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Lamjung Yolmo copulas in use: evidentiality, reported speech and questions

**Lamjung Yolmo
copulas in use:
Evidentiality, reported speech
and questions**

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Abstract

Lamjung Yolmo is an endangered dialect of the Tibeto-Burman Yolmo language, spoken in Nepal. In this thesis I focus on three grammatical features of Lamjung Yolmo: The encoding of modality on copula verbs, question structures and reported speech structures. I explore the grammatical structure of these features and focus on their function from the perspective of social cognition. Social cognition recognises that human language is deeply embedded in interaction, and that this interaction is situated within a larger interpersonal and cultural context.

In chapter 5 I give an introduction to the theoretical perspectives on the grammatical constructions under investigation. Not only do all three of these features have a rich history of investigation in Tibeto-Burman languages, but together form the basis of conjunct/disjunct and egophoric analyses of a number of languages related to Lamjung Yolmo, which I also introduce in this chapter.

In chapter 6 I look at the copula verb paradigm of Lamjung Yolmo. Like in other Tibetic languages, they encode a range of evidential and epistemic meanings in the copula verbs. In Lamjung Yolmo this includes ego, perceptual evidential, general fact and dubitative. These function not only as copulas but also as verb final auxiliaries. I look at the semantics of the ‘ego’ form, which is similar to the Standard Tibetan egophoric, but also has some major differences. I demonstrate that the variation in the use of copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo is attributable to their semantics, but also to the way speakers wish to construct their knowledge states for their interlocutors in interaction, and cannot be reduced to the kinds of patterns described in the conjunct/disjunct literature.

In chapter 7 I look at question structures in Lamjung Yolmo. I describe their grammatical properties and then look at their role in interaction. Questions in

Lamjung Yolmo, like many other Tibeto-Burman languages with modally marked copulas, involve using the copula form you expect your interlocutor to use in their answer. I argue that this is one feature of the conjunct/disjunct literature that we can analyse separately to the others.

In chapter 8 I look at reported speech constructions in Lamjung Yolmo. There are two strategies for reporting speech in Lamjung Yolmo: a verb of saying, and a reported speech particle. For the verb of saying I observe that the kind of structures found in Lamjung Yolmo make a conjunct/disjunct approach to reported speech unnecessary. In regard to the reported speech particle I show that in interactional data it actually has a wider role than reporting speech events.

In chapter 9 I draw together common threads of analysis. This includes trying to formalise the relationship between different evidential and epistemic forms in a hierarchy, and to evaluate the effect opacity of mind has on interaction in Lamjung Yolmo. I also return to the merit of a conjunct/disjunct analysis for Lamjung Yolmo. Instead of the current conjunct/disjunct or egophoric analyses I present a reduced analysis which focuses on two main features; the first is existence of an ‘ego’ or ‘self’ type modal and the second is questions structures that use the modal of the expected answer. This analysis allows for a better cross-linguistic comparison with other languages that have been described as conjunct/disjunct or egophoric.

This thesis also gives a general description of Lamjung Yolmo (Appendix 1) and is based on original fieldwork.

Declaration

This is to certify that:

- i. this thesis comprises only of my original work towards the PhD,
- ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,
- iii. this thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, diagrams, language examples, bibliographies and appendices.

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List of abbreviations

1	first person	IPFV	imperfective
2	second person	INCL	inclusive
3	third person	INF	infinitive
ABL	ablative	INS	instrumental
ALL	allative	LOC	locative
CAUS	causative	M	male
CLF	classifier	NEG	negative
COND	conditional	NOM	nominaliser
COP	copula	NOM.LOC	locational nominaliser
DAT	dative	NON.PST	non-past tense
DU	dual	OPT	optative
DUB	dubious	PART	particle
EGO	ego	PE	perceptual evidential
EMPH	emphatic	PERF	perfective
ERG	ergative	PL	plural
EXCL	exclusive	PST	past
F	female	Q	question
FOC	focus	REL	relativiser
GEN	genitive	RS	reported speech
HON	honorific	SG	singular
HORT	hortative		

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1. Introduction

Lamjung Yolmo is an isolated dialect of Yolmo,¹ a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in Nepal. The Lamjung Yolmo speech community arrived in the hills in west Lamjung after migrating from the Helambu area, 200 kilometres to the east, some eighty to one hundred years ago. The Yolmo population of Lamjung settled in half a dozen villages. More recent migration patterns have seen speakers move to towns and cities, as well as overseas for employment. Although it is still spoken as a home language, the rise in migration and the presence of Nepali as the language of education means that Lamjung Yolmo, like many other small languages the world over, is facing a precarious future as the current generation of children grow up. Although Lamjung Yolmo is still similar enough to Yolmo spoken elsewhere to allow for mutual intelligibility, it exhibits differences, especially in key areas such as the copula system.

The purpose of this thesis is twofold: the first is to focus on several features of the grammar and provide a description that also accounts for their usage. This includes the copula verb set, which encodes a variety of epistemic and evidential distinctions, as well as question structures and reported speech structures. The second is to provide the first documentation of this endangered language variety, which includes the detailed sketch grammar in Appendix 1.

These features all involve the speaker's stance towards the content of the utterance, but also their relationship to their interlocutors.² As a result these features are deeply embedded in the interactional contexts in which they occur. Take, for example, the copula verb system of the language (discussed in chapter 6). Like in many other

¹ Lamjung Yolmo is also referred to in the literature as Yohlmo, Hyolmo and Helambu Sherpa.

² Stance will be defined and discussed in more detail in §4.2.5.

Tibeto-Burman languages, these forms in Lamjung Yolmo function not only as copulas, but also encode a range of epistemic meanings, including evidentiality and epistemic certainty. These forms are readily used in interaction by speakers, as can be seen in (1). While describing images in a task known as the Family Story (§3.2.1.) speakers AL and SL used these different copula forms in this negotiation event.³ The syntactic features of these forms will be explained in §6.1.

1) AL: *dì tɕí yimba*
 this what COP.EGO
 ‘what is this?’ (091108-01 01:14)

AL: *màgi yimba*
 corn COP.EGO
 ‘it is corn.’ (091108-01 01:14)

SL: *mòdze tile dù*
 banana like COP.PE
 ‘it is like bananas.’ (091108-01 01:15)

AL: *màgi yindɔ*
 corn COP.DUB
 ‘it may be corn.’ (091108-01 01:16)

SL: *màgi thó pè dù*
 corn cradle do COP.PE
 ‘(she) is cradling corn.’ (091108-01 01:18)

AL starts by asserting that it is corn using the *yimba* ego form (§6.1.1.1.). When SL suggests it looks like a banana using the perceptual evidential *dù* (§6.1.1.3.) AL reduces the epistemic certainty of her original suggestion by using a dubitative *yindɔ* (§6.1.1.2.). Finally, SL agrees that it is corn, again using the perceptual evidential, and the description continues with having reached a consensus that the image depicts

³ See §1.3. for an explanation of how the examples in this thesis are presented.

corn. Different speakers use different forms because they have different stances towards the information being described and are negotiating their stances in interaction.

Therefore, by looking at how these forms are used by speakers in interaction, we can develop a better understanding of both the forms, and speakers' modal strategies. This has implications for the current discussion of 'conjunct/disjunct' systems (§5.5) in Tibeto-Burman languages, and language families in other parts of the world. It also provides discussion of evidentiality (§5.2.2.) as a grammatical category, and especially the role of egophoric evidentials (§5.2.2.3.). This thesis takes its motivation for the interaction focus from recent developments in 'social cognition' (§2.2.). Social cognition emphasises the importance of high-level socio-cognitive skills in human interaction.

This thesis is part of a larger Language and Social Cognition project, funded by the Australian Research Council.⁴ This project seeks to look at the relationship between social cognition and the grammars of the world's languages. Work has been done on languages in a number of countries including Australia, Papua New Guinea and Nepal. This thesis is a contribution to that work, but also is intended to be read as a stand-alone piece.

1.1. Thesis outline

Like all people, speakers of Lamjung Yolmo use language to talk to each other about the world in which they exist. When speakers of Lamjung Yolmo use their language they have a unique grammatical toolkit with which to construct their

⁴ "Language and Social Cognition: The Design Resources of Grammatical Diversity" Australian Research Council Discovery Project 0878126. Chief Investigators Nicholas Evans and Alan Rumsey (ANU), Andrea Schalley (Griffith), Barbara Kelly (University of Melbourne).

interactions. In this thesis I explore how the grammar features of Lamjung Yolmo allow us to gain an insight into the cognitive processes people use to indicate their relationship to the propositional content of the utterance, as well as to the people they are interacting with. There is an introduction to the major features of Lamjung Yolmo in chapter 2, however this thesis is not designed to be an introduction to the grammar of Lamjung Yolmo. However, as Lamjung Yolmo has received no study before, an extensive sketch grammar of the language is given in Appendix 1.

Chapter 2 gives an introduction to Lamjung Yolmo and its speakers. The first section of the chapter (§2.1.) is an ethnography of Lamjung Yolmo. The second section is a summary of the orthography, phonology and grammar of the language (§2.2.). Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used in this thesis, including elicitation tools created specifically for this project.

After the introduction to the language and cultural context of Lamjung Yolmo I present the theoretical background for this thesis. Chapter 4 will look at socio-cognitive approaches to human interaction and language use. Although social cognition as a domain of linguistic enquiry is relatively new, it comes from a long line of research interested in the relationship between language, cognition and the intensely interactional way humans live their lives (§4.2.). In this chapter I will also introduce the concept of ‘opacity of mind’ (§4.4.), which has come out of recent work in social cognition (Robbins and Rumsey 2008). Opacity of mind is a cultural framework regarding the ability to understand the mental states of other people and is found in languages closely related to Lamjung Yolmo (Desjarlais 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 2003). As a cultural framework it is particularly relevant to, and poses some challenges for, our assumptions about the use of the grammatical features I discuss in the subsequent chapters.

The three features of the language that I will be looking at are modality, especially in relation to the copula verb set (chapter 6), questions (chapter 7) and reported

speech (chapter 8). A background on these features, and how they have been described in related languages is given in chapter 5.

Like many Tibeto-Burman languages Lamjung Yolmo uses the copula system to encode evidential and other modal information (van Driem 2001). Evidential and modal encoding is an interesting phenomenon from the standpoint of social cognition, as it requires the speaker's to take a show their knowledge and perspective within the utterance. Lamjung Yolmo has a four-way distinction, between information known personally to the speaker, information known to the speaker through inference, information that the speaker is unsure of and information that is considered a general fact. This chapter will tease out the differences between these four copula verbs in terms of what they mean, and how they are used by speakers. One thing that is readily apparent in Lamjung Yolmo is that speakers will manipulate their copula choice in interaction to show their stance towards the information (§6.3.), showing that evidential use is not just about a speaker's relationship with the object of discussion, but their stance towards it within the larger interaction.

Chapter 7 will look at questions. To ask an appropriate question, the person asking the question must have a sufficient understanding of their interlocutor's knowledge. In Lamjung Yolmo this is even more demanding as the person who asks the question must use the evidential form that the respondent will most likely reply with so as to ask a grammatically appropriate question. This means that the question-asker must not only know what their interlocutor knows, but how they know it. I demonstrate that while this may sometimes involve making assumptions based on general expectations, speakers are able to model and react to their interlocutor's knowledge state in interaction so as to form more appropriate questions.

Chapter 8 focuses on reported speech constructions. Reported speech is a valuable locus for investigating notions of social cognition because the speaker is

retransmitting the utterances of the originator for a third person. There are two different strategies for encoding reported speech in Lamjung Yolmo, a verb of saying and a reported speech particle. Building on work in chapter 6 I show that the embedding of the evidential copula in a verb of saying construction is contextually dependent. In regards to the reported speech particle I demonstrate that it does a great deal more than just report “speech,” and instead functions more broadly as a “reported intent” marker in interaction.

Chapter 9 will bring together the linguistic analysis in the previous chapters and serve as a discussion of some of the more important threads that come out of the grammatical analysis. This will include discussions of modality, evidentiality, reported speech and mirativity (§9.1.), as well as hierarchies of evidence (§9.2.), conjunct/disjunct systems (§9.3.), opacity of mind (§9.4.) and social cognition (§9.5). Chapter 10 concludes the core thesis.

The grammatical sketch in Appendix 1 gives a more general introduction to the grammar of Lamjung Yolmo. Without completing this initial documentation it would not have been possible to discuss many of the underlying complexities of the data discussed above. It is also a major part of the project to document the Lamjung variety of Yolmo. It has been placed at the end, separate to the rest of the thesis structure to allow easy access as its own independent reference.

The remaining appendices contain supplementary linguistic data for Lamjung Yolmo and additional metadata. These include the transcripts of several narratives (Appendix 2), a list of data recordings and their metadata (Appendix 3), and a full list of speakers with appropriate metadata (Appendix 4). There are also Lamjung Yolmo to English and English to Lamjung Yolmo word lists (Appendices 5 and 6). These are more up to date than the Lamjung-Yolmo-English dictionary (Gawne 2011a).

1.2. A note on examples

This section outlines the way example sentences are presented in this thesis. All example sentences include the initials of the speaker, and link back to the file or notebook from which they were taken. All examples longer than a single lexeme include the utterance segmented for morphemes, interlinear glossing and a translation into English. A list of recordings is presented in Appendix 3. A list of the most frequently quoted speakers is presented in Table 3.1. (§3.1.) and a full list of speakers is presented in Appendix 4. As an illustration, (2) can be found in the sketch grammar discussion on the non-past tense (Appendix 1 §1.3.5.1.1.).

- 2) *mò jàl-ke*
 3SG.F sleep-NON.PST
 ‘she sleeps.’ (AL 090915-02)

So for this example we know it comes from speaker AL, and the file is 090915-02.

When example sentences come from naturally occurring data, such as a narrative or conversation, a time code will also be given. To illustrate, (3) is again from the sketch grammar, from the section on the verb phrase (§1.3.3.).

- 3) *tòŋbo mìn*
 tree COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘this is not a tree.’ (SL 091108-01 02:21)

This time we can see that the speaker was SL, the file is 091108-01 and we know it comes from naturalistic data because the time code is present. This utterance occurred at 2 minutes and 21 sections into the recording. Appendix 3 lists the file names of all audio recordings made and a summary of their content. In the Appendix

this recording is given as a recording of the Family Story task (§3.2.1.), with speakers SL and AL. Where relevant, I will make note of which activity the example is drawn from in the discussion.

Should an example be taken from observation, but not a recording, this will be made clear in the context given for the utterance. The date of the observation and location in field notes will be given, the speaker initials are also included if the person is known, although sometimes the utterances were overheard in group situations. As an illustration, (4) is discussed in relation to the perceptual evidential copula (§6.1.1.3).

- 4) *yàabu dù mìnđu*
 good COP.PE COP.PE.NEG
 ‘is it good or not good (to eat).’ (22/11/2010 book 7, p. 46)

Thus we know this utterance was made on the 22nd of November 2010 and it can be found in book 7, on page 46.

Where examples have been taken from the work of other people their orthography and glossing conventions have been maintained unless otherwise stated. Any orthographic or glossing conventions that are not consistent with the format I have used or are not transparent from context will be explained. To illustrate, (5) comes from Hari’s (2010) ‘Yohlmo sketch grammar.’

- 5) *‘kho-ni ‘maçtar ‘yihn-gen*
 he-FOC teacher be-EMPH
 ‘I am quite sure that he is/ was a teacher.’ (Hari 2010, p. 67 ex. 74)

Some examples involve lexical items that are borrowed into Lamjung Yolmo from other languages. Where this is the case I will indicate it in brackets after the lexical item. Most borrowings are from Nepali. Some words, such as *phón* ‘phone,’ are

marked as being borrowed from English, although they are most frequently borrowed into Nepali first before being used in Lamjung Yolmo.

2. Ethnography and language summary

Lamjung Yolmo is spoken in Nepal by around 700 people living in half a dozen villages half a day's walk to the west of Besisahar, the main city of the Lamjung district. These speakers migrated from the Melamchi and Helambu valleys around eighty to one hundred years ago (§2.1.2.), and are practicing Buddhists of the Nyingma school. Although they have not maintained all cultural practices still found in the original areas of settlement, they still have patrilineal clans and exogamous marriage (§2.1.3.). The Yolmo people of Lamjung live at altitudes of around 1500-1900 meters and maintain a range of agricultural crops. Traditionally they also made paper and bamboo products.

In this chapter I begin with an ethnography (§2.1.), which includes the situating of Lamjung Yolmo in a wider linguistic context, and is an introduction to the culture of the speakers. This is followed by a brief summary of the orthography, phonology and grammar of the language (§2.2.). This language summary is designed to be only a brief introduction to the major features of the language. A more detailed illustration of the grammar of the language can be found in Appendix 1.

2.1. Ethnography

2.1.1. Introduction

This chapter will provide background information on this language and its speakers. To begin, in §2.1.2. I will situate Lamjung Yolmo in the wider linguistic context, both in its relationship to closely related languages (§2.1.2.1.) and its place in the larger linguistic schema (§2.1.2.3.). Section 2.1.3. will give more specific information about where the language is spoken and the people who speak it. Previous work on related languages will be detailed in §2.1.4.


2.1.2. Relationship to other languages

2.1.2.1 Relationship to Yolmo

Yolmo speakers in Lamjung migrated there a little less than a century ago, arriving from the Helambu and Melamchi valleys. Yolmo is still currently spoken in that area, which spreads north and north-east from Kathmandu to the south of the Helambu mountains. The Helambu area is considered the central area of the traditional Yolmo population (Hari and Lama 2004, p. 669). This mainly falls into the Nuwakot and Sindhupalchok districts of the Bagmati zone. Around the same time as the Lamjung group migrated, a similar group moved east to the Ramechhap district, and their language is now referred to as Kagate (Höhlig and Hari, 1976). It has also been reported that there is a group of Yolmo speakers in Ilam that migrated around the same time (Thokar 2009). Although there is no documentation as to why these groups left the original areas in the Helambu and Melamchi valleys, it would appear that this was a way to either reduce population pressures in the area, or for those migrating to seek new opportunities. None of the speakers who for either Ramechhap or Lamjung appear to have been of high social standing, which may have been the motivation for migration.

Lamjung Yolmo speakers generally agree that the migration to Lamjung took place around five to six generations ago, although there is no definitive date. 92-year-old BBL from Nayagaun (now living in the Terai), one of the eldest remaining speakers, says that it was his grandparents' generation who moved, so we can assume that it was around a century ago that speakers settled in the area. Although I have found little documentation to support the oral history of the Yolmo speakers in Lamjung, there is some corroborating evidence in the field diaries of Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf. I discuss this in §2.1.3.6. Some speakers are quite specific about the details regarding the migration, including the names of villages their ancestors are reported to have come from. It would be worth comparing the Yolmo spoken in those specific villages and in Lamjung as a future research question.

Map 2.1. is a map of Nepal, indicating the geographical relationship between the region of Helambu and the group of Yolmo speakers in Lamjung, as well as other groups of interest discussed below.



Map 2.1. Map of Nepal with the locations where Yolmo is spoken (drawn by C. Gawne).

There are estimated to be between 10,000 and 50,000 speakers of Yolmo in the main area of settlement that the Lamjung Yolmo speakers migrated from (Hari and Lama 2004, p. 702-03), compared to only around 700 speakers in Lamjung. This main group of Yolmo speakers also trace their origin back to a migration event; some two hundred to three hundred years ago their ancestors made the journey from the Kyirong, in what is now Southwest Tibet, across the Himalayas to settle in the Helambu and Melamchi valleys (Clarke 1980a, p. 83, van Driem 2001, p. 864, Desjarlais 2003, p. 7). The name ‘Helambu’ is said to be a corruption of the name of the language and cultural group Yolmo (Hari and Lama 2004), although Goldstein (1975, p. 69) and Clarke (1980b, p. 4.) give a spurious etymology deriving from a

combination of the words *hee* (potato) and *laphug* (radish), a supposed reference to the main crops of the area. The people and their language are still often referred to as Helambu Sherpa, a reference to their cultural similarity to the relatively prestigious Sherpa of the Solu-Khumbu region, with whom the Yolmo people aligned themselves in the 1970s and 1980s (Clarke 1980a). Interestingly, with the rise of interest in smaller cultural groups in Nepal since the introduction of democracy the Yolmo people no longer identify as Sherpa and see themselves as being a distinct cultural unit (Desjarlais 2003, p. 8).

In recent years the Yolmo speakers of the Lamjung District have had contact with Yolmo speakers in other areas through the Yolmo Society. This society has a branch in Besisahar - the capital of the Lamjung district - and distributes calendars and organises occasional events. They are more active in the town although their influence does reach into the villages.

The oral history of the migration to Lamjung is similar to that of another language community, the Kagate of the Ramechhap district, also in Nepal (Höhlig and Hari 1976). Their stories are almost identical, except that the language community studied in this thesis moved about 200 kilometres west of the Helambu valley, while the Kagate moved almost the same distance to the east, and settled in the Ramechhap district. Both groups left at around the same time (5-6 generations ago), in similar numbers, and when they arrived in their destination took up the trade of cane furniture and papermaking. The Nepali term for paper is *kagate*, and both the Kagate of Ramechhap and the Yolmo of Lamjung have been referred to exonymously as *Kagate*. The profession of paper maker is considered to be a low caste occupation in the strict Hindu caste system that exists in Nepal. It seems that while the Yolmo in the Helambu area are of a relatively high social standing (Clarke 1980b, 1990), those who left the area do not hold a similar social standing in their new environments. Whether this reflects their historic social position within the Helambu society, or came about as a result of their travels, has not been established.

Recent fieldwork carried out by students of Tribhuvan University as part of the Nepal Linguistic Survey indicates there is also a pocket of Yolmo speakers living in the Ilam district in the very far east corner of Nepal (Thokar 2009). Goldstein, Tsarong and Beall (1983) also refer to a pocket of Kagate speakers living in the Solu area, but make no reference to their origins. The earliest reference to Kagate is in Grierson's (1909) linguistic survey of India. Bonnerjea's (1936) survey of the phonology of several languages, also makes mention of Kagate. He refers to speakers as living in 'the east of Nepal' and in Darjeeling, India. An initial look at the lexical items used in the study indicates that it is, at the least, a cognate of Yolmo and the Kagate spoken in Ramechhap. Given that the name Kagate is related to the work-based caste, it should not be expected that every reference to 'Kagate' language definitely has an origin in the Yolmo community. The tendency for language groups to migrate and dissipate is very common in Nepal (Sharma 2008 p. 67), and the population of Yolmo speakers do not appear to be immune to this.

Bishop (1998, pp. 14, 24) makes passing references to a group of Yolmo speakers in the village of Siran Danda in the Ghorka region, which is not too far from Lamjung. According to Bishop these speakers moved to the area with a Yolmo Lama some time in the mid 20th century. People in the area still spoke Yolmo when Bishop met them, however they had married with Tamangs and other ethnic groups in the area. This gives evidence that movement away from the original Yolmo area is quite common. As Bishop notes, the ecology in the Melamchi and Helambu valleys does not have the capacity to sustain a large population, which may account for these waves of migration away from the area over time.

What makes the Lamjung group of Yolmo speakers particularly interesting is their rather unusual migration path. Prior to malaria being brought under control, people from the mountains were generally unwilling to move to the humid flatlands (Banister and Thapa 1981). Having said that, Gurung (1989) has observed that the

general route of migration in Nepal has been for people to move from the higher mountains to somewhere lower but more or less directly south of their original homelands, much like the original group of Lamas who moved south to settle into the Melamchi and Helambu valley areas from Tibet. When that has not happened, the other general tendency has been for eastward migration, much like the Yolmo who moved to Ramechhap and Ilam, east of their original homelands. Thus the westward migration of the Lamjung Yolmo group is quite a novel migratory event compared to the usual trends in Nepal (although the report of Yolmo speakers in Ghorka from Bishop (1998) indicates that this may not be an isolated event). Also, although there appear to have been multiple migration waves to various parts of Nepal around the same period a century ago, a more recent study by Bishop (1993) indicates that permanent migration away from at least one Melamchi village in a twenty-year period was very low compared to the national trend.

Given their common history, we would expect a strong level of similarity between Yolmo spoken in Melamchi and those languages spoken in the diaspora communities that have developed. Ethnologue (Lewis 2009) states on the Helambu Sherpa information page that the language is not mutually intelligible with Kagate. However, Hari (2010, p. 1), who has worked extensively with both languages, argues that ‘to quite a large extent they are mutually intelligible dialects.’ Gawne (2010) presented a small-scale survey of the lexical similarity of the main branch of Melamchi Valley (M.V.) Yolmo, Lamjung Yolmo and Kagate following the method outlined in Blair (1990). The lexical similarity of the three languages is summarised in Table 2.1:

<i>Languages compared</i>	<i>Lexical similarity</i>
M.V. Yolmo and Kagate	79%
M.V. Yolmo and Lamjung Yolmo	85%
Lamjung Yolmo and Kagate	88%

Table 2.1. Lexical Similarity: M.V. Yolmo, Lamjung Yolmo and Kagate.

The first thing to note is that all three of Yolmo, Lamjung Yolmo and Kagate have a very high lexical similarity. This is further evidenced by comparison to other Tibeto-Burman languages identified as sharing similarities with Yolmo; according to Ethnologue (Lewis 2009) Yolmo has a lexical similarity of 65% with Lhasa/Standard Tibetan and 61% with Sherpa. Also interesting to note is that Kagate and Lamjung Yolmo have a higher lexical affinity with each other than with the main Yolmo language, which may lend weight to the folk history of their concurrent migration.

2.1.2.2 *Language name*

One issue that makes this discussion complicated is that of language names. As mentioned above in §1.2.1, Yolmo is also referred to as Helambu Sherpa. There are also orthographic variations; here the language is being referred to as *Yolmo*, however it is also often written *Yohlmo* or *Hyolmo*, reflecting the low tone of the word (Hari 2010). The Kagate of Ramechhap also refer to themselves internally as *Syuuba*, which, like *Kagate*, also means paper, but in their own language.

To confuse matters, the speakers of Yolmo in Lamjung are also referred to by other ethnic groups in the area as *Kagate* – unsurprising given their historical occupation. In his notes, von Fürer-Haimendorf observes that the Tamangs of the area (although he most likely means the Yolmo group) “are sometimes described as ‘Kagate Bhote’” (von Fürer-Haimendorf, unpublished fieldnotes Nepal 1957, no. 12, p. 278).

Bhote means ‘people of Tibetan origin’ (Adhikary 2007 p. 270). This name, von Fürer-Haimendorf states, is a reflection of the fact that they make paper, “[t]his paper is sold locally and also sold to Tibet.” Even today Yolmo in Lamjung is occasionally referred to as *Kagate Bhoti* although this is considered rather pejorative, even by non-Yolmo speakers.

Earlier anthropological work by Clarke (1980a, p. 79) and Desjarlais (1992b, p. xiii) also referred to Helambu Valley Yolmo people as speaking Kagate, although as Hari (Hari and Lama 2004, p. 701) notes, this should not be taken too seriously as there was little ethnographic work at that point that established Yolmo as a separate group to Kagate.

These are not the only groups that have been given this exonym. Bista (1967) mentions that the exonym for Lhomi speakers in the Sankhuwa-Sabha district of Nepal is *Kath Bhote*, indicating the more generalised use of this term. Therefore it is not a particularly definitive or differentiating name.

Similarly the languages of Lamjung, Ramechhap and Helambu are often referred to as *Lama*, or *Lama Bhasa* in Nepali (*bhasa* being the Nepali word for language) or *pèepa tám* (‘Tibetan people’ and ‘language’ in Yolmo) – although this is related to their Buddhist faith and is a term used for, and by, many other Buddhist groups as well.

Members of the Ramechhap Kagate group I have spoken to are proud of their name and their heritage, however speakers from the Lamjung area are less so, because of its historical significance as a low-caste occupation. For this reason, several members of the community have asked that the language not be referred to as Kagate. This is also sensible for the sake of not confusing Lamjung Yolmo with Kagate in Ramechhap, which already has a presence in the linguistic literature. After

discussions with speakers of the language in Lamjung, which is the focus of this study, it will be referred to as *Lamjung Yolmo*. This indicates its origins from, and close link to, the language spoken in the Melamchi and Helambu valleys, and prevents confusion with the other groups of speakers still to be accounted for in the literature.

Throughout this thesis reference and comparison will be made to the language of the larger body of Yolmo speakers as documented by Anne Marie Hari. Upon her advice (Hari p.c.) the language of this group will be referred to as *Melamchi Valley Yolmo* as the main population she works with are located in this area. The community in Ramechhap and their language will continue to be referred to as *Kagate*.

2.1.2.3 *Within Tibeto-Burman*

Based on linguistic, ethnographic and historical evidence, Lamjung Yolmo, Melamchi Valley Yolmo and Kagate should all be regarded as dialects of the same language. Although Kagate speakers consider their language to be separate for the sake of this discussion I will refer to these three dialects together as ‘Yolmo.’

As Hari and Lama (2004 p. 699) note in a survey of various classification schema, Yolmo is consistently classified as being in the Central Bodic (also Central Tibetan) group of the Tibeto-Burman branch of the larger Sino-Tibetan family. Grierson (1909/1966), Shafer (1966) and Voegelin and Vogelin (1977) all agree on this classification, as do Thurgood and LaPolla (2003, p. 9). Other languages frequently included in this group are Sherpa, Tibetan, Nyamkat and Jad.

Within this group Yolmo is more closely related to some languages than others. The most interesting links appear to be with “sub-dialects” of Tibetan (which tend to be

languages in their own right) rather than the classical or Standard⁵ varieties that have received so much scholarly attention. Kyirong Tibetan is spoken in the Kyirong county in western Central Tibet (Huber 2002). Biemeier noticed the similarity of Kyirong Tibetan, Yolmo and Kagate as early as 1982 and even at a cursory inspection the Yolmo dialects have more in common with Kyirong Tibetan than other varieties of Tibetan. This correlates with known records of Yolmo history. Clarke (1980b, p. 83) traces the settlement of Yolmo speakers in the Helambu area to the arrival of Tibetan religious practitioners in the 18th and 19th centuries.

The similarity to Kyirong Tibetan also points to a similarity with Gyalsumdo (Hildebrandt and Perry 2011). This Tibetan dialect is spoken in a small cluster of villages in southern Manang, just north of the Lamjung Yolmo settlement area. While the similarity between Gyalsumdo and Yolmo is striking, it appears that the geographic proximity of Gyalsumdo and Lamjung Yolmo is merely coincidence. Lamjung Yolmo speakers migrated to the area only recently and there is strong evidence to suggest that Gyalsumdo speakers arrived in Manang from Kyirong, a considerable time earlier than the Yolmo arrived in Lamjung (Hildebrandt and Perry 2011, Mumford 1989).

Throughout this thesis I will refer to these languages that are closely related to Lamjung Yolmo as ‘Tibetic’ languages as per Tournadre (2008, p. 283). This term captures a much broader range of languages than are in the Central Bodic group. It represents around 25 languages that all have a common origin in Old Tibetan. This thesis is not primarily intended to serve as a historical or comparative analysis of the

⁵ In this thesis I will be referring to “Standard Tibetan” and not “Lhasa Tibetan.” As Vokurková (2008) notes ‘Standard Tibetan’ is that spoken around Lhasa - it is a "language of standardisation" and is influenced by other languages in the diaspora, as well as influencing them. While it is not a constant entity, Standard Tibetan is still internally similar enough for the sake of discussion in this thesis.

features of Lamjung Yolmo under consideration; however I will be drawing on the established literature on these languages throughout my analysis.

2.1.3. Speaker demographic

2.1.3.1 Location

The variety of Lamjung Yolmo in this study is spoken in five culturally homogenous villages situated 2-3 hours walk west of Besisahar, the main town of the Lamjung district. These five villages are spread over a large, hilly area and the walk between the two most distant is no more than one hour (Figure 2.1.). They are all exclusively populated by Yolmo speakers. There is not a great deal of variation in language use between villages. The area is heavily agricultural and surrounding villages are populated by Buddhist Gurungs, Tamangs and small numbers of Chetri and Brahmin Hindus. Lamjung Yolmo speakers do not use their language with outsiders, instead resorting to Nepali, and for older speakers, small amounts of Gurung.



Figure 2.1. A view of Nayagaun from the fields between Nayagaun and Toljung. In the distant left is Namgyu and above that is Ghaleshing.

Table 2.2. presents basic information about the five villages. It is based on a survey of households made by the Yolmo Social Service Society while collecting donations for the construction of a *kòmpa* (Buddhist temple) in Besisahar. The number of families seem a little low, but they likely account for multiple generations in a single household. The numbers give a good indication of general distribution of speakers across the villages. These villages are in two contiguous Village District Committee (VDC) zones. Although these villages form the basis of the study, the Lamjung Yolmo-speaking population is by no means limited to these villages. Some families from these villages have moved to larger villages such as Kapurgaun, which are closer to the local school.


<i>Village Name</i>	<i>Village Development Committee (VDC)⁶</i>	<i>Number of families</i>
<i>Ghaleshing</i>	Baglung Pani	5
<i>Namgyu</i>	Baglung Pani	5
<i>Nayagaun</i>	Maling	12
<i>Toljung</i>	Maling	8
<i>Pondri</i>	Maling	7

Table 2.2. List of Villages and households

A map of the area is presented in Figure 2.1, which is based on my own GPS data as there are currently no available maps of the area. The road that runs between Kapurgaun and Maling is, for the most part, the highest ridge of the mountain and is

⁶ The Village Development Committee (VDC) is the smallest unit of governance in Nepal. They usually consist of a central village and then a number of “wards.” In the area of Lamjung where the Yolmo speakers live, each “ward” is usually one of the villages within the VDC area. In this area each VDC usually has at least one primary school.

wide enough for a jeep, with the villages lower down on narrower roads for foot-traffic only. The Yolmo-speaking villages are in green.



Map 2.2. A map of the Lamjung Yolmo speaking villages (in green) (drawn by C. Gawne).

There are also over twenty households of Lamjung Yolmo speakers in Besisahar, and while some of these are recent migrants who have come down from the villages it appears there has been a group of speakers in the town for as long as there have been Yolmo speakers in the area. There are also other villages with Yolmo speakers, with Khudi, north of Besisahar, being one of the larger. These other villages tend to be less culturally/linguistically homogenous than the five listed above. For example the survey indicates there are only four Yolmo households in Khudi, which is a town of at least 100 households. According to locals there are small pockets of Yolmo speakers that spread all the way north along the rivers from Khudi to the border with Manang, and possibly even further beyond. No known detailed survey of the area can be drawn upon to validate these claims. This thesis is based on speakers from

the five villages in Table 2.2, but there is certainly more work to be done establishing just how many Yolmo speakers there are in the Lamjung area and how similar their language is. I worked briefly with one Yolmo speaker from Khudi (VL) and there was nothing immediately noticeable or different about her speech compared to the speakers from the five villages above.

2.1.3.2 Speaker numbers

Gauging speaker numbers is a difficult task, compounded by the lack of population retention in the villages in Lamjung. Many have left to seek employment opportunities in larger cities of Nepal, such as Besisahar, Pokhara and Kathmandu, or overseas, with Korea, Israel and various Arab countries being popular destinations. Others have moved to the Terai, further south in Nepal, where farming is easier and the weather is less harsh. Community members do not always leave as family units. Often men will travel to find employment for prolonged periods of time leaving his wife and children in the village, which results in the majority of those still resident in the home villages being predominantly female. This is a pattern found in many of the villages in the area; according to data from the 2001 census extracted by Digital Himalaya (2010), in the immediate district of 2641 people there were 110 females aged 30-34 compared to only 43 males of the same age.

Given the population movement the best possible estimate of speaker numbers is anywhere from 500-1000 speakers. This figure takes into account those who have left their villages, however it is not really known to what extent speakers living in places like Besisahar, Kathmandu and the Terai still use their mother tongue, and the levels of intergeneration transmission of the language that are currently occurring.

2.1.3.3 *Language use*

Lamjung Yolmo is used at a village and domestic level. As one Gurung speaker from a neighbouring village described it, Lamjung Yolmo is an ‘inside’ or ‘underneath’ language – with speakers using Nepali for communicating with outsiders.

Nobody in any of the villages is truly a monolingual Lamjung Yolmo speaker - even the most elderly speakers who have spent their whole lives in the village speak Nepali (an Indo-Aryan language not related to Yolmo) to a competent level in communication with outsiders. Nepali is also increasingly being used in the home. This appears to be especially true of those that have moved away from Yolmo-speaking villages, as schools are run in Nepali and parents want their children to speak the language before going to school. Parents I spoke to said their children had good passive understanding of Yolmo, but did not speak the language particularly well. There is evidence of intergeneration language transmission in the villages of Toljung and Nayagaun.

Speaker attitudes towards the similarity between language use in different villages is interesting. The main observation people make is of the difference between the group of five villages in the hills, given in Map 2.1, and those pockets of Yolmo speakers who live nearer to Besisahar and Khudi. DML believes that people in the five upper villages talk “quicker” than those who live lower down. She also notices a small amount of lexical variation. AL also agrees that speakers in the upper villages talk “quicker” than those down lower, indicating that there is, for locals, an observable difference in the Yolmo spoken by these two groups. AL also observes that of the five main villages people in Namgyu and Pondri talk slower than Nayagaun and Toljung. This is possibly something to do with some phonetic reductions in fast speech that I have observed in speakers from these villages, and a more systematic study of inter-village variation would likely find evidence to correlate with AL’s observations.

AL, having married outside of the Yolmo-speaking community, and therefore being more financially independent than many who remained in the villages, also had the opportunity to visit the Melamchi area. She observed that they use more honorifics, especially verbal honorifics, which are now not rarely, if ever, used in the Lamjung dialect. She attributed the use of these honorifics, and their social politeness, in Melamchi to the superior social standing of the Yolmo speakers in that area.

2.1.3.4 Culture

Lamjung Yolmo speakers are homogeneously Tibetan Buddhist of the Nyingma school of Mahayana Buddhism. Like many other language groups who have a Tibetan origin, many speakers take the surname Lama. This use of Lama is to be differentiated from the title of the priestly Lamas. There are a number of these Lamas in the community, often local men who travel away to study and return to the community. They live in their family households within the villages and continue to work on the land when not being called upon for religious duty.

Unlike the Yolmo living in the Helambu area, the people of Lamjung do not maintain a culture of Shamanism. This system of belief, tied deeply to notions of illness and healing is separate from Buddhism but works to complement it. Shamanism was the major focus of Desjarlais' (1992b) anthropological study of the Yolmo in Helambu. Although Yolmo speakers in Lamjung are aware of the idea of Shamanism, the practice is restricted to the local Tamang and Gurung people, indicating that it is one feature of Yolmo culture that did not make the transition when Yolmo speakers immigrated to the Lamjung area.

Yolmo speakers in Lamjung do not wear traditional Tibetan dress as many, especially older, speakers do in the Melamchi and Helambu area. The Lamjung Yolmo women wear lungi (long cotton wrap skirts in bright colours) or Nepali-style

kurta surwal. Older men wear a wrapped dhoti, but younger men will wear Western clothes. Lamjung Yolmo speakers also have not maintained traditional Yolmo-language songs, nor the traditional dance style; instead they sing and dance to Nepali songs. As Lamjung speakers of Yolmo become more aware of their roots they are beginning to embrace their language more. At least one Lamjung Yolmo speaker (CL) sings in his native language, and another speaker in Besisahar is reported to have started a group for people to perform traditional *çàpru* dance, including traditional Tibetan dress.

Tea is another domain where Yolmo speakers in Lamjung have changed to suit local practices. Unlike in their ancestral homelands, they do not consume salt butter tea as a general practice. Although some speakers will salt their tea as a preference, they use black leaf tea, as opposed to the special tea used for Tibetan butter tea, and they do not churn the tea in the preparation.

Lamjung Yolmo speakers traditionally lead an agrarian life. The main crops are rice, millet and corn, with smaller crops of potato, mustard seed and other vegetables. Animals kept include chickens, goats, buffalo and oxen for their meat, eggs and milk. The soil is fertile, but the steep terracing of the land and very limited access to modern agricultural machinery makes farming labour-intensive.

In the villages the household is the major organisational unit. There is no official organisational hierarchy beyond the household, with larger-scale organisation occurring due to family relationships and implicit social expectations. As Desjarlais (1992a, p. 1109) mentioned in his observations of Yolmo living, although each household is autonomous it operates within a village where households must work together. Within the household there is a patriarchal hierarchy with those that are older bearing more responsibility.

2.1.3.5 Clans

Yolmo speakers in Lamjung belong to exogamous patrilineal clans, like their Helambu and Melamchi ancestors. There are three major clans: *dòŋba*, *tçàba* and *çàŋba*. There is a correlation between clan and village, with Nayagaun being predominantly *çàŋba*, Toljung *dòŋba* and Pondri *tçàba* and Namgyu and Ghaleshing being a mix of mainly *dòŋba* and *çàŋba*. There is one household of *tçàba* in the predominantly *dòŋba* village of Toljung.

In the lower areas around Khudi there are also other clan groups, including *gòle*, *mùkten* and *yèba*. These clan names of the lower area Yolmo are also shared by Tamangs, which indicates that Yolmo speakers in Lamjung possibly had ties to the Tamang community post- and possibly pre-migration to the area.

Of the six clan names, five are attested by Hari and Lama (2004) in their list of clan names. The only one that is not attested is *mùkten*, which is a common clan name among Tamang groups. Hall (1982, p. 103), for example, lists *moktan* as a Tamang clan in the Helambu area. All of the other five are listed by Hari and Lama (2004, p. 675) as “non-Lama clans” as opposed to a smaller group of “Lama clans.” Although they do not give a definition of what differentiates Lama clans from non-Lama clans.

Speakers participate in clan activities. One of these is a triennial prayer ceremony called *kàn púza*. Two men of the clan are trained to lead the day-long ceremony, which involves sets of chants in front of a prayer place set with white rice *tórma* statues, incense, unhusked rice, and jugs of water. The two males lead the chant, and use a *gyàŋ rò* drum, with other males joining in the chanting and dancing. Many of the clan sit around behind the chanting men. There does not appear to be any restriction on non-clan members attending. This is something that the clan does external to their Buddhist beliefs, and although the two men do not identify as

shamans, this is the closest thing I have observed to the shamanic culture mentioned by Desjarlais (1992b).

Yolmo people cannot marry someone of their own clan. Marriages between Yolmo speakers are still very much the norm, and because villages are mostly single-clan marriages are most likely to be inter-village. After marriage a bride will go to her new husband's house and become a member of that household, although she will also retain her own clan affiliation.

A Yolmo *mùkten* and Tamang *mùkten* cannot marry. There are also some Tamang clans that have affinities with Yolmo clans and this prevents marriage. For example, the Yolmo *tçàba* clan are commensurate to the Tamang *toka* clan and thus cannot intermarry.

The eldest son and his family will inherit the house from his parents, and younger brothers and their wives traditionally continue to live in the house or build a new house in the village. More frequently sons are moving away for work, leaving their wives in the family house and returning, or moving with them to cities or flatter farming land in the Terai. Unlike Sherpa and Tibetan communities (Ortner 1978) there is no traditional practice of polyandry. Bride kidnappings, as described in Desjarlais (2003), no longer occur, however did so as recently as a generation ago.

2.1.3.6 *Migration to Lamjung*

The oral history of Lamjung Yolmo speakers, and the lexical similarity between Lamjung Yolmo and other varieties, indicates that there was a relatively recent migration event from the Melamchi and Helambu valleys to Lamjung. There is corroborating evidence of this migratory event in the field diaries of legendary anthropologist Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf.

In 1957 von Fürer-Haimendorf spent a period of time in the prosperous Gurung village of Ghalegaun, which is one of the highest villages of the area near the Yolmo villages and a regional centre. Von Fürer-Haimendorf was there to study the local Gurung society, in his notebook he makes a passing reference to recent migrants in the Kapurgaun area:

"On the land of Kapurgaun there are three Tamang settlements, only some 25 years ago: Toljung, Nayagaun, Namgyul. The Tamang settled with permission of the Gurung Jimal. The Tamangs came from the east of the Nepal valley: - then their kinsmen joined them, they cultivated new land, cleared of forest." (von Fürer-Haimendorf, unpublished fieldnotes
Nepal 1957, no. 12 "Gurung", p. 89)

Toljung, Nayagaun and Namgyul (sic) are all Yolmo speaking villages today. The reference to the people in these villages is interesting. Tamang are an indigenous group in the main Yolmo speaking area and there are also groups of Tamang in Lamjung. It is possible, but unlikely that there was an original population of Tamang in these villages who were then displaced by the Yolmo speakers, as this is not attested in any of the oral history, and most families have oral histories that involve their land being cleared and houses being built by members of their family. It is possible that the Yolmo speakers in the area were referred to as Tamang at some point. Tamang are of a lower social standing in the Yolmo area (Clarke 1980a), and it is likely that although the Yolmo speakers in Lamjung speak the more socially prestigious Yolmo language, it is possible that they were not of high social standing prior to migration.

Von Fürer-Haimendorf's report would place the migration some time around 1932, whereas the report of the 92-year-old Yolmo speaker I interviewed would put it around 1912. It also indicates that the migration event was not an immediate exodus

from the original language area, but a slower process where more and more families came after an initial wave of settlers.

Further on in von Fürer-Haimendorf's notes (p. 306) he mentions that there are "Lamas" from Maling, who were quite different from Gurung Lamas and came across from "Yelmu" three generations earlier. He reports that some twenty to twenty-five households migrated but by his report there were now around 120, and they still spoke the Yelmu language. Vitally, he also listed their clans "domba", "chianu" and "sheangba." This is an interesting addition to the information above. Once again, the dates are slightly later than those estimated by the Yolmo speakers, but still within a similar window. More importantly, this time they are referring to Yolmo, and the language, and the clans (§2.1.3.5.). "domba" clearly refers to the *dòṅba* and "sheangba" to the *çàṅba*, the final one "chianu" is something more of a mystery, but could possibly be *tçàba*.

The question here is whether there was perhaps another group of Tamangs who settled in the three villages, as mentioned above, and were later displaced by the more prominent Yolmo lamas who had settled nearby. I have seen absolutely no evidence of previous Tamang habitation in the area currently occupied by Yolmo speakers, and no legacy of Tamang language in their speech. What is also possible is that von Fürer-Haimendorf received two different reports on the same community of Yolmo speakers, who were sometimes also considered to be Tamang because of their social standing. With so few written records it is unlikely we will ever know for certain.

2.1.4. Previous work

Extensive documentation work has been carried out on Yolmo over the last twenty years by Anna Marie Hari. This has resulted in the publication of a large and comprehensive Yolmo-English-Nepali dictionary (Hari and Lama 2004) as well as a

grammar (Hari 2010). Yolmo has also been the subject of several anthropological studies. Graham Clarke wrote a series of papers on the social structure and religion of Yolmo life (Clarke 1980a, 1980b, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1991), and more recently Robert Desjarlais has written two monographs on the Yolmo people of Helambu, one on shamanic healing practices (1992b) and the other looking at life, death and the senses (2003), as well as a series of articles on similar themes (1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 2000). Peters and Price-Williams (1980) also briefly discuss fieldwork with shamans. Bishop (1989, 1993, 1998) has looked at the changing lifestyle of the Yolmo of the Melamchi area and the reduction of grazing, as well as the migratory patterns of present-day residents of the area, and although she refers to the Yolmo speakers as Sherpas, she also acknowledges their difference from the Sherpa of the Solu-Khumbu area. Bishop has also been involved in the production of a documentary film (Bishop and Bishop 1997) that also explores these themes. The changing lifestyle of the Helambu Yolmo in recent years has also been examined by Pokharel (2005).

Although Kagate (spoken in Ramechhap, as discussed above) has a much smaller speaker population than Yolmo (1,500 compared to at least 10,000) it has, until recently, received much more attention from linguistic researchers. Höhlig and Hari (1976) produced a comprehensive phonemic summary of the language, and Höhlig (1978) went on to publish a paper on speaker orientation.⁷ Nishi (1978) has published a paper on Kagate tone and register as well as a survey paper (1979) on a range of languages, including Kagate. As discussed in §1.2.1 above, Kagate has also been discussed in Goldstein, Tsarong and Beall (1983) and Bonnerjea (1936).

⁷ Höhlig also created a typewritten Kagate-English-German-Nepali dictionary. A copy of this was left with a Kagate speaker. This Kagate speaker and I have started a project to digitise this dictionary to make it more accessible for both speakers of Kagate and the wider linguistic community.

After an extensive survey of the available literature, to date there are no known publications regarding Lamjung Yolmo. This thesis therefore constitutes a major component of the initial documentation of this dialect of Yolmo. A Lamjung Yolmo-Nepali-English dictionary (Gawne 2011a) has already been produced, utilising a modified Devanagari script for Lamjung Yolmo created in consultation with the speakers.⁸

2.2. Language summary

This section is designed to provide a brief summary of some of the main grammatical features of Lamjung Yolmo. For more detailed description, and more examples, please see the sketch grammar (Appendix 1). This section looks briefly at the phonology and orthography (§2.2.1.), word order (§2.2.2.), nouns (§2.2.3.) and verb forms (§2.2.4.), as well as major clause types (§2.2.5.) of Lamjung Yolmo.

2.2.1. Phonology and orthography

2.2.1.1 Consonants

There are 36 consonants in Lamjung Yolmo. These are presented in Table 2.3. using IPA orthography. This table also shows the orthography that will be used throughout the thesis. Where the two are different, the standard orthographic symbol will appear to the right of the IPA symbol in brackets.

⁸ The dictionary was made in partnership with the World Oral Literature Project. Copies have been printed and distributed to Lamjung Yolmo speakers through the “Doing great things with small languages” ARC Discovery grant (DP0984419) held by Nick Thieberger and Rachel Nordlinger at The University of Melbourne.

The orthography used throughout this thesis is a mixture of standard IPA symbols and other orthographic conventions.⁹ Several symbols will move away from IPA for ease of transcription. The alveolar liquid [ɹ] is represented by the standard character ‘r’. The dorso-palatal glide [j] is written as ‘y’ in the orthography.

For aspiration, non-superscript ‘h’ has been used in keeping with Roman orthography of Nepali, and many of the Tibeto-Burman languages of the area. For example, ‘th’ for [t^h]. The voiceless liquids [ɹ̥] and [l̥] will be represented as ‘rh’ and ‘lh’ respectively. This is for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is easier to write. Secondly, it is a common convention in other Tibeto-Burman languages with the same sounds. And thirdly, the voiceless liquids always take high tone (see §2.2.1.3.), like the aspirated stops and affricates and thus the orthography makes this similarity more salient.

⁹ An orthographic convention for Lamjung Yolmo has also been created using the Devanagari alphabet, which is used in the production of community resources.

	Bilabial	Apico- alveolar	Lamino- post- alveolar	Apico- retroflex	Dorso- palatal	Velar	Glottal
Stops	p p ^h (ph) b	t t ^h (th) d		ṭ ṭ ^h (ṭh) ɖ	c (ky) c ^h y (khy) tʃ (gy)	k k ^h (ky) g	
Fricative		s z	ʃ ʒ				h
Affricate		ts ts ^h (tsh) dz	tʃ tʃ ^h (tʃh) dʒ				
Nasal	m	n			ɲ	ŋ	
Liquids		l̥ (lh) l̥ (rh) l ɭ					
Glides	w				j		

Table 2.3. Lamjung Yolmo consonant phonemes, including regular orthographic symbol in brackets where different to IPA symbol.

2.2.1.2 Vowels

The vowel phonemes of Lamjung Yolmo are given in Table 2.4. Lamjung Yolmo has five places of articulation for vowels, each with a length distinction, making a total of ten vowel phonemes.

i i:	u u:
e e:	ɔ ɔ:
a a:	

Table 2.4. Lamjung Yolmo Vowel Phonemes

In the orthography for vowels in this thesis, the symbols in Table 2.4 will be used, except for the back open rounded vowel [ɔ], which has been modified to ‘o’ for easier transcription. Long vowels are denoted with a doubled vowel (e.g. ‘aa’) instead of the lengthening diacritic [a:] to simplify transcription and prevent a single symbol from having diacritics for both length and tone. Also, other linguists working on related languages have used two letters to represent a single continuous vowel sound (See Höhlig and Hari 1976 and Nishi 1978 for Kagate and Hari 2004 for Yolmo).

2.2.1.3 Tone

Lamjung Yolmo has a binary high/low lexical tone distinction that is marked on the first syllable of the word (1), and the negation prefixes (2.2.4.2.). Low tone words are occasionally produced with breathy voice, although the degree of breathiness can vary greatly and some speakers don’t produce any breathiness at all. High tone words are produced with modal voice.

Tone is marked using acute and grave accents over the first vowel of the word, with acute used for high tone and grave used for low tone. The tone diacritic only appears on the first of the two characters in long vowels, however the tone is present across the whole phoneme.

- 1) *pú* ‘body hair’
 pù ‘son’
 kómba ‘thirsty’
 kòm̃ba ‘temple’

Tone is predictable in some environments. It is low following voiced stops and affricates, and is always high following all aspirated stops, affricates and voiceless liquids. The verbal negator prefixes *ma-* and *me-* both have low tone, however if the following root has high tone it will not change tone because of the preceding low suffix.

2.2.1.4 *Phonotactics*

Lamjung Yolmo has a (C)(C)V(C) syllable structure, with a preference for consonant onset, although this is not mandatory. All vowels, and all consonants except the bilabial glide /w/ can be syllable-initial. All vowels and a restricted set of consonants can occur word-finally. This consonant set includes voiceless unaspirated bilabial and velar stops, all nasals except the palatal and voiced unaspirated liquids.

There is a restricted set of syllable onset consonant clusters. These involve the alveolar liquid /r/ in /pr/, /br/ and /kr/ as the dorso-palatal glide /y/ in /py/ and /phy/. The labio-velar glide /w/ has been observed in clusters including /sw/, /kw/ and /t̥hw/, however these clusters tend to be lexical items that are borrowings, or reductions from forms where there was historically a vowel between the two consonants.

2.2.2. Word order and parts of speech

Lamjung Yolmo has SOV word order (2).

2) a) *ŋà =ki tó sà-sin*
1SG = ERG rice.cooked eat-PST
'I ate rice.' (AL 100928-01)

b) *ŋà kárta =ki cǎ túp-ke*
1SG knife(Nep) = INS meat cut-NON.PST
'I cut meat with a knife.' (AL 100923-01)

Below is a summary of the parts of speech in Lamjung Yolmo. Nominal and verbal structures are described briefly below, and all are described in more detail in the sketch grammar (Appendix 1).

1. Nominals

- (i) nouns
- (ii) pronouns
- (iii) demonstratives

2. Verbs

- (i) lexical verbs
- (ii) copulas
- (iii) auxiliaries

3. Adjectives

4. Adverbs

5. Postpositions

6. Interjectives and discourse markers

There is a very small set of honorific verbs and a few honorific nouns. These are used when talking to Buddhist Lamas or elderly people to convey respect. There are very few forms compared to the set found in Melamchi Valley and Helambu Yolmo and not all speakers know or use them.

2.2.3. *Nominals*

Lamjung Yolmo has lexical nouns, proper nouns and pronouns. Lexical nouns can be simple (3a) or complex (3b).

- 3) a) *tshá* ‘salt’
 khámbu ‘peach’
- b) *khát zà-kandi khópi*
 bed put-NOM room
 ‘bedroom’ (AL 091019-02)

Personal pronouns are given in Table 2.5.

	Singular	Plural	Dual
1.inclusive	<i>ɲà</i>	<i>òraŋ</i>	<i>òraŋ ɲípu</i>
1.exclusive		<i>ɲì</i>	<i>ɲì ɲípu</i>
2.	<i>khé</i>	<i>khyá</i>	<i>khyá ɲípu</i>
3.male	<i>khó</i>	<i>khúŋ</i>	<i>khúŋ ɲípu</i>
3.female	<i>mò</i>		
3. generic	<i>dì / òodi</i>	<i>díya</i>	<i>dì ɲípu</i>
reflexive	<i>ràŋ</i>		

Table 2.5. Personal pronouns in Lamjung Yolmo

Adjectives most commonly follow the noun (4). It is unusual to have more than one adjective, although this is possible (4b).

- 4) a) *tèbul tɛíi thóla kwèla màrmu tɛíi tíŋ-sin dù*
table(Eng) one above clothing red one spread-PST COP.PE
‘above a table a red cloth is spread.’ (AL 101006-01 48:14)
- b) *sá=la bàltiŋ káɾpu tɛéemi tɛíi dù*
ground=LOC bucket white small one COP.PE
‘a small white bucket is on the ground.’ (AL 101010-01 11:15)

Plurals are marked using the optional clitic =*ya*, which comes at the end of the noun phrase, and before any case marking (5).

- 5) *mèeme kápu=ya=ki árak thún-ke*
 grandfather old=PL=ERG alcohol drink-NON.PST
 ‘old men drink alcohol.’ (AL 091016-01 02:49)

Case marking is encoded by a clitic at the end of the noun phrase. Like other Tibeto-Burman languages of this branch of the family (see Kelly 2004, Vesalainen and Vesalainen 1980) Lamjung Yolmo has a small number of case-markers that perform multiple functions. The case-markers in Lamjung Yolmo are:

- =*ki* genitive, ergative, instrumental
- =*la* locative, allative, dative
- =*le(gi)* ablative

Ergative marking in Lamjung Yolmo is optional. This is a common feature of ergative marking in Central Tibetan languages, occurring in related languages including Standard Tibetan (Tournadre 1995) and Sherpa (Kelly 2004, pp. 349-352). As LaPolla (1995) shows, optionality of ergativity is actually the preference in Tibeto-Burman languages. There is a small subset of transitive verbs where the subjects take the dative marker instead of an ergative marker; these denote personal, and usually internal, states and actions.

2.2.4. Verbs

2.2.4.1 Verb types

There are three major types of verbs in Lamjung Yolmo, copula verbs, lexical verbs and auxiliary verbs. Verbs inflect for tense, aspect, mood and evidence, and take negation. Copulas are not inflected for person, number or politeness level and many do not distinguish tense. Instead they have functions that include equation (6a) and existence (6b).

- 6) a) *òodi mì ñà=ki rò yimba*
 that person 1SG=GEN friend COP.EGO
 ‘that person is my friend.’ (AL 091109-01)
- b) *mò yèke*
 3SG.F COP.EGO.PST
 ‘she was.’
 (lit. ‘she existed.’) (AL 100922-01)

The existence copula also occurs in location, possession and attribution clauses.

Copula verbs not only function as standard copulas, but like many closely related Tibeto-Burman languages a subset of them is also used as auxiliaries in the inflection of lexical verbs, where they contribute modal (and some tense) information (7b).

- 7) a) *òodi lú yàabu dù*
 that song good COP.PE
 ‘that song is good.’ (RL 110129-01)
- b) *òodi lú yàabu thé-ku dù*
 that song good hear-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘that song sounds good.’ (RL 110129-01)

The use of copular verbs will be explored in detail in chapter 6.

Negation for copulas is irregular compared to lexical verbs, and therefore each copula has been given with the equivalent negative form in Table 2.6.

	Ego	Dubitative	Perceptual evidence	General fact
Equation	<i>yimba</i> <i>mìn</i>	<i>yìnɔ</i> <i>mìnɔ</i>	<i>(dùba)</i> <i>(mìnduba)</i>	-
Existential present	<i>yè</i> <i>mè</i>	<i>yèto</i> <i>mètɔ</i>	<i>dù</i> <i>mìndu</i>	<i>òŋge</i> <i>mèoŋge</i>
past	<i>yèke</i> <i>yèba</i> <i>mèke</i> <i>mèba</i>		<i>dùba</i> <i>mìnduba</i>	

Table 2.6. The Lamjung Yolmo copula system. Affirmative forms are in bold and the negative forms appear below them

The auxiliary verb *tè-* is the only observed auxiliary verb in Lamjung Yolmo, apart from the auxiliary use of the copula verbs. It is a grammaticalisation of the lexical verb ‘sit’ and is used in a number of constructions to give imperfective aspect to the utterance (8).

- 8) a) *mò jàl tè-sin dù*
3SG.F sleep AUX-PST COP.PE
‘she was sleeping.’ (AL 101008-01)
- b) *ɲà qò-ni tè-ku dù*
1SG go-OPT AUX-IPFV COP.PE
‘I am wanting to go.’ (AL 100923-01)

Lexical verbs are the most numerous. They can be either simple or complex (9).

- 9)
- | | | | |
|-----------------|--|---------|-------------------|
| <i>nəl</i> | | ‘sleep’ | |
| <i>tér</i> | | ‘give’ | |
| <i>prù</i> | | ‘write’ | |
| <i>lóp tér</i> | | ‘teach’ | (lit. learn give) |
| <i>kèe kyàp</i> | | ‘call’ | (lit. noise fall) |

They can be used with the auxiliary *tè-* to give imperfective aspect, and are used with the copulas in some constructions. Lexical verbs can occur without either in some constructions.

2.2.4.2 Tense

There is a tense distinction in Lamjung Yolmo between past and non-past. For lexical verbs the non-past is marked with the *-ke* suffix (10a), and the past is marked with the *-sin* suffix (10b). Tense is discussed in Appendix 1 §1.5.3.1.

- 10)
- | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| a) | <i>nà tàpse tó</i> | <i>sà-ke</i> | |
| | 1SG now rice.cooked | eat-NON.PST | |
| | ‘I am now eating rice.’ | | (AL 100930-01) |
| b) | <i>dàn khyá tó</i> | <i>sà-sin</i> | |
| | yesterday 2SG rice.cooked | eat-PST | |
| | ‘you ate rice yesterday.’ | | (AL 090916-06) |

The verbal suffix *-pa* also marks past tense (11).

- 11)
- | | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| <i>nà dàn</i> | <i>nəl-pa</i> | |
| 1SG yesterday | sleep-PST | |
| ‘I slept yesterday.’ | | (AL 090917-01) |

However it has the additional sense in some contexts of marking a question, and has a somewhat emphatic quality compared to the regular past tense suffix *-sin*.

2.2.4.3 Aspect

The three main aspectual distinctions are perfective, imperfective and habitual. There is only one main perfective marking suffix, but several imperfective marking suffixes and two similar habitual constructions. I will go through these different constructions briefly and they are all discussed in more detail in Appendix 1 §1.5.3.2.

The perfective suffix is *-ti*. In the corpus collected it collocates with the ego existential copula (12) but not the perceptual evidential, instead a plain past tense construction is used with a perceptual evidential.

- 12) a) *ɲà lèn-ti yèke*
1SG sing-PERF COP.EGO.PST
'I had sang.' (AL 091028-04)
- b) *ɲà khím=la lò-ti yè*
1SG house=DAT return -PERF COP.EGO
'I have returned home.' (AL 120318-02)

There are three different imperfective suffixes. The first is the lexical verb suffix *-teraŋ*, or less commonly, *-peraŋ* (13a). The second is the *-ku* suffix, which can only occur with the *dù* copula (13b). The final is the use of *tè* as an auxiliary verb (13c). The *tè* constructions are like *-teraŋ* can occur with both ego and perceptual evidential forms, however it is not a lexical suffix but a separate auxiliary verb.

- 13) a) *ɲà tàpse tè-teraŋ yè*
1SG now sit-IPFV COP.EGO
'I am now sitting down.' (AL 110204-01)

b) *thúŋ thúŋ lǎp-ku dù*
 drink drink say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘‘‘drink, drink’’ (they) say.’ (SL 091108-01 19:37)

c) *mò jàl tè-sin dù*
 3SG.F sleep AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘she was sleeping.’ (AL 101008-01)

There are a number of different constructions that *tè* can be used in, but it always contributes imperfective aspect.

The habitual is created using either a bare lexical verb stem (14a) or a verb with an infinitive verb suffix and an existential copula verb (14b).

14) a) *ŋà jìma tǎŋmaran khúra sà yè*
 1SG day every bread eat COP.EGO
 ‘I eat bread every day.’ (AL 101001-01)

b) *ŋà sà-dze yèke*
 1SG eat-INF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I used to eat.’ (AL 091009-03)

2.2.4.4 Mood

There are four major grammatical moods in Lamjung Yolmo: imperative, hortative, optative and dubitative. I will give examples of all of these in turn, and more detail can be found in §1.5.3.3. of the sketch grammar (Appendix 1).

The imperative suffix is *-toŋ*, which is also used to make the preferred verb citation form for speakers. Imperatives formed with this suffix are considered to be more polite (15a) than those that use a bare verb stem (15c), which is used with familiars, children and animals. There are also a small subset of verbs where there are

irregular imperative forms (15b), although the regular form with the *-toŋ* suffix can also be used.

- 15) a) *tè-toŋ* ‘please sit’
 b) *çè* ‘please eat’
 c) *tè* ‘sit!’ (regular)

The prohibitive is formed by placing the past tense prefix on the verb stem. As the negator results in no suffix use, there is no difference between the more polite and less polite forms of the imperative with the regular verbs (16) as there was between (15a) and (15b).

- 16) a) *mà-tè* ‘do not sit’
mà-sà ‘do not eat’

There are two strategies for forming hortative constructions in Lamjung Yolmo. The first is the suffix *-ka* (17a), and the second is *-tço* (17b). All evidence collected to date indicates that the *-ka* suffix cannot occur with first person singular structures, instead *-tço* is used:

- 17) a) *òraŋ sà-ka*
 1PL.INC eat-HORT
 ‘let’s eat!’ (AL 091104-02)
- b) *ŋà khím=ki lè pè-tço*
 1SG house=GEN work do-HORT
 ‘let me do the house work!’ (AL 101008-01)

The difference between the two is subtle and appears to be that the *-ka* suffix is more strongly injunctive while the *-tɕo* suffix is milder and thus more frequently used.

The only morphologically constructed optative mood marking is using the verb suffix *-ji* (18).

- 18) *ɲà ɲàl-ɲi tɛ-ku dù*
 1SG sleep-OPT AUX-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I am wanting to sleep.’ (AL 100923-01)

Dubitative mood is marked with the lexical verb suffix *-to* or the copula *yɛ̀to*. It gives a sense of speaker uncertainty to the proposition. The lexical verb suffix can only be used in non-past constructions (19c), while the copula *yɛ̀to* and the equational *yìnɔ̀o* can also be used in past constructions (19a) and (19b).

- 19) a) *tàpse khó òɲ yɛ̀to*
 now 3SG.M come COP.DUB
 ‘he is/ probably coming now.’ (RL 101028-04)
- b) *dàɲ m̀ò=la tóoba yɛ̀to*
 yesterday 3SG.F=DAT hunger COP.DUB
 ‘she was probably hungry yesterday.’ (AL 100929-01)
- c) *tiring m̀ò=la tóo-to*
 today 3SG.F=DAT hunger-DUB
 ‘she is/will be probably hungry today.’ (AL 100929-01)
- d) * *dàɲ m̀ò=la tóo-to*
 yesterday 3SG.F=DAT hungry-DUB
 * ‘she was probably hungry yesterday.’ (AL 100929-01)

2.2.4.5 Negation

Negation of auxiliary and lexical verbs is done with one of two verbal prefixes; *mà-* and *mè-* (20). These are the only known prefixes in the language. The first is used for past tense (20a) and imperative (20b) and hortative mood (20d) and the second is used for non-past tense (20c). When the negation prefix is present the verb does not use over markers for tense, and some moods. Some forms of aspect and mood (20d) remain overtly marked, even when the negation prefixes are used. More discussion of negation, and how it interacts with different constructions, can be found in Appendix 1 §1.5.5.

- 20) a) *ɲà mà-len*
1SG NEG.PST-sing
'I did not sing.' (AL 091028-04)
- b) *mà-len*
NEG.PST-sing
'do not sing!' (AL 091028-04)
- c) *ɲà mè-lèn* *yè*
1SG NEG.NON-PST-sing COP.EGO
'I do not sing.' (AL 091028-04)
- d) *ɲì* *mà-tchám-ka*
1PL.EXC NEG.PST-dance-HORT
'let us not dance.' (AL 110215-01)

2.2.5. Major clause types

This section gives a brief description of some of the major clause types that are relevant to the discussion in this thesis. In this section I will look at conditionals (§2.2.5.1.), nominalisation (§2.2.5.2.), complementation (§2.2.5.3.), relativisation (§2.2.5.4.) and clause chaining (§2.2.5.5.). Discussion of question constructions can be found in chapter 7, and discussion of reported speech constructions can be found in chapter 8.

2.2.5.1 Conditionals

Conditionals are formed by using the conditional suffix *-na* on the verb in the protasis clause. In counterfactual conditionals, the infinitive is used in the apodosis in place of the regular non-past tense.

- 21) a) *nám mà-kyap làp-na ñà phíla dò-ke*
rain NEG.NON.PST-fall say-COND 1SG outside go-NON.PST
'if it doesn't rain I will go outside.' (AL 091103-02)
- b) *ñà nímu táŋa yè-na ñà sàse*
1SG with money COP.EGO-COND 1SG food
ñò-tçe yèke
buy-INF COP.EGO.PST
'If I had money with me, I'd have bought food.' (AL 031109-02)

2.2.5.2 Nominalisation

The most common and productive verbal nominaliser in Lamjung Yolmo is the suffix *-kandi* (22).

- 22) a) *ñà=ki òlbu yúŋ-kandi thé-ku dù*
1SG=ERG bell.prayer shake-NOM hear-IPFV COP.PE
'I hear the ringing of bells' (AL 100922-01)

The nominaliser is used for more than just the creation of nominalised forms. It is often found marking lexical verbs in utterances, where it has a non-past tense function (23) and is often considered by speakers to be a politer way of constructing sentences.

- 23) a) *ñà kyàmi tám làp-kandi yimba*
1SG foreign language speak-NOM COP.EGO
'I speak a foreign language.' (AL 091109-03)

- b) *ɕĩŋɔ sà-kandi yàabu yè*
 fruit eat-NOM good COP.EGO
 ‘fruit eating is good.’ (AL 091109-02)

There is also the locational nominaliser *-sa*, which attaches to verbs to make locational nouns (24).

- 24) *tó yò-sa kòga*
 rice cook-NOM.LOC fireplace
 ‘the rice-cooking fireplace.’ (AL 090928-02)

Nominalisation is discussed in more detail in Appendix 1 (§1.6.4.).

2.2.5.3 *Complementation*

A complement clause is a clause that functions as an argument of another clause. To date, only object complement clauses have been observed. The verb of the complement clause takes the infinitive *-tɕe*. Examples below show clauses with complement-taking predicates such as *remember*, *forget* and *want* (25).

- 25) a) *ɲì=la yìgi prù-tɕe tèm̄ba sàl-toŋ*
 1PL.EXC=DAT letter write-INF remember-IMP
 ‘remember to write us a letter.’ (AL 091103-01)
- b) *ɲà ɲàl-tɕe tèm̄ba tɕè-sin dù*
 1SG sleep-INF forget-PST COP.PE
 ‘I forgot to sleep.’ (AL 091101-03)

As shown in the section on mood (§2.2.4.4. above), the optative can also be used as a complementiser.

2.2.5.4 Relativisation

There are two main strategies for producing relative clauses in Lamjung Yolmo. Both of them involve suffixing the verb of the relative clause. The first is the nominaliser *-kandi* (26a). The second relativisation strategy is a lexical verb, often reduplicated, with the suffix *-pa-ki* or *-ka-ki* (26b).

- 26) a) *khím sáŋma pè-kandi mì nà-sin dù*
house clean do-NOM person be.ill-PST COP.PE
‘the man who cleans the house is ill.’ (AL 101005-01)
- b) *khyá=ki prù-prù-pa-ki yìgi*
2PL=GEN write-write-PST-REL letter
‘the letter that you wrote.’ (AL 091101-05)

2.2.5.5 Clause chaining

Clause chaining is done using the perfective suffix *-ti* discussed in §2.2.4.3. Verbs with this suffix can be ‘stacked’ to give a clause chain structure in either past or non-past constructions. The sentence with the most clauses chained together that has been recorded to date has three non-finite verbs in a row (27). As there is no overt tense marking the translation is in past-tense, in keeping with the narrative.

- 27) *áarak tùŋ-ti dzì-ti òŋ-ti péemi=la*
alcohol drink-PERF drunk-PERF come-PERF wife=ALL
‘(he) drank alcohol, got drunk and came to his wife.’
(AL 091108-01 09:30)

Many of these structures will occur during the discussion about how modality, evidentiality, questions and reported speech are used across a range of interactional situations in chapters 6-8. Before that, I will outline the methodology I used to elicit the data.

3. Methodology

3.1. *Data collection*

Data used in this thesis was collected over a three and a half year period on three separate field trips to Nepal, totalling 10 months (September-December 2009, September 2010 to February 2011 and January-March 2012). Time on each field trip was spent between working with speakers who had migrated to the cities of Kathmandu and Besisahar and time spent in Yolmo-speaking villages in Lamjung. Data recordings were made with more than twenty speakers of the language between the ages of 5 - 70 and informal consultation and interaction occurred with a much larger number of speakers. The full list of speakers with whom I worked is given in Appendix 4. The principal consultants who are mentioned most frequently throughout this thesis are listed in Table 3.1.

Name	Gender	Age	Village	Relation
AL	Female	47	Namgyu	
SL	Female	34	Namgyu	Younger sister of AL
DML	Female	70	Toljung	
KL	Female	26	Toljung	Daughter of DML
ST	Female	32	Toljung	Daughter of DML
RL	Male	17	Toljung	Grandson of DML, maternal nephew of KL and ST
SBL	Male	26	Nayagaun	Distant uncle of RL

Table 3.1. Main consultants.

All sessions were recorded on a Zoom H4n audio recorder at CD quality (44.1 kHz, 16-bit stereo) and narrative tasks involving pictures or stimulus were also video recorded using a Flip HD video recorder and a Canon Ixus 100is when available. Both were chosen for their compact size and economical battery life.

In regard to ethics, the requirements of the university's ethics policy have been met, but as Crowley (2007, p. 33) notes, linguists have a broader ethical obligation to the community than simply meeting the official policy. To this end, every effort went into ensuring that copies of all recordings were returned to each speaker I worked with. I also assisted in the production of materials. These included a small Lamjung Yolmo-Nepali-English dictionary (Gawne 2011a) made using the already existing Toolbox data. A small picture book was made with the Jackal and Crow narrative images (see §3.2.2. below) and distributed to the children, with bigger bilingual (Lamjung Yolmo/Nepali) copies made for the library at the local school. Copies of this thesis will also be returned to primary consultants. These have all been archived along with original recordings, field notes and images, as discussed in §3.4.

3.2. Types of data

Two principal methods of data collection were used in this research: elicitation and text collection. These methods were complementary in the types of data they yielded. As Bybee and Fleischman (1995, p. 8) note, face-to-face naturalistic narrative is optimal for collection of rich modal data, only collecting narrative and interactional data is insufficient. As Joseph (2003, p. 318) observes when it comes to grammatical features like evidentiality, there are specific situations that are rare naturalistically, and there is also a need to use negative evidence as to the grammatical viability of certain forms in certain situations.

The elicited data consisted of word lists, sentence paradigms and requesting grammatical judgements about specific utterances from speakers, as well as translating more naturalistic data and discussing usage more broadly. Appendix 3 gives the metadata for recorded data collection, giving a more detailed idea of the types of elicited data collected.

Of the more naturalistic data, close to six hours of narrative, conversation and open description of stimulus materials were recorded. A large proportion of this was video recorded as well as audio recorded. There are a number of narratives, descriptive and expository recordings from speakers, and there are also a variety of tasks and activities that contributed to the non-elicitation data. I used a variety of elicitation tools to collect a range of different data. For example, the Twenty Questions game (§3.2.5.) was designed to elicit question structures and therefore is predominantly drawn upon in chapter 7 where I look at question constructions. For each experiment type I will outline the procedure, the implementation and how it has been of use in my research. The first two Family Story (§3.2.1.) and Jackal and Crow (§3.2.2.) are picture-based narrative tasks. I will then discuss the use of activities created by other people, which include the MPI created Put Project and Reciprocals Project video sets (§3.2.3.) and the Hidden Objects task (§3.2.4.). Finally I will look at tasks I developed specifically for this thesis, including the Twenty Questions game (§3.2.5.), Multiple Reports task (§3.2.6.), as well as sets of magic tricks (§3.2.7.) and optical illusions (§3.2.8.).

3.2.1. Family Story

The first activity is a picture task entitled “Family Story.” The task is based around 16 images. With these images it is possible to form a single narrative. The canonical narrative tells the story of a family attempting to overcome a drama, however the images are open-ended enough to allow participants to change the storyline around or create a whole new narrative. This task was developed as a way of eliciting

socially interactive data and lent itself to cross-linguistic comparison as part of a larger research project investigating Language and Social Cognition.¹⁰

There are three main parts to the task. First, the participants are given each card individually, out of any particular narrative order, and asked to describe what they see. This elicits descriptive information with some conversation. Next, they must work together to establish a cohesive narrative, which generates a great deal of naturalistic conversation and negotiation. Finally one speaker is asked to tell the story. If they present the story in third person they are asked to repeat it in first person, assuming the role of one of the main characters. This provides narrative, but also provides specific point-of-view data. This task is discussed in more detail in San Roque et al. (2012).

The activity was undertaken with two dyads of speakers (091108-01 and 101124-03). The less literate speakers struggled with conventions such as speech bubbles, but the two groups managed to complete the task to their own satisfaction, creating similar but unique stories. This task provided a wealth of naturalistic data, including copula use, questions and reported speech, and is drawn on throughout the thesis.

3.2.2. *Jackal and Crow*

The second narrative task is the story of the Jackal and Crow. This is also a picture-based activity, this time telling the fable-style story of the two animal characters across nine images. The crow takes a fish and flies to a tree, a jackal passes by, sees the crow and decides he wants the fish. The jackal devises a plot where he gets the crow to sing by complimenting him on his voice, thus making the crow drop the

¹⁰ “Language and Social Cognition: The Design Resources of Grammatical Diversity” Australian Research Council Discovery Project 0878126. Chief Investigators Nicholas Evans and Alan Rumsey (ANU), Andrea Schalley (Griffith), Barbara Kelly (University of Melbourne).

fish. In the final images, the jackal is happy with his meal while the crow is sad in his tree.

It is a useful story because it involves two perspectives - the Jackal's and the Crow's. It also has cognitive acts, such as the jackal wanting the fish and the crow feeling sad. Another benefit is that the scale and themes of the narrative are appropriate for a wider age range than the family story, thus allowing for data from children to be collected. Also, because it took less time to record and transcribe, a wider cross-section of speakers were recorded telling this story. In total eleven speakers from 5 - 50 years of age were recorded telling this story across a number of recordings, sometimes in groups and sometimes alone. A summary of the recordings made is presented in Table 3.2.

This story was also commissioned by the Language and Social Cognition research group. The task, including the materials and procedure is discussed further in Kelly and Gawne (2011). As with the Family Story the data collected from these stories is used throughout the thesis, especially in chapter 6 and the sketch grammar.

File number	Speaker (gender/age)	Notes
101010-01	AL (F, 50)	Includes video.
101023-02	STL (F, 11), NBL (M, 41)	Both tell story once.
101026-01	KL (F, 26)	Told once.
101027-01	RL (M, 17)	Told twice.
101027-02	RL (M, 17), NIL (M, 5), RKL (M, 5), SUL (M, 5), SAL (M, 5)	Told to the children by RL who and then SUL retold the story with others participating. Inc. video.
101028-01	ALL (M, 13), NMT (M, 12)	ALL told and NMT listened and responded, includes video.
101028-02	ASL (F, 7), NKL (F, 8), NFS (F, 9), STL (F, 11)	Told by ASL with NKL and NFS contributing. Then told by STL. Includes video.
101030-01, 101030-02, 101030-03	NKL (F, 8), NFS (F, 9)	101030-01 and 101030-02 in Lamjung Yolmo, 101030-03 in Nepali

Table 3.2. Summary of the recordings of the Jackal and Crow.

3.2.3. *Put and Reciprocal videos*

For this task I used two pre-existing video stimulus kits. The first is the Put Project (Bowerman, Gulberg, Amjid and Narasimhan 2004) and the second is the Reciprocal Project (Evans, Levinson, Enfield and Gaby 2004), both developed at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen. Both sets contain short videos of

people acting out situations. The first set involves a lot of ‘putting’ situations, placing or dropping different size objects onto, into and near other objects, some examples include putting a rag in a pipe, putting water in a cup and dropping a book on a table. The second set involved people acting out reciprocal and non-reciprocal events. For example in one video, two people give each other a book, and in another video one person gives the other a book without any reciprocal action.

Although this project is not interested specifically in either put verbs or reciprocal constructions the videos were still very useful. They were both done with AL (Put: 101006-01 and Reciprocals: 101012-02). They helped give an idea of which evidentials were appropriate for visual information.

3.2.4. Hidden Objects

This experiment is based on an experiment run by Vokurková (2008, pp. 13-14) as a way to get controlled data on evidential and epistemic use by different speakers. The experiment involves taking a number of everyday objects and covering them with a cloth.

The participant is first invited to guess what the objects are, based purely on their shape. Unsurprisingly, people find this stage quite difficult and are often unwilling to give an answer. Next they are invited to feel the objects through the cloth and guess what they are. Finally, the cloth is removed and speakers are asked to say what the objects are while looking at them. Vokurková included an additional step between the last two where speakers would feel the object under the cloth, but I found that speakers were unwilling to engage in this step as they had usually guessed what the objects were.

Vokurková used quite large objects (for example, a motorbike helmet, a teapot and a pile of apples). I chose smaller objects to allow for the activity to be more portable

and easily replicated across field sites. The items I chose were two small books, an onion or lemon (depending on availability), a packet of noodles, a woollen hat and a pair of reading glasses. I ensured that I asked questions of speakers using the same script to allow for consistent data collection. Speakers found this task engaging and entertaining and I recorded sessions with seven different participants (AL 120212-01, RL 120219-01, ST 120304-01, KL and CL together 120304-02, DML 120304-03 and STL 120304-03). This experiment provided data as to copula use, and the results will be drawn on in chapter 6. ST was also present during the recording with KL and CL and used some reported speech constructions based on utterances I had made while running the experiment with her. This generated some of the only spontaneous examples of reported speech where both the original speech event and the reported speech event were recorded, and as such will be discussed in chapter 8.

3.2.5. Twenty Questions

This activity is based on a game popular with Western children where one person thinks of an object and the other players must figure out what that object is by asking yes/no type questions about features of the object. To make it easier for participants I took photos of everyday items around the village (a broom, an ox, a shoe) for use in the game. This task was run once with RL and SNL (101120-02), which resulted in one round played in Nepali and one round in Lamjung Yolmo, and once with AL and SL (120214-02) which was much more successful and involved seven rounds in Lamjung Yolmo with participants taking turns to guess the item. This second recording resulted in almost two hundred question and answer pairs across the seven rounds. This data is discussed in the chapter on question structures (chapter 7).

3.2.6. Multiple Reports

This activity was a set of ten situations where the participant was given conflicting reports of this situation and has to decide who they believe. In each situation there is

some information given to set up the event, and then two people give conflicting reports that also had conflicting evidential or modal information on the copula verb. With this conflicting information the speaker then has to make a choice about the situation.

The intention in this activity was to access speaker intuitions about whether the modal or evidential information in the sentence influenced which of the reports they would believe. For example, would a person be more likely to choose the utterance that involved perceptual evidence over reported evidence? All of the other experiments are designed to create situations where people can talk using modal information, so this activity was designed to access intuitions without necessarily asking people to create the utterances themselves. Below is an example, translated into English:

Your sister has a new skirt, you have not seen the skirt. One person says “The skirt is red (using a perceptual evidence)” another person says “the skirt is green (using an ego evidence)” - what colour do you think the skirt is?

The participant then gives their answer. The story information was given in Nepali, and the reported speech events were in Lamjung Yolmo. There were two sets of the activity and the copulas were inverted between the two sets - so while set A had the order above, the same event had “the skirt is green (perceptual evidential)” in set B. This was done to minimise any influence of the content of the utterance. This task was run with five speakers; AL (101013-01), RL (101025-04), KL (101026-04), VL (101224-02) and UL (110115-02). This was not enough speakers to be able to perform a quantifiable analysis of the answers given, but the task did give some insight into how speakers process evidential information, and has informed the discussion throughout the thesis.

3.2.7. *Magic*

Magic tricks involve a change of state which is often unexpected, this makes them an interesting activity for the elicitation of evidential (§5.2.2.) and potentially mirative forms (§5.2.3.). For this project I used three magic tricks. The first is a basic ‘conceal/reveal’ trick using a magician’s change box or change bag. These allow the magician to place a small object inside and have it disappear or reappear at will. The trick can also be performed where the audience is shown the empty box or bag and then ‘magically’ make an item appear inside. The second magic trick involves a “magic colouring book.” The book is designed so that the first time it is shown to the audience the pages are blank. The performer then uses their magic to make black and white images appear in the book, and then, finally, the performer ‘colours’ the images. The third trick is a silk scarf, which changes from yellow and green to blue and red.

Different tricks were performed with a number of speakers, dependent on what materials I had with me. With RL I performed the change box and magic book tricks (110208-03) as well as the change scarf (120219-01), and performed all three with AL as well (110217-03 and 120209-02). With ST I performed the change scarf and change bag tricks (120304-01) and with KL and CL together I performed the change bag trick (120304-02).

I performed the role of magician for all speakers, working off a script developed with RL. I had hoped to train RL in the role of magician to remove myself from the experiment, but this was not feasible.¹¹ At the completion of the task I showed participants how the trick was performed, having decided my responsibility to act as

¹¹ This is partly because RL left the village to attend college while I was there on my 2012 trip. It is also because when I demonstrated the magic tricks I had with me in 2010 he was so excited about it that he had shown everyone the trick before I had a chance to get my audio recorder. This is an unfortunate example of an elicitation task that was too favourably taken up by speakers.

an ethical researcher and ensure that the participants understood the tricks outweighed my duty as a responsible magician who never reveals her secrets.

I incorporated these magic tricks into the fieldwork for this project because they involve the kinds of parameters that the Lamjung Yolmo evidential system reflects (§6.1.1). There are moments where speakers have to say whether they see something or whether they assume something, and moments of uncertainty and surprise. For most performances of the magic tricks the reactions were not those that would be expected when performed for a Western audience. This is not particularly surprising, given that such magic tricks are a social construction, as is the way a Western audience is taught to react to them. Having said that, they did provide a useful opportunity to explore the way people use different evidential constructions and are mostly discussed in the chapter on evidentiality (chapter 6).

3.2.8. Optical Illusions

For this task I presented participants with five different printed optical illusions. I used these to generate talk that involved observation and potential uncertainty. I did not tell participants that these were illusions. Instead I requested that they tell me what was in the image. These images are presented in Appendix 7.

The first is of an oil painting by Ukrainian artist Oleg Shuplyak, which shows a bird on a branch next to a cluster of leaves that look like a bird. The second is an image of a swan painted onto a hand by Italian artist Guido Daniele. The hand is hard to perceive and the swan is very detailed. The third is another painting by Oleg Shuplyak, this time a combination of a self-portrait and a landscape with the figure of a painter in the foreground. In this image both the landscape elements and the face are quite prominent, which is a common feature of Shuplyak's style. The fourth image is of a crocodile painted onto a hand by Guido Daniele. Although the image is also very lifelike, the style of image is exactly the same as the swan image above, so

by this image speakers have been primed to know that they are looking at a hand. The fifth and final image is of a classic optical illusion where the black and white image of a duck rotated 90 degrees becomes an image of a rabbit. I kept this one until last, as it is more abstract and less photo-realistic than the others and the preceding images worked as something of a warm-up for this one.

This task was conducted four times. KL and CL performed the task together (120304-02), and AL (120209-01), RL (120219-01) and ST (120304-01) also undertook the task individually. Speakers responded positively to this activity, with different speakers focusing different images depending mostly on how intriguing they found the illusion. The results of this experiment are incorporated into the discussion of the copula verbs (chapter 6). As with the Hidden Objects task ST was present during the recording with KL and CL and so there is reported speech data from this that I will discuss in chapter 8.

3.3. Data analysis and tools

All audio files were imported to the computer and narratives were transcribed in Transcriber (Boudahmane, Manta, Antoine, Galliano and Barras 2008) and later ELAN (Hellwig, Van Uytvanck and Hulsbosch 2009). Lexical items and elicited sentences were entered into the program Toolbox (Buseman and Buseman 2009) for interlinearisation and to build a database of the lexicon. There were 6503 utterances in the Toolbox database, including both naturalistic and elicited data. This corpus was used to develop the analysis in this thesis.

The lexicon that was created was used with an MDF (Multi Dictionary Formatter) to generate a Lamjung Yolmo-Nepali-English dictionary (Gawne 2011a) and the word lists in this volume (Appendices 5 and 6). The interlinearised texts gave the transcripts of narratives in Appendix 2. Some facets of the phonetics were analysed using Praat (Boersma and Weenik 2007), for example the pitch traces for

interrogative and declarative utterances in Figure 7.1. to Figure 7.4. in section §7.2.2.

3.4. Archiving processes

In regards to archiving, all data from this project has been stored with the Pacific and Regional Archive for Digital Sources in Endangered Cultures (Paradisec <http://paradisec.org.au/>). This includes audio and video files, scans of field notes, program files from Transcriber, ELAN and Toolbox as well as a corpus of images, all with appropriate meta-data. Most of this data can be found in the list of recording files in Appendix 3. This is to ensure that future generations, of both the Lamjung Yolmo community and linguists, may have access to these materials. The information about the archived data is available at the Open Language Archives Community (OLCA www.language-archives.org) with which Paradisec is affiliated.

These various elicitation tools have generated a wealth of data that is spontaneous, but sufficiently structured so as to allow an analysis that can track who has access to what knowledge, and how this knowledge is shared and constructed by participants in the process of performing these tasks. In the next chapters I situate this within the literature on social cognition, which influenced the social dimension of these tasks, and the specific grammatical features that were the target of many of these activities.

4. Socio-cognitive approaches to language in use

4.1. *Introduction*

Language does not exist in isolation. It is a part of a uniquely human set of cognitive attributes that allow us to interact with our environment and, most importantly, with other humans. Thus, language sits within a wider set of cognitive skills that we can refer to collectively as ‘social cognition.’

As this thesis focuses on the interactional use of modality, questions and reported speech, this chapter gives a brief survey of the current understanding of the socio-cognitive processes that people draw upon when using language. This thesis is not intended to capture the scope of the evolution of the specific socially oriented cognitive functions possessed by humans, instead it is focused on the end-state result, in relation to several grammatical features of Lamjung Yolmo. This chapter situates this thesis within the wider work being done on the interactional and cognitive underpinnings of language use.

In this chapter I will look at a number of methodologies that have taken a socio-cognitive perspective on language use. I start by looking at the ways in which human social cognition is considered different to other animals (§4.2.1.). I then turn to specific methodologies, including (inter)subjectivity (§4.2.2.), stance (§4.2.3.), conversation analysis (§4.2.4.) and sociality (§4.2.5). I then introduce theory of mind (§4.3.). In response to theory of mind, turn to the notion of ‘opacity of mind,’ which has been put forward as a cultural construct that could present an interesting framework for our understanding of the cognitive processes people use to interact (§4.4.), and its prevalence in cultural groups closely related to speakers of Lamjung Yolmo.

Throughout this chapter, and the rest of the thesis, I will use the general term ‘social cognition’ to refer to the undercurrent that runs through all of the methodologies under discussion here. While not a specific theory in itself, the term social cognition allows us to focus on the fact that all of the topics discussed in this chapter are interested in the relationship between language, human social interaction and the underlying cognitive process that allows us to communicate with each other.

4.2. Socio-cognitive perspectives on human interaction and language

4.2.1. Human social cognition

Social cognition is a term that originated in the field of social psychology. Researchers in the 1970s became interested in the cognitive processes that underlie people’s interactions with the world and other humans, unconvinced by the Behaviourists’ assumptions that the human mind was a ‘black box’ that could not be observed objectively (Kunda 1999, p. 1, Bless, Feidler and Strack 2003, p. 6, Hamilton 2005, p. 83, Augoustinos, Walker and Donaghue 1996, p. 63). Since then social cognition has become one of the dominant mainstream approaches in social psychology.

Despite being interested in human cognition, and how humans mediate their relationship with the world and other humans, social cognition research has shown very little interest in language. As Augoustinos et al. (2006, p. 53) note, “[a] sorely neglected area of empirical research in psychology has been the everyday use of language.” This is because there has been an attempt to seek empirical legitimacy within experimental psychology by trying to use procedures that sidestep overt language use in the belief that it can also sidestep linguistic bias and get to the heart of cognition. This is not true of all researchers. For example, Hostetter, Alibali and

Neidenthal (2012, p. 220) acknowledge that "[c]ommunication always occurs in context. For communication to be successful, addressees must be able to reference the speaker's message to objects, events, or concepts that are currently present or that can be imagined or remembered." By acknowledging that language is a key element of social interactions social psychologists are trying to come to terms with the possibility that language is not hindering the quest to understand social cognition, but is a necessary part of trying to reach that understanding.

Models for the high level of interactional intelligence humans have come out of other areas as well as the social psychology field of social cognition. "Machiavellian intelligence" an evolutionary account proposed by Nicolas Humphrey (1976/1988). Humphrey was looking to find a reason that human intelligence out-stripped that of non-human primates. As a species we are too intelligent for simple survival, and so Humphrey argued that our intelligence is not so much for surviving the world as it is for surviving each other. Humphrey proposes "...that the chief role of creative intellect is to hold society together" (1976/1988, p. 18). But like the opinion of the influential Florentine for which this theory is named, Machiavellian intelligence is primarily about using intelligence for one's own end; life is tough in a group "but there are benefits to individuals for preserving group structures and exploiting others within it (Humphrey 1976/1988, p. 19)."

Social intelligence grew out the initial ideas of Machiavellian intelligence, but with a recognition that the skills humans have developed are not just about competition, but about being socially adept. Thus, instead of only competitive behaviour, social intelligence encompasses co-operative behaviour and social interdependence as well (Goody 1995). Machiavellian intelligence is still considered a subset of social intelligence (Goody 1995, p. 7) but limited to that which involves deception and lying (Byrne 1995). Social cognition has historically been the domain of experimental psychologists, while social intelligence has generally been the domain of anthropologists and the more theoretical psychologists (see, for example, the

contributors in Goody 1995). Typically, social intelligence has, as a field of enquiry, given more consideration to how language is used to construct social worlds and what evidence language gives us for social intelligence (for example, Drew 1995).

Language is a feature of human social cognition that is often discussed when differentiating humans from other animals. As Fitch, Huber and Bugnyar (2010) report in a summary of studies undertaken with a range of animals, while there are various features of human social cognition that we share with animals there is no animal that exhibits all of the skills we possess. Interestingly, they also found that the evidence to date indicates that phylogenetic proximity to humans does not result in an increase in social intelligence. Instead there were a variety of skills spread throughout the species that were reported on. In another review of work on a variety of animals, Emery and Clayton (2009) conclude that all current evidence points to limited social cognitive abilities in animals other than humans.

Frith and Frith (2007) argue that what sets us apart from other animals is that we have higher-level processing skills for social signals. They split social cognition abilities into two groups. The first is the lower-level, which involves unconscious signals such as facial expressions and body movements, which are skills shared by many animals. The second is the higher-level, which involves signals that are processed deliberately, and are more human-specific than lower-level skills. The awareness of the exchange of signals, for example in the use of language, is what makes human communication so powerful.

When it comes to interacting with members of our own species and the world around us, we appear to be doing something different to other animals. Language is something that is often noted as an immediately obvious difference, however the cognitive structure that underpins this language faculty is possibly a more fundamental point of difference. There have been a number of approaches to the use

of language that have focuses on it's interactional nature, and cognitive underpinnings, which I discuss below.

4.2.2. *(Inter)subjectivity*

Subjectivity, and the closely related idea of Intersubjectivity, builds on the cognitive underpinnings of ideas like theory of mind and social intelligence. At it's heart is the premise that the human mind is a "shared mind" (Zlatev, Racine, Sinha and Itkonen 2008b), and that our interactions with other humans is a fundamental part of human experience of the world. Subjectivity focuses on the idea that an individual is a cognitive agent who is aware that other people are autonomous cognitive agents, while intersubjectivity is focused on how people, as autonomous cognitive agents, show this faculty in their interaction (Verhagen 2005, p. 4). Thus they are looking at the same cognitive phenomenon from different angles. In this thesis I will only refer to subjectivity, but I will presume that it includes the interactional phenomena that make up intersubjectivity as well as the faculty of any individual within that interaction. There is a rich tradition of work under the rubric of intersubjectivity that is interested in broader cognitive issues than language, such as the Zlatev, Racine, Sinha and Itkonen (2008a) edited volume and the work of Tomasello (see Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll 2005) however in this section I will focus specifically on work that is interested in the way language is used in the construction of intersubjectivity.

The subjective has its opposition in the objective, but we are not only focusing on the difference between an individuals perspective and the 'objective' world, but specifically on how one person's subjective perception is different to other people's subjective perception, which is the domain of intersubjectivity. This triangle of the speaker's cognitive state, the world they are referring to in their speech and the cognitive state of their interlocutor, is a useful triad to consider when we think about interactional situations. Variation in language use in interaction is not driven by the objective world, but the way people relate to it and each other (Verhagen (2005, p.

29, Mushin 2001), which I will demonstrate in relation to the choice of evidential copulas in Lamjung Yolmo (§6.3.).

Verhagen (2005) shows that humans use a variety of linguistic tools as part of the deep mutual cognitive engagement involved in subjectivity. Some of the most seemingly simple grammatical constructions such as negation and discourse connectives have complexities that can only be teased out when we stop looking at language as primarily the transmission of information about the world and instead take into account that language also serves an important function in how we regulate our interaction with other people. For example, in his discussion of negation, Verhagen (2005, p. 32) argues that negation is not just about reversing the truth-value of an utterance to make it describe something, but instead it instructs the addressee as to what inferences to make about events based on the use of the negation. It is therefore not the removal of the negated information from the context, but the addition of extra information. By thinking of the choice to negate something as a co-construction of meaning between the speaker and their interlocutor it can foreshadow why a speaker may or may not choose to negate something. Verhagen's work is based on Ducrot's idea of argumentation (see Anscombe and Ducrot 1983) and analysed within the Cognitive Grammar paradigm, so his interests and the presentation of his analysis are different to those found in this thesis, but his focus on the intersubjective function of language, and not just the objective, is useful when considering the grammatical features discussed in this thesis.

Mushin (2001) looked at evidential and epistemic use in narratives and found that taking a particular subjective orientation in a narrative relies on more than just knowledge of a linguistic system, but also contextual, social and cultural knowledge. For Mushin, this was a chance to step away from the focus on the syntactic and grammatical properties of evidentiality that were (and still are) the focus of discussion, and instead examine the discourse pragmatics of evidential forms. Thus for both Mushin and Verhagen, understanding the communicative intent of an

utterance as more than just conveying propositional content was a way to make better sense of the variation we find when people use language in interaction.

Subjectivity has provided a useful perspective on how language is used in interaction. It has also given researchers a framework in which to view linguistic output as potential evidence of otherwise inaccessible cognitive processes. While those working in subjectivity do acknowledge the wider cultural framework that shapes people's cognitive processes and interactional patterns (e.g. Mushin 2001, p. 15) the focus is more on the immediate context of utterance than the wider cultural framework this interaction is situated in. Work on stance has attempted to consider this wider frame as well.

4.2.3. *Stance*

Work focusing on stance acknowledges that when people communicate and interact they are, at all times, taking a perspective on the interaction, which is manifested in the communicative choices that they make. This perspective moves away from a focus on the specific cognitive processes that go into these choices, to understanding exactly how peoples' speech and actions show evidence of these stance choices. As Englebretson (2007a, p. 2) observes, stance can be defined in many different ways by different researchers. Consensus is still developing as to what falls into the domain of stance, but there are some important features of stancetaking that are relevant to the discussion in this thesis and offer an important perspective on the type of data I present.

The first is that stance can only ever occur in interaction (Englebretson 2007a, p. 6, Du Bois 2007, p. 141). Stance is not something that exists in an interactional vacuum, it affects the stance of the other people in an interaction as well as the propositional content of an utterance. Stance is something that develops and can shift during an interaction. It is also important to remember that if a person is

performing their stance then other people are understanding these stancetaking moves and reacting as part of their own stance. The listener in one stance action may be the stance-taker in the next turn. Therefore, it is important to not just understand how a person is indicating their stance during their turn, but how it affects the stance of their addressee.

The second feature of stance is that researchers identify different levels of stance. Englebretson (2007a, p. 6) separates stance on a personal level from the kind of stancetaking that occurs at the level of a sociocultural frame. While stance is something that is enacted in every interaction, there is a level of stancetaking that is the individual's own attitude, and different individuals from the same cultural group may show different stances towards the same object. Although some stancetaking occurs on an individual level there is some stancetaking that occurs on a cultural level, where there may be an overt or covert cultural attitude towards the object of the stance taking, and all (or most) individuals within a cultural group will share this stance. This understanding that there are choices operating on different levels for individuals is also a perspective shared by researchers working in human sociality, which I discuss in §4.2.6. below.

The final feature of stance that is important to note is that it is always manifested. As Englebretson (2007a, p. 6) points out stance can be physical. In this he could be referring to the literal idea of stance in terms of the way people physically position themselves, but in a broader sense it is useful to consider all non-verbal co-speech movement when considering a person's stance. Although I focus predominately on grammatical choice people make in interaction, the co-speech gestures and other physical actions people make in interaction can support or challenge an analysis of a person's stance. Also, while stance is always explicit, exactly how it is manifested can vary from language to language as the grammatical choices people have vary between languages. As studies of how people construct stance in interaction become more common, the range of languages that are considered become broader too. In

“Stancetaking in discourse” (Englebretson 2007a) there are articles on Finnish (Rauniomaa 2007) and Indonesian (Englebretson 2007b), and the more that stance becomes a topic of discussion the more that research on communication in languages beyond the European mainstays can show that there is a broad and complex range of stancetaking strategies that humans can take. Studies in stance are only now becoming more varied in terms of the languages that are analysed. In contrast, linguistic work on social cognition has begun from an understanding that the best way to come to terms with the breadth of skills people can use is to look at a broad range of languages and cultures.

4.2.4. Conversation analysis

When discussing stance, it is also important to mention the contribution of Conversation Analysis (CA) to our current understanding of interactional dynamics. CA is a methodology that takes natural conversation as its focus, working with the belief that language, and interaction, is orderly at the minute level of conversation (Stivers and Sidnell 2013, p. 2). Stemming from the ethnomethodology work of Harold Garfinkel, CA’s focus on turn-by-turn interaction has led to a better understanding of the ways in which people can maintain a ‘scorecard’ or ‘ticker’ to track the knowledge state of their interlocutor against their own (Sidnell 2012, p. 53).

This thesis does not use CA methodology, and much of the data is drawn from structured interaction - not spontaneous conversation - however the discussion of the nature of conversational interaction is heavily influenced by the developments that have come out of the CA literature in the last forty years. These include the importance of conversational interaction as a focus of study (Sacks 1972), the role of adjacency pairs in conversation (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974), and the perspective that repair can give in our understanding of interaction (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977).

In a recent set of papers from CA practitioners on interaction, Heritage (2012a) argues that all interaction is about the dynamics of epistemics and the shifting and levelling of epistemic stance across the duration of an interaction. A person will track what they know, and what they expect their interlocutor knows and attempt to redress (or maintain) that balance. In this thesis show that the grammatical choices people make in interaction make their knowledge state and epistemic stance available to their interlocutor. Heritage's (2012b, p. 33) discussion is also important as it separates epistemic status from epistemic stance. The epistemic stance in a person's utterance may not actually reflect their actual knowledge state. We see this is relevant to the discussion of Lamjung Yolmo when we see speakers manipulate their epistemic stance to claim different evidence from what they actually have (§6.3.3.). This notion is also important in the discussion of question and answer structures (§7.4.) when we see that the epistemic stance of the question does not actually align with the speaker, but with the person to whom they are directing the question.

Sidnell's (2012, p. 55) responds to Heritage (2012a, 2012b) by suggesting that languages with grammatical evidentiality may offer an opportunity for gaining a different perspective on stance. He asks whether languages with obligatory marking of source can use these features to contribute to stance. As I show in this thesis, epistemic stance is certainly part of the function of evidential forms in interaction in Lamjung Yolmo and contributes in conversation to a speaker's stance.

4.2.5. Human sociality

Social cognition has long been the domain of psychologists, while more recently work relating to social cognition has emerged from the areas of anthropology and linguistics. Although many psychologists who are interested in social cognition do not study the way people use language, it is a vital component of shared social cognition. As discussed in Tylén, Weed, Wallentin, Roepstorff and Frith (2010), language is a fundamental tool that humans have to mediate between minds. The

focus on general cognitive faculties over specific linguistic faculties within the psychological literature on social cognition gives the impression that social cognition makes language use possible. There is also an argument that it is language that also enhances social intelligence, in a mutual ratcheting up throughout human evolution that Foley (1997) calls “structural coupling” (pp. 8-11). Language not only encodes information about the physical world, but about how people relate to it, and how they relate to each other. Each language does this in a different way and the range of conversational practices cross-linguistically and cross-culturally are important in showing us the diversity of ways humans employ this social intelligence, and the parameters that exist.

Social cognition and related concepts has been discussed under a variety of names. Although ‘social cognition’ is the preferred term in psychology Enfield and Levinson use ‘human sociality’ for closely related concepts and Frith and Frith (2007) use the terms ‘social cognition’ and ‘theory of mind’ almost interchangeably. Evans prefers to use the term ‘psychosocial cognition’ (see, for example Evans 2010, p. 70) rather than ‘social cognition.’ He suggests that the term psychosocial is preferable as it draws attention to the fact that what we are referring to is both cognition about social facts and also inner psychological states (Evans p.c.). While it is important to note that our scope of reference encompasses both of these areas, I will continue to refer to the concept via the more widely used term ‘social cognition.’

In an attempt to bring the ideas from social cognition into a linguistic and anthropological domain, Enfield and Levinson (2006) published a collection of papers that fell under the frame of ‘human sociality.’ For them human sociality is about asserting the centrality of social interaction in human societies, which involves a special kind of cognition that humans exhibit (2006, p. 9). Central to this cognition is the idea that as well as co-existing in the physical world, we also participate in a common mental world where we have detailed expectations of “each other’s

behaviour, beliefs about what we share and do not share in the way of knowledge, intention and motivation” (Enfield and Levinson 2006, p. 1).

Enfield and Levinson propose a schema that looks at a number of levels at which social cognition is engaged by humans (2006, p. 26-27). This involves what they term ‘the interaction engine,’ the ‘interaction matrix’ and the ‘socio-cultural frame.’ Each of these interacts with social cognition on a different level. The first, the ‘interaction engine,’ includes the “equipment for dealing with interaction” (Enfield and Levinson 2006, p. 26), which includes a theory of mind and biological constraints. The second level is the ‘interaction matrix’ which is the interpersonal level, and the point of interaction; this cannot be reduced to a single person’s intentions and only exists in interaction. The third and final level is the ‘socio-cultural frame’ which is the cognitive environment in which social interaction occurs and constrains the interaction matrix. This division outlined in Enfield and Levinson is a useful framework for thinking about the relationship between different phenomena. I will be using it in this thesis to separate out specific linguistic phenomena, such as the modal alternatives in the copula verb paradigm (chapter 6), from socio-cultural frames that may interact with this, such as opacity of mind (§4.4), and looking at these from the point of interactions, which constitute the ‘interactional matrix.’

Although language has only recently become a focal point for researchers interested in social cognition, it is a rich line of enquiry. Any grammatical device in a language that encodes socially motivated information, especially those that vary from other known examples, gives us crucial understanding of the human mind by showing us what social information it is capable of calculating and tracking on-line during speech. Examples of this are grammatical categories that are about more than just the propositional content of an utterance - such as the evidential choice in the copula verb set in Lamjung Yolmo (§6.3.) and the reported speech particle (§8.2.3.). These allow us to see how people are tracking and using source of information in

interaction. This is not to say that speakers of languages without these grammatical features are not able to attend to the source of information in interaction - but the fact that we can track the use of evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo gives us an insight into the language that would not be possible in other languages such as English. It may also give us insight into what early members of that society considered important enough to encode linguistically. This is something I will discuss in §9.4. in relation to Lamjung Yolmo and opacity of mind.

When discussing ideas surrounding ‘language’ and ‘cognition’ it is best to make clear that social cognition and this thesis are not within the frame of linguistic relativity (à la Whorf 1940/1956). I argue that communicative interaction requires some elaborate cognitive processing, however I will not be making any Whorfian claims that the grammatical structures available in Lamjung Yolmo influence the way that speakers of the language perceive reality. Slobin’s (1996) notion of ‘thinking for speaking’ is more relevant to the aims of this thesis. This calls attention to the details that speakers must make note of before they can utter a grammatical sentence in a particular language. This sidesteps the deterministic function that linguistic relativity has become known for, and seeks to situate the linguistic choices we make in the specifics of interaction.

There are many different features of every language that are viable candidates for research within social cognition. Indeed, when you start with the premise that language is a tool for interaction and all of our interaction is with other humans that share the same social cognitive skills, it is fair to argue that there is a wealth of data at every level of linguistic structure. In this thesis I will present three different grammatical features of Lamjung Yolmo: modal copulas (chapter 6), reported speech (chapter 7) and questions (chapter 8). These features not only require references to the real world to be grammatically correct, but an ability to understand one’s place in an interaction with other cognitively aware interactants. The choices of modal verbs include marking source of evidence, and epistemic certainty, which

means that a speaker is indicating the status of their knowledge about the event to interlocutors. Reported speech involves framing the utterance of another person for your own audience. Question structures involve knowing that you are asking the right person for the right information, and in Lamjung Yolmo also involve asking using the right modal form. Many of the grammatical features of these structures in Lamjung Yolmo mean that we can track people's knowledge states as manifested in their linguistic choices in very different ways to a language like English. Instead the grammatical framework and the interactional event are only two of the three features of Enfield and Levinson's framework for understanding social cognition. In §4.4. I will introduce a socio-cultural framework that has been discussed in relation to Melamchi Valley Yolmo and other Tibetic languages that may offer an insight into the framework Lamjung Yolmo speakers situate themselves in during interaction.

4.3. Theory of mind

'Theory of mind' is an important component of social cognition. In this section I will look at theory of mind as exhibited in language use. This is important as it is considered to be one of the cognitive process that underpin human language skills (§4.2.1.), but also because folk-attitudes to theory of mind may influence some languages, including those closely related to Lamjung Yolmo (§4.4.).

The 'theory' component of theory of mind is not an academic theory, but the idea that as part of their cognitive abilities, human beings have a functioning theory that other people they interact with also have the same level of cognition as they do. As Premack and Woodruff (1978, p. 515) introduced the concept when they first argued for it, a being has a theory of mind when they "[impute] mental states to [themselves] and others." By assuming that other conspecifics have their own mental states, humans also assume they act intentionally based on their own set of beliefs and knowledge, which may or may not be the same as ours. Since Premack and Woodruff proposed this idea in their study of chimpanzees, there has been a great deal of work around theory of mind in the domain of psychology. In regards to

animals' theory of mind, Emery and Clayton (2009, p. 105) found that while there are some species of animals that show similar cognitive processes to humans, there is too much variation across different species to really say anything definite about theory of mind as a general cognitive skill in animals that could be linked to the same mechanisms in humans.

Much is yet to be done looking at the broader ideas of theory of mind across species, in terms of human cognition, it has been well established as a part of the human cognitive faculty. One form of evidence for the existence of theory of mind in humans has been linguistic. The false belief test (Wimmer and Perner 1983) involves a person being able to understand and articulate the difference between their own knowledge and another person's. This test, which has been widely replicated indicates that children up to the age of 3-4 cannot differentiate their own knowledge from another person's. This Wimmer and Perner (1983) argue, is evidence that a long developmental period is required for the complex cognitive task of considering and talking about other minds.

This is, however, not quite so clear-cut. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) argue that a non-verbal version of the false belief test indicated that children as young as 15 months of age have a working theory of mind. As this thesis does not have a human development focus I will leave this issue here. It is sufficient to say that even though many researchers are confident that human social cognition differs from non-human social cognition, the work on theory of mind illustrates that it is still incredibly hard to reliably pin down the mechanisms and their development. Language is one feature of interaction that can be used to investigate theory of mind by looking at the way people talk about other people's knowledge states.

Although theory of mind is a central feature of the psychological model of social cognition, it is not the only thing that is considered evidence of social cognition. Researchers also take into account interactional skills such as meaningful gaze and

social learning when considering social cognition (Frith and Frith 2007, Fitch et al. 2010).

4.4. Opacity of mind

4.4.1. A challenge to theory of mind?

While theory of mind is one of the core cognitive skills at the heart of social cognition, ‘opacity of mind’ has been presented as a challenge to how theory of mind operates in some cultures. Opacity of mind is the salient belief in some cultures that it is impossible, or extremely difficult, to know the beliefs, emotions or intentions of others. In this section I will present an introduction to opacity of mind (§4.4.1.), the challenges it presents to theory of mind and the presence of opacity of mind in various Tibetic societies in general, and Yolmo society in particular (§4.4.2.).

In an *Anthropological Quarterly* special issue on opacity of mind, Robbins and Rumsey (2008) draw on their extensive anthropological work in Papua New Guinea to talk about a phenomenon they have observed where people often talk about how they cannot know what other people are thinking. They named this cultural belief ‘opacity of other minds’ and argued that it may present a challenge to the established notion of theory of mind (§4.3.). They acknowledge that theory of mind may be a general human capacity that plays an important role in communication, but argue that “...it does not follow that all language ideologies will give it equal prominence, or even allow it to be openly recognized or actualized in speech” (Robbins and Rumsey, 2008, p. 414). Although Robbins and Rumsey refer to “opacity of other minds” throughout their work I will be using the phrase “opacity of mind” in analogy with theory of mind.

The notion of opacity of mind has been documented in a variety of societies in geographically disparate locations. The *Anthropological Quarterly* special issue

shows a particularly strong focus on languages of Papua New Guinea. There is Ku Waru (Rumsey 2008, p. 455), Korowai (Stasch 2008, p. 443), Urapmin (Robbins 2008, p. 421) and Bosavi (Schieffelin 2008, p. 431). However, it would be incorrect to assume this is specifically a phenomenon of the PNG area as it also has been noted for Ilongot speakers of the Philippines (Rosaldo 1984, p. 146), the Gusii of Kenya (LeVine 1984, 82-83), the Quichua of Ecuador (p.c. in Schieffelin 2008, p. 439, endnote 1) and in Sherpa and Yolmo (§4.4.2.) - both Tibeto-Burman languages of Nepal. It should be noted that this is different to the concept of ‘opacity of mind’ put forward in Carruthers (2011) which is a philosophical investigation of how well we can know our own minds. Although this is a separate concept it may overlap with an opacity of mind belief in some cultures.

These papers indicate that reports of opacity of mind fall on a spectrum as to their strength. Robbins and Rumsey (2008, p. 409) identify a scale of the strength of opacity claims made by different groups. Those identified as being at the stronger end are groups like the Bosavi, who Schieffelin (2008, p. 432) notes do not even engage in speculative gossip about people’s intentions. At the other end would be groups like the Korowai, who Stasch (2008, p. 443) argues make opacity claims more out of politeness for authority-of-knowledge than a true belief that you cannot know what another person is thinking.

Working with opacity of mind claims is, the authors concede, problematic. As Robbins explains, claims about opacity of mind come close to the liar’s paradox (Robbins 2008, p. 422-423). If the only evidence we have of opacity of mind is people’s claims, how can we know them to be true? Instead a more complex set of evidence needs to be built. It should be noted that very little of the evidence for opacity of mind claims in the *Anthropological Quarterly* special issue is linguistic. Instead, the researchers focused on the self-reporting of these opacity beliefs, and general practices like the introduction of Christian confession in Ku Waru (Rumsey 2008) or the lack of speculation on reasoning in Bosavi gossip (Schieffelin 2008). If

language is central to how humans interact with each other, and there is a strong claim in these communities that one cannot really know what another person is thinking in interaction, then it would be expected that there would be some features of the way people share knowledge through talking that would reflect this cultural belief.

It should also be pointed out that this concept is by no means alien to Western thought, especially within the philosophical tradition. Husserl (1977) is generally credited with framing the problem within the Continental context, however it is a problem that has also been addressed by other philosophers throughout the years in various ways including Wittgenstein (1953, p. 350) and Reed (in Avramides 2000). Chalmers's (1996) thought experiments on topics such as considering other people as zombies also explore the idea that we cannot suppose to know the thought processes of another human being. There is no need to deny that there has been a strain of thought in Western culture that focuses on the opacity of other minds; however this is supposed by the authors in the *Anthropological Quarterly* special issue to be different to the fundamental cultural perspective of an entire community.

In the framework of social interaction proposed by Enfield and Levinson, discussed in §4.2.5, opacity of mind would belong in the 'socio-cultural frame.' That is, opacity of mind is a constraint on the interaction matrix, in that (to some degree) it prevents speakers from making assumptions about what they can infer another speaker is thinking. In the Enfield and Levinson categorisation, theory of mind would be within the biological endowment of the interaction engine. Another way of looking at the relationship between opacity of mind and theory of mind is to consider the division in Frith and Frith (2007) of lower-level and higher-level social signal processing. An argument could be made that in this model, opacity claims would be considered higher-level signals we are socialised into, while theory of mind would be in the unconscious lower-level processes.

If opacity of mind is a socio-cultural frame that affects the way people interact, then it becomes important to try and be clear about what a community believe in regard to opacity of mind. For example in Ortner's (1989) passing reference to a belief in opacity of mind in the Sherpa community she notes that "[t]he apparent lack of interest in, or more active refusal to consider, motive in the Western sense is an interesting cultural fact..." (1989, p. 216 footnote 17). There is considerable difference between a "lack of interest" in and an "active refusal to consider" other people's thoughts. The first would indicate that opacity of mind is a more passive part of the Sherpa world-view while the other would indicate that it is an active consideration in every interaction. This returns to the point made above, that opacity of mind is scalar, and that different beliefs surrounding the mental opacity of others may result in different ways of enacting it at the level of the socio-cultural frame.

The claims made in the papers presented in *Anthropological Quarterly* have not been accepted completely within the anthropological community. Duranti (2008 pp. 485) argues that a more nuanced analytical framework is needed to deal with the variations in opacity doctrine beliefs and how they relate to the cultural practices of the groups that hold those beliefs. There is also a need for more data looking at specific interactions between people as well as more general cultural practices data. Given that this was an initial exploration of this topic, it is not surprising that the framework is not particularly nuanced; however it does point to a need for work in this area so that claims can be supported by a variety of real-world data.

Another criticism Duranti puts forth (2008, p. 486-487) is that many examples that claim to show opacity of mind also show that participants still have a deep and sophisticated theory of mind. It is not possible, he argues, to exist in everyday life without a certain amount of introspecting on the behaviour of others (p. 492). He argues for an understanding of interaction based on Husserl's 'phenomenological approach' (see also Duranti 2009). For Duranti (2008, p. 491), this means more than just a mutual understanding. Instead, being aware of others in a shared world

involves “...immediate, intuitive, pre-rational understanding of another’s actions.” This is a similar criticism to that made by Keane (2008, p. 474), who argues that opacity of mind is “... a metalinguistic claim about the relations between public evidence and private states” and not actually an impediment to a functioning theory of mind. This outlook is commensurate with either the models suggested by Enfield and Levinson (2006), Englebretson (2007a) or Frith and Frith (2007), discussed above, where opacity of mind and theory of mind actually operate at different levels. Whilst opacity of mind allows for a more conscious awareness of what can be communicated, it does not prevent the more innate theory of mind from operating completely, although it is a reminder that claims about opacity of mind and how it interferes with a speaker’s theory of mind need to be much more carefully considered.

Aikhenvald (2004, 355-359) observes that when it comes to the link between beliefs, mental attitude and the structure of language there is much work to be done. She discusses Quechua and Eastern Pomo, which have both evidentials and a strong cultural belief that one must use the right evidence so as not to misspeak about others. While it is tempting to draw a correlation between the presence of evidentials and the presence of this cultural belief, Aikhenvald points out that in Tuvaluan and Weyewa there is a similar cultural attitude, but without the grammaticalised evidential system. We can also suppose that it is quite possible to have grammaticalised evidentiality in a language without the cultural preoccupation with ensuring that others are not misspoken about. Therefore, while it may be possible to build an argument for the relationship between grammatical forms and social attitudes, one should be careful to avoid presuming there is a direct and inextricable correlation between the two phenomena. This problem has also been considered by Ameka (2004), who has come to a similar conclusion.

Interest in opacity of mind has, until now, largely been in the domain of anthropological study of non-Western cultures and philosophy. The researchers

mentioned above primarily identify as anthropologists; however some, like Rumsey, Duranti and Schieffelin, work at the intersection of linguistics and anthropology. Robbins (2008, p. 423) makes an interesting link between a cultural structure, such as opacity of mind, and a grammatical structure, such as evidentiality, arguing that evidentiality is a good example of how opacity of mind and other language ideologies are socialized. He cites Schieffelin's work, pointing to how references to other people's internal states can only be made with the correct evidential marking (Schieffelin 2008, p. 436). Garrett (2001, p. 3), in his work on Tibetan grammatical evidential structures, also observes that these categories "provide a map of mental structures" that are, unlike those of philosophers, "a natural phenomenon." In this thesis I will look at how speakers make the linguistic choices they do, and whether these are influenced by the parameters of opacity of mind. The opacity of mind framework is particularly relevant to endopathic verbs (§6.4.2.), the choice of copula people make when framing questions (§7.4.1.) and the breadth of what is appropriate for speakers to frame within a speech event using the reported speech particle (§8.3). The discussion across all of these chapters will be brought together within the discussion of opacity of mind in (§9.4).

4.4.2. Opacity of mind in Yolmo and related languages

Opacity of mind in the wider Tibeto-Burman literature has been well documented by a range of researchers. This is especially true of Sherpa, although this is largely because the Sherpas have been an attractive subject for anthropological investigation since Nepal opened up to foreigners in the 1950s.

Ortner (1989), in a footnote, illustrates that the Sherpa community appear to have an opacity of mind belief:

“If one asks why somebody did something, one gets a shrug and a one-word answer..., or even a hostile response: “How should I know, we can’t see into other people’s heads?”

(Ortner 1989, p. 216, footnote 17)

This is a similar observation to what we saw documented in the *Anthropological Quarterly* special issue discussed above. Although Ortner does not expand upon her observations this initial insight is reflected in the research of others who have worked with the Sherpa community. Paul (1995) explains how Sherpas find that it is hard to share their mental states with others:

“[T]here would be no point in asking why [people] do not talk ‘truthfully’ and ‘objectively’ about intention and inner states. Why should they? ... What point would there be in translating their already adequate abilities and mechanisms for coping into a blunter and more destructive language, the ‘psychologizing’ language of intent, fault, blame and inner state.” (Paul 1995, p. 36)

Paul (1995, p. 18) makes an important distinction between knowing what somebody’s actions are and knowing what their intentions are. He argues that in small, close-knit societies like Sherpa villages, one can judge another’s acts and intentions not by any kind of ‘mind reading’ but simply by knowing what kind of situations occur in day-to-day life. Thus there is a focus on actions, but not the internal mental states that may govern those actions.

More closely related to Lamjung Yolmo, Desjarlais’ work with Yolmo speakers of the Melamchi Valley and Helambu areas indicates there is a strong opacity of mind belief there. It is a theme that runs as an undercurrent though almost all of his work:

“As villagers have asked me many times, ‘how can you know what is in another person's heart [sem]?’” (Desjarlais 1989b, p. 1)

“... it is considered difficult to know what another person is thinking or feeling.” (Desjarlais 1991a, p. 398)

“One never really knows what is in another’s heart-mind by merely interpreting his behaviour.” (Desjarlais 1991b, p. 214)

“As harmony must reign in social relations, a villager must ‘hold’ private desires within the heart, lest they spark social conflicts.”
(Desjarlais 1992a, p. 1109)

“In accordance with what Yolmo wa¹² themselves hold... no one can truly know what lies within another’s sem, or ‘heart-mind.’”
(Desjarlais 2003, p. 6)

Throughout the quotes Desjarlais refers to the ‘heart,’ ‘heart-mind’ and ‘sem.’ The *sem* is defined in Hari and Lama (2004, p. 498) as the “mind; heart-mind; spirit (human); soul (used for humans and animals).” It is the place of emotions and personal feelings and is located in the central chest area. It is assumed to be inaccessible to others, meaning that when a person talks of another they can not base their assertions of whether they are a good person on anything other than their actions (Desjarlais 2000, p. 276). *Sem* is not just an important concept for Yolmo speakers, but in Tibetan Buddhist teachings that are part of the cultural perspective

¹² The *wa* here is the suffix to denote “people from that place” (Hari 2010, p. 87) and is in variation with *-pa* ~ *-ba*. It has been regularised to *-pa* in Lamjung Yolmo, but is not always used.

of almost all peoples who speak Tibetic languages, including Sherpa. Trungpa (1991) and Sogyal Rinpoche (2002) talk about the *sem* being the “basic” mind that involves general consciousness, emotion and perceiving the world, as opposed to higher or lower levels of consciousness. While the inaccessibility of another person’s *sem* is not discussed in Tibetan Buddhism it is this part of the mind that people refer to when discussing ideas about opacity of mind.

In the quotes above, Desjarlais paints for us a picture of a society where the primary underlying assumption is that your interlocutors are not cognitively available to you. Interestingly, while three of the quotes are about the unavailability of other people’s heart-minds and thoughts, the quote from (1992a, p. 1109) is focused on the fact that a person must keep their own thoughts in. Thus, it is helpful to remember that opacity of mind is a two-way system. Although much has been made in the literature about the inability to read other people’s thoughts, it follows that in holding this belief one presumes that others equally do not have access to your private states. Regardless of how strongly the speakers of Lamjung Yolmo hold this belief today, it is evident that they come from a strong opacity of mind tradition - It is held in the Yolmo speaking areas of Helambu from whence they came to Lamjung and is found in other Tibetic groups like Sherpa.

An interesting conclusion that Desjarlais draws from his work with the Yolmo community is that “because of such limitations language becomes the prime medium through which friends bridge.” (1991b, p. 214). In this thesis I will look at whether the socio-cultural framework of opacity of mind has any direct bearing on the linguistic choices that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo make. It has echoes in the pattern of endopathic verbs (§6.4.2.), which is a set of verbs for internal states, thoughts and emotions that involve a different pattern in evidential verb choice to the regular lexical verb set, but then appears to be incommensurate with the way questions are structured (§7.4.1.) and the scope of what can be reported within a construction using a reported speech particle (§8.2.3.). These strands of discussion about how

people negotiate the existence of a cultural belief in opacity of mind and the way they communicate are drawn together in §9.4. Since social interaction always occurs within a socio-cultural frame I will use the opacity of mind doctrine as one way of viewing the linguistic choices made by speakers in their interaction. Now I will turn to the types of grammatical structures that will be the focus of this analysis.

5. Modality

5.1. Introduction

Social cognition entails a broad range of skills, of which language is only one dimension. Even when we take language as the skill on which we are focusing, there is a massive range of phenomena that could be considered from a social cognition perspective. In this chapter I introduce the grammatical properties of Lamjung Yolmo that are the focus of my analysis. I have chosen to focus on several interrelated grammatical properties of Lamjung Yolmo that have a strongly interactional basis for their use, and are of typological and cross-linguistic value as well.

The first of these grammatical properties is the set of copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo, which I introduced briefly in §2.2.4.1. In Lamjung Yolmo the copula verbs not only have the primary syntactic function of a copula, but they also encode other information, including epistemic (§5.2.1.), evidential (§5.2.2.) and possibly mirative (§5.2.3.). They have an additional function in as clause-final verbal auxiliaries in many constructions. This means that they occur across a large number of clause types, allowing us to track speakers' knowledge state through grammatical information in a way that is not possible in a language like English. This type of information is of interest within a social cognition framework as it marks the relationship of the speaker to the propositional content of the utterance, and as I will show, it also marks the relationship of the speaker to their audience. I will present a summary of each of these, including current theoretical positions and discussions of these phenomena in both closely related languages and languages from other language groups. Although I have placed each of these grammatical properties in separate subcategories, I will argue that they are closely related and need to be studied in relation to one another.

The subsequent two grammatical constructions discussed in this thesis build upon my analysis of the copula verbs. In §5.3. I will discuss question structures, which in Lamjung Yolmo, like many other Tibetic languages, require the people asking the question to use the copula form they expect in the answer. Exactly how a speaker determines which form is most appropriate is a matter of contention. This background will be relevant to the discussion of questions in chapter 7.

The final grammatical feature that I look at is reported speech constructions (§5.4.). Like many other Tibeto-Burman languages, Lamjung Yolmo has two different strategies for reporting speech; a verb of saying and a reported speech particle. In this section I look specifically at how the reported speech particle is analysed in a range of closely related languages (§5.4.2.) and in chapter 8 I will discuss how in Lamjung Yolmo the particle is used to report more than just speech, as well as outlining exactly how the verb of saying is used.

Finally, I bring all of the features examined so far to a discussion of conjunct/disjunct systems and related analyses (§5.5.). Conjunct/disjunct is an analysis of the grammatical systems of a range of languages, both in the Tibeto-Burman family and beyond. It attempts to make sense of the choice of different verb forms for different grammatical person in a range of sentence constructions and a set of phenomena that relate to this. In most analyses this involves modal marking, questions and reported speech. For this reason I have chosen conjunct/disjunct as an analysis to contrast with a social cognition analysis to show what can be gained from such a perspective.

5.2. Modality, evidentiality and mirativity

5.2.1. Epistemic modality

The first grammatical category that is relevant to a discussion of Lamjung Yolmo is epistemic modality. Epistemic modality is generally taken to be the grammatical

encoding of speaker stance. It falls within the large domain of mood and modality, which pertain to the “actuality of an event” (Bhat 1999, p. 63). This larger domain also contains deontic mood, which is concerned with need or requirement (Bhat 1999), as well as features like interrogative and imperative moods. Epistemic modality is one dimension of the copula system in Lamjung Yolmo, but it is also worth considering as there is an ongoing discussion in the literature on epistemic modality as to whether evidentiality should be considered a subcategory of epistemicity, which I will return to in §5.2.2.2.

Epistemic modality is defined as “speaker attitude or judgment” (Bhat 1999), and pertains to the “possibility or necessity of *the truth of propositions*” (Bybee and Fleischman 1995, p. 4, their emphasis). Thus it is a category that is closely tied to the knowledge and belief of a speaker, and their commitment to the truth of a proposition.

Very little work on Tibeto-Burman copula systems has taken epistemic marking as a main feature of the paradigm. One researcher who has is Caplow (2000), in her description of émigré Dokpa Tibetan. In Caplow’s analysis of this variety of Tibetan she argues that the system is “best viewed as epistemic rather than evidential” (Caplow 2000, p. 1). Caplow argues for epistemic modality being superordinate over evidentiality on the basis that the degree of certainty is indicated in every sentence, while the evidence for an utterance is not always marked. For example (Caplow 2000, p. 45), the form *yö rɛʔ* indicates the speaker has proprietary knowledge “which gives him/her the epistemic authority to speak,” but carries no evidential weight, and the form *yö Do* is used to indicate a lack of certainty, also with no evidential weight. On the other hand, *duk* indicates perceptual evidence and epistemic certainty. Thus, in the paradigm Caplow presents, epistemic modality is a semantic feature of all forms, but evidentiality is only a feature of some, which is why she argues that the system is, over all, epistemic.

It is important to note that even in this analysis where epistemic modality is considered the primary feature of the analysis, evidentiality is still also found. As will become even more apparent in the section below, it is rather unusual to find a description of a Tibetic copula system that does not include discussion of epistemic modality and the next topic, evidentiality. Because the two are so closely related in discussions of their use in Tibeto-Burman languages I will return to epistemic modality in §5.2.2.2. when I look at its relationship to evidentiality.

5.2.2. Evidentiality

Evidentiality is the grammatical marking of the source of the information in an utterance. While speakers of any language have the capacity to state the source of their knowledge, only a subset of human languages encode this information as a grammatical feature, and they do it using a variety of strategies. It is estimated that as many as 25% of the world's languages have grammatically encoded evidentiality (Aikhenvald 2004, p. 1) so it is not an exotic or unusual feature of a linguistic system.

Evidentiality in a language like Lamjung Yolmo allows for the tracking of different speakers' sources of knowledge across a single interaction. Within a social cognition framework this means that we can see the source of evidence expressed in a language like Lamjung Yolmo that would otherwise be inaccessible in a language like English without actively interrogating the knowledge states of the participants during the interaction.

5.2.2.1 Definitions of evidentiality

Evidentiality has been observed as a phenomenon for quite some time. Jacobsen (1986, p. 4) points to Boas's (1911, p. 443) use of the term in relation to Kwakiutl suffixes "expressing subjective knowledge" as one of the earliest observations of

evidentiality in modern linguistic description. Although Boas and others over the years observed evidentiality in a variety of languages, the first collection of research to give sustained attention to the phenomenon was not until Chafe and Nichols (1986). This was a body of work stemming from a 1981 symposium to discuss the state of the art, which was, as Chafe and Nichols point out in their introduction, not a particularly unified field at that point in time (1986, p. viii). Thus we see discussion of non-grammaticalised evidential strategies, such as in English (Chafe 1986, Woodbury 1986), as well as discussion of an old/new grammatical distinction in Turkish (Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986), which is now referred to as mirativity (§5.2.3.), but until this point there had been so little work done with evidentiality, and even less with mirativity, that it was all included together.

Also, as the name of the book gives some indication, it is not entirely clear how evidentiality related to modality at this point. By titling the book “The linguistic coding of epistemology” Chafe and Nichols are not making any clear distinction between evidentiality as a source of information and the domain of epistemic modality. Instead evidentiality is just a facet of what they refer to as ‘natural epistemology’ (p. vii), with the source and the reliability of knowledge not teased out in any particular detail. The lack of distinction between notions of certainty and evidence does not appear to be driven by anything more than the fact that the analyses contained in this collection are very early in the discussion about evidentiality and serve as a reminder that the two phenomena are often closely related, not only in the way native speakers use language, but also in the way linguists analyse and discuss them.

A work that indicated the shift in the study of evidentiality is Aikhenvald’s (2004) book, as well as the co-edited collection in Aikhenvald and Dixon (2003). Many of the articles in the edited volume provided information for Aikhenvald’s typologically driven monograph and so the two books are worth considering together, especially as they give a good indication of the way in which discussion on

evidentiality has evolved and developed in the two decades since Chafe and Nichols (1986).

One distinct development is that the range of phenomena referred to in Aikhenvald and Dixon (2003) and Aikhenvald (2004) is much narrower than in Chafe and Nichols (1986). Aikhenvald (2004, p. 10) makes it very clear that while every language has some way of referring to the source of information, not every language does so grammatically, and that her exclusive focus is on the grammatical ways that languages encode this information.

Many tend to refer to the difference between Aikhenvald's outlook and that in the Chafe and Nichols volume as a difference between the 'narrow' and 'broad' view of evidentiality. While it is somewhat useful to separate them this way, it is also problematic, because Aikhenvald is 'narrow' in several different ways. Not only is her view less broad in regards to what counts as evidentiality formally (i.e. only grammatical evidentiality) but also in terms of how it relates to other categories (i.e. it is in no way a part of modality). Although it seems these two features of her definition are closely related, it is not necessarily a given that this is true. One could argue for studying non-grammatical evidentiality strategies under the rubric of 'evidentiality' but still make an argument to not conflate it with any kind of modality, and likewise one could only study evidentiality as a fully grammaticalised phenomenon in a language but still have compelling reasons to include it in the modal category.

Researchers who work with grammatical evidentiality often use it as a way of making inferences about what is an ideal knowledge status for speakers of a language. Aikhenvald (2004, pp. 305, 307) observes that there is a tendency towards more concrete or definite options as the preferred, or uninflected, evidential marker. This results in researchers being able to plot evidentials along a cline of strength, where if a speaker had two different forms of evidence those forms on the left of the

cline would be used over those on the right with the implicature being that to use a ‘weaker’ form of evidence you do not have a stronger one available. Aikhenvald presents Figure 5.1. as one such evidential cline for Tariana and Tucano, languages with five different evidential forms.

Visual < Non-visual < Inferred < Reported < Assumed

Figure 5.1. A hierarchy of the preferred evidentials suggested for Tariana and Tucano in Aikhenvald (2004, p. 307).¹³

De Haan (2001b, p. 197) also argues for a hierarchy of evidentiality, which I have presented in Figure 5.2.

Sensory¹⁴ > Inferential > Quotative

Figure 5.2. de Haan’s hierarchy of evidentiality (2001b, p. 197).

As de Haan (1997, p. 128) and Faller (2002) observed in relation to hierarchies of evidentiality, these are not ‘true’ hierarchies in terms of the relationship between the items. While choosing one form indicates that a person does not have a stronger

¹³ I have left the direction of the hierarchical > symbols in the same direction as originally published by Aikhenvald and de Haan for both Figure 5.1. and Figure 5.2.

¹⁴ *Direct, sensory* and *perceptual* are all terms that are used to refer to the set of evidential forms that are used when the speaker has direct experience of that being described, generally through one of their senses. While there are some differences in the semantics of these terms that means that some researchers prefer one term over the other, they refer more or less to the same subset of evidential forms. In this thesis I will maintain the form that others have used in their discussion, but I will be referring in my own analysis to ‘perceptual’ evidentials. The reason for this is discussed in §6.1.1.2. This type of evidence may be further divided in some languages (for example, into visually perceived and non-visually perceived) such as Tariana and Tuyuca (Aikhenvald 2004, p. 307).

form of evidence from higher up the hierarchy, it does not necessarily mean that a speaker does not have a weaker form of evidence as well. So, in de Haan's hierarchy in Figure 5.2, while a person using an inferential is indicating that they do not have sensory evidence, there is no way to be certain that they do not also have quotative evidence as well.

Faller (2002) also argues that different researchers create hierarchies driven by different underlying motivations. In Figure 5.3. (§5.2.2.3.) we will see that Garrett's (2001) hierarchy for Standard Tibetan is based on 'intimacy of knowledge.' Faller (2002) suggests 'directness' as a measure. Being clear about the motivations in a hierarchy and what it represents is important when presenting this type of analysis.

These figures give the impression that evidential choice is an objective action independent of other features of the interaction. Not all researchers agree with such a position. Mushin (2001) and Fitneva (2001), for example, examine the role of the interactional setting and pragmatics of the interaction. Speakers take these factors into consideration as well as the actual evidence when they select an evidential marker. That the cognitive processing of evidential information is a contextually motivated practice becomes even more apparent when we consider phenomena such as multiple-perspective marking in languages such as Kogi (Arwako-Chibchan) (Bergqvist 2012, forthcoming). This is an Amazonian language like those discussed by Aikhenvald, but it does not share the same epistemic categories. The multiple-perspective forms in Kogi require the speaker to include their point of view, and their best estimation of their addressee. Although Bergqvist refers to these forms as epistemics, rather than evidentials, we see that humans are cognitively capable of tracking information in context, their own perspective on it and their best estimation of their interlocutor's perspective as well. Because speakers are considering more factors than just the objective evidence to hand, evidential marking becomes more of an expression of an epistemological stance. This is discussed in §5.2.2.2.

In chapter 6 and 8 I introduce different types of evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo and their use in context. In §9.2. I take the analysis presented in these two chapter and look at how this works within a hierarchical representation of their use by speakers.

5.2.2.2 *Evidentiality and epistemic modality*

As noted above, Aikhenvald takes a narrow approach to evidentiality. She is unreserved in her belief that evidentiality is exclusive from any other category, including modality, stating “[e]videntiality is a category in its own right, and not a subcategory of epistemic or some other modality, or of tense/aspect (Aikhenvald 2003a, p. 1).”

Aikhenvald is open to whatever grammatical strategies languages use, and she also acknowledges that evidentiality may be ‘scattered’ throughout the linguistic system and in paradigmatic relationships with other features (2003a, p. 10). She also observes that “[e]videntiality may be independent of clause type, modality or tense-aspect choice. Alternatively, evidentiality may be fused with a tense-aspect marker; or clause type.” (2003a, p. 2). Even though Aikhenvald argues evidentiality can occur independently of TAM marking, she only observes that it can be fused with either tense or aspect, and not modality. This is interesting, because if evidentiality and modality really were completely separate categories we might expect that modality could not be fused with evidentiality in the same way as tense and aspect are.

Not everyone takes such a strong line on this issue. In fact several of the contributors to the Aikhenvald and Dixon (2003) volume do not appear to completely agree with this stance (although it should be noted that none of them overtly state their disagreement). McLendon (2003, p. 120) talks about evidentials in Eastern Pomo as part of a set of modal affixes and Friedman’s (2003, p. 211) analysis of Balkan languages includes two types of grammaticalised evidentials, one

being past tense and the other modal. Even when contributors separate out evidentiality and modality it often appears artificial. For example, in Dixon's (2003) discussion of Jarawara he observes that in one verbal suffix slot there are six past tense/evidentiality suffixes and five modal suffixes. One of the modal suffixes is 'reported' which is used "to emphasise that what the speaker is relating has been reported by someone else" (Dixon 2003, p. 177). Dixon argues for it as a modal based on its position in the predicate structure and its similarity to other modal terms in the system. On semantics alone this is clearly an evidential form and it is only the artificially enforced divide between epistemic modality and evidentiality that results in an analysis like Dixon's.

It should be noted that even though Aikhenvald is adamant that evidentiality and modality are separate grammatical categories, she does concede that they are related (Aikhenvald 2004, p. 8). It appears that part of Aikhenvald's concern in keeping them separate is that the secondary meanings of reliability or probability that some evidential systems acquire are different in each language. Aikhenvald is not the only person to argue for the separation of the categories of evidentiality and epistemic modality. De Haan (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2006) has also strongly argued against conflating the two. De Haan (2005, p. 380) argues that the difference between the two categories lies in the fact that "[e]videntiality *asserts* the evidence, while epistemic modality *evaluates* the evidence." In its assertive role, de Haan (2005) argues evidentiality is fundamentally a deictic category, marking the relationship between the speaker and the event by pointing to the evidence the speaker has. Like Aikhenvald it appears that de Haan assumes that evidentiality is not an evaluative choice in communication, but an objective one.

Mushin (2001, p. 5) argues that de Haan's analysis of evidentiality as deictic does not inhibit, but enhances an analysis of it as an epistemic phenomenon. Mushin notes that deictic expressions only ever index information to some particular context. The deixis serves to ground the information in the 'here' and 'now' and does not

represent some objective state of affairs. As subjective expressions rely on deixis to give them the context they require to be understood, the deictic nature of evidentiality “makes it even more useful as an epistemic subjective tool” (Mushin 2001, p 5).

De Haan also argues that evidentiality is different to modality in regards to negation (1997). Along with Willett (1988), de Haan argues that evidentials fall outside the scope of negation, because “any reference to a non-existing or not yet existing event is beyond the realm of evidence” (de Haan 1997). Therefore, because evidence cannot be given for something that has not occurred, it means that evidentiality is outside of the scope of any negation. Not everybody shares this position. Aikhenvald (2004, p. 256-257) and Aikhenvald and LaPolla (2007), show that cross-linguistically there are examples of languages where the evidential comes within the scope of negation. For example, the negation may negate the act of the evidential rather than the action itself. This is not to say that it is the case for all languages, but points to the fact that negation and evidentiality may have more than one relationship,

De Haan (2005,p. 384) draws upon a description of Tuyuca (East Tucanoan) where the direct evidential is sometimes used for an end result or general fact. For example, if a person came to their neighbour’s field and saw that it had been burnt (without having seen the event of the fire), it would be possible to say (1) using the direct evidential.

- 1) *wesé sóe-ri-gi* *nĩ-wi*
 field burn-RES-MASC.SG AUX-VIS.3SG.MASC.PAST
 'He burned his field (I saw his field and it had been burnt).'
- (de Haan 2005, p. 384, ex. 5a)

He argues that the use of the visual in these situations where the inferential would normally be used does not imply more certainty, as the speaker was not present for the event regardless of what evidential was used. However, de Haan does not explain in what contexts the visual may be invoked, or how interlocutors would be able to distinguish between an inferred event where the speaker happened to use the visual evidential, and a genuinely witnessed event. Although de Haan's description states that there is no epistemic meaning to be inferred from this choice it is not exactly clear what motivation the speaker has from an interactional perspective to use the visual in this context, except de Haan's observation that "the presence of the speaker at any stage of the process can override the normal evidential used."

Contextualisation of evidential use is something that is not often discussed in typological work like de Haan's. In the original paper from which de Haan's examples are taken, Barnes (1984, p. 259) observes that when speakers are only reporting the end state with a visual they will use a resultative morpheme as well to differentiate events that the speaker has only seen the end result of, but she provides no indication as to why speakers would use a 'visual' evidential for durable facts, such as a person's name, except to say that visual evidentials are the generally preferred choice (Barnes 1984, p. 262). So strong is the cultural preference for visual evidence that speakers will give complex compound constructions "to describe the observed end result of an event which he had not seen," such as the gravestone of a family member who they had not seen die, or seen the dead body of (Barnes 1984, p. 263). From Barnes's description there is something more occurring in this language than simply the direct deictic indication of evidence that de Haan argues is the sole unifiable function of evidentials.

Aikhenvald argues that it is the influence of "Standard Average European" languages - which are generally devoid of a grammatical evidential system - that has prevented Western linguists from seeing that evidentiality is a common a category in many languages, distinct from modality (2004, p. 8). While this may be part of the

problem, another issue is that in many languages separating out modality and evidentiality is an artificial exercise. For example, Aikhenvald considers a system like West Greenlandic (Fortescue 2003), where evidentials are in a paradigmatic relation with a number of epistemic modal markers, to be “somewhat problematic” and only “marginally relevant” to her study (Aikhenvald 2004 p. 81). As we will see in many Tibetic languages (§5.2.2.3.) it is also artificial to separate out notions of source of evidence and attitude to evidence. Fortescue (2003, p. 292) does not consider the paradigm in West Greenlandic to be problematic. Instead he argues that it forms a cline of subjectivity from the sensory-specific evidential forms through epistemic modality to attitudinal forms. This is similar to Palmer’s (2001, p. 24) argument that there are some semantic categories that can be argued to exist in both systems, for example the inferential involves evidence of something, but also the speaker’s personal attitude towards what the information they have may infer. In this regard we can see another way in which evidentiality and epistemic modality are related, and how they overlap in a system like West Greenlandic.

For de Haan (2005, p. 394), it is undesirable to assume that epistemic modality is the basic meaning of evidentiality as it “presumes that other cultures share a Western idea of relativistic truth.” It might not only be a Western-style approach to relative truth that might lead to epistemically weighted evidential systems, but other cultural factors. Indeed, it may not be a specific cultural trait, but a basic tendency of human cognition. As Traugott (1995) discusses, there is a general grammaticalisation tendency whereby over time forms become less concrete and objective and begin to serve more pragmatic, interpersonal and speaker-based functions. This process of ‘subjectification’ explains how frequently, evidential markers that ostensibly point objectively to the source of evidence are used as markers of subjective attitude towards the content of the utterance.

So far I have looked at the work of those who argue that evidentiality is completely separate to epistemic modality. As we will see in chapter 6, Lamjung Yolmo

provides evidence that even though we can separate evidentiality and epistemic modality conceptually, when we look at their use in interaction this separation becomes less worth making, and can actually limit our understanding of the kinds of interactional choices people make. As I have shown, there are other ways to view the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality. I will look at two other models. The first, similar to my analysis of Lamjung Yolmo, that evidentiality and epistemic modality exist together equally within a broader understanding of modality, and the second is that evidentiality is subsumed by epistemic modality.

The first way of looking at the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality is to subsume both speaker evidence and certainty within the category of ‘epistemic modality.’ If we take epistemic to literally and most broadly refer to ‘knowledge’ (from its Greek root *epistēmē*) then it would be possible to assume evidential marking is a part of such system, as it marks the source of knowledge. This is in contrast to the ‘state of knowledge’ that is captured within a category of certainty. This is how Bhat (1999, p. 65) relates these two features, renaming epistemic modality as ‘judgements’ and arguing that they are “two different facets of epistemic mood.” This is really a similar argument to those who argue that the two features are both within the same broad category of modality (discussed below) but rearranges the established terminology. Given that ‘epistemic modality’ is a strongly established term in the literature, focusing specifically on the certainty value that a speaker gives an utterance, following Bhat’s analysis may cause unnecessary confusion. For this reason I will still refer to only speaker certainty as ‘epistemic modality,’ which falls under the broader scope of modality, including evidentials.

The inclusion of evidentiality in a broader conception of modality is the model Palmer (2001, p. 24) gives, arguing that:

“...epistemic modality and evidential modality are concerned with the speaker’s attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition and may thus be described as ‘propositional modality.’” (Palmer 2001, p. 24)

This is useful in that it shows that there is something tangible about the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic certainty, in that they are both different from deontic modality because they involve speakers expressing meaning relating to the factual status of something. By having them as separate elements of propositional modality it makes it clear that they are still different things. While I do not agree with Palmer that evidentiality is necessarily about “speaker attitude” in all languages or at all times within a particular language, it is a marker of the speaker’s relationship to the knowledge that they have, which for me is reason to include it within the parameters of modality in my analysis of Lamjung Yolmo.

Vokurková (2008) discusses Tibetan evidentiality within her broader study of epistemic modality in Standard Tibetan. Vokurková considers evidentiality to be a component of modality, arguing that a broad definition of modality allows for this, because they are both tied to the speaker’s knowledge state (p. 35). Vokurková does separate out ‘epistemic modality’ from ‘evidential modality,’ mainly on semantic grounds, arguing that the first pertains to a speaker’s understanding, knowledge or commitment to the truth in their utterance, while the second pertains to knowledge source. Vokurková also notes there are some morphological differences between the two. Like my analysis of the relationship between the two categories in Lamjung Yolmo, Vokurková does not collapse the two categories completely, but she does maintain that they are closely related.

A final way of considering the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality is to look at the French tradition of *médiatif* (henceforth *mediative*). Dendale and Tasmowski (2001, p. 341) argue that while the term *evidentiality*

foregrounds a focus on the type of evidence available to the speaker, the term *mediativity* “focuses on the special character of utterances mediated by reference to the evidence.” This lines up much more with the more general relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality that many observe, as it is about the way the speaker is relating to the content of the utterance, through the type of evidence they present. As Dendale and Tasmowski observe, while in theory it is easy to see a distinction between epistemic modality and evidentiality, it is a distinction that is not always clear in practice. While I will continue to use the term *evidentiality* and not refer to *mediativity*, it is worth remembering in the analysis that we are not only looking at the type of evidence at a speaker’s disposal, but how the evidence used relates the speaker to the original event or state.

To my mind there is no reason to assume that evidentiality cannot be both modal and deictic. Those such as Mushin (2001) who consider evidentiality to be related to epistemic modality in some way do not directly challenge the argument put forth by de Haan (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2006) that it is not a modal category, but a deictic one. It is possible to assume that deictic reference to the source of knowledge is a component of evidentiality, but still consider it to be modal in that it is deictically referencing something that is marking the speaker’s relationship to the propositional content, and that the speaker can choose what deictic reference they will make in that interaction.

Either way, separating evidentiality from modality may have its uses in some languages, but given that they both pertain to the speaker’s knowledge state in relation to the proposition, a definite divide appears to be artificial. Nuyts (2006) observes that when we start to consider modality as it is used, then delineating it from other phenomena in a simple way is very difficult. In chapter 6 I will demonstrate that in Lamjung Yolmo, not only is this difficult, it is unnecessary, since it prevents us from understanding why speakers make different evidential choices when they have the same evidence to hand.

5.2.2.3 *Languages related to Lamjung Yolmo*

Evidential marking is not an uncommon feature of Tibeto-Burman languages (LaPolla 2003b). While it does not receive as much attention as some other language families in surveys such as Aikhenvald (2004), it is clearly an important feature of many languages in the area, as evidenced by the Linguistics of the Tibeto-Burman Area special issue on evidence and person in the Himalayan area (Bickel 2000) in which almost all of the languages discussed are Tibeto-Burman. In this section I will look at work on a range of Tibeto-Burman languages closely related to Lamjung Yolmo.

The Tibeto-Burman language that has received the most attention in regard to evidentiality, and indeed general documentation, is Standard Tibetan. Like Lamjung Yolmo, the evidential information in Tibetan is encoded in the copula system. While earlier general grammatical descriptions made almost no mention of the evidential features of the copula system (Jäschke 1865/1954, Hannah 1912, Bell 1919, Goldstein and Nornang 1970), there has been a fairly extensive body of research on evidentiality in Standard Tibetan (DeLancey 1986, 1990b, 1997, 2001, Curnow 2000, Garrett 2001, Tournadre 1996, 2004, 2008, Tournadre and Jiatso 2000, Tournadre and Dorje 2003). This research is worth discussing in some detail as it has set the tone for the analysis of many closely related languages. The discussion about Standard Tibetan copulas is also part of the ongoing discussions about conjunct/disjunct systems, which will be picked up again later in this chapter (§5.5.).

Most of DeLancey's work on the copula verbs of Tibetan has treated them as a manifestation of a conjunct/disjunct pattern (DeLancey 1990b, 1992, 2003), and has argued that what many other researchers consider a sensory or perceptual evidential is a mirative (DeLancey 1986, 1997, 2001). His treatment of both of these features will be discussed in sections below (mirativity in §5.2.3. and conjunct/disjunct in

§5.5.). While his work has been taken up by many typologists and other researchers interested in cross-linguistic comparison, it has not been taken up so readily by other Tibetanists. I will present those criticisms when I present DeLancey's work in the sections below, but DeLancey has rather little to say about the evidential values of these forms.

Tournadre's (2008, also Tournadre and Dorje 2003) analysis of Tibetan copulas is as a set of evidential distinctions. For Tournadre these distinctions include assertive, sensory, inferential and 'egophoric' copula forms. The semantics of the egophoric copula are quite specific and unlike what we find in many other evidential systems. Tournadre and Dorje (2003, p. 93) describe the egophoric:

*"Certain auxiliary verbs are associated only with **the first person** (singular or plural), irrespective of the function of that person in the sentence, i.e., as subject, object or complement. The use of an "egophoric" auxiliary expresses the speaker's knowledge or personal intention, often directly implied in the event that is being described."*

(Tournadre and Dorje 2003, p. 93, original emphasis)

Thus the egophoric copula can only be used in Standard Tibetan if the speaker of a declarative sentence is drawing on their own personal information about something that is very closely associated with them or their intentions.¹⁵ It is clearly not just

¹⁵ This is a somewhat different sense of 'egophoric' to that in Dahl (2000). Dahl's (2000, p. 37) definition states that "Egophoric reference is defined as reference to speech act participants and generic reference." The use of the term 'egophoric' in the sense of Tibetan can include non-speech act participants, but they always must relate back to a speech act participant, namely the speaker, or in questions, the person to whom the question is directed.

first person marking, as the ‘first person’ element can be any part of the sentence, or in some contexts, absent altogether. For example, from Tournadre (2008), we see that the egophoric copula used for the person’s own actions (2a), but also for the actions of other people, if they are closely related to the speaker (2b).

- 2) a) *nga-s mo.Ta btang-gi.yod*
 I + ERG car drive-IMPF + EGO int./EGOhabitual
 'I drive the car.' (Tournadre 2008, p. 297, ex. 13)
- b) *nga-'i bu.mo-s mo.Ta btang-gi.yod*
 I-GEN daughter-ERG car drive-IMPF + EGO int./EGOhabitual
 'my daughter drives the car.' (Tournadre 2008, p. 297, ex. 14)

Because egophoric copulas can only be used for first person when the speaker did something over which they had control, this means that non-volitional actions (such as ‘see,’ as opposed to the volitional ‘look’) for first person are not marked with egophoric but with direct perception (3).

- 3) *nga-s thong-song/*thong-pa-yin*
 I-ERG see-[DIR PAST]/*see-[EGO PAST]
 'I saw it.' (Garrett 2001, p. 18, ex. 16b)

Tournadre (2008, p. 296) has further refined his analysis of the egophoric system. The usage described above is what he refers to as the “wide” scope egophoric. Tournadre also notes that some egophoric evidentials can only be used with first person subjects, which he refers to as the “narrow” scope egophoric. Garrett (2001, p. 181) referred to the same distinctions as “weak” and “strong,” with the weaker egophoric evidentials able to be used when the subject is not first person. Garrett’s weak egophoric copulas are therefore in the same category as Tournadre’s (2008) broad egophorics.

Tournadre and Jiatso (2001, p. 66) observe that this egophoric sense is something that is only found in modern Standard Tibetan and was not present in Classical Tibetan. While the cognate forms existed they are functionally distinct. Tournadre (p.c.) observes that Middle Tibetan, as found in the writings Milarepa in the 11th century, appears to contain uses of the cognate forms that are for personal knowledge but not exclusively egophoric, in that they could be used for second and third person utterances as well. It is therefore a sense that has developed more recently in the evolution of the language, which is why it is only found in more northern Tibetic languages including Standard Tibetan, rather than in the southern languages found in Nepal.

An example of this level of personal involvement is a sentence discussed in Garrett (2001, pp. 102-103). Taking an example from an earlier analysis by DeLancey (1986), Garrett proposes that the utterance can have only two of the three meanings originally given by DeLancey, listed as the English glosses (4a)-(4c):

- 4) *bod-la g.yag yod*
 Tibet-loc yak [ego ELPA]
 a) ??‘There are yaks in Tibet.’
 b) ‘I have yaks in Tibet.’
 c) ‘My yaks are in Tibet.’

(DeLancey 1986, p. 204, quoted in Garrett 2001, p. 102, ex. 1 question marks are Garrett’s)

The reason I have quoted this example from Garrett and not the DeLancey original is that Garrett questions DeLancey’s analysis of it. DeLancey argues (1986, p. 204) that speakers of Standard Tibetan will accept meaning (4a) if they have had long term exposure to and knowledge of the presence of yaks in Tibet (which is part of a broader argument about the status of the sensory evidential as a mirative marker). Garrett argues that no speaker of Standard Tibetan would accept (4a), but would find both (4b) and (4c) felicitous. This fits with Tournadre’s discussion of an egophoric

analysis, because the egophoric form *yod* can only be used in situations where the speaker has a personal connection to the yaks. So for Standard Tibetan the idea of ‘egophoricity’ is not just personal knowledge though extended exposure, but because of some real personal link to the content of the proposition, even sometimes when the speaker is not overtly expressed in the clause.

Another important feature of Garrett’s (2001, pp. 77-82) and Tournadre’s (1996, 2008, Tournadre and Dorje, 2003) analysis of Standard Tibetan are their observations regarding endopathic verbs. Endopathic verbs are that subset of verbs relating to internal states. For things like hunger, illness and emotion it is not possible to truly assess another speaker’s state, instead the best that can be done is to infer based on available evidence. This means that the types of copulas used are different for these verbs. Garrett (2001) also notes that when one is referring to one’s own internal state, copulas with the evidential meaning of direct perception are used. This is different to non-internal states, where the egophoric is the preferred form for first person. As an example in (5) we see an example from Garrett (2001, p. 81) of an internal state, the feeling of hunger. In (5a) the speaker can use the direct evidential to talk about themselves, as they have internal access to this information, but they can not use the same evidential to talk about 2nd or 3rd person subjects (5b), instead they have to use a different construction (5c) that does not assume access to their internal state (5c).

- 5) a) *nga grod.khog ltog-gi-‘dug*
 I stomach hunger-[dir imp]
 ‘I’m hungry.’ (Garrett 2001, p. 81, ex. 21)
- b) **kho/*khyed.rang grod.khog ltog-gi-‘dug*
 he/you stomach hunger-imp-dir
 Intended: ‘You’re hungry.’ / ‘He’s hungry.’ (Garrett 2001, p. 81, ex. 22)
- c) *kho/khyed.rang grod.khog ltogs-gi-‘dug-na...*
 he/you stomach hunger-[dir imp]-if
 ‘If you’re hungry...’ or ‘If he’s hungry...’ (Garrett 2001, p. 82, ex. 23)

The cross-linguistic salience of the endopathic verb category is something worth exploring, as it adds another parameter to the way the source of information can be expressed. I look at the function of endopathic verbs in Lamjung Yolmo in §6.4.2.

Garrett's (2001) analysis of Standard Tibetan copulas looks specifically at the evidential meanings found in the system. Similar to Tournadre, Garrett (2001) argues that there are evidential distinctions for direct perception, indirect perception (inferential) and ego copulas, as well as an independent reported speech particle. The innovation of Garrett's work is that he analyses the use of copula verbs in context; as he himself admits, "[f]ew of the issues here have much to do with sentences' truth-values." (Garrett 2001, p. 2). Instead of trying to tease out absolute evidential semantics his work focuses on the pragmatics of evidentiality. Like Tournadre, Garrett explores the function of the 'egophoric' copulas (which he calls 'ego'), which he considers to be a unique feature of Tibeto-Burman languages. He argues that they are used when 'the origo'¹⁶ has intimate and immediate knowledge of a situation" (p. 4). Although Garrett explains the semantics of the ego copula, he also shows that in many contexts, such as embedded clauses, it is used as a 'default' form, and the ego semantics arise as a contextual feature of the evidential, not an inherent one.

Garrett plots the evidential contrasts in Standard Tibetan on a cline (Figure 5.3.), like we saw in Aikhenvald and de Haan in the previous section. Garrett's (2001, p. 41) hierarchy represents what he calls 'intimacy,' which indicates which form a speaker is likely to use based on how intimate the knowledge is:

¹⁶ Garrett uses the term *origo* to highlight the fact that in question structures the person speaking presupposes the evidential value of the intended answer, and thus the evidential value does not relate to the speaker, but to the intended question-answering speech participant. This also occurs in Lamjung Yolmo and will be discussed in chapter 7. Garrett's use of this term is taken from Agha (1993), who himself references Bühler (1990).

Ego[phoric] > Direct > Indirect

Figure 5.3. Garrett's (2001, p. 41) hierarchy of evidential intimacy.

In this hierarchy each evidential form is used for a more intimate form of knowledge than the last, and using a form lower on the hierarchy indicates you do not have any stronger knowledge for your assertion. Tariana and Tucano (Figure 5.1.) do not have an egophoric form, which is why visual sensory evidence was at one end of the hierarchy in these languages, while in Tibetan the egophoric is more intimate knowledge and therefore considered the strongest form, for first person utterances at least.

A different perspective on the interactional use of copula verbs in Standard Tibetan has come from de Villiers, Garfield, Gernet-Girand, Roepr and Speas (2009) and de Villiers and Garfield (2009). These papers discuss an experiment where children were given images and asked questions about them. The children's use of evidentials did not pattern with standard adult usage and indicated that younger speakers are more likely to use the 'direct observation' evidential as a certainty marker (de Villiers, Garfield, et al. p. 35-36). They also argue that even adults will occasionally use the direct observation evidential in this function. While it is not clear how a controlled classroom experiment extends to actual and contextual usage of evidential copulas, this paper shows that these systems are highly complex and subtle in their function interactionally, even for native speakers.

In Sherpa, another language closely related to Lamjung Yolmo, Woodbury (1986) discusses two main evidential distinctions in the present tense, the 'habitual experiential' *nok* and the 'gnomic' *wi*. These appear to be much the same as in Kelly's (2004) analysis. In Kelly (2004) *wi* (in her work presented as *ĩ*) is described as a 'first person conjunct' form, in contrast to *nok* as a disjunct. I will discuss these

terms in §5.5, but by ‘conjunct’ Kelly means that a speaker has experienced an event they have volitionally instigated (p. 353). This, then, appears to have similar semantics to the Tibetan egophoric. Indeed in the discussion in Tournadre, Sherpa, Chodrak and Oisel (2009) *wɛ*’ (Woodbury’s *wi* and Kelly’s *ĩ*), as well as *hin*, are described as egophoric forms, with different syntactic distributions. This means that there may be other Tibeto-Burman languages where a form with egophoric sense may exist, but under different terminology.

The term egophoric has been used in relation to other Tibeto-Burman languages. In Kurtöp, a language of Bhutan, Hyslop (2011a, p. 589) calls the perfective suffix *-shang* an egophoric. This is the only example I have come across of the use of ‘egophoric’ for a grammatical feature other than the copula forms that are cognates of the Standard Tibetan copulas *yin* and *yod*. Hyslop observes that *-shang* ‘encodes certainty on behalf of the speaker and the expectation that the interlocutor does not share the knowledge’ and that the speaker has ‘direct, personal evidence of a given event.’ Hyslop presents an example of the ‘egophoric’ *-shang* used with a third person subject (6).

- 6) *tshe o-ning* ‘*au-rang* *shakhwi tshui ge-shang*
 DM 3.PROX-ABL where-EMPH hunting dog look.for go-PFV.EGO
 ‘And then (they) went everywhere looking for the hunting dog.’
 (Hyslop 2011a, p. 591 ex. 563, PS20061206.48.553P)

There is nothing to indicate that the third person subject has any close personal relevance to the speaker. Thus it appears that it is perhaps a somewhat different feature to what Garrett (2001) and Tournadre (2008) have described as egophoric. Therefore there appear to be two strains of description on Tibetic languages, those languages which have a definition of ‘egophoric’ whereby it is used for describing that which relates directly to the speaker, and another definition of ‘egophoric’ which pertains, not to the closeness of the relationship between the speaker and the event, but to the fact that the knowledge of this event comes from personal

knowledge, and not necessarily a perceptual event. I will look at these two different definitions in §6.2.1, where I will demonstrate that while Standard Tibetan is in the first category of definition, Lamjung Yolmo falls into the second category.

Kyirong evidentiality has been discussed in Huber (2002). It is a useful resource for this thesis, as Kyirong is historically more closely related to Yolmo than Standard Tibetan. Huber (2002, p. 133) is careful to note that evidentiality in Kyirong is determined by both the *type* of knowledge the speaker has of the event and the *way* they have acquired this knowledge. For Huber (2002) the main dichotomy in Kyirong is between old and new information. Under ‘old information’ Huber includes ‘generic knowledge’ and ‘personal experience,’ the second category being explained as something similar to ‘egophoric’ in Standard Tibetan. Under ‘new knowledge’ Huber includes ‘direct sensory evidence’ and ‘inference.’ For Kyirong these semantic categories hold across both true copula uses and the forms that are found in verbal compounds, even though the forms might be different.

In Melamchi Valley Yolmo, Hari (2010, p. 63) presents the copula verbs in a table with a basic two-way distinction between “old or general knowledge” and “mirative/inferential forms.” The inclusion of an inferential indicates that there may be some basis for this paradigm in evidentiality, but it appears to be not a purely evidential split; instead it also incorporates mirativity (discussed in §5.2.3. below). A subset of these verbs is also used as verbal auxiliaries, with ‘*duyo*’ being used as a mirative/inferential as per its copula use, and the other forms that were under the category of “old or general knowledge” broken down further ‘*yihn*’ being used for “truth, emphasized” and ‘*yeh*’ termed “neutral” (p. 73). It is possible that the ‘truth’ that is being invoked in Hari’s description is driven by a speaker’s personal knowledge, and therefore is an egophoric-type meaning similar to the cognate in related languages like Standard Tibetan and Sherpa.

5.2.2.4 *'Egophoric' beyond Tibeto-Burman*

While work on several languages was briefly mentioned in the discussion about the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality, here I would like to discuss research on evidentiality in some non-Tibeto-Burman languages that is relevant for teasing out exactly the type of egophoric patterning we find in Lamjung Yolmo, and how that fits into a wider cross-linguistic discussion. Many researchers consider the egophoric to be a particularly unique feature of Tibetic languages, but there are similar phenomena in unrelated languages of Papua New Guinea and North America.

An evidential category that is found in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is the 'participatory' evidential, discussed in Rule (1977) and also in San Roque and Loughnane (2012) in their survey of evidentiality in a range of languages of the area. The participatory is a category where the speaker knows the evidence because they performed, or are performing the action. Out of the eleven languages they looked at, San Roque and Loughnane (2012) identify Oksapmin (of the Ok-Oksapmin family), Enga (Engan), the Angali languages (also known as the Mendi languages, Engan), Fasu (West Kutubu) and Foe (East Kutubu) as languages with participatory evidentials, indicating that in the area it is a relatively common evidential type, and is also not genetically constrained.

The participatory is not entirely like the Standard Tibetan egophoric, which can also be used for states and attributes as well as actions, and with non-first person subjects. What Oksapmin, Foe and Fasu share with Tibetan though is that there is also a sensory evidential. Oksapmin has a single 'visual-other' and Foe has both a 'seen' and an 'unseen (other sense)' form. This means that, like the Tibetan egophoric, these participatory forms are doing more than just marking that the speaker was a witness of something, but highlighting a level of personal involvement. This is because the existence of the sensory evidential creates a divide where the participatory is used predominantly for first person declaratives and the

sensory is used for second and third person, because you have sensory evidence of their actions. This is a setup that is useful to recall in the discussion of conjunct/disjunct systems (§5.5.), where there is a declarative split between first person and non-first person utterances.

San Roque and Loughnane (2012) observe that in languages with a participatory evidential category it is normally treated as the strongest evidence source in a hierarchy. This is much like we saw for the Tibetan copulas in Garrett's (2001) work, where the ego form is stronger than the perceptual evidential. San Roque and Loughnane also argue that the typological set-up created by Aikhenvald (2004) assumes participation to be an extension of meaning of visual, direct or firsthand categories and that more work needs to be done on languages where there is an evidential distinction like the participatory/visual distinction found in Fasu, Foe and Oksapmin.

In Fasu, Foe and Oksapmin the participatory is actually a participatory-factual evidential (San Roque and Loughnane 2012, see also Loughnane 2011 for Oksapmin). 'Factual' is another evidential type initially observed by Rule (1977), which San Roque and Loughnane define as "signifying events for which the speaker has accumulated evidence of various types throughout his or her life, where this evidence is assumed to be shared by or accessible to others." This is also interesting in that the semantics as laid out by San Roque and Loughnane indicate that the use of this form requires that the speaker has to make an assumption about the knowledge state of their interlocutor.

As well as in PNG there have been descriptions of 'personal' evidentials in Northern American languages. Oswald (1986) describes a 'performative' evidential in Kashaya (Pomoan) used by speakers to show that they know what they know because they are performing, or have just performed an action. This is, like the languages of PNG, more limited than the range of uses of the 'egophoric' in Tibetan. The performative

can also have an extended use to indicate that something is a general fact, which is like what we saw in the personal-factual forms for PNG languages. Also, like Tibetic languages and those of PNG, Oswalt (1986, p. 43) observes that the performative “has priority” over the visual evidential form in terms of speaker choice. The relationship of egophoric-style evidential categories to other categories in a hierarchy of speaker choice is something I will return to in §9.2.).

Mithun (1999) also observes a similar form in this related language Central Pomo (also Pomoan) which she says is for “first hand personal experience,” although she also mentions that this experience is usually ‘visual,’ so perhaps this is not so closely tied to first person as what we saw in Kashaya and is more of the visual evidential type. Mithun (1999) mentions that while Kashaya and Central Pomo two languages share this experiential category it is not found in related Pomoan languages.

Thus it appears that there are similar phenomena cross-linguistically, where there is an evidential form that indicates the speaker has strong personal knowledge of the event. It also appears that cross-linguistically speakers use this form over visual evidence as the most personal category of evidence. Such an evidential form is rarely discussed in the mainstream typology and deserves more attention. I will discuss a category of evidential that is similar to egophoric forms in chapter 6, and come back to a more general discussion of how they relate to other categories in §9.1.2.

5.2.3. Mirativity

The category of mirativity can be summarised as the grammatical encoding of surprising or new information. In discussions of evidentiality, mirativity is often something that is observed as a closely related phenomenon. This is especially true of Tibeto-Burman languages. The beginning of sustained interest in the mirative and

its function was DeLancey's (1986) article "Evidentiality and volitionality in Tibetan." Although in this article he does not mention the term 'mirative,' it started a long discourse about the mirative dimension of forms in Standard Tibetan that are closely cognate to those found in Lamjung Yolmo. In this section I will look at DeLancey's original argument and the reception it has had both in the general literature and in relation to Tibetan. I will then give a survey of how mirativity is discussed in relation to other Tibeto-Burman languages before also looking at the broader discussion of mirativity cross-linguistically.

DeLancey (1986) outlines his analysis of the *hdug* form in Tibetan, which has been analysed by a variety of other scholars (Garrett 2001, Tournadre and Dorje 2003, Vokurková 2008) as a sensory, perceptual or direct evidential, as discussed above. For DeLancey though, this form is not about the source of the speaker's knowledge, but the relative novelty of the information for the speaker. In a later article (DeLancey 1990a) he notes that in Hare, a western Apache language, the 'new knowledge' affix has a special affinity for second person statements, where the information is clearly not new for addressee, and is used to create an exclamation of surprise as the knowledge is new for the speaker (DeLancey 1990a, p. 156). The 'new knowledge' marker was eventually given the name 'mirative.' DeLancey argues the mirative is separate to evidentiality as the source of the information makes no difference, only whether the information is new or not (DeLancey 1997, p. 33).

Since this article, numerous linguistic descriptions have involved discussions of mirativity. Within Tibeto-Burman this has included Standard Tibetan (DeLancey 1986, 1997), Kham (Watters 1997), Kurtöp (Hyslop 2011a, 2011b) and Qiang (LaPolla 2003a, LaPolla and Huang 2003). These will be discussed in §5.2.3.1. Outside of Tibeto-Burman languages, mirativity has been discussed in relation to languages from a wide range of families, including, but certainly by no means limited to, Amazonian languages such as Shipibo-Konibo (Panoan) (Valenzuela

2003) and Jarawara (Arawá) (Dixon 2003), Balkan languages (Friedman 2003), and others including Yukaghir (Yukaghir) (Maslova 2003), Abkhaz (West Caucasian) (Chirikba 2003) and Tsafiki (Barbacoan) (Dickinson 2000). These will be discussed in §5.2.3.2.

Hill (2012) argues that, as an independent grammatical category, mirativity is highly dubious. He revisited all of the examples and languages examined by DeLancey (1986, 1990a, 1997, 2001) and Aikhenvald (2004) and came to the conclusion that for many of the languages the examples could just as easily be analysed as a perceptual or inferential evidential, rather than mirativity, based on the evidence provided in the original analyses. For other languages he concluded that the data presented was insufficient to stake a definitive claim for grammatical mirativity. Hill believes that without any solid evidence of its existence there should be no need to use a term like mirativity. Others, like Peterson (2012), have argued that ‘evidential mirativity,’ where the mirative sense arises from existing evidentials when used in context, is a sufficiently robust cross-linguistic phenomenon to be considered worth maintaining the terminology for, even if there are very few examples of mirativity existing as its own grammatical category.

Regardless of whether mirativity exists as an independent grammatical category, cross-linguistically it is described as an extension of other grammatical categories. I will discuss this in relation to Tibetic languages in §5.2.3.1. and in relation to other languages in §5.2.3.2. Therefore, even if Hill’s argument stands that there is no independent category of mirativity, there are still many details about the semantics of mirativity that we need to consider. As Aikhenvald (2004, p. 215) observes, there is still much to be done teasing out the subtleties and intricacies of mirativity. For example, she argues that perhaps too much has been made of the link between new information and surprise, and not enough has been done to understand new, but possibly unsurprising information. This would allow us to understand whether mirativity is used as a marker of surprise, or just new information, which lacks the

strength of psychological unpreparedness, or if it is information that counters expectation, but is not surprising (if that is even possible).

5.2.3.1 *Related languages*

DeLancey is the only person who has worked extensively on Tibetan and also argues that it contains a grammaticalised mirative form. As I mentioned above, almost all other scholars describe it as a sensory or direct evidential. Although Garrett (2001) draws upon earlier papers of DeLancey's that reference mirativity, he does not overtly reference DeLancey's work on mirativity. He does mention that "surprise" is an extended meaning of one copula form but does not appear to link this closely to DeLancey's analysis.

Likewise Tournadre (2008, p. 298) and Vokurková (2008) both acknowledge that mirativity is one extension of some copula forms. As Vokurková (2008, p. 161) puts it "[s]ome sentences with an epistemic ending convey the speaker's surprise at what he hears and may also imply his disagreement or discontent with the content of the sentence." Thus in this analysis of Tibetan, mirativity is not a distinct grammatical category, nor is it the only meaning extension some epistemic copulas take, as they can also take on additional senses of disagreement, which is not considered a feature of mirativity.

Huber (2002) uses new/old information as one of the major distinctions in the Kyirong evidential paradigm. Although she does this she also describes a specific form as being mirative. This form is *nukpa* - the direct sensory evidential *nu:* with the addition of a *-ba* morpheme. Huber (2002, p. 142) analyses this form as being used in a context where "the speaker expresses that he is surprised about a fact, and that he expected it to be different than what he now sees," such as when a person finally finds a key they have been looking everywhere for. Huber contrasts this with the form *jøba* (the unspecified evidence form *jø:*, also with the *-ba* suffix) but in this

case the speaker “is not directly talking about a current perception, but he contrasts it with his old knowledge.” As an example she describes a situation where the speaker is looking for his book which he expected to be in a certain place, but it is not there. Although she makes no overt mention of this, it appears that for Huber “mirative” is only about the encoding of “surprise” while old/new information falls outside of this. This is similar to Zeisler’s (2000) analysis of mirativity and evidentiality, where she notes that the perceptual evidential in Standard Tibetan is used for ‘novelty’ but that this is a different type of newness to the ‘unexpectedness’ that is encoded in mirativity. This distinction is a useful one to keep in mind when teasing out the difference between the common uses of the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo and the uses that appear to be much more mirative in their semantics (§6.3.1.)

Hari (2010, p. 71) refers to ‘*du* in Melamchi Valley Yolmo as ‘mirative/inferential.’ From the cognate forms in closely related languages and examples given in her grammar it would appear that by inferential she means ‘perceptual evidence’ or ‘direct evidence.’ The reference to mirativity would make sense in relation to Huber’s (2002) grammar of Kyirong discussed above, where the perceptual forms are linked closely to new information. It is hard to understand how the type of mirativity in Melamchi Valley Yolmo could be of the strong “surprise” type when Hari observes that the ‘*du* form combined with the past tense leads to “somewhat remote mirativity” (7b) and with an imperfective gives a sense of “present continuous mirative” (2010, p. 80) (7c). While she does not link examples directly to her descriptions, except for the one in (7a), I have presented the constructions with the other forms in the examples below.

- 7) a) *dela 'thaa 'du!*
 here blood COP.MIRATIVITY
 'Oh I see, there is some blood here.' (Hari 2010, p. 61, ex. 89)

- b) gyooba-'raŋ 'khaŋba-la looh ɕo
 quickly-EMPH house-LOC return come.IMP
 'mee-di 'mee-ba-ni, pruhl 'tsemu 'tse-ẽ
 say.A.VS-NFNL say.A.VS-PFCT-FOC snake game play-REL
 gyaa-la-'ga tee 'teh-ku 'du!
 place-LOC-C.E.FOC look.A.VS sit-IMPF AUX.MIR
 'I told him to come home quickly, but here, he keeps watching the
 snake charmer at the road side!' (Hari 2010, p. 95, ex. 52)
- c) 'bele 'azi-gi goo 'thoo-la tɕaŋ-'gyo-gi 'laahwor
 that time e.sister-GEN head above-LOC hang-REL-REL.OPTL mill.stone
 'phok taŋ-sin 'du lo.
 intensifier send-N.PST AUX.MIR REP
 'At that moment (the monster) swiftly loosened the mill stone which
 was hanging just above the head of the elder sister.'
 (Hari 2010, p. 77, ex. 08)

For (7a) there is no context given to indicate why this should be surprise and not just perceptual observation. The sentence in (7b) is interesting in that it is the act of sitting/watching that is durative, not the surprise. To be in a continuous state of surprise is a particularly difficult thing to imagine. Instead, Hari could be referring to a very weak “new information” sense of perceptual evidence. Hari does not tease out when the mirative or inferential (likely perceptual) sense of the form is. It is possible that it performs both roles at once, or that both features are dependent on contextual use.

Watters (1997) in his grammar of Kham distinguishes between a perceptual evidential and a mirative form. Watters gives examples of the mirative form being used in situations where the speaker has inferential knowledge, but also where the speaker has direct visual knowledge. Therefore the mirative is not primarily concerned with the source of evidence, but the newness of that evidence to the speaker. Watters (1997, p. 590) argues that the mirative not only marks new information, but that “the newly discovered event must not have been anticipated.”

One feature of Watters's analysis is that "the report of the discovery must also be relevant to the addressee" (p. 592). Thus, for the mirative to work the speaker must not only be aware of their own knowledge state, but that of their interlocutor as well. The speaker can also use the mirative pragmatically to engage the addressee (p. 592).

Watters (1997) observes that the mirative in Kham can also be used when the speaker later finds out about an event that they did not witness. This gives a sense of inference or hearsay, which is much more evidential than the primary mirative sense described above. This is interesting because in many languages where mirativity is observed, researchers argue that the mirative sense is an extension of the evidential function of an inferential form (see discussion of languages beyond Tibeto-Burman in the next section), but here Watters appears to be arguing that an inferential sense arises from a category that is predominantly mirative. Still, it is one of the clearest arguments for a distinct mirative category to date, and one of the few in the Tibeto-Burman family where the mirative is tied to a sense of inference and not to the direct perceptual evidential.

Likewise Hyslop (2011a, 2011b) argues for mirativity being a highly salient grammatical category in Kurtöp. Hyslop looks at the use of different grammaticalised mirative strategies in regard to imperfective, perfective and copula constructions. What is most interesting about Hyslop's analysis is that she argues that mirativity has a more central place in the semantics of Kurtöp verbs than evidentiality. As Watters noted for Kham, Hyslop (2011b, p. 50) states that the Kurtöp mirative in the imperfective paradigm "...is also used in situations of inference and hearsay, alongside situations of surprise."

Further afield in the Tibeto-Burman family, Qiang is part of the Qiangic branch and quite different to the Tibetic languages discussed so far. In LaPolla's (2003a, LaPolla and Huang 2003) analysis of the evidential system of Qiang, which is not

linked to the copula verb set, he observes a distinction between visual evidentials, reportative/hearsay evidentials and what he calls “inferred/mirative.” This inferred/mirative form can co-occur with the other forms, to give more semantically complex forms.

5.2.3.2 *Mirativity beyond Tibeto-Burman*

There has been a growing body of work on mirativity cross-linguistically, and some of the issues that occur in work on Tibeto-Burman languages also arise in languages further afield. I will look at three different types of analyses. The first involves treating mirativity as a semantic extension of an existing form, like an evidential. The second is where mirativity is in a hybrid role with another function. Finally I will look at analyses where mirativity is independent.

For many of the language descriptions where mirativity is raised as a feature, it tends to be described as an extension of another category, such as evidentiality. We see this in many of the papers in Aikhenvald and Dixon (2003). This is perhaps unsurprising, given that the focus of that book is evidentiality, with a phenomenon like mirativity only considered as one of the various extended uses of evidential markers cross-linguistically. Shipibo-Konibo has a mirative extension of the speculative (Valenzuela 2003, p. 47-48), and there is a mirative extension of the Jarawara non-eyewitness immediate past suffix (Dixon 2003, p. 165). The ‘admirative’ in Balkans languages involves mirativity as part of inference Friedman (2003, p. 199), as does Yukaghir (Maslova 2003, p. 229) and Abkhazm (Chirikba 2003, p. 246). Johanson, in a discussion of Turkic languages (2003, p. 284) also observes the extension of a mirative sense for indirect forms in particular contexts, but stresses that “this does not mean they are ‘mirative’.”

Thus it appears that cross-linguistically there is a tendency for contextually triggered mirative semantics in relation to predominantly inferential and indirect evidential

types. Languages like Standard Tibetan, where the discussions of mirativity have focused around a perceptual evidential form (DeLancey 2001), appear to be less common. What is clear, though, is that mirative-like extension of evidentials is cross-linguistically not uncommon. Almost half of the evidential systems described in Aikhenvald and Dixon (2003) were reported to have a mirative sense of an evidential category.

Instead of assuming that mirativity is something that is an extension of, or secondary to, evidentiality, there is some research in which it is described having equal status with an evidential type in the description of the form. We saw this with LaPolla's (2003a) description of Qiang, where he described the inferential/mirative and did not really make a strong case for it being one or the other. We also see this in de Reuse's (2003, p. 80) description of Western Apache where he differentiates between experiential evidentials, quotative evidentials, of which there are two different particles, and inferential evidentials, of which there are three particles. Of these three inferential types, one is a physical inferential, one is a mirative evidential and the final is a non-mirative inferential. This is somewhat different to the descriptions of contextual mirative extensions above, in that use is not just a contextual choice, but also encoded in the grammar. Interestingly, the mirative is linked to the inferential, which we saw with many of the extensions above, so this may have started as a similar pattern but is now further down a path of grammaticalisation.

Those who describe mirativity as an independent grammatical feature are much fewer. Dickinson (2000) has argued for grammatical mirativity in Tsafiki, a Barbacoan language of Ecuador. Similarly to Watters, one of Dickinson's main arguments for the validity of mirativity as a separate grammaticalised category from evidentiality is that the mirative form in Tsafiki can occur independent of perceptual evidentiality. Dickinson observes that because there is grammatical mirativity, the direct evidential acts in contrast to information that is integrated into one's general

knowledge. Once again we see a close link between mirativity and inference, with Dickinson (2000, p. 407) noting: “[i]n Tsafiki, when the source of the information is not a primary participant in the event or state, an inferential evidential marker also serves as a mirative marker.” Thus it appears that even though Tsafiki has a grammaticalised mirative marker it is still possible to extend the inferential to give a mirative meaning as well.¹⁷

The status of mirativity as an individual grammatical category is still a matter of some contention. While there are not many languages for which an independent category of mirativity has been proposed, there are many languages where surprise or counter-expectation is observed as a common extension of evidential categories including perceptual and inferential evidentials. Whether this type of extension is sufficient to constitute a category of mirativity is something that I will be discussing in relation to Lamjung Yolmo in §9.1.4.

5.3. Questions

Questions involve the speaker asking something of their interlocutor. As simple as that sounds, asking a question is a highly complex cognitive process as it involves ensuring that you are asking for the relevant information or object from the appropriate person. This highly interactive cognitive requirement alone is reason enough for question structures to be of interest to a study of social cognition, but Tibeto-Burman question structures are even more interesting due to the required use of copula verbs, and the epistemic or evidential values that they bring to the utterance.

¹⁷ Another language with potentially grammaticalised mirativity is M̃yky, a language isolate in Brazil. Monserrat and Dixon (2003) provide a very brief description of the evidential system in M̃yky. In this description they mention the “mirative mood suffix” - indicating that it is a grammatical feature that contrasts with other moods. However they not give any examples of its use.

There has been a lot of work done on the syntactic features of questions cross-linguistically (including, but not limited to Hiz 1978, Chisholm and Millic et al. 1984, Comorovski 1996, Cheng 1997, Lahiri 2001 and Aoun and Li 2003). While I will give a formal outline of the structure of questions in Lamjung Yolmo, the main focus in this thesis is accounting for their use in interaction. This includes both the content of the question and the modal or evidential value of any copula that is present. Thus, while much work on questions is focused strongly on the structure of the question, I take the question-answer dyad as the minimal feature for my analysis.

Many grammatical descriptions of languages include a section on the grammar of question structures, but only a scant number of them will also examine answer structures in the same section. This is also the case in many Tibeto-Burman languages, even though, as I will show, using the appropriate question relies on using the evidential construction one presupposes will be in the answer. Taking a social cognition approach places the interaction at the centre of the discussion. Question structures involve complex interaction and the need to think about, and encode, not only one's own knowledge state but that of an interlocutor as well.

In Tibeto-Burman languages there is a small but highly relevant body of work on questions, their relationship to evidentiality and broader implications in Tibetan. Sun (1993, p. 956) observed in Amdo Tibetan that the evidentials generally associated with first person also occur with second person in questions, thus this 'self person' (i.e. egophoric) form "is not deictically bound to the speaker." Garrett (2001) unpacks the mechanisms behind the same phenomenon in Standard Tibetan. In the mechanics of the evidential forms Garrett separates out the 'origo' and the speaker. If we take evidentials to encode the evidence *someone* has for something, there is no reason to necessarily presume that 'someone' is the speaker. The origo then is "the person from whose perspective a given evidential is evaluated" and while that person is usually the speaker, this does not always have to be the case. The easiest

way to explain the shift of the egophoric in Tibetan from first person declaratives to second person interrogatives is to posit an ‘origo shift’ from the speaker to their interlocutor. Garrett (2001) spends a whole chapter exploring this mechanism in Tibetan. He argues that “...not only does a question expect an answer, but its very form encodes information about how it’s supposed to be answered” Garrett (2001, p. 225). This process underlies all question structures in Standard Tibetan, and it is likely that it is also a feature of closely related languages, although there is very little discussion in the literature of whether this is the case.

This is interesting because it shows that Tibetan questions require the speaker to overtly encode more information about their interlocutor’s knowledge state than an English question. Not only does the speaker have to ask the right question of the right person, but they have to ask them for the right evidence as well. For example, in Standard Tibetan, Garrett (2001) shows how different copulas are used in different questions. Both questions are directed at a second person, but while the first uses an ego copula the second uses a perceptual evidential form (8). These choices are based on the fact that the person replying is required to use different evidentials for different types of phenomena:

- 8) a) *khyed.rang/*nga/*kho lha.sa-la phyin-pa-yin-pas*
 you/*I/*he Lhasa-loc go-[**ego past**]-Q
 ‘Did you go to Lhasa?’ (Garrett 2001, p. 228, ex. 3)

*nga/*khyed.rang/*kho lha.sa-la phyin-pa-yin*
 I/*you/*he Lhasa-loc go-[**ego past**]
 ‘I went to Lhasa.’ (Garrett 2001, p. 227, ex. 1)

- b) *khyed.rang/*kho/*nga grod.khog ltogs-gi-‘dug-gas*
 you/*he/*I stomach hunger-[**dir imp**]-Q
 ‘are you hungry?’ (Garrett 2001, p. 228, ex. 4)

*nga/*khyed.rang/*kho grod.khog ltogs-gi-‘dug*
 I/*you/*he stomach hunger-[**dir imp**]
 ‘I’m hungry’ (Garrett 2001, p. 227, ex. 2)

In (8a) the statement involves an ego form, so the question is constructed with an ego, and likewise in (8b) the speaker chose a perceptual as that is the copula in the expected answer. I will show how this preference also occurs in Lamjung Yolmo in §7.4.1. Similar mechanisms have been discussed in other languages, but with different terminology, Hargreaves (1991) refers to ‘epistemic source,’ Aikhenvald uses ‘locutor’ and Creissels (2008a, 2008b) to ‘assessor.’ All of these analyses seek to differentiate the person speaking from the person who holds the epistemic or evidential assertion.

This process is also discussed in de Villiers, Garfield, et al. (2009, pp. 34-35), who observe that “[w]hen an evidential is used in a question in Tibetan, there is a point-of-view shift from speaker to listener.” They explore the interactional implications of using the wrong evidential form. If the person asking a question uses a non-felicitous evidential then the onus is on the person answering the question to use the correct one. Failure to use the correct evidential in an answer is not only pragmatically bad but grammatically incorrect. Thus in Standard Tibetan it appears it is possible to separate out expected knowledge state from actual knowledge state by examining not only the question, but also the answer.

This is an interesting proposition, because it means that it is possible to gain overt linguistic evidence of a person’s assumption of their interlocutor’s knowledge state in an interaction, and ascertain whether the modal form in the response matches this. There are two possible reasons why a speaker may ‘suppose’ which evidential an interlocutor will answer with. The first is that it is a dynamic feature of the interaction, and speakers are able to track the knowledge states of their interlocutors. The second reason is that there are cultural ‘scripts’ regarding which type of evidential knowledge status is appropriate to which type of question that is being

asked. For example, any question directed at a person about his or her actions will generally take an ego form. There is also the possibility that in most interactional situations, participants will resort to using these expected forms in questions and only in some more novel and specific situations be more contextually motivated to consider the kind of evidential they are encoding into questions.

Beyond Standard Tibetan, work on languages closely related to Lamjung Yolmo has only touched briefly on question structure. In Melamchi Valley Yolmo Hari does not discuss how questions interact with the copula system *per se*, but she does mention a suffix *-pa/-ba*, which is used for past tense questions if it occurs with rising intonation (2010, p. 104). This suffix also occurs in Standard Tibetan (Tournadre and Dorje 2003, p. Garrett 2001, p. 228). Hari (2010, p. 104) mentions that this question suffix can also be used with copula verbs as clause final evidential auxiliaries with rising intonation to form questions. Hari gives no examples of how these questions are answered, but the fact that this suffix can occur with copulas indicates that patterns similar to those in Standard Tibetan may occur.

Although the pattern of predicting the evidential status of the answer in the question appears to be a common pattern for Tibeto-Burman languages, it should not be assumed that this is the only way that evidentiality can interact with question structures. De Haan (2001a, p. 207) refers to a 1965 grammar of Acoma (Keresan, Mexico) by Miller, in which he describes the ‘dubitative’ mood. This form is used for doubt, when events are not witnessed by a speaker and in asking questions. The modal value of the Acoma question is marking the knowledge state of the person asking the question - showing that they are uncertain of the answer, hence why they are asking for information. The modal value of questions in Lamjung Yolmo and other Tibetic languages is centred around the person that the question is directed towards, instead of the person asking the question.

5.4. Reported speech

5.4.1. General background

Reported speech is most typically reporting on the speech of another person to a third party. This involves a social triangulation where the person reporting the speech must keep in mind both the original speaker and the audience to whom they deliver the speech. This involves negotiating two social interactions in a single utterance. For this reason it is an interesting topic for social cognition.

Ameka (2004, p. 8) argues that reported speech is an important area of investigation as, like an evidential system, it signals the attribution of responsibility in discourse. Indeed, in many languages ‘reported,’ ‘quotative’ or ‘hearsay’ evidentials grammatically mark that the information was heard from a human source (Anderson 1986, p. 289, Aikhenvald 2004). In many Tibeto-Burman languages, as will be discussed below, there are both fully lexical verbs of saying that function like other verbs, and there are often also ‘reported’ or ‘quotative’ forms that do not function like standard verbs, but as grammaticalised evidential particles. Both of these forms are relevant to a social cognition analysis of interaction, and specifically in relation to evidential systems and conjunct/disjunct structures in language.

Lamjung Yolmo has both a verb of saying (*lâp*) and reported speech particle (*lô*). I will be discussing the structure and use of both of these in chapter 8. While I will be looking at both verb of saying constructions and reported speech particle constructions, in this section I will be focusing specifically on the Tibeto-Burman literature on reported speech particles. This is because there are a variety of different forms across Tibeto-Burman languages that appear to have a similar function of reporting a prior utterance. These are often given in a brief discussion within a wider description of ‘evidentiality’ or ‘discourse particles.’ One of the sub-aims of this thesis is to give a more detailed and interactionally situated account of this particle in Lamjung Yolmo to allow for more detailed comparative work in the future.

In discussions of the equivalent form in other Tibeto-Burman languages, and beyond, one thing that is often not teased out is the difference between ‘reported speech’ and ‘hearsay.’ Willett’s (1988, p. 57) categorisation of evidentiality includes ‘reported’ as a category, which he breaks down into ‘hearsay’ (both second and third hand) and ‘folklore.’ To my mind, hearsay is something where the original speaker is not important, and could be glossed as something like “it is said” - but without the same cultural immutability of folklore, more like gossip, rumors or generally accepted thought. Reported speech, on the other hand, supposes a particular origin, even if this is not overtly expressed in the utterance, as I discuss in §8.2.1. In discussions of reported or quoted evidence cross-linguistically researchers are rarely clear in whether they mean something more like ‘hearsay’ or more like a direct ‘reported.’ Mithun (1999, p. 184), working on Central Pomo, is an example of somebody who disambiguates these terms. In her work she makes it clear that "prototypical hearsay evidentials, which indicate verbal evidence from unspecified persons, are distinct from quotative makers used in citing the words of a specific speaker." This allows for a clean separation of the two different phenomena.

According to Anderson (1986), the use of a reported speech evidential can allow speakers to distance themselves from the content or indicate that they are uncertain about the proposition in another person’s speech. However this is only one possibility for how reported speech could be used, and it does not necessarily follow that reported constructions are markers of reliability (Mushin 2001, p. 73). Michael (n.d.) in his work on the Amazonian language Nanti (Arawak) provides strong evidence that reported speech can be used to enhance the directness and responsibility for an utterance as opposed to distancing oneself. In §8.2.3. I will look at the assertive role of the reported speech particle in Lamjung Yolmo.

5.4.2. Reported speech in related languages

In this section I will look at reported speech particles in other Tibeto-Burman languages. All of these languages also have a verb of saying, which behaves like other lexical verbs, having subcategorisations requiring a subject (even if it is not overtly expressed) and taking the full range of TAM marking. In contrast, reported speech particles are by and large, utterance-final particles that have different syntactic and pragmatic features to constructions using a verb of saying. This is not an exhaustive survey of such markers in Tibeto-Burman languages; instead it is only focusing on discussions that are of languages closely related to Yolmo or others that present interesting features. Reported speech markers can be found in Tibeto-Burman languages including Dolakha Newar (Genetti 1994, 2007), Kathmandu Newar (Hargreaves 2005, p. 16, Hale and Shrestha 2006, p. 218), Camling (Ebert 1997) Ladakhi Tibetan (Zeisler 2004, 2012), Amdo Tibetan (Sun 1993), Standard Tibetan (Tournadre and Dorje 2003, p. 424, Zeisler 2004), Kagate (Höhlig 1978), Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010, pp. 79-80) and as far away as Lahu, a member of the Lolo-Burmese branch of Tibeto-Burman (Matisoff 1982, p. 377-380).

These reported speech markers are clause-final particles that indicate that the speaker is not the author of the propositional content of the utterance, and therefore not responsible for it. They do not take morphological marking and are often monosyllabic. These markers often have a different syntactic structure and pragmatic effect from constructions that use a verb of saying. However although these forms are often described in similar ways, as I set out below, there are a variety of forms that do not all come from the same historical cognate. Grammars often only include a short description of the reported speech marker in the section on evidentiality or clause-final particles. This is, like question and answer structures, why a more socially interactive exploration of their use in at least one Tibeto-Burman language is needed.

In his grammar of Kham, Watters (1997, p. 603) explains that the reported speech particle *di* reports hearsay “but makes no claim about the truth of the statement.” Thus it has evidential weight, but no extension of speaker attitude towards the reported information. Even though Watters states that the reported speech particle contains no extensions of speaker attitude in his summary of the function of the particle, he claims that in using the reported speech particle the speaker “disclaims responsibility” for the “apprehension of truths leading up to the conclusion.” While this may be a fixed characteristic of the reported speech particle in Kham, and does not contain the specific attitude of a speaker, this element of “disclaiming responsibility” is a way in which a speaker could possibly indicate their attitude towards the information.

Caplow (2000, p. 48-49), working on Dokpa Tibetan, observes that the reported speech marker can occur in narratives as well as in general speech. She notes that a reported speech marker does not need to be used consistently throughout a narrative to flag reported information. Instead it could be omitted after an initial use. Interestingly, Caplow also has not observed the reported speech with personal evidentials (equivalent to the ‘egophoric’ in Tibetan in both form and function) and argues that this is not surprising as “a speaker’s claim of knowledge of an event or state through personal involvement is incompatible with a claim of knowledge through hearsay,” as the reported speech marker cannot be used with first person quotes. Early in her description of the form, Caplow (2000, p. 48) observes that the reported speech marker is operating in relation to the person making the report of the speech, and the other evidential form is that used in the original utterance. It is not clear why a person would not be quoted saying something about themselves, and in §8.2. I will show that this restriction does not exist in Lamjung Yolmo.

There is an attested reported speech marker in the Melamchi Valley variety of Yolmo. Hari (2010, p. 79-80) observes that the form *lo* is used to indicate “I heard somebody else say this.” This is followed by a direct quote of the other speaker. The

reported speech particle relates to the information the second speaker has, and exists outside the copula verb paradigm, and therefore can co-occur with any other TAM forms, indicating the particle acts independently of the rest of the evidential system in the language. Hari observes that the speaker will usually mention who the original author of the utterance was. Although she labels this a ‘hearsay’ particle, it appears from her description that it functions as what I am calling a ‘reported’ marker, as it relates to a single specific utterance from an individual, and is not used for vague, unattributable utterances. This appears to be concordant with Höhlig’s (1978, p. 20) analysis of the closely related language Kagate, where *lo* is used when a person is “reporting what he has heard from an eyewitness.” Zeisler’s (2012) discussion of the cognate *lo* in Ladakhi (West Tibetan) mentions that in the quoted speech the evidential value does not shift, but the pronoun does shift to reorient from the original speaker to the person now reporting. This indicates that evidential information is retained from the original utterance in at least one language related to Lamjung Yolmo.

Although not a related language, it should be noted that Nepali also has a ‘hearsay’ marker. Peterson (2000, p. 18) observes that the particle *re* “denotes that the speaker has his/her knowledge through another person.” While he does not give any details of the syntactic structure of utterances with this hearsay particle, he does argue that it is historically related to inferential constructions in Nepali. Peterson (2000 p. 25) argues that inferential evidentials and reported speech have parallels because both are about reporting what they were not actually a witness to. While reported speech markers indicate that the speaker was present during the other person’s speech event, it indicates that they were not witness to the information that the other person was referring to, otherwise they would be able to claim the information as their own. Given that Yolmo speakers are often also highly proficient speakers of Nepali as well it is worth keeping in mind how the Nepali form functions.

As can be seen from the small survey above, there is a broad range of ways that reported speech markers have been discussed. In chapter eight I look at how both verbs of saying and the reported speech marker are used in Lamjung Yolmo, in terms of both the grammatical structure and pragmatic effect. It will hopefully serve to demonstrate that, even in just one language, there is a need to provide a more detailed account of how this form is used than is currently available in the literature.

5.5. The conjunct/disjunct system

In this discussion so far I have introduced the three areas of grammatical description that will constitute the discussion in the next three chapters. While introducing each feature I justified its inclusion in the thesis by explaining how it is relevant to an interactionally focused study of language. These structures all have something else in common, in that they are prominent grammatical features within a discussion of conjunct/disjunct systems.

A conjunct/disjunct system is one way of talking about the relationship between person reference and the marking of something like evidentiality in language. Arguments about the function of conjunct/disjunct often centre on the use of grammatical forms and subject person in both question and reported speech constructions as well as regular declarative sentences, which means that all of the topics discussed above are relevant to an understanding of the debate.

When it comes to discussing conjunct/disjunct systems there is an issue of nomenclature. Hale popularised the term ‘conjunct/disjunct’ but this is not the only way to refer to the system. Dickinson (2000) in her analysis of the Barbacoan language Tsafiki uses ‘congruent’ and ‘noncongruent’ in their place. Hargreaves (2005) uses the terms ‘self’ and ‘other,’ which is an part of a more pragmatically-motivated analysis of Kathmandu Newar that I will discuss in §5.5.2. Although these terms are all slightly different they refer to a similar binary opposition. At a recent

Linguistics Society of America Summer workshop “The grammar of knowledge asymmetries: ‘Conjunct/Disjunct’ alignment from a cross-linguistic perspective” (Boulder, Colorado, July 13-14, 2011) there was a great deal of discussion about the terminology that should be used when talking about these phenomena. “Alignment” was one suggestion that was discussed in depth but not taken up by participants as many felt it to be imprecise (Kelly p.c.).

I will continue to use the terms conjunct and disjunct and refer to the conjunct/disjunct system. Although the terminology is opaque to the point of irrelevance in regards to the actual phenomena described, it has been the basis of the literature for so long that like many others before me, I will continue to use it.

5.5.1. Hale’s (1980) conjunct/disjunct analysis of Kathmandu Newar

The conjunct/disjunct system was first proposed by Hale (1980) as a system whereby first person declaratives are marked differently to second and third person declaratives, with the pattern being inverted in interrogative structures. As you can see in (9) (examples from Hale (1980), emphasis throughout is mine), the first person verb is different to the second and third person forms through a lengthening of the vowel.

- 9) a) *ji ana wanā*
 ‘I went there.’ (**conjunct**) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 1)
- b) *cha ana wana*
 ‘you went there.’ (disjunct) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 2)
- c) *wa apa wana*
 ‘he went there.’ (disjunct) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 3)

This system has three major features in Hale's description that are important for understanding how it works. The first is that in question constructions the second person form (Hale 1980, p. 95) has the same structure as the first person declarative (10).

- 10) *cha ana wanā lā*
 'did you go there?' (**conjunct**) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 4)

The second is that this pattern only holds when the subject is the 'true instigator' of the action. Impersonal verbs, which the subject has no control over, are never marked with a conjunct form, not even for first person or interrogatives (11).

- 11) a) *jii wa saa tāla*
 'I heard that noise.' (disjunct) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 9)
- b) *chaq wa saa tāla*
 'you heard that noise.' (disjunct) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 9)
- c) *waq wa saa tāla*
 'He heard that noise.' (disjunct) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 9)

This dimension of 'instigator-hood' means that for verbs other than the impersonal set (where they are always marked disjunct regardless of person) it is possible to thus make a distinction for first person between actions that were done voluntarily and those done involuntarily (Hale 1980, p. 96). This is possible because the conjunct form is used for intentional actions (12a) and this means that first person acts with the disjunct were not intentional (12b).

- 12) a) *jii lā palā*
 ‘I cut the meat (intentionally).’ (**conjunct**)
 (Hale 1980, p. 96, ex. 10)
- b) *jii lā pala*
 ‘I cut the meat (quite by accident).’ (disjunct)
 (Hale 1980, p. 96, ex. 11)

The third and final important feature of Hale’s conjunct/disjunct is the way it interacts with indirect quote frames. The two examples below are translated the same way in English, but use different verb forms in Newar and have different co-referential relations. In (13) I have given Hale’s gloss and also given subscript notation on the line below.

- 13) a) *wəq wa ana wanā dhakāā dhāla*
 ‘he said that he went there (himself).’
 ‘he_i said that he_i went there.’ (**conjunct**) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 5)
- b) *wəq wa ana wana dhakāā dhāla*
 ‘he said he (someone else) went there.’
 ‘he_i said that he_j went there.’ (disjunct) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 6)

The first utterance involves the person saying that they themselves went, while the second one is a person reporting on a third person who went. Hale does not discuss how the choice of conjunct/disjunct forms in these constructions intersect with impersonal verbs (12), or with non-volitional acts (12), but Hargreaves (2005, p. 17) demonstrates that the conjunct/disjunct pattern does not hold in such conditions and all forms are marked disjunct as we saw in example (11).

This use of the conjunct/disjunct forms is reminiscent of logophoricity (Stirling 1993), in that both are grammatical patterns where the third person pronominal referent in this kind of reported speech is not ambiguous, but they are not exactly

the same. Logophoricity involves using a different pronoun form, whereas conjunct/disjunct in Newar, and other languages discussed below (§5.5.2.) is located on the verb. Also, conjunct/disjunct only ever disambiguates third person referents, while logophoric pronouns can, in a small number of languages disambiguate single second person referents as well (Stirling 1999).

These main features of Hale's discussion of the conjunct/disjunct system in Kathmandu Newar, formed the start of an ongoing discussion about this kind of system in Tibeto-Burman languages and beyond. Hale did not talk about the semantics of the conjunct and disjunct forms, and whether that was contributing to the patterning that was found, but it is possible already to draw some parallels between what is found in the Kathmandu Newar system and the kind of features I have discussed in the sections above. Firstly, the split between first person and non-first person in declaratives is reminiscent of the egophoric in Standard Tibetan (§5.2.2.3.) and the participatory in the languages of PNG (§5.2.2.4.), in that first person is marked differently from second and third based on the semantics of the egophoric or participatory forms. Secondly, there is an inversion of the pattern in interrogative utterances, at least for second person in Hale's description. This is the same mechanism as is found in the copula systems of other Tibetic languages closely related to Lamjung Yolmo (§5.3.). The parameter of volitionality is something that affects the choice of evidential form in Standard Tibetan and Sherpa (§5.2.2.3.), giving further evidence that the system underpinning the structures found in Kathmandu Newar may be evidentially motivated. While I have not discussed the relationship between reported speech and evidentiality in particular, it is something that I will pick up on in §8.1.3. as there is some contention in regard to Standard Tibetan as to whether the kind of reported constructions in the examples here actually exist.

Even though Hale (1980) did not mention whether the Kathmandu Newar system is motivated by a distinction like evidentiality, there are many parallels between the

structure of this system and the grammatical structures found in languages closely related to Lamjung Yolmo. Hale's initial paper was very influential, both within discussions of Tibeto-Burman languages and beyond. In §5.5.2. I will look at the work that grew out of this initial analysis.

5.5.2. Further work in conjunct/disjunct systems

Since Hale's 1980 paper this type of structure has been widely discussed in relation to the broader Tibeto-Burman family (Schöttelndreyer 1980, DeLancey 1992, 2001; Hargreaves 1991, 2005, 2011, 2012; Post 2011, and Tournadre 2008), and beyond, particularly in Amazonian (including Tsafiki, Dickinson 2000, 2011), Papua New Guinean languages (Loughnane 2009, 2011, San Roque and Loughnane 2012) and Northeast Caucasian (Nakh-Daghestanian) languages (Creissels 2008a, 2008b). In particular, researchers have focused on the features of person, intentionality, questions and reported speech that Hale discussed in his original paper, but they have also looked at other factors such as agency, speaker knowledge of the events in question, and how these interplay in the deployment of such a system. In this section I will look at work that has been situated within the conjunct/disjunct literature and in §5.5.3. I will look at analyses that have taken a different approach.

Weber's (2011) research on the phenomenon cross-linguistically has indicated that there are a few typological commonalities between languages that have been described as having a conjunct/disjunct or similar system. They all have verb final word order, and have no canonical verbal person marking. This has also been observed by San Roque, Floyd and Norcliff (2012). This indicates that there may be some features of these languages that predispose them to these kinds of patterns.

Schöttelndreyer (1980) presented a short analysis of Sherpa as a conjunct/disjunct system, which he says is based largely on a now inaccessible 1971 SIL manuscript of Hale's, but appears to be very similar in substance to Hale (1980).

Schöttelndreyer focuses on declaratives, interrogatives and indirect quotations to demonstrate the pattern. It appears that he is equating the egophoric *we* and the perceptual evidential *sung* (discussed in §5.2.2.3. above) with the conjunct and disjunct respectively. While questions and interrogatives pattern as per Hale’s analysis, indirect quotations do not occur because, although grammatical, they are “not natural.” Speakers do not prefer the kind of indirect quotation seen in (13b) and instead speakers prefer direct quotations like (14) (Schöttelndreyer 1980, p. 129).

- 14) a) *'tiki “nga lepiq” 'sikyaasung*
‘he said “I arrived.”’ (**conjunct**) (Schöttelndreyer 1980, p. 126, ex. 7)
- b) *'tiki “ti lepsungq” 'sikyaasung*
‘he said “he arrived.”’ (disjunct) (Schöttelndreyer 1980, p. 126, ex. 8)

The different pronouns in the direct speech and matrix clauses mean no disambiguation of the different forms is necessary. Schöttelndreyer (1980, p. 129) states that Hale finds the indirect speech forms in (13) are dispreferred in Kathmandu Newar, with speakers preferring a direct reported speech structure more like the Sherpa examples in (14) in natural speech instead. This is an interesting observation for Schöttelndreyer to make as it indicates that, even in Kathmandu Newar, which is the language on which many other analyses are based, one feature of the system may not actually be as robust or prevalent as has been considered. Kelly (2004, p. 366) has also analysed Sherpa as a conjunct/disjunct system along the same lines as Schöttelndreyer, observing that “The bases of knowledge source and volitionality appear to interact in providing a motivation underlying the patterning of conjunct and disjunct in Sherpa.”

Of all the languages related to Lamjung Yolmo, Tibetan has the longest and richest history of debate about the validity of a conjunct/disjunct analysis. Like Yolmo and Sherpa, but unlike Newar, Tibetan is a Tibeto-Burman language that encodes the

information relevant to the discussion of conjunct/disjunct in the copula verb system, which is used by extension with the rest of the verb system, whereas Newar encodes this information on the lexical verb itself. Although the grammatical process is different, the patterns are sufficiently similar to have warranted study.

The conjunct/disjunct pattern in Standard Tibetan is somewhat less immediately apparent than it is in Sherpa. DeLancey (2001, p. 373) argues that the equational and existential copulas *yin* and *yod* are the conjunct forms, while the disjunct forms are *red* and *‘dug*. The first two are known more generally in analyses of Standard Tibetan as egophoric forms, as discussed in §5.2.2.3. Of the two disjunct forms, *red* is discussed as an inferential form and *‘dug* as a direct evidence form (Garrett 2001, p. 54). Thus, we begin to see the start of a pattern in Tibetic languages in regard to how the semantics of the different forms might be the driving factor. The egophoric is closely linked with first person actions, as described in §5.2.2.3, while the perceptual evidential is more appropriate for second and third person actions because it is possible to witness others perform actions in a way it is not possible to witness yourself. The use of perceptual for first person non-volitional acts is already something that has been described for Standard Tibetan (§5.2.2.3.) and so fits the existing pattern nicely. The fact that the inferential *red* is also described as a disjunct can still be understood to relate to the semantics of the form, as inferred events are unlikely to have occurred to the person speaking, and therefore more likely to occur to second or third person subjects.

DeLancey has been the main proponent of the argument that Standard Tibetan is a conjunct/disjunct language (1997, pp. 44-45). This is closely related to his analysis of Standard Tibetan as a language with grammatical mirativity (§5.2.3.1.). Although the analysis of mirativity in Standard Tibetan has been dismissed by other researchers (§5.2.3.1.), he identifies the perceptual evidential as the mirative, which he equates to Hale’s (1980) ‘disjunct’ form, and the patterns he gives look similar to those for Newar. Although other researchers working on Standard Tibetan (Garrett

2001, Tournadre 2008) do not call this form a ‘disjunct’ they do observe that the perceptual evidential does pattern strongly with second and third person forms, although they argue that this is because of the perceptual evidential semantics of the form, and not due to any mirative function.

Curnow (2000) has argued against DeLancey’s linking of conjunct/disjunct with the mirative system from a broader cross-linguistic perspective. He notes that while there is some similarity between other conjunct/disjunct languages and Standard Tibetan, conjunct/disjunct does not result in the grammaticalisation of mirativity cross-linguistically. Curnow (2002, p. 6) also notes that conjunct/disjunct pattern occurs in future constructions in Awa Pit (Barbacoan), which he argues cannot happen if the structure is fundamentally about evidence and surprise. Curnow (2002, p. 7-8) also shows that cross-linguistically the relationship of conjunct forms to intentional first person agents is not as direct in languages like Awa Pit and Tibetan as it is in languages like Kathmandu Newar and Tsafiki. In Tibetan and Awa Pit the subject does not necessarily have to be the volitional subject - a first person non-volitional participant in a clause can lead to the use of the ‘conjunct’ marker. As I demonstrate in §6.4.1, while volitionality is something that can be discussed in Lamjung Yolmo, it is not as intrinsically related to the choice of verb form as is for some languages. This supports Curnow’s analysis that the parameters of conjunct/disjunct systems less about rigid grammatical patterns, but more about the specific semantics of each individual language.

One of the biggest problems in a discussion of conjunct/disjunct systems is that people will take different parameters of the system into account in their discussion. For example Aikhenvald (2004, p. 391) defines the system as “person-marking on the verb whereby first person subject in statements is expressed in the same way as second person in questions, and all other persons are marked in a different way (also used to describe cross-clausal co-reference).” This ignores the facet of volitionality, as described in Hale’s (1980) original analysis, and ignores the reported speech

constructions that Hale discusses in detail. It reduces the distinction to one of consistent and robust person marking, and does not explain what could possibly motivate the different choices. In fact Aikhenvald (2004, p. 127) argues that “Conjunct-disjunct person-marking systems are not evidential in nature,” even though anything that patterns like conjunct/disjunct in Sherpa or Tibetan as discussed so far appears to be exclusively motivated by evidential, or at least modal, semantics, and are not “additional meanings” of the forms as argued by Aikhenvald (2004, p. 124).

In Melamchi Valley Yolmo Hari (2010, p. 55) argues that there is no conjunct/disjunct system because the perceptual evidential is not reserved for use with second and third person structures, but can be used with first person “[i]f a speaker does something involuntarily and wants to express this.” This ignores one of Hale’s (1980, p. 98) primary observations regarding the conjunct/disjunct system that “finite conjunct forms are appropriate only where the actor of the clause is portrayed as a true instigator, one responsible for an intentional act.” Thus on the current evidence it appears that Yolmo does pattern like a conjunct/disjunct language, in at least one regard. I will show that while this is true for Lamjung Yolmo as well, it is not as strong as it is in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (§6.4.1.)

Hargreaves (2005) revisits Kathmandu Newar and presents a great deal of considered data around the topics in Hale’s original discussion. What makes Hargreaves’s analysis different is that he focuses on the underlying lexical semantics of the forms, and the pragmatics of how they are used in interaction, to try and understand what motivates the collection of syntactic patterning that Hale originally observed. Although Hargreaves (2005, p. 5) continues using conjunct and disjunct to allow his work to remain relevant to the literature, he observes that Newar scholars have observed that the conjunct and disjunct marks the difference between ‘self’ statements and ‘other’ statements, and therefore the difference between the two is “epistemic source.” That is, the system is less fixed on the evidence that a person

has for an utterance, and more on the authority that a person has for attributing intentional actions to actors. In much the same way that a person in Standard Tibetan has privileged access to their own actions that allows them to use the egophoric in such situations, the conjunct in Kathmandu Newar indicates that the speaker can be certain of their own actions in a way that they can not attribute certainty to the actions of others. Another important thing to note in regard to Kathmandu Newar is that the choice of either the conjunct or disjunct form is binary, unlike similar analyses of languages like Sherpa and Standard Tibetan (Garrett 2001, Tournadre 2008), and even languages in other families such as Tsafiki (Dickinson 2011), where the two forms are actually part of a larger paradigm of evidential and non-evidential choices. Tournadre (2008, p. 290) observed this for Standard Tibetan, where speakers have three evidential choices (egophoric, direct and indirect), but it is also true for Yolmo where there are a range of evidential choices (ego, perceptual and general fact) as well as an epistemic choice (dubitative) or the possibility to not include any overt modal marking (all of which are discussed in chapter 6).

It may not be that evidence and access to knowledge are the only features that result in the kind of patterning that can be analysed as conjunct/disjunct. Hyslop (2011b, p. 51) in a discussion of mirativity in Kurtöp mentions that the mirative occurs with both first person statements and second person questions, which is one of the basic features of the systems described above. Thus there may be some features other than evidentiality that drives such a pattern in a language.

Dickinson (2000), in her discussion of Tsafiki (Barbacoan), also observes the same pattern. She argues that the same kind of conjunct/disjunct patterns we see in other languages also occurs in Tsafiki, but is linked to a system of grammatical mirativity. Thus mirativity, like evidentiality and epistemic source, may be a grammatical feature that promotes these kind of patterns. This makes sense, when we consider that all of these grammatical features involve constructions based around knowledge,

and access to knowledge. There are also examples of languages, such as Cha'palaa (Barbacoan) (Floyd 2011), where the 'conjunct' form has a meaning of encoding the authority for the utterance (the speaker in statements, the addressee in questions) but the 'disjunct' form has no evidential, mirative or epistemic meaning that can be discerned, other than it being not the conjunct form. Therefore, as long as speakers acknowledge that there is a difference between the access to their own knowledge state (be that the evidence, certainty, or expectation) and that of others, we would expect to see a similar pattern. This does not explain all of the features of the system, and I will return to these problems throughout my analysis (§6.4.3.).

In this section I have accounted for a variety of analyses that, while predicated on different semantic structures, use these structures to build an analysis within the conjunct/disjunct literature. In the next section I will look at analyses that try to move away from the conjunct/disjunct discussion.

5.5.3. Egophoric systems: An alternative to conjunct/disjunct

Tournadre (2008) has argued against the validity of describing Tibetic languages as having a conjunct/disjunct system. He argues that the term is not appropriate and instead believes the term 'egophoric' (discussed in §5.2.2.3.) is more appropriate. For Tournadre, to draw a binary distinction such as conjunct versus disjunct does not really capture what is happening in a language with more than two choices, and it prevents cross-linguistic comparison.

Much like Hargreaves (2005), Tournadre (2008 pp. 298-299) argues that the focus should not be a syntactic phenomenon like conjunct/disjunct, but instead the analysis should be "driven by semantic, pragmatic and cognitive concepts, accounting for a broader range of elements of language use." These are the semantic properties of the evidential forms (§5.2.2.3.) and their relationship to features such as volitionality, and the presence of endopathic verbs. The fact that Tournadre names the system

‘egophoric’ after one of the forms in his paradigm indicates that the semantics of the copula set in Standard Tibetan are central to the patterns of use in interaction. This makes it clear that this is not just a binary pattern, but part of a larger paradigm of choices in Standard Tibetan copulas.

For Tournadre another major problem with the conjunct/disjunct system is that it is very common in Tibetan for first person statements to take the ‘disjunct’ form. This is not a “wrinkle on the pattern” as DeLancey (1997, p. 44) put it, but a basic feature of the usage of the evidential system. He lists three major situations where these forms occur: firstly, sensory self-observation such as in dreams or movies; secondly, factual statements about the distant past or future; and thirdly, sensory inferentials including lack of intention or awareness (Tournadre 2008, p. 303). By taking into account the language-specific semantics of these forms it is easy to account for these features, which would be considered anomalies in a systematic conjunct/disjunct account.

Tournadre’s analysis is similar to Sun’s (1993). In his work on Amdo Tibetan, Sun (p. 995) acknowledges that the person-marking of the utterance is roughly split between first person and other person but argues against calling it conjunct/disjunct because it is “utterly unrevealing” about the function of these forms. Instead, Sun focuses on the semantics of the system.

More recently, Post (2011) has looked at the Galo (Tani). He observes that “epistemic authority’ is central to the distinction between ‘conjunct’ forms and ‘disjunct’ forms, but unlike in many other Tibeto-Burman languages “actor agency, intention or volitionality seem to play no role in the Galo system.” This is in contrast to Sun’s (1993) observation, and indicates that considering it as a system of volitionality reduces the cross-linguistic applicability. As I demonstrate in §6.3.1, much like in Galo, volitionality is not a major feature of the distinction in Lamjung Yolmo, although it is one dimension of it.

The ‘egophoric’ analysis is not exclusive to Tibetic languages. As discussed in relation to evidential systems in languages outside of the Tibeto-Burman family (§5.2.2.4.), there may be some reason to consider that it is viable for languages of PNG and Northern America with ‘personal’ or ‘participatory’ evidentials as well. Loughnane (2009) and San Roque and Loughnane (2012) argue that there is a strong implicature in languages with these kinds of evidentials that actions marked with them are more likely to be first person, and visual evidentials are more likely for non-first person statements. This natural implicature is inverted for question structures. Like Tournadre’s analysis of Standard Tibetan and Hargreaves’s analysis of Kathmandu Newar, this analysis is focused on the semantics of the individual forms and how they group with person-marking based on semantics in interaction, rather than overall grammatical patterns. These analyses aim to understand the function of these forms, instead of just labelling them ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct.’

Creissels (2008a, 2008b) similarly talks about the “‘assessor’s involvement’ in the conjunct/disjunct pattern found in Northern Akhvakh. Unlike Hargreaves, for Creissels the main focus is whether the speech event participant in charge of the assertion is also involved in the event or not. Thus, for Creissels, the focus is not on the shift of ‘epistemic source’ but on the involvement of the speaker or addressee. This achieves much the same result as Hargreaves’s analysis, in that he is trying to find a unifying motivation for all of the features of Hale’s original analysis, but with a slightly different perspective. Interestingly, the distinction in Northern Akhvakh does not appear to come about as a result of any inherent modal semantics of the alternate forms; instead they encode perfective aspect. While all of the languages I have discussed to date have located the conjunct/disjunct distinction within a modal element of the grammar, it may be possible that there are languages in which the distinction is not overtly modal.

San Roque et al. (2012) have drawn together research from a number of geographic areas that has an egophoric-type semantic distinction. These involve patterns where the modal information encoded on the verb leads to a self-versus-other distinction in declaratives, and a second person versus other in interrogatives. They argue that the link between the different languages is that the egophoric pattern indicates the epistemic authority for the utterance. This means that their analysis incorporates contrasts that are motivated by evidentiality, epistemicity, mirativity or some other category that can encode speaker perspective. For this reason they have extended the term ‘egophoric’ beyond the specific semantics of the Standard Tibetan egophoric as discussed by Garrett (2001) and Tournadre (2008). In some cases this is motivated by evidentiality, but they also observe that there are other languages, such as Cha’palaa, that have a form with egophoric semantics, but it is not necessarily contrasted with any other form. For these reasons, they argue that egophoricity can be something that in some languages can sit within the evidential system as a distinction, but in some languages it is something that sits above evidentiality as it encompasses a broader range of phenomena.

Such analyses that focus on the evidential values of the contrastive forms challenge Aikhenvald’s (p. 127) assessment that conjunct/disjunct systems are primarily ‘person-marking’ and cannot be considered evidential. Instead of focusing on the way person and various forms are linked in the final utterance as per older analyses, there is a wealth of knowledge to be gained by instead focusing on the semantics of the forms that are in contrastive distribution that give rise to these collocations with person in various contexts.

Throughout the next three chapters I will discuss how the modal copulas, question and reported speech structures relate to a conjunct/disjunct analysis. Because the focus is on the role of these forms in interaction, attempts to analyse the system as conjunct/disjunct will also need to be interactionally motivated. I will demonstrate that some features of the system, such as the choice of modal copula, are

semantically driven (§6.4.1.), while others appear to be separate mechanisms, such as the inversion of the choice of copula for questions (§7.4.1.), while others still are not present in Lamjung Yolmo interaction, such as direct reported speech events (§8.1.3.). Once I have discussed all of the structures in the relevant chapters, I will draw the threads of conjunct/disjunct analysis together in the discussion §9.3. and, armed with an interactionally motivated account of Lamjung Yolmo, create a more nuanced picture of the nature of conjunct/disjunct and egophoric systems.

6. Modality and evidentiality in Lamjung

Yolmo

Jäschke, in his 1865 grammar of Tibetan, lamented that Tibetan verbs "show nothing beyond a rather poor capability of expressing the most indispensable distinctions of tense and mood" (1865/1954, p. 40). While this may have been true of the variety he was studying, the verbal system of Tibeto-Burman languages such as Lamjung Yolmo, more than makes up for this with its complex and subtle expression of modality. This is especially true in regard to the set of copulas.

In this chapter I will look at the grammatical category of copula verbs, which in Lamjung Yolmo involve distinctions of evidentiality, epistemic certainty and newness of information, amongst other things. The copula system in Lamjung Yolmo has nine different copula verbs, some of them closely related but all with different functions. The distinctions between these different copulas do not fit neatly into a single grammatical category such as 'evidentiality' or 'certainty,' but all fit within a definition of modality that relates to a speaker's knowledge of the proposition (§5.2.2.2.). As discussed in §5.2, the relationship between these features is contentious cross-linguistically, and when taken from an interactional perspective like social cognition Lamjung Yolmo illustrates some of these complexities. The copula verbs provide a good framework for exploring the major grammatically encoded modal distinctions in Lamjung Yolmo, and where these differences also exist in other constructions¹⁸ they will be mentioned and discussed in the relevant sections.

¹⁸ It is worth noting that the copula verbs are not the only locus for such distinctions in Lamjung Yolmo - source of evidence or certainty can be marked lexically, and there is also the reported speech particle that has an evidential function (chapter 8).

The modal distinctions available allow speakers to grammatically mark their knowledge states within the interaction. In (1), two different people are talking about the fact that a bag is empty, but only the second person can see inside, and therefore only the second person can use the perceptual evidential. Note that there is nothing in the grammar of the English glosses to demonstrate the different knowledge state of the two participants, but in a language like Lamjung Yolmo it is possible to track these differences.

- 1) a) *mè* (*laughs*)
 COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘there is no (money) (laughs).’ (CL 120304-02 11:14)
- b) *táŋa mǝndu léé*
 money COP.PE.NEG PART
 ‘the money is not there.’ (CL 120304-02 11:21)

In this chapter I will outline the semantics that allows for these kind of distinctions.

The first section (§6.1.) of this chapter is an outline of the basic features of the copula system of Lamjung Yolmo. This includes an introduction to the basic semantic function of the verbs (§6.1.1.), as well as their syntactic properties (§6.1.2.). One of the most important features of this set is that many of the distinctions occur not just when these forms function as copulas but also when they occur as auxiliaries for lexical verbs (§6.1.3.), meaning that they occur in a large number of clauses in interaction.

As another example, the dubitative copulas *yǝndɔ* and *yètɔ* are related to the dubitative suffix - *tɔ*, which attaches to lexical verbs.

Even once we have established the basic semantics of each of the copula forms, we find that contextual features also motivate their use. In (2) AL is looking at, and touching, the same scarf only seconds apart, yet uses a different copula form in each case. The first is the ego copula, used when a speaker is referring to their own knowledge (§6.1.1.1.), and the second is the perceptual evidential copula, used when a speaker is referencing direct perceptual evidence (§6.1.1.3.).

- 2) a) *ηόmbu yìmba*
 green COP.EGO
 ‘it is green.’ (AL 120209-02 01:07)
- b) *tàpse-ni ηόmbu dù*
 now-FOC green COP.PE
 ‘now it is green.’ (AL 120209-02 01:31)

Here, it is not just the speaker’s knowledge state in relation to the propositional content that is affecting the choice of copula, but also her relationship to her interlocutors. In (2a) she makes a claim as to the colour of the scarf, but it is only on being asked to reiterate does she choose to make it clear to her interlocutor that the information for this claim comes from perceptual evidence. The shift in evidential value is not for the sake of the person speaking, but for the person they are speaking to. Once I have established the basic features of the copula set, I will look at these more contextually embedded modal manipulations and their motivations in more detail, including returning to the discussion of this example in §6.3.3.

Once I have given a basic outline of how these forms function I look at some specific features of their use in detail. I first look at the semantics of the ego copulas in more detail (§6.2.) as they are central to the whole paradigm. Next, I look at a number of examples where the same situation has resulted in the use of different copula verbs (§6.3.), either from different people (§6.3.2.) or the same person (§6.3.3.). These examples give insight into how people can use different copulas to

achieve different communicative ends. Having established the ways people use these forms in interaction, I look at how grammatical person interacts with the choice of copula (§6.4.). This is especially relevant to the discussion around conjunct/disjunct marking I introduced in §5.5. Finally, I look at those clauses where there are no copulas (§6.5.), and what these may contribute to our understanding of the interactional function of copulas when they are used.

6.1. An outline of copula verbs

This section is an introduction to the basic semantic properties and the syntactic features of copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo. It is a foundation on which the later section of this chapter is built, where I will look at the variety of these forms as used in interaction. I give a brief summary of the semantic function of each set of these copulas (§6.1.1.) before turning to features of their syntactic function. Although their use as both copulas (§6.1.2.) and clause-final auxiliaries (§6.1.3.) means that they occur quite frequently in interaction, it should be noted that there are also constructions where they are not used. These are discussed specifically in §6.5.

6.1.1. The semantic properties of the copula set

The copula verb paradigm of Lamjung Yolmo is summarised in Table 6.1. The first form in each cell is the affirmative construction while the second one is the negative. As the copula system has relatively irregular negation compared to lexical verbs it is necessary to list all the negative forms. Throughout this thesis I will generally be referring only to the affirmative forms of the copula verbs, but everything equally applies to the negative construction, unless otherwise stated. I discuss negative forms specifically in §6.1.4. In Table 6.1. the distinctions along the side denote functional distinctions, including arguments licensed and tense. Equational copulas take two noun phrases, while existential copulas are used for a variety of constructions including existence, location, possession and attribution (discussed in §6.1.2.). The categories along the top are semantic distinctions, which I will discuss below.

	Ego	Dubitative	Perceptual evidence	General fact
Equation	<i>yimba</i> ¹⁹ <i>mìn</i>	<i>yìnɔ</i> <i>mìnɔ</i>	<i>(dùba)</i> <i>(mìnduba)</i>	-
Existential present	<i>yè</i> <i>mè</i>	<i>yètɔ</i> <i>mètɔ</i>	<i>dù</i> <i>mìndu</i>	<i>òŋge</i>
past	<i>yèke</i> <i>yèba</i> <i>mèke</i> <i>mèba</i>		<i>dùba</i> <i>mìnduba</i>	<i>mèŋge</i>

Table 6.1. Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs. The affirmative forms are bolded and the negative forms appear below them. The brackets indicate that this form is possible, but appears infrequently.

As can be seen in Table 6.1, only the existential ego copula has distinct forms that occur in the past tense. The *yèba* form is related to the lexical *-pa* past tense suffix (Appendix 1 §1.5.3.1.2.), while the *yèke* form cannot be morphologically analysed as the *-ke* suffix is a non-past tense suffix for lexical verbs (Appendix 1 §1.5.3.1.1.).

Three different copulas involve *-ba* suffixes (*yimba*, *yèba* and *dùba*). These are related to the lexical verb suffix *-pa*, which is found in Lamjung Yolmo and related Tibeto-Burman languages. This lexical suffix is predominantly a past tense marker (Appendix 1 §1.5.3.1.2), however it also is used in interrogative constructions (§7.1.3.) and has a somewhat emphatic sense. Although they likely all come from

¹⁹ Some speakers of Lamjung Yolmo reduce the *yimba* copula in running speech so that it sounds more like [mà]. Not all speakers do this, and those speakers who do are not consistent in this pronunciation. This reduced form is not used in careful speech or writing (as discussed with RL 110208-02).

the same historic form, that the copulas all have the same suffix does not mean that they have a unified function or feature and they will all be discussed separately.

The speaker must choose the most appropriate copula form for an utterance. For now it is sufficient to summarise this by saying that it must be the form that semantically most closely resembles how they know the information that they assert. Occasionally in naturalistic speech, speakers will omit the copula from utterances, which is discussed in §6.5.3. Working from left to right in the columns of the table, there are four different categories of copula verbs. I will discuss the salient semantic properties of each of these in turn. I will discuss the distinction between equational and existential copula types in the discussion of their syntactic function in §6.1.2.

6.1.1.1 *Ego copulas*

The ego (EGO) copulas²⁰ are used when the speaker is not relying on external evidence, but on their own existent knowledge-state, for an utterance (3).

- 3) a) *ɲà tó sà tè-ti yèba*
 1SG rice.cooked eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I was eating rice.’ (AL 091104-01)
- b) *ɲà=ki mèmeyà mèmeme tìn yè*
 1SG=GEN family people seven COP.EGO
 ‘my family is seven people.’
- c) *òodí mì ɲà=ki rò yimba*
 that person 1SG=GEN friend COP.EGO
 ‘that person is my friend.’ (AL 091109-01)

²⁰ In earlier publications these were left unglossed for semantic content and referred to only as ‘copulas’ (Gawne 2011a, 2011b, San Roque, Gawne, et al. 2012).

In all of the examples above the speaker is either a participant in the event described (3a) or knows from repeated long-term exposure the state of their friendships and family structures (3b) and (3c). In such situations the speaker is drawing, not on external perception, but their own cognitive experience for evidence. Thus the deictic function of the evidential is not to point to a specific event, but to the speaker's own knowledge state. For this reason I will call these copulas ego. Like Garrett (2001), I chose this term because 'ego' rather than 'self' or 'self knowledge' detaches the 'ego' from the 'speaker' - which is useful for question structures, where it is not the questioner's 'self knowledge' that is invoked but their intended responder's (see chapter 7 for more discussion of questions).

The ego construction is common across closely related languages. Within the study of Tibetan the equivalent copulas have been referred to, amongst other things, as 'participant specific' (Agha 1993, p. 157), 'self-centred' (Denwood 2000), 'personal' (Caplow 2000), and 'egophoric' (Garrett 2001, Tournadre and Dorje 2003), or shortened to 'ego' (Garrett 2001). While each of these definitions have their own nuances and caveats, they all speak to the fact that the information for making the assertion comes from the speaker's own knowledge state.

Although the ego copulas, (the equational *yimba* and the existential *yè/yèke/yèba*), occur in different grammatical constructions they share a great deal in common as to the modal information they contribute to an utterance, thus they act as a set. Unlike some dialects of Tibetan such as Dokpa, the *yimba* and *yè* copulas, when used as auxiliaries, do not exhibit different temporal patterns or pragmatic implications (Caplow p. 33). For this reason they will be discussed together, in the same way that their dubitative equivalents *yinqo* and *yèto* will be discussed as a unified set. I will discuss the semantics and usage of the ego copulas in more detail in §6.2. below.

6.1.1.2 Dubitative copulas

The dubitative (DUB) forms *yìndɔ* and *yèto* are used when a speaker is less than completely certain about the proposition in the utterance.²¹ This could either be in situations where the speaker would otherwise have used a perceptual evidential because they can see the event or object, or an ego evidential because they know the propositional content to be true based on personal knowledge. I have indicated this lack of epistemic certainty in the English translation with the use of lexical forms such as ‘possibly’ and ‘may.’

An appropriate context of the use of this type of utterance would be (4), where the speaker has spotted something in the room, but from this distance is unsure if it is a bangle, as it may be an elastic band for tying up hair.

- 4) *dì dîw yìndɔ*
 this bracelet COP.DUB
 ‘this may be a bracelet.’ (RL 101028-04)

In this situation, the speaker believes that it is likely to be a bracelet, but does not have enough evidence to be sure of it. Had the speaker been certain that it was a bracelet it would have been appropriate to use the perceptual evidential copula.

Another example of the use of the dubitative comes from the Multiple Reports experiment (§3.2.6.). AL gave the answer below to situation four, where one person had told her that a person was Gurung using a dubitative copula and another person had told her the person was Tamang, using a perceptual evidential. When I asked her what she thought she replied with (5). The perceptual evidential at the end here is appropriate with a verb of thinking, as it is endopathic (§6.4.2.), what we are

²¹ These were referred to in earlier analyses as ‘uncertainty’ (UNCERT) copulas (Gawne 2011a, San Roque, Gawne, et al. 2012)

focusing on in (5) is the fact that the status of the person as Gurung is marked with a dubitative copula.

- 5) *ɲà=ki sém=la gòroŋ yinɔo née-ku dù*
 1SG=GEN mind=LOC Gurung COP.DUB think -IPFV COP.PE
 ‘in my mind I think (he) is a Gurung (maybe).’ (AL 101013-01)

This is interesting, partly because she does not appear to take the evidential ‘strength’ of the perceptual evidential marked utterance over the dubitative. This is something I will discuss in §6.3.1. It is also interesting because the cognitive verb framing the utterance indicates that the dubitative is about cognitive processes, and not evidential state.

These two examples indicate that the dubitative form is not evidence-based, but instead encodes a lack of epistemic certainty. An utterance like (4) is used in a situation where a speaker is looking at something directly, and would therefore use a perceptual evidential if certain, while (5) is used when a speaker has no visual evidence, but would be drawing on their own knowledge of a person, and therefore would use the ego evidential if they knew the information to be true. Instead, the speaker can use the dubitative regardless of whether their knowledge of the content of the utterance is from direct perception or from personal knowledge. This shows that what is being encoded here is not evidence based, meaning any deictic function does not refer to source of evidence. While an inferential points to the evidence of the resulting state to mark the assumed earlier event, the dubitative does not necessarily point to some outwards event or state, or personal knowledge.

The dubitative can be used for first person, but only if the speaker does not have stronger evidence one way or the other. The utterance in (6) is not possible as it is expected that the speaker would either know one way or the other that they dreamt:

- 6) * *ɲà=ki mílám thón yèto*
 1SG=ERG dream see COP.DUB
 *'I maybe dreamed.' (RL 101028-04)

This is true for all first person past tense events. RL said that for all first person events the preference is to use the ego form. If it is possible to use the dubitative we did not manage to construct a situation where it would be plausible.

The dubitative can be used in situations similar to where the inferential evidential can be used in other languages. For example, in (7) the speaker sees his brother's shoes by the door, because he has not seen his brother he can not use the perceptual evidential, but he can use the dubitative to indicate that his brother is likely to be in the house.

- 7) *rídzan khím=la yèto*
 Rijan house=LOC COP.DUB
 'Rijan is probably in the house.' (RL 110129-01)

The dubitative can also be used for other situations where the speaker does not have direct perceptual evidence, such as to speculate on the thoughts of a second or third party. In (8a) below, the speaker was cooking dinner and spoke to herself, while in (8b) she was addressing her sister who was not providing her any assistance as she was trying to figure out one of the images in the Optical Illusions task (§3.2.8.).

- 8) a) *rò tóo yèto*
 friend hunger COP.DUB
 'my friend is probably hungry.' (KL 23/01/11 Book 8, p. 8)
- b) *khyá áɲ ɲò mà-ɕee yèto*
 2SG also know NEG.PST-know COP.DUB
 'you also probably do not know.' (KL 120304-02 05:39)

The dubitative allows the speaker to voice a statement about the mental state of another person, but not be seen to be presuming to know exactly what another speaker is thinking or feeling. This indicates that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo can talk about the internal states of other people, unlike languages where people have a particularly strong opacity of mind belief (§4.4.). The use of the dubitative in these construction indicates that while they may be able to talk about the mental states of others it may be inappropriate to express certainty about these states.

There are other strategies speakers can use to indicate that they are not certain about the information given. The utterances in (9) are two common strategies, and are drawn from the early stages of the hidden object experiment where people were still trying to guess what the objects were. Most participants used more than one strategy to indicate their uncertainty. The strategies involve either equating the shape with something familiar (9a) or framing the utterance as a question (9b).

- 9) a) *tʃéemi tʃhé límu dù*
small book like COP.PE
 ‘it is like a small book.’ (AL 120212-01 01:45)
- b) *tsá-ke sè yimba*
play-NON.PST thing COP.EGO
 ‘is it a playing thing?’ (ST 120304-01 01:04)

Neither of these strategies involve the use of a dubitative copula. Instead, the use of the manner adverb ‘like’ (Appendix 1 §1.6.3.2) involves a perceptual evidential, and the question involves the copula form that is expected in the question (which is discussed in much more detail in §7.4.1).

The two dubitative copula forms are based on the ego copula forms with the addition of the *-to* suffix (which has undergone voicing after the voiced nasal in

yìnqo (see Appendix 1 §1.2.6.1. for morphophonemics). This suffix is used for dubitative constructions with lexical verbs, however it is used exclusively for non-past events, while the copulas can also occur in past tense constructions. This tense-restriction difference is shown in (10). Both (10a) and (10b) are considered acceptable by speakers, as there is no tense-restriction for the copula form. For the dubitative suffix (10c) is considered grammatical by speakers, but not (10d) as it involves the dubitative suffix on a lexical verb in a past tense utterance, indicated by the presence of ‘yesterday.’

- 10) a) *tàpse khó òŋ yèto*
 now 3SG.M come COP.DUB
 ‘he is probably coming now.’ (RL 101028-04)
- b) *dàŋ m̀=la tóoba yèto*
 yesterday 3SG.F=DAT hunger COP.DUB
 ‘she was probably hungry yesterday.’ (AL 100929-01)
- c) *tiring m̀=la tóo-to*
 today 3SG.F=DAT hunger-DUB
 ‘she is/will be probably hungry today.’ (AL 100929-01)
- d) * *dàŋ m̀=la tóo-to*
 yesterday 3SG.F=DAT hungry-DUB
 * ‘she was probably hungry yesterday.’ (AL 100929-01)

6.1.1.3 Perceptual evidential copulas

The perceptual evidentials (PE) are used to indicate that the source of information is sensory perception.²² The *dùba* form is more emphatic and usually occurs with past tense events.

²² These were referred to in San Roque, Gawne, et al. (2012) as mirative (MIR) forms, following Hari’s (2010) analysis, and in Gawne (2011b) were only glossed as copulas without reference to semantic function.

This class of copulas has been referred to as a ‘perceptual’ evidential but also as ‘sensory’ or ‘direct’ - all of these terms indicate that the evidence does not come from a person’s own knowledge, inference or the reports of others, but instead from directly witnessing the event or the state. Thus the deictic function of the perceptual evidential is to point to some perceivable event or state. Because that which is being pointed out is perceivable it is also a specific instance, and often one that is new to the speaker; if the event were not new or specific the ego copula would suffice, because the speaker is drawing on their existing knowledge state. These different components of the meaning of the perceptual evidential forms will be explored in more detail in the section looking at different copula use in context in §6.3.

As Aikhenvald (2004) demonstrates in her survey of languages with evidential systems, what counts as ‘direct’ or ‘perceived’ evidence can vary greatly from language to language. In this section I will outline what counts as perceptual evidence in Lamjung Yolmo. This is much broader than it is for many other languages, and includes direct perception via any of the senses. Sight is the most frequently used evidence. Both of the examples in (11) come from AL looking at the images in the Jackal and Crow story.

- 11) a) *dì prùl dù*
 this snake COP.PE
 ‘this is a snake.’
 (lit. ‘this snake exists.’) (AL 101010-01 01:08)
- b) *tàbu límu dù*
 horse like COP.PE
 ‘it is like a horse.’ (AL 101010-01 02:34)

The perceptual evidential involves perceived evidence that is direct and not inferred. A person who saw the shadow of a chicken that was in the doorway would not comment on the chicken directly, but instead utter something like (12). Only direct

perception of the chicken would allow the person to talk about the chicken directly, although it would be possible to talk about the chicken directly using the dubitative form.

- 12) *dì tçà=ki t̥psa d̥ù*
 this chicken = GEN shadow COP.PE
 ‘this is a chicken’s shadow.’
 (lit. ‘this chicken’s shadow exists.’) (RL 110129-01)

Hearing can also be used as evidence. In (13) the information is from aural perception.

- 13) *òodi lú yàabu thé-ku d̥ù*
 that song good hear-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘that song sounds good.’ (AL 110129-01)

In Lamjung Yolmo evidence beyond the visual and aural can also be encoded with the perceptual evidential. Two examples illustrate the use of tactile, non-visual evidence in an utterance. In (14) the speaker has picked up a small bag, not expecting that it contains a bottle of water, which made it much heavier than expected.

- 14) *jhola tçéñdi d̥ù*
 bag(Nep) heavy COP.PE
 ‘the bag is heavy.’ (ST 26/01/11 book 8, p. 10)

ST uses the perceptual evidential because she perceives that it is heavy in a way that visual information did not convey.

In (15), the speaker is a neighbour who had joined us for an evening meal. While eating arum root (*yá*), the speaker was trying to find the tastiest ones. In a poorly lit

hut, she was not basing her assessment of the arum’s potential tastiness on visual information, but on their tactile merit as she gently squeezed them. She asked herself as she moved through them:

- 15) *yàabu dù mìnđu*
 good COP.PE COP.PE.NEG
 ‘is (this one) good or not good?’ (22/11/10 book 4, p. 47)

The perceptual evidential is again used and indicates that she was assessing each arum on whether she had evidence that it was good or not, and that evidence came from feeling and not vision.

Speakers of Lamjung Yolmo can also encode olfactory evidence with the perceptual evidential (16).

- 16) *tó ʃima ɕimbu dù*
 rice.cooked aroma tasty COP.PE
 ‘the rice smells tasty.’ (AL 100929-01)

This is different to the parameters of the cognate verb in Dokpa (Caplow 2000, p. 22), which does not allow olfactory evidence. In Dokpa, olfactory evidence can only be discussed using an inferential form. Perhaps it is because Lamjung Yolmo does not have an inferential evidential category that smell-based evidence can be encoded with the direct perception evidential.

As well as the frequently used *dù* form there is the *dùba* form, which I have glossed as ‘emphatic.’ This emphatic dimension means that it can occasionally have a mirative-like sense (§5.2.3.). This means that in some contexts an utterance like (17)

These examples are useful because it is almost impossible to construe a way in which these utterances are mirative. AL gives no indication of being more surprised by these events than any others. When I asked her what the difference would be in choosing to use *dù* or *dùba* in example (18c) she said *dùba* would be for a book that would remain on the table whereas *dù* would be for a book that was moved. Example (18d) was given when I had stopped the video after the flower had been removed. So here *dùba* represents something static or completed while *dù* is used for something that is still in progress, hence why we see *dù* used with imperfective aspect and *dùba* with completed events.

Volitionality does not appear to be as important to the use of perceptual evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo as it is in closely related languages (for Sherpa see Kelly 2004, for Standard Tibetan see Tournadre 2008). In those languages the perceptual with first person indicates a lack of volitionality on behalf of the speaker. In Lamjung Yolmo this is not a major feature of the semantics of the perceptual evidential. For example, if a person broke a pencil accidentally they would say the same thing as if they broke it deliberately (19). This does not involve the inclusion of a copula.

- 19) *ŋà=ki tchá tè-sin*
 1SG=ERG break AUX-PST
 ‘I broke (the pencil).’ (RL 120217-02)

The perceptual evidential would only be used if an action was non-volitional and not witnessed. Instead, the end result is witnessed, which is why the perceptual is used, and why the emphatic form is preferred. For example, in (20) the pencil is accidentally broken in the bag, but the speaker did not find out about it at the time, realising it later when they found the pieces in the bottom of their bag.

- 20) *ŋà=ki kálam tçhá dùba*
 1SG=ERG pencil(Nep) break COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘I have broken the pencil.’ (RL 120217-02)

This is less intrinsically linked to volitionality, and is more closely linked to the marking of information about an event that is completed, that is newly perceived at the time of utterance, and then the sense of volitionality arises from this. The use of the emphatic form is linked as much to the perfective-past sense that the *-pa* adds as it is to any emphatic newness. I will pick up on this usage in more detail in the discussion of the relationship between copula choice and person marking (§6.4.).

Finally, although the perceptual evidential is used when an event is perceived, this does not mean that it is obligatory to use the perceptual evidential when talking about information that you have through perceptual evidence. All three of the utterances in (21) were made when speakers were describing a novel item that they were looking at in various stimulus-based activities, yet none of them involve the use of the perceptual evidential copula.

- 21) a) *dì hããs yimba*
 this duck(Nep) COP.EGO
 ‘this is a duck.’ (AL 120209-01 02:29)
- b) *tàze bòkas nàŋla táŋa yè*
 now box(Nep) inside money COP.EGO
 ‘now the money is inside the box’ (RL 110208-02 04:11)
- c) *ŋómbu yimba*
 green COP.EGO
 ‘it is green’ (AL 120209-02 01:07)

These uses are not anomalies, but a common part of how people describe the world as they perceive it. I will discuss all of these examples, and the context of their use, in §6.3.3.

6.1.1.4 General fact copulas

The final copula form is the general fact (GF) *ònge*. While the above are used for specific statements, the general fact copula is used for statements of commonly-known fact. The facts are usually attributes or properties of things, and the copula does not occur in identification constructions, only existence (§6.1.2.). Unlike the other categories of copulas, general fact copulas do not have an additional function as clause final auxiliary particles. The difference between the general state copula and the ego copula can be seen in (22).

- 22) a) *dì kágati kyúrpu yè*
 this lemon(Nep) sour COP.EGO
 ‘this lemon is sour.’ (AL 091016-02)
- b) *kágati kyúrpu ònge*
 lemon(Nep) sour COP.GF
 ‘lemons are sour.’ (AL 091016-02)

The general fact copula can also be used for a specific entity, usually a person, if the property it possesses is generally known. This can be expressed with a noun and adjective as above, or as in (23) where there are two noun phrases.

- 23) *khó yàabu mì ònge*
 3SG.M good person COP.GF
 ‘he is a good man.’ (UL 110115-01)

This copula only appears to be used to ascribe a generally expected state or an entity. Verbs can also be used in this construction; here one speaker uses the infinitive construction (24a) while the other uses the *-kandi* nominaliser for the same utterance (24b).

- 24) a) *ɲâl-tɕe yàabu òŋge*
 sleep-INF good COP.GF
 ‘sleep is good.’ (RL 101125-01)
- b) *ɲâl-kandi yàabu òŋge*
 sleep-NOM good COP.GF
 ‘sleep is good.’ (VL 101224-01)

The deictic function of this evidential form is more difficult to pinpoint than for the ego or perceptual evidential. The evidence comes from many observed instances, but also from the general consensus that this is the general state to be observed. That the general fact can only be used for such specific instances limits the variation in use.

The general stative copula is most likely derived from the lexical verb *òŋ* ‘to come’. It is an unusual process for a lexical verb meaning ‘come’ to become a copula where there is no sense of a change of state. Nordhoff (2009) synthesised a collection of responses he received after asking for examples of copula-type verbs derived from ‘come.’ Although there were many examples cross-linguistically of ‘come’ verbs grammaticalising into copula-like ‘become’ verbs, there were no examples other than Yolmo where the verb ‘come’ has grammaticalised into a copula. Tournadre and Jiatso (2000, p. 57) observe that the Standard Tibetan final auxiliaries all derived from action, motion or stative verbs, so perhaps it is not so unusual a process in these languages.

Although this copula may have been derived from a lexical source, there is clearly some morphological reanalysis underway. The copula can be distinguished from the related lexical verb by the fact that speakers will leave the non-past tense marker on the copula when there is a negator prefix (25b). With the lexical verb *òḡ-* the non-past tense suffix is dropped (25d) as with all lexical verbs (Appendix 1 §1.5.5.)

- 25) a) *kálaḡ sè kyúrpu òḡge*
 lapsi sour COP.GF
 ‘lapsi (fruit) are sour.’ (RL 101125-01)
- b) *kálaḡ sè ḡàrmu mèòḡge*
 lapsi sweet COP.GF
 ‘lapsi (fruit) are not sweet.’ (RL 101125-01)
- c) *áma nàḡbar òḡ-ke*
 mother tomorrow come-NON.PST
 ‘mother is coming tomorrow.’ (AL 100924-01)
- d) *ába mè-òḡ*
 father NEG.NON.PST-come
 ‘father is not coming.’ (AL 100924-01)

Speakers will still understand, and very occasionally use, the negative form of the general stative copula as *mèòḡ* instead of *mèòḡge*, indicating that for some speakers the reanalysis of the form *òḡge* as a single item is still not complete.

The general fact copula can only be used for present tense facts. According to all speakers that I asked, example (23) above could not be expressed using the past tense (26).

- 26) * *khó yàabu mì òḡ-sin*
 3SG.M good person COP.GF-PST
 *‘he was a good man.’ (UL 110115-01)

Instead the speaker would use the ego copula for past tense constructions (27).

- 27) *khó yàabu mì yèke*
 3SG.M good person COP.EGO.PST
 ‘he was a good man.’ (UL 110115-01)

When I asked another speaker about something that was generally considered to be a fact, but not in the present, he said (28) would not be acceptable.

- 28) *dinosaurs tchómbo *ònge/ *òŋ-sin*
 dinosaurs(Eng) big COP.GF/COP.GF -PST
 ‘dinosaurs *are/*were big (they said).’ (RL 101125-01)

This is because the fact is not current. Although RL (who had studied dinosaurs at school) could agree that dinosaurs had indeed been big animals, the general fact copula could not be used because it is a historical fact. For such facts he offered the structure in (29), which other speakers have also given as a way of capturing generally known facts that are no longer current.

- 29) *dinosaurs tchómbo yèke ló*
 dinosaurs(Eng) big COP.EGO.PST RS
 ‘dinosaurs are/were big.’ (RL 101125-01)

I will return to this specific use of the reported speech marker in chapter §8.2.1.

Of all of the semantic categories of copula forms in Lamjung Yolmo, the general fact copula shows the least variation in use across speakers. Speakers consistently provide exactly the same construction (30), and there is a very robust agreement

across different people as to when it is appropriate, even if they disagree on other details.

30) a) *tháa màrpu ònge*
blood red COP.GF
'blood is red.' (VL 101224-01)

b) *tháa nàkpu ònge*
blood black COP.GF
'blood is black.' (UL 110115-01)

Not only are speakers remarkably consistent as to when they give the general fact copula in elicitation, but it also occurs very infrequently in the interactional data in my corpus. Although in this section I have given it equal prominence in its description, this form is actually much less prominent than the others in the genres of talk that I have captured and as such will not be discussed in much further detail.

Across the four different types of copulas we see that three have evidential semantics (ego, perceptual evidential and general fact), while one has a more epistemic modal sense (the dubitative). I will come back to all of these forms and present more contextually nuanced analyses in the sections below, but before that I explain their syntactic properties.

6.1.2. *Use as copula verbs*

All of the forms above are used in Lamjung Yolmo as copula verbs. They do not co-occur or combine, but are used individually. In this section I will look at the syntactic properties of their role as copula verbs. It should be noted here that by 'copula' I am referring to both forms that have equational (NP NP COP) and existential (NP (Adj/NP = LOC) COP) structures.

The equational copula has the primary function of identifying something by equating two independent noun phrases (NP NP COP). There is an ego form *yimba* (31a) and (31b) and a dubitative form *yindo* (31c). The general fact *oŋge* used in equational constructions is marginal, nor can the regular form of the perceptual evidential *dù* be used. There are examples of the emphatic perceptual evidential *dùba* in equational constructions; these are discussed later in this section.

- 31) a) *dì kàpu yimba*
 this old.animate COP.EGO
 ‘this is and old man.’ (SBL 101124-03 00:55)
- b) *òodì mì ñà=ki rò yimba*
 that person 1SG=GEN friend COP.EGO
 ‘that person is my friend.’ (AL 091109-01)
- c) *dì kítàb yindo*
 this book(Nep) COP.DUB
 ‘this is probably a book.’ (RL 120219-01 03:09)

The equational forms contrast with existential forms, which are used to show that something exists. The ego form is *yè* (32) and the dubitative form is *yèto*.²³

- 32) *mò yèke*
 3SG.F COP.EGO.PST
 ‘she was.’
 (lit. ‘she existed.’) (AL 100922-01)

²³ There are actually very few examples of the existential functioning exclusively as an existential, which is why there is no example of the dubitative existential in this role. Instead most examples are of the other functions it has, which are described below.

The ‘existential’ copula is somewhat misleading as a name, as it performs a variety of functions, existential constructions being one of the less frequent. These functions include locative, possessional and attributive constructions. This is similar to other Tibeto-Burman languages. Genetti (2007, p. 190), van Driem (1993, p. 168) and Hari (2010) all refer to the ‘existential’ copula even though it often includes other functions, including existence, location, possession and attribution. Caplow (2000) coined the term ELPA to make it clear that this copula construction is not used exclusively for existential constructions. The term ELPA has also been taken up by Garrett (2001). Although I find that the acronym ELPA makes the multiple function of the copula more apparent I will use the more generally accepted term “existential” in this thesis. The ego and dubitative can both be used in all of these constructions, however there are some constructions for which I do not have examples of the dubitative in my corpus.

The locative function requires the presence of a locative marker (33).

- 33) a) *ŋà khím = la yè*
 1SG house = LOC COP.EGO
 ‘I am in the house.’ (AL 090916-02)
 (lit: ‘I in the house exist.’)
- b) *çàmu ŋà = ki gòo = la yè*
 hat 1SG = GEN head = LOC COP.EGO
 ‘the hat is on my head.’ (AL 090916-02)
 (lit: ‘the hat exists on my head.’)
- c) *khó khím = la yèto*
 3SG.M house = LOC COP.DUB
 ‘he is probably in the house.’ (AL 090916-02)

Possessional use of the existential copula involves a dative case marked possessor (34).

- 34) *ŋà = la làkpa ní yè*
 1SG = DAT hand two COP.EGO
 ‘I have two hands.’ (AL 120122-01)

The final use of the existential copula discussed here is in attribution, where a quality, expressed using an adjective, is attributed to somebody or something (35).

- 35) a) *khyá nà-ti yèke*
 2SG be.ill-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘you were ill.’ (AL 091104-01)
- b) *dì tchú sùŋbu yè*
 this water clean COP.EGO
 ‘this water is clean.’ (AL 091001-01)
- c) *khó tchúkpu yèto*
 3SG.M rich COP.DUB
 ‘he is probably rich.’ (AL 091001-01)

There is also the much less frequently used *yèba* form of the equational copula. It is a form that is found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo as well; Hari (2010, p. 49) describes it as being the same as the *yè* form but more emphatic. In Lamjung Yolmo it is also restricted to past tense constructions, like lexical verbs with the *-pa* past tense suffix (Appendix 1 §1.5.3.1.2.). Historically, it is the existential equivalent of the equational ego form *yimba*, whose unsuffixed equivalent *yin* has been lost from the Lamjung dialect. While *yimba* has become the generic form in the absence of *yin* for speakers of Lamjung Yolmo, the *yèba* form is still marked as past tense (36) in contrast to the non-past *yè*.

- 36) *ŋà tó sà tèt-ti yèba*
 1SG rice.cooked eat aux-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I had eaten rice.’ (AL 091104-01)

Unlike the perceptual evidential equivalent *dùba*, it is also often used for questions (37). This role in questions is discussed in more detail in §7.1.3.

- 37) *ɲà=ki mobil kàla yèba tɕí*
 1SG=GEN mobile.phone(Eng) where COP.EGO.PST what
 ‘where is my phone?’ (AL 120311-01)

The perceptual evidential *dù* (38a-c) and the general fact copula *ònge* (38d) can only occur in existential constructions.

- 38) a) *náriwal tòŋbo dù*
 coconut tree COP.PE
 ‘there is a coconut tree.’
 (lit. ‘a coconut tree exists.’) (AL 091108-01 07:14)
- b) *ɲà=ki pìza dâla dù*
 1SG=GEN baby here COP.PE
 ‘my baby is here.’ (AL 091109-04)
- c) *khyá nâ-ti dù*
 2SG be.ill-PERF COP.PE
 ‘you are ill.’ (AL 091104-01)
- d) *tɕíni ñàrmu ònge*
 sugar sweet COP.GF
 ‘sugar is sweet’ (AL 120127-01)

In comparison, the *dùba* form can occur in both existential (39a) and equational constructions (39b). This is reflected in Table 6.1. by the inclusion of the *dùba* form in the equational category, but not the *dù* form. It has been bracketed as it is not a highly frequent function of this form.

- 39) a) *kòpça ráŋgi tché dùba*
 shoe and book COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘(they are) a shoe and a book.’ (AL 101006-01 01:01:25)
- b) *khó-dí cérma dùba*
 3SG.M-FOC girl.young COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘he is a girl.’ (SBL 101124-03 22:14)

(39a) is from description of one of the Put Project videos (§3.2.3.). (39b) is from the Family Story task (§3.2.1.) where SBL just decided that the person he was describing as a man is a woman, and so we have the sense of surprise or unexpectedness that leads to the emphatic perceptual evidential sometimes having a mirative dimension. This use in equational structures is highly uncommon for cognate forms in related Tibeto-Burman languages, which only occur in existential constructions.

6.1.3. Use as clause final markers

A subset of the copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo also have an additional role as an auxiliary verb in some clause types. In (40a) the copula is the main verb in the clause, while in (40b), the copula comes after a lexical verb as an additional component of the verb phrase. Many of the examples in §6.1.1. were constructions of this type, and I will now look at their structure in more detail.

- 40) a) *òodi lú yàabu dù*
 that song good COP.PE
 ‘that song is good.’ (RL 110129-01)
- b) *òodi lú yàabu thé-ku dù*
 that song good hear-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘that song sounds good.’ (RL 110129-01)

The general fact copula (*òŋge*) and equational ego (*yìmba*) and equational dubitative (*yìndqo*) copulas are not used for anything beyond standard copula verb constructions (although the ego copulas are used in nominalised forms which look similar, as discussed in §1.5.3.1.1. of the sketch grammar and mentioned briefly below). When used as verbal auxiliaries, the copula verbs bring to the utterance the same modal sense that they have as copulas, thus Table 6.2. summarises the copulas that have this use. I will refer to them as auxiliary copulas when they are used for this function. This is a subset of Table 6.1.

	<i>Ego</i>	<i>Dubitative</i>	<i>Perceptual evidence</i>
<i>present</i>	<i>yè</i> <i>mè</i>	<i>yèto</i> <i>mèto</i>	<i>dù</i> <i>mìndu</i>
<i>past</i>	<i>yèke yèba</i> <i>mèke mèba</i>		<i>dùba</i> <i>mìnduba</i>

Table 6.2. Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs used as clause final auxiliaries including negative forms.

These auxiliary copulas are used as sentence-final elements in a number of main, constructions, and some copulas only occur in some of these. The tense and aspectual structures that use copulas as auxiliaries are perfective and imperfective, narrative past and habitual mood. I will discuss these in turn. I will then briefly discuss the use of the nominalised form, which has a similar surface structure, but different constraints, from the others.

In all of these structures the auxiliary copulas are grammatically obligatory elements. The use of the auxiliary copula gives modal information and if the auxiliary copula used is an ego form then it can also contribute tense information to the utterance. Speakers will consider perfective, imperfective and habitual

constructions ungrammatical if the copula is not present. Although this is a robust assessment by speakers in elicitation and transcription sessions, speakers can omit the auxiliary copula from the utterance in naturalistic speech, which is discussed in §6.5.3. The absence of an auxiliary copula in the narrative past results in a standard past tense construction. This means that there are a number of constructions that do not have copula forms as part of their construction. This includes regular past and non-past tense constructions, as well as a number of moods including imperative and optative. These have not been included in Table 6.2. This is because where there is a choice of clause final copula, these are the choices, and a ‘zero’ modal marking is not an option, while for the other structures there is no clause final copula as part of the construction. The distribution of these copula-less constructions is discussed in 6.5.2. while the majority of this chapter is focused on assessing the distribution of the copula verbs in those constructions where they do occur, including copula constructions and those that use the copula as an auxiliary.

Auxiliary copulas are used at the end of clauses with imperfective or perfective aspect. As can be seen below, some auxiliary copulas only collocate with certain structures; this is discussed in §1.5.3.2.2. of the sketch grammar (Appendix 1), and in the relevant sections below. There are three imperfective aspect structures, all of which involve clause-final auxiliary copulas. The first involves the lexical verb suffix *-ku*, which only correlates with the perceptual evidential *dù* (example 41a); the second contains the lexical verb suffix *-teraŋ* (example 41b and 41c), which can occur with any of the auxiliary copulas in Table 6.2.; and the third includes the auxiliary verb *tè*, which can also occur with any of the clause-final auxiliary copula set (example 41d and 41e). The perfective *-ti* suffix can be used with the ego (41f) or perceptual evidential (42g).

- 41) a) *thún thun ləp-ku dù*
 drink drink say-IPFV COP.PE
 “‘drink, drink’ (they) say.’ (SL 091108-01 19:37)

- b) *ɲà tàpse tè-teraŋ yè*
 1SG now sit-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘I am now sitting.’ (AL 110204-01)
- c) *mò kòlela tè-teraŋ dù*
 3SG.F slowly sit -IPFV COP.PE
 ‘she is slowly sitting.’ (AL 101023-03)
- d) *ɲà ɲàl tè-ti yèke*
 1SG sleep AUX-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I have been sleeping’ (AL 101008-01)
- e) *mò sà tè-ti dù*
 3SG.F eat AUX -PERF COP.PE
 ‘she has been eating’ (AL 101008-01)
- f) *ɲà khím=la lò-ti yè*
 1SG house=DAT return-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I have returned home.’ (AL 120318-02)
- g) *lùndi=ki tɕé tèn-ti dù*
 jackal=GEN tongue go.out-PERF COP.PE
 ‘the jackal’s tongue went out.’ (KL 101026-06 06:50)

There is no grammaticalised way to produce a clause with imperfective aspect and *not* include an auxiliary copula, although when used in interaction people will occasionally omit the copula (§6.5.3.).

Another structure in which clause-final copulas are used is the habitual (Appendix 1, §1.5.3.2.3.). In this structure the ego existential auxiliary copula *yè/yèke* is used with either a bare verb stem (42a) or the infinitive (42b):

42) a) *ɲà ɲìma ʔàɲmaraŋ khúra sà yèke*
 1SG day every bread eat COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I used to eat bread every day.’ (AL 101001-01)

b) *ɲà sà-dze yèke*
 1SG eat-INF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I used to eat.’ (AL 091009-03)

The final structure in which clause-final copulas are used is the narrative past. This is comprised of the standard past tense *-sin* with the *dù* auxiliary copula. This form is frequently used in narrative, hence the name, and can be seen in examples such as AL telling the Family Story (43).

43) *só nà-ti tèt-sin dù*
 tooth sore-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘the tooth had been sore.’ (AL 091108-01 14:49)

The meaning of this construction in Melamchi Valley Yolmo is described by Hari (2010, p. 62) as “I wasn’t there at the time when it happened, but I found out later.” However, it frequently occurs in elicitation for video and image-based stimulus in the same descriptive passage as other perceptual evidential constructions that are predicated on direct perception (in both analyses of Melamchi Valley and Lamjung Yolmo). For example, these two sentences occurred in succession in the description of a video in the Reciprocals Project video set (§3.2.3.).

44) a) *pèmpiza ɲí làŋ tèt-sin dù*
 woman two stand AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘two women were standing.’ (AL 101006-01 49:51)

b) *tçíi=ki tçíi=la káp tér-ku dù*
 one=ERG one=DAT cup give -IPFV COP.PE
 ‘one was giving (the other) one a cup.’ (AL 101006-01 50:05)

The women were standing at the start of the video, so AL is commenting on something she saw. I will discuss its use alongside that of the regular past tense in the section on copula-less constructions in §6.5.3.

All of these examples use forms taken from Table 6.2. All of the auxiliary copulas in that table are existential copulas, which have the additional function of being auxiliaries for lexical verbs. The final structure I will discuss here is the nominalised structure that often occurs as part of a regular verbal paradigm. As discussed in the section on nominalisation in the sketch grammar (Appendix 1 §1.6.4.), nominalised structures such as (45) are often used by speakers. This structure can be used in non-past situations, especially to mark greater formality.

- 45) *ŋà ɲàl-kandi yimba*
 1SG sleep-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘I will sleep.’ (AL 090928-02)

On the surface this looks much like the structures in (41)-(44), with an auxiliary copula verb in the presence of a lexical verb. The difference here is that the verbal suffix is a nominaliser, and as such the speakers treat the verb as a nominal, and with two noun phrases to be equated use the equational copula. Although this nominalised form has a surface structure similar to that of those clauses that have a copula used as an auxiliary - and there is no reason to assume speakers perceive them as anything else - they still conform to the syntactic structure of true copulas (in that they equate two noun-phrases) and thus are treated as such.

As I mentioned above in regard to (41) there is an aspectual auxiliary that is distinct from the auxiliary copulas. This is the auxiliary verb *tè-* which brings durative aspect to an utterance. It originates from the lexical verb *tè-* ‘to sit.’ In (46) we see that the lexical verb takes either an additional aspectual or modal marker (46a and

46b) or no aspectual marker (46c). The *tè-* auxiliary always occurs with one of the copulas that can function as auxiliaries. This concurrence means that the auxiliary copulas and the aspectual auxiliary *tè-* occur in different grammatical slots, and are different types of auxiliaries.

- 46) a) *ŋà lèn-teraŋ tè-ti yè*
 1SG sing-IPFV AUX-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I have been singing’ (AL 091028-04)
- b) *ŋà qò-ŋi tè-ku dũ*
 1SG go-OPT AUX -IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I am wanting to go.’ (AL 100923-01)
- c) *ŋà ɲàl tè-ti yèke*
 1SG sleep AUX-PERF COP.PST
 ‘I have been sleeping’ (AL 101008-01)

You will observe that in (46) I have glossed *tè-* as AUX, but the copulas remain glossed as COP and not AUX. This is because in this thesis, while the syntactic role that the copulas play needs to be acknowledged, the primary motivation is to study how they are used in interaction. As I will be discussing examples where the forms occur as a copula or an auxiliary, with focus on the semantic value rather than specifically on the syntactic structure, I have decided to gloss the forms consistently so as to focus on their similarities in establishing knowledge states in interaction. I will, however, refer to the auxiliary function of the copulas in the prose description of the examples where relevant.

The extension of copula verbs to verbal auxiliaries is a common process in languages of the Bodic branch of the Tibeto-Burman language family. It also occurs in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari, 2010, p. 54), Sherpa (Kelly 2004, p. 351), Kurtöp (Hyslop 2011a), Standard Tibetan (Garrett 2001) and Dokpa Tibetan (Caplow 2000). It must be noted here that unlike Standard and Dokpa Tibetan, the use of copulas as

clause-final auxiliaries in Melamchi Valley and Lamjung Yolmo is not a complex composition of multiple copula forms. Unlike Standard Tibetan, in which Vokurková (2008) observes that the copulas and the additional tense/aspect information act as a “single verbal ending,” the copula verbs are not necessarily part of the same phonetic, semantic or syntactic unit as the main lexical verb, and are easy to separate out, both by speakers and in analysis. Only one copula may be used in a structure. This makes Yolmo more like Sherpa, and results in a smaller number of contrasts.

6.1.4. Negation and Lamjung Yolmo copulas

Negation is not a major focus of the analysis of this thesis, however there are some examples given with negative polarity as well as positive polarity. Therefore, this section is intended to serve as a brief introduction to how negation and the semantics of the copula verbs interact. All of the copulas in the paradigm have a single negative equivalent. This is slightly different to lexical verbs, which have two different negative prefixes, with one being used for non-past and the other being used for past and imperative constructions (§2.2.4.5. or sketch grammar §1.5.5.). I will go through them in turn, giving particular attention to the relationship between negation and the evidential value within the clause. Although the negation attaches to the copula directly for all forms, the modal value scopes over the negation in copulas in Lamjung Yolmo.

With the ego copula, the evidence is internal and tied to the assertions people make, and it not part of the scope of the negation. (47) gives examples of negated ego copulas with both a copula of identification *mìn* (47a) and one of existence *mè* (47b). The speaker is not negating their knowledge state, but only the propositional content of the utterance.

- 47) a) *mò gòroŋ mìn*
 3SG.F Gurung COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘she is not Gurung.’ (AL 110217-02)
- b) *ŋà nímu táŋa mè*
 1SG with money COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘I have no money with me.’ (RL 120217-02)

In neither of these the participant can be said to be negating their own knowledge of the proposition they are putting forth, so we can say that the negation scopes under the evidential value of the utterance.

The dubitative forms in (48) also include both an identification form (*mìnɔ*) and an existential form (*mètɔ*).

- 48) a) *kauli mìnɔ*
 cauliflower(Nep) COP.DUB.NEG
 ‘it is probably not a cauliflower.’ (SL 120214-02 10:44)
- b) *mì òŋ mètɔ*
 person come COP.DUB.NEG
 ‘the person is probably not coming.’ (RL 101028-04)

In this situation the negation has scope over the content of the clause, but not the possibility, so the evidential scopes over the negation.

The perceptual evidential copulas have the clearest relationship between the evidential value and negation of all of the forms under consideration. Both of the utterances in (49) involve a person looking at the thing that is being referenced.

49) a) *òodi khí tçómbó m̀ndu*
 that dog big COP.PE.NEG
 ‘that dog is not big.’ (AL 100924-01)

b) *nàŋla tçí àŋ m̀ndu*
 inside nothing COP.DUB.NEG
 ‘there is nothing inside.’ (AL 110217-03 01:50)

With the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo, it is not the act of perceiving that is negated, but the information that is being described with the perceptual evidential. Therefore, the scopes under the perceptual evidential.

As I mentioned in the section on the general fact copula (§6.1.1.4), the negative form is different to that of its lexical cognate. We can see this in (50).

50) *kálaŋ sè ŋàrmu m̀èðŋge*
 lapsi sweet COP.GF.NEG
 ‘lapsi (fruit) are not sweet.’ (RL 101125-01)

The scope of the negation with the general fact copula is quite difficult to discern compared to some of the other examples. It is possible that it can be interpreted that the negation scopes over the evidential, and so it could be that lapsi are sweet, but this is not a generally known fact. However, in this specific instance (given that lapsi are very sour), and what appears to be the case for all uses of the general fact, the negation scopes under the evidential and is instead negating the property of the item referred to, and not its status as a general fact.

As mentioned in §5.2.2.2, some have argued that evidentials are different to the category of modals because negation does not scope over evidentials (Willett 1988, de Haan 1997). Although the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo scopes over negation, this is not a definitive reason to exclude it from a discussion of modality,

especially given that the dubitative, which is clearly modal, also appears to scope over negation.

6.1.5. Summary

In this section I have shown the types of copula verbs found in Lamjung Yolmo and their semantic and syntactic distribution. However, this level of description is still inadequate for explaining how we find patterns like AL's choices of copula while referring to the colour of the scarf that I presented at the start of the chapter (2), and the wider variation that we see in these verbs in interaction. For example, in (51) two speakers are looking at the image of an ox at the same time, but use different evidential forms, based on their different knowledge states. The difference is that while AL knew what the image was all along, SL had been trying to guess.

- 51) a) *láj láj*
ox ox
'an ox, an ox.' (SL 120214-02 11:29)
- b) *láj yimba*
ox COP.EGO
'it is an ox.' (AL 120214-02 11:30)
- c) *láj ðù*
ox COP.PE
'it is an ox.'
(lit. 'an ox exists.')

Now that we are armed with an idea of the basic syntactic and semantic properties of these verbs we can look at situations where speakers manipulate the meaning of these forms in interaction like those in (2) and (51) in more detail.

6.2. Ego copulas in more detail

Although I defined the ego copulas in §6.1.1.1. as expressing speakers' own personal knowledge of an event, their role in the copula paradigm is somewhat more complicated. First, in §6.2.1. I will show that the Lamjung Yolmo ego copulas are different to the sense of 'egophoric' in Standard Tibetan. I will then look at the use of Lamjung Yolmo ego copulas in more detail (§6.2.2.), including some uses of the ego copula that have the role of evidentially neutral copulas in some contexts (§6.2.3.).

6.2.1. Lamjung Yolmo ego and Tibetan egophoric

It is already apparent from the description in §6.1.1.1. that the Lamjung Yolmo ego copula functions somewhat differently to the Standard Tibetan egophoric forms, even though they are cognate. Before I begin this discussion I will briefly clarify terminology. I am referring to the Lamjung Yolmo copulas *yimba* and *yè* (and their negative equivalents) as 'ego' and the Standard Tibetan *yin* and *yod* as 'egophoric.' This is different to Garrett's (2001) analysis in which he refers to the Standard Tibetan egophoric as 'ego' in his analysis. I will refer to these Standard Tibetan forms as 'egophoric' as per Tournadre's (2008) analysis for ease of distinction. Although the terms 'ego' and 'egophoric' are unfortunately not particularly distinct, other proposed names for the Lamjung Yolmo ego have so far proved unsatisfactory. I will discuss these terms at the end of this section. An alternative would be to refer to both Lamjung Yolmo forms and Standard Tibetan forms as 'ego' or 'egophoric.' I have considered this, but given that most of the discussion in this thesis is about teasing apart the differences between the semantics of the forms in these two languages I do not feel that it will bring anything new to the analysis. Given that I will still need to explain the difference between the Lamjung Yolmo ego and the Standard Tibetan egophoric in all discussions it will also be easier to keep their names slightly different as well. Although the Lamjung Yolmo ego and Standard Tibetan egophoric have some differences in their function they share enough in common to have this reflected in the terminology. The final issue is that Tournadre

(2008, Tournadre and Dorje 2003) uses ‘egophoric’ to refer to both the specific copula and verbal auxiliary forms, as well as the system whereby speakers choose different forms, as opposed to using the terminology ‘conjunct/disjunct’ (which I discussed in §5.5.3.). In this section I am not referring to the entire system, but only to the specific forms of this name.

In Standard Tibetan the egophoric forms require either a first person subject, or a close personal connection to the subject (§5.2.2.3), I contrast the Lamjung Yolmo ego forms can be used with any person reference (§6.4.3.). Unlike in Standard Tibetan, this does not presume that there is some personal connection between the speaker and the item in the subject position. In (52) we see AL’s response when asked during the performance of a magic trick, to name the item being shown to her.

- 52) *dì kàlda yìmba*
 this bag COP.EGO
 ‘it’s a bag’ (AL 110217-03 01:44)

This is the default way of answering this question, and in no way was AL asserting that the bag is hers, which would be the only possible reading of an equivalent utterance in Standard Tibetan (Tournadre p.c.). As I introduced in chapter five, in the analysis of egophoric in Standard Tibetan we saw that any non-first person use of the egophoric copula was still deeply connected to the speaker, as per the example from DeLancey (1986), quoted in Garrett (2001) and repeated here as (53).

- 53) *bod-la g.yag yod*
Tibet-loc yak [ego ELPA]²⁴
a) ??'There are yaks in Tibet.'
b) 'I have yaks in Tibet.'
c) 'My yaks are in Tibet.'

(DeLancey 1986, p. 204, quoted in Garrett 2001, p. 102, ex. 1
Garrett has inserted the question marks)

For this kind of egophoric evidential Garrett shows that the only interpretations can be where the speaker is directly linked to the semantic content of the utterance, even if it does not overtly include a first person pronoun.

Tournadre (1996, 2008) refers to the type of Standard Tibetan egophoricity in (53) as having 'wide' scope, and claims it can be used with third person subjects while still relating back to the speaker as in (53b) and (53c), (53a) being too wide and not related back to the speaker at all is therefore not a valid interpretation for speakers of Standard Tibetan. This 'wide' scope is in contrast with 'narrow' scope egophorics, which can only be used with a first person subject. As we saw with Yolmo above, ego copulas do not relate to the subject of the sentence, or the relationship of the speaker to the subject, but instead express the speaker's knowledge. Therefore, the involvement of the speaker in the propositional content of the two languages is slightly different.

For Standard Tibetan the egophoric involves the idea that the speaker knows about something because they have participated or were involved (as subject), as in the narrow scope reading, or they have a personal connection to the event, as per the wide scope use. Garrett (2001, p. 52) describes this as a "direct link between the origo and the situation reported," which is a useful way to think about the

²⁴ As mentioned in §6.1.2 above, ELPA in Garrett's (2001) analysis stands for **E**xistential, **L**ocative, **P**ossessional and **A**tributive - referring to the syntactic structures in which this copula appears. It is a term taken from Caplow (2000).

egophoric, but to my mind this implies that there is only a relationship between two elements in the construction of the utterance. Instead it is best to consider it as a relationship between three elements - the speaker, their knowledge state and the event. The egophoric in Tibetan requires that the event be related to the speaker in some way, and it is the speaker's knowledge through this close relationship that allows the use of the egophoric copula. In Lamjung Yolmo, however, the ego copula does not refer to the speaker's relation to the state or event, but only to their knowledge of it. It is for this reason that the Lamjung Yolmo ego forms can be used with any grammatical person as subject, while there is the 'narrow' scope restriction on some of the egophoric forms in Standard Tibetan.

As I have demonstrated in this section, although the Lamjung Yolmo ego and Standard Tibetan egophoric have some similarities, closer analysis shows that they are actually slightly different phenomena. To separate the type of ego usage we see in Lamjung Yolmo from the more specific and restrictive use in Standard Tibetan, I will continue to refer to the ego in Lamjung Yolmo and the egophoric in Standard Tibetan. Other names are possible for the Lamjung Yolmo ego forms, but none of these have proven satisfactory. Terms such as 'personal knowledge' do not adequately capture the breadth of situations the Lamjung Yolmo copula is used in, while names based around 'self' risk of being confused with the discussion in Hargreaves analysis of Kathmandu Newar (§5.5.2.). This option also doesn't reflect the fact that it is not the 'self' who is the epistemic source in questions (§7.4.1). Referring to the Lamjung Yolmo ego forms as 'assertive' was also considered, but not taken up. Although it attempts to capture the fact that the speaker is making the statement based on personal assertion, it implies there is something less assertive about the general fact or perceptual copulas. The term 'ego' captures the fact that the source of information is inherent to the speaker, but it also distinguishes that the information does not necessarily pertain to the ego by not using the self-centric term 'egophoric.'

The egophoric in Standard Tibetan is used for the personal knowledge of the speaker through close personal relation to the subject of the utterance, either because they are the subject, or the subject is closely related to them. In Lamjung Yolmo, the ego is the personal knowledge of the speaker, but the speaker is not necessarily related closely to the subject of the utterance. In §6.2.2. I look at examples of this in more detail.

6.2.2. *Ego copulas in Lamjung Yolmo*

In §6.2.1. I described the main difference between the Lamjung Yolmo ego and the Standard Tibetan egophoric as being that the Lamjung Yolmo forms do not have the same restriction on the choice of subject. Having said that, the first thing that is apparent is that the ego is the preferred evidential for first person constructions. It would be inappropriate to choose a perceptual evidential copula for an utterance like (54).

- 54) *ŋà sà tè-ti yè*
 1SG eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating.’ (AL 100930-01)

It would also be inappropriate to use the dubitative when you are sure of your own current actions. Much like in Caplow’s (2000, p. 25) analysis of the cognate forms in Dokpa, we can argue that the ego is a choice of personal knowledge over external evidence, and certainty over uncertainty.

Secondly, the ego is used for knowledge that is not obtained through visual evidence, regardless of who it refers to. This includes information about a person’s name (55a), or discussing a person’s internal state (55b).

55) a) *khó=ki mìn sòm yimba*
 3SG.M=GEN name Som COP.EGO
 ‘his name is Som.’ (RL 110129-01)

b) *khó=ki tèm̄ba sàl-teraŋ yè*
 3SG.M=ERG remember-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘he remembers’ (AL 101013-02)

Examples like (55a) could be analysed as having no evidential value, similar to an analysis of Standard Tibetan egophoric (such as Garrett 2001) in which the ego is the ‘default’ copula that does not always have egophoric semantics. This analysis is useful in Standard Tibetan, where the egophoric semantics are narrow enough that a ‘default’ reading without evidential value is the most elegant way to make sense of these examples. In Lamjung Yolmo on the other hand, the semantics of the ego copulas is broader, so an evidentially motivated explanation can still be made for examples such as this. Because we do not have to take into account the relationship of the speaker to the person whose name is being stated, as we would for Standard Tibetan, the sense of ‘having knowledge’ of this person’s name can sufficiently explain the use of the ego copula in these constructions. I will come back to these types of examples throughout the discussion. The type of example in (55a) is relevant to the discussion of conjunct/disjunct systems (§6.4.) while the type in (55b) is a part of the discussion of endopathic verbs in §6.4.2.

The ego form is also used in habitual constructions. If a person does something frequently enough then we know from personal knowledge that they perform the action habitually, regardless of whether it is yourself or another person.

56) a) *còole jìma t̄aŋmaraŋ ŋà=la tóo yè*
 morning sun every 1SG=DAT hunger COP.EGO
 ‘every morning I feel hungry.’ (AL 091005-02)

- b) *mò árak mi-thún yè*
 person alcohol NEG.NON.PST-drink COP.EGO
 ‘she does not drink alcohol.’ (RL 110129-01)

That these copulas do not point deictically to a specific referent distinct from the speaker makes their status as evidentials more difficult to confirm than something like the perceptual evidential, which is clearly linked to a state or event external to the speaker that is the source of knowledge. Garrett (2001, p. 161) refers to egophoric knowledge in Standard Tibetan as being ‘immediate,’ not because there is no evidence, but because the evidence is not mediated through a specific act of perception. He acknowledges that this gives egophoric information a unique status in terms of epistemological stance. The lack of external evidence means that it can initially appear that the ego is just functioning as a default choice for speakers. In §6.2.3. I give some examples of contexts where the ego is used in fixed constructions, however speakers identify the ego as pertaining to the speaker’s own knowledge, and examples of its use in interaction (§6.3.) support this.

The ego is used in a broad range of constructions, as it is used in situations where the speaker does not have perceptual evidence; but the fact that speakers do not use the dubitative in such situations indicates that the process they undertake is not simply one of ‘guessing’ but of relating the current situation to their existent knowledge state. Also, in discussions of the copula forms, speakers will occasionally contrast it with the perceptual evidential as a difference between ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ indicating that the semantics of this form is salient for speakers.

We can summarise the main uses of the ego copula based on the discussion in this section. The ego is used in situations in which the perceptual evidential is not appropriate. Since the perceptual evidential is used for events for which there is a single specific instance of perception, this means that the range of uses of the ego is quite broad. Firstly, it is used for personal actions, where the speaker cannot have access to any other knowledge because they are the one performing the action.

Secondly, it is used for knowledge about others that cannot be ascertained through perception, but through knowing the person or the situation. This includes speculating about internal states of others for which there is no perceptual access. Thirdly, it can be used for habitual actions, because the knowledge of these is acquired over a period of time, and not a single event. As will be seen in the discussion in §6.3. and §6.4, these uses are quite broad and can be called upon by speakers in a number of ways, but as a summary they will suffice for now. Finally, it also has a set of specific functions in fixed constructions, to which I now turn.

6.2.3. Fixed uses of ego copulas

In §6.2.2. I observed that in many contexts, the internal locus of the knowledge source for the ego copulas makes it much more difficult to be certain of their evidential status than the perceptual evidential copulas, which are easier to describe due to the fact they frequently pertain to external stimulus (though not always, see endopathic verbs in §6.4.2.). There are fixed expressions in Lamjung Yolmo where speakers use the ego copula consistently, and do not appear to have the same choice of copula use that they do in other construction. Firstly I will look at clauses with the particle *ná* and secondly conditional constructions. I will then look at nominalised forms.

The first structure in which the ego copula is used as part of a fixed expression is *yimba ná kí*. This expression involves the equational ego copula, particle *ná*, which indicates supposition²⁵ and the conjunction *kí* ‘or.’ This construction often does not involve a conjoined element (57), and is used as a way of expressing uncertainty on the speaker’s behalf. The first example of this is from the Family Story (§3.2.1.), in which SBL is telling the story in the third person. At one point he expresses his uncertainty about the identity of the man in the image, saying (57).

²⁵ See Appendix 1 §1.3.7. for a fuller discussion of this, and other particles.

- 57) *kàpu tɛ́í mìn khún ába yìmba ná kí*
 old.animate one COP.EGO.NEG 3PL father COP.EGO PART or
 ‘it’s not the old man. He is maybe the father, or...’
 (SBL 101124-03 21:11)

The phrase *yìmba ná kí* is a common construction, used by many speakers when they are unsure of the referent. It appears in my database only with ego copulas, even though there is no reason, in terms of the grammar of the language, why the perceptual evidential could not be used in this syntactic position as well. The fact that speakers often leave the second half of the conjunction unexpressed further indicates that this is a set phrase.

It is, however, possible to express the second conjunction. There are some variations on this, as discussed in relation to (58). In (58a) AL is describing the story of the Jackal and Crow and is unsure whether the crow has a fish or a small bird in its beak. She has completed the second half of the clause with an alternative, which still expresses her uncertainty about the initial referent. The use of the perceptual evidential in the second half of the conjunct indicates that she is using perceptual evidence, but the set phrase requires the ego form. In (58b) the second half of the clause is filled with a question. AL is describing events in short videos from the Put Project (§3.2.3.) immediately after she watched them. For all event descriptions AL used the perceptual evidential *dú*, but there were situations where she was unsure of the referent in the video, in which case she used the phrase *yìmba ná kí*.

- 58) a) *jà yìmba ná kí tɛ́ádzuŋma límú dù*
 fish COP.EGO PART or bird like COP.PE
 ‘it is a fish, or it looks like a bird.’ (AL 101010-01 05:10)
- b) *tò yìmba ná kí tɛ́í yìmba ná kí lú-sin*
 stone COP.EGO PART or what COP.EGO PART or put.into-PST
 ‘(the person) put in, is it a stone, or what is it?’
 (AL 101006-01 28:44)

When presented as written examples it could be possible to assume the first clause in these constructions is a question. If this were the case then it is predictable that an ego copula would be used, as the speaker always orients the value of the copula towards the person to whom they are asking the question (see chapter 7). There is nothing in the intonation, or the way that people describe or translate such utterances to indicate that they consider the first half of the utterance to be a question. Example (58a) above also shows that the second clause does not always have to be a question, although it is possible as shown in (58b).

The second type of construction in which the ego copula does not appear to have a distinct epistemic or evidential value is in conditionals (discussed in the sketch grammar §1.6.3.3.). In sentences where the verb of the protasis clause is a copula, such as (59), it is always an ego form. The copula ego in these example utterances are semantically ego, and could be any other copula form that can operate as an auxiliary.

59) a) *ɲà nímu táɲa yè-na ɲà sàse ɲò-tɕe yèke*
 1SG with money COP.EGO-COND 1SG food buy-INF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘If I had money with me, I’d have bought food.’ (AL 031109-02)

b) *ɲima ɕár-ɕár-pa yè-na ɲiɕa = ya ɲhíla*
 sun shine-shine-PST COP.EGO-COND child = PL outside
tɕéemi tsá-kandi yèke
 small play-NOM COP.EGO.PST
 ‘If the sun had shone the children would have played outside.’
 (AL 031109-02)

Given that it is a hypothetical situation on which another event is contingent the ego copula does not actually express any certainty or personal knowledge on behalf of the speaker. It is possible that the speaker is expressing personal knowledge that if

the first condition is met the second will occur, in much the same way that the habitual constructions (§6.2.2.) indicate that something occurs often based on personal knowledge of this. There is no way to be sure that this is the case, and it appears that the ego is used in these set constructions simply because in a binary choice between either an ego or a perceptual evidential its semantics make it the more appropriate of the two.

Finally, Ego copula forms are also found nominalised as part of complex noun phrases created using nominalisation. In (60) we see two examples where the nominaliser *-kandi* is attached to the ego *yè*.

- 60) a) *mò=ki t̃abu ráŋgi khí yè-kandi phóto*
 3SG.F=ERG horse and dog COP.EGO-NOM photo(Eng)
bìta=la p̃ér-ku dù
 surface=LOC stick-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘she was sticking the horse and dog poster on the wall.’
 (AL 101006-01 08:12)
- b) *sá=la yè-kandi t̃ché khér-ti kàl-sin*
 ground=LOC COP.EGO-NOM book take.away-PERF go.PERF-PST
 ‘the book on the ground was picked up and taken away.’
 (AL 101006-01 01:09:11)

In (60a) we see the nominalised ego is in a complex noun phrase which, in turn, is part of a clause that has a perceptual evidential as the copula choice. During the video description task that these examples were taken from, AL used a very high proportion of perceptual evidentials in her description of the events, however for complex noun phrases using nominalisation the choice of copula was always ego. Although she is describing the poster and the book with the same level of perceptual evidence as the other elements of the video, the use of the ego consistently in such constructions indicates that it is a fixed use.

These fixed uses of the ego copulas in some constructions makes it difficult to argue that they have any particular modal function in those uses. This is similar to Garrett's (2001, p. 107) analysis of the egophoric forms in Standard Tibetan, where he observes that the egophoric in Standard Tibetan occurs in similar expressions where it does not appear to contribute evidential information.

It would be reasonable at this point to consider an alternative analysis, in which we consider the ego forms to all be acting as the default copula choice. This is Garrett's (2001, p. 103) stance, in which he argues that the ego copula in Tibetan is simply a 'default inference' in the absence of something more overtly perceptual. Although Garrett chooses to not resolve the exact evidential status of the ego copula he does set out some options (2001, p. 197). The first is that the ego form encodes some 'ego access' knowledge that is not accessible to other interlocutors. The second is that the speaker believes these facts with no evidence at all. This is especially applicable to the 'broad' egophoric types. His third suggestion is that there may be a mixture of these two options. Garrett (2001) glosses these forms as ego and continues to refer to them as such, arguing that apart from these constructions the egophoric meaning is present.

Like Garrett for Standard Tibetan, I think that the semantics of ego copulas that I described in §6.2.1. is something that is present in interaction. Given that the current ego copulas were historically the only copula forms in Classical Tibetan (Tournadre and Jiatso 2001, p. 66), it is perhaps not surprising that they still have a presence in fixed expressions. Compared to the other copula choices, the semantics of the ego is less incongruous in a fixed construction, where modality is not necessarily relevant.

Given that this thesis is concerned with the meaning that arises in interaction, I will maintain the glossing of *yimba*, *yè* and related forms as 'ego.' This reflects the fact that contextually, the ego forms are contrasted with perceptual knowledge (in the form of the perceptual evidentials) and epistemic uncertainty (in the form of the

dubitatives). It also reflects the fact that speakers describe the ego forms as being for personal knowledge, even though there are contexts where this is not necessarily the case.

6.3. Same situation, different copulas

So far I have looked at each copula verb and its specific semantics as though each correlates to a specific context of use. Once we start looking at interaction though, it becomes apparent that there are many contexts where speakers are presented with the same evidential information but use different copulas to talk about it. It is these situations that I will look at in this section, as they tell us a great deal about how people use the semantics of the evidential verbs to communicate their knowledge state to their interlocutors.

In this section I will focus on the choices people make between the perceptual (*dù*, *dùba*) and ego copulas (*yimba*, *yè*). This is because these two categories are the most common in naturalistic interaction, and often they occur in similar contexts. I will also mention the dubitative in some examples, although it is less complex in the variation of usage. The focus on only these two most commonly used forms is central to being able to compare the use of these forms in Lamjung Yolmo to conjunct/disjunct systems in §6.4.

I will begin by examining how different copulas can give rise to different meanings independent of specific contexts (§6.3.1.). This will lay the foundation for a discussion of specific situations where different speakers have used different evidentials (§6.3.2.), and what meanings arise from these uses. Finally, I will look at a smaller set of examples where the same speaker uses different evidentials in the same context (§6.3.3.), and what this means.

6.3.1. *Different copulas, different meanings*

The semantics of the copula verbs described in §6.1.1. means that using a different copula with the same sentence gives different senses. This is one of the reasons that grammatical testing of sentences with copula verbs can be very difficult, as speakers will acknowledge that both sentences are valid, but it takes considerable discussion to ascertain the contexts in which each would be used. For example, AL gave the two utterances in (61) as being equally valid and there are many others like this given by her and other speakers.

- 61) a) *dì mì thómbo dù*
this person tall COP.PE
'this person is tall.' (AL 100924-01)
- b) *dì mì thómbo yè*
this person tall COP.EGO
'this person is tall.' (AL 100924-01)

(61a) would be used if the speaker had never met the person before, or was meeting someone they had not seen since they were a small child, and was commenting on their height. The speaker would either be looking at the tall person in question, or have recently seen them (or have seen an image of them). They would not necessarily be speaking with surprise, but by using the perceptual evidential to show that they have acquired this information by looking at the person, so there would be an element of newness to the information. (61b) would be used if the speaker was related to the person, or they were an acquaintance. Although they would have acquired such information through visual means originally, it is not warranted to use the perceptual evidential as they are not referring back to a specific event of obtaining this knowledge as it is a part of their established set of knowledge.

Broadly speaking, within these two contexts there are three main and interrelated features of the semantics of these copulas that are relevant when looking at how

speakers make a choice between the perceptual and ego evidentials, all of which come into play to varying degrees in each case. I will go through these now so we can see how they apply to more contextually specific cases in the following sections. The first is the specificity of the reference, the second is engagement with the content, and the third is the newness of the information. I will discuss all of these in relation to example (61) above, as well as drawing on other examples to illustrate.

The first difference between the perceptual evidential and the ego is the specificity of the event being referred to. The deictic function of the perceptual evidential *dù* is to point to a specific instance of perception involving a specific event. This is how, in the example above, when the speaker uses the perceptual evidential they are referring to a specific incident of seeing a tall person. The event of someone being tall is not a specific event, as it's a property of that person, but the event of seeing this tall person is the specific event that the evidential is indicating. This has been frequently observed in analyses of Standard Tibetan. Goldstein (1970), Denwood (1999) and Garrett (2001, p. 86) have all discussed the specificity of *dug*, which is cognate with Yolmo *dù*. For Dokpa Tibetan Caplow (2000, p. 20) also observes that the perceptual evidential is for specific events. In all of these analyses a specific instance contrasts with the general, usual or commonly known. The ego evidential points to the person's own knowledge, and therefore the deictic reference is not to a specific event but the knowledge state of an individual.

The two examples below illustrate a contrast in the specificity of an event. Example (62) would be used if a person does not have children. This is because the ego is for personally known information.

- 62) *pìza mè*
 child COP.EGO.NEG
 'I don't have children.' (RL 110129-01)

Example (63) on the other hand would be used if a speaker did not have their children present at the time of the utterance.

- 63) *p̣iʒa mindu*
 child COP.PE.NEG
 ‘my children aren’t here.’ (RL 110129-01)

This is because the perceptual points to a specific instance of an event, i.e. the non-presence of the children, but this does not also mean that beyond this event the speaker does not have children. That the ego is preferred for habitual actions (as discussed in §6.2.2.) is further evidence that it is preferred for non-specific events, as opposed to the perceptual evidential, which is preferred for more specific, individual instances. These features are similar to some aspectual phenomena found in other languages, and a cross-linguistic comparison could be a productive future line of enquiry.

The second difference between the perceptual and ego categories is the level of engagement with the context. By using the ego copula and deictically referring to their own knowledge, the speaker is showing that they have more personal knowledge of the context than if they had used the perceptual evidential, which involves pointing to something that they have perceived, which would indicate that someone else could also see what they are talking about. This means that for (61b) the person would have to be acquainted with the tall subject of the sentence so as to know they are tall. It should be noted that this is not on the level of close personal proximity as the egophoric in Tibetan, which would involve the speaker being closely related to the subject. Instead the relationship between the speaker and the subject is not as rigid, simply that the speaker knows the person, without necessarily any personal connection (see §6.2.1). This is a part of Garrett’s (2001, p. 41) concept of ‘intimacy’ in of Standard Tibetan. The more personally acquainted with the knowledge a speaker is, the more appropriate the use of the ego becomes.

Caplow (2000, p. 51) notes for Dokpa that it is possible to make copula choices to express a greater sense of involvement. By using personal evidentials (equivalent to Lamjung Yolmo ego) to describe the states or activities of others, the speaker can indicate a personal connection in a way that using the perceptual evidential does not capture. Caplow (2000, p. 2) terms this the process of ‘engagement.’

The final parameter of distinction between the two copulas is that of a newly perceived event. This again ties back into the fact that the perceptual deictically indicates a specific instance of observation. It appears that speakers have a preference to only use this when the event of perception was recent enough to be recalled specifically.

To return to the descriptions of the tall person in (61), the perceptual evidential would be used if the tall person was a new acquaintance (or someone who has grown tall since you last met them). This is because after a period of time it would not be necessary to flag the specific instance of seeing them (and their remarkable height); instead the ego would suffice. The perceptual evidential therefore has a stable sense of marking recently perceived information, in contrast to the information that already exists as part of an individual’s personal knowledge. This is a feature that has been observed in the cognate form in Standard Tibetan (Tournadre 2008, p. 298, Vokurková 2008, p. 111) as well as Kyirong (Huber 2002, p. 159).

That there is a sense of newness should not be confused with mirativity. DeLancey (1997, p. 33) defines mirativity as information “new or surprising to the speaker, regardless of whether the information source is first- or second-hand.” In the examples above, the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo includes only events directly perceived by the speaker, so we can discount part of the definition referring to ‘second-hand’ information. The difference between ‘new’ and ‘surprising’

information is worth considering though, as they are quite different. While speakers may often use the perceptual evidential to show that something is newly perceived they are not necessarily surprised by these events, or lack “psychological preparation” (DeLancey 1997, p. 35) to deal with the events they are describing. Also, to describe these forms as ‘mirative’ is to take away from the fact that their primary function is to indicate perceptual evidence. Others have separated out newness and surprise in their discussions of perceptual evidentials in closely related languages, including Huber (2002) in her discussion of Kyirong and Zeisler (2000, p. 39-40), who takes into account a number of different Tibetic languages.

Having said that, there are some specific instances where we see perceptual evidentials used with a strong sense of surprise, or counter-expectation. This is most frequently the role of the emphatic *dùba* form. Examples elicited for different contexts can show how they are used. The two sentences in (64) could be used as statements about the location of the speaker’s child. Sentence (64a) would be used if a mother had left her child in someone else’s village and knew that the child was being looked after. Example (64b) would be used if the mother expected that her child was at home, and found that instead the child was at another person’s house. The choice of the emphatic perceptual evidential over the regular perceptual evidential indicates that the information in (64b) is not only new to the speaker, but also surprising. This would be further emphasised by an increase in pitch and volume, and other paralinguistic indicators such as the accompanying stance or gesture.

- 64) a) *ɲà=ki pìza khé=ki yùl=la yè*
 1SG=GEN child 2SG=GEN village=LOC COP.EGO
 ‘my child is in your village.’ (SKL 101023-06)
- b) *ɲà=ki pìza khé=ki khím=la dùba*
 1SG=GEN child 2SG=GEN house=LOC COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘my child is in your house.’ (SKL 101023-06)

For a naturalistic example, the performance of the change bag magic trick for AL (110217-03) is a nice illustration. In this iteration I showed her the empty bag, and demonstrated for her that there was nothing inside. She observed this empty state (65a) before I made a bank note ‘appear’ in the bag, and then she exclaimed (65b).

- 65) a) *nàŋla tɕí àŋ m̀indu t̀ŋba-raŋ d̀ù*
 inside none COP.PE.NEG empty-EMPH COP.PE
 ‘there is nothing inside, it is empty.’ (AL 110217-03 01:50)
- b) (*laughs*) *t̀áŋa-raŋ d̀ùba*
 money-EMPH COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘(laughs) there is money.’ (AL 110217-03 02:02)

Here the speaker had been prepared for the emptiness of the bag and had observed the state with the perceptual evidential, however the appearance of the money was contrary to her expectations (as indicated by the laughter and exclamation immediately afterwards that her daughter should come and see the trick and by the use of the emphatic *d̀ùba*).

These examples demonstrate the kind of psychological unpreparedness that DeLancey sees as key to mirativity. It is, however, only one use of the *d̀ùba* form, and there are also intonation cues such as increase in speech volume for others to tell that speaker is surprised. At best we can only say that in Lamjung Yolmo what DeLancey defines as mirativity is a pragmatic extension of the perceptual evidential, and not a core feature of its semantics.

The examples above show that different contexts call for either an ego copula or a perceptual evidential. What is important about this is that it highlights that neither of these copulas can be plotted as the ‘default’ or most appropriate on a cline of certainty or reliability. The ego copula has some default uses in fixed constructions

as outlined in §6.2.3, and is the preferred copula for first person subject. Still, it is important to keep in mind that there are contexts where it is not considered to be the default in terms of speaker preference.

For example, when visiting DML at her house, she asked me where her daughter KL (who I refer to as *rò* ‘friend’) was. I answered using the ego copula (66) on the assumption that personal knowledge would be the most certain.

- 66) *rò* *khím = la* *yè*
 friend house = LOC COP.EGO
 ‘(my) friend is in the house.’ (LG 29/10/10 book 4, p. 19)

Instead, DML corrected me (67), and showed that in this context the perceptual evidential is preferable. This is because in this situation, having recent perceptual knowledge of whether KL is in her house at a specific time is considered more reliable.

- 67) *rò* *khím = la* *dù*
 friend house = LOC COP.PE
 ‘(my) friend is in the house.’ (AML 29/10/10 book 4, p. 19)

So while there are some situations that we will see below where speakers can pragmatically manipulate copulas, the examples above indicate that there are situations where a certain copula has a specific use in that context. Which evidential is preferable is not based on a globally applicable cline, but is relevant to that context and dependent on whether it is a specific event and how closely related the speaker is to the event. Speakers are able to process the context when making a choice of which copula to use, rather than relying on a standard context-free framework of appropriateness. I will discuss these issues further in §9.2.

The discussion above does indicate broadly which copula would be more appropriate in particular contexts. If the event being described is a single instance that is immediately perceivable by the speaker then the perceptual evidential is preferred. In contrast to this, utterances involving iterative, durational or habitual events, as well as those relating to the speaker directly, will generally be marked using the ego copulas.

Given that speakers can make copula choices for different contexts, it follows that their interlocutors would track this information. While much of the discussion in this thesis is about the evidential and epistemic choices that people make in interaction, it is also important to consider how these choices are taken up by the interlocutors who hear them. This is somewhat harder to measure, but the Multiple Reports task was designed to try and access some of these intuitions. The task (described in more detail in §3.2.6.) was designed so that there was a short scenario given, and then two different people remarked on an element of this event. The two reports were given with one different detail, and had different evidential values. The participants were then asked which of the two reports they thought was most likely to be true (the information encoded by each copula was switched for each participant, so as to see if the content of the utterance was affecting their choice). The intention of this experiment was to see how much attention speakers paid to modal information encoded in copulas.

There were ten different scenarios, with reports of different modal weigh. Of these ten scenarios There were only two where all participants chose the report that had the same copula form. In the first of these two, a participant is told that their friend has a new dress, which they have not seen. They are given two reports about the dress, each saying it is a different colour (red or green). One report uses the ego copula *yè* to describe the colour of the dress and the other uses the emphatic perceptual evidential *dùba* in their description. Regardless of which colour was marked with the perceptual emphatic form all participants chose the colour option

marked with the *that* form over the ego copula, and those participants who gave a reason said it was because the person who said that had seen the dress. In many ways this was one of the better designed of the Multiple Reports scenarios as there is minimal chance of external context distracting from the binary choice. It also indicated that people place value on their interlocutors providing perceptual evidence. In the second of the two consistently answered scenarios, participants were asked which report they believed about what food was stored in a vessel. The two reports varied in the type of common food stuff stored (rice or corn) and in the use of either an emphatic perceptual evidential or an utterance with an ego evidential that also had a reported speech particle (§8.2.). Only one person did not choose the report marked with an emphatic perceptual evidential, instead preferring the ego form with a reported speech marker. Therefore, in these situations where someone is describing a specific event, the perceptual evidential is considered by speakers to mark more direct knowledge than the ego copula or the reported speech particle.

This may seem to be a straightforward order of preference for certain types of evidence, except it does not hold across all scenarios, even for the same speaker. VL had said that the emphatic perceptual was preferred over the ego when describing the dress in the first scenario described above, and that the perceptual evidential was preferred to the reported speech particle in the second. This was in concord with the responses of the other participants. In another situation two people describing the colour of a new goat someone in the village has purchased, one person used the perceptual evidential *dù*, while the other used the ego *yè*. In this scenario VL appeared to have different intuitions about scenario one, in that she did not want to presume that one report was more likely to be correct than the other, instead stating that both participants saw the colour of the goat (68).

- 68) *ɲí thón-sin*
 two see-PST
 ‘two saw.’ (VL 101224-02)

This is interesting because the other two times she chose a perceptual evidential over the ego or reported speech particle, stating that the person who used the perceptual evidential presumably saw the item or event, while the person using ego-marking has not. It is possible that because scenario one was early in the task VL was still getting used to the format, but it is also possible that the ‘ego means no visual perception’ idea is not as strong as Lamjung Yolmo speakers’ introspection indicates.

Although speakers appear to share some consensus in the situation above, in eight of the ten scenarios there was a great deal less agreement. There were some scenarios where the choice of modal expression did not appear to make any difference to which of the two options people chose. This included situation ten, where participants were given reports that their shoes were either outside or in another room, with one marked with a perceptual evidential and one marked with a reported speech marker. Across all of the performances of this experiment participants chose either option and did not appear to be swayed by which one was marked with which form. UL, VL and KL all preferred the report that the shoes were outside with the perceptual evidential. AL and RL had the outside option marked with the reported speech marker, although RL chose this only the second time he performed the task. The first time he did the task he chose the perceptual evidential. It is not clear if this situation was difficult for the participants to imagine, or if they brought their experiences into their choice, but there appears to be no pattern to their choice based on modal information. Given that this task was only performed with half a dozen speakers across ten scenarios, it is best to not draw any strong conclusions about the lack of agreement in terms of the modal information given in the multiple reports; however it does indicate that perhaps speakers may not pay as much attention to modal information in Lamjung Yolmo as de Villiers et al. (2009) argues that they do in Standard Tibetan.

6.3.2. *Different person, different copulas*

The above examples set out different contexts in which speakers use different copulas to achieve different communicative ends. In this section I look at situations where speakers in the same context use different copulas. Whereas above it was easy to explain the use of different copulas based on the semantic descriptions in §6.1.1, the more examples we look at in this section the more we will see that different speakers can use different evidential markers for what appears to be the same information. By relating to the same information in different ways, speakers can flag for their interlocutor the state of their knowledge.

This is not unheard-of in related languages. Manipulating choice of copula for pragmatic effect is common in related languages and has been discussed in relation to Dokpa and Standard Tibetan, (Caplow 2000, p. 51), Kham (Watters 1997, p. 590) and Sherpa (Woodbury 1986, Kelly 2004, p. 331), however these discussions are often quite short, and these functions are often treated as additions, extensions or manipulations of the primary function of the copulas. In contrast, I will argue that the way speakers make copula choices is an important part of their use.

Sometimes, two speakers will use different evidentials in the same context because they have different sources of evidence. In a real life example, RL and I were sitting inside his aunt's house waiting for her return. While we were there a neighbour walked by and called out to see if RL's aunt was home. In reply RL called out (69).

- 69) ***m̄indu***
 COP.PE.NEG
 '(she) isn't (here).' (RL 25/11/10 book 4, p. 47)

It was appropriate for RL to use this copula form because he had direct visual evidence that his aunt was not home. Using direct visual evidence for a specific event gives the interlocutor a stronger level of reliability, as you are indicating that

- 72) *táŋa mǐndu léé*
 money COP.PE.NEG convincing
 ‘the money does not exists/ is not there.’ (KL 120304-02 11:21)

Both speakers are stating that there is no money in the bag, but while KL marks that she is using perceptual evidence, CL has used no visual evidence and therefore uses the ego form.

In both of the above examples, the speakers use different evidentials, and it is clear from their actions or locations that they have different evidence and knowledge states to reflect those choices. In the following examples there is often nothing immediately obvious in regard to context that makes it clear that one speaker has any different knowledge from another, and yet they use different copulas. These examples are more interesting as they show that speakers are making different claims about their relationship to the knowledge that they have.

Compare RL and AL participating in the hidden object task (§3.2.4.). Both of them feel the hat under the cloth, but have different levels of certainty as to what it is. This is reflected in their choice of copula. RL is uncertain as to what the item is, being only able to feel the soft knitted item through the cloth. AL can also only feel the item, but she has seen me wear this hat before, and when her fingers find a specific detail she realises exactly what it is. Although neither participant can see the item, the perceptual evidence of touching the item through the cloth is sufficient for AL to make an assertion (73b), while RL does not has enough evidence to be so certain (73a). This difference in knowledge state is not immediately obvious in the context of the experiment, but makes sense in the larger context of the these people and their interactions with specific items in the world.

73) a) *çàmu yìnđo*
hat COP.DUB
'it is maybe a hat.' (RL 120219-01 04:00)

b) *çàmu dùba*
hat COP.PE.EMPH
'it is a hat.' (AL 120212-01 09:13)

Examples that are not based on a difference between marking epistemic certainty are more common in the collection of recordings. Here, speakers are still marking their relationship to information that involves different knowledge status.

The twenty questions game (§3.2.5.) is a useful experimental study for unequal access to knowledge, as it is based around one person trying to guess an item of which the other person has a photograph. Unlike naturalistic communication, where different speakers bring a wealth of background knowledge to the interaction, here it is easy to track who has access to knowledge.

For all rounds of the game, with both pairs who played the game, the person attempting to guess what the item is consistently uses the ego copula forms *yimba* and *yè*, the value of which is oriented towards the person being asked the question (this question asking mechanism is discussed in more detail in chapter 7). We see this in the question and answer sets in (74), each taken from a different pair playing the game.

74) a) Q: *tòṅbo = ki mìn*
tree = GEN COP.EGO.NEG
'is it not something from a tree?' (RL 101020-02 08:15)

A: *mìn*
COP.EGO.NEG
'it is not.' (SNL 101020-02 08:16)

b) Q: *mèndza mìn*
bowl COP.EGO.NEG
'is it not a bowl?' (AL 120214-02 01:57)

A: *mìn*
COP.EGO.NEG
'(it) isn't.' (SL 120214-02 01:59)

The person being asked the questions has direct perceptual evidence of the specific and immediate item, but both the person asking the question and the person answering use the ego copula. It appears that, in playing this game, speakers are not referring back to the specific item in the image, but instead are showing that they have general knowledge of this type of item. Referring to the item in the image as one of a generic type (and indeed these are all very generic items in village life) is much the same strategy as English speakers use when playing this game, instead of flagging the specific visual evidence of the specific item with a perceptual evidential.

We see the mismatch in participant knowledge state at the end of one round. This is the end of a round where AL has a picture of an ox and SL is guessing what it may be. This has been a protracted round (largely due to being sidetracked about the edibility status of the object in question). SL has finally figured out that it was an ox, looked at the image and exclaims (75a) with the perceptual evidential, and then AL confirmed by saying (75b) and using the ego form. SL looks at the image and concurs with AL, but instead of using the ego form uses the perceptual evidential (75c):

- 75) a) *láj láj*
 ox ox
 ‘an ox, an ox.’ (SL 120214-02 11:29)
- b) *láj yimba*
 ox COP.EGO
 ‘it is an ox.’ (AL 120214-02 11:30)
- c) *láj dù*
 ox COP.PE
 ‘it is an ox.’
 (lit. ‘an ox exists.’) (SL 120214-02 11:37)

Both women only have the photograph as their referent, and yet both use different copula forms in saying what it is. This is because the women bring different knowledge states to their viewing of the image. AL, who has been looking at the image for some time, and has taken the role of the person with knowledge, uses the ego form, like all participants did when answering questions in (74). SL is looking at the image for the first time, and her use of the perceptual evidential indicates that the visual information is more important for her to comment on what the image is.

Similarly, (76) is taken from the Optical Illusions task (§3.2.8.), which KL and CL performed together. Both had observed already that the image could be either a rabbit or a bird. Neither person used overt copula marking in that discussion (see §6.5.3. for more on the absence of copulas). After I suggested that it could be like a duck (*hããs límu dù* ‘it is like a duck’) they had different opinions as to whether that statement was correct.

- 76) a) *hããs mìn*
 duck(Nep) COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘it is not a duck.’
 (lit. ‘a duck does not exists.’) (KL 120304-02 09:49)

- b) *hããs* *dù*
 duck(Nep) COP.PE
 ‘it is a duck.’
 (lit. ‘a duck exists.’) (CL 120304-02 09:51)

Not only do they use different polarities but they also use different copula types in their assessments of the situation. It appears that they are drawing on different evidential recourses to give strength to their own assertions. While KL is drawing on her own personal knowledge about what ducks looks like, CL is referring specifically to the image to hand with the use of the perceptual evidential. In this interaction it appears that CL’s assertion wins out over KL’s, as KL next replies with (77), using the perceptual evidential like CL.

- 77) *tíbirere hããs* *límu dù* *gòo dù*
 some duck(Nep) like COP.PE head COP.PE

hããs = ki *tçhódo nómbó dù*
 duck(Eng) = GEN lip sharp COP.PE
 ‘it is a little bit like a duck. It is the head. The duck’s beak is sharp’
 (KL 120304-02 09:52)

Here she is no longer using the ego and instead has aligned her copula usage to show that her opinion has moved closer to that of her husband’s, and is showing how her ideas relate to the specific image in front of them. Whether she is actually in agreement, or is agreeing with him to humour him (either in this specific instance or as a general tendency) is something that cannot be captured in interaction. The end result, whatever her underlying motivation, was that her copula choice mirrored her husband’s when she changed her opinion to agree with his.

Both the examples from (75) and (77) are important because they demonstrate that it is not just the type of access to the information that speakers have, but also the

knowledge state that they bring to the interaction. This is a factor that is not captured in any of the hierarchies of evidential preference.

This manipulation can also be used to humorous ends. In the next two examples speakers use different copulas to other people in the same situation, and it is clear from the way that others react to this that claiming these knowledge states is incongruous with the knowledge they hold.

To return to the twenty questions game played by AL and SL, we see AL play around with knowledge status to vary the interaction. In (78) SL puts forward a question (78a), and most likely because SL has hit close to the mark (a sickle) instead of immediately answering affirmative or negative AL defers by using a dubitative form (78b). This results in sustained laughter for one and a half seconds, which shows that the speakers acknowledge the absurdity of the response as a mismatch for AL's true knowledge state. She then finishes the clause that the conjunctive *kí* indicated (78c), before finally telling her that her guess was incorrect (78d) (although it is not clear why AL decided that this guess was incorrect, it is possibly because *túp-* is more the kind of cutting that an axe would be used for, while *ṅà-* is the kind of cutting usually done with a sickle):

78) a) *túp-kandi sè yimba*
 cut-NOM thing COP.EGO
 'is it a cutting thing?' (SL 120214-02 00:36)

b) *yìnḍo kí*
 COP.DUB or
 'it may be, or...?' (AL 120214-02 00:38)

c) *tɕí yimba*
 what COP.EGO
 'what is it?' (AL 120214-02 00:41)

d) *mìn*

COP.EGO.NEG

‘it is not (a cutting thing).’ (AL 120214-02 00:42)

Likewise we see DML during the hidden objects task use an evidential that is incongruous with her actual knowledge state (79). During the early stages of the hidden objects task, participants found it difficult to make any guesses as to what might be hidden under the cloth. Many used uncertainty strategies, such as using the dubitative copula or asking questions using the ego copula (which means that they are assuming that the experimenter has the knowledge, see chapter 7).

DML also uses the ego copula, but in a non-interrogative structure. At this point in the task there is insufficient evidence for the speaker to make any certain claims about the items under the cloth. DML showed the most bemused exasperation at the difficulty of the early stage of the hidden object experiment out of any of the participants, having been talked into participating by her enthusiastic children and grandchildren, who made for an attentive audience. In (79) she expresses her uncertainty as to what the items are.

79) *tɕí ləp-ke léé ɲà = ki*
what say-NON.PST PART 1SG = ERG
‘what do I say?’ (DML 120304-03 01:40)

But then decides to make an assertion regardless of the evidence to hand (80).

80) *dì kítáb yìmba dì gùri yìmba dì mì yìmba*
this book(Nep) COP.EGO this cat COP.EGO this person COP.EGO
‘this is a book, this is a cat, this is a person.’
(DML 120304-03 01:42)

Her audience of family members find this particularly funny. While much of their amusement appears to be due to her rather whimsical choices (the book being the only realistic one of the three), the direct way in which she asserts what the items are is also part of the absurdity of her suggestion. Her audience know that she is speaking with greater certainty and knowledge than she actually possesses, especially given the small size (and inanimate nature) of the items under the cloth. In using this copula DML is not making a claim about her own knowledge state, but is making a point about the unrealistic expectation that she would be able to identify the items.

That other speakers found AL and DML's choice of copula humorous in these interactions illustrates that Lamjung Yolmo speakers have at least some expectations of their interlocutor's knowledge states within a specific context. Speakers can use an unexpected and inappropriate copula to mark their knowledge, but this is often observed by others as incongruous. These examples serve as a reminder that speakers are not always beholden to the grammatical properties of language, but can vary the use of these forms in interaction.

6.3.3. Same person, different copulas

So far I have looked at data where different speakers in the same context used different evidentials, but there are some situations where a single speaker will use different copulas in the same context. While the section above showed that different speakers can have different perspectives on the same event, these examples show that a single speaker can show shifting perspective in regard to an object or event. Unlike the example of sitting in the house while the neighbour walked past, or the magic trick where KL looked and CL presumed, these shifting uses are hard to pin down, because there are no comparable and different knowledge states. Instead, whatever choices there are for using the different copulas is driven entirely by the speaker's knowledge state or communicative intent.

We see one speaker using different evidentials in narratives when they are flagging different perspectives. For example, in the Family Story SBL had introduced the character of the husband, and had referred to him as such (81).

- 81) *khyóbo pèemi phársi=ya dzàmma zò-di dù*
 husband wife pumpkin=PL all make-PERF COP.PE
 ‘husband and wife grow all the pumpkins.’ (SBL 101124-03 04:54)

Later in the story, when the husband is refusing a drink from his friends, we see that SBL has changed the pronoun used, and also the preferred copula form (82).

- 82) *ḡà=ki di pìza yè pìru yè*
 1SG=GEN this baby COP.EGO small COP.EGO
 ‘(this) is my child, is (my) little one.’ (SBL 101124-03 06:35)

The pronoun helps confirm that the copula shift in this passage is because the perspective has changed to that of the man. Earlier the perceptual evidential was used frequently, which is consistent with an outside narrator observing events, and then the shift is to ego when the character is talking about himself. This shifting of epistemological stance is a common narrative strategy in many languages; as Mushin (2001, p. 173) observed, speakers rarely maintain a ‘default’ epistemological stance throughout an entire narrative. What this shows is that speakers are able to shift between their perspective in the story and that of a character while maintaining the same narrative. Audience members can use the evidential information in the narrative to keep track of the shifts in perspective used by the speaker.

Sometimes it is possible to observe that the change in copula has occurred because the speaker, even though they have the same visual information, has also been given additional information. For example, in the Optical Illusions task (§3.2.8.), AL was looking at the image of a hand painted very realistically to look like a duck. The use

of the ego copula (83) indicates that there is nothing about the duck that warrants the perceptual evidential to draw attention to it.

- 83) *dì hãās yimba*
 this duck(Nep) COP.EGO
 ‘this is a duck.’ (AL 120209-01 02:29)

However, once I introduced doubt by suggesting that it might not be a duck, AL was no longer so certain and instead used the dubitative (84).

- 84) *hãās-raŋ yindo*
 duck(Nep)-EMPH COP.DUB
 ‘it is a duck (maybe).’ (AL 120209-01 02:48)

Here, having taken into account the possibility that her interlocutor has introduced, we can see that AL is flagging with her choice of copula that she is no longer so certain as to whether the image is of a duck or not. It is also possible that she was just responding politely to her interlocutor. In much the same way as we saw in (76-77) when KL shifts her choice to align with her husband, it is never clear if the speaker has changed copula as a result of a shift in attitude towards the item, or a shift towards aligning their attitude with that of their interlocutor, but it does indicate that the way people describe events around them can shift, often as part of the larger interactional context.

This is similar to the interaction that I introduced at the beginning of this thesis (Chapter 1, example 1). Returning to that interaction in (85), now that we are equipped with an understanding of the features of these different copulas, we see that AL’s description of the item she is describing shifts from ego to dubitative after SL makes another suggestion.

- 85) *màgi yìmba*
 corn COP.EGO
 ‘it is corn.’ (AL 091108-01 01:14)
- mòdze tile d̀̀*
 banana like COP.PE
 ‘it is like bananas.’ (SL 091108-01 01:15)
- màgi yìnd̀̀*
 corn COP.DUB
 ‘it may be corn.’ (AL 091108-01 01:16)
- màgi thó pè d̀̀*
 corn cradle do COP.PE
 ‘(she) is cradling corn.’ (SL 091108-01 01:18)

What is interesting about this interaction is that after AL has weakened her assertive strength regarding the item SL agrees with her suggestion. This negotiation is interesting because it shows that weakening the epistemic certainty in an utterance may act as a meaning negotiation strategy in interaction.

There are also non-narrative examples that cannot be accounted for by assuming that the speaker is shifting between perspectives in a narrative, or that some external influence on the event or state has changed their perception. Two of the most interesting cases of this are the copula choices made by both AL in the magic scarf trick and RL in the change bag magic trick (§3.2.7.). Both speakers make a similar choice of copula verb at a critical juncture of the performance of the magic trick. I will describe these in turn.

In the magic scarf trick AL has just seen the cloth change from blue and red to yellow and green, and when asked what colour the scarf is now, she states (86).

- 86) *ηόmbu yìmba*
 green COP.EGO
 ‘it is green’ (AL 120209-02 01:07)

When I ask her to tell me what colour it was before, her reply is to restate the colour that the scarf is now (87).

- 87) *tàpse-ni ηόmbu dù*
 now-FOC green COP.PE
 ‘now it is green’ (AL 120209-02 01:31)

In the images below (Figure 6.1.) you can see that at the time of both utterances AL is not only looking at the scarf, but touching it as well:



Figure 6.1. Magic trick, AL (120209-02) at 01:07 and then 01:31.

She is using exactly the same evidence, is interacting with the item in the same way, and yet different evidential forms. The first utterance occurs straight after she has watched the cloth change colour. It is possibly that she was primed by my initial question *dì tǎí yìmba* ('what is that'), however that was over a minute before this utterance, and other speakers (and AL in other contexts) showed no such tendency to use the same evidential as me if another form was more appropriate. It is likely that AL did not actually find anything remarkable about the scarf that warranted her to make an observation with anything other than the ego copula. Also, AL is used to me doing strange things in general, and had seen me perform magic tricks before (110217-03), so she simply observes that the scarf is green and uses an ego copula. When I press her on what colour the scarf used to be before it changes (again using the ego copula) she realises that I am after stronger validation of the event. This time she uses the perceptual evidential *dù*. It is worth noting that here she also uses the focus-marked temporal adverbial *tǎpse* 'now' which highlights along with the pointing gesture to the cloth that she is using visual evidence at a specific instant to answer my question. Although interacting with the item the same way when she answers both times, looking at and touching the cloth. AL changes the evidential marking of the copula not because of the evidence to hand, but because of her relationship to her interlocutor within the interaction.

Note also that in (86) AL uses the equational copula *yìmba* instead of the existential *yè*, which is normally used in attributive constructions. Tournadre (p.c.) has observed that speakers of Tibetan are more likely to use the equational copula (usually for NP NP COP constructions) for properties like colour (an adjective, so usually used in an existential NP ADJ COP construction) if they consider the colour to be intrinsic to the item. Given that the portion of the cloth is a solid green colour it is perhaps not surprising that AL has used the equational ego copula instead of the existential, but it is an interesting choice given that only minutes ago there was a red and blue cloth instead. In §6.1.2. I described the difference between the choice of

equational and existential copulas as being one that is only made in regards to syntax, however in this example it appears that this distinction might also be manipulated by speakers to show their opinion about the centrality of a property to an object.

A similar pattern occurs with RL during the change bag trick (which in this instance was performed with a box, but the principle of having a small object appear and disappear is the same). RL has seen a small coin be placed into a box and disappear when the box is opened again. When the box is opened once more it reappeared he observed the box (88) using the ego copula form.

- 88) *tàze bòkas nàŋla táŋa yè*
 now box(Nep) inside money COP.EGO
 ‘now the money is inside the box’ (RL 110208-02 04:11)

This is interesting because we see he has also used a temporal adverbial *tàze* equivalent to English ‘now’, but he has used an ego instead of a perceptual evidential. Therefore, the perceptual evidential does not appear to even have obligatory uses even when the speaker is referring to a specific event that they are witnessing, even though the perceptual is preferred to mark a specific event (§6.3.1.). When the money is hidden again, he again observes with an ego form (*táŋa mè* ‘money is not there’). When the money reappears again he says (89).

- 89) *táŋa dù*
 money COP.PE
 ‘the money is there.’
 (lit. ‘money exists.’) (RL 110208-02 04:30)

This time he has used the perceptual evidential, even though he was looking at the item both times. We see again the same pattern that we saw with AL, where a speaker uses two different evidential options in identical situations. Both speakers

used the ego in the first iteration, and then used the perceptual evidential for the second. This is evidence to further invalidate any attempt to claim that the perceptual evidential *dù* has mirativity as a strong feature of its primary functions. Both speakers had already seen the event take place and described it with an ego form before choosing the perceptual evidential, meaning that there was nothing particularly surprising about the event by time they marked it perceptually. In RL's case, there was an absence of the money when it disappeared inside the box, so in his case it is also possible that the perceptual here is marking his renewed perception of the money the second time around. Thus, while there is a dimension of newness to the event here, there is not so much surprise or unexpectedness.

This variation in the choice of copula does not just occur with the magic tricks. We see a similar process with the Family Story (§3.2.1.). After I had given SBL the first card he begins a description, talking about the village in the image, and in (90) describes the old man in the image.

- 90) *dì kàpu yìmba*
 this old.animate COP.EGO
 ‘this is the old man.’ (SBL 111023-04 00:56)

He then stops for a second and reconfirms with me in Nepali that he is performing the task correctly by describing the image, which I confirm. He begins to talk about the old man again, but in Nepali. When RL reminds him to speak in Yolmo this time he utters (91).

- 91) *dì kàpu mì dù*
 this old.animate person COP.PE
 ‘this is the old man.’
 (lit. ‘this old man exists.’) (SBL 111023-04 01:08)

He has shifted to the perceptual evidential to make it clear to his interlocutors that he is describing something specific that he can see, and thus fulfilling the request that I had made. This request had an effect for the whole of the description of that specific card; he used perceptual evidentials in eight of the subsequent twelve utterances. In the last card, where he maintains the perspective of external narrator (card 9 of 14, before taking on the voice of the man), he only uses three perceptual evidentials across fifteen utterances. By that point he had made it clear to his interlocutor that the information he was relaying was perceptually obtained. The newness of the perceptual knowledge does not appear to be as pressing in this example, and he did not have to make it as clear with his choice of copula marking.

These examples give a good indication that in Lamjung Yolmo the modal value of the copula verb is not a static selection where speakers must only use a certain form in a certain context. Instead when speakers choose an evidential form they are not just responding to the evidence available to them, but also to their interlocutor. When both AL and RL moved to a perceptual evidential in (86)-(89) it was to strengthen the indication that they had perceptual evidence for what they were referring to. This appears to be the same as with SBL in (90) and (91). Given that the evidence itself did not shift, it appears that they are shifting their choice of copula for the sake of their interlocutor, to make it clear that they do possess direct perceptual evidence.

6.4. Intersection of person and evidence

Although it is a system with no grammatically marked distinctions for person, the modal values of the copula system of Lamjung Yolmo result in complex and subtle interactions with person in clauses. These interactions have often been referred to in the literature as either conjunct/disjunct or egophoric, both of which I introduced in §5.5. In this section I will look at how Lamjung Yolmo exhibits correlations of person and copula marking that are like those of other languages that have been described as conjunct/disjunct, especially in Tibeto-Burman (§6.4.1.). I will then

look in more detail at endopathic verbs, which are a subset of verbs for internal perception that have an interesting intersection with person marking and evidentiality (§6.4.2.). Having established a basic understanding of the kinds of person-evidential correlations, and the additional factor of endopathic verbs, I will look at how the patterns interact with the kinds of contextual factors that I introduced in §6.3, and discuss the implications of this for the status of Lamjung Yolmo as either a language with a ‘conjunct/disjunct’ or ‘egophoric’ system. In this chapter I focus on declarative structures only, as interrogatives and reported speech are considered in chapters 7 and 8 respectively.

6.4.1. Conjunct/disjunct patterns

As discussed in §5.5, conjunct/disjunct is based on a binary choice of marking: a ‘conjunct’ form and a ‘disjunct’ form. In §6.1.1. I demonstrated that there were four semantic categories in the choice of copula forms in Lamjung Yolmo. In §6.3. I showed how in many interactional contexts the choice is between a perceptual or ego copula forms. If we treat this as the major binary distinction in interactional choice for speakers, then we can see how the semantics of these forms may motivate a pattern that looks like a conjunct/disjunct pattern. The ‘conjunct’ in established literature on this topic equates to the ego copulas *yimba* and *yè* (and their variations), as they are the preferred choice for first person declaratives, while the ‘disjunct’ equates to the perceptual evidential copula *dù* (and the *dùba* variation), which are preferred for describing the actions of others.

In (92) we see the pattern of copula choices in an elicited declarative set with the two imperfective structures that use the two different copulas. The first person uses the ego copula (conjunct) and the second and third use the perceptual evidential (disjunct).

92) *ḡà tó sà-teraḡ yè*
 1SG rice.cooked eat-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating rice.’ (AL 100929-01)

khé tó sà-ku dù
 2SG rice.cooked eat-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘you are eating rice.’ (AL 100929-01)

khó tó sà-ku dù
 3SG.M rice.cooked eat-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘he is eating rice.’ (AL 100929-01)

First person as distinct from second and third is the standard pattern for declaratives in the conjunct/disjunct system. This pattern occurs often in elicited data, and when we think about the semantics of the two copulas it is easy to build a case for why this might be. The ego is used with first person because it is the strongest evidence available for first person referents (§6.1.1.1.), while, when referring to second and third person, you can use the perceptual evidential because they are being witnessed by you perceptually in a way that it is not possible witness oneself (§6.1.1.3.). Basically, what the conjunct/disjunct pattern is showing in declarative utterances is the difference between commenting on one’s own actions and the actions of others, and using the most appropriate evidence. This pattern can also be seen across first, second and third person subjects in (93) with the verb *kyú-* ‘vomit’ (93a) and *tè-* ‘sit’ (93b).²⁶ Note that while ‘vomit’ and ‘sit’ can be considered to have different levels of volitionality they are generally not treated much differently by speakers as volitionality is not a particularly strong parameter in copula choice in Lamjung Yolmo compared to other languages that are said to have a conjunct/disjunct system (as discussed in §5.5.2.).

²⁶ That these involve different imperfective aspect structures is an artefact of the preferences of different copulas (see the language summary in chapter 2 or §1.5.4.2.2. of the sketch grammar).

93) a) *ɲà kyú tè-ti yèke*
 1SG vomit AUX-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I was vomiting.’ (AL 101008-01)

khé kyú-teraŋ dù
 2SG vomit-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘you were vomiting.’ (AL 100929-01)

mò kyú tè-sin dù
 3SG.F vomit AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘she was vomiting.’ (AL 100929-01)

b) *ɲà tàpse tè-teraŋ yè*
 1SG now sit-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘I am sitting now.’ (RL 110204-03)

khé tàpse tè-ku dù
 2SG now sit-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘you are sitting now.’ (RL 110204-03)

khó tàpse tè-ku dù
 3SG.M now sit-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘he is sitting now.’ (RL 110204-03)

As discussed in §5.5.2, Hari (2010, p. 55) argues that Yolmo does not have a conjunct/disjunct system because first person can take a ‘disjunct’ form if the speaker wants to indicate surprise at their own actions. This does not actually negate the conjunct/disjunct principle, as Hale (1980) observed that speakers of Kathmandu Newar used the disjunct when they were not the ‘true instigator’ of the event, that is, when they performed an event that they did not do volitionally, which would be unexpected and therefore a surprise. It should be noted that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo can also encode surprise at their own non-volitional actions with the perceptual evidential. In (94), the speaker would be surprised to find himself dancing:

- 94) *nà tàpse tchám-ku dù*
 1SG now dance-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I appear to be dancing.’ (RL 110204-03)

This would be appropriate if the speaker had intended to not dance all evening and found themselves pulled into the dance. Although Hale does not explain why non-volitional activities would not pattern as conjunct within the proposed system, a basic knowledge of the function of the forms used in these distinctions make it sufficiently clear. As Hargreaves (1991, 2005) showed for Kathmandu Newar, the semantics of the perceptual and ego evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo interact with the volitionality of the action. The ego cannot be used for first person non-volitional because the speaker’s knowledge of the event is not drawn from their existent knowledge state. This relates to the sense of newly perceived information that I discussed in §6.3.1. Although, as I showed in §6.1.1.1, volitionality is not a strong component of the semantic distinction of these verbs with first person, it is still one of the dimensions on which they operate.

Thus, for declarative sentences, Lamjung Yolmo looks like a language with a conjunct/disjunct system. There are, however, a great deal many more parameters than the ones I have looked at in this section. In §6.4.2. I will introduce endopathic verb, and the way that they intersect with the conjunct/disjunct pattern. Ultimately I will argue that while the semantics of the ego copula and perceptual evidential copula make Lamjung Yolmo similar to a conjunct/disjunct language the only way to think of it as such would be to rethink what evidence is required to call a language conjunct/disjunct or not.

6.4.2. *Endopathic verbs*

One important feature of Lamjung Yolmo that intersects with the copula patterns described above is the existence of endopathic verbs. These are a subset of verbs

relating to internal feelings, cognitive processes and sensations. (95) is a non-exhaustive list of such verbs.

95)	<i>kyáa</i>	‘feel cold’
	<i>tóo</i>	‘feel hungry’
	<i>ɲílo</i>	‘feel sleepy’
	<i>nà</i>	‘be sore’
	<i>tèmba sàl</i>	‘remember’
	<i>tèmba tɛ̀</i>	‘forget’
	<i>há kò</i>	‘know’
	<i>ɕée</i>	‘know’
	<i>ŋò</i>	‘recognise’
	<i>née</i>	‘think’

This class of verb differs from other verbs in that they are used with the perceptual evidential for first person subject, but that perception is personal and internal, and unobservable by others. Talking about other people as having these states and emotions cannot be done using the perceptual evidential copula, as it is not possible to have perceptual evidence of the internal states of others. In these situations the ego form is used instead. These parameters mean that endopathic verbs have a different split in ego and perceptual evidential for first versus second and third person subjects; with the perceptual evidential being used for first person subjects and the ego forms being used for second and third person subjects.

Tournadre (2006, see also Tournadre and Dorje 2003, pp. 167-168) observed this patterning for Standard Tibetan. It has also been discussed by Garrett (2001, p. 19) for Standard Tibetan and by Caplow (2000, p. 23) for Dokpa. It appears to be a relatively common feature of the Tibetic branch of Tibeto-Burman languages.

Example (96) shows this with first and third person. This pattern is not always as straight-forward, as I will discuss below.

- 96) a) *ɲà=ki tèm̄ba sàl-ku d̄ù*
1SG=ERG remember-IPFV COP.PE
'I remember it.' (RL 110204-03)
- b) *khó=ki tèm̄ba sàl-teraŋ yè*
3SG.M=ERG remember-IPFV COP.EGO
'he remembers it.' (AL 101013-02)

Examples of second person declaratives with endopathic verbs are very hard to obtain, even in elicited contexts. As Caplow (2000, p. 18-19) observed for Dokpa Tibetan, it appears that it is interactionally odd to make direct statements about the person you are addressing, not to mention somewhat impolite. Instead speakers prefer to use other strategies such as a question construction (97).²⁷

- 97) *khé=ki tèm̄ba sàl-teraŋ yè*
2SG=ERG remember-IPFV COP.EGO
'do you remember?' (RL 110204-03)

Another strategy is to use the dubitative copula forms when speculating about the thoughts of one's interlocutor. I mentioned this briefly in §6.1.1.2. and present it here again as (98).

²⁷ As I will discuss in §7.4.1. questions use the copula form that is expected in the answer. 'Remember' is part of the endopathic category I discuss in this section. Were the category as robust in Lamjung Yolmo as it is in other languages we would expect the question to be asked with a perceptual evidential.

98) a) *rò tóo yèto*
 friend hunger COP.DUB
 ‘my friend is probably hungry.’ (KL 23/01/11 book 8, p. 8)

b) *khyá áŋ ñò mà-çee yèto*
 2SG also know NEG.PST-know COP.DUB
 ‘you also probably do not know.’ (KL 120304-02 05:39)

There is one revealing example of the use of the ego copula with a second person endopathic verb in a declarative utterance. In the story of the Jackal and Crow (§3.2.2.) the crafty Jackal manages to get the crow to drop the fish he is holding by flattering him into singing. In his strategic flattery the Jackal declares that the Crow can sing (99).

99) *tçàro khé lú nèn çée yè*
 crow 2SG song sing know COP.EGO
 ‘crow, you know how to sing songs.’ (RL 101027-01 01:46)

Here the Jackal is presuming familiarity with the Crow’s (fictitious) ability to sing. In a second telling of the story, when the Crow shows reluctance to sing, the Jackal further goads him (100).²⁸

100) *lùndi làp-sin yimba ná kí khé=ki*
 jackal say-PST COP.EGO PART or 2SG=ERG
lú nèn mè-çée dùba
 song sing NEG.NON.PST-know COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘(the) jackal said ‘perhaps you [...] don’t know how to sing a song!’
 (RL 101027-01 04:48)

Here the Jackal has shifted to the perceptual evidential to indicate that the Crow has provided no evidence of his ability to sing, indicating that he does not know how.

²⁸ Note that the use of the ego in the first line of this utterance is a part of the fixed grammatical construction *yimba ná kí* that I discussed in §6.2.3.

By shifting to the perceptual evidential copula in the interaction, the Jackal in the story is further prompting the Crow to sing. As I discussed in §6.3.3, the same speaker will often alternate the evidential they use in conversation for interactional reasons. Here the Jackal is shifting the evidential to manipulate his interlocutor (the Crow) and obtain the fish, instead of to help him.

For first person, the use of the perceptual evidential for endopathic verbs does not occur if the utterance involves a habitual internal state or feeling (101). This is because the perceptual evidential is only appropriate for reference to a single instance of an event or feeling, while the ego is used for habitual constructions (§6.1.1.1.).

- 101) *còole jìma tàmaraŋ ɲà=la tóo yè*
 morning sun every 1SG=DAT hunger COP.EGO
 ‘every morning I feel hungry’ (AL 091005-02)

This process has also been observed in Tibetan by Denwood (1999) and Garrett (2001, p. 174) and is consistent with the analysis of the ego copula I have presented as being preferred for knowledge obtained over a period of time (§6.2.2.).

As can be seen in the example above, the choice of copula with endopathic verbs can be context-dependent. For example, (102a) would be uttered if the person was ill in a way that left no physical trace, such as a headache, while (102b) would be for contexts where there were visible symptoms of the illness, such as vomiting, or sweating:

- 102) a) *mò nà-ti yè*
 3SG.F be.ill-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘she is ill.’ (AL 120127-01)

- b) mò nà-ku **dù**
 3SG.F be.ill-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘she appears ill.’ (AL 120127-01)

Endopathic patterning for first person also appears to occur with the optative suffix *-ni* (103).

- 103) *ŋà òo=la qò-ni tè-ku dù*
 1SG there=LOC go-OPT AUX-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I want to go there.’ (AL 100923-01)

The extended use of the perceptual evidential to describe internal and unobservable states of the speaker, and the inability to use the direct perception evidential for the internal states of others, echoes the parameters of opacity of mind (§4.4.). Opacity of mind draws a line between that which is observable in the world and a person’s inner state, and with endopathic verbs we see a line drawn between verbs relating to inner states and the remainder of the verb word class. Even if speakers of Lamjung Yolmo, and closely related languages with endopathic verb sets that are overtly marked in the way they intersect with the modal marking of the copulas, do not have a conscious and considered philosophy of opacity of mind, it is clear that there is a grammatical understanding in their language of this phenomenon.

Speakers interpret the use of the optative with second person subjects as a question (104).²⁹

²⁹ The optative was not explicitly tested for, but does occur in a number of elicited and naturalistic constructions in my corpus. It would certainly be worth examining in more detail in the future, especially the function it has in question constructions.

- 104) *khé dò-ni tèt-ku dù*
 2SG go-OPT AUX-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘do you want to go there?’ (AL 100923-01)

The optative is about an internal desiderative state, and so the use of the perceptual evidential in a question here indicates that the speaker is assuming their addressee would use an optative in a declarative as in (103) (this feature of question structures is discussed in more detail in §7.4.1.). Examples (103) and (104) show us that it is not just the set of verbs give in (95) that pattern endopathically, but also the optative verbal suffix. This indicates that ‘endopathic’ is not just a grammatical function of a subclass of verbs, but perhaps a more general feature of the language. This may be a reflection of a larger cultural understanding of opacity of mind, whereby the distinction between the minds of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ manifest in the grammar more broadly than just the list of verbs that are usually classed as endopathic in descriptions of Tibetic languages. Unfortunately there is currently insufficient data to be able to make any definite analysis.

That the concept of ‘endopathic’ in Lamjung Yolmo might be broader than just a sub-set of verbs indicates that what we see in this language may be similar to Hargreaves’s (2011, 2012) analysis of internal state attribution in Kathmandu Newar. Hargreaves distinguishes between ‘self’ and ‘other’ in terms of knowledge structures, of which internal state attribution is one component. Such an analysis is concerned with looking at the way speakers construct knowledge attribution across the whole language. Hargreaves’s work indicates that the distinction in Kathmandu Newar between one’s own internal states, and those of others, is quite robust, like that in Sherpa and Standard Tibetan. Even though the distinction appears to be less clear in Lamjung Yolmo, Hargreaves treatment is a more holistic way of considering the way people use these structures.

Garrett (2001, p. 80) observes that the judgements Standard Tibetan speakers have about endopathic verbs and their modal properties are “quite robust.” When I

overtly discussed the preferred copulas for different verbs with Lamjung Yolmo speakers I also got quite consistent descriptions from them, on which the above analysis is based. Although the description of endopathic verbs so far makes it sound like they are a clear-cut set that are easily distinguishable from other verbs, this is not really the case once we start looking at more examples from a broader range of naturalistic interaction. While the existence of endopathic verbs is robust, there are fringes where speakers' reported usage is different to actual production.

Above I observed that endopathic verbs occur with perceptual evidential forms for first person subjects, however the use of ego evidentials for endopathic verbs with first person subjects appears to be at the fringes of general acceptable use. There are many examples such as those in (105) where first person constructions are given with the ego instead of the perceptual evidential.

- 105) a) *ŋà = ki née-teraŋ yè*
 1SG = ERG think-IPFV COP.EGO
 'I am thinking.' (RL 110204-03)
- b) *ŋà nà-ti yè*
 1SG be.ill-PERF COP.EGO
 'I am ill.' (AL 101013-02)
- c) *ŋà = ki sém há kò yè*
 1SG = GEN mind know COP.EGO
 'I know.'
 (lit. 'my mind knows.')

It is possible that because speakers are producing these utterances in elicitation they are not referring to their own cognitive processes, but are using the ego to mark something more generic. Given how consistent the general attitude to endopathic verbs is amongst speakers, This is likely not the case. Instead it appears that the

boundary between what constitutes perceived knowledge that is internal to oneself and personal knowledge does not appear to be particularly delineated for speakers of Lamjung Yolmo.

There does not appear to be any clear contextual motivation for this shift, especially considering all of these processes involve observation of one's own internal state. There does not appear to be any influence from tense or aspectual information either. This may indicate that perhaps any opacity of mind belief that is manifested in the grammatical parameters of the language is not as rigid as the description in §4.4.2. had shown. Another possibility is that there is some level of opacity of mind happening in relation to first person. That is, just like a speaker does not have access to the internal states of others, they may not have total access to their own internal states. This analysis is reminiscent of the definition of opacity of mind by Carruthers (2011) (§4.4.1.). This is unlikely for two reasons. The first is that the perceptual evidential and the ego are both semantically adequate for referring to personal internal states and events, with neither of them indicating that the speaker does not have access to that which they are describing in relation to their own internal state. The second is that at no point have speakers of Lamjung Yolmo indicated that the difference in choice between ego and perceptual evidential for first person constructions is a matter of not knowing what they themselves are thinking, as opposed to discussions of examples like (102a) where speakers do articulate that they use the ego evidential for second and third person because they have no direct perceptual evidence of another person's internal state.

Examples like (105) indicate that the delineation between 'self' knowledge and 'other' knowledge that Hargreaves (2005) observes in Kathmandu Newar is not as straightforward in Lamjung Yolmo, which would be one of the reasons that the conjunct/disjunct system in Lamjung Yolmo is not as strong a pattern as Hale (1980) and Hargreaves (2005) have observed in Kathmandu Newar.

In contrast, there are also examples where speakers use the perceptual evidential for non-first person (106). These are situations where there is some external evidence for the state being described.

- 106) *khó=ki* *khím* *khó=ki* *khím*
 3SG.M=GEN house 3SG.M=GEN house
 tèmba sàl-di ***ḍù*** *hai*
 remember-PERF COP.PE PART.Q
 ‘his house, he remembered his house yeah?’ (SBL101124-03 01:58)

In this example SBL is reporting on the main character in the Family Story (§3.2.1.) going through a period of reminiscence and regret about his misdeeds. The man is sitting in a thoughtful posture with a thought-bubble above his head detailing his house and family. Although in interaction speakers do not have such privileged visual access to another person’s thoughts, in this image the speaker is able to use the perceptual evidential because the man’s thoughts are clearly depicted, and his physical stance indicates that this is the process that is occurring. In elicitation these kinds of contexts appear to dictate which copula speakers find appropriate, which is why we find variation, but they are difficult to access. In interactional data we can actually observe these contextual factors.

Endopathic verbs are a specific feature of Tibetic languages that nicely illustrate a grammatical manifestation of the delineation present in the theory of opacity of mind. It must be observed, though, that there is more variation in their use than the claim of a strong opacity of mind doctrine might dictate. I return to this in §9.4.

Endopathic verbs add another complication that is not mentioned in descriptions of conjunct/disjunct languages. Their use is commensurate with the Yolmo stance towards knowledge and access to other people’s knowledge states in a way that echoes opacity of mind, and they also exist in closely related languages that have

been described previously as being conjunct/disjunct. Therefore, they need to be factored into the system. I return to this in §9.3.

With this final problem it is very difficult to come to a definite conclusion as to how speakers chose a copula verb form for verbs on the endopathic list in (95). We can consider a number of hypotheses. The first is that there is no set notion of what counts as unreadable in regards to other minds. Instead, speakers have different ideas, dependent on context. This seems unlikely given how robustly the feature of endopathic verbs has been described for related language such as Standard Tibetan, and the fact that in the corpus to date there are no immediately obvious patterns of preference for endopathic verbs by a particular speaker, or group of speakers. The second is that there is a set of speakers who treat endopathic verbs like non-endopathic verbs. This hypothesis is unlikely for the same reason as the first, but it can be tested with future work looking specifically at the endopathic phenomenon. The final, and most likely, possibility is that different speakers are relying on different cues in regard to what is considered an internal or external phenomenon in different situations and these are not always easily recoverable from context, even with designed tasks and stimulus. We saw this in the sentences in (102), where the choice of endopathic construction or non-endopathic with the verb *nà-* ‘be ill’ depended on the type of evidence the speaker had. With endopathic verbs we are attempting to find the motivation for people’s unconscious processing of other people’s mental states - this level of mental abstraction makes it difficult to ascertain what factors are at play. This is one situation where the abstraction is possibly too great to be able to capture, even within a social cognition description perspective. What I have shown in this section is that there is a great deal more variation and contextual influence than has been demonstrated in descriptions of the endopathic verb set in related languages.

Endopathic verbs are not the only complication for conjunct/disjunct descriptions of a language like Lamjung Yolmo. In §6.4.3. I will return to looking at the full range of verbs.

6.4.3. *Beyond conjunct/disjunct patterns*

Now I have shown which features of Lamjung Yolmo are similar to those described for conjunct/disjunct systems, and introduced endopathic verbs as a variation in these patterns, in this section I will look in more detail at how speakers of the language use copulas with different persons across a wider range of contexts. As I mentioned in §6.1.3. I have chosen to look at examples of the use of these forms both as copula verbs, and in their role as verb final auxiliaries. This is because the semantics that they contribute does not vary depending on function. In trying to understand what the underlying pragmatic and cognitive motivation for the choices that speakers make then it is important to consider all of the uses of these forms to come to the most complete understanding.

There are some contexts in which the same copula is used regardless of the person-marking of the subject. For example, when talking about a person's name the ego is used, regardless of whether you are talking about your own name, the name of your interlocutor or another person (107).

107) a) *ŋà=ki mìn rádʒ yimba*
1SG=ERG name Raj COP.EGO
'my name is Raj.' (RL 110204-03)

b) *khó=ki mìn sòm yimba*
3SG.M=GEN name Som COP.EGO
'his name is Som.' (RL 110129-01)

When we consider that the perceptual evidential is only used when there is external evidence of something (or internal evidence for endopathic verbs (§6.4.2.), but that is only for first person subjects) then it makes sense that speakers would use the ego for all speakers, as there is no external evidence of what a person's name is. There are some fringe cases where the perceptual might be appropriate, such as reading a name tag of a person whose name you were not sure of, but speakers were reluctant to agree with such scenarios, perhaps because it was quite specific, unlikely and not a particularly polite interactive move.

Likewise, when talking about somebody's ethnicity, the ego is the preferred copula across all persons (108).

- 108) a) *ɲà yòlmo yìmba*
 1SG Yolmo COP.EGO
 'I am Yolmo.' (VL 101224-01)
- b) *khé yòlmo yìmba*
 2SG Yolmo COP.EGO
 'you are Yolmo.' (VL 101224-01)
- c) *mò yòlmo yìmba*
 3SG.F Yolmo COP.EGO
 'she is Yolmo.' (VL 101224-01)

This is more interesting because unlike a name, which involves nothing physical, it is possible for people to guess one's ethnicity relatively accurately based on clothing and appearance (not to mention language or accent). Even though this might be the case, it is still preferred to use the ego evidential, likely because there are few situations where you would pass comment on someone's ethnicity without knowing them well enough for it to be a piece of general knowledge and not related to a specific piece of perceptual evidence.

The use of the perceptual evidential *dù* in this context is considered ungrammatical by speakers (109). This is because the perceptual evidential is only used existential-type constructions, and not equational constructions (§6.1.2.).

- 109) * *khó yòlmo dù*
 3SG.M Yolmo COP.PE
 * ‘he is Yolmo.’ (AL 120126-02)

Although they consider that form to be incorrect, there are contexts where it would be possible to use the emphatic perceptual evidential copula, as in (110). Lamjung Yolmo appears to be one of the few where this cognate can be used in equational structures as well as existentiality.

- 110) *khó yòlmo dùba*
 3SG.M Yolmo COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘he is Yolmo.’ (AL 120126-02)

The appropriate context for (110) would be if a person looked like a member of one ethnic group (for example, if they looked like a Tamang) and then when the person started talking Yolmo it became apparent that he was, in fact, Yolmo. It has that element of mirativity that is often found in the use of this more emphatic form, as it involves newly perceived knowledge. Although there are some contexts where the ego is used across all persons, there are no equally consistent contexts in which the perceptual evidential is used for all persons.

As I mentioned above in §6.1.3, I have deliberately chosen to include all uses of these forms, regardless of whether they are being used as copulas or verbal auxiliaries. This is not the same as the analysis taken up by others. Kelly (2004), in her analysis of Sherpa, does not include the copula uses of these forms in her conjunct/disjunct analysis, instead she focuses only on the verbal auxiliary use. This

means that the data present is more like that found in Kathmandu Newar (Hale 1980, Hargreaves 2005), in that it is only concerned with lexical verb choices. Such an analysis would avoid the difficulty of how to account for the use of ego across all persons that I presented in (108) above in terms of a conjunct/disjunct model of the language. There is no reason to avoid these forms for the sake of the analysis, as they can be accounted for in relation to all the other uses of these forms in Lamjung Yolmo, even when we take into account all uses of the copulas if we sufficiently understand the boundary between ‘self’ and ‘other’ knowledge in a language. I discuss this in more detail in §9.3. of the discussion.

Even if we exclude copula uses of these forms from the analysis there are still situations where the verbal auxiliary uses of the forms do not pattern how a conjunct/disjunct system would predict. For example, the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo is most like the disjunct category in a conjunct/disjunct model in that it is most likely to be found with second and third person in declaratives. In some contexts the perceptual evidential can be used for first person that are not accounted for in conjunct/disjunct descriptions.

The perceptual evidential can be used for volitional first person actions, as long as another self undertakes those actions. Example (111) would be appropriate if the speaker was looking at a photograph or a video of themselves at a funeral, lighting one of the many butter candles that are burned during the ceremonial proceedings:

- 111) *ŋà bòti pá-r-teraŋ d̀̀*
 1SG candle light -IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I am lighting a candle.’ (RL 29/10/10 book 4, p. 18)

In this example there is never any doubt that the speaker was acting volitionally in the image. The perceptual evidential is not being used as a disjunct because of a lack of volition, it is being used as its semantics indicate, for a witnessed event. This is

only because the speaker is referring to an image of himself lighting a candle. It is not the action, but the perception of the action that is the focus here. Garrett (2001, pp. 78, 166) has also talked about the use of the perceptual evidential being used when talking about another version of oneself, such as in an image or video.

One criticism of conjunct/disjunct as an explanation for the types of patterns we get in Tibetic languages is that it is focused on a binary distinction (Garrett 2001, p. 209, Tournadre 2008, p. 290). Although I have focused on contrasting the ego with the perceptual evidential in this discussion, they are not the only two options speakers have available. They can also use the dubitative, or chose to forego any kind of marking (see §6.5.). Even when we do only focus on the distinction between these two specific forms it becomes apparent that there is not always a single motivation for the split between first person and non-first person subjects and the types of copulas that are used with them in declarative sentences. These examples of how speakers use copula verbs show the variation and complexity in their application to interaction. These should not just be considered as extensions of a simple pattern that is underlyingly conjunct/disjunct as it takes away from the fact that so much of this is not variation from the norm, but it is the norm.

6.4.4. An egophoric analysis

So far, I have argued that conjunct/disjunct is an insufficient way to describe the types of patterns that we see in copula use in Lamjung Yolmo. Another type of analysis that has been put forward for related languages is that of an ‘egophoric’ system (Tournadre 2008). In this system the forms are not thought of as ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ but are instead considered in regard to their semantics. So instead of thinking of the Standard Tibetan egophoric as a ‘conjunct’ form, we can instead consider it as the form speakers use mostly when speaking about themselves (or, for some forms, a closely related person or object). This means that in the many situations where first person subject takes a ‘disjunct’ perceptual evidential these are not considered aberrations, but fit the semantics of the language, because the person

has direct perceptual evidence, either through endopathic perception of an internal state or event (§6.4.2.) or because they have perceptual evidence of an earlier, recorded version of themselves such as (111) in §6.4.3. This also avoids the concerns of Sun (1993, p. 995) and Garrett (2001, p. 291) that the terms ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ are meaningless in relation to their function in declarative sentences in any system.

The ‘egophoric’ analysis of Standard Tibetan is much more in line with the approach to the relationship between person marking and copula choice that I have presented above. It is much more sympathetic to the semantically and contextually driven way that distinctions in use between these forms are made. It also allows for more nuance than a conjunct/disjunct description does.

However, although this description is better than that offered by the conjunct/disjunct framework, there are still problems with adopting the ‘egophoric’ framework for Lamjung Yolmo. First of all, while this works as a description of Standard Tibetan, we still have to consider the differences between the Standard Tibetan egophoric and Lamjung Yolmo ego that I discussed in §6.2. The Standard Tibetan egophoric copula forms include a set where the subject of the utterance is closely related to the speaker, and hence they have personal knowledge of the proposition.

The Lamjung Yolmo cognate forms (*yimba* and *yè*) of the Standard Tibetan egophoric forms do not share quite the same function as the Standard Tibetan egophoric forms (§6.2.1.). Instead these forms are ‘ego,’ not because of any close relationship to the content of the utterance, but because their knowledge comes from personal general knowledge, not current, specific, perceived evidence. While the copula evidential and epistemic values in Lamjung Yolmo are closer to Standard Tibetan than a classic conjunct/disjunct analysis, to refer to what we find in Lamjung Yolmo as ‘egophoric’ is misleading for a number of reasons. Firstly, it

implies that egophoricity is at the heart of the system, while what we see is actually an interaction between the choice of ego or perceptual evidential in most situations. Secondly, it implies that there is a greater similarity between the semantics of copulas in Standard Tibetan and Lamjung Yolmo than is really the case. More work is needed on languages that are closely related to Standard Tibetan and Lamjung Yolmo, to describe in more detail both the specifics of the semantics and use of the cognates of the ‘ego(phoric)’ forms, and in the way these forms interact with the grammatical person of the subject of an utterance. I will return to this in more detail in §9.3. where I present a new analysis of conjunct/disjunct languages that makes many of the current parameters secondary to two main ones; the first being the semantics of ego-type copulas and the second is the structure of questions (discussed in chapter 7). While Standard Tibetan is an egophoric system, the differences in the semantics between Standard Tibetan egophoric and Lamjung Yolmo ego means that it is not justified to refer to Lamjung Yolmo as an egophoric language either.

6.5. The absence of copulas

So far I have only looked at constructions where there is a copula, which encodes overt modal information. This can lead to the erroneous impression that speakers use these forms in all utterances in Lamjung Yolmo. There are several common sentence constructions that do not involve copulas in their role as the main verb or as a final auxiliary. These include the regular past and non-past tense constructions as well as mood constructions of imperative and hortative. It is these ‘un-marked’ sentences that I shall be focusing on in this section.

6.5.1. Constructions without copulas

The basic tense distinction in Lamjung Yolmo is past/non-past. This is marked using a suffix on the verb with the past form *-sin* or the non-past form *-ke*. Both of these and their phonological properties are discussed in §1.5.3.1. of the sketch grammar

(Appendix 1). As is evident in examples of the use of each below, they occur independent of any clause-final copula marking.

The non-past tense suffixes are discussed in §1.5.3.1.1. of the sketch grammar. Some examples of their use are given in (112).

112) a) *ɲà tàpse tó sà-ke*
1SG now rice.cooked eat-NON.PST
'I am now eating rice.' (AL 100930-01)

b) *khó nàɲbar òɲ-ke*
3SG.M tomorrow come-NON.PST
'he comes tomorrow.' (RL 101120-01)

The past tense form is discussed in §1.5.3.1.2. of the sketch grammar. Examples of past tense marked verbs are given in (113).

113) a) *dàɲ khyá tó sà-sin*
yesterday 2SG rice.cooked eat-PST
'you ate rice yesterday.' (AL 090916-06)

b) *tòɲla dènmu lè zò-sin*
before like.this work make-PST
'before (he) worked like this.' (AL 091108-01 39:20)

The past and non-past tense suffixes do not have any overtly marked evidential value. They can be used equally across all persons and irrespective of whether the speaker has seen the event or not. As can be seen in (114), the non-past can be used to describe a specific event.

- 114) *khó tapse òη-ke*
 3SG.M now come-NON.PST
 ‘he is now coming.’ (RL 101120-01)

This utterance could be used regardless of whether the person has been seen or not. As it can be used for a specific instance of something it is not possible to just assume that there is a default modal value assigned to these copula-less constructions. Garrett (2001, pp. 113-114) observes that in Standard Tibetan those verbs that are unmarked with a copula are underlyingly egophoric; however in Lamjung Yolmo, given that the ego has a wider range of use, it is not possible to say whether a speaker would be drawing on perceptual or personal knowledge in many cases where there is no overt marking. It would appear that overt evidentiality is not relevant to these clauses, and epistemic certainty is assumed because it has not been marked otherwise as uncertain.

In regard to tense constructions, it is worth briefly discussing the collocation of the past tense *-sin* with the perceptual evidential *dù*. I refer to this as the narrative past (§6.1.1.3.). This construction is not common in elicitation, but is highly frequent in certain genres of narrative. It does not appear in first person monologues, such as AL discussing her family (090929-01) or her village (091006-01), however it is used heavily in the picture task activities (091108-01, 101124-03). The narrative past involves the simple past tense suffix *-sin* discussed above, and the perceptual evidential copula *dù*. Some naturalistic examples are given in (115).

- 115) a) *só nà-ti tē-sin dù*
 tooth sore-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘the tooth had been sore.’ (AL 091108-01 14:49)
- b) *pìza ηù-ti tē-sin dù*
 child cry-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘the child had been crying.’ (AL 091108-01 12:20)

- c) *thàa thén-sin dù*
 blood go.out-PST COP.PE
 ‘the blood had flowed.’ (AL 091108-01 23:44)

The *-sin* past tense suffix does not occur in any constructions with other copulas, but only occurs with the perceptual evidential.

As I mentioned in §6.1.1.3. on perceptual evidentials, the narrative past does not occur in first person narrative. To give an indication of this, in one recording of the Family Story picture task (SBL and RL 101124-03) the participants were asked to tell the story in the third person and then in the first person. During the third person component of the task the participants used the *-sin dù* construction 20 times in 8 minutes and 15 seconds, but in the first person retelling the participants spoke for 9 minutes and 50 seconds and did not use this construction at all. The person telling the story is a participant in the event, as opposed to simply a witnessing, which would be a reason to not use a construction with a perceptual evidential that is commensurate with the semantics of the perceptual. It is likely that the narrative past is a fixed construction that further is not preferred in first-person narratives. I will discuss this absence of narrative past with first person in more detail in §6.5.2.

The hortative and imperative moods also do not include any use of copula verbs. Below are some examples of the hortative suffix *-ka* (116).

- 116) a) *òraŋ khúra kyàp-ka*
 1PL.INC bread fry-HORT
 ‘let’s fry bread!’ (AL 091104-02)
- b) *òraŋ sà-ka*
 1PL.INC eat-HORT
 ‘let’s eat!’ (AL 091104-02)

The imperative is either marked with the verb suffix *-toŋ*, or involves one of a small set of verbs in its imperative form, or a bare verb form in the case of imperatives directed at a younger person. In the example below we see all three options with the verb *tè* ‘sit’ (117).

117)	<i>tè-toŋ</i>	‘please sit’
	<i>çù</i>	‘please sit’
	<i>tè</i>	‘sit!’ (regular)

That these moods do not interact with the copula set, including the evidential items in that set, provides further evidence that it is worth considering evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo as a component of a wider system of modality. As these forms do not occur in the same types of sentence as copula-marked forms in the way that the tense-marked verbs do I will not discuss them in any more detail.

6.5.2. *Copula-less constructions in use*

The use of copula-less tensed constructions is quite frequent in some genres of discourse. This includes explications and first person narratives. I will begin by looking at these, and then move on to examples where speakers alternate between constructions with less predictability. In both instances I will explore what motivates the lack of copula use, and what that says about construction of knowledge in interaction.

The first genre I will look at is explication. Something that is readily apparent about the data from this genre of texts is that there is very little copula use. There is no use of perceptual evidentials across the three recordings, and very few examples of the ego copula.³⁰

³⁰ The general fact copula is also not used in explicatory texts. Although in some

The younger speakers (KL and ST) use the non-past tense in their explication (118a) and (118b), while their mother (DML) uses only past tense, alternating between the standard past tense *-sin* (118c) and the somewhat less common past/emphatic form *-pa* (118d).

- 118) a) *òlegi ṭháj tén-ke*
 and.then alcohol pull.out-NON.PST
 ‘and then take out the alcohol.’ (KL 101026-05 01:16)
- b) *òlegi òo-tile léto òη-ke*
 and.then there-after gravy come-NON.PST
 ‘peel the shell from the cooked egg.’ (ST 120307-01 00:59)
- c) *òo = la túp-sin*
 there = LOC cut-PST
 ‘cut it there.’ (DML 120309-01 00:14)
- d) *tòηla tòηbo = la túp-pa*
 before tree = LOC cut-PST
 ‘before, it was cut on the tree.’ (DML 120309-01 02:18)

DML had only been showing me the day before how to make baskets, and it is likely that her choice of past tense forms in (118c) and (118d) was referring back to those specific past events as opposed to the non-past used by her daughters in (118a) and (118b).

ways the semantics of the form could be considered appropriate, its use is limited, as described in §6.1.1.4.

We also see the absence of copulas in the first half of AL's description of how to travel from Besisahar to her village (119).

- 119) a) *sérkyugaun = le tá-na kháwa kàŋ dzàmma-raŋ thóŋ-ke*
sérkyugaun = ABL look-COND mountain.peak all-EMPH see-NON.PST
 'from Serkyugaun if (you) look (you) can see mountain peaks.'
 (AL 091006-01 00:50)
- b) *áni nàmgyu = le kháwa kàŋ dzàmma-raŋ thóŋ -ke*
and namgyu = ABL mountain.peak all-EMPH see-NON.PST
 'and from Namgyu (you) can see all the mountain peaks.'
 (AL 091006-01 01:07)

That component of the text is very expository in nature, especially in comparison to the rest of the text. For the remainder of the text she describes the location and her family who live there, and uses ego copulas to mark this (120).

- 120) a) *áni rì nàkpu yè*
and forest black COP.EGO
 'and the forest is black.' (AL 091006-01 01:14)
- b) *ŋà = ki águu = ki pù pòmo = ya yè*
1SG = GEN father's.younger.brother = GEN son daughter = PL COP.EGO
 'my father's younger brother's son and daughter (exist).'
 (AL 091006-01 01:19)

As AL has not returned to her village for many years the ego is appropriate as it is information that she knows, but is not based on recent perceptual confirmation. She is no longer giving instructions that describe the generic event of travelling to the village, but is instead referring to the more specific and personal topic of describing her village environs and talking about her family. Thus her choice of evidential marking (or lack thereof) changes as the function of her narrative shifts.

First person narratives also exhibit low use of copula forms. The Family Story (§3.2.1.) provides an interesting example of this, as we can compare the first person telling to the third person and general descriptive tellings. The third person descriptions feature use of the perceptual evidential, as well as some ego forms, while the first person descriptions use few ego constructions and many copula-less constructions. For example, in card five the man and his wife are sitting in court after he has hit her. The actual hitting event is presented in a subsequent card, but the man is restrained and the woman is heavily bandaged. The utterances in (112) are from the first time SBL is describing the cards.

- 121) a) *pèemi gòo róp-sin dù*
 wife head break-PST COP.PE
 ‘(the) wife’s head was broken.’ (SBL 101124-04 01:10)
- b) *khyóga =ki kyàp dùba*
 husband=ERG hit COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘(the) husband hit (her).’ (SBL 101124-04 01:12)
- c) *khyóga =ki kyàp yèto*
 husband=ERG hit COP.DUB
 ‘(the) husband probably hit (her).’ (SBL 101124-04 01:14)

Here he uses a narrative past to describe the wife’s state, before claiming that the husband hit her. Although this statement is based on assertion SBL uses the emphatic perceptual evidential. He realises that he does not actually have any perceptual evidence of the event itself, only the residual evidence of the wound and so downgrades the epistemic assertion of his statement in the next utterance. He uses the narrative past construction when retelling the story (122), this time he does not need to correct the evidential value of the copula as he has already seen the specific hitting event and can therefore report having seen it.

- 122) *khó = ki kyàp-sin dù*
 3SG.M=ERG hit -PST COP.PE
 ‘he hit (his wife).’ (SBL 101124-04 17:58)

When he is reporting these events from the perspective of the husband in the final telling there is no evidence marking used (123).

- 123) *òolegi kyàp tér-sin*
 and.then hit give-PST
 ‘and then (I) gave (her) a hit.’ (SBL 101124-04 28:23)

Although actions and events reported by first person can use the ego copula it appears that in extended narratives speakers find modally-unmarked tense sufficient. This is not surprising, as the modal value of events relayed by a participant (although in this case a hypothetical participant) can be inferred to be ego knowledge. There are some utterances like (124) that do overtly mark ego in narratives that otherwise have large stretches without the use of any copulas.

- 124) *ṅà = la láure kwèla tér-ti yè*
 1SG=DAT soldier(Nep) clothing give-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘the soldiers gave me clothing.’ (SBL 101124-03 25:42)

However, even when telling your own story, things still happen to other people. In such situations though, the first person narrator uses a modally unmarked past tense (125) construction.

- 125) a) *òṅḍa rò dzàti dzàmma bonti-sin*
 that.way friend group all say(Nep)-PST
 ‘in that way, all my friends spoke.’ (SBL 101124-03 27:02)

- b) *dàmba = la kyàp-timaraŋ pèemi ñù-sin*
 cheek = DAT hit-after wife cry-PST
 ‘After (I) hit (her) on her cheek, my wife cried.’
 (SBL 101124-03 30:38)

This indicates that the speaker does not feel the need to mark that they witnessed the event if the narrative framework appears to make it clear to others they were a participant in the events.

In much the same way that there are contexts where speakers do not use copula constructions, there are some situations that are more likely to license modal constructions than others. For example, actions are most commonly elicited with non-evidential marking, while perceptual descriptions are highly likely to include evidential marking, as can be seen in (126).

- 126) a) *ñà tó dèe-ke*
 1SG rice.cooked touch-NON.PST
 ‘I am touching the rice.’ (AL 100929-01)

tó yàabu dèe-ku dù
 rice.cooked good feel-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘the rice feels good.’ (AL 100929-01)

- b) *ñà tó sà-ke*
 1SG rice.cooked eat-NON.PST
 ‘I am eating rice.’ (AL 100929-01)

tó çìmbu dù
 rice tasty COP.PE
 ‘the rice is tasty.’ (AL 100929-01)

Even in situations where speakers use a high number of perceptual evidentials, and we would expect a great deal of perceptual evidentials, we still find modally

unmarked clauses. We see this in the Put Project (§3.2.3.) videos. Although, as I discussed in §6.1.1.3. (18), many of the clauses were marked for perceptual evidence in these recordings, there are also many clauses where AL uses only the past tense marker *-sin* (127).

- 127) a) *dzòla nàkpu tɛí kò nàŋla zàa-sin*
 bag(Nep) black one door inside put-PST
 ‘(the woman) put a black bag inside the door.’ (AL 101006-01 1:07:12)
- b) *òŋ-terəŋ tʰók thí-sin*
 come-IPFV knock join-PST
 ‘after coming (they) knocked (each other).’ (AL 101012-02 21:04)

These examples occur in a context where many utterances are marked with a perceptual evidential form, and yet we get these modally unmarked past tense *-sin* forms.

This then raises the question of why speakers will chose to use these copula-less modally-unmarked forms in interaction when they also have the option of marking the information modally. There are some general observations that can be made from this data about how speakers alternate between modally marked and unmarked forms, but it is important to note that there is no way to predict whether a speaker will chose to use a modal construction such as *-ku dù* or the unmarked *-sin*. Both constructions are used with the same verbs in the ‘put’ data, often in the same context, so we can rule out the possibility that there may be something inherent about the action or the internal logistics of the event that dictate which form is appropriate.

It is possible then that speakers may just be making a choice as to whether they want to mark the internal aspect of the event, as doing so results in choosing to mark modality as a secondary feature as there is no way to mark imperfective aspect that

does not involve a clause-final copula (see §6.1.3. or Appendix 1 §1.5.3.2. for more on aspect).

In utterances where AL uses the *dùba* copula form, the remaining clauses in that video description almost always are left modally unmarked. In (128) we see two examples from the video tasks where AL uses the *dùba* copula and the subsequent *-sin* past tense suffix:

- 128) a) *pèmpiza tçi=ki gòo=la mendo dùba*
 woman one=GEN head=LOC flower COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘in the woman’s hair was a flower.’ (AL 101006-01 24:46)

khyópiza tçi òη-ti tén-sin
 man one come-PERF pull.out-PST
 ‘a man came and pulled it out.’ (AL 101006-01 24:57)

- b) *tòηbo=la thákpa pyán zàa dùba*
 tree=LOC rope hang put COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘on a tree a rope was put hung.’ (AL 101006-01 40:49)

khyópiza tçi òη-ti tén-ti khér-sin
 man one come-PERF pull.out-PERF take.away-PST
 ‘a man came, pulled out and took away (the rope).’
 (AL 101006-01 41:07)

In situations where a speaker uses a *dùba* form it would appear that they have chosen to mark the event as complete, which would lend support to the argument that the evidential status of the utterance is secondary to the aspectual marking. This would possibly also indicate the emphatic *dùba* is sufficient in contextualising for the listener that the information was obtained through perceptual information, and does not warrant that the evidential status of the event needs to be mentioned again. This is not always the case. there is one instance (129) where the speaker uses the

perceptual evidential and then uses an aspectually imperfective *-ku dù*. This was the full description of the event by AL.

129) *mòʃor tʃéemi tʃíi dùba*
car(Eng) small one COP.PE.EMPH
'a small car.' (AL 101006-01 45:45)

πίep=ki tòlbo nàŋla khyópiza tʃíi=ki ʃígu lú-ku dù
pipe(Eng)=GEN hole inside man one=ERG paper put.into-IPFV COP.PE
'into the pipe a man was putting a piece of paper.' (AL 101006-01 46:05)

It is possible that for the speaker there is a different internal aspectual structure to this event compared to the events in (128), being less of a set up and action, and more of a protracted event.

There are also descriptions of whole clips where the evidential status is not marked, which perhaps indicates that AL feels that it is clear from preceding utterances in this discourse that the information is based on perceptual evidence.

That some constructions do not have any evidential value is not a flaw or an absence in the system, but a basic feature of it. As I have shown in this section, speakers prefer these constructions for specific discourse types and can use different constructions to mark something using the set of copulas should the communicative need arise. Just because the speakers are not using overt copula forms does not mean that they are not cognitively tracking this information. This thesis is concerned with the linguistic expression of these cognitive processes, and perhaps future work will be able to create an experimental design where we can see if or how speakers of Lamjung Yolmo track such information even when it is not linguistically expressed.

6.5.3. *The absence of overt copulas*

So far I have focused on those constructions where the use of copulas is not licensed as part of a grammatical utterance. There are also situations where there is no overt copula marking due to omission as a natural feature of interactional discourse. While copulas occur in almost every elicited sentence where they are expected within the grammar of Lamjung Yolmo (§6.1.), there are some types of interaction where they are rarely actually used. In this section I will look at those naturalistic interactional situations where speakers frequently omit copula verbs from constructions where they are included with high frequency in elicitation.

We see this in explication and narratives, where one participant in the interaction talks more than the other. Below we see examples from the explication texts discussed in the section above. In (130a) ST uses a perfective marker *-ti*, which is typically followed by either an ego or a perceptual evidential in most contexts. Both speakers also use a nominal construction (130b) and (130c). While it is possible for nominalised forms with the *-kandi* suffix to not include a copula, this is uncommon in elicited sentences when the construction is being used to describe an action.

- 130) a) *tçhú = la lú-ti*
water = LOC put.into-PERF
'put into the water.' (ST 120307-01 00:02)
- b) *tçhú kàl-timaraŋ kyàgar lú-kandi*
water go.PERF-after millet put.into-NOM
'after the water goes, put the millet in.' (KL 101026-05 05:24)
- c) *tshé yindzo-ni pába kyúr-kandi*
cooked.be from-FOC bark throw-NOM
'peel the shell from the cooked egg.' (ST 120307-01 00:18)

The lack of overt copulas in these contexts is explained by the fact that they exist in a larger context. Any evidential that would be present could be inferred from context. For example, with the explicative texts the speakers were not referring to a specific instance of an event, but a general description of a frequently performed task. The lack of evidence marking does not detract from the speaker's role as the author of an utterance. As Aikhenvald (2004, p. 79) has observed, the ability to do this relies on the sentence being in 'connected speech' where the interactional context makes clear what evidence the speaker intended.

Aikhenvald (2004) presents a narrative as an example of connected speech, but there is no reason to assume that other interactions cannot support the absence of copula verbs. In (131) we see two questions from the Twenty Questions game (§3.2.5.). Although I will deal with the structure of questions in more detail in chapter 7, one thing that is striking and relevant to this discussion is how speakers who used full questions early on in the game (131a) began reducing their questions at a later stage (131b).

- 131) a) *túp-kandi sè yimba*
 cut-NOM thing COP.EGO
 'is it a cutting thing?' (AL 120214-02 00:36)
- b) *tɕápal*
 sandals(Nep)
 'sandals?' (AL 120214-02 12:35)

Given that the game of Twenty Questions involves asking the other person a set of yes/no questions, it is unsurprising that people move to reducing the questions down. The task is formulaic and repetitive, and shorter questions allow a person to find the answer sooner. It illustrates that narratives are not the only kind of connected speech where it is possible to omit epistemic information.

An example that is less predicated on this kind of consensus-through-repetition is the interaction between KL and her husband CL during the Optical Illusions task. I have already mentioned in §6.3.2. above how they used different copulas when deciding if the duck/rabbit image was of a duck or not. In the lead-up to this they had an exchange as to whether the image was a rabbit or a bird, without overtly marking their utterances with copulas (132).

132) *dì khárayo*
 this rabbit(Nep)
 ‘this (is) a rabbit.’ (KL 120304-02 09:14)

dàla-ni dì=la khárayo thón-kandi kàl-sin
 here-FOC this=LOC rabbit(Nep) see-NOM go.PERF-PST
 ‘here, in this a rabbit could be seen.’ (CL 120304-02 09:32)

As the speakers are able to focus on the same item, the context indicates that they are both using perceptual evidence in stating what the image is. What is interesting about this is that the speakers return to marking evidence overtly when confronted with the need to make their case when I ask if it could be a duck. When asked for an opinion about the image (i.e. when asked if it could be a duck) the participants actually used different copulas, drawing on different evidence. Because the copulas are omitted from the early stage of the interaction it is not clear if the speakers were also drawing on different evidence in the earlier part of the discussion.

De Haan (2001b, p. 197) acknowledges that evidentials are optional in most languages. He summarises that the motivation for this optionality “can best be seen as either the absence of evidence or a choice on the part of the speaker not to express his/her evidence for the action described.” In most examples from Lamjung Yolmo the first reason does not appear to be particularly robust, as speakers omitted copula forms when they had direct visual evidence. The second reason appears to be closer to the reason that Lamjung Yolmo speakers omit copulas, although they

appear to do this simply because the evidence should easily be inferred from context, and not to avoid making a modal claim.

Aikhenvald (2004, pp. 78-79) only briefly talks about the ‘omission’ of evidentiality. Her framing of the process as one of omission rather than optionality reflects her focus on languages that have obligatory marking of evidential information on every sentence, such as Tucano and Tariana (see also Aikhenvald 2003b). In a language like Lamjung Yolmo, where the system is flexible enough to allow for a great deal of variation, talk of ‘omission’ implies that there is a rigidity to the system and that it is context that distorts this, whereas to talk of ‘optionality’ is to accept that a system like that found in Lamjung Yolmo is naturally variable depending on the interactional needs of the speakers.

This last part of the discussion requires us to consider just how important the Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs, and the modal distinctions they provide, really are for the interactions in which they are used. As I have shown, there are several often-used constructions with no modal status, and even in situations where a copula could be used speakers often omit them if they assume that their modal status is recoverable from context. Thus it appears that the copula verbs of Lamjung Yolmo, while useful (and in some contexts still necessary), do not carry the same kind of obligatory use as is described for some of the languages of Amazonia (Aikhenvald 2004), nor even closely related languages like Standard Tibetan (Garrett 2001).

Before I look at the importance of these modal forms in §9.1. I will look at two other specific structures in which they are used; questions: (chapter 7) and reported speech (chapter 8). What we have seen so far is that the copula verbs of Lamjung Yolmo encode a variety of evidential and epistemic distinctions. The ego evidential has been discussed in detail as it is a category that is cross-linguistically less common, or at least less commonly discussed, than the perceptual evidential. The use of the evidential distinctions of ego and perceptual evidence also gives rise to

distinctions of familiarity versus novelty, and generic versus specific events. These allow for the mirative extension of the perceptual evidential in certain contexts. In the discussion that focuses specifically on the use of the ego and perceptual evidential forms it became clear that their use was dependent, not only on the semantics of the forms, but the interactional context. This means that any pattern that may appear similar to a conjunct/disjunct pattern is not nearly as consistent as that described for other languages, and it is better to consider the pattern as something that comes from the semantics and interactional use of the individual copulas. Other features like endopathic verbs also contribute to a pattern that does not match the existing literature on conjunct/disjunct systems. Furthermore, the frequent omission of copula forms in interaction and the use of non-copula constructions add further ways in which the Lamjung Yolmo pattern is different to the established conjunct/disjunct pattern. I return to this issue in §9.3, once we look at how the copula forms are used in question and reported speech constructions.

7. Questions

In chapter 6 I introduced the Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs, the range of modal information that they encode, and how they are used in interaction. In that chapter I focused on declarative sentences. While more common than interrogative sentences, they only make up half the story. Question and answer constructions are an interesting topic for social cognition, as they involve one person explicitly directing their speech to another person and expecting something of that other person in the form of an answer.

In this chapter I discuss how people request information from each other using direct questions, and how these requests are responded to. Two people in a question and answer interaction require a shared experience because the person who asks the question assumes enough of the other person's knowledge state to know that the question they are asking is relevant, and that the addressee is likely to know a useful answer. There is an added dimension of complexity a language like Lamjung Yolmo, where the person asking the question also has to use the form of the copula that is most appropriate for the question. In this chapter I start by outlining the general syntactic features of questions (§7.1.), including their word order (§7.1.1.) and prosody (§7.1.2.). I then introduce the two main question types: binary questions (§7.2.) and questions with interrogative pronouns (§7.3.).

Once I have given this overview of the grammatical features of question structures in Lamjung Yolmo I then explore their use in interaction (§7.4.). One of the most important features of such an analysis is to look at the answers that are given, as well as the questions being asked. From an interactional perspective like social cognition, only looking at the structure of the question and not looking at how it is answered misses some important features of the question structure.

In §7.4.1. I look at the mechanisms that people use in choosing the modal value encoded in their question. This modal value is based on an expectation of what the other person's answer will be. I show that while this is usually based on expected copula values, speakers can form questions based on more specific contextual cues. I then look at the relationship between person and copula use (§7.4.2.), building on the section on declarative sentences in §6.4.3. I then look at self-directed questions (§7.4.3.), which are different to other directed questions in that there is not a second participant in the interaction. Finally, I look at how my analysis of questions in Lamjung Yolmo compares to conjunct/disjunct analyses of other languages (§7.4.4.).

Compared to other linguistic forms, questions are quite difficult to collect in large numbers. As I show in §7.4.2, eliciting questions and answers does not always make patterns of use more transparent, and even in paired tasks speakers do not always ask each other many questions. I used several methods to generate naturalistic question data. The Twenty Questions game (§3.2.5.) gave many question tokens, but these were predominantly binary questions. Tasks like the Family Story (§3.2.1.) or Hidden Object task (§3.2.4.) or telling the Jackal and Crow story (§3.2.2.) to children generated more varied data, but the corpus is small compared to instances of reported speech or general declarative constructions. However, there is enough data to be able to draw some interesting conclusions about the choices people make when forming questions.

7.1. Question structures

7.1.1. Word order

The first feature of question structures is that they involve no change in word order from a declarative utterance (1).

- 1) a) *khó yòlmo yimba*
 3SG.M Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘he is yolmo/is he yolmo?’ (VL 101224-01)
- b) *mò=ki tó sà-sin*
 3SG.F=ERG rice eat-PST
 ‘she ate rice/has she eaten rice?’ (AL 100928-01)

Although word order is not distinct for questions, there are other features, external to context, that can indicate that an utterance is a question. As we will see in each of the sections below the different question structures have their own indicators, for example the inclusion of the verb in both affirmative and negative forms (§7.2.) or the presence of an interrogative pronoun (§7.3.).

7.1.2. Intonation patterns

One of the distinguishing features of questions is the presence of rising intonation. To illustrate this below are spectrographs of utterances taken from naturalistic data, where AL and SL were playing a game of Twenty Questions (120214-02). AL is asking questions (2a), and SL is answering (2b).

- 2) Q: *gùndri yimba*
 mat COP.EGO
 ‘is it a mat?’ (AL 120214-02 02:07)
- A: *mìn*
 COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘(it) is not’ (SL 120214-02 02:09)

Below we see the spectrograms for these two utterances, taken from Praat (Boesma and Weenik 2007), with the pitch trace visible. The first (Figure 7.1.) is of AL’s question (2a).




Figure 7.1. Spectrogram with pitch trace of AL's question utterance in (2a).

What we see is a distinct high rising intonation at the end of the utterance. This is observably different to SL's declarative reply (2b) (Figure 7.2.), which does not exhibit the same high rising pattern seen in the question.




Figure 7.2. Spectrogram with pitch trace of SL's answer utterance in (2b).

The use of rising intonation and contextual cues to distinguish questions from statements is important in interaction. For example, in the hidden object task both ST and her sister KL say 'pyáz yimba,' which looks identical in a transcript (3).

However, in the audio-visual recordings it is readily apparent that while ST is asking a question (3a), KL is making a statement (3b).

3) a) *pyáz yimba*
 onion(Nep) COP.EGO
 ‘is it an onion?’ (ST 120304-01 03:20)

b) *pyáz yimba*
 onion(Nep) COP.EGO
 ‘it is an onion.’ (KL 120304-02 03:14)

When we look at the spectrograms for both of these utterances (Figure 7.3. and Figure 7.4.), we clearly see from the pitch traces that (3a) is a question and (3b) is a statement. ST’s interrogative shows a strong high rising intonation pattern at the end (Figure 7.3.) while KL’s declarative utterance has falling pitch.




Figure 7.3. Spectrogram with pitch trace of ST’s question utterance in (3a).




Figure 7.4. Spectrogram with pitch trace of KL's declarative utterance in (3b).

As I will show in §7.4.1, the evidential value of the question points to the person being asked the question, while in statements it is a reflection of the speaker's own knowledge. Therefore even though it is often syntactically difficult to separate questions from answers (especially in written transcripts of interactions), it is important as they involve knowledge states of different people in the interaction.

7.1.3. *The use of the -pa suffix*

In all types of questions the verbal suffix *-pa* can be used with lexical verbs to indicate that the sentence is an interrogative. While it does not appear to be particularly used for first person, it is for second and third person (4).

4) a) Q: *khé tàp-pa*
 2SG fall-PST
 'Did you fall?' (AL 100928-01)

A: *khé tàp-sin*
 2SG fall-PST
 'you fell.' (AL 100928-01)

b) Q: *khó tè-pa*
 3SG.M sit-PST
 ‘Did he sit?’ (RL 110204-03)

A: *khó tè-sin*
 3SG.M sit-PST
 ‘he sat.’ (RL 110204-03)

As I mentioned in §5.3, this suffix also occurs in Standard Tibetan (Tournadre and Dorje 2003, p. Garrett 2001, p. 228) and Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010, p. 104), however there are some things that need to be noted. Firstly, this form only occurs with lexical verbs in Lamjung Yolmo, while for the other languages it can also occur with copula verbs. As I showed in §6.1, three of the copula verbs do occur with an equivalent suffix, but the behaviour of the suffix for each of those forms is not entirely the same as it is for lexical verbs. As the clearest example, the ego identification copula *yimba* no longer has an unaffixed equivalent, meaning that it is used regardless of whether the utterance is an interrogative or not. With the ego equational *yèba* and the perceptual evidential *dùba* there are many instances where their use is clearly non-interrogative. While there are some uses of the *-pa* suffix that are also non-interrogative it tends to be more common in interrogatives with lexical verbs than it is with copulas the equivalently marked copulas.

As we saw for the equivalent forms of the copulas, verbs with the *-pa* suffix are only used for questions relating to past events, not future ones (5).

5) a) *kàla kâl-pa*
 where go.PST-PST
 ‘Where did you go?’ (AL 100928-01)

- b) * *kàla d̀ò-pa*
 where go-PST
 * ‘Where are you going?’ (AL 100928-01)

- c) *kàla d̀ò-ge*
 where go-NON.PST
 ‘where are you going?’ (AL 100928-01)

It should be noted that even though the *-pa* structure is often used in interrogative sentences, it is also commonly found in past tense declarative sentences. We see some examples in (6) from the family story.

- 6) a) *khó=ki tíŋla t̀emba s̀al-pa*
 3SG.M=ERG after remember-PST
 ‘after, he remembered.’ (SBL 101124-03 8:44)

- b) *t̀chémaŋ t̀chémaŋ òodi t̀chémaŋ t̀ap-pa*
 saliva saliva that saliva fall-PST
 ‘saliva, saliva, the saliva fell’ (SUL 101027-02 02:36)

Just as the *-pa* suffix is not limited to questions, it is possible to ask a question without using the *-pa* suffix on a lexical verb; instead the appropriate tense/aspect marking is used. I demonstrated this in example (5c) above, as the *-pa* interrogative only occurs in past tense constructions, but we also see that the regular past tense can be used as well. This is shown in example (7), but also occurs in question constructions throughout this chapter.

- 7) *d̀aŋ khyá tó s̀a-sin*
 yesterday 2SG rice.cooked eat-PST
 ‘did you eat rice yesterday?’ (AL 100928-01)

Thus, while the *-pa* suffix interacts with question structures, it is also a suffix that has a range of functions, not all of which relate to interrogatives. The use of the *-pa* suffix for questions is expressed as a preference by speakers, but there are many occasions where it is not used for questions, and many occasions where it is used for declarative constructions.

7.1.4. *Question and dubitative mood*

The dubitative copulas *yìnḍo* and *yèto*, while not interrogative, have an interesting relationship to question-asking in interaction. In some systems it might make sense for a questioner to show their uncertainty about something by using a dubitative form to frame their question, but as will be discussed in more detail in §7.4, the copula form of the question matches the expected form of the copula in the answer. Given that a person asking a question is hoping for the most maximally useful answer, it is not surprising that speakers thus find it unlikely that a question would be asked using the dubitative form. Although they are not used in questions there is something about them which makes them question-like in interaction.

If a person saw an item lying on a table, and was unsure whether it was a bracelet or an elastic hair tie, it would be appropriate to use a declarative construction like (8).

- 8) *dì dìw yìnḍo*
 this bracelet COP.DUB
 ‘that is maybe a bracelet.’ (RL 101028-04)

But if they were looking at the item with someone and wanted to ask the other person if it were a bracelet or a hair elastic the appropriate question form would be (9).

- 9) Q: *dì dīw yìmba*
this bracelet COP.EGO
'is that a bracelet?' (RL 101028-04)

In a conversation with RL about the use of the dubitative (120220-03) he said that although a form like *yìndò* would be unacceptable in a question structure, there is something of an expectation that if you use that form to refer to something and someone knows better they will correct you. For example, if someone said (8), and another person was more certain, then they would offer a more definitive response (10).

- 10) A: *dì dīw yìmba*
this bracelet COP.EGO
'that is a bracelet.' (RL 101028-04)

I also have observed this in non-elicited situations as well. In the interaction below KL is showing several people a number on her mobile phone that she does not recognise. An old man suggests (11).

- 11) *kantcha yìndò*
kancha COP.DUB
'it might be Kancha.' (19/01/2011 book 8, p. 8)

KL can see that it is not Kancha's number and replies (12):

- 12) *kantcha mīndu*
kancha COP.PE.NEG
'it is not Kancha.' (KL 19/01/2011 book 8, p. 8)

This is quite different to the use of the dubitative as the default question form in Acoma (de Haan 2001a, p. 207) that I mentioned in §5.3. Here, the dubitative leaves

space in the interaction for the other speaker to make her own assertion, but it is not, in itself, a question. This leads into a discussion about interaction types beyond overt questions, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead I focus on utterances that are overtly questions, but interactions like those laid out in (8)-(12) above are certainly worth future attention.

7.2. *Binary questions*

Binary question structures are those where the expected answer is a choice of affirmative or negative. There are a number of different strategies people use to create binary questions, but they are all similar in that they expect one of two possible answers from the respondent.

A binary question can be asked by uttering a declarative sentence with rising intonation (13):

- 13) *khé nàl-sin*
 2SG sleep-PST
 ‘did you sleep?’ (AL 100928-01)

The expected answer to this is to either reply in the affirmative (14a), or the negative (14b):

- 14) a) *nà nàl-sin*
 1SG sleep-PST
 ‘I slept.’ (AL 100928-01)
- b) *nà mà-nàl*
 2SG NEG.PST-sleep
 ‘I did not sleep.’ (AL 100928-01)

Such polar questions do not always have to be asked in the affirmative; it is also possible to pose polar questions in the negative. In the examples below we see that in the Twenty Questions game (§3.2.5.) speakers would often ask questions in the negative (15):

15) a) Q: *tòŋbo = ki mìn*
tree = GEN COP.EGO.NEG
'is it not something from a tree?' (RL 101020-02 08:15)

A: *mìn*
COP.EGO.NEG
'it is not.' (SNL 101020-02 08:16)

b) Q: *mèndza mìn*
bowl COP.EGO.NEG
'is it not a bowl?' (AL 120214-02 01:57)

A: *mìn*
COP.EGO.NEG
'it is not.' (SL 120214-02 01:59)

This use of the negative would usually not occur early in the round, but after a period of questions in the affirmative. After a person had received a number of negative responses to their question it appeared they oriented more towards the negative response that they had come to expect as the answer.

Another strategy for marking polar questions is to include both the affirmative and negative polarities of the verb. When doing this, speakers do not include any tense marking on the affirmative form, and use the either the past or non-past negation marker where appropriate (16).

16) a) Q: *sà mèt-sà yè*
 eat NEG.NON.PST-eat COP.EGO
 ‘(do you) eat (it) or not eat it?’ (RL 101020-02 06:32)

A: *mèt-sà yè*
 NEG.PST-eat COP.EGO
 ‘don’t eat (it).’ (SNL 101020-02 06:33)

b) Q: *tó sà mà-sà*
 rice eat NEG.PST-eat
 ‘did (you) eat rice or not?’ (RL 120220-02)

A: *mà-sà yè*
 NEG.PST-eat COP.EGO
 ‘(I) didn’t eat’ (RL 120220-02)

When the two polarities are expressed with the ego identification copula *yimba/mìn*, one of the *yimba/mìn* pair is often modified so that the two match. In (17a) the form *yimba* is reduced to *yìn* to match the negative polarity *mìn* in the question, but is expressed in full in the answer. In (17b) we see the negative form become *mimba* to match the affirmative polarity, which occurs in no other context except these binary question structures.

17) a) Q: *òolegi khó=ki nà sà-ni bitça pèt-sin*
 and.then 3SG.M=GEN fish eat-FOC think do-PST
yìn mìn
 COP.EGO COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘and then he thinks about eating the fish, is it or not?’
 (RL 101027-02 02:57)

A: *yimba*
 COP.EGO
 ‘it is.’ (SUL 101027-02 03:01)

b) Q: *sàse yimba kí mìmba*
food COP.EGO or COP.EGO.NEG
'did (you) eat rice or not?' (AL 120214-02 15:50)

A: *mìn*
COP.EGO.NEG
'(I) didn't eat' (SL 120214-02 15:51)

Another common feature of questions we can see is a tendency towards reduction. There is no overtly expressed subject, and the answer often contains even less overt information than the question. This occurs frequently in naturalistic data. In the Twenty Questions game the participants get so used to the utterance structure that the questions and answers become single words. The questions are still clearly distinguished by the use of rising intonation (18):

18) a) Q: *kúniŋ*
thresher
'a thresher?' (AL 120214-02 06:32)

A: *mìn*
COP.EGO.NEG
'no' (SL 101020-02 06:33)

b) Q: *lâgor*
millstone
'a millstone?' (RL 101020-02 07:14)

A: *mìn*
COP.EGO.NEG
'no' (SNL 101020-02 07:15)

7.3. Interrogative pronoun questions

The second major question type is that which involves an interrogative pronoun. Unlike binary question structures discussed above, questions with interrogative

pronouns allow for a wider range of answers as they are asking for a reply that includes content other than an affirmation or rejection of the proposition in the question.

There is a closed set of interrogative pronouns in Lamjung Yolmo (19).

19)	<i>sú</i>	‘who’
	<i>nàm</i>	‘when’
	<i>kàla</i>	‘where’
	<i>tɕípe</i>	‘why’
	<i>tɕí</i>	‘what’
	<i>kàndi</i>	‘which’
	<i>kànmu</i>	‘how’ (attribute)
	<i>kàn pèdi</i>	‘how’ (mode)
	<i>kànɕa</i>	‘how’ (mode)
	<i>kàze</i>	‘how many’

There are also the composite forms *súgi* ‘whose’ made of the interrogative pronoun *sú* and the genitive clitic = *ki* and *súla* ‘whom’ again using the pronoun *sú* this time with the dative = *la*. These forms are listed and discussed briefly in the sketch grammar (Appendix §1.4.3.3.) but I will discuss their use in more detail in this chapter.

Below we see examples of these interrogative pronouns in questions and the corresponding answers. The interrogative pronouns occur where the relevant noun would occur (20).

20) a) Q: *khúŋ=ki mìn tɕí yimba*
 3PL=GEN name what COP.EGO
 ‘what is his name?’ (RL 200212-03)

A: *khúŋ=ki mìn sòm yimba*
 3PL=GEN name Som COP.EGO
 ‘his name is Som.’ (RL 200212-03)

b) Q: *kâze bòdz tè-sin*
 how.many o'clock(Nep) sit-PST
 ‘what is the time?’ (RL 200212-03)

A: *kù bòdz tè-sin*
 nine o'clock(Nep) sit-PST
 ‘it is nine o'clock’ (RL 200212-03)

c) Q: *ŋà=ki pòŋgep kàndi yimba*
 1SG=GEN apron.traditional which COP.EGO
 ‘which apron is mine?’ (AL 100924-01)

A: *khé=ki pòŋgep dî-raŋ yimba*
 2SG=GEN apron.traditional this-EMPH COP.EGO
 ‘this apron is yours’ (AL 100924-01)

As with binary questions, there is a tendency towards elision when such questions are asked and answered in naturalistic speech. As in (21), the question form often has an omitted subject, which does also occur in declarative sentences in naturalistic interaction. The answer form can often just be reduced to the content requested in the interrogative pronoun of the question.

21) Q: *nàm qò-ke*
 when go-NON.PST
 ‘when are (you) going?’ (RL 101027-03)

A: *sà jáma*
 Sunday
 ‘Sunday.’ (RL 101027-03)

In naturalistic speech the omission of the copula is common. In (22) from the Family Story (§3.2.1.), SBL is telling the story in first person and asks and answers a question without the use of a copula:

22) a) Q: *òodi = le pàrkila tɛí*
 that = ABL between what
 ‘from that, what is in between?’

A: *tɕháuki = la qò-ke gàrila*
 Barracks(Nep) = DAT go-NON.PST at.the.time
 ‘that time when I went to the barracks.’ (SBL 101124-03 25:37)

It is also possible, with the right context, for the question to be reduced to only the interrogative pronoun with a rising intonation, and for the answer to mirror it with the appropriate content. In (23) AL is moving cards from the Family Story around and asks and answers her own question.

23) Q: *kàla*
 where
 ‘where (should this card go)?’

A: *dàla*
 here
 ‘(it should go) here.’ (AL 091108-01 28:45)

7.4. Questions and answers: their use in interaction

Until this point in the chapter I have focused on the syntactic features of questions, but this is only one half of an interactional pair. Without looking at answers as well as questions we miss the chance to understand some important features of how

questions are used in interaction. By looking at the answers as well as the questions we begin to see the full interactive force of questions, the role of the modal semantics of the copulas and how speakers model each other's knowledge. In this section I will look at the use of copula verbs in question-answer pairs and what this can tell us about interaction.

I will start by looking at how the copula used in questions pre-empts, or predicts, that which will be used in the answer, and account for how the questioner goes about deciding which modal form is most appropriate (§7.4.1.). I will then look at the relationship between the person marking of the subject and the copula used in interrogatives, and how this relates to a possible conjunct/disjunct analysis for second and third person (§7.4.2.). I will then look specifically at self-directed questions, which bring with them their own specific issues (§7.4.3.). I will bring together the threads of these analyses in §7.4.4, when I discuss the relationship between Lamjung Yolmo question/answer pairs and conjunct/disjunct systems.

7.4.1. Questions predicting answers

When a person asks a question, any modal value present in the question is that which the person asking the question expects that the other person will use in their answer (24).

24) a) Q: *dì sú=ki tché yimba*
 this who=GEN book COP.EGO
 'whose book is this?' (AL 091001-01)

A: *dì nò=ki-di tché yimba*
 this brother.younger=GEN-FOC book COP.EGO
 'this is younger brother's book.' (AL 091001-01)

b) Q: *tçàro = ki tçhódo = la nà dù mîndu*
 crow = GEN lip = LOC fish COP.PE COP.PE.NEG
 ‘is there or is there not a fish in the crow's mouth?’
 (RL 101027-02 02:01)

A: *dù*
 COP.PE
 ‘(there) is.’ (SUL 101027-02 02:03)

In (24a) the person asking the question uses the ego copula because they are assuming that the person that they are asking has sufficient knowledge about who owns the book to not require visual evidence, but instead reply with the ego. In (24b) the person asked the question with the perceptual evidential because he wanted information from his interlocutor that was specific to an image (as part of a larger collection of images). The second question is also a little different, as RL is asking the question of a group of children while reading the Jackal and Crow story (§3.2.2.). RL using the perceptual evidential, indicating that he is expecting the answer to also contain a perceptual evidential as well. RL already knows the answer to this question - having previously read the story himself (101027-01). Therefore, he is asking this question to prompt the children’s engagement. In using the perceptual evidential we can see that RL is giving the children a clue as to how to answer the question, and that there should be perceptual evidence for their answer. Indeed, not only SUL but all of the children present respond with *dù*, indicating that they are all attending to the copula form used in the question.

To give an observed example of this pattern, KL is in the cooking area of her house, around a corner from the toilet. One of her children is going to enter the toilet, but cannot find the plastic sandals to wear into the wet room, and so walks back into the cooking room to put on her own sandals to enter the toilet. KL then asks the child (25).

- 25) *tɕápal mĩndu*
 sandals COP.PE.NEG
 ‘are the sandals not there?’ (KL 02/02/2011 book 8, p. 11)

KL can not see the room, and has no perceptual evidence of whether the sandals are there, she is thus using the perceptual evidential form because she assumes that the child has seen whether the sandals are there and would reply with a perceptual evidential copula, which she did.

This pattern of pre-emptive copula use in these structures raises an interesting problem. How do speakers choose the copula with which to ask a question? Is it based on the generally expected answer, or do speakers calculate the expected knowledge state of their interlocutor in interactions? With either of these options, the questioner is still foreshadowing an expected knowledge state. This appears to be incompatible with the concept of opacity of mind (§4.4.). On one hand there is a cultural belief in groups speaking languages related to Lamjung Yolmo that you cannot know the thoughts of another person, and then a standard syntactic pattern across this same branch of languages that requires a person asking a question to overtly grammatically encode what they think their interlocutor’s thought state might be. Previous work on questions has not addressed this in any detail. Garrett (2001, p. 229, footnote 73) acknowledges that a person can use a different evidential in the answer than that used in the question, but the questioner has chosen the copula they used because they “presuppose” the type of copula the answerer will use. Garrett, like Tournadre and Dorje (2003, pp. 94-95) and Hale (1980, p. 99) who refer to “anticipation” of the answer, do not address the difficult question of whether this supposition is made based on general interactional trends or interactionally specific data.

If speakers use the first strategy of just generalising the expected knowledge state from general patterns, then perhaps they are not making a specific claim about their interlocutor. In this case one could argue that such a process does not interfere with

opacity of mind, as it is simply a codified behaviour and the speaker does not really make any claim about the knowledge state of the person to whom they are directing the question. On the other hand, it might be the case that the speakers are tracking the expected knowledge state of their interlocutor online during interactions. In this case, it may be possible that opacity of mind belief and cognitive modelling of knowledge state operate on two different levels. Opacity of mind is about much more overt types of assumptions about another person's knowledge state (such as gossiping, or overt speculation about a person's knowledge state). The third possibility is that assumptions about the *source* or *certainty* of another person's knowledge is different to making assumptions about the propositional content of another person's knowledge. The fourth possibility is that while people might believe in opacity of mind as a cultural framework they do not actually implement it in their interactions. Thus, even if opacity of mind is a held belief it may not actually have any great effect on how people interact.

Across most interactions it appears that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo rely on generalised expected answer patterns while asking questions. This appears to stem from the semantics of the choices available, and the general understanding of the likely knowledge state of a person directly or indirectly involved in an event that lead to the types of common correlations between certain copulas and different person subjects discussed in §6.4. The fact is that there are relatively few copula choices to be made - presuming that the person you are talking to is not going to be answering the question using the dubitative forms, and the general fact copula is so uncommon, it is usually a matter of choice between the perceptual evidential and the ego. In contexts other than talking about first or second person subjects, or internal states, the ego appears to be the general preferred choice. When asking questions devoid of context (for example, in elicitation) it appears that the general preference is for ego copulas (if any copula is used at all, see §6.5.). For example in (26) we see that the ego is preferable in the context of obtaining information about the general state of something (26).

26) a) Q: *dì kàndi kyàsa yimba*
this which city COP.EGO
'what city is this?' (AL 091001-01)

A: *dì yèmbu yimba*
this kathmandu COP.EGO
'this is Kathmandu.' (AL 091001-01)

b) Q: *dì tchú kànmu yè*
this water how COP.EGO
'how is this water?' (RL 101027-03)

A: *dì tchú sánbu yè*
this water clean COP.EGO
'this water is clear.' (RL 101027-03)

The easiest way to show that speakers usually rely on predictable patterns is to find examples where these patterns are broken, either by the person asking or answering the question.

An uncommon copula choice in a question construction can help demonstrate that in at least some interactions the questioner is taking into account a specific individual's knowledge state, rather than general expectations. (27) occurred between KL and her older sister ST during the hidden object experiment (§3.2.4.). KL was at the first stage, where the objects are covered and can only be guessed at by looking, and was finding it difficult to make any guesses. She expressed this overtly (27a), and then her sister asked her what the items were, and did this using the dubitative copula (27b). KL responded by restating the question, and then made an attempt to guess what the object might be (but elided the copula) (27c).

27) a) *tɕí yimba tɕí yimba léé*
 what COP.EGO what COP.EGO PART
ŋà mè-çée dù léé
 1SG NEG.NON.PST-know COP.PE PART
 ‘what is it? What is it? I don’t know.’ (KL 120304-02 00:38)

b) Q: *tɕí yèto òola*
 what COP.DUB there
 ‘what is it probably?’ (ST 120304-02 00:42)

c) A: *òodi yèto tɕí làp-ke pìza tsá-kandi sè*
 that COP.DUB what say-NON.PST child play-NOM thing
 ‘what is that? What to say? A children’s toy.’ (KL 120304-02 00:47)

This example shows that the speaker is not just using a default assumption as to what knowledge her interlocutor might have. Instead, she uses the dubitative copula in a question, which is a very uncommon construction in my corpus. In this context ST has observed that KL is uncertain as to what is being hidden under the cloth, and having already done the task is aware of how, in this context, it is difficult to guess what it might be. Instead of using the ego form, as I had done while asking the same question earlier, she instead chooses to use the dubitative form. This indicates to her interlocutor that she is not expecting an answer with complete certainty, but one marked with the dubitative copula. ST’s use of the dubitative indicates that within the interaction she is able to use the contextual cues and KL’s behaviour to model how she thinks KL’s answer will most likely be marked. Examples such as this give us an opportunity to see one speaker’s perception as to the mental state of another speaker. This kind of use of the copula verbs is a challenge to the idea that there is a generic default choice of copula that all speakers of Lamjung Yolmo make when asking questions. This allows us to better understand what level of ‘presupposition’ or ‘anticipation’ is occurring when speakers make a choice of which copula to use in questions. This takes the analysis a step further than that found in Hale (1980, p. 99), Garrett (2001, p. 229) and Tournadre and Dorje (2003, pp. 94-95).

Much more commonly found in the corpus are situations where a person asks a question using the generally accepted choice, and the person replying uses a different copula in their response. If the person asking a question uses a copula that does not match the evidence that a person actually has for their answer then the person must change the copula value to better reflect their answer. This is a basic expectation, but it is important because it gives us examples where the answerer's knowledge state is different to what the questioner may have expected. It is also a reminder that while there are contexts where speakers of Lamjung Yolmo are not syntactically required to use copula verbs (§6.5.2.) when they do use a copula they will use the one that most reflects their knowledge state.

(28) is what one person would ask another person if they came across something foreign like a digital audio-recorder. Like many of the examples above, the ego copula is used:

- 28) *dì phón yimba*
 this phone(Eng) COP.EGO
 ‘is this a phone?’ (RL 120220-03)

It would not be worth asking a question if you were not expecting a definitive answer, but if the person answering the question were equally unsure then it would not be appropriate to reply using the ego form, and instead the dubitative form would be used (29):

- 29) *dì phón yindɔ*
 this phone(Eng) COP.DUB
 ‘this is maybe a phone’ (RL 120220-03)

During the Twenty Questions game (§3.2.5.), the person guessing what the item was would almost always ask questions using ego copulas, based on the fact that the

other speaker knew what the item was. This was reflected in the fact that the person with the image would respond with an ego copula (if overt copulas were used at all, see §6.5.2.). At one point in the game SL decided to use the perceptual evidential (30) in her question instead of the ego.

30) Q: *chulo* *mìndu*
fireplace(NEP) COP.PE.NEG
'a fireplace?' (SL 120214-02 13:23)

A: *mìn*
COP.EGO.NEG
'is not.' (AL 120214-02 13:24)

It is possible that this was just done to break up the pattern of ego copulas that are usually used in the Twenty Questions game, as it occurs over 10 minutes in. It is also possible that it was a strategy where she was asking AL to attend to the specific image, rather than just her knowledge (by evoking the specificity the perceptual evidential encodes, see §6.3.1). Either way, neither the specific context of the game nor a general knowledge of interaction gave SL any reason to ask the question with anything other than an ego copula, but chose to use something different, even though her interlocutor did not align their answer with it. A question flouting the expected copula (but providing one that is still contextually valid) highlights the fact that even though a speaker models the copula choice in the question on the expected answer, there is always a chance that the 'expected' answer is not the actual answer.

It appears then that, in general, questions with copulas are asked using the form that is the norm for that type of question. However, speakers can also take into account the specifics of the interaction, and model the knowledge state of their interlocutor to ask questions that are based more specifically on their current knowledge state. When asked a question a speaker is not constrained to only answer with the copula form in the question, as we saw in (29) the person answering the question must use

the most appropriate form for the knowledge they have, although as (30) indicates there is some ability to vary one's answer.

That these situations occur is a natural feature of interaction. My general observation indicates that the 'expected' copula in the question is based on a generalised tendency factoring in the semantics of the copula and an understanding of the different knowledge states people often have. The fact that there are situations where a person can answer using a different copula to the one in the question indicates that speakers are only ever relying on best-guesses and, of course, they can never really know the knowledge state of their interlocutor. There are situations like ST's use of the dubitative in (27) where speakers will model the expected answer on more immediate contextual information. None of this, it appears, is influenced by a belief in opacity of mind. So far I have only been talking about questions pertaining to fairly generic, accessible information, but when it comes to asking questions about other people things become more complicated.

7.4.2. Person and copula choice

As we saw in §6.4, there is a tendency for certain copulas to be used with certain subjects, dependent on context, and this tendency extends to interrogatives as well. Because the copula in the interrogative is the same as the in presumed answer, it is only the subject marking that varies. Therefore the person of subjects and the copula used can appear to be an 'inversion' of that in declaratives for first and second person. Temporarily putting aside the variation in the copula that I introduced in chapter 6, the ego is generally preferred for first person declarative utterances, and the perceptual is more likely to be used for declarative subjects other than first person. Table 7.1. gives an idea of what this pattern would look like.

	<i>Interrogative</i>	<i>Declarative</i>
1 st person	perceptual evidential (<i>dù/dùba</i>)	<u>ego</u> (<i>yimba/yè</i>)
2 nd person	<u>ego</u> (<i>yimba/yè</i>)	perceptual evidential (<i>dù/dùba</i>)
3 rd person	perceptual evidential (<i>dù/dùba</i>)	perceptual evidential (<i>dù/dùba</i>)

Table 7.1 A representation of the patterns expected in interrogatives and declaratives in a choice between perceptual evidential and ego copula forms for standard verbs.

Third person is marked with the perceptual evidential regardless of whether the utterance is a declarative or interrogative. This is because when it is a declarative the person is witnessing a third person's actions and reporting them to a second person. When a question is being asked, the person being asked the question is also watching the third person. As we'll see below, even though that is the pattern that a conjunct/disjunct model assumes, it does not mean that we find such patterns in language use.

The elegance of this table ignores the kind of variation in copula use with different subjects that I introduced in 6.4. Even in carefully structured elicitation sessions I have not yet been able to elicit a full paradigm for a single verb that patterns in the way represented in Table 7.1 above. Take, for example, the volitional, highly visible act of spitting, elicited in imperfective constructions so that a copula would have to be present (unlike regular past and non-past tense, where they are not used as in §6.5.1.). In (31) we have RL's given constructions. I have underlined sentences using the ego copulas and bolded those using the **perceptual evidential**. I refer not to questions and answers, but interrogatives (I) and declarative (D), as these

were elicited, and therefore not necessarily natural pairs of questions and answers that would occur in a specific context of interaction.

- 31) I: *ɲà tchémaŋ kyúr-teraŋ yè*
 1SG saliva drop-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘Am I spitting?’ (RL 101026-02)
- D: *ɲà tchémaŋ kyúr tɛ-sin dù*
 1SG saliva drop AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘I was spitting.’ (RL 101026-02)
- I: *khé tchémaŋ kyúr tɛ-ti yèke*
 2SG saliva drop AUX-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘were you spitting?’ (RL 101026-02)
- D: *khé tchémaŋ kyúr tɛ-ti yèke*
 2SG saliva drop AUX-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘you were spitting.’ (RL 101026-02)
- I: *mò tchémaŋ kyúr tɛ-sin dù*
 3SG.F saliva drop AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘did she spit?’ (RL 101026-02)
- D: *mò tchémaŋ kyúr tɛ-sin dù*
 3SG.F saliva drop AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘she spat.’ (RL 101026-02)

As you can see, the pattern almost fits Table 7.1. above, with both third person declarative and interrogative utterances using the perceptual evidential, and the inversion of the ego in first person declarative to perceptual in the interrogative. The second person declarative should be a perceptual evidential if we were following Table 7.1. but instead it is an ego. This may just look like a single quirk in a pattern that largely conforms to the expected pattern in Table 7.1, except that RL said that ego constructions would also be acceptable for first person interrogative, and both third person interrogative and declarative utterances. In the same paradigm AL (101008-01) gave a similarly mixed response, predominantly using ego copulas but

acknowledging that perceptual evidentials could be used as well for most interrogative and declarative utterances.

We also see some tense variation across this set, which was elicited using a consistent Nepali present imperfective (*-raheko chha*). This variation is likely a result of the speaker finding it unnatural to comment on a person's actions while they are happening (and a possible result of the fact that spitting is often not an event with a long duration). Also, as I mentioned in §6.4.3, second person declaratives are not that easy to elicit, as it is unusual to comment on the actions of a person to that individual.

It would appear that here, one of the main factors weakening any expected patterning is that just because you can see something does not mean you have to use the perceptual evidential. The paradigm for 'spit' in (31) is one of the more robust; in a paradigm with the verb *sà* 'eat' both RL (101026-02) and AL (101008-01) used ego across all persons for interrogative and declarative. AL gave alternatives that used the perceptual evidential for third person declaratives and interrogatives.

As with the use of copulas in declarative utterances, the choice of copula in questions is strongly context-based, and dependent on the knowledge state of the participant, as demonstrated by the different copulas used in (32) and (33). In a situation where a person was hiding a small item in their pocket and the question was asked "what is in the pocket?" the question would be the same in English regardless of who was asking, but in Lamjung Yolmo the copula choice depends on who is asking. In (32) the person asking is the one who has the item hidden in their pocket, knows what it is and is directing their question at another person.

- 32) *kháldjì = la tçí yè*
 pocket = LOC what COP.EGO
 'what is in the pocket?' (RL 2010 book 4, p. 14)

In (33) the person asking would not know what the item is, and it would be hidden in the pocket of the person they are asking.

- 33) *kháldi = la tǝí dùba*
 pocket = LOC what COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘what is in the pocket?’ (RL 29/10/10 book 4, p. 19)

The difference here is that the questions are directed at people with different knowledge states. The question directed at the person with the item in their pocket can be asked with the perceptual evidential (33) because they have perceptual evidence (tactile evidence presumably coupled with prior visual evidence). The person hiding the item, however, cannot ask the question with a perceptual evidential because they know their interlocutor has no perceptual evidence of what the item is, and if they know at all it would only be because of some kind of personal knowledge (about what the person generally keeps in their pockets, for example). Thus it appears that for the elicited data speakers are making choices based on likely contexts of use.

Although the way the copulas pattern with declarative and interrogative sentences does not appear to be particularly robust, even in elicitation, there are also other factors beyond knowledge state that make such a neat pattern as we saw in table 7.1 unlikely. These include the existence of endopathic verbs, situations where the same copula is appropriate across all persons and the absence of copulas in some contexts.

Firstly, there are the endopathic verbs (§6.4.2.), where the general pattern is similar, but inverted from the other verbs. This is because endopathic verbs relate to internal states, thoughts and emotions, which means that for first person the perceptual evidential is preferred and for second and third person it is the ego that is generally used. As with any other verb elicited in a paradigm there is a great deal of variation,

perhaps more so given that in §6.4.2. I gave examples of endopathic verbs occasionally patterning more like other verbs. However, if we temporarily put aside the varieties of their use, an abstraction of the pattern that would be expected is the inverse of Table 7.1. This is represented in Table 7.2.

	<i>Interrogative</i>	<i>Declarative</i>
1 st person	<u>ego</u> (yìmba/yè)	perceptual evidential (dù/dùba)
2 nd person	perceptual evidential (dù/dùba)	<u>ego</u> (yìmba/yè)
3 rd person	<u>ego</u> (yìmba/yè)	<u>ego</u> (yìmba/yè)

Table 7.2. A representation of the patterns expected in interrogatives and declaratives in a choice between perceptual evidential and ego copula forms for endopathic verbs.

This indicates why the use of the perceptual evidential with second person endopathic verbs is treated by speakers as a question in elicitation, as per (34).

- 34) *khé máse tséma ráŋ tó sà-kandi*
 2SG daal vegetable and rice.cooked eat-NOM
sém kyé-ku dù
 mind think-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘do you want to eat daal, vegetables and rice?’ (AL 100930-01)

Secondly, as we saw in §6.4.3, there are some contexts in which the same copula is used in declaratives for all subjects, regardless of the grammatical person of the subject. Examples of this include making reference to a person’s name or ethnicity (35).

- 35) a) *ɲà yòlmo yimba*
 1SG Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘I am Yolmo.’ (VL 101224-01)
- b) *khé yòlmo yimba*
 2SG Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘you are Yolmo.’ (VL 101224-01)
- c) *mò yòlmo yimba*
 3SG.F Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘she is Yolmo.’ (VL 101224-01)

Given that the copula is the same across all persons, it is no surprise that it is also the case in questions, as shown in (36):

- 36) a) *ɲà yòlmo yimba*
 1SG Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘am I Yolmo?’ (VL 101224-01)
- b) *khé yòlmo yimba*
 2SG Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘are you Yolmo?’ (VL 101224-01)
- c) *mò yòlmo yimba*
 3SG.F Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘is she Yolmo?’ (VL 101224-01)

This was also the same paradigm in sessions with AL (101217-01) and SKL (101023-06). Given the variation when there is opportunity for choice between the perceptual evidential and the ego, speakers are consistent in contexts such as this.

The third, and final, issue with trying to track the relationship between person and modal choice is that there are many contexts in which speakers do not use copula

verbs. As I demonstrated for declaratives in §6.5.1, questions, when asked with regular tense marking, do not carry a copula and therefore are consistent across subjects. (37) demonstrates the use of the regular past tense across all persons in interrogative and declarative utterances.

37) I: *ηὰ τὰρ-σιν*
 1SG fall-PST
 ‘did I fall?’ (RL 101026-02)

D: *ηὰ τὰρ-σιν*
 1SG fall-PST
 ‘I fell.’ (RL 101026-02)

I: *κῆ τὰρ-σιν*
 2SG fall-PST
 ‘did you fall?’ (RL 101026-02)

D: *κῆ τὰρ-σιν*
 2SG fall-PST
 ‘you fell.’ (RL 101026-02)

I: *μὸ τὰρ-σιν*
 3SG.F fall-PST
 ‘did she fall?’ (RL 101026-02)

D: *μὸ τὰρ-σιν*
 3SG.F fall-PST
 ‘she fell.’ (RL 101026-02)

As we saw above, questions with lexical verbs can also be asked with the *-pa* question suffix if they pertain to past events. Although this form is acceptable for the question form, it is not preferred for the answer (although it can be used), which generally uses the regular past tense *-σιν* instead (38). Use for first person questions appears to be marginal so I have left it out of the examples below.

38) Q: *kàla kàl-pa*
where go.PERF-PST
'where did (you) go?' (RL 120220-03)

A: *yùl=la kàl-sin*
village=DAT go.PERF-PST
'(I) went to the village' (RL 120220-03)

Q: *khó tè -pa*
3SG.M sit-PST
'did he sit?' (RL 110204-03)

A: *khó tè-sin*
3SG.M sit-PST
'he sat.' (RL 110204-03)

This is different to the type of patterning that copulas have, as it does not appear to relate to the subject person. Instead, it is simply marking that it is a question.

While there are some situations where speakers choose constructions that do not require copulas (such as with the regular past and non-past tense suffixes on lexical verbs discussed in §6.5.1.), there are also situations where the copulas are syntactically expected, but omitted in naturalistic speech. I discussed this in relation to declaratives in §6.5.3, but it is also the case for interrogatives. We saw this in the binary questions in (18) where the copula was omitted from the highly reduced binary question, and was given in the answer. I also showed a similarly reduced answer to a question with an interrogative pronoun that did not include the original copula (23). We also saw that in (27), after ST asked her sister a question making the unusual but contextually relevant use of a dubitative copula in her question, KL did not use an overt copula in her response. Thus, while copulas can be a useful way to track a person's knowledge state, this an option that is not always taken up by speakers.

7.4.3. *Self-directed questions*

The examples I have looked at so far involve two different people; one person who asks the question and the other who answers it, usually with an intention of rectifying a mismatch in knowledge states. In this section I will explore what happens when a person takes on the role of both question asker and answerer. Self-directed questions are different to questions asked of another person, because one is not interrogating the knowledge state of another person.

This is an interesting context from a social cognition perspective, because we have a speech event that is generally interactive, and requires another person in the interaction, but in a context where there is no other expected participant in the interaction. In this section I will demonstrate that speakers negotiate these situations by presuming the presence of another person, or at least another version of themselves.

If a person is searching for their mobile phone in their pockets, unsure of where they left it, (39) is the appropriate question to ask themselves as they are searching.

- 39) *ɲà = ki phón kàla yè*
 1SG = GEN phone(Eng) where COP.EGO
 ‘where is my phone?’ (RL 120220-03)

Regardless of whether a person was alone in a room and asking this of themselves, or with a second person, the ego copula is the preferred choice. The reason for using the ego with another person is that there is an expectation that the interlocutor would know without the need to see the phone. It appears then that when asking self-directed questions you are asking them of an ideal version of yourself, or imaginary other person, who would be able to answer based on their existing knowledge of where the keys are. When the person eventually found their phone (40) would be the appropriate thing to say.

- 40) *dèla dù*
 here COP.PE
 ‘it is here.’ (RL 120220-03)

This time the perceptual evidential is used, because the speaker has direct evidence of knowledge that is perceptually new for him. Thus, while the question was asked of oneself, it was directed at another self, and when finding the item it is appropriate to reflect your actual knowledge state.

Looking at naturalistic examples, many speakers across many activities use the ego evidential when they are asking a question to themselves regarding something they are uncertain about (41). While watching one of the Put Project videos (§3.2.3.) where a person pulls a small item from a hole at the base of a tree, AL is unsure what the item is. She observes that the action was performed (hence her use of the perceptual evidential for the action), but, unsure of what the item is, she asks herself what it could be. The lack of separation from the rest of the utterance, and the fact that she did not shift her gaze towards me indicates that the question was not for me to answer.

- 41) a) *tòŋbo dàg=ki tòlbo nàŋla=le tɕí yìmba ná*
 tree base=GEN hole inside=ABL what COP.EGO PART
 tɕí tén -ku dù
 what pull.out-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘from the tree base’s hole what is it (the person) pulls out.’
 (AL 101006-01 1:04:35)

In (41) AL does not answer the question that she has posed for herself, but moves on to describe the rest of the video. There are naturalistic examples from the Family Story task (§3.2.1.) where speakers indicate their uncertainty about what a feature of the image is, before giving their answer (42).

42) a) Q: *khí tɛ́í yìmba ná kí tɛ́í yìmba*
dog what COP.EGO PART or what COP.EGO
'a dog... what is it, or what is it?' (AL 101010-01 03:11)

A: *khí límú dù*
dog like COP.PE
'it is like a dog.' (AL 101010-01 03:13)

b) Q: *dì tɛ́í yìmba*
this what COP.EGO
'what is this?' (KL 120304-02 03:48)

A: *dìni tsasma dùba léé*
this-FOC glasses(NEP) COP.PE.EMPH PART
'these are glasses.' (KL 120304-02 03:49 0)

In all cases the speaker continues to look at the thing that they are describing and go on to answer their own questions, which indicates that the questions were not directed at anyone but themselves in what is a fixed phrase. This is a common use of the ego evidential, much like that I introduced in §6.2.3, and its use in this phrase appears to be consistent across speakers. Therefore I analysed this as a fixed construction that was not necessarily based on the evidential value of the ego copula. Now that we have looked at how questions are asked and answered in Lamjung Yolmo, I would like to propose a second possible analysis of why the form of the copula in questions is ego. Instead of this being a stock phrase with no evidential information we can think of the ego in these questions as orienting towards the knowledge state of someone other than the speaker. This fits with elicited example (39) where the speaker is orienting themselves towards an imaginary self or other person who has the knowledge that they do not have. An ideal interlocutor would know answers using ego evidence because they would know from their own knowledge, and not from specific external evidence. That all speakers ask what something is using an ego copula and then use a perceptual evidential in their answer (or in the case of (41), describing the event even if she cannot discern what

the object is) indicates that the question is addressed to someone with a different knowledge state to them.

When speakers ask a self-directed question they are not necessarily asking it of the same self. Instead, it appears that they are asking it of what could either be conceived of as a second person, or a different version of themselves. Either way, the person to whom the question is being directed has a different knowledge state, as can be seen from the different choice of copulas in the interrogative and declarative forms. Even in a situation where a person is not acting as part of a social interaction the way they frame self-directed questions is still with an interactant in mind.

7.4.4. Conjunct/disjunct and question-answer pairs

Question constructions are a major feature of a conjunct/disjunct analysis of other languages, as I discussed in §5.5. Hale (1980, p. 95) observed that in question constructions the second person form has the same structure as the first person declarative. In §7.4.2. I showed that due to the way questions are constructed in Lamjung Yolmo there is a semantically and contextually driven tendency for some copula forms to occur with certain person subjects in declaratives and interrogatives in ways that resemble the types of patterns seen in conjunct/disjunct systems. I noted that there are problems with considering Lamjung Yolmo as a conjunct/disjunct system in §6.4. and these are reinforced when we look at question structures.

Given the variation that we saw in copula use in declarative sentences in §6.4, it is perhaps not surprising that question structures in Lamjung Yolmo are also prone to a great deal more variation than is expected in a conjunct/disjunct pattern. Speakers vary the use of copulas depending on the interactional context. For example, in (43) both the perceptual evidential and the ego constructions are given as valid by a speaker in elicitation. According to RL, the difference is that in (43a) the speaker is

specifically appealing for direct evidence while in (43b) this is not the intent of the question.

- 43) a) *mò tchémaŋ kyúr tè-sin dù*
3SG.F saliva drop AUX-PST COP.PE
'was she spitting (did you see)?' (RL 101026-02)
- b) *mò tchémaŋ kyúr tè-ti yèke*
3SG.F saliva drop AUX-PERF COP.EGO.PST
'was she spitting (do you know)?' (RL 101026-02)

In many ways, with questions, as with declaratives, the relationship between grammatical subject and the choice of modality encoded by a particular copula is not something that is as rigid as a conjunct/disjunct analysis would indicate. The alternatives are to either try to capture the important contextual alternation that is a vital feature of copula use in Lamjung Yolmo, or concede that the conjunct/disjunct analysis is insufficient for this language.

So far I have argued that the choice of copula is contextually and semantically driven, and different to a purely syntactic pattern like that which is argued to produce a conjunct/disjunct systems (§6.4.1.). There is, however, something about question structures that is slightly different, and worth discussing in more detail. The semantics of Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs are actually separate from the grammatical expectation that speakers will use the intended-answer copula when formulating a question that I demonstrated in §7.4.1. This feature of the language is certainly interesting from a social cognition perspective, in that it allows us to observe how people negotiate their knowledge states in interaction, but there is no reason to assume this feature is inherently connected to the semantics of the forms under consideration. Indeed, it is possible to imagine other strategies, such as a specific question form, or a default use of the ego in questions.

Garrett's (2001) analysis of question structures in Standard Tibetan is worth briefly considering here, as he has done one of the best jobs of articulating an underlying cognitive mechanism for question constructions. This is done by focusing on the 'origo' instead of the 'speaker.' The origo is the person in the interaction who has the authority for the utterance. While in declaratives this rests with speaker, in questions this rests, not with the person asking the question, but the person being asked. Garrett's analysis focuses on who has epistemic authority, and not what epistemic forms are required to be expressed. This is because it is actually a separate, albeit closely related, feature of the language. Similar discussions, based on different terminology, have been had in relation to 'epistemic source' (Hargreaves 1991), 'locutor' (Aikhenvald 2004), and 'assessor' (Creissels 2008a, 2008b).

This means that 'conjunct/disjunct' systems could arise based on the co-occurrence of two distinct parameters. The first would be that there is a facet of the modal system that divides 'self' from 'other,' be that a predominantly evidential distinction like we see in Lamjung Yolmo and Standard Tibetan, or (as I discussed in §5.5.2.) an epistemic one like Hargreaves (2005) suggested for Kathmandu Newar. It could be found in a broader range of systems as well, and the lines are not always drawn the same between 'self' and 'other' in all languages. For example, In Hyslop's (2011b) analysis of Kurtöp, which has a set of mirative-based distinctions. This is also like Tsafiki, in which Dickinson (2000) observes that there is a pattern of relationship between the system of 'congruent/noncongruent' (i.e. conjunct/disjunct) patterns and the use of mirative forms. While this is not immediately clear that this is the same as Hargreaves self/other distinction in Kathmandu Newar it does also appear to be predicated on the same concept that there is a difference between what is known about yourself and your own actions and what can be known about others. The present of a broad self/other distinction, combined with the second requirement that the modal form used in questions pre-empts the form used in the expected answer, gives the kinds of patterns that are at the heart of the conjunct/disjunct pattern.

By focusing on the two features of a self/other distinction and pre-emptive choice of modal choice in questions as the primary mechanisms of the system, we can account for the fact that there is something similar, and worth discussion, about Kathmandu Newar, Standard Tibetan and Lamjung Yolmo and all of the other languages I have introduced as being analysed as conjunct/disjunct languages. But this analysis also acknowledges that there are fundamental differences in the semantics of these forms across different languages, which is how different patterns can arise. So while earlier descriptions of these systems were heavily focused on the syntax of the data they presented (Hale 1980 for Kathmandu Newar, Schöttelndreyer 1980 and Kelly 2004 for Sherpa and Dickinson 2000 for Tsafiki) and later analyses like Hargreaves's (2005) discussion of Kathmandu Newar takes a much more semantic approach. My approach acknowledges that there are both semantic and syntactic features of the language that speakers are using, as well as pragmatic and interactional information, when making choices about what copula forms to use. I will discuss the benefits of this approach in more detail in §9.3.

As was the case with declarative sentences, there is actually more complexity to interrogative structures than a standard conjunct/disjunct analysis can capture. When used by speakers in context there is variety in terms of the copulas that can be used to ask a question, but there can also be variation between the copula used in the question and that used in the answer. Given that questions and answers involve the contextual knowledge state of two minds (both the questioner and answerer), it is not particularly surprising that there is contextual variation. As with the analysis of declarative copulas in chapter 6, any patterning of subject person with choice of copula derives from the semantics of the copula within the specific context. We can add to that the interrogative requirement that in order to ask a question the speaker must use the copula form that is most likely to be the one in their interlocutor's answer (whether they make that choice based on general patterns or specific contexts). This final requirement is not necessarily driven by the semantics of the copula verbs, nor their use in interaction as speakers can also perform this task in elicitation situations. As I suggested above, this could be the mechanism that is the

locus of what others refer to as ‘conjunct/disjunct’ languages. I will return to the discussion of this possibility in §9.3.

8. Reported speech

Like questions, reported speech constructions implicitly involve interaction, as they involve (i) an original speech event, (ii) the person reporting it and (iii) the person the speech event is being reported to. Like questions, the discussion of reported speech constructions builds upon the description of copula verbs in chapter 6, as some of the information encoded in a reported speech event is the modal stance of the original speech event.

In interaction, people do not only speak for themselves. Sometimes they report the words of others, and on occasion, a person reports their own speech. In Lamjung Yolmo there are two different grammatical strategies for reporting speech; the first is to use a verb of saying (VoS) *lâp-* (1a) and the other is to use a reported speech particle *ló* (1b).

- 1) a) *rò = ya-di k hó = la thúη-toη thúη-toη lâp-sin*
friend = PL-FOC 3SG.M = DAT drink-IMP drink-IMP say -PST
'these friends said to him "drink! drink!"' (SBL 101124-03 20:43)
- b) *áma òη-ke ló*
mother come-NON.PST RS
'mother is coming (she said).' (RL 101123-02)

In this chapter these two different strategies will be discussed in turn. First I look at the VoS structure (§8.1.) and then I will turn to the reported speech (RS) particle (§8.2.). They both have different grammatical properties and usages, and this results in different effects in terms of features relevant to our discussion, including evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct structure.

8.1. *Verb of saying*

Reported speech in Lamjung Yolmo can be accomplished using the verb of saying (VoS) *lâp-*. In this section I will look at the basic features of VoS utterances (§8.1.1.), before a more detailed description of common structures (§8.1.2.). The final section (§8.1.3.) will look at whether the structures described can be reconciled with the way reported speech is discussed in languages that are said to have a conjunct/disjunct system.

8.1.1. *Reported speech constructions*

Like other verbs (§2.2.4.), the VoS occurs in utterance-final position. In (2) it is used in a direct speech structure. The reported speech is presented with no deictic shift from the original utterance. The first person pronoun remains, as does the tense and epistemic value of the copula. The subject in the matrix clause (*ŋà = ki nòmò = ki*) is deictically oriented towards the person who reported the speech. The subjects at both levels of the utterance in (2) share a referent, as shown in the subscript notation on the English translation.

- 2) *ŋà = ki nòmò = ki ŋà nà-ti yè lâp-ku dù*
 1SG=GEN sister=ERG 1SG be.ill-PERF COP.EGO say-PST COP.PE
 ‘my sister_i said “I_i am sick”.’ (AL 101013-02)

The VoS can also be used with something that looks like indirect reported speech as well (3). In this example we see that there are no longer two overt subjects. Instead, only the subject that is deictically oriented towards the person reporting the speech remains. The epistemic value of the copula form, however, always remains as it was in the original utterance.

- 3) *ŋà=ki rò nà-ti yè l̀ap-ti l̀ap-ku d̀u*
 1SG=GEN friend be.ill-PERF COP.EGO say-PERF say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘my friend_i said she_i is sick’ (AL 101013-02)

In (3) not only is there a non-direct reported speech construction, but also a repetition of the VoS. The first of the two always has the perfective aspect suffix, which is likely being used as a clause chaining device (§2.2.5.5.). This has also been observed in Dolakha Newar (Genetti 2007, p. 422). In elicited constructions speakers will often give the two verbs of saying, although this is not as frequently in non-elicited utterances like (4).

- 4) *r̀o=ya-di khó=la thúŋ-toŋ thúŋ-toŋ l̀ap-sin*
 friend=PL-FOC 3SG.M=DAT drink-IMP drink-IMP say-PST
 ‘these friends said to him "drink! drink!"’ (SBL 101124-03 20:43)

In naturalistic speech the VoS is sometimes moved from the clause-final position to before the reported speech content (5).

- 5) *l̀undi l̀ap-sin khé lú nèn c̀ée yè*
 jackal say-PST 2SG song sing know COP.EGO
 ‘the jackal said “you know how to sing a song.”’ (RL 101027-01 02:14)

We also see in (5) that although the origin of the reported speech event is often marked with the ergative case, this is not obligatory, especially in naturalistic speech. This is the case for all ergative marking in Lamjung Yolmo, and is discussed in more detail in the case-marking section of the sketch grammar (Appendix 1 §1.4.5.). Ergative marking of transitive verb subjects is usually pragmatically motivated, and is most often found on agentive subjects in past tense.

One final thing to note about reported speech constructions in Lamjung Yolmo is that the subject of the verb within the reported speech frame is often not expressed.

As discussed in the sketch grammar (Appendix 1 §1.4.3.), the subject of a verb is often not expressed if it is apparent from context. In narrative, often the subject who is uttering the speech is not expressed, and if the subject of the reported speech is also clear from context this will not be made explicit either, as seen in (6). SBL is telling the Family Story (§3.2.1.) from the perspective of the man in the story. In the first line he overtly makes reference to the fact he is talking from the perspective of the man, and in that context it appears he found it unnecessary to make that clear again.

- 6) *ŋà tɕháŋ thúŋ-di tɕíraŋ qò-kandi*
 1SG alcohol drink-PERF only go-NOM
 ‘after drinking alcohol, I go alone.’ (SBL 101124-03 28:00)
- tàpse òŋ-ke l àp-pa-ni*
 now come-NON.PST say-PST-FOC
 ‘(I) am now coming (I) said.’ (SBL 101124-03 28:03)

The VoS *l àp-* also means something more like ‘to speak’ or ‘to talk’ in regard to a particular language (7).

- 7) *mò=ki khása tám l àp khú yè*
 3SG.F=ERG Nepali language speak can COP.EGO
 ‘she can speak Nepali language.’ (AL 100930-01)

This is interesting when it comes to a comparison of the VoS in Lamjung Yolmo with that in Melamchi Valley Yolmo. In Melamchi Valley Yolmo the VoS is *má-*, with *l àp-* being used “in very restricted contexts” (Hari and Lama 2004, p. 448). The only example given in Hari and Lama’s dictionary of *l àp-* is in the sense of “to talk language to someone” so it does not appear, from this information at least, that it can be used as a VoS as per constructions such as (2)-(6), but it does share the usage that we saw in (7). One major difference between the two dialects then is that *l àp* is the main VoS in Lamjung Yolmo. The form in Kagate as given in the Höhlig

(n.d.) dictionary is *sere*, again this is a completely different form. Further afield, Gyalsumdo has the form *lapkẽ*, which is clearly cognate with the Lamjung Yolmo form and the Classical Tibetan for *lab* (Hildebrandt and Perry 2011, p. 185), while Kyirong shares a cognate with Melamchi Valley Yolmo in using *mẽ:* as the VoS (Huber 2002). This variation in such a small cluster of languages may indicate that there may also be some structural variation in how they deal with reported speech, which may make for interesting further cross-linguistic study.

8.1.2. *Hybrid speech*

In §8.1.1. I gave examples of the VoS occurring in direct (2) and indirect (3) reporting constructions. This gives the impression that constructions with a VoS in Lamjung Yolmo fall into a neat dichotomy of being either direct or indirect constructions. In this section I will present a discussion of VoS structures in more naturalistic utterances and introduce the notion of ‘hybrid’ speech that is neither direct nor indirect.

In reported speech constructions speakers rarely give both the subject of the matrix clause and the subject of the reported utterance as pronouns. Instead there is a preference for only giving the referent of the reported speech event, much as we saw in (3) above. (8) is taken from an activity where I replayed recordings from earlier session to speakers and asked them to report the speech event to me. We can see the pronoun shift between the original utterance (8a) and the reporting of that utterance (8b). The referent is oriented towards the person reporting the speech event, but the modal value of the copula remains oriented towards the speaker of the original utterance.³¹

³¹ In this example, although it is AL in the original utterance, when I played it back she did not recognise it as her own voice and assumed that it was another female talking.

- 8) a) *ŋà sà tè-ti yè*
 1SG eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating.’ (AL 100930-01)
- b) *mò sà tè-ti yè làp-ku dù*
 3SG.F eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘she is eating (she said)’ (AL 120208-01)

Because there are some elements of the utterance that undergo a deictic shift (e.g. the subject pronoun) but not others (e.g. the epistemic value of the copula) Tournadre (2008, pp. 300-301, see also Tournadre and Dorje 2003, p. 214-216) refers to this type of construction as ‘hybrid speech,’ which I will also adopt. Therefore, although I referred to (3) above as ‘indirect’ it would be better to refer to it as a ‘hybrid’ speech construction. Tournadre argues that the hybrid structure occurs when the subjects of both the matrix clause and the reported speech clause would likely be expressed as pronouns. There is a general reluctance towards having two pronouns, especially when they would be coreferent. There is no real evidence that the overt pronoun is either specifically that of the matrix or the reported event. This is also the case in Lamjung Yolmo, where almost all utterances with coreferring pronouns occur in elicited situations, and not in naturalistic narratives or interaction.

The example in (8) is a situation that would have generated two coreferent pronouns at the two different levels of the clause. Instead we see that the deictic value of the pronoun has shifted to that which is relevant for the speaker quoting the speech, but the rest of the information does not change. It is this lack of distinction, the absence of either direct or indirect speech that led Tournadre (2008) to describe this kind of construction as ‘hybrid’ speech. We also saw something similar in Schöttelndreyer’s (1980, pp. 126-129) analysis of Sherpa and Hargreaves’s (2005, pp. 16-17) analysis of Kathmandu Newar, indicating that it may not be an uncommon strategy in Tibeto-Burman languages.

The existence of hybrid speech is not to the exclusion of other types of reported speech constructions. As we saw in the first two examples of this chapter, it is possible to elicit structures that are more like prototypical direct and indirect speech structures, but in naturalistic speech they are highly marked in comparison to the hybrid construction - in situations like the Jackal and Crow story (§3.2.2.) where both referents are rarely referred to with pronouns it is more common to have direct speech utterances like (9) where both the referent of the matrix clause and the reported speech clause are present.

- 9) *lùndi l àp-sin tçàro =la tçàro khé lú nèn çée-ke*
 jackal say-PST crow =DAT crow 2SG song sing know-NON.PST
 ‘(the) jackal said to (the) crow “crow, you know how to
 sing a song.”’ (RL 101027-01 04:27)

8.1.3. Hybrid speech and conjunct/disjunct

Verb of saying constructions are used as evidence for a conjunct/disjunct system in some languages. As we saw in the review of literature on conjunct/disjunct (§5.5.), there is an expected relationship between the choice of form, and whether there is co-reference between the utterer of the reported speech and the subject of the reported speech when they are both third person. In (10) I have repeated the example given by Hale (1980), and once again included my own subscript annotation on the bottom line.

- 10) a) *wąą wa ana wanā dhakāā dhāla*
 ‘he said that he went there (himself).’
 ‘he_i said that he_i went there.’ (**conjunct**) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 5)
- b) *wąą wa ana wana dhakāā dhāla*
 ‘he said he (someone else) went there.’
 ‘he_i said that he_j went there.’ (**disjunct**) (Hale 1980, p. 95, ex. 6)

These reported speech structures involve more complexity than the declarative conjunct/disjunct pattern, because they involve embedded constructions. However, it is this co-reference that is at the heart of discussions of conjunct/disjunct patterns in many languages because it is part of the original problem that Hale presents (1980) and it is where the con-/disj- nomenclature comes from, referencing the way the subject relates between the two levels of the speech act.

It is possible to elicit constructions in Lamjung Yolmo where speakers interpret them in ways that are similar to what is found in the traditional literature on conjunct/disjunct systems. In (11) we see an example where the change of copula also brings about a change of referent, as shown in the English gloss:

- 11) a) *mò=ki mò nà-ku dù làp-ti làp-ku dù*
 3SG.F=ERG 3SG.F be.ill-IPFV COP.PE say-PERF say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘she_i said she_i was ill’ (AL 101013-02)
- b) *mò=ki mò nà-ti yè làp-ti làp-ku dù*
 3SG.F=ERG 3SG.F be.ill-PERF COP.EGO say-PERF say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘she_i said she_j was ill’ (AL 101013-02)

The distinction arises because of the endopathic (§6.4.2.) sense of ‘ill’ the perceptual evidential is appropriate for first person utterances, and the ego for third person. In (11), based on this, the use of the perceptual evidential suggested that the person originally uttered a first person utterance where the pronoun was reoriented from first person to third. In (11b) the ego could be appropriate for commenting on another person being ill, and therefore indicate that there are two different people referenced in the utterances. Thus, these examples appear to fit the conjunct/disjunct pattern proposed by Hale (1980).

Although these constructions are possible, they are not particularly frequent in the database and eliciting them usually involves a great deal of prompting and

contextualising. Also, as I will show below, there are limited contexts in which such distinctions can be made, indicating that even though distinctions like those above can be made, they are not necessarily used by speakers in interaction to make disambiguation easier, as we saw in examples (2) and (3). Unlike the mechanism for forming questions (§7.4.1), this style of reporting speech is not a prominent syntactic feature of the language, nor is it independent of the semantics and use of the copula verbs.

You may also observe in (11) that the difference in copula is not the only difference between the two utterances. The verb *nà* ‘be ill’ has a different perfective aspect marker in (11a) and (11b). There is no semantic difference in their use, but while the *-ti* perfective suffix can be used with either the ego or the perceptual, the *-ku* perfective suffix only occurs with the perceptual evidential, and is the preferred choice in naturalistic speech (§2.2.4, see also the sketch grammar, Appendix 1, §1.5.3.2.1.). This means that when different copulas are used it is still not the kind of perfect minimal difference we see in Hale’s (1980) system.

As I mentioned, the verb *nà* ‘be ill’ is an endopathic verb (§6.4.2.), so in the context of (11a) and (11b) the distinction may be present but in other contexts different copulas could be used. In (12) we see that the use of hybrid speech, and the fact that some endopathic verbs can have non-endopathic uses (§6.4.2.) means such distinctions as in (11) are not always so clear in other utterances such as (12).

- 12) a) *ŋà=ki rò nà-ti yè lâp-ti lâp-ku dù*
 1SG=ERG friend be.ill-PERF COP.EGO say-PERF say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘my friend_i said she_i is ill’ (AL 101013-02)
- b) *ŋà=ki rò nà-ku dù lâp-ti lâp-ku dù*
 1SG=GEN friend be.ill-IPFV COP.PE say-PERF say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘my friend_i said she_i is ill’ (AL 101013-02)

I have given two referents in the English gloss, to make it clear that regardless of whether the ego or perceptual evidential is used, they both still refer to an utterance with a single co-referent. This is not something predicted in the conjunct/disjunct model. On the other hand, my discussion of endopathic verbs in §6.4.2. explains the semantic difference between the two. I demonstrated that many endopathic verbs, especially *nà-* ‘be ill,’ will sometimes function endopathically, and sometimes not. (12b) would be that the person’s friend said they were ill, using the perceptual evidential to indicate that they perceived this internally, and the illness may not be observable to others. In (12a) the person who said they were ill used an ego copula originally, either because they are one of a subset of Lamjung Yolmo speakers who appear to not treat illness as an endopathic verb (see §6.4.2.) or because the illness was not something that was particularly about internal perception (for example, if they had vomited already). It is this variation in the use of the verb that leads to the different choice, and not anything to do with an independent conjunct/disjunct pattern.

Another problem for a conjunct/disjunct analysis of Lamjung Yolmo is that there are situations where the same copula is used across all subjects. I have shown in §6.4. and §7.4.2. that there are some contexts in which it is appropriate to use the ego copula for all subjects, regardless of their grammatical person. Any utterance such as “X is Yolmo,” where X can be any person, will always use an ego copula *yimba*, unless there is a specific context in which the speaker wants to emphasise that they have only recently discovered through perceptual evidence that someone is Yolmo (§6.3.1.). This means that in reported speech there is no way to tell from the evidential information if the person who made the original utterance is the same as the subject of the utterance. (13) gives a hybrid speech construction as per the discussion above, but as the copula would not change regardless of whether the pronouns were co-referential there is no way to tell outside of context whose speech is being reported.

- 13) *khó yòlmo-pa yimba làp-sin*
 3SG.M Yolmo person COP.EGO say-PST
 ‘he_i is a Yolmo person he_{i/j} said.’ (SKL 101023-06)

Speakers are aware that sentences like (13) can be ambiguous, and they can disambiguate by using a plural pronoun (14) instead of the singular (13). This use of the plural pronouns for single subjects as an honorific is common in Lamjung Yolmo (see Appendix 1, §1.4.3.). The use of the honorific for talking about oneself would not occur, so the speakers interpret this as two different referents.

- 14) *khúj yòlmo-pa yimba làp-sin*
 3PL Yolmo person COP.EGO say-PST
 ‘he_i is a Yolmo person he_j said.’ (SKL 101023-06)

This strategy is also observed in Tibetan (Tournadre 2008, p. 301), where Tournadre observes it is ‘crucial’ for disambiguating grammatical roles in context. This further indicates that the speakers cannot rely on the conjunct/disjunct patterns described to disambiguate referents in reported speech structures because the ego copula is too broad to simply function as a ‘conjunct’ form.

As discussed in chapter 6 (§6.5.) there are many constructions in Lamjung Yolmo with no epistemic marking on the verb, making it impossible to make a distinction of the kind found in conjunct/disjunct systems in reported constructions (15).

- 15) *khó=ki làp-pa khó yèmbu=la kàl-sin*
 3SG.M=ERG say-PST 3SG.M Kathmandu=DAT go.PERF-PST
 ‘he_i said he_{i/j} went to Kathmandu’ (UL 110115-01)

As with the English gloss, in constructions like these there is no information in the verb in Lamjung Yolmo to determine whether the second pronoun is co-referential with the initial pronoun. Therefore, anything that resembles conjunct/disjunct

patterns in Lamjung Yolmo that we see are just that, patterns that emerge from the use of certain copula forms in some, but not all contexts. There is no need to look for the language to fit an exact pattern, because there are features of this language that do not always conform to the usages we see in other languages, such as always using a self/other distinction on verbs.

It is possible to build a hypothesis that the conjunct/disjunct pattern of reported speech in Lamjung Yolmo only occurs in some tense or aspect constructions. In Creissels's (2008a) analysis of a conjunct/disjunct pattern in Akhvakh (Nakh-Daghestanian) the conjunct/disjunct style pattern only occurs in the affirmative form of one past tense construction. Such an analysis may also work for Lamjung Yolmo (if we temporarily ignore the kind of contextual copula variation I demonstrated in chapter 6, endopathic verbs and the use of ego copulas across all persons in some contexts). The fundamental problem with this, though, is that it bypasses the fact that it is possible for speakers to understand this pattern based on the semantics of the copulas being used within the context of the utterance, and as such it does not have to be treated as a separate type of syntactic phenomenon.

It makes very little sense to delineate one specific type of reported speech construction from the rest, when it still comes from the same interactional use of the semantics of the forms. In presuming a system like conjunct/disjunct, one is taking a top-down approach to the syntax of the language, but this means that the nuances of actual usage could be missed. If we instead focus on the reported speech as a social event, and build up our analysis based on observed examples, we reach a much more nuanced idea of what is happening.

So far in this chapter the discussion has only focused on one way that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo can report the speech of others. In §8.2. I will demonstrate that they have another strategy for this.

8.2. Reported speech particle

In §8.1. I discussed the way that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo report speech using a verb of saying. There is another strategy for reporting speech in Lamjung Yolmo, which involves the reported speech (RS) particle *lɔ*. While there are similarities in these two strategies there are also differences. The RS particle is more of an evidential form than the verb of saying. In this section I will start with outlining the basic features of how the RS particle functions (§8.2.1.), and how it interacts with the copula system (§8.2.2.). I will then explore how the RS particle is used in discourse (§8.2.3.), and show that it actually does a whole lot more than just report speech.

8.2.1. RS particle constructions

There are several structural differences that are apparent between the VoS discussed above and the reported speech particle. First, the particle does not take verb inflection such as tense or aspect. Second, the original speaker is not overtly referenced but is instead inferred from context. With these differences, the RS particle functions as an evidential particle rather than a verb of saying, although it does not sit grammatically within the epistemic system of copula verbs (chapter 6). Instead, it occurs on the matrix level of the reported speech clause, separate to the modal value of the copula in the original utterance. This means it can co-occur with all of the copula verbs, because the copula verb is part of the reported speech but the particle is not a part of the original utterance, it just marks it as belonging to another person.

To illustrate how the RS particle is different to the VoS construction let us look at the RS particle in use (16). The example below is taken from an experiment where I played participants back sections of previously recorded speech through headphones and asked them to report it to me. (16a) is the original speech event and (16b) is the

reporting of this using the RS particle. The first thing to observe is that the pronoun is deictically reoriented, from the speaker in the first utterance to the speaker in the second utterance. The epistemic value of the copula, however, does not change. In these regards constructions with the RS particle look similar to the hybrid speech constructions introduced in §8.1.2.

- 16) a) *ŋà sà tè-ti yè*
 1SG eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating’ (AL 100930-01)
- b) *mò sà tè-ti yè ló*
 3SG.F eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO RS
 ‘she is eating (she said)’ (RL 120218-01)

Although it occurs clause-finally, the RS particle is not a verb as it does not conjugate for tense, aspect or mood, nor take a subject. This behaviour of the RS particle is different to its cognate in Kyirong (Huber 2002, p. 107-108). In Kyirong the RS particle is a sentence final clitic that attaches to the final verb - in a narrative it will attach to the VoS. In Lamjung Yolmo, as with Melamchi Valley Yolmo, it is a separate particle. The verb within the reported speech takes the regular TAM morphology, and the particle occurs separately. The fact that it has its own lexical tone further indicates that it is not a suffix.

Another difference between the RS particle and the VoS is that the RS particle is always final. Although most of the examples of the VoS above have the verb in the final position in the clause, as is the usual word order, this is not always the case. As shown in (5), in naturalistic speech it is common for the VoS to precede the reported speech. Although this is a common strategy for VoS in naturalistic data it never happens with the RS particle, which is always utterance-final.

The third difference is that the RS particle never occurs with an overt subject indicating who was the original author of the speech event. I have not heard in elicited, experimental or observed data that a person will indicate who the source of the utterance was while giving the utterance with a reported speech particle. While we saw above that a VoS does not always have an overt subject, especially in hybrid speech structures (§8.2.2.), the RS particle does not involve a matrix clause like the verb of saying does so there is no overt indicator of who is the origin of the reported speech. Instead, as I will show below, the RS particle is used in contexts where the original author of the utterance can be determined.

For these reasons, the RS particle can be considered an evidential form. This fits with the definition that an evidential form is the grammaticalisation of the source of information. As I have discussed in relation to (16) above, the RS particle does not contribute to tense or aspect, nor does it indicate the original author of the utterance. Its predominant role in the utterance is to indicate that the speaker's source of information for the utterance is a report from somebody else. We can consider it a part of Lamjung Yolmo speakers' evidential repertoire, even though it occurs in a different grammatical position to the evidential distinctions made in the copula verb paradigm.

Another difference between the VoS and the RS particle is the 'directness' of the speech being reported. As shown above the VoS can occur with both direct and indirect speech types, as well as the more common hybrid structures. The reported speech that is being framed with the RS particle is only ever reported in constructions like (16b) above, which are indirect in that the pronominal information always reorients to the person reporting the original utterance. Of course, this is difficult to determine in situations where nothing shifts, but in situations where there are deictic elements these always reorient. If a child said (17) to their mother:

- 17) *yíbi* *òṅ-ke*
 grandmother come-NON.PST
 ‘grandmother is coming.’ (RL 091108-01)

Then the woman could report to her sister what her child said to her using a construction such as (18).

- 18) *áma* *òṅ-ke* *ló*
 mother come-NON.PST RS
 ‘mother is coming (she said).’ (RL 091108-01)

From this and other examples it appears that the RS particle is not intended as a verbatim quote marker, but to give the salient content of the original utterance, and to indicate that the speaker of the information is not the originator. The fact that the RS particle is not used to report your own speech back to someone further indicates that the information is being flagged as reported, and not the speaker’s own.

We also see this in the way the reported speech can be then further transferred. If the woman reported (18) above, and her sister wanted to subsequently pass on the information to another party something like (19) would be ungrammatical.

- 19) * *áma* *òṅ-ke* *ló ló*
 mother come-NON.PST RS RS
 * ‘mother is coming (she said she said).’ (RL 101123-02)

Reported speech markers are not embedded in this way; instead she would use a construction with a single RS particle, such as (20).

- 20) *áma* *òŋ-ke* *ló*
 mother come-NON.PST RS
 ‘mother is coming (she said).’ (RL 101123-02)

Like with the shifting deixis above, this indicates that it is not important that the original message is reiterated exactly the same, but that the main content of the message is transferred. It also indicates that it is the content of the reported speech, and not the originator that is of prime importance in these constructions, as the originator of the speech is no longer clear in the repeated utterance.

It does not appear to be common to use the RS particle to quote something back to the originator of the utterance. To date I only have one naturalistic example of this (21). This occurred during the Twenty Questions game (§3.2.5.), where RL had been asking SNL questions and after a few minutes goes back to something she said earlier to re-confirm what her answer was.

- 21) *úu phérti* *mì-ti* *yè* *ló*
 breathe NEG.NON.PST-(breath) COP.EGO RS
 ‘breathes, exists (you said).’³² (RL 101120-02 09:11)

Instead of quoting speech back to someone, the majority of examples involve a speaker repeating the speech of the originator for a third person. Having said this, it should be noted that speakers can still use the RS particle for their own speech, if that speech is reheard on something like a recording or read out from a letter, as in (22), where RL listened to a recording of his own voice from an earlier elicitation

³² In this example we see the strange negation pattern of the verb, which occurs with Nepali loan words (while *úu* is traditionally a Yolmo word meaning ‘breath’ the verb is made with the Nepali word for breath *phernu*). See the sketch grammar, Appendix 1 §1.5.2.1 for more information on Nepali loan verbs.

session (22a) and then repeats what he heard using a RS particle construction (22b).³³

22) a) *ɲà ɲàl tè-ti*
1SG sleep AUX-PERF
'I am sleeping' (RL 101026-02)

b) *ɲà ɲàl tè-ti yè ló*
1SG sleep AUX-PERF COP.EGO RS
'I am sleeping (I said)' (RL 120218-01)

The addition of the copula in the quote means that RL is supplying additional information in the quote that was not in the original utterance, which is something I discuss in §8.2.3.

There appears to be a preference for using the RS particle over the VoS for very recent speech events. In sessions with both AL (120208-01) and RL (120218-01) I played them various sentences that I had elicited from different sessions. I would then ask them either *tɛí láppa?* or *tɛí ló?* ('what did (she/he) say?') with either the VoS or RS particle). Both speakers showed strong preference for repeating the speech with the RS particle, even when I asked them *tɛí làppa?* using the VoS such as in (23). This indicates that for recent utterances there is a strong preference for the RS particle for reformulating the utterance.

23) *khí tó sà-teraŋ yèke ló*
dog rice.cooked eat-IPFV COP.EGO.PST RS
'the dog was eating rice (he said).' (AL 120208-01, RL 120218-01)

³³ The fact that the pronoun did not reorient does not mean it is a direct speech structure, but simply indicates that he is aware he is quoting his own, previous, speech and as such there is no deictic reorientation of the pronoun needed.

This was also something that I observed while transcribing sections of the Family Story by SBL and RL (101123-04) with ST. Often ST would listen to something they said and then repeat it to me with the RS particle. The immediacy of the repetition and the fact that the original speaker is contextually apparent appear to be the main motivational reasons for the choice of the RS particle in such contexts. RL's (101027-03) intuitions about the preferred use of the RS particle supported this. He felt that it was most appropriate for situations where a person was still present after making the original utterance. If the original speaker were on the telephone he felt that it would be acceptable to use the RS particle, but only if they are still on the line. The fact that the RS particle is preferred for situations where the original utterance was recent enough to glean from context might explain why the lack of reference to the original speaker or the absence of an overt subject in many constructions with an RS particle is not a source of confusion.

In (21) and (23) we saw speech being reported only a few minutes, at most, after the original utterance, but the time span between the original utterance and report can be much longer than indicated by speakers' intuitions. Example (24) is from a conversation I participated in with some Lamjung Yolmo speakers from one of the more isolated villages. During a discussion about who was related to whom in the village, one of the older people wanted to know about my family. We were talking in Nepali and one person asked *baa aamaa hunuhunchha?* ("are your mother and father alive?"), to which I replied *hunuhunchha*, ("they are"), and KL supplied the man with additional information, in Lamjung Yolmo:

- 24) *mème yíbi yè ló*
 grandfather grandmother COP.EGO RS
 'grandfather and grandmother are alive (she said).'
- (KL 21/11/2011 book 4, p. 46)

There are two things to note about this example. The first is that the reported information is in Yolmo, but this is something that I had told KL in Nepali. This

translation of Nepali into Yolmo in RS particle constructions is discussed in §8.2.3. in more detail. Secondly, the information KL is reporting (that my grandparents are still alive) is something I told her at least 4 weeks earlier. In discussions about the use of reported speech, speakers are reluctant to say that they would report speech beyond a relatively short duration of time. In one conversation RL thought that maybe a week would be acceptable, but only for some particularly salient and stable information (101027-03). This example shows that speakers are happy to report particularly salient facts many weeks after the original utterance. This is clearly a longer time span than would be expected from general speaker intuitions, and the fact that KL reported the information in a different language than it was given again indicates that it is not important to capture the exact wording, but the general intent, of the reported speech.

The RS particle does not only have to report speech. RL (101027-03) confirmed that it would be acceptable to report the content of a letter, or other written information, using the RS particle. Thus the RS particle can be used for more than just speech. As I will demonstrate in §8.2.3. what is considered appropriate to include in a reported speech frame goes further beyond speech than just writing.

The RS particle can also be used as a question-asking strategy, in which RS particle is used with an interrogative pronoun. The most common construction of this type is (25).

- 25) *tɕí ló*
 what RS
 ‘what (did you say?)’ (RL 101120-01)

This is very similar to the interrogative pronoun question structures discussed in §7.3, however they specifically relate to information that has already been given, and that the person asking the question desires to be repeated. Unlike declarative

A: *áma òŋ-ke ló*
 mother come-NON.PST RS
 ‘mother is coming (she said).’ (AL 120311-01)

When asking a question of the original speaker, their reply does not include a RS particle for their own utterance, however when asking about a third person’s speech the RS particle is generally included. (27) is an observed example that indicates this is not a strict requirement. ST, on being introduced to a non-Nepali friend of mine, did not hear her name properly, and asked her sister KL to repeat what she had said:

27) a) Q: *mìn tɕí yimba ló*
 name what COP.EGO RS
 ‘what (did she say) her name was?’ (ST 27/11/10 book 4, p. 45)

A: *kate*
 Kate
 ‘(her name is) Kate.’ (KL 27/11/10 book 4, p. 45)

Even though this was not KL’s own utterance originally, she did not include a RS particle. That these question forms are created to elicit further information about a specific speech event gives evidence that the RS particle is not used for reporting general information, but information derived from a specific speech event.

One final note to make about the structure and use of the RS particle is that although speech is sometimes translated from Nepali into Lamjung Yolmo as seen in §8.2.3, it is also possible to quote Nepali using the Lamjung Yolmo reported speech particle. In (28), which is an observed example, a person asked me in Nepali if I were cold (*chiso bhayo?*), and when my reply in Nepali (*ali ali bhayo* ‘a little bit’) was not heard PML repeated what I had said, still in Nepali (28), even though both of the women are Lamjung Yolmo speakers.

- 28) *[ali ali bhayo] ló*
 [some cop.PST]Nep RS
 ‘a little bit (she said)’ (PML 17/01/2011 book 8, p. 5)

Although the examples above demonstrate that while the RS particle has the function of quoting the speech of others, this does not mean that the use of the RS particle is compulsory. There are many instances where speakers can use a VoS, or just repeat the information that is reported. Therefore, it is a choice of the speaker, and not a compulsory requirement, to mark speech as reported. Therefore, the person listening cannot assume that because something is *not* marked with a RS particle (or a VoS) then it is *not* something that is being reported. This is different to a system like Tariana (Arawak) (Aikhenvald 2004, p. 3) where it is a grammatical expectation that all reported speech is marked as such in the grammar.

As we can see from the grammatical structure of the utterances above, the RS particle thus functions as a reported evidential. As its deictic function is to refer to an original and specific speech event it is not a hearsay particle as in Van Driem’s (1993) analysis of Dumi, Genetti’s analysis of Dolakha Newar (2007, p. 258) or Watters analysis of Kham (1997, p. 603), or the Nepali *re* (Acharya 1991, pp. 183-184) for that matter. In (29) the speaker reports that the food is tasty. The person does not do this because they have eaten it, or because it is the general consensus, but because a friend had told them it was tasty.

- 29) *tó çìmbu dù ló*
 rice tasty COP.PE RS
 ‘the rice is tasty (she said).’ (AL 110215-01)

This is a much more specific use of the RS particle than is found in Melamchi Yolmo. Hari (2010, pp. 92-92) gives examples of the marker being used as a more general marker in narratives. In her description of Kyirong, Huber (2002, p. 107) explains that the ‘quotative’ is for direct quotes, but also for events that have been

heard about from others. This appears to be much more like the use of the RS particle that we find in Lamjung Yolmo.

There is a small set of examples that do not quite fit the analysis presented above. In my discussion of the general fact copula *òŋge* in §6.1.1.4. I mentioned that it can only be used in constructions relating to generally known facts that are current. In (26) of chapter 6 I showed that mention of a historical fact, such as dinosaurs being large, would be inappropriate with the general fact copula since that fact is no longer current. While it would be possible to just use a regular past tense construction, speakers also gave sentences like (30) as an alternative phrasing.

- 30) a) *dinosaurs t̥hómbo yèke ló*
 dinosaurs(Eng) big COP.EGO.PST RS
 ‘dinosaurs were big.’ (RL 101125-01)
- b) *kàpu yàabu yèke ló*
 old.animate good COP.EGO.PST RS
 ‘the old man was good.’ (VL 101224-01)

The speakers appear to include the RS particle to capture the fact that this is not just their opinion, but that of others as well. This appears to act much more like a hearsay evidential, where deictically the form does not point back to a specific speech event but to the fact that the speaker knows this information through repetition from multiple sources. When I asked RL if the RS particle could be used instead of the general fact copula in a situation where the fact was still current he said that this was not an appropriate use of the RS particle and that the general fact copula should be used. As the only examples of these in my corpus occur in specific elicitation contexts it is possible that speakers use the RS particle in this context to fill the paradigm gap left by the general fact copula.

8.2.2. Interaction with copulas

The example above shows that the RS particle functions as an evidential, and that it can also co-occur with the copula verbs that have so far been the focus of our examination of the Lamjung Yolmo modal system. Most of the examples in §8.2.2. show the RS particle co-occurring with perceptual evidential *dù* and various ego forms (*yè*, *yèke* and *yimba*), which are the most common, and the focus of much of my analysis. (31) gives examples of the RS particle co-occurring with the emphatic perceptual evidential *dùba* (31a) and a dubitative *yìnqo* (31b) and the general fact copula *ònge* (31c). Only examples with affirmative copulas are given, although it is also possible with the negative equivalents.

- 31) a) *dì cìmbu dùba ló*
this tasty COP.PE.EMPH RS
'this is tasty (she said).' (AL 120127-01)
- b) *dì phón yìnqo ló*
this phone(Eng) COP.DUB RS
'this is probably a phone (she said).' (AL 120127-10)
- c) *nám tíj màrmu ònge ló*
sky red COP.GF RS
'the sky is red (she said).' (AL 120127-10)

That reported speech is marked with a particle, instead of on a copula verb like the other distinctions (chapter 6), means that it is separate from them. The RS particle does not interact to any great degree with the value of the copula being reported.

This is because the evidential value of the copula in the original utterance (if there is a copula present) has scope over a different part of the clause to the RS particle. The evidential copula has scope over the original utterance and the RS particle has scope over the whole utterance.

This is not the case in all languages with a reported evidential form. For example, Aikhenvald (2004, p. 83-84) observes that in Tsafiki (Arawak) the reported evidential can occur with the other evidentials to specify “the source of information the original speaker had.” Unlike Lamjung Yolmo, though, it can occur without another evidential. This is similar to the quotative clitic *-lo* in Kyirong (Huber 2002, p. 107), which is cognate with the Lamjung Yolmo form. In Kyirong the quotative attaches to the verb at the end of a sentence, meaning that “the copula does not need to be overtly present.” This is not the case in Lamjung Yolmo.

The evidential value contained in the reported speech event is separate from the act of reporting the event itself, and thus both levels of evidence can be shown. We can see how this interaction works by looking at the reporting of internal states. As discussed in chapter 6, verbs of internal perception such as *think*, *dream* and *know* are endopathic (§6.4.2.) and invert the expected use of evidentials, so that a speaker uses a perceptual evidential for themselves, but cannot for another person, because they do not have perceptual access to their inner state or thought. In (32) the speaker is reporting on something that was internally perceived by another speaker.

- 32) *mò=ki mílam thón-ku dù ló*
 3SG.M=ERG dream see-IPFV COP.PE RS
 ‘she had a dream (she said).’ (RL 100928-01)

The report in (32) would have stemmed from an original utterance like (33).

- 33) *ḡà=ki mílam thón-ku dù*
 1SG=ERG dream see-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I had a dream.’ (RL 100928-01)

Internally perceived events like dreams are endopathic, which means that a speaker would use the perceptual evidential with a first person subject in a declarative

utterance. It is appropriate to use the perceptual evidential in the reported speech construction (32) because the speaker used it in the original utterance (33). This is because while features of the utterance like the pronoun reorient to the person reporting the utterance, the evidential value does not.

The strategy of reporting a third person's internal state with a reported speech marker is also something that occurs occasionally in elicitation. In (34) AL uses it, even though the utterance given in Nepali was a general declarative without a reported speech marker, and there was no original speech event that she was quoting.

- 34) *mò = ki mílam thóη-sin ló*
 3SG.F = ERG dream see-PST RS
 ‘she had a dream (she said).’ (RL 100928-01)

This appears to be a strategy to signal to others that you are not speaking on behalf of another person about their internal thoughts or perceptions. That this is a delineation between endopathic (§6.4.2.) and non-endopathic verbs is indicated by the fact that in the same session AL did not use the RS particle for third person actions including falling or sleeping. Although this is not a common strategy in the corpus, it does indicate a desire to show one is not speculating about the internal states of another that is reminiscent of opacity of mind (§4.4.). The RS particle gives the speaker the opportunity to indicate to another person in the interaction that the comment about another person does not come from one's own assessment, but the original person's report.

An argument could be made that the Lamjung Yolmo evidential and modal system only has its locus in the copula verb paradigm and the RS particle is not part of the system in a narrow sense. The RS particle operates separately to the copula paradigm within the grammatical structure of Lamjung Yolmo as it is part of a

different grammatical category (sentence-final particle as opposed to copula verb). Although it is not located in the same syntactic position as the other evidential distinctions in the language, there is nothing to be gained from omitting the RS particle from the wider discussion of evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo. The RS particle is very much a component of the Lamjung Yolmo speakers' evidential toolkit, as it allows speakers to make another distinction as to what evidence they are basing their utterance on. The verb of saying can be considered another non-grammaticalised way to indicate source of evidence, but it is not a grammatical evidential like the RS particle is.

8.2.3. *Discourse functions*

Since the RS particle is used in repeating the speech of another person, an utterance that includes it is always embedded in the context of a larger interaction. Many of the examples in §8.2.1. and §8.2.2. are quite contextually grounded, but in this section I examine in more detail the way the RS particle is used in interaction. Specifically, I focus on two features of the use of the RS particle in interaction. Firstly, its role in relation to the speaker's certainty of the utterance, and secondly, how the RS particle can be used to report content not actually uttered.

Before we get into a discussion of these uses, it should be noted that there is an expectation that the RS particle is not used if one has heard about something, but was also witness to it. In that case it is not appropriate to use the RS particle. If a person had seen their mother arriving in the distance, and then been told about it by their sibling it would be inappropriate to say something like (35a) (although it is grammatically acceptable), but instead would be expected to say (35b).

- 35) a) *áma òŋ-ke ló*
 mother come-NON.PST RS
 'mother is coming (she said).' (RL 101030-05)

- b) *áma òŋ-ke*
 mother come-NON.PST
 ‘mother is coming.’ (RL 101030-05)

In discussions of reported speech there can be an assumption that such constructions indicate that the speaker is not certain of the reliability of the reported content (Anderson 1986). This is not always true, as Michel (2008, p.181, n.d.) argues in relation to Nanti (Arawak, Peruvian Amazon). He argues that the use of a reported speech construction does not reduce the speaker’s certainty about, or belief in, the propositional content of the reported utterance, but emphasizes the validity of an utterance by ascribing it to another person. To use a form unmarked with a reported speech evidential in this language would be to put words in another person’s mouth. Thus the RS particle can emphasise the true value of a speaker’s utterance, and does not necessarily give the ‘hearsay’ meaning that a literal English translation often can. To illustrate (36) is an observed example of the use of the RS particle. At an event where guests were being served dinner, KL uttered (36) to the person serving.

- 36) *ɛ́á m̀è-sà ỳè ló*
 meat NEG.NON.PST-eat COP.EGO RS
 ‘she doesn’t eat meat (she said)’ (KL 31/01/2011 book 8, p. 6)

Here, KL is not using the RS particle because she doubts the truth of the utterance. She is well aware of this preference, and could have used a standard habitual construction without a RS particle. In choosing to use the RS particle KL validates the statement by indicating that it was not her own, and prevents the appearance that she is preventing the person serving from giving the referent meat.

In (37) we see an example of a reported speech event during the Optical Illusion task (§3.2.8.). KL and CL are looking at an image that could either be a landscape or a man’s face. This is not a particularly easy illusion to see, and they were debating

utterance, in a situation where a group of people had walked from a distant village to one near the bus stop, and were waiting at a friend's house until the arrival of the next bus. AL had just been told by the friend at whose house they were visiting that there would be another jeep that day. When someone else asked whether a jeep was coming AL replied:

- 39) *gàdi òṅ-ke ló*
 bus come-NON.PST RS
 the bus is coming (she said)' (AL 23/01/2011 book 8, p. 5)

From the context alone it is not entirely clear whether AL is using the RS particle to show that there is authority behind her utterance, or whether she is using it to indicate that she is avoiding responsibility for the information in case the bus does not show up. In different contexts this may shift.

Although there is insufficient evidence to argue conclusively like Michael (2008) that the use of the RS particle emphasises the speaker's belief in the propositional content of the utterance, there is no evidence to indicate that the RS particle is used in discourse by speakers to distance themselves from an unreliable utterance. Any shift in responsibility for the content of the utterance is an attempt to claim greater validity for the content of the utterance, not to indicate a reduced reliability.

The RS particle can also be used to quote something someone has not actually said. This includes cases where a speaker reports a speech event that did not happen, as well as those where the original speech was in a different language and with different modal information.

The RS copula can be used to deliberately falsify a reported utterance. Following on from (36), shortly after KL said this her friend joined in with (40). Unlike (36), this was not something that had ever been said, and was said in jest.

- 40) *tɕháŋ thúŋ-ke yè ló*
 alcohol drink-NON.PST COP.EGO RS
 ‘she drinks alcohol (she said)’ (woman1, 31/01/2011 book 8, p. 6)

Beyond obvious jesting, there are examples where the RS particle is used for utterances that were not made. (41) is a question that I was asked by KL.

- 41) *rò tóo-pa*
 friend hungry -PST
 ‘(are you) hungry friend?’ (KL, 20/11/2010 book 4, p. 45)

I attempted to respond (42a), but what I said was not considered a grammatically appropriate response by KL, instead in (42b) she corrected my attempt to the answer form she was expecting, and also included a RS particle.

- 42) a) *mè-tóo*
 NEG.NON.PST-hungry
 ‘(I’m) not hungry.’ (LG, 20/11/2010 book 4, p. 45)
- b) *mà-tóo yè ló*
 NEG.PST-hungry COP.EGO SRS
 ‘(you) are not hungry (you said).’ (KL, 20/11/2010 book 4, p. 45)

KL has used the RS particle, not to indicate what I did say, but to indicate what I should have said. This indicates that the RS particle is less about being a verbatim quote marker and more about capturing the intended meaning of the utterance. It is also used here as a politeness strategy by KL, to indicate that she is not telling me

whether I am hungry or not, but to indicate that she is quoting my non-existent words. Much like in (36), the conversation participant is avoiding claiming knowledge of the other person's internal state by using a RS particle to indicate this.

Sometimes it is not clear whether something has actually been said before it is framed as a reported speech event. For example, while KL and CL were doing the Optical Illusion task (§3.2.8.) they were looking at the image of the swan-painted hand and trying to figure out what it was. They had been saying it is a bird and I had been rejecting their suggestions, but had not yet told them what the image was. In an attempt to help them along ST said (43).

- 43) *yàabu pè-ti tá-toŋ ló*
 good do-PERF look-IMP RS
 ‘look at it well (she said).’ (ST 120304-02 06:00)

There is no one else but myself to whom that RS particle could be referring to in this interaction, but I have said nothing of the sort during this session, and while looking at the image with ST (120304-01) I also made no such request or suggestion. I did, however help ST to see that it was a hand and not a swan or duck and it appears that she is reporting what was, at most, an implicit motivation I was trying to achieve and never a direct utterance of mine. The reported speech particle here indicates that it is not her own request but someone else's (i.e. mine). This again ties in with the fact that the RS particle can give authority to an utterance by ascribing it to another person.

The RS particle can be used not just to report speech, but also gesture. In a general conversation, a woman asked the group if any of us had change for a thousand rupee note. When KL looked at me I shook my head to indicate that I did not. She then reported this as (44) to the other woman.

- 44) *mè* *ló*
 COP.EGO.NEG RS
 ‘does not (she said).’ (KL 07/03/2012 Book 4, p. 26)

We also see the RS particle giving information beyond what was explicitly said in a context where a Nepali utterance is reported in Lamjung Yolmo. In these elicited examples I gave the speaker a Nepali utterance and asked how they would report this speech using the reported speech marker. Speakers had very strong ideas about what Lamjung Yolmo copula would be the appropriate choice in such situations. For example, if someone said in Nepali *aamaa gharma chha* (“mother is in the house”), an utterance with no information about source of information, then speakers would report this in Lamjung Yolmo as in (45).

- 45) *áma khím = la yè ló*
 mother house = LOC COP.EGO RS
 ‘mother is in the house (she said).’ (RL 110129-01)

AL also gives this form using the ego copula for the reporting of this Nepali utterance (110215-01). Speakers reject the use of the perceptual evidential as a valid report of the utterance, such as in (46).

- 46) * *áma khím = la dù ló*
 mother house = LOC COP.PE RS
 * ‘mother is in the house (she said).’ (RL 110129-01)

As we saw in the section above, the way copula verbs relate to the RS particle is to ensure the copula stays the same as it was in the original utterance, even though deictic information shifts. Here, a speaker is translating from a language where the copula has no evidential value³⁴ (Nepali), and in reporting the information they also

³⁴ Of course, there is the matter of the copula form *rahechha* in Nepali, which some

report what they assume would be the evidential value of the copula form if the utterance were in Lamjung Yolmo. This appears to be part of a similar cognitive process as to how question structures in Lamjung Yolmo include the copula expected in the answer. As I discussed in §7.4.1, in many situations it appears that the copula used when formulating a question is often dependent on expected patterns of copula use. Here too, the choice of copula translating from Nepali to Yolmo in RS constructions appears to be predominantly based on the general pattern of what copula is expected in a given context. Further research in both of these areas may indicate that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo are using different processes for making copula choices in these situations, which would give us further insight into how speakers make copula choices in different situations.

We know that this is not just a case of speakers translating all Nepali copula forms into the ego copula as a default, as the perceptual evidential is found when we would expect a Lamjung Yolmo speaker to use it, as in (47). In (47) the Nepali utterance was *khaanaa miṭho chha* (“food is tasty”). This is the same copula form as the example above (*chha*), which was translated into the ego evidential, but is the kind of sensory-evidence based context where a speaker of Lamjung Yolmo would use a perceptual evidential (§6.1.1.3.), which is exactly what we find.

- 47) *tó* *çimbu dù* *ló*
 rice.cooked tasty COP.PE RS
 ‘rice is tasty (it is said).’ (AL 110215-01)

In these examples then, speakers of Lamjung Yolmo are reporting more than the original utterance, as their translation into their mother tongue from Nepali also

analyse (such as Peterson 2000, p. 17) is glossed as a mirative/result-inferential evidential. In this set of elicitation all forms given in the initial Nepali utterances were either *chha* or *hunuhunchha*, which are both evidentially neutral.

includes an evidential value that was not grammatically present in the original utterance.

These examples all indicate that there is a certain amount of flexibility when it comes to what is reported using the RS particle. It is for this reason I analyse it as a reported speech marker, not a quote marker, because it is not really quoting the original utterance verbatim. Instead, it is capturing the essence of the other person's communicative act. I asked RL (120218-01) if the VoS construction or the RS particle construction would be more appropriate in a context like a courtroom, where people are interested in exactly what the original person said. He said that in that context that the VoS *lâp*- constructions would be better, because they can represent exactly what someone said. This indicates that speakers are aware of the fact that even though the RS particle is used to report speech events, it does not necessarily replicate the original speech event.

In terms of the evidential strength of the reported speech particle, it is considered to have less weight than the perceptual evidential (RL 101030-05). If a person was presented with (48a) and (48b) then the information in (48a) would be considered more likely to be true because the person saw it, while the person who claimed (48b) only heard somebody else.

48) a) *tó dùba*
rice COP.PE.EMPH
'it is rice.' (RL 101030-05)

b) *màgi yìmba ló*
corn COP.EGO RS
'it is corn (she/he said).'

The reported information is, however, considered more reliable than someone who expresses uncertainty through the use of a dubitative. In (49), this time it is the

speaker who uses the RS particle (49b) who is considered a better source of information than the person in (49a) who uses the dubitative.

- 49) a) *pìza tchómbo yèto*
child big COP.DUB
'the child might be big.' (RL 101030-05)
- b) *pìza tcéemi yè ló*
child small COP.EGO RS
'the child is small.' (RL 101030-05)

The relationship of priority between the RS particle and the ego copula is not so straightforward. This is for similar reasons to the complexity of the relationship between the ego and perceptual evidential copulas that I discussed in §6.3. Like the perceptual evidential, the RS particle's deictic function involves pointing towards a single event. In the case of the perceptual this involves something that was seen, felt, heard or acquired specifically through a person's senses. In the case of the RS particle this involves a specific speech event. The ego copula, on the other hand, points to a person's knowledge state, and therefore not to a specific instance. Therefore, when talking about knowledge that is not necessarily acquired through a single perceptual or reported event, the ego copula will be considered a stronger form of evidence than the RS particle. In contexts where the information is something involving a specific instance, then the ego copula is not preferred to the perceptual evidential, and it appears from (50) that it is also not preferred to the RS particle. When I gave RL the choice of the two options below in the Multiple Reports task (§3.2.6.) he said that the difference between them in terms of reliability of utterance was minor, but a person who uttered (50b) with the RS particle would be more likely to be correct. The person in (50a) would be basing their guess on knowledge of habitual action, while the person in (50b) would be basing it on another person's report. In this case, according to RL, the person who had reported evidence would be more likely to be correct than the other person.

- 50) a) *sàse máse tçèema yìmba*
 food daal vegetables COP.EGO
 ‘the food is daal and vegetables.’ (RL 101030-05)
- b) *sàse ràra yìmba ló*
 food noodles COP.EGO RS
 ‘the food is noodles (she said).’ (RL 101030-05)

There are few instances of events where the RS particle and the ego copula are contrasted in this way in my corpus, and it is likely that the exact relationship between them is more contextually dependent and variable than this single example can demonstrate. When it comes to the truth of reported information, the grammatical choice that is made is one factor, but the reliability of any individual is a major factor that the Multiple Reports experiment was not designed to investigate. It does indicate, however, that the RS particle has similar deictic properties to the perceptual evidential and the two behave differently to the ego in terms of speaker preference for certain knowledge types, dependent on the context.

In this section I have shown some of the intricacies of how the RS particle can be used in discourse. While it is not clear how much the use of the RS particle affirms the utterance, there is no indication that speakers necessarily use it to create a sense that the veracity of the content of the utterance is unreliable. The RS particle can also be used in all kinds of situations where it is not a direct quote, including lying, presuming a person’s answer and translating from an evidentially neutral language like Nepali into Lamjung Yolmo. These examples show that while speakers are reporting what someone else had said, it is rarely a verbatim ‘quote’ and there is certainly scope for manipulation. This manipulation appears to be at odds with an attitude like opacity of mind. While on one hand you have instances where the reported speech appears to ensure that the speaker is not presuming the internal state of another (32), there are also sufficient numbers of examples where speakers use the RS particle to put words in the mouths of others. It may be the fact that these utterances are marked with the RS particle that makes them acceptable to speakers

of Lamjung Yolmo, rather than making a claim about someone else's internal state that is not framed within a (possible fictitious) reported speech event.

As I have discussed in this chapter, there are two different reported speech marking strategies in Lamjung Yolmo. Although they are different, they do share some commonalities. Both preference structures that are neither indirect speech nor direct speech, but instead are 'hybrid' speech structures. Both can occur with copula verbs, which have the same kind of contextual variation that I introduced in chapter 6. Neither of the reported speech strategies supports a conjunct/disjunct analysis, but the VoS can, in some contexts, be used to produce utterances similar to what is expected of a conjunct/disjunct language. There are some differences between the two strategies as well. The RS particle is used for a specific speech event, especially a recent one, but is not as direct a representation of that speech event as a VoS is. Instead, it focuses on the general communicative import of the utterance. It is not a verbatim quote marker, but it is for more specific instances of reporting than hearsay evidentials are.

In the last three chapters I have introduced and discussed the Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs, including their use in declarative sentences, as well as their use in question structures and reported speech constructions. I have demonstrated that even within a small set of choices there are various syntactic, semantic and pragmatic pressures that speakers must process during interaction to communicate with each other. This nuanced system has involved discussion of a number of different themes throughout the three chapters, which I will now draw together.

9. Discussion

The previous three chapters of the thesis each had a specific grammatical feature as their focus (copula verbs, questions and reported speech). In this chapter I present issues and ideas that have cut across all of these chapters, and that draw on all of the grammatical constructions that have been under consideration.

The set half of topics that I discuss in this chapter are related to typological and grammatical issues. This includes the relationship between modality and evidentiality, and a discussion of related typological issues (§9.1.), as well as the hierarchical ordering of copula choice (§9.2.). Next I bring together the discussion of the copula choices made in Lamjung Yolmo in relation to conjunct/disjunct systems (§9.3.) This topic leads into the second half of the discussion, which focuses on larger language usage and cultural issues. This includes the role of opacity of mind in the linguistic choices made by speakers (§9.4.). Following this I give a summary of the ways that a social cognition perspective has helped illuminate important features of Lamjung Yolmo grammar and their use (§9.5.).

9.1. Modality and evidentiality

The analysis in this thesis has centred around the set of copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo. These copula verbs have a range of properties that include evidentiality, epistemic modality and, in some cases, mirativity. The reported speech particle, although evidential, is a particle that exists in a distinct grammatical category. In §9.1.1. I will return to the discussion of the relationship between evidentiality and modality (§5.2.2.2.), and discuss this from the perspective of Lamjung Yolmo.

The discussion of modality and evidentiality also involved discussion of related typological issues which were present throughout my analysis, and which I now

draw together here. These include ego copulas (§9.1.2.), reported speech evidentiality (§9.1.3.) and mirativity (§9.1.4.).

9.1.1. The relationship of modality and evidentiality

As I demonstrated in chapter six, the copula paradigm in Lamjung Yolmo contains some forms that are evidential (the perceptual evidentials *dù* and *dùba* and the general fact *ònge*) as well as forms that are for reduced epistemic certainty (*yìndò* and *yèto*) and forms that are predominantly evidential, but also have a fixed function in some constructions (the egophoric forms including *yimba* and *yè*). Also, there are features that fulfill similar semantic functions that are outside of the copula grammatical paradigm, such as the evidential reported speech particle *ló*. Thus it appears that the Lamjung Yolmo copula system is not one of only evidential distinctions, nor that evidential distinctions in Lamjung Yolmo exist only in the copula verb paradigm.

In chapter 5 I outlined a number of ways that evidentiality and modality could be related to each other. Broadly speaking, there are three different ways to conceptualise the relationship between the two. The first is to consider evidentiality as a completely separate phenomenon to modality (Aikhenvald 2004); the second is to subsume evidentiality within the category of epistemic modality (Bhat 1999); and the third is to consider evidentiality as a category within modality, on an equal footing to epistemic modality (Palmer 2001). In chapter 6 I showed that in Lamjung Yolmo speakers can use evidentiality to flag their stance towards the propositional content of their utterance for their interlocutors in much the same way as modality. For this reason evidentiality fits most closely with the third model.

There is no reason to follow Bhat's (1999) lead and completely conflate evidentiality with epistemic modality. In using evidentials it is not possible to assume a direct relationship between the type of evidential used and the certainty that the speaker

has about the information. In chapter 6 (§6.3.1.) I showed that the perceptual evidential can be preferred over the ego in some contexts, such as describing a specific event, but in other contexts speakers are considered to have more reliable knowledge if they use the ego evidential, such as for enduring information like a person's name. Likewise, in chapter 8 (§8.2.3.) I showed that for the reported speech particle it was not always clear whether the person used the form to indicate that they were uncertain about the propositional content of the reported utterance. Although it is possible to ascribe a sense of certainty to the contextual use of evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo, this is an interactional dimension of these forms, and not an intrinsic value. Therefore, it does not make sense to talk about evidentials as a type of epistemic modality.

There is, however, an artificiality to separating out evidentiality and epistemic modality in Lamjung Yolmo. Although the evidential forms in Lamjung Yolmo are not directly related to certainty, they are still strongly tied to a speaker's stance towards the propositional content of their speech. In §6.3.3. I gave a range of examples where speakers would shift the forms of copulas used during an interaction for the sake of the person that they are interacting with. There is very little about the use of copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo that is objective in relation to the propositional context being described. Instead they can be manipulated by speakers for interactional ends. By assuming a relationship of this kind between epistemic modality and evidentiality within a broader category of modality, my work fits within the wider descriptive literature on Tibetic languages, including work by Garrett (2001), Tournadre (2004) and Vokurková (2008). It also is commensurate with descriptions of languages from other families, including West Greenlandic (Fortescue 2003).

In chapter 5 (§5.2.2.2.) I introduced de Haan's (1997, 1999, 2001a, 2005) argument that evidentiality is not a form of modality. One of his arguments is that evidentiality is not part of the modal category because it is fundamentally deictic in its function

(de Haan 2005). Throughout this thesis I have used the deictic facet of evidentiality to explain how it is used, for example, in the basic definitions of the different copulas in §6.1.1. and when talking about the reported speech particle in §8.2.1. Considering the deictic function of evidential forms is a useful way of conceptualising their function, but it does not detract from the fact that speakers use this deictic function in interaction to signal their stance towards the propositional content. For example, in chapter 6 we saw that speakers alternated between the ego copula and perceptual evidential to describe something if they wanted to highlight for their interlocutor that they could perceive something (§6.3.3.). Example (1) below, which was discussed in that section (examples 90-91), shows SBL first use the ego copula to refer to an old man in the Family Story (1a) before I ask him again to tell me what he sees and he changes to the perceptual evidential (1b).

- 1) a) *dì kàpu yìmba*
 this old.animate COP.EGO
 ‘this is the old man.’ (SBL 111023-04 00:56)
- b) *dì kàpu mì dù*
 this old.animate person COP.PE
 ‘this is an old person.’
 (lit. ‘this old man exists.’) (SBL 111023-04 01:08)

Here the speaker has the same evidence to hand, but is repositioning his stance in relation to both the evidence and the person he is interacting with. The deictic function of the perceptual evidential in this interaction makes this choice clear. It is also how we can account for the sense of newness that is present with the perceptual evidential that I discussed in detail in §6.3.1. (which is different to a sense of surprise, which is much stronger, which I also discuss in that section). Thus even within a modal analysis of evidentiality which takes the social cognition perspective of placing the interactional motivations of the speaker at the centre of the analysis, deixis is still an important feature to consider.

9.1.2. *Ego and egophoric evidentials*

In chapter 6 I introduced the ego evidential copulas (*yimba*, as well as *yè* and its derivatives) in Lamjung Yolmo (§6.2.). This set of copulas are used for situations where the person's evidence for an utterance is based on personal knowledge. When we situate this form within the wider category in Tibetic languages that have been discussed as being 'ego,' 'egophoric' or 'personal' (§5.2.2.3.) it becomes clear that there are closely related, but distinct, categories of evidential forms that have been conflated in the literature.

What many languages in this family have in common is an evidential category that pertains to the knowledge state of the speaker, and this category contrasts with some form of external perceptual evidence category. The Standard Tibetan egophoric requires the speaker to have a relationship to the propositional content of the utterance. In some cases this means that the subject must be first person ('narrow' egophoric, Tournadre 2008) and in other cases the subject may be a person or thing with a close personal relation to the speaker ('broad' egophoric, Tournadre 2008). This is quite different to Lamjung Yolmo, where the main criteria for the use of the ego is that the speaker has personal knowledge of the propositional content, regardless of their relationship to the subject. This appears to be more closely related to the use of ego in other Tibeto-Burman languages such as Kurtöp (Hyslop 2011a), discussed in §5.2.2.3, and van Driem and Karma's discussion of 'personal knowledge' in Dzongkha (1998).

In this thesis I have given an analysis that clearly delineates between a category of ego knowledge in languages like Lamjung Yolmo, which comes from personal knowledge, and the egophoric in Standard Tibetan, which is similar but fundamentally different. Future analyses may find there are sufficient differences between the two different forms to create more distinct nomenclature. This is of special importance to future typological work, as ego/personal evidential categories have not been discussed in detail in previous typologies such as those in de Haan

(2001b) or Aikhenvald (2004). It is also of importance as the growing body of work regarding ‘egophoric’ systems develops. I will return to this particular topic in §9.3.

9.1.3. Reported speech, quotation and hearsay

Another typological issue is that surrounding the reported speech, hearsay and quotative categories of evidentiality. In chapter 5 I introduced a variety of analyses of such particles in Tibeto-Burman languages, which have a variety of functions and a variety of names. In chapter 8 I discussed the function of the reported speech particle *ló* in Lamjung Yolmo. Invoking the deictic function of the particle, it does not function as a hearsay evidential, as there is always an expectation that it refers back to a single communicative event, and a single person, as opposed to a general report from numerous people. It is also not a quotative, as the information repeated is not a verbatim quote, but undergoes a shift for features like pronoun reference.

For these reasons I refer to *ló* in Yolmo as a ‘reported speech’ evidential, which captures the fact that a specific communicative event is reported, but not verbatim. The term ‘reported speech’ is still too specific, as there are many instances where non-verbal information is reported verbally, or a person has something attributed to them by speakers who guessed their communicative intention or has some other intention. Until more work is done on related languages I have decided to remain with the slightly incorrect term ‘reported speech.’

This thesis has offered one of the most detailed studies of the function of a reported speech/quotative/hearsay particle in a Tibeto-Burman language to date. By taking a social cognition perspective and exploring how these forms are used by speakers in interaction I have shown that the range of uses of this form in Lamjung Yolmo are complex and varied. Hopefully this has paved the way for more detailed consideration of these forms in other languages in the future.

9.1.4. *Mirativity*

Mirativity is something that has been discussed as a grammatical phenomenon in a range of Tibeto-Burman languages including Standard Tibetan (DeLancey 1986, 1997), Kham (Watters 1997), Kurtöp (Hyslop 2011a, 2011b) and Qiang (LaPolla 2003a), LaPolla and Huang 2003). Although Lamjung Yolmo has a form *dùba* which can occasionally indicate surprise, this form is still primarily a perceptual evidential. Therefore, anything resembling mirativity in Lamjung Yolmo is only ever pragmatically motivated not a grammatical feature.

As discussed in chapter 6, the perceptual evidential *dù* and the emphatic form *dùba* are used for specific, discrete events, often when the perceptual event is new to the speaker (§6.3.1.). There are some occasions, especially with the use of the emphatic form *dùba*, where there appears to be a great deal of emphasis placed on the newness of the uttered information. For example, in §6.3.1. I discussed a number of situations where the speaker appears to use the perceptual evidential to show the information is unexpected, much more ‘surprising’ than just ‘new.’ One elicited minimal set presented in §6.3.1. is presented here again as (2).

- 2) a) *ŋà=ki pìza khé=ki yùl=la yè*
 1SG=GEN child 2SG=GEN village=LOC COP.EGO
 ‘my child is in your village.’ (SKL 101023-06)
- b) *ŋà=ki pìza khé=ki khím=la dùba*
 1SG=GEN child 2SG=GEN house =LOC COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘my child is in your house.’ (SKL 101023-06)

Sentence (2a) would be used if a mother had left her child in someone else’s village and knew that the child was being looked after. Sentence (2b) would be used if the mother expected that her child was at home, and found that instead the child was at another person’s house. The emphatic form of the perceptual evidential is used here,

according to SKL, instead of the regular perceptual evidential to indicate that the information was newly perceived and unexpected for the speaker.

Such examples do occur in both naturalistic and elicited data; however, as discussed in §6.1.1.3, there are many more examples where the perceptual evidential forms, both the emphatic and the other form, are used in ways that do not express surprise. Two of these examples are repeated in (3). In both of these examples the speaker does not indicate any more surprise than she did for the description of other items in the video task with which she used the *dù* perceptual evidential form.

- 3) a) *tèbul thóla tché dùba*
table(Eng) above book COP.PE.EMPH
'on the table was a book.' (AL 101006-01 31:19)
- b) *pèmpiza tçíi=ki gòo=la mèn-do dùba*
woman one=GEN head=LOC flower COP.PE.EMPH
'in a woman's hair was a flower.' (AL 101012-02 24:46)

In the context of (3) the use of *dùba* appears to be motivated by the perfective aspect sense. An examination of the corpus indicates that there is no consistent or stable sense of surprise with the use of these forms. Instead, this sense of 'surprise' or 'counter to expectation' is a contextual extension of the perceptual evidential sense of these forms. That they often involve a rise in pitch, volume and accompanying gestures/gaze indicates this further. While the perceptual evidential does not always have a sense of 'surprise' it does have a sense of newness, which is a feature of the fact that speakers are deictically referring to a single perceptual event that they are marking as distinct. The mirative sense in these situations is not from an independently evolved use of the perceptual evidential *dùba* form, as Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012, p. 498) suggest might be the case for some systems with miratives.

So far, I have been referring to these extended uses as ‘mirative’ or ‘mirative-like’ uses of the perceptual evidential forms. This is a somewhat misleading choice of terminology; in the literature to date mirativity is described as a grammatical phenomenon (DeLancey 1997, Aikhenvald 2004, p. 195), not a semantic one. I have made the choice to continue using a syntactic term for what is a pragmatically motivated phenomenon in Lamjung Yolmo. Firstly, the term ‘mirative’ is more elegant than ‘psychological unpreparedness’ or ‘information that is surprising to the speaker.’ Secondly that it allows me to flag where there is an intersection between my work and the established literature on mirativity in Tibeto-Burman languages, including Standard Tibetan (DeLancey 1997, Tournadre 2008, Hill 2012), and Yolmo (Hari 2010), as well as more distantly related Tibeto-Burman languages like Sunwar (DeLancey 1997, Hill 2012). For example, I have argued that mirativity is a pragmatic extension of the perceptual evidential category in Lamjung Yolmo. This is, according to Hill (2012), not uncommon in Tibeto-Burman languages, yet Aikhenvald (2004, 2012, p. 467) still insists that if any category in an evidential inventory is likely to have mirative overtones it is the inferred or reported. Aikhenvald (2012, p. 471) also argues that the conjunct/disjunct patterns analysed in many languages is a way in which mirativity can be expressed. In §9.3. I’ll discuss how the ‘conjunct/disjunct’ systems are more generally a ‘self/other’ distinction coupled with answer-predicting questions. Therefore, mirativity can be considered a possible feature of a self/other type distinction in interaction, but not a direct grammatical feature of such structures. Therefore, work like this which shows patterns that are different to claims in the existing literature can add to a more well-rounded discussion of the cross-linguistic features of pragmatically-motivated mirativity.

Hill (2012) observes that as an independent grammatical category ‘mirativity’ is highly dubious in many of the languages for which it is described. Lamjung Yolmo adds further evidence to an argument such as Hill’s. Hill argues that without any solid evidence of the existence of a syntactic phenomenon there should be no need to use the term mirativity. Even DeLancey (2012, p. 554) now concedes that in

Standard Tibetan “despite its strong mirative connotations, the immediate evidence [perceptual evidential] category in Tibetic languages is, strictly speaking, an evidential category, and thus by definition not a pure mirative.” Therefore, it appears we are entering a new, and more nuanced, era of discussion about what exactly constitutes ‘mirativity.’ If we begin to think about mirativity as a semantic or pragmatic feature of language then the conclusion is that there will be some form of ‘mirativity’ in every language, as all humans have the capacity to express surprise. While this may seem to be a step backwards in the short term, for now, I concur with Peterson (2012) that a mirative extension of evidentiality appears to be a common and specific cross-linguistic phenomenon that is worth flagging with the term to facilitate cross-linguistic comparison.

9.2. Hierarchy of evidence

Copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo are not exclusively epistemic or evidential, which means there is no neat way of representing them on a hierarchy of evidence or certainty. This is further compounded by the fact that different evidential forms are preferred depending on the context. In this section I will revisit the hierarchies posited for other languages that I introduced in §5.2.2.1. before looking at the challenges Lamjung Yolmo presents when trying to perform the same exercise.

In §5.2.2.1. I introduced some examples of how researchers had generalised a cline of preference for certain evidential forms in interaction. This is a common exercise in discussions of evidential systems cross-linguistically. Figure 9.1. is Aikhenvald’s (2004, p. 307) hierarchy for the evidential systems of Tariana (Tucanoan, Brazil) and Tucano (Tucanoan, Brazil), both of which have five different evidential distinctions. The forms are distributed so that the left-most are considered a stronger form of evidence when discussing an event. Speakers must use the strongest form of evidence that they have available when describing something; so a person who has both reported and non-visual evidence of an event would use the non-visual form.

Visual < Non-visual < Inferred < Reported < Assumed

Figure 9.1. A hierarchy of the preferred evidentials, Tariana and Tucano (Aikhenvald 2004, p. 307).³⁵

Five is close to the maximal number of evidential distinctions known to exist cross-linguistically (Aikhenvald 2004, p. 23). That the hierarchy is the same for both languages indicates that there is, on a small scale at least, a cross-linguistic commonality in the types of evidence that are preferred over others. Such a schema works so neatly in these languages because all of the forms are exclusively related to evidence status and have no other sense such as epistemic certainty, specific event versus general knowledge or mirativity.

Similarly, de Haan (2001b) gives a hierarchy of evidentiality in Figure 9.2, reduced to three main distinctions cross-linguistically. As with Aikhenvald's hierarchy in Figure 9.1. the left-most is considered the strongest form of evidence.

Sensory > Inferential > Quotative

Figure 9.2. de Haan's hierarchy of evidentiality (2001b, p. 197)

Here, Aikhenvald's visual and non-visual are collapsed into a single category and the 'assumed' evidentials in Figure 9.1. are not included. Given that Aikhenvald (2004, p. 367) described the scope of assumed evidentials as including things like 'general knowledge,' 'logical reasoning' or 'assumption,' it is not surprising that de Haan does not include this category, as he takes a very strong view of what

³⁵ As mentioned in (§5.2.2.1.) I have left the direction of the > symbols in the same direction as originally published for all figures as not all authors put them in the same direction.

constitutes an evidential and the ‘assumed’ does not pertain to a specific type of evidence.

Aikhenvald (2004, p. 308) argues that these hierarchies show that “everything else being equal, the visual evidential is preferred as the functionally unmarked choice in these languages.” However, neither Aikhenvald or de Haan’s representations account for the (ego)phoric evidential category found in Tibetic languages, or similar categories in other languages families that I introduced in §5.2.2.3. Garrett (2001, p. 41), in his discussion on evidentiality in Standard Tibetan, presents a hierarchy of what he calls ‘intimacy’ which represents which form a speaker is likely to use based on how intimate the knowledge source is.

Ego[phoric] > Direct > Indirect

Figure 9.3. Garrett’s (2001, p. 41) hierarchy of evidential intimacy.

Garrett’s hierarchy is similar to Aikhenvald’s (Figure 9.1.) and de Haan’s (Figure 9.2.) in that direct evidence is preferred over indirect evidence. As with the other two, using a form down on the hierarchy indicates you do not have any stronger knowledge for your assertion. The egophoric, being used for oneself and people closely related, is considered to be an even stronger form of evidence. In arranging the choices so that he is not only talking about which is preferred as the strongest form of evidence, but also what is more ‘intimate’ to the speaker, Garrett also indicates in his hierarchy that there are some situations where the egophoric is preferable, but there will also be some situations where the egophoric will not be most appropriate because the speaker will have insufficient intimacy in relation to the event described to warrant its use.

Beyond the Tibetic ego-type copulas, Figure 9.4. gives a similar hierarchy for Kashaya (Oswalt 1986, p. 43).

Performative > Factual-Visual > Auditory > Inferential > Quotative

Figure 9.4. Oswald's (1986, p. 43) hierarchy of evidentials in Kashaya.

The performative was introduced in §5.2.2.4. and is used specifically for events where the speaker performs the action. This captures something similar to the Tibetic ego(phoric) but is more specific, relating exclusively to personal actions as opposed to just personal knowledge. Still, it shows that Tibetic languages are not the only ones where there is an evidential relating to personal knowledge that is considered a 'stronger' indicator of evidence than a visual evidential is.

Finally, all of the languages discussed so far involve paradigms composed of exclusively evidential distinctions. This is not the case in Lamjung Yolmo, which is one of the challenges of portraying the distinctions within a single cline. As discussed in §5.2.2.2, West Greenlandic is another language where evidentiality and epistemic modality co-exist in the same grammatical paradigm (Fortescue 2003, p. 292). Although he does not plot a physical cline like Aikhenvald, de Haan, Garrett and Oswald, Fortescue talks about how the set of suffixes in West Greenlandic can be plotted on a cline of subjectivity from object-sensory specific forms (evidentials) through epistemic modality and then through to subject attitudinal affixes. Figure 9.5. is my representation of this.

Object-sensory > epistemic modality > subject attitude

Figure 9.5. Fortescue's (2003, p. 292) cline of subjectivity.

Fortescue's account of West Greenlandic differs from the other models I have presented in two regards. Firstly, it is representing a different relationship between the categories. The other hierarchies focus on the appropriateness and preference for

type of the evidence. Garrett is more specific by framing his hierarchy in terms of the ‘intimateness’ of the knowledge. Fortescue’s cline, however, is much more focused on the subjective stance of the speaker. I introduced subjectivity in §4.2.2. In that section I focused on the facet of subjectivity that involved humans modelling others’ mental states, but Fortescue is referring to the other sense of subjectivity that I discussed; that is, where people’s attitude towards, or description of, the physical ‘objective’ world varies. Fortescue is therefore capturing something different to the others, in that he is referring to people’s mental states and not just the type of evidence a person has to hand. The second way that Fortescue’s representation is different is that it is a cline instead of a hierarchy. It is not just a matter of the forms on the left being more preferred than the ones further down the hierarchy in terms of speaker preference. Instead speakers can move along it in either direction depending on how subjective their relationship to the information is, with no one category being generally considered the most optimal in regard to speaker preference.

Having looked at how a variety of evidential systems are represented as a hierarchy in other languages, I will now discuss such models in relation to Lamjung Yolmo. What quickly becomes apparent is that the semantics of the ego form (§6.2.), and its use in interaction (§6.3.), mean that the type of hierarchies that we see for other languages with evidential systems do not work for a language like Lamjung Yolmo. As Faller (2002, p. 47) observes, when creating hierarchies, it is best to consider types of evidence, as opposed to individual forms, and so categories will be discussed as opposed to each copula in that category.

Figure 9.6. is an initial hierarchy without the ego plotted. The dubitative copulas have been included even though they are epistemic modals and not evidential. Although they do not encode any evidential information per se, these forms can be used in contexts where the inferential form is used in other languages, such as using someone’s shoes in the doorway as evidence of them being at home (§6.1.1.2). Although evidence is a secondary sense of these copulas, they would not be used if

there was enough direct perceptual evidence of the event or state in question. Therefore, on a hierarchy of evidentiality, they would be weaker than the perceptual or reported evidential forms. The reported speech form has also been included, even though it is in a distinct grammatical category from the copulas. An event that is reported has more evidential strength than an event that the speaker has insufficient evidence to be sure about. But if a person has seen an event then this would constitute more evidential strength than a reported speech particle (§8.2.3.). Therefore, the reported speech (RS) particle would hold more evidential weight than the dubitative, but not as much as the perceptual evidential. Finally, the perceptual evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo are used to indicate specific evidence, usually visual (§6.1.1.3.). This evidence is usually accessible to other people as well, unless it is used for endopathic verbs where the sensory perception being marked is internal (§6.4.2.). Perceptual evidence is preferred to the dubitative and reported speech (§6.3.). Figure 9.6. therefore has the perceptual evidential category left-most, which is similar to Aikhenvald's hierarchy in Figure 9.1. and de Haan's hierarchy in Figure 9.2. The reported speech is in the middle and the dubitative is the weakest in terms of evidential weigh.

Perceptual (dù/dùba) > Reported speech (ló) > Dubitative (yètə/yìnqə)

Figure 9.6. Lamjung Yolmo evidential hierarchy, without ego.

I have omitted the general fact copula (§6.1.1.4.) from this discussion. This is because they are infrequent in the elicited corpus and almost non-existent in naturalistic texts. Also, when they occur, it is in different contexts to the other evidential forms, in that the deictic function of the general fact copula is not to point to a single specific instance of something, but to the general consensus that this fact is true. More work needs to be done teasing out the function of the general fact copula, and to establish if it is considered a stronger form of evidence than other types in interaction.

I omitted the ego copula category from Figure 9.6. because it presents a challenge in terms of where it is placed in the hierarchy. As discussed in §6.2, the ego copulas are used for situations where the speaker knows the information based on personal knowledge. If we take a situation like knowing a person’s name, or using the ego for one’s own actions (§6.1.1.1.) then this internal evidence is considered by speakers to be stronger than having perceptual evidence of this. The ego copula can also be used in situations where the speaker is certain of something based on the context, but does not have direct evidence for it (§6.3.1.). In such a situation the speaker is often not considered to have as reliable evidence as a person using the perceptual evidential, as I showed in a discussion of the Multiple Reports task (§3.2.6.) in §6.3.1. In that section I also gave an example where a person who has heard a report from someone who used the perceptual evidential would also be considered to have more reliable information than a person who used the ego copula. Therefore, if we have a single hierarchy such as Figure 9.7, the ego copula would have to be both a left of the perceptual for the first type of situation, and right of both the perceptual and reported speech categories for the second type of situation discussed.

Ego (yè/yimba) > Perceptual > RS > Ego (yè/yimba) > Dubitative

Figure 9.7. Lamjung Yolmo evidential hierarchy, with ego.

The placement of the ego category to the left of the perceptual evidentials looks much like Garrett’s hierarchy for Standard Tibetan in Figure 9.3. This is also commensurate with Oswald’s description of the performative (Figure 9.4.), which has similar semantics to the ego and egophoric copulas found in Tibetic languages (§5.2.2.4.). However, as I described in §6.2.1, although the forms are cognate, the ego copula in Lamjung Yolmo is not entirely the same as that in Standard Tibetan. There are some uses where it sits in the hierarchy in a way that is similar to the ‘assumed’ evidential in Aikhenvald’s (2004, p. 367) descriptions of Tariana and Tucano. As I discussed in §8.2, when the information is pertaining to a specific

event the reported speech is considered marginally stronger than the unmarked ego form.

This leaves us in a situation where the ego category is plotted twice on the same hierarchy, which defeats the point of trying to place these forms in a hierarchy. We can resolve this by plotting two separate hierarchies. One hierarchy would be for contexts where the information is about an ongoing state, such as a person's name, or a habitual action (Figure 9.8.). As mentioned above, in these situations the ego copula is considered the preferred copula.

Ego (yè/yimba) > Perceptual > RS > Dubitative

Figure 9.8. Lamjung Yolmo evidential hierarchy for durative information.

The other hierarchy would then be for specific events of a finite duration (Figure 9.9.). In these situations the perceptual evidential is preferred and the ego is no longer at the left-most place in the hierarchy.

Perceptual > RS > Ego (yè/yimba) > Dubitative

Figure 9.9. Lamjung Yolmo evidential hierarchy for specific events.

The dual hierarchy model is useful because it abstracts and separates the situations where the ego is preferred and those where the perceptual evidential is preferred. It reflects the fact that the ego and perceptual evidential categories do not operate as a semantically-closed distinction, but have different properties associated with them. These hierarchies are still just generalisations that still fail to capture the fact that the choice speakers make between the ego and perceptual evidentials do not just encompass the evidence to hand. They can also be manipulated for factors such as whether the speaker wants to foreground the perceptual evidence they are using, or whether they wish to evoke a mirative sense and highlight something is new to them

(§6.3). Although less elegant than the single-hierarchy analyses of other languages, the dual-hierarchy comes closer to capturing the choices speakers of Lamjung Yolmo make in interaction, although it artificially represents this choice. Also, neither this analysis nor Garrett's hierarchy (Figure 9.3.) take into account the fact that there are situations where these forms are used in set expressions and have no evidential weight (§6.2.3, see also Garrett 2001, pp. 105-106).

A final treatment of these forms is to plot them using 'subjectivity' as a defining feature instead of 'evidential weight.' This would avoid the double-placement of the ego evidentials in the hierarchy (Figure 9.10.). This is more along the lines of Fortescue's discussion of West Greenlandic that I represented in Figure 9.5. In this representation of the choices people make the perceptual evidentials would be left-most as the most 'objective' of the options, followed by the reported speech particle. In the next position is the ego copula, although if they are predicated on a person's own evidence for something then there is no reason to assume they are much less subjective than the dubitative copulas.

Perceptual (dù/dùba) > RS (ló) > Ego (yè/yimba) > Dubitative (yèto/yindo)

Figure 9.10. Lamjung Yolmo subjectivity hierarchy.

This is a much more elegant way of displaying the choices faced by speakers of Lamjung Yolmo. It is also useful in accounting for some of the motivation behind the choices of evidential forms in interaction, for example, in the magic tricks described in §6.3.3, when speakers used the ego forms repeatedly and then shifted to the perceptual evidential it could be argued that this gave their utterances more objective weight rather than appearing to be a subjective assumption.

This exercise has shown that traditional ways of talking about preferred forms in evidential systems do not work for Lamjung Yolmo. Attempting to plot these

features on a hierarchy of evidentiality has shown that speakers have to take into account multiple factors when choosing a copula form in Lamjung Yolmo. It is not just a matter of selecting the most appropriate evidential, as it is in purely evidential languages like Tariana and Tucano, but deciding, based on the content of the utterance and the context in which it is delivered, what the most important feature of the utterance is. While this has not caused any particular problem for my analysis, it does highlight why it is typologically useful to consider hybrid evidential/epistemic systems alongside purely ‘evidential’ or ‘epistemic’ systems.

9.3. A new perspective on conjunct/disjunct

The three different aspects of Lamjung Yolmo that I have looked at (modality, questions and reported speech) are all elements of the language that are central to a discussion of conjunct/disjunct systems. In each chapter I discussed how the particular feature of the language relates to the established analysis of how conjunct/disjunct systems function (§6.4.1, §7.4.4. and §8.1.3.). In this section I will synthesise these main arguments in light of the literature on conjunct/disjunct (§5.5.) and the related egophoric model (§5.5.3.). What becomes clear is that across all of these analyses there are two main features in common; the first is a system that has a modal, evidential or even mirative form with a ‘self’ versus ‘other’ type distinction, and the second is that questions require the speaker to use the form of the copula they expect their interlocutor to use in the answer. It is the combination of these two elements that results in systems that are called conjunct/disjunct or egophoric.

Although I have reduced the features of conjunct/disjunct or egophoric analyses to two basic parameters, there are still a variety of additional features of these systems that should be considered. It is these additional features of individual languages that results in differences between the systems in each language. In Hale’s (1980) original analysis of Kathmandu Newar, the additional features of volitionality, impersonal verbs and co-reference in reported speech all become additional features in light of the two main ones. What has made the discussion about languages under

the rubric of conjunct/disjunct so difficult for so long is that people have given equal priority to all of the features they found. There is some commonality to the types of additional features we see across a range of languages, but it is rare for two systems to behave exactly the same. By focusing on the two main features of ego semantics and questions that require the same modality as the expected question, and taking all the others as additional, researchers can spend more time looking at commonalities between the systems instead of detailing all the ways in which they vary.

One of the initial problems for analysing Lamjung Yolmo as a conjunct/disjunct language is that the copula forms that would be the locus of this system are not fixed in their distribution. To begin with, conjunct/disjunct is predicated on having two forms that fulfil the two functions, but Lamjung Yolmo has more than two basic forms in that grammatical category. Instead, Lamjung Yolmo has four main semantic categories in the copula paradigm (§6.1.1.). This includes the ego (*yè*, *yèba*, *yèke*, *yimba*), perceptual (*dù*, *dùba*), dubitative (*yètò*, *yinqò*) and the general fact (*ònge*). Therefore, to make a conjunct/disjunct analysis of Lamjung Yolmo work, the first thing that would need to be done is to ignore two elements of a natural set of choices that speakers can make. This is similar to the criticism Garrett (2001, p. 209) and Tournadre (2008, p. 290) made in relation to Standard Tibetan, which has been called a conjunct/disjunct system (DeLancey 1992), even though it has three main distinctions. Dickinson also makes note of this in relation to Tsafiki (2011). In Lamjung Yolmo the case can be made that the main choice for speakers in interaction is between the ego and perceptual evidential categories. The general fact copula is rarely found in the naturalistic data collected for this project (§6.1.1.4.) and the dubitative is a choice made only when a speaker feels uncertain enough about the information to hand to use either the ego or perceptual forms (§6.1.1.2.).

We can reconcile this problem by being clear that the pattern under discussion is part of a larger grammatical paradigm. In much the same way we can talk about the

choice between two different imperfective forms (§2.2.4.3.) within the larger category of tense/aspect. The pattern of these forms only exists in a wider pattern of tense and aspect choices speakers make, but we can still talk meaningfully about this specific set of choices.

Even when we only take into consideration the two most common copula types that occur in interaction, the perceptual evidentials and the ego evidentials, the system is still not as elegant as is predicted by a conjunct/disjunct system. On initial description of these two forms we can see that there are similarities between their semantics and how a conjunct/disjunct system would pattern. The ego forms are used when the evidence for an utterance is based on the speaker's personal knowledge, and the perceptual is used when a person has direct perceptual evidence (usually visual) of an event. Given that the conjunct/disjunct declarative pattern involves one form for first person subjects and another for second/third person subjects, it is possible to consider the ego as the form that goes with first person statements (as you know your own actions through your personal knowledge) and perceptual evidentials with second and third person (as you watch others perform an action).

While there are certainly examples where patterns occur along these lines, as I showed in §6.3. the variation between these forms requires a wider range of contextual factors to be taken into account than simply the subject of the utterance. This contextually driven variation of choice between these two copulas (not to mention the fact that the dubitative or general fact copula could also be used), is something I discussed in detail in §6.3. The Lamjung Yolmo ego can be used when a speaker had direct visual evidence of something, which means that the ego and perceptual evidential are not mutually exclusive in the contexts they can be used in. There are some other components of the system that do not pattern in the way conjunct/disjunct patterns have been described, which I list below. These differences have a major flow-on effect for the analysis in chapters 7 and 8. If it is not possible

- b) *khé yòlmo yimba*
 2SG Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘you are Yolmo.’ (VL 101224-01)
- c) *mò yòlmo yimba*
 3SG.F Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘she is Yolmo.’ (VL 101224-01)

Therefore, there are features of the semantics of Lamjung Yolmo ego that mean there is actually no change in copula use regardless of the person of the subject. It was this features of the semantics of the Lamjung Yolmo ego that made it difficult to place in a hierarchy of evidentiality (§9.2.), and here it makes a conjunct/disjunct analysis irrelevant for this type of utterance. It is in this way that semantics of the Lamjung Yolmo ego are different to those of the Standard Tibetan egophoric (§6.2.1.), which results in the ego in Lamjung Yolmo not always patterning as per Tournadre’s (2008) analysis of the Standard Tibetan egophoric system.

One possibly is to discount these forms from an analysis because they are acting as copula verbs, and not verbal auxiliaries on lexical verbs. This removes one ‘flaw’ in Lamjung Yolmo’s analysis as a conjunct/disjunct language, but it still does not account for all the other variation from the expected patterns that I discussed throughout this thesis. It also creates an unnecessary divide between different uses of a form that has a consistent semantic function.

Finally, there are also times where no overt copulas are used at all. This is possible because the standard past (*-sin*) and non-past (*-ke*) can occur without an accompanying evidential. The sentences in (5) were given in §6.5.2. These demonstrate that that there is nothing in the verb or suffix that varies with subject.

- 5) a) *ṅà tàpse tó sà-ke*
 1SG now rice.cooked eat-NON.PST
 ‘I am now eating rice.’ (AL 100930-01)
- b) *khó nàṅbar òṅ-ke*
 3SG.M tomorrow come-NON.PST
 ‘he comes tomorrow.’ (RL 101120-01)

There are also many situations where speakers use a sentence where there is a grammatical requirement for a copula, but these can be omitted in naturalistic speech (§6.5.3.). While examples like (5) above show that the grammar of the language does not necessarily require a modal distinction in all utterances, situations where speakers have chosen to omit the copula means that if the likely source of evidence is contextually apparent then the overt expression of this information is not considered important.

Therefore, there are many ways in which Lamjung Yolmo does not quite pattern as do conjunct/disjunct or egophoric languages. Most of this stems from the fact that the ego copulas in Lamjung Yolmo have different semantics and constraints to similar forms in other languages.

Looking specifically at question mechanisms, we find that in Lamjung Yolmo these behave the same as question structures in languages that have been analysed as having conjunct/disjunct systems. The conjunct/disjunct literature, as well as the egophoric literature for Standard Tibetan, observes that in interrogative constructions the conjunct/disjunct or evidential value (depending on the analysis) is the same as that which is predicted to be the appropriate answer (Hale 1980, Garrett 2001, Tournadre 2008). Although the initial choice of copula in Lamjung Yolmo is complicated by the kind of variation discussed in chapter 6, we find that the same mechanism occurs. As I argued in chapter 7, this is the one feature of conjunct/disjunct description that rigorously holds in Lamjung Yolmo. While it is

one feature of a conjunct/disjunct analysis that is found in Lamjung Yolmo, there is no reason to assume that it is related to any other feature of the analysis. This is because it is possible that a language could have a self/other distinction such as is found with the ego copula in Lamjung Yolmo, but does not also have a grammatical requirement that the person asking the question use the evidential form that is expected in the answer. As a grammatical feature, this form of question asking does not require a conjunct/disjunct analysis to make sense of its use.

Finally, reported speech constructions showed syntactic variation not predicted by a conjunct/disjunct system. For verb of saying constructions, preference for a hybrid speech style (§8.1.2.) means that using copula preference to disambiguate two pronouns is not an exercise that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo frequently perform. Thus, a major component of Hale's (1980) description of the conjunct/disjunct system in Kathmandu Newar is not applicable in a discussion of Lamjung Yolmo. The presence of a reported speech particle also means that speakers have recourse to a second speech reporting strategy, and one that does not involve indicating who the original speaker is with an overt subject in the matrix clause (§8.2.1.). Much like there are ways of creating declarative sentences in Lamjung Yolmo without a copula, or with a copula other than an ego or perceptual evidential, it is important to acknowledge there are other ways that speakers can create reported speech constructions so that we can remember that the systems that are discussed as being 'conjunct/disjunct' often only represent a subset of the grammatical features of that language.

The description of these features in Lamjung Yolmo shows that in many ways the language is reminiscent of conjunct/disjunct systems, and in some selected examples can look remarkably like one. However, when looking at how these features are used by speakers in interaction, we see that there is a great deal more variation and manipulation of the systems than a conjunct/disjunct analysis would predict.

This variation and manipulation should not just be discounted as deviation from an expected norm. Instead, all of these features behave as expected when we observe each element of the system individually instead of trying to understand the whole combination as ‘conjunct/disjunct.’ At this point we can say that the original conjunct/disjunct analyses proposed do not hold for Lamjung Yolmo, although there are points of similarity.

In this way the patterns that we see in Lamjung Yolmo are much more akin to the newer generation of ‘egophoric’ (Tournadre 2008, San Roque et al. 2012) analyses. I introduced these analyses in §5.5.3. as an alternative to the existing conjunct/disjunct literature. These analyses posit that there is a basic distinction in epistemic perspective between how you talk about yourself and how you talk about others. What is most useful about these is that they are motivated by the semantics of the forms that give rise to a two-way choice for speakers. This is unlike conjunct/disjunct descriptions, which are so focused on the syntactic end-product that researchers like Aikhenvald (2004, p. 146) are led to the erroneous conclusion that the system is one of participant marking and is incapable of giving rise to an evidential system. As we have seen from Lamjung Yolmo, as with Standard Tibetan, any ‘person marking’ that arises in the system is a direct result of the epistemic and evidential value present in those distinctions. By focusing on the semantics of the forms, and allowing that to motivate the pattern, the current egophoric analyses are much more like what I have suggested for Lamjung Yolmo throughout this thesis.

The other useful feature of an ‘egophoric’ analysis of Lamjung Yolmo is that the parameters of what is expected are much more flexible than those for a conjunct/disjunct analysis. This is because the requirements for an egophoric system are simply that there is some distinction between first person and non first person in terms of epistemic perspective (although I will tease this out in more detail below). This means that all of the reasons that Lamjung Yolmo does not pattern like a conjunct/disjunct analysis become less relevant. Features like endopathic verbs,

coreferent reported speech, volitionality and parts of the paradigm that are not marked for endopathic distinctions are all secondary considerations that vary from language to language. It also means that even though there are many situations in Lamjung Yolmo where the ego has a different pattern of use to the Standard Tibetan egophoric we do not have to discount it entirely as a language worth considering in relation to other egophoric languages. Further, with this stance, regardless of whether the distinction in a language is motivated by a system that is epistemic, evidential, mirative (or perhaps other distinctions that have not yet been observed), we can consider them as a similar phenomenon. The egophoric analysis allows us to focus on what these languages have in common instead of simply listing the ways in which they differ.

Although this type of analysis is much more appealing than the conjunct/disjunct analysis, there are two issues that need to be discussed. Both of these are centred on what exactly is captured by the term ‘egophoric.’ The first is based on my discussion of the Standard Tibetan egophoric and the Lamjung Yolmo ego in §9.1. I mentioned that one of the contributions of this thesis had been to outline that there are two very similar, but slightly different evidential phenomena in Tibetic languages; the first is the very specific egophoric of Standard Tibetan and the second is what I have called the ego, which is what we find in Lamjung Yolmo and some other Tibetic languages. I have argued that the ego semantics in these languages need to be distinguished from the Standard Tibetan egophoric, but this is somewhat at odds with my current suggestion that Lamjung Yolmo should be considered a language with an egophoric system. This is because San Roque et al. (2012) have taken the Standard Tibetan term ‘egophoric’ and applied the general principle to other languages, but not kept the specific sense of the semantics as outlined in Tournadre (2008). While ‘egophoric’ is a much better umbrella term for what we find happening in these languages than ‘conjunct/disjunct,’ it does pose a specific problem for Tibetic languages. We need to show a general affinity between languages, but also to acknowledge there is a difference between the egophoric in Standard Tibetan and the ego in other languages like Lamjung Yolmo.

The second problem stems from the first. The term ‘egophoric’ is used to refer to the specific semantics of one evidential form in the Standard Tibetan paradigm, but in discussions of ‘egophoric’ systems it not only refers to the semantics that signal an epistemic split between first and non-first person access to knowledge, but also the corresponding pattern that occurs in interrogatives where the second person subject is marked as having privileged access to knowledge.

As I suggested in §7.4.4, there is no reason to presume that the semantics of the ego forms and the shift that happens in questions structures are one and the same. It may be possible that there are languages that have an evidential form that has a sense like the Lamjung Yolmo ego, but with a different strategy for question formation, such as a dubitative, or no evidential marking at all. If a language has no ego-like evidential category, or something that encodes a distinction between knowledge of self and knowledge of other then there is nothing to be shifted in question constructions. My argument is largely based on what we have observed in Lamjung Yolmo, supplemented by the literature on other languages, but it is a starting point for a new way to consider how these egophoric systems are actually created. This kind of analysis would explain why Weber (2011) observed that we have no real evidence of a conjunct/disjunct type system in decay in a language. Once we have reduced our analysis of this system to two main parameters of (a) an ego type self/other distinction, and (b) a shift in perspective in questions, then any ‘decay’ of this type of system would result in it looking like any other ego-less or evidential-less system.

Given that there are many languages that exhibit these patterns, and they come from language families across the globe (Tibeto-Burman, Barbacoan, and various language families of Papua New Guinea), then we can say that there does appear to be a tendency for languages with some kind of self/other epistemic distinction to encode these kind of shifts in question structures where the person being asked the

question is considered the epistemic source. It may be that there is a strong correlation between languages with egophoric semantics and question structure perspective shift. This would not be particularly surprising since both of these features indicate a sensitivity to the difference in knowledge states about oneself and others.

This also means that all of the other features that had previously been invoked as features of a conjunct/disjunct or egophoric analysis, such as intentionality, co-reference in reported speech structures and impersonal verbs, can be treated as additional, language specific features. Bickel and Nichols (2007, p. 223) have a description of conjunct/disjunct systems that considered volitionality to be a non-core feature. This way we do not lose sight of the commonalities by constantly observing the differences in these systems. As Post (2011) observed, the fact that we lack a definitive set of descriptive parameters for these systems is not something to be worried about, but something to look forward to figuring out in future research. This thesis is part of a new direction in the study of languages that were once called ‘conjunct/disjunct,’ and currently known by some as ‘egophoric.’ This new perspective has been an opportunity to look at how the patterns in Lamjung Yolmo are motivated by the semantics of these forms and how they are used in interaction. I have also tried to situate the motivating factors within a wider cultural framework of opacity of mind.

The analysis I have presented means that we do not have to be overly concerned with trying to account for the types of variation between languages and groups of languages in terms of how these systems are used. While it is worth noting the kind of variation between different manifestations of the egophoric-based system and answer-predicting question pairing that leads to these kinds of systems, there is no reason to assume this kind of variation is problematic. This analysis also allows for the possibility that we can begin to examine more critically the reasons that we find the kinds of variation that exist. As I have shown in my analysis, Lamjung Yolmo

does not exhibit the kind of strong volitionality focus or endopathic verb semantics that other Tibetic languages like Sherpa and Standard Tibetan do. One possible reason for this may be the contact influence of Tamang on Melamchi and Helambu Valley Yolmo, from which Lamjung Yolmo originates. Owen-Smith and Donohue (2012) have shown that the structure of the Yolmo copula paradigm shows similarities to the Tamang copula paradigm, which are not found in other Tibetic languages. This could be a part of the reason why Yolmo is not so strongly representative of the typical features that are described as being part of conjunct/disjunct systems. Whether or not this may prove in the future to be a worthwhile line of enquiry it will be enhanced by the knowledge that we are not trying to compartmentalise the features of the language into a system that does not actually represent how they are being used by speakers.

9.4. Opacity of mind in Lamjung Yolmo

Throughout chapters 6 to 8 I flagged features of the grammar of Lamjung Yolmo that appeared to reflect the social attitudes that constitute the theory of opacity of mind (§4.4.). In this section I will look at all of these grammatical features together and discuss whether they constitute enough evidence to support the idea that there are grammatical manifestations of an opacity of mind theory in Tibetic languages, and if this is reflected in speaker attitudes.

As I introduced it in §4.4, opacity of mind is a culturally salient belief that one cannot know the thoughts of another person. The literature across a range of languages indicates that this belief can vary in strength between cultural groups (§4.4.1.). A belief in the opacity of other minds in Tibetic language speaking groups, including Sherpa and Yolmo, has been documented by a number of anthropological researchers (§4.4.2.). If such an attitude is so prevalent in languages closely related to Lamjung Yolmo then we could look for evidence in the way people talk about the internal states of others.

Across the grammar we do see grammatical differences between talking about one's own inner state and talking about the inner states of others. These occurred across all three of the different grammatical features of the language that are the focus of this thesis, and I will briefly return to each of these.

Endopathic verbs were discussed in §6.4.2. These differ from other lexical verbs in that they are often used with copula verbs in a different distribution. Instead of the perceptual evidential being preferred for second and third person and the ego for first person in declaratives, the pattern is inverted and perceptual evidentials are generally preferred for first person, with the ego for second and third. The semantic commonality between the subset of lexical verbs that have this pattern is that they all pertain to inner thoughts, emotions or states. The sentences in (6) below were originally given in §6.4.2.

- 6) a) *ŋà=ki tèm̄ba sàl-ku d̄ù*
 1SG=ERG remember-IPFV COP.PE
 'I remember.' (RL 110204-03)
- b) *khó=ki tèm̄ba sàl-teraŋ yè*
 3SG.M=ERG remember-IPFV COP.EGO
 'he remembers' (AL 101013-02)

We see in many examples from Lamjung Yolmo a collocation of internal perception verbs for first person with perceptual evidentials, and discussions of internal perception for second and third person. This indicates that in Lamjung Yolmo, there appears to be a correlation with the type of evidence available to talk about an internal state, and whether you are talking about yourself or someone else. It appears that at some point speakers of this language have analysed their own internal states as perceivable to them, but the internal states of others cannot be talked about as directly perceivable. That this pattern also occurs in Standard Tibetan (Tournadre

2006) (§5.2.2.3.) indicates that it is a well-established feature of Tibetic languages, and not a recent Yolmo innovation.

The discussion about the reported speech particle (RS particle) *ló* also gave some examples of how the grammar of the language allows speakers to avoid discussing the internal states of others. (7) below was given as an example in §8.2.2.

- 7) *mò = ki mílam thón-sin ló*
 3SG.F = ERG dream see-PST RS
 ‘she saw a dream (she said).’ (RL 100928-01)

The use of reported constructions in elicitation only occurs with third person endopathic verbs, meaning that the speaker is reporting the person’s own utterance about their internal state, or at least presenting themselves as such.

Although these grammatical features do exist, they are not always as robust as they may appear on initial description. For example, in the discussion of endopathic verbs (§6.4.2.), there are situations with some verbs where there is sufficient external evidence of someone else’s internal state for a speaker to be able to talk about it using the perceptual evidential; for example, if a person has a physical fever. The use of the RS particle construction for third person internal state reporting is not something that is always done, but on some occasions. Otherwise an ego construction is used (§8.3.2).

There are also some instances where the grammar of Lamjung Yolmo appears to go against a belief in opacity of mind. One of the most consistent of these is in the way questions are constructed (§7.4.1). Questions in Lamjung Yolmo that contain a copula verb use the form that the speaker expects is the one that their interlocutor will use in their answer. This means that asking a question in Lamjung Yolmo

involves making a presumption about the knowledge state of your interlocutor. As I showed in §7.4.1, the majority of the time the choice of copula appears to be made on generic assumptions about a person’s knowledge state, and does not involve real-time modelling of their thoughts, but there are some occasions where speakers appear to be tracking their interlocutor’s knowledge state.

Even though an opacity of mind discourse may exist amongst Lamjung Yolmo speakers, there is no reason to assume that this discourse prevents speakers from being able to model their interlocutor’s mental state. There are many occasions on which speakers in interaction manage quite competently to model their interlocutor’s thoughts or attitudes based on cues during interaction. Indeed, every time during an experimental task (§3.2.) that someone gave an answer and then asked if they were correct, these participants showed they were perfectly capable of at least surmising what my thoughts were as competently as any speaker of English or another language without a belief in the opacity of mind. As an example, while guessing what was under the cloth during the Hidden Object task (§3.4.2.) ST, on receiving no confirmation from me as to her answer, assumed that she was possibly wrong and asked for confirmation (8).

- 8) a) *dì tɕáwtɕaw yimba dì*
 this noodles(Nep) COP.EGO this
 ‘these are noodles, these.’ (ST 120304-01 03:45)
- b) *yimba*
 COP.EGO
 ‘they are.’ (ST 120304-01 03:47)
- c) *mìn*
 COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘they aren’t?’ (ST 120304-01 03:49)

ST speculates here that my non-answer means that her answer is not correct. Although it may appear to be a trivial example, the trivial examples are important. Duranti's (2008) criticisms of the opacity of mind studies in the Robbins and Rumsey (2008) *Anthropological Quarterly* special issue was that there was insufficient separation of the theory of mind skills from opacity of mind. In §4.2.5. I showed a model where the opacity of mind belief could be considered a cultural framework which overlays theory of mind, but does not necessarily prevent people from modelling the cognitive processes of their interactants. Example (8) shows that speakers of Lamjung Yolmo are perfectly capable of considering the stance of their interlocutors, and any opacity of mind belief does not interfere with this level of cognitive processing.

Across all of the chapters there was evidence of speakers tracking each other's knowledge states during interaction. Given this, it is possible to assume that if there is a belief in the opacity of mind doctrine in Tibetic languages, this does not actually prevent speakers from using their theory of mind (§4.3.) skills to model the knowledge of their interlocutor in interaction. This lack of interference by opacity of mind on low-lying participant knowledge tracking was also observed by Duranti (2008) and Webb (2008), and shows that if opacity of mind does exist it is on a different level of cognitive processing to theory of mind.

That there is some variation in how speakers talk about the knowledge states of others, and the fact that all speakers can, on some level, model the knowledge of their interlocutor, is an indicator that opacity of mind may not be a particularly robust cultural framework for speakers of Lamjung Yolmo. In discussions focusing on ideas surrounding other people's internal states, speakers of Lamjung Yolmo also vary in their attitudes. The majority of discussion in Lamjung Yolmo is centred on the *sém*, not quite analogous to either the heart or mind in the Western tradition, but the place of emotion in Yolmo psychology.

Some speakers show a very robust attitude toward the opacity of other minds. Three people that I talked to indicated a very strong belief in opacity of mind, very much along the lines reported in Robbins and Rumsey (2008). KL (120306-01) said that while you can know your own *sém*, you can never know that of another person, no matter how long you know them and witness their actions for. Her mother, DML also shared these thoughts (120306-02). When I asked her in Nepali whether you could understand another person's *sém* (*arko manchheko sem bujne sakchha?*) she emphatically replied that this could not be done (*sakdaina*). AML (9120307-04) also agreed that another person's emotions were not accessible to others. Even if it is someone you live with, a mother, sister, or husband, you never really know what is in their *sém*. When I asked her what she thought about a man who drank and beat his wife, she said “*sém yàabu mè*” (‘his sem is not good’). I attempted to point out that this was a contradiction of what she had said earlier, and her daughter also noticed this, but she was unable to reconcile her specific opinion about this man to her general opinion about understanding a person's *sém*.

She is not the only speaker who claims to not understand another person's inner thoughts and emotions, but who still makes judgements about it. An old man was telling a group of us a story about a young relation of his, who had been covered in petrol by her husband and set alight. She died, and her husband went to jail. KL repeated a part of the story for me, at the end giving her own opinion of the man and his actions (9).

- 9) *sém màiba*
 sem bad
 ‘(his) sem is bad.’ (KL 08/03/12 book 4, p. 17)

Even though she had claimed that you could not even know the *sém* of those people you are closest to, she can make a judgement about a person she has never met based on his reported actions.

understanding other people's minds. One possibility is that interviewing more people might give a better idea of whether opacity of mind belief is centred in one village more than another, or that it is an attitude held by older people that is no longer so prevalent amongst younger speakers. The small data set indicates that neither of these hypotheses are likely. For example, both ST and KL are daughters of DML, but while KL shares her mother's belief in a strong version of opacity of mind her sister has a very different attitude. Also, AL is more than 20 years older than KL, but has less stringent views about the opacity of other minds.

This leaves us in a quandary. We have data that indicates that there is something about the difference between the speaker's mind and other people's mind that leads to using different grammatical constructions, but these are not always rigidly upheld. We also have speakers with a variety of attitudes towards those values that are held to be key to a cultural opacity of mind doctrine. It could be possible that the grammatical patterns we see represent a model of the way people construct each others' mental states that is no longer prevalent. Perhaps studying closely related languages, like Melamchi Valley Yolmo or even Kagate, might give us a different perspective on the relationship between the two phenomena. This study has indicated, though, that while people's reports about social attitudes towards opacity of mind beliefs are an interesting and important record, this needs to be checked against the way people talk about each other.

Considering an opacity of mind doctrine in a Tibetic language while analysing the grammar it has allowed for the opportunity to consider what appear initially to be a disparate set of grammatical phenomena as having a possible social cognitive motivation. It is possible these grammatical constructions would arise in the absence of such a belief in opacity of mind, indeed Ameka (2004, p. 25) observes that there should never be an expectation of a one-to-one correspondence between a cultural perspective and a linguistic form. Given that there is a belief held by some speakers in regard to the opacity of other minds, but they appear to not follow this belief on

either a conscious or unconscious level, it would be too great a leap to posit a direct relationship between the grammar and this social attitude. At best, they are separate manifestations of a long-standing cultural attitude that manifests itself in other Tibetic languages, in both their grammar and social attitudes.

Aikhenvald (2004, p. 350) observes that there is much work to be done in establishing how social attitudes relate to the existence of evidential marking, although she also concedes that attempts “to establish correlations between beliefs, mental attitudes, and the structure of language” generally have not gone well. (Aikhenvald 2004, p. 356-357). Lamjung Yolmo is a language where there is a complex folk understanding of the opacity of other people’s minds, and a grammar that requires speakers to make complex and often socially motivated choices between epistemic or evidential marking, making it a potentially interesting focus for such questions. Of course, linking social attitudes to features of grammar is a fraught exercise, and one likely to result in no clear outcome. But given that features like the highly flexible epistemic marking in this language that appear to have complex correlations to peoples attitudes towards modelling other peoples’ mental states we need to start asking more of these difficult questions.

9.5. Social cognition and the grammar of Lamjung Yolmo

Throughout this thesis I have used social cognition (§4.2.) as a framework for considering how Lamjung Yolmo speakers use their language as a tool of interaction. By focusing on language as a tool, instead of a grammatical system in isolation, I have been able to offer a more satisfactory account of features like ‘conjunct/disjunct,’ mirativity and the kind of variation in the use of evidential forms that is a common feature of the language.

In §4.2.5. I introduced Enfield and Levinson’s (2006, p. 26-27) breakdown of the levels at which social cognition is engaged. I will now return to the schema as a way

of summarising how we have seen social cognition manifested throughout this thesis. This schema involves what they term “the interaction engine,” the “interaction matrix” and the “socio-cultural frame.” I will discuss these in turn.

The first, the “interaction engine,” includes the “equipment for dealing with interaction” (Enfield and Levinson 2006, p. 26). Enfield and Levinson include theory of mind and biological constraints within this category. We can also include some grammatical features in this, such as the deictic function of evidential forms, and the shift in epistemic source in question constructions. These are the kind of grammatical features that remain across the variety of interactional situations. We can then think of the interaction engine as operating at the level of grammar.

The second level is the “interaction matrix,” which is the interpersonal level, and the point of interaction. The important thing about this is that because it exists in interaction it cannot be reduced to a single person’s intentions. This is where we get the kind of variation in copula use that, initially, appeared to be so confusing. In interaction we find that speakers use the deictic functions of evidentials to achieve communicative ends in a way that may not appear immediately obvious when we only consider the forms as they exist in the “interaction engine.” The interaction matrix covers the traditional domain of pragmatics with a strong focus on interaction.

The third and final level is the “socio-cultural frame” which is the cognitive environment in which social interaction occurs and constrains the interaction matrix. I have attempted to look at this by considering Lamjung Yolmo interaction through the frame of opacity of mind. This has proven to be a more challenging component of the model to examine. This is possibly because opacity of mind is not as much of a constraining socio-cultural frame as ethnographers working on related languages have indicated it is. It is also possible that opacity of mind is a much more abstract, or historical, influence on the interaction matrix than reports have indicated.

Social cognition allows us to see language as doing much more than describing events. As Verhagen (2005, p. 79) observed in relation to intersubjectivity, once we start looking at phenomena like modality as a tool for interaction as much as description, it alleviates many of the problems. This is certainly the case in Lamjung Yolmo, with an analysis driven by social cognition rather than the traditional models focusing on the syntactic end-product of the interactional choices people make. Even if modal information in Lamjung Yolmo does not involve the grammatical encoding of complex perspectives at the level of the interaction engine, at the level of the interaction matrix we have to account for more than just the speaker's perspective. By thinking about these things from a social cognition perspective we can consider the way people use language in interaction on all of these levels.

10. Conclusion

When people communicate with each other there are many things that are brought to bear on their choice of utterance. In this thesis I examined the use of a set of features of Lamjung Yolmo that have been discussed in related languages as being primarily syntactic in distribution. When we looked at how these forms were used in interaction I demonstrated that the linguistic choices people make are motivated not only by the propositional content and their stance towards it, but also by semantics and a person's relationship to other people in the interaction. By contrasting this approach with traditional conjunct/disjunct descriptions of related languages, I have shown the benefits of taking a more interactional approach via the lens of social cognition. This has allowed for a more satisfying description of the features of Lamjung Yolmo, and their interactional motivation, and helped pave the way for more interactionally considered descriptions of egophoric phenomena in other languages.

In the introduction to this thesis I argued that approaches like social cognition are needed to allow us to create more nuanced analyses of interactionally motivated features of language. I am not suggesting that there is not a place for traditional grammatical description within language documentation. The sketch grammar of Lamjung Yolmo (Appendix 1) attests to this fact. Instead this thesis is an acknowledgement that language is a social tool, and that there are some features of language where we can only come to a fuller understanding of why speakers are making some choices if we look at a wider scope than what has traditionally been considered within the scope of grammar. There will always be a place for grammatical description. The fact that this thesis only covers copula verb modality, reported speech and question constructions, while the sketch grammar provides an introduction to a far greater range of features in the language, indicates that while

social cognition can take an analysis deep into the function of some features, it is intensive and unable to capture the full range of features in a language.

There are several directions that the analysis in this thesis can be taken. The first could be to take the results from this work and observe how it relates to a corpus of entirely naturalistic interactional data. The majority of data in this thesis is from semi-structured tasks and narratives. This was important as the aim was to track the way people used modal forms based on their knowledge state and the knowledge state of others. In naturalistic interactions this knowledge state is drawn from a much wider range of references, especially with people you are close to. Now that we have an understanding of the extent to which modal choice is based on knowledge state we can extend the analysis to a broader range of interaction. Also, as González et al. (2012) observed, there is the opportunity to bring non-grammatical features of communication to bear on discussions of evidentiality and modality.

A second direction would be to look at other features of Lamjung Yolmo that also lend themselves to a social cognition-focused analysis. Features that would lend themselves to this type of analysis would be embedded in the grammar of the language, but also heavily interactionally motivated. Discourse particles would be a good candidate (Appendix 1, §1.3.7.), as would ergative marking (Appendix 1, §1.4.5.2.), which has a strongly pragmatic motivation, like in many other Tibeto-Burman languages.

The final potential development would be to compare the analysis of Lamjung Yolmo to similar features in closely related languages. This would allow us to observe the differences, not only in grammar (which I have done in my comparative analysis with Standard Tibetan and other closely related languages), but also in the way knowledge is constructed, accessed and shared. This would allow for an even stronger understanding of where the differences in these systems lie and would go beyond the typological discussion in work such as Aikhenvald (2004), which tends

to focus on context-independent semantic and syntactic features of evidentiality. Melamchi Valley Yolmo, Kagate and Ilam Yolmo are all closely related to Lamjung Yolmo, and each other, but have all been isolated from each other for around 70-100 years. These groups form an opportunity to compare the use of copula verbs, question constructions and reported speech to tease out exactly what variation is driven by grammar and what variation is driven by interaction.

Language is one of the most sophisticated interactional tools in existence. When we look at the complexity of human interaction we see that the linguistic choices people make are built upon a complex, interactionally driven, set of cognitive tools. For Lamjung Yolmo speakers, the epistemic and evidential choices that they make in interaction are one small, but important, part of every interaction.

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Appendix 1: Sketch grammar of Lamjung Yolmo

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1.1. Introduction

This sketch grammar provides an overview of Lamjung Yolmo¹. It is not intended to be an exhaustive description of the language, but to simply outline the major features of this previously undescribed dialect of Yolmo. This grammar also provided the foundations for the specific discussions found in the main body of the thesis. It has been placed in an appendix, instead of in the main body of the thesis, as it is somewhat independent from the argument in that section. This allows for easier access to information about features of Lamjung Yolmo that are not included in the main body of the thesis, and allows those reading the main body to not be distracted by grammatical features that are unnecessary to the line of argumentation. Where there are features of the grammar that receive greater attention in the main chapters of the thesis, for example the copula paradigm or question structures, I will flag this.

The sketch grammar starts with the sound system of the language (§1.2.), which is followed by a summary of the parts of speech (§1.3.). The next two sections explore the structure of the noun phrase (§1.4.) and verb phrase (§1.5.) respectively before the final section (§1.6.) looking at clause level structures.

There are some parts of the thesis that are directly relevant to the information in this sketch grammar. The layout of example sentences is explained in §1.3. of the thesis. All examples are presented with interlinear glossing following the Leipzig conventions, with a list of glossing abbreviations found at the start of the thesis. All examples include the initials of the speaker and the name of the recording from which the example was taken. A list of recordings is given in Appendix 3 and a list of speakers is given in Appendix 4. Where the example is taken from a naturalistic

¹ Yolmo is also found in the literature as Yohlmo, Hyolmo and Helambu Sherpa.

narrative or interaction the time of the utterance in the recording is also given. Where the example is taken from observation (and not a recording) the date and location in my notebooks is given. This has been done to ensure that examples can be traced back to the original recordings.

The methodology in chapter 3 outlines the procedure for data collection for this project. It lists the tools, processing and archiving procedures, but also gives detailed information about the different tasks I used to elicit data. There was elicited data, which gave grammatical testing and some of the less common constructions. There was also a focus on recording structured but naturalistic linguistic data as well. This included the use of image-based story tasks including the Family Story (§3.2.1.) and Jackal and Crow (§3.2.2.). I also used video stimulus from the Put Project (Bowerman, Gullberg, Amjid and Narasimhan 2004) and Reciprocals Project (Evans, Levinson, Enfield and Gaby 2004), as well as a Hidden Objects task (§3.2.4.), Twenty Questions game (§3.2.5.), Multiple Reports task (§3.2.6.), magic tricks (§3.2.7.) and optical illusions (§3.2.8.). Where relevant throughout this sketch grammar I will indicate when examples are drawn from. Much of the data included in this sketch grammar is drawn from earlier field trips, which is why elicited utterances from AL feature quite prominently.

I give an introduction to the speakers of Lamjung Yolmo and their culture in §2.1. In that chapter I also present the orthography that I use throughout the thesis. I have given the tables for the orthography again as Table 1.1. and Table 1.2. below, but the justification of the choices I made in creating the orthography are set out in §2.2.1. of the main thesis. References can be found alongside those in the reference section of the main thesis.

These various names and their relationship are discussed in chapter 2 of the thesis.

Consonants:

	Bilabial	Apico- alveolar	Lamino- post- alveolar	Apico- retroflex	Dorso- palatal	Velar	Glottal
Stops	p p p ^h ph b b	t t t ^h th d d		ʈ ʈ ʈ ^h ʈh ɖ ɖ	c ky c ^h khy ɟ gy	k k k ^h kh g g	
Fricative		s s z z	ʃ ʃ ʒ ʒ				h h
Affricate		ts ts ts ^h tsh dz dz	tʃ tʃ tʃ ^h tʃh dʒ dʒ				
Nasal	m m	n n			ɲ ɲ	ŋ ŋ	
Liquids		l lh l l ɭ rh ɽ r					
Glides	w w				j y		

Table 1.1. Lamjung Yolmo consonants standardised orthography.

Vowels:

Short:	i	Long:	ii
	u		uu
	e		ee
	o		oo
	a		aa

Table 1.2. Lamjung Yolmo vowels standardised orthography.

1.2. Phonology

Lamjung Yolmo has 36 consonant phonemes and 10 oral vowel phonemes. The consonant phoneme inventory and arguments for their existence are presented in §1.2.1. and vowel phonemes are presented in §1.2.2. The tone system is presented in §1.2.3, while §1.2.4. presents the phonotactics of Lamjung Yolmo, including syllable structure, consonant clusters and a brief discussion of diphthongs. Stress is mentioned briefly in §1.2.5 and morphophonemic change in regards to voicing and deletion is outlined in §1.2.6. Throughout this chapter the Lamjung Yolmo data will be presented in International Phonetic Alphabet script and accompanied by the same item in the orthography (§1.1. above) as well as the English equivalent.

1.2.1. Consonant Phoneme Inventory

Consonant phonemes in Lamjung Yolmo can be divided into obstruents and sonorants. Obstruents include stops, fricatives and affricates, while sonorants include nasals, liquids, trills and glides. The inventory of consonants phonemes is displayed in Table 1.3, with salient allomorphs presented in square brackets where appropriate.

	Bilabial	Apico- alveolar	Lamino- palatalised- post- alveolar	Apico- retroflex	Dorso- palatal	Velar	Glottal
Stops	p p ^h b	t t ^h d		ʈ ʈ ^h ɖ	c c ^h ɟ	k k ^h g	
Fricative		s z	ɕ ʑ				h
Affricate		ts ts ^h dz	tɕ tɕ ^h dʑ				
Nasal	m	n			ɲ	ŋ	
Liquids		l̥ (ɭ) l ɭ [r]					
Glides	w				j		

Table 1.3. Lamjung Yolmo Consonant Phonemes

1.2.1.1 Obstruents

1.2.1.1.1 Stops

Stops include voiced, voiceless unaspirated, and voiceless aspirated forms. There are six places of articulation; bilabial, apico-alveolar, apico-retroflex, dorso-palatal, velar and glottal. All stop phonemes can appear at syllable onset, but only voiceless unaspirated bilabial and velar stops can occur syllable-finally.

A minimal set² showing the contrast of the three bilabial stops is presented below:

1)	/b/ vs /p/ vs /p ^h /		
	bù	bù	‘insect’
	pù	pù	‘son’
	p ^h ú	phú	‘pig’

From this contrasting minimal set we can establish /b/, /p/ and /p^h/ as separate phonemes.

The phonemic status of the three dental stops is established below:

2)	/d/ vs /t/ vs /t ^h /		
	dì	dì	determiner, proximal
	tí	tí	‘ask’
	t ^h í	thí	‘burn’

From this minimal set we can see that /d/, /t/ and /t^h/ are individual phonemes.

The phonemic status of the three retroflex stops in relation to each other is established in the minimal set below:

² It should be noted briefly here that voiceless aspirated stops, fricatives and affricates can only take high tone, voiced stops can only take low tone, and voiceless unaspirated stops can take either high or low tone. Therefore no minimal set with all of these stops will have exactly the same tone value across all three items. Tone is marked with a diacritic above the vowel. This will be discussed further in the section on tone below (§1.2.3.).

- 3) /d/ vs /t/ vs /t^h/
- | | | |
|------------------|-----|---------|
| dù | dù | ‘grain’ |
| tù | tù | ‘six’ |
| t ^h ú | thú | ‘ruler’ |

From this minimal set we can conclude that /d/, /t/ and /t^h/ are separate phonemes.

There is no minimal set to show phonemic status of the three dental stops in relation to each other. Instead, minimal pairs are given for each distinction below:

- 4) /d/ vs /t/
- | | | |
|----|----|-----------------|
| dà | dà | ‘bow and arrow’ |
| tá | tá | ‘see’ |

- 5) /d/ vs /t^h/
- | | | |
|------------------|-----|--------|
| dì | dì | ‘this’ |
| t ^h í | thí | ‘join’ |

- 6) /t/ vs /t^h/
- | | | |
|------------------|-----|----------|
| tè | tè | ‘sit’ |
| t ^h é | thé | ‘listen’ |

This allows us to establish that the three dental stops are separate phonemes, giving us /d/, /t/ and /t^h/.

There are also minimal pairs that confirm that the retroflex and dental stops are separate phonemes as well:

7) /d/ vs /d/

dù	dù	‘grain’
dù	dù	perceptual evidential copula

8) /t/ vs /t/

tò	tò	‘wheat’
tò	tò	‘stone’

9) /tʰ/ vs /tʰ/

tʰú	tʰú	‘ruler’
tʰé	tʰé	‘listen’

The phonemic status of palatal stops is established in the near-minimal set below:

10) /ʃ/ vs /c/ vs /cʰ/

jà:	gyàa	‘place’
cá	kyá	‘float’
cʰá	khyá	pronoun, 2 nd person plural

The phonemic status of the velar stops in relation to each other (11), and in relation to the palatal stops (12)-(14), is established below. The voiced pair (14) are only a near-minimal distinction as there are not many voiced palatal stops in the lexicon:

11) /g/ vs /k/ vs /kʰ/

gò:	gòo	‘head’
kò	kò	‘door’
kʰó	khó	pronoun, 3 rd person male singular

12) /k/ vs /c/

kà	kà	‘open’
cá	kyá	‘float’

13) /k^h/ vs /c^h/

k ^h á	khá	‘mouth’
c ^h á	khyá	pronoun, 2 nd person plural

14) /g/ vs /j/

jùp	gùp	‘fast’
gùri	gùri	‘cat’

1.2.1.1.2 Fricatives

Fricatives occur as voiced and voiceless forms in both alveolar and palatised post-alveolar places of articulation, and as voiceless forms at the uvular. All fricatives can only occur syllable-initial.

A minimal pair establishing the phonemic status of the voiced and voiceless alveolar fricatives is given below:

15) /z/ vs /s/

zò	zò	‘make’
sò	sò	‘eat’ (imperative)

This establishes two distinct fricative phonemes /z/ and /s/.

The minimal pair below establishes that the palatalised post-alveolar voiced and voiceless forms are also different phonemes:

- 16) /ʒ/ vs /ç/
 zàa zàa ‘leave’
 çáa çáa ‘split’

The glottal fricative is voiceless and only occurs word initially:

- 17) hée hée ‘potato’

As a phone it is not in complementary distribution with any other phone and is thus established as the phoneme /h/.

1.2.1.1.3 Affricates

Affricates have voiced, voiceless and voiceless aspirated forms and occur in two places of articulation; alveolar and palatalised post-alveolar. All affricates can only occur syllable-initially.

A minimal set establishing the phonemic status of the alveolar affricates is given below:

- 18) /dz/ vs /ts/ vs /ts^h/
 dzà dzà ‘climb up’
 tsá tsá ‘below’
 ts^há tshá ‘salt’

The minimal set above established /dz/, /ts/ and /ts^h/ as individual phonemes.

A near-minimal set establishing the phonemic status of the palatalised post-alveolar affricates in comparison to each other is given below. These form a minimal set with

the alveolar affricates in the example above, establishing the phonemic status of all the affricates.

19)

<i>/dz̥/</i>	vs	<i>/tɕ/</i>	vs	<i>/tɕʰ/</i>
<i>dzà:</i>		<i>dzàa</i>		‘put’
<i>tɕà</i>		<i>tɕà</i>		‘chicken’
<i>tɕʰá</i>		<i>tɕhá</i>		‘break’ (transitive)

By establishing the minimal and near-minimal contrasts between the affricates we also establish */dz̥/*, */tɕ/* and */tɕʰ/* as individual phonemes.

1.2.1.2 *Sonorants*

The class of sonorants in Lamjung Yolmo consists of nasals, liquids, trills and glides.

1.2.1.2.1 Nasals

Nasals occur in four places of articulation; bilabial, dental, palatal and velar. Each can occur syllable-initial and all nasals except the palatal nasal can occur syllable-final.

A minimal set establishing the phonemic status of four nasals is given below:

20)

<i>/m/</i>	vs	<i>/n/</i>	vs	<i>/ɲ/</i>	vs	<i>/ŋ/</i>
<i>mà</i>		<i>mà-</i>				negator prefix (past)
<i>nà</i>		<i>nà</i>				‘to be ill’
<i>ɲà</i>		<i>ɲà</i>				‘fish’
<i>ŋà</i>		<i>ŋà</i>				‘five’

With this minimal set we can establish four distinct nasal phonemes; /m/, /n/, /ɲ/ and /ŋ/.

1.2.1.2.2 Liquids

Lamjung Yolmo has both apico-alveolar and lateral-alveolar liquids. Both have a voiced and a voiceless form. Voiced liquids can occur syllable initially and syllable finally, and can also occur as the second element in a consonant cluster (see 1.6.1.2 for more detail). Voiceless liquids only occur word initial.

There is only one attested example of a voiceless apico-alveolar liquid:

- 21) /ɿ/
- | | | |
|-------|--------------|-------|
| ɿélmu | <i>rélmu</i> | round |
|-------|--------------|-------|

In this analysis I am treating it as a separate phoneme, following Hari (2010). Even in Hari and Lama's (2004) dictionary, which has a much larger lexical inventory than that currently documented for Lamjung Yolmo, there are still only a handful of words containing /ɿ/. It is possible that it is a borrowing from another Tibeto-Burman language with the few lexical items that are /ɿ/ initial, but its perceptual saliency for speakers is another reason I have classed it as a separate phoneme. Given the low frequency of the use of this phoneme there are no minimal pairs with which to contrast it to similar sounds and it is thus treated as a marginal phoneme until more robust evidence for it can be found.

Below we have minimal pairs to establish that the other liquids are all separate phonemes:

22)	/ɹ/ vs /l/		
	ɹò	rò	‘friend’
	lò	lò	‘year’

23)	/l/ vs /l̥/		
	ló	l̥ó	reported speech marker
	l̥ó	lhó	‘south’

With these minimal pairs we can establish that /ɹ/, /l/ and /l̥/ are separate phonemes, and the limited data available I have also classed /l̥/ as a marginal separate phoneme.

Voiced alveolar liquids are in free variation with alveolar trills in some environments for some speakers:

24)	/ɹ/ vs /r/		
	príw	pr̥íw	‘monkey’
	pr̥íw	pr̥íw	‘monkey’

As the alveolar central approximant is more common than the trill, and appears in contrast to the alveolar lateral, both /ɹ/ and /r/ are considered allophones of the phoneme /r/.

1.2.1.2.3 Glides

Glides occur at two places of articulation; bilabial and palatal, and are always voiced.

Bilabial glides /w/ are more accurately named labio-velar glides. They never occur word-initial. They can occur syllable-initial in the second syllable of a word, as a

coda and as the second element of a consonant cluster (see 1.6.1.2. for more on consonant clusters), as shown below:

25)	t ^h áwa	tháwa	‘eagle’
	tsáw	tsáw	‘grandson’
	swà	swà	‘nettles’

Palatal glides /j/ only occur word initial:

26)	jà:bu	yàabu	‘good’
	jùl	yùl	‘village’
	jíbi	yíbi	‘grandmother’

While the glides occur in restricted environments there appears to be no factors controlling this and they are thus treated as two separate phonemes; /w/ and /y/.

1.2.2. Vowel Phonemes

Lamjung Yolmo has five vowels, each with a length distinction, making a total of ten vowel phonemes. These are presented in respect to their height and backness in Table 1.4.

i	i:	u	u:
e	e:	ɔ	ɔ:
a			
a:			

Table 1.4. Lamjung Yolmo Vowel Phonemes

Two minimal sets establishing the phonemic status of each places of articulation are given below:

27) [i] vs [u] vs [e] vs [ɔ] vs [a]

k ^h í	<i>khí</i>	‘dog’
k ^h ú	<i>khú</i>	‘can’
k ^h é	<i>khé</i>	pronoun, 2 nd person singular
k ^h ó	<i>khó</i>	pronoun, 3 rd person singular male
k ^h á	<i>khá</i>	‘mouth’
ɕì	<i>çì</i>	‘four’
ɕè	<i>çè</i>	‘eat’, honorific
ɕù	<i>çù</i>	‘sit’, honorific
ɕò	<i>çò</i>	‘curd’
ɕà	<i>çà</i>	‘grease’

With these two minimal sets it can be established that the five points of articulation represented in Table 1.4. are individual phones.

Vowels occur in two forms, long and short, with short vowels being more common across the lexicon. The length of the vowel does not affect its quality. While the length difference is not highly distinct there are enough minimal and near-minimal pairs across a range of environments to attest to its existence:

28) [i] vs [i:]

tɕí	<i>tçí</i>	‘what’
tɕí:	<i>tçíi</i>	‘one’

29) [u] vs [u:]

tù	<i>tù</i>	‘six’
tú:	<i>túu</i>	‘pick’

- 30) [e] vs [e:]
- | | | |
|----|------------|---------|
| pè | <i>pè</i> | ‘do’ |
| pè | <i>pèe</i> | ‘Tibet’ |
- 31) [ɔ] vs [ɔ:]
- | | | |
|-----|------------|----------------|
| tó | <i>tó</i> | ‘rice, cooked’ |
| tó: | <i>tóo</i> | ‘be hungry’ |
- 32) [a] vs [a:]
- | | | |
|-----|------------|--------------------|
| sá | <i>sá</i> | ‘ground’ |
| sá: | <i>sáa</i> | ‘burn, transitive’ |

1.2.2.1 Environmental Effects

1.2.2.1.1 Centring

Consonant environment can affect vowel placement. Palatal plosives and approximants cause the back vowel phonemes /u/ and /o/ and the low vowel phoneme /a/ to centralise:

- 33) [u] > [ɯ]
- | | | | | |
|---------|---|---------|-------|-----------|
| /jùl/ | > | [jɯl] | jùl | ‘village’ |
| /gyùpa/ | > | [gyɯpa] | gyùpa | ‘fast’ |
- 34) [ɔ] > [ɚ]
- | | | | | |
|---------|---|---------|-------|---------|
| /jòlmo/ | > | [jɚlmo] | yòlmo | ‘Yolmo’ |
|---------|---|---------|-------|---------|

- 35) [a] > [ɐ]
 /jambu/ > [jɛmbu] yambu ‘Kathmandu’
 /gyà/ > [gyɐ] gyà ‘place’

1.2.2.2 Nasalisation

Nasalisation often occurs in two environments; on the non-past and the past tense suffixes. The regular form of the completed past tense is *-sin*. In rapid speech for some speakers the final nasal is dropped and the vowel nasalised:

- 36) sà-sin > sà-sĩ sàsĩn ‘eat-PST’

The non-past tense is pronounced as *-ge* or *-gẽ* in free variation:

- 37) sà-ge sàgẽ ‘eat-NON.PST’
 sà-gẽ sàgẽ ‘eat-NON.PST’

This is likely due to the fact that the suffix was historically *-gen*, as it still is in the Yolmo spoken in the Helambu area (Hari and Lama 2004).

Nasalisation does not occur for other lexical items that end in [en], for example:

- 38) p.réken préken ‘monkey’
 *prékẽ préken ‘monkey’

Therefore it is likely that nasalisation for the two suffixes given above is related to their high frequency and explains the nasalisation of the non-past tense suffix even though the final velar nasal has been lost.

1.2.3. *Tone*

Lamjung Yolmo has a binary high/low lexical tone distinction that is marked on the first syllable of the word. Similar systems have been described in closely related languages including Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010), Sherpa (Watters 1999, Kelly 2004) and Standard Tibetan (Tournadre and Dorje 2003).

There are many tone minimal pairs in Lamjung Yolmo. One pair has been given below for each of the five places of articulation for vowels:

39)	ɕí	ɕí	‘die’, imperative
	ɕì	ɕì	‘four’
	kée	kée	‘voice/noise’
	kèe	kèe	‘split’
	pú	pú	‘body hair’
	pù	pù	‘son’
	kómba	kómba	‘thirsty’
	kòmba	kòmba	‘temple’
	sámba	sámba	‘new’
	sàmba	sàmba	‘bridge’

Tone not only establishes lexical difference, but in a closed set of verbs the change in tone indicates a change in transitivity:

40)	lànɖoŋ	<i>lànɖoŋ</i>	‘rise!’
	lánɖoŋ	<i>lánɖoŋ</i>	‘raise!’

tàptɔŋ	<i>tàptɔŋ</i>	‘fall’
táptɔŋ	<i>táptɔŋ</i>	‘be scattered’
ròptɔŋ	<i>ròptɔŋ</i>	‘break’
róptɔŋ	<i>róptɔŋ</i>	‘break something’

Tone is predictable in some environments. It is low following voiced stops and affricates:

41)	bìliŋ	<i>bìliŋ</i>	‘cockroach’
	dòp	<i>dòp</i>	‘bush land’
	dù	<i>dù</i>	‘grain’
	gyà	<i>gyà</i>	‘place’
	gù.ri	<i>gù.ri</i>	‘cat’
	dzùbu	<i>dzùbu</i>	‘body’

Tone is always high following all aspirated stops, affricates and voiceless liquids, as shown below:

42)	p ^h á	<i>phá</i>	‘pig’
	t ^h éka	<i>théka</i>	‘straight’
	t ^h áwa	<i>tháwa</i>	‘eagle’
	k ^h yému	<i>kyhému</i>	‘cheap’
	k ^h í	<i>khí</i>	‘dog’
	ts ^h é	<i>tshé</i>	‘colour’
	tɕ ^h ú	<i>tɕhú</i>	‘water’
	l ^h áma	<i>lháma</i>	‘stale’

The verbal negator prefixes *mà-* and *mè-* both have low tone. If the following root has high tone it will not change tone because of the preceding affix with low tone:

43) a) *mà-túp*
NEG.PST-cut
'did not cut'

b) *mè-túp*
NEG.NON.PST-cut
'do not cut'

Unlike the negative prefixes discussed above, no verb suffixes appear to have a tone value specified independent of the root.

Low tone words are often produced with breathy voice, although the degree of breathiness can vary greatly. Even those speakers who do use breathy voice will not use it in all instances. Impressionistically it is more common for females than males to use breathy tone, perhaps as a strategy to make low tone perceptually stronger. High tone words are produced with modal voice. The relationship of tone and register is common across Tibeto-Burman languages (for a summary see Bradley (1982)).

Hari (2010), in her analysis of Melamchi Valley Yolmo, gives a four way tonal difference, with a distinction between 'falling' and 'basically level' contours for both high and low tones. There are very few minimal or near minimal pairs that Hari gives, and all hand drawn tone contours for Yolmo in Hari and Lama (2004, p. 797-799) show an eventual falling of the contour, regardless of whether they are falling or level tones. There is no evidence given that the four-way distinction is phonologically valid for speakers of the Lamjung variety of Yolmo, and may just be a phonetic artefact of historical processes.

Gawne and Teo (2012) looked at the acoustic properties of the tone system of Lamjung Yolmo. In this experiment we looked at a set of tone minimal pairs recorded with AL (50 year old female) and RL (18 year old male), all of which can be found in both Lamjung and Melamchi Valley Yolmo. For both speakers we recorded the minimal pairs in carrier sentences and divided the high and low tones into the respective categories in Hari's (2010) analysis (1 being low falling, 2 being low level and 3 and 4 being high falling and level respectively). Figure 1.1. gives the pitch traces for these tokens for speaker AL in open syllables.




Figure 1.1. Tone pitch traces for AL in open syllables

Given the chart above, it was unsurprising that there was no significant difference between tone contours 1 and 2 or between 3 and 4 with ANOVAs done at 50% and 80% of the vowel segment and Tukey's post-hoc test. The same also held for both

AL and RL across open syllables, nasal final and disyllables. It appears from this acoustic evidence that tonal contour distinctions are not found in Lamjung Yolmo. This is interesting given that Höhlig and Hari (1976, pp. 40-45) also observed a difference between level and falling contours in Kagate, indicating that Lamjung Yolmo may be the only known dialect that has neutralised this distinction.

1.2.4. *Phonotactics*

1.2.4.1 *Syllable structure*

Lamjung Yolmo has a (C)(C)V(C) syllable structure, with some restrictions regarding the initial configuration of two consonants and a limited set of consonants that can occur as the final consonant. There is a preference for consonant onset, although this is not mandatory.

All consonants and vowels can occur word-initial. All vowels and a restricted set of consonants can occur word-final. This consonant set includes voiceless unaspirated bilabial and velar stops, voiced liquids, the voiced labio-velar /w/ and all nasals except the palatal. There is a restricted set of syllable-onset consonant clusters (discussed in §1.2.4.2. below). The syllable patterns that have been found in Lamjung Yolmo are presented below:

44)	V	ð:	òo	‘there’
	VC	ùɿ	ùr	‘fly’
	CV	pù	pù	‘son’
	CVC	pðɿ	pòr	‘leave’
	CCV	p.ù	prù	‘write’
	CCVC	p.ùɿ	prùl	‘snake’

1.2.4.2 Consonant clusters

Consonant clusters are only permitted in the syllable-onset in restricted environments. The alveolar liquid /r/ has only be observed occurring after voiced and voiceless unaspirated bilabial stops and voiceless unaspirated velar stops, as shown below:

- 45) p.íw *príw* ‘monkey’
 b.rè: *brèe* ‘oats’
 k.rému *krému* ‘scarf’

The dorso-palatal glide can occur after voiceless bilabial stops, both aspirated and unaspirated. To date there are no items where it occurs with a voiced bilabial stop:

- 46) pjáŋ *pyáŋ* ‘hang’
 p^hjá *phyá* ‘wipe’

The bilabial glide /w/ can also occur as the second element of a consonant cluster. So far these have been recorded in the following environments:

- 47) swá *swá* ‘rice, unhusked’
 swà *swà* ‘nettles’
 kwèla *kwèla* ‘clothing’
 t^hwá *t^hwá* ‘mallet’

swá and *swà* are recorded in Melamchi Valley Yolmo as having a vowel between the two elements of the consonant cluster; *sówa* and *sòwa* respectively (Hari and Lama 2004). This indicates that there has been a reduction of these items from two syllables to one, with the loss of the vowel between /s/ and /w/. There is no lexical

item similar to *kwèla* (Hari and Lama 2004). It looks as though this consonant combination is actually a lexical borrowing from the Lamjung Yolmo speakers Gurung neighbours. Glover, Glover and Gurung (1977) give the Gurung word for clothing as *kwě*.

1.2.4.3 *Diphthongs*

In the analysis above, the labio-velar glide at the end of a syllable is treated as a consonant, and as such there are no attested diphthongs in Lamjung Yolmo. The closest thing to a diphthong in the language is the lexical item below:

48)	máiba	<i>máiba</i>	‘bad’
	?mái.ba	<i>máiba</i>	‘bad’
	má.i.ba	<i>máiba</i>	‘bad’

This word can be analysed as being formed from the word for good *yàabu* with the negative prefix *mà-*, which, through reduction as the word is separated from its lexical origins, result in the diphthong in running speech.

1.2.5. *Stress*

Stress is not a salient phonological phenomenon in Lamjung Yolmo. There are no observable perceptual cues for phonemic stress and it is only used by speakers as a strategy to mark lexical emphasis.

1.2.6. *Morphophonemics*

1.2.6.1 *Voicing*

Stop initial suffixes are unvoiced following unvoiced plosives, and alveolar liquid /ɹ/ (49). These suffixes become voiced following nasals and lateral liquid /l/ (49). They

are also always voiced following all vowels (50) except /e/, where the voiceless form is also sometimes used (51). Examples of these processes are shown with the *-təŋ/-dəŋ* variation in the imperative suffix:

49)	á táp-təŋ	á táptəŋ	‘bite!’
	tèr-təŋ	tèrtəŋ	‘give!’
	sìn-dəŋ	sìndəŋ	‘complete!’
	làŋ-dəŋ	làŋdəŋ	‘stand!’
	ɲàl-dəŋ	ɲàldəŋ	‘sleep!’
50)	tì-dəŋ	tìdəŋ	‘ask!’
	pù-dəŋ	prùdəŋ	‘write!’
	lè-dəŋ	lèdəŋ	‘return!’
	sà-dəŋ	sàdəŋ	‘eat!’
51)	pè-dəŋ	pèdəŋ	‘do!’
	tè-təŋ	tètəŋ	‘sit!’
	sé-təŋ	sétəŋ	‘kill!’
	t ^h é-təŋ	thétəŋ	‘hear!’

Voicing also affects words in compounds. For example, the base-ten counting system is a compounding with the second element being the word for ‘ten,’ *tɕú*. The voiceless affricate /tɕ/ becomes voiced when the first item in the compound ends with a vowel, lateral liquid or nasal, as shown below:

52)	súmdzu	<i>súmdzu</i>	‘thirty’
	ɕíptɕu	<i>ɕíptɕu</i>	‘forty’
	ŋáptɕu	<i>ŋáptɕu</i>	‘fifty’
	tùktɕu	<i>tùktɕu</i>	‘sixty’
	tìndzu	<i>tìndzu</i>	‘seventy’
	kyàdzu	<i>kyàdzu</i>	‘eighty’
	kùptɕu	<i>kùptɕu</i>	‘ninety’

1.2.6.2 Deletion

Deletion of the voiced velar stop occurs in the inter-vocalic position. This is shown with the possessive/genitive suffix *-ki/-gi* in running speech when it is attached to vowel-final syllables:

53)	/ŋà = gi/	>	[ŋà-i]	<i>ŋàki</i>
	1SG = GEN			

In Standard Tibetan (Tournadre and Dorje 2003, pp. 102-103), where the genitive has the allomorphs *gi*, *gyi*, *kyi*, and *i*, with the last form only occurring after vowels. In Lamjung Yolmo however, the deletion of the /g/ to give only *-i* is not consistent and therefore is only described as a phonological process and not analyses as a set of allomorphs.

This process does not only occur on the boundaries of morphemes and lexemes in running speech, but also in the middle of them as well:

54)	/màgi/	>	[ma-i]	<i>màgi</i>	‘corn’
-----	--------	---	--------	-------------	--------

Deletion of other consonants intervocalically has not been observed.

1.3. Parts of Speech

In this section I provide a list of the parts of speech in Lamjung Yolmo (§1.3.1.) before discussing each one in detail. This starts with the nominal parts of speech in §1.3.2, verbs in §1.3.3, adjectives in §1.3.4, adverbs in §1.3.5, and postpositions in §1.3.6. Interjections and discourse particles are discussed together in §1.3.7. Finally I will look at honorific forms in Lamjung Yolmo in §1.3.8. These are in their own section as they encompass both nouns and verbs. The different parts of speech are determined by the distributional characteristics of each word, as well as their inflectional properties. Semantic differences also play a part in determining word classes. The parts of speech are mutually exclusive classes, although words can change class through derivational processes.

1.3.1. Parts of Speech

The categories of the parts of speech of Lamjung Yolmo are presented in the list below, with more information about each in sections afterwards:

1. Nominals

- (i) nouns
- (ii) pronouns
- (iii) demonstratives

2. Verbs

- (i) lexical verbs
- (ii) copulas
- (iii) auxiliaries

3. Adjectives

4. Adverbs

5. Postpositions

6. Interjectives and discourse markers

The first two classes discussed will be nominals and verbs. Both of these classes are inflected for multiple grammatical categories. Nominals inflect for categories such as case and number, while verbs inflect for tense and aspect. These two are also the largest open word classes. The remaining parts of speech that will be discussed are all non-inflected. These include adjectives, adverbs, postpositions and interjections.

1.3.2. *Nominals*

Semantically, nouns typically denote objects, both concrete and abstract. All nouns take case suffixes where appropriate. Cases that are marked in Lamjung Yolmo are genitive, ergative, instrumental, locative, allative, dative and ablative. These will be discussed in more detail in §1.4.5. There are three types of nominals; nouns, pronouns and demonstratives.

1.3.2.1 *Nouns*

Nouns are an open class and by far the largest of the three types of nominals.

Morphologically, count nouns can take the plural suffix =*ya*:

55)	<i>rò</i>	‘friend’
	<i>rò = ya</i>	‘friends’

The plural suffix is optional if the number can be inferred from context, either visually or because of previous mention. This is true of both human and non-human animate and inanimate nouns.

Syntactically, nouns can be modified by a demonstrative (56), which typically appears to the left of it in a noun phrase.

- 56) a) *òodi dòktor saá=la dù*
that doctor ground=LOC COP.PE
'that doctor is on the ground.' (SL 091108-01 18:55)
- b) *òodi mílam yàabu yèke*
that dream good COP.EGO.PST
'that dream was good.' (AL 100924-01)

Nouns can also be modified by an adjective and/or a number (57), which typically appears to the right of the noun in a noun phrase.

- 57) a) *pìza tɕómbo*
child big
'big child' (AL 091108-01 30:59)
- b) *mèeme kàpu tɕíi thón-sin*
grandfather old one watch-PST
'an old man watched.' (AL 091108-01 23:30)

Nouns can be either simple, compound or complex; these are discussed in more detail in §1.4.2.1. Nouns can be created from verbs using a range of derivational suffixes. This process of nominalisation is discussed in §1.6.4.

1.3.2.2 Pronouns

Pronouns are a small, closed class of nominals. They distinguish between person (first, second and third), number (singular, dual and plural) and also make inclusive/exclusive distinctions in first person non-singular. There are also two third person singular pronouns that make a male/female gender distinction for humans.

Pronouns have the same case marking as regular nouns, and are discussed further in §1.4.3.

They differ from nouns in several ways. Firstly, there is no use of the morphological plural suffix except for the third person inanimate pronoun. Secondly, there is no co-occurrence with determiners, adjectives or numbers.

1.3.2.3 *Demonstratives*

Demonstrative pronouns have a proximal/distal distinction. There is also a third, less-used demonstrative that indicates something as being distal but within view, unlike the basic distal where the visibility of the item is not specified.

Demonstratives crosscut the other word classes as they can occur not only as the head of a noun phrase (58a), but can also function as a modifier of another noun (58b) (see also §1.4.3.).

- 58) a) *òodi yàabu yè*
that good COP.EGO
'that is good.' (AL 100922-01)
- b) *òodi mì yàabu yè*
that person good COP.EGO
'that person is good.' (AL 100922-01)

1.3.3. *Verbs*

Verbs are the clausal predicate and semantically denote actions, states and events. Verbs morphologically inflect for tense and aspect, and take a negator prefix. There is no evidence of derived verbs. There are three main types of verbs; lexical verbs, copulas and auxiliaries. Verbs inflect for negation: lexical and auxiliary verbs take a

prefix (59a) and (59b), while the negative form is more blended for the copulas (59c).

- 59) a) *ɲà ɲàl-sin*
 1SG sleep-PST
 ‘I slept.’ (AL 090916-06)
- ɲà mà-ɲal*
 1SG NEG.PST-sleep
 ‘I did not sleep.’ (AL 090916-06)
- b) *ɲà lú lèn-teraŋ yèke*
 1SG song sing-IPFV COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I was singing a song.’ (AL 091028-04)
- ɲà lú lèn-teraŋ mà-tè yè*
 1SG song sing-IPFV NEG.PST-AUX COP.EGO
 ‘I was not singing a song.’ (AL 091028-04)
- c) *dì tònbo yimba*
 this tree COP.EGO
 ‘this is a tree.’ (AL 091108-01 02:23)
- dì tònbo mìn*
 this tree COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘this is not a tree.’ (SL 091108-01 02:21)

Negation is discussed in more detail in §1.5.5.

1.3.3.1 Lexical verbs

Lexical verbs in Lamjung Yolmo are an open class of verbs. Semantically, these generally refer to actions, states and events. They can be simple, composed of one element, or complex (§1.5.2.1.). Verbs can either be intransitive, transitive or ditransitive (see §1.6.1.). Verbs must inflect for tense or aspect. There is a basic

tense distinction of past/non-past. Finite verbs can take a tense suffix, either past *-sin* or non-past *-ke* (§1.5.3.1.). Verbs can also inflect for perfective or imperfective aspect (§1.5.3.2.).

1.3.3.2 Copula verbs

Copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo are a small closed class that behave differently to main verbs in two basic ways. First, they do not inflect for tense, save one, which has an irregular past tense form. Secondly, they do not only function as the main verb in a clause (60a) but also in some uses they can be auxiliary verbs that act as modal modifier (60b).

- 60) a) *òodi lú yàabu dũ*
 that song good COP.PE
 ‘that song is good.’ (RL 110129-01)
- b) *òodi lú yàabu thé-ku dũ*
 that song good hear-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘that song sounds good.’ (RL 110129-01)

Because they can also function as the main verb in a clause these copulas are classified as a type of verb. They are discussed in more detail in §1.5.1. The modal value of copula verbs is also one of the main topics of discussion in the thesis, and is presented in chapter 6.

1.3.3.3 Auxiliary verbs

There is a small class of auxiliary verbs that are used in combination with main lexical verbs in some syntactic structures. These are different to the auxiliary use of copula verbs discussed in §1.3.3.2, in that they encode aspectual information instead of modal information. Verbs used as auxiliaries can also function as a lexical verb. When used as an auxiliary, however, they always accompany a lexical verb. The

most common auxiliary verb is *tè*, which is the same as the lexical verb ‘sit’ and is most likely derived from it. In (61a) we can see this verb functioning as the main clause predicate with its lexical meaning ‘sit’. In (61b) it is being used as an auxiliary to carry additional aspect information. In this example the reference is an image of a man standing, indicating that as an auxiliary the verb has had much of its lexical semantics bleached.

- 61) a) *mèeme kápu tçíi thóla tè-sin dù*
 grandfather old one above sit-PST COP.PE
 ‘an old man sat above.’ (AL 091108-01 00:53)
- b) *dì yàrdala nám thíŋ=la tá-ti tè-sin dù*
 3SG up.towards sky=LOC look-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘he was looking up into the sky.’ (AL 091108-01 25:07)

The auxiliary *tè-* is discussed in relation to the imperfective aspectual information it contributes to the clause in §1.5.3.2.2.

1.3.4. Adjectives

There is a distinct class of adjectives in Lamjung Yolmo (62). This word class undergoes no known inflectional or derivational morphological processes. Comparative and superlative constructions are periphrastic, and are discussed in §1.4.7. below.

- 62) a) *pìza tàpse tçhómbo yè*
 child now big COP.EGO
 ‘the child is now big.’ (SKL 101023-06)
- b) *dì phóçop khyému yè*
 this soap cheap COP.EGO
 ‘this soap is cheap.’ (AL 091001-01)

c) *mèeme kàpu tɕíí thón -sin*
 grandfather old.animate one see-PST
 ‘and old grandfather saw.’ (AL 091108-01 23:31)

d) *ɲómbu khá*
 blue mouth
 ‘blue eyes.’ (KL 120304-02)

For many speakers, including AL, the adjective always follow the noun in the noun phrase, while for others including KL and her family from Toljung, the adjective does precede the noun in naturalistic speech (62d). The adjective never occurs in the head position. The word class of adjectives is distinct from the word class of nouns. We can see this in basic sentence structure, wherein a sentence equating two noun phrases uses the equational copula (63a) while a sentence containing a noun phrase and an adjective uses an existential copula (63b).

63) a) *òodi mì ɲà=ki rò yìmba*
 that person 1SG=GEN friend COP.EGO
 ‘that person is my friend.’ (AL 091109-01)

b) *khó tɕhúkpu yè*
 3SG.M rich COP.EGO
 ‘that person is rich.’ (SKL 101023-06)

Distinguishing the class of adjectives from adverbs is more difficult owing to the small number of adverbs in Lamjung Yolmo and the preference for deriving them from adjectives, as discussed in §1.3.5.

1.3.5. Adverbs

Adverbs appear to be a small word class that serves two main functions. The first is to modify the manner of the main verb, the second is as a clause level subordinator.

When adverbs modify the verb they are situated just before the verb. While there are a small number of adverbs that are unique lexical items, many created through combination of an adjective with the verb *pè* ('do') in the perfect form (64).

- 64) a) *yàabu pè-ti*
 good do-PERF
 'well.' (AL 091012-03)
- b) *mò kùlba pè-ti lèn-ku dù*
 3SG.F slow do-PERF sing-IPFV COP.PE
 'she is singing slowly.' (AL 091012-03)

Adverbs are also used as subordinators at clause level, where they mark temporal and manner subordination (§1.6.3.).

1.3.6. Postpositions

As with all Bodic languages, the adposition in Lamjung Yolmo is a postposition. Many typical postpositional functions are realised by the case marking suffix =*la* which attaches to nouns (see §1.4.5.) and is used to mark spatial and temporal relations (locative), movement towards a goal (allative), and the recipient of a transitive or ditransitive verb (dative). There is also a small, closed class of lexical postpositions (65).

- 65) *nàŋla* 'inside'
phíla 'outside'
tòŋla 'before' 'in front'
tíŋla 'after'
kyàpla 'behind'
thárdi 'above'
tsála 'below'

<i>phákonla</i>	‘across’
<i>pàrkila</i>	‘between’
<i>tàlda</i>	‘later’
<i>phòla</i>	‘near’
<i>tshúr</i>	‘this side’
<i>yàrla</i>	‘up’
<i>jímu</i>	‘with’

These appear directly after their object noun phrase (66), which fits with the general right-headed tendencies of the language.

- 66) a) *tcháj jímu tchú lú-kandi*
 alcohol with water put.into-NOM
 ‘put alcohol with the water.’ (KL 101026-05 0:51)
- b) *mèeme kápu tçíi thóla tè-sin dù*
 grandpa old one above sit-PST COP.PE
 ‘an old man sat above.’ (AL 091108-01 00:53)
- c) *jà lùndi=ki khá nàŋla çùu-tçe pè-ku dù*
 fish jackal=GEN mouth inside enter-INF do-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘the fish entered into the jackal’s mouth.’ (RL 101026-06 02:39)

1.3.7. Interjections and discourse markers

The final category is interjections and sentence-final particles. Interjections can occur at any point in the sentence, while discourse markers are monosyllabic and sentence-final. While interjections and discourse markers are slightly different in their functions they have been categorised together as they are short, uninflected and not grammatically obligatory.

The only interjection recorded to date is *átcha*. It mainly used to express dismay after the speaker says something they feel to be incorrect. It can constitute a complete utterance by itself. This example comes from the Family Story (thesis §3.2.1.), where AL uses the Nepali word for ‘newspaper/magazine’ *pótrika* before remembering the Yolmo equivalent *čígu*, and expresses her dismay at using the wrong word:

- 67) *khyópiza tçí=ki pótrika tsòŋ...pótrika... átcha chígu*
 man one=ERG newspaper sell...paper... sorry newspaper
tsòŋ-ti tèt -sin dù
 sell-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘a man sells newspaper... newspaper...sorry, has sold newspaper.’
 (AL 091108-01 11:52)

Discourse markers are monosyllabic sentence-final elements in this language. They semantically modify the content of the preceding clause. To date, there is no evidence that they can be used anywhere other than sentence-finally. They are different to nominal emphatic markers (discussed in §1.4.8. below) in that they operate at the clausal level instead of just the noun. A broad analysis of several of them has been given here, however they warrant much more study. The reported speech particle *ló* is used to indicate that the utterance is the reported speech of another person (68).

- 68) *dì mèmeya qò-ke ló*
 this family go-NON.PST RS
 ‘this family is going (she said).’ (AL 100926-01)

This particle is discussed in more detail in the section on reported speech (§1.6.9.). It is also discussed in much more detail in §8.2 of the main thesis.

A very common discourse marker is the long, high *óo* which is used frequently in natural discourse. It has an invocative sense similar to the English use of ‘ok?’ as a tag at the end of a sentence (69).

- 69) a) *nàṅbar thú óo*
 tomorrow meet PART
 ‘tomorrow (we) meet, ok!’ (AL 091002-01)
- b) *khé=ki mème=la khé=ki pìza pìru tér-toṅ óo*
 2SG=GEN family=DAT 2SG=GEN child small give-IMP PART
 ‘give (it) to your family, your small child, ok!’
 (SBL 101124-03 25:56)

The particle *ná* when used alone gives the sentence a degree of supposition (70).

- 70) *khyá sà-ṭo ná*
 2SG eat-DUB PART
 ‘you will eat, I suppose?’ (AL 091206-01)

In contrast, the particle *lée* adds emphasis to the utterance (71).

- 71) *khyá sà-ke lée*
 2SG eat-NON.PST PART
 ‘you will eat.’ (AL 091206-01)

This is not quite the imperative that the English reading gives, but a more generally emphatic sense. The particles *ná* and *lée* are most often heard used together, and give a sense of polite request to the utterance (72).

- 72) *sò ná léé*
 eat.IMP PART PART
 ‘please eat.’ (RL 101029-02)

1.3.8. *Honorifics*

As with many other Tibetan languages, Lamjung Yolmo has a set of honorific forms of common words. This includes a small set of honorific verbs and an even smaller set of honorific nouns. These are used in speech directed towards Lamas (Buddhist priests) and very respected senior members of the community. A list of the honorific are given with their non-honorific equivalents below.

73)	Regular form	Honorific form	English
	<i>sà</i>	<i>çè</i>	‘eat’
	<i>tè</i>	<i>çù</i>	‘sit’
	<i>jàl</i>	<i>sìm</i>	‘sleep’
	<i>òŋ</i>	<i>phép</i>	‘come’
	<i>làŋ</i>	<i>çàŋ</i>	‘stand’
	<i>thúŋ</i>	<i>tché</i>	‘drink’

Honorific verbs can take tense and negation, but do not take imperative marking. To give an imperative sense they are used bare.

There is also a small number of honorific nouns.

74)	Regular form	Honorific form	English
	<i>çàmu</i>	<i>kúça</i>	‘hat’
	<i>ába</i>	<i>yàp</i>	‘father’
	<i>làkpa</i>	<i>tchék</i>	‘hand’
	<i>tíŋba</i>	<i>çáp̄ta</i>	‘foot’

None of these honorific forms are used in regular conversation, and many speakers do not use them at all. It is highly likely that these forms were not used in Lamjung Yolmo at all for some time, and have been reappropriated by speakers looking to make their language more sophisticated. This is in contrast to speakers in Helambu Valley, who I observed recalled these forms, and many more, quite easily. This almost complete lack of the use of these honorifics in Lamjung Yolmo is one regard in which it is different to that spoken in Melamchi and Helambu.

1.4. Morphology of the noun phrase

This section takes the nouns phase as its focus. I start by looking at the structure of the noun phrase (§1.4.1.), before looking at lexical noun (§1.4.2.). In regards to lexical nouns I will first look at simple nouns (§1.4.2.1.), then compound nouns (§1.4.2.2.), proper nouns (§1.4.2.3.) and then the process of pluralisation (§1.4.2.4.). I then turn to pronouns, (§1.4.3.), before looking at articles (§1.4.4.), case-marking (§1.4.5.) and numerals and measurements (§1.4.6.). Finally I look at the role of the adjective in the noun phrase (§1.4.7.) and nominal discourse suffixes (§1.4.8.).

1.4.1. Structure of the noun phrase

The noun phrase in Lamjung Yolmo consists of an obligatory noun or pronoun. It is possible for it to also contain a determiner, case-marker, numeral classifier, number marker or focus marker. The word order is consistent; a template of prototypical noun phrase order would be (Determiner) Noun = CASE(-FOC)(= PL) (Numeral Classifier) (Number) (Adjective). Some examples of noun phrases are given below, marked in square brackets, as can be seen, nouns can be either concrete (75a)-(75c), or abstract (75d):

- 75) a) [*tchómbo háḍa*]
 [big alcohol.distilling.pot]
 ‘big distillation pot.’ (KL 101026-05 1:01)
- b) [*bènzei thóla [khyópìza ní] [sáa=la] [kyopìza tçíi]*]
 [bench(Eng)] above [man two] [ground=LOC] [man one]
 ‘on the bench, two men, on the ground one man.’
 (AL 091108-01 06:12)
- c) [*pìza [áma-ti nímu] pháŋ-sin dù*]
 [child] [mother-FOC with] carry-PST COP.PE
 ‘with the mother the child was carried.’ (AL 091108-01 09:35)
- d) [*òodi mílam] yàabu yèke*
 [that dream] good COP.EGO.PST
 ‘that dream was good.’ (AL 100924-01)

1.4.2. Types of lexical nouns

Nouns in Lamjung Yolmo can be either simple or compound, although simple nouns are much more common. Each is discussed below (§1.4.2.1. and §1.4.2.2. respectively). After this proper nouns, which differ from regular lexical nouns, are outlined (§1.4.2.3.) followed by a discussion about the plural form of lexical nouns (§1.4.2.4.).

1.4.2.1 Simple nouns

Simple nouns can be either monosyllabic (76a) or disyllabic (76b).

- 76) a) *tshá* ‘salt’
khá ‘mouth’
- b) *khámbu* ‘peach’
dzùbu ‘body’

1.4.2.2 Compound nouns

There are a few instances where it appears that nouns have been formed from compounding; notably these nouns are longer than the simple nouns and are often trisyllabic. In the examples below the original lexical items are taken from Hari and Lama (2004) for Melamchi Valley Yolmo. *khyòwa* is not used in Lamjung Yolmo and *pèemi* specifically refers to a wife, the word *pìza* in Lamjung Yolmo refers to a baby or child. Neither of the compounded forms that exist in Lamjung Yolmo appear to exist in Melamchi Valley Yolmo.

- 77) a) *khyòwa* + *pìza* *khyòpìza*
 man + child ‘man’
- b) *pìimi* + *pìza* *pèmpìza*
 woman + child ‘woman’

The compound noun only carries tone on the first syllable and has the stress pattern of a single word. Given this evidence compound nouns have been treated as single lexical items. Compounding appears to not be particularly productive and the small number of compound nouns found are used consistently across a number of speakers.

Complex nouns are formed when one or more nouns or nominalised verbs are used together (78).

- 78) a) *khát zà-kandi khópi*
 bed put-NOM room
 ‘bedroom.’ (AL 091019-02)

- b) *dzùbu thú -sa*
 body wash-NOM.LOC
 ‘bathroom.’ (AL 091019-02)

There have been more examples collected that resemble these, indicating that this strategy is much more productive than the compounding seen above.

1.4.2.3 *Proper nouns*

Proper nouns are a sub-group of lexical nouns that behave differently to other nouns. Proper nouns refer to specific locations, such as village or town names, or to personal names. They do not occur with number marking or articles and to date there are no examples of proper nouns occurring with adjectives. Instead they occupy the whole noun phrase (79).

- 79) a) *rám tóo-ku dù*
 Ram hunger-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘Ram is hungry.’ (AL 270112-01)

- b) *ɲà=ki mìn sòm yimba*
 1SG=GEN name Som COP.EGO
 ‘my name is Som.’ (RL 110208-02)

1.4.2.4 *Plural*

Number marking on lexical nouns except proper nouns can take a plural using the suffixing clitic =*ya* (80a), or a dual using the separate lexical item *ɲípu* (80b). There is no indication that the plural is more likely to occur with human or non-human nouns.

- 80) a) *rò* 'friend'
rò = ya 'friends'
- b) *khyópiza* 'man'
khyópiza nípu 'two men'

Both are optional, and not invoked if the number is clear from context or if an overt number or adjective is used with the noun. This appears to hold consistent regardless of whether the noun is human, animate or inanimate (81).

- 81) a) *ɲà túpre-raŋ*
 fish many-EMPH
 'many fish.' (RL 101027-02 01:11)
- b) *pèmpiza sùm dù*
 woman three COP.PE
 'there are three women.' (AL 101012-02 21:07)

Only count nouns are marked for plurality, although given the optional plurality this is often hard to distinguish (82).

- 82) a) *tɕà*
 chicken
 'a chicken.' (AL 091020-03)
- b) *tɕà = ya*
 chicken = PL
 'two chickens.' (AL 091020-03)
- c) *tɕà ní*
 chicken two
 'two chickens.' (AL 091020-03)

d) * *tçà çá jí*
 chicken meat two
 * ‘two chicken meat.’ (AL 091020-03)

e) *tçà çá kilo jí*
 chicken meat kilo(Eng) two
 ‘two kilos of chicken meat.’ (AL 091020-03)

The plural suffix comes before case marking, as shown in §1.4.5.1. below. Where the noun phrase includes an adjective the plural marker will come after the adjective, indicating that this is a clitic (83).

83) *néki sám̄ba = ya*
 cooking.pot new = PL
 ‘new cooking pots.’ (AL 100924-01)

1.4.3. *Pronouns*

Lamjung Yolmo has personal (§1.4.3.1.), demonstrative (§1.4.3.2.), interrogative (§1.4.3.3.) and indefinite (§1.4.3.4.) pronouns.

1.4.3.1 *Personal Pronouns*

Personal pronouns are given in Table 1.5.

	Singular	Plural	Dual
1.inclusive	<i>ŋà</i>	<i>òraŋ</i>	<i>òraŋ nípu</i>
1.exclusive		<i>ɲì</i>	<i>ɲì nípu</i>
2.	<i>khé</i>	<i>khyá</i>	<i>khyá nípu</i>
3.male	<i>khó</i>	<i>khúŋ</i>	<i>khúŋ nípu</i>
3.female	<i>mò</i>		
3	<i>dì / òodi</i>	<i>dìya</i>	<i>dì nípu</i>
reflexive	<i>ràŋ</i>		

Table 1.5. Personal pronouns in Lamjung Yolmo

As with lexical nouns, plural forms can and do frequently occur without a plural marker (84a), however they can also be used with the plural suffix (84b). It is still unclear if the plural is used to any pragmatic effect, or whether it is simply optional.

- 84) a) *ɲì tçémendo sà-ke*
 1PL.EXCL egg eat-NON.PST
 ‘we are eating egg.’ (AL 090915-04)
- b) *ɲì = ya yèmbu = la yè*
 1PL.EXCL = PL Kathmandu = LOC COP.EGO
 ‘we are in Kathmandu.’ (AL 090916-02)

Although not obligatory in this context, pronouns can also co-occur with numbers (85).

- 85) a) *khó=ya súm òŋ-ke*
 3SG.M=PL three come-NON.PST
 ‘them three are coming.’ (AL 120121-01)

Pronouns can occur with adjectives but this is a forced meaning and quite uncommon. (86) would be acceptable if there were two women in the room (one big and one small) and the larger one was asleep.

- 86) a) *tchómbo mò jàl-ke*
 big 3SG.F sleep-NON.PST
 ‘the big she is sleeping.’ (AL 120121-01)

Pronouns can not occur with determiners (87), even to give a coerced meaning.

- 87) a) * *dì mò jàl-ke*
 this 3SG.F sleep-NON.PST
 * ‘this she is sleeping.’ (AL 120121-01)

For non-first person pronouns the plural form can be invoked to distinguish a higher level of formality with singular reference instead of the standard singular form; this occurs frequently in paradigm elicitation (88).

- 88) a) *dàŋ kùŋmu khé jàl-sin*
 yesterday night 2SG sleep-PST
 ‘last night you (singular) slept.’ (AL 090916-06)
- b) *dàŋ kùŋmu khyá jàl-sin*
 yesterday night 2PL sleep-PST
 ‘last night you (singular, high) slept.’ (AL 090916-06)

An example from more naturalistic data occurred during the Family Story task (thesis §3.2.1.). One of the characters in the story is an old man. In (89) we see the

older man being referred to with the plural form to convey more respect while the younger man (who they infer is his son) is referred to with the less respectful pronoun form:

89) a) *kàpu tɛí mìn khúj ába yimba-na kí*
 old.animate one COP.EGO.NEG 3PL father COP.EGO-COND or
 ‘it’s not an old man it is their father maybe.’ (SBL 101124-03 21:12)

b) *dì khó = ki ába yimba*
 this 3SG.M = GEN father COP.EGO
 ‘this is his father.’ (SBL 101124-03 08:05)

In naturally occurring narrative and conversation the subject noun phrase can often be dropped if the subject is clear from context. In (90a) the last overt reference to the subject was a half a dozen utterances ago, however it is still clear from the context who the referent is. In (90b) there is no overt verbal reference to the subjects, however the speaker and her interlocutor have a single image that they are both looking at, thus making the subject of the utterance clear to both.

90) a) *healthpost = la kál-sin dù*
 healthpost(Eng) = DAT go.PERF-PST COP.PE
 ‘(they) went to the healthpost.’ (SBL 101124-03 03:02)

b) *phársi túu-ti dù*
 pumpkin(Nep) pick-PERF COP.PE
 ‘(they) pick pumpkin.’ (SL 091108-01 06:34)

1.4.3.2 *Demonstrative Pronouns*

There are three basic demonstrative pronouns *dì*, *tóodi*, and *òodi*:

91)	<i>dì</i>	‘this’	proximal
	<i>tóodi</i>	‘this/that’	mid-distal
	<i>òodi</i>	‘that’	distal

The proximal is the same as the third singular personal pronoun used for proximal objects. The mid-distal is used for things that are considered to be not proximal but can still be seen. The distal is used for things that are not proximal and either visible or not to the speaker.

- 92) a) *dì kálam yimba*
 this pen(Nep) COP.EGO
 ‘this is a pen.’ (AL 091001-01)
- b) *òodi kálam yimba*
 that pen(Nep) COP.EGO
 ‘that is a pen.’ (AL 091001-01)

For examples of their usage as determiners see §1.4.4. below.

1.4.3.3 Interrogative Pronouns

The following interrogative pronouns have been recorded for Lamjung Yolmo:

93)	<i>sú</i>	‘who’
	<i>nàm</i>	‘when’
	<i>kàla</i>	‘where’
	<i>tçípe</i>	‘why’
	<i>tçí</i>	‘what’
	<i>kàndi</i>	‘which’
	<i>súgi (who = GEN)</i>	‘whose’

súla (*who = DAT*) ‘whom’
kànmu ‘how’

There is no word order change when interrogative pronouns are used (94).

94) a) Q: *khúŋ = ki mìn tɕí yimba*
 3PL = GEN name what COP.EGO
 ‘what is his name?’ (RL 200212-03)

A: *khúŋ = ki mìn sòm yimba*
 3PL = GEN name Som COP.EGO
 ‘his name is Som.’ (RL 200212-03)

b) Q: *kàze bòdz tè-sin*
 how.many o'clock sit-PST
 ‘what is the time?’ (RL 200212-03)

A: *kù bòdz tè-sin*
 nine o'clock sit -PST
 ‘it is nine o'clock’ (RL 200212-03)

b) Q: *pìza kàla yèba*
 baby where COP.EGO.PST
 ‘where is the baby?’ (AL 091001-01)

A: *pìza khím = la yè*
 baby house = LOC COP.EGO
 ‘the baby is in the house’ (AL 091001-01)

The interrogative pronouns *sú* (‘who’) and *tɕí* (‘what’) are the only two that form cliticised interrogatives with the ego equational copula *yimba* in naturalistic speech, giving *súmba* and *tɕímba* respectively:

- 95) a) *ɲà=ki di ába súmba áda súmba*
 1SG=GEN this father who.COP.EGO brother.elder who.COP.EGO
pòmo súmba ádzi súmba
 daughter who.COP.EGO sister.elder who.COP.EGO
 ‘who is my father? who is my brother? who is my daughter? who
 is my older sister?’ (SBL 101124-03 10:52)
- b) *tçímba?*
 what.COP.EGO
 ‘what is it?’ (AL 091001-01)

In careful speech, and in writing, speakers will separate the forms. These cliticised forms are also found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari and Lama, 2004).

Interrogative pronouns and their use in question constructions are discussed in more detail in chapter 7 (§7.3.) of the thesis.

1.4.3.4 Indefinite Pronouns

Indefinite pronouns in Lamjung Yolmo have been rarely recorded consistently across speakers or even with the same speaker. Some common forms are given below:

- 96) *tíbirere* ‘some’ (count nouns)
tíbitçi ‘some’ (mass nouns)
tçi àŋ ‘anything’ / ‘nothing’
mì dzàmmaraŋ ‘everyone’

Some examples of the use of relative pronouns in clauses are given in (97).

- 97) a) *ɲà ɲímu tɕí àŋ mè*
 1SG with nothing COP.EGO.NEG
 ‘I have nothing with me.’ (SBL 101124-03 25:51)
- b) *tíbitɕi dùba dèla*
 few COP.PE.EMPH here
 ‘there are a few (fish) here.’ (SUL 101027-02 01:04)

1.4.4. Articles

There are no words in Lamjung Yolmo that are specifically used as articles. There are, however, words that do function as articles. They are not always used and the definiteness of the noun phrase cannot be inferred from their absence. The proximal demonstrative pronoun and third person pronoun *dì* is used to signal definiteness, as are the distal variants *òodi* and *tóodi* (98).

- 98) a) *dì mì nàkpu koŋa=le lép-sin dù*
 this person black room=ABL arrive-PST COP.PE
 ‘this black person arrived from the room.’ (AL 081109-01 24:10)
- b) *dì tɕàro=ki lú nèn yè*
 this crow=ERG song sing COP.EGO
 ‘the crow sings a song.’ (RL 101027-01 02:08)
- c) *òodi lú yàabu dù*
 that song good COP.PE
 ‘that man is my friend.’ (RL 110129-01)
- d) *tóodi míi=la phó-kandi*
 that eye=DAT hit-NOM
 ‘(he) hit that eye.’ (AL 091108-01 16:22)

The plural demonstrative is not used as a determiner, only the single (99). Plurality is conveyed on the noun itself, not the determiner, which is functioning as an article.

- 99) a) *dì mì=ya yòlmo yimba*
 these person=PL Yolmo COP.EGO
 ‘these people are Yolmo.’ (AL 120121-01)
- b) * *dì=ya mì yòlmo yimba*
 these=PL person Yolmo COP.EGO
 * ‘these people are Yolmo.’ (AL 120121-01)

It should be noted however that when a demonstrative pronoun is not being used as an article it can take the plural marker as it is acting as the noun in the noun phrase (100).

- 100) a) *òodì=ya yàabu yè.*
 that=PL good COP.EGO
 ‘those are good.’ (AL 100922-01)
- b) * *òodì=ya mì yàabu yè*
 that=PL person good COP.EGO
 * ‘those person are good.’ (AL 100922-01)
- c) *òodì mì=ya yàabu yè*
 that person=PL good COP.EGO
 ‘those people are good.’ (AL 100922-01)

The numeral ‘one’ *tɕíí* can be used as an indefinite article (101).

- 101) a) *pèmpiza tɕíí dàla gòò tà-m-ti tèt-sin dù*
 woman one here head bind-PERF sit-PST COP.PE
 ‘a woman here had her head bound.’ (AL 091108-01 04:17)
- b) *mèeme kàpu tɕíí thón-sin*
 grandfather old.person one watch-PST
 ‘an old grandfather watched.’ (AL 091108-01 23:30)

As can be seen in the examples above, these uses of demonstratives and numbers for these functions does not constitute a consistent lexical class of articles as they do not appear in a constant location in the noun-phrase. The demonstratives always precede the noun as they do in their other functions, while the number *tɕii* follows.

1.4.5. *Case-marking*

Like other Tibeto-Burman languages of this branch of the family (see Kelly 2004 for Sherpa, Vesalainen and Vesalainen 1980 for Lhomi, Tournadre and Dorje 2003 for Standard Tibetan and LaPolla 1995 for Tibeto-Burman languages in general)

Lamjung Yolmo has a small number of case-markers that perform multiple functions. The case-markers in Lamjung Yolmo are:

= <i>ki</i>	genitive, ergative, instrumental
= <i>la</i>	locative, allative, dative
= <i>le(gi)</i>	ablative

Each case-marker will be glossed with these specific functions for every utterance, rather than a general glossing for each form. This is for a number of reasons. The first is that there is no underlying feature of each group of meanings that they could be glossed. Secondly although they have the same form their functions vary; for example, as will be shown below, the ergative suffix =*ki* is optional while the instrumental =*ki* is obligatory. Finally, as mentioned Tibeto-Burman languages frequently have multiple functions for each case-marking form, and these are always differentiated in the glossing, for example the Dumi ergative and instrumental (van Driem 1993, pp. 62, 65) and Sherpa =*la* which is used for dative, associative, allative, instrumental, comitative and locative (Kelly 2004, p. 307).

The case-markers are phonologically bound, as explained in §1.2.6.1. The genitive/ergative marker is voiced in some environments. Case-markers are

morphologically clitics; in (102a) the genitive marker scope is across the two conjoined nouns in the subject position and in (102d) we see the dative scope across the two conjoined nouns in the object position. It is less preferable to have the case marker on both the conjoined nouns as in (102b) and (102e) and the case marker can't be used on only the first conjoined noun as in (102c) and (102f).

- 102) a) *ása ráŋgi sùsma=**ki** khím*
 Asa and Susma=GEN house
 'Asa and Susma's house.' (AL 100923-01)
- b) ? *ása=**ki** ráŋgi sùsma=**ki** khím*
 Asa=GEN and Susma=GEN house
 ? 'Asa and Susma's house.' (AL 100923-01)
- c) * *ása=**ki** ráŋgi sùsma khím*
 Asa=GEN and Susma house
 * 'Asa and Susma's house.' (AL 100923-01)
- d) *khó sàse ñà ráŋgi khyá=**la** tér-sin*
 3SG.M food 1SG and 2SG=DAT give-PST
 'he gives food to you and me.' (AL 100923-01)
- e) *khó sàse ñà=**la** ráŋgi khyá=**la** tér-sin*
 3SG.M food 1SG=DAT and 2SG=DAT give-PST
 'he gives food to you and me.' (AL 100923-01)
- f) *khó sàse ñà=**la** ráŋgi khya tér-sin*
 3SG.M food 1SG=DAT and 2SG give-PST
 'he gives food to you and me.' (AL 100923-01)

Subjects of intransitive verbs and of transitive verbs where the ergative case is not used take no overt case marking. These are fulfilling a nominative case function, however as there is no overt case marker it will not be glossed. The relatively consistent SOV word order and disambiguation in context ensure that speakers of

Lamjung Yolmo rarely confuse sentence arguments in contexts without overt case-marking.

1.4.5.1 Case-marking and plural suffixation

Where the noun has a plural marker the case-marking suffix comes after the plural-marking suffix (103).

- 103) *mèeme kápu = ya = ki árak thúj -ke*
 grandfather old = PL = ERG alcohol drink-NON.PST
 ‘old men drink alcohol.’ (AL 091016-01 02:49)

1.4.5.2 Case-marker = *ki*; genitive, instrumental and ergative case

The case marker = *ki* has three functions: as the marker of a possessor in a possessive relationship (genitive), the entity that indirectly instigates an action (instrumental), and the subject of a transitive verb (ergative). These uses are all discussed separately below, but (104) is one example in the corpus where all three uses of the case marker are found in the one utterance.

- 104) *ɲà = ki di çérma pìza sùm = la ɲà = ki làkpa = ki*
 1SG = ERG this girl.young child three = DAT 1SG = GEN hand = INS
çáu tér-sin
 apple give-PST
 ‘I gave the three young girls apples with my hand.’ (AL 100926-01)

The genitive marker is used for alienable (105a) and inalienable possession (105b).

- 105) a) *khó = ki khím*
 3SG.M = GEN house
 ‘my house.’ (SBL 101124-03 01:58)

- b) *tɕádzuŋma = ki kʰá*
 bird = GEN mouth
 ‘the bird’s mouth.’ (ST 120304-01 06:36)

The second use of the =*ki* clitic is to mark instrumental case (106).

- 106) a) *ŋà ŋà = ki ləkpa = ki tɕémendo sà-ke*
 1SG 1SG = GEN hand = INS egg eat-NON.PST
 ‘I eat egg with my hand.’ (AL 091029-02)
- b) *tɕàro = ki kʰá = ki ɲà dzùm-sin dù*
 crow = GEN mouth = INS fish seize-PST COP.PE
 ‘the crow seized the fish with its mouth.’ (KL 101026-06 0:27)

In situations where two of the =*ki* suffixes are needed it is not reduplicated. In these situations speakers will only use the suffix once. For example, in (107) the =*ki* suffixed to *tɕhódo* is glossed as an instrumental, but given that it is the subject of a transitive clause it could also be marked as ergative:

- 107) *khó = ki tɕhódo = ki ɲà sá = la tàp-ke*
 3SG = GEN lip = INS fish ground = DAT drop-NON.PST
 ‘his beak dropped the fish to the ground.’
 (RL Jackal and Crow picture book)

When asked to give a gloss of such a sentence into Nepali speakers will generally chose to give only one of the forms. It is possible that the one suffix is undertaking both functions, or it is clear enough from context so that it’s not so important to overtly mark the ergative function, as discussed in optional ergativity above.

Finally, the case-marker =*ki* is also used to mark the ergative case, appearing on the subject of transitive verbs (108).

- 108) a) *áma =ki lækpa tçi =ki pìza dzùm-timaraŋ*
 mother = GEN hand one = ERG child hold-IPFV
 ‘the mother’s hand held the child.’ (AL 091108-01 05:05)
- b) *tçàro =ki jà dzùm-sin dù*
 crow = ERG fish seize-PST COP.PE
 ‘those two drank alcohol.’ (KL 101026-06 0:22)

The ergative marking on verbs in Lamjung Yolmo is not always present. This is a common feature of ergative marking in Central Tibetan languages, occurring in both Standard Tibetan (Tournadre 1991, 1995) and Sherpa (Kelly 2004, pp. 349-352), and as LaPolla (1995, 2003b) shows, optionality of ergativity is the preference in Tibeto-Burman languages; indeed DeLancy (1990c, pp. 78-79) argues that this can be traced back to Proto-Tibeto-Burman. There is a small sub-set of transitive verbs where the subjects take the dative marker instead of an ergative marker, which are discussed at the end of §1.4.5.3. below.

McGregor (2010) notes that the optionality of ergativity is rarely simply a result of free variation, but occurs in specific environments. For Lamjung Yolmo the optionality of ergative case-marking depends on a number of factors; those that I will discuss below include agentivity, tense and habitual mood. There is still a lot of work to be done in the cross-linguistic study of ergativity, and there is also a lot more analysis to do of ergativity in Yolmo, but the discussion below presents some of the more salient observations.

Subjects of transitive verbs that display strong agentivity are more likely to take ergative marking. In the (102a) from the Jackal and Crow story (thesis §3.2.2.) we see AL does not mark the agent of the verb *túu*, meaning to pick or pick up, but she does use the ergative marker in (109b) for the more strongly agentive *dzùm*, which means take, or take away, but is also often used in situations where English would

use capture or seize. For this verb the subject is much more agentive and so it is more likely to be marked with the ergative (109b).

- 109) a) *tçátsuŋma tçíi òŋ-ti tju-ti khér-sin*
 bird one come-PERF pick up-PERF take.away PST
 ‘a bird came, picked up (the fish), took it away.’
 (AL 101010-01 06:36)

- b) *tòŋbo thóla tçátsuŋma = ki jà há nàŋla dzùm -ti*
 tree above bird = ERG fish mouth inside take-PERF
tè-sin dù
 AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘up in the tree the bird took a fish in its mouth.’
 (AL 101010-01 07:24)

This does not mean that there is a defined set of verbs that will have ergative marking in all contexts. In (11) we see the *dzùm* verb being used by two different speakers with different tense constructions. In (110) we see ALL using the =*ki* ergative marker, but in (110b) we see AL use the same verb without the ergative, even though she does so in a later section of the narrative, as shown in (109b).

- 110) a) *tçàro = ki maachhaa dzùm-sin dù*
 crow = ERG fish(Nep) take-PST COP.PE
 ‘the crow took the fish.’ (ALL 101028-01 01:56)
- b) *tçàro há = la dzùm-sin dù*
 crow mouth = LOC take-PST COP.PE
 ‘in the crow’s mouth, took (the fish) away.’ (AL 101010-01 01:35)

An interesting feature of this agentivness is that it appears from narrative examples that the subject of an intransitive verb can sometimes take ergative case if the agentivity of the subject is a highly salient feature of the event (111).

- 111) *lùndi = ki òŋ tè-ke*
 jackal = ERG come AUX-NON.PST
 ‘the jackal is coming.’ (RL 101027-01 03:49)

This agentive element of the ergative marker in Lamjung Yolmo indicates that perhaps the motivation for ergativity is not entirely syntactic, but more pragmatic. Like Coupe’s (2011) analysis of the use of Mongsen Ao, for Yolmo it can be easier to predict the use of ergativity based on pragmatic features than syntactic.

The use of the ergative marker also correlates with tense. As mentioned in Hari (2010, p. 39-42) the ergative marker is more common in past tense constructions than non-past tense in Melamchi Valley Yolmo, and this pattern appears to also exist in Lamjung Yolmo (112).

- 112) a) *ŋà tó sà-ke*
 1SG rice.cooked eat-NON.PST
 ‘I eat rice.’ (RL 101023-03)
- b) *ŋà = ki tó sà-sin*
 1SG = ERG rice.cooked eat-PST
 ‘I ate rice.’ (RL 101023-03)

In elicited constructions there are examples of the ergative marker not being used with past construction (113).

- 113) *khé mëndza kyúr-sin*
 2SG bowl throw-PST
 ‘you threw the cup.’ (AL 100928-01)

This is likely because in elicited paradigms the speaker usually decides to start the paradigm with or without the use of an ergative marker and then sticks with this condition for most of the set. There are far fewer naturalistic examples where the

- c) *jì=ya yèmbu=la yè*
 1PL.EXCL=PL Kathmandu=LOC COP.EGO
 ‘we are in Kathmandu.’ (AL 090916-02)

Examples of the locative use in temporal constructions (116).

- 116) a) *jì bàkal sà pémba=la jò-ke*
 1PL.EXCL group Saturday=LOC shop-NON.PST
 ‘we shop on Saturday.’ (AL 091029-02)
- b) *jì bàkal màgi dawa=la çamu dù*
 1PL.EXCL group Mag(Nep) month=LOC cold COP.PE
 ‘we are cold in Mag.’ (AL 091029-02)

Example of the allative use (117).

- 117) a) *arak tùŋ-ti dzi-ti òŋ-ti péemi=la*
 alcohol drink-PERF drunk-PERF come-PERF wife=ALL
 ‘(he) drank alcohol, got drunk and came to his wife.’
 (AL 091108-01 09:30)
- b) *heltpost=la kâl-sin dù*
 healthpost(Eng)=ALL go.PERF-PST COP.PE
 ‘(they) went to the healthpost.’ (SBL 101124-03 03:02)

Examples of the dative use, where it is not in subject position (116).

- 118) a) *khyá=ki ñà=la tó tér-ti yèke*
 2PL=ERG 1SG=DAT rice.cooked give-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘you gave me rice.’ (AL 091029-02)

- b) *ŋà = la láure kwèla térti yè*
 1SG = DAT soldiers(Nep) clothing give-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘the soldiers give me clothing.’ (SBL 101123-04 25:22)

The case marker =*la* also marks the subject in a very small set of transitive verbs. Hari (2010, p. 39) refers to this class of verbs as the ‘receptive’ set while those verbs that pattern using ergative marking as the ‘active’ verb set. This set of dative-marked subjects denote personal, and usually internal, states and actions (119). In data collected so far it appears that the receptive set in Lamjung Yolmo is smaller than in Melamchi Valley Yolmo.

- 119) a) *ŋà = la tóoba*
 1SG = DAT hungry
 ‘I feel hungry.’
 (lit. ‘to me hunger is felt.’) (RL 101027-01 04:12)
- b) *ŋà = la jàl-ni sém kyé-ku dù*
 1SG = DAT sleep -FOC mind think IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I would like to sleep.’
 (lit. ‘to me sleeping is thought.’) (RL 101123-02)

There is a similar process, and set of verbs, in Nepali. Acharya (1991, p. 150) refers to this set of verbs in Nepali as “requir[ing] the obligatory fronting of the dative complement.” This leads to the same structure with a dative verb where verbs not in this category would have a standard subject. The verbs given as examples of this set in Nepali include the same sense of personal experience or state that is found in dative subject verbs in Yolmo.

1.4.5.4 Case-marker =*le(ki)*; ablative case

The ablative is used to describe the location that something is moving away from. In speech there is variation in form between either =*le* (120a) and =*leki* (120b):

- 120) a) *bèsisahar =le yàrki gàq̄i =la t̄chúdze jí*
 Besisahar = ABL up bus = LOC hour two
káŋba q̄ò-na t̄chúdze s̄úm
 leg go-COND hour three
 ‘Up from Besisahar two hours in a bus, three hours if you walk.’
 (AL 091006-01 00:40)
- b) *nàmgyu =leki kháwa kàŋ dzàmmaraŋ thón-ke*
 nàmgyu = ABL mountain.peak all see-NON.PST
 ‘from Namgyu you can see all the mountain peaks.’
 (AL 091006-01 01:08)

The difference between the use of =le or =leki could possibly be a difference of containment, as shown by the example below where the source location is relatively constrictive of the object moving away. In (121) the speaker was very clear that only =leki was appropriate.

- 121) a) *pèmpiza t̄c̄í t̄bul thóla t̄-ti c̄ígu nàŋla =leki*
 woman one table above sit-PERF paper among = ABL
tòriyaŋ tén-ku dù
 cucumber pull.out -IPFV COP.PE
 ‘a woman sat above the table, from amongst the papers (she) pulled a cucumber.’
 (AL 101006-01)
- b) * *pèmpiza t̄c̄í t̄bul thóla t̄-ti c̄ígu nàŋla =le*
 woman one table above sit-PERF paper among = ABL
tòriyaŋ tén-ku dù
 cucumber pull.out-IPFV COP.PE
 * ‘a woman sat above the table, from amongst the papers (she) pulled a cucumber.’
 (AL 101006-01)

This sentence was elicited using the video stimulus from the Put Project (Bowerman, et al. 2004), discussed in §3.2.3. of the thesis. Other videos in the kit that elicited the

= *leki* form included those where small items were retrieved from a bottle, a paper envelope, a garment pocket and a hole in a tree. Utterances where the = *le* form was used included those where items were retrieved from the ground and a person's head. This pattern would appear to confirm the analysis, however what is or is not a containment situation needs to be refined.

1.4.5.5 Associative and comitative '*jímu*'

Unlike Sherpa, which shares many case-marking similarities with Lamjung Yolmo (see Kelly 2004), associative and comitative do not use the = *la* case marker but are marked lexically using the postposition *jímu* 'with'.

Example of the associative (122).

- 122) *ɲà ɲà=ki ádzi jímu lú lèn-sin*
 1SG 1SG=GEN sister.older with song sing-PST
 'I sang a song with my older sister.' (AL 091029-02)

Example of the comitative (123).

- 123) *ɲà tó jímu tɕémendo sà-sin*
 1SG rice with egg eat-PST
 'I ate egg with rice.' (AL 091029-02)

1.4.6. Numerals and measures

Lamjung Yolmo has two counting systems, a base ten and a base twenty. The base twenty system is now only used by a small number of people who are mostly older, and even they often only remember parts of the system. Even the base ten system is only known to around 20 by many speakers, who then resort to Nepali to count any higher.

1.4.6.1 Cardinal Numbers

The base ten and base twenty counting systems have the same form from one through to nineteen:

124)	<i>tɕíi</i>	‘one’	<i>tɕúdʒi</i>	‘eleven’
	<i>ɲí</i>	‘two’	<i>tɕíɲi</i>	‘twelve’
	<i>súm</i>	‘three’	<i>tɕúpsum</i>	‘thirteen’
	<i>ɕì</i>	‘four’	<i>tɕúpɕi</i>	‘fourteen’
	<i>ɲá</i>	‘five’	<i>tɕéɲa</i>	‘fifteen’
	<i>tù</i>	‘six’	<i>tɕútu</i>	‘sixteen’
	<i>tìn</i>	‘seven’	<i>tɕúptin</i>	‘seventeen’
	<i>kyè</i>	‘eight’	<i>tɕépkye</i>	‘eighteen’
	<i>kù</i>	‘nine’	<i>tɕúrku</i>	‘nineteen’
	<i>tɕú</i>	‘ten’		

From there, two different systems diverge:

125)	<u>base ten</u>	<u>base twenty</u>	<u>English</u>
	<i>ɲídʒu</i> (2x10)	<i>kháldʒi</i> (20x1)	‘twenty’
	<i>súmdʒu</i> (3x10)	<i>kháldʒi tɕú</i> (20x1 + 10)	‘thirty’
	<i>ɕíptɕu</i> (4x10)	<i>khálɲi</i> (20x2)	‘forty’
	<i>ɲáptɕu</i> (5x10)	<i>khálɲi tɕú</i> (20x2 + 10)	‘fifty’
	<i>tùktɕu</i> (6x10)	<i>khálsu</i> (20x3)	‘sixty’
	<i>tìndʒu</i> (7x10)	<i>khálsu tɕú</i> (20x3 + 10)	‘seventy’
	<i>kyàdʒu</i> (8x10)	<i>khálɕi</i> (20x4)	‘eighty’
	<i>kùptɕu</i> (9x10)	<i>khálɕi tɕú</i> (20x + 10)	‘ninety’

Given that both systems are used rarely, there has been no clear information about which contexts each system is preferable in, although AL did indicate that the base twenty system is more preferable when money and weights are involved.

Other than the increments of ten shown above, other numbers in the base twenty counting system are shown below to give an idea of how the numbers are arranged between the increments of 20. (126) gives a sample of these.

126)	<i>kháldzi tçíí</i>	(20 + 1)	‘twenty one’
	<i>kháldzi jí</i>	(20 + 2)	‘twenty two’
	<i>kháldzi súm</i>	(20 + 3)	‘twenty three’
	<i>kháldzi tçídzi</i>	(20 + 11)	‘thirty one’
	<i>kháldzi tçíjpi</i>	(20 + 12)	‘thirty two’
	<i>kháldzi tçúpsum</i>	(20 + 13)	‘thirty three’

The pattern continues in this fashion until both systems collapse back together at one hundred (127).

127)	<i>màna kàŋ</i>	‘one hundred’
	<i>màna jí</i>	‘two hundred’
	<i>màna súm</i>	‘three hundred’
	<i>màna çì</i>	‘four hundred’
	<i>màna ŋá</i>	‘five hundred’
	<i>màna tù</i>	‘six hundred’
	<i>màna tìn</i>	‘seven hundred’
	<i>màna kyè</i>	‘eight hundred’
	<i>màna kù</i>	‘nine hundred’

There have been no elicited numbers beyond this in Lamjung Yolmo, instead speakers resort to the Nepali numbering system.

1.4.6.2 Ordinal numbers

Ordinal numbers have been harder to elicit than cardinal numbers, and don't appear to be used as frequently. There are two constructions for ordinal numbers, both based on the cardinal system. The first uses a *-pa* suffix, which is voiced in the environment of vowels or voiced consonants, and is also found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010, p. 68). The second uses a *-la* suffix, which is not found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo and is most likely derived from the locative case marker discussed in §1.4.5.3. above. The *-pu* suffix for ordinals found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010, 68) has not been observed in use by Lamjung Yolmo speakers to date. (128) is a list of the first dozen ordinal numbers using both systems.

128)	-pa suffix	-la suffix	
	<i>tòŋbo</i>	<i>tçúila</i>	‘first’
	<i>ŋíba</i>	<i>ŋíla</i>	‘second’
	<i>súmba</i>	<i>súmla</i>	‘third’
	<i>çìba</i>	<i>çìla</i>	‘fourth’
	<i>ŋába</i>	<i>ŋála</i>	‘fifth’
	<i>tùkpa</i>	<i>tùkla</i>	‘sixth’
	<i>tìmba</i>	<i>tìmla</i>	‘seventh’
	<i>kyèba</i>	<i>kyèla</i>	‘eighth’
	<i>kùba</i>	<i>kùla</i>	‘ninth’
	<i>tçúba</i>	<i>tçúla</i>	‘tenth’
	<i>tçúdziba</i>	<i>tçúdzila</i>	‘eleventh’
	<i>tçìŋiba</i>	<i>tçìŋila</i>	‘twelve’

No speakers readily gave ordinal numbers over 20 and it's likely that Nepali is more often used for ordinal constructions in daily speech.

1.4.6.3 Quantifiers

Some quantifiers in Lamjung Yolmo are given in (129).

129)	<i>phé</i>	'half'
	<i>kàŋ</i>	'full'
	<i>tòŋba</i>	'empty'
	<i>rèeree</i>	'each'
	<i>màŋbu</i>	'much' / 'many'
	<i>tíbitçi</i>	'few' (count nouns)
	<i>tíbirere</i>	'some' (mass nouns)
	<i>tàŋse</i>	'every'

As with numerals and adjectives these quantifiers occur after the noun in the noun phrase (130).

- 130) a) *nìma t̚àŋse-raŋ*
 day every-EMPH
 'every day.' (AL 100922-02)
- b) *çiŋ màŋbu yè*
 farm many COP.EGO
 'there are many farms.' (AL 091006-01-02 01:22)

1.4.6.4 Measures

Like Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari and Lama 2004, pp. 715-717), Lamjung Yolmo speakers use the Nepali system of weights and measurements, which is based around the *pathi* (just under 90 ml), *mana* (8 pathi, or 700 mls) and *muti* (5 mana, or 3 kg).

1.4.6.5 Nominal Classifiers

There are three different nominal classifiers. As they all have different grammatical forms, and are only used optionally in limited contexts for emphasis, they do not constitute a particularly unified grammatical category. The three different nominal classifiers are *mènda*, *thál* and *káraŋ*.

The first nominal classifier is *mènda*, which occurs with human animate nouns preceding a number. In elicited examples the speaker has agreed that not using the classifier also produces an acceptable utterance (131).

- 131) a) *dì mì **mènda** tù mòomo sà-ke*
this person CLF six momo eat-NON.PST
'These six people are eating momos.' (AL 091106-02)
- b) *dì mì tù mòomo sà-ke*
this person six momo eat-NON.PST
'These six people are eating momos.' (AL 091106-02)
- c) * *dì **khí** **mènda** tù mòomo sà-ke*
this dog CLF six momo eat-NON.PST
* 'these six dogs are eating momos.' (AL 091106-02)
- d) *dì **khí** tù mòomo sà-ke*
this dog six momo eat-NON.PST
'these six dogs are eating momos.' (AL 091106-02)

The second nominal classifier is *thál*, used for animals and objects, both concrete and abstract. This marker is only used to emphasise the quantity, so in (132) the speaker would only use *thál* to express their surprise at the duration of time.

132) a) *tçhúdze ní*
 hours two
 ‘two hours.’ (AL 101007-01)

b) *tçhúdze ní thál*
 hours two CLF.EMPH
 ‘only two hours!’ (AL 101007-01)

As can be seen from the example, this nominal classifier appears to the right of the number that it is referring to, while the nominal classifier *mènda* appears to the left of the number, between it and the noun. Therefore, while the two nominal classifiers are semantically in complementary use (with *mènda* used for human animate objects and *thál* used for non-human animate and all inanimate objects) they do not occur in the same position in the word order of the noun phrase.

The final numeral classifier is *káraŋ*. Although none of the three nominal classifiers can be said to be of high frequency use in Lamjung Yolmo this one is the least frequently used of the three. (133) comes from one telling of the Jackal and Crow story (thesis §3.2.2.):

133) *tçádzuŋma ní káraŋ =ki kàl màrki*
bird two CLF.EMPH=ERG go.PERF down
né çór-sin dù
 chase get.out-PST COP.PE
 ‘two birds went down and were chased out.’ (AL 101010-01 11:15)

Like *thál*, this nominal classifier appears to be used to emphatically highlight the number of non-human animate or inanimate objects. In this story the speaker had

been occasionally referring to a single bird, and occasionally to a pair, so in describing this part of the narrative it's apparent that she wants to make it clear there are two birds.

1.4.7. *Adjectives*

The class of adjectives modify nouns, and were discussed briefly in §1.3.4. above. As seen in these examples, adjectives always follow the noun and number that it is marking. It is very unusual for speakers to use more than one adjective to modify a noun. The only naturalistic example of this is when AL was describing video stimulus (thesis §3.2.3.), although it does have non-standard word order with the adjectives preceding the number (134).

- 134) *sá=la* *bàltiŋ* *kárpú* *tɕéemi* *tɕíi* *dù*
 ground=LOC bucket white small one COP.PE
 ‘a small white bucket is on the ground.’ (AL 101010-01 11:15)

More commonly, if there is a number as well as an adjective then the adjective follows the number (135).

- 135) a) *dì* *mì* *tù* *tɕúkpu*
 this person six rich
 ‘these six rich people.’ (AL 061109-02)
- b) *pèmpiza* *kyè* *dzèbu*
 women eight beautiful
 ‘eight beautiful women.’ (AL 090914-01)

One relatively productive method of creating adjectives is to use a verb stem, which is often reduplicated, with a *-pa* suffix (136).

- 136) a) *rùl-* ‘rot’ (intransitive verb)
rùl rùlba ‘rotten’ (adjective)
- b) *pàŋ-* ‘wet’ (transitive verb)
pàŋ pàŋba ‘wet’ (adjective)

It is likely that this process is related to the historic *-pa* nominaliser found in other Bodic languages (Noonan 1997, 2008).

1.4.7.1 Comparatives

There are very few examples of comparative adjective forms in the data collected for this project and it appears that it is not a preferable construction for speakers. These have a form very similar to Nepali (Acharya 1991, p. 121), where two noun phrases are placed together, followed by form to indicate the comparative, and the adjective (137).

- 137) a) *khyá=ki khím ñà=ki khím mádi tçómbó yè*
 2PL=GEN house 1SG=GEN house compare big COP.EGO
 ‘your (plural) house is bigger than my house’ (AL 091001-02)
- b) *ña=ki khím dzàmma mádi tçómbó yè*
 1SG=GEN house all compare big COP.EGO
 ‘my house is the biggest of all.’ (AL 091001-02)

1.4.7.2 Superlatives

Superlatives in Lamjung Yolmo are also lexically constructed rather than relying on morphological information attached to the adjective (138). This is in contrast to the use of the superlative suffix *-çó* found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo, as discussed by Hari (2010, p. 31).

- 138) a) *ɲà=ki khím dzàmma nàŋla tɕómbó yè*
 1SG=GEN house all among big COP.EGO
 ‘my house is the biggest.’ (AL 091001-02)
- b) *ɲà=ki dzàmma nàŋla tɕómbó pòmo=ki*
 1SG=GEN all among big daughter=GEN
bìha pè sìn-sìn
 wedding do complete-PST
 ‘My eldest daughter’s wedding is done.’ (AL 090929-01 02:35)

1.4.8. Discourse suffix

There are two nominal discourse suffixes recorded to date; *-di* and *-ni*. Both of these are optional and give prominence to the noun to which they attach. All examples collected only show these suffixes being used on the subject of a sentence, and never the object. These suffixes are able to occur in all phonological environments so they do not appear to be in morphophonemic variation.

According to Hari both of these forms can be found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo, but while she glosses the *-ni* particle as a focus marker, the *-di* suffix is referred to as an emphatic marker for experiencer in an attributive copula construction (2010 p. 25-26). Also, while Hari notes a regular morphophonemic variation between *-ti* and *-di* for the *-di* suffix in Melamchi Valley Yolmo, all examples collected to date for Lamjung Yolmo indicate that the suffix is voiced in all environments.

Both suffixes have been recorded attached to both animate and inanimate nouns. As a general tendency *-di* is more likely to attach to human animate nouns while *-ni* is more likely to attach to inanimate nouns. As these suffixes are difficult to elicit in non-naturalistic utterances it is hard to tease apart what, if any, difference there is in the emphatic function they share.

The focus-marking suffix always precedes the case-marker, as shown in (139a). As we can see from example (139b) it can also suppress the case-marker, and often does. Example (139c) shows the suffix coming after the plural suffix.

- 139) a) *áarak tùŋ-ti kyhógo-ti = ki*
 alcohol drink-PERF husband-FOC = ERG
 ‘this man drank alcohol.’ (as opposed to another man)
 (AL 091108-01 09:28)
- b) *áma-di dàla màgi làkpa = la màgi dzùm-sin dù*
 mother-FOC here corn arms = LOC corn seized-PST COP.PE
 ‘this mother is carrying corn in her arms.’ (AL 091108-01 31:39)
- c) *òodi khím = ya-di*
 that house = PL-FOC
 ‘those houses.’ (not the other ones) (AL 100924-01)

An interesting use of the *-ni* focus marker is in concessive constructions, where the subject of the second clause is focused (140).

- 140) *dì máse tséma çìmbu dù pìtça tó-ni*
 3SG dhal vegetable.curry tasty COP.PE but rice.cooked-FOC
çìmbu mìnđu
 tasty COP.PE.NEG
 ‘the daal and vegetables are tasty but the rice is not tasty.’ (AL 101005-15)

1.5. Morphology of the verb phase

In this section I look at the features of the verb phrase and its components. I start with the copula verbs and their different functions in §1.5.1. Section 1.5.2. focuses on simple and compound lexical verbs (§1.5.2.1.), and then stem classes (§1.5.2.2.), which are notably absent in Lamjung Yolmo. The inflection of the finite verb is set out in §1.5.3 including the tense (§1.5.3.1.), aspect (§1.5.3.2.), mood (§1.5.3.3.) and

verb valency (§1.5.3.4.). I look at causatives in §1.5.4. and finally verb negation in Lamjung Yolmo in §1.5.5.

1.5.1. Copulas

Lamjung Yolmo has a set of copula verbs. Not only do these verbs function as standard copulas (discussed immediately below), but like many Tibeto-Burman languages they are also used in the inflection of lexical verbs where they contribute modal information. Copulas are not inflected for person, number or politeness level and many do not distinguish tense. Instead they have functions that include equation and existence.

This section is not intended to be an exhaustive demonstration of the copula verbs. Instead it is intended to outline the main functions of each copula. The copula and evidential system and its use in interaction is complex and contextually dependant. More in-depth discussion about the meaning and uses of these forms can be found in chapter 6 of the thesis.

Table 1.6. gives the copula forms in Lamjung Yolmo. The distinctions along the side denote functional distinctions, including arguments licensed and tense (discussed in §1.5.1.1.), while those along the top are the semantic distinctions, which I will discuss in turn.

	<i>Ego</i>	<i>Dubitative</i>	<i>Perceptual evidence</i>	<i>General fact</i>
<i>Equation</i>	<i>yimba</i> ³ <i>mìn</i>	<i>yìnɔ</i> <i>mìnɔ</i>	<i>(dùba)</i> <i>(mìnduba)</i>	-
<i>Existential present</i>	<i>yè</i> <i>mè</i>	<i>yètɔ</i> <i>mètɔ</i>	<i>dù</i> <i>mìndu</i>	<i>òŋge</i> <i>mèŋge</i>
<i>past</i>	<i>yèke yèba</i> <i>mèke mèba</i>		<i>dùba</i> <i>mìnduba</i>	

Table 1.6. The Lamjung Yolmo copula system

As can be seen in Table 6.1, only the existential ego copula has distinct forms that occur in the past tense. The *yèba* form is related to the lexical *-pa* past tense suffix (§1.5.3.1.2.), while the *yèke* form cannot be morphologically analysed as the *-ke* suffix is a non-past tense suffix for lexical verbs (§1.5.3.1.1.).

1.5.1.1 Copulas of equation and existence

The equational copula has the primary function of identifying something by equating two independent noun phrases, as shown in the example below:

- 141) a) *dì kàpu yimba*
 this old.animate COP.EGO
 ‘this is the old man.’ (SBL 101124-03 00:55)

³ Some speakers of Lamjung Yolmo reduce the *yimba* copula in running speech so that it sounds more like [*mà*]. Not all speakers do this, and those speakers who do aren’t consistent in this pronunciation. This reduced form is not used in careful speech or writing (as discussed with RL 110208-02).

- b) *òodí mí ñà=ki rò yìmba*
 that person 1SG=GEN friend COP.EGO
 ‘that person is my friend.’ (AL 091109-01)

The equational structure can also be used for possessive constructions:

- 142) a) *dì pokhara=ki khúra yìmba*
 it Pokhara=GEN bread COP.EGO
 ‘it is bread from Pokhara.’
 (lit: ‘it is Pokhara’s bread.’) (AL 091001-01)

This is not a common strategy and the more common possessional structure can be found in the section on the existential copula below.

The ‘existential’ copula is somewhat misleading as a name, as it performs a variety of functions. Genetti (2007, p. 190), van Driem (1993, p. 168) and Hari (2010) all refer to the ‘existential’ copula even though it often includes other functions, including existence, location, possession and attribution. Caplow (2000) coined the term ELPA, referring to each of the functions above, to make it clear that this copula construction is not used exclusively for existential constructions. The term has also been taken up by Garrett (2001). Although I find that the acronym ELPA makes the function of the copula more transparent I will use the more generally accepted term ‘existential’ in this discussion.

Here we see the existence function (143).

- 143) *mò yèke*
 3SG.F COP.EGO.PST
 ‘she was.’ (AL 100922-01)

The locative function requires the presence of a locative marker (144).

- 144) a) *ɲà khím = la yè*
 1SG house = LOC COP.EGO
 ‘I am in the house.’
 (lit: ‘I in the house exist.’) (AL 090916-02)
- b) *çàmu ɲà = ki gòo = la yè*
 hat 1SG = GEN head = LOC COP.EGO
 ‘the hat is on my head.’
 (lit: ‘the hat exists on my head.’) (AL 090916-02)

Possessional use of the existence copula involves a genitive case marked subject (145).

- 145) *ɲà = ki làkpa tçómbò yè*
 1SG = GEN hand big COP.EGO
 ‘I have two big hands.’ (AL 090924-02)

The final use of the existential copula discussed here is in attribution, where a quality, expressed using an adjective, is attributed to somebody or something (146).

- 146) a) *khyá nàdi yèke*
 2SG ill COP.EGO.PST
 ‘you were ill.’ (AL 091104-01)
- b) *dì tçhú súŋbu yè*
 this water clean COP.EGO
 ‘this water is clean.’ (AL 091001-01)

1.5.1.2 Copulas as clause-final auxiliaries

The copula does not only function as the main verb of a sentence; some can also function as an auxiliary in certain constructions. This is a common use of copulas in

Tibeto-Burman languages and is also found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010, p. 60) and Sherpa (Kelly 2004, p. 351).

In (147a) the copula is the main verb in the clause, while in (147b), the copula comes after a lexical verb as an additional component of the verb phrase.

- 147) a) *òodi lú yàabu dù*
 that song good COP.PE
 ‘that song is good.’ (RL 110129-01)
- b) *òodi lú yàabu thé-ku dù*
 that song good hear-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘that song sounds good.’ (RL 110129-01)

The general fact copula (*ònge*) and equational ego (*yìnɔo*) and equational dubitative (*yèto*) copulas are not used for anything beyond standard copula verb constructions (although the ego copulas are used in nominalised forms as discussed in §1.5.3.1.1.). When used as verbal auxiliaries the copula verbs bring to the utterance the same modal sense that they have as copulas, thus Table 1.7. summarises the copulas that have this use is a subset of Table 1.7.

	<i>Ego</i>	<i>Dubitative</i>	<i>Perceptual evidence</i>
<i>present</i>	<i>yè</i> <i>mè</i>	<i>yèto</i> <i>mèto</i>	<i>dù</i> <i>mìndu</i>
<i>past</i>	<i>yèke yèba</i> <i>mèke mèba</i>		<i>dùba</i> <i>mìnduba</i>

Table 1.7. Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs used as clause-final auxiliaries.

In this role a subset of copula verbs can be used to add tense information as well as epistemic information about the evidential status of the utterance. The structures that use copulas as auxiliaries are perfective and imperfective (§1.5.3.2.1. and §1.5.3.2.2.), narrative past (§1.5.3.1.2.) and habitual mood (§1.5.3.2.3.). The function of copulas in these structures will be outlined in the relevant sections below.

In all of these structures the copulas are grammatically obligatory elements. The use of the copula gives modal information and if the copula used is an ego then it can bring tense information to the utterance. Speakers do omit the copula from the utterance in naturalistic speech, (§6.5.3. of the thesis). Although the copulas are behaving more like auxiliaries in these structures they will continue to be referred to as copulas throughout this sketch grammar. The reasons for this are set out in detail in chapter six (§6.1.3.).

1.5.1.3 Ego copulas

Now that we have looked at the grammatical constructions that the copulas can occur in, I will turn to discussing the semantics of each category.

The ego (EGO) copulas⁴ are used when the speaker is not relying on external evidence, but on their own internal knowledge for an utterance (148).

⁴ In earlier publications these were left unglossed for semantic content and referred to only as ‘copulas’ (Gawne 2011a, 2011b, San Roque, Gawne, et al. 2012).

- 148) a) *ɲà tó sà tèt-ti yèba*
 1SG rice.cooked eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I was eating rice.’ (AL 091104-01)
- b) *ɲà=ki mèmeyà mèmeme tìn yè*
 1SG=GEN family people seven COP.EGO
 ‘my family is seven people.’
 (lit: my seven person family exists) (AL 090929-01 00:02)
- c) *òodí mì ɲà=ki rò yimba*
 that person 1SG=GEN friend COP.EGO
 ‘that person is my friend.’ (AL 091109-01)

In all of the examples above the speaker is either a participant in the event described (148a) or knows from repeated long-term exposure the state of their friendships and family structures (148b) and (148c). In such situations the speaker is drawing, not on external perception, but their own cognitive experience for evidence. Thus the deictic function of the evidential is not to point to a specific event, but to the speaker’s own internal knowledge state. For this reason these copulas are named EGO. This choice I made because ‘ego,’ rather than ‘self’ or ‘self knowledge,’ detaches the ‘ego’ from the speaker - which is useful for question structures where it’s not the questioner’s ‘self knowledge’ that is invoked but their intended responder’s (see chapter 7 for more discussion of questions). As in Standard Tibetan, there are some constructions in which ego copulas appear to have non-evidential use, such as conditionals and other fixed phrases. These are discussed in §6.2.3. of the thesis.

The ego construction is common across closely related languages. Within the study of Tibetan the equivalent copulas have been referred to, amongst other things, as ‘participant specific’ (Agha 1993, p. 157), ‘self-centred’ (Denwood 2000), ‘personal’ (Caplow 2000), and ‘egophoric’ (Garrett 2001, Tournadre and Dorje 2003), or shortened to ‘ego’ (Garrett 2001). While each of these definitions have

their own nuances and caveats, they all speak to the fact that the information for making the assertion comes from the speaker's own knowledge state.

1.5.1.4 Dubitative copulas

The dubitative (DUB) forms *yìndɔ* and *yèto* are for when a speaker is less than certain about the proposition in the utterance.⁵ This could either be in situations where the speaker would have used a perceived evidential because they can see the event or object, or an ego evidential because they know the propositional content to be true based on personal knowledge. I have indicated this lack of epistemic certainty in the English glossing with the use of lexical forms such as 'possibly' and 'may.'

In this example, an appropriate context of utterance would be (149), where the speaker has spotted something in the room, but from this distance is unsure if it is a bangle, or band for tying up hair.

149) *dì dîw yìndɔ*
 this bracelet COP.DUB
 'this may be a bracelet.' (RL 101028-04)

In this situation, the speaker believes that it is likely to be a bracelet, but doesn't have enough evidence to be sure of it. Had the speaker been certain that it was a bracelet it would have been appropriate to use the perceptual evidential copula.

Unlike the other copula distinctions, the dubitative is not based on the speaker's evidence to hand (ego, perceptual or general fact), but their certainty about the

⁵ These were referred to in earlier analyses as 'uncertainty' (UNCERT) copulas (Gawne 2011a, San Roque, Gawne, et al. 2012)

information. Therefore, it is not an evidential form, but one that marks epistemic certainty.

1.5.1.5 Perceptual evidential copulas

The perceptual evidentials (PE) are used to indicate that the source of information is sensory perception.⁶ The *dùba* form is more emphatic and often occurs with past tense events.

The next contrast to be discussed in regards to the copula system is between all the forms presented above and the *dù* copula. This copula is used for information that is external to the speaker as opposed to knowing from personal knowledge (ego). This involves external perceptual evidence and therefore this copula is referred to as the ‘perceptual evidential.’ The scope of perceptual evidence in Lamjung Yolmo is across all of the senses. Including sight (150a), sound (150b), touch (150c), smell (150d) and taste (150e).

- 150) a) *ŋà=ki pìza dàla dù*
1SG=ERG baby here COP.PE
‘my baby is here.’ (AL 091109-04)
- b) *òodi lú yàabu thé-ku dù*
that song good hear-IPFV COP.PE
‘that song sounds good.’ (AL 101010-01 02:34)
- c) *jhola tçéendi dù*
bag(Nep) heavy COP.PE
‘the bag is heavy.’ (ST 26/01/11 book 8, p. 10)

⁶ These were referred to in San Roque, Gawne, et al. (2012) as mirative (MIR) forms, following Hari’s (2010) analysis, and in Gawne (2011b) were only glossed as copulas without reference to semantic function.

d) *tó* *ʃìma* *çìmbu* ***dù***
 rice.cooked aroma tasty COP.PE
 ‘the rice smells tasty.’ (AL 100929-01)

d) *dì* *çìmbu* ***dù***
 this tasty COP.PE
 ‘this is tasty.’ (RL 120217-02)

Just because an event is witnessed, this does not mean that the speaker must use the perceptual evidential. Indeed, the perceptual evidential and the ego copulas are often used in the same context, even by the same speaker. Teasing out the variation in the use of these two forms in context is a main focus in §6.3. of the main thesis.

The perceptual evidence copula has a closely related form *dùba*. Like those verbs with a *-pa* suffix discussed in §1.5.3.1.2. below the *dùba* form often has a past tense sense in constructions like (151).

151) a) * *khó* *nàŋbar* *òŋ* ***dùba***
 3SG.M tomorrow come COP.PE.EMPH
 * ‘he comes tomorrow.’ (RL 101006-01)

b) *khó* *dàŋ* *òŋ* ***dùba***
 3SG.M yesterday come COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘he came yesterday.’ (RL 101006-01)

c) *khó* *nàŋbar* *òŋ-ke*
 3SG.M tomorrow come-NON.PST
 ‘he will come tomorrow.’ (RL 101006-01)

I have glossed *dùba* as ‘emphatic.’ This emphatic dimension means that it can occasionally have a mirative-like sense (§5.2.3. of thesis). In these utterances *dùba* appears to be less constrained to past tense. This means that in some contexts an

utterance like (152) can be used if the speaker is surprised. For example, if the person had left their child with someone, and came back to find the child is now at another person's house.

- 152) *ɲà=ki pìza khé=ki khím=la dùba*
 1SG=GEN child 2SG=GEN house=LOC COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘my child is in your house.’ (SKL 101023-06)

However, as I discuss in §6.1.1.3. and §6.3 of the main thesis, this is not an inherent feature of the form, but arises in some contexts.

1.5.1.6 *General fact copulas*

The final copula form is the general fact (GF) *ònge*. While the above are used for specific statements, the general fact copula is used for more statements of common fact. The facts are usually attributes or properties of things. It is the only one of the copula verb set that cannot be used for anything other than the copula functions. This difference between the general state copula and the regular copula can be seen in (153) below.

- 153) a) *dì kágati kyúrpu yè*
 this lemon sour COP.EGO
 ‘this lemon is sour.’ (AL 091016-02)
- b) *kágati kyúrpu ònge*
 lemon sour COP.GF
 ‘lemons are sour.’ (AL 091016-02)

This copula appears to only be used to ascribe a generally expected state on to an entity. Verbs can also be used in this construction; here one speaker uses the

infinitive construction while the other uses the *-kandi* nominaliser for the same utterance:

154) a) *nàl-tɕe yàabu òŋge*
sleep-INF good COP.GF
'sleep is good.' (RL 101125-01)

b) *nàl-kandi yàabu òŋge*
sleep-NOM good COP.GF
'sleep is good.' (VL 101224-01)

The general fact copula is most likely derived from the lexical verb *òŋ* 'to come.' Although this copula may have been derived from a lexical source there is clearly some morphological reanalysis underway, as many speakers will leave the non-past tense marker on the verb when there is a negator prefix (155).

155) a) *kálaŋ sè kyúrpu òŋge*
lapsi sour COP.GF
'lapsi (fruit) are sour.' (RL 101125-01)

b) *kálaŋ sè ñàrmu mèòŋge*
lapsi sweet COP.GF
'lapsi (fruit) are not sweet.' (RL 101125-01)

This is something that cannot be done with lexical verbs (§1.5.5.), instead the tense marking suffix is not expressed. Speakers will still understand, and very occasionally use the negative form of the general stative copula as *mèòŋ* instead of *mèòŋge*, indicating that for some speakers the reanalysis of the form *òŋge* as a single item is still not complete.

The general stative copula is only used in the non-past tense, even by speakers who do not appear to analyse the *-ge* element as a separate non-past tense marker:

- 156) a) *khó yàabu mì òŋge*
 3SG.M good person COP.GF
 ‘he is a good man.’ (UL 110115-01)
- b) * *khó yàabu mì òŋ-sin*
 3SG.M good person COP.GF-PST
 * ‘he was a good man.’ (UL 110115-01)

For past tense constructions, the regular past tense form *yèke* is used, sometimes with the reported speech marker *ló* to indicate that the information comes from other people, and thus is generally accepted knowledge:

- 157) a) * *mì yàabu òŋge*
 person good COP.GF
 * ‘that person was good.’ (RL 101125-01)
- b) * *mì yàabu òŋge ló*
 person good COP.GF RS
 * ‘that person was good.’ (RL 101125-01)
- c) *mì yàabu yèke ló*
 person good COP.EGO.PST RS
 ‘that person was good.’ (RL 101125-01)

I will discuss this specific use of the reported speech particle for general fact constructions in §8.2.3. of the thesis. The general fact copula is also attested in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari and Lama 2006, p. 38), although not in Sherpa or Tibetan, and is discussed in §6.1.1.4. of the thesis.

1.5.1.7 Copula verbs and the Conjunct/Disjunct system

Languages related to Lamjung Yolmo have often had the patterns of use of the copula system described as being conjunct/disjunct. This includes Tibetan (DeLancey 1992), Sherpa (Schöttelndreyer 1980 and Kelly 2004) and more distantly Kathmandu Newar (Hale 1980). The conjunct/disjunct model and its relationship to the use of copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo is a major theme throughout the main thesis (especially §6.4. and §9.3.), and therefore I will only give a brief summary of that argument here.

The conjunct/disjunct pattern is most similar to the distribution of use of ego and perceptual evidential copulas. The ‘conjunct’ relates to first person actions, and ego evidentials are for personally known information, thus is more likely to occur with first person actions. The ‘disjunct’ relates to actions of others, for which the perceptual evidential is used more often in Lamjung Yolmo. Although an initial similarity is there, the reality of use of Lamjung Yolmo copula forms is much less ridged and contextually dependant. A conjunct/disjunct analysis does not capture this kind of variation. If anything, Lamjung Yolmo more closely resembles the newer generation of ‘egophoric’ analyses (Tournadre 2008, San Roque, Floyd and Norcliffe 2012), which is much more driven by the semantics of the forms and their use in interaction (§9.3. of main thesis).

1.5.2. Lexical Verbs

Lexical verbs carry the main semantic content of the verb phrase. In this section I will look at both simple and compound verbs (§1.5.2.1.) before turning to the notable absence of verb stems in Lamjung Yolmo as compared to Melamchi Valley Yolmo (§1.5.2.2.).

1.5.2.1 Simple and compound verbs

Verbs in Lamjung Yolmo can be simple or compound, although simple verbs are more common across the lexicon. Simple verbs are formed from a simple root and can have a range of syllable structures; VC, CV, CVC, CCV and CCVC have been observed to date. The citation form of verbs includes the imperative suffix *-toŋ*:

158)	<i>ùrtoŋ</i>	‘fly’
	<i>òŋdoŋ</i>	‘go’
	<i>ŋùdoŋ</i>	‘cry’
	<i>thétoŋ</i>	‘hear’
	<i>ɲàldoŋ</i>	‘sleep’
	<i>tértoŋ</i>	‘give’
	<i>prùdoŋ</i>	‘write’
	<i>prùptoŋ</i>	‘fall down’

Compound verbs are formed by combining a verb with either a noun or another verb (159).

159)	<i>lóp tér-toŋ</i>	‘teach’	(learn give-IMP)
	<i>kèe kyàp-toŋ</i>	‘call’	(noise fall-IMP)
	<i>lè pè-toŋ</i>	‘work’	(work do-IMP)
	<i>ʈèmba sal- doŋ</i>	‘remember’	(remembrance converse.IMP)

As discussed in §1.5.5. below, negative prefixes attach to the main verb of the clause. With compound verbs they attach to the second element (160).

160)	<i>lè mà-pe</i>	‘did not work’	(work NEG.PST-do)
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tèmba mà-sal ‘did not remember’ (remembrance
NEG.PST-converse)

Thus, we can establish that some verbs are likely to have historically been compound verbs even though the meaning of the individual elements is not always clear (161).

- 161) a) *há kòdoŋ* ‘know’ (know.IMP)
há mà-ko ‘don’t know’ (NEG.PST.know)
- b) *á táptoŋ* ‘bite’ (bite.IMP)
á mà-tap ‘don’t bite’ (NEG.PST.bite)
- c) *tçal kyàptoŋ* ‘swim’ (swim.IMP)
tçal mà-kyap ‘don’t swim’ (NEG.PST.swim)

This is the same negation process as is found in Dolakha Newar (Genetti 2007, p. 175-176), whereby multi-syllable words take the negation on the second syllable.

Verb forms borrowed from Nepali involve slightly different morphology. Many Nepali verbs take a suffix *-ti* before any tense or aspect marking. This suffix is not voiced in any environment, unlike the perfective aspect marker *-ti*. In (162) the Nepali verb *tal-* ‘patch’ takes the *-ti* suffix before the past tense marker.

- 162) *dènmu khó=ki dàla kwèla tál-ti-sin dù*
 this.way 3SG.M=ERG here clothing patch-PST COP.PE
 ‘in this way here he patched the clothing.’ (SBL 101124-03 16:44)

In negated clauses it is this *-ti* suffix that takes the negation suffix. In (163) we see this with RL asking a binary question where both the affirmative and negative forms of the Nepali verb *pher-* ‘breathe’ are used.

- 163) *úu phérti mì-ti yè ló*
 breathe NEG-(breath) COP.EGO RS
 ‘it breaths, or doesn’t breathe, did you say?’ (RL 101120-02 09:11)

1.5.2.2 Stem classes

There are no verb stem classes in Lamjung Yolmo. The absence of this feature is worth noting, as it is one of the major differences between Lamjung Yolmo and Melamchi Valley Yolmo. As described by Hari (2010, p. 35-39) verbs stems that end in a short vowel and take a voiced suffix will undergo a change in vowel quality in some contexts while other vowels do not. These contexts are varied and include affirmative imperatives, the presence of some auxiliaries including *tè* (discussed in §1.5.3.2.2. below) and the presence of suffixes including *-pa* and *-ti*. Verbs with front vowels /i/ and /e/ will have these lengthened while verbs with back vowels /a/, /o/ and /u/ have these fronted with /a/ and both /o/ and /u/ becoming /e/. As can be seen from countless examples of Lamjung Yolmo to date, no such vowel modification occurs (164).

- 164) *pìza ñù-ti tè-sin dù*
 child cry-PERF aux-PST COP.PE
 ‘the child cried.’ (AL 091108-01 12:21)

In this environment the *-ti* suffix would be voiced. As can be seen and heard in the example the /u/ vowel is not fronted to a /e/ vowel, nor does this occur in any of the environments that Hari describes. Recordings of the use of front vowels were collected in case there was a length distinction that I had not yet perceived, however even just from initial observation there was no observable length difference. Thus all

vowels at the end of verb stems remain constant in Lamjung Yolmo regardless of the morphosyntactic environment. Further research will need to be done on other dialects of Yolmo before it can be ascertained whether the alternating verb stem pattern found in the Melamchi Valley variety is an isolated feature or whether it is Lamjung Yolmo speakers who do not follow the general pattern by not modifying vowels.

1.5.2.3 Case-marking

All lexical verbs license case marking of subjects and objects. As discussed in §1.4.5.2. transitive and di-transitive verbs take an ergative subject with the marker =*ki*, although the use of the ergative marker is optional in some conditions. Some transitive verbs take a dative subject with the case marker =*la* as discussed in §1.4.5.3. above. Examples of all of these structures can be found in the relevant sections above.

1.5.3. Finite verb inflection

The finite verb phrase structure can be depicted as such below:

(negative) + stem + (tense/aspect) (auxiliary + tense/aspect) (copula)

Negation is discussed in §1.5.5. below. In this section tense (§1.5.3.1.), aspect (§1.5.3.2.) and mood (§1.5.3.3.) and their interaction with the main verb and copula will be discussed as well as verb valency (§1.5.3.4.).

1.5.3.1 Tense

The tense system in Lamjung Yolmo has a past/non-past distinction. Across the tense system there are no variations for person, number or honorific usage. Non-past

and past tense are not present on the main verb when there is negation. This is one of the main structural differences between tense and the other two inflectional categories of finite verbs, as aspect and mood are not dropped in negated clauses. Tense is also dropped from the main verb when an aspect marker is used. As discussed in the section on aspect (§1.5.3.2.) below, the accompanying copula can then be used to carry the tense information.

1.5.3.1.1 Non-past tense

The non-past tense marker is *-ke*. As discussed in §1.2.6.1. the voiceless stop will become voiced when preceded by a voiced phoneme. Also mentioned in the phonology above (§1.2.2.2.), the non-past tense suffix is occasionally nasalised. This is most likely a remnant of the velar nasal that still remains on the Melamchi Valley Yolmo form *-ken* (Hari 2010, p. 56). Examples of the non-past tense are given in (165).

- 165) a) *ɲà tàpse tó sà-ke*
 1SG now rice.cooked eat-NON.PST
 ‘I am now eating rice.’ (AL 100930-01)
- b) *ɲì tàpse tɕhám-ke*
 1PL.EXCL now dance-NON.PST
 ‘we are now dancing.’ (AL 090915-02)
- c) *khó nàɲbar òɲ-ke*
 3SG.M tomorrow come-NON.PST
 ‘he comes tomorrow.’ (RL 101120-01)

The non-past tense suffix is not present on the main verb when the negator prefix is present (166). This is because there is a distinction in negation between past *mà-* and non-past *mè-* as discussed in §1.5.5. below. Thus the negator prefix indicates that the verb phrase is not past tense.

- 166) *ɲà tó mɛ̀-**sà***
 1SG rice.cooked NEG.NON.PST-eat
 ‘I am not eating rice.’ (AL 090915-04)

The use of aspect also results in the non-past tense suffix not occurring (167). The use of the copula as an auxiliary helps give some tense information.

- 167) a) *ɲà lèn-**teraŋ** yè*
 1SG sing-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘I am singing.’ (AL 091028-04)
- b) *ɲà tɕémendo sà-**neraŋ** yè*
 1SG egg eat-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating egg.’ (AL 090918-01)

This is only possible because the existential copula is the only one of the copula set to have a distinction between non-past (*yè*) and past (*yèke*).

Although *-ke* is the non-past tense marker, one other structure that exhibits non-past tense behaviour needs to be mentioned briefly here. The nominaliser *-kandi* can be used in some instances in verbal constructions (its role as a nominaliser is discussed in more detail in §1.6.4.). When used in verbal constructions, the *-kandi* suffix is used often for higher status second and third persons, although it can be used with first person too. Most importantly it can only be used in non-past constructions (168).

- 168) a) *ɲà tàpse tó sà-**kandi** yimba*
 1SG now rice.cooked eat-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating rice now.’ (AL 100929-01)

b) *ɲà nàŋbar tó sà-kandi yimba*
 1SG tomorrow rice.cooked eat-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘I will eat rice tomorrow.’ (AL 100929-01)

c) **ɲà dàŋ tó sà-kandi yimba*
 1SG yesterday rice.cooked eat-NOM COP.EGO
 * ‘I ate rice yesterday.’ (AL 100929-01)

The nominaliser suffix behaves very differently to the regular tense marker, as discussed in the section on nominalisation (§1.6.4.). It takes an equational copula verb, does not drop in negated clauses and has other functions besides these constructions.

1.5.3.1.2 Past tense

The past tense suffix is *-sin*. There is variation in its pronunciation across the speech community. Some speakers will pronounce the past tense form as *-siŋ*, moving the alveolar nasal back to the velar. Less frequently we find the nasal consonant is only represented as nasalisation of the vowel in the pronunciation *-sĩ*. Some speakers use two or three of these pronunciation forms in free variation. Those who use *-siŋ* are also likely to articulate it as *-suŋ* in rapid speech; moving the vowel further back in the articulatory space in response to the back position of the velar nasal. As an initial observation speakers from Toljung and Nayagaun are more likely to use this velarised *-sin* form. As the two forms are more or less in free variation across the community I have chosen to use *-sin* as the underlying form as this is also the form in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010, p. 57).

Examples of past tense marked verbs (169).

169) a) *dàŋ khyá tó sà-sin*
 yesterday 2SG rice.cooked eat-PST
 ‘you ate rice yesterday.’ (AL 090916-06)

- b) *tòŋla dènmu lè zò-sin*
 before like.this work make-PST
 ‘before like this (he) worked.’ (AL 091108-01 39:20)

As with the non-past tense, the past tense marker is does not occur when there is a negator prefix or aspect marking (170). The past tense negator (170a) and the past tense copula (170b) make the tense in most of these structures evident even without the past tense suffix.

- 170) a) *ŋà mà-tchám*
 1SG NEG.PST-dance
 ‘I did not dance.’ (AL 090916-06)
- b) *ŋà lèn-tirang yèke*
 1SG sing-IPFV COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I was singing.’ (AL 091028-04)

This will be shown again in more detail in the sections on negation (§1.5.5.) and aspect marking (§1.5.3.2.) below.

One particular type of past tense that needs to be discussed is the narrative past. This construction rarely occurs in elicitation, but is frequently used in certain genres of narrative. It doesn’t appear in first person monologues, such as AL discussing her family (090929-01) or her village (091006-01). It is used heavily in the picture task activities (091108-01, 101124-03). The narrative past involves the simple past tense suffix *-sin* discussed above, and the perceptual evidential copula *dù* (171).

- 171) a) *só nà-ti tèt-sin dù*
 tooth sore-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘the tooth had been sore.’ (091108-01 14:49)

- b) *pìza ñù-ti tèt-sin dù*
 child cry-PERF AUX-PST PE.COP
 ‘the child had been crying.’ (091108-01 12:20)
- c) *thàa thén-sin dù*
 blood go.out-PST COP.PE
 ‘the blood had flowed out.’ (091108-01 23:44)

The *-sin* past tense suffix does not occur in any constructions with other copulas, such as *yèke*. Hari also notes that this structure occurs in Melamchi Valley Yolmo, and argues that with the combination of the copula and past it captures the sense "I wasn't there at the time when it happened, but I found out later" (2010, p. 62). When we look at some data from Lamjung Yolmo, in one recording of the Family Story picture task (thesis §3.2.1.), the participants were asked to tell the story in the third person and then in the first person. During the third person component of the task the participants used the *-sin dù* construction 20 times in 8 minutes and 15 seconds, but in the first person retelling the participants spoke for 9 minutes and 50 seconds and did not use this construction at all. This may possibly be because the form patterns as per Hari's analysis, but more likely it is because speakers use different evidential forms when they are a participant in the story instead of just a witness of the event. This is discussed in further detail in §6.5.1. of the main thesis.

The final construction that will be discussed in relation to past tense is the suffix *-pa*. This suffix has a range of functions, which include question marking (see chapter 7 of the thesis) and in some contexts has an emphatic quality.

One of the main functions of this suffix is as a past tense marker (172).

- 172) *ñà dàŋ ñàl-pa*
 1SG yesterday sleep-PST
 ‘I slept yesterday.’ (AL 090917-01)

There are two main reasons why *-pa* is not a simple past tense suffix. The first is related to function, in that the *-pa* suffix can have a range of functions, including use in question and a slightly emphatic sense. The second is related to the form of the suffix in that for some speakers it is possible to use the *-pa* suffix in negative constructions as well as positive (173).

173) *ɲà tɕhám-pa*
 1SG dance-PST
 ‘I danced’ (AL 110215-01)

ɲà mà-tɕhám-pa
 1SG NEG.PST-dance-PST
 ‘I did not dance’ (AL 110215-01)

As discussed in relation to both the simple present *-ke* and past *-sin* above, one of the main formal properties that separate them from aspect and mood markers is that they are omitted in negative constructions.

The *-pa* suffix appears to be related to that found at the end of many of the copula forms. Some of the copula forms have more of the emphatic sense, such as *dùba* (§1.5.1.4.), while others are more commonly noted by speakers for their question function, such as *yèba* (discussed in §1.6.8. below). The *yimba* form does not really have any of these properties, as it no longer has the historic *yìn* copula as a contrast. Thus, the *-pa* suffix has a number of dimensions, not just past tense marking, but not all of these are present for all verbs, and in all uses.

1.5.3.2 *Aspect*

Aspect is marked through verb suffixing. There are three main aspect distinctions: perfective, imperfective and habitual. These are discussed in order below. Some aspects, especially the imperfective, can be marked though more than one strategy.

Aspect markers interact with the tense markers in that when the aspect is marked it attaches directly to the verb stem. This requires tense to be marked by the use of auxiliary verbs. When there are two aspect elements, such as in the non-past perfective, one element is carried by the main verb and the other by the auxiliary. This will be explained in detail in the relevant sections below.

1.5.3.2.1 Perfective

The perfective is marked with the *-ti* suffix. As with all suffixes that are stop initial the perfective suffix is voiced in certain environments. The perfective most frequently occurs with the ego copula (174). There are some examples in the collected texts where speakers use it with the perceptual evidential *dù* (174c).

- 174) a) *ɲà lèn-ti yèke*
 1SG sing-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘I have sung.’ (AL 091028-04)
- b) *ɲà khím=la lò-ti yè*
 1SG house=DAT return-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I have returned home.’ (AL 120318-02)
- c) *lùndi=ki tçé tèn-ti dù*
 jackal=GEN tongue go.out-PERF COP.PE
 ‘the jackal’s tongue went out.’ (KL 120304-02 06:50)

Perfective aspect is not present when there is a negator prefix (175.)

- 175) a) *ɲà lèn-ti yè*
 1SG sing-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I have sung.’ (AL 091028-04)

- b) *ŋà mà-lèn yè*
 1SG NEG.PST-sing COP.EGO
 ‘I have not sung.’ (AL 091028-04)

As shown in the next sub-section on the imperfect aspect, there are some imperfect constructions that make use of the perfective aspect marker. Although constructions with only one perfective marker have been shown here, verbs with the perfective marker can be strung together in chains. This clause-chaining feature of the perfective marker is discussed in §1.6.7. below.

1.5.3.2.2 Imperfective

There are three different imperfective constructions. The first is the lexical verb suffix *-teraŋ*, or less commonly, *-neraŋ*. The second is the *-ku* suffix, which can only occur with the *dù* copula. The final is the use of *tè* as an auxiliary verb, which like *-teraŋ* can occur with both ego and perceptual evidential forms. All of these will be discussed in turn before a general discussion about the difference in their functions below.

The first construction is the *-teraŋ* verbal suffix. This suffix is also realised much less frequently as *-neraŋ*. These two forms appear to be in free variation - no phonetic environmental features can account for the variation and there appears to be no semantic difference. Only speakers from Namgyu have exhibited this variation to date. As with other suffixes the same voicing conditions apply to the initial oral stop.

There are examples of this imperfective marker being used without a clause-final copula, and most of these, such as the example below, are from elicited and not naturalistic speech (176).

- 176) *ɲà tó sà-teraŋ*
 1SG rice.cooked eat-IPFV
 ‘I am eating rice.’ (AL 100929-01)

The vast majority of utterances involving this imperfective suffix occur with a clause-final copula. This can either be the auxiliary use of the ego form *yè* or the perceptual evidential *dù* (but not the more emphatic *dùba*). In (177) we see two different copulas used with the auxiliary.

- 177) a) *ɲà tàpse tè-teraŋ yè*
 1SG now sit-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘I am now sitting down.’ (AL 110204-01)
- b) *mò kòlela tè-teraŋ dù*
 3SG.F slowly sit-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘she is slowly sitting down.’ (AL 101023-03)

The difference between the uses of these two constructions is the difference of the semantics of the copula verb, discussed in §1.5.1.

The *-teraŋ* progressive suffix does not occur with the negative prefix (178).

- 178) *ɲà mɛ̀-lèn*
 1SG NEG.NON.PST-sing
 ‘I am not singing.’ (AL 091028-04)

The *-teraŋ* strategy is the least common in naturalistic data recorded to date. There are only five uses of the *-teraŋ* suffix in RL and SBL’s (101124-03) telling of the Family Story (thesis §3.2.1.) compared to 13 uses of the *-ku* suffix and 12 uses of the *tè* auxiliary verb discussed below. Also, in all of the tellings of the Jackal and Crow story (thesis §3.2.2.), although many use progressive aspect in the narrative,

the *-teraŋ* form only occurs once in the whole set, in a telling by AL (101010-01). Therefore it appears that it is not the preferred construction, at least in narratives.

The next strategy is to use the verbal suffix *-ku*. Like the *-teraŋ* suffix this cannot occur as the final element in a clause. Unlike *-teraŋ*, which is not so restrictive, it always occurs with the clause-final auxiliary *dù* (179).

- 179) *thúŋ thúŋ làp-ku dù*
 drink drink say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘‘‘drink, drink’’ (they) say.’ (SL 091108-01 19:37)

Throughout the corpus collected to date, *-ku* always collocates with the copula *dù* and not with any other copula, including the closely related form *dùba*. The *-ku* suffix is not used with a negative polarity verb.

The final imperfective structure to be discussed is different to the other two in that it uses the auxiliary verb *tè* instead of a verbal suffix. There is actually a range of slightly different, but closely related structures based on the *tè* auxiliary to give an imperfective aspect sense. It is beyond the scope of this grammar to discuss each of them in detail. Instead I will mention the most commonly occurring, all of which are based around the *tè* auxiliary and previously discussed forms.

The first is that the auxiliary occurs with a bare lexical noun, and the past tense marking is taken by the auxiliary with or without the presence of a clause-final copula (180).

- 180) a) *lùndi=ki òŋ tè-ke*
 jackal=ERG come AUX-NON.PST
 ‘the Jackal is coming.’ (RL 101027-01 03:52)

- b) *lùndi sòz tèt-sin*
 jackal think(Nep) AUX-PST
 ‘the Jackal was thinking.’ (RL 101027-01 02:02)

The other most common construction is where the auxiliary is marked with perfective suffix and then a clause-final copula is used (181). In these constructions the lexical verb is usually bare, although it can also take aspect marking (181a).

- 181) a) *ɲà lèn-teraŋ tèt-ti yè*
 1SG sing-IPFV AUX-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I have been singing’ (AL 091028-04)

- b) *ɲà ɲàl tèt-ti yèke*
 1SG sleep AUX-PERF COP.PST
 ‘I have been sleeping’ (AL 101008-01)

- c) *mò sà tèt-ti dù*
 3SG.F eat AUX-PERF COP.PE
 ‘she has been eating’ (AL 101008-01)

The *tèt* auxiliary is also used in conjunction with the *-ku dù* construction (182). This does not appear to have a radically different meaning. In (182b) it appears that the *tèt* is allowing the imperfectivity of the utterance to be marked since the lexical verb already has the optative case-marking suffix.

- 182) a) *lùndi lú-tile kàl-timaraŋ sà tèt-ku dù*
 jackal song-after go.PERF-after eat AUX-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘the jackal, after the song, went and was eating.’ (STL 101028-02 5:51)

- b) *ɲà qò-ɲi tèt-ku dù*
 1SG go-OPT AUX-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I am wanting to go.’ (AL 100923-01)

The *tè* auxiliary can also be used with the *-teraŋ* imperfective suffix (183). Again, it is unclear what aspectual difference this makes, but the copula is constrained by the person marking.

- 183) *ŋà ɲàl tè-teraŋ yèke*
1SG sleep AUX-IPFV COP.EGO.PST
'I was sleeping.' (RL 101026-02)

Less common is the use of the *tè* auxiliary with the *dùba* copula (184).

- 184) *làŋ tè dùba*
stand AUX COP.PE.EMPH
'[they] were standing.' (AL 101012-02 18:24)

Notice that, as with lexical verbs, in the presence of the emphatic *dùba* copula there is no tense/aspect marking on the auxiliary verb. This construction only occurs a handful of times in the corpus.

tè is also the lexical verb 'sit.' The auxiliary form has become grammaticalised, as evidenced by the fact there are constructions like those in (185) because it can be used in constructions that would otherwise be semantically implausible.

- 185) a) *ŋà kòlela làŋ tè-ti yè*
1SG slowly rise AUX-PERF COP.EGO
'I am slowly standing up.' (AL 101008-01)
- b) *ŋà lèn-diraŋ mà-tè yè*
1SG sing-IPFV NEG.PST-sit COP.EGO
'I was not singing.' (AL 091028-04)

Although there is a range of constructions involving the *tè* auxiliary, the negative constructions formed with the auxiliary are relatively consistent. The negative will attach to the auxiliary *tè* (186), and the lexical verb carries tense/aspect/mood information which is not expressed when the negative prefix attaches to the lexical verb.

- 186) a) *ŋà lèn-diran mà-tè yè*
 1SG sing-IPFV NEG.PST-sit COP.EGO
 ‘I was not singing.’ (AL 091028-04)
- b) *pèemi=la tá-ŋi mèt-tè*
 wife = DAT look-OPT NEG.NON.PST-AUX
 ‘I don’t want to look at my wife.’ (SBL 101124-03 33:06)

All three imperfective constructions, *-teran*, *-ku dù* and the auxiliary *tè*, are used frequently by all members of the speech community. To date no noticeable difference between the functions of the three constructions has been discerned. All three constructions also occur in Melamchi Valley Yolmo. *-teran* is glossed as ‘perfect continuous’ (Hari 2010, p. 58), the *-ku* suffix is glossed as the ‘imperfect’ (Hari 2010, p. 58) while the *tè* auxiliary is defined in Hari and Lama (2004, p. 280) as ‘keep doing action of the main verb.’ The *-teran* suffix in Lamjung Yolmo does not appear to function with the same perfect aspect. In (177) these utterance can be said while the action is still being carried out. Tests with multiple speakers indicate that all three of these constructions can be used in both stative and process constructions, thus all three can be used for ‘I am sitting in an ongoing way’ or ‘I am in the process of sitting down.’ None seem to be constrained by tense, or temporal distance from the speaker. The only thing that can be said is that constructions with copulas as clause-final auxiliaries can only be used with the correct evidential meaning.

1.5.3.2.3 Habitual

The habitual is created using either a bare lexical verb stem (187a) or a verb with the infinitive (187b) and an existential copula verb.

187) a) *ɲà ɲìma ʔàɲmaraŋ khúra sà yè*
1SG day every bread eat COP.EGO
'I eat bread every day.' (AL 101001-01)

b) *ɲà sà-dʒe yèke*
1SG eat-INF COP.EGO.PST
'I used to eat.' (AL 091009-03)

Some speakers use the infinitive suffix to mark habitual with no copula form (188).

188) a) *ɲà tó sà-tʃe*
1SG rice.cooked eat-INF
'I eat bread every day.' (RL 101023-03)

b) *ɲà ɲàl-tʃe*
1SG sleep-INF
'I sleep.' (RL 101123-02)

This use of the habitual without the final copula has only been observed in speakers under the age of twenty, although it may also be a village-specific preference. Either way, it is an interesting reanalysis of the structure as it's the only instance of something other than a tense-marked verb or copula at the end of a clause known to date.

1.5.3.3 Mood

1.5.3.3.1 Imperatives and prohibitives

The imperative suffix, as we have seen above, is also used as the general citation form of a verb. The same imperative form is used regardless of person or number. The imperative using the suffix *-toŋ* is generally a polite imperative (189).

189)	<i>tè-toŋ</i>	‘please sit’
	<i>sà-toŋ</i>	‘please eat’

For the small number of verbs that have honorific forms (§1.3.8.) it is possible to use the honorific as a polite imperative. This is usually reserved for talking to Lamas or high-status members of the community. When the honorific form of a verb is used as an imperative, the imperative suffix is not used (190).

190)	<i>çù</i>	‘please sit’
	<i>çè</i>	‘please eat’

There is a less polite imperative, which consists of an unmarked verb stem (191a). A handful of verbs have an irregular informal imperative form (191b).

191)	<i>tè</i>	‘sit!’ (regular)
	<i>sò</i>	‘eat!’ (irregular, regular verb is <i>sà</i>)

The prohibitive is formed by placing the *mà-* negator prefix on the verb stem. As the negator results in no suffix use there is no difference between the more polite and less polite forms of the imperative with the regular verbs. Where specific honorific forms exist, the prohibitive is formed in the same manner. The first two examples in

(192) are negative forms of standard prohibitive verbs and the second two are of honorific prohibitive verbs.

- 192) *mà- tè* ‘do not sit’
 mà- sà ‘do not eat’
 mà- tché ‘do not eat’ (honorific)
 mà- phép ‘do not come’ (honorific)

1.5.3.3.2 Hortatives

There are two strategies for forming hortative constructions in Lamjung Yolmo. I will look at both of these in turn. The first is using the *-ka* suffix (193), which, like all stop and affricate suffixes, undergoes regular voicing in the relevant environments.

- 193) a) *òraŋ khúra kyàp-ka*
 1PL.INCL bread fry-HORT
 ‘let’s fry bread!’ (AL 091104-02)
- b) *òraŋ sà-ka*
 1PL.INCL eat-HORT
 ‘let’s eat!’ (AL 091104-02)

The *-ka* hortative suffix remains even when there is a negative affix is attached (194).

- 194) *ji mà-tchám-ka*
 1PL.EXCL NEG.PST-dance-HORT
 ‘let us not dance.’ (AL 110215-01)

This is different to tense and aspect marking, in which the suffixes are suppressed, indicating that mood behaves differently to tense and aspect.

All evidence collected to date indicates that the *-ka* suffix cannot occur with first person singular structures (195).

- 195) a) *ɲà khím=ki lè pè-ke*
1SG house=GEN work do-NON.PST
'I do/will do the house work.' (AL 101008-01)
- b) * *ɲà khím=ki lè pè-ka*
1SG house=GEN work do-HORT
* 'let me do the house work!' (AL 101008-01)

Instead, this is where the second hortative suffix *-tɕo* is used (196).

- 196) *ɲà khím=ki lè pè-tɕo*
1SG house=GEN work do-HORT
'let me do the house work!' (AL 101008-01)

This suffix occasionally sounds like it has a final velar nasal, i.e. *-tɕoŋ*, which may be indicative of a historical form. There is no construction in Hari (2010) that matches this construction. The difference between this and *-ka* is subtle and appears to be that the *-ka* suffix is more strongly injunctive while the *-tɕo* suffix is milder and thus more frequently used. The most common use of this suffix is in the routine farewell (197).

- 197) *nàŋbar thú-tɕo óo*
tomorrow meet-HORT PART
'let's meet tomorrow!' (AL 101008-01)

Like the *-ka* hortative, the *-tɕo* hortative suffix remains in negative structures (198).

- 198) *ŋà tó mɛ̀-sà-tɕo*
 1SG rice.cooked NEG.NON.PST-eat-HORT
 ‘let me not eat rice.’ (RL 101023-03)

The *-tɕo* suffix is often collocated with the *óo* invocation suffix (197) described in §1.3.7, however in data collected and observations made to date the *-ka* suffix does not occur with *óo* but with *lée* (199).

- 199) *tó sà-ka lée*
 rice.cooked eat-HORT PART
 ‘let’s eat rice.’ (RL 101023-03)

1.5.3.3.3 Optative

The only morphologically constructed optative is the verb suffix *-ɲi* (200).

- 200) a) *ŋà ɲàl-ɲi tɛ̀-ku dù*
 1SG sleep-OPT AUX-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I am wanting to sleep.’ (AL 100923-01)
- b) *khó sà-ɲi tɛ̀-sin dù*
 3SG.M eat -OPT AUX-PST COP.PE
 ‘he wanted to eat.’ (AL 101010-01 03:41)

This *-ɲi* suffix is described in Hari and Lama (2004, p. 146) as a verb suffix ‘expressing strong wish.’ Unlike both of the hortative mood structures described above, the optative can occur in past tense structures.

1.5.3.3.4 Dubitative

The final mood to be discussed is the dubitative. This is marked either with the suffix *-to* or the copula *yèto* depending on the construction. It gives a sense of uncertainty to the proposition, however it can only be used in non-past constructions (201).

- 201) a) *khún jàl-to*
3PL sleep-DUB
'they might sleep.' (AL 090928-02)
- b) *ɲà mè-ɲàl-to*
1SG NEG.NON.PST-sleep-DUB
'I might not sleep.' (AL 090928-02)

As can be seen in (201b), in negative constructions the suffix remains, while the negative copula form is *mèto* for existential and *mìnɔ* for the equational.

1.5.3.4 Verb valency

There has been no data collected to date that shows a verb that has more than one valency. One interesting phono-syntactic process of altering verb valency is to change the tone of the verb. Given the limited phonological environments in which both low and high tone can occur (discussed in §1.2.3. above), this is not a highly productive way to modify transitivity, however it is an interesting process.

- 202) *làŋ* 'rise'
láŋ 'raise'
- tàp* 'fall'
táp 'be scattered'

<i>ròp</i>	‘break’
<i>róp</i>	‘break something’

It is most likely an historical process that is now fossilised, and is reminiscent of the Sherpa system of volitionality (Kelly 2004, pp. 362-365). In the Sherpa system pairs of verb stems differ in the aspiration of the initial consonant, which affects whether the action was undertaken volitionally or not.

1.5.4. *Causatives*

Causation is marked with the suffix *-tɕu*, with the affricate undergoing a voicing process in the relevant environments §1.2.6.1.). This suffix is a separate lexical verb *tɕú* in Melamchi Valley Yolmo meaning ‘push unto’ and in its role as a causative acts as an auxiliary to the lexical verb (Hari 2010, pp. 64-65). In Lamjung Yolmo this verb does not appear on its own in any example collected to date, and no speakers recognise it as a separate verb. As can be seen in (203), the causative attaches closest to the lexical verb root and has become an integrated component of the main verb, instead of the separate auxiliary attested in Melamchi Valley Yolmo.

- 203) a) *pè-toŋ*
do-IMP
‘do.’
- pè-tɕú-toŋ*
do-CAUS-IMP
‘cause to do.’ (AL 091103-03)
- b) *ŋà pìza = la khímbu = ki sà-tɕu-ke*
1SG baby = DAT spoon = INS eat-CAUS-NON.PST
‘I feed the baby with the spoon.’ (AL 100923-01)

1.5.5. *Negation*

Negation in Lamjung Yolmo is formed by the use of one of two negative prefixes; *mà-* and *mè-*, both of which immediately precede the verb stem. It is the only known prefix in Lamjung Yolmo. The distinction between the two forms is one of tense. The negative prefix has low tone. The prefix attaches to the main verb, whether this is a copula or a lexical verb, but if there is a progressive auxiliary verb (*té*) then it takes the negation. As mentioned in §1.5.2.1. in compound nouns it is the second element that takes the negator.

When negation is used the verb does not carry tense or aspect information, but the nominaliser and some mood marking suffixes remain. Mood suffixes as a class are not as consistent in their behaviour as other categories, as seen in (204b), the imperative suffix is dropped for prohibitive forms, while as shown in §1.5.3.3.4. above the dubitative marker remains in negative constructions. Some of the information does not get expressed needs to be inferred from context, while some is carried by the negative prefix itself.

The *mà-* prefix is used with and past tense verbs (204a), and also forms a prohibitive (204b):

- 204) a) *ŋà len-sin*
1SG sing-PST
'I sang.' (AL 091028-04)
- ŋà mà-len*
1SG NEG.PST-sing
'I did not sing.' (AL 091028-04)
- b) *lèn-toŋ*

sing-IMP
'sing!' (AL 091028-04)

mà-len
NEG.PST-sing
'do not sing!' (AL 091028-04)

One strategy for maintaining aspect information is to use an auxiliary (205).

- 205) a) *ɲà lèn-diran yèke*
1SG sing-IPFV COP.EGO.PST
'I was singing.' (AL 091028-04)
- b) *ɲà lèn-diran mà-tè yè*
1SG sing-IPFV NEG.PST-sit COP.EGO
'I was not singing.' (AL 091028-04)

The *me-* negator prefix is used for all non-past negation (206). It undergoes morphophonemic change in vowel quality from *mè-* to *mì-* when it precedes a lexical verb with a high vowel /i/ or /u/ or the palatal glide /y/.

- 206) a) *ɲà lèn-ke*
1SG sing-NON.PST
'I sing.' (AL 091028-04)
- ɲà mè-lèn yè*
1SG NEG.NON.PST-sing COP.EGO
'I do not sing.' (AL 091028-04)
- b) *ɲà lèn-kandi yìnɔ*
1SG sing-NOM COP.DUB
'I will probably sing.' (AL 091028-04)

ɲà mɛ̀-lèn-kandi yìnɔ
 1SG NEG.NON.PST-sing-NOM COP.DUB
 ‘I will probably not sing.’ (AL 091028-04)

The different negative prefixes allow for some tense distinction to be made, even though the tense marker is not expressed (207).

- 207) a) *ɲà mà-len*
 1SG NEG.PST-sing
 ‘I did not sing.’ (AL 091028-04)
- b) *ɲà mɛ̀-lèn*
 1SG NEG.NON.PST-sing
 ‘I do not sing.’ (AL 091028-04)

The small set of honorific verbs take the same negation as regular verbs (208).

- 208) *khyá tɛ́mendo mɛ̀-ɕè*
 2SG egg NEG.NON.PST-eat.HON
 ‘you do not eat egg.’ (AL 091007-02)

There is only one irregular lexical negative prefix form recorded thus far, which is the verb ‘go’ (209). All other verbs elicited to date (including ‘come’) appear to behave in a highly regular way have regular patterns of negation.

- 209) *ɖò-ton* ‘go!’ go.IMP
mènɔ ‘do not go’/ ‘will not go’ NEG.NON-PST.go
mànɔ ‘did not go’/ ‘do not go’ NEG.PST.go

While negation is highly regular across lexical verbs it is irregular for the copulas. As such, the negative form for each copula is given in Table 1.8. There is no

past/non-past distinction in negation for copulas, and as such they all only have one form.

	Ego	Dubitative	Perceptual evidence	General fact
Equation	<i>mìn</i>	<i>mìnɔ</i>	<i>mìndu(ba)</i>	<i>mèŋge</i>
Existential present	<i>mè</i>	<i>mèto</i>		
past	<i>mèke/mèba</i>			

Table 1.8. The Lamjung Yolmo copula system, negative forms

1.6. Clause Structure

1.6.1. Grammatical Relations

This section will outline the grammatical relations present in Lamjung Yolmo such as subject, object, indirect object, adjunct and complement. These grammatical functions are not only based on semantic roles but other properties of the forms, grammatical relations and semantics do not always match (Bresnan 1982).

Subject, object and direct object are core functions, in that they are subcategorised for by the verb. By this, I mean that the semantics of different verbs have different subcategorisations. For example the verb *ɕí* ‘die’ only subcategorises for a subject, while *sé* ‘kill’ subcategorises for both a subject and object. That means that without the object the use of ‘kill’ would be considered ungrammatical by speakers but with the object ‘die’ would be grammatical. These roles of subject, object and direct object, can all be identified and differentiated from each other, and other

grammatical relations through case marking and word order. Subjects are the first constituents in a canonical clause. They can take ergative case with transitive and ditransitive verbs. For subjects of intransitive verbs and some transitive verbs there is no overt case marking (see §1.4.5.).

Objects are usually the second element in a canonical clause. They do not appear to take any overt case marking, which means they may function as an absolutive when subject is ergative, and as an accusative when the subject is nominative. When the subject is nominative and takes no overt case marker it appears that it is distinguished from the object by word order and semantic content.

Indirect objects are marked with the dative case. They may precede the direct object in the clause, but like direct objects they appear to the right of the subject. They are differentiated from dative complements and adjuncts in that they are subcategorised for by the verb.

Complements can be subcategorised for by the verb. They are, however, not a core function, in that the core functions are to a much greater extent obligatory, while complements are less so. This use of the term complement is based on the analysis in Bresnan (1982) and does not include objects, which have already been discussed above. Also, unlike the core functions, complements always have a consistent semantic sense in relation to the verb. Unlike the core functions, where a subject can be an agent or a patient depending on the verb, complements are consistent in their meaning. For example *qò* ‘go’ can take an allative complement, while the verb *túp* ‘cut’ can take an instrumental complement.

- 210) a) *khó pàtan = la qò-ke*
3SG.M Patan = ALL go-NON.PST
‘he goes to Patan.’ (AL 091007-03)

- b) *ɲà kárta = ki ça túp-ke*
 1SG knife=INS meat cut-NON.PST
 ‘I cut the meat with a knife.’ (AL 100923-01)

Unlike the relations discussed above, adjuncts are not subcategorised for by the verb, and unlike the core functions the meaning is not affected by the nature of the verb they occur with. This reduces the limitations on what verbs they can occur with. Typical adjuncts include locative phrases and temporal phrases, such as (211), which has the temporal phrase ‘on Saturday.’ In this example, as with adjuncts in general, its can be moved in the sentence without any change in the meaning. Even though speakers would consider (211a) to be the most typical position of the adjunct there is nothing to prevent it occurring elsewhere (211b) and (211c).

- 211) a) *ɲà kyàsa sà pásanɲ = la qò-ke*
 1SG market Friday=LOC go-NON.PST
 ‘I go to the market on Friday.’ (AL 101004-01)
- b) *ɲà sà pásanɲ = la kyàsa qò-ke*
 1SG Friday=LOC market go-NON.PST
 ‘I go to the market on Friday.’ (AL 101004-01)
- c) *sà pásanɲ = la ɲà kyàsa qò-ke*
 Friday=LOC 1SG market go-NON.PST
 ‘I go to the market on Friday.’ (AL 101004-01)

1.6.2. *Word order*

Lamjung Yolmo typically has a verb-final clause structure, which is the same as all Sino-Tibetan languages except those of the Bai and Karen families (Dryer 2003, p. 43). The word order of Lamjung Yolmo is consistent, with the SOV pattern across both elicited and naturalistic data (212).

- 212) a) *ɲà tó sà tè-ti yè*
 1SG rice.cooked eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating rice.’ (AL 101008-01)
- b) *òo tɕàro=ki ɲà sà-sin*
 there crow=ERG fish eat-PST
 ‘there the crow ate a fish.’ (RL 101027-01 00:36)
- c) *khó=ki khím=la zò-ti ònɔa pè-sin*
 3.M=GEN house =DAT make -PERF that.way do-PST
 ‘he made the house, like that.’ (SBL 101124-03 15:12)

It is this consistent word ordering that appears to be one reason that the marking of the ergative case is not obligatory, as speakers can usually rely on the word order to reflect the subject and object roles.

In connected discourse and narratives the subject is regularly not expressed if the referent has been introduced at an earlier stage, as discussed in §1.4.4. The object argument is more typically realised than the subject, as shown in the example above. It can occasionally be left unexpressed when the referent is clear from circumstances. Again using data from the Family Story task (thesis §3.2.1.), when the participants are referring to a key event that they have already seen and discussed, the object, as well as the subject is left unexpressed (213).

- 213) *áarak thúŋ-ti kyàp-sin dù*
 alcohol drink-PERF slap-PST COP.PE
 ‘(he) drank alcohol and slapped (his wife).’ (SL 091108-01 11:14)

Ditransitive verbs have both a direct and indirect object. The indirect object is marked with dative case. While both the direct and indirect object occur after the

subject and before the verb the order of these two components is more flexible than other elements of the sentence discussed so far (214).

214) a) *ɲà=la khúra náɲ ná léé*
 1SG=DAT bread ask.for PART PART
 ‘please give me bread’ (AL 101005-01)

b) *tèbul thóla kàldzuɲ tɕéemi tɕíi zàa dùba*
 table above packet small one put COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘(she) put a small packet on the table.’ (AL 101006-01)

Adjuncts are much more flexible in regards to their position in the word order of the sentence. As discussed above in the grammatical relations section (§1.6.1.), this is one of their defining features. As long as they do not split the components of an established phrase, such as coming between the noun and adjective in a noun phrase or between the verb and auxiliary verb in a verb phrase then they are generally accepted (215).

215) a) *dàɲ ɲà ɲàl-sin*
 yesterday 1SG sleep-PST
 ‘yesterday I slept.’ (AL 090917-01)

b) *ɲà dàɲ ɲàl-sin*
 1SG yesterday sleep-PST
 ‘I yesterday slept.’ (AL 090917-01)

c) *ɲà ɲàl-sin dàɲ*
 1SG sleep-PST yesterday
 ‘I slept yesterday.’ (AL 090917-01)

Although I have shown above that the word order for Lamjung Yolmo is very consistent, there are still many examples of sentences that do not follow this word ordering. The suppression of the subject has already been discussed above in §1.4.4. and as this does not change the word order, but simply involves the elision of a participant it will not be discussed further here. The two most common changes to word order observed are given below.

The first word order change process is the placement of the subject at the end of the utterance, to the right of the verb (216). This structure can occur with both subjects of intransitive and transitive sentences. It is the presence of the object before the verb in the transitive construction that makes it clear that this structure is one of placing the subject at the end of the word, and not one of fronting the verbal element.

216) a) *tèm̄ba sàl-ti dù khó*
 remember-PERF COP.PE 3SG.M
 ‘he is remembering.’
 (lit. ‘is remembering, he’) (RL 101124-03 10:36)

b) *yàabu mìn dì*
 good COP.EGO.NEG this
 ‘this is not good.’ (SBL 101124-03 20:16)

c) *çérma jímu màya çùu-ti ñà*
 girl.young with love enter-PERF 1SG
 ‘I fell in love with a girl.’ (SBL 101124-03 33:25)

This structure is possibly used where the speaker goes to drop the subject, as is common in conversation, but then decides that the subject needs to be overtly expressed. Example (216a) is interesting in that RL’s interlocutor immediately

repeats the same utterance with the subject at the end (SBL 101124-03 10:37), indicating that it is an acceptable sentence construction.

The second non-standard word order pattern is the fronting of the indirect object of a di-transitive sentence (217).

217) a) *mì nàkpu = la pèmpiza tčí = ki tçà kyòη-ti tér-sin*
person black = DAT woman one = ERG tea carry-PERF give-PST
'to the black man a woman carried and gave tea.' (AL 101006-01)

b) *ηà = la láure kwèla tér-ti yè*
1SG = DAT soldier clothing give-PERF COP.EGO
'to me the soldiers gave clothes.' (SBL 101124-03 25:23)

This gives greater prominence to the fronted element, but also assists the narrative flow. (217b) is preceded by discussion about the subject's actions before arriving to receive clothes and thus this sentence fits more naturally into the already established topic by fronting the direct object, in this case, the speaker.

1.6.3. Adverbial clauses

1.6.3.1 Temporal markers of adverbial subordination

There are a number of constructions that mark temporal markers of adverbial subordination. I will begin with *tòηla* which can be roughly glossed as 'before,' then the lexical item *tíηla* and the verbal suffixes *-tile* and *-timaraη* which can be glossed as 'after.' The final section of the discussion on adverbial subordination will look at constructions that can be glossed as 'when' or 'at that time,' these include the lexical forms *nàm bèla = la* and *gàri = la* and the suffix *-kamu*.

The first can be glossed as ‘before.’ As in these examples, the complement clause is at the end (218).

- 218) a) *nàl-kandi tònla nà tò-ke*
 sleep-NOM before 1SG read-NON.PST
 ‘I read before going to sleep.’ (AL 091015-02)
- b) *sà-kandi tònla nà làkpa thú-ke*
 eat-NOM before 1SG hand wash-NON.PST
 ‘I wash my hands before eating.’ (AL 091015-02)

This complement-final structure fits with the head-final position analysis of Lamjung Yolmo that also includes the verb in the final position in the sentence.

In narratives, *tònla* is often used to mark the temporal order of an event in the narrative structure without being used as an adverbial subordinator (219).

- 219) *nà = ki story tònla dènmu-raŋ yimba*
 1SG = GEN story before like.this-EMPH COP.EGO
 ‘my story before was just like this.’ (AL 091108-01 39:55)

Although we have seen that there is a preference for the adverbial subordinator to come at the end of the subordinated clause, it can occasionally be moved. (22) is an example where it is used as an adverbial subordinator with a different word order.

- 220) *tònla mì thún-kandi pù tçéemi yèke gàrila*
 before person drink-NOM son small COP.EGO.PST at.the.time
 ‘the son was small at the time before the people were drinking.’
 (AL 091108-01 34:39)

The use of *tòŋla* before the subordinated clause may be for narrative effect, or it may be that its position relative to the rest of the clause is relatively unfixed. The *-kandi* nominalising suffix is discussed in §1.6.4.

As something of a pair with *tòŋla* we also have the *tíŋla*, which means ‘after’ (221).

221) a) *tó sà-ti tíŋla ñà khyásala dògan=la kàl-sin*
 rice eat-PERF after 1SG market shop=DAT go.PERF-PST
 ‘after eating lunch I went to the market.’ (AL 091013-01)

b) *ñà=ki ába òŋ-ti tíŋla khyá=ki ába òŋ-ke*
 1SG=GEN father come-PERF after 2PL=GEN father come -NON.PST
 ‘your father will come after my father.’ (AL 091013-01)

There are two main ways to create an adverbial clause with the sense of ‘after.’ The first is by using the lexical item *tíŋla* as shown in (221). The other is to use a suffix on the subordinate clause verb, either *-tile* or *-timaraŋ*. Both of these take the perfective marker *-ti* as their starting point. While this suffix has a function that can convey a sense like ‘after’ especially in clause chaining (see §1.6.7. below) it alone never marks the verb of a subordinate clause and is therefore itself not a temporal adverb subordinator. The two constructions that derive from it, *-tile* or *-timaraŋ*, are discussed below.

The examples below show the sense of ‘after’ marked using the suffix *-le* on a verb with a perfective *-ti* suffix:

222) *khúŋ tché khér-ti-le kàl-sin*
 3PL book take-PERF-after go.PERF-PST
 ‘she took the book and left.’ (AL 091013-04)

The *-le* suffix most likely originates from the ablative marker with the same form. As Genetti (1986, 1991) notes, it is a common process for Bodic languages to take case markers and use them as verbal subordinators, with the ablative suffix commonly used to mark the temporal relation of ‘after’. The *-le* suffix does not occur in a sentence with *tíŋla*. To date I have discerned no difference in meaning between the two structures, with neither appearing to encode an immediate or delayed sense. The choice is perhaps largely personal, in two different tellings of the Family Story (thesis §3.2.1.) we see very different distribution of the two strategies. In 101124-03 SBL and RL use *tíŋla* only 5 times and more frequently use *-tile*, with 24 uses, while AL and SL in 091008-01 do not use the *-tile* construction at all but used *tíŋla* to mark temporal adverbial subordination 24 times.

The final temporal adverbial subordinator is *-timaraŋ*. All data collected with this form to date indicates that it behaves exactly the same as *-tile*. in that it suffixes to the verb of the subordinated clause (223).

223) a) *pí-timaraŋ pèmpiza tér-ku dù*
 take.off-after woman give-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘after taking off (the jacket) the woman gave it (to the man).’
 (AL 101012-02)

b) *khím=ki yíldo òŋ-timaraŋ dàgarmu tá-sin dù*
 house=GEN courtyard come-after moon look-PST COP.PE
 ‘after coming to the house’s yard (he) looked at the moon.’
 (SBL 101124-03 22:46)

I have as yet found no meaning or function difference between *-tile* and *-timaraŋ*. Speakers use both interchangeably and both appear to occur with all verbs.

The remaining temporal markers all capture something that means ‘at the time’ or ‘when.’ To date any difference between them and their usage is not apparent. The

first is *nàm*. This is the interrogative pronoun ‘when’ as listed in §1.4.3.3, but is used occasionally as an adverbial subordinator as well. This is different to the other processes discussed here as both the main clause and the subordinate clause are marked with the word *nàm*, which comes at the start of the clause instead of the end (224).

- 224) *nàm jail=la tè-ku yè*
 when jail =LOC sit-IPFV COP.EGO
nàm dzèŋi pèemi=la tèmba sàl-ke
 when elder wife =DAT remember-NON.PST
 ‘when (he) is sitting in jail then he remembers his first wife.’
 (SBL 101124-03 05:56)

The other two lexical items that that can both be glossed as ‘at that time’ are *gàri=la* and *bèla=la*. Both are Nepali words meaning ‘time’ with the Lamjung Yolmo locative suffix to give the meaning of ‘at that time’. Of the two *gàri=la* is the more common (225a), with only a few examples of the use of *bèlala* (225b).

- 225) a) *pèmpiza tçíi òŋ-ti lèn-sin*
 woman one come-PERF takes-PST
lèn-ke gàri=la tçhú púŋ-sin
 take-NON.PST at.the.time water pour-PST
 ‘a woman came and took (things). When (she) took them (she) poured water.’
 (AL 101006-01)
- b) *ŋà sà-ge bèla=la mè-thúŋ yè*
 1SG eat-NON.PST time =LOC NEG.NON.PST -drink COP.EGO
 ‘I do not drink when I eat.’ (AL 091124-01)

As can be seen from the two examples, the subordinating adverb comes at the end of the subordinated clause like we saw for ‘before’ and ‘after’ above, and the subordinated clause uses relative tense.

There is also a suffix form that can be used to indicate concurrent actions. The suffix *-kamu* is attached to the subordinated verb (226).

- 226) a) *ɲà tɕéemi yè-kamu yùl=la tè-ti yèke*
 1SG small COP.EGO-when village=LOC reside-PERF COP.PST
 ‘when I was young I lived in a village.’ (AL 091015-02)
- b) *ɲà sà-kamu tám mè-làp*
 1SG eat-when language NEG.NON.PST-speak
 ‘I do not talk when I eat.’ (AL 091015-02)
- c) *ɲà yèmbu=la tè-kamu nám mà-kyàp*
 1SG Kathmandu=LOC reside-at.the.time rain NEG.PST-fall
 ‘when I lived in Kathmandu it didn’t rain.’ (AL 101004-01)

With the tense on the subordinated verb not expressed due to the suffixing nature of the *-kamu* structure it is usually not possible in most examples to tell what tense the subordinated verb is. However, in (227), taken from the Jackal and Crow story (thesis §3.2.2.), the verb in subordinate clause verb is ‘go’ which has different forms for non-past *qò-* and past or perfect *kàl-* thus allowing us see that the subordinate clause in this construction has relative tense.

- 227) *tòŋbo thóla tè qò-kamu kɪ́=ki ɲé-ti khér-sin dù*
 tree above sit go-at.the.time dog=ERG chase-PERF take.away-PST COP.PE
 ‘when (the bird) went to sit up in the tree the dog chased and took (the fish) away.’ (AL 101010-01 10:26)

From these examples of the different adverbial subordinators we can make some generalisations about their place in the sentence structure. If the temporal adverbial subordinator is a suffix then it will always be attached to the verb of the subordinated clause. If the temporal adverb is a lexical item then in elicited forms it

will always come at the end of the subordinated clause. As we saw with example (227) above, the word order is more flexible in naturalistic data.

In the examples above I've shown that the subordinated clause comes before the main clause. It is possible to invert the clauses in these construction, as in (228), but speakers find this phrasing unwieldy and do not prefer it.

- 228) a) *yùl = la tèt-ti yèke ñà tçéemi yè-kamu*
 village=LOC reside-PERF COP.EGO.PST 1SG small COP.EGO-when
 'when I was young I lived in a village.' (AL 091015-02)
- b) *ñà kyàsa = la kàl-pa tó sà-ti tíŋla*
 1SG market=DAT go.PERF-PST rice.cooked eat -PERF after
 'I went to the market after I ate rice.' (AL 091015-02)

1.6.3.2 Manner adverbs

Manner in Lamjung Yolmo can be expressed using a word such as *límu* (229a) or *tìle* (229b) which both translate as 'like' or *dènmu* which would translate as 'like this' (229c). Examples given below indicate that the subordinated manner adverb takes a nominaliser suffix.

- 229) a) *khúj tábu límú gyùbu tçóŋ-ku dù*
 3PL horse like fast run-NOM COP.PE
 'he runs fast like a horse.' (AL 091109-03)
- b) *mòdze tìle dù*
 banana like COP.PE
 'it is like a banana.' (SL 091108-01 01:15)
- c) *khé dènmu sà-kandi yimba*
 2SG like.this eat-NOM COP.EGO
 'you eat like this.' (AL 091109-03)

To date I have not observed any examples of *tìle* or *límu* being used with anything other than a noun phrase.

1.6.3.3 Conditionals

Conditionals are formed by using the conditional suffix *-na* on the verb in the protasis clause. There appear to be two different strategies for forming conditionals. The first is to place the suffix directly onto the main verb (230).

- 230) a) *nám mà-kyap-na* *ηà phíla qò-ke*
rain NEG.PST-fall-COND 1SG outside go-NON.PST
‘if it doesn’t rain I will go outside.’ (AL 091103-02)
- b) *khé mà-oη-na* *ηà tçíiraη qò-ke*
2SG NEG.PST-come-COND 1SG alone go-NON.PST
‘if you don’t come, I will go alone.’ (AL 091103-02)

The other strategy is to use the main protasis verb in the simple past, or with no tense suffix and attach the conditional to *lâp*, the verb meaning ‘say’ (231).

- 231) a) *nám mà-kyap lâp-na* *ηà phíla qò-ke*
rain NEG.PST-fall say-COND 1SG outside go-NON.PST
‘if it doesn’t rain I will go outside.’ (AL 091103-02)
- b) *khé mà-oη lâp-na* *ηà tçíiraη qò-ke*
3SG NEG.PST-come say-COND 1SG alone go-NON.PST
‘if you don’t come, I will go alone.’ (AL 091103-02)
- c) *ádzi ηù-sin lâp-na nòmò ηù yè*
sister.older cry-PST say-COND sister-younger cry COP.EGO
‘if elder sister cries, younger sister cries.’ (AL 091103-02)

According to AL, who gave the forms in both of the examples above during elicitation, they both mean the same thing.

The use of the lexical item *dèze* can also be used optionally at the start of the protasis clause to indicate conditionality (232), however the verb suffix is still always present in all elicitation in which it was used.

- 232) *dèze kòkpa mà-dzàr ləp-na kyàpɕar ɲò-toŋ*
 if garlic NEG.PST-get say-COND ginger buy-IMP
 ‘if garlic is unavailable, get ginger.’ (AL 091103-02)

So far, the examples of conditionals have non-past tense suffixes on the apodosis clause, however in (233) we see some examples where the infinitive suffix is used.

- 233) a) *ɲà ɲímu ʃáŋa yè-na ɲà sàse ɲò-tɕe yèke*
 1SG with money COP.EGO-COND 1SG food buy-INF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘If I had money with me, I’d have bought food.’ (AL 031109-02)
- b) *nám mè-kyàp-na-ni ɲà òŋ-tɕe yèke*
 rain NEG.NON.PST-fall-COND-FOC 1SG come-INF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘If it had not rained, I would have come.’ (AL 031109-02)

It is possible that where there is a counterfactual sense to the apodosis clause then the infinitive is used, as opposed to the regular non-past tense.

1.6.4. *Nominalisation*

Most basically, nominalised complements are predications that have undergone a derivational change that results in them acting as a noun phrases. As is common in many Tibeto-Burman languages (Matisoff 1972, Noonan 1997), the nominalisers in Lamjung Yolmo serve many more functions besides. Some Bodic languages appear to have only one suffix that constantly acts as a nominaliser, such as Sherpa (Kelly

2004, p. 385), or Manange, with the *-pa* nominaliser that is found across many Tibeto-Burman languages (DeLancey 2002, Hildebrandt 2004, p. 82, Noonan 2008). Instead nominalising suffixes in Lamjung Yolmo appear to act more like Standard Tibetan nominal suffixation, where there is a range of forms dependent on tense, aspect and deontic information (Tournadre and Dorje 2003, p. 177).

While it may not share similarities in the form of nominaliser with other Tibeto-Burman languages, Lamjung Yolmo certainly has a wide range of uses for nominal markers like many closely related languages, such as use as a relative clause marker, and in verbal complements.

Hari talks about the nominaliser *-ka*, which she describes as ‘not very productive’ (n.d., p. 32). This suffix form is the same as the hortative (see §1.5.3.3.2. above). There has been several example attested to date (234).

- | | | | | |
|------|----|----------------|-----------|----------------|
| 234) | a) | <i>t̪àa</i> | ‘study’ | |
| | | <i>t̪àa-ka</i> | ‘teacher’ | (AL 091012-02) |
| | b) | <i>t̪ò</i> | ‘read’ | |
| | | <i>t̪ò-ka</i> | ‘school’ | (AL 091013-04) |

also *náŋ-ka* ‘beggar’ where *náŋ* is verb ‘to ask for something.’ Although there are some tokens the suffix does not appear to be productive, or used by all speakers.

The most common and productive verbal nominaliser in Lamjung Yolmo is the suffix *-kandi*. This suffix is not recorded as occurring in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari and Lama 2004, Hari 2010) and so appears to be a recent, though widespread feature of Lamjung Yolmo. It is most likely cognate with the Standard Tibetan

-khan/-ngan which Tournadre and Dorje (2003, p. 249) observe is used as *-khan* in more formal registers. The suffix attaches to verbs to vary their function (235).

- 235) a) *áarak thúŋ-kandi*
 alcohol drink-NOM
 ‘alcohol drinking.’ (SL 120214-02, 17:39)
- b) *ŋà=ki ðilbu yúŋ-kandi thé-ku dù*
 1SG=ERG bell.prayer shake-NOM hear-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘I hear the ringing of bells’ (AL 100922-01)

The nominaliser is used for more than just create nominalised forms. It is often found marking lexical verbs in utterances (236).

- 236) a) *ŋà kyàmi tám làp-kandi yimba*
 1SG foreign language speak-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘I can speak English.’ (AL 091109-03)
- b) *ɕíŋɖo sà-kandi yàabu yè*
 fruit eat-NOM good COP.EGO
 ‘it is good to eat fruit.’ (AL 091109-02)

As discussed in the section on copulas above (§1.5.1.), the *yimba* copula is equational, taking two noun phrases. As seen in (237), unlike other tense and aspect suffixes which occur with *yè* in some tense constructions, the *-kandi* suffix only occurs with the *yimba* copula, as shown in (237a) and (237b). The *dù* and *dùba* forms do not have this functional split, and in example (237c) is a *-kandi* nominalised verb occurring with this copula form.

- 237) a) *ŋà ñàl-kandi yimba*
 1SG sleep-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘I will sleep.’ (AL 090928-02)

b) *kàndi kòtha d̀ò-kandi yimba*
 which story go-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘in which story will it go?’ (AL 091108-01 14:18)

c) *khyá gyùba gyùba d̀ò-kandi dùba*
 2SG fast fast go-NOM COP.PE.EMPH
 ‘you walk quickly.’ (AL 091012-03)

Notice above how the adjective ‘*gyùba*’ is modifying the nominalised verb form *d̀ò-kandi* ‘go.’ As adjectives only modify nouns this adds more evidence to the analysis that *-kandi* is a nominaliser.

Other evidence that *-kandi* is a nominalising suffix and not a tense marking suffix is that the suffix is not dropped in the negated form. As shown in §1.5.5. the negative form of a verb does not include tense marking suffixes, however in the (238), the *-kandi* suffix remains on negated constructions.

238) a) *ḡà tó m̀è-sà-kandi yimba*
 1SG rice.cooked NEG.NON.PST-eat-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘I am not eating rice.’ (AL 100929-01)

b) *yèmbu = la m̀è-dzòr-kandi sàse*
 Kathmandu = LOC NEG.NON.PST-get-NOM food
 ‘food that is not available in Kathmandu.’ (AL 091101-05)

In her work on Manange, Hildebrandt notes that the nominal can be used on main verbs, which indicates future tense (2004, p. 83). In Lamjung Yolmo the *-kandi* suffix is also only used in non-past constructions (239).

239) a) *ḡà tàpse tó sà-kandi yimba*
 1SG now rice.cooked eat-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating rice now.’ (AL 100929-01)

b) *ḡà nàḡbar tó sà-kandi yimba*
 1SG tomorrow rice.cooked eat-NOM COP.EGO
 ‘I will eat rice tomorrow.’ (AL 100929-01)

c) * *ḡà dàḡ tó sà-kandi yimba*
 1SG yesterday rice.cooked eat -NOM COP.EGO
 * ‘I ate rice yesterday.’ (AL 091012-03)

Tournadre and Dorje (2003) also observe that the Standard Tibetan *-khan/-ngan* has a present-future sense (i.e. non-past) giving further evidence that these forms are likely to be cognates.

The final nominaliser to be discussed in this section is the locational nominaliser *-sa*. This nominalising suffix is also found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010, p. 34) and other Tibetic languages such as Kurtöp. It is attached to a verb to make a locational noun (240).

240) a) *mòḡor kúu-sa*
 bus(Eng) wait-NOM.LOC
 ‘bus stop.’ (AL 120121-01)

b) *dzùbu thú-sa*
 body wash-NOM.LOC
 ‘bathroom.’ (AL 091019-02)

c) *tó yò-sa kòga*
 rice cook-NOM.LOC fireplace
 ‘the fireplace where rice is cooked.’ (AL 120121-01)

1.6.5. *Complementation*

A complement clause is a clause that functions as an argument of another clause. To date, only object complement clauses have been observed to be used in Lamjung

Yolmo. The complement clause takes the infinitive *-tɕe*. (241) shows clauses with complement taking predicates such as *remember*, *forget* and *want*.

- 241) a) *ɲì=la yìgi prù-tɕe tɛmba sàl-toŋ*
 1PL.EXCL=DAT letter write-INF remember-IMP
 ‘remember to write us a letter.’ (AL 091103-01)
- b) *ɲà ɲàl-tɕe tɛmba tɕè-sin dù*
 1SG sleep-INF forget-PST COP.PE
 ‘I forgot to sleep.’ (AL 091101-03)
- c) *ɲà tò-tɕe lóp-ɲeraŋ yè*
 1SG read-INF learn-IPFV COP.EGO
 ‘I am learning to read.’ (AL 091109-03)
- d) *khúŋ=ki pàama pè-tɕe pè-ti yèke*
 2PL=ERG wedding do-INF do-PERF COP.EGO.PST
 ‘they decided to get married.’ (AL 091109-03)

While (241) show the use of the infinitive in complementation, there is also the optative mood suffix (§1.5.3.3.3.) that can be used as a complementiser (242).

- 242) a) *ɲà=la ɲù-ɲi tɛ-sin*
 1SG=DAT cry-OPT sit-PST
 ‘I want to cry.’ (AL 091020-02)
- b) *khýá=la tɛ-ɲi tɛ-sin*
 2PL=DAT sit-OPT AUX-PST
 ‘you want to stay.’ (AL 091020-02)

1.6.6. *Relativisation*

There are two main strategies for producing relative clauses in Lamjung Yolmo. Both of them involve suffixing the verb of the relative clause. The first is the

nominaliser *-kandi* discussed in the immediately preceding section. The second is the suffix *-pa-ki* or *-ka-ki*. I will look at both of these strategies in turn.

For both of these strategies you will notice the link to nominalisation. As I discussed in §1.6.4. above *-kandi* is the most common nominaliser in Lamjung Yolmo and as discussed in Noonan (1997) *-pa* is frequently used as a nominaliser in Tibeto-Burman languages. Noonan notes that the nominaliser in Tibeto-Burman languages often has a wide range of functions, including relativisation (Noonan 1997, also Kelly 2004, p. 391). For clarity of function these relativiser uses of the *-kandi* nominaliser are being discussed in this separate section, rather than in the general section on nominalisation. The *-pa-ki* construction is also being discussed in this section because while it is likely that *-pa* is historically a nominaliser it is no longer productively used as such.

In (243) we *-kandi* functioning as a relativiser.

- 243) a) *khím sáŋma pè-kandi mì nà-sin dù*
house clean do-NOM person ill-PST COP.PE
‘the man who cleans the house is ill.’ (AL 101005-01)
- b) *tàzi bìta=la pè-kandi phóto lò-ti khér-sin*
before wall=LOC do-NOM photo return-PERF take.away-PST
‘the photo that was attached to the wall was returned and taken
away.’ (AL 101006-01)

The second strategy to be discussed here is the use of the suffix *-pa-ki* or *-ke-ki*. This suffix is most likely a combination of elements, including what was historically a nominaliser suffix *-pa* or the non-past tense suffix *-ke* and the suffix *-ki*, which functions as a relativiser. The *-ki* is likely related to the case suffix with the same form (§1.4.5.2. It would appear that the *-pa* suffix is also used for its past tense function (see §1.5.3.1.2.). It is likely that speakers have reanalysed what was initially

a nominaliser functioning as a relativiser as a past tense marker, and thus were able to also include the form *-ke-ki* as a nominaliser. The distinction in tense allows for a past/non-past distinction. Hari (2010, p. 76), in her discussion on relative clauses, notes that this structure also exists in Melamchi Valley Yolmo, however in Lamjung Yolmo there is a preference for reduplicating the verb in the relative clause. Examples of this structure are given below. (244a) to (244c) are past tense and (244d) is non-past tense. In (244a) we see a relativised object, and in the other examples of (244) we see relativised subjects.

- 244) a) *khyá = ki prù-prù-pa-ki yìgi*
 2PL = GEN write-write-PST-REL letter
 ‘the letter that you wrote.’ (AL 091101-05)
- b) *dàŋ òŋ-òŋ-pa-ki pèmpiza*
 yesterday come-come-PST-REL girl
 ‘she sang slowly.’ (AL 091012-03)
- c) *tàzi = ki khyópiža = ki tàp-tàp-pa-ki tché kyòŋ-ti zàa-sin*
 before = GEN man = ERG fall-fall-PST-REL book carry-PERF put-PST
 ‘the man who fell before carried the book and put it down.’
 (AL 091012-03)
- d) *òodi màrmu càmú kèn-ke-ki mì*
 that red hat wear-NON.PST-REL person
ŋà = ki rò yimba
 1SG = GEN friend COP.EGO
 ‘the man wearing the red hat who is my friend.’ (AL 091109-01)

As can be seen from the examples above, the one speaker uses both strategies, however a difference in their function has not yet been determined. The difference may mainly be stylistic.

- b) *khé pòṅgep dī-raṅ yimba*
 2SG apron.traditional this-EMPH COP.EGO
 ‘your apron is this one.’ (AL 100924-01)

This is an interesting situation, as it requires the person asking the question to presume to know what copula form would be most appropriate to reply with. This is discussed in detail in §7.4.1. of the thesis.

There are also constructions where no copula is used (247).

- 247) a) *khé tó sà-sin*
 2SG rice.cooked eat-PST
 ‘did you eat rice?’ (RL 101124-02)
- b) *ṅà tó sà-sin*
 1SG rice.cooked eat-PST
 ‘I ate rice’ (RL 101124-02)

A common question strategy is to use the *-pa* suffix (§1.5.3.1.2). In this question construction it is assumed that the person answering will use the appropriate tense/aspect marking in reply, and rarely respond with the *-pa* suffix (248).

- 248) a) *khé tó sà-pa*
 2SG rice.cooked eat-PST
 ‘did you eat rice?’ (RL 101124-02)
- b) *ṅà tó sà-sin*
 1SG rice.cooked eat-PST
 ‘I ate rice’ (RL 101124-02)

Binary constructions can be formed as per example (247) above, but another strategy is to include both the affirmative and negative forms of the copula or lexical verb in question. In (249) two people were playing the Twenty Questions game (thesis

§3.2.5.) and trying to guess objects by only asking questions binary yes/no questions.

249) a) Q: *sà mèt-sà yè*
eat NEG.NON.PST-eat COP.EGO
'(do you) eat (it) or not eat it?' (RL 101020-02 06:32)

A: *mèt-sà yè*
NEG.NON.PST-eat COP.EGO
'don't eat (it).' (SNL 101020-02 06:33)

1.6.9. *Reported speech*

Reporting what other people have said is a communicative strategy for which there are two different structures in Lamjung Yolmo. Reported speech is explored in much more depth in chapter six of this thesis, including its grammatical features and use. This section will only briefly outline the two strategies.

The first strategy is to use the verb of saying *lâp-*. Although there are examples of directly reported speech, in reported speech constructions with the verb of saying speakers rarely give both the subject of the matrix clause as well as the subject of the reported utterance as pronouns. Instead there is a preference for only giving the referent of the reported speech event. (250a) gives an original recording that I played for a speaker and (250b) is their reporting of the original speech event. We can see the pronoun shift between (250a) and (250b). This referent is oriented towards the person reporting the speech event, but the modal value of the copula remains oriented towards the speaker of the original utterance.⁷

⁷ In this example, although it's AL in the original utterance, when I played it back she did not recognise it as her own voice and assumed that it was another female talking.

- 250) a) *ɲà sà tè-ti yè*
 1SG eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating.’ (AL 100930-01)
- b) *mò sà tè-ti yè làp-ku dù*
 3SG.F eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO say-IPFV COP.PE
 ‘she is eating (she said)’ (AL 120208-01)

This type of reported construction has been called ‘hybrid’ reported speech, as it is neither prototypically direct or indirect. It is discussed in more detail in §8.1.2 of the thesis.

The second reported speech strategy is to use the reported speech marker *lò*. This is a sentence final particle that takes no affixes. It indicates that the preceding sentence is reported speech and not that of the speaker. (250) includes both the original speech event and the reporting of this using the reported speech marker.

- 251) a) *ɲà sà tè-ti yè*
 1SG eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO
 ‘I am eating’ (AL 100930-01)
- b) *mò sà tè-ti yè ló*
 3SG.F eat AUX-PERF COP.EGO RS
 ‘she is eating (she said)’ (RL 120218-01)

As with the verb of saying, the deictic elements of the utterance reorient to that of the person reporting the speech.

Although I have called it a reported speech marker, the range of communicative phenomena that can be reported using the marker is broader than just speech. For example in a general conversation, a woman asked the group if any of us had change

for a thousand rupee note. When KL looked at me I shook my head to indicate that I did not. She then reported this as (44) to the other woman.

252) *mè* *ló*
 COP.EGO.NEG RS
 ‘does not (she said).’ (KL 07/03/2012 Book 4, p. 26)

This broader function of the reported speech marker is discussed in a more detailed look at its use in interaction in §8.2.3.

Appendix 2: Texts

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This appendix contains a small number of interlinearised and translated texts. As all of the recordings for this project have been archived with Paradisec, along with accompanying ELAN transcripts (see thesis §3.4. for more detail), this small collection of texts is intended to give a feel for the language as used in narratives, and is not intended to serve as the primary corpus for the project.

The majority of texts are from the Jackal and Crow story (thesis §3.2.2.). This includes recordings from a number of speakers, as well as the version that was written to make a children's picture book (§2.4.). There is also a description of AL's villages (§2.5.).

For all lines of the text there is a time code (minutes and seconds) that corresponds to the original recording. Where the speech has been inaudible it is marked with <xx>. Information about the speakers can be found in Appendix 4, and more information about the recordings can be found in Appendix 3.

1.7. *Jackal and Crow: AL (101010-01)*

This is the second telling of the story AL did, after an initial description of the images. AL is not literate in storybook conventions and as such the story she tells is quite different to the others.

tókari sùm nàŋla ɲà dùba
basket three inside fish COP.PE -EMPH
'there was fish in three baskets' (10:32)

tókari sùm nàŋla = ki ɲà tɕátsuŋma tɕíi òŋ-timaraŋ
basket three inside = GEN fish bird one come-after
ɲà tɕíi tén-ti khá nàŋla lú-sin dù
fish one pull.out-PERF mouth inside put.into-PST COP.PE
'fish in the three baskets. A bird came, pulled out a fish
and put it inside its mouth' (10:36)

òo = le ùr-timaraŋ tònbo thóla tè kâl-sin dù
there = ABL fly-after tree above sit go.PERF-PST COP.PE
'from there, it flew and went to sit in a tree' (10:44)

tònbo thóla tè qò-kamu kší = ki ɲé-ti khér-sin dù
tree above sit go-at.the.time dog = ERG chase-PERF take.away-PST COP.PE
'when (the bird was) going to sit above, a dog chased it' (10:49)

kší ɲé ɲé-ti khúr-sin dù kító
dog chase chase-PERF carry-PST COP.PE 3SG.M
tònbo thóla tè-ti tá tè-ku dù
tree above sit -PERF look AUX-IPFV COP.PE
'The dog chased and he sat looking up at the tree' (10:53)

áni pítɕa ràŋsa rò òŋ-timaraŋ ràŋsa
and again other friend come-after different
rò áŋ khá tàŋ-ti tè-sin dù
friend also mouth open-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE
'and again, another friend came, a different friend also opened their mouth' (10:58)

áni pìtça khá tòn-ti tèt-sin dù khí pìtça rànsa
 and again mouth open-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE dog again other
tònbo thóla tçón-ti tèt-sin dù
 tree above run-PERF AUX-PST COP.PE

‘and again, he was opening his mouth. The dog again ran to another tree.’ (11:07)

tè-ke gàrila khí=ki thóla=le màr
 sit-NON.PST at.the.time dog=ERG above=ABL down

‘while sitting, the dog came down, from above’ (11:15)

jí káraṅ tçátsuṅma jí káraṅ=ki kàl màr jé çór-sin dù
 two CLF.EMPH bird two CLF.EMPH=ERG go.PERF down chase get out-PST COP.PE

‘the two birds both went down, were chased out’ (11:20)

áni khí khá sé-timaraṅ tèt-sin dù
 and dog mouth kill-after sit-PST COP.PE

‘and the dog killed them with his mouth and sat down’ (11:24)

tíṅla qàṅa <xx>-di tèt-sin dù
 after manner <xx>-FOC sit-PST COP.PE

‘after, in the manner of <xx>, sat around’ (11:28)

jí káraṅ qàṅa pòr-ti tè-ke gàrila
 two CLF.EMPH manner leave -PERF sit -NON.PST at.the.time

‘at the time the two (birds) left sitting like that’ (11:29)

tíṅla pìtça rànsa tònbo=la jé-ti kàl-sin khí=ki
 after again other tree=LOC chase-PERF go.PERF-PST dog =ERG

‘after again, to the other tree the dog went and chased’ (11:32)

jé-ti qò-ke gàrila tçátsuṅma tçíi
 chase-PERF go-NON.PST at.the.time bird one

‘at the time he went chasing a bird’ (11:37)

khí=ki khá=la khí dzùm-sin dù
 dog=ERG mouth=DAT dog take-PST COP.PE

‘the dog took (it) in his mouth’ (11:44)

khí sà-tçe pè tè-sin dù
dog eat-INF do sit-PST COP.PE
'and wanted to eat the bird' (11:46)

áni tíŋla tçi-ni sà-sin
and after one-FOC eat-PST
'and after ate that one' (11:50)

tçi-ni ñà=ki rò-ni sà -sin làp-sin ná tíŋal pè-ti tè -sin dù
one -FOC 1SG=GEN friend-FOC eat -PST say-PST PART sad do-PERF AUX -PST COP.PE
'that one friend eaten said "I am feeling sad"' (10:54)

1.8. Jackal and Crow: KL (101026-06)

Unlike the version AL tells in §2.1 above, this is the first time KL viewed the images so her version involves a lot more description of the images.

tçàro=ki ñà dzùm-sin dù
crow=ERG fish seize-PST COP.PE
'the crow seized a fish' (00:22)

tçàro=ki khá=ki ñà dzùm-sin dù
crow=GEN mouth=INS fish seize-PST COP.PE
'the crow seized a fish with its mouth' (00:27)

dì
this
'this' (00:39)

lùndi
jackal
'jackal' (00:42)

lùndi
jackal
'jackal' (00:45)

tçàro = la tá-ku dù
crow = DAT look-IPFV COP.PE
'looking at the crow' (00:47)

lùndi tçàro tá-ku dù
jackal crow look-IPFV COP.PE
'the jackal looking at the crow' (00:51)

dì tçí yìmba mè-çée lée
this what COP.EGO NEG-know PART
'what is this? I don't know' (00:58)

tçé tèn-ku dù
tongue go.out-IPFV COP.PE
'tongue going out' (01:11)

dì
this
'this' (01:15)

dì lùndi yìmba
this jackal COP.EGO
'this is a jackal' (01:20)

lùndi yìmba
jackal COP.EGO
'is a jackal' (01:22)

ɲà dù
fish COP.PE
'it is a fish' (01:40)

ɲà
fish
'fish' (01:41)

tçàro=ki tònbo=la zàa-ti nà nà dzùm-sin dù
crow=ERG tree=LOC leave-PERF fish fish seize-PST COP.PE
'the crow in the tree after leaving seized the fish' (01:49)

dì
this
'this' (02:06)

lùndi tçàro=la tá-ku dù
jackal crow=DAT look-IPFV COP.PE
'the jackal looked at the crow' (02:14)

lùndi tçàro tá-ku dù
jackal crow look-IPFV COP.PE
'the jackal looked at the crow' (02:24)

tçàro tònbo thóla nà dzùm-di dù
crow tree above fish seize-FOC COP.PE
'the crow over the tree seized the fish.' (02:28)

lùndi khá sé-ku dù
jackal mouth kill-IPFV COP.PE
'the jackal's mouth is killing it' (02:36)

nà lùndi=ki khá nàŋla çùu -tçe pè-ku dù
fish jackal=GEN mouth inside enter-INF do-IPFV COP.PE
'the fish is entering the jackal's mouth' (02:39)

lùndi yimba
jackal COP.EGO
'is it a jackal?' (02:52)

ŋà mè-çée yè
1SG NEG-know COP.EGO
'I do not know' (02:54)

lùndi jà sà-ku dù
jackal fish eat-IPFV COP.PE
‘the jackal is eating the fish’ (03:13)

lùndi
jackal
‘jackal’ (03:20)

tçé tèn-ti jàl tè-sin dù
tongue go.out-PERF sleep AUX-PST COP.PE
‘(its) tongue goes out and he slept’ (03:22)

jàl tè-sin dù
sleep AUX-PST COP.PE
‘it slept’ (03:25)

tçàro tònbo=la dzàa-ti jàl tè-sin dù
crow tree=LOC put-PERF lay AUX-PST COP.PE
‘the crow in the tree sat and lay’ (03:30)

dì tçàro=ki jà tçàro=ki khá=ki jà dzùm-sin dù
this crow=GEN fish crow=ERG mouth=INS fish seize-PST COP.PE
‘this crow's fish, the crow seizes the fish with its mouth’ (03:34)

dì tçàro tònbo=la dù
this crow tree=LOC COP.PE
‘the crow is in the tree’ (04:21)

dì lùndi wála dù
this jackal under COP.PE
‘the jackal is underneath’ (04:26)

lùndi tçé tèn-ti dù
jackal tongue go.out-PERF COP.PE
‘the jackal's tongue comes out’ (04:34)

tçé tèn-ti

tongue go.out -PERF

‘tongue comes out’ (04:36)

dì thóla nà dù

this above fish COP.PE

‘above this is the fish’ (04:40)

tçàro =ki nà dzùm-sin dù

crow = GEN fish seize-PST COP.PE

‘the crow seized the fish’ (04:44)

tçàro =ki khá =ki

crow = GEN mouth = INS

‘the crow with (its) mouth’ (04:46)

lùndi tá tèt-ku dù

jackal look AUX-IPFV COP.PE

‘the jackal is looking’ (04:48)

tçàro tònbo thóla nà dzùm-ti dù

crow tree above fish seize-PERF COP.PE

‘the crow above the tree seizes the fish’ (04:55)

lùndi sá =la tá tèt-ku dù

jackal ground = LOC look AUX-IPFV COP.PE

‘the jackal on the ground looking’ (05:00)

lùndi tsáala khá sèt tèt-ku dù

jackal below mouth receive AUX-IPFV COP.PE

‘the jackal below receives in its mouth’ (05:05)

nà yàrla =le màr òn-ku dù tçàro =ki táŋ tér-sin

fish up = ABL down come-IPFV COP.PE crow = ERG throw give-PST

‘the fish comes down from above, the crow throws (it)’ (05:07)

dàla lùndi jà sà tè-ku dù
here jackal fish eat AUX-IPFV COP.PE
'here the jackal is eating the fish' (05:13)

lùndi jàl tè-sin dù tɛ́ tèn dù léé
jackal sleep AUX-PST COP.PE tongue go.out COP.PE PART
'the jackal was sleeping, his tongue went out' (05:20)

tɛ̀àro tònbo thóla jàl tè-sin dù
crow tree above sleep sit-PST COP.PE
'the crow above in the tree was sleeping' (05:26)

1.9. Jackal and Crow: RL (101027-01)

This version of the task was the first time RL had seen the images, and so like for KL (§2.2. above) involves quite a bit of description.

tɛ̀àro
crow
'crow' (00:31)

tɛ̀àro tɛ̀í yèke
crow one COP.EGO.PST
'there was a crow' (00:33)

òo tɛ̀àro =ki
there crow =ERG
'there, the crow' (00:36)

jà sà-sin
fish eat-PST
'ate a fish' (00:38)

sà-sin
eat-PST
'ate' (00:48)

dàla

here

‘here’ (00:51)

tupre-raŋ nà = ya yèke

many(Nep)-EMPH fish = PL COP.EGO.PST

‘all the fishes were there’ (00:54)

tçàro = ki nà khér-sin

crow = ERG fish take.away-PST

‘the crow took the fish away’ (01:01)

òolegi tçàro tònbo = la tè-sin

and.then crow tree = LOC sit-PST

‘and then the crow sat in the tree’ (01:05)

òolegi

and.then

‘and then’ (01:08)

lùndi òŋ-sin

jackal come-PST

‘the jackal came’ (01:09)

tçàro tònbo = la tè tè-ti lùndi òŋ-sin

crow tree = LOC sit AUX-PERF jackal come-PST

‘the crow sat in the tree and the jackal came’ (01:14)

lùndi tá-sin

jackal look-PST

‘the jackal looked’ (01:17)

lùndi sòz tè-sin

jackal think(Nep) AUX-PST

‘the jackal thought’ (01:22)

jà sà òŋ-na-ni òŋ-tçe
fish eat come-COND-FOC come-INF
'if the fish comes' (01:27)

lùndi làp-sin tçàro = la
jackal say-PST crow = DAT
'the jackal said to the crow' (01:38)

lùndi tçàro = la tá-sin òodi làp-sin tçàro = la
jackal crow = DAT look-PST that say-PST crow = DAT
'the jackal looked at the crow, it said to the crow' (01:42)

tçàro khé lú nèn çée yè
crow 2SG song sing know COP.EGO
'crow, you know how it sing songs' (01:46)

lùndi tá-sin
jackal look-PST
'the jackal looked' (01:56)

òolegi jà sà-kandi bítsa pè-sin
and.then fish eat-NOM though(Nep) do-PST
'and then thought about eating the fish' (01:59)

lùndi sòz tè-sin
jackal think(Nep) AUX-PST
'the jackal thought' (02:08)

dì tçàro = ki lú nèn yè
this crow = ERG song sing COP.EGO
'this crow sings.' (02:10)

jà tàp-ke
fish fall-NON.PST
'the fish falls' (02:14)

òolegi lùndi làp-sin
and.then jackal say-PST
'and then the jackal said.' (02:17)

khé lú nèn çée yè
2SG song sing know COP.EGO
'you know how to sing songs' (02:21)

tçàro = la
crow = DAT
'to the crow' (02:23)

kwestun pè-sin
question(Eng) do-PST
'(he) asked' (02:23)

práçna tji-sin
question(Nep) ask-PST
'he asked a question' (02:24)

tçàro = ki rò = la tçàro = la práçna tji-sin
crow = GEN friend = DAT crow = DAT question ask-PST
'to the crow's friend, to the crow asked a question' (02:27)

tçàro = ki làp-sin
crow = ERG say-PST
'the crow said' (02:31)

ŋà = ki lú nèn çée-ke
1SG = ERG song sing know-NON.PST
'“I know how to sing a song”' (02:32)

tçàro = ki làp-sin lú nèn-toŋ
crow = ERG say-PST song sing-IMP
'the crow said. “sing a song”' (02:36)

lùndi làp-sin lú nèn-toŋ
jackal say-PST song sing-IMP
‘the jackal said “sing a song” (02:38)

ŋà lú mè-nèn ŋà=ki ɲà tàp-ke
1SG song NEG-sing 1SG=GEN fish fall-NON.PST
“‘I won’t sing a song, my fish will fall” (02:41)

yè-na-ni khé lú nèn mè-çée dùba
COP.EGO-COND-FOC 2SG song sing NEG-know COP.PE.EMPH
“‘you don’t know how to sing a song” (02:46)

tçàro=ki lú lèn-tçe tçòl-sin
crow=ERG song sing-INF do-PST
‘the crow did sing a song’ (02:50)

òolegi ɲà tàp-sin
and.then fish fall-PST
‘and then the fish fell’ (02:53)

ɲà lùndi sà-sin
fish jackal eat-PST
‘the jackal ate the fish’ (02:56)

tóoba yèke khó=ki sà-sin
hungry COP.EGO.PST 3SG.M=ERG eat-PST
‘(he) was hungry and he ate’ (02:58)

ɲà khó=ki sà-sin lùndi sà-sin
fish 3SG.M=ERG eat-PST jackal eat-PST
‘he ate the fish, the jackal ate’ (03:02)

òolegi khó tóoba sé khó=ki tóoba sé-sin
and.then 3SG.M hungry kill 3SG.M=ERG hungry kill-PST
‘and then he killed the hunger, he killed the hunger’ (03:06)

jà sà-ti

fish eat-PERF

‘ate the fish’ (03:10)

lùndi phó kàŋ-ti = le aram-ti jàl-sin

jackal belly fill-PERF = ABL rest(Nep) -PERF sleep-PST

‘after the jackal's belly was full (he) slept’ (03:13)

<xx> *jàl -sin*

<xx> sleep -PST

‘<xx> slept’ (03:17)

tçàro = ki sòz tề-sin

crow = ERG think(Nep) AUX-PST

‘the crow thought’ (03:20)

ŋà = ki lú nèn-ti = le ŋà = ki jà tập-sin

1SG = ERG song sing-PERF = ABL 1SG = GEN fish fall-PST

‘after I sang the song I dropped the fish’ (03:22)

ŋà tóba-raŋ tề-sin

1SG hungry-EMPH AUX-PST

‘I feel very hungry’ (03:26)

1.10. Jackal and Crow: Picture Book

This version of the Jackal and Crow story is a written text RL created to be included with the images in a small story book for Yolmo speaking children. As there are few examples of written texts in Lamjung Yolmo I have included it here. There are no time codes because it is not a recorded text.

tçàro tókari = la tề-sin

crow basket = LOC sit-PST

‘the crow sat in the basket’

tçàro =ki jà kúmen kyàp-sin
crow =ERG fish thief(Nep) fall-PST
'the crow stole a fish'

òolegi tçàro ùr-sin
and.then crow fly-PST
'and then the crow flew'

tçàro ùr-tile tòŋbo =la tè -sin
crow fly-after tree =LOC sit -PST
'after flying the crow sat in a tree'

lùndi tçàro thóŋ-sin
jackal crow see-PST
'the jackal saw the crow'

tçàro =ki tçhódo =la jà thóŋ -sin
crow = GEN lip =LOC fish see-PST
'in the crow's lips (it) saw this fish'

lùndi =ki née-sin jà sà thóŋ-sin làpna-ni ñà =ki phò kàŋ-ke
jackal =ERG think-PST fish eat see-PST if -FOC 1SG = GEN belly fill-NON.PST
'the jackal thought "if I eat the fish then my belly will be full."'

òolegi lùndi =ki tçàro =la òm-sin tçàro khé yàabu yè
and.then jackal =ERG crow =DAT convince-PST crow 2SG good COP.EGO
'then the jackal wooed the crow "you are good"'

khé ùr khú yè
2SG fly can COP.EGO
"you can fly"

çókpa yàabu yè
feather good COP.EGO
"(your) feathers are good"

khé=ki kàla-raŋ l àp áŋ ùr khú yè
2SG=GEN where-EMPH say also fly can COP.EGO
“‘you can fly better than anyone’”

lùndi=ki n ée-sin l ú n èn-sin y ìmba-na khé=ki t çhódo=ki
jackal=ERG think-PST song sing-PST COP.EGO-COND 2SG=GEN lip=INS
j à s á=la t àp-ke
fish ground=DAT fall-NON.PST
‘the jackal thought “‘if (the crow) sang a song the fish in your
mouth will fall to the ground’”’

khé=ki dz àmma s è y àabu y è
2SG=GEN all thing good COP.EGO
“‘everything of yours is good’”

khé=ki l ú n èn m è-ç ée-ke
2SG=GEN song sing NEG-know-NON.PST
“‘(but) you don’t know how to sing a song’”

t çàro=ki l àp-sin ŋ à=ki l ú n èn-t çe t çòl-sin
crow=ERG say-PST 1SG=GEN song sing-NOM do-PST
‘the crow said “‘I can sing a song’”’

khó=ki t çhódo=ki j à s á=la t àp-sin
3SG.M=GEN lip=INS fish ground=DAT fall-PST
‘the fish in his mouth fell to the ground’

lùndi=ki j à khér-tile s à-sin
jackal=ERG fish take.away-after eat-PST
‘the jackal took the fish away and then ate it’

lùndi=ki phò k àŋ-sin
jackal=GEN belly full-PST
‘the jackal’s belly was full’

òolegi j àl-sin
and.then lay-PST
‘and then (he) lay down’

tçàro paatçuto lag tè-sin
crow feel.sad(Nep) AUX-PST
'the crow felt sad'

1.11. My Village: AL (091006-01)

This is a short description from AL about her home village of Namgyu, and the journey there.

ɲà=ki rò ɲímu ɲà tám làp-ke
1SG=GEN friend with 1SG language speak-NON.PST
'I talk with my friend' (00:14)

yèmbu=le yàrki bèsisahar-samma dò-na gàdji=la
Kathmandu=ABL above bèsisahar-LOC(Nep) go-COND bus(Nep)=LOC
'If you go up from Kathmandu to Besisahar on a bus' (00:25)

màna ɲí ráŋgi kàldzi tçú kilomèter
hundred two and thirty kilometer(Eng)
'(it is) two-hundred and thirty kilometers' (00:29)

gàdji=la bèsisahar=le lép-ke
bus(Nep)=LOC bèsisahar=ABL arrive-NON.PST
'on the bus from Besisahar arrive' (00:35)

bèsisahar=le yàrki gàdji=la tçhúdze ɲí
Besisahar=ABL above bus(Nep)=LOC hour two
'up from Besisahar, two hours in a bus' (00:38)

káŋba dò-na tçhúdze súm
leg go-COND hour three
'if you walk, three' (00:43)

òole yàrki bèsisahar=le yàrki dò-na çérkyugon=le lép-ke
and.then up Besisahar=ABL above go-COND çérkyugon=ABL arrive-NON.PST
'and, if you go up from Besisahar' (00:45)

çérkyugon = le tá-na kháwa kàᅇ dzàmmaraᅇ thón-ke
çérkyugon = ABL look-COND mountain.peak all see-NON.PST
‘If you look from Baglung Pani you can see all the mountain peaks’ (00:49)

áni çérkyugon = le pàrki dòn-na mádzugon = la lép-ke
and(Nep) çérkyugon = ABL up go-COND mádzugon = LOC arrive-NON.PST
‘and if from Baglung Pani you walk you arrive in Kapurgaun’ (00:52)

mádzugon = le pàrki ᅇà = ki yùl nàmgyu lép-ke
mádzugon = ABL up 1SG = GEN village namgyu arrive-NON.PST
‘up from Kapurgaun, you arrive in my village Namgyu’ (00:58)

tchúdze phéga = la nàmgyu = la lép-ke
hour half = LOC nàmgyu = LOC arrive-NON.PST
‘in an hour and a half you arrive in Namgyu’ (01:02)

ani nàmgyu = legi kháwa kàᅇ dzàmmaraᅇ thón-ge kháwa kàᅇ
and(Nep) nàmgyu = ABL mountain.peak all look-NON.PST mountain.peak
‘and from Namgyu, the mountain peaks, you can look at all the mountain peaks’
(01:07)

kàᅇ lùᅇ thón-ke
hill river look-NON.PST
‘look at the mountain rivers’ (01:11)

ani rì nàkpu yè
and(Nep) forest black COP.EGO
‘and there is a dark forest’ (01:14)

çìᅇ màᅇbu yè
farm many COP.EGO
‘there are many farms’ (01:20)

érka pépé màᅇbu òᅇ-ge
season.wet leech many come -NON.PST
‘in wet season there are many leeches’ (01:22)

ɲà=ki águu ɲà=ki tçétçe
1SG=GEN father's.brother 1SG=GEN mother's.sister
'my father's brother and mother's sister' (01:25)

ɲà=ki águu=ki pù pòmò=ya yè
1SG=GEN father's.brother=GEN son daughter=PL COP.EGO
'my uncle's son and daughters are there' (01:29)

ràṅsa-ni ádzi nòmò=ya yè
other-FOC older.sister younger.sister=PL COP.EGO
'there are other older and younger sisters' (01:32)

çìṅ=ki lè pè érka dḡ-na
farm=GEN work do season.after.monsoon go-COND
'if you go in spring season you do farm work' (01:42)

swá dzù-kandi
rice.unhusked sew-NOM
'sew rice' (01:46)

kyàgar dzù-kandi
millet sew-NOM
'sew millet' (01:50)

sértaṅ=la màgi tàp-kandi
season.dry=LOC corn plant-NOM
'in the cold season plant corn' (01:55)

gahun tàp-kandi
wheat(Nep) plant-NOM
'plant wheat' (01:57)

hée dzù-kandi
potato sew-NOM
'sew potatoes' (01:58)

phalphul dzù-gandi

fruit(Nep) sew-NOM

‘plant fruit’ (02:00)

rì màṅbu yè ṅà=ki yùl=la

forest many COP.EGO 1SG=GEN village=LOC

‘there is much forest in my village’ (02:04)

yàrki mà-dò kò yè

above NEG.PST-go need COP.EGO

‘you do not need to go up (higher)’ (02:06)

kàṅ lùṅ kháwa kàṅ màṅbu yè

hill river mountain.peak many COP.EGO

‘there are many mountain rivers and mountain peaks’ (02:10)

Appendix 3: List of recordings

This list gives information about the recordings made as a part of this project. The recording names are those used when discussing an example (§1.3 of thesis). This table also gives information about the content of these recordings, whether they were naturalistic, and what pages of the field notes the recording correlates to. It also lists the speakers who feature in the recordings. More information about these speakers is available in Appendix 4. All of this metadata is linked to the files in the Paradisec archive, which houses all of the data from this project (discussed in §3.4 of the thesis).

File	Name	Speaker	Time	Notes
090914-01	Basic greetings	AL	02:49	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 1.
090914-02	Vocab: body parts	AL	13:21	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 1.
090914-03	Tea discussion	AL	04:27	A brief discussion about tea drinking, no notes made.
090914-04	Vocab: numbers	AL	08:01	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 3. Includes 1-22, 100, 1000, 10 000.
090914-05	Vocab: colours	AL	05:55	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 4.
090914-06	Vocab: pronouns, quants.	AL	10:04	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 5.
090914-07	Vocab: basic adjectives pt. 1	AL	05:15	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 7.
090914-08	Vocab: basic adjectives pt. 2	AL	08:15	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 7.
090915-01	Follow up: vocab, tones	AL	12:11	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 12.
090915-02	Verb: 'to sleep' present	AL	24:35	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 13.
090915-03	Vocab: family members	AL	11:27	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 15.
090915-04	Verb: 'to eat'	AL	14:37	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 14. Using the phrase 'X eat(s) egg.'
090915-05	Possessive pronouns	AL	18:05	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 18.
090916-01	Vocab: days of the week	AL	00:50	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 26.
090916-02	Vocab: prepositions	AL	05:33	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 27.
090916-03	Vocab: directions	AL	12:53	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 28.
090916-04	Vocab: demonstratives	AL	02:49	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 28.
090916-05	Verb : 'to hit'	AL	07:13	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 23.
090916-06	Verb: 'to sleep' past perfect	AL	07:34	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 21.
090917-01	Swadesh 100 list – pt. 1	AL	24:00	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 33.

090917-02	Swadesh 100 list – pt. 2	AL	22:51	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 33.
090917-03	Follow up: Vocab, numbers, verbs	AL	22:53	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 32. Inc. nums. in NPs and Verb morph.
090917-04	Follow up: yesterday's vocab	AL	08:23	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 28, 24.
090918-01	Verb: 'to eat' – present prog.	AL	15:15	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 31. 'X eat egg.'
090918-02	Vocab: food – pt. 1	AL	24:03	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 39. Vegetables, grains.
090918-03	Vocab: food – pt. 2	AL	13:04	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 39. Grains, fruit.
090918-04	Vocab: food – pt. 3	AL	07:36	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 39. Fruit, flour, spices.
090918-05	Vocab: food – pt. 4	AL	18:46	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 39. Spices, meat. Cut at end.
090922-01	Discussion: Kagate, Yolmo	AL	15:04	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 49.
090922-02	Follow up: sounds	AL	36:29	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 49.
090923-01	Verb: 'to sleep' future	AL	29:19	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 51.
090923-02	Vocab: body parts, numbers	AL	28:53	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 53. Ordinal numbers.
090923-03	Vocab: animals	AL	41:14	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 53.
090924-01	Vocab: animal names (cont.)	AL	10:10	Notes in 2009 Bk 1, p. 53. Continued from yesterday.
090924-02	Noun phrases in sentences	AL	20:53	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 1.
090924-03	Vocab: trees flowers pt. 1	AL	02:39	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 4.
090924-04	Vocab: trees flowers pt. 2	AL	33:22	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 4.
090928-01	Follow up: imp. and plurals	AL	08:37	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 8.
090928-02	Verb: Future probable	AL	08:18	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 9.
090929-01	Story: AL's family	AL	03:46	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 11. AL describes her family.
090929-02	Showing surprise	AL	02:55	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 10. Mainly based on Nepali <i>chha</i> vs. <i>rahechha</i> .
090930-01	Verb: completed events	AL	11:30	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 13. Completed present and past.
090930-02	Reported speech	AL	22:06	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 15. Inc. RS particle, conjunct/disjunct.
090930-03	Vocab: religious words	AL	21:20	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 16.
091001-01	Wh- questions	AL	25:26	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 20.
091001-02	Superlatives and comparatives	AL	12:41	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 19.
091001-03	Vocab: clothing	AL	20:47	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 18.

091002-01	Postpositions	AL	20:57	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 28.
091002-02	Follow up: vocab.	AL	19:41	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 24.
091002-03	Metalanguage	AL	19:49	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 26.
091004-01	Follow up: verbs, numbers	AL	20:23	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 30.
091004-02	Adjectives, pt. 1	AL	24:31	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 33.
091004-03	Adjectives, pt. 2	AL	09:30	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 33.
091004-04	Adjectives, pt. 3	AL	18:49	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 33.
091005-01	Follow up: grammar	AL	29:13	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 40. Phone call during. Inc 2nd dual, conj/disj, RS and tenses.
091005-02	Verbs: to feel	AL	16:14	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 38
091005-03	Verb: to be	AL	19:06	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 42
091006-01	Story: AL's village	AL	02:33	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 49. Journey from Kathmandu to AL's village, and life there.
091007-01	Follow up: pronouns, seasons	AL	06:52	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 48
091007-02	Respect verb sentences	AL	03:25	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 53. Lot of ambient noise. Not transc.
091007-03	Hale conjunct/disjunct	AL	07:01	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 47. Based on Hale (1980).
091007-04	Verbs, regular and respect	AL	14:14	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 44.
091008-01	Numbers 30-40	AL	21:11	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 58.
091008-02	Verb conjugations	AL	27:35	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 53.
091008-03	Vocab: weather	AL	18:06	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 56.
091009-01	Discussion: Lamjung place-names	AL	15:10	Notes in 2009 Bk 2, p. 59. Map of Nepal and Lamjung district.
091009-02	Verbs: past progressive	AL	20:30	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 1.
091009-03	Verbs: past habitual	AL	09:56	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 2.
091009-04	Conjunctions pt. 1	AL	12:56	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 3.
091009-05	Conjunctions pt. 2	AL	06:11	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 3.
091012-01	Verbs: should/must pt. 1	AL	08:52	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 6.
091012-02	Verbs: should/must pt. 2	AL	13:12	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 6.
091012-03	Adverbs pt. 1	AL	22:19	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 8. Interrupted by phone call.
091012-04	Adverbs pt. 2	AL	27:59	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 8
091013-01	Vocab: zodiac	AL	18:53	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 11
091013-02	Follow up: voicing, negation	AL	06:23	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 14
091013-03	Multiple verbs pt. 1	AL	11:38	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 12
091013-04	Multiple verbs pt. 2	AL	16:46	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 12
091015-01	Verbs: negation	AL	24:49	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 15

091015-02	Temporal adverbs	AL	26:16	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 16. Inc. before, soon as, cont., never
091016-01	Story: food	AL	03:02	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 20. Different types of food.
091016-02	Reported and general knowledge	AL	08:54	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 19. Includes RS particle.
091019-01	Follow up: multi-verb sentences	AL	06:06	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 26. Follow up from 091013-03.
091019-02	Vocab: domestic items pt. 1	AL	35:48	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 22.
091019-03	Vocab: domestic items pt. 2	AL	16:28	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 22.
091020-01	Vocab: directions	AL	06:09	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 27.
091020-02	Verbs: ability/desire	AL	29:16	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 28.
091020-03	Nouns: count/mass	AL	15:34	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 30.
091028-01	Constructions: why/because	AL	17:54	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 32.
091028-02	Starting/commencing pt. 1	AL	14:22	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 33.
091028-03	Starting/commencing pt. 2	AL	11:24	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 33. Someone outside hammering.
091028-04	Follow up: full verb paradigm	AL	20:04	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 37. Verb 'sing,' inc. negation.
091029-01	Follow up: general	AL	16:48	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 40. Inc. vocab, sounds, comparatives.
091029-02	Follow up: case markings	AL	48:13	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 41.
091029-03	Vocab: tools and agriculture	AL	27:57	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 35.
091101-01	Vocab: months	AL	06:37	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 47.
091101-02	Follow up: structures	AL	09:30	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 46. pronouns, quantities, conj.
091101-03	Vocab: including, excluding	AL	27:33	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 44.
091101-04	Evidential	AL	20:48	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 48. Focused on witnessed events.
091101-05	Derivation	AL	15:28	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 49. Focused on verb to adj.
091102-01	Vocab: approximations	AL	23:33	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 52.
091102-02	Vocab: body honorifics	AL	06:14	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 53.
091102-03	Vocab: phrases	AL	10:04	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 39.
091103-01	Follow up: forget/remember, phonemic minimal pairs	AL	07:57	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 54.
091103-02	Constructions: realis/irrealis	AL	29:58	Notes in 2009 Bk 3, p. 55.
091103-03	Constructions: causatives	AL	14:20	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 1.
091103-04	Swadesh list, 1-10	SL	26:41	Notes in 2009 Bk 6, p. 6, 37.
091104-01	Follow up: copula conjugations	AL	30:03	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 9.

091104-02	Injunctive, subjunctive	AL	04:54	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 3.
091104-03	Vocab: occupations	AL	10:15	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 4.
091104-04	May/possibly	AL	08:45	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 5.
091104-05	Habitual action	AL	13:22	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 6.
091105-01	Follow up: Vocab, sounds, syntax	AL	25:19	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 12. Inc. word order.
091105-02	Including, excluding	AL	12:36	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 8.
091106-01	Story: the orphans	AL	02:16	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 15. Discussed and translated in 120210-03
091106-02	Follow up: grammar	AL	20:05	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 21. Includes conj, pal, conj/dies.
091108-01	Family story: Audio	AL, SL	41:12	Notes in 2009 Bk 5. (.wav file).
091108-02	Family story: Video one	AL, SL	41:12	Notes in 2009 Bk 5. (.mp4 file).
091108-03	Family story: Video two	AL, SL	41:12	Notes in 2009 Bk 5. (.move file).
091109-01	Relative clauses	AL	22:01	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 18.
091109-02	Constructions: nominalisation	AL	08:46	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 19.
091109-03	Constructions: simile/metaphor	AL	07:22	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 20.
091109-04	Follow up: on 2009 Bk two, pt. 1	AL	09:51	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 26. On 091108-01.
091117-01	Follow up: on 2009 Bk two, pt. 2	AL	27:30	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 27.
091117-02	Follow up: minimal pairs/sets	AL	14:45	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 30.
091117-03	Follow up: Family Story, pt. 1	AL	21:09	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 31. On 091108-01
091122-01	Follow up: on 2009 Bk three, pt. 1	AL	30:12	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 34.
091122-02	Follow up: Family Story, pt. 2	AL	23:58	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 37. On 091108-01
091123-01	Follow up: general	AL	47:40	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 39.
091124-01	Follow up: on 2009 Bk three, pt. 2	AL	39:00	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 45.
091125-01	Follow up: Family Story	AL	01:29:53	Notes in 2009 Bk 5, p. 50. On 091108-01
911026-01	Follow up: on 2009 Bk three, pt. 3	AL	41:05	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 49.
091130-01	Swadesh 100, pronouns	VNL	40:13	Notes in 2009 Bk 6, p. 6, 2.

091201-01	Swadesh 100, vocab	KL	42:00	Notes in 2009 Bk 6. includes adjectives, case, conj., counting.
091202-01	Swadesh 100, directions	DML, KL	29:38	Notes in 2009 Bk 6, p. 48, 15
091206-01	Follow up: on 2009 Bk four	AL	27:35	Notes in 2009 Bk 4, p. 55
100922-01	Follow up: lexical items	AL	54:11	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp 1-6. Lexical items and sentences.
100923-01	Follow up: noun phrase, case	AL	34:06	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 7-10. Case marking, and moods.
100923-02	Dictionary discussion 2	AL	23:54	Discussion about current draft of dictionary. Notes Bk 5, 2010.
100924-01	Follow up: noun phrase	AL	50:08	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 11-18
100924-02	Dictionary discussion pt. 3	AL	50:06	Discussion about current draft of dictionary. Notes Bk 5, 2010.
100926-01	Follow up: noun plurals and case	AL	16:24	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 10 and 19.
100926-02	Dictionary discussion pt. 4	AL	1:08:15	Discussion about current draft of dictionary. Notes Bk 5, 2010.
100927-01	107 word Swadesh	AL	46:54	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 20-25. Along with 090917-01 and 090917-02 comprises the whole 207 word Swadesh list.
100927-02	Vocab: food and clothing	AL	21:38	Food and clothing words, collected by AL. Notes in Bk 5.
100927-03	Dictionary discussion pt. 5	AL	31:38	Discussion about current draft of dictionary. Notes Bk 5, 2010.
100928-01	Conjunct/disjunct follow up	AL	39:31	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 26-34.
100929-01	Follow up: sense verbs	AL	43:50	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 36-42.
100929-01	Dictionary Discussion pt. 6	AL, IL	39:15	Discussion about current draft of dictionary. Notes Bk 5, 2010.
100930-01	Follow up: verbs, pt. 1	AL	27:05	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 43-51. inc. habitual, prog., causation, desire, intention, honorifics. Batteries died.
100930-02	Follow up: verbs, pt. 2	AL	41:20	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 43-51. Follows on form 100930-01.
101001-01	Follow up: verbs	AL	30:33	Notes in 2010 Bk 1, pp. 51-58. Inc. erg., copula and modals.
101003-01	Follow up: phonetics	AL	27:07	Notes in 2010 Bk 2, pp. 1-4. Minimal pairs and retroflexes.
101004-01	Follow up: Clause structure	AL	37:42	Notes in 2010 Bk 2, pp. 5-12. Inc. concessive, temporal and

				manner adverbs, comps, adj.
101005-01	Discourse markers, relative clauses	AL	33:09	Notes in 2010 Bk 2, pp. 13-16.
101005-02	Colours	AL	22:20	Notes in 2010 Bk 2, pp 17-19. Using colour cards. Inc. video.
101006-01	Video elicitation: Put	AL	1:13:48	Notes in 2010 Bk 2, pp. 22-25. MPI 'put' videos, version one.
101007-01	Verb paradigm 'turn' and follow up	AL	27:42	Notes in 2010 Bk 2, pp. 22-21 and 26-27. Includes the verb paradigm 'to turn/travel.'
101008-01	Follow up: general	AL	46:40	Notes in 2010 Bk 2, pp. 30-38. Inc. conj/disj, nouns, ergativity, imperf., hort.
101008-02	Dictionary: follow up discussion	AL	16:21	Final discussion about dictionary. Notes in 2010 Bk 5.
101010-01	Story: Jackal and Crow	AL	12:06	Jackal and Crow picture task. Also includes video.
101010-02	Vocab: religion and kitchen	AL	21:58	Notes in 2010, Bk 2, pp. 41-43. Also includes photos of the items.
101011-01	Follow up: Jackal and Crow part 1	AL	52:49	Notes in 2010 Bk 2, pp. 44-47. listening though 101010-01.
101012-01	Video elicitation: Put follow up	AL	14:05	Notes in 2010, Bk 2, pp. 39-40. Repeating some of the videos watching in 101006-01.
101012-02	Video elicitation: Reciprocals	AL	26:10	Notes in 2010, Bk 2, pp. 28-29. MPI videos, short set.
101012-03	Follow up: Jackal and Crow part 2	AL	13:18	Notes in 2010, Bk 2, pp. 48-49. Listening though 101010-01.
101012-04	Picture task: post cards	AL	08:58	Notes in 2010, Bk 2, pp. 50-51. Six postcards from Nepal.
101013-01	Hypotheticals	AL	10:13	Notes in 2010, Bk 2, pp. 53-56. Incomplete recording.
101013-02	Reported speech	AL	10:54	Notes in 2010, Bk 2, pp. 57-58
101013-03	Consent discussion	AL	07:46	Notes in 2010, Bk 2, p. 52.
101018-01	Follow up: general	AL	24:37	Notes in 2010, Bk 5, pp. 40-43. Follow up from this year.
101022-01	Swadesh 100	UL	22:18	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 1-6.
101023-01	Colours	STL	18:51	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 23 and 24.
101023-02	Jackal and Crow	STL, NBL	07:00	Recording of J&C story.

101023-03	Adjectives, body parts, verbs	SML, RL	40:38	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 20-22, 18-19 and 25-29.
101023-04	100 word Swadesh pt. 1	RL	12:11	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 1-6.
101023-05	100 word Swadesh pt. 2	RL	03:14	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 1-6.
101023-06	Basic copula paradigms	SKL	26:15	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 30-32 and 55-58.
101023-07	Vocab: Colours	AML	18:30	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 23, 24.
101024-01	Retroflex and vowel length	RL	05:52	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 33-35.
101025-01	Conjunct/disjunct first set	RL	12:29	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 13-17.
101025-02	Extra vowel length data	RL	0:34	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 33-35.
101025-03	Vocab: Numbers	RL, DML	17:33	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 42-43.
101025-04	Hypotheticals set A	RL	06:02	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 45-49.
101026-01	Vocab: photographs	RL	13:55	Notes in 2010, Bk 4, p. 2. Based on photographs taken.
101026-02	Conj/disj progressives	RL	20:03	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 37-41.
101026-03	Retroflex and vowel length	KL	06:28	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 33-35.
101026-04	Hypotheticals set B	KL	06:24	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 50-54.
101026-05	How to make Raksi	KL	05:53	Transcribed in 101123-01.
101026-06	Story: Jackal and Crow	KL	05:50	Transcribed in 101123-01.
101026-07	107 Swadesh	RL	26:43	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 7-12.
101027-01	Jackal and Crow	RL	05:29	Transcribed in 101118-01.
101027-02	Story: Jackal and Crow	RL, NIL, RKL, SUL, SAL	08:05	Includes video. KL and NMT present. Transcribed 101116-01.
101027-03	Discussion: RS marker	RL	15:03	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 6-8.
101028-01	Story: Jackal and Crow	ALL	03:24	Includes video, also present NMT. Transcription: 101118-01
101028-02	Story: Jackal and Crow	NFT, NKL, STL, ASL	13:05	Includes video. Also present RL. Transcribed in 101117-01.
101028-03	Vocab: 'after' clauses	RL	07:29	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 9.
101028-04	Discussion: copulas	RL	16:24	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 10-12.
101029-01	Vocab: yesterday and tomorrow	RL	02:25	Very little data.
101029-02	Discussion: discourse particles	RL	10:11	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 13-14.
101030-01	Story: Jackal & crow, version 1	NFT, NKL	04:04	Practice for 101030-02, recorded but left untranscribed to date.
101030-02	Story: Jackal and crow: version 2	NFT, NKL	02:57	Second time through.
101030-03	Story: Jackal and crow: in	NFT, NKL	01:54	Same story as 101030-01, in

	Nepali			Nepali.
101030-04	Reciprocals and BDI	RL	13:25	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 16-17.
101030-05	Hypotheticals set A	RL	11:19	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 45-49.
101112-01	Dictionary: general	AL	58:32	Notes in book left with AL
101116-01	Transcribing J&C 101027-02 pt. 1	RL	04:03	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 23-28.
101116-02	Transcribing J&C 101027-02 pt. 2	RL	57:01	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 23-28.
101117-01	Transcribing J&C 101028-02	RL	27:07	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 29-31.
101117-02	Vocab: Colours	ST	17:54	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp.
101117-03	Vocab: Numbers	ST	02:59	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp.
101118-01	Transcribing J&C with RL	RL	21:06	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 32-34. Files 101028-01, 101027-01
101120-01	Copulas	RL	06:35	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 35-36.
101120-02	Questions game	RL, SNL	12:05	Played 3. Only 2 nd in Yolmo.
101120-03	Song	RL, SNL	13:59	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 37-38. Song written CL.
101123-01	Transcribing recordings with RL	RL	10:25	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 39-40. Files 101026-05, 101016-06
101123-02	General questions	RL	16:19	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 pp. 20-22.
101123-03	Translating J&C into Nepali	RL	15:53	Translation being made for picture book for children.
101124-01	Vocab: photos taken	RL	05:10	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 p. 41.
101124-02	General questions	RL	11:20	Notes in 2010, Bk 4 p. 42.
101124-03	Family Story	RL, SBL	34:39	Includes audio and two videos. Video cuts out at one point.
101125-01	General fact copula	RL	05:05	Notes in 2010, Bk 4, p. 44.
101217-01	General follow up	AL	39:22	Notes in 2010, Bk 5, pp. 47-51. Includes copulas and honorifics.
101224-01	Copula constructions	VL	14:47	Notes in 2010 Bk 3 pp. 50-54
101224-02	Hypotheticals - set B	VL	09:58	Notes in 2010, Bk 3 pp. 50-54.
110115-01	Copula constructions	UL	20:27	Notes in 2010 Bk 7, pp. 21-24.
110115-02	Hypotheticals - set B	UL	14:01	Notes in 2010 Bk 7, pp. 16-20.
110126-01	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 1	ST	28:12	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, pp. 1-4. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110126-02	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 2	ST	22:17	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, pp. 4-6. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110127-01	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 3	ST	48:36	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, pp. 7-13. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110127-02	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 4	ST	09:31	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, p. 14. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.

110129-01	Follow up: general	RL	18:11	Notes in 2010 Bk 7, pp. 1-8. General follow up questions.
110129-02	Follow up: semantics	RL	09:51	Notes in 2010 Bk 7, pp. 33-34. Questions about homonyms.
110129-03	Follow up: J&C final, pt. 1	RL	05:50	Notes in 2010 Bk 7 pp. 25-28. Transcribing 101026-06.
110201-01	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 5	ST	33:31	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, pp. 15-18. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110204-01	Follow up: J&C final, pt. 2	RL	31:56	Notes in 2010 Bk 7 pp. 29-32, 57-58. J&C stories, 101120-01.
110204-02	Verb paradigms, pt. 1	RL	04:30	Notes in 2010 Bk 7, p. 34. Session stopped for a phone call.
110204-03	Verb paradigms, pt. 2	RL	56:36	Notes in 2010 Bk 7, pp. 35-55 Past, prog, and non-past.
110205-01	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 6	ST	21:13	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, pp. 19-20. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110206-01	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 7	ST	15:11	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, pp. 20-21. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110206-02	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 8.1	ST	33:21	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, pp. 23-26. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110206-03	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 8.2	ST	29:08	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, pp. 26-29. Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110207-01	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 9.1	ST	01:05:49	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, p. 30-37.
110207-02	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 9.2	ST	12:04	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, p. 36-37, Transc. 101124-03 with ST.
110207-03	Follow up: final	RL	06:26	Notes in 2010 Bk 7, p. 56. Some final lexical follow-up.
110207-04	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 10	RL	11:05	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, p. 38-39. Transc. 101124-03.
110207-05	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 11.1	RL	24:38	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, p. 40-42. Transc. 101124-03.
110207-06	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 11.2	RL	50:06	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, p. 42-47. Transc. 101124-03.
110208-01	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 11.3	RL	47:49	Notes in 2010 Bk 6, p. 47-51. Transc. 101124-03.
110208-02	Follow up: copulas	RL	02:43	Notes in Bk 8 2010, p. 27.
110208-03	Magic tricks	RL	02:40	Notes in Bk 8 2011, p. 14. Includes Video.
110215-01	Follow up: final	AL	33:35	Notes in 2010 Bk 8, pp. 16-26.

				Final follow up.
110217-01	Transcribing: Family Story, pt. 12	AL	1:16:53	Notes in 2010 book 6, p. 52-58. Transc. 101124-03
110217-02	Follow up: adj., negation	AL	02:12	Notes in 2010 Bk8, p. 26.
110217-03	Magic tricks	AL	02:50	Includes video and separate audio.
120121-01	Follow up: words, grammar	AL	18:01	Notes in 2012 Bk 1, pp. 1-5.
120122-01	Follow up: verbs, pt. 1	AL	22:28	Notes in 2012 Bk 1, pp. 6-10. Inc. possessives', imperfectives, negation, optative and hort.
120122-02	Conversation: other minds and follow up: verbs, pt. 2	AL	12:55	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, p. 11. Inc. complementation.
120126-01	Ditransitive verbs	AL	22:10	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, pp. 12-17.
120126-02	Follow up: copula verbs	AL	30:20	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, pp. 18-26. Inc. general fact, volitionality, self-viewed actions.
120127-01	Follow up: rep. speech, pt. 1	AL	26:57	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, pp. 27-31.
120127-02	Follow up: rep. speech, pt. 2	AL	13:28	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, pp. 31-34.
120127-03	Follow up: rep. speech, pt. 3	AL	07:22	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, pp. 35-38.
120208-01	Reported speech experiment	AL	19:57	Notes in 2012, Bk 1 pp. 42-51.
120208-02	Lies and jokes	AL	12:20	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, pp. 39-40.
120209-01	Optical Illusions	AL	09:32	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, p. 41. Video and audio.
120209-02	Magic	AL	02:01	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, p. 52. Video with own audio only.
120209-03	Family tree discussion 1	AL	26:13	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, p. 2.
120210-01	Listen through: optical illusions	AL	12:32	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, p. 41. Transcribing 120209-01.
120210-02	Listen through: magic	AL	01:44	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, p. 52. Transcribing 120209-02.
120210-03	Listen through: AL's story	AL	08:04	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, p. 55. Transcribing 091106-01.
120210-04	Family tree discussion 2	AL	12:15	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, p. 3. Continuing from 120209-03
120212-01	Hidden object experiment	AL	05:09	Includes video.
120212-02	General follow up	AL	12:46	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, pp. 53-54. Follow up on Bk 1 questions.
120212-03	Discussion about birds	AL	07:22	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, p. 57. Using images from a book.
120213-01	Discussion about photos: AL	AL	20:37	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 4-5. Discussing photos of people.

120214-01	Listen through: AL's story and hidden object experiment	AL	18:51	Notes in 2012, Bk 1, pp. 56, 58. Transcribing 091106-01 and 120212-01.
120214-02	20 questions game	AL, ST	18:05	Played 7 rounds with photos.
120217-01	Body Parts	BML	01:50	Notes in 2012, Bk 3, p. 7. Reading through a list.
120217-02	General questions	RL	49:30	Notes in 2012, Bk 3, pp. 1-20. Follow up from 2010-2011.
120217-03	Family tree discussion 1	RL	09:53	Notes in 2012, Bk 3, p. 11.
120218-01	Reported speech experiment:	RL	14:10	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 22-31.
120218-02	Joke	RL	02:34	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, p. 20.
120218-03	Photo discussion	RL	37:51	Notes in 2012, Bk 3, pp. 12-16. Discussing photos of people.
120219-01	Hidden object experiment, optical illusions and magic	RL	09:16	Includes audio and video.
120219-02	Tone minimal pairs, part 1	RL	10:15	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 33-34. Also with AL (120312-01/02)
120220-01	Conversation: BBL's life	BBL	21:04	Discussion with BBL about his life. Nepali and Yolmo.
120220-02	Tone minimal pairs, part 2	RL	13:10	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 35-36. Second half of 120219-02.
120220-03	Question structures	RL	06:46	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 37-38.
120304-01	Hidden objects, optical illusions and magic	ST	13:27	Includes video.
120304-02	Hidden objects and optical illusions	KL, CL, ST	12:10	KL and CL undertake the tasks together. Includes video.
120304-03	Hidden objects	DML, STL	08:02	Participants the task separately. Includes video, but very dark.
120305-01	Conversation 1	DML, ST	15:36	Includes separate video. Filmed while basket-making.
120305-02	Conversation 2	DML, ST	18:23	Includes separate video. Filmed while basket-making.
120306-01	Discussion: 'sem' and other minds	KL	06:56	Notes in 2012, Bk A, p. 9.
120306-02	Discussion: 'sem' and other minds	DML	02:53	Notes in 2012, Bk A, p. 9.
120307-01	Recipe: egg curry	ST	04:25	Notes in 2012, Bk 4 p. 23. Told in Yolmo, repeated in Nepali.
120307-02	Discussion: photographs	AML, NBL	29:02	Notes in 2012, Bk 3, pp. 22-24. Images of other people.
120307-03	Vocab: birds and animals	NBL,	21:39	Notes in 2012, Bk 4 pp. 20-22.

		AML, SNL, KL.		Mainly NBL. Book for images.
120307-04	Discussion: 'sem' and other minds	AML, STL	05:47	Notes in 2012, Bk A, p. 9. Discussion AML, STL present.
120309-01	Description: basket making	DML	03:02	Unfortunately large amounts of background noise.
120311-01	Question structures	AL, DBL	15:58	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 40-43.
120311-02	Discussion: 'sem' and other minds	AL, SL, DBL	06:09	Notes in 2012, Bk A, p. 8.
120312-01	Tone minimal pairs, part 1	AL	14:49	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 33-34. See also 120219-01/02.
120312-02	Tone minimal pairs, part 2	AL	12:45	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 35-36. See also 120219-01/02.
120313-01	Transcribing: 120214-02, pt. 1	AL	44:07	Notes in 2012, Bk 4, pp. 30-35.
120313-02	Transcribing: 120214-02, pt. 2	AL	09:13	Notes in 2012, Bk 4, pp. 36-37.
120314-01	Transcribing: 120214-02, pt. 3	AL	37:50	Notes in 2012, Bk 4, pp. 38-42.
120314-02	Transcribing: 120214-02, pt. 4	AL	10:40	Notes in 2012, Bk 4, pp. 43-44.
120315-01	Transcribing: Hidden Object, pt. 1	AL	48:00	Notes in 2012, Bk 4, pp. 45-51. Transcribing 120219-01, 120304-01 and 120304-02.
120316-01	Transcribing: Hidden Object, pt. 2	AL	44:30	Notes in 2012, Bk 4, pp. 52-57. Transcribing 120304-02, 120315-01 and 120304-03.
120318-01	Transcribing: Multiple	AL	25:22	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 46-49. Transcribing 120218-02, 120307-01 and 120309-01.
120318-02	Final follow-up: questions	AL	05:07	Notes in 2012, Bk 2, pp. 44-45. Mainly on reported speech.

Appendix 4: List of speakers

Below is a list of speakers with whom the above recordings were made. They are listed alphabetically by their name codes. Gender, village of birth and place of current residence are also listed. Age is given as the age when I first started recordings with the person, and for older speakers it is an approximation. Not all speakers have clan information listed, as clans were something that was only discussed on later field trips. For many speakers the information collected about them is kept in a field book, which is listed under ‘more information.’

Name	Gender	Age	Village (birth)	Village (current)	Clan	Details
AL	F	49	Namgyu	Kathmandu	Dòᅇba	2010a, p. 39
ALL	M	13	Namgyu	Kapurgaun		Son of AL’s younger sister. 2010a, p. 33.
AML	F	38	Toljung	Toljung	Tçàba	Mother of RL, DL and STL. Wife of NBL. 2010a, p. 37.
ASL	F	7	Nayagaun	Kapurgaun	Dòᅇba	Daughter of SBL. 2010a, p. 32.
BBL	M	92	Namgyu	Terai	Dòᅇba	Father of BML.
BML	F	65	- (India)	Terai	Dòᅇba	Daughter of BML. 2012a, p. 37.
CL	M	25	Nayagaun	Kapurgaun	Tçàba	Husband of KL. 2012, book 3, pp.

						26-27.
DBL	F	~60	Namgyu	Terai	Dòᅇba	Aunt of AL.
DML	F	70	Toljung	Kapurgaun	Tçàba	Mother of NBL, ST and KL. 2010a, p. 37.
KL	F	26	Toljung	Kapurgaun	Dòᅇba	DML's daughter. Mother of RKL and NKL. Wife of CL. 2010a, p. 37
NBL	M	41	Toljung	Toljung	Dòᅇba	Son of DML. Father of RL, DL and STL. Husband of AML. 2010a, p. 37.
NFT	F	8	Kapurgaun	Kapurgaun	Yunᅇzen (Tamang)	Daughter of ST. 2010a, p. 32.
NIL	M	5	Nayagaun	Kapurgaun	Dòᅇba	2010a, p. 34.
NKL	F	9	Toljung	Kapurgaun	Tçàba	Daughter of CL and KL. 2010a, p. 33.
NMT	M	12	Kapurgaun	Kapurgaun	Yunᅇzen (Tamang)	Son of ST. 2010a, p. 33.
RKL	M	5	Toljung	Kapurgaun	Tçàba	Son of CL and KL. 2010a, p. 34.
RL	M	16	Toljung	Kapurgaun	Dòᅇba	Son of NBL and AML. 2010a, p. 37, 32.
SAL	M	4	Nayagaun	Kapurgaun		2010a, p. 33.
SBL	M	36	Nayagaun	Nayagaun	Dòᅇba	Father of

						ASL, SUL and NIL. 2010a, p. 30.
SKL	F	~40	Toljung	Toljung		2010a, p. 35.
SL	F	34	Namgyu	Terai	Gole (Tamang)	AL's mother's sister's daughter. 2010a, p. 38
SML	M	20	Toljung	Toljung		2010a, p. 36.
SNL	F	11	Nayagaun	Nayagaun	Dòᅇba	CL's elder sister's daughter. 2010a, p. 31.
ST	F	~33	Toljung	Besisahar	Dòᅇba	Daughter of DML. Mother of NML and NFL. 2010a, p. 35.
STL	F	11	Toljung	Kapurgaun	Dòᅇba	Daughter of NBL and AML 2010a, p. 37, 34.
SUL	M	5	Nayagaun	Kapurgaun	Dòᅇba	Son of SBL. 2010a, p. 34.
UL	M	37	Besisahar	Besisahar		Grandson of DML's husband's sister. 2010a, p. 36.
VL	F	33	Khudi	Khudi		2010a, p. 30.
VNL	F	27	Namgyu	Besisahar	Dòᅇba	AL's father's brother's daughter. 2010a, p. 38.

Appendix 5: Lamjung Yolmo to English wordlist

This wordlist is slightly more up to date than the separate Lamjung Yolmo-Nepali-English dictionary (Gawne 2011a), but does not contain Nepali glosses or Devanagari script. The lexical items are in Roman script alphabetical order.

apé <i>excl.</i> oh	bànda <i>n.</i> cabbage
á táp <i>v.t.</i> bite	bàr <i>v.t.</i> burn
ába <i>n.</i> father	bàr tòŋbo <i>n.</i> banyan tree
áda <i>n.</i> brother, elder	bàrbari mendo <i>n.</i> mint
ádzi <i>n.</i> sister, elder	bàri <i>n.</i> garden
águu <i>n.</i> father's younger brother	bèlala <i>temp.</i> at the time
águu tçómbo <i>n.</i> father's elder brother	bènda <i>n.</i> eggplant
ál <i>n.</i> puddle, dirty	bèsari <i>adv.</i> very
áma <i>n.</i> mother	bìha <i>n.</i> wedding
áni <i>n.</i> father's younger sister	bìliŋ <i>n.</i> cockroach
áni conj. and	bìta <i>n.</i> wall
áni tçómbo <i>n.</i> father's elder sister	bòdqa <i>n.</i> bean
áŋ conj. also	bòkto <i>adj.</i> dull
árak <i>n.</i> alcohol	bòŋna <i>n.</i> tumbler
áru <i>n.</i> jug	bòçela <i>n.</i> plane
áçañ <i>n.</i> mother's younger brother	brèe <i>n.</i> rice, uncooked
áçañ tçómbo <i>n.</i> mother's elder brother	bù <i>n.</i> insect
átsale <i>adj.</i> wrong	bù sïkpa <i>n.</i> caterpillar
átçha <i>excl.</i> exclamatory particle	bùbro <i>n.</i> coals
àloŋ <i>n.</i> earring	bùdi <i>n.</i> seed
àmbak <i>n.</i> guava	dà <i>n.</i> bow and arrow
àŋduŋ <i>n.</i> dress, traditional	dàa <i>v.t.</i> lick
bàamen <i>n.</i> Brahmin	dàalu <i>n.</i> worm
bàktal <i>n.</i> bamboo, strip	dàg <i>n.</i> base
bàkhal <i>n.</i> group	dàgarmu <i>n.</i> moon
bàl <i>n.</i> force	dàkla <i>n.</i> raisin
bàltiŋ <i>n.</i> bucket	dàla <i>dem.</i> here <i>alt.</i> dèla
	dàlo <i>n.</i> basket

dàm <i>v.t.</i> choose	dzìba <i>adj.</i> afraid
dàŋ <i>n.</i> yesterday, earlier	dzìŋba <i>n.</i> neck
dàŋ <i>v.t.</i> have enough	tèmu <i>adj.</i> easy
dàŋ tèriŋ <i>adv.</i> nowadays	dzòr <i>v.t.</i> get
dàpa <i>n.</i> parcel	dzùbu <i>n.</i> body
dàr <i>n.</i> candle wick	dzùm <i>v.t.</i> arrest, seize, take
dàri <i>n.</i> carpet	dzàa <i>v.d.</i> put
dàsain mèndo <i>n.</i> marigold	dzàgi <i>n.</i> grit, rice
dàwa <i>n.</i> month	dzàmbala <i>n.</i> god of wealth
dàza <i>n.</i> cloth strips	dzàmbu <i>adj.</i> fine
dàze <i>adj.</i> many	dzàŋgu <i>adj.</i> blue or green
dèe <i>v.t.</i> touch	dzàra <i>n.</i> snack
dèk <i>n.</i> coin	dzè <i>n.</i> penis
dèlegi <i>conj.</i> from there	dzèr <i>v.i.</i> available
dèndà <i>adv.</i> this way	dzèti <i>adj.</i> elder
dènmu <i>adv.</i> this way	dzìp <i>v.t.</i> suck
dèç <i>n.</i> country	dzò <i>n.</i> imp. put, imperative
dèze <i>conj.</i> if	dzù <i>v.t.</i> sew, grain
dì <i>dem.</i> this	dàlo <i>adj.</i> spherical
dìnla <i>loc.</i> front of, before	dàmba <i>n.</i> cheek
dìw <i>n.</i> bracelet	dàŋa <i>adv.</i> manner
dógan <i>n.</i> shop	dèba <i>n.</i> money
dòŋba <i>n.</i> dòŋba clan	dède <i>n.</i> insect
dòp <i>n.</i> bushland	dìi <i>v.i.</i> match
dòrdze <i>n.</i> dorge (Tibetan)	dìibu <i>adj.</i> agreeable, compatible, matching
dù <i>v.cop.</i> perceptual evidential copula	dò <i>v.i.</i> go
dùba <i>v.cop.</i> perceptual evidential copula, emphatic	dòmbo <i>n.</i> guest
dùŋ <i>n.</i> spike	dù <i>n.</i> grain
dùp <i>n.</i> incense	dùk <i>n.</i> dragon
dzáberdzasti <i>n.</i> force	éé <i>part.</i> hey
dzà <i>v.i.</i> climb up	érka <i>n.</i> monsoon <i>alt.</i> értan
dzàge <i>n.</i> pants	érman <i>n.</i> Szechuan pepper
dzàmma <i>adj.</i> all	gàda <i>adj.</i> dark
dzàti <i>n.</i> group	gàndzi <i>n.</i> singlet
dzèbu <i>adj.</i> beautiful	gàram mènà <i>n.</i> garam masala
dzèwa <i>adj.</i> lame	gàrila <i>temp.</i> at the time
dzì <i>v.i.</i> fear	gèd pále <i>n.</i> gate keeper

gèda <i>n.</i> rhinoceros	kár <i>v.t.</i> trick
glàs <i>n.</i> glass	kár <i>v.t.</i> weigh
gòle <i>n.</i> gòle clan	kára <i>n.</i> belt
gòṅde <i>n.</i> flour	káraṅ <i>class.</i> emphatic numeral classifier
gòo <i>n.</i> head	káray <i>n.</i> cooking pot
gòroṅ <i>adj.</i> Gurung	kárma <i>n.</i> star
gùndri <i>n.</i> mat	kárma <i>n.</i> minute
gùri <i>n.</i> cat	kárpa <i>adj.</i> spicy
gyàa <i>n.</i> place	kárpu <i>adj.</i> white
gyèl <i>v.i.</i> fall over	kárse <i>adj.</i> white, off
gyùbaraṅ <i>adv.</i> soon	kárta <i>n.</i> knife
gyùguyba <i>adj.</i> fast	káru <i>n.</i> barley
há kò <i>v.t.</i> know	káti <i>n.</i> nail
háḍa <i>n.</i> pot, alcohol middle	kátha <i>n.</i> dagger
háḍaṅ <i>n.</i> buddha, laughing	káyu <i>n.</i> cup
hàṅsa <i>n.</i> duck	kà <i>v.t.</i> like
hée <i>n.</i> potato	kà <i>adj.</i> open
hòbrakpa <i>n.</i> panda, red	kà pè <i>v.t.</i> open
húṅgar <i>n.</i> horse radish	kàda <i>n.</i> khata
íbi rère <i>n.</i> asparagus	kàl <i>v.i.</i> go, perfective
ìnar <i>n.</i> well	kàla <i>q.</i> where
kaulikopi <i>n.</i> cauliflower	kàlda <i>n.</i> jug
káa <i>v.i.</i> stop	kàldzo <i>n.</i> bag, small
kágati <i>n.</i> lemon	kàldzṅ <i>n.</i> packet
káito <i>n.</i> shawl	kàm <i>n.</i> box
kálam <i>n.</i> pen	kàmbu <i>n.</i> bottle
kálaṅ sè <i>n.</i> lapsi	kàmu <i>adj.</i> old
kálaṅgu <i>n.</i> partridge	kàn pèdi <i>q.</i> how
kám <i>v.i.</i> dry	kàndi <i>q.</i> which
kám sáṅbu <i>adj.</i> fine	kànḍa <i>q.</i> how
káma <i>adj.</i> steep	kànmu <i>q.</i> how
kámbu <i>adj.</i> dry	kàṅ <i>adj.</i> full
kántḗi <i>adj.</i> younger	kàṅ <i>n.</i> hill
káṅba <i>n.</i> leg	kàṅ <i>v.i.</i> fill
káṅba dzùbu <i>n.</i> toe	kàpu <i>adj.</i> old.animate (<i>female</i> , kamu)
káṅba láḗa <i>n.</i> thigh	kàwan <i>n.</i> cucumber
káṅdo <i>n.</i> spring	

kàze *q.* how many
ké *v.t.* visit
kée *n.* noise
kée kyàp *v.i.* call
kée tén *v.i.* shout
kéemu kyàp *v.i.* laugh
kémba *n.* tongs
képha *n.* hip
kèdu *n.* vegetables dried
kèe *v.t.* split
kèedaŋ làŋ *adj.* happy
kèn *v.t.* wear
kí *conj.* or
kíi *v.t.* bind
kípa *n.* caste
kípu *adj.* lucky
kíçi *n.* flea
kítáb *n.* book
kó *v.t.* dig
kóhar *n.* porcupine
kól *v.t.* boil
kóoba *n.* skin
kóoma *n.* chin
kór *v.i.* walk
kóra kyàp *v.t.* walk around
kò *v.t.* need
kò *n.* door
kòga *n.* kitchen
kòkpa *n.* garlic
kòldza *n.* lock
kòlela *adj.* quiet, slowly
kòlmo *n.* lake
kòlo tséema *n.* leafy greens
kòmba *n.* temple
kòn *v.t.* dress
kòn *v.t.* wear
kòŋ *v.i.* crouch
kòpça *n.* shoes

kòrko *n.* basket
kòrmo *adj.* round
kòtaraŋ *postp.* including
kòtolo *n.* sickle holster
krému *n.* scarf
kú *v.t.* rub
kúku *n.* cuckoo
kúmen *n.* thief
kúnđe *n.* pot, alcohol, large
kúniŋ *n.* thresher
kúŋ dzùŋ *n.* elbow
kúŋga *n.* candle holder
kúrtçi *n.* chair
kúça *n.h.* hat, honorific
kúu *v.i.* wait
kù *num.* nine
kùba *num.* ninth
kùl *n.* spirit house
kùlba *adj.* slow
kùŋmu *n.* night
kùŋmu nùp phé *n.* midnight
kùŋse *n.* evening
kùptçu *num.* ninety
kùr pè *v.i.* bend over
kùrçiŋ *n.* sugarcane
kwèla *n.* clothing
khá *n.* mouth
khádzu *n.* saliva
khálak *n.* clan
kháldzi *num.* twenty
kháldzi súm *num.* twenty three
kháldzi tçií *num.* twenty one
kháldzi tçu *num.* thirty
kháldzi ní *num.* twenty two
kháldzo *n.* health
kháldji *n.* pocket
khálma *n.* kidney
khálpni *num.* forty

khálɲi tɕú *num.* fifty
khálsu *num.* sixty
khálsu tɕú *num.* seventy
khálɕi *num.* eighty
khálɕi tɕú *num.* ninety
khámbu *n.* peach
kháp *n.* needle
khápe *n.* branch
khárayo *n.* rabbit
khárbesare *n.* strawberry
khárnup *n.* day before yesterday
khása *adj.* Nepali
khát *n.* bed
kháwa *n.* snow
kháwa kàŋ *n.* mountain peak
khé *pr.* you (singular)
khémbu *n.* lama, head
khéndi *adj.* bitter
khéndi kòrilo *n.* zucchini
khér *v.t.* take with
khéɕa *n.* deer
khí *n.* dog
khíba *n.* caterpillar
khím *n.* house
khím dɕe *n.* neighbour
khímbu *n.* spoon
khíp *n.* pin
khó *pr.* he
khólmo *n.* well
khóp tíba *n.* tattoo
khópi *n.* room
khór *v.t.* visit
khóte *adj.* crippled
khú *v.aux.* can
khúŋ *pr.* they (plural)
khúr *v.t.* carry
khúr *n.* hoof

khúra *n.* bread
khúrpu *n.* load
khwá *n.* sauce
kyá *v.i.* float
kyáa *v.i.* feel cold
kyáabu *n.* cold weather
kyákpa *n.* faeces
kyákpa táŋ *v.i.* defecate
kyàaba *adj.* fat
kyàdɕu *num.* eighty
kyàgar *n.* millet
kyàlbu *n.* king
kyàmi *adj.* foreign
kyàp *n.* back
kyàp *v.i.* fall
kyàp *adj.* closed
kyàpla *postp.* behind
kyàpre *n.* buckwheat
kyàpɕar *n.* ginger
kyàsa *n.* market
kyàwa *n.* funeral
kyé *v.t.* give birth
kyé thál *adj.* pale, light
kyépa *n.* waist
kyè *num.* eight
kyèba *num.* eighth
kyèp *n.* turn
kyèwa *n.* spoon, wooden
kyèi *n.* knowledge
kyòŋ *v.t.* carry
kyú *v.i.* vomit
kyú *v.t.* leave
kyúr *v.t.* throw, drop
kyúrpu *adj.* sour
kyùbu *n.* father-in-law
kyùma *n.* intestines, guts
kyùma *n.* Brahmin

kyùmu *n.* mother-in-law
khyá *pr.* you (plural)
khyému *adj.* cheap
khyóbo *n.* husband, *alt.* khyóga
khyópiṣa *n.* man
lála *n.* someone, something
láma *n.* Lama
lán *n.* ox
lán *v.t.* pick up
lásii *n.* cucumber
là *n.* mountain
làba *n.* cheese
làbu *n.* radish
làgor *n.* millstone
làgor bù *n.* insect
làkpa *n.* hand
làkpa dzùbu *n.* finger
làkpa pùṅba *n.* arm
làkpa sému *n.* fingernail
làkpa tìṅ *n.* palm
làṃ *n.* road
làṅ *v.i.* stand
làṅguṣa *n.* elephant
làp *v.t.* say, speak
làpna *conj.* if
làpti *n.* leaf
léé *part.* particle, convincing
lékam *n.* sandals
lémba *adj.* deaf
léndi *adj.* soggy
lénda *n.* okra
lép *v.i.* arrive
lépa *n.* brain
lépa bù *n.* snail
lépta *adj.* flat
lè *n.* work
lèn *v.t.* take
límu *rel.* relative clause

ló *part.* particle, reported speech
ló khó *v.i.* cough
lóma *n.* winnowing tray
lóp *v.t.* learn
lò *n.* year
lò *v.i.* return
lòma *n.* leaf
lòṅ *v.t.* break even
lú *n.* song
lú *v.d.* put into
lú *n.* snake spirit
lúṅdar *n.* prayer flags
lúwa *n.* lungs
lù *n.* sheep
lùndi *n.* jackal
lùṅ *n.* river
lùṅso *n.* spine
lhá *n.* god
lhába *n.* wind
lháma *adj.* stale
lhámu *n.* goddess
lhéema *n.* hairstyle
lhó *n.* south
mámu *adj.* low
máni *conj.* if
máṅra *n.* hair, facial
már kyàp *v.t.* sacrifice
mártsi *n.* chilli
máse *n.* lentils, daal
máza *adj.* centre
màdat *n.* help
màgi *n.* corn
mài *n.* buffalo, female
màiba *adj.* bad
màkpa *n.* sister's husband
màna kàṅ *num.* one hundred
màna ní *num.* two hundred
màndj *n.* blanket

màni <i>n.</i> prayer	mìn <i>n.</i> name
màᅇbu <i>adj.</i> many much	mìndu <i>v.cop.</i> copula verb, perceptual evidential, negative
màr <i>n.</i> butter	mìndɔ <i>v.cop.</i> copula verb, dubitative negative
màr <i>loc.</i> down	mò <i>pr.</i> her
màrmu <i>adj.</i> red, <i>alt.</i> màrpu	mòdza <i>n.</i> sock
màrmu làbu <i>n.</i> carrot	mòdze <i>n.</i> banana
màrse <i>adj.</i> red, pale	mòmo <i>n.</i> momo
màya <i>n.</i> love	múkpa <i>n.</i> cloud, fog
méloᅇ <i>n.</i> mirror	múr <i>v.t.</i> rub
mén <i>n.</i> medicine	múrtsa <i>n.</i> forehead
ména <i>n.</i> cumin	mùda <i>n.</i> legal dispute
mè <i>n.</i> fire	mùkten <i>n.</i> mùkten clan
mèelaᅇ <i>n.</i> rack	mùl <i>n.</i> spring
mèeme <i>n.</i> group, female	mùr <i>v.i.</i> chew
mèeme dzùdzu <i>n.</i> great grandfather	ná <i>part.</i> particle, supposition
mèke <i>v.cop.</i> copula verb, past negative	ná tsùse <i>adj.</i> dark
mème <i>n.</i> grandfather	náaso <i>n.</i> gift
mènda <i>class.</i> numeral classifier	náasum <i>n.</i> nose
mèndo <i>n.</i> flower	nám kyàp <i>n.</i> rain
mèndza <i>n.</i> bowl	nám sé <i>v.i.</i> become dark
mèᅇoᅇ <i>n.</i> blowing pipe	nám tíᅇ <i>n.</i> sky
mèᅇo <i>v.cop.</i> copula, dubitative negative	nám thá <i>n.</i> thunder, lightening
mèwa <i>n.</i> papaya	náma <i>n.</i> brother's.wife
míi <i>n.</i> eye	námda <i>adj.</i> dirty
míi pú <i>n.</i> eyelash	nám dzo <i>n.</i> ear
míidzu <i>n.</i> tear	námli <i>n.</i> headstrap
míikᅇél <i>n.</i> reading glasses	námsaᅇ <i>n.</i> thought
míima <i>n.</i> bamboo, small split	námsaᅇ táᅇ <i>v.t.</i> think about things
mílam <i>n.</i> dream	náᅇ <i>v.d.</i> ask.for
míli ᅇíi <i>n.</i> tick	náᅇgandi <i>n.</i> beggar
mílim <i>n.</i> bamboo, small	náᅇgo <i>adj.</i> naked
míliᅇ tséma <i>n.</i> bamboo shoots	náᅇma <i>n.</i> Buddhist
mítsa <i>n.</i> eyebrow	nápᅇal <i>n.</i> snot
mì <i>n.</i> person	náriwal <i>n.</i> coconut
mìn <i>v.cop.</i> copula, ego negative	nà <i>v.i.</i> sore, ill

nàkpu *adj.* black
nàm *q.* when
nàm sùmu *adj.* early
nàmaŋ *adv.* never
nàniŋ *n.* last year
nàŋ dīna *n.* day after tomorrow
nàŋbar *n.* tomorrow
nàŋla *postp.* inside
nàŋma *n.* inner basket
née *n.* oats
née *v.t.* think
née kór *n.* pilgrimage
néendi *adj.* hurt
néesa *n.* rest place
néki *n.* pot, cooking
ném *v.t.* squeeze
nèn *v.i.* sing *alt.* lèn
nèpa *n.* sick person
ní *part.* politeness particle
nímaba *n.* citrus, large
níŋ *n.* heart
níŋba *adj.* old
níŋtɕa *n.* poor thing
nómbo *adj.* sharp
nòm *v.t.* feel
nòmbo *n.* sister, younger
nòŋ *v.t.* spoil
nòo *n.* brother, younger
nòrgunma *n.* goddess
núm *n.* oil
núŋtɕa *n.* idea
nùrma *n.* alcohol
nùrpu *n.* diamond
jà *n.* fish
jàl *v.i.* sleep, lay
jàlaŋ *n.* raspberry
jé *v.d.* pass
jé *v.t.* chase

jébul *n.* pillow
jén *n.* ally
jér *v.t.* annoy
jèn *v.t.* listen
jí *num.* two
jí tsé *v.i.* sleep
jíba *num.* second
jídzu *num.* twenty
jíkarəŋ *adj.* both
jílo *v.i.* feel sleepy
jímu *postp.* with
jípu *num.* dual
jì *pr.* us (exclusive)
jìma *n.* sun
jìma d̀ùptəŋ *n.* sunset
jìma phé *n.* midday
jìp *v.t.* swallow
jókpa *adj.* dirty
jóŋba *n.* insane person
jò *v.t.* buy
jòŋ *v.i.* suffer hardship
júŋ *n.* drill
jùm *n.* north
ŋá *num.* five
ŋá *v.t.* cut grass
ŋába *num.* fifth
ŋámaŋ *n.* tail
ŋáptɕu *num.* fifty
ŋà *pr.* I
ŋàrmu *adj.* sweet
ŋó *v.t.* roast
ŋó tɕhamu *adj.* embarrassed
ŋómbu *adj.* green
ŋómse *adj.* green, pale, blue
ŋóŋ *n.* egg, reptile
ŋò *v.t.* recognise
ŋòtɕha *adj.* shy
ŋù *v.i.* cry

ɲùl *n.* silver
ókel *n.* mortar and pestle
óo *voc.* invocation
òm *v.t.* convince, woo
òma *n.* milk
òndzu *n.* shirt, traditional
òndɔa *adv.* that way
òŋ *v.i.* come
òŋ *v.cop.* copula, general fact
òo *postp.* there, that
òodi *dem.* that
òolegi *conj.* and then *alt.* òole
òraŋ *pr.* us (inclusive)
òrmu *adv.* that way
òrta *n.* fence
òzeraŋ *adj.* that much
páalo *n.* turn
pába *n.* skin, bark
pádi kàŋ *num.* one thousand
pádi tɕú *num.* ten thousand
páli *n.* roof
páluŋ tséma *n.* spinach
pánbu *n.* basket rim
pánima bù *n.* dragonfly
páŋdza *n.* grassy field
páŋgep *n.* apron, traditional *alt.*
 páŋdeŋ
pár *v.t.* light
pára kúna *n.* cave
páral *n.* straw
pásagi tséma *n.* mustard greens
pátap *n.* bamboo, large
páti *n.* side
pátuka *n.* belt
pàa *v.t.* hold
pàama *n.* wedding
pàk *n.* dumpling

pàka *adj.* married
pàkpa *n.* motorbike
pàkpe tsám̄ba *n.* flour, wheat
pàkpur *n.* pot for tsám̄ba
pàlaŋ *n.* cow
pàlba *n.* frog
pàlbu *n.* Brahmin
pàŋpaŋba *adj.* wet
pàrkila *postp.* between
pé *n.* incense
pé bùr *n.* censer
pépé *n.* leech
pè *v.t.* do
pèe *n.* Tibet
pèemi *n.* wife
pèmpiza *n.* woman
pí *v.t.* take off
pín *n.* sibling
pírka *n.* stool
pírma *n.* semolina
pítsu *postp.* downhill
pítuli *n.* bird
pìru *n.* coral
pìru *adj.* young animal
pìru yú *n.* necklace for marriage
pìtiri *n.* porcupine
pìtɕa *conj.* or, again
pìza *n.* baby
póla *n.* rice husk, chaff
póldum *n.* pants
póŋ *n.* jar
póŋdi *n.* mosquito
pótrika *n.* magazine
pò *v.i.* come out
pòla *postp.* near
pòmbo *n.* shaman
pòmbo *n.* daughter

pòni *n.* pot, alcohol, conical
pòr *v.i.* leave
pòrtsa *n.* bamboo mat
pòtsi *n.* gills
pràᅇbu *adj.* poor
prà *v.t.* cut
pràᅇ *n.* molasses
pràᅇbu *n.* chest
pràᅇdza *n.* hug
pràᅇmaᅇ *n.* fly
préken *n.* monkey
prèe tà *v.t.* taste
prèka *n.* stick
prípu tàp *v.i.* sneeze
príw *n.* monkey
prò *v.i.* fall out
prù *v.i.* write
prùl *n.* snake
prùp *v.i.* fall down
pú *n.* hair, body
púᅇ *v.t.* pour
pù *n.* son
pùmba *n.* jug, ceremonial
pùᅇga *n.* mustard
pùᅇgu *n.* donkey
pùzapaᅇ *n.* worship
pùzi *n.* raski cup
pyáᅇ *v.t.* hang
pyàk *n.* parcel
phá *n.* pig
phábaᅇ *n.* bat
phálgí *n.* rice, beaten
phálpᅇul *n.* fruit
pháᅇ *v.t.* hold in arms
pháᅇba *n.* lap, cradled arms
pháp *n.* yeast, brewing
pháp *v.i.* come down, fall
phár *postp.* that side

phára *n.* wolf
phárkonla *postp.* across
phárpe *postp.* that way
phársi *n.* pumpkin
phártshúr *adv.* this way, that way
phás *n.* trap
phé *adj.* half
phéebe *pr.* group, male
phép *v.i.h.* come
phíla *postp.* outside, foreign
phíma *n.* basket, outer
phímli *n.* butterfly
phír *v.i.* jump
phó *n.* belly
phóo *v.i.* feel
phóoᅇᅇp *n.* soap
phró *v.t.* snatch
phú *v.i.* blow
phúl *v.t.* push
phúmba *n.* jug
phúmbu *n.* corpse
phyá *v.t.* wipe
phyáma *n.* broom
rál *v.t.* tear
ráᅇ *conj.* and *alt.* ráᅇgi
rára *n.* noodles
rà *n.* goat
rà *n.* physical fight
ràkpa *n.* headstrap, bamboo
ràlràlba *adj.* worn
ràᅇ *n.* self
ràᅇsa *adj.* other
ràpalaᅇ *n.* mulberry
ràra *postp.* like
ràᅇta *n.* loom
réldi *n.* rack
réndza *n.* soybeans
rèere *adj.* one each

rídza *n.* wild chicken
ríl *v.t.* cause to fall
rì *n.* forest
rì héé *n.* yam
rìkpa *n.* intelligence
rìda *n.* animal
rìl *v.i.* fall over
rìmbur tché *n.* lama, reincarnate
rìṅbu *adj.* long *alt.* rìmbu
róp *v.t.* break
rò *n.* friend
rò *n.* corpse
ròko *n.* bone
ròm *v.i.* collapse
ròṅ gòlòṅ *n.* stork
ròp *v.i.* break
rùl *v.i.* rot
rùlrulba *adj.* rotten
rùp *v.t.* gather
rùsusus *adj.* driftingly
rhélmú *adj.* round, spherical
sá *n.* ground, floor
sáa *v.t.* burn
sádzo *n.* key
ságar *n.* whitewash
sál *v.t.* clean
sámba *adj.* new
sáṅ *n.* incense
sáṅbi *n.* next year
sáṅbu *adj.* clean
sáṅbur *n.* incense pot
sáṅma *adj.* clean
sápu *adj.* thin
sáta *n.* week
sátíṅ sá *n.* earth
sáwa bù *n.* spider
sà *v.i.* eat

sà dàwa *n.* Monday
sà lhákpa *n.* Wednesday
sà mìnṅmar *n.* Tuesday
sà náma *n.* Sunday
sà pásanṅ *n.* Friday
sà pémba *n.* Saturday
sà púrpu *n.* Thursday
sàl *v.i.* converse
sám̄ba *n.* bridge
sàndan *n.* offspring
sàṅ *n.* copper
sàṅ dīk *n.* cooking pot, large
sàṅbuṅ *n.* pitcher
sàṅgi bàgari *n.* storage pot
sàṅgi kúrwa *n.* pot for water
sàru *n.* bird
sàse *n.* food
sé *v.t.* kill
sébi *n.* two years ahead
sée *v.t.* mix
sém *n.* mind, heart
sém kyé *v.t.* like
sémdzen *n.* animal
sému *n.* nail
sén *n.* seed
séndi *adj.* hard
sér *n.* gold
séra *n.* hail
sérki *adj.* golden
sérpu *adj.* yellow
sértaṅ sérka *n.* dry season
sértop *n.* ring
séter *v.t.* kill
sè *n.* thing
sèe *v.t.* receive
síid̄i *n.* clay wash
síninṅ *n.* two years before

sì <i>n.</i> necklace, men	ɕára <i>adj.</i> young
sìm <i>v.i.h.</i> sleep, honorific	ɕáu <i>n.</i> apple
sìn <i>v.t.</i> complete, finish	ɕà <i>n.</i> grease
sìnda <i>adj.</i> hectic	ɕàama <i>n.</i> skirt
sìpyu sàrkyu <i>n.</i> prayer after death	ɕàk <i>adj.</i> greasy
só <i>n.</i> tooth	ɕàmu <i>n.</i> hat
só <i>v.t.</i> raise	ɕàŋba <i>n.</i> ɕàŋba clan
sóma <i>n.</i> egg louse	ɕé <i>v.d.</i> tell
sómbo <i>adj.</i> alive	ɕé kyàŋ <i>v.i.</i> stretch limbs
són <i>v.imp.</i> go, imperative	ɕée <i>v.t.</i> know
sò <i>v.imp.</i> eat, imperative	ɕér <i>n.</i> east
sòmba <i>n.</i> boots	ɕérma <i>n.</i> young girl
sòra <i>n.</i> sickle	ɕè <i>v.i.h.</i> eat, honorific
sòtor <i>n.</i> fern	ɕí <i>n.</i> louse
sú <i>q.</i> who	ɕí <i>v.i.</i> die
sú áŋ <i>n.</i> no one	ɕí khú <i>n.</i> small louse
súm <i>num.</i> three	ɕíba <i>adj.</i> dead
súmba <i>num.</i> third	ɕígu <i>n.</i> newspaper
súmdzu <i>num.</i> thirty	ɕíka <i>n.</i> rupee
súntala <i>n.</i> orange	ɕíkar tsá <i>v.t.</i> hunt
sún <i>adj.</i> clean <i>alt.</i> súnbu	ɕími <i>n.</i> beans
súnja <i>n.</i> amulet	ɕín <i>n.</i> wood
súr <i>v.d.</i> put into	ɕíŋa páko <i>n.</i> bayleaf
sù <i>n.</i> sore	ɕíŋdo <i>n.</i> fruit
sùla <i>n.</i> embers	ɕíŋgar <i>n.</i> chestnut tree
sùli <i>n.</i> corn pile	ɕíŋgul <i>n.</i> earthquake
sùrla <i>loc.</i> near	ɕì <i>num.</i> four
swá <i>n.</i> rice, unhusked	ɕìba <i>num.</i> fourth
swà <i>n.</i> nettles	ɕìmbu <i>adj.</i> tasty
ɕá <i>n.</i> meat	ɕìŋ <i>n.</i> farm
ɕá kyàp <i>v.i.</i> joke	ɕìŋle <i>n.</i> farmer
ɕáa <i>v.t.</i> split	ɕìptɕu <i>num.</i> forty
ɕál <i>v.t.</i> exit	ɕìtaŋ <i>adj.</i> anger
ɕáma <i>n.</i> afterbirth	ɕó <i>v.imp.</i> come, imperative
ɕámu <i>n.</i> mushroom	ɕó kyap <i>v.i.</i> lie
ɕáŋ <i>v.t.</i> churn buttermilk	ɕókpa <i>n.</i> feather
ɕápɕa <i>n.h.</i> foot, honorific	ɕóo <i>n.</i> conical basket
ɕár <i>v.i.</i> shine	ɕór <i>v.i.</i> get out

ɸò <i>n.</i> curd	tén <i>v.t.</i> show
ɸò <i>v.t.</i> brush	tén <i>v.t.</i> pull out
ɸòole <i>n.</i> morning	ténmu <i>n.</i> show
ɸòwa <i>n.</i> wound	téphula <i>dem.</i> there
ɸù <i>v.i.h.</i> sit, honorific	tér <i>v.d.</i> give
ɸùkpa <i>n.</i> incense	tè <i>v.i.</i> sit
ɸùu <i>v.i.</i> enter	tègini tséema <i>n.</i> wild greens
tá <i>v.i.</i> look	tèmba sàl <i>v.i.</i> remember
táa <i>v.t.</i> wear jewellery	tèmba tçè <i>v.t.</i> forget
tákpa <i>n.</i> tree	tèn <i>v.i.</i> go.out
tám <i>n.</i> language	tèn <i>n.</i> mattress
tám ɸék <i>v.i.</i> gossip	tèrma <i>n.</i> plate
támbe <i>n.</i> story	tíbirere <i>adj.</i> some
támya pè <i>v.i.</i> converse	tíbitçi <i>adj.</i> few
tán <i>v.t.</i> send	tíip <i>n.</i> bee
tán <i>v.t.</i> throw	tíip tshán <i>n.</i> beehive
tánɖzu <i>n.</i> shirt, traditional	tíkis <i>n.</i> back apron
tánɖgu <i>n.</i> rhododendron	tíl <i>n.</i> sesame
tánlimu tséema <i>n.</i> leafy greens	tín <i>v.i.</i> spread
táp <i>v.t.</i> scatter	tínba <i>n.</i> foot
tári <i>n.</i> axe	tínɖgi <i>adj.</i> next
táta <i>n.</i> basket crossbeam	tínla <i>postp.</i> after
tà <i>part.</i> particle, emphatic	típaama <i>n.</i> bee
tàa <i>temp.</i> now	tíçal kyàp <i>v.t.</i> drag
tàbu <i>n.</i> horse	tíya <i>n.</i> navel
tàlda <i>postp.</i> later	tì rùnbu <i>adj.</i> deep
tàm <i>v.t.</i> bind, tie, weave	tìi <i>v.i.</i> burn
tàn <i>v.t.</i> count	tìn <i>num.</i> seven
tàn <i>v.i.</i> open	tìnba <i>num.</i> seventh
tàp <i>v.i.</i> fall down	tìndzu <i>num.</i> seventy
tàpse <i>adv.</i> now	tìnɖa <i>n.</i> week
tàra <i>n.</i> buttermilk	tìnɖal kèdi <i>adj.</i> sad, worried, upset
tàze <i>adv.</i> now	tìpa <i>n.</i> smoke
tàzi <i>adv.</i> before	tìriɖ <i>n.</i> today
téba <i>n.</i> ladder	toózi <i>n.</i> hoe
témba <i>adj.</i> correct	tó <i>n.</i> rice, cooked
tému <i>n.</i> religious festival	tóba <i>adv.</i> somewhat

tóka *n.* toggle
tóko *n.* shirt
tóo *v.i.* hunger
tóodi *dem.* this, that
tór *v.i.* stolen
tórma *n.* statue, rice
tóryaŋ *n.* gourd
tò *n.* stone
tòkpa *n.* foot
tòkpagi kyàp *v.t.* kick
tòlbo *n.* hole
tòm *n.* bear
tòŋba *adj.* empty
tòŋba *n.* face
tòŋbo *n.* tree
tòŋbo *num.* first
tòŋla *postp.* before
tòo *postp.* there
tòo *v.t.* put down
tòodi *dem.* that visible
tòriyaŋ *n.* cucumber
tòtçe *n.* shirt, traditional
tsá *v.t.* play
tsáala *postp.* below
tsáama *n.* pot, alcohol middle
tsámba *n.* flour
tsármu *n.* flat basket
tsárŋi *n.* root
tsà *n.* vein
tséema *n.* leafy greens
tsélba *n.* basket
tsém *v.t.* sew
tséma *n.* vegetable curry
tséme *n.* game
tsètre *n.* bird
tshá *n.* salt
tshál *v.t.* choke
tshámu *n.* granddaughter

tshápa *adj.* hot
tshápre *adj.* salty
tshárkya *n.* vulture
tsháw *n.* grandson
tsháwa *n.* fever
tshé *n.* colour
tshé *v.i.* be cooked, be ripe
tshé tshébe *adj.* ripe
tshénda *n.* appearance
tshér *v.i.* sad
tshérsi *adj.* lazy
tshí *v.i.* burn
tshíingor *n.* knee
tshól *v.t.* search
tshólam *n.* part in hair
tshóp *n.* offering
tshúr *postp.* this side
tshúrpe *adv.* this way
tsík tsíba *n.* mole
tsíkpa *n.* wall
tsíma *n.* ribs
tsímɕa *n.* tongs
tsír *v.t.* squeeze
tsókpu *adj.* stupid
tsóp *n.* pickle
tsòŋ *v.t.* sell
tsòra *n.* hoe
tsúbu *adj.* good, nice
tsúkul *n.* latch
tsúm *v.t.* close
tsúŋbe *n.* mouse
tçáa *adj.* iron
tçádzuŋma *n.* bird
tçákɕi *n.* round mat
tçál *v.t.* pay
tçál kyàp *v.i.* swim
tçáŋ *v.t.* suffice
tçáŋbu *adj.* clever

tɕáŋgi *n.* tripod
tɕápal *n.* sandals
tɕà *n.* chicken
tɕà *n.* tea
tɕà pàktu *n.* tea
tɕàba *n.* tɕàba clan
tɕàbu *n.* rooster
tɕàmu yóma *n.* young hen
tɕàŋ *n.* west
tɕàŋ *n.* storage basket
tɕàro *n.* crow
tɕàwa *n.* manure
tɕé *n.* tongue
tɕéemi *adj.* small *alt.* tɕéemu
tɕén *n.* tiger
tɕéŋdi *adj.* heavy
tɕéŋa *num.* fifteen
tɕépkye *num.* eighteen *alt.* tɕápkye
tɕétɕe *n.* mother's younger sister
tɕétɕe tɕómbó *n.* mother's elder sister
tɕémendo *n.* egg
tɕèmu kòŋa *n.* egg
tɕhá *v.t.* break
tɕhá tɕába *adj.* broken
tɕháduŋ *n.* blacksmith
tɕhák *n.h.* hand, honorific
tɕhálida *n.* necklace
tɕhálida kyàpti *adj.* bound
tɕhám *v.t.* dance
tɕhán *v.t.* choose
tɕhán *n.* alcohol
tɕhán *n.* flock
tɕhánŋela *n.* drunkard
tɕháre *adj.* straight
tɕháuki *n.* barracks
tɕhé *n.* book

tɕhé *v.i.h.* eat, drink
tɕhéé *n.* grass
tɕhémaŋ *n.* saliva
tɕhéme *n.* candle
tɕhép *v.d.* give each other
tɕhépare *n.* lizard
tɕhípa *adj.* Hindu
tɕhó *n.* island
tɕhódo *n.* lip
tɕhómbo *adj.* big
tɕhórten *n.* stupa
tɕhú *n.* water
tɕhú héé *n.* yam
tɕhú sàŋ *n.* water urn
tɕhú tɕára *n.* waterfall
tɕhúba *n.* coat
tɕhúda *n.* millstone
tɕhúdze *n.* time
tɕhúdze *n.* watch
tɕhúkpu *adj.* rich
tɕhúli *n.* bamboo sap
tɕhúrpi *n.* cheese
tɕí *q.* what
tɕí àŋ *adj.* any, anything
tɕí ínaŋ *n.* something
tɕíduŋ táŋ *v.i.* urinate
tɕíi *num.* one
tɕíiraŋ *adj.* alone
tɕímba *n.* liver
tɕíni *n.* sugar
tɕíni *num.* twelve *alt.* tɕiŋpi
tɕíniiba *num.* twelfth
tɕíŋ *v.t.* wear a belt
tɕíŋ *n.* urine
tɕípe *q.* why
tɕípe làpna *conj.* because
tɕìpa *adj.* thin

tɕóŋ *v.i.* run
tɕóŋ *n.* chives
tɕò *v.i.* finish
tɕòl *v.t.* do
tɕòŋ *n.* onion
tɕú *v.d.* cause to
tɕú *num.* ten
tɕúba *num.* tenth
tɕúdzi *num.* eleven
tɕúdziba *num.* eleventh
tɕúp *v.t.* imprison
tɕúpsum *num.* thirteen
tɕúpei *num.* fourteen
tɕúptin *num.* seventeen
tɕúrku *num.* nineteen
tɕútu *num.* sixteen
tɕùru *n.* necklace
tú *n.* vagina
tùŋbo dzùk *adj.* ancient
túp *v.t.* cut
tùkpu *n.* suffering, hardship
tùŋ *v.t.* hit
tùŋda *n.* hit
thá ríŋbu *adj.* far
tháa *v.t.* weave
thákpa *n.* rope
thál *class.* numeral classifier, emphatic
thála *n.* second
thála *n.* dust
thála ráŋ *adj.* brown
thálbi *n.* dirt
thán sál *v.i.* rest
thán tɕhé *adj.* tired
thánku *n.* thangka
thánŋaŋ *adj.* ragged
thé *v.i.* hear
théemi *adj.* short

théemu *adj.* shallow
théka *adj.* straight
thél *v.t.* plaster
thén *v.i.* go out
thén *v.t.* stretch
thére *n.* sealing cloth
thí *v.t.* join
thíbri *n.* kettle
thínbu *adj.* dark
thó *v.t.* cradle
thóla *postp.* above
thómbo *adj.* high, tall
thón *v.t.* see
thón *n.* plough
thón *v.t.* seen
thóo *v.t.* take
thú *v.t.* meet
thúkpa *n.* porridge
thúkpu *adj.* thick
thúŋ *v.t.* drink
thútɕe tɕhé *excl.* thank you
ɕá *n.* hair
ɕálti *v.t.* patch
ɕán *v.i.* swell
ɕána *n.* money
ɕánɡa *adj.* flat
ɕáp *v.t.* winnow
ɕáɕi dèle *excl.* greetings
ɕáɕe *n.* scar
ɕázaŋ *n.* tent
ɕà *n.* enemy
ɕà *v.t.* bind
ɕà *n.* pheasant
ɕàa *v.i.* study
ɕàa *v.i.* recover
ɕàba *n.* Buddhist monk
ɕàlu *adj.* dirty
ɕánmaran *adj.* every

tàŋmu *adj.* cold
tée táŋ *v.t.* warm
téeba *n.* stair
tè *n.* advice
tíka *n.* tika
tíŋbur *n.* boil
tì *v.t.* pull
tìi *v.t.* ask
tìlbu *n.* bell.prayer
tìle *postp.* like
tìma *n.* aroma
tìma nám *v.t.* smell
tìpsa *n.* shadow
tókari *n.* basket
tò *n.* wheat
tò *v.t.* read
tò tsámpa *n.* wheat flour
tòlkar *n.* goddess
tòlma *n.* goddess
tòmaŋ *n.* ant
tòmbo *adj.* warm
tòsa *n.* school
túk *v.t.* gather
túŋ *n.* button
túu *v.t.* pick
tù *num.* six
tùkpa *num.* sixth
tùktɕu *num.* sixty
tùl *v.t.* apply; paint
tùp kàla *adj.* joyfully
tháa *n.* blood
thádok *adj.* jealous
tháwa *n.* eagle
tháwa *n.* mallet *alt.* thwá
thíba *n.* bile
thú *n.* ruler
thú *v.t.* wash

thúkpa *n.* quarrel
úp *v.t.* cover
úpa *n.* owl
úu *n.* breath
úu phér *v.i.* breathe
ùr *v.i.* fly
ùusu *n.* coriander
wála *postp.* under
yá *n.* arum
yák *n.* yak
yálo tséema *n.* leafy greens
yáŋdi *adj.* light
yàa *n.* bear fruit
yàabu *adj.* good
yàmbi *n.* moment
yàŋ *part.* particle, emphatic
yàp *n.h.* father, honorific
yàrla *postp.* up, above
yée *part.* particle, exclamation
yéeba *n.* yéeba clan
yè *v.cop.* copula, ego
yèke *v.cop.* copula, ego past
yèmba *n.* moment
yèmbu *n.* Kathmandu
yèndzap phúl *n.* bowls of water
yèto *v.cop.* copula, dubitative
yíbi *n.* grandmother
yíbi dzùdzu *n.* great grandmother
yíldo *n.* courtyard
yíp *v.t.* hide
yìgi *n.* letter
yìmba *v.cop.* copula, ego
yìndzo *adv.* from
yìndɔ *v.cop.* copula, dubitative
yìr *v.t.* turn
yóba *adj.* right
yóma *adj.* left

yóndo *n.* cloth-headed broom

yò *v.t.* cook

yòlmo *n.* Yolmo

yòpta kyàp *v.t.* cook

yú *n.* turquoise

yúŋ *v.t.* shake

yù *v.i.* stroll

yùl *n.* village

yùm *n.* mother, honorific

yùŋga *n.* saffron

yùr *v.t.* turn soil

yùrkandi *n.* pickaxe

yùu *v.t.* go, walk

zì *v.i.* become drunk *alt.* dzi

zò *v.t.* make

zàa *v.t.* leave

Appendix 6: English to Lamjung Yolmo wordlist

This wordlist is slightly more up to date than the separate Lamjung Yolmo-Nepali-English dictionary (Gawne 2011a), but does not contain Nepali glosses or Devanagari script. The lexical items are in Roman script alphabetical order.

above <i>postp.</i> thóla	apron, back <i>n.</i> tíkis
across <i>postp.</i> phárkonla	apron, traditional <i>n.</i> pángep <i>alt.</i> pángden
advice <i>n.</i> t̥è	arm <i>n.</i> làkpa pùŋba
afraid <i>adj.</i> dzìba	aroma <i>n.</i> t̥ima
after <i>postp.</i> tíŋla	arrest, seize, take <i>v.t.</i> dzùm
afterbirth <i>n.</i> čáma	arrive <i>v.i.</i> lép
again <i>conj.</i> p̥it̥ça	arum <i>n.</i> yá
alcohol <i>n.</i> árak	ask <i>v.t.</i> t̥i
alcohol <i>n.</i> nùrma	ask for <i>v.d.</i> náŋ
alcohol <i>n.</i> t̥chán	asparagus <i>n.</i> íbi rère
alive <i>adj.</i> sómbo	at the time <i>temp.</i> bèlala
all <i>adj.</i> dzàmma	at the time <i>temp.</i> gàrila
ally <i>n.</i> jén	available <i>v.i.</i> dzèr
alone <i>adj.</i> t̥çíraŋ	axe <i>n.</i> tári
also <i>conj.</i> áŋ	baby <i>n.</i> p̥iça
amulet <i>n.</i> súŋa	back <i>n.</i> kyàp
ancient <i>adj.</i> túŋbo dzùk	bad <i>adj.</i> màiba
and <i>conj.</i> áni	bag, small <i>n.</i> kàldzo
and <i>conj.</i> ráŋgi <i>alt.</i> ráŋ	bamboo mat <i>n.</i> pòrtsa
and then <i>conj.</i> òolegi <i>alt.</i> òole	bamboo sap <i>n.</i> t̥chúli
anger <i>adj.</i> çit̥aŋ	bamboo shoots <i>n.</i> míliŋ tséma
animal <i>n.</i> rida	bamboo, large <i>n.</i> pátap
animal <i>n.</i> sémdzen	bamboo, small <i>n.</i> mílim
annoy <i>v.t.</i> jér	bamboo, small split <i>n.</i> míima
ant <i>n.</i> t̥òmaŋ	bamboo, strip <i>n.</i> bàktal
any <i>adj.</i> t̥éi àŋ	banana <i>n.</i> mòdze
appearance <i>n.</i> tshénda	barley <i>n.</i> káru
apple <i>n.</i> čáu	

barracks *n.* tɕháuki
base *n.* dàg
basket *n.* dàlo
basket *n.* kòrko
basket *n.* tsélba
basket *n.* tɕókari
basket, conical *n.* ɕóo
basket, crossbeam *n.* táta
basket, flat *n.* tsármu
basket, inner *n.* nàŋma
basket, outer *n.* phíma
basket, rim *n.* pánbu
basket, storage *n.* tɕəŋ
bat *n.* phábaŋ
bay leaf *n.* ɕíŋa páko
bean *n.* bòdɔ
beans *n.* ɕími
bear *n.* tòmm
bear fruit *n.* yàa
beautiful *adj.* dzèbu
because *conj.* tɕéipe ləpna
bed *n.* khát
bee *n.* tíip
bee *n.* tí páama
beehive *n.* tíip tsháŋ
before *adv.* tàzi
before *loc.* dīnla
before *postp.* tònŋla
beggar *n.* náŋgandi
behind *postp.* kyàpla
bell, prayer *n.* tɕilbu
belly *n.* phó
below *postp.* tsáala
belt *n.* kára
belt *n.* páɕuka
belt, wear *v.t.* tɕíŋ
bend over *v.i.* kùrpè
big *adj.* tɕhómbo *alt.* tɕhúmbu,

tɕhómbo
bile *n.* tɕhíba
bind *v.t.* kíi
bind *v.t.* tàmm
bind *v.t.* tɕà
bird *n.* píɕuli
bird *n.* sàru
bird *n.* tsètɕe
bird *n.* tɕádzuŋma
birth, give *v.t.* kyé
bite *v.t.* átáp
bitter *adj.* khéndi
black *adj.* nàkpu
blacksmith *n.* tɕhádun
blanket *n.* màndji
blood *n.* tɕháa
blow *v.i.* phú
blue, green *adj.* dzàŋgu
body *n.* dzùbu
boil *n.* tɕíŋbur
boil *v.t.* kól
bone *n.* ròko
book *n.* kítab
book *n.* tɕhé
boots *n.* sòm̄ba
both *adj.* níkaraŋ
bottle *n.* kàmbu
bound *adj.* tɕhál̄da kyàpti
bow and arrow *n.* dà
bowl *n.* mèn̄dza
bowls, water *n.* yèndzap phúl
box *n.* kàm
bracelet *n.* dīw
Brahmin *n.* bàamen
Brahmin *n.* kyùma
Brahmin *n.* pàlbu
brain *n.* lépa
branch *n.* khápe

bread <i>n.</i> khúra	carpet <i>n.</i> dàri
break <i>v.i.</i> ròp	carrot <i>n.</i> màmmu làbu
break <i>v.t.</i> róp	carry <i>v.t.</i> khúr
break <i>v.t.</i> tchá	carry <i>v.t.</i> kyòŋ
break even <i>v.t.</i> lòŋ	caste <i>n.</i> kípa
breath <i>n.</i> úu	cat <i>n.</i> gùri
breathe <i>v.i.</i> úu phér	caterpillar <i>n.</i> bùsikpa
bridge <i>n.</i> sàmba	caterpillar <i>n.</i> khíba
broken <i>adj.</i> tchá tchába	cauliflower <i>n.</i> kaulikopi
broom <i>n.</i> phyáma	cause <i>v.d.</i> tẹú
broom, cloth <i>n.</i> yóndo	cave <i>n.</i> párakúna
brother, younger <i>n.</i> nòo	censer <i>n.</i> pébùr
brother, elder <i>n.</i> áda	centre <i>adj.</i> máza
brother's wife <i>n.</i> náma	chair <i>n.</i> kúrteì
brown <i>adj.</i> thála ráŋ	chase <i>v.t.</i> jé
brush <i>v.t.</i> ẹ̀d	cheap <i>adj.</i> khyému
bucket <i>n.</i> bàlitiŋ	cheek <i>n.</i> ẹ̀mba
buckwheat <i>n.</i> kyàpre	cheese <i>n.</i> làba
buddha, laughing <i>n.</i> hácaŋ	cheese <i>n.</i> tchúrpi
Buddhist <i>n.</i> náŋma	chest <i>n.</i> pràŋbu
buffalo, female <i>n.</i> mài	chestnut tree <i>n.</i> ẹ̀ŋgar
burn <i>v.i.</i> tii	chew <i>v.i.</i> mùr
burn <i>v.i.</i> tshí	chicken <i>n.</i> tẹ̀a
burn <i>v.t.</i> bàr	chicken wild <i>n.</i> rídza
burn <i>v.t.</i> sáa	chilli <i>n.</i> mártsi
bushland <i>n.</i> dọp	chin <i>n.</i> kóoma
butter <i>n.</i> màr	chives <i>n.</i> tẹ̀oŋ
butterfly <i>n.</i> phímli	choke <i>v.t.</i> tshál
buttermilk <i>n.</i> tàra	choose <i>v.t.</i> dàmm
button <i>n.</i> tují	choose <i>v.t.</i> tchán
buy <i>v.t.</i> jò	churn buttermilk <i>v.t.</i> ẹ̀aŋ
cabbage <i>n.</i> bànda	citrus, large <i>n.</i> nímaba
call <i>v.i.</i> kée kyàp	clan <i>n.</i> khálak
can <i>v.aux.</i> khú	classifier <i>class.</i> mènnda
candle holder <i>n.</i> kúŋga	classifier, emphatic <i>class.</i> káraŋ
candle <i>n.</i> tchéme	classifier, emphatic <i>class.</i> thál
candle wick <i>n.</i> dàr	clean <i>adj.</i> súŋ <i>alt.</i> súŋbu, sáŋbu

clean *v.t.* sál
clever *adj.* tɕánbu
climb up *v.i.* dzà
close *v.t.* tsúm
closed *adj.* kyàp
cloth strips *n.* dàza
cloth, sealing *n.* thére
clothing *n.* kwèla
cloud, fog *n.* múkpa
coals *n.* bùbro
coat *n.* tɕhúba
cockroach *n.* bìliŋ
coconut *n.* náriwal
coin *n.* dèk
cold *adj.* tɕànmu
cold, feel *v.i.* kyáa
cold weather *n.* kyáabu
collapse *v.i.* ròm
colour *n.* tshé
come down *v.i.* pháp
come out *v.i.* pò
come *v.i.* òŋ
come *v.i.h.* phép
come, imperative *v.imp.* ɕó
compare *part.* mádi
converse *v.i.* sàl
converse *v.i.* támyapè
convince *v.t.* òm
cook *v.t.* yò
cook *v.t.* yòpta kyàp
cooking pot *n.* káray
cooking pot, large *n.* sàŋdik
copper *n.* sàŋ
copula, dubitative *v.cop.* yèto
copula, dubitative *v.cop.* yìnɕo
copula, dubitative, negative
v.cop. mèto
copula, dubitative, negative

v.cop. mìnɕo
copula, ego *v.cop.* yè
copula, ego *v.cop.* yimba
copula, ego, negative *v.cop.* mè
copula, ego, negative *v.cop.* mìn
copula, ego, past negative *v.cop.*
mèke
copula, ego, past *v.cop.* yèke
copula, general fact *v.cop.* òŋ
copula, perceptual evidence
v.cop. dù
copula, perceptual evidence,
emphatic *v.cop.* dùba
copula, perceptual evidence,
negative *v.cop.* mìnɕu
coral *n.* pìru
coriander *n.* ùusu
corn *n.* màgi
corn, pile *n.* sùli
corpse *n.* phúmbu
corpse *n.* rò
correct *adj.* témba
cough *v.i.* ló khó
count *v.t.* tàn
country *n.* dèɕ
courtyard *n.* yildo
cover *v.t.* úp
cow *n.* pàlaŋ
cradle *v.t.* thó
crippled *adj.* khóte
crouch *v.i.* kòŋ
crow *n.* tɕàro
cry *v.i.* ñù
cuckoo *n.* kúku
cucumber *n.* kàwan
cucumber *n.* lásii
cucumber *n.* tòriyaŋ
cumin *n.* ména

cup *n.* káyu
cup, raski *n.* pùzi
curd *n.* cò
cut *v.t.* prà
cut *v.t.* túp
cut, grass *v.t.* nǎ
dagger *n.* kátha
dance *v.t.* tchám
dark *adj.* gàḍa
dark *adj.* ná tsùse
dark *adj.* thínbu
dark, become *v.i.* nám sé
daughter *n.* pòmo
day after tomorrow *n.* nàḅ dìna
day before yesterday *n.* khár *alt.* khárnup
dead *adj.* cǐba
deaf *adj.* lémba
deep *adj.* tì rùḅbu
deer *n.* khéca
defecate *v.i.* kyákpa tán
diamond *n.* nùrpu
die *v.i.* cǐ
dig *v.t.* kó
dirt *n.* thálbi
dirty *adj.* námnda
dirty *adj.* nókpa
dirty *adj.* tǎlu
do *v.t.* pè
do *v.t.* tchòl
dog *n.* khí
donkey *n.* pùḅgu
door *n.* kò
dorge *n.* dòrdze
down *loc.* màr
downhill *postp.* pítsu
drag *v.t.* tíçal kyàp
dragon *n.* dǔk
dragonfly *n.* pánima bù
dream *n.* mílam
dress *v.t.* kòn
dress, traditional *n.* àḅduḅ
driftingly *adj.* rùsusus
drill *n.* núnḅ
drink *v.t.* thúnḅ
drunk, become *v.i.* zì
drunkard *n.* tchángela
dry *adj.* kámbu
dry season *n.* sértanḅ, *alt.* sérka
dry *v.i.* kám
dual *num.* nípu
duck *n.* hànḅsa
dull *adj.* bòkto
dumpling *n.* pàk
dust *n.* thála
eagle *n.* tǎháwa
ear *n.* nám dzo
early *adj.* nàm súmu
earring *n.* àloḅ
earth *n.* sátiḅ sá
earthquake *n.* cǐḅgul
east *n.* cǐr
easy *adj.* tèmu
eat *v.i.* sà
eat, drink, honorific *v.i.h.* tché
eat, honorific *v.i.h.* cè
eat, imperative *v.imp.* sò
egg *n.* tchémendo
egg *n.* tchèmu kòḅa
egg, louse *n.* sóma
egg, reptile *n.* ḅóḅ
eggplant *n.* bènda
eight *num.* kyè
eighteen *num.* tchépkye *alt.* tchápkye

eighth *num.* kyèba
eighty *num.* khálçi
eighty *num.* kyàdzu
elbow *n.* kún dzùŋ
elder *adj.* dzèti
elephant *n.* lànğuça
eleven *num.* tçúdzi
eleventh *num.* tçúdziba
embarrassed *adj.* ɲótçhamu
embers *n.* sùla
empty *adj.* tònɓa
enemy *n.* t̩à
enough, have *v.t.* dàŋ
enter *v.i.* çùu
evening *n.* kùŋse
every *adj.* t̩ànmaran̩
everything *n.* yìndze m̀ndze
exclamation *excl.* átçha
exit *v.t.* çál
eye *n.* míi
eyebrow *n.* mítsa
eyelash *n.* mípú
face *n.* tònɓa
fall down *v.i.* pr̀p
fall down *v.i.* t̩ap
fall out *v.i.* pr̀o
fall over *v.i.* gyèl
fall over *v.i.* r̀il
fall *v.i.* kyàp
fall, cause to *v.t.* r̀il
far *adj.* thá r̀inɓu
farm *n.* çin̩
farmer *n.* çin̩le
fast *adj.* gyùgùyba
fat *adj.* kyàaba
father *n.* ába
father-in-law *n.* kyùbu
father, honorific *n.h.* yàp

father's elder brother *n.* águu
 tçómbo
father's elder sister *n.* áni tçómbo
father's younger brother *n.* águu
father's younger sister *n.* áni
fear *v.i.* dzi
feather *n.* çókpa
feces *n.* kyákpa
feel *v.i.* phóo
feel *v.t.* nòm
feel sleepy *v.i.* ɲílo
fence *n.* òrta
fern *n.* sòtor
fever *n.* tsháwa
few *adj.* tíbitçi
fifteen *num.* tçéŋa
fifth *num.* ɲába
fifty *num.* khál ɲitçú
fifty *num.* ɲáptçu
fight, physical *n.* rà
fill *v.i.* kàn
fine *adj.* dzàmbu
fine *adj.* kám sánɓu
finger *n.* làkpa dzùbu
fingernail *n.* làkpa sému
finish *v.i.* tçò
finish *v.t.* sìn
fire *n.* m̀è
fish *n.* ɲà
five *num.* ɲá
flat *adj.* lépt̩a
flat *adj.* t̩ánɓa
flea *n.* kíçi
float *v.i.* kyá
flock *n.* tçhán̩
flour *n.* gònɓe
flour *n.* tsám̩ba
flour, wheat *n.* pàkpe tsám̩ba

flour, wheat *n.* t̄ò tsámpa
flower *n.* m̀èndo
fly *n.* pr̄añmaŋ
fly *v.i.* ùr
food *n.* s̀àse
foot *n.* tíŋba
foot *n.* t̀òkpa
foot, honorific *n.h.* ɔ́ápt̄a
force *n.* bàl
force *n.* dzáberdzasti
forehead *n.* múrtsa
foreign *adj.* kyàmi
forest *n.* r̀ì
forget *v.t.* t̀èmba t̄ɛ̀
fork *n.* khím̄bu
forty *num.* khálpi
forty *num.* ɔ̀ipt̄ɛ̀u
four *num.* ɔ̀ì
fourteen *num.* t̄ɛ̀p̄ɔ̀i
fourth *num.* ɔ̀iba
Friday *n.* s̀à pásañ
friend *n.* rò
frog *n.* p̀al̄ba
from *adv.* ỳindzo
from there *conj.* d̀èlegi
fruit *n.* phálphul
fruit *n.* ɔ̀íŋdo
full *adj.* k̀añ
funeral *n.* kyàwa
game *n.* tséme
garam masala *n.* g̀aram m̀èna
garden *n.* bàri
garlic *n.* k̀òkpa
gatekeeper *n.* g̀èd pále
gather *v.t.* r̀ùp
gather *v.t.* t̄úk
get out *v.i.* ɔ̀ór

get *v.t.* dzòr
gift *n.* náaso
gills *n.* p̀òtsi
ginger *n.* kyàp̄ɔ̀ar
girl, young *n.* ɔ̀érma
give each other *v.d.* t̄ɛ̀hép
give *v.d.* n̄añ
give *v.d.* t̄ér
glass *n.* glàs
glasses, reading *n.* míik ɔ̀él
go out *v.i.* t̀èn
go *v.i.* d̀ò
go, imperative *v.imp.* s̀ón
go, perfective *v.i.* k̀al
go, walk *v.t.* ỳùu
goat *n.* rà
god *n.* lhá
god, wealth *n.* dzàmbala
goddess *n.* lhámu
goddess *n.* ǹòrgunma
goddess *n.* t̀òlkar
goddess *n.* t̀òlma
gold *n.* sér
golden *adj.* sérki
good *adj.* tsúbu
good *adj.* ỳaabu
go out *v.i.* thén
gossip *v.i.* tám ɔ̀ék
gourd *n.* t̀óryan
grain *n.* d̀ù
granddaughter *n.* tshámu
grandfather *n.* m̀ème
grandmother *n.* ỳíbi
grandson *n.* tsháw
grass *n.* t̄hée
grassy field *n.* p̀añdza
grease *n.* ɔ̀à

greasy *adj.* ɕàk
great grandfather *n.* mème dzùdzu
great grandmother *n.* yíbi dzùdzu
green *adj.* ɲómbu
green, pale or blue *adj.* ɲómse
greens leafy *n.* yálo tséema
greens wild *n.* tégini tséema
greetings *excl.* ʦáci dèle
grit, rice *n.* dzàgi
ground *n.* sá
group *n.* bàkhal
group *n.* dzàti
group, female *n.* mème
group, male *n.* phébe
guava *n.* àmbak
guest *n.* ɕòmbo
Gurung *adj.* gòronɲ
hail *n.* séra
hair *n.* ʦá
hair, body *n.* pú
hair, facial *n.* máɲra
hairstyle *n.* lhéema
half *adj.* phé
hand *n.* làkpa
hand, honorific *n.h.* tɕhák
hang *v.t.* pyáɲ
happy *adj.* kèedaɲ làɲ
hard *adj.* séndi
hardship *n.* tùkpu
hat *n.* ɕàmu
hat, honorific *n.h.* kúɕa
he *pr.* khó
head *n.* gò
headstrap *n.* námli
headstrap, bamboo *n.* ràkpa
health *n.* kháldzo
hear *v.i.* thé
heart *n.* níɲ

heavy *adj.* tɕéndi
hectic *adj.* sinda
help *n.* màdat
hen, young *n.* tɕàmu yóma
here *dem.* dàla *alt.* dèla
hey *part.* ée
hide *v.t.* yíp
hill *n.* kàɲ
Hindu *adj.* tɕhípa
hip *n.* képha
hit *n.* tùɲda
hit *v.t.* tùɲ
hoe *n.* toózi
hoe *n.* tsòra
hold in arms *v.t.* pháɲ
hold *v.t.* pàa
hole *n.* tòlbo
hoof *n.* khúr
horse *n.* tàbu
horseradish *n.* húɲgar
hot *adj.* tshápa
house *n.* khím
how many *q.* kàze
how *q.* kànda
how *q.* kànmu
how *q.* kànpèdi
hug *n.* pràɲdza
hundred *num.* màna kàɲ
hunger *v.i.* tóo
hungry *v.i.* tóo
hunt *v.t.* ɕíkartsá
hurt *adj.* néendi
husband *n.* khyóbo *alt.* khyóga
husk, rice *n.* póla
I *pr.* ɲà
idea *n.* núɲtɕa
if *conj.* dèze
if *conj.* làpna

imprison <i>v.t.</i> tɕúp	king <i>n.</i> kyàlbu
incense <i>n.</i> dùp	kitchen <i>n.</i> kòga
incense <i>n.</i> pé	knee <i>n.</i> tshíngor
incense <i>n.</i> sán	knife <i>n.</i> kárta
incense <i>n.</i> ɕùkpa	know <i>v.t.</i> hákò
incense pot <i>n.</i> sánbur	know <i>v.t.</i> ɕée
including <i>postp.</i> kòtaraŋ	knowledge <i>n.</i> kyii
insane person <i>n.</i> nónba	ladder <i>n.</i> téba
insect <i>n.</i> bù	lake <i>n.</i> kòlmo
insect <i>n.</i> dèdè	Lama <i>n.</i> láma
insect <i>n.</i> làgor bù	lama, head <i>n.</i> khémbu
insect <i>n.</i> tshákpalin	lama, reincarnate <i>n.</i> rimbur tché
inside <i>postp.</i> nàŋla	lame <i>adj.</i> dzèwa
intelligence <i>n.</i> rìkpa	language <i>n.</i> tám
intestines <i>n.</i> kyùma	lap <i>adj.</i> phánba
invocation <i>voc.</i> óo	lapsi <i>n.</i> kálaŋ sè
iron <i>adj.</i> tɕáa	latch <i>n.</i> tsúkul
island <i>n.</i> tɕhó	later <i>postp.</i> tàlda
jackal <i>n.</i> lùndi	laugh <i>v.i.</i> kéemu kyàp
jar <i>n.</i> pón	lazy <i>adj.</i> tshérsi
jealous <i>adj.</i> thádok	leaf <i>n.</i> làpti
join <i>v.t.</i> thí	leaf <i>n.</i> lòma
joke <i>v.i.</i> ɕá kyàp	leafy, greens <i>n.</i> kòlo tséema
joyfully <i>adj.</i> tùp kàla	leafy, greens <i>n.</i> tánlimu tséema
jug <i>n.</i> áru	leafy, greens <i>n.</i> tséema
jug <i>n.</i> kàlda	learn <i>v.t.</i> lóp
jug <i>n.</i> phúmba	leave <i>v.i.</i> pòr
jug, ceremonial <i>n.</i> pùmba	leave <i>v.t.</i> kyú
jump <i>v.i.</i> phír	leave <i>v.t.</i> zàa
Kathmandu <i>n.</i> yèmbu	leech <i>n.</i> pé pé
kettle <i>n.</i> thíbri	left <i>adj.</i> yóma
key <i>n.</i> sádzò	leg <i>n.</i> kánba
khata <i>n.</i> kàda	legal dispute <i>n.</i> mùda
kick <i>v.t.</i> tòkpagi kyàp	lemon <i>n.</i> kágati
kidney <i>n.</i> khálma	lentils <i>n.</i> máse
kill <i>v.t.</i> sé	letter <i>n.</i> yìgi
kill <i>v.t.</i> séter	lick <i>v.t.</i> dàa

lie *v.i.* ɸókyap
light *adj.* yáŋdi
light *v.t.* páp
like *postp.* ràra
like *postp.* ɸile
like *v.t.* kà
like *v.t.* sém kyé
lip *n.* tɸhódo
listen *v.t.* jèn
liver *n.* tɸímba
lizard *n.* tɸhépare
load *n.* khúrpu
lock *n.* kòldza
long *adj.* rìŋbu
look *v.i.* tá
loom *n.* ràɸa
louse *n.* ɸí
louse, small *n.* ɸí khú
love *n.* màya
low *adj.* mámu
lucky *adj.* kípup
lungs *n.* lúwa
magazine *n.* pótrika
make *v.t.* zò
mallet *n.* ɸháwa *alt.* ɸhwá
man *n.* khyópiza
manner *adv.* dāŋa
manure *n.* tɸàwa
many *adj.* dàze
many, much *adj.* mànɸbu
marigold *n.* dāsain mēndo
market *n.* kyàsa
married *adj.* pàka
mat *n.* gùndri
mat, round *n.* tɸákɸi
match *v.i.* dji
matching *adj.* djiibu
mattress *n.* tèn

meat *n.* ɸá
medicine *n.* mén
meet *v.t.* thú
midday *n.* jìma phé
midnight *n.* kùŋmu nùp phé
milk *n.* òma
millet *n.* kyàgar
millstone *n.* làgor
millstone *n.* tɸhúda
mind, heart *n.* sém
mint *n.* bàbari mēndo
minute *n.* kárma
mirror *n.* méloŋ
mix *v.t.* sée
molasses *n.* prāŋ
mole *n.* tsík tsíba
moment *n.* yàmbi
moment *n.* yèmba
momo *n.* mòmo
Monday *n.* sà dāwa
money *n.* dèba
money *n.* ɸāŋa
monk, Buddhist *n.* ɸàba
monkey *n.* préken
monkey *n.* príw
monsoon *n.* érka *alt.* értāŋ
month *n.* dāwa
moon *n.* dàgarmu
morning *n.* ɸòole
mortar and pestle *n.* ókel
mosquito *n.* pónɸi
mother *n.* áma
mother-in-law *n.* kyùmu
mother, honorific *n.h.* yùm
mother's elder brother *n.* áɸāŋ
 tɸómbo
mother's elder sister *n.* tɸétɸe
 tɸómbo

mother's younger brother *n.* áçaŋ
mother's younger sister *n.* tçétçe
motorbike *n.* pàkpa
mountain *n.* là
mountain peak *n.* kháwa kàŋ
mouse *n.* tsúŋbe
mouth *n.* khá
mulberry *n.* ràpalaŋ
mushroom *n.* çámu
mustard greens *n.* pásagi tséma
mustard *n.* pùŋga
nail *n.* káti
nail, finger *n.* sému
naked *adj.* náŋgo
name *n.* mìn
navel *n.* tíya
near *loc.* sùrla
near *postp.* pòla
neck *n.* dzìŋba
necklace *n.* tçhálda
necklace *n.* tçùru
necklace, marriage *n.* pìru yú
necklace, men's *n.* sì
need *v.t.* kò
needle *n.* kháp
neighbour *n.* khímdze
Nepali *adj.* khása
nettles *n.* swà
never *adv.* nàmaŋ
new *adj.* sámba
newspaper *n.* çígu
next *adj.* tíŋgi
night *n.* kùŋmu
nine *num.* kù
nineteen *num.* tçúrku
ninety *num.* khál çitçú
ninety *num.* kùptçu

ninth *num.* kùba
noise *n.* kée
noodles *n.* rára
no one *n.* sú áŋ
north *n.* pùm
nose *n.* náasum
now *adv.* tàpse
now *adv.* tàze
now *temp.* tàa
nowadays *adv.* dàŋ tètìŋ
oats *n.* née
offering *n.* tshóp
offspring *n.* sàndan
oh *excl.* apé
oil *n.* núm
okra *n.* lénɔa
old *adj.* kàmu
old *adj.* níŋba
old, animate *adj.* kamu, kàpu
one each *adj.* rèree
one *num.* tçíi
onion *n.* tçòŋ
open *adj.* kà
open *v.i.* tàŋ
open *v.t.* kà pè
or *conj.* kí
orange *n.* súntala
other *adj.* ràŋsa
outside *postp.* phíla
owl *n.* úpa
ox *n.* lán
packet *n.* kàldzuŋ
paint *v.t.* ṭùl
pale, light *adj.* kyé thál
palm *n.* làkpa tìŋ
panda, red *n.* hòbrakpa
pants *n.* dzàge

pants *n.* pórdum
papaya *n.* mèwa
parcel *n.* dàpa
parcel *n.* pyàk
pàrkila *postp.* between
part, hair *n.* tshólam
particle, convincing *part.* lée
particle, emphatic *part.* tà
particle, emphatic *part.* yàŋ
particle, exclamatory *part.* yée
particle, polite *part.* ní
particle, supposition *part.* ná
partridge *n.* kálanḡu
pass *v.d.* jé
patch *v.t.* tǎlti
pay *v.t.* tǎál
peach *n.* khámbu
pen *n.* kálam
penis *n.* dzè
person *n.* mì
pheasant *n.* tǎ
pick up *v.t.* lánḡ
pick *v.t.* tǎú
pickaxe *n.* yùrkandi
pickle *n.* tsóp
pig *n.* phá
pilgrimage *n.* née kór
pillow *n.* nébul
pin *n.* khíp
pipe, blowing *n.* mèçonḡ
pitcher *n.* sàŋbuḡ
place *n.* gyàa
plane *n.* bòçela
plaster *v.t.* thél
plate *n.* tèrma
play *v.t.* tsá
plough *n.* thonḡ
pocket *n.* kháldj
poor *adj.* práŋbu
poor thing *n.* níŋtça
porcupine *n.* kóhar
porcupine *n.* pìtiri
porridge *n.* thúkpa
pot, alcohol conical *n.* pòni
pot, alcohol large *n.* kúnḡe
pot, alcohol middle *n.* háḡa
pot, alcohol middle *n.* tsáma
pot, cooking *n.* néki
pot, tsámba *n.* pàkpur
pot, water *n.* sàŋgi kúrwa
potato *n.* hée
pour *v.t.* púnḡ
prayer after death *n.* sìpyu sàrkyyu
prayer flags *n.* lúnḡdar
prayer *n.* màni
puddle, dirty *n.* ál
pull *v.t.* tǐ
pull out *v.t.* tén
pumpkin *n.* phársi
push *v.t.* phúl
put down *v.t.* tòo
put into *v.d.* lú
put into *v.d.* súr
put *v.d.* dzàa
put, imperative *n.imp.* dzò
quarrel *n.* thúkpa
quiet, slowly *adj.* kòlela
rabbit *n.* khárayo
rack *n.* mèelaḡ
rack *n.* réldi
radish *n.* làbu
ragged *adj.* thánḡnaḡ
rain *n.* nám kyàp
raise *v.t.* só
raisin *n.* dàkla
raspberry *n.* jàlaḡ

read *v.t.* ʈò
receive *v.t.* sèè
recognise *v.t.* ɲò
recover *v.i.* ʈàa
red *adj.* màrmu *alt.* màrpu
red, pale *adj.* màrse
relative clause marker *rel.* límu
religious festival *n.* tému
remember *v.i.* tèmba sàl
reported speech particle *part.* ló
rest place *n.* néesa
rest *v.i.* thán sál
return *v.i.* lò
rhinoceros *n.* gèda
rhododendron *n.* tángu
ribs *n.* tsíma
rice, beaten *n.* phálgi
rice, cooked *n.* tó
rice, uncooked *n.* brèè
rice, unhusked *n.* swá
rich *adj.* tchúkpu
right *adj.* yóba
ring *n.* sértop
ripe *adj.* tshé tshébe
ripe, be *v.i.* tshé
river *n.* lùŋ
road *n.* làm
roast *v.t.* ɲó
roof *n.* páli
room *n.* khópi
rooster *n.* tchàbu
root *n.* tsárŋi
rope *n.* thákpa
rot *v.i.* rùl
rotten *adj.* rùlrulba
round *adj.* kòrmo
round *adj.* rhélmu

rub *v.t.* kú
rub *v.t.* múr
ruler *n.* ʈhú
run *v.i.* tçónŋ
rupee *n.* çíka
sacrifice *v.t.* már kyàp
sad *v.i.* tshér
saffron *n.* yùŋga
saliva *n.* khádzu
saliva *n.* tchémaŋ
salt *n.* tshá
salty *adj.* tshápre
sandals *n.* lékam
sandals *n.* tçápal
Saturday *n.* sà pémba
sauce *n.* khwá
scar *n.* ʈáŋe
scarf *n.* krému
scatter *v.t.* táp
school *n.* ʈòsa
search *v.t.* tshól
second *n.* thála
second *num.* jíba
see *v.t.* thónŋ
seed *n.* bùdi
seed *n.* sén
seen *v.t.* thónŋ
self *n.* ràŋ
sell *n.* tsòŋgola
sell *v.t.* tsòŋ
semolina *n.* píрма
send *v.t.* táŋ
sesame *n.* tíl
seven *num.* tìn
seventeen *num.* tçúptin
seventh *num.* tìnba
seventy *num.* khálsuŋ tçú

seventy *num.* tìndzu
sew, cloth *v.t.* tsém
sew, grain *v.t.* dzù
shadow *n.* tìpsa
shake *v.t.* yúnj
shallow *adj.* théemu
shaman *n.* pòmbo
sharp *adj.* nómbó
shawl *n.* káito
she *pr.* mò
sheep *n.* lù
shine *v.i.* çár
shirt *n.* tóko
shirt, traditional *n.* òndzu
shirt, traditional *n.* tándzu
shirt, traditional *n.* tètçe
shoes *n.* kòpça
shop *n.* dógan
short *adj.* théemi
shout *v.i.* kée tén
show *n.* ténmu
show *v.t.* tén
shy *adj.* ñòtçha
sibling *n.* pín
sick *adj.* nàdi
sick *v.i.* nà
sickle holster *n.* kòtolo
sickle *n.* sòra
sick person *n.* nèpa
side *n.* páti
side, that *postp.* phár
side, this *postp.* tshúr
silver *n.* ñùl
sing *v.i.* nèn *alt.* lèn
singlet *n.* gàndzi
sister, elder *n.* ádzi
sister, younger *n.* nòmo
sister's, husband *n.* màkpa

sit *v.i.* tè
sit *v.i.h.* çù
six *num.* tù
sixteen *num.* tçútu
sixth *num.* tükpa
sixty *num.* khálsüm
sixty *num.* tükteu
skin *n.* kóoba
skin *n.* pába
skirt *n.* çàama
sky *n.* nám tíj
sleep *v.i.* pàl
sleep *v.i.* jí tsé
sleep, honorific *v.i.h.* sìm
slow *adj.* kùlba
small *adj.* tçéemu *alt.* tçéemi
smell *v.t.* tìma nám
smoke *n.* tìpa
snack *n.* dzàra
snail *n.* lépa bù
snake *n.* prùl
snatch *v.t.* phró
sneeze *n.* prípu tàp
snot *n.* nápçal
snow *n.* kháwa
soap *n.* phóoçop
sock *n.* mòdza
soggy *adj.* léndi
some *adj.* tìbirere
someone *n.* lála
something *n.* tçi ínañ
somewhat *adv.* tóba
son *n.* pù
song *n.* lú
soon *adv.* gyùbarañ
sore *n.* sù
sour *adj.* kyúrpu
south *n.* lhó

soybeans *n.* réndza
spherical *adj.* d̀àlo
spicy *adj.* kárpa
spider *n.* sáwa bù
spike *n.* dùṅ
spinach *n.* páluṅ tséma
spine *n.* lùṅso
spirit house *n.* kùl
spirit, snake *n.* lú
split *v.t.* kèè
split *v.t.* ́áa
spoil *v.t.* nòṅ
spoon *n.* khím̄bu
spoon, wooden *n.* kyèwa
spread *v.i.* tíṅ
spring *n.* káṅdo
spring *n.* mùl
squeeze *v.t.* ném
squeeze *v.t.* tsír
stair *n.* ́éeba
stale *adj.* lháma
stand *v.i.* làn
star *n.* kárma
statue, rice *n.* tórma
steep *adj.* káma
stick *n.* prèka
stolen *v.i.* tór
stone *n.* tò
stool *n.* píрка
stop *v.i.* káa
storage pot *n.* sàṅgi bàgari
stork *n.* r̀òṅg̀òl̀oṅ
story *n.* támbè
straight *adj.* théka
straight *adj.* t̀eháre
straw *n.* páral
strawberry *n.* khárbesare

stretch limbs *v.i.* ́é kyàṅ
stretch *v.t.* thén
stroll *v.i.* ỳù
study *v.i.* ́àa
stupa *n.* t̀eh̀órten
stupid *adj.* tsókpu
suck *v.t.* dz̀ìp
suffer hardship *v.i.* j̀òṅ
suffice *v.t.* t̀éáṅ
sugar *n.* t̀éini
sugarcane *n.* k̀ùr̀çin
sun *n.* j̀ìma
Sunday *n.* sà jíma
sunset *n.* j̀ìmaḍ̀ùpt̀oṅ
swallow *v.t.* j̀ìp
sweet *adj.* ṅàrmu
swell *v.i.* ́áṅ
swim *v.i.* t̀éálkyàp
Szechuan pepper *n.* éрмаṅ
tail *n.* ṅámaṅ
take off *v.t.* pí
take *v.t.* lèn
take *v.t.* thóo
take with *v.t.* khér
tall *adj.* thómbo
taste *v.t.* prèetà
tasty *adj.* ́èimbu
tattoo *n.* khóp tíba
tea *n.* t̀èa
tea *n.* t̀èa pàktu
tear *n.* míidzu
tear *v.t.* rál
tell *v.d.* ́é
temple *n.* k̀òmba
ten *num.* t̀éú
ten thousand *num.* pádi t̀éú
tent *n.* ́ázaṅ

tenth *num.* tɕúba
thangka *n.* thánku
thank you *excl.* thútɕe tɕhéé
that *dem.* òodi
that much *adj.* òzeran
that way *adv.* ònda
that way *adv.* òrmu
that, visible *dem.* tòodi
there *dem.* téphula
there *postp.* òo
there, visible *postp.* tòo
they (plural) *pr.* khún
thick *adj.* thúkpu
thief *n.* kúmen
thigh *n.* kánba láça
thin *adj.* sápu
thin *adj.* tɕəpa
thing *n.* sè
think about things *v.t.* námsan tán
think *v.t.* née
third *num.* súmba
thirteen *num.* tɕúpsum
thirty *num.* kháldzi tɕú
thirty *num.* súmdzu
this *dem.* dì
this way *adv.* dènda
this way *adv.* dènmu
thought *n.* námsan
thousand *num.* pádi kàn
three *num.* súm
thresher *n.* kúniŋ
throw *v.t.* kyúr
throw *v.t.* tán
thunder and lightning *n.* nám thá
Thursday *n.* sà púrpu
Tibet *n.* pèe
tick *n.* míli ɕíi
tiger *n.* tɕén

tika *n.* tɕíka
time *n.* tɕhúdze
tired *adj.* thán tɕhé
today *n.* tíriŋ
toe *n.* kánba dzùbu
toggle *n.* tóka
tomorrow *n.* nàŋbar
tongs *n.* kémba
tongs *n.* tsímɕa
tongue *n.* tɕé
tooth *n.* só
touch *v.t.* dèe
trap *n.* phás
tree *n.* tákpa
tree *n.* tònbo
tree, banyan *n.* bàr tònbo
trick *v.t.* kár
tripod *n.* tɕáŋgi
Tuesday *n.* sà miŋmar
tumbler *n.* bònna
turn *n.* kyèp
turn *n.* páalo
turn *v.t.* yìr
turn soil *v.t.* yùr
turquoise *n.* yú
twelfth *num.* tɕéjiba
twelve *num.* tɕéjii *alt.* tɕéjii
twenty *num.* kháldzi
twenty *num.* jídzu
twenty one *num.* kháldzi tɕéi
twenty three *num.* kháldzi súm
twenty two *num.* kháldzi ní
two hundred *num.* màna jí
two *num.* jí
under *postp.* wála
up, above *postp.* yàrla
uphill *adj.* káma
upset *adj.* tìŋal kèdi

urinate <i>v.i.</i> tẹ́iduṅ tán	week <i>n.</i> sáta
urine <i>n.</i> tẹ́iṅ	week <i>n.</i> tinda
us (exclusive) <i>pr.</i> jì	weigh <i>v.t.</i> kár
us (inclusive) <i>pr.</i> òraṅ	well <i>n.</i> ìnar
vagina <i>n.</i> tú	well <i>n.</i> khólmo
vegetable curry <i>n.</i> tséma	west <i>n.</i> tẹ̀aṅ
vegetables dried <i>n.</i> kẹ̀ḍu	wet <i>adj.</i> pàṅpaṅba
vein <i>n.</i> tsà	what <i>q.</i> tẹ́
very <i>adv.</i> bèsari	wheat <i>n.</i> tọ̀
village <i>n.</i> yùl	when <i>q.</i> nàm
visit <i>v.t.</i> ké	where <i>q.</i> kàla
visit <i>v.t.</i> khór	which <i>q.</i> kàndi
vomit <i>v.i.</i> kyú	white <i>adj.</i> kárpú
vulture <i>n.</i> tshárkya	white, off <i>adj.</i> káarse
waist <i>n.</i> kyépa	whitewash <i>n.</i> ságar
wait <i>v.i.</i> kúu	who <i>q.</i> sù
walk around <i>v.t.</i> kóra kyàp	why <i>q.</i> tẹ́ipe
walk <i>v.i.</i> kór	wife <i>n.</i> pèemi
wall <i>n.</i> bita	wind <i>n.</i> lhába
wall <i>n.</i> tsíkpa	winnow <i>v.t.</i> táp
warm <i>adj.</i> tòmbo	winnowing tray <i>n.</i> lóma
warm <i>v.t.</i> tée tán	wipe <i>v.t.</i> phyá
wash <i>v.t.</i> tshú	with <i>postp.</i> jímu
watch <i>n.</i> tẹ́húdze	wolf <i>n.</i> phára
water <i>n.</i> tẹ́hú	woman <i>n.</i> pèmpiza
water urn <i>n.</i> tẹ́hú sàṅ	wood <i>n.</i> ẹ́iṅ
waterfall <i>n.</i> tẹ́hú tẹ́ara	work <i>n.</i> lè
way, that <i>postp.</i> phárpe	worm <i>n.</i> dàalu
way, this <i>adv.</i> tshúrpe	worn <i>adj.</i> ràràlba
way, this and that <i>adv.</i> phár tshúr	worship <i>n.</i> pùzapaṭ
wear <i>v.t.</i> kèn	wound <i>n.</i> ẹ̀owa
wear <i>v.t.</i> kòn	write <i>v.i.</i> prù
wear, jewellery <i>v.t.</i> táa	wrong <i>adj.</i> átsale
weave <i>v.t.</i> tháa	yak <i>n.</i> yák
wedding <i>n.</i> bìha	yam <i>n.</i> rìhéé
wedding <i>n.</i> pàama	yam <i>n.</i> tẹ́hú héé
Wednesday <i>n.</i> sà lhákpa	year <i>n.</i> lò

year, two ahead *n.* sébi
year, two before *n.* sínin
year, last *n.* nàni
year, next *n.* sánbi
yeast, brewing *n.* pháp
yellow *adj.* sérpu
yesterday *n.* dàŋ
Yolmo *n.* yòlmo
you (plural) *pr.* khyá
you (singular) *pr.* khé
young *adj.* cara
young animal *adj.* pìru
younger *adj.* kántei
zucchini *n.* khéndi kòril

Appendix 7: Optical illusion images

This appendix contains copies of the six optical illusions that I used for the Optical Illusions task described in §3.2.8 of the thesis. The way people talk about these optical illusions is discussed in examples throughout the thesis. They are presented here in the order in which they were given to participants in the task.

Image One: Bird and a leaf, by Oleg Shuplyak



Image Two: Swan painted onto a human hand by Guido Daniele



Image Three: Self portrait and Landscape by Oleg Shuplyak



Image Four: Crocodile painted onto a human hand by Guido Daniele



Image Five: Image of a duck/rabbit, artist unknown

