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Lake Tanganyika: Commercial Frontier in the Era of Long-Distance Commerce, East and Central Africa, c.1830-1890

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD

2017

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Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis

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Abstract

This thesis uses Lake Tanganyika as a case study to analyse long-distance commerce in East and Central Africa during the period c.1830-1890. This era is loosely demarcated by the arrival of traders from the Indian Ocean Coast to the lakeshore at its beginning, and the imposition of European colonial rule at its end. Its central argument is that the shores of Lake Tanganyika represented a frontier region in this spatial and temporal context. The nature of this frontier was intimately tied to Lake Tanganyika’s specific environmental characteristics. People migrated to and across the lake for protection and because of the commercial opportunities that were available to those who did so. This promoted cultural exchange, political instability, and commercial opportunity – themes that are common in other analyses of frontiers, borderlands, and other large bodies of water. The development of the frontier was tied to the ways in which lakeshore populations and long-distance traders encountered each other within the context of the lakeshore environment. The results of these encounters led to the emergence of distinct cultural forms. These were expressed via a collective demand for certain commercial goods in an integrated lakeshore market, pervasive religious beliefs and rituals, and types of settlement that re-shaped the lakeshore’s position in relation to elsewhere in East and Central Africa. The coalescence of these cultural forms may be regarded as the development of a ‘frontier culture’ that set the lacustrine region apart from nearby landward regions. Such a focus on cultural exchange sheds new light on the encounter between long-distance traders and other interior populations, which is often understood in terms of economic transactions and political upheaval. The Lake Tanganyika case study, therefore, allows for the addition of a cultural layer to some of the prevailing perspectives regarding long-distance commerce in East and Central Africa.
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For the most part, I have taken out all Swahili prefixes, such as *m* and *wa*, that determine the nature of the object as well as singularity and plurality. These are replaced by English terms that achieve the same function. The one exception to this rule is the use of ‘*U*’ as a prefix in the names of regions. This allows for a linguistic distinction when discussing the region and when discussing objects or people from that region. In most cases, describing an article as from a region is achieved by dropping the U prefix. Thus, a canoe made in Ugoma is a ‘Goma canoe’ and a person from Ujjii is a ‘Jiji person,’ or, simply, ‘Jiji.’ Manyema, Marungu, Bemba, the Mrima, and Itawa are the only regions that this thesis refers to that do not have this U prefix in any of the primary or secondary sources. In such instances when these regions are discussed, attempts are made to make the distinction between their articles and their geographical spaces especially clear.

Using terminology in this way is consistent with current historical trends in the interior of East and Central Africa. For example, people from Buganda are now usually referred to as the Ganda, rather than the Baganda, while people from Unyamwezi are now usually referred to as the Nyamwezi, rather than the Wanyamwezi. However, it is understood by the author that such patterns are not reflective of trends on East Africa’s Indian Ocean Coast. For example, ‘freeborn’ or ‘gentlemen’ residents of the coast during the nineteenth century are still usually referred to as *wangwana*, rather than *ngwana*. This means that, when ‘the *wangwana*’ is written, it literally translates as ‘the the *ngwana*.’ Similarly, writing ‘an *mngwana*’ to denote one freeborn person or gentleman literally translates as ‘an an *ngwana*.’ I seek to avoid the cumbersome nature of such translations by using current methods of translation from the interior. Given that this thesis pertains primarily to a region that is in the interior, this seems appropriate. Furthermore, this thesis’ focus on cultural exchange between coastal and interior populations as a key theme promotes using the same methods of translation, regardless of the
origin of the person or object in question. To not do so would be to imply linguistic and cultural distinctions between interacting peoples that are not intended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aeene nkaandawa</strong></td>
<td>Regional chief appointed by the <em>mweene</em> in Ufipa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aeene mnsi</strong></td>
<td>Locally-appointed district chief in Ufipa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coastal Traders</strong></td>
<td>Term encompassing all traders from the coast who entered the interior during the era of long-distance commerce. Includes Rima and Omani populations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doti</strong></td>
<td>Measurement of cotton cloth equal to around 4 yards (twelve feet).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dhow</strong></td>
<td>All native-built sailing craft on the Indian Ocean Coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fundo</strong></td>
<td>A bunch of 10 <em>khete</em> of beads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goma Canoe</strong></td>
<td>A dugout canoe made in Ugoma. Often found in Ujiji.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hongo</strong></td>
<td>A toll local chiefs imposed on traders for passing through their territories or using their markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iron Boat</strong></td>
<td>A boat made of iron. Includes iron sailing canoes and steamers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iron Sailing Canoe</strong></td>
<td>An iron boat in the shape of a canoe, and with a sail attached. Built by Europeans on Lake Tanganyika during the 1880s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jembe</strong></td>
<td>Iron hoe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kaniki</strong></td>
<td>Indian Dyed Calico. Mostly blue in Ujiji’s market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kanzu</strong></td>
<td>Long, loose robe worn by Muslim men. Usually made from <em>merikani</em> cloth. Sometimes referred to as a <em>dishdash</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kasanga</strong></td>
<td>District chief in Uguha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khete</strong></td>
<td>A measurement of beads. In Ujiji and up to c.1860, equal to double the distance between the thumb and elbow. Thereafter, equal to 20 <em>sofi</em> beads.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Liwali**  Town governor appointed by the Sultan of Zanzibar.

**Matunda**  Blue glass beads. Sometimes referred to as *mzizima*.

**Mbugu**  Barkcloth.

**Manyema**  Heterogeneous region in modern-day eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Also refers to most people from that region.

**Merikani**  American-manufactured, unbleached calico or sheeting. Favoured in the making of *kanzus*.

**Modified Canoe**  A Goma canoe with the addition of a keel, rudder, and planks to the sides.

**Mwami**  The central chief in both Urundi and Ujiji.

**Mweene**  The central chief in Ufipa.

**Ngwana**  Lit: Gentlemen (Swahili). Indicative of respectability and of being freeborn amongst coastal populations. Usually seen as the opposite of *shenzi*.

**Omani**  Someone from Oman. The Omani traders represent one of the factions of coastal traders.

**Pagazi**  Porters, mostly from Unyamwezi.

**Rima**  Someone or something from the Mrima. The region is roughly demarcated as the coastal region between the modern border between Kenya and Tanzania, and just south of Dar es Salaam.

**Sailing Canoe**  A Goma canoe with the addition of a keel, rudder, planks to the sides, masts, sails, and sometimes decks.

**Sambo**  Iron anklets, particularly prominent in Uvira’s markets.

**Samisami**  Coral beads; often red.

**Satrap**  Provincial governor.
**Shamba**
Farm.

**Shenzi**
Lit: Barbarians (Swahili). Used by Swahili-speaking coastal populations to describe people from the non-Islamic interior, who they deemed as potential slaves. Opposite of ngwana.

**Shukka**
Measurement of cotton cloth equal to around 2 yards (6 feet).

**Sofi**
White and blue clay beads in the shape of broken pipe stems. Sometimes referred to as masaro.

**Steamer**
Iron boat with a steam engine. Built by Europeans on Lake Tanganyika during the 1880s.

**Teko**
Lit: Earth-Priest (Ha). District chief in Ujiji and Urundi.

**Tembe**
Most common type of housing built by coastal traders in the interior.

**Tumwa**
Lit: One who is sent or used (Swahili). Often translated as ‘slave.’

**Tware**
Regional chief appointed by the mwami in Ujiji and Urundi.

**Zimu**
Spirit(s) (Swahili). Often associated with nature spirits.
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7. Map 1. Sketch Map showing Lake Tanganyika’s political divisions during the era of long-distance commerce, including the major settlements of that period, the most important rivers, and modern-day political borders.

14. Map 2. Sketch Map showing the major towns, regions, and geographical features on long-distance trade routes that encountered or crossed Lake Tanganyika during the Era of Long-Distance Commerce.

238. Map 3. Sketch Map showing the districts of the Ujiji proto-urban space in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Chapter 1: Lake Tanganyika as a Nineteenth-Century Frontier

This chapter introduces the region, the time period, the historiographical contexts, and the theoretical perspectives to which this thesis refers. In so doing, it sets out the thematic order of the rest of the thesis. Its central argument is that Lake Tanganyika represented a ‘frontier’ in the spatial context of East and Central Africa and the temporal context of the era of long-distance commerce. The frontier is conceptualised as a region in which circumstances have led to heightened levels of political instability, economic opportunity, and cultural exchange. This view is consistent with long-standing and more recent studies of other frontiers, and is also informed by analyses of borderlands and large geographical features such as lakes, deserts, and mountain ranges. In this thesis, the circumstances that led to the development of Lake Tanganyika as a frontier are argued to be the expansion of long-distance commercial networks within the context of the lacustrine environment. The necessity of crossing the lake to expand commercially led to the creation of numerous port towns, which also acted as markets and sites of refuge. This drew peoples from all over East and Central Africa to them, which led to political, commercial, and cultural competition and exchange that was intrinsically bound to the lakeshore environment. What emerged from this were cultural forms that were tied to the lake and its shores. These forms are deemed as constituting a ‘frontier culture.’ The specific nature of this frontier culture and the ways it affected elsewhere in East and Central Africa is the subject of the rest of this thesis.

The Spatial and Temporal Contexts

Lake Tanganyika lies almost at the centre of the African continent. Currently, it straddles the border between Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Zambia. The southern-most point of the lake represents the southern end of the Albertine Rift Valley, which stretches first in a northwestern direction over the rest of the lake, and then in a
north and northeastern direction over Lakes Kivu, Rutanzige (Edward) and Albert. The lake itself is 673 kilometres in length from its southern to its northern tip, and spans 82 kilometres at its widest point. It is the second deepest and second largest freshwater lake by volume in the world, behind Lake Baikal in Russia in both categories. It is at between 770 and 785 metres above sea level, depending on the season and year, and is surrounded by high-lying ground.¹ Important geographical features next to the lakeshore include, the Itombwe Mountains (on its northwestern shore), the Marungu Mountains (southwestern), the mountainous country of Burundi (northeastern), the Mahale Mountains (eastern), and the Ufipa plateau (southeastern). Apart from in the Ufipa plateau, all these ranges have peaks that are over 2,400 metres above sea level (or, depending on the level of the lake, over 1,600 metres above Lake Tanganyika). The highest point around the lake is in the Itombwe Mountains, at 3,475 metres above sea level. The physical characteristics around Lake Tanganyika give the impression of a large body of water surrounded by a high wall of mountains.

Numerous rivers descend from Lake Tanganyika’s mountainous surrounds into the lake. The two largest of these are the Rusizi, which enters Lake Tanganyika at its most northern point (and partially delineates the modern-day border between Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and the Malagarasi, which enters on its eastern shore. Other notable rivers include the Lufubu River (sometimes referred to as the Lofu River) on the eastern edge of the modern-day Sambu National Park in Zambia, and the Lufuko River, which enters the lake at Mpala in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many smaller rivers appear and disappear depending on the season: they flow at a greater rate and with a greater volume of water during the two rainy seasons. These are the masika rains (long rains) between March and May, and the vuli rains (short rains) between October and November. There is only one outflowing river,

the Lukuga River, which exits the lake to the west near the modern city of Kalemie. Eventually, this river becomes a tributary of the Lualaba, which exits the African continent into the Atlantic Ocean via the River Congo. Collectively, these rivers bring fertility to the soils of many parts of the lakeshore.

The water level of Lake Tanganyika is subject to fluctuation. The mean lake level increased from 777.6 metres above sea level in 1846, to a maximum of 783.6 metres in 1878. This then fell to 775 metres in 1884, and reached a minimum of 772.5 metres in 1894 and 1902. Much of this fluctuation is down to annual variations in rainfall, but longer-term shifts are caused by changes at the Lukuga River outlet. At the mouth of the Lukuga, there is a rocky sill, where reeds and mud sometimes gather to form a dam. When the lake was at its maximum height in 1878, this dam was at a height of 781.1 metres above sea level. When Henry Morton Stanley visited it in 1876, he saw that it was straining under the weight Lake Tanganyika’s rising level. He noted that, “[This] makes it clear that there is either a crisis approaching in nature or that it has lately taken place, or is occurring.”

By the time Hore and Thomson visited the Lukuga in 1879, the reed and mud dam was washed away, leaving the rocky sill at a height of 769.7m. The current of the Lukuga River thus increased, with eddies and white water rapids forming just beyond its mouth. This caused the lake’s level to decrease. Such changes at the Lukuga outlet and the consequential changes to the lake’s water level continue to occur in the modern period, and undoubtedly occurred before the nineteenth century. One of the effects of

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2 Ibid.
7 Crul, ‘Limnology and Hydrology,’ p. 34.
Lake Tanganyika’s fluctuating level is that the location of its most efficient ports shifts over time. This specific environmental change and the resultant shifts in human-environment interaction that it caused is an important dynamic that pervades this thesis.

Broadly speaking, the lakeshore is host to three environmental sub-regions. The region extending clockwise from the modern-day city of Uvira in Democratic Republic of Congo, around the entirety of Burundi’s lakeshore, and most of Kigoma Region in modern-day western Tanzania is characterised by its low-lying nature and its fertile soils. This promoted the emergence of large population centres. This is the northeastern section of the lakeshore. This environmental zone is interrupted by the presence of the Mahale Mountains National Park at the south end of Tanzania’s Kigoma Region. This region is mountainous and densely forested. These characteristics inhibit the presence of dense population centres. This region also marks the beginning of the southeastern section of the lakeshore, which extends from here, and around the south end of the lake through the Rukwa region of Tanzania, and the entirety of Zambia’s lakeshore region. Apart from the region encapsulated by Mahale Mountains National Park, the lakeshore regions of this section are notable for their low-lying and fertile nature. However, this section’s experience of the nineteenth century limited the presence of permanent or large settlements. The arrival of Ngoni migrants and the resultant violent destruction of villages and fields that their presence caused led to (re-)forestation and a dense population of tsetse flies, which carry trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), a disease fatal to cattle. The memory of

violence and these environmental characteristics discouraged people who lived in these regions from migrating to the lakeshore and building centres with high population densities. More people lived inland, especially in Ufipa, whose plateau was better protected and highly fertile. The western section extends from the modern border between Zambia and Democratic Republic of Congo to the southern extremity of the Uvira urban space. Most of this section is covered by mountains that descend directly into the lake which have rocky and relatively infertile soils. Small, fertile enclaves on flatter land exist around the regions where the Lufuko River enters and the Lukuga River exits the lake. These represent two of the only regions in this section of the lake to have had high population densities for at least some of the nineteenth century. The ways in which humans interacted with the lakeshore’s different environmental contexts was crucial for determining the location of its largest population centres.

In the nineteenth century, the lakeshore was divided into numerous political sub-regions. These loosely correspond to a combination of spatial changes in the environment and modern political divisions. In the northeastern section, the region around the modern city of Uvira was also called Uvira, while modern-day Burundi was referred to as Urundi. South of Urundi was Ujiji. In the modern period, Ujiji refers to a district in the city of Kigoma, but in the nineteenth century, it referred a town on the lakeshore and a broader region in what is today western Tanzania. The region of Ujiji was one of six kingdoms in the Uha cultural space, and is sometimes referred to as Nkalinzi or Manyovu after the settlement in which the mwami (central chief, king) lived. In general, this thesis uses ‘Ujiji’ to describe the lakeshore town,
except when it explicitly states that it refers to the region of the same name. The mountainous region of Ukawende is to the south of Ujiji, and is roughly demarcated by the region between Cape Kabogo (just south of the Malgarasi River’s entrance into Lake Tanganyika) and the southern-most part of the modern-day Mahale Mountains National Park. Further south on the eastern shore is Ufipa, which extends to the modern border between Tanzania and Zambia. Heading around the south end of the lake, Ulungu refers to the region encapsulated by modern-day Zambia’s lakeshore region. The people of this region are sometimes referred to as the Tabwa. The Lungu (or Tabwa) are closely related in tradition, customs, and origin to the Tumbwe people, who inhabited the region of Marungu, and which is demarcated by the border between Zambia and Democratic Republic of Congo and the Lukuga River Valley. Marungu is bordered to the north by Uguha, which encapsulates the region around the Lukuga River. The people in this region are usually referred to as Guha, though some sources refer to them as Holoholo. The Guha are a sub-division of the Tumbwe, and so are closely related to the populations who inhabited Marungu and Ulungu. North of Uguha are Ugoma, Ubwari, and Massanze. Ubwari refers to the peninsula of the same name. Ugoma and Massanze lie south and north of this peninsula respectively, the latter of which is limited to the north by Uvira.

in Uha,’ in Man, 39, 2 (1939), p. 22; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 3; Annie B. Hore, To Lake Tanganyika in a Bath Chair (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1886), pp. 158-159.
course, all these nineteenth-century political demarcations are rough. No polity was homogenous, and all had populations who lived beyond what might be considered their borders. These environmental and political markers, therefore, are used as illustrative tools to describe the locations of certain developments on the lakeshore, rather than as sharply defined sub-regions. The political composition of nineteenth-century Lake Tanganyika is shown in Map 1. This map also includes Lake Tanganyika’s largest rivers, its most important nineteenth-century settlements, and the region’s modern political borders.

Map 1. Sketch Map showing Lake Tanganyika’s political divisions during the era of long-distance commerce, including the major settlements of that period, the most important rivers, and modern-day political borders.

The lakeshore’s different environmental contexts correlate with the nature of its different governance structures. In general, regions with higher population density and flatter,
more fertile soils had more hierarchical systems than those that did not. Similar patterns are well-established in Africanist historical writings. Central powers had more difficulty governing large, sparsely populated regions because such characteristics made it harder to establish administrative structures between different settlements. Thus, the only regions around the lakeshore that had a loosely centralised political system over a large territory were Urundi, Ujiji, and Ufipa. Urundi and Ujiji’s central chief was referred to as a mwami, who appointed tware (regional chiefs) to mediate between him and locally-appointed district or town governors (teko). Ufipa had a similar system, though the titles of the chiefs were different. Ufipa’s central chief was the mweene, its regional chiefs were aeene nkaandawa, and its locally-appointed district chiefs were aeene nnsi. Nevertheless, the role of central chiefs and their appointed administrators on the lakeshore was limited. They all lived in the lakeshore’s mountainous surrounds and they rarely exerted political rights on the lakeshore other than via the periodic claiming of tribute. Additionally, all three polities were subject to violent attacks from either outside forces or by internal insurrection during the nineteenth century. Central chiefs, therefore, were more concerned with preserving their position at the heart of their polities than with exerting their influence on their lakeshore periphery. Despite a structure that


21 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ Ch. 1.

22 Willis, A State in the Making, p. 164; Willis, ‘The Fipa,’ p. 90.

implied a degree of centralisation, lakeshore governance in Urundi, Ujiji, and Ufipa was largely in the hands of locally-appointed district chiefs.

The role of locally-appointed district chiefs in Urundi, Ujiji, and Ufipa bears similarity to the role of village, town, and district chiefs in other lakeshore regions. Apart from in the three aforementioned polities, no lakeshore region had what may be described as a centralised system of governance. The polities of the lake’s southern and western shores were almost exclusively decentralised, and each village, town, or small district was governed by its own individual chief. This is not to argue that chiefs in these regions did not have larger territorial ambitions. Chiefs Kyombo of Urua and Lusinga in Itawa / Marungu, who lived in or beyond the lake’s mountainous surrounds and took inspiration from Luba political structures in Katanga, installed emissaries in some Tumbwe and Guha settlements, and used them as bases from which to conduct raids on other nearby lakeshore regions. Yet, their influence was tenuous in the long term, and they were never able to replace the existing decentralised systems that pre-dated their ambitions on the lakeshore. Historians have noted that the kasangas (district chiefs in Uguha), for example, co-opted Kyombo’s emissaries to buttress their power within their own communities. In general, therefore, Lake Tanganyika’s shores were dominated by locally-sourced governance structures that only had tenuous and episodic links to political forces whose centres were in the lake’s mountainous surrounds. It was these locally-sourced political structures into which long-distance traders inserted themselves when they reached the shores of Lake Tanganyika during the nineteenth century.

The era of long-distance commerce is bookended by the point at which traders travelling overland from the coast (collectively referred to as ‘coastal traders’) first entered the interior of East and Central Africa at the beginning, and the imposition of European colonial

24 Roberts, A Dance of Assassins, pp. 21, 231; Reefe, Rainbow and the Kings, pp. 124, 135.
25 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 90; Reefe, Rainbow and the Kings, pp. 127, 135; Roberts, A Dance of Assassins, p. 231; Macola, The Gun in Central Africa, Ll. 742-748.
rule at the end. Coastal traders arrived at Lake Tanganyika for the first time in c.1830; Europeans with an explicitly colonial agenda arrived in the 1880s and early 1890s. This gives a rough temporal purview of c.1830-1890 for this case study. The reasons for the growth of long-distance commercial routes are usually seen to be economic. The demand for – and price of – ivory on the world market soared during the nineteenth century. This occurred at the same time that cotton cloth, industrially manufactured Britain and in India, was being produced in increasingly vast quantities and at cheap rates. An economic model emerged in which cotton cloth made specifically for the East and Central African market was exchanged for ivory, which was taken from the interior to the Indian Ocean Coast and Zanzibar. At the beginning of the century, Nyamwezi traders dominated the ivory trade between the interior of modern-day central Tanzania and the coast. They came from Unyamwezi, a region that roughly corresponds to the present administrative region of Tabora. As demand for ivory on the world market increased, various interest groups sought to control its supply. These included Indian financiers, primarily from Gujarat, who made profits by selling cheaply-made cotton cloth from India in Africa in exchange for ivory, which they then sold at inflated prices back home.


\[30\] Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, p. 84.
Another interested party was the Sultan of Oman, who moved his capital to Zanzibar in the early 1830s. Indian financiers and rich Omani merchants supplied traders living on Zanzibar and the coast with credit to buy ivory in the interior. Once they returned to Zanzibar or the coast, this ivory was sold on the world market for a profit.

Coastal traders travelled to Lake Tanganyika by foot. They travelled in caravans of between 100 and 3,000 people, which were comprised of numerous labourers from both the interior and the coast. Especially important actors in this context were Nyamwezi porters and ngwana traders and labourers. Nyamwezi porters were also traders, who carried both the coastal traders’ goods for a wage and their own commodities to sell in markets on their journeys. The idea of being ngwana, meanwhile, was an evolving identity based on a term that literally translates from Swahili as ‘gentlemen.’ In coastal society, to be an ngwana was to be a respected member of coastal society: ngwana were Muslims, they lived in coastal towns, they wore merikani cotton cloth in the style of a kanzu, and they participated in coastal rituals and festivals. Being ngwana was also indicative of being ‘freeborn,’ and so they could not be enslaved. The conceptual antithesis of ngwana was shenzi (barbarians). Shenzi were from the

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interior and, in the eyes of people form the coast, they could be denied access to mosques and festivals, and they could be enslaved. The encounter between coastal traders and interior populations away from the coast, however, gradually blurred the distinction between ngwana and shenzi. Some people from the interior, many of whom voluntarily submitted to a period of bonded servitude under a coastal trader, claimed to be ngwana. This demonstrated their loyalty to their coastal trader patrons, indicated a level of assimilation to coastal norms, and stated a claim that they could neither be treated nor regarded as slaves. The interactions between ngwana, shenzi, the coast, the interior, slavery, and other forms of labour are explored in depth in Chapters 4 and 5. For now, it is sufficient to state that the people referred to as ngwana in this thesis represent a wide demographic of labourers and traders who were connected to coastal society through a combination of coastal trader patronage and assimilation to coastal norms.

The interactions between coastal traders’ caravans to arrive at the lakeshore probably did so by first travelling from the Mrima part of the coast (between the modern border between Kenya and Tanzania and just south of Dar es Salaam) in a westerly direction, until they reached somewhere near the modern town of Iringa (referred to as Isanga in the primary sources). From here, they turned north-westwards through the modern administrative regions of Tabora and Kigoma, before arriving at the town of Ujjii on the lake’s northeastern shore. In the 1840s or 1850s, this route was superseded by a route to its north. Violence in the vicinity of Songea

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40 Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition, pp. 73-74.
41 For more on coastal perceptions of the interior during the twentieth century, see: Pat Caplan, ‘‘But the coast, of course, is quite different’: Academic and Local Ideas about the East African Littoral,’’ in Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1, 2 (2007), pp. 305-320
made the route to Iringa decreasingly practicable.\textsuperscript{43} This caused traders to establish another route through the dry savannah region of Ugogo (around the modern city of Dodoma) on their way to Tabora.\textsuperscript{44} From here, traders either travelled in a northwestern direction to Buganda, a westward direction to Ujiji, or a southwestern direction towards and around the south end of Lake Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{45} Collectively, these paths are referred to as the ‘central route.’\textsuperscript{46} Some traders also reached Lake Tanganyika via a ‘southern route.’ This started in towns near the modern-day border between Tanzania and Mozambique on the Indian Ocean Coast.\textsuperscript{47} Most traders departing from this region headed in a southwestern direction towards Lake Malawi. However, there was at least one route from Lindi that headed in the direction of Katanga and elsewhere in the Congo Basin via the south end of Lake Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{48} Some traders also travelled between Lakes Malawi and Tanganyika, having departed the coast on the southern route.\textsuperscript{49} The ‘northern route,’ which departed the Indian Ocean Coast from Indian Ocean ports in modern-day Kenya, had no bearing on travel to Lake Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{50} The major towns, regions, and geographical features on the long-distance trade routes that encountered Lake Tanganyika are labelled on Map 2.

\textsuperscript{44} Sheriff, \textit{Slaves, Spices & Ivory}, p. 176.
The Historiographical Context

Despite using the term, ‘frontier,’ to conceptualise Lake Tanganyika, this thesis approaches the historiography of frontiers with a healthy degree of skepticism. Historians and political scientists alike have used the term ‘frontier’ to describe a wide range of different regions, time periods, and contexts. The origins of its usage in history can be traced to Turner’s seminal thesis on the American frontier. He argued that the actions of European migrants in pushing the limits of their settlements westwards in what became the United States shaped the political culture of the centres the Europeans established on the east coast.\(^{51}\) Since then, scholars have used the themes of Turner’s study to inform studies of other ‘frontiers’ in world history. The most famous of these in the African context is Kopytoff’s 1987 volume, in which the author argues that numerous small-scale migrations led to the formation of numerous internal frontiers in Africa, which then led to the self-replication of the continent’s political

culture(s). Yet, it is since the beginning of the twenty-first century that academic analyses of frontiers have really taken off in world history. Siberia in 1581-1991, Baltic Europe in c. 1150-1300, and Ulster and Upper Silesia in 1918-1922 have all been conceptualised as frontiers in different ways, and these are just three of what must be hundreds (if not, thousands) of similar studies that have done likewise. There is thus little temporal or spatial correlation between historical conceptions of the frontier. The thesis’ response to this current historiographical situation is to conceive the frontier broadly. It draws out key themes that are common in analyses of frontiers as lenses through which to view the era of long-distance commerce around Lake Tanganyika. In so doing, this thesis reappraises certain perspectives taken in other analyses of nineteenth-century East and Central Africa, most which were written in the 1960s and 1970s.

There are conflicts over what is meant by the term ‘frontier’ and how it should be used as an analytical term in different spatial and temporal contexts. When Turner wrote his original text on the frontier in American history, he challenged historians and political analysts to see how far his conceptualisation could be applied elsewhere. Writing over half-a-century later, Gerhard responded to this call. While drawing on many of the key themes from Turner’s study, he emphasised the individual characteristics of different frontier regions. Yet, there is little consensus – at least, in Africanist circles – about how the idea of the frontier should be applied in African history, and about its wider applicability beyond the African continent.

55 Ibid.
Kopytoff, for example, claims that there is a specific type of African frontier; Adejuyigbe argues that African frontiers are not inherently different from frontiers in other continents; and Nugent argues that there is more utility in studying each frontier individually rather than as a collective whole, regardless of region. The latter perspective, of course, is the most similar of the three to Gerhard’s original response to Turner’s call. Nevertheless, there is room to straddle each of these perspectives, and this analysis of Lake Tanganyika represents an attempt to do so. This thesis is primarily about Lake Tanganyika, and, as such, is a study about an individual frontier that corresponds to Nugent’s perspective on frontiers. Yet, it also draws on the themes of frontiers in both African and world perspectives to frame how Lake Tanganyika should be conceived in relation to the regions around it and within the time period to which this thesis refers. It does so by drawing on three common themes in analyses of frontiers: political instability, commercial opportunity, and cultural interaction – the latter of which often leads to the formation of distinct cultural forms that may be termed as constituting a ‘frontier culture.’ The frontier, in this thesis, is defined as a region in which certain conditions – whether political, economic, and/or environmental – provoke the emergence of these three themes in distinct and robust ways. It is argued here that Lake Tanganyika was such a region, and that its emergence as a frontier region was intrinsically tied to the interactions caused by the expansion of commercial networks within the context of the lakeshore environment.

Emphasis on political instability, economic opportunity, and cultural interaction is consistent with other analyses of lakes, large bodies of water, and other large geographical features, such as deserts and mountain ranges. The regions around these geographical features

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are often seen as (or, at least, as performing similar roles as) frontiers. There are two interlinked reasons for this. Firstly, the settlements on the edges of these geographical features perform the function of meeting places. People seeking to traverse lakes, mountain ranges, or deserts are often obliged to rest in what are effectively ‘border towns’ before they do so. In such border towns, they stock up on foodstuffs, labour, and other necessities for their onward journey. Even where ecological or political changes have caused such towns to decline, people have shifted their positions to new towns that perform similar functions to the old ones. A core function of many of these towns is the provision of a market that links regions either side of the geographical body together. Taking advantage of these commercial opportunities promotes instability around geographical features as different interest groups compete, while it also promotes a great deal of cultural exchange. Indeed, speaking to this phenomenon, Preiser-Kapeller describes ports and coastal zones as “the most important points of interaction between the interior of Anatolia and the Mediterranean world.” Additionally, he notes a high level of conflict, as different interest groups with their links to different political centres sought greater control over port towns and the direction of trade. The conditions within maritime or lacustrine environments provoke the emergence of themes that are cogent with the idea of the frontier.

61 Ibid.
The second reason for the utility of frontier paradigm in analyses of large geographical features pertains to political conditions outside of the frontier. State-builders and centralised political powers have often found it difficult to extend their authority over or across lakes, deserts, and mountains ranges. This is primarily because of these regions’ environmental characteristics. Crossing them requires specific forms of infrastructure, such as boats, camels, or other carrying animals. Such regions also tend to have low population densities, as their soils (if they have them) are often infertile and can only feed a small number of people. Making effective administration that binds the peoples of these regions together is thus difficult, as is trying to govern people on both sides of them. Consequently, rulers have often seen the edges of these geographical features as the limit of their territorial authority. This means that multiple central powers often govern lakeshore regions and other similar regions. In this context, Lake Tanganyika is a case in point, with its four modern nation states and numerous nineteenth-century polities on its shores. Meanwhile, in many instances, rulers have tended to have only a loose level authority over the edges of their domains. In regions where the state or central authority is weak, its influence diminishes as one travels further away from the political centre. Given that lakeshores, coastal areas, and the edges of deserts and mountain ranges are often the limits of their territories, their authority on them is often at its weakest. This applies in the pre-colonial era for Africa and much of the Indian Ocean World, as much as it applies to the regions around modern political borders in the same regions.

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distinct forms of political authority to emerge on the shores of lakes and seas, as well as within deserts and mountains ranges. Governance structures on the fringes of large geographical features tend to be heterogeneous and negotiated by a combination of local and multiple, distant, central forces in a way that necessarily promotes a degree of political instability.

The historiographies of African frontiers and lakes have rarely been combined, despite the thematic links between them. Reid refers to Lake Victoria as the “final frontier” of Ganda nineteenth-century political expansion, and he identifies “physical frontiers and borderlands between environmental and economic zones” in northeastern Africa.\(^6^5\) Lakes certainly fit within the definition of the latter example. Elsewhere, Brown refers to Ujiji (on Lake Tanganyika’s northeastern shore) as an ‘urban frontier,’ an idea that condenses the idea of the frontier to one section of a lacustrine environment, and Castryck takes inspiration from Kopytoff in his conceptualisation of Lake Tanganyika’s nineteenth-century position in relation to the rest of East and Central Africa.\(^6^6\) Beyond these examples, the links between histories of African lakes and African frontiers are largely only thematic. In political terms, for example, no African lakes of comparable size and historical significance to Lake Tanganyika, such as lakes Chad, Victoria, or Malawi, have been known to have been governed by one centralised political body at one time. Rather, they are all notable for their political heterogeneity. Additionally, lakes Chad and Victoria have been noted for their historical functions as meeting places. Lake Chad is the centre of a particularly fertile sub-region that is surrounded by a region that experiences periodic water shortages. This has provoked the arrival of numerous


\(^{66}\) Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ Ch. 3; Geert Castryck, ‘Bordering the Lake: Transcending Spatial Orders in Kigoma-Ujiji,’ (forthcoming), p. 4.
immigrants, particularly in times of ecological hardship, which has become a pre-cursor to trade and cultural exchange around, across, and from the lake.\textsuperscript{67} The exchange of cultures on the shores of Lake Victoria, meanwhile, has been seen to have created the existence of distinctive cultural forms that are indigenous to the lakeshore environment. Kenny argues that the nineteenth-century populations of Lake Victoria were bound by a pervasive ritual framework associated with Mukasa, the god of the lake.\textsuperscript{68} Thus, despite Lake Victoria’s people’s various political affiliations, there was at least one cultural phenomenon that set them apart from others living beyond the lake’s immediate hinterland.

The extent to which the Lake Victoria’s (and other African lakes’) cultural forms may be referred to as constituting a ‘frontier culture’ may be contested. Indeed, Kenny may take issue with the imposition of the frontier concept on his analysis of Lake Victoria, and this thesis does not argue for doing so. Yet, the thematic parallels between some forms of frontier and histories of lacustrine environments – of distinct cultural forms emerging out of interaction in a politically heterogeneous but environmentally distinct region – cannot be denied. Also, historians of lakes and other large bodies of water outside of Africa have found the concept of the frontier a useful tool of analysis. Brauer identified “sea frontiers” in his analysis of political territoriality in Medieval Muslim states, for example, and numerous contributors to Peacock’s edited volume on frontiers in the Ottoman world focus on maritime and lacustrine regions.\textsuperscript{69}


In the latter examples, the themes of cultural interaction, economic opportunity, and political heterogeneity and instability are particularly prominent. The prominence of such themes can be argued to have been caused by the nature of the frontier in a sea- or lake-facing environment. Preiser-Kapella provides further insight into the nature of the cultural interaction in such regions in another volume edited by Peacock – this time with Bruno De Nicola and Sara Nur Yildiz. He argues for the presence of “maritime communities” in regions near to seas and large lakes in Medieval Anatolia. He uses this term to describe the fluidity of relations between different groups, rather than emphasising the divisions between Byzantines, Armenians, Turks, Persians, and Arabs, and between Orthodox, Oriental, and Western churches, and Islam that were situated in his regional case study. Given the identification of frontiers in the same regions that Preiser-Kapella describes in another of Peacock’s edited volumes, it is not far-fetched to argue that these ‘maritime communities’ represented forms of a ‘frontier culture’ as well.

This is not to argue that the themes of political instability, economic opportunity, and cultural interaction are exclusive to regions that have been referred to as frontiers, or to regions around the kinds of large geographical features described above. Indeed, the combination of these themes are also prevalent in analyses of what scholars have referred to as ‘borderlands.’ Just like the history of frontiers, borderland studies originated in North America, though they only did so much more recently – in the 1970s. For historians and political analysts, the idea of the borderland provided a lens through which to view the border between the USA and


Mexico. What is particularly notable about these studies is the identification of ‘borderland communities.’ Such communities have cultural forms that are tied to their proximity to and interactions with the border, and are distinct from those of metropolitan centres. Studies of borderlands in Africa, which have been prominent since the end of the 1980s, have acknowledged the existence of similar communities around modern political borders. The focus on political borders in this context is not surprising. Firstly, it is cogent with the original focus of borderland studies in North America. Secondly, the growth of borderland studies in Africanist historical studies has occurred as colonial and postcolonial history has become increasingly popular, while the production of histories on pre-colonial Africa has declined. Despite this, it is still possible to talk of borderlands between peoples or civilisations, as well as between nation states. Indeed, historians, such as Reid and Scheele have shown a high degree of historical continuity over the longue durée in regions in which political borders have only recently been imposed. Also, Nugent argues for the importance of understanding African notions of territoriality since the pre-colonial period to conceptualise the ways in which

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Africans view modern borders. He argues that Africans mapped their regions mentally, rather than cartographically, and that the limits of a people’s or ruler’s territorial jurisdiction before the arrival of European colonial powers were often marked by environmental features, such as lakes, mountain ranges, seas, or trees. The regions around these territorial limits may at least be seen as similar to the ‘borderlands’ of modern nation states. Thus, Nugent’s analysis of how Africans in the Ghana-Togo borderland have reinforced the border for their own benefit since colonial times may be interpreted as an adaptation of how such peoples interpreted lakes and other large geographical features in the pre-colonial period. The implication in these studies is that borderlands can pre-exist the political border.

The relevance of borderland studies to this thesis is partly established by regarding the history of Lake Tanganyika ‘backwards.’ Since the beginning of the colonial period, the lake has represented a border between the European colonial powers, modern nation states, and/or Anglophone and Francophone Africa. If, in some instances, the borderland can be seen to have pre-existed the border, then it could be argued that Lake Tanganyika represented a borderland during the era of long-distance commerce. Such an argument would be particularly pertinent, given that other lakes and large geographical features are often used as the lines to mark the limits of political entities. Thus, the extent to which Lake Tanganyika represented a borderland more than it represented a frontier may be debated. However, it is here that hard distinctions between these two phenomena become blurred. Some academics have attempted to define frontiers and borderlands separately, but, as of now, no consensus is forthcoming. Furthermore, making such a distinction may be futile, or, at least, artificial. In the French language, there is only one word for frontier and for border: frontière. Trying to make hard distinctions between the two, therefore, may be based on semantics that are limited to the

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78 Paul Nugent, ‘Arbitrary Lines,’ p. 36
English language and which do not reflect international applications of each phenomenon. Given the Francophone influences in the longer history of Lake Tanganyika’s shores, over-emphasising Anglophone semantic debates in this thesis would be dangerous.\textsuperscript{80} The conceptualisation of Lake Tanganyika as a frontier, therefore, is not at the exclusion of borderlands. Instead, borderland studies inform this study of a frontier. The choice of frontier, rather than borderland, to describe Lake Tanganyika here reflects the fact that ‘frontier’ is more commonly used in analyses of regions before the imposition of state borders, and borderlands after – even if this rule is not absolute.

The use of a framework based around the frontier/borderland (or frontière) dynamic to make a history of this lacustrine environment invites reflection on phenomena that are often relatively overlooked in existing analyses of nineteenth-century East and Central Africa. Most of these histories were written in the 1960s and 1970s. Works in this body were at least partially written in the context of a drive by historians to understand the longer-term past(s) of African peoples and nations, the latter of which were only just coming into being.\textsuperscript{81} The first wave of Africanist historical analysis, therefore, was intimately linked to the growth of new nation states – the results of which may loosely be termed ‘nationalist writing.’\textsuperscript{82} The nature of this nationalist writing focused on certain trends that more recent historians are beginning to question. One perspective this thesis taps into, is that historians of the 1960s and 1970s tended to refer to homogenous groups of people, whether they were Jiji, Nyamwezi, or Arabs.\textsuperscript{83} Their doing so was partly to understand how these groups eventually comprised the peoples of modern nation states. This thesis uses the frontier/borderland dynamic to complicate the

\textsuperscript{81} See, for example: Roberts (ed.), \textit{Tanzania Before 1900}.
\textsuperscript{83} See, for example: Bennett, \textit{Arab Versus European}. 
nineteenth-century aspect of this history somewhat. It emphasises the heterogeneous nature of Lake Tanganyika’s shores to the extent that it does not view peoples such as the Jiji, the Fipa, or the coastal traders as one body of people. Instead, these peoples are better seen as comprised of numerous factions of people, each with competing interests and shifting power dynamics. In so doing, this thesis analyses the encounters between different interior and coastal populations more closely than was customary in the older historiography. Such is conducive to the identification of a frontier culture and its associated power structures.

The frontier/borderland dynamic also helps to place this pre-colonial history of Lake Tanganyika into a longer-term context. For the most part, there is a divide in Africanist circles between scholars who study the pre-colonial era and scholars who study the colonial and post-colonial eras, and, at least since the end of the 1970s, the latter group has outnumbered the former. Yet, recently, some historians, whose focus is on the pre-colonial era, have shown the importance of their specialisations to later eras. Reid argues, for example that, “a more thorough examination of precolonial conditions often provides more effective parameter within which to consider the recent past.” Historians of East and Central Africa appear to agree. Deutsch, for example, draws on the status of labourers in what became German East Africa during the nineteenth century to inform his study on the abolition of slavery in the German colonial period; Macola’s study on the role of guns in Central Africa emphasises the need to refer to the long-term symbolisms that guns have held within his region of study; and Ross, Hinfelaar, and Peša invite the readers of their edited volume to see the thematic continuities across the last 200 years in the circulation of people, goods, and ideas in Central Africa. The

87 Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition; Macola, The Gun in Central Africa, Ch. 1; Robert Ross, Maja Hinfelaar and Iva Peša, ‘Introduction: Material Culture and Consumption Patterns: A Southern African Revolution,’ in Robert Ross, Maja Hinfelaar and Iva Peša (eds.), The Objects of Life in Central Africa: The
emphasis on continuity between the pre-colonial and colonial eras is particularly pertinent to this thesis. Since the imposition of European colonial rule, Lake Tanganyika has been the border between colonies or states. Its shores, therefore, may be conceptualised as a ‘borderland’ in the modern political sense (though no study has yet analysed the specific role that this border has played in the colonial or post-colonial lives of the shore’s inhabitants).\textsuperscript{88} By using the frontier/borderland dynamic in this thesis, this study of Lake Tanganyika uses a framework which is relevant to the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras. The intention is to draw links between nineteenth and early twentieth-century trends to place the era of long-distance commerce in a longer perspective.

Finally, tapping into the concept of the frontier provides a precedent for analysing interactions between different populations elsewhere in East and Central Africa during the era of long-distance commerce. Many of the peoples that encountered each other on the shores of Lake Tanganyika also encountered each other elsewhere in the interior. It is thus likely that some of the encounters analysed in this thesis inform the understanding of encounters in other regions. This can partly be explained through analysis of other conceptions of the frontier. Other frontiers are often seen as ‘moving.’ They are reflective of migrants travelling into new regions. This was certainly the view that Turner took in his seminal thesis on the American frontier: of frontiersmen heading west and incorporating new land into what eventually became the USA.\textsuperscript{89} Similar views have been taken in regards to the Great Trek of Afrikaners in Southern Africa, and of Russians travelling east into Siberia (amongst numerous others).\textsuperscript{90} Two


\textsuperscript{89} Turner, ‘The Significance.’

similar moving frontiers are also observable on the central trade route in East and Central Africa: the migration of coastal and other long-distance traders in a western direction from parts of modern-day Tanzania to the Congo Basin, and the migration of peoples from the Congo Basin across Lake Tanganyika to the east. 91 The key point here is that the encounters between migrants on the moving frontier and the peoples they meet are often seen to create similar phenomena to which this thesis refers: political instability, economic opportunity, and cultural interaction. 92 The themes and encounters to which this thesis refers thus may inform studies of other regions in the interior of East and Central Africa during this time period. Where Lake Tanganyika differs from these studies is in the intensity and duration of encounters and exchanges between peoples. The necessity of meeting at Lake Tanganyika’s port towns to cross to and from the Congo Basin provoked the arrival and departure of peoples throughout the era of long-distance commerce. Such caused Lake Tanganyika to be an enduring site of interaction. The intensity of the encounter between peoples in other regions, meanwhile, was likely to rise and wane as the moving frontiers were pushed into new regions. The Lake Tanganyika case study, therefore, is used to draw out a framework for understanding how the interactions on other moving frontiers may have taken place. To conclude: Lake Tanganyika was a specific type of frontier/borderland, characterised by its lacustrine environment and the enduring and intense interactions that this environment provoked.

Sources and Methodology

This thesis uses European-authored books and archival documents as its main source material, supplemented by evidence taken from museum visits and oral interviews that I conducted with people living on the shores of Lake Tanganyika between October and December 2013. Europeans based in Zanzibar first reported on a lake that can now be identified as Lake Tanganyika in 1845.93 Their reports are held in published geographical journals. In 1858, Richard Burton and John Hanning Speke were the first Europeans to arrive on the lakeshore. They documented their travels in published books and unpublished journals and letters.94 Subsequent visits by Europeans to the lake were conducted by David Livingstone, who arrived at the lakeshore in 1869 and 1871, Henry Morton Stanley (1871 and 1876), Verney Lovett Cameron (1874), Joseph Thomson (1879-1880), Paul Reichard (1882-1883), Hermann Wissmann (1882 and 1887), and Victor Giraud (1884). Like Burton and Speke, these explorers wrote of their travels in both publications and unpublished letters and journals.95 Some of the unpublished work of these explorers is held at the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in London, United Kingdom, whose archives are a sub-division of the National Archives (NA).

Most of Stanley’s unpublished notes and correspondence are held at the Stanley Archive at the Royal Museum for Central Africa (RMCA) in Tervuren, Belgium. The first Europeans to reside on the lakeshore were missionaries and members of European political organisations. These included members of the London Missionary Society (LMS – active on the lakeshore 1878 to 1908), White Fathers (Pères Blancs – active 1879 to the present), and the International African Association (Association Internationale Africaine, AIA – active 1879 to 1885). Their members produced published books and journal articles as well as unpublished diaries and correspondence now held in archives. The LMS archives are held at the School of Oriental African Studies in London, United Kingdom; the White Fathers’ archives are held in their own archive in Rome, Italy; and the individual archives of members of the AIA are held at the RMCA. Finally, the Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA) contain correspondence and re-printed correspondence between political figures in Zanzibar and Europeans travelling through or living in the interior.

The limitations, challenges, and opportunities associated with using European-authored sources in African history are well-known. Many Europeans gave detailed accounts of the societies they encountered. Even though their texts are interspersed with mundane issues such as the everyday occurrences in the lives of missionaries, they also contain notes on political structures, cultural peculiarities, and commercial interactions. Indeed, it was in the Europeans’ interest to write about these phenomena. Explorers were obliged to paint detailed pictures of the previously unknown peoples and regions they came across, and missionaries

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96 See, for example: Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes;’ Victor Jacques and Emile Storms, Notes sur L’Ethnographie de la Partie Orientale de L’Afrique Équatoriale (Brussels, Académie Royale de Belgique, 1886); Edward C. Hore, Tanganyika: Eleven Years in Central Africa (London: Edward Stanford, 1892); François Coulbois, Dix Années au Tanganyika (Limoges: Pierre Dumont, 1901); Alfred J. Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters in Central Africa: A Record of Twenty-Six Years of Travel & Adventure Round the Great Lakes and of the Overthrow of Tip-pu-Tib, Rumaliza and other Great Slave-Traders (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1910).

needed to understand their potential converts to evangelise effectively. The limitations with
their accounts stem from their subjectivity. Their accounts were heavily influenced by their
own – and their readers’ and funders’ – pre-conceptions about Africa and Africans. It has been
argued that their texts say more about their cultural biases and prejudices and the societies they
came from than the people they discuss. This argument is particularly valid in regards to the
texts written by authors who did not speak the languages of the peoples they wrote about, who
spent most of their time with kings and chiefs rather than the broader populace, and who relied
on one or two informants more than their own observations and interviews. Despite this,
most nineteenth-century Europeans sought to understand the African contexts they
encountered as much as possible, and some were forthright with their shortcomings when they
failed to do so. This led McCaskie to argue that the writings of nineteenth-century Europeans
in Africa represent an expression of “an ever evolving cultural hybrid.” This description
means that biases in the observations of Europeans in Africa were not just related to their
cultural backgrounds in Europe, but also to the nature of their encounter with the Africans they
met. There is thus a degree of African input into these sources. Critical evaluation of these
sources is required to draw out this ‘African input’ to construct this history of Lake Tanganyika.

History (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2005), p. 258; T.C. McCaskie, ‘Cultural Encounters:
Britain and Africa in the Nineteenth Century,’ in Andrew Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire,
99 Falola, ‘Mission and Colonial Documents,’ pp. 276-277; Norman Etherington, ‘Missions and Empire,’ in
100 Meredith McKittrick, ‘Capricious Tyrants and Persecuted Subjects: reading Between the Lines of Missionary
Records in Pre-Colonial Northern Namibia,’ in Toyin Falola and Christian Jennings (eds.), Sources and
Methods in African History: Spoken, Written, Unearthed (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2003),
p. 222; Thornton, ‘European Documents,’ p. 255; Etherington, ‘Missions and Empire,’ p. 311; John Tosh and
Sean Lang, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History, Fourth
103 Ibid. See also: Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, ‘Between the Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a
Research Agenda,’ in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1997), pp. 5-6; McKittrick, ‘Capricious Tyrants,’ pp. 221, 233; Thomas Spear, ‘Section
The specific limitations and opportunities inherent with using European-authored sources pertaining to nineteenth-century Lake Tanganyika are threefold. These can be organised chronologically. Firstly, there are relatively few sources compared to other regions and time periods, especially for the period before 1858. Before this point, all written sources concerning Lake Tanganyika were written by Europeans based in Zanzibar. The European authors interviewed coastal traders who had travelled to the interior, and then returned to Zanzibar.  

They were thus constructed with the use of second hand information. Almost inevitably, there were communication and memory issues. Some of the accounts have information that texts written by Europeans who entered the interior later show to be inaccurate. European authors based in Zanzibar often conflated information about Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika especially, which was probably caused by the fact that the central route encountered both of them. The root of these misconceptions lay in the works of geographers based in Europe, who had been postulating on the size and number of lakes in the interior of East and Central Africa since long before Europeans established a presence on Zanzibar. Many believed, for example, that there was only one giant lake in the interior of Africa, and not numerous smaller ones, as later explorers discovered. This feeds into the broader discourse about the Europeans’ pre-conceptions about Africa and Africans affecting the validity of their accounts, described above.

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106 See, for example: William Desborough Cooley, Claudius Ptolemy and The Nile or an Inquiry into that Geographer’s Real Merits and Speculative Errors His Knowledge of the Mountains of the Moon (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1854), pp. 94-97; Livingstone, Last Journals, p. 269; Chrétien, L’invention de l’Afrique, p. 6.
This thesis deals with the lack of sources pertaining to Lake Tanganyika before c.1858 via two methods. Firstly, it refers to histories of nearby regions that had longer term contact with Europeans. For example, the first Portuguese trader to reach the kingdom of Kazembe, in present-day Northern Zambia and the Katanga region of Democratic Republic of Congo, did so in 1796. He was followed by a series of other traders and explorers throughout the early nineteenth century. From their accounts, some aspects of the history of regions around Lake Tanganyika and modern-day western Tanzania are observable. Roberts, for example, argues that there was a trade in copper from Katanga to Unyamwezi from the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{107} At least some of this copper passed across Lake Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{108} Therefore, analyses of other regions in East and Central Africa that had longer-term European contact provide a useful supplement to the sources that pertain directly to Lake Tanganyika. Secondly, the accounts of the first European explorers to reach Lake Tanganyika are useful for understanding the period before they arrived. Burton, for example, asked questions of people living in Ujiji about other lakeshore regions. By doing so, he reported on the direction of the coastal traders’ commercial expansion in the years preceding his arrival, as well as the nature of the people and the land that these traders passed through.\textsuperscript{109} Although this methodology relies on second-hand information, Burton provided details that were at least broadly accurate. Explorers from later in the period verified his findings, and, thus, historians have found them useful for constructing the early patterns of long-distance commerce.\textsuperscript{110} Interviews with coastal traders while they were in the interior led to more accurate reports than those sourced from interviews conducted by Europeans based in Zanzibar.

\textsuperscript{107} Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ p. 56; Smith, ‘The Southern Section,’ p. 264.
The second set of limitations and opportunities associated with the use of written sources pertaining to Lake Tanganyika mainly applies to the two decades between the years 1858 and 1878. This is the period in which the primary source material is written by European explorers, such as Burton, Speke, Livingstone, Cameron, and Stanley. Collectively, the writings of these explorers provide a first-hand account of the lakeshore in the years 1858, 1869, 1871, 1874, and 1876. Each contains a detailed snapshot of conditions on the lakeshore. However, the relatively brief nature of these explorers’ visits to the lakeshore meant that most explorers were unable to perceive change over time from a first-hand perspective. The one limited exception to this rule is Henry Morton Stanley, who visited the lake on two occasions (1871 and 1876). He occasionally used his observations from his first visit as context for how conditions had changed by the time of his second visit. In his second account, he also referred to Cameron’s notes to establish change over time between 1874 and 1876. Even without this kind of context in most of the other explorers’ texts, change over time can be observed by considering them as a collective body of work. This is because they provided details on similar phenomena – such as markets, cultural traits, and the influence of immigrant communities – which enables cross-referencing between them. This is aided by the fact that these sources were produced at relatively regular intervals, especially after 1869. Cross-referencing the explorers’ texts reveals changes over time.

The third set of limitations and opportunities inherent with using nineteenth-century sources on Lake Tanganyika pertains to the period from 1878 to c.1890. This is the period during which Europeans, as members of the LMS, the White Fathers and the AIA, resided on

the lakeshore in permanent residences. At different times, they had stations in Ujiji, Urundi, Massanze, Ugoma, Uguha, Marungu, Ulungu, and Ufipa. Collectively, the documents written by the members of these organisations comprise the most complete primary source record for Lake Tanganyika in the era of long-distance commerce both in terms of volume and the geographical scope to which they refer. Missionaries were also occasionally visited by explorers and political figures who passed through the region, including Hermann Wissmann, Paul Reichard, and Victor Giraud. The works of these individuals supplement those of the members of the LMS, White Fathers, and AIA. Yet, the journals, letters, and published works of the members of these latter organisations have advantages over the works of explorers in this and the previous period because the authors established themselves in their societies for a long period, were able to learn local languages, and witnessed change over time from a first-hand perspective.\textsuperscript{114} Also, the larger volume of sources for this period allows for a greater degree of cross-referencing them, and they provide a basis for comparison with sources dating to earlier periods. They thus often add additional layers to the explorers’ observations. Missionary sources provide a point of reference and verification for phenomena that are described in periods for which less sources are available.

One potential limitation of the LMS, White Fathers, and AIA’s sources is that the authors were often antagonistic towards the people they reported on, despite their attempts to align themselves with, and convert, these same people. The relationship between missionaries and peoples living on the lakeshore was influenced by the missionaries’ opposition to what they referred to as the slave trade.\textsuperscript{115} The missionaries’ failure to convert interior populations and to abolish the slave trade can be linked to increasingly belligerent and racist overtones in

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their reports. Furthermore, their opposition to human traffic meant that long-distance traders and lakeshore populations sought to prevent them from gaining influence in their societies by pushing them to the socio-political margins. This may have limited the missionaries’ capacity to provide accurate accounts of conditions at the heart of lakeshore societies. However, the nature of the relationships between missionaries and others on the lakeshore shifted over time and varied depending on the missionary organisation. For example, the LMS sought to undermine the slave trade by not buying slaves at all. The White Fathers, meanwhile, sought to undermine it by buying slaves and granting them ‘freedom’ by employing them in conditions that they regarded as ‘free’ at their stations. This elicited varying responses from coastal traders. At the beginning of the 1880s, the coastal traders were generally confrontational with the LMS, while they saw the White Fathers as allies and potential trading partners. By the mid-1880s, however, their attitudes had shifted. The White Fathers had established large-enough followings that they were considered a threat to the coastal traders’ establishments, while the LMS were treated as intermediaries. This transition is beneficial methodologically. At different times, the members of the LMS and White Fathers provide accounts from both the centres and the margins of societies on the lakeshore. By cross-referencing between them, they provide perspectives from a wide range of lakeshore circumstances.

The accounts of nineteenth-century Europeans are supplemented by oral sources that I collected in East Africa between October and December 2013. I conducted interviews in Bujumbura and Rumonge in Burundi, and Kigoma / Ujiji, Karema, and Kipili in Tanzania. The

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117 Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 99.
119 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
120 Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 100.
121 Ibid., p. 247; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 189.
political situation and unavailability of visas prevented interviews from being conducted on the lake’s western shore in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite travelling to Mpulungu in Zambia, illness prevented me from conducting interviews in sufficient depth to be of use for this thesis. In Burundi and in Ujiji, I was aided by local research assistants, both of whom I met on location. Fabrice Munezero, in Burundi, and Hamisi Ali Juma al-Hey (Hababi), in Kigoma / Ujiji, organised interviews with elders in their communities on my behalf. In Burundi, Fabrice then translated the informants’ answers from Kirundi into French, so that Émilie Clavel-Forget (as a native French speaker and acting as an additional assistant) could help me to translate them into English. In Kigoma / Ujiji, when necessary, Hababi translated informants’ answers directly into English from Swahili, though two interviews were conducted in English. From informants’ responses, I asked follow-up questions. Once I returned to the UK, I employed Désiré Kathihabwa and Ivy Gathambo to translate and transcribe the Kirundi and Swahili aspects of my interviews directly into English. It is from these translations that any quotations of oral sources in this thesis are made. Elsewhere in Tanzania, my interviews were made on a more ‘ad-hoc’ basis. In Karema, I conducted interviews in a mixture of English and Swahili with members of a church congregation, and in Kipili, I interviewed a missionary of the Moravian Church in English who had made attempts to understand the history of the community that he lived in. In Kipili, I also acquired a locally-circulated copy of a written history of the White Fathers’ mission in Western Tanzania. Ultimately, a total of 27 people gave me information that is cited in this thesis.

There are certain challenges associated with my oral sources that limit their citations in this thesis. Some of these are well-known from methodological appraisals of oral sources in African history. Language issues, particularly in regards to the meaning behind certain

semantic tropes, are particularly pertinent here. In this context, certain terms or turns of phrase may be difficult to translate into English, particularly when they have been translated via two languages, as was the case in Burundi. In certain instances, this may have limited my ability to ask appropriate follow-up questions. Additionally, I necessarily gave a great deal of power to my research assistants. As a foreigner, I was reliant on ‘insiders’ to locate willing participants in my research. The informants that my research assistants selected, therefore, may say more about the historical knowledge of their contacts than the history of the community they live in as a whole. Unfortunately, unless I lived in lakeshore towns for extended periods (which would have compromised the conditions of my visas and would have infringed on the amount of archival research I would have been able to do), this was unavoidable. Additionally, the ways in which interviewees responded may have been affected by the fact I was a young, white male who was just passing through their home towns. Indeed, many of my informants’ first comments were about my young age. They also often asked if I was married (yes), and if I had children (no). My lack of children, particularly, may have been interpreted as a sign of immaturity, and may have caused some informants to be reticent about discussing certain topics that they considered taboo with me.

Oral sources pertaining to nineteenth-century Lake Tanganyika also have features that make their usage challenging in distinct ways. Possibly the most important of these is the fact that all the first-hand witnesses of the events and conditions described in this thesis died decades

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ago. The information I received from my informants, therefore, was second-hand. Nevertheless, it was hoped that by asking questions in certain ways, I would be able to access histories that are not evident in the Europeans’ documentary sources. I asked informants about their family histories, and about their towns and regions in the time that their grandparents and great grandparents were alive. Such was supposed to elicit accounts of the past that had been passed down through generations to the lakeshore’s modern inhabitants, as opposed to histories that were learned through museums or ‘official’ education that were largely created by using European documentary sources. This methodology worked better in some interviews than in others. Problems that arose included the fact that some informants jumped between time periods, often referring to events in the colonial period because they had witnessed them first hand and had better knowledge of them. Additionally, a problem with my interviews in Karema was that informants recounted the history taught to them by the mission school, which is prominent in that community. What they told me was similar to histories created from European documentary sources. In general terms, this may be referred to a case of ‘feedback,’ in which documentation or ‘official’ education has affected the transmission of oral traditions over generations. Also, in Kipili, I was unable to find any people who were born on the lakeshore who could have given me an oral history of their town in the pre-colonial period. I was told by a potential research assistant that, after his inquiries, the elders of the town only knew the history of the lakeshore since the foundation of their village. This was considerably more recent than the nineteenth century, as migrations caused by rises and declines in the lake’s level during the last century-or-more led to the abandonment and creation of lakeshore settlements in the region. In general, despite attempts to minimise its effects, the length of time

between the events described in this thesis and when I conducted interviews negatively affected the validity of at least some of the oral histories collected for this thesis.

Given the methodological challenges associated with using my oral sources, it is appropriate they are only used to supplement the more complete source material provided by nineteenth-century Europeans. Indeed, the inherent problems of my oral sources are the key reason why I spent more time on archival than on oral research. It was deemed more useful to research the archives at the RMCA and the ZNA, particularly, than to spend additional time collecting oral sources on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. This was because these two archives are generally cited less frequently in historical research than the LMS and White Fathers’ archives, which are much better known.\footnote{See, for example: Pallaver, ‘Nyamwezi Participation,’ pp. 513-531.} Expanding beyond the habitual contours of archival research in the LMS and White Fathers’ archives, therefore, was seen as of greater importance than using oral sources in a more than supplementary role. This does not mean that the oral sources collected for this thesis are without use, however. The intention is to use my oral sources to ‘illuminate’ the archive further.\footnote{Peniston-Bird, ‘Oral History,’ p. 107; Tosh and Lang, The Pursuit of History, p. 316.} That is, instead of focusing on the inconsistencies of my informants’ collective memories, I focus on the instances in which informants provided new and different perspectives on phenomena that are well-established from archival research in the existing historiography. In the words of Peniston-Bird, therefore, I distinguish between “factual inconsistencies and interpretative shifts within interviews.”\footnote{Peniston-Bird, ‘Oral History,’ p. 107.} It is argued here that my oral sources are usable as a lens through which to interpret the archive in new ways.

The use of oral sources in this thesis is important because of the discourse it promotes. Recently, Africanist historians have emphasised the ‘democratic’ aspects of oral sources. Most written sources pertaining to pre-colonial Africa are written by Europeans, and many of the most prestigious history departments with a strong Africanist focus are either in Europe or
North America. Using oral sources is thus a tool that inserts African voices into a history about Africans that is often dominated by the commentaries of Europeans and North Americans.132 This drive to democratise African history in this way is particularly pertinent to this thesis. There are only two primary documents that refer to Lake Tanganyika in the era of long-distance commerce that offer at least partially non-European interpretations. These are Tippu Tip’s autobiography, which was transcribed in Swahili and translated into English, German, and French, and a written account of the history of a trader called Abdullah bin Suleiman, which was garnered from interviews by a British colonial official, and then eventually published as an article by Andrew Roberts in the journal, *African Social Research*.133 Even by pre-colonial Africanist standards, having just two documents made from the testimonies of non-Europeans represents a relative dearth of this kind of source material. The African-authored documents for Buganda and Ethiopia – two nearby regions with broadly similar thematic experiences of the nineteenth century to Lake Tanganyika – for example, are more extensive than those which pertain directly to this thesis.134 Archaeologists, such as Stephanie Wynne-Jones and Sarah Croucher, have sought to reduce this disparity by conducting research around Ujiji and elsewhere on the central route.135 In so doing, they have contributed new knowledge about African material cultures and local trading networks, and so added layers to many historical

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134 See, for example: Apolo Kagwa, *The Customs of the Baganda*, trans. Ernest B. Kalibala, ed. May Mandelbaum (New York: AMS Press, 1969); E.A. Wallis Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (I): being the ‘Book of the Glory of Kings’ (Kebra Nagast) a work which is alike the traditional history of the establishment of the religion of the Hebrews in Ethiopia, and the patent sovereignty which is now universally accepted in Abyssinia as the symbol of the divine authority to rule which the kings of the Solomonic line claimed to have received through their descent from the house of David*, Second Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1932).
works that focus on the interaction between local, regional, and long-distance commercial networks.\textsuperscript{136} Crucially, in methodological terms, they did this by interpreting African objects, rather than solely European-authored documents. The use of oral sources in this thesis, is designed to do similarly. It inserts African voices into a history which has been especially dominated by the interpretations of Europeans and North Americans.

The oral sources collected for this thesis are particularly useful for analysing the interactions between and amongst the different peoples who encountered the shores of Lake Tanganyika. In Ujiji and Kigoma, for example, I asked informants about their family histories and about the period of lakeshore history when the first ‘Arabs’ arrived. Using the term ‘Arab’ is in line with the nineteenth-century European categorisations of traders whose landward journeys to the interior started at the coast. Despite the use of such a collective term, these ‘Arabs’ originated in various regions, including coastal towns, Zanzibar, the Hadramawt, and Oman, and were linked and divided by numerous different kinship networks.\textsuperscript{137} My interviews shed light on the problems of using such a term. When I asked Ujiji and Kigoma’s modern inhabitants about ‘Arabs,’ they referred to solely to people who came from the Arabian Peninsula, and particularly those whose kinship networks extended to Oman.\textsuperscript{138} It was only after further questioning that I realised that I had to ask questions about traders from coastal towns, such as Pangani or Bagamoyo, explicitly, to garner answers about other people referred to as ‘Arabs’ in the primary documents. Thus, I refer to all the traders described above as ‘coastal traders,’ which reflects the landward beginnings of these traders’ journeys to the

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 10; Thomas Franklin McDow, ‘Arabs and Africans: Commerce and Kinship from Oman to the East African Interior, c. 1820-1900,’ (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 2008), p. 34.
interior. The relationships between different coastal traders and the nature of their respective encounters with interior populations is explored in Chapter 2. In this instance, the terminology used by my informants promotes closer analysis of the ‘Arab’ or ‘coastal trader’ communities in the interior.

My oral sources also promote re-appraising certain aspects of the ways in which coastal traders encountered lakeshore and other interior populations. Coastal traders were reliant on labour from the interior to help them expand their commercial networks. Thus, in some instances, they expanded what nineteenth-century European commentators referred to as a slave trade to increase the pool of slave labour. Historians have questioned some aspects of this analysis. For example, it was assumed by many nineteenth-century Europeans that coastal traders developed a traffic in humans that extended from Manyema in modern-day eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to East Africa’s Indian Ocean Coast and Zanzibar. Additionally, captions in modern museums dotted along the central route explain that ivory was carried from the interior to the coast by slaves. Yet, Rockel, for example, shows that closer reading of the primary sources leads to a revision of this perspective. He argues that ivory was largely carried by free-waged labourers, and that some unfree labourers usually had more agency than the term ‘slave’ allows for. Also, there is consensus that slaves from the far interior were not traded over long distances to the coast. My oral sources promote

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140 Rockel, *Carriers*, Ch. 1.
142 Rockel, *Carriers*, p. 5; Rockel, ‘Slavery and Freedom,’ p. 87.
critiquing the nineteenth-century commentators’ view of slavery and the slave trade further. In Ujiji, for example, despite believing that a long-distance slave trade between Manyema and the coast existed (another instance in which feedback from ‘official’ histories has clouded the oral record), informants claimed that the institution of slavery in Ujiji either did not exist or was unimportant.144 This contradicts the European-authored documents, which describe a slave trade from Manyema to the lakeshore, and argue that coastal traders owned large numbers of slaves. Instead, informants claimed that the coastal traders and migrants from Manyema were “close,” and that the latter could not have been slaves because they inherited the estates of coastal traders when the latter either died or departed the lakeshore.145 Therefore, there is a contradiction between the archival record and the collective memory of Ujiji’s modern populations in regards to the relationships between coastal traders and their labourers from Manyema.

The reasons for the contradiction between the archive and collective memory are likely two-fold. Both relate to the subjectivity of the informant, whether as a nineteenth century European or as a modern inhabitant of the lakeshore. Firstly, in regards to the archive, Rockel noted an “obsession with slavery” amongst nineteenth-century European commentators in Africa.146 This meant that when commentators saw a form of traffic or labour that did not correspond to their pre-conceived ideas of free-waged labour, they labelled it ‘slavery.’147 The roots of this obsession can be seen from the aftermath of the abolishment of the slave trade in Europe and the Americas from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The difficulties that

146 Rockel, Carriers, p. 20.
147 McCaskie, ‘Cultural Encounters,’ pp. 673-675.
Europeans’ had in stemming the illicit slave trade – both across oceans and within the African continent – led to racialised discourses amongst Europeans in which the African continent and Africans themselves became associated with slavery and the slave trade.\textsuperscript{148} Indeed, such discourses were partially used to justify European colonial rule from the end of the nineteenth century. The association between Africans, the slave trade, and slavery in European discourse led explorers and missionaries reporting on what they saw in East Africa to overstate the existence of the slave trade and slavery. When they entered the interior, it can be argued that they were actively looking for slave trades because they assumed they were there in the first place.\textsuperscript{149} This may have blinded them to the existence of different, more complex gradations of servitude based on kin, family, and assimilation, the kind of which have been seen elsewhere in Africa and the Indian Ocean World.\textsuperscript{150} Prominent nineteenth-century discourses in Europe led to misconceptions about the complexity and cultural meanings of different labour forms in a way that led to an over-stating of the existence of slavery in East and Central Africa in the archival record.

On the other hand, the social needs of Lake Tanganyika’s modern inhabitants may lead to an understatement of the existence of slavery and the slave trade. Most of Ujiji’s modern inhabitants are Muslims, and many descend from both the coastal traders and migrants from Manyema who arrived at the lakeshore during the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{151} Islamic law prohibits

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Rockel, \textit{Carriers}, Ch. 1.
the enslavement of Muslims. Thus, to admit that the nineteenth-century migrants from Manyema were slaves is to shed doubt on the community’s Islamic heritage. In similar scenarios, a collective denial of a history of slavery has been used as a tactic to validate the nature of the modern community and the telling of its history.\textsuperscript{152} It could be argued that a similar process may be occurring here. Nevertheless, my oral sources remain useful for re-interpreting aspects of the archival record. Informants in Burundi, for example, claimed that slaves were taken by coastal traders, who sold them on to the Americas via the trans-Atlantic slave trade.\textsuperscript{153} Informants in Ujiji, meanwhile, often discussed a coastal-trader-driven slave trade between the Congo Basin and East Africa’s Indian Ocean Coast, similar to that which would have been seen on the trans-Atlantic slave trade.\textsuperscript{154} Despite the inaccuracy of these discourses, they provide an account in which lakeshore populations distinguish between the slave trade, slavery, and the forms of labour they understood to have been present on the shores of nineteenth-century Lake Tanganyika. This provokes a closer analysis of the archival record to explain how and why labour traffic and forms of labour were similar or different to popular conceptions of slavery. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. In this instance, my oral sources lead to a re-interpretation of the archive that paints a more complex picture of labour than ideas of either being a ‘slave’ or ‘free’ allows for.

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\item \textsuperscript{153} Interview with Remy Ngiriye, 4 November 2013; Interview with Simeon Sindimwo & Venant Baragasirika, 5 November 2013; Interview with Silas Bujana, 5 November 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Interview with Saidi Hamisi Kunga, 11 November 2013; Interview with Branbati Ali Kiola & Isa Pama Kiola, 12 November 2013; Interview with Musa Isa Rubinga, 14 November 2013.
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Structure

This thesis is divided into five chapters subsequent to this one. Chapter 2 examines the commercial networks that traversed Lake Tanganyika and connected the lakeshore to other regions in East and Central Africa. In so doing, it explains how and when different peoples encountered each other on the lakeshore, and in what context. By analysing the existence of different factions within these peoples, it emphasises the key theme of heterogeneity amongst the peoples who encountered the lakeshore. This provides the lens for understanding how different peoples interacted with each other from a cultural standpoint, which led to the creation of what this thesis refers to as a frontier culture.

Chapter 3 analyses the emergence of certain market conditions that came to bind the different regions of the lakeshore together. It argues that previously distinct markets became integrated into one market, in which a rise in supply or demand in one lakeshore region led to a corresponding rise or decline in another. Chapter 4, meanwhile, analyses the growing links between different lakeshore regions in terms of religious beliefs associated with lacustrine craft (canoes, dhows, and iron boats). Pre-existing religious structures in Ujiji were combined with ideas from Manyema and the Indian Ocean Coast to make a religious framework that pervaded the entire lakeshore. These two chapters collectively argue that the development of certain market conditions and religious frameworks were two core features of Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture. Furthermore, in both chapters, the power relations between different traders and lakeshore actors are explored. Thus, they show how coastal traders and their labourers became increasingly influential on the lakeshore, firstly in the context of commercial exchange in Chapter 3, and secondly in terms of their political authority in Chapter 4.

Chapter 5 analyses labour on the lakeshore. It shows how labourers from different parts of East and Central Africa were incorporated into lakeshore societies, and how labourers
assimilated to and influenced lakeshore norms. In so doing, it taps into a history that is currently dominated by ideas of a slave trade and of slavery. It argues that many labourers contested their positon as ‘slaves’ and did so successfully via the acquisition of rights, goods, and prestige. They were important actors in the development of Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture, and in shaping socio-political change elsewhere in East and Central Africa.

Finally, Chapter 6 analyses the emergence of towns on the lakeshore. It identifies towns as the location in which most of the encounters described in the previous chapters occurred. Furthermore, the emergence of internal governance structures within these towns represents a major shift in the loci of power in the polities connected to Lake Tanganyika’s shores. It was transformed from a political periphery into a distinct commercial and cultural zone with numerous inter-connected and self-governing towns.
Chapter 2: Lacustrine and Long-Distance Commercial Networks

This chapter analyses the integration of lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks across and around Lake Tanganyika. In so doing, it makes a distinction between commercial networks that were limited to the lakeshore (lacustrine networks), and those that traversed the lake and extended into regions beyond its immediate shoreline (long-distance networks). This is in line with other histories of East and Central Africa in this period, which distinguish between regional and long-distance trades.\(^1\) The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how lacustrine and long-distance networks formed, developed, and interacted with each other during the era of long-distance commerce. It does this by exploring the reasons for changes in the direction of trade routes and the volume of trade on them. It argues that commercial shifts were primarily caused by shifting power dynamics between and amongst long-distance traders and lakeshore populations. These power dynamics were shaped by a range of phenomena, including how traders interacted with the environment, the availability of credit, and changes in East and Central Africa’s broader political construction. By analysing the development of commercial networks in these terms, this chapter establishes the key themes of competition and conflict as core reasons for the shifting nature of commercial networks around and across Lake Tanganyika.

The historiography of long-distance commerce in East and Central Africa emphasises two inter-linked phenomena that shaped long-distance commercial networks. Firstly, there were economic shifts on the coast and the interior. The high price for ivory on the world market at the beginning of the nineteenth century encouraged coastal traders to take control of its

supply from East and Central Africa by travelling inland for the first time. The potential profits from these transactions increased over the course of the nineteenth century. This was caused by the rising price of ivory versus the relatively stagnant value of beads and cotton cloth on the world market. Such potential profits led coastal traders to attempt to link different regional networks together to form larger, long-distance networks that extended from the Indian Ocean Coast to the Congo Basin and elsewhere in the interior. Secondly, long-distance commercial networks were shaped by the variety of interactions coastal traders had with the populations they encountered in the interior. For example, in the towns of Tabora and Ujiji, coastal traders made what historians have referred to as “colonies;” in Buganda, they were incorporated into an existing kingdom; and in Manyema, Tippu Tip, a prominent coastal trader, imposed a form of direct political authority over a large area of land. These variations are usually seen to have been caused by the intersection between the shifting scope of coastal traders over time and the variety of peoples, societies, and political structures they encountered. Such discussions revolve around the shifting power relations between coastal traders and interior populations.

This chapter proposes a third crucial phenomena that shaped long-distance commerce in addition to the two described above. This is competition and conflict between and within the various coastal trader communities in the interior. This perspective builds on an established discourse about disunity in the ranks of coastal traders. For example, Reid argued that Tabora and Ujiji’s respective coastal trader communities were “riddled with intrigue,… internal tensions and rivalries;” Smith wrote that Tippu Tip’s main ally in opening the road between Ujiji and the Indian Ocean Coast was Mirambo, rather than the coastal traders in Tabora; and

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2 Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, p. 77; Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 41; Pallaver, ‘New Modes of Production,’ p. 35.
3 Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, pp. 87, 188-189; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 113.
5 Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, pp. 156, 188; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 91; Ranger, ‘The Movement of Ideas,’ pp. 161-162.
Bennett noted that Tabora’s coastal trader community was characterised by disunity and disorganisation in wars versus Mirambo in Western Unyamwezi in 1871-1875. Despite these arguments, the majority of analyses refer to the coastal traders as one body of people. Most, for example, refer to the coastal traders collectively as ‘Arabs’. This categorisation is vague and unsatisfactory, particularly because most coastal traders were born on the African continent and were of mixed Arab and African ancestry. There was nothing that was distinctly ‘Arab’ that bound them. These statements are supported by the current discourse amongst Ujiji’s inhabitants, some of whom I interviewed as part of the research for this thesis. In general, they attributed the moniker, ‘Arab,’ solely to describe people who descended from Oman. This categorisation excludes many of the other traders who hailed form the coast. The intention with this chapter is to unpick how and why coastal traders competed and conflicted with each other. The main basis for doing so is by analysing their communities in terms of rivalries between different factions. Far from being one homogeneous body of people, the communities of coastal traders in the interior were divided and sub-divided into different interest groups. Shifts in the power dynamics between and among these groups affected how coastal trader communities interacted with interior populations and shaped long-distance commercial networks.

This chapter unpicks the rivalries between different coastal traders by rooting it in the history of the Mrima. The Mrima is the part of East Africa’s Indian Ocean Coast that extends roughly from the present-day border between Kenya and Tanzania to just south of Dar es

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8 Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ p. 148; McDow, ‘Arabs and Africans,’ p. 34.


Salaam. The history of the Mrima in the nineteenth century is a history of political, economic, and cultural change. This was partly caused by the encounter between two bodies of people, which are referred to in this thesis as Omani and Rima, and which collectively are referred to as coastal traders once they entered the interior. The Omani faction was comprised of people who traced their kinship network back to Oman. Thus, this thesis considers Tippu Tip, who was born in Zanzibar and whose real name was Hamed bin Muhammad al-Murjebi, as Omani, because the origins of the al-Murjebi clan are in the Adam region of Oman. Meanwhile, ‘Rima’ refers to a pre-existing elite on the Mrima coast, which are elsewhere variously referred to as ‘Swahili-speaking patricians,’ ‘Swahili,’ ‘Shirazi.’ The term ‘Rima’ is chosen over the other three terms listed because the word ‘Swahili’ in the context of the nineteenth century also includes some phenomena associated with Omanis (and ‘Arabs’), and ‘Shirazi’ refers to a mythical heritage that some traced to the town of Shiraz in modern-day Iran, and so offers a less-valid geographical reference point than Rima. The encounter between Omanis and Rima grew in intensity in the 1830s, after the Omani Sultan moved his capital to Zanzibar, and especially after 1870, when Said Barghash became Sultan of Zanzibar and imposed unprecedented levels of political influence on the Mrima. This encounter is usually portrayed as a nuanced blend of accommodation and competition over a long period, but, by the 1870s, it was increasingly characterised by conflict. These conflicts were rooted in numerous phenomena, ranging from the religious to the political, but a core aspect of them related to

14 Glassman, Feast and Riot, pp. 150-154. See also: Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 32.
competition for control of the long-distance commercial networks heading into to the interior.\textsuperscript{15} Sultan Barghash appointed his own liwali (governors) on the Mrima as a parallel hierarchy that gradually undermined that of the pre-existing Rima.\textsuperscript{16} This reduced the Rima’s right to collect tax from passing caravans and, after the abolition of the slave trade in Zanzibar in 1873, export slaves.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, it undermined the Rima’s authority over their networks based on “patronage and clientele” heading into the interior.\textsuperscript{18} Such political and economic change provoked conflict between the Rima and Omani kinship groups.\textsuperscript{19} Historians of the coast acknowledge that these conflicts had an effect on the nature of long-distance commerce, but historians of the interior have yet to unpick how they did so.\textsuperscript{20} This chapter is the first of its kind to attempt to trace coastal conflicts between Omani and Rima populations into the interior.

McDow’s recent Ph.D. thesis on the links between commerce and kinship as phenomena that bound long-distance networks offers useful insights for this chapter’s core arguments.\textsuperscript{21} A key point in his thesis is the idea that coastal traders were not rational, or even efficient, economic actors.\textsuperscript{22} Their motivations for the expansion of commercial networks were not solely for personal enrichment. Instead, they were equally motivated by the need to expand the reach, influence, and wealth of their kinship networks, potentially at the expense of those of others.\textsuperscript{23} McDow focuses primarily on how this played out in regards to Omani coastal


\textsuperscript{16} Glassman, \textit{Feasts and Riot}, p. 150; Horton and Middleton, \textit{The Swahili}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{17} Horton and Middleton, \textit{The Swahili}, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{18} Glassman, \textit{Feasts and Riot}, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 152.

\textsuperscript{20} Horton and Middleton, \textit{The Swahili}, p. 107; Pallaver, ‘Muslim Communities,’ p. 2.

\textsuperscript{21} McDow, ‘Arabs and Africans.’

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. pp. 29-30.

traders, whose networks extended from Oman to the interior of East and Central Africa via Zanzibar. He notes that there were certain divisions and complexities between the Omani communities in the interior of Africa. Thus, while some Omanis were bound by kinship networks, others were divided by them. This affected how different Omani traders interacted with each other and with interior populations, and influenced the nature and direction of long-distance commercial networks. McDow does not, however, analyse the Omani’s relations with the Rima kinship networks in the interior to any great degree, although he occasionally mentions the actions of some Rima traders to understand the Omani networks more fully. This chapter agrees with McDow’s thesis about the importance of kinship in understanding the long-distance networks in East and Central Africa. It builds on his findings by examining the competitions and conflicts between the Omani kinship networks he describes and those of the Rima.

This is not to argue that the Omani and Rima traders were perpetually in conflict with each other. Indeed, there was often a degree of cooperation between them. Omanis and Rima travelled in the same caravans, gave each other credit to trade on each other’s behalves, and fought together in wars versus hostile interior populations. Furthermore, they used their Islamic beliefs and links to the coast to culturally distinguish themselves from the populations they encountered in the interior. They did not evangelise at all, except amongst those that became their bonded labourers and associates. In this context, it could be argued that coastal traders were bound by a “pioneer ethic” – a term used by Hopkins to describe relationships between long-distance traders in West Africa – emanating from the coast. Yet, this ‘pioneer

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25 Ibid. p. 130.
ethic’ is only important for understanding the relationship between Omani and Rima traders up to a point. Once coastal traders settled and established themselves in a locality, they ceased being ‘pioneers,’ and were instead the followers of existing commercial routes that were developed in previous years. Coastal traders who were resident in the same settlement or locality then competed for the same commercial contacts. This pattern informs a study in which competition and conflict between coastal traders increased as they became more established in the interior over time. Thus, competition between coastal traders increased as lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks became gradually more integrated.

Pre-Existing Lacustrine Networks and Early Commercial Pioneers, c. 1830-1860

The years up to c.1860 represent the early pioneer period of the era of long-distance commerce. Coastal traders in the interior were few in number, and those that were there had only recently started exploring the regions they encountered. The nature of their establishments was weak and subject to the goodwill of interior populations, especially in regions that were distant from the Mrima. Furthermore, apart from in a few isolated examples, coastal traders did not create new commercial routes. Instead, they followed routes that were already established by traders from the interior, especially those of the Nyamwezi. Broadly speaking, the arrival of coastal traders in this period increased the volume of trade on these routes and adjusted the proportion of different goods that were traded on them. Yet, they encountered numerous difficulties in attempting to establish themselves further. These difficulties stemmed from political instability in the interior, logistical problems associated with maintaining communication over long distances in harsh environments, and economic uncertainty. This

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29 Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 111-112.
31 Koponen, *People and Production*, p. 110.
section argues that these factors inhibited the coastal traders’ ability to make sustained links between pre-existing lacustrine commercial networks and the long-distance networks they were trying to create.

Evidence for the existence of lacustrine commercial networks before the arrival of long-distance traders comes from three sources. Firstly, oral traditions tell of long-term connections between populations on both sides of the lake. In Ujiji, traditions record an adventurer called Mshelwampambamba who travelled by raft from Ujiji to Ugoma on the opposite shore of the lake. When he returned, he did so with some Goma peoples in a fleet of large canoes made in Ugoma. These Goma populations then settled around Ujiji, and the canoes were used by both locals and newcomers alike as fishing and trading vessels around the lake. This sparked a long history of migration from Lake Tanganyika’s western shore to the region around Ujiji. Further north on Urundi’s lakeshore, traditions told in Rumonge tell of migrants from the western shore crossing the lake, ousting the existing chief, and installing one of their own in his place. Migrations of this nature in this west-to-east direction may have increased in prevalence in the late eighteenth century as a result of instability on and around the western shore, particularly in Ubembe, and via the expansion of Luba political structures towards Uguha, and Marungu. Meanwhile, the people of Ubwari credit Tumbwe populations from just south of the Lukuga River with teaching them how to fish. These traditions thus tell of migrations that prompted

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35 Wagner, Trade and Commercial Attitudes,’ p. 156.
the exchange of goods and ideas around the lake from sometime before the arrival of long-distance traders.

The works of the first European explorers to visit Lake Tanganyika provide the second body of evidence for the long-term existence of lacustrine commercial networks. When Burton and Speke visited Ujiji in 1858, they commented on a trading system that was dominated by lakeshore products and populations. They had to pay Jiji political figures for access to Ujiji’s markets and for the use of canoes, and they had to pay Jiji boatmen for their labour.\(^{36}\) The same rules applied to coastal traders.\(^{37}\) With only one exception – a coastal trader who built his own sailing craft and lived on Kasenge Island near Uguha – all coastal traders at Ujiji at the time of their visit were obliged to use lakeshore infrastructure and labour to travel around the lake.\(^{38}\) Furthermore, the majority of products being traded on lacustrine trade routes were demanded locally. These included iron from Uvira, barkcloth from Urundi, salt from Uvinza (and traded overland to Ujiji before entering lakeshore markets), and numerous agricultural products from around the lake’s northern shores.\(^{39}\) Ivory and slaves (the former brought from Uvira; the latter from around the north end of the lake and Uha), the goods that coastal traders demanded the most, were only “occasionally… hawked about.”\(^{40}\) The centrality of lakeshore labour, infrastructure, and trade goods in these accounts imply indigenous – rather than coastal trader – agency over the formation of the first lacustrine commercial networks.

Finally, evidence for pre-existing lacustrine commercial networks comes from precedent. In the early part of the era of long-distance commerce, few coastal traders pioneered

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entirely new commercial networks. Instead they followed pre-existing routes developed by interior populations. Numerous studies on the coastal traders’ first encounter with the Nyamwezi support this view: in the early nineteenth century, Nyamwezi traders dominated the ivory trade from the interior to the Mrima; coastal traders followed the routes of the Nyamwezi trade as they established their positions in the interior.\textsuperscript{41} Crucially, these studies also indicate that Nyamwezi traders had contact with Lake Tanganyika and regions beyond its western shores.\textsuperscript{42} Salt from Uvinza, a crucial article of exchange around the northern regions of the lake, was also crucial to the Nyamwezi commercial economy.\textsuperscript{43} It thus follows that Nyamwezi traders came into contact with Jiji salt collectors and traders in regions of modern-day western Tanzania. Furthermore, Nyamwezi commercial networks extended to Katanga, in modern-day southern Democratic Republic of Congo and northern Zambia from sometime around the beginning of the nineteenth century. This is shown by the presence of copper from that region on the lake’s eastern shore and in Unyamwezi from this point, and by accounts of Nyamwezi traders visiting there from sometime between 1806 and 1820.\textsuperscript{44} If coastal traders followed pre-existing Nyamwezi trade routes into western Tanzania, then it is likely that they followed similar routes to and across Lake Tanganyika as well. This is substantiated by the fact that Katanga became one of the coastal traders’ earliest inland goals.\textsuperscript{45} Collectively, these sources provide evidence for the existence of lacustrine commercial networks before the arrival of coastal traders.

The arrival of coastal traders to Ujiji in c.1830 resulted in the extension of certain trade routes across Lake Tanganyika, and created demand for different goods on them. This is firstly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ pp. 49-50; Sheriff, \textit{Slaves, Spices & Ivory}, p. 175; Rockel, \textit{Carriers}, p. 35; Austen, ‘Patterns of Development,’ p. 647; Pallaver, ‘New Modes of Production,’ pp. 34, 36.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Deutsch, \textit{Emancipation without Abolition}, p. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ pp. 45-48.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Rockel, \textit{Carriers}, pp. 44-45; Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ p. 56; Alpers, \textit{Ivory and Slaves}, p. 180; Smith, ‘The Southern Section,’ pp. 265-266.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Sheriff, \textit{Slaves, Spices & Ivory}, pp. 185-186; MacQueen, ‘Notes on African Geography,’ p. 373.
\end{itemize}
visible from the coastal traders’ commercial activities around the north end of the lake. Coastal traders sought expand the use of routes to Uvira. They reached this region by following pre-existing routes from Ujiji via southern Urundi and the northern tip of the Ubwari peninsula. Uvira was a logical destination because the region to the west of it was densely populated by elephants, and so was rich in ivory. In this initial period of the era of long-distance commerce, Vira traders and elephant hunters were the main ivory suppliers to its lakeshore market. Some Rima traders, including Mwinyi Mokaia, Mwinyi Kheri, and Mwinyi Akida, may have contributed directly to a westward expansion from Uvira by forming caravans that travelled in that direction. Although they were not mentioned in Burton or Speke’s accounts, reports from later in era indicate that they were in the vicinity of the lake from sometime in the 1840s, and that their main centres of commerce were Ujiji, Uvira, and the regions west of Uvira. Their absence from Burton and Speke’s accounts may be attributed to their being on commercial enterprises west of Lake Tanganyika at the time of the explorers’ visit. Long-distance traders then took Uvira’s ivory from the lakeshore, through modern-day Tanzania and to the Mrima and Zanzibar so that it could be sold on the world market. This process represents one of the initial stages in the integration of lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks.

Coastal traders also used lacustrine networks heading in a southwestern direction from Ujiji. In the 1840s, some Omani traders, including Mohammed bin Saleh, Mohammed bin Gharib, and Said bin Habib followed pre-existing Nyamwezi routes to Katanga. They travelled over the lake southwards from Ujiji along Lake Tanganyika’s eastern shore to Kabogo point in Ukawende, before crossing to Uguha. From here, they either marched overland through Urua

46 Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, p. 186; Burton, Lake Regions, p. 338.
47 Livingstone, Last Journals, p. 327.
49 Livingstone, Last Journals, p. 327; Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 628.
or travelled by canoe to the Lufuko River in Marungu and marched from there.\textsuperscript{50} On their south-westward journey beyond the lake’s western shores, they encountered a Tabwa chiefdom under the jurisdiction of a chief called Nsama in Itawa, who was hostile to them and defeated them in battle.\textsuperscript{51} The Omani traders fled to Kazembe’s kingdom in Katanga, where they built commercial domains based on the ivory, slave, and copper trades.\textsuperscript{52} For the next 25 years, Kazembe’s kingdom became their commercial base, and their successes attracted other Omani traders to Katanga region.\textsuperscript{53} However, all the coastal traders in the region were at the mercy of the local rulers, which often restricted their movements. Nsama’s hostility meant that they were unable to develop sustained commercial links to Lake Tanganyika, and, in the 1860s, a change in the Kazembe (chief of the kingdom called Kazembe) resulted in the seizure of much of their wealth.\textsuperscript{54} It was not until 1867, when more coastal traders arrived from the southeast, that the coastal traders from this period could return to Ujiji.

Finally, at least one coastal trader used Kasenge Island near the shores of Uguha as a base from which to launch caravans into Urua.\textsuperscript{55} This was an Omani called Hamed bin Sulayyam.\textsuperscript{56} In travelling to Urua, he and his followers followed routes pioneered by Luba-inspired traders and state-builders, who viewed Uguha’s lakeshore as the eastern limit of their political domains, and had done so since sometime near the end of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{57} Some coastal traders garnered a great deal of wealth from such ventures. Hamid bin Sulayyam was probably the richest of the coastal traders that Burton and Speke encountered around Lake

\textsuperscript{50} Livingstone, \textit{Last Journals}, p. 296.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 186; St. John, ‘Kazembe,’ p. 218; Livingstone, \textit{Last Journals}, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{55} Sheriff, \textit{Slaves, Spices & Ivory}, p. 186.
Tanganyika in 1858. Furthermore, the opening of this route to Urua encouraged other coastal traders to follow it. One such trader, who later came to be known as Tippu Tip, travelled on this route on his first journey into regions to the west of Lake Tanganyika. The cheapness of the ivory in this region enabled him to generate large profits by selling it into the world market once he returned to Zanzibar. However, this route was also beset by instability. Soon after Burton and Speke’s visit to the coastal trader station on Kasenge Island, Hamed bin Sulayyam and Salim bin Habib (another Omani trader, and brother to Said bin Habib), were killed by Rua raiders. The dangers inherent in commercial ventures towards Urua led Burton to comment that this route was left to “debtors and desperate men.” Viewed alongside the difficulties that traders encountered on their journey to Katanga, these dangers display the limitations to which coastal traders integrated lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks in this period.

The difficulties that coastal traders encountered around and across Lake Tanganyika in this period were partially characteristic of issues they encountered elsewhere in East and Central Africa. In most regions of present-day western Tanzania, the coastal traders’ position was characterised by its vulnerability. For example, coastal traders had to abandon many settlements in Unyamwezi due to political instability in their surroundings, and an old route to Ujiji via Isanga (Iringa) fell into disuse in the 1840s or 1850s because of increased levels of violence in its vicinity. Yet, by the late 1850s, their establishment around Lake Tanganyika appears to have been even more tenuous than elsewhere. This is shown by the strength of their position in Tabora and Msene, the two coastal trader settlements in Unyamwezi that survived

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62 Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 111-112; Pallaver, ‘New Modes of Production,’ p. 44.
until the end of the 1850s, versus their relative weakness in Ujiji. Tabora was principally occupied by Omani coastal traders and Msene was principally occupied by Rima, but such distinctions did not apply to Ujiji. This was because Ujiji was largely seen as a crossroads town rather than a permanent residence. Only pioneers, and not traders with established domains, reached Ujiji in this period. Where in Unyamwezi Rima and Omani traders divided themselves to avoid competing for the same commercial contacts, in Ujiji this was not yet necessary. Thus, coastal traders who had tembes (houses) in Ujiji also had tembes in either Msene or Tabora, and they lived in the latter for most of the year. Most them only visited Ujiji in “flying caravans” from Tabora or Msene in the long dry season between May and September. Once they completed their business in Ujiji, most coastal traders returned to either Tabora or Msene. Only a minority attempted to cross the lake to explore the regions to its west. Ujiji and the rest of the lakeshore were of peripheral importance to most coastal traders up to c.1860.

Logistical difficulties explain why Lake Tanganyika remained peripheral to most coastal traders in this period. Travel between Unyamwezi and the lakeshore was difficult. Ujiji is 400 kilometres west of Tabora, and travel there represented a 50 per-cent addition to the already-long journey from the Mrima to the established settlements in Unyamwezi. Once in Unyamwezi, coastal traders were usually obliged to form new caravans, as the body of Nyamwezi pagazi (porters) they employed for the journey between the coast and Tabora or Msene invariably disbanded when they arrived there. Forming caravans in Unyamwezi was

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64 Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, pp. 185-186.
66 Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, pp. 185-186; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 53-54; Bennett, Arab versus European, pp. 90-91; Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 34.
68 Hore, To Lake Tanganyika in a Bath Chair, p. 159.
inconvenient and expensive, and acted as a deterrent to further westward travel. Furthermore, the route between Unyamwezi and Ujiji was politically unstable. Burton reported that the most prominent coastal traders in Tabora discouraged him and Speke from travelling to Ujiji owing to “the dangers of the road.” These dangers are largely attributable to Ngoni raiders, who, since the 1840s, had been pushing northwards between the lakeshore and Unyamwezi from Ufipa. Such was the danger that soon after Burton and Speke left Ujiji in 1858, western factions of these Ngoni attacked it and forced a change in Ujiji’s lakeshore chieftaincy.

Sufficient levels of safety on the route between Tabora and Ujiji could only be secured by large and heavily armed caravans. As already explained, such caravans were difficult and expensive to form.

The coastal traders who made it to Ujiji with the intention of crossing Lake Tanganyika encountered further difficulties. Travel across and around the lake was a risky and expensive undertaking. Nyamwezi pagazi refused to travel on the lake. Their refusal in this context was informed by numerous factors. These included stories of capsizing canoes, the perceived dangers associated with terra incognita on the western shores, and the necessity of returning to Unyamwezi for agricultural work. Nyamwezi populations usually only made themselves available for porterage in the dry season so that they could help with the harvest, planting, and

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72 See: Oliver, ‘Discernible Developments,’ pp. 208-211.
clearing of fields at other times of the year. If the coastal traders were willing to overlook the dangers of lacustrine travel, therefore, they were obliged to form caravans filled with followers from the coast who were willing to travel the entirety of the journey to the interior, or to employ Jiji boatmen to convey them across the lake and hope they could find porters on the opposite shore. Both these options were expensive, and the success of the latter was doubtful. In any case, the fact that coastal traders had to pay Jiji boatmen and chiefs for the use of lacustrine craft and labour added further costs to their journey. All these factors ate into any potential profits that could be garnered from extending long-distance networks across Lake Tanganyika.

Even coastal traders who travelled to Ujiji with the intention of returning directly to Unyamwezi encountered obstacles that inhibited their profit-making ability. Nyamwezi pagazi who carried the coastal traders’ goods to the lakeshore were liable to desert if they spent too long at Ujiji. This was because they brought their own goods to trade in addition to those of the coastal traders. They used these goods primarily to purchase ivory and captives. Those who bought captives were obliged to return to Unyamwezi quickly to reduce the costs of feeding them before they were put to work, and to limit the time that captives had to escape en route to Unyamwezi. The Jiji, meanwhile, refused to work as porters. Therefore, if coastal traders could form a large-enough caravan to protect them on the route to the lakeshore, there was no guarantee that they could form a similar-sized one for the return journey. Meanwhile, Ujiji’s market became decreasingly profitable to traders who intended on returning to Unyamwezi soon after arriving at Ujiji. Burton stated that the prices in Ujiji represented a “high

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77 Rockel, ‘Caravan Porters,’ p. 65; Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices & Ivory*, pp. 186-188.
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, for goods that were not indigenous to the Ujiji region, prices had to account for the costs incurred by lacustrine and long-distance travel from the west. Secondly, the fact that Ujiji was a commercial destination for long-distance traders increased the circulation of coastal products, such as beads and cotton cloth, in its market. As the volume of these goods increased, their purchasing power decreased. This meant that coastal traders were obliged to part with increasingly large amounts of tradable goods from the coast to buy less lacustrine products. Therefore, by the end of the 1850s, the coastal trader establishment on the lake, which had always been limited up to this point, was in decline.

Certainly, Burton saw Ujiji in these terms by describing the market as “a relic of Arab civilisation.” To him, it represented a symbol of past prosperity. Despite some attempts by coastal traders to integrate Lake Tanganyika into long-distance commercial networks, up to c.1860, most commercial ventures around and across the lake were limited to the enterprises of lakeshore populations.

**Diversion and Re-Connection, c. 1860-1880**

The period c.1860-1880 is marked by increased integration between lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks. The expanding influence of coastal traders was the driving force behind this process. During the 1860s, some of the first coastal traders to explore regions to the west of Lake Tanganyika returned to Zanzibar and the coast for the first time. When they arrived, they reported on the region of Manyema, in modern-day eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, in which there were dense elephant populations amongst peoples who did not value ivory. This occurred at a time when the price of ivory was soaring

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83 Ibid., p. 309.
84 Wright and Lary, ‘Swahili Settlements,’ p. 552.
on the world market and cotton cloth made for the East African market was only tentatively recovering after hitting a low in around 1850. Although the value of cotton cloth increased from this point onwards, it never did so at an equal rate to ivory. 86 This encouraged increasing numbers of coastal traders to enter the interior with unprecedented amounts of credit and to travel to Manyema and bring its cheap and abundant ivory to the coast. How lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks became integrated because of this was dependent on several factors. These included competition and conflict among coastal traders, political instability in regions beyond Lake Tanganyika’s shores, and conditions on the lakeshore itself. This section argues that the ways in which these factors coalesced caused Ujiji to become an eastern terminus of long-distance commerce during this period.

Most coastal traders who entered the interior for the first time during this period were Omani. This owed much to political shifts in Zanzibar and on the coast. In 1859, Said Barghash failed in a coup to topple his half-brother, Said Majid, the Sultan of Zanzibar. Although Sultan Majid’s retribution against Barghash was brief – with the help of the British, Barghash was exiled to Bombay, before returning to Zanzibar in 1861 – this resulted in many of Barghash’s supporters fleeing to the interior, especially to Tabora. 87 These were predominantly from the Busaidi faction of Omanis. From this point on, this faction, which included traders such as Tippu Tip and Rumaliza, played an integral role in determining the nature long-distance commercial networks from the coast to Manyema and elsewhere in the Congo Basin (though Rumaliza did not emerge as an important trader until the late 1870s). 88 Once Barghash returned to Zanzibar, he became heavily invested in long-distance commerce through his connections

86 Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, p. 88.
to Indian merchants and British governmental representatives in Zanzibar, and increasingly so after he became Sultan in 1870. These parties provided much of the economic and political capital for the expansion of long-distance commercial networks.\(^89\) This granted traders with connections to Barghash greater access to credit, which, in turn, enabled them to exert greater influence over regional and long-distance commercial networks in the interior. This marks the beginning of a period of sustained Omani influence in the interior.

Omani contact with Lake Tanganyika in this period mostly occurred in the southern regions of Ufipa, Ulungu, and Marungu. In 1867, Tippu Tip led a caravan of around 700 people around the south end of the lake through Ugalla (southwestern Unyamwezi), Ufipa, Ulungu, Itawa, and Urua on the way to Manyema.\(^90\) He and his followers eventually established themselves at a settlement called Kasongo on the Lualaba River. In so doing, he followed routes first used by Nyamwezi traders heading to Katanga, and linked them to routes used by Luba-inspired traders and state-builders near to the southwestern parts of the lakeshore.\(^91\) Other traders, including Nyamwezi and Rima traders, attempted to use this route before and after Tippu Tip’s expedition, but their influence was not as great as the Omani faction’s.\(^92\) Indeed, at least one caravan led by a Rima trader was massacred on this route just before Tippu Tip’s arrival in the region.\(^93\) In this context, it is important to note that the size of Tippu Tip’s caravan on Lake Tanganyika’s shores was unprecedented, even if it is representative of a general increase in the size of caravans elsewhere in the interior during this period.\(^94\) The people in this caravan were heavily armed and many owned guns. They were thus able to engage hostile

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\(^93\) Tippu Tip, *L’autobiographie*, pp. 54, 197.
\(^94\) Pallaver, ‘Nyamwezi Participation,’ p. 522.
chiefs in battle successfully. They fought wars in Ugalla and against Nsama in Itawa.\textsuperscript{95} The latter battle opened the route between Kazembe and Lake Tanganyika, and gave Mohammed bin Saleh, Mohammed bin Gharib, and Said bin Habib – the Omani traders who had been in Katanga since the 1840s – greater access to Ujiji and elsewhere on the shores of Lake Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{96} In the aftermath of these battles, coastal traders settled in two locations on the lakeshore: Liendwe in Ulungu and Pamlilo (sometimes referred to as Akalungu) in Marungu.\textsuperscript{97} By the end of the 1870s, Liendwe was considered the most important commercial centre on the shores of Lake Tanganyika apart from Ujiji.\textsuperscript{98} These settlements were used as station towns for goods and traders on the long march around the south end of the lake. They were also bases from which coastal traders raided nearby regions for local produce and captives.\textsuperscript{99} The use of violence secured a long-distance trade route around the south end of Lake Tanganyika and ensured that the coastal traders’ stations were supplied with goods and labour.

Omanis based in Tabora had considerably less influence in and around Ujiji than they had at the south end of Lake Tanganyika. This was because the issues associated with access to Lake Tanganyika’s northern shores and its markets in the period up to c.1860 were amplified during this period. Firstly, instability on the route between Tabora and Ujiji increased. After 1858, violent Ngoni populations headed eastwards from around Ujiji towards the plateau

\textsuperscript{97} Cameron, \textit{Across Africa}, p. 206; NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 22 April 1874; Wright and Lary, ‘Swahili Settlements,’ p. 549.
between Tabora, Uha, and Lake Victoria. Thereafter, violence in the region was dominated by Mirambo, a Nyamwezi warlord, trader, and state-builder based in Urambo, in western Unyamwezi. Mirambo fought wars in Uvinza, Ufipa, Uha, and elsewhere in Unyamwezi, as well as against the coastal traders based in Tabora. His proximity to Msene caused it to cease being an important coastal trader station by the beginning of the 1870s. Part of Mirambo’s successes are attributable to his co-option of Ngoni raiders and tactics, as well as his importation and use of guns. A broader effect of Mirambo’s rise was that the whole region between Unyamwezi and Lake Tanganyika flooded with firearms. This represents a militarisation of the route between Tabora and Ujiji that limited the Omani traders’ ability to travel between the two in safety without investment in large, heavily-armed caravans. Even if they did manage to reach Ujiji, profits were hard to come by once they arrived there. Prices in Ujiji’s market continued to inflate. Stanley reported, for example, that most goods were 100 per-cent more expensive in 1876 than they had been in 1871. Additionally, crossing the lake continued to be difficult. The increasingly large and heavily-armed nature of caravans meant that traders required more boats to transport them across the lake. Meeting these requirements remained an expensive and dangerous transaction. Most long-distance traders still had to pay Jiji chiefs and boatmen for the use of lacustrine craft and for the latter’s labour, while reports of lacustrine craft capsizing on journeys around the lake discouraged traders from using

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101 See: Bennett, *Mirambo*.
103 Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices & Ivory*, p. 179.
104 Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 50-51; Bennett, *Mirambo of Tanzania*, p. 53.
Conditions between Tabora and Ujiji, and in Ujiji itself discouraged Omani traders based in Tabora from extending their commercial networks to the northern part of the lakeshore.

The most prominent coastal traders in Ujiji during this period were veterans of the earlier period who had pioneered routes to the west of Lake Tanganyika. These included the Rima traders whose domains extended from Ujiji, Uvira, and regions to the west, including Mwinyi Mokaia, Mwinyi Kheri, and Mwinyi Akida; and the Omani traders who had recently gained freedom from Katanga via the arrival of Tippu Tip’s caravan in 1867, including Mohammed bin Saleh, Mohammed bin Gharib, and Said bin Habib. All these traders returned to Ujiji sometime in the late 1860s and early 1870s. They were among the most prominent coastal traders within a community that rarely exceeded 25 in number, and whose population fluctuated according to how many were on trading expeditions. In Ujiji, coastal traders added sails and planks to the side of existing lacustrine craft so that they became faster, safer, and larger. This allowed them to explore the lake and integrate lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks with greater efficiency. Their two most commonly-used long-distance commercial routes both started in Ujiji and ended in Manyema. The first went via Uvira and ended in Nyangwe, the site of a coastal trader community founded in the late 1860s. The second went via Uguha and Urua. Manyema then became Ujiji’s coastal traders’ main source of both

109 Cameron, Across Africa, pp. 174-175; Stanley, Dark Continent, II, pp. 1-12, RMCA Stanley Archive 32.
110 See: Chapter 4.
ivory and labour, the latter of which was provided by a mixture of captives and migrant labourers.\textsuperscript{111} The success of the coastal traders’ expeditions in this direction is summed up by Livingstone, who wrote that “the news of cheap ivory [in Manyema] caused a sort of California gold-fever at Ujiji.”\textsuperscript{112} These developments made Ujiji the second most important coastal trader station in the interior of modern-day Tanzania, behind Tabora.\textsuperscript{113}

It is necessary to explore the relations within Ujiji’s coastal trader community to further understand how and why long-distance commercial networks to Manyema formed as they did in this period. In the 1860s and 1870s, Ujiji’s coastal trader community was dominated by a faction of Rima traders.\textsuperscript{114} This is notwithstanding Cameron’s statement that the most important coastal trader in Ujiji during his visit in 1874 was Mohammed bin Saleh.\textsuperscript{115} This statement was probably made in error. Even if Mohammed bin Saleh had a high degree of influence amongst the Omani traders, it is notable that it was Mwinyi Kheri who married a daughter of the chief of Ujiji during Cameron’s visit.\textsuperscript{116} Clearly Mwinyi Kheri was held in higher esteem than Mohammed bin Saleh by Jiji populations on the lakeshore.\textsuperscript{117} Furthermore, in all other European accounts from this period and in the early 1880s, the leader of the coastal trader community was a member of the Rima faction. The first of these was Mwinyi Mokaia, who was governor until he died in Tabora in 1873, and after Mohammed bin Saleh’s death in

\textsuperscript{111} Northrup, ‘Slavery & Forced Labour,’ pp. 113-114; Bennett, Arab versus European, pp. 99-100, 106, 115; Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ pp. 624-625; Iliffe, A Modern History, pp. 49-50. See also: Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{112} David Livingstone, Livingstone to Murchison, April-July 1870, ‘Letters of the Late Dr. Livingstone,’ in Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London, 18, 3 (1873-1874); Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 114; Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{113} Smith, ‘The Southern Section,’ p. 272.

\textsuperscript{114} Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ pp. 148-150; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 56; Livingstone, Last Journals, p. 293; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 16 April 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore to LMS, 9 December 1878; A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7. Journal du P. Deniaud, 6 November 1880.

\textsuperscript{115} Cameron, Across Africa, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.; Iliffe, A Modern History, pp. 47-48; Pallaver, ‘New Modes of Production,’ pp. 42-43.

\textsuperscript{117} Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 91; Interview with Hamisi Ali Juma al-Hey (“Hababi”), 14 November 2013.
sometime between 1874 and 1876, it was Mwinyi Kheri.\footnote{Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ pp. 148-149; Livingstone, \textit{Last Journals}, p. 292; Stanley, \textit{Dark Continent}, II, pp. 2, 7.} There was thus probably a high degree of continuity between Mwinyi Mokaia and Mwinyi Kheri’s periods of governorship. Such continuity diminishes the level of influence that Cameron believed Mohammed bin Saleh had within Ujjii’s coastal trader community. Mwinyi Mokaia and Mwinyi Kheri lived with their followers in the districts of Kawele and Ugoy (hereafter Kawele-Ugoy), which contained the largest and most important lakeshore market for ivory, slaves, and coastal goods in Ujiji.\footnote{Stanley, \textit{Dark Continent}, II, p. 1; Hore, \textit{Tanganyika}, p. 68; Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, p. 116.} Mwinyi Akida, meanwhile, lived as the sole coastal trader in Kigoma, one of Ujjii’s suburbs.\footnote{Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, pp. 116-117; Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ p. 153; Brown, ‘Ujjii,’ p. 135.} Collectively, these Rima traders were the richest and most influential coastal traders living in Ujiji in the period c.1860-1880.

The relationship between the Rima and Omani traders in Ujiji was often characterised by conflict.\footnote{Tippu Tip, \textit{L’autobiographie}, p. 259.} The Omanis lived separately from the Rima in the district of Kasimbo, another of Ujjii’s suburbs. After Mohammed bin Saleh’s death, the leader of this faction was a trader called Abdullah bin Suleiman, who was closely followed in importance by Said bin Habib.\footnote{Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, p. 116.} In 1878, the LMS missionary, Hore, wrote that Abdullah bin Suleiman and Mwinyi Kheri were “the leaders of two opposing factions among the Arabs [coastal traders].”\footnote{CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore to LMS, 9 December 1878. See also: Stanley, \textit{Dark Continent}, II, p. 2.} The competition between these two factions occasionally resulted in bloodshed. Stanley documented an episode in which the Rima traders of Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma mustered a force of armed Jiji against the Omani faction in Kasimbo, owing to the actions of one of Abdullah bin Suleiman’s slaves. The first verdict was to cut off Abdullah’s right hand, though the eventual result was the killing of the slave who committed the crime.\footnote{Stanley, \textit{Dark Continent}, II, pp. 8-9; Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ p. 153.} Despite having his hand spared, it is likely that
Abdullah bin Suleiman and the Omani faction felt aggrieved by this settlement. Even so, as a later missionary account displays, they were powerless to prevent it.\textsuperscript{125} Political influence amongst Omani and Rima traders in Ujiji was contested and distributed unevenly.

The nature of the Rima traders’ position in Ujiji sheds further light on the nature of long-distance commercial networks emanating from elsewhere on the central route. The Rima in Ujiji were ambivalent towards the Omani-dominated coastal trader establishment in Tabora. This is shown from Cameron’s description of the unease with which they viewed the Omani’s conflicts with Mirambo in Western Unyamwezi. He wrote:

\begin{quote}
The prevailing feeling among them [the Rima] did not seem to be one of fear that they might be robbed by [Mirambo] on the road to Unyanyembe, but rather that they should be compelled by Said ibn Salim [the Omani governor of Tabora] to remain there instead of going on to Zanzibar, so as to increase the numerical strength at his disposal [in the war against Mirambo].\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

It would have infringed on the Rima’s commercial aims if they had been obliged to fight on the side of Tabora’s Omani traders on their or their followers’ journeys to the coast. They also probably feared reprisal attacks on Ujiji from Mirambo if such an event were to take place. Evidence for this comes from 1880, when rumours of Sultan Barghash sending troops to confront Mirambo to avenge the deaths of two representatives of the International African Association (Association Internationale Africaine, AIA) spread in Ujiji, which, again, caused Ujiji’s Rima traders to believe they were vulnerable to reprisal attacks.\textsuperscript{127} Ujiji’s Rima traders, therefore, saw Omani actions in Unyamwezi as an indirect threat to their commercial position.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[125] CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 16 April 1879.
\item[126] Cameron, \textit{Across Africa}, p. 12.
\item[127] Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, 70, 117; Bennett, \textit{Mirambo}, 113-119; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse, 11 December 1880, Wookey to Whitehouse, 27 December 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/006 Southon to Whitehouse, 1 January 1881.
\end{footnotes}
on the lakeshore. This may have contributed further to the lack of sustained commercial contact between Tabora and Ujiji in this period.

Similar levels of ambivalence between Rima and Omani traders were visible in Manyema. Rima traders heading westwards from Ujiji tended to travel to Nyangwe, a settlement in Manyema that was founded by Rima traders who travelled via Uvira in the 1860s.\textsuperscript{128} The head of coastal trader community during the 1870s was a Rima trader called Mwinyi Dugumbi.\textsuperscript{129} Omani traders travelling around the south end of the lake, meanwhile, headed to the region around Kasongo.\textsuperscript{130} Nyangwe and Kasongo were between eight and fifteen days’ march, or 65 kilometres, from each other, and so, compared to the distance between most other coastal trader stations in the interior, they were relatively close to each other.\textsuperscript{131} Their proximity contributed to conflicts between Omani and Rima traders in and around Manyema. Livingstone was the first to note this when he wrote that Omani traders on their journey to Manyema bought up all the ivory in Itawa, which priced-out Rima traders travelling across the lake from Ujiji in this direction.\textsuperscript{132} The Rima traders of Livingstone’s account were forced to return from Itawa to Ujiji empty-handed.\textsuperscript{133} This ensured Omani commercial prominence over the Rima in this region. Similarly, Cameron described an episode in which Tippu Tip forced some Rima traders from Nyangwe to compensate some Manyema populations for attacking them. This was because Tippu Tip considered the Manyema peoples in question to be under his, and not the Rima’s, jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{134} Tippu Tip also used his autobiography to refer to

\textsuperscript{129} RMCA Stanley Archive 18. Field Notebook, 18 October 1876. See also: Tippu Tip, \textit{L'autobiographie}, pp. 240-241.
\textsuperscript{130} Sheriff, \textit{Slaves, Spices & Ivory}, p. 190; Tippu Tip, \textit{Maisha}, p. 81; Stanley, \textit{Dark Continent}, II, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{133} Livingstone, \textit{Last Journals}, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{134} Cameron, \textit{Across Africa}, pp. 270, 273.
Nyangwe’s Rima traders in insulting terms. He wrote, for example, that, “men from the Mrima coast [in Nyangwe] have not much sense.” Clearly, Tippu Tip felt the presence of Rima traders emanating from Ujiji infringed on, rather than benefited, his commercial domain in Manyema. Manyema was the site of heightened conflict between Omani and Rima traders.

Heightened competition in Manyema and ambivalence towards Tabora in this period led Ujiji’s Rima traders to make the northeastern lakeshore an eastern terminus of long-distance commerce. This conceptualisation indicates that the Rima were far more likely to travel and expand their links to the west than they were to the east. Mwinyi Kheri, for example, did not return to the coast after 1870, and likely before. When he required more credit or needed to settle debts with his creditors, he sent his subordinates to command caravans on his behalf. This meant that Mwinyi Kheri and his faction stored a great deal of their wealth in Ujiji, causing them to become the richest inhabitants of the lakeshore. No doubt, this brought them a great deal of prestige amongst the Jiji populations among whom they lived, and encouraged the formation of allegiances between them. A further reason for making Ujiji an eastern terminus of long-distance trade was the underlying threat from the Omani faction. Mwinyi Kheri and his associates would have been aware of the large amounts of credit that were available to Omanis with contacts to Sultan Barghash during this period. If the links between Tabora and Ujiji were expanded, it had the potential to undermine the Rima traders’ position as the richest and most influential coastal traders on the lakeshore. Making Ujiji an eastern terminus was thus a defence against potential interference from a more powerful Omani faction. Such developments led Thomson of the Royal Geographical Society to comment in 1879 that Ujiji had “an appearance not unlike a coast village on the Mlima [sic.],” such as Pangani, Saadani, Bagamoyo, and Dar

135 Tippu Tip, Maisha, p. 135.
136 See also: Tippu Tip, L’autobiographie, p. 101.
137 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 59; Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ p. 150.
es Salaam. However, unlike these Mrima towns, Ujiji was not subject to increasing amounts of sustained interference from Omanis during this period. Ujiji’s coastal trader establishment resembled more closely the towns of the Mrima in previous decades than that which was current at the time of Thomson’s writing.

Jiji populations found ways to adapt to the new reality of greater integration between lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks. In some ways, the influence of coastal traders reduced the Jiji’s role in linking the eastern and western shores of the lake together. The coastal traders’ ownership of lacustrine craft and their importation of labour from Manyema meant that they were no longer reliant on Jiji canoes and boatmen to transport them across the lake. This did not diminish the Jiji’s ability to generate wealth from the presence of coastal traders in their midst, however. The rising prices of lakeshore goods in Ujiji’s markets are a case in point. Jiji populations demanded ever increasing value from the coastal traders in exchange for the goods they produced. Where such tactics failed, many moved away from the market in Kawele-Ugoy that was frequented by coastal traders. Stanley noted that the physical size of the market there decreased in size from 3,000 to 1,200 square yards between 1871 and 1876. This contraction seems paradoxical given that it occurred at a time when long-distance trade was booming. The only explanation is that many Jiji traders, whose wealth came from lacustrine networks, deserted Kawele-Ugoy in favour of other markets. This is confirmed by a report made by Hore in 1880, that described the market at Kigoma as equal in size to the one in Kawele-Ugoy, and that it was dominated by products from around the northeastern part of

141 See, for example: Glassman, Feasts and Riot, pp. 20, 52; Horton and Middleton, The Swahili, pp. 86-87.
142 Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ pp. 617, 627.
143 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 2.
144 Ibid.
Jiji traders thus maintained agency over their own commercial affairs. The presence of coastal traders in their vicinity also provided a protective function. The coastal traders’ followers’ ownership of guns acted as a deterrent for raiders in the surrounding regions. The memory of the Ngoni’s attack in 1858 and the potential threat held by Mirambo in Western Unyamwezi may have made this protection appear invaluable. Jiji populations continued to take advantage of the commercial and protective opportunities that the presence of coastal traders offered them during the 1860s and 1870s.

The ways in which coastal traders expanded their long-distance commercial networks also allowed the Jiji to expand their lacustrine networks. Coastal traders made modifications to the lacustrine craft that they owned to make them safer and more efficient. These modifications also affected the ways in which the Jiji built their own lacustrine craft. This enabled Jiji traders to travel further and to exploit markets at the south end of the lake in Ufipa, Ulungu, and Marungu. Ujiji’s coastal traders had largely abandoned these regions in favour of extending their influence to Manyema via Uvira and Uguha. By extending their lacustrine networks in this direction, the Jiji tapped into a growing market for captives. Coastal traders travelling around the south end of the lake and stationed at Liendwe and Pamlilo contributed to the already-high levels of violence in these regions. They, alongside Nyamwezi, Bemba, and Ngoni raiders and traders made frequent attacks on populations living on or near the lakeshore. This generated captives, many of whom they sought to sell. Also, the destruction the Ngoni wrought on these regions created widespread impoverishment. Local communities were thus

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145 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 26 February 1880; Hore, *Tanganyika*, p. 90; Brown, ‘Ujjii,’ pp. 45, 50.
146 Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, p. 172; Bennett, *Arab Versus European*, p. 91.
147 See: Chapter 4.
149 NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 22 March 1874; Stanley, *Dark Continent*, II, p. 40; Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, p. 171.
forced to exchange their own kin for food to survive.\(^{150}\) Jiji traders became willing buyers in this context. This marks a departure from the period up to c.1860, during which time the Jiji imported most of their captives from northern lakeshore regions and Uha.\(^{151}\) The ways in which long-distance and lacustrine networks were integrated was mutually advantageous to Jiji and coastal traders.\(^{152}\)

**Competition and Conflict, c.1880-1890**

The direction and nature of long-distance commercial networks between the Indian Ocean and the Congo Basin shifted during the 1880s. This was caused by phenomena that were internal and external to Lake Tanganyika. The wars associated with Mirambo near the route between Tabora and Ujiji declined in intensity after c.1875, and ceased entirely after Mirambo’s death in 1884.\(^{153}\) This allowed Omani traders based in Tabora to reach the lakeshore in greater security. Once they made such a journey, they found that the Omanis based in Ujiji had developed lacustrine transport. In 1876, Stanley described Abdullah bin Suleiman as having “the air of an opulent ship-owner” who had built a “big ship,” whose size “offended the vanity” of Mwinyi Kheri, who only owned forms of canoe.\(^{154}\) Meanwhile, Mohammed bin Khalfan (also known as Rumaliza), another Omani trader, commissioned the construction of Lake Tanganyika’s first *dhow*, in the style of waterborne craft seen on the Indian Ocean Coast, which was built in 1879.\(^{155}\) After its completion, one missionary wrote that it was “very superior to [all other boats on the lake],” which were all either canoes or modified canoes with

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\(^{152}\) See also: Bennett, *Arab Versus European*, p. 91.


\(^{154}\) Stanley, *Dark Continent*, II, p. 2.

\(^{155}\) NA RGS CB6/1167 Hore to RGS, 10 December 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Whitehouse, 11 December 1879. See also: Chapter 4.
sails. The construction of these vessels allowed for the transport of large, heavily-laden caravans across the lake for the first time. Therefore, instead of travelling around the south end of the lake, Omani traders increasingly sought to traverse it. This decreased Ujiji’s importance as a terminus for long-distance commerce. Instead, in the words of one member of the London Missionary Society, it became, “a station on the road [between Manyema and Tabora] rather than a position of independent importance.” This section argues that these changes caused Lake Tanganyika to become a zone of transition that linked the entirety of the central route between the Mrima and Manyema together.

The growth of commercial links between Tabora and the northeastern part of Lake Tanganyika heightened competition and conflict between Omani and Rima traders in Ujiji. Emphasis on competition and conflict in this context contradicts previous analyses of how newly-arrived Omanis interacted with the pre-existing and dominant Rima faction. For example, Brown describes this period of Lake Tanganyika’s history as signifying a “Pax Arabica.” This term is loosely defined as a form of ‘proto-colonialism’ headed by a unified body of ‘Arabs’ that encapsulated the northern part of Lake Tanganyika. These ‘Arabs’ are seen to have achieved this loose form of political hegemony through military strikes and the development of commercial stations in Uguha, Massanze, Ubwari, Uvira, and Urundi. Although the creation of a Pax was never entirely fulfilled – as Brown concedes, coastal traders had to deal with numerous rebellions with military force throughout the 1880s – it is the idea that the phenomena that characterised this period were caused by a collective body of people who can be referred to a ‘Arabs’ that this section contests most vehemently. The idea of the

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158 Hore, *Tanganyika*, p. 69. See also: Hore, *To Lake Tanganyika in a Bath Chair*, p. 159.
159 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 163-165.
160 Castryck, ‘Bordering the Lake,’ p. 4.
"Pax Arabica" was first used by Sutton and Roberts to describe an allegiance between Tippu Tip and Rumaliza in a war versus Vinza populations in the region between Ujiji and Tabora in 1881. An allegiance of this kind makes sense, given that Tippu Tip and Rumaliza were part of the same commercial and kinship network, and that such actions allowed greater communication between Omani traders across present-day Tanzania. Yet, Brown extends the use of the term to include Mwinyi Kheri as well, and uses it to refer to a process by which all of Ujiji’s coastal traders militarily expanded their influence around the north end of Lake Tanganyika. Such an allegiance would have entailed the coalescence of Omani and Rima traders’ networks, a phenomenon which, as has been shown, did not occur amongst settled populations of coastal traders elsewhere in the interior before this period. Furthermore, given that the Rima and Omani relationship on the coast during the 1880s was increasingly characterised by conflict, there is no reason to suggest that an allegiance of this kind would have occurred around Lake Tanganyika at this time. As opposed to the "Pax Arabica," this section emphasises competition and conflict between factions of coastal traders as a driving force behind changes to long-distance commercial networks across Lake Tanganyika during the 1880s.

Evidence for competition and conflict between coastal traders at the North End of Lake Tanganyika comes initially from the idea that increased Omani influence was economically catastrophic for Ujiji’s Rima traders. Given their respective economic and political positions on the coast, the credit lines of Omani traders dwarfed those of the Rima. As Glassman attests, many of the Rima patricians in coastal towns were “hopelessly in debt” by the 1880s. At

162 Sutton and Roberts, ‘Uvinza,’ p. 75.  
163 Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods, p. 166; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 117; McDow, ‘Arabs and Africans,’ p. 30; Tippu Tip, L’autobiographie, pp. 113, 254.  
166 Ibid. p. 24.
first, the arrival of more Omani traders to Ujiji brought Ujiji’s Rima faction economic opportunities. Omani traders paid Rima traders for use of their lacustrine transport when that which was provided by Abdullah bin Suleiman and Rumaliza was not available or sufficient. However, the influx of rich Omani traders created longer-term economic problems for the Rima. Omani caravans often contained over 1,000 people. As Ujiji had a population of between 5,000 and 10,000 at this point in time, the arrival of caravans of this size put pressure on Ujiji’s infrastructure and sources of food, and caused the latter to become more expensive. Furthermore, the wealth of the Omani traders flooded the market with imported goods, such as beads and cotton cloth. This resulted in the devaluation of important trade goods in Ujiji’s markets. Between 1880 and 1883, for example, the value of kaniki cloth lost over half of its value. Inflation of this nature drastically reduced the profits of Rima traders, who maintained a great deal of their wealth in Ujiji. Thus, by 1884, Ujiji’s market was “deserted and decayed.” Omani traders, meanwhile, were not so affected by such price rises. They garnered most their wealth from maintaining their network between Zanzibar and Manyema rather than from the market in Ujiji. The wealth that Omani traders accumulated from long-distance transactions subsidised their position in Ujiji. Such developments to long-distance commercial networks were clearly disadvantageous to Ujiji’s Rima traders. It is thus likely that they would have contested increased Omani influence there and elsewhere around the lake.

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167 ZNA BL1/3 Thomson to Kirk, 20 August 1878; CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore to LMS, ‘Launch of the Calabash,’ 9 December 1878.
168 Rockel, ‘Caravan Porters,’ pp. 1, 14, 224, 282; Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 112-113; Rockel, Carriers, p. 128; Smith, ‘The Southern Section, p. 274.
169 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 2; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hutley to Whitehouse, 19 October 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/007 Griffith to Thomson, 16 October 1882; Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 116-118. See also: Chapter 6.
171 CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Brooks to Whitehouse, 6 August 1884.
Further evidence for conflict between Ujiji’s Rima and Omani factions comes from the broader East and Central African context. Omani traders in Tabora and Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar saw Ujiji’s Rima traders as a threat to their position throughout East and Central Africa. These sentiments were shown in letters sent by members of the London Missionary Society (LMS) based in Ujiji to the Sultan and Sir John Kirk, the British Consul in Zanzibar, in 1880. In these letters, the members of the LMS claimed that Ujiji’s Rima traders were preventing them from building a mission station in Gungu, one of Ujiji’s suburbs, despite the wishes of the teko (Jiji district chief).\textsuperscript{173} Such claims were an embarrassment to the Sultan, who had used British help to establish his representatives in towns on the Mrima, such as Pangani, Saadani, Bagamoyo, and Dar es Salaam.\textsuperscript{174} The letters implied that Sultan Barghash did not have the power to protect British subjects in the interior from people who were supposed to be under his jurisdiction. If the matter was not resolved, wrote Kirk in response, he would cease to recognise the Sultan’s authority in Ujiji.\textsuperscript{175} Even though the Sultan had very little influence in Ujiji, this would have been a dangerous precedent given the increasing role of Omanis elsewhere in East and Central Africa. The matter was eventually resolved with the planting of the Zanzibari flag in Ujiji, and Sultan Barghash’s appointment of Mwinyi Kheri as the official liwali (governor) of Ujiji, Uvira, and Uguha.\textsuperscript{176} This changed little about the internal structure of Ujiji’s coastal trader community in the immediate term. Neither the Sultan nor Kirk could affect change from their positions in Zanzibar, and Ujiji’s Rima traders were probably happy to deal with the LMS with the increased legitimacy that the symbolic influence of Zanzibar brought them.\textsuperscript{177} Nevertheless, this was an imperfect solution, and it acted as a precedent for

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{173}{CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 10 March 1880; ZNA AA1/28 Hore to Kirk, 7 December 1880.}
\footnote{174}{Horton and Middleton, \textit{The Swahili}, p. 86.}
\footnote{175}{ZNA AA2/29 Kirk to Hore, 21 June 1880; Barghash to Kheri, Akida, the natives of Ujiji and the Arabs, 17 June 1880; Barghash to Abdullah bin Nassib, June 1880; Bennett, \textit{Arab Versus European}, p. 98.}
\footnote{176}{CWM/LMS/06/02/006 Griffith to Thomson, 29 May 1881; Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, p. 117; Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 628.}
\footnote{177}{Pallaver, ‘New Modes of Production,’ p. 43.}
\end{footnotesize}
increased Omani interference thereafter. Omani influence in Ujiji was partly by political design of forces in Zanzibar, which had long been undermining Rima power on the coast.

Finally, closer analysis of the ways in which coastal traders expanded their power around Lake Tanganyika’s northern regions shows how Omani traders gradually undermined Ujiji’s Rima faction. Military campaigns in Urundi, Uvira, and Massanze began soon after Tippu Tip visited Ujiji in 1881 with a caravan of 3,000 people, on his journey from Manyema to Zanzibar. According to Brown, these campaigns were the result of “a fateful conjunction of powerful personalities, massive firepower, and large manpower reserves” caused by an allegiance between Tippu Tip, Rumaliza, and Mwinyi Kheri. This is at least partially accurate. Rumaliza sent troops to aid an offensive headed by Rima traders in both Uvira and Urundi, and Tippu Tip left 140 troops in Ujiji for this purpose. Yet, this allegiance can be considered in the same light as other episodes of collective action by Rima and Omanis in the interior of Africa. In times such as this – when coastal traders were expanding their commercial domains – Omani and Rima traders were bound by a ‘pioneer ethic’ that transcended their rivalry in a way that benefited their respective networks. But, the Omani motivation for joining the Rima faction in these wars was certainly self-interested. According to Deniaud of the White Fathers, when Tippu Tip met Mwinyi Kheri in 1881, Tippu Tip referred to Mwinyi Kheri and his faction as “savages.” Although this may have been hearsay, such an insult would have been in line with others he reserved for Rima traders in Nyangwe, described above. In any case, while in Ujiji, Tippu Tip spent a greater amount of time with Rumaliza than he did with Mwinyi Kheri, and it was with the former that plans for Omani commercial expansion around the lake

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178 Pallaver, ‘Nyamwezi Participation,’ p. 522; Rockel, Carriers, p. 128.
180 Tippu Tip, Maisha, 99; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Massanze, 30 May 1881, 26-27 June 1881; CWM/LMS/06/02/006 Griffith to Thomson, 29 May 1881.
Once the coastal traders established their position around the north end of the lake, they divided the region into distinct spheres of influence. The Rima faction dominated the lakeshore regions of Urundi, Uvira and Uguha, and the Omani faction dominated Massanze and the Ubwari peninsula. Once the Omani faction’s right to influence the northwestern shore of the lake was established, Rumaliza joined Tippu Tip’s caravan and returned to the coast.

During Tippu Tip and Rumaliza’s absence from the interior in 1881-1884, Omani traders based in Ujiji expanded their political and commercial influence at the expense of Rima traders. Abdullah bin Suleiman violently subdued many chiefs in Uguha and Urua, which further secured Omani influence on the route to Manyema through these regions after Tippu Tip’s passage through these regions in 1880-1881. This contested Mwinyi Kheri’s political rights as the official liwali on Uguha’s lakeshore. Further north, Nassor bin Sef, another Omani trader associated with Rumaliza, and a large following of Rumaliza’s men continued to attack the lake’s northwestern regions. They established a station at Chumin in northern Massanze, and used this as a base from which to subdue populations in the mountainous region of Ubembe to the west. These actions secured a new, more direct, route to Manyema. Collectively, the routes via Uguha and Massanze came to dominate long-distance trade through Ujiji to Manyema. The Rima, faction, meanwhile, was increasingly restricted to their station and route from Uvira. This represents a relative abandonment of Uguha to Omani traders. Mwinyi Kheri moved his permanent residence to Uvira in the early 1880s, and largely influenced affairs

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184 Wright, ‘East Africa,’ p. 563; CWM/LMS/06/02/006 Griffith to Thomson, 12 August 1881.
187 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 167-168, 207; CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Jones to Thompson, 10 February 1885.
in Ujiji from a distance through his younger relatives. Uvira was a cheaper place for him to live and was safer from Omani military expansion. Although there was no direct confrontation between the Rima and Omani faction in this period, this represents a gradual shift in power over long-distance commercial networks across Lake Tanganyika from the Rima to the Omani faction.

While Abdullah bin Suleiman and Nassor bin Sef were expanding Omani influence around Lake Tanganyika, Tippu Tip and Rumaliza were planning their return to the interior. Once Tippu Tip reached Zanzibar in 1881, he met with Sultan Barghash. Although they had never met before, they were well known to each other through Tharia Topan, an Indian merchant based in Zanzibar. Tharia Topan had been Tippu Tip’s most prominent financier since the 1860s. Once Barghash became Sultan in 1870, he appointed him as one of his closest advisors. This appointment represented Barghash’s increased interest in influencing the direction of credit on long-distance commercial networks. When Tippu Tip first returned to Zanzibar, Barghash’s first intention was to appoint him as the liwali of Tabora, having recently recalled Abdullah bin Nassib, the previous liwali. However, on hearing of the nature of Tippu Tip’s influence in Manyema, he saw the latter’s position as an opportunity to expand the geographical scope of what he considered his commercial empire. He made sure that Tippu Tip’s supply of credit from Tharia Topan was unlimited, and gave him the jurisdiction to act

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188 CWM/LMS/06/02/006 Hutley to Thomson, 28 February 1881; Griffith to Thomson, 6 May 1881; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Jones to Whitehouse, 12 April 1884; A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7 Journal du P. Deniaud, 28 February 1879; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Massanze, 2 August 1881; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 174; Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ p. 151.

189 Tippu Tip, L’autobiographie, p. 170.


191 Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 33.


as his “satrap” (provincial governor) in Manyema.\textsuperscript{194} Rumaliza, meanwhile, was mandated to secure trade routes across Lake Tanganyika, so that traders, credit, and ivory on the journey between Zanzibar and Manyema could travel safely and efficiently.\textsuperscript{195} Therefore, the transformation of Ujiji into a mere “station on the road” was not just the natural result of economic phenomena associated with the shifting direction of long-distance networks.\textsuperscript{196} Rather, it was also a consequence of political directives from Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar and supported by the commercial aims of Tharia Topan, Rumaliza, and Tippu Tip.

When Tippu Tip and Rumaliza returned to the interior in 1884, they directly challenged the position of the Rima faction in Ujiji and elsewhere in Lake Tanganyika’s northern regions. Rumaliza sought to further establish the most direct trade route from the lake’s western shore to Manyema, which went via Chumin in Massanze. To get to Chumin from Ujiji, coastal traders first travelled north on the lake’s eastern shore to Rumonge in Urundi, before traversing the lake to Ubwari and Massanze. Since 1881, the lakeshore regions of Urundi was considered part of the Rima faction’s domain.\textsuperscript{197} However, in 1884, Rumaliza claimed to Tippu Tip that the Rima-backed chiefs in Rumonge were preventing him from securing the route to the degree that was necessary to maintain effective links between Zanzibar and Manyema.\textsuperscript{198} In response, Tippu Tip sent Rumaliza 500 men armed with guns to subdue any populations in Massanze, Urundi, and Uvinza who compromised the trading propensity of Omani traders in these regions.\textsuperscript{199} These actions precipitated three years of violent competition between the respective armed followings of the Omani and Rima factions on Urundi’s lakeshore.\textsuperscript{200} By 1886,

\textsuperscript{194} ZNA AA1/36 Kirk to Earl Granville, 23 October 1884, Tipo Tipo to Barghash, undated; Brode, \textit{Tippoo Tib}, p. 160; Horton and Middleton, \textit{The Swahili}, p. 87; Wright, ‘East Africa,’ pp. 562-563.
\textsuperscript{196} Hore, \textit{Tanganyika}, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{198} A.G.M.Afr. C.16-133. Charbonnier to White Fathers, 30 April 1886; Martin, ‘Muslim Brotherhoods,’ p. 170.
\textsuperscript{199} Tippu Tip, \textit{Maisha}, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{200} A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 4 February 1887, 2 April 1887.
Rumaliza was able to claim to be the principal coastal trader in the lakeshore regions of both Massanze and Urundi, and by 1887, dissenting members of the Rima faction conceded their political claims in Urundi in exchange for the right to trade there in Rumaliza’s name.\footnote{A.G.M.Afr. C.16-133. Charbonnier to White Fathers, 30 April 1886; A.G.M.Afr. C.19-439 ‘Voyage à Oujiji,’ 1888; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 178.} Faced with the Omani faction’s vast military capabilities, members of the Rima faction were forced to take a lesser role in Lake Tanganyika’s internal political structures.

Uvira was the final lakeshore region at the north end of the lake to come under Omani influence. The Rima faction’s position in Uvira was undermined by the death of Mwinyi Kheri in 1885. At the time of his death, Mwinyi Kheri was in his sixties, and the majority of his contemporaries of similar age had already died.\footnote{Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ pp. 148-149, 151.} Coincidentally, his most natural heir from the Rima faction, called Bwana Mkombe, died in Ujiji during the same year.\footnote{RMCA HA.01.017-20 Moinet to Storms, 15 September 1885; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 26 January 1886.} None of Mwinyi Kheri’s other younger relatives or associates from the Rima faction had enough wealth or influence to replace him.\footnote{Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 175.} Rumaliza was thus able to step into the power vacuum as his natural successor, a process that ensured the Omani faction’s dominance in all of Mwinyi Kheri’s former domains.\footnote{Bennett, \textit{Arab Versus European}, p. 246.} As a result, Uvira was soon considered part of the Omani faction’s region of influence.\footnote{Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 168-169; CWM/LMS/06/02/015 Swann to Thompson, 1 August 1890.} Indeed, in 1890, Rumaliza could justifiably claim to representatives of the LMS that he was the governor of all the coastal traders in all of Lake Tanganyika’s northern regions.\footnote{CWM/LMS/06/02/015 Swann to Thompson, 1 August 1890.} This included the coastal trader depots in Uguha, Massanze, and Uvira, which all acted as launch-points for expeditions to Manyema. Even so, Sultan Barghash never bestowed Rumaliza with the title of \textit{liwali} of Ujiji, Uvira, or Uguha, like he did with Mwinyi Kheri. This should not be construed as lack of recognition for his rights over the lakeshore’s other coastal
traders or his ability to govern. Rather, it is reflective of the Sultan’s pre-occupation with events closer to home, as German forces gradually undermined the Omani and Rima establishments on the coast. In any case, Rumaliza did not need an official appointment to act in the Sultan’s name. By trading with credit supplied by Tharia Topan, he was doing so by default. By the second half of the 1880s, an Omani faction of coastal traders dominated all the long-distance commercial routes across Lake Tanganyika via Ujiji to Manyema.

Increased Omani influence in Ujiji initially caused social problems and political conflict. The arrival and departure of large caravans created short-term and sharp demands for food, which Ujiji’s markets often could not supply. Even when there was enough food, members of the Omani’s caravans may have been unwilling or unable to buy it, owing to the high prices that Jiji traders imposed. The result of this was periodic spells of guerrilla warfare between the followings of coastal traders and Jiji food producers. The fact that many of the coastal traders’ followers owned firearms and most of the Jiji did not put the Jiji at a disadvantage in such disputes. One particularly violent episode occurred in 1881, when Tippu Tip passed through Ujiji with a caravan of 3,000 people. By the time this caravan had departed, many of the town’s surrounding fields were destroyed. Additionally, large caravans brought diseases to the regions they encountered. The most common and deadly of these diseases was smallpox, which ravaged Ujiji’s population almost annually during the 1880s. Because of these disruptions, the Jiji leadership attempted expel all the coastal traders from their vicinity in 1880, except for Mwinyi Kheri, Mwinyi Akida, and their closest

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208 Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 246.
209 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 111-113.
210 Ibid., p. 51; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 10; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hutley to Whitehouse, 19 October 1879.
211 Ibid., War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 112-113; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 91.
associates. The Jiji’s demands in this context indicate that they were conscious that it was mostly the newly-arrived Omani traders, and not the long-term Rima residents of Ujiji’s lakeshore regions, who were shifting the nature of commercial networks across and around Lake Tanganyika during this period. Although this crisis eventually passed, it is indicative of some resistance from the Jiji leadership to how the influence of the Omani faction was affecting Ujiji during the early part of the 1880s.

Nevertheless, the longer-term response amongst lakeshore populations to increased Omani influence in the 1880s was to take advantage of the opportunities afforded them by increased integration between lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks. Many people from the lakeshore joined the ranks of the coastal traders’ followings, much like migrant Manyema labourers had been doing since the 1860s. They involved themselves in wars around the northern end of the lake and joined the coastal traders’ caravans heading to regions that were distant from the lake. This brought them opportunities for paid labour and personal wealth through trade. Thus, many people from the lakeshore directly contributed to the expansion of Omani influence around the lake and elsewhere on the central route. This does not mean that all traders living on the lakeshore ceased using lacustrine networks exclusively. Indeed, the number of lacustrine traders probably still outnumbered their long-distance counterparts. Rather, it means that the wealthiest and most influential traders were those who were able to integrate their lacustrine networks with long-distance ones. It was clear to these traders that greater profits were afforded to those who were willing to travel long distances, and that the lakeshore did not represent a particularly lucrative terminus for trade. Lakeshore populations were active agents in transforming Lake Tanganyika from a terminus for trade into a region that linked Zanzibar to the Congo Basin. These links are indicative of Lake Tanganyika as a

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zone of transition that linked the regions of present-day Tanzania and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

**European Influence and the Collapse of Omani Political Hegemony c.1885-1895**

Conditions in Lake Tanganyika’s southern regions in the period c.1885-1895 build on the previous analysis of the lake as a zone of transition. Traders and political figures settled in the lakeshore regions of Ufipa and Marungu to establish links with distant regions to their east and west. Yet, the Omani’s pre-occupation with establishing links across the lake to Manyema via Ujiji allowed other groups a greater level of prominence here. Some of these were the Omanis’ allies. These included ngwana (Swahili: gentlemen) traders. Such traders represented a wide demographic of people from the coast and the interior. They referred to themselves as ngwana to claim prestige in coastal communities, as a sign of assimilation to coastal norms, and to state that they were not to be regarded as slaves (the antithesis of ngwana, shenzi (barbarians), were allowed, according to coastal customs, to be enslaved, while ngwana were not). Collectively, these ngwana traders were crucial agents in the settlement of Kirando in Ufipa, and Katele in Marungu. They used these locations as stations on the route between Katanga, Unyamwezi, and the coast. Others figures, such as Nyamwezi traders and Luba-inspired chiefs living in Marungu, were not necessarily allies of the Omanis, but were aware that the Omani’s presence probably helped their commercial position in the long-term. This was because they garnered a great deal of their wealth and political power via commercial links to Unyamwezi, which included the Omani-dominated settlement of Tabora. Of course, Nyamwezi traders had been traversing Lake Tanganyika since before the arrival of coastal

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215 See: Chapters 1, 5.
traders to the region, but they had rather been superseded in prominence at the north end of the lake by this stage. From the 1860s onwards, Nyamwezi traders were more prominent on routes around and across the south end of the lake, as they travelled between their homelands and Katanga. However, other immigrant groups near the south end of Lake Tanganyika were openly and increasingly hostile to the Omani establishment in its northern regions. These were Europeans based in Karema and Mpala, in northern Ufipa and Marungu respectively. This section explores how the development of these European centres of power contributed to the gradual decline of the Omani establishment in Ujiji. It argues that the Europeans expanded long-distance networks to and across the lake to an even greater degree than the Omanis. The emphasis on long-distance networks in this context indicates that the nature of European influence at the end of the era of long-distance commerce and in the early colonial period does not represent a sharp break with the phenomena that also linked Omani traders in distant regions. Rather, it represents an evolution in the extent to which they used commercial and military might to establish themselves in the interior.

Europeans were stationed in Karema and Mpala from 1879 and 1883 respectively. The first to inhabit these settlements were members of the International African Association (Association Internationale Africaine, AIA), a Belgian organisation under the leadership of King Leopold II. The AIA’s establishment on the lakeshore grew in power and significance after the 1883 arrival of Emile Storms. He was the agent who founded Mpala, which he then used as a military base to form a political domain extending into Marungu’s mountains. His broader intention was to use Mpala as a launching point from which to establish a station at Nyangwe. This was meant to be supported by Henry Morton Stanley, who was also working for the AIA at this time, and who was travelling into the interior from the Atlantic Coast and

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forming stations along the Congo River. In general, Storms had little contact with – and received little opposition from – coastal traders who were based at the north end of the lake. However, his plans for a long-distance network extending to the Atlantic Coast did not come to pass under his watch. In 1885, changes in the European political discourse regarding Africa forced the AIA to recall him and to hand over their lakeshore stations to the White Fathers. Mpala was occupied by Fathers Moncet and Moinet, who continued to expand its regional influence via violent means. Then, in 1887, they were joined by Leopold-Louis Joubert, a French soldier and lay missionary. It is from this point that the relationship between Europeans based in the lake’s southern regions and coastal traders based in the north became increasingly confrontational.

Tension between Europeans and coastal traders on Lake Tanganyika’s shores first arose in a dispute over different peoples’ rights to settle in Katele, a town in Marungu. Ngwana traders based in Kirando, who were at least nominally aligned with Rumaliza, wanted to form a commercial station there. Joubert and the White Fathers at Mpala, however, viewed this settlement as part of their domain. Consequently, Joubert formed an armed following and violently resisted the ngwana’s arrival in both 1887 and 1888. He was finally defeated in his preventative measures in 1889, when Rumaliza mediated over negotiations that allowed the ngwana to settle. Yet, this did not relieve the tension. In 1890, some ngwana traders based in Katele attacked one of the White Fathers’ neighbours and allies. This provoked Joubert and

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221 Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 107.
222 Bennett, ‘Captain Storms,’ p. 61.
224 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 184; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 251.
225 For more on Rumaliza’s influence near to the south end of Lake Tanganyika, see: Roberts, ‘The History of Abdullah,’ p. 245.
226 A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Mpala, 11 August 1887; RMCA HA.01.017-20 Moinet to Storms, September 1888.
his armed following to occupy Katele. He forced the *ngwana* to abandon it, and renamed it Saint Louis (Baudouinville, present-day Moba/Kirungu). Soon after, in 1891, Joubert was joined at the lakeshore by Captain Victor Jacques of the Belgian Antislavery Society, who arrived from the Atlantic Coast. Jacques had a dual mandate as a Congo Free State Official to set up the apparatus of government on the lakeshore. One of his first moves was to establish a station at Albertville (modern-day Kalemie). From here, he threatened the Omani and *ngwana*’s trading post in Uguha, which was just a few kilometres further north in Mtowa. He also attempted to charge traders *hongo* (tribute) for passing through this region. This infringed directly on the coastal traders’ ability to trade, and resulted in numerous battles along the Lukuga River Valley throughout most of 1892. By the early 1890s, the European presence on the lakeshore was impeding the Omani and *ngwana* traders’ commercial networks.

These events occurred against a backdrop of shifting political dynamics at the western and eastern extremes of the coastal traders’ commercial networks, about which Ujiji’s coastal traders were increasingly uneasy. Since the mid-1880s, agents of the German army had been gradually entering the interior from the Indian Ocean Coast, often by violent means. They made numerous treaties with African chiefs that made the German government the political sovereign. Meanwhile, people working for the Congo Free State were establishing stations along the Congo River and were *en route* to meeting the western-most point of Omani commercial expansion. This was a heavily-armed and militarily organised migration of Belgian political power that directly threatened the Omani position in Manyema and elsewhere in the Congo Basin. Thus, Rumaliza and some of his Omani allies joined their kin there to prevent

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229 Ibid., p. 199; Bennett, *Arab Versus European*, pp. 233, 251.
231 See, for example: ZNA AC1/7 Kirk to Foreign Office, 14 May 1892.
the Belgians from marching further inland. During 1893 and 1894, they engaged them in battle at Stanley Falls (modern-day Kisangani), Nyangwe and Kasongo. In the final battle, the second of two at Kasongo, Rumaliza was only one of two of the coastal traders’ commanders who neither surrendered, nor was captured or killed. He fled back to the lakeshore via the route his followers had pioneered in the preceding decade, through Ubembe and Massanze and ending at Chumin. Indebted to his creditors and humbled by European military might, he arrived in Zanzibar in secret in 1894.

On his way back to the coast, Rumaliza visited Ujiji, where he was disgraced and had already been replaced as the leading coastal trader in town. The new governor was Msabah bin Njem, an Omani who may have been resident on the lakeshore since before the time of Burton and Speke’s voyage in 1858, and who lived in Kasimbo. He became the first German-appointed liwali of Ujiji in 1893. During the late 1880s, Msabah had reasons to have grievances against Rumaliza’s domination of Ujiji’s coastal trader community. This was because, in 1882, Tippu Tip referred to him as the liwali of Ujiji. This was an overstatement of his influence. Despite the gradual rise of the Omani faction at that time, Mwinyi Kheri was the undisputed liwali of the community, having been appointed as such by Sultan Barghash only a year previously. However, Tippu Tip’s statement is probably indicative of a high level of respect that Ujiji’s Omani traders held for Msabah. Rumaliza’s return and his military campaigns after 1884, therefore, enabled him to usurp Msabah as the leading Omani on the lakeshore. Throughout the second half of the 1880s, Msabah was side-lined in the Omani community. Yet, if there was conflict between Rumaliza and Msabah, it did not manifest itself into open

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235 Ibid., p. 176; Interview with Silas Bujana, 5 November 2013.
236 Tippu Tip, Maisha, p. 101; Tippu Tip, L’autobiographie, pp. 122, 259.
237 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 177.
conflict until the 1890s. The fact that Msabah appears to have been an ally of Abdullah bin Suleiman, who, as has been shown, helped establish Omani influence in Uguha, may have restricted his scope to renegotiate his position. However, the increased interference of Europeans gave him an opportunity to step out of the shadows. By challenging Rumaliza’s leadership, Msabah made himself the natural inheritor to the former’s positions on the lakeshore once the Europeans became the new political hegemons. If there were divisions in Ujiji’s Omani faction before the 1890s, therefore, the moving frontier of European colonialism exacerbated them. This lack of unity in the face of European military strength was a pervading theme that limited the coastal traders’ ability to resist the onset of colonial rule throughout East and Central Africa. The Europeans’ better funded, longer, and more unified military networks undermined the common aims and kinship allegiances that bound those of the Omani traders.

Conclusion

The direction and nature of lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks shifted for multiple reasons. Some of these are well-established in the existing historiography of this period. These include changes in the numerical, political, and economic strength of coastal trader communities, and shifting relations between long-distance traders and interior populations over time. This chapter adds a further component to this analysis. It does so by unpicking the rivalries between different factions of coastal traders. The ways in which coastal traders competed with each other led to conflict within their communities. This affected the direction of trade routes and the power dynamics between different commercial networks. By

239 Ibid. p. 176; McDow, ‘Arabs and Africans,’ pp. 164-165; ZNA AC10/1 Hore to Kirk, 17 August 1880.
analysing this phenomenon, this chapter establishes one of the core themes of this thesis: that of the heterogeneous nature of lakeshore societies. This analysis shows that the coastal traders cannot be regarded as one homogenous group of people, but a collection of people who were bound and divided by different commercial and kinship networks. This chapter also examined the agency amongst lakeshore populations in shaping commercial networks across and around Lake Tanganyika. Rather than representing entirely new phenomena, long-distance commercial networks represented extensions of pre-existing lacustrine ones. Up to c.1860, Jiji traders maintained a high degree of influence over all existing networks across Lake Tanganyika; in c.1860-1880, they extended their lacustrine networks to the south end of the lake; and in c.1880-1890 many Jiji contributed directly to Omani commercial expansion by joining their followings. This shows how the nature of the encounter between long-distance traders and lakeshore populations shifted over time, and that different regions of the lakeshore became increasingly integrated into the same commercial networks. The following chapters build on these themes further by analysing in greater depth how populations living on or migrating across the lakeshore reacted to different factions of coastal traders as the power dynamics between them shifted.
Chapter 3: The Lacustrine and Long-Distance Economies

This chapter analyses how changes to Lake Tanganyika’s economy affected the socio-political make-up of the lakeshore. Its main focus is on how goods brought from the coast, such as beads, cotton cloth, and guns, were incorporated into the lakeshore economy. It shows how different products were demanded by different lakeshore populations in different quantities at different times, and in exchange for various goods. The key drivers of these variances were shifting fashions, the emergence of new opportunities for economic and social advancement through ownership of certain products, and the uneven development of market conditions. Yet, as each lakeshore region became integrated into long-distance commercial networks, its markets became increasingly integrated as well. This meant that changes in demand in one lakeshore region affected price and demand in another. This chapter, then, documents a history in which Lake Tanganyika became a distinct and integrated economic zone. This market that emerged from this and linked Lake Tanganyika’s different regions together is seen as central component of what constituted Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture. Also explored is how different actors sought to control the supply and distribution of certain goods for political gain. In so doing, this chapter becomes the first of two that explains how coastal traders became increasingly prominent in lakeshore political hierarchies (the following chapter looks at similar phenomena via developments to lacustrine craft). This chapter argues that coastal traders integrated the economic demands of their long-distance commercial networks into a pre-existing lacustrine system. Once they did this, they and their allies expanded this system and manipulated the supply of expensive goods. This enabled them to increase their prestige and accumulate political power all over the lakeshore.

The historiography of how goods imported from the coast, such as beads, cotton cloth, and guns, were incorporated into economies in the interior of East and Central Africa identifies two broad trends. The first of these is an increase in the levels of market-oriented trade. This
is the condition in which “far-reaching economic innovations [were] directly dependent on commercial opportunities.”¹ This is opposed to the condition in which expensive goods were primarily passed from chiefs to their peoples through systems of patronage. Coastal traders entered the interior primarily to acquire ivory and to set up infrastructure whereby ivory could be taken to the coast with greater efficiency. With this in mind, their influence facilitated the growth of markets throughout the interior. Elephant hunters and other ivory owners then used these markets in order to sell ivory for the goods that coastal traders brought from the coast.² People also used these markets to sell their agricultural surpluses.³ They did this to make profits from the demands of people in caravans, who required a steady supply of food as they travelled across East and Central Africa. Thus farmers gained greater access to markets and acquired new opportunities to purchase imported and expensive goods.⁴ Beforehand, they primarily produced goods for subsistence purposes or for small-scale exchanges between households, and only acquired expensive goods via the distributive measures of their chiefs.⁵ The expansion of markets gave the interior’s general populace more direct access to greater personal wealth.

The second trend in the historiography of East and Central Africa’s economy emphasises how some people tried to control the supply of imported goods to buttress their political power. Chiefs used imported goods for both symbolic and practical purposes.

³ Kjekshus, Ecology Control, pp. 121-122; Rockel, Carriers, pp. 135-136; Austen, ‘Patterns of Development,’ p. 647; Roberts, ‘Nyanwezi Trade,’ p. 57; Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 22.
Ownership of the newest and most expensive imports became representative of chiefly power.\(^6\) This power could be supported by military might in instances where chiefs imported guns and supplied them to their armed followings.\(^7\) By controlling the supply of these goods, chiefs could distribute them to their most senior, loyal, or military-minded supporters through patronage.\(^8\) This process was not lost on coastal traders. They often sought to control the supply of certain goods themselves. When they limited the supply of certain goods, they created scarcity. This kept the value of those goods artificially high, which allowed the coastal traders to purchase more ivory in exchange for fewer beads, cloths, or guns.\(^9\) It also led some chiefs to become increasingly indebted, as they sought access to more of these highly-priced imports.\(^10\) The indebtedness of chiefs alongside the wealth of coastal traders enabled the latter to attract more followers and to take a prominent role in interior politics.\(^11\) The ways in which chiefs and coastal traders controlled and limited the supply of certain goods acts as a counterpoint to the former historiography’s emphasis on the general populace’s increased access to expensive goods in markets. The intention with this chapter is to use the Lake Tanganyika case study to unpick how different populations sought to manipulate the expansion of markets for their own social or political benefit.\(^12\)

A key dynamic to this study is analysis of how the production of food shifted over time and varied over space. Agriculture was the mainstay of much of the interior’s economy.\(^13\)

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\(^7\) Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 46-52; Gordon, ‘Wearing Cloth, Wielding Guns,’ pp. 30-31.

\(^8\) Austen, ‘Patterns of Development,’ p. 646; Gray and Birmingham, ‘Some Economic and Political,’ pp. 3, 11.


\(^12\) See also: Zwanenberg, An Economic History, p. 147.

\(^13\) Kjekshus, Ecology Control, pp. 26-28; Rockel, Carriers, p. 117.
Lakeshore populations supplemented the agricultural supply with fishing.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, agriculture and fishing were the bases of the nineteenth-century lakeshore economy. Indeed, the similarities of each lakeshore populations’ economy was a phenomenon that connected them, even before the expansion of lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks increased links between them in a physical sense through trade. Goods, such as beads, cloth, and guns, were imported into these food producing economies. This is important in light of recent studies on the links between food production and economic growth. Tiffin and Irz, for example, show how variances in the food supply affect economic activity and demand for other goods. They do this by analysing the relationship between agricultural efficiency and economic growth in the modern period. They argue that in developing economies, efficient agricultural practices promote economic growth and industrialisation. Agriculture – or food production, more broadly – is, “the engine of growth.”\(^\text{15}\) Despite the modern focus of Tiffin and Irz’s study, its focus on developing economies means that it has a high degree of applicability to this chapter. Nineteenth-century East and Central Africa represents a ‘developing economy,’ even if such terminology is only usually applied to present or recent conditions.\(^\text{16}\) Thus, food production is linked to the growth of markets on the shores of Lake Tanganyika during the era of long-distance commerce.\(^\text{17}\)

Tiffin and Irz provide three reasons why improving the efficiency of food production may be linked to the growth of markets in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa. Firstly, in regions where food is produced efficiently, some labourers can be released from the food producing process.\(^\text{18}\) This allows them to engage in other economic pursuits, such as iron work,


\(^{17}\) See also: Håkansson, ‘The Human Ecology,’ p. 561.

\(^{18}\) Tiffin and Irz, ‘Is Agriculture the Engine,’ p. 80.
porterage, or full-time trading. Secondly, where food is abundant, it is also likely to be cheap. This means that employers can pay their labourers less and not have to worry about their survival, and traders can market surplus food to regions where it is scarce to make a profit. Finally, if food producers are making a profit from their yields, then they are able to enter markets to purchase other goods more regularly. Thus, efficient food producing mechanisms can be a stimulant to demand for non-food-related products. In the context of nineteenth-century East and Central Africa, the most prominent of these non-food-related products were the goods brought by long-distance traders, such as beads, cotton cloths, and guns. Tiffin and Irz’s analysis shows that the development of agriculture and fishing on the shores of Lake Tanganyika can be seen as a pre-cursor to widespread demand for these products. Thus, the food producing capacity of certain regions had to be expanded for them to be integrated into lacustrine and long-distance commercial networks. Measuring the changing efficiency of food production is thus a lens through which to view when and how different lakeshore regions developed markets and commercial links around the lake and beyond its shores. The resultant connections between different lakeshore markets is seen as indicative of the emergence of Lake Tanganyika as a distinct and integrated commercial zone.

**Early Trends toward a Market-Oriented Economy, to c.1860**

Most people living on the shores of Lake Tanganyika were either farmers, fishermen, or both. The conduct of these activities depended on numerous factors, such as soil quality,
security, the quality and quantity of lacustrine craft, and the absence or presence of tsetse flies. Variances in these phenomena across different parts of the lakeshore led different populations to farm and fish with different levels of intensity. This variation in activity determined which regions developed a high level of market-oriented trade before the arrival of long-distance traders and which regions did not. The lakeshore’s northeastern regions of Ujiji, Urundi, and Uvira contained the most favourable conditions for market-oriented trade. The land in these regions was flat, fertile, and relatively protected from raiders in the surrounding regions. This allowed local populations to build permanent settlements surrounded by large fields. The part of the lake next to Urundi and Ujiji was also one of the lake’s most fertile fishing regions. Thus, the Rundi and Jiji developed the most efficient forms of lacustrine craft for fishing purposes. These craft enabled the Jiji, especially, to also travel on months-long fishing expeditions around the lake in search of other seasonal fishing opportunities. Food production in other lakeshore regions was compromised by a number of factors. The soils in the lakeshore regions of Ufipa and Ulungu were notable for their fertility, but, for much of the nineteenth century, the peoples in these regions were subject to attacks from Ngoni, Nyamwezi, Bemba, and coastal traders and raiders. Populations on the western shore had to contend with periodic raids from populations who lived between Katanga and the lake, as well as rocky soils on mountainous terrain. These factors promoted small and mobile settlements, and limited the use of farming and fishing techniques that produced large yields. This section argues that

25 Kjekshus, Ecology Control, Ch. 1; Hartwig, ‘Demographic Considerations,’ pp. 655-656; Alson, ‘The Effect of the TseTse,’ p. 338.
30 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 171; Roberts, A History of the Bemba, pp. 146-151.
31 Reeve, Rainbow and the Kings, pp. 124-128; Roberts, A Dance of Assassins, p. 233; Bennett, Arab Versus European, pp. 109-110; Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 90.
Lake Tanganyika’s northeastern regions’ higher propensity for intensive methods of food production made them more adapted to the expansion of markets. Furthermore, their people’s control over the food producing process was a basis from which they manipulated the market for long-distance goods for their benefit.

The production of agricultural surpluses in Ujiji, Urundi, and Uvira was a stimulant to the expansion of commercial contacts. Fishermen sold their fish to populations living beyond the lakeshore in exchange for iron products, such as jembes (hoes).\textsuperscript{32} Indeed, fish from Lake Tanganyika were recorded as being sold as far away as Unyamwezi for these products.\textsuperscript{33} Jembes were then used to make agriculture more efficient and less dependent on a large labour force to turn over the land. This then freed some members of these lakeshore societies to use their labour in other ways. Apart from expanding their fishing capabilities, this also led to the development of other specialised industries. Uvira became a region that specialised in iron smelting and working, many Rundi populations made mbugu (barkcloth) and produced palm oil, and many Jiji populations made contacts with Uvinza and became specialised salt collectors and vendors.\textsuperscript{34} These goods, particularly, salt and iron, are widely acknowledged to have been a stimulant to regional trade throughout East and Central Africa. Roberts, for example, argues that the scarcity of iron and salt in parts of modern-day western Tanzania provoked Nyamwezi populations to form inter-regional trading networks.\textsuperscript{35} Similar phenomena occurred around Lake Tanganyika. Jiji populations demanded the Vira’s iron and the Rundi’s mbugu, and so brought salt to their regions for the purposes of acquiring them.\textsuperscript{36} The scarcity of salt in Urundi


\textsuperscript{33} Pallaver, ‘Nyamwezi Participation,’ p. 526; Kjekshus, \textit{Ecological Control}, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{34} Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 45, 47-49; Sutton and Roberts, ‘Uvinza,’ p. 69; Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ p. 54.


\textsuperscript{36} Burton, \textit{Lake Regions}, p. 320; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ pp. 8-9, 11.
and Uvira made such transactions profitable to all parties.\textsuperscript{37} Regional specialisations encouraged greater commercial interaction between lakeshore populations who already produced surplus food.

Salt was the most important stimulant to the development of lacustrine commercial networks across Lake Tanganyika’s northeastern region. This contrasts with other regions in East and Central Africa, such as the interior of Urundi and much of present-day Tanzania, where \textit{jembes} are seen to have been more important.\textsuperscript{38} Salt’s importance to commercial contacts around Lake Tanganyika’s northeastern regions owes itself to the Jiji’s advantageous position in lacustrine trade. Jiji traders acquired salt cheaply. They either collected it themselves from salt pans in Uvinza and brought it back to the lake, or they purchased it from Vinza salt traders who came to their lakeshore markets and demanded palm oil in exchange.\textsuperscript{39} As palm trees grew wild on Ujiji’s lakeshore, the cost to Jiji traders in such transactions was nominal.\textsuperscript{40} Once Jiji traders had salt in hand, they sold it to other lakeshore populations by exploiting existing infrastructure. The Jiji owned the largest and most efficient lacustrine craft on Lake Tanganyika, which they primarily used for fishing in regions all around the lake. In addition to their fishing equipment, Jiji fishermen carried packets of salt under their benches to trade it with other lakeshore populations. The salt trade acted as a supplement to the Jiji’s fishing exploits on their extensive journeys around the lake.\textsuperscript{41} Jiji traders then brought their wares, including Uvira’s iron and Urundi’s barkcloth, to Ujjii, and sold them for a profit. The

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\textsuperscript{39} Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 45, 47-49; Roberts, ‘Nyanwezi Trade,’ p. 54.
\textsuperscript{40} Burton, \textit{Lake Regions}, p. 317; ZNA CA4/4 Livingstone to Waller, 2 September 1872; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 9.
\textsuperscript{41} Brown, ‘Ujjii,’ pp. 1, 45; Interview with Raphael Ntangibingura, 5 November 2013.
\end{flushright}
centrality of salt to lacustrine trade made Ujiji the lakeshore’s earliest regional commercial centre.

Despite being available to a wide population of traders, lakeshore chiefs found ways to ensure they owned a greater amount of salt and iron than the populations they governed. They fostered this dynamic because these two goods, especially, had a symbolic as well as a practical value. Ownership of large quantities of iron and salt was synonymous with chiefly power. Thus, restrictions were placed on their circulation to ensure that chiefs had the greatest access to them. This may partly explain why Kannena, a Jiji teko (district chief) on the lakeshore in 1858, was the only member of a trading expedition to Uvira to buy sambo (iron anklets), while the rest of the crew purchased ivory and captives. Long-established taxes on iron may have led to its regional trade being less profitable than the developing ivory and captive trade for members of Ujiji’s non-chieflly classes at this time. Lakeshore chiefs also gained wealth in the form of rare products through taxing traders for passing through their territories and using their markets. This levy was called hongo and acted as a form of tribute. This form of exchange gave chiefs access to an alternative source of expensive and scarce goods that was not available to regular traders. Despite high levels of food productivity and the subsequent growth of markets frequented by farmers and fishermen, regulations over certain forms of exchange alongside hongo ensured that chiefs remained the wealthiest members of society.

Market expansion alongside chiefly restrictions were key themes in the initial processes that brought long-distance goods into the lakeshore economy. Up to c.1860, the most important of these goods were beads and cotton cloth, which Jiji traders used as a supplement to their salt

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42 Koponen, People and Production, p. 106; Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ p. 45.
43 Gray and Birmingham, ‘Some Economic and Political,’ p. 3; Pallaver, ‘Nyamwezi Participation,’ p. 528.
44 Burton, Lake Regions, p. 354.
to expand commercial contacts around the north end of the lake. Jiji traders took beads and
cotton cloth to Uvira to purchase ivory, which they then sold on to coastal traders in Ujiji, who
either took or sent it back to the coast.\textsuperscript{46} Most of the ivory that Jiji traders acquired in Uvira
was bought from chiefs rather than individual traders.\textsuperscript{47} This suggests that Vira chiefs either
taxed traders’ ivory as it entered their regions, rented the tools required to hunt elephants in
exchange for a share of the hunters’ ivory, or both.\textsuperscript{48} This ensured that Vira chiefs had access
to the most imported beads and cotton cloths from amongst their populations. Similarly, chiefs
on the entire route between Ujiji and Uvira demanded beads and cotton cloth as *hongo*.\textsuperscript{49} They
invariably demanded the beads and cloths that the coastal traders valued the most, such as coral
*samisami* beads and elaborate chequered cloths.\textsuperscript{50} The value of such goods made them a symbol
of prestige. Jiji chiefs were probably the most successful at imposing such taxes. They charged
traders for entering their territory, for renting canoes, and for employing Jiji boatmen.\textsuperscript{51} Even
though Jiji boatmen also received wages, the Jiji chiefs’ role in the distribution of their labour
restricted their ability to usurp the chiefs as the demographic who owned the most expensive
products, in both value and quantity. This meant that, up to c.1860, even though beads and
cloths were available in markets and circulated amongst the general populace, lakeshore chiefs
owned the largest proportion of them.

The ways in which Jiji populations demanded different beads and cloths sheds more
light on the power dynamics between coastal and Jiji traders and lakeshore chiefs. Jiji

\textsuperscript{48} Similar tactics were employed in Buganda and in Mirambo’s kingdom. See: Kagwa, *The Customs of the
Baganda*, p. 92; Bennett, *Mirambo*, p. 73.
Trade,’ p. 70.
\textsuperscript{50} Burton, *Lake Regions*, pp. 320, 326, 331, 340, 346, 354.
\textsuperscript{51} Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 627; Michele Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History: ‘Nature in
Mind,’ in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Buha, Western Tanzania,’ in Gregory Maddox, James L.
Giblin, and Isaria N. Kimambo (eds.), *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*
populations demanded beads based on the fashions of the time.\footnote{Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ p. 66; Pallaver, ‘What East Africans Got,’ pp. 9-13.} These fashions diverged from elsewhere in East and Central Africa, including Zanzibar and the coast. There were three types of bead with a notable level of circulation in Ujiji in 1858: the \textit{matunda} (also known as the \textit{mzizima}, made from blue glass), the \textit{sofi} (\textit{masaro}, made from clay, usually white or blue, in the shape of broken pipe stems), and the \textit{samisami} (made from coral, usually red). They were sold on strings in measurements of \textit{khete}, one of which, in Burton and Speke’s time at the lakeshore, was equal to double the distance between the thumb and the elbow.\footnote{Burton, \textit{Lake Regions}, pp. 113-114; Pallaver, ‘What East Africans Got,’ p. 8.} \textit{Khete} were also be sold in bunches of 10, called \textit{fundo}. The \textit{matunda} and the \textit{sofi} were most in-demand and were valued highly.\footnote{Burton, \textit{Lake Regions}, p. 326; Pallaver, ‘What East Africans Got,’ p. 10; Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 621.} This was because the Jiji used the former in jewellery, and the Rundi used the latter for the same purpose.\footnote{Burton \textit{Lake Regions}, pp. 320, 347, 372; A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7. Journal du P. Deniaud, 7 October 1880; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 12.} Jiji traders thus demanded \textit{sofi} as a means to supplement their salt in trades with Rundi populations.\footnote{Burton, \textit{Lake Regions}, p. 350; A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7. Journal du P. Deniaud, 14 September 1879.} Neither population valued \textit{samisami}, however. As a result, in Ujiji’s market, a \textit{khete} of \textit{samisami} was only a third of the value of a \textit{khete} of \textit{matunda} or \textit{sofi}.\footnote{Burton, \textit{Lake Regions}, pp. 326, 530.} This is despite the fact that \textit{samisami} were considerably more expensive to buy at Zanzibar than the other two aforementioned beads.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 529-530.} Similar discrepancies in price between Zanzibar and the lakeshore are observable in terms of the value of cotton cloth. Burton wrote of the Jiji, “the people, contented with softened skins and tree-bark, prefer beads, ornaments, and more durable articles [to imported cotton cloth].”\footnote{Ibid., p. 325.} The majority of people in the lakeshore regions of Ujiji, Urundi, and Uvira wore \textit{mbugu} (barkcloth), and up to c.1860, the importation of cotton cloth did not change this.\footnote{Gordon, ‘Wearing Cloth, Wielding Guns,’ p. 27; Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ pp. 64-65; Wynne-Jones, ‘Lines of Desire,’ p. 229.} This was not because cotton cloth was too
expensive. A piece of *mbugu* could be bought in Ujiji for between six and 12 *khete*, and a “small [cotton] cloth” could be bought for 3 *khete*, presumably of *matunda* or *sofi*.\(^{61}\) Larger cloths of wearable size were priced at 10 *khete*.\(^{62}\) Cotton cloths and *mbugu* were thus of similar value per unit. The values that Jiji populations attributed to different beads and cloths shows that lakeshore fashions were a greater determinant of price than the values that long-distance traders, as suppliers, attributed to them.

By the late 1850s and possibly before, some Jiji traders found ways to make profits from the availability of cheap *samisami* and cotton cloth in their markets. Burton noted that long-distance traders were obliged to exchange their *samisami* for *matunda* if they wanted to trade in Ujiji’s markets.\(^{63}\) This indicates that there were Jiji populations on the lakeshore who took on the role of money changers. This phenomenon is well-established in Ujiji’s historiography, though only from c.1870 onwards.\(^{64}\) As will be seen, the position of money changers became more established from this point on, but Burton’s evidence indicates that they probably existed in some form beforehand as well. The money changers in Burton’s account are likely to have acquired large amounts of *samisami* beads. As they had little value in Ujiji, they were of limited use there. The only lakeshore populations who valued *samisami* highly at this stage were chiefs, particularly in Urundi and Uvira, who wore them as symbols of their chiefly status.\(^{65}\) Coupled with this is the phenomenon that the only other section of lakeshore society to readily accept *samisami* in exchange for goods or services were Jiji boatmen. They also accepted cotton cloths, even though there is no indication that they wore them.\(^{66}\) As they were not fashionable items at this stage, their primary usage was as tradable items. It is likely

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\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 530.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 326.


that they traded *samisami* beads and cotton cloths to lakeshore chiefs in Urundi and Uvira in exchange for ivory and captives. These could then be sold in Ujiji for a larger amount of *samisami* beads or cloths, or other goods that they valued higher and which had greater purchasing power in their own market, such as *matunda* or *sofi* beads. High demand for *samisami* and cotton cloths amongst Rundi and Vira chiefs, coupled with their cheapness in Ujiji, enabled Jiji traders to purchase ivory and captives cheaply at the north end of the lake so as to sell them for a profit once they returned to Ujiji.

Jiji chiefs on the lakeshore were probably in favour of the expansion of Jiji traders’ commercial capabilities. Such a statement is in opposition to what is normally observed in this period of East and Central Africa’s history. Chiefs are usually seen to have wanted to control the circulation of expensive goods, including ivory, beads, and cotton cloth, and to keep them as symbols of their own prestige. Given the distribution of such goods in Uvira and Urundi, this may even have been the case in other lakeshore regions. In Ujiji, however, evidence suggests otherwise. Later in the period, for example, a Jiji *teko* (district chief) on the lakeshore demanded that the representatives of the London Missionary Society (LMS) pay their Jiji workers in cotton cloths, the same currency with which the missionaries were obliged to pay him. Similarly, Burton and Speke described a cooperative relationship between Kannena, the *teko* of Kawele in Ujiji, and Jiji boatmen and traders. Kannena negotiated the payment of the boatmen, and was rewarded with extra payment for doing so. He also took payment for the renting of the canoe that carried Burton and Speke to Uvira, a right that was given to him by his chiefly position. The expansion of trade around the lake and the employment of boatmen

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thus brought him material gains. Furthermore, it probably strengthened his position as a chief. In lakeshore Jiji society, travel on the lake was a sign of prestige. Lakeshore chiefs owed much of their status to their perceived ability to master the lake, and the *teko* used numerous rituals to represent this.\(^{71}\) In the context of increasing commercial links around the lake, successful lacustrine trading missions were seen as symbols of these rituals’ success.\(^{72}\) Jiji chiefs, such as Kannena, therefore, were reliant on the material advancement of Jiji boatmen and lacustrine traders to validate their position.

The Jiji’s trade between Uvira and Ujiji limited the extent of the coastal traders’ establishment on the lakeshore. A side-effect of the Jiji traders’ practices was that they established high prices for goods in their own market. Burton provided a list of prices in Ujiji that he described as a “high average.”\(^ {73}\) This is further represented by the observation that the standard unit of measurement for a piece of cotton cloth was double that of everywhere else in the interior, apart from in Unyamwezi.\(^ {74}\) This was because cotton cloth was so devalued in Ujiji that it had to be sold in larger quantities for it to be a practical unit of exchange. One reason for Ujiji’s markets to have higher prices than elsewhere on the lakeshore was that many of the goods sold there were transported over the lake. This necessitated the traders having to incorporate travel costs, such as the rental of canoes, the payment of boatmen, and the payment of *hongo* into their prices to make a profit. Another reason for Ujiji’s high prices was because it was the market on the lakeshore that was the most integrated into long-distance commercial networks. Ujiji was, therefore, supplied with the most amount of beads and cotton cloths from the coast. Their relative abundance in Ujiji compared to elsewhere on the lakeshore reduced

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\(^{71}\) Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ pp. 190-192; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 43-44; Swann, *Fighting the Slave-Hunters*, pp. 77-78.

\(^{72}\) See: Chapter 4.

\(^{73}\) Burton, *Lake Regions*, p. 325.

their purchasing power there. Finally, it was in the Jiji traders’ interests to set high prices. They had a virtual monopoly on lacustrine transport and its associated labour requirements. There were no competitors who could drive their prices down, and so if coastal traders wanted to enter Lake Tanganyika’s markets they were obliged to pay the Jiji, regardless of the prices they set. Up to c.1860, prices for imported goods were set by the fashions and commercial demands of Jiji, Rundi, and Vira chiefs and Jiji traders, and the value that coastal traders attributed to them was of little consequence.

**Expansion of the Market and Greater Coastal Trader Influence, c.1860-1880**

The 1860s-1870s were a period of commercial expansion across and around Lake Tanganyika. Coastal traders based in Ujiji, who were mostly from the Mrima, extended their commercial networks into Manyema, via Uvira or Uguha; coastal traders based in Tabora, who were mostly Omani, extended their commercial networks to Manyema via the south end of the lake; and Jiji traders extended their lacustrine networks to include Ufipa, Ulungu, and Marungu. These developments led to an expansion of market-oriented trade around the lake. Bigger surpluses of food were generated to be sold in markets, new markets were opened, existing markets were expanded, and regular transactions were facilitated through the development of at least one standardised currency in Ujiji. These phenomena represent new layers that were added to the existing market-oriented trade that emanated from Ujiji and which incorporated the lakeshore regions of Uvira and Urundi in previous decades. As these new

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75 Speke, ‘Journal of a Cruise,’ p. 355; CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Jones to Thompson, 10 February 1885.
76 See: Chapter 2.
layers became more established, competition for control of markets grew. This section argues that coastal traders became increasingly influential over Lake Tanganyika’s commercial economy during this process. They did this by expanding the agricultural sector under their influence and by limiting the supply of certain, in-demand long-distance goods. Their influence also caused the prices for ivory and captives to become more even around the north end of the lake. This reduced Jiji traders’ ability to take advantage of price differentials in these regions to make a profit, and led the Jiji to expand their commercial networks to the south end of the lake.

An increase in agricultural production on the lakeshore was the foundation for commercial expansion around and across Lake Tanganyika.\(^79\) Coastal traders brought new crops with them as they entered the interior. The first and most prominent of these was maize. This is likely to have been grown on the lakeshore from soon after the first coastal traders got there in the 1830s, and possibly before. By the 1870s, it was being grown by lakeshore populations in all lakeshore regions north of Ukawende and Uguha. Kawende and Guha populations generated surpluses, which enabled them to sell some of their produce to passing canoes and caravans, and to travel by canoe to trade it in Ujiji.\(^80\) This represents increased levels of participation by Kawende and Guha populations in lacustrine trade and the integration of their regions into a lacustrine market. Rice was the other major crop imported from the coast. It probably arrived at the lakeshore at a later date than maize, because reports only exist of rice being grown in this period on fields owned by coastal traders in Ujjijji and Liendwe.\(^81\) Thus, coastal traders probably only brought rice to the lakeshore when they started settling there.

\(^80\) Cameron, *Across Africa*, p. 176, 184, 190; Stanley, *Dark Continent*, II, p. 4. See also: Interview with Knud Knudsen, 24 November 2013.
permanently in the 1860s. Coastal traders in Ujiji primarily employed captives and labourers who migrated from Manyema to the lakeshore to work on their rice paddies. Coastal traders in Liendwe supplemented the labour supply from Manyema with captives from Ulungu. The coastal traders’ ability to generate their own food supply made them less reliant on food produced and sold by lakeshore populations. They also employed surplus agricultural labour as boatmen and as artisans who modified lacustrine craft to make them more adapted to commercial voyages. The coastal traders’ relative self-sufficiency in these regards meant that they were no longer reliant on Jiji food production, infrastructure, or labour for the conduct of commercial expeditions across and around Lake Tanganyika. This meant that Jiji traders were less able to buy ivory cheaply in Uvira to sell it to coastal traders for a profit in Ujiji, and that coastal traders could reserve imported goods, such as beads, cloth, and guns, for other expenditure. This gave them the ability to limit the supply of certain imported goods to make them scarce and to increase their value. As important suppliers of both agricultural goods and imported products to the lakeshore, coastal traders were able to manipulate prices to support their commercial aims.

The expansion of market-oriented trade can also be seen through the functioning of markets in Ujiji. A standard currency emerged in the market most-frequented by the coastal traders in Kawele-Ugoy. This currency is what historians have referred to as “a bead currency based on a cloth standard.” Sofi beads became the dominant currency for transactions in the market. Matunda and samisami were circulated too, though not to the same extent, and they

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83 CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 10 January 1879, Hore to Mullens, 16 April 1879.
84 CWM/LMS/06/02/008 Jones to Whitehouse, 11 November 1883; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Swann to Whitehouse, 8 January 1884.
were valued less. Units of beads also became more standardised in this period, with a *khete* of *sofi* beads being re-defined as a string of 20 beads, rather than the subjective measurement of the distance between the thumb and elbow (between 55 to 60 beads) as it was in the late 1850s. The importance of beads in this period is further illustrated by the increased role of money-changers. They took their positions on the edge of the market and required traders to exchange their goods for beads before entering. The money-changers set the rate for the value of beads every day, and made profits by doing so. They favoured cotton cloth as the medium of exchange for beads, though they accepted alternative goods for at least some of the period. Reporting on his visit to Ujiji in 1874, for example, Cameron makes it clear that copper wire and ivory were equally exchangeable for beads as cotton cloth. But, cotton cloth was the most important commodity in this context during his visit, and it certainly grew in importance thereafter. These developments represent institutional and infrastructural developments that facilitated market-oriented trade in Ujiji’s lakeshore markets.

The money-changers’ demand for cotton cloth is representative of a broader shift in Jiji fashions on the lakeshore. Cotton cloth became a desirable item for all sections of Jiji society on the lakeshore. It replaced *mbugu* (barkcloth) as the most fashionable item of clothing. Most Jiji people living on the lakeshore wore blue *kaniki* (Indian dyed calico). They wore this in the same fashion as they did *mbugu* previously, that is, under one arm and tied across the opposite shoulder, leaving one side bare. Jiji traders, farmers, fisherman, and other artisans

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87 Stanley, *Dark Continent*, II, p. 4.
91 Cameron, *Across Africa*, p. 177.
on the lakeshore all gained access to kaniki via the market. An alternative fashion was for white merikani cloth cut into a kanzu. This was the style of dress that coastal traders wore. This fashion was most popular amongst the coastal traders’ labourers, the majority of whom came from Manyema. Although the coastal traders’ labourers wore numerous styles and makes of cloth when they first joined the coastal traders, they sought merikani as a symbol of their seniority once they had spent some time in the coastal traders’ company. This was one of the stages through which they became considered ngwana (Swahili: gentlemen), which was a sign of respect amongst coastal populations, and distinguished them from interior populations who could be, according to coastal norms, enslaved. The longest-standing of the coastal traders’ labourers received merikani in exchange for their labour. Demand for kaniki and merikani on Ujiji’s lakeshore contrasts with parts of the broader Ujiji region that were merely five or six kilometres inland. According to Hore, Jiji populations living just beyond the lakeshore continued to wear mbugu. They either had no desire for (or too little wealth to purchase) cotton cloth. Jiji demand for cotton cloth and the expansion of market-oriented trade that this represented was exclusive to its lakeshore region.

Demand for cotton cloth on Ujiji’s lakeshore contributed to a devaluation of beads in Ujiji’s lakeshore markets. The purchasing power of beads declined in relation to most other goods, including cotton cloth. Reporting on the time he spent in Ujiji between 1878-1880, Hore wrote that a doti (four yards) of kaniki was worth the equivalent of between 9 and 11

95 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 4; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 9; RMCA HA.01.017-7 Storms, ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883.
97 See: Chapter 5; Roberts, A Dance of Assassins, p. 16; Glassman, Feasts and Riot, p. 62; Rockel, Carriers, p. 17.
fun do of sof i, depending on the daily condition of the market.\textsuperscript{100} This amounted to between 1800 and 2200 individual beads (there being 10 \textit{khete} in a \textit{fundo} and 20 sof i in a \textit{khete}). A \textit{doti} of merikani, meanwhile, was worth between 12-15 \textit{fundo} of sof i (2,400-3,000 total beads).\textsuperscript{101} These values contrast with the values that Burton gave in relation to his and Speke’s visit in 1858. He wrote that a \textit{doti} of kaniki was worth 15-25 \textit{khete}, which, before the measurement of \textit{khete} was standardised, was equal to between 825 and 1500 sof i beads. The values of beads in relation to cotton cloth thus probably declined by around a half in the twenty years between 1858 and 1878. Factors that caused the devaluation in beads in relation to other goods may be related to their abundance during this period. The long-term residence of coastal traders may have flooded the market with beads, which caused their value to depreciate. Also, sof i and matunda fell out of fashion. By the early 1890s, the Jiji wore neither as bodily ornamentation.\textsuperscript{102} This trend may have begun before this point, and if it did, it would have taken away one of the key factors that made them valued highly in the period up to c.1860. Finally, the declining price of beads may merely have been caused by increased demand for currency amongst Jiji populations on the lakeshore. This was certainly Stanley’s view, as he argued that the Jiji’s demands for more beads in exchange for their agricultural produce was representative of their increased commercial nous.\textsuperscript{103} As the coastal traders now supplied a portion of their own food, labour and lacustrine transport, they were less reliant on the Jiji in these regards. This could have created a hole in the Jiji’s income, and price hikes may have been used as a way to offset this. In any case, this marks a shift in which cotton cloth became increasingly valued as a fashionable item, and beads were used mostly just as a currency.

\textsuperscript{100} Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 9; RMCA HA.01.017-6. Storms to AIA, 1883; RMCA HA.01.017-7. Storms, ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883.
\textsuperscript{101} Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 9.
\textsuperscript{102} Roberts, ‘Nyamwezi Trade,’ p. 64; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 12.
\textsuperscript{103} Stanley, \textit{Dark Continent}, II, p. 2. See also: ZNA AC10/1 Hore to Kirk, 17 August 1880.
Increased demand for cotton cloth on Ujiji’s lakeshore was beneficial to the town’s faction of Rima traders, who, at this stage, were the richest and most influential coastal traders living on the lakeshore. They were able to buy more beads for their cotton cloth, which was essential for purchasing goods in the market. Thus, increased prices in the market were offset by the coastal traders’ ability to buy more beads with their cotton cloth. They were also able to limit the supply of certain types of cotton cloth. This is shown by the payment of merikani cloth to their labourers. Merikani was the most expensive cloth in the market. Its high value in the market may seem surprising, given that Jiji populations appear to have preferred kaniki. It is thus indicative of scarcity, rather than demand, creating value. By these means, the coastal traders’ labourers became the owners of the most expensive cloths on the lakeshore. This gave them and the coastal traders an air of prestige, and attracted other lakeshore peoples to try to join the coastal traders’ followings as well. Indeed, from the 1870s onwards, increasing numbers of people living on the lakeshore sought to become members of the coastal traders’ followings to acquire cotton cloth, en route to becoming ngwana.¹⁰⁴ Most of these people originated in Manyema, though some came from around the lakeshore and from regions to the lake’s east.¹⁰⁵ Ujiji’s coastal traders limited the supply of certain cotton cloths to enhance their prestige and to increase the size of their followings. Such practices buttressed their political standing on the lakeshore.

Coastal traders based in regions around the south end of the lake enhanced their political standing via similar methods to their counterparts in Ujiji, though with different goods. The Omani-dominated communities at Liendwe and Pamlilo controlled the supply of guns as a route to political power. Limiting the supply of guns partly served a practical purpose. It contributed to the coastal traders’ military supremacy in the region, which gave them and their

¹⁰⁴ CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Jones to Thompson, 2 December 1884; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Mkapakwe, 26 January 1885; Page, ‘The Manyema Hordes,’ pp. 76-77.
¹⁰⁵ See: Chapter 5.
caravans greater security and enabled them to supplement their agricultural production and labour supply through raiding.\textsuperscript{106} The only Lungu and Rungu peoples to own guns were chiefs, who demanded them from the coastal traders in exchange for their loyalty.\textsuperscript{107} Guns were then viewed as objects of prestige and symbolic of chiefly status.\textsuperscript{108} The only way for the general populous of these regions to gain access to guns was to join the coastal traders’ followings. Apart from prestige and wealth, joining one of the coastal traders’ followings gave people greater security. Those that did so also had opportunities to acquire merikani cloth and to become referred to as ngwana as a sign of respect amongst coastal populations.\textsuperscript{109} This represents a similar transition to that which is described above in regards to Ujiji. The ways in which coastal traders limited the supply of certain goods made people want to join their followings and assimilate to their fashions.

The destruction caused by the coastal traders’ gun-toting followers and other violent populations around the south end of the lake enabled Jiji traders to expand the geographical scope of their market. Violence in Ukwende, Ufipa, Ulungu, and Marungu was destructive to much of these regions’ agricultural sectors. Raiders thus demanded food in exchange for the captives that they took, and raided populations were forced to sell their own kin in exchange for food to ensure their communities’ survival.\textsuperscript{110} Jiji traders took food to these regions to supply this demand in exchange for captives. Cameron described how one such transaction took place:

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{106} CWM/LMS/06/02/008 Hore to Whitehouse, 15 August 1883, Jones to Whitehouse, 11 November 1883; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Swann to Whitehouse, 8 January 1884.
\item[\textsuperscript{107} Roberts, A History of the Bemba, pp. 203, 206, 306.
\item[\textsuperscript{110} Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 66. CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Swann to Whitehouse, 8 January 1884.]
\end{itemize}
The Wajiji [sic.], who coasted down with us [to Ras Kungwe, Northern Ukawende], sold their corn, oil, and goats for slaves—the only product of the place—and then turned homeward. The price of a slave was from four to six doti [sic. of cloth], or two goats; and as a goat could be bought for a shukkah [sic. of cloth] at Ujiji, where slaves were worth twenty doti, the profits of the Wajiji must have been enormous.111

Given that the value of a doti was double that of a shukka, if a Jiji trader exchanged two goats that he bought for one shukka each in Ujiji for a captive in Ukawende, his investment could return 20 times if he sold that captive when he returned to Ujiji, minus the costs of labour and transport. Transactions of this kind were also noted in Ufipa, Ulungu, and Marungu.112 Jiji traders took advantage of the low price for captives at the south end of the lake in order to make a profit in Ujiji. This process was similar to how they traded around the north end of the lake in order to make profits in their own markets where prices were higher. The Jiji’s commercial expansion to the south end of the lake offset some of the losses they incurred from the coastal traders’ declining demand for their food, labour, and lacustrine craft. The south end of the lake was brought into a network of market-oriented trade that emanated from Ujiji, and was exploited primarily by Jiji traders.

111 Cameron, Across Africa, p. 184; See also: NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 24 March 1874; Speke, ‘Journal of a Cruise,’ p. 349.
112 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 34; Thomson, Central African Lakes, II, p. 34; NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 18 March 1874, 19 March 1874, 23 March 1874, 3 April 1874; RMCA Stanley Archive, 17. ‘Field Notebook,’ 30 June 1876; ZNA AA2/29 Hore to Kirk, 25 February 1880; CWM/LMS/06/05/21, Hore, ‘Voyage to the South End,’ 1 April 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Jones to Thompson, 2 December 1884; Giraud, Les Lacs, p. 523.
The Integration of the Lakeshore’s Markets, c.1880-1890

During the 1880s, long-distance commercial networks expanded all over Lake Tanganyika. Omani traders, who previously travelled around the south end of the lake, increasingly sought to traverse it via Ujiji instead, and ngwana and Nyamwezi traders traversed the lake between Ufipa and Marungu on their routes between Unyamwezi and Katanga with more regularity. These shifts brought almost the entire lakeshore into contact with long-distance trade routes. In order to affect this shift, long-distance traders developed the food producing capabilities of regions where, previously, farming and fishing techniques lacked intensity. This made long-distance traders more self-sufficient in food, and promoted the creation of larger populations centres. It also decreased demand amongst the populations who already inhabited these regions for imported food from Ujiji. This reduced the price differentials for goods in different lakeshore regions, and reduced Jiji traders’ ability to make profits by exploiting them. Greater profits were made from selling lakeshore products and goods from the Congo Basin at higher prices in regions closer to the coast. Pallaver, for example, notes that the value of ivory doubled on the journey between Ujiji and Tabora, and then doubled again between Tabora and Zanzibar.113 This section argues that this process is reflective of Lake Tanganyika shifting from a region with many markets, into a region with many commercial centres bound by one market. This process is referred to as the integration of the lakeshore’s markets. The power dynamics associated with this shift were such that coastal traders, particularly from the Omani faction, manipulated the lakeshore market to their favour. This helped the Omanis usurp Ujiji’s Rima traders as the dominant faction of coastal traders on the lakeshore.

The expansion of long-distance commercial networks across Lake Tanganyika was supported by increases in food production in regions where previously food was scarce.

Violence and commercial opportunities brought by long-distance commerce encouraged people to live in larger, better protected settlements with market centres. These were set up in fertile enclaves where food production could be expanded. For example, Kirando became notable for its rice fields, Chumin was notable for its market for locally-grown agricultural produce, and *ngwana* traders and labourers in Uguha became prominent fishermen and rice cultivators, where before Guha populations partook in neither activity intensely. The growth of European stations followed similar principals. Europeans based on the lakeshore sought to be self-sufficient in food, and so established farms around their stations for their followers and Christian converts to work on. These were then protected by armed guards, many of whom referred to themselves as *ngwana*. These measures made settlements more permanent, which encouraged more efficient and intense forms of food production. In turn, this greater efficiency meant that less labour was required to produce enough food for a community to survive and thrive. This decreased some people’s reliance on imported food, particularly around the south end of the lake, and encouraged them to pursue other economic activities, including the marketisation of food and full-time trade. The wealth generated via these transactions created speculative demand for other, non-food-based goods. As the most valuable imports to the lakeshore during this period, lakeshore populations with new-found food security primarily demanded beads, cotton cloth, and guns.

Increased demand for imported products around the lakeshore led to a decline in price differentials between different markets at the north and south ends of the lake. Guha and Rungu

116 Oliver, *Missionary Factor*, pp. 61-63; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 8 October 1883; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Hore to Whitehouse, 2 April 1884.
populations primarily demanded *matunda* beads in exchange for their products, as they used them to ornament necklaces, belts, and musical instruments.\(^{118}\) This diverges from Jiji demand up to the end of the 1870s, when the Jiji valued *sofi* beads more than *matunda*. Yet, increased demand of *matunda* in Uguha and Marungu caused Jiji traders to demand these beads to a greater degree than previously as well. In the 1880s, the Jiji demanded *matunda* more so that they could use them as tradable items in transactions involving populations in Uguha and Marungu. As a result, in 1883, Storms reported that most items in Ujiji were bought with *sofi* beads, but that the most expensive goods, such as slaves, guns, and ivory, were “procured with mitounda [sic.] and cloths.”\(^{119}\) In this instance, *matunda* were valued at a level that was comparable to that of cotton cloth. This shows that *matunda* beads became a higher unit of currency compared to *sofi* beads, and represents reversal on their respective values during the 1860s and 1870s. Demand for certain imported products at the south end of the lake affected their value in markets at the north end. This caused prices for imported products across the lake to become increasingly equal. Lake Tanganyika’s commercial centres became increasingly integrated as one market, with similar prices being attributed to long-distance goods in each commercial centre.

The value of *kaniki* cloth was similarly influenced by increasing links between commercial centres around Lake Tanganyika. No lakeshore population other than the Jiji demanded *kaniki* or saw it as a fashionable or prestigious item.\(^{120}\) This contributed to its declining value in Ujiji during the 1880s, as traders could not get high returns for it if they tried to sell it elsewhere around the lake. From 1883 onwards, the price of a *doti* of *kaniki* was around

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\(^{119}\) RMCA HA.01.017-7. Storms, ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883.

\(^{120}\) CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hutley to Whitehouse, 22 November 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse, 12 August 1880; RMCA HA.01.017-6. Storms to AIA, 1883; RMCA HA.01.017-7. Storms, ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883.
four *fundo* of *sofi* beads (800 total beads), when in 1878-80 it fetched 9-11 *fundo* (1800-2200 total beads). This represents a reduction in its value of between a half and two-thirds. An additional cause to this declining trend in *kaniki*’s value may also have been through the actions of newly-arrived Omani traders passing through Ujiji on their journeys between Tabora and Manyema. The Omani’s caravans were larger and richer than previous caravans to visit the lakeshore, and they may have flooded Ujiji’s market with *kaniki*, causing its value to decrease. This may have been an unintended consequence of Omani commercial expansion in this period. A similar phenomena in Buganda, in which coastal traders flooded the market with cowrie shells and caused their value to depreciate there, has been viewed in these terms. Therefore, having had little contact with the north end of the lakeshore outside of Ujiji before this period, Omani traders may have expected demand for *kaniki* around the lake to have been similar to demand in Ujiji. Nevertheless, flooding Ujiji’s market with *kaniki* served the Omani faction of coastal traders well in the long-run. It was detrimental to the Rima faction, who were no longer able to acquire so many beads with it to buy lakeshore products in Ujiji’s markets. In 1881, Mwinyi Kheri, the most prominent Rima trader, attempted to impose regular tariffs to limit the effect of *kaniki*’s lesser value, but by the mid-point of the decade it was clear that he had failed. The Omani faction, however, were less concerned with such transactions. The majority of their profits were made by keeping trade routes between Zanzibar and Manyema open, so that credit could flow west and ivory could flow east along them. Greater profits could be generated by following this economic model than by focusing solely on the lacustrine

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122 CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 10 January 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/015 Jones to Thompson, 10 February 1885.
124 Jacques and Storms, *Notes sur L’Ethnographie*, pp. 31-37; CWM/LMS/06/02/006 Hutley to Thomson, 21 June 1881. CWM/LMS/06/02/015 Jones to Thompson, 10 February 1885.
125 See: Chapter 2.
market.\footnote{Pallaver, ‘What East Africans Got,’ p. 21.} Just as Jiji traders took advantage of price differentials between the north and south ends of the lake in c.1860-1880, Omani traders took advantage of price differentials between the lakeshore and regions to the east. The Omani’s successes in this pursuit and the Rima’s declining profits contributed to the process that enabled the Omanis to become the richest coastal traders on the lakeshore. The lack of demand for kaniki amongst most lakeshore populations was a crucial factor that contributed to the rise of the Omani faction around the north end of Lake Tanganyika.

The decline in the price of kaniki also made merikani and guns comparatively more expensive. Indeed, guns entered Ujiji in large quantities for the first time during the 1880s.\footnote{The scarcity of guns in Ujiji before 1880 should not be construed as a lack of demand. See: Macola, The Gun in Central Africa, Ll. 1193-1200.} Before this period, coastal traders had successfully avoided supplying the northern lakeshore region with firearms so as to blunt any possible rebellion against their position.\footnote{Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 51; Burton, Lake Regions, p. 321; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 10; Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 52.} But, the violent expansion of the coastal traders’ domains around the north end of the lake in this period necessitated a change in policy. Coastal traders supplied their followers with guns to subdue rebellious chiefs and secure long-distance trade routes across Lake Tanganyika.\footnote{A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7 Journal du P. Deniaud, 20 June 1879, 31 July 1880, 5 December 1880, 25 January 1881.} Although the primary sources do not refer to the price of guns in Ujiji’s market, the fact that a missionary noted the necessity of returning to Ujiji in order to acquire them in the second half of the 1880s indicates that they were probably available.\footnote{CWM/LMS/06/02/013 Jones to Thompson, 6 March 1888. See also: RMCA Stanley Archive 7. ‘Journal in Lett’s Diary,’ 19 December 1871.} Even so, they would have been expensive, and few people who were not members of the coastal traders’ followings owned them.\footnote{Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 10; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hutley to Whitehouse, 19 October 1879.} It was much easier for lakeshore populations to acquire guns by joining one of the coastal traders’
followings, and this is what most did. By doing so, they also acquired merikani cloth, which they turned into kanzus. Unlike kaniki, merikani cloth was in high demand all around the lakeshore, and did not depreciate in value during this period. The acquisition of these goods led many of the coastal traders’ followers to refer to themselves as ngwana, as a sign of respect for – and assimilation to – the coastal traders’ culture, alongside a claim that they were not slaves. This indicates that the ways in which coastal traders controlled the supply and distribution of guns and merikani ensured that they and their followers were the richest inhabitants of the lakeshore, which then attracted more people to join their ranks.

European colonial powers gained influence in the interior of East and Central Africa by using similar methods to coastal traders after c.1860, and especially after c.1880. Germans arriving from the east and Belgians arriving from the west both tapped into widespread demand for guns. For example, missionaries in Mpwapwa stated that “powder and guns are freely sold to everyone by the German authorities and the supply of these things is now greater than ever.” In what became the Congo Free State, meanwhile, Belgian officials attempted to ensure that access to guns was only achievable through them and the expansion of the Force Publique (the Congo Free State’s military force). This, alongside widespread depredations associated with the coastal traders’ ivory trade in the previous decades, meant that incoming Belgian military commanders were able to recruit large numbers of soldiers to their ranks. The central continuity from the era of long-distance commerce in these contexts is the use of

133 CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Jones to Whitehouse, 24 June 1884, 2 December 1884; A.G.M.Afr. Daire de Mkakawe, 26 January 1885.
134 RMCA HA.01.017-6 Storms to AIA, 1883; Jacques and Storms, ‘Notes sur l’Ethnographie,’ p. 32.
135 See: Chapter 5.
136 ZNA AC1-7 Kirk to Foreign Office, 3 July 1892.
guns as symbols of power and prestige, and as a means for gun suppliers to attract people to their followings.\(^{139}\) Just as it did for the coastal traders in preceding decades, the manipulation of the market for expensive imported products contributed to the growth of European political influence in East and Central Africa.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown how the shores of Lake Tanganyika were gradually transformed from a region with multiple markets into one integrated commercial sub-region with links to other markets in East and Central Africa. This emergent market is seen as one component of Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture. Before the arrival of long-distance traders, lakeshore populations were connected by their mutual reliance on agriculture and fishing. The conditions of long-distance commerce built on these connections. By the end of the 1880s, parts of each lakeshore region produced enough food that some from among their societies could specialise in other economic pursuits. Prime among these was trade, particularly that which was associated with long-distance commercial networks. Partaking in long-distance commerce became increasingly desirable and profitable for lakeshore populations partly because of the ways in which coastal traders had limited the supply and manipulated the price of certain goods to further their commercial aims. Throughout the era of long-distance commerce, different traders sought to take advantage of conditions in different markets in order to increase their wealth, prestige, or political power. Up to the end of the 1870s, Jiji traders and chiefs were particularly successful in doing so by taking advantage of cheapness in some lakeshore regions and by selling goods for a profit in their own markets. Chiefs were also able to charge taxes of traders to ensure that they owned the largest amount of valuable products. However, Lake Tanganyika’s integration with long-distance commercial networks and greater food security in

\(^{139}\) See also: Macola, *The Gun in Central Africa*, Ch. 4.
most lakeshore regions made these tactics less profitable during the 1880s. Greater profits were made from trading lakeshore goods and goods from the Congo Basin in regions further east. By this stage, coastal traders were the prime manipulators of the market. They and their labourers increased food production, which made most of the lakeshore increasingly self-reliant and less dependent on marketised food from other lakeshore regions where food was already abundant. Coastal traders also controlled the supply of imported products from the coast, such as beads, cotton cloths, and guns. This took the market for these goods out of the hands of Jiji chiefs and traders, and allowed coastal traders to create scarcity, and thus value, in certain varieties of these goods. Coastal traders then distributed the rarest and most-valued goods to their followers, which gave the impression that they had both wealth and prestige. This encouraged more lakeshore populations to join the coastal traders’ followings and to involve themselves with long-distance commercial networks. This, in turn, increased the coastal traders’ political standing on the lakeshore. This model then acted as a precedent for the methods of European colonial conquest. Just as the coastal traders had done so before, incoming Belgians and Germans controlled the supply of guns to boost their prestige, attract followers, and dominate the region militarily. Control of the market for expensive imported products was a route to political power.
Chapter 4: Lacustrine Craft: Canoes, Dhows, and Iron Boats

This chapter analyses the effects of technological innovations on Lake Tanganyika’s lacustrine craft. The term, lacustrine craft, refers to all waterborne vessels on Lake Tanganyika, including canoes, dhows, and iron boats.¹ Vessels such as these in East and Central Africa are a relatively little-studied topic in the context of the era of long-distance commerce. This is hardly surprising given that, for most of the era, most long-distance commercial networks on the central route were connected via land. Until the 1880s, most traders travelling between modern-day mainland Tanzania and the Congo Basin travelled around the south end of Lake Tanganyika, and until the 1870s, most traders travelling to and from Buganda travelled around the west of Lake Victoria via Karagwe.² This timescale indicates that, for most traders in East and Central Africa, the development of lacustrine craft was one of the final innovations made on commercial networks. Yet, lacustrine craft were also at the heart of trade, communication, and the economy amongst the peoples of Lake Tanganyika since long before the arrival of long-distance traders. Developments made to them during the nineteenth century were part of a longer history of technological innovation and exchange. This applies especially around the north end of the lake, where lacustrine commercial networks were at their most developed at the time of the coastal traders’ arrival at the lakeshore in c.1830. Suitable forms of lacustrine craft were just as important for fishing expeditions and the functioning of long-standing lacustrine commercial networks as they were for newer long-distance ones. As such, this chapter is an analysis of adaptation and innovation within the context of rapidly changing political and commercial circumstances. As will be seen, modifications made to lacustrine craft

¹ See: Interview with Kassim Govola Mbingo, 22 October 2013.
were intrinsically tied to transitions in the loci, nature, and ownership of political power on the lakeshore.

In African history, forms of waterborne transport are seen to perform a wide range of functions, from the religious, to the economic and military. For example, canoes and canoe paddles on Lake Victoria and Bioko Island (Equatorial Guinea) were symbols of past migrations by people living on water-shores and were used as protection against supernatural powers in the surrounding waters.3 Fishermen are often characterised as the body of people most capable of using these symbols to appease these supernatural powers, as is shown by Reid and Kenny’s4 analyses of the role of Sesse Islanders in Ganda society. In terms of their economic role, the pre-colonial history of fishermen is often one of men in small canoes, staying close to the shore, following seasonal migrations of fish around lakes and along rivers.5 This role often changed as a result of commercial or military expansion. The Ganda attempted to expand commercially and militarily around Lake Victoria in the nineteenth century by tapping into the expert knowledge of the lake’s fishermen, who knew about waterborne craft, the geography of the lake, and the lake’s religious framework.6 Expansion of commercial networks in the pre-colonial era also increased demand for waterborne craft. In terms of the effects this had on fishing industries, Harms argues that increasing the size of waterborne craft on the Congo River decreased yields, because their construction used labour that would otherwise have been used for making small, easily manoeuvrable canoes that were more appropriate for fishing in swampy water.7 In most other regions, however, and especially in lakes, increases in the size of waterborne craft for commercial and military purposes aided the

7 Harms, River of Wealth, p. 69.
fishing industry, because larger commercial vessels could also be used to carry larger hauls of fish.\textsuperscript{8} These histories inform a study about commerce and military-inspired adaptation of existing fishing vessels within a religious framework based on beliefs about the supernatural powers of waterborne craft.

There is one previous analysis of Lake Tanganyika’s lacustrine craft during the era of long-distance commerce. This is contained within Brown’s 1973 doctoral thesis on Ujiji in the period 1800-1914. In this text, Brown identifies the religious context within which canoes were constructed and launched on the lake, and the ways in which commercial enterprise led to the development of larger and faster craft.\textsuperscript{9} These themes sit squarely within the broader history of waterborne craft in African history. This applies especially in regards to the history of nineteenth-century lacustrine craft on Lake Victoria, on which considerably more has been written than for Lake Tanganyika. For example, Kenny explores the religious framework within which canoes were situated on the lake. He argues that canoes were built and decorated in the image of \textit{Mukasa}, Lake Victoria’s most prominent deity.\textsuperscript{10} Reid, meanwhile, examines the development of Ganda canoes for economic and political purposes. After the 1840s, he argues, the size and number of Ganda canoes increased. The central reasons for this were stalling land-based military campaigns – which provoked the Ganda to attack lakeshore regions instead – and a desire to expand and control lacustrine trade.\textsuperscript{11} Finally, Hartwig and Holmes analyse the development of lacustrine craft from the perspective of coastal traders who traversed Lake Victoria between Mwanza, Kagei, and Buganda. They both assess the impact of new lacustrine craft on commerce and political power. For example, they link the coastal


\textsuperscript{10} Kenny, ‘The Powers of Lake Victoria,’ pp. 720, 725-726.

\textsuperscript{11} Reid, \textit{Political Power}, p. 234.
traders’ development of *dhows* with their increased commercial independence from the Buganda *kabaka* (king), and increased European influence around Lake Victoria with their ownership of iron boats and other imported forms of lacustrine craft.\(^{12}\) This chapter builds on these histories by arguing that there may be greater links between them than has been previously acknowledged. It hypothesises that, as Ganda canoes were made larger and more numerous during the nineteenth century, the ways in which they embodied *Mukasa*, could have changed as well. Similarly, the construction of *dhows* by coastal traders could have affected the ways in which lacustrine craft embodied *Mukasa*. Although testing these hypotheses in regards to Lake Victoria is beyond the remit of this thesis, they provide the lens through which Lake Tanganyika’s lacustrine craft are analysed here. It explores how the development of lacustrine craft re-shaped both the nature of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework and the role that this religious framework had within the lakeshore’s societies.

The influence of coastal technology and cultural forms are important dynamics for understanding how lacustrine craft were used around Lake Tanganyika. From a technological standpoint, this is evident from the construction of *dhows* on lakes in the interior of Africa. The word, *dhow*, is a generic term that refers to all forms of sailing craft designed and built by peoples living around the Western Indian Ocean. *Dhows* came in numerous forms, including the larger *jahazi* and the smaller *mashua*, as well as all manner of alternative designs and sizes in-between.\(^ {13}\) Therefore, the use of the term, *dhow*, in this chapter is not meant to denote a particular form of technology. Instead, it is used to indicate a form of waterborne technology that originated on somewhere around the Indian Ocean, as opposed to one that originated on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Coastal *dhows* were built within their own religious

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framework. Their most prominent symbol was the ubiquitous *oculi* (eyes; sing: *oculus*) on the bow and sometimes the stern as well. These were meant to “guard the soul of the boat and to drive off any malignant spirits which endanger the vessel.” Other protective decorations and symbols on *dhows* included tassels and palm fronds hung from the stern, cowrie shells around the false sternpost, the Arabesque motif, and written poetry. Investigating if, when, and how some of these religious symbols were used around Lake Tanganyika may indicate a shift in the religious framework that the lake’s lacustrine craft were situated in. Furthermore, a preponderance of religious motifs from the coast may indicate increasing levels of coastal trader influence on the lakeshore from a religious and cultural standpoint. This builds on themes from the previous chapter, in that it explores the ways in which coastal traders became increasingly powerful on the lakeshore. Analysis of the changes to lacustrine craft and their associated framework is used to understand shifting power dynamics between coastal traders and lakeshore populations.

This analysis also provokes an examination of the nature of political power on the lakeshore. From a continent-wide perspective, Reid argues that the nineteenth century was a period of military revolution. He states: “By mid-century… violence… had become one of the key expressions of political and cultural creativity, and war became ever more important as an extension of economic policy.” Thus, he argues, military strength became a central vehicle for exerting political authority. Such strength was also used to acquire access to trade, which was crucial for the exertion of military power: markets provided access to weapons, and

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16 Ibid., pp. 103, 105-109.
18 Ibid.
material wealth gained from markets attracted people who could form the basis of an armed following. In the East and Central African context, historians have argued that the rising importance of military power represents a transformation from a previous period in which political authority was based primarily on the religious and territorial rights of political leaders.\textsuperscript{19} Perhaps the most prominent case study in this context is Feierman’s 1974 analysis of the Shambaa kingdom in present-day northeastern Tanzania.\textsuperscript{20} He argues that up to the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century, the Shambaa kings exerted their authority through the collection of tribute from farmers in Shambaai (the region of the Shambaa peoples).\textsuperscript{21} After the death of king Kimweri in 1862 and an ensuing succession dispute, the nature of this authority was brought into question. A key actor in this process was Semboja, a previously unimportant son of Kimweri who lived in Shambaai’s southern periphery. Rather than through territorial authority, Semboja primarily exerted his power through access to long-distance trade. Indeed, his main supporters were people who felt oppressed by the Shambaa kings’ tributary claims and his trading partners, many of whom originated outside of Shambaai.\textsuperscript{22} Collectively, these peoples formed an army designed to take over Shambaai centre.\textsuperscript{23} Although ultimately unsuccessful, this is representative of a “transformation of political culture” in modern-day northeastern Tanzania, and elsewhere in East and Central Africa more generally.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed, Feierman cites Uha, of which Ujiji was one of six kingdoms, as a potentially comparative case study to his on the Shambaa kingdom.\textsuperscript{25} This chapter, then, examines the extent to which increasing coastal trader

\textsuperscript{20} Steven Feierman, \textit{The Shambaa Kingdom: A History} (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974).
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. p. 123.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. pp. 159-160. See also: Håkansson, ‘Ivory,’ p. 129.
\textsuperscript{23} Feierman, \textit{The Shambaa Kingdom}, pp. 159-160.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. p. 171.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid. p. 143.
influence on the lakeshore was tied to a concurrent shift in the nature of political authority in a fashion that is consistent with Feierman’s analysis.

This case study into lacustrine craft and political authority on the lakeshore generally agrees with Feierman’s analysis, though with one major caveat. That is, it emphasises a greater level of continuity than which Feierman allows for in his central argument. It argues that lacustrine craft were used to exert political authority throughout the era of long-distance commerce in both symbolic and practical terms. It does this by first analysing the religious framework within which lacustrine craft were situated, and then showing how military and commercial influences affected their design, construction, and usage during the era in question. The pervasive presence of lacustrine craft in this context represents an adaptation of existing political forms on the lakeshore to the conditions of long-distance commerce, rather than a complete transformation of political authority. In arguing such, this chapter builds on some of the less-quoted aspects of Feierman and other historians’ analysis. For example, Feierman reflects that Semboja’s support from disgruntled people in Shambaai and from foreign traders bore similarity to how the kingdom was founded:

   The founder of the Shambaa kingdom had initially met the need for new forms, for a new scale of political activity, but making transitory alliances which were so useful that they developed into permanent institutions… Semboja used the same modes of alliance [but with outsiders to the kingdom].

   Elsewhere, Roberts, writes in one chapter that “the nature of political change in [what constitutes modern-day] Tanzania in the nineteenth century… consisted of a shift from religious to military power as a basis for political authority.” But, in another, he contributes to a volume that shows the importance of trade to political authority before the era of long-

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26 Ibid. p. 188.
distance commerce, and the importance of religious regalia to the same structures throughout and beyond the same period. Such arguments, and the continuity of forms of allegiance described in Feierman’s analysis, hint at a level of structural continuity in the perception of political forms, despite a change in the ways in which political authority was exerted. Thus, if political change can be understood in terms of a ‘military revolution’ in this period, then, in these East and Central African case studies, it can be argued that this revolution occurred within the contours of pre-existing political frameworks based on the religious and territorial rights of chiefs.

Emphasising the structural continuity of political forms helps to understand the nature and role of religious belief in lakeshore societies. In a recent book on Ghanaian and Burkinabe religious forms in the pre-colonial and colonial period, Allman and Parker describe a process referred to as the ‘commercialisation of religion.’ Broadly speaking, this term describes how religious objects were attributed commercial value, and commercial goods were attributed religious value. In their study, this process is dominated by the exchange of talismans, idols, figurines, and other religious regalia for an equivalent monetary value, and the payment of expensive imported goods to religious leaders for the conduct of religious rituals. Similar phenomena have been observed in East and Central Africa, especially in terms of the trade in Luba religious insignia from Katanga to elsewhere in the region, and in the monetary demands of religious leaders in Uha. Thus, in these examples, commercial transactions had religious

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29 See also: Koponen, People and Production, p. 361.

30 See also: Vansina, Paths in the Rainforests, p. 97.


32 Ibid., Ch. 4, p. 213.

connotations, and the performance of religious rituals was tied to demand for trade goods. Lake Tanganyika’s lacustrine craft fit into both aspects of this historiography, and contribute a further dynamic to them. Lacustrine craft were religious objects that became increasingly marketable and taxable.\(^3^4\) At the same time, they became increasingly designed for the purposes of bringing greater efficiency to lacustrine trade as commercial networks expanded.\(^3^5\) They also became used to transport military troops around the lake. This chapter explores the idea that commercial and military uses put to lacustrine craft caused successful trading and military expeditions to become associated with religious power. It thus shows the ways in which religious power endured on the lakeshore, and how its role in the determination of political authority was affected by the influence of new commercial and military phenomena. It argues that even though lacustrine craft were increasingly used as commercial and military vessels, they continued to be perceived as religious objects by lakeshore populations and long-distance traders alike. Furthermore, the religiosity associated with lacustrine craft is crucial for understanding the nature of political power on the lakeshore throughout the era of long-distance commerce.

**Goma Canoes as Religious Objects in Jiji Society, up to c.1860.**

There were three main types of canoe made by lakeshore populations at the beginning of the era of long-distance commerce. They were predominantly owned by people in the shore’s northeastern regions, where people fished and traded most intensely.\(^3^6\) The Rundi made dugout canoes from trees in their vicinity, and then tied around six of them together to form catamarans.\(^3^7\) The Jiji made dugout canoes of between 10 and 15 feet in length from trees

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\(^3^6\) See: Chapters 2, 3.
\(^3^7\) Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 12.
grown either locally or in Northern Ukawende.38 Both these styles of craft were largely used only for fishing in waters local to their nearest shore. The most famous canoes on Lake Tanganyika were those that were built in Ugoma, and were used by Jiji fishermen and traders to travel around the lake in search of seasonal fishing locations and lakeshore markets. These were made from a tree known as the mvule, which, at up to 150 feet tall, were the largest trees on the lakeshore.39 The canoes made from these trees were between 25 and 40 metres in length, and were Lake Tanganyika’s largest type of dugout canoe.40 As commercial networks expanded around Lake Tanganyika, Goma canoes were used as the carriers of trade goods, such as salt, iron, beads, cloth, ivory, and captives, while also serving their original purpose as fishing vessels. Given their links to commerce, it is with these craft that this chapter is primarily concerned. This section argues that lakeshore people’s usage of Goma canoes as religious objects reinforced their political structures, particularly in Ujiji.

According to common religious beliefs amongst nineteenth-century lakeshore populations, Lake Tanganyika was filled with spirits. It was believed that these spirits, referred to as zimu, determined whether a canoe could perform its economic functions or not. Zimu was the word all European explorers and missionaries used for these spirits, and it translates literally as “spirits” from Swahili.41 Unlike in Lake Victoria, which contained many incarnations of the same spirit called Mukasa, Lake Tanganyika had many different spirits.42 The reasons for this discrepancy may be related to Buganda and Lake Tanganyika’s respective political structures.

38 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 42.
39 Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, p. 77. Mvule trees produce timber known as African teak or iroko. Its Latin names include milicia excelsa and chlorophora excelsa.
41 In Swahili, the translation of spirit in the singular is mزمع and the plural is mزمعلا. As with names of populations, this thesis deducts the numeric prefix of the vernacular, and indicates singularity or plurality using English sentence structure.
Buganda was a centralised kingdom that became increasingly influential over all of Lake Victoria in the nineteenth century. The centralised role of Mukasa as a deity in the lake bares similarity to the role of the Kabaka (king) in Ganda society. The multiplicity of zimu in Lake Tanganyika, therefore, may be a reflection of the largely decentralised organisation of its shores’ societies. Such an argument is supported by the view put forward in many analyses that religious and political structures in societies often reinforce each other in their respective societies. Lake Tanganyika’s zimu were believed to have been located on peninsulas that jutted out into Lake Tanganyika’s waters. These were the points from and to which fishermen and lacustrine traders traversed the lake. The most-frequently commented-on zimu were those which were located at Kabogo point in Ukawende and at a place referred to as Mzimu on the northern tip of the Ubwari peninsula. These were the points at which Jiji fishermen and traders traversed the lake to and from Uguha and Uvira respectively. The zimu had to be appeased to safeguard the people and lacustrine craft travelling across and around the lake. This was achieved by creating what was referred to as a dawa (medicine). If the zimu were not appeased (or the dawa not created), then canoes and their crews were believed to be prone to destruction. Storms were usually attributed to the wrath of zimu. Crocodiles and, to a lesser extent, hippopotami were seen to act on behalf of disgruntled zimu by “devouring” those that

43 Reid, Political Power, Ch. 11.
47 NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 19 March 1874; Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 67; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Massanze, 17 October 1881; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Jones to Whitehouse, 12 April 1884.
49 Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, pp. 77-78; Jacques and Storms, Notes sur l’Ethnographie, p. 84.
had caused his or her wrath.\textsuperscript{50} When people from the lakeshore entered the lake not in a canoe, they wore amulets, also referred to as \textit{dawa}, to protect themselves from crocodiles, who acted on behalf of the \textit{zimu}.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, at least some people on the lakeshore believed that \textit{zimu} could be invoked to send crocodiles to destroy their enemies through the use of a particularly powerful \textit{dawa}.\textsuperscript{52} The creation of the \textit{dawa} to appease the lake’s \textit{zimu} was a crucial facet of life on the lakeshore and of lacustrine travel.

Lakeshore populations created \textit{dawa} to appease Lake Tanganyika’s \textit{zimu} by using several religious objects and rituals. The design of Goma canoes was at the heart of these practices. The \textit{mvule} trees, which formed the base for Goma canoes, were cut down and then dragged down Ugoma’s mountains to the lakeshore.\textsuperscript{53} Here they were worked on by carpenters, who used a combination of axes, adzes, and fire, to transform them into dugout canoes.\textsuperscript{54} They were then painted white, decorated with numerous insignia, and blessed by religious leaders.\textsuperscript{55} The religious aspects of this process were commented on by European missionaries, who resided on the lakeshore from 1878 onwards. The lack of explorer accounts in this regard means that there is a dearth of primary source material that relates to the religious aspects of lacustrine craft construction for the first 50-or-so years of the era of long-distance commerce. Nevertheless, a measure of change over the course of the whole era is still observable. The missionaries referred to the religious leaders who blessed the canoes as medicine men.\textsuperscript{56} There is no indication that these medicine men came from the coast, and so it is logical to suspect that

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\begin{itemize}
\item Swann, \textit{Fighting the Slave-Hunters}, pp. 91-92.
\item A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 7 February 1887.
\item Hore, \textit{Tanganyika}, p. 106.
\item Ibid., p. 107; Swann, \textit{Fighting the Slave-Hunters}, pp. 77-78; Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ pp. 191-192.
\item Hore, \textit{Tanganyika}. p. 107; Swann, \textit{Fighting the Slave-Hunters}, p. 77.
\end{itemize}
they originated in Ugoma, and that their role pre-dated the arrival of coastal traders. The decorations they made to the canoes were painted with decomposed minerals and iron oxide.\footnote{Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, p. 77.} Swann describes these decorations as “variegated,” as though they appeared un-ordered and random, although this may have been a result of his inability to comprehend their meaning rather than a true reflection of their design.\footnote{Ibid.} Even so, this contrasts with the designs on coastal dhows, on which many religious symbols were carved into the wood, and poetry in Arabic script was painted on.\footnote{Agius, ‘Decorative Motifs,’ pp. 104-108.}\footnote{Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, p. 77.} This suggests the existence of a religious framework associated with lacustrine craft that was indigenous to the northern shores of Lake Tanganyika, rather than one that originated with the arrival of traders from the coast. Swann also mentions that the medicine men marked “two immense eyes on the bow.”\footnote{Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, p. 77.} These ‘eyes’ are reminiscent of the oculi that were printed on dhows on the Indian Ocean. It is fathomable, therefore, that Goma medicine men only painted ‘eyes’ on their canoes from sometime after c.1830, when coastal traders started arriving at the lakeshore. Yet, the medicine men’s continued prominence alongside the use of lakeshore materials indicates that coastal cultural forms were incorporated into their religious framework, as opposed to the idea that a coastal religious framework replaced it.\footnote{Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 191.}\footnote{Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, p. 77.} This indicates that Lake Tanganyika’s lacustrine craft were designed with a religious framework in mind since before the arrival of coastal traders, and that these designs were adaptable to new influences.

Once on the lake, lacustrine travellers practiced further rituals to appease the lake’s zimu. In their completed state, Goma canoes were characterised as “infants.”\footnote{Ibid.} To lakeshore populations, this meant that only youths were allowed to carry them onto the lake.\footnote{Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, p. 77.} When
youths first travelled on the lake, they were obliged to drink the water of the lake at the location of each zimu they encountered in order to solidify the link between them, the canoe, and the lake. Also, at the same locations, the leader of each lacustrine expedition dropped valuable goods into the lake as a sacrifice. These ranged from locally-sourced livestock and crops, to long-distance commercial goods such as beads and cotton cloths. This latter ritual was practiced on every lacustrine journey, and not just those with youths on. Alongside the blessings made by the medicine men on the lakeshore, these practices ensured the strength of the canoe’s dawa, which was believed to appease the lake’s zimu. The relationship between lakeshore populations and Lake Tanganyika’s zimu was determined by a combination of sorcery, sacrifice, and the use of dawa, the creation of which were heavily intertwined with the construction and usage of Goma canoes.

The appeasement of spirits through the design, construction, and use of canoes was exclusive to people living on the lakeshore. This is partly self-evident: people living in Lake Tanganyika’s surrounding plains or mountains had no practical use for canoes, and so they did not enter their religious framework. However, this distinction is significant because it indicates a level of cultural division between the populations of the lakeshore and the regions beyond it. This division was reinforced by traditions. According to people living on the lakeshore regions of Ujiji, society as it is known in the region today began when an adventurer called Mshelwampamba travelled from the lake’s eastern shore to Ugoma, and then returned to Ujiji

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65 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 44; NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 19 March 1874, 1, 3, 4 April 1874; A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7. Journal du P. Deniaud, 9 October 1879, 21 October 1879; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Massanze, 17 October 1881; Wissmann, My Second Journey, p. 258; RMCA HA.01.017-7. Storms, ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883; Jacques and Storms, Notes sur l’Ethnographie, p. 84. The sacrifice of beads and cloth was a common feature of sacrifice elsewhere on the central route. See: Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 79. One informant claimed that first-born children were killed to appease the spirits in the lake, though this has not been verified elsewhere: Interview with Daniel Rucintango, 7 November 2013.
with the first immigrants from the lake’s western shore to the region. An integral facet of this tradition is that when Mshelwampamba departed Ujiji, he did so on a raft. When he returned, he did so with a fleet of Goma canoes. Goma canoes, therefore, are intrinsically tied to the foundation of Jiji society on the lakeshore. The importance of this tradition does not extend to the people living in the plains beyond Ujiji’s lakeshore. The stories of ancestral migrations in these parts of Ujiji are dominated by the movement of cattle-owners from the north, rather than by peoples crossing Lake Tanganyika. Furthermore, Jiji populations living on the plains beyond the lakeshore had an ambivalent relationship with the lake. Just as in Urundi, the mwami (head chief) was forbidden from viewing it, because it was believed that if he did so, the lake’s zimu would cause his death. There was thus a collective belief in the lake’s zimu amongst both lakeshore and plains populations. Differences between their beliefs lay in the ways they interacted with these zimu. These differences were embodied by the uses lakeshore populations had for Goma canoes, and their lack of importance to plains populations.

The most prominent religious leaders on Ujiji’s lakeshore were the teko (district chiefs). This was legislated for in Ujiji’s political structures. Ujiji was one of six kingdoms in Uha. Each Ha Kingdom had a mwami (head chief), who appointed numerous tware (regional chiefs). This hierarchical structure came about via the migration of cattle-owners from Urundi during the early and mid-eighteenth century. When the cattle-owning migrants arrived and

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70 See also: Chapter 1.

established themselves as a chiefly class, they did not overhaul the existing chiefly structure.\footnote{Oliver, ‘Discernible Developments,’ p. 192.} This was a decentralised system of districts, governed by the teko. According to Wagner, the word, teko, translates as “earth-priest(s),” and the teko’s “authority… prevailed in all matters pertaining to the environment.”\footnote{Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 182; Gwassa and Mbwiliza, ‘Social Production,’ pp. 16, 18. Similar phenomena have been observed in the Luba Kingdom in Katanga. See: Macola, The Gun in Central Africa, Ll. 737-741.} The teko interacted with spirits on their land, which ensured their respective communities’ safety, and their right to political power.\footnote{Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ pp. 189-191; Grant, ‘Uha in Tanganyika Territory,’ p. 416; Gwassa and Mbwiliza, ‘Social Production,’ p. 14.} Such is reminiscent of other East and Central African political structures, in which chiefly authority was determined by religious and territorial rights.\footnote{Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 191.} For the power of the mwami and tware to be acknowledged in Uha, they had to first acknowledge the rights of the teko over environmental issues. In most parts of Uha, this extended from organising the harvest to grazing rights.\footnote{Ibid.; Burton, Lake Regions, p. 350.} However, on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, it also extended to communication with the lake’s zimu.\footnote{Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 191.} Jiji teko living on the lakeshore led rituals in the manner of a medicine men before the disembarkation of a canoe, and led ceremonies at peninsulas in which goods were sacrificed to the zimu.\footnote{Ibid.; Burton, Lake Regions, p. 350.} They thus performed a crucial role in the practices that created the dawa to ensure the Goma canoes’ safety.\footnote{Ibid.; Burton, Lake Regions, p. 350.} Beliefs in Lake Tanganyika’s zimu and the religious framework associated with canoes reinforced the Jiji teko’s political position on the lakeshore.

The arrival of long-distance traders in the early part of the nineteenth century initially strengthened the Jiji teko’s authority on the lakeshore. The increased volume of trade caused an increase in the number of lacustrine voyages. This necessitated an increase in the frequency

\begin{itemize}
\item Oliver, ‘Discernible Developments,’ p. 192.
\item Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 182; Gwassa and Mbwiliza, ‘Social Production,’ pp. 16, 18. Similar phenomena have been observed in the Luba Kingdom in Katanga. See: Macola, The Gun in Central Africa, Ll. 737-741.
\item Feierman, The Shambaa Kingdom, p. 120; Roberts, ‘Political Change,’ p. 58; Iliffe, Africans, p. 188.
\item Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 191.
\item Ibid.; Burton, Lake Regions, p. 350.
\item Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 191.
\end{itemize}
of religious rituals to ensure the safety of the canoes. The safety and success of commercial voyages on the lake then reinforced the teko’s religious and political role amongst people living on the lakeshore. The teko also took payment in the form of beads and cotton cloth in exchange for the conduct of religious practices. The ability to preside over religious matters concerning Lake Tanganyika’s zimu, therefore, was increasingly linked to the exchange of expensive imported goods. Furthermore, by the time Burton and Speke arrived at the lakeshore in 1858, beads and cotton cloth were the primary objects that were sacrificed to the zimu from canoes at the peninsulas jutting into the lake. Kannena, one of Ujiji’s teko living on the lakeshore, accompanied these two explorers on their journey to Uvira. At Mzimu (the northern tip of the Ubwari peninsula) he demanded sofí beads from his European guests. Burton wrote that he viewed this as payment to the teko for their safe carriage to this part of the lakeshore. However, as this was the site of a prominent and powerful zimu, it is more likely that these beads were dropped in the lake to ensure their further safe passage. This hypothesis is supported by Burton’s statement that Kannena was “heavily in debt” by the time he reached Uvira. The beads Burton gave Kannena at Mzimu were not claimed for material gain, but were used for ritual purposes to support the teko’s political position. Thus, the creation of dawa that protected canoes was increasingly linked to the ability of canoe leaders to sacrifice imported goods. These processes reflect the gradual commercialisation of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework, a process that was well underway by the time Europeans first began visiting the lakeshore.

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80 Ibid., pp. 191-192.
81 Burton, Lake Regions, p. 358.
83 Burton, Lake Regions, p. 350.
84 Ibid., p. 354.
The commercialisation of religious practices associated with *zimu* in the lake increased the Jiji *teko’s* reliance on traders on the lakeshore.\(^8^5\) This was for two reasons. Firstly, the Jiji *teko* on the lakeshore required access to imported products brought by traders from the coast to perform their religious role. Secondly, they needed traders to make regular journeys on the lake as a sign that their religious power continued to ensure the safety of canoes and their crew. Once lacustrine and long-distance traders returned to Ujiji, their material profits became symbolic of a lacustrine expedition’s success, and thus also of the *teko*’s religious power. As such, amongst the Jiji, lacustrine commerce was both a religious and an economic transaction: commercial wealth was perceived as symbolic of religious power. The nature of lacustrine commercial transactions reinforced the role of the Jiji *teko*’s political authority on the lakeshore through expressions of their religious power.

**Modified Canoes and Sailing Canoes, c.1860-1890**

The period after c.1860 is marked by the continued commercialisation of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework. Commerce and lacustrine travel continued to be associated with religious beliefs in the lake’s *zimu* and their appeasement through the creation of *dawa*. The departure from the previous period is that there was a gradual shift in the power dynamics associated with this religious framework. This transition is associated with two phenomena. Firstly, an increase in the frequency of lacustrine expeditions meant that it was impractical for the Jiji *teko* living on the lakeshore to dominate the ritual involving the sacrifice of goods to Lake Tanganyika’s *zimu* at peninsulas jutting into the lake. This process sped up soon after coastal traders made permanent residences on – and imported goods to – the lakeshore in larger quantities in the 1860s.\(^8^6\) This enabled the traders who owned the most imported goods to

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\(^8^5\) Gray and Birmingham, ‘Some Economic and Political,’ p. 3; Gordon, ‘Wearing Cloth, Wielding Guns,’ pp. 18-19; Koponen, *People and Production*, p. 106.

\(^8^6\) Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices & Ivory*, pp. 185-186. See also: Chapter 2.
gradually claim ritual roles that were previously reserved for the Jiji teko. Secondly, traders made modifications to canoes to make lacustrine and long-distance trade more efficient and profitable. It is crucial that many of these modifications were instigated by coastal traders and their labourers, and not by people who were associated with Jiji teko living on the lakeshore. These modifications enabled traders to travel around the lake in greater numbers and with greater speed than previous lacustrine travellers. Some traders, for example, extended their commercial networks to the south end of the lake, and they sacrificed beads and cotton cloths at peninsulas in regions where they previously had not ventured. This represents the spreading of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework emanating from Ugoma and Ujiji over the entirety of the lake. Once spread, this religious framework became a crucial component of what this thesis refers to as Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture, a phenomenon that bound the various lakeshore regions together. The modification of lacustrine craft also contributed to the traders’ ability to generate larger profits, as they could transport more goods with greater speed. In the context of the increasingly commercialised nature of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework, these developments gave the impression that the traders on these lacustrine craft owned the most powerful dawa to appease the lake’s zimu. This allowed some traders to became religious leaders, which, in turn, compromised the religious basis for some of the Jiji teko’s political power on the lakeshore.

Analysing the prominence of traders in terms of religious power contests some aspects of a previous history of religious change and political authority in Ujiji. Wagner argues that:

As the sole arbitrators who could coax lake spirits into maintaining calm conditions [for lacustrine travel], lakist bateko [sic.] probably enjoyed an augmentation of their duties and their popular authority… [Furthermore,] the
Islamic faith of many... traders... bolstered a major component of the ideological framework that legitimized the *bateko* [sic.].  

This section supports the view that the role of traders, including coastal traders, “bolstered a major component of” Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework, but stops short of arguing that this legitimised the political role of the *teko*. Instead, it argues that traders re-shaped aspects of the existing religious framework in a way that allowed them to appropriate it and replace the *teko* as Lake Tanganyika’s principal religious authorities. The addition of *oculi* to the bows of lacustrine craft, described above, may have been a part of this shift. Building on broader analyses of political authority, this section argues that traders’ interactions with Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework was crucial for increasing their influence amongst lakeshore populations. This is opposed to the view that their rise was primarily tied to their commercial and military power, and that this replaced religious power as the principal construct that determined political authority.  

Instead, the exertion of military and commercial strength continued to be perceived in pre-existing terms associated with the usage of lacustrine craft in the appeasement of the lake’s *zimu*.

Canoes built in Ugoma continued to be the base for most lacustrine craft used for trade after c.1860. Instead of inventing or importing new lacustrine technologies, coastal traders modified existing technologies to make them more suited to commerce. This meant increasing the canoes’ structural strength, stability, manoeuvrability, size, carrying capacity, and – in some cases – speed. The modifications made to Goma canoes can be divided into two categories: those that did not have masts and sails, and those that did. Hereafter, the former are referred to as modified canoes, and the latter are referred to as sailing canoes. The use of the term ‘sailing canoe’ may appear contradictory. Canoes, often by definition, do not have sails.

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But, referring to them with different terminology would not allow for the high degree of continuity in forms of canoe construction from the previous period. That is, the term ‘sailing canoe’ emphasises continuity in the use of Goma canoes as a base for lacustrine craft, and is opposed to the idea that these sailing craft were formed from entirely new or imported technologies to the lakeshore. The most common alternative to the term, sailing canoe, is dhow. This term is usually used describe sailing craft on the Indian Ocean, and using it to describe the canoes with sails on Lake Tanganyika in this period does not allow for the necessary level of continuity from the period up to c.1860 that the continued use of Goma canoes indicates. Furthermore, a form of coastal dhow was constructed on Lake Tanganyika during the late 1870s, and it is necessary to differentiate this vessel from the Goma canoes with sails described here. The key departures from the period up to c.1860 documented in this section relate to the construction, ownership, and usage of lacustrine craft. Traders took a greater role in these facets of modified and sailing canoes than they did with un-altered Goma canoes beforehand. The extent to which this occurred, however, varied depending on which body of traders owned, used, and commissioned the construction of which type of canoe. Differences in these attributes necessitate analysing modified and sailing canoes in turn.

Modified canoes were Goma canoes with the addition of a keel, rudder, and planks to the sides. These additions increased their size, structural strength, manoeuvrability, and carrying capacity. Canoe-makers from Ugoma continued to cut down mvule trees in their region and carve them into dugouts on their lakeshore, with all the ceremonies and decorations described above. Goma traders then paddled them to Ujiji, where they were sold to a mixture

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90 See: Next section.

91 Stanley, How I Found, p. 388; CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore, ‘Launch of the “Calabash,”’ 9 December 1878.


of Jiji and coastal traders.\textsuperscript{94} Jiji \textit{teko} on the lakeshore also bought many of these canoes for modification. Traders and \textit{teko} then employed both local and coastal carpenters to add the necessary modifications.\textsuperscript{95} By the time modified canoes were finished, they were usually between 25 and 40 feet long and between six and eight feet wide.\textsuperscript{96} They could carry between 40 and 50 people, or less if they were carrying loads.\textsuperscript{97} The estimated carrying capacity of these craft, therefore, was around 7,000 lbs. Having a large carrying capacity was of utmost importance to all traders based in Ujiji, especially after c.1860 when demand for bulky goods, such as ivory from Manyema and captives from the south end of the lake, increased. In terms of speed, it took around 24 hours to traverse the lake between Kabogo point and Uguha, the shortest distance across the lake in the central lakeshore regions, in these modified canoes.\textsuperscript{98} They were powered by paddlers, predominantly from Ujiji, who sat in the boat and faced forwards.\textsuperscript{99} Modified canoes became the standard commercial lacustrine craft in Ujiji. Their wide usage represents an increase in the size and the number of the average canoe that is reflective of similar phenomena occurring on Lake Victoria at the same time.\textsuperscript{100} Furthermore, on both Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika, the development of lacustrine transport was dominated by one technological centre. On Lake Victoria, this was Buganda; on Lake Tanganyika, this was Ujiji.\textsuperscript{101}

The importance of Ujiji as a commercial and technological centre for modified canoes reinforced some aspects of the Jiji \textit{teko}'s religious and political role on the lakeshore. Given

\begin{footnotes}
\item[96] Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 41-42.
\item[98] CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Griffith to Whitehouse, 1 November 1879.
\item[99] Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ pp. 623, 626; Speke, ‘Journal of a Cruise,’ 4 March 1858.
\item[100] Reid, \textit{Political Power}, p. 234.
\item[101] Ibid.; Hartwig, ‘The Victoria Nyanza,’ p. 544.
\end{footnotes}
what historians have written about Buganda in this period, this is expected. Hartwig describes a situation in which the *kabaka* (king) of Buganda monopolised lacustrine transport emanating from Buganda on Lake Victoria, and so, even independent traders were reliant on the *kabaka’s* good will for access to lacustrine markets.\footnote{Hartwig, ‘The Victoria Nyanza,’ p. 544.} Jiji *teko* on the shore of Lake Tanganyika were at the head of a similar hierarchy, though it was neither as efficient nor absolute. Just as in the period before c.1860, they charged traders for the conduct of pre-expedition religious rituals that created the necessary *dawa* to appease the lake’s *zimu*.\footnote{RMCA Stanley Archive 73. Field Notebook, 17 December 1871; Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 191.} They also received payment for the use of Jiji labour on canoes and charged taxes on transactions associated with canoes being sold in Ujiji’s market.\footnote{Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ pp. 190-192; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880; Hutley, *The Central African Diaries*, p. 80; Burton, *Lake Regions*, pp. 338, 342; CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Jones to Thompson, 10 February 1885.} The use and purchase of modified canoes, therefore, was a commercial and religious transaction that reinforced the Jiji *teko’s* power on the lakeshore. The wealth that the Jiji *teko* received in these transactions enabled them to invest in commercial expeditions on the lake. Many independent Jiji traders were funded by credit supplied by the Jiji *teko* on the lakeshore.\footnote{Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 626.} As a continuation of a process that began in the period before c.1860, commercial and religious power became increasingly intertwined. Jiji *teko* on the lakeshore sought to position themselves in a way that established them as the most religiously and commercially powerful actors on the lakeshore.

The increasingly strong links between commercial wealth and religious power also empowered traders. Some traders took a role in the performance religious rituals that were previously reserved for the Jiji *teko* living on the lakeshore. After Kannena, the *teko* who travelled with Burton and Speke to Uvira in 1858, there is no record of a Jiji *teko* travelling on the lake on a commercial expedition. This meant that the creation of *dawa* for the appeasement
of the lake’s *zimu* through sacrifice at peninsulas fell into the hands of traders.¹⁰⁶ This transition was partly by the design of the Jiji *teko*. In the context of more frequent lacustrine voyages, it would have been impossible for them to lead religious rituals at every peninsula on every expedition. Traders who traded on a *teko’s* behalf or with a *teko’s* credit were thus charged with appeasing the lake’s *zimu* as well. However, many traders were independent of the Jiji *teko* on the lakeshore. Having paid their taxes for the purchase of a modified canoe, they were no longer obliged to the Jiji *teko* if they could supply their own labour and commercial goods. These traders included a few Jiji, but, more significantly, the whole body of coastal and *ngwana* traders and their followers. The wealth these traders garnered from lacustrine trade gave them commercial power exclusive of the Jiji *teko* on the lakeshore. Their lucrative lacustrine journeys also gave the impression that they were favoured by the lake’s *zimu*. As will be seen in analysis of sailing canoes, some traders made efforts to perpetuate the existing religious framework by appropriating rituals that were previously symbols of Jiji *teko’s* religious power on the lakeshore. The nature of trade and the development of lacustrine craft on Lake Tanganyika undermined the Jiji *teko’s* dominance of some religious rituals on the lakeshore and around the lake.

Sailing canoes differed from modified canoes in terms of design, size, speed and ownership. Sailing canoes had masts, sails, and sometimes decks, in addition to the keels, rudders, and extra planks that were attached to modified canoes.¹⁰⁷ These additions increased the carrying capacity and speed of sailing canoes compared to modified canoes. Sailing canoes could carry up to 120 people at a time, which represents a carrying capacity of around 16,800

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¹⁰⁷ Hartwig, ‘The Victoria Nyanza,’ p. 535; NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 4, 5, 11 March 1874. CWM/LMS/06/02/003, Hore, ‘Launch of the “Calabash,”’ 9 December 1878; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 20 February 1880.
lbs. This meant that they could carry more than twice the weight of a modified canoe. Depending on wind and surf, it took between five and 10 hours to travel between Kabogo and Uguha. Even under the least-favourable conditions, therefore, sailing canoes were more than twice as fast as modified canoes. There were far fewer of these sailing canoes than there were modified canoes on Lake Tanganyika. Apart from those owned by European missionaries and explorers in the 1880s, they were almost exclusively owned by coastal traders. In 1858, Hamed bin Sulayyam, the Omani trader based on Kasenge Island, owned the sole sailing canoe on the lake. In 1878, there were around 15 stationed in Ujiji’s harbour, though there may have been more elsewhere. Mwinyi Kheri, the most prominent Rima trader and governor of the coastal trader community at Ujiji in c.1875-1885, owned nine sailing canoes in 1876, though the largest of all sailing canoes at this time was owned by Abdullah bin Suleiman, the leader of the Omani faction of traders based in Kasimbo. The relative scarcity of sailing canoes meant that most lacustrine trade was conducted on modified canoes. In this sense, sailing canoes performed a similar role to dhows on Lake Victoria in the same period. The volume of trade conducted on Ganda canoes far outstripped that which was conducted on what historians have called dhows throughout the nineteenth century. Rather than increasing the volume of trade, the crucial role that dhows played on Lake Victoria was that it gave the coastal traders who owned them more independence from the Ganda kabaka in their commercial

108 CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Griffith to Whitehouse, 1 November 1879; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 17 March 1885. The White Fathers wrote that it took around 8 hours to travel in a vessel of this kind between their station in Massanze and Rumonge in Urundi, which is of a slightly lesser distance (A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7. Journal du P. Deniaud, 19 February 1880).

109 CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore, ‘Launch of the “Calabash,”’ 9 December 1878; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse 25 April 1880, Hutley, ‘Uguha and its People,’ 29 September 1880; RMCA HA.01.017-6. Storms to AIA, 15 November 1883, Storms to AIA, January 1885; Hore, Tanganyika, p. 251; CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Hore to Thompson, 10 February 1885; A.G.M.Afr. ‘Guillet to White Fathers, 23 February 1883’ in Chronique Trimestrielles, 18 (April, 1883).


111 CWM/LMS/06/02/003, Hore, ‘Launch of the “Calabash,”’ 9 December 1878.

112 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, pp. 2, 7.

This was also the case with sailing canoes on Lake Tanganyika. Furthermore, on Lake Tanganyika, coastal traders charged large fees to other traders to use their sailing canoes. This bears similarity to the taxes that the Jiji teko charged on the use of modified canoes. The ownership of sailing canoes enabled coastal traders to make commercial transactions with increasing independence from the Jiji teko on the lakeshore.

The commercial independence of coastal traders was rooted in the ways they acquired, built, and used their sailing canoes. Unlike the dugout bases of modified canoes, which were sold in Ujiji’s market, coastal traders bought the Goma canoes that were turned into sailing canoes in Ugoma itself. They did this in the northern region of Ugoma, where mvule trees were smaller, but whose canoes were more structurally capable of withstanding extensive modification. Additionally, in 1884, Giraud, a French explorer, claimed that most of the largest lacustrine craft in Ujiji were built from trees near to Mpala in Marungu. Even though this is probably an exaggeration of Marungu’s importance in the construction of Ujiji’s lacustrine craft, it is reflective of the expanded geographical scope of canoe-construction in this period. It is unlikely that Mpala supplied most of Ujiji’s dugout canoes because Ujiji’s coastal traders rarely visited this region. Also, Giraud only visited Lake Tanganyika’s southern shores, and this probably led to some misconceptions about Ujiji and of the nature of the commercial networks that traversed the north end of the lake. Nevertheless, by purchasing canoes on the west side of the lake rather than in Ujiji, coastal traders avoided the taxes that Jiji teko on the lakeshore charged for use of their markets. Once purchased, coastal

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116 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 2; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Griffith to Whitehouse, 28 August 1880.
117 Giraud, Les Lacs, pp. 519-520.
118 See: Chapter 2.
119 See: Chapter 5.
traders ferried the canoes back to Ujiji, where they employed ngwana carpenters to work on them. Until the 1880s, most these ngwana carpenters were from the coast and not free to sell their labour to other parties. Coastal traders favoured carpenters from the coast because their knowledge of dhow construction learned at the coast was easily adaptable for the construction of sailing canoes on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. In the 1870s and 1880s coastal traders added to this labour pool by training labourers from Manyema, who travelled to the lakeshore and joined their followings. The use of their own labour pool also allowed them to avoid taxes imposed by the Jiji teko for the use of Jiji labour. If carpenters from the lakeshore were to work on sailing canoes, they first had to be trained by members of the coastal traders’ followings, and then they, too, were not free to sell their labour to other parties. These processes acted as another barrier to the Jiji teko’s ability to charge taxes to canoe-owners on the lakeshore. The ways in which coastal traders acquired Goma canoes and employed labourers denied other lakeshore populations access to the necessary capital and technologies to build or own sailing canoes.

Once the coastal traders’ sailing canoes were completed, they employed members of their followings to man them. This eliminated their previous reliance on Jiji boatmen, which meant that they did not have to pay taxes to the Jiji teko for the necessary labour to power their lacustrine craft. The coastal traders’ decision to employ their followers rather than Jiji boatmen in this context was not solely motivated by the desire to limit their expenditure to the teko, however. The use of sailing canoes required a slightly different type of expertise to that which

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121 Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 74; CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore to Mullens, 17 September 1878, Hore, ‘Launch of the “Calabash,”’ 9 December 1878; A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7. Journal du P. Deniaud, 10 June 1879, 6 February 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 20 February 1880.
122 See: Chapter 2.
123 See: Chapter 5.
124 Speke, ‘Journal of a Cruise,’ p. 352; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 16 April 1879.
Jiji boatmen were accustomed. Until the 1880s, the coastal traders favoured *ngwana* labour from the coast because of their expertise in commanding sails, as this was a customary facet of labour associated with coastal *dhows*. Furthermore, when the winds were unfavourable for sailing, sailing canoes were powered by men facing backwards and using oars. This contrasts with modified canoes, on which Jiji boatmen faced forwards and used paddles. During the 1870s and 1880s, there was a move to train Manyema migrants and some people from the lakeshore (including some Jiji) to man sailing canoes. However, just as with the carpenters who built the sailing craft in these decades, these boatmen became part of the coastal traders’ followings, and were employed exclusively by coastal traders. Coastal traders maintained a near monopoly on the labour and resources needed to man sailing canoes. This eliminated coastal traders’ reliance on the Jiji *teko* to provide the necessary labour to complete lacustrine journeys around and across the lake.

The ways in which sailing canoes were owned, developed, and used sparked shifts in religious power on the lakeshore. The speed and size of the loads with which sailing canoes travelled around the lake indicated to lakeshore populations that they possessed a powerful *dawa* that appeased the lake’s *zimu* to a degree not achieved before. Furthermore, the fact that they were monopolised by coastal traders and their labourers gave the impression that they, and not the Jiji *teko* on the lakeshore, were the most powerful religious leaders on the lake. It is unknown whether the coastal traders acted upon this perception, though the presence of *oculi* on sailing and modified canoes during the 1880s could be associated with an awareness that

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125 Gilbert, *Dhows and the Colonial Economy*, pp. 36-51.
126 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley, ‘Uguha and Its People,’ 29 September 1880.
127 Ibid.
lakeshore populations associated their position with some degree of religious power. Apart from this, though, the sources give more attention to the nature of the coastal traders’ Islamic beliefs and the extent to which they proselytised to their followers, than the ways in which they may or may not have interacted with Lake Tanganyika’s existing religious framework. Conversely, the sources are clear that the coastal traders’ labourers and followings were active participants in Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework and became some of the lake’s most prominent religious leaders. By the 1870s, most of these labourers came from Manyema. They are variously referred to as ‘Arabs’ slaves’ or ‘ngwana’ in the primary sources. The distinctions and transitions between these terms is explored in Chapter 5. For the purposes of this chapter, they are referred to as ngwana labourers. According to Stanley:

The Arab’s slaves [ngwana labourers] … spread… reports of Muzimus [sic.], hobgoblins, fiery meteors, terrible spirits, such as Kabogo, Katavi, Kateyé and Wanpembé, that the teeth of the Wanyamwezi [sic.] … chattered with fright.

Similarly, the White Fathers based in Massanze wrote that, “It is not the [locals] who have the greatest fear of [the zimu], it is mainly the Wangouana [sic.].” Therefore, by the mid-to-late 1870s, the coastal traders’ ngwana labourers were the most prominent proponents of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework. The ngwana labourers’ association with the coastal traders’ commercial wealth and the most efficient form of lacustrine transport on Lake Tanganyika enabled them to wield increasingly large amounts of religious power.

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130 Becker, ‘Commoners,’ p. 239.
132 Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 67. See also: RMCA Stanley Archive 18. Field Notebook, 31 August 1876.
Environmental factors may have further contributed to a shift that emphasised the ngwana’s religious power. Sometime between 1876 and 1878, the reed and mud dam at the source of the Lukuga River, Lake Tanganyika’s sole outlet, collapsed. This resulted in a dramatic decline in the lake’s level, from 783.6 to 772.5 metres above sea level between 1878 and 1894.\textsuperscript{135} The results of this environmental change were catastrophic to some of Lake Tanganyika’s ports. This applied particularly to the port at Kawele-Ugoy, which was the setting of the coastal traders’ most prominent market in Ujiji. Brown aptly describes this port during the nineteenth century as “shallow” and “vulnerable.”\textsuperscript{136} By the 1880s, Kawele-Ugoy’s docking point was more like a 100-metre-wide beach than a workable port.\textsuperscript{137} The problems associated with this environmental change were exacerbated by the increasing size of lacustrine craft during this period, which meant that boatmen and sailors required deeper, not shallower, ports than in previous decades. Kawele-Ugoy’s teko’s powerlessness to prevent the decline in the lake’s level may have been interpreted as his losing favour with the lake’s zimu. In this environment, lakeshore populations in this district were likely to search for new sources of religious authority. Some did this by migrating to Kigoma, one of Ujiji’s suburbs.\textsuperscript{138} Here, the port was considerably deeper, a fact that may have enhanced the perception of religious power in the teko there. Others viewed the ngwana labourers as more prominent religious leaders. They showed this by joining the coastal traders’ followings and adopting their customs.\textsuperscript{139} The ngwana’s commercial successes and efficiency at lacustrine travel represented a source of religious authority that some lakeshore populations were probably already looking for.

\textsuperscript{135} Crul, ‘Limnology and Hydrology,’ p. 34.
\textsuperscript{136} Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 2.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} See: Chapters 2, 6; Stanley, \textit{Dark Continent}, II, p. 2; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 26 February 1880; Hore, \textit{Tanganyika}, p. 90; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 45, 50.
\textsuperscript{139} See: Chapter 5.
The influence of ngwana labourers caused Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework to become increasingly commercialised. The ngwana emphasised the importance of sacrificing beads and cloth to the zimu located at the peninsulas jutting into the lake.\textsuperscript{140} By the 1880s, these practices became the most commented-on aspects of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework. Because the ngwana labourers were bound to the coastal traders, they had greater access to beads and cloth than any other trader on the lake. Furthermore, when ngwana labourers were employed on modified canoes, rather than on sailing canoes, they were often charged with leading a body of independent Jiji boatmen. This position gave them the responsibility of leading the sacrifice of beads and cloths to the lake’s zimu.\textsuperscript{141} This brought them both material wealth and social prestige.\textsuperscript{142} Commercial goods, therefore, were increasingly important to the conduct of religious rituals on the lakeshore and around the lake. Other pre-existing rituals, meanwhile, became less important to Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework. The medicine men in Ugoma continued to practice pre-launch rituals before their canoes were taken to Ujiji for modification, but similar rituals became less frequent in Ujiji.\textsuperscript{143} In any case, the Jiji teko’s lack of agency over the processes associated with sailing canoes probably negated their right to charge a fee to enact pre-launch rituals on them. After c.1860, therefore, the commercialisation of lacustrine craft and their associated religious framework enhanced the religious influence of ngwana labourers, and limited the religious power of the Jiji teko on the lakeshore.

The religious power of ngwana labourers on and around Lake Tanganyika represents an amalgamation of religious influences from different parts of East and Central Africa. The

\textsuperscript{140} NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 19 March 1874, 1, 3, 4 April 1874; A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7. Journal du P. Deniaud, 9 October 1879, 21 October 1879; Wissmann, My Second Journey, p. 258; Jacques and Storms, Notes sur l’Ethnographie, p. 84.


\textsuperscript{142} See: Chapters 3 and 5.

\textsuperscript{143} Hore, Tanganyika, p. 107; Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, p. 77.
ngwana’s presence on the shores of all lakeshore regions by the mid-1880s meant that the religious framework that they promoted permeated at least some part of every lakeshore region. This represents a part of a process that gradually integrated all the different regions of the lakeshore into a distinct sub-region that was connected by pervasive religious rituals and beliefs. As members of the coastal traders’ followings, ngwana labourers were expected to abide by some Islamic practices. These included adapting their diets and praying according to Islamic law. Such practices did not prohibit belief in the lake’s zimu. The ways in which Islam was practiced on the coast were heavily intertwined with local beliefs and rituals associated with the environment that were not prescribed for in Islamic law. When coastal traders reached Lake Tanganyika, they found that these practices were compatible with the religious beliefs about the environment in Uha and on Lake Tanganyika. The ngwana labourers’ religious role on Lake Tanganyika, therefore, was partially seen as a form of Islam. Indeed, the ngwana labourers referred to themselves as Muslims. As will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 5, their claims to ngwana and Islamic identity can be seen in a similar light to the Muslim converts described by Felicitas Becker in early-colonial southeastern German East Africa. Becker shows how new converts to Islam reconciled Islamic monotheism with pre-existing religious rituals, and that Islam was “integrated into pre-existing patterns of life.” In so doing, she promotes the idea of local agency in the Islamisation of populations in the interior, rather than the idea that they were converted by the actions of traders.

145 CWM/LMS/06/02/013 Carson to Thompson, 20 August 1888.
146 Pouwels, Horn and Crescent, pp. 65, 73.
148 CWM/LMS/06/02/006 ‘Hutley Mahommadanism in Central Africa: Its Professors,’ August 1881; Pallaver, ‘New Modes of Production,’ p. 47.
149 Becker, ‘Commoners,’ pp. 227-249.
or religious leaders from the coast.\textsuperscript{151} Similar phenomena occurred on the shores of late-nineteenth-century Lake Tanganyika. Indeed, the practice of pre-existing local rituals was particularly important to the \textit{ngwana}’s identity because no mosque was built on Lake Tanganyika’s shores until the colonial period. Adapted pre-existing rituals were thus used in place of orthodox Islamic practices as a means of asserting their Islamic identity. Their success in doing so is illustrated by the claims of one informant in Rumonge, who claimed that Islam was brought to the region by Congolese populations, rather than by coastal traders.\textsuperscript{152} These ‘Congolese’ are the \textit{ngwana} labourers of the coastal traders, the majority of whom came from Manyema (in modern-day eastern Democratic Republic of Congo). The rise of these \textit{ngwana} labourers, therefore, represents an early stage in the spread of Islam into the interior of East and Central Africa, a process which is usually seen to have started in the early colonial period.\textsuperscript{153} The Islamic beliefs and identity of \textit{ngwana} labourers were adapted to Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework.

Adapting Islam to Lake Tanganyika’s pre-existing religious framework was advantageous to the \textit{ngwana} labourers’ social position. Claiming to be \textit{ngwana} in the first instance was a mode through which they claimed rights from coastal traders that non-\textit{ngwana} could not claim. To be an \textit{ngwana} was to be of higher social standing amongst coastal populations, and gave one the right to be not regarded as a slave.\textsuperscript{154} Following some Islamic practices and claiming to be \textit{ngwana} was tied to improving the conditions of their labour and the level of respect they received from coastal traders. Additionally, it improved their social standing amongst non-Muslim lakeshore populations. It is widely reported that lakeshore populations had an ambivalent relationship with Manyema, the region from which most of the

\textsuperscript{151} See also: Glassman, \textit{Feasts and Riot}, pp. 133-145.
\textsuperscript{152} Interview with Daniel Rucintango, 7 November 2013.
ngwana labourers on the shores of Lake Tanganyika came after c.1870. On the one hand, lakeshore populations often referred to Manyema and other peoples from beyond Lake Tanganyika’s western shores as cannibals. Even if such claims were false, it is indicative of a belief that people from what is now eastern Democratic Republic of Congo were savage, to be feared, and not to be considered their equals in social terms. On the other hand, lakeshore populations associated the regions west of Lake Tanganyika with the supernatural. People in Massanze, for example, employed rainmakers from Ubembe, the mountainous region between the lake and Manyema, and commercial contacts with Katanga promoted the importation of numerous Luba and Luba-inspired idols and religious insignia throughout the nineteenth century. The migration of Manyema peoples from the west thus probably had supernatural significance for lakeshore populations. The Manyema people’s reputation for religious power, therefore, made them ideally situated to adapt Islam and Lake Tanganyika’s pre-existing religious framework to assert religious power. This also gave them the chance to leave behind previous conceptions of them as cannibals and potential slaves. The ways in which Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework was adapted to outside influences enhanced the prestige Manyema migrants amongst both coastal traders and lakeshore populations.

The growth of religious power amongst ngwana labourers also enhanced the coastal traders’ political authority. This builds on the central theme of the previous section, in which it was argued that the religious role of the Jiji teko on the lakeshore legitimised their political position. Up to c.1860, the influence of long-distance commerce strengthened their position further, by making lacustrine commerce appear as though it was dependent on their religious power. Yet, after this point, the power dynamics of this transaction shifted. Coastal traders

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156 A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 22 August 1886; Roberts, A Dance of Assassins, p. 231; Reefe, Rainbow and the Kings, p. 127.
became the owners of the canoes with the most powerful *dawa*, and they were the main suppliers of beads and cloths that were sacrificed to the *zimu* at the lakeshore’s peninsulas. Implicitly, therefore, coastal traders had a great deal of influence over the nature of religious authority on the lakeshore. This highlights the increasing importance of commercial power for the exertion of political authority.\(^{157}\) This does not mean that religious power became less important to the construction of lakeshore societies, however. Rather, it reflects an adaptation of Lake Tanganyika’s pre-existing religious framework that was representative of the increasing prominence of commerce in lacustrine societies. Furthermore, it reflects an acceptance amongst the coastal traders that their Islamic beliefs were adaptable to the lakeshore environment. The intersection of Islam and Lake Tanganyika’s pre-existing religious framework brought the coastal traders and their followers social prestige amongst lakeshore populations. In this context, it is not correct to merely state that political authority was increasingly tied to commercial power as a one-way process. The success of lacustrine voyages and commercial transactions remained associated with religious power, and this religious power remained important in lakeshore populations’ perceptions of political authority.

**Technological and Political Change in the 1880s**

During the 1880s, two alternative forms of lacustrine craft were developed on Lake Tanganyika. These were *dhows* and iron boats. *Dhows* were the dominant form of sea-faring vessel in the Western Indian Ocean region. There were (and continue to be) numerous different types of *dhow*, and all have different shapes, sizes, and purposes. In some ways, nineteenth-century *dhows* were similar to Lake Tanganyika’s sailing canoes. They both had masts, and sails, for example, and many had decks. The distinction between *dhows* and sailing canoes in the context of this thesis is that sailing canoes were made with the base of a Goma canoe, and

**dhow**s were not. Instead, **dhow**s were made like many on the coast: that is, with a base of planks that were attached together with nails or tied together with leather. What is referred to as a **dhow** on Lake Tanganyika during the 1880s, therefore, resembled a **jahazi** on the coast, more than they did the smaller **ngalawa**.\(^{158}\) Iron boats on Lake Tanganyika came in two forms. Firstly, as canoes powered by oars and sails (hereafter: iron sailing canoes), and secondly as steamers, powered by steam engines. The materials and technologies required to build iron boats were brought overland from the coast by Europeans.\(^{159}\) The importance of **dhow**s and iron boats in the context of the previous discussion is that they were entirely imported technologies. They were the first forms of lacustrine craft to traverse Lake Tanganyika that were not built with the base of a dugout canoe carved on the lakeshore. This meant that no part of their design was made specifically with the appeasement of the lake’s **zimu** in mind. These technological developments challenged the role that Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework had in lakeshore society. This section argues that the development of **dhow**s and iron boats on Lake Tanganyika was symbolic of a prevailing trend that increased the importance of military and commercial power as the bases for political authority.\(^{160}\) Even so, the ways in which **dhow**s and iron boats were perceived by lakeshore populations lends itself to viewing them within the context of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework.

It is important not to overstate the practical importance of **dhow**s and iron boats. This statement is similar to those which are given in analyses of Lake Victoria’s **dhow**s in this period. Hartwig argues that **dhow**s are “better understood as a supplementary means of transportation.”\(^{161}\) Despite the emergence of **dhow**s on Lake Victoria in the 1880s, Ganda canoes remained the dominant form of lacustrine transport. Similarly, modified canoes and, to

\(^{158}\) Gilbert, *Dhows and the Colonial Economy*, pp. 36-51; Agius, *In the Wake of the Dhow*, pp. 96-97, 116-117.

\(^{159}\) Hore, *To Lake Tanganyika in a Bath Chair*, p. 212; ZNA AA1/30 Kirk to Lord Granville, 20 July 1882.

\(^{160}\) Iliffe, *A Modern History*, p. 53.

a lesser extent, sailing canoes far outnumbered both dhows and iron boats on Lake Tanganyika throughout the 1880s. Indeed, Lake Tanganyika only had one dhow in this period. This was completed in either 1879 or just before, and was owned by Rumaliza, the most prominent member of Ujiji’s Omani faction at this time. Mwinyi Kheri was said to have been building a similar craft to Rumaliza’s in 1879, but there is no indication that it was ever completed. Unfortunately, there are no pictures of Rumaliza’s dhow, and the primary sources do not refer to its design other than to say that it was the only non-European-owned sailing craft on Lake Tanganyika that was not built with the base of an Goma canoe.\textsuperscript{162} The lack of technical details as to the design of Rumaliza’s dhow mean that it is impossible to specify what type of dhow it actually was.\textsuperscript{163} In reality, it probably incorporated features from a range of Indian Ocean styles. Nevertheless, given Rumaliza’s origins and the lack of Goma canoe in its construction, it is almost certain that the technological knowledge and labour necessary to build such a craft was imported from the coast.\textsuperscript{164} Once completed, one missionary described it as “very superior to [all other boats on the lake],” and another described it as the “most beautiful [form of lacustrine craft built by non-Europeans on the lakeshore].”\textsuperscript{165} This discourse indicates that it is likely to have travelled around the lake with greater efficiency than any craft made with the base of an Goma canoe. Rumaliza, his followers, and the broader Omani faction of coastal traders also owned many modified and sailing canoes.\textsuperscript{166} His dhow, therefore, was just one of many forms of lacustrine craft that he and his followers used to travel around the lake.
There were three iron boats on Lake Tanganyika during the 1880s. The first to be built was the *Cambier*, which was a steamer of around 22 feet in length and was owned by the International African Association (Association International Africaine, AIA). It was completed in 1881, but after a breakage and a subsequent lack of spare parts, it soon fell into disuse.\(^{167}\) In any case, its small size meant that it was no more efficient than one of Lake Tanganyika’s sailing canoes. Indeed, after the *Cambier* became obsolete, the members of the AIA continued to make innovations to sailing canoe technologies. One such innovation was the use of ambatch trees as caulking and as the providers of additional strength.\(^{168}\) They used this method to build the *Strauch*, a sailing canoe with two masts, four sails, and a tonnage that enabled it to carry 150 men. This meant that it was about 25 per cent larger than the largest of the coastal traders’ sailing canoes.\(^{169}\) The other two iron boats on Lake Tanganyika were owned by the London Missionary Society (LMS). The first to be constructed was an iron sailing canoe, powered by oars, called the *Morning Star*. This was launched in 1883.\(^{170}\) The second was the *SS Good News*, which was first launched in 1885 as an iron sailing canoe, but which eventually had a steam engine fitted in 1887.\(^{171}\) Just like the AIA’s *Cambier* and Rumaliza’s *dhow*, the *Morning Star* and *SS Good News* were part of a larger fleet of lacustrine craft. The LMS, most notably, adapted sailing canoes called the *Calabash* and the *Alfajiri* to fit their purposes.\(^{172}\) One of their most noteworthy innovations was the addition of a second mast and sail.\(^{173}\) The members of the LMS also periodically rented sailing canoes from coastal traders when they required

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\(^{167}\) RMCA HA.01.017-6. Storms to AIA, January 1885.

\(^{168}\) RMCA HA.01.017-6. Storms to AIA, 15 November 1883. The Latin name for an ambatch tree is *aeschynomene elaphroxylon*. Ambatch trees grow up to nine metres in length, are about 20 centimetres wide, and have strong but bendable, spiny stems that were ideal for this usage.

\(^{169}\) RMCA HA.01.017-6. Storms to AIA, January 1885.

\(^{170}\) CWM/LMS/06/02/008 Hore to Whitehouse, 25 May 1883; Hore, *Tanganyika*, p. 222.

\(^{171}\) CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Swann to Thompson, 7 March 1885, Brooks to Thompson, 2 August 1885; Hore, *Tanganyika*, pp. 252, 280; CWM/LMS/06/02/012 Carson to Thompson, 11 September 1887.

\(^{172}\) CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore, ‘Launch of the “Calabash,”’ 9 December 1878; Hore, *Tanganyika*, p. 251; CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Hore to Thompson, 10 February 1885.

\(^{173}\) CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore, ‘Launch of the “Calabash,”’ 9 December 1878.
additional transport or when one of their lacustrine craft was being repaired. Dhows and iron boats were supplementary forms of lacustrine craft to the more prominent modified and sailing canoes.

Dhows and iron boats were more important for their symbolic impact than for their practical uses. Their construction affected the role of lacustrine craft and their associated religious framework in lakeshore society. Even though dhows and iron boats were imported technologies and not built with the base of Goma canoes, lakeshore populations still viewed them in terms of the creation of dawa and the appeasement of the lake’s zimu. This was first hinted at by Hore’s translations, in which he states that Jiji populations referred to the Morning Star as an “iron canoe.” The use of this terminology indicates a belief in a level of conceptual parity between existing forms of Goma canoe and the new form of lacustrine craft imported by the members of the LMS. Links between new technologies and Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework are more explicit in Swann’s account of a Lungu man’s perception of the SS Good News. As it was being constructed, the man did not believe that it would float because it was made of iron. When he was proven wrong, he declared to Swann: “You put medicine into it!” This ‘medicine’ would have been a dawa to appease the lake’s zimu that allowed it to float, despite its material. There are no comparable accounts of how Rumaliza’s dhow was viewed in the context of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework. However, given the precedent of how the LMS’s iron boats were incorporated into this framework, and the fact it was manned by ngwana labourers, who, as detailed above, perpetuated beliefs and practices associated with zimu in the lake, it is likely that it was viewed as having some kind of dawa as well. Also, owing to Rumaliza’s origins on the coast, it is likely to have had oculi painted on

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174 Hore, Tanganyika, p. 278; CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hore, ‘Launch of the “Calabash,”’ 9 December 1878; CWM/LMS/06/02/007 Griffith to Thomson, 16 October 1882.
175 Hore, Tanganyika, p. 222.
176 Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters, pp. 99-100.
177 Ibid. p. 102. Emphasis in the original.
it, although no first-hand evidence verifies this explicitly. These examples show the continued adaptability of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework to technological developments in lacustrine transport.

The continued belief in lacustrine craft as religious objects was problematic to the European owners of iron boats. Armed with the aim of converting lakeshore populations to Christianity, the members of the LMS sought to undermine Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework, and not to have their technologies incorporated into it.\textsuperscript{178} When they did increase the size of their followings in this period, it is widely acknowledged that this was not the result of religious teaching. Instead, they did so by ‘purchasing the freedom of slaves’ and obliging them to work on their stations (in the case of the AIA and White Fathers) or by providing a safe settlement for people to flee to when their villages were attacked by traders or raiders (LMS, White Fathers, and AIA).\textsuperscript{179} Once settled, new arrivals were baptised and declared Christians. Even then, and much to the chagrin of the missionaries, many of these new Christians continued to practice local religious rituals, including those associated with lacustrine craft and \textit{zimu} in the lake.\textsuperscript{180} In the case of the LMS, this may have occurred precisely because of the ways in which they used their lacustrine craft, particularly at Niamkolo, in Ulungu. High levels of violence near to the LMS’s station caused periodic food shortages throughout the 1880s. Consequently, the members of the LMS used their sailing canoes and iron boats to purchase food for their stations from Ufipa, where it was more abundant.\textsuperscript{181} As

\textsuperscript{178} Becker, ‘Commoners,’ pp. 242-243.
\textsuperscript{180} McCaskie, ‘Cultural Encounters,’ p. 679; Iliffe, \textit{A Modern History}, pp. 86-87; CWM/LMS/06/02/014 Jones to Thompson, 23 January 1889; A.G.M.Afr. Diare de Mpala, 23 November 1885.
\textsuperscript{181} CWM/LMS/06/02/008 Swann to Whitehouse, 30 October 1883, Hore to Whitehouse, 25 September - 11 November 1883; CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Swann to Thompson, 7 March 1885, Brooks to Thompson, 16 July 1885.
Oliver argues, this probably attracted more followers to them.\footnote{Oliver, \textit{The Missionary Factor}, p. 70.} However, it probably also associated their lacustrine craft with the ability to produce the miracle of food in a time of shortage. If seen through the lens of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework, the iron boats’ absence and then return with plentiful food could have been seen as indicative of an incredibly powerful \textit{dawa}. Clearly, then, perceptions of Christianity amongst lakeshore populations were intertwined with the lake’s pre-existing religious framework, just as the missionaries’ iron boats were intertwined with beliefs about the need for \textit{dawa} to appease the lake’s \textit{zimu}.

In contrast to the Europeans’ usage of iron boats during the 1880s, Rumaliza explicitly used his \textit{dhow} as a symbol of political power. This represents a degree of continuity with the analysis in the previous two sections, in which it was argued that Jiji \textit{teko} on the lakeshore and coastal traders used Goma, modified, and sailing canoes to support their political authority. No doubt, the ‘beauty’ and probable speed and size advantages of Rumaliza’s \textit{dhow} gave the impression that he owned a powerful \textit{dawa} that appeased the lake’s \textit{zimu} in a particularly effective way.\footnote{C.16-7. Journal du P. Deniaud, 10 April 1881.} However, the ways in which Rumaliza’s craft was used in the 1880s mean it cannot solely be considered from this perspective. Rumaliza’s \textit{dhow} was primarily a military vessel. European accounts report it as a carrier of guns, ammunition, and of Rumaliza’s armed associates.\footnote{RMCA HA.01.017-27 Journal du Lieutenant Storms,’ 29 May 1885; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Karema, 2 November 1892.} When it docked on the lakeshore, it was often for the purpose of attacking a locality for plunder, imposing his followers as chiefs through violence to secure a new trade route, or extracting \textit{hongo} (tribute) from lakeshore populations.\footnote{A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Massanze, 26 June 1881.} These transactions caused Rumaliza’s \textit{dhow} to become increasingly symbolic of military power. Such symbolism led the White Fathers stationed at Kibanga to state that, “only the apparition [of Rumaliza’s \textit{dhow}]
scares the residents of the lake.\textsuperscript{186} The sight of it caused lakeshore populations to flee into the lake’s mountainous surrounds. The perceived military strength that accompanied ownership of Lake Tanganyika’s sole \textit{dhow} in the 1880s was indicative of the increasing importance of military power to political authority. Therefore, by the end of the 1880s, political power on the lakeshore was increasingly exerted through military and commercial means, even if it continued to be perceived in religious terms.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Lakeshore populations regarded all lacustrine craft on Lake Tanganyika as, among other things, religious objects during the era of long-distance commerce. These religious objects were used and adapted for commercial and military purposes. This had two broad-based and inter-linked consequences for lakeshore society. Firstly, Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework became increasingly commercialised. That is, as lacustrine craft were adapted for the purposes of commerce, so too was Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework. This meant that religious rituals were increasingly tied to the supply of expensive imported goods, and religious power was associated with the profitability of lacustrine commercial voyages. This shift gave increasing amounts of religious power to the traders who owned or used the most efficient forms of lacustrine transport. The importance of lacustrine and long-distance traders in this context meant that this religious framework spread all over Lake Tanganyika, when, at the beginning of the era of long-distance commerce, it was centred in Ujiji and Ugoma. Such is representative of an emerging cultural phenomenon that bound the lakeshore together, and which was a crucial component of the lake’s frontier culture. The \textit{ngwana} labourers of the coastal traders, who were mostly from Manyema, were the most prominent actors in this context. Their incorporation of Islamic and lakeshore beliefs and their position on the most

\textsuperscript{186} A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 23 December 1887.
efficient forms of lacustrine craft allowed them to garner respect from lakeshore populations and coastal traders alike. The intricacies of their relationship with coastal traders are explored in greater depth in the following chapter via analysis of the conditions of their labour. Secondly, the commercial and military uses of lacustrine craft shifted the role of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework in lakeshore society. Up to c.1860, the religious power harnessed through ownership and use of Goma canoes was the most central attribute of political authority. This political power was augmented by the incorporation of commercial elements into it. Political leaders exerted their authority through commercial transactions and military power from their lacustrine craft. Nevertheless, this authority continued to have religious connotations to how it was perceived. Finally, regardless of the time-period, the fastest and largest lacustrine craft were always used as tools or symbols of political authority. This represents the adaptability of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework and the broader elements that comprised its shores’ political structures.
Chapter 5: Labour: “Complex and Conflicting Gradations of Servitude”

The expansion of commercial networks in East and Central Africa during the nineteenth century was dependent on a concurrent expansion of the labour force. Long-distance traders required numerous labourers to perform roles as part of their caravans and in commercial centres. These roles included, but were not limited to: porters to carry their goods, farmers and fishermen to feed their caravans and the people living at their trading stations, boatmen to transport them across bodies of water, soldiers to protect them and their goods, and commercial agents to trade their goods on their behalves in distant regions. This chapter examines the conditions under which these labourers were employed, the agency that they held in different contexts, and the consequences labour force expansion had for societies on the lakeshore and elsewhere in East and Central Africa. It argues that the most crucial dynamics in this context were the gender and age of the labourer, the aims and cultural background of the employer, and the temporal and spatial setting in which labour roles were negotiated. In so doing, it argues that the ways in which these factors intersected contributed to the formation of ‘complex and conflicting gradations of servitude.’ This phrase was used by William Clarence-Smith in his analysis of slavery and abolition in Islamic societies. It reflects a situation in which the social status of the labourer and the conditions of his or her labour are fluid, hard to categorise, and subject to change over time. Clarence-Smith argues that these phenomena were particularly common in regions where Muslims had only recently entered. In regions such as these, Islamic and local customs were likely to blend with each other in a way that created contradictory and

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1 Phrase taken from: Clarence-Smith, Islam and the Abolition, p. 2.
3 Clarence-Smith, Islam and the Abolition, p. 2.
unfixed categorisations of labour.\textsuperscript{5} Given the intersection between Islam, Lake Tanganyika’s, and other religious frameworks, described in the previous chapter, the relevance of Clarence-Smith’s terminology for this chapter is clear.

In focusing on gender, age, and culture, this chapter takes a different approach to most other analyses of labour in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa. Most scholars analyse labour in this spatial and temporal context in terms of slavery, and of a growing slave trade that fuelled an expansion of this institution. Collectively, this body of work explains how increased levels of violence generated large amounts of war captives who were then sold, often over long distances, to slave owners in commercial centres.\textsuperscript{6} In turn, the wealth available from raiding and trading captives contributed to increased levels of violence.\textsuperscript{7} Once they were traded, captives were coerced into working for their new masters.\textsuperscript{8} These captives lost connections to their kin in their place of origin, and they had no kinship links within their new society. This led them to suffer what Orlando Patterson refers to as “social death,” or, in the words of other historians, they became “outsiders,” meaning that they could be owned and they did not have access to the same rights, privileges, or kinship relations as established citizens (“insiders”).\textsuperscript{9}

Nevertheless, some studies have shown that, over time, the position of slaves in nineteenth-

\textsuperscript{7} Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, pp. 109, 119; Roberts, \textit{A Dance of Assassins}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{8} Iliffe, \textit{A Modern History}, p. 74; Deutsch, ‘Some Notes on the Rise,’ p. 92; Hanson, ‘Stolen People,’ pp. 161-162; Page, ‘The Manyema Hordes,’ p. 76.
century East and Central Africa had the propensity to gradually improve. Bennett touched upon this phenomenon in his 1987 work, by writing:

[The coastal traders’ labourers] doubtless shared the feelings of a Banda man of similar status: becoming a slave, he recounted, “happened once, and all was soon over. Then you were given a home, food, cloths, etc., and above all a gun; you were a man.”

This feeds into other analyses by Northrup, Rockel, Page, Iliffe, and Hanson, for example, which show that some slaves gained their freedom after a period of captivity, and became free waged labourers, traders, or influential political figures thereafter. Others have equated this process with a gradual gaining of respect, to the extent that slaves could contest their status as slaves and gradually claim more agency over the terms of their labour. This implies that the levels of coercion involved in slave labour decreased over time, and that some slaves could develop new kinship relations outside of the master-slave relationship in their new societies. Thus, after their initial ‘social death,’ some slaves experienced a kind of ‘social resurrection’ that redefined the nature of their labour roles and social position to the extent that they may have become ‘insiders.’ The condition of slavery was, therefore, neither fixed nor absolute. Acknowledging this provokes analysis that looks beyond this term as a tool to understand the different forms of labour. Indeed, slavery can be regarded as just one gradation of servitude within a broader range of labour forms and social statuses.

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10 Deutsch, ‘Some Notes on the Rise,’ p. 92; Page, ‘The Manyema Hordes,’ pp. 74, 79-80, 84; Northrup, Beyond the Bend, pp. 24, 28, 29; Rockel, Carriers, p. 18.
12 Northrup, Beyond the Bend, p. 28; Rockel, Carriers, p. 18; Page, ‘The Manyema Hordes,’ p. 80; Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 48; Hanson, ‘Stolen People,’ p. 168.
There are numerous reasons for emphasising the importance of numerous gradations of servitude, rather than analysing these gradations in terms of their relationship to slavery, in this case study. One of these pertains to the sources and their usage. The first authors to use ‘slavery’ as the central paradigm to understand labour in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa were the European explorers and missionaries whose works make up the bulk of the source material for this thesis. They wrote at a time when European ideas about Africa were increasingly ‘racialised.’ Within this context, Reid used a case study on eastern and northeastern Africa to show how the nature of European texts contributed to a misunderstanding of warfare in its nineteenth-century history.\(^\text{14}\) He argues that warfare was an innovative and entrepreneurial process, and not merely a long-term self-replicating pattern of slave raiding, kidnapping, and indiscriminate violence, as the discourse of the sources would have had their readers believe.\(^\text{15}\) This chapter argues that a similar process occurred in regards to labour and slavery. As McCaskie states, explorers and missionaries entering Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century were heavily influenced by a rising anti-slavery zeal that, at that time, permeated European thinking.\(^\text{16}\) This was especially true in regards to East Africa after the death of David Livingstone in 1874. Livingstone was vehemently against what he saw as slave trades and slavery in Africa. His idea was to bring the three ‘C’\’s (commerce, Christianity, and civilisation) to Africa to expunge these ‘afflictions’ from the continent.\(^\text{17}\) Indeed, this ideology explicitly permeated the London Missionary Society’s decision to found a station on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. In the declaration that a lakeshore mission was to be founded, Joseph Mullens, the LMS’ foreign secretary, quoted Livingstone extensively and

\(^{14}\) Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, Ch. 1.
\(^{15}\) Ibid.
\(^{17}\) Chrétien, L’invention de l’Afrique, p. 61.
noted Ujiji’s importance in his travels as a core reason for directing evangelism there.\textsuperscript{18} For the explorers and missionaries, counter-acting what they saw as a slave trade and slavery was intrinsic to their being in East and Central Africa.

The central problem with explorer and missionary motivations is that they contributed to what Rockel calls an “obsession with slavery” in their reports, and this obsession has since permeated modern historical literature.\textsuperscript{19} Europeans went into Africa during the nineteenth century with preconceptions about the conditions that labourers worked under. They thus conflated numerous different forms of labour that they did not immediately recognise as ‘free-waged labour’ with forms of slavery.\textsuperscript{20} Such a binary view of labour relations probably increased the sense of racialisation associated with this discourse. Missionaries (and particularly those of the LMS) struggled to gain converts on the lakeshore. Often, they saw the reasons for their failures as being associated with their potential converts’ attachments to slavery and the slave trade.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, their drive to gain converts became associated with a crusade against slavery, and long-term frustration at the lack of converts led the importance of the slave trade and of slavery in the societies they reported on to be over-stated.\textsuperscript{22} Rockel showed this process in action in his analysis of Nyamwezi pagazi, who, he argued, were free-waged porters.\textsuperscript{23} In so doing, he contested the missionaries’ statements, and much of the historical discourse that stemmed from such statements, which refer to them as slaves. He did this by re-interpreting some aspects of the missionaries sources within the context described


\textsuperscript{19} Rockel, \textit{Carriers}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 9-10; Wright, \textit{Strategies of Slaves}, p. 8; Médard, ‘Introduction,’ in \textit{Traites}, pp. 12-16.

\textsuperscript{21} CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 16 April 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/007 Griffith to Thomson, 13 March 1882; CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Harris to Thompson, 15 March 1885.

\textsuperscript{22} McCaskie, ‘Cultural Encounters,’ p. 686; Bennett, \textit{Arab Versus European}, pp. 96, 99.

\textsuperscript{23} Rockel, \textit{Carriers}, pp. 1-33.
above, and by referring to a wide historiography of slavery and labour. The intention here is to take Rockel’s methodology closer to its logical extremity. It looks beyond the prevailing discourse in the primary documents, and re-interprets them in a way that does not correspond to their authors’ ‘obsession with slavery.’ It then also looks beyond the binary of slavery versus free-waged labour, a model that Rockel partially accepts. It is within this context that the various gradations of servitude come into view.

Building on Rockel’s work in this way is provoked by three further phenomena. The first comes from the historiography of slavery on the African continent and in the Indian Ocean World. The earliest and most important text in this context is Miers and Kopytoff’s volume, written in 1977. Many of Miers and Kopytoff’s core arguments remain applicable, despite some revisions in more recent histories that use different terminology. The central point of Miers and Kopytoff’s opening chapter is that discussions about slavery – in the English language, particularly – are dominated by popular images of chattel slavery on plantations in the southern United States and British Caribbean. What has been considered slavery in Africa, by nineteenth-century commentators and modern historians alike, they argue, does not correspond to these images. Of course, these popular images are problematic. Individual slaves in the northwestern Atlantic world found ways to acquire agency over time in a fashion that contravenes the idea of being a chattel in perpetuity, for example. Nevertheless, the popular images persist, and, as Miers and Kopytoff argue, it is important to distinguish them

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24 Ibid.
from forms of servitude on the African continent, just as it is important to note the occasions in which some slaves in North America gained agency over time. Yet, as Cooper argues, there was not merely one type of ‘African’ slavery. Thus, what emerges from the combination of African, American, popular, and Islamic discourses regarding slavery is both convoluted and conflicting. This is particularly difficult to untangle in this history of Lake Tanganyika, a region characterised by long-term encounters between numerous peoples and cultures, the nature of which shifted over time in a way that likely led to near constant negotiations of labour conditions. The singular term, slavery, does not do justice to the multiple and changing forms of servitude described here.

Interpreting the oral record also supports analysing labour beyond the idea of slavery. Informants in Ujiji sought to minimise the importance of slavery in the history of their town and elsewhere on the lakeshore. They discussed the relationship between coastal traders and Manyema populations, which is often seen as one being characterised by the relationship between masters and slaves in archival sources and in the historiography. They contested this notion. They claimed that Omani traders, in particular, were “close” to the Manyema, and that the former treated the latter well when they were their labourers. Furthermore, many Manyema peoples inherited the coastal traders’ property, a phenomenon that, in the eyes of my informants, meant that they should not be considered slaves. Subsequent studies have shown

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33 The usefulness of such sources to the theme of slavery in East African history was recently indicated in: Médard, ‘Introduction,’ in Slavery, p. 4.
Manyema people’s claims to property ownership in Ujiji are verifiable, and that groups of these Manyema became important political actors in the colonial and post-colonial periods. Nevertheless, informants did not dispute the idea that slavery, or at least a slave trade, existed in the vicinity Lake Tanganyika. They claimed, however, that slaves were not absorbed by the internal demand of the lakeshore. In their collective memories, slaves were traded over long-distances to the east, and often beyond East Africa’s coast. This is also the official narrative contained in museums commemorating the nineteenth century in Tanzania, such as the Livingstone Museum in Ujiji and Livingstone’s Tembe in Tabora. Recently historians have shown such a pattern on slave migration to be false: slaves taken from as far away as Lake Tanganyika were rarely, if ever, traded at the coast. A further misconception in the oral record appeared in Burundi. Informants there claimed that the long-distance slave trade between Lake Tanganyika and the coast (which did not exist) was directed towards the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This information shows that the use of ‘slavery’ as the key term to describe labour relations in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa has created a feedback loop. Lake Tanganyika’s modern inhabitants have equated slavery with popular images from the Americas. Their denial about the historical existence of slavery in their communities is part of

39 See also: Caravan Serai Museum and Roman Catholic Mission in Tabora, and the books that are available in their bookshops: Henschel, The Two Worlds; Henschel, 1868-1893 Bagamoyo Catholic Mission; Henschel, Descendants of Former Slaves; Henschel, 19th Century Humans as Merchandise; Interview with Hamisi Kaloka, 16 October 2013.
41 Interview with Remy Ngiriye, 4 November 2013; Interview with Simeon Sindimwo & Venant Baragasirika, 5 November 2013; Interview with Silas Bujana, 5 November 2013; Interview with Saidi Hamisi Kunga, 11 November 2013.
a well-founded denial that such conditions existed on the lakeshore. Their belief that a long-distance slave trade existed may be part of a process in which informants tried to marry this denial to the official history that slavery and the slave trade was prevalent in this period. The different conceptions of slavery in popular and historical discourses have led to contradictions in the oral record.

Finally, histories of the early colonial period indicate the validity of interpreting labour in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa beyond a ‘slave-free’ binary. Deutsch, for example, shows that there was a high degree of continuity in labour forms in what became German East Africa between the second half of the nineteenth century and the early colonial period.\(^{42}\) He argues that slaves became ‘emancipated’ via a gradual process in which they claimed more individual rights and agency over a long period of time, and that their doing so pre-dated the arrival of European colonial powers and the ‘official’ the abolition of slavery.\(^{43}\) This is opposed to the view that the imposition of colonial rule represented a sharp end to pre-existing labour forms and slavery. Such a perspective sheds more light on the gradual rise of Manyema populations in Ujiji during the colonial period as property owners and important political actors.\(^{44}\) Their rise in this context can be viewed as a long-term process that began with in the nineteenth century. While they may have arrived at the lakeshore as slaves, they gradually asserted their rights to autonomy. No doubt, certain conditions of the colonial period aided this process. In 1899, for example, 2,000 refugees from what was then the eastern Congo Free State settled in Ujiji, and joined with pre-existing Manyema populations in a way that enhanced their respective statuses.\(^{45}\) Yet, given Deutsch’s analysis, it is likely that Manyema


\(^{43}\) Deutsch, *Emancipation Without Abolition*, pp. 53-82.


populations began asserting themselves in a similar fashion before this as well. The implication here is that the process by which Manyema populations became important political actors in Ujiji occurred over a long period of time. If some among them were considered slaves at some point during the nineteenth century (something that the oral record disputes, but which is explored further below), then their position in society and the nature of their labour probably went through numerous transformations before they became property owners and important political actors. Analysis of the discourses about slavery, the oral record, and histories of the early colonial period causes the distinctions between ‘slave’ and ‘free’ to become blurred.

Questioning the utility of slavery as the central lens through which to analyse labour in this thesis leads to a re-evaluation of one prominent aspect of the historiography from a logical standpoint. It is widely accepted that most of the people who were sold into slavery in the interior were women and children. Men, on the other hand, were perceived as too likely to run away, and so they fetched such a little price that it was not worth escorting them to a slave market to be sold. Thus, during slave raids, it was customary to attempt to kill the male kin of the captured women and children. This served a further purpose, in that it severed the women and children’s kinship links to their former homes, and so gave them less motivation to attempt to flee to their former homes. Despite acknowledgement of this demographic, some of the most prominent labourers in the sources and the historiography of nineteenth-century East and Central Africa have been termed “armed slaves,” who were almost exclusively male. For the most part, these were the armed followers of coastal traders. Their jobs included protecting the


47 Northrup, *Beyond the Bend*, p. 19.

coastal traders and their interests, and trading and fighting battles on their behalves. There is thus a contradiction in the discourse, in which most of the people who were sold into slavery were women or children, while some of the most prominent ‘slaves’ were men. Indeed, as Page points out, many of these male ‘slaves’ came to be so by voluntarily joining the coastal traders’ followings. Clearly, a distinction needs to be made between the routes to servitude that trafficked women and children and volunteer men experienced. Additionally, such gendered differences provide a lens for understanding the different labour conditions and social roles that different labourers took based on gender, rather than on the slave-free binary.

This is not to argue that the idea of slavery was unimportant in this period. Indeed, histories of labour that focus on slavery in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa provide many of the key themes that permeate this chapter. These include brutality, coercion, and exploitation. These are also common themes that describe the condition of slaves in various other contexts. The intention here is not to disregard these themes. Rather, it is to state that they are applicable to varying degrees at different times. This applies at both an individual and institutional level. For example, the extent to which individual labourers were coerced to work depended on numerous factors, such as age, gender, and the aims and culture of masters. Additionally, in some instances, as slaves spent more time in their masters’ company, voluntary aspects to their labour emerged and the masters’ need to coerce them decreased.

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49 ZNA AA1/23 Hore to Kirk, 14 April 1879; Jacques and Storms, Notes sur l’Ethnographie, pp. 66-67.
51 Copper, ‘The Problem of Slavery,’ pp. 103-125; Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, pp. 35-76; Lovejoy, Transformations, pp. 1-2.
century. Alpers, for example, shows how a system of pawnship (in which people are exchanged as collateral for debt) became increasingly linked to slavery and the slave trade on the East African coast.\(^{54}\) Pawns were often sold into an Indian Ocean slave trade centred on Zanzibar before they could be returned to their origins after the payment of debt. In this instance, the distinction between pawnship and slavery became blurred, as the former became more brutalised and exploitative.\(^{55}\) Elsewhere, such shifts have been referred to as ‘transformations in slavery.’\(^{56}\) Yet, it is clear from Rockel’s analysis, for example, that some of these themes also apply to free-waged labourers. He argues that Nyamwezi pagazi were subject to similar levels of brutality in the conduct of their labour roles to people who have elsewhere been considered slaves. Disease and malnutrition were just as likely to afflict free-waged labourers as they were slaves, for example.\(^{57}\) Themes that are prevalent in histories of slavery are also applicable to histories of other forms of labour, including free-waged labour, and so are also prevalent here.

Slavery, and the idea of people being enslaved, also provides a useful lens to understand social hierarchies on the lakeshore. For a full exploration of the reasons why this is the case, it is useful to look at the history of Zanzibar and the Mrima coast. From the perspective of people living in these regions, people could be divided into two categories: ngwana and shenzi. Ngwana was a term that signified honour and respect. To be an ngwana meant that one was a resident of a coastal town and a Muslim.\(^{58}\) It was illegal under Islamic law for an ngwana to be enslaved (though the extent to which someone’s claims to conversion were recognised

\(^{55}\) A similar transition has been observed on the West Coast of Africa: Vansina, Paths in the Rainforests, p. 207.
\(^{56}\) Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, pp. 1-18; Rossi, ‘Introduction: Rethinking,’ p. 8; Manning, Slavery and African Life, Ch. 7.
\(^{57}\) Rockel, Carriers, p. 132.
Tapping into this dynamic, the term, ngwana, has frequently been translated to mean ‘freeborn.’ Thus, being an ngwana was also tied to being born on the coast into a kinship network headed by someone that was also ngwana. Shenzi, meanwhile, were seen to be people who originated in the interior. They were non-Muslims, and, according to coastal customs, slaves were to be taken from these shenzi populations. Once enslaved, these slaves were referred to as tumwa (Swahili: ‘one who is sent or used’). Yet, shenzi slaves also negotiated their status on the coast over time. Having spent a long time in their masters’ household, many assimilated to coastal customs and claimed to be ngwana. This was an attempt to claim respect in their new societies and to distinguish themselves from newly-arrived slaves. The process by which they did so was contested and went through many stages, and many coastal peoples resisted their slaves’ claims. For example, even those who gained status within their masters’ household were often barred from participating in coastal festivals and from attending mosques. Such rights were often only granted to the children of slaves who had assimilated to coastal customs and who were recognised as a member of a coastal resident’s kin. Yet, by claiming to be ngwana after a period of time on the coast, shenzi who originated the interior contested their labelling as slaves, and claimed honour and respectability in coastal society. Being a slave was dishonourable and symbolic of low status, and so slaves sought to assimilate to their masters’ culture to become respected their new societies.

61 Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 65; Northrup, Beyond the Bend, p. 24.
62 McMahon, Slavery and Emancipation, p. 15; Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 73.
63 Iliffe, Honour, p. 136; Glassman, Feasts and Riot, p. 41; Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition, 75.
64 Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition, p. 68; Glassman, Feasts and Riot, p. 23.
A similar transition from slave to respectability is observable on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, though in a slightly modified form. On the coast, routes to respectability were restricted by long-established rituals and socio-political hierarchies. The institutional strength of these hierarchies meant that elites had the power to refuse people the right of entry to festivals and mosques, when attendance of these phenomena was crucial for the assertion of respectability.67 Similar institutions did not exist on Lake Tanganyika. This was a frontier region with numerous social and political hierarchies, many of which were in flux due to the encounters caused by long-distance trade. Shifts in the nature of political authority and in the principal power holders on the lakeshore, described in the previous chapters, are evidence for this.68 Meanwhile, coastal traders, who emerged as some of the lakeshore’s most important political actors, were few in number and were reliant on the bravery and agency of their armed followers and proxy traders for the conduct of their business.69 They thus had to induce them to stay with them via the provision of material or social benefits. This necessity was made starker by the numerous opportunities that labourers had to run away and find work elsewhere. The openness of much of Africa’s environment represented a vast frontier into which runaway slaves could flee if they felt abused, and the coming and going of long-distance caravans gave them cover, security, and opportunities to become free-waged labourers if they chose to do so.70 Many former slaves, for example, became free-waged porters.71 The weakness of Lake

68 See also: Wright, *Strategies of Slaves*, p. 31.
69 See: Chapter 2; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 106.
71 Northrup, *Beyond the Bend*, p. 28; Rockel, *Carriers*, p. 18.
Tanganyika’s institutions and long-distance traders’ reliance on specialised labour gave more power to labourers to negotiate the conditions of their labour than on the coast. Additionally, as shown in Chapter 4, this also gave some labourers the power to appropriate and adapt different religious beliefs to enhance their social position. Instead of relying on their masters and their new societies’ elites for respectability, they, the labourers (some of which were slaves or former slaves), shaped some of the routes to respectability themselves.

For many labourers on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, therefore, slavery was thus more of a social category than it was a term that accurately reflected the conditions under which they laboured. The weakness of the lakeshore’s social hierarchies and the tenuousness of the potential masters’ position meant that the condition of being a slave was almost certainly very brief. Slaves – whether trafficked or voluntarily in servitude – could expect material inducements and social opportunities from staying bonded to their master. This improved their social position on the lakeshore, distinguished them from newly-arrived labourers who were considered slaves, and allowed them to take agency over the conditions of their labour and their relationships with their masters, former masters, and other lakeshore populations. If such benefits did not appear to be forthcoming, the arrival and departure of caravans made it relatively easy for slaves and other labourers to escape. As will be seen in the following discussion, many slaves sought alternative employment in this manner. Ironically, this probably improved labour conditions for slaves, as masters sought to provide them with more inducements that would reduce the chances of their running away as well. Thus, the gradual transition from slave to respectability likely happened much quicker and with less obstacles placed in front of slaves on the lakeshore than it did on the coast. It is within the context of this transition that different gradations of servitude come into view. Masters and slaves alike were motivated to release labourers from the tag of being a slave: the former to ensure their labourers’ loyalty; the latter to improve their social position and the conditions of their labour.
As the rest of this chapter will explore, the ways in which slaves experienced the transition from slave to respectability depended to a far greater degree on their gender and age, and the culture and aims of their masters, than it did on the conditions in which labourers entered their new societies.

**Labour Traffic and Migrant Labour**

Histories of nineteenth-century East and Central Africa comment on two major forms of long-distance migration by labourers. These are loosely termed the slave trade and migrant labour. Similar phenomena led to both these forms of labour migration. For example, the violence involved in capturing slaves also led to the migration of ‘free’ peoples whose villages and crops were destroyed. Similarly, many people referred to as slaves in the primary documents joined caravans in order to run away from their master and become ‘free’ migrant labourers. This section builds on this analysis by arguing that many aspects of the “slave trade” and “migrant labour” were indistinguishable. Apart from being provoked by similar phenomena, they also followed the same trade routes. Also, captive and migrant labourers experienced the journeys in similar ways, and, when they reached their destination, captive and migrant labourers had similar rights and roles in their new societies. The status of being traded as a slave or migrating as a free labourer had little bearing on the migrants’ experience of their journey or their social status once they arrived and settled at the lakeshore.

People living on the shores of Lake Tanganyika tapped into two largely distinct sources of labour traffic. The longest standing of the two was the lakeshore itself. People from beyond

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74 Rockel, *Carriers*, p. 22.

75 See: Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition*, pp. 53-54.
the lakeshore brought captives to lakeshore markets to be sold to lakeshore populations. For most of the nineteenth century, the greatest beneficiaries of these practices were the Jiji. Up to the 1860s, most their imported slaves came from around the lake’s northern regions, such as Uha, Urundi and Uvira.\textsuperscript{76} By the 1870s, the Jiji market was supplied to a greater degree by Ufipa, Ulungu, and Marungu.\textsuperscript{77} These were the lake’s southernmost regions. This shift was caused by a combination of developments to lacustrine craft and violence around the south end of the lake. The development of larger, faster, and more stable lacustrine craft allowed traffickers on the lake to travel further, with greater speed, and in greater numbers.\textsuperscript{78} Meanwhile, violence around the south end of the lake generated captives that could be sold to passing canoes.\textsuperscript{79} It also destroyed crops and forced people to flee, causing them to sell either themselves or their own kin in exchange for food.\textsuperscript{80} In this latter instance, sellers may have imagined that they were merely pawning their kin, rather than selling them, though they had no recourse to claim their kin back at a later date. Alpers’ analysis of similar processes on the coast indicate that such a pattern existed in East Africa, though there is not enough evidence to state definitively if a comparable process occurred on the lakeshore as well.\textsuperscript{81} Regardless, violence enabled traffickers to increase their profits by entering southern lakeshore markets. By the 1870s, some lakeshore populations partook in raids for the generation of captives themselves. The most prominent among these were the Guha, on the lake’s western shore. The Guha went on annual raids in Ugoma and Ubwari for this purpose.\textsuperscript{82} Most captives were kept

\textsuperscript{76} Burton, \textit{Lake Regions}, pp. 318, 340, 376.
\textsuperscript{77} Cameron, \textit{Across Africa}, pp. 184, 253; NA RGS JMS/2/144 Cameron, ‘Diary of a Boat Journey,’ 24 March 1874; Stanley, \textit{Dark Continent}, II, p. 40; Thomson, \textit{Central African Lakes}, II, p. 34; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Jones to Thompson, 2 December 1884.
\textsuperscript{78} See: Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{79} Reid, \textit{War in Pre-colonial}, pp. 144, 171-172; Cameron, \textit{Across Africa}, p. 184. See also: Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{80} Cameron, \textit{Across Africa}, p. 184; Campbell, ‘Introduction: Slavery and Other Forms,’ pp. xxv; Iliffe, \textit{A Modern History}, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{81} Alpers, ‘Debt, Pawnship and Slavery,’ pp. 31-44. See also: Wright, \textit{Strategies of Slaves}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{82} Sheriff, \textit{Slaves, Spices & Ivory}, p. 185; Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, pp. 90, 145; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hutley to Whitehouse, 19 October 1879, Hutley to Whitehouse, 22 November 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Griffith to
for domestic purposes, though some were sold to traders travelling in the direction of Ujiji. In general, the human traffic around Lake Tanganyika supplied lakeshore populations more than it supplied long-distance traders.

The other major source of human traffic was Manyema and the regions between Lake Tanganyika and Manyema in present-day eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. This source was used almost exclusively by coastal and *ngwana* traders. Coastal traders established permanent residences in Manyema during the 1860s, primarily to gain access to its cheap, abundant, and high-quality ivory, though it also acted as a source of labour. Coastal traders and their armed followers raided Manyema populations to take captives. Groups of Manyema raiders and traders also contributed to this process. In any case, most captives generated in these raids were kept for domestic consumption in Manyema. This allowed coastal traders, especially, to expand their followings and territories, and to raid for more captives thereafter. Surplus captives were transported in caravans to be sold as slaves on the shores of Lake Tanganyika or further east. Reports indicate that Manyema raiders joined coastal trader caravans to secure greater safety for them and their captives on the journey eastwards. Once they traversed the lake, very few captives were taken to the coast. Most were absorbed by the demand of coastal traders in the interior of modern-day mainland Tanzania, particularly in Ujiji and Tabora. By the end of the 1870s, the size of the labour traffic from Manyema to Ujiji

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83 A.G.M. Griffith to Whitehouse, 19 May 1880.

See: Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 79; Interview with Daniel Rucintango, 7 November 2013.


dwarfed the longer-standing traffic that was restricted to Lake Tanganyika’s shores.\(^90\) This contributed to the coastal traders’ employment of the largest body of labourers on the lakeshore in this and the following decade.

Captives, raiders, and traders from Manyema were accompanied by numerous ‘non-captive’ migrant labourers on their journeys to Lake Tanganyika.\(^91\) They came primarily as porters, and, once at Ujiji, they searched for work. Many remained as free-waged porters (in the manner of a Nyamwezi pagazi) who travelled between Ujiji and Tabora, and sometimes to the coast.\(^92\) Others joined the ranks of coastal traders in Ujiji, and were employed in a range of professions, including soldiery and boating.\(^93\) According to LMS missionaries, the main objective of migrant labourers from Manyema was to gain ownership of a gun.\(^94\) For some, this meant earning enough tradable items to purchase one in a market, such as in Ujiji, Urambo, or Tabora.\(^95\) Others acquired guns by becoming the coastal traders’ soldiers.\(^96\) This shows that migration to the eastern side of Lake Tanganyika brought Manyema migrant labourers opportunities. However, this fascination with guns was also symbolic of a migration that was, at least partially, forced upon them.\(^97\) The violence associated with the coastal traders’ ivory trade and raids for captives in Manyema destroyed settlements and crops.\(^98\) This forced

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\(^90\) CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 16 April 1879.
\(^92\) Northrup, *Beyond the Bend*, p. 28; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse, 20 February 1880.
\(^94\) Hutley, *The Central African Diaries*, pp. 105, 144-145, 158; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse, 20 February 1880; ZNA AA2/29 Hore to Kirk, 25 February 1880.
\(^95\) Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 45-46; Bennett, *Arab Versus European*, p. 116; Roberts, *A Dance of Assassins*, p. 21; CWM/LMS/06/02/013 Jones to Thompson, 6 March 1888; Jacques and Storms, *Notes sur l’Ethnographie*, p. 71; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse, 20 February 1880.
\(^97\) Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 111-113, 172.
Manyema populations to migrate. A central reason for the coastal traders’ military successes was their followers’ usage of guns, as tools of both destruction and fear. This is likely to have contributed to the high value that migrating Manyema populations attributed to them. Guns became symbols of prestige, power, and security. Violence was a causal factor behind the emergence of both trafficked and migrant labour.

The journey from Manyema to Lake Tanganyika was a brutal process for captive and migrant labourers alike. They both had to contend with malnutrition and disease, particularly smallpox. Stanley, for example described the conditions that many migrants arrived in at the lakeshore:

The objects of traffic as they are landed on the shore of Ujiji are generally in a terrible condition, reduced by hunger to bony skeletons… These livings skeletons have all been marched from Marungu to Uguha, thence to Ujiji they were crowded in canoes. When our expedition crossed over to Uguha we met 800 slaves of exactly such cast as already described, principally children & women.

Livingstone, meanwhile, documented the painful diseases that many trafficked humans had to endure:

The sores on my feet now laid me up as irritable-eating ulcers. If the foot were put to the ground a discharge of bloody ichor flowed, and the same discharge

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100 For an analysis of the links between demand for guns and another particular socio-political setting, see: Macola, *The Gun in Central Africa*, Ll. 1347-1461.


103 RMCA Stanley Archive 4610. Stanley to *Daily Telegraph* and *New York Herald*, 28 October 1876.
happened every night with considerable pain, that prevented sleep. The wailing of the slaves tortured with these sores is one of the night sounds of the slave-camp: they eat through everything—muscle, tendon, and bone, and often lame permanently, if they do not kill the poor things.104

Because of these depredations, Europeans claimed that between 50 and 80 per cent of captives were lost to human traffickers on the journey between their capture and their destination through either death or escape.105 Descriptions such as these no doubt fuelled the anti-slave trade rhetoric that was prevalent in Europe at this time.106 Yet, there is no reason to suggest that migrant labourers experienced the journey in a less brutal fashion than their captive counterparts. This is because migrant labourers were no more immune from disease than captives, and, having been forced to flee their destroyed settlements, they had no more access to food than them either. This is supported by Rockel’s analysis of life in caravans, in which he states that “famine and disease were the biggest killers” of long-distance travellers, regardless of status.107 Captive and migrant labourers experienced the journey from Manyema to Lake Tanganyika in a similarly brutal fashion.

Once settled on Lake Tanganyika, both captive and migrant labourers were considered slaves in their respective societies. Almost all of them lost their kinship links to their origins, and their position in their new society was determined by their masters. If some Manyema peoples attempted to re-establish their links to their homelands by escaping and returning there, they would have encountered a region vastly different from the one they left. The violence of


106 Rockel, Carriers, pp. 8-23.

the ivory and slave trades scattered populations, destroyed villages, and broke up kinship networks.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, captive and migrant Manyema peoples who travelled to Lake Tanganyika and further eastwards had little recourse to their geographic origins.\textsuperscript{109} They thus sought to better their position either around Lake Tanganyika or to its east. Many did thus by running away from their new master’s household. Thus, runaway slaves formed a significant section of the population in both market centres and caravans.\textsuperscript{110} These former slaves sought to establish themselves in their new communities through selling their labour themselves and acquiring guns and other forms of independent wealth. The presence of caravans and market centres offered routes to exit the condition of being a slave via a captive or migrant labourer’s own agency.

The opportunities for escape shaped the labour conditions of slaves who did not run away. Masters and employers had to induce their slaves to stay where they were and to work for them instead of searching for independent wealth elsewhere. Thus, numerous reports exist in which Europeans describe the conditions of slaves in favourable terms. For example, Stanley stated:

In the treatment of their slaves they [the coastal traders] must also be credited with not cruelly abusing their own interests. Except under very rare circumstances, the condition of the slaves, is not worse than when they enjoyed their… freedom.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{108} Northrup, Beyond the Bend, pp. 15, 27; Iliffe, A Modern History, pp. 48-50; Médard, ‘Introduction,’ in Slavery, p. 12; Livingstone, Last Journals, p. 361; Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 71; ZNA BK1/9 The British Plenipotentiaries at the Slave Trade Conference, ‘Summary of Mr. Stanley’s Speech at the Meeting of the Anti-Slave Trade Conference Commission,’ 25 April 1890.
\textsuperscript{109} See: Iliffe, Honour, p. 129.
\textsuperscript{110} Cameron, Across Africa, p. 154; RMCA HA.01.017-5. Ramaekers to AIA, 18 January 1882; Wissmann, My Second Journey, pp. 244-245; RMCA HA.01.017-6. Storms, ‘L’Esclavage,’ n.d.
\textsuperscript{111} RMCA Stanley Archive 4610. Stanley to Daily Telegraph and New York Herald, 28 October 1876.
Here, Stanley shows how the conditions that captive labourers lived in differed little from those of free-waged or migrant labourers. In a similar vein, Hore noted a wide range of professions that trafficked and migrant labourers were employed in:

Slaves are captured in war, [etc.], amongst surrounding tribes, and passed from hand to hand till they finally come to a stand in some Arab’s shamba [farm]… they are their domestics, boatmen, carriers, body-guards, and cultivators.112

The use of the term ‘domestic’ in this latter passage implies ‘domestic slavery.’ Although this phrase emphasises domestic work, and so overlooks the wide range of professions that these labourers embarked upon, it is often used to describe a relatively benign form of labour compared to chattel slavery.113 Additionally, some of these labour roles needed more trust from the masters than others. Body-guards were armed with weapons, and boatmen were often supplied with large amounts of capital to trade on their masters’ behalves.114 Masters thus had to be sure that labourers in these professions would not turn on them or flee with the profits of their transactions. Both these sources, therefore, indicate that the lives of trafficked and migrant labourers improved once they were employed on the lakeshore or elsewhere in the regions to the east.115 The only major source to shed doubt on this summation is Giraud’s report on his journey through East and Central Africa in 1884. Having visited the south end of the lake, Giraud claimed that the Fipa treated their slaves with kindness.116 Yet, he maintained his assumption that “misery” characterised the slave life in Ujiji, even though he did not visit the north end of the lake.117 Based on closer reading of the above primary sources, if he visited

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112 ZNA AA1/23 Hore to Kirk, 14 April 1879. See also: Jacques and Storms, Notes sur l’Ethnographie, pp. 66-67.
113 Clarence-Smith, Islam and the Abolition, p. 3; Lovejoy, Transformations, pp. 15-16.
114 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 106; Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 51; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ p. 10; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hutley to Whitehouse, 19 October 1879.
115 Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition, pp. 73-74; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 10.
117 Ibid.
Ujiji he would have found that the conditions that slaves lived in there were more similar to slaves’ conditions in Ufipa than he realised. There was a disconnect between the conditions of captives’ and migrants’ travel to the lakeshore and the conditions of their labour once they arrived there.

The improved condition of trafficked and migrant labourers on the lakeshore confused the members of the LMS who resided on the lakeshore from 1878 onwards. They expected to see a slave trade and an institution of slavery that were brutal in all their forms. This assumption had been made based on pre-conceived ideas about conditions in Africa.\(^{118}\) This was partly caused by the descriptions of the region found in the explorers’ reports, and partly by their overlooking of the less brutal aspects of these descriptions because they (the descriptions) did not match their pre-conceived ideas.\(^{119}\) In any case, the LMS missionaries had two main theories for why people they viewed as slaves were not treated as badly as they had previously expected. The first was that their presence on the lakeshore forced the coastal traders to treat their labourers better.\(^{120}\) This was because they had the stated aim of ending slavery and the slave trade in the interior of Africa, and they believed that the coastal traders were fearful that if reports reached Europe of abuses to slaves, then it would provoke greater European intervention.\(^{121}\) Hutley wrote, for example:

> Only yesterday I was told that, since we have been here, there have been but very few floggings amongst our landlord’s slaves, and... the slaves say it is because of our presence here.\(^{122}\)

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\(^{118}\) McCaskie, ‘Cultural Encounters,’ p. 665.
\(^{119}\) Rockel, *Carriers*, pp. 12-17.
\(^{120}\) See: Bennett, *Arab Versus European*, p. 99.
\(^{122}\) CWM/LMS/06/02/003 Hutley to Mullens, 14 October 1878.
Similarly, Hore claimed that “since their arrival [at Ujiji] there have been no slaves exposed in the market,” and that slaves were exchanged in houses instead.\(^{123}\) However, the LMS missionaries are unlikely to have had this kind of influence. This is because these passages were written less than six months after they arrived at the lakeshore, and it is hard to believe that their presence dramatically shifted the ways in which slaves were treated. This is supported by the fact that there were only three of them when they arrived, one of whom died less than two months after his arrival. This theory, therefore, over-estimates the missionaries’ influence on the conditions of labour on the lakeshore.\(^{124}\)

The second missionary theory pertaining to the improved condition of labourers once they reached Lake Tanganyika relates to the presence of migrant labourers. In April 1879, Hutley wrote:

> The remainder of the Manyuema [sic.] people arrived this morning… Some new slaves have come… It appears that some of these Arabs have Manyuema [sic.] slaves in great numbers, but that now they are afraid to ill-treat them because so many others who are free men have come.\(^{125}\)

The basis for this theory was the idea that the presence of migrant labourers from Manyema forced the coastal traders to treat their captives with greater kindness. It was born out of the missionaries’ preconceptions about the existence of a slave trade. Before they arrived at the lakeshore, they were less aware of the extent of migrant labour travelling on the same routes as the labour traffic. They thus thought the presence of migrant labourers was a relatively new phenomenon. This led them to believe that the migrant labourers that they saw re-shaped the nature of human traffic during the period between the first explorers’ visits to the lakeshore, and when they arrived. However, as is also clear from closer reading of the explorer sources,

\(^{123}\) CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 10 January 1879. See also: Hore, *Tanganyika*, p. 74.
the expansion of migrant labour occurred alongside the expansion of human traffic, and was provoked by similar phenomena. This theory over-emphasises the role of ‘free’ migrant labourers in the caravans from Manyema to Lake Tanganyika.

Contrary to the missionaries’ explanations, the kind treatment given to slaves on the lakeshore is explained by emphasising the traders’ need to rapidly assimilate their new workers. This applies to captives and migrant labourers alike. As described above, the unstable nature of Lake Tanganyika’s political institutions and the frequent arrival and departure of caravans provided opportunities for labourers to flee, if they so chose. Slave-owners thus had to induce them to stay and work for them with incentives and kind treatment. Given the brutality of the journey to Lake Tanganyika, achieving this would have been difficult. Indeed, such can be linked to the high volume of runaway slaves that populated caravans and market centres throughout East and Central Africa. To minimise such losses, trafficked and migrant labourers were given material inducements and certain rights in their new societies soon after they were purchased or hired. Indeed, the process by which slaves became ‘respectable’ in their new societies may have begun as soon as they were tied to a master. This process continued via the exchange of goods and the acquisition of rights over time. Thus, slaves had opportunities to exit ‘social death’ and ‘outsider’ status so as to become fully-fledged members of their new societies in a similar way that runaways who sought independent wealth did. As will be explored in the following sections, the nature of the transition from slave to respectability varied according to the slave’s age and gender, and the aims and customs of the slave owner.

Nevertheless, in all cases, the traders’ intention was to make their labourers stay in their

126 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 111-113, 172; Rockel, Carriers, p. 22; Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition, pp. 53-54.
company voluntarily. Thus, despite the brutal, coercive, and exploitative nature of many labourers’ journeys to the lakeshore, the extent to which these terms characterised the conditions of their labour once they settled there decreased.

**Women and their Pre-Adolescent Children: agriculture, domesticity, and agency**

Women on the lakeshore were mainly occupied with domestic and agricultural work. This is representative of women’s occupations all over East and Central Africa during this time period. In Unyamwezi, for example, Rockel argues, “women generated enough agricultural production to support the caravan system, with additional household labor coming from their menfolk, children, slaves, and, perhaps, Tutsi clients.” This additional labour was supplied when agricultural labour was particularly intensive, such as during the harvest and clearing seasons. Women then sold surplus agricultural produce in their nearest markets. They were also charged with the care of pre-adolescent children. When the latter were old enough, they contributed their own labour to the household. As they grew up, girls aided their mothers with both agricultural and domestic work, while boys were employed in other professions. As women and children from distant regions were incorporated into lakeshore societies as slaves, they did the same jobs as the women and children who were already resident there. Slave women were also expected to contribute to their households by giving birth to

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135 Ibid., pp. 40-41.

their master’s kin. This section argues that slave women became ‘respectable’ on the lakeshore through assimilation to their labour roles and their use of their reproductive capabilities.

The lives of women in East and Central Africa are generally seen to have become increasingly unstable over the course of the nineteenth century. This instability was caused by two phenomena. Firstly, women and children were the prime demographic of people that armed men raided so that they could traffic them as slaves. Raiders preferred women and children because they received higher prices in markets than captive adult men. This was because adult male slaves were seen as more liable to attempt to flee or to cause disruption in their new societies than trafficked women and children, who were seen as easier to assimilate to their new households and societies. Secondly, violence on and around the lakeshore restricted women’s access to free movement, especially during the 1880s when coastal and ngwana traders expanded their commercial networks all over the lake, often through violent means. Women became increasingly dependent on armed men to protect them in fields, on the paths to markets, and in the markets themselves. The histories that describe these conditions document a process by which women’s lives were increasingly determined by armed and often violent men.

137 Deutsch, Emancipation Without Abolition, p. 60; Lovejoy, Transformations, pp. 2, 14, 17-18.
138 Médard, ‘La Traite et Esclavage,’ p. 47.
140 Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 50; Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 110, 120, 133; Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, p. 59.
141 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 157; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 26 May 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/007 Griffith to Thomson, 16 October 1882.
Men also had a large influence over the nature of women’s kinship relations. Female slaves were incorporated into a system that exploited women as tradable objects. Before the expansion of captive and migrant labour in the nineteenth century, this process was dominated by a system of bride-wealth. In this system, adult men paid other adult men for the right to marry their female kin. The trafficking of women followed a similar process. Once purchased, women were either married or forced into concubinage with the trader or one of his kin. The payment to the trafficker was thus an adaptation of the pre-existing payment of bride-wealth.

Once in the household, trafficked women often had paths to become of similar status as women purchased via bride-wealth over time. Trafficked women who gave birth to a child fathered by their patron became essentially, in the words of Lovejoy, “free dependents.” This meant that they could no longer be sold, and that they were considered a member of the family and of the kin. Indeed, their children were probably considered free, and were allowed to marry and sell their labour as they pleased. In this sense, trafficked women and their children departed their condition as slaves by becoming a member of their masters’ family or kin. This is not to argue that this transition was necessarily smooth. Slave women usually had no kinship relations with other members of their new society when they first arrived there. They thus had no recourse to judiciary processes or to their father or mothers’ household if they felt abused. Indeed, because of this, slave women were probably more likely experience abuse at the hands

143 Gray and Birmingham, ‘Some Economic and Political,’ p. 3; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 10 January 1879; Johan Herman Scherer, Marriage and Bride-wealth in the Highlands of Buha (Tanganyika) (Groningen: V.R.B Kleine der A., 1965), p. 39.
145 Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 84; Koponen, People and Production, p. 124.
149 Wright, Strategies of Slaves, p. 25.
of the male head of their household than those who were integrated via bride-wealth. Yet, there is no indication that such abuse infringed on their ability to gradually accumulate rights in their new households and societies, if it did not cause them to flee beforehand. Despite experiencing high levels of violence and dependence, slave women and their children were able to gain rights over time so that they were no longer considered slaves.

Increased instability for women in their homes caused a minority to forge new labour roles. Being dependent on a male patron put them in danger if that patron experienced financial hardship, if they lost his favour, or if he neglected to protect them with armed guards in the fields. Hutley described the condition of a woman in Ujiji who experienced such phenomena in his diary:

I learnt that she was the slave of one of these wretched Mrima [sic.] men and that her master gave her and her companions nothing to wear or eat, although he employed them to do his work. The consequence is that the women are obliged to do something for a living and they generally consort with the numerous Wangwana [sic.] in the town… from whom they receive cloth to wear and food to eat and in return they be to them as wives, cooking their food, etc.

The arrival and departure of caravans presented opportunities for women who were not attached to a male patron, or who sought to find a new one. Stanley, for example, portrayed Ujiji as a town ripe with sexual activity between resident women and members of passing caravans. Although not mentioned explicitly, it is logical to suspect that some women found

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150 Ibid., p. 36. See also: CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Griffith to Whitehouse, 28 August 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 20 July 1880; Hutley, Central African Diaries, p. 106.
152 See: Wright, Strategies of Slaves, p. 43.
154 Hutley, Central African Diaries, p. 106.
material security in this environment via a form of prostitution. In other instances, women joined men in caravans as “caravan wives.” They provided their ‘husbands’ with domestic and sexual services, companionship, and assistance with carrying loads. Many caravan wives brought their children on journeys as well. In exchange for their labour, women received protection, food, clothing, and a share of the profits made from their husband’s commercial transactions. Once the caravan arrived at its destination, it is unknown whether caravan wives customarily maintained their relationship with their ‘husband,’ or if the man also had a ‘domestic wife’ and the caravan wife went on to live an “independent life.” It is probable that there was no general rule in this regard, and that caravan wives had a choice over the nature of their future relationships to their caravan husbands. This sense of female agency is supported by the phenomenon of women fleeing caravans if they felt that they were abused. Market centres and caravans provided opportunities for women – slave or otherwise – to sell their labour independently.

Once at the lakeshore, slave women gradually gained access to the same position in society as ‘respectable’ women who had pre-existing kinship links there. The transition from slave to respectability was characterised by their assimilation to the labour roles that women were expected to perform on the lakeshore, and through giving birth to new members of their master’s kin. The distinction between a slave or a respectable woman was thus not an enduring one. Furthermore, slave and non-slave women had shared historical experiences of the era of

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158 Northrup, *Beyond the Bend*, p. 28.

159 Rockel, *Carriers*, p. 123.

160 Ibid. p. 126.

long-distance commerce. Violence in and around their homes caused them to be reliant on armed men for their protection. It may have been the case that slave women experienced more violence from men who considered themselves their masters, than from men who considered ‘respectable’ women their wives. Nevertheless, the conditions of long-distance commerce gave all women opportunities to shape their own labour roles if they chose to leave their master or husband. Caravans required women as a supplementary supply of porters and domestic workers. In this context, it is notable that such women were referred to as caravan ‘wives’ rather than as slaves. Free-waged women in this context saw their employment as respectable and as indicative of a social status above that of being a slave. Slave women followed routes to respectability in their new societies through both the family and through selling their labour independently.

**Jiji Boatmen: Customary Obligations to Land, Lake, and Teko**

Jiji boatmen were fishermen, lacustrine traders, and an important labour pool for powering canoes around the lake. They were comprised of adult men and adolescent boys who lived on Ujiji’s lakeshore. Becoming a boatman was part of the transition from boyhood to adulthood for Jiji males. There is no reason not to believe that pre-adolescent imported slaves were granted access to the same transition once they were of age. As indicated above, the children of female slaves often had more immediate access to respectability than their mothers. However, the respect claimed by Jiji boatmen does not mean that they were free-waged labourers. Such a statement is contrary to much of the historiography on Jiji boatmen (and, more generally, boatmen in African history), which emphasises their agency. Instead, this section argues that Jiji boatmen were tied to the Jiji teko (district chiefs) on the lakeshore, who

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had customary rights over the distribution of their labour and the ways they were paid. Their respectability alongside these restrictions indicates that Jiji boatmen were neither slaves in a social sense, nor free in terms of the conditions applied to their labour. Their labour was a form of servitude that intersects the binary terms of ‘slave’ and ‘free.’ Nevertheless, the arrival and departure of large numbers of migrant and captive labourers to the Jiji lakeshore created a need to adapt this system. Some of the Jiji tekos’s inability to do so resulted in their losing of many of their followers, which is representative of how some of them lost a great deal of political power during the 1880s.

Jiji boatmen are the most widely commented-on of Lake Tanganyika’s labourers in the European-authored primary sources. European explorers and missionaries were enamoured with the Jiji’s boating skills and their geographical knowledge of the lake. In their eyes, the Jiji boatmen’s skills characterised the distinctions between the Jiji and other lakeshore populations, and made the former a desirable labour pool to use for lacustrine travel. As Brown wrote in the early 1970s, this signifies a process of adaptation. Jiji boatmen adapted the skills they learnt as fishermen to become a popular source of labour that guided long-distance traders around the lake. This also allowed them to conduct trade on the lake with greater regularity and gave them access to increasingly large amounts of personal wealth. Commenting on these phenomena, Brown argued that Jiji boatmen became, “independent carriers and traders.” The early historical analysis of Jiji boatmen, therefore, emphasises the agency that Jiji boatmen had over the conditions of their labour.

Early histories of Jiji boatmen contrast with many of the histories of Nyamwezi pagazi (porters) written at a similar time. Where Jiji boatmen were “entrepreneurs” and “artisans,”

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166 Ibid., pp. 623-624.
167 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 52-53.
discussions of Nyamwezi pagazi were dominated by ideas of poverty, the coercion it required to get them to work, and their lack of labour specialisation.\textsuperscript{168} Brown and Brown, for example, wrote that Jiji boatmen were “skilled,” while Nyamwezi porters were merely “rugged.”\textsuperscript{169} The implication is that Jiji boatmen had to learn their craft, while Nyamwezi porters were capable as long as they were strong enough. This contrast fits squarely with other early histories of boatmen and porters elsewhere on the African continent. For example, in the context of the Bight of Benin, Manning contrasted, “the porters [who were] unspecialized, part-time workers who acted as petty-trader transporters, with specialized canoemen, who worked in corporate groups and often received wages.”\textsuperscript{170} Histories such as these created a discourse in which boatmen were viewed as more skilled and as having more agency than porters. More recently, Rockel challenged the prevailing characterisation of porters. He argues that Nyamwezi pagazi were “professionals” with a particular set of skills and socio-cultural forms that led to their emergence as a force of free-waged labourers.\textsuperscript{171} In so doing, he challenged the discourse of earlier histories by implying that the position of Nyamwezi pagazi was similar to that of boatmen. This section dispels the dichotomy established by historians in the 1970s and 1980s between porters and boatmen further, by re-appraising the conditions of the Jiji boatmen’s labour.

The ways in which Jiji boatmen were employed were tied to their relationships with Jiji teko living on the lakeshore. In Jiji society, the teko were viewed as the owners of the land. Jiji teko living on the lakeshore extended this framework over Lake Tanganyika by adapting landward rituals to appease zimu (spirits) in the lake. They thus claimed ownership of parts of

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 623; Rockel, \textit{Carriers}, pp. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{169} Brown and Brown, ‘East African Trade Towns,’ p. 185.
\textsuperscript{170} Manning, ‘Merchants, Porters, and Canoemen,’ p. 51.
\textsuperscript{171} Rockel, \textit{Carriers}, Ch. 3. See also: Pallaver, ‘New Modes of Production,’ pp. 37-38.
the lake as well as the land in their districts. In so doing, Jiji teko living on the lakeshore took a major role in determining the conditions under which Jiji boatmen from their districts worked. For example, they charged long-distance traders and Europeans a premium to employ Jiji boatmen, which was added to the costs of paying the boatmen individually. If the teko’s demands were not met, he or she had the power to withdraw the boatmen’s labour. Therefore, the Jiji boatmen were not free to sell or withdraw their labour as they pleased, as would be customary amongst free-waged labourers. A similar system existed in Uguha. In one episode, the kasanga (district chief) of Mtowa charged members of the London Missionary Society (LMS) for the use of Guha labour from his district. It is important to note in this context that these systems contrast with that of the Nyamwezi. In Unyamwezi, land was owned privately by individuals. This meant that Nyamwezi peoples were less tied to the land via political custom than people living on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. This gave Nyamwezi populations greater scope to sell their labour as free-waged labourers than Jiji boatmen living on the lakeshore. As the owners of the land in their districts and the lake around them, lakeshore chiefs claimed ownership of the labour from their districts as well.

The restrictions on the Jiji boatmen’s labour did not preclude them from accumulating personal wealth. The expansion of commercial networks across and around Lake Tanganyika enabled them to trade their own goods to a wider population, and they received payment for manning canoes that were either owned or rented by other traders. These arrangements were

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175 Hutley, *The Central African Diaries*, pp. 78-80; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 10 January 1879, Hore to Mullens, 25 February 1879, Hore to Mullens, 16 April 1879.
176 CWM/LMS/06/02/010 Jones to Thompson, 10 February 1885.
supported by the Jiji teko, who ensured that canoe and labour rental benefited the boatmen as well as himself. For example, Abee, the teko of Kawele-Ugoy demanded that the representatives of the LMS pay their Jiji workers in expensive cotton cloths. This was the same currency with which they were also obliged to pay him.\textsuperscript{179} Kannena, one of Abee’s predecessors, made similar arrangements with Burton and Speke, which ensured that both his and the boatmen’s wealth increased.\textsuperscript{180} Furthermore, Jiji teko on the lakeshore partook directly in lacustrine commerce by sending Jiji boatmen to trade goods on their behalves.\textsuperscript{181} This is in line with practices elsewhere in Uha (of which Ujiji was one of six kingdoms), in which it was the teko’s right to force people living on their districts to work on his or her plots.\textsuperscript{182} The Jiji boatmen were probably well-remunerated for doing so, though their wages may have been offset by the teko’s provision of the canoe and willingness to allow them to trade their own goods as well as his. In this sense, the Jiji boatmen acted as the teko’s clients, with the teko being the boatmen’s patrons. The teko provided capital and remuneration in exchange for loyalty and wealth, which acted as symbolism of their political power. Jiji teko on the lakeshore used the organisation of wages and commercial opportunities to induce Jiji boatmen to remain tied to them and not seek opportunities elsewhere.

The arrival of large numbers of imported slaves to Ujiji alongside the growth of long-distance commercial networks disrupted the organisation of the Jiji boatmen’s labour. In 1858, Burton stated that all peoples living on the lakeshore (including the Jiji) refused to carry goods overland.\textsuperscript{183} The Jiji remained as boatmen, while living in their teko’s districts. Their decision not to exploit the potential wealth to be gained from porterage can be interpreted as a sign of

\textsuperscript{179} Hutley, \textit{The Central African Diaries}, pp. 79-80.
\textsuperscript{181} Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 48; Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ p. 189-191.
\textsuperscript{182} Gwassa and Mbwiliza, ‘Social Production,’ p. 18.
\textsuperscript{183} Burton, \textit{Lake Regions}, p. 374.
their loyalty and cultural affinity to the Jiji teko. In the 1870s-80s, however, the arrival and departure of caravans filled with people they considered slaves from Manyema brought this loyalty into question. From the Jiji’s perspective, these ‘slaves’ were able to acquire material wealth and respectability exclusive of the Jiji teko. This occurred at a time when more wealth was available from participation in long-distance commercial networks than from transactions that were limited to the lacustrine environment.\textsuperscript{184} Evidence that some Jiji boatmen sought out alternative routes to respectability comes from the Jiji district of Kawele-Ugoy. By the 1880s, coastal traders and their labourers formed a larger proportion of the population here than the Jiji.\textsuperscript{185} The implication here is that some Jiji boatmen changed their allegiance from Kawele-Ugoy’s teko to one of the coastal traders, whom they chose to work for under different conditions. How they and other populations did this is the subject of the following section. Further evidence comes from the Guha, who, by the 1880s, formed a notable minority of porters in long-distance caravans.\textsuperscript{186} This represents a precedent for other lakeshore populations to have resisted their district chiefs’ control over their labour. The conditions of long-distance commerce encouraged some Jiji boatmen to take greater control over their labour and to distribute it elsewhere, exclusive of the Jiji teko. This is representative of a decline in the Jiji teko’s customary rights caused by the rising political authority of traders during this period.

\textbf{The Coastal Traders’ Male Labourers: Becoming Ngwana}

This section analyses the coastal traders’ adult and adolescent male labourers. When coastal traders first entered the interior, they brought followings of labourers and subordinates

\textsuperscript{184} See: Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{185} Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes,’ pp. 8-9; RMCA HA.01.017-7. ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883; Bennett, \textit{Arab Versus European}, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{186} CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse, 20 February 1880; Rockel, \textit{Carriers}, p. 95; Smith, ‘The Southern Section,’ pp. 283-284.
with them. These people are often referred to as *ngwana.*\(^{187}\) This term literally translates from the Swahili as ‘gentlemen.’ Being an *ngwana* implied being, ‘free,’ ‘civilised’ and respected in coastal society.\(^{188}\) Its antithesis was *shenzi,* which translates as ‘barbarians,’ and was used to describe people from the non-Islamic interior.\(^{189}\) According to coastal customs, *shenzi* people were considered slaves if and when they settled at the coast and entered coastal society. Once *shenzi* were enslaved, they were referred to as *tumwa* (lit: ‘one who is sent or used’). As coastal traders penetrated further into the interior, they supplemented their *ngwana* labour with the employment of people they considered *shenzi.*\(^{190}\) The free-waged labour of the Nyamwezi *pagazi* were the most famous interior labourers to the east of the Lake Tanganyika.\(^{191}\) To the west of Lake Tanganyika, coastal traders mostly employed people from Manyema. Male Manyema labourers came to dominate the coastal traders’ followings to the west of, and around, Lake Tanganyika (though the supply of the coastal traders’ labour around Lake Tanganyika was also supplemented by lakeshore populations).\(^{192}\) Given their interior origins and the brutality of many of their experiences (particularly in Manyema; see above), the coastal

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\(^{187}\) Northrup, *Beyond the Bend,* p. 72; Rockel, *Carriers,* p. 21.


\(^{190}\) Sheriff, *Slaves, Spices & Ivory,* p. 194.


traders’ labourers are often referred to as slaves. However, after spending a certain amount of time with the coastal traders, many among them referred to themselves as ngwana, in a clear echo of coastal conceptions of being ‘free,’ ‘civilised,’ and respected. This section is concerned with the processes by which these labourers from the interior adopted and adapted forms of coastal social categorisation. It argues that their claims to ngwana identity were tied to the nature of their labour and their social position on the lakeshore, and that their doing so had major consequences for the position of interior populations on the coast.

Interior populations who claimed to be ngwana (hereafter: interior ngwana) were distinguishable from other peoples by their demonstration of particular cultural phenomena, the nature of their labour, and their social position. They wore cotton cloth, preferably merikani in the style of kanzus, which was in line with the coastal traders’ fashions; they spoke Swahili fluently; they preferred to eat rice instead of cassava; and they were knowledgeable in at least some aspects of Islam to the extent that they claimed to be Muslims. Those who did not, or had not yet, adopted these characteristics were either referred to as shenzi or, if they had recently been brought into a coastal trader’s following, tumwa. In terms of their labour, interior ngwana performed a range of tasks. They were the coastal traders’ boatmen, soldiers,
proxy traders, town governors, and porters. Those engaged in the latter profession supplemented the supply of free-waged pagazi. The interior ngwana refused agricultural work, as it was considered the job of women, children, shenzi, or tumwa. However, the interior ngwana’s claims to be respectable were not always recognised, particularly on the coast. For example, Glassman, argues that interior ngwana were denied access to coastal mosques, markets, and political representation, all of which were available to people with coastal origins and were denied to shenzi. There was thus a distinction between interior ngwana and ngwana who were born on the coast (hereafter: coastal ngwana), at least in the minds of people living on the coast. The struggle of the coastal traders’ labourers’ transition from slave to respectability was thus contested differently in different regions. The encounter between coastal and interior populations led to the formation of new and conflicting gradations of servitude that conflated coastal conceptions ‘slavery’ with these interior populations’ conceptions of ‘respectability.’

The transition from slave to respectability in regions where Muslims had only recently arrived is well-established in the historiography. Clarence-Smith refers to, “obligatory emancipation after a fixed time,” a process that took around seven years. Slaves who converted to Islam or who were part of the military, however, may have ‘emancipated’ sooner. In the context of this thesis, ‘emancipation’ refers to the transition from slave to ‘respectability,’ rather than the freedom to sell one’s labour as a free-waged labourer. As will

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197 Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition*, p. 74; ZNA AA1/23 Hore to Kirk, 14 April 1879.
be seen, many slaves who became *ngwana* chose to stay bonded to their masters in a form of patron-client relationship rather than become entirely autonomous. Nevertheless, a transition along similar lines to the one described by Clarence-Smith appears to have occurred on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. For example, Griffith, a member of the London Missionary society based in Uguha, wrote that faithful work and conversion to Islam precipitated the granting of ‘free’ status to someone who was previously considered a slave.\(^{203}\) Further evidence suggests that the transition from *tumwa* to *ngwana* was faster on the shores of Lake Tanganyika than in Clarence-Smith’s summation. The White Fathers, for example, reported that some independent *ngwana* traders came to their station at Kibanga and demanded that some of their *ngwana* labourers be given their freedom because they had been working for them for five years.\(^{204}\) Their claims may have been made on the basis of their experiences with coastal traders. Elsewhere, Ramaekers of the International African Association (Association Internationale Africaine, AIA) designed a system in which labourers under his care were obliged to do gradually less work for the association over time. After three years, they were to be given land to work on privately, and after six years they were to be granted complete autonomy.\(^{205}\) These measures were made to try to induce new labourers to develop loyalty to the AIA so that they would not run away. In the letter to the AIA in which he describes this system, he also wrote, “the Arabs [sic.], in general, very gently treat their slaves, nevertheless many deserted.” Clearly, he and the coastal traders had similar concerns in regards to their labourers. It is thus logical that the system Ramaekers designed was based on one which was already employed by

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\(^{204}\) A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 30 October 1888.

the coastal traders, even if he may have tried to improve it. Coastal traders in the interior provided their slaves routes to respectability via the terms of their labour.

The specific reasons for the relative rapidity of the transition from slave to respectability amongst the coastal traders’ male labourers – beyond the need to prevent them from running away – are twofold. The first pertains to the types of jobs that the coastal traders required their labourers to do, particularly from the beginning of the 1880s onwards. At this point, coastal traders based in Ujiji began expanding their domains militarily, and then used military means to safeguard commercial routes across the lake that linked them to other regions in East and Central Africa.\textsuperscript{206} To this end, coastal traders armed many of their labourers with guns.\textsuperscript{207} This represents a militarisation of their labourers’ work. If other regions and time periods in which Muslims had only recently arrived are used as a precedent, such a process is likely to have garnered slaves access to respectability at a greater rate than before this militarisation took place.\textsuperscript{208} Additionally, once the coastal traders’ labourers became the dominant military force in a region, the coastal traders required them to look after their trading interests at commercial stations on their behalves. Thus, Chumin and Mtowa (in Massanze and Uguha, respectively), for example, had large communities of the coastal traders’ labourers. Once installed, they acted as town governors.\textsuperscript{209} Being given such responsibility was indicative of their gaining respect. Indeed, it is notable that the primary sources refer to these town governors and the communities around them as ngwana, even though a large proportion of them came from the interior.\textsuperscript{210} Additionally, from their position in these towns, interior

\textsuperscript{206} See: Chapter 2; Iliffe, \textit{A Modern History}, p. 48; Bennett, \textit{Arab Versus European}, pp. 245-247; Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, pp. 112-113; Rockel, ‘Slavery and Freedom,’ p. 97.
\textsuperscript{207} CWM/LMS/05/06/004 Hutley to Whitehouse, 19 October 1879; A.G.M.Afr. C.16-7 Journal du P. Deniaud, 20 June 1879, 5 December 1880, 12 April 1881.
\textsuperscript{208} Clarence-Smith, \textit{Islam and the Abolition}, p. 69; Iliffe, \textit{Honour}, pp. 121, 123.
\textsuperscript{209} Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 166-167; Iliffe, \textit{A Modern History}, p. 48; Bennett, \textit{Arab Versus European}, pp. 245-247; Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, pp. 112-113; Rockel, ‘Slavery and Freedom,’ p. 97.
ngwana raided nearby regions for slaves, ivory, and food. Coastal traders probably encouraged such actions, as it served to make their labourers’ position self-sufficient. Supplying their labourers with guns expanded and safeguarded the coastal traders’ commercial networks, and the trust they put in their military and governing prowess was indicative of the respect that such labourers wielded.

The second reason for the rapidity of the transition from slave to ngwana pertains to the labourers’ agency. Emphasising agency in this context is in line with recent studies on Islamic conversion in early colonial German East Africa. Becker, for example, argues that the main drivers of conversion were those that converted, rather than traders or Sufi evangelists. In the context of this thesis, the labourers’ claim to be ngwana represents a similar process, in which interior populations demanded that they be recognised as Muslims, despite their interior origins. Evidence for this partially comes from conditions described in the previous chapter: the coastal traders’ ngwana labourers claimed to be Muslims, while adapting Lake Tanganyika’s pre-existing religious framework to emphasise their religious power. The idea that they were doing so partly as a means to appear respectable and to cease being labelled as slaves is a persuasive one, and is consistent with the ways in which other slaves have contested their status in other contexts. The coastal traders’ labourers’ agency also came through the power of the gun. As described in Chapter 3, guns were symbols of prestige as well as weapons of war. Owning a gun was a sign of power and was indicative wealth. The prestige that the

213 See: Chapter 4.
coastal traders’ labourers garnered from gun ownership enabled them to gather their own followings. Ujiji, for example, became filled with people who called themselves *ngwana*, and their cultural influence discouraged Christian missionaries from attempting to evangelise there.\(^{216}\)

Lakeshore populations saw the success of the coastal traders’ labourers, and sought to become like them by following them.\(^{217}\) Indeed, they wanted to become *ngwana*, and they saw the route to becoming such as through the labourers, many of which would have been considered slaves when they entered the lakeshore environment from Manyema. By the end of the 1880s, therefore, some migrant or captive labourers from Manyema had been through a transition in which they were firstly slaves, then trusted labourers for the coastal traders, and then respected and powerful enough that they could attract their own followings.\(^{218}\) This was not just a transition from slave to respectability within the contours of lakeshore society or the coastal trader community. Instead, it was a transition that re-shaped the very routes to respectability on the lakeshore themselves.\(^{219}\)

The agency with which interior *ngwana* acted provided both opportunities and problems for coastal traders based in Ujiji. Having converted to Islam, performed bravely in battle, or completed the terms of their labour, many interior *ngwana* chose to remain tied to a coastal trader patron in a clientelist fashion.\(^{220}\) Those who did so considered this more

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\(^{217}\) Wynne-Jones, ‘Lines of Desire,’ p. 223; Page, ‘The Manyema Hordes,’ pp. 72, 80; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Jones to Whitehouse, 24 June 1884, Jones to Thompson, 2 December 1884; A.G.M.Afr. Randebel to White Fathers, 28 December 1885 in *Chronique Trimestrielles*, 31 (July 1886); CWM/LMS/06/02/013 Carson to Thompson, 20 August 1888; CWM/LMS/06/02/014 Jones to Thompson, 23 January 1889; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 9 July 1886, 22 August 1886, 16 October 1888, 22 December 1888; RMCA HA.01.017-7. Storms, ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Karema, 8 December 1888.

\(^{218}\) See also: Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests*, p. 228.

\(^{219}\) See also: Médard, ‘Introduction,’ in *Traités*, pp. 21-22.

favourable than becoming entirely independent traders or labourers. This was probably because remaining tied to a coastal traders may have granted them access to privately-owned land (an item that was not available if they remained tied to lakeshore chiefs or if they sought to live independently among them), and they gained access to their patron’s line of credit. This allowed them and their coastal trader patrons to expand their collective commercial reach. In instances in which interior *ngwana* broke ties with their specific coastal trader patron, they were generally treated like allies of the coastal trader community, with whom they shared similar cultural characteristics. Their presence in lakeshore regions was a boon for the maintenance of commercial networks heading beyond the lakeshore environment. Whether attached to a coastal trader or not, most interior *ngwana* partook in long-distance trade, and so were interested in safeguarding the same trade routes that coastal traders used. The presence of armed interior *ngwana* promoted the kind of long-distance commercial networks that coastal traders aspired to maintain.

Yet, the actions of the some interior *ngwana* also caused problems for the coastal traders, particularly in regards to their relations with Europeans on the lakeshore. By the mid-1880s, it was clear that European influence in Zanzibar and on the mainland could pose a threat to the coastal traders’ commercial interests. Therefore, Rumaliza sought to placate Europeans living on the lakeshore, so that they would not send reports that might provoke European military might into contesting his position. The actions of some interior *ngwana*, however, undermined such efforts. In 1887, for example, interior *ngwana* in Ubwari and

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223 Bennett, *Arab Versus European*, p. 211

224 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 176; Farrant, *Tippee Tip*, p. 120; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Mpala, 22 January 1889; CWM/LMS/06/02/014 Swann to Thompson, Niamkolo, 14 August 1889.
Massanze, whom the White Fathers believed were attached to Rumaliza, attacked regions so close to their station in Kibanga that the missionaries were forced to hurriedly arm their men in defence.\textsuperscript{225} Twenty days after the battle, Rumaliza visited the White Fathers’ station. The missionaries commented that, despite Rumaliza’s disapproval of the ngwana’s actions, he was powerless to stop them.\textsuperscript{226} Consequently, the interior ngwana’s raids continued throughout the following year.\textsuperscript{227} Elsewhere, in 1889, Rumaliza mediated in a dispute between the White Fathers and some ngwana populations over the settlement of Katele, in Marungu. His influence ensured, at least temporarily, that the ngwana could settle and that the White Fathers were forced to recognise their right to do so.\textsuperscript{228} But, merely one year later, the White Fathers felt obliged to retake Katele, as some ngwana attacked one of their neighbours and allies.\textsuperscript{229} In the context of encroaching European colonial powers elsewhere in East and Central Africa at this time, these events were a diplomatic disaster for Rumaliza. In this instance, the interior ngwana’s agency represents the coastal traders’ inability to control the actions of their labourers, former labourers, and their allies.\textsuperscript{230} Many interior ngwana used their guns and social position to shape their own commercial and military domains exclusive of the interests of coastal traders.

The agency of the interior ngwana on the shores of Lake Tanganyika and elsewhere in the interior also re-shaped the relationship between the coast and the interior from a cultural standpoint. Despite establishing themselves as ‘respectable’ amongst interior populations and coastal traders in the interior, similar perceptions of the interior ngwana were not held by people living on the coast. There, they remained regarded as shenzi or tumwa, and their claims

\textsuperscript{225} A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 3 December 1887.
\textsuperscript{226} A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 23 December 1887.
\textsuperscript{227} A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 10 November 1888, 23 November 1888.
\textsuperscript{228} Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 193-194.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid.
to being Muslim were seen as heterodox or blasphemous. From the perspective of people living on the coast, only the descendants of slaves who lived on the coast for a long period of time could acquire the right to be considered ngwana. Thus, people could only be ngwana if they were born on the coast into the family of an ngwana man. By definition, such people were born free, hence the translation of ngwana to mean ‘freeborn’ as well as ‘gentlemen.’ The contradictions in the interior ngwana’s status in the interior and the coast came to a head in 1888. In August of that year, riots broke out, as people rioted against the coastal elites, and, during the following year, caused the overthrow of the Omani Sultanate on the Mrima coast. In the words of Glassman:

[The beginning of the riots occurred at] the end of the caravan season, and crowds of porters were continually arriving from upcountry, shooting guns as they entered the town in noisy celebration of having long and difficult safaris.

Many of these gun-toting porters were what this chapter classifies as interior ngwana. Glassman argues that the rebellious crowd was forged out of their struggles against the coastal elites’ exclusionary policies towards them. Fabian adds to this summation by outlining the local dynamics to the riots in different coastal towns. Yet, there was also a broader context to these riots that is intrinsically linked to the interior. The riots were not just expressions of discontent with conditions on the coast; they were also motivated by the drive to establish the same level of agency for interior ngwana on the coast as they had in the interior. The prominence of guns in this context is instructive. The interior ngwana used guns to assert their

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231 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, p. 134; Lovejoy, Transformations, p. 3; Wright, ‘East Africa,’ pp. 547, 553; Tippu Tip, L’autobiographie, p. 191.
233 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, p. 4. See also: pp. 199-225; Fabian, ‘Locating the Local,’ pp. 441-443.
234 Ibid., p. 11.
235 Ibid., ‘Locating the Local,’ pp. 432-444.
prestige and power on the coast, just as they had in the interior throughout the previous decade. In so doing, the interior ngwana established aspects of an Islamic identity that was forged in the interior on the coast. The growth of such cultural and religious links between the coast and the interior in this period was an initial stage in the Islamisation of parts of the interior. This process, just like the rise of peoples originating from Manyema in Ujiji, continued in the colonial period.237

Conclusion

This chapter has described the transition from slave to respectability that many labourers on the shores of Lake Tanganyika experienced. Labourers who came from distant regions, whether in captivity or as ‘free’ migrants, were regarded as slaves when they arrived in lakeshore societies. Such a labelling was symbolic of their low status and their experience of ‘social death’. Yet, many of these slaves gained rights and material wealth over time – a time that was probably uncharacteristically brief compared to other regions in which similar transitions have occurred. The reasons for this relate to slaves’ ability to run away and find work as free-waged labourers in a caravan or in market centres. In this context, many women became ‘caravan wives’ and many men became porters. This gave the former access to kinship relations and the latter access to wealth and guns, all of which elevated the labourers’ status. Thus, slave-owners were obliged to induce their slaves to stay attached to them via the provision of goods and rights. Women were gradually accepted into family networks, and performed similar labour roles to women with pre-existing kinship relations in their communities. Similarly, slave men in Jiji society became boatmen, just like pre-existing Jiji populations. Finally, the male slaves of coastal traders claimed to be ngwana, a term that indicated that they were Muslim and to be respected amongst coastal communities as

237 See: For example, Becker, ‘Commoners;’ Nimtz, Islam and Politics; Becker, Becoming Muslim, p. 287.
‘freeborn.’ The ways in which groups of ‘interior ngwana’ re-shaped the routes to respectability in lakeshore societies had long-term consequences for socio-political hierarchies on the lakeshore and on the coast. Interior ngwana owned guns and adapted coastal and Lake Tanganyika’s religious frameworks in a way that emphasised their prestige, power, and agency. Their success in doing so attracted many people from the lakeshore to join their followings, including people from Ujiji who were previously tied to a Jiji teko. Such is indicative of the ngwana’s agency in the emergence of the components of what this thesis refers to as Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture. Furthermore, the interior ngwana’s role in the development of this frontier culture had consequences for other regions in East and Central Africa. Interior ngwana contested their classification as shenzi, tumwa, or slaves on the coast through similar means to which they contested them on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Religious rituals, guns, and their associated power structures and symbolisms were at the heart of both contestations. The transition from slave to respectability on the shores of Lake Tanganyika and elsewhere in the interior re-shaped socio-political hierarchies in their regions as well as on the coast.
Chapter 6: Settlements of Power: The Effects of ‘Proto-Urbanism’ on the Lakeshore

Settlements in the interior of East and Central Africa were transformed during the era of long-distance commerce. Most began the period as small villages amidst rural surroundings. The largest and most important among them were the site of religious shrines and political centres.¹ Some had markets, though most were only used periodically, often weekly, and sometimes more or less frequently depending on their regional importance.² By the end of the era, these small villages were interspersed with considerably larger settlements, usually referred to as towns. These were commercial centres that held daily markets, and were sites of refuge for people fleeing from raiders in rural areas.³ Reid provides an apt description of such towns:

Eastern African towns can… be identified as fortified garrisons, strongholds, sprawling army camps, politico-military administrative centres and refuges, at the same time as they were markets, commercial intersections, agricultural and fishing depots and religious centres.⁴

This chapter is concerned with the emergence and development of these types of town on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. It includes analysis of Ujiji (in the kingdom of Ujiji), Uvira (Uvira), Rumonge (Urundi), Kirando (Ufipa), Liendwe (Ulungu), Katele and Pamlilo

² Pallaver, ‘“A Second Zanzibar,”’ p. 8.
⁴ Reid, ‘Warfare and Urbanisation,’ p. 46.
(Marungu), Mtowa (Uguha), and Chumin (Massanze). The major European stations at Karema (Ufipa / Ukawende), Niamkolo (Ulungu), Mpala (Marungu), Kibanga (Ubwari / Massanze / Ugoma) are also applicable in this context. The conditions brought about by the expansion of long-distance commercial networks led to a re-shaping of the size, purpose, and style of the settlements on Lake Tanganyika’s shores.

Historians have only given cursory analysis to the majority of lakeshore towns described in this chapter. The only town to receive a considerable amount of attention is Ujiji, which is often analysed alongside other coastal trader centres in East and Central Africa, such as Tabora and Bagamoyo. These three towns are usually seen as containing the most important markets on the central commercial route across modern-day mainland Tanzania. Indeed, their primary function for most of their inhabitants was the facilitation of commercial transactions. As Reid attests, they were not built with defence in mind. Stockades were more prominent and permanent in other towns in the interior, such as at Urambo in Unyamwezi. Yet, the size of Tabora and Ujiji served an intrinsic protective purpose. The idea of safety in numbers drew many people to them. Other towns on Lake Tanganyika’s shores had similar purposes, though they have received less scholarly attention, and their protective and commercial capabilities were lesser than Ujiji’s owing to their smaller size. For example, Willis describes Kirando as one of the three largest markets in Ufipa; Brown describes Uvira as “crucial nodal [point] in the lake region’s trade system [and] a vital trade settlement;” and St. John quotes Thomson when he describes Liendwe as “the most important place… on Lake Tanganyika (besides

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6 Brown and Brown, ‘East African Trade Towns,’ p. 183; Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 115; Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, p. 192; Glassman, Feasts and Riot, p. 58; Rockel, Carriers, p. 135; Brown, ‘Bagamoyo,’ pp. 69-70.
7 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 169-170.
8 Ibid., pp. 167-168.
9 Ibid., p. 116; Rockel, ‘Caravan Porters,’ pp. 37, 100.
Ujiji)’ because of its commercial usage by long-distance traders.\textsuperscript{10} Furthermore, the idea that European missionary stations became important trading stations and sites of refuge in times of disturbance is well-established.\textsuperscript{11} Clearly, collective analysis of these other lakeshore settlements brings out similar themes to more established studies on Ujiji, Tabora, and Bagamoyo.

The rise of commercial centres and sites of refuge was accompanied by the collapse of other settlements. In this context, Reid argues, “just as fortified towns and villages appeared as a result of local political and military conditions, so other formerly thriving settlements were abandoned and largely disappeared.”\textsuperscript{12} This process is associated with both commerce and violence. A shift in the direction of trade routes could precipitate the collapse of a trading centre. Bagamoyo’s declining population numbers at the beginning of the colonial period is often attributed to this, as is the growing importance of colonial Kigoma in place of the district that colonial administrators referred to as Ujiji.\textsuperscript{13} But, on the shores of nineteenth-century Lake Tanganyika, violence was probably a larger factor behind the decline of some settlements. Apart from the commercial centres described above, the lake’s eastern shore was notable for the amount of deserted and destroyed villages on it for most of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{14} One of the more famous settlements to be destroyed was Zombe’s village, in Ulungu. In 1880, it was described as a large, fortified town, but when the LMS missionaries returned there in 1883, it had been destroyed.\textsuperscript{15} This was caused by an invasion of Bemba raiders in the intervening

\textsuperscript{10} Willis, \textit{A State in the Making}, p. 156; Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 626; St. John, ‘Kazembe,’ p. 221.
\textsuperscript{11} Oliver, \textit{Missionary Factor}, pp. 50-51, 53, 61; McKittrick, ‘Capricious Tyrants,’ pp. 223-224; Bennett, \textit{Arab Versus European}, pp. 95-98.
\textsuperscript{12} Reid, ‘Warfare and Urbanisation,’ p. 46. See also: Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, pp. 161-172.
\textsuperscript{14} Reid, \textit{War in Pre-Colonial}, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{15} Roberts, \textit{A History of the Bemba}, pp. 357-359; St. John, ‘Kazembe,’ p. 226; CWM/LMS/06/05/21 Hore, ‘Voyage to the South End,’ 12 April 1880. See also: CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 2 March 1880, 12 April 1880, 8 May 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/008 Hore to Whitehouse, 15 August 1883.
period.\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, it is well-established that the destruction of settlements in Manyema precipitated the migration of labourers to the east side of Lake Tanganyika.\textsuperscript{17} This chapter is not concerned with the nature of these towns or the internal reasons for their ultimate failure to adapt to the conditions of the era of long-distance commerce \textit{per se}. However, their destruction is an important dynamic for bearing in mind when discussing the reasons for the emergence of more permanent centres of commerce and refuge thereafter.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses the theoretical perspective within which the towns of nineteenth century East and Central Africa are explored. It uses the existing historiographies of urbanism, ‘transitory towns,’ and urban frontiers to put forward the concept of ‘proto-urbanism.’ The analysis of the links between nineteenth-century towns and twentieth-century urban forms means that this chapter fits into the broader discourse held in this thesis about the high level of continuity between the end of the era of long-distance commerce and the beginning of European colonial rule. This perspective helps to place the forms of settlement growth and cultural changes described in this chapter within the broader context of these themes in other eras and regions. The second section analyses the physical and political make-up of Lake Tanganyika’s towns. Specifically, it analyses how different communities within these towns negotiated their political position in their new settlements and in relation to Lake Tanganyika’s mountainous surrounds. As such, it is a description the spatial dynamics to the encounters between long-distance traders, Europeans, and lakeshore populations. Overall, this chapter argues that, as well as being commercial centres and sites of refuge, the towns that emerged on the shores of Lake Tanganyika were political centres. The presence of political centres on the lakeshore was an unprecedented phenomenon. The


\textsuperscript{17} See: Chapter 5; Iliffe, \textit{A Modern History}, p. 50; Page, ‘The Manyema Hordes,’ p. 70; Northrup, \textit{Beyond the Bend}, p. 27.
emergence of lakeshore towns, therefore, represents a major shift in the nature, distribution, and loci of political power on and around the lakeshore.

Lakeshore Towns in Transition

This section places the emergence of towns on the shores of Lake Tanganyika during the era of long-distance commerce in the context of other forms of settlement growth on the African continent. The growth of towns where before there were just villages is often associated with the process of urbanisation. Histories of urban centres emphasise themes such as demographic and cultural change, which are also prevalent in this chapter. Yet, the applicability of established urban histories to this chapter is limited, particularly in terms of the lakeshore towns’ time-depth, size, cultural forms, and governance structures. This is partly because ‘urban histories’ in East and Central Africa are only usually made in relation to the colonial and post-colonial metropolises, such as Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Kampala. These urban centres are built on a much larger scale than the towns described here. Therefore, this section taps into histories of alternative settlement forms as well. These include the idea of a kind of ‘transitory town,’ as described by Scheeele in her analysis of a town on the border between modern-day Algeria and Mali, and ‘urban frontiers’ described by Barnes in her history of nineteenth-century Abeokuta and Ibadan in modern-day Nigeria. These examples provide the lenses through which to view transitions and encounters in the lakeshore towns described.

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here in a pre-colonial context. By drawing on these histories, this section argues that lakeshore towns may be described as ‘proto-urban settlements.’\(^{22}\) This term acknowledges both the continuities and distinctions between the emergence of towns described in this chapter, and the emergence of urban metropolises in the colonial and post-colonial periods.

The ideas of demographic and cultural change are important themes of both this chapter and existing histories of urbanism. The number and proportion of people living in settlements that may be considered towns rather than villages in East and Central Africa increased during the era of long-distance commerce. This is observable because commercial centres and sites of refuge grew in size and in number within a context of relative stability in East and Central Africa’s population numbers.\(^{23}\) For example, historians have argued that the size of Tabora’s population grew from around 5,000 in the early 1870s to 20,000 in 1891; Ujiji’s grew from 3,000 in the mid-1870s to 5,000 or more in 1883; and Mpwapwa’s grew from 1,500 in 1878 to over 2,000 in the late 1880s.\(^{24}\) Similarly, the capital of Buganda transformed from a town of around 10,000 in the early 1850s to a large, cosmopolitan centre that covered numerous hills and districts in the 1880s-1890s.\(^{25}\) Such population estimates are necessarily rough.\(^{26}\) The lack of defined spatial boundaries, the arrival and departure of caravans, and the seasonal nature of caravan travel meant that estimating the size of a town’s population was difficult for nineteenth-century European reporters and that the size of a town’s populations fluctuated.\(^{27}\) Nevertheless, a general trend towards gradual population increases in commercial centres and

\(^{22}\) The idea that certain conditions of nineteenth-century East and Central Africa represent ‘proto’ versions of colonial forms has already been explored in: Castryck, ‘Bordering the Lake,’ pp. 4-5.

\(^{23}\) Kjekshus, Ecological Control, Ch. 1.

\(^{24}\) Brown and Brown, ‘East African Trade Towns,’ p. 197. See also: Pallaver, “A Second Zanzibar,” p. 9; Anderson and Rathbone, Urban Africa, p. 6; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 91; Rockel, Carriers, p. 137.

\(^{25}\) Reid and Médard, ‘Merchants, Missions and the Remaking,’ pp. 100-106.


\(^{27}\) Smith, ‘The Southern Section,’ p 274; Rockel, Carriers, pp. 128, 137; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 91; Beachey, ‘The East African Ivory Trade,’ p. 273; Rockel, ‘Caravan Porters,’ Ch. 2, pp. 70-71; Pallaver, “A Second Zanzibar,”’ p. 5.
sites of refuge is observable, and the development of settlements such as Mpwapwa in regions where before there were only villages indicates that they were increasing in number. The growth of market centres and sites of refuge during the era of long-distance commerce was associated with a process by which increasing numbers of people lived in towns rather than in villages.

The growth of towns in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa is also associated with cultural change. People migrating to towns bring their cultural frameworks with them, and these often interact with the cultural frameworks of other’s who also live in towns. As much is clear from this thesis. Developments to patterns of life on the shores of Lake Tanganyika were at least partially caused by encounters between traders and lakeshore populations in towns. Such is clear in terms of the development of new forms of commercial exchange, the technological innovations made to lacustrine craft, and where most interior ngwana (who embodied the encounter between lakeshore and coastal cultural frameworks most explicitly) lived. This is also reflective of how other historians have described cultural change in other nineteenth-century East and Central African towns. Castryck, for example, analyses the growth of Ujiji alongside the emergence of a distinctly “commercial culture.” Indeed, the capacity of the Jiji to develop the commercial aspects of their everyday lives was crucial for growth of Ujiji as a commercial centre. Similarly, Brown sees the cultural exchanges that occurred in Bagamoyo as crucial in the production of a “durable social and economic structure.” Cultural change was both a characteristic of nineteenth-century towns and a phenomena that drove their growth and enduring qualities.

29 See: Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
There are limitations to the extent to which the demographic and cultural changes described above correspond to the ways that the same themes are analysed in histories of urbanism in East and Central Africa. Most of these latter studies limit their timeframes to the colonial and post-colonial eras. This is partly because the demographic change described in histories of twentieth-century urbanism was much more considerable than that which is described here. Metropolises, such as Kampala, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, and Mombasa emerged with populations into the 100,000s by the mid-twentieth century.\footnote{Burton, ‘Urbanisation in Eastern Africa,’ p. 21.} These dwarf all the towns on the shores of nineteenth-century Lake Tanganyika, none of which had more than 10,000 inhabitants.\footnote{Brown and Brown, ‘East African Trade Towns,’ p. 197; Anderson and Rathbone, ‘Urban Africa,’ p. 6. See also: Chrétien, L’invention de l’Afrique, p. 34.} There is thus a difference in the scale of demographic change described here, and that which has been described in urban histories. Similarly, urban histories often describe cultural change in terms of a distinctly ‘urban culture.’ This implies having a way of life that is intrinsically linked to the urban settlement and that the values associated with this way of life contrast with those of rural areas.\footnote{Lonsdale, ‘Town Life in Colonial Kenya,’ pp. 208, 210; Anderson and Rathbone, ‘Urban Africa,’ p. 9; See, for example: Laura Fair, Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945 (Oxford: James Currey, 2001); Lonsdale, ‘Town Life in Colonial Kenya,’ p. 208.} Urban cultures are often reflected in pastimes, occupations, music, performance, and fashions that are limited to the urban environment.\footnote{See: Chapter 4.} It cannot be justifiably argued that an ‘urban culture’ emerged during the nineteenth century along similar lines to twentieth-century urban centres. The assertion of ngwana identity around Lake Tanganyika, for example, was tied to the performance of religious rituals on the lake, more than it was via residence in a commercial centre.\footnote{\textsuperscript{36} See: Chapter 4.} In this context, it may be appropriate to describe cultural change in East and Central Africa’s towns in terms of the development of a ‘commercial culture,’ which had the capacity to pervade rural and lacustrine areas as well. The lives of many East and Central Africans during the nineteenth century were increasingly
geared towards the generation of profit, whether via the trading of goods over long distances or via the marketisation of their surplus food in nearby commercial centres. As the sites in which many goods were sold and bought, towns were important spaces in which this commercial culture developed.

Time-depth is a further limit to the extent of urban histories’ applicability to this study. Parts of western, southern and northern Africa have a long tradition of urbanism that stretches back to some of the earliest records we have of their societies. Settlements such as Timbuctu, Jenne, and Gao in West Africa, Great Zimbabwe in south-central Africa, and Marrakech in North Africa were crucial commercial, intellectual, administrative, and religious centres for centuries before the emergence of similar centres in East and Central Africa. They had large populations with established political, economic, and kinship links spread over a large area.

The towns of Lake Tanganyika’s shoreline in the nineteenth century did not have such a sense permanence. This applies in terms of their period of existence and the purposes for which they were used. Hore’s statement, examined in Chapter 2, that Ujiji “became a station on the road [between Manyema and Tabora] rather than a position of independent importance” during the 1880s supports this view, because it characterises Ujiji as a town in transition. Its purpose shifted rapidly as the power dynamics associated with lacustrine and long-distance commerce also shifted. Furthermore, the arrival of European colonial powers shifted Ujiji’s purpose again in the 1890s and early twentieth century so that it became an official border town and administrative centre. This indicates that the purpose of lakeshore towns continued to be re-

40 Hore, *Tanganyika*, p. 69.
41 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ 209.
moulded in the early colonial period. The nature of Lake Tanganyika’s towns was more transitory than in other more established urban centres elsewhere in Africa.

The idea that there was a break between nineteenth- and twentieth-century forms of settlement growth is well-established in Africanist historical literature. For example, Freund shows how ‘new layers’ were added to urban areas in different eras, and Anderson and Rathbone write that, “in Africa, as elsewhere, the interpretation of pre-industrial urbanization necessarily differs sharply from that of the industrial city.”42 This latter statement hinges on the argument that differences between nineteenth- and twentieth-century towns can be interpreted via the absence or presence of industrialisation. This is not to argue that all colonial settlements that were classified as towns or cities were necessarily industrialised metropolises. Lonsdale shows this in regards to the urbanism in colonial Kenya. He argues that only three cities in colonial Kenya should be regarded as ‘urban,’ even though there were 33 listed ‘urban areas in a post-independence census. The three urban areas he identified were Nairobi, Mombasa, and Nakuru. The other 30 had populations of 20,000 people or less, and, he argued, were, “little more than villages – a double row of dukas lining the road, a market place, a hoteli or two, perhaps a maize mill and a hide-drying banda.”43 He thus questioned whether the inhabitants of these ‘urban areas’ were, in fact, townspeople, and the extent to which they shared “distinctively urban careers and values,” like they counterparts in larger urban metropolises.44 The towns of nineteenth-century East and Central Africa resembled the smaller towns of Lonsdale’s analysis more closely than his urban centres. This applies both in terms of the size of their populations and the fact that most of their inhabitants still worked either as farmers or boatmen beyond what may be considered the towns’ limits. Thus, the everyday lives

44 Ibid.
of people living in nineteenth-century towns were intrinsically connected to rural areas in a way that does not befit analyses of townspeople in twentieth-century urban centres. 45 Despite some thematic similarities, the growth of larger towns in the nineteenth century was provoked by – and resulted in – different phenomena than that which is related to studies of urbanism.

In order to conceptualise Lake Tanganyika’s nineteenth-century towns more fully, this chapter taps into historical analyses of two other forms of settlement growth other than urbanism. The first of these is what Scheele describes as a ‘garage or caravanserail.’ She uses these terms to analyse Al-Khalil, a town on the modern border between Algeria and Mali. She writes that between the years 1993 and 2008, the region in which Al-Khalil is now situated was transformed from a region with no water, no paved road, and no electricity, into a busy market centre that linked kinship groups in Algeria and Mali’s larger and better-known metropolises. 46 The town’s growth was primarily fuelled by wealth garnered from smuggling. Smuggling, of course, is a modern phenomenon dependent on the presence of official state boundaries and laws. Despite the absence of these institutions in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa, traders inhabiting Lake Tanganyika’s towns traversed the lake in a similar manner to how Al-Khalil’s population traversed the Algeria-Mali border. Just as in modern-day Al-Khalil, profits were made by taking advantage of price differentials in different parts of the broader region in which Lake Tanganyika’s towns were situated in. In Scheele’s analysis, Al-Khalil represents an “outpost” that resembles other Saharan commercial centres of times past, rather than anything permanent or distinctly urban. 47 She argues that, “its rapid growth… seems to carry the promise of an equally rapid decline.” 48 Phenomena that shape such declines in the Saharan context are usually the result of environmental, political, or economic shifts, both in the Sahara

46 Scheele, ‘Garage or Caravanserail,’ p. 223.
48 Ibid., p. 232.
and elsewhere in Mali and Algeria.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 232-234.} This gives the impression of Al-Khalil as a town within a broader region that is experiencing constant transition. These dynamics offer a useful perspective when considering the commercial and violent factors that affected the rise and decline of towns on the shores of nineteenth-century Lake Tanganyika as well. The idea of the garage or caravanserail in this analysis emphasises the transitional nature of Lake Tanganyika’s nineteenth-century towns. As such, the towns analysed in this chapter may partly be termed ‘transitory towns.’ This reflects the internal dynamics of their shifting purposes and levels of prominence, as well as their external position as station towns connecting regions to the east and west of the lake.

The other historical analysis of settlement growth that this chapter refers to is the idea of the ‘urban frontier.’ This is a term that Barnes used to describe the nineteenth-century growth of Abeokuta and Ibadan, in what is now modern Nigeria.\footnote{Barnes, ‘The Urban Frontier.’} It has also been applied to at least two nineteenth-century East and Central African contexts. The first of these is Rockel’s analysis of Mwapwa.\footnote{Rockel, Carriers, pp. 136-141.} He shows how Mwapwa was the site of much “cultural intermixing and overlapping” between Gogo, Sagara, Kaguru, Maasai, and Hehe peoples.\footnote{Ibid. p. 138.} As such, he claims that “Mwapwa fits the model of an African frontier community assembled from the “bits and pieces” of established societies.”\footnote{Ibid.} The ‘bits and pieces’ that he refers to are a quotation from Kopytoff’s conceptualisation of the internal African frontier.\footnote{Kopytoff, ‘The Internal African Frontier,’ p. 3.} Rockel uses this analysis to argue that Mwapwa and other nineteenth-century East and Central African towns (which he refers to as urban centres) sometimes represented the ‘frontier.’\footnote{Rockel, Carriers, p. 138.} His recognition of Kopytoff’s volume in this context is important: Barnes’ original conceptualisation of the urban
frontier is contained within this same volume. The themes of his study thus reflect many of the themes in Barnes’ work as well. In this instance, the idea of the urban frontier emphasises the heterogeneous nature East and Central Africa’s nineteenth-century towns. The idea of heterogeneity is also prevalent in the other instance in which the idea of the urban frontier has been applied to these towns. This is in Brown’s analysis of Ujiji.\textsuperscript{56} In the third chapter of her thesis, Brown refers to Ujiji as an ‘urban frontier.’ Although this term is not defined in the text, the themes of cultural intermixing and exchange are prevalent in her analysis.\textsuperscript{57} Existing analyses of urban frontiers in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa emphasise the high levels of cultural exchange in market towns and sites of refuge.

Despite its usage in the East and Central African context, Barnes’ original analysis of the urban frontier can be taken further than Rockel, for example, acknowledges. This applies in terms of the internal dynamics of town governance. Barnes describes how peoples from the surrounding regions of Abeokuta and Ibadan migrated to form the urban environments. Once settled, chiefly hierarchies and descent groups that governed in rural areas continued to govern their people and their descendants after they moved to towns. In Barnes’ terms, the different sources of political power formed an “urban federation” of independent “townships.”\textsuperscript{58} As a result, there were “several centres of control—often competing and overlapping.”\textsuperscript{59} Similar forms of town governance can be observed in towns in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa. In Tabora, for example, Pallaver argues that what might be termed, ‘Greater Tabora’ was composed of three major inter-linked districts, called Tabora, Kwikuru, and Kwihara, as well as numerous smaller ones between them.\textsuperscript{60} By the 1880s, the district of Tabora was

\textsuperscript{56} Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ Ch. 3.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. p. 87. See also: Castryck, ‘Bordering the Lake,’ p. 4.
\textsuperscript{58} Barnes, ‘The Urban Frontier,’ pp. 274, 276.
\textsuperscript{60} Pallaver, “‘A Second Zanzibar,’” pp. 7-9. Rockel Mwapwa in similar terms. See: Rockel, Carriers, pp. 136-141.
dominated by coastal traders and their followings, and was Greater Tabora’s main commercial centre. Kwikuru meanwhile, was the seat of the ntemi (central chief) of Unyanyembe, and was where the Sultan’s appointed liwali lived. The latter’s job was to mediate between coastal traders, their followers, and Nyamwezi populations and political structures. A degree of spatial segregation between different populations alongside collective town governance thus comes into view. Such is reminiscent of Barnes’ idea of federated townships in her urban frontiers. The limitations of Barnes’ analysis’ relevance to this thesis are rooted in scale, much as they are in relation to the relevance of histories of urbanism. By the 1850s, Ibadan and Abeokuta had populations of between 60,000 and 100,000, and so dwarfed the settlements to which this chapter refers. Their size and sense of permanency also probably led to the formation of distinctive ‘urban cultures,’ which, as has been shown above, was largely absent in East and Central Africa’s nineteenth-century towns.\textsuperscript{61} It is for this reason that this chapter does not conceptualise these towns solely as urban frontiers. Nevertheless, the idea of the urban frontier remains useful for conceptualising the political and cultural negotiations between migrants and long-term residents of lakeshore towns.

The historiographical influence of urban centres, transitional towns, and urban frontiers lead to the conceptualisation of the towns described in this chapter as ‘proto-urban settlements.’ This term implies that the forms of settlement growth in the nineteenth century represent a precursor form of urbanism, which developed more fully at a later date. This does not mean that all the towns described here evolved into urban centres during the twentieth century. Rather the term is a characterisation of the forms of settlement growth in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa more generally. This draws out the historical and thematic links in forms of settlement growth across a long period of time, while allowing for distinctions to be made

\textsuperscript{61} Anderson and Rathbone, ‘Urban Africa,’ p. 5; Freund, The African City, p. 2.
between different eras. These distinctions are such that, cultural exchange and political negotiation in nineteenth-century towns occurred in relatively small-scale settlements that were characterised by both political instability and commercial opportunity. In the twentieth century, meanwhile, similar themes were associated with the creation of much larger urban metropolises, whose inhabitants became bound by a distinctly ‘urban’ culture. The importance of instability and opportunity in nineteenth-century towns led to processes of rapid transition, cultural exchange, and political negotiation. Such is reminiscent of ‘transitory towns,’ and what historians have described as urban frontiers. These forms of settlement are also often viewed as distinct from urban centres. ‘Proto-urban settlements’ in nineteenth-century East and Central Africa were sites of transition, in which their political and cultural composition and their purposes shifted rapidly over time. Despite the fact that these themes have some similarities to those which are described in analyses of urban areas, the nature and results of these transitions are seen as distinct from those which led to the emergence of urban metropolises in the twentieth century.

The Emergence and Composition of Proto-Urban Settlements on Lake Tanganyika’s Shores

This section analyses the internal composition of Lake Tanganyika’s towns collectively. Such is in line with the methods of Brown and Brown used in their analysis Bagamoyo, Tabora, and Ujiji. They argue that despite these towns having “contrasts in their habitats, core communities, and immediate hinterland relationships,” these three towns shared “similarities in their historical experience.” This allowed them to draw out a collective history of the three most important nineteenth-century commercial centres in what became mainland

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62 Chrétien, L’invention de l’Afrique, p. 34.
Tanzania. A similar perspective is taken here. Lake Tanganyika’s towns had shared historical experiences during the nineteenth century, and this allows them to be analysed alongside one-another as part of one history. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that this methodology is contrary to current trends in urban histories. Historians have recently tended to analyse urban centres individually so as to reflect the distinct aspects of their specific urban cultures. The reasons for not doing similarly here are twofold. Firstly, it is impractical. The number of towns that this chapter refers to necessitates drawing links between them, rather than meticulously detailing all their differences. Also, the lack of source material in certain instances means that making an individual history of each town is likely to be impossible. Therefore, while there might be a distinct history of Kirando, for example – in which the histories of Ufipa, the lakeshore, and proto-urbanism coincide in a specific way – this may well remain hidden by fading memories and a lack of documents. It is thus more valid to analyse Kirando and other lakeshore towns like it as part of a broader pattern of settlement growth on the lakeshore.

The second reason for analysing Lake Tanganyika’s towns collectively rather than individually pertains to specific similarities in their historical experience. Brown and Brown point to differences in the habitats, core communities, and hinterland relationships of East and Central Africa’s towns, but these differences were likely less dramatic amongst lakeshore towns than between others, such as between Ujiji, Tabora, and Bagamoyo (the three towns that Brown and Brown analyse). For example, the towns described in this chapter had similar habitats, owing to their respective locations on the lakeshore. As such, as well as performing the role of market centres and sites of refuge, they were also ports and jumping-off points from

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which to traverse the lake.\textsuperscript{67} Also, their communities were linked by their mutual adaptations to the lakeshore environment. This is shown via their people’s careers as fishermen and boatmen and their collective beliefs in \textit{zimu} that inhabited the lake, as well as the emerging market that linked their different parts of the lakeshore together. Finally, the towns on the lakeshore were situated within similar political frameworks. Despite some lakeshore peoples having to pay tribute to chiefs in their hinterlands, they were all largely self-governing and had locally-appointed chiefs. As will be seen, the ways in which these lakeshore chiefs collectively negotiated the challenges of the era of long-distance commerce played a greater role in determining their hinterland relationships than interference from the hinterland itself. In this instance, therefore, divergent hinterland relationships were of lesser consequence to the histories of lakeshore towns than their internal power structures. In this context, this section argues that lakeshore towns were not just linked by their inhabitants’ cultures, their markets, and their mutual adaptations to the lakeshore environment, but also by the nature their respective internal governance structures. Furthermore, it argues that, as these governance structures developed and expanded their geographical reach, it increased lakeshore towns’ importance in the construction of regional politics. The similarities of the lakeshore towns’ governance structures and of their regional influence represents a crucial component of what this thesis refers to as Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture.

This examination of Lake Tanganyika’s towns begins with analysis of Ujiji. This is partly by necessity. There are more primary records that apply to Ujiji than there are for any other lakeshore town. Ujiji was also the longest-standing and most important town on the lakeshore. Conversely, Liendwe, which was described as Lake Tanganyika’s second-most important town, only has a few fleeting references to it by Thompson, Giraud, and the members

\textsuperscript{67} Håkansson, ‘The Human Ecology,’ p. 563.
of the London Missionary Society (LMS). The following description of Ujiji, therefore, is used as a framework from which to analyse the lakeshore’s other towns. Ujiji lies on Lake Tanganyika’s northeastern shore. In the modern period, the place referred to as Ujiji is a district within the broader urban settlement of Kigoma. Kigoma is also the name of the central district of this modern urban space, and is where the town’s main transport infrastructure, administrative buildings, consulates, and commercial enterprises are situated. Other important districts include Mwanga, Gungu, Bangwe, and Kasimbo. With the exception of Mwanga, which grew as an extension of Kigoma district in the twentieth century, all of these districts were in existence during the nineteenth century. They have fared variously since this period, and the importance of each district to the broader settlement has shifted over time. Analysis of these twentieth-century developments is beyond the remit of this thesis. However, one development of note is the shifting name of the broader settlement. In the nineteenth century, the collection of districts were referred to as Ujiji, and not Kigoma, as they are now. This section is concerned with the nineteenth-century development of this broader settlement. This marks a diversion from the majority of analyses of nineteenth-century Ujiji. Most historians of Ujiji focus on the region encapsulated by the modern district of Ujiji in Kigoma’s modern urban space. In the nineteenth century, this area was made up of two districts, called Kawele and Ugoy. The only studies not to do this are recent, and trace the long history of Kigoma and

68 Thomson, Central African Lakes, II, pp. 11-19; Giraud, Les Lacs, pp. 429-433; CWM/LMS/06/02/008 Hore to Whitehouse, 15 August 1883, Hore to Whitehouse, 21 August 1883, Griffith to Whitehouse, 14 September 1883, Hore to Whitehouse, 16 September 1883, Hore to Whitehouse, 14 October 1883; CWM/LMS/06/02/009 Swann to Whitehouse, 8 January 1884, Swann to Whitehouse, 21 March 1884.


Ujiji through and nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This analysis of Ujiji builds on such studies to make a more spatially complete nineteenth-century history of the town.

The location of each of Ujiji’s districts during the second half of the nineteenth century is displayed on Map 3. It labels the districts of Kawele and Ugoy in one location. This is in line with the map in Brown’s thesis on Ujiji, which refers to these two districts simply as ‘Ujiji.’

Although the perspective taken in this thesis diverges from Brown’s focus on these districts by analysing them as part of a broader settlement, this map still provides the best geographical framework for understanding the location of Ujiji’s different districts. This is because maps made by nineteenth-century Europeans also do not distinguish between the respective locations of Kawele and Ugoy. This is despite the fact that they refer to them as distinct districts in their texts. Stanley was only explorer to write either Kawele or Ugoy on his map, and he did so by placing the word ‘Ugoy’ in brackets underneath the word ‘Ujiji.’ He thus did not show Ugoy’s location within the broader settlement of Ujiji, only that it was a part of it. Modern maps, meanwhile, do not distinguish between Kawele and Ugoy, because they are now collectively referred to as ‘Ujiji’ in the Kigoma urban space. One of the core issues with establishing the exact locations of Kawele and Ugoy is that any geographical line that existed between them was blurred, and they became increasingly integrated as one district during the era of long-distance commerce. The difficulties associated with establishing the respective locations of Kawele and Ugoy necessitate labelling them as one district in this map.

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72 See: McCurdy, ‘Transforming Associations;’ Castryck, ‘Bordering the Lake.’
73 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. xxi.
74 See, for example: Burton, Lake Regions; Stanley, Dark Continent, II; Hore, ‘Twelve Tribes.’
76 Stanley, Dark Continent, II.
77 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 116.
When Burton and Speke reached the lakeshore region of Ujiji in 1858, they encountered what might be described as a ‘collection of villages.’ Rockel uses to a similar term to describe Mpwapwa before these villages grew and morphed into what might be described as districts in a town. Burton and Speke’s findings at Ujiji are also consistent with what they saw at Tabora, which Burton described as containing, “villages and hamlets, but nothing that can properly be termed a town.” Burton described Kawele, in Ujiji, similarly, as:

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78 Rockel, *Carriers*, p. 137.
A few scattered hovels… surrounded by fields of sorghum and sugar-cane, and shaded by dense groves of the dwarf, bright-green plantain, and the tall sombre elaeis, or Guinea-palm.  

In this extract, Burton gives the impression of Kawele as an isolated village in a rural environment. He also noted two other lakeshore districts in Ujiji. Firstly, of Gungu, he wrote that it was deserted by traders owing to its former teko’s (district chief’s) reputation for plundering their goods. Its current teko, Lurinda, was attempting to show greater courtesy to traders in order to attract them to his district in the future. Secondly, of Ugoy, he wrote that many coastal traders visited there, as its chiefs, Habeyya and Marabu, were less extortionate than their contemporaries in other districts. Burton also describes a system in which Jiji teko on the lakeshore had to induce traders to trade in their districts via the exchange of expensive goods, if they wanted them to do so. This was supported by the mwami (central chief), who lived in the lake’s mountainous surrounds. Before entering any lakeshore district from the east, traders were obliged to wait outside, often for a period of days. While making temporary camp there, they sent hongo (tribute) to the mwami via the tware (regional chiefs), whom the mwami appointed. They could only choose which lakeshore district they wanted to trade in once this transaction had been completed. The lack of a uniform policy amongst the chiefs of different lakeshore districts in regards to traders indicates weakness in the socio-political links between them, and suggests that they were distinct settlements, rather than districts in a town. The links between Ujiji’s lakeshore villages were largely determined by their mutual allegiance to the mwami, who lived in the lake’s mountainous surrounds.

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83 Ibid., p. 314.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., pp. 323-324; Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 627.
The influence of coastal traders after c.1860 re-shaped the relationships between Ujiji’s lakeshore villages. This is the point from which coastal traders resided on the lakeshore in permanent residences. Most coastal traders lived in Ugoy, which contained the most important market for long-distance commerce. The coastal traders’ ngwana labourers lived in Kawele alongside many Jiji. Referring to the 1870s, Reid describes Kawele and Ugoy collectively as “a thriving cosmopolitan centre, a sanctuary of trade amid warzones.” This characterisation signifies the coalescence of Kawele and Ugoy into one district. This is the district which is referred to as ‘Ujiji’ in the modern-day Kigoma urban space. For the purposes of clarity, hereafter, it is referred to as Kawele-Ugoy. The coalescence of these villages into one district is reflected in Jiji hierarchical structures. Apart from in Burton’s account, there are no others in which distinct chiefs for Kawele and Ugoy are recorded. From the 1870s onwards, there was only one teko (district chief) for the two districts. For the rest of the era of long-distance commerce, the teko of Kawele-Ugoy was called Abee. Presumably, this is the Habeyya of Burton’s account. Certainly the fact that he was described in 1881 as being “old” hints at the possibility that he maintained a chiefly position on the lakeshore between Burton’s visit to the lakeshore and this point. The expansion of long-distance commerce in the 1860s and 1870s led to the development of increased links between Kawele and Ugoy to the extent that they formed a single district.

Outside of Kawele-Ugoy in the 1860s and 1870s, coastal trader influence ensured the maintenance of divisions between different lakeshore districts in Ujiji. Indeed, conflict between them probably increased during this period. This was partly caused by rivalries amongst coastal traders. Kawele-Ugoy was dominated by Rima traders. There was a small faction of Omani

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86 See: Chapter 2; Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory, p. 186.
88 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 116.
90 CWM/LMS/06/02/006 Hutley to Whitehouse, 11 February 1881.
traders who lived in Kasimbo, and a solitary Rima trader who lived in Kigoma. Rivalries between factions in different districts and disputes between the coastal traders’ followers caused episodes of violence. In one example, Rima traders based in Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma, including Mwinyi Kheri and Mwinyi Akida, enlisted the Jiji populations living around them to violently redress a perceived wrong enacted upon them by the Omani traders living in Kasimbo. Jiji populations, therefore, were party to the rivalries between coastal traders in different parts of Ujiji. They were probably motivated to be so via a number of phenomena. Firstly, they may have been induced to help one faction in exchange for goods, though this is not referred to explicitly in the primary sources. Certainly, coastal traders such as Mwinyi Kheri could afford to buy the support of Jiji populations living on the lakeshore. Secondly, Mwinyi Kheri was integrated into the Jiji political system via marriage to one of the mwami’s daughters. This may have given him the position of tware (regional chief) of the lakeshore settlement. This was an appointed position by the mwami, whose role was to mediate between him and the teko. Even if an appointment of this kind was not official, the prestige he gained through this marriage may have been enough alone to garner him the support of local chiefs and their followers. Thirdly, this episode may have been representative of a level of continuity from Burton’s time at the lakeshore. Burton noted that lakeshore Jiji chiefs were in competition with each other to attract long-distance traders into their domains. In the 1850s, this was done via the exchange of valuable commodities; by the 1870s, these competitions may have involved more violence. The increased importance of long-distance trade to Ujiji’s economy in the

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91 See: Chapter 2.  
93 Stanley, *Dark Continent*, II, p. 7; Bennett *Arab Versus European*, pp. 91, 95.  
1860s and 1870s increased competition between Jiji chiefs and populations living on the lakeshore.

Coastal trader influence also contributed to conflicts within Kawele-Ugoy itself. The arrival and departure of caravans and the gradual expansion of the coastal traders’ followings brought numerous armed young men to Ujiji. This increased demand for Ujiji’s resources, which resulted in competition and often conflict.\(^97\) As these young men were armed with guns and the Jiji were often not, the Jiji were usually at a disadvantage when disputes arose.\(^98\) Furthermore, these conflicts occurred during a period of environmental change on the lakeshore. Sometime between the August 1876 and August 1878, the reed and mud dam at the Lukuga River outlet collapsed, which caused the level of the lake fall from 783.6m above sea level in 1878 to 775m in 1884.\(^99\) This change was disastrous for Kawele-Ugoy’s harbour, which was so shallow that it soon became unsuitable for large lacustrine craft.\(^100\) These phenomena provoked many Jiji to follow one of two courses of action. Some joined the coastal traders’ followings. This decision gave them greater access to guns, protection, and access to the coastal traders’ commercial networks.\(^101\) Others, meanwhile, left Kawele-Ugoy in favour of living in one of the lakeshore Jiji districts. This process was first indicated by Stanley. He wrote that between 1871 and 1876, the size of the market in Kawele-Ugoy declined in size from 3,000 to 1,200 square metres.\(^102\) As this was a period in which transactions associated with long-distance commerce were booming in Ujiji, the only explanation for this contraction is that Jiji traders ceased using this market so regularly. Instead, Jiji traders primarily used a market that

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\(^97\) Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, p. 116.

\(^98\) Bennett, *Arab Versus European*, p. 91; Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 628; Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 117-118; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hutley to Whitehouse, 19 October 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse, 7 November 1880.

\(^99\) Crul, ‘Limnology and Hydrology,’ p. 32.

\(^100\) Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 2; RMCA HA.01.017-7. ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidi,’ 7 July 1883.

\(^101\) See: Chapter 5; Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 45-46; Bennett, *Arab Versus European*, p. 116; Roberts, *A Dance of Assassins*, p. 21; Wright, *Strategies of Slaves*, p. 2

straddled Kigoma and Gungu. The closest harbour to these districts, in Kigoma Bay, was deeper and less vulnerable than the one at Kawele-Ugoy to the lake’s declining level.\textsuperscript{103} By 1880, Kigoma and Gungu’s market was equal in size to the market in Kawele-Ugoy. It was dominated by local, agricultural products, and it attracted palm oil traders from Urundi and ivory traders from Unyamwezi.\textsuperscript{104} The success of the Jiji populations living next to this market is represented by Hore’s statement in 1880 that Kigoma and Gungu had the largest houses that he had seen built by the Jiji.\textsuperscript{105} This suggests that the richest Jiji populations living on the lakeshore (who did not become members of the coastal traders’ followings) resided in the districts of Kigoma and Gungu. Increased conflict and environmental change in Kawele-Ugoy caused some Jiji populations living there to relocate to Kigoma and Gungu.

The movement of Jiji populations to Kigoma and Gungu signifies two broad power shifts in Ujiji’s lakeshore districts. Firstly, it represents the declining power of Abee, the \textit{teko} of Kawele-Ugoy, versus an increasingly powerful body of coastal traders in his district.\textsuperscript{106} This statement is supported by the nature of Kawele-Ugoy’s community in the 1880s. Storms described Ujiji as a town inhabited by a mixture of Jiji, Nyamwezi, and \textit{ngwana} populations alongside numerous people who had run away from captivity.\textsuperscript{107} Apart from the Jiji, these people were not tied to the \textit{teko} in any way. They were mostly interested in the conduct of long-distance trade, and did not depend on the \textit{teko} to organise or sanction lacustrine expeditions. Also, the transition in power in Kawele-Ugoy was tied to the changing nature of political power in this period, from one which was primarily exerted via the religious power of the \textit{teko} to one that was exerted via the commercial and military strength of the coastal

\textsuperscript{103} Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 2.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., pp. 45, 50; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 26 February 1880; Hore, \textit{Tanganyika}, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{105} CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 26 February 1880.
\textsuperscript{106} Brown, ‘Muslim Interference,’ p. 627.
\textsuperscript{107} RMCA HA.01.017-7. ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883.
traders. As the site of the most established community of coastal traders on the lakeshore, Kawele-Ugoy was the district where this transition was felt most strongly. Secondly, the movement of Jiji populations to Kigoma and Gungu is representative of increased links between these two districts. From the mid-to-late-1870s onwards, Kigoma and Gungu became indistinguishable from each other and were governed by one teko, called Bogo. This bears similarity to the process by which Kawele and Ugoy became one district previously, especially as a major factor behind transitions in Kawele-Ugoy and then Kigoma-Gungu was the expansion of a market within them. Hereafter, therefore, Kigoma and Gungu are referred to collectively as Kigoma-Gungu. The coalescence of Kigoma-Gungu up to the beginning of the 1880s is notable because it signifies the beginning of a process that is usually considered to have begun at the beginning of the colonial period. The prevailing historiography regards Kigoma as a colonial town, which grew in importance because of the German usage of it as an administrative and military centre, and as the terminus of the railway line from Dar es Salaam. Clearly, the process by which Kigoma-Gungu grew in importance pre-dates the arrival of European colonial powers. By the beginning of the 1880s, Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma-Gungu represented two major centres of power within Ujiji.

The leaders of Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma-Gungu governed their districts autonomously, though consulted each other in matters pertaining to the whole town and the broader polity of Ujiji. Their lack of influence in the internal affairs of each other’s district partly came about because neither leadership group had the power to dominate the other. The coastal traders were far less influential in Kigoma-Gungu than they were in Kawele-Ugoy, having only one representative, Mwinyi Akida, resident there. The teko of Kigoma-Gungu,

108 See: Chapter 4; Roberts, ‘Political Change,’ p. 58.
109 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880.
111 Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ pp. 131, 135; Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, pp. 116-117.
Bogo, also retained a greater degree of support from Jiji populations living near him than Abee in Kawele-Ugoy. This was partly caused by the increasing importance of the port at Kigoma-Gungu versus the decline of the port at Kawele-Ugoy. As teko living on the lakeshore, Abee and Bogo’s power was tied to their perceived ability to appease spirits living in the lake.\footnote{See: Chapter 4; Wagner, ‘Environment, Community & History,’ pp. 189-191; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880; Hore to Whitehouse, 26 May 1880.} The declining efficiency of the port in Kawele-Ugoy may have indicated to Jiji populations that Abee was losing his power to do this. The depth of Kigoma-Gungu’s port meant that Bogo did not suffer a loss of political capital from environmental change in the same manner. Bogo’s power was also buttressed by the nature of his relations with Mirambo. In 1879, Mirambo was said to have been a “friend” of Bogo, and, in 1880, Mirambo’s representatives were welcomed into Bogo’s court.\footnote{CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to LMS, 18 September 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 26 February – 2 March 1880, 10 March 1880.} This alliance is likely to have made the coastal traders in Kawele-Ugoy uneasy. Given Mirambo’s history of violent conflict with the coastal traders based in Tabora, rumours of Mirambo’s presence or influence near Ujiji filled them with fear. On at least two occasions, in 1879 and 1880 respectively, rumours that Mirambo was nearby caused Ujiji’s coastal traders to fortify their tembes (houses) and to send their kin and valuables to nearby islands for protection.\footnote{Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 172; ZNA AA1/23 Hore to Kirk, 14 April 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/004 Hore to Mullens, 16 April 1879; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Griffith to Whitehouse, 19 May 1880, Hutley to Whitehouse, 7 November 1880, Hutley to Whitehouse, 11 December 1880; ZNA AA1/28 Southon to Kirk, 29 November 1880, Hore to Kirk, 30 November 1880; RMCA HA.01.017-7. Storms, ‘Rapport de Voyage à Oudjidji,’ 7 July 1883.} In reality, long-term safety from an attack from Mirambo was only achievable through accommodating and appeasing him, his representatives, and his allies – including Bogo.\footnote{Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 117; CWM/LMS/06/02/007 Griffith to Thompson, 1 July 1882.} Bogo, meanwhile, had no power-base in Kawele-Ugoy, and so could not hope to dislodge the coastal traders’ (or Abee’s) position there. The nature of their respective
positions meant that it was more practical for the powers of Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma-Gungu to accommodate rather than undermine each other.

The nature of the relationship between the coastal traders of Kawele-Ugoy and Bogo of Kigoma-Gungu was put to the test by the arrival and demands of LMS missionaries in 1878. In 1880, the members of the LMS applied to Bogo to build a mission station in Gungu. The negotiations for this transaction were overseen by Mwinyi Akida, the Rima trader who lived in Kigoma, who was acting on behalf of the Rima faction in Kawele-Ugoy. Initially, they were successful, and the members of the LMS were granted a piece of land to build on. However, as the missionaries began establishing themselves on their new plot of land, the coastal traders based in Kawele-Ugoy asked Bogo to rescind his permission. The main reasons for the coastal traders’ position was probably related to the LMS’s opposition to the slave trade, and fears about European colonial expansion. Bogo quickly complied with the coastal traders’ request. The members of the LMS were furious by this turn of events. They claimed that the coastal traders should not have had any jurisdiction in this part of Ujiji, that their interference in Kigoma-Gungu’s affairs was unprecedented, and that Bogo was coerced into caving to their demands. However, this was probably not the case. In an environment in which Bogo had to choose between aligning with the coastal traders or the LMS when using people as tradable commodities was a point of contention, it made much more sense for him to choose the coastal traders. This is because he and his people were just as invested in the maintenance of human traffic as the coastal traders were. In this instance, the issue of the

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116 Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ p. 153; Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 116-117; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 26 February – 2 March 1880.
117 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880; ZNA AA2/29 Hore to Kirk, 25 February 1880. See also: Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, pp. 116-117.
119 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 10 March 1880.
120 Ibid.; ZNA AA2/29 Hore to Kirk, 10 March 1880, Hore to Kirk, 17 March 1880; ZNA AC10/1 Hore to Kirk, 17 August 1880.
121 See: Chapter 5; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 52.
LMS station was transformed from one that concerned Kigoma-Gungu to one that concerned the whole of the town of Ujiji. The powers of Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma-Gungu cooperated with each other to make a collective decision on a town-wide political matter.

The collective power wielded by the leaders of Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma-Gungu had consequences for the rest of the Ujiji polity. This is evident via the nomination of a new mwami (central chief) of Ujiji, who lived in the lake’s mountainous surrounds. This process began in January 1880, when Mugassa, the previous mwami, died.122 The negotiations for this were held in Bogo’s court in Kigoma-Gungu, and were overseen by Mwinyi Akida and members of the coastal trader community from Kawele-Ugoy.123 The fact that these negotiations occurred on the lakeshore was probably unprecedented. This is because the importance of the lakeshore to the Ujiji polity had only grown recently via the expansion of long-distance commercial networks, and because of the long distance between the lakeshore and Nkalinzi and Manyovu, the two centres where the mwami of Ujiji is known to have resided during the nineteenth century.124 Before this time, Ujiji’s central leadership viewed its lakeshore regions as a distant and unimportant periphery.125 During the negotiations, the Jiji chiefs on the lakeshore and the coastal traders ensured that the next mwami was an infant, called Rusimbi, who was presided over by a regent.126 This reduced the strength of the central Jiji leadership, and ensured that its power was reliant on the compliance of people living on the lakeshore. This marks a departure from the 1850s, in which the interactions between lakeshore chiefs and long-distance traders were limited until the mwami had collected tribute. By the 1880s, the powers of Kawele-Ugoy

122 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880; ZNA AA2/29 Hore to Kirk, 9 February 1880.
123 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880; Bennett, ‘Mwinyi Kheri,’ p. 153; Bennett, Arab Versus European, p. 91.
124 Iliffe, A Modern History, p. 48; Brown, ‘Ujiji,’ p. 23; Burton, Lake Regions, p. 323; Stanley, Dark Continent, II, p. 5; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hutley to Whitehouse, 11 December 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/006 Wookey to Whitehouse, 26 January 1881.
125 See: Chapter 1.
126 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 26 May 1880, Hore to Whitehouse, 20 July 1880.
and Kigoma-Gungu comprised a political federation that governed town affairs and influenced the wider Ujiji polity.

It is unknown exactly where Kasimbo fitted into the construction of political power in the lakeshore town of Ujiji during the 1880s. There is no first-hand record of the nature of the Jiji leadership in this district, for example. The coastal traders who resided in Kasimbo often opposed the coastal trader leadership in Kawele-Ugoy. In the 1870s and early 1880s, this was characterised by Abdullah bin Suleiman’s opposition to Mwinyi Kheri; in the late-1880s and early 1890s, it was characterised by Msabah bin Njem’s opposition to Rumaliza and the majority of the Omani faction.\textsuperscript{127} Yet, throughout this period, the coastal traders in Kasimbo were lesser in number and in influence compared to their counterparts in Kawele-Ugoy.\textsuperscript{128} Furthermore, the Jiji leadership, whatever its nature, was probably weakened after the mid 1870s. Situated, as it was, to the southeast of Kawele-Ugoy, its port was shallow. This meant that its functionality was compromised by the dramatic decline in Lake Tanganyika’s water level from this point onwards. If the experience of Kawele-Ugoy, described above, is used as a precedent, this probably contributed to some Jiji people leaving Kasimbo to move to Kigoma-Gungu, where the port was deeper. Such would have been catastrophic for the basis of the Jiji leadership in Kasimbo’s power. By the 1880s, therefore, Kasimbo was probably just a minor district of Ujiji. It was dwarfed both in size and political importance by Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma-Gungu.

Bangwe is the only other lakeshore district in Ujiji to enter the nineteenth-century primary source record with any regularity. During the 1880s, it was located on a peninsula that juts into the lake, which was connected to the mainland by a beach.\textsuperscript{129} However, until at least

\textsuperscript{127} See: Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{129} Hore, \textit{Tanganyika}, pp. 82-83; CWM/LMS/06/02/008 Hore to Whitehouse, 18-21 June 1883.
1876, it was referred to as an island. Indeed, Jiji populations fled to what the primary sources refer to as Bangwe Island when the Ngoni attacked in 1858, and Stanley stated that it was about 8 kilometres by boat to Bangwe from Kawele-Ugoy. The shift from island to peninsula was almost certainly caused by the decline in the lake’s level after the collapse of the reed and mud dam at the Lukuga outlet in 1876-1878. Bangwe, itself, had its own teko, who, during the first half of the 1880s, was called Mtagle. It is unknown what level of power the Bangwe teko had in relation to the other districts in Ujiji before the late 1870s. At this point, Hore hints at increased links between Bangwe and other lakeshore districts in Ujiji by describing it as one of Kigoma’s “smaller attachments.” This, firstly, indicates that, just like Kasimbo, Bangwe was not as important at Kigoma-Gungu or Kawele-Ugoy in Ujiji’s political composition. Secondly, it probably indicates increased political integration between Bangwe and the rest of the lakeshore districts of Ujiji in the last decade of the era of long-distance commerce compared to previous decades. It seems unlikely that Bangwe could be considered a ‘smaller attachment’ of a lakeshore settlement if it was divided from the mainland by around 8 kilometres of water. Nevertheless, Mtagle probably maintained autonomy over his district’s internal affairs. In 1883, for example, Hore refers to Mtagle and “his” peoples, which indicates that Bangwe was not dominated by the powers of either Kawele-Ugoy or Kigoma-Gungu. Thus, Mtagle, as the teko of Bangwe in the 1880s, may have been a minor power-holder in the proto-urban federation that governed town affairs in Ujiji.

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132 Hore, *Tanganyika*, p. 82.
133 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880.
134 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 25 May 1883. See also: Hore, *Tanganyika*, p. 223; CWM/LMS/06/05/5 Hore, ’3 Voyages of the ‘Calabash,’ ’ 6 August 1879.
The importance of Kigoma-Gungu and other lakeshore districts to Ujiji’s internal construction leads to one final revision to the prevailing historiography of the town. This is in relation to the size of its population. As described above, most historians estimate that Ujiji’s population in c.1890 was around 5,000, though some claim that it was as little as 3,000. However, these estimates were made in the context of a prevailing historiography that analyses Ujiji solely in terms of Kawele-Ugoy, and which does not include Kigoma-Gungu, Kasimbo, or Bangwe. By including these districts in this analysis of Ujiji, it is expected that its population was much larger. Early colonial estimates are of limited use here. In 1901, Coulbois estimated the population of Ujiji to be between 7,000 and 8,000. It is unlikely that this was reflective of a growing appreciation amongst Europeans living on the lakeshore of the integration of different districts in Ujiji, even though German administrators in the early colonial period sought to govern all of Ujiji’s districts collectively. Coulbois’ higher estimate is attributable to the fact that Kawele-Ugoy was the destination for many migrants fleeing the war in what became the Congo Free State during the 1890s. Thus, the jump from 5,000 to 7-8,000 in missionary figures between c.1890 and 1901 was probably caused by population growth in Kawele-Ugoy alone. Hore’s statement in 1880 that Kigoma-Gungu’s market was the same size as the one in Kawele-Ugoy may be more useful in this context. From this statement, it may reasonably be argued that Kigoma-Gungu and Kawele-Ugoy had similar-sized populations around them. This would result in a doubling of most estimates of Ujiji’s population in 1890 from 5,000 to around 10,000. The addition of population figures from Kasimbo and Bangwe.

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139 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 9 February 1880.

140 See: Hore, To Lake Tanganyika in a Bath Chair, p. 156.
may inflate these numbers further. Although these estimates are necessarily rough, it is probable that Ujiji’s population was closer to 10,000 than 5,000 in c.1890. The larger population size that this chapter argues was present in Ujiji is reflective of the complexity of its internal governance structures and its wider influence in its polity’s affairs, which, hitherto, have also been under-estimated.

Similar patterns to that which occurred in Ujiji also occurred in other lakeshore towns. In general, the central difference between developments in Ujiji and those of elsewhere was that elsewhere, they occurred within a shorter time-frame. Early descriptions of sites that became towns at a later display this. In 1874, for example, Cameron described Kirando as a small village populated solely by Fipa populations who were unable to supply him with adequate amounts of food for his onward journey. Conversely, by the mid-1880s, it was a commercial centre with numerous resident coastal and ngwana traders, who used it as a station town on the journey between Unyamwezi and Katanga. By this time, it was also surrounded by rice fields, which were not recorded in Cameron’s report. This reflects a drive by its new inhabitants to increase Kirando’s food producing capabilities in order to feed a larger population. Similar patterns occurred around mission stations. At the White Fathers’ station in Kibanga, the number of Africans living on their compound increased from 115 on 1 July 1886 to 1,000 on 1 January 1888. These figures do not include the district known by the name of its chief, Poré, which was about 15 minutes’ walk away in 1883. The White Fathers had to gain Poré’s permission to settle at Kibanga when they moved there and to expand their station thereafter. When the White Fathers first settled, Poré’s settlement was described as having

141 Cameron, Across Africa, p. 196.
142 A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 3 October 1885, 26 September 1887, 28 March 1888; Willis, A State in the Making, pp. 96, 156.
145 A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 4 April 1886.
100 women and 400 children. Including the male population, it is imagined that the total population was between 600 and 1,000. Collectively, the mission station and Poré’s village came to form two districts of a town that was probably of between 1,500 and 2,000 people. This likely represents a doubling of the size of its population in the space of five years. Collectively, these histories suggest a period of rapid transformation in lakeshore settlements during the late-1870s and 1880s.

The period of rapid population growth in lakeshore towns was contemporaneous with the rise of Kigoma-Gungu’s importance in Ujiji. It is notable that in some lakeshore towns, new or previously minor districts became increasingly prominent along similar lines as the Kigoma-Gungu example. This is hinted at in the above analysis of Kibanga, in which the White Fathers developed a new district on the edge of chief Poré’s longer-standing settlement. The White Fathers governed their station independently, though negotiated with Poré on matters pertaining to the whole town, such as when they desired to expand the size of their station. Poré, meanwhile maintained autonomy over his district’s internal affairs. Similar phenomena are observable at other European stations. The AIA and White Fathers’ station at Karema was built on the edge of a pre-existing village governed by a chief called Kasagula, and the White Fathers’ station at Mkapakwe (in Northern Marungu) was built as an attachment of chief Chanza’s village. Both Kasagula and Chanza continued to govern the peoples in their districts, while they and their European counterparts collectively negotiated governance of the whole town. Elsewhere, Liendwe was described as being “formed of twenty or thirty villages, lying along [a] rich alluvial plain.”

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147 See also: Wynne-Jones, ‘Lines of Desire,’ p. 228.
is unknown, and so it is impossible to estimate accurately which among them may be considered districts in one town. Nevertheless, Thomson and other Europeans’ description of its importance as a commercial centre indicate that at least some of these are likely to have been transformed into part of one proto-urban settlement. Coastal traders lived in one of these districts, while a chief called Kapufi (not to be confused with the mweene (central chief) of Ufipa, who had the same name) lived in another. These formed two distinct centres of power, which were collectively responsible for the governance of the whole town. Just as with Kawele-Ugoy and Kigoma-Gungu in Ujiji, Europeans and coastal traders in other lakeshore settlements formed a federation with the pre-existing powers that governed their towns, and had autonomy over the internal governance of their own districts.

The collective power in these proto-urban federations was such that they were able to influence power dynamics within their broader polities. This bares similarity to the ways in which people living in Ujiji established an infant as the broader polity’s mwami. Elsewhere, however, this process was often characterised by violence. Reid shows this in terms of the relationship between the lakeshore Guha and the Rua associates of Kyombo, who originated near the confluence of the Lukugu and Lualaba Rivers. He writes that the Guha “utilised [the Rua] for the purpose of waging war.” This enabled the Guha to use Mtowa as a base from which to periodically raid regions to their north, such as Ugoma and Ubwari. The strength of the allegiance between the Guha and Kyombo’s Rua associates was amplified through the kasanga’s (Guha chief’s) appropriation of Luba insignia and traditions. This was a tool that

152 CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 8 May 1880.
153 Ibid.; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Hore to Whitehouse, 12 April 1880; CWM/LMS/06/02/008 Hore to Whitehouse, 31 August 1883; Thomson, Central African Lakes, II, p. 16.
154 Reid, War in Pre-Colonial, p. 90.
Kyombo and other chiefs living between the centre of the Luba Kingdom in Katanga and the lakeshore had used to a similar effect in previous decades. This gave the impression of cultural and political parity between Kyombo and the kasangas, and enhanced Mtowa’s importance within the context of the spatial distribution of political power to the west of Lake Tanganyika. Elsewhere, peoples in towns attacked regions in their mountainous surrounds to assert their regional importance. For example, in Mpala, Storms of the AIA attacked and defeated Lusinga, another Luba-inspired Rua chief, living two-days’ march to the west of his settlement. He was assisted in this process by the pre-existing chief of Mpala (also called Mpala), who remained the governor of the Tumbwe populations living in his district of the same town. After the battle, Storms forced the entire surrounding region to pay him and Mpala tribute. Further north, ngwana traders in Chumin (Massanze) attacked regions to their west, and their contemporaries attacked the interior of Urundi from Rumonge. Although some of these campaigns had mixed results (especially those that were conducted from Rumonge), these actions established these two towns as important sites of political power within their broader polities. The growth of towns was conducive to the exertion of power from the lakeshore to the lake’s mountainous surrounds.

The exertion of political power from lakeshore settlements to regions beyond the lake’s immediate shoreline represents a major shift in the spatial distribution of political power in the lake’s polities. Up to the beginning of the era of long-distance commerce, the lakeshore can

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158 Roberts, *A Dance of Assassins*, pp. 44.  
159 Ibid., p. 37.  
partly be characterised as a periphery of larger political centres situated beyond the lake’s immediate hinterland. Ujiji, Urundi, and Ufipa all had central chiefs who lived in the lake’s mountainous surrounds, and Luba, Bemba, and Luba-inspired chiefs all exerted varying degrees of influence around the south and southwestern parts of the lakeshore. Although lakeshore populations presided over their internal affairs autonomously, many had to recognise the rights of these distant powers via periodic tribute payments.\(^{162}\) By the end of the era, however, the growth of lakeshore towns allowed lakeshore populations to influence the distribution of power in the lake’s mountainous hinterland to a greater degree. They did this via the election of the central chief (in the case of Ujiji) or via violence (elsewhere). This represents a partial reversal in the direction in which political power was asserted. This is not to argue that central chiefs were powerless in this process. For example, in 1890, mweene Kapufi of Ufipa sought influence in Kirando, and so appointed Ngombe Sazi, an ngwana trader who had previously held positions in his royal court, as his representative there.\(^{163}\) Similarly in Mtowa (Uguha), Kyombo appointed associates to look after his interests amongst the Guha throughout the 1870s and 1880s.\(^{164}\) These Rua populations used Mtowa as a base from which to trade and to raid other lakeshore populations, most notably in Ugoma and Ubwari.\(^{165}\) Nevertheless, such moves buttressed the growing political power held within the new lakeshore towns. Ngombe Sazi’s appointment in Kirando can be seen as political recognition for the ngwana populations already living there, and Guha populations used the Rua influence to increase their strength through raiding. The lakeshore was transformed from a periphery into a

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162 See: Chapter 1.
163 Willis, *A State in the Making*, p. 156.
165 Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial*, p. 90; CWM/LMS/06/02/005 Griffith to Whitehouse, 2 August 1880; A.G.M.Afr. Diaire de Kibanga, 11 June 1883; Hore, *To Lake Tanganyika in a Bath Chair*, p. 175; ZNA AC10/1 Hore to Kirk, 17 August 1880.
region with numerous self-governing towns that had political influence beyond their immediate surroundings.\textsuperscript{166}

**Conclusion**

The growth of towns on the shores of Lake Tanganyika re-defined the lake’s political position within the context of East and Central Africa. Before their emergence, the lakeshore was a relatively unimportant periphery of polities whose centres were situated in the lake’s mountainous surrounds. Yet, by the late 1880s, the power held by the peoples in these towns enabled them to exert regional political influence that extended beyond the lake’s immediate shoreline. This power was born out of the increased size of lakeshore settlements, which was caused by the need to use the lakeshore for the transport of peoples and goods to, from, and across the lake, and for the need of protection from nearby raiders. The ways in which the power of people living in lakeshore towns was structured relates to the encounter between longstanding lakeshore populations and immigrant groups. Although the spatial barriers between different peoples were never demarcated absolutely, immigrant groups and their followers often lived in separate districts to pre-existing lakeshore populations. Each of these districts had their own leadership group, and it was only when matters that pertained to the whole town or to regional affairs when the heads of each district came together to negotiate a position. Such is representative of town governance being organised via a form of federation. The encounter between immigrants and lakeshore populations re-shaped the size, purpose, and governance structures of lakeshore settlements, and the extent of their regional influence. What emerged from this process was a series of similarly-structured towns with similar purposes, and, as such, they may be viewed as forms of settlement that were distinct to the lakeshore environment. Analysed collectively, the towns can be seen to have linked the different regions of the

\textsuperscript{166} See also: Rockel, *Carriers*, p. 138; Geenhuizen and Rietveld, ‘Land-Borders and Sea-Borders,’ p. 75.
lakeshore together in a way that allows them to be considered as one aspect of what this thesis refers to as Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture.
Conclusion

The central theme of this thesis is the development of Lake Tanganyika as a frontier. This was a region whose environmental characteristics promoted heightened and distinct forms of political instability, economic opportunity, and cultural exchange. Lake Tanganyika represented a large geographical feature that lay along the central long-distance commercial route between Zanzibar and the Congo Basin. Traders had to establish themselves and their kin on both sides of the lake to connect the two ends of their commercial route. This promoted large-scale migrations to the lakeshore. This process was further augmented by the arrival of other migrants, who sought the use of new, larger settlements for protection from raiders in rural areas. As such, people from a variety of regions and backgrounds settled on the lakeshore amongst pre-existing lakeshore populations for numerous different reasons. Such brought competitions between different networks of peoples, commercial opportunities, and opportunities to make new kinship networks. It also promoted a great deal of cultural exchange. This thesis argues that the results of this exchange resulted in phenomena that were distinct to the lakeshore environment. They can be listed as the following: an integrated market that linked each of the lake’s market centres together; a pervasive belief in spirits (zimu) in the lake along with a religious framework that was associated with the appeasement of these spirits; and the development of a distinct settlement types that re-shaped Lake Tanganyika’s geo-political position within the context of the rest of East and Central Africa. These three phenomena are the characteristics of what this thesis refers to as Lake Tanganyika’s ‘frontier culture.’

There were numerous agents in the development of Lake Tanganyika’s frontier culture. In the first decades of the era of long-distance commerce, the main agents were the Jiji. They had a pre-existing market and a pre-existing religious framework that associated itself with the lake, and Ujiji was the first settlement on the lakeshore to develop into what may appropriately be described as a town. Many of the cultural phenomena that eventually pervaded the entire
lakeshore had their roots in these Jiji forms. The Jiji were crucial agents in the dissemination of these forms to other parts of the lake. Once coastal traders and their followers settled permanently on the lakeshore from the 1860s onwards, however, the Jiji’s role in this context diminished somewhat. The coastal traders and their followers adapted and took control of certain aspects of the frontier culture to suit their needs. For example, they manipulated the supply of expensive goods to Ujiji’s market (and other markets around Lake Tanganyika), they became more prominent in the construction of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework, and they became important sources of political authority in most of the lakeshore’s towns. Crucial within this shift in agency was the emergence of a body of people who referred to themselves as ngwana. These were people from the interior of Africa who adopted and adapted certain aspects of Lake Tanganyika’s religious framework and aspects of the coastal traders’ customs that originated on the coast. Most of these ngwana came from Manyema, in modern-day eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and many arrived on the shores of Lake Tanganyika as slaves. Yet, by the end of the 1880s, some among them were town governors, wealthy independent traders, and the leaders of large followings of people. Their rise in this context is representative of robust cultural interaction, and the high levels of political instability and commercial opportunity on Lake Tanganyika’s shores.

The development of the Lake Tanganyika frontier had consequences for elsewhere in East and Central Africa. In general, Lake Tanganyika became more important to the construction of the broader region as time went on. This can firstly be seen in terms of commercial networks and its political status. Traders traversed the lake more as time went on, instead of travelling around its edges, and political leaders in lakeshore towns took increasing agency over regional politics. As such, Lake Tanganyika became an important zone of transition between regions to its east and west at the same time that it became an increasingly influential political sub-region in East and Central Africa. Secondly, the rise of the ngwana on
the shores of Lake Tanganyika had broader consequences for conditions on the Mrima coast. The ways in which the idea of being *ngwana* was conceptualised on Lake Tanganyika clashed in certain ways with its conceptualisation on the coast. On the coast, being *ngwana* meant to being long-term resident of the coast and being ‘freeborn.’ People from the coast thus rejected many interior populations’ claims to being *ngwana* on the basis of their origins and the belief that they could be enslaved. Yet, *ngwana* from the interior, such as those who emerged on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, contested this. Crucially, they did so with one of the key tools that enhanced their prestige in the interior: through the power of the gun. In this sense, the robustness and the instability of the frontier affected other regions that had longer-standing and more established social and political frameworks.
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