic posts into one bureaucrat has been remarkably successful in achieving the outcomes expected by the CM. The bond, however, combined with the method of appointment, cultivated forms of patronage that were strong enough to offset any challenges to Khan’s lack of transparency.

**Electoral Gain**

“Where everyone is eating, so what if this man eats too? Give him a turn, others are eating as it is.”

- Interview 30, a PAS officer, on how politicians try to convince her to transfer a bureaucrat so that he too can get a cut of state resources.

The fact that politicians use bureaucratic appointments to get ahead in electoral terms will not be news to anyone. However, many find it hard to describe politicisation precisely in terms of objectives/methods/bonds. A prominent Jhang politician was an exception; unlike other politicians I spoke to, he did not deny the charge of making politicised appointments. In fact, he saw his behaviour as a public service – ‘There is an inequality in the system. This is where the politician plays a role. The politician fights for those who elected him. They expect the politician to fight for their rights.’ For a politician, helping out people is not simply a matter of winning the votes of the bureaucrat and his/her family; it is about winning good will and a reputation for doing the right thing that will travel and bring in far more votes than that of one person and his family.

Appointments made with the intent to gain an electoral advantage are less easily examined than those tied to bureaucratic efficiency. In the latter, there are instructions issued to the appointed bureaucrat as to what is expected of him. In the former, though, exchanges are less public and more inferential. Many cases involve removing someone who is unhelpful – through an extra-legal transfer or appointment as Officer on Special Duty (OSD) – in order to appoint a loyalist. Though much of my

fieldwork involved tracking the former part of the equation, this section explicates the motivations of patrons (with access to the CM) and the ‘loyal’ bureaucrats they extra-legally appoint in pursuit of electoral gain outcomes.

Political DCOs and Commissioners

The posts of DCO and Commissioner are some of the most powerful and most coveted in the bureaucratic set up, particularly in the absence of elected local governments. Most bureaucrats divide Commissioner and DCO postings into significant and insignificant – large urban divisions or districts with complex political scenarios like Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Faisalabad are significant ones; appointments in these divisions/districts are a sign of trust by the political leadership (Interview 77, a former PAS officer). They can make a career, bringing an officer into the ambit of the provincial and party leadership (forming lasting bonds between them). Appointments to a Commissioner or DCO post in less significant divisions or districts are still valuable, but do not necessarily suggest a closeness with the political and bureaucratic leadership. However, Commissioner and DCO appointments are rarely made without the consent of prominent party figures (those in the CM’s inner circle) in the area (Interview 77).

During Musharraf’s PMLQ government, a bureaucrat perceived as being unreceptive to military/political demands was liable to be removed. In Jhang, for instance, it became necessary to replace the DCO just days before a caretaker government took over to prepare for the 2008 elections because he had had a very public disagreement with the munshi of MNA Faisal Saleh Hayat, a prominent member of the ruling party. Hayat told CM Elahi that either the DCO be removed or he would quit the party. When the new pick for the DCO post was introduced to CM Elahi as a young man from Gujrat (Elahi’s own district), the CM commented, ‘Oh yes, boys from the ‘pind’ [village] are the best, he will keep my MPAs happy’ (Interview 77).

Under the PMLN, carefully chosen bureaucrats appointed as DCOs are less likely to be transferred for disagreements with politicians, provided the politicians are not part of the CM’s kitchen cabinet. After the 2008 election and the dismantling of Musharraf’s local government system, the PPP government at the centre tried to
convince the PMLN not to revert to a system where bureaucrats controlled districts. Instead, the PPP wanted local MPAs and MNAs to be in charge of the administration of the districts, and for bureaucrats to report to them – a system that would retain the best elements of Musharraf’s local government system but through democratically elected, partisan parliamentarians. The PMLN originally seemed to consider this request, but by mid-2009, it had decided that bureaucrats remain in charge of affairs at the district and sub-district levels. The Punjab government establishes its own ties with the bureaucrats it appoints to various districts and consolidates multiple lines of authority in the hands of one person, thus ensuring that a great deal of power rests in the hands of these officials.

A number of DCO posts in large districts are given (extra-legally) to officers who have worked closely with the CM in the past – for instance, Azmat Mehmood was Personal Staff Officer to the CM before he became DCO Gujranwala – even when more senior officers are available. With there being no elected local government setup after 2008 (until 2016/17, i.e. after my fieldwork was completed), the CM’s bonds with bureaucrats posted as DCOs were used to direct service delivery to particular areas or projects, but they could also have more overtly electoral purposes. Interview 77, for instance, revealed that at times, the CM issues directions to bureaucrats, telling them to embarrass/harangue certain MPAs (those who may be junior or less favoured) while helping others (those in the CM’s inner circle): look after this one, not that one, etc. It is likely that such directions lead to junior politicians filing privilege motions (their only recourse) against bureaucrats in parliament, such as the one filed by Toba Tek Singh PMLN MPA Amjad Ali Javed against DCO Waqas Alam for damaging his private property and threatening him.

Prioritising relationships with bureaucrats over those with junior politicians allows the party leadership (specifically the CM) to exert itself at the district level so that local politicians remain indebted to the party for development activity (delivered by the CM’s favoured bureaucrats) in their constituency. But an even more significant
consequence is that it is a tactic to keep local politicians under check and establish centralised control in areas where the party is factionalised. In Faisalabad, Noor ul Amin Mengal was DCO for three years – an extraordinarily long term for a DCO. Mengal is from Balochistan and therefore, arguably less prone to political pressure in Punjab. However, he has worked closely with CM Shahbaz Sharif throughout his career, starting with a posting as Special Secretary to the CM, where he was in charge of developing the pilot for the much-praised Public Feedback Model\textsuperscript{239} (an anti-corruption initiative). Mengal therefore not only saw eye-to-eye with the CM on reducing corruption – particularly corruption by local, junior politicians and bureaucrats – he was also someone the CM worked with and trusted to ‘deliver’ expected outcomes. This trust led to Mengal’s (extra-legal) appointment as DCO Lahore after Ahad Cheema’s somewhat controversial tenure ended in 2012.\textsuperscript{240} Mengal was in BPS 19 on an officiating basis at the time of his appointment,\textsuperscript{241} but according to the Punjab government’s 2010 Promotion Policy, promotions on officiating basis are permitted (temporarily) only where a suitable official cannot be found. Mengal’s appointment to DCO Lahore did not meet these requirements.\textsuperscript{242}

After the 2013 election, however, Mengal was posted as DCO Faisalabad. He was again too junior for the post since there is no record of his being promoted regularly to BPS 19. Soon after, he was also given additional charge of the Director General of the Faisalabad Development Authority, essentially giving him absolute control over development activity in the city.\textsuperscript{243} The appointment of a trusted bureaucrat as DCO Faisalabad was critical at this juncture for two (related) reasons. The first was that, although Faisalabad was electorally dominated by the PMLN, there were deep and longstanding divisions amongst party members in the district. The main fault line is between factions of the party led by MPA Rana Sanaullah (Punjab Law Minister) on the one hand, and Chaudhry Sher Ali and his son MNA Abid Sher


Ali (State Minister for Water and Power) on the other (Interview 30, a PAS officer who had previously been posted in Faisalabad). Sanaullah is a close advisor of Shahbaz Sharif while Abid Sher Ali is the Sharif brothers’ nephew. The factions have existed, with district MPAs, MNAs, and party workers taking sides, since the early 2000s, when Sanaullah advised against giving Abid Sher Ali a ticket for the 2002 election because of Chaudhry Sher Ali’s imprisonment on corruption charges. Attempts by the PMLN leadership to intervene and defuse the situation were unsuccessful and tensions remained high, with exchanges of gun fire and open clashes between the party factions. The consequence of party factionalisation in the district was that space opened up for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf and put a dent in the PMLN vote. In a by-election in October 2013 for a provincial seat the PMLN had considered safe, less than six months after the general election, the PTI won.

In these circumstances, the CM had to hold together the PMLN’s vote bank and stave off the PTI’s electoral challenge through DCO Mengal. The strong bond the two men had from working together closely in the past was further strengthened by Mengal’s extra-legal appointment to a post for which he was too junior. This gave the CM enough leverage to demand that Mengal not only ‘deliver development’ in Faisalabad, but also that he play a more political role by helping manage the PMLN’s factions and retaining the party’s vote. Mengal’s reputation as a ‘man of integrity’ who rooted out corruption and worked on improving the district and, most importantly, his closeness to the CM meant that, regardless of what local PMLN

leaders did, the party’s overall image was protected. But when Sanaullah and Sher Ali (and their loyalists) were in a confrontation, it was up to Mengal to defuse the situation (by negotiating with both sides) before it escalated into violence. For instance, when one faction registered an FIR against the other for violating the election code of conduct, the DCO office had the FIR sealed to prevent a further ‘trade of accusation [sic]’. If the DCO favoured one faction over another at any point, the CM (as the DCO’s boss) would be seen as playing favourites, causing a rift within the party.

Commissioners are in charge of multiple districts (comprising a division) and they act as a liaison between the DCOs of each of those districts and the provincial government. Since the Commissioner is responsible for projects, revenue, and law and order, his post is key to politicians in the division. Rawalpindi’s Commissioners are generally difficult to appoint because politicians have very clear preferences as to whom they want in the position. In 2012, the CM was hamstrung for a month by a senior politician from Rawalpindi (most likely Chaudhry Nisar, then leader of the PMLN opposition at the centre) pressuring him to appoint a specific official. The CM interviewed four short-listed officials, but it was the most junior of them, Imdadullah Bosal, who was appointed.

Bosal had never headed a department but had been DCO Rawalpindi from 2008 to 2011, when the PMLN had formed the provincial government and won six out of seven MNA seats in Rawalpindi. All seven towns in the district, however, were ruled by PMLQ-backed nazims under the local government system. Bosal’s posting was extra-legal (he was too junior for the post since he was in BPS 19 at the time and the post was for officers in BPS 20 or 21), but in due course he played a key role in dismantling the power of the PMLQ-backed nazims by withholding development funds and stopping work on initiatives that had been taken by the PMLQ.


Case against Mayor group for code violation. 31 October 2015. DAWN. Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1216538/case-against-mayor-group-for-code-violation> [Accessed 31 May 2017].


Pindi gets commissioner. March 19, 2012. DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/703959/pindi-gets-commissioner> [Accessed 17 April 2016]. Bosal went on to become Commissioner Lahore when the PMLN returned to power in Punjab in 2013, and then because Principal Secretary to the CM, a post he currently holds.
government. These work ties formed the basis of a strong bond between Bosal and senior PMLN politicians, a bond that was enhanced by Bosal’s extra-legal appointment as Commissioner. The strength of this bond made him the right bureaucrat for the post in 2012 in the lead up to the 2013 election (when the PMLN was under pressure from the PTI, particularly in Rawalpindi where the PMLN’s politicians were apprehensive about their prospects, and Imran Khan [the leader of the PTI] was contesting himself). Between April 2012 and March 2013 (when the caretaker government made Bosal an Officer on Special Duty [OSD]), Rawalpindi saw the accelerated initiation and completion of a number of high visibility development projects, including a flyover, an underpass, and various road widening projects. In addition, Bosal ensured that the performance of the revenue department was improved, not just in terms of collection but also with regard to assisting citizens with their complaints (see Nelson 2011). Though Bosal held the post for just a year – till March 2013 – the PMLN managed to fend off the substantive electoral challenge by the PTI and win four out of seven MNA seats in Rawalpindi.

**Politically Appointed in Bulk**

In many cases, extra-legal bureaucratic appointments are made with the simple objective of rewarding those loyal to the party leadership and those who voted for (or might vote for) the party. Every single elite, mid-level, and street-level bureaucrat I spoke to acknowledged interference by senior politicians in appointments and there are, of course, numerous accounts of officials being transferred on the *sifarish* of MPAs and MNAs. Appointments made for these purposes are usually made in bulk, dozens at a time and are quite effective in gaining votes and rewarding supporters. Though such tactics do not involve developing close individual bonds with appointed

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bureaucrats, they are timed and designed to create a general sense amongst voters of munificence on the part of the politician.

**Figure 1: Objectives, Methods, Bonds, and Outcomes**

There are methods of making such appointments in patent violations of the rules – these are discussed in Chapter 5. The methods of bulk appointment discussed here are extra-legal – attempts to make appointments under some form of (debateable) legal cover, without drawing too much media or court attention.

**Contracts and Regularisation for Junior Bureaucrats**

At the level of middle-tier or street-level bureaucrats (teachers, lady health workers, etc.), contract appointments are a means of dispensing patronage amongst those left out of government jobs due to a lack of qualifications. At the same time, such appointments allow governments to bypass the rules regarding bureaucratic appointments to place particular people in particular posts. A news report on contract hiring in the public-sector Punjab University, quoting a member of the university syndicate, provides a succinct account of how these appointments can be made:256

> a person, who does not fulfill the criteria for a certain post, is first hired on contractual basis. Later, an advertisement is given in the newspapers and those already working on the contract at the university are given preference by the Selection Board and are hired permanently.

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Regardless of the concept of a contract, those who take up these government positions believe they will be regularised, entitling them to the same perks and privileges as a regular employee – security of tenure, promotion, and a pension. With protests from contract employees in a variety of departments (health, education, communications and works, population and welfare) at various times over the last few years, there has been substantive pressure on the government to give in to these regularisation demands.

Regularising employees means adding to a department’s wage and pension bill and therefore, the only person with the (extra-legal, discretionary) power to order the regularisation of contract employees is the CM. However, regularisation does have electoral cache, as CM Shahbaz Sharif noted when he issued CM Directives (at his discretion and ‘in the public interest’) to regularise employees (first contracted by the PMLQ government) in 2009 and 2010. Similarly, in the run up to the 2013 election, a CM Directive ordered the regularisation of all employees in BPS 1-16 (roughly 100,000 people), a decision that the Election Commission of Pakistan regarded as ‘pre-poll rigging’.

The scale of these appointments is crucial – regularisation means permanent pension-linked jobs for thousands of people. The CM does not have one-on-one bonds with them but regularisation is ordered with the hope that at least some of them will be grateful enough to support him and his party electorally. This is why the political context of regularisation decisions is important – in July 2014 for example, there were

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protests in Multan with one of the threats being that protestors would join the PTI’s upcoming protests if they were not regularised.  

It is important to note, though, that for all the flexibility of extra-legal appointments, and the advantages of making them in bulk, the circumstances in which they are made are critical to achieving a successful electoral outcome. Extra-legal bulk appointments (no matter how big the scale) will not result in electoral gain outcomes if the patron has not maintained a close relationship with the PAS bureaucrats (DCOs, Secretaries) and mid-tier bureaucrats (EDOs) who are actually in charge of appointing (or approving the appointment of) lower-tier staff. For instance, when the PMLN formed the government in Punjab in 2008, it accused the PMLQ (and specifically the CM Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi) of making hundreds of appointments in 2007 to the ‘police, revenue, education and other departments to “secure and promote his financial and political interest and rig the Feb 18 [2008] elections’’’. Many of these were allegedly cases of civil servants who were either retired or due to retire. However, the PMLQ’s attempt to ‘rig’ the 2008 election via extra-legal appointments was stymied by two institutional barriers. The first was the caretaker government, which would have transferred at least some of these officials, thus reducing the impact of any attempt to rig the election. The second and more significant barrier was set up by Musharraf and the PMLQ themselves – they alienated the powerful PAS cadre in the implementation of the local government system by handing the administrative reigns to elected local representatives (rather than bureaucrats), by posting military officials to senior bureaucratic posts, and blocking available bureaucratic posts with retired officials – thus slowing down promotions for everyone else. As an example of these power dynamics, and the resentments of PAS officers, Interviewee 6 (a PAS officer) recounted her experience of trying to get a field posting when the local government system was in operation and the PMLQ was in power:

> After making a fuss for a field posting, I was finally issued orders for Sahiwal [by the S&GAD]. Then I got a call saying, ‘No [you can’t go to Sahiwal because] the CM Secretariat has cancelled the posting. Though the DCO there has completed his three-year tenure, the

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264 Ibid.
nazim doesn’t want to let him go.’ I then suggested Khushab, where the DCO had served for 4 years. Again the nazim said ‘No, I can’t spare him; we don’t know this lady and don’t want her here.’

In such circumstances, the PMLQ succeeded in making the PMLN (with its reputation for establishing close ties with the bureaucracy) seem more and more attractive to PAS and mid-tier bureaucrats. These officials knew that a PMLN government would mean more power in their hands – and so it was in Punjab from 2008 to 2013, and in Punjab and the centre from 2013 to the present. Bureaucrats like Interviewee 6, therefore, had little incentive to aid the PMLQ in rigging the election (unless the party had individual biraderi ties with them or paid individual bribes). In the 2008 provincial election, the PMLQ placed third after both the PMLN and the PPP.

**Line Departments and Bureaucrats**

Ordinarily, mid-tier bureaucrats do not have close working relationships with the CM or senior politicians in his inner circle. The onus of developing a bond with a politician is therefore on the bureaucrat. It is for this reason that many district officials will make it a point to attend a prominent politician’s dera every day after work – usually with a gift (fruit, for example) in hand (Interview 8, a retired School Education Department bureaucrat). It is this practice that makes these bureaucrats familiar to prominent politicians and provides the necessary relationship on which to build strong bonds.

**The School Education Department**

Aside from extra-legal bulk appointments made to gather voters and reward party workers, appointments to forward electoral objectives are also made to particular posts. In the district-level School Education Department, for instance, these posts are the managerial/administrative ones: EDO, DEO, Deputy DEO, AEO, and school principals. These posts are coveted because they place teachers in positions of relative power and privilege as administrators at the district, tehsil, or markaz level. EDOs control the operation of the department throughout the district and interact with provincial bureaucratic elites (the Secretary, DCOs, and even the CM Secretariat staff). DEOs are the appointing authority for teachers (elementary and secondary)
recruited in BPS 9 to 16.\textsuperscript{265} However, there is an inherent precarity to these postings. For instance, only teachers promoted to the post of principal can be considered for EDO roles, and EDOs can always be transferred back to a principal post. The perks of the EDO position mean that all teachers aspire to EDO posts and those occupying them do not wish to be transferred back into schools. For this reason, EDOs involve themselves in patronage relationships in order to keep their post.

Why do senior politicians need an EDO or DEO or Deputy DEO of their choice appointed in their district? The simplest answer lies in the appointment and transfer of teachers.\textsuperscript{266} The department has over 400,000 employees and is therefore one of the largest public-sector employers in the province. Across the board, officials in the department agreed that though recruitment to these posts have recently become ‘merit-based’, transfers are entirely political. Interview 39 revealed that while she was DCO, an MPA approached her to ask that she have all transfer lists checked and approved by his office. In this instance, the DCO was able to refuse because the MPA was not close enough to the CM to cause problems for her. Furthermore, EDOs are the ones who recruit Class IV staff for schools – guards, peons, sweepers. These are all government jobs and are invariably filled with political appointees.

A prominent example of a bureaucrat appointed to aid politicians in making extra-legal appointments for electoral gain is Pervaiz Akhtar. Favoured by Hamza Shahbaz Sharif and Rana Mashood (Minister School Education), Pervaiz Akhtar was recruited as a Senior Subject Specialist Geography but has never actually taught the subject (Interview 8, a School Education Department bureaucrat who retired as Director of Public Instruction). Akhtar’s name appears in a list of corrupt education department officials drawn up by Interviewee 8 in the late 1990s, focusing on kickbacks from contracts and making fake appointments. These allegations were not pursued, and Interviewee 8 recounts that Akhtar was (extra-legally) appointed EDO-E Kasur and then EDO-E Lahore in early 2011, bypassing his seniors. The EDO-E post is a critical means of distributing patronage through appointments to primary and secondary schools and financial malfeasance in budgets and contracts. A Section Officer (Interview 49) with the School Education department waited for the Section


\textsuperscript{266} Furthermore, EDOs are the ones who recruit Class IV staff for schools – guards, peons, sweepers. These are all government jobs and are invariably filled with political appointees.

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Officer who shared his office to step out before he lowered his voice and commented that Akhtar was outside the department’s and even the Secretary’s jurisdiction due to his political connections. Attempts to transfer him from the post of EDO-E Lahore invariably failed as senior politicians would start calling immediately to demand that he remains in his post (Interview 8; 49). The fact that Akhtar retained the post of EDO-E Lahore for such a long period of time (in discretionary violation of tenure rules), despite his poor reputation within the School Education department and the various investigations launched into his alleged corruption, suggest that his strong bonds with prominent PMLN politicians were further strengthened through his extra-legal appointment. These bonds ensured that he worked to achieve electoral gain outcomes for his patrons.

Centralisation of Discretion: From Localities to Lahore

Though it is difficult to tease out the exact exchange between politicians and bureaucrats where the outcome desired is electoral gain, the postings and behaviour of an EDO-E can often indicate their electoral value to a politician in the CM’s inner circle. Mazhar, EDO-E Rawalpindi for six years and counting (in violation of tenure rules), was somewhat coy to begin with, but soon admitted that although recruitment

267 In 2012, Akhtar faced an Anti-Corruption Establishment investigation when he was accused of receiving bribes from 140 people whom he recruited into the department and embezzling government money in purchasing furniture for schools. The investigation then seems to disappear entirely from media reports, suggesting that Akhtar was protected by a political patron. (Education EDO faces probe over corruption. November 11, 2012. The Nation. Available at: <http://nation.com.pk lahore/11-Nov-2012/education-edo-faces-probe-over-corruption> [Accessed 5 January 2017].) In 2014, Akhtar was accused of violating the School Education Department’s transfer ban by issuing backdated transfer letters to favoured primary and secondary school teachers. (Abassi, Y. Education Department backdated teachers transfer orders to Lahore to 15 September for 25 female and 18 male elementary teachers, and 14 male and 17 female secondary teachers. Available at: <http://www.786times.com/edo-education-lahore-issued-transfer-orders-rather-than-punjab-govt-already-ban-on-transfer-of-teachers/> [Accessed 27 April 2017].) In addition, in 2011, Akhtar was accused of bussing school students from Lahore to Faisalabad to attend a PMLN rally. (Hassan, M. LHC dismisses petition against school headmistress. November 26, 2011. The News Tribe. Available at: <http://www.thenewstrib.com/2011/11/26/lhc-dismisses-petition-against-school-headmistress/> [Accessed 5 January 2017].) It was not until In May 2016, Akhtar fell afoul of the CM when he failed to improve the condition of a school the CM made a surprise visit to. (EDO, DEO education suspended. May 4, 2016. The News. Available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/117308-EDO-DEO-education-suspended> [Accessed 5 January 2017].) This suggests that though Akhtar may have been valuable electorally, no one is safe – not even the man providing students to fill out the venue of a PMLN rally.

and promotion are rule-bound, transfers are political (including his own). When the caretaker government took over in 2013, Mazhar was moved to the post of EDO-E Mianwali. However, after the election, Mazhar was back to the post of EDO-E Rawalpindi. Soon after, the CM ordered his transfer when he failed to provide adequate dengue prevention measures in schools. However, the CM was ‘convinced’ by members of his inner circle – allegedly Chaudhry Nisar and Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, both prominent PMLN politicians in Rawalpindi (Interview 8) – to reverse his orders. Mazhar’s return to Rawalpindi and his longevity in the EDO-E post (he personally told me what a difficult district Rawalpindi is to work in, stressing the short tenure of most bureaucratic officers there) suggest that the strong bonds he had with influential politicians in Rawalpindi were enhanced by his extra-legal appointment. He made himself indispensable to the achievement of his patrons’ electoral objectives by ensuring that their party workers, loyalists and voters were provided with the teaching jobs and posts they wanted.

The only reason Mazhar was willing to give me a few minutes for an interview was my reference to a prominent retired Education Department official when introducing myself to his staff. The waiting area was tiny, and a few people had clearly been waiting some time to see the EDO. While I sat across from him in his office, a small, white-washed room dominated by the desk behind which he sat, Mazhar only occasionally looked up from his paperwork as a constant stream of officials went in and out, and the phones – the office landline, and the two cell phones he had on the desk in front of him – rang incessantly.

Mazhar’s Deputy DEO later called him remarkably ‘flexible’, a term that carries a wealth of meaning amongst bureaucrats. This ‘flexibility’ became obvious after just a few minutes in his office as Mazhar chose which phone to answer, guiding select callers to seek political intervention to achieve their desired outcomes. The first phone call Mazhar answered was from someone who was requesting a favour. Mazhar’s response was simple:

It is a political issue…I don’t have that kind of understanding with those with power…Army people don’t do [i.e. help] as much. Speak to the person who you want to vote for, he will have weight. Otherwise it will become very difficult…Ok, let’s see, we will do something [about it] this evening.

The last comment references a common practice amongst bureaucrats at this level of the hierarchy – visiting politicians’ deras after they leave work, usually with
some fruit or other small gift to offer. In this case, Mazhar seemed to be offering to accompany the caller to a politician’s dera to request some type of sifarish.

Once the call ended, Mazhar turned to me again. In response to a question, Mazhar claimed that he had never ‘done a favour’ for anyone and that ‘one is silly if he does’. However, it didn’t take long for his actions to contradict his words – one of his cell phones rang moments later, and this time, the call was from the representative of a politician who was trying to track down the progress on a favour. Mazhar said:

You didn’t follow up. I have the file. DCO sahab has just forgotten, just remind him… We have the file ready. Rana sahab wasn’t under much compulsion so he didn’t follow up.

Though I asked, he wouldn’t tell me what the politician’s representative was calling about. For all his flexibility, Mazhar has a healthy sense of self-preservation. He told me that, when the CM Secretariat calls, he has the jurat (daring) to always ask for instructions in writing – a CM Directive, for instance. And, when asked about a cell allegedly formed at the CM Secretariat for the express purpose of facilitating teacher transfers in 2011, he told a reporter: “We issue transfer orders on the orders of the education secretary”.269 At the district level, Mazhar did admit to me that,

[T]here is no one who does not pressure us to go against the policy – additional secretary, deputy secretary, section officer, PSO to CM. The CM doesn’t talk to us directly. I got a call from the CM Secretariat just a while ago. I said this is not in rules. They said this has to be done… I receive ten calls a day from the CM Secretariat, and the Education Department doesn’t even let me sleep at night.

When a certain kind of sifarish comes across their desk, phone calls like the ones Mazhar complains about are made to EDO-E offices across the province by officials in the CM Secretariat, the School Education Minister’s office, and the School Education Department in Lahore. For example, a Deputy Secretary would initially respond to requests for out-of-turn (and thus extra-legal) transfers by saying that if the EDO had said no, nothing could be done. However, when the names of political connections started to flow, specifically those of politicians in the CM’s kitchen cabinet, the Deputy Secretary would change his tack – ‘Let me discuss it with the EDO, he is new. Or we will look for another solution’.

At the district level, receiving instructions from Lahore on how to bend or circumvent the law regarding education-sector appointments and transfers seems to be

269 It is easy if you have political connections! June 22, 2011. The News. Available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/307919-it-is-easy-if-you-have-political-connections> [Accessed 5 January 2017].
an everyday practice, indicating the distortion of the EDO’s discretion through centralisation (supposedly ‘in the public interest’). Since the development of detailed policies for the recruitment, transfer, and promotion of staff in the School Education Department, regulating (politicised) appointments by issuing instructions to EDOs from Lahore has become the method of choice for distributing patronage, all the while claiming that corruption is being eradicated at the lowest (‘most corrupt’) tiers of the bureaucracy. Mazhar’s experiences and comments, echoed by senior bureaucrats including one serving as Secretary Services, point to the way power is distributed and maintained, and how key patronage appointments now seem to work, in Punjab. While instructions to bend the law on teacher appointments now come from the centre, Mazhar is the guardian/gatekeeper of the district-level department, the bouncer outside the club acting on instructions from the top as to who can be appointed (admitted) and who cannot.

**Personal Enrichment and Protection**

Though many people I interviewed were willing to speak about the methods used in making appointments, few were willing to divulge the personal motivations behind those appointments. The response would almost unfailingly be an uncomfortable laugh and the comment that I must know the answer already. Therefore, where personal advantage (enrichment and protection) are involved, I had to rely on media accounts or ascribe motivations based on my conversations with bureaucrats.

**Senior Bureaucrats**

One of the benefits of a senior political or bureaucratic post is the ability to help not just one’s self, but one’s family, friends, and cronies. Such personal advantages can be seen through extra-legal bureaucratic appointments from the lowest to the highest tiers of the bureaucracy. Amongst PAS bureaucrats, these appointments reflect the socialisation of the cadre. Trained together at the PAS Academy and residing in close proximity in Government Official Residences (GOR) throughout their careers, PAS officers are close knit and will always look out for each other. In doing so, a PAS bureaucrat is not only helping a fellow officer but ensuring that he will have favours and support should he ever need them in the future.
In some cases, bonds between PAS bureaucrats do not ‘deliver’ personal advantage outcomes but do make the path toward them significantly easier. For instance, Interview 47, a PAS officer in the Punjab Home Department, suddenly remembered a phone he had to make in the middle of our interview. While I sat across from him at his desk, he called up a senior bureaucrat serving as a department’s Secretary and requested that his batch mate, who wanted to move from Islamabad to Lahore, be put on the interview list for a post. He praised the woman he was recommending, providing a summary of her career, highlighting her strengths, and provided her contact details to the Secretary. The phone call did not hand the post to Interview 47’s batch mate; it did, however, improve her chances since she had a fellow bureaucrat vouching for her.

In other cases, personal advantage outcomes are ‘delivered’ on the basis of strong bonds of patronage resulting from the socialisation of PAS bureaucrats and the making of extra-legal appointments. Javed Mahmood, CS Punjab 2008-2010, for instance, had a reputation for benefitting fellow batch mates. During his time as Personal Secretary to the CM in 1997-1999, he allegedly kept his fellow course mates ‘happy’ with good postings. He kept up this practice when he became CS in 2008 – a news report notes that Mahmood’s:

7th common has been appointed at the province’s top civil administrative posts, replacing the pre-commoners, 1st and 2nd commoners which were considered the previous government’s ‘elite’ in the bureaucracy.

For instance, the post of Additional Chief Secretary was held by Javed Aslam from 2008 till the imposition of Governor’s Rule in 2009, then by Sami Saeed, both of whom are from the 7th Common. Between Mahmood and his batch mate Nargis Sethi, who was Principal Secretary to the PM at the time, members of the 7th CTP were in prominent positions in Punjab and the centre in 2009/2010. In other words, Mahmood made sure his fellow batch mates benefitted personally from his tenure as CS. When the PMLN’s favoured bureaucrats occupied the PM Office as well in 2013,

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similar accounts of favouritism by Secretary to the PM Fawad Hasan Fawad began circulating.²⁷²

Most PAS bureaucrats would not consider Mahmood’s or Fawad’s favouring of his batch mates to be an instance of extra-legal appointment or, for that matter, personal enrichment or protection. Instead, they would likely justify it as discretionary and in the public interest – Mahmood and Fawad were appointing a team they trusted to work with them. However, most PAS bureaucrats frowned upon attempts by fellow members of the cadre to benefit from individual appointments made for personal gain or protection and few indulge in such practices on a systematic, sustained, or one-to-one basis with politicians or other bureaucrats. Nonetheless, PAS bureaucrats serving in line departments such as School Education find that, despite their disapproval and without their knowledge, their junior office staff leak information, fake documents, and even authorise appointments. Interview 30 (a PAS officer in the S&GAD Punjab), for instance, told me that a politician came to see her with a fully authorised document for a self-glorification project – the construction of a large gateway. Gesturing toward the door into the small outer room where her PA and a peon sat at a small desk, she told me that she believed this was only possible with the collusion of the junior staff in her office.

Gaining the loyalty of office staff is therefore key for a senior bureaucrat – not just to control his own office, but also to protect himself and his activities from disciplinary action or public exposure. The best method for doing this is by forming bonds of patronage, e.g. by accepting sifarish for junior appointments. These sifarish will typically be for the extra-legal appointment of staff members’ family, friends, neighbours, and acquaintances (though it is possible that staff members accept money from people to make the case for extra-legal appointments and use their influence, essentially acting as touts). In exchange for the PAS officer granting these extra-legal favours, members of office staff such as clerks, typists, peons, etc. guard the senior bureaucrat’s interests rather than subverting them. A betrayal of trust by the junior staff (clerks, for example) will mean the end of this patronage chain in the form of extra-legal appointments. Junior officers are able to help their friends and relations with extra-legal appointments, while senior bureaucrats achieve their outcome of protection from leaks and illicit activities taking place without their knowledge.

In many cases, such patronage by a PAS bureaucrat creates a situation where lower-tier staff (like clerks) feel confident enough to demand extra-legal appointments. This confidence is the result of two factors: the position and power of the PAS bureaucrat, and the strength of their bond with him. The more senior the PAS bureaucrat is (and the closer he is to the CM’s inner circle), the more legal and extra-legal power he, and therefore his staff, wield over junior posts. And the stronger the bond between the PAS bureaucrat and his office staff, the more likely the PAS officer is to guide his subordinates on ways to bend the regulations without breaking them, in exchange for their loyalty and protection of their boss’ interests. Furthermore, these strong bonds are not a secret – everyone in the department will typically know that a request from a clerk is backed by his PAS boss. Refusing a favour requested by the clerk is tantamount to refusing a favour request by the PAS bureaucrat.

An example will explicate these complex relationships. In the School Education Department, in a Deputy Secretary’s office, two men walked in somewhat cautiously, suggesting that they considered themselves in the presence of a superior. One of the men explained that he was there to request a transfer for a relative (before the end of her tenure). ‘It is the Government Girls Primary School in Sialkot. The school is 12 km away. The other school is close to the teacher’s house; it has two vacancies. A teacher who worked with her moved to a school close by, now she wants to move too.’ The Deputy Secretary replied that a transfer was not possible, to which the man responded by suggesting a temporary posting. The Deputy Secretary took the parchi the man handed him in silence; it was covered in Urdu script detailing the name of the teacher, her particular post and BPS, and the name of the schools. The Deputy Secretary sighed and nodded his head, and the men thanked him and left. The Deputy Secretary turned to me, ‘These men were from the staff of the Additional Secretary in the department. If I say no to them, they will say he is very ‘kameena’ (mean spirited), doesn’t listen to anyone.’ For the Deputy Secretary, the fact that these men worked for a more senior bureaucrat in the department robbed him of the choice to refuse to accommodate the extra-legal transfer request. For the men making the request, they knew that their working relationship with the Additional Secretary would be the key to achieving their expected outcome, even if the request was patently extra-legal and being made on the flimsiest of excuses. For personal
professional reasons, the Deputy Secretary simply could not say no to the staff of his superior officer.

In another instance, the Deputy Secretary sought a more equitable exchange relationship. A teacher had repeatedly approached him seeking an out-of-turn transfer to Rawalpindi (while a transfer ban was in place) where there were no vacancies. After the Deputy Secretary’s repeated refusals to help him, the teacher asked a senior bureaucrat he was related to – the Personal Assistant to the Additional Chief Secretary – to approach the Deputy Secondary on his behalf. The Personal Assistant thus became a patron (one with a close link to the CM’s inner circle) seeking an extra-legal appointment to benefit his family member. Unlike the times the teacher had tried to get a transfer on his own (and unlike the others who had been making similar requests before the Personal Assistant to the Additional Chief Secretary arrived), the Deputy Secretary did not say ‘No’ to the request for a transfer. Instead, he offered the Personal Assistant ideas for how the transfer could be carried out without openly violating the law, suggesting that he ‘approach the Secretary directly’ to make the transfer, or that the teacher ‘take leave for four months, then fifteen days in to the leave, get the holiday cancelled, and he will then be at disposal for a fresh [extra-legal] appointment’. The change in the Deputy Secretary’s attitude was in response to the presence of a senior bureaucrat who was close to the CM’s inner circle. In exchange for offering these suggestions and smoothing the path for the extra-legal appointment, the Deputy Secretary asked the Personal Assistant to get him a job with the procurement department of DFID or USAID. In other words, the Deputy Secretary was only willing to risk making an extra-legal appointment if he was offered something in exchange, with that transaction becoming the basis for a stronger bond between him and the Personal Assistant. The teacher had nothing to offer the Deputy Secretary, and no work or family ties, to sustain a bond between them. Once the Personal Assistant to the Additional Chief Secretary promised to do what he could for the Deputy Secretary’s search for a different job, the teacher’s move to Rawalpindi (after a period of leave) was settled. The Personal Assistant (the patron), achieved his objective: benefitting his family member through an extra-legal appointment.
Line Departments

Influential politicians and bureaucrats can exercise an inordinate amount of power amongst the lower tiers of the bureaucracy. It is through appointments at this level that politicians achieve personal (not merely institutional or party) outcomes. Interviewees 8 (retired School Education Department bureaucrat) and 30 (PAS officer serving in the S&GAD Punjab) explained that appointing loyal officers at mid-tier posts is about much more than making appointments to teaching positions or Class IV posts (guards, cleaning staff, peons, etc.). Though appointments can be a valuable electoral lever, mid-tier bureaucrats (EDOs and DEOs in the School Education Department and Executive Engineers [EXEN] in the Irrigation Department, for instance) are also in charge of government buildings (e.g. schools and rest houses), contracting out work on government infrastructure (canals and distributaries), and the provision of government goods and services (furniture, stationery, and canteens in schools). For politicians and senior bureaucrats in the CM’s kitchen cabinet, therefore, appointing a loyal EDO, DEO, head teacher, Sub-Divisional Officer, or EXEN can be critical to benefitting financially from these contracts.

Irrigation

In the Irrigation Department, budgets and contracts for irrigation work are the preoccupation of senior and mid-tier officials in the department – the Chief Engineer, Superintendent Engineers, and Executive Engineers in a division. Extra-legal appointments are often made to benefit from kickbacks and skimming, as Wade (1984) also records for India. A former Minister for Irrigation, Interviewee 109, told me that transfers and postings were a huge issue during his time in office:

There was a lot of political pressure to appoint particular people in particular places…Posts on barrages and quarries [stone is quarried and transported for use in building flood banks] are particularly in demand.

The mention of barrages and quarries specifically is important because of the substantial contracts involved. The Irrigation department contracts out work for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure – canals, dams, barrages, etc. – and these contracts run up to millions of rupees. Depending on the amount of money

273 Instead of being structured around districts, the Punjab Irrigation Department is structured around divisions or zones – Lahore, Faisalabad, Bahawalpur, Multan, D.G. Khan, and Sargodha. See Appendix 2.
involved, control of this money falls with senior members of a division’s bureaucracy – the Executive Engineer (EXEN), Superintendent Engineer, and Chief Engineer. Therefore, making appointments to these senior posts, and strong bonds with those appointed, are important wherever well-connected patrons wish to benefit financially from government contracts. For instance, a Superintendent Engineer posted in Lahore (Interview 123) shared his seniority list with me, pointing out that an officer had been (extra-legal) ‘inserted’ into the list at number six even though he had been promoted to BPS 19 just a week before the issuance of the list and should have been placed much lower. Two others had been (extra-legal) posted to Chief Engineer posts in their Own Pay Scale, meaning that they were too junior for the posts. According to the Superintendent Engineer and other senior officials in the department, such actions are taken to appoint bureaucrats with influential patrons to posts in charge of projects, allowing them to skim from the budget and benefit the (well-connected) patrons who appointed them.

An example from the Irrigation Department is useful in understanding how bureaucrats achieve both personal gain and protection outcomes. In 2014, a canal in Faisalabad division breached its banks, leading to a shortage of water for local farmers.\(^{274}\) The canal had undergone a recent rehabilitation program to increase its capacity, but since the breach had taken place well below the supposed improved capacity of the channel, an investigation was launched. The investigation report, published in 2015, revealed that Rs 2.1 billion had been paid out by the Faisalabad Division Chief Engineer Khawar Nazir for the defective work on the canal. Not only did this suggest that project funds had been misappropriated (i.e. pocketed by department officials and favoured contractors) but also that the monitoring of the project had been poor. The latter, in tandem with the posting decisions that Nazir made right after the breach, suggest that he had colluded with his subordinate officer, the Executive Engineer (EXEN), to embezzle project funds. At the time of the breach in 2014, the Chief Engineer blamed the serving Executive Engineer, Ashraf Shahid, and suspended him from service. But the Chief Engineer then requested the department Secretary to, in the ‘public interest’, fill the vacant post of Executive Engineer with the same man who had been serving at the post when the rehabilitation

project had been carried out – Rashid Aziz. The return of Aziz to the post of EXEN suggests not only the Chief Engineer’s involvement in the embezzlement of government funds, but also his punitive and extra-legal use of his power to suspend an official so that a post could be vacated for a favoured officer. It also speaks to the strong bond between the two bureaucrats – Aziz returned to the post since the Chief Engineer trusted him, having worked with him before. In extra-legally vacating the post for him again, the Chief Engineer strengthened this bond further and set up a mutually beneficial (personal gain and protection) patronage relationship.

However, when the investigation into the breach got underway, Rashid Aziz came under scrutiny. He was suspended from service after confessing to his involvement in embezzling project funds. Though implicated, the Chief Engineer Khawar Nazir did not face similar consequences. Absolving senior bureaucrats but punishing (albeit not very harshly) mid-tier ones is a common outcome of such accountability investigations. Though there is no clear evidence of this, it does suggest something important – that senior bureaucrats have more backing from influential, well-connected individuals in the bureaucracy and amongst politicians. As an example, Nazir, though tainted by corruption allegations, had sufficient support within the department, and particularly from the department Secretary, to be given a different post – General Manager of the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (a post typically reserved for officials who are about to retire or who need to be given a non-controversial job that keeps them out of the spot light).

School Education

As I outlined above and as Interview 8 (retired School Education Department bureaucrat) pointed out for the School Education Department, there is an entire network within each department that benefits from kickbacks and skimming off of government budgets (see Wade 1984). If an EDO (or other mid-tier bureaucrat) is taking a cut out of contract profits, he is not doing so alone (Interview 8).

In one instance, a headmistress, allegedly with political backing, was renting out the premises of a government school in Gulberg (Lahore) to nearby

275 Ibid.
She was found out by the Deputy District Education Officer (DDEO) and transferred to a different school in January 2011. However, the District Education Officer (DEO), though lacking the legal authority to do so, almost immediately (and extra-legally) returned the headmistress to her post, allegedly on the directions of the EDO Lahore, Pervaiz Akhtar, and a prominent local MPA. Though the DDEO had the requisite proof of wrong doing and even the DEO acknowledged that the school premises were being misused, the headmistress’s transaction-based bond (presumably formed with personal enrichment as the expected outcome) with the EDO and well-connected local political figures, was strong enough to protect her from being held responsible and transferred away from the school. Remarkably, a few months later, the Deputy DEO who had originally discovered the misuse of the school premises was made an Officer on Special Duty (OSD) by the Secretary of the School Education Department. Not only does this suggest that the EDO and prominent local politicians were to be allowed to continue their enrichment activities (through junior bureaucrats); it also implies that either the Secretary himself or a well-connected politician was complicit in the misuse of government property.

Interviewee 64, a District Monitoring Officer with the School Education Department, noted the political pressure placed on headmasters when issuing contracts for a school’s purchases. When a headmaster tried to hold an open auction for purchase contracts, politicians gave him a hard time until the DCO intervened to allow the auction to go ahead. Most contractors who take on government contracts are well connected to prominent politicians in the area – for instance, politicians or their family members may have a financial stake in the business or the contractor may be a party worker. These contractors rely on politicians with ties to the CM’s inner circle to help them ease the process of winning a government contract in exchange for a cut of the profits. For example, a frequent occurrence is that pressure from a politician forces the bureaucrat to hand out contracts without advertising them. In many cases, the contractor will then embezzle government funds – for example, use shoddier and cheaper materials for making furniture while pocketing the money left over from the budget. The profits for the politician from these contracts are used to finance not just deras and electoral campaigns, but also their lifestyles.

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For example, when Sheikh Rasheed was an MNA in Rawalpindi and Minister for Overseas Pakistanis in the late 1990s, he had a stake in a contract for providing furniture to schools in the district. Interviewee 8 was (legally) appointed to a senior post in the School Education Department district hierarchy in Rawalpindi in 1999, just as the furniture was being delivered and payment was due, and soon became aware that Rasheed had interfered in the granting of the contract through district bureaucrats. Since Rasheed stood to gain from the payment himself, he pressured Interviewee 8 constantly to authorise payment to the contractor without any delay and without any investigation into the granting of the contract – in fact, at one point, Rasheed tried to bribe him as well (Interview 8, Interview 30). This incident suggests that the bureaucrat will ensure that a contract is granted to the business in which Sheikh Rasheed (a politician with close ties to the ruling party at the time) has a personal interest (the desired outcome), in exchange for his extra-legal appointment to the post, an extra-legal extension, or even a small cut of the profit. Rasheed’s expected outcome would have been achieved had it not been for Interviewee 8’s posting; Interviewee 8 refused to authorise the payment when he checked and found that the furniture was of poor quality. Sheikh Rasheed’s experience is not surprising; a transactional relationship with a district bureaucrat, though producing a strong bond, cannot guarantee that there will be no interference from higher levels of the bureaucracy. Therefore, senior politicians (who have a seat in the CM’s, or even PM’s, kitchen cabinet) will usually prefer to establish exchange relationships, and therefore bonds, with more senior bureaucrats to achieve desired personal gains.

Precarity and the Structural Incentives Underpinning Extra-Legal Appointments for Personal Gain

Why do mid-tier officials risk their careers to help patrons gain personally? The answer has to do with the structure of departments, which creates a need for patrons. In the School Education Department, district officials like the EDO and DEO work under two masters – the local DCO and the department’s Secretary. Often the local DCO will seize the EDO’s powers over appointments and demand that he be consulted before any decisions are made, particularly regarding the transfer of Primary School Teachers and other officials (Interview 8). But, of course the EDO still has to satisfy the department Secretary that he is meeting set targets (or at least
trying to). To counter the influence of the DCO and the demands made by the Secretary, and to secure his own position, the EDO will approach politicians or senior bureaucrats (who are close to the CM and the centre of power) for support and form bonds of patronage with them.

In both the School Education and Irrigation Departments, bureaucrats at the mid-tier and junior levels are transferred frequently and promoted rarely, and often seek protection or assistance (respectively) from well-connected patrons. In both departments, the preferences of politicians and other influential landowners regarding who they want posted to mid-tier posts (such as EDO or Executive Engineer [EXEN]) mean that posts remain blocked – if there is no vacancy, there can be no promotion. This problem is particularly acute in the Irrigation Department. For instance, Interviewee 107 was serving as EXEN of the Lower Chenab Canal West when I met him. He had served as Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) – the entry position into the department – for 24 years before being promoted! Interviewee 116 (EXEN Lahore) was SDO for 21 years before being promoted to EXEN. Slow promotions lead to Irrigation officials finding influential patrons who can get them a post at EXEN level – the level at which they finally acquire an office and staff of their own.

In the School Education Department, assistance or protection from well-connected patrons becomes even more necessary. It is possible that the DEO in a district is higher on the seniority list than the EDO. Furthermore, the posts of EDO and DEO (BPS 19) supervise and write PERs for principals and head teachers who are often in BPS 20. Interviewee 8 believes that this causes ‘heartburning’. ‘Seniors say he is junior, sifarishee aa kar baitha hua hai [He has only been posted here due to sifarish],’ Interview 8 told me, ‘Iss ki sifarish strong thi, humari kanzor thi [His sifarish was strong, ours was weak]’. Note that the default position is not there was no sifarish on one side and there was sifarish on the other, but that one sifarish (patron) was stronger than the other.

Amongst junior staff such as teachers, Sub-Engineers, patwaris, and baildaars though, transfers are frequent, often punitive, and prone to interference from influential politicians, bureaucrats, and other players, despite the existence of a transfer policy that specifies tenure for various posts. For example, an EXEN told me that two MPAs had come to see him just that morning – one wanted him to suspend a

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**patwari**; the other wanted him to restore a **patwari** who had been suspended.

However, even street-level officials like the mate (gauge reader) and **mistri** are critical appointments – Interviewee 130 (Assistant EXEN Gujranwala) revealed that once the Secretary called the Executive Engineer to have him take back the transfer of a mate. As Interviewee 154 (SDO Sargodha) put it, ‘If you don’t listen to what the [well-connected] politician has to say, bistar baandh kar rakhain [keep your belongings packed up]. You will get transferred because the politician will go to the Secretary. If your home is in Islamabad, they will post you to Rahim Yar Khan, and [vice versa] – as far as possible.’ His colleagues, seated in the Irrigation Department’s Sargodha office’s meeting room and listening to our conversation, nodded their heads in agreement and sympathy when he related an incident where he discovered water theft on land owned by a Secretary in one of the departments in Punjab and was transferred to Dera Ghazi Khan for his trouble.

The result of such precarity is that bureaucrats at both mid- and lower tiers are seeking patrons (those close to the CM and his inner circle) who will help them navigate their careers. In exchange for assisting the patron in embezzling government funds or stealing water, the bureaucrat receives (extra-legal) stability of tenure or the promise of a desired transfer or promotion (Interview 116, EXEN Irrigation Lahore). These transactions set out clearly the expected (personal enrichment and protection) outcomes for both the patron and the bureaucrat.

**Politicians and Bureaucrats Lacking Access to the Centre**

Most mid-tier and junior bureaucrats will never have the chance to work closely with the CM or even with bureaucrats in the CM Secretariat. PAS bureaucrats (and arguably even the Punjab Provincial Management Service) have very stable careers compared to the tiers that comprise most bureaucrats – mid-tier and junior line-department employees. At this level of the bureaucracy, the competition for posts – promotions and transfers – is intense. Many wait years to move up a single pay scale, others spend years posted far away from their families.
Aside from members of the opposition parties, numerous junior PMLN office holders have complained to the press, and many to me during fieldwork, that the CM is inaccessible and unavailable to them. However, these complaints are in stark contrast to repeated references to, for instance, CM Directives being used to make appointments to lower-tier posts. This discrepancy suggests that the CM has created a hierarchy of patronage – he acts to fulfil the lower-level sifarish of cronies and party workers but ignores politicians who are not as closely connected to him – in other words, a hierarchy of patronage within the ruling party. The CM’s office issues Directives for those who have stuck with the party for some years, who continue to win competitive districts, and who are party candidates that the party cannot afford to lose, but will shut out others from access to extra-legal appointments.

Bureaucratic Efficiency

As the Punjab government has centralised power in its own hands, it has also simultaneously emphasised the ‘delivery’ of services to citizens. In order to meet performance targets, district bureaucrats need to be able to trust the people they work with and therefore, look to appoint familiar faces to posts under their ambit. For example, when the post of Deputy District Education Officer in Rawalpindi became vacant, Mazhar (EDO-E) recommended a bureaucrat, Shafqat, for the post. Mazhar had worked with Shafqat while posted in Attock for some years prior to 2010 and knew him well. Shafqat (Interview 72, Deputy DEO Rawalpindi) sees Mazhar as a mentor, praising his wisdom and work ethic and the way he deals with the demands on his time. But Shafqat did not want to transfer from his post as Deputy DEO Attock to Deputy DEO Rawalpindi. He told me that he knew that the post would involve administering a very large and complex tehsil, where far too much pressure is exerted by influential parties, particularly from the military GHQ, on bureaucrats. After he had refused the posting a number of times, it was Mazhar who finally convinced Shafqat to take the post in 2015 when it became vacant, even though Shafqat’s tenure in Attock had not been completed (Interview 72). In effect, Shafqat’s posting was extra-legal.

Mazhar’s interest in getting Shafqat to take the post of Deputy DEO (extra-legally) was that he needed someone he could trust to head the tehsil of Rawalpindi. The tehsil is a large one, Shafqat told me, roughly the size of the entire district of Jhelum (Interview 72). Its administration is further complicated by the numerous pressures exerted on bureaucrats regarding the posting of teaching staff – from politicians to the President House to the GHQ. For the hour or so that I sat across from the Deputy DEO in a large room that he shared with more junior staff, there were constantly people coming in with requests of all kinds – some needed paperwork signed, one wanted to tell the Deputy DEO about plans for an event to be held that week, one wanted guidance with the primary school admissions process.

The EDO-E is the approving authority for making appointments to elementary and primary school teaching posts, but the Deputy DEO is the officer who makes recommendations for his approval. The EDO-E does not have the time to investigate every single recommendation for a transfer. Particularly in an environment as complex as Rawalpindi, the EDO needs to be able to trust the decisions made by his Deputy DEO. Shafqat, like Mazhar, understands that there are times when it is important to go on the ‘back foot’ in the face of pressure from politicians, particularly senior ministers, while at other times, it is important to take a stand and resist pressure regarding appointments (Interview 72). The strong bond between Mazhar and Shafqat, based on the work ties they developed in Attock and further strengthened by Shafqat’s extra-legal appointment to Rawalpindi, allows Mazhar to achieve bureaucratic efficiency outcomes in a highly complex, difficult environment.

In 2014, the School Education Department set a Universal Primary Education (UPE) enrolment target for EDOs in all of Punjab’s districts. When I visited department offices in different districts, this target was a primary concern for officials, particularly in large districts. In Rawalpindi, the government had decided that 120,000 out-of-school children must enrol in government schools by October 31, 2014. To achieve this target, the department ordered EDOs to appoint Assistant Education Officers (AEOs) in all vacant posts in their district. These AEOs would be responsible for monitoring enrolment and would be held responsible for enrolment numbers in their markaz. At the time the campaign began, 35 out 50 AEO seats in Rawalpindi were vacant. The Rawalpindi EDO-E was the appointing authority for AEOs (BPS 16), but when he tried to appoint the district’s teaching staff to these monitoring
positions, those eligible for the posts refused to take responsibility for the enrolment campaign. Their refusal was based on their understanding that they could never achieve the target the government had set (and would suffer when they could not do so). Note that it was the EDO’s peripheral status that made it possible for teaching staff to refuse to obey him.

In the face of the deadline and the knowledge that he would be held responsible for any lack of up-to-date enrolment figures, then, the EDO had to find a means of filling the AEO posts. He decided to make extra-legal appointments to the vacant posts, appointing junior teachers to BPS 16 AEO posts so that the task of monitoring enrolment for the Universal Primary Education (UPE) campaign could be achieved. In May 2014, when the EDO was asked by a reporter how he had managed to fill the seats when the eligible teaching staff refused to take them, he admitted that the AEOs appointed did not have the requisite seniority for the post but that he had been desperate. The EDO’s desperation is a reflection of his peripheral status – he did not have the connections to the CM Secretariat required to air his grievances and have the deadline for monitoring enrolment moved. Instead, he had to make-do as best he could – in this case, via extra-legally appointing junior staff to senior posts.

The EDO had an exchange relationship with the extra-legal appointees. Those who took on the AEO posts could enjoy the salary, perks, and privileges of a temporary and extra-legal promotion to an administrative post in exchange for ‘delivering’ the data on enrolment required by the department. As it happened, the deadline for the UPE campaign was extended to May 2015, meaning that the extra-legally appointed AEOs remained in their post for a year, if not more. More importantly for the EDO, the expected outcome was achieved – the monitoring required by the government was completed.

**Electoral Gain**

Officially, bureaucratic departments in Punjab emphasise that all appointments are to be made in line with department policy and bureaucrats are expected to turn away an ordinary citizen who shows up with a parchi from a politician or a bureaucrat. However, those appointed to key positions in the Secretariat and the

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district are expected to acquiesce to the right kind of *sifarish* – *sifarish* requested by the well-connected. This duality allows the image of ‘bureaucratic efficiency’ to remain intact as a key (albeit selective) talking point.

Attempts by those outside the CM’s inner circle to make extra-legal appointments are rarely successful unless they can offer the mid-tier or senior bureaucrat enough incentive (for instance, a bribe) to overcome the risk of bending the rules. These incentives typically tip the scales, however, making the appointment illegal rather than extra-legal. By co-opting the senior bureaucracy, then, the central political leadership in Punjab has effectively shut out junior and opposition politicians from making extra-legal bureaucratic appointments for electoral gain.281

*The Powerless PM*

In 2011, a case was registered by the Rawalpindi office of the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) against the industrial conglomerate Bahria Town, owned by the infamous property magnate (‘goonda’) Malik Riaz. Residents of villages near Rawalpindi complained that Riaz and his employees had had community land transferred to their own names using fake documents.282 Though attempts were made to quash the investigation, the Supreme Court ordered the Director General of the ACE Rawalpindi, Abid Javed, to present a report on the case. Prime Minister Gilani of the PPP stepped in and tried to transfer Javed to Balochistan under the Inter-Provincial Rotation Policy. However, Javed had already served in that province for 15 years and was thus outside of the remit of the policy.283

In effect, Gilani sought to protect Malik Riaz, a supporter of PPP co-chairman Zardari and the PPP’s fragile coalition government, and his party’s and his own financial interests as well, since Riaz was likely a source of funds for electoral campaigns and personal enrichment. However, since Punjab was controlled by the PMLN, and Rawalpindi by PMLN stalwart Chaudhry Nisar, Gilani soon found

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281 Politicians without access to the CM office have the most success in appointing supporters to Class IV posts (peon, guards, etc.) or at most to posts such as *mistrī*, mate, *patwāri*, and in some cases, elementary school teachers. However, occasional appointments to these posts are unlikely to make a significant difference to the politicians’ electoral prospects, even in the run up to an election.
himself on the back foot. As an opposition politician, he was outside the CM’s kitchen cabinet and lacked any working relationship with Javed – the sort of relationship that could have been used to establish a bond of patronage to achieve the outcome of protecting Bahria Town (Malik Riaz) from investigation. In response to Gilani’s attempt to transfer Javed, Chaudhry Nisar (PMLN) ‘threatened to transfer all the favourite police and administration officials’ that Gilani had had appointed (including the DCO, who was appointed in consultation with Gilani in Gilani’s home district of Multan) if Javed was moved.\textsuperscript{284} Gilani could not afford for that to happen – these favourite officials made it possible for Gilani and his family to dispense patronage to their voters and win their seats come election time. In other words, PM Gilani’s ‘outsider’ status in Punjab – and the PMLN’s ability to check his power over the appointments of bureaucrats posted in Punjab – meant that he lacked the leverage needed to push through Javed’s election-enhancing extra-legal appointment without damaging repercussions. The investigation into Bahria Town’s activities continued.

\textit{Personal Enrichment and Protection}

Personal gain and protection are outcomes that are difficult to accomplish unless a bureaucrat or politician has the right connections. This is made evident when demands for extra-legal appointments conflict. For instance, an Executive Engineer (EXEN) in the Irrigation Department told me that one morning, an MPA arrived to demand that a \textit{patwari} be suspended or transferred for stealing water. A little later, another MPA arrived demanding that the same \textit{patwari} be retained in his post so that he can continue his activities. Whichever action the EXEN takes in such a situation will involve a tacit endorsement of one or the other MPA, which means that the EXEN must weigh his options carefully. Typically, an EXEN will favour the MPA with connections to the CM and the Secretariat because this is the MPA who can come to the EXEN’s aid when he needs an extra-legal transfer or promotion (or protection from investigation). This transactional understanding – assisting the EXEN in his time of need in exchange for the EXEN looking the other way on an incident of water theft – will form the basis of a strong bond between the bureaucrat and the MPA. However, an MPA lacking connections to the centre of power in the province

(either because he is new to the ruling party and/or to politics, or because he is a member of the opposition) is of little use to an EXEN and is unlikely to get him to grant extra-legal appointments. In this instance, the EXEN decided to oblige the ruling party MPA and do nothing – the patwari retained his post.

**Government versus Judiciary**

Though we think of senior politicians as usually having the connections needed to protect themselves and their cronies from investigations, there are circumstances in which even the Prime Minister can find himself powerless and unable to make an extra-legal appointment without damaging personal consequences.

In 2010, the government’s arrangements for Hajj were plagued by accusations of embezzlement (Rs 200 million). The scam implicated not just the federal minister for religious affairs and his departmental staff, but staff within the PM Secretariat, the (PPP) PM Yousaf Raza Gilani, and his son, Abdul Qadir Gilani (then a PPP MNA) as well. In April 2011, the government transferred the man in charge of the Hajj scam investigation, Hussain Asghar (Senior Director of the Federal Investigation Agency [FIA]) to Gilgit-Baltistan, in an effort to stall the investigation expanding into the PM Secretariat.

The Supreme Court, headed by activist Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, initiated a suo moto case into the Hajj scam and, in a hearing held on 25 July 2011, ordered the government to reinstate Hussain Asghar to the FIA immediately. When the Establishment Secretary, Sohail Ahmed, obeyed the court’s orders and issued the notification reinstating Asghar, he was removed from his post and made OSD. Though this was clearly an instance of the (extra-legal and discretionary) punitive use of the OSD designation by PM Gilani to protect himself and his cronies, he justified the decision by claiming that Ahmed had not consulted...
the PM office in reinstating Asghar and had thus ‘undermined’ the PM’s authority. In other words, the PM did not have the kind of professional or other ties with the Establishment Secretary that could form the basis of a strong bond (let alone one buttressed by an extra-legal appointment) leading the latter to protect the former.

By this point, the Supreme Court was furious at what it considered contempt of court. On 28 July 2011, the court ruled that a civil servant could not be punished for obeying court orders, declared the notification making Sohail Ahmed OSD ‘null and void’, and ordered that he be reinstated as Establishment Secretary within a week. On 1 August, Ahmed was reinstated, but posted as Secretary Narcotics Control. The Supreme Court continued to pursue Hussain Asghar’s return to the FIA. Asghar returned to the FIA in 2012 and the investigation into the Hajj scam, including Gilani and his son’s involvement, continued into 2013.

The Hajj scam case was just one of many run-ins that PM Gilani had with the Supreme Court over bureaucratic appointments. His willingness to sacrifice a senior bureaucrat in pursuit of his own personal interest was resented by members of the PAS and led to a protest by a PAS officer working in the Ministry of the Interior, Anita Turab (Interview 18). The protest got picked up by media personnel and, soon, the Interior Minister Rehman Malik was calling Turab to demand an explanation. Not long after, Turab filed a case praying that the Supreme Court would order the government to follow its regulations and put an end to its wide discretion in making bureaucratic appointments. Though other PAS bureaucrats thought Turab foolhardy (even if they supported her in principle) – she has in fact suffered professionally after...
taking such a public stand – the judgment in this case became a touchstone for all future judgements regarding bureaucratic appointments.293

Conclusion

This chapter began with cases of extra-legal appointments made to achieve bureaucratic efficiency: project or policy implementation, anti-corruption measures, cuts to government spending. However, unlike the previous chapter, outcomes in this chapter were achieved when extra-legal appointees cut a few corners or caused substantial dissension amongst their colleagues. In doing so, these bureaucrats received support and protection from the well-connected patrons who had appointed them. Amongst bureaucrats without access to the CM and his inner circle, extra-legal appointments are similarly used to achieve departmental targets.

Extra-legal appointments made by well-connected patrons for electoral gain can take one of two forms – bulk appointments (reshuffles, contract appointments and regularization, CM Directives) or targeted appointments to key posts (Commissioner, DCO, EDO). In the first instance, the objective is to win good will amongst a large number of people either in advance of an election or soon after it. In the second, the objective is to deliver more targeted goods to voters and control the political narrative through ties formed on the basis of strong bonds and clear expectations with individual bureaucrats. Amongst politicians without access to the CM’s kitchen cabinet, the centralisation of patronage and discretion has made it very difficult to use extra-legal appointments for electoral gain.

Personal outcomes are also well served by extra-legal methods where well-connected patrons are concerned. Protection is crucial, not just in terms of accountability investigations and disciplinary enquiries, but also from punitive transfers and violence. Personal gain amongst elite bureaucrats may involve financial transactions, but these are often quite difficult to track. In some cases, however, personal gain is evident in patterns of appointment amongst senior PAS bureaucrats. Within line departments, appointments can gain a patron access to kickbacks from government budgets. Indeed, it is in the departments that regulate state resources that

true gains are to be made. In the Irrigation Department, for example, patrons make extra-legal appointments to acquire more than their fair share of water.

With regard to personal outcomes, those without access to the CM and his inner circle are in a position not unlike the one they find themselves in with regard to electoral gain. Whereas mid-tier bureaucrats are able to make extra-legal appointments for personal gain and protection due to their familiarity with the rules and regulations (and their legal mandate to make appointments to junior posts), politicians excluded by the CM from his inner circle have no such opportunity. They are thus unable to make extra-legal appointments for personal benefit or to protect themselves or their cronies from investigation.

In the next chapter, as I explore illegal methods of bureaucratic appointment not only does the focus shift to more personal objectives, but power also shifts from the political leadership and their cronies to those left on the margins.
CHAPTER 5: ILLEGAL METHODS OF APPOINTMENT

“Kuch log taqatwar hain, kuch hum corrupt hain.” (To some extent, people are powerful, to some extent, we are corrupt).

- Interviewee 152, a bureaucrat with the Irrigation Department, serving as Superintending Engineer in Lahore

It is important to emphasise that illegal methods are not a residual category for everything that does not fit under legal or extra-legal. Just as with the methods discussed in earlier chapters, there is agency in choosing illegal methods, but also consequences. However, Pakistan’s accountability mechanisms are flawed. Many who do get caught do not get prosecuted. Those who are convicted are not always punished. Those who are punished might be pardoned. It could be argued therefore that there is little to stop an actor from employing illegal methods of appointment. However, if those aiming to politicise appointments hope to achieve specific outcomes, the risk to that outcome is much greater when using illegal methods. It is possible that the people involved will not get caught. It is possible that, if caught, the punishment will be minimal. But it is also possible that the media will find out; that they will be caught; that the CM will decide to act, and the illegal appointments will be reversed. Essentially, in terms of the outcome that the actor was trying to achieve, the risk of derailment is higher with illegal activity than with extra-legal or legal activity.

The problem with exploring illegal activity is that there is a reporting bias. Typically, the only way of finding out about it is if those involved get caught. Even cases reported in the papers are sometimes inaccurate or contradictory. It is therefore foolish to deny that illegal activity can be successful. Many of those who fake documents and signatures, take bribes, or commit violence are never exposed, let alone caught. In many cases, departments and cadres will be rife with rumours, but there will be no proof. It is also difficult to trace the bonds and networks that enable and sustain even well-documented illegal appointments. Few admit to such connections, and not many reports make an effort to trace them.

Furthermore, much of the illegal activity reported does not directly have to do with bureaucratic appointments. In fact, most academic work on corruption focuses on graft, bribery, and other forms of corruption in the delivery of services to citizens. The assumption is that officials already in the department are bribed to perform
particular tasks – distribution of contracts, aiding water theft, etc. Of course, corruption does take place in this fashion but this thesis is not concerned with corruption unless there is a direct link to bureaucratic appointments. What I have aimed to do throughout this thesis is to shift the focus to corruption in making appointments – the appointments that enable the kind of outcomes discussed in most of the corruption literature.

A review of the newspapers soon reveals that most publicised illegal activity is that which takes place amongst the lower tiers of the bureaucracy – teachers, patwaris, etc. Those in the senior-most tier will sometimes get caught up in scams and embezzlement schemes with politicians – National Insurance Company Limited, Bahria Town, etc. But for the most part, mid-tier bureaucrats (Executive District Officers, District Education Officers or Executive Engineers) are not mentioned as much. In fact, mid-tier names come up most frequently as investigating officers. It is at this level, however, that I believe a lot of illegal activity gets overlooked, particularly bribery and problematic documentation. This is likely for two reasons. The first is the ability of mid-tier bureaucrats to dissociate themselves from corrupt practices by blaming clerks and other junior officials who were also complicit – for instance, by disavowing their signature on paperwork. The second is the bonds these mid-tier bureaucrats maintain with their department’s secretariat (Deputy Secretaries and Additional Secretaries, and the Secretaries). These bonds ensure that ‘valued’ mid-tier staff will be protected by the department while those lacking such protection will be implicated in corrupt practices…where necessary.

The Precarity of Illegal Appointments

There are three reasons more and more cases of illegal appointments are coming to light: recent improvements in appointment policy, increasing private media (and media interest in illegal appointments), and persistent resentment amongst bureaucratic colleagues. These three factors combine to produce circumstances that have made it increasingly difficult for illegal appointees to achieve, and sustain for the long term, the outcomes set for them by their patrons.

In August 2012, the School Education Department issued a notification to all of its administrative officials down to the AEO. Titled ‘Inter-District Transfers and Inter-Tehsil Transfers of PSTs Through Fake Orders’, the notification warns officials to be vigilant about fake documents. To counter the problem, the department mandates that all transfer requests be accompanied by a full set of original or attested documents (listed in the notification). If any teacher is appointed on the basis of fake documents, any salary she may have been paid would be ‘recovered from the DDO [Drawing and Disbursement Officer] concerned in person and concerned officials’ (Para 5).

These policy-based attempts at limiting illegal appointment mechanisms are aided by the media’s interest in illegal appointments. Since Musharraf opened the door for private media companies, there has been an explosion of print, television, and online media in Pakistan, alongside established names like the Jang Media Group and DAWN. The most prominent indicator of the media’s critical role in the lives of the bureaucrats was their fear that I was a journalist trying to covertly collect material for a newspaper or television expose. In addition, in Punjab, the CM’s desire to portray himself as the Khadim-e-Aala has not only generated media interest in his activities (and those of his political and bureaucratic cronies), but also led the CM’s government to use various media to broadcast its activities. Certainly, there is a degree of media manipulation. For instance, it is an open secret that the new TV channel ‘Bol’ is funded by the military’s intelligence wing, and that the military’s dislike of Jang’s Geo News has led the channel to be banned from broadcasting in cantonment areas. However, competition between media groups has made it possible to find a variety of coverage and, often, to verify this or that account. Still, the bureaucrats I deal with in this chapter – mostly mid-tier and street-level bureaucrats – are not powerful enough to manipulate the media on their own behalf. In fact, many of them are more likely to be the ones held accountable for illegal activities and exposed in the media for those activities.

Reports in the press create a great deal of pressure on the department to verify documents and investigate corruption more fully, and frequently result in the matter going to court, particularly in an environment where government jobs are in high

demand and illegal appointees are portrayed as encroaching on the rights of those who deserve these jobs. The feeling amongst bureaucrats themselves that some of their peers are cheating others out of promotions and choice postings leads illegal appointees to be ratted out by their department colleagues. Extra-legal behaviour can still be justified, even if in a roundabout fashion, but bribery, faking documents, tampering with lists, etc. provides a short cut that creates resentment amongst others who worked hard for the same post, or who also tried but failed to get the post through sifarish. In other words, the problem with illegal behaviour is that the person’s colleagues are directly alienated by the practice. Therefore, illegal methods are often quite personal in their impact. While those directly involved in an illegal enterprise may benefit from it, it is difficult to share the spoils or the parties may be unwilling to do so.

**Political Leaders and their Cronies**

*Bureaucratic Efficiency*

Unlike Chapters 3 & 4, this chapter focuses very little on efficiency outcomes. Efficiency outcomes, most often entrusted by patrons to senior bureaucrats belonging to the elite PAS, are poorly served by bureaucrats appointed illegally for the simple reason that such appointments may be found out, increasing the risk of derailment of the outcome.

There are two avenues through which bureaucrats appointed illegally for achieving an efficiency outcome can be found out. First, holders of posts associated with projects and policies garner a great deal of scrutiny, media, political, and judicial. Extra-legal appointments do garner some attention, but it is possible for well-connected politicians and bureaucrats to explain those away using the logic that the appointment is permitted under the powers and discretion of the CM or in the public interest. However, an illegal appointee would not be able to stand up to such scrutiny. Therefore, illegal appointments would endanger the ‘delivery’ of the project – an outcome the patron does not desire. This is not to say that there is no corruption in such projects – there may be. However, the bureaucrat chosen to ensure the project’s timely and efficient ‘delivery’ is not likely to tar the project from the start as an illegal appointee.
Second, though cadres like the PAS are considered tightly knit, there are often factions within them. Some of these factions are relatively trivial (those who drink alcohol and those who do not, for example), but at times, the divisions can become quite charged. For instance, factions can play off against each other by leaking information to journalists (most newspaper reports cite ‘official sources’) and, at times, filing court cases. In fact, disputes over who received a promotion and who did not are often placed before the court by disgruntled PAS bureaucrats, with the Orya Maqbool Abbasi case being one prominent example. The petitioner (Abbasi) argued that he and others had been skipped over by the PPP-led federal government to grant promotions (to BPS 22) to political favourites who were placed much lower than them on the seniority list. The case divided the bureaucracy into camps – those who had been favoured by the PPP in the grant of promotions in violation of seniority rules, those who had been overlooked (including the petitioners), and those who were already in BPS 22. A fourth camp could be identified as those who were aligned with the PMLN in Punjab. Abbasi’s complaint was essentially one against the (extra-legal) discretion allowed in determining promotions, and was thus not an instance of illegal appointments. However, the willingness of bureaucrats to go to court with such matters (even though they are well aware that other PAS bureaucrats may see it as a betrayal of the cadre), and thereby stall the work of any bureaucrat named in the case, is a clear incentive for patrons not to use illegal appointments when seeking to deliver bureaucratic efficiency outcomes.

Aside from the risk of discovery and thus derailment, a senior illegal appointee within a department would also face resistance to his leadership. Extra-legal appointees to posts that regulate the activities and performance of junior bureaucrats (for example, posts in monitoring units) are rarely liked and there is resistance to reforms targeting department norms. For instance, the head of the monitoring unit in the Irrigation Department is not universally liked – in part because he is responsible for checking the performance of everyone else in the department and in part because there are rumours that he is too junior for his post. It would be reasonable to assume

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297 The court ruled in Abbasi’s favour and overturned the flagged promotions.
that similar, perhaps even stronger, attitudes would result were he an illegal appointee.

Why then are illegal appointments ever made for posts focusing on the delivery of services? I argue that such appointments are made for electoral gain or personal advantage or protection, but very rarely (if ever) for bureaucratic efficiency outcomes. For instance, the man who forcibly ousted an Executive Engineer and took over his post in Sheikhupura did not do so to improve the functioning of the Irrigation Department. He did it to benefit himself and his cronies. Rather than improve efficiency, such an appointee is more likely to become caught up in claims and counter claims regarding his appointment. Even where the objective is to thwart a project or policy, an illegal appointment is unnecessary when other (subtler) options are available.

**Electoral Gain**

Traditionally, illegal politicised appointments to the lowest tiers of the provincial bureaucracy, particularly Class IV employees (guards, peons, sweepers) and to street-level posts such as patwaris and teachers, have been made without a second thought. For politicians, the distribution of these jobs is a key means of winning votes. These are jobs that come with a pension and more job security than the private sector, and the posts are situated in the villages, tehsils, and towns where voters and party workers actually live. In terms of outcomes, the combination of electoral objectives and illegal method seem the most likely to produce the strong bonds and patronage-based reciprocity that sustain long-term outcomes.

The problem is that applicants far outnumber jobs. Unemployment is the biggest issue amongst constituents, according to politicians, and it is likely to remain so considering Pakistan’s rapidly growing youth bulge. However, the government is not creating enough jobs to meet the demand as manufacturing has continued to decline, the private sector is too competitive for the vast majority, and government jobs are subject to hiring freezes. In this context, voters expect and demand that politicians provide them with jobs illegally. In making illegal appointments for electoral gain, politicians are forming a bond of patronage on the understanding that the voter (and his family) will remain electorally loyal once in the bureaucratic post of his choosing. Though this bond may be underpinned by loyalty and perhaps even a
**The Centralisation of Sifarish**

Some politicians (Interview 61, a PMLN MPA, for example) contend that sifarish is sufficient to get their constituents what they want. This is true in some cases – typically where the politician has an established presence in a district, is well-connected to the leadership of the ruling party, or has a pre-existing relationship with the appointing authority. For instance, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of the PMLN has won an MNA seat in Rawalpindi in every general election since 1988 and is a close ally of the Sharif brothers. He is therefore the most influential politician in the district. Every bureaucrat knows that no appointment in Rawalpindi can be made without Nisar’s blessing, and bureaucrats in mid-tier posts in the district were at pains to tell me how much they respected the MNA for his fairness and respect for the regulations regarding bureaucratic appointments. According to the Deputy District Education Officer (Interviewee 72), when Nisar sends in a note with a sifarish, he also writes that the regulations be checked and the sifarish fulfilled only if it is within the rules.

In previous years, it was common practice for the ruling party to give its politicians a quota for fresh recruitment to government jobs – Class IV posts, clerks, patwaris, but, most crucially, teachers (Interviews 81, 82, both PMLN MPAs). Teaching jobs are important not just because there are so many jobs available, the work used to be unregulated, there were opportunities to shirk, and there was room to skim off school finances and contracts, but especially because of the additional responsibilities teachers are assigned at election time as polling agents. These additional responsibilities make the sifarish-based appointment of junior teaching staff a key route to achieve electoral gain outcomes.²⁹⁹

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²⁹⁹ They also provide an explanation for the majority of government schools in the country are primary schools. The demands of voters for primary school teaching jobs outweigh the need for secondary and higher education for children. Abbasi, K. ‘81pc of all schools in Pakistan are primary’. May 25, 2016. DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1260547> [Accessed 17 December 2016].
Though job quotas were declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 1993\(^\text{300}\), their use continued for many years as an open secret, providing legal cover for what was essentially an illegal practice. They have now been abolished for the most part (at least formally), according to PMLN MNAs and MPAs in Punjab (Interviews 62, 81, 82, 106). Interviewee 61, a PMLN MPA in Lahore, told me that he had been able to appoint ‘only’ ten people to government posts (clerks and junior clerks) in the two years since his election in 2013. Though he was quick to reassure me that he believed in his CM’s merit-based policies, I had just walked past a long line of people waiting to see him to enter his small office, and it was hard to believe that they would be as easily reconciled to the need for merit in government recruitment.

Now that quotas are less widespread, if not completely eliminated, the problem a politician faces in making illegal appointments is three-fold. The first is that illegal appointments are more visible. This is particularly true because politicians are public figures, and in Pakistan, as elsewhere, they are the subject of substantial media scrutiny. For this reason, the politicians I spoke to distinguished between ‘jaiz kaam’ (just or right thing to do) and ‘na-jaiz’ (unjust) or ‘ghalat kaam’ (wrong thing to do) (Interview 78, a PMLN MPA). The second is that, in making illegal appointments, no politician can accommodate everyone. There will be someone who is left out, disgruntled, perhaps because he couldn’t afford to bribe the politician, or because he made the request too late, or because the politician simply favoured someone else over him. This person may try to upstage not just the politician, but also all those he favoured. Third, the politician is in a position where he has to convince a bureaucrat to help him in appointing a bureaucrat illegally in the face of the PMLN government’s emphasis on merit and policy based appointments.

Despite a stated interest in more meritocratic government by the PMLN over the last few years (thus the crackdown on quotas), Class IV posts remain heavily politicised and a great leveller amongst politicians with and without access to the CM and his kitchen cabinet. Most politicians I spoke to openly said they influenced these postings, using them to provide patronage to voters. Particularly after the closing down of avenues to politically appoint teaching staff (through the development of detailed appointment policies by the School Education Department), Class IV

\(^{300}\) Munawar Khan v. Niaz Muhammad and 7 others (1993 SCMR 1287)
appointments are hugely in demand. Though Class IV posts may have few prospects for advancement, they provide voters with a steady government salary and a pension.

In most cases, Class IV appointments are the domain of departments’ district-level bureaucrats such as Executive District Officers (EDOs) and Executive Engineers (EXENs). For instance, a PMLN MPA from Lahore (Interview 90) I spoke to mentioned approaching the EDO Health to ‘facilitate’ a voter in getting a post as a mid-wife. But such ‘facilitation’ may become problematic if it is brought to the attention of the press or higher authorities, by someone who was not amongst those favoured by the politician, or if the EDO refuses to accommodate the MPA’s demands, knowing that the MPA (being outside the CM’s kitchen cabinet) lacks the connections to penalise him or force the illegal appointment through. In such circumstances, the sifarish of a well-connected politician produces a far more certain outcome for both the voter and the politician.

In the office of the Secretary Higher Education (Interview 42), two men walked in – a father and son. Once seated next to the Secretary’s desk, the father did all of the talking, but the job was for his son. The father had an application form for a security guard post in his hand, neatly filled out, with a small parchi attached to it. Security guard posts are usually the domain of a district’s EDO, not the Secretary. Handing the form to the Secretary, the father said ‘Malik Pervaiz sahab [a prominent PMLN MNA and party leader close to the Sharif brothers] sent us to you.’ In silence, the Secretary looked at the form with the parchi attached in the corner, wrote something on a separate piece of paper which he handed to the father to take to another office so that they could finalise the paperwork for the job. There were no questions asked, no rules mentioned, no objections raised regarding merit or recruitment lists – the Secretary simply accepted the politician’s sifarish. The implication of this incident is that, for those at the centre, appointments made completely outside the rules matter little at the Class IV level – the posts are not important to policy or even to the larger functioning of a department. This was reflected in conversations I had with other bureaucrats (PAS, mid-tier, and junior) and politicians (MPAs and MNAs) who were happy to concede that Class IV appointments are politicised. Senior bureaucrats are therefore happy to let well-connected politicians dictate these appointments ‘100%’ as it takes the heat off other, more significant bureaucratic appointments. The politician benefits because his
constituent or party worker goes home not only with a government job, but also having been listened to and treated with respect by a ‘babu’ - if he was forced to respect the voter, then the bureaucrat must respect the politician too, and therefore, the politician is deserving of the voter’s support.

In addition to buttressing my argument regarding the centralisation of patronage and discretion, it is evident from this example that by accepting influence over Class IV appointments himself, the Secretary is, by default, allowing his junior officers to engage with politicians in dispensing this type of patronage illegally. In cases where the right kind of sifarish (that is, sifarish from the well-connected) presents itself, the Secretary will look the other way as long as the district administration is able to keep the work of the department going and meet performance targets. At the same time, the Secretary also sees these appointments as a small concession to political patrons – to keep them happy so that they do not raise too much of a fuss over other, more senior appointments. Many bureaucrats showed some appreciation of the demands on a politician by the citizenry (Interview 16, a BPS 20 PAS officer on leave from the civil service). As Interview 63 (a PAS officer serving as DCO Gujranwala), seated in his spacious, wood-panelled, tastefully furnished office, said, ‘Politicians are good people, it is their majboori. The DCO cannot understand that majboori of a man who has won 70 or 80 thousand votes. His dera works 24 hours, unlike bureaucratic offices’.

Sifarish through Bureaucratic Intermediaries

Martin (2016, 136) records that the electoral opponent of a prominent landlord believed that:

by buying people’s votes Chowdri Abdullah was effectively carrying out a commercial transaction that absolved him of any future responsibility towards his voters…if anyone who had received money for their vote went to Chowdri Abdullah for patronage they would be told that they had already received money and be turned away.

In my fieldwork, however, I found the converse to be true. Though money (or food or service) may well exchange hands in the lead up to voting day, the politicians I spoke to felt bound to deliver further patronage (here, jobs) to their voters. Though the popular perspective is that politicians are to blame for politicised appointments – they illegally appoint their constituents and workers to government jobs to benefit electorally or personally – many politicians mentioned the pressure they face from
their constituents to ‘deliver’. Interviewees 81 and 82, both PMLN MPAs in Punjab, for instance, said that when they left their homes in the morning, they were faced with people gathered outside waiting to see them (mostly to demand jobs).

The difference between Martin’s view and mine may be due to a number of reasons – above all the fact that Martin’s fieldwork was conducted while the PMLQ was the king’s (and dictator’s) party with the entire state machinery on its side and little political opposition. 301 My fieldwork was conducted in 2014-15 when the PMLN was serving its second term (consecutively) in Punjab and had also formed the government at the centre in 2013, and when the rise of the PTI as an opposition party, the increased viability of independent candidates, the judicial activism of the courts, and the rise of private media as an avenue for constituents to air their grievances against unhelpful politicians had all contributed to a much more competitive political environment. While there are similarities between the way the PMLQ and the PMLN conducted government business, one significant difference is the emphasis the PMLN and in particular CM Shahbaz Sharif has placed on ‘delivering’ ‘good governance’ (an emphasis that spread to the federal government as well post-2013). Driven by political competition, the consequence has been a further centralisation of power, patronage, and discretion in the CM’s hands and those of his inner circle (bureaucrats and politicians), particularly through bureaucratic appointments, and the demand that local politicians conform to the policies and practices of not just the CM but the bureaucrats his office appoints.

The CM’s focus on ‘depoliticising’ recruitment, for example, has been a heavy blow to some (but not all) politicians. One of the major reasons for this is that the government has recently begun increasing access to the information underpinning recruitment (particularly merit lists). Therefore, when bureaucrats follow politicians’ instructions on who to recruit illegally, the recruitments are challenged by applicants themselves. In 2012, for instance, Kasur district saw protests by those who had applied for the post of SST (BPS 16) for Bio-Chemistry. These are senior positions amongst teaching staff, and the next step is often a head teacher position or a district management position like Deputy DEO. According to the disgruntled applicants, the district’s recruitment committee interviewed them and displayed a merit list of twelve

301 See also Nelson 2016.
selected candidates to fill nine posts. However, when the appointments were officially notified by the department, only two people from the merit list of twelve people were actually appointed. Those who were overlooked accused the EDO of filling the posts with those who had not made the merit list at all as a result of political pressure. Essentially, the final appointments were illegal in that they completely bypassed the rules and procedures that were not only in place, but had actually been followed. This implied that a political patron had intervened after the selection process to nominate his own people for the teaching posts.

Image 2: Merit list for recruitment of teaching staff displayed at the Lahore Education Complex

In cases like the one mentioned above, the outcomes sought by patrons are usually stymied by public protests, press attention, and most crucially, by the courts overturning politicised appointments. For example, in a case before the Lahore High Court (Bahawalpur Bench) in 2010, the petitioner contended that the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) had advertised for various posts open to those resident in the jurisdiction of the Multan Electric Power Company (MEPCO).

303 Ibid.
304 Photo taken by the author in June 2015.
However, those appointed to the posts were ‘recommended’ by the WAPDA Minister and other politicians, and were not resident in the designated area.\textsuperscript{305} The court found that the department had not followed the rules and procedure laid down in their original advertisement and overturned the appointments made from outside the MEPCO jurisdiction.

For politicians holding ministerial or other senior offices (and thus belonging to the CM’s kitchen cabinet), the drive to de-politicise the bureaucracy and curb illegal appointments necessitates a slight shift in the way patronage is dispensed. Senior politicians holding government office continue to make illegal appointments, but aware of increased scrutiny, they do so in a subtler manner than ministers did in the past. Rather than getting personally involved in making illegal appointments, politicians depute the task to favoured bureaucrats. These bureaucrats accept the lists with the awareness and blessing of the CM (explicitly expressed or implied), allowing the CM to regulate the distribution of patronage amongst his own party members (indirectly through the discretion of hand-picked bureaucrats) while the politician is able to keep his hands clean should there be any investigation by the courts or the media.

The simplest way of making illegal appointments through intermediary bureaucrats is to tamper with lists of appointees. The ability to do so mandates a bond between the politician and the bureaucrats in charge of the list, either through the complicity of members of the department in the politician’s plan, or at least sufficient fear of the politician and his connections to do as he says (thus avoiding transfers or OSD appointments). Where there is complicity, it is quite likely that the well-connected politician used extra-legal means to appoint bureaucrats who could illegally manipulate appointee lists for him. The politician may even have bribed the bureaucrat. However, fear of punitive transfers and appointments is simply the result of the knowledge that the politician has the ear of the CM or his inner circle.

Regardless, tampering with lists is a method typically used to make appointments in bulk. There is no unique bond between the illegal appointees and the politician because there is no one-to-one relationship between them. Instead, a bureaucrat appointed illegally as part of a list is one of many whose support the

politician hopes to retain. Even the outcome that is specified by the patron – electoral support – is unenforceable and somewhat vague. Therefore, since there is a lack of a specific, tangible, and enforceable outcome for the patron in exchange for the appointment, the bond between the patron and the bureaucrat is diffuse.

An incident of list tampering that I personally witnessed was in the office of the Personal Assistant to the Deputy Speaker of the Punjab Assembly. This was a large room situated right next to the Deputy Speaker’s office, housing all of his staff. There was a sofa and a few chairs in one corner, but the rest of the room comprised of desks covered either with files and papers or computers. As I waited to see the Deputy Speaker, a man walked in and out a couple of times, each time with a few slips of paper in his hands. Each time he handed the slips to a man sitting in front of a computer in one corner of the room. The second time, the man stood behind the typist and as they spoke, I realised that they were drawing up a list of names of people who had asked the Deputy Speaker for government jobs. These were people who had visited the Deputy Speaker (an MPA) at his dera, in South Punjab. When the MPA returned to Lahore, he brought all the slips of paper with the details of his voters who were seeking jobs or transfers or promotions, handed them over to his staff who made up lists to send to the relevant departments. Again, tampering with lists, adding names to merit lists, is a means of electoral gain by helping voters.

In the case of the Deputy Speaker, lists of names were being sent out from his office, thus blurring the lines between the formal and the informal power he holds. The bureaucrats receiving the lists may well have been extra-legally appointed or even bribed – the well-oiled machine that was collating and dispatching the lists of names to the relevant departments seemed to hint at a set of receptive bureaucrats at the other end. However, even where the bureaucrats receiving the lists are not complicit, the fact that the list is coming from the Deputy Speaker’s office will be sufficient incentive to add the names to the merit list. It is his central position as Deputy Speaker of the Punjab Assembly that clinches the deal – to refuse him would put the career of any bureaucrat in jeopardy.

I observed a slightly different approach being adopted by a provincial minister who is close to the Sharif brothers. Rather than conducting the distribution of patronage himself, the minister outsourced it to junior bureaucrats in his ministerial office. It is not uncommon for the minister to visit his office infrequently at best. In
his absence, PAs and clerks become quite influential. This is in sharp contrast to the offices of constituency politicians where politicians themselves (or their relatives or munshis) made phone calls to bureaucrats with requests on behalf of their constituents. Though both these practices seem counter to the trend toward centralisation I have highlighted, they are actually extensions of the same process. Phone calls made to bureaucrats from the offices of constituency politicians who lack access to the CM’s inner circle may have no force at all. In the case of the minister outsourcing the distribution of patronage to his staff, a politician with access to the CM’s inner circle is simply extending his powers to junior bureaucrats he trusts.

There are numerous advantages to this tactic – the minister is not tied to his office dealing with an endless stream of supplicants, does not risk being caught making illegal appointments, can disassociate himself from any appointment decisions that are called into question, and is able to present himself as an advocate of merit-based policy making while still ensuring that illegal appointments are extended to voters.

This elaborate set-up is only possible if there is a strong bond between the Minister and the PA, but the PA is not, himself, typically an illegal appointment (though he may be an extra-legal one). However, the sifarish he authorises may involve illegal appointments. Clerks are in charge of the office’s documentation – typing up documents, assembling files and lists, and ferrying them back and forth (see Hull 2012), but the PA has control over what and who the Minister sees and when. The PA has access to all the resources that would ordinarily be available to the minister, and can drop the minister’s name wherever necessary with the knowledge and blessing of the minister himself. In fact, it is quite likely that some of the parchis reaching the PA are signed by the minister himself, handed to him by a voter at his dera – as was the case for the parchis collated by the staff in the Deputy Speaker’s office (above). It is also quite likely that the minister encourages the PA to entertain certain sifarish over others (for example, those of government politicians over opposition politicians, senior party leaders over newer PMLN members, and favoured

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306 In the offices of senior bureaucrats, though the bureaucrat is more present, junior bureaucrats are no less influential. Thus appointments to these posts can become controversial – in Sheikhpura, a dispute between two PMLN factions led to a controversy over the transfer of a Personal Assistant in the DCO’s office (Interview 30).
bureaucrats over others) reflecting the hierarchy of patronage that exists within parties and within the bureaucracy.

The office of the PA to the provincial minister in the Punjab Civil Secretariat is connected by a closed door to the Minister’s office. It is impossible to get to the Minister without seeing the PA first. The PA’s office was a long rectangular room with one side taken up completely by desks lined up to support a string of computer terminals. When I entered, my first impression was of a mass of cables hanging off the desk, papers stacked on every surface between the desktop computers, and a crowd of people. The PA himself, standing behind a desk that sat right in front of the Minister’s closed door, was the centre of attention. There were a couple of people waiting to speak to the PA, their faces showing their anxiety, and one or two had just left before I entered. I was there for about fifteen minutes and in that time, the PA dealt with three or four people, all sifarishees who produced small square pieces of paper with writing on them and asked the PA to help them. The sifarishee did not explain the problem – the PA would look at the slip they handed him which detailed the necessary information and bore the signature of the influential politician (who must be the ‘right kind’ of politician – ruling party, ally of the CM, etc.). The PA would ask a question: was there a seat vacant at the school the person wanted to be transferred to, or why the transfer was necessary. A typical response was that the teacher’s current school was too far away and the request was to transfer him or her to a nearer one. But these were all cases where not only had the teacher not completed his or her tenure in a post, and a transfer ban was in place, but the transfer was being requested where no seat was vacant – an illegal transfer.307

The PA would then order one of the men sitting in front of a desktop computer nearby to call the relevant EDO or DEO, or if the request was more complex, a Deputy Secretary in the department. The PA would recount the details to the officer at the other end of the line and then turn to the sifarishee and tell him to go speak to a department official (the Deputy Secretary or the relevant EDO or DEO) for further instructions. The PA did not make suggestions as to how the requested appointment was to happen. That was for the district or department officer to figure out – how to work around the transfer ban that was in place for the next six months, for instance. The PA’s job was to make sure that the supplicant saw that his request was

307 Note that requests were not being made by those outside the bureaucracy for fresh recruitment, but by bureaucrats themselves.
acknowledged and acted on. Legally speaking, a PA has no standing to order district officials to comply with his demands. No money exchanges hands – people are not bribing the PA to get them the appointment they want. They are drawing instead on their political connections, and the PA is exercising power that is associated with his position (not a degree or money or votes or membership of a particular powerful group) and made possible by the absence (and blessing) of the minister to place a request for an illegal appointment to be made.\(^{308}\) In cases of intra-district teacher transfers, for example, the bureaucrats that obey the PA’s instructions are well aware not only that the PA is operating with a blank cheque from the department’s minister, but that the minister’s close alliance with the CM means that non-compliant bureaucrats will be punished through punitive transfers, OSD designations, even suspensions.

Though district and secretariat officials are well aware that a call from the Minister’s PA is essentially a call from the Minister, however, it is possible that the favour may not be granted. Where inter-district transfers or transfers of more senior teaching staff are involved, the sifarish may require approval from an official in the department secretariat (from a Deputy or Additional Secretary, or the Secretary), raising too many red flags. The PA has little regard for what the procedure is supposed to be and does not feel in any way strait jacketed by regulations that are neither his domain nor directly impacting him. In calling up district employees, though, the PA is essentially passing the buck to the district bureaucrat who will have to produce the necessary paperwork, and sign it, to put the appointment through. The risk to the PA is minimised, but the risk for the department bureaucrat is enhanced, making them more cautious.

Where the transfer does not take place, the fault would (be perceived to) lie with the officials of the department, not the PA or the referring politician. This is an important point because it tells us something about the relationship between the supplicant and the patron whose influence they are drawing upon to get the illegal appointment of their choice. The Minister or some other politician has no direct bond with those demanding an illegal appointment of the PA. While this means that the bureaucrats seeking transfers cannot hold him responsible if no transfer is forthcoming, it also means that the Minister cannot ensure that they will continue to

\(^{308}\) Furthermore, since the sifarishees were government servants themselves (clerks or stenographers, for instance), in helping them the PA was forming bonds that would last throughout their careers.
vote for him even if they get their desired transfer. The bond between the Minister and the appointee is therefore quite diffuse.

**Jobs for Their Boys**

Unlike the outsourcing of discretion and patronage by ministers to bureaucrats, interference by ministers in recruitments to their departments was carried out directly, openly and on a large scale during the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. Despite the fact that the Rules of Business establish that ministers and legislators have no legal standing to recruit officers or determine their postings within departments, ministers often succeeded in appointing voters and party workers to their departments in the hope of winning or retaining their electoral support. Many bureaucrats I spoke to who were employed at the time mentioned the complete lack of regulation concerning appointments during this period, when lists of names would be sent in by politicians for vacant posts and accepted without question. The objective of such appointments was (and where it is attempted, still is) to reward those who cast votes for the politician at the last election, but more crucially, to ensure the support of voters in the next election – an electoral gain outcome. However, it is important to acknowledge that electoral gain is not something that politicians go looking for only as elections are approaching. The whole five-year term is spent preparing for the next round of voting. Bureaucrats acknowledged that as elections neared, the demands made on them increased, but almost every one I spoke to told me that electoral gain is sought throughout the electoral cycle.

In a case from 1996, a Minister was accused of making illegal appointments to his department to help his own constituents and those of his fellow politicians. The Federal Minister of the Oil and Gas Development Corporation Limited (OGDCL), Anwar Saifullah Khan, recruited 145 people without advertisement (a legal requirement) and in violation of merit requirements. Khan was originally found guilty in 2000, but in 2002, the Lahore High Court overturned the conviction on appeal on the basis that Khan’s actions – making illegal appointments for political gain - had not

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309 It is important to remember that throughout the 1990s, none of the governments completed their term. With no way of knowing when an election would be held, appointments for electoral gain were made throughout the term.
involved criminal intent and was the ‘prevalent practice’. The state appealed this judgement before the Supreme Court in 2006, but the judgement was reserved till 2016. Authored by Justice Asif Saeed Khosa, the judgement includes a comprehensive and authoritative review of case law on misuse of authority by politicians and bureaucrats, and finds that the Minister had ‘maneuvered the relevant appointments and that too against the resistance of the Chairman, Oil & Gas Development Corporation and against the interests of that Corporation and with the sole object of pleasing his political friends in the Parliament.’ In many cases of this type, courts and tribunals find the appointments to be illegal, but may not dismiss the appointees. The only politician I spoke to who openly admitted to distributing jobs amongst constituents in exchange for their vote was a former MNA from Jhang. Sitting in his marble-floored, tastefully decorated, spotless office, Interviewee 79 (a former MNA who has changed parties a number of times) said, ‘Unemployment is a huge issue and I try to provide for my people. This is not Westminster style of democracy. Legislators don’t only legislate. When I ask for votes, people ask what will you give us in return?’

Faisal Saleh Hayat is a religious pir and thus has dedicated followers (a vote bank) in his constituency. His bond with his voters is almost paternal. However, his constituency has never been a safe one. This is because his most prominent opponents are his cousin, Abida Hussain, and now her son, Abid Hussain Imam, who bring their own religious vote bank to the table. This makes the distribution of patronage (here, government jobs) essential to his success as a politician. In 2002, Hayat became Minister of Interior. Though there are no reports regarding corruption from the press

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312 Arguments for this include preserving the departmental status quo, preventing further litigation, and allowing those who may have worked diligently despite an illegal appointment a career.

313 His vote bank and willingness to dispense patronage with largesse, has allowed him to be flexible in his political loyalties, going where his personal interests direct him.
at the time, later accounts of Hayat’s career note that his tenure at the Ministry of Interior was dogged by rumours of corruption. In 2008, Hayat was re-elected in NA-87 Jhang and became the Minister of Housing and Works under the coalition government between the PPP and PMLQ. Thereafter, two separate investigations were launched by NAB regarding illegal recruitment during his term as Minister. In 2012, NAB launched an investigation into allegations of illegal recruitment of daily wagers in the Pakistan Public Works Department (an attached department of the Ministry) after receiving evidence from department employees. Then, in 2014, NAB initiated an investigation into the illegal appointment of 130 people (in violation of merit and age requirements, some with fake degrees, and some after the payment of bribes) in the Pakistan Housing Authority (an autonomous body under the Ministry). The investigation began when the majority of the recruits in the Housing Authority were found to be from Jhang, Hayat’s constituency, suggesting that Hayat had used the jobs to reward voters and loyalists in his constituency and ensure their future support. When NAB questioned the illegal recruits, they allegedly admitted that they were appointed in violation of the rules, through a ‘special order’. The fact that the people Hayat had recruited to win their electoral support reported his illegal activities is evidence of the risk of making illegal appointments. Since Hayat was making appointments in bulk, his bond with the illegal appointees was diffuse. For now, some of Hayat’s illegal appointments stand in both the Pakistan

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314 This is likely because the media was more regulated at the time since Musharraf was in power and was determined to ensure that the PMLQ’s government seem successful.
Public Works Department and the Pakistan Housing Authority. However, the proverbial sword of Damocles hangs over the heads of Hayat’s appointees, as well as Hayat himself, with NAB liable to prosecute on the basis of these investigations at any time. As a result, Hayat’s expected outcome from the appointments – electoral gain – was not achieved.

**Personal Enrichment and Protection**

Personal advantage is what makes the risk of illegal appointments worthwhile. Patrons and bureaucrats both seek to gain something for themselves (government funds, jobs, services, protection), in a manner that is outside the law. These gains may or may not be monetary and may or may not be used for other purposes – for instance, campaign funding, personal expenditures, investment, etc. Here, I focus on (1) money and employment, (2) services, resources, and protection.

**Money and Employment**

In 2013, when the PMLN came back into power in Punjab and won at the centre as well, both the provincial and federal governments decided to crack down on corruption, and bureaucratic corruption in particular. The only real challenge for the PMLN in Punjab had been the PTI and its anti-corruption rhetoric. The PPP, plagued by corruption scandals throughout its term (2008-2013), was more or less wiped out in Punjab in the 2013 election. At the same time, ‘anti-corruption’ tied into the CM’s desire to retain control of all aspects of governance, including the dispensing of patronage in the province.

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320 No further information is available on this since the case is still pending with NAB.
321 Hayat’s inability to provide stable (though illegal) appointments to his voters, alongside a party wave favouring the PMLN and Hayat’s last minute disqualification (then requalification as an independent candidate) on a charge of water theft in April 2013, all contributed to his loss by a margin of roughly 13,000 votes to the PMLN candidate in the 2013 election. (Elections: Faisal Saleh Hayat, Abid Imam disqualified for stealing water. April 4, 2013. Geo News online. Available at: <https://www.geo.tv/latest/85825-election-faisal-saleh-hayat-abid-imam-disqualified-for-stealing-water> [Accessed 23 November 2016].)
322 In November 2013, the government decided that an official who had been convicted in a corruption case by the courts would be suspended from service with immediate effect - Ahmed, S. Officials under ACE spotlight to be ‘removed’. November 29, 2013. DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1059319> [Accessed 26 September 2015]; Officials facing corruption cases to be suspended. November 20, 2013. The Express Tribune. Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/633983/officials-facing-corruption-cases-to-be-suspended/> [Accessed 26 September 2015]. The decision was also made that those accused of corruption would not be given ‘important assignments’.
The CM’s focus on eradicating petty corruption (through a ‘citizen response system’ for example) highlighted a distinction that was brought up by certain bureaucrats – between corruption on a grand scale but limited to the higher echelons of government, and petty, personal corruption carried out on all kinds of everyday transactions. Those who make this distinction have a great disdain for the latter, which they associate with the PPP. Unsurprisingly, it is this form of petty corruption that has been the focus of accountability measures in the recent past.

Members of the PPP, as some party members themselves freely admit (Interview 46 and 80), are more likely to ask voters for bribes for small tasks (arranging a transfer, getting leave approved). Interviewee 46, who contested (but lost) an MPA seat on a PPP ticket in 2013 and was obviously unhappy with the direction the party has taken in recent years, went a step further and admitted that the PPP’s politicians were ‘pick pockets’ taking petty amounts from constituents for helping them get a transfer, etc. In essence, they are making illegal bureaucratic appointments to benefit personally through the bribes they receive. There are no meaningful bonds. There are simply transactions creating temporary and diffuse bonds – money in exchange for a post, with the patron expecting little more than enrichment as an outcome. Though some of this money may be re-directed toward electoral campaigning or running the politician’s dera, electoral gain is seen as a (distant) secondary objective.

This kind of petty personalised corruption extended to the highest levels of government while the PPP was in power at the centre between 2008 and 2013, and is perhaps best exemplified in the illegal appointment of the Prime Minister’s son-in-law to a post with the World Bank. Raja Azeem-ul-Haq Minhas, an Income Tax group officer and son-in-law of Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, Prime Minister of the PPP government toward the end of its tenure, came to the attention of the press and then the Supreme Court when he was illegally appointed an Executive Director of the World Bank, a post for bureaucrats to represent Pakistan’s (and selected other countries) economic and development interests at the Bank in Washington. Not only was Mr Minhas too junior and inexperienced for the job, he was appointed without the formation of a selection board or a head-hunting committee, completely at the discretion of the PM and in the face of resistance from advisors and representatives of the Finance

Division. However, the PM’s expected outcome was stymied by the press attention the illegal appointment garnered, which led to the Supreme Court taking suo moto notice of the appointment. When the court ordered the Establishment Division to furnish the details of his appointment, Minhas resigned from his post. In its ruling in 2014 on various petitions related to illegal appointments, the Supreme Court referred Mr Minhas’ case to NAB. Appointments made for personal gain in this manner ensured that the PPP’s reputation amongst elite bureaucrats was that of a party that would do anything to benefit itself and nothing to benefit anyone else. In contrast, bureaucrats would tell me that though the PMLN is also corrupt, at least they benefit others alongside themselves.

Indeed, PPP politicians are by no means the only ones to indulge in illegal appointments for personal gain. Despite the Punjab CM’s claims of eradicating corrupt appointment practices through policies and an emphasis on merit, the reality is that the government has succeeded only in establishing a hierarchy of illegal appointment practices – some are acceptable and some are not. The distinction between the two depends on who is indulging in it and the potential for the illegal practice to be found out and linked definitively back to a well-connected political patron. This makes the PMLN’s indulgence in politicised appointments subtler than the PPP’s. For instance, protection for those stealing irrigation water is often ensured at the highest levels of the department and the government as a whole. In 2013, an incident in Bahawalnagar involved members of the local Farmers’ Organisation attacking and detaining an EXEN and SDO. The officials were there to check outlets after a complaint that some had been tampered with (to steal water). The incident was investigated by the CM’s Inspection Team, but when the report was sent to the CM Secretariat, no action was taken against those named and found guilty in

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the report. Journalists quoted an official as saying that the men who had attacked the officials were backed by prominent local politicians.327

Services, Resources and Protection

When I asked the Secretary Irrigation (Interview 89) about political pressure he faced on the job, he mentioned the existence of ‘a political economy of flood’. ‘Floods bring with them compensation issues, lead to fake paperwork, patwaris carrying out fake surveys [of flood risk/damage],’ the Secretary told me. ‘And people demand that we do flood work (repair/prevention) near to flood [season] so accountability is zero.’

There is plenty of evidence of this ‘political economy of flood’. Over the past few years, Pakistan has seen devastating flooding in parts of the country. In 2010, Muzaffargarh was hit particularly hard allegedly due to the corruption of irrigation officials in the district – 51 died and 1.5 million were displaced.328 Much of the damage was caused by the unwillingness of officials to divert flood water into land that had been set aside for that purpose. The reason for this was that the designated land was being used by influential families in the area to grow crops. Therefore, no bureaucrat was willing to risk the ire of these influential families by flooding their crops and causing them losses.329 One of these influential families was the Khosas, the family of then prominent PMLN politician and senior adviser to the CM, Zulfiqar Khan Khosa.

This kind of decision making and the financial malfeasance surrounding procurement and construction that has become a hallmark of the flood season is enabled by what I call a political economy of bureaucratic appointments around floods. Seated behind a solid wood desk in a massive, luxurious office, the Secretary Irrigation told me,

…there are posts where a lot of money is involved, and posts that are in charge of distribution and flow. So when politicians would come to make a request for an illegal appointment [close to flooding season], they had already made exchange arrangements [with the bureaucrat] in advance.

327 Ibid.
The evidence of these illegal appointments can be found in the inquiries into the 2010 floods by the ACE, the Irrigation Department, the Supreme Court, and a judicial commission. The Supreme Court enquiry (p.24) found that the department had abolished a number of posts in the recent past but had retained the staff, (illegally) transferring them to positions for which they lacked the required qualifications and skills. This suggests that there was room for politicians to intervene on behalf of these employees to have them posted to particular areas. Though none of the investigations explored why and on whose orders these illegal appointments were made, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that they were the result of strong transactional bonds of patronage that influential politicians like Zulfiqar Khan Khosa had with bureaucrats to ensure that their lands were protected from flooding and their losses were limited.

Despite investigations into the flooding by various bodies, this time the politicians’ expected outcome of personal gain was achieved. The reason that the reports on the flooding did not stymie the outcome is that protection for these politicians and ‘their’ illegal bureaucrats was provided by the highest levels of the government; the reports into the floods of 2010 were buried and the recommendations never followed up on. No one was held responsible – the Secretary Irrigation at the time was transferred to the post of Secretary Energy and faced no repercussions whatsoever.

However, it is misleading and unfair to suggest that only politicians are looking to gain financially through illegal appointments – bureaucrats are too. In fact, most cases of illegal appointments made for personal financial advantage can be

330 Ibid.
332 Ibid.
traced back to bureaucrats who occupy posts in the lower tiers of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

**Politicians and Bureaucrats Lacking Access to the Centre**

In the introductory chapters of this thesis, I suggested that bureaucrats and politicians in Punjab are currently preoccupied with ‘delivering’. What precisely is being delivered (i.e. where objectives meet outcomes) varies substantially from case to case - it could be an electoral win, a project completed on time, improvement in departmental performance, providing electricity to a certain village, or protection from an enquiry. While Martin (2014) argues that patronage exercised by landlords in rural Punjab unequivocally disadvantages the poor, I argue that patronage appointments to the bureaucracy produce more mixed results. Certain kinds of patronage appointments to the bureaucracy allow some politicians and some bureaucrats to ‘deliver’ to select beneficiaries. For instance, the appointment of lower and mid-tier Irrigation Department bureaucrats is key to aiding farmers (both rich and poor) in stealing irrigation water.

The average constituency politician (holding no political party or government office) continues to try to influence bureaucratic appointments in the face of attempts by the PMLN’s Punjab government to limit such politicisation. Though districts and departments are endeavouring to reduce politicised recruitment (in line with the Punjab government’s centralisation of patronage), much less attention has been paid to transfers and promotions. It is mainly in the transfer of street-level officials that many politicians (even those lacking contact with the CM) continue to find a discretionary – albeit illegal – toe hold against an increasingly centralised bureaucracy.

Though the CM has tried to remove the power to politicise appointments from politicians outside his inner circle, there are times when he has had to make concessions to members of the ruling party. These concessions take the form of an intervention by the CM permitting ruling party politicians to make illegal appointments of their choice to lower-tier posts – for instance to posts for the baildaars (BPS 11) who maintain and repair water distributary channels. After an advertisement was published in 2011, tests and interviews were conducted and 756
people were selected for vacant baildar posts in April 2012. However, the CM Secretariat then ordered the Secretary Irrigation to stop the recruitment process. A news report quotes an official as revealing that DCOs were asking district politicians to hand in their own lists for appointments. A similar controversy over baildar appointments emerged in Toba Tek Singh in 2004. The posts were advertised and interviews were held, but recruitment was delayed because politicians insisted that they be given a quota of appointments. These quotas would allow politicians to appoint favoured officers to baildar posts – baildaars who would overlook outlets that had been tampered with (allowing the theft of irrigation water with impunity). Strong bonds based on loyalty and kinship ensure that the patron’s personal gain outcome is achieved.

**Bureaucratic Efficiency**

Amongst junior politicians, concerns of bureaucratic performance are only a priority in so far as they impact their electoral performance. And although bureaucrats at the department level will often form alliances with their subordinates to achieve bureaucratic efficiency goals, these alliances will rarely be the result of illegal appointments. The reason for this is simple – no bureaucrat would risk an illegal appointment simply to improve government performance. Illegal appointments are made where patrons and appointees wish to benefit personally (whether it be in the form of votes or money or protection), by occupying particular bureaucratic posts. Furthermore, improving bureaucratic performance is rarely in the hands of those most likely to be appointed illegally – junior and some mid-tier bureaucrats. These bureaucrats do not set policy agendas or oversee the development or implementation of projects. These are bureaucrats who carry out instructions issued by those higher up the bureaucratic hierarchy where illegal appointments are less likely.

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Electoral Gain

Interview 61, a PMLN MPA from Lahore, told me that although he made attempts to get some girls from his constituency teaching jobs, he was refused by the EDO and the school principal. The girls did not meet the merit requirement for the posts, and another EDO had recently been dismissed by the CM for allowing such appointments. No other EDO or principal was willing to risk the same fate.

Interviewee 90 is an MNA who contested and won his seat as a PPP candidate in Punjab in 2008. During the 5 years the PPP was in his office, the MNA told me he distributed many jobs. In 2013, however, Interviewee 90 switched parties to join the PMLN. And, in contrast to his previous term, he told me he is no longer able to help his constituents with jobs. When he tries, he tells me that the official response is, ‘Humaare bas mai nahin hai’ (We do not have the ability to do this). There is therefore considerable anxiety amongst many politicians who lack connections to the nerve centre of the provincial government.

An example of a politician faced with voter demands will serve to illustrate this anxiety. I was interviewing a PMLN MPA whose constituency falls in Gujranwala district (Interviewee 138) at his political office when a group of men came in. After an elaborate exchange of handshakes, hugs, and greetings, the MPA ushered the men into an adjoining room requesting that they wait a few minutes while he finished an interview. The MPA began by asking his assistant to serve the men some tea, but quickly amended his instructions, telling him to offer a meal instead. I could tell just by his tone, the near anxiety to please in his voice, that these were constituents. When I asked him if people came to him with requests for bureaucratic transfers, the MPA lowered his voice to a whisper and told me that that was why the group of constituents were there. Still in the same low voice, the MPA told me that this was the third time these men had come to his office to push for the transfer. Thus far, the MPA had not succeeded in securing the transfer they wanted because of resistance from the bureaucracy. The MPA said he had previously helped these men by getting a murder case against their relative dropped. ‘But if I don’t get this [transfer] done, they will forget what I did previously, and they will remember this – he didn’t get this done for us’, the MPA told me. The MPA’s own vote bank (a secure group of voters on the basis of biraderi ties – the MPA is from the Chattha biraderi) was in the largest town in his constituency, but most of his constituency was rural.
Therefore, he relied on local *biraderi* leaders to bring in votes from other areas (vote blocs – see Nelson 2011 and Mohmand 2011) and pleasing these leaders who had arrived at his office demanding a teacher transfer be arranged while a transfer ban was in place was critical to the MPA’s success.

These stakes, alongside the closing of avenues of patronage by the CM, are what drive politicians without access to the centre to break the law in making appointments that benefit both themselves and their constituents. In such circumstances, citizens and bureaucrats (with the nudging of political patrons) turn to illegal methods such as faking documents, making paperwork disappear, and drawing up their own recruitment, seniority/promotion, and transfer lists (or tampering with existing ones) – i.e. disengaging with the rules entirely – to get the posts they want. Some believe that money is necessary to turn bureaucratic wheels; in fact, Interviewee 90, an MNA who had switched parties from the PPP to the PMLN in 2013, told me, ‘Money is far more effective – [citizens] just have to pay a Personal Secretary/Assistant or clerk. It is more effective than sending a politician, to whom the bureaucrat just makes excuses. However, if there is *sifarish* and money, then it is most effective.’ A report into teacher recruitment³³⁷ argues though that either a teacher will bribe a department clerk for a transfer or use political connections, but does not consider that a teacher may do both to cement the transaction. In some cases, teachers will ask politicians to intercede on their behalf, and may even pay them, to ensure their request goes through.

It is, however, unsustainable for politicians to pay bribes to have constituents or party workers appointed – no politician has the resources to pay for the appointment of thousands of people. And, if they do so for one person, word will invariably get out causing resentment amongst constituents who were not able to benefit from such generosity. For this reason, and others, illegal methods of appointment do not always produce sustainable results.

Still, the increasing power of elite bureaucrats and attempts to institutionalise lower and mid-tier appointments has created a sort of alliance between some politicians (those not close to the party leadership) and their voters. The most common refrain in the Punjab Assembly, and in the National Assembly, amongst

party workers, the average citizen, and recently even the PM’s son-in-law (a sitting MNA)\(^\text{338}\), is that the bureaucracy is running the show in league with the Sharif brothers’ kitchen cabinet. Both citizens and politicians find bureaucrats (*babus*) condescending, unapproachable, rigid, and unhelpful. For most ordinary citizens, there is a specific terror associated with going to a bureaucratic office while ordinary politicians find that asking bureaucrats for assistance is pointless. Since we were meeting at his house and could be overheard by only his own family, Interview 78 (a PMLN MPA from Narowal) felt comfortable complaining to me of the treatment of MPAs by bureaucrats. He told me that he found it so hard to get development funds released, he had to ask his constituency’s MNA (a Minister) to get the job done. So disgruntled are the MPAs that they were holding meetings to discuss ways of complaining about bureaucrats and having them removed for obstructing the work of MPAs (Interview 78). This unity of experience creates an interesting situation with regard to electoral gains. When a politician tries to have a voter or party worker illegally appointed, and the *sifarish* is not granted after a meeting with the bureaucrat, the voter will not blame the politician. Though the appointment is never made, the politician’s expected electoral gain outcome may still be achieved. This is due to the mutual understanding between the politician and the voter that it is the *babu* who is blocking the appointment. In this manner, the voter stays loyal to his local politician even though an appointment is never actually made.

At a PMLN politician’s constituency office in Lahore, an MNA (Interviewee 13) sat behind a large desk, with his PA seated at his elbow – close enough to reach over and whisper in the MNA’s ear. The room was rectangular, with the desk at one end and, incongruously, a cage with a white parrot in it at the other. Other than the chairs that lined one wall, where voters sat patiently to be seen by the MNA, the room was bare. As I waited for the MNA to grant me an interview, I watched one after the other voter get called up to the desk and have his issue dealt with – like at a bank. Eventually, the MNA called a young man to approach. The young man wanted the politician to intercede on his behalf with an Additional Secretary to get him a job. After hearing out the young man, the MNA said, ‘Yeh too ghalat baat hai [this is wrong], procedure must be followed.’ Regardless, the MNA made sure that the young man (who had waited over an hour to speak to him personally) did not feel like he

was being let down. After making the young man wait a while longer, the MNA asked his PA to make a phone call. The PA swiftly dialled a number and after some back and forth, managed to get the right person on the line. He handed the phone to the MNA, who asked the person at the other end, very politely, to hear out the case of the young man, to help him if possible. In such situations, the supplicant goes into the meeting with the bureaucrat knowing that the chances of his request being granted are small. The typical response from the bureaucrat in such cases is a noncommittal ‘I will try my utmost’ (Interview 45, a PAS officer serving as DCO Narowal), but all parties are well aware that it is extremely unlikely that the favour will be granted. However, the voter may well be satisfied with having received a hearing from the bureaucrat and continue to support the politician who got him that hearing.

‘Misplaced’ Documents

In order to achieve an illegal appointment for electoral gain objectives, politicians need an intermediary ally within the department who will actually process the appointment for them. This need not be a particularly senior bureaucrat – often, a clerk or a Section Officer is sufficient – but it does need to be someone the politician trusts to carry out the illegal task. The bond between the politician and this intermediary bureaucrat may be based on an exchange – the politician may have, for the express purpose of making illegal appointments, arranged the extra-legal appointment of the bureaucrat (through the CM or the department Secretary, for example) or even bribed him, or promised him future rewards, to make appointments to lower tier posts.

An effective way of making illegal appointments for those without access to the CM and his cronies involves ‘losing’ or ‘misplacing’ documents – a common practice in government departments. Interviewee 30, a PAS officer in BPS 18 serving in the S&GAD, for instance, was aware that politicians were in contact with the junior staff seated outside her door and sometimes asked them to make files ‘disappear’. The purpose of this is to delay a pending decision, for example enquiries or transfers, for a favoured bureaucrat.

Perhaps the simplest way of making illegal appointments is through tampering with recruitment and seniority lists. Interview 39, a PAS bureaucrat in BPS 19, was serving as a DCO when an MPA demanded that she have teacher transfer lists sent to
his political office so that they could be checked and approved by him. In the past, the issuance of such lists was a common practice, but as bureaucrats occupying DCO posts have come increasingly within the CM’s ambit, local politicians have found it hard to make illegal appointments in this manner. Instead, they have had to employ other illegal means to get their voters and party workers appointed. Interviewee 23 (a retired School Education Department bureaucrat) told me that when applications come in for new posts or transfers, one means of thinning the herd is to separate the signature page from the rest of the application, or remove one required document (a No Objection Certificate, for example) and destroy it. When the applicant turns up to ask why he was not selected, he will be shown an incomplete application. Such behaviour produces results because it changes the merit or seniority list for posts, removing people so that others – favoured by politicians – can be moved up or inserted.

In March 2015, for example, applicants for educator posts in Sialkot complained that their forms and documents had been ‘misplaced’ by department officials. It is a beautifully simple and yet perfectly believable excuse – the sheer volume of paperwork that the average bureaucrat has to deal with, particularly in departments with thousands of employees like Education or Health, make misplaced documents a common occurrence. A patron will encourage this kind of behaviour because he wants particular people (key party workers, loyal voters, even friends and family) – those with whom he has established bonds of patronage, even if diffuse since the outcome is unenforceable – to get the posts, rather than those deserving on merit, for electoral gain outcomes.

**Personal Enrichment and Protection**

Despite various anti-corruption initiatives and campaigns, promises to eradicate corrupt practices by the next election, claims of merit-based appointments in the bureaucracy, and the centralisation of discretion and sifarish, illegal appointments are continuously made. The CM Secretariat may appoint a loyalist as department Secretary or DCO and that allows for an element of control and supervision. However, as we move down the hierarchy to districts, tehsil, and markaz (School

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Education) or divisions, canals, and distributaries (Irrigation), we have to acknowledge that there is no way one PAS or PMS officer can control every single person in the department. This means that bureaucrats in the middle tiers (even those appointed by the Secretary) have a level of discretion in dealing with their juniors, and with local politicians. Government departments in the districts are where centralised control often wavers.

Though limited to some extent by performance targets and monitoring, mid-tier and junior bureaucrats are free to establish their own bonds of transaction-based patronage, typically based on work ties or kinship, to benefit themselves and their cronies. The sheer volume of staff, paperwork, and appointments at this level of the government are such that not even monitoring units can track every single action. A Secretary or DCO cannot keep track of the minutiae of each street-level appointment, nor do they want to. So long as district officials achieve set performance targets and do not flag unwanted attention from local politicians or senior bureaucrats (DCO), the courts, or the media, the department at the centre will allow them to work without interference. It is, therefore, at the district level that politicisation (by politicians and by bureaucrats) really takes hold beyond the CM and senior party advisors or bureaucrats.

What benefit do junior bureaucrats gain from illegal appointments? For junior bureaucrats, such illegal appointments are a readily available means of personal gain in three forms: (i) jobs for friends and relatives who would not otherwise be eligible for them, or (ii) financial gain in bribes paid for appointments, or (iii) crooked access to state services and resources. Just like senior bureaucrats, those at lower tiers of the bureaucratic hierarchy also use work ties to establish relationships of transaction with other bureaucrats. However, unlike senior bureaucrats, kinship ties can be much more important at this level since appointments and outcomes are often being arranged within, and by people from, a relatively small geographical area. They are next to impossible to identify since news reports do not delve into these details and officials themselves are hesitant to answer questions on illegal appointments. The one account I got from my fieldwork was a Deputy DEO in Lahore who was found to have appointed his friends and relatives to various teaching posts using forged appointment letters and certificates by Interviewee 23 – a retired education department official (while he served as EDO). However, most cases of illegal appointments in the
department seem to involve the exchange of money, and it is unclear whether or not there is any kinship tie.

Regardless of whether they are based on kinship or work ties, the bonds mid-tier or junior bureaucrats form with patrons for financial gain are transactional. But the transactional nature of the bond makes the patronage relationship contingent on the achievement of a single goal – the agreed upon transaction (enrichment or protection in exchange for an illegal appointment). The outcomes do not need to be achieved in the future by the appointee once he is in his post. Instead, the outcome is achieved in exchange for the appointment alone.

**Bribery and Financial Gains**

In any given week, the newspapers will run a number of stories about clerks, patwaris, assistants, and other lower-tier bureaucrats accepting bribes to recruit, transfer, and promote people. In 2015, the media reported extensively on numerous cases of teachers in Muzaffargarh recruited on the basis of fake appointment letters and other documentation.\(^{340}\) One news report revealed that according to officials within the School Education Department, more than 100 teachers had been recruited since 2012 on the basis of fake degrees and result cards from the National Testing Service.\(^{341}\) The investigation in Muzaffargarh began when the appointment letters of three teachers were found to be fake, which led to the questioning of all the new recruits in the district that year. One man told reporters that he had paid two department officials Rs 200,000 for a job as a teacher.\(^{342}\) A female recruit told the press that she had paid an agent Rs 200,000 to be provided with a fake degree and appointment letter – indeed that department employees were complicit in providing the forgeries.\(^{343}\) One of the officials implicated in forging documents was a computer assistant working for the district monitoring team.

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Of the Irrigation department employees I spoke to, many referred obliquely to illegal appointment practices but only one admitted to paying a bribe for a post. An Assistant EXEN in Gujranwala, Interviewee 130, told me that in 1995, he had a zidd (obstinate desire) to be promoted. So he paid money to the appointing authorities for the post. A few months into his new promotion, the authority told him to pay some more money and they would regularise his new appointment. Interviewee 130 had no money left to pay, so his peers got regularised while he did not.

In these examples, and particularly in interactions with the general public, the ability to facilitate illegal appointments allows junior bureaucrats an inordinate amount of power, completely incommensurate to their salary and social position. Clerks, Section Officers, accounts officers, and other department district officials, for instance, are all relatively poorly paid with limited opportunity for rising up the bureaucratic ladder and limited power within the departmental hierarchy. But their control over department paperwork and access to senior officials – particularly when they work together – allows these junior officials to act as patrons and enrich and protect not just themselves, but their family, friends, and cronies. In such cases, a junior bureaucrat makes illegal appointments primarily for financial gain in the form of bribes (or by appointing a family member to a government job to increase the household income).

An example will highlight the power clerks can have, and how they can utilise it to make illegal appointments for personal financial gain. In 2011, a news report revealed that six officials with a history of corrupt practices—members of the booti mafia (see also Nelson 2014, unpublished manuscript) – had been illegally appointed as invigilators by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE) for matriculation examinations. The six teachers had previously been barred from invigilating when they were found aiding students in answering examination questions. Officials from the BISE claimed that clerks from the BISE and the EDO-Education’s office were responsible for these appointments, having taken Rs 35,000 from each of the officials they appointed. In other words, the clerks formed a

diffuse transactional bond with the teachers – the clerks achieved their personal gain outcome and the teachers got the posts they wanted.

However, junior and mid-tier bureaucrats making illegal appointments need protection from discovery, investigation, and prosecution, just as senior bureaucrats do. As many bureaucrats pointed out to me, corrupt transfers, promotions, and appointments are not possible at the lower or middle tiers of the department without the involvement and collusion of higher tiers.

Most cases reported in the press are not able to pin down these networks within a department’s hierarchy. For instance, stories of patwaris being illegally appointed are common but there is rarely any clarity on who appointed them or for what purpose. In rare cases, there are reports of illegal appointments made in order to gain financially where the network of officials involved are pinned down clearly. I recount one such story here. In 2004, in Sheikhupura, fifteen officials of the education department in the district, including the district education officer, two deputy district education officers, an assistant education officer, headmasters, and clerks, were arrested for their involvement in a teacher recruitment scam. The scam was brought to the attention of the police by primary school teachers who claimed that they would have to bribe various department officials each month to have their salaries approved. During the investigation, the police found that the gang of department officials took bribes of between Rs 50,000-100,000 to appoint 200 teachers to various posts in the district. In addition, the men faked the official stamps of the Punjab Services Tribunal and forged court orders to convince the department to reinstate officials fired for disciplinary reasons.346

Services and Resources

Alongside jobs, access to state services and resources (electricity, clean water, telephone, television, and mobile connectivity, sewage, roads, etc.) is a key concern. Most citizens find that they have to approach state functionaries and politicians to get access to their basic rights. However, state services and resources are also limited, which results in both politicians and bureaucrats battling to ensure that those they

favour get what they need. One way of ensuring ‘selective’ provision is to make illegal appointments to junior and mid-level posts in government departments.

Though illegal appointments made for access to resources and services are a common practice, it is very difficult to assign responsibility for such behaviour. Reports of such behaviour do not disentangle the network of connections that lead to illegal appointments, so patterns must be guessed at. For instance, appointments made to posts of head teachers in schools are frequently made with interference from politicians with the intention of diverting school funds and handing out contracts for canteens and furniture, but the precise connection between the patron and the appointee is often difficult to establish.

Though it may be hard to tease out the ties that underpin bonds of transaction in cases where the outcome is to gain personally through service and resource allocation, we can generally say that these ties need to be meaningful enough to produce strong bonds if the desired ‘delivery’ outcomes are to be achieved. Unlike bonds formed where the outcome is financial gain and the transaction is an immediate one, service or resource allocation requires sustained work and effort on the part of the illegal appointee once he is in his post. The ‘delivery’ of expected outcomes is only possible therefore if the patron trusts the appointee not to renege on the deal. Such trust is engendered either through biraderi ties or established political loyalties.

Water

In 2013, a PMLN MPA from Rahim Yar Khan accused the military and politicians (including members of his own party) of causing shortages of water in his constituency’s distributaries. While the PMLN MPA couched his objections to such behaviour in terms of his constituents’ suffering, the fact is that many politicians – particularly those who contest from rural constituencies – are landowners and ‘agriculturists’. While the politician may think in electoral terms - access to water is the key to votes from village farmers and their families - there is also a distinct element of personal gain in water theft. Influential landowners will try to ensure that sympathetic officials are appointed to monitor and maintain channels in their area, aiding water theft to allow for better crop yields and higher earnings on the landlord’s

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land. There is also the added benefit that such appointments can be used to provide constituents with jobs.

At mid-tier levels, posts such as Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) and Executive Engineer (EXEN), a common practice is to harass or intimidate subordinate officials if they are unwilling to look the other way on water theft or appoint junior officials who will enable it. Irrigation Department officials reported, in lowered voices and only after making sure the office door was tightly closed, that they received threatening phone calls from senior bureaucrats such as department secretaries (Interviewee 113, EXEN Operations Small Dams) and from military and intelligence officials (Interviewee 115, an Irrigation Department Section Officer, and former SDO). An EXEN in Lahore told me that an EXEN of his acquaintance was threatened because he refused to provide a No Objection Certificate for a politician who wanted to have his water outlet widened (thus allowing an increased flow of water).

Interviewee 152 (Superintending Engineer Lahore) revealed that the Jhang politician Faisal Saleh Hayat once shot an SDO while the latter was monitoring a channel.

The powerlessness of these officials was explained by Interviewee 152. Some Irrigation Department officials (SDOs, patwaris, etc.) live on land held by influential landowners. The threat of being evicted is ever present should he stray out of line. The threat of actual violence is important too, or the perception of the ability/willingness to use it. For instance, in South Punjab, landowners will travel in daalas (pickups) with two or three guards in the back with weapons. The implication is very clear – interfere with what the landowner wants, and there will be violence.

The appointment of patwaris is key to the enterprise of stealing water. Patwaris can easily tamper with land records and, therefore, water allocations, allowing a landowner to receive more water than he is owed. Second, a patwari can tamper with revenue records so that landowners can avoid paying the (nominal) water tax (aabiana). For this reason, politicians and other influential landowners exert a great deal of pressure on mid-tier bureaucrats for the appointment and transfer of patwaris. However, for those without the connections required to have Executive Engineers obey them, bribery is common. In 2012, the ACE launched an investigation into the appointment of patwaris in selected districts since 2004. It was found that

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bribes in excess of Rs 1,750,000 were paid to Section Officers for these posts. Once appointed, the patwari reciprocates by helping his patron steal irrigation water.

Protection in Line Departments

Patron bureaucrats involved in illegal appointments are looking for protection, and not just from investigation and prosecution for illegal activity but also from their appointee reneging on their deal. Protection in circumstances of illegal appointment can be achieved in a number of ways. The first is by co-opting senior bureaucrats into the scam itself, thereby leaving nothing to chance – for instance by including a judicial magistrate or Deputy Secretary. This could involve establishing additional relationships of patronage, based on work ties or kinship and a different set of outcomes. For instance, an investigation into the recruitment of ghost employees in the Rawalpindi School Education Department revealed that officials of the education and accounts departments were involved in the scam and the district department’s investigation named a Deputy Education Officer as being involved as well. However, when the EDO filed an FIR for fraud, he named only a department clerk as the culprit. Leaving the Deputy Education Officer off the FIR was no doubt an intentional decision by the EDO – to protect a junior colleague with whom he had a strong bond of patronage that the EDO relied on to achieve bureaucratic efficiency outcomes in his district, and potentially, to gain personally through scams such as the one that had been discovered.

A further avenue of protection, focused on protecting a bureaucrat from a partner who might renege on the deal, are the very rules that are violated in making illegal appointments. In the pursuit of personal advantage, neither the patron nor the appointee will hesitate in going to the authorities and admitting to participating in an illegal exchange in the hope that the ‘authorities’ will intervene to get them ‘justice’.


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So pervasive are illegal appointments driven by purely personal motivations that disputes over the terms of the agreement – the exact amount of the bribe, what was promised in exchange - are often put before the department itself, through its Efficiency and Discipline Wing. Interviewee 57, the Section Officer of the Efficiency and Discipline Wing in the School Education Department, sat in a tiny office surrounded by stacks of files. Gesturing toward them, he told me that complaints regarding back-dated promotions, politicised transfers, disputes over the amount of a bribe, and the failure of a bureaucrat to deliver on the expected outcome after the payment of a bribe are all brought to the Efficiency and Discipline Wing. Since the department’s internal disciplinary proceedings are open only to department staff (and not the general public) these complaints are filed by bureaucrats against other bureaucrats.

There have been numerous cases of people (bureaucrats and citizens) approaching the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) to file complaints against officials to whom they paid a bribe but who have failed to deliver their side of the agreement. In 2015, a District and Sessions Court senior clerk agreed to get a job for the sister of a resident of Sahiwal within an agreed time frame, demanding Rs 500,000 as a bribe. However, the time passed, and though the money was paid, the clerk was not able to secure the job. The man who bribed the clerk filed a case with the ACE, who launched an investigation and issued a warrant for the arrest of the clerk. The man who had paid the bribe did not face punishment. (This sends an interesting message – paying a bribe is not illegal, but reneging on the deal is.)

The willingness to pull authorities into a dispute over an illegal appointment distinguishes the activities of junior bureaucrats from bureaucrats and politicians who are well-connected. The latter have the clout of the ruling party and the elite bureaucracy behind them, and fear of their ability to punish through appointments will drive bureaucrats to obey them and achieve expected outcomes. Amongst those without such access, however, fear is not a sufficient motivator. As a result, quite ironically, lower and mid-tier bureaucrats (and citizens) are forced back onto the same rules and regulations they violated in the first place. Luckily for these bureaucrats, the anti-corruption and disciplinary systems have their own unique nuances – they seem

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352 Each department has its own disciplinary procedures which are guided by the PEEDA (Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act 2006).

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to expect that illegal appointments are being made and (seemingly) make no serious attempt to hinder this.

Cases of bribery placed before anti-corruption bodies like the ACE, or the department itself, tell us something about the bonds between patrons and illegal appointees. Where the method of appointment is illegal, there is always a risk that either party will renege. The bond is diffuse since there is often no prior relationship, or an insufficient one, that would encourage trust or reliance. Each party is therefore interested solely in their own personal financial gain, meaning that the chances the deal will break down are high as both parties look to benefit themselves. The patron may fail to produce the agreed upon posting, or the appointee may fail to pay the bribe.

Where the Secretary or the EDO takes action and transfers or disciplines a bureaucrat in the district administration for making illegal politicised appointments, the consequences may go one of two ways. The first is that the Secretary or EDO succeeds in removing the official and is able to manage any fallout with disappointed and, therefore, angry politicians. This means that the appointing officer was acting without any substantial backing from influential parties (typically for personal enrichment). However, it could be that, although the appointing officer had political backing, the illegally appointed bureaucrat went beyond his purview and indulged in practices which had not been agreed upon. For instance, the agreement with the political patron may have involved making politicized appointments to Class IV posts, but may not have included embezzlement from the department or the granting of contracts to favoured parties.

The second option is that, even when clear punishments are meted out, they may not have much of an effect. In 2013, an official with the School Education Department in Gujranwala filed a complaint against 45 new recruits with the regional director of the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE). The official claimed that all 45 had forged documents to get their jobs. The ACE investigation held five clerks of the department and an Assistant Education Officer, Zaib un Nisa, responsible for

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accepting bribes for the appointments. However, the named Assistant Education Officer, Zaib un Nisa, was also implicated in making illegal appointments in Gujranwala division in 2011 and suspended for her involvement. This suggests not only a pattern of corrupt behaviour for the purpose of personal gain, but also that punishments like suspensions are insufficient disincentive. This is perhaps why, though illegal appointments made by bribing officials and faking documents are precarious when it comes to achieving long-term personal gains, they remain pervasive. Many believe that, in pursuing such illegal appointments, there is really not much to lose.

Conclusion

Illegal appointments involve substantial risk. Though they were common for many years, a combination of factors – donor influence, greater political competition, an activist judiciary, an aggressive media industry – have all contributed to making illegal methods less sustainable. However, even before illegal appointments became riskier, tactics such as forging documents, bypassing selection and recruitment procedures, threats, and significant violence were rarely conducive to achieving outcomes that have to do with improving bureaucratic efficiency. Using illegal methods for such outcomes is like using a hammer on a common pin. Not only does it attract the wrong kind of attention, diverting from the desired outcome, it is likely to taint the effectiveness of both the patron and the appointee.

When desired outcomes are electoral, illegal methods can be effective in satisfying voters and gaining their support (at least temporarily), typically in making bulk appointments with the collusion of bureaucrats. Though ministers have no legal power to make bureaucratic appointments, they seek electoral gains by influencing illegal appointments – tampering with merit and recruitment lists or issuing lists of names to bureaucrats for recruitment. However, the margin to indulge in such appointments for electoral gain is shrinking as the Punjab government centralises patronage in its own hands and both the courts and the media become more engaged in prosecuting such behaviour. In the past, politicians were allowed a quota of

government jobs to distribute as they wished. These quotas have (formally) been withdrawn and politicians have had to find other ways of influencing the appointment process. Some politicians rely on junior bureaucrats in their offices (for example, clerks and personal assistants) to influence illegal appointments; others establish relationships with department bureaucrats in charge of appointments. Though these avenues are available to senior politicians, the pool of patrons making them has shrunk as the CM has centralised discretion and patronage. Amongst politicians without access to the centre, making illegal appointments in pursuit of electoral gain is therefore difficult as requests are often refused by bureaucrats.

Illegal methods are, however, ideal for personal gain outcomes made on the basis of short-term (typically financial) transactions. Though I have discussed a number of cases, these reports are likely just a drop in the ocean – there are probably thousands of such illegal appointments that have never been discovered. In recent years, there are some departments that have been more successful in investigating such practices – School Education, for example – but, by and large, even these efforts are too half-hearted to fully dis-incentivise illegal appointments.

In many cases, patrons are happy to risk illegal appointments for short-term gains. Some are incredibly lucky in that they repeatedly escape serious consequences. Others, typically at the lower levels, are frequently caught and punished.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This thesis was inspired by conversations about Pakistan’s politics, policy making, and policy implementation with academics, politicians, journalists, and observers. Though the military (as a political force) was ever present in these conversations, explanations for politicians’ behaviour often had little to do with the military and more to do with those who actually ran the machinery of the state – bureaucrats. Though the literature on Pakistan accounts for military interference in politics, the shortcomings of politicians and parties, and problematic interactions between bureaucrats and citizens, it gives short shrift to ties/exchanges between politicians and bureaucrats, or bureaucrats themselves. This thesis aims to fill this gap.

The politicisation of the bureaucracy – that is, political influence over bureaucratic appointments and, thus, bureaucratic behaviour and action – is no secret in Pakistan. The practice has garnered significant attention in recent years due to the growth of private media and an activist Supreme Court (e.g. under Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry), which issued various judgements on bureaucratic appointments. However, the practice is invariably defended through claims of political and bureaucratic ‘discretion’ for the purpose of defending the ‘the public interest’. This is a convenient phrase used to explain away a wide range of (often extra-legal) practices. Identifying a gap in the political science literature on South Asia in particular, and bureaucracies in general, this thesis has developed an analytical framework to decipher the intentions, incentives, methods, and relationships that lie behind the exercise of discretion in making bureaucratic appointments, at least ostensibly for the sake of ‘delivering’ positive outcomes for the public.

Throughout this thesis, I have explored why politicians and bureaucrats feel the need to influence bureaucratic appointments, what outcomes they seek in doing so, and how politicised appointments are made. I stress the interaction of three factors: objectives (bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, or personal enrichment and protection), methods (legal, extra-legal, or illegal), and bonds (strong or diffuse), showing how these factors come together to produce differential outcomes for the politicians and bureaucrats who make politicised bureaucratic appointments. I argue that, overall, the most effective means of achieving desired outcomes are extra-legal methods of bureaucratic appointment. However, this finding can be nuanced further -
bureaucratic efficiency outcomes are more likely to be achieved through legal and extra-legal methods of appointment; electoral gain outcomes are more likely to be achieved through extra-legal methods of appointment; and personal enrichment and protection outcomes are more likely to be achieved through extra-legal and, especially, illegal methods of appointment.

Figure 1 – Objectives, Methods, Bonds, and Outcomes

The ability to utilise different methods of bureaucratic appointment (legal, extra-legal, or illegal), however, depends on the proximity of politicians and bureaucrats to the centre of power – in Punjab, the CM and his kitchen cabinet. Patrons with close ties to the CM Secretariat were able to benefit (in terms of bureaucratic performance, electoral gain, or personal enrichment and protection outcomes) from both legal and extra-legal methods of bureaucratic appointment. Politicians and bureaucrats excluded from the CM’s inner circle, however, were often forced to turn to illegal methods to achieve their objectives.
Figure 2: Patron Objectives and Appointment Methods for Strong Bonds and Successful Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patron Objectives</th>
<th>Appointment Method</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Efficiency</td>
<td>Legal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral Gain</td>
<td>Extra-Legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Enrichment &amp; Protection</td>
<td>Illegal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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- - - - - Successful outcomes possible, but may be stymied, unverifiable, or unsustainable
- - - - - Successful outcomes very likely

Figure 3: Patrons without Access to the Centre: Their Objectives and Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patron Objectives</th>
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<td>Illegal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- - - - - Politicians without access to the centre whose outcomes are likely to be achieved
- - - - - Politicians without access to the centre whose outcomes might be achieved but are unverifiable, temporary or substantially risky
- - - - - - - - - Bureaucrats without access to the centre whose outcomes are likely to be achieved
- - - - - - - - - Bureaucrats without access to the centre whose outcomes might be achieved but are unverifiable, temporary or substantially risky
The variables I use in my argument and the conclusions I draw in this thesis emerge from a year of fieldwork. For many conducting research in bureaucratic or political circles in South Asia, ties to figures within these institutions offer an important point of access. I found that I had none of these advantages and had to spend a substantial amount of time establishing contact and trust with bureaucrats and politicians across a range of positions. Though my lack of connections made my fieldwork time consuming and at times frustrating, I also believe it provided valuable insight. As someone who was largely a stranger to political and bureaucratic processes, I took the time to have my interviewees explain their work, their duties, their concerns, and their complaints to me in detail.

What resulted was a multi-faceted picture of something that many consider a monolith – the ‘bureaucracy’. I traced people’s lives, experiences, and interactions, acquiring a rich tapestry depicting the inner workings of governance in Punjab, Pakistan. This is not an abstract thesis. It is a thesis grounded in conversations, observations, experiences, and patterns in the real world. It is not based on the fleeting (numerical) observations we see in quantitative work.

It was senior bureaucrats’ persistent emphasis on their need to ‘deliver’, and the pressure exerted by the CM Secretariat (or senior politicians and bureaucrats), that led me to place ‘patterns of delivery’ at the heart of this thesis. In pursuing this notion of ‘delivery’, I began by exploring the motivations and ‘objectives’ of politicians and bureaucrats – what is it they want? This exploration led me to three outcomes pursued by both politicians and bureaucrats: bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal enrichment and protection, and what each of them meant in real terms. I was quickly able to draw up a list of specific illustrations of each of category – the Lahore Metro Bus project, fighting off a challenger from the PTI in the next election, or getting more irrigation water, for example.

Next, I asked how politicians or bureaucrats would set about (successfully) achieving these broad outcomes: their ‘methods’. It was this question that led me back to the notion of politicisation. All of the ‘delivery’ that bureaucrats were frantically pursuing was tied to bureaucratic appointments by politicians and other bureaucrats. Interference in bureaucratic appointments, even at the most junior tiers of the bureaucracy, was driven by clear intentions. This was evident in the fact that bureaucratic appointments were closely monitored by the CM, other politicians, and
other bureaucrats. In sharp contrast were any number of other activities, projects and initiatives that aroused little interest amongst politicians, bureaucrats, the CM Secretariat, or the media. This difference was brought home to me most sharply when the main site of my fieldwork shifted from the School Education Department to the Irrigation Department. The former was in the midst of a donor-funded reform program alongside tens of thousands of employees all belonging to very active unions. The latter was a sleepy department for which an urban-focused CM office had little time, and whose employees rarely banded together to influence policy decisions. In the education sector, every step was scrutinized. In the irrigation sector, deadly flooding (for example) was considered par for the course, but appointments still attracted considerable attention. Appointments, I noticed, were always at the heart of the (‘delivery’) machine. Getting the right bureaucrat into the right post was always the key to achieving the goal a patron politician or bureaucrat desired, whether it be bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, or personal enrichment or protection. Anything that disrupted this well-oiled ‘delivery’ machine – for instance, the arrival of an unsympathetic DCO or Secretary – caused complaints, protests, or (anonymous) quotes in related newspaper articles, not just from department employees, but also from politicians and senior bureaucrats.

But how did a politician or bureaucrat seeking a particular outcome ensure that the bureaucrat appointed to achieve it actually did what was required? My conversations with politicians, bureaucrats, political observers, and journalists, various newspaper reports of bureaucratic and political activity, and my own observations from the field all pointed toward intricate patterns of patronage, specifically in the intervening but critical process of making bureaucratic appointments, as the means for ensuring results. I found that actors within the state (politicians or bureaucrats) rely on informal bonds of trust, far more than I had imagined they would and over and above biraderi ties, to stave off the precarity that comes with their profession in a poorly institutionalised country such as Pakistan. This was most evident in the stories I heard of mentorship between politicians and bureaucrats, and amongst bureaucrats themselves, at all levels of the hierarchy, from the elite PAS to teaching staff and Executive Engineers. In making bureaucratic appointments to achieve a specific outcome, patrons and bureaucrats are initiating a bond, a relationship based on professional networks or exchange. It is this bond and
its strength or diffusion that determines whether or not the patron’s desired outcome will be achieved. Identifying the existence, and the nature, of these bonds required thinking outside the proverbial box – politicians and bureaucrats would not openly reveal (or even consciously notice) these informal ties. So I began tracing the careers of bureaucrats – the districts in which they had been posted, what posts they occupied, who they had offended, and, most importantly, who they had worked with more than once. Mapping career trajectories, and investigating political and bureaucratic performance along the way, allowed me to pinpoint where the lives of politicians and bureaucrats intersected. It was from this investigation that I was able to identify, and characterize, these crucial bonds between key actors.

Detecting and characterizing bonds is tricky; detecting whether or not outcomes were achieved was often even harder. In some cases, the outcome is visible – the red Metro Buses in Lahore can be seen traversing their route. In other cases, outcomes are less tangible – electoral gain can only be part and parcel of a number of other factors that affect an election, personal enrichment is not something patrons declare on a tax form, and protection from investigation involves burying the cover up. In these cases, I relied on winning the trust of politicians and bureaucrats so they would tell me ‘what happened’ (even if it was a whispered conversation in the middle of a large hall full of other department employees) as well as newspapers. The examples I have presented in this thesis focus on instances where I was able to verify the sequence of events and the outcome.

Finally, it was almost by coincidence that I stumbled into the pivotal connection between what might be described as ‘the centralisation of discretion’ in Punjab and the politicisation of the bureaucracy. As I expanded my research to politicians and bureaucrats on the fringes of the centre of power (the CM Secretariat and the provincial secretariat), I tapped into the resentment and frustration of politicians and bureaucrats with regard to access – not just vis-à-vis the CM, but power in general. It was not just the differential experiences of those with and without access to the CM’s kitchen cabinet, it was also the discrepancies in how these two sets of people understood the system and their place within it – for instance, what a politician is supposed to do once he is elected, who bureaucrats are accountable to, and (a more complex problem) whether decision-making power over district-level and
lower appointments legally rested with the DCO or the department Secretary – that underscored the reality of the centralisation of discretion and patronage in Punjab.

**Contributions**

Bureaucratic politicisation is a worldwide phenomenon. Though the degree and legality varies, politicised appointments are used everywhere to achieve outcomes desired by politicians and bureaucrats alike. Even though my research was conducted in Punjab, Pakistan, my findings are likely to be generalizable to other parts of South Asia, other postcolonial states, and beyond. In the US, for example, (legal) politicised appointments are used by politicians to further particular agendas. In Pakistan and India, even where politicised appointments are not legal, they are widely used by state actors within the state to achieve their own ends.

Although ‘politicisation’ is a term used frequently in popular discourse concerning bureaucracies, there is surprisingly little political science literature on the concept itself – what it means, how it takes place, and why. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in the disciplinary literature on bureaucracies in general, and South Asian bureaucracies in particular. It explores what precisely politicisation is, why and how politicised appointments are made, and explicates the consequences of politicised appointments for governance, as well as for the actors involved. In doing so, I consider institutional and structural hierarchies and regulations in some detail – for instance, in my detailed discussion of the rules on bureaucratic appointments in Pakistan (Chapter 2) – and, even beyond the rules themselves, I investigate how these rules influence the pursuit of outcomes by actors operating within or alongside them. In particular, I provide a detailed account of, and emphasise the critical importance of, specific regulatory loopholes related to bureaucratic appointments – loopholes that allow patrons (politicians or bureaucrats) to make extra-legal appointments in pursuit of targeted outcomes. As a result, I contribute to the political science literature on bureaucratic politicisation, and on bureaucracies more generally, by linking the manipulation of regulations on bureaucratic appointments to the pursuit of wider outcomes.

This thesis contributes to three further bodies of literature within the discipline of political science. The first contribution is a criticism of Principal-Agent Theory’s (PAT) overly simplistic representation of the relationship between politicians and
bureaucrats. In emphasising political oversight and delegation (or subversion), while focusing primarily on senior bureaucratic cadres, the political-economy literature onPAT misrepresents the more nuanced ties between politicians and several different layers of the bureaucracy. In this thesis, I present evidence of the variety of ways in which bureaucrats and politicians interact, across their respective hierarchies, through relationships that reach beyond simple monitoring to transactional relationships of exchange curated to suit specific strategic objectives. I contend that politicians’ relationships with bureaucrats often reach beyond delegation, information control, and monitoring. In fact, bureaucrats and politicians often work together on a more equitable footing than envisioned in much of the PAT literature, with both parties subscribing to the same worldview and vision of ‘good governance’. And, yet, the ties between these actors often extend beyond the pursuit of simple ‘governance’ outcomes. I argue that politicisation is often a means not only for politicians and even bureaucrats to gain electorally, but also to achieve more personal objectives – personal enrichment or protection.

In this thesis, the most important transactional relationships are defined by the fact that, although those who engage in them are unequal, both benefit. Rather than using the rather confusing, and in some ways limiting (see Chapter 1), term ‘clientelism’, I describe strategic (‘curated’) relationships based on bonds of trust or exchange – what I call strategic patronage relationships – to show exactly how politicised appointments are used to achieve targeted outcomes. In South Asia, the existing literature on patronage has been used to examine relationships between politicians and voters (for instance, Nelson 2011; Mohmand 2011; Javid 2012; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2015) as well as politicians and criminality (for instance, Michelutti 2010, 2014; Piliavsky 2014). Moving beyond this targeted focus on politicians, my work places both politicians and bureaucrats at the centre, exploring ties not just between politicians and bureaucrats, but also between individual bureaucrats themselves. As a result, this thesis contributes to the political science literature on patronage in South Asia by considering the interests and objectives of bureaucrats, rather than just those of politicians and/or citizens.

In addition, this thesis cuts against the conventional focus on biraderi and kinship ties in the South Asia literature on patronage, emphasising, instead, the professional and school networks that underpin crucial bonds between politicians and
bureaucrats (and, again, bureaucrats themselves). This is not to say that *biraderi* or kinship ties do not exist in the contexts I examine. They do. However, my research revealed that bureaucrats placed greater emphasis on relationships built during schooling, training, and working together.

This thesis does not focus on discuss criminality, with the exception of Chapter 5, which discusses illegal methods of appointment. However, even here, not all cases of illegality are matters of criminal law – most are matters of administrative (or civil) law, dealt with by tribunals, rather than the police. As such, my work does not discuss the role of the police (or the politicisation of police appointments) in any great detail. In fact, my work expands our understanding of politicisation beyond the realm of the police and criminal law – focusing attention on the use of legal and extra-legal appointment as well as ‘illegal’ administrative acts.

Unlike PAT’s focus on senior bureaucrats and the patronage literature’s focus on street-level bureaucrats, my research is not limited to elite or street-level bureaucrats (*PAS*, *patwaris*, etc.). Instead, my focus extends to politicisation amongst *mid-tier* bureaucrats as well. These are the officials responsible for implementing policies formulated in the federal or the provincial capital. These are the people who are most aware of both administrative and local realities; they play a key role in achieving the outcomes sought by individual patrons and the bureaucrats they seek to appoint (legally, extra-legally, or illegally).

Broadly, this thesis extends the study of strategic patronage ties to their role in promoting bureaucratic performance – an underrepresented aspect in the political science literature on bureaucratic politics in South Asia. Amongst those who do use patronage as a lens to study bureaucracy (Grindle 2012), the objective is often to explain patterns of bureaucratic career advancement. What is often overlooked in this body of work, however, are the more diverse motivations that underpin existing patronage relationships, as well as the significance of politicised appointments for the success of governance, electoral, and personal enrichment or protection goals.

Typically, even the political science literature on bureaucratic appointments (Grindle 2012; Iyer and Mani 2012; and Akhtari, et al. 2017) investigates only the initial recruitment or political turnover of bureaucrats, overlooking the ways in which legal (regular and irregular), extra-legal, and illegal appointments can be made during the course of a bureaucrat’s career. I explore not just the initial recruitment of
bureaucrats or bureaucratic movement (transfers, promotions, etc.) following a change in political leadership, but also a variety of appointments taking place throughout individual bureaucratic careers. In doing so, I contribute to the existing literature on the politics of bureaucratic appointments by exploring the ways in which regulations on bureaucratic recruitment, promotion, and transfer are manipulated and bent to extra-legally appoint particular bureaucrats to particular posts for particular ends.

My additional contributions target is to the literature on Pakistan and South Asia more generally. Until 2000, much of this literature focused on the structure of Pakistan’s postcolonial state, particularly its colonial heritage and comparisons with India. During the early 2000s, however, the focus on terrorism and security studies side-lined explorations of the state and the actors who comprise it – their motives, behaviour, and interests. Furthermore, the dominance of the military in Pakistan’s political sphere has meant that far too much academic attention has been paid to the military and its interactions with other organs of the state. After Alavi’s notion of the over-developed bureaucratic-military state and Kennedy’s exploration of the evolution of the Pakistan bureaucracy, few academics have focused on the operation of the postcolonial bureaucracy in itself.\(^{356}\) I aim to revive and extend this crucial part of the political science literature by studying the ways in which bureaucratic appointments shape governance.

My exploration of variation in patterns of bureaucratic appointment reveals some of the consequences associated with the centralisation of power – specifically, how such power is used to benefit some while excluding others. Such centralisation goes against the spirit of Pakistan’s landmark 18\(^{th}\) Amendment (2010) which envisioned not just a devolution of power from the federal to the provincial level, but also the devolution of decision making and the creation of an empowered, democratic local government system. While most elite bureaucrats I spoke to like the idea of local government (in theory), few are willing to concede power to provincial civil servants or to local representatives in practice. Elected local governments have been resisted by federal and provincial bureaucrats alike, for they take power and money away from the bureaucracy as well as federal and provincial politicians. The new local government system introduced in Punjab in 2016/17 does little to enable elected representatives to make independent decisions at a local level. Instead, it continues to

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\(^{356}\) Saeed Shafqat (1999; 2011; 2013) is an exception. However, his focus has been on reform and federalism.
provide the provincial government (and senior bureaucrats, e.g. Deputy Commissioners) with inordinate power over local representatives’ decision making (see Chapter 2). As such, the 18th Amendment has had an impact on the bureaucracy in a manner opposite to the principle of devolution. It has allowed federal bureaucrats to take over provincial departments, side lining provincial civil servants and resisting the creation of an empowered local government system. Ignoring the amendment’s basic tenets, politicians and bureaucrats have sought instead to centralise power rather than redistribute it.

While it is by no means novel to argue that politicians in positions of power favour their cronies, illuminating exactly why and how they do so (via bureaucratic appointments) is still a worthwhile contribution. My research reveals that politicians in positions of leadership (such as the CM) create hierarchies within both the bureaucracy and their political parties in order to cement their own position with voters. This is done via appointments that help them prioritise the delivery of policies and projects favoured by the members of the kitchen cabinet. Indeed, a deeper understanding of this process helps to explain inconsistencies in government performance within a particular province – why and how certain policies and projects are developed, implemented, and completed at light speed even as others languish behind the scenes. Distributing government largesse in a targeted manner, and favouring the requests of some while ignoring others is enabled when political leaders create a class of elites comprised of bureaucrats and other politicians that orbit around them.

Still, these links respond to political and personal circumstances (for instance, the calculus surrounding an approaching election or the challenge of an opposition party). In Punjab, changes in the party of government at the centre have often shaped the interaction of provincial bureaucrats and politicians – particularly, with reference to the ease (or lack thereof) of making politicised appointments. If a party holds Punjab but not the centre, there is always some tension over elite (PAS and PSP) appointments. The elite cadres become divided along party lines. And, when this happens, their elite bureaucratic powers are checked – as much by their internal divisions as by the whims of two different parties. It is important to remember, though, that whoever wins Punjab will be in a stronger position. Forming a government at the centre without winning Punjab (the province with the most
National Assembly seats) will typically require a coalition. As such, a coalition central government that differs from the provincial government in Punjab will rarely succeed in regulating the appointment of elite bureaucrats against the wishes of Punjab’s ruling party. If, on the other hand, a party wins both Punjab and the centre, that party will enjoy full control of PAS and PSP bureaucratic appointments. Barring military intervention or some type of external shock (such as the release of the Panama Papers), there is little to stop such a party from moving forward with its agenda by appointing its favoured bureaucrats in key posts. During such periods, favoured bureaucrats from the elite cadres of the bureaucracy and the ruling party work as one. This often involves handing substantive powers (administrative and even political) to senior bureaucrats in key positions at both the federal and provincial levels, often concentrating the powers of multiple posts in one or a handful of offices (see the case of Jehanzeb Khan in Chapter 4).

Recent literature on the Pakistan bureaucracy focuses on bureaucratic artefacts (for instance documentation and paperwork) as a means of political or state control (Hull 2012) or uses quantitative methods (interventions, regressions, large-N studies, randomised control trials, and experiments) to research bureaucratic performance and the factors that shape it. In using qualitative methods (interviews, semi-participant ethnographic observation, and research through newspaper archives) to study the interactions between actors within the state, I provide a more nuanced account of the political and bureaucratic landscape, moving beyond mere artefacts to various types of formal and informal relationships. I do not confine my remarks to just one government (as Martin 2016 does). My qualitative work for this thesis explores and recounts events, experiences, and interactions between political and bureaucratic actors across nearly thirty years of Punjab’s, and Pakistan’s, history.

However, my preference for qualitative methods is not to suggest that further data collection is not needed. Any academic working on the subject of Pakistan’s bureaucracy will be aware of the lack of publicly available data. Though records are kept, they are often inaccessible even to those working inside the system – filing systems are complicated and outdated and paperwork is frequently lost, misplaced, or buried (often intentionally, of course). Much of the information on the bureaucracy’s activities can only be found in the newspapers. The first step for any future work on Pakistan’s bureaucracy must be to encourage better (digitised) records, making them
more accessible to those who lack connections in the bureaucracy (e.g. via Right to Information requests).\textsuperscript{357}

In sum, this thesis investigates political and bureaucratic efforts to realise three types of outcomes: bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal enrichment or protection via legal, extra-legal, and illegal methods of bureaucratic appointment. In setting out the interaction between (a) the objectives of politicians and bureaucrats, (b) their methods of bureaucratic appointment, and (c) the patronage bonds that exist between patrons and their appointees, as well as (d) how these factors may (or may not) come together in ways that ‘deliver’ desired outcomes, I criticise the Principal-Agent Theory body of literature and contribute to the political science literatures on politicisation, patronage, and the bureaucracy. Moreover, I contribute to the literature on South Asia with my use of qualitative methods to study bureaucratic regulations, relationships, and performance.

\textit{Future Research}

For the most part, this thesis has focused on Punjab with occasional references to the federal bureaucracy. A comparative study of Punjab with Sindh or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, however, may prove instructive. Do provincial bureaucrats lacking access to the central government (now controlled by the PMLN) behave like those in the Punjab who lack access to ‘the centre’ in Lahore?

Though I drew cases from across the bureaucracy, my fieldwork was focused on two departments – School Education and Irrigation. A simple method of verifying my findings would be to conduct fieldwork in other departments such as Health.\textsuperscript{358} Furthermore, it would be valuable to study departments as they are brought increasingly into public-private partnerships. At the federal level, it would also be worth studying how ‘autonomous’ bodies such as the Oil and Gas Regulatory

\textsuperscript{357} The Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act was passed in 2013. When I did my fieldwork, the Act had had little impact on the day-to-day operations of departments beyond the creation of a post (or an officer being put in charge of) dealing with Right to Information requests. Since then, there has been resistance by the bureaucracy to sharing data, but it is still too soon to judge the impact of the Act.

\textsuperscript{358} This thesis has not covered the politicisation of the Pakistan Police Service. This was a conscious decision – my lack of contacts meant that it would take me a very long time to gain the kind of access I needed to win trust; in fact, I believe the police’s interactions with politicians and other bureaucrat requires a special focus. This area would be a useful and interesting area in which take this project forward.
Authority, the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, and the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority operate. The ruling PMLN is aware that it is under scrutiny for its close relationship with particular bureaucrats. In fact, for precisely this reason, it has increasingly relied on public-private partnerships and the creation of autonomous bodies to stifle criticism. However, the leadership also ensures that it retains a critical stake in decision making by appointing trusted bureaucrats to head not just important government departments but also ‘autonomous’ bodies and corporations.

In the two years since I completed my fieldwork, the most significant development in Pakistan has been the initiation of a new China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – a series of infrastructure projects that extend across the length of the country supported by Chinese investment and management. The involvement of the Chinese state has provoked criticism; however, there is no doubt that the corridor’s development and implementation will shape Pakistan’s bureaucracy. How Pakistan’s politicised bureaucracy might cope with this infrastructural behemoth is a question that deserves more attention. Studying the interaction of the Chinese and Pakistani bureaucracies will produce fascinating insights.

What does my argument imply for other countries? Though this thesis focuses on Pakistan, it is inspired and influenced by work on bureaucracies from around the world. In some countries, political appointments to the bureaucracy are, of course, perfectly legal and acceptable – presidential systems like the US, for instance. However, in countries that inherited the British parliamentary system, where bureaucracies are supposed to be neutral and rational (Weberian), bureaucracies are often anything but. Even in Canada and in the UK, there are concerns that the bureaucracy is compromised. Understanding how this politicisation works, and particularly what interests it serves, is an undertaking with broad significance.

Pakistan is just one of many countries today with weak institutions. Even countries like India, which many would have certified as democratic and stable just a year ago, seem to be back-sliding. My focus on how actors within states take advantage of weak institutions to hijack official processes to serve their own interests might be useful in other countries. In particular, studying politicised bureaucratic

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appointments is important for those with an interest in understanding how strongmen (like Narendra Modi) operate. In addition, my emphasis on interactions and prior professional relationships between actors taps into a growing interest in behavioural sciences while acknowledging that politicians’ and bureaucrats’ behaviour is shaped by the institutions in which they operate.

**Conclusion**

This thesis presents a nuanced account of the politicisation of the bureaucracy in Pakistan. I highlight the use of legal, extra-legal, and illegal bureaucratic appointments, by politicians as well as bureaucrats, to achieve specific outcomes, including bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal enrichment or protection. In doing so, I underscore the increasing centralisation of discretion and patronage in the hands of the CM and his kitchen cabinet, which enables insiders to make legal and extra-legal appointments to benefit themselves while pushing outsiders to use illegal methods to achieve their goals.

One of the triggers for this PhD was the periodic claim that Pakistan is a ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ state. Pakistan may have a weak state, but I believe it is a state that can achieve much of what it wants to achieve. For all its weakness, inequality, and injustice, Pakistan is not a failed state; it is merely one that, as I have tried to illustrate, is driven by elite actors who pursue a range of interests, or ‘objectives’, not all of which seek to enhance the well-being of the public at large.

My fieldwork and writing up for this thesis were conducted at a unique moment in Pakistan’s history. The historic 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution had been passed (in 2010), devolving power to the provinces and getting rid of Article 58(2)b (thus preventing the president from dissolving the National Assembly). And, in 2013, for the first time ever, the country saw an elected government complete its term and hand power directly to a different party in a peaceful electoral transition. When I started this project, there was palpable hope that ‘devolution’ and ‘democracy’ would bring rewards in the form of development and improved governance. However, these conclusions were evidently premature.

At the time of my fieldwork (2014-15), there were rumblings of a new local government system being introduced. By 2017, local elections had been held and that new system was operational. Though touted as a sea change in the conduct of
governance, the system in fact changed little. The ruling PMLN has simply used this local government system to press on with its centralising tendencies by enhancing the power of the district bureaucracy at the expense of elected local government representatives (and by retaining provincial control or a veto over local level decision-making and staffing). ‘Democratising’ changes at both the national and the local level have not always produced the ‘good governance’ outcomes they were expected to support. In Pakistan, bureaucratic politicisation as a means of control by those in power at the centre seems likely to increase.

At its heart, this is a thesis about the underpinnings of governance. It identifies the ways in which well-connected actors in Pakistan’s most populous province get what they want. Where the public good happens to coincide with their objectives, good governance is the result. But, in other cases, the results are less encouraging.
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The Nation

**Magazines**

286
The Friday Times

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Election issues 2013; 2008
APPENDIX 1

Interview 1
Post: Dean, National Management College (NMC)
Dean’s office, NMC, Lahore; 19 August 2014, 11am

Interview 2
Post: Chief Instructor, National Institute of Management
NIM Campus, Lahore; 19 August 2014, 3pm

Interview 3
Post: Program Director, Punjab Education Sector Reform Program, PAS officer, BPS 19.
PESRP, PMIU, Lahore, 2 September, 2014, 12pm

Interview 4
Post: Director General, Civil Services Academy
Civil Services Academy, Walton Campus, 12 September 2014, 1130am

Interview 5
Post: Teacher, Government Islamia High School, Lahore/Punjab Teachers’ Union General Secretary
Govt Islamia High School (as above), 13 September 2014, 11:15am.

Interview 6
Post: Deputy Secy Higher Education Punjab, PAS officer.
Her office, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Lahore, 18 September, 2014, 9:30am

Interview 7
Post: Chairman WAPDA
Chairman’s office, WAPDA House, Lahore, 19 September, 2014, 4:45pm.

Interview 8

Interview 9
Post: Deputy Secretary, Services, Services and General Administration Department, PAS officer, BPS 18.
Her office, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Lahore, 25 September, 2014, 11am

Interview 10
Post: Secretary Labour and Human Resources, Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 20.
His office, P & D Dept Building, Nabha Road, Lahore, 24 & 29 September, 2014, 11am & 4pm.

Interview 11

360 A full list of interviewee names are available with the author.
Name of Interviewee: Dr Saeed Shafqat  
Post: Professor FC College & Director Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
His office, FC College, Lahore, 30 September, 2014, 2:15pm.

Interview 12  
Post: Secretary Planning and Development, PAS officer, BPS 20.  
His office, P&D Building, Nabah Road, Lahore, 2 October, 2014, 12pm moved to 3:30pm

Interview 13  
Party office, Lahore, 14 October, 2014, 3pm

Interview 14  
Post: Secretary Services, S&GAD, Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 21.  
His office, Civil Secretariat, Lahore, 15 October 2014, 12:30pm

Interview 15  
Post: Advocate of the Supreme Court, ex Governor, ex Minister, legal representative of the PMLN.  
His office, Lahore, 16 October 2014, 10:45am

Interview 16  
Post: Consultant with SNG - Sub National Governance. PAS officer. On leave from the civil service while in BPS 20.  
SNG office, 22 October 2014, 3pm.

Interview 17  
Post: Deputy Secretary Establishment, S&GAD Secretariat, Lahore, 23 October 2014, 9:30am

Interview 18  
Post: Deputy Secretary, NACTA, Federal Ministry of Interior, BPS 18  
Her office, Ministry of Interior, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad, 28 October, 2014, 10am

Interview 19  
Post: Journalist with DAWN Islamabad  
DAWN Islamabad office, Zero Point, 28 October, 2014, 4:30pm

Interview 20  
Post: Retired federal secretary, PAS officer.  
His office, Islamabad, 29 October 2014, 1130am

Interview 21  
Post: Head of the Centre for Civic Education  
His office, Islamabad, 29 October, 2014, 12:30pm

Interview 22  
Party Affiliation: PMLN, MNA NA 117 (Narowal-III), Minister for Planning & Development.
Interview 23
Post: Retired Additional Director of Public Instruction, School Education Department. Quaid College, Lahore, 8 December, 2014, 5pm

Interview 24
Party Affiliation: PTI, MNA NA 126 (Lahore-IX)
Party office, Lahore, 22 November, 2014, 5pm

Interview 25
Party Affiliation: PTI MPA PP 151 (Lahore-XV), Leader of the Opposition in the Punjab Assembly.
Party office, Lahore, 25 November, 2014, 11am

Interview 26
Post: Information and Complaints Officer, School Education Department
School Education Department, Old P&D Building, Nabha Road, Lahore, 27 November 2014, 9:30am

Interview 27
Post: Deputy Secretary Elementary Education
School Education Department, Old P&D Building, Nabha Road, Lahore, 27 November 2014, 10am

Interviews 28 and 29
Post: Head teachers, Government Boys and Girls High Schools, Lidher
Government Boys and Girls High Schools, Lidher, Bedian Road, Lahore, 6 December, 2014, 11am

Interview 30
Post: Deputy Secretary (Confidential), S&GAD, PAS officer, BPS 18
Her office, Punjab Secretariat, Lahore, 12 December 2014, 11am

Interview 31
Post: Professor, SDSB, LUMS
His office, SDSB, LUMS, 15 December, 2014, 10 am

Interview 32
Post: Assistant Professor at LUMS. Retired bureaucrat
His office, SDSB, LUMS, 17 December, 2014, 10am

Interview 33
Post: Rector, National School of Public Policy (NSPP), PAS officer on extension after retirement.
His office, NSPP, Lahore, 9 January 2015, 11am

Interview 34
Post: former Deputy Chairman Planning Commission
His house, Lahore, 10 January 2015, 10:30am

Interview 35
Post: Registrar, Punjab Services Tribunal
His office, PST, Lahore, 14 January 2015, ~ 12pm; 23 January 2015, 11am; 11 February 2015, 12pm

Interview 36
Post: Senior clerk, Punjab Minister for Food
His office, 14 January, 2015, 12:30pm

Interview 37
Post: Additional Secretary Schools, School Edu Department
His office, Nabha Road, Lahore, 26 January 2015, 11:30am

Interview 38
Post: Director of Public Instruction (Secondary Education)
His office, Lahore, 28 January 2015, 10:45am

Interview 39
Post: Director General Civil Defence Department Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 19
Her office, Lahore, 28 January 2015, 11:30am

Interview 40
Post: Director Monitoring, Schools
His office, School Education Department, Lahore, 29 January 2015, 11am

Interview 41
Post: Deputy Secretary Secondary Education
His office, School Education Department, 29 January 2015 9am, 17 February 2015 10am, 24 August 2016, 12pm

Interview 42
Post: Secretary Higher Education Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 21.
His office, Punjab Secretariat, 6 February 2015, 11:45am

Interview 43 & 44
Post: Retired Provincial Civil Service officers
Chenab Club, Faisalabad, 9 February 2015, 12pm

Interview 45
Post: DCO, Narowal, PAS officer.
DCO Complex, Narowal, 12 February 2015, 11:45am

Interview 46
Party Affiliation: PPP, member Central Executive Committee, losing candidate for PPP for NA-121 (Lahore-IV).
His office, Lahore, 12 February 2015, 4pm

Interview 47
Interview 48
Post: Additional Secretary, Home Department, Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 18
His office, Punjab Secretariat, 16 Feb 2015, 11am

Interview 49
Party Affiliation: PPP, former MPA PP-59 (Faisalabad-IX)
His office, Lahore, 19 February 2015, 2:30pm

Interview 50
Post: Section Officer Promotions – IV, School Education Department
His office, SE dept., 24 February 2015, 12 pm & 24 August 2016, 11am

Interview 51
Post: Section Officer (Admin), School Education Department
His office, SE dept., 24 February 2015, 12:30pm

Interview 52
Post: Budget officer, Lahore Education Complex
His office, Education complex, Hall Road, Lahore, 27 February 2015, 10am

Interview 53
Post: Secretary Food Balochistan, PAS officer
His house, Lahore, 1 March 2015, 11am

Interview 54
Post: Punjab Ombudsman. Former Chief Secretary Punjab
His office, Nabha Road, 3 March 2015, 10am

Interview 55
Post: Section Officer Recruitment, School Education Department
His office, SE Department, 10 March 2015, 9am

Interview 56
Post: Section Officer (Secondary Education - I)
His office, SE Department, 11 March 2015, 9:15am

Interview 57
Post: Section Officer (Efficiency & Discipline - I) – Discipline, School Education Department
His office, SE Department, 11 March 2015, 9:45am

Interview 58
Post: Additional Secretary Admin, School Education Department
His office, SE Department, 11 March 2015, 10am

Interview 59
Party Affiliation: PMLN, MPA PP-145 (Lahore-IX)
Outside Services Hospital building, 17 March 2015, 5pm

Interview 60
Party Affiliation: IND, previously PML, PMLQ, PTI. Former MNA NA-94 (Toba Tek Singh-III) and Minister of Education Punjab.
Gymkhana, 18 March 2015, 4:15pm

Interview 61
Party Affiliation: PMLN, MPA PP-138 (Lahore-II)
His office, Lahore, 20 March 2015, 2pm

Interview 62
Party Affiliation: PMLN, MNA NA 123 (Lahore-VI)
His house, Lahore 22 March 2015, 12:30pm

Interview 63
Post: DCO Gujranwala, PAS officer, BPS 18.
His office, Gujranwala, 27 March, 2015, 10am

Interview 64
Post: District Monitoring Officer Edu and Health, Gujranwala
His office, Gujranwala 27 March 2015, 11am

Interview 65
Post: Section Officer Operations, Irrigation
His office, Irrigation Department secretariat, Lahore, 26 March 2015, 10:50am

Interview 66
Post: Head of PMIU Irrigation
His office, Irrigation Department, Lahore, 26 March, 2015, 11:15am-ish

Interview 67
Party Affiliation: PMLQ, Former MPA PP-111 (Gujrat-IV).
Gymkhana, Lahore, 2 April 2015, 2pm

Interview 68, 69, 70
Post: PIDA Employees - Deputy General Manager (Social Mobilisation), Communications Manager, Accounts officer
PIDA office conference room, Irrigation Department Secretariat, Lahore, 6 April 2015, 2pm

Interview 71
Post: EDO (E) Rawalpindi
His office, Education complex, Benazir Bhutto Shaheed Road, Rawalpindi, 8 April 2015, 2pm

Interview 72
Post: Deputy DEO Rawalpindi
His office, Education Complex, Benazir Bhutto Shaheed Road, Rawalpindi, 8 April 2015, 3pm
Interview 73
Post: Project Manager, Alif Ailaan
His office, Alif Ailaan, Islamabad, 9 April 2015, 1145am

Interview 74
Party Affiliation: PMLN. Former Senator (on a PPP ticket) and chairperson of the Benazir Income Support Programme.
His office, Islamabad, 9 April 2015, 4pm

Interview 75
Post: PAS officer, presently OSD. PAS officer, BPS 21. Former Press Secretary to PM Nawaz Sharif.
His house, Lahore, 13 April 2015, 4pm

Interview 76
Post: Retired PAS officer, former Secretary Irrigation
His house, Lahore, 14 April 2015, 11:30am

Interview 77
Post: ex-PAS officer, presently World Bank
Executive Lounge, Third Floor, Avari Hotel, Lahore, 16 April 2015, 4pm

Interview 78
Post: PMLN MPA PP 135 (Narowal-IV)
His home, Lahore. 21 April 2015, 10am

Interview 79
Party Affiliation: IND, formerly PMLQ, PPP. Ex-MNA NA-88 (Jhang-III)
His office, FIFA House, Gaddafi Stadium, Lahore, 25 April 2015, 3pm

Interview 80
Post: PPP member. Former MPA PP-112 (Gujrat-V) and Finance Minister Punjab.
PPP party office, Cantt Lahore, 28 April 2015, 2pm

Interview 81
Post: MPA PMLN PP-100 (Gujranwala-X) (now deceased)
Punjab Assembly, 29 April 2015, 11am

Interview 82
Post: MPA PMLN PP-28 (Sargodha-I)
Punjab Assembly, 29 April 2015, 11am

Interview 83
Post: Former MPA PMLN PP-52 (Faisalabad-II)
His residence DHA Lahore, 29 April 2015, 6pm

Interview 84
Post: Section Officer Admin Irrigation
His office, Irrigation Secretariat Lahore, 4 May, 2015, 11am
Interview 85
Post: Admin officer irrigation
His office, Irrigation Secretariat Lahore, 4 May 2015, 1130am

Interview 86 + 87
Post: Deputy Secretary Irrigation + anonymous bureaucrat
His office, Irrigation Department, 4 May 2015, 10am

Interview 88
Post: Deputy Secretary General Irrigation
Her office, Irrigation Secretariat Lahore, 4 May 2015, 1230pm

Interview 89
Post: Secretary Irrigation, Punjab, PAS Officer, BPS 19.
His office, 6 May 2015, 6pm

Interview 90
Post: MNA PMLN NA-159 (Khanewal-IV)
His office, Barkat Market Lahore, 7 May 2015, 1030am

Interview 91
Post: PMLN party worker
MPA’s Party office, Lahore, 12 May 2015, 11am

Interview 92
Post: MPA PMLN PP-150 (Lahore XIV)
His home, Lahore 12 May 2015, 1pm

Interview 93
Post: MPA PMLN PP-30 (Sargodha-III).
His office, Mall road Lahore, 12 May 2015, 6pm

Interview 94
Post: Budget officer School Education Gujranwala
His office, Gujranwala, 14 May 2015, 11:30am

Interview 95, 96, 97
Post: School Education Gujranwala teachers
EDO office, Gujranwala, 14 May 2015, 12:15pm

Interview 98
Post: Education Grievance Officer Gujranwala
Education office, Gujranwala, 14 May 2015, 11:50am

Interview 99
Post: EXEN Irrigation Gujranwala
Irrigation office, Commissioner office, Gujranwala, 14 May 2015, 1230pm

Interview 100 + 101
Post: DEO E female Hafizabad + 1 her colleague
Her office, Hafizabad, 15 May 2015, 10am

Interview 102
Post: DEO E male Hafizabad
His office, Hafizabad, 15 May 2015, 11:30

Interview 103
Post: Deputy DEO SE Hafizabad
His office, Hafizabad, 15 May 12pm

Interview 104
Post: Superintendent Admin Edu Faisalabad
Education Complex, Faisalabad, 19 May 2015, 1pm

Interview 105
Party Affiliation: PMLN MPA PP-165 (Sheikhupura-IV)
MPA Library, Punjab Assembly, 25 May, 2015, 6:15pm

Interview 106
Party Affiliation: PMLN MPA PP-102 (Gujranwala-XII)
Punjab Assembly MPAs Library, 25 May 2015, 6:30pm

Interview 107
Post: EXEN LCC West Hafizabad
Irrigation office, Faisalabad, 19 May 2015, 3:30pm

Interview 108
Post: Deputy Speaker Punjab Assembly, PMLN MPA PP-247 (Rajanpur-I)
His office, Punjab Assembly, 22 May 9:30am

Interview 109
Party Affiliation: MPA PMLQ PP-32 (Sargodha-V), former Minister for Irrigation; Livestock and Dairy Development
Opposition Chamber, Punjab Assembly, 22 May 2015, 1145am

Interview 110
Post: Assistant director planning and development Faisalabad
His office, Faisalabad, 19 May 2015, 2pm

Interview 111
Post: Deputy DEO Secondary Education Faisalabad
His office, Faisalabad Education Complex, 19 May 2015 2:30pm

Interview 112
Post: Assistant Superintendent Admin irrigation
His office Lahore, 27 May 2015 9:30am

Interviews 113, 114, 115
Post: EXEN Operations Small Dams, Deputy Secretary, Section Officer (ex-SDO)
His office, Lahore Irrigation Secretariat, 27 May 2015, 10am

Interview 116
Post: EXEN Irrigation Lahore
His office, Lahore Irrigation Secretariat, 27 May 2015, 1030am

Interview 117
Post: Deputy Manager PIDA
His office, PIDA, Lahore Irrigation Secretariat, 27 May 2015 10am

Interview 118
Post: retired Irrigation Department bureaucrat
His house, Lahore, 27 May 2015 3pm

Interviews 119, 120, 121
Post: Design in-charge Lahore + 2 SDOs Irrigation
Irrigation office, Dharampura, Lahore, 28 May 2015 11am

Interview 122
Post: Superintendent development irrigation Lahore
His office, Irrigation office, Dharampura, Lahore, 28 May 2015 1pm

Interviews 123, 124
Post: Superintending Engineer UCC Lahore + Additional Secretary Irrigation
His office, Irrigation office, Dharampura, Lahore, 30 May 2015, 9:30am

Interview 125
Post: DEO female Elementary Education Lahore
Her office, Lahore Education Complex, 9 June 2015, 9am

Interview 126
Post: Superintendent male elementary Lahore
His office, Lahore Education Complex, 9 June 2015 9:30am

Interview 127
Post: Student Welfare Officer Lahore
Education Complex, Hall Road, Lahore, 9 June 2015, 10:15am

Interview 128
Post: EDO-E Lahore
His office, Education Complex Lahore, 9 June 2015 11am

Interview 129
Post: Chief engineer development, irrigation, Lahore
His office, Irrigation office, Dharampura, Lahore, 9 June 2015, 1pm

Interview 130, 131
Post: Assistant XEN Gujranwala + Anti-Corruption Establishment officer Gujranwala
His office irrigation building, Gujranwala, 10 June 2015 10am
Interview 132
Post: Head clerk irrigation Gujranwala
His office, Gujranwala, 10 June 2015, 1pm

Interview 133
Post: DEO Elementary Education male Gujranwala
His office, Gujranwala, 10 June 2015 2pm

Interview 134
Post: Deputy DEO Elementary Education male Gujranwala
His office, Gujranwala, 10 June 2015 2:30pm

Interviews 135, 136, 137
Post: DEO-Secondary Education Gujranwala + 2
His office, Gujranwala 10 June 2015, 3pm

Interview 138
Post: MPA PMLN PP-103 (Gujranwala-XIII)
His office, Lahore, 11 June 2015 11am

Interview 139
Post: MPA PMLN PP-94 (Gujranwala-IV)
His office, Lahore, 11 June 2015 2pm

Interview 140
Post: MPA PMLN PP-62 (Faisalabad-XII)
His office, Lahore, 11 June 2015, 4pm

Interview 141
Post: DEO Elementary Education female Narowal
Her office, Narowal, 16 June 2015 9:30am

Interview 142
Post: Irrigation SDO Narowal
Irrigation office complex, Narowal, 16 June 2015 11:30am

Interview 143
Post: EDO Hafizabad
His office, Hafizabad Education Complex, 17 June 2015, 9:30am

Interview 144
Post: DEO Secondary Education Hafizabad
His office, Hafizabad Education Complex, 17 June 2015 10am

Interviews 145, 146, 147
Post: SDO Gujranwala , 2 Sub-Engineers Gujranwala
SDO’s office, Gujranwala, 17 June 12pm

Interview 148
PEF office Gulberg Lahore, 18 June 2015 11am

Interview 149
Post: Superintending Engineer Lahore link Canal
His office, Lahore, 25 June 2015 10am

Interview 150
Post: SDO Lahore
His office, Lahore, 25 June 2015, 11am

Interview 151
Post: MPA PMLN PP-1 (Rawalpindi-I), Minister Labour and Human Resources
His office, Lahore, 9 July 2015 10am

Interview 152
Post: Lahore Superintending Engineer + 1 colleague
His office, Dharampura, Lahore, 9 July 2015, 3pm

Interview 153
Post: DCO Sargodha
His office, Sargodha, 28 July 2015, 10am

Interview 154
Post: SDO Sargodha
Irrigation complex Sargodha, 28 July 2015 11:30 am

Interview 155
Post: EXEN Sargodha
His office, Irrigation complex Sargodha, 28 July 2015 12pm

Interview 156
Post: School Education Department Law Officer Sargodha
His office, Sargodha, 28 July 2015 1pm

Interview 157, 158
Post: Section Officer admin (non-gazetted officers) irrigation + 1 colleague
His office, Irrigation Secretariat, Lahore, 31 August 2015 9am

Interview 159
Post: Section Officer Enquiries irrigation
His office, Irrigation Secretariat, Lahore, 31 August 2015 10am
Semi-Participant Ethnographic Observations

Courts

Politician’s offices
PMLN MNA, office Lahore, 14 October, 2014
PTI MNA, office Lahore, 22 November, 2014
PMLN MNA office, Lahore, 7 May 2015
PMLN MPA office, Lahore, 12 May 2015
Deputy Speaker Punjab Assembly’s office, 22 May
MPA PMLN, his office Lahore, 11 June 2015

Bureaucrats’ offices
Deputy Secretary’s office, School Education Department, 29 January 2015, 17 February 2015, 24 August 2016,
Secretary Higher Education Punjab’s office, Punjab Secretariat, 6 February 2015
Secretary Planning and Development’s office, P&D Building, Nabah Road, Lahore, 2 October, 2014
DPI (Secondary Education) office Lahore, office, 28 January 2015
DG office Civil Defence Department Punjab, office, Lahore
Additional Secretary, Home Department, Punjab, office, Lahore
EDO (E) Rawalpindi office, 8 April 2015
Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), Disciplinary meeting with head of school in public-private partnership, PEF office Gulberg Lahore, 18 June 2015
APPENDIX 2

Organogram – Government of Punjab

Chief Minister

Chief Secretary

Additional Chief Secretary

Secretary Services (S&GAD)

Provincial Cabinet (Ministers)

Special Assistants and Advisors to the CM

Departmental Secretaries
Organogram – Punjab School Education Department

Minister for Education

Secretary, School Education Department

Special Secretary, School Education Department

Additional Secretaries – Schools, General, Budget and Planning, Education Reforms, & (since the new local government system) District Education

Deputy Secretaries – Administration, Elementary, Secondary, Efficiency & Discipline, Academic, Litigation, Budget and Planning, & Education

Director Monitoring

Section officers – Administration, Elementary, Secondary, Efficiency & Discipline, Academic, Litigation, Budget & Planning, & Education

Executive District Officer - Education

District Education Officers & Deputy District Education Officers

Assistant Education Officers

Head teachers & Principals

Teachers – elementary, primary, secondary

District level and below

Secretariat in Lahore
APPENDIX 3

INTERVIEW GUIDE - POLITICIANS

PERSONAL HISTORY AND POLITICAL CAREER

When did you first contest an election?
Have you contested from multiple or different constituencies?
Are you usually resident in your present constituency?
Is your family amongst the top 20% of landholding families in your constituency?
Is any other member of your family in politics?
Is a member of your family in the bureaucracy or in the military?
Have you ever held party office?
Have you ever switched parties or contested as an independent? If yes, why?
Have you ever held a position in the Cabinet?
If yes, why do you think you were chosen for this position?

RELATIONSHIP OF PARTY WITH THE CANDIDATE and CONSTITUENCY

What function does the political party serve for the candidate? Does the party provide an access to winning state resources?
How does your political party establish links with the citizen? Programmatic agendas, charismatic leadership, or ties to particular local groups?
Does your party have a clear ideological position? What is it?
Explain to me how policy is made in your party. Research and policy-making unit?
How many people are dedicated to this task?
How strong are lobbies, businesses and businessmen in impacting policy?
What is the role of civil servants in policy making and implementation?

Does your party have a policy on education? Can I have a copy?
How were such policies developed?

BEFORE ELECTION

PREPARATIONS
How do you prepare for an election – when do you start preparing? How do you prepare? Walk me through it
Do you think your seat is a safe seat or a competitive one?
What are the major local families, biraderis and social cleavages in your constituency?
What is the difference between urban and rural settings within the constituency?
How much autonomy does the individual candidate have when designing his campaign strategy?
What is the candidate selection process? When does the party let you know that you will be its candidate?
What are your core priorities/concerns at this time?
What do constituents expect from you?

THE ISSUES
Does your *party* assist with constituency politics/development?
If other parties have won from your constituency in the past, how are you different from them? Do you do different types of things, or simply more of the things people like? Apart from ‘development’, jobs, and education, what do people like?
Does it make a difference to you as a constituency politician if your party is in or out of provincial or federal government during the election campaign? Explain.
Do you think it is easier for a *politician* to win as an incumbent?
Do you think it is easier for a *party* to win as an incumbent?

**MONEY**
How much do you spend – approx. – on an election?
Where does this money come from? Does the party help? Personal?
Are accounts kept of this money? Can I get a copy?
How much money is usually made available to you by the government (per year) at your discretion for your constituency?
Have you ever faced problems in either receiving, accessing or spending this money?
How is this money spent? Are accounts kept and submitted? Who keeps these accounts? If so, are they public/can I have a copy?
Does the party control how this money is spent?
In terms of development funds, when is the greatest amount spent - soon after the election or close to an upcoming election?

**PEOPLE**
Do you think it is important for a politician and a party to have connections in the bureaucracy and with businessmen?
In your opinion, do businessmen in this country influence elections/campaigns?
How/Why not?
Are bureaucrats useful in campaigns? How?

To what extent do parties make an effort to ensure compatibility between MPA and MNA candidates when handing out tickets?
Are electoral campaigns, efforts before the election, more difficult if the MPA is from a different party?
During your campaign/s, have you ever faced opposition or restrictions from anyone?
How are these restrictions to be overcome? Can parties, party leaders, courts, or bureaucrats help?
If a minister at any point - is it easier to campaign as a sitting minister? What are the advantages?
There tends to be a flurry of development activity just prior to an election. How do you make such work happen on such a tight deadline? What needs to be done to ensure that ministerial instructions are carried through?
If has held/holds party office - is this useful prior to an election? How?
When you are the incumbent, what are the advantages of campaigning in your constituency?
Have you ever had to campaign in a constituency in which you have no roots?

If party-switcher - when you changed your party, did you find it harder to campaign, to convince people to support you?
Do bureaucrats make things more difficult if you have changed parties? Why or why not?
Do bureaucrats make things more difficult if you are from a certain party?
How did you appeal to voters after you had changed parties?

To what extent is constituency politics and campaigning easier if your party is ruling at the centre?
Is it also easier if your party is ruling at the province but not the centre?
Does it make a difference if they are the ruling party at both centre and province?

PROCESSES
How do district level bureaucracies prepare for elections?
Who is in charge of delimitation?
Who does the measuring and counting for delimitation?
Who is in charge of voter lists?
Who does the door to door work for the list?
It has been a while since the census, but who would be responsible?
What was the impact of Musharraf’s devolution?
What has changed since that devolution was suspended?
Are bureaucrats more powerful now or were they before?
Do you think a local government system is needed? Why or why not?
Can bureaucrats impact election processes and results?
Are polling staff neutral?

AFTER ELECTION

PRIORITIES
What happens after the election? What are your core priorities in your constituency?
What expectations do constituents have right after an election? How have they changed?
Does the party have any expectations of you post-election?

Do you think that your preoccupations and interests as a politician change before and after an election? Explain. How does this work for incumbents seeking reelection?
Do policy priorities change for you or for your party?
Does the behavior of bureaucrats change before and after an election?

How has your relationship been with MPAs from your own party?
What happens in terms of constituency politics if the MPA is from a different party?
How do MPAs from a different party impact the post-election scenario?
If has held/holds party office -Is it useful after an election (provided you won)? How?

Are party policy ideas actively pursued when in office? Why or why not?
Is policy implementation blocked? By whom?

BUSINESSMEN
In your opinion, do businessmen in this country influence politics and decision making after the election? How/Why not?

BUREAUCRATS
What problems do politicians face when fulfilling their agenda once elected to office?
How are these problems exacerbated by the bureaucracy?
Does the bureaucracy manipulate circumstances, or directly interfere? In what ways?
Have bureaucrats ever clearly disobeyed you?
How do you deal with such situations?

How do you view the politician-bureaucrat relationship in general?
How have politicians’ relationships with the bureaucracy changed over time? Give examples of cooperation, cooptation or confrontation?
Are there specific situations where this relationship is smoother/harder? Explain.
Do you think bureaucratic power needs to be reduced?
How would you suggest doing that?

In your opinion, who are bureaucrats loyal to?
To whom should they owe loyalty?
Is there a list of favoured bureaucrats for each party? Like for the PMLN, PPP, etc.
PMLN, Shahbaz Sharif are said to have a close relationship with bureaucrats, BB is said to have maintained a list of favoured bureaucrats, Zardari is known to have cronies. Do you agree?

Do you think bureaucrats are hired on merit?
How and when are bureaucrats assigned, for example to the education department?
Have you ever had a constituent complain about a bureaucrat? If yes, what did you do then?
Have you ever had a constituent ask you for a job in the district bureaucracy? If yes, when and what did you do then?
Has a bureaucrat ever asked you for a promotion or transfer? If yes, when and what did you do then? What were the terms?
Do you have any say in promotions or transfers?

What is ‘acting incharge’? Do you have any say in such appointments?
What is Officer on Special Duty? Do you have any say in such appointments?

Governments often put in place bans on transfers and postings. Why?
Who makes these decisions?
Is such a move more likely before or after an election?
Is the ban respected? Or are ways found around it? What are those ways?
Where can I get a record of appointments, transfers, promotions in the education department in a district?

EDUCATION
What are your thoughts on government provision of education in your constituency?
How many primary and secondary schools are there?
Do you know if they are all functional?
Have you initiated any changes in the education set up in your area?
Which bureaucrat is the most influential in the education set up in your area?
Have you ever felt that the bureaucrats are not listening to you?
Have you ever felt that the bureaucrats are not doing their job?
If yes to either, what did you do?
Have you ever complained about a bureaucrat in the education department? To whom and what was the result?
How are teachers appointed to schools in your area? Who makes the decision and on what basis?
Do you know any of these teachers personally?
How is the EDO appointed? His PA? DCO? AEO?
What is your relationship like with the EDO, AEO in your area?

INTERVIEW GUIDE – BUREAUCRATS

PERSONAL HISTORY AND CAREER
What year did you enter the civil service?
Why did you choose the specific cadre you are in?
Are there/Have there been other members of your family in the civil service?
Are there/Have there been members of your family involved in elected office?
Where are you originally from - town, district, constituency?
What offices, appointments have you held?
What districts have you been posted to? Who posted you there?
Have you ever been acting in-charge?
Have you ever been made OSD?
Have you ever been affiliated with a political party?

THE BUREAUCRACY
Explain the bureaucratic hierarchy to me in terms of grades and cadres.
Who oversees the district bureaucracy?
Explain to me the source of the DMG’s prestige.
Do you think the DMG has too much power?

SELECTION and TRAINING
Walk me through your selection and training process.
During training, what are you taught about your interaction with politicians?
To whom do you owe loyalty?

TASKS
What tasks do DMG officers perform?
What duties were you expected to perform in the different positions you have held?
Do you think individual bureaucrats are able to impact decisions through their bureaucratic or political contacts? For example, kin, caste, old school tie, etc
Do you think bureaucrats shape decisions through information to which they have access?

Explain to me how policy decisions are made in Pakistan. Who plays what role? What is the procedure to, for example, make a policy re education?

APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS and TRANSFERS ETC
Explain to me how appointments, transfers and promotions take place in the civil service. Walk me through your own. Why do you think you were transferred and/or promoted?
In your experience, is merit of primary importance in bureaucratic appointments, transfers and promotions?
Is there a Transfer Sanctioning Authority? Who is the ultimate arbiter of transfers? What is acting in-charge? Who makes such appointments and why?
What is Officer on Special Duty? Who makes such appointments and why?
Have you ever made an appointment/promotion? If yes, what factors do you keep in mind in deciding?
When were you most likely to make appts/promos/trans? Before or after an election?
The government frequently places a ban on transfers and postings. What happens at such times? Is there contract hiring?
Why is the ban put in in the first place, and who decided to put it in?
In your opinion, are such bans more likely before or after an election? Why?
Where can I get a record of appointments, transfers, promotions in the education department in a specific district?

GENERAL ELECTIONS
1) The ECP uses district officials to do some of its work. In your opinion, is this a good or bad idea?
2) To what extent do bureaucrats at the provincial and district levels have the ability to influence the electoral process?

BEFORE ELECTION
What is the role of district bureaucrats in the lead up to a general election?
Specifically, the DCO, the DEO, EDOs (education in particular).
When does preparation for the election start amongst district bureaucracies?
Who monitors the election related activities of the district bureaucracy?

What is the chain of command in a district in the run up to the election?
What is the role of PCS officers in electoral decision making at the district level?
What is the role of DMG officers in electoral decision making at the district level?
Are these roles (of PCS and DMG officers) within their legal powers? Or do you think they exceed them?

Do you think polling staff are neutral?
How and by whom are polling agents (including Presiding Officers) chosen?
Criteria?
Is it possible to influence these appointments?
Do politicians try and influence them? How?
Do PCS officers try to influence them?
Do DMG officers try to influence them?
Who trains polling staff?
Who decides where to set up polling stations?
Who is in charge of election finances in a district?
Who is in charge of any delimitation exercise? Who chooses the officers who will do the actual re-drawing of boundaries?
Who checks voter lists? Who chooses the officers who go door to door?
Do politicians influence these appointments? How?
Do you think election management at district level ensures fairness in the electoral process?
As a bureaucrat, did you play any role during the last election? And in elections before that?
How did Musharraf’s devolution impact the role of district bureaucracies in the election?

Since the devolved set up has been suspended, what has changed since?

Do bureaucrats assist politicians during the election? Why? How?

Are bureaucratic appointments/transfer/promotions more frequent before or after an election? Why?

Do you think there is a difference in district management of elections in competitive seats as compared to safe seats?

Do politicians in competitive seats make more of an effort/attempt to influence the appointment of polling staff?

Are politicians who have not been able to deliver services to their constituents more likely to influence polling staff appointments?

In a constituency where the MPA and MNA are from different parties, do bureaucrats choose sides? On what basis?

When politicians switch parties, do bureaucrats shift loyalties?

AFTER ELECTION

Once the election is over, what is the first interaction between the politician and district bureaucrats?

Does the newly elected politician influence appointments/promotions/transfer to get the people he wants in power?

Is this more likely to happen if:

- Competitive or safe seat
- Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won)
- MPA and MNA from different parties
- Politician recently switched parties
- Incumbent party wins but with different candidate
- Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins

Do bureaucrats have influence over politicians in developing policy?

If incumbent wins, is he in a weaker or stronger position vis a vis his ability to pressurize bureaucrats?

Do newly elected politicians (non-incumbents) make more political appointments than an incumbent winner? Why? Who do they appoint?

When a new person is elected, what are the first actions of the district bureaucracy, specifically DCO?

Usually, do polling staff remain in their position after elections? Or are they promoted? Or transferred?

Are teacher appointments higher before or after an election?

Are party loyalists appointed before or after elections? To what positions?

How do such appointments take place – do these people go through the merit process? If not, what is the process through which they get the post?

How do politicians get bureaucrats to make these appointments?

How is the appointment of such loyalists effected by:

- Competitive or safe seat
- Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won)
- MPA and MNA from different parties
- Politician recently switched parties
- Incumbent party wins but with different candidate

...
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins

INTERACTION
What is the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats?
How does the bureaucrat-politician relationship develop?
What is the role of the political party in this relationship?
Does the bureaucrat approach the politician to form a tie? Under what circumstances is this more likely than the other way around?
At what time in the electoral cycle is this more/less likely?

Is an external actor involved in connecting politician and bureaucrat? A businessman? Another bureaucrat? Another politician? A family member?
Is this more likely before or after an election?

Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by the politician being a minister - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by whether the seat is competitive or safe - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by the politician’s service delivery record - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted by the MNA and MPA being from different parties - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted if the politician is not an incumbent - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted if the politician is a party switcher - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted if the politician holds party office - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted by the seniority/place in hierarchy of the bureaucrat - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?

Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats? How? At what level of the hierarchy? When?
How do these factors impact the pressure exerted by politicians on bureaucrats:
Competitive or safe seat
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won)
MPA and MNA from different parties
Politician recently switched parties
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins
Politician is a minister

What are the consequences of resisting such pressure?
Do bureaucrats manipulate politicians? How? At what level of the hierarchy? When?
How do these factors impact the manipulation of politicians by bureaucrats:
Competitive or safe seat
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won)
MPA and MNA from different parties
Politician recently switched parties
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins
Politician is a minister

What are the consequences of resisting/fighting back against such manipulation?

Do politicians ‘request’ bureaucrats to do something? In what situation is it a request and not an order? When?
How do ties of kin, caste, old school tie, etc. between politicians and between bureaucrats matter? When do they matter most?
Do politicians, parties favour specific bureaucrats? Examples?
Do bureaucrats prefer working with particular politicians? Is this preference stronger at particular times or in particular situations?
Do senior bureaucrats have preferences amongst their juniors in terms of appointments/transfers/promotions? Why? What do they do about it?
Do you prefer working with bureaucrats you already know? Why or why not?

What is the role of bureaucrats in constituency politics - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do bureaucrats ignore politicians’ orders - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Do bureaucrats disobey politicians’ orders?
What are the consequences of such disobedience?

Do bureaucrats obstruct/ delay politicians’ orders? Why? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do senior bureaucrats move around junior ones at the request of politicians? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister
Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of constituents? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of influential businessmen? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of other groups (religious, military, etc.) - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do politicians ask bureaucrats for help in pressurizing other bureaucrats? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do the political parties maintain relationships with specific bureaucrats (at federal, provincial, district levels)?
How are these ties maintained?
When are they strongest - - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?

What is the relationship like between DMG officers and Provincial Service officers?
What is the relationship of DMG officers with politicians? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
What is the relationship of Provincial Service officers with politicians? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
How are they different and why?

In your opinion, are decisions on policy influenced by businessmen? Saigols, Dawoods, Riaz, etc
How do businessmen influence decisions? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election? With whom do they interact?
Do businessmen have links with bureaucrats? Familial, work, exchange?

During your career, do you think that the bureaucracy has changed? How?
During your career, do you think the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians has changed? How? Does it vary over time?
During your career, do you think that there are significant variations in bureaucratic-politician ties, behaviour before and after elections?

INTERVIEW GUIDE – EDUCATION OFFICIALS

How did the 18th amendment change the handling of education?
How did local government under Musharraf impact education?
How important are posts in the education department from a political perspective?
Who appoints teachers?
Who decides teacher transfers?
Do teachers request transfers? Why?
Do politicians request transfers for teachers?
Who do they go to make such requests?
What is the deal between a politician and bureaucrat to allow such transfers to happen?
Why are teaching jobs so politicized?
What are the duties of teachers, apart from teaching?
What role do teachers play in elections?
What role do education department bureaucrats play in elections?
Explain the education bureaucracy to me
How are officials appointed to education departments at district level?
Do you think they are appointed on merit?
To what extent do you think politicians can and do interfere in these appointments?
Does the level of interference increase before an election?
Does the level of interference decrease after an election?
Is interference greater in constituencies with smaller margins?
Is the interference affected by other factors – development, party, finances, etc?
How frequently do transfers of these officials take place?
How are transfers decided and by whom?
How frequent are promotions?
Who decides on promotions?
Where can I get a record of appts, trans, promos?

QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO DISTRICT - FOR BUREAUCRATS

Tell me about your district.
How many constituencies in your district?
Who are the major politicians and parties?
What are the major biraderis, families in the area?
Explain what your relationship with them is like
How many teachers are hired in total?
Are any of the constituencies competitive? Which ones are safe?
What are elections like in your district?
What is the role of teachers in elections?
Have any of them been hired, transferred at the request of a politician or other influential?
Have you ever rejected a request for such an appointment/transfer? What were the consequences?
Who appoints you?
What are your duties?
Have you ever been pressured by anyone in discharging your duties?
Have you ever been transferred?
Do you fear being transferred?
When were you last promoted?
Are regular promotions possible?
Were you ever placed as acting in charge?
On what basis do you appoint teachers?
Have you ever had someone approach you to appoint a teacher against the rules?
On what basis do you transfer or promote teachers?
Have you ever had someone approach you to transfer/promote a teacher against the rules?
Who exerts this pressure? Politicians? Senior bureaucrats?
To what extent do provincial bureaucrats interfere with your work?
Where can I get a record of transfers, appointments, promotions?

INTERVIEW GUIDE – ACADEMICS/JOURNALISTS/POLITICAL OBSERVERS
OF Political parties/politicians

POLICY MAKING
How is policy made in Pakistan’s political parties?
How strong are lobbies, businesses and businessmen in impacting policy?
What is the role of civil servants in policy making and implementation?

ELECTIONS
Does it make a difference to you as a constituency politician if your party is in or out of provincial or federal government during the election campaign? Explain.
Do you think it is easier for a politician to win as an incumbent?
Do you think it is easier for a party to win as an incumbent?

What is the importance of development funds to politicians?
How are such monies spent? Who decides?
Are they used to control politicians by blocking receiving, accessing or spending this money?
How much control do bureaucrats have over development funds and how they are utilised?
In terms of development funds, when is the greatest amount spent - soon after the election or close to an upcoming election?
There tends to be a flurry of development activity just prior to an election. How do you make such work happen on such a tight deadline? What needs to be done to ensure that ministerial instructions are carried through?
Do you think it is important for a politician and a party to have connections in the bureaucracy and with businessmen?
In your opinion, do businessmen in this country influence elections/campaigns?
How/Why not?
Are bureaucrats useful in campaigns? How?

To what extent do parties make an effort to ensure compatibility between MPA and MNA candidates when handing out tickets?
Are electoral campaigns, efforts before the election, more difficult if the MPA is from a different party?
Do bureaucrats make things more difficult if a politician has changed parties? Why or why not?
Do bureaucrats make things more difficult if a politician is from a certain party?
To what extent is constituency politics and campaigning easier if the politicians’ party is ruling at the centre?
Is it also easier if party is ruling at the province but not the centre?
Does it make a difference if they are the ruling party at both centre and province?

PROCESSES
How do district level bureaucracies prepare for elections?
Who is in charge of delimitation?
Who does the measuring and counting for delimitation?
Who is in charge of voter lists?
Who does the door to door work for the list?
It has been a while since the census, but who would be responsible?
What was the impact of Musharraf’s devolution?
What has changed since that devolution was suspended?
Are bureaucrats more powerful now or were they before?
Do you think a local government system is needed? Why or why not?
Can bureaucrats impact election processes and results?
Are polling staff neutral?

Do you think that preoccupations and interests of a politician change before and after an election? Explain. How does this work for incumbents seeking reelection?
Do policy priorities change for the politician or the party?
Does the behavior of bureaucrats change before and after an election?
Are party policy ideas actively pursued when in office? Why or why not?
Is policy implementation blocked? By whom?

BUSINESSMEN
In your opinion, do businessmen in this country influence politics and decision making after the election? How/Why not?

BUREAUCRATS
What problems do politicians face when fulfilling their agenda once elected to office?
How are these problems exacerbated by the bureaucracy?
Does the bureaucracy manipulate circumstances, or directly interfere? In what ways?
How do you view the politician-bureaucrat relationship in general? How have politicians’ relationships with the bureaucracy changed over time? Give examples of cooperation, cooptation or confrontation? Are there specific situations where this relationship is smoother/harder? Explain. Do you think bureaucratic power needs to be reduced? How would you suggest doing that?

In your opinion, who are bureaucrats loyal to? To whom should they owe loyalty? Is there a list of favoured bureaucrats for each party? Like for the PMLN, PPP, etc. PMLN, Shahbaz Sharif are said to have a close relationship with bureaucrats, BB is said to have maintained a list of favoured bureaucrats, Zardari is known to have cronies. Do you agree?

Do you think bureaucrats are hired on merit? How and when are bureaucrats assigned, for example to the education department? Governments often put in place bans on transfers and postings. Why? Who makes these decisions? Is such a move more likely before or after an election? Is the ban respected? Or are ways found around it? What are those ways?

INTERVIEW GUIDE – ACADEMICS/JOURNALISTS/POLITICAL OBSERVERS OF BUREAUCRACIES

Explain the bureaucratic hierarchy to me in terms of grades and cadres. Who oversees the district bureaucracy? Explain to me the source of the DMG’s prestige. Do you think the DMG has too much power?

SELECTION and TRAINING
Walk me through the selection and training process. During training, what are bureaucrats taught about their interaction with politicians?

What tasks do DMG officers perform? Do you think individual bureaucrats are able to impact decisions through their bureaucratic or political contacts? For example, kin, caste, old school tie, etc Do you think bureaucrats shape decisions through information to which they have access? Explain to me how policy decisions are made in Pakistan. Who plays what role? What is the procedure to, for example, make a policy re education?

APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS and TRANSFERS ETC
Explain to me how appointments, transfers and promotions take place in the civil service. In your experience, is merit of primary importance in bureaucratic appointments, transfers and promotions?

Is there a Transfer Sanctioning Authority? Who is the ultimate arbiter of transfers? What is acting in-charge? Who makes such appointments and why? What is Officer on Special Duty? Who makes such appointments and why?
When were burs most likely to make appts/promos/trans? Before or after an election? The government frequently places a ban on transfers and postings. What happens at such times? Is there contract hiring?
Why is the ban put in in the first place, and who decided to put it in?
In your opinion, are such bans more likely before or after an election? Why?
The ECP uses district officials to do some of its work. In your opinion, is this a good or bad idea?
2) To what extent do bureaucrats at the provincial and district levels have the ability to influence the electoral process?

BEFORE ELECTION

What is the role of district bureaucrats in the lead up to a general election?
Specifically, the DCO, the DEO, EDOs (education in particular).
When does preparation for the election start amongst district bureaucracies?
Who monitors the election related activities of the district bureaucracy?

What is the chain of command in a district in the run up to the election?
What is the role of PCS officers in electoral decision making at the district level?
What is the role of DMG officers in electoral decision making at the district level?
Are these roles (of PCS and DMG officers) within their legal powers? Or do you think they exceed them?
Do you think polling staff are neutral?
How and by whom are polling agents (including Presiding Officers) chosen?
Criteria?
Is it possible to influence these appointments?
Do politicians try and influence them? How?
Do PCS officers try to influence them?
Do DMG officers try to influence them?
Who trains polling staff?
Who decides where to set up polling stations?
Who is in charge of election finances in a district?
Who is in charge of any delimitation exercise? Who chooses the officers who will do the actual re-drawing of boundaries?
Who checks voter lists? Who chooses the officers who go door to door?
Do politicians influence these appointments? How?
Do you think election management at district level ensures fairness in the electoral process?

How did Musharraf’s devolution impact the role of district bureaucracies in the election?
Since the devolved set up has been suspended, what has changed since?
Do bureaucrats assist politicians during the election? Why? How?
Are bureaucratic appointments/transfers/promotions more frequent before or after an election? Why?
Do you think there is a difference in district management of elections in competitive seats as compared to safe seats?
Do politicians in competitive seats make more of an effort/attempt to influence the appointment of polling staff?
Are politicians who have not been able to deliver services to their constituents more likely to influence polling staff appointments?
In a constituency where the MPA and MNA are from different parties, do bureaucrats choose sides? On what basis?
When politicians switch parties, do bureaucrats shift loyalties?

AFTER ELECTION
Once the election is over, what is the first interaction between the politician and district bureaucrats?
Does the newly elected politician influence appointments/promotions/transfers to get the people he wants in power?
Is this more likely to happen if:
Competitive or safe seat
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won)
MPA and MNA from different parties
Politician recently switched parties
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins

Do bureaucrats have influence over politicians in developing policy?
If incumbent wins, is he in a weaker or stronger position vis a vis his ability to pressurize bureaucrats?
Do newly elected politicians (non-incumbents) make more political appointments than an incumbent winner? Why? Who do they appoint?
When a new person is elected, what are the first actions of the district bureaucracy, specifically DCO?
Usually, do polling staff remain in their position after elections? Or are they promoted? Or transferred?
Are teacher appointments higher before or after an election?
Are party loyalists appointed before or after elections? To what positions?
How do such appointments take place – do these people go through the merit process? If not, what is the process through which they get the post?
How do politicians get bureaucrats to make these appointments?
How is the appointment of such loyalists effected by:
Competitive or safe seat
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won)
MPA and MNA from different parties
Politician recently switched parties
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins

INTERACTION
What is the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats?
How does the bureaucrat-politician relationship develop?
What is the role of the political party in this relationship?
Does the bureaucrat approach the politician to form a tie? Under what circumstances is this more likely than the other way around?
At what time in the electoral cycle is this more/less likely?
Is an external actor involved in connecting politician and bureaucrat? A businessman? Another bureaucrat? Another politician? A family member?
Is this more likely before or after an election?

Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by the politician being a minister - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by whether the seat is competitive or safe - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by the politician’s service delivery record - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted by the MNA and MPA being from different parties - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted if the politician is not an incumbent - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted if the politician is a party switcher - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted if the politician holds party office - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
Is this relationship impacted by the seniority/place in hierarchy of the bureaucrat - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?

Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats? How? At what level of the hierarchy? When?
How do these factors impact the pressure exerted by politicians on bureaucrats:
Competitive or safe seat
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won)
MPA and MNA from different parties
Politician recently switched parties
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins
Politician is a minister

What are the consequences of resisting such pressure?
Do bureaucrats manipulate politicians? How? At what level of the hierarchy? When?
How do these factors impact the manipulation of politicians by bureaucrats:
Competitive or safe seat
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won)
MPA and MNA from different parties
Politician recently switched parties
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins
Politician is a minister

What are the consequences of resisting/fighting back against such manipulation?
Do politicians ‘request’ bureaucrats to do something? In what situation is it a request and not an order? When?

How do ties of kin, caste, old school tie, etc. between politicians and between bureaucrats matter? When do they matter most?

Do politicians, parties favour specific bureaucrats? Examples?

Do bureaucrats prefer working with particular politicians? Is this preference stronger at particular times or in particular situations?

Do senior bureaucrats have preferences amongst their juniors in terms of appointments/transfers/promotions? Why? What do they do about it?

Do you prefer working with bureaucrats you already know? Why or why not?

What is the role of bureaucrats in constituency politics - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?

If seat is competitive or safe?

If service delivery record is poor

If MPA/MNA is from a different party

If recently switched parties

If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner

If minister

Do bureaucrats ignore politicians’ orders - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?

Do bureaucrats disobey politicians’ orders?

What are the consequences of such disobedience?

Do bureaucrats obstruct/ delay politicians’ orders? Why? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?

If seat is competitive or safe?

If service delivery record is poor

If MPA/MNA is from a different party

If recently switched parties

If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner

If minister

Do senior bureaucrats move around junior ones at the request of politicians? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?

If seat is competitive or safe?

If service delivery record is poor

If MPA/MNA is from a different party

If recently switched parties

If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner

If minister

Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats *on behalf of constituents*? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?

If seat is competitive or safe?

If service delivery record is poor

If MPA/MNA is from a different party

If recently switched parties

If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of influential businessmen? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of other groups (religious, military, etc.) - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do politicians ask bureaucrats for help in pressurizing other bureaucrats? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
If seat is competitive or safe?
If service delivery record is poor
If MPA/MNA is from a different party
If recently switched parties
If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner
If minister

Do the political parties maintain relationships with specific bureaucrats (at federal, provincial, district levels)?
How are these ties maintained?
When are they strongest - - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
What is the relationship like between DMG officers and Provincial Service officers?
What is the relationship of DMG officers with politicians? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
What is the relationship of Provincial Service officers with politicians? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election?
How are they different and why?
In your opinion, are decisions on policy influenced by businessmen? Saigols, Dawoods, Riaz, etc
How do businessmen influence decisions? - (a) before the election; (b) after the election? With whom do they interact?
Do businessmen have links with bureaucrats? Familial, work, exchange?
Do you think that the bureaucracy has changed? How?
Do you think the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians has changed? How?
Does it vary over time?
Do you think that there are significant variations in bureaucratic-politician ties, behaviour before and after elections?
INTERVIEW GUIDE for BUREAUCRACY TRAINERS

Could you please give me a brief synopsis of your career in the civil service. Please walk me through the selection and training process for bureaucrats, highlighting the role of the CSA.

What is the profile of CSA inductees? Is there a record kept that I can access?

What are the core elements of the training provided by the CSA - Common and Specialized?

Are there any practical elements to the syllabus?

Can I get access to the syllabi?

Is there training provided regarding policy making? Could you please give examples from both the Common and Specialized programs?

How is the policy making process explained to newly inducted bureaucrats?

Is there training provided to guide bureaucrats regarding their interaction with (1) other bureaucrats, especially PAS with PCS officers; (2) politicians; (3) other influentials; (4) ordinary citizens?

What are bureaucrats taught about their interaction with politicians?

In your opinion, what is the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats? Is it different from what the CSA teaches?


Most bureaucrats will at some point be pressured to do something. Does the CSA teach them how to deal with such pressure? How?

Are there particular courses on election management, perhaps for the PAS?

What are the concerns that bureaucrats bring up during their training on either course?

How is the PAS training different from other specialized groups?

What is the source of the PAS/DMG’s prestige?

Do you think the PAS/DMG has too much power?

In your opinion, is there a difference in the interaction of DMG officers with politicians, and the interaction of bureaucrats from other groups with politicians?

How did Musharraf’s devolution plan impact training imparted here at CSA?

How much influence does the government have on the training of bureaucrats? For example, when a government changes, is there pressure to change the training regime in any way?

Once the training courses are complete, does the CSA get feedback from its students on the courses?

Does the CSA get feedback from senior bureaucrats in the field or from those who conduct trainings for more senior bureaucrats?

Does the CSA retain contact with alumni, invite them back?

Are there ever alumni who turn to the staff at the CSA for advice later in their careers?

If so, on what sort of issues?

Do you think that the bureaucracy has changed? How?

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1 Man kills himself so his son is given a job. 24 May 2017. DAWN. Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1335085> [Accessed 6 June 2017].