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“Japan is Back”
Japan’s (Re)Engagement in Africa:
The Case of South Sudan

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis examines Japan’s engagement in Africa in the period 2008-2013 through analysis of relations with South Sudan. The study focuses on three dimensions of Japan’s presence in South Sudan – Official Development Assistance, resource-focused investment and peacekeeping – as a lens through which to understand Japan’s broader strategic objectives and tactical approaches towards engagement in Africa. The study examines the development and implementation of Japan’s Africa policy through the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, which incorporates both structural factors and intervening domestic considerations in explaining foreign policy outcomes. The thesis demonstrates that Japan’s policies towards Africa have undergone a significant realignment in the years since 2008. In applying a neoclassical realist framework this study outlines the international structural drivers of Japan’s engagement in Africa while also incorporating domestic considerations such as norms, and policymaker’s perceptions in developing a theoretically-informed empirical analysis of Japan’s presence in South Sudan. The study examines how efforts to re-invigorate the Japanese economy, secure resources, ensure energy security and respond to the rise of China are all reflected in Japan’s relations with Africa – and specifically in Japan’s activities in South Sudan. In this respect the research demonstrates that South Sudan is a particularly relevant location from which to better understand the evolution of Japan’s Africa policies, as well as the significance of those policies in the broader context of Japanese foreign policy. The nature and extent of Japanese engagement in South Sudan can thus also be seen as a significant precedent for Japan’s future interaction in Africa and this thesis contributes to the literature on Japanese foreign policy with specific reference to Japan’s strategy towards Africa.
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I am also grateful to JICA (UK) for awarding me the Postgraduate Study Tour which funded field research in South Sudan, and Professor Masaru Kohno who supported my application to Waseda University in Tokyo as a visiting researcher.

On a more personal note I would like to thank my mother, Jennifer for offering support and a reassuring ear throughout this process, as well my fiancée and best friend Sara, who gave up her job and moved to London to be with me – her encouragement and advice was valuable and deeply appreciated.
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>African Union High Level Implementation Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bbl/d</td>
<td>Barrels per day</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGPCS</td>
<td>Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPOC</td>
<td>Dar Petroleum Operating Company</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EIA</td>
<td>Energy Information Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNPOC</td>
<td>Greater Nile Petroleum Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPOC</td>
<td>Greater Pioneer Operating Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEEJ</td>
<td>Institute of Energy Economics, Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Oil Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCL</td>
<td>International Peace Cooperation Law</td>
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<td>JBIC</td>
<td>Japan Bank for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCG</td>
<td>Japan Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDT</td>
<td>Joint Donor Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<td>JETRO</td>
<td>Japan External Trade Organisation</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICS</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOGMEC</td>
<td>Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEI</td>
<td>Katahira &amp; Engineers International</td>
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<td>LAPSSET</td>
<td>Lamu Port and Lamu Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSFO</td>
<td>Low Sulphur fuel oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>METI</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (Japan)</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>NILEPET</td>
<td>Nile Petroleum Corporation</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (Japan)</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Oil Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCDI</td>
<td>Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUMOZ  United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
OPEC  Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OVL  Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Ltd.
PKO  Peacekeeping Operations
SAF  Sudan Armed Forces
SDF  Self Defence Forces
SLOCs  Sea Lanes of Communication
SPLA  Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SPLM-N  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North
SPOC  Sudd Petroleum Operating Company
SSDA  South Sudan Democratic Army
SSDP  South Sudan Development Plan
SSLA  South Sudan Liberation Army
SUDAPET  Sudan National Petroleum Corporation
TICAD  Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UNAMID  United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMIS  United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS  United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
US  United States (of America)
WFP  World Food Programme
WNPOC  White Nile Petroleum Operating Company
Figure 1: Map of Africa

Figure 2: Map of South Sudan[^1]

Figure 3: Map of the Horn of Africa

[Map image]

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1. Introduction

Starting towards the end of 2007 Africa began to take on far greater strategic importance in the eyes of Japan’s policymakers and business leaders, leading to a significant re-alignment of policy priorities and extensive re-engagement with the continent. While this change was not sudden, in the years since 2008 there has been a marked shift in Japanese perceptions of Africa from a place of aid, to a place of investment, a potential consumer market and a strategic location from which to reaffirm Japan’s aspirations as a great power. In this respect Japan’s re-engagement in Africa reflects as much a change of attitude as policy, and should be understood as an element within a much broader discourse in Japan about the country’s position in the world. As such, Japan’s engagement in South Sudan reflects the “revitalised Japan” discourse that is championed by the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe through his assurance that “Japan is back” – and is finding expression through a more proactive foreign policy and an increased international profile. The title of this thesis therefore refers both to Japan’s re-engagement in Africa and the narrative of Japanese renewal promoted by the Abe administration that is increasingly shaping Japan’s foreign policy approaches. Against this backdrop this study seeks to identify and contextualise the changes that have characterised Japan’s re-focused and re-energised involvement with Africa through analysis of Japanese engagement in South Sudan.

Japanese engagement in Africa is multifaceted and the factors underpinning this engagement are multidimensional – and in many instances overlapping. Yet as this study will explore, the particular dimensions of Japan’s activities in South Sudan can be identified as policy responses to the shifting realities of the global system. Moreover, South Sudan is a particularly relevant location in which to

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examine the evolution of Japan’s African engagement. It is the only country in Africa in which Japan has deployed peacekeepers, is pursuing a controversial oil pipeline, as well as developing key infrastructure and providing development aid. These multiple layers of interaction reflect Japan’s growing engagement on the continent but also the extent to which South Sudan is emerging as a location from which to expand Japanese influence on the continent. The nature and extent of Japanese engagement in South Sudan can thus also be seen as a significant precedent for Japan’s future interaction in Africa and beyond.

Furthermore, South Sudan’s external political relations are well suited to Japan’s foreign policy strategy in that the country’s international relations are built around strong ties with the United States (US) and historically complicated relations with China. In this respect, Japan’s engagement in South Sudan broadly supports its existing foreign policy aims, while strengthening its profile and presence in the East African region. Indeed as this study will demonstrate, Japan’s growing activities in South Sudan can be seen to inhabit a frontier on a “strategic arc” of East African engagement stretching from Djibouti to Mozambique— an arc of interest that encompasses infrastructure developments, energy investments and the establishment of a naval base.

South Sudan is a frontier state, drawn towards East Africa yet still tied inextricably to Sudan and the Muslim-majority, Arab North Africa. As a pre-independence Sudanese expression held, “Sudan is the heart of Africa and the backdoor to the Middle East”—and since realising independence in 2011 the country continues to balance between its past and its aspirations of a future aligned towards East Africa. Moreover the country represents a frontier of opportunity: rich with resources it is an emerging location for competing interests as it searches for allies, donors, and investors. Thus

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5 Japan has established a naval base in Djibouti that will be explored in chapter 6 and Japanese company Mitsui has a significant equity investment in Mozambique’s developing gas fields. See Page 11 for a map of Africa.
South Sudan whilst fragile and conflict-affected is a surprising location in which to find a multidimensional Japanese presence. It is for these reasons that South Sudan is understood in this study to inhabit the “frontier” of Japan’s Africa strategy – a high-risk location on the edge of a region of emerging importance to Japanese policymakers.

Yet primarily this research seeks to understand how Japan’s interactions in South Sudan, and more broadly in Africa, demonstrate a renewed interest and a new approach towards engagement with Africa. As the chief researcher at the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO)\(^6\) points out, “re-engagement with Africa is the correct assessment”\(^7\), because starting around 2008 a number of structural pressures and domestic factors coalesced to underpin Japan’s re-focused engagement with the continent. In this respect this thesis comprises a history of the present with themes that echo with theory. The development and implementation of Japan’s Africa policy will be interpreted through the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, which incorporates both external drivers and domestic considerations in explaining foreign policy outcomes. Thus as the following chapters will explore, domestic debates around how best to respond to a changing global environment by re-invigorating the Japanese economy, securing resources, ensuring energy security and responding to the rise of China are all reflected in Japan’s relations with Africa – and specifically in Japan’s activities in South Sudan.

\(^6\) JETRO is a government-related organisation that works to promote mutual trade and investment between Japan and the rest of the world, JETRO has 76 offices in 56 countries.

\(^7\) Author’s interview with chief Senior researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 27 September 2013
1.2 Research Objectives

A number of Japanese academics and ministry officials interviewed for this study observed that Africa is very far from Japan geographically, and perhaps even further from the everyday consciousness of the Japanese public. Japan’s activities in Africa are thus to a large extent being conducted beyond the awareness of most people in Japan – despite the fact that Japan has a growing interest in Africa, and as this study will explore, a notable presence in South Sudan. In this respect this study aims to explore and understand this presence in the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy strategies.

In the decades since Japan’s first resource-led engagement in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s the world has changed fundamentally – and Japan’s current economic and political imperatives reflect these changes. In this context the analytical objective guiding this research is to identify the factors – at both the systemic and domestic levels, that can explain Japan’s presence in South Sudan and relate these to the shifts in Japan’s Africa policies over the period of investigation. Therefore the central questions this study sets out to answer are:

1. What explains Japan’s extensive engagement in South Sudan?
2. Does this engagement reflect the ambitions and approaches of Japan’s broader Africa strategy?
3. To what extent can Japan’s presence in Africa be understood to reflect a policy response to structural forces at the global level perceived through the lens of domestic considerations and priorities?

While the parameters of this research project are focused primarily on the particular aspects of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, the study also seeks to place this engagement in the broader
context of the structural factors driving the development of Japan’s Africa policies, the domestic dimensions of Japanese policymaking, and the regional context of Japan’s activities in East Africa. In this context neoclassical realism will operate as a vehicle of analysis and provide a theoretical framework through which to interpret the various elements driving and influencing Japanese foreign policy in Africa. The research objective therefore is to provide a theoretically-informed empirical analysis of Japan’s policy towards Africa in the years 2008 to 2013, as explained through engagement with South Sudan.

The timeframe of this study are the years 2008 to the end of 2013 – with some earlier references providing context. As the following chapters will explore, the fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Yokohama in 2008 signalled a marked change in Japan’s policy approach towards Africa and is thus a useful point from which to examine the evolution of Japan’s activities in Africa. However with respect to the primary case study of South Sudan, the analysis will focus on the first years of the country’s independence from July 2011 to December 2013, again with references to the period before South Sudan’s independence where relevant. The period of research ends as the current conflict in South Sudan erupted at the end of 2013, thus events that happened after the research period are not included in the analysis. Of particular importance in this regard is the significant, and as yet sustained, drop in oil prices that began in 2014, as well as new developments associated with the on-going war in South Sudan.

Thus while the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan complicates this study (as described in more detail in section 1.4 Research Method) it does not ultimately affect the objectives of this research project, nor its findings. South Sudan remains a compelling case study to plot the emergence of a bolder, multidimensional Japanese approach to engagement in Africa in part because the country is
unstable, and also because it is a new player on the frontier of the East African region which along with South Africa remains the focal point of Japan’s presence in Africa.

### 1.2.1 Why This Research Matters

This study is a response to an under-researched dimension of Japanese foreign interaction, as well as a contribution to the very limited existing literature on South Sudan as an independent country. Yet while this study focuses on the particular example of Japanese interaction in South Sudan, the research is also significant in that it explores themes around Japan’s policy responses to shifting global conditions. As such, an important element within this research is the notion of change and how states adapt to change. And while this thesis does not engage with the extensive literature on change in international relations (IR) (for example see works by Buzan and Jones,\(^8\) Gilpin,\(^9\) Holsti, Siverson and George,\(^10\) or Katzenstein\(^11\)), the following chapters will outline how Japan’s current engagement in Africa is in many ways a journey beyond its foreign policy comfort zone. As such, this research is also about relevance and how states respond to relative decline. Faced with an aging population, a stagnant economy and the new reality of a global order in which its place is not assured, Japanese policymakers are expanding the boundaries and approaches to their international engagement – of which an increased presence in Africa is an important component.

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\(^8\) Buzan, Barry and Jones, Barry, *Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension*, London: Frances Pinter, 1981
\(^11\) Katzenstein, Peter, “Analysing Change in International Politics: The New Institutionalism and the Interpretive Approach”, Max-Planck-Institut Discussion Paper 90/10 November 1990
The ramping-up of Japanese engagement on the continent discussed in this study coincided with South Sudan’s independence and there is no existing scholarship related to this particular dimension of Japan’s presence in Africa. Moreover, there is limited literature on South Sudan as independent state, and the publications that do exist tend to be focused on the complexities of the country’s separation from Sudan and on the multitude of internal challenges that the new nation faces (for example see works by Copnall, LeRiche and Arnold, Malwal and Thomas).

The lack of existing research on South Sudan’s external engagement with key investors and donors is understandable given the country’s short and unstable history, but it also provides an opportunity for this study to add genuine value to an unfolding policy environment – and place Japan’s interaction in the country in the context of the growing relevance of Africa in international affairs. As Harman and Brown point out, “Africa is increasingly present in IR in a significant way. It is the geographical space where much that is systemically important in international relations has played out.” Put another way, what happens in Africa matters. As the World Bank outlines, the continent experienced 4.7 per cent growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2013, well above the global GDP growth rate of 2.4 per cent. Sub-Saharan African countries are also among the fastest-growing countries in the world, and the GDP growth is widespread: more than a third posted annual growth rates of at least six per cent in 2012.

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12 Copnall, James, *A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts, Sudan and South Sudan’s bitter and incomplete divorce*, London: Hurst & Company, 2014
14 Malwal, Bona, *Sudan and South Sudan, from one to two*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015
18 World Bank, *Annual Report 2012*
Indeed a brief overview of recent publications on Africa captures this optimism, with titles including: *Africa – the Ultimate Frontier Market: A guide to the business and investment opportunities in emerging Africa*,19 *Africa Rising: How 900 million African consumers offer more than you think*,20 *Africa’s Turn?*,21 and *Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way*.22 And as the World Bank further reports, “Foreign direct investment (FDI) to Sub-Saharan Africa expanded more than 30-fold in the last 20 years, 7.5 times faster than in high-income countries and nearly ten times faster than global GDP.”23 Thus as international investors increasingly turn to Africa, this study offers context in understanding the extensive range of dynamics underpinning relations between advanced economic powers such as Japan and complex developing countries such as South Sudan. Detailing a particular relationship in amongst a plethora of bilateral agreements, aid commitments and private sector investments offers insights into the multiple layers at which external engagement between countries occurs. Moreover as this study demonstrates, the complex interplay between international systemic drivers and domestic considerations provide texture and nuance to a relationship that an overarching statistical analysis of Africa’s external engagement does not.

Yet quite apart from the growing significance of Africa’s economic relations, Japan is the world’s third largest economy, a significant contributor to international institutions, and a mature democracy, how it engages with Africa also matters. The relationship is significant both in terms of Japan’s presence in Africa, and in terms of how the interaction unfolds. This study therefore seeks to examine how Japan is responding to the growing international interest in Africa in the broader context of its foreign policy priorities and complex domestic debates around how the country should

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operate on the international stage. Thus in exploring a little-known dimension of Japan’s foreign relations this research will offer a wider perspective on how the challenges of global power dynamics or domestic constitutional debates can be identified in a particular dimension of a state’s external engagement.

1.2.2 Contributions of the Study

This study seeks to contribute to the literature on Japanese foreign policy with specific reference to Japan’s strategy towards Africa. In this context analysing Japan’s engagement in South Sudan will provide a valuable addition to the scholarship on Japan’s Africa policies since 2008 and contribute more broadly to an understanding of the evolution of Japan’s approach to foreign policy. In addition, this study seeks to contribute to the literature on South Sudan’s external donor and investor relations. While the complex dynamics underlying South Sudan’s independence and the conflict in Sudan have been researched extensively, there is almost no literature addressing the new reality of South Sudan as a sovereign nation and its international engagement.

There are also distinct gaps in the existing literature on Japan’s relations with Africa. Particularly in terms of the current dynamics of Japanese engagement on the continent such as energy investments, the emerging security dimension of Japan’s presence on the continent as well as an assessment of Japan’s contemporary engagement in East Africa and its activities in South Sudan. The relatively limited literature on Japan-Africa relations points to the low profile of Japan’s presence in Africa and the resultant limited interest it has gained from researchers. Yet as this study will demonstrate, given the global significance of Japan as an economic power and its stated aim to increase its presence and profile in Africa, this study is timely. Moreover, as this research will
demonstrate, Japanese policy towards Africa has undergone a distinct shift in recent years and this thesis seeks to recognise and understand these changes while also contributing to the literature on Japan-Africa relations by exploring under-researched contemporary dimensions of the relationship and interpreting those dynamics in the broader context of Japanese foreign policy responses to international pressures.

Japan’s foreign policy in the post war era is often described in terms of Calder’s reactive state thesis which maintains that “the impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, and reaction prevails over strategy.” Indeed Inoguchi and Jain described Japan’s approach to foreign policy as “karaoke diplomacy” while Pharr maintained the country followed a “low-cost, low risk” defensive foreign policy. Miyashita and Sato’s examination of ten case studies however found that some cases support the reactive thesis of Japanese foreign policy and others do not. This study will therefore seek to demonstrate that the evidence of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan and more broadly in Africa reflects the emergence of a more strategic and confident foreign policy. In this respect this research project reflects the neoclassical realist view that “states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment.” Indeed Samuels and Pyle point to the emergence of a conspicuously more robust foreign policy – one that reflects Rose’s assertion that regardless of the many ways states may define their interests

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25 Inoguchi, Takashi, and Jain, Purnendra (eds), Japanese Foreign Policy Today, New York: Palgrave, 2000
26 Pharr, Susan, “Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing”, in Curtis, Gerald (ed.), Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change, Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1993
27 Miyashita, Akitoshi, Sato, Yoichiro (eds.), Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific, New York: Palgrave, 2001
“they are more likely to want more rather than less influence, and pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do so.”

This research project will thus integrate the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism into the study of a contemporary aspect of Japan’s foreign policy – thereby relying on neoclassical realism as a vehicle of analysis for Japan’s engagement in Africa. In developing the neoclassical realist argument this study will further contribute to the existing interpretations of Japanese foreign policy by exploring the influence of structural and domestic factors in policy development. For example, Pyle’s historical analysis of Japan’s policies since the Meiji period maintains that:

Few countries in modern history have been as subject – and as sensitive, responsive, and adaptive – as Japan to the forces of the international environment. The international system has held a powerful effect on Japan’s foreign policy, and it has exercised an extraordinary role in shaping Japan’s domestic institutions.

Pyle thus argues that Japan is again in the midst of an adaptation to changing international conditions and this explains Japan’s more proactive international presence. Katzenstein by comparison believes that “Japan’s security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power.” Thus in applying a neoclassical realist framework this study will outline the international structural drivers of Japan’s engagement in Africa while also incorporating domestic considerations such as norms, and policymaker’s perceptions in developing a theoretically-informed empirical analysis of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.

31 Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 152
32 Pyle, Kenneth, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose p. 21
Furthermore, this research project broadly contributes to analysis of Japan’s prevailing political and business culture of *kiken kaihi*, or “uncertainty avoidance.” Adem and Mazrui explain that “risk avoidance or *kiken kaihi* is one of the key principles of Japanese diplomatic and bargaining actions.” And yet as the following chapters will explore, the emergence of a more robust and self-assured Japanese foreign policy is being accompanied by a higher tolerance for risk in pursuing the country’s interests in Africa. In this respect this research will synthesise arguments in the secondary literature with current data collected through interviews related to the particular example of Japanese activities in South Sudan to provide a new perspective of Japan’s foreign policy approaches and objectives in Africa.

Finally, the study contributes to the literature on Japan-Africa relations. There is not a very extensive range of literature published in English in recent years on Japanese relations with Africa, and this study is the first to focus on South Sudan, and explore the particular changes in Japanese policy since 2008. Indeed much of existing literature examines the Cold War period and Japan’s ties with Apartheid South Africa in analysing Japanese engagement in Africa. For example Ampiah’s landmark study on Japan’s relations with South Africa, Tanzania and Nigeria covers the period from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. While both Owoeye and Sono focus on this period, Sono also provides a broad history of Japan’s relations with Africa since the 1500s. Ampiah’s work examines the particular dynamics driving Japan’s relations in Africa, and the nature of the “economic determinants of Japanese foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa.” In comparison, Morikawa critiques Japan-Africa relations by arguing that “there is a general tendency to overemphasise the

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38 Sono, Themba, *Japan and Africa, the evolution and nature of political, economic, and human bonds 1543-1993*, Pretoria: HSRC Press, 1993
39 Ampiah, Kweku, *The Dynamics of Japan’s Relations with Africa*, p. 202
economic aspects “of Japan’s presence in Africa. In exploring the Western anti-communist strategy in Africa, Morikawa maintains that Japan’s policies are essentially elements within the broader framework of US-Japan relations and reflect Japan’s desire to “become politically more powerful and influential on the world stage.”

However the largest body of literature related to Japan’s interaction with Africa deals with development aid. And while there are a number of studies such as Ensign, Lancaster, and Schraeder, Hook and Taylor which reference or compare Japan’s aid policies in Africa to other regions or donors, the recent literature on Japan-Africa relations tends to focus on Japan’s aid and the extent to which Japan’s development model offers lessons for Africa. For example Osei-Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie, Nafziger, Raposo and Lehman, who explores the “Asian economic model in Africa” and argues that Japan’s vision for development could be applied in Africa. Moreover, Lehman’s exploration of Japan’s non-Western donor identity is particularly relevant to this study’s assertion that Japan’s evolving presence on the continent reflects a changing foreign policy identity and international presence. This dynamic is discussed in Chapter Four and remains an important theme running throughout this study.

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41 Ibid, p. 3
42 Ensign, Margee, Doing Good or Doing Well?, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992
45 Osei-Hwedie, Bertha, and Osei-Hwedie, Kwaku, Japan-Africa Relations, Applying the Asian Development Experience to Sub-Saharan Africa, Institute for African Development, Cornell University, 2010
47 Raposo, Pedro Amakasu, Japan's Foreign Aid to Africa, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014
49 While this study makes reference to certain dimensions of Japan’s national identity, it does not extensively engage with the extensive literature associated with identity in the context of international relations.
Taking the end of the Cold War as a point of departure, Lumumba-Kasongo’s comprehensive analysis of Japan-Africa relations examines the real purposes of foreign economic assistance, its philosophical basis and methods used in dispensing it. In doing so Lumumba-Kasongo goes beyond Japan’s aid policy to explore the connections between Japan’s domestic political and economic environment and its foreign policy towards Africa. He concludes that “Japan-Africa relations are dynamic, as they are constantly changing to respond to the claims and agenda of their states, the imperatives of the international political economy, and the demands of their national economies.”\(^5\) In this respect this study builds on Lumumba-Kasongo’s work in that it explores the dynamic nature of Japan-Africa relations by examining the changes that have characterised relations since 2008 through analysis of a particular dimension of Japan’s presence in Africa. As such this research is valuable in that it examines a relatively little-known dimension of Japan’s foreign engagement but places it in the context of the country’s response to changing global and domestic conditions. Through the use of a neoclassical realist framework of analysis (outlined in Chapter Two) this thesis will detail the structural, political and economic imperatives driving Japanese policy in Africa today, as well as the domestic perspectives and considerations that that shape Japan’s activities on the continent.

1.3 Case Study: South Sudan

This research project primarily seeks to understand the dynamics underlying Japan’s relations in Africa through exploration of its presence in South Sudan. Consequently, the analytical focus of this thesis remains centred on Japan and its policies, while South Sudan should be understood as the arena in which Japan’s Africa engagement is examined. The South Sudan case study therefore serves to provide a theoretically-informed explanation of the factors driving Japan’s engagement in the country and more broadly in Africa. As such, the case study research approach is well suited to

the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism which underpins this study. As Rose explains, “the major neoclassical realist works to date have been narratives or case studies of how great powers have responded to relative material rise or decline.”\textsuperscript{51} Christensen\textsuperscript{52} on the US and China, Schweller\textsuperscript{53} on the belligerents of World War II, Wohlfforth\textsuperscript{54} on the Soviet Union, and Zakaria’s\textsuperscript{55} study on US history. In this context Japan’s engagement with South Sudan will serve as a barometer of Japan’s broader Africa policy and as an example of its response to changes at the structural level.

This case study also echoes Thomas’ definition of a case study as comprising two elements: firstly, the subject – “a practical, historical unity”, and secondly, the object – “an analytical or theoretical frame.” South Sudan can thus be understood in terms of Thomas’ description as “the case that is the subject of the inquiry (and) will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an object – within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates.”\textsuperscript{56}

As the following chapters will illustrate, the case of South Sudan was not identified because it is representational of African states nor because it is a typical example of Japanese interaction on the continent. Rather it reflects Stake’s definition of the case study as “the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances.”\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{51} Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 154
\textsuperscript{54} Wohlfforth, William Curti, \textit{The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the cold war}, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993
\textsuperscript{56} Thomas, Gary, “A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse, and Structure”, \textit{Qualitative Inquiry}, Vol.17, No.6, 2011, pp. 511–521
Indeed as Thomas explains “the essence of selection must rest in the dynamic of the relations between subject and object. It cannot rest in typicality.” 58 Thus as Thomas further describes, “the subject will be selected because it is an interesting or unusual or revealing example through which the lineaments of the object can be refracted.” 59 And while the particular relevance of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan within a broader study of Japanese interaction with Africa will be demonstrated throughout this study, it can be understood to meet Thomas’ criteria as a “key case” – one which exemplifies the analytical object of the enquiry. Furthermore, in addition to the selection of South Sudan due to its inherent interest it was also identified for this study due to what Thomas refers to as “local knowledge”, or prior familiarity with the case. In this respect the author has worked on issues related to political dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan for several years and lived in South Sudan before undertaking this study. Thus South Sudan is both a compelling example of a fragile state seeking to develop relations with foreign investors and donors, and a revealing case study of Japan’s engagement with an emerging state on the frontier of their growing economic and political interests in Africa.

1.3.1 A brief History of South Sudan

South Sudan’s emergence as an independent country on 9 July 2011 was the product of a peace agreement that ended Africa’s longest and arguably bloodiest civil war. Yet while the country’s cessation effectively ended Sudan’s second civil war, it did not bring an end to conflict and political instability in either country. Indeed South Sudan’s descent into civil war less than three years after achieving independence is testimony to the inherent fragility of the new state at its birth – Cockett

58 Ibid
59 Thomas, Gary, “A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse, and Structure”
even asks if the country was a “Pre-failed state.” Thus while the complex history surrounding the break-up of Sudan remains integral to any analysis of South Sudan; this section will briefly explore the historical context that defines the country today.

Before separation Sudan was the largest country in Africa, brought together in the 19th century as a single entity under colonial Turco-Egyptian rule. The country that was then known as *Turkiyya* comprised the Sultanates of Funj and Dar Fur and a southern periphery which as Mamdani explains “both Sultanates had over the centuries turned into a reserve for the capture of prized booty, mainly slaves and ivory.” Thus under the *Turkiyya* the beginnings of central administration were extended into what is now South Sudan, although as Copnall points out, “the motivation was economic plunder, rather than building a state.” Moreover in establishing Khartoum as the military and administrative centre of the new state, the Turco-Egyptian colonial rulers effectively put in place a framework of centralisation that would define Sudan’s political and economic life for the next 190 years.

The Egyptian revolution in 1952 and Sudan’s subsequent unusual status as a colony of two countries precipitated it becoming the first African territory administered by Britain to gain independence in January 1956; the first in a wave of African countries to gain independence in the decades that followed. Yet the tensions between Northern and Southern Sudan that had been accentuated and exacerbated by colonial rule only increased after independence and the country slid into civil war. Indeed a brutally quashed mutiny by Southern Sudanese troops at Torit in 1955

62 Copnall, James, *A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts, Sudan and South Sudan’s bitter and incomplete divorce*, p. 2
63 Sudan was administered between 1899 and 1956, as a “condominium” of the United Kingdom and Egypt.
effectively started the first Sudanese civil war even before the country’s independence. The war, or Anyanya Rebellion as it became known, lasted until 1972 and was ostensibly the result of the new government reneging on previous commitments to establish a federal government and guarantee autonomy for the southern states. The factors that undermined the peace of 1972 and created the conditions for a return to war in 1983 are complex and are dealt with in detail by Cockett,64 Johnson,65 as well as Sidahmed and Sidahmed.66 However in summary, the failure of peace can be understood as driven by changing political dynamics within the elite politics of Khartoum that resulted in the emergence of what became known as “political Islam”, and the on-going marginalisation of the South.

This study will not examine the Sudanese Civil Wars and subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in much detail as those elements relevant to South Sudan’s engagement with Japan are discussed in the following chapters (see works by Cockett,67 Johnson, 68 LeRiche and Arnold,69 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Thomas,70 as well as Young71). However in essence the second civil war tore the country apart and the peace agreement that ended the conflict in 2005 laid out the framework for the separation of the South. The organisation that emerged to lead the war against Khartoum, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), has in turn struggled to transition from a rebel army to a supposedly democratic ruling party, and the war-time fractures within the SPLA are manifesting in the current conflict in South Sudan. In this respect the war still defines the political dynamics within and between both states.

64 Cockett, Richard, Sudan, Darfur and the failure of an African state
66 Sidahmed, Abdel Salam; Sidahmed, Alsir, 2005
67 Cockett, Richard, Sudan, Darfur and the failure of an African state
68 Johnson, Douglas, The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars
69 LeRiche, Matthew, Arnold, Matthew, South Sudan, from revolution to independence
71 Young, John, The Fate of Sudan, the origins and consequences of a flawed peace process, London: Zed Books, 2012
Indeed the frailties that defined South Sudan at its independence were exposed when on 15 December 2013 South Sudan effectively descended into civil war. Rivalries within the Presidential Guard erupted in a violent clash that quickly spilled into the streets of Juba and across the country. Following accusations by President Salva Kiir of an attempted *coup d’état* by former Vice President Riek Machar, the ruling SPLM and SPLA quickly split along divisions unaddressed from the independence war and the conflict escalated. Taking on distinct ethnic dimensions, the conflict spread to the oil producing states of Unity and Upper Nile. And while the government has been quick to downplay the ethnic dimensions of the conflict, political constituencies are routinely mobilised along ethnic lines, and civilians have also been targeted for attack based on their ethnicity. Despite a series of ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreements sponsored by the regional organisation Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), fighting continued in the states of Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei. As previously described, this study ends its analysis in December 2013, so while the ramifications of the current conflict may impact on Japan’s activities in the country they are not considered within this research project. But the current conflict also demonstrates the complex layers within the political system that led to the current crisis, and within which Japan’s engagement was occurring.

South Sudan’s history is therefore defined by war, marginalisation, and a struggle for identity. Effectively experiencing two anti-colonial struggles, the region existed on the periphery of the Anglo-Egyptian colony and post-independence Sudan. Yet as this study will explore, South Sudan as an independent country remains a frontier state. Inhabiting the limits of East and North Africa, the

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73 Salva Kiir Mayardit has been president of South Sudan since its independence in 2011. Prior to independence, he was President of the Government of Southern Sudan, as well as First Vice President of Sudan, from 2005 to 2011.
country embodies what Parish termed the “vanguard of progress” – a land of rich opportunity whose riches are still to be exploited. South Sudan should thus be understood to represent a particular frontier within Japan’s broader African engagement – at the western edge of a strategic arc of interest in East Africa where risk is tempered by the promise of reward.

1.3.2 South Sudan on the Frontier of Japan’s Africa Policy

In conceptualising South Sudan in the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy, the country can be said to inhabit a frontier within Japan’s Africa policy – a location in which to observe the expansion of Japan’s presence on the continent as well as the potential for future changes in Japan’s engagement in Africa. Thus much as Turner observed in his essay on the American West, expanding the frontier means “breaking the bond of custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities.” In this respect this study utilises a conceptual metaphor of the frontier in explaining the manner and motives of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.

As Bach explains, “the concept of the ‘frontier’ has become widely associated with the increasing importance of Africa in international relations and the global economy.” Pointing to the current depiction of Africa as a “global frontier” Bach notes there has been a dramatic shift in perceptions of the continent among corporate decision makers. A view echoed by Carmody in his book The New Scramble for Africa where he notes that Africa which had long been by-passed by globalisation is

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74 Parish, John Carl, Reflections on the Nature of the Westward Movement, University of California Press, 1943, p. 36
witnessing a “massively increased interest and investment” from major world powers.\textsuperscript{77} Indeed as this study will explore, the discourse on Africa as the “last great investment frontier” has a growing resonance in Japan and is shifting perceptions of the continent’s value in Japan’s strategic calculations.

Yet while the concept of the frontier has been extensively utilised in the context of international relations – from US President John F. Kennedy’s invocation of a New Frontier\textsuperscript{78} to Slaughter’s interpretation of the social, developmental, and digital frontier of foreign policy\textsuperscript{79} – it remains a loaded concept in the context of Africa. As Rundbell explains, Turner’s frontier thesis of the American West “liberated the frontier from a strictly geographical definition” but in so doing established the overwhelming understanding of the frontier as a constantly evolving location from which “civilisation pushed into the wilderness.”\textsuperscript{80} The frontier has thus come to be analogous with expansion and appropriation of new territory for farming and mining, while overlooking the impact on indigenous peoples and ecosystems.\textsuperscript{81} As Bach further describes, “the frontier’s association with the assertion of control by a core over its periphery also accounts for the widespread metaphor of a ‘new scramble for Africa’ based on the extraction of Africa’s resources.”\textsuperscript{82} Yet at the same time, while external engagement with Africa in the post-colonial era has ranged from indifference to sympathy and exploitation, the increasing integration of Africa into the global economy is in turn

\textsuperscript{80} Rundbell, Walter, “Concepts of the ‘Frontier’ and the ‘West’”, \textit{Arizona and the West}, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1959, pp. 13-41
\textsuperscript{81} Mikesell, Marvin, “Comparative Studies in Frontier History”, \textit{Annals of the Association of American Geographers}, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1960, pp. 62-74
\textsuperscript{82} Bach, Daniel, “Africa in International Relations: The frontier as a concept and metaphor”, p. 13
Jeremy Taylor  
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breaking down some of the essentialist perceptions of the continent, and writing-over patronising stereotypes.

Thus in looking beyond the neo-colonial interpretations of the concept, the frontier metaphor remains a useful conceptual tool to explore Japan’s activities in South Sudan. Accordingly, the frontier metaphor used in this study references the emerging discourse in Japan of untapped African opportunities, a location for policy experimentation, as well as South Sudan’s geographic and figurative location on the outer edge of the East African region.

Furthermore, despite the conceptualisation of South Sudan as being on the frontier of Japan’s Africa strategy the country remains an important case study and should not be considered merely as a global interface, or a location which is acted upon. As this study will demonstrate, the country’s agency in pursuing its own interests when interacting with foreign actors is apparent. Similarly, Harman and Brown argue that the “new scramble for Africa” narrative ignores the accompanying potential for African states to demonstrate their agency using the interest of competing powers and shifts in global power dynamics to pursue their own interests. Thus while this study is grounded in the Japanese perspective on engagement with Africa, and is by definition attuned to Japanese interests, it also recognises areas of mutual interest between the two countries. As the following chapters will explore, Japan’s activities in South Sudan strengthen the country’s integration with East Africa through important infrastructure and a potential oil pipeline. In this way this study will show that Japan’s presence in South Sudan is blurring the lines of the frontier by expanding the scope of its own activities and challenging its norms around engaging in Africa.

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83 Harman, Sophie and Brown, William, “In from the Margins? The Changing Place of Africa in International Relations”, p. 79
1.3.3 South Sudan as a Testing Ground for New Policies

As this study will establish, Japanese attitudes and approaches towards Africa have undergone a significant shift in the years since 2008 and in challenging Japan’s pre-existing norms of engagement with Africa, Tokyo is developing new policies and methodologies of operating on the continent. Indeed as the following chapters will outline, important aspects of Japan’s presence in South Sudan reflect new approaches to the strategic use of development assistance, energy security and the deployment of military personnel abroad. In this respect the conceptual metaphor of the frontier will be further developed to demonstrate that South Sudan can also be understood to represent a testing ground for new Japanese methods and policies.

Bach argues that “the African frontier is also a global interface and a space for expression and experimentation of new strategies and paradigms.”84 Meanwhile Harman and Brown point out that “Africa is a key space in which a wide range of these new policy ideas are applied, replicated and developed.”85 In this respect this study understands South Sudan as both a frontier of opportunity within Japan’s Africa policy, and a location where new policy approaches are developed and honed. Indeed as this thesis will demonstrate, key policies and methodologies which impact Japan’s energy security approaches or the deployment of military personnel overseas are being defined in East Africa.

Yet as previously noted, Africa is far from the everyday concerns of most Japanese people, and these activities face little in the way of public scrutiny as they are taking place far away in a little-known

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84 Bach, Daniel, “Africa in International Relations: The frontier as a concept and metaphor”, p. 12
85 Harman, Sophie and Brown, William, “In from the Margins? The Changing Place of Africa in International Relations”, p. 83
location. For these reasons the renewed interest in Africa by Japanese policymakers has potential far-reaching implications for Japan’s broader foreign policy agenda. As Chapter Six will highlight, this is especially true of security policy where decisions made in South Sudan regarding the deployment of peacekeepers effectively creates a precedent and circumvents uncomfortable political debates. Thus just as Bach points to a European Union-led peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo as being “a test as much as a symbol”, Japan is testing its constitutional limits for international military deployments through its presence in South Sudan.

Furthermore, quite apart from a space in which to explore new policy approaches, this thesis will also examine the extent to which the East African region is emerging as a location from which Japan can reaffirm its ambitions as a global player. Just as Besada has noted that “Africa has also become a testing ground on which to pull the EU’s foreign policy trigger”, so too can Japan’s growing engagement on the continent be understood to reflect the country’s ambitions to expand its international prestige. As Section 3.2.1 examines, East Africa is also emerging as a location in which to trial new dimensions of Sino-Japanese engagement. Thus reflecting Martel’s observation about US policy towards Africa in the 1960s where he noted that “Africa had long been considered to be a geopolitical backwater, but the Kennedy team looked upon the mineral-rich continent as a testing ground for third-world diplomacy.” In this respect as Japanese perceptions of Africa shift, unlikely locations such as South Sudan become important spaces from which new strategies, approaches and paradigms for external engagement emerge.

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86 A short-term EU-led interim peacekeeping mission (Operation Artemis) was sent to Bunia, in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2003. It operated separately from the UN peacekeeping operation in the country.
87 Bach, Daniel, “Africa in International Relations: The frontier as a concept and metaphor”, p. 8
Moreover, the notion of South Sudan as a testing ground for new policies also speaks to the question of how Africa generally and South Sudan specifically is perceived in Japan. Given that decision-makers perceptions matter in the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research, the following chapters will outline how the continent is increasingly viewed as a location for investment as well as a site in which new policies related to important national considerations such as the role of the Japanese military abroad and strategies to diversify energy supplies are explored. Thus this study will seek to demonstrate that as international pressures drive Japan’s presence in Africa, its multifaceted engagement in South Sudan is pushing the boundaries of its existing norms and perceptions of the continent, and in turn, influencing Japanese foreign policy more broadly.

1.4 Research Method

In conceptualising this research project, a qualitative approach was identified as the most appropriate methodology to better understand Japan’s growing presence in South Sudan. As King Keohane and Verba explain, qualitative research uses interviews and in-depth analysis in developing “a rounded or comprehensive account of some event.”\(^9\)\(^0\) Indeed as Klotz further describes, “qualitative methods are somehow linked to meaning”\(^9\)\(^1\) – a view supported by Berg who maintains that qualitative research provides a greater depth of understanding.\(^9\)\(^2\) Put another way, Thies

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explains that qualitative methods are best suited when “the concepts to be studied are more amenable to labelling by words rather than numbers.”

This study is structured thematically as opposed to a chronological narrative. As such, the thesis seeks to identify the structural factors driving change within Japan’s foreign policy approaches and then explore that change in the context of the particular case study of South Sudan. Thus reflecting King, Keohane and Verba’s explanation that qualitative research in the social sciences is often “linked with area or case studies where the focus is on a particular event, decision, institution or location.”

Moreover given the limited data available on Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, a statistical analysis would not have provided a sufficiently nuanced description of the changes taking place in Japan’s Africa policies. For example, the significance of the proposed oil pipeline described in Chapter Five lies as much in the intent and the shift in approach by Japanese policymakers, as in the construction of the pipeline itself which is yet to happen. Thus as Berg points out “objects, people, situations, and events do not in themselves possess meaning”, but rather “meaning is conferred on these elements by and through human interaction.” A qualitative methodological approach therefore provides the depth, context and detail necessary in seeking to understand the why and how of Japan’s re-engagement in Africa through particular analysis of Japanese activities in South Sudan.

94 King, Gary, Keohane, Robert, Verba, Sidney, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, p. 4
95 Berg, Bruce, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, p. 9
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In this respect the primary sources utilised for this study comprised a combination of key informant interviews, additional primary print resources, and supportive secondary literature – thereby balancing an empirical explanation of Japanese engagement in South Sudan within a neoclassical realist theoretical analysis. As will be explained in Chapter Two, a neoclassical realist approach begins its analysis at the systemic level and examines how perceptions of relative power and changes in relative power are translated through the foreign policy behaviour of state actors. Thus the collection of primary data sought to examine the factors driving Japan’s engagement in South Sudan as well as understand the nature of that engagement.

1.4.1 Primary Data

Key informant interviews contributed a major component of the primary data collected for this study, allowing for an in-depth exploration of an otherwise under-documented subject, and the discovery of information that might not otherwise be published in official policy documentation. This aspect was of particular significance for this study given the current and unfolding nature of the research where there is limited alternative data available. Moreover the individuals interviewed shared particular insights and analysis relevant to their expertise or experience. The interview data thus formed the backbone of this research project, reinforced with additional primary data, and contextualised against secondary sources and the theoretical framework.

As outlined in Appendix One, a total of 39 interviews were conducted with individuals directly involved or with particular knowledge of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan or Africa more generally. In this respect purposive non-probability sampling was used to identify interviewees, which as Tansey explains is the best approach when the goal is “to obtain information about highly
specific events and processes.”\footnote{96} Successfully securing interviews with senior-ranking\footnote{97} individuals was a significant achievement in undertaking this study as they contributed valuable perspectives to a contemporary and emerging area of research. In addition, undertaking senior level interviews added particular value to this study by augmenting and solidifying official documents with interview data.

Identifying the “right” informants and drawing general conclusions from a relatively small number of interviewees can be a challenge associated with this methodological approach;\footnote{98} however this study benefitted from the detailed and rich information provided by these well-placed informants. Moreover as described below, the limited secondary data and relatively small number of people working on Japan’s Africa relations meant that securing interviews with senior well-placed and well-informed individuals was important in developing a comprehensive data set.

Interviews were conducted in Boston, Juba, London and Tokyo between January and November 2013. From September to November 2013 field research was conducted in Tokyo\footnote{99} where the author conducted the majority of the interviews informing this study. In January 2013 the author also travelled to South Sudan on a “Postgraduate Student Study Tour” funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)\footnote{100} to conduct preliminary field research with senior JICA officials, Japan Liaison Office representatives, Japanese contractors, Self Defence Force (SDF)Tansey, Oisin, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling”, Political Science and Politics, Vol. 40, Issue 4, 2007, pp. 765–772
\footnote{97} As outlined in Annex 1, interviews were conducted with government representatives at the director and deputy director level within JICA, MOFA and METI, as well as the chief representative of JICA in South Sudan and a retired ambassador.
\footnote{98} For example see Mahoney, James, “Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis”, Sociological Methods and Research, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2000, pp. 387–424
\footnote{99} The author was a visiting scholar at Waseda University in Tokyo. This was made possible due to a research exchange agreement between Waseda University and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
\footnote{100} As described in more detail in Chapter Three, JICA is an implementing agency that operates under MOFA to manage and coordinate the operations of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)
peacekeepers, and high-level South Sudan government officials. The programme sought to support researchers working on topics in Sub-Saharan African countries where JICA operates. In the case of this research project, the support of JICA London was instrumental in facilitating access to Japanese contractors and peacekeepers as well as JICA’s South Sudan operations. Interviews were also conducted with Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) officials closely associated with key policymakers in the Government of South Sudan. The conflict that broke out in South Sudan in December 2013 however impacted on this study in that further field research planned for February and March 2014 was not possible. During the first six months of 2014 most embassies, private companies and non-humanitarian organisations withdrew their foreign staff due to safety concerns. The author was therefore unable to travel to Juba and it was impossible to conduct further field research in South Sudan.

In undertaking the research for this study semi-structured and open-ended interviews\textsuperscript{101} were held with government officials, retired ambassadors, think-tank researchers, academics, journalists, and representative of private-sector companies. The individuals\textsuperscript{102} interviewed were identified as having particular experience or knowledge relevant to the study. For example the academics interviewed included experts on Japan-Africa relations, Japanese foreign policy and Japan’s peacekeeping operations. Likewise government officials interviewed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment (METI) were identified as having particular responsibility for relevant aspects of the research project such as energy security or Africa policy. In this respect interviews were structured around the main themes of the study or on particular

\textsuperscript{101} Interviews were conducted in English due to the limited Japanese/Arabic capabilities of the author. Despite many people in South Sudan speaking Arabic, the official language is English and it remains the predominant diplomatic language employed in Japan-East Africa relations. Furthermore, official Japanese government statements and press releases are available in English on government websites.

\textsuperscript{102} Contact was made primarily through referral from previous interviewees, attending relevant seminars and talks, and direct email contact. In the case of South Sudan interviewees were contacted with the assistance of JICA London and previous professional contacts made by the author while working in South Sudan. In addition, informal conversations were held with senior South Sudanese diplomats and ministers at speaking events at Chatham House, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and SOAS.
aspects depending on the individuals interviewed or their specific areas of expertise. The open-ended interview format also resulted in previously unconsidered dimensions of the study being explored and included in the analysis.

As a number of those interviewed for this study pointed out, despite the growing importance of Africa in Japan’s foreign policy calculations, there remain a relatively small number of people in Japan researching or working on issues related to Africa. Thus while the interviews sought to provide a relatively comprehensive and inclusive sample of opinions not all can be expected to be entirely representative of official policy. Indeed while academics might be free from the same levels of scrutiny as government officials, their comments can be viewed as more subjective but arguably less informed. Thus by including a balance of academic, think-tank and government sources the study provides a comprehensive analysis of the drivers and outcomes of Japan’s Africa policies.

There is very little existing literature on Japan’s current engagement in Africa and none on its activities in South Sudan, it should be recognised therefore that the inferences from interviews are liable to the author’s own interpretation. In this respect, while interviewees were largely forthcoming and willing to share opinions, the author recognises that responses from government officials may have been constrained by concerns of confidentiality and by keeping their answers in line with official guidelines. Moreover this study also recognises the possible impact of the Japanese social phenomena of *tatamæ*. As Johnson describes, *tatamæ* is “a statement that spells out the way things should be while veiling the fact that reality is otherwise.”\(^{103}\) By comparison *honne* designates “the underlying truth – the real intention, fact, or essence.”\(^{104}\) Researchers point to the


\(^{104}\) Ibid
tendency of people in Japan to express views (tatemae) in order to fit in with society’s expectations or those of their employer rather than express a contrary opinion.

Yet despite this social tendency individuals interviewed for this study showed a general willingness to discuss the issues openly – even criticising Japanese policy. This was especially true of senior-level participants who spoke more openly about the motivations underlying official policy – and at times even overruled junior interviewees and provided a more nuanced understanding of events that did not appear in official documents. Moreover, as a number of Japanese academics and officials explained, African issues have long been considered marginal and unimportant in elite policy circles, and as a result they were happy to share their views and contribute towards building awareness of Japanese engagement with Africa. Indeed many of those interviewed noted the failure of government initiatives to better publicise Japan’s growing presence in Africa and welcomed the fact that this research was being done. As such, respondents were in many instances explaining, contextualising, or identifying the priorities related to shifts in Japan’s policies towards Africa and were thus not inhibited in speaking openly.

The first step in the analysis of interview data was the identification and elimination of bias, both on the part of the interviewees and the author. In this regard the author sought to follow the advice of King, Keohane and Verba who point out that methodological self-awareness can yield a large improvement in scholarship.\textsuperscript{105} Initially the potential for biased responses was avoided through a research design that ensured a spread of interviewees operating in different sectors, at different levels and in different locations. Although subjectivity and the potential for biased responses are

\textsuperscript{105} King, Gary, Keohane, Robert, Verba, Sidney, \textit{Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research}
recognised limitations of key informant interviews, the author sought to identify consistent responses to particular questions from a range of interviewees. This was reinforced by crosschecking between interviewee responses and comparing responses with official documentation where available. Moreover, the author sought to mitigate “sponsor bias” or tatemae by comparing the responses of official representatives with those of academics or private company representatives where relevant. Finally, all interviews – except those representatives of the government of South Sudan – were recorded to ensure responses were accurately transcribed. The representatives of the government of South Sudan also requested not to be named following the outbreak of conflict.

The second step in avoiding bias was related primarily to an assessment of the subjectivity of the author in undertaking the research. Given that the author was both the instrument of data collection and analysis, it was important to be cognisant of his position relative to the subject matter and his own affinity with the issues, concepts and theories underpinning this research. It is worth noting therefore that the author was an external observer to the subject matter – while having previous experience working in South Sudan, had no prior views or positions on Japanese engagement in the country. In this regard the author sought to avoid leading questions, aimed for consistency of approach towards all interviews and allowed the findings to emerge through synthesis of the data.

The approach used in analysing the interview data began by categorising key themes identified by the interviewees as driving Japan’s engagement in Africa as well the methods of this engagement. This was achieved by cross-checking and triangulating the responses of participants – more simply

\[^{106}\text{For example see Berry, Jeffrey, "Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing", Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35, Issue 4, 2002, pp. 679–682}\]
put, this entailed identifying similar answers to key questions and tabulating the answers. Then building on the particular area of expertise of the participant such as energy policy, development assistance or peacekeeping, a more detailed understanding of the various dimensions of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and Africa more broadly was developed. In this regard there was largely a consensus of opinion around the primary drivers of Japan’s growing presence in Africa, which are described in Chapter Three as constituting the strategic objectives of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan. While the tactical approaches to engagement outlined in Figure 5 (page 75) were developed through cross-referencing interview data from subject-specific interviews such as those conducted with the Institute of Energy Economics of Japan (IEEJ), Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI) and Toyota Tsusho to formulate an understanding of the particular tactical approaches to Japan’s energy security strategy that are emerging in East Africa. The interview data was then further analysed against official government publications, media releases and news reports to fully develop the arguments outlined in the study.

The interviews thus provided particular insight into the combination of internal and external factors that underpin Japan’s engagement in Africa, and the extent to which the country’s Africa policy can be seen to reflect changing priorities within the broader spectrum of Japan’s strategic policies. Therefore as explained in Chapter Two, it was through analysis of the primary data that emerged from these interviews that neoclassical realism was identified as the best-suited theoretical framework through which to examine the research questions underpinning this study.

107 For example, the description of Japan’s emerging security engagement in East Africa that is discussed in Chapter Six was developed by cross referencing interviews responses from MOFA officials responsible for Africa, academics working on Japanese security policy or Japan’s Africa policy, the commanding officer of the Japan peacekeeping contingent in South Sudan, and an official from the Japanese Embassy in Juba.

108 JOGMEC was established in 2004 and integrates the functions of the former Japan National Oil Corporation, which was in charge of securing a stable supply of oil and natural gas, and the former Metal Mining Agency of Japan, which was in charge of ensuring a stable supply of nonferrous metal and mineral resources for Japan.
Additional primary data used in this research included speeches and official statements from both the governments of Japan and South Sudan. Furthermore, statistical information was sourced from official Japanese government publications, World Bank reports and organisations such as the United States energy Information Administration (EIA). Given the contemporary nature of this study news sources also provided a significant amount of primary data – providing an important perspective on both current events, and in the case of Japan, a reflection of Japanese attitudes and approaches towards engagement with Africa. Japanese online media sources included Asahi Shimbun, JapanToday.com, Kyodo News, Mainichi Shimbun, NHK World, Nikkei Shimbun and The Japan Times.

In addition to the fact these newspapers are available online and in English, they were chosen as they provide a range of perspectives on Japan’s foreign policy and insights into the domestic context against which policy decisions are made. For example the complex debates around Japan’s international security engagement or the country’s energy security policies can be monitored through the editorial positions of these newspapers. Current news and opinion on South Sudan was sourced primarily from the Paris-based Sudan Tribune, which is recognised as a reliable and up to date resource. In addition, international news agencies and Africa-focused current affairs publications such as Reuters, All Africa, African Arguments, The Economist and Think Africa Press were included for analysis of South Sudan and the East African Region.

1.4.2 Secondary Data

This study also incorporates secondary data sources such as peer-reviewed journals, think tank reports, books and policy-oriented publications. These sources were relied on primarily in providing theoretical substance and context to the empirical findings, as well as for deeper analysis of the various dimensions of Japan’s foreign policy such as development aid, energy security and peacekeeping. In this respect this study is multidisciplinary in that it drew on literature from wide
range of fields including international relations, development studies, Japan studies and Africa studies. Furthermore, the secondary literature also provided deeper analysis of particular aspects of Japan’s policy environment such as the country’s “pacifist” constitution and the complexities of relations with China, as well as its historical engagement with Africa. And while there is limited literature on South Sudan as an independent country, this study relied on existing literature on the conflict in Sudan and the eventual cessation of South Sudan in providing an important context against which to frame Japan’s current engagement.

1.5 Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis comprises seven chapters. The introductory chapter outlined the study’s primary research questions and research objectives, as well as explored the contribution of this study. This chapter also included a short summary of historical context of South Sudan and introduced the two conceptual metaphors used in this thesis to conceptualise the dynamics associated with Japan’s renewed political and economic presence in Africa.

The second chapter then outlines the research approach. In making a case for a neoclassical realist framework of analysis for Japan’s engagement with South Sudan, the chapter summarises the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of Japan’s foreign policy and outlines how neoclassical realism is utilised in this study.

The third chapter explores the major structural considerations influencing Japanese foreign policy in Africa and the context in which the particular aspects of Japan’s activities in South Sudan are
examined. These include a general assessment of Japan’s status on the international stage through examination of the growth of the G20, the rise of China, and Chinese influence in Africa. The chapter then details structurally-driven factors directly linked to Japan’s presence in South Sudan, namely economic revitalisation, ensuring energy security and meeting international security commitments.

The following three chapters comprise the key empirical findings at the heart of this study. They explore Japan’s engagement in South Sudan in terms of the structural drivers identified in Chapter Three, and the diagrammatic outline of Japan’s strategic and tactical approach to Africa outlined in Figure 5 (page 75). In this respect Chapter Four focuses on Japan’s aid engagement in South Sudan. In evaluating the evolution of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Africa and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the chapter explores the emergence of “strategic” ODA in the context of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.

Chapter Five examines the proposed oil pipeline project to be undertaken by Japanese company Toyota Tsusho, the trading arm of the Toyota Corporation. The chapter address the investment-component of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and explores the context against which the proposed oil pipeline development is understood by this study. Namely, Japan’s broader resource strategy in Africa and how this intersects with the domestic imperative of energy security which remains a fundamental aspect of Japanese foreign policy.

Chapter Six examines Japan’s security presence in Africa through the deployment of peacekeepers in South Sudan and anti-piracy naval operations in the Horn of Africa. The chapter concludes that the expansion of Japan’s presence on the continent to include a security dimension is significant both as
a reflection of the structural pressures influencing Japan’s foreign policy in Africa, and in terms of the complex constitutional considerations that accompany the deployment of Japan’s armed forces.

Finally Chapter Seven concludes by summarising the study and exploring possible avenues for future research.
2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework used to interpret Japan’s activities in South Sudan. While this study places particular emphasis on empirical evidence and analysis of an under-researched element within Japan’s international engagement, it still recognises the importance of presenting research within a theoretical perspective – or systematically developing and organising ideas to explain phenomena. Indeed the approach to theory in this study also draws inspiration from Jackson’s argument that researchers should be “explicit about their philosophical commitments, so that readers can better appreciate the basis on which subsequent knowledge-claims are being advanced.” As such, incorporating theory into a study frames the analysis within wider debates, and provides an important context for terminology or assumptions that are used in the thesis. Furthermore, as Wolfers points out,

If attention is focused exclusively on the goals and means of policy with no consideration for the forces that determine or influence the actors in choosing among these goals and means, one is left without any guide to anticipate future choices and without any way of affecting policy.

Theory is therefore understood in this study as an important means to systematically explain the empirical observations of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and neoclassical realism will be used as the framework of analysis. The dominant theories of international relations offer some valuable perspectives through which to understand Japanese engagement in South Sudan – and more broadly in Africa, but as the following section will examine, they are also unable to provide a universally

110 Jackson, Patrick, quoted in: Jackson, Patrick, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 190
applicable framework to interpret the multiple dynamics driving Japanese policy in Africa. Indeed as Haglund and Onea point out, neoclassical realism is unique in international relations scholarship in that it “highlights the centrality of theorising foreign policy”\(^{112}\) as opposed to developing theories of international politics. Consequently, neoclassical realism is understood in this study to be a more inclusive hybrid approach that bridges the divide between macro and micro level analysis in developing a descriptive understanding of the drivers of foreign policy outcomes. This chapter will therefore explain the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism through which Japan’s engagement in South Sudan will be examined in the chapters that follow.

Theory is integrated into this study as a framework through which descriptive observations are interpreted. In this respect the following chapters while focused on descriptive detail, will rely on neoclassical realism as a vehicle for analysis and will reference the theory throughout the thesis. It is important to note however that the construct of neoclassical realism emerged from the key informant interviews which comprise the primary data underpinning this research. In other words participants identified particular systemic pressures as driving Japan’s renewed interest in Africa and the extent to which those policies are influenced by the perceptions of policymakers or the particular dynamics of Japan’s domestic political environment. Thus given that the theoretical framework emerged from the key informant interviews, it did not influence the design or implementation of the study – nor were the findings simplified or manipulated for the sake of conformity to a theoretical or methodological principle. But rather neoclassical realism emerged as a practical construct of understanding that balanced the empirical observations with the rigour of advanced critical analysis.

Neoclassical realism begins analysis at the systemic level but also incorporates domestic factors such as policymaker’s perceptions of relative power and the extent to which they are translated into state behaviour. In this respect the approach broadly reflects Lebow’s “layered” approach to understanding societal order and international relations, but as this chapter will explain, neoclassical realism remains the best-suited model through which to interpret the changes in Japan’s Africa policies since 2008 as well as Japanese engagement in South Sudan.

It is also necessary however to first explore some other theoretical approaches that could be used to explain Japan’s engagement in Africa. The following sections will therefore examine existing approaches to the study of Japan’s foreign policy before outlining the role of neoclassical realism as a vehicle for analysis in this study.

2.1 Competing Perspectives of Japanese Foreign Policy Analysis

Theories of international relations rely on a variety of approaches to explain the behaviour of states within the international system and have consequently formulated a number of paradigms through which state interaction is understood. Paradigms which can be broadly summarised to encompass two primary approaches to the unit of analysis or the central variable – namely analysis based on external factors such as the international system or analysis based on internal, domestic variables. In this respect the interpretation of Japan’s foreign policy also reflects this dichotomy with academic opinion divided on how best to understand and assess the country’s foreign relations. This section will therefore examine and critique the primary theoretical approaches to the analysis of Japan.

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Realism and neorealism have long dominated the analysis of state behaviour at the international level. Realism is not however a unified theory, but rather a collection of disparate approaches to understanding the actions and motivations of states. As Ashley observes, “realist scholarship is very far from being an internally harmonious tradition”,¹¹⁴ but it is based on common assumptions. Namely, that the international system is anarchic, in which states are the most important actors. Furthermore, states are understood to be unitary, rational actors whose primary concern is survival.¹¹⁵ While classical realism was not identified as a formal discipline until after the Second World War by theorists such as Morgenthau¹¹⁶ and Carr,¹¹⁷ it traces its lineage through the works of Hobbes,¹¹⁸ Machiavelli¹¹⁹ and Thucydides.²¹ Yet in a departure from the classical realism of Morgenthau, Carr and Gilpin,¹²¹ Waltz¹²² proposes that structural constraints determine state behaviour in international relations. In outlining structural realism, or neorealism, Waltz argues that states have the same needs but differing capabilities for achieving them. As such, the actions of a state are explained primarily by the causal systemic variable of the relative distribution of power capabilities among states. Neorealism remains among the most influential contemporary approaches to the study of state behaviour. Yet when considering this research project, neorealism’s parsimonious approach and focus on structural analysis might offer some insight into the why of Japan’s Africa policies but does not offer enough detail or context to understand the how of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan. Nor does it adequately reflect African agency as an element within

¹²² Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979
Japan’s interactions on the continent and the extent to which Japan’s objectives in South Sudan match that country’s own strategic or developmental goals.

Moreover in the case of broader Japanese policy analysis, the realist approach has faced considerable criticism. As Kawasaki observes “Japan is commonly regarded as an anomaly to realism”\textsuperscript{123}, or as Yasutomo points out, “realism does not produce a uniform picture of Japan.”\textsuperscript{124} Indeed as Yasutomo goes on list, diverse interpretations of realism related to Japan include what Heginbotham and Samuels refer to as pragmatic “dual hedging”\textsuperscript{125}, Lind’s militarily strong “buck-passing”\textsuperscript{126}, or Green’s “reluctant realism.”\textsuperscript{127} In contrast, Pyle\textsuperscript{128} argues that Japan has always been characterised by classical realism, and Hughes\textsuperscript{129} and Kilman\textsuperscript{130} see Japan in recent years as once more exhibiting realist tendencies.

The complexity inherent to the interpretation of post-war Japanese policy is due in part to the development path followed by Japan after the Second World War which prioritised economic growth while keeping a low diplomatic profile and a military strategy confined to the US-Japan Alliance. Often referred to as the “Yoshida Doctrine”, the strategy was developed by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (1946–47, 1948–54) and defined Japan’s national strategy throughout the Cold War.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Heginbotham} Heginbotham, Eric, and Samuels, Richard, “Japan’s Duel Hedge”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 81, No.5, September/October 2002, pp. 110–121
\bibitem{Green} Green, Michael, \textit{Japan’s reluctant realism: foreign policy changes in an era of uncertain power}, New York: Palgrave, 2003
\bibitem{Pyle} Pyle, Kenneth, \textit{Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose}
\bibitem{Hughes} Hughes, Christopher, \textit{Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004
\end{thebibliography}
era. As Chai explains, this policy resulted in the levels of Japan’s defence expenditure being uniquely low among the major industrialised countries.\textsuperscript{131} Japan therefore appeared to defy the realist assumption that states seek to maximise the power that their economies allow, and developed what Miyagi refers to as a “lopsided power profile.”\textsuperscript{132} Miyagi’s view thus reflects Calder’s analysis of Japan as a “reactive state” that could or would not take international leadership.

In recognising the challenge that post-war Japan offered to realist analysis Yasutomo observes that “Japan specialists find it necessary to adapt their conceptualisation to fit their nuanced view of realist Japan.”\textsuperscript{133} As a result, some scholars altered their point of analysis of Japan from cherry-picking elements of realist theory to focusing on what had been previously overlooked. As Johnson explains,

\begin{quote}
Since realism either does not inquire into all the domestic responses to and constraints on foreign policies or else assumes that such responses are homogenous across all states facing similar international pressures, the cases of pre-war and post-war Japan directly challenge realist theory.\textsuperscript{134}
\end{quote}

Thus in response to the apparent shortcomings of realist paradigms for analysing Japan’s foreign policy approaches, some scholars turned to a constructivist approach.

\textsuperscript{133}Yasutomo, Dennis, “Norms, interests, and power in Japanese foreign policy (review)”
Constructivism, as Alder explains is centred on the idea that “international politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities.” As such, constructivists do not base their analysis on structure, but rather they argue that the international system is socially constructed by cognitive structures which in turn give meaning to the material world. Constructivist theories of international relations therefore are concerned with how ideas define international structure, how this structure defines the interests and identities of states, and how states and non-state actors reproduce this structure. Thus by focusing on domestic unit-level variables, the constructivist approach to analysis of international relations places equal value on non-material aspects such as identity, norms and customs.

In the context of Japan’s policy analysis, the emphasis placed on norms by the constructivist approach is particularly relevant when considering the norm of anti-militarism. As discussed in Chapter Six, Japan’s constitutionally entrenched pacifism defines the context in which Japanese security policy is developed and implemented. Indeed as Katzenstein has argued, the norm of anti-militarism permeates Japanese policymaking and is a consequence of its national identity, historical experience and culture. While Berger points out that the reluctance of Japan to rearm and become a “normal” country “is not be found in any structural factor [...] but rather is attributable to Japan’s post-war culture of anti-militarism.” A norm that Berger goes on to describe as “one of the most striking features of contemporary Japanese politics.” Furthermore, the perspective of history and historical memories remain important factors in determining Japanese foreign policy.

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138 Berger, Thomas, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring), 1993, pp. 119-150
outcomes – particularly as this study maintains with regard to Sino-Japanese relations and Japanese perceptions of China’s rise.

As Chernoff explains however, this approach fails to appreciate the influence of the international system, and that “constructivism has provided little in the way of substantive knowledge, or even hypotheses, about the behaviour of states or state systems.”139 Constructivism also treats the norms and culture of identity as a property concept — as an intrinsic attribute of a state. Instead, Neumann maintains that identity should be treated as a relational concept, because even the way identity is domestically constructed typically relies on a process of differentiation between oneself and others.140 Furthermore as Hagström points out, the problem, for both constructivists and their realist critics, is that “in recent years Japan has taken a much more proactive stance in its foreign policy — a development which seems to be related precisely to China and North Korea, and which has often crystallised in its policies toward those countries.”141 Indeed for the same reason constructivism does not offer a suitable framework for the analysis of Japan’s engagement in Africa. For example, while a constructivist analysis provides important context in understanding the domestic dynamics associated with the deployment of Japanese military personnel to the Horn of Africa (as described in Chapter Six) it does not explain the factors leading to their deployment or the context in which they are operating.

A further theoretical approach to understanding Japan in the post-war era is neo-liberalism which seeks to incorporate the role of economic cooperation and international institutions into the analysis of state behaviour. Keohane and Nye question the realist assumption that power dictates behaviour

139 Chernoff, Fred, Theory and Metatheory in International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008, p.68
141 Hagström, Linus, “Identity politics and Japan’s foreign policy”, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 2006 årg 108, No. 2
and argue instead for a model of “complex independence”, where economic relations between states define state interaction rather than military force and power-balancing.\textsuperscript{142} Neo-liberalism does however acknowledge some neo-realist conditions, for example Kegley and Wittkopf point to the significance of a state’s national interest and the existence of anarchy in the global system.\textsuperscript{143} Though despite these conditions, neo-liberals take a more positive view of the international system, believing that sustainable cooperation is possible. Moreover, they argue that states seek cooperation through trade and institutions despite the prevalence of anarchy at the global level.\textsuperscript{144}

Japan’s state-pacifism and active participation in multilateral institutions such as the UN can therefore be explained through the framework of neo-liberalism. As Akimoto explains, Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations is also compatible with neo-liberalism, because it affirms the utilisation of Japanese military forces for the goal of multilateral cooperation, and international peace and security.\textsuperscript{145} While realists might argue that Japan’s participation in multilateral forums is aimed at achieving great power status and a seat at the UN Security Council, for neo-liberals, Japan’s focus on non-militarism and trade is an example of a pragmatic interpretation of their national interests, and it has served the country well. In this respect liberalism might explain Japan’s desire to increase investment in Africa and even the establishment of ties with a new state such as South Sudan, but it does not explain the changes that have occurred in Japanese policy towards Africa since 2008 nor the broader structural considerations influencing Japanese policymakers.

\textsuperscript{144} Keohane, Robert, \textit{After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy}, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1984
\textsuperscript{145} Akimoto, Daisuke, “A theoretical analysis of Japan’s changing security identity”, \textit{Soka University Peace and Research Institute}, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2013
Thus when considering the key issues at the heart of this study it became apparent that the theoretical approaches described above do not provide a suitable framework in which to understand the complex factors influencing Japan’s re-engagement in Africa. Indeed as Akimoto notes in the context of security policy “each theory of international relations is incomplete, and each provides only a partial explanation of Japan’s security identity.” The same could be said for theoretical explanations of Japan’s activities in South Sudan which reflect a number of factors driving Japanese policies in the region. As Akimoto further points out, the problem for the theoretical analysis of Japan’s foreign policy, “lies in the lack of an eclectic and comprehensive approach in the existing scholarship.” A view shared by Katzenstein who noted that the study of Japanese foreign policy needs to be more eclectic, “analytical eclecticism highlights different layers and connections that parsimonious explanations conceal.”

Consequently, analysing the multiple dimensions of Japan’s strategy in Africa requires a more comprehensive theoretical framework through which empirically-driven research can be interpreted. In this regard this study relies on neoclassical realism as a vehicle of analysis – a theoretical framework described by Guilhot as eclectic and which recognises both the influence of the international system and the internal dynamics of states in explaining foreign policy outcomes. Representing a progression within the field of realist approaches, neoclassical realism extends Waltz’s work by incorporating intervening variables in explaining how and why states deviate from the balance of power logic that defines neorealism. The sections that follow will examine the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism and its suitability as a mechanism for the analysis of Japan’s engagement in Africa.

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146 Ibid
2.2 Framework of Analysis: Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism represents a progression within the broad literature on realism, by seeking to incorporate aspects of Waltzian neo-realism with a constructivist critique of elite perceptions. Neoclassical realism therefore looks to extend Waltz’s approach by incorporating analysis of decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structures. As Rose explains, neoclassical realists occupy a middle ground between pure structural theorists and constructivists. Thus while states remain the principal actors within this paradigm, greater attention is given to the forces above and below the state. The international system is seen as a structure acting on the state, and intervening factors such as decision-makers’ perceptions influence the state from below. The theory can therefore be understood as illustrative rather than demonstrative and this thesis will not seek to test the theory nor apply a model, but rather use the theory as a framework to explain and interpret Japan’s engagement in Africa.

Neoclassical realism was delineated as an approach to understanding the behaviour of states by Rose who drew on the work of Christensen, Schweller, Wohforth and Zakaria in outlining a distinct school of international relations analysis. The approach provides for a single independent variable: relative power in the international system, intervening variables comprising factors such as state structure and incentives, as well as policymakers’ perceptions of their relative power. And finally, a dependent variable: the foreign policy decision. Therefore as Roth points out, “neoclassical

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149 Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”
realists reject the privileging of systemic structural variables”154 and include institutional and cultural factors in the analysis of state behaviour. In this way the framework of analysis is better suited to explaining variations in states’ reaction to changes in the international system. Japan’s re-engagement in Africa is thus interpreted by this study as a response to changes at the structural level interpreted through the particular lens of that country’s domestic political norms and the perceptions of its policymakers.

The construct of neoclassical realism is not however without its critics, most notably Legro and Moravcsik who argue that with the inclusion of domestic considerations neoclassical realism sacrifices the coherence of realism. They maintain that realism is a theory with important explanatory power and that expanding the paradigm to discuss explanatory factors beyond the core realist framework effectively dilutes realism making it less determinant and distinctive. They explain that these approaches “inevitably import considerations of exogenous variation in the societal and cultural sources of state preferences” and that the neoclassical realist scholars mentioned above are in fact liberals with an identity crisis.155 Legro and Moravcsik’s critique of neoclassical realism ultimately rests on their view that without distinctiveness and coherence it becomes difficult to distinguish between international relations paradigms.

Yet as the sections below will demonstrate, understanding why a state chooses from the possibilities presented by its relative material power requires incorporating aspects of other paradigms into the analysis. Indeed as Rathbun points out, neoclassical realism uses domestic politics and ideas to flesh out the central consideration in neorealism – namely the concept of power. “Drawing and

improving on insights of classical realism, it shows how domestic politics and ideas are key elements in the process of self-help inherent to an anarchic system.” Rathbun further maintains that the role of domestic politics cannot be possessed by one paradigm, arguing they are “fair game for realism and neoclassical realists have taken up this mantle.”\textsuperscript{156} Nye moreover believes that international relations theory is “unnecessarily impoverished by exclusivist claims”, arguing that “liberal theory should not be seen as an antithesis to realist analysis but as a supplement to it.”\textsuperscript{157} As such, Desch notes that cultural theories supplement security studies by filling a gap between structural change and differences in state behaviour as well as explain seemingly irrational state behaviour.\textsuperscript{158} Thus as Rathbun explains, while neoclassical realism maintains the neorealist core assumption of the importance of structure it has taken “a natural and progressive next step”\textsuperscript{159} through the inclusion of domestic units into its analysis.

Moreover as Kitchen also emphasises, neoclassical realism “is a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive one”\textsuperscript{160} and as such this study draws on the key informant interviews and secondary sources previously described to develop a picture of the factors driving Japan’s re-engagement in Africa – and the particular domestic considerations underpinning the Japanese presence in South Sudan. These strategic objectives therefore are considered in this study in conjunction with the intervening domestic considerations that ultimately influence Japan’s particular methods of engagement in Africa. The paradigm of neoclassical realism is therefore understood in this study as a practical and policy-relevant approach best suited to the analysis of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan.

\textsuperscript{156} Rathbun, Brian, “A Rose By Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the logical and necessary extension of structural realism”, \textit{Security Studies}, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2008, P. 301
\textsuperscript{157} Nye, Joseph cited in Feaver et al., “Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)” p. 174
\textsuperscript{159} Rathbun, Brian, “A Rose By Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the logical and necessary extension of structural realism”, P. 301
2.2.1 Relative Power in the International System

Neoclassical realism as Taliaferro describes stresses the causal primacy of structural variables, “chiefly the relative distribution of material power and anticipated power in shaping foreign policies.”\(^{161}\) Indeed as Rose reiterates, “the scope and ambition of a country is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities.”\(^{162}\) For this reason, adherents of neoclassical realism are still realists. Yet significantly, Rose also goes on to point out, there is no immediate or perfect mechanism linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. But rather foreign policy choices are made by political leaders and elites so it is their “perceptions of relative power that matter not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being.”\(^{163}\)

Perceptions of prestige within the international hierarchy are therefore also considered in the neoclassical realist framework. The importance of how states perceive themselves relative to other states in the system influences their policy outcomes. And states are assumed to wish to advance their power and status in the international system – a system which Taliaferro points out is competitive and provides incentives to emulate the political, military and technological practices of others.\(^{164}\) Consequently when China surpassed Japan to assume the title as the world’s second largest economy, it did not necessarily diminish Japan’s power in real terms – but the perceptive difference will influence how decisions are made. A point made clear by Prime Minister Abe when

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162 Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 146
163 Ibid
164 Taliaferro, Jeffrey, “state building for future wars: neoclassical realism and resource extractive state”, pp. 464 – 495
he noted that “Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-Two country.” A MOFA director further explains that “once you have been number one, you can never be satisfied to be number two”, Going on to point out that the prospect of being a “middle power was not an option for Japan.” In this regard neoclassical realism draws on the classical realist perspective of status rivalries as described by Morgenthau, “whatever the ultimate objectives of a nation’s foreign policy, its prestige – its reputation for power – is always an important and sometimes the decisive factor in determining the success or failure of its foreign policy.”

Systemic forces thus create incentives for all states to ensure their security or advance their positions relative to other states. However while the anarchic environment encourages the goal of survival, Sterling-Folker points out, that it is a domestic process that is responsible for the ability of states to emulate the processes of others. Thus it is the “domestic process that acts as the final arbiter for state survival within the anarchic environment.” In this context, the framework of neoclassical realism heeds the advice of Zakaria who observes that a “good account of a nation's foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of the policy can be explained by what factors.”

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166 Author’s interview with director, MOFA, Tokyo, 5 November 2013
167 Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, p. 95
2.2.2 The Domestic Context of Foreign Policy Formation

While neoclassical realism begins its analysis of state behaviour at the systemic level it deviates from neorealist perspectives by including analysis of unit-level variables. These intervening factors should be understood to reflect interpretations of observed realities rather than measureable facts – such as attitudes, perceptions and intentions. Thus in order to understand the way states interpret and respond to their external environment, Rose maintains that they must analyse “how systemic pressures are translated through unit-level intervening variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structure.”\(^\text{170}\) In this regard, unit-level factors included in neoclassical realist analysis include the details of state institutions, public opinion, the media and the dynamics of domestic party politics. As Dueck explains, domestic politics does not shape the whether but rather the when and the how of foreign intervention.\(^\text{171}\)

Consequently, as Schweller summarises, “complex political processes act as a transmission belt that channel, mediate, (re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces (primarily changes in relative power).”\(^\text{172}\) Yet in contrast to the approaches of constructivism and liberalism which argue that foreign policy is best understood as the product of a country’s internal dynamics, the neoclassical realist perspective views domestic considerations as intervening rather than dominant. In this way the environment rather than the process remains the primary factor of analysis. Neoclassical realism however also includes analysis of norms – a key element of constructivist interpretation of state behaviour. Of particular significance to this study are the norms most relevant in Japan such as anti-militarism, human security, the primacy of the US Alliance, and energy

\(^\text{170}\) Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 152


security. The norm of anti-militarism for example, whilst originally externally imposed, has strong domestic support and continues to define Japan’s security policy response to structural dynamics – it is discussed in Chapter Six as an important consideration when understanding Japan’s security engagement in Africa.

As Rose further points out, the international system only provides states with “murky signals” on how to respond to systemic pressures and changes – thereby highlighting the role of domestic elites and policymakers in interpreting those signals and orchestrating a state’s response. Zakaria further notes that “domestic politics explanations can be most useful in explaining events, trends and policies that are too specific to be addressed by a grand theory of international politics.” Consequently as Dueck has suggested, state responses can be measured with reference to policy instruments such as military deployments and spending, alliance commitments, foreign aid, and the willingness to commit to diplomatic initiatives. As this study will explore, these policy instruments have all been deployed in Japan’s engagement in South Sudan and reflect strategic decision-making by policymakers tasked with planning and implementing Japan’s Africa policy.

Thus as Schweller argues, “states respond (or not) to threats and opportunities in ways determined by both internal and external considerations of policy elites, who must reach consensus within an often decentralised and competitive political process.” In this way the neoclassical realist perspective views states as comprising divergent groups with at times competing objectives and influence in the development of foreign policy. As such, as this study will demonstrate, Japanese engagement in South Sudan and Africa more generally reflects the evolution and diversity of opinion

172 Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 160
among elites in the formulation and implementation of key policy frameworks such as ODA, energy investments and peacekeeping.

Neoclassical realism therefore provides a balanced and policy-relevant construct around which to frame this study. As a widely accepted theoretical perspective, neoclassical realism contributes to the realist tradition while also being a theoretical framework well suited to empirically-driven research in that it combines the theoretical rigour of Waltzian neo-realism with a content-rich empirical analysis.

### 2.3 How Neoclassical Realism is Used in This Study

This study asks the primary question: what explains Japan’s engagement in South Sudan? It thereby seeks to explore the particular activities undertaken by Japan in South Sudan and frame a deeper analysis of the broad strategic considerations underpinning Japan’s Africa policy. Yet to arrive at broader conclusions around the factors driving Japan’s engagement in Africa requires a theoretical framework through which to interpret the empirical findings which are at the core of this study. In this respect neoclassical realism provides a practical mechanism through which to understand an evolving and under-researched aspect of Japan’s foreign policy. The neoclassical realist approach is also best suited to an empirically-driven study that seeks to find meaning in Japanese policy in Africa. As previously mentioned, the environment rather than the process remains the primary factor of analysis. As such, Walt points out that “where neorealism sacrificed precision in order to gain parsimony and generality, neoclassical realism has given up generality and predictive power in an attempt to gain descriptive accuracy and policy relevance.”

Consequently this study will

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177 Walt, Stephen, “The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition”, in Katzenelson, Ira and
employ the neoclassical realist perspective as a vehicle of analysis, but will not seek to apply a model or contribute to the specific literature on neoclassical realism.

In this context the structural factors examined in this study can be considered as “causes” influencing the limits and tactics of Japan’s approach to South Sudan – and reflect the views of key informants interviewed for this study. Furthermore, in line with a neoclassical realist approach, intervening or unit-level considerations are also included in the analysis. This study will therefore include analysis of a range of domestic factors relevant to the specific elements of Japan’s activities in South Sudan. These include for example the perceptions of policymakers and norms such as the constitutionally defined anti-militarism, adherence to human security policies, risk-averse investment policies, as well energy security concerns and aid policies.

This study does not however undertake a detailed process-tracking methodological approach to examine the domestic factors influencing Japan’s foreign policy formation. But rather examines the particular domestic context that explains the three primary dimensions of Japanese engagement in South Sudan: ODA, resource-focused investment and peacekeeping. These activities therefore form the empirical basis of this research project, but are also explored in the following chapters in terms of their international and domestic dimensions. In this way the empirically-driven analysis of Japan’s activities in South Sudan is examined in the context of both the structural factors, and the intervening domestic considerations that influence the manner and approach of Japan’s policies in South Sudan. The diagram below (Figure 4) provides a visual framework of how this study will examine Japan’s engagement in South Sudan through the lens of neoclassical realism.

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Figure 4: Neoclassical realist framework of analysis of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan

**International Systemic Pressures**

- Japan’s relative economic decline
- International security commitments
- Resource/Energy competition
- The rise of China

**Domestic Factors / Elite perceptions**

- Norms (anti-militarism, risk aversion)
- Energy security concerns
- Aid strategies / objectives
- Perception of China’s rise
- Perception of Japan in the world order

**Foreign Policy Outcome**

- Increased and diversified presence in Africa
- Engagement in South Sudan
As this study will explore, Japan’s engagement in Africa is multifaceted and the factors underpinning this engagement are multidimensional and in many instances overlapping – yet there are still discernible broad strategic objectives that are driving Japanese engagement in Africa. These objectives reflect a response to pressures and incentives at both the systemic and domestic levels. In turn these objectives define the tactics or methods of Japan’s engagement on the continent generally, as well as Japan’s particular activities in South Sudan.

The following chapter will therefore briefly outline the primary structural factors shaping Japan’s Africa policy. The subsequent chapters will then provide analysis of Japan’s activities in South Sudan as representative of the broader tactics of Japanese policy in Africa – contextualised against the strategic objectives driving Japan’s refocused African presence. And as such, it will seek to demonstrate how Japan’s activities in South Sudan are distinct elements within Japan’s tactical engagement in Africa, as well as indicative of the broad strategic objectives that characterise Japanese policy in the period 2008–2013.

As Kitchen describes in his work on neoclassical realism and grand strategy formation, grand strategy is the level at which “systemic and unit level factors converge” and that strategy emerges through the processes of empirical assessment and ideational competition within the state. And while this study is not focused on Japan’s overarching “Grand Strategy”, it maintains that the same principles can be used when referring to a particular element within the scope of a state’s strategic objectives. Thus just as Kitchen describes a set of policies that set out the goals of the state, and prescribe how a broad range of national resources should be utilised in pursuit of those goals, so this study will outline the objectives and methods underpinning Japan’s re-engagement in Africa. Dueck further

178 Kitchen, Nicholas, “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation”, p. 121
179 Ibid, p. 136
points out that “the process of identifying national interests and then mobilising resources to pursue those interests is not a given [...] a wide variety of domestic political factors may influence this process.” Indeed as Professor Nakanishi summarises, Africa remains a long term consideration in Japan’s foreign policy determinations, and while the overarching strategy might be defined, the tactics are still being developed.

Consequently, the strategic objectives underpinning Japan’s refocused engagement in Africa that are identified in this study emerged from key informant interviews undertaken with Japanese government officials, academics and think tank researchers. Through these discussions interviewees identified a number of overlapping factors that make-up Japan’s emerging strategic objectives – and their corresponding tactical approaches towards engagement in Africa.

The diagrammatic relationship outlined below in Figure 5 (page 75) shows how this study understands Japan’s strategic objectives, tactical approaches and “on the ground” activities. These in turn reflect global structural pressures, interpreted via the intervening considerations of domestic policy imperatives – resulting in a particular policy outcome in South Sudan. The diagram should be understood as a visual representation of the key findings to emerge from the interviews that underpin this research. In other words Figure 5 is not a model that this research sets out to test, but rather an illustration of how the interview data was interpreted and how the following empirical chapters will be structured.

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180 Dueck, Colin, “Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions”, in Lobell, Steven; Ripsman, Norrin; Taliaferro, Jeffrey; Neoclassical realism, the state and foreign policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.146

181 Author’s interview with Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013
Thus the strategic objectives understood by this study to be driving Japanese engagement in South Sudan address four primary aims:

1. Economic revitalisation and growth
2. Ensure resource and energy security
3. Meet Japan’s international security commitments
4. Respond to the rise of China.

A detailed examination of each of these factors will be undertaken in Chapter Three, however it should also be noted that while these factors reflect both the changes and the challenges that Japan faces at the structural level, this study only considers those strategic objectives that reflect Japan’s Africa policy. For example, economic revitalisation is a central element of government policy and encompasses a variety of policy options encompassed by Prime Minister Abe’s “Three Arrows” which include fiscal stimulus, aggressive monetary easing from the Bank of Japan and structural reforms to boost competitiveness – only some of which can be interpreted as driving Japan’s renewed enthusiasm for engagement with Africa. Furthermore, a primary strategic objective for Japan remains the relationship with the United States – Calder\(^{182}\) would even argue that the US relationship completely defines the parameters of Japan’s foreign policy – but the experts interviewed for this study did not interpret Japan’s re-engagement with Africa as a means to strengthen US-Japan ties. And while the extent to which Japan’s presence in South Sudan dovetails with US policy in the region is explored in Chapter Six, it is not considered a primary strategic objective of Japan’s Africa policy. Similarly, while the role of China in Japan’s strategic calculations is multifaceted, this study restricts analysis to those aspects related to Japan’s presence in Africa.

\(^{182}\) Calder, Kent, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation”
Thus building on the strategic objectives identified by the key informants and supporting literature, this study examines the corresponding tactical approaches employed in Japan’s engagement in Africa. Japan’s tactical approach to Africa is evolving, and is particularly susceptible to politically-necessitated policy changes. However there are still observable elements within the strata of Japanese engagement on the continent that this study summarises as three distinct methods of engagement – or tactics:

1. “Strategic” ODA
2. Resource-focused investment
3. Security engagement through peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations

As Figure 5 below outlines, each of these tactical approaches is in turn reflected by a particular activity or dimension of Japan’s presence in South Sudan, such as peacekeeping, ODA provision, or the proposed oil pipeline project.
Figure 5: Japan’s strategic and tactical engagement in South Sudan

- **Economic growth / Revitalization**
  - Resource-focused investment
    - Toyota Tsusho
    - Pipeline project

- **Ensure Resource / Energy Security**
  - ‘Strategic’ ODA
    - ODA Projects
      - South Sudan

- **Respond to the rise of China**
  - Peacekeeping / Anti-Piracy operations
    - UNMISS
    - Peacekeeping

- **Meet international security commitments**
The methods of engagement outlined above will each be examined in detail in the following chapters through reference to particular aspects of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan. In this respect the approaches identified above are comprehensive and cover the most significant aspects of Japan’s presence in Africa. And while there are other dimensions to Japan-Africa relations such as lobbying political support, or funding international bodies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), which relate to African issues, these are relatively minor facets of Japan’s interaction on the continent. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Four, building support from African states for Japanese initiatives such as reform of the United Nations Security Council was established through the use of ODA mechanisms such as the provision of grant aid.

As previously described, this study emphasises an empirical analysis of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and by examining particular Japanese activities in the country it develops a picture of the wider emerging Japanese engagement in Africa. Thus when considering the nature of this study, neither a purely systemic theory of international outcomes, such as neorealism, nor a purely innenpolitik theory of foreign policy would adequately capture the nuance, impact or rationale for Japan’s engagement in South Sudan (as an element of Japan’s broader re-engagement in Africa). Neoclassical realism therefore provides a practical and policy-relevant theoretical framework through which Japan’s engagement in South Sudan can be examined. In this regard the model is well suited to an evidence-based study analysing a particular component of Japan’s response to international pressures. South Sudan also serves as an important case study of Japan’s re-engagement in Africa as Japan’s presence in the country reflects all three of the “tactics” deployed in achieving the principal strategic objectives that this study believes are driving Japan’s renewed focus on the continent. Furthermore, South Sudan is a deeply unstable post-conflict country that represents a policy “frontier” and challenges many of the existing perspectives on the nature of the Japanese presence in Africa.
3. The Structural Context: Japan’s Place in an Evolving World Order

While this research is focused primarily on Japan’s engagement in South Sudan it is also important to consider the structural context in which this relationship is occurring and this chapter outlines some of the structurally-driven factors underpinning Japan’s presence in Africa. The preceding chapters outlined the historical context that frames Japan’s engagement in Africa, the strategic significance of South Sudan as a case study and the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism through which the study is interpreted. This chapter will therefore summarise the broad structural considerations driving Japan’s Africa policy and frame the context in which the deeper analysis of Japanese engagement in South Sudan is occurring. Accordingly, the chapters that follow comprise the key empirical findings at the heart of this study, and as such will explore Japan’s engagement in South Sudan as a barometer that reflects the broader strategic objectives underpinning Japan’s re-engagement in Africa.

Given that the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research stresses the causal primacy of structural conditions, this chapter will explore the impact of changes to the relative distribution of Japan’s material power on Japan’s Africa policy. This element within the neoclassical realist interpretation draws on the neorealist view that systemic forces create incentives for all states to ensure their security or advance their positions relative to other states. As Waltz maintains, “we know from structural theory that states strive to maintain their positions in the system. Thus, in their twilight years great powers try to arrest or reverse their decline.”183 In this context there are a number of structural factors that could be considered to be influencing Japanese foreign policy and this study will focus on those factors that are pertinent to Japan’s engagement in Africa. These

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factors emerged from the key informant interviews previously described and are consolidated through the secondary literature. Consequently, Japan’s relative loss of international relevance, combined with the rise of China and the imperatives of economic revitalisation and resource security will be considered as the primary structural drivers of Japan’s engagement with Africa.

Yet these structural pressures however only provide a foundation upon which the empirical detail of this study will be built. As Waltz explains, a neorealist theory of international politics can describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system and show how the range of expectations varies as systems change. It can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will respond to those pressures and possibilities.\textsuperscript{184}

The questions that Waltz raises of how and how effectively states respond to structural pressures are thus addressed in this study through analysis of intervening domestic considerations. In this way the texture and detail missing from a purely structural interpretation of Japan’s policy in Africa is provided in the following empirically-driven chapters that explore the particular dimensions of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan and Africa more generally.

Furthermore, the structural factors outlined in this chapter should also be considered in conjunction with what Carmody refers to as the “new scramble for Africa” where rising demand for primary resources combined with the emergence of new players such as China and India are changing the dynamics of Africa’s integration into the global economy, and creating competition around access to

\textsuperscript{184} Waltz, Kenneth, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, p. 71
the continents natural wealth and growing markets.\textsuperscript{185} In this regard, the continent has become of greater significance to Japanese policy makers – especially in terms of medium to long-term planning. As Professors Nakanishi and Kataoka\textsuperscript{186} both highlight, Japan’s foreign policy is occurring in the context of Prime Minister Abe’s assertion that “Japan is back”\textsuperscript{187}, and as a result Africa is becoming central to the discourse of a “revitalised Japan.”\textsuperscript{188} Indeed as Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) recognises: “Africa is a prospective economic frontier with abundant strategic natural resources and sustained economic growth. In addition Africa has been increasing its influence in the international community.”\textsuperscript{189} In this way the NSS formally reiterates the conceptual theme of the frontier in Japan’s Africa policy that runs through this study, and as this chapter will detail, is becoming increasingly relevant to Japanese policymakers as structural conditions change. Africa is therefore both the site of significant economic potential as well as a space where Japan can demonstrate a new vigorous international presence – as a donor, investor, and peacekeeper.

3.1 G20 and the Rise of the Rest

This research is premised on the neoclassical realist perspective that shifting global conditions are driving Japan’s re-engagement with Africa. These structural realities encompass a number of specific areas including economic revitalisation and expanding security responsibilities which are reflected in the particular aspects of Japan’s presence in South Sudan, and explored in the following

\textsuperscript{186} Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
\textsuperscript{187} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan in Back”, address by PM Abe at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 22 Feb 2013, accessed 15 May 2014, available at: \url{http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html}
\textsuperscript{188} Author’s interview with Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013
chapters. Yet the rise of the G20\textsuperscript{190} is significant in that it represents a broader perspective among Japan’s policymakers that the country’s international prestige, and therefore relevance, is in decline. This section will explore the role of the G20 as an indicator of change at the structural level and the resultant impact on Japan’s perception of its relative power and influence on the global stage.

The growing international relevance of the G20 also points to a broader geopolitical consideration, namely the rise of what might be termed “next generation powers” and the much debated notion of a transformation from a US-centred system to a multipolar global order. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ensuing preponderance of the United States’ economic and military power led scholars such as Brooks and Wohlforth,\textsuperscript{191} and Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth,\textsuperscript{192} to define the global distribution of power as “unipolar.” However this conceptualisation of global power dynamics changed with the growing influence of emerging nations such China and India – prompting scholars such as Drezner to characterise the international system as multipolar.\textsuperscript{193} And others such as Haass to argue that the global system is in fact “non-polar” in that there are “numerous centres of meaningful power.”\textsuperscript{194} These profound shifts in the structure of the global system are further examined by Beckley,\textsuperscript{195} Kupchan,\textsuperscript{196} Walt\textsuperscript{197} and Zakaria\textsuperscript{198} who point out that by expanding the distribution of global power, the United States and its allies – such as Japan – have lost their ability to reach consensus on issues or drive the international agenda. This has become especially apparent

\textsuperscript{190} The Group of Twenty (G20) comprises: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union (EU)


when considering the lack of a shared set of assumptions among the states that now make up the G20 on fundamental questions such as the nature of the state, the role of the state in the economy or the rights of its citizens. These factors therefore provide an analytical overlay through which this study will frame the growth of the G20 in the context of Japan’s declining global influence – and resultant desire to increase its presence in Africa.

The emergence of the G20 presents what Rathus acknowledges is a “major challenge for Japan”\(^{199}\). This is due in part to the fact that the seismic changes at the systemic level that led to the decreasing relevance of the G8 also coincided with the “lost decades” of Japan’s economic stagnation, but also because as Dobson explains, “an expanded G20 not only dilutes Japan’s presence at these summits but points to the broader decline in its position in the world.”\(^{200}\) As Rathus describes, “the G8 holds a special place in Japan’s international relations in general and foreign economic policy in particular.”\(^{201}\) This is due in part to the country’s inability to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the G8 was therefore a symbol of the country’s global power – and ultimately its relevance. Moreover, Japan’s presence among the global elite of the G8 provided substance to the popular discourse in Japan that the country was a “bridge between East and West” or as Jain and Lam point out, “perceived as the only Asian actor with considerable economic clout on the world stage.”\(^{202}\) Indeed the G8 also allowed Japan to influence policies and provided a forum to manage key bilateral relationships – which is therefore at the heart of Japan’s fears of an expanded G20.


\(^{201}\) Rathus, Joel, “Japan and the G20: Ambivalence and the China Factor”

In this regard, the demise of Japan’s relative global relevance alongside the rise of the G20 highlights a corresponding Japanese strategic fear: abandonment by the US. As Shinoda explains, when the level of dependence on an alliance is asymmetrical, there is a strong fear of abandonment on the part of the junior partner.\textsuperscript{203} And while US interests in Asia are undiminished – or even expanded given the “Asia Pivot” outlined by the Obama administration in 2012,\textsuperscript{204} Japanese policymakers recognise the potential for the US to be unwilling to escalate a conflict with China over an issue that is of limited strategic value in Washington. Moreover as a Japanese security policy analyst explains, the fear in Tokyo is that the US will no longer consider Japan as its primary partner in Asia – “Japan fears that the US will discuss important global issues with China first.”\textsuperscript{205} This is particularly relevant when considering that the East Asian region in many respects still suffers from a form of cold war hangover, reflecting Kupchan’s observation that “deep political cleavages still exist in East Asia.”\textsuperscript{206} Thus in a region defined in part by neorealist state interaction, the rise of the G20 reminds Japanese elites of their diminished status as the leading power within the region.

In addition, Japan’s participation in the G8 was also the fulcrum around which much of its international policy was developed – including engagement with China and championing aid to Africa. Rathus describes how the G8 meeting in Tokyo in 2008 saw the “Outreach 5” process extended to include Chinese participation (but not membership) – “this system suited Japan as China

\textsuperscript{204} The Obama administration’s 2012 “re-balancing” or “Pivot to East Asia” was a stated shift in foreign policy from a Middle Eastern and European focus to an Asian one
\textsuperscript{205} Author’s interview with Senior correspondent, Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo, 8 November 2013
could be engaged in a way that gave Japan institutional advantage and influence." Additionally, as Dobson describes, in 2008 Japan hosted TICAD IV and the G8 Summit which provided a high-profile diplomatic opportunity within both Japan’s relations with Africa and its summit diplomacy to shape regional and global agendas respectively and, to these ends, the Japanese government sought to connect the two international meetings.  

Moreover, as Cornelissen observes, the G8 was used by Japan to signal foreign policy initiatives, of which activism around African development issues was a key component. Cornelissen continues by explaining that Japan’s Africa diplomacy has at times converged with, and in fact reinforced, the country’s G8 politics. Consequently, “by adopting certain rhetorical stances on the ‘cause’ of Africa, Japan has found ways to express its (now possibly dwindling) middlepowership.” As Cornelissen further notes, “questions around the future of the G8 have implications not only for Japan’s claim as a major power, but indeed also for the way the way in which the country seeks to operationalise objectives around Africa.” In this respect the following chapters will examine the various mechanisms through which Japan is operationalising a new strategic approach to engagement with Africa.

Thus a process that began with Japan’s participation in the Versailles Treaty as a great power and permanent member of the League Council of the League of Nations, and in the post-Second World War era through representation in the G8, has essentially been radically undermined by the emergence of the G20. And while the rise of the G20 symbolises Japan’s decline as the leading

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207 Rathus, Joel, “Japan and the G20: Ambivalence and the China Factor”
power in Asia, this process is occurring in the context of Japan’s fraught relations with Asia’s predominant rising power: China. Indeed as the *Economist* noted in January 2014, “hardly a day goes by without a new flare-up in the war of diplomatic attrition being fought out by China and Japan.”

Thus during the time period covered by this research Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated considerably and resultantly must be considered in a broader analysis of the drivers of Japan’s foreign policy.

### 3.2 The Rise of China

When considering Japan’s engagement in South Sudan as a barometer of its broader re-engagement in Africa, the “China factor” is an important consideration in understanding the forces driving Japanese policy in Africa. Given the extent of China’s presence and influence on the continent, combined with the complex and evolving relations between the two countries, it is a theme that emerges throughout the various elements that make up Japan’s engagement in Africa. From the establishment of a Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) base in Djibouti to a policy of ODA differentiation, and the political considerations around Toyota Tsusho’s pipeline bid in South Sudan, the “China factor” is a consideration for Japanese policymakers. While these elements will be addressed in more detail in the following chapters, this section will explore the wider context of Sino-Japanese relations and the extent to which Japan’s refocused engagement on the continent – and South Sudan in particular – can be interpreted as linked to the broader dynamics underpinning relations between the two countries.

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In addition, as will be explored in more detail in the coming chapters, South Sudan is a particularly interesting location in which to consider the evolution of China’s relations in Africa. In many respects South Sudan is also an important frontier within China’s own engagement on the continent as the country’s independence from Sudan created a number of unprecedented scenarios for Beijing. Primarily, China’s strong ties with Khartoum has meant that it has had to overcome a perception problem in South Sudan when compared to its engagement with most other African states where Beijing had been able to leverage its lack of colonial baggage in building relations. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, this is particularly relevant given that South Sudan inherited most of Sudan’s oil reserves and the Chinese companies invested in drilling and exporting the oil. The extent of these energy investments can also been seen to underpin the high levels of attention China accorded South Sudan since the start of the civil conflict in December 2013 – including attempts to mediate the conflict211 and the first deployment of Chinese combat troops to a peacekeeping operation.212

Yet beyond the particular case of South Sudan, the rise of China has significantly shifted the international order and is therefore considered by this study to be among the primary structural factors influencing Japan’s foreign policy. The neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research recognises international systemic factors as dominant in determining state behaviour. Indeed as Lai contends, “Japanese-Chinese relations have always been and will continue to be shaped by external circumstances, which define the parameters of both governments’ policy behaviour and responses in their mutual relations.”213 Japan’s place in a rapidly changing global

213 Lai, Yew Meng, Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s relations with China, London: Routledge 2014, p. 58
environment remains an important factor when considering how Tokyo views China’s growing global influence, thus also reflecting the neoclassical realist contention that perceptions – and possible misperceptions – of power weigh on the minds of Japanese policymakers. This is further accentuated by Matake’s observation that as the difficulty of managing the Sino-Japanese relationship has intensified, so have Japan’s fears about both the capabilities and motives of China.²¹⁴ Fears that have been heightened by deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations as well as elements of economic and foreign policy rivalry, such as over the construction of a trans-Siberia oil pipeline,²¹⁵ or the use of foreign aid to secure access to strategic natural resources in Myanmar.²¹⁶ Thus as Professor Nakanishi observes, “there is still a debate in Japan around how to ‘deal’ with China, and how to see the future between the two countries.”²¹⁷

This study however pays particular attention to the role of China’s growing presence in Africa as a factor influencing Japan’s policies on the continent. The literature on China’s engagement in Africa since the 1990s is extensive (for example, see Alden,²¹⁸ Brautigam,²¹⁹ Chan,²²⁰ Rotberg,²²¹ and Taylor²²²) and reflects the evolving diversity of China’s presence in Africa. Yet in essence much of the literature addresses the same underlying phenomenon: China’s rapidly expanding economic – and arguably political, influence in Africa. Political influence which reflects China’s growing economic might as well as Beijing’s ability to leverage historic ties and its lack of colonial baggage to establish an influential presence on the continent. Indeed Harman and Brown contend that China’s political

²¹⁷ Author’s interview with Professor Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013
²²² Taylor, Ian, *China’s new role in Africa*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009
and economic influence in Africa provides empirical evidence for China’s increased relevance in international affairs. Yet as Japan’s presence in Africa grows, so too does the likelihood of competing Japanese and Chinese interests. Especially in the context of South Sudan where the country’s independence effectively created the ‘space’ in a country that was previously firmly within China’s sphere of influence for Japan to enter with an ODA-led engagement that expanded to include infrastructure and potential energy projects.

In this context, the role of China and its presence in Africa is both a structural causal factor in the determination of Japan’s strategic approach to the continent – as well as a factor determining Japan’s tactical approaches to African engagement. Furthermore, it should be recognised that as long as Sino-Japanese relations remain characterised by tension and mutual suspicion, all diplomatic efforts – in Africa or elsewhere, will be coloured by the broader dynamics underpinning relations between the two countries.

3.2.1 The “China Factor” in Japan’s Africa Policy

The deterioration of relations between Japan and China has coincided with a remarkable expansion of China’s economic and political influence in Africa. Consequently the worsening of Sino-Japanese relations has focused attention on Japan and China’s mutual activities in Africa and has largely driven the popular discourse of Japan’s “competition” with China in Africa. As a deputy director at METI observes, this in turn fuelled a discourse in Japan that “China will occupy all of Africa and we will not be able to get in.” He goes on to explain that this debate was strongest in Japan between 2005

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223 Harman, Sophie and Brown, William, “In from the Margins? The Changing Place of Africa in International Relations”, p. 80
224 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013
and 2008, where it culminated in the reorientation of Japan’s engagement in Africa following TICAD IV, which is discussed in Chapter Four. Yet as the METI representative also cautions, “government might be driven by the “China factor” but I’m not sure if it is true in the field.” By this the representative means that private sector Japanese investors are more motivated by their own objectives and incentives to engage in a particular country or location than by the presence of Chinese investors in that country.

This section will therefore explore the notion that Japan’s rivalry and political tension with China is manifesting in Africa. It will further situate the competition discourse in the broader context of the structural drivers of Japan’s re-engagement in Africa and the role of perception in influencing Japanese policy on the continent. Given that neoclassical realist theory holds that systemic pressures are filtered through the perceptions of decision-makers, the role of China’s presence in Africa must be considered as a contributing factor in understanding Japan’s engagement in South Sudan and more broadly across the continent.

As a representative from JETRO explains, when China overtook Japan in terms of its economic size, it coincided with a growing discourse in Japan that “China is conquering Africa” and that Japanese companies should be seeking opportunities to counter this dominance. Indeed as the representative continues to point out, the perception in Japan around China’s economic and political influence in Africa has “created a sense of urgency” in Japan’s policy response towards Africa – an urgency that was then further enhanced by the election of the Abe administration. An administration whose energetic agenda has identified Africa as region to which it can expand Japan’s investments and

225 Ibid
226 Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 157
227 Author’s interview with director, JETRO, London, 9 September 2013
228 Ibid
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influence, but which is also notable for Prime Minister Abe’s stated intention to “stand up to China.”

In this regard Davies identifies a “growing strategic competition between China and Japan” in Africa, noting that “the trend of Japan’s anxiety over China’s engagement of Africa is already clear.” Furthermore, Davies also maintains that “Japan has replaced Taiwan in the Chinese policy-makers mind vis-à-vis its aid strategy in Africa,” thus pointing to a distinct Chinese policy of competing with Japan for access and influence in Africa. Lehman further notes with reference to Japan’s ODA strategy in Africa that “China’s expansion into Africa clearly worries the Japanese government since China challenges Japan’s previous dominance as the Asian model.” Yet when considering the factors driving Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and more broadly in Africa, it is apparent that a more nuanced view of the “China factor” is required in understanding the role of China in the determination of Japan’s Africa policy. As Rose explains,

> While it is true to say that China’s Africa policy (in addition to the initiatives of other donors) contributed to Japan’s own (re)engagement with Africa, and a certain reinvigoration of the TICAD process, this was not the only, or key determinant.

Moreover, the narrative of Sino-Japanese competition should also be considered in the context of this observation from a deputy director at METI, “not all the people talking about China all the time are actually thinking about China all the time.” Indeed as the METI representative continues to point

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out, “the best way to get ordinary people interested in an issue is to bring in a China angle.” 233

Furthermore, the Abe administration played down media discussion of Sino-Japanese competition in Africa by stating during Abe’s Africa tour in January 2014, “Wherever he goes, Prime Minister Abe is asked if he is there to compete against China, but that’s not our intention at all, as far as the African nations are concerned, they are important regardless of China.” 234 Dr Michishita at GRIPS 235 however observes that in policy circles it is useful to use China to justify Japan’s greater commitment to Africa. Consequently, he asserts that “China as a factor [in Japan’s engagement in Africa] is more important as a justification than a motivation.” 236

These perspectives are significant in that they highlight how changes at the systemic level such as the rise of China are interpreted and ultimately influence Japan’s foreign policy. However when it comes to Japan’s strategy towards Africa, it is apparent that the term “competition” is incorrectly used and overly simplifies the dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations and how they are manifesting in Africa. As a METI representative explains, whatever Japan’s intentions in Africa – “China does not think it is competing with Japan.” 237 Furthermore, as the research director at JETRO clarifies, given the sheer scale and breadth of Chinese involvement in Africa, China is “not our rival.” 238

This is evidenced by the fact that Japan and China do not operate in the same areas. As a METI representative notes, Japanese economic interests in Africa are currently focused on automobiles, power generation and the procurement of metals such as platinum, manganese and chrome. 239

233 Author’s interview with deputy director, METI, Tokyo, 21 September 2013
235 Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan
236 Author’s interview with Dr Narushige Michishita GRIPS, Tokyo 3 October 2013
237 Author’s interview with deputy director, METI, Tokyo, 21 September 2013
238 Author’s interview with Senior Researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 27 September 2013
239 Author’s interview with deputy director, METI, Tokyo, 21 September 2013
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is compared with China’s primary mineral imports from Africa: copper, zinc, nickel, iron ore and lead, paired with infrastructure development such as roads and construction.\textsuperscript{240} As another METI representative explains, Japan’s real competition in Africa occurs at different levels. The highest level is geo-strategic engagement – developing client states or securing support for UN resolutions – at this level, China as well as former colonial powers such as France are well established in Africa. The second level comprises company to company competition, for example Hitachi might compete with Siemens, while the third level comprises local supermarkets and small manufacturers usually run by immigrants from China, Lebanon or India.\textsuperscript{241} In the opinion of the official, Japan is therefore best positioned to grow its presence in Africa through mid to high-end company investment and growing geo-political relevance through the strategic use of ODA and investment.\textsuperscript{242}

Thus while Japanese policy in Africa seemingly never targeted direct competition with China – it was still influenced by China in two significant ways. Firstly with respect to mineral and energy resources, China’s remarkable economic growth effectively shifted the international structural environment, thereby changing the nature of resource markets by making them both more competitive (especially with regards oil and gas) and driving the trend towards the equity ownership of resources which is discussed in Chapter Five. These changes were in turn interpreted by Japanese policymakers in the context of Sino-Japanese relations, and realised through a reinvigorated Africa strategy. Secondly, due to the strained nature of Sino-Japanese relations, China’s actions (in Africa and elsewhere) are viewed as inherently more threatening than those of other emerging powers with a presence in Africa such as India or Brazil. This reflects the neoclassical realist critique of purely systemic explanations of foreign policy which presume accurate and objective interpretations of state behaviour. Yet as a representative of JOGMEC also explains, “China’s activities are


\textsuperscript{241} Author’s interview with deputy director, METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid
influencing Japanese activity because they are so aggressive – people [policymakers] think we must also act decisively.” As she goes on to admit, resources are very important to Japan’s policies, but if China’s demand was to decrease, so to would the interest of Japanese politicians decline. Thus in effect the “China factor” is a combination of the sheer demand for resources underpinning China’s rise and the fact that it is China – as opposed to another power – that is driving that demand.

In 2006, the government of Japan released a New National Energy Strategy. The report was noteworthy in that unlike previous reports it emphasised energy security, as well as mentioning the increasing international competition for natural resources with China. This report followed the displacement of Japan by China as the second largest importer of African oil after the United States in 2005, and despite falling total petroleum imports, Japan’s African supplies still grew by nearly 20 per cent in 2004, while over the same period Chinese imports grew by more than 35 per cent. Thus as discussed in Chapter Five, the momentum towards renewed energy security priorities in Japanese policy reflected the rising price of oil – but also the primary driver of high world oil prices: increasing demand in China. In this regard the years leading up to the re-focusing of Japan’s Africa strategy in 2008 were characterised by deteriorating relations with China as well as renewed concerns around energy security. It was thus against this backdrop that the discourse on Sino-Japanese competition in Africa was focused – for example in 2006 the Asia Times reported that “the increasingly fierce competition between Japan and China over energy and political influence is spilling over into Africa.”

243 Author’s interview with Senior Researcher JOGMEC, Tokyo, 29 October 2013
As a number of authors such as Andrews-Speed, Morikawa, Sato, Taylor as well as Townsend and King have noted, the rush to secure access to new sources of energy remain part of a wider strategic programme of action, which includes, diplomacy, technological assistance, and aid. Indeed much has been written in recent years regarding China’s increasingly visible presence on the continent, the majority of which is presented in terms of aid and investment directed towards the single purpose of securing access to natural resources. While Brautigam argues that this view is simplistic, she does recognise that China is heavily invested in resource-led initiatives in Africa. Consequently the extent and nature of China’s influence in Africa was recognised in Japan, where for example an Asahi Shimbun report from 2006 stated that “China is outstripping Japan in the diplomatic race to woo Africa.” The article coincided with former Prime Minister Koizumi’s (2001-2006) visit to Africa in 2006 – the last by a Japanese leader until Abe’s visit in 2014 – which was also presented in the Japanese press as evidence of Sino-Japanese rivalry in Africa. The conservative Japan Times for example reported on “Japan and China’s great African game”, claiming that “a new scramble for Africa is unfolding [between China and Japan].” These somewhat overblown articles highlight a point made earlier and reiterated by the senior researcher at JETRO when he pointed out that there are not many people interested in Africa in Japan, but if you can tie Japan’s activities on

248 Morikawa, Jun, Japan and Africa Big business and diplomacy, London: Hurst & co, 1997, p. 69
252 Brautigam, Deborah, The Dragon’s Gift, the Real Story of China in Africa, p. 278
the continent to China that number increases exponentially. “Thus if African issues are linked to China they become more important in Japan.”

Yet even in Africa the Sino-Japanese competition discourse is emerging. As the following chapters will explore, East Africa has emerged as an especially significant region in Japan’s refocused attention on Africa. However this has been recognised and interpreted in the region as reflecting Japan’s efforts to wrestle opportunities and influence away from China. The Business Daily Africa notes that “Kenya has become the latest beneficiary of the battle heating up between Japan and China for control of Africa’s economic landscape.” The publication goes on to quote a lecturer at the University of Nairobi’s Institute of International Relations as saying, “there is some kind of soft competition emerging between China and Japan, not just in Kenya but across Africa.” Noting that “Japanese interest in Kenya is part of a wider plan to exert its influence in Africa” and on the “the global stage”, the publication points to a range of diplomatic and business links between Japan and Kenya from the extension of a soft loan of US$ 375 million to the visit by Japan’s Crown Prince Naruhito in 2010. A further article from an East African news website quotes another university lecturer as observing, “Japan and China are large economies and they are looking for markets where they can deploy their capital [...] Japan wants to show China that it can also flex its muscle and establish its presence here.” These views thus emphasise the predominance of the Sino-Japanese competition in Africa-narrative, but as the following chapters will explore, Japan’s activities in response to China’s presence and influence in Africa require a more nuanced understanding.

255 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
257 Ibid
258 Ibid
Moreover, quite apart from responding to Chinese influence, there is significant strategic economic value for Japan of developing a strong presence in East Africa. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, the prospects of linking South Sudan’s oil fields with those being developed in Uganda and Kenya is a significant factor underpinning Toyota Tsusho’s pipeline project. However the Sogo Sosha\textsuperscript{260} (along with Japan’s Toshiba and South Korea’s Hyundai) will also develop a geothermal power generating complex\textsuperscript{261} and a new assembly plant for Toyota vehicles in Kenya. Thus the company – as well as Japan’s policymakers are tempted by the prospects that the East African region holds. With a combined population of 135 million people,\textsuperscript{262} the East African Community (EAC) which comprises Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, has a common market for goods, labour and capital – in addition to un-exploited oil and gas reserves. In this regard, South Sudan’s aspirations to join the EAC has distinct economic advantages for South Sudan as well as investors in the region, and it is unsurprising that linking its infrastructure with its East African neighbours is a priority of Japan’s ODA and energy strategies outlined in Chapters Four and Five.

Thus despite the lack of apparent competition in the purely economic sense, Japan’s re-engagement in Africa also comprises a large political component which can be interpreted as a “response” to China’s extensive political ties on the continent. The following chapters will further explore the question of a “China factor” within the particular aspects of Japan’s engagement in Africa. Yet as Japan’s investment-focused economic footprint grows along with increased political interaction, their interests will increasingly come to compete with those of China – such as in the case of an

\begin{footnotes}
\item[260] Sogo Shosha refers to a type of Japanese company with a business model unique to Japan. Referred to as general trading companies, they have extremely diversified business lines and operate at different levels across a range of sectors. There are currently seven major Sogo Shosha: Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui & Co., Sumitomo Corporation, Itochu, Marubeni, Toyota Tsusho and Sojitz.
\end{footnotes}
alternative oil pipeline from South Sudan. In addition, the poor state of Sino-Japanese relations will likely manifest in Africa as the opportunity for mutual interaction increases. Consequently while the extent to which Japan’s objectives in Africa are intended to achieve its own interests – irrespective of China’s presence – is debatable, the fact remains that the state of Sino-Japanese relations impact on how Japan perceives China’s presence in Africa and resultantly formulates policy. A representative of MOFA underlines this when he notes that “China is not popular in Japan and many people criticise China for what they are doing in Africa.” Thus Japan’s policies on the continent should not try to copy (and thereby compete) with China, but rather Japan should “polish its strong points” and build its own presence in Africa.263

In this regard, China is again part of the consideration underlying Japan’s strategy in Africa – if not through competition, then at least as a point of comparison. During his visit to Mozambique, Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia in January 2014 Prime Minister Abe used this comparison to differentiate Japan’s interaction in Africa from that of China – but in doing so he also reinforced the view that the “China factor” is an element within Japan’s strategy in Africa. Speaking in Mozambique Abe’s spokesman admitted Japan is lagging behind China in terms of investment in Africa but told the BBC that Japan “cannot provide African leaders with beautiful houses or beautiful ministerial buildings.” He continued by saying that “Japan’s aid policy is to really aid the human capital of Africa.”264 These remarks were interpreted as directed towards China and its much debated policies (see Brautigam265) on the use of Chinese workers in Africa as well as perceptions that Chinese infrastructure projects include frivolous government prestige buildings.

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263 Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo 5 November 2013
Indeed Beijing’s response took place in the Chinese-built US$ 200 million266 new headquarters of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, where China’s Ambassador to Ethiopia told a news conference that Abe was “the biggest troublemaker in Asia.”267 While Chinese workers living in Addis Ababa protested outside the Japanese embassy,268 the ambassador also responded to Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine369 the previous month, by holding up graphic photos which he said showed victims of Japanese atrocities in World War II and said he wanted to inform Africans about Japan’s record in Asia.270 This incident is remarkable for not only bringing African attention to the poor state of Sino-Japanese relations, but in demonstrating how history continues to shape mutual perceptions of engagement between Japan and China. Indeed, as the Economist observes, by resorting to history the Chinese ambassador passed-over an opportunity to comment on the hypocrisy of Japan’s own foreign policy positions, and instead referenced events over seventy years old that have no resonance with an African audience.271

Therefore when considering how the “China factor” should be considered in terms of a neoclassical realist analysis of Japan’s renewed engagement in Africa, it is significant in two respects. Firstly, China’s remarkable economic growth in the past 30 years has fundamentally shifted structural power dynamics. Secondly, the historical animosities between the two countries influence the perceptions of these systemic changes by Japanese policymakers. Consequently in the context of

269 The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine in Tokyo that is dedicated to the souls of Japanese who have died in the name of their country. However, the shrine is controversial in that those venerated include convicted war criminals and visits to the Shrine by sitting Japanese Prime Ministers invokes outrage and protest in many countries especially China and South Korea. Prime Minister Abe visited the Shrine on 26 December 2013
270 New York Times, “Between China and Japan, a tug-of-war over Africa”
this study, China’s presence in Africa matters to Japanese policymakers because it is China. While there is an emerging discourse around a “new scramble for Africa”, it is apparent that what China does is more significant to Japan than what India or France does. Thus the particular context in which China’s activities and intentions are interpreted in Japan is important. The following chapters will therefore explore the complex dynamics underpinning relations between the two states as they make up an important component within the intervening domestic factors such as elite perception driving the development of Japan’s policy in Africa.

Furthermore, the role of domestic perception as an intervening consideration in the policy response of Japan to changes in the global structure – most notably the rise of China – explains the significant role that the “China Factor” continues to play in Japan’s strategy in Africa. And although the scale and extent of China’s economic activities in Africa far outweigh those of Japan, increased Japanese engagement is going to bring increased opportunities for mutual interaction – which will in turn be defined by the broader dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations. Thus China’s presence in Africa matters to Japanese policymakers because of the particular context in which China’s activities and intentions are interpreted and should be included in the broader analysis of the strategic considerations underlying Japan’s re-engagement in Africa.

3.3 Economic Revitalisation

Japan has experienced two decades of economic stagnation, and resultantly, stimulating economic growth has remained a central policy feature of every administration since the early 1990s (for
example, see works by Garside,\textsuperscript{272} Hutchison and Westermann,\textsuperscript{273} Kojo,\textsuperscript{274} and Lincoln\textsuperscript{275}). Indeed the importance of regaining economic vitality is viewed in Japan as a strategic imperative that underpins Japan’s status in the global hierarchy. In this regard the potential benefit of increased economic engagement with Africa is understood in this study to align with a key objective of Japanese policymakers: economic revitalisation. This section will therefore examine the economic potential of Africa in the context of Japan’s strategic objective of reinvigorating its economy. In this respect this study considers Japan’s economic stagnation as a structural power consideration for Japanese policymakers and therefore a driver of its foreign policy approaches towards Africa.

The second Abe administration has promoted the concept of “Abenomics” as a policy intended to drive structural reforms within the Japanese economy – accompanied by fiscal stimulus and monetary easing.\textsuperscript{276} “Abenomics” however are significant in the context of Africa in that they reinforce a policy of greater investment and trade with Africa which began in 2008 during the administration of Yasuo Fukuda (2007-2008). As a deputy director at JICA explains, in 2008 Prime Minister Fukuda “reconsidered the relationship with Africa.”\textsuperscript{277} But as Hirano also notes, “economic relations between Africa and Japan are, in a sense, a mirror of the dynamics of the Japanese economy itself.”\textsuperscript{278} Up to this point the contraction of Japan’s economy had been accompanied by a pulling-back of many Japanese companies from Africa as businesses decreased their operations and closed offices.

\textsuperscript{274} Kojo, Yoshiko, “A freer foreign policy? Abe’s foreign policy after the landslide victory”, \textit{Canada-Asia Agenda}, Issue 36, 18 December 2013
\textsuperscript{277} Author’s interview with deputy director general JICA, Tokyo 2 October 2013
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Japan’s “withdrawal” from Africa was driven by two corresponding factors. Firstly, economic stagnation following the bursting of the so-called bubble economy and the resultant reduction in demand for Africa’s natural resources and secondly, the decline in real per capita GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1980s to the early 2000s meant the continent was not a viable market for Japanese companies. Hirano explains that “as Africa became almost negligible to the Japanese economy, the country’s business community lost interest in the region’s economic potential.”

Consequently, as the figure below indicates, trade between Japan and Africa contracted since the 1970s and then remained skewed towards the long established market of South Africa.

Figure 6: Japan’s trade with Africa (percentage share of imports and exports)

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279 Ibid
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Africa’s economy however started to grow at the beginning of this century, with the average growth rate for Sub-Saharan Africa from 2003 until the Lehman Shock in 2008 standing at 19.5 per cent, which was higher than China’s 18.6 per cent. Yet Japan was not positioned to benefit from these fast-growing emerging economies in Africa. As the chief researcher at JETRO explains, “Japan’s economic interests were focused on Asia, and Africa only accounted for approximately one per cent of Japan’s economic interest.”

Furthermore, as Figures 6 and 7 indicate, Japan has been falling behind the other major economies in both importing from and exporting to Africa – thereby further highlighting the extent to which Japan is a marginal player in the region. Quite apart from the declining trade with Africa, of further concern to Japan’s policymakers is the overall growth in trade with Africa from the other major world economies, and the inability of Japan’s economy to respond to the potential. Therefore as a consequence of Japan’s poor trade relations with Africa, “Abenomics” now combines structural reforms within Japan’s economy with the recognition that Africa represents the last frontier of investment, and resource exploitation. Indeed as Prime Minister Abe stated in his address to the UN General Assembly in October 2013, “Japan will also continue to extend cooperation to the countries of Africa, which are certain to become a growth engine this century.”

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281 Hirano, Katsumi “TICAD and National Interest of Japan”
282 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 27 September 2013
Figure 7 indicates that there has been an overall increase in exports to Africa since the early 2000s – reflecting both economic growth on the continent and the emergence of consumer markets. Indeed the *Economist* expects the average African economy to grow at an annual rate of seven per cent over the next twenty years.\(^{285}\) Therefore as a deputy director at JICA explains, for the Japanese government “Africa is very important.” This economic expansion and emergence of a middle class has led Japan to “reconsider the African consumer market”\(^ {286}\) and ultimately develop methods of tactical engagement accordingly. As Professor Kataoka further reiterates, the best way to understand Japan’s role in Africa today is necessity – “the necessity to diversify trade partners.” This has resulted in the recognition of Africa as a trade partner for the first time.\(^ {287}\) Thus while stimulating trade and investment is the primary policy response to the strategic objective of

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\(^{284}\) Hirano, Katsumi “TICAD and National Interest of Japan”, Presentation: Policy advisory group seminar towards TICAD V, London 18-19 January 2013


\(^{286}\) Author’s interview with deputy director general JICA, Tokyo 2 October 2013

\(^{287}\) Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
revitalising the economy, as will be discussed in the following chapters, this is realised in Africa through an investment-led approach to aid policy and resource-based equity investments.

In addition, when considering imports from Africa, as depicted in the Figure above, Japan is again seen to be lagging someway behind the other major economic powers. Given that African exports remain predominantly resource-based, the low level of Japanese imports from Africa reflects a number of factors, most significantly, the growing presence of African oil producers – as much of the exports depicted in this graph comprise energy exports. Diversification of supply has been an integral component of Japan’s energy security strategy for decades, yet the country remains

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overwhelmingly dependent on the Middle East. Consequently ensuring energy and resource security is emerging as an important strategic objective when considering Japan’s re-engagement in Africa.

3.4 Ensure Resource and Energy Security

Japan’s re-engagement with Africa is occurring under very different geopolitical and geo-economic conditions than during the 1960s and 1970s, yet one key driver remains the same: access to natural resources. Japan today faces the challenge of maintaining its economic position and carving a space for political relevance in a global order increasingly influenced by brash emerging powers, against the backdrop of the enduring reality that is the country’s lack of natural resources. Japan’s limited endowment of natural resources has been a defining factor in its strategic and economic policies since the Meiji era and the emergence of industrialisation. Thus while access to mineral resources and energy security have been perennial factors within Japan’s strategic considerations for decades, in recent years these issues are once again at the forefront of Japanese policy in Africa. As the senior researcher at JETRO explains, “Africa is re-emerging again as the government recognises the serious situation of the need for natural resource security.”

This section will therefore examine Japan’s strategic objective of ensuring energy and resource security in the context of the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research. In terms of this framework, the structural conditions of global energy and resource markets are interpreted and acted upon by Japanese policymakers and shape Japan’s engagement in Africa. And while this study gives particular attention to the question of energy security and its impact on Japanese policy in

289 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 27 September 2013
South Sudan, it does not however engage extensively in the literature on “energy security” but relies on a basic understanding of energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.” In addition it recognises two key assumptions outlined by Sovacool that underpin an understanding of the concept – namely the concentration of energy fuels (geographically) and their rates of depletion – thus making oil importing countries vulnerable to oil price shocks. This interpretation is summarised by Wesley who points out that as more countries become more dependent on imported energy, they become more vulnerable to irregularities of supply and affordability. In this regard he refers to the hysteresis effect of energy – where a single disturbance affects the course of the economy. Consequently, as Yergin explains, “we are living in a new age of energy supply anxiety” where the “starting point for energy security today, as it has always been, is diversification of supplies and sources.”

As the chief economist at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) explains, since the oil crisis of 1973 “energy security has always been the number one priority for Japanese policy making.” Indeed former Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso observed that “energy security is an indispensable subject even in general discussions about foreign policy.” This is because as a MOFA official described, the energy crisis in 1973 effectively ended the high growth period of the Japanese economy and pushed energy security to the forefront of policy making until the mid-1990s when energy prices collapsed. But by the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, oil prices had reached a record high, and

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294 Author’s interview with chief economist and managing director IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
296 Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo 5 November 2013
energy security was once again a preoccupation of policymakers – becoming a central feature of Japan’s foreign policy agenda. Consequently, Japan’s energy security policy in the period following the crisis of 1973 was focused on five key areas: energy diversification, energy import source diversification, oil stockpiling, energy conservation and strengthening ties with major oil and gas producers. In many respects these efforts have been successful: Japan diversified its energy sources – including the use of nuclear power until the post-Fukushima shutdown – improved energy efficiency, and has large oil stockpiles to manage demand. Yet the country’s reliance on imported fossil fuels remains, as well as its dependence on the Middle East. Indeed as the Figure below indicates, the Middle East accounts for approximately 83 per cent of Japan’s crude imports – up from 70 per cent in the mid-1980s.

Figure 9: Japan’s crude oil imports by source (2012)

Source: United States Energy Information Administration

297 Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo 30 October 2013
298 Following the meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant as a result of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in March 2011, all of Japan’s nuclear power stations were shut down. This is discussed further in Chapter Five
300 Ibid
Thus as discussed in Chapter Five, a MOFA director admits that Japan’s policy of diversification of supply has been failing for the past three decades, but that the essential goal remains the same. And while the government is concerned about overreliance on a single region and the threat of a 1973-type oil shock – domestic refiners and distributors are focused more on the cost implications of moving away from Middle Eastern oil for which there are established and cost-effective procurement systems in place.

Furthermore, when considered in the context of the Figure below which shows that despite a slight decrease in Japanese demand for oil, the rapid growth of China and India effectively means greater competition on world markets and higher prices of crude oil – energy security is once again a central element within Japan’s foreign policy agenda. Indeed as Klare points out, when China overtook Japan as the world’s second biggest importer of petroleum it raised the level of anxiety in Japan, “prompting an intensified search for foreign sources of energy – a search that will become more frantic with time.” The renewed focus on energy security for Japanese policy makers also emphasises the role of structural pressures on the development of foreign policy objectives.

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301 Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo 30 October 2013
302 At the end of the research period for this study in December 2013 the composite price of crude oil was US$105. Data available at: Index Mundi, accessed 13 February 2015, http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil&months=60
303 Klare, Michael, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet how scarce energy is creating a new world order, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008, p. 87
In this context, and given that it is believed that one-third of the world’s new oil discoveries since the year 2000 have taken place in Africa, the continent is emerging as a new frontier of energy diplomacy. Consequently, as explored in Chapter Five, a significant method of engagement by Japan in South Sudan and more broadly in the region is a policy of pursuing upstream equity concessions – or *Hinomaru Oil*. Thus as the IEEJ explains, energy investments in Africa are largely initiated by the government, who then request private companies to participate later – and although this is not true of every energy investment, it does indicate a policy-driven approach to resource investment in Africa. Moreover in the context of neoclassical realism this policy can be understood as an example of how

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306 Hinomaru can be translated from Japanese as “Circle of the Sun” and is used to refer to the national flag of Japan
307 *Hinomaru Oil* refers to oil developed and imported to Japan by a Japanese company
308 Author’s interview with Manager at IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
states seek to shape the international environment so as to eliminate uncertainty. Indeed as outlined in Chapter Five, Japan’s poor endowment of energy resources is perceived by policymakers as a defining vulnerability within the country’s material power profile.

It is also important to note therefore that energy is but one component of Japan’s interest in Africa’s resource sectors. For example Japan’s vice-minister of economy, trade and industry, Yoshihiko Isozaki revealed in February 2014 a new assistance package that would see Japan’s public and private sector invest US$ 32 billion in infrastructure, human and mineral resource development in Africa over the next five years; of which two billion dollars would come from Japanese government-affiliated agencies and go towards accelerating resource development projects. Isozaki noted that Africa was the “starting point” of the supply chain for the minerals Japan needed to produce cars and electronic appliances.309

Thus while the broad strategic objective of securing resources is defining Japan’s engagement with different regions in different ways, it can be clearly identified as a factor underpinning Japan’s re-engagement in Africa – and in turn influencing its methods of engagement. When considering the structural factors driving Japan’s re-engagement in Africa, it is apparent that energy security is also among the issues motivating Japan’s evolving assertiveness and presence on the continent. The Fukushima disaster and subsequent shutdown of the country’s nuclear power plants in 2011 came after a prolonged period of rapidly growing demand for oil and gas in China, India, and the growing economies of South East Asia which had driven oil prices to an all-time high in 2008. This in turn created an atmosphere of urgency in securing energy supplies among Japanese policymakers that coincided with efforts to increase Japan’s economic presence in Africa. Consequently, Chapter Five will explore the

significance of Toyo Tsusho’s bid to develop an alternative pipeline in South Sudan in the context of Japan’s renewed structural-driven policy focus on resource security.

3.5 Meet International Security Commitments

The final structural driver considered by this study to be relevant to Japan’s engagement in Africa relates to the country’s complicated domestic security considerations, and its ambitions to play a more recognisable role in multilateral security engagements. In this regard Japan’s deployment of peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa are significant. While these deployments are discussed in more depth in Chapter Six, it is important to recognise the structural context in which Japan’s African security deployments are occurring.

As Vosse, Drifte and Blechinger-Talcott observe, since the end of the Cold War “Japan’s security environment has changed quite significantly.” A view emphasised by Hemmings who points out that “three trends have dominated the region over the last decade: the growth of Chinese power, the relative decline of US power and the resulting remilitarisation of Japanese power.” It is in this context that Hughes notes that in the past 40 years Japan has incrementally raised its defence budget, expanded the range of its security operations, and elevated the profile of the defence forces. And while Hughes’ primary argument is that these are indicators of the country’s remilitarisation despite its pacifist constitution, they also reflect Japan’s response to a challenging

312 Hughes, Christopher Japan’s remilitarization, Oxford:Routledge, 2009
security environment in the post-Cold War era. Thus in detailing Japan’s security policy, MOFA notes that in the 21st Century Japan faces a “rapidly changing global power balance” combined with a “security environment around Japan that has become increasingly severe.”\footnote{313} As a consequence, the Japanese government has established a National Security Council (NSC) (operational from 4 December 2013) and developed a National Security Strategy (NSS) (adopted 17 December 2013).

The structural drivers of Japanese aspirations to play a greater role in multilateral security operations are outlined in the NSS which details Japan’s intention to be a “proactive contributor to peace” while at the same time recognising that “Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.”\footnote{314} In this regard, Japan’s international status is advanced through the security contributions in Africa examined in Chapter Six. Indeed Black and Hwang (drawing on the work of Sunstein\footnote{315}) argue that participation in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden is evidence that Japanese policymakers “intend to transform the dominant norms of international society” and attain great power status.\footnote{316} As they continue to point out, in the case of anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, Japan operates like a fully-fledged “Great Power contributing both materially and normatively to international society.”\footnote{317} Thus while this study will not engage meaningfully with the literature on great powers (for example see works by Kennedy,\footnote{318})

\footnote{317} Ibid, p. 444
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Mearsheimer, or Wohlforth\(^{320}\) the following chapters will explore Japan’s stated intention to raise its profile through increased commitments to international security operations.

The NSS also highlights as an objective “to improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order.”\(^{321}\) In this regard the Strategy outlines a commitment by Japan to step-up its cooperation with UN bodies and provide further personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. Yet given that Japan’s only current UN deployment is with UNMISS in South Sudan, this further demonstrates the relevance of African-engagement for Japan’s international security commitments. Furthermore, the Security Strategy points out that “when participating in PKO [Peacekeeping Operations], Japan will endeavour to ensure effective implementation of its operations, through coordination with other activities, including ODA projects.”\(^{322}\) Thus while the link between ODA engagement and peacekeeping is explored in Chapter Six, it is important to recognise the role of security deployments within Japan’s broader international commitments as both a donor and a participant in multilateral forums.

Thus Japan’s strategic objective in meeting international security commitments through engagement in Africa recognises the structural context and goes some way towards achieving what Suzuki refers to as “recognition” or “legitimate status” as a great power.\(^{323}\) As Suzuki explains, Japan’s international commitments have long been derided as “chequebook diplomacy” – paying the cost of upholding international security but failing to make a normative contribution to international


\(^{321}\) Prime Minister of Japan’s Office, “National Security Strategy”

\(^{322}\) Ibid

society. Indeed as the Figure below indicates, Japan is the second highest funder of UN peacekeeping operations after the US, and along with Germany, the only non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) among the top six funders. Moreover, in striving for a “legitimate status” as a great power, Japan’s security commitments in Africa can also be viewed in the context of the country’s on-going bid to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC.

Figure 11: Top UN peacekeeping funders (percentage of total)\(^{325}\)

While the diplomatic significance of Africa in Japan’s thus-far unsuccessful bid to reform the UNSC is recognised throughout this research, it must also be considered among the factors driving Japan’s strategic and tactical engagement in Africa today. As Prime Minister Abe stated at the UN General Assembly in 2013, Japan will “spare no pains to get actively engaged in historic challenges facing today’s world.” Speaking of Japan’s “regained strength and capacity” Abe again confirmed that

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324 The UNSC permanent members are: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States, they are coloured darker on the graph

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“Japan’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the Council has not changed in the slightest.”\textsuperscript{326} Thus Abe underlined the link between Japan’s international commitments, its own renewed vitality, and ambitions to assume greater international relevance. In this context, Chapter Six will explore the extent to which Japan is using deployments in Africa to reinvent the parameters of the country’s commitment to multilateral security operations.

3.6 Conclusion

Given the neoclassical realist perspective through which this research is focused, this chapter has sought to outline the structural context against which to interpret Japan’s engagement in South Sudan. The following empirical chapters will therefore each address a “tactic” or element of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan that reflects a policy response to the structural pressures driving the overarching objectives of Japan’s presence in Africa.

As Kitchen points out, “the challenge for neoclassical realist explanations is to emphasise structural factors whilst allowing for their mediation through domestic political processes.”\textsuperscript{327} This chapter has therefore outlined the structural context against which the following empirical chapters should be understood. In this regard the structural drivers outlined in this chapter broadly guide Japan’s strategic objectives and underpin the tactical approaches to the country’s engagement in South Sudan that will be explored in the following chapters. In addition, factors such as the rise of China, Japan’s economic stagnation, or the emergence of the G20 are creating urgency in Japan’s foreign

\textsuperscript{326} Government of Japan, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations” 26 September 2013, accessed 2 April 2014, available at, \url{http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/statement/201309/26generaldebate_e.html}

policy approaches. And while these factors may not objectively reduce Japan’s power in absolute terms, as the following chapters will explore, they do impact on the perceptions of policymakers – and in turn, Japanese foreign policy. As Kitchen reiterates, “states have a choice of means with which they may pursue strategic goals” and the chapters that follow will therefore examine the particular aspects of Japan’s African engagement that reflect policy responses to current structural pressures.

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328 Ibid, p. 135
4. Strategic Official Development Assistance (ODA)

As previously outlined, there are a number of distinct strategic objectives driving Japan’s refocused engagement in Africa, which are in turn implemented through identifiable tactics, or methods of engagement. This chapter will therefore address the most recognisable dimension of Japan’s presence in Africa, as well as a key component of Japanese engagement in South Sudan: Official Development Assistance (ODA). Beyond detailing the scope and nature of Japan’s ODA commitments, this chapter will specifically explore the changes that have taken place in ODA policy since 2008 and assess the emergence of “strategic” ODA in the context of Japan’s presence in South Sudan.

Yet while this study reflects the growth and expansion underlying Japan’s re-engagement in Africa, it should be noted that in the case of ODA, the significant change relevant to this study is the approach and manner of ODA use within the broader spectrum of Japan’s Africa policy. This is because throughout the period of Japan’s “withdrawal” from Africa, the country remained an important international donor, and development assistance was the primary mechanism for Japanese interaction on the continent. Therefore today ODA is still the cornerstone of Japan’s Africa policy and is a fundamental tool in building diplomatic relationships and creating a platform for Japanese private sector engagement. Indeed Professor Aoki points out that “our strategy in Africa is mostly ODA.”

Author’s interview with Professor Kazutoshi Aoki, Nihon University, Tokyo, 7 November 2013
Many authors such as Hasagawa, Nestor, Scalapino, and Stirling argue that development aid was used by Japan in the post-war period to develop ties with resource-rich countries, and to pursue policies of economic self-interest. Davies further maintains that ODA increases “the visibility of Japan in the international arena”, and he points to the link between Japanese ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa and Japan’s strategic objectives such as seeking political support for a seat on a reformed UN Security Council – for which African backing is required. In this respect ODA is still used instrumentally by all donor countries – Japan included – but what this chapter will explore are the specific changes that have taken place in Japanese aid policy in Africa since 2008, and how these changes can be understood through a neoclassical realist perspective. Furthermore, the chapter will locate specific Japanese ODA projects in South Sudan within the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy objectives outlined in the previous chapter. Thus Japan’s aid presence in South Sudan can be understood to reflect Tokyo’s response to changes at the structural level, as well as being elements within a broader domestically-driven discourse on strengthening Japan’s international presence and image. Furthermore, this study will explore the extent to which South Sudan is a test-case for Japan’s emerging approach to an ODA-led multifaceted engagement in Africa.

The overview of Japan’s ODA white paper 2013 states,

The environment surrounding ODA has been significantly changing in recent years. Amid the rapid change of the political and security environment surrounding Japan, it is important to support countries which share

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Indeed Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida reiterates that “the environment surrounding us has changed significantly, especially in the past ten years, [Japan’s] ODA needs to evolve too.” In this regard, the evolution of Japan’s ODA policy reflects the key changes in Japan’s Africa policy that this study explores. Consequently, the focus and direction of Japan’s aid programme in South Sudan reflects not only the country’s acute developmental deficit, but also a response by Japanese policymakers to the structural changes and associated challenges outlined in Chapter Three.

Additionally, ODA remains the primary tactic of Japanese engagement in Africa, but as this chapter will highlight, it also reflects the changes in Japan’s approach to Africa. As Professor Kataoka explains, previously the government saw Africa as a place for aid, or eligible voters in international institutions – but this view is changing and Africa is now a “genuine partner for Japan.” And as the Professor continues to explain, Africa is now seen as a place for important investment and that “we now have a new era for Japan-Africa relations.”

### 4.1 JICA in South Sudan

Japan’s ODA engagement in South Sudan comprises bilateral and multilateral assistance or aid. As illustrated in the diagram below, bilateral assistance comprises the “Three Pillars” of grant aid, ODA loans, and technical cooperation. These aspects of Japan’s ODA provisions are managed by the

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337 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Japan’s ODA channelled through multilateral assistance comprises contributions to United Nations Agencies operating in South Sudan. In exploring the extent of Japan’s ODA presence in South Sudan, this section will focus on the role of JICA as an implementing agency, and briefly outline the ODA projects being undertaken in South Sudan.

Figure 12: Japan’s ODA engagement in South Sudan

Japan’s ODA policy is formulated by MOFA “in line with its foreign policy” under the guidance of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Council (OECC). Chaired by the prime minister, this body “identifies priority issues and regions to effectively utilise its ODA resources.” The meetings will often include participation from the chief cabinet Secretary, minister of foreign affairs, minister of finance, and the minister of economy trade and industry – thus demonstrating that ODA policy is developed at the very highest levels of government. Since the establishment of the OECC in 2006, “the Government of Japan has worked to reinforce the strategic nature of its international cooperation and enhance the effectiveness of its implementation.” In this respect JICA’s ODA activities in South Sudan directly reflect Japan’s foreign policy objectives. Objectives, which as this thesis

338 JICA, “An overview of Japan’s ODA and JICA”, resource material provided to author, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
maintains, are driven by the country’s place in the international system and are a product of its policymakers recognition of the need to increase Japan’s presence and profile in Africa.

JICA therefore is an implementing agency that operates under MOFA and the OECC’s strategic guidance to manage and coordinate the operations of Japan’s bilateral support for South Sudan. Thus while the strategic decision to support South Sudan is driven by MOFA and the OECC, JICA is responsible for the development of a “regional and thematic assistance strategy” that matches Japan’s ODA capabilities with the particular requirements of the target country. In the case of South Sudan, a JICA representative in Juba explained that Japan’s ODA is intended to align with the economic development objectives of South Sudan’s Development Plan (SSDP). In this regard, Japan’s bilateral grant aid projects in South Sudan that are outlined in the table below reflect the chronic need for infrastructure development in the country.

In addition, Japan’s ODA White Paper 2013 recognises the expanding demand for infrastructure and states that “Japan will be engaged in the facilitation of trans-boundary transport.” In this way South Sudan’s development requirements align comfortably with Japan’s ODA focus and historic strength. As Wild, Denny, Menocal and Geddes describe, the thematic focus of Japan’s ODA to Africa in the early 2000s reflects a predominant approach of debt relief and significant investment in infrastructure and basic services – “Japanese ODA in Africa has focused heavily on infrastructure and trade.” Thus while this chapter will outline the evolution of Japan’s ODA strategy after 2008 and the strategic significance of ODA support for South Sudan, it is worth noting that in terms of bilateral

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340 Author’s interview with chief representative, JICA, Juba 22 January 2013
342 Wild, Leni, Denny, Lisa, Menocal, Alina, Rocha, Geddes, Mathew, “Informing the Future of Japan’s ODA”, Overseas Development Institute, October 2011, p. 21
grant aid Japan still relies on what Wild, Denny, Menocal and Geddes describe as its “traditional spheres of operation.”[^343] And in this respect the changes in Japan’s ODA approach towards Africa since 2008 can be understood as both a return to historic methods of engagement as well as indicative of a broader re-engagement with the continent. Yet as this chapter will also explore, the inclusion of large-scale infrastructure projects within Japan’s ODA framework reflects an attempt to further differentiate its development approach and offerings from the main Western donors and as such, reflects the perception of policymakers that Japan needs to respond to Chinese methods of engagement in Africa.

The table below lists the current grant aid projects funded by Japan in South Sudan. The most significant of which is improving the Juba river port and construction of a US$ 100 million “Freedom Bridge” over the River Nile.[^344] Upgrading the river port is intended to improve transport links within the country as the lack of reliable road infrastructure between cities along the Nile such as Bor and Malakal make river transport vital to internal trade and the movement of people. Yet it is the Nile river bridge that is perhaps Japan’s most noteworthy ODA project in South Sudan – not only because of its cost but also because of its strategic importance to South Sudan and in advancing Japan’s position as a valued partner in the region. The development of a new bridge is immensely valuable because South Sudan is heavily dependent on trade with neighbouring countries – mainly Uganda and Kenya – importing foodstuffs, petroleum and almost all consumer products and building supplies.

[^343]: Ibid, p. 23
[^344]: Construction of the ‘Freedom Bridge’ was officially begun in March 2015 when the project was launched by President Kiir and Japanese Ambassador Takeshi Akamatsu. The bridge is estimated to be completed by 2018.
Table 1: Japan’s Bilateral Grant Aid to South Sudan 2012/13-2013/14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>US$ Value (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of water supply in Juba</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and rehabilitation of bridges / culverts in Juba</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of facilities and equipment of Multi-Service Training Centre</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of Juba river port</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of the Nile River bridge</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>217</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A new bridge over the Nile is of vital importance to South Sudan as the existing Juba Bridge currently provides the only crossing point over the Nile along the road connecting Juba and Uganda and as a JICA assessment concludes, “does not have sufficient structural capacity to accommodate increasing traffic volume and cargo.”346 Thus constructing a new bridge is a primary objective for the government, because quite apart from the immediate trade benefits, the bridge will form a significant symbolic and material indication of South Sudan’s desire to develop closer ties to its East African neighbours. As LeRiche and Arnold point out, “as is the case with Kenya, Uganda will be a critically important logistics outlet for South Sudan, since the road linking Juba to Northern Uganda via Nimule is the country’s key transport route.”347 As the chief executive of the East African Association, an organisation that represents foreign investors in the region explains, other countries in East Africa are starting to see South Sudan as a strong trading partner. Noting that South Sudan “is a growing market for Kenyan goods, pretty much everything you get there is imported from or

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345 Liaison Office of the Government of Japan in Juba, “Japan’s Assistance to South Sudan”, resource material provided to author, Juba, 29 January 2012
346 JICA, “Construction of New Nile Bridge”, resource material provided to author, Juba, 22 January 2013
347 LeRiche, Matthew, Arnold, Matthew, South Sudan, from revolution to independence, p. 204
through Kenya.” Indeed South Sudan is already Kenya’s third largest market for goods after Uganda and Tanzania, accounting for sales of approximately US$ 200 million worth of foodstuffs, manufactured goods, chemicals and textiles in 2012.

As LeRiche and Arnold also note, the discovery of oil in Lake Albert in Uganda opens the possibility for “regional cooperation and energy schemes, including infrastructure development such as pipelines.” Consequently, as discussed in Chapter Five, Japan’s involvement in the development of an alternative oil pipeline form South Sudan alongside key infrastructure projects such as the Nile bridge highlights Japan's important role in supporting South Sudan’s integration into the East African Community. Moreover, it emphasises the significance of East Africa – and South Sudan as a frontier – within Japan’s broader objectives in Africa.

Comprising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, the EAC is a common market that South Sudan applied to join shortly after independence in 2011. As a report by the Brookings Institute explains, this was motivated largely by the economic benefits from trade and commerce that it hopes to gain from having access to a much larger market. “In addition, it expects to be able to take advantage of the community’s existing infrastructure (especially airports, railways, roads and seaports) to improve its access to regional and global markets.” Yet perhaps a far greater consideration for the government in Juba is the statement it sends to Khartoum by committing its

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350 Ibid
economic and political future to East Africa. As was demonstrated in 2011 when Khartoum closed border crossings, South Sudan is susceptible to an economic blockade from Sudan.\textsuperscript{352} Resultantly, developing transport and trade links within the EAC is a significant strategic as well as economic objective of the government in Juba. In this regard, Japan’s ODA contributions are substantial.

The Nile bridge is expected to be completed at the end of 2018,\textsuperscript{353} and as JICA explains will “provide an alternative and more reliable access to Juba from neighbouring countries”, as well as form part of a ring-road that will improve traffic flow in the city.\textsuperscript{354} Thus the Nile bridge along with upgrading of the river port is of both strategic and developmental importance in ensuring the viability of South Sudan. Moreover, when combined with the infrastructure development undertaken by the contingent of Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) engineers deployed as peacekeepers with the UN, Japan’s support to South Sudan is significant. However while the provision of essential infrastructure through ODA grant aid is an important contribution to the economic development of South Sudan, Japanese corporations are also benefiting from Japan’s ODA engagement in South Sudan.

For example, the river port upgrade is being managed by the Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan (OCDI) with the engineering work being undertaken by the Japanese engineering company Katahira & Engineers International (KEI). OCDI is a non-profit organisation established in 1976 under the authority of the Japanese government to undertake research and the development of ports in developing countries.\textsuperscript{355} KEI’s website explains that the company has implemented “numerous grant aid and technical cooperation projects under the sponsorship and supervision of

\textsuperscript{352} Reliefweb, “North, South Sudan agree to open border crossings”, 18 September 2011, accessed 23 April 2014, available at \url{http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/north-south-sudan-agree-open-border-crossings}

\textsuperscript{353} The bridge was originally expected to be completed by 2016, but the conflict in South Sudan delayed construction

\textsuperscript{354} JICA, “Construction of New Nile Bridge”, resource material provided to author, Juba, 22 January 2013

\textsuperscript{355} Author’s interview with OCDI representative, Juba, 22 January 2013
JICA.” As the website goes on to outline, KEI has provided consulting engineering services to the Japanese government through ODA-funded transport-sector projects for over 30 years.\(^{356}\) Another Japanese engineering firm (CTI Engineering Co. Ltd.) is undertaking the upgrading of bridges and culverts in Juba and the construction of the Nile bridge. Thus a significant component of Japan’s private sector presence in South Sudan is as a result of Japanese ODA spending.

As Wild, Denny, Menocal and Geddes explain, “Japan’s aid is often tied\(^ {357}\) to the use of Japanese organisations and expertise”, and in recent years the providers of this assistance have reportedly broadened, to “include both private sector and civil society organisations.”\(^ {358}\) However as a JICA representative in South Sudan explains, within Japan’s ODA framework the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS) is responsible for procurement related to grant aid and technical cooperation. With JICS involvement contractors are selected through international bidding while JICA contractors are “Japan-tied.”\(^ {359}\) Thus in the case of South Sudan there is one Japanese construction contractor registered in the country and Japanese companies are undertaking all of Japan’s major ODA-funded infrastructure projects. Indeed as Professor Kataoka explains, the first “pillar” of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan “is a typical one – ODA construction.”\(^ {360}\)

Given that Japan has not extended any ODA loans to South Sudan, the final area of JICA’s involvement in the country is through the provision of technical assistance. As a JICA representative

\(^{357}\) For a more detailed discussion on “tied aid” see:
\(^{358}\) Wild, Leni, Denny, Lisa, Menocal, Alina, Rocha, Geddes, Mathew, “Informing the Future of Japan’s ODA”, p. 19
\(^{359}\) Author’s interview with chief representative, JICA, Juba 22 January 2013
\(^{360}\) Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo 7 October 2013
Jeremy Taylor
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in Juba explains, there are a limited number of countries that can repay loans, and for that reason Japan tends to provide loans to “those countries most likely to make regular repayments.”

Technical assistance or cooperation is an all-embracing term used to describe practical support for the target country. As such, technical cooperation can include the deployment of JICA experts, capacity development for local officials, the supply of equipment or financial assistance. Technical assistance projects therefore are intended to address a broad range of needs and are usually developed and implemented in consultation with the host government. The table below outlines Japan’s technical assistance projects in South Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>US$ Value (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enhance operations and management of inland waterways</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support management capacity of Urban Water Corporation</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable road maintenance and management in Juba</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve basic skills and vocational training</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support capacity development for solid waste management in Juba</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen science and mathematics education</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional capacity development of South Sudan TV and radio</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and support for social economic infrastructure Malakal</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Agricultural Development Master Plan</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation Master Plan</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>76.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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361 Author’s interview with chief representative, JICA, Juba 22 January 2013
362 Liaison Office of the Government of Japan in Juba, “Japan’s Assistance to South Sudan”, resource material provided to author, Juba, 29 January 2012
Given that South Sudan is characterised by multiple priorities, Japan’s technical assistance is directed across a number of sectors: health, education, vocational training, rural development and infrastructure. As JICA resource material outlines, the organisation is reviewing its aid priorities so as to better streamline the portfolio in terms of the SSDP and aid harmonisation initiatives of South Sudan’s government. However the technical assistance projects outlined in the table above reflect two of the four priority areas identified in the SSDP – namely the Economic Development Pillar and the Social and Human Development Pillar.

The Economic Development Pillar comprises three sectors: natural resources, infrastructure and economic functions. The section focused on natural resources aims to increase agricultural production so as to improve food security and improve livelihoods. JICA’s development of comprehensive agricultural and irrigation plans are therefore intended to align with the priorities identified by the SSDP. Furthermore as previously outlined, Japan’s grant aid contributions are focused on strategic infrastructure, and in addition, JICA’s technical assistance is also aimed largely at the development of critical infrastructure such as inland waterways and the construction and rehabilitation of Juba’s road network. While JICA’s programmes around the Social and Human Development Pillar focus on the capacity development of public service providers, with priority given to science and math education as well as nursing and midwifery training.

In comparison to bilateral assistance, Japan’s multilateral assistance to South Sudan is handled directly by MOFA, and via this mechanism provides humanitarian support through international

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363 JICA, “Helping Realise “Inclusive and Dynamic” development – JICAS’s role in South Sudan”, resource material provided to author, Juba, 22 January 2013
365 JICA, “Helping Realise “Inclusive and Dynamic” development – JICAS’s role in South Sudan”, resource material provided to author, Juba, 22 January 2013
organisations and a small number of Japanese NGOs. The Association for Aid and Relief (AAR) Japan, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) Japan, Japan Emergency NGO (JEN), Peace Winds Japan, and World Vision Japan all have operations in South Sudan – though the lion’s share of Japanese humanitarian assistance is made through UN agencies, as the table below indicates.

Table 3: Japan’s multilateral assistance through international organisations 2012/13–2013/14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>US$ Value (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency intervention for vulnerable populations – including refugees</td>
<td>UNICEF(^{367})</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food assistance for conflict affected population</td>
<td>WFP(^{368})</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection and early reintegration of IDPs and returnees</td>
<td>UNHCR(^{369})</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration and protection for displaced groups</td>
<td>UNIDO(^{370})</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>UNDP(^{371})</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration and community security and arms control</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of South Sudan education sector</td>
<td>UNESCO(^{372})</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border control and migration management</td>
<td>IOM(^{373})</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency aid for Sudanese refugees in South Sudan</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>44.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{366}\) Liaison Office of the Government of Japan in Juba, “Japan’s Assistance to South Sudan”, resource material provided to author, Juba, 29 January 2012

\(^{367}\) United Nations Children’s Fund

\(^{368}\) World Food Programme

\(^{369}\) United Nations High Commission for Refugees

\(^{370}\) United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

\(^{371}\) United Nations Development Programme

\(^{372}\) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

\(^{373}\) International Organisation for Migration
While the extent of Japan’s humanitarian assistance through UN agencies reflects support for South Sudan, it is also a reflection of Japan’s intention to demonstrate a broader commitment to international engagement and support for multilateral institutions. As Kawai and Takagi explain, despite Japan’s generous contributions to multilateral institutions, “many in the international development community criticise Japan for a heavy emphasis on bilateral loans to economic infrastructure-related projects and for restrained willingness to participate more openly in a multilateral framework.”

Thus much like the decision to commit peacekeepers (as discussed in Chapter Six), South Sudan is emerging as an important location for Japan to demonstrate its support for multilateral international institutions and processes. As the Figure below indicates, Japan is the second-highest contributor to the regular budget of the UN, yet its approach to bilateral grant assistance has in some respects overshadowed its contributions to multilateral institutions.

Figure 13: Japan’s contribution as percentage to the regular budget of the UN 2011

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

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Undeniably, Japan makes significant contributions in multilateral aid through international institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional banks. For example as Schriver and Mroczkowski detail, in 2010 Japan contributed US$ 3.68 billion to multilateral institutions, and relative to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 2005-2009, Japan made up the single largest share of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) gross multilateral ODA disbursements, with 16 per cent of OECD contributions. Yet despite this, and the importance of the “visibility of Japanese aid” being stipulated in Japan’s ODA Charter, Kawai and Takagi point to Japan’s “dual position as a generous multilateral provider and hesitant multilateral partner.” As Kawai and Takagi continue to explain, Japan has distanced itself from attempts by other OECD DAC donors to create a “common fund” from pooled resources. Noting that “for the most part, when it comes to the use of bilateral resources, Japan still prefers to work alone, fearing that its already low visibility will become even more diminished if its resources are to be pooled with other donors.”

Indeed this hesitancy to engage in multilateral donor partnerships is evidenced in South Sudan where Japan did not join the Joint Donor Team (JDT). Operating from 2006 until 2013, the JDT was established by the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK – later joined by Denmark and Canada, with the primary objective of overseeing the multi-donor funds to which the joint donor partners had contributed. Japan however whilst an engaged member of the OECD DAC group of donor

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376 This does not count disbursements to the European Development Fund (EDF) and European Union budgets
377 DAC is a forum within which OECD donors discuss aid policies and development assistance strategies
380 Kawai, Masahiro, and Takagi, Shinji, “Japan’s Official Development Assistance: Recent issues and future directions”, p. 269
381 Ibid
countries maintained a separate identity for its ODA presence in Southern Sudan and then in the new republic after 2011. This desire by Japan to develop an independent identity as a donor is explored further in Section 4.4 and it reflects a distinct policy decision to increase the profile of Japan’s aid engagement in Africa. Consequently, despite significant multilateral contributions in South Sudan, Japan’s focus remains on bilateral engagement. This is largely because bilateral aid is more useful as a tool of foreign policy, and as this study demonstrates, the shift in Japan’s aid priorities in Africa since 2008 reflect the systemic pressures and incentives driving Japanese ODA strategy.

Accordingly, Japan’s grant aid and technical assistance programmes delivered in terms of its bilateral ODA strategy in South Sudan are integral components of its engagement in the country. As the following chapters will outline, ODA ties together Japan’s peacekeeping commitment and the bid to develop an alternative oil pipeline by the Sogo Sosha Toyota Tsusho. In this regard ODA became the primary “face” of Japan in South Sudan – underpinning its diplomatic and investment activities. Indeed, Japan’s ODA engagement in Sudan began in 2003 two years before the signing of the CPA and as such defined the trajectory of Japan’s later engagement in the country. In underlining this point, a director at MOFA reiterated that “South Sudan is important, and there are various reasons to support this new country.”

Yet as DeWaard argues, the perceived national interests that may have informed the decision to establish a country’s national aid program may or may not be those that explain its continuation or define its current character. In this respect DeWaard points out that “national interests are subject

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383 Authors’ interview with director, MOFA, Tokyo 5 November 2013
to change” and with them the intent and the method of ODA engagement. Similarly, Tokyo’s relationship with Juba evolved from purely humanitarian support to encompass much broader diplomatic, economic and security dimensions. As the following section will examine, the complex conditions in Sudan following the signing of the CPA and South Sudan’s independence were important factors in the development of Japan’s aid priorities and approaches in Africa during this period.

4.1.1 The Evolution of Japan’s ODA Support for South Sudan

Japan’s interaction with Sudan began before the signing of the CPA when JICA reopened an office in Khartoum that had been shut following the escalation of the Sudanese civil war. As a deputy director general at JICA explains, “MOFA had an interest in participating in the peace process and they were very slow to act – as usual.” But as the JICA representative continues, “it was madam Ogata who strongly drove operations in South Sudan to assess their needs – this was the starting point of JICA’s involvement.”

Former President of JICA Sadako Ogata is a highly respected and experienced development professional who served as the chairperson of the UNICEF board and as the high commissioner for refugees before heading-up JICA from 2003 until 2012. Under her leadership JICA restructured so that “peacebuilding and reconstruction assistance could be started in a country or area immediately after the end of conflict” – and Sudan was an important step in that evolution. In this regard JICA conducted a field survey of the states of southern Sudan in 2005 shortly before the signing of the final agreements of the CPA, and set about developing a programmatic approach focused on the “transition from humanitarian assistance to

385 Author’s interview with deputy director General, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
reconstruction.” Among the first projects undertaken in this period was the initial rehabilitation of the Nile River port in Juba – which is now being further developed and expanded as part of Japan’s current grant aid projects.

Thus throughout the CPA period, JICA expanded its operations in Sudan in terms of the methodology promoted by madam Ogata – namely a greater focus on field presence, human security, and an emphasis on peacebuilding in Africa. During this period JICA allocated more staff to the field, undertook programmes outside of Khartoum and Juba, and expanded the human security approach that came to define JICA’s operational focus. While discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, human security was founded on the concept that socially vulnerable people are protected from diverse threats and empowered to address those threats. Furthermore, JICA’s focus on peacebuilding during that period also underpinned Japan’s engagement in Sudan during the CPA period.

However despite JICA’s strong developmental approach to engagement in Sudan, politics have remained an important factor. The underlying principle of the CPA was to “make unity attractive” and as a JICA representative describes “we tried to balance [our approach] between North and South – especially with regards the possible succession of the South.” In this regard a further complication for Japan was the extent to which it should align with US policy in its opposition to the regime in Khartoum. But as the JICA representative continues, “Japan had no hidden agendas to separate the country – unlike say the US.” The role of Japanese support for US policy in Africa is explored further in Chapter Six, but it should be noted here that while the US as a leading member of a “Troika” comprising the United Kingdom and Norway which supported the CPA negotiations,

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387 Ibid
388 Ibid
389 Author’s interview with deputy director General, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
390 Ibid
was also a key supporter of the SPLA and in the eyes of many in South Sudan ultimately delivered the country’s independence.\textsuperscript{391} Japan’s role however was far less conspicuous despite the considerable number of international actors engaged in witnessing the CPA and supporting its implementation. In this respect the country had maintained its traditional low diplomatic profile while providing multilateral financial support.

For example, Japan provided support for the implementation of several key CPA milestones including the elections in 2010 and the Southern Sudan referendum in 2011. Following the formation of the Government of National Unity in 2005, the next significant milestone outlined by the CPA was legislative and executive elections to be held in April 2010. In this regard Japan extended emergency multilateral grant aid of approximately US$ 10 million through UNDP to support the general elections. Japan’s assistance was used for the procurement of ballot papers and boxes, and an awareness-raising campaign for political participation aimed specifically at women voters.\textsuperscript{392}

A further multilateral contribution made by Japan to the CPA process was through support for the referendum on southern Sudanese independence. The referendum held in January 2011 was the final milestone outlined in the Naivasha Agreement,\textsuperscript{393} and would result in a definite determination of whether southern Sudan would remain part of Sudan or become an independent country. Japan dispatched a 15-member Referendum Observation Mission mandated under the International Peace Cooperation Law. The law stipulates the structures and procedures for Japan’s active contribution

\textsuperscript{391} Author’s interview with SPLM official, Juba, 31 January 2013
\textsuperscript{393} The set of agreements that comprise the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) are also known as the “Naivasha Agreement.” This is because many of the separate protocols and agreements that make up the CPA were signed in the Kenyan town of Naivasha.
to international peace, including UN peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian relief operations, and international election observation operations. In addition, Japan provided through the UNDP a grant of US$ 8.17 million for voter education, media training and the procurement of voter registration and voting materials.\textsuperscript{394}

A third element of Japan’s multilateral support for the CPA process was by contributing funding to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme. The CPA’s Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements agreement mandated a sustainable ceasefire and disengagement of armed groups followed by a DDR process for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA. Through the UNDP Japan assisted the DDR programme from 2005 and provided a second tranche of US$ 10.7 million in 2011.\textsuperscript{395} Furthermore, JICA ran a technical cooperation project that provided training for teachers at vocational training centres intended to provide training for ex-combatants. In this way Japan’s support for the DDR programme operated through both multilateral grant aid via the UNDP and technical cooperation managed by JICA.

Alongside Japan’s multilateral support for CPA implementation and JICA’s growing presence in Sudan during this period, the Japanese government also began considering the deployment of peacekeepers. While discussed further in Chapter Six, a JICA representative explains that the decision to send peacekeepers to South Sudan in 2012 was the culmination of a long process, and that the government “had been exploring the possibility since 2008/9”\textsuperscript{396} when three GSDF representatives were deployed to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). But it was only with South Sudan’s independence that the final decision was made, and the “second pillar” of Japan’s engagement in the country realised. When viewed in the context of this study however, the process

\textsuperscript{394} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “TICAD 4 report: Consolidation of peace / good governance”
\textsuperscript{395} Ibid
\textsuperscript{396} Author’s interview with deputy directorGeneral, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
of expanding Japan’s physical presence in Sudan that began in 2008 is a significant indicator of the country’s intention to increase its profile in Africa. It further demonstrates the extent to which South Sudan became a test-case for Japan’s transition from a low profile donor to that of a fully-engaged international actor operating in the country.

Yet with South Sudan’s independence Japan’s ODA funds were effectively split between the two countries. And while this study demonstrates the growing strategic and economic rationale for Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, from the perspective of development assistance, Japan has maintained a balanced approach between the two countries. As Professor Fukushima explains “if you look at ODA, the two Sudans receive equal shares – and Japan is careful not to isolate one or the other.”397 The professor goes on to note that “Sudan is at the edge of collapse” and Japan’s policy is therefore very careful to not exacerbate this instability.

A further dimension to understanding JICA’s continued engagement in South Sudan is the leadership of its current president, Professor Akihiko Tanaka and his scholarly contribution to the understanding of “fragile states.” The influence of Professor Tanaka in shaping a new approach for JICA in Africa is explored in the following section yet as a JICA representative describes, “Professor Tanaka is interested in political issues” and fragile states in Africa – “South Sudan, the Sahel region and Somalia.”398 Tanaka has observed that “the conditions of developing countries are diverse and the conventional dichotomy [developed versus developing countries] is insufficient.”399 In this regard JICA is developing a nuanced approach to addressing the complex issues that face South Sudan. As previously outlined, South Sudan’s vulnerability to internal and external shocks combined with weak

397 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
398 Author’s interview with deputy director General, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
governance and an overreliance on oil revenues presents a particular set of development challenges alongside the economic potential already highlighted. Thus given JICA’s leadership priorities and the established peacebuilding presence in the country it is likely that South Sudan will continue to play an important role within Japan’s Africa strategy – both in realising its development objectives, and as this chapter will explore, in identifying “win-win” opportunities for Japanese investment in the region.

Japan’s ODA policies in Sudan through the CPA period and now in independent South Sudan are therefore framed with a political awareness of the complexities of the region. But they also reflect the changes that have taken place within Japan’s ODA policies since 2008. As the following sections will outline, Japan’s ODA strategy has evolved to encompass a more investment-oriented approach and one that sees ODA as part of a broader Japanese private-sector engagement. Thus South Sudan remains an important location for the development of Japan’s ODA policies around peacebuilding and operating in post-conflict countries, but also as a test-case for the evolution of those policies to encompass security and investment components. In this regard ODA remains a cornerstone of Japan’s presence in South Sudan and has underpinned the broadening of Japan’s presence to include peacekeeping and potential investment in a new oil pipeline.

### 4.2 Japan’s ODA in Africa

Japanese ODA engagement in South Sudan is an important component within the broader context of Japan’s ODA strategy in Africa. As this study seeks to demonstrate, Japan’s presence in South Sudan reflects a policy of re-engagement with the continent, and an examination of Japan’s ODA support to Sub-Saharan Africa underlines this growing relationship. According to OECD aid statistics, Japan is
the fifth largest bilateral ODA donor to Africa. While these figures do not include China which is not a member of the OECD, it lists the US, France, the UK and Germany as the leading ODA providers to Africa. Indeed as the figure below indicates, the average annual value of Japanese ODA to Africa in the period 2003–2007 was US$ 0.9 billion. This doubled to US$ 1.8 billion in 2012. Furthermore as the Figure also illustrates, the most significant increase in ODA to Africa happened in 2008, and coincided with TICAD IV. As will be explored later in this chapter, TICAD IV was a significant turning point for Japanese engagement on the continent, and the growing importance of Africa in the eyes of Japanese policymakers is perhaps best illustrated through the marked increase in ODA flows from 2008 onwards.

Figure 14: Total ODA to Africa (2003–2011)

Source: Japan Official Development Assistance White Paper 2012

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Japan’s US$ 1.8 billion ODA commitment to Africa in 2012 as shown in the Figure above, does not include aid to multilateral donors such as the World Bank. Moreover in the period 2003 to 2010 the percentage of JICA’s total budget allocated to Africa grew significantly. For example technical cooperation increased from 14 per cent of JICA’s total expenditure in 2003 to 20.9 per cent in 2010, while grants increased from 25.6 per cent in 2003 to 42.8 per cent in 2010. In 2011 JICA dispatched 2045 experts along with 513 volunteers to Africa and provided technical training for over 10,000 people. Furthermore, Japanese ODA loans to Africa increased over the same period from 1.8 per cent in 2003 to 10.7 per cent of total loans provided in 2010. Thus as the Figure below indicates, Africa’s total share of Japan’s ODA has increased as expenditure in East Asia declines.

**Figure 15: Japan’s ODA (2008 constant price)**

Source: OECD/DAC

402 JICA, “JICA and Vibrant Africa”, resource material provided to author, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
As a JICA representative explains, Africa was a low priority for the organisation from 2000 to 2008 when Japan committed to double aid to Africa. This decision by the Fukuda administration recognised the importance of investment in Africa from emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil which had resulted in a period of rapid economic expansion across the continent. As a result Japanese politicians “were aware that Africa is the last resort for our development, and that our economy will need Africa in the future.” The spike in ODA to the Middle East in 2005 was intended solely for Iraq and is something of an anomaly in terms of Japan’s longer-term ODA trends. It is interesting to note that the region other than Africa where Japan’s ODA expenditure is growing is South and Central Asia. This reflects Japan’s longstanding ODA relationship with India and growing presence in Central Asia. Indeed since 2003/2004 India has been the single largest recipient of Japanese ODA – as Hornung explains “Japan and India work together diplomatically to promote common interests.” For example they share interests reforming the UN Security Council and Prime Minister Abe is known to be staunchly pro-India – emphasising the two countries shared values and overlapping security interests. Moreover as Rakhimov points out, Japan’s so-called “Silk Road Diplomacy” and ODA loans in Central Asia saw Tokyo “carve out a special diplomatic role for itself in Eurasia”, with a significant focus on the Central Asian republics. Yet alongside these regions Africa is a key destination for Japan’s ODA and development-led presence.

Beyond the stated aims of advancing development in these regions however, the ramping-up of Japanese ODA in Africa as well as India and Central Asia can be seen to reflect Japan’s intention to increase its presence and profile in these regions. As described in Chapter Three, the growing importance of emerging countries combined with perceptions of Japan’s own diminished

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405 Author’s interview with deputy director General, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
international status is driving this strategy. Thus in terms of a neoclassical realist interpretation, this policy reflects Japan’s response to changing structural pressures and opportunities. As Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman describe, “Leaders define the “national interest” and conduct foreign policy based upon their assessment of relative power and other states’ intentions but always subject to domestic constraints.” In this respect both the manner of the increased ODA engagement in Africa as well as its motivation is significant as it reflects the particular domestic dynamics and considerations influencing Japan’s policymakers.

The defining aspect of Japan’s ODA policies in recent years is the changing focus to incorporate a more investment-led approach to engagement in Africa. This evolution has been most clearly expressed through the changing priorities of the TICAD conferences in 2008 and 2013, but also reflects the role of leadership within JICA. As the chief researcher at JETRO notes, “some would say that JICA is now changing.” He goes on to explain that “under madam Ogata’s leadership JICA was more social-assistance oriented, but is now more business oriented.” A further factor to be considered therefore in the evolution of Japan’s ODA strategy in recent years is the influence of its new President Akihiko Tanaka. Formerly the vice president of the University of Tokyo, Tanaka is a respected academic in the field of international relations, publishing extensively on international politics and Sino-Japanese relations. Thus as Professor Samuels of MIT points out, his academic background gives Tanaka a particular perspective on Japan’s national interest, its place in the world, and relations with China when compared to Ogata’s background with international development organisations.

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409 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher, JETRO, Tokyo 27 September 2013
410 Author’s interview with Professor Richard Samuels, MIT, Cambridge Massachusetts, 22 February 2013
Professor Tanaka’s assumption of the presidency of JICA in 2012 coincided with the re-focused approach to energising the Japanese economy driven by the Abe administration and the changing reality of the development industry. The influence of major investments in Africa from emerging countries – most notably China, effectively changed the context into which aid was being delivered and consequently the approach of the DAC donor countries. As former British Prime Minister Tony Blair observed, “China’s offering to Africa is fundamentally different to ours [the British]. If China has changed the terms of engagement, we’re going to have to change.”⁴¹¹ Therefore as Professor Tanaka recognises, “some of the leaders [in Africa] told us that while assistance is definitely important, what is extremely important for developing nations is direct investment.” Accordingly, JICA’s approach to engagement in Africa has evolved to facilitate investment by focusing on those development aspects such as improving customs processes and physical infrastructure which assist Japanese businesses to establish themselves in new countries. As Professor Tanaka continues to outline, “if this is needed for Japanese businesses to make inroads into other countries, we are more than willing to facilitate such efforts.”⁴¹²

Consequently, as Professor Kataoka points out, the three “pillars” of Japanese engagement – ODA, investment and peacekeeping, are interactive and the scope of Japan’s overall presence is growing. Yet it is the expansion of the investment “pillar” through private sector non-ODA engagement that largely characterises the shifting and expanding Japanese presence in South Sudan – as well as the tactical approach to securing Japan’s interests. As a representative of Toyota Tsusho details in Chapter Five, the company worked closely with Japanese government officials in pushing to secure a deal to develop an alternative oil pipeline in South Sudan. The representative explains that before MOFA staff travel to Kenya or South Sudan they meet with Toyota Tsusho to identify the company’s

priorities, and essentially carry the message to Juba that “if you move early [with the pipeline] the Japanese government would like to give you ODA money for other projects.” Moreover, as he reiterates, “such kind of discussion is always there with MOFA people or METI people.”

JICA’s embrace of a more investor-led approach to ODA engagement in Africa therefore reflects the structural pressures driving Japan’s strategic objective of stimulating growth through overseas investment. In this regard ODA policy is now intended to partly assist Japanese companies make investments – as the JETRO researcher explains “this is an inevitable phenomenon. ODA is more limited, so we must be more efficient with our aid budget.” Thus as Japan’s economy has stagnated, “and we are not as rich as we used to be, we must think about what our aid can do for Japan.” As a director at MOFA further explains, the policy framework for overseas engagement has also been “mobilised to secure resources.” In this regard, visits by government officials and the more “strategic use of ODA” have been combined in defining Japan’s Africa strategy. Indeed the deputy director general for trade policy at METI summarises this trend by noting, “in recent years, Africa has come to attract the attention of Japanese companies again for one, natural resource development, two, infrastructure development, and three, entry in new business fields.”

In this regard ODA policy is an essential factor in facilitating access for Japanese businesses – from supporting infrastructure development by Japanese firms, to establishing important bilateral relations, and improving the business environment through targeted programmes in skills

413 Author’s interview with Toyota Tsusho representative, Tokyo, 23 October 2013
414 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher, JETRO, Tokyo 27 September 2013
415 Author’s interview with director, MOFA, Tokyo, 30 October 2013
development and regulatory reform. ODA therefore underpins Japan’s growing private-sector presence in Africa. Indeed as Professor Tanaka explains:

When I became president, I suggested that we should promote development cooperation that both revitalises the world’s developing nations as well as Japan. Through international cooperation Japanese businesses establish their bases in places that they never thought could become candidates for their business activities. We believe this is among the important points.417

Indeed in the context of South Sudan, Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline represents the very type of initiatives referred to by JICA’s president.

Supported by Japanese diplomatic efforts and welcomed by the government of South Sudan, the project encapsulates the emerging “win-win” discourse of Japan’s foreign investment. As a representative of Toyota Tsusho explains, the company has no history of doing “ODA business in Africa” and are therefore proud of their emerging reputation in Japan as “the first-mover towards direct investment in Africa.”418 As the chief researcher at JETRO further observes, “Toyota Tsusho is a newcomer as a trading company and are a little different – more risk loving.”419 In this respect the company has built on its well-established operations in Kenya to push for a greater regional presence in South Sudan, and in so doing opening the way for other investors such as Japan International Tobacco.420

Thus in many ways the Sogo Sosha’s approach reflects Japan’s broader policy in the region in that while South Sudan is still unstable, it remains on the frontier of Japanese interests in East Africa and

418 Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013
419 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher, JETRO, Tokyo 27 September 2013
Jeremy Taylor
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offers significant future investment potential as part of an expanded EAC. Indeed as the Figure below indicates, the East African region has been the focus of Japan’s ODA presence in Africa since the 1970s, and remains central to Japan’s plans for future engagement on the continent.

Figure 16: Japan’s ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa by region

As a deputy director at METI explains, the East African region offers “opportunities for Japan” as it is an area in which the country has established strong relations and is geographically the best location for trade with Japan. Indeed the importance of the region as a frontier within Japan’s broader Africa strategy is apparent when considering the extent and manner of development assistance being undertaken in East Africa. For example, Japan currently supports the creation of a common customs infrastructure within the EAC – which enhances regional trade as well as builds a larger market for Japanese companies operating in the region. Japan’s support for the EAC was

421 Wild, Leni, Denny, Lisa, Menocal, Alina Rocha, Geddes, Matthew, “Informing the Future of Japan’s ODA”
422 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013
also included in the deliberations of TICAD V (2013) where a number of key regional infrastructure projects were identified. These projects include the Rusumo Bridge linking Rwanda and Tanzania, piers and ports on Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika as well as power grid connections between Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. In addition, Japan supports the EAC Disaster Risk Management Strategy, rehabilitation and upgrading of Climate Observing Stations, implementation of the Ten-Year Strategy for Biodiversity, and promotion of Low carbon Emissions Development in the EAC.

JICA’s activities in the East African region to enhance trade linkages and critical infrastructure therefore support development within the EAC as well as the conditions for Japanese private sector investors. In this context South Sudan is a significant frontier location as it seeks to join the EAC and is both resource-rich and infrastructure poor. Thus given the extent of Japanese ODA in East Africa, supporting South Sudan’s ability to integrate economically into the EAC, while at the same time enhancing Japan’s presence through peacekeeping and high profile projects such as the proposed oil pipeline, is significant in establishing Japan’s presence in the region, refining its methodology of engagement and ultimately facilitating opportunities for future economic expansion.

JICA’s activities in Africa can therefore be seen to reflect a neoclassical realist ODA policy framework developed in Tokyo in response to structural pressures and defined by domestic imperatives and debates. In this regard Japan’s ODA strategy in Africa also reflects a merging of global development trends with Japan’s own economic and diplomatic priorities. These complex factors have therefore

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424 See map of Africa on page 11
427 Ibid
largely defined the evolution of the TICAD process and remain relevant in understanding the political context in which Japan’s Africa policies are formulated.

4.3 The Evolution of TICAD

The TICAD process has since the first conference in 1993, served as the primary forum for engagement between Japan and Africa – while also serving as a barometer of the political and economic objectives underlying Japan’s presence in Africa. Moreover in the broader context of this study, the evolution of the TICAD process should also be considered in terms of Rose’s observation that “understanding the links between power and policy requires a close examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented.” In this respect this section will plot the evolution of the TICAD process, paying particular attention to the changes that happened since 2008 and contextualised against the structural drivers underpinning the changing priorities of Japan’s Africa policies.

Raposo explains that “TICAD can be seen both as an agenda of the Japanese Government and a comprehensive approach to Japanese foreign policy for Africa.” Professor Kataoka reiterates this by pointing out that “TICAD is a good way to measure Japan’s policy in Africa.” A deputy director at JICA explains that the initial conference was a response to the international donor environment as well as a reflection of Japan’s diplomatic ambitions. In the immediate post-Cold War era during the early 1990s there was an increase of ODA to the former Eastern Bloc countries, and “aid fatigue” from the major Western donors resulted in decreasing attention on Africa. Consequently as the JICA

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428 Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 147
429 Raposo, Pedro Amakasu, Japan’s Foreign Aid to Africa, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, p. 6
430 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
representative notes, “through the TICAD initiative there was a chance for Japan to take the lead” and galvanise attention and support from the international community towards the development of Africa.” However as the representative also goes on to point out, “the hidden agenda was reform of the UN Security Council – to get a permanent seat for Japan.”

Thus as the first TICAD conference demonstrated, Japan developed a policy response to the rapidly changing global environment that identified a real need – development support to Africa, but could also be matched with its own strategic objectives. And while the first TICAD was a relatively small conference, drawing only six African leaders, it laid the infrastructure for Japan’s ODA-led engagement in Africa for the next 20 years. It is also important to recognise that the TICAD meeting of 1993 took place during a time of withdrawal by Japanese businesses from Africa. As Hirano describes, “Japan in fact had little interest in the region. This accounts for the initial lack of interest in TICAD from the Japanese business community and media.” Furthermore, due to the country’s persistent economic recession and budgetary restrictions, the expansion of Japan’s ODA decreased after 1998 (around the time of TICAD II). And as Hirano notes “the signs that Japan was losing the opportunity to lead in the international discourse on development were becoming evident by then.”

A former Japanese ambassador to Kenya however also points out that from the perspective of those developing Japan’s aid strategies “TICAD I was very genuine. There was a concern about African ownership.” But as the ambassador goes on to explain, the OECD DAC guidelines dictated Japan’s aid programme and there was no real implementation of TICAD’s good intentions. Moreover,

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431 Author’s interview with deputy director general, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
432 Hirano, Katsumi “TICAD and National Interest of Japan”
433 Ibid
434 Author’s interview with retired Japanese ambassador to Kenya, Tokyo, 25 October 2013
with the proposal to reform the UN Security Council running out of steam and little apparent support for the proposal from Africa countries – themselves divided on which countries should represent Africa in an enlarged Security Council – the TICAD process itself seemed to be losing support in Tokyo.

Yet as described in Chapter Three, a significant change started to be seen in Africa around the turn of the century – the continent’s economy started to grow. As Hirano explains, “the accelerated growth in the region was not attributable to endogenous factors, nothing particularly striking happened in the region to ignite economic growth.” Consequently the growth appeared to be driven by external factors, most notably a rise in the price of mineral resources and oil, this in turn attracted investors in Africa’s energy and resource sectors – most significantly China. China’s aggressive pursuit of mineral resources and its influence on Japan’s policies in Africa was discussed in Chapter Three, but it is significant to note the changing environment in Africa at the time of TICAD III in 2003. As the Figure below indicates, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) towards Africa started growing at the end of the 1990s and experienced rapid increases after 2004. And while this reality would shift the focus and approach of Japan’s Africa strategy at TICAD IV in 2008, TICAD III focused on peacebuilding and human-centred development. As Professor Kataoka points out, “2003 was the first TICAD where the economic conditions in Africa has started to change, but the Japanese government was timid – taking a wait and see attitude.”

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435 Hirano, Katsumi “TICAD and National Interest of Japan”
436 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
Yet while TICAD III did not necessarily respond to the shifting economic conditions in Africa, the focus on peacebuilding saw JICA begin its engagement in southern Sudan. Indeed JICA publications on the TICAD process highlight engagement in southern Sudan as a key outcome of Japan’s commitments and approaches at TICAD III.\footnote{438 JICA, “An overview of Japan’s ODA and JICA”, resource material provided to author, Tokyo, 2 October 2013} But in the years immediately after the third TICAD conference there was a growing criticism of the effectiveness of the TICAD initiatives to make a meaningful difference to development in Africa – or advance Japan’s own interests when considering the rapidly growing Chinese presence in Africa. For example see Horiuchi\footnote{439 Horiuchi, Shinsuke, “TICAD After Ten Years: A Preliminary Assessment and Proposals for the Future”, \textit{African and Asian Studies}, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2005, pp. 465-483} and Morikawa,\footnote{440 Morikawa, Jun, “Japan and Africa after the cold war”, \textit{African and Asian Studies}, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2005, pp. 485-508} and as Cornelissen observes, “one major deficiency of the TICAD process is that its
rallying calls to promote ownership and partnership in Africa’s development had little impact on Japan’s longer term relationship with the continent.”  

However as Professor Kataoka explains, “2008 was the turning point” where the focus of the TICAD initiative – and Japan’s African policy more broadly, evolved to encompass greater private sector engagement in Africa by bolstering trade and investment on the continent. These changes were in fact recognition of the economic growth that had been taking place in Africa during the preceding decade, and China’s “model” of investment-led interaction on the continent. In other words, the structural conditions were changing and Japanese policymakers were re-interpreting their country’s ability to exert influence and extract value from their development engagement in Africa. As Hirano contends, the conditions were now in place for Japan to reassess the attitude that persistently identified Africa merely as a target for ODA, “and to look to the region more proactively as a repository of potential economic gains and therefore as lucrative for various types of investment.”

As a deputy director at METI who participated in TICAD IV describes, “at the time the first priority in Africa was diplomatic – particularly UN Security Council reform, and secondly compete with China on the UN Security Council issue. But then Japanese companies started to see Africa as a business opportunity, we noticed this because China’s influence started growing in the region.” Thus as Watanabe describes, TICAD IV effectively signalled a shift in Japan’s approach to Africa as well as a ramping-up of activity or re-engagement following the withdrawal of Japanese businesses and

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442 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
444 Author’s interview with deputy director, METI, Tokyo 16 October 2013
declining ODA since its peak in 1998. Cornelissen also points out that the ramifications of the changes evident at TICAD IV should be read against the broader changes in the Japanese aid setting and shifts in the country’s foreign policy interests. “These include, from the perspective of Japan, a desire to balance dwindling aid resources and domestic and international pressures for greater aid accountability, with the need to deepen the country’s involvement in sectors – particularly resource-based ones – deemed of strategic significance.”

Moreover, TICAD IV in 2008 was notable for a marked increase in high-level political engagement alongside the discussions on investment and aid strategies. As Professor Kataoka describes, for the first time Sudanese President Omar al Bashir was invited, “indicating an important turning point for Japan’s Sudan relationship.” Indeed only the year before had responsibility for Sudan been transferred from the MOFA Middle East Division to its Africa Division One, and with Japan now a major buyer of Sudanese oil and with a growing JICA presence in the country, Japan was entrenching bilateral relations between the two countries. In addition, as previously noted, Japan committed significant funds towards supporting the implementation of the key milestones of the CPA.

Thus while the trajectory of Japan’s engagement with Africa clearly shifted with TICAD IV in 2008, this was solidified and accentuated by TICAD V in 2013. Prime Minister Abe stated in his opening address that “what Africa needs now is private sector investment” – and went on to commit US$ 32 billion in ODA and US$ 16 billion in “other public and private resources.” As a deputy director

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447 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
448 Prime Minister of Japan’s Office, “Address by H.E. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the opening session of TICAD V”, 1 June 2013, accessed 3 March 2014, available at [http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201306/01speech_e.html](http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201306/01speech_e.html)
general at JICA explains, Abe’s statement underlined the sea-change in Japan’s engagement with Africa by underlining that “ODA is now intended to support the private sector, whereas before it was to address development issues like poverty reduction or achieving the Millennium Development Goals [MDGs].”

Indeed as Professor Kataoka reiterates, “2013 confirmed the trend that Africa is a business partner, with natural resources and a market – a continent in which we have to invest.” Moreover as a deputy director at MOFA describes, in 2013 there was a sense that “Japan’s economy was regaining self-confidence” and therefore trying to “re-open doors with Africa.” As the MOFA representative continues to explain, the reason for the evolution of the TICAD initiative is multifaceted, but can be summarised as a request from African countries for trade and investment alongside aid – and the increasing appeal of Africa as a market and a location from which to build economic growth for Japan. Indeed the neoclassical realist framework of interpreting this evolution is reinforced by Hirano who recognises that Japan is facing a multifaceted crisis: 20 years of economic stagnation, an aging population, fierce pressure from the ever-expanding power of China, and the after-effects of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. Thus given the circumstances it is no surprise that the new TICAD initiatives “were designed with the crisis facing Japan in mind. Understandably Japan’s new engagement with Africa should include a self-driven attempt to find a way out of its own impending problems.”

Consequently as a JICA representative summarises, “TICAD is a package: ODA, private investments and political agreements.” But when asked whether Japan has identified priority countries in Africa

449 Author’s interview with deputy director General, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
450 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
451 Author’s interview with director, MOFA, Tokyo, 30 October 2013
452 Hirano, Katsumi “TICAD and National Interest of Japan”
for ODA-led investment, the representative points out that the government would never admit to having priority countries – but the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] at a political level has been more forthright in recognising that “Africa is huge and some countries will bring benefit to Japan and some will not.” So while the government’s official policy is that it has no priority countries, the “LDP has pushed the idea that the ODA budget is limited so we now need to prioritise which countries to operate in.” Indeed as a JETRO representative points out “Mozambique was the hidden main agenda at TICAD [V]” and establishing ties with the country remains Japan’s first priority in Africa.

As the representative continues to explain, Mozambique’s large reserves of coal and gas are hugely attractive and when combined with the potential of Uganda and Kenya to become oil producing states – it reaffirms Japan’s strategic emphasis on East Africa.

As Professor Aoki points out, TICAD V also reflected the decision by the Japanese government to “promote cooperation between business and politics.” In this regard it is notable that bilateral agreements were developed or signed at TICAD V with Mozambique and Kenya. Moreover, the announcement that Toyota Tsusho would develop an alternative oil pipeline from South Sudan was made following a meeting with South Sudan’s President Kiir on the side-lines of TICAD V in Yokohama. In addition, Abe also held a brief summit meeting with Kiir who “expressed his profound gratitude to Japan for its support to the independence of South Sudan.” Prime Minister Abe also referenced Japan’s ODA-funded infrastructure projects, the UNMISS peacekeeping

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453 The LDP was in power in Japan from 1955 to 2009 (with the exception of an 11-month period between 1993 and 1994). In the 2012 election however it regained control of government, holding majorities in both houses of Japan’s bicameral National Diet
454 Author’s interview with deputy directorGeneral, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
455 Author’s interview with director, JETRO, London, 9 September 2013
456 Author’s interview with Professor Kazutoshi Aoki, Nihon University, Tokyo, 7 November 2013
deployment and noted that he “expects Japanese companies to expand their business to South Sudan.”

The TICAD process therefore is an important reflection of the evolution of Japan’s Africa strategy in the past twenty years and points to future policy priorities in Japan-Africa relations. Moreover the evolution of the TICAD initiative reflects Japan’s response to changing global dynamics and the role of ODA as a method of engagement in pursuing the country’s strategic objectives. In this regard Japan’s instrumental use of ODA is not a new phenomenon, but rather it reflects the particular challenges that Japan faces today, combined with the economic and diplomatic opportunities that strengthening ties with Africa offers. As Professor Morikawa explains, “there is an element of ‘scramble for Africa’ occurring now”, and Japan is attempting to regain its market in Africa. In this respect the expansion of TICAD since 2008 reflects a response by Japanese policymakers to the growing presence of new external players in Africa – which in turn is indicative of structural change and the rising political and economic influence of emerging powers. In this regard Mawdsley and McCann, Stolte and Harte detail the growing presence in Africa of India, Brazil and Turkey respectively. Yet as described in Chapter Three there is a further significant element to consider when assessing Japan’s ODA strategy over the past twenty years: namely the rise of China and its growing influence in Africa. As a JICA representative observes about Japan’s emerging investment-centred approach to Africa, the “win-win notion came from China – they never had a distinction between ODA and investment.” And in this regard, Japan’s relations with, and perceptions of,

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461 Author’s interview with Professor Jun Morikawa, Rakuno Gakuen University, Tokyo, 10 November 2013
463 Stolte, Christina, “Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, November 2012
465 Author’s interview with deputy directorGeneral, JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013
China are factors in understanding Japanese ODA strategy both in South Sudan and more broadly across Africa.

4.3.1 FOCAC and the “China Factor”

The role of China in the development of Japan’s presence in South Sudan is a theme that emerges throughout this study, and this section will address the “China factor” in the particular context of Japan’s ODA policies in Africa. Because as Hirano explains, “China’s initiatives and development are always matters of top priority to the Japanese public, its expanding interests in Africa attracted much media coverage in the period leading to TICAD IV.” In this regard, the increased discussion around China’s presence and approach in Africa coincided with Japan’s own shift in approach to ODA engagement that began around 2008. Consequently, China’s influence on the method and manner of Japan’s aid engagement in South Sudan is worth considering.

As outlined above, Japan is currently engaged in developing key infrastructure projects in South Sudan – including roads, a river port, and a strategically and symbolically important new bridge over the Nile. In this way, Japan’s bilateral ODA engagement in the country is not unlike its activities in Africa in the 1970s where infrastructure construction was undertaken by Japanese companies in resource-rich countries deemed strategically valuable. In this context the evolution of Japan’s ODA approach since TICAD IV in 2008 is not only a response to structural economic imperatives and the success of China in recent years, but a return to ODA methodology that Japan had relied on in the past. As King points out, “China’s intensely bilateral engagement with 48 of Africa’s 53 countries today is reminiscent of an earlier era in the cooperation activities of many donors, including

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466 Hirano, Katsumi “TICAD and National Interest of Japan”, Japanese Studies
467 There are now 54 countries in Africa following South Sudan’s independence
Japan. In addition however Japan’s ODA strategy today is built around the concept of differentiation and identifying a formula for Japan’s development assistance that charts its own path distinct from that of China and the major Western donors.

China’s economic presence and political influence in Africa is extensive, and Beijing strongly promotes the discourse that it is itself a developing country, and that as a result, its relations in Africa reflect a partnership of two-way cooperation. Thus in pursuing greater trade and investment on the continent, China has largely avoided the language of “donor” and “aid-recipient” that characterises the DAC aid discourse. And the political and diplomatic mechanism that has come to underpin Beijing’s relations with Africa is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The conference has been held every three years since 2000 and as Professor Kataoka argues, “is an imitation of TICAD.” Albeit with some significant differences: UN agencies, the AU and World Bank all participate in TICAD meetings, whereas as the professor explains “FOCAC is a restricted meeting – a pledging conference.” But the FOCAC process aside, it is the extent and the success of China’s economic and diplomatic interactions on the continent that are focusing the attention of policymakers in Tokyo.

China’s extensive presence in Africa emerged largely during the period of Japan’s economic “withdrawal” from the continent. As a result during this time Japan’s primary method of engagement was through JICA – and the DAC norms of donor-led engagement. Thus the largely Western discourse on Africa with its focus on capacity development, poverty reduction and the need for good governance contrasted with the China’s self-proclaimed “win-win” approach to Africa which focused on bilateral economic cooperation and trade. Japan is the only substantial non-

469 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
Western member of the OECD DAC, and as King describes, has been obliged over several decades – somewhat reluctantly – to come into line with what the West deemed an appropriate approach to the development of Africa.\textsuperscript{470} Consequently as King continues to explain, Japan faced the dilemma: “join the chorus of DAC donors criticising China for undermining the West’s carefully constructed agenda for the development of Africa.”\textsuperscript{471} Or pursue its own preferences and articulate a model that in effect tries to balance between the two.

In this regard Professor Hughes explains that Japan’s interests in Africa are largely driven by market forces, and that as a result TICAD has come to offer a particular model for Africa’s development. A model that “highlights quality infrastructure – as opposed to China’s, with the developmental aspirations that incorporate concepts such as good governance.”\textsuperscript{472} As the professor continues to point out, Japan’s development model therefore increasingly accentuates its unique characteristics when compared to the OECD DAC or Chinese approaches to development engagement in Africa. Professor Kataoka reiterates this view by noting that Japan’s strategy is to “defend and differentiate our policy – by focusing on the good values.”\textsuperscript{473} A strategy which appears to be working in South Sudan – as an SPLM representative explains, the widely-held perception of China is that “they are just here to make money, while Japan is here for our development.”\textsuperscript{474}

Thus Japan’s ODA policies in Africa, as well as the TICAD initiative have evolved to reflect changes in the global environment – including the rise of China – as well as the economic imperatives driving Japan’s businesses into African markets. As a result Japan is trying to establish a development

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{471} Ibid
\textsuperscript{472} Author’s interview with Professor Christopher Hughes, Warwick University, Coventry, 2 September 2013
\textsuperscript{473} Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
\textsuperscript{474} Author’s interview with SPLM representative, Juba, 31 January 2013
\end{footnotesize}
approach in Africa that balances ODA solely for its own reward, with the DAC best practices that have guided Japan’s ODA policies for the past twenty years.

4.4 Differentiation and the Politics of Identity

It is becoming apparent that a central element within Japan’s ODA strategy in Africa is a policy of differentiation and focusing on Japan’s particular competitive advantages as an aid and investment partner. And while part of this process is aimed at creating a unique identity for Japanese engagement outside of the DAC framework, it is also apparent that this approach is framed in comparison to China. This is occurring for two separate reasons: on the one hand a realisation within Japan that China’s approach to investment in Africa is largely supported by African governments – and is seen by them to be less prescriptive and patronising than the DAC aid model. For example Ampiah contrasts Japan’s donor-recipient African engagement with China’s and concludes that it provided “much needed momentum” in terms of emphasis on trade and investment.475 While on the other hand, Japan recognises that the “Chinese model” is often criticised for enabling corrupt or authoritarian regimes, or for supporting poor labour and environmental practices – for example, Tull concludes that the economic consequences of increased Chinese involvement in Africa are “mixed at best, while the political consequences are bound to prove deleterious.”476 Consequently as a MOFA official puts it, “while we have something that we can learn from China, we must also improve our strong points and deliver them to Africa.”477

477 Authors interview with director, MOFA, Tokyo 5 November 2013
This is especially true of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan. While Japanese contractors working in Juba emphasised the need to highlight the quality of Japanese infrastructure as compared to that of China, at a political level the incentive to strengthen ties in South Sudan is that much greater given China’s complicated relations with Juba. Japan’s support for the CPA implementation and JICA engagement in southern Sudan before independence is appreciated in Juba. Indeed as an SPLM official points out, the feeling in South Sudan is that “when the oil is finished, China will go – but Japan will be here much longer.” Thus in pursuing extensive ODA projects such as the Nile bridge and road building alongside important strategic investments such as the pipeline bid, Japan is well-placed to emphasise the particular values underpinning its engagement in South Sudan. Though promoting Japan’s particular “brand” of infrastructure development and investment over China’s is easier in South Sudan where as a SPLM official points out – apart from the oil industry, “China has no major investments in South Sudan, and is now scrambling.”

It should be noted however that during the 1990s in particular there were considerable areas of convergence between Japanese and Chinese engagement with Africa. As Cornelissen and Taylor explain, both countries sought to “further the integration of Africa into the global economy under a particular framework relating to the organisation of domestic production.” While Raposo outlines a number of similarities between Japan and China’s aid policies in Africa, including their preference for “self-help” approaches, emphasising loans over grants – in particular infrastructure loans – and support for African-led initiatives such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). In this context Japan’s emerging differentiation strategy for the country’s aid policies can be understood as an evolving element within the country’s international identity.

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478 Author’s interview with director, Japanese civil engineering company, Juba 23 January 2013
479 Author’s interview with SPLM official, Juba, 31 January 2013
480 Ibid
482 Raposo, Pedro Amakasu, Japan’s Foreign Aid to Africa
Japan’s ODA strategy can therefore be understood to reflect Neumann’s critique of the constructivist view of norms and culture as being a “property” of identity, but rather a relational concept. Japan is thus restructuring its aid priorities in direct comparison to those of the Western donors and, perhaps most notably, China. As explained in Chapter Three, China’s actions in Africa matter to Japanese policymakers because it is China, while the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research further emphasises the importance of policymakers’ perceptions of relative power and influence at the systemic level. In this respect the complexities of Sino-Japanese relations are also manifesting in Japan’s ODA policies and reflect Jervis’ assessment that perceptions influence decision-makers – and ultimately foreign policy outcomes. Thus without engaging too deeply with the literature on identity, this study will limit its understanding of Japan’s “ODA identity” as being specific to its relationships with China and the Western donors, and is correspondingly defined by those interactions. Additionally as Hagström explains, the discursive process of differentiation between Japan and China or the US is different now compared to the process in the 1990s and reflects the changing nature of Japan’s foreign policy approaches. Hagström further argues that despite Katzenstein and Berger’s view that Japan’s identity is biased towards stability and hence foreign policy continuity, evidence suggests that Japan is demonstrating a “distinctly more assertive and proactive foreign policy.” Indeed as Berenskoetter explains, “identity formation is an active/on-going process” and identities are therefore contingent constructs. Consequently, Japan’s emerging identity as an international donor in comparison to China and the DAC countries reflects a more self-assured foreign policy. A view reiterated by

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485 Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan
487 Hagström, Linus, “Identity politics and Japan’s foreign policy”
Jeremy Taylor
564257

Lehman who points out that by carving out a unique developmental niche “Japan also hopes to highlight its global strategic position by exerting greater influence in Africa and other developing regions.”

Japan’s more visible foreign policy therefore mirrors the Abe administration’s promotion of a “revitalised Japan.” Indeed the “Japan is back” discourse combines economic revitalisation policies with those that directly challenge key aspects of Japan’s international identity such as state-pacifism. And while these dynamics are explored in more detail in Chapter Six it is worth considering Rozman’s view that Abe is “unabashed in his commitment to transform [Japan’s] national identity” and consequently the differentiation of Japan’s approach to ODA in Africa is a less-debated component within a much broader dynamic within Japan’s foreign policy agenda.

In this respect Japan’s emerging “aid identity” in Africa reflects Duara’s argument that national identity formation is inseparable from the interplay of actors’ other political identities and agendas, and reinforces Jepperson and Wendt’s view that identity functions as a “crucial link between environmental structures and interests.” Therefore when considering the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this study, the role of Japan’s emerging “ODA identity” will be considered among the intervening considerations driving Japan’s aid policy in Africa, and influencing

the growing sentiment among Japanese policymakers that ODA must be used more strategically to advance Japan’s interests.

4.5 Strategic ODA in a Changing Global Environment

This study seeks to demonstrate that Japan’s policies of renewed interest and attention towards Africa in the years since 2008 are in response to changes in the international system – changes which are in turn understood in the context of Japan’s domestic perceptions and objectives. In this regard, the deployment and use of ODA is one of the three primary tactics or methods of engagement used in pursuing Japan’s interests in Africa – and this section will explore the role of aid as a strategic tool in Japanese official engagement with Africa.

As Kitchen explains, the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this study allows aid to be viewed as a normative suggestion translated into policy, this is because it can be considered by a state’s policymakers as “the right thing to do.” In expanding this interpretation Kitchen maintains that ideas and interests are viewed as conceptually distinct phenomena, and in this regard development aid can be understood as an “intentional idea” that seeks to establish the goals of foreign policy. Ideas thus understood articulate in the realm of foreign policy what the nation should seek to do, such as advance human rights or fight poverty. This perspective of international development aid is advocated by Lumsdaine who argues that “foreign aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of the economic and political interests of the donor countries alone” but rather in the humanitarian and egalitarian principles of donor countries. And while this chapter has

494 Kitchen, Nicholas, “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation”, p 129
demonstrated that Japan’s ODA policies do contain elements of normative ethical approaches, and that JICA is staffed by dedicated development professionals.\textsuperscript{496} It is also apparent that Japanese aid to Africa is aligned with the country’s political and economic objectives.

This view is supported by a number of studies. For example Gounder,\textsuperscript{497} Schraeder, Hook and Taylor,\textsuperscript{498} Maizels and Nissanke,\textsuperscript{499} and Alesina and Dollar who find “considerable evidence that the pattern of aid giving is dictated by political and strategic considerations.”\textsuperscript{500} Thus despite some discrepancy around how to measure “strategic interests” and the variations between the “strategic objectives” of donor countries – as well as the need to recognise the particular dynamics of Cold War aid flows, there is an extensive literature essentially supporting the view that donors target their aid in a largely self-benefiting manner. In this respect, this study’s primary contention related to Japan’s ODA expenditure in Africa is that while Japan’s development aid continues to provide genuine assistance to countries and communities in need, the emerging trend towards the “strategic” use of ODA is rather a reflection on where the aid is spent. As Professor Fukushima explains, “from the ODA side not much is changing in terms of how they’re working, but because of budget decline there is a greater strategic focus.” But as the professor also points out, the Japanese government needs to be accountable to the electorate as to how they spend ODA funds, and consequently they are

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{496} Interviews conducted with JICA officials in London, Juba and Tokyo underlined the dichotomy between the development objectives and motivations of staff members and the more overarching “strategic” considerations driving Japan’s aid policies.
\item \textsuperscript{499} Maizels, Alfred, and Nissanke, Machiko; “Motivations for aid to developing countries”, \textit{World Development}, Vol. 12, Issue 9, September 1984, pp. 879–900
\item \textsuperscript{500} Alesina, Alberto, and Dollar, David, “Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?”, \textit{Journal of Economic Growth}, Vol. 5 No. 1, (March) 2000, pp. 33–63
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
referring more frequently to “strategic ODA.” In this sense it is not always clear how best “to integrate everything to maximise Japan’s interests.”

Moreover, beyond the more general objectives that ODA serves in pursuing Japan’s national interests, there are also specific instances of ODA that quite clearly advance Japan’s political and economic objectives in Africa. As explored in Chapter Six, Japan’s anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa are of considerable strategic value in advancing its presence in international multilateral security operations, as well as pushing the boundaries of its security legislation. It is therefore not surprising to note that Japan’s grant assistance to Djibouti increased from US$ 2.24 million in 2008 to US$ 34.42 million in 2010. Indeed as Japan’s ODA White Paper 2012 states:

Maritime assistance for developing countries through ODA has thus far been conducted in various countries. However in recent years, ODA has been used more strategically from the viewpoint of ensuring the safety of Sea Lanes of Communication linking directly to Japan’s national interest. This is conducted in the form of countermeasures against terrorism and piracy.

In this regard ODA support for anti-piracy measures in East Africa eventually led to the establishment of a permanent MSDF facility in Djibouti in 2011. As Styan notes in a Chatham House report on Djibouti, the MSDF facility has led to an “expansion of Japan’s civilian aid programme in Djibouti, which has also become a hub for wider development activities in the Horn by the Japan International Cooperation Agency.”

501 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
504 Styan, David, “Djibouti: Changing influence in the Horn’s strategic hub”, Chatham House Africa Programme, April 2013
Another factor to consider when assessing the strategic nature of Japan’s ODA engagement in Africa is Japan’s perennial ambitions to reform the UN Security Council. While previously mentioned as a key factor defining Japan’s engagement in Africa at the time of TICAD I, it is important to consider that UN Security Council reform remains an important objective of Japan’s foreign policy. As Prime Minister Abe confirmed when addressing the UN General Assembly in 2013, “the Security Council must be reformed without delay. Japan’s aspiration to become a permanent member of the Council has not changed in the slightest.”505 As Davies explains, seeking support for a seat on a reformed Security Council will still require African backing. Thus much “in the same manner which China courted Africa to secure its UN Security Council seat, Japan’s efforts are not too dissimilar, although far less obvious to the African observer.”506 Thus as Professor Morikawa observes, Japan’s approach to Africa has actually remained largely unchanged in that Tokyo has followed a policy of “select and concentrate” when engaging in ODA-led diplomacy on the continent. The professor believes that “right from the beginning ODA was a tool for national interest, and remains an effective tool to materialise our national interest.”507

Yet beyond the political dynamics of Japan’s ODA engagement in Africa, there is also an economic dimension to the strategic targeting of specific regions and countries for Japanese donor aid. As already outlined, Japan’s economic and strategic focus in Africa – apart from the long established ties with South Africa – can be envisaged as an arc extending from Djibouti to Mozambique. These two countries therefore are critical sites along the frontier of Japan’s engagement in Africa. As Chapter Six will examine, Djibouti is an important location from which Japan is expanding its international security engagement, while Mozambique is emerging as a key focus of Japan’s energy security strategy after

507 Author’s interview with Professor Jun Morikawa, Rakuno Gakuen University, Tokyo, 10 November 2013

Furthermore, the political and economic drivers underpinning the targeting of aid to particular countries in Africa can be understood in terms of what Hook and Zhang have referred to as the “METI discourse” and the “MOFA discourse” in the implementation of Japan’s ODA policies. Hook and Zhang argue that the “METI discourse” essentially advocates the use of aid to support Japan’s own economic interests while the MOFA discourse advocates using aid in support of Japan’s international diplomacy.\footnote{Hook, Steven, and Zhang, Guang, “Japan’s aid policy since the cold war: rhetoric and reality”, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, no. 11, 1998, pp. 1051-1066} Yet as discussed in Chapter Three, both economic imperatives and perceptions of Japan’s relative lack of international power are sustaining Japanese re-engagement in Africa. Thus when considering Japan’s ODA engagement in Africa today, it is apparent that there are elements of both political and economic considerations driving Japan’s growing presence on the continent. Indeed as Hirano summarises, Japan’s aid “policy towards Africa is now going to be formulated on the basis of Japan’s national interest.”\footnote{Hirano, Katsumi, “TICAD and the national interest of Japan”, Japanese Studies} In this respect it is apparent that ODA will remain an important tactic in Japan’s broader strategic engagement in Africa. And while ODA-led diplomacy is not new, it is currently being harnessed in a new direction by Japanese policymakers to reflect systemic challenges and the economic opportunities of re-engagement in Africa. Since TICAD IV in 2008, the total amount of ODA to Africa has increased, and it has largely been refocused to support opportunities for Japanese trade and investment on the content.
But in addition to providing much-needed infrastructure and skills, Japan’s ODA is also being deployed to establish and shore-up diplomatic relations, and to open avenues for strategic resource-based investments. Against this backdrop therefore, South Sudan remains an important element of Japan’s engagement in Africa. As the following chapters will illustrate, Japan’s presence in South Sudan combines political, economic, and security dimensions – all of which are underpinned by significant ODA projects.

4.6 Conclusion

In many respects ODA has been the most visible and effective element of Japan’s foreign policy in the post-war era. The “International Cooperation Initiative” launched by former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita (1987-1989) in 1988\(^{511}\) effectively made ODA a central component of Japan’s foreign policy – leading Yasutomo to argue that Japan was thus an “aid great power.”\(^{512}\) Thus while Japan’s constitution limited the development of the military and its participation in multilateral international security operations, ODA and financial support for international organisations became the most prominent facet of Japan’s international engagement. Yet as Yasutomo further observed, Japan’s aid policy consequently became more complex as it “merged with the overall objectives of Japan’s foreign policy”\(^{513}\), and has thus evolved to meet shifting priorities of Japan’s foreign policy following the end of the Cold War and the bursting of the asset price “bubble.” This chapter has therefore sought to understand the role of ODA projects in South Sudan in terms of Japan’s broader Africa policies – and the factors influencing those policies.


\(^{513}\) Ibid, p. 491
Japan’s ODA support for South Sudan is a critical component within a broader engagement that includes resource-based investments and the deployment of peacekeepers. However it is ODA that ties together the various elements of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and it remains the primary means of Japanese interaction across the region. Moreover, Japan’s ODA projects in South Sudan reflect the country’s position on the frontier of Japan’s Africa strategy, and the East African region. Fragile and high-risk, South Sudan also offers the potential of integration into the East African Community, and as the following chapter will discuss, as a significant supplier of energy resources.

Yet as this chapter has also explored, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa is evolving and reflects changes at the systemic level and an emerging discourse in Japan around the role of ODA within Japan’s foreign policy framework. Consequently, Japan’s role as a donor country is changing both in response to international structural pressures, and domestic debates around how the country should balance budget constraints with economic advantage. In differentiating itself from China and the Western donor countries operating in Africa, Japan’s ODA approach therefore reflects not only a refocused aid relationship with the continent, but also its broader ambition of developing a more prominent and distinguishable international presence.

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514 Kawai, Masahiro, and Takagi, Shinji, “Japan’s Official Development Assistance: Recent issues and future directions”, p. 269
5. Resource Focused Investment

As outlined in the previous chapter, Japan’s engagement in Africa since 2008 is characterised by an increasing focus on investment and linking ODA priorities with investment opportunities. This chapter will therefore address the investment-component of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and in particular explore the wider context against which the proposed oil pipeline development discussed here must be understood. Namely, Japan’s broader resource strategy in Africa and how this intersects with the domestic imperative of energy security which remains a fundamental aspect of Japanese foreign policy. In this regard, this chapter combines two of the strategic objectives identified in Chapter Three – economic revitalisation through overseas investment and ensuring energy security – both of which are encapsulated in the case study of Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan.

Moreover, the proposed pipeline is emblematic of a bolder Japanese investment strategy: one which is willing to take on greater risks, and as such reflects the evolution of the Japanese perspective of the international environment, as well as the ever-present consideration of energy security. This chapter will therefore explore concepts of opportunity and risk, and consider how the pipeline expands both the physical frontier of Japan’s engagement in Africa as well as the boundary of its established methods and attitudes. The proposed development of a new oil pipeline by Sogo Sosha Toyota Tsusho from South Sudan to the Kenyan port of Lamu (or the less likely route to Djibouti through Ethiopia) has the potential to radically alter the political and economic dynamics in the region – consequently placing Japan’s foreign policy in Africa in sharp focus.

515 As detailed on Page 102/103, energy security is understood in this study as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”
As this chapter will explore, the prospect of securing an alternative means to export oil remains a central objective of South Sudan’s strategic planning as it would break the dependence on the current oil export route through Sudan. Thus, the realisation of a new oil pipeline would impact Sudan, major investors in the existing pipeline such as China, and potential regional partners such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. In this regard the project has a major political dimension that overshadows the business and logistical considerations of merely building an oil pipeline. As such the pipeline represents an important dimension of Japan’s new approach and objectives in the region – and is understood by this study as both a test-case for Japan’s evolving approach to energy investment and a physical manifestation of the outer edge of Japan’s arc of engagement in East Africa.

It should also be noted at the outset that the proposed pipeline is currently far from realisation, at the end of the research period it lacked financing, and there were innumerable political obstacles still to be surmounted. Yet it is important and worthy of analysis. As this chapter will explore, despite South Sudan’s relatively small oil reserves (by global standards) the pipeline holds immense economic potential and political ramifications for South Sudan and the region. Furthermore, the potential involvement of a Japanese company – and accompanying Japanese diplomatic support, in such a complicated and politically sensitive project is a significant example of the evolution of Japan’s engagement in Africa. The proposed pipeline is therefore particularly noteworthy in that it combines two important dimensions of Japan’s emerging presence in Africa: energy security and increased investment, resulting in the private sector-led pursuit of Hinomaru Oil. This high-risk project also aligns Japan’s strategic objectives in the region with those of South Sudan, and accordingly has far-reaching consequences for the political and economic outlook of the region.
In bridging new frontiers the proposed pipeline demonstrates a shift in Japan’s policy approach to ensuring energy security, which as Rose explains, reflects perceived shifts in the distribution of power at the structural level. Thus in line with the neoclassical realist approach framing this research, this chapter will build on the structural context of Japan’s energy security outlined in Chapter Three through specific analysis of Japan’s involvement in the complicated oil politics of South Sudan. As such, this chapter will begin by examining Japan’s energy policy responses to shifting structural conditions in world energy markets. It will then outline the context of South Sudan’s oil industry and the importance of the proposed pipeline to its strategic considerations. The chapter will then explore the multiple layers of risk and opportunity that the project holds for Japan as well as the domestic dynamics that define its policy responses.

5.1 Energy Security and Japan’s Search for Hinomaru Oil

Japan’s energy policy in East Africa is an element within the country’s broader re-engagement in Africa – comprising a re-oriented approach to targeted ODA-led investments, accessing the continents growing markets, and as a site to expand the margins of its international security commitments. Yet access to natural resources is integral to Japan’s economic model, and as such ensuring the security of energy supply is a critical concern for Japanese policy makers. As outlined in Chapter Three, resource and energy security remains a key structural driver of Japan’s foreign policy, as the country ranks second-last among the 34 countries of the OECD in energy self-sufficiency. In addition, energy security is a contentious domestic issue as it involves debates around the country’s reliance on nuclear power and the national ownership of energy resources. This section will

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517 Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 160
therefore explore this imperative in the context of recent changes in Japanese resource strategy in Africa since 2008.

Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS) notes that the stable supply of energy is essential to a vibrant Japanese economy “and thus constitutes a challenge to national security.” While METI’s Strategic Energy Plan (2014) also recognises that “it would be difficult for the country to secure [energy] resources autonomously if an energy supply problem should occur abroad.” In further recognising the emerging challenge of resource nationalism, and growing demand, especially in emerging economies, for energy (and mineral resources), the NSS goes on to note that “Japan will actively utilise diplomatic tools” to ensure access to these resources. Japan’s NSS therefore recognises the systemic or structural factors outlined in Chapter Three that are once again pushing energy security to the forefront of Japan’s policy priorities. These factors, combined with Japan’s post-Fukushima energy environment is also driving policymakers to reconsider the country’s reliance on energy markets and encourage the exploration and development of oil resources by Japanese companies – known as Hinomaru Oil.

In addition, Japan’s National Energy Strategy includes provision to further expand the ratio of Hinomaru Oil within Japan’s energy mix to around 40 per cent by 2030. As a deputy director at METI explains, the change of policies towards the national ownership of oil in Japan started in 2008 when the oil price increased to US$ 145 a barrel – “before that even METI people said we don’t need

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concessions, we can just buy commodities on the market.”

It is also worth noting that the oil price peak in 2008 coincided with TICAD IV, which as described in the previous chapter, signalled the beginning of Japan’s refocused engagement with Africa by encouraging private-sector investment alongside increased ODA commitments. Moreover as the METI representative continues to point out, the second turning point was the earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Before that, Japan’s energy policy was focused on diversifying the sources of supply, and to reduce dependency on the Middle East. But following the nuclear shutdown, Japan’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil and gas is even greater – giving renewed emphasis and urgency to the policy of securing energy concessions in new locations outside the Middle East.

The example of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan thus demonstrates that while energy and resource security have dominated Japanese strategic outlook for many years, the tactical approach to securing these resources is changing – and is in turn changing the nature of Japan’s engagement with Africa. Japan’s energy policies however are particularly significant elements within the country’s broader policy discourse. As Katzenstein and Okawara point out, Japan’s near complete dependence on imported energy sources is a defining element in the norms that make up Japan’s perception of national security – in particular, Japan’s energy vulnerability. In this regard they argue that Japan’s energy imperatives effectively creates a policy consensus that “facilitates flexibility” in developing policy responses to securing economic or energy objectives. Yet while Katzenstein and Okawara’s constructivist analysis maintains that “international structures do not determine Japan’s foreign policy choices”, this chapter will demonstrate that changing global realities are changing Japan’s energy policies. Yet in line with a neoclassical realist framework of analysis, shifting

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522 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo 21 September 2013
524 Ibid, p. 85
structural conditions are still framed by the country’s longstanding domestic perceptions of energy vulnerability and the importance of energy security within the country’s foreign policy priorities.

As demonstrated in Chapter Three, Japanese perceptions of shifts in global energy conditions have brought the imperative of energy security once more to the forefront of the country’s policy framework. Indeed the view that Japan’s energy and resource policy is changing to reflect global dynamics is reiterated by a manager at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) who notes that “things have changed”, oil markets are changing and emerging countries like China, India and South Korea are aggressively seeking equity resources. In response, “the Japanese government is more willing to provide support and push private Japanese companies abroad to acquire equity.” Consequently, as he further explains, the role of Africa in Japan’s energy security strategy is becoming increasingly important, because with undeveloped hydrocarbon resources – “it is a natural area for Japan’s attention.” Thus while the concept of energy security has largely remained central to Japanese policy making, it is now evolving to include the exploration of opportunities in Africa – and with South Sudan at the frontier of its long term ambitions that are increasingly focused on equity investments.

Indeed, the tactics of ensuring resource security that are emerging in Japanese policies today reflect changing approaches to an ever-present perception of risk. As the chief senior researcher at JETRO observes, “Japan needs to think about natural resource security, and we must acquire our own shares in world resource markets.” This view is reflected in Japan’s renewed engagement in Africa and particularly in Toyota Tsusho’s pipeline bid in South Sudan. As the JETRO official continues,
“Japan must become a partner and stakeholder in the global resource business.” As such the growing significance of Africa in Japan’s energy resource strategy is reiterated by a representative of Toyota Tsusho who notes that “collaboration with the Japanese government is essential, and without doing some resource business we don’t have a chance to talk to METI.” He goes on to point out that in this sense the resource business itself is very important as a “purchase right” for oil is included in the proposed pipeline agreement and thus building and operating the pipeline is merely a means to an end. Thus despite always being understood as a paragon of pragmatism when it comes to economic matters, in recent years the pursuit of equity energy concessions and Hinomaru Oil have defined Japan’s long term energy strategy. As a METI official from the Petroleum and Natural Gas Division observes about Japan’s energy strategy in Africa, “my division and the Japanese government are only interested in upstream concessions – equity shares. This is government policy, this is Hinomaru Oil.”

Consequently, in realising this objective the role of the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) was reviewed by the Japanese government. As the IEEJ chief economist explains, particular attention was paid to the influence of National Oil Companies (NOCs) – especially the big resource holders in producing countries such as Saudi Aramco, and Gazprom in Russia, as well as the NOCs from consumer countries such as China’s CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC. Thus as the IEEJ chief economist continues, it was becoming apparent that these NOCs were getting involved in the global oil market to ensure security of supply for their countries, “so the government felt

528 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 27 September 2013
529 Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013
530 Ibid
531 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013
532 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation or Sinopec Limited is the world’s fifth biggest company by revenue. Sinopec’s business includes oil and gas exploration, refining, and marketing; production and sales of petrochemicals, and other chemical products; storage and pipeline transportation of crude oil and natural gas; import, export of crude oil and natural gas
533 China National Offshore Oil Corporation or CNOOC Group is the third-largest national oil company in the People’s Republic of China, after CNPC and China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation. The CNOOC Group focuses on the exploitation, exploration and development of crude oil and natural gas in offshore China.
there was a need to enhance the support to JOGMEC. Resultantly, the Japanese government took on a greater role in protecting oil and resource security through upstream development assistance, while continuing to pursue the ever-present goal of diversification of supply for energy resources.

Recognising that the emerging trend towards national ownership of energy resources is being driven by Asian countries, MOFA acknowledges that Japan’s economy is structured in such a way that the government can play certain roles – but that essentially private companies are driven by the market. As such, Japan’s search for equity energy resources while being “a bit half-hearted” is growing and it is significant to note that the budget and portfolio of JOGMEC increases every year. Indeed, Japan has not followed the other OECD countries in recent years by privatising NOCs. Andrews-Speed comments that “a resurgence of fears over security of supply in Japan triggered the creation of JOGMEC and the founding of a new international company, INPEX” (19 per cent owned by METI), and the continuation of JAPEX (34 per cent owned by the government). By 2010, INPEX alone had 71 projects in 26 countries. As the chief senior researcher at JETRO confirms, “JOGMEC is now a very important agency” which works closely with JETRO in determining which countries offer the best investment opportunities for Japanese businesses.

The role of JOGMEC in stimulating Japanese energy investments forms a central component of the policy debate in Japan around the real value of equity oil in ensuring Japanese energy security and economic wellbeing. And while the chief economist at IEEJ recognises that government interest in

534 Author’s interview with chief economist and managing director IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
535 Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo 30 October 2013
537 Author’s interview with chief senior researcher JETRO, Tokyo, 27 September 2013
the concept of Hinomaru Oil has fluctuated over the years, current market conditions are propelling greater government involvement in ensuring energy security. As he continues to point out, when world oil prices reached record highs in 2008, the key question facing policymakers in Tokyo was: “what caused this? And is it a structural thing?”538 Despite the record oil price being followed shortly thereafter by the collapse of Lehman Brothers and a global recession that led to a significant decrease in global demand for oil, the structural dynamics underpinning high oil prices were clear. As described in Chapter Three, the analysis pointed to changes in the market driven by strong demand from China, India, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, and instability in the Middle East. Consequently, unlike the oil crisis of 1973 which was the result of a political decision by Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to cut production, in 2008 systemic factors were clearly responsible for the high oil prices. Thus the increasing presence of Japanese energy interests in Africa from 2008 can be seen to reflect a policy response to shifting systemic conditions – and the proposed pipeline in South Sudan as the most complex and risky project to date.

5.2 The Context: Sudan and South Sudan’s Oil Industry

The secession of South Sudan radically altered the political dynamics of oil extraction and access in the region, yet until an alternative oil export route is developed, the logistics of oil exploitation continues to tie the two countries together. Most of Sudan’s and South Sudan’s proved reserves of crude oil and natural gas are located in the Muglad and Melut basins, which extend into both countries – yet approximately 75 per cent539 of the oil reserves are believed to lie within the territory

538 Author’s interview with chief economist and managing director IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
of South Sudan and effectively changed ownership with the secession. Given that Sudan’s oil industry was largely developed during the civil war, oil exploration was for the most part limited to the south-central regions of the then unified Sudan. Moreover as will be discussed later, significant fields such as Block B were surveyed but exploration never took place. As depicted on the Figure below, the Muglad Basin includes Blocks 1, 2, 4 and 5A, while the Melut Basin comprises Blocks 3 and 7. Currently, oil produced from Blocks 2 and 4 is counted as Sudan's production, while oil from Blocks 1, 3, 5A, and 7 belongs to South Sudan. 540

Figure 18: Oil blocks in South Sudan 541


541 Image developed by author based on map from Wikimedia Commons, accessed 20 February 2014, available at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_Sudan_Oil_Concessions.svg
As depicted in the map below, Sudan currently has two export pipelines extending northwards to a Marine Terminal south of Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The Unity State field’s pipeline is operated by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), and Petrodar operates the pipeline from the oil fields of Upper Nile State.

Figure 19: Current and proposed oil pipelines in Sudan and South Sudan

The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the majority shareholder in both companies (40 and 41 per cent respectively), along with Malaysia’s Petronas, and India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Ltd (OVL). In addition to the large Asian national oil companies, the Sudan

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National Petroleum Corporation (Sudapet) and its counterpart in South Sudan, the Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) are also minority shareholders in the operating companies. The Petrodar pipeline transports the Dar Blend, a heavy, sweet crude from Blocks 3 and 7 in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state. The pipeline stretches 850 miles and includes several heating units along its length because of the waxy, acidic nature of the crude. Dar Blend is also heavily discounted due to its highly acidic content – though it can be used for fuel oil blending, and is purchased by both China and Japan. The other existing pipeline is operated by GNPOC and transports Nile Blend crude, a low-sulphur waxy crude oil, 1,000 miles from the Heglig processing facilities to the Bashayer Marine Terminal at Port Sudan. The Nile Blend is sourced from Blocks 2 (Heglig and Bamboo fields) and 4 (Diffra and Neem fields) in Sudan and Blocks 1 (Unity field) and 5A (Mala and Thar Jath fields) in South Sudan.

Given that oil is believed to account for 98 per cent of South Sudan’s government revenue, it will remain for the time being the fulcrum around which any economic growth and development will emerge – as well as by far the most important strategic consideration for South Sudan’s policymakers. Yet as this chapter will explore, South Sudan’s oil also holds opportunities for Japan to consolidate its ODA contributions with a major private sector investment that links Japan’s energy security objectives with South Sudan’s primary strategic ambition of breaking free from Sudan’s oil export infrastructure.

543 In March 2012, the oil consortia operating in South Sudan registered as separate companies and changed their names: GNPOC became Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC), and Petrodar was renamed Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC) and a third consortium was changed from White Nile Petroleum Operating Company (WNPOC) to Sudd Petroleum Operating Company (SPOC). SPOC is 50/50 joint operating company between Petronas and South Sudan’s state-owned Nilepet. In most instances this study will still refer to GNPOC and Petrodar when referring to their pipeline operations in Sudan.

544 “Heavy” crude oil is highly viscous, it is referred to as "heavy" because its density or specific gravity is higher than that of light crude oil. “Sweet” crude oil is a type of petroleum with less than 0.42% sulphur. Petroleum containing higher levels of sulphur is called “sour”


546 Ibid
5.2.1 South Sudan’s Strategic Lifeline

The development of an alternative pipeline is the focal point of South Sudan’s strategic vision. Although the intuitive and economic logic dictates that the country rely on the existing oil infrastructure, the depth of mistrust and animosity that remains between Juba and Khartoum combined with both countries’ overwhelming reliance on oil revenues means that so long as both countries are tied together by pipelines, oil will remain a tool for leverage, and a potential catalyst for conflict. Indeed as an SPLM official observed, “the international community prefers that both countries are viable and that the oil passes through Sudan.”547 Yet as the official continues to point out, the list of unresolved issues between the two states and Khartoum’s apparent objective of undermining the SPLM-led government is evidence enough for South Sudan that it cannot have its economic lifeline dependent on good relations with Sudan.

Consequently, the concept of developing an alternative oil pipeline emerged during the period of autonomy following the signing of the CPA when the government in Juba realised that despite owning the lion’s share of Sudan’s oil reserves, an independent South Sudan would remain dependent on Sudan’s midstream oil infrastructure. Under the terms of the CPA, the SPLM was to share power with the National Congress Party (NCP) in a Government of National Unity from 2005 up to the referendum on South Sudan’s independence in 2011. Despite the provision of autonomy for the south, and the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) which was allocated half of the revenues generated by southern production, Patey notes that “intense jockeying for power occurred between the NCP and SPLM, particularly over oil.”548 The tensions were focused on a number of issues that ranged from un-demarcated borders – thus not allowing for the division of the oil fields between north and south – to the SPLM not being given access to any of the

547 Author’s interview with SPLM official, Juba, 31 January 2013
Jeremy Taylor
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information relating to oil production and existing contracts.\(^549\) The atmosphere of mistrust between the SPLM and their NCP partners in the unity government were further heightened by a report by the advocacy group Global Witness which stated that “the oil figures published by the Khartoum government do not match those from other sources.”\(^550\) The report claimed that the government had reported smaller volumes of oil produced in the southern oil blocks, than the operating company CNPC reported for the same blocks. In addition it highlighted discrepancies in the prices received for oil sold by the government in Khartoum, and that in fact GOSS did not receive their half of Sudan’s oil revenues due to it.\(^551\)

Thus while GOSS itself lacked oversight and was frequently guilty of what Patey terms “glaring examples of fiscal mismanagement and corruption”\(^552\), the overriding sentiment in Juba to emerge from that period was that Khartoum could not be trusted, and that only through realising an alternative means of exporting its oil would an independent South Sudan control its own economic destiny. And while Toyota Tsusho would not reveal exactly when they first became involved in the discussions around an alternative pipeline, a representative of the company did emphasise that they “got information at a very early stage.”\(^553\) The representative explained that through Toyota Tsusho’s close ties with a former Kenyan Ambassador to Japan – now the director of Toyota East Africa, the company was able to make contact with the SPLM when the notion of developing a new pipeline was first emerging. Moreover, a representative of the Japan Liaison Office in Juba


\(^550\) Global Witness, “Fuelling mistrust, the need for transparency in Sudan’s oil industry“, September 2009

\(^551\) Ibid


\(^553\) Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013
confirmed that the initial feasibility study for an alternative pipeline had been conducted by an energy research institute funded by the Japanese government.\(^{554}\)

The option of developing an alternative pipeline gained further impetus following South Sudan’s independence in July 2011. Despite the fact that negotiations with Sudan on a number of issues including transit fees for the use of Sudan’s oil pipelines were unresolved, the oil continued to flow. Indeed Juba estimated revenue of US$ 3.2billion from oil sales in the final six months of 2011.\(^{555}\)

Then in December 2011 claiming non-payment of transit fees, Khartoum seized US$ 850 million in oil revenue and began diverting South Sudanese oil to its own refineries. South Sudan responded in February 2012 by shutting down all of the country’s oil wells and effectively stopping oil exports. Significantly, concurrent with the oil shutdown resolution, a second cabinet resolution was adopted in Juba to seek an alternative pipeline route.\(^{557}\) Thus as tension between the two sides increased, the dynamics that had for so long defined inter-Sudanese relations returned, and conflict broke out along the new, and in places, undefined border.

In April 2012, South Sudan’s President Kiir visited Beijing – primarily to request Chinese financing for a new pipeline to be built by Toyota Tsusho. As Patey describes, “Kiir had shut down his country’s oil production in January, and in the process had brought a multi-billion Chinese led oil project to a standstill.” But President Kiir was still hoping that China’s President Hu Jintao would offer South Sudan financial support to build a new pipeline. Yet as Patey continues to explain, “Hu was

\(^{554}\) Author’s interview with representative of Japan Liaison Office South Sudan, Juba, 29 January 2013


\(^{557}\) Open Briefing, “The likelihood and potential impacts of alternative South Sudan oil pipelines”, Intelligence Brief 5 June 2013
welcoming, but was not ready to give Kiir what he wanted most. Indeed President Kiir abruptly cut short his official to visit to China to return to South Sudan – ostensibly to deal with the on-going crisis with Khartoum, but media reports implied his decision was linked to Beijing’s reluctance to finance an alternative pipeline. As the Paris-based Sudan Tribune reported, Beijing “found itself forced to tread carefully so as not to alienate either side.” Thus the military confrontation and fifteen months without oil revenue that resulted from the transit-fee disagreement with Khartoum further invigorated South Sudan’s desire to develop an alternative pipeline. Indeed the inflation, currency devaluation, and severe austerity measures that accompanied the shutdown demonstrated that without an alternative pipeline, South Sudan’s near total dependence on oil revenues combined with on-going poor relations with Sudan effectively constituted an existential threat to the country’s viability.

As a result of both the urgency with which an alternative pipeline was seen in Juba and the preferences and interests competing for attention across the region, a number of alternative options were sought. These included a plan to integrate a new pipeline as part of the Lamu Port and Lamu South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project which will include railways, refineries, ports and airports. In addition, the South Sudan pipeline was envisaged to connect with new oil fields being developed in Kenya and Uganda. Yet as the Economist points out “the new oil states of East Africa cannot agree where to build their pipeline”, and South Sudan has further confused matters by holding talks with Ethiopia about building a pipeline to Djibouti rather than Lamu, cutting out Kenya. As the Economist continues to explain, this would cement South Sudan’s friendship with

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560 Ibid
the strong military power of Ethiopia – thereby reinforcing its position against Sudan, despite the fact that this route is considerably more difficult to build and would resultantly cost more. Thus as Open Briefing notes, in the period since January 2012 South Sudan has negotiated multiple memorandums of understanding and intergovernmental agreements with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to progress pipeline feasibility studies and broader economic integration issues. In addition, President Kiir “initiated a programme of financier outreach, seeking project finance from Asian and Gulf State countries and international finance institutions.” The Economist expects investors “mostly from Japan” to finance the pipeline from South Sudan – whichever route it follows.

5.2.2 Asian Buyers of Sudanese Crude

When considering Sudan and South Sudan’s oil industry, one of its primary characteristics is the fact that oil exports are bought almost entirely by Asian countries. This is due in part to a US trade embargo and sanctions regime against Sudan which explicitly prohibits transactions “relating to the petroleum or petrochemical industries.” And while the sanctions do not apply to South Sudan’s oil industry, interpretation of the sanctions regulations are complicated given the fact that the country’s oil still passes through Sudan’s pipelines and refineries. Yet Sudan’s oil exports also point to the changing characteristics of the global oil market. As discussed in Chapter Three the growing economies of the G20 countries are shifting power dynamics at the structural level as well as driving global demand for oil. In this context the dynamics associated with the historical development of

562 Open Briefing, “The likelihood and potential impacts of alternative South Sudan oil pipelines”, Intelligence Brief 5 June 2013
Sudan’s oil industry reflect the need by rapidly growing economies to identify new suppliers of oil and gas – and reflect an important shift in structural conditions.

As will be explored in more detail later in this chapter, Sudan’s oil industry was essentially realised through Chinese (along with Malaysian and Indian) investment, and thus the market for Sudanese oil exports was established under a unified Sudan. As the figure below shows, at the time of South Sudan’s independence China was the single biggest buyer of oil from Sudan/South Sudan. China purchased 260,000 bbl/d or around two thirds of Sudan/South Sudan’s exports, which accounted for five per cent of China’s oil imports.

Figure 20: Sudan and South Sudan crude exports by destination 2011

*Source: Global Trade Atlas and FACTS Global Energy*

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566 China’s imports from Sudan/South Sudan fell to zero in April 2012 during the shutdown and accounted for less than one per cent of total imports for 2012. By 2013 imports from Sudan/Sudan had still not returned to the levels of 2011.

Despite purchasing considerably less, Japan was the second largest buyer of Sudanese crude in 2011 followed by the other major investors in Sudan’s industry: India and Indonesia.\(^{568}\) This was in part due to Japan buying more of the heavy sweet grades of Sudanese oil for power production. Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster in March 2011 and the subsequent closure or halting of activity at almost all of the country’s nuclear power plants, Japan’s demand for fuel oil increased significantly – importing 1.75 million kilolitres or about 369,000 bbl/d for power generation in February 2012, more than four times as much as the previous year.\(^ {569}\) Indeed the share of oil in Japan’s power generation mix increased from nine per cent in 2010 to an estimated 18 per cent in 2012. Sudanese Low Sulphur Fuel Oil (LSFO) is of particular value in Japan as it can be used by the country’s oil-fired generators, and significantly, Sudan is the second largest supplier of LSFO to Japan. Consequently during the suspension of oil production in South Sudan in 2012 Japan’s power utilities were paying a premium to access LSFO from other sources. Thus despite a METI official pointing out that LSFO is a short term solution as it is too expensive to continue indefinitely, and that Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and coal would replace LSFO in the longer term,\(^ {570}\) the fact remains that unless there is a political decision to restart Japan’s nuclear power stations,\(^ {571}\) the country will be buying increased volumes of Sudanese fuel oil.

The divergence of Japanese interests from the existing key players in Sudan/South Sudan’s oil sector, combined with increased demand for Sudanese crude, therefore presents an opportunity for Japan to not only become a regional player in the energy sector but tie this involvement into their broader

\(^{568}\) Due to the on-going conflict, South Sudan now produces just 165,000 barrels per day, down from 245,000 in Dec 2013. Compounded by the shutdown of oil exports in 2012 Sudan/South Sudan today accounts for just 3% of China’s oil imports


\(^{570}\) Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo 16 October 2013

\(^{571}\) In April 2014 the Cabinet approved a new energy policy overturning the decision to shut down the country’s nuclear power stations. Whilst outside of the time frame of this study, it is unclear how this policy will be implemented given the continued popular opposition to nuclear power and the costs of meeting new safety upgrades.
strategic objectives in the region. Building on the base of ODA-led investment, and strengthened regional presence through peacekeeping, the pipeline bid essentially reflects private-sector investment realising the objectives of Japan’s energy diversification strategy.

5.3 Investing in the Unknown

The proposed oil pipeline discussed in this chapter encompasses multiple layers of risk. As this section will outline, the implications of developing the pipeline are multifaceted and reflect the complex political and historical dynamics upon which South Sudan’s oil industry was built. As such it will examine the wider political implications for the region and the deeply unstable relations between Sudan and South Sudan. Yet primarily his section will explore the business and diplomatic risks faced by Toyota Tsusho in building the pipeline and the Japanese government in supporting and driving the project. Moreover it will examine how this project is evidence of new Japanese attitudes towards risk and how this change can be interpreted through a neoclassical realist framework of analysis.

The political and financial risk associated with Japan’s involvement in the pipeline project should also be considered in terms of Japan’s dominant business culture of *kiken kaihi*, or “uncertainty avoidance” which tends to influence strategic thinking. According to Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory which describes the effects of a society’s culture on the values of its members and how these values relate to behaviour, “Japan is one of the most uncertainty avoiding countries on earth.”\(^572\) Thus in line with a neoclassical realist framework of analysis, *kiken kaihi* can be understood as a particular societal norm that influences the perceptions of Japanese policymakers.

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In this respect the decision by Toyota Tsusho to pursue the project reflects both a higher tolerance for risk by a Japanese company and emphasises South Sudan as a location in which new Japanese approaches are tested in pursuit of the country’s interests in Africa.

At the end of this research period, the route for an alternative pipeline from South Sudan was still undecided. Yet Toyota Tsusho confirmed that the company would build whichever pipeline route was decided on by the regional governments, including an option through Ethiopia to Djibouti. But as a representative of the company explained, if Juba were to decide on developing a pipeline to Djibouti via Addis Ababa, this would require pumping and heating stations to get the oil over the Ethiopian highlands – making the construction project considerably more costly and take longer to build. Moreover, revenues would likely be shared with both Ethiopia and Djibouti, and Ethiopia’s ambition is to feed its expanding domestic fuel market would leave less crude available for export.

Yet while the Djibouti option is more logistically challenging, a risk analyst explains that the route does offer South Sudan an enhanced economic and political partnership with Ethiopia whose regional influence and powerful military “will help to tip the balance of force in its favour compared with Sudan.” This route could also be strategically appealing for Japan as it would enhance Japanese ties with Ethiopia through a major investment as well as consolidate Japan’s presence in Djibouti. Japan provided US$ 108 million in ODA to Ethiopia in 2012, and the pipeline investment would underpin Japan’s commitment to a country with a large potential market and an economy

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572 Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013
Jeremy Taylor
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which has averaged ten per cent growth over the past decade.576  Moreover, the pipeline would enhance the strategic value of their engagement in Djibouti, where Japan’s MSDF have established a base for anti-piracy operations and to patrol the vital sea lanes through which much of its oil imports travel from the Persian Gulf. Yet the most likely alternative route remains the proposed pipeline to Lamu in Kenya and this section will focus on that option.

Toyota Tsusho is facing a number of risks in undertaking to develop the pipeline, not least of which is whether there are sufficient oil reserves in South Sudan to justify a new pipeline. According to BP’s 2013 Statistical Review, South Sudan’s oil reserves are 3.5 billion barrels – which comprises 0.2 per cent of the world’s total reserves.577  Yet the concern for investors is that output levels of the high quality Nile Blend fell from a peak of nearly 287,988 bbl/d on average in 2004 to 124,766 bbl/d by June 2011 – effectively the time of South Sudan’s independence. Moreover, since going on-stream in April 2006 production from Blocks 3 and 7 in Upper Nile of the lower quality Dar Blend compensated for the loss, but as Patey explains, the fields passed their output peak in 2010 and were expected to drop sharply in the coming years. “A lack of new discoveries was shortening the oil industry’s lifespan.”578

South Sudan’s Energy Minister Stephen Dhieu Dau however has claimed that South Sudan has seven billion barrels579 in proven oil reserves. Yet a few months before, Deputy Minister Elizabeth James Bol’s presentation at an oil investor conference only stated reserves of 1.5 billion barrels –

predominantly Dar Blend in Blocks 3 and 7.\textsuperscript{580} Thus as \textit{Open Briefing}, which has produced a comprehensive report on an alternative pipeline from South Sudan points out, “without any new discoveries, South Sudan oil production is likely to decline by 50 per cent over the next ten years. At historical production rates, existing fields will be depleted in 20-30 years.”\textsuperscript{581} The report goes on to note that industry analyst consensus leans towards there being insufficient oil reserves to justify a new pipeline. Yet as Copnall also explains, “whether new reserves are found or not, for at least the first decade after independence oil is likely to represent South Sudan’s greatest, indeed almost only, source of income.”\textsuperscript{582}

While the possibility of new discoveries and linking with oil fields in Kenya and Uganda mitigate this risk somewhat, a key impediment of financing the project remains: “the highly politicised nature of supporting an alternative pipeline with concessional finance has kept the international financial institutions such as the African Development Bank and International Finance Corporation at bay.”\textsuperscript{583} Speaking in 2012, South Sudan’s finance minister stated that the project would cost three billion dollars and that “we don’t need to have the money right now, we have the reserves [...] South Sudan will definitely have equity in the pipeline.”\textsuperscript{584} Alternatively, the \textit{Open Briefing} report also suggests that a “Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT)\textsuperscript{585} structured arrangement with Japan’s Toyota Tsusho corporation remains a possibility for financing the project.” Furthermore, the report notes that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{580} Bol, Elizabeth James (Deputy Minister), “Oil Investment Conference, presentation”, Ministry of Petroleum and Mining, March 2012, Juba South Sudan
\item \textsuperscript{581} Open Briefing, “The likelihood and potential impacts of alternative South Sudan oil pipelines”, Intelligence Brief 5 June 2013
\item \textsuperscript{582} Copnall, James, \textit{A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts, Sudan and South Sudan’s bitter and incomplete divorce}, p. 95
\item \textsuperscript{583} Open Briefing, “The likelihood and potential impacts of alternative South Sudan oil pipelines”, Intelligence Brief 5 June 2013
\item \textsuperscript{584} Reuters, “South Sudan says oil pipeline via Kenya will cost $3 billion”, 10 August 2012, accessed 28 April 2014, available at \url{http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/10/us-kenya-sudan-south-oil-idUSBRE8790U20120810}
\item \textsuperscript{585} BOOT refers to a financing arrangement in which a developer designs and builds a complete project at little or no cost to the government or joint venture partners, then owns and operates the project (in this case the pipeline) for a set period after which returns it to the government.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
“Kiir’s May 2013 visit to Japan to explore investment opportunities for Japanese companies may indicate Shinzo Abe’s government is open to exploring pipeline financing options.”586

A further risk consideration for Toyota Tsusho – or other project financiers – is the issue of security along the pipeline and the extent to which this can hamper construction, future oil exports, and inflate project costs due to insurance coverage. The development of Sudan’s oil industry was in many respects defined by the civil war587 and arguably so too will South Sudan’s oil future be defined by conflict. South Sudan is a deeply unstable country. Quite apart from the violence that erupted in December 2013, armed insurgencies and inter-communal conflict are widespread – especially in Jongleli State through which the proposed pipeline would be constructed. Moreover, the outcome of the current conflict to the development and operation of the pipeline – and accompanying oil drilling operations – while beyond the timeframe of this study, will no doubt radically impact the confidence of investors in South Sudan’s undeveloped oil fields. Indeed, much of the conflict in December 2013 and January 2014 was focused around the oil producing areas of Unity and Upper Nile States, and resulted in oil output dropping by 20 per cent.588

In addition, the logistical challenge facing Toyota Tsusho is immense. While the existing GNPOC and Petrodar pipelines from the Upper Nile and Unity oil fields measure approximately 1,500589 and

586 Open Briefing, “The likelihood and potential impacts of alternative South Sudan oil pipelines”, Intelligence Brief 5 June 2013
kilometres respectively, it is estimated that the new pipeline will be around 2,000 kilometres depending on the route. As Patey also explains, “unlike the largely flat desert over which Sudan’s existing pipelines run, South Sudan’s pipeline may have to travel over diverse terrain through Kenya to its final destination at Lamu.” Moreover, due to the inclines and declines of the topography, more pumping and heating stations than the six stations along the existing pipelines’ route would be necessary in order to keep the highly-acidic and congealing Sudanese Dar Blend crude moving.

Yet beyond the logistical and business risks faced by Toyota Tsusho, the Japanese government faces a number of significant strategic considerations and political risks associated with supporting the development of an alternative pipeline from South Sudan. These include negatively impacting Japan’s relations with Sudan and directly challenging China’s established interests in the existing oil pipelines. Thus while South Sudan’s desire to develop a new pipeline essentially reflects its poor relations with Sudan, the realisation of an alternative oil export route will no doubt further weaken those relations – and consequently could also affect Japan’s relations with Khartoum if the project is undertaken by a Japanese company. Officially, as a MOFA director clarifies, “Japan’s objective in the region is the peaceful coexistence of the two Sudans.” He goes on to note that Japan appreciated that it was a tough decision for Sudan to accept independence of the south, but now that there are two separate countries, the priority is to ensure the viability of both.

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592 Author’s interview with director, MOFA Tokyo, 5 November 2013
Nonetheless a METI official has confided that “the pipeline is diplomatically difficult” and that the Japanese government will find it hard to choose sides between the two countries.\textsuperscript{593} This view is supported by Professor Kataoka of Waseda University who observes that the pipeline “can undermine Japan’s relations with Sudan.”\textsuperscript{594} Further, a director general at JICA echoes this sentiment by observing that “if the pipeline is built, it could impact negatively on Japan’s relations with Sudan – we also depend on Sudan for some natural resources, so the basic idea is to balance good relations with both countries.”\textsuperscript{595} For this reason, MOFA maintains an official policy that the proposed pipeline is a “private sector issue” and that private companies can pursue their own strategies and tactics of investment in Africa.\textsuperscript{596} But as Toyota Tsusho maintain, the political dimensions of the pipeline are handled by the Japanese government and that before government delegations visit the region they meet with Toyota Tsusho to identify the company’s priorities in pushing the deal forward. As a representative of the Sogo Sosha points out, “the government supports the project, because when it comes to resource business the government is always in the background.”\textsuperscript{597}

Yet when considering the proposed pipeline through the lens of neoclassical realism, the factors propelling Japan’s involvement in such a risky project can also be interpreted in terms of Taliaferro’s argument that perceived loss in relative power or perceptions of prestige drive leaders to pursue risky diplomatic or military interventions in peripheral regions.\textsuperscript{598} Consequently, perceptions of Japan’s declining global relevance combined with energy security concerns can be understood to be changing Japan’s attitude towards operating in frontier regions characterised by higher levels of risk.

Furthermore, as small players trying to enter the energy sector, it could be argued that the only

\textsuperscript{593} Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013  
\textsuperscript{594} Author’s interview with Professor Kataoka, Waseda university, Tokyo 7 October 2013  
\textsuperscript{595} Author’s interview with deputy director general JICA, Tokyo, 2 October 2013  
\textsuperscript{596} Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo 5 November 2013  
\textsuperscript{597} Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013  
\textsuperscript{598} Taliaferro, Jeffrey, \textit{Balancing Risk: Great power intervention in the periphery}, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004
options available to Japanese companies such as Toyota Tsusho are those on the margins – and that such investments are by definition more complex and risky.

The proposed pipeline thus aligns Japan’s emerging investment and energy objectives in Africa with the primary strategic aims of South Sudan. As such it should be considered an important element bridging the frontier of Japan’s East African interests and tying South Sudan’s future towards East Africa. Yet the realisation of the pipeline will also impact the delicate political dynamics of the region – most obviously relations between Sudan and South Sudan – and further emphasises the significance of the pipeline beyond merely a conduit for oil.

5.3.1 Implications of a New Oil Pipeline for Inter-Sudanese Relations

The failure of cooperation between Khartoum and Juba has created a particular set of complex diplomatic dynamics for South Sudan to manoeuvre as it tries to convince donors and investors of the need to develop a new oil pipeline. These calculations include the possibility of further worsened relations with Sudan, antagonising China and complex regional dynamics linked to the possible pipeline scenarios believed to be considered (through Kenya to Lamu, or via Ethiopia to Djibouti, or via Uganda to Mombasa).

While Juba’s national interests are essentially focused around securing a stable means to export its oil while at the same time loosening its dependence on Sudan, pursuing an alternative pipeline may have considerable implications. Not least of which is a further deterioration of relations with Sudan.
It is telling that a threat by Khartoum to block oil transfers from South Sudan came only days after the official announcement of the new pipeline deal with Toyota Tsusho and President Kiir’s meeting with company executives in Tokyo at the end of May 2013. Yet the reason given by Khartoum for threatening South Sudan’s oil exports was Juba’s apparent support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N). Thus in making this threat Sudanese President Al Bashir in effect deployed a tactic by which economic pressure is used against South Sudan to achieve domestic political objectives. While in Juba it served to reinforce the strongly held perception that Sudan’s primary objective is to see the collapse of the regime in South Sudan – a view confirmed by a representative of the SPLM.

Furthermore, the deeply unstable southern states of Sudan that stretch from Darfur in the West to Blue Nile in the East hold the potential to deteriorate even further if Khartoum and Juba no longer have the mutual incentive of ensuring enough stability to keep the oil flowing. Indeed despite the forced marriage between the two states held together by the existing pipeline there is ample evidence to suggest Khartoum would move to actively undermine the construction and utilisation of an alternative pipeline. As LeRiche and Arnold observe, “while Khartoum publicly supported a stable South, it nonetheless continued a policy of destabilisation by using proxy militias during the CPA’s Interim Period.” In addition there appears to be evidence that this practice continued in the post-independence era – especially regarding the provision of weapons to the rebel group led by David

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600 The Sudanese Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North was founded by the local elements of the SPLA/M that remained in Sudan following the South Sudanese vote for independence in 2011. SPLM-N was banned by the Sudanese government in September 2011 and is now engaged in an insurgency against the government in Khartoum, operating primarily in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

601 Author’s interview with SPLM official, Juba, 31 January 2013

602 LeRiche, Matthew, Arnold, Matthew, South Sudan, from revolution to independence, p. 198
Yau Yau. As well as previous support for earlier rebellions led by former SPLA generals such as George Athor and Peter Gadet, who formed the short-lived South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) that was described by SPLA spokesman Philip Aguer as “northern mercenaries.”

However while these rebellions were as much reflections of internal political and power dynamics within the SPLA/M, as well as what LeRiche and Arnold refer to as the “ethnic overtones” of the insurgencies – they all impacted the oil industry. The SSLA launched major attacks in Unity state, while George Athor’s insurgency destabilised Upper Nile and Joglei state until his death in 2011. Yet until the outbreak of violence across the country in December 2013, it was the Yau Yau-led insurgency by his militia known as the South Sudan Democratic Army (SSDA) that was the biggest single threat to the realisation of an alternative pipeline.

All of the complicated and delicately-balanced components of the relationship between the two Sudans are therefore susceptible to the consequences of South Sudan securing a new oil pipeline. And although the view of the South Sudanese government is that a new pipeline would remove Khartoum’s ability to use the threat of seizing or blocking oil exports in future negotiations around the many issues unresolved following South Sudan’s secession, the pipeline could also remove any incentive for future cooperation from Khartoum. Indeed as former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq

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604 Despite reintegration into the SPLA in August 2011, Peter Gadet rebelled again in December 2013. At the conclusion of this research his whereabouts were unknown
606 LeRiche, Matthew, Arnold, Matthew, South Sudan, from revolution to independence, p.231
608 Yau Yau signed a peace agreement with the government in March 2014, though it is worth noting that a previous peace agreement broke down and the region is still deeply unstable
Al-Mahdi observed “North Sudan has the power to resolve or complicate the problems of South Sudan and both of them have the ability to turn themselves into failed states.”

In addition, the proposed pipeline would serve as a significant symbolic and material indication of South Sudan’s desire to push its integration in the EAC. And despite the lack of agreement between the countries in the region on a route for the pipeline, and the lure of strengthening ties with Ethiopia at the expense of a Kenyan pipeline, South Sudan has the potential to be a major player in driving the development of an integrated hydrocarbon industry in East Africa. Thus South Sudan and the potential pipeline, is of particular interest to Japan. Indeed, as a METI official observes, the entire region of East Africa from Djibouti to Mozambique holds huge potential for Japan – because unlike more established African oil and gas producers such as Nigeria or Angola, East Africa has less established energy development and resultantly offers “more opportunities for Japan.”

The development of an alternate pipeline from South Sudan is therefore a project characterised by great uncertainty and potential rewards. As South Sudan strives to realise its own economic agency by breaking free of Sudanese influence, the country faces a delicate balance between its own objectives and the competing interests of external players. Not least of which is Japan – for whom the proposed pipeline is a product of the political and economic dynamics occurring within the country that are driving the policy of developing a more robust and extensive footprint in Africa. Yet on the other hand an alternative pipeline will have considerable repercussions for Sudan’s biggest investor China, whose diplomatic and economic ties with Sudan have been underwritten by oil investments.

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610 Author’s interview with deputy director, METI, Tokyo, 21 September 2013
5.3.2 The “China Factor” and the Complex History of Sudan’s Oil Industry

As previously mentioned, the role of China in influencing the thinking of Japanese policymakers is a significant consideration that includes structural pressures as well as the particular dynamics of Japanese elite perceptions. Indeed while the rise of China was explored in Chapter Three as a critical component of the structural context driving the urgency of Japan’s re-aligned Africa policy, the role of China is of particular importance in understanding the dynamics of South Sudan’s oil industry. This section will therefore explore the particular context in which China’s presence in Sudan continues to influence inter-Sudanese relations and the background against which Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline and Japan’s expanding African engagement should be understood. Furthermore, the realisation of an alternative oil pipeline bypassing China’s extensive investments in Sudan is a further consideration for Japanese policymakers given the complexities of Sino-Japanese relations.

CNPC’s arrival in Sudan in the early 1990s effectively realised Khartoum’s long-held dreams of oil exports, and announced China’s presence as a major investor in Africa. As Large and Patey\textsuperscript{611} and Patey\textsuperscript{612} have noted, through CNPC’s majority stake in GNPOC and Petrodar, driving the construction of Sudan’s oil pipelines, refineries and terminal port, China became Sudan’s most important external partner. Furthermore, as Patey describes, “Sudan was more than just another investment on the company’s portfolio: it was a venture of crucial strategic importance for CNPC’s international expansion.”\textsuperscript{613} And significantly for future relations with Juba, CNPC inserted itself into a civil war to build Sudan’s oil industry. Thus as \textit{Open Briefing} notes, China’s preference for maintaining the existing pipeline is “likely based on a combination of avoiding a Sudan-South Sudan zero sum game,

\textsuperscript{611} Large, Daniel and Patey, Luke (eds), \textit{Sudan looks East, China, India and the politics of Asian alternatives}, Woodbridge: James Currey, 2011
\textsuperscript{612} Patey, Luke, \textit{The New Kings of Crude}
\textsuperscript{613} Ibid, p. 111
securing operations for upstream refineries, and resuming oil exports.” Consequently, an alternative pipeline would radically diminish CNPC’s income as well as fundamentally undermine the value of the political and financial investment China has poured into Sudan since the mid-1990s.

As Burr and Collins, Johnson, and Patey describe, the civil war in Sudan was intimately tied-in with the development of the oil industry, and China (through CNPC) only became engaged in Sudan following the withdrawal of US oil major Chevron and the breakdown of relations between the US and Sudan. When the second civil war broke out in 1983, the oil fields became targets and following an attack at a Chevron facility that killed three expatriate workers in 1984, Chevron suspended its operations in Sudan. As the conflict within Sudan grew, the importance of the oil fields to the Sudanese government became increasingly significant – resulting in the forced displacement of communities from the oil producing regions, and the use of proxy armies to defend the oil facilities. As Patey describes,

Oil alone was not responsible for the outbreak of the second civil war, but the Sudanese government’s plans to exploit the resources for its own narrow purposes reinforced the wider grievance of regional marginalisation in Southern Sudan. During the fighting oil fields became hotly contested areas of strategic control and the sites of horrendous human rights violations against southern Sudanese communities by the Sudanese army and its militias.

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614 Open Briefing, “The likelihood and potential impacts of alternative South Sudan oil pipelines”, Intelligence Brief 5 June 2013
616 Johnson, Douglas, The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars
Thus as the brutal conflict of Sudan’s second civil war washed over the oil fields, a number of smaller oil companies continued to operate in Sudan, though none had the investment capital and experience to develop Sudan’s oil infrastructure – until the arrival of CNPC along with Malaysia’s PETRONAS and Indian National Oil Company OVL in the early 1990s. Yet developing Sudan’s oil industry in the midst of a civil war would also effectively mean taking sides in that war – the consequences of which impact on China’s relations with South Sudan today. LeRiche and Arnold observe that “lingering resentment exists in the South over the violence that unfolded in the late 1990s around the oilfields; many communities were brutally driven away in order to allow Chinese corporations to begin pumping.” Consequently as Large describes, for many in the south – not only those directly affected by the oil development, “the link between China and the oil wars of the late 1990s remains predominantly negative and [a] very present, vivid and automatic association.”

Chinese commitment to Sudan was extensive, as Patey describes, a former Chevron oilman commented after the company left Sudan that the infrastructure needed for Sudan’s oil fields required a “virtual re-colonisation of Sudan”, and “CNPC was prepared to go the distance to provide Sudan with the necessary infrastructure.” The creation of the GNPOC pipeline in 1999 and a refinery in 2000 eliminated the need to import fuel for domestic use, and Sudan becoming a major oil exporter to China: providing on average five per cent of China’s total oil imports between 1999 and 2011. Moreover as Patey points out, “Sudan was proof that Chinese national oil companies could compete in the international oil industry. It also became the centrepiece in China’s growing engagement in Africa.”

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620 LeRiche, Matthew, Arnold, Matthew, *South Sudan, from revolution to independence*, p. 209
623 Ibid, p. 118
624 Ibid, P. 119
Thus with the signing of the CPA and the realisation that South Sudan might separate from Sudan, taking with it nearly three quarters of Sudan’s oil, China began exploring relations with the SPLA. As Large points out, the Chinese government had cultivated effective close political relations with Sudan’s ruling elite which made meaningful engagement with the SPLA difficult. Indeed as an SPLA commander stated in 2004, “the suffering of the people is on the hands of the Chinese. The agreements for the Chinese company may be terminated.” Consequently Beijing undertook concerted efforts to develop ties with Juba – described by Patey as a “diplomatic offensive to win over the SPLA.” An offensive that was largely successful in that despite South Sudan achieving independence, they did not cancel the CNPC contracts and have taken a largely pragmatic position with regards engagement with China. As former Secretary-General of the SPLM Pagan Amun noted, “During the struggle of the people of South Sudan, China took the side of the government in Khartoum. But that is history, a troubled history, and we will not allow ourselves to be hostages of the past.” However it should also be noted that without an alternative oil pipeline South Sudan has no choice and is dependent on CNPC for almost all of its revenue.

Thus relations between Beijing and Juba remained uneasy. As a researcher working on China’s engagement in South Sudan points out, while the elite in Juba are more pragmatic, “the general population in South Sudan has not moved on from negative perceptions of China’s past relations with Khartoum.” Consequently, the on-going political instability in South Sudan and continued tension between Juba and Khartoum means that an air of lingering wariness characterises relations between China and South Sudan. And while the imperative of oil revenues and the lure of Chinese

625 Large, Daniel, “China’s Sudan engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War”
629 Author’s interview with researcher, London, 11 September 2013
infrastructure investments and loans will likely still induce pragmatic mutual engagement, a new route to export its oil remains a cornerstone of South Sudan’s strategic vision. Moreover as an SPLM representative in Amun’s office also confided, “do not expect to see Chinese companies winning any new oil concessions in South Sudan – we will look for more friendly players.”

Thus Toyota Tsusho’s pursuit of the project despite the inherit risks – both political and economic – is indicative of a new approach by Japanese businesses operating overseas. An approach characterised as moving away from risk aversion, to one that is beginning to place greater emphasis on potential economic and political gain for Japan when considered alongside the immediate risks of the particular project.

Indeed as this chapter will further explore, expanding Japan’s presence beyond ODA-investments and peacekeeping to include private-sector energy investment, advances the country’s interests and offers a number of strategic opportunities such as diversifying oil supplies, acquiring equity oil and even undermining China’s influence in South Sudan. As such the pipeline project reflects a response to shifting structural conditions and can be understood to bridge both geographical and cultural frontiers in advancing Japan’s interests in the region.

5.4 The Frontier of Opportunity

As previously noted, the proposed pipeline is a complex venture characterised by multiple layers of risk, yet the project also holds distinct opportunities to advance Japan’s emerging energy objectives.

630 Author’s interview with SPLM official, Juba, 31 January 2013
in the region. In contrast to the other major buyers of Sudan/South Sudan’s oil such as China, Malaysia, and India, Japan is not invested in the success of Sudan’s pipelines or refineries. Thus this divergence of Japanese interests from the existing key players in Sudan/South Sudan’s oil sector presents an opportunity for Japan to not only become a regional player in the energy sector but tie this involvement into their broader strategic energy objectives in the region. This section will explore the strategic and economic potential that investment in South Sudan’s oil pipeline holds for Japan and contextualise that potential in a broader analysis of Japan’s energy policies.

As described in Chapter Three, energy security is a critical component of Japan’s strategic planning and METI recognises that the proposed pipeline is the key to unlocking further potential from South Sudan’s oil fields. A METI official notes that although the fields currently under exploration have reached peak production and probably do not justify the development of a new pipeline – there remains huge potential in the currently undeveloped Block B, and that if development of this block were to advance then Toyota Tsusho’s pipeline would be extremely valuable. As a JETRO official reiterates, “if it is found to have good oil reserves it could change the conditions for the new pipeline.”

The 120,000 square kilometre Block B in Jonglei and Lakes state is roughly the size of Eritrea and has been owned by France’s Total since 1980, but was abandoned in 1985 due to the civil war. As LeRiche and Arnold explain, great hope has been placed in the development of the block as “studies suggest that substantial oil reserves are likely to exist underground, but the full nature and quality of the reserves are unclear.” METI’s interest however is linked to the decision by the government in Juba to split the huge concession into separate parts and invite new investors to develop the field.

631 Author’s interview with JETRO representative, London, 9 September 2013
632 LeRiche, Matthew, Arnold, Matthew, South Sudan, from revolution to independence, p. 179
Jeremy Taylor  
564257

The petroleum bill passed after South Sudan seceded said its new government was not bound by past agreements and had the right to review and split blocks. While it signed new agreements with the Chinese, Malaysian and Indian companies already operating in South Sudan, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining indicated that one share of Block B would be offered to Total and the others would be offered for tender. Indeed oil minister Stephen Dhieu Dau noted that "Definitely Block B will not be any longer continuing as Block B, it will be blocks of Block Bs, it will be many Bs", he said, declining to specify how many. Open Briefing concludes that “the proposed carving up of Total’s exploration licence in Block B was not only aimed at generating revenue and bringing US oil and gas interests back into South Sudan, but also at spurring competitive exploration activity.” Similarly, attempts were made to generate government income during the shutdown by offering new exploration licences to a range of private and state-owned NOCs. Thus when asked if Toyota Tsusho is following the discussions around the opportunities linked to Block B, a company representative confirmed that “yes we are involved, but the discussion is still at the government level.” A METI official also reiterated that “if a Japanese company could get involved in the development of Block B then the Japanese government would fully support the pipeline.”

Beyond the potential of Block B however, oil fields in Uganda offer even more opportunities, and METI recognises that they expect to begin oil production in 2018 – and will need a pipeline. The official continues by noting that his department encourages Japanese companies to become involved in developing oil fields in South Sudan and across East Africa, “the Japanese government is only interested in upstream concessions, and the pipeline is a means to get involved in upstream

635 Open Briefing, “The likelihood and potential impacts of alternative South Sudan oil pipelines”, Intelligence Brief 5 June 2013
636 Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013
637 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo 16 October 2013
concessions.” Thus highlighting not only the significance of equity energy investments within the broader conception of Japan’s Africa policy, but also the role that the pipeline plays in securing a place for Japan within the development of East Africa’s energy sector.

The pipeline is therefore also a potential framework around which to develop an integrated energy sector in East Africa. Upstream investment in the region is expected to reach US$ 7 billion by 2018 as East Africa is believed to contain 130 trillion cubic feet of gas and around two billion barrels of oil, with the same again in still-to-be-proven potential. In a report on oil and gas in East Africa, Control Risks points out that while the lack of infrastructure to support the industry in the region could be seen as an impediment it also offers “considerable commercial opportunities and is likely to be a major growth area of the next two decades.” In this context South Sudan sits at the very frontier of Japan’s Africa strategy – enticing bold investors such as Toyota Tsusho with the promise of reward and integration into the more established and stable countries of East Africa. Yet as a MOFA director explains, “commercial conventional ways of securing resources are not abundant so we need to go to the frontiers – those markets that are difficult to enter.” And when it comes to frontiers in Africa, such as Mozambique, Uganda, and Kenya, MOFA believes that Japan’s energy strategy should focus on mobilising policies to secure resources. For example, using visits by the Prime Minister and other senior officials to build relations, and to use ODA more strategically in advancing Japan’s energy ambitions in the region.

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638 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo 16 October 2013
641 Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo, 30 October 2013
Yet while Jonglei remains unstable, Block B unexplored, and the government of South Sudan and others in the region are still to finalise a route, the pipeline remains a high-risk project far from realisation. Indeed as a representative of Toyota Tsusho pointed out, until the route is decided, the final cost assessment cannot be completed, and without the final costs determined it is difficult to secure financing. The representative goes on to explain that the final decision on the route is made by the government in Juba – in agreement with others in the region – and it is out of Toyota Tsusho’s control. “That’s why that sort of coordination [with the governments in the region] should be done by the Japanese government and why we collaborate closely with our government on this project.”

Beyond providing diplomatic support to private sector companies, the Japanese government has two primary policy tools in pursuing its energy policies: JOGMEC and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). JOGMEC provides financial assistance to private companies from Japan, as well as technical assistance and stockpiling of oil and rare metals. As a representative from the company points out, “banks rarely finance oil and gas exploration, so we take the risk.” By studying the project risk and providing 75 per cent of the funding, JOGMEC supports Japanese companies, and effectively allows them to compete against more established international energy companies. For example, 75 per cent of Mitsui’s equity investment in the Anadarko-owned gas field in Mozambique was provided by JOGMEC. Significantly, there is a condition attached to JOGMEC’s financial support for Japanese companies, and that is that while oil and gas would be normally sold to the market, “if there is an emergency situation they must give their share of oil and gas to Japan.” As a JOGMEC representative explains, the purpose of the corporation is safeguarding Japan’s energy

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642 Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013
643 Author’s interview with representative of JOGMEC, Tokyo, 29 October 2013
644 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013
security, and the financing was after all provided by public funds. Indeed as METI acknowledges, often the interests of the government and private companies are the same – but in the event that they are not, this requirement will ensure that valuable energy resources are returned to Japan.

Thus while the prospects for African oil production is limited compared with the Middle East there are however some distinct advantages for Japan to pursue investment in the continent’s energy sector. As a representative of JOGMEC describes, “Africa is a more open market than the Middle East or Russia.” In these regions investment opportunities for foreign companies are rare, or restricted to “the majors” or NOCs. Africa by comparison is unusual in that there are many smaller resource companies operating – these minor companies explore and exploit resources which they then sell to a major resource company. These conditions therefore offer opportunities for smaller Japanese companies to enter the energy market, secure equity concessions, and thereby diversify Japan’s energy supplies. In this regard, JOGMEC currently supports oil and gas investments by Japanese companies in the Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique and Namibia. In addition, JOGMEC is conducting geological surveys with the Kenyan National Oil company and has an office and remote sensing centre in Botswana.

As a JOGMEC representative goes on to explain, despite the fact that Africa is not a priority for many Japanese companies, it offers a variety of opportunities to develop technical proficiencies, and expand market access. Furthermore, as JOGMEC reiterates, “Mitsui’s big gas investment in Mozambique is making other companies see Africa’s potential.” Indeed, Mitsui’s 20 per cent

645 Author’s interview with representative of JOGMEC, Tokyo, 29 October 2013
646 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013
647 Author’s interview with representative of JOGMEC, Tokyo, 29 October 2013
648 Ibid
649 Ibid
650 Ibid
stake in the Anadarko owned gas field in Mozambique remains Japan’s highest profile equity investment in Africa and in some respects establishes Japan’s intentions on the continent – and Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline should be understood as a component within Japan’s expanding energy strategy in Africa. An energy strategy which increasingly is focused on the potential for equity energy investments.

5.4.1 Toyota Tsusho and Equity Oil in the Pipeline?

The announcement that Toyota Tsusho would develop the pipeline was made following an official visit to Japan by South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir in June 2013 – where he also attended TICAD V. President Kiir met with representatives of the company and finalised a deal that has been in discussion since 2010. For the Japanese government, the announcement added an important symbolic and material dimension to the underlying message of TICAD V – namely that Japan’s engagement on the continent had evolved to encompass much more than just aid, and that it is a serious investor. In a separate meeting between Prime Minister Abe and President Kiir, both leaders referenced the extent of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan from ODA projects such as the Nile bridge and the deployment of Japanese peacekeepers, emphasising their mutual wishes that private Japanese companies increase their presence in South Sudan. This view is reinforced by a representative of the Japan Liaison Office in South Sudan, who noted that Japan’s ODA-focused cooperation with South Sudan was “the start of a relationship that would hopefully grow to include a business-level.”

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652 The Liaison Office was upgraded to an Embassy in July 2013
653 Author’s interview with representative of Japan Liaison Office South Sudan, Juba, 29 January 2013
Thus coming alongside Japan’s flagship TICAD conference, the announcement of Toyota Tsusho’s involvement in the pipeline project was significant in that it tied together two of Japan’s strategic objectives in Africa: economic revitalisation through increased overseas investment, and efforts to ensure energy security. Furthermore, as this chapter has explored, the pipeline project reflects not only the systemic drivers underpinning Japan’s re-engagement in Africa but also points to an evolution in the country’s investment-led approach to engagement in Africa, and an increasing focus on obtaining equity oil investments. In this regard the proposed Toyota Tsusho project is an opportunity to advance Japanese emerging policy framework for ensuring energy security through equity investments.

Yet Toyota Tsusho’s role in the complex political environment of South Sudan is also an interesting indicator of Japan’s broader objectives in the region and willingness to engage in high risk investments. As such, it is a reflection of the extent to which Japan’s engagement in South Sudan represents both a bridgehead and a test-case for expanding Japanese energy investment in Africa. As a representative of the company points out, Toyota Tsusho is the only Japanese company to invest directly in Kenya, and in doing so the organisation has developed strong regional business networks and personal relationships at the highest political levels. It was through these relationships that the company became aware at a very early stage that South Sudan was seeking to develop an alternative pipeline for its oil exports. Therefore despite lacking experience in this sort of project the company was able to move early in developing a strategy and carrying out feasibility studies for the proposed pipeline – in effect leveraging advance knowledge of the project and relationships in the region to overcome the company’s lack of a track record in securing an agreement with the government in Juba.

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654 Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo, 23 October 2013
As a representative of Toyota Tsusho points out, “while we have no experience in building a pipeline we can coordinate a project successfully” – that is, coordinate with various component specialists such as pipe manufacturers and oil infrastructure companies. Yet an underlying question remains: why would the company undertake such a risky, politically sensitive project in a field in which it has no experience? The Toyota Tsusho representative goes some way to answering this as well as intimating a broader strategy for Japan in the region when he observes that the pipeline is not in itself “a very interesting business” as it merely consists of connecting the pipes and exporting the oil. However purchasing oil “is good business” – to have rights to purchase oil is “good for our company and also for Japanese energy management.” As the representative goes on to explain, their strategy would be that the existing operating companies can continue to drill the oil, but that Toyota Tsusho would then buy oil from them – which would then become Hinomaru Oil.

It is for this reason Toyota Tsusho continues to pursue a project that up to the end of this research period has neither financing nor a confirmed route. The company confirms that before securing finance the route will have to be decided, but that they will build any of the options. Indeed as a representative of Toyota Tsusho notes, “deciding the route is a political decision which is out of our control – and that is why coordination should be done by the Japanese government.” In this regard the company collaborates closely with the Japanese government, and encourages discussion between METI officials and government officials in South Sudan and Kenya.

Yet the paradox that surrounds Japan’s current approach to energy security by increasing the ratio of Hinomaru Oil within Japan’s energy mix is the commonly-held assumption that owning foreign or equity oil adds to the security of energy supply for that country. In this regard Fesharaki remains the

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655 Ibid
656 Ibid
657 Authors interview with representative of Toyota Tsusho, Tokyo 23 October 2013
most significant opponent of this view, and argues that “energy security can be achieved through
the efficient operation of market forces.” Fesharaki’s primary position is that energy markets
have mitigated energy rivalries and all but eliminated traditional security threats – where market
presence and position, and the ability to secure contracts rather than territorial access ensures
energy security. Indeed Manning suggests that “insofar as oil is a globalised commodity, a
disruption anywhere is a price spike everywhere. Thus mere geopolitical access to strategic
resources will not yield the accessing party the best price. What matters, rather, is who gets what
long term contract.” Further, Powell notes when questioning the logic of India’s extensive equity
oil investments that equity oil is still sold to the global oil market, and despite the presumption, does
not insulate the economy from higher world oil prices.

Indeed the global energy market in recent years has been characterised by increasing transparency
and globalisation where prices are no longer determined by deals between producers and
distributors, but rather by futures contracts negotiated openly and competitively. Furthermore as
May points out, an open worldwide spot market has largely replaced the exclusive long-term
arrangements of the past, and has thus reduced the political element in oil supply.

The argument holds therefore that the increasingly free international energy markets provide
security for importing countries in a number of ways. Wesley points to the fact that markets


659 Ibid, p. 85
661 Powell, Lydia, “Do India’s equity oil investments make sense?”, Observer Research Foundation, Vol. 8 Issue 43, April 2012
diversify risks and provide the capacity to absorb disruptions through the price effect – given that oil is considered a fungible commodity: under market conditions all consumers absorb an equal part of a supply disruption through paying the same increased price. Additionally, there is a convergence of interests between producers and consumers in maintaining affordability and stability in global energy markets. Underlying these views are basic assumptions on the logic of cooperation as a consequence of increasing global economic interdependence, and that the growth of energy markets will inevitably break down security-driven energy policies.

Yet despite the apparent historical trend toward the “anti-geopolitics” of the market, Wesley points out that it is also clear that major energy consumers such as China, Japan, Russia and India are developing alternative energy security policies – policies that “represent a statist quest for direct control over energy sources and supply routes, the opposite logic to a fuller integration into the market.” Wesley goes on to observe that in effect two competing geopolitical logics are asserting themselves in the energy sector. Further, as a MOFA director points out, “the energy market is actually not a very market based mechanism – especially with regards fossil fuels.” Consequently there is a big consolidation of wealth in fossil fuel industries and more International Oil Companies (IOCs) are retreating because of the strength and influence of governments and NOCs. He continues by noting that “the energy market itself is not what it was some time ago – and it is more and more difficult for companies to rely on market forces.” As a result governments are pushing NOCs and trying to attach certain conditions to concessions for foreign companies.

As the MOFA official also points out, NOCs ultimately benefit from being affiliated with government because they can then access unlimited financial resources, and when combined with the realisation

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664 Wesley, Michael, “The Geopolitics of Energy security in Asia”, p. 3
665 Ibid, p. 4
666 Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo 30 October 2013
that, unlike some years ago, competition within the energy markets is not really market based — “more government investment is probably necessary. And this has broad support within the leadership and parliament in Japan.”

Indeed as a manager at IEEJ further notes, “in my view equity oil is very important.” He goes on to point out the value of developing expertise in the oil and gas sector, and given Japan’s total dependence on imported oil and gas the country needs to develop expertise in the entire value chain. Without this expertise, “our negotiating power against competitors is weakened.”

Moreover, as Andrews-Speed observes, while oil prices have risen over the last ten years, the level of international investment by Asian NOCs has soared. Chinese companies lead the way, but NOCs from Japan, South Korea, India and Malaysia are also active. Thus the acquisition of equity oil through investment by China’s CNPC and the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) has become a much-analysed aspect of China’s energy operations across the world – driven by the “going abroad” policy to acquire oil through exploration and corporate mergers. While Herberg maintains that the expansion of Asia’s NOCs has been driven by both energy security concerns and the commercial drive to exploit new opportunities, policymakers in Japan are responding to the changing oil market and are now more willing to provide support and push private Japanese companies abroad to secure equity stakes in energy. Thus the significance of securing energy supplies is such that governments effectively choose to hedge against the presumed infallibility of the energy market by securing equity oil investments.

667 Ibid
668 Author’s interview with Manager at IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
669 Ibid
Moreover, these policies are in line with broader strategic approaches to policy development, as Samuels has noted about Japan, given the country’s geographical location and late development, “it is no surprise that hedging has long been an arrow in Tokyo’s strategic quiver.” A manager at IEEJ reiterates this point by noting that “downstream and upstream capabilities are a natural hedge against the fluctuation of oil and gas prices.”

The IEEJ representative continues by noting that “the norm or pattern of resource acquisition has changed because of Asian NOCs” – consequently the role of government has become more prominent due to the emergence of Asian NOCs in the upstream market. Klare further points out that national leaders are assuming a greater role in the management of their energy polices, “driven not only by hard-headed calculations about global energy supplies, but also by what can only be viewed as a degree of hysteria over the future adequacy of reserves and outsize fears about the possibility of losing out to more aggressive procurement tactics by rivals.” In other words, Japanese policymakers are interpreting structural pressures through the particular perspective of Japan’s energy vulnerability – a vulnerability that has in itself become a norm and an important domestic consideration in a neoclassical realist interpretation of Japan’s energy policy formation. Consequently the discourse in Japan about Hinomaru Oil should also be understood as an identity issue – one that resultantly resonates deeply with policymakers and does not always reflect a purely objective assessment of Japan’s energy requirements. Indeed as Japanese foreign policy is increasingly accompanied by a national discourse of revitalisation and Abe’s assertion that he “will

674 Author’s interview with Manager, IEEJ, Tokyo 18 October 2013
675 Ibid
676 Klare, Michael, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet how scarce energy is creating a new world order, p. 26
bring back a strong Japan,” the pursuit of Hinomaru Oil is a further example of a particular domestic interpretation and response to structural conditions by Japanese policymakers.

It is also worth considering that while the value of equity oil is repeatedly discussed in Japanese policy circles, a manager at IEEJ also explains that investing in a foreign country’s oil and gas sectors also provides insights into the political dynamics in those countries. Indeed with reference to Africa, this is especially relevant in drawing Japan into increasingly more entangled and multifaceted relationships on the continent as it seeks to secure energy from new sources. Not least of which in South Sudan where Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline draws Japan into the complex political undercurrents swirling across the region. Increased engagement in Africa however also challenges the established approaches and perceptions within Japan’s domestic energy industries to accommodate the shifting policies of Japanese government elites. This is a relevant dimension of this study given that a neoclassical realist perspective requires analysis of international structural conditions as well as domestic institutions and political considerations.

5.5 The Domestic Dynamics of Japan’s Energy Policy in Africa

Despite the fact that diversification of oil supplies remains a central element within Japanese energy policy, a director at MOFA concedes that “the strategy has been failing for the past three decades,” and Japan remains overwhelmingly dependent on Middle Eastern supply. Thus soliciting the question why has the policy of diversification of oil supply in Japan not been achieved?

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678 Author’s interview with Manager at IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
679 Author’s interview with director, MOFA, 30 October 2013
Notwithstanding the centrality of energy security within Japan’s policy framework, there appears to be a number of domestic constraints within Japan that result in a divergence between official government policy and the private energy sector. In terms of the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism underpinning this study, domestic considerations are an important factor in understanding foreign policy outcomes and this section will therefore briefly outline some of the domestic factors that are also influencing Japan’s energy strategy in Africa.

Despite diversification of supply being an objective of Japanese policy since the 1973 oil crisis, Japanese refineries are built for Middle Eastern crude, and Japan’s refining companies are reluctant to make the investment in changing their infrastructure in a shrinking market. As the IEEJ points out, Japanese companies have even been reluctant to purchase Russian crude for a variety of technical reasons – and essentially do not want to alter the most cost-effective procurement methods. Thus while China and India are building refineries to accommodate oil from South America and Africa, “Japanese companies are unwilling to invest in development of new refineries” – thereby ensuring that “Japan’s dependence on Middle Eastern supplies will remain.” As a MOFA representative explains, if left to market forces the Middle East will continue to dominate the oil export market, and while the country’s gas imports are quite diverse, Japan is struggling to find alternatives to the Middle East for oil.

This situation highlights a challenge for the Japanese government in realising its strategic objectives to diversify its oil supply by encouraging more aggressive and internationally-focused investments from Japanese companies. It also adds to the complexity of its pursuit of Hinomaru Oil concessions in Africa. Because while the government is concerned about structural changes to energy markets,
overreliance on a single region and the threat of a 1973-type oil shock, domestic refiners and distributors are focused more on the cost implications of moving away from Middle Eastern oil for which there are established and cost-effective procurement systems in place. As a MOFA director further explains, “there is no easy way out of this situation” and that when it comes to oil supply and price, essentially consumer countries are not winning and this could mean Africa becomes an option for Japan.⁶⁸³

Consequently, Japanese policymakers are encouraging and supporting the private sector to invest in equity energy projects in Africa. As the IEEJ further explains, energy investments in Africa are largely initiated by the government, who then request private companies to participate later⁶⁸⁴ – and although this is not true of every energy investment, it does indicate an elite-level policy-driven approach to engagement in Africa. This was further demonstrated by the Japan Sustainable Mining, Investment and Technology Business Forum (J-SUMIT) hosted by METI in conjunction with TICAD V in 2013. At the summit Japan pledged to invest two billion dollars in African energy and mineral projects, and METI Minister Toshimitsu Motegi stated that the “conference put in place the building blocks to encourage investment from Japanese companies and to help create Africa’s sustainable growth.”⁶⁸⁵

Thus while Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan is evidence of an emerging appetite within Japan’s private sector to pursue investment opportunities on the continent, this chapter has also demonstrated that it has benefitted from concerted government support in realising Japan’s energy strategy in East Africa. A strategy which as a deputy director at METI points out is in part an

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⁶⁸³ Ibid
⁶⁸⁴ Author’s interview with Manager at IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
effort to diversify sources of supply – albeit as “a long term policy.”686 This view is reiterated by a representative of JOGMEC who explains that while Africa is not the first priority for Japanese oil and gas companies, diversification of supply is always important, so for this reason they will seek opportunities where possible.687

In this context and when considering overarching systemic conditions driving high oil prices in 2008, an examination of Japan’s response to the 1973 oil crisis provides a telling indication of how oil concerns impacted on Japanese elite perceptions and foreign policy, as well as provides a useful base for understanding Japan’s responses to present energy concerns. Indeed the events of 1973 effectively created the norms of energy vulnerability that underpin Japan’s energy policies – and tie those policies into the framework of the country’s external interactions. There is an extensive literature on norms and ideas as motivators for state behaviour, for example Kratochwil,688 Goldstein and Keohane,689 and Wendt,690 but in terms of the neoclassical realist framework of this study their significance is determined by how they are perceived and acted upon by policymakers. Moreover, as with the case of Japan’s energy vulnerability, when the norm is supported by structural realities they embolden and reinforce elite decision-making. Consequently a brief analysis of Japan’s experience of the 1973 oil crisis provides an explanatory context to understand the policy decisions underlying the prioritisation of equity oil investments and ultimately Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan.

686 Author’s interview with deputy director METI, Tokyo, 16 October 2013
687 Author’s interview with representative of JOGMEC, Tokyo, 29 October 2013
5.5.1 Policy Lessons from the 1973 Oil Crisis

As Yorke describes, following the decision by OPEC to cut production by 25 per cent and classify Japan as an “unfriendly state” in 1973, Japan engaged in a damage limitation program through the formulation of bilateral relations with oil at their core. Yorke continues by noting that,

Tokyo was thrown into a state of panic. In order to restore interrupted supplies,
Japan proceeded to abandon the principle on which its post-war external relations had been based: the separation of economic and political matters.691

Indeed as a MOFA official points out, energy security has not always been on the agenda of Japan’s (post-World War II) foreign policy priorities692 – however the energy crisis in 1973 changed that. The oil shock effectively ended the high growth period of the Japanese economy and pushed energy security to the forefront of policy making until the mid-1990s when energy prices collapsed. Thus reassuring Japanese elites that energy resources – though still of critical importance, could be secured on the world’s energy markets.

The 1973 oil crisis therefore had considerable repercussions in Japan, both in terms of the economic costs of reduced growth and in terms of the diplomatic response to the threat to energy supplies. Throughout the 1960s, Japan experienced double-digit growth yet between 1974 and 1978 the Japanese economy grew at only 3.7 per cent,693 thereby demonstrating the continued economic damage caused by the oil disruptions and increased price of oil. As Eguchi points out, there has always been a very close link in the Japanese economy between energy consumption and the growth rate, as well as a link

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691 Yorke, Valerie “Oil, the Middle East and Japan’s search for security”, International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 3, 1981, p. 434
692 Author’s interview with director MOFA, Tokyo 30 October 2013
693 Eguchi, Yujiro “Japanese energy policy”, International Affairs, Volume 56, number 2, 1980, p. 265
between growth and the price of oil.\textsuperscript{694} Basically, higher energy prices compel the government to pursue restrained monetary and fiscal policies so as to avoid the inflationary pressures associated with higher oil prices. Yet the most significant long-term outcome of the crisis was the absorption of energy security priorities within all aspects of policymaking.

As outlined in Chapter Three, the resultant energy security policy rested on five core pillars: energy source diversification, energy import source diversification, strengthening ties with major oil and gas producers, oil stockpiling and energy conservation.\textsuperscript{695} In many respects the concerted efforts of the government were realised in achieving these objectives, with the share of oil in total energy consumption declining from around 72 per cent in 1979 to 40 per cent in 2010.\textsuperscript{696} Although still heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels, the country also became a world leader in energy saving technology and steadily introduced nuclear power into the power generation mix – from three per cent in 1973 to 30 per cent in 2010 and this was expected to grow to 50 per cent in 2030.\textsuperscript{697} Consequently, as the chief economist of the IEEJ points out, despite significant strides in the past 40 years to reduce dependence on oil, “the fact remains that we are still very dependent on fossil fuel.” He continues by noting that since Fukushima and the nuclear shutdown, the gap in energy supply is largely being made up by LNG-fired power plants, with more LNG coming from Qatar – “therefore dependence on the Middle East is increasing again.”\textsuperscript{698}

The meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi plant has had a number of significant repercussions for the country’s energy planning and policies, quite beyond the human and ecological disaster that is still

\textsuperscript{694} Ibid
\textsuperscript{695} Author’s interview with chief economist and managing director IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
\textsuperscript{698} Author’s interview with chief economist and managing director IEEJ, Tokyo, 18 October 2013
unfolding. Energy security is again at the forefront of the attention of Japanese policy makers and the public, and as Vivodo points out, unlike in the 1970s, when the focus was on affordability and security of oil supplies, the current challenge is multidimensional.\footnote{Vivodo, Vlado, “Japan’s energy security predicament post-Fukushima”, Energy Policy, Vol. 46, 2012, pp. 135 - 143} Japan remains a leading player in the field of nuclear power generation and the debate currently raging about whether to abandon nuclear power altogether will impact on the country’s ability to export nuclear technology and skills, as well as the longer-term planning around making up the nuclear shortfall with increased imports of fossil fuels. Indeed, such was the extent of the shock caused by the nuclear shutdown on Japan’s economy that in 2011 Japan recorded its first trade deficit since the second crisis of 1979, with the trade deficit mainly caused by an increase of 25 per cent in fossil fuel imports – adding up to one third of Japan’s import spending in 2011.\footnote{The Japan Times, “A Worrisome Trade Deficit”, 31 January 2012, accessed 2 June 2014, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/01/31/editorials/a-worrisome-trade-deficit/#.UmTfxFDPeRY}

A further significant element of the 1973 oil crisis to consider is Japan’s foreign policy response. OPEC’s embargo led to Japan’s first break with American foreign policy when Japan called for Israel’s withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967 and reiterated Japan’s support concerning the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, and hinted at a reconsideration of its policy towards Israel. Yorke refers to this process as Japan’s departure into “resource diplomacy.”\footnote{Yorke Valerie, “Oil, the Middle East and Japan’s search for security”, p.434} Thus the events of 1973 highlighted not only Japan’s severe dependence on imported oil – made worse by the fact that at that time Japan had no emergency oil stockpiles, but also stressed the need to diversify its sources of supply. Furthermore, the 1973 oil crisis, and to a slightly lesser extent, the oil disruptions following the Iranian revolution in 1979, highlighted the extent to which energy concerns had become the central issue for Japan’s foreign policy
in the Middle East – resulting in bilateral diplomacy with the oil producing states, centred around investment aid and trade.⁷⁰²

Consequently Japan’s energy vulnerability norms, developed in response to the crises of the 1970s, are again in sharp focus and exacerbated by the loss of 30 per cent of power generating capacity following the post-Fukushima nuclear shutdown. So despite the growing significance of LNG in the country’s power mix, the heavy reliance on oil in the transport sector remains. As Vivodo points out, the lessons that Japan has learnt from the 1970s oil crises attest to the dangers of increased reliance on imported fossil fuels, and are today “exacerbated by the increased imports of oil to fuel thermal plants, zero-sum competition for oil with China, India and South Korea, and US pressure to reduce oil imports from Iran.”⁷⁰³ In essence, these structural pressures are once again affirming the perception among Japanese elites of the country’s energy vulnerability, and energy security is becoming a central feature of Japan’s foreign policy agenda.

The realisation of Japan’s long-term energy security strategy in the context of its African engagements is therefore dependent not only on elite-level policymakers, but also on the dynamics of Japan’s private sector. This section has emphasised the neoclassical realist position that domestic considerations build on structural pressures and affect the timing and manner of government policies. Yet despite these challenges Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan also highlights Japan’s refocused attention on Africa as a location to pursue the country’s future energy diversification, as well as places Japanese energy investments into the context of a broader engagement with Africa that includes ODA and security engagement.

⁷⁰² Ibid
⁷⁰³ Vivodo, Vlado “Japan’s energy security predicament post-Fukushima”
Despite the markedly different global conditions under which Japan’s current engagement in South Sudan is occurring when compared with Japan’s presence in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, one key driver remains the same: access to natural resources. Japan today faces the systemic challenges of maintaining its economic position and carving a space of political relevance in a global order increasingly influenced by emerging powers – against the backdrop of the enduring perception of the country’s energy vulnerability. In the decades since Japan’s first resource-led engagement in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s the world has changed fundamentally, and Japan’s current economic and political imperatives reflect these changes. During the 1960s as the so-called “Japanese miracle” of post war reconstruction was unfolding, the country’s rapid growth was dependent on imported resources, while today Japan faces the challenge to re-invigorate a rich but stagnant economic model. As such, the lure of Africa’s energy and mineral resources must be contextualised against the changes that have taken place in Japan, and across the rest of the world. Changes that have seen Japan’s economic status overtaken by a rising China and a growing realisation that Japan needs to reconsider the risk aversion that has characterised its political and economic direction in recent years

Consequently, the Toyota Tsusho bid to develop an alternative oil pipeline in South Sudan should be understood as part of a broader initiative to drive Japanese energy-based investment in Africa. While South Sudan inhabits a high-risk frontier position within East Africa’s investment space, it offers a significant opportunity for one of the newest and smallest Sogo Sosha to play a key part in the development of infrastructure that will underpin the region’s oil and gas industry – while also offering the potential to purchase Hinomaru oil. Put another way, the pipeline is also an important opportunity to expand the frontiers of Japan’s presence and thereby its interests in the region.
Thus when considered in terms of Japan’s overall engagement in South Sudan, the pipeline bid best illustrates a willingness to engage in more risky, politically sensitive investments that are driven as much by existing imperatives such as energy security as by a desire to demonstrate Japan’s status as a committed contributor and investor in Africa’s development. Moreover, growing interest in East Africa’s energy potential is a significant backdrop to Japan’s corresponding interests in establishing a presence in South Sudan through high-profile ODA projects and a peacekeeping contribution. Thus the high level of Japanese engagement in South Sudan, combined with the sensitivity of the pipeline project, and Japan’s renewed energy security considerations reflect a neoclassical realist analysis of the Japanese government’s response to changes in the global environment. Indeed this chapter expanded upon the causal effects of the systemic pressures discussed in Chapter Three with analysis of Japan’s domestic energy considerations to arrive at an explanation for the foreign policy motivations supporting Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan. A policy response that is interpreted through the particular prism of Japan’s domestic experience of dependence on imported energy, and which is now manifesting in Japan’s refocused engagement in Africa.
6. Security Engagement

The previous chapters explored Japan’s ODA and resource-led investment strategy in South Sudan as a barometer of broader engagement and intent underlying Japan’s re-engagement in Africa. In this regard, the previous chapters reflect a tactical response by Japan to the strategic objectives of economic growth and ensuring energy security as described in Chapter Three. This Chapter will therefore outline the third key tactic or method of engagement underpinning Japan’s commitments on the continent – namely security engagement. Comprising UN peacekeepers in South Sudan and a multilateral anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa, the expansion of Japan’s presence on the continent to include a security dimension is significant both as a reflection of the growing importance of Africa within Japan’s foreign policy objectives, and in terms of the complex constitutional considerations that accompany the deployment of Japan’s armed forces.

Thus in line with neoclassical realist analysis, this chapter will also explore the steadily increasing role and profile of the Self Defence Forces (SDF) in the context of domestic debates around the interpretation of Japan’s constitutional restrictions such as the right to collective self-defence. In this respect this chapter will further outline the structural pressures underpinning Japan’s expanding international security role and the extent to which its African security engagements can be understood as important test-cases that create precedents and advance the boundaries of Japan’s constitutional debate in locations far from the public consciousness.

It is important at this juncture to also clarify how the term security is understood in this section, and more broadly throughout the study. With the exception of specific reference to Japan’s policy of human security discussed below, security is understood in its most basic interpretation as those...
factors related to the armed forces of Japan and the policies related to their deployment. Security engagement therefore refers to those aspects of Japan’s interaction in Africa undertaken by its armed forces. In this context, this study does not engage with the extensive literature on security studies or securitisation in international relations (for example see works by Baldwin, Booth or Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde) – but rather recognises the challenge of terminology when referring to the military in Japan. As Smith describes, the particular complexities of Japan’s constitution has resulted in sensitivity among policymakers around the use of specific terminology related to defence, national security or the military. For this reason this study only refers to the armed forces by their official titles and uses a single term, security, to identify all matters pertaining to the military and the operational deployment of the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) and Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF).

Perhaps the single biggest change in the evolution of Japan’s engagement with Africa is the inclusion of a security element within the relationship. In other words, while many foreign actors such as the US, Britain or France have long combined their business and aid engagement in Africa with a military dimension – such as training or basing military personnel in the country – the presence of the Japanese military in South Sudan and Djibouti is a significant evolution in Japan’s presence on the continent. Thus despite the fact that Japan did deploy Self Defence Force (SDF) personnel to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) between 1993 and 1995, the extent and scale of the deployment to South Sudan combined with the naval operations in the Horn of Africa makes the current operations far more significant. Indeed as this chapter will describe, the current

operations are noteworthy both in terms of the diversity of Japan’s presence in Africa and in terms of the evolution of the debate in Japan around the role of the military in Japanese foreign policy.

The inclusion of Japan’s Africa policy within the discourse of a revitalised Japanese foreign policy finds expression in Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS calls for Japan to take the lead in “setting the international agenda” and to “proactively advance its national interests, without being confined to a reactionary position to events and incidents after they have already occurred.” The NSS is thus effectively outlining a sea-change in Japan’s international engagement and reflects Japan’s response to evolving dynamics in the international environment. It also seeks to promote an image of focused security priorities after a period of seven years characterised by the rapid turnover of political leaders – five different prime ministers between Abe’s first administration (which only lasted a year) in 2006 and his second which began in late 2012.

Yet despite the shifting priorities of different administrations, there has been continuity regarding Japan steadily increasing security engagement in Africa since 2008 – as well as a link between this engagement and a broader recognition within Japan of the country’s international responsibilities.

As Singh observes, a consequence of Japan’s experience in the US-led “war on terror” was that the conception of national security was widened to incorporate an international or global dimension. In conceptually and logistically formulating Japan’s support for the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) expanded the concept of national security from a narrow, geographically-defined conception to a global one. This broad principle has been carried through subsequent LDP and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administrations from the first tentative

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710 Singh, Bhubhindar, Japan’s Security Identity, From peace state to an international state, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 93
commitment to UN operations in Sudan in 2008 to the deployment in South Sudan and establishment of the Djibouti facility. In this way Japan’s security engagement in Africa reflects not only the country’s ambition to expand its influence and security footprint, but also a realisation that what happens internationally matters in Japan too.

Singh continues by outlining the evolution of this discourse in terms of Japan’s support for the “war on terror”, and how the government tied events such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and the perceived threat of “weapons of mass destruction” to Japan’s own domestic vulnerabilities. Consequently, “Japan’s participation in the US-led “war on terror” significantly strengthened the international dimension in its security policy and its international-state security identity, as the SDF was authorised to operate in activities outside the areas surrounding Japan.”

Despite McCormack arguing that Japan will be obliged eventually to apply the same levels of cooperation to bilateral security operations with the US in other regional and global crises, internationalisation has nonetheless become a permanent feature of Japan’s security profile with the establishment of the MSDF facility in Djibouti. This chapter will therefore explore these dynamics through the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism by identifying the structural drivers of Japan’s expanding security presence in Africa and contextualising that presence in terms of the intervening considerations of Japan’s particular constitutional restraints and popular conceptions of national pacifism.

When considering Japanese engagement in South Sudan in the broader context of Japan’s Africa policy, South Sudan is significant as it is the only country to which Japan has currently deployed peacekeeping troops. Japan’s commitment to contribute forces to the United Nations Mission in the
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)\textsuperscript{713} constitutes the third key strand of engagement in South Sudan and introduces an important security dimension to the relationship – tying together development assistance and investment with the complexity of Japan’s security policies. Policies which are complex because of the country’s constitutional restrictions, but as will be explored in this chapter, also represent the domestic dimensions, or unit-level factors of Japan’s policy response to the structural drivers underpinning the wider expansion of Japan’s engagement in Africa. Furthermore, structural considerations are changing the parameters in which the domestic debate around Japan’s security policy is deliberated – along with underpinning the economic and energy security imperatives at the heart of Japan’s re-energised engagement in Africa. The presence of peacekeepers in South Sudan and the MSDF in Djibouti therefore links the domestic discourse around the role of the security forces in shaping Japan’s identity as a state with its international identity as a multilateral aid donor and investor. In this regard the decision by Tokyo to expand its presence in Africa to include a security dimension targets multiple audiences – both foreign and domestic.

The deployment of a GSDF engineering battalion to UNMISS in November 2011 was therefore a significant indicator in building the relationship between Japan and South Sudan, as well as signalling Japan’s intention to shoulder greater international commitments. The deployment of the engineering unit coincided with the establishment of a permanent diplomatic office – later upgraded to an embassy, which was well received by the government in Juba. A South Sudanese government minister noted that “out of the ‘A’ groups of countries, Japan is the only country that contributes to the peacekeeping forces in the state.”\textsuperscript{714} Significantly, Minister Marial Benjamin also went on to


\textsuperscript{714} Government of South Sudan online, “Japan establishes office, engineering Self Defence Force in South Sudan”, 2 February 2012, accessed 1 August 2014, available at \url{http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/news.html}
reference Japanese Sogo Sosha Toyota Tsusho’s involvement in conducting a feasibility study for the proposed oil pipeline to Lamu. The government thereby indicated that the multiple dimensions of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan are recognised as being linked, and effectively build upon one another in cementing relations.

Similarly as Professor Kataoka points out, “Japan considers South Sudan very important” and the UNMISS deployment is also seen as part of a greater engagement that includes targeted ODA, investment and the expansion of Japan’s regional presence and relevance. The professor continues by noting that Japan’s immediate recognition of South Sudan’s independence in 2011 was unusual, in that the wheels within MOFA tend to move much more cautiously – and slowly. But the presence of Japan’s vice minister for foreign affairs at South Sudan’s independence ceremony in Juba was recognition of Japan’s steadily increasing role among the international players in South Sudan. Indeed when responsibility for Sudan within MOFA was transferred from the Middle East Bureau to Africa Bureau One in 2007, the profile and importance of Sudan within Japan’s Africa policy, and ultimately its foreign policy more generally, increased considerably. In this regard as Professor Kataoka continues, “Japan started to see Sudan as important from that time.”

As discussed in Chapter Four, Japan was involved in supporting the implementation of the CPA. JICA had reopened an office in Khartoum a few years previously, and Japan later took an active role within the international community’s efforts to support and monitor the CPA milestones through the provision of multilateral grant aid in support of the 2010 elections and the referendum in 2011. The greater importance afforded to Sudan within MOFA after its transfer to the Africa Bureau in 2007

715 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
717 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
also reflected the importance that the United States was placing on securing peace in Sudan, and therefore its prominence as an international issue. Considering UN Security Council resolutions in 2007, 66 per cent of the resolutions passed related to conflict in Africa and of those ten per cent were related to Sudan. Consequently Japan’s desire to play a more important international security role would require a peacekeeping engagement in Africa. This began with a modest deployment of three officers to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2008. So while this deployment in some way laid the groundwork for Japan’s much greater commitment to the subsequent UNMISS mission in independent South Sudan, it also highlights the increased political relevance that Tokyo placed on building relations with the newly independent state.

Thus while the UNMISS contribution is interesting in terms of what it says about Japan’s commitment to South Sudan, it is also significant as the peacekeeping commitment forms an integral part of Japan’s international security contribution, along with the anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. The decision to send peacekeepers to South Sudan no doubt contained within it elements of foreign policy imperative interpreted via the domestic considerations so central to Japan’s security policy. As Dr Michishita observes, the deployment to South Sudan was “easy and necessary.” Following the withdrawal of the Japanese contingents from the Golan Heights and Haiti, there was increasing international pressure on Japan combined with domestic perceptions that China was contributing troops to peacekeeping missions and that Japan should also be seen to do so. Furthermore, as Dr Michishita continues, the fact that South Sudan was close to Western

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720 Author’s interview with Dr Michishita GRIPS, Tokyo 3 October 2013
countries and important to US policy in Africa meant that providing peacekeepers in South Sudan was a “win-win situation for us [Japan]. It allows us to revive our presence in the international security community, support our allies, kind-of compete with China and establish a stepping stone to bolster our position in Africa.”

6.1 GSDF Deployment to South Sudan

Japan began the deployment of a GSDF engineering unit of 330 personnel to South Sudan in November 2011, tasked with infrastructure projects such as the restoration of roads, as well as maintenance and improvement of UN logistics facilities. In addition, approximately 20 personnel are stationed at a Coordination Centre and liaise with relevant organisations, while a further three staff officers are stationed at UNMISS Headquarters.

In outlining the rationale for the deployment the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes two priorities underlining the deployment:

1. The Government of Japan recognises that peace and stability of South Sudan is important for the peace and stability of Africa, and that support for the nation-building and stability of South Sudan is one of the significant challenges for which the international community needs to work on cooperatively.

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723 Author’s interview with Dr Narushige Michishita, GRIPS, Tokyo 3 October 2013
724 Author’s interview with Commander of Japan Contingent Engineering Company UNMISS, Juba, 23 January 2013
2. The Government of Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, remains committed in cooperating with the international community and making proactive efforts toward the achievement of peace and stability in South Sudan.  

In laying out these priorities the government placed the UNMISS deployment in the context of Japan’s decade-long support for human security which has been a central pillar of ODA policies in Africa, as well as its desire to meet international commitments – and thereby entrench its position as a relevant and major player within the international community. As Professor Fukushima observes, “Japan’s overseas commitments are changing in nature, what began twenty years ago with special legislation is now experiencing an expanding scope of operations.” This combined with a more targeted ODA strategy means that Japan’s engagement in South Sudan reflects a new approach. Indeed, as Professor Nakanishi points out, in South Sudan Japan is “combining human security objectives with strategic gains.”

The decision to commit peacekeepers to UNMISS has allowed Japan to refine a concept first coined during Japan’s commitment to UN operations in Haiti – an “All Japan” project. Namely extensive coordination between all components of Japan’s operations in the country: SDF, MOFA, and JICA harmonised in terms of the overall ODA budget priorities in that country. Though increasing coordination between the SDF and JICA began in Iraq, where Japan’s experience in Samara effectively created a new framework for overseas deployment, the deployment in South Sudan is significant in that it was envisaged from the outset as an integrated mission. Indeed as Professor

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726 Ibid
727 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
728 Author’s interview with Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013
729 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
730 Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo 7 October 2013
Kataoka explains, “the “pillars” of Japan’s engagement in Africa are interactive”\textsuperscript{731} and the formalisation of this relationship in South Sudan demonstrates a significant evolution in Japan’s overseas commitments.

The deployment of peacekeepers in South Sudan within the framework of an “All Japan” project therefore underlines the linkages between Japan’s tactical approaches to realising its strategic objectives in Africa. The Japanese embassy in Juba is largely tasked with coordinating Japan’s activities in South Sudan – at all levels ranging from budgets and data collection to the implementation of projects. And while Professor Fukushima explains that “in the past aid people had a hesitation of working with uniformed guys”\textsuperscript{732}, the changing reality of Japan’s international engagement in South Sudan is altering that mind-set. As previously discussed, Japanese bilateral ODA is increasingly being used to facilitate opportunities for Japanese investment and to differentiate Japan from the Western donors and China. In this context the inclusion of a coordinated security dimension to Japan’s presence in South Sudan strengthens the overall impact of the provided assistance as well as the message to the government in Juba that Japan is a committed partner.

The coordinated approach to Japan’s ODA and security engagement in South Sudan along with the anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa that will be examined later in this chapter all point to an expanded role for Japan’s military within the country’s external engagements. Yet in exploring the transformation of Japan’s public perception from a pacifist state to one with an international security identity, it is important to first understand the evolution of the human security approach within Japan’s security discourse. As the following section will outline, the concept of human

\textsuperscript{731} Ibid
\textsuperscript{732} Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo 3 October 2013
security has become fused with domestic debates around constitutional interpretations of collective security – and have therefore directly impacted on Japan’s UNMISS deployment.

6.1.1 Human Security and Peacekeeping

The literature related to the evolution of Japan’s peacekeeping within its broader security discourse is quite extensive – including work by Dobson,733 George,734 Ishizuka735 and Yanai.736 Yet the underlying principle of human security can be traced throughout. As Suzuki notes, the human security approach became “a guiding principle for Japan to remain relevant in the post-Cold War world, within the ‘pacifist’ constitutional constraints which limit Japan’s active engagement in traditional security issues.”737 Indeed Prime Minister Abe remarked at the UN General Assembly in September 2013 that,

until now Japan has continually promoted the concept of “human security.” The implications of this concept will surely expand as well [...] Japan is determined to further spread the concept and build actual practices.738

Abe then continued by committing Japan to serving as a “proactive Contributor to Peace [...] even more actively engaged in UN collective security measures, including peacekeeping operations.” Thus Abe effectively linked the UNMISS deployment in South Sudan to Japan’s key international policy

734 George, Aurelia, “Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations: Radical departure or predictable response?” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No.6, 1993, pp. 560–575
Jeremy Taylor
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position. In doing so, Abe highlighted the significance of South Sudan within Japan’s Africa policy – the embodiment of the “comprehensive” human security response ranging from ODA to peacekeeping – but also addressed a domestic audience on the issue of how Japan’s involvement in collective security should be interpreted.

The concept of human security emerged as a response the “new” security challenges of the post-Cold War era and sought to look beyond the state to focus rather on individual people in developing security approaches. Thus the prevalence of intra-state conflicts, refugees and continuing development inequalities prompted a view that focused on health, development and education initiatives. Emerging in the 1990s, the notion fitted well with Japan’s pursuit of a non-military international presence and became a central element in the country’s ODA and foreign policy agenda – with MOFA and JICA absorbing the concept as an institutional norm. Former Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi (1998-2000) defined the concept as the “key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats.” Moreover Japan’s Diplomatic Blue book for the year 2000 described human security as a key perspective in developing Japan’s foreign policy.

Whereas the notion of human security generated considerable debate and analysis (for example see works by Acharya, Lam and Paris), it remained largely undefined and allowed states and

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international organisations to interpret it in terms of their prevailing policy agendas. Indeed as Paris points out, “the most ardent backers of human security appear to have an interest in keeping the term expansive and vague.” According as the UN evolved ever more interventionist peacekeeping policies throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, so too did Japan broaden its interpretation of human security to involve a greater role for peacekeeping troops – resulting in the “All Japan” approach that unites ODA and peacekeeping strategies today in South Sudan.

The evolution and development of Japan’s peacekeeping engagements have continued through both LDP and DPJ administrations. Indeed the decision by former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to commit Japanese peacekeepers to South Sudan was continued by his immediate successors Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda, as well as being enthusiastically supported by current Prime Minister Abe. This process has been made possible by passing small incremental pieces of legislation to manoeuvre around the restrictions of the constitution – for example, 21 pieces of security legislation were passed between 1992 and 2005.745

The Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, also known as the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) of 1992 authorised Japan to send troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations for the first time. Arguably, the legislation reflected the response of the Toshiki Kaifu administration to the loss of international standing and criticism following the Gulf War where Japan’s contribution was limited to financial support. Shinoda notes that although the resultant IPCL legislation did not serve the original objective, “it provided Tokyo with a new diplomatic tool for contributing personnel to the

744 Ibid, p. 88
745 Johnson, Chalmers, “No Longer the ‘Lone Superpower’: coming to terms with China”, Japan Policy Research Institute, working paper no. 105 (March), 2005
international community.” In addition, it was also becoming increasingly apparent to Japan’s government that narrowly defined security policy was incongruent with the new security culture of the early post-Cold War period. As Singh points out, “instead of retreating into the background as it did/could during the Cold War, Japan had to demonstrate its membership of international society by claiming a stake and contributing to the post-Cold War security order.” The result was peacekeeping commitments constrained to operate within the so-called “Five Principles” which govern Japan’s peacekeeping operations and do not allow for collective self-defence. This effectively means that Japan’s UNMISS contingent rely on Rwandese soldiers to provide their security, and they are restricted to operate in Juba.

The development of the legal framework for Japan’s peacekeeping operations is best understood through the perspective of neoclassical realism. As described above, Japanese policymakers responded to changing structural conditions and international pressures in the context of the particular domestic dynamics that define the country’s security considerations. In this respect the domestic intervening factors interpret systemic conditions as well as define – or in the case of Japan’s constitution, restrict – the state’s potential responses. Thus as Rose explains, states are “likely to want more rather than less external influence, and pursue such influence to the extent they are able to do so.” This chapter will therefore explore how security engagement in Africa since 2008, while reflecting new structural pressures and existing domestic dynamics, has also significantly advanced the evolution of Japan’s international security engagement.

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748 Author’s interview with Commander of Japan Contingent Engineering Company UNMISS, Juba, 23 January 2013
749 This restriction was later broadened to include the three southern states of Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria, as these were deemed the ‘safest’
750 Rose, Gideon, “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy”, p. 152
Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan are therefore still required to conduct their work around the complex interpretations of the constitution. As such, they are unable to engage in collective self defence of their fellow UNMISS peacekeepers and South Sudanese civilians – despite the fact that protection of civilians remains central to the UNMISS mandate. As Dr Michishta points out, “there is a relationship between the current debate around collective self-defence and peacekeeping operations. But as far as [South] Sudan is concerned, we don’t assume there would be such a situation, so don’t debate it in that [context].” However the violence that erupted in South Sudan in December 2013 was just such a situation, and challenged the Abe administration to find a balance between the domestic restraints of the constitution and the international perceptions of Japan as a reliable partner in security operations.

Thus while the evolution of Japan’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations reflects the complex and convoluted nature of Japan’s post-war security identity, and the apparent de facto dissolution of Japan’s image as a pacifist state (see Hughes, Johnson and Mathur) the crisis in South Sudan nonetheless posed a considerable challenge to the Japanese government. The deployment was the centrepiece of Japan’s commitment to an integrated human security programme in Africa and had featured strongly in Prime Minister Abe’s speech only months before at the UN General Assembly. Moreover the outbreak of violence effectively meant that the debate on collective self-defence was now at the very forefront of Japan’s ability to carry out its international security commitments.

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751 Authors’ interview with Dr Narushige Michishita GRIPS, Tokyo 3 October 2013
752 Hughes, Christopher, Japan’s remilitarization, Oxford:Routledge, 2009
753 Johnson, Chalmers “No Longer the ‘Lone Superpower’: coming to terms with China”, Japan Policy Research Institute, working paper no. 105 (March) 2005
When considering what Izumikawa refers to as “Japan’s dramatically changed attitude toward overseas military involvement”\textsuperscript{755}, some authors such as Johnson have claimed that the “the Japanese government has launched a stealth programme of incremental rearmament.” And that the impetus towards “normalisation” of the military includes – among others – the sending of troops abroad, and a growing acceptance of military solutions to international problems.\textsuperscript{756} Thus by implication, the many pieces of peacekeeping legislation passed since 1992, bolstered by a further series of context-driven “exceptions” to the strict rules of engagement for Japanese peacekeepers are effectively changing the context around which the constitutional debate is occurring in Japan. Indeed, the outbreak of violence in South Sudan arguably created a scenario that provided the Abe administration with enough justification to radically alter the constitutional interpretation of collective defence by appealing to the clearly “exceptional” circumstances facing Japanese troops.

The announcement by the Japanese government that they will supply ammunition\textsuperscript{757} to South Korean peacekeepers in South Sudan is just such an example. Citing the urgency of the crisis in South Sudan Japanese officials made an exception to the long-standing arms embargo that restricts the sale and distribution of weapons. In making the decision, the National Security Council decided to overlook the “three rules on arms exports” and its official interpretation of the peace cooperation law. Shortly thereafter in January 2014, Prime Minister Abe called for the three principles to be revised to allow “Japan to keep up with the times.”\textsuperscript{758}

\textsuperscript{756} Johnson, Chalmers “No Longer the ‘Lone Superpower’: coming to terms with China”, Japan Policy Research Institute
These developments are noteworthy in the context of this study in that they demonstrate the significance of Japan’s peacekeeping operations in South Sudan within the broader framework of Japan’s ambitions to play a greater international security role. Certainly Japan’s response to the conflict is telling in that the Japanese government was quick to confirm that its troops would remain in South Sudan despite the outbreak of violence. Furthermore, when Prime Minister Abe addressed the African Union (AU) in January 2014 he committed a further US$ 25 million to address the crisis in South Sudan, reiterating his support for Japan’s peacekeeping operation. Indeed Abe continued his policy speech by calling for a stronger economy, and for Japan to play a greater security role abroad. Professor Hughes reiterates this point by noting that ODA and TICAD is not enough – a security presence is needed in Africa to demonstrate that Japan is global power.

Thus while peacekeeping-related security policy transformed Japan’s security identity from a pacifist state into one with a distinct international security presence; the development of Japan’s international security role, supported in turn by more confident security policy-makers, drove Japan’s involvement in another African security operation. The strategically significant Anti-Piracy operations further push the boundaries of Japan’s security legislation, but more importantly, they entwine Japan’s strategic global objectives with its Africa policies.

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761 Author’s interview with Professor Christopher Hughes, Warwick University, Coventry, 2 September 2013
6.2 Anti-piracy Operations in the Horn of Africa

The second component of Japan’s contribution to multilateral international security is its anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa. This deployment is an important element within Japan’s international security presence and also links to a number of areas included in this study such as ODA, energy security, responding to the rise of China and broader narratives around Japan’s more visible international presence. Indeed the anti-piracy contribution is significant in that it sends a strong signal about Japan’s ambitions to increase its relevance in the international security context, and is thus a noteworthy element within the broader Japanese strategic response to changing global conditions.

Furthermore, through participation in the anti-piracy operation, the Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) has established a naval base in Djibouti\textsuperscript{762} – the first outside Japan since the end of the Second World War. Thus in establishing a physical presence in the region, Africa will remain central to discussions around Japan’s evolving security identity and its future contribution to international security operations. For these reasons this study recognises Djibouti as the northern point of a strategic arc of emerging Japanese interests that stretches across East Africa to Mozambique in the south. In this context, Japan’s anti-piracy operations consolidate its peacekeeping contribution in South Sudan and reinforce the importance of Africa within Japan’s international security policy. This section will therefore examine Japan’s presence in the Horn of Africa in the broader context of the country’s international security policies and the neoclassical realist perspective underpinning this study.

MOFA outlines the following activities that Japan has undertaken in addressing Piracy in the Horn of Africa:

1. Enacting the "Anti-Piracy Measures Law" which criminalises the act of piracy and enables Japan’s naval vessels to protect any ship from pirates regardless of her flag. The law came into effect on 24 July 2009.

2. Deploying two MSDF destroyers with Japan Coast Guard law enforcement officers on board from March 2009, as part of the international effort to enhance maritime security through naval patrols and escort operations. As of 5 September 2012, Japan’s vessels have escorted 2,805 ships in 389 escort missions.

3. Deploying two P-3C maritime patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden. These aircraft began patrol missions out of Djibouti on 11 June 2009.

4. Establishing MSDF facility for counter-piracy mission in Djibouti, operations from the facility began on 1 June 2011.

5. Actively participating in discussions in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) established pursuant to UNSC resolution 1851 and its Working Groups. Japan is committed to working in cooperation with other participants in the CGPCS.

6. Providing financial assistance of approximately US$ 229 million since 2007 through international organisations, for improvement of the humanitarian and security situations in Somalia.


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8. Initiating multi-donor trust fund for capacity-building in coastal countries neighbouring Somalia, and a further US$ 3.5 million to the Trust Fund to Support Initiative of States countering pirates off the coast of Somalia for the purpose of prosecution of suspected pirates.

9. Sending survey/ODA missions to the coastal countries including Djibouti and Kenya to consider possible assistance in the area of maritime security toward TICAD V (held in June 2013 in Tokyo). Japan has also invited coast guard officials of coastal countries neighbouring Somalia to training courses and experts meetings in Japan.

In detailing Japan’s contribution to multilateral efforts against piracy, there are a number of aspects worth considering. Firstly, the balance between intervening domestic considerations (enacting special legislation), and Japan’s commitment to playing a constructive international role is evident. Moreover, linking anti-piracy security operations with ODA objectives and TICAD V further illustrates the evolution of Japan’s engagement in Africa. Indeed, integrating security objectives with targeted ODA in a strategically important region one can see parallels with the “All Japan” approach to peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. The parallels between the two operations are also testimony to what has been referred to as the “deepening and widening” of Japan’s international security posture taking place in the context of declining ODA budgets764 – thus requiring a more targeted and strategic approach to engagement in Africa. An approach to East Africa which this study recognises as including ODA and energy-linked investments, as well as securing energy supply routes – all of which are essentially strengthened by a military presence in the Horn of Africa.

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764 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
The threat of piracy to Japan’s maritime interests in the region also encouraged Japanese policymakers to develop a more collaborative approach to the issue of maritime security, given that Japan faces particular obstacles when it comes to multilateral engagement in security matters. Yet Japan’s latest NSS (released December 2013), identifies Japan as a “proactive contributor to peace”\textsuperscript{765}, a role which includes the protection of Japan’s access to global supply chains and natural resources – including energy. As Bateman points out, “deploying warships to counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa also serves the purpose of governments wishing to establish a strategic presence and influence in a region that is politically unstable but vitally important as a source of energy.”\textsuperscript{766} The anti-piracy operations therefore provide a multi-purpose platform for establishing a strategic footprint. Bateman further notes that while the anti-piracy deployments were ostensibly to protect Japanese merchant ships,

Japan was also concerned about its prestige and image in the region, particularly after China had decided to deploy warships to anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. The deployments also aligned with Japan’s desire to attain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and helped the MSDF to justify its substantial budget.\textsuperscript{767}

Indeed as previously discussed, the role of African support for UN Security Council reform is recognised in Tokyo where the TICAD initiative was ostensibly launched in 1993 as a mechanism towards achieving that goal. Thus the presence of Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan and MSDF ships in Djibouti further establishes Japan’s credentials as committed to the region.


\textsuperscript{767} Ibid
Japan’s contribution to anti-piracy operations therefore bring together a number of areas included in this research project: namely ODA, energy security, Japan’s response to a rising China, and a broader discourse on Japan’s engagement in Africa reflecting a “revitalised” and more assertive international presence. While Japan’s ODA policy was discussed in Chapter Four and energy security formulations in Africa were discussed in Chapter Five, it is worth noting a few salient aspects that embed these issues within the analysis of Japan’s anti-piracy operations.

Firstly, Japan’s aid policy has evolved to reflect a changing approach and priorities towards engagement in Africa. Among those changes are a more targeted and strategic use of aid in line with Japan’s broader strategic objectives and the interaction between the country’s ODA policies and international security presence. For example, as Aoki points out, TICAD V featured three official themes: robust and sustainable economy, inclusive and resilient society, and peace and stability.\(^{768}\) In terms of the commitment to peace and stability, Japan resolved to share Asian experiences in combating piracy as well as committing to support peacekeeping on the continent. In addition, a special conference on Somalia\(^{769}\) was convened on the margins of TICAD V which highlighted Japan’s security contribution in the region as well its status as a leading international aid donor. The inclusion of the conference on Somalia thus reflected the incorporation of Japan’s international security presence within the broader context of its Africa policies. Indeed the “Yokohama Declaration” which emerged from TICAD V reflected not only Japan’s growing security presence in Africa alongside its well established role as an ODA provider, but it also reflected Japan’s broader...

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\(^{768}\) Aoki, Kazuyoshi, “Japan and the TICAD process”, \textit{South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)}, policy briefing 66, May 2013

global ambitions by reiterating the country’s “determination to urgently reform UN bodies, including the Security Council.”

Secondly, Japan is almost completely dependent on imported energy resources – the majority of which originate in the Middle East, and of which 99 per cent of oil and 96 per cent of LNG are imported by sea. Graham argues that an “ingrained perception” of vulnerability and dependency regarding access to vital resources pervades policymaking in Japan. Consequently as Japan’s NSS highlights, the region is central to Japan’s energy security policies, “vulnerability is also increasing in sea lanes of communication, spanning between Japan and the Middle East, on which Japan is largely dependent for its natural and energy resources.” In this regard the NSS outlines a combination of military and political initiatives in expanding effective alliance relationships but highlighting the need for Japan to “proactively advance its national interests.”

Thus while Graham argues that “piracy is more of an irritant to the global maritime transportation system than a system threat”, it has certainly resulted in focused attention from policy makers in Japan – while also enabling Coast Guard and MSDF lobbies to defend budgetary claims. Likewise as Bateman observes, apart from the direct threat of piracy there is also a broader strategic context to consider, “Piracy has allowed Japan to establish a strategic presence in key areas where Japan has a vital interest in securing the safety and security of SLOCs” (Sea Lanes of Communication). Indeed, as a Professor Fukushima points out, “having an international presence is a message, and the SDF

772 Ibid
774 Graham, Euan, Japan’s sea lane security, 1940-2004: a matter of life and death?, p. 35
775 Bateman, Sam, “Piracy and Maritime Security: Japan’s strategic challenges”, p. 214
Jeremy Taylor
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...gains more utility in a strategic sense than it does from merely preventing Japanese ships from being targeted by pirates. Thus when considering that the Bab-el-Mandeb strait between Yemen and Djibouti which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden is a recognised “choke point” in an area vital to Japan’s trade and energy security – establishing a permanent foothold in the region through the Djibouti MSDF facility is a strong position from which advance Japan’s interests.

Furthermore, the presence of Japan’s ships as part of an international operation supports the development of closer ties between Japanese forces and their existing allies such as the US, and potential future allies such as India. While the MSDF works closely with the organised naval task forces in the region such as the European Union’s ATALANTA, US-led CTF 151 or NATO’s operation Ocean Shield, Japan is not a part of a distinct task force. Yet beyond areas of cooperation Bateman observes that “piracy has served the broader strategic interests of all three rising powers of Asia – China, India and Japan.” All three nations have sought to play a role in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, but with “an element of strategic competition.” They have all deployed warships to Somalia on anti-piracy operations and have provided capacity building assistance to local security forces. But as Bateman concludes, “these actions have been as much about competing for regional power and influence as about countering piracy.”

Indeed as Hughes points out, Japan took “special note” of China’s first decision to dispatch destroyers to the Somali coast in 2008. It is also worth recognising that this event coincided with the other factors identified by this study as significant turning points for Japan’s approach to Africa that took place in and around 2008. As Hughes goes on to explain, it was not just the modernisation of

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776 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
777 See map of the Horn of Africa on page 13
778 In military Strategy a choke point refers to a geographical feature such as a strait with limited space for manoeuvrability. Other significant maritime choke points, include the Hormuz Strait and the Strait of Malacca
779 Bateman, Sam, “Piracy and Maritime Security: Japan’s strategic challenges”, p. 214
China’s military capabilities that concerned Japan, but “that it has a new appetite to project military power outside its own territory”\textsuperscript{780} – an appetite that Japan now shares and has consolidated with the MSDF facility in Djibouti. Both Japan and China have demonstrated that their presence in the waters off the Horn of Africa arguably extends far beyond the immediate threat of Somali pirates, but rather to a more sustained and long-term securitisation of the SLOCs along which Asia’s vital energy resources travel.

6.2.1 Developing a Military Footprint in Djibouti

Japan’s anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa encompass a range of factors that contextualise and underpin the broader narrative around Japan’s re-engagement in Africa. Including Japan’s more proactive, assertive international presence developed in response to concerns over energy security and China’s growing influence in Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. The strategic opportunity created by the piracy threat is such that Japan has established a permanent facility for the first time outside of Japan since the end of the Second World War. The facility brings together an integrated team of approximately 200\textsuperscript{781} MSDF, GSDF, Japan Coast Guard, aircraft maintenance crews and security officers. And this is happening in Africa – reflecting a new engagement that has strengthened and evolved to incorporate new dimensions.

Japan’s military presence in Djibouti began in May 2009 when the MSDF P-3 (maritime patrol plane) detachment rented space at Camp Lemonnier\textsuperscript{782} – the only official US military base in Africa. The

\textsuperscript{780} Hughes, Christopher, Japan’s military modernisation: A Quiet Japan-China Arms Race and Global Power Projection”, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009, p. 87
\textsuperscript{781} Ministry of Defence, “Establishment of facility for counter piracy in Djibouti”, accessed 4 February 2014, available at \url{http://www.mod.go.jp/e/gy/h/mo23/topics01.html}
\textsuperscript{782} Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
base is located alongside Djibouti’s airport and makes use of its runway\textsuperscript{783} and in July 2011 the Japanese contingent moved to a purpose built facility alongside Camp Lemonnier. Formally known as the “Japanese Facility for Counter-Piracy Mission in Djibouti”, it is notable that the Japanese government avoids the word “base” as this implies a permanent deployment – though the government currently estimates a presence of ten years in Djibouti.\textsuperscript{784} A position endorsed by Hughes who points out that with an estimated 2,300 merchant ships of concern to Japan passing through the Gulf of Aden annually it “will ensure that the MSDF remains on station for the long term.”\textsuperscript{785}

As Professor Fukushima points out, the facility in Djibouti provides unparalleled opportunities for intelligence-gathering, and “communicating with other actors”\textsuperscript{786} – mostly the United States. Camp Lemonnier is home to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)\textsuperscript{787} which apart from piracy is tasked with combating extremism and executes the United States’ “War on Terror” operations in the region. As Professor Kataoka explains, the “US factor”\textsuperscript{788} was an important consideration for Japan in opening their base in Djibouti. Since strengthening the Japan-US alliance through practical engagement and developing interoperability of systems and processes is vitally important for Japanese military planners. Interoperability refers to the ability of different military organisations to conduct joint operations, and it allows forces, units or systems to operate

\textsuperscript{785} Hughes, Christopher, Japan’s Remilitarisation, p.89
\textsuperscript{786} Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
\textsuperscript{788} Author’s interview with Professor Sadaharu Kataoka, Waseda University, Tokyo, 7 October 2013
By developing a common doctrine and procedures through long term engagement in the Horn of Africa, Japan’s military is overcoming a very practical hurdle that is rarely included in the debates around Japan’s collective defence capabilities. Indeed as Hughes points out, while Japan’s participation in anti-piracy operations will be useful addition to international security efforts, “more importantly it will enable the [SDF] to expand and prolong its presence in the Indian Ocean and beyond.”

Thus extending and broadening Japan’s military presence beyond East Asia is hugely important for building alliance structures, as well as demonstrating Japan’s ambitions as an internationally responsible and relevant security actor. The NSS confirms this by underscoring Japan’s intention to be more proactive – but in the broader alliance context, in which the relationship with the US is paramount. What is underscored in the new strategy therefore is the importance of blending military, security and political initiatives together in expanding the effectiveness of Japanese alliance relationships.

Djibouti is also very strategically located, not only sitting on the chokepoint of the Gulf of Aden, the tiny country is a pivot connecting Northern, Eastern and Central Africa with the Arabia peninsula and the Persian Gulf. Indeed as an analyst of Japan’s security policy points out, “Djibouti is a very important strategic point, and the government of Japan is thinking that the base will be used as a hub to deploy SDF in the Middle East if required.” A MOFA official however makes a different

790 Hughes, Christopher, Japan’s Remilitarisation, p. 89
792 Author’s interview with Senior reporter, Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo, 8 November 2013
though no less significant observation”, there is rising demand for PKO in Africa and the Middle East. Being able to swiftly deploy forces to trouble spots can contribute to the [security of] neighbouring nations.”

This point was highlighted when Prime Minister Abe visited Djibouti in August 2013 as part of a Middle East tour to Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. It was the first visit to an African country by a sitting Japanese Prime Minister since Junichiro Koizumi in 2006, and foreshadowed Abe’s official visit to Mozambique, Côte D’Ivoire and Ethiopia in January 2014. The visit also reflected the political importance of the MSDF facility in Djibouti. As the Asahi Shimbun notes, “Abe pushed for a visit to Djibouti because he wanted to use it to illustrate to both domestic and foreign audiences the contributions being made by Japan to the international community.” The article goes on to note that apart from seeking to secure stable energy supplies, “Abe has also reached agreement with his counterparts in Bahrain and Kuwait to hold national security discussions.” Abe thus reinforced the message that Japan is a security player in the region – as well as a major buyer of oil and gas, and that having a presence in Djibouti is central to realising this position. In this context, the antipiracy operations are a tactic utilised by the Japanese government in achieving the broader strategic objectives outlined in Chapter Three – namely ensuring energy resource security and establishing a Japanese international security presence. In this way anti-piracy operations are also significant in that they bring together important themes that underpin Japan’s engagement in Africa, from energy security to targeted ODA and the evolution of Japan’s international security policies.

6.3 The international Context of Japan’s Security Operations in Africa

This research demonstrates the multi-layered approach of Japanese engagement in South Sudan – an approach accentuated and strengthened through the addition of a security dimension. Yet the deployment of UNMISS peacekeepers and MSDF personnel and ships to the Horn of Africa also reflects a Japanese response to the structural pressures and rewards previously described which are driving Japan’s participation in international security operations – and which also underpin the neoclassical realist framework of analysis employed in this study. Indeed Pyle argues that through the course of its modern history Japan has “adopted its foreign policies” and “restructured its internal organisation” to take advantage of, and reflect changes to, the structure of the international system. While Katzenstein on the other hand, maintains that “Japan’s security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power.” Accordingly, the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this study stresses the causal primacy of structural factors – albeit interpreted via the intervening considerations of domestic policy, perceptions and norms. And in the case of Japan’s security policies, the domestic intervening considerations are particularly significant and will be addressed below, but it is nonetheless important to briefly recognise the broader international context in which Japan’s African security operations are taking place.

Professor Fukushima’s previously mentioned observation that “Japan’s overseas commitments are changing in nature” is significant when considering that what began over twenty years ago with Japan’s first peacekeeping deployment has evolved to incorporate an expanding scope of operations. This combined with a greater focus around how ODA is targeted, means that Japan has

795 Pyle, Kenneth, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose,
796 Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan
797 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
far greater ability to pursue its own strategic interests. Interests which in Africa include greater investment opportunities, access to resources and political support from African states in Japan’s perennial ambition to gain a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Indeed Japan’s security engagement in Africa is thus central to underpinning a broader political relationship on the continent that has for many years been defined by the pursuit of a permanent seat on the Security Council. A political objective that is as dependent on garnering support from African countries, as demonstrating Japan’s willingness to shoulder international security responsibilities. Prime Minister Abe has reminded African leaders that “Japan and Africa share common interests” in reforming the Security Council, and as such committing Japan to peacekeeping operations in Africa – alongside extensive ODA commitments, goes some way towards building the political support that Japan requires.

Moreover, Japan’s new National Security Strategy even states that it is “necessary for Japan to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s position in the international community” – a position considerably enhanced by shouldering the burden of peacekeeping and committing to anti-piracy operations. This stance also signals a desire within Japan to carve out a more defined – and arguably independent diplomatic and security presence.

Thus the evolution of Japan’s official perception of the security environment to one that includes piracy and terrorism goes some way to understanding the evolution of Japan’s overseas security engagements. As Bosco observes, China’s rise is complicating the dynamics of Japan’s security relationship with the US – a relationship that has been the fulcrum around which all Japanese strategic thinking revolves. Bosco points out that mutual fear of “entrapment” and “abandonment”
are beginning to emerge in the US-Japanese security discourse. Though as Hughes also points out, Japanese support for US actions in the “war on terror” effectively created a de facto precedent of cooperation with the US. As Hughes continues to explain, Japan is thus “learning the habits of multilateral interaction” under US instruction and ultimately towards the primary empowerment of US strategy and interests.

The US-Japan Security Alliance therefore effectively delineates the context against which much of Japan’s security policy is defined – including Japan’s emerging security presence in Africa. Indeed a joint US-Japan press briefing notes a shared commitment between the two countries to “promote peace, stability and economic growth throughout the world, including Africa.” In this context it is important to recognise the role of the United States in influencing Japanese engagement more broadly in Africa. The following section will thus examine Japanese alignment with US policy in Africa in the particular context of US policy towards South Sudan.

### 6.3.1 Alignment with United States’ Policy in Africa

As previously discussed Japan’s peacekeeping presence in South Sudan underlines and accentuates the other aspects of Japan’s engagement in the country. And while the mandate of Japan’s peacekeepers is very narrowly defined in terms of the UNMISS mandate and Japan’s complicated

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799 Hughes, Christopher, “Japan’s security policy, the US-Japan alliance, and the ‘war on terror’:Incrementalism confirmed or radical leap?”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 4, December 2004 pp. 427–445

800 Ibid

legal framework, it is still important to consider the influence of US policy alignment when considering Japan’s broader engagement in South Sudan.

There is considerable jostling for influence amongst the international players operating in South Sudan. This is largely driven by a combination of the country’s substantial development backlog and unexploited mineral resources resulting in the prospect of mining, oil and agricultural concessions as well as infrastructure contracts. But when viewed in light of South Sudan’s strategic location that connects East Africa with Muslim-majority Arab North Africa and the importance that the US placed on securing and sustaining the country’s independence, the Japanese decision to commit peacekeepers can be viewed from a number of perspectives that provide a broader context from which to assess Japan’s peacekeeping commitment.

Relations between the US and Sudan were defined by first the Cold War and what would later be referred to as the “War on Terror.” The poor relations between the two countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s reflected the presence of Islamist groups in Khartoum, combined with Sudan’s support for Iraq during the first Gulf War. Consequently, the US played a significant role in supporting the southern Sudanese rebels, the CPA negotiations (as part of the Troika which also comprised the United Kingdom and Norway), and finally the realisation of South Sudan’s independence. As the New York Times summarises, “South Sudan is in many ways an American creation, carved out of war-torn Sudan in a referendum largely orchestrated by the United States, its fragile institutions nurtured with billions of dollars in American aid.”\(^{802}\) Indeed a bipartisan Congressional coalition, known in recent years as the Sudan Caucus, pushed three successive US

presidents to make Sudan a foreign policy priority. \(^{803}\) Support for southern Sudanese independence united African Americans, evangelical Christians with Democrats and Republicans. Thus US interests in independent South Sudan are extensive and range from training security forces, \(^{804}\) to providing hundreds of millions of dollars \(^{805}\) in development assistance.

Moreover as in Japan, there is an emerging discourse in the United States around the need to compete with China in Africa. As former US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Princeton Lyman observed, “China is not a strategic threat to the United States in Africa. But it poses serious challenges for political and commercial influence.” \(^{806}\) Indeed Secretary of State John Kerry was questioned during his confirmation hearing before Congress on how the United States should compete with China’s growing footprint across Africa. Kerry’s response notes that China’s influence is extensive and admits that in places, the “US is not in the game.” \(^{807}\) In South Sudan however, this is not the case and despite recognition in Juba that the US has already played its most important leverage card – ensuring independence for South Sudan \(^{808}\) – Washington will remain a critically important ally for the foreseeable future. As Large describes, the government in Juba appears “to prioritise its ‘special relationship’ with the US.” \(^{809}\)

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\(^{807}\) Congressional Transcripts, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Massachusetts Democratic Sen. John Kerry to be Secretary of State, 24 January 2013

\(^{808}\) Author’s interview with SPLM official, Juba, 31 January 2013

\(^{809}\) Large, Daniel, “Southern Sudan and China: Enemies into friends?” in Large & Patey (eds) *Sudan Looks East, China, India and Politics of Asian Alternatives*, p.173
Thus South Sudan’s independence was seen by some as an apparent focal-point of US-China competition in Africa – along with Libya during the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. This is due in part to the view that China’s large investments in Sudan’s oil industry had resulted in its interests being strongly aligned with maintaining the status quo – a unified Sudan. American interests on the other hand were focused on achieving independence for South Sudan. Indeed as a former United States Ambassador in the region explains, the Sino-US competition discourse is accentuated when “the United States tries to isolate or punish countries like Sudan” which are deemed by China to be important in maintaining its own energy security.\(^{810}\)

Against this backdrop, and given Japan’s primary strategic objective of continuing its policy alignment with its most important ally, the strategic advantages of establishing a Japanese presence in South Sudan are further enhanced. Japan has in many respects been a model ally of the US, and aligning its policy in South Sudan with American policy priorities makes sense for both Japan and South Sudan. As LeRiche and Arnold point out, South Sudan’s foreign policy prospects at independence are mixed, but clearly focused on US political backing, East African economic integration and defence of the northern border.\(^{811}\) In this regard, Japan’s ODA infrastructure developments such as the Nile bridge and the infrastructure provided by the UNMISS engineers, as well as the proposed oil pipeline contribute to these objectives by supporting South Sudan’s road links and oil exports – all key logistical elements underpinning South Sudan’s integration into east Africa. In this regard Japan’s own interests in the region are aligned with those of the US and South Sudan – namely to realise a viable state – and have come at a time when Tokyo has a renewed enthusiasm to pursue deeper political and economic relations in the region.


\(^{811}\) LeRiche, Matthew, Arnold, Matthew, South Sudan, from revolution to independence, p. 211
Thus while maintaining and consolidating the US-Japan alliance remains a central strategic objective for Japanese policymakers, the rise of China is impacting Japan’s tactical approaches towards policy implementation. Indeed Japan’s renewed presence and multi-pronged engagement in the East African region has also been seen by some analysts as a component of a broader discourse on Sino-Japanese competition spilling over into Africa. The following section will therefore explore some of the dynamics of Sino-Japanese engagement particularly related to Japan’s peacekeeping and anti-piracy commitments in Africa.

6.3.2 The “China Factor” and Japan’s Security Engagement in Africa

The role of China’s presence in Africa as a factor driving Japan’s re-engagement on the continent is a theme that emerges throughout this research project. The rise of China was explored in Chapter Three as a structural influence on Japanese foreign policy, and as such the “China factor” must be considered among the elements driving Japan’s security engagement in South Sudan and in Africa more broadly.

As previously discussed, China has been unable to exert the same levels of influence in South Sudan as it has in many other African countries – this is due in large part to its close ties with Khartoum and how this relationship is perceived in Juba. But China’s investments and oil purchases from both countries have meant that it is still a significant and involved player in the region. Moreover as Patey explains with reference to the oil dispute in 2012, China wants to be seen as a responsible player by the international community for “doing their share to build peace alongside other international
actors, particularly the US.”\(^{812}\) In this regard both Japan and China are using peacekeeping deployments as elements within a broader strategy of advancing their respective international profiles through international security commitments.

Therefore China’s contribution of a medical and engineering contingent to UNMIS was continued after South Sudan’s independence with a deployment to the subsequent UNMISS peacekeeping mission.\(^{813}\) Based in Wau, Bahr El-Ghazal State since 2005 the deployment was seen at the time – especially by the Western media – as being linked to China’s extensive oil investments and political ties with Khartoum. China committed further troops to the hybrid UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007 and as Large points out China’s multidimensional role in Sudan was rooted in the “full spectrum of economic, political, military and cultural relations.”\(^{814}\) Consequently as Hughes notes, Japan’s decision to post three staff officers to UNMIS was “in part a response to China’s growing peacekeeping presence in Africa.”\(^{815}\) Moreover, the fact that South Korea has also deployed a contingent of engineers to South Sudan further compels Japan to demonstrate an active security presence if it is to successfully develop the narrative of leadership in Asia to which it aspires.

Japan’s military presence in the Indian Ocean however predated the anti-piracy operation: the MSDF provided support for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan between 2001 and 2007 by deploying destroyers and a fuel supply ship. Thus the anti-piracy deployment once again offers Japan an


\(^{813}\) After the end of the research period of this study China committed to send an additional 700 infantry troops as peacekeepers to South Sudan under the aegis of UNMISS. The troops were expected to be fully deployed by April 2015.

\(^{814}\) Large, Daniel, “China and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: the case of Sudan”, *South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)* Policy Briefing 36, October 2011

\(^{815}\) Hughes, Christopher, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, p. 85
opportunity to establish a presence in a region strategically and politically significant for Japan’s longer-term power calculations and alliance development. Before being elected in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe published a perspective of Japan’s strategic future entitled “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” in which he outlined his vision,” I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the Western Pacific.” Abe went on to state that he is prepared to invest, “to the greatest possible extent”, Japan’s capabilities in this diamond.816

In realising this strategic framework, Japan has sought closer ties with India, framing the engagement in terms of the two countries as potential sources of regional stability in the face of China’s rise. Indeed in outlining the “Security Diamond”, Abe notes “the need for the Indian and Japanese governments to join together to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.”817 Perhaps most significantly in Japan’s calculation however, is the fact that India is closer to Washington than Beijing, and containing China’s influence in the Indian Ocean ultimately underpins this strategy. Indeed in January 2014 India and Japan held their first bilateral naval exercise in Indian waters following a similar exercise in Japanese waters in June 2012 – in addition, both countries have taken part in the multilateral “Malabar” naval exercises with US, Australian and Singaporean ships.818 Thus the MSDF presence in Djibouti allows Japan to not only project power into the Western Indian Ocean, and secure SLOCs, but also to build important alliances and establish a platform for projecting a more assertive international position.

817 Ibid
Dr Michishita however also expressed a concern over the establishment of the MSDF facility in Djibouti. Noting that it “cuts both ways” and despite the contribution it makes to Japan’s international standing, “through the establishment of a permanent base we can become drawn into a conflict situation in the Middle East or North Africa.” Pointing out that a situation could arise where if Japan does not respond – due to domestic pressure or legal interpretations, it would once again be labelled a “free-riding rich nation.”\(^{819}\) This view again highlights that Japan’s growing security presence on the international stage must be understood in the context of an evolving domestic debate around Japan’s security policies.

The following section will therefore explore the particular domestic dynamics around which Japan’s security policies are developed. Furthermore, in terms of the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this study, the following section explores the intervening considerations through which systemic pressures are translated by elites in the development of Japanese security policy.

### 6.4 The Domestic Context of Japan’s Peacekeeping and Anti-Piracy Commitments

As this research demonstrates, Africa is gradually entering the strategic imagination of Japan’s policymakers – steadily shifting from the periphery to the arena in which Japan’s security policy is being implemented. And while structural circumstances provide the dominant rationale behind Japan’s security policy, the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research maintains that structure alone cannot explain Japan’s security policies in Africa. As such, domestic factors must be

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\(^{819}\) Authors’ interview with Dr Narushige Michishita GRIPS, Tokyo 3 October 2013
considered. According to Desch,\textsuperscript{820} the absence of international systemic pressures gives domestic factors such as elite perception greater influence in the policy-making process, and conversely when structural pressures are overwhelming, the influence of domestic factors decreases. However the neoclassical realist model maintains that external factors are translated through elite perceptions and can therefore at times override structural considerations. This is particularly true of Japan’s security policy generally and peacekeeping in particular. This section will therefore explore the particular domestic dynamics associated with Japan’s security policy in the context of its deployments in South Sudan and the Horn of Africa.

It should be also noted at the beginning of this section that this study is not attempting to show a causal link between the “normalisation” of Japan’s military and its peacekeeping deployment in South Sudan or anti-piracy operations. However it remains important to appreciate the domestic factors which make the UNMISS commitment and the anti-piracy operations significant to a deeper understanding of Japan’s motivations in Africa. Indeed it is these domestic perceptions and interpretations of Japan’s global imperatives which led to the UNMISS and Djibouti deployments. Thus when the extremely sensitive issue of constitutional reform or interpretation is debated in Japan, the parameters of the debate are being effectively shifted by events taking place in Africa.

As such, Japan’s peacekeeping deployment in South Sudan and anti-piracy operation in Djibouti tie together long-held commitments to human security, with an emerging foreign policy agenda – a global foreign policy that this study demonstrates is “occurring in the context of ‘Japan’s Comeback.’”\textsuperscript{821} As Professor Nakanishi goes on to note, Abe is using this message to remind people that Japan is not a fading country, and as such, its peacekeeping operations are “now part of the


\textsuperscript{821}Author’s interview with Professor Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013
‘Japan revitalised’ discourse.” A discourse that is an essential domestic perspective through which to interpret Japan’s expanding international security commitments. Indeed as Kitchen explains, “neoclassical realism understands that the ideas held by powerful actors within the state matter.” Thus Abe’s message is as much targeted towards a domestic audience as an international one, and the context in which Japan’s African security operations are occurring must be understood in light of the particular domestic interpretations of the international structural considerations that frame Japan’s security policies in Africa.

Japan’s peacekeeping operations have in many respects always reflected a balance between competing pressures: international and domestic. As Singh has noted, the collective security culture of the early 1990s put pressure on Japan because the “norm of burden sharing among member states of the UN challenged the prevailing domestic norms that were responsible for Japan’s strategy of separating economics from politics and resultant passive involvement in international security affairs.” These international norms are interpreted in Japan as gaiatsu, or external pressure – often emanating from the United States. As Cooney explains, “the official Japanese explanation for many of the nation’s defence and security policy decisions is essentially that ‘the Americans made us do it.’” In this way gaiatsu becomes a lightning rod for unpopular decisions that Japanese leaders want to make. As Cooney further points out Japan’s security policies are an example of a “two-level game”, where for instance the US wants Japan to do something that is in Japan’s overall interests (such as sending forces to contribute to international peacekeeping operations) and Japanese leaders want the same outcome – such as becoming a “normal” nation. But the public, and in many

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822 Kitchen, Nicholas, “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation”, p. 130
824 Cooney, Kevin, Japan’s Foreign Policy Since 1945, London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p.137
cases elements within the ruling party are unlikely to support it. Thus as Cooney continues to explain,

Japanese leaders will use the excuse of foreign pressure as a way of convincing internal interests, both in government and the public at large that Japan is being forced to pass the PKO law and that Japan cannot afford to say no to the foreign interests [the United States].

Though the extent to which *gaiatsu* as a structural imperative dictates Japanese policy is disputed. Calder, Hirose, and Wolferen for example take the view that external pressure (most significantly from the United States) does dictate Japan’s policy formulation – best captured by Calder’s view of Japan as a “reactive state.” Calder argues that the pluralistic and fragmented nature of Japan’s political system has resulted in so much infighting and bureaucratic rivalries that no grand strategy is even possible. This view is rejected however by Heginbotham and Samuels who argue that “Japan’s leadership is both pragmatic and strategic”, and point to Japan’s “duel hedge” strategy where Japan continues to rely on the US for military balance while seeking additional commercial opportunities and expanding influence.

Thus while the extent and impact of *gaiatsu* is contested, it is apparent that notions related to military contribution through peacekeeping and multilateral cooperation were accepted and

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825 Ibid, P. 137
829 Samuels Richard, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, p. xii
interpreted by policymakers in such a way as to not contradict the peace constitution. As Singh further explains, peacekeeping became a policy option to Japan during the 1990s and thereafter a part of the national security discourse. While Midford argues that Japan’s policy and opinion changes in recent years are much less significant than widely believed as the political elite and Japanese public have long supported the role of the SDF, others such as Hughes, Pyle, Samuels, and Wada maintain that Japan’s security posture has expanded in terms of military strength and through its contributions to the regional and international security environment.

Primarily this was achieved by developing its role as a contributor to international peacekeeping operations, and deepening and widening the responsibilities of the SDF through a greater institutionalisation of the US-Japan Security Alliance – referred to by Samuels as the “mother of all catalysts.” However as Samuels also goes on to note, Japan’s military capabilities were enhanced through progressive relaxation of the SDF’s rules of engagement for each successive peacekeeping deployment. And as such, peacekeeping underpinned the evolution of Japan’s domestic security discourse – through the creation of a legal framework and the precedent created through SDF deployments in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, Haiti, and South Sudan. As a MOFA director confided, “in my personal view, peacekeeping operations serve a dual purpose” in that “the government uses international peace activities as a tool so that the SDF can be

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833 Hughes, Christopher, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power
834 Pyle KE, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose
835 Samuels Richard, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, p. 82
837 Samuels Richard, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, p. 102
838 Ibid, p. 102
839 Author’s interview with Commander of Japan Contingent Engineering Company UNMISS, Juba, 23 January 2013
recognised [as valuable] in Japan. In this regard the strategic value that peacekeeping operations offer for the government in unravelling the restrictions of the constitution is that the Japanese public remain relatively disengaged, and Africa is perceived as far away and marginal to domestic political issues – but where the SDF can also be shown to be performing a valuable international service.

Professor Nakanishi reiterates this view by noting that “human security and peacebuilding have wide domestic support in Japan – and the government is conscious of this. So when perhaps only 30 per cent of the population support a reinterpretation of the constitutional restraint on collective defence – it is not easy to sell.” But peacekeeping operations are a tactical move by the government’s public relations arm to “sell the idea to the public.” Thus looking beyond Prime Minister Abe’s professed “historical mission” to amend the constitution, the professor observes that “the second Abe administration is trying to wrap up the incremental changes of the last two decades.” Whether interpreting security policy or strengthening the US-Japan Alliance, these issues have been on the shelf since Abe’s first cabinet – and resultantly, “peacekeeping operations and pirate action is easier to sell to the population than complex ideas of collective security.”

However, the peacekeeping tactic is “dependent on one assumption: that it is safe. If it gets unsafe it will put policymakers in a difficult position.” Remembering that pacifism is still a key part of post war Japan’s policies and that since World War II no one has been killed by the SDF. “But once that happens, it will be a very serious first-time experience […] if a Japanese soldier kills someone it will change the debate in Japan.” Emphasising Berger’s view that domestic political attitudes towards the use of force vary significantly among states situated similarly in the international system.

840 Authors interview with director, MOFA, Tokyo 5 November 2013
841 Author’s interview with Professor Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013
843 Author’s interview with Professor Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013
844 Ibid
845 Berger, Thomas, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism”
Indeed as Aoi has argued, Japan’s “current restrained approach reflects the desire to avoid a heavy global security commitment while keeping alive the option of again making a bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat.” As Aoi continues to point out, perhaps the most fundamental hurdle for Japan is to “develop a more responsive and responsible political leadership that begins to grasp the implications of the changed security environment of today from a global perspective.”

It is further apparent that in line with neoclassical realist analysis Japan’s response to the global security environment is interpreted and defined within the realm of domestic political discourse between the so-called “revisionists” who aspire to Japan becoming a “normal state” and those who continue to identify with Japan as a “pacifist state.” Indeed Vosse’s work on Japanese public attitudes towards the military reiterates this by acknowledging that “the gradual foreign policy changes in the last sixty years and particularly those of the last fifteen years have not had the effect of making Japanese embrace military options to a significant level.” Consequently, the complicated and unstable environment in South Sudan is no doubt challenging Japan’s lawmakers and as the situation continues to unfold it will test the public’s tolerance for Japan’s commitments in Africa.

As such, it is the very fact that Africa is perceived to be distant and poorly understood by the majority of the Japanese public that the “peacekeeping tactic” is so effective. Public weariness of a “normalised” military in Japan is centred on what Izumikawa describes as the “three elements” of Japan’s antimilitarism: “pacifism, anti-traditionalism and fear of entrapment” – meaning that as the junior partner in the US-Japan Security Alliance, Japan would become drawn into all future US conflicts. Thus the outbreak of violence in South Sudan will challenge the Abe administration to manage the new threats posed by the instability, and the resultant opportunities to advance the

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849 Author’s interview with Senior correspondent, Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo, 8 November 2013
debate on collective self-defence as well as Japan’s role as a responsible international security partner.

The domestic dimension of Japan’s UNMISS deployment therefore relates to the interpretation of collective self-defence. As such, it is important to distinguish between removing or revising Article Nine, from changing the interpretation of Article Nine – see Hagström. This much debated article in the Japanese constitution outlaws collective self-defence and has been at the forefront of the national question about what type of state Japan should be. As Samuels indicates, the article “was a useful way to avoid entanglements in US cold war strategy [...] and [is] an indispensable instrument for protecting Japanese interests within the US-Japan alliance”, but it is becoming increasingly incompatible with the Japanese government’s international security objectives and commitments. As Professor Fukushima points out, “most countries do not distinguish between self-defence, collective self-defence and collective security” – and having obscure interpretations of these concepts “means that Japan has less choices than our peers from other countries involved in peacekeeping operations.” Consequently changing the interpretation of the notion of collective self-defence as well as the right to exercise collective self-defence would give Japan the same policy choices as other countries.

But the consequences of those policy choices are still unwelcome to many Japanese. For example an editorial in the Asahi Shimbun encapsulated these views in criticising the NSS unveiled by the

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850 In July 2014, Prime Minister Abe’s Cabinet approved a reinterpretation of the Constitution to allow for collective self-defence. This reinterpretation essentially allows the Japanese military to use force alongside the armed forces of other countries. This decision was taken after the research period included in this study.


852 Samuels Richard, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, p. 33

853 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013.
government in December 2013. The newspaper noted that in calling for “proactive pacifism” “the Abe administration is paving the way for changing the traditional interpretation of Article Nine to enable Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defence.”\(^854\) The point underlined by the *Asahi Shimbun* is that the NSS – along with Japan’s response to developments in South Sudan, reflect a major turning point in Japan’s national security policy.

Peacekeeping operations therefore serve as the testing grounds for much broader considerations that are central questions of Japanese national security policy. The debate rests on whether Japan should use “the right to collective self-defence” – that is, whether Japan should use force or engage in combat operations for friends and allies. Dr Michishita outlines the four specific scenarios Prime Minister Abe argues should allow Japan to use collective self-defence:

1. US and Japanese vessels on joint patrol and attacked by a third party – currently Japan cannot use force in this situation.

2. North Korea missile attack against Guam or Hawaii flies over Japan – currently Japan is not able to shoot it down despite having ballistic missile defence capabilities.

3. Peacekeeping operations – currently Japan is unable to assist forces of another country when they come under attack.

4. Similar situation but related to logistical support. Japan is currently able to provide logistic support to military operations however if the ally comes under attack Japan is not able to provide logistical support in a combat situation (when they are most likely to need it).\(^855\)

Of particular relevance to the UNMISS deployment are the last two points and the manner of response from the Japanese government to the crisis in South Sudan. While there have been no

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\(^{855}\) Author’s interview with Dr Narushige Michishita, GRIPS, Tokyo 3 October 2013
reports of Japanese peacekeepers called on to defend other UNMISS forces in South Sudan, the
dearth of two Indian peacekeepers\textsuperscript{856} is indicative of the dangers present in the country. Thus while
the government made an exception in providing ammunition to South Korean peacekeepers; they
refused a UN request to transport military personnel and weapons in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{857} On the same
day that Prime Minister Abe committed Japanese support to South Sudan at the African Union the
government was tying itself in constitutional knots. As the \textit{Japan Times} reports, “the administration
was worried it would go against Japan’s policy of not exercising the right to collective self-
defence.”\textsuperscript{858}

Thus despite the steady drip of legislation that first allowed the SDF to undertake peacekeeping
operations and then increasingly broadened its mandate – the reality still remains that the SDF is far
better equipped in terms of military hardware than the regulatory and legal “software” that defines
its rules of engagement. As the SDF’s activities expanded to include dangerous and unstable
overseas missions such as in South Sudan – these shortcomings are being made increasingly
apparent. Indeed following the withdrawal of peacekeepers form the Golan Heights citing the
violence in neighbouring Syria,\textsuperscript{859} Japan’s entire commitment to international peacekeeping rests
with the UNMISS mission and withdrawing from that mission would certainly damage Japan’s
standing as a reliable international security partner.

\textsuperscript{856} BBC News, “Indian UN peacekeepers killed in South Sudan attack”, 20 December 2013, accessed 25 January
2014, available at \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25456862}
\textsuperscript{857} The Japan Times, “UN request for Japan to transport troops, arms in South Sudan nixed”, January 14 2014, ,
\textsuperscript{858} Ibid
\url{http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-06/undof_golan_heights_2.php}
Jeremy Taylor
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Japan’s commitment to anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa however has a somewhat different historical development to that of peacekeeping – but is no less significant in understanding the intervening domestic context in which Japan’s African security operations are conducted. While Hughes, Kersten, Pyle, Midford and Samuels address these aspects in greater detail, Japan’s rear-guard support for United States action in Afghanistan in 2001 was significant for both its intent and the speed with which special legislation was developed and passed to facilitate it. Likewise as Kersten points out “when Japan symbolically joined the fray in Iraq in February 2004 [...] it represented more precedent-making action on the part of the hitherto constitutionally constrained nation.” Consequently as Bateman notes, when Japan sought to join the multilateral anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia in 2009 it again “provided the catalyst for widening the scope of the Japanese constitution to permit overseas deployment by the [MSDF].”

Furthermore, as Professor Fukushima explains, a study group is currently looking into how to interpret the constitution in terms of the new legislation, and they believe that Japan can defend sea lanes as part of an alliance – if so requested by alliance partners – thereby radically widening the scope of operations covered under the legislation.

Before the Somali operation, the Japan Coast Guard was primarily responsible for anti-piracy operations, and under Article 82 of the Self Defence Force Law the MSDF could only protect Japanese ships from piracy on the assumption they were only protecting the lives and assets of

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860 Hughes Christopher *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004
862 Pyle KE, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*
865 Kersten, Rikki, “Japanese Security Policy Formation: assessing the Koizumi revolution”
866 Bateman, Sam, “Piracy and Maritime Security: Japan’s strategic challenges”, p. 214
867 Author’s interview with Professor Akiko Fukushima, Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, 3 October 2013
Japanese nationals. However following increased pirate attacks in 2008 and a growing international response, the Diet passed the “Anti-Piracy Measures Law” in June 2009 and dispatched MSDF destroyers to the Horn of Africa. Significantly, the legislation allowed for the first operation abroad for Japan’s SDF that was not restricted to rear-area support such as transportation or refuelling and it enabled the MSDF to protect any ship – including those without Japanese connections.

Black and Hwang further argue that Japan’s anti-militarist norm has shaped the country’s non-military contributions to international society, yet by self-identifying as pacifists when participating in multilateral security operations Japan is effectively creating a new norm around multilateral security engagement. This assessment, while failing to appreciate the importance of the international system in driving the changes occurring in Japan’s security posture and policies, does highlight the overall importance of norms in understanding Japan’s security policy – particularly anti-militarism as identified by Berger and Katzenstein. Thus while pacifist norms are important intervening considerations in a neoclassical realist analysis of Japanese security policies, they are not fixed but tend to be fluid and interpreted by elites and policymakers in response to systemic pressures. Indeed research by Vosse identifies exceptionally high levels of threat perception among Japanese concerning global and domestic issues yet non-militarist values also remain strong.

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869 The National Diet refers to Japan’s bicameral legislature, which is composed of a lower House of Representatives, and an upper House of Councillors.
Japan’s contributions to multinational security operations in Africa have therefore impacted on the evolving debate within Japan around its future as a security actor in the international arena. While anti-piracy operations have created an important mechanism for operationalising the Japan-US alliance outside of Japan’s territory, peacekeeping in South Sudan has created an important platform from which to signal Japanese commitment to multilateral engagement. Yet ultimately in terms of this research project, it further demonstrates the significance of security operations in Africa within the context of its broader engagement on the continent in response to a changing global environment. Moreover, when considering Japan’s peacekeeping presence in South Sudan, the essential message to emerge is that what happens there matters because it impacts on the debate around the interpretation of collective self-defence – and thus ultimately shapes Japan’s security policies. This “accidental agency” must therefore be included when considering the impact of Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, and along with the anti-piracy operations, remains a key factor in the broader analysis of Japan’s evolving engagement in Africa.

Thus while peacekeeping has been a significant factor in the evolution of Japan’s domestic debate around state pacifism, it has also played an important role in altering domestic perceptions of the military and the influence of the SDF amongst policymakers. The following section will consequently explore the expanding influence of Japan’s military in foreign policy development with particular reference to Japanese engagement in Africa.
6.4.1 Evolution of the SDF’s Role in Japan’s Security Discourse

As Hughes and Singh have observed, Japan’s peacekeeping policy served as a crucial catalyst in carving out a new role for the SDF – “namely expanding the SDF’s identity from a force with a national defence mission to one that incorporated an international dimension.” The SDF’s identity was transformed from a military designed solely to address the threat from the Soviet Union against Japan, which precluded the deployment of SDF forces beyond the country’s borders, to one that allows for participation in international peacekeeping operations overseas under the aegis of the UN. As Yamaguchi reiterates, the SDF thus “began their transformation from forces devoted strictly to assuring Japan’s own defence within the framework of the US–Japan Security Treaty, to ones that could share the tasks of assuring international security.” And while this expansion is still occurring within the tight confines of the particular vocabulary permissible for official discussion on security matters – jietai (self-defence force) as opposed to the United States’ guntai (military force), the inclusion of peacekeeping within the mandate of the SDF broadened the capabilities and perceptions of the SDF within Japan.

In this context, the military have their own perspective on the value of their deployment in South Sudan. For example, the Ground Self Defence Forces (GSDF) see peacekeeping operations offering unrivalled opportunities for the logistical training and equipment testing necessary for the military’s growing role in Japan’s geopolitical position. In addition, the military’s response to the Tōhoku earthquake in 2011 went a long way in developing a positive domestic image for the SDF as well as

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874 Hughes, Christopher, “Japan’s Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan-China arms race and global power projection”  
875 Singh, Bhubhindar, “Peacekeeping in Japanese security policy: international-domestic contexts interaction”, p 443  
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showing lawmakers the value of a large force that could deploy 100,000 soldiers to lead humanitarian and rescue efforts. But beyond these issues, Dr Michishita explains that,

The GDSF has latent fears that the force will be reduced significantly. Japan’s force structure is lopsided and unbalanced: top heavy, with a disproportionately high number of officers and Non-commissioned officers. Thus while this is not a public debate – there is a widely held view that at some point we have to significantly reduce the size of the Ground SDF.

As Hughes has observed, in order to respond to multifarious security challenges “Japan has found it necessary to embark on successive revisions of its national defence doctrines and capabilities.” Consequently the government is currently revising its basic defence policy paper – the National Defence Programme Guidelines. The Guidelines were last revised in 2010 and are being reviewed again following the election of Prime Minister Abe and the new LDP administration. But as Dr Michishita points out, regardless of how much this issue is being discussed in this current review, it is likely to come back and the GSDF will be defensive. In response the GSDF will attempt to transform into a new force with amphibious capabilities – a small number are now training with the US Marine Corps. Yet while the primary justification for maintaining the size of the GSDF in their view is the need to strengthen defence of contested island chains – “it is also good when they can say they are deployed overseas.”

Indeed the SDF is understood to have an increasingly strong voice when it comes to influencing security policy. It has been observed that army officers are astute and make good arguments to

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877 Author’s interview with Commander of Japan Contingent Engineering Company UNMISS, Juba, 23 January 2013
878 Author’s interview with Dr Narushige Michishita, GRIPS, Tokyo 3 October 2013
879 Hughes, Christopher, “Japan’s Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan-China arms race and global power projection”
880 Author’s interview with Dr Narushige Michishita, GRIPS, Tokyo 3 October 2013
maintain the size and force structure of the SDF – demonstrating their political awareness by “taking off their uniforms to lobby parliamentarians in Nagatachō.” Thus while the complicated constitutional debates continue in the Diet and Kantei (prime minister’s residence) that constitute the halls of influence in the Tokyo district of Nagatachō – the SDF’s view is that Africa matters. The combination of peacekeeping in South Sudan and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia constitute Japan’s entire international security cooperation commitment and are important sites to project influence, build security partnerships as well as test equipment and systems. Furthermore, they will not need to remind lawmakers of the hard security challenges that characterise the region. In this regard the SDF – encompassing all three forces (Ground, Maritime and Air) are considered to be in a strong political position, “we are in no way short of threats to justify continued investment on defence.” Indeed Japan’s increased military budget for 2014 indicates the growing relevance of the SDF in determining how Japanese policy makers interpret and respond to a changing global environment.

6.5 Conclusion

The long-established view on Japan’s strategic ambition is that the country privileged economic strength over military might, yet authors such as Hughes, Samuels, and Singh point to growing evidence that Japan’s future strategic ambitions will be bolstered by a strong international military presence. In doing so, a gradual new consensus is emerging around Japan’s foreign and

881 Ibid
882 Ibid
885 Hughes, Christopher, Japan’s Remilitarisation
886 Samuels Richard, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia
887 Singh, Bhubhindar, Japan’s Security Identity, From peace state to an international state
security policy – and while for now many questions remain about how the country will resolve the legal contortions that surround its existing security policy – it is apparent that Japan’s African Security engagements will play a central role in those developments.

This chapter has therefore explored the role of Japan’s security engagement in Africa as a response to the structural pressures identified in Chapter Three and interpreted via the particular domestic perspectives and norms that influence the country’s security policies. The neoclassical realist perspective underpinning this research maintains that the basic parameters of a country’s foreign policy are defined by domestic interpretations of shifting power dynamics at the structural level. In this respect Japan’s security engagement in Africa reflects Kitchen’s observation that international politics and the formation of a state’s strategy is a “complex and multi-layered undertaking.” As such, the decision to deploy peacekeepers to South Sudan and shoulder anti-piracy operations in Djibouti reflects a combination of objectives that intimately tie Japan’s Africa policies with a broader narrative around Japan’s place in the world and what kind of state it wishes to be. As well as creating a platform upon which to build experience, test equipment and develop interoperability with allies.

The deployment of peacekeepers to South Sudan is also a significant reflection of the growing importance of Africa within Japan’s foreign policy objectives. The addition of a Japanese security element in South Sudan further supports and solidifies the other components of Japan’s presence in the country – in terms of infrastructure development, but also as an indicator of Japanese commitment towards building relations with Juba. Moreover the expansion of Japanese engagement in Africa to include a security dimension is significant as it creates important precedents

Kitchen, Nicholas, “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation”, p. 120
that are in turn influencing the debate and development of Japan’s security policies. Thus given the significance of the UNMISS deployment and anti-piracy operation within the broader context of Japan’s international security presence, the continent will remain essential to the further development of Japan’s security policies.
7. Conclusion

This study has ultimately been about change: changes in Japan’s approaches and attitudes towards Africa and the structural changes driving Japanese policymakers to explore new frontiers and new methodologies. Referencing Prime Minister Abe’s narrative that “Japan is back”, this thesis has sought to understand how Japan’s interactions in South Sudan, and more broadly in Africa, demonstrate a renewed interest and a new approach towards engagement with the continent. In so doing a conceptual metaphor of the frontier was employed to describe Japan’s engagement in South Sudan as expanding the boundary of an arc of interests that stretches from Djibouti to Mozambique across East Africa.

As the previous chapters have outlined, Japan’s presence in Africa since 2008 has grown in absolute terms, but more importantly it has also developed in terms of the breadth of its engagement and how it reflects new attitudes and perceptions of the continent. As Japanese policymakers interviewed for this research explained, Africa has gone from a place of charity to a place of investment, a market and a location from which Japan can expand its international presence. Consequently this study was also about relevance and how Japanese policymakers are responding to the shifting structural conditions of a global order in which its place is no longer assured. For this reason neoclassical realism was employed as a vehicle of analysis as it accommodates systemic conditions, cognitive factors of perception and misperception as well as the domestic considerations of state institutions and norms in theorising foreign policy formation.

Accordingly, in applying neoclassical realism as a lens of analysis, this thesis maintains that Japan’s policies in Africa – and activities in South Sudan in particular – reflect policy responses to specific structural pressures interpreted via the perceptions and norms of Japanese policymakers. This study therefore sought to demonstrate that dynamics within the structure of the international system such as Japan’s relative economic decline, energy security imperatives, pressures to contribute toward international security operations or the rise of China are driving a more active and refocused engagement with the African continent.

Thus as the previous chapters have outlined, Japanese engagement in Africa is multifaceted and driven by complex and at times overlapping dynamics, yet Japan’s presence in Africa is expanding and South Sudan is a particularly relevant location from which to better understand the evolution of Japanese relations with Africa. It is the only country in which Japan is providing development assistance in conjunction with pursuing a complex oil pipeline project as well as developing key infrastructure and deploying peacekeepers. These multiple layers of interaction reflect Japan’s growing presence on the continent but also the extent to which Japanese engagement in South Sudan can be seen as a testing ground as well as a precedent for Japan’s future interaction in Africa and beyond. In this respect the emergence of a more assertive and risk-tolerating Japanese approach to external engagement is likely in the coming years.

The significant contribution of this study therefore is that it explores a little-known dimension of Japan’s foreign relations and places that engagement in the context of the country’s policy response to changing global and domestic conditions. Yet this thesis also references two overriding realities. Firstly, that Japan is the world’s third largest economy and an important contributor to international institutions, and as such all dimensions of the country’s foreign policy are significant. Secondly, what
happens in Africa matters. This research outlines a particular dimension of what is a growing realisation around the importance of Africa as a site for investment and trade. Consequently, better understanding the dynamics driving Japan’s Africa policies provides not only the rationale for this thesis, but also its value.

This concluding chapter will therefore provide a brief overview and synthesis of the primary findings of this study. In so doing, this short chapter will address the research questions underpinning this thesis while also recognising limitations of the study and identifying areas for potential future research.

### 7.1 Overview of Findings

This study sought to answer the primary question, what explains Japan’s engagement in South Sudan? And in doing so it explored the particular activities undertaken by Japan in South Sudan so as to frame a deeper analysis of the broad strategic considerations underpinning Japan’s Africa policy. Yet as Chan and Sylvan have pointed out, “the domain of analysis for foreign policy decision making is vague and subject to disagreement.” For this reason theory was integrated into this study as a framework through which descriptive observations are interpreted, and its findings comprise a history of the present with themes that echo with theory. Put another way, the aim of this research was never to forge a new paradigm or provide a universal defence for a particular perspective of international relations but rather to operationalise a framework that matched the primary data uncovered through key informant interviews.

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When considering the dominant perspectives within international relations, it was apparent that neither a purely systemic theory of international outcomes, such as neorealism, nor a purely *innenpolitik* theory of foreign policy would adequately capture the nuance, impact or rationale for Japan’s presence in South Sudan. Japan’s re-engagement in Africa was therefore interpreted in this study through the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism which conceptually ties together the methodological approach with the primary findings to emerge from the research. In this context neoclassical realism proved to be a practical mechanism through which to appreciate an empirically-driven study of an evolving dimension of Japan’s foreign policy – while further accentuating the descriptive accuracy and policy relevance of the study. Indeed key informants interviewed for this study identified global dynamics driving Japan’s renewed enthusiasm for engaging in Africa as well as corresponding domestic factors that shape the specific priorities and methods of Japanese engagement in Africa. Yet this research focused only on those strategic objectives where the tactical approach to achieving the objective was reflected in Japan’s presence in South Sudan or broader Africa policy.

As described in Chapter Three, structural factors establish the parameters of Japan’s engagement in Africa – the *why* factors. Yet the limitations of a purely systemic analysis are clear: it is unable to adequately capture the nuance and context necessary for understanding how Japanese policy towards Africa is developed. This is due in part to the homogeneity of state behaviour often associated with the realist perspective. This study therefore relied on the eclectic umbrella of neoclassical realism in combining a structural frame with elements of constructivist thought such as the perceptions of policymakers and norms particular to Japan to better understand how Japan’s structural pressures are realised as policy. This was achieved by highlighting the linkages and connections between the structurally-motivated drivers of Japanese engagement in Africa with the specific dimensions of Japan’s activities in South Sudan. In this respect the preceding chapters
reflect the model (Figure 5)\textsuperscript{891} outlined in Chapter Two which illustrates the relationship between the broad strategic objectives of Japan’s presence in Africa with its tactical approaches, and finally, the particular aspects of Japan’s presence in South Sudan. Thus the case study of South Sudan demonstrated that Japanese engagement in the country comprises distinct elements within Japan’s tactical approach towards Africa – which in turn reflects overarching structural pressures.

Chapter Three explored the systemic context underpinning this research. It examined aspects such as Japan’s economic stagnation, its energy security imperatives, the rise of China and pressure to contribute towards international security operations as factors shaping the country’s tactical approaches in Africa. These factors also serve as a foundation upon which the following empirical chapters are built. As such, these elements reflect policymakers’ perceptions of structural dynamics – or perceptions of Japan’s relative power in the international system. The dynamics explored in this chapter therefore reflect the neoclassical realist perspective of international hierarchy and a state’s perceptions of itself with regards to other states. For example the complexities of Sino-Japanese relations influence policymaker’s perceptions of China’s economic and political influence in Africa and are in turn creating a sense of urgency in Japan’s policy response towards the continent. Thus as this chapter demonstrated, structural pressures are forcing Japan’s policymakers and business leaders to reconsider the strategic and economic value of Africa, and this is best observed through the evolution of Japan’s primary forum for African engagement – the TICAD process.

TICAD IV in 2008 was in many respects the turning point of Japan’s Africa policy – measured by a large increase in aid as well as private sector commitments of greater trade and investment with the continent. As described in Chapter Four, these changes were in fact recognition of the economic growth that Africa had experienced since 2000 and the broader structural dynamics affecting Japan’s

\textsuperscript{891} See page 75
relative power in the international system. The continent was therefore no longer perceived merely as a location for aid but as a location from which to begin responding to the country’s structurally-determined economic and political strategic objectives. Significantly, while the broader objectives of Japanese policymakers to revive the country’s economy and strengthen its international presence are well documented, this research explored the links between these processes and Japan’s development policies in South Sudan. Indeed by exploring new approaches and situating its aid in a wider strategic context Japan’s development engagement in South Sudan offers significant insight into the future of Japanese interactions in emerging countries. Especially in terms of how the country is seeking to differentiate itself from both the Western donors and China, improve coordination among the various entities operating in the country and to focus Japanese aid in those countries identified as being of particular strategic value.

As outlined in the chapter, ODA has been the most visible and effective element of Japan’s foreign policy in the post-war era. And as such it remains the cornerstone of Japan’s Africa policy and is a fundamental element in creating openings for private sector investors and establishing diplomatic relationships. But significantly, since 2008 there has been a noted realignment of Japan’s attitude and approach to ODA – reflecting both structural pressures and a domestic discourse around the role of ODA within the country’s foreign policy framework. Furthermore, the evolution of Japanese ODA approaches towards Africa also reflects a refocused ODA relationship with the continent and a broader ambition to develop a more assertive and distinguishable international presence – centred on a policy of differentiating Japan’s aid approach from those of the Western donors and China.

Thus in the context of Japan’s presence in South Sudan, it is ODA that ties together the various elements of Japanese engagement in the country and it remains the primary means of interaction
across the region. Japan’s ODA projects in South Sudan are significant in that they represent a return to the infrastructure-led approach that long defined Japan’s development assistance and reflect South Sudan’s own development priorities by strengthening the country’s physical links with East Africa. Moreover, these factors are noteworthy not only because of what they say about Japan’s approach towards South Sudan and East Africa, but what they say about the future trajectory of Japanese overseas engagement – not least of which the goal of increasing overseas investment to drive economic growth at home.

The evolution of Japan’s Africa strategy to increase focus on investment and to secure access to energy and mineral resources is examined in Chapter Five. Centred on the particular case study of Toyota Tsusho’s bid to develop an alternative oil export pipeline from South Sudan, the chapter explores Japan’s ever-present imperative of energy security and the emerging policy of acquiring equity energy resources. The proposed pipeline is therefore significant in that it combines two important dimensions of Japan’s emerging presence in Africa: energy security and increased investment, resulting in the private sector-led pursuit of Hinomaru Oil.

In line with the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this study, Chapter Five examines how distinct changes in the structural conditions of world energy markets reinforced the perception amongst policymakers of Japan’s energy vulnerability and led to the identification of East Africa as a potential location for Japanese companies to secure stakes in its emerging energy sector. The chapter therefore contextualises Japan’s energy imperatives in terms of the structural pressures driving change and the perceptions and norms that determine how the country’s energy policies are developed and prioritised. Most notably, these include the impetus towards reconsidering Japan’s reliance on energy markets and encouraging the exploration and development of oil resources by
Japanese companies. The bid by Toyota Tsusho to develop an alternative oil pipeline from South Sudan to the Kenyan port of Lamu is therefore an element within a much broader initiative to drive Japanese energy-based investment in East Africa. As such, the pipeline represents an important dimension of Japan’s new approach and objectives in the region – and is thus understood by this study as both a test-case for Japan’s evolving approach to energy investment and a physical manifestation of the outer edge of Japan’s arc of engagement in East Africa.

Thus despite diversification of supply having been an – albeit unsuccessful – cornerstone of Japan’s energy security policy for decades, this chapter provided a unique perspective on how this strategy is being pursued in East Africa through the particularly complicated and contentious example of South Sudan. In examining the historical, logistical and political dimensions of the proposed project for South Sudan and its relations in the region, the chapter explored the relevance and impact of the pipeline far beyond the transportation of oil. As such, the pipeline also demonstrates a willingness by Japan to challenge existing norms of business and foreign relations to undertake a politically sensitive, economically risky yet potentially rewarding project. The potential investment is also noteworthy in that it matches South Sudan’s strategic objectives with Japan’s energy security concerns and a desire to demonstrate its status as a committed contributor and investor in Africa.

Chapter Six explored what is perhaps the most significant and single biggest change in the evolution of Japan’s Africa policy – namely the inclusion of a security dimension within the relationship. The deployment of peacekeepers to South Sudan and anti-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa tie Japan’s Africa policies to structural shifts, complicated domestic debates on the country’s state pacifism, as well as broader narratives around Japan’s place in the world and the type of state it wishes to be. While the long established view on Japan’s strategic ambition is that the country
privileged economic considerations over military, it increasingly appears that the country’s future strategic ambitions will be bolstered by a strong international military presence – and this chapter explores these debates in the context of Japan’s African operations.

Comprising a unit of GSDF engineers deployed to UNMISS in South Sudan and MSDF deployment in the Horn of Africa, these operations are significant in that they are a strong indicator of Japan’s ambitions to increase its international security role. Moreover as described in the chapter, Japan’s military engagements in Africa comprise important test-cases that effectively create precedents and advance the boundaries of Japan’s constitutional debate in locations far from the public consciousness. Thus as new precedents in the deployment and mandate of Japanese military forces abroad are effectively being developed in Africa, so too is a gradual new consensus emerging around Japan’s foreign and security policy.

Again reflecting this study’s neoclassical realist framework of interpretation, this chapter also explored the structural considerations such as pressure from the United States, the rise of China as a potential military threat and Japan’s undiminished ambitions for a seat on the UN Security Council as factors driving the country’s growing international security presence. In addition, the chapter also examined the steadily increasing role and profile of the SDF in the context of Japan’s pacifist norms and the domestic debates around the interpretation of Japan’s constitutional restrictions such as the right to collective self-defence. Thus as Chapter Six concluded, despite many questions remaining about how the country will resolve the legal contortions that surround its existing security policies, expanding the country’s engagement in Africa to include a security dimension has allowed events on the continent to have a significant impact on the evolution of Japan’s own security identity.
7.1.1 Research Questions Revisited

The analytical objective at the heart of this study has been identification and analysis of the factors underlying Japan’s engagement in South Sudan – and in so doing exploring the systemic and domestic-level factors influencing Japanese policy in Africa. The following section will therefore briefly synthesise the analysis outlined in the previous chapters in terms of the research questions guiding this study.

1. What explains Japan’s extensive engagement in South Sudan?

Each element of Japan’s presence in South Sudan can be seen to reflect specific structural pressures driving Japan’s re-engagement in Africa, yet particular conditions in South Sudan are responsible for the extent and nature of Japanese activities in the country. Simply put, South Sudan is an energy-rich country on the frontier of a region significant to Japan’s broader Africa strategy. Moreover as this study outlined, South Sudan is a strong ally of the United States, has complicated relations with China and is actively seeking new investors and allies. In this context the country is a space into which Japan has expanded the range and approach of its African engagements: taking on more risk, expanding its ODA approaches and incorporating a security element in the relationship. In conceptualising South Sudan in the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy, this study utilised a metaphor of the frontier in explaining the manner and motives of Japan’s presence in the country. South Sudan therefore represents a key location from which to examine the expansion of Japan’s presence on the continent as well as the potential for future evolution in Japan’s engagement in Africa.
2. Does this engagement reflect the ambitions and approaches of Japan’s broader Africa strategy?

As each of the primary empirical chapters outlined, Japan’s presence in South Sudan can be interpreted as evidence of a more assertive and proactive Japanese foreign policy approach that increasingly recognises the importance of Africa as a location in which to expand Japan’s investments and international presence. In this respect Japan’s approach to engagement in South Sudan reflects the broader ambitions of its Africa strategy. Moreover Japan’s activities in South Sudan can also be viewed as elements that feed into wider strategic foreign policy considerations such as reform of the UN Security Council, relations with the United States, and balancing Chinese influence in Africa. The empirical examination of Japan’s presence in South Sudan thus provided a theoretically-informed explanation of the factors driving Japan’s broader engagement in Africa.

3. To what extent can Japan’s presence in Africa be understood to reflect a policy response to structural forces at the global level perceived through the lens of domestic considerations and priorities?

Through analysis of Japan’s activities in South Sudan it is apparent that structural factors provide the motivation and the parameters for Japanese engagement in Africa. Indeed as this study demonstrates, structural dynamics delineate Japan’s strategic objectives in Africa, and define its priorities on the continent. Yet while Japan’s broad policy objectives towards Africa are determined by structural conditions, its methods of engagement on the continent reflect the domestic political considerations of policymakers – influenced by societal norms and their own perceptions. In this respect particular domestic considerations such as energy security or norms around state pacifism influence and colour Japan’s policy responses to structural pressures. These unit-level or intervening factors are described in this study with reference to the particular dimensions of Japan’s activities in
South Sudan and are a central component within the neoclassical realist framework underpinning this research.

7.1.2 Caveats

As with any study, there are certain caveats which should be identified in this research project. In this respect, while the study sought to examine Japan’s engagement in South Sudan as a barometer of broader Japanese approaches and attitude towards Africa, it was not possible given the limits of a thesis to examine the full extent of Japan-Africa relations. This is due in part to the rapid expansion of Japan’s engagement on the continent in recent years, and the wide range of activities included within that engagement. This study therefore did not address Japan’s long-standing relations with South Africa, growing energy-driven ties with North African states such as Algeria, nor did it examine the full range of Japan’s private sector presence on the continent. This is because the historical dimensions of Japan-South Africa relations have been extensively analysed in works by Ampiah, Morikawa, while Japanese engagement in North Africa is largely defined by Tokyo’s Middle East policies – see works by Özçelik, Katakura and Miyagi.

Moreover, given the contemporary nature of this study, it must be considered that future events can alter Japan’s policies towards Africa – this could be the result of significant shifts in structural conditions or domestic political considerations. Although as this study demonstrated, widespread

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892 Ampiah, Kweku, “The Ideological, Political and Economic Imperatives in China and Japan’s Relations with Africa”
895 Katakura, Kunio, Japan and the Middle East, Tokyo: Middle East Institute of Japan, 1994
re-engagement with Africa began under a DPJ government and has been continued by the current LDP administration of Shinzo Abe. In this regard there does appear to be a certain amount of political consensus around the importance of increasing Japan’s presence in Africa – be it through investment, targeted ODA or political engagement. Thus while the conclusions of this study point to a broad realignment of Japan’s policies towards Africa, the exact manner of future engagement or policy implementation may differ from the approaches identified by this study.

This is particularly true of Japan’s engagement with South Sudan. As previously described, the period of research included in this study ended as conflict in South Sudan broke out and at the time of writing the conflict is unresolved and stability in the short to medium-term for South Sudan remains unlikely. The political uncertainty within South Sudan therefore has potential implications for Japan’s engagement in the country – primarily affecting the proposed oil pipeline project and Japan’s peacekeeping contingent, but also impacting ODA priorities and broader political relations. The conflict in South Sudan has largely centred on the oil producing regions in Unity and Upper Nile states and has resulted in oil production dropping to 165,000 barrels per day from 245,000 before the civil war began in December 2013. This has also meant that further expansion in South Sudan’s oil sector is on hold and it is likely to delay securing financing for the Toyota Tsusho pipeline, or the development of Block B. Yet the fundamental elements of the project remain the same: South Sudan’s desire to build an alternative pipeline, Toyota Tsusho’s willingness to build it, and the energy security concerns of Japan’s policymakers supporting the project.

As discussed in Chapter Six, the current conflict in South Sudan has changed the dynamics around Japan’s peacekeeping commitment, and events within the country could lead to a radical rethink in

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Tokyo with regards its security commitment in South Sudan. As Professor Nakanishi explains, if the peacekeeping mission were to become more dangerous, or if a Japanese soldier were to kill someone it will put policymakers in a difficult position and effectively “change the debate in Japan.” Yet as the previous chapter explored, the government stood firm on its peacekeeping commitment despite the deteriorating security environment. Moreover as a number of key informants interviewed for this study pointed out, there is a growing realisation in Japan that the country will have to develop a higher tolerance for risk if it is to increase its presence and profile in the emerging countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Finally it should be noted that this study focused on Japanese engagement in South Sudan but not on the bilateral relationship. Given that the research sought to understand the motivations and context of Japan’s presence in the country, there was consequently limited exploration of South Sudanese views on Japan’s activities and bilateral relations more generally. Thus despite a high-level advisor to the government and representatives of the ruling SPLM party being interviewed for this study, the research did not extensively examine South Sudanese perspectives on the particular dimensions of Japan’s activities in South Sudan. And while these perspectives would have augmented the study by providing a further level of context, it was not necessary to understanding the factors underlying Japan’s renewed presence in Africa.

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898 Author’s interview with Professor Nakanishi, Tokyo, 1 November 2013
899 This was further accentuated by the author’s inability to conduct extensive field research in South Sudan after the outbreak of war in December 2013
This study has identified a distinct trajectory of renewed Japanese engagement in Africa, and in so doing has unearthed a number of related areas where future research can be undertaken. Indeed given the current instability in South Sudan, a further examination of Japan’s policy responses to the outbreak of conflict and resultant uncertainty could be undertaken. Yet in addition to these aspects there are also a number of avenues for future research that emerge from the findings of this study.

This research project identified three primary tactics or methods of engagement employed by Japan in Africa: peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations, “strategic” ODA, and resource-focused investment – and from each of these further questions emerged. In the years since 2008 Japan’s policies towards the continent have expanded but also shifted focus to encourage private sector investment – thus also opening new avenues for future Japanese activities in Africa. Moreover as described in Chapter Four, this policy of investment-driven engagement in Africa includes ODA-linked infrastructure development as well as the promotion of Africa as an investment destination for a variety of Japanese businesses. In this respect further research can be undertaken on Japan’s evolving ODA strategies – particularly with respect to the debate emerging in Japan around the limitations of the DAC donor guidelines in comparison to the perceived benefits of China’s approach towards Africa. Furthermore this study outlined the evolving investment-oriented focus of TICAD conferences, and further research is required to track not only the implementation of the commitments made at TICAD V in June 2013, but also the longer-term impact on the overall nature of Japan’s presence in Africa.
In terms of the growing significance of resource-based investments that were discussed in chapter Five a number of experts interviewed for this study indicated that Mitsui’s equity stake in the Anadarko gas field in Mozambique has raised the profile of Africa’s energy potential, and that the success of the project would encourage other Japanese companies to pursue African equity investments. Future research can therefore be undertaken in exploring the emerging importance of Hinomaru Oil in Japan’s energy security strategy as well as the outcome and impact of Toyota Tsusho’s proposed pipeline in South Sudan. Or on the other hand, future research could assess Japan’s policy response to current low oil prices and how this will impact on the current commitment to equity energy investments. Yet as this study also identified, the pipeline project creates an opportunity for a Japanese company to play a central role in East Africa’s developing energy sector – and this also warrants further investigation.

There are also a number of avenues for future research to emerge from Japan’s security engagement in Africa that was explored in Chapter Six. As previously discussed, Africa is a significant location for Japan’s international security commitments, and arguably demand greater scrutiny following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan and the government’s reinterpretation of the constitution. While some of the policy implications in Japan of South Sudan’s conflict were identified in Chapter Six, the broader repercussions and possible expansion of Japan’s international security presence following the landmark reinterpretation of the constitution merit further research. The decision by Abe’s cabinet to reinterpret the constitution and allow for “collective self-defence” was ostensibly in response to worsening relations with China – but it has ramifications for both Japan’s peacekeeping commitments and its contribution to anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa.

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7.2 Where Next for Japan-Africa Relations?

In examining Japan’s activities in South Sudan as a window through which to better understand the broader dynamics of Japan’s re-engagement in Africa, this study has sought to analyse an evolving and contemporary aspect of Japanese foreign policy. This section therefore offers some concluding thoughts on the future of Japan’s presence in South Sudan and its relations with Africa. Key informants interviewed for this study were unanimous in their view that the trajectory of Japan’s growing relations with Africa would continue to expand. Pointing to the multiple dynamics outlined in this thesis that are driving and sustaining Japanese engagement in Africa, many of those interviewed noted the growing discourse that Africa is the last great investment frontier – and as such, critical to Japan’s own economic revitalisation.

This study has shown that Japan’s presence in South Sudan reflects changing global realities and changing perceptions of Japan’s interests in Africa. Yet South Sudan is neither typical of Japanese engagement in Africa nor is it representative of African states. But rather South Sudan demonstrates the multiple dimensions of Japan’s presence in a particularly complex environment, and through the dynamics of this relationship reveals the multiple factors underpinning Japanese re-engagement in Africa. As such it is more difficult to predict the future of Japan’s relations with South Sudan – especially given the on-going conflict in the country. Thus beyond the uncertainties of South Sudan’s immediate future and the resultant impact on the ability of donors and investors to operate in the country, South Sudan is a compelling precedent of Japanese engagement in a fragile post-conflict state.
As this study has also demonstrated, Japan’s re-engagement in Africa is notable as much for its new approaches and attitudes as it is for an increased Japanese presence on the continent. In this respect there is a growing realisation that if Japan is to reaffirm its aspirations to become a great power, it will need to change the way that it operates. Many of those interviewed for this study noted an emerging discourse among policymakers that in order to change the way Japan operates – both at home and abroad – the country will need to take risks, be bold, and increase its presence in the complicated and uncomfortable places of the world. There is therefore an emerging view in Japan that it is in the country’s own interest to have a presence in Africa – resultantly, Japanese engagement with the continent is likely to continue to grow. Moreover, the identified trends within the structural factors underpinning Japan’s policies in Africa are unlikely to change in the short term, thus further emphasising the expansion of Japan-Africa relations and an increasing Japanese presence in complex emerging African states.

There are however hurdles that will have to be overcome if Japan is to establish itself as a meaningful presence in Africa. Not least of which is the extent to which the continent remains distant and poorly understood by the Japanese public and many businesses. Overcoming domestic perceptions of Africa as dangerous, corrupt and too poor to buy Japanese products will thus remain a basic element within the government’s broader objectives towards Africa. Furthermore, these efforts will be accompanied by an attempt to differentiate Japan’s aid and investment approach from those of the Western countries and China. As previously described, policymakers recognise the need to create a unique identity for Japan’s undertakings in Africa given that it cannot compete with the extent of Chinese investment or the cultural and linguistic ties that continue to define relations between European powers such and Britain or France and their former colonies in Africa.
Much of the rhetoric around Africa’s international relations in the post-colonial era has been defined by pledges of “long term” relations and the development of the continent. In this respect Japan’s ambitions and the commitments outlined at TICAD V are no different – and the coming years will test these pledges of aid and investment. But in returning to this thesis’ primary question of what explains Japan’s engagement in South Sudan, this study has shown that through a multifaceted presence in the country, Japan’s relations in Africa go beyond rhetoric and reflect new approaches and new dimensions in its foreign policy. In this respect, the example of South Sudan also demonstrates the widening of Japan’s ODA-based relationship to a more transactional and varied engagement which expands the boundaries of its foreign policy options in a strategic space on the frontier of East Africa. This study has therefore sought to demonstrate that South Sudan represents a significant frontier in which the new paradigms and strategies of Japan’s Africa policies are evident, and which challenges its previous norms around engaging in Africa.
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Annex 1: Interviewees

**BOSTON**

SAMUELS, Richard, *Professor of Political Science and director of the Centre for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)*, 22 February 2013

**LONDON**

HUGHES, Christopher, *Professor of International Politics and Japanese. Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick*, 2 September 2013

LARGE, Daniel, *Assistant Professor at Central European University*, 29 April 2013

MORÉ, Charles, *Asia Editor at Africa-Asia Confidential*, 2 August 2013


UNATTRIBUTED, *Senior advisor to the Government of South Sudan*, 23 January 2014

WHEELER, Tomas, *Conflict and Security Adviser at Saferworld*, 10 September 2013

**JUBA**

HANATANI, Atsushi, *Chief Representative JICA*, 22 January 2013


KAWABATA, Tatsuo, *Senior Researcher, Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan (OCDI)*, 23 January 2013

KIMURA, Makiko, *Project Formulation Advisor, JICA*, 24 January 2013

KOBAYASHI, Tomoko, *Deputy Chief Representative, JICA*, 22 January 2013

MOTONO, Ichio, Director, *Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan (OCDI),* 23 January 2013

MUSSIE, Yosief, Civil Engineer, CTI Engineering Co. Ltd, 23 January 2013

UNATTRIBUTED, *Sudan People’s Liberation Movement,* 25 January 2013

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**TOKYO**

AKAO, Kunikazu, *Africa Division One, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),* 3 October 2013

AOKI, Kazuyoshi, Professor. *College of Humanities and Sciences, Nihon University,* 7 November 2013

FUKUSHIMA, Akiko, Senior Fellow. *Tokyo Foundation (Project leader: ‘Linking Japan’s Foreign Aid and Security Cooperation’),* 3 October 2013

HADA, Yutaka, Group Leader. *External affairs Group, Toyota Tsusho Corporation,* 23 October 2013

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OGAWA, Satoshi, Political News Department, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 November 2013

OSUMI, Yo, Director. First Division Intelligence and Analysis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 30 October 2013

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SUGANO, Masafumi, Deputy Director. Middle East and Africa Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), 21 September 2013

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