Conflicting Perspectives on the ‘migrant crisis’ in the Horn of Africa

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In sharp contrast to the sense of a ‘migrant crisis’ which prevails in Europe, nation-states in the Horn of Africa understand migration, including state-induced population displacement, as unexceptional. I address this apparent paradox by contrasting European policy discourse on migration with the long-term political and structural processes in north eastern Africa which cause population displacement and migration. I then examine the migration policies of governments in the Horn and the impact of the EU migration policy initiative on regional policy and practice. I conclude by arguing that the EU misrepresents and misunderstands the factors responsible for large-scale migration and the role of states in exploiting migrants. For these reasons it is highly unlikely that the EU-Horn of Africa Action Plan/Khartoum process will bring about better border management policies and practices which will prevent ‘migrants’ reaching Europe.

Key words: migration, policy, European Union/EU, Horn of Africa, Khartoum Process

In 2014 the media, in response to statements by European Union (EU) and certain European states that Europe was overwhelmed by the arrival of 300,000 refugees and ‘migrants’, began to carry reports about a ‘migrant crisis’. These reports were given further impetus by the arrival of more migrants in 2015, a situation made worse by the refusal of EU member states to agree a common EU policy for assessing, settling and integrating refugees and migrants and their failure to agree the ‘external dimension’ of EU asylum policy (Faure, Gavas & Knoll 2015). In the wake of this policy failure, and facing the prospect of yet of more ‘migrants’ arriving, the EU Commission committed significant political and economic resources to support specific policy initiatives aimed at preventing ‘migrants’ from reaching Europe.

Thus in 2015 the EU initiated a €3 billion deal with Turkey to stop the flow of ‘migrants’ – the use of the term ‘migrant’ by European states and the EU is highly problematic because it subsumes many individuals who have a valid claim to refugee status as illegal migrants – entering southern Europe (Collett 2016). At roughly the same time the EU hosted the Valletta Summit where it linked its concerns about migration to the Africa-wide Khartoum Process.1 In 2015 the EU also created ‘The EU-Horn of Africa Action Plan’2 which sought to create a co-ordinated inter-continental policy response aimed at ‘managing’

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migration and facilitating the return of African migrants back to their country of origin. To date this strategy has funded 118 projects across the continent and it has established migration ‘partnerships’ with countries situated on the principal migration routes to Europe. This policy dialogue is supported by funding from a variety of different EU initiatives which include the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and €1.8 billion from the ‘EU Trust Fund’ for the period 2015-2020. The Trust Fund is aimed, in large part, at building ‘the capacity of governments to manage migration more efficiently’. Additional bi-lateral funding for related initiatives has been provided by EU states desperate to stem the flow of migrants and reduce political pressure in the run up to general elections.

The policy initiative adopted in the Khartoum Process has been defined by the EU as a problem specific to Africa, one which can be regionally contained by enhancing the capacity of regional states to manage their borders (i.e. entrenched political problems are rendered/transformed into technical and bureaucratic practices by policy discourse; Apthorpe 2003). The policy language employed by the EU seeks to persuade rather than inform the public about the nature of a specific problem; it also uses ‘key words’ (migration partnerships) and makes selective use of ‘data’ and facts to arrive at a specific policy prescription, namely that enhanced border control will stop ‘illegal migration’ which is caused by human traffickers and smugglers. This policy message, which seeks to persuade the public that the EU understands and can successfully address the key ‘drivers’ of illegal migration, is based on a gross simplification of a complex set of social, political and economic processes. As will become clear, policy ‘success’ is contingent on the willingness and ability of African states to support EU objectives.

Except for the scale of what is being pursued, the thinking behind the initiative is not new. Andersson (2014, 2016) reminds us that the EU’s ‘fight against irregular migration’ began with the introduction of the Schengen agreement on free movement in the EU in the mid-1990s which led to a massive economic investment in the EU’s external borders. As part of its enforcement activities the EU initiated a succession of policy initiatives – the European Neighbourhood Policy with African states, Operation Hera in West Africa, Operation Sophia in the central Mediterranean and the EU ‘Hotspot policy’ in the Eastern Mediterranean – which were rolled out to deal with successive migration ‘crises’. The 2015/16 ‘crisis’ is the most recent and the most ambitious attempt to link EU concerns about the ‘migrant crisis’ to aid negotiations with African states.

Against a background in which the EU has ‘managed’ successive migration crises by investing massively in the ‘illegality industry’ (Andersson 2014), this chapter focuses on

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4 See: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/horn-africa_en. Funding from this source excludes other EU and EU member-state funding mechanisms. (accessed 26 June 2017)
5 See: ‘Britain sends £9 million to Libya to fight terror threat and migration crisis’ (The Guardian, 23/8/2017) and ‘Italy’s deal to stem flow of people from Libya in danger of collapse’ (The Guardian, 3/10/17).
three issues. Section (i) examines the structural processes which generate migration in the Horn of Africa (which includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia (including Puntland and Mudug), Sudan and South Sudan). Section (ii) examines EU initiatives aimed at stemming migration to Europe and how regional states have responded to the initiative. Given that migration is a logical social response to poverty and conflict, the chapter concludes by considering whether regional and EU migration policies are likely to succeed and, if not, whether it is time to rethink security-oriented approaches to political, development and humanitarian problems?

Understanding population movement in the Horn of Africa

What do we know about the individuals transiting towards Europe from the Horn? First they constitute a small percentage of the total number of individuals in the Horn who reside outside their country of origin. Individuals fleeing persecution initially seek refuge in refugee camps located just outside their country of origin. However these camps have become increasingly large and insecure places where individuals are warehoused. In theory encamped refugees should have three options available to them. First registered refugees should be able to apply for resettlement to a third country (they wait in the camps pending a decision). However the number of individuals accepted for resettlement has rapidly declined. Second host countries can offer refugees the choice of local integration. However none of the states in the Horn currently grant status to refugees which means that there is no possibility for refugees to legally settle in a host country. A final but equally limited possibility arises if conflict in a refugee’s country of origin abates. When this happens UNHCR initiates a program of voluntary repatriation to send refugees home. The only repatriation programme currently in operation is for Somali refugees in Kenya who are being repatriated to Sudan.6 The situation in the region’s refugee camps is therefore precarious: the camps have become very large, insecure and unsafe; food supplies have been drastically cut and residents are experiencing hopelessness and despair. The situation in the camps has led increasing numbers of individuals to avoid/leave the camps.

To understand what propels individuals to leave the region we need to reject the simplistic policy-based distinction between forced and voluntary migration which depends on making assumptions about the ‘motives’ of migrants (Turton 2003). Instead we need to look at the complex factors which influence migration including the politics of governance, political economy (poverty, inequality etc.), geography, social networks and what happens to migrants/refugees while they are in transit.

Economic factors have been important in spurring migration. Poverty is clearly one factor behind rural-urban migration, but equally important are ecological problems, landlessness and unsustainable rural livelihoods (Markos Ezra 2003; IOM 2006). Since the 1950s differential levels of development across the region has led individuals to migrate to find work and access higher education. It is partly for these reasons that Eritreans migrated to Ethiopia and Sudan in the 1960s, northern Sudanese migrated to Egypt and the Middle East, 

6 However implementation of this programme is facing serious difficulties. See: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/factsheet_kenya_april_17_rio_co.pdf (accessed 20 June 2017).
Ethiopians migrated to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and Somali’s migrated to the Gulf. Subsequent population movement has been spurred by civil war, economic recession and conflict which resulted in growing levels of migration to Europe, the Middle East and North America.

Migration over the past decade is increasingly dominated by youth, especially young men from Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia and it seems to be shaped by new political-economic factors and new sensibilities. For instance poor migrants target regional labour markets and, at least initially, have little intention of moving outside the region. At the same time increasing numbers of young, fairly well educated youth are leaving (in groups) for Europe (Triulzi 2013).

The principle factors driving young people to migrate are concerns about the limited value of their education, peer pressure (many friends are leaving), an awareness that Diaspora nationals with better qualifications monopolize the best jobs and because ‘there is nothing to do’ at home (Kuschminder et al 2012; Nimo-Ilhan Ali 2016; van Heelsum 2016). Better educated migrants from better off households with better social networks tend to target Europe; whereas poor migrants with limited social networks seek work in regional labour markets. Regardless of the motivations or the economic status of migrants, most encounter violence, extortion and death on the transit routes.

The decision to migrate is shaped by many factors. First youth believe that they can achieve more by leaving rather than staying home. Second while individuals do assess the potential costs and problems of migration, their assessment of the risks is outweighed by the expected benefits of reaching Europe. Third their assessment of the costs – which includes knowledge about smugglers, demands for ransom and possible death – are assuaged by the development of ‘leave now – pay later’ schemes which are negotiated directly with ‘smugglers’ in their communities. These schemes substantially lower the initial cost of transiting to Europe by placing the financial burden on family and kin after an individual has left. Finally the decision about where to migrate to – within the region or Europe – is partly determined by the existence of an extended social network in the Diaspora. An extended network allows individuals to call on their kin to pay the costs of migration which are substantially higher if the destination is Europe, i.e. to get money to bribe smugglers and officials to release them from captivity/detention, to pay multiple demands for ransom and to secure transport and food (Belloni 2016).

The low level of development across the Horn of Africa is caused by periodic drought and recurrent political conflict which has created high levels of population displacement and has exacerbated poverty. Nicholson’s (2014: 78) examination of data on drought in the Horn for the period 1998-2012 indicates that while drought tended to follow a 10-12 year cycle in the period prior to 1984, it has recurred in 1998, 2000, 2005/6, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011.

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7 I am indebted to Mesgina Tedla and Hyab Yohannes for talking to me about their research and their experience of transiting from Eritrea to Europe.

8 While Eritrean youth are clearly leaving in order to avoid indefinite military service, in other ways their motivations differ little from their counterparts in Ethiopia and Somalia.
Indeed the 2016/17 drought is estimated to affect 20 million people. Historically the impact of drought has been exacerbated by: (a) the absence of reliable data on rainfall, food crops and regional markets (which allows authorities to anticipate food shortages, strategically position relief supplies and request emergency assistance in a timely manner); (b) the existence of a viable economic infrastructure which allows relief supplies to be moved and positioned where they are needed; (c) the absence of credible civil administrative systems that can be trusted to respect human rights and manage and deliver development assistance, food aid etc.; and (d) on-going political conflict.

The region has a long history of political instability which has given rise to coup d’états in every state which in turn has led to a dismantling and reconstruction of state administrations, including famine early warning systems, and to population displacement and growing poverty (de Wall 2015). The resultant failure of regional states to create the conditions for peace and economic development has made it difficult for donors to respond with adequate assistance.

Regional states also have a poor human rights record. Al Shabaab – an Al Qaeda inspired political movement – operates in Somalia where, in addition to its terrorist activities, it is responsible for population displacement and for preventing the distribution of relief to victims of drought and conflict. Despite recent elections and the formation of a national government, the frailty of political authority in Somalia is underwritten by international peace keeping forces under the umbrella of AMISOM.9

In Sudan it was hoped that conflict would end following the independence of the Republic of South Sudan in 2010. However Sudan has continued its efforts to undermine South Sudan and, at the same time, rival ethnic-based political parties in South Sudan are attacking each other and the civilian population causing massive population displacement, food shortages and famine. In 2011 a UN mission was established with the aim of protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, and supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.10 The Republic of Sudan has been run by a military junta since 1989 which, in addition to destabilising South Sudan, has pursued an indiscriminate war in Darfur and with Chad and Libya. In 1997 the complex political situation in Sudan led to UN intervention11 which has seen its mandate expand to include South Sudan, Abyei and Darfur.

In 1991 a liberation front seized power in Ethiopia which facilitated the creation of the state of Eritrea. However in 1998 Eritrea and Ethiopia engaged in a bitter two year border war that resulted in widespread death, the displacement of over one million people and the flight of several hundred thousand individuals from the region (Campbell 2014). War set back development in the region by a decade. Subsequently Ethiopia, supported by the

9 See: http://amisom-au.org/ (accessed 1 July 2017)
international community, has seen significant improvements in the country’s economic infrastructure, a significant decline in the level of poverty but also rising expectations for a better standard of life. Even so persistent drought, water and food shortages, extreme climate events and on-going conflict has caused internal population displacement and a steady flow of refugees. In Eritrea the ruling party in Eritrea has suspended the constitution, refused to hold elections, established indefinite military conscription and has overseen a deterioration of the economy and the exodus of its population. At the other extreme is Somaliland which, while not recognized as a state by the international community, has managed to create a relative island of political and economic stability as a result of investment by its Diaspora.

Box 1 (below) indicates the scale of the development challenge in the Horn. The region covers a huge geographic area, has a very limited economic infrastructure, a large and geographically dispersed population, high levels of poverty and inequality and high levels of population displacement (i.e. Internally Displaced Persons or IDPs).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
<th>Territory (square kilometres)</th>
<th>Poverty rate</th>
<th>Per capita income (US$)</th>
<th>IDPs (million)</th>
<th>Displaced to other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>637,657</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>$284</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>$531</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>363,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>1,886,000</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>$1,170</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>666,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>1,104,000</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>$1,523</td>
<td>298,000</td>
<td>87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>619,745</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>$1,630</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.75m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The region also hosts and produces large numbers of refugees. Disparities in development and protracted conflict contribute to extensive population displacement and migration. A sense of the scale of the refugee problem is provided by Verwimp & Maystadt (2015: 7; see Figure 1 below). Their data, which excludes statistics on IDPs, indicates that refugee numbers have never dropped below two million; numbers peaked in the early 1990s at 4.5 million, began to decline in the late 1990s but are once again rising.

By the late 1990s increasing numbers of refugees and migrants began to move out of the region in mixed migration flows along one of four routes (Campbell 2009, 2014; Horwood 2009; Soucy 2011). There are two principle routes13 out of the Horn which came into being in the 1960s. The first route, along which as many as 50,000 individuals moved each year, was to Puntland (northern Somalia) and across the Straits of Hormuz to Yemen. Yemen recognized the asylum claims of Somali nationals and provided them with access to refugee camps; however the Yemeni authorities saw Ethiopians as economic migrants who

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12 I have drawn upon various sources including the International Monitoring Displacement Service and IOM. IDP’s are Internally Displaced Persons.

13 The other routes, which are not discussed here, are: (a) flying direct to the Middle East ostensibly on pilgrimage or to work as domestic labour; (b) through the ‘southern Africa corridor’ to South Africa and out; and (c) by flying to Europe, North America and elsewhere.
were subject to arrest and deportation. Even so thousands of Ethiopians used smugglers to make their way north to Saudi Arabia, while others moved to Turkey and to Europe. However this route became increasingly dangerous in 2011 when Saudi Arabia built a border wall. The situation confronting illegal immigrants in Saudi Arabia has worsened in recent years when the authorities imposed a ‘Saudization’ policy which led to the arrest and deportation of hundreds of thousands of migrants back to their country of origin. The number of people moving along this route appears to have substantially dwindled.

The second major route out of the region was to Egypt or Libya via Khartoum: individuals were either trafficked northwest from Khartoum to Kufra (Libya) or north to Cairo (some individuals who travelled to Cairo entered Israel where they are incarcerated; Campbell et al 2013). The number of individuals moving on these routes has varied. For instance when difficulties were encountered in Egypt making further movement difficult – e.g. due to the arrest of migrants by the Egyptian authorities or Israel’s construction of its border barriers in 2010 – migrant flows were re-routed from Khartoum to Libya.

The principal embarkation point to Europe has been the Central Mediterranean route from Khartoum to Libya along which an estimated 673,000 persons entered Europe between 2011 and mid-2017. Data on the nationality of individuals using this route (see Table 2)

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14 Tens of thousands of Ethiopians have illegally migrated to the Middle East allegedly to practice the Haj and have stayed – in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and The Lebanon – to work including large numbers of young and poorly educated women who work as domestic labour. The Ethiopian government has only recently attempted to control the large number of ‘labour recruiters’ in Addis Ababa who are involved in recruiting women to work in the Middle East.

show that between 2014 and 2106 the number of individuals arriving in Europe from the Horn has substantially decreased.\textsuperscript{16} The fluctuation in the number and the nationality of individuals travelling this route illustrates that EU-African strategies to contain or prevent migration do not work: a blockade imposed on one route results in individuals being re-routed through a different and potentially more risky route.\textsuperscript{17} Research clearly indicates that conflict and poverty are the main reasons why people initially leave their country of origin and that large numbers of ‘migrants’ become immobile/stuck in transit (MEDMIG 2016) as a direct result of actions by state and non-state actors involved in extortion, torture and holding individuals for ransom (e.g. Healey & Forin 2017). By the end of 2016 the growing risks on this route saw migrants from the Horn being re-routed back towards Cairo (Malakooti 2016, Frontex 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2105</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138,796</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>181,000</td>
<td>116,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regional policy initiatives**

The movement of individuals out of the Horn towards Europe which contributed to a sense of ‘crisis’ Europe is in sharp contrast to the views of most governments in the Horn who view the situation with indifference. To understand why this situation exists I examine how the EU has responded to the ‘migration crisis’ and how states in the Horn have responded to EU initiatives.

The EU has targeted the Horn because it is seen a major source of irregular/illegal migrants and because it is a transit route to Europe. The EU has pursued its anti-migration agenda via two distinct policies. First in 2007 it initiated and funded the ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy Roadmap’ (JAES) which sought to expand co-operation with the African Union in eight policy areas which including ‘migration, mobility and employment’. The EU has

\textsuperscript{16} The statistics clearly indicate that the majority of individuals entering Europe on this route are from West Africa, though an increasing number are from Bangladesh. For an overall view see: \url{http://www.nature.com/news/what-the-numbers-say-about-refugees-1.21548} (accessed 2 July 2017).

\textsuperscript{17} In 2017 increasing numbers of migrants were diverted away from Libya and attempted to take boats from Tunisia and Algeria.

\textsuperscript{18} 2017 data is for the first 10 months of 2017. See: Sahan (2016: 12); UNHCR 2017; ESI 2017; and \url{http://migration.iom.int/docs/2016_Flows_to_Europe_Overview.pdf} (accessed 3 July 2017); European Commission 2017).
invested heavily in this process. More recently the EU has focused its resources on the agenda set out in the Joint Valetta Action Plan which identified five ‘priority domains’ which have been picked up in the Khartoum Process. It is not possible to summarize all the discussions and projects pursued by the Khartoum Process in this chapter. Nevertheless it is clear that the EU is attempting to steer consultations in ways that prioritise its concerns. This conclusion becomes clear by looking at the allocation of expenditure committed to different policy/priority domains and it is reflected in the language of the ‘analysis report’ and documents which summarise the efforts made in 2017(Khartoum Process 2017). The principal planning document submitted to Senior Officials in February 2017 makes it clear that there are tensions between African states and the EU regarding the focus of policy dialogue (it also documents the lack of progress on the ground) and the fact that EU funding is driving the process (many African states have failed to finance national and regional initiatives).

European Commission documents suggest that African states are concerned about the failure of the EU to facilitate access to visas to enter the EU and they are unwilling to support a ‘returns policy’ to speed up the return of ‘migrants’ back to their country of origin. However even if the EU facilitates the entry of highly skilled Africans into the EU the large number of young and unskilled migrants transiting towards Europe will be excluded. The exclusion of migrants arriving in Europe, not to mention those in transit, raises questions about how they are to be ‘returned’ to the region, a subject that has received insufficient attention and funding. In the absence of evaluations and reports on the numerous projects overseen by the Khartoum Process, we are left to read between the lines of official communique which contrasts a call for further consultations on key policy issues with the need to secure clear agreements that will facilitate efficient border management and prevent ‘migrants’ entering Europe. The urgency to prevent ‘migrants’ from reaching Europe is

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20 For information on these discussions and to understand how it is funded, see: http://www.khartoumprocess.net/news-and-events/news/42-joint-valetta-action-plan-senior-officials-meeting-som-in-malta-8-9-february-2017 (accessed 26 June 2017).


22 Apparently they fear that if the ‘diaspora’ is forcibly returned there will be a significant decline in remittances which constitutes the largest flow of foreign exchange into Africa (EC 2017: 14).
reflected in the political calculations of certain EU states who are keen to seen by the electorate as being tough on migration.23

The EU’s attempt to create a strategic partnership with Africa via the Khartoum Process is fraught with contradictions. First, policy dialogue reflects a fundamental asymmetry of power in which the EU identifies priorities and decides how funding will be allocated: this strategy is very familiar to its African ‘partners’. Second the ‘priority domains’ identified by the EU do not address the structural causes of migration/population displacement. Third while the EU is investing considerable sums of money in this initiative, its investment is disbursed across the continent in a variety of projects which may have a limited impact unless it can be they can be effectively co-ordinated. Fourth a narrow focus on migration fails to address other important policy issues which confront the continent, namely how to contain and manage ongoing regional conflict, the need to create a more diversified economy with high skilled jobs that will be attractive to educated nationals (60% of the continent’s population are under the age of 30) etc. Finally, the failure of EU member states to fund this initiative has led the European Commission draw on other, more limited sources of funding.24

If we look at regional migration initiatives pursued in the Horn it becomes clear just how wide the policy gap is between the EU and its ‘partners’. African states are expected to guarantee and protect the human rights of migrants, however historically they have made little effort to protect their nationals from exploitation or risk once they are outside their country of origin (e.g. the large number of migrant deaths involved in crossing the Straits of Hormuz and the failure to create policies to allow for the free movement of nationals within the region). The policy situation began to change in 2012 when, under pressure from the EU, regional states signed international conventions. Nevertheless a careful look at regional migration policies shows that they primarily reflect concerns with national security (Majidi & Oucho 2015). Regional states have criminalized migration rather than offered protection to vulnerable migrants. While formally complying with EU expectations regarding enhanced border management, policy implementation is creating new threats to migrants and new opportunities to smugglers/traffickers who collude with officials to exploit migrants. This situation prevails because there are no legal migration channels within the region or between the region and Europe (MHUB 2015).

In 2007 Ethiopia signed the Convention against Organized Transnational Crime25 and in 2012 it signed the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and

23 See the ‘Joint Statement Addressing the Challenge of Migration and Asylum’ between France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the EU and Niger, Chad and Libya at:
In 2012 it established the ‘Council against Human Trafficking and Smuggling’ which is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister (Sahaan 2016: 32-f). The Council established four working groups supported by law enforcement and has set up ‘community-based task forces’ in 400 localities. During this period the Federal police ‘intercepted’ more than 30,000 individuals believed to be vulnerable to trafficking along the Sudan-Ethiopian border and convicted 640 ‘human traffickers’.

In 2014 Sudan ratified the Palermo Protocol ‘to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons’, it joined the ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy’ to enhance EU-African cooperation and it created the Asylum Regulation Act (2014). In 2014 Sudan also established the National Committee for Combating Human Trafficking and adopted the *Combating of Trafficking Act (2014)* which set out maximum prison sentences of 10 and 20 years for smuggling and for smugglers who cause the death of migrants. Worryingly, in 2013 a former warlord commanding irregular troops drawn from Darfur was given the task of policing the border with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt and Libya. This ‘Rapid Support Force’ has been given immunity from prosecution ‘for all acts committed in the course of its work’ (AI 2016; Ali 2017). In 2015 Sudan established joint border patrols with Ethiopia which focused on the Gedaref/Kassala and the Humera/Metema regions. Twenty one operations were reportedly conducted between 2014 and 2015 which led to the ‘release’ of 850 victims of trafficking. However trafficking was re-routed rather than stopped, and the Sudanese authorities continue to arrest, mistreat and refoule individuals back to Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Despite ratifying international conventions and creating new legislation, migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers in Sudan remain vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labour. Indeed individuals without legal status find themselves in a situation in which corruption, lack of access to justice and a criminal justice system characterised by arbitrary arrest, torture and detention pushes individuals to move onward towards Europe (Oette & Abdesalam Babiker 2017). Indeed Khartoum continues to function as the central hub for individuals going to Libya, Egypt and Turkey (Frontex 2016). There is considerable scepticism regarding the intention of the government to implement any of the conventions and laws to protect vulnerable migrants and refugees; this concern is underlined by a deliberate policy of transforming tens of thousands of nationals of South Sudan resident in the Republic into stateless persons.

Eritrean policies include imposing strict controls on movement within the country, arbitrary security sweeps, mass arrests and a policy of shooting individuals attempting to leave (MHUB 2015: 53-4). Indeed Ethiopia has repeatedly argued that Eritrea should be

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excluded from access to the EU-Horn of Africa Trust Fund because it is ‘the main driver’ of refugees in the Horn, because it has repeatedly refused to respond to previous EU initiatives and because it is a ‘serious threat to peace in the region’. The Ethiopian argument is reinforced by Eritrea’s occupation of a disputed area along its border with Djibouti in June 2017. In sharp contrast, Puntland and Somalia have no resources to create border controls.

Looking across the region it is clear that states do not share a common political agenda on migration. Indeed the evidence suggests that while they are willing to accept funding from the EU for specific projects (for equipment, training or institutional capacity support) they lack the capacity to co-ordinate policies between key ministries/departments (IGAD 2016: 6-f) and they are unwilling to sign up to the EU agenda (Ali 2017: 45-f; EC 2017: 12-15).

Conclusion

The picture which emerges regarding the ‘migration crisis’ in the Horn of Africa is complex and fluid. First it should be clear that Europe’s concern about ‘migrants’ is driven by anti-immigrant sentiment which had fed into electoral politics in the UK, Italy, Greece, Germany and new accession states (Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia). The EU is promoting short-term managerial solutions to a problem defined as emanating from the Horn of Africa by imposing legal and technical solutions, i.e. capacity building. This narrow policy focus defines the problem as African in origin and it fails to address the structural factors causing migration. Furthermore EU policy does not take into account the deep-seated problems of governance reflected in the failure of its African ‘partners’ to protect the human rights of citizens and migrants.

In sharp contrast to the EU, states in the Horn of Africa do not buy into the notion of a ‘migration crisis’; high levels of migration/displacement are normal and it is not a priority in the region. In all probability it will be difficult for the EU, through the Khartoum Process and other multi- and bi-lateral development initiatives, to establish effective border management in the Horn of Africa that will prevent ‘migrants’ reaching Europe.

Within the region there is abundant evidence that conflict is unmanageable. Regional states have proved to be unable or unwilling to negotiate an end to conflict and, without extensive international assistance, they are unable to support the growing number of IDPs and refugees. This situation has occurred despite the presence of four ongoing UN interventions in the region, and it reflects the unaccountable nature of elite politics across the region. Without peace there can be no development, and without development population displacement and migration will continue.

A notable feature of the Khartoum Process is the extent to which African development needs are side-lined by the EU’s focus on migration. Not only has the EU failed to address key structural factors responsible for population movement and migration – factors which differ by country and region – it is negotiating from a perceived position of strength based on the belief that Europe holds all the bargaining chips, namely access to a huge export market, to finance and to development assistance. This view fails to recognize that a
migration policy based on deterrence will fail because it displaces rather than prevents migration and because it incentivizes states and international firms to deceive the EU in an attempt to secure funding and/or recognition in exchange for a promise to control migration. The continued pursuit of such policies indicates that the EU has not learned from earlier policy failures in West and North Africa which attempted to prevent irregular migration into Europe.

The Khartoum process represents a much more fragile political basis for preventing irregular migration than the EU is prepared to admit. Negotiations are underpinned by the transfer of huge amounts of EU and EU member state funding to a multiplicity of state and non-state actors who are linked together by a variety of formal and informal agreements. These actors have very different interests in the outcome of the process. Indeed many actors to whom responsibility for migration control has been delegated cannot be held to account for human rights violations they commit in the name of managing migration or for failing to implement agreements. This lack of accountability extends well beyond states in the Horn of Africa and includes local police, military and paramilitary organizations as well as European-based organizations such as Frontex and international firms funded by the EU to build border fences, construct and manage immigration detention centres, deport failed asylum seekers and provide increasingly sophisticated forms of border surveillance paid for by European citizens.

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