

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in *Place, identity, and national imagination in post-war Taiwan* [2015], available online:
<https://www.routledge.com/Place-Identity-and-National-Imagination-in-Post-war-Taiwan-1st-Edition/Chang/p/book/9781138788282>

Formatted: Left

Formatted: Font: Italic, Complex Script Font: Italic

Chapter 1. Introduction

Homeland Building: Nationalism, Identity, and Geographical Imagination in post-war Taiwan

In 2004, two Kuomintang (KMT, *Zhongguo guomindang*)¹ candidates running for the Presidency of Taiwan each made the public gesture of kneeling down to kiss the ground during their election campaigns. This symbolic act by the politicians was an unambiguous demonstration of their deep love for, and undying allegiance to, Taiwan. The last two decades of Taiwan's history have been marked by a dramatic transformation in indigenous identity, expressed both in the rise of Taiwanese consciousness and a steady growth in Taiwan-centrism. Representing a party that has often stood accused of being "a foreign regime" (*wailai zhengquan*) (Shiba 1994), the KMT candidates' attempt to win favor by declaring their love for and loyalty to Taiwan – by kissing the ground and kowtowing to the land – may simply have been a political necessity. However, behind the media hype and the opposition's mockery, this political act can also be understood as a meaningful spatial practice; a strategy that signifies both membership and ownership of the land, producing spatial markers that identify its performers as insiders.

In the last few decades, issues of Taiwan identity, the dramatic changes it has undergone,

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

the reasons for these changes, and the ways in which they have taken place, have been of great interest for many scholars working across various disciplines in both Taiwan Studies and China Studies. The narrative of nationhood promoted by the KMT regime during its 50-year rule of Taiwan had always been China-centric, regarding Taiwan merely as a small part of the great country. As time passed, this approach has become increasingly irrelevant and outdated, alienating the islanders from the land they inhabit.

In the struggles for political and cultural hegemony that Taiwan has witnessed since the 1980s, the focal point in contesting narratives and the key battlefield in the political debates are primarily spatial and place-based. The major fault line appears to be a split between an imposed identity emphasizing cultural origin (China) and an emphasis on the recovery of place identity of 'the local' (Taiwan). In the wake of the democratization process in the 1990s, a new discourse rapidly emerged that asserted Taiwanese subjectivity and advocated its independence and that brought about a dramatic identity change in the mid-1990s. In the struggle for political hegemony, great emphasis has been placed on Taiwan's unique historical and cultural 'positioning' (B. Chang 2004; 2006; 2009). In contrast to the previous China-centric focus, a more grounded discourse has been constructed to promote Taiwanese consciousness and create a longing for an 'authentic' Taiwan (and Taiwanese roots). The indigenization issue has thus been at the center of Taiwanese politics. In 2000, the opposition party – the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, *minzhu jingbudang*)² – won the Presidential election and ended half a century of KMT rule. Since then, although the KMT regained power in 2008 and has adopted a more China-friendly policy, the indigenization trend has continued. In other words, the dramatic identity conflicts have resulted in a more local-focused identity.

Since no individual is outside or beyond geography, we are all bound up in the struggle over geography, which is, as Said (1993: 6) states, not only about “soldiers and cannons” that take possession of or defend a piece of land, but also “about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings” that conceptualize our sense of place, enhance our understanding of the world, and equip us to navigate in our lives. However, these extremely influential spatial factors are often overlooked in the consideration of identity politics.

My concern here is to see how our sense of place in the world can be influenced, shaped, or even constructed and (re)invented, through spatiality. To address the question of why the concept of ‘place’ which one can call one’s own is so important in the construction of identity, geographical imagination, and nation-building, the book adopts a spatial approach. In particular, my focus is on the importance of and the relationship between state spatiality and identity formation. Taking Taiwan as a case study, *Place, Identity, and National Imagination in Post-war Taiwan* aims to explore the relationship between the operation of state power and the construction of social space. Thus, the book looks at the long neglected spatial dimension of identity formation, examining the symbolism, construction, visualization, and contested meanings of Taiwan’s geography and political landscape.

Colonial Context

Located 100 miles off the southeast coast of China, Taiwan lies between Japan and the Philippines and had long been populated by Austronesian-speaking peoples before the arrival of the Chinese and Europeans. This tropical island came to the world’s attention

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries when its European name – Formosa – first appeared.³ From the early 17th century, the Chinese, Japanese, Dutch, and Spanish had all sought control of the island, resulting in a colonial history that was both bloody and complex. Since that time, there was a succession of colonial occupations, first by the Europeans (1624-62),⁴ then by the Qing (1662-1895),⁵ and finally by the Japanese (1895-1945).⁶ One prominent result of the constant changes in political control is that there was never a single and stable identity for the islanders, or a clear-cut ethnic mixture.

After World War II Taiwan and the nearby islands were retroceded to the Chinese government – the Republic of China (ROC, *Zhonghua Minguo*). Only four years later, the KMT-led ROC government was defeated in the Chinese Civil War and fled to Taiwan in 1949 under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Approximately 1.5 million refugees and retreating army personnel fled from the mainland to Taiwan, accounting for roughly one-sixth of the island's total population.⁷ Since the KMT retreat, the region under ROC direct control has an area of approximately 36,000 km² in total, roughly equivalent in size to the Netherlands. The land that under ROC control is generally referred to as the 'Taiwan region' (*Taiwan diqu*)⁸ consists of the island of Taiwan and nearby islands, including the Penghu island group (i.e. the Pescadores), several frontier islands near China (such as Kinmen⁹ and Matsu), and a few small islets in the South China Sea.

Both upholding a 'one China' policy, the two Chinese polities across the Taiwan Strait insisted on their own political legitimacy, leading to military confrontation at first and later to fierce struggles for international recognition and the right to represent the 'real'

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

China. During the Cold War, with American support and protection, the exiled KMT government in Taiwan managed to hold on to the Chinese seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council as the legitimate Chinese representative for two decades until 1971, rather than the People's Republic of China (PRC), established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949. When the PRC was finally accepted as the Chinese representative at the UN in 1971, the international status of the ROC, and thus Taiwan, was formally cast into doubt. Immediately after the ROC's withdrawal from the UN academics suggested some possible solutions to the problems raised by the issue of the ROC's sovereignty (Chen and Reismant 1972), though its ambiguous status has never been resolved. Because of its problematic legal status, the ROC has often been barred or excluded from participation in international organizations as a sovereign member state, or at best, has been forced into a position in which it was treated as part of China (and implying merely a break-away province of the PRC).

The impact of international isolation was not confined to the diplomatic arena. Domestically, the effects of isolation were equally detrimental. As a result of diplomatic defeats and international de-recognition, many difficult issues were brought to the fore and discussed fervently by the island's population. If the world considered the PRC to be the legitimate Chinese government, what would be the ROC's place in the world? Moreover, who then were the Taiwanese whose Chinese identity was rejected by international society? In the process of soul-searching and as a result of the self-doubt that arose from the island's isolation, grievances over political, economic, and cultural inequality between the local Taiwanese (*benshengren*) and the newly arrived mainlanders (*waishengren*) began to surface. What was seen as the unfair distribution of power, resources, and capital became the key issue for Taiwan's opposition

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

movement, and was deemed to reflect colonial suppression and cultural imperialism by the foreign (Chinese) regime.

The Local and the Newcomers

For immigrant communities such as Taiwan, the bonds with the land that they have long inhabited and the constructed ‘homing desire’¹⁰ to return to the ancestral home sometimes seem contradictory. The crucial factor influencing people’s identity in Taiwan has been *shengji* – that is, the province of one’s birthplace or origin and also known as *benji* (original home) or *zuji* (ancestral home). During most of the post-war period, people in Taiwan generally categorized themselves as either ‘*benshengren*’ or ‘*waishengren*’: the former term meaning ‘people from the local province’ and usually referring to the Taiwanese, the latter term meaning ‘people from other provinces’ and commonly referring to the mainlanders who came to Taiwan after the end of World War II. The category of *benshengren* is seen to consist of three groups of people: aboriginal people (*yuanzhumin*),¹¹ Minnan,¹² and Hakka,¹³ and generally signifies people who lived in Taiwan and whose ancestors migrated to the island before the Chinese take-over. The category of *waishengren* mainly refers to those who came to Taiwan after 1945, no matter from which part of China. Thus, the division is carved arbitrarily and homogenously, ignoring the many differences. The term ‘*waishengren*’ carried negative connotations for the local Taiwanese, in part because of the rampant corruption experienced under Chinese rule following the departure of the Japanese and the arrival of ill-disciplined Chinese soldiers and officials working under Governor Chen I. The tension between *benshengren* and *waishengren* occurred soon after the Chinese take-over and eventually erupted in the February 28 Incident of 1947.¹⁴ This incident, in

which the armed police killed unarmed protestors and which led to a bloody suppression island-wide, was an old wound that remained unhealed and became a taboo subject for many decades. The deep-rooted mistrust and resentment between the two groups could not be easily overcome or forgotten.

Except for Taiwan's aboriginal people, who account for 2.29 per cent of the island's total population,¹⁵ most people in Taiwan are ethnic Han Chinese.¹⁶ Apart from the aboriginal people, the division of Taiwanese identity rests not simply on ancestral origins, but also depends on the point in time when one's ancestors migrated from the mainland. In other words, Taiwan's identity conflicts are not exacerbated by issues of ethnicity; rather, they are further complicated by a politically generated agenda. The simplistic and somewhat arbitrary categorization proposes a fixed definition of each group's identity regardless of variables such as intermarriage, actual place of birth, and personal circumstances, affiliation and choice. Not everyone fits neatly into one of these categories.

Even so the dichotomy between the two identities – the *benshengren* (the local) and the *waishengren* (the newcomers) – had always been obvious, and the gap started to widen in the first half of the 1990s. Although the KMT's China-centric governance, compounded by its authoritarian rule and ideological construction, was extremely effective in the early post-war decades, the ways in which the Taiwanese people identified themselves changed dramatically in the mid-1990s. For example, before the DPP took power in 2000, 62 large-scale surveys were carried out between 1989 and 2000 on the issue of 'how the Taiwanese identified themselves.'¹⁷ Although the surveys were conducted by various institutions and their results did not always

correspond entirely, the overall trend was congruent and consistent. Before 1994, the majority of the islanders identified themselves as ‘Chinese only’ or as ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese,’ while less than one-fifth of the interviewees identified themselves as ‘Taiwanese only.’¹⁸ After the rising hostility across the Strait and the growing negativity associated with China in the mid-1990s, the result of the surveys on self-identification was reversed, the turning point being reached in 1994. While the majority of respondents classed themselves as ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese,’ the number of those who identified themselves as ‘Chinese only’ steadily decreased, and those identifying themselves as ‘Taiwanese only’ continued to grow.¹⁹

The reversal of Taiwanese identity happened within only a few years in the mid-1990s. Both the process of making Taiwan ‘home’ and the demarcation of borders between inside and outside both contribute to the creation of an effective place-identity. After all, the politics of assuming an ‘insider’ identity are also “the politics of claiming power” (Rose 1995: 116). A strong sense of inside-ness can easily be employed to arouse nationalist fervor and also to stir up hostility towards ‘the Other’ – both of which are strategies regularly used in the construction and articulation of state spatiality. Thus, identity politics have driven Taiwan’s push for democratization and social justice during the last two decades. But they have also created social divisions, conflicts and political upheaval. Consequently, identity tension came to a head at the beginning of the 21st century.

The Fish in the Water

As Taiwan’s identity crisis deepened, the main issue appeared to be a rift between how

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

people identified themselves politically and spatially. In other words, the major fault line appears to be a gap between the imposed Chinese identity emphasizing cultural origin and political *daotong* (i.e. Confucian orthodoxy) and the emerging Taiwanese consciousness demanding a recovery of ‘the local’ and an emphasis on the locality. Unlike the existing literature, this book adopts a spatial approach and explores the issue of Taiwanese identity by examining spatial politics. The importance of space is not simply a question of where things happen and where people are placed. The significance of space has to do with the fact that it is where people perform their daily spatial practices, where social hierarchy is established, actualized and reinforced, and where power is exercised and cemented. In any case, we are located and live in a geographical environment, and we develop a relationship with our surroundings, shaping them and being shaped by them. However, people rarely notice the hidden effect and the structural impact of their surroundings. Tuan (1990: 63) describes this unconsciousness as a person’s “immersion in the totality of his environment,” while Cresswell (2004: 109) uses an old Sri Lankan saying to explain this blindness: “The fish don’t talk about the water.” Although space seems to be in the background, as a context and social framework, it is always present in the conception and the operation of power. This spatial structure should not just be seen as a domain where social life takes place, but rather “as a medium through which social relations are produced and reproduced” (Gregory and Urry 1985: 3). Space is omnipresent, and so is its framing of our life and views. Just like the influence of culture, the most powerful elements of space are its transparency and its seemingly realistic naturalness (Lefebvre 1976: 27-30).

It is indeed not easy to ‘see’ one’s taken-for-granted environment, feel the structural

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

limitation or sense the subtle influences in which one is submerged, even though this environment has a huge and incessant impact on our sense of self. Thus, our sense of identity is closely connected to where we are positioned, both socially and geographically, and is intertwined with our sense of place, which in turn informs our view of our 'place in the world.' This sense of place is constantly changing and being reshaped, depending on our lived experience, position (physical and social), and the cultural framework within which we are placed. Simply speaking, sense of place can be positive (i.e. identifying with a place), negative (i.e. identifying against a place), or indifferent (i.e. not identifying with a place) (Rose 1995). Moreover, senses of place have different scales. Every individual is immersed in space and surrounded by "concentric 'layers' of lived space," from one's bedroom to home, neighboring areas, city, region and nation (Buttimer 1976: 284). In other words, senses of place vary from person to person but can also differ from time to time for any one individual. This feeling of 'in place' or 'out of place' not only suggests some kind of connection between a person and a particular location, but it is also closely associated with a sense of belonging, ownership, and even a fixed position in the social hierarchy (e.g. 'knowing one's place'). The combination of the concentric circles of space and their corresponding sense of place lays the foundation of our identity and shapes a "lifeworld" that acts as the anchor and the navigation structure in life.²⁰ In other words, the place in which we are located is not external to us acting as a kind of *mise-en-scène* for things to happen or dramas to unfold. Rather, it symbolizes, materializes, and also contextualizes the place we occupy in the world. It is both outside of us (environment) and inside of our being (socially, culturally and politically).

Without a doubt, our sense of identity is closely connected to our sense of place,

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

particularly the concentric understanding of the extension of oneself – i.e. ‘home,’ ‘homeland’ and ‘country.’ Among all the different kinds of places, ‘home’ is considered by many geographers to be the ‘ideal place’ and “an exemplary kind of place where people feel a sense of attachment and rootedness” (Cresswell 2004: 24). For example, Anne Buttimer (1976: 284) describes home as the “zero point” of one’s “personal reference system,” while Yi-fu Tuan (1977: 128, 149) sees home as occupying the central part of one’s life that seemingly “connotes origin and beginning” and serves as “the focal point of one’s cosmic structure.” Gaston Bachelard (1994: 4, 7) discussed the role of one’s childhood home in a similar way, designating it in metaphorical terms as “our corner of the world... our first universe,” “the human being’s first world” and “cradle.” Thus, home occupies an important place in one’s life and is seen as the manifestation of one’s identity.

On a personal level, home is often described as “an irreplaceable centre of significance” that defines who a person is and manifests his or her identity (Relph 1976: 39). Similarly, homeland has been, and continues to be, seen as the ‘nurse’ and ‘mother’ for the people who inhabit it, while also containing an archive of memories, history and past achievements. In other words, ‘home,’ on whatever scale it may be conceptualized, is the ‘perfect place’ that exemplifies ‘a field of care’ and ‘a repository of memories and dreams’ of human beings (Tuan 1977: 164). Within the concentric layers of one’s lifeworld, the intimate affection for home can also be projected upon other kinds of belonging. On a higher level, the profound attachment to the homeland (and country) is regarded as a universal phenomenon in modern society. The transfer of an intimate personal feeling to a collective commitment and loyalty to one’s ‘homeland’ is welded on to a locality by culture, because we usually think of our culture as our ‘home’ (Hall

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

1995: 182).

Yet, I do not suggest that everyone's idea of home is the same, or that it always necessarily represents a sense of warmth, love and protection. Nor do I intend to portray 'home' only as an ideal place and a safe haven that everyone longs for and cherishes. Feminist geographers, such as Rose (1993) and McDowell (1998), have already shown that the positive and central position of the concept of 'home' is debatable, and have also argued successfully that 'home' can also be where the oppression of women takes place. Equally, 'country' can be the site of discrimination, exploitation, and suppression. However, I use the term here in a broad sense to address the issue of identity formulation, and to refer to a general idea of 'belonging.' After all, home acts as a mental coordinate system that positions us in the world and informs our sense of place, as with Bachelard's depiction of the influence of the childhood home in which "our memories of former dwelling-places are relived as daydreams that ... remain in us for all time" (1994: 6). In other words, home leaves its marks on us, positive or not, and defines the way we are and how we identify ourselves. Thus, our identity is not just shaped by culture and ethnicity, but also by the space we occupy – both geographically and socially – and the unique experience inscribed in it.

We are all 'spatial beings,' living in and participating in physical, social, and mental spaces. We make places and places also make us. Those who inhabit a particular place will usually use the same language, eat the local food, share the culture, values, and customs of a place, and understand the place intimately. As Edward Relph aptly states, "people are their place and a place is its people" (1976: 34). There is indeed no better way to understand a place than by being in that place. For the most part we embody (or

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

at least are expected to embody) the place we are part of. Hence, places are the defining marker of one's experience and identity and influence the making of one's sense of place. The significance of one's 'place in the world' is closely connected to one's locality and social standing and thus, one's 'place' becomes one's identity, geographically, politically, culturally, and socially. It is worth noticing though that different articulations of identity for any one place often coexist and compete at the same time. Parallel to the continuous change, contradiction, and contestation of identity, the meanings of places are never fixed or completed, but always negotiating, shifting and 'becoming' – in common with identity, which is always multifaceted, constantly changing and forever slippery and contradictory.

Longing for Rootedness

The desire to have a place where one feels comfortable and at home is natural, and is "perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul" (Weil 1987: 41). The development of sense of place is therefore intimately connected to the place in which one is located and which one calls 'home.' For most people, the place and the culture to which they belong manifest their identity, while their ancestral home is usually regarded as their 'roots.' Any incongruity between the place one identifies as home and the place in which one is actually located may create anxiety and alienation, and also arouse suspicion and hostility from those who identify themselves as insiders. This close connection between place and identity is extremely prominent in Chinese tradition. Fundamentally, the Chinese are place-bound, and as Lynn Pan (1991: 12-3, 21) said, few can "beat" the Chinese commitment to their native land and ancestral origin. The very name of the country – *Zhongguo* (literally 'the country in the center')

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

– reveals the central position the Chinese have assigned themselves and the importance they attribute to their own ‘place’ in the world.

In traditional Chinese society, attachment and loyalty to one’s native village or hometown was always strong. People preferred to be rooted, staying put in their place of origin. Historically, those who moved away from their native land to a new place would be considered ‘visitors,’ ‘guests’ and ‘outsiders,’ both by the locals and by themselves, even after several generations. The best example of this is the ethnic group Hakka – whose name clearly labels them as “guest people” who are “not local.” The attachment to one’s native land, and the unwillingness to move are both deeply ingrained in the Chinese psyche and are described by the proverb ‘*an tu zhong qian*’ – which means ‘to be content on one’s native soil and consider moving a serious affair.’ For people who had left their ancestral home, the desire to ‘return home’ at the end of their life’s journey was always powerful, even after decades, and sometimes generations, of ‘sojourning.’²¹

This yearning to return to one’s ancestral home has been described as a longing of ‘*luoye gui gen*,’ literally translated as “the falling leaves return to the roots.” The nostalgic sense of the loss of *laojia* (old home), *guxiang* (homeland or hometown), *jiaxiang* (homeland), or *yuanxiang* (original hometown), has deeply affected Chinese consciousness.²² The Han immigration communities in Taiwan had also inherited this mentality and had always referred to China as ‘*Tangshan*,’ the generic reference to their ancestral origin on the mainland. Similarly, such a desire of and longing for ‘returning’ has been common in Taiwanese society. For example, in his renowned novel *Hanye Trilogy* (*hanye sanbuqu*), Taiwanese writer Li Chiao compared people’s longing for

home with the natural instinct of salmon (1981: 420). He believed that the pull of home was a natural calling for the Taiwanese, just like the genetic urge of salmon to return to their place of origin, despite the difficulties of covering long distances in the ocean and swimming hundreds of miles upstream. Thus, the desire to ‘return home’ is usually seen as inherent and natural, and is considered to be the ultimate goal in life for those who had left home.

Traditionally Chinese liked to signal their ‘place identity’ in order to indicate their belonging. For example, it was common practice among Chinese intellectuals to supplement their names with information about their birthplace, or to add geographical factors when formulating their courtesy names²³ or naming their children, their workplace, their studies, or the house in which they were living, so as to identify themselves spatially. However, spatialized names are used as an identity indicator not just by locals wishing to identify their origin. It was equally important to mark out one’s identity as an outsider, a guest traveler, or someone in transit. For example, many babies were named Yu-sheng (literally meaning ‘being born in Yu’) during the anti-Japanese war period when the ROC government set up its provisional capital in Chongqing (aka. Chungking), which was also known as *Yu*. Similarly, many post-war baby boomers in Taiwan were given place-based names. For example, in the late 1940s and 1950s many boys were named Tai-sheng – meaning ‘being born in Taiwan,’²⁴ while girls might be named Tai-li – meaning ‘beauty in Taiwan.’ Such naming practices not only specified the babies’ birthplace, but was also seen as a record of their parents’ displacement and as a marker of their ‘outsider’ status. Any place in which one resided outside of one’s hometown, however wonderful and prosperous, was traditionally viewed only as a “temporary dwelling” (*jiju* or *jiji*)²⁵ that could never equal the importance of *laojia*,

even if the home that one had left behind might be war-ridden or poverty-stricken. In comparison to the supreme status of homeland (e.g. *jiexiang*, *guxiang*, *laojia*, or *benji*), in which psychological belonging is anchored and loyalty invested, other places are regarded only as a foreign land (*yixiang*), from which one might feel alienated and lack a sense of belonging.

Loyalty to the ancestral home is especially evident in overseas Chinese communities. In order to support their fellow villagers, and others emigrating from the same region, overseas Chinese usually formed a *tongxianghui* (Fellow Townsmen Association) as a bonding mechanism, providing a self-help network to support socialization, communication, and the transaction of business (Sinn 1997). The fervent longing for ‘home’ of the overseas Chinese – who might never have seen or visited their ‘homeland’ – speaks volumes about the strong connection between the Chinese identity and their sense of home. Similarly, traditional Taiwanese identity had also been closely linked with the ideas of “home,” “native soil,” and the place of one’s original home. The fierce armed conflicts between groups of settlers from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou under Qing rule manifested the importance of different regional belongings and loyalties, even though they all came from Minnan.

This focus on origin thus harbors the danger of creating (or assuming) a timeless and universal identity and proposing an essentialist view in which one’s origin is fixed and permanent. Furthermore, such emphasis on an essential and mythified ‘origin’ is anachronistic in a fast changing, highly mobile and increasingly globalized world. Indeed, this notion of origin, which is often imagined and constructed, hinders any attempt to make new homes for those displaced by migration. The imagined close ties

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

with one's *guxiang* (or *jiaxiang*) not only make leaving home particularly traumatic, but also make it difficult for the outsiders to be integrated into an established community.

Space, Identity, and Spatiality

After the 'cultural turn' that brought sweeping changes to the social sciences and humanities in the 1980s, a recent 'spatial turn' has injected these disciplines with a new theoretical energy and has also enriched, and even revolutionized, intellectual thinking across disciplinary boundaries (Warf and Arias 2009). Scholars working in these areas have become increasingly interested in the concept of *deep space* and its socially constructed nature.²⁶ The fundamental issue considered in this book is exactly how the 'self' is spatially expressed and socially constructed. In understanding questions such as how societies operate, the ways in which politics function, and the ways and extent to which cultures and identities are constructed, the spatial approach provides a new set of insights that explores "what gnaws at it [the society] from within" (Lefebvre 1991: 420).

In my examination of the spatial development of post-war Taiwan, I draw particular inspiration from the work of Henri Lefebvre. In his book *The Production of Space* (1991), Lefebvre challenges the conventional concept of 'space,' which is commonly treated as an inert spatial medium, merely a 'container' for more important historical processes. He argues that space is not a passive background to historical events, but rather a socially constructed mechanism inducing events to develop in a certain way. The process of spatial production is reproduced, expounded, and supported by knowledge of this space. Thus, every society produces its own space, and within each

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

social space social actions take place which are shaped by its subjects (both as individuals and as a collective). In other words, social change and new social relationships necessitate the production of a new space, and vice versa. Since every society produces its own space and unique social relations at different historical junctures, any new social relationship calls for the emergence of a new space, which incorporates social actions, in order to materialize the spatial order into physical reality (Lefebvre 1991: 31-6, 53-9). Since space is produced, the examination of changes in the production of spaces and their meanings can be used to map out the changing course and to read the implications of social and power relations at any particular moment. This not only reveals how new spaces come about and why some places have disappeared, but it also demonstrates how and why our perceptions of a place have been drastically changed at a particular historical moment.

For Lefebvre, space is at the center of a continuing social and historical process, involving struggles over ideology, meanings and values, and is thus the ultimate locus and medium of politics (Elden 2007). He suggests that the understanding of space should break away from the previous dichotomy of 'spatial practices' (i.e. relating to material and physical space) and 'representations of space' (i.e. relating to mental and abstract space), and proposes to include a third element in the production of space. This additional dimension – 'spaces of representation'²⁷ – refers to social spaces that are lived, experienced, expressed, recorded, and created through the actions of those who occupy and use them. In Lefebvre's 'spatial triad' – i.e. perceived space, conceived space, and lived space – each element corresponds to another, and operates at all times. This approach towards space provides a deeper understanding of both the real and imagined world.

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

Both as the product and (re)producer of power relations, space can not only regulate and maintain relations of domination, but also challenge and even change existing power relations. According to Lefebvre (2009: 244-5), state space “‘regulates’ and perpetuates the relations of domination,” and consists of three important dimensions – the ideological (the technocratic representation of the social), the practical (instrumental, a means of action), and the tactical (strategic – consisting principally in the subordination of a territory’s resources to political ends). Because the exercise of power is deeply inscribed in space, ‘state space’ plays a crucial (albeit almost invisible) role in state control and domination, and is seen as the spatial articulation of state power. In other words, states aggressively engage in the production of space for the purposes of governance and manipulation and, in turn, are shaped and reshaped by the space produced. Thus, the three dimensions of Lefebvre’s theorization of ‘state space’ – the state territory, the state territorial strategies, and the “territory effect” (which is the state’s tendency to naturalize certain socio-spatial relations) (Brenner and Elden 2009) – are particularly insightful in the examination of the spatial dimensions of state power where they are most directly articulated.

The spatial structures of our environment lay the foundations for sense of place to develop, influence the formation of identity, and provide both a physical and mental structure for us to position ourselves in the world. Thus, power is operated through ‘spatiality’ which concretizes a spatial discourse to provide a ‘spatial order’ that organizes an ensemble of possibilities and interdictions (de Certeau 1984: 98). Although the concept of ‘spatiality’ in human geography is widely used, it is nevertheless difficult to formulate an all-encompassing definition (Gregory et al. 2009:

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

715-17). ‘Spatiality’ can be many things: actual material space and jurisdiction, socially produced space, virtual space, spatial metaphor, assumptions about the nature of space, the quality of a space, everyday spatial practices and experience, and so on (Hillis 2006: 455). Generally speaking, it refers to the quality of material space, the influence of spatial metaphors, and most often to both. Many scholars now use the term specifically to refer to ‘socially produced space,’ understood to extend far beyond physical settings or measurable surface appearances. Furthermore, since a dominant spatial discourse brings about a spatial order that organizes and regulates people’s lifeworld, state spatiality can be understood as the articulation of power relationships, that is, the spatial structure where powers operate (or are challenged), politics function, and a state-engineered identity is formulated. Thus, it is essential to adopt a spatial perspective when examining the relationship between identity, power, and place.

Theoretical Neglect

Identifying the emphasis placed on historicism as a 19th century obsession, Foucault acknowledged the importance and the long-standing neglect of space. He asserted that the 20th century was “the epoch of space...the epoch of simultaneity... of juxtaposition... of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed” (1986: 22). His criticism of the over-emphasis placed on history certainly rings true in Taiwan Studies. Although there is a rich corpus of literature on the political, economic, social and cultural aspects of Taiwanese identity and nationalism from a historical perspective,²⁸ the spatial dimension has seldom been touched upon. Since the positioning of the ‘self’ and the identification of home and homeland are fundamental in the formation of identity, the spatial aspect of both identity politics and cultural

nationalism is crucial, but unfortunately is rarely addressed. In the English-speaking world, relatively little attention has been paid to the spatial aspect of Taiwan, and the modest number of publications from this perspective contrasts sharply with the active and flourishing research on Taiwan's history, politics, and economy. Among those who have published in this field in the early post-war decades, the better known are perhaps Cheng-siang Chen (1950; 1963; 1982), Chiao-min Hsieh (1964), Ronald Knapp (1976; 1980), and Jack Williams (1973).²⁹ However, most of this early literature tended to work with a more narrowly defined concept of 'Geography' – i.e. “the study of the systems and processes involved in the world's weather, mountains, seas, lakes, etc. and of the ways in which countries and people organize life within an area” (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary) – and dealt mainly with the physical, political, and economic aspects of Taiwan's geography.

In recent decades, related publications have grown in number, and their scope has also expanded to include historical geography, urban studies, [political landscape](#) and environmental issues (e.g. Edmonds 1992; 2001; Wachman 2007; Teng 2004; [Matten 2012](#); Williams and Chang 2008, etc.). In addition, scholars in other disciplines have also started to draw inspiration from the 'spatial turn.' For example, some have taken an anthropological approach to place and religion (e.g. Dell'Orto 2013), some criticized the stagnation of Taiwan's 'feminist geography' (Chiang and Liu 2011), others have examined spatial elements in Taiwan literature (e.g. A. Yee 2001), and still others have focused on 'nature writing' in the wake of Taiwan's growing environmental awareness (e.g. M. Fan 2007). Historians have explored the construction of geographical imagination as it related to Taiwan during the Qing dynasty (e.g. Teng 2004), examined Taiwan's cartographic representation in historical maps (e.g. Lay et al. 2010; L. Hsia

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

2008), and considered colonial governance (e.g. H. C. Tsai 2009). The development of Taipei city, and its spatial innovation and recent globalization are the focus of many academic enquiries (e.g. Allen 2011; Kwok 2005; Leitner and Kang 1999; C. Wang 2003; Simon 2003). The contemporary issues of alternative identities, sense of neighbourhood, and new social behaviors are also included in the discussion of Taiwan's landscape (F. Martin 2000; Lin et al. 2006; Wilson 2009; Hsieh and Chang 2006.), while the preservation of Taiwan's historical heritage and the politics of landscape are seen as the new phenomena in post-democratization society (Taylor 2005; Simon 2003; C. Hsia 2002). However, research on state spatiality in general and the effect of spatial politics on Taiwanese identity in particular, remains an area in which there is still much to be done. Moreover, most research on Taiwan has tended to focus on the Japanese or Dutch colonial periods or on the Chinese influence during the Qing dynasty, while the post-war era has been relatively neglected.

Inspired by the newly emerging 'spatial-cultural discourse' in cultural studies (Deutsche 1995), this book aims to explore Taiwan's identity politics and post-war power relations through the examination of spatiality. Since culture is always *placed*, both the production of culture and the construction of meaning have strong spatial influences. Thus, any analysis of the production of culture and the formation of identity that does not consider the politics of 'positions' fails to take stock of its spatial context. Therefore, this book sets out to bridge the academic gap between identity and spatial politics, by examining the relationship between place and power. By looking through the lens of spatiality, I hope to provide a fresh perspective on the thorny issue of Taiwanese identity.

Drawing on Lefebvre's work, *Treasure Island* thus addresses issues of how state spatial

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

practices continuously shape and reshape our everyday life, the ways that geographical knowledge and imagination are constructed, and also how state territorial strategies naturalize and strengthen power relations through spatial discourses. Furthermore, I examine the ways in which state spaces are operated, contested and changed and, lastly, how through state spatiality, power relations are concretized, social alliances established, and cultural change takes place. In my examination of identity politics, I also draw on theoretical support from Edward Said (1989; 1993; 1995) and Stuart Hall (1990; 1995), especially in the Postscript, to consider the recent de-colonization and nation-building processes in Taiwan.

Though the case of Taiwan is regionally specific, the major concerns of this book are universal. They relate to territoriality and national identity; the relationship between geography, power, and identity; the spatial aspect of cultural nationalism; and state spatiality in the nation-building process. My 'transgression' of disciplinary boundaries is an exploratory intervention into the complex interplay between place, identity, politics and nationalism in post-war Taiwan and hopefully will provide a fresh approach to understanding the issue of Taiwanese identity and stimulate a rethinking of how state spatiality influences national identity.

Arrangement of Chapters

Since the meaning of and the discourse about a place may at times conflict and at other times be mutually reinforcing, every society produces a particular kind of space, and socially constructed space is period- and region-specific. To understand Taiwan's geography, my own study must therefore be conscious of being historically situated.

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

My focus is on the state spatiality of the post-war period. This period demands particular attention not just because the era has often been overlooked in the existing literature, but more importantly because it was only in the second half of the 20th century that “the massive interrogations of space, the city, hyper growth and excess, and the organization of space” took shape (Lefebvre 2009: 212). Using Lefebvre’s spatial triad as its underlying analytical framework, this book explores post-war construction of ‘state space’ in Taiwan – in Lefebvre’s words, i.e. the state territory, its territorial strategies, and the territory effect – be it physical, symbolic or functional. Four chapters that follow this introduction will explore various aspects of state spatiality and its impact on identity, specifically by looking at national territory and state territorialization, the power and politics of cartography, the construction of national geography and knowledge, and a modernist experiment in urban planning that embodies the official vision of a model ‘Chinese province.’ Finally, the Postscript is a summary reflecting on the recent spatial reform and the possible essentialist pitfalls.

Chapter 2

After the KMT-led government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC was declared ‘dead’ by the newly established PRC and was deemed by the international community to have ceased to exist. To maintain the ROC’s status as a modern nation-state without territorial control over “China proper” was thus highly problematic. Starting in 1951, the ROC government on Taiwan has published an annual yearbook – ROC Yearbook (*Zhonghua Minguo nianjian*). This annual publication is a declaration of survival with which the ROC asserts its political legitimacy and territorial claims to China. In the austerity of the 1950s, the insistence on publishing a national statement in the form of

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

a yearbook was a political decision and a significant spatial strategy declaring its rightful ownership of the mainland. It not only demonstrated the KMT's wish to reinforce its status as the only lawful Chinese regime, but was also a strategy to legitimize its political rule on the island. This chapter examines the changing definition of 'national territory' and also analyzes the ROC's territorial claims and the strategies adopted in the ROC Yearbooks of the last 6 decades, from 1951 to 2010.

Within the modern inter-state system, the state is regarded as possessing sovereign control over its territorial borders, and the naturalization of 'state space' is usually taken for granted. In fact these territory-based assumptions evolved in 17th century Europe³⁰ and usually lead to the "territorial trap" of regarding states as fixed units of sovereign space and 'containers' of societies (Agnew 1994). In reality, the idea of 'state space' should not be limited to physical territory, but should also include territorial jurisdictions, administrative subdivisions, the physical embodiment of state spaces, cultural and symbolic meanings, and spatial strategies. Therefore, after losing control of the mainland and fleeing to Taiwan, the flimsy territorial claims made in the post-war yearbooks relied heavily on the insistence on the regime's legitimacy and its historical legacy.

This chapter considers the ROC's various territorial claims in the post-war yearbooks and evaluates the state's spatial strategies as set out in these formal national statements. It looks at how the concept of the nation – 'ROC' – has been presented, not only by examining ambiguities and changes in the text of the yearbooks, but also by comparing and contrasting the different versions of the ROC Map that were presented over the years. Thus, the examination of yearbooks investigates state territoriality beyond the

dimension of physical territory, thereby avoiding the ‘territorial trap.’

Chapter 3

In the post-war era, geography has served national interests by playing the role of agent of the state and acting as the vehicle of modernization. The most politicized geographical knowledge and spatial practice is undoubtedly cartography, the post-war development of which is the focus of Chapter 3. Because of technological and financial requirements, map making has always been controlled by the rich and the powerful. In particular, map-making on a large scale is a kind of spatial practice that can only be taken up by the state or global enterprises. Far from being the innocent products of ‘disinterested science’ or decorative collections in museums and libraries, maps are now widely recognized as “inscriptions of political power” (Harley 1990b). The ability to produce ‘scientific’ and accurate maps and mastery of new cartographic technologies symbolize the extent of state power and the degree of modernization. Therefore, the exploration of post-war cartographic development in Taiwan reveals how state power has been, and continues to be, exercised through the projection of maps and the worldview they embody. Because of cross-Strait tension, particular focus of this chapter is on examining the stringent control of cartographic knowledge and the rigid scrutiny of the production of national maps, and therefore, an officially approved visualization of ROC territory, which had been defined and insisted upon by the KMT regime.

Before the completion of the first island-wide land survey in 1980, most of the maps that were published in Taiwan and were available on the market were rough duplicates of pre-war maps. It is generally recognized that the poor quality of post-war maps in

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

Taiwan was due to strict map censorship and a stifling political atmosphere. In recent decades, researchers in Taiwan Studies have started to associate the cartographic expression of Taiwan with its historical and political development. So far, most of the research has focused on maps produced before 1945 by the Japanese, the Qing and the Dutch. In contrast, this chapter concentrates on examining the development of cartography in the post-war era. While it is true that Taiwan's map production was extremely poor and under great strain when the ROC was on high security alert, Taiwan's cartographic ability was not as 'backward' as it is commonly thought to have been. This chapter examines the general problem of the lack of accuracy and apparent regression in Taiwan's cartographic production before the 1980s, explores the reasons for this, presents examples of the serious consequences befalling those accused of leaking cartographic secrets, and finally, evaluates the popular discourse on Taiwan's post-war cartographic blankness. It does not address map-making technology or aesthetic appreciation, but focuses rather on the social and political implications of post-war cartographic development, exploring the reasons for decades of cartographic stagnation and also analyzing how and why changes in cartographic expression and discourse came about after the 1980s.

Chapter 4

Chapters 2 and 3 address the issue of state spatiality in terms of institutional forms, concentrating on the construction and changing meaning of national territory, borders, and the state's administrative divisions. Chapter 4, on the other hand, takes one particular example of urban planning – Chunghsing New Village (*Zhongxing xincun*) – to examine the intricate connections between state spatiality and power relations.

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

Located in Nantou County, Chunghsing New Village was Taiwan's first post-war 'new town' and was built to house the Taiwan Provincial Government. The construction of Chunghsing New Village began in 1956 in the name of national security, but its design aimed to realize a vision of a model province and a modern way of living that was in tune with the ROC national imagination.

The first phase of construction was completed in 1957, facilitating the relocation of the provincial government from Taipei City to Nantou County and thereby separating local government from central government. The provincial government dutifully accepted its new secondary status, having lost its position as Taiwan's economic, political, and social center. In constructing Chunghsing New Village and by relocating the provincial government there, the KMT government not only established a clear-cut political hierarchy, but also constructed a model community permitting a modern lifestyle, and presented a modernist vision of a future China, run according to Sanminzhuyi (*Three Principles of the People*, a political philosophy developed by Sun Yat-sen). In this sense Chunghsing New Village mirrored the ROC national imagination and its aspirations. But at the same time, the construction of Chunghsing New Village physically inscribed the hierarchical division between central state and local government by locating them at different sites, and consequently installed a spatial order on Taiwan's political landscape. This stratified power relationship and hierarchy were challenged in the early 1990s when the increasingly powerful provincial government threatened to overshadow the KMT central government. At the end of 1998, the administrative power of the province was reduced, ostensibly to streamline government structure. In the decade after restructuring, Chunghsing New Village became an empty shell – the location of the once autonomous local state and blueprint of a 'Free China' was now no more than

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

a relic of the past.

This chapter examines the origin and genealogy of Chunghsing New Village, its political and spatial significance, and its changing meaning over the decades. In so doing, it explores the interplay between place and power at different historical-political junctures and investigates the ways in which the changing relationships have impacted on the importance of Chunghsing New Village, the identity of its residents, and also symbolically, how the place has been viewed. Thus, an examination of the development of this project helps us to understand spatial politics at work. This study of the place, therefore, is not simply an investigation into one particular example of urban planning. Rather, it becomes a means by which to examine Taiwan's post-war power struggles and social change from the perspective of state spatiality, and the ways in which the distribution and redistribution of power that defines the political landscape is articulated in spatial terms.

Chapter 5

Although the majority of people have a limited personal experience of the state, the abstract concept of 'nation' cannot only be taught, it can also be elevated into an object of passionate fervor and harnessed to induce patriotic action. This nationalist fervor is usually fostered through education, daily school routines, and exposure to national symbolism with particular emphasis on national identity. Alongside the democratic development and the rise of Taiwanese consciousness over the last two decades, the dominant China-centric discourse has given way to a Taiwan-first mindset. There has been an increased sense of local pride, the development of a distinctive indigenous

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

culture, and a growing awareness of Taiwanese subjectivity, each contributing to a Taiwan-centric sentiment. Chapter 5 examines post-war elementary school textbooks used to teach geography-related subjects and analyzes how the imagination of national (ROC) geography has been constructed, adjusted, and reshaped in education.

The impact of mass education is extremely significant because it not only produces knowledge and reproduces values, but also ‘creates’ people who see no viable alternative to the pre-existing condition (Apple 1979: 6). In the case of post-war Taiwan, the state not only imposed compulsory mass education, but also tightened its ideological grip during the formative years of childhood by extending the duration of compulsory education (from six to nine years in 1968) and standardizing textbooks. The ideological impact of education was particularly effective during the early post-war decades when resources were scarce and access to alternative information was almost impossible. Thus, through the analysis of 92 volumes of elementary level geography-related textbooks published by the National Institute for Compilation and Translation (NICT, *Guoli bianyiguan*)³¹ between 1945 and 2000, Chapter 5 investigates what kind of geographical ‘knowledge’ and political ideology were systematically taught in school, considers the ways in which the state’s involvement in education results in the conscious design and construction of a student’s ‘sense of place’ and place identity, and in particular explores the state’s intervention in shaping students’ ideas of ‘homeland’ and ‘country.’

Postscript

The concluding chapter offers a brief reflection on Taiwan’s post-war spatiality and the

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

prospect of its geographical repositioning. This summary focuses mainly on one place-specific phenomenon that has been prominent in the last decade – that is, the tendency to openly declare one’s love for Taiwan as an identity marker. For example, Chen Shui-bian, the DPP President between 2000 and 2008, referred to himself as a ‘son of Taiwan’ (*Taiwan zhi zi*). Chen’s public declaration of a ‘rooted’ identity became a symbol of loyalty and patriotism. His actions suggest that simply *being* affectionate and loyal to one’s native land is not sufficient; rather, true loyalty must be expressed through deeds and declared openly. Thus one’s affection for the land had to be physically *demonstrated* to be believed, either by kissing the ground, visiting every town and village,³² speaking the native languages when addressing the public, or simply acknowledging the policy as “*ai Tai*” (i.e. ‘loving Taiwan’).³³ This exploitation of people’s genuine affection for their native land harbors the danger, perhaps, of mobilizing nationalist fervor like “a religious cult,” leading to an extremist campaign of exclusion (Tuan 1977: 177). A sense of rootedness can indeed help people to develop an intimate and genuine relationship with the land they inhabit and in which they feel ‘at home.’ Paradoxically, however, this sense of belonging (and hence, ownership) can also generate a tendency towards narrow-mindedness and exclusivity, potentially incite hatred against the other, and ultimately make some groups in society ‘homeless.’

Through the examination of state spatiality in post-war Taiwan, this book aims to present an alternative approach to understanding the thorny issue of Taiwanese identity. Although every chapter has its distinctive theme, each echoes and complements each other and acts as part of a spatial triad, mirroring and supplementing the rest. Although my research is region-specific, focusing on Taiwan, the spatial concerns addressed in this book are universal. State spatiality and territorial strategies, the close ties between

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

place and identity, the interconnections between geographical knowledge, sense of place, and national imagination, and also the relationships between spatial constructions, social relations, and spatial symbolism are all issues that have significance beyond the immediate context of Taiwan.

Too Big to Ignore

Despite international de-recognition and decades of military intimidation by the PRC, Taiwan has thrived. During the most uncertain years of Taiwan's post-war diplomatic history, economically the island seemed to go from strength to strength. In the 1960s, Taiwan changed from an agricultural to an industrial society, and its economy flourished after the 1970s (DGBAS 1997; Shen 1974: 5; Edmonds 2001: 18). Taiwan has made a mark as the world's electronic factory and has had dealings and trading relationships with the world far beyond its limited diplomatic allies. In other words, this tiny island is a global economic powerhouse, being not only an electronics giant – accounting for 65 per cent of the world's electronics manufacturing services in 2011 (Thomas White Global Investment 2011) – but also one of the world's top investment destinations.³⁴

Coinciding with a period of outstanding economic performance, Taiwan's political transformation from authoritarian rule to a fully-fledged, multi-party democracy has also been impressive (Winckler 1984). Taiwan's success story as a stable and maturing new democracy is highly regarded and holds up “an example to the PRC and others in the region... [to] encourage progress in the furthering of democratic principles and practices, respect for human rights, and the enhancement of the rule of law” (US

Congress 2000: 11357). Many see Taiwan's development as the proof of and the model for a more democratic, open, and modernized version of China. Moreover, Taiwan occupies a position of strategic importance. The island stands at "the geographic forefront of the strategic competition" between two political and economic powers – the US and the PRC – and thus its every political move is said to have the potential to "define the 21st century" (Mazza 2011).

Although Taiwan is more significant, in political and economic terms, than its size suggests, nevertheless, for many outsiders, the island is just... an island. Some may consider Taiwan to be politically unimportant in comparison to China's mighty presence and regard cross-Strait tension merely as a nuisance and a hangover of the Cold War. At most, some would regard Taiwan as an active economic entity, taking it as a reference point to understand China, or as a mediator through which to do business with the Chinese. The physical size of Taiwan might support the view that it is of no great significance in the global context (or indeed even the Chinese context). And particularly in recent years, overshadowed by the rising economic power and political influence of China, Taiwan may have appeared to be of little consequence to many international organizations and politicians, and was deemed dispensable in dealings with the PRC. Thus, its existence is often overlooked, its international rights disregarded, and the opinions of its 23 million residents ignored.

Over the years, many academics, analysts, and military strategists have urged the international community to recognize that "Taiwan matters,"³⁵ and have also proposed that Taiwan is "too big to ignore" in international politics and the global economy (*New York Times* 1990). However, the truth of the matter is that size does matter sometimes,

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE
AFTER PEER REVIEW

and dismissiveness is almost inevitable. Thus, the island has always struggled for recognition and can never overcome the international tendency to judge it by its smallness. Yet, these taken-for-granted views fail to recognize Taiwan's strategic position and neglect the fact that its influence cannot be evaluated solely by its size. Geographically, the island is the artery of East Asia and holds the key to peace in the region. Some American analysts have acknowledged its strategic position "astride the sea lanes of supply and communication," which is not just "critical to Japan" but more importantly, will guarantee the "freedom of navigation" for the American Navy and safeguard U.S. domination in the region (US Congress 2011). Little wonder then that analysts see Taiwan as the crucial factor that can easily destabilize East Asian politics and trigger regional tension. Some commentators have even described Taiwan as "the tail that wags dogs" (McDevitt 2005; Su Chi 2009), because of its ability to upset the three great powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and the US) and set them in a reactive mode. In addition to its strategic, economic and political significance, a complex colonial past and cultural mix, its unique post-war development, and the success of a 'Chinese' model of democratization all mean that Taiwan is too important to ignore. As a *de facto* state, the island plays an indispensable role in the complex web of East Asian politics and the global economy. In the post-modern world of high mobility, globalization, and interdependent world politics, no place is *just* an island.

¹ *Zhongguo guomindang* means 'Chinese Nationalist Party.' Its predecessor, *Tongmenghui*, was a secret society founded by Sun Yat-sen during the late Qing period. It was reorganized as a legal political party after the Qing dynasty was overthrown in 1911. After decades of struggles between warlords, the KMT nominally unified China in 1928 and was the ruling party until 1949 when it was defeated by the CCP in the civil war.

² The DPP was established in 1986 when it was still illegal under martial law to set up a new political party. After martial law was lifted in 1987, the DPP became a powerful opposition

party, counterbalancing the dominant KMT. In 2000, the DPP won the presidential Election and ended half a century of KMT one-party rule. Historically, the party has had a strong record on human rights, social justice, and (*de jure*) Taiwan independence.

³ The name ‘Formosa’ first appeared in 1590 when the Portuguese passed the island and hailed it “Ilha Formosa” (meaning ‘beautiful island’) for its lushness (Cutshall 1944: 247). The name was then adopted and in common use in the West up to the mid-20th century. For example, ‘Formosa’ rather than ‘Taiwan’ was used in the Cairo Declaration (1943), Potsdam Declaration (1945), the Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951), and the Formosa Resolution adopted by the US Congress in 1955.

⁴ In the early 17th century, the Spanish took control of the northern coast of Taiwan for a short period of time (1626-42). This ended when the Dutch moved northward from their southern commercial base and drove out their Spanish rivals. The Dutch occupation, too, was short-lived (1624-62).

⁵ In 1662, Ming loyalist general Cheng Cheng-kung (aka. Koxinga) seized control of Taiwan from the Dutch, using it as a military base during his campaign to restore the Chinese Ming dynasty and resist the new Manchu Qing regime. In 1683, the Ming loyalists surrendered to the Qing, and the island was formally annexed by the Qing empire and entered on the maps of ‘Chinese territory’ in 1684 (Teng 2004: 44).

⁶ Following China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War, the island was ceded to Japan in 1895 and became its first colony; the islanders were made to “become Japanese.” During World War II, because of its strategic position, Taiwan served as the base for Japan’s southward advance.

⁷ The population in Taiwan was around 6.5 million before the Chinese retrocession in 1945.

⁸ Unless otherwise specified, the usage of ‘Taiwan’ in this book usually refers to the ‘Taiwan region.’

⁹ Kinmen is also known as Quemoy, or Jinmen.

¹⁰ According to Brah (1996), the ‘homing desire’ of the ‘diaspora’ is different from the ‘desire for homeland’ of political exiles. This difference will be discussed in the Postscript.

¹¹ Ethnologically, Taiwan’s Malayo-Polynesian people are regarded as the original inhabitants of the island. However, some would prefer to replace the term ‘*yuanzhumin*’ (indigenous residents) with ‘*xianzhumin*’ (first residents) or ‘*zaozhumin*’ (early residents) to emphasize that “everyone was an immigrant” (Staintan 1999: 39). They originally inhabited the whole of the island and only started to move out of the western plains during the Dutch occupation. Their original living space was further encroached upon by Cheng’s military colonization during the 17th century. During Qing rule, with the expansion of Chinese settlements, many aborigines were forced to retreat deeper into the mountains, while some *Pingpu* (lowland

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE.
AFTER PEER REVIEW

aborigines, or plain aborigines) were sinicized, and lived side by side with the Han Chinese. Half a century of Japanese occupation greatly altered the aboriginal lifestyle and habitat because of tightening colonial control and forced relocation. After 1945, Taiwan's aborigines became 'Chinese citizens' and supposedly had the same legal rights as the Han Chinese. However, the most part of post-war aboriginal development has been characterized by Han exploitation and a series of China-centric and patronizing policies. Since the 1990s, aborigines have campaigned for their rights. To demonstrate official support, the Taiwanese government set up the Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP, *yuanzhuminzu weiyuanhui*) in 1996 and has so far officially recognized 14 tribes. Even though the aboriginal policy has greatly improved, the indigenous people remain on the lowest rungs of the legal and socioeconomic hierarchy and are still trapped in a dominantly Han society. Although the issues of aboriginal rights and their struggle for land and traditional usage of the land are beyond the scope of this book, I acknowledge the grave damage they have suffered as a result of unfair resource distribution, restrictions on their traditional way of living, lack of land rights, and the general stereotyping imposed upon them by the Han Chinese as a whole. All of which has affected the aborigines socially, economically, politically, and culturally. Even with the recent improvement in legal rights and some reversal of discrimination, there is still a long way to go to establish an "Indian country," as it were, in which the aborigines receive basic land rights similar to those given to the American Indians.

¹² Fujian Province is also known by its old name Min. The term 'Minnan' literally means "the south of Min."

¹³ The Hakka is a branch of the Han Chinese. It is said that the Hakka originally came from North China and migrated to southern China (especially Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Guangxi provinces) during the fall of the Southern Song dynasty in the mid-13th century. The Hakka population is estimated to number 80 million worldwide. The name Hakka may derive from the Cantonese pronunciation of the Mandarin word *kejia* (Encyclopædia Britannica 2011).

¹⁴ The incident started off as a relatively small dispute on February 27, 1947. A female vendor was apprehended by Monopoly Bureau agents for selling a few untaxed cigarettes. When she begged for mercy and appealed to them not to confiscate her goods, she was brutally struck down. The crowds started to gather and confronted the agents. They panicked, fired at the crowds, and escaped to a nearby police station. In the struggle, an onlooker died of gunshot wounds and the public was outraged. The next day, a crowd of some 2000 people went to the authorities, demanding punishment for the agents and petitioning for a reform of the monopoly policy. Security forces at the Governor-General's Office fired at the protestors. Instead of communicating with the representatives and responding to their demands,

Governor Chen I deployed both armed police and army to suppress the uprising (Kerr 1966). The uprising spread throughout the island and lasted more than a month. Although the exact death toll is still unclear, it is estimated to be between 10,000 and 30,000. The harsh crackdown on protests intensified the violence and increased people's resentment not only against the KMT authorities but also against what they stood for – the Chinese regime and the mainlanders. Therefore, the incident is seen to be the defining moment that shaped (and is still impacting upon) the formation of Taiwanese identity.

¹⁵ In May 2014, the aboriginal population was put at 535,953. This accounts for approximately 2.29 per cent of Taiwan's total population of 23,386,883 (MOI 2014a).

¹⁶ There have been different views on the ethnic composition of the Taiwanese population. Because of the strict migration policy of the Qing to curb coastal rebellions, most early Chinese migrants to Taiwan were male. Inter-marriage between the Han Chinese and the indigenous tribal women was common. There was thus a folk proverb: "*you Tangshan gong wu Tangshan ma*," meaning "there were only Chinese grandfathers, but there were no Chinese grandmothers." As a result, some scholars claim that most Taiwanese are ethnically mixed people rather than pure Han Chinese (Lin Ma-li 2006). However, this genetic discourse is highly controversial. The claim has been seen as part of the nation-building myth to support Taiwan independence (Chen Shu-juo and Tuan Hung-kun 2008; Lin Yao-chi 2006). There have also been discussions on the linguistic connections, suggesting strong links between Taiwanese indigenous tribes and the Austronesian-speaking people in Southeast Asia and Oceania (Melton et al. 1998).

¹⁷ The figures were collected and compiled by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) (2001). The figures quoted in this collection of surveys are mostly taken from those conducted by the reputable Election Research Centre (ERC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU). However, when there was more than one survey conducted by the ERC (particularly in the late 1990s), or none (before 1994), I would give preference to those commissioned by the MAC or those which were based on a larger sample of interviewees.

¹⁸ Since the surveys started in 1989, the numbers of those who identified themselves as 'Chinese only' were highest at the beginning – 52% in 1989, 54% in 1990, 32% in 1991, 44% in 1992, 48.5% in 1993 – and the category 'both Chinese and Taiwanese' grew steadily – 26% in 1989, 19% in 1990, 47% in 1991, 36.5% in 1992, 32.7% in 1993. In comparison, the number of respondents who identified themselves as 'Taiwanese only' remained relatively low – 16% in 1989, 19% in 1990, 12% in 1991, 16.7% in 1992, 16.7% in 1993.

¹⁹ Starting from 1994, the situation was reversed. Fewer and fewer people admitted their 'Chinese only' identity – 24.2% in 1994, 23.8% in 1995, 20.5% in 1996, 21.8% in 1997, 18.2% in 1998, 13.7% in 1999, and 13.6% in 2000. At the same time, more and more

THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE.
AFTER PEER REVIEW

Taiwanese felt comfortable admitting their ‘Taiwanese only’ identity – 29% in 1994, 27.9% in 1995, 24.9% in 1996, 32.8% in 1997, 34.5% in 1998, 39.5% in 1999, and 42.5% in 2000. Even so, the share of respondents who identified themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese remained high – 43.2% in 1994, 43.6% in 1995, 49.5% in 1996, 45.4% in 1997, 41.3% in 1998, 41.5% in 1999, and 38.5% in 2000. The growing trend of ‘Taiwanese-only identity’ has continued into the 2000s and is now the dominant category of Taiwanese self-identification.

²⁰ Anne Buttimer (1976: 277-92) uses the phrase to mean “the culturally defined spatiotemporal setting or horizon of everyday life.” In other words, the term ‘lifeworld’ refers to the social context and pattern of daily living that we take for granted. The idea will be further discussed in Chapter 5.

²¹ According to Cohen (2008: 85-6, 145), the pattern of ‘sojourning’ –circular migration – is most common in the Chinese diaspora.

²² Here, the word *xiang* is of central importance, signifying ‘native place’ or ‘home village.’ Traditionally, the attachment to *xiang* and one’s ancestral origin was closely associated with the filial duties that the Chinese regarded as moral responsibilities.

²³ The courtesy names – *zi* or *hao* – were mainly given to men but have not been used since the early 20th century. *Zi* was a name given to mark one’s reaching adulthood (after the age of 20) and was used by one’s peers to show respect. It was given either by parents or teachers and rarely chosen by the individual. *Hao* was usually self-selected as the pseudonym. Moreover, it was common for intellectuals to have more than one *hao*.

²⁴ The name ‘Tai-sheng’ was very common in the 1950s among mainlander boys. Chen Shun-chang (2009) identified 76 well-known people named ‘Tai-sheng’ in Taiwan. Adopting the Chinese naming tradition, the former Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (Taipei Office), David Dean also gave his son the Chinese name Tai-sheng during his term of office in Taiwan (1979-86).

²⁵ The phrases such as ‘*jiju*’ and ‘*jiji*’ mean ‘temporary resident’ or ‘living away from home.’ On the old ROC identity card used on the mainland there were two entries for ‘*benji*’ (original home) and ‘*jiji*’ (temporary home).

²⁶ The idea *deep space* is “quintessentially social space... physical extent fused through with social intent” (N. Smith 1984: 214).

²⁷ In the English translation of Lefebvre’s book *The Production of Space*, the phrase was translated as “representational spaces” (1991:33). However, Soja (1996: 61) believes that a better translation would be “spaces of representation,” which Brenner and Elden also use in their translation of Lefebvre’s book – *State, Space, World: Selected Essays* (Lefebvre 2009: 229).

²⁸ There is a large amount of outstanding research focusing on Taiwanese identity. Cases in point are Chun (1994); Wachman (1994); Hsiao (2000); Makeham and Hsiao (2005); Corcuff (2002); Hughes (1997); Wang Fu-chang (2005); Ngo and Wang (2011).

²⁹ Taiwan was usually seen by western scholars as an alternative to China when it was difficult to go to the mainland to do fieldwork before the late 1970s. Even so, publications in English about Taiwan geography were very few during the early post-war era. Scholarly publications on geographical topics relating to Taiwan were mostly written in Chinese and Japanese. Those written in English were limited in number and were mainly the results of research on traditional aspects of geography, i.e. the land, geographical features, inhabitants, and the economy of Taiwan. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion here refers to publications written in English.

³⁰ Since the mid-17th century, the European inter-state system has generally been presented as the dominant form of geopolitical organization. Within the Westphalian system, the two elements 'sovereignty' and 'territoriality' have been tightly linked (Ruggie 1993).

³¹ In 2011, the NICT was merged into the National Academy of Educational Research (NAER).

³² According to Rigger (2001: 178-79), during the 1994 governor election James (Chu-yu) Soong relied heavily on the support of then president Lee Teng-hui to 'overcome the liability' of his mainlander ethnic background. To demonstrate that he really cared about the people and was in touch with the provincial reality, Soong endeavored to visit every provincial city, town, and village at least once during his four-year term of office as governor.

³³ For example, the 2008 electoral agenda drawn up by the KMT Presidential election used the slogan '*ai Tai 12 xiang jianshe*' (Love-Taiwan Twelve Constructions) which later became the national policy under the Ma Ying-jeou administration (Executive Yuan 2009).

³⁴ In September 2011, Taiwan was rated the third best destination for investment (i.e. up one place from fourth best in the previous report), just behind Singapore and Switzerland. This survey was conducted by the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI). The BERI report studied the investment climate and competitiveness of 50 major world economies by evaluating each country's operational risk, political risk, and foreign exchange risk. Among major Asian economies, Taiwan was ahead of Japan (no. 11), China (no. 13), Malaysia (no. 16), South Korea (no. 17), and Australia (no. 19) (Norway News 2011).

³⁵ Over the years, there have been many similar calls, for example, Wachman (2007), Rigger (2011), Copper (2011), Committee on Foreign Affairs (2011).