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A Communal Affair over International Affairs: The arrival of IR in Late Colonial India

This paper makes an archival journey into the making of institutes of international affairs in late colonial India. By exploring the intertwined lives of two such institutions, it unearthed an ideational fight over the study of international affairs in India between the Indian Institute of International Affairs (IIIA), established in 1936, and the Indian Council for World Affairs (ICWA), established in the 1940s. From the outset, the IIIA was strongly pro-government and saw the ICWA as an institutional rival and a propaganda front for the Indian National Congress (INC). Closer to independence, the two institutes were increasingly divided on communal and nationalist political lines. The IIIA’s leadership became dominated by Muslims and the Muslim League and the ICWA by Brahmin Hindus and the INC. In this context, a battle for legitimacy and recognition ensued over participation in international conferences and the ability to publish meaningful research. The ICWA successfully organized the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, which sealed the fate of the IIIA, which moved to Pakistan with Partition and quietly closed down, after coexisting briefly with the Pakistan Institute for International Affairs (PIIA).

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Introduction: The Arrival of IR in India

Conventional narratives of the study of International Relations (IR) in India begin with the founding of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in 1943, under whose auspices the School of International Studies (SIS) was opened in 1955. Nehru’s influence was critical in these initiatives

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and Indian IR thinking, it is assumed, remained wedded to the Nehruvian postcolonial project. However, the history of IR in India is more complex and precedes the ICWA story by about a decade, if not more. Indeed, IR’s arrival in India was tied to the global history of IR, which, as recent revisionist disciplinary histories suggest, was embedded in the imperialism of the US and the UK. The arrival of these institutes also presents to us a fascinating case in South Asia’s international history, which reveals the struggles for international recognition of India just prior to independence, and the last-ditch attempts by the Indian colonial government to control discourse on and the study of international affairs.

Early ‘think-tanks’ of IR, and certainly its first, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA, also known as Chatham House) were initiated and helmed by the Round Table group, an empire-wide community of Anglo-imperial enthusiasts. They founded Chatham House in 1919, with the belief that, to paraphrase Peter Lasslet, the horrors of war had made international politics too serious a task to be left to politicians. Consequently, the ‘scientific study of international affairs’ would allow academics to chart the course of the future. Given their belief in positivist knowledge, the Chatham House founders were convinced that objective and scientific study of international affairs would lead to world peace. They successfully opened similar groups across the British Commonwealth. This idea was premised on the pre-World War I work of the Round Table movement, which had envisioned the British Commonwealth as an ‘Organic Union’. During the war, such groups were particularly strong in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Attempts to open such groups were made even in India, albeit with limited success. Through the institutes the Round Table had enabled in Canada (1928), Australia (1933), New Zealand (1934), South Africa (1934) and finally India (1936), they hoped to bind the empire together by circulation of ideas while emphasizing a common identity.

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7 King-Hall, Chatham House, p. 91.
8 Kendle, The Roundtable Movement; May, The Round Table.
9 MS Eng Hist. c 802, f. 27-35, Papers of the Round Table, Bodleian Libraries, Oxford University.
Although their work is somewhat distinct from IR in universities, these institutes are still important to disciplinary history as they honed a ‘scientific’ method for the study of international affairs. This empirical approach of studying IR to fit political agendas is evident today in research projects and publications of think-tanks globally. The origins of this form of research can be traced back to the journal The Round Table, founded in 1909. In the 1940s, most Chatham House affiliated institutes established journals which remain key outlets for IR today. The PIIA’s Pakistan Horizon and the ICWA’s India Quarterly fulfill this same role.

This paper tells the forgotten tale of the IIIA. Founded in 1936, this short-lived institute was caught in political and communal crossfires of the time. Although notionally independent from the government and aimed at promoting the objective study of world politics along the Chatham House model, our story reveals the farcical nature of this attempt. We show that from its founding, the Institute was tethered to the colonial Indian government and did no work at all, let alone ‘scientific’ research. The ICWA, in fact, emerged as a rival organisation to the IIIA in early 1940s, just as the anti-colonial movement in India reached its peak. The ruptures that eventually led to Partition were also inscribed in the emerging rivalry between the two institutes, as they were maneuvered along political and communal fault lines that separated the INC and the Muslim League. A hard fought battle for legitimacy ensued, at the end of which the IIIA moved to Pakistan and briefly co-existed in the same room with the newly founded PIIA, before folding in 1948.

**Founding the Institute**

In September 1932, Chatham House received an unlikely request for grants from an Indian scholar of international law. Lanka Sundaram, later an Indian parliamentarian, informed Ivison Macadam, the RIJA’s secretary, that he had started an ‘Indian Institute for International Studies’ at Bejawada (Vijayawada) in South India with ‘a view to help India rise in her proper stature in the comity of nations’. Sundaram knew the workings of Chatham House well. He had worked in its library and contributed an article to its journal and published alongside Alfred Zimmern and Charles Manning, both early university professors of international affairs and prominent members of

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10 Thakur et al., ‘Imperial Mission, Scientific Method’.

11 These journals are the Australian Journal of International Affairs (formerly Australian Outlook), International Journal (Canada), South African Journal of International Affairs, and New Zealand International Review.

12 Lanka Sundaram to I. Macadam, 20 September 1932, file no. India Office Records at The British Library (hereafter IOR/L/1/1/427, f. 22).

Chatham House. As such, he sought to affiliate his institute with Chatham House. On account of ‘the poverty and general unpreparedness of India’, he requested that Chatham House fund his endeavor in order to consider matters of international affairs seriously.

Macadam wrote to the India Office to investigate Sundaram and his institute. The request reached the Madras Government, which dismissed Sundaram as ‘an ardent Congressman with anti-British views and bitterly hostile to the present policy of government’. The India Office counselled Chatham House to ‘wait and see whether the institute is capable of standing on its own legs before affording it assistance, and cautioned that ‘Sundaram himself is a man of no property and no profession, the son of a cook’ and that his real aim was to secure himself a ‘lucrative appointment’. The India Office advised Chatham House not to cooperate with Sundaram ‘until it is evident that [his Institute] is not likely to fall under the influence of Congress opinion’. Sundaram’s request was dismissed.

The following year, in 1933, the RIIA organized the first unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference in Toronto, where plans for future development of such institutes were formally discussed. An Indian delegation led by Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, including Zafrulla Khan, Mir Maqbool Mahmood and Laurie Hammond, was invited to attend. All representatives were close to the colonial government and the delegation followed the then-set tradition of including non-official members from the legislative assemblies, a representative of the princely states, and a British member. At the conference, the Indian delegation expressed strong interest in opening an institute in India. Mudaliar argued that ‘it was very desirable that an Institute should be established in India’ consisting of a central institute at Delhi and branches in the provincial capitals. He enquired, however, ‘how the high standard of membership of [Chatham


13 Lanka Sundaram to I. Macadam, 20 September 1932, file no. IOR/L/I/1/427, f. 23. See also I. Macadam to R.A. Butler, 9 November 1932, file no. IOR/L/I/1/427, f. 21.


15 Ibid., f. 15.

16 Butler to Macadam, 9 November, 1932.

17 Anon, ‘Meeting on Institutes of International Affairs, First Meeting, Ref. No. T89/20th/140, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, British Commonwealth Relations Conference Toronto, September 11th-21st, 1933’, Folder 7/1/1e, Chatham House Archives, London (hereafter CHA).

18 From 1939 to 1942, Mudaliar served in the Viceroy’s Executive Council and from 1942-1945 was a member of Churchill’s Imperial War Cabinet. Mudaliar represented India at the San Francisco Conference of 1945 and became the first president of UNESCO. Zafrulla Khan was a chief proponent of the Pakistan movement and became Pakistan’s first external affairs minister. Mir Maqbool Mahmood was the foreign minister of Patiala and represented the princely states. Hammond was a former governor of Assam.
House] was achieved and had not developed into a “fashion”. Concerned that such an institute might criticize the colonial government’s policies, Mudaliar also wanted to know ‘how it had been possible to exclude discussions on purely domestic questions’. Chatham House was enthusiastic and informed him that 38 of its members were in India and hence there as a considerable knowledge base to draw from. Subsequently, Chatham House held discussions with Girija Shankar Bajpai, Tej Bahadur Sapru and Surendra Kumar Datta, apart from Mudaliar and Zafrulla Khan.

Consequently, on 3 March 1936, the Viceroy’s House in Delhi played host to a few Indian liberal politicians and bureaucrats, who formally established the IIA. This meeting elected Zafrulla Khan, then a young and dynamic Muslim politician who had been drafted into the Viceroy’s executive council, as the chairperson of this new institute. The Viceroy was made the ex-officio president. This meeting, in the words of Stephen King-Hall, was made possible through the ‘energy and initiative’ of Frederick E. James, a European member of the Central Legislative Assembly, who along with M.S.A. Hydari, a member of the Indian civil service, was elected as the Honorary Secretary. B. Shiva Rao, labour leader and journalist, was nominated as the Organising Secretary. Invitations to join were also sent to pro-Congress leaders such as Bhulabhai Desai and Sarojini Naidu. Although most of its council comprised of bureaucrats and politicians, the Institute sought a ‘non-political’ character, precluding it from ‘expressing any opinion, from endorsing any policies, or from conducting any propaganda on any aspect of international affairs’. Its founding statement noted that its sole purpose was ‘encouraging and facilitating in India the scientific study of international questions’.

21 ‘Meeting of Institutes of International Affairs’, p. 7.
22 Ibid., p. 8.
23 Ibid., p. 9.
24 A member of the ICS and later the first Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
25 Eminent lawyer and liberal politician who had served in the Viceroy’s Council and represented India at the 1923 Imperial Conference.
26 A prominent YMCA member and member of the Central Legislative Assembly. Earliest Indian member of Chatham House, and the first Indian participant in the IPR Conference of 1929.
27 R.C.M. Arnold to Edward Carter, 18 May 1935, Folder 6/2/38, CHA.
29 Zafrulla Khan later recanted that he was the ‘first and only President of the Institute’. This is untrue. The Viceroy was the ex-officio president, but even as chairperson Zafrulla Khan was replaced by Ramaswami Mudaliar in late-1930s, who was followed by Sultan Ahmad in November 1942. See, Zafrulla Khan, Reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan: Based on interviews by Prof. Wayne Wilcox and Prof. Aislie T. Embree, Columbia University, 2004, p: 136-137.
30 King-Hall, Chatham House, p. 105.
However, the Institute’s pro-government character, reflected in its membership and leadership, implicitly flouted the ‘non-political’ requirement of Chatham House. S.K. Datta, the oldest Indian member of Chatham House, refused an invitation to the executive council arguing that there was little space for an institution like this in India because it would be controlled by government officials.33

At the IIA’s founding, Stephen King-Hall, Chatham House’s representative and chairperson of its Endowment Committee, argued that a suitable Secretary General had to be found for the Institute’s first two formative years. They would need to make a prolonged India tour to acquaint themselves with Indian conditions. But, with scant regard to the Indians present in the room, King-Hall added patronizingly, such a person ‘should be an Englishman, with experience of the working of Chatham House and preferably only a slight previous acquaintance with Indian conditions’. Moreover, he ‘should be unmarried’, unless the spouse was effectively ‘his unpaid assistant’.34 Datta noted despairingly in response:

All things that emanate from Delhi and Shimla, whether it is the Red Cross or the St James Ambulance or the Dufferin Fund or the Boy Scouts, do so from the departments of government. Has it not occurred to anybody to see that an Indian is found and trained for this work. …[appointing an English Secretary General would never be] put forward to a Japanese Committee or a Chinese Committee.35

The first meeting of the Institute was held in Shimla on 3 October 1936 where the South African Minister for Interior Jan Hofmeyr, leading a South African delegation to India, delivered an address titled ‘A South African looks at the Empire’.36 Two branches were opened in Calcutta and Bombay. They soon became dysfunctional. Despite the initial fanfare, prior to WWII, the Institute ‘only had odd meetings’, at which ‘the attendance was thin, the discussions on topics were poor and dull, and there was nothing of real interest in these activities’.37 The Calcutta branch closed in December 1940, while the Bombay branch ‘practically ceased activity’.38 Furthermore, although the Institute had originally envisaged on the Chatham House pattern, ‘research into international problems by

33 S.K. Datta, ‘Correspondence with the IIA’.
34 King-Hall, ‘Note’, MSS EUR F178/36, CHA.
35 S.K. Datta to Lionel Curtis, 26 May 1936, MSS EUR F178/36, CHA.
36 On Hofmeyr’s India visit, see Alan Paton, Hofmeyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 245-254
individual members and study groups by experts’, it conducted no research until the early 1940s. Its only function was to send representations to the International Studies Conferences of 1939 and 1940 and the 1938 unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference in Sydney. For the latter, the Indian contingent went without any preparatory work.

Rejuvenating the Institute and the Emergence of the ICWA

By 1942, WWII had extended to the Pacific and the British Empire was threatened by Japanese advances. Although the formal entry of the United States into the war had come as a huge relief to Britain, American politicians were generally hostile to British imperialism. Both Whitehall and New Delhi were worried about pro-Congress propaganda carried out by the India League in America, believing it could jeopardize American support. The League had argued that until India had a national government, the country’s human and military resources could not be fully mobilized for war. G.S. Bajpai, who had recently arrived as India’s Agent General, wrote in May 1942 that there was a strong need to counter Indian nationalist propaganda which found considerable sympathy with anti-British undercurrents in America, shaped by the country’s own revolutionary history and its significant Irish population.

An important non-government platform that shaped such opinions was the Pacific Relations Conference, organised by the liberal internationalist US-based Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). Its eighth conference was proposed in September 1942 in the US (subsequently taking place in Mont Tremblant, Canada, in December 1942). Edward Carter, the left-oriented Secretary General of the IPR, had visited India in 1935 where several Indians had expressed the hope of opening a National Council of IPR in India. He was, however, told by the Viceroy and S.K. Datta that an Indian IPR delegation would only be of service if ‘it is authentically Indian; if it gets its stimulus from the Pacific rather than from England, and if its development is on scientific rather than on political and government lines’. The possibility of such an institute, whose members were mostly Indian and was driven by its Indian rather than imperial outlook, without drawing its patronage and

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39 Ibid., p. 13.
40 Ibid.
43 G.S. Bajpai to David Monteath, 16 May 1942, IOR/L/I/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
45 Edward Carter to R.C.M. Arnold, 4 April 1935, Folder 6/2/38, CHA.
worldview from the colonial government, was impossible.\textsuperscript{46} The IIIA, founded a year after this visit, had validated these concerns. Hence, Carter was keen to invite a delegation more ‘representative… of Indian citizens’ than the IIIA.\textsuperscript{47}

Considered ‘anti-British’, Carter’s and the IPR’s moves in India were viewed suspiciously by the British. Carter had previously funded Nehru’s 1939 trip to China and was allegedly close to the India League.\textsuperscript{48} Keen to have the INC represented in the 1942 IPR Conference, Carter sent an invitation to Jawaharlal Nehru (he also considered inviting C. Rajagopalachari, as Nehru had been jailed). Unconfirmed rumours also reached Whitehall that Nehru had been invited to visit President Roosevelt. This made both Whitehall and the Indian government anxious about American support to the war effort.\textsuperscript{49}

British representatives in America were pleased, however, that the failure of Cripps Mission and Gandhi’s insistence that Indians should not be engaged in the war, and should deal with the Japanese threat through nonviolent means had created an impression that the Congress was unreasonable.\textsuperscript{50} Lord Halifax, the British high commissioner, argued that ‘Congress pacifism has aroused impatience and Congress distrust of loan of technical and military aid has caused resentment’.\textsuperscript{51} Consequently, Bajpai wrote, ‘psychologically, the atmosphere has never been more propitious to educating the American peoples to take a more balanced and detached view of the Indian political situation’.\textsuperscript{52} Bajpai suggested that pro-government Indian leaders should visit the US on lecture tours to counter nationalist propaganda, alongside attending the IPR Conference.\textsuperscript{53}

Buoyed by this, Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, that to prevent invitations to Congress-aligned individuals, efforts should be made to secure invitations for the IIIA.\textsuperscript{54} The IIIA would give the requisite air of autonomy to the Indian delegation while at the same time ensuring, as another internal government memo noted, that the ‘right kind of Indians attend the meeting’.\textsuperscript{55} Olaf Caroe, the Secretary of India’s External

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} ‘Indian Representation at the IPR Conference’, p. 3, Folder 6/2/38, CHA.
\textsuperscript{48} ‘Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6 May 1943, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94; A.S. Shah, ‘Report on the eighth session of the IPR Conference held at Mont Tremblant, Canada, from December the 4th to December the 14th’, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{49} ‘Draft telegram for circulation: Secretary of State to Viceroy, No. 2645’, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
\textsuperscript{50} G.S. Bajpai to David Monteath, 16 May 1942, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{51} Telegram: Washington to Foreign Office, 24 May 1942, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
\textsuperscript{52} G.S. Bajpai to David Monteath, 16 May 1942, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Secretary of State to Viceroy, 26 May 1942, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
\textsuperscript{55} ‘Minute, External Department, 18 May 1942,’ IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
Department, wrote that they should ‘handpick the Indian representatives and do everything possible to stop the Chinese and Americans from talking pernicious non-sense about British imperialism in India’. Consequently, Bajpai, who was friends with Carter, was asked to secure a direct invite to the IIIA. Carter readily agreed, knowing little that the whole delegation was chosen by the Indian government. Linlithgow appointed Ramaswami Mudaliar, who was also then Chairperson of the IIIA, to lead the delegation. The final delegation comprised Zafrulla Khan, M.C. Khanna, Begum Shah Nawaz, K.M. Panikkar, S.E. Ranganathan and N. Sivaranj. Importantly, as advised by Bajpai, the delegates were also to give lectures across America to influence the American opinion on India.

Despite Carter’s wishes, the delegation, had an ‘official’ stamp to it. Carter suggested to Bajpai that Congress delegates should be included in the Indian delegation. E.J. Tarr, the chairperson of the Pacific Council, also emphasised the ‘desirability [of] having [a] non-official Indian’ on the delegation. But Bajpai responded that the Indian government could not be expected to receive such a suggestion favourably, considering that the Congress had just launched the Quit India Movement. After the Indian government threatened to withdraw from the conference and Chatham House, which served as the IPR’s National Council in the UK, expressed concern that its Indian affiliate was deliberately being sidelined by Carter, the Indian delegation was accepted.

Larger issues, however, were brewing within the Institute in India. Anantra Pattani, Dewan of Bhavnagar state and a member of the IIIA, wrote to Chatham House’s founder Lionel Curtis that the Indian delegation should have included ‘best possible personnel to represent [the] Indian branch of the Royal Institute at Pacific Conference’ and suggested that people of M.R. Jayakar’s and Tej Bahadur Sapru’s stature should have been in the delegation. Pattani’s telegram to Curtis, although dismissed by Chatham House Secretary Ivision Macadam as inconsequential, pointed towards deeper-seated problems. Sharp differences had arisen within the IIIA due to the intensifying nationalist movement. A rival faction, led by men including P.N. Sapru, H.N. Kunzru and B.

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56 Ibid.
57 Khanna represented the Hindu Mahasabha. Begum Shah Nawaz represented Muslim League and Women. Panikkar, scholar, diplomat and Dewan of Bikaner, represented Princely States. Ranganathan was adviser to the Secretary of State and Sivaraj was a last minute addition, at the insistence of the Viceroy, to give a representation to dalits.
58 ‘Indian Representation at the IPR Conference’, p. 4.
59 G.S. Bajpai to David Monteath, 27 August 1942, IOR/L/1/1/1090, File No. 462/94.
60 ‘Indian Representation at the IPR Conference’, p. 4.
61 Ibid., p. 3.
62 Led the Swaraj Party from 1923 to 1925 and was a Federal Court Judge (1937-39).
63 ‘Indian Representation at the IPR Conference’, p. 4.
64 Ibid., p. 5.
65 Eminent lawyer, member of the Central Legislative Assembly and son of T.B. Sapru.
Shiva Rao, now increasingly resented the Institute’s pro-government outlook. The way the Mont Tremblant delegation was picked had proved to them that the Institute was a lackey of the government.

While the Indian delegation went to Mont Tremblant as an official delegation of the IIIA, the dissenters pointed that it had not organised any meetings to confirm these delegates, nor were other members consulted. Further, Mudaliar had ceased to be the chairperson of the Institute in October 1942 and had no right to choose the delegation on the Institute’s behalf. After the government realized these procedural errors, Mudaliar accepted that the delegation did not represent the Institute as the Viceroy had appointed him in personal capacity to the delegation. Indeed, the delegation was funded by the Indian government.

At Mont Tremblant, anti-British sentiment, especially among the Americans and Chinese, was strong. Carter himself made no bones about it, especially on the issue of imperialism in India. In discussions on the specially convened round table on India in the conference, the dominant mood was anti-British. An internal British memo noted ‘a plan by means of this Round Table for a pro-Congress demonstration which would set up ripples, or rather tidal waves, to wash Gandhi and Nehru out of prison’. In response, Mudaliar was forced to grant concessions. He proposed the complete Indianisation of the Viceroy’s council and establishing an exploratory commission, which could include foreign observers, for the creation of a constitution-making body. These went further than the Indian government’s position and surprised even the British delegates. Back in India, Mudaliar was admonished in departmental communiques for ‘speaking with complete irresponsibility’, although they acknowledged that this helped the Indian delegation demonstrate independence. Major A.S. Shah, an officer from External Affairs department who served as the secretary for Indian delegation, wrote a scathing report arguing that Carter had strongly canvassed for a pro-Congress point of view in the Conference. The IPR report on the Indian Round Table, he alleged, was laden with an anti-British bias. Carter, he wrote, was keen on opening a National

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67 Telegram No. 99, 3 November 1942, Information Department, India Office’, IOR/L/1/1/1090, File No. 462/94.
69 Anon, ‘An Impression of the IPR Conference’, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
70 Political Secretary: Note, 6940/42’, f. 117-120, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
Council of IPR in India which would be closer to Congress and posed ‘a danger of this organisation taking a communal bias and indulging merely in anti-British feelings’.\(^\text{72}\)

To counter this, Shah advised that immediate steps should be taken to ‘strengthen the existing branch of Chatham House’ in India. Its membership should be extended among selected non-officials and, importantly, a permanent secretary should be appointed. The Institute should draw a constitution and begin publishing and disseminating studies.\(^\text{73}\) He had also accompanied the Indian delegates on lecture tours to America after the Conference and was convinced that these lectures had helped greatly in turning the American opinion against ‘a class of people [the Congress] who are out to establish a system of government based on antiquated notions of caste and rule of numerical majority’.\(^\text{74}\) He envisioned the Institute’s work helping in furthering such informed opinion nationally and internationally. During the war the funding support for the IIIA, he wrote, would have to primarily come from the government.\(^\text{75}\)

Back in India, Caroe wanted to publish Shah’s report to discredit the IPR by emphasising its biased nature.\(^\text{76}\) However, Mudaliar advised against publishing it and in turn suggested that the IIIA should apply to become an affiliate of the IPR, in order to preclude the latter’s plans of creating a pro-Congress National Council in India.\(^\text{77}\) The Viceroy supported Mudaliar’s suggestion and advised revitalising the IIIA.\(^\text{78}\) Accordingly, Mudaliar raised the membership issue with Carter, who told him that the IIIA would have to reorganise itself according to the IPR guidelines (which included complete autonomy from the government and representation of all principal groups in a country). Carter promised Mudaliar that if such changes were made, the Institute would be formally admitted upon an application in this regard before the next meeting.\(^\text{79}\)

Meanwhile, differences within the Institute became public on 24 August 1943 when Kunzru and P.N. Sapru issued a circular that called for ‘the immediate establishment of an independent organisation for the study of world affairs’ in India.\(^\text{80}\) The circular foregrounded this need on the newly established principles of the Atlantic Charter, especially relating to the future of dependencies and colonies, and more generally, on the need to create a machinery for world peace.

\(^{72}\) *Ibid*, p. 20.
\(^{75}\) Shah, ‘Report on the eighth session of the IPR Conference’, p. 20.
\(^{76}\) Olaf Caroe to A. R. Mudaliar, 18 May 1943, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
\(^{77}\) Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, POL (S) 1225, 1943’, IOR/L/1/1/1090, file no. 462/94.
\(^{78}\) ‘Telegram: Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6 May 1943’.
\(^{79}\) ‘Indian Representation at the IPR Conference’, p. 5.
Critiquing IIIA’s representation at the Mont Tremblant Conference, Kunzru and Sapru noted that given ‘the urgent need for a thorough study of such questions... and the importance of India being represented at any Conference that may be held hereafter for their discussion, *by delegations capable of voicing the views and aspirations of the great majority of people* [emphasis added]*’*, a new institute was necessary.\(^{81}\) This statement gestured towards the lack any serious research being undertaken by the IIIA, and its pro-government and non-representative character, which, given the growing likelihood of independence, made the Institute increasingly irrelevant.

Stung by these internal criticisms and pushed by the IPR, the IIIA was now keen to revitalise itself. At the behest of the government, many organisational changes were introduced. Sultan Ahmad, the member for Information and Broadcasting department in the Viceroy’s executive council, was made the new chairperson of the Institute. In November 1943, Ahmad proposed wide ranging changes in the organisation and working of the Institute aimed at increasing the membership, opening new branches across the country and setting up of a Secretariat with a full-time secretary and clerical staff. These proposals also announced that the IIIA ‘would be a body of independent status in no way controlled by any government department or made a subordinate organ of government policy’.\(^{82}\) Further, on the Chatham House model, Ahmad proposed that the Institute should focus on ‘scientific research on international questions’ and consider the production of a periodical journal overseen by a Research Director.\(^{83}\)

Although Ahmad promised institutional autonomy, this was almost immediately compromised when he requested government funding. This was particularly ironic, given that he was head of the government’s propaganda department. Nevertheless, the finance department quickly agreed to make a grant of Rs. 80,000 per annum for the first two years and an additional sum of Rs.10,000 for the library.\(^{84}\) The only substantial non-government support came from Pattani who had promised a sum of Rs. 100,000 for building the new headquarters in Delhi.

Ahmad advanced his new proposals in a stormy meeting of the IIIA executive council on 15 November 1943. Chaired by Ahmad, the meeting included: P.P. Pillai (Vice Chairperson), Kunzru, Mudaliar, Zafrulla Khan, P.N. Sapru, C. Jahangir, U.N. Sen, N.M. Joshi and Narain Mahtha. When asked to explain his move for forming a rival organisation, Kunzru replied that his dissatisfaction

\(^{81}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{82}\) *Extracts from Minutes of Meeting of the Council of the Indian Institute of International Affairs, held on Monday the 15th November 1943: Appendix A*, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.

\(^{83}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{84}\) A. Joyce to A.F. Morley, 3 November 1943, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.
with the IIIA was because ‘he saw nothing really Indian in the Institute. Neither in the discussions, nor in the composition either of its council or its general body could he find substantial element representing Indian views or Indian sentiments or aspirations’. Replying to Kunzru’s accusations, Ahmad stated that his new proposals met with most of Kunzru’s concerns. Kunzru promised to reconsider his decision in a meeting with his friends six days later. This 21 November meeting instead birthed a new institute: the ICWA. B. Shiva Rao alleged that the Indian government tried to prevent the establishment of the Council. Carter, who was in India on a visit to discuss this new body with Kunzru and others, was effectively blackmailed by the Indian government to withdraw from further discussions by making his further journey to Moscow conditional upon him not meeting Kunzru.

The Struggle for Survival: IIIA and ICWA

If the IIIA was based on the Chatham House model, the ICWA ‘owed its inspiration to the IPR’. Following IPR requirements, it committed to keeping its executive council and the majority of its members non-official (although government officials were allowed to become members). Further, its council was required to be representative of the principal groups and interests in the country. Tej Bahadur Sapru was chosen to be the president of the Council and vice-presidents included Congress-inclined politicians and business-persons such as Vijayalakshmi Pandit, G.D. Birla and Shri Ram. Shri Ram, a Delhi businessman, and Pattani provided initial the funding. B. Shiva Rao, the first organising secretary of the IIIA, also became the first organising secretary of the ICWA. Many IIIA members, such as Pattani, C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer, Sri Narayan Mahata and N.M. Joshi, were also on the executive committee of the ICWA.

Over the next two years, the two institutes competed for legitimacy. They began producing research. After having published nothing in its first eight years, the IIIA published 17 pamphlets and organised 18 lectures in 1944. Likewise, by November 1945, the ICWA had published three monographs (with two more in press) and 8 pamphlets. It had also opened 11 branches across the country and formed two study groups on ‘India and Security in the Pacific’ and ‘Progress towards

85 ‘Extracts from Minutes of Meeting of the Council of the Indian Institute of International Affairs’, 15 November 1943, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.
86 Ibid.
87 Kunzru and P.N. Sapru however continued to be on the executive council of the IIIA.
88 Rao, ‘The Indian Council of World Affairs’.
89 B. Shiva Rao to Edward Carter, 26 July 1944, (intercepted message), IOR/L/I/1/1091, file no. 462/94.
90 Rao, ‘The Indian Council of World Affairs’
91 B. Shiva Rao to Carter, 24 March 1944, Folder 6/2/38, CHA.
Self-Government in Dependent Areas’ in Delhi and Poona (Pune), respectively.\(^92\) Both the Institutes started their flagships journals in January 1945. In its founding statement, the IIIA’s *Journal of the Indian Institute of International Affairs* (JIIPA) stated that new awareness on foreign affairs was needed because having been ‘directly and fully involved in the war, India has become more than ever aware of her place in the world, more than eager to play her part in the world’.\(^93\) In contrast, the ICWA’s *India Quarterly*, brandishing its anti-government credentials, retorted: ‘The fact that India has had no share in the shaping of her foreign policy is largely responsible for the absence of an effective public opinion here on foreign affairs, but the same fact makes continued vigilance all the more essential’.\(^94\) In this sense, the ICWA and its journal was an attempt to project an international identity prior to independence, in response to the colonial government’s effort to control discourse on international affairs. *India Quarterly*’s founding statement also implicitly critiqued the founding canard of Chatham House and its affiliate institutes that scientific study of international affairs *will* lead to peace. The newly recruited secretary of the ICWA and later the doyen of IR in India, Angadipuram Appadorai wrote in his editorial statement:

> For publicists, similarly, to claim that their discussions, however, well-informed or dispassionate will set all things right is a piece of professional pedantry, for it ignores the basic fact that social progress is the result of interaction of several factors of which understanding is just one.\(^95\)

In addition to research, there were fierce battles over legitimacy at international platforms, which took place over representation at The Unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conferences, organized by Chatham House, and the Pacific Relations Conferences organized by the IPR. As an official branch of the Chatham House, the IIIA qualified automatically for the former, but a place at the next IPR conference was up for grabs.

The ninth IPR Conference was scheduled for January 1945 in Virginia, US. Conscious of the problems of representation in the previous conference and the split that ensued, E.J. Tarr asked Maurice Gwyer, the Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University and former Chief Justice of India, for help in the selection of an Indian delegation of ‘five to ten members’. Tarr told him that the IPR had not reached an agreement about affiliation to an Indian institute, and wanted to avoid such a decision given the problems between the two institutions.\(^96\) Gwyer met both Ahmad and Kunzru to devise a mechanism for Indian representation. He first suggested that the delegation be selected from

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\(^92\) ‘The Indian Council for World Affairs: Constitution, Rules and Activity, 1945’, F. 14/19 – CC/46 (Vol. 1), External Affairs Department, NAI.


\(^94\) A. Appadorai, ‘Ourselves’, *India Quarterly*, 1, 1, 1945, p. 4.

\(^95\) *Ibid*, p. 5.

\(^96\) E.J. Tarr to Morris Gwyer, 18 January 1944, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.
members from both the institutes. Ahmad agreed to this on the condition that the delegation should officially be regarded as representing the IIIA. Kunzru rejected this. Gwyer then suggested a joint delegation without reference to either institute. This was acceptable to Kunzru but not Ahmad. Unable to settle the conflict, Gwyer pointed out to Tarr two major differences between the institutions which made a solution unlikely. First was the widening gap between officials and non-officials in India, as the independence movement continued to intensify. The IIIA was mostly run by government officials, which was ‘mainly... due to absence of interest in foreign affairs among non-officials’. Second, the ICWA consisted ‘almost entirely of Members of one community and similar political complexion [Hindu, upper-caste Brahmin]’. He noted that this led to the ‘possibility of... communal institutions springing up’.

Gwyer correctly sensed that the political fault lines in India were increasingly sharpening on these two issues: the opposition to the British and the communal issue. The pro-Congress Hindu elite was also increasingly anti-British, while the pro-Muslim League Muslim elite was closer to the British Indian government. The two organisations fell on either side of the divide.

Having realised that membership of the IPR would be a step towards legitimacy, both organisations considered applying separately. The ICWA was seized the initiative. On 24 March 1944, it sent a letter to Carter requesting the ICWA’s affiliation with the IPR. Once the ICWA sent its request, the IIIA was stuck. If it did not send a request of affiliation to the IPR, the ICWA would be affiliated by default which meant that ‘the [IIIA] would have suffered such a blow in the eyes of Indian public opinion that it would with difficulty recover (sic)’. However, both Ahmad and Mudialiar were now against affiliation with the IPR, given its favoring of the ICWA, in particular Carter’s alleged role in the latter’s creation. Hence, Ahmad sought the advice of Chatham House on the matter.

By now, Chatham House was also uneasy about the IIIA’s closeness to the government. In his reply to Ahmad, its chairperson Lord Astor wrote that the grant to the Institute from the government was indeed contrary to the principles of Chatham House. Any application made to the IPR might be prejudiced by acceptance of such a grant, he added. He further advised Ahmad

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97 Telegram, Secret 10068, from Government of India, External Affairs Department, to Secretary of State, 22 March 1944, Folder 6/2/38, CHA.
98 Sultan Ahmad to Lord Astor, received 30 May 1944, Folder 6/2/38, CHA. Also, see Sultan Ahmad to Lord Astor, Received 5 February 1944, IOR/L/1/1/729, file no. 462/16E.
99 Sultan Ahmad to Lord Astor, received 30 May 1944.
100 In internal meetings, this concern was expressed strongly. See P.J. Patric ,’Draft Memo’, 17 August 1944*, IOR/L/1/1/729.
101 Lord Astor to Sultan Ahmad, 20 April 1944, Folder 6/2/38, CHA.
that Mudaliar should informally write to Tarr, expressing the Institute’s intent of joining the IPR, given that the Institute had made the desired changes in its organisation.\textsuperscript{102} Accordingly, Mudaliar wrote such a letter, insisting that in the previous year the Institute had undergone major changes which made it non-official and self-sufficient. He added that the Institute was contemplating surrendering its government funding,\textsuperscript{103} which it did in September 1944.\textsuperscript{104}

To find a way out of this conundrum, the IPR wrote to Chatham House for suggestions. The latter did not want to disappoint its affiliate in India nor be seen as partisan in India’s internal fight. Through its representative at the IPR, Chatham House advised the IPR not to invite any Indian representation to the Conference. It also asked for the decision about affiliation to be postponed until the January Conference.\textsuperscript{105} The IPR accepted the latter suggestion and wrote to the ICWA that the decision towards affiliation of a National Council in India could only be taken at the IPR Conference in January.\textsuperscript{106} However, it was not ready to forgo Indian participation.

Tarr once again requested Maurice Gwyer to nominate his own delegation. He declined.\textsuperscript{107} Afterwards, Tarr wrote directly to Tej Bahadur Sapru and Sultan Ahmad, the respective heads of the two organisations, asking them to send four members each. The ICWA accepted this proposition and appointed Vijayalakshmi Pandit, H.N. Kunzru, B. Shiva Rao and Gaganvihari Mehta. P.S. Lokanathan, the editor of \textit{Eastern Economist}, served as Secretary to the delegation. Sultan Ahmad, however, sent a ‘polite refusal’.\textsuperscript{108} Ahmad was far less polite in discussions with the Indian government. In a discussion with the foreign secretary, Olaf Caroe, Ahmad said that the ‘procedure suggested was an insult to the institute which on previous occasion was regarded as the only competent body’ and that the ‘world council [was] a partisan and sectarian body being inspired partly by “certain American friends connected to the IPR”’. The IPR, Ahmad added, was now ‘left with a team made up of all-Brahmin group of one school of thought’.\textsuperscript{109}

In a final effort at reconciliation, Tarr wrote to Mudaliar asking if merging the two institutions, since both of them were non-official and worked on the same issues, was a possibility. Alternatively he suggested forming an ‘Indian Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations’ with

\textsuperscript{102} Lord Astor to Sultan Ahmad, 8 July 1944, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.
\textsuperscript{103} A.R. Mudaliar to E.J. Tarr, 28 July 1944, Folder 6/2/38, CHA.
\textsuperscript{104} I. Macadam to A.F. Morley, 5 September 1944, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{106} Maurice Gwyer to Ivison Macadam, 4 July 1944, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.
\textsuperscript{107} A.S.B. Oliver to A Morley, 7 December 1944, IOR/L/I/1/729.
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{109} Anon, ‘Cypher Telegram, Secret 38620, Government of India, External Affairs Department, to B.A.S Washington, 4 November 1944’, IOR/L/I/1/729.
only two corporate members (the IIIA and the ICWA) and each would nominate exactly half the members.\textsuperscript{110} Nothing came of these suggestions. Tarr worried that the two organisations were ‘digging in for a fight to the death’.\textsuperscript{111} They were.

The ‘Fight to the Death’

While the IIIA was constantly under criticism for its official character, the Indian government and the India Office were keen to keep it alive. Both the India Office and the India External Affairs Department impressed upon Chatham House the need to find funding through alternative channels. In an informal meeting between Olaf Caroe and Margaret Cleeve, the deputy secretary of the RIIA, in November 1943, Caroe argued that unless Chatham House provided considerable subsidy from its own funds, government funding was the only feasible source for sustaining the Institute. Caroe warned Cleeve that the IPR, which was propping the rival faction of Kuzru and Sapru, ‘would step in and steal the thunder’ if nothing was done. The Institute, he argued, had not been able to secure any funding from rich Indians, in response to which Cleeve suggested approaching the Rockefeller and Carnegie endowments. Caroe argued that seeking American funding for the Institute would be risky. He further argued that the Institute would need funds amounting to an initial amount of Rs. 100,000 (£7,500), a recurring sum of £3,000 per annum and an additional amount of £2,000 per annum for a competent secretary. Caroe also suggested considering moving the Institute from Delhi to either Bombay or Calcutta, since in Delhi it could not shake off its official character.\textsuperscript{112}

Leo Amery and the new Viceroy, Lord Wavell, took keen interest in the attempts to reorganise and revive the institute, especially in the matters of selection of the Institute’s delegation for the 1945 Unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference.\textsuperscript{113} But this Conference turned out to be the last major conference of the IIIA. The delegation was headed by Zafrulla Khan and included other Institute members such as K.M. Panikkar, Mir Maqbool Mahmood and Maharaj Singh. K. Sarwar Hasan, the new Director of Research, served as the Secretary. The Institute, however, fell back into oblivion after the Conference, partly because the two competing organisations were further divided along political and communal lines. The ICWA members were pro-Congress and the ICWA was seen as Hindu-dominated. While the Council’s Muslim

\textsuperscript{110} E.J. Tarr to R. Mudaliar, 16 October 1944*, IOR/L/I/1/729.

\textsuperscript{111} E.J. Tarr to Frederick Whyte, 16 October 1944, IOR/L/I/1/729.

\textsuperscript{112} Olaf Caroe, ‘Note’, 23 November 1943, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.

\textsuperscript{113} Leo Amery to Wavell, 15 March 1944, IOR/L/I/1/729, file no. 462/16E.
membership had increased, most of these Muslim members were pro-Congress. The IIIA, on the other hand, increasingly became a Muslim (League)-dominated organisation (‘...with a sprinkling of Europeans’) in its day-to-day decision-making. Hindus, however, were still a majority of its membership. Hindu members of the IIIA executive council, such as K.M. Panikkar and P.P. Pillai, also soon joined the ICWA and ‘indulge[d] in vigorous attacks’ on the IIIA. Further, the Institute had returned the government funding, it struggled to find alternative sources. Chatham House’s attempt to secure funding through Carnegie endowment failed. Run from one room in Delhi which worked both as office and library, the Institute, according to internal Chatham House notes, ‘continue[d] to exist but [had] little vitality’. Its Secretary, K. Sarwar Hasan was ‘depressed and in consequence tend[ed] to be rather depressing’. The membership remained low. The recently restarted branches in Bombay and Calcutta had once again become non-functional. In contrast, the ICWA grew in substance and stature. By the end of 1946, its membership was 1056 and it had 15 active branches across the country, apart from the headquarters in Delhi. Although ‘non-political’ and ‘un-official’, the ICWA was boosted by the presence of political stalwarts like Jawaharlal Nehru on its executive council.

The Asian Relations Conference of 1947 sealed the rivalry between the two organisations. Convened exactly on the pattern of the IPR Conferences, the ICWA took upon itself the task of organising this massive conference between 23 March-2 April 1947 that eventually hosted 193 delegates and 51 observers from 34 countries. The successful organisation of this Conference (which also produced a short-lived Inter-Asian Organisation, once again on the IPR template) catapulted the ICWA into limelight. The Conference further sharpened the divide between the two institutions.

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114 Early on, the ICWA lacked Muslim representation (only two members in its executive committee were Muslims) and was justifiably attacked for its upper-caste Brahmin character. Muslim membership increased over time. Likewise, it had five women participating in its executive council.


116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid., p. 12.

120 Ibid., p. 12.

The Muslim League boycotted the Conference. Its newspaper, *Dawn*, whose editor Atif Hussain was a member of the IIIA and was close to Hasan, warned of ‘the expansionist designs of Indian Hinduism’ and called the Conference ‘An Asian Fraud’.\(^{123}\) P.N.S. Mansergh, the Chatham House observer to the Asian Relations Conference, noted that ‘prominent figures on each side [spoke] with great bitterness of the rival organisation’.\(^{124}\) Ahmad and Hasan had decided to move the IIIA to the future Pakistan. Ahmad told Liaquat Ali Khan, the Muslim League leader, that if the Institute was not taken to Pakistan ‘it will be used against you [Pakistan]’.\(^{125}\) To do this, Hasan engineered an increase in the pro-Pakistan Muslim membership of the Institute. He first got Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, a professor of history at Delhi University and an activist for the Pakistan Movement, elected as the Honorary Secretary of the Institute in place of F.P. Antia, a Parsee. Thereafter, closer to Partition, Atif Hussain and Mumtaz Hasan, Liaquat Ali Khan’s secretary, and Qureshi helped Hasan to enroll pro-Pakistan Muslim members into the Institute.

Under the Institute’s constitution, the headquarters could be moved anywhere in India through a resolution passed in a general meeting. In a carefully planned move just a few days before Partition, Hasan called a general meeting of the Institute where pro-Pakistan members dominated. Atif Hussain proposed that the Institute be taken to Karachi, which was then still within India. Hindu members in the meeting, such as Kunzru and Pattani, opposed this. Pattani reminded the meeting that he had donated a sum of Rs. 100,000 for a building to be constructed in Delhi. Ahmad replied that this sum would be returned if the Institute moved to Karachi. After some arguments, Atif Hussain pressed for a vote on this resolution. The motion was easily carried, and the headquarters of the Institute moved to Karachi. Liaquat Ali Khan provided the facilities and rail wagons for moving the library and furniture of the institute to its new location.\(^{126}\)

In Pakistan, the ‘Indian’ Institute operated from Hasan’s new home in Karachi, and later from three rooms in the Frere Hall building. With funding from Pakistan’s government, Hasan started another institute from the same office, the PIIA, which was officially inaugurated by Liaquat Ali Khan in April 1948. The IIIA and PIIA briefly worked from the same office in post-Partition Karachi. But the IIIA was defunct.\(^{127}\) Its last official publication was a volume of its journal, JIIIA, which came out in the middle of 1947. It was difficult to formally dissolve the IIIA because 165 of

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\(^{123}\) P.N.S. Mansergh, ‘The Inter-Asian Relations Conference, 16 April 1947, Folder 3/6 INDa 1-2, CHA, p. 10.

\(^{124}\) Anon, ‘Note on the Indian Institute of International Affairs’, p. 2.


\(^{127}\) ‘Memorandum on an interview with K. Sarwar Hasan at Chatham House on 5 October 1948’, Folder 3/6 - Pakistan, CHA.
its 215 members still lived in India. Many suggested that Hasan might let it ‘die a natural death’.\textsuperscript{128} It is unclear how matters were finally settled, but some evidence suggests that an Extraordinary General Meeting was called in Karachi towards the end of 1948 to formally dissolve the Indian Institute.\textsuperscript{129}

**Conclusion**

In narrating this story, this paper makes four interventions into the history of IR in India. First, it reveals the depth of history that IR in India has beyond Nehru and ICWA. Nehru’s contribution to the development of IR in India is surely deserving of strong emphasis, but the context of IR’s emergence in India was actually imperialism, which sparked a strong nationalist backlash. Second, this account allows us to re-interpret the institutional identities of two current South Asian research institutions, the ICWA and the PIIA. It is interesting to note that on their websites, the two institutes narrate their own stories very differently.\textsuperscript{130} The PIIA sees itself as an institutional successor to the IIIA, while the ICWA views itself as a *sui generis* institution: this article demonstrates that the institutional inheritances of the organisations are rather different. The PIIA started while the IIIA was still technically functioning, while the ICWA was initiated by some members of the IIIA as a rival organisation. Some of their motives were certainly ideological – the organisation’s closeness to government, for instance – but communal and nationalist identities and political contexts (the inevitability of independence by early-1940s) also strongly influenced this break-up. Third, this story helps us place the emergence of these Indian institutes within the global politics of institution-making in IR at the time, especially in the context of Chatham House and the IPR. The Indian story is not a solitary one, but forms a part of the broader politics of the role of institutions in particular forms of knowledge creation. Finally, it shows us the colonial government’s attempt to control the study of international affairs in India, and how the competing nationalist movements began to unwind this control, in an effort to project new international identities just prior to independence.

\textsuperscript{128} *Ibid.*
\textsuperscript{129} *Ibid.*