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Czechoslovakia and East Africa in the late colonial and early post-colonial period: the case studies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania

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Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in African Studies
2016

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Declaration for PhD thesis

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Abstract

This research sets out to explore the origins, nature and effects of relations between Czechoslovakia and Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in the late colonial and early post-colonial period from 1958 up to and including 1970. It identifies the motivations and intentions with which both parties entered into these relations. It examines in particular the matter of how Czechoslovak activities and interactions with local political parties and leading politicians influenced political and economic development in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in this period. Using a unique set of previously unstudied primary historical sources it identifies the primary and secondary objectives that Czechoslovak foreign policy set out for relations with these countries, the most common and the most effective strategies used to attain these objectives, and the extent to which these objectives were eventually successfully reached. Ultimately, by a comparative analysis of the three case studies it concludes which were the most effective strategies as well as identifying the necessary preconditions that allowed Czechoslovakia to interfere actively in the political development of these states and eventually to come close to reaching its stated objectives.

The findings of this research show that if Czechoslovakia was to have had a realistic chance of reaching any of its political objectives in East Africa a combination of specific conditions had to be met. The most effective form of exerting influence on political development in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika proved to be special military or security assistance. However, this was effective only when Czechoslovakia was able to ensure political support of the Kenyan, Ugandan or Tanganyikan political leadership. In order to sustain the political influence gained by Czechoslovakia, it was necessary to provide the assisted country with effective economic support or technical aid that would drive that country’s development. If all of these conditions were met, Czechoslovakia was able actively to influence the political development of local states, undermine the position of the West and come close to reaching and sustaining her political objectives. However, if any of these conditions were not present or other forms of support were provided instead, the Czechoslovak capacity to influence political development in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika was very low.
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List of abbreviations

ADP- African Democratic Party
ANC- African National Congress
ASP- Afro-Shirazi Party
Comecon- Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU- Communist party of the Soviet Union
CSR- Czechoslovak republic (1918-1939, 1945-1961)
CSSR- Czechoslovak socialist republic (1961-1989)
CTK- Czechoslovak news agency
ELDC- economically less developed countries-
ERP- European Recovery Program
FLNA- National Liberation Front of Angola
FRELIMO- The Mozambique Liberation Front
GSU- General Service Unit
HTS- Main Technical Directorate
KADU- Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU- Kenya African National Union
Kčs- Czechoslovak crown
KPU- Kenyan People’s Union
KSČ- Communist party of Czechoslovakia
MFA- CS Ministry of foreign affairs
MFT- CS Ministry of foreign trade
MNC- The Mouvement National Congolais
MND- CS Ministry of national defence
MPLA- The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OAU- Organisation of African Unity
PF- Patriotic Front
RENAME- The Mozambican National Resistance
ROH- Revolutionairy trade union movement
SP- Special Branch
StB- State Security Agency
SWAPO- The South West Africa People’s Organization
TANU- The Tanganyika African National Union
UNC- Uganda National Congress
UNITA- National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UPC- The Uganda People's Congress
ÚRD- Central council of cooperatives
ZANU- The Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU- The Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZNP- Zanzibar National Party
Introduction

In the late summer of 1945 the greatest and most destructive conflict of human history finally ended. The world that emerged from it could not have been more different from that which saw the beginning of the war in 1939. Immense destruction and massive forced migration of millions of people were the most visible outcomes of six years of warfare, but a number of changes that the war caused were not so apparent at first, and their effects were yet to be unravelled. The global political system that had existed before the war and that had been based on the dominance of European colonial empires was fundamentally shaken and ready to disintegrate. The new global political order was to be dominated by two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the USA, which had united in their war effort to subdue German Nazism and Japanese imperialism, only to quickly drift apart once the war ended. Very quickly, global political affairs became re-defined by the new kind of conflict, an undeclared Cold War characterised by deep ideological, political and economic rivalry between the socialist and capitalist camps.

One of the effects of the Second World War that was not immediately apparent when the war finished was the beginnings of the collapse of the colonial empires of France, Britain, Belgium and other European states. Asian and African nations were directly affected by the war events which started far-reaching social, political and economic change. The vanquished nations of the Middle East, Africa and Asia began to intensify their calls for the right of national self-determination, for political sovereignty and for economic independence, and they set out to challenge the very principles of European colonial domination over their lands. Frontrunner in this process of decolonisation was India, followed by the countries of the Middle East and south-east Asia. Even though Africa was a comparative latecomer to this political struggle, by the second half of 1950s it was clear that European colonisers would have neither the political will, the military might, nor the economic means to stop the steady disintegration of their African empires.

The British government was first challenged by the expanding nationalist African parties in western Africa and it eventually decided to grant their colonies there self-government under British supervision; this soon evolved, however into the granting of complete independence. Matters were more complicated in British East Africa due to
the presence of substantial white-settler communities in Kenya and small, but
economically significant, white-owned farms in Tanzania, and the growing conflict
between traditional rulers and emerging nationalist politicians in Uganda. The British
government did not anticipate the rapid spread of nationalist politics to East Africa and
it lacked a coherent policy to deal with this new political reality. In the early 1950s it
faced the bloody insurgency of Mau Mau in Kenya aimed against the British political and
economic dominance. The horrors of this campaign worked as a warning should the
granting of independence to East African countries be poorly prepared or ill-executed.
Britain resented the granting in East Africa of substantial political concessions to the
African nationalists when it brought a high risk of tragic consequences for local settlers.
Britain was also uncertain whether it would be able to maintain and further develop its
economic interests in the region after independence. For this reason the frontrunners of
local national liberation movements and their leaders, Jomo Kenyatta and the Kenya
African National Union (KANU), Apollo Milton Obote and the Uganda People's Congress
(UPC) and Joseph Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) faced
much opposition from the British administration in their quest for national liberation.

In their pursuit of national liberation East African political parties often sought
external support to their struggle wherever they could find it. They needed to find
international political support in order to put pressure on Britain to grant them political
concessions, but they also needed financial and material aid in order to function, to
campaign for popular support, to build organisational structure, to take part in elections,
and to recruit professionals who would be able to participate in the running of the future
independent state. It was from this standpoint that political parties of East Africa in
pursuit of national liberation in the late 1950s engaged with Czechoslovakia.

Socialist Czechoslovakia was by this time fully entrenched in the Soviet sphere
of influence and it held the position of one of the most significant Soviet satellites in
Europe. Industrial, economic, military and political capacities of Czechoslovakia were
fully devoted to building Soviet-style socialism by applying the ideological, political and
economic principles of scientific Marxism-Leninism. Up until 1954 the countries of the
Soviet camp including the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were expecting Western
aggression to take place imminently. That is why governments of socialist states were
concentrating on consolidating the dominant position of local Communist or Workers’
Parties and boosting countries’ economic development under the new economic paradigms.

From 1954 the fears of an imminent escalation of military conflict decreased and the Soviet Union alongside Czechoslovakia began altering their political objectives. Much higher priority was given to the sphere of foreign political relations. Execution of Soviet and Czechoslovak foreign policy was now fully aimed at achieving the newly-set objectives. Fully in line with the Soviets, Czechoslovak foreign policy was to be aimed at exporting socialism, increasing the Soviet sphere of influence, acting against the interests of the USA, Britain and other capitalist powers, seeking external economic relations that would be beneficial for the Czechoslovak economy and supporting the ongoing national liberation struggle of Asian and African peoples in order to undermine the last remnants of Western imperialism. Among the socialist countries Czechoslovakia was the best suited particularly for this last objective and from 1956 it rapidly intensified and spread its activities on the African continent. Czechoslovakia quickly earned a reputation as a fervent supporter of African and Asian nations in their anti-colonial struggle.

By the end of the 1950s when its officials were first approached by East African freedom fighters, Czechoslovakia managed to establish a working system of cooperation with a number of Northern and Western African states that had already reached or were about to reach independence. That is why by this point Czechoslovakia was able to provide the KANU, the UPC and the TANU with various forms of effective support that significantly contributed to their ultimate political success in attaining independence. Czechoslovakia acted as a political advocate of these countries in international organisations, provided them with financial and material help and organised professional training for Kenyans, Ugandans and Tanganyikans in a number of fields, from propaganda to military courses. However, Czechoslovakia’s foreign political objectives in East Africa went beyond merely contributing to successful national liberation. Czechoslovakia sought to establish close cooperation with Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, to provide them with a feasible political and economic alternative to their traditional relations with Britain, to bring them closer to the socialist camp and ultimately to contribute to the introduction of socialism in these countries.
**Definition of subject matter, research objectives, fundamental hypothesis and related research questions**

This research sets out to explore the origins, nature and effects of relations between Czechoslovakia and Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in the late colonial and early post-colonial period from 1958 until 1970. It identifies the motivations and intentions with which both parties entered these relations. It looks particularly into the matter of how Czechoslovak activities and interactions with local political parties and leading politicians influenced political and economic developments in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in this period. Using a unique set of previously unexamined primary historical sources it identifies the primary and secondary objectives that Czechoslovak foreign policy set out for relations with these countries, the most common and the most effective strategies used to reach these objectives, and the extent to which these objectives were eventually successfully attained. Ultimately, by comparative analysis of the three case studies it decides which were the most effective strategies as well as the necessary preconditions that allowed Czechoslovakia to interfere actively with political development in these states, eventually coming close to reaching its particular objectives. The main hypothesis of this research states that only unwavering support to seeking cooperation with Czechoslovakia by Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian leaders (first independent variable), in combination with well-managed and well-timed civil and special technical assistance, development aid and/or rich trade relations, (second independent variable), could provide Czechoslovakia with a realistic opportunity to at least partially fulfil her ultimate political objectives (dependent variable). An ultimate objective of Czechoslovakia’s involvement in the political development of East African states was bringing them into socialist sphere of influence and introducing socialism, preferably a Soviet-style one, into their political system.

It needs to be established here that this primary objective was never completely accomplished in the time period studied by this research, but in the case of Tanzania and partially also Uganda, it came close. Tanzania’s decision to introduce the politics of *ujamaa*, and simultaneously allowing socialist countries to actively support Marxist Southern-African freedom fighters from its territory, was viewed as a major accomplishment of the socialist camp. Paradoxically, in the studied period, Czechoslovak cooperation with Tanzania never reached a quality or intensity that would have made it
a decisive influence on this political development. On the other hand, Czechoslovak activities in Uganda and close relations with President Obote’s UPC were of major significance for the internal political development of Uganda that eventually also led to the introduction to Ugandan society and economy of the Move to the Left, a set of policies based on socialist principles, and close cooperation with several socialist states. The attainment of the ultimate objective of Czechoslovak foreign policy in Uganda was only prevented by the military coup d’état. Czechoslovak activities in Kenya ended up very far from reaching CS primary objectives despite the high hopes of Czechoslovak policy-makers, even though Kenya reached independence with substantial support provided to its national-liberation movement by Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia met with a similarly varied rate of success also in reaching its secondary objectives in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, vital way-points leading, it was hoped, to the ultimate goal.

These preliminary tasks were often precursors to the eventual fulfilment of the main one. Among these tasks was effective contribution to the deconstruction of the colonial system in these countries, establishing and maintaining relations with the most suitable local political candidate, strengthening his political position, contributing to his successful emergence on the top of the political hierarchy in these countries where he could be most useful for Czechoslovak purposes, undermine the political and economic position of Western powers, and provide Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania with effective support in such fields where the Czechoslovak political and economic influence could be most effectively exerted. These tasks were being completed by different means and naturally also with mixed results.

It is very difficult to apply an adequate evaluation technique that would allow for establishing any kind of concise and precise assessment of the rate of Czechoslovak success. The only analytical approach that can be used to interpret the primary and secondary data collected during this research is qualitative analysis which by its nature eludes the formation of a rigid evaluation framework. It is therefore necessary to judge and evaluate the extent of success in fulfilling various objectives in every particular case separately and in an adequate country-specific context.
The purpose of this thesis is not only to evaluate the rate of Czechoslovak success in reaching its various foreign-political objectives. The historical narrative of Czechoslovak-East African relations between 1958 and 1970 provides at least partial answers to the following questions, some of which were already mentioned above. In what way were Czechoslovak actions determined by the context of Cold War and how did they coincide with Soviet activities in this part of Africa? What were the most effective strategies and tools in reaching Czechoslovak foreign political objectives as formulated in the 1961 *Africa Policy*? Which factors were adverse and hostile to these objectives and disqualified Czechoslovakia in their pursuit? With what expectations and goals did Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika enter into relations with Czechoslovakia, how did these expectations evolve over time and how did they reflect the countries’ specificities? What were the necessary conditions on the part of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika to allow for effective cooperation with Czechoslovakia to develop? In what way did Czechoslovak relations with these countries affect political or economic development in these countries? How did Czechoslovak activities in East Africa clash with the interests of Britain, the USA or China and what were the effects of their rivalry? And finally, how decisive was the personal consent of charismatic nationalist leaders in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika to the establishment of a working cooperation between Czechoslovakia and its East-African partners?

**Czechoslovak-East African relations in the wider academic context of the study of history and international relations and the significance of this research**

There are several aspects of this research which justify its pursuit and determine its academic relevance and significance. Firstly, the narrative presented in this thesis is relevant to several fields of political history of the twentieth century which can benefit by the findings of this particular research – Cold War history, the history of decolonisation of British East Africa and the history of the early political development of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. All of these histories are substantially complemented by the findings of this particular research and they are enriched by the application of the new historical perspective made possible by the analysis of new historical documentary evidence.
Secondly, by undertaking this research project, a large set of primary historical data was collected, analysed and interpreted, much of it for the first time. It was thus made more accessible for further historical examination or for use as a secondary reference in future history projects. In this respect this research project certainly took full advantage of newly acquired access to rich documentary sources of historical data as new collections of archival records are being progressively opened up in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Thirdly, findings produced by this research project represent new subject matter for the eternal discussion on theoretical approaches in the field of political science and international relations.

The study of Czechoslovak-East African relations in the approximate period of the 1960s is a historical study in the field of political history and international relations. More specifically it falls into the wide corpus of Cold War history that represents perhaps the largest bulk of political historiography of the twentieth century. Cold War historiography addresses a wide range of historical topics in various fields and on multiple levels of historical insight, ranging from micro-studies of local phenomena, through country case studies, all the way to the study of the global development of this political-ideological conflict in its widest perspective. Czechoslovak-East African relations are in this respect somewhere around the middle of this range. They represent a comparatively specific topic that can be perceived as a subsection of the wider theme of Soviet engagement in the Third World. It has been one of the fundamental themes targeted and examined by Cold War historiography for several decades.¹ Close involvement of both the Soviet Union and the USA with the developing states of the Third World was both the strategy and the means to achieve the ultimate goal of global political dominance. In some cases the Soviets and to a lesser extent also the Americans delegated contacts with some regions or specific countries to allies or satellites. This tactic would be used if the superpower itself did not possess the necessary capacities to establish satisfactory mutual political relations or if it expected to meet with uncertain or negative reactions in the country being approached. This research project forms the

narrative of how such tactics were used by the Soviets in East Africa in the late colonial and early post-colonial period when Czechoslovakia was acting, if not always blatantly on behalf of the Soviets, than certainly fully in line with the Soviet foreign political objectives of the export and spread of socialism to newly independent countries.

Cold War historiography has lately been undergoing a shift in the theoretical approach to its subject matter as well as in forms of its interpretation. The increasing availability of Central and Eastern European archives was identified as a crucial determinant of a fundamental shift in the historiography of the Cold War. For the first time, the focus of scholarly activity has shifted from the United States and the Western bloc to the Soviet Union and its former allies. At the same time, there has been a noteworthy shift from an emphasis on geopolitics to a stress on ideology, from a concern with interests to a preoccupation with culture, from analyses of the international system and the threats emanating therefrom to a concern with regime-types and with personalities. The Soviet part of the Cold War equation is becoming central for new Cold War historiography for many historians. This research thesis aspires to be the valid product of this content and the methodological shift and to contribute by its findings to the formation of new perspectives and new insights into the understanding of the Cold War.

Study in the field of political history is always closely connected to other academic disciplines such as political theory or international relations theory as it produces the subject matter which can be and often is used to form or support widely applicable theories in these academic fields. This relationship is however a two-way affair as the established and accepted theoretical approaches of politics and international relations often have to be applied in order to interpret the empirical findings of historical research. Various theories of political science and international relations provide historians with an analytical extension to their historiography product which is not always necessary but certainly significantly improves the relevance and

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4 Leffler, “Bringing,” 43.
academic value of every historical study. The application of a valid and appropriate theoretical filter not only allows for effective interpretation of historical findings but sometimes also results in unravelling historical causality that might otherwise have remained unidentified.

International relations theorists were already using the Cold War as their subject matter while the conflict was still taking place. Many of the initial results of their research were seriously challenged, however, by the sudden and totally unexpected end of the Cold War. The school of thought of international relations most affected by this was that of realism, and neo-realism, which had always emphasised the paradigm of bipolar stability induced into global international relations by the causality of the balance-of-threat.

The findings of this historical research address a number of questions including the motivations of participating states in seeking mutual relations with each other, the forms that these relations eventually adopted, the influence of leading political personalities of these states on the formation and development of relations, as well as the effects that this cooperation had on a country’s political development. Some of these answers are integral to the international relations debate on the nature of the Cold War.

Several fundamental principles of realist and neo-realist theories are still valid for studying and analysing Cold War relations and therefore they represent an appropriate theoretical approach for interpretation of Czechoslovak-East African relations. Neo-realists view the Cold War conflict as the competition of two rival entities, where winning a decisive advantage over the enemy endangers the status quo in a global system of power. They also view the struggle for power as central to international relations, which is certainly a valid point. The power struggle was the driver on the Soviet side of the conflict, which, as was well illustrated by numerous cases of Soviet expansionism shortly after the Bolshevik revolution, as well as by the Soviet expansion across Eastern Europe with the end of World War II, and eventually in the late 1950s when various Third World countries were being approached either directly by the USSR or by its satellites acting on the Soviets’ behalf. An eventual clash with the

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8 Drulák, Petr, Teorie mezinárodních vztahů, (Praha: Portál, 2003), 176-178.
enemy, in reality represented by the capitalist West, was unavoidable and it was clearly theoretically formulated by Lenin and later put into practice by Stalin. In an attempt to reach the ultimate goal of establishing a Communist society, the factor of consolidation of all political power was considered crucial by Russian Bolsheviks, as well as later by the leaders of Communist and Workers’ parties in Central Europe. On a larger scale the export of socialism, first to Eastern Europe and, in the next stage, to Third World countries, including Africa, was certainly an ideological move; however, it was even more so a strategic step towards securing more power over the West. In political reality implementation of these principles meant that conflict with the West was inevitable.

In the case of the Cold War the neorealist argument of the centrality of power also works on the American side of the conflict, yet in a slightly different way. The struggle for power was necessitated by the increasing Soviet expansionism and, in its initial phase, it was imposed on the American government. Unlike in the Soviet Union, no ideology perpetuated the expansionist power struggle of the American government, except perhaps for the interests of a liberal American economy. Nevertheless, the Soviet advance left the American administration with no choice but to enter the competition for power in order to defend the democratic principles rooted in the American constitution and eventually to overcome the opponent. The fact that the ultimate competition for power of two superpowers did indeed create a system of international relations which was stable for four decades is another argument in support of the realist-neorealist approach to international relations. The concept of a power struggle as a driver of political development is absolutely valid for Czechoslovak relations with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in the 1960s. Not only did Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union compete with Britain, the USA and China for political influence in these countries, but they also supported political rivalry between various politicians for dominance in their parties. As mentioned above, the realists and neo-realists fail in attempting to explain the sudden end of the Cold War conflict, but some, however, argue that the end of the Cold War was a deviation from normality that can never be explained by the systematic theoretical framework.10

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While analysing and interpreting the findings of this research some principles of the latest theoretical approach to international relations, the post-positivist approach, became highly relevant. Post-positivists refuse to perceive international relations, and the Cold War is the perfect example for this argument, as a field of knowledge measureable by the methodology of natural sciences or economics, as does the neo-neo discourse, and they criticise the omission of the human factor in the equation. With virtually limitless power on the part of the leader in decision-making in the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Eastern bloc on one side, and with the American presidential system, where the figure of the president has vast power as well, on the other, it is impossible to ignore the influence of factors such as character, mental or physical health, integrity, religion, culture, etc. in the decision-making of leaders such as Stalin, Khrushchev, Kennedy, Gottwald, Truman, Nyerere, Kenyatta and others. Stalin's late anti-Semitism, Khrushchev's lack of education, Kenyatta's ethnic links to a Kikuyu tribe and Gottwald's life-long panic-fear of Stalin are just some of the personal features that determined everyday decision-making in Cold War development. The real influence of such factors on the final decision is impossible to measure. The post-positivist argument is highly relevant for relations between Czechoslovakia and the countries of East Africa. The decision-making of charismatic East-African leaders was the most important determinant of Czechoslovak relations with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

It is only natural that in writing the history of such a complex and versatile process as were the relations between Czechoslovakia and Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, the rigid theoretical framework of political science and international relations will not be applicable without resort to serious compromises. It is perhaps an advantage of the nature of historical research in comparison to political science and international relations that a researcher does not have to work with a firmly established theoretical framework. Instead he can, as in this case, draw on valid aspects of various theoretical approaches to facilitate the most appropriate interpretation of his findings.

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11 Drulák, Teorie mezinárodních vztahů, 134-139.
Review and critical assessment of relevant secondary literature

The subject matter of this thesis, that is, 'Czechoslovak-East African relations between 1958 and 1970' has not been previously studied in any academic work in its entirety, complexity, or scope as covered by this research. Therefore there is not a single academic work which would act as a fundamental point of reference for this thesis. There are, however, some texts that proved essential throughout the writing of the majority of this thesis while other works were of the utmost importance for one or two sections in relation to a particular topic. Some works were invaluable as a source of historical data, some offered a unique interpretation of historical events, or an alternative perspective on notoriously well-known events.

The bulk of secondary literature that was studied, quoted, referenced or simply consulted in the process of creating this thesis is extensive. Due to the nature of the studied subject matter it includes a large variety of historiographical or social-scientific works from several fields – political history, economic history, international relations, comparative politics etc. Secondary literature sources that were used for this thesis include a variety of works as regards the time they were written and the country of origin of their author. Some works were written as the events studied by this research were still unfolding, allowing the reader to get a grasp of historical development from the unique standpoint of a contemporary. In some cases the sense of being present in the midst of unfolding history provides one with a unique perspective that makes it easier to understand the causality of the history under examination. On the other hand contemporary works of current authors benefit from the advantage of a time gap between analysis and the studied event. The main advantage lies in the likelihood of greater objectivity based on the authors in question having more complex data available and studying the historical event or period in its entirety knowing the full story.

The authors are as complex and varied as their works. They are a heterogeneous group that includes predominantly professional historians, economists and social scientists, besides these, however, there are also diplomats, soldiers, politicians, and spies, from Britain, Africa, Czechoslovakia, the USA, the Soviet Union, China and other countries, writing in a more or less professional way about the events that they themselves took part in or had the chance to observe very closely. Works by such authors are naturally more prone to bias and are often of dubious academic value,
but at the same time they provide one with a unique insight into historical event or epoch, and often they are primary historical sources in their own right.

This secondary literature review sets out to outline, introduce and critically assess the most important secondary sources that were used during the writing of this thesis. Works dealt with in this section are divided primarily according to the topic they cover. Subsequently they are further subdivided according to more specific characteristics – the time of their creation, the country of origin of their author, the applied methodology etc.

**Czechoslovak-African relations**

If there had to be one work chosen that was used as a fundamental reference for this research it would be that of Czech historian and journalist Petr Zídek Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948-68. Zídek looks in this book in unprecedented detail into relations between Czechoslovakia and the francophone states of western Africa that received independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The book is a unique piece of current Czech historiography focusing on the sphere of foreign political relations of socialist Czechoslovakia never previously addressed in one coherent study. Findings in this book are most of all based on evidence from extensive archival research in various Czech archives, complemented by approximately twenty interviews with Czechoslovak citizens who were engaged in contacts with western Africa in this period.

While Zídek’s book benefits greatly from the large amount of original archival material and from the insights collected through interviews, there are also some shortcomings to it that its author did not prevent. Data collection was limited to Europe and the author did not conduct any archival research or interviews in Africa. Also, despite the fact that his list of secondary resources is quite exhaustive, very little was done in setting the Czechoslovak activities in particular western African countries into the wider political context of local politics or the Cold War rivalry between the USA, the UK, France and the Soviet Union. The study works very well as an overview of activities.

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of Czechoslovak state institutions and organs in western Africa and helps to identify the motives for Czechoslovak activism in this part of the world in the period studied by Zidek but does not provide much analytical insight. It works as a more detailed, region-specific extension of Zídek’s other book Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948-1989\(^{13}\) which is a complete overview of Czechoslovak state relations with all the countries of sub-Saharan African during the Cold War. This second work is fully based on archival data collection in the Czech Republic and besides the overview of particular relations it also explains the creation of the Czechoslovak Africa policy, and offers a periodization of Czechoslovak-African relations during the Cold War that can, however, be challenged for overgeneralising and oversimplifying. This (second) book does not aspire to provide any analytical output, but it is very useful as a comprehensive and very complete overview of Czechoslovak activities in the whole of Africa during this particular period and works well as a point of departure for further research.

Besides the studies mentioned above, a limited number of journal articles\(^ {14}\) exist that address country-specific Czechoslovakian involvement in Africa at different periods during the twentieth century. In most cases the main concern of these articles is Czechoslovakia’s subversive actions against Western interests. Among these articles one stands out in a rather negative way. The 1963 World Politics article Czechoslovakia’s penetration of Africa, 1955-1962 written by Curt Beck\(^ {15}\) is an example, way below academic standards, of highly unprofessional handling of primary sources, in the form of newspaper and journal articles; there is inadequate critical assessment of the sources used. The article is for the most part based on articles from the Czechoslovak newspaper Rudé právo which was the main communist media in the country after 1948. Even in the illiberal, censored media environment of socialist Czechoslovakia where all newspapers had to support and celebrate the building of socialism, Rudé právo was notorious for its heavily ideologically-biased, propaganda-driven, erroneous or downright false reporting. The author of the article in question quotes Rudé právo or the similarly biased


ČTK (Československá tisková kancelář) on a number of occasions without exposing the content to any kind of critique. Beck thus ends up basing his conclusions on material of clearly propagandistic purpose drafted by various government offices and intended as a celebration of foreign-political successes of socialist Czechoslovakia for the readership at home. Methodological and factual shortcomings of this article however do not end here. Beck completely ignores the relations that had existed previously between Czechoslovakia and African countries, and erroneously places the beginning of Czechoslovak involvement in Africa in the year 1955. Beck continues to provide his readers with an overview of Czechoslovak activities across Africa in the 1950s as they were presented in various Czechoslovak newspapers. Beck fails to distinguish between the real accomplishments of Czechoslovak activities in various African countries and the ambitious plans announced by the Czechoslovak government that were to take place in the future, and never in the majority of cases executed. On the other hand Beck succeeds in identifying correctly Czechoslovak importance for the Soviet Union’s Africa policy as well as pointing out the political-economic reasoning of the Czechoslovak government which motivated the pursuit of closer cooperation with African states.

Foreign policy of socialist Czechoslovakia

Development of Czechoslovak foreign policy was the main determinant of Czechoslovak relations with the states of East Africa. Surprisingly, there are not many contemporary historiographical or political science works that deal with this topic in its entirety. Works of an earlier date are of limited use due to their heavy ideological bias and one-sided emphasis on the relations within the socialist camp. One of few existing works that deal with the topic of Czechoslovak foreign relations development during the 20th century is František příl’s Československá a česká zahraniční politika: minulost a současnost. This study concentrates on the most prominent events that marked the development of Czechoslovak foreign policy and therefore only a small proportion of the text deals with Czechoslovak activities in Cold War relations in the Third World, including Africa. Major events that marked the cooperation between Czechoslovakia and

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18 Zbořil, František, Československá a česká zahraniční politika: minulost a současnost [Czech and Czechoslovak foreign policy] (Czech Republic: Leges, 2010).
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are only mentioned briefly in the text. Nevertheless, the book is very useful for the understanding of the relationship between socialist Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the mechanisms of decision-making, the structure of relevant institutions that formed or executed these relations, and the implications these relations had for the formation of Czechoslovak foreign policy in relation to the West as well as to Third World countries.

A similar topic, but from a more radical standpoint, critical of Soviet expansionist politics, is presented in Josef Kalvoda’s *Role Československa v sovětské strategii*. Kalvoda thoroughly analyses the origins of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations and examines the historical events that made Czechoslovakia one of the most prominent Soviet allies in Europe. In a well-constructed argument, Kalvoda presents the vital role that Czechoslovak economic and political capacities played in the global spread of Soviet communism. His explanation of how the democratic victory of communism in Czechoslovakia worked as an example proudly presented to the developing countries of the Third World is highly relevant for this particular research topic.

The extensive political-economic study, by Václav Průcha and colleagues, entitled *Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918-1992* was invaluable in explaining the social and economic causality that determined the exercise of Czechoslovak foreign policy. The structure of the liberal, capitalist, industry-oriented economy of Czechoslovakia and its development before the Second World War fundamentally determined Czechoslovak relations with the African continent in the pre-war period. Far-reaching political turbulence after the Second World War caused immense structural changes in the Czechoslovak economy which inadvertently affected the implementation of Czechoslovak foreign policy everywhere, including East Africa. Understanding the connection between centralised economic planning and its implication for Czechoslovakia’s external relations explains why socialist Czechoslovakia struggled to reach its ambitious goals in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

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19 Kalvoda, Josef, *Role Československa v sovětské strategii* (Role of Czechoslovakia) (Czech Republic: Dílo, 1999).
20 Kalvoda, Role, 275.
**Historiography of the Cold War and of Soviet engagement in Africa**

Czechoslovak engagement in East Africa in the 1960s was a result of the Cold War conflict which created a bipolar international political system defined by the ideological clash of two superpowers and their allies. Therefore the historiography of Cold War conflict represents a source of wider historical background for this present historical research, allowing investigation, analysis and explanation of the causality of relations between Czechoslovakia and the countries of East Africa. As mentioned above, the four decades of complex and complicated historical processes that together constitute the Cold War conflict motivated the creation of perhaps the largest body of twentieth-century historiography. Both subject matter and methodological and analytical approaches used to study it have over time evolved so much that substantial academic debate exists as to how the Cold War should be studied and analysed. The best grasp of this academic discourse is provided by Odd Arne Westad in his introduction to *Reviewing the Cold War*, where he explains the main approaches to study of Cold War history and he introduces his audience to works of leading academics of this historical field who are representatives of their respective approaches to Cold War history.

While the work of Odd Arne Westad cited above (*Reviewing the Cold War*) provides one with a very good overview of this field of history, the best entry point into study of the crucial historical events of the Cold War is given in the three-volume set *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, a collection of some fifty articles by various scholars compiled and edited by Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler, two of the leading scholars in this field. Both editors begin their work by explaining some of the most common issues that a historian faces when undertaking research in this wide and complex field. Participating academics continue by explaining that the ideological origins of the Cold War conflict lay in an inevitable clash between American liberalism and the Soviet application of Marxist socialist philosophy. ‘Soviet and American ideology were both universalistic; they both held that their conceptions of society applied to all

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nations and peoples. Both nations prided themselves on their modernity, seeking to supplant what they saw as the moribund traditions of Europe – and ultimately to transform Europe itself. [...] Each side feared the advance of the other as a step backward.’ 25 Once Westad has explained how these ideological origins made the Cold War more or less inevitable, the separate studies of various aspects and case studies of Cold War development are presented. For this present research, Bradley’s study, Decolonization, the global South and the Cold War 1919-196226 is particularly useful. Bradley investigates here the relationship between the Cold War and the growth of nationalism amongst African and Asian peoples; it was a process at first not much influenced by Soviet-American rivalry, but in later stages it was, however, very much affected by the realities of Cold War. Among other things Bradley explains how Cold War political rivalry led to the Bandung Conference and the creation of the non-aligned movement.27 Two other studies that provide this present research with important historical background is Kemp-Welch’s Eastern Europe: From Stalinism to Solidarity28 and Latham’s Cold War in the Third World, 1963-1975.29

The third of Westad’s large historical works on the Cold War should not be omitted. In his The Global Cold War30 Westad provides his readership with a particularly good account of the ideology that motivated Soviet expansionism and he explains the forms of political imagination in the Soviet camp which played a significant role when the Soviets were setting out their foreign political objectives towards the Third World.

While all the works mentioned in previous paragraphs are recent studies of the Cold War and thus can benefit from the fact that their studied subject matter is no longer developing and changing, there is a large body of historiography that was produced

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27 Bradley, “Decolonization, the global South,” 479.


while the Cold War was still ongoing, or immediately after it had ended. Some of these earlier works, such as Fritz Schatten’s 1966 work, investigate the Communist ideology. Schatten explores the various ways through which the Communist ideology was penetrating African politics and society, to what extent this was the result of Cold War rivalry and tries to establish what the implications were for the immediate political developments in Africa. Another highly influential work from this period is Legvold’s 1970 *Soviet Policy in West Africa* which examines how the Soviet Union dealt with the historical opportunity to establish itself in this part of Africa after the colonial regime was deconstructed, how its approach to Africa changed during the 1960s and what lessons were learnt by the Soviet political leadership from this period.

Some of the works from the 1980s and early 1990s, such as Breslauer’s edited volume of *Soviet policy in Africa*, Rothenberg’s *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power* or Fukuyama and Korbonski’s *The Soviet Union and the Third World* look into how Soviet political objectives developed over time and what the implications of this change were for the practical implementation of Soviet policy in Africa. The main part of the historical narrative in these works is, however, concerned with Soviet actions under Brezhnev’s leadership in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Therefore they provide only very little historical data for this particular research. The insight provided into the mechanism of ideology’s influence on foreign policy-making in the USSR is, however, applicable.

The new accessibility of Russian archives in combination with the oral testimonies of direct participants prompted increased activity by Russian authors on the subject of Soviet involvement in the Third World during the Cold War. The leading Russian historiographic work in this respect is Sergey Mazov’s *A Distant Front in the Cold War*. Even though Mazov examines Russian activities in West Africa, a number of his conclusions are relevant for this particular research as well. Mazov investigates the

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forms and means used by Soviets to enter Africa as well as the foreign political framework under which these proceedings were taking place.

*Historiography of British decolonisation*

The decolonisation of the British Empire is another field of twentieth-century historiography that has motivated extensive historical research and given rise to a number of high-quality historiographic works. No particularly deep historical excursion into the history of British decolonisation was needed for the purposes of this present research. A set of widely accepted and well-appraised historical works were used to furnish a satisfactory background context in relation to British decolonisation. Two of these books are works of general political history of Africa in the twentieth century (Meredith 2005, Cooper 2002); a further one deals with the history of British Empire (Fergusson 2003) and a fourth specifically addresses the British retreat from its colonial dominance (Darwin 1988).

John Darwin’s work, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*, was the main referential guide for the purposes of the British decolonisation section of this thesis. Darwin first introduces his readers to the topic of decolonisation; he defines the crucial concepts and explains the applied analytical approach in order to clarify the effects of decolonisation in the wider context. He goes on to establish the main historical factors that had started the decolonisation of British Empire, as well as those that sped up and intensified the process at a later stage. Darwin then introduces various factors (British, African, and international) that contributed to the disintegration and eventual demise of the British Empire. In his section on East Africa he provides a substantial amount of historical data which clearly explains the causality of those local historical developments that eventually resulted in independence being granted despite the initial unwillingness of the colonial administration.

38 Cooper, Frederick, *Africa since 1940- The Past of the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
A different methodological and analytical approach to the study of the history of British decolonisation was used by Frederick Cooper in his *Africa since 1940: the Past of the Present*. Cooper puts more emphasis on the wider interdisciplinary approach as he uses various social and economic data to identify non-political drivers of this ultimate political change. Historical events are approached by Cooper in a very novel way which in effect allows him to draw original and surprising yet fully plausible and acceptable conclusions. Yet another slightly different approach to this topic was chosen by Martin Meredith in his *State of Africa*; he places great emphasis on the personalities of African leaders, and correctly so, as Kenyatta, Obote and Nyerere were all of the utmost importance in changing the political settings of their respective countries. A final member of the list of different approaches to the topic, Niall Ferguson, one of most controversial figures of world historiography, draws a unique narrative of the British retreat from colonial power in his *Empire* by concentrating on one or two episodes that best characterise this process. Subsequently he offers a brief but solid explanation of the UK’s economic weakness being a decisive factor in the British retreat.42

Specific details of the decolonisation of British East Africa are more closely targeted by two other works, Daniel Branch’s *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya*43 and David Anderson’s *Histories of the Hanged*,44 which were also consulted during this research but which were not referenced in the final version of this thesis. They can, however, be recommended as more detailed accounts of decolonisation in East Africa, more specifically in Kenya.

*Late colonial and early post-independence historiography of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika*

The last tranche of secondary literature sources was used to explain the historical context of political development in East Africa in the late 1950s and the whole of the 1960s. These sources to some extent address the same topic as the works mentioned above, but they do so from the perspective of the liberation struggle rather
than from that of the failing colonial system. Even though in a sense the historical processes studied are the same, the historical narrative created is strikingly different. Historians of the East African liberation struggle concentrate on the African part of the story, on the African motivations and incentives that drove the process of change and on the African agents and actors that precipitated it. Also the limits of the period studied for this thesis are rather different. Where the story of decolonisation ends, another completely new historical narrative, that of African independence, continues.

Various forms of Czechoslovak-East African relations were taking place mostly in East Africa, in the late colonial and early post-colonial political landscape. The internal political development of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika provided the historical settings for these relations. In order to depict these relations in their entirety and complexity, one has to understand the political, economic and social processes that were taking place in these countries at the period that concerns this thesis. The historical narrative of Czechoslovak-East African relations only can be satisfyingly built in the context of the historical development of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika.

The historiography of political history of East Africa of the period covered by this thesis is surprisingly substantial. There are several books which act as general histories of each particular East African country. A number of other books and journal articles address more specific topics of historical development, in some cases with a cross-disciplinary approach. During the depiction of the historical context of the three countries studied several country-specific works functioned as core sources of historical data on each of the three countries. Other sources then addressed some more specific but highly relevant topics.

Timothy Parsons’ book *The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa* acted as a point of entry for the excursion into the political history of East Africa, and as a main referential guide throughout all three case studies. Even though the central topic that this book addresses, i.e. the mutinies of East African armies soon after independence, is quite specific, Parsons uses these events very successfully as a basis for creating a wider picture of local political environments and developments. Parsons is very effective in presenting the major political burdens inherited from the colonial

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regime and explaining what effects they had on post-independence history. Even though the time scope of Parsons’ book is quite short, it coincides with the period of highest intensity of Czechoslovak activities in East Africa. This work was also highly relevant for the present thesis on account of its deep analytical insight into the role of military and security in the newly independent states, two fields which were of the utmost importance for Czechoslovak objectives in this part of Africa. Parsons was also very successful in explaining the implications of army mutinies for the political development of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. The topic of army mutinies was also investigated by Tony Laurence’s *The Dar Mutiny of 1964* and in several journal articles by other authors.47

There were several works that provided the author of this research with a general historical context in the case of each country. Perhaps the richest of the three national historiographies is Kenya’s, which has lately been enriched by two very well-received works. Charles Hornsby’s *Kenya: A History since Independence* is the *opus magnum* of Kenya’s post-independence history and a typical example of political history study in relation to the research method applied, the analytical approach as well as the historical narrative produced. It addresses all the relevant aspects, agents and episodes of Kenyan political development in the last fifty years to a satisfactory depth leaving greater detail to the attention of other historians’ further research. Very similar in the time scope to Hornsby but somewhat different in the emphasis on the internal political division of Kenya is Daniel Branch’s *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963 and 2002*.49 Most relevant for thesis is Branch’s investigation of the internal division of Kenya’s political leadership due to ethnic tensions and competing visions of Kenya’s way forward. This same topic is very well researched, analysed and explained in a somewhat older work (1970) by Cherry Gertzel: *The Politics of Independent Kenya*.50 Gertzel concentrates in this book on discovering mechanisms and factors that resulted in

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shortcomings of the Kenyan institutional system as well as Kenya's early political parties in the decades after independence.

Ofcansky's simple historical overview *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa*\(^{51}\) and an older, yet more detailed and more sophisticated work by Jan Jorgensen, *Uganda: A Modern History*\(^{52}\) both do for Uganda what Hornsby does for Kenya. Both books were capable of providing a basic overview of the historical development of Uganda in the period this thesis covers with some level of detail. Nevertheless for a more thorough and accurate reconstruction of Uganda's political history number of journal articles had to be consulted and eventually also referenced. Kabwegyere's *The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda*\(^{53}\) was very useful for the purposes of this research. The author explains here the major determinants, agents and limitations of Uganda's political system, together with the practical outcomes it had on Uganda's history.

In the case of Tanganyika the role of main secondary source of historical context of Tanganyika was provided by Parsons' book (mentioned above) which was complemented by Ronald Aminzade's *Race, Nation and Citizenship in Post-colonial Africa*.\(^{54}\) The Aminzade book is not a usual product of political history but is very much affected by political science. Aminzade examines various political concepts and theories in reference to the history of independent Tanzania. The book works with a structure unusual for political historiography but succeeds in presenting solid argument while creating an equally good, if slightly disorganised historical narrative. 2012 work of James Brennan\(^{55}\) and Paul Bjerk's unpublished doctoral dissertation\(^{56}\) and were also of considerable importance for this research even though neither of them was widely referenced in the final thesis.

Research methodology and thesis structure

This paper is a historical study in the field of political history of international relations. It uses various methods of historical research to produce the narrative of development of Czechoslovak-East African relations in the period of 1958 up to and including 1970. The fundamental research method used in this project was archival research complemented by the collection of oral testimonies. The resulting historiographic narrative is a fusion of primary and secondary data that were subsequently subjected to qualitative historical analysis. By applying a comparative qualitative analytical approach on the three presented case studies the thesis supplies the answers to the research questions raised in this introduction section and it allows for the primary hypothesis to be supported. This research fills in the existing historiographic gap caused by the methodological limitations which to a great extent prevented any earlier attempt of thorough and complete historical analysis of this topic. Archival documents that represent the main source of primary data for this research had for a long time been inaccessible and because of the paucity of alternative historical sources any analysis attempted would have necessarily worked with only a fragment of primary sources.

The formation of research objectives and the establishment of research boundaries

The initial motivation to undertake the research in the field of Czechoslovak-African relations arose from the aforementioned existing historiographic gap, from the striking limitations of previous research done in this field and from the author’s belief that proper analysis of this topic would allow a historical narrative to be produced that would establish some conclusion that will be relevant beyond the scope of this research, and might prove useful for the general historical discourse of Czechoslovak Cold War involvements as well as for an on-going academic discussion of international relations theories. Until recently this part of Czechoslovak foreign political history had remained on the periphery of academic interest. The only existing work that targeted this subject in its entirety was the book by Petr Zídek (2006), mentioned in more detail in the literature review section, but it was marked by a number of substantial limitations. Zídek’s other (2007) work overcame some of these limitations and partially succeeded
in building a region-specific and more detailed account of Czechoslovak activities in West Africa. However, even though Zídek worked with a large amount of unique primary sources, including a limited number of oral accounts, he failed to contextualise his research successfully in the wider arena of the Cold War as well as local political development in West Africa.

In the preliminary stage of this research a number of primary and secondary sources were consulted and the research design as well as the subject matter began to take shape. The original grossly unrealistic plan of undertaking a research project dealing with Czechoslovak relations with all sub-Saharan countries throughout the entire Cold War period had to be abandoned immediately. Initial analysis of fragments of primary and secondary resource, threw up some reoccurring patterns of Czechoslovak proceedings in relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Simultaneously, first questions began emerging concerning the causality of these relations, their wider historical context and their effects and implications for local African political development as well as for Africa-based Cold-War rivalries. It was becoming apparent that the most effective way to deal with the topic of Czechoslovak-African relations was to focus on a small group of countries characterised by similar political and economic settings. This set-up would permit a comparative analysis of Czechoslovak relations with these particular countries to be undertaken, which would subsequently allow some general conclusions applicable to the wider spectrum of sub-Saharan African countries to be drawn.

Several possible groupings were considered as research subjects – countries of British West Africa; Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan; Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa. None of these groupings proved ideal for the purposes of this research either because their political and economic characteristics were too distinct from each other for a satisfactory comparative analysis to be attempted, or because available historical data that would allow recreating the image of their relations with Czechoslovakia was in short supply. Eventually, the group of three East African states, the former British colonies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, were selected as the most appropriate objects for the purposes of this research. These states have a history of similar political development and they faced a number of similar political, economic and social issues. Nevertheless, there are also some important specific differences in their political,
economic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which determined their diverse degrees of involvement with socialist Czechoslovakia.

In the preliminary stage of this research its time scope also had to be narrowed down significantly. Four decades of Cold War development were marked with several political turns of events that drastically affected the execution of Czechoslovak relations with African countries. The most important of these critical incidents was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which marked the boundary between the first and second period. Czechoslovak involvement in Africa before and after the invasion was very different and it would have caused some serious methodological constraints in reaching conclusive results if two such distinctive periods were to be analysed. Instead, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia provided the approximate upper time limit for this research. The lower limit was the year 1958 when the first contacts between the freedom fighters and Czechoslovak officials took place. The selected period of 1958 through 1970 represents an integrated and clearly delineated stage that allows for the thorough and coherent analysis of the historical processes that were taking place.

*Data collection and the constraints faced*

Once the subject matter and the boundaries of this research were firmly set the plan for data collection was established. Data collection was divided into two phases, European and African. In both these phases the selected and applied research methods were archival research and collection of oral histories.

The original plan envisaged initial archival research in the Czech Republic and Slovakia producing a substantial amount of documentary evidence that would, upon being examined, allow the more specific research structure to be drafted. This initial research structure was to be later supplemented by the historical data collected by interview in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the second East African phase of data collection, archival research was planned to take place in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania together with collecting more oral testimonies. In reality, the two phases of data collection did not produce all the results hoped for. In phase 1, oral testimonies fell significantly below expectations, and in phase 2 the archival research was abandoned
completely for reasons explained below and the oral testimony collection also fell short of expectations.

The first phase of data collection for this research did take place in the Czech and Slovak Republic as had been planned. Approximately ten archives of all kinds were visited and researched, ranging from state archives, regional archives, archives of various governmental offices and company archives. All of the collected primary sources however originate from four main archives located in the Czech Republic – The Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, The National Archive, The Central Military Archive and The Security Services Archive. The first three archives allow direct access to their collections while the Security Services Archive conducts research internally according to the parameters that they are provided with. Eventually the researcher is provided with the results of archives internal research. In case of this particular research project collecting archival data took over a year and a half and resulted in the collection of an immense amount of more than 40,000 pages of original historical documents, a substantial part of which had never before been subjected to historical analysis.

Once this initial data collection was completed, it was followed by thorough processing of a large amount of primary sources that needed to be properly indexed, analysed, and exposed to a historical critique to establish their historical value, their credibility and authenticity. In case of this particular research the bulk of primary resources consisted mainly of various kinds of documentary evidence produced by state and governmental institutions, agencies, military, private and state-owned enterprises and intelligence services. The list below includes all the forms of original documents that were collected and analysed during data collection. They are categorised according to their origin, and their type.

1. State, government and political parties – reports, orders, regulations, correspondence (letters, telegrams, dispatches etc.), speeches, declarations, agreements, etc.
2. Security services and army – orders, correspondence, regulations, reports, lists and charts, advertising, etc.
3. Civil society organisations – brochures, bulletins, correspondence, declarations, reports, etc.
4. Trade – trade records, agreements, correspondence, lists and charts of goods, taxes, duties and fees forms, bank account records, marketing materials, etc.
5. Private – diaries, interviews, notes, video and sound recordings, etc.
6. Other – photographs, newspapers, magazines, etc.

The immense amount of collected documents meant a serious methodological challenge in itself. All of the documents had to be read, indexed and grouped according to relevance, topic, date and origin. The preliminary notes produced at this stage of initial historical analysis amounted to some 100,000 words. The quantity of material meant that it was not only a challenge in keeping it organised, but it also put a strain on the provisional research timetable, especially due to a significant six-month delay in obtaining the results from the Security Services Archive.

The archival material that was collected in the Czech archives, despite its quantity, is certainly not a complete record of the historical development that is addressed by this research. However it probably represents a major portion of existing original historical sources on this topic and more importantly it is more than adequate to reach the objectives set out by this research. Despite all the available primary historical sources, a large amount of historical data remains incomplete or missing altogether. In such a situation a historian is forced to formulate informed assumptions or even outright speculation. Wherever that is the case in this research, it is clearly highlighted.

While the archival research in the Czech Republic produced an unexpectedly high amount of unique original historical sources, the subsequent collection of oral testimonies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic was hindered by unexpected constraints. It proved to be almost impossible to get hold of direct participants of Czechoslovak-East African relations from the period prior to the Soviet invasion. The majority of them are deceased and the few remaining are either reluctant to speak or cannot be traced. This might seem surprising given that fifty years is not such an extreme period of time but one has to realise three important factors that are in the way. Firstly, Czechoslovak-African relations in the 1960s were a very specific and quite narrow field of Czechoslovak state external activities. It would not directly concern or employ more
than a few hundred people, mostly politicians, soldiers, experts, journalists etc., over the course of one decade. Secondly, one has to realise that involvement with Africa would have called for persons of either high political ranking or expert professional training. In effect, it would attract mainly people of thirty-five years of age and higher, many of whom would be now nearly ninety. Thirdly, the Soviet invasion of 1968 caused a large number of people directly involved in relations with East African countries never to want to return to Soviet-occupied Czechoslovakia and they emigrated, with their tracks often being lost entirely. A combination of these factors made the results of collection of oral testimonies in Czech Republic and Slovakia very meagre.

In phase 2 the data collection moved to East Africa where it was planned for archival research to take place, along with more oral testimonies being collected. However, the original plans eventually had to be significantly revised due to serious problems faced during the data collection. Initial archival research took place in the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi, but failed to produce any relevant historical data for the period studied. The only documents dealing with Czechoslovakia were fragments of records from the colonial administration addressing trade issues in the early 1950s. Archival research in Uganda was even less productive and never really took place due to the inaccessibility of state archives at the time of conducting this data collection. After this experience the author of this research decided to abandon the planned archival research in Tanzania as well, in order to prevent a distorted methodology that might have had negative effect on the historical narrative produced. After the failure to conduct satisfactory archival research in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, the data collection in these countries was entirely based on the collection of oral testimonies.

The author of this research tracked and interviewed approximately fifteen direct participants of Czechoslovak-East African relations, political figures, soldiers, diplomats, doctors and tradesmen. However, the personal testimonies collected did not fulfil the high expectations as a source of unique historical data as they offered only very little specific information on Czechoslovak relations with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Nevertheless, they proved a valuable source of background information on a number of political issues.

Interviews were conducted in the same manner in all three countries. The interviewee was asked a set of general questions to establish his knowledge of
Czechoslovakia and that country's actions in East Africa. Once the interviewee showed any such knowledge, more specific questions were asked. Even though all the interviewees were selected as the potentially most promising sources with a good chance of having a deep specific knowledge of Czechoslovakia's relations with East Africa, only a minority of them showed any real knowledge of this subject. The majority had only a very generalised knowledge of Czechoslovakia unrelated in any way to the specific questions asked. On the other hand, all of the interviewees were persons who had unique experience with East African political developments in the period addressed by this research and some of the interviews therefore produced an interesting and useful insight into a range of issues that were helpful in providing some background information or a unique perspective on some aspects of the political or economic development of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

The range of issues that were eventually addressed in these interviews ranged from recollections of figures of political leadership, their actions and motivations, through the African perspective of an on-going Cold War conflict, all the way to specificities of local political and economic development. As is always the case, collected testimonies were marked by the intended or unintended personal bias of interviewees, and a few of them were substantially hindered by an interviewee’s failing memory. Some information collected in these interviews proved wrong or inaccurate, when examined against the hard historical evidence, while other information was far too specific to be verifiable. Nevertheless, once the collected data was filtered by appropriate historical critique, they still produced some valuable historical information, a unique insight into the period studied and in a few cases also a valuable perspective on Czechoslovak cooperation with Africa in this period. Details of some of the most useful collected testimonies are presented in the introductions of the relevant chapters, as some of the content is best understood in relation to appropriate segments of text.

As is usually the case, an author is aware of the shortcomings and limitations of his or her work even if he does not like to admit there are any. In the case of this particular research, the main limitation related to the data collection was the failure to obtain primary sources in East Africa as well as the complete omission of archival data collection in Russia and the United Kingdom. While it is quite likely that Russian and British archives store original documents on the activities of the Soviets and the Czechoslovaks in East Africa during the Cold War, it is unlikely that they would
ultimately change the conclusions reached by this research. Where they would be useful is in providing an alternative perspective of these historical events. Unfortunately, due to constraints of time, there was no opportunity to engage in the thorough archival research in British or Russian archives that this topic would have deserved.

*Handling, analysing and interpreting of the primary sources*

Handling all the different kinds of historical material produced by data collection required a very thorough organisation of analytical processes. The history researcher working with primary resources never previously studied needs to verify the authenticity of the material and establish the correctness of its contents. Original historical research does not usually provide one with a plethora of sources on the same historical information and one thus has to make use of what material is available. Therefore it is of the utmost importance to gather as much information as possible on the material studied. All primary sources need to be correctly dated, identified as to point of origin and if possible also authorship, original purpose and intended audience. This should allow the researcher to apply the appropriate perspective to each document and to use it as effectively and accurately as possible. Whenever doubts arise regarding the authenticity of a document or the truthfulness of its content, this should be taken into account, in extreme cases leading to completely omitting such a document from the research. These were the fundamental principles of historical analysis used to process and interpret the collected material. Most of the collected material was affected by the ideological and political stance of their authors. That in itself would not be a reason to ignore them, but the appropriate historical critique had to be applied when dealing with such documents.

A great deal of collected archival documents analysed during this research was produced by state institutions and as such subject to various levels of confidentiality. This often works as an important hint of the authenticity and credibility of such material. Even though it is not universally applicable, in general there is good reason to presume that confidential material from different government offices would be authentic and unaltered, if not necessarily correct. Related to this is a long-running debate in post-socialist countries on the authenticity and reliability of records of local intelligence services. The majority of experts agree that there is no reason to doubt the
records’ authenticity and this approach was also applied during this research project when sources of this kind were being handled.

An interesting aspect of analysing the collected archival material is the consideration of what is missing from this collection. Often, the missing information tells a story equally as important as the available documents, although it is much more difficult to unravel it. This notion occurred in connection with documents from the vast collections from the Security Services Archive. The existing documents are just a small fragment of the vast body of documents originally archived. Each folder from the collection of the Security Services Archive begins with the lengthy list of documents that were at one point shredded. Speculation as to why they were shredded and what they contained based on the titles of these documents brings no satisfying results.

The study of history expanded over the course of the twentieth century considerably opening itself to collaboration with a number of other academic disciplines from sociology to economics, which also introduced new methodologies and analytical approaches. The qualitative approach in analysing historical data had been repeatedly challenged and criticised in previous decades as various alternative methods of historical research were gradually introduced to the study of history from the sphere of social sciences and economy. Traditional approaches of historical research and analysis were increasingly criticised on the basis that they produce subjective historical narrative without a clear hypothesis, and the results are impossible to measure. At the same time, however, a fervent group of supporters of traditional approaches to historical research was formed, claiming that for certain kinds of historiography the qualitative analysis of historical documentary evidences remains a most suitable and effective methodology. There is no disputing that the qualitative approach is the best and sometimes the only possibility of analysing some history research projects, and this particular one is among them. The nature of the primary material employed, the research objectives as well as the characteristics of this research project prevented the application of an alternative research methodology as well as quantitative analysis. The most suitable analytical method applied to interpret the historical material collected during this research was thus a qualitative historical analysis.

The structure of this thesis is quite simple and follows a logical division. Besides the Introduction and the Conclusion, the main body of text is divided into six chapters.
Chapter One deals with the creation of Czechoslovak relations on the African continent before the Second World War, acting as a crucial precursor of later successful cooperation between socialist Czechoslovakia and various African states. In Chapter 2 three major determinants of Czechoslovak-East African relations are presented – the formation and development of Soviet relations with Africa; the causality and process of decolonisation of the British Empire in Africa; the formation and development of foreign policy of socialist Czechoslovakia after the Second World War and the creation of the Czechoslovak Africa Policy in the early 1960s. While Chapter 1 works as a kind of historical introduction for the main argument of this thesis, Chapter 2 provides it with historical background as well as with wider context that is necessary in understanding the historical processes that marked the creation and the development of Czechoslovak-East African relations. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 each represent a separate case study. Czechoslovakia’s relations with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are recreated in these chapters in order to answer the questions set out by the research objectives. A rather short Chapter 6 very briefly looks into the effect of the year 1968 and the Soviet invasion on cooperation between Czechoslovakia and East Africa and on the variations that marked these relations in the aftermath of this major political upheaval.

In the writing of this thesis, several seemingly marginal methodological issues have arisen that the reader should be advised of here. As large parts of the presented text are based on original historical material, there is a certain level of confusion when it comes to nomenclature and terminology and especially in translating it from the original. When speaking of governmental offices and civil servants, in most cases the translation of the Czech terms is used. For that reason, the members of African cabinets are referred to as ‘Ministers’, even though the English term ‘Secretary’ might be more fitting. When mentioning non-Czechoslovak political parties, international organisations and other similar entities, in most cases the available English term or its abbreviation is used, where commonly known. When it comes to Czechoslovak organisations, on first use the Czech term with the English translation is provided with the abbreviation that will be used in the rest of the text. It is made clear in every single case whether the abbreviation refers to the Czech or English version of the term. Some of the best generally known and most widely used Czech abbreviations are used in this thesis. (eg.
StB, Kčs). Should any confusion arise, a list of all abbreviations is available at the beginning of the thesis.

In this work there are a number of technical or professional terms, especially in relation to intelligence services and special material. When speaking of the procedures and structure used by Czechoslovak intelligence, the appropriate English term is used whenever possible. However, when there is the slightest doubt as to the respective meanings of Czech and English terms, or if no English translation of a specific Czech term exists, a descriptive translation is presented with the appropriate explanation in the footnote. When referring to special material, the original name of the weapon is used, together with its mark and specification.

The subject matter being Czechoslovak activities in Africa, an excessive use of the term ‘Czechoslovak’ could not be avoided. In order to make the text more coherent, the abbreviation ‘CS’ is used wherever suitable. When mentioning Czechoslovakia, two sets of abbreviation are widely used. In period before 1945 it is the official abbreviation ‘CSR’. To avoid confusion, in the period after 1945 Czechoslovakia is abbreviated as ‘CSSR’ even though this became official only after 1960.

In some of the chapters a large number of quotations of original documents of Czechoslovak origin are used. In many cases the choice was made to use the complete quotes rather than paraphrasing the original. It is due to the very unusual nature of the language – tightly regulated in style, official and ideologically-charged – in which these materials were usually written that the presented quotes often seem lengthy, complicated and hard to understand upon first reading.

Lastly, I would like to address the issue of referencing secondary as well as original material. All secondary sources used when writing this thesis, either quoted or paraphrased, follow the standard rules of a Chicago style referencing system using footnotes and bibliography. Due to the excessive amount of foreign language citations used in this text, the original language versions were transferred to Appendix 1 of this thesis. Due to the unusually large quantity of analysed historical documents, it is impossible to include all of them in the attached Bibliography. Therefore, only the list of archival collections and folders with their names and numbers is included in the Bibliography.

1. Czechoslovak-African relations in the period 1918-45

1.1. Creation and pillars of independent Czechoslovak foreign policy

1918 to 1939 was the period of foundation-laying for relations between the newly independent Czechoslovak republic and selected African territories. The nature, intensity and quality of these relations was determined by a number of different factors that were not favourable for creating really close and intense cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Africa. At this point most of Africa was still deeply entrenched in the colonial empires of European powers. This effectively ruled out the creation of political or diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and African colonies that would certainly have worked as the vanguard for other forms of cooperation. Also, the Czechoslovak republic had only been established in the early aftermath of the First World War as one of the successive states of the Habsburg Empire as it disintegrated. The new state's ability to survive post-war chaos and defend its unity and sovereignty was yet to be proven. Effective foreign political activism was one of guarantees of its independence and initially Africa was certainly not a territory of highest priority in this respect. Despite all this, after a sluggish start around 1920 the intensity of relations with selected African territories increased and reached a surprisingly substantial level considering all the limitations that existed.

The founders of the republic built the country on the concept of broad civil liberties, social rights and sound economic progress.58 The democratic basis of the Czechoslovak state, coupled with its location in the centre of Europe surrounded by dictatorships, made the CSR extremely vulnerable to external influences – economic, as well as political.59 As Edvard Beneš, the then Foreign Minister, put it, ‘... [o]ur politics will be influenced by international politics far more than the national politics of any other country.’60 Czechoslovak foreign policy during the inter-war period was orchestrated by Beneš, and the first president, Tomáš Garrique Masaryk, who both had very good

58 Olivová, Věra, Dějiny nové doby [History of the New Age] (Czech Republic: Temi CZ, 2008), 85.
60 Klimek Antonín, and Eduard Kubů, Československá zahraniční politika 1918-1938: kapitoly z dějin mezinárodních vztahů [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy] (Czech Republic: Institut pro středoevropskou kulturu a politiku, 1995), 9.
connections with politicians in the USA, the UK and France. Very soon after its creation the core principles of the Czechoslovak republic’s foreign policy crystallised.

The CSR’s existence was defined in the post-war Versailles system\(^61\), the continuance of which was viewed as essential for the CSR’s existence as a state.\(^62\) Close relations with Britain and France – masterminds of the Versailles system – thus became one of Beneš’ main concerns. However, more security guarantees were also required. As a result, the CSR formed a defence alliance with Romania and Yugoslavia that became known as the ‘Little Entente’. Cooperation within the Little Entente was viewed as a vital condition to maintaining peace in central Europe. For the same reason both Masaryk and Beneš paid a great deal of attention to Germany. They both supported a steady and systematic German economic recovery after the war rather than economic deprivation, which would have undoubtedly led to the rise of German radicalism.\(^63\) The CSR was criticised for this soft approach by France which preferred to see Germany weakened and paralysed economically, politically and militarily. Development in the 1930s showed that the Czechoslovak approach to Germany was much more rational than that of France. Finally, the most important pillar of Czechoslovak foreign policy was the League of Nations, of which the CSR was one of the founding members, and one of its most active and vocal supporters.

The League of Nations was formed during the Paris Peace Conference in 1920 at the instigation of US president Woodrow Wilson.\(^64\) The main notion supporting the League was the idea that, in the unified world of the 20\(^{th}\) century, any military conflict anywhere in the world could lead to a new global war.\(^65\) In order to avoid this, all the member states agreed to deal with all possible tensions and disagreements through common diplomatic resolution. In the case of military aggression, members of the League agreed to act jointly against the aggressor by using all possible economic, financial or even military means.\(^66\) All members of the League were to have the same rights and powers, as well as obligations, regardless of their size, wealth or any other

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\(^{61}\) The system of political relations that Europe adopted after Versailles peace conference.


\(^{64}\) Kvtun, Republika, 42-55. Unfortunately due to internal political opposition the USA never joined the organisation, which was to become the organisation’s main shortcoming, weakening it greatly.

\(^{65}\) Olivová, Dějiny, 68.

\(^{66}\) Krofta, Kamil, Zahraniční politika Československá a její kořeny [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy] (Czechoslovakia: Svaz národního osvobození. 1937), 4-10.
aspect. Beneš soon became one of the leading thinkers and driving forces behind the League of Nations. Considering Beneš’s activity in the formation of the League it is not surprising that some of the League’s core principles, for example, ‘All nations, whether large or small, are equal state and cultural entities and have a right to self-governance.’ were strikingly similar to how Czechoslovak leaders viewed the ideological foundations of their own state. As I explain later in this chapter, it was in relation to the League of Nations that Czechoslovakia became an active participant of African political affairs for the first time.

The interwar period in Africa can be viewed from today’s perspective as an inconspicuous beginning of the end of colonialism. At the time, most of the continent was controlled by European colonial powers. For a while the only independent states in Africa were US-sponsored Liberia and the old Abyssinian empire. In the first half of the century these were joined by the de facto independent South African Union and the former British protectorate of Egypt.

Colonial officers, soldiers, traders, and the various colonial authorities had dominated African society across the entire continent for decades. Participation by Africans at any but the lowest levels of the governing structure was rare, as was their involvement in external trade. Africans were almost completely excluded from higher education, and indigenous cultural practices were often ignored. In fact, Africans throughout the continent found themselves in very similar situations to the many European nations who had sought self-determination during the 19th century. The traditional tribal authorities were too weak and ineffective to challenge the bureaucratic machinery of colonial systems which were backed by enormous wealth and power.

The forward-thinking indigenous leaders were few and far between and concepts of modern leadership amongst Africans were only just emerging. Interestingly, the same World War that redrew the political map of Europe had, in the long-term, very similar effects on African societies. The participation of thousands of ordinary Africans on the Western front during the First World War deeply affected societies all over Africa.

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67 Krofta, Zahraniční, 5.
68 Dominion of the British Crown.
69 Independent from 1922.
The invincibility and power of their European masters was challenged and shattered by the horrors of the trenches. Their experience demonstrated the weakness and fragility of European society and their political systems – and this started to change the African soldiers’ own individual perceptions of themselves as Africans. It was indeed some of these soldiers that were galvanised into becoming the new leaders of a modern political Africa, and opposed to European colonialism. However, for the time being, colonialism seemed invincible, and all African affairs were dominated by the European masters.

1.2. Establishing the Czechoslovak diplomatic network and entry into Africa

The Czechoslovak republic was organised on the system of parliamentary democracy. The President was the nominal head of state, but the Prime Minister held most of the executive powers. The organisation of the state bureaucratic apparatus was derived from the political systems of Austria and of France. The execution of official foreign policy was the responsibility of various government institutions: the office of the Prime Minister, the President’s office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and others. Unlike some other institutions (e.g. police and local authorities), these organs were for the most part created from scratch – they were not inherited after the monarchy. This had obvious implications for the republic’s effectiveness in the first years of its existence. A shortage of professional staff and the lack of a coherent organisational structure in the first years of its existence were among the reasons why it took several years to increase the activity of Czechoslovak government beyond the European foreign political priorities.

The formation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began in 1919. It was accurately modelled on the French system. First, the central structures of the Ministry were organised in Prague. The Prague headquarters were soon followed by a widening net of diplomatic offices of different types and responsibilities. They included embassies,

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71 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 24-27.
72 Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 21.
general consulates, vice consulates, consulates and the lowest level diplomatic office of honorary consulates.73

‘In mid-1921, when the formation of the Czechoslovak diplomatic body was completed, there were 23 embassies, 20 general consulates, and 29 consulates and honorary consulates that operated around the world.’74 Only one of the offices in this list was located on the African continent. It was a general consulate in Egypt, Cairo. The reason why Africa initially hosted so few diplomatic offices was the direct result of the logic behind developing the Czechoslovak diplomatic net. It was crucial to favour strategically important countries. Thus, there was a natural inclination towards Europe rather than Africa. Additionally, in relation to Africa, Czechoslovak diplomacy was rather cautious of trespassing on British or French colonial interests. Therefore especially in the initial phase, all issues concerning the French and British African empires were dealt with through the following link:

Ministry in Prague → Czechoslovak embassies in Paris / London → The Foreign Office in London / the French Foreign Office on the Quai d’Orsay.75

However, it soon became obvious that such communication was not as effective as it could be, and was ultimately useless when it came to expanding Czechoslovak activities in Africa. While it was clear that no favourable conditions existed for developing any substantial political relations with most of Africa, economic and trade relations offered some attractive opportunities for the export-oriented Czechoslovak economy. Therefore several African territories were included in the later stages of expansion of the network of diplomatic offices. Several African consulates were included in the group of new offices located around the world. The main criterion for their establishment was typically linked with the existing business activities or business interests of Czechoslovak traders. Decisive for the success of establishing new offices in Africa was an ability to overcome all the existing practical and bureaucratic obstacles that often arose. The excessive cost of establishing and maintaining such offices, the overly complicated means of maintaining contact between headquarters and the office,

73 Dejmek, Jindřich, Československo, jeho sousedé a velmoci ve XX. století (1918-1992) [Czechoslovakia, her neighbours and superpowers] [Czech Republic: CEP, 2002], 333-336.
74 Dejmek, Československo, 336.
lack of reliable staff, resentment of local administration are some of the most common difficulties that Czechoslovak diplomats were facing in Africa.

The general consulate in Egypt was the first Czechoslovak foreign office established on African soil. Up until the Second World War it remained one of the most active offices in Africa. It was responsible mainly for prosperous and expanding business relations between the CSR and Egypt. In 1925, the Cairo consulate was followed by a similar office in Cape Town. This main office received administrative support in 1928 through the creation of various honorary consulates in Durban and East London, and a vice consulate in Port Elizabeth. The diplomatic network in the South African Union was completed in 1930 with the creation of an honorary consulate in Johannesburg – the emerging business capital of the SAU. All of these offices were initially appointed to foreigners and, even though some problems did occur, in general they had a positive influence on business and trade relations.

At approximately the same time there was an unsuccessful attempt to establish an honorary consulate in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia. Similarly vain attempts were made to open consulates in Portuguese East Africa. There was also a failed attempt to establish some form of representation in Liberia. The disappointment in this case was largely due to procedural obstacles on the Czechoslovak side. Unlike these failed attempts, an honorary consulate was successfully established in 1927 in Dakar, West Africa. The Czechoslovak sphere of influence in Africa at this point largely consisted of French West Africa. Dakar was soon followed by Leopoldville, where the consul for the Belgian Congo was established in 1929.

In Ethiopia (Abyssinia), however, one of three independent African states, the CSR was constantly refused a permit to open a diplomatic office in Addis Ababa. The Czech consulate in Cairo repeatedly emphasised the need for a diplomatic office in Ethiopia; however, due to a variety of procedural reasons, Ethiopia never agreed. An independent office in Ethiopia was not opened before WWII, and the local French embassy remained in charge of Czechoslovak diplomatic affairs in Abyssinia. Finally, the Czech diplomatic network in Africa was completed in 1937 with the opening of the

76 Dejmek, Československo, 348.
honorary consulate in Mombasa. It was in charge of Czech foreign trade in Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Uganda.\textsuperscript{79}

1.3. \textbf{Business and trade relations between Czechoslovakia and Africa}

During the two decades of its existence in between two world wars, the Czechoslovak republic quickly established itself as one of the strongest economies in Europe and as a leading exporter of various industrial goods.\textsuperscript{80} External economic and trade activities became the most common form of relations between Czechoslovakia and distant overseas territories including Africa.

From the very beginning Czechoslovak policy was based on the imperative of ensuring economic prosperity. Not only did it help to maintain stable home affairs by providing a system of social security and comparatively better living standards than most European countries, but it also strengthened the reputation and position of the state when confronted by a hostile external environment. Throughout the first twenty years of the First Republic, the CS government remained strictly liberal in terms of the free market and trade competition even though in the 1930s a growing amount of government legislation was passed with the purpose of supporting the economy through large infrastructural or industrial investments. These tactics were adopted for two purposes. It was supposed that it would boost the growth of an open and liberal Czechoslovak economy which had been severely damaged by the impact of the global ‘Great Depression’. Secondly, projects such as the building of defence lines along the Czechoslovak borders or increasing the number of weapon-producing plants were aimed at strengthening the state’s defence capacities.

The nature of CS industrial production was very much determined by what it inherited from its empire days. The western part of the CSR (Bohemia, Moravia, and part of Silesia) had always been the industrial heart of the Habsburg Empire, and during the 19th century it was among the most industrially developed regions of the whole world.\textsuperscript{81} A plethora of different industries located here ranged from glass production, mining,

\textsuperscript{79} Olša Jr, “Českoslovenští diplomáti,” 92-97.
\textsuperscript{80} In some areas of its export-orientated production it would be a world leader, for example in weapons production. (Franěk, Otakar, Zbraně pro celý svět: Zahraníční obchod se zbraněmi a municí z koncernu brněnské Zbrojovky mezi dvěma válkami [Arms for world] [Czechoslovakia: Blok, 1970], 10-19.).
ironworks, light and heavy machinery. These industries employed one third of the national labour force.\(^{82}\) It was local industrial production that would account for largest part of Czechoslovak exports around the whole world – and, to a large extent, to Africa.

There were several Czechoslovak commodities that were in great demand in various parts of Africa. Certain CS products had had a long history of being imported to Africa and they enjoyed a good reputation, while some others were newly introduced to African markets in this period. Old-established business links survived unharmed from the Habsburg Empire and they played a vital role for the Czechoslovak business presence in Africa. Their positive reputation allowed the CSR to expand its export commodity structure and also further develop its network of partners.\(^{83}\) Glass bead jewellery and glass production, originating from the Sudetenland\(^ {84}\) in the CSR, had an incredibly long history and perhaps the greatest social-economic impact on African societies. Over the course of history, beads had often been used as currency by European explorers and traders bartering with Africans. The ease with which they could be stored, their ready availability, and aesthetics meant that they were very popular across the continent. As the colonial administration developed, their use as a currency diminished. However, the glass and bijoux exports to Africa remained strong until the mid-twentieth century. Some of the largest glass factories such as Preciosa were involved in glass-exporting activities to Africa. Besides these large companies, it was not uncommon for smaller enterprises or family businesses to take part in the trade as well.\(^{85}\) This is surprising when one considers the obstacles and difficulties posed by distance, lack of infrastructure, problems in establishing a working means of communication, or uncertainty in obtaining payment reliably.

The newly-established CS diplomatic offices acquired a leading role in establishing and maintaining Czechoslovak business relations in Africa. These offices were to a large extent responsible for mediating the communication between geographically remote trade partners who in most cases never had the opportunity to meet.\(^{86}\) As the numerous archival documents show, facilitation of trade was by far the

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\(^{82}\) Bartoš, Československo 1918-1938, 29.


\(^{84}\) Historical border region of Czech lands populated by a German-speaking majority.

\(^{85}\) Small family businesses such as J. Poláček company. (NAA, F. 497, kt. 153, č.j. 328.)

\(^{86}\) Archival documentation records, for example, intensive mediating activities by Czechoslovak consul Mr Ivan H. King in South Africa. (NAA, F. 497, kt. 149, č.j. 290.)
most important activity of the CS diplomatic service. The consulate was also involved in verifying the credentials of African business partners, thereby minimising the risk of fraud. CS diplomats often worked in cooperation with their foreign colleagues. The mutual exchange of background information on active merchants was beneficial for all sides and resulted in flourishing trade and business relations during the whole inter-war era. Diplomatic offices were also involved in dealing with any cases of fraud, delayed payments or other business misdemeanours. Such cases were not uncommon but the system of mutual information exchange that European diplomatic offices developed in Africa was surprisingly effective in their prevention.

Besides glassware another group of Czechoslovak commodities in high demand in Africa were metalwork products. This covered a huge array of light industrial items including things like paraffin lamps or tableware. There was also a growing demand for CS-made cars and motorcycles as well as other articles of medium-range machinery. In addition, huge CS companies such as Škoda, Kolben Daněk, Sigma and others, provided the equipment for heavy industrial and infrastructure projects (e.g. power plants, factories, railways), with the potential for establishing long-term and commercially beneficial cooperation. The shoe-producing giant, Bata, was also a large exporter of goods to Africa. Its penetration of African markets was eventually so successful that it decided to establish some of its production capacity directly in Africa.

Last but not least, Czechoslovak weapons manufacture also played a very important part in the African continent. It was this business segment that eventually exceeded the limits of commercial relations and directly entered political affairs in Africa. Czechoslovak engagement in Africa on the basis of weapons trade was to become quite common in decades to come. Foundations for this particular kind of business link with Africa were thus already laid before World War II. This fact later proved to be of the utmost importance as it gave Czechoslovakia a decisive comparative advantage in its ambitious political and economic involvement with Africa during the Cold War.

In the 1930s the Czechoslovak government was already aware of the growing tensions and dangers in international politics at the time. It was therefore seen as vital that the republic be self-sufficient in weapons production, and military equipment was

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87 National Archive, Fund 497 - Export office, cartons 149, 153.
also produced for export. The absence of Germany on the international weapons market allowed CS companies to become market leaders and develop strong and effective business links with many parts of the world. It did not take long for the CSR to become one of the largest weapons producers in the world.

One faces certain difficulties in accurately assessing the weapons market in the CSR between the two world wars. The nature and confidentiality of the business often meant a lack of verifiable documentation in the archives. The use of a complex network of re-sellers, misleading or downright false business documentation and absence of transport documentation are all reasons why the papers that are actually available today fail to provide us with a comprehensive picture of exports of Czechoslovak weaponry between the wars. Nevertheless, available documents suggest that the import of CS weapons to Africa was anything but marginal and as the international political situation deteriorated it grew in importance. There are records which indicate that almost all independent African countries, including the South African Union, Ethiopia and Egypt, were recipients of CS weapons before WWII. The companies Zbrojovka Brno, Škoda Plzeň and others produced the majority of the weapons, which ranged from pistols and rifles to machine guns, cannons and guns. The weapons trade between CSR and Africa, interrupted by WWII, was able to re-establish itself very soon after the war and develop from the solid foundation it had created during the inter-war years.

On the African side there were two kinds of entity involved in business with Czechoslovak exporters. In a handful of cases the business partner was an individual African state represented by its government. However, the majority business partners on the African side were either local businessmen, often of Indian or Arab ethnicity, or European-owned firms re-selling imported goods. In the case of independent African states such the South African Union, Ethiopia and Egypt, members of the indigenous population were involved in the business activities on a more regular basis.

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90 The German army, as well as traditional German weapon-producing companies, were greatly limited by the results of the Versailles treaty and did not recover until the 1930’s. This significantly strengthened the position of Czechoslovak companies.
Many of the nascent business links with African partners furthered an awareness among the indigenous population of the CSR as a source of high-quality, reliable and relatively cheap goods even though the country was rarely directly involved in the business itself. This local awareness of Czechoslovakia via its produce certainly helped Czechoslovak activities after the war. At the same time, African exports (e.g. bananas, peanuts, cocoa, tea and other exotic produce) brought the continent closer to the CS public. Africa, through its exports, became attractive and fashionable. Yet it was remaining distant, exotic and quite unknown as the first-hand experience of Czechoslovak population with African culture and people was, in comparison to that of the cosmopolitan societies of London or Paris, still at a very basic level.92

Egypt and other Maghreb countries, the South African Union, the Gold Coast, and the Congo were the main destinations for CS businesses. In the case of Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, good trade relations were determined mainly by their relative geographical proximity, reasonably developed market and safe investment environment. Business and trade with the South African Union were, by contrast, based on a direct link with numerous CS expatriates and on the size and strength of the local market, which was inherently dominated by white Boers and British agents, and boosted by the diamond and gold mining industries. In West Africa and in Abyssinia CS companies often benefitted from close cooperation with their French counterparts. The rest of the African countries and territories were greatly disadvantaged by distance, lack of development and infrastructure, and their relationship with the old colonial powers.

1.4. Abyssinian crisis

In October 1935 Fascist Italy attacked the independent Abyssinian Empire. The attack was the culmination of several cross-border disputes between Abyssinia and the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somalia.93 Diplomatic relations between the two

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92 Various forms of reference towards Africa were being widely used for marketing purposes by a number of companies (eg. Julius Meinl, Figaro). Coffee, tea, chocolate, fruit, nuts and other products were regularly marked as ‘African’ which equalled exotic and high quality. (Ľubomír Dobrovoda Sr, interview with the author, Bratislava, Slovakia, 15 May, 2010.)

93 A major incident occurred on 5 December 1934 at Walwal, part of Ethiopian territory of Ogaden occupied by Italians since 1928. Fighting cost almost 200 casualties and resulted in growing tension between Italy and
countries had already been steadily declining, despite membership (for both countries) of the League of Nations, and despite diplomatic attempts of this organisation to avert Italian aggression. The conflict commenced on 3 October 1935 and had far-reaching effects, not only on Abyssinia, but also on the international political environment. The League of Nations found its concept of collective international security under threat. For Czechoslovakia the involvement in the Abyssinian crisis represented its first direct political engagement with an African country. In some aspects it set the pattern for future political Czechoslovak involvement with African countries. Positive Czechoslovak involvement in favour of an independent African state facing European aggression was certainly a strong contributor in winning it prestige amongst national-liberation movements across Africa after the Second World War.

Czechoslovakia did not have political interests in the region before the conflict started other than to expand its business relations with local tradesmen and to establish working a diplomatic representation in Abyssinia. Despite this lack of initial political interest, Czechoslovakia emerged as playing an important role during the growing crisis and the subsequent war. At the time of the conflict diplomatic relations between the two countries were only starting to form.

As Abyssinia was one of the only three independent African states at the time, the CSR naturally felt it was potential territory for the expansion of its business activities. However, this potential turned out to be limited due to French dominance of Abyssinian affairs, in both the political and the commercial sphere. CS diplomats did not want to be overly active and competitive in a region that was already viewed by Czechoslovakia’s crucial European allies as being of high interest.94 The CSR was therefore treading carefully in establishing political cooperation with Abyssinia. Another factor that had a negative effect on the CSR’s ability to form a working economic relationship with Abyssinia was the state of the local economy. The Abyssinian economy was particularly weak and restricted in size, which greatly limited trade opportunities. As a result of these two factors the intensity and quality of relations between the CSR and Abyssinia during the 1920s and in the first half of the 1930s was nowhere near resembling the original hopes and plans devised by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic relations between the CSR and Abyssinia existed despite the

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94 Olša, “Českoslovenští diplomáti,” 94.
absence of any Czechoslovak diplomatic office in Addis Ababa, the formation of which was repeatedly delayed. The platform for bilateral diplomatic relations of both countries turned out to be the League of Nations. Diplomatic contacts between Czechoslovakia and Abyssinia intensified mainly after 1930 and eventually led to the establishment of initial business links between two states. With the worsening security situation in the Horn of Africa the commodity most in demand for the Abyssinian government was Czechoslovak weaponry.

After WWI the African continent was re-drawn with an enhancement of British and French colonial acquisitions. Italy was a latecomer to colonial conquest and, as such, it controlled only Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland. The Italian leader Benito Mussolini had the ambition to establish an African-Roman Empire by turning independent or undisputed African territories into colonies. With the already established French and British empires well entrenched on the continent, the only direction left for Mussolini’s expansion was to push towards Abyssinia. International affairs during the first half of the 1930s were a labyrinth of alliances, agreements, competing interests, and ambitions from a number of states. Abyssinia’s destiny was affected by political affairs and interests that had nothing to do with its own political sovereignty. To a great extent the fate of Abyssinia was decided on the European stage, in Paris, Rome, London and Geneva.

Beneš was nominated President of the Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1935, only weeks before the Italian attack was launched. Beneš’ nomination came after several failures to intervene\(^\text{95}\) and solve the growing tension between Italy and Abyssinia. Abyssinian leaders were aware of Italy’s colonial ambitions, and had worked tirelessly to gain the support of the international community. They repeatedly informed the League about border skirmishes and incidents, and complained through official channels about Italy’s actions. In 1935, under joint pressure from France and Britain, Italy promised to enter into bilateral talks and international arbitration with Abyssinia.\(^\text{96}\)

The relationship between Italy and France was a critical element in the Italian-Abyssinian dispute and, unfortunately for Emperor Selassie and his country, Paris and

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\(^\text{95}\) The League proved to be similarly ineffective in 1931 when Japan committed atrocities while attacking Chinese Manchuria.

\(^\text{96}\) Petruš, Taliánsko-etiópska vojna, 75-77.
Rome were moving closer together in 1935. This was marked particularly by the Danube Pact, an alliance which was to guarantee the political status quo in central Europe. In exchange for his support of the French political project of the Danube Pact, Mussolini ultimately received a ‘free hand’ in his quest to colonise Abyssinia.\textsuperscript{97} The French foreign minister, Laval, not only opened the door for Italian aggression, but also weakened the international community’s reaction to the invasion.\textsuperscript{98} For the lack of French determination to stop Italian aggression the League of Nations was effectively becoming a paper tiger. Even though much less supportive toward Italy,\textsuperscript{99} due to its traditional reluctance to interfere in European political affairs, Britain also failed to do enough to prevent the invasion from taking place. Another important international player with its own interests vested in Abyssinia was Japan.\textsuperscript{100} Again, much like the French position, Japan gave Italy a ‘free hand’ in exchange for a similar openness towards Japan’s expansion in Asia. With all of this diplomatic manoeuvring and ‘back door’ agreements, the international community on the floor of the League of Nations failed to put together enough political pressure against Mussolini to divert him from his expansionist plans. At the end of the rainy season in October 1935, Mussolini advanced from his positions in Eritrea and Somaliland into Abyssinian territory.

The CSR was one of the countries most dedicated to supporting the role of the League in resolving and preventing international disputes. The CS Foreign Minister, Edvard Beneš, was a leading proponent of the idea of collective security and it was he who happened to head the League during Italy’s aggressive posturing toward Abyssinia. Edvard Beneš was a respected diplomat, representative of a democratic state and a successful international mediator. In the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia he stood firmly on the side of Abyssinia, but he lacked real political tools to exert decisive pressure rather than just disregarding Italy’s actions. The CSR found itself cornered, diplomatically, in terms of promoting internal European security by sticking to the principles of the League of Nations, once Italy, formerly critical of the League’s respected position, blatantly decided to ignore these principles.

\textsuperscript{97} Klimek, Kubů, Československá, 74.
\textsuperscript{98} Dejmek, Československo, 71-74.
\textsuperscript{99} Dejmek, Československo, 238-240.
\textsuperscript{100} Japanese goods at this time represented about 60% of total annual Abyssinian imports. (Petruf, Taliantsko-etiópska vojna, 69-70.)
The superiority of the Italian army over the Abyssinians was overwhelming in all respects. *The [Italian] army was equipped with the most modern arms including air force, tanks and armoured vehicles, nay chemical weapons, mainly yperite.*\(^{101}\) By contrast, the Abyssinian army was poorly equipped, often with only traditional weapons such as swords, machetes and bows and arrows.\(^{102}\) Emperor Selassie and his government were aware of their significant handicap and for several years prior to the invasion had worked on a modernisation process to transform Abyssinia’s medieval army.

A vital cooperation in this modernisation process came from Czechoslovakia and its weapons factories. The three main CS commercial exporters of weapons to Abyssinia were Škoda Plzeň, Zbrojovka Brno and Sellier Bellot.\(^{103}\) Even though all of these firms were of mixed ownership (partially privatised, partially state-owned), their production and exporting activities were under government scrutiny. Particularly in the 1930s this sphere of industry became one of the government’s top priorities and was controlled and monitored through a variety of ministerial positions.\(^{104}\) Therefore the decision to export weapons to Abyssinia was dependent on both political and economic interests of the republic.

It is difficult to locate complete archival materials relating to the trade in weapons that are both accurate and authentic. Incomplete and unclear export records of weapons to Abyssinia have led to a never-ending dispute between various academics\(^{105}\) over the nature, extent and impact of CS weaponry in Abyssinia. There are however reliable documents that record the details of several deliveries of various weapons material since 1928. The character and size of these deliveries varied. The material exported to Abyssinia ranged from millions of small-calibre bullets and hundreds of cheap, outdated rifles, to modern, light and heavy machine guns, cannons and guns.\(^{106}\) For various reasons, not every transaction was successfully completed – which some critics interpret as an ambivalent or ‘tendentious’ approach of Czechoslovak government to the Abyssinian case.\(^{107}\) With growing tensions over the Italian-Abyssinian dispute, the position of the CSR as a major Abyssinian weapons provider put

\(^{101}\) Petřuf, Taliansko-etiópska vojna, 94.
\(^{102}\) Petřuf, Taliansko-etiópska vojna, 96.
\(^{103}\) Woldekiros, “Tendenční neutralita,” 12.
\(^{104}\) Straka, “Nejvyšší rada obrany státu,” 4-7.
\(^{106}\) Woldekiros, “Tendenční neutralita,” 12-17.
\(^{107}\) Woldekiros, “Tendenční neutralita,” 12-17.
the CS government in a delicate position towards not only Italy but also France. The political status quo in Central Europe desired by the CS government and France was very much dependent on Italy; therefore, open dispute with Mussolini would have had negative effects on the CSR. For this reason the Czechoslovak government initially hesitated to provide Abyssinia with arms openly once the international embargo in weapons import to Abyssinia was effective.

Archival records charting the weapons export activities around the years 1934 to 1936 are few in number, misleading and incomplete. Some documentation suggests that, during the spring of 1935, the CS government unofficially postponed all deliveries to Abyssinia, while others indicate that the vital weapons continued to flow uninterruptedly through illegal, unofficial transportation hubs, accompanied by false paperwork carried by foreign agents. The weapon deliveries became open and official again in October 1935 after the beginning of the conflict. Even though the exact extent and nature of weapons deliveries will remain unclear, the fact is that the great technological disadvantage of the Abyssinian army was at least partially lessened, and this therefore stands as one of the reasons why Abyssinia managed to hold off Italian attack for much longer than expected.

What CS support meant to Abyssinia at the time is best illustrated by Emperor Haile Selassie’s letter to President Beneš in his exile during the Second World War in London. ‘We may not forget that Your Excellency sympathized with Abyssinia at the time when it lacked arms and was attacked by fascist Italy. Even though it was quite difficult for allied countries to provide Abyssinia with weaponry, Czechoslovakia ignored this hurdle and helped the oppressed country with material which was in such short supply. The position of Czechoslovakia did not alter despite accusations of the aggressor.’

Material support for Abyssinia was only one aspect of the CS relationship with Abyssinia. As significant as the CS weapons export was, its political influence in the League of Nations was exerted via Beneš. Under Beneš’ presidency, the League responded with a surprisingly swift and energetic reaction, which was in stark contrast to the League’s previous clumsy interventions. ‘By a unanimous vote The League Council on October 7 proclaimed Italy an aggressor for having violated Article 12 of the Covenant.’

Two days later the Assembly took up the question in a plenary session and on October 10 it ratified the action of the Council.\textsuperscript{111} The League soon ratified the sanctions. However, they ultimately proved ineffective as they were not approved by several member states and a number of neutral states, namely Albania, Hungary, Austria, Germany and the USA. The effectiveness of the sanctions was also diminished by the fact that they did not include a ban on the import of oil and gas – the fuel for Italian aggression and the only viable obstacle to sustaining an invasion.\textsuperscript{112}

Britain held a strong anti-Italian position which subsequently caused a rift with France. As stated above, France’s back-door diplomacy with Italy through the Danube Pact granted Mussolini a gateway into Abyssinia. Yet, despite this initial moral posturing, in December Britain changed its stance and joined France. Disregarding the League completely, Laval and the British Foreign Secretary, Samuel Hoare, worked on a plan of carving up Abyssinia and appropriating large parts of the territory currently under Italian control. After the secret plan was leaked to the public, both politicians had to resign and the aggression continued with new intensity.\textsuperscript{113} In relation to political manoeuvring by France and Britain the unanimity of the League started to fracture and the concept of a collective defence proved to be impossible to maintain despite the attempts of President Beneš. In May 1936 the Italian armies finally reached Addis Ababa, after committing a number of atrocities, including the use of chemical warfare. The empire lost its independence, Emperor Haile Selassie fled to Britain and Abyssinia technically became the first victim of the aggression of the newly-formed Axis powers.

Edvard Beneš, Kamil Krofta, Jan Masaryk and other leading CS politicians were fully aware of what the failure of the League of Nations meant for their own country. An inability of the international community to guarantee the independence and security of one of its most distant and weakest members gave a foretaste of the tragedy that was about to follow.

Even though Czechoslovak diplomatic and material support failed to stop Fascist Italy’s aggression, it represented one of the most positive engagements of a European state in Africa in this period. Czechoslovakia and Abyssinia established an

\textsuperscript{112} Petruf, Taliansko-etiópska vojna, 86-89.
\textsuperscript{113} Petruf, Taliansko-etiópska vojna, 90-91.
unlikely cooperation of two geographically distant countries on the basis of mutually beneficial relations of two equal partners. The Abyssinian case attracted a great deal of media attention in Czechoslovakia in 1935 and 1936 and public awareness of the Abyssinian struggle against Italy was certainly the most well-known African affair of the inter-war period. Czechoslovak involvement in the whole process showed that Czechoslovakia had the political and economic ability to become a significant player on the African continent. At the same time, however, it became clear that this capability had clear limits defined mainly by Czechoslovak economic and human capacities and its second-rate political power in global political affairs.

1.5. Czechoslovak-African Relations during WWII

Abyssinia's defeat marked a further change in the balance of international relations during the 1930s. France and the United Kingdom continued to practise a policy of appeasement, which subsequently strengthened the position of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. The unpunished invasion of Abyssinia was followed by the German re-occupation of the demilitarised zone along the river Rhine and German re-unification with Austria (the Anschluss). A weakened Entente, a fractured League of Nations and a paralysed system of collective security were all factors which combined to endanger the very existence of the CSR.

As a result, these factors led the government at the time into a period of international isolation. In September 1938 the CSR followed the Abyssinian example and became yet another victim of the League’s and Entente’s impotence in international politics. Unable to resist German pressure, the CSR yielded to Nazi Germany and the Munich conference marked the beginning of the end of the First Republic. Large parts of CS territory were carved away and united with Germany and, as a result, foreign and domestic policy of the Second CS Republic\textsuperscript{114} was dominated by Germany. New leaders of the Foreign Ministry tried to implement foreign policy fully in line with Germany, in order to guarantee the survival of the endangered Republic.\textsuperscript{115} Many of the CS diplomatic offices in Africa were undergoing a long-expected transformation which, together with political uncertainty, rendered them ineffective during the final months of

\textsuperscript{114} Second Republic is commonly used term for the Czechoslovak state between 1 October 1938 and 15 March 1939 when independent Czechoslovakia ceased to exist.

\textsuperscript{115} Klimek, Kubů, Československá, 21-23.
the then CS state. The Second Republic lasted only until spring 1939, when Hitler annexed the rest of the Czech lands and proclaimed them the German *Protectorate of Böhmen und Mähren*, while Slovakia became a *de iure* independent state and an ally of Germany.

President Beneš and several members of his previous government formed an exile cabinet in Britain, and remained the official representatives of the CSR throughout the war. Foreign political relations once again became the tool by which to ensure at least the *de iure* survival of the CS state for the future. The network of diplomatic offices around the world was to play a crucial role in this plan. Embassies in London, Paris, Washington, Moscow, and Warsaw remained loyal to the exiled CS government. Other existing diplomatic offices were either seized by Axis powers, carried on working for the German Protectorate of Czech lands or ceased to function entirely.

The Czechoslovak consulates in Africa also experienced the effects of this political turmoil. The consulate in Cape Town, for example, came under German control immediately in March 1939, when it was voluntarily surrendered by the local consul, Lavante. A similar fate was chosen by diplomatic staff in consulates in the South African Union – Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Johannesburg. The consulate in Dakar, run by French citizens on behalf of the CS state, was negatively affected by the outbreak of the war in Europe. However, with some improvisation it remained active and loyal to the exiled Czechoslovak government throughout the remainder of the war. The only consulate which remained untouched was that of Mombasa, under the control of E. Lowenstein. Local consul Lowenstein, besides representing the Czechoslovak Republic in British East Africa, also took over the agenda for Rhodesia and South Africa. One new diplomatic office was even formed and opened during the war. The close relations with Haile Selassie, in temporary exile in London, reintroduced the matter of diplomatic representation for Abyssinia, which finally became real in 1944.

The World War II is, on the one hand, a period when an independent CS state was de facto non-existent. Paradoxically, however, it was a time when a large number of CS citizens were able to experience Africa and Africans at first-hand. These citizens were predominantly young men who had fled the CSR after the Munich conference. Many of

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117 Klimek, Kubů, Československá, 24.
118 Olša, “Českoslovenští diplomati,” 97-98.
these men were soldiers of the CS army who wanted to carry on armed struggle against Germany. They escaped the CS through different channels to France, the Soviet Union or to the Middle East. With the support of Britain and France the CS was able to organise its exile army by drawing on hundreds of the Czechoslovak expatriates already in France, Britain, the Soviet Union, Africa and as well as the Arab Middle East. This newly-formed force was named Battalion No. 11 East and soon was to become part of the Allied forces in the Middle East and Africa.119

Battalion 11 was formed officially in October 1940 in Palestine. In the Jericho region the battalion underwent extreme desert training in order to acclimatise to the African desert. In the spring of 1941 the battalion was further reinforced and moved to Egypt for additional battle practice. There are numerous archived materials, consisting of memoirs and diaries, that chart the experiences of these young men.120 On reading, one gets a sense of the deep culture shock which affected them in Africa.

The highlight of the CS presence in Africa during WWII culminated in the autumn of 1941. As an attachment to a Polish Carpathian Brigade, Battalion 11 took part in the defence of the besieged Libyan city of Tobruk. After months of defensive fighting the garrisoned Australian army was replaced by Polish, CS and British troops. The defence was ultimately successful and the international force managed to hold off the German attackers until the city was freed by the advancing British 8th Army under the command of Gen. Auchinleck from Egypt.121 The battle of Tobruk became one of the major chapters in the CS's foreign army campaign during the Second World War. Ultimately, Battalion No. 11 remains only one account of a series of very successful military engagements by Czechoslovak exiles during WWII. A number of CS men fought with the armies of foreign states. CS soldiers often joined up with the French Foreign Legion, which took its combatants all over Africa. As members of various foreign units, the CSR took part in many battles in the North African campaign, including crucial clashes such as those at Bir Hakejm or Marsa Matruh.122 The African campaign, coupled with the success of the 1st Czechoslovak Army formed later during the war in the Soviet Union, and the involvement of Czechoslovak fighter pilots in the ranks of Royal Air

122 Zdráhala, Válčil jsem, 94-112.
Force, justified the position as one of the Allies’ most significant contributors to the war effort against the Axis powers, and it certainly aided in resurrecting the CSR after the War.
2. Historical and international context of Czechoslovak-East African relations after the Second World War

2.1. Soviet Policy towards Developing Countries and Africa during the Cold War

In the second half of the 1940s, after the end of the Second World War, the main focus of Soviet interest lay in Central Europe, the Mediterranean and its Asian boundaries. Shortly after the war, the vast colonial empires began to disintegrate and it took several years before a large number of independent states emerged. Most analysts correctly identify Soviet foreign policy of this period as having been completely dominated by Stalin and his global ambitions. However, many of these analysts are misguided in completely disregarding Stalin's interests in the colonial regions which later became independent developing Third World states. While it is certainly true that Soviet involvement in these regions peaked after Stalin's death, and after the collapse of colonial empires, there are several cases which indicate that some of these Third World countries had been considered, if not directly included, in Soviet foreign policy much earlier than that. African countries, however, were not amongst them.

In the first decade after the end of the Second World War Stalin concentrated on achieving and maintaining for the USSR the status of a world superpower and of the only challenger to the USA in its quest for global dominance. His attitude to foreign policy was determined by his dual-world perception of international politics, which as good as ignored the role of the slowly emerging Third World. There were three exceptions which complement the duality concept. In that decade three undertakings considered to be cases of Soviet involvement in the Third World occurred: in Iran in 1946, the Korean peninsula in 1950123 and, indirectly, in Israel between 1947 and 1949. Soviet reluctance to withdraw from Northern Iran and remove its support for local rebels seeking independence from Tehran, as well as, later, its broad support of Kim Ir Sen’s aggressive actions against South Korea, defined and determined the beginning of the Cold War. Both these episodes follow the logic of Stalin's interest in the Third World countries, restricted as it was to security issues. It is this very same logic that resulted in ‘the

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architects of Soviet foreign policy being interested in the geostrategic positions of Libya, Somalia and Eritrea... Soviet diplomacy showed remarkable persistence and flexibility in trying to achieve a Soviet presence in the Mediterranean – the traditional priority for Russian geopolitical aspirations. "124 Both these episodes share another characteristic. It was the Soviet habit to cooperate only with local communist or workers' parties which could be directly controlled from Moscow.125

Long-lasting Soviet attempts to gain direct access to the Mediterranean can partially explain its indirect support of Israel through the CSSR. Besides this motivation, Soviet involvement in the state of Israel can be perceived as an attempt to establish itself in the new region, which promised to be an important theatre in the new period of global politics. The vision of controlling socialist Israel and using it as a base for extensive export of socialism to the region was certainly an attractive one for Stalin. The failure of this plan not only deeply affected traditionally strong Jewish members of European communist parties who incurred Stalin's disfavour, but de facto determined Soviet policy towards the whole of the Middle East for the next four decades. Intensive and long-term support from Moscow of Israel's Arab neighbours and its satellites shaped the political map of North Africa and the Middle East and significantly affected global affairs.

Security aspects and the need permanently to safeguard every corner of the huge Soviet territory defined Soviet foreign policy-making. Plus, the non-existence of communist parties meant that the Africa south of Sahara was not in the spotlight of Stalin's interests. African colonial territories were, for the most part, not considered promising for the future export of communist ideology, the secondary theme of Soviet foreign policy. Local African politicians who had recently started to establish themselves as the leaders of the vanguard nationalist movement were largely looked down upon by the Soviets, who considered them `mere pawns of the Western colonial powers, which were manipulating them into accepting a fake independence.'126

126 Mazov, A distant front, 12.
2.1.1. *Soviet entry into Africa 1953-1965*

It was not before the mid-1950s that the Soviets established substantial relations with Third World countries. This period begins with the death of Stalin and ends in the mid-1960s, when initial results of Soviet involvement in the Third World had to be revised for the first time. It is no coincidence that the dates more or less echo those of Nikita Khrushchev’s time in power. It was his radical split from Stalin’s politics and the heritage it left behind that gave the new impulse to Soviet foreign policy, including that towards Third World countries. The change of guard in the Kremlin coincided with a surge in declarations of independence throughout the collapsing colonial empires. Those responsible were mainly the African national leaders, who were quickly catching up with some of the Asian forerunners. Events in India, the Middle East and South East Asia served to inspire African nationalists and they certainly had a great influence on the political imagination across the African colonies. The wave of nationalism in the Third World countries was very strong from the late 1940s and the countries involved in the anti-colonial struggle communicated and cooperated with each other. The United Nations became the main forum for regular anti-colonial criticism voiced by numerous members of the Third World, by socialist countries and occasionally by the US. Criticism was always loudest at times of crisis for the British, the French or other colonial powers. This was particularly true with the Mau Mau rebellion, the Suez crisis or events in the Congo. All these affairs steadily weakened the position of European colonial nations, and forced them eventually to decide to break official political ties with their colonies.

The conference of unaligned states of Asia and Africa in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 is usually identified as the major starting point of Soviet engagement with the newly-independent countries.\(^{127}\) The political gesture of participation was immediately followed by a very practical step as arms deals with Egypt were carried out with substantial CSSR assistance. In February 1956 engagement with the Third World countries was officially outlined at the 20th Congress of the *Communist Party of Soviet Union*. There follow the three principles of Soviet policy in the Third World:

1. The choice of a 'peaceful coexistence' policy justified by the irreversible reinforcement of the socialist camp and the emergence of a broad 'peace zone' in the new, liberated countries;

2. The willingness of the Soviet Union to offer support for the economic development of these new states;

3. The recognition by the Soviet Union of the 'national bourgeoisie' as the principal vector in the anti-imperialist struggle. \(^{128}\)

Points 2 and 3 in particular later became vital characteristics of Soviet involvement in Africa under Khrushchev's leadership.

Khrushchev's attitude towards the emerging African political elites, which the Soviets referred to as the 'national bourgeoisie', was in total contradiction to Stalin's. The absence of workers' or communist parties in Africa made it inevitable that he would try to establish contacts with nationalist African leaders in order to stand a chance of obtaining political influence there. The social structure in Africa at this time was very different when compared to the Soviet Union and the traditional vehicle for revolutionary ideas, namely the proletariat, was almost completely absent. This could not be ignored by the Soviets and it was clear that ideological goals would have to be postponed for the sake of acquiring immediate political influence.

Soviet relations with Africa in the 1950s suffered greatly as a result of the insufficiently skilled cadres (due to their previously limited involvement in African affairs.)\(^{129}\) While this was a tremendous practical disadvantage in comparison to the English, French or even Americans, especially in the initial stages of establishing contacts, the absence of a colonial past was something that helped the Soviet image throughout the continent. The existing network of Soviet diplomatic offices was generally understaffed and positions were occupied by some of the lowest calibre cadres. A lack of previous relations and skilled staff was why well-established CS links with African countries, though weakened by political persecution of highly-qualified cadres, were so important to the Soviets at this stage. Soviet penetration strategy depended on the strength of the position, after independence, of the former colonial


\(^{129}\) Mazov, A distant front, 23.
power in each case. The weaker the position, the more attractive the prospect became to the Soviets. That is why, while contacts with former British colonies were more widespread, the Soviets initiated contacts in francophone Africa only with Mali and Guinea.

Whether or not Khruschev had any set conceptualised policy of the Soviet involvement in Africa has never been established. One can only trace the main steps and procedures that took place in practice. The political influence of the Soviet Union in Africa was to be acquired through constant propaganda, economic support, technical assistance and the indoctrination of future African elites while studying in Moscow. The ultimate goal was to limit the influence of former colonial rulers, but also that of the USA which, in the late 1950s, also realised the risks and challenges posed by the power vacuum in Africa.

In their propaganda the Soviets considered African broadcasts by Radio Moscow to be an important tool. High Soviet expectations for this project were, however, never really fulfilled, as the broadcasts suffered a number of setbacks. Once again, a lack of Africa experts hampered Soviet ambitions; inappropriate programme content, unappealing to African listeners, further limited the effectiveness of the Soviet Union’s propagandistic goals.¹³⁰

Printed media and publishing were also used for propaganda purposes. Unlike Radio Moscow, oriented entirely towards an African audience, regular newspaper reports, mainly from Guinea and Ghana, helped to raise awareness of Africa within the Soviet Union. Newspapers and journals, mainly of an ideological nature, streamed in the opposite direction by the thousand.¹³¹ The effect of such propaganda on large masses of illiterate Africans could not have been great. The system of scholarships for African students at universities in Soviet Union, however, proved a great deal more significant for future Soviet-African relations and for the development of independent African states.

As regards the success of Soviet engagement in sub-Saharan Africa four groups of countries can be distinguished: those countries where, at least temporarily, the Soviets successfully participated in political and economic relations and influenced local affairs; countries where their attempts would fail due to opposition from the Americans,

¹³⁰ Mazov, A distant front, 20.
¹³¹ Mazov, A distant front, 22.
the British or the French; countries considered potentially viable for Soviet engagement in the near future; lastly, countries which were, for different reasons, not considered suitable for Soviet interest.

Countries which were of the highest interest for the Soviets in this period were Mali, Guinea and Ghana. Guinea, for example, ‘was believed to have become not only a model of socialist orientation but also a showcase for Soviet policy in Africa.’\(^{132}\) Political involvement of these three countries with the Soviets quickly bore fruit in the form of economic loans, weapon deliveries, and technical assistance from numerous Soviet and other eastern bloc experts. ‘Between 1959 and 1964, Guinea, Ghana and Mali received nearly half (44.5%) of the Soviet aid commitment to black Africa... This Soviet aid naturally encouraged its beneficiaries to increase imports of Soviet goods.’\(^{133}\) On the other side of the mutually profitable cooperation, ‘each of these countries had adopted a radical pan-African, anti-Western posture.’\(^{134}\) The Soviets naturally supported these three countries politically. After the fragmentation of Africa’s continental politics, which resulted in the formation of the Brazzaville group\(^{135}\), the Casablanca group\(^{136}\) and the Monrovia group,\(^{137}\) the Soviets praised the Casablanca group for achieving ‘important success in the struggle for economic independence and in strengthening national sovereignty’ while denouncing the Brazzaville group for cooperating with imperialists.\(^{138}\)

Soviet involvement in the affairs of Congo-Leopoldville and Somalia caused the two major failures of Soviet action in this period. In each case they were subjected to US opposition which, in the first case, stopped the penetration of Soviet influence into the newly independent country and, in the second case, managed to considerably postpone it. The complicated and highly-charged situation regarding the former Belgian colony became the theatre for the first powerful clash between Soviet and American ambitions in Africa. The vast size of the country, the abundance of its natural resources and its strategically important position at the centre of the continent were all reasons for the Congo’s playing such an important role for both superpowers.

\(^{132}\) Mazov, A distant front, 129.

\(^{133}\) Laidi, Superpowers, 20-21.


\(^{135}\) Chad, Cameroon, Democratic republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Niger, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Senegal and Ivory Coast

\(^{136}\) Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Guinea

\(^{137}\) Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo and Tunisia

\(^{138}\) Mazov, A distant front, 158.
In July 1960, after Katanga’s secession from Congo-Leopoldville, the Lumumba government requested Soviet military aid in addition to its prior request for UN help. The Soviets responded by first arranging an airlift of Ghanaian troops and supplies [...],[and] in August began sending in additional Soviet aircraft and equipment. In September, however, when the Mobutu-Kasavubu faction ousted Lumumba, Congo’s airports were closed to the Soviets, diplomatic relations were broken, and the initial Soviet military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa ended in a setback.¹³⁹ The later assassination of Lumumba, the vital figure for Soviet intentions in Congo, effectively put an end to their aspirations. The Americans backed Mobutu, who became President and enjoyed permanent western support; as a result, he ruled as dictator for almost four decades.

Those countries considered by Soviet strategists suitable for future Soviet involvement were mainly British colonies in East Africa, Kenya and Uganda. African political parties had already enjoyed a certain amount of support from the USSR before independence. Nevertheless, the strong position of the British, especially in Kenya, did not herald great prospects for exerting Soviet influence in the future. Countries that were considered altogether inappropriate for building closer relations with the USSR were those of the Casablanca group, South Africa, Rhodesia, as well as Angola and Mozambique, which remained solidly part of the intact colonial empire.

By the end of the Khrushchev era the Soviet Union was established in Africa to a degree hardly imaginable ten years previously. It became a strategic partner for several independent states, successfully forming new economic links and significantly weakening the position of the former colonial powers in several cases. Even though it was far from reaching some of the overly ambitious targets envisaged by certain Soviet politicians in the euphoria of 1960, the Soviet Union became a major player in African affairs and, despite its defeat in the Congo, successfully challenged the USA. In the Soviet Union itself, however, these advances were perceived as insufficient and unstable. It is true that the political and economic links the Soviets established with most countries were fragile and often linked to a particular politician. Khrushchev’s critics viewed Soviet success in Africa as woefully inadequate in the light of the effort, financial and human capital invested.

Soviet involvement in the Third World in the mid-1960s hit the limits of Soviet capacities – both economic and political. The Soviets were competing with the

¹³⁹ Hosmer, Wolfe, Soviet policy, 19.
Americans in arming their vast military and, at the same time, they were struggling to support their underdeveloped satellites economically. The Soviet economy, organised on central planning and built on heavy machinery production and mining, began to feel its growing disadvantage compared to western rivals. The Soviets were also unable to keep up the full scale of previous engagement in Africa. In the late 1960s they had to abandon their positions in sub-Saharan Africa while concentrating on affairs in Europe and in south-east Asia. This provisional retreat was used by Soviet strategists for a complete re-evaluation of their involvement in Africa.

The period between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s in Soviet-African relations is characterised as a period of temporary retreat from previous activism in Africa and of reassessment of future plans. Strategy re-appraisal in the early 1970s eventually led to the re-engagement of the Soviets in Africa based on a new theoretical approach, using different means and targeting different countries.

When Nikita Khrushchev was challenged for his leading role as head of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, one of the main criticisms raised against him concerned his politics towards Third World countries. The Soviet strategy of supporting what were now termed bourgeois nationalist movements in Africa, in the hope of their eventually embracing socialism, was, according to his detractors, unsatisfactory in the long term, as several regimes generously sponsored by the Soviets were either overthrown or proved unreliable and uncooperative regarding Soviet aims.\textsuperscript{140} African leaders soon became aware of the possibilities they possessed for manoeuvre thanks to competition between the Soviets and the Americans for dominance in Africa. A wavering allegiance to either superpower guaranteed much-needed economic support, often decisive for their hold on power.

The failure of the previous Soviet strategy in Africa resulted in the need for a complete revision of future involvement in Africa. \textit{In the late 1960s and early 1970s Soviet theorists began developing a twofold solution to the weaknesses that came to be closely associated with the late Brezhnev period. The first aspect was the promotion of parties or national liberation movements that explicitly based themselves on Marxist-Leninist ideology; the second was the encouragement of these groups to transform themselves into formal vanguard parties once in power.}\textsuperscript{141} Toppling some of their former

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{140}] Fukuyama, “Soviet strategy,” 29.
  \item[\textsuperscript{141}] Fukuyama, “Soviet strategy,” 30.
\end{itemize}
African favourites by military coups weakened the Soviet position, and emphasised the provisional removal of the African agenda from the prime interest of the Soviets in favour of the Arab countries and nations in Asia. The fragility of the allied African regimes motivated the Soviets to embark on establishing long-term structural ties with specific African countries mainly through establishing tight economic relations. Partial success in this sphere was achieved with some North African countries, namely Algeria and Egypt. Economic ties were enhanced, in several cases, through close cooperation between political parties in power.142

Frustration over the results of previous cooperation with national democrats in liberated African countries resulted in the introduction of a firmer ideological approach to African states. A certain level of ideological revision had already emerged during the late Khrushchev era by means of greater emphasis on providing assistance to ‘progressive’ rulers who declared a genuine intention to build socialism in their countries.143 Later, ideological orientation towards progressive leaders became the core characteristic of Soviet theoretical and practical approaches in the Third World for the next decade and a half. Exceptions did occur over time, usually justified by the political or economic importance of the country. In Africa, the main exception to the rule was represented by Nigeria, which enjoyed vital Soviet support during the civil war with Biafra between 1967 and 1970, despite its non-socialist orientation.144

2.2. The Demise of British Colonial Rule in Africa after World War II

From today’s perspective the collapse of the British colonial empire seems more or less inevitable, but in 1945 hardly anybody could have predicted how sudden and buoyant the development across the empire would be. Britain’s status after six years of global conflict was completely different from the position in 1939. Some indication of stagnation and the problems of maintaining this vast colonial entity had been slowly

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143 Albright, “The USSR,” 62.
becoming evident even before the war. Despite these factors, no British politician imagined the course of development the empire was about to go through.

In short, the processes that took place across countries overseas dominated by Britain – colonies, dominions or protectorates – could be described as a surprising, to a certain extent controlled, largely inevitable and irreversible official political retreat from power. The perfect definition describes decolonisation `as a partial retraction, redeployment and redistribution of British and European influences in the regions of the extra-European world whose economic, political and cultural life had previously seemed destined to flow into Western moulds.'\textsuperscript{145} The British decolonisation process started in the Middle East in Palestine, South East Asia and in the Indian subcontinent as early as 1947, but the development leading to it had been taking place for years, even decades. It continued in Sudan and West Africa from the mid to late-1950s and peaked in the rest of the African continent during the 1960s. During these two decades Britain was forced by numerous objective factors to reconsider all direct political involvement in its overseas colonies while trying to sustain most of the existing economic ties and to create an effective network of unofficial political influence in the newly independent territories.

Four main approaches are generally accepted as valid perspectives on the British colonial retreat. Each view is characterised by the factor or group of factors it identifies as being decisive for the fall of the British Empire. These perspectives include nationalist, neo-colonialist, planned decolonisation and international pressure factors. Convincing arguments have been presented in favour of all these theories. Nevertheless, one still gets the most accurate account of British decolonisation, in Africa in particular, by accepting a mixture of all of the above. In a very simplified explanation, the nationalist perspective views the rise of nationalist tendencies and political movements across colonies as the prime force behind the collapse of British rule.\textsuperscript{146} Neo-colonialist\textsuperscript{147} and planned decolonisation theories\textsuperscript{148} are somewhat similar as they both identify the colonial side of the relationship as the origin of activities leading towards the end of colonial rule. The level of acceptance in academia is very different, as the planned decolonisation theory was repeatedly found inadequate, while the neo-

\textsuperscript{146} Darwin, Britain, 19.
\textsuperscript{147} Darwin, Britain, 22.
\textsuperscript{148} Nugent, Paul, \textit{Africa since independence} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2004), 23.
colonialist perspective is still popular with many. The perspective which identifies the numerous international pressures as the main determinants of the decolonisation has been gaining in importance in recent years.\textsuperscript{149}

The major factor affecting British post-war involvement in its colonies was its own unhealthy economic situation and the heavy indebtedness affecting all levels of British society in numerous ways. Another factor, vital for the future of the colonies, was the political will and decision-making of several post-war UK cabinets. Lastly, the changing aspirations and expectations of the wider British public, together with its notion of the future of the British Empire, helped to bring about a fast and definite rupture from its colonial past.

The main shortcomings on the British part were the inability to regain control of development and the loss of initiative. In most cases the British cabinet and British authorities in Africa were purely reacting to incidents and events beyond their control. For most of the post-war period British politicians lacked the absolutely vital initiative needed in order to sustain their African colonial empire. Attempted reform policies and other approved political and economic decisions were, in most cases, late, ineffective or inadequate.

The majority of available literature agrees on the fact that neither the British public nor the British government had expected such a sudden and rapid disintegration of the Empire in 1945. The circumstances in which Britain found itself after a victorious, yet devastating, world conflict quickly made it a necessity to deal with a range of problems. First of all, Britain was on the verge of economic bankruptcy, carrying the burden of the huge war debt to the USA and requesting further necessary loans.\textsuperscript{150} America had, amongst the Western allies, been the state to profit most highly from the war.

The Americans were ruthless towards their closest ally when they stated that their condition for providing Britain with financial assistance was the liberalisation of the Sterling area. Such a condition opened up a previously inaccessible trading area,
dominated completely by British Sterling currency, to American dollar competition, and very soon endangered Sterling’s stability and value.151

The US was cautious at first in its criticism of the British colonial empire, but once the momentum of decolonisation started in Asia, the States became ever more articulate about the fact that there was no place for colonialism in the new era. "Washington itself was keen to gain greater access to Africa and realised that this would be easier to achieve if it could deal directly with the Africans rather than with their colonial masters in Europe. Moreover, Washington feared that any postponement of decolonisation would play into the Soviet Union’s hands."152 Some academics, however, argue that, especially in the first decade after the war, the USA was still quite sympathetic to British colonial interests and thus did not exert any great pressure on London to disengage from its colonies. The fact that it took a decade and half for Britain to finally reconsider its colonial future is the supporting evidence for this thesis.153 Unlike the case of South-East Asia, India or the Middle East, until the 1960s the USA had never viewed Africa as its prime interest and British actions here were thus pretty much free of American influence.154 In the later stages, American anti-colonial activities had to be circumspect and they were subject to the wider Cold War strategy of not undermining the balance of power.155

Post-war Britain was committed to extensive rebuilding projects, while social welfare and health system reforms also had to be implemented. Spending all-too scarce funds in distant colonies, necessary to empower British positions there, would be highly unpopular with the British public and the government simply could not afford it financially. Thus, the British economy abandoned the system in which Britain was a creditor and its colonies enjoyed financial support. The wartime economy turned this relationship upside down when African colonies strongly supported a struggling London and made up for the recently loss of produce from some of the surrendered Asian colonies. In post-war years production from African colonies, now more accessible to American trade, provided a significant volume of trade exchange. The core of emerging

151 White, Nicholas J., Decolonisation: the British experience since 1945 (London: Longman, 1999), 5.
152 Van Der Veen, Roel, What Went Wrong with Africa?: a Contemporary History (Amsterdam: KFT Publishers, 2004) 27.
153 Darwin, Britain, 24-25.
154 Darwin, Britain, 169-171.
155 White, Decolonisation, 72-73.
problems linked to growing African discontent lay in the fact that ‘the sterling equivalents were not returned to the African colonies, but were banked in the metropolis.’156

While economic interests had a decisive influence on the development of the British Empire, it was always the nation’s prestige that swayed every British post-war cabinet, whether Labour or Conservative, on decisions concerning the Empire. The first British cabinet after the war was formed by Labour’s Clement Attlee, with the participation of some strong politicians such as Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, and, a powerful figure on the economic front, Herbert Morrison. ‘None of them regarded with distaste the continuation of Britain’s colonial empire or objected to Britain’s pursuit of an independent great power position based on her pre-war spheres of influence outside Europe.’157 A severe economic situation was, however, to force British leaders to reassess or completely revoke several strategically important overseas commitments during the period 1945-1948. It was thanks to American loans that Britain did not, at that point, yet have to completely surrender its overseas aspirations.158 However, it was becoming clear to the whole world that Britain had lost its status as a first global power. At the culmination of the Cold War it was not economically feasible for Britain to sustain the remains of its vast empire while attempting to compete with the USA and the Soviet Union for global influence and keeping up with them in the arms race.

The news reaching the UK from Africa was full of growing discontent, civil riots and strikes. London’s response to the changed situation and charged atmosphere in Africa was three-fold. Britain promised its African colonies a gradual introduction of self-government, British disengagement from African affairs and the prospect of a flourishing economic development. These were meant as responses to the most often articulated African complaints concerning economic hardship and lack of political representation.

The concept of introducing self-government to African colonies was first proposed in 1947 in connection with the Gold Coast, a West African colony which was, according to the British, one of the most politically advanced and which was to be used as a sample case. ‘British leaders claimed that their policy had long been to bring colonial subjects first into local government and then slowly, as they proved worthy, into territorial

156 Nugent, Africa, 27.
157 Darwin, Britain, 71.
158 Darwin, Britain, 75-79.
self-government within the Commonwealth. In practice, it meant a slow, controlled incorporation of regional councils and other bodies of local government and educated elites into more autonomous regional internal self-government. Elections were the new concept introduced to African colonies.

The idea of self-government very soon proved to be insufficient to appease African demands for three reasons. It did not take long before it was clear that the British plan was careful selection of the local politicians and elites to be responsible for self-governance. In that way the British believed they could keep their informal but decisive influence on local affairs, further enhanced by the suggested invitation for each self-governed colony to join the British Commonwealth. Another problem was that the British were quite open about the fact that they did not expect self-governance to be accomplished in the near future; an estimation of one complete generation was the most common view held. Lastly, the self-governance concept was not universally applicable across British Africa. Rather, it was intended mainly for West African colonies, while East and Central Africa, with a large minority of white settlers, were to be omitted. All of these factors became the main limitations of the self-governance concept and, hence, it proved ineffective. African political aspirations and demands very quickly outgrew it.

The second pillar of consolidation of British power across African colonies after the war was economic development. The British government believed that, by improving their African subjects’ well-being, their political demands would be blunted. Several large investment projects were introduced, most of which had little success. The famous groundnut scheme failure from Tanzania best illustrates the limitations many of these initiatives had. Due to the lack of high-quality planning, proposed projects, even though aimed at improving the livelihood of local populations, often met with conflicts with the very same locals they were supposed to help. Environmental issues, cultural and religious conflicts linked to land ownership, the system of beliefs and the value structures of the indigenous people, were the most common reasons for the failures of large developmental projects. Even though some were successful and a number of African colonies were undergoing a period of rapid industrialisation and relative

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159 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 39.
160 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 49-53.
162 White, Decolonisation, 49.
prosperity, the economic profit to the wider public was insufficient to appease political demands.

British civil servants were slow to realise the deep structural changes in their colonies that African society had undergone during the war years. They were unable to address all the African grievances and demands and, therefore, the British grasp on these colonies slowly started to loosen. Initial post-war attempts to address all the new issues proved to be too little, too late. Inevitably, the British approach to African colonies had to change to reflect reality. The intended slow, controlled transfer of power into the hands of carefully chosen members of African autonomous administrations had to be reconsidered. From the late 1950s it was becoming clear that full independence for African colonies would be the only development to appease the populace. Conducting the transfer of power across the range of colonies with different levels of political development, economic performance, social structure or proportion of non-African minorities became the new challenge for the British government.

2.2.1. The roots of African nationalism

While British society and politics did not fundamentally change during the World War, African society was transformed to an unprecedented extent. Some tendencies towards political, economic or social change might already have been occurring before the war, while others were completely new. Some changes were similar to or even directly linked to events and developments in other parts of the British Empire while others were unique to Africa. A combination of all of these events, together with the above-mentioned developments in Britain itself and changes in international affairs, resulted in the rapid dissolution of British rule across Africa. Many identify wartime and post-war development in Africa as the prime reason for the fall of the British colonial system. I tend to believe that they are right, as long as the change in the global political system with its huge impact is taken into consideration as well.

Thousands of African soldiers were conscripted to fight in the colonial army in Africa, Asia or even Europe. African soldiers witnessed the defeats the British suffered and became aware of how the fragility of the vast empire was tested by the Japanese in

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163 Iliffe, Africans, 267.
India and South-East Asia. Britain itself, hanging on the verge of defeat in 1940, with a bloody victory at the last line of defence in Egypt, and the urgent need to defend its Horn of Africa colonies against aggressors – all these were the images placing the colonial masters into a new corner and the previously unquestioned concept of British superiority was now being challenged. The fundamental idea of the moral legitimacy of colonial dominance was called into question by the war. While arguing for the morally superior cause behind the British campaign against Nazi Germany, it was very hard for British politicians to justify the racial inequality found all across British Empire. It was not only Africans who were starting to question the morality of colonialism, but members of the British public as well.

Traditional African society had already started to change before the war. The main reason for this was the new means of economic production. Greater mobility of Africans travelling in order to find work caused more inter-regional migration, the root of future tensions between different tribes. The traditional bond between people and land was endangered and the effects were far-reaching. Similarly, the old economic system was being affected as wage labourers suddenly had access to resources. By acquiring these resources, they could ignore and avoid traditional forms of earning their keep and they became more independent of their leaders and chieftains. Even though British colonial servants used and supported the traditional system of rule, this was now being tested.

Rising demand for African agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee or tea was met mainly by white farmers using modern methods, including mechanisation. Colonial production on these plantations, but also in the ports and in the new mines and factories, demanded a high concentration of the labour force – mainly young men. Despite attempts to isolate the men, the women soon started to follow. Settlements in these locations were growing and some large cities started to evolve. The phenomenon of urbanisation occurred in large parts of sub-Saharan African for the first time and it was to change African society for ever. In these growing cities traditional ways faded into the background and modern society dominated. Urbanisation was soon followed by a population explosion which, in less than a generation, deepened tensions

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164 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 20.
165 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 33.
and frustrations in society, which was failing in so many ways to provide for an expanding population.

Thousands of labourers working together had begun organising unions long before the war. Trade unions became the first of the modern kind of African political organisation, and, in turn, they gave rise to the first modern political parties. During the war, African production had been vital for British success. Trade unions thus grew to new prominence. Poor wages, bad working conditions, and political ignorance became the sparks for a number of strikes, hitting almost every British colony in Africa. Leaders of these strikes were to become the first African politicians who eventually led Africa to independence. In the beginning, trade unions were common only amongst railway workers, public servants and dockyard workers in East Africa. Only after the war did other industrial and agricultural labourers, including miners, begin to form substantial trade unions.167

Trade unions had yet another important role in the newly-emerging politics of Africa. Trade unions from different parts of the continent communicated and cooperated successfully with each other. Pan-Africanism was a commonly shared principle and very popular during this period. However, communication between trade unions was not limited to Africa. They `worked within international trade union organisations, notably the leftist World Federation of Trade Unions, to link their demands for equal wages, for the end of oppressive colonialist legislation, and for fuller recognition of collective bargaining to a world-wide movement.'168 Contacts with Eastern bloc countries on the basis of trade unions were viewed with great concern in Britain and this perception was not completely irrational. In the Soviet Union, as well as in the CSSR, contacts with African trade unionists were seen as an immensely important entry point into African affairs and an opportunity to undermine British rule. These tactics were certainly sound and, to a limited extent, successful, as indicated by the reactions caused. ‘Anti-communist trade unionists in the United States and Great Britain felt obliged to counter this form of labour internationalism by promoting their own trade union organisations in Africa and elsewhere, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and African activists

167 Iliffe, Africans, 266.
168 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 59.
found this organisation, too, would support them in clashes with colonial administration.¹⁶⁹

Due to the swift modern development of African societies in towns and cities, the contrast between urban dwellings and traditional, conservative rural areas was increasing. Originally traditional political and social structures and the village economy came less often into conflict with colonial masters. Up to this point, conflicts had been more common, occurring when it was felt traditional ways were being endangered. This was the case of large agricultural or infrastructural projects after the war, when new practices imposed on farmers were met with great opposition, such as in Tanganyika. Similar opposition occurred when traditional land ownership was contested by colonial authorities.¹⁷⁰ The result was a rural mobilisation in which traditional rulers tried to adapt to modern ways, to cooperate regionally and to oppose the colonial order. Another form of mobilisation of the rural population was linked to local farmers joining forces in their attempts to receive higher prices for their produce and thus to compete with the large white-owned plantations.¹⁷¹

Most of the characteristics typical for post-war development in British African colonies are best illustrated by the Gold Coast example. The Gold Coast, as a colony, had seen its economy perform very well due to the booming demand for its main commodity, cocoa. Adequate financial resources made it possible to implement some of the new British ideas. The British administration also judged recent political developments in the Gold Coast had made it the most evolved of all the colonies. However, a wave of strikes hit the country and this, for the colonial authorities, was an indication that it was time to instigate political reform. The original political party, the United Gold Coast Convention, as approved by the British and expected to lead the colony in a convenient direction, was very quickly challenged by the more radical Convention People’s Party led by ex-UGCC member and Western-educated pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah.¹⁷²

Nkrumah’s views were far too radical for the British administration, but it was exactly the kind of demand the masses in Africa shared. Nkrumah’s imprisonment only strengthened his position and his persuasive election victory put the British into a

¹⁶⁹ Cooper, Africa since 1940, 59.
¹⁷⁰ Cooper, Africa since 1940, 21.
¹⁷¹ Cooper, Africa since 1940, 59.
¹⁷² Iliffe, Africans, 283.
corner. Nkrumah was released, formed his government and effectively steered the colony towards its independence in 1956. His autocratic style and lack of political experience, however, soon lost him his universal popularity.\footnote{Iliffe, Africans, 297.} British attempts to award more autonomy to its model colony and lead it steadily to self-governance and away from British rule went completely wrong, and another of the colonial jewels was lost from Britain’s crown.\footnote{Nugent, Africa, 27-29.}

British plans elsewhere in Africa were quite different, namely in the east and the centre of the continent. British politicians did not believe ‘\textit{that the remaining African colonies were ready for independence. Most were economically weak; all were inadequately prepared.}’\footnote{Meredith, Martin, \textit{The State of Africa} (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 90.} As mentioned above, due to the presence of significant minorities of white settlers, the idea of Kenyan or Rhodesian independence was contemplated with much greater caution. The future of the colonies was discussed in depth with the representatives of these settlers, but the final arrangement was in both cases very different from the British plans.

In East Africa, namely Kenya, the post-war decade was marked by an unprecedented wave of violence. The conflict arose from the discontent of the indigenous people of Kikuyu who were struggling for land ownership after white settlers expelled them from Kenya’s most fertile lands, traditionally held by the Kikuyu. Frustrated young men, with no access to the land ownership which conventionally would mark their coming of age and their status within society, began to attack white settlements. Conflict quickly grew in intensity and the wave of violence, the results of which included dozens of white farmers and thousands of Africans being killed, paralysed Kenya. The reaction of the colonial British administration was harsh and resolute. Thousands of convicted or suspected Mau Mau fighters were killed or locked up in concentration camps. The insurgency was eventually suppressed, but there were many lessons to be learnt.\footnote{Meredith, The State, 78-81.}

The British colonial administration showed its willingness to accept that emerging African political initiatives had their limits, and movements as radical as Mau Mau would be met with strong opposition. On the other hand the British realised how fragile the balance of power was in their colonies and they certainly wanted to prevent
the spread of Mau Mau insurgency in Africa. With the African population continually growing in size and frustration, any similar insurgencies occurring elsewhere in the continent would be very costly in terms of both lives and resources and might irreversibly harm future British economic interests should the African colonies become independent.

The Mau Mau rebellion attracted much attention globally and news of some of the methods used by the British to suppress it gave rise to considerable criticism. The revolt was certainly one of the major factors behind the British decision to expedite all arrangements for a peaceful transfer of power and a colonial departure from Africa. This decision was met with much criticism amongst white settlers, who felt London had abandoned them. It is certainly true that any white-settler hopes of being able to rule an independent Kenya were more or less totally destroyed by the manner of the British departure; nevertheless, this was the only feasible way to avoid a resurrection of the conflict, this time with new intensity and without any British support for the white population of Kenya. It was the will of the white settler population to unite different territories into federations. However, with the lack of support from London, the Central African Federation and East African Federation projects were destined to fail.177

The experience learnt from the Gold Coast, Tanganyika, Kenya or Nigeria, international and domestic pressure and economic interests, all occurring during the ten years after the end of the war, resulted in colonial administrations realising the inevitability of the African route towards independence. ‘French and British governments on the one hand and African movements and leaders on the other struggled with and occasionally fought each other, and ended up defining a certain kind of decolonisation, one which opened up some political possibilities and shut down the others. Supra-national possibilities – federations of more than one territory, and Pan-Africanist imaginings – were excluded from the political map. And as British and French governments came to realise that hanging on to power would be too painful and costly, they made clear that the responsibility for the consequences of these decolonisations would fall on African shoulders.’178

177 Meredith, The State, 78.
178 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 66.
2.3. **Foreign policy of socialist Czechoslovakia after the Second World War**

2.3.1. **War origins of Czechoslovak convergence towards the Soviet Union**

Once the war was over in Europe the Czechoslovak state was swiftly resurrected within its former boundaries\(^\text{179}\) but in a very different political climate, both domestic and international. The leaders of the main allied powers split their spheres of influence\(^\text{180}\), with Czechoslovakia falling firmly into the Soviet zone, mainly due to the fact that the greater part of its territory had been liberated by the Soviet and Romanian armies during the spring of 1945. The far-reaching implications of this arrangement in regards to its democratic nature were not fully appreciated by leading Czechoslovak politicians at the time. The leader of the CS exiled government in London, last president of the First Czechoslovak Republic and first post-war head of state, Edvard Beneš, also welcomed the decision and ‘was greatly content that Czechoslovakia was incorporated into Soviet sphere of operations.’\(^\text{181}\) As on so many other occasions, Beneš’ ability to predict the political development proved woefully inadequate.

Early developments in the politics of the resurrected CSR were mostly in the hands of the returning exiled CS political elites from both the Soviet Union and from the United Kingdom (UK). During the war there had been two main groups of CS political representation: in London and in Moscow. Similarly, two initially independent CS exile armed forces were created. In London political leadership was formed around the figure of the last pre-war CS president, Beneš.\(^\text{182}\) While Beneš spent six war years mainly in the UK, Klement Gottwald, for many years a chairman of the Communist party of

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\(^{179}\) With the exception of the easternmost region of Trans-Carpathian Ukraine that was now incorporated into the Soviet Union.

\(^{180}\) The destiny of small European states was agreed by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt long before the end of the war at conferences in Tehran in November 1943 and in Yalta in February 1945. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and all of the Balkans were to be incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence, while Greece and Italy would remain with the West.

\(^{181}\) Kalvoda, Role, 175.

\(^{182}\) In the first years of the war, Beneš and his National Council struggled for recognition by Allied governments. Despite previous frequent criticism by both French and British governments Beneš became the leading personality of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government. Eventually, this body was recognised by Allies as the main and legitimate political representation of the people. Unlike the exile governments of Yugoslavia and Poland, Beneš soon became very positive towards cooperation with the Soviets. This caused a great deal of criticism in Beneš’ own team, and Beneš’ lack of cooperation and arrogance towards other exiled politicians gave him the aura of a dictator.
Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) formed another CS exile group in Moscow.

During the war Beneš was unaware of any existing Soviet strategy for communist dominance in Central Europe, in which the CSSR played a vital role. His unexpected tolerance was surprising, even for the Soviets, who did not hesitate to include him in their post-war plans. In 1943 Beneš was invited to Moscow to meet with Stalin and Gottwald. The visit was used by Stalin to propose the new treaty between the Soviets and the Czechoslovak government. ‘Signing of a Treaty of Friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union on 12th December 1943, which was in effect for 20 years, had far-reaching consequences not only for Czechoslovakia, but also for whole of Central and Eastern Europe.’ The treaty legitimised, to a great extent, Stalin’s interference in Czechoslovakia and weakened the democratic opposition parties to the point where democracy in Czechoslovakia could not survive. The Soviet political strategy in Czechoslovakia proved to be correct as Beneš’ role turned out to be a decisive factor leading to the communist victory which determined the fate of the CSSR for decades.

Gottwald’s Communists enjoyed wide public support in Czechoslovakia in the post-war years. The combination of popular encouragement, the structural weaknesses of democratic principles in the CS political system, strong Soviet support and Soviet-inspired ruthlessness in conducting politics brought Gottwald quickly to power. This favourable set of conditions allowed Gottwald to dominate the democratic system in the CSSR in less than three years. Once power was firmly in hands of the KSČ, dismantling of democratic principles of the Czechoslovak political system was accomplished in a matter of weeks.

In years to follow the political struggle between East and West took over all aspects and spheres of European political affairs. Czechoslovakia, once the object of this unfolding rivalry between East and West, soon became an active agent of the Cold War and an important ally of the USSR in Central Europe. The significance of Czechoslovakia in Soviet expansionist aspirations was based on several crucial facts. The country is located in the strategically important position at the very centre of the continent, critical

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183 Kalvoda, Role, 163.
184 Kalvoda, Role, 144.
in the case of armed conflict in this region. Czechoslovakia possessed the most developed and least damaged industrial economy of all socialist countries. Control over CS resources was vital if Stalin realistically wanted to compete economically with the West. ‘Czechoslovakia, as the most industrially developed country of the Soviet bloc, was charged with over-dimensioned production tasks: on the one hand, Czechoslovak industry greatly participated in the industrialisation of other economically less developed Comecon countries, while on the other hand rapidly increasing the volume of its arms production. Czechoslovakia became the object of pressure from Soviet Union and other countries to maximise the rate of growth of strategically important production.’

In an attempt to prepare the socialist bloc for universally expected western aggression, large areas of CS industry were given over to arms production and the whole arms industry was programmed to work as if in a ‘war time regime’. In January 1951 a ‘plan for maximum arms production’ was introduced. Its goal was to ‘equip the Czechoslovak army so that it would, by the end of 1953, be ready to conduct active defence.’ In 1952 armaments manufacture represented more than a quarter of all engineering production. Czechoslovakia was by this point supplying most of its partners from the Warsaw Pact, but it still had large supplies of arms and weaponry available for exports to other countries. As it was becoming clearer that no open armed conflict with West was on the horizon, the Ministry of National Defence was able to release more of its supplies for export. In the years to follow, Czechoslovak weapon deliveries became more and more common all over the world. Arms and ammunition from Czechoslovakia were provided in line with newly formed ideological terms formulated in Moscow: providing support world-wide to ‘friendly’ regimes. Most recipients of this ‘special’ support were the economically less developed countries in South and South-East Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, soon to be joined by freshly independent states in sub-Saharan Africa.

1945 was the year the world entered the nuclear age. The Soviets were at this point lagging behind the USA with their own nuclear programme. While the technological delay was partially compensated for by the capture of results and some leading scientists of Hitler’s nuclear programme, the necessary raw materials had not

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185 Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, 269.
186 Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, 280.
187 Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, 280.
yet been located in the Soviet Union by 1945. Therefore the inter-governmental agreement between the CSR and the USSR, signed as early as 23 November 1945, was of the utmost significance. This secret agreement dealt with the mining of uranium bearings around the town of Jáchymov. By signing the agreement, the Soviets were able to get hold of the uranium and radium necessary for the development of their own atomic bomb. The agreement was already in place before the communist take-over as, for the Soviets, unobstructed control over uranium mines was of the highest strategic importance. The status quo within the world’s balance of power was maintained largely due to the fact that Soviets were able to get effective control over Czechoslovak uranium.

The final reason for Soviet interest in the CSSR, and no less important than the others, involved the ideological and propaganda values. The CSSR was an example of a country where communists prevailed in a reasonably non-violent or downright democratic manner. CS experience was to be used in the future in ‘the export of revolution’ around the world. Some characteristics of the CS communist coup were later applied during the Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro.188 Czechoslovak economic successes were also important tools for the Soviet bloc’s global propaganda machinery. The technological achievements of the highly developed Czechoslovak industry and the improvements brought by collectivised agriculture were powerful images giving hard supporting evidence to the ideological message of triumphant socialist revolution. In decades to come, African countries received a fair share of this propaganda.

2.3.2. **Czechoslovak foreign policy and trade after the World War II and the communist take-over**

The steady convergence towards the Soviet Union that resulted in the communist victory in 1948 had far-reaching implications for the political and economic landscape of post-war Czechoslovakia. The three years between the end of the war and the communist coup d’état witnessed a complete turnaround in Czechoslovak foreign policy. In 1945 the CS government outlined its foreign political orientation within its first peace programme as follows. ‘The foundation of our foreign politics was already laid during the previous war. The alliance with the Soviet Union, as declared in the Treaty of

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188 Many of his close acquaintances were trained and indoctrinated in the CSSR in the 1950s in subjects ranging from partisan warfare all the way to agricultural reform. (Kalvoda, Role, 244-245).
1943, remains the crucial principle of our foreign politics also in time of peace, as we understand that the Soviet Union is the most reliable guarantee of our freedom and independence [...] In order to express the immense gratitude to the Soviet Union of the Czech and Slovak nation, the government shall consider the closest alliance with the victorious Slavonic superpower in the East to be an unwavering principle of Czechoslovak foreign policy. The treaty [...] of mutual help, friendship and post-war cooperation will forevermore determine our state’s foreign politics position."189 Principles on which foreign politics were to be based were clearly defined and the orientation towards the Soviet Union could not have been stressed more strongly. At the same time, the position and prestige of western Allies remained high among the population and most of the active political parties and this fact was reflected in the government’s programme as strong links of friendly nature to western Allies were highly regarded.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was run in the post-war period by Jan Masaryk, the son of the first president and a respected and highly-educated Western-oriented diplomat. In March 1946, in one of his speeches, he outlined the position in which Czechoslovakia was trying to place itself in the international context. He said that ‘Czechoslovakia is bound to the USSR with a permanent, sincere and consistent alliance which shall never become the matter of parties’ quarrels. However at the same time we are interested in fostering friendly relations with the United Kingdom, USA and France.’190 Similarly, but in greater detail, the CS’s foreign politics were outlined by Klement Gottwald after the elections of 1946 in an approved government programme. The main emphasis was once again on relations with the Soviet Union, but prospects of an intensification of relations, both political and economic, with the UK and the USA were also highlighted. Good relations with France, a cautious attitude towards Germany, friendly bonds with Yugoslavia, Poland, Bulgaria, Austria and Romania were amongst other listed principles of Czechoslovak foreign policy at this point. In international organisations, the CS government promised to work towards the reconstruction of world peace.191 The ambition of President Beneš to become the bridge between East and West, which he often mentioned, was however never fulfilled.

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189 Slovenská národná rada. Košický vládny program (SNR, 1945), as Quoted in Zbořil, Československá a česká, 207.
191 Zbořil, Československá a česká, 212-213.
The CSSR became very active in the post-war years on the international scene and participated in a number of bilateral and multilateral proceedings. It became a founding member of the United Nations, joined the Breton Woods agreement, participated in the creation of the World Health Organization and signed a number of technical international agreements.\textsuperscript{192} The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs also took part in the 1946 Paris war reparations talks. A number of loan agreements were signed with the USA, New Zealand, the Soviet Union and other countries.\textsuperscript{193} The CS population benefited to a great extent from the \textit{United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration} (UNRRA). A number of trade agreements were signed, mainly with the countries of South America.\textsuperscript{194}

In practice, Czechoslovakia’s official external political relations were conducted at three main levels – the lowest level of contacts between political parties and civil organisations, at the middle level of bilateral contacts with other countries, and at the highest level between different international organisations. However, the lowest level of contacts did not necessarily mean they were of the lowest significance. Also, the contacts within one level varied greatly according to the partner. For example, the importance of contacts between the KSČ and the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had over time gained much more significance than, for example, CS activities at UNESCO, which fell technically into the highest category. The actual importance of the different levels and forms of contact could be estimated by the respective influence on political decision-making in the CSSR. For example, while consultations between trade union leaders from the CSSR and the USSR would regularly result in government legislation and decision-making after being approved by the Central Committee of the KSČ, declarations of CS representatives in UNESCO would often have only declaratory importance and did not affect real politics.

Soon after the war, and by the order of Minister Masaryk, the CSSR started with the reconstruction of its network of diplomatic offices. While the CSR in 1938 had been running 85 proper and 138 honorary diplomatic offices, by 1947 it had 64 proper diplomatic offices and 43 honorary consulates.\textsuperscript{195} Addis Ababa was one of the planned

\textsuperscript{192} Eg. European Central Inland Transport Organisation (ECITO), Consultative Committee on International Radio (CCIR) etc.
\textsuperscript{193} Petřuf, Československá zahraničná, 10-15.
\textsuperscript{194} Zbořil, Československá a česká, 213-215.
\textsuperscript{195} Zbořil, Československá a česká, 219-220.
offices in 1947. No sudden decolonisation of Africa was expected and therefore no ambitious foreign political objectives were formulated for Czechoslovak engagement south of the Sahara. In striking similarity to the situation after the First World War, Africa was once again on the periphery of interest in this initial stage of building diplomacy contacts. This was owed to a great extent to the fact that colonial dominance over Africa was still intact and the continent lacked the anti-colonial momentum that was already driving political change in Asia.

One can identify several main affairs in the CS foreign policy of this time that indicated the CSSR’s firm course of approach to the Soviet Union. The most important was the affair over participation in the European Recovery Program, notoriously known as the Marshall Plan. The CS government was officially invited to join the ERP in July 1947, and it welcomed this development. Stalin’s harsh reaction was immediate and Gottwald’s government was quickly forced to withdraw from talks and from participating in the Marshall Plan in the CSSR. Western diplomats perceived this act as a final CS step into the Soviet Union sphere of influence.

The Communist’s Victorious February of 1948 marked the beginning of four decades of complete KSČ dominance of all aspects of the Czechoslovak state, economy and society. The huge Soviet-inspired structural changes of the Czechoslovak economy included land reform, collectivisation in agriculture, further industrialisation, complete nationalisation of all sectors of economy, and monetary reform. They were all implemented in the new conditions of central planning of state and had an immense effect on Czechoslovak society. In the foreign policy sphere bilateral relations with the Soviets grew to paramount importance while relations with western countries were limited to the most basic necessary contacts. Czechoslovakia became an active member of the Soviet bloc international organisations serving as a platform for cooperation with other socialist countries. For economic cooperation the CSR joined Comecon, for the purposes of shared security it signed a Warsaw pact treaty and for official talks with communist parties in power it participated in the Informbyro. The general consensus at the Informbyro in 1948 was that ‘imperialists’ were getting ready for war and the outburst of conflict was expected no later than 1953.196 The western border of the CSSR

196 Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, 269.
was thus seen as likely to become the battlefront, and the whole of the country was crucial as a strategic base for Eastern bloc countries.

The Informbyro of Communist and Workers’ Parties, founded in September 1947, immediately became a new platform for effective Soviet control over the ruling communist or workers’ parties in the region. Suggestions and declarations from the Soviet representative Zdanov were binding for the representatives of other countries. Therefore once Zdanov declared that the world was divided into an ‘imperialist and antidemocratic camp led by the USA, and a camp of democracy and peace led by the USSR’ this perception of global political affairs had to be adopted by all the member countries. Participation of important CS representatives at Informbyro was in itself a clear indication which camp the CSSR itself felt to be part of. From then on strong political links with Eastern bloc countries were further enhanced in the economic sphere through a number of new trade agreements with Bulgaria, Poland, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

2.3.3. The chain of command in socialist Czechoslovakia’s official foreign political relations

Political and diplomatic relations of socialist Czechoslovakia are described below. External political relations were being implemented on four main levels. The order given here is not intended in any way to reflect the significance of the respective level of relations.

1. Official state relations in the field of various international organisations – United Nations (UNESCO, UNICEF etc.), COMECON, Organisation of African Unity, Non-aligned movement, etc. Participating CS personnel were most often recruited from the ministries, the Communist Party, or else they were experts employed by various Foreign Trade Enterprises (FTEs).

2. Inter-state relations at the level of presidents, governments, single ministries, national legislative bodies, armed forces, intelligence services, police, etc. The most highly visible but not necessarily the most crucial sphere and level of external relations.
3. International relations at the level of political parties – this was the decisive and most significant level and sphere of external political relations during the Cold War. The KSČ had tight control of all CS participators, and a similar hold was often in force concerning autocratic African regimes.

4. Diplomatic relations. Embassies, consulates – officially standard diplomatic duties. In practice, the majority of diplomatic staff were recruited by State Security. In Africa some of the consulates (Leopoldville, Pretoria) were of huge significance for socialist penetration into Africa.

At all four levels cited above, the Communist Party (KSČ) was the mastermind, if not always the performer, of external relations. The KSČ was the only institution possessing absolute power in the CS political system. To understand the strategy and practice of CS external political relations, it is crucial to be familiar with the internal structure of the KSČ ‘chain of command’.

The central governing body of the KSČ was the Central Committee of the KSČ, consisting of 150 members and 50 “candidates” (members in reserve). These were elected in the national congress of the KSČ, which took place irregularly every couple of years. The Central Committee of the KSČ was organised both horizontally and vertically. The head of the Central Committee was the First (or General) Secretary, leading both the Presidency (the highest-level cabinet of the party) and the Secretariat of the KSČ. The First Secretary of the KSČ was the most powerful person in the country, and his status was eventually institutionalised via the automatic assumption of the post of President of the Republic. One level below the First Secretary were the different specialised departments (e.g. International Relations Office) of the Central Committee.

Meetings of the Central Committee took place three or four times every year, where issues related to organisation, activities and cadres of KSČ were addressed and the candidates for the party’s Secretariat and Presidency were elected. The governing body of the Central Committee was the Presidency (also known as the Politbyro) of the Central Committee of the KSČ. The Presidency of the Central Committee usually had around 12 members who were delegated by the Central Committee, which also appointed secretaries of the Central Committee of the KSC and the First (or General) Secretary of the Presidency of the KSČ. The second highest governing body of the Central Committee, the Secretariat, had up to 13 members, who were Secretaries of the KSČ and
several other high-ranking party members. The internal rules of delegation and election of members for the leading bodies of the KSČ were not always clearly formulated and thus were easily manipulated. The nomination of candidates was often decided in Moscow and the vote, not unusually unanimous, was a formality.

The Presidency of the Central Committee of the KSČ was the organ which governed the CSSR from 1948 through to 1989 and was where all vital political decisions were made. Meetings of the Presidency took place at least once a week and commonly dealt with the material provided by the ministries, army, and national companies, and represented the agenda typically dealt with by the cabinet. The material presented to the Presidency was usually already analysed and approved by the appropriate Secretariat and by the other ministries that might have been concerned with it. 'Available documents do not enable exact interpretation of the Presidency [...] It is not quite clear how individual decisions were adopted [...] or whether the concrete issues were subject to being voted for or whether they were approved unanimously.' The First Secretary had a decisive influence on the actions of the Presidency for two reasons. Not only did he decide what the Presidency would be dealing with, but he also had full control over Presidency declarations and decisions. Even though the First Secretary was nominally elected by the KSČ Congress, his real power stemmed from the approval of the Soviets. The Soviets unofficially chose and approved every man who acquired this highest rank in the KSČ, and they naturally always picked the candidate who could be easily controlled by them and who could be relied upon to stay in line with Soviet politics. Once a First Secretary lost Soviet backing it did not take long before he was replaced, as was the case of both Antonín Novotný and Alexander Dubček.

All crucial decisions in the sphere of external relations were reserved for the Presidency and, thus, for the personal approval of the First Secretary of the KSČ. Here, individual decisions as well as long-term strategies formed by the Ministries were amended, approved and sent back for implementation. Compatibility with Soviet activities had to be checked at the highest places. The Presidency also held the power to appoint high diplomatic officials – ambassadors and chargés d'affaires – to the CS network of diplomatic offices abroad. With these wide-ranging powers and regular

197 Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 22-23.
198 Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 23.
implementation of approved strategies the Presidency kept tight control over CS foreign policy.

There is no doubt that a certain level of autonomy in the execution of approved strategies still existed and that practical implementation by ministry employees, diplomats, foreign trade representatives, technicians and other participating personnel often differed significantly from the official line. This was caused by concurrent developments in the sphere of external relations, the pace of which at times was too fast to be reacted upon at the highest level. Another reason was that often Presidency or ministry directives were too ideologically dogmatic, lacking an expert overview, thus rendering them unrealistic and impractical. One can only speculate as to what extent the members of the Presidency were aware of this disparity between officially approved policies and those that were actually carried out. It would not be surprising if a certain level of manipulation of the directives was more or less taken as read and, perhaps, welcomed, even by actual members of the Presidency.

Less important aspects of external politics fell within the structures of the Central Committee in the agenda of the Secretariat and at the Department of External Relations. The Secretariat was in charge of more practical issues than the responsibilities of the Presidency.199 The Secretariat occupied itself mainly with personnel issues: amongst other things, it appointed low rank diplomats. Furthermore, the Secretariat intervened in foreign politics to the extent of granting travel permits to journalists, scientists and persons involved in cultural affairs, and it also periodically received reports from various organisations involved in international relations.200 The Secretariat of External Relations was, meanwhile, responsible mostly for the external relations of the KSČ itself. It usually dealt with the KSČ’s foreign visitors and foreign trips organised for members of the General Committee of the KSČ. Besides that, they had an influence on the cadre structure and activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, managed relations with international organisations located in the CSSR and, eventually, went on to supervise international student programmes in the CSSR.201

Universal state control imposed on all production after 1948 meant that also the authorities responsible for foreign trade had to be completely reorganised. Officially,

199 Judr Eduard Kukan, interview with the author, Bratislava, Slovakia, March 18, 2011
200 Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 23.
201 Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 23.
foreign trade was declared a state monopoly having Ministry of Foreign Trade as its supreme body. In a wider context the arrangement signified state monopoly over external economic relations.\textsuperscript{202} The bodies directly responsible for executing the foreign trade transactions were initially licensed enterprises for foreign trade, organised like a joint stock company, and later transformed into foreign trade enterprises which were active in specialised fields of production.\textsuperscript{203} The state’s philosophy on its monopoly in foreign trade stressed several advantages this organisation provided: ‘ensuring economic independence from capitalist states, protecting the domestic market from fluctuations on world markets, facilitating cooperation with socialist countries, incorporating centrally regulated trade into the system of national economy planning and uniting management of export and import in unison with trade policy and internal public-wide interests.’\textsuperscript{204} The character of the CS economy predetermined the commodities exported. Consumer goods production made up a significant proportion of total exports. The most popular exports in this sphere were textiles, leather products and glassware. Production and export of machines, transport vehicles and industrial machinery were favoured by the state and heavily subsidised. This included complete investment units, power plants, electric motors, vehicles of all kinds and weapons.\textsuperscript{205}

\section*{2.3.4. The position of StB in Czechoslovak government structure}

After the coup of 1948 the KSČ party structure existed in parallel to traditional state legislative and executive bodies in the CSSR. The national government, members of which were nominated by the KSČ’s Presidency, was responsible for the execution of directives issued by the Presidency of the Central Committee of the KSČ. Cabinet ministers were bound to follow the directives and strategies approved by the Presidency of the KSČ and they were officially supervised by different party organs, but still enjoyed a certain level of autonomy in the execution of approved policies. The ministries most relevant for this thesis are mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of the Interior.

\textsuperscript{202} Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, 566.
\textsuperscript{203} Eg. Strojexport responsible for heavy machinery exports, Motokov exporting light machinery, Skloexport dealing with glass and glassware exports etc.
\textsuperscript{204} Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, 566.
\textsuperscript{205} Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, 575.
The organisational structure of the government changed several times as different ministries were created or dissolved. The change in the system of government most significant for this research took place in 1956 when the 1st Directorate of the National Security Corps – or, as it was generally known, StB (Státní bezpečnost – State Security Services) – became an independent institution within the government. Before this date the StB had previously been subject to the Interior Ministry and with the new arrangement, its powers and independence increased considerably. In relation to all three East African case studies the activities of the StB represented a huge and important part of CS external relations with these countries.

StB activities have only recently begun to be thoroughly studied as older collections of governmental archives are being progressively made accessible. Much specific information still remains unclear about the internal structure of the service, as well as its modus operandi. Available documents, however, allow one to reconstruct East African activities of the StB in the 1960s to an extent sufficient for the purposes of this research.

CSSR intelligence services, though commonly known as the StB, consisted of several fairly independent agencies with various responsibilities not differing greatly much from the Western counterparts. Their main fields of activities were domestic espionage, domestic counter-espionage and foreign espionage. In relation to East Africa, StB responsibilities involved technical cooperation in Czechoslovakia as well as in Africa, the execution of Active Measures that mostly took place in Africa, the gathering of case-relevant intelligence in Czechoslovakia as well as in Africa, surveillance of enemy persons, surveillance and, where appropriate, also recruitment of potential collaborators.

Those StB activities concerning East Africa taking place within Czechoslovakia included mainly analytical work, management and execution of technical assistance and working with foreign nationals from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. When it comes to foreign nationals located in the CSSR, StB activities were mostly of a dual nature; these persons were watched to ensure their activities did not constitute a risk to national security and/or they were being assessed for use by the StB itself. StB agents maintained daily surveillance and detailed analyses of persons thought potentially relevant for the

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operational objectives of the StB or for intelligence purposes. Such persons were commonly referred to as types.

There were several stages of operational procedures in the development of working contact with types. Initially, StB operatives would try to estimate their general potential for StB purposes, and in later stages they were evaluated for use in specific actions. If considered relevant in any respect, the type was discreetly approached by an StB operative or agent, who further analysed the type’s inclination for willing cooperation or, at least, for unwittingly providing the StB with various items of intelligence – such a procedure would have been known as mining. In the majority of cases, people became the source of intelligence for the StB without ever being aware of it. In those cases where a type was considered suitable and likely to engage in cooperation, the StB operative would offer the person some kind of working arrangement to fulfil the objectives. In the case of mutual consent, specifics of cooperation were agreed upon, such as reward, communication routine, objectives, etc., and the type would at this point become known as a contact while the particular StB agent that approached him would become its managing organ.

Cooperation between the contact and the managing organ could be established at varying levels of commitment. The StB in general recognised several categories of cooperating contacts – a confidant, an associate, an agent. All would be used for routine intelligence work, the objectives and particular arrangements of which differed from case to case. Usually, regular meetings, briefings, instruction sessions or simply information exchange were arranged between the managing organ and the contact. Such cooperation remained in place as long as was considered beneficial by StB analysts, as long as the contact was willing to cooperate, and as long as conditions made it feasible. Only a small proportion of all types under consideration were ever successfully brought to the contact stage. In most cases, types proved to be either of no interest for the StB or there was no potential for willing consent to cooperation. Among successfully established contacts, once again only a fragment proved to be of high importance to the StB. Most contacts were dismissed after several years for a variety of reasons, most often for low usefulness of provided intelligence.
2.4. **Czechoslovak-African relations after 1945 and the creation of the Africa policy**

2.4.1. **Foreign policy towards Africa resurrected**

The lack of promising economic opportunities and complicated access via the colonial centres meant that the African continent was de facto proclaimed by the post-war CS government to be of little interest to them and it was largely ignored in their plans. Due to constant budget constraints that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to deal with, openings of new embassies in Africa were not included in immediate short-term planning. The only exception was the CS embassy in Ethiopia, which had been planned since the mid-1930s, but the outbreak of war had postponed it indefinitely. The only active regular office in independent Africa that CS diplomacy possessed in 1946 was a general consulate in Cape Town in the South African Union. The number of CS expatriots living in the South African Union was significant and members of this community had intensive contact – cultural and economic – with their homeland. Besides serving the ex-pat community, the consulate was mainly concerned with trade. Numerous South African companies cooperated with CS exporters in a range of spheres, from glass production to machinery. Two CS honorary consulates were up and running in Dakar and Nairobi, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1950 closed all offices of this kind around the world. Attempts to establish regular consulates in colonial lands, in Southern Rhodesia in 1956 and Nigeria in 1958, were rejected by local colonial authorities.

In the turbulent days of February 1948, the consulate in Leopoldville in the Belgian Congo was established as one of the last foreign policy decisions of the democratic regime in the CSR. Paradoxically, it was this very office that proved so useful for the Soviet bloc during the Congolese independence struggle against the Belgians. No other Eastern bloc diplomatic office was accredited in the Belgian Congo prior to independence, and thus Jan Virius' consulate was the only channel of contact with the

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207 Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 100-105.
210 Olša, “Českoslovenští diplomáté,” 100.
211 NAA F. 1261/0/4 č.j. 323/3, Feb 1963, 1, l. 4.
Soviets and their allies for independence movements. After Congo received independence, the CS diplomatic office remained active as a prolonged arm of the USSR in the region and also cooperated with Angolan freedom fighters from here. In 1961, for example, the consul’s office helped to organise the special material delivery for 3000 soldiers, which was approved by the Politbyro, but delayed due to logistical problems.

2.4.2. The formation of a Czechoslovak Africa policy and its implications for various forms of CS involvement in African affairs

The second half of the 1950s saw the beginning of a new era in formal political Czechoslovak-African relations. This period was marked by growing activism in CS foreign policy, especially in the relation to the Third World countries – or, then also commonly called economically less developed countries (hereafter ELDCs) – including Africa. In numerous historical documents the term ‘Bandung atmosphere’ is repeatedly used. This term refers to the Conference of African and Asian nations that took place in 1955 in Indonesia and at which participating countries expressed their opposition to any form of imperialism, regardless of whether it came from West or East, a formulation that predestined the future creation of a non-aligned countries movement. The conference was a reaction to decolonisation processes already taking place in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and it certainly had its share of influence on the spread of decolonisation south of the Sahara in subsequent years.

In what was called the ‘post-Bandung atmosphere’, official CS foreign policy activities, conducted mainly by the MFA and the KSČ Foreign Office grew exponentially as not only the number of potential partners for bilateral relations, but also that of international organisations multiplied. A turning point in Czechoslovak activities towards Africa can be seen during the years 1955-56, when more and more critical

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212 NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 3357, 1.9.1959, 2-3, l. 4-5. The CS consul was in contact with the ABAKO NLM as well as the MNC of Patrice Lumumba. Representatives of ABAKO approached the consul with requests for training of officers and future technical assistance. The consul recommended the MFA provide such assistance disguised as courses for Guinean soldiers.
213 MZV F. IV/6, 10, č.j. 026.620/64-10, 27.6.1964, 18.
215 In the historical material of Czechoslovak origin, African, Arab and Asian countries before but mainly after independence are referred to variously depending on their geographical locations, political allegiance and/or economic performance. Amongst the commonest terms were: Third World countries, colonial and dependant lands, economically less-developed countries, unaligned countries, eastern countries etc.
voices from the highest-ranking CS officials and members of the Politbyro regarding the lack of activism and poor performance in past years, especially before 1955, were directed towards the Third World countries. Previous passivity and merely sporadic action was to be changed to full-scale commitment in all forms of possible cooperation fully in line with Soviet Third World engagement under Khrushchev.

The rapidly changing international situation with new states and organisations emerging seemingly uncontrollably demanded the creation of a framework for the practice of foreign policy in these new circumstances. In the sphere of official political relations between the CSSR and an Africa seeking liberation the first formalised foreign policy concept for Africa became created as just such a framework. However, it was not until 1961 that this concept was officially completed by the MFA. Until then, ever-intensifying relations with Africa were being executed mostly on an ad hoc basis in line with the orders from the Politbyro. The first document, a practical predecessor of the concept dealing with Africa as a single subject within CS foreign policy, dates back to September 1959 and bears the title ‘Further development of relations with African states’. In unprecedented detail and specificity, the Politbyro delegated various offices of state apparatus with three following sets of instructions:

A. Further development of political relations with African countries.
B. Establishing and further development of economic relations.
C. Initiation and development of cultural cooperation.

In sphere ‘A’, political and diplomatic relations, two streams of suggested operations included the following practical actions:

I. Initiation of diplomatic relations and establishing Czechoslovak diplomatic offices in African countries
   • immediate setting up of embassies in Morocco, Tunisia, and Ghana;
   • continuing negotiating and setting up of an embassy in Libya;
   • reconsideration of the diplomatic office in Liberia;
   • preparation for offices in Nigeria, Somalia, Cameroon, Togo, and the Central African Federation;

• reconsideration of consulates in French autonomous republics such as Mali.

II. Activation of Czechoslovak foreign policy towards African countries

• Use all opportunities for visits of high-ranking CS officials in countries of Africa

• Use every appropriate opportunity to invite leading officials of African countries to the CSSR for both official and unofficial visits (e.g. Sékou Touré, Kwame N’krumah, Mohamed V., Habib Burgiba, Tom Mboya etc.)

• Besides bilateral issues, use visits to discuss European and international affairs (e.g. Ban on nuclear tests) and attempt to formulate joint political declarations

• Attempt to formalise the bilateral relations by two-sided agreements, including an agreement on friendship and cooperation. (Ethiopia and Guinea to be considered in 1960; Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and others later.)

• At all opportunities, refer to the Czechoslovak Resolution on peaceful co-existence approved by the XIII UN General Assembly (supported by Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia, South Africa and Sudan) and emphasise CS support of Bandung principles, as well as the 1958 Accra conference resolution

• Use the arena of international organisations to deepen relations with African delegations and seek support for CS suggestions

• For the same purposes, especially in the UN Economic Commission for Africa, send an observer and attempt to become a member of the commission’s secretariat

• Closely follow all pan-African conferences, attend them, ensure media coverage for these conferences

• Fully encourage and support relations of civil society organisations (unions, youth and student movements, women’s organisations, Red Cross, etc.) with their African counterparts
Seek new forms of cooperation to benefit both sides and thus contribute to the national liberation struggle against imperialism.217

Zídek refers to *Africa Policy* as a single document.218 However, in reality it represented the set of papers put together by different ministries in the early 1960s dealing with different spheres of Czechoslovak relations with Africa ranging from foreign policy through trade, economic support, all the way to educational and cultural relations. The core document of this set was compiled by the MFA in the summer of 1961 and was entitled *‘Czechoslovak foreign policy towards African countries’*. It evolves in many ways from the 1959 document *‘Further development of relations with African states’* mentioned above. The central MFA *Africa policy*, as it was commonly known, was devised at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by order of the Politbyro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Summer 1961. In some detail it analyses past and existing relations between the CSSR and Africa, African economic, political and social development since the Second World War and drafts the set of objectives for future activity in four main spheres – politics, the economy, culture and propaganda, and the relations of civil society organisations. Among the core objectives and principles of execution for Czechoslovak foreign policy were the following points.

- Continue supporting countries of high interest (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria) in all spheres that will strengthen democratic and progressive orientation in these countries (assistance in industry, infrastructure development, technical assistance etc.);
- Fully support the legal government of the Democratic Republic of Congo in its attempts to preserve the independence and unity of its country;
- Attempt to develop political and economic relations with other independent African countries;
- Unmask imperialist and neo-colonial tendencies of Western states and support an anti-imperial stance by African countries;
- Continue in cooperation with African countries within international organisations;

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218 Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 14.
• Improve coordination with other socialist states;
• Provide all possible economic assistance to specific African countries;
• Contribute to attempts in African countries to improve industrialisation and agricultural production differentiation;
• Develop foreign trade exchange with African countries on the basis of mutually beneficial relations;
• Continue providing experts and other forms of technical assistance;
• Continue providing and further increase educational assistance;
• Improve the effectivity of CS propaganda across Africa;
• Seek relations with trade unions, youth and student organisations and with cooperatives.219

The core document was put together by the Africa department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had the benefit of previous, but in no way incredibly rich, encounters with Africa since the war, and of some analytical material provided by the Soviets. After a considerable amount of corrections by all the CS government offices involved, the paper was eventually approved by the KSČ Politbyro. The purpose of creating the *Africa policy* was to react effectively to turbulent and often unclear political developments across Africa.

From today’s perspective, a number of limitations, inaccuracies and unfulfilled objectives of the presented *Policy* can be pointed out straight away, but one has to remember that the processes that were taking place in the 1960s were impossible to predict, very difficult to follow and even harder to analyse correctly with the scant information available. The political landscape of the collapsing colonial period in Africa was as fluid, complex and unpredictable as a set of historical events can possibly be. Policymakers, not only in the CSSR, were also facing a number of objective methodological problems. Political developments were rapid, but information travelled much slower than today, causing reaction to be much less effective and more prone to error. Also, MFA analysts had very little expert knowledge of most African countries and even the little they knew was quickly becoming useless as Africa went through such far-reaching change. Nevertheless, despite all possible limitations that the *Africa policy* might have had, it proved useful enough as a complex theoretical guideline for

implementing purposeful relations with African countries, with clearly stated objectives. For research purposes the 1961 *Africa policy* works as an official ideological and theoretical framework, an entry point and a guideline for orientation in the complex web of Czechoslovak-African relations.

When examining Czechoslovak relations to East Africa, the same, if not higher, importance regarding the core *Africa policy* must be accorded to yet another official document. In 1961, separately from the core MFA *Africa policy*, another document was formulated and approved by the Politbyro – *The Concept of Czechoslovak foreign policy towards colonial lands in Africa*.\(^{220}\) This document concentrates mainly on two forms of activities that could prove decisive in a still on-going African liberation movement. These were an outspoken diplomatic support of the UN General Assembly, attacking the very principles of the colonial system and focussing on providing direct assistance to various national-liberating movements in different countries, mainly in British Africa. Other forms of support and potential post-independence cooperation were granted to these regions without too many specifics. The crucial points for future cooperation, later working as an outline for all subsequent documents on this topic, were the following:

- Closely follow the processes of political differentiation in these countries, especially in respect of imperialist activities
- Seek trade relations and their further development even before the ultimate success of the national-liberation struggle
- Seek relations with civil society organisations, especially unions and agricultural cooperatives
- Intensify supporting activities in international organisations, especially the UN
- Send delegations to independence declarations
- Establish diplomatic contacts
- After independence, provide assistance in the cultural and science sphere with special attention to agriculture.\(^{221}\)


\(^{221}\) MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 033.096/60, 10.12.1960, 7-8.
Despite all their limitations, the MFA Africa policy and related documents represented the first coherent attempt amongst socialist states to address African affairs and it met with approval when presented at the Soviet MID.\textsuperscript{222} Soviet officials, specifically the head of MID’s Africa department, Schvedov, agreed with all the presented conclusions and recommendations and announced Soviet plans to put together a similar framework for their own activities in Africa.\textsuperscript{223} These facts are the best evidence there is of the CSSR’s frontrunner role in relation to post-colonial Africa engagement within the Soviet bloc.

A more organised and conceptualised approach towards Africa was not only visible on the national level, but became an important part of socialist state joint activities. Bilateral and multilateral meetings of mainly European socialist countries in regards to deepening their engagement with Africa became quite common in this period. The April 1964 Prague conference can be mentioned as a typical example of such cooperation. The conference brought together the foreign policymakers from international departments of governing political parties from the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The main result of the week-long conference was a joint declaration stating that a significant improvement had to be achieved in respect of all forms of cooperation between socialist countries and at all levels of relations with Africa. The most crucial concrete and practical recommendations from the conference that were to be reflected in foreign political practice of socialist states are listed below:

- Improve and deepen contacts with communist parties and also national democratic parties of African states and with local civil-society organisations
- Improve cooperation of socialist states’ representatives with their African colleagues within international organisations
- Cooperate in delivering support to African press offices and other mass media
- Systematically concentrate on qualitative improvement in trade relations with Africa
- Boost technical assistance in education

\textsuperscript{222} NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 010027/62-SM, 6.1.1962.
\textsuperscript{223} F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 010027/62-SM, 6.1.1962, 2.
• Concentrate on generating native African technical cadres
• Consider effectiveness of joint export of large industrial complexes to Africa
• Improve conditions for providing loans
• Closer cooperation when sending out technical specialists
• Closer cooperation in publishing activities (propaganda material and science publications)
• Consider possible forms of a joint economic and political boycott of South Africa.224

The United Nations General Assembly in this period was indeed the main forum for the rival political ideologies of East and West. Until the 1950s CS diplomats were very critical of the UN’s role and position in the bipolar world. They temporarily boycotted the UN and often criticised it and its agencies as active agents of imperialism, working in favour of colonial powers and undermining the position of former colonies.225 Soon, however, CS officials realised the potential that General Assembly meetings, as well as other, regional and sub-regional organisations, had to offer for their ideological battle against colonialism. With the growing number of independent ex-colonies, it was also possible to acquire increased support for CSSR activities in the UN. The legislative quest of the USSR and its allies against colonialism succeeded in 1960 at the 15th meeting of the UN General Assembly, which resulted in the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’226 despite strong opposition by colonial powers. Several subsequent meetings of the General Assembly dealt with the practical execution of this declaration and kept the issue high on the list of the UN’s priorities.227

From the beginning MFA experts kept a close eye also on the pan-African tendencies of several African leaders which eventually resulted in a unifying process on a regional scale, such as the African and Malagasy Union (so-called Brazzaville group) and

227 PK 84, č.j. 026.403/63-10, 27.6.1963, 5-6.
the Casablanca group. While the pro-French activities of the Brazzaville group states were viewed critically as a neo-colonial construct, the activities and declarations of the Casablanca group, denouncing colonialism and seeking neutrality, met with CS approval. The establishment of the Organisation of African Unity was perceived by CS officials to be a step of primary importance in African political development away from post-colonial political dependency. The OAU became the main African political platform for multilateral diplomatic dialogue, and CS diplomats never missed an opportunity to propagate CS support for African independence and their dedication to the on-going national-liberation struggle.

2.4.3. **Loans, barter and technical assistance in tropical Africa – presenting an alternative to the capitalist way**

In addition to the core MFA Africa policy, another document dealing with the economic sphere of external relations with Africa was put together in the early 1960s. This document was called ‘A Concept for Economic Cooperation with Economically Less Developed Countries’ and was compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade in 1961. Besides giving a short-term perspective, it tried to predict the development of economic ties between the CSSR and Africa until the 1980s – an impossible task indeed.

The authors of the document characterise the economies of ELDCs as of high global importance due to their large share of global agricultural production, but especially due to the abundance of natural resources. As the main limitations of these economies, they correctly identify their common mono-commodity orientation, rather low levels of industrialisation, insufficient financial resources and dependency on foreign capital, know-how and technical infrastructure. As the primary conditions for the future growth of local economies, the authors consider an increase in ELDC exports and the offer of fair monetary loans. Unsurprisingly, it was thought that the only way

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228 From available archival documents it remains unclear whether all the partial policy guidelines put together by other ministries (eg. Conception of educational and cultural relations between the CSSR and African states, Conception of Economic Cooperation with Economically Less-Developed Countries) that in some way regulated contacts with Africa represented a coherent part of the MFA’s Africa policy, whether they were loosely based on it, or whether they were completely independent from it. It seems likely that they represented a loosely connected set of documents for which MFA’s Africa policy was an entry point.

229 NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 00/1509/61, June 1961.
towards a brighter economic future was the coming together of socialist countries.230

The monopoly on economic relations of imperialist states with ELDCs was disrupted by the rise of the universal socialist system of states, which, due to the development of economic relations with these countries on the basis of equality, mutual profitability and without interference in their internal affairs, actively influences the character of international economic relations between capitalist countries.231 By this rather vague and clumsy formal statement, economists from the Ministry of Foreign Trade expressed the most significant truth of the trade exchange between the socialist camp and ELDCs in general, and that of the CSSR and Africa in particular. This truth can be simplified as follows: regardless of the actual scale of on-going trade relations, the mere existence of an alternative trade partner – in this case, the CSSR – has a significant effect on the much more substantial trade relations between African states and their capitalist partners, often the former colonial masters. More importantly, this fact is also valid for most of the other forms of relations between the CSSR and Africa. Czechoslovakia in the late 1950s was the second largest trade partner of African countries, representing almost 19% of the total trade exchange of socialist countries with Africa, surpassing even China.232

In comparison with the previous period of relations, economic loans became an important tool in boosting trade relations with ELDCs. Short-term and long-term loans were used to overcome the lack of financial resources on the side of the ELDCs. In 1962, the total amount of CS loans provided to African countries amounted to some 531 million Kčs, with a substantial amount of 389 million being provided in a single year in 1961.233 Such a rapid increase in loans was not an entirely altruistic step, as most of the loans were tightly bound to CS export goods and, more importantly, large industrial complexes as a part of technical assistance.

2.4.4. Special assistance

In 1951 the CS Ministry of National Defence began to adopt a programme of massive expansion of the weapons industry followed by the complete reorganisation and reconstruction of its armed forces. While the main goals were to create an

\[\text{NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 00/1509/61, June 1961, 2-12.} \]
\[\text{NAA F. 1261/0/11 č.j. 00/1509/61, June 1961, 6.} \]
\[\text{MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 026.261/61-10, 19.6.1961, 19.} \]
\[\text{NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 10 985/14, 9.7.1962, 8.} \]
infrastructure that could provide weaponry for its socialist partners, including the Soviet Union, and thus create another effective Soviet-bloc armed force, the welcome side effect was the release of older weaponry for export. The MND had in its possession large stocks of special material ranging from personal weapons, automatic guns, vehicles and tanks, all the way to aeroplanes. The first substantial part of these stores was provided to Nasser’s Egypt. It was done directly, or through the Soviets, just before the Suez Crisis. The MND later described this operation as follows: ‘Thanks to success in the development of our weapons-producing industry it was possible in years 1955 and 1956 to provide significant help to Egypt and several other economically poorly-developed states which had freed themselves from the colonial yoke. The political significance of these deliveries, in which Czechoslovakia participated alongside the Soviet Union, was extraordinary. Hence the Suez Crisis and the failure of Anglo-French aggression.’

The newly-acquired and strongly-accentuated CS stance against the colonial yoke and western aggression was to become the motif of its foreign political activities for years to come.

The CS delivery of arms and ammunition to Egypt in the mid-1950s is one of the first examples of activity that was to become one the main forms of CS involvement, not only with Africa but with the Third World countries around the globe. In archival material, this activity is usually referred to as technical assistance or special assistance, depending on whether it is executed in civil or military form. Special assistance, besides the weapons and other military material deliveries, commonly designated special material, also included capacity building assistance, provision of training to personnel and, occasionally, secret direct involvement of CS personnel in military operations abroad. Civil technical assistance was, on the other hand, practised in spheres with no direct military connection, even though the profits resulting from such assistance might have benefitted the military indirectly. That is why it is sometimes quite difficult to distinguish between the two. Such distinction was further complicated by the fact that civil technical assistance was often officially used as cover for special activities of various kinds.

Cooperation with Egypt was a milestone in the activities and international importance of Czechoslovakia. Shortly after the special cooperation agreement was signed, the CS embassy in London was approached by the Sudanese government.

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representative to discuss technical assistance between the two countries. In the case of Egypt, the CSSR attempted for the first time effectively to deliver large-scale technical assistance to a country in Africa. It successfully established itself as a ‘go to’ partner for governments of the Third World, recently independent countries seeking greater practical independence from their former colonial masters. In the years following the Suez crisis, an undisputed Soviet Union foreign policy victory – a significant part of which was due to CS weapons – rich cooperation with countries such as Syria, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Cuba and others ensued. In Africa, countries that would benefit from cooperation with the CSSR included Mali, Guinea, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and others.

The MND’s programme of technical assistance was perhaps the best organised and most effective form of technical assistance amongst all CS agencies. To satisfy all foreign requests, it managed to train almost 1,800 experts acting as tutors and commanders of foreign course participants. The MND cooperated effectively with the Soviet army in drafting the courses and in sharing experience. To maximise the effectiveness of its foreign courses the MND managed, between 1960 and 1962, to build three air force training centres and several infantry training camps. In strict secrecy, it also successfully established the Foreign faculty at the Military Academy of Antonín Zápotocký. Altogether, between 1955 and 1960, the MND sent some 450 experts abroad and provided training for 1,012 foreign personnel.

In 1965 the MFT published a document evaluating recent developments in relation with ELDCs in the sphere of trade and technical assistance, including the special sphere. The authors of the document assess past practices of technical assistance quite positively with minor suggested corrections for the future. In the subsequent years technical assistance was still to be ‘provided especially in fields crucial for tackling the main issues of developing countries and in such places from where not only the direction of

236 VUA MNO 1960, č.j. 30/2, 011296-OTP/61, 23.11.1961, 1. (The MND was operating within the framework of a document called Delivering technical assistance to ELDCs in the sphere of special material exports that clearly outlined the objectives and means of practice of special assistance. The core objective of the MND’s special assistance was to help to build the military capacity of ELDCs to fight colonisers and to help to maintain their independence. This was to be achieved by providing material, courses and trained personnel in the CSSR or directly in these countries.)
238 VUA MNO 1960, i.č. 411, č.j. 38/9, Dec 1960, 7.
internal development could be affected in a positive and peaceful manner, but also relations of these states with the CSSR and other socialist states.\textsuperscript{239}

Competition from capitalist states in the sphere of providing technical assistance was identified as a newly identified major obstacle to reaching the highest economic, but especially propaganda effectiveness. '\textit{[W]e need to attempt, especially in the progressive countries, to replace advisors from imperialist states positioned in important bodies such as state organs, armed forces, economy, culture and propaganda with our own experts.}'\textsuperscript{240} For the future, the strategy of training local experts directly in the recipient country was widely recommended.

\textbf{2.4.5. Theory and practice of cooperation in the spheres of education, culture, propaganda, science and civil society organisation – presenting everyday life in socialism}

A typical trend of this period – a formal conceptualisation of all forms of relations – did not bypass spheres of education, culture, propaganda, science and civil society relation, either. In March 1961 the cooperation between the CS Ministry of Education and Culture and the 10\textsuperscript{th} (Africa) Department of the MFA resulted in drafting and eventually getting approved the first formalised 'Concept of educational and cultural relations between the CSSR and African states', one of the documents that together formed the complex Africa policy. An approved document was to be put into practice by both Ministries in joint cooperation and was sent to all CS diplomatic offices across Africa.\textsuperscript{241}

Quoting only parts of this lengthy document, it is especially interesting to note from what political and ideological background it originated and what its authors’ real objectives were. As expressed in the preface, by creating this document the MFA is reacting to 'the declaration of the Workers and Communist parties’ gathering held in Moscow in 1960 [...] stating ‘that the utter failure of colonialism is inevitable. Collapse of the colonial slavery system under the pressure of national-liberation movements is in its historical significance the second most important occurrence after the rise of the universal

\textsuperscript{239} NAA F. 1261/0/5, č.j. 893/9,1966, 37.
\textsuperscript{240} NAA F. 1261/0/5, č.j. 893/9,1966, 37.
\textsuperscript{241} MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961.
socialist system'. The vital importance of the CSSR in this mission was clear, as were the means to reach the stated objectives. 'Due to its high level of industrial development, education and culture, our republic is in a favourable position effectively to assist the self-emancipating nations of Africa in their economic and cultural development.' Without intention to do so the authors of the document very accurately described the difference between the declared noble objective of their actions and the real, more cynical political reasoning behind them. – ‘the aim of our cultural and educational cooperation is promptly to help newly-liberated African nations to eliminate any detrimental impact of colonialism on the education of African people, to build and develop all levels of an African educational system, to battle technical backwardness, to help establish and develop science and to contribute to the flourishing of art’ – and the higher, more selfish purpose – ‘the purpose of our cultural-propagandistic activities in Africa is soundly to present the immense successes of building a socialist Czechoslovakia, to acquaint the African public, through popular and accessible means, with the highly humanistic and democratic principles of existence rooted in our republic’s socialist Constitution, to spread the knowledge of successes of Czechoslovak engineering, science and culture, to get Africans acquainted with high standard of living, social benefits and the results of work the Czechoslovak people enjoy in general. Along with that we need to destroy, especially in the countries of North Africa, false images of European capitalist states’ superiority and their indispensability for the development of African economy and culture.’

Authors of this document were aware of the social-economic structure of African nations and of the transformation processes that were occurring there at this point. They quite correctly decided to concentrate their activities on students and youths in general, as they ‘are more receptive to our ideas than the old generation, who were formed by the feudal system and the ideology of colonisers.’ The above statement became the core principle in the execution and organisation of CS support to the African educational system. A detailed outline of this aid was put together at the Ministry of Education; it counted on increasing the number of students from all Economically less

242 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961. 2.
243 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961.2.
244 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961. 8.
245 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961., 8.
246 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961, 8.
developed countries (ELDCs) studying in the CS educational system from 1,216 students in 1960/61\textsuperscript{247} to somewhere between 4,500 and 6,000 students in 1965.

The most successful agents in the propaganda and cultural relations sphere proved to be the Czechoslovak Broadcasting Service and Czechoslovak Press Agency (ČTK). The Czechoslovak broadcasting service established regular programmes for Africa. A significant pitfall in broadcasting for Africa was its unavailability in native languages, which prevented its effective reach to the uneducated masses of Africans. The CS press agency, meanwhile, established vital contacts with newly-established national press agencies in Mali, Guinea, Ghana and in North Africa and played an important role in delivering technical assistance to these countries in this sphere. Technical assistance in propaganda and the media sphere was given full attention by the MFA, and plentiful material support, as well as the training of professional staff, and was amongst the first assistance delivered to African countries.\textsuperscript{248} Technicians from Mali, Guinea and Algeria were trained directly in the CSSR and some practical educational courses were later organised directly in Mali.\textsuperscript{249}

A totally unprecedented oddity in this sphere of relations, which never made it to the stage of practical execution, was a Soviet recommendation to CS officials to pursue cooperation with Africa through church contacts. As they put it, ‘establishing and developing our relations along religious links represents another idle capacity of our relations with African countries. Religious influence in Africa is strong and imperialists use it as a very effective tool for maintaining their exploitative interests. In this sphere the CSSR has greater opportunities than the USSR and in this area it would be appropriate to make the biggest effort possible.’\textsuperscript{250} It is interesting evidence of how eager the Soviets were to use all the possible ways to reach their political objectives in Africa.

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\textsuperscript{247} NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 00/1509/61, June 1961, 23.
\textsuperscript{248} NAA F. 1261/0/11, b.11, č.j. 10 985/14, 9.7.1962, 9-10.
\textsuperscript{249} NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 10 985/14, 9.7.1962, 11.
\textsuperscript{250} NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 010027/62-SM, 6.1.1962, 6.
3. Czechoslovakia and Kenya between 1945 and 1968

In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis I present the case studies of three East African countries – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In these examples I want to illustrate the forms Czechoslovak involvement took in Africa at different periods. I show how the theoretical principles of the Czechoslovak Africa policy formulated in the early 1960s were executed in political relief in East Africa and how much of the stated objectives was actually achieved. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are the three cases that allow a thorough analysis of the implementation of the CS Africa policy as they all were, at different times, considered a priority for CS Africa policymakers. Besides that, CS activities in these countries can be used to illustrate the whole range of relations typical for CS politics throughout Africa. In each presented case study I try to portray the effect that CS activities may have had on political development in these countries.

Relations with Kenya are amongst the oldest-established Czechoslovak ones in the African continent. In previous chapters I give various instances of CS involvement with Kenya. Whether it was trade relations before WWII, Kenyan colonial administrative assistance in the formation of the CS foreign army in the Middle East, or the trade conflict of the 1950s, relations between the CS and Kenya always had the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation. At the end of the 1950s, relations between the CSSR and British Kenya aiming for independence entered a whole new era of cooperation that had far-reaching effects, especially on political developments in this British colony.

The analysis of CS relations with Kenya I present here is based mainly on the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, the Central Military Archive in Prague, the Czech National Archive and the recently opened resources of the Archive of Security Forces in Prague, which proved especially useful. Of significant importance for this particular case study were the personal testimonies of those directly involved who I was able to meet and interview in Kenya. Among the people I interviewed, three personalities stand out as providing me with a particularly valuable insight into this topic, namely Mr Odhiambo Okello, Mzee Ezekiel Barnagutu and Mr Oburu Odinga.

Mr Okello was one of the most important activists of the Kenyan national-liberation movement in the late 1950s. He was a colleague of Oginga Odinga before independence and his activities were vital for promoting the Kenyan case abroad. In
1959 he opened and managed the Kenyan national-liberation movement office based in Cairo that sought political, material and technical support for the Kenyan independence struggle. Once Kenya declared independence, Odhiambo Okello joined the diplomatic services of his country, where he worked for several decades. Mr Okello proved to be an invaluable source of information on the cooperation between the CSSR and the Kenyans before independence, as he himself was not only affected but had been active in setting up this relationship. The interview with Honorary Mzee Ezekiel Barngatuny was another source of interesting information that allowed me to analyse from a Kenyan perspective some information gathered in archives in the Czech Republic. As a former high-ranking member of KADU and colleague of Oginga Odinga, he eventually joined KANU and progressively climbed the internal structure of the party. After acquiring various high-ranking posts in the independent Kenyan administration, including Member of Parliament or Minister, Mzee Barngatuny became one of the most influential political figures in Kenya during the presidency of Daniel arap Moi, when he acted as the principal advisor to the President. Even now, Mzee Barngatuny remains in close contact with the highest levels of Kenyan politics and, until recently, he acted as an advisor to President Kibaki. The interview with Mzee Barngatuny provided me with a wide range of information on political developments in Kenya, from the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya during the 1950s, through early post-independence political developments in Kenya, all the way to the reasoning behind Kenya’s foreign policy under President Moi. The interview with Mzee became the crucial source of information on the formation of modern political parties in Kenya and also on President Moi’s period of office. My attempted interview with President Moi to investigate why in the 1970s all contacts with socialist countries including (Czechoslovakia) might have been abandoned was repeatedly refused on the basis of previous negative experiences with Czechoslovaks.

The third invaluable source of information on political developments in Kenya was the interview with Honorary Oburu Odinga. Mr Odinga was not only Assistant Minister in the Cabinet of President Kibaki at the time of the interview, but he is also Oginga Odinga’s son. Mr Oburu Odinga had personal experience of the cooperation between Kenya and socialist countries before Kenyan independence. Mr Odinga was, in the early 1960s, one of thousands of African students who were awarded scholarships in the Soviet Union or the CSSR. These CS scholarships were a welcome solution to the problem of the Britain’s refusal, prior to Independence, to provide technical courses for
Kenyan students. Mr Odinga not only has a unique insight into the practical cooperation between Kenya and socialist countries, but, as the son of Oginga Odinga, he was able to observe from the front line the formation of Kenyan politics and their subsequent development. In the interview he gave me some interesting information on how personal preferences, animosities and interpersonal relations determined the political orientation of Kenya.

These three major interviews became prime sources of information about the early development of Kenyan politics. In addition I collected several other testimonies that provided me with some background knowledge on the political developments before and after independence, and several life stories of Kenyan students who gained their education behind the Iron Curtain. While only fragments from these interviews are directly paraphrased in this thesis, they still influence my personal perspective on some of the issues linked to this research. They helped to recreate the image of Kenya before and early after independence, the period when the future of the country was being decided in so many different spheres – its foreign political orientation was being decided, its domestic political rivalries were being formed, its future elites were being trained and roots for future ethnic tensions and grievance were being put down.

3.1. Czechoslovakia and KANU’s quest for national liberation

During the 1950s Kenya struggled as the strong opposition to colonial rule and white dominance led to the formation of the Mau Mau movement. This bloody anti-colonial uprising was the first of its kind in Africa for several decades and had a decisive effect on the anti-colonial movement, and not only in Africa. According to the testimonies of some direct participants of the uprising, Mau Mau resistance inspired, amongst others, the national liberation activities of Nelson Mandela and his South African ANC, as well as the civil unrest in Algeria that eventually led to the fall of colonial rule in this North African département of France.251 Even though the Mau Mau revolt

251 Hon. Odhiambo Okello, interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, 11 June, 2011. Okello as the head of the Kenya NLM office in Cairo since 1959 had intensive contacts with the fellow Algerian NLM office. Its members, according to Okello, repeatedly talked about the inspiration that Mau Mau movement was to their own resistance.
was eventually suppressed and defeated by colonial authorities, and many of its leaders were executed or imprisoned, its contribution to Kenyan independence was vital.

The political national liberation movement in Kenya did not directly evolve from the Mau Mau movement; rather, they came into being and existed in parallel. This is true, despite the accusations of colonial authorities that Jomo Kenyatta, the main personality of the Kenyan political campaign for independence, was a leading figure of Mau Mau. Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya became the main protagonists of the National Liberation Movement, a grouping active in the late 1950s, and bore two important distinctions from the Mau Mau – its members sought full political independence for Kenya rather than just the return of land occupied by white settlers, and they preferred a political rather than a military solution of the situation.

After the Mau Mau insurgency was defeated in Kenya, the national liberation movement became dominated by the first nationalist parties. In 1960 the original Kenya African Union (KAU) party founded in 1944 split into two independent political parties that quickly became strong rivals – the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). In the very beginning of their existence both KANU and KADU were able to attract support from any tribe and in most regions of Kenya. However, it took only a couple of years for the traditional ethnic division of Kenya’s population to begin to be reflected as an important aspect of each party’s emerging political identity. Meanwhile however, between 1960 and 1962, the aspect of ethnicity was still set aside for the higher common objective of achieving independence from the British. ‘The issue of independence was at that moment uppermost, and the man who could state this demand most simply and effectively held the greatest advantage.’

From late 1961 first signs of growing inter-ethnic political rivalry were occurring. Together with the ethnic split there were other divisions among Kenyans as well – the economic one, related mainly to land ownership, and then the issue of acceptance of British rule, where radicals and loyalists were at odds. After 1960 Kenyans were growing increasingly concerned over arrangements for impending political change. The competing interests, hopes and ambitions of the various ethnic and social groups were soon projected onto the political make-up of Kenya’s two largest African parties. The main ideological rift between KANU and KADU appeared around 1961 and it

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253 Gertzel, The Politics, 11.
concerned the future system of government. Most of the minor tribes supporting KADU advocated the introduction of a federalist system of government that would ensure adequate representation for themselves.

KANU politicians on the other hand were mostly recruited from the largest ethnic groups of Kikuyu and Luo. ‘KANU and Odinga envisaged the infant nation-state as dominated by a centralised government responsible for implementing development policy.’ They were not overly fond of federalism and they did eventually accept it only for the short transitional period of power-sharing between KANU and KADU. Once KANU consolidated its grip on power, the federalist system of government was quickly abandoned. Unfortunately, the dispute over federalism, or majimboism, concerned not only the system of exerting political rule over Kenya. It was also closely linked to the politically very risky and highly charged question of land redistribution which in turn had a direct link to control of the means of economic production. Very soon after independence land redistribution became an issue which played a significant role in the quarrel between Kenyatta and Odinga.

In 1959, the KANU opened its foreign office in Cairo, which was made possible by the support of the anti-colonial campaign of Egyptian President Nasser, who backed anti-colonial movements politically but also supported the NLM offices in Cairo financially. Nasser’s regime was at this point a recipient of generous support from the USSR and the CSSR that had begun just three years earlier. In this period Egypt became both a gateway and a middleman for Czechoslovak involvement in East-African affairs. The Cairo office had approximately five workers and was led by Odhiambo Okello, a fellow Luo, and close colleague of Oginga Odinga’s, educated at the University of Khartoum. A similar KANU office was also soon established in Addis Ababa. The objective of the Cairo office was to obtain political, financial and material support for the Kenyan NLM cause. Kenyan leaders considered political support to be the most crucial precondition for the success of their demands, but financial and technical support was also necessary as the colonial authorities’ effective anti-NLM strategies were depriving them of material and financial resources. Soon after the office was established, Okello approached the CS diplomats in Cairo in Odinga’s name with a request for support. As he

256 Branch, Kenya, 8.
himself put it, ‘the Czechoslovak anti-colonial stance was widely known, as was its willingness to support the freedom fighters.’257

The demands of the KANU were dealt with in the CSSR at the highest levels and they were given full priority by the Politbyro. CS officials were well aware of Kenyan political and economic potential in the region. Not long before this, MFA analysts had been sceptical about any likelihood of the East African colonial system’s going into a decline; the unexpected rise in organised political opposition to British and white rule in Kenya was warmly welcomed behind the Iron Curtain. Supporting Kenyan freedom fighters was not only fully in line with the CS ideological and political strategy, but it was hoped that it would seriously harm its Main Enemy.258

After the Czechoslovak MFA was approached by the KANU office in Cairo, it hastily tried to collect and analyse all available information about the Kenyan political scene. Based on the analysis of mainly Soviet information, the CS administration decided to orientate all its support to Oginga Odinga and his political wing within KANU. It was believed he would be able to set Kenya on the socialist track. Unlike KANU general secretary Tom Mboya, viewed as America’s man, and KANU chairman James Gichuru, believed to be under the influence of the West Germans, Odinga was viewed as the Eastern bloc’s favourite. In one of the available documents MFA experts describe Odinga as follows: ‘party leader Oginga Odinga is a strict supporter of anti-imperialist struggle and promotes cooperation with socialist bloc countries. Odinga has the support of most of the party and enjoys great popularity among its members. For some time the CSSR has maintained relations with the left wing of KANU, whose leader, Odinga, visited the CSSR in summer 1960.’259 Another document states, ‘Odinga is popular with young people, under pressure from whom the request for “planned economy” was incorporated into the party’s program.’260

Such a portrayal of Odinga was common, not only in the CSSR and the Soviet Union, but also shared by the colonial administration, who were well aware of Odinga’s foreign contacts and activities. While Tom Mboya’s contacts with the USA were tolerated

257 Okello, interview.
258 Main Enemy is term widely used in the original documents of different Czechoslovak governmental offices. Its meaning is rather fluid as in different regions and in different periods it was used to refer to the USA, the United Kingdom, Israel, West Germany or France or several of these countries combined. In case of Kenya and East Africa in general the term almost exclusively refers to Britain.
259 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 003.950/61, 1961, 4.
and the student exchange programme to US universities was taking place without major obstacles, similar activities by Odinga and his colleagues in the Cairo office in relation to socialist countries were viewed more critically.

As ethnic fragmentation became ever more apparent with the approach of Independence, the main rivalry eventually came to a head between the two most numerous tribes of Kenya, the Kikuyu and the Luo. Both of these ethnicities had the benefit of high numbers and of sophisticated political leadership. Kikuyu had their unchallenged leader in the figure of Jomo Kenyatta, universally accepted, even by the British, after his release from British detention in 1961 for his alleged role in the Mau Mau rebellion, as the leader of the emerging Kenyan nation. Another advantage that predestined the Kikuyu people a leading role in Kenya’s NLM was the fact that they were the best integrated in Kenya’s British-dominated economy of Kenya, the heart of which was located at White Highlands in the Kikuyu homeland. Kikuyus were also responsible for the Mau Mau uprising, thus determining their general acceptance as the leading freedom fighters.

The Luo people also had influential and skilful political leaders in Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya, who led KANU during Kenyatta’s absence, but unfortunately for the Luos their leaders’ personal antipathy to each other rendered the unity of Luo political leadership a mere dream from the very beginning. Mboya represented a young generation of Kenyan nationalists and he started his swift rise to the highest circles of Kenyan politics via his fervent trade union activism. Odinga, on the other hand, was not only a modern politician, but also a traditional Luo chief and in this period he was very close to Jomo Kenyatta. He was perhaps not as charismatic as Mboya and he suffered from a lack of diplomatic skills. Very soon after independence Odinga got into ideological conflict with the rest of KANU’s leadership over some principal policies mainly linked to economy and proportional ethnic representation in redistributing the means of economic production once colonialism in Kenya ended, which in effect cost him his political career.

Odinga was, as early as 1960, accused in the Kenyan Parliament by one of the white MPs of being a Soviet agent. Odinga repeatedly refuted these accusations, as his

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261 Okello, interview
262 Branch, Kenya, 4.
263 Branch, Kenya, 176
264 Hon. Oburu Odinga, interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 6, 2011.
closest colleagues and his family members still do today. They unanimously claim that his intentions were never to seek full incorporation of Kenya into the Soviet sphere of influence and that colonial accusations, and later those of his political rivals in the Kenyan government, were based on deliberate misinterpretation of his political activities. Both Oburu Odinga and Odiango Okello claim that Oginga, while cooperating closely with socialist countries, ignored the ideological aspect of this cooperation and pursued only its beneficial effects for the Kenyan economy. Nevertheless, a number of documents from CS archives indicate that the accusations against Odinga, of close cooperation with socialist countries, were not completely unjustified, especially in the years after independence.

Communication between the Cairo office and CS officials was already starting, by 1960, to contribute to the Kenyan NLM. During his visit to Prague in 1960 Odinga approached Czechoslovaks in person with a request for assistance. At that time he asked CS officials for material and financial support, scholarships for students and unspecified forms of special assistance. The Politbyro swiftly responded and approved the initial financial help for KANU, as well as organising tailor-made security courses for Kenyans. Financial help was to reach, in the first stage, 671 000 Kčs, out of which sum the equivalent of 95 000 Kčs was provided in foreign currency.

In the years to come more financial and material help for KANU was approved and provided by the Politbyro, while special assistance began with the direct involvement of the Interior Ministry and the secret service StB. Despite recent claims of KANU officials that no cooperation in the special sphere occurred, the available archive documents speak otherwise. The CS government organised several special courses for KANU, of both a military and a security nature, before independence, and vital cooperation in this sphere continued after 1964.

In July 1961 the MFA approached the MND and the Politbyro with a request to organise a one-year army and militia course for five candidates selected by KANU. The CS government was to pay for the full expenses. The request was eventually approved by

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265 Odinga, interview.
267 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 003.950/61, 1961, 5.
268 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 003.950/61, 1961, 5.
269 Okello, interview.
the Defence Minister;\textsuperscript{271} but it is not clear whether the course ever took place. It is also not clear whether the matter was an independent activity of the MFA’s African department staff, or if it was raised in response to a request from KANU.

In February 1962 the second round of Lancaster House talks took place in Britain between British representatives and Kenyan nationalist African politicians. Until 1961 Kenya was ruled by KADU despite the fact that the 1961 elections were won by KANU. This was because KANU refused to join the government before Jomo Kenyatta was released from detention. To make the government of Kenya more representative of Kenyan popular support, Britain invited both KANU and KADU to be present at the talks. The purpose of the meeting was to find and prepare a suitable political arrangement to bring Kenya slowly towards independence. Negotiations were marked by the fact that while British preferred Ronald Ngala and his KADU, it was KANU and Kenyatta who could claim wide-spread popular support amongst the Kenyan population. Kenyatta had only been released from detention the previous year by the very same British government that was now hosting the talks, and this fact did not make proceedings any easier. However, the British considered it vital to organise these negotiations because ‘they were increasingly concerned that the political impasse and weak KADU-led government would drive KANU left into the arms of Odinga, the Eastern bloc and communism.’\textsuperscript{272}

The Constitution that had emerged from the Lancaster House talks was to a great extent a considerable compromise on the part of KANU who from the beginning accepted it with misgivings. The Constitution’s main purpose was to provide the British with the legal framework for a political transition of Kenya to independence that would maximise the chance that the interests of white settlers as well as those of British government would be safeguarded. In effect, the Constitution ‘institutionalized and entrenched the colonial political legacy while at the same time imposing on the new central government severe limitations on its exercise of the powers inherited under the administrative legacy.’\textsuperscript{273} The most prominent compromise agreed upon at the negotiations was the introduction of a federalist system of government. This was viewed as a victory for KADU and it was the arrangement the British preferred as well. However,


on the other hand, another highly contested issue of land redistribution was adopted in the form preferred by KANU. ‘A million acres of mixed farms (half the total) would be taken over and used to settle Africans. This would be funded by British and international loans, and executed through private land purchase.’

Besides drafting the legal framework for Kenya’s move to Independence, the British government also hoped the negotiations would provide them with an opportunity to disrupt the unity of KANU by attracting some of its young and less radical leaders such as Tom Mboya to join forces with Ngala’s KADU, which was a party of loyalists much more acceptable to the British. The KANU leadership, especially Kenyatta and Odinga, was perceived as radical and a threat to British interests in Kenya after independence. British hopes and plans in this respect failed because KANU remained intact and it was becoming clear that in the agreed coalition government, KANU would clearly dominate KADU. The only concession the British managed to get from Kenyatta was the exclusion of Odinga from the new coalition cabinet, due to his close relations with socialist countries. Odinga accepted his fate for the time being, but he was frustrated by Kenyatta’s decision to comply with the British stipulation, and this was perhaps the first rift in their collaboration.

In March 1962 the Czechoslovak MFA received a letter directly from Kenyatta in which he requested substantial help, as his delegation had found itself in a critical financial situation while negotiating political independence in London. Alongside the required finances, material support, especially in the sphere of propaganda and publishing facilities for KANU foreign offices, was also requested. KANU had received a tape recorder, a copier and an amplifier for their Cairo office from the CSSR in 1960, but more professional equipment was requested now. A printing machine was considered crucial for the success of KANU’s campaign in the upcoming Kenyan elections. Lastly, Kenyatta and Odinga asked for security training for ten persons, military training for 25 Kenyan students and admission for up to 30 Kenyans to CS factories for practical training. In order to acquire political support for KANU’s request, Odinga emphasised the ideological and political importance of such assistance. According to MFA records,
Odinga said, ‘KANU is in acute need of immediate help. The pre-election campaign in Kenya, crucial for the future position of progressive forces in the country, is underway. The USA and the UK keep sending large sums of money to Kenya, in order to maintain their own positions in the region by means of corruption. A hundred-man bureaucratic apparatus based in the American consulate in Nairobi contributes to this policy. […] this period decides the immediate future of Kenya and […] progressive forces rely only on countries of the socialist block, especially the USSR and the CSSR. […] If the CSSR wants to help, it is necessary to provide help now, in order not to repeat the case of Congo.’

In addition to requests for a Kenyan delegation in London, the MFA was also visited, in March 1962, by Okello, requesting technical training for journalists.

The Politbyro and the MFA gave KANU’s request the highest priority. Kenyatta’s personal involvement in this matter was of the utmost strategic importance for CS officials, as they were aware of his unrivalled dominance in Kenyan politics. Fulfilling a personal request from Kenyatta would, it was believed, help to buy his allegiance in future. As there was a shortage of available funds, the MFA decided to transfer all financial resources originally approved for the NLMs of Zanzibar and Rhodesia to KANU’s account, a move which clearly shows that Kenya was, at this point, perceived to be the area of highest priority for Czechoslovak foreign policy.

Despite a transfer of Zanzibari and Rhodesian funds to Kenya, not all of Kenyatta’s and Odinga’s requests could be met, but a substantial part was dealt with. KANU received 713,000 Kčs in financial assistance (the equivalent of 106,600 Kčs was provided in foreign currency), the greater part of which was used to cover the KANU delegation expenses during the Lancaster House talks. The MFA also decided to provide KANU with a professional printing press for its upcoming campaign. In cooperation with the MND and the Interior Ministry, the MFA also approved and prepared an expert security course for six persons, a military course for four, basic military training for ten and practical internship at CS factories for eight Kenyan nationals. The ČTK journalist course for six KANU members was approved independently from these activities.

279 NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 11103/14, 20.7.1962, 2.
280 NAA F. 1261/0/44, č.j. 9996/8, 5.3.1962, 3.
281 NAA 1261/0/44, č.j. 9996/8, 1962?
282 NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 11103/14, 20.7.1962, 1.
The specifics of the planned special courses were agreed with Okello and Odinga during their visit to Prague in July 1962. The special military course for Kenyans was nicknamed ‘Action 137’ and was approved by the Politbyro to commence during the summer of 1962. The objective of the course was to train four military experts and to organise summer vacation military training by the MND for ten Kenyan students. Despite the agreement, for undisclosed reasons the Kenyan students never enrolled for the summer military training. Whether the expert military training ever took place remains unclear because available archive documents contain no mention of the matter. However, detailed records of most other special courses that took place in this period are available in Czechoslovak archives and these often include personal data of participants, reports on the course proceedings and evaluation of results. The absence of any such records in this case may indicate that Action 137 probably did not take place.

While not furnishing much detail, StB internal records state that, in 1962, two personal bodyguards for KANU leaders were trained and, in 1963, a six-month course for counter-espionage was completed by six Kenyans. These two courses set the pattern for the future special cooperation that became the focus of CS-Kenyan relations after independence. CS officials viewed their special technical assistance as a very promising sphere for future cooperation, especially after the 1963 visit to the CSSR by the Kenyan Minister for Panafrican Affairs, Koinange, a close collaborator of Kenyatta’s. According to Koinange, during one of the recent meetings of the Kenyan cabinet, Jomo Kenyatta presented the following strategy: ‘In the course of military and other types of confidential cooperation Kenya will, after the declaration of independence, direct its attention to socialist camp countries, while it will naturally not refuse economic cooperation with the West, potential economic help from the USA and the International development bank.’

In 1962 contact with the CSSR entered yet another sphere. From the position of explicit political support for Kenyan anticolonial activities, the CS became unexpectedly directly involved in the intra-KANU political rivalry between Mboya on the one side and Kenyatta and Odinga on the other. During the second round of the Lancaster House negotiations for Kenyan independence, Kenyatta himself contacted the CS embassy in

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283 VUA MNO 1962, č.j. 33/2-5, 26.3.1962.
284 ABS 81029_000_1_2, Č.jA. 00145/40-67, 27.2.1967, 13, l. 51.
285 ABS 11691_000_2_4, Č.jA 7, Kenjya, 1963?, 1, l. 81.
London. According to the embassy’s report, several members of the Kenyan delegation were repeatedly approached by American, Israeli and West German diplomats, provided with finances and invited for visits. The report states that Kenyatta was deeply concerned by this, as most of these KANU delegates were members of Tom Mboya’s wing. Kenyatta perceived this as a danger to his leading position in the party.

In order to counter-balance actions of Western diplomats, Kenyatta asked the CSSR to receive the delegation of twelve members of the Kenyan parliament and delegates of Kenyatta’s Lancaster House mission. The MFA gave the matter the highest political priority and, based on its recommendation, the CSSR National Assembly officially invited the Kenyan delegation for a state visit to take place in March 1962. This episode represents an important political gesture by Kenyatta to the West. His allegiance was not yet guaranteed in the bipolar world, and Kenyatta was trying to show that he had the means of defence against overweening Western intervention in Kenyan politics. At the same time, Kenyatta’s contacts with CSSR diplomacy proved a very effective tool for buying their future support. This proved to be decisive not only for Kenya itself, but especially for the dominance of Kenyan politics by KANU, Kenyatta and the Kikuyu. From today’s perspective the success of Kenyatta’s tactics of balancing between East and West is undeniable. Kenyatta received rich financial and also technical support from both camps. Hundreds of Kenyans received training in the USA, the UK, Israel but also the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and through this vital educational enrichment the economics of independent Kenya was much strengthened.

This case also represents the first indirect clash between Mboya and CS officials. The activities of Tom Mboya were, for years to come, observed with the greatest concern by all Czechoslovak institutions involved with Kenya. Mboya was regarded up until his death as the greatest threat to socialist countries’ interests in the region. In the years after Kenyan independence, Tom Mboya became the target of numerous CS intelligence activities.

In the period just before and soon after independence, Kenyatta had much closer relations with Odinga than with Mboya. Kenyatta at this point considered Odinga his most important collaborator and their good personal relationship was crucial for the Western Kenyan Luo people’s of acceptance of KANU. Kenyatta was always suspicious of Tom Mboya, who had politically matured in the trade union movement; Kenyatta was not entirely comfortable with this. ‘Kenyatta’s dislike of Mboya apparently arose from a
belief that Mboya had colluded with the British over Kenyatta’s detention so that the Luo union leader could become the foremost nationalist leader. The old man mistrusted his young lieutenant’s evident ambitions and talents. Hence until the end of 1964 Kenyatta tended to favour Odinga in the Mboya-Odinga rivalry for pre-eminence and to support attempts to undermine Mboya’s trade union base. Mboya derived the major part of his political influence from the trade unions and he did not hesitate to make use of this political capital. A further source of Mboya’s political power was the group of radical Youth Wingers, mostly Luos, who supported him and on several occasions clashed with Kikuyu youths.

In the summer of 1962 a conflict had arisen within KANU between Mboya and Kenyatta. Kenyatta organised a rally in Mboya’s Nairobi district without Mboya’s consent while he was abroad; this was considered trespassing on a politician’s own special territory. During his speech at the rally Kenyatta criticised politicians who were receiving money from the imperialists, which was most clearly aimed at Mboya who had frequent contacts with Western countries. Upon his return Mboya denounced Kenyatta’s anti-democratic tendencies as the leader of KANU and ‘threatened to leave KANU and use the Kenya Federation of Labour as the organizational basis for a new party.’

Considering the political support that Mboya was able to attract should he really decide to establish his own party, Kenyatta pulled back and retracted some previous criticism. Even though the imminent crisis was prevented, Kenyatta and his collaborators subsequently tried to limit the political power of Mboya’s Kenya Federation of Labour. Up until 1965 the alternative trade union movement sponsored by Odinga was preferred by the Kenyan government. This obviously changed when Odinga fell out with Kenyatta.

Perhaps the most significant form of assistance that the CSSR provided KANU with in this period were the free university scholarships for young Kenyans. The first Kenyan student, according to available documents, was admitted to a CS university in 1959, and as of 1960 many others followed. In 1961 82 new Kenyan students enrolled at

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CS universities. Based on the incomplete records, it is possible to estimate the total number of Kenyans studying at CS universities between 1960 and 1964 to be in the region of 150-200.

Education cooperation became one of the main responsibilities of the KANU Cairo office prior to independence. From the beginning, the office was in full charge of sending Kenyan students to socialist countries, particularly to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany. In comparison to Mboya’s student exchange programme with the USA, the admission of Kenyans to socialist countries’ universities was much more problematic mainly due to legal and logistical obstacles. Most of the suitable young Kenyans did not possess passports and colonial authorities did all they could to prevent them from leaving East Africa. Kenyans who were offered scholarships behind the Iron Curtain had to undertake complicated and risky journeys to Cairo on their own. After illegally leaving Kenya, they crossed to Uganda and then to Sudan. Okello and his colleagues from the Cairo office arranged for Sudanese officials not to impede Kenyans travelling without documents. Once the would-be students reached Egypt, the KANU office provided them with fake passports and arranged their onward travel.

Students who were admitted to universities in Czechoslovakia often struggled to cope with insufficient funds, unsuitable clothing and the completely alien environment. They usually had one year to master the language before commencing their technical studies. With the growing numbers of African students there were some cases of racism and hostility from the locals who had never come across black Africans before. Occasional conflicts with the local population, combined with stress, led to repeated complaints to both KANU and the CS Ministry of Education and Culture from unhappy African students. In order to minimise the negative experiences of foreign students, which was making for unwelcome propaganda, the CS government tried where possible to accommodate them close together. This measure proved successful in respect of the local population, but it did not prevent conflicts amongst the African and Arab students, and there were frequent outbursts of ethnic and tribal rivalries.

In our interviews, all Kenyan alumni of CS universities, as well as officials who helped to arrange this educational exchange programme unanimously agreed on the

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289 Okello, interview.
290 Odinga, interview; Okello, interview.
great significance that the system of CS scholarships for Kenyans had on the development of an independent Kenya. The CSSR, as well as some other socialist states, provided Kenyans with education mainly in what they called technical subjects such as economics, engineering, agriculture, forestry or medicine. Prior to 1960 the British colonial administration had not allowed black Kenyans to study these subjects in Africa and, therefore, a country aiming for independence was in desperate need of technical cadres. This was especially so if the independent Kenya was to aspire to become truly economically independent of its white settler population as well as of Britain. While it is true that more scholarships for Kenyans were provided by the USA in programmes managed by Tom Mboya, the fact that most students there studied Arts and Humanities meant that the doctors, engineers and economists trained in the Soviet Union, the CSSR and East Germany, played a much more significant role in the early economic development of Kenya after independence. This statement is valid despite the fact that many of the alumni from socialist countries faced some form of repression from the Kenyan government, especially after 1966 during the anti-communist campaign and later during the rule of President Moi.

In the early 1960s the number of students from Economically Less Developed Countries receiving their university training in Czechoslovakia reached significant levels. In 1961, the total number of African students in the CSSR reached more than a thousand and Kenyans represented one of the fastest-growing groups. Kenyan students in the CSSR were politically active which caused some tensions especially between the rival Luo and Kikuyu tribes. Political organisations of foreign students as well as individuals were attracting the attention of both CS and foreign intelligence services.

The StB saw great potential in establishing a working relationship with African and Arab students, as they were expected to become the future ruling elite of newly independent countries and it was assumed many of them would acquire high positions in state administrations after their return from their studies. StB archives include a

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291 Odinga, interview; Okello, interview.
292 Okello, interview.
293 Odinga, interview; Okello, interview.
294 Dr Jela O., interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 7, 2011.
295 MZV F. III/5 Keňa, č.j. 127.312/64–10, 10.12.1964, 1.
296 Okello, interview. According to Odhiambo Okello conflict that occurred between Luo and Kikuyu students in Czechoslovakia in 1962 was artificially provoked by black loyalists supporting the colonial administration.
297 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 003.950/61, 1961, 8.
number of reports of operational activities intended to recruit these foreign students for intelligence purposes.298

Meanwhile, Western countries, concerned at the newly-established cooperation between Africa and the socialist camp, were eager to portray the on-going cooperation to its own public in the darkest possible colours. Colonial administrators as well as pro-Western politicians within KANU were concerned at the well-functioning cooperation between Odinga’s wing and socialist countries. Students returning from Iron Curtain countries were viewed as carriers of revolutionary thought, who, given their expert training and political ambitions, might attempt a pro-communist coup. In order to prevent this, a negative propaganda campaign was started. Several conflicts amongst the African students in Czechoslovakia, or between the local population and Africans, were believed by the Cairo office as well as the CS Ministry of Education to have been provoked by pro-Western Africans who allegedly penetrated student organisations for the very purpose of causing conflict and unrest.299 Today, it is impossible to judge to what extent this explanation was just an excuse or whether it was based on substantial evidence. Nevertheless, there were some cases that prove how desperate Western governments were to ignore and effectively undermine the on-going cooperation.

In December 1961 there was a well-publicised case of two Kenyan students being contacted by the British embassy in Prague. Both students were forced to interrupt their studies in Prague and fly to London. Here, they were interrogated by the British Ministry for Colonies and by the British Council. They were both offered substantial sums of money to write and publish an article on their negative experiences in Czechoslovakia.300 The whole issue was eventually dealt with by the CS MFA who issued a serious diplomatic warning to the British embassy in Prague, on the grounds that it had ‘exerted hostile activities, encouraged students to leave the CSSR and to spread rumours and malign statements after leaving our territory’.301 The Western media’s negative propaganda soon proved to have only a minor effect on the cooperation between Africa and socialist camp countries.

298 Eg. ABS 11451_311, 1 správa MV, 47.O. A-0084/75-47-85.
299 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 1416/9, 1966, 1. Example of such conflict occurred at the IV Congress of European Federation of African Students that took place in December 1966 between two delegations of African students from the CSSR that each claimed to be the only rightful representative of Africans at CS universities.
300 NAA F. 1261/0/44, č.j. 010.021/62-SM-6, 7.2.1962, 1-3.
301 NAA F. 1261/0/44, č.j. 010.021/62-SM-6, 7.2.1962, 2.
StB activities with regard to foreign students were rather common. The StB managed to create an effective net of loyal agents amongst people with direct dealings with the foreign students – teachers, university staff members, family members of fellow CS students, members of youth and student organisations and others.\textsuperscript{302} In multiple cases, students were specially selected for cooperation and some eventually became contacts.

During 1963 Kenya was on the verge of acquiring independence and political competition within KANU was becoming ever more tense. Experts from the MFA stayed in close contact with Odinga and Okello and were informed in detail about intraparty rivalry. According to the MFA’s analytical report based on the meeting with Okello in June 1963, competition was peaking between the Mboya right wing and the Odinga left wing for seats in the future government. Kenyatta placed himself in the middle between the competing factions, which allowed him to balance strategically between the two camps.

Kenyan foreign political orientation was very much predetermined by its previous relations with Britain and the fact that Britain maintained a strong position in Kenya after independence. At first in 1962 Kenyatta was not overly fond of the British, but he had to accept their economic significance for the sake of Kenya's development. Another determinant of Kenya's foreign policy was the Cold War rivalry that was very much present in East Africa in this period. East and West were already competing to establish efficient relations with Kenya even before Independence. The USA provided Tom Mboya with some technical and educational assistance, but otherwise they treated Kenya as being in Britain’s sphere of influence and did not choose to seek full-scale economic and political engagement there. The USA continued to provide Kenya with educational and technical assistance after independence, but their intentions did not go much beyond this. On the other hand, socialist countries also established relations with Kenya and their ambitions were stronger. They believed that by providing generous technical assistance they would be able to attract Kenya's allegiance and eventually to implant socialism in Kenya. Nevertheless it was Britain who had the best position in Kenya both pre- and post-independence. ‘The British, meanwhile, still controlled much of

\textsuperscript{302} For example Dr Pavel T. the chairman of Commission for Foreign Students’ Affairs at Vysoká Škola Ekonomická was registered as a contact and up until 1968 regularly informed his managing organ.
the civil service, and worked quietly to ensure that Kenya started on a path of stability, bureaucratic efficiency and economic growth. Since they believed this could only be achieved under a non-communist system, they ‘educated’ the new government in the need for moderation.’

Officially, Kenya declared its external relations to be based on the notion of non-alignment. In reality, and in comparison with Tanganyikan commitment to the non-aligned movement, this never fully translated into practical actions. British retained a substantial influence not only in the economy, but also in the security and military spheres. As in the case of Tanganyika’s President Nyerere, in Kenya it was the nation’s leader’s personal interest and preference that more or less determined the country’s foreign political orientation. After a slow and chilly start, relations between the British and Kenyatta gradually improved. Between 1962 and 1964 ‘Kenyatta’s personal relations with the British deepened, and their commonality of interest became clearer. The elderly leader was surrounded by ambitious lieutenants who owed him little, and who had close ties with the leading actors in the Cold War drama.’ In these circumstances Kenyatta made sure that the British position and interests in Kenya were safeguarded, and the British in return provided the country with military assistance, technical assistance and development aid. Kenya occasionally clashed with both Britain and the USA over their actions in other parts of Africa. Most notable in this respect was the Congo crisis and the dealings with Southern Rhodesia.

At this point, Odinga enjoyed a strong position within KANU due to his strength in the Luo region but also thanks to his contacts with socialist countries. Before and immediately after independence his role in this respect was valued and welcome by Kenyatta, but soon the situation changed. Kenyatta decided to position himself in between the two rival fractions, not only within KANU, but he hoped to manoeuvre Kenya after independence into a similar position in between two global political camps, at least for the time being. While good contacts with the USA and the UK were guaranteed through Kenyatta himself and through Mboya’s connections in the American government, good relations with the socialist camp were the responsibility of Odinga

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303 Hornsby, Kenya, 89.
304 Hornsby, Kenya, 103.
and his wing. However, Kenyatta’s flirt with socialist countries was to be over very soon. After independence Odinga’s and Kenyatta’s opinions on Kenyan external policies drifted far apart. Odinga advocated Kenya’s pursuing a more subtle neutral foreign policy close to the non-aligned movement as it was becoming apparent that links with Britain and the West far outweighed those with the East. Kenyatta meanwhile, after initial manoeuvring, set the foreign political orientation of Kenya very firmly towards the West. Internal ideological conflict between Mboya’s conservatives and Odinga’s radicals increasingly affected relations with socialist countries.

3.2. **Czechoslovakia and independent Kenya - from high hopes to marginalisation**

Soon after independence KANU became an undisputed leading political force, after members of the rival KADU, such as Daniel arap Moi or Ezekiel Barngatuny, dissolved their organisation and joined KANU. KADU was in a rather difficult position right from the start as it had in KANU a very strong and capable rival for political dominance in Kenya. In the 1961 elections KANU emerged clearly victorious and it was only due to British pressure that the grand coalition government was formed in 1962 to lead Kenya towards the 1963 elections and later towards independence. The May 1963 elections decided political power in Kenya after the imminent independence would be clearly dominated by the KANU. KADU’s reaction was untypical for African political practice in this period, when most states were experiencing growing competition between ruling and opposition parties leading eventually in many cases to the growth of executive’s authoritarianism and later to the introduction of a one-party system. KADU leaders opted for a different future. ‘Partly enticed by offers of co-optation and partly threatened by what might happen to members of a disloyal opposition, KADU members of Parliament soon began to cross the floor. On the first anniversary of independence in December 1964 the opposition dissolved itself and its remaining members joined KANU, creating a de facto single-party state.’ Meanwhile the KANU government had already

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305 MZV F. IV/4 Keňa, č.j. 0184/63, 1963, 4-5.
eliminated all the federalism notions that the British had insisted on having incorporated in Kenya's pre-independence Constitution. During 1964 the KANU leadership introduced far-reaching legislative changes that cancelled most local government power and centralised executive power in the hands of the national cabinet.

KANU's government faced first crisis just one month after the independence. On 21 January 1964 the first of the East African army mutinies started in Dar es Salaam. Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya all inherited military forces, previously known as the King's African Rifles (KAR), from the colonial administration, and with them the source of potential disruption due to a number of grievances the soldiers had. The first mutiny broke out in Tanganyika, and it encouraged the Ugandan soldiery to follow suit. Kenya had received its independence only three weeks earlier and the political situation in the country was thus quite volatile. Kenyatta was aware that the mutinies in Tanganyika and Uganda would most likely inspire Kenyan soldiers and he took the necessary precautions by asking British to provide him with military assistance should such a development take place. Kenyatta was correct to anticipate this, because the Kenyan forces' complaints over low pay in combination with the example set by others did eventually result in attempted mutiny.

Mutiny broke out on 24 January with soldiers refusing to follow orders. Mutineers took control of the camp, arrested their commanding officer and demanded a pay rise. The whole affair was fairly disorganised and poorly managed. The British reaction to the mutiny was swift and effective. A British unit stationed nearby moved towards the occupied camp and, after a short clash and two casualties on the mutineers' side, gained control.308 Other British units meanwhile spread around the capital and took control of strategically important posts. In the course of the next few months the perpetrators of the mutiny were tried and sentenced to between 11 and 15 years of imprisonment.

Kenya’s response to the 1964 mutiny and subsequent military development was notably different from that of Tanzania and Uganda. Uganda reacted to the mutiny by speeding up process of Africanisation whereby all of the remaining British officers were quickly dismissed. In the years that followed, the Ugandan President Obote sought to develop the Ugandan army by intense special cooperation with foreign countries such as

Israel or Czechoslovakia, but he also retained many aspects of traditional British military organisation. Meanwhile, a similar mutiny in Tanganyika meant an ultimate break with British military tradition. Tanganyika reacted to the mutiny which had seriously challenged the country's political stability, by dissolving the national army completely and rebuilding it on a very different basis as a kind of political militia. Also, in Tanganyika's case external military aid, in this case mostly provided by Canada and China, was needed to accomplish military reform.

On the question of military reform Kenya's reaction to mutiny was the mildest response of the three, perhaps because the mutiny had never had a chance to escalate fully and thus did not seriously challenge the political stability of the country. The Kenyan government did not choose to go for any far-reaching structural reform of its army following the mutiny, except for trying to change the ethnic structure of the service. While before the mutiny the army was dominated by the warrior tribes of the Kalenjin and the Kamba, in the following years the government encouraged an influx of Kikuyu recruits.309 Kenya retained the British influence in its army fully, 310 despite signals extended towards Czechoslovak officials that clearly indicated otherwise. The Kenyan army retained its British commanding officer until 1966 when he was finally replaced by a Kenyan, but a number of British officers still remained in post even after this.

Even though the Kenyan army mutiny never escalated into a full-blown crisis or attempted coup d'état, it still had surprisingly far-reaching effects on the country. The news of the army mutiny in Kenya had a negative, but luckily only a temporary impact on the country's tourist industry. 'A more far-reaching result was the effect upon the government's attitude to real or imagined subversion.'311 In the aftermath of the mutiny Kenyatta became increasingly worried about a Communist plot against the government. Odinga blamed this fear on 'highly imaginative and slanted intelligence reports delivered daily to Prime Minister by British, British-trained or British-influenced intelligence officers.'312 This newly acquired fear of hostile foreign intervention resulted in the government's decision to limit the number of staff at foreign embassies in Kenya. Not

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309 Tamarkin, "Roots," 300.
only the Kenyan and British governments but also a number of East African as well as Western media at the time saw the mutinies as the results of Communist countries’ plotting. 313 No direct link in any of the East African countries between the mutineers and socialist countries’ was, however, ever established and from today’s perspective it seems unlikely.

Internal political development was greatly affected by the mutiny. ‘In the months following the mutiny, [Kenyan] politics were conducted in an atmosphere of what appeared to be a drawn-out crisis. This could not be attributed only to the revolt because there were other important influences such as the continuing Somali threat on the north-western border and reports of renewed Mau-Mau oath-taking ceremonies in the bush. But the mutiny was certainly significant. The years 1964 and 1965 were years of growing conservatism in Kenya, leading to the final isolation of Odinga and the radicalism he personified.’ 314 The mutiny certainly added a new factor of distrust to the relationship between Kenyatta and his second-in-command Odinga, who was known to have strong ties with socialist countries. Kenyatta considered these links useful initially, but with his growing fears of conspiracies against the government, he viewed Odinga’s socialist links with increasing suspicion.

It is difficult to explain what purpose Kenyatta was pursuing when he met with Odinga to discuss in some detail the arrangements for military technical assistance to be provided by Czechoslovakia, (particulars of which are provided in the following paragraphs) only weeks after the mutiny. Did Kenyatta seriously contemplate an alternative course of development for Kenya’s military in the aftermath of the mutiny? Is it possible that his aim in retaining British officers and upholding British military tradition was not always as definite as it might seem from today’s perspective? It is probably impossible to establish whether Kenyatta’s interest in special military cooperation with Czechoslovakia was genuine, or whether he merely saw it as an opportunity to get hold of cheap or free special material while not making any political concessions.

After independence, relations between Kenya and the CSSR continued to develop in several spheres – standard political relations, trade relations, cultural

exchange, technical and educational assistance. Their importance was, however, surpassed by the special cooperation which interlinked with all these other forms, and eventually became the main formative power of relations between Kenya and the CSSR. Via its support of Oginga Odinga’s wing Czechoslovakia aspired to limit British influence in Kenya, to defeat the pro-western faction in the Kenya government and to incorporate this most important East African country tightly into the socialist camp.

The declaration of independence represented a beginning of a new era in cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Kenya. A positive CS contribution to success for the KANU NLM cause was a good starting point for cooperation with the newly independent Kenya. The CS MFA also participated directly in the glorious event of the declaration of independence, by providing KANU with material and financial support to organise it. The MFA also sent out a diplomatic delegation to the celebrations. Without delay, the CS administration began activities towards establishing a CS diplomatic office in Nairobi in February 1964. With the assistance of CS diplomats from the embassy in Dar Es Salaam and in cooperation with members of the official ČTK mission, who had arrived in Nairobi some time previously, MFA officials managed to open a CS embassy in Nairobi in a matter of weeks.

The newly-opened embassy became the main official channel of contact between the two countries and members of this diplomatic office became vital for the further development of official political relations. The Kenya embassy became the crucial office for the success of Czechoslovak penetration into the high political game of independent East Africa. The diplomatic duties at this mission exceeded the usual agenda of an embassy in many respects. The office was approached, on a regular basis, by various Kenyan politicians with unofficial requests for scholarships for their family members, as a university degree from the CSSR was at this point still perceived as the guarantee of a successful professional career. To buy the allegiance of these politicians, the CS administration did all it could to accede to their requests. The CS embassy also processed most of the communications between the various cultural or civil society organisations such as trade unions, youth organisations or agricultural cooperatives.

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315 The MFA provided KANU with celebratory flags used during celebrations and presented KANU with a range of gifts for its leading officials.
316 MZV F. III/5 Keňa, č.j. 127.312/64-10, 10.12.1964, 1.
317 MZV F. IV/4 č.j. 010110/64, 23.12.1964, 1.
The classified objectives of several members of this diplomatic office became at least as important as the official activities. As was often the case in this period of Czechoslovak activism across Africa, diplomatic posts were used as an effective cover for intelligence officers. The Nairobi embassy became the base for the StB operatives’ Residency very soon after its formation. For some years the unofficial activities of embassy staff were of much greater importance than their official diplomatic duties. In many cases it is impossible to determine whether the activities of StB operatives, disguised as diplomats, were being carried out as part of their diplomatic mission or as a part of their special activities.

The Nairobi embassy became the main point of contact for Odinga and his colleagues with their main foreign ally. All further cooperation and strategy was discussed and agreed upon via this office. While Odinga’s own contacts with embassy officials, in most cases, fell under the category of official political relations and were not of a particularly classified nature, contacts with some of his closest colleagues were of a far more unorthodox nature. As most of these people had recently received high positions in the Kenyan administration, meetings with them were prime sources of information from the highest levels of Kenyan government and reports of such meetings were regularly delivered to the Czechoslovak MFA, the Interior Ministry and the StB for analysis and strategic planning.

The first meetings with Odinga in his position as Minister were held by the provisional chargé d'affaires of the CS embassy, Mr Veselý, in Spring 1964. Veselý, reported every meeting with Odinga in detail to the MFA in Prague. Headquarters in Prague perceived the maintenance of close political cooperation with Minister Odinga as a main condition for an effective means for intervening in Kenya’s political development. At this point Odinga was the second highest Kenyan official with real influence on the country’s policy-making, both in domestic matters as well as abroad. In 1964 MFA strategists’ confidence in Odinga’s devotion to turning Kenya towards socialism was very high. In his regular contacts with CS embassy staff Odinga was reported as believing that Kenya intended to cooperate closely with the countries of socialist camp. 'He said that he was counting on our help. He also said that Kenya intended to use the good experiences of socialist countries when building a politically and economically independent Kenya. He also declared that we should not be mistaken, when nowadays it is spoken of
African socialism in Africa, as the main principles of socialism are the same throughout the whole world.”

Despite the fact that Odinga’s contacts with the East were soon to be used against him, his activities in this respect during 1964 and 1965 were in line with Kenyatta’s early foreign policy after independence. Kenyatta’s strategy at this point was to position Kenya in between both camps and to strengthen the country’s position by receiving support from both blocs. While the dense net of relations linked Kenya to Britain, the US and other western countries, the quality and intensity of contacts with the East was much lower. Odinga represented the only vital link between the Kenyan state and socialist bloc countries and he enjoyed the trust of both the USSR and Czechoslovakia. In this respect for Kenyatta and Kenyan politics Odinga was of the greatest importance as his links with East allowed Kenyatta to exert the pressure on the West by implying that the real alternative for Kenya lay east of the Berlin wall. In this sense Odinga fully satisfied the political needs of the Kenyan state. To what extent he maintained contacts with Czechoslovak officials with a view to furthering his own personal political ambition is difficult to assess. No hard evidence is traceable in CS archives that would justify accusations made against Odinga in 1966 that some of his activities were aimed against Kenyatta as the head of KANU and against the Kenyan state itself. Some documents from late 1965 and from 1966, the time when the strong anti-socialist campaign aimed at Odinga peaked, indicated that his contacts with the CS embassy did not lack personal political ambitions and that Odinga was growing increasingly discontent with his position in the government as well as in KANU.

In his capacity as Interior Minister, and from December 1964 as a vice-president, Odinga maintained intensive official contacts with the CSSR, which was a more acceptable partner than the feared Soviets. In 1964 Odinga did indeed visit the Soviet Union, where he negotiated a loan of 40 million roubles and credit for purchasing Soviet commodities to the tune of another 13 million roubles, but the execution of this plan was halted by the Kenyan government. According to the economic agreement, both parties signed up for several large investment projects, including a textile factory, a fish-processing plant, an irrigation project, a large hospital and some others. Most of these plans remained on paper as economic cooperation with the East was put under immense

318 MZV F. III/5 Keňa, č.j. 01028/64,, 27.4.1964, 1.
319 NAA ÚV KSČ A. Novotný, č.j. 264261/1, 1966, 1.
pressure by Britain, which retained tight control over large segments of the Kenyan economy.\footnote{NAA ÚV KSČ A. Novotný, č.j. 264261/1, 1966, 1.} Once the Soviets urged implementation of the agreement, Tom Mboya was delegated to deal with the issue, a clear sign that Kenyatta did not really want cooperation with the Soviets to develop, and Mboya’s manoeuvring during the Moscow meeting led to the abandonment of the agreed cooperation. This strategy clearly indicates that at this point planning of economic and political cooperation with the East lacked Kenyatta’s real political support. It was becoming obvious that despite declarations of wanting to build African socialism, Kenya was set clearly on its way to the western bloc. This fact had clear implications for Odinga and his position within the Kenyan government. A bleak future for Odinga meant no bright future for Czechoslovak plans in Kenya either.

Odinga was undoubtedly a crucial man for CS plans for Kenya, but MFA experts were aware of certain limitations linked to his person even before his eventual fall from power. As there was virtually no alternative he was however the only choice available. An analytical paper from Czechoslovak MFA’s on Odinga’s role in Kenyan government in 1966 states that ‘[t]he disadvantage of cooperation with Odinga and his group is that he himself and all of his co-workers come from the Luo tribe, therefore our cooperation with this group could be used as a pretext for action against us.’\footnote{MZV F. IV/4 č.j. 01028/64, 27.4.1964, 2.} With the growing dominance of Kikuyu people from around President Kenyatta, Odinga’s position was becoming steadily weaker. CS strategists were aware of the risk that Odinga’s potential fall would leave them isolated from top politics in Kenya.

In cooperation with intelligence the MFA tried to widen the spectrum of CS co-operators in the country as early as in 1964 but with limited success. The internal directive from 1964 set a clear objective. ‘It will be necessary to seek tighter relations with people around Kenyatta himself and those who represent the most powerful tribe of Kikuyu in the administration. Even though this issue might seem marginal, it must not be overlooked. Tribal rivalries that were backtracked during the struggle for independence reached the new intensity after independence was granted, especially when the seats in the emerging state apparatus were awarded, and it is necessary to be aware of this fact.’\footnote{MZV F. IV/4 k č.j. 01028/64, 27.4.1964, 2.} Fully in line with the above statement, CS diplomats in Kenya tried to maintain regular contact with Kenyatta himself and, in the first few years, they were successful. Chargé
d’affaires Veselý had already had two meetings with Kenyatta in March 1964, during
which Kenyatta expressed a willingness to cooperate further with the CSSR. ‘Kenyatta [...] proclaimed, that he welcomes our presence in Kenya and he promised us full support
during all our operations/activities in Kenya. [...] Kenyatta expressed his willingness to
cooperate with us closely in diverse spheres and asked us for specific help in the field of
country’s defence since the British military troops will depart from Kenya at the end of the
year.’

In the first months of his diplomatic mission Mr Veselý met almost all the
members of Kenyatta’s cabinet and he was surprised by the warm welcome and the
willingness to cooperate that he met with at most of the Ministries. Among the priorities
of official bilateral cooperation he recommended contact with Kenyan Health Minister
Dr Njoroge Mungai along with the agreed technical assistance. Minister Mungai had, at
the first meeting presented several suggestions for cooperation. As Kenya was willing to
cover the greater part of the costs for the suggested hospital-building projects, Mr
Veselý saw the proposed cooperation as economically feasible and he recommended
inviting Dr Mungai to the CSSR at the first opportunity. The most surprising and, in the
given circumstances, somewhat suspicious aspect was the meeting with Tom Mboya,
recently appointed Minister of Justice. Veselý reported on this meeting as follows: ‘[He]
declared that he was always in favour of close cooperation with us, and that in government
he will personally support every suggestion to cooperate with the CSSR. This statement of
his is even more peculiar, as it is publicly known that he is a pro-American exponent. [...] Minister T. Mboya himself is very active in a whole range of other issues and expresses his
opinion on problems of women, African unity, South Africa and many others. All his
speeches are prepared by a group of five American experts, specialists on different
economic and political matters. Therefore, it is possible that his declarations about
cooperation with us are more or less hypocritical and were intended to cover up his true
orientation.’

The above report of Mboya’s unusual attitude towards CS officials is in clear
conflict with his political orientation and all his political activities. In the given historical
circumstances, however, it can be used to interpret the strategy that the Kenyan
government was using in relation to the CSSR. This strategy, most likely prescribed by

323 MZV F. IV/4 č.j. 01028/64, 27.4.1964, 3.
324 MZV F. IV/4 Keňa, č.j. 01028/64, 27.4.1964, 5-6.
325 MZV F. IV/4, č.j. 01028/64, 27.4.1964, 7.
Kenyatta himself, was very similar to the affair (previously discussed) that took place during the second round of Lancaster House negotiations in 1962, when contacts with the CS government helped Kenyans to exert pressure on the Western countries. In 1964, cooperation with the CSSR and a hinted-at cooperation with the USSR were more or less feasible economic and political alternatives to Kenyan relations with the West. Or, at least, that was the message being directed to the UK and US policymakers. It had to be made clear to the British, in control of large parts of the Kenyan economy, that the opportunity to cooperate economically with the Soviet camp was a valid option, and that technical cooperation with the CSSR in the special sphere, could help Kenya overcome the departure of British police and military experts. This is the only explanation for the sudden desire, in even the most unexpected Kenyan politicians, to seek close cooperation with the CSSR. Cautiousness and suspicion regarding this development can be traced in the reports of CS diplomats in Kenya. Nevertheless, the slow realisation that Kenyatta, Mboya and other right-wing politicians were playing the socialist card only to improve their bargaining position with the West was becoming ever more apparent as from late 1965.

In the first months of his mission in Nairobi, chargé d'affaires Veselý was not only busy with official protocol meetings, but aiming to establish the system for a working cooperation with the left-wing KANU, who were repeatedly approaching CS officials with requests for assistance, especially in providing training for their cadres. In relation to civil technical assistance, Veselý received the following instructions:

- Begin negotiations with Minister Odinga about help for the left wing of KANU
- Negotiations about the air route Prague-Nairobi
- Negotiations about cultural agreements
- Enquire if Kenya still interested in the CS planning experts’ mission.326

The activities of Veselý and his provisional team prepared the ground for several expert missions while some others took place without the Nairobi embassy. Already by March 1964 the trade delegation had managed to secure the trade agreement and the scientific-technological cooperation agreement with the Kenyan government. The MFA considered the trade agreement a core document for effective future relations

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326 MZV F. IV/4, k č.j. 021.911, 17.2.1964, 1-4.
with Kenya as the amount of trade exchange with Kenya, despite the past obstacles, reached 10 million Kčs in 1965 excluding any loans or technical help. The shortcoming of the agreed covenant was the condition of balanced payments that was limiting CS exports to Kenya.

Official political relations between CS ambassador Mr Roškot, who eventually replaced Veselý, and members of the Kenyan cabinet, continued throughout 1965 and several suggestions for ministerial visits were raised by both sides. For a variety of reasons none of these plans materialised and neither did any negotiations for the long-planned cultural agreement. Despite strong competition from well-established British and American companies, as well as from the Chinese government, a positive trend in trade exchange between the CSSR and Kenya was visible throughout the 1960s. In 1965 trade amounted to some 17 million KČS and Kenya was one of the few African countries to enjoy a positive balance of trade with the CSSR. Limited successes were also recorded in the sphere of civil technical assistance, which officially started after the inter-state agreement was signed in 1964. Cooperation with Kenyan broadcasters and journalists was also proving promising and fruitful.

From the beginning of 1965 the reports from the CS embassy concerning the internal political situation in Kenya start to show a sceptical view of the position of Odinga’s wing in the government. There is also more obvious desperation in meetings with Odinga himself and his colleagues, who were slowly getting ousted from decisive positions within the administration. Growing discontent was especially related to the isolation of alumni of special courses as well as civil courses from the CSSR, who had hoped to receive high posts within the Kenyan administration, security and army. Instead, in many cases, Kenyan graduates from the CSSR had to deal with suspicion, limited access to important posts and poor career prospects. Despite all this, MFA analysts still believed that Odinga’s strong position amongst the thousands of ordinary members of KANU, as well as his ethnic ties to West Kenya, gave some hope for political change in his favour, especially as the right wing of KANU was fragmented into several

327 MZV F. IV/4, č.j. 027.258/64-10, 20.8.1964, 4.
328 MZV F. IV/6 Keňa, č.j. 05/66 6.1.1966, 2-9. Between 5 and 7 CS doctors worked in Kenya in this period and sending out a vet, nurses and an urban planner was being considered. Practical internships and university scholarships were still being granted by Czechoslovakia for the Kenyan government. The CS embassy considered this state of technical assistance a success especially due to Kenyan preference for Western experts.
329 MZV F. IV/6 Keňa, č.j. 05/66 (020288), 6.1.1966, 2-9.
330 Dr Jela O, interview.
rival fractions, and the highly feared Tom Mboya also failed to acquire a decisive position in the administration. As Odinga and his collaborators slowly began to lose their leading positions in the state apparatus, cooperation between them and the CSSR was becoming ever more problematic, even though nominally Odinga’s post was that of second man in the state.

Odinga did not share Kenyatta’s political opinions on a number of crucial political aspects that were to determine Kenya’s political, social and economic development. Before independence these ideological differences were to a large extent muted for the greater good of the anti-colonial cause and perhaps on the basis of long-standing good personal relations between Kenyatta and the leader of Luo people. After independence, however, Kenyatta increasingly consolidated most of the executive power in his own hands and his fellow Kikuyu collaborators began to dominate KANU. Odinga and some other KANU leaders such as Bildad Kaggia, a former Mau Mau activist, found themselves slowly becoming an intra-party opposition regarded as radical and alien to KANU’s political principles by the party’s establishment around Kenyatta. This intraparty division became more apparent after the former KADU members, most of whom were politically moderate, joined the party and tilted the power equilibrium in favour of Kenyatta’s group favour. The period of 1964 to 1966 saw a widening intra-KANU gulf between right-wing conservatives around Kenyatta and Mboya, and a radical left-oriented group of which Odinga and Kaggia were the main representatives. Kenyatta at first tried to stay out of this growing rivalry, but he began to lean more and more towards the former group.

Both Odinga and Kaggia clashed with Kenyatta mainly over the issue of land redistribution. ‘Much of the criticism was directed at specific aspects of settlement policy: the squatter problem, the future of labourers evicted from former European farms, the organization of the Ministry of Settlement, the behaviour of settlement officers, [etc.]’

Even though this is almost impossible to prove reliably, Odinga supposedly rejected Kenyatta’s offer to acquire large portions of abandoned land and instead demanded its distribution to minor local farmers. Kenyatta allegedly took Odinga’s rejection very

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332 Gertzel, The Politics, 44.
badly and their personal as well as professional relationship was marked by this disagreement for years to come.\(^{333}\)

Another issue which polarised KANU was the nationalisation of foreign-owned enterprises which would have been a harsh blow to Britain’s economic interests in the country. Nevertheless, a substantial number of KANU politicians as well as many ordinary Kenyans found it difficult to follow government policies that were, as they saw it, benefitting the former colonial power. The matter was further politicised by the fact that Kenya declared itself a socialist country, even though in reality very little progress was achieved to make such a claim valid. Nevertheless, partial or full nationalisation of large enterprises was one of the fundamental pillars of the socialist system, and it was only logical that some politicians would call for its implementation. Since as early as 1964, however, Kenyatta himself had been opposed to nationalisation.\(^{334}\) Lastly, another source of ideological conflict within TANU was linked to already-mentioned contradictory opinions of two newly-formed factions concerning the foreign political orientation that Kenya should seek.

During 1964 and 1965 rivalry between conservatives and radicals began to affect cabinet ministers’ ability to work together and eventually also penetrated the National Assembly. After Independence, Odinga held the highly influential post of Interior Minister, but once the Presidential system was established he became Kenyatta’s vice-president. In some respects this position was perceived as less influential on the everyday execution of power in the security sphere,\(^{335}\) but Odinga was formally and practically still the second-highest-ranking official in the presidential system. Therefore Odinga’s actions, speeches and political gestures all carried substantial political weight and were closely scrutinised. In this period Odinga did not refrain from making some rather radical public statements in relation to land reform and the building of socialism.\(^{336}\) These activities of Odinga’s were noted with increasing discontent by Tom Mboya, KANU’s general secretary, and he challenged Odinga and the radicals on the grounds of their having abandoned official KANU policy. Mboya was responsible for drafting legislation on African Socialism and he refused to accept the radicals’

\(^{333}\) Odinga, interview.
\(^{334}\) Gertzel, The Politics, 50.
\(^{335}\) Parsons, 1964 Army Mutinies, 186.
\(^{336}\) Gertzel, The Politics, 56.
interpretations of this policy. In the following months Mboya and Odinga became arch rivals within KANU and their conflict was to determine the party’s future orientation.

African socialism – the new government programme Kenya announced in 1965 – brought great disappointment and the hint of the beginning of a rejection of socialist countries. The nature and objectives of this programme were explained in a document called ‘African socialism and its application in Kenyan planning’. Thoughts and plans presented in this document were critical of the Marxist version of socialism that had supposedly failed. The paper also refused to contemplate Kenya’s being a satellite of any country or group of countries, and stressed the importance of maintaining the traditional stratification of Kenyan society which was very different from socialist perceptions of the class system. Private ownership was welcomed and nationalisation of private property was only allowed with full compensation. Much more subtle was the criticism of capitalism and, even though the programme’s authors tried to place Kenya theoretically in between the two systems, the manifesto of African socialism represented the first open rejection of socialism by Kenyan leaders.337

As the conflict between Odinga and Mboya progressed, Odinga found himself facing frequent criticism about his links to socialist countries. These links certainly existed and Odinga himself was open about them. In his position as minister and later as vice-president Odinga was responsible for maintaining the country’s relations with socialist countries, most notably China and the Soviet Union, and this he did with Kenyatta’s approval. However, at later stages these relations seemed to justify claims that Odinga and his wing were Communist. The British government, the Kenyan press and Mboya’s supporters certainly played a major part in creating an image of Odinga as a Communist agent; rumours were spread of a coup d’état338 being prepared to take place under Odinga’s lead.339

Eventually, it was Odinga’s connection with Czechoslovakia that was used to discredit him. In November 1964 several British newspapers printed the story of suspicious deliveries of special material carried out by socialist Czechoslovakia to the Interior Ministry, then used by Odinga. Besides the deliveries of special material for the

338 Branch, Kenya, 48.
339 Gertzel, The Politics, 68.
Ministry, an affair of an unscheduled plane carrying Kenyan students returning secretly from Czechoslovakia also came to light. Allegedly the students were allowed by Odinga himself to enter Kenya secretly. Six months later in April 1965 more unexpected special material deliveries were thought to have taken place. The countries of origin, (in this second case, the Soviet Union) maintained in both instances that these actions had been agreed with the Kenyan government and that one of the shipments was intended for Uganda.340

In all cases the important role of disclosing ‘suspicious’ events to newspapers and to Kenyatta was played by security officers attached to the Headquarters of the British Land Forces Kenya. ‘Encouraged by Western diplomats and intelligence officers, Kenyatta’s advisors warned that Odinga was planning a military coup. [...] Malcolm Macdonald, who had become the British High Commissioner in Nairobi, believed that the arms shipments were part of a larger plot to destabilize Kenyatta’s government by weakening British influence in the armed forces and provoking unrest among the landless and unemployed.’341 In these turbulent months Odinga’s close collaborator MP Pio Gama Pinto was assassinated. His death was used as an explanation why the plot to overthrow the government failed.

This campaign lasted for over six months and it bore fruit for Odinga’s opponents. Kenyatta became increasingly suspicious of Odinga and he decided to break his influence on security matters by already mentioned ‘promoting’ Odinga from the Interior Ministry to the office of vice-president in December 1964. Odinga’s public image was certainly harmed too, regardless of the truth of the matter, because plotting against the government in this period when nationalist governments around Africa were being swept by a series of coups d’état was received very sensitively by the public.

Odinga repeatedly claimed that the special deliveries had been approved by Kenyatta and that other ministers had been aware of them too, but to little avail.342 Available documents from the Czechoslovak archives plainly indicate that the accusations against Odinga were clearly wrong. If Odinga did indeed plan a coup d’état it had nothing to do with the ‘secret’ arrival of Kenyan students from Czechoslovakia, nor was it linked to any of the disclosed special deliveries. On the contrary, available documents clearly testify that Kenyatta was not only informed about these deliveries,

340 Gertzel, The Politics, 68.
but also that he met with Czechoslovak officials and discussed in person other matters of special military cooperation with Czechoslovakia, including training for military cadets and organising more deliveries to take place in 1965.

The decisive blow to Odinga’s political aspirations came when he challenged British influence in the Kenyan administration. In his capacity as Interior Minister, Odinga instigated the process of fast Africanisation of the Kenyan administration and he tried to limit the powers of the British staff within his Ministry by transferring these people to less influential posts. He continued in this activity as vice-president. Odinga hoped to bring all the organs of Kenyan intelligence under the control of the Interior Ministry, but he failed in this. Odinga’s powers became quite limited especially after British pressure stripped him of his responsibilities, particularly for the Africanisation of the administration, which was transferred directly to the President’s office.

One of the conditions for granting independence was that initially, high posts would be retained for British staff in the Kenyan administration, and Odinga’s activities were perceived by the British as a major threat to their position in Kenya. After Odinga’s departure from the Interior Ministry, the network of British advisors and officers was present in all crucial Kenyan administration offices – three advisors in the new Interior Minister Mungai’s secretariat, two Britons in leading positions at Police headquarters, and British staff as the chiefs of Kenyan army, navy and air force headquarters. All these influential posts, in combination with a tight British grip on the Kenyan economy, meant that they were able to exert very strong pressure on Kenyatta if any threat to their dominance appeared, such as was the case of Odinga. They also possessed all the means necessary to discredit Odinga and destroy his close relationship with Kenyatta, and this is most likely what happened in the spring of 1965.

Growing tensions within KANU escalated in the summer months of 1965. The anti-communist campaign that was taking place from the spring months of 1965 was, according to Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence, driven by the British and eventually turned Kenyatta against Odinga. While the position of the left in the Kenyan

343 Demands of Africanisation for the armed forces were also voiced by Kenyan soldiers who rebelled in January 1964. Their rebellion was suppressed by the British who as a result strengthened their position in the army and retained the posts they were originally supposed to leave by December 1964. (Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 121.)
344 ABS 80952_000_1_5, Č.jA. A-1/00, 7.9.1964, 2, l. 32.
345 MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 039/65-Ca, 23.3.1965, 1.
346 MZV F. IV/6, Keňa, č.j. 060/65-Ks, 28.7.1965, 3.
government was already weak, the balance of power in the Kenyan parliament was much more in favour of the left. Repeated criticism of left-oriented MPs provoked Kenyatta into threatening them with the dissolution of Parliament. In order to deal with this situation the KANU right wing, despite internal fragmentation, stripped Odinga of his leading position in KANU’s Parliament Commission with Kenyatta’s approval. The new Commission was immediately staffed with members of the right wing. According to CS intelligence, ‘it was proved that both the British and Americans have an eminent interest in unity and cooperation of the three right wing groups’\textsuperscript{347} and that pressure was being exerted to force rivals Mboya and Gichuru to cooperate. Meanwhile, the group of left-wing representatives of 12 regional offices of KANU independently organised a KANU conference and elected a new party leadership under Kenyatta and Odinga. Their demand for dissolution of the current KANU leadership was followed by police action and 27 delegates of this unofficial conference were imprisoned.\textsuperscript{348} Odinga hesitated to express his support of these young left-oriented delegates for fear of further weakening his own position within the party. Joint pressure against Odinga was successful and the right wing of KANU was significantly strengthened. Odinga’s position within KANU was becoming untenable.

With Odinga’s retreat from power CS aspirations and objectives were destined to fail. In January 1966 the CS ambassador to Kenya sent the MFA a lengthy account of past relations between Kenya and the CSSR, in which he tried to explain the reasons for the initial failure of the ambitious plans from 1964 and in which he recommended adapting CS political objectives in Kenya to the new circumstances. Regarding the initial failure of CS plans, he blames the MFA strategy for not fully appreciating ‘the extent of [Kenya’s] economic and political and military dependency on Great Britain and her position in the administration and economy [...] [whilst] being the country that [Great Britain] also considers crucial in the East African region. [...] In order to prevent an upheaval in the domestic as well as external politics of Kenya, Great Britain has been using Kenyan economic and military dependency to exert more pressure on right-wing members of government. Loans from western countries have played a vital role.’\textsuperscript{349}

\textsuperscript{347} MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 092/65-Ks, 28.7.1965, 2.
\textsuperscript{348} MZV F. IV/6, Keňa, č.j. 092/65-Ks (026860), 28.7.1965, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{349} MZV F. IV/6, Keňa, č.j. 05/66 (020288), 6.1.1966, 1.
Britain is thus considered to be the main factor in the failure of socialist countries’ objectives. The rest of the blame was aimed at the left itself, who, having overestimated their powers, failed to create effective united political leadership and remained poorly organised. Despite this criticism the CS ambassador recommended providing help for the left in all requested forms. The original objectives of 1964, which demanded the seeking and developing of cooperation with Kenyan governments on all levels and in all spheres, were not revised despite the failures of the past two years. As the ambassador put it, ‘Kenya remains an important African country for prospects of cooperation with the CSSR as well as for prospects of increasing progressive political forces. Besides that, its significance did not decrease, either in East African or in continental affairs.’ These remnants of CS optimism about future cooperation with the Kenyan government were to be swept away in less than two months.

3.2.1. Special military cooperation

At the beginning of this chapter I discussed the unique role that special assistance of various kinds played within Czechoslovak-Kenyan relations. The basis for cooperation in this sphere had already been prepared before independence and, from 1964, it continued uninterrupted. Special technical assistance was to be delivered in two spheres, namely military and security, and it was to involve a range of different activities. Abundant archival records allow us to reconstruct how this special cooperation started, developed and, in just a couple of years, was eventually abandoned on account of not delivering the hoped-for effects. It is possible to reconstruct how this special cooperation was planned and eventually implemented by presenting the major events and organisations involved in it. Analysing and interpreting the effects of this special cooperation is, however, a difficult, not to say impossible task. Plans and aspirations that motivated this special cooperation on the CS side are well recorded in the archival material and they are fully in line with CS strategy elsewhere in Africa. Much more problematic is the analysis of the motivation and expectations behind the interests of Kenyan politicians in seeking this cooperation with the CSSR and why these aspirations changed so suddenly. In the following section I discuss the nature and course

\[350\] MZV F. IV/6, Keňa, č.j. 05/66 (020288), 6.1.1966, 4.
\[351\] MZV F. IV/6, Keňa, č.j. 05/66 (020288), 6.1.1966, 2.
of the development of special technical cooperation between the CSSR and Kenya in the military and security spheres. A major part of this development, also examined here in more detail, is represented by the activities and objectives of the StB Residency in Nairobi between the years 1964 and 1972.

Special cooperation in the military sphere had been established before Kenyan independence and the positive experience from this cooperation promised well for future prospects. On the Czechoslovak side, this kind of special assistance was on the MND agenda. On the Kenyan side, the responsibilities for negotiating special assistance remained with Odinga and his closest colleagues. Odinga’s position in negotiating the specifics of this special cooperation was supported by Kenyatta himself, as, especially in the early stage of cooperation in 1964 and the first half of 1965, he was personally involved in the talks and showed great interest in them.

Odinga appointed his close colleague Othieno Othiego, former head of the KANU office in London, to lead the team negotiating special military assistance with the CS MND. Othiego approached CS officials with Odinga’s request for special technical assistance shortly before independence. ‘He requested training for at least twenty Kenyan army officers in one-year or two-year courses and a six-month course for thirty security officers. According to Othieno, officers trained in the CSSR were gradually to replace the British experts. KANU’s left wing also intends to purchase weapons from the CSSR after independence and to retrain selected officers currently being trained in the UK, in the CSSR.’

In addition to this, he interpreted Odinga’s demand for ‘help in reorganising and expanding a new security apparatus. This mainly includes training the required cadres personnel in the CSSR and eventually sending out CS experts to develop organization and management methods of this organ.’ The CS government accorded Odinga’s requests the highest priority. The issue of military training was dealt with by the MND, while Odinga’s second demand, related to security and intelligence work, was forwarded to the Interior Ministry and the StB.

Following the required approval of the CS Politbyro, the CS Ministry of National Defence organised and instigated two military courses for Kenyans in 1963 and 1964.

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352 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 2273/13, 4.11.1963, 5, l. 10.
353 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 2273/13, 4.11.1963, 5, l. 10.
However, organising the courses and providing training for Kenyan soldiers was to be only one part of the developing cooperation.

In March 1964, shortly after the mutiny of Kenyan army took place experts from MND visited Kenya and led long discussions with Kenyatta and Odinga about further cooperation in the special sphere. During several meetings, both sides discussed a range of crucial issues of existing as well as planned cooperation. Kenyatta displayed very little knowledge of the matters under discussion and gave CS experts a free hand on several issues. CS experts were to suggest the organisation of the newly-created Kenyan armed forces and especially the placing of graduates of CS courses within its structure. For the future, Kenyatta suggested courses should take place primarily in Kenya due to lower costs and easier organisation. This suggestion met with a positive response from the CS delegation, who internally noted that ‘unless there is a sudden political change during 1964, a small group of military experts could be sent to Kenya at the beginning of 1965, assuming that British troops will leave Kenya by 12 December 1964 (as agreed).’

Kenyatta also informed the CS delegation that the recruitment of thousands of new soldiers amongst KANU youth was underway and that, after the departure of British troops, there would be a lack of military material and weaponry. For that matter, Kenyatta asked CS officials to provide sets of complete equipment for thousands of soldiers. Lastly, Kenyatta expressed interest in obtaining training for pilots and airfield personnel.

Kenyatta’s demands were considered a great opportunity for CS political and economic objectives in East Africa. However, at the same time, if they were to be provided for free, then they would be too large an expense for the CS government to handle. Nevertheless, the training of a 1000-strong military unit made up of KANU youth, loyal to Odinga’s left wing and quite revolutionary-oriented, was considered a vital step in Odinga’s competition within the party as he would acquire the ‘muscles’ that he still lacked. The presence of Kenyatta at these negotiations, and his silent consent to measures which were considered as a strengthening of the left within KANU, were

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356 VUA MNO 1963, č.j. H, 02305/64-OTP, March 1964, 3-6. In addition to special technical assistance, both Kenyatta and Odinga asked CS delegations also to assist Kenya in building the Lumumba institute close to Nairobi, which would become the base for education and training for technical cadres. The suggested financial participation of the CSSR was £20 000, but the CS delegation remained rather indifferent in this matter.
welcomed by CS analysts at the MFA as evidence of Kenyatta’s inclination towards the left.

There are detailed MND reports on courses 137 and 137a that commenced in the CSSR in 1963 and 1964 respectively. The objective of the courses was the training of platoon or battalion commanders in three specialisations – infantry, artillery and armoured battalion. A noteworthy fact in relation to courses 137 and 137a is that they were the first special technical assistance courses that were provided on a non-commercial basis, which meant that the CS administration covered all the costs for their organisation. This indicates how important Kenya was for the CS officials and how strong the negotiating position of the Kenyan government was. It was believed there would be several benefits from organising such courses. Besides having a direct influence on the creation of the Kenyan military and providing an open channel of communication to its high-ranked officers, CS generals expected these courses would increase demand for CS special material deliveries.

A CS MND delegation visited Kenya in March 1965, after the successful completion of course 137a and met with Kenyan Internal Security and Defence Minister, Dr Njoroge Mungai, who replaced Odinga once the latter had been appointed vice-president. Dr Mungai, being one of the right-wing KANU politicians, showed no specific interest in an increased number of special courses being organised in Czechoslovakia, but agreed to a demonstration of CS weapons for potential import to Kenya. The weaponry presented at this pre-purchase display included submachine gun Mk.58, machine gun Mk.59, machine pistol Mk.61, and self-loading rifle Mk.52/57. The second part of the presentation was to take place in the CSSR and included L-29 jet training aircraft, armoured carriers OT 62 TOPAS and SKOT, T 54A tank, 120mm mortar and 82mm recoilless gun, but it is not clear whether the delivery ever took place. Despite Dr Mungai’s consent to the weapons presentation, CS MND experts were becoming sceptical about Kenyan interest in completing the transaction. The MND delegation was surprised by the fact that the command positions in the Kenyan army, three battalions strong, were still being retained by English officers, in clear contrast to Kenyatta’s promise the previous year. They reported home that ‘taking into consideration the situation as described it is assumed that Kenya will be circumspect about obtaining special

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material from socialist bloc countries, in order not to provoke retaliatory economic sanctions by England.\textsuperscript{360} Clues that the future of special cooperation with Kenya would not be as bright as once hoped were becoming ever more difficult to ignore.

Spring 1965 was a time of a gradual deterioration of political relations between Kenya and the socialist countries. A new, cold attitude towards the Soviet bloc was also reflected in the special military cooperation between Kenya and the CSSR. Despite Kenyatta’s initial personal involvement in the organising of courses 137 and 137a, the course leaders reported Kenyan officials showed only limited interest in the progression and results of both courses towards their conclusion in early 1965. Also, Minister Mungai’s indifference in this matter indicated the Kenyan government had changed its approach. The CS government was forced to reconsider its plans and ambitions in relation to continuing special military cooperation in the immediate future. The original hopes of MFA, MND and Odinga proved grossly overambitious and, in the new political circumstances, highly unrealistic. Odinga’s hopes that the newly-formed Kenyan armed forces, backed by the CSSR, would become a decisive force within Kenya’s security apparatus were failing.

Unlike in neighbouring Uganda, the Kenyan army played only a symbolic and strictly apolitical role in the first years of its existence.\textsuperscript{361} The political turnabout that the MND experts had so feared, did indeed occur and, what was more important, the departure of British military units planned for December 1964 was delayed. British officers remained in command of the Kenyan army, and the ambitions of Odinga and CS officials of replacing the departing British with loyal graduates of CS security courses were thwarted. Not only were the police together with the General Service Units (which also retained close ties with the British) still the most powerful coercive organ in the Kenyan security system, but, with the command of the military being out of reach too, there was no hope for turning this balance of power in favour of Odinga’s left.\textsuperscript{362}

The Special Branch of the Kenyan police was a force inherited from the British colonial administration which together with the newly established General Service Unit aimed to defeat the Mau Mau uprising. Administration and structure of both police and security forces were important topics during the 1962 Lancaster House negotiations, together with the position of the King’s Africa Rifles units that were to form the new

\textsuperscript{361} MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 011/66-Ro (020293), 8.1.1966, 3-6.
\textsuperscript{362} ABS 11691_108_1_1, 10.2.1966, 1, l. 11.
Kenyan military. After independence, the GSU became an alternative army that Kenyatta developed into the loyal Kikuyu-dominated two thousand-strong force to counterbalance the official Kenyan army which had already proved unreliable and which was traditionally dominated by Kalenjins, not Kikuyu. The GSU developed into a disciplined, well-equipped and highly mobile force that would eventually be able to provide the government with some degree of coercive power should segments of the Kenyan army become restive. In effect while the Kenyan army was remaining strictly apolitical, the GSU became ‘a political force, the regime’s coercive arm against its internal enemies.’

3.2.2. Special assistance in the security sphere

The Czechoslovak intelligence service, the StB, played a unique role, in cooperation with the CS Interior Ministry, in relations between Kenya and Czechoslovakia. Their activities can be divided into two categories – activities of the StB Residency in Nairobi, and special missions executed under direct headquarters control. While it is true that the presence of CS intelligence agents was common in this period in other states of Africa too, the extent and the nature of its activities, as well as its unusually daring aspirations, made the StB’s role within CS-Kenyan relations unique.

The Interior Ministry and the StB proclaimed Kenya to be its top priority in East Africa in 1963. The role of StB agents located directly in Kenya, as well as those who were sent to Kenya for special missions by headquarters, was to use all means available to bring Kenya closer to the socialist camp and limit the influence of the Main Enemy, in this case, Britain. The activities of the Nairobi Residency affected virtually all aspects of relations between the two countries, while some spheres of cooperation between Kenya and the CSSR were completely controlled and even carried out by the StB Resident and his officers. This was especially true for cooperation with Odinga and his political wing and for the special technical assistance provided by the CS Interior Ministry to the Kenyan government. The agents of the Nairobi Residency were authorised to work in Kenya as employees of the CS MFA, and they effectively used their cover to penetrate political, diplomatic and business circles. Agents arriving in Kenya for special missions

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363 Tamarkin, "Roots," 301.
364 ABS 11691_000_2_4, Č.JA. A-1/00 444/81-63, 16.12.1963, 1, l. 76
as security advisors, technical staff or in the roles of technical experts of the ČTK or other state agencies were nominally independent of, but worked in full collaboration with the Residency.

The intensity of the StB’s activities in Kenya peaked in 1964 and 1965. In this period, StB agents were in close contact not only with Odinga and his wing, but with Kenyatta himself. The matter of special security cooperation was raised by the direct order of President Kenyatta. The CS government saw the Kenyan request as a good opportunity to enhance its influence on Kenyan politics and to get direct access to the newly-formed Kenyan police and intelligence services. Kenyatta’s extremely positive attitude can be illustrated in a number of Resident reports. This is somewhat surprising and perhaps suspicious, especially in the light of the unexpected deterioration of relations between Kenya and socialist countries from the summer of 1965 onwards. Nevertheless, it was Kenyatta and his interest in cooperating with the CSSR on security matters that provoked one of the most ambitious StB operations anywhere in Africa.

### 3.2.3. The StB Residency in Kenya and its operations

The amount of original material available in the Prague archives on the activities of the StB in Kenya is immense and it would suffice for a whole new independent research project. Here, I attempt only to give the basic outline of how the StB Residency in Nairobi functioned and how it contributed to relations between Kenya and the CSSR. In no way do I attempt to present a complete list of Residency activities, or to mention all of its contacts, missions or the agents who worked for this office. There is no room, either, to explain all the political as well as internal twists and turns that occurred during the approximately eight years of the Nairobi Residency, as would be necessary in order to tell its full story correctly. The boundaries of this research allow me to present only very basic information related to the Nairobi StB Residency, such as the main principles of its organisation and functioning, the objectives of its activities, some of the main contacts and a few examples of the active measures it took over the years.
Establishing an StB Residency at the CS embassy in Nairobi had already been agreed with the MFA in 1963 and, in 1964 the plan was swiftly implemented. Within the total allowance of diplomatic staff approved by Kenya, the MFA set aside three embassy posts for StB operatives. The first one to arrive was Jaroslav S., officially the embassy’s Second Secretary, and two colleagues soon joined him. The Resident and his officers immediately renewed contacts with some of Odinga’s closest colleagues from before independence and started to carry out instructions from headquarters.

Officers of the Nairobi Residency were responsible for two main forms of activities –liaison work for acquiring intelligence, and planning and execution of active measures. These actions were aimed to misinform, discredit or otherwise harm the Main Enemy. The most common activity of the Resident and other StB officers was liaison work executed in most cases undercover by diplomatic staff. Diplomatic cover allowed StB operatives legally, and without raising excessive suspicion, to maintain contacts with local political circles, members of diplomatic corps, business elite and any other persons that might be of any use in acquiring intelligence. An intricate web of contacts provided agents with a surprisingly rich and substantial bank of knowledge useful for the agency’s objectives without any high risk of exposure. In the first months of the Residency’s activities in Kenya, this was also partially the case, even though using diplomatic cover for intelligence operations was a widely known procedure used by most countries, and members of diplomatic corps were always treated with caution. Once the good relations between Kenyan officials and closet StB operatives were over, the diplomatic cover quickly became useless and the Kenyan government tended to ignore StB operatives’ diplomatic immunity. Constant surveillance, psychological pressure and later expulsion followed the loss of diplomatic status.

The main objectives of the Nairobi Residency’s work, as formulated at headquarters, were initially vague and included the following points:

- work against the Main Enemy – Great Britain – unravel its influence mechanism in Kenya and undermine it by using active measures

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365 ABS 11691_000_2_4, Č.jA. A-1/00 444/81-63, 16.12.1963. 1, l. 76.
366 ABS 80955_200_1_1, 1967-72, 1-6.
- maintain contact with the left-wing powers in Kenya, and, through espionage, support them in their struggle for winning the decisive influence in the country
- as part of its assistance to the left-wing, train the security specialists and, with the help of CS advisors, develop a parallel security force that would eventually take over the responsibilities currently held by the British- controlled Special branch.\textsuperscript{367}

Over a period of several months, these objectives were reviewed and made more specific as the Residency's officers became acquainted with the operational situation in Kenya. In cooperation with the Prague headquarters, the specific primary and secondary objectives for the agency's activities in Kenya were laid down. The primary set of objectives related to actions against the British and the right wing in KANU, and the Nairobi Residency was to play the most important part in their implementation. The secondary objective was effective support, especially on a material basis, for Odinga and his wing. The Nairobi Residency was responsible for negotiating the specifics of this assistance and maintaining everyday communication with Odinga's people; but the assistance itself was mainly the responsibility of the Prague StB headquarters in cooperation with the HTS\textsuperscript{368} of the MFT.\textsuperscript{369}

The general strategy for reaching the primary set of objectives and responsibilities for the Nairobi Residency was outlined in the 20 October 1964 letter from the Prague headquarters. \textit{The Residency is expected continuously to forward all obtained official materials and intelligence agency findings concerning all UK institutions and offices in Kenya, all British nationals working in Kenyan administration and other persons that have direct relation to the objects (including persons) of the Main Enemy.}\textsuperscript{370} Residents were also instructed to extend their network of contacts for the purposes of obtaining intelligence and increasing the likelihood of successful active measures. Headquarters were quite reserved about the effectiveness of existing established Kenyan contacts, as they were for the most part Odinga's close collaborators with only

\textsuperscript{367} ABS 11691_000_4_4, Č.jA. 11691/012, 1.11.1966, 3, l. 146.
\textsuperscript{368} The HTS of the MFT, or the Main Technical Board of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, was a semi-independent governmental office responsible for delivering special material abroad in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence, other departments of the MFT or the Interior Ministry.
\textsuperscript{369} ABS 80952_000_1_5, Č.jA. A1-00 562/40-64, 21.9.1964.
\textsuperscript{370} ABS 80952_000_1_5, Č.jA. A1-00 641/40-64, 20.10.1964, 1, l. 43.
limited access to the intelligence that StB was after. ‘By the holidays in 1965 Headquarters expect the Residency to find at least six appropriate persons with relation to the Main Enemy, two of whom will be ready to be approached for recruitment.’

Towards the end of 1964 the Nairobi Residency already operated in the standard regime: its members were in regular contact with Headquarters, were sending out the gathered intelligence, and were successfully extending the network of local contacts. The Residency had extensive correspondence with Headquarters and the gathered intelligence was analysed and forwarded to Prague to be used directly by the Interior Ministry, or by other governmental offices, for political or economic purposes. A large part of the gathered intelligence was also forwarded to the Soviets. The political situation in this period was still favourable to socialist countries and, with Odinga high in KANU’s hierarchy, the special cooperation was developing according to CS plans.

During the first year of activity, the Nairobi Residency successfully created a small network of highly-valued associates, most of whom fell under the category of ‘confidential contacts’. Operatives also regularly ‘mined’ numerous other persons, especially members of other diplomatic missions, local businessmen and others. Amongst the valued confidential contacts were, in the first years, OLEANDER, KONOPO, OMOLO, LASKOT, KOTLAN and, most importantly, DRUH. Available documents from the Prague archive allow us to unravel the real people hidden behind these pseudonyms, but I decided to keep the exact identity of most of these persons undisclosed as some of them are still alive and I was not able to get their consent to reveal their cooperation with CS intelligence. For an illustration of the StB’s penetration of Kenyan politics, the case of confidential contact KONOPO can be mentioned. The name, according to available material, was a designation for one of the most outspoken left-wing MPs in Kenya, Pio Gama Pinto, who was eventually murdered in February 1965 and whose death coincides with the beginning of open rivalry between the left and right in KANU.

Pinto was one of the CS StB’s Kenyan MP contacts, which the StB was trying to use to

371 ABS 80952_000_1_5, Č.jA. A1-00 641/40-64, 20.10.1964, 2, l. 45.
372 ABS 80952_000_4_5, Č.jA. A1-00 110/40-66, 22.2.1966, 1, l. 187.
373 Czech Wikipedia. “Státní bezpečnost [StB].” accessed on September 8, 2013. http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/St%C3%A1tn%C3%AD_bezpe%C4%8Dnost#Terminologie_spolupracovn
A confidential contact (CC) was a collaborator of a lower category than an agent. Collaboration was not classified. The category mostly involved foreign nationals. A CC was willing to deliver sensitive information but did not formally agree to cooperation with the StB. Reasons for collaborations were material support, personal profit, ideological reasons etc.
374 ABS 80952_000_2_5, Č.jA. A1-00 91/40.65, 24.2.1965, 1, l. 87.
375 ABS 80952_000_2_5, Č.jA. A1-00 91/40.65, 18.3.1965, 1-2, l. 92-93.
place parliamentary questions and for obtaining first-hand information from Parliament. Headquarters viewed the establishment of contacts in the Kenyan Parliament as a great Nairobi Residency success story, and the opportunity for indirect influence on Kenyan parliamentary proceedings by the use of questions raised by loyal MPs was perceived as a very effective way of contributing to activities of the left. Most of the StB’s confidential contacts were high KANU officials from Odinga’s wing, some others were graduates of CS universities or expert courses, Kenyan journalists, or diplomats from other African countries, and the rest were CS nationals active in Kenya in expert positions.\(^{376}\) It was not uncommon for confidential contacts to receive gifts or money for their services, indicating that they must have been aware or at least suspicious of the identity of their CS acquaintances. Most of these contacts were used only for a limited period of time and, once they lost access to information of any interest for the StB, or they became afraid to continue their collaboration, further contact was abandoned and after several years their files were archived.

In January 1965 Headquarters evaluated the activities of the Nairobi Residency in the previous year. Despite some beginners’ mistakes being pointed out, they particularly praised the on-going cooperation with Odinga’s group. The primary objective, penetrating the Main Enemy’s institutions, achieved only very limited success but, as this was viewed as the long-term aim, no consequences arose from this. The intelligence and analytical work was of fluctuating quality, but in general there was satisfaction with this part of the Residency’s work.\(^{377}\)

Active measures (hereafter AMs) were the sphere for which the Nairobi office was repeatedly criticised by Headquarters.\(^{378}\) Despite this criticism, the Residency’s officers successfully planned and executed approximately 30 AMs between 1964 and 1969. In order to illustrate the Residency’s activity in this sphere, I present short characteristics of some of the executed actions, as well as the results of the most successful ones. The most common targets over the years were the USA and the UK and their activities in Kenya, white settlers’ links to the British and the figure of Tom Mboya.

As a pattern for future planning and implementing of AMs the Residency used the document from 6 September 1965 written in cooperation with Headquarters. A few days before this document was compiled, the Residency got hold of secret agreements of

\(^{376}\) ABS 80952_000_2_5, Č.jA. A1-00 91/40.65, 24.2.1965, 1, l. 87.
\(^{377}\) ABS 80952_000_2_5, 5.1.1965, 1, l. 69.
\(^{378}\) ABS 80952_000_4_5, 22.2.1966, 1, l. 187.
financial and military cooperation between Kenya and the UK, and it was recommended they use these agreements as the first AM. The leaked document was to be used in such a way that it would ‘reveal UK neo-colonial methods of penetrating Kenya and unmask the right wing agents of KANU as instruments of British politics in Kenya.’379 In practice, it meant using the document in such a way that it would provoke anti-British pressures from the public as well as from other African leaders and would harm the established Anglo-Kenyan cooperation.380 Other suggested AMs in this document included the following actions:

- discrediting Tom Mboya and his American advisors
- destruction of British-owned objects
- public attacks against Gichuru
- launching the rumour of American support to Kenya-based Somalis in their attempts to reclaim lost homelands
- dissemination of threatening pamphlets to British nationals across Kenya
- provoking competition between the USA and the UK381

Several examples of executed, or at least suggested, AMs that took place in the following years are as follows:

Action **RASIST** – creating and spreading fake letter of support allegedly written by British settlers in Kenya expressing concern, support and sympathy for the situation of white settlers in Rhodesia after their declaration of independence.

Action **TELEX** – using acquired intelligence to discredit US activities in Kenya as imperialist, and forwarding selected information to progressive African politicians prior to the upcoming OAU conference.

Action **AMI** – creating and distributing pamphlets accusing Tom Mboya of misappropriating KANU funds, of secret contacts with some politicians arrested in Uganda, of being under direct US control and working for their secret military objectives in Kenya, etc.

379 ABS 11691_109_1_2, 6.9.1965, 2, 2.
Action **DOBRODINEC** – one of the most successful Nairobi Residency actions; the Residency collected available intelligence data about CIA activities in Kenya, manipulated it in its own favour and anonymously sent the documents to Odinga, who made the material public; publication of this material provoked a number of critical speeches by Kenyan politicians and allegedly led to the expulsion of an American diplomat; this action was highly regarded by the Soviets.

Action **MOCHOMURKA** – distributing a critical pamphlet about American war crimes in Vietnam; this plan was probably not carried out.

Action **HABARI** – the Nairobi Residency acquired intelligence of American plans to create a pro-American military alliance in East and Central Africa through close cooperation with Kenya, Congo and Ethiopia; the Residency disclosed information about American plans to President Obote before the regional conference, whose actions caused the American plans mediated by the Congo to be rejected; considered one of the most successful actions.

Action **LISKA** – by using available intelligence, the Residency decided to start the pamphlet campaign about CIA penetration in most American organisations in Kenya and their corrupting activities in respect to Kenyan administration; the action was to create the impression of being of British origin and thus cause a rift between the UK and the USA.

Action **USEDLIK** – the Residency decided to distribute leaflets to white settlers; the intention was to criticise an increase in criminality against the community and to call for the creation of vigilante groups independent of the Kenyan police; the objective of the action was to cause tension between the settlers and the Kenyan government.382

The Residency did not stop organising AMs even after being paralysed by the expulsion of two of their operatives in 1966. On the contrary, the period between 1966 and 1969 was the most fertile in respect of the number of AMs fully or partially executed by the Residency. Many of these AMs were aimed at Tom Mboya, who was considered – and not only by Odinga’s group – the main political enemy, but was becoming ever more

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382 ABS 11691_109_1_2, Č.jA. A/1-0 692/40-65, 1-51, l. 1-58.
feared by Kenyatta and Moi who, once again, improved their relations with the CSSR in 1968. Among AMs that targeted Tom Mboya in this period were those designated FUSER, KAKTUS and MELOUCH. Their main objective was to reveal and pillory Mboya’s links to the USA – to the effect that he was receiving orders from the CIA and corruptly using American money.

The last action of the Nairobi Residency against Mboya started only a few weeks before his murder. Action KAKTUS was yet another provocation aimed at Mboya and his close cooperation with the Americans, which was ultimately to turn the Kenyan public against him. The aim of the action was ‘in connection with previous operations of the same objective, to further deepen political discredit of Mboya and to complete his political elimination.’ According to the StB’s report, Tom Mboya’s pro-American activities concerned not only the left and Odinga but, in the last months, were also viewed negatively by the British supporting Kenyatta and Moi. Available archival material shows that StB officials were shocked and surprised by Mboya’s murder. In the days that followed it, StB officers met with several of their contacts in an attempt to gather some information on the case but found no information other than that published by the media. Several weeks later the Residency became fully occupied with the issues related to the Soviet invasion of the CSSR, which meant the beginning of the end for intensive CS activities in Kenya.

3.2.4. Action SPECIAL and the defeat of Czechoslovak ambitions

Action SPECIAL was the most ambitious StB activity in Kenya and its ultimate failure had a far-reaching negative effect on relations between Kenya and the CSSR. Action SPECIAL was planned and executed independently of the Soviets and it represents one of the most important autonomous activities of the Czechoslovak government in Africa in this period. As I make clear below, it is difficult to get a clear picture of the motivations that led to SPECIAL, or of the reasons for its failure, or of the effects it had on relations between Kenya and Czechoslovakia.

Odinga’s strong position in the Kenyan administration, initially as Interior Minister, and later as a vice-president with a security agenda, was perceived by the StB

383 ABS 11691_109_2_2, Č.jA. A-00 311/40-69, 23.4.1969, 1, l. 73.
384 ABS 11691_322_3_3, Č.jA?, 7.7.1969, 1, l. 107
as providing a unique opportunity to spread its influence in the newly-formed system of Kenyan security and affected internal as well as external Kenyan politics. Odinga’s and the StB’s confidential contact DRUH requested special security cooperation, which became the much-welcomed invitation for the StB to achieve its objectives. Odinga and DRUH mediated Kenyatta’s request to assist Kenya in building a secret security service that would be independent of the existing British-controlled Special Branch. Operatives were to be Kenyans trained in socialist countries and the organisation would eventually merge with the Special Branch once British experts had left, and its officers would take control of the Special Branch. Another suggestion was dissolving the Special Branch completely and replacing it with the new SPECIAL.

To deal with the request, in October 1964 StB Headquarters sent a security advisor to Kenya, Lieutenant Colonel Antonín K. His mission received the highest priority and its success was viewed as vital for the future victory of the left in Kenya. The advisor was supposed to cooperate with Odinga’s people, particularly with DRUH, in organising this new Kenyan intelligence agency and providing training for its first operatives. In respect of this new priority, Headquarters provided the Residency with the outline of proposed measures. The most illustrative of the CS objectives are the following orders:

1. The advisor is to recommend creating a small group of operatives that will control the network of collaborators. Creation of supporting bodies will be postponed.

2. The primary objective will be to target the internal enemy. Internal enemy is defined as persons hostile to Odinga, supportive of capitalist development in Kenya, those resenting Kenyan cooperation with socialist countries or those active against the unifying processes in Africa.

3. Target foreign nationals only in relation to the internal enemy. Avoid using methods that might cause fear or uncertainty.

4. Establish close cooperation with DRUH through financial support and the gift of a car. Use DRUH to exert the anti-imperialistic orientation of the agency.

385 ABS 11691_100_3_6, 22.10.1964, 1, l. 126.
5. Persuade Odinga to enroot the agency legally in such a way that it will eventually join the current security set-up, or that it will take over its role once the British and pro-British persons are expelled from it.386

The advisor was supposed to organise security so it 'could fight against enemies of liberated Kenya and against major imperialist states. [...] The main duty of the newly created democratic security service of Kenyan left-wing patriots is to reveal the intentions of right-wing pro-imperialist persons, their connection with colonialists and imperialists, to acquire position and influence amongst them and through these means to apply the political reasoning and principles of governing party KANU and of the left-wing [...] The task of our advisor is to create a situation such that all important information acquired by Kenyan security shall be used via him by our Residency in Kenya for the purposes of keeping track of information about the Main Enemy’s intentions and actions.'387

The StB advisor stayed in Kenya for almost two years and he cooperated closely with DRUH, who was responsible on the Kenyan side for the action SPECIAL. DRUH was appointed the head of security and he was one of a small number of officers to receive comprehensive intelligence training. After the promising start, however, cooperation with DRUH was becoming problematic and the organisation of the security service was stagnating. The StB turned down DRUH’s request for funding for the whole operation, which proved to be a major blow for its final outcome. DRUH promised that alternative financial sources would be found in the Kenyan budget. This funding, however, never materialised and the progress of the action was threatened. The StB advisor was repeatedly very critical about DRUH’s lack of activity and utter lack of interest in the action. On several occasions all activities in relation to SPECIAL were halted for fear of disclosure by the Special Branch. As the political will to cooperate with socialist countries weakened in the second half of 1965, it was becoming obvious that Action SPECIAL would be a failure. The main causes of the failure were identified as lack of political support, insufficient funds and especially DRUH’s ignorance and mismanagement. It is, indeed, DRUH’s role in the whole action that poses a range of questions.

386 ABS 80952_000_2_5, 19.1.1965., 1-2, l. 76-77.
387 ABS 11691_100_3_6, 22.10.1964, 1-6, l. 126-131.
During the 1960s DRUH had emerged as the StB’s most important Kenyan contact. A set of hints and incomplete information allows us to deduce DRUH’s identity, which I have, however, decided not to reveal. DRUH was undoubtedly one of Odinga’s closest collaborators and a fellow Luo. The documentation shows that DRUH was in close contact with President Kenyatta and with other political elites in KANU, including some of the right-wing politicians. The StB had already become interested in cooperating with DRUH in 1964 and, once contacted by local residents, DRUH showed interest in collaborating. The nature of the cooperation indicates that DRUH must have been aware of the true mission of the StB operative who was in touch with him from the very beginning. DRUH was one of the CCs regularly receiving financial rewards and gifts for his services and it seems that, after 1966, he was enlisted as an agent for the StB. Collaboration with DRUH was established and further developed, despite some warnings the Residency received about DRUH from other confidential contacts, especially OLEANDER. Warnings that DRUH might be working in favour of the KANU right-wing or even the British, were noted by the StB, but disregarded. Also, DRUH’s past training in Israel, which was pointed out by OLEANDER, was disregarded as unimportant.

Cooperation with DRUH was considered vital for the success of StB objectives in Kenya. The StB valued him highly for the intelligence he regularly provided and, once Odinga lost his leading position in KANU, DRUH’s political importance for the CSSR expanded even further. Unfortunately for the StB, DRUH seems to have been one of the main reasons why the StB ultimately failed in its objectives. Warnings foolishly disregarded by the StB proved to be true. The object description available in the archives duly describes the person that effectively defeated the StB in Kenya and, to a great extent, was responsible for the failure of the left in its quest for dominance in KANU. ‘[DRUH] is the representative of Kenyan security with close relations to Kenyan vice-president Oginga Odinga and also with President Kenyatta. [He] behaved progressively towards countries of the socialist camp. From the CSSR he received a consignment of arms and also special training for Kenyan security workers. He was well acquainted with forms and methods of Czechoslovak intelligence work. Later it was verified with ever greater certainty, that he is a British IS agent, deployed into Kenyan
government. Our actions undertaken in Kenya were revealed by American and British security services and many of our operatives exposed.'

It is not entirely clear when StB operatives finally realised that DRUH was working for British Intelligence. The first serious doubts about his loyalty appeared around 1967, but cooperation with DRUH continued until at least 1969. It remains unclear when DRUH actually started working for the Special Branch. The information about timing is vital for establishing whether Czechoslovak activities would ever have had any realistic chance of destabilising Kenya’s pro-western orientation. If it was as soon as 1964, the whole mission of building SPECIAL with StB assistance must be perceived as a very effective case of infiltration of and perhaps sabotage of CS activities from the outset. If it was later, the failure of SPECIAL must be linked to the general decline of political power of Odinga's left in KANU. With limited resources and the lack of political support on Kenya’s side, the success of Action SPECIAL was simply impossible.

It also remains unclear to what extent Kenyatta or Odinga were aware of DRUH's links to Special Branch. It is highly unlikely that Odinga would have kept DRUH close to him if he had known of it, as it is now clear that DRUH contributed to large extent negatively to Odinga’s political decline. It also remains possible that DRUH started to cooperate with the Special Branch at a later date, around 1966, once Odinga’s political position was significantly deteriorating. It is hard to believe that the SB would have been able to maintain an agent so close to Odinga without his growing suspicious. Hard, yet not impossible, to believe. Odinga repeatedly proved somewhat naïve in his power struggle, and this might have been just another of his mistakes.

What is perhaps even more peculiar in relation to Action SPECIAL and to Kenyan-CSSR cooperation in general is the role of President Kenyatta. Kenyatta’s repeatedly expressed desire to cooperate with CSSR in this sphere is recorded in multiple documents and is fully in line with official Kenyan politics pre-1965. Kenyatta even had his own residence checked by StB technicians to prevent spying on his person by the British-dominated Special Branch. However, in the light of the DRUH affair, and especially in the light of the ultimate change in attitude against socialist countries Kenyatta authorised in 1965, it seems very likely that Kenyatta was playing CS officials

388 ABS 11691_301_1_1_6, Č.jA?, Poznámka k fondu, 3.
389 ABS 11691_100_3_6, Č.jA. A/1-00 928/40-64, 15.12.1964, 1, l. 170.
and operatives from the beginning. A simple motivation for this could very well have been a wish to destroy Odinga’s political opportunities and the ambitions of his closest socialist ally to interfere with Kenyan politics by sabotaging their most ambitious cooperation. An alternative perspective is that Kenyatta’s desire to cooperate with Czechoslovakia in the security sphere was sincere in 1964 at least until the final arrangement with Britain could be resolved in all areas – political, economic, security and military. In such a scenario the failure of Action SPECIAL could be fully attributed to deliberate sabotage by DRUH, most likely masterminded by British intelligence from the very beginning. None of these interpretations alters the fact that Operation SPECIAL was a failure, in the same way Czechoslovak cooperation with Odinga later was. However, unravelling the true motivations with which Kenyatta sought special cooperation with the CSSR might shed more light on two only partially resolved questions of early Kenyan political development. The first would be to what extent the alternatives to pro-western orientation were really considered by Kenyatta. The second is then linked to the roots of the subsequent political breakup between Kenyatta and Odinga.

DRUH’s activities for the SB completely change the perspective to be applied when analysing all other StB activities in Kenya. No other action of such far-reaching aspiration was undertaken by StB once SPECIAL failed. However, numerous AMs might have been affected by DRUH’s treason. To what extent these AMs were unmasked and exposed by DRUH remains uncertain, as does his role in the diplomatic expulsion of three CS nationals working for the StB. It is not unlikely that it was through DRUH’s knowledge of StB Residency members and their activities that the Kenyan government was able to paralyse it the minute it decided to do so.

When it comes to assigning blame for the failure of Action SPECIAL, of StB activities in Kenya in general and of CS politics in Kenya as such, there is only one organisation to blame: the StB itself. It failed to provide sufficient funding for its ambitious aims; it was not able to retain political support for its activities; it had underestimated the British as its enemy that proved too great to defeat with the limited means the StB allocated to the mission; and, most importantly, it ignored the information from its own confidential sources and allowed the enemy to completely sabotage its actions. The blame for the failure of its objectives is thus allocated, and that cannot be changed by any new information yet to be revealed.
Amongst StB papers in DRUH’s dossier, there is set of files illustrating how subversive the actions of DRUH were for Odinga. On 5 August 1965 DRUH met with his StB contact in Nairobi. During the meeting he expressed great disappointment over the latest political development and he conveyed the message, allegedly, from Odinga. ‘DRUH claimed that he got the green light from Odinga and that he should focus on the preparation of the forced removal of right-wing pro-imperialist agents, such as Tom Mboya, Mungai, McKenzie, Gichuru, Ronald Ngala and others.’ DRUH stated that preparations in Odinga’s group for the coup were underway and he asked for specific assistance from the Czechoslovak embassy. DRUH asked the CSSR to provide an advisor for the planning of this action and for organising a short course for 20 officers. These trained officers would afterwards train 2000 persons in Tanzania or Uganda. The date planned for the coup was to be the national celebrations in December 1965. DRUH’s requests met with a cool response, and the StB operatives reported the whole case as an example of DRUH’s and Odinga’s unrealistic perceptions of the political situation in Kenya. It is interesting to note that this operative did not doubt DRUH’s claims that it was Odinga who had initiated the whole plan, even though such an approach would have been in striking contrast with his political past and there is no other evidence in Czechoslovak archives indicating that Odinga had really planned for a coup d’état to take place. Surprisingly, StB officials were prone to trust DRUH, even though there were more and more hints indicating his uncertain loyalty. In the light of DRUH’s links to the SB the whole matter was with most likely aimed to discredit the CSSR as well as Odinga once and for all. Luckily for Odinga, the Nairobi Residency’s limited resources did not stretch to meeting DRUH’s request. It is very likely that any steps towards the preparations of a coup would have been revealed and used in Kenya against both Odinga and against socialist countries.

3.2.5. Czechoslovak retreat from Kenya

In 1966 at the time of the failure of Operation SPECIAL relations between the CSSR and Kenya came to an abrupt end, followed by Odinga’s departure from KANU.

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390 ABS 11691_100_5_6, Č.jA?, Záznam, 25.8.1965, 1, l. 284.
392 ABS 11691_100_5_6, Č.jA. A/1-00769/40-?, 7.10.1965, l.296.
During late 1965 and the first months of 1966 the internal rift within KANU widened. During the full-scale KANU conference in February 1966 Mboya announced the plan to introduce a new Constitution. Various measures limiting Odinga’s powers within the party were also introduced and were effective. ‘A KANU party conference in March abolished the Vice-Presidency and replaced the post with eight regional Vice Presidents, thereby depriving Odinga of his national office.’393 ‘All those known or thought to be associated with him [Odinga] and the Radical group [...] failed to win re-election.’ 394 Once it was clear that Odinga had no political future in KANU, he opted for an alternative political project. The one-party system had not at this point been introduced in Kenya, so legally Odinga’s plan could not be challenged.

The Kenya People’s Union (KPU) became a populist party that attempted to challenge the government by using long-standing grievances of various groups of the Kenyan population. Odinga’s project was not completely hopeless in the beginning as he was joined by Bildad Kaggia, an influential freedom fighter, Kenyatta’s close ally and one-time fellow detainee, a popular Kikuyu politician who was certainly able to attract considerable Kikuyu support for his KPU project. Odinga and Kaggia emphasised the importance of the heritage of freedom fighters including Mau Mau veterans, many of whom felt increasingly overlooked, marginalised and unrewarded by the KANU government. Former detainees and supporters of the Mau Mau insurgency became one of the first groups to openly support the KPU. Odinga also raised the topic of land redistribution. ‘KPU urged a significant programme of land redistribution, including the cancelling of the debt accrued by African smallholders who had joined settlement schemes on former European-owned land.’395 The KPU was more openly socialist than the KANU cabinet and it strongly criticised some of KANU’s capitalist development plans. Odinga was also understandably much more open to cooperation with socialist countries including Czechoslovakia with which he had very close relations.

The KPU was formed initially by a group of secessionists from KANU when twenty-nine Members of Parliament left KANU to join the new party. Odinga wanted the KPU to be a strong and vocal opposition in parliament but his plans suffered a blow

393 Parsons, 1964 Army Mutinies, 188-189.
394 Gertzel, The Politics, 72.
when KANU passed the Constitutional amendment that all the Parliament members who had decided to swap party allegiance would have to seek re-election in their home districts.\textsuperscript{396} This move prevented more MPs from joining the KPU for their fear of not being able to secure re-election.\textsuperscript{397} The most radical branch of KANU, the Youth Wing, was mobilised prior to these supplementary elections and they prompted attacks on known KPU supporters.\textsuperscript{398} It was the first time since independence that such violent practices occurred in the political arena and they predestined the future of Kenyan elections for decades to come. Youth-Wing actions proved effective as only nine KPU MPs retained their seats.

Some evidence exists that it was Tom Mboya who masterminded both the abolition of the Vice-President post and the Constitutional amendment to weaken Odinga’s position among the Luo people.\textsuperscript{399} Despite the fact that the KPU lost much of its power following the election, the government was concerned about growing political as well as popular opposition throughout Kenya, so it decided to introduce legislation which allowed \textit{`detention without trial and press censorship in the name of national security.'}\textsuperscript{400} Despite this measure the KPU managed to operate for another two years, until it was banned in 1969, in reaction to riots of Luo people whose frustrations over their growing political and economic marginalisation ran high after Tom Mboya was assassinated. Opposition leaders were detained and Odinga eventually spent two years in detention between 1969 and 1971, after his ultimate falling-out with Kenyatta. By this time Czechoslovak activities were virtually non-existent and all of the previous objectives were cancelled.

In his attempt to unite the left in Kenya, Odinga once more turned to the CSSR and other socialist countries with requests for support. CS experts from the MFA were sceptical about the success of the KPU project, as they were blaming mainly Odinga and his lack of managerial and leadership skills for the defeat of the left within KANU. MFA’s report stated that \textit{‘a major shortcoming of that group [progressive forces] and especially of Odinga himself was their failure to establish a nation-wide political platform and also the fact that the Left movement remained limited by tribal boundaries. Odinga was unable}}
to take advantage of anti-British and anti-American tension, he chose tactics of cooperation with the right within KANU and eventually enabled the right wing to split the left wing. Nevertheless, lacking a credible political alternative, CS officials decided to continue their support for Odinga. However, the pressure from the Kenyan government made it virtually impossible to challenge KANU’s dominance effectively.

During the early months of 1966, at the time of Odinga’s final break with KANU, the Kenyan media and government officials unleashed an openly hostile campaign against the socialist countries. During 1966 it officially expelled two Soviet diplomats and a Soviet journalist, and likewise two CS diplomats, a ČTK journalist and one Hungarian diplomat. At the same time the Chinese embassy was effectively paralysed by the cutting of its staff number allocation to the minimum. Another Soviet diplomat had to leave Kenya in 1967. During 1968 an ANP correspondent and a Soviet Filmexport expert had to close their offices and leave Kenya as well, to be followed by the ČTK correspondent and the closing of the ČTK office. In an MFA internal document, this Kenyan government campaign is described as follows: The number of expelled nationals from socialist countries, especially Soviet ones, in such a short time is completely unprecedented not only in Africa, but also in imperialist countries. These specific actions of the Kenyan government were accompanied by Kenyan press campaigns against socialist countries and undermining activities of communists and they were linked to “subversive” KPU activity, as vice-president Moi informed Parliament in April 1968, when he was announcing the closure of the Nairobi ČTK office.

In the political reality of the late 1960s Oginga Odinga’s new political project was destined to fail from the beginning. Odinga counted on receiving more support from socialist countries including Czechoslovakia but the Kenyan government made it impossible to provide the KPU with any effective help. The Czechoslovak embassy after 1966 had nowhere near the political influence it had enjoyed in 1964. The ambitious plans of 1964 were now wholly abandoned and the embassy as well as the StB Residency functioned under strong pressure from the Kenyan state to a very limited modus operandi. Constant supervision of Kenyan intelligence, actions against embassy staff, including the expulsion of diplomatic as well as technical personnel and a ban on their movements, made it very difficult to provide any meaningful support to the KPU.

401 NAA ÚV KSČ A. Novotný, č.j. 264261/1, 1966, 1.
The KPU itself failed to effectively challenge KANU’s position in the state and, once it was banned by the government, the left-wing political forces around Odinga were marginalised in Kenya for more than two decades. The end of Odinga’s political career pretty much coincided with the ultimate decline of Czechoslovak activism in Kenya.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 represented a major disruption to all government activities and Czechoslovak activities in Kenya were no exception. The Czechoslovak embassy in Nairobi, as well as the local StB Residency, had, after the Soviet invasion, to deal with the defection of several operatives, whose knowledge of StB activities contributed to the crippling of the Nairobi Residency. StB Residency activities were now intermittent and their effect on the political development in Kenya was becoming marginal. Gradually the Residency abandoned its activities against the Kenyan government and the Main Enemy completely, and officially gave up its initial political objectives, to concentrate on the supervision and penetration of the CS expat community. Eventually, in the first half of the 1970s, Headquarters decided to pull its operatives from Nairobi and the Residency ceased operating. A low-ranking StB officer represented the embassy for the following years as well, but his responsibilities were completely different from those of the Residency proper. The decline of the Nairobi Residency is the best illustration of the CS government’s utter relinquishment after 1968 of its once ambitious political plans in Kenya.

402 ABS 80955_110_1_3, 30.11.1969, l. 9.
4. Czechoslovakia and Uganda between 1945 and 1968

4.1. Introduction and methodological note

Chapter 4 presents, as a case study, the cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Uganda during the formative period for the newly independent Uganda in the 1960s; it can be easily seen to be one of the most remarkable cases of CS involvement in Africa during the Cold War. The ideological and political entry points for this cooperation were much the same as in the case of Kenya, but the development of the actual cooperation between the two countries and effects on political development were different. My intention in this chapter is to identify and analyse in what crucial ways Uganda and Czechoslovakia interacted in this period and how these contacts and various forms of cooperation shaped and affected Uganda’s political development. I also point out some of the striking similarities with, and, more importantly, differences from the other two case studies covered in this research.

After Uganda received independence and the UPC successfully established itself as the strongest political party in the country, Obote’s government started to seek foreign assistance in the military and security spheres in order to consolidate its control over the power institutions of the Ugandan states. From 1964 on Uganda was receiving extensive assistance in this field from Israel. The motivations of both countries and the form and nature of this cooperation are well known in academic circles. Uganda’s special cooperation with other countries including Britain, the USA or the Soviet Union has also been at least partially researched. However, when it comes to Czechoslovak involvement in developing the Ugandan military and security spheres during Obote’s and Amin’s eras existing academic texts do not give us much more than a brief acknowledgement that Czechoslovakia did indeed provide Uganda with some special material during Amin’s rule. It seems that there is no deeper academic knowledge of any special military cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Uganda evolving during Obote’s regime. Similarly, existing secondary literature either ignores or is simply unaware of the role that Czechoslovakia played in forming and developing Obote’s intelligence apparatus, known as the General Service Unit. For this reason the effects of these activities on Ugandan political affairs have never previously been analysed and presented to an

403 Eg. Ofcansky, Uganda.; Jorgensen, Uganda.
academic audience. This is true in spite of the fact that the role of the Ugandan military is amongst the most closely studied themes of political development in post-colonial Uganda as the army turned out to be a major political agent, driving far-reaching political change that ultimately caused the collapse of the Ugandan state.

The following section of this thesis will attempt to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive overview of Czechoslovak cooperation with Uganda in the field of special military and security assistance. The motivations for, and forms and effects of this cooperation are presented here in relation to the major events of political development in Uganda in this period. The Czechoslovak-Ugandan special cooperation is viewed and interpreted here in reference to existing academic discourse on the role of the military in Ugandan politics and other major topics including the matter of Bugandan separatism or Obote's inclinations to a one-party system. The significance of the role that both the Ugandan army and Ugandan security forces played in the political development of the newly independent Uganda in the first decade of its existence proved paramount in the period of Obote's rule as well as that of Amin. Both of these organisations initially contributed to Obote's rise into limitless power, only to add to his fall a few years later by increasing their own interdisciplinary tensions, and in the case of the army, finally mounting the coup against him and acquiring the control of the state for itself.

The text in this chapter is organised chronologically and thematically and covers the period from the mid-1950s when the anti-colonial processes in Uganda intensified until circa 1970 when the rule of President Obote was steadily declining until it was ultimately challenged by the Ugandan army in the figure of its Commander-in-chief Idi Amin. The most significant effects of Czechoslovak-Ugandan cooperation on this development are presented against the background of crucial events in the political development of Uganda. I outline the main forms of cooperation that were typical for each period, the main personalities that were involved in their execution, and the political effects that these relations might have had on regional or supra-regional affairs.

Archival materials from the CS records are the only source of information on this curious topic that I have managed to trace. Archival records are plentiful enough to aid an attempt at reconstructing this cooperation, but they are by no means complete. A large part of the documentation, especially that from Interior Ministry and StB sources, are incomplete and the remainder have still to be organised. With the stored materials
being in disarray, together with the common use of code names and confidentiality measures, the reconstruction of the full image of this cooperation is somewhat of a challenge.

I gathered more personal testimonies and interviews in Uganda than I did in Kenya and Tanzania. Unfortunately, the quantity in this case was no guarantee of quality and this part of the field research fell short of my hopes. I travelled to Uganda with a list of names that I hoped would shed more light on some of the issues left unresolved by the archival material. Once in Uganda, it quickly turned out on contact with local authorities that none of the figures from my list would be traceable. Most of the people on my list were already dead; others had been missing for a long time, while the rest proved impossible to locate within the constraints of time and funds at my disposal. I was forced to apply a different approach in my data collection. Through contacts and the help of some Ugandan officials, I decided to find and interview people who might have been personally involved in Czechoslovak activities in Uganda as members of the state administration, military or security in the periods when relations between Uganda and the CSSR had peaked. The other group of people who I decided to interview, with little hope of success, included persons who might not have had direct contact with CS activities but might have gathered some knowledge of CS activities in, for example, the Ugandan military either ex-post or indirectly through other people.

In my desperate quest for information, I met and talked to several current high-ranking officials of the Ugandan army, including Brigadier Rusoke and Colonel Pecos Kutesa. Most of these people were directly involved in the past in the opposition to the government of Idi Amin, who maintained his vital contacts with the CSSR. With the same outlook, I interviewed several former politicians from Amin’s period in power or Obote’s second regime. I placed a lot of hope in contacting Idi Amin’s family members, some of whom still reside in Uganda. However, despite my repeated attempts to acquire their details and contact them through my network of helpers, Idi Amin’s sons and daughter remained unreachable. In the end, I ended up interviewing ten people, but I obtained very little information on CS activities in Uganda, in striking contrast to the actual intensity and duration of these activities. Nevertheless, most of the interviews proved helpful in respect of providing me with a unique insider’s view of the turbulent and complicated historical development to which the CSSR had contributed.
4.2. **Towards Ugandan independence**

The 1950s were the period when most African countries were rapidly moving towards political independence and the British protectorate of Uganda – though somewhat of a latecomer – was no exception. The momentum of growing African nationalism that swept through British Africa was initially much weaker in Uganda because in the early 1950s the modern political parties were only starting to emerge but new nationalist leaders eventually managed to catch up. The British were very successful in Uganda in sustaining the ethnic divisions in the local population by maintaining the system of semi-autonomous kingdoms with wide-ranging powers of self-rule. This factor pretty much prevented the creation of any kind of stronger uniting pan-Ugandan identity and had far-reaching effects on political affairs in Uganda in the decades to follow. The main competition to the strong uniting Ugandan identity came from the traditional ethnic and regional identities of numerous African tribes occupying several kingdoms of Uganda.

Best organised, most advanced and most ambitious was the quasi-nationalistic movement of Ganda people in the largest kingdom of Buganda, which had enjoyed special status accorded by the British since the 1900s. With the end of the Second World War some Ganda politicians increased their calls for complete separation of Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate. Eventually, the formal traditional leader of Buganda kabaka Mutesa II confronted the British Governor of Uganda with demands for separate and complete independence of Buganda. To deal with the situation and to solve the causes of discontent of Buganda’s kabaka and of members of the local legislative body (called the lukiko), the British governor of Uganda, Sir Andrew Cohen, held many meetings with Buganda’s leaders. These however failed to produce any solution. The British reacted by detaining the kabaka, which in the long term only improved the kabaka’s popularity in Buganda, and they rejected taking any political steps towards separate independence for Buganda. Eventually some steps towards granting greater powers to both the kabaka and the lukiko were agreed upon, and the leader of Ganda people returned from detention in 1955 with a hero’s glory. Academics still discuss how exactly the kabaka’s detention affected the Ugandan process of moving towards independence. Most authors agree that the kabaka’s detention ‘reinforced particularist

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404 Baganda term for king
attitudes in Buganda and slowed down national political development. Later long-term political development however indicates that the two-year absence from Uganda was decisive in allowing other mostly non-Ganda political parties to establish themselves as serious political competitors to the kabaka and his supporters. It remains a fact that conceding greater powers to Buganda’s leaders strengthened the special status of Buganda within the Protectorate, but while aspirations were appeased, the original demands for separate independence were effectively side-lined for long enough to lose the required political momentum. The effect of this was two-fold: immediate and long term. The immediate effect of the provisional surrender of Buganda’s separatist aspirations was that Uganda’s national liberation movement was no longer being undermined and could rapidly advance. In the long term a greater political emancipation of the semi-autonomous Buganda within an independent Uganda seriously weakened the political, economic and ethnic unity of Uganda for years to come and became the source of major political tensions and conflict very soon after independence.

What is certain is that the two years of the kabaka’s detention saw some far-reaching changes in Uganda’s political landscape. Parallel to Buganda’s political struggle, the nationwide nationalist Ugandan political parties began emerging, most of which were seeking independence for Uganda as a whole and some of which had various Bugandan politicians actively participating. Bugandan separatism was thus provisionally overshadowed and replaced by the nationwide struggle for independence and it never again had a realistic chance to reach its original ambitious political goals.

The nationalist movement led by Ugandan political parties began in the first half of 1950s when the first modern-style parties were formed, the aim of which was to move Uganda towards independence. Political affairs in the Protectorate were at this point still clearly dominated by the British, who, unlike in neighbouring Kenya, were not faced with strong challenges to their authority. Many factors of the anti-colonial and pro-independence movement that brought a wave of politically-related violence to Kenya in the early 1950s were not present in Uganda. The Ugandan economy was providing most native labourers with enough resources to guarantee a sustainable livelihood, thus largely preventing the outbreak of social grievances seen elsewhere in British Africa. The numbers of white British settlers never reached significant levels in Uganda, a

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406 Ofcansky, Uganda, 33-35.
circumstance that spared Uganda the complicated and politically charged issue of the white British settlers’ community that traumatised Kenya or Rhodesia. Lastly, the British for the most part preserved the traditional system of historical African kingdoms in Uganda, which in effect very much lowered any urgent desire of the native African population to seek and demand political emancipation in modern terms. Crucial for propelling the Ugandan nationalist movement towards independence was the foreign inspiration of Ugandan nationalist leaders who reflected aspirations of African societies in neighbouring Kenya and Tanzania but also those of Ghana and the more distant British colonies.

The first political parties to become active and significant at national level during the 1950s were the Buganda-based Democratic Party of Benedicto Kiwanuka and the Uganda National Congress established by Ignatius Musaazi. The important defining characteristic of these parties was their religious affiliation. While the DP was perceived as a Catholic party and as such in opposition to the political establishment around the kabaka, the UNC profiled itself as the political movement of Protestants. Both of these parties were most active in Buganda and less so in other parts of the Protectorate. However, they failed to spread to all regions of Uganda and they also struggled to form the appealing nationwide political programme needed to gain them broad popular support. Both parties found it difficult to mobilise supporters from other religious camps, and the same was true for overcoming traditional ethnic allegiances.

Later on in the 1950s the UNC began to fragment internally. Some of its members left the party, while several others, led by Apollo Milton Obote, formed an autonomous wing within the UNC. Eventually Obote’s wing merged with the Uganda People’s Union, a party founded in 1958 by two independent members of the legislative council, that quickly gained widespread support outside of Buganda. In 1960 the UPU and Obote united to form the Uganda People’s Congress, a political party that could have benefitted from the UPU’s popular support in the most of Uganda and from Obote’s charismatic leadership. The UPC quickly became the party that came closest to resembling a modern political party in Uganda but it also struggled with limited financial resources, low membership and an inability to establish a country-wide network of local representatives.

Throughout the 1950s and the early period after independence there were two major defining factors of Ugandan politics. The main one was the status of Buganda and
its relationship with the rest of Uganda. The second defining factor of Uganda’s road to independence was the nature of its future relationship with Britain as well as with British citizens living in Uganda, mostly of Asian descent.

The Protestant political elites of Buganda who were gathered around kabaka Muteesaa II renewed their attempts to reach independence towards the end of the decade. However, Britain’s continuing reluctance to grant Buganda greater autonomy than the rest was behind its refusal to participate in the Constitutional Committee that was to oversee the transition to African majority rule in Uganda which was by then already under way.407 In effect the main responsibility for negotiating with the British and for stirring Uganda to triumphant Uhuru fell to the UPC and Obote, who thus earned valuable political capital for establishing himself as a leader of a united Uganda.

In 1960 the kabaka was once again unsuccessful in proclaiming Buganda independent by means of getting a legal motion passed in the lukiko. Another unfortunate political move followed a year later, when the kabaka and his supporters refused to participate in nationwide elections in reaction to their failure a year earlier.408 This resulted in the renegade catholic Democratic Party led by Kiwanuka winning most of the seats for Bugandan constituencies and even forming Uganda’s first African cabinet. The Democratic Party held political power in Buganda between 1961 and 1962 but the popular support of the Ganda people clearly favoured the kabaka and his allies. The formation of a modern-style political party became a necessity in order to finally capitalise politically on this support. This decision probably should had come much sooner, given how little the kabaka achieved through the tactics of boycotting cooperation with Britain. In 1961 in reaction of DP’s ascent to power the popular gatherings of kabaka’s supporters resulted in establishing the movement named Kabaka Yekka409. Kabaka Yekka was to be the Democratic Party’s main challenger in the first post-independence elections of 1962 for seats in Bugandan constituencies while Obote’s UPC was the main favourite in elections on a nationwide level.

Uganda first came to the attention of the CS MFA in the second half of the 1950s when the expansion of CS trade activities in Africa was being considered. Uganda was at

409 The name originates from the most common chant of kabaka’s supporters. In Ganda language it means ‘only kabaka’. 
this point on the periphery of the CS MFA strategists’ interest. Available documents clearly indicate that within the region of British East Africa, Ugandan affairs were almost completely overshadowed by its larger, richer and more accessible neighbours of Kenya and Tanzania. The whole of East and South Africa was neglected in the first stage of CS activism in Africa due to local delays in the decolonisation process, but even by the standards of this overlooked region Uganda was given a considerably lower priority than its neighbours. This was mainly because CS planners saw very little potential in Uganda to affect political affairs on the continent and similarly they saw very little potential for profitable business cooperation. Even later when East Africa was being reconsidered by CS foreign policy makers, and neighbouring Kenya and Tanzania joined the list of African countries of highest priority in approximately 1962, Uganda was still marginal to the CS Africa policy. Nothing at this point indicated how far and how quickly cooperation between the two countries would eventually develop.

Archival documents show that there was inadequate knowledge of Ugandan economic and political affairs at the MFA and the small amount of available information was provided by foreign sources, from East Germany or the USSR. The situation of the national liberation movement in Uganda was judged solely on the basis of this fragmented information and was therefore prone to be wrongly assessed. Available analytical material from 1960 evaluated the situation of the Ugandan NLM from 1945 to 1960 and by applying a completely inappropriate ideological perspective it led to numerous gross misinterpretations of the political processes taking place in Uganda in this period. The analysis for example highlighted the existence of a ‘widespread progressive peasant movement’ in such a context that it implies some kind of organised peasant movement forming a political vanguard for anti-colonial struggle. In the same document the matter of Buganda’s status within an independent Uganda is then defined as a ‘struggle of wide popular masses against feudalism’ whereas in reality Buganda’s separatist tendencies are an example of a very conservative and traditionalist political movement of a narrow group of elites trying to preserve their own tight grip on political and economic power. This shows how poorly Czechoslovak policy-makers understood the political relief of Uganda at first and it helps to explain why initial

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410 MZV F IV/5 Uganda, kt. 1, príloha k č.j. 026.907/60, 16.6.1960. 1.
411 MZV F IV/5 Uganda, kt. 1, príloha k č.j. 026.907/60, 16.6.1960. 1.
contacts with Ugandan politicians were so ineffective in comparison to the far more fruitful cooperation with the national liberation movement of Kenya.

Due to the lack of CS activism targeting Uganda and low interest in Ugandan affairs, it was only thanks to a Ugandan initiative that communication between the local NLM and Czechoslovakia was established in 1960. High-ranking representatives of the KSČ were directly approached by the Secretary of the Uganda National Congress (UNC), Mr Joseph Kiwanuka. At the time of initial contact the UNC was already an internally deeply fragmented party, whose significance within the national liberation movement had been steadily declining for over a year. Nevertheless, the representative of the UNC successfully used the fact that neither Czechoslovaks, nor the Soviets, whom the CS MFA consulted on the issue, had up-to-date knowledge of Ugandan political development, and they successfully portrayed the UNC as the winner of the 1958 Ugandan elections and undisputed leader of the anti-British decolonisation struggle. After presenting this image of the UNC in Prague, the UNC representative approached the KSČ with an official request for financial support for their anti-colonial campaign. After consultation with the Soviets the Politbyro approved limited financial aid for the UNC in order to exert pressure on the pro-Western African Democratic Party (ADP) which was perceived as an agent of British interests in Uganda.

An important supporting argument for CS and Soviet policy makers to provide assistance to the UNC was the existence of the UNC’s office in Cairo and its declared intentions to cooperate with other African NLMs to mount continent-wide pressure on colonialists. CS support for the UNC, however, did not evolve into long-term cooperation. It was only in 1962 that the CS MFA finally realised that the UNC was in a state of utter collapse and they refused any support to this party on the basis of the on-going internal crisis and accusations of mismanagement of previously allocated resources. As Obote’s UPC had no office in Cairo, the Czechoslovaks and the Soviets completely misjudged its actual significance in Ugandan politics and thus lost circa two years that could had been otherwise used for effective support of Obote. By 1962 CS policy-makers were becoming more interested in and better acquainted with Ugandan affairs and they chose a new favourite to support: the Uganda People’s Congress.

One year after the opening meeting with the UNC, CS officials were contacted by representatives of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), a party that had recently been profiled as the most powerful challenger to the pro-Western Democratic Party. The leader of the UPC, Apollo Milton Obote, sent an introductory letter to CS officials, proclaiming his socialist orientation and requesting urgent material and financial help ahead of the coming elections. His clearly-expressed genuine inclination to socialism was an important stimulus for CS policymakers to grant more attention and support to Ugandan affairs. In immediate reaction to the letter, Obote was invited to the CSSR in October 1961, where he personally negotiated financial help for the upcoming elections that would determine the political fate of Uganda after independence, and which the British decided should take place in 1962. Obote’s direct personal involvement in establishing working cooperation with CS officials from the very beginning turned out to be an important factor for future successful cooperation of both countries especially when compared to the cases of Tanzania and Kenya. The fact that Obote met with a positive CS reaction to his requests for assistance, and later emerged as the leader of Uganda, meant that Czechoslovakia enjoyed a very special direct personal link to the highest levels of Ugandan politics. Neither in Kenya, nor in Tanzania could Czechoslovakia benefit from such exclusive access to the ruling politician and his closest collaborators. Czechoslovakia enjoyed as good a reputation in Uganda as with other ex-colonial nations in Asia and Africa for its practical support and because it had no past colonial history. These factors resulted in a strong position in Uganda for Czechoslovakia from the first days of independence.

4.3. The 1962 Elections

Previously to the 1962 elections only three political parties had held serious chances of acquiring leadership in Uganda: Obote’s UPC, Kiwanuka’s Democratic Party and the Bugandan Kabaka Yekka. It was apparent that the upcoming popular vote would be decisive for setting the course of political development in Uganda’s internal as well as external political and economic affairs. Any future administration of an independent

414 MZV F. IV/5, Uganda, č.j. 029.609/61-10, 10.7.1961.
Uganda would be faced with several pressing issues. The main challenges were linked to national unity and Buganda’s secessionist tendencies, to the successful transfer of power to Africans, the Africanisation of state apparatus and army, to the maintaining of relations with the former British colonial power, to establishing Uganda as a new sovereign agent in international political affairs and to maintaining economic prosperity. These are also the main topics around which academic discourse of Ugandan independence revolves and to which researchers have paid most attention.

From 1960 a series of talks was being held between the British colonial administration and Ugandan politicians with the purpose of outlining the proposed decolonisation. A legal framework for the initial phase of political development after independence was provided by the Constitution, the responsibility for the drafting of which was a core outcome of bilateral talks between the British and the Ugandans. The 1962 constitution was supposed to address all the possible pitfalls threatening to destabilise Uganda after independence and this it did quite successfully regardless of the many revisions introduced in first years after independence.

The vital constitutional issue that was the focus of numerous talks during 1961 and 1962 was the organisation of the new state, the status of traditional kingdoms, especially that of Buganda, and the proposed system for the electoral process. The result of the lengthy talks was a compromise between a rigid centralised state and the call for autonomy for traditional regions. The final version of the approved Constitution stated that Uganda was to be organised as a federation and that substantial powers were granted to the traditional leaders of the Ugandan kingdoms. The crucial clause for the kabaka of Buganda and his supporters stated that while direct elections to national assembly were to be held around Uganda, the representatives for Bugandan constituencies were to be elected indirectly by the Lukiko, the seats of which were contested separately from the rest of the country.415 It is not completely clear why the British agreed to such a compromise, because the indirect elections of Bugandan representatives meant a serious complication to the aspirations of the Democratic Party which was highly unpopular there. The Democratic Party was perceived not only by the Czechoslovaks and by the Soviets as a protegé of Britain for the purposes of ensuring the

continuance of the British economic and political grip on Uganda and as such a main enemy to socialist countries.\textsuperscript{416} Strangely enough, it was the constitution approved by Britain that effectively disqualified the DP from contesting political leadership in Uganda. Whether this was an intentional move by the British who believed that their interests would be equally secure under the government of Obote or simply a political miscalculation remains open to discussion. The fact remains that the prevailing popularity of the Kabaka Yekka in Buganda meant that the DP would find it impossible to win any support there and that they would subsequently struggle to win a majority at nationwide level.

The electoral system introduced by the constitution was applied in the 1962 elections, shortly before independence. The nationwide elections were held to delegate representatives to the Legislative Council, which was to become the National Assembly at the moment of receiving full independence. Already before elections it was becoming clear that Obote's UPC and the Kabaka Yekka would be seeking to create a political partnership if they won enough seats to dominate National Assembly.\textsuperscript{417} This they did because the Kabaka Yekka won the vast majority of Bugandan seats and the UPC managed to beat the DP in the rest of the country. The UPC and the KY created the coalition government in which the kabaka Edward Mutesa was to acquire the highest post of Ugandan President once the British Governor left the country and Obote became the first Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{418}

From today's perspective agreeing to this division of power seems to be yet another of Edward Mutesa's mistake: though a formal head of state he held only very little real power in the Ugandan political system and he remained out of touch with Ugandan politics in following years. Obote on the other hand had the opportunity of actively shaping the political affairs of the state. He acquired a decisive influence on the formative processes of the state institutions that were going through rapid Africanisation, on the distribution of the state's economic resources, on the development of the Ugandan military and on the external relations of the independent Uganda. All these spheres he could and did indeed use to strengthen his own position and that of the UPC. He quite successfully and rapidly created a network of loyal supporters and

\textsuperscript{418} Gertzel, “Report,” 4.
kinsmen from northern Uganda in all state bodies, creating a kind of early patronage scheme. This loyal network of supporters proved decisive in less than two years after independence when the political unity of the Ugandan government, and that of the UPC itself, began to crumble for the first time. Obote emerged from this crisis victorious and stronger than before mainly thanks to the loyalty of his kinsmen and their dominant position in the institutions of power – the army and the intelligence services.

It was not only the local network of patronage that helped Obote strengthen his position but also his valuable contacts with foreign countries. Czechoslovakia proved to be among the most important with the different forms of assistance it provided to Uganda in the first years after independence. Most Czechoslovak assistance was executed in those forms and spheres of highest personal interest to Obote. Naturally these were chosen not to be in any conflict with Obote’s own ambitions and ideally they would help consolidate his grip on all decisive sources of power. This logic helps to explain why most Czechoslovak assistance was provided in the security and military spheres. Therefore the assistance provided needs to be viewed not only in relation to Ugandan affairs in general but also in particular in relation to the personalities of Obote, and later Amin, who were, in their respective periods, the defining figures in Uganda’s political and economic development. In several cases the performance of different forms of assistance by the CSR had an inconspicuous effect at first but far-reaching implications on Ugandan politics in the long run.

As early as 1962 the MFA decided to organise another visit of UPC leaders to the CSSR, during which the first technical cooperation in the civil sphere was agreed. The CS administration offered the UPC organisation a ČTK course for two journalists, a broadcasting course for one person and a course for a photographer.419 Journalism courses were viewed as an effective propaganda tool as they helped to make African journalists more sympathetic to the socialist cause. Ideologically approved and trained journalists could, of course, prove very useful in influencing public opinion in Africa in favour of socialist countries.

A new, more active approach by the CS administration was motivated by the striking success that Obote and the UPC had experienced in the elections of 1962. The

419 NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 10835/14, 16.6.1962, 5.
MFA tended to approve of Obote’s openly declared progressive orientation\textsuperscript{420} and it was this repeated declaration of sympathy for socialism that won Uganda and Obote personally the unwavering support of the CSR and the Soviets for the next decade. The MFA characterised the UPC as a party representing a massive popular movement for liberation from colonial rule under the leadership of a progressive intelligentsia. UPC foreign policy was perceived in Prague as being based for the time being on a principle of positive neutrality.\textsuperscript{421} However, it was expected that Obote would orientate the country later after its independence more firmly towards socialist countries.\textsuperscript{422}

Even though the foreign political priority of the CSSR in this region was still KANU’s NLM struggle and bringing independent Kenya closer to the socialist camp, the continued delay in these processes opened up an opportunity for cooperation with Uganda. Uganda was not subjected to a similar delay and the former British protectorate, advanced under the leadership of Prime Minister Obote, to a formal declaration of independence on 9 October 1962.\textsuperscript{423} The celebrations became an opportunity for the first formal bilateral meeting between the CSSR and an independent Uganda. A CS one-man delegation reported on the meeting as follows: ‘During the festivities the prime minister paid extraordinary attention to Comrade Valo and he gave him priority over all governmental delegations. In interviews he stressed his gratitude for help provided and emphasized its significance for a victory of the People’s Congress of Uganda party in elections. [...] At the same time he asked the CSSR to send its ambassador to Kampala as soon as possible, and pointed out that he would welcome advice and help in dealing with the serious issues which await independent Uganda.’\textsuperscript{424}

The months that followed Ugandan independence were used for legal formalisation of relations between Uganda and the CSSR in various arenas. Negotiations of diplomatic relations had already been opened up during Valo’s 1962 mission but, despite mutual consent and interest, the opening of a diplomatic office had to be

\textsuperscript{422} NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 10835/8, 16.6.1962, 1.
\textsuperscript{423} Ofcansky, Uganda, 38.
\textsuperscript{424} NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 11763/8, 5.11.1962, 1.
provisionally postponed. Even though Kampala was not involved in the original plan of diplomatic offices for Africa, reconsideration of this matter was recommended by the MFA due to the delay in opening the Nairobi office and to promising prospects of Kampala’s orientation towards socialism. Despite this recommendation, the office was not opened until 1965 owing to cadre and financial problems that had to be solved by transferring funds originally allocated for the embassy in Senegal. This situation is illustrative of certain practical obstacles that Czechoslovakia faced in implementing its ambitious Africa policy, mainly due to its limited human and financial capacities.

During 1963 official negotiations were taking place for the trade agreement which, it was hoped, would improve the ‘regrettable state’ of trade exchange between the two countries. The CS trade mission visiting Uganda in January 1963 with a view to dealing with these matters was staffed by officials from the MFT and the MFA and the representatives of several foreign trade enterprises. The objectives for the mission included several high priority conditions for the future improvement of mutual cooperation, but not all of them were fully met. The trade agreement was intended to be negotiated with conditions that would remove the main obstacles negatively affecting trade relations in the past – particularly licensing issues and the condition of balanced trade exchange. In practice, the issue of a negative trade exchange on Uganda’s part became the main concern for Ugandan officials, despite CS arguments about the necessity of breaking the Western trade monopoly of the Ugandan economy. The delegation was also to present the Ugandan government with an offer of loans that could be provided by Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Enterprises on goods or investments. In addition, the delegation also discussed the matter of cultural agreement, but any practical steps were left for future negotiations.

Overall, it can be said that the objectives for the mission were met only partially, but they still represented an important opening step for future bilateral cooperation. In the mission’s report, failure to accomplish all the tasks was blamed on the absence of any accredited CS diplomat, who could have prepared the ground for negotiations, and

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425 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 11763/8, 5.11.1962, 1.
426 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 00391/63, 23.7.1963, 1.
427 MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 026.023/63, 11.6.1963, 1.
428 MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 020.930/63-10, 13.2.1963, 1.
430 MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 020.930/63-10, 13.2.1963, 11.
on the lack of expertise of the Ugandan civil servants, the majority of whom were inexperienced. Most of the blame, however, was directed towards the actions of the British consultants within the Ugandan state apparatus, who had actively interfered with the on-going negotiations of the CS delegation, a matter which had to be eventually reported to the Secretary of State, Magezi, for intervention.\footnote{MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 020.930/63-10, 13.2.1963, 11-12.}

The presence of British nationals within the Ugandan administration, and especially their grip on the Ugandan economy, was not dissimilar to their position in Kenya. In this respect, the CSSR was facing the same challenges in the political, economic as well as technical cooperation spheres. Upon the return of the mission from Uganda, a detailed report of the political and economic situation was presented to the Politybro, which identified yet another challenge – the presence of experts from multiple Western countries. Experts from the UK, the USA, West Germany and Israel were viewed as a potential threat to CS interests in Uganda.\footnote{MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 020.930/63-10, 13.2.1963, 1-2.}

A crucial precondition that was strikingly different to the situation in Kenya, and which was the most important determinant in the prospect of a longer-lasting and more successful cooperation with the CSSR, was the openly expressed and genuine desire of the Ugandan government to seek long-lasting cooperation with the CSSR. In the conclusion of its report, the MFA says that, despite all the constraints, ‘\textit{Interviews with the Prime Minister M.A. Obote and his deputy Magezi confirmed their essential interest in cooperating with the CSSR. [...] A positive aspect of these interviews was that both, especially Magezi, talked about domestic and foreign politics quite openly and in a friendly tone}.’\footnote{MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 020.930/63-10, 13.2.1963, 13.} In comparison to Kenya, Obote’s orientation towards socialist countries proved to be of a much longer duration and to be much more substantial, and it survived some of the internal turbulences within the UPC that occurred in 1964.

Practical outcomes of the 1962 Czechoslovak-Ugandan talks on cooperation began to materialise almost immediately. The core of negotiations about civil technical cooperation was concerned with the future organisation of professional technical courses and the provision of university scholarships for Ugandan students. Even though no formal agreement was agreed upon as yet, cooperation in this sphere went on
unhindered. As early as 1962, four Ugandans travelled to the CSSR for professional courses – three were trained in union organisation and one in the unification of agriculture. In 1963 the CS government offered Uganda twelve university scholarships, while another journalism and broadcasting course was organised by the CTK for four Ugandan candidates.\textsuperscript{434} The professional courses in broadcasting, journalism, union organisation and other spheres were successfully carried out, but the university scholarship programme faced certain shortcomings in the first couple of years after independence. Uganda failed, on several occasions, to appoint students for the scholarships that had been allocated by the CS Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{435} Whether this was the result of poor management on the part of the Ugandan Ministry of Education or British pressure remains unclear.

4.4. The 1964 Mutiny and the beginnings of cooperation between Uganda and Czechoslovakia in the military sphere

The influence of the military on political development was an important factor in each of the three East African states but nowhere did the local army have such a decisive, far-reaching and ultimately destructive influence on the state as was the case in Uganda. It was indeed in relation to the special assistance provided in the military and security spheres that Czechoslovakia actively interfered with and deeply influenced the political development of the independent Ugandan state, though perhaps not always in the manner it intended.

Upon independence Uganda inherited two battalions of the former colonial army known as the King’s African Rifles (KAR). The KAR was a military body which served the colonial administration and the main responsibility of which prior to independence was to ‘intimidate the domestic subject population’.\textsuperscript{436} Traditionally the officers of the KAR were professional white British soldiers, while the ordinary soldiers, ‘askaris’, were recruited from among the most suitable indigenous candidates. Over the years the British colonial army in different parts of the world took a liking to particular

\textsuperscript{434} MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 026.023/63, 11.6.1963, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{435} MZV F. IV/5 č.j. 069/64, 12.6.1964, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{436} Parsons, 1964 Army Mutinies, 12.
ethnic groups who were regarded as naturally better suited than others for the military. Therefore the majority of local soldiers would belong to one or two ‘martial’ ethnicities of the specific region.⁴³⁷ In the case of Uganda such positions were held predominantly by men of northern tribes, in particular the Acholi, the Lango, and the Nubi people, an ethnic group consisting of several smaller tribes who were often regarded as being alien to Uganda.

There were several problems linked to the KAR and its planned transformation into the national armies of newly independent East African states. Among the most pressing ones were the lack of educated and well-trained African officers, the ex-colonial forces’ potential unreliability and uncertain loyalty to the national governments, the matter of an undesirable British influence on national armies, and the problematic social and economic status of soldiers in the new socio-economic reality of the independent states. ‘Veteran askaris were profoundly suspicious of their new African leaders. Their military service isolated them from the nationalist politics of the late colonial era, and they had few ties to the new generation of African political elites.’⁴³⁸ At the same time, new post-independence African political leaders ‘came from the politically sophisticated ‘non-martial’ ethnic groups that colonial officers had barred from the KAR. Few of the newly empowered elites from these communities had much sympathy for the Askaris who had served the old colonial regime so reliably.’⁴³⁹ All the problems of transforming the KAR into loyal and functioning national armies and the difficulties of the ‘askaris’ adjusting to a new reality eventually resulted into the crisis of January 1964 when a series of army mutinies swept Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, shaking the weak fundamentals of their political systems.

The East African mutinies of 1964 shared several similarities, mainly in the soldiers’ initial motivation to rebel, but the uprisings were quite distinct as regards their handling by the local governments and the mutinies’ long-term effects. Inspired by the earlier action by their Tanganyikan colleagues, the Ugandan army mutinied on 23 January 1964 at Jinja barracks. The soldiers’ chief demands were for a pay rise and immediate Africanisation of the corps. Obote gave the issue the highest priority and sent

Interior Minister Onama (and later Minister of Regional Affairs Obwangor) to deal with the issue in person. Even though Obote initially refused to label events a mutiny, he was aware of the potential risk for state security should affairs turn bloody, or should the army decide to march on Kampala. Like Nyerere and later Kenyatta, Obote asked the British army stationed in Kenya for military assistance. On the 24 January talks between Obwangor and discontented soldiers continued but tensions were beginning to run high. It was the intervention of Major Idi Amin, one of a handful of African officers in the corps, that calmed the situation until the morning of the 25th when, after a surprising bloodless strike British soldiers took control of the Jinja camp. On the following day Amin presented Obote with the soldiery's demands, which were agreed and met by the government. To prevent any repeat of the mutiny, several hundred of the soldiers involved were discharged from the army and most of the mutiny leaders were tried and imprisoned.440

Unlike in Tanzania, the reaction to the events brought no fundamental change to the Ugandan army apart from an accelerated process of Africanisation of the corps. More important, yet indirect, effects of the mutiny seem to be traceable in the development of Obote’s stance towards the army in the years to follow. There are some strong hints that justify the speculation that the Jinja mutiny of 1964 warned Obote of the army’s power over national politics where it decided to intervene. It could have been equally important to realise that military power firmly placed behind one’s political aspiration is a potential source of political legitimacy that in Ugandan conditions cannot be practically challenged by any other institution without outside involvement. Shortly after the mutiny Obote began to turn the Ugandan army into an effective and powerful force. He needed a national army that would firmly back his government and he provisionally succeeded in creating a strong and loyal army, applying a mixed strategy of three core principles. The three principles were: to maintain the dominance of his northern compatriots in the armed forces, to ensure economic prosperity for the soldiery, and to strengthen the corps by seeking expert technical assistance from abroad. Cooperation with Czechoslovakia and a few other states helped achieve these last objectives.

Special cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Uganda had been evolving from 1963 onwards in two spheres: military and security. It took Uganda only a couple of years, from the first arms and weapon systems presentation that took place in 1963,\(^{441}\) to become by far the largest recipient of CS military assistance in the region. Akena Adok, a close personal collaborator of Prime Minister Obote, first approached CS officials even before the mutiny in 1963 with Obote’s message of interest in special military cooperation. Uganda was then in dire need of well-trained officers in order to complete the process of Africanisation. Ugandan officials were eager to receive training for army cadets wherever possible and therefore they approached Israel, too, at the same time; military cooperation with the Israelis also reached substantial levels during Obote’s rule.\(^{442}\) Even though hard evidence is yet to be found, one can reasonably speculate that the mutiny of 1964 had a big influence on Uganda’s rapid establishment of military cooperation with Czechoslovakia and a few other countries.

Cooperation in the military sphere with the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defence was of a dual nature. Firstly, the CSSR organised several military training courses for selected Ugandan cadets in various arms specialisations. A second form of cooperation was represented by a flourishing trade with arms and other special material. After opening negotiations, cooperation of both kinds started in 1965 and 1964 respectively, and continued more or less uninterrupted throughout the whole period of President’s Obote rule despite various incidents of political turbulence in both countries. On the CS part, some constraints occurred during the August invasion of 1968 that interfered with planned trade transactions, as well as with the organisation of the courses, but they were relatively quickly resolved and cooperation was resumed.

In March 1964 Uganda and the CSSR came to a bilateral agreement on technical cooperation. Within the legal limits set by this fundamental document, specific agreements between the Ministry of Defence of Uganda and the CS MFT were soon to be completed. The first one was Contract Agreement 5252, which concerned training for Ugandan pilots on CS-produced L 29 aircraft. The CS government warmly welcomed the fact that it was to receive more than 166,000 GBP for organising the course, making an important distinction to cooperation with most West African countries who normally

\(^{442}\) Ofcansky, Uganda, 128.
received most of the assistance in this sphere for free or on very favourable credit terms. Even before Contract 5252 was agreed, CS deliveries of ten 30mm PLdvK cannons Mk 53 and appropriate ammunition took place in 1964. The expert mission that would provide basic training for Ugandan soldiers to use these guns was sent to Uganda in 1965.  

On 1 July 1965 the first military course for Ugandan cadets under Contract 5252 started at one of the CS’s Army training colleges in Přerov. The course objective was to train pilots as well as technical air force staff, in three different specialisations over the course of seventeen months. The course, codenamed 257B, was originally supposed to be taken by eighteen Ugandan nationals – ten pilots and eight technicians – but ten more technicians actually enrolled. During the organisation of this course, the MND successfully overcame the common limitations that many CS training offices had faced in the past, namely the poor language skills of the army instructors. Just a couple of years previously, the MND had created a reasonably successful and effective pattern of cooperation with ELDCs and organisation of expert courses for foreigners. In the early 1960s the MND successfully completed building its training facilities for foreign cadets and Uganda became the first East African country to participate in the MND’s programme of cooperation with ELDC armies.

During the negotiation of the contract between the Ugandan Minister of Security and the representative of MFT-HTS in June 1965, the matter of further training provided by CS military experts was raised and discussed. The Ugandan government was interested in receiving additional training for its pilots once course 257B in the CSSR was completed. Twelve military experts from the CS armed forces were to organise the course directly in Uganda. An important precondition for this course to take place was the delivery of CS L 29 aircraft to Uganda.

During the talks some other suggestions for military cooperation were raised by both sides, but they were not satisfactorily resolved. In addition to training pilots and technical staff, the CS side offered the Ugandan delegation experts in artillery and in infantry; however, because of the fear of possible accusations of extreme political orientation towards socialist countries, Minister Onama decided not to accept the offer

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446 VUA MNO 1965, č.j. 38/3-8, 14, 20, 21, 042862, Aug 1965?, 3-5.
for the time being.\textsuperscript{447} It was around this time that conflict within the UPC was mounting and Obote’s group, of which Onama was the prime member, was often reproached for socialist tendencies.

According to the available report by the MFT-HTS delegate, Minister Onama, speaking on behalf of the Ugandan government, expressed content with the cooperation despite a few shortcomings in the negotiations. According to the author of the analysis, it was ‘possible to assume that based on experiences from training in the CSSR and gradual domestic political development, Uganda will request Czechoslovakia to provide more military experts. It could be assumed that as well as air force expertise, expertise regarding artillery and infantry, which would be connected to the supply of material, will be requested.’\textsuperscript{448} Material deliveries originating from Contract 5252 did not only include L 29 aircraft, but the CS MFT-HTS informed Ugandans of additional special material necessary for the regular service operations of the newly-formed Ugandan air force – air base facilities, technical equipment, storage for spare parts, and a service depot for maintenance.\textsuperscript{449} It is, however, not clear whether the CS provided Uganda with this material, or whether it was purchased elsewhere. Some deliveries of such material from Israel are documented in this period.\textsuperscript{450}

Detailed reports of the proceedings of Course 257B, or Action 142 as it was also marked, are available in the MND archives. The report mentions great discontent experienced by the Ugandan cadets caused by financial problems, as the Ugandan government failed to provide them with the agreed wages and more or less ignored them for several months. CS course commanders blamed the discontent on the low morale of the participants, who were otherwise evaluated as some of the best African cadets ever to be trained in the CSSR.\textsuperscript{451}

In September 1965 Minister Onama visited the CSSR and led more talks on the special cooperation with the CS MND. He expressed interest in material deliveries and the organisation of the course for Ugandan military instructors. The special material that Onama was interested in included the BZK 82 cannon, the PLK 85 cannon, the 160mm

\textsuperscript{447} VUA MNO 1965, č.j. 38/3-8, 14, 20, 21, 04242, 28.4.1965, 1
\textsuperscript{448} VUA MNO 1965, č.j. 38/3-8, 14, 20, 21, 042862, Aug 1965?, 4.
\textsuperscript{449} VUA MNO 1965, č.j. 38/3-8, 14, 20, 21, 042473, 13.4.1965, 1.
\textsuperscript{450} Ofcansky, Uganda, 128.
mortar, the T 54A tank, and OT 62 and OT 64 armoured vehicles.\footnote{VUA MNO 1965, č.j. H, J, 04550/OTP-1965, 3.11.1965, 1.} The instructor course proposed was a twelve-month one and it was to produce twelve tank commanders, ten to twelve artillery commanders, eight to sixteen tank technicians, up to ten radio-locator technicians and eight artillery technicians.

Meanwhile, the first phase of the training of Ugandan pilots in the CSSR was successfully completed despite the organisational problems, mentioned above, caused by the Ugandan government. The organisation of the advanced course was agreed as the supplement to the existing Contract 5252. The absolvents of the first course were to undertake the advanced training as of December 1966. This advanced course was to be the last step before transferring the training to Uganda in 1967 under the label of Course 5253.\footnote{VUA MNO 1966, č.j. H 3, 05432/OTP, Aug 1966, 1.}

By the end of 1965 turbulence in Ugandan politics indicated far-reaching political changes were about to take place in the country. Obote's government was successful in stabilising the situation in the national army after the 1964 mutiny and the Ugandan army was, through successful cooperation with foreign military experts, becoming an effective and powerful military force. Units of the Ugandan army engaged successfully in several operations around the country but also across its borders.\footnote{Lofchie, Michael F., "The Uganda Coup-Class Action by the Military," \textit{The Journal of Modern African Studies} 10, No. 1 (May, 1972): 26.} Modern equipment and quality training compensated for the army's limited size. The Ugandan army had in two years become what Obote needed it to be, a powerful and loyal source of political legitimacy behind his government.

4.5. \textbf{The development of intelligence services in cooperation with Czechoslovakia}

Like military cooperation, collaboration in the security sphere was first mentioned in the bilateral talks between Czechoslovakia and Uganda in 1963, but practical negotiations first took place in 1964, perhaps to some extent motivated by the Ugandan army mutiny and the fears over its immediate reliability. The person
responsible for negotiating conditions of security cooperation was Akena Adoko, the representative of the Ugandan administration, the President’s cousin and one his closest collaborators. During his visit to Czechoslovakia in March 1964 (as mentioned above) Adoko met with officials from the Interior Ministry and the StB and also with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Václav David. During his talks with the StB officials at the Interior Ministry, Adoko put forward the Ugandan government’s intention of creating a counter-espionage organisation that would help to solve some of the pressing issues that the country was facing.

The Ugandan government was, according to Adoko, concerned with the growth of inter-tribal conflict that was believed to be fuelled by the British and which posed a threat to Ugandan political stability. Obote was also concerned by what was seen as a further potential source of political instability, namely the activities of British and American experts. In an immediate response to Adoko’s requests, the Interior Ministry prepared and suggested a plan to organise a course for six or seven Ugandan students to be trained in intelligence work. Adoko himself used the visit to get acquainted with some of the basic principles and StB practices of espionage and counter-espionage and he used this knowledge to lay the foundations of new intelligence organisation upon his return to Uganda.

Both Adoko’s requests – at the MND and the Interior Ministry – met with a positive response and practical cooperation in both areas commenced in 1964. The Interior Ministry organised the security expert course for Ugandans in the second half of 1964 and, during his visit to the CSSR in December 1964, Adoko expressed his satisfaction with its provisional results. He used the visit to negotiate further espionage training for approximately 25 Ugandans to take place in following years. In addition to this, he asked the CS Interior Ministry to provide some of the carefully selected Ugandan students enrolled at CS universities with an opportunity to complete the limited security course during the academic holidays.

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455 ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA?, 25.3.1964, 1, l.31.
457 ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA?, 25.3.1964, 1-2, l. 31-32.
458 ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA?, 25.3.1964, l. 31-32.
459 MZV F. IV/5 č.j. 069/64, 12.6.1964, 2.
Meanwhile, Adoko began the formation of an intelligence organisation, attached to the office of the Prime Minister, and later to become known as the General Service Unit (GSU). From the outset Czechoslovak-Ugandan cooperation in the security sphere contributed greatly to the creation of the GSU and to the drafting of its operational procedures. Also from the beginning, graduates of the first intelligence course organised in the CSR acquired high-ranking positions within the GSU. The unique feature of Adoko’s intelligence service was the fact that for several months its existence was neither publically announced nor given any legal standing. Therefore it operated in obscurity, outside the system of constitutional control, unlike the official intelligence service of the Special Branch of Ugandan police inherited from colonial times. In this initial period knowledge of the very existence of Adoko’s service was withheld from the institutions of the state, making it virtually impossible to exert any kind of legal or practical control over the GSU and its activities. Also, it gave Adoko and his people a considerable advantage over their rivals in fulfilling their operational objectives.

In some respects, security cooperation between the Czechoslovak interior ministry and Adoko bore many similarities to the StB’s Action SPECIAL in Kenya. The main objective in each case was to form an alternative intelligence service that would be a loyal and effective tool to aid the particular politician’s ascent to ultimate political power and to interfere effectively with western influence in the country. Ideally this intelligence service would eventually substitute for existing security institutions and take over their responsibilities. While this plan failed in Kenya due to Odinga’s gradual exclusion from the top levels of Kenyan politics, until 1971 the story of Adoko’s GSU in Uganda was a success story. There were several reasons for this, but the main one is that in contrast to Kenya, the politician in whose favour the project of the intelligence service was being implemented did not lose political power and could thus ensure constant political backing to it. Also, unlike in Action SPECIAL, most of the Ugandan graduates of the CS security courses received positions within the Ugandan administration, including in the office of the President and in various ministries, thus extending Obote’s and Adoko’s influence. Adoko’s project also retained the unwavering support of his Czechoslovak partners, who viewed Adoko and his colleagues as vital agents for the success of the growth of socialism in Uganda, under pressure as it was from the West.

461 ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA?, 7.12.1964, 3, l. 65.
Further contacts between Adoko and various CS officials were regular and frequent in the years that followed. Adoko became the main point of contact for most Ugandan matters. He became the source of important background information about internal political affairs in the country; on the CS side, contact was mostly conducted by StB operatives, at first from the Nairobi residency, then later from a similar office in Kampala. In Prague’s view the legalisation of Adoko’s intelligence service in July 1965 seemed promising for CS interests in Uganda. In 1965 one of the graduates of the first CS security course, James Gregory Otto, was formally appointed head of one of the sections responsible for counter-espionage and was directly answerable to the PM’s office.

Legalisation of the status of the GSU was perceived to be a great success and it motivated the CS administration to approve additional funding for cooperation in this sphere, especially once the StB received signals that the Israeli-trained members, some of whom also joined Adoko’s GSU, were losing their positions to newcomers trained in Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. Provisional successes of this cooperation were also viewed as a promising future challenge to the interests and activities of western countries in Uganda, particularly Israel and the USA, who were working for their own political interests in Uganda. Israel also provided Uganda with special security assistance, but the successfully developing cooperation between Uganda and Czechoslovakia in this same sphere undermined Israel’s position in Uganda. The CS administration decided to continue providing Adoko with assistance by training more cadres, while limited deliveries of professional intelligence equipment were also approved.

Cooperation between the CSSR, represented by StB operatives, and Adoko’s GSU reached a new quality and intensity in the first months after the service was legalised. The General Service Unit, under the leadership of Adoko, Otto and other CS security course graduates, was profiled as a strict anti-American organisation. Its legalisation in 1965 coincided with the mobilisation of pro-western politicians within the UPC, who, as Adoko and Otto believed, were receiving finances from the Americans. Activities of these pro-western politicians became a primary concern for the GSU in this period. Obote

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462 ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA. A/1-04657, 14.7.1965, 1, l. 83.
464 ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA. A/1-04657, 14.7.1965, 1-4, l.78-84.
465 ABS 81029_000_1_2, Č.jA?, 21.5.1966, 3, l. 37.
ordered Adoko and his people to provide him with evidence of collaboration between several cabinet members and US agencies. In the period when internal antagonism was building against him, the newly-established service and the information it gathered certainly strengthened the position of Prime Minister Obote, helped him face the opposition and contributed to the victory that was of paramount importance for the socialist countries. Obote was well aware of the CS connection with the GSU, and the CS position in Uganda was thus also significantly strengthened.

4.6. Political crisis 1964-1966

A legislative framework, according to which political power was conducted in an independent Uganda was sketched out in cooperation with Britain; it attempted to address the most acute issues of the ethnically divided country. The 1962 Constitution proved useful in navigating Uganda to a peaceful transition of power from the UK to Ugandans but it was not similarly successful in solving centrifugal separatist tendencies of the Ugandan regions and the political aspirations of traditional regional Ugandan leaders. ‘The Constitution was by no means a charter of unity, nor a basis for its attainment at a future date: rather it legally recognised and entrenched localism.’ Many threatening sources of possible political conflict were left unresolved for future dealings by an independent government. There was one political issue in particular inherited from the colonial period that was left unsettled and it caused an early major rift in the Ugandan administration. In Ugandan affairs this issue is known as the matter of the 'lost counties' of Bunyoro.

The origins of the 'lost counties' issue can be traced back into the very beginning of colonial rule in Uganda. The kingdom of Buganda provided the British with assistance in their attempt to subdue the kingdom of Bunyoro. When the British conquest of Bunyoro and other Ugandan kingdoms was successfully completed, the Bugandan king received a reward from the British for his services. Besides receiving special status within the British Protectorate of Uganda, the kabaka of Buganda also assumed control.

466 ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA. A/1-0645/40-65, 2.10.1965, 1, l. 98.
467 Kabwegyere, The Politics, 204.
of two districts that had originally belonged to Bunyoro. The Banyoro people however
never accepted this arrangement and with the advance of independence they renewed
their demands for the return of their lost counties. Their demands were given extra
substance by the fact that the population of the lost counties was still predominantly
Banyoro. Eventually it was decided that the fate of the lost counties should be decided
by popular vote. The referendum did indeed take place in November 1964 and the
majority vote was for return to Bunyoro. This result was a blow to President Mutesa’s
political prestige in Buganda and it only contributed to a universal decline of his power
that was increasingly manacled by the growing dominance of the UPC and Prime
Minister Obote. The ‘lost counties’ affair inspired similar demands of some other
disputed micro-regions and it was becoming apparent that the unity of the Ugandan
state was being challenged. For Obote national unity was a core notion of his political
programme, partially as a sincere conviction that it was a vital condition for ensuring the
survival of an independent Uganda, partially as a working strategy towards his complete
dominance of Ugandan politics.

The ‘lost counties’ affair marked the end of political cooperation between
Obote’s UPC and Kabaka Yekka. As Obote successfully consolidated state control in UPC
hands, the membership of the party was becoming a necessity for Ugandans seeking
political influence or a state service career. From 1964 a number of supporters of KY and
of other political parties had been joining the ranks of the UPC, seemingly adding more
power to Obote, but in reality increasing the risk of internal dispute. The party’s
incorporation of new members from Buganda brought a heightened threat of
fragmentation along ideological and ethnic lines and of possible intraparty conflict. Such
conflict did occur in 1964 and 1965 when an anti-Obote group was formed within the
UPC, challenging the PM’s control of party and of the government. These events were
taking place at the time of Obote’s declared intentions of introducing a one-party system
in Uganda, a move far from infrequent or unusual in Africa in this period.

The years 1964 through 1966 represented a period when the course for future
political development was being decided by the power struggle between Obote and his
opponents inside as well as outside the UPC. Even though Obote did eventually emerge
victorious from the confrontation, his ultimate political success was by no means a

certainty until the very last moment. There were several decisive factors to Obote’s success: his ability to use ethnic and personal loyalties for his own political gain, his success in containing the power of traditional leaders, and, most importantly, the fact that he consolidated and maintained control of the security forces and the military at all critical times. The last point especially represented a crucial condition for Obote’s success in the struggle for power which resulted in 1966 in the series of affairs known as Obote’s revolution. Besides providing Uganda with effective assistance in the military sphere, Czechoslovakia was also of vital importance to Obote in his project of building a loyal intelligence service, an institution that would later play a decisive role alongside the Ugandan army in supporting Obote in his clash with the opposition and in his move to a one-party state.

The internal fragmentation of the UPC that began in 1964, and the growing intraparty opposition to Obote resulted in the 1966 deep political Ugandan crisis during which Obote had to defend his position as PM and as leader of the UPC. It still remains to be firmly established as to what extent the 1966 crisis was imposed on Obote by the actions of his political opponents, or whether it was the result of a well-drafted political strategy by Obote himself, using the situation that had arisen to sweep aside the whole spectrum of his rivals and to change the fundamental organisation of the Ugandan state to his preferred model of a centralised one-party system. Regardless of which of those two possibilities is closer to reality, the fact remains that Obote stayed at the top of political developments in Uganda between 1964 and 1966, and in most cases it was he who was the driver of the major political changes to which his opponents had to react. It was by Obote’s decision that the coalition between the UPC and KY was terminated in August 1964, it was his dealings on the Ugandan army mutiny that solved the military crisis and started the army’s development and it was his declaration of intention to lead Uganda towards the future of one-party state that his opponents had to react to.469

The increasing internal divisions of the UPC and also of the Ugandan cabinet were occurring mostly along ethnic lines for individual members. The division between southerners and northerners was not only a tribal division but it also carried the implications of related divisions between rich and poor, between kingdoms supporting traditionalists, and nationalist radicals, between pro-West and pro-socialist camps, and

as was becoming ever more apparent, between anti- and pro-Obote factions.470 The existing division of the UPC was more starkly exposed in the aftermath of the referendum on the 'lost counties' when the UPC members from Buganda especially did not hold back from expressing their discontent with Obote. Several went so far as to cross to the Democratic Party opposition.471 In this period a group critical of Obote’s actions formed around Grace Ibingira.

The Ibingira group’s criticisms of Obote mounted throughout 1965, especially in connection to the affair often referred to as the ‘Congo gold scam’. This affair developed throughout 1965 and was concerned with the alleged illegal receiving of money, gold and ivory from the Congo by Colonel Idi Amin, Obote and the two ministers Nekyon and Onama. According to Obote’s brief explanation the whole affair was a matter of a secret agreement between Nyerere, Kenyatta and himself in providing assistance to the Congolese Stanleyville regime, for which it paid with this money, gold and ivory.472 A thorough investigation as called for by Ibingira’s group was repeatedly postponed until it finally resulted in February 1966 in the ultimate rift within the Ugandan cabinet, by then also split between Obote’s opponents and his supporters. Daudi Ochieng was known to sympathise with Ibingira’s group and he ‘accused Deputy Army Commander Idi Amin of involvement – in collusion with Obote and two cabinet ministers, Adoko Nekyon and Felix Onama – in a gold and ivory scandal. Ochieng then proposed a motion demanding Amin’s suspension from the army pending an investigation of the matter.’473 In the absence of Obote and of almost half the cabinet, the remaining ministers – mostly southern politicians – passed the motion to begin an investigation into Obote’s conduct. Upon his return to Kampala Obote had the motion annulled but the cabinet remained torn.

The crisis culminated on 24 February 1966 when Obote accused his opponents of an attempted coup against him and had five cabinet members arrested. Subsequently Obote suspended the 1962 Constitution and acquired all executive powers by proclaiming a state of emergency. To ensure the complete loyalty of the Ugandan army

473 Ofcansky, Uganda, 41.
Obote stripped the Commander-in-Chief Brigadier Shaban Opolot of his powers and appointed the popular and loyal Northerner Amin in his stead. In April 1966 Obote introduced the new republican constitution, widely criticised at the time, which, among other measures introduced the concept of the centralisation of power in the post of Executive President, a position intended to substitute for the suspended post of Prime Minister. The same constitution also cancelled the special status of Buganda and all the constitutional rights of the lukiko and the kabaka of Baganda.474 This move naturally provoked a reaction from Edward Mutesa, the kabaka of Buganda and the President of Uganda, who officially demanded the Ugandan government to withdraw from Buganda. Mutesa also called for foreign help against Uganda, a move which was bound to be controversial, given the precedent in East Africa. The crisis then swiftly escalated into the short but bloody armed conflict between Amin’s troops and the Bugandan army which ended with Buganda’s defeat, the kabaka’s exile and a consolidation of Ugandan power over the rebellious kingdom, the administration of which was to be split into four separate regions.475 ‘The army was thus pivotal as an instrument of presidential power at the time of the alienation of Baganda support, as well as compensation for the organisationally weak and faction-ridden Uganda People’s Congress.’476

Besides the army, there was one other power institution of Ugandan state that reinforced Obote’s position at a time of political crisis. It was the Ugandan intelligence service, known as the General Service Unit, which was organised at Obote’s direct request in cooperation with Czechoslovakia. Documents in Prague archives suggest that over the critical period of 1965 the GSU had been maintaining constant surveillance over the opposition group within the UPC.477 To what extent GSU activities helped Obote to defend his position once it was openly challenged is difficult to assess, as the relevant information on GSU activities is largely non-existent or at least not yet locatable. However, the fact that in subsequent years Obote upheld security cooperation arrangements with Czechoslovakia as well as other countries and spent extensive resources on the development of the GSU, suggests that he considered the GSU a useful tool in ensuring his political survival.

474 Southall, “General Amin,” 97-98.
477 ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA. A/1-0645/40-65, 2.10.1965, 1, l. 98.
4.7. Obote’s ‘Move to the left’

The events of 1966 saw Obote emerge victorious from the most serious political crisis of Uganda after independence, in what his critics judged a constitutional coup with the involvement of the Ugandan army. In April 1966 Obote had the new Constitution passed in the National Assembly placing virtually all power in his hands. Even though this step was seemingly legal, Obote’s opponents pointed out that the Constitution was passed in the National Assembly without being read and in the absence of the necessary quorum. Legal or not, the new Constitution was a major step towards the centralisation that Obote sought and effectively rid him of any viable political opposition. Obote’s coup, or revolution, depending on the perspective, deeply alienated and frustrated large sections of the Ugandan population.

In 1967, after yet another new Constitution replaced the previous one, completing the centralisation of the state, Obote held all the political power in Uganda. He had the loyalty of the army, the police and the GSU, as all of these power institutions were by now dominated by his fellow northerners. Obote also decided to prolong the life of the serving National Assembly for five more years because he believed this would allow him to implement the desired reforms that would win him popular approval. In subsequent years government under his leadership tried to implement the programme which came to be known as the ‘move to the Left’. Its fundamental principles were progressively explained in several documents drafted by Obote and which were intended to cause far-reaching structural socio-economic changes in Uganda.

Uganda originally entered the independence era with comparatively good prospects for successful economic development in the immediate future. The country possessed a functioning and developing economy based on agricultural produce and related industries and was blessed with a favourable natural environment. Ugandan agriculture was productive enough to provide sustenance for the whole population. The country was able to benefit from a well-developed transport infrastructure and from its economic links to markets in Britain and other western states. Plans for tighter economic cooperation with Kenya and Tanzania were promising. While all these strengths were present in the 1960s in Uganda, there were also some serious structural

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478 Ofcansky, Uganda, 93.
weaknesses to be dealt with by Obote’s government. Among these the most pressing issue was to Africanise the economy and in some acceptable way limit the role of and penetration by foreign-owned companies. Furthermore, reliance on a limited number of agricultural commodities subject to fluctuating prices always posed a great risk for the economic and hence also the political stability of Uganda. Redistribution of the means of economic production was also on the table.

Obote’s sympathies with socialism had been well known since his early ascent to power and it was obvious that in one way or another they would be reflected in the economic policies of his cabinet especially after 1966, when he acquired all the power in Uganda. Some very limited economic adaptation of a capitalist economy towards the principles of African socialism was sought as early as 1964, but it was only at the end of the decade that Obote announced (and attempted to implement) more radical socialist policies in the country’s economy. It was only in 1969 that Obote finally introduced the political programme that would provide some kind of theoretical backing for the long-proclaimed project of building socialism in Uganda. This programme was declared in the document called the Common Man’s Charter and was presented on 18 December 1969 to the Annual Delegate Conference of the UPC. Several fundamental political principles for implementation in Uganda can be extracted from the document.

‘The Charter professed the rejection of foreign exploitation and domination. [...] Socialism was to be adopted as the theory and practice of social life in Uganda. [...] The Post-Independence Crusade was to fight against poverty, ignorance and disease. [...] Over and above this, the Charter was aware of the problem of integration in Uganda. Thus it professed that efforts should be mobilised to build one country with one people, one Parliament and one Government. [...] It was also written in the Charter that the gap between the well-to-do and the masses was inherited from the pre-Independence era. [...] There was also a hint that nationalisation of private property was necessary as a fulfilment of this principle.’479 While the Charter provided the theoretical framework for further development, several documents and speeches that followed it in 1969 and 1970480 added practical implementation guidance. However the practical application of Obote’s

479 Kabwegyere, Politics, 212.
ambitious reforms was much less successful and much slower than would have been needed to ensure Obote won the broad popular support he so desired, but lacked. This caused growing social discontent, which in combination with the continuing resentment of Obote in Buganda, rampant corruption in all the spheres of state apparatus, most importantly in the military, predestined Obote’s ultimate enforced fall from power in 1971.

The ‘Move to the left’ proved disastrous to Obote’s political destiny. While some of his radical intentions scared the rich, the foreign contingent, the business owners and the West, slow implementation of the proposed policies frustrated and alienated the rest of society. Therefore the programme which was supposed to win Obote broad popular support only brought him more antipathy from his opponents and was received badly by the West, relations with which were still critically important for the health of the Ugandan economy. Frustration over the ‘move to the left’ only served to fuel the long-standing criticism of Obote that he had still not sought confirmation of his status as head of state by popular vote. The longer the country went without actual elections after Independence, the lower the level of legitimacy of government’s actions and the lower its public approval.481

In this situation Obote found himself increasingly dependent on the strength and allegiance of the institutions that gave him his power. Obote’s political destiny was determined by the support of the army and the GSU, and he needed these bodies to be effective, powerful and loyal. In the period of 1966 through 1971 he also ensured this by maintaining cooperation with Czechoslovakia in the special sphere. It is a historical paradox that Obote was perhaps too successful in this one respect. He managed to create an intelligence service that was such a formidable threat that it caused envy and fear in the national army, which was, on the other hand, powerful enough to stage a successful coup against the government.

It is perhaps important to point out that while Obote was able to organise an effective system of cooperation with socialist countries in the military and security areas, he had no similar success in the civil sphere. Socialist countries including Czechoslovakia were incapable of providing Obote with the instant economic support

481 Kabwegyere, Politics, 211.
for his implementation of the ‘move to the left’ that would have made this reform programme feasible in such a short time. This situation can be illustrated once again by the case of Czechoslovak commitment in Uganda. While special cooperation between Uganda and the CSSR was going through a period of intense development, other spheres of cooperation lagged behind. Cooperation in the sphere of civil technical assistance remained marginal throughout 1960 except for a limited number of scholarships provided for a handful of Ugandan students. CS officials were aware that the main Foreign Trade Enterprise Polytechna, responsible for this cooperation, was unable to compete with the conditions of civil technical cooperation that Western, and even other socialist countries, were offering Uganda, but it lacked the financial resources, expert cadres and, after 1968, also the political will to do anything about it.

Civil technical assistance for Uganda thus lay on the periphery of CS interest and unlike the special cooperation, it did not provide the much needed support to an ever more unpopular Obote. At the same time, trade relations, after the period of stagnation, were enjoying a positive development, especially in 1968 and 1969. However, in no way could they aspire to substitute for the trade with the British should they be excluded from Uganda. Very limited successes were recorded in the sphere of cultural relations, but here also the activities of the CS MFA and various civil society organisations fell significantly short of the ambitious objectives sketched in the original Africa policy from 1961. It is clear that Czechoslovakia simply did not possess the economic and expert capacities to provide Obote with substantial support beyond the special sphere. Obote was most likely aware of the limited capabilities of socialist countries and this might be one of the explanations why he was not overly active in taking practical steps towards implementing his radical economic policies.

482 VUA MNO 1965, č.j. 38/3-8, 14, 20, 21.
483 In 1968 trade exchange reached more than 7 mil Kčs, in 1969 more than 9 mil Kčs, excluding special material.
484 MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 016/68, 22.11.1968, 10-11.
4.8. Special cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Uganda between 1967 and 1971

The period of 1967 to 1971 saw further cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Uganda in both the military and the security spheres. However, Czechoslovak military experts were not the only foreign military expert mission present in Uganda at this point. Various expert groups from capitalist and socialist countries included those from Israel, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China. While some of these countries delivered their assistance to Uganda on more favourable conditions, the CSSR benefitted from good personal relations with the Ugandan government and army officials, and the positive personal experience of Ugandan officials from their frequent visits to the CSSR.\textsuperscript{485} It was quite common for relations to be fostered in form of gifts to Ugandan officials with the aim of furthering cooperation between the two countries.\textsuperscript{486} At the same time it was however of the utmost importance for Czechoslovakia to maintain its image, which contrasted strongly with the powerfully manipulative influence of the superpowers and of Britain. It was Czechoslovakia's reputation as the non-ambitious, help-providing, socialist, friendly country that opened the door for years of flourishing cooperation. In this respect, the political position of the CSSR resembled that of Israel within the capitalist camp. Uganda retained close contacts and a working military cooperation with Israel despite denouncing Israel's conflict with Arab countries in 1967. Uganda defended its continuing cooperation with Israel on the basis of its own neutral foreign politics. Much the same explanation could be used to describe relations with Czechoslovakia.

Initial results of cooperation between the CSSR and Uganda in the special sphere proved mutually beneficial and, due to the prime state of relations between Obote and Czechoslovak officials, there were good prospects for extending it even further. For Czechoslovakia special military cooperation with Uganda was a welcome source of hard currency as Uganda was being charged for most of the assistance it received. At the same time, Czechoslovak politicians cherished good relations with Obote's administration, which was now officially leaning towards socialism as it was one of very few countries that posed the best prospects for the successful accomplishment of the ambitious

\textsuperscript{485} MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 0189/68, 1.2.1968, 1-4.
\textsuperscript{486} Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 216.
foreign political objectives of the CSSR as defined in their 1961 *Africa policy*. Maintaining and eventually developing this working relationship was still a priority despite the fact that previous Czechoslovak activism around Africa had been seriously reassessed by now. The CS MND emphasised the importance of involving the highest level of all participating state offices in this cooperation.

Pivotal for military cooperation in this period was the extension of the original Agreement 5252 by means of the new Contract 5253. The fact that the execution of Contract 5253 was to take place directly in Uganda brought the special military cooperation between the two countries to a whole new level. The mission of CS military experts in Uganda between 1967 and 1970 became the largest, the most ambitious and perhaps the most successful operation of its kind conducted by the CS military in East Africa during the Cold War. Specifics of the contract were once again discussed with Minister Onama in Uganda in May 1967. According to the original version of Contract 5253, CS experts were to arrive in Uganda in the spring of 1967; therefore, the course could commence at Gulu airport in June after the delivery of six L 29 planes was completed in May 1967.\textsuperscript{487} Due to the delay on the Ugandan part in preparing facilities for the course, another extension of training in the CSSR was mutually agreed upon. Ugandan cadets absolved another course in the CSSR in the summer of 1967 before they eventually moved back to Uganda.\textsuperscript{488} Repeated extensions of the original course proved lucrative for the CS MND.\textsuperscript{489}

During negotiations, the CS delegates were informed about the simultaneous disruption of the special cooperation between Uganda and Israel caused by conflict in the Middle East; it was hoped this would further increase the significance of Czechoslovak assistance for Uganda. On the other hand, from 1966-67 Czechoslovakia was facing unexpected competition from within the socialist bloc, namely from the Soviets themselves. The USSR provided Uganda with deliveries of special material for the Ugandan air force as well as other units and it did so gratis. This caused several negotiated deliveries of Czechoslovak weaponry to be cancelled because the Ugandan government naturally chose the Soviets over the Czechoslovaks who expected payments

\textsuperscript{488} VUA MNO 1967, č.j. 015112, 065695, 23.10.1967, 1.
\textsuperscript{489} VUA MNO 1967, č.j. G, H, 02041, 4.7.1967, 2. Summer course that took place in 1967 cost the Ugandan government 69 000 GBP.
for the provided material.\textsuperscript{490} For example, during another visit of Minister Onama and the high ranking officers of the Ugandan military in November 1967 the Ugandans declared interest in purchasing more special material from the CSSR, including six more L 29 aircraft. However, due to the competition posed by the Soviet air force experts and Soviet air force hardware, this transaction was never completed. This case illustrates that cooperation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia in providing support to progressive African regimes was, surprisingly, not as coordinated, collaborative and effective as it should have been.

The military mission of CS air force experts was finally agreed to arrive at Uganda in October 1967. Over the initially agreed period of eight months they were to achieve multiple aims. These mission objectives included the completion of training for operating L 29 aircraft, training Ugandan pilots in standard operational activity at the newly-built airfield, training pilots and technicians in the service maintenance of their aircraft and other material in the local environment, assisting the pilots to operate according to orders from their headquarters, contributing to building training facilities for the Ugandan air force, etc.\textsuperscript{491}

This well-established cooperation had to face serious practical constraints upon the arrival to Uganda (at Gulu airport) of a CS military expert group led by Colonel Hlad’o. The repeated delay in the commencement of the course, poor management of preparatory works before the arrival of the group and multiple errors on the part of the Ugandan Defence Ministry, as well as on the part of the CS MFT-HTS in respect of the provision of facilities and technical material more or less paralysed the operating schedule of Hlad’o’s group in the first weeks after their arrival.\textsuperscript{492} These initial troubles, however, did not affect the positive outcome of the mission, which was eventually extended until 1970 and was terminated only after the new wave of political persecution began in the CSSR after the Soviet invasion. The practical effect of project 5253 was much diminished by the Soviet invasion and by Obote’s later fall from power.

After 1968, the Ugandan Defence Ministry’s limited budget, competition from other countries and the disruption on the Czechoslovak side caused by the Soviet

\textsuperscript{490} Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 216.  
invasion, meant that only a handful of contracts were negotiated. The most important transaction of this period was the delivery of SKOT armoured vehicles at a cost of 330,000 GBP.\footnote{MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 0189/68, 1.2.1968, 2.} In connection with this transaction several groups of Ugandan soldiers were being trained in the CSSR in the use of armoured vehicles.\footnote{MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 016/68, 22.11.1968.} The transaction was provisionally suspended due to the Soviet invasion in 1968 as well, but due to its high profitability for the CS MND it was eventually resumed and completed.\footnote{VUA MNO 1969, č.j. 30/3/ K, J, 0158370, 8.10.1968, 1.}

In parallel to Czechoslovak-Ugandan military cooperation, security collaboration was also developing. The further development of security cooperation between 1967 and 1971 is difficult to reconstruct due to the absence of sufficient data. The activities of the StB Residency in Kampala remain for the greater part unknown, unlike those of Nairobi. There are neither any archival collections available of intelligence gathered by the Kampala Residency nor any database of the Active Measures it took. Existing documents indicate that such documents did once exist but that they were discarded. Bits and pieces of information on the Kampala Residency can be traced in the collections that cover special cooperation with Uganda and Ugandan students in the CSSR and several personal files such as that of Akena Adoko. Existing secondary literature also fails to provide enough information on the role of and importance of Adoko’s GSU in the later stages of Obote’s rule. Only the most general informations available on the GSU and on Czechoslovak cooperation with the GSU in this period.

In the years 1966 and 1967, Adoko remained in regular contact with StB operatives from the Kampala Residency, which was established around 1965 and operated probably until the summer of 1968. At a later stage he was also regularly contacted by officials from the Nairobi Residency, for whom watching the political development in Uganda became the prime objective after 1970 as by then all their activities in Kenya had been abandoned.\footnote{80958_012_1_2, Č.j A-00681/6, 1.} Adoko visited the CSSR on several occasions to check on the on-going training of several Ugandan students and also to receive regular ‘gifts’. In 1967, however, open criticism of StB operatives was expressed over
deteriorating collaboration with Adoko. Reports from the Kampala Resident throughout 1967 were becoming critical of the low effectiveness and poor organisation of Adoko’s intelligence. As Adoko moved up the political hierarchy of Uganda, cooperation with him was becoming problematic at times and he was not easy to control. The StB plan of using Ugandan counter-espionage for its own purposes had to be provisionally suspended.\textsuperscript{497} Adoko’s new politically influential position brought him regular contacts in the circles of Kenyan opposition politicians, as relations between Obote and Kenyatta were not good.\textsuperscript{498} StB operatives thus received an important channel of information on Kenyan internal political development which was especially valuable as the Residency in Nairobi was at this point largely immobilised. Adoko also remained useful as a direct channel to President Obote, but in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion the relevant Czechoslovak institutions were partially paralysed and hardly seemed to use this channel for their operational objectives. The post-invasion period was marked by a lack of determined CS activism in Uganda and the only projects which were being implemented were those already under way from earlier.

4.9. Obote’s fall from power – the army’s motivations for the coup d’etat

There is an expert analysis of the internal Ugandan political situation in 1970-71 available in the Czechoslovak archives which evaluates the stability of Obote’s regime. According to multiple situational reports from the Czechoslovak embassy in Kampala, Obote’s tight grip on Ugandan politics in this period was only made possible thanks to the power of the army and its loyalty to the Presidential office. The Ugandan army, in striking contrast to the situation in Kenya, had evolved into an organisation with a very strong position within the country’s political system and had also succeeded in removing British experts from its ranks.\textsuperscript{499} Through effective cooperation with other states, including Czechoslovakia, it had become a reasonably effective and impressive force that had to be taken into account not only in the security sphere but also as the decisive source of political legitimacy for the Ugandan government. However, with the

\textsuperscript{497} ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA. A-00 25/40-67, 24.10:1967, 2, l. 191.
\textsuperscript{498} ABS 11701_300_1_2, Č.jA. A-00 25/40-67, 22.4.1968, 1-2, l. 197-198.
\textsuperscript{499} ABS 11701_000_2_2, Č.jA. A-00 484/6-71, 9.2.1971, 7, l. 53.
growing public discontent over Uganda's development under Obote, the loyalty of the army was not as guaranteed and as it once had been and eventually it was the army itself that removed Obote from power. Over the years, several academic articles have discussed the army's motives for this step. An overview of the factors that contributed to the Ugandan army's coup is given below.

Between 1968 and 1971 issues were mounting within the Ugandan army but also in regards to relations between army and government and the GSU. In December 1969 Obote became a target of a failed assassination attempt. Five weeks later the deputy army commander Brigadier Okaya, Obote's man within the army, was assassinated and rumours of rising tensions between Obote and Amin began to spread. Some academics highlighted the possible link between the attempt on Obote's life and the governmental audit into army's spending, held shortly before the attempted assassination, which found gross mismanagement of army's funds and an extensive budget overspend for which army headquarters would be held accountable. It was also suggested that some of the army elites, who had become rich following the 1964 mutiny, might have resented the 'move to the left' Obote had announced. Even though this might not have necessarily been directly linked to the assassination attempt, it certainly contributed to the decline of Obote's popularity among these army elites.

Two more characteristics of the Ugandan army before the coup are highly relevant to this discussion. Most importantly the army was becoming increasingly split internally between two ethnic factions – the members of Acholi and Lango tribes loyal to Obote and the Nubi people loyal to Idi Amin. Most state institutions were dominated by Acholi and Lango people and Amin must have been aware of his weakening position with the influx of new army members from these tribes. It would be only natural if Obote had decided to replace Amin by someone from his own tribe. Given Amin's responsibility for the poor management of army finances, such a step could be easily explained without his being criticised for preferential treatment along ethnic lines. Some of the earliest analyses of the coup did indeed explain the course of action as being

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500 There is a CS aspect traceable in this affair as the assassination weapon proved to be a gun of CS origin. In the matter of finding the origin of the gun Adoko contacted StB operatives who afterwards travelled to Uganda to investigate.
503 Lofchie, "The Uganda Coup," 34.
Amin’s pre-emptive reaction to the rumours of his being held accountable for misappropriation of army funds.504

Last but not least, the growing tension between the GSU and the army should be mentioned as a likely contributing factor for the coup. ‘The largely secretive nature of the GSU greatly magnified the danger it seemed to represent to the army, and in the general atmosphere of the uncertainty which pervaded Uganda politics it became the subject of extraordinary rumours and speculation. The army’s fear of the GSU, like any fear of the unknown, was intensified by an inability to calculate the magnitude and potential significance of its budgetary rival.’505 The available StB analysis also identified the conflict, between Obote and Adoko on the one side and Amin and his fellow army colleague Oryema on the other, as the ultimate cause of the coup.506 It is noteworthy that once in power one of Amin’s first actions was the dissolution of the GSU.507

Some academics508 also tried to follow up the coup’s international links. However, no external involvement in Amin’s coup was ever proven despite the fact that Western countries in particular had numerous reasons for welcoming the ousting of Obote. In this respect the above mentioned StB analysis which identified the political and economic interests of Britain as a crucial contribution to the success of the coup, was, in all probability, wrong.509

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504 First, “Uganda,” p.132.
506 ABS 11701_000_2_2, Č.jA. A-00 484/6-71, 9.2.1971, 5, l. 51.
507 First, “Uganda,” 134.
509 ABS 11701_000_2_2, Č.jA. A-00 484/6-71, 9.2.1971, 6, l. 52.
5. Czechoslovakia and Tanzania between 1945 and 1968

5.1. Introductory and methodology section

Tanzania represents the third and last case study amongst the East African countries that concern this thesis. In this section, the specifics of Czechoslovak-Tanzanian relations are presented as they evolved from 1960 to approximately 1970. The period analysed is for obvious reasons the same as in the previous two case studies but while in the case of Kenya and Uganda the phase virtually corresponds to the era of most intense and most frequent relations with Czechoslovakia, this is not exactly the case for Tanzania. In many respects the 1960s period in relations between Czechoslovakia and Tanzania can be better interpreted as the preliminary stage of mutual cooperation. For various reasons, cooperation between the two partners did not fully evolve during the 1960s and it reached its climax with significant delay compared to the other two East African cases between 1975 and early 1980s. Having said this, it should be pointed out that even then this climax never actually came near to fulfilling the high hopes and ambitions of politicians from both states in the early 1960s, nor the real economic and political potential. Why cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Tanzania failed to fully evolve during the 1960s is one of the major questions addressed in this chapter.

This chapter's main concern is, meanwhile, related to other questions, similar to the previously discussed case studies of Kenya and Uganda. What were the main forms and spheres of cooperation that evolved between Tanzania and Czechoslovakia during the 1960s, what were the political and economic aspirations and objectives with which politicians on both sides engaged in cooperation, to what extent did these objectives materialise in this period, and if they failed, why? Answers to these questions are then compared to the previously discussed case studies in order to identify any possible pattern or correlation. Were the most prominent forms of relations the same as in the case of Kenya and Uganda? Were they executed successfully? What were the decisive determinants for the success or failure in execution of these forms of cooperation? Answers to these questions should allow for a satisfactory conclusion to be drawn on the basis of the comparative analysis.
The nature and the characteristics of CS-Tanzanian relations bore many similarities with, but, as will be shown, also striking differences to Uganda and Kenya. Active cooperation during the Cold War between Czechoslovakia and Tanzania lasted longest of the three and it was to a large extent spared any radical turbulence or the political changes that would motivate a period of intense activity, followed by a period of reduced contact, as was the case with Kenya and Uganda. The political stability and continuity of Nyerere's regime from 1961 till the end of the Cold War did, indeed, suffer some highs and lows, but none of them were far-reaching enough to mean an end to relations between the CSSR and Tanzania. There were certainly some events that resulted in a temporary decrease in activity by one partner or the other, but never for a prolonged period or to a critical extent. Twists and turns of political or economic cooperation came about, for example, in the aftermath of the Zanzibar revolution and the Tanganyikan army mutiny or in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The case study of Tanzanian-Czechoslovak relations is presented in slightly different way from the previous two as more room is devoted to the context of the internal as well the external political development of Tanzania. The reason for this is that during the 1960s it was mainly the Tanzanian determinants that decided whether or not the greater cooperation with Czechoslovakia would be sought. To understand these determinants properly, a more thorough inspection of them is needed. In effect, Czechoslovak activities in Tanzania are presented within the narrative of major events that marked internal political development as well as the formation of Tanzania’s foreign policy.

It should perhaps also be mentioned at this juncture that the text in this chapter is organised somewhat differently from that in the previous two case studies. While, in the Kenya and Uganda case studies, the core of the text focusses on two of the most important spheres of relations typical of cooperation between the CSSR and Kenya or Uganda, here no such preferential sphere of relations crystallised during the period under analysis. Therefore the findings and available data presented in this chapter more evenly address political and diplomatic relations, special cooperation, civil technical assistance and an attempt to develop cultural and civil organisation relations between the two countries.

Tanzania’s political development was for the decades to a great extent defined by the actions and ideas of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, his political project of TANU and the
building of African socialism. His significance for Tanzania’s political development was
decisive, and this was also the case for Czechoslovak-Tanzanian cooperation. In
interviews, Nyerere’s close collaborators all emphasised the decisive role that Nyerere
played, not only in internal affairs but also in forming Tanzania’s foreign political
orientation. It is apparent from the available sources that Nyerere, as was not unusual
among charismatic nationalist African leaders at this time, based his decisive foreign
policy on very personal motivations and preferences, which were thus formative for the
external relations of the whole nation.

Lastly, an important topic touched upon in this chapter is the role and position
of Dar es Salaam for the regional national liberation movements. It would certainly not
be unreasonable to say that Czechoslovak relations with the NLMs located in Dar es
Salaam were as important as those with the Tanzanian government, and the importance
of the diplomatic office in Dar also has to be considered in the light of its contacts with
these NLMs.

The methodology in preparing this chapter does not differ significantly from the
other case studies. The most important sources of data were, once again, various CS
archive collections. However, due to the specific nature of relations between the CSSR
and Tanzania, and due to the fact that mutual cooperation peaked slightly later than the
period discussed here, the data collected in the Czechoslovak archives from this period
is not as abundant as those for after 1970. Nevertheless, the documents still represent
an invaluable source of information especially concerning the underlying political
motivations and objectives of Czechoslovak officials seeking cooperation with Tanzania.
And even more so, when it comes to unravelling how President Nyerere’s status in
Prague and Moscow fluctuated because of his foreign policy. The archival records are
also invaluable when it comes to assessing Czechoslovak support to various NLMs via
the office in Dar es Salaam.

As in the previous cases, during the field data collection I travelled to the
country in question in order to conduct interviews with persons who had directly
participated in different kinds of relations between the CSSR and Tanzania. The number
of suitable and available interviewees proved rather limited, but three of my Tanzanian
interviews were with perhaps the best qualified persons that there are on this topic. I
was able to speak to Dr Hassy Kitine, former Head of Intelligence and a Member of
Tanzania’s Parliament, Sir George Kahama, former Tanzanian Minister and one of the
closest political colleagues of Mwalimu Nyerere, and Mzee Joseph Butiku, head of the Nyerere Foundation and Mwalimu’s personal friend. As the core of relations between Tanzania and CS lay in the political and ideological sphere, most of my questions targeted these topics. When writing on the Tanzanian political development after independence, one has to devote a great deal of attention to the personality of Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanzania, who left the largest imprint on the modern history of Tanzania, and whose ideological preferences determined the political orientation of Tanzania in the first three decades after independence.

My discussion with Sir George Kahama was an invaluable source of information regarding Mwalimu Nyerere’s political goals, motivations and opinions, all of which shaped Tanzania’s political course. Information from Sir George helped to explain some of the decisions determining Tanzania’s foreign political orientation, part of which was cooperation with the CSSR. Discussion with Mzee Butiku was yet another vital source of information that complemented the images of Nyerere and TANU provided by the secondary literature. This interview helped to explain how some of the crucial political and economic issues including Nyerere’s ever-evolving allegiance to socialist countries, and his devotion to the project of ujamaa and the non-aligned movement were perceived and dealt with by the TANU political leadership and Nyerere himself. Security and internal political issues, and the effects that cooperation with socialist countries had on them, were the main issues addressed in my interview with Dr Hassy Kitine.

In addition to these interviews collected in Tanzania, another interview conducted in Slovakia proved valuable. Mr Eduard Kukan, former Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former attaché to the Czechoslovak Lusaka embassy between 1966 and 1970 provided me with information on the organisation and the activities of Czechoslovak diplomatic offices in this region during the late 1960s period. This information was particularly useful for assessing the role and the significance of the Czechoslovak Dar es Salaam embassy in its mission to support the southern African national liberation movements of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and others.

The secondary literature was also of the prime importance to this chapter, as it provided me with the necessary background information on the political development in Tanzania before and after independence, on the personality of President Nyerere and on the principles as well as the execution of Tanzania’s foreign policy, including topics such as Nyerere’s role in the non-aligned movement and Tanzania’s cooperation with China.
All of the crucial topics of Tanzanian domestic and foreign political development presented in this chapter could only be understood and sketched out correctly thanks to the abundant secondary literature sources. This is particularly true in case of topics such as the Zanzibar revolution, the mutiny of Tanganyika’s army, the *ujamaa* project or the development of Tanzanian foreign policy.

5.2. **TANU and Nyerere before independence**

Tanganyika and later Tanzania from the early 1960s became another East African country closely eyed by Czechoslovak foreign policy drafters in their outline of political objectives within the *Africa policy* formulated in 1961. In the early 1960s Tanganyika bore some similarities to Uganda and Kenya, but due to its different political and economic development since World War I, some characteristics made its cooperation with Czechoslovakia in many ways unique. Tanganyika’s political development after World War II was very much shaped and driven by the political activities of its main nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and by its leader, Julius Nyerere.

Tanganyika, once one of three German African colonies, had been ruled by the British as a mandated territory of the League of Nations since the end of World War I. After World War II, the original international mandate of the League was replaced by the newly introduced Trust of the United Nations. The fact that British control over the territory was not as exclusive and strong as in the case of other East African colonies allowed Tanganyika to enjoy, between the wars only very mild economic development, which stepped up only with the beginning of the Second World War and intensified after 1945. This economic setting had a two-stage effect – initially it held back societal processes, such as the growth of labour force, higher village-to-town mobility and trade unionism that some other African territories were going through at the time, only to experience sudden and very steep growth of all these processes once the economy’s growth boosted after 1945.510

As elsewhere in the British African colonial empire, the acceleration in economic growth after the Second World War was accompanied by growing political activism of the local African population. In the case of Tanganyika this activism was at first mainly linked to trade unionism of the growing labour force. Trade unionism in many African colonies represented the first vital and often for a long time the only opportunity for future nationalist leaders to learn the political activism that later naturally evolved into more sophisticated forms of political organisation. Trade unionism in Tanganyika was originally introduced and managed by the British administration who faced several strikes after WWII. In the first years after they were founded in 1947 the unions helped in several cases to mediate the demands of the African workers to their companies’ leaders, but these first unions also turned out to be structurally weak. Trade unions established themselves as more stable and more powerful organisations around 1954-55 after the first modern nationalist party TANU was formed. In this period numerous small Tanganyikan unions enjoyed boosted membership but the whole movement was still rather fragmented and lacked united leadership. This changed in 1956 when the united and centralised Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) was formed. The first large test of its power and determination was the Dar es Salaam general strike in late 1956, the result of which was the establishment of a minimum wage in Dar es Salaam. Hereafter, the unions enjoyed growing popularity and political power. 511

From 1954 onwards, in parallel to trade unionism, Tanganyika saw the ascent of an organised nationalist movement led by TANU. TANU was, from the very beginning, the political project of its founding father Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who used it as a vehicle to reach political goals, some of which might better be regarded as political utopias. Nyerere very quickly established himself not only as a leading African politician of Tanganyika but also as one of the most charismatic and inspiring anti-colonial leaders of the Third World. Some of Nyerere’s political concepts, such as devotion to pan-Africanism or to non-alignment, earned him widespread popularity across Africa and Asia and some of his political achievements represent true success for his unique political project. Unfortunately for Tanzania, most of his economic concepts, in later stages, proved grossly inadequate or downright harmful for Tanzanian citizens.

Very soon after TANU was established, it attracted a massive influx of members. In the first two years TANU claimed to have over 100,000 members and continued to

511 Friedland, “Co-operation,” 68.
grow substantially until the end of the decade. TANU became one of Africa’s first mass parties and as such could benefit from a strong position while negotiating with the British for independence. Britain hoped to limit the TANU’s growing power before the first national elections of 1958 but TANU emerged from this poll victorious despite the strange ethnic tripartite voting system applied by the colonial administration. After the victory TANU became the main political partner for British governor Richard Turnbull in arranging the Tanganyika’s move to independence. Towards the end of the decade several more political parties emerged in Tanganyika, including the British-sponsored United Tanganyika Party (UTP) founded in 1956, the African National Congress (ANC) in 1958 and the All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT) in 1959 formed by former members of TANU. None of these parties had any particular success in limiting TANU’s dominant position in the country around 1960.

The fundamental principle of TANU’s political programme was to lead Tanganyika towards full independence. However, Nyerere’s political ambition went beyond this single objective. Quite early in his political career Mwalimu began to stress the principles of pan-Africanism, regional cooperation and later also the foreign policy of non-alignment. He was also fully devoted to his, ultimately very successful, project of building Tanganyikan, later Tanzanian, nationhood. Nyerere and TANU vehemently supported universal compulsory primary education and the promotion of Kiswahili in schools from the very beginning. For Tanganyika’s population the spread of Kiswahili, which quickly established itself as the lingua franca, represented a vital unifying basis for the new sense of nationhood that Nyerere hoped to foster. It helped to unify an otherwise incredibly ethnically fragmented population that had been made a single one state entity imposed thanks to rivalry between European colonial empires. Before the wide spread of Kiswahili ‘Tanganyika did not share a common language, culture or religion on which to base the creation of a shared national identity. What they did share was subjugation to foreign rule and a common enemy.’ Nyerere and TANU proved more than able to capitalise on this fact and in a very short time the project of building national identity proved strikingly successful. The success of Tanganyikan/Tanzanian nationhood-building stood in sharp contrast to Kenya where the division along ethnic lines remained a source of political frustration for decades to come, and in contrast

513 Aminzade, Race, 64.
partially also to Uganda where the ethnic rivalries within the country’s military contributed to the demise of the state. Nyerere’s accomplishment also stood out globally, as only ‘a few political leaders of low-income societies have succeeded in countering the problems posed by ethnic diversity by superimposing a constructed national identity.’\textsuperscript{514}

While most of these core political principles of Nyerere’s gained him popularity at home and abroad, they were at the same time the source of some opposition at home or certainly within his own party. It was for example the vision of the political project of an East-African Federation, to which Nyerere was personally devoted from the very beginning of his political career\textsuperscript{515}, that caused the first major rift between the TANU and the TFL\textsuperscript{516} which then worsened and later caused much political tension between 1961 and 1964. Nyerere’s eagerness to pursue regional cooperation threatened to postpone Tanganyikan independence. For this reason Nyerere faced much criticism and his position was further harmed by his being in close contact around 1960 with the British colonial administration negotiating the country’s future, which compromised his reputation among the most radical segments of the population.

Between 1955 and 1960 both leading political organisations (TANU and TFL) co-existed and to a lesser extent also cooperated towards a shared vision of an independent Tanganyika. TANU sympathised with TFL strike activities and on several occasions used its connections to support the TFL against possible opposition. At later stages, however, internal disputes within the TFL endangered cooperation with TANU, and the growing anti-British radicalism of some union leaders also collided with Nyerere’s political leadership of TANU.\textsuperscript{517} Cooperation between TFL and TANU in the initial period was natural as they both shared the common enemy – the British colonial administration. However, TANU progressively switched from political opposition to the establishment role replacing the British, and the clash with the TFL thus became inevitable, as it was now TANU’s administration facing all TFL demands.\textsuperscript{518}

In 1960 TANU as the election winner formed the first African Tanganyikan government. One of the members of the cabinet was Rashidi Kawawa, former leader of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[515] Aminzade, Race, 62.
\item[516] Friedland, “Co-operation,” 74.
\item[517] Friedland, “Co-operation,” 74-76.
\item[518] Friedland, “Co-operation,” 94-96.
\end{footnotes}
the TFL and subsequently one of Mwalimu’s most loyal collaborators. Another leading TANU personality in this formative period of independence was Oscar Kambona, often regarded as the leader of the socialist wing within TANU. It was Kambona who opened the lines of communication between TANU and socialist countries and he was particularly active in establishing relations with Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak officials, especially in the first years of mutual cooperation, were very fond of Kambona, especially as Nyerere was hesitating to declare for the socialist cause.\textsuperscript{519}

From the outset the TANU cabinet faced pressure from union leaders to grant their members various benefits. Cabinet however had to deal with Tanganyika’s significant structural weaknesses linked mainly to the lack of trained bureaucratic staff and educated personnel to replace British civil servants and technical experts in various spheres – the economy, trade, education, the military etc. One of the TFL priorities was the rapid Africanisation of all aspects of the economy and state institutions, but it hit these limits, and contributed to the TFL-TANU dispute\textsuperscript{520}. The TFL did not subsequently restrain itself from openly criticising the government, which ultimately led to conflict between the former collaborators.

5.3. \textbf{Establishing first contacts with socialist Czechoslovakia}

Almost from the very beginning relations between Tanganyika, and later Tanzania, with the CSSR were between two sovereign states as no substantial cooperation had had time and space to evolve before Tanganyika received independence. By 1960 Tanganyika of all three East African states was the most firmly set on the path to independence as Britain failed to introduce any effective institutional obstacles to slow this process down or to create a strong political alternative to TANU and Nyerere. Its wide popular support gave TANU such a strong political position that, in comparison to KANU and partially also to the UPC, it was not in desperate need of external support, either political or technical or financial, to reach independence. Therefore in this pre-independence stage relations between the CSSR and TANU lacked

\textsuperscript{519} Eg. MZV F IV/5, č.j. 077/63, 22.6.1963, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{520} Friedland, “Co-operation,” 80-81.
the motivation that propelled cooperation with the national liberation movements of Kenya or Uganda.

The initial contact between TANU officials and Czechoslovak representatives did indeed take place several months before independence in 1961, by which time TANU was in the position of effectively ruling Tanganyika. Therefore the entry point for developing working relations between the CSSR and Nyerere was notably different from that of previous case studies, when Czechoslovakia could benefit at later stages politically, even though in Kenya’s case for only a limited time, from its support to successful NLM missions prior to independence. This fact might seem marginal, but it turns out to be significant when evaluating nature and causality of political relations between Nyerere’s government and Czechoslovakia in the later period of the 1960s.

When TANU approached the CS government, it was for different reasons and from a very different position from those of KANU and the UPC. In July 1961 Oscar Kambona, General Secretary of TANU, visited the CSSR during his planned foreign trip to socialist countries. Unlike in the cases of UPC and KANU already mentioned, TANU’s delegation did not request any particular assistance before independence as its negotiations with the British were already quite advanced, and the declaration of independence planned for later in 1961 was doubted by nobody. The concern of TANU was rather to seek the prospect of political and economic cooperation for after independence, to be further discussed by another delegation in the autumn of 1961.

Kambona’s trip to socialist countries and particularly to Czechoslovakia had a dual objective. Firstly, it was an important initial phase of Tanganyika’s foreign policy intended by TANU and especially by Nyerere himself to be based on balanced relations with all countries. Secondly, a proclaimed desire to cooperate with Czechoslovakia after independence was part of Nyerere’s strategy before further negotiations with Britain took place. Exerting pressure on Britain by ostentatiously advertising the possibility of cooperation with socialist-camp countries was effectively the same as the strategy employed by Kenyatta and Odinga who demonstratively held parallel meetings with Czechoslovak officials during the Lancaster House talks in 1962. Kambona disclosed this plan to CS officials during their talks. ‘Kambona indicated that should this trip take place before the Tanganyikan declaration of independence, the British government would be

shocked by this fact. [...] On the side of Nyerere and the TANU leadership it is a planned move which is to be used in order to attain other concessions from the British government during negotiations about economic help to Tanganyika.Čzechoslovak officials approved of this strategy and recommended the planned visit be carried out.

The previous paragraph, and especially the recorded words of the TANU delegate, clearly indicate the significance that even the most basic political contacts with socialist countries, including the CSSR, might have had on the position of national liberation movements and their attitudes towards colonialists even at this late stage of the decolonising processes. Nyerere’s strategy was in no way unique, but Kambona’s openness about their intentions is somewhat unusual.

It is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to measure how much the negotiating position of Tanganyika improved by applying such a strategy and whether any British concessions were a direct result. It is however perfectly clear that by making himself open for cooperation Nyerere made Tanganyika much more attractive for the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia. More importantly, Nyerere’s strategy was successful in another respect and that was in ensuring substantial aid from the West, mainly from Britain but also from the USA or West Germany. The fact that the quality and intensity of Tanzania’s relations with Czechoslovakia as well as other socialist countries in the period of 1961 to 1964 remained very low indicates that the purpose of this initiative was really to attract more western support rather than to seek full-blown cooperation with the Soviet bloc. It took Czechoslovak policy-makers some time to realise this.

5.4. Political development in Tanganyika between 1961 and 1964

On December 9 1961 Tanganyika finally received independence and the country proclaimed itself a republic, in order to break most of its institutional ties to the United Kingdom.Č Prior to independence Tanganyika had become restless and the population’s frustrations occasionally erupted on a limited scale. Local outbursts of violence were not unheard of, but more indicative of the internal tensions prior to

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523 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 0225/61, 3.7.1961.
independence were strikes and other labour actions organised by the TFL. Segments of the population were frustrated about the dominant position of the Asian community in the country's economy, low levels of participation of Africans in both economy and the state, and the continuing presence of British nationals in state service. Radical trade union leaders, as with the *African National Congress* party and even some members of TANU, were quite responsive to these popular complaints and did not always refrain from stirring up feelings of unrest.525 This caused some serious worries about potential violence against foreigners and ethnic minorities after independence. Nyerere used all his political authority and wide-spread popularity to prevent such a development; this proved successful.

Any imminent risk of violence was prevented by Nyerere's activism and by the swift arrival of independence, but it was this sudden, abrupt and even surprising granting of *Uhuru* that was at the same time a source of many governmental issues in the first years of independence for Tanganyika. 'The relative ease and rapidity with which Tanganyika obtained independence meant that the party leading the independence struggle never developed the cohesiveness and organizational discipline that a more violent, revolutionary path to independence might have created. The absence of rigid mechanisms of internal party discipline meant that divisions within the ranks of the party that took over the government in late 1961 were a persistent feature of early post-independence politics.'526

Nyerere was aware of a structural weakness in TANU that existed despite its receiving a dominant mandate by popular vote and he decided to take several measures to strengthen the party's position. Worsening rivalry with the TFL, as mentioned above, and some internal opposition within the party motivated Nyerere's decision temporarily to resign as Prime Minister in 1962 in order to restructure the organisational system of TANU and to prepare the change in Tanganyika's political system. TANU's reform was successfully accomplished by actively working and communicating with the grass root branches around the country. Nyerere's work in reforming TANU and establishing a working hierarchical organisation of the party proved immensely important in January

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526 Aminzade, *Race*, 75.
1964 when the army mutinied and a plot against the government was mounted. At this critical moment TANU remained unanimously loyal to Nyerere.527

Radicals from the ANC and from TANU clashed with Nyerere particularly on the topic of rapid Africanisation, which to them meant preferential treatment for black Africans while holding back white and Asian Tanganyikans. Nyerere did not share this view, preferring the concept of localisation which favoured all Tanganyika’s citizens regardless of skin colour. Nyerere eventually had to make some concessions to the radicals, when, at his 1962 resignation, he allowed Rashidi Kawawa, loyal interim Prime Minister, to speed up the process of Africanisation of high-ranking state service positions.528 Nevertheless in the long term Nyerere was successful in maintaining the characteristics and the image of Tanganyika as a non-racial egalitarian state, which went down well with Western states, including the USA, which subsequently became generous donors for Tanganyika. On the other hand, socialist countries would have welcomed more radical and speedier Africanisation, because it would have made more opportunities and created more demand for their technical support and at the same time would have had an adverse effect on the position of Western states in Tanganyika.

In the first years after independence both the ANC and the TFL began increasingly to define themselves most of all as anti-Nyerere in all respects. It was therefore only logical that ANC leaders should decide to seek international support by establishing contacts with socialist-camp countries, particularly with China,529 in order to strengthen their political position at home. The ANC however did not have either the time or the means to develop substantial cooperation with China and a few years later it was indeed Nyerere who took over ANC activism in relations with the socialist camp and particularly to China. Overall, in the period right after independence, Nyerere’s readiness to cooperate with the British and his universally inclusive domestic policies won him the reputation of a neo-colonialist, pro-Western puppet among his political rivals at home and this also prompted serious doubts as to his suitability as a political partner among socialist countries including Czechoslovakia.

Nyerere used his temporary retreat from the PM’s office not only to reconstruct TANU but to prepare the policies which were to consolidate his grip on political power in the country. At Nyerere’s request Tanganyika’s legislative approved far-reaching

528 Aminzade, Race, 84.
529 Aminzade, Race, 80-82.
changes to the country's political system by introducing the presidential system.\textsuperscript{530} Nyerere naturally acquired the post of Tanganyika's first President. Several laws intended to limit the rights and powers of the TFL were introduced as a further consolidation measure for Nyerere's administration.\textsuperscript{531} This move obviously met with much resentment by the trade unionists who intensified their criticism of the government during the army mutiny. For their part in plotting against the government during the mutiny several union leaders were arrested and the TFL was dissolved. In order to eradicate all opposition from the trade unions, the government formed a new body designed to represent workers – the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA). The government had much better control of this organisation, appointing its leadership; this move proved effective in limiting the political ambitions of the labour movement.\textsuperscript{532}

5.5. **Tanzania's foreign policy after independence**

At the beginning of the 1960s Czechoslovak officials saw Tanganyika as the most promising destination\textsuperscript{533} for the export of socialism to East Africa. Such an optimistic view of Tanganyika was most likely derived from initially promising contacts with Oscar Kambona. The CSSR at this point felt Nyerere was an important political partner and this attitude was soon reflected in practical diplomatic steps, the first of which was the Czechoslovak delegation visit at the declaration of independence in December 1961. This opportunity was used to officially establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. More practical political and diplomatic steps followed the next year, such as the first inter-governmental talks and the establishment of a CS embassy in Dar.

Archival documents illustrate how high and how quickly Czechoslovak hopes rose in regard to Nyerere's willingness to cooperate, as declared in 1961. However, in the period after independence CS officials' high expectations quickly clashed with political reality. Nyerere's foreign policy was not leaning at all towards the socialist

\textsuperscript{530} Nye, “TANU and UPC,” 237.
\textsuperscript{531} Nye, “TANU and UPC,” 240.
\textsuperscript{532} Friedland, “Co-operation,” 93-96.
\textsuperscript{533} MZV F IV/5, kt.1, 2, č.j. 0225/61, 1-5.
camp and the British position had remained reasonably strong even after the 1961 independence. This is why MFA analysts paid great attention to the growth of anti-Nyerere radicalism inside and outside of TANU. In this period it was Oscar Kambona, not Julius Nyerere, who was considered the vital figure within TANU for developing higher intensity cooperation with the CSSR. Nevertheless, Mwalimu Nyerere’s foreign political priorities did not lie in relations with socialist countries, but rather in the non-aligned movement, pan-Africanism, and in maintaining close collaboration with Britain.

It is important to understand that Nyerere’s later tendencies towards socialism and the socialist camp were nowhere as clear and as definite in the time of Tanganyika’s independence. At independence Nyerere had no ideological aspirations to introduce any kind of Marxist or even socialist policies to Tanganyika. In reality he faced some of the strongest intraparty opposition by members calling for socialist policies, (including Mwalimu’s own brother Joseph) and who were therefore labelled as Communist. In 1962, while consolidating his power within TANU, Nyerere expelled a number of such members from the party. This move illustrates Nyerere’s political preferences soon after independence and this must be acknowledged when attempting to explain why Nyerere’s political leaning towards socialist countries was initially much slower than Czechoslovak policy-makers had hoped and expected. It was very much Nyerere’s personal reluctance to commit to close cooperation with socialist countries that stood in the way of faster and more intensive cooperation between Tanganyika and Czechoslovakia in the first years after independence.

Nyerere was initially open to cooperation with socialist countries only to a limited extent, because it was very important for Tanganyika after independence to retain the vital channels of cooperation with the British. The future arrangement of relations with the former colonial power became the source of an ideological rift within TANU when the more radical youth movement members demanded Tanganyika leave the Commonwealth. Nyerere, however, advocated retaining membership, though under very specific conditions, and he used all his political sway to repel domestic opposition inside and outside of the party. Radical rupture of all links with Britain would have been disastrous for Tanganyika’s economy, as Nyerere was aware.

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534 Assensoh, African, 132.
535 Aminzade, Race, 92.
536 Aminzade, Race, 85.
537 Aminzade, Race, 75-77.
In the first post-independence years maintaining relations with Britain and the West was not only an economic necessity and a politically sound decision, but it was realistically the only feasible option to ensure Tanganyika's immediate survival and possible development. Had existing ties with Britain and other Western countries been torn, the country's economy as well as the state apparatus would have collapsed. ‘In 1961 approximately 80% of her total trade was with the sterling area, the EEC and the United States, 85% of her development revenue came from British loans and grants and only one-quarter of the senior and middle-grade posts in the civil service were held by the country's own citizens.’\textsuperscript{538} The imperative of economic development put the government in dire need of donors and in this period most would be Western countries, first and foremost the United Kingdom itself. Between 1961 and 1964, therefore, relations with the West and particularly with Britain, though criticised by some, remained intact.

5.5.1. \textit{Nyerere and pan-Africanism}

From the outset Nyerere was one of the leading pan-Africanists and he saw the movement as a viable and highly desirable route for the continent's political development. However, he soon became disillusioned by the slow progress that African leaders were achieving here and he became increasingly doubtful as to their sincerity. At the 1964 summit of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) in Cairo he was, for example, very critical of Nkrumah's Ghana, stating, ‘We [African statesmen] are divided between those who genuinely want continental government and patiently work for its development, and those who use the phrase ‘Union government’ for the purpose of propaganda. [...]Some people are willing to use their great talent to wreck any chance of unity on our continent, as long as some stupid historian can record that they wanted unity when nobody else did.’

The vision of establishing effective continental government was only one dimension of the pan-African movement in the 1960s. Another, perhaps even more significant for its immediate political impact, was the on-going mission to support the remaining national liberation movements of those African nations who were latecomers to the decolonising struggle. Virtually all influential nationalist African leaders such as

Sékou Touré or Kwame Nkrumah, who achieved political sovereignty for their states, were devoted to this objective. Nyerere’s long period in power was an important prerequisite in this respect for the real positive impact, as was the fact that Tanzania was very close to the region where most of these NLMs were based.

Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s Nyerere became perhaps the most outspoken advocate for freedom fighters of the whole southern African region. Nyerere’s dedication to this cause was reflected in the very substantial help provided by Tanzania to African freedom fighters in late 1960s and 1970s. Both Nyerere and Kambona were very much behind the OAU motion to establish the African Liberation Committee that was to operate from Dar es Salaam.\textsuperscript{539} In this period Tanzania’s capital, together with fellow socialist Kenneth Kaunda’s Lusaka, became a foreign headquarters for freedom fighters mainly from Mozambique, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; Nyerere himself had close personal relations with most of the freedom fighters’ leaders.\textsuperscript{540} Nyerere’s government created favourable conditions in Dar es Salaam, as well as across the Tanzanian countryside, for practical cooperation between NLMs and their international supporters, mainly from socialist countries, to take place, which became another source of concern for West.\textsuperscript{541}

5.5.2. Tanzania and the non-aligned movement

After receiving independence Tanzania very much identified itself with the bloc of Afro-Asian states as well as with the wider movement of non-aligned states. In my interviews, members of the former Tanzanian political leadership, fully in line with Nyerere, all voiced pride in the Tanzanian role within the non-aligned movement, and they emphasised the importance of political partnership with leaders such as Tito, Indira Gandhi, Nehru, Nasser and others. Nyerere was devoted to the project of a non-aligned movement, especially at a later stage so as not to keep Tanzania from receiving economic and technical help from both rival blocks. Even though Tanzania was economically weak, it became one of the most influential members of this third Cold War

\textsuperscript{539} Tordoff, “Politics in Tanzania,” 358.
camp, mainly due to the outspoken zeal of President Nyerere in working for its common cause.

The non-aligned movement was attractive for Tanzania for several reasons. Over the years, even at the time of the introduction of radical policies defined by the Arusha declaration, Nyerere repeatedly expressed his wish to maintain friendly relations with all countries and reserved right to choose to cooperate and receive assistance from anybody; this he did quite successfully.\textsuperscript{542} The non-aligned movement was the ideal platform to seek such relations. Countries loosely united in this group cooperated effectively in the UN and other international organisations. Through political partnership and close cooperation their ideological and political stance carried a comparatively greater weight than if they had acted separately. This was apparent especially in the case of Tanzania increasing its international influence considerably through membership of the non-aligned movement.

Secondly, its declared neutrality and active participation in the non-aligned movement made Tanzania immune to a certain extent in this period to Cold War rivalry. Tanzanian officials I interviewed unanimously perceived the non-aligned movement as crucial protection from the much more invasive superpowers’ interference in Tanzanian politics. This became apparent especially at the time of increased tensions after the Zanzibar uprising, when both camps very closely observed the course of revolutionary events, and the active intervention of a foreign power was not being completely ruled out.\textsuperscript{543}

Thirdly, especially in the later period, relations with some of the partner countries from the non-aligned movement became the source of much welcome trade activity that helped Tanzania’s struggling economy. In this respect, perhaps the most valued were the relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia, the source of substantial trade exchange but also a provider of development aid to Tanzania.\textsuperscript{544} It was not a coincidence, rather a conscious gesture of Tanganyika’s position in the bipolar world, that Nyerere chose to travel to Yugoslavia just before independence for one of his first official visits as the Head of State.\textsuperscript{545}

\textsuperscript{542} Hoskyns, “Africa’s Foreign Relations,” 456-457.
\textsuperscript{544} Sir George Kahama, interview with the author, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 30 June, 2011.
\textsuperscript{545} Bjerk, “Nyerere,” 322.
5.6. Czechoslovak activities in Tanganyika between 1961 and 1964

Pan-Africanism, the non-aligned movement, and close collaboration with Britain were characteristic for Tanganyika’s foreign policy in this period. Meanwhile, Czechoslovak policy-makers struggled with ineffective attempts to initiate a working relationship with Tanganyika and to establish an influential position similar to the ones they had in Uganda or Kenya. Absence of any history of effective cooperation before independence was making this task more difficult in comparison to Kenya or Uganda. Also, given that establishing a working partnership with Tanganyika was a higher priority than cooperation with Obote’s Uganda had initially been, and that many more personnel were assigned to this task, it is surprising how little was accomplished in this period. Tanganyika was not completely oblivious to Czechoslovak attempts and contacts of high-ranking cabinet officials were not uncommon, but with limited results. For various reasons these contacts failed to transform into intense and effective cooperation.

One important factor preventing more effective cooperation was Czechoslovakia’s position as prime Soviet ally. Even though Nyerere was quite open to seeking relations with any country, close cooperation with the Soviet Union was very low on the list of Nyerere’s foreign political priorities prior to 1965. Nyerere was on occasion quite critical of the Soviets, as for example in 1963, when he criticised unspecified, but clearly implied, rich socialist countries that were using their wealth for acquiring political power and prestige. It was very much this personal reluctance of Nyerere’s to engage into close cooperation with the Soviets and their loyal satellites that stood in the way of more rapid and more intensive cooperation between Tanganyika and Czechoslovakia in the first years after independence. Nyerere’s continued reservation towards the Soviet Union certainly cast a shadow over Czechoslovak activities in Tanganyika, but it was most of all the inability of Czechoslovakia to support Tanganyika’s economic development effectively that should be blamed for their failure to achieve the 1961 Africa policy objectives. Czechoslovak officials were aware of Nyerere’s reservations, and therefore they tried to get round this situation by maintaining frequent contacts with other Tanganyikan politicians, mainly with Oscar

546 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 551/7, Feb 1963, 1-3.
Kambona, who played a similar role to that of Oginga Odinga in Czechoslovak contacts with Kenya.

Political relations between the CSSR and Tanzania continued to develop immediately after independence. The CS MFA opened their embassy in Dar es Salaam a few months after Tanganyikan independence was declared. The embassy very quickly became the main point of contact with Tanganyikan officials and it mediated all communication on cooperation issues between the countries. The embassy in Dar was very active in organising the visits and cooperation of various professional, cultural and civil society organisations including unions, agricultural co-operatives, women's groups and youth organisations. Contacts with these civil organisations became much more common and much richer in comparison to activities in this field in Kenya or Uganda. The shortcomings of technical and economic cooperation were being covered up by exaggerated reports of success in these other forms of relations and the embassy in Dar was responsible for much activism in this field. The opening of a trade office at the Dar es Salaam embassy was viewed by both sides as welcome progress and a crucial step towards improving the regrettable state of the common trade exchange.

The CS MFA followed the internal political development of the country closely, and tried to identify the best entry point for practical steps to establish a working relationship between the two countries. The visits of Interior Minister Oscar Kambona and of the Treasury Secretary of Tanganyika, Paul Bomani, in the spring and summer of 1962 presented ideal opportunities. During the talks with both members of the Tanganyikan government, the need was expressed for CS experts in various fields who would help to solve Tanganyika’s dependency on British cadres and would bring socialist practices into the country's economy. Bomani expressed particular interest in the methods of planning economy and in learning from experts in this field. He also discussed the provisional plans for student scholarships, inter-governmental scientific-technological agreements and agricultural cooperatives. Bomani explained that Tanganyika would cooperate closely with the CSSR and other socialist countries as it was felt necessary to restore the balance in political leverage after the substantial economic loans made by West Germany and the UK.

547 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 072/64, 27.6.1964, 6.
548 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 01/64, 10.1.1964, 4.
Several months after Bomani’s visit, the Tanganyikan government contacted the CS embassy at Dar with a request for CS assistance in training pilots for Tanganyika’s government.551 Slight optimism marked the prospects of further relations between the two countries when the trade agreement was signed in January 1963.552 It provided better access to the Tanzanian market for CS traders, as a range of various license limitations was lifted. It did not, however, greatly improve the regrettable state of Tanganyika’s exports to Czechoslovakia, a source of frustration for Nyerere’s government.553 In order to lessen the problems caused by the growing trade deficit on the part of Tanganyika’s government the CS MFA expressed interest in Tanganyikan imports, especially of cotton and sisal.554 This political gesture, however, could not change the gloomy reality of mutual trade exchange.

Between 1961 and 1964 practical cooperation in all spheres of technical assistance between the CSSR and Tanganyika was negatively marked by the absence of bilateral agreement on science-technological cooperation and by the fact that the Tanganyikan government was reluctant to cover even the smallest portion of expenses for technical cooperation.555 This matter was urged upon several times as it interfered with the practical implementation of the proposed projects.556 The MFA officials blamed political pressure from Britain for the slow progress of formalisation of mutual relations. One of the largest technical cooperation projects planned by Czechoslovakia at this stage was building a ceramics factory, but the commencement of works remained uncertain due to the absence of a legal framework for mutual cooperation.

The lack of a bilateral legal framework for the execution of technical cooperation can also be blamed for the poor state of educational cooperation, as well as the stagnation of technical assistance via the expert missions.557 The exact number of Tanganyikan students studying at CS universities between 1962 and 1965 is not known; however, available documents indicate that especially in the beginning the state of cooperation was highly unsatisfactory. To change this, the Czechoslovak government allocated 15 scholarships for Tanganyikan students and another 5 for Zanzibaris for the
1963/64 academic year. Later during 1964, perhaps in reaction to the changed political situation, the CS government urged that the number of newly allocated scholarships be further increased by eight. Despite improvements during 1964 it was clear that the state of educational assistance for Tanganyika had certainly not reached its full potential. While other spheres of technical cooperation were stagnating, Czechoslovakia should certainly have provided a greater number of scholarships for Tanganyikan students much sooner, especially when one takes into consideration the total number of African students studying at Czechoslovak universities in this period.558

Czechoslovak officials also increased their activities in the field of civil technical assistance in 1963 and prepared a range of courses for Tanganyikan participants. In 1963 six Tanganyikans were enrolled for journalism and photography courses. For the following year, in an attempt to further develop civil technical cooperation and to enter the new technical sphere, the CS government also offered Tanganyika 20 six-month places for co-operative practice for agricultural planning and management. Czechoslovak officials were, however, quite sceptical of Tanganyika’s interest in taking up the places offered.559

Other factors that could be blamed for the lapse in practical cooperation, despite the expressed political will on both sides, are not all entirely clear. On the Czechoslovak part, budget constraints and insufficient funding of governmental organisations that were expected to pursue cooperation with Tanganyika were certainly major factors. Tanganyika, on the other hand, was dealing with the lack of educated and experienced professional cadres in the state service and in the handful of Tanganyika-owned enterprises who could effectively manage cooperation projects with Czechoslovakia. Poor management and low effectiveness of the organisational structure on both sides interfered with the swift execution of ambitious plans. Blame should also be directed at Czechoslovak policy-makers, whose plans were far too elaborate to be effectively executed in such a short time as was desired.

558 MZV F IV/5, č.j. 0209/64, 17.12.1964., 2; MZV F IV/5, č.j. 072/64, 27.6.1964, 6.
559 MZV F IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 026023/63 10, 11.6.1963, 1-5.
5.7. **The Zanzibar revolution and the creation of Tanzania**

The island of Zanzibar, though located very close to Tanganyika's mainland, had, until 1964, been following its own political development quite independent of nearby Tanganyika. The island had had a long history of colonial dominance not only by European powers, but also by Omani Arabs who had controlled the island for almost 200 years. For centuries Zanzibar was the commercial centre for the slave trade managed mainly by the Arab traders, as well as for other commodities common in the Indian Ocean area. Over the course of several centuries Zanzibar progressively became one of the centres of distinct Swahili culture. The Swahili language that originated here was eventually to spread as *lingua franca* not only to Tanzania, but to a certain extent to the whole of East Africa. Traditionally, Zanzibar was ruled by the Sultan of Zanzibar. In 1890, however, it became a Protectorate of the United Kingdom and so it remained until independence was granted in 1963.

Complex political and social development during the first half of the twentieth century allowed inter-ethnic tensions to arise in Zanzibar from the end of the Second World War and with them the question of the island's political future. The self-determining anti-colonial nationalist struggle that had been progressively spreading across Africa since the late 1950s was not going to be an appropriate solution to solve Zanzibar's growing tensions because the growing Arab nationalism was a conservative and highly non-inclusive process.560 Social mobility in East Africa had increased considerably since World War I and one of its effects was significant change in the ethnic structure of the island's population, which had always been very much determined by the influx of foreign settlers. In the nineteenth century it was first the wave of Arab colonisers from the Arab peninsula that very much changed the local ethnic balance. Later, a substantial number of south Asian immigrants arrived when the British took control of the island and of the greater part of East African mainland, too. Both of these groups quickly and successfully established themselves in the island's economy as traders, merchants or land owners. The influx of immigrants continued between the wars and especially after the Second World War, but this time it was mainly African immigrants from mainland Tanganyika, Kenya or the even more distant Uganda that were arriving in Zanzibar. For them it was often a hopeless struggle to compete with the

political and economic dominance of Arabs and Asians. Africans, even though the most numerous group, found themselves increasingly impoverished, socially oppressed and politically marginalised. In this social and economic setting, a political struggle was to be fought in the early 1960s not only for independence from British rule, but also for political dominance over the island.

As elsewhere in Africa, Zanzibar also experienced the spread of political activism when the first political parties were established in the late 1950s. The major party supported by the British and Arabs and expected to lead the country after independence was the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP). The ZNP was a predominantly Arab party supported by the Arab aristocracy as well as by most Asian middle-class business-owners. Despite general expectations to the contrary the ZNP was seriously challenged by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in the very first elections organised on the island in 1961. Like the ZNP the ASP was also built along ethnic allegiances, drawing most of its electoral support from Africans and people of Shirazi descent. The ASP benefitted from the fact that ethnic groups from which they recruited most supporters, African and Shirazis, were clearly dominant in numbers: only 65 000 Arabs and Asians as against 270 000 Africans and Shirazis. The third relevant party in this period was the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP), established after the internal rift of the ASP. In 1963, a last influential pre-independence party was established by an internal rift in the ZNP. Its name was Umma and it was headed by Sheikh Babu who supported quite radical socialist policies, for which Umma had already been banned by the British in 1963. Even though Umma failed to establish any substantial membership rate, it was a party important to Zanzibar’s political future for its ties to socialist countries, making it a possible future partner. Representatives of the Umma party were very quick to establish relations with Czechoslovakia in August 1963. Czechoslovaks and Soviets saw potential in developing cooperation with Umma alongside similarly oriented parties of East Africa.

In the elections of June 1961 and July 1963 the ASP dominated the polls but the electoral system, similar to the British one, prevented the ASP from forming a government. In both cases the ASP recorded a higher total number of votes than the ZNP and ZPPP combined, but the uneven spread of popular support did not achieve a

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561 Shirazi people are a subgroup of Swahili people on the Zanzibar archipelago that trace their ancestry to a group of settlers from Persia.
majority of seats in the constituencies that had been won. In both cases the ZNP formed a coalition government with the ZPPP and further added to the frustrations of the majority African population. ‘For many Africans the election results appeared to rule out any constitutional means of addressing the existing social, political and economic imbalances within Zanzibar society and stood in contrast to the movement towards Uhuru (freedom) in mainland East Africa.’

Already in 1961 growing tensions had led to an outburst of inter-ethnic violence causing more than 60 deaths. To prevent such events recurring the elections of 1963 were marked by extreme security measures. The ZNP’s leadership under Ali Muhsin was aware of the risks that this charged atmosphere carried, but he was able and willing to make only minor improvements to Africans’ social and economic positions, mainly because greater concessions would be highly unpopular among the richest Zanzibari Arabs, the ZNP’s main sponsors.

As the ZNP-ZPPP cabinet failed to improve the situation by introducing any substantial reforms, in the approach to independence it had to resort to ever more authoritarian measures to preserve its dominant position. One such measure was a reconstruction of the police force in which a substantial share of positions was held by Africans, and ZNP’s cabinet began to doubt its future loyalty. Over the course of 1963 a large number of African policemen were dismissed and the government tried to replace them with Arab or Asian recruits. The ZNP intended to improve the security of the island by forming loyal police forces manned by members of the Arab and Asian ethnicities, but in reality it did the exact opposite. The police force was not only short of men, but the new recruits were poorly trained and lacked experience. The government’s mismanagement of this reform made it vulnerable to any aggression that might occur. Unrest was becoming ever more likely as Africans felt let down by constitutional measures and thought they were left only with the option of a violent uprising. While President Nyerere was aware of such a risk, and even warned the British in this respect, the ZNP government failed to fully appreciate the possible outcome should the situation turn violent.

When the Sultanate finally received independence on 10 December 1963, Arab and Asian citizens celebrated the event, but for many Africans national independence

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565 Okello, Revolution, 15.
meant only the change of colonial master. By this time there existed in Zanzibar a subversive group of Africans led by Ugandan-born John Okello. The group evolved partially from ASP members around Okello and partially from discontented Africans active in local trade unions. Over the course of 1963 it gained considerable support from experienced policemen expelled from the Zanzibar police force. The intentions of this revolutionary group were to carry out a coup against the government to unseat the Sultan and end Arab dominance in Zanzibar. The group was about 2000 men strong but with the exception of the former policemen they lacked the appropriate training and were also short of arms.

The insurgency against the Sultan and the ZNP government started in the early morning on 12 January 1964 in the form of several simultaneous attacks on police posts around Zanzibar Island. Decisive for the success of the operation was perhaps the attack on the police station in Stone Town led by John Okello in person. Despite being poorly armed and despite some of Okello’s partisans’ reluctance to fight once the attack started, the insurgents were able to capture the main police station. Here they get hold of automatic weapons from a police armoury. With proper arms they were now able to withstand the counter-attack by small government para-military units. Over the course of several hours the insurgents dispersed the remaining loyal government forces and got control of all significant positions in the capital. The Sultan and the government meanwhile fled the island on the royal yacht. The revolution was successfully completed over the course of nine hours.567

In the early aftermath of the revolution numerous mob attacks on the Arab and Indian populations took place, resulting in several thousand deaths. Estimates of the death toll that the subsequent rioting caused varies greatly, but there is no doubt that for the size of population and the low political significance of the island, events of Zanzibar’s revolution were exceedingly bloody. In the following days the chaotic events, that the leader of Umma party Abdulrahman Babu called ‘the lumpen revolution’,568 received more coherent political oversight, and the new coalition government of the ASP and Umma parties was formed. The new head of state was the ASP leader Abeid Karume as Zanzibar’s President and the influential position of the country’s Foreign Minister was acquired by Babu.

567 Okello, Revolution, 27-34.
The revolution in Zanzibar and the far-reaching political turn of events that occurred with the formation of the new government shocked Britain and the USA. The ideological aims of the ASP were not completely clear but those of Umma were among the most radically socialist in the whole of East Africa. Both Britain and the US feared that Zanzibar might become an Indian Ocean analogy to Cuba. The new Zanzibar government quickly showed such fears were well-founded as it managed to develop working cooperation with several socialist countries in the course of only a few weeks. The front runner in providing swift and effective assistance to the Zanzibar government proved to be East Germany while other socialist countries were among the first to officially recognise the new government. Britain and the USA tried to influence President Karume, using Nyerere as the mediator, to get rid of Babu and other radicals, but without success.

5.8. Czechoslovak relations with Zanzibar

In the first half of the 1960s the CS MFA followed political developments in Zanzibar very closely, and its experts treated it as an independent political entity until the end of 1964. The initial contacts between Czechoslovak officials and Zanzibar nationalists came even sooner than similar contacts with Tanganyika. In 1960 the Czechoslovak embassy in Cairo was approached by the local branch of the Zanzibar NLM requesting several scholarships for Zanzibari nationals. At the same time, the Czechoslovak Addis Ababa embassy was visited by representatives of the Zanzibar Federation of Labour also requesting scholarships and professional training. In response to these requests two scholarships were awarded, but the number allocated subsequently never exceeded three due to limited availability.

In 1962 and 1963 Zanzibar’s potential for future socialist development was considered higher than that of Tanganyika as anti-British sentiments were growing on the island. MFA analysts also correctly identified revolutionary tendencies against the feudal system represented by the Sultan long before they actually transformed into a full-blown socialist revolution. In order to support the Zanzibar national liberation

569 Wilson, “Revolution,” 1032.
movement, the Czechoslovak MFA maintained contacts with the island’s emerging nationalist political parties. In late 1960 initial contacts were established between Czechoslovak diplomats at the Cairo embassy and representatives of the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP). The Cairo ZNP office approached CS officials to request material help. At the same time the ZNP was also approaching other socialist country embassies, most notably that of East Germany. Based on information provided by the East German officials, the Czechoslovak MFA approved aid to the ZNP by providing two typewriters and a tape recorder. According to the MFA document available the ZNP was perceived in this period as a significant nationalist force that could realistically challenge British dominance over the island. The MFA emphasised the fact that a sizable proportion of ZNP members were of a progressive, socialist orientation. This perception of the ZNP as a progressive nationalist party with socialist tendencies was further enhanced in 1961 and 1962 when a group of ZNP activists travelled to Cuba for training. The Czechoslovak embassy in Havana established contact with this group and followed their training process closely.

In 1961 the Cairo ZNP office repeatedly asked the CS embassy for more assistance. Three ambulances, three tractors, medicine and school utilities were requested, but the KSČ Politibyro did not approve the grant. The Czechoslovak MFA found itself increasingly flooded with requests for assistance by various African NLMs and its available budget was limited. It was therefore decided after consultations with other relevant ministries that assistance for the ZNP, alongside aid for ZAPU, would be revoked and funding redirected for the support of KANU.

Besides demands for immediate assistance, contacts with ZNP representatives also concerned future arrangements for effective cooperation between Zanzibar and socialist countries. In 1961 Ali Sultan Issa, the head of the Cairo ZNP office, visited Prague and held several meetings with MFA and MFT representatives. Issa declared his intention to break away completely from the British economic sphere of influence after independence and he introduced plans for restructuring Zanzibar’s economy by implementing radical socialist policies. Issa sought among other things to establish a plan for viable economic cooperation with socialist countries to supplement existing

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572 MZV F IV/5, č.j. 023213/62-10, 7.7.1962, 1-2.
574 MZV F IV/5, č.j. 023 546/62-10, 22.3.1962.
economic links with the West. These plans and intentions were naturally eagerly approved of by CS officials.

Potential links with the leaders of the ZNP sustained a hard blow in April 1962 with the internal ZNP power struggle. With British administration approval, the socialist wing of the party’s leadership was deposed and the most influential socialists detained, in the case of Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu, or expelled, in the case of Ali Sultan Issa. The ZNP became completely dominated by the conservative politicians, led by Ali Hamsin, who also took over the ZNP’s Cairo office.

Concerned about this development, socialist countries including Czechoslovakia naturally retracted all planned support for the ZNP. In this turbulent situation the Czechoslovak MFA approved the establishment of cooperation with the ASP which had been regarded until then as a pro-British political power. MFA analysts were not convinced about the ASP ideological profile, but the unanimous approval it had received from TANU, KANU and the UPC spoke in its favour. In the course of 1963 Czechoslovak officials considered supporting both the ASP and the Umma party established by Babu after his definite break up with the ZNP. Provision of five university scholarships was finally approved for the ASP, but due to their inability to find five candidates with secondary education qualifications, it was Babu who promised to choose suitable candidates for the scholarships. Abdurahman Babu maintained regular contacts throughout 1963 with Czechoslovak officials and held several meetings at the CS embassy in Dar. He eventually became the main favourite of socialist countries for the future leadership of an independent Zanzibar and maintaining close cooperation with him was considered of prime importance.

The Zanzibar revolution to depose the ZNP government, which had been regarded as a conservative, pro-feudal, anti-socialist power, was naturally welcomed by the socialist countries including Czechoslovakia who were quick to recognise the new government officially. CS diplomats in Dar es Salaam were approached as early as February 1964 by Babu, Zanzibar’s newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, to establish official diplomatic relations. The Zanzibar government addressed a request in the first post-revolution months for urgent assistance to several socialist governments, including Czechoslovakia. The CS Politbyro gave the issue high priority and support was

576 MZV F IV/5, č.j. 081/63, 2.7.1963, 1-2.
swiftly approved. The Zanzibar government received two ambulances, a substantial amount of medicine and 100 tonnes of sugar from Czechoslovakia. For the time being the Czechoslovak government did not approve special assistance, or military training for the Zanzibar army, as also requested by the Zanzibar government. The most likely explanation for their refusal to provide special assistance was that East Germany and the Soviet Union as well as China had agreed to provide some assistance in this sphere.

Meanwhile the political development in Zanzibar was viewed very cautiously as the Soviets and their allied governments were aware that USA or Britain might step in to reverse the results of the revolution, and they knew socialist countries could do only very little to prevent such a development from taking place. While the revolutionary events in Zanzibar were welcome, the Tanganyikan army mutiny and especially the subsequent British intervention were noted with the utmost frustration. Nyerere’s decision to call in the British was heavily criticised. Immediately after the British intervention the author of a situational report for the MFA stated, ‘The impression that Tanganyika is an independent state fell, when the British attack mounted against African soldiers upon the request of an African government demonstrated Nyerere’s neo-colonialist orientations. [...] His [Nyerere’s] power apparatus has strengthened so it can increase attacks against the left.’

When the establishment of the Zanzibar federation with Tanganyika was announced in April 1964, Czechoslovak officials were cautiously optimistic. However, they viewed the new Zanzibar government with Babu’s participation as an important foothold in the region. MFA analysts were unsure about the potential viability of the proposed union and they warned of possible adverse effects any dissolution of the union might have on Zanzibar. At the same time the union was welcome because it was believed that the socialist element of the government of Zanzibar would eventually strengthen socialist tendencies within TANU and push the whole country closer to the socialist camp. This prediction did eventually prove correct.

Once Zanzibar joined in the federation with Tanganyika, MFA interest in local affairs decreased. The MFA lacked the human resources needed to deal with Zanzibar separately and it was also aware of East German interest in the island, which would

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577 MZV F IV/5, č.j. 023.524/64-10, 17.4.1964, 2.
578 MZV F IV/5, č.j. 022.901/64-10, 3.4.1964.
579 MZV F IV/4, č.j. 0322_64, 12.2.1964, 1-10.
580 MZV F IV/4, č.j. 0322_64, 12.2.1964, 3.
suffice to defend the socialist countries’ interests there. After 1965, Zanzibar was regularly visited by officials from the Dar es Salaam embassy, and technical assistance or material support was even provided occasionally for Zanzibar, but it was not of high political interest for the CS MFA. Czechoslovak officials tried, however, to maintain good relations with Zanzibari socialists, who joined the federal government and became influential members of TANU.

5.9. **The 1964 army mutiny**

On several occasions between 1961 and 1963 there were rumours of growing discontent amongst the soldiery of East African states threatening to develop into mutiny, but they never materialised. Even though these rumours had always, before January 1964, proved false, they were founded on real frustrations of African soldiers, formerly known as the King’s African Rifles (KAR). Eventually in January 1964 the East African soldiers’ tensions and frustrations finally erupted into mutiny over several days. Of all the three mutinies that occurred consecutively in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, it was this first mutiny of the Tanganyikan army which was the most important, setting an example as it did for similar events in the other two countries. The reasons and grievances that stood behind this mutiny, the progress of the mutiny itself, and its main political effects are the subject of the following paragraphs.

As already mentioned in the chapter on Uganda, with independence advancing upon East African states, the African soldiers of the former colonial KAR army struggled to find their place in the new political settings of the independent states. KAR units were always the power arm of the colonial administration and having been loyal servicemen of the hated colonisers it was not easy for African soldiers and the new independent African administrations to find accord and build mutual trust. In Tanganyika, this inherited atmosphere of distrust was further deepened by the slow progress of Africanisation within the military. African soldiers during colonial times had never been allowed to have officer status; the higher ranks were reserved for the British. On independence the Tanganyikan army retained its British officer corps, thus effectively

582 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 62/64, 7.4.1964, l. 2-5.
remaining under British command. Naturally, African soldiers hoped this army structure would change quickly with them acquiring commanding posts within the national armies’ ranks. However, the pace of Africanisation in Tanganyika was much slower than expected.

From 1961 the Tanganyika government tried to speed up the training of African officers, but they struggled to find appropriate candidates. The country’s Minister of Defence, Oscar Kambona, tried to solve this issue by agreeing to Israel’s offer for training of 15 cadets. However, upon the candidates’ return the government’s Officers Selection Board in January 1964 found them unsuitable for promotion. Tanganyikan soldiers blamed the British command for the absence of promotions, even though the British had provided the government with a list of African soldiers suitable for advancement, including for the highest command.\textsuperscript{583} The rejection of promotions came at the time of the critical governmental decision on general Africanisation. Only two weeks before the mutiny took place, Nyerere announced that the Africanisation processes in Tanganyika were to be halted in order to prevent the creation of first and second class citizenship in the country.\textsuperscript{584} It seems that it was this announcement that became the last straw for the soldiery and their frustrations erupted. Discontent already ran high as soldiers’ pay had been lowered in 1963.\textsuperscript{585} Eventually the heightened frustrations of African soldiers broke out in open mutiny on the morning of 20 January.

The mutiny started when all the British officers of the 1st Battalion of Tanganyika Rifles stationed at Collito barracks were arrested by their Tanganyikan soldiers. The commanding officer of the Tanganyikan army, Brigadier Sholto Douglass, was not among the prisoners as he was away from the camp at the time of the mutiny. Soldiers were very quick to take control of all the important positions in the capital, including the post office, airport, railway station, radio station, and bank. The Tanganyikan government as well as British officers were taken completely by surprise and especially in the first hours of the mutiny it was not clear what the intentions of rebellious army were. A full-blown coup d’état attempt seemed likely. For that reason President Nyerere and the majority of the cabinet went into hiding, while the Minister of Defence, Oscar Kambona, was rushed to the Collito base to meet the mutineers and hear their demands. The soldiers demanded the immediate removal of European officers and

\textsuperscript{583} Baynham, “Mutinies,” 153-154.
\textsuperscript{584} Aminzade, Race, 86.
\textsuperscript{585} Aminzade, Race, 86.
a substantial pay rise of some 150%. Significantly, the soldiers were not making any political demands. Kambona informed them that he had no constitutional right to agree such measures, but he also did not dismiss the demands out of hand. The soldiers were quite confident that their demands would be met as they were clearly in the position of power. Meanwhile some rioting and looting occurred in Dar es Salaam streets that police struggled to contain as many officers had been transferred to Zanzibar some days earlier. Several attacks against Asians and Arabs took place and peace was restored eventually only by the rebellious army units despite the fact that some of the soldiers had previously also joined in the looting. The number of casualties was quite substantial at the end of the day with 14 dead and 20 being seriously injured.586

Meanwhile, on the second day of mutiny the 2nd battalion of Tanganyika rifles stationed in Tabara also arrested all of its officers. They raised the same demands as the 1st battalion a day earlier and they too met with Minister Kambona who technically accepted their demands. This initially calmed the situation as there had been some rioting and violence here, too. It was only on 22 January that President Nyerere appeared in public to inspect the results of looting and rioting. In his public address on the situation the President refused to recognise any connection between the mutiny, (or strike as the soldiers’ action was alternatively called) and the revolution on Zanzibar or any other political cause. The fact that the President came out of hiding indicated that the situation had calmed down somewhat. Negotiations with the soldiers eventually began on the specifics of concession to their demands.

During these talks the government found itself in a peculiar position as it was virtually defenceless should the army rise again or should it formulate any political demands. Nyerere hesitated to deal with the matter as a full-blown mutiny because as such it would have to lead to serious punishment of the participating soldiers, and the government simply lacked the power to execute such actions. In this stalled situation rumours spread of preparations of a plot by the opposition group of former TFL leader Victor Mkello and politician Christopher Tumbo to overthrow the government. When this group contacted the mutiny leaders and asked them to take over control of the state in their name, Nyerere had no other option than to ask for external military aid.587

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On 24 January Nyerere contacted the British government and requested assistance to put down the mutiny and the suspected plot to overthrow the government. On 25 January such assistance was swiftly provided by the British navy that had arrived into the vicinity of Dar es Salaam soon after the news of mutiny spread. In the aftermath of what was perceived in London to be a communist coup on Zanzibar, a similar fate for Tanganyika was considered a great threat to British interests in the region. British troops were quick to take control of both rebellious units and all the important hubs around the capital. The Tanganyikan soldiers were disarmed and arrested and the national army thus effectively ceased to exist.588

In the days that followed the successful suppression of the mutiny, the government attempted to regain full control of state and security affairs. It also needed to regain some of the prestige that had been severely harmed not only by the fact that the national army mutinied, but especially because it had had to ask the British for assistance. A number of arrests took place, including those of rebellious soldiers, plot leaders, trade union leaders, some politicians and several dozen rebellious policemen. Prosecution of participators took place over several weeks following the mutiny. All of the ordinary soldiers were dishonourably discharged from the army, the ring-leaders received between 5 and 15 years' imprisonment and the plot leaders spent two years in detention before their release.589 The Tanganyikan army was never to be reconstructed in its original form.

The revolution on Zanzibar followed by the mutiny of the Tanganyikan army meant a major disturbance to the political setting of Tanganyika and threw the country into the midst of Cold War rivalry virtually overnight, the effects of which had until then been almost negligible. President Nyerere found himself facing several critical scenarios which endangered the political stability of Tanganyika, especially considering the fact that after the mutiny Tanganyika was left without its own army. The British military presence was eventually replaced by the more welcome and less controversial mission of the Nigerian army, but it could have not been a long term solution to Tanganyika's military crisis; military reform was urgently needed. The fact that Zanzibar was controlled by a government that involved Umma radicals posed a threat to Nyerere's position, which was repeatedly challenged by the more radical socialists inside and

outside of TANU. Left radicals would have certainly received an effective support from Zanzibar should they have decided to plot a coup against Nyerere. At the same time, a substantial risk would have been posed to the stability of Tanganyika, should Britain or USA decide to mount an attack or to support counter-revolution on Zanzibar. Such intervention was indeed being seriously considered by American and British governments. At the end of the day it was not executed, because in April 1964 Nyerere and Karume announced their plan to form a Federation between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The plan came as a surprise to many, but it proved perhaps the best solution to an unusual and politically charged situation.

5.10. The effects of the mutiny and the Zanzibar revolution

The formation of the United Republic of Tanzania in April 1964 had far-reaching implications for the internal politics of Tanzania, but even more so for its external affairs. Dar es Salaam granted limited political powers to Zanzibar, but most important decisions were reserved for the federal government. Nyerere proved a skilful tactician in offering the Vice-President post to Karume while Babu and five other Zanzibaris received federal ministerial positions. This inclusive policy designed by Nyerere proved very effective in appeasing the political aspirations of Zanzibari leaders, and by keeping most of them in Dar he lowered the risk of their mounting the coup against him from Zanzibar. He also very much neutralised the extreme left tendencies of these politicians by progressively introducing more socialist policies. Inclusion of the radicals into Tanzanian government was certainly not welcomed by the West and from 1964 relations between the West and Nyerere deteriorated. This was marked among other things by the diplomatic crisis with West Germany protesting over the newly established diplomatic ties between Zanzibar and East Germany. President Nyerere however refused to give in on Tanzania’s right to seek diplomatic relations with any country, which resulted in all the substantial West German aid being revoked.

Meanwhile ‘[t]he mutiny pushed Nyerere towards a much stronger executive orientation in the government to avoid future threats to the state, and towards an even more active role in the liberation movement to channel military energy and prove his

credentials after the British intervention. The liberation policy also helped outflank African nationalist extremism at home. Inviting Chinese aid for the liberation movement helped manage Chinese political pressure, which was particularly keen among the revolutionaries in Zanzibar.\footnote{Bjerk, “Nyerere,” 444.} Nyerere found himself in need of building a complete new military, but he lacked the necessary capacities. Despite the fact that objectively he had not had any option for defending his government’s position his political prestige at home, but especially in the rest of Africa, was deeply damaged by his having resorted to calling for military action by the former colonial power against his own national army. As with Obote and Kenyatta who also faced army mutiny, Nyerere needed to decide the way to rebuild the military as well as establish its future format. Deeply disappointed by the disloyalty of the army inherited from the British, Nyerere decided to break away from British military tradition and instead he opted to reconstruct it with external help from various Western as well as socialist countries.\footnote{Parsons, 1964 Army Mutinies, 150.} The realities of Cold War rivalry determined which countries would eventually participate in the reconstruction of Tanzanian army – China, East Germany, to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia, and, to balance the socialist countries’ influence, Canada.

The alienation between Tanzania and the West progressed steadily over the 18 months that followed the mutiny. While the army mutiny initially enhanced the intensity and quality of cooperation with Britain, because it was the former colonial power providing Tanganyika with assistance, the radical military reform that followed these events had exactly the opposite effect. Western countries and Western media were openly critical of developments in Tanzania, which was received very bitterly in Dar es Salaam. The growing misunderstanding and distrust was further deepened by rumours of the US preparing a coup against the Tanzanian government.\footnote{Tordoff, “Politics in Tanzania,” 357-359.} All these events, together with the frustration over development aid from the West being less generous than expected, led to the revision of foreign policy. \textit{‘More substantial contacts were established, on the one hand with the socialist countries (which now appeared more responsive), and, on the other hand, with the less-committed Western countries, notably}
Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. In this context, China began to replace Israel as the main model for development.\textsuperscript{594}

5.10.1. Tanzanian move towards socialist countries

Nyerere’s move to the left and his seeking greater cooperation with socialist countries were not without limits or certain reservations. One can most clearly identify how Nyerere’s personal belief in principles, such as democracy, human rights, egalitarianism, education for self-reliance and women’s liberation,\textsuperscript{595} prevented him from seeking full unrestrained cooperation with the Soviet camp, even at the time of his increased criticism of the West. This remained true despite the fact that Nyerere was, at this stage of his political career, becoming devoted to a socialist orientation, and under his leadership Tanzania became effectively a one-party state. Dr Hassy Kitine recalled in some detail how much Nyerere’s view on Soviet-style socialism was also affected by his visit to the Soviet Union in 1969. The visit to Russia formed Nyerere’s perception of the Soviet Union as one of a rather gloomy, sad and un-free society, paralysed by fear and resignation.\textsuperscript{596}

The sombre image of Soviet society that Nyerere came away with after his visit to the USSR was not the only factor that interfered with the development of close partnerships between Tanzania and the Soviets and their satellites. Soviet policy in Africa, especially during Brezhnev’s era but also earlier, was one of political hegemony with clearly stated objectives of political dominance. Nyerere remained critical of this aspect of the Soviet regime which he perceived as just another form of imperialism. Especially in the 1970s this opinion was supported by substantial evidence as Soviet conduct in Africa and its relations with many African leaders was far removed from the subtlety of the early 1960s.

It was not only the ideological rift that prevented closer collaboration with the socialist camp but perhaps even more importantly it was the inability or perhaps unwillingness of these countries to assist Tanzania economically. Even though relations with Soviet satellites such as Czechoslovakia or East Germany might have differed from

\textsuperscript{594} Hoskyns, “Africa’s Foreign Relations,” 454.
\textsuperscript{596} Dr Hassy Kitine, interview with the author, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 29 June, 2011.
those with the USSR itself, their clearly-stated role in the Soviet political scheme still disqualified them to a certain extent in cooperation with Tanzania. This was especially recognisable in comparison to the successful development of Tanzania’s relations with Yugoslavia, Egypt and especially with Mao’s China. It is for the lack of China’s apparent imperial or dominating ambition that cooperation with China was preferred over that with the Soviet bloc.

Of all the socialist countries it was Mao Ze Dong’s China that benefitted most from Nyerere’s declared wish to cooperate with the socialist camp after 1964. China’s position in the 1960s and 1970s was not one of a superpower, and generous economic cooperation and technical assistance for Tanzania came from China without any unwelcome ideological subtext or political conditions. Cooperation with the Soviets, East Germans and Czechoslovaks was certainly of no minor importance to Tanzania; in fact, the contrary was true, but it always carried political implications. The case of China was different, and much more acceptable for Nyerere’s political profile. After his visit to China in 1965, Nyerere became infatuated with China and Chinese socialism and to some extent he modelled his own ujamaa project on it.597

There were some important distinctions between China and the Soviet Union that predestined the former to become the vital economic partner of Tanzania in the second half of the 1960s. Tanzania’s political leadership perceived China as a fellow Third World country that had its own adverse historical experience with imperialism. China criticised actions of both superpowers in Africa, proclaiming itself the only power which could legitimately speak and act on behalf of Third World countries. China’s outspoken denunciation of Soviet imperialism had one main objective – to establish itself as the third major global power by attracting wide support for its actions across Africa and Asia. An important arena for Chinese politics in Africa was the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee meeting. ‘For Peking, maintaining an Afro-Asian organisation that would reflect the non-aligned movement was essential, for it was the only one that would enable Peking to participate while excluding the Soviet Union... For these two powerful countries, however, the benefits of this competition were ultimately rather limited... As it was, the growing spread of a non-aligned movement in which neither of the two communist powers was involved reflected the reluctance of Third World states to let

themselves be drawn into an uncertain struggle." In the case of Tanzania this objective was partially successful but elsewhere in Africa less so.

It is important to note that it was the substantial economic and military support provided by China rather than any ideological closeness that was behind effective cooperation with Tanzania. China was one of the few countries providing Tanzania with effective military assistance after the mutiny of Tanganyika's army. In the following year China also provided very generous development aid and in 1967, together with Zambia, Tanzania negotiated Chinese funding for one of the largest infrastructural projects in Africa, the TAZARA railway from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka. After 1970 China became Tanzania's largest donor and also the largest provider of military assistance. The Soviet Union and its satellites tried to challenge China's position in Tanzania but they failed to provide such effective support in the civil technical as well as the special military spheres.

5.11. Czechoslovak cooperation with Tanzania between 1964 and 1968

Tanzania's gravitation towards socialist countries and especially the rapidly growing competition of Mao's China called for intensified effort on the part of the CSSR to develop working cooperation with Tanzania in multiple spheres. For that reason several meetings took place between Czechoslovak officials and Tanzanian government members as early as summer 1964. More practical steps in the spheres of trade, economic assistance and technical assistance were discussed during the visit of the vice-president of Tanzania, Rashidi Kawawa, to the CSSR. The main subjects discussed were the various forms of Czechoslovak cooperation in the next five-year plan of Tanzania. Suggested forms of cooperation included delegations of CS expert advisors, financial loans and training for Tanzanian experts in CS organisations. Tanzania was slowly transforming its economy under a planning system which, together with the decreasing interest of the British in the country's affairs, was bringing TANU closer to socialist

598 Laidi, Superpowers, 28-29.
600 Bailey, "Tanzania and China," 40.
countries. In contrast to the past Nyerere would often get directly involved in the talks and he showed constant interest in the progress of cooperation.

The Tanzanian government was, at this point, negotiating economic help, not only with the CSSR but also with Poland, East Germany and the Soviet Union. Available documents show the specific requests that Tanzanians made of the Soviets in 1964, namely building a metallurgic complex, alongside a coal and iron mine, building an oil refinery, a 700 km railway to Northern Zambia and the financial loan of 600 million Roubles. The Polish government also handled requests for technical assistance in industry, mainly in the field of mining and heavy industry. All this information illustrates how, after initial hesitation, relations between Tanzania and socialist countries began to flourish in the aftermath of the Zanzibar revolution and the creation of the United Republic of Tanzania.

5.11.1. Czechoslovak ‘special’ activities in Tanzania and support to various regional NLMs

Between 1961 and 1964 the sphere of special military and security cooperation was largely neglected within Czechoslovak-Tanganyikan cooperation. The political situation in this period was not ripe for it especially due to the British presence in the Tanganyika’s army as well as in the state service. Despite this fact Czechoslovakia decided to open a local intelligence office at the Czechoslovak embassy soon after independence, but in the first year of its existence the main operational objectives did not include special cooperation with Tanganyika’s government. Instead, the main concerns of the Dar es Salaam StB Residency was Tanzania’s significance in the ongoing anticolonial struggle and Nyerere’s strong and open support of various national liberation movements in this part of Africa. The StB Residency in Dar was supposed to establish working contacts with various freedom fighters, which would later develop into effective cooperation.

The Dar es Salaam Residency was established in 1963 or 1964 and operated until 1969, when it was provisionally suspended and its operatives were recalled to the

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602 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 026.884/64-10, 7.9.1964, 1-2.
603 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 0131/64, 23.7.1964.
604 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 027.468/64-10, 7.9.1964, 1.
605 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 027.468/64-10, 7.9.1964, 2.
Prague headquarters in reaction to the Soviet invasion. As was the case with the Nairobi Residency, for the Dar es Salaam Residency it is quite difficult to distinguish between the responsibilities and activities of the MFA and those of the StB. Dar es Salaam Residency archive material amounts to some 4000 pages and includes intelligence reports, personal profiles and reports of the active measures of local operatives over more than 20 years extending until the early 1980s.

The Residency was reopened in 1970 with new, politically-approved staff and operated at least until 1975. The Dar Residency was the first to come into action in East Africa and the experience gained during its organisation and the first months of operation were later used in the creation of similar offices in Nairobi and Kampala. The Residency’s officers cooperated closely with diplomatic staff and, legitimised as members of the diplomatic corps, they were responsible for a number of official embassy activities. Besides cooperation with and support for local NLMs, the Residency had a range of other aims, amongst which were acquiring intelligence and working actively against the Main Enemy and later also cooperating with the Tanzanian government in the special sphere.

During the first year of its operations the Dar Residency faced many shortcomings. The chief Resident, Viliam Ciklamini, had to put up with his operatives’ lack of experience, which caused low effectiveness and brought repeated criticism from headquarters. Poor organisation and mismanagement affecting so many spheres of the socialist state and economy negatively, did not bypass the StB either, and the first years of operation of the Dar es Salaam Residency can serve as a prime example. The Resident, for example, had managing operatives who lacked basic language skills. Their inability to speak Swahili or even English was indeed a blow to the pursuit of the stated objectives and made intelligence work difficult and sometimes downright ridiculous.

The specific operational objectives formulated by the Prague headquarters were changing regularly, but mostly they involved the collecting of intelligence on the enemy states in East Africa that, over time, involved Britain, Canada, USA, Israel or West Germany. Three-year objectives formulated in 1965 stated the following: ‘Britain remains our main enemy in Tanzania. The elementary long-term task of residency is to penetrate into organizations through which Great Britain influences the development in

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606 ABS 80958_011_1_2, Č.jA?, 4.2.1970, 1, l. 47.
607 ABS 80958_013_2_2, Č.jA. A-00130/17-75, 1, l. 109.
608 ABS 81038_000_1_4, Č.jA?, 4.1.1966, 1, l. 3.
Tanzania and politics of Tanzania’s government with the aim of obtaining especially such documents and evidence of activities of British embassy and other British organizations, which could be used to limit British influence in Tanzania and simultaneously to deepen cooperation and understanding between Tanzania and socialist camp countries, especially between Tanzania and CSSR. In addition to actions against the British, other enemy states were to be targeted according to these objectives. 'USA and West Germany constantly show greater political and economic interest in Tanzania. The task of residency is to obtain documents and important information about activities of these states in Tanzania, especially on activities of American intelligence.'

In the first years of operation the Residency was also to follow the internal political development and foreign political orientation of the Tanzanian government closely. In 1964, the main objective was 'observing relations between Zanzibar and Tanganyika and their projection on the relations with the CSSR and the countries of the socialist camp.' As Residency operatives gained experience, objectives became more ambitious. In 1966 President Nyerere was set as the primary observation object for the Residency. The Residency was to collect all the information on activities of the British and other enemies that might undermine Nyerere’s political position. They were also to collect the appropriate intelligence to support Nyerere’s progressive political orientation and, via different channels, provide Nyerere with intelligence discrediting Western experts, especially Canadian military experts. The permanent objective for the Dar es Salaam Residency was also to maintain contact with local NLMs, providing them with support and collecting information on developments amongst various NLMs, but also within different organisations.

Ciklamini and his operatives created a network of contacts that included Tanzanian and Zanzibar politicians, diplomats from other African countries, delegates of local branches of the OAU and other international organisations, members of NLMs, local journalists, students and university staff, and even some nationals of Western states. Maintaining contact with all these people was much easier in comparison to similar
activities of the Nairobi Residency. StB Residents in Dar es Salaam had very good legal diplomatic cover and, even if there were a suspicion of their working for CS intelligence, they were still viewed as representatives of a friendly socialist state. At no point did the Dar es Salaam Residency have to face state persecution or active measures against its operatives, as was the case in Nairobi where StB operatives faced permanent surveillance, bans on movement and, eventually, expulsion.

By 1966 the Resident and his operatives had a small network of confidential contacts, amongst whom were high-ranking officials of the Tanzanian and Zanzibar governments, including ministers; by this means the Residency acquired substantial intelligence on Nyerere’s plans: internal as well as foreign policy. Via these people they were also well-informed about Tanzania’s cooperation with Western states and they tried to infiltrate some of the Western organisations with their CCs. Contacts within the Tanzanian government were used to execute CS influence on government decisions and there are reports of multiple active measures, mostly disinformation and discreditation attempts aimed at Western states, being conducted through these people.

As was mentioned above, civil technical assistance was mostly stagnating in the first half of the 1960s; but, as in most cases, the CSSR was more effective in providing assistance in the special sphere, even though it in no way reached the intensity of the special cooperation with Uganda. In the summer of 1964 the Interior Minister of Tanzania, J.M. Lusinde, visited Prague and officially requested security assistance for Tanzania mainly in the form of weapons and ammunition. The MFA dealt with this request in cooperation with the Interior Ministry. The Tanzanian request was only partially met, as ‘the Interior Ministry does not consider it wise immediately to fully meet all requests at the initial stage of cooperation. We shall reserve the opportunity for future high-level meetings and reassess the usefulness of providing arms in the future.’ The Politbyuro eventually approved the delivery of 360 Mk 23 or 58 machine rifles, and 30 Mk 52/57 machine-guns. CS help fell short of what Lusinde requested by 200 machine rifles. This material delivery was viewed as the first step to a further cooperation of security forces. More courses for Tanzanian cadets were expected to be sought once the delivery

615 ABS 81038_000_3_4, Č.jA?, č.E/9, 1-2, l. 159-160.
617 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 4400/7, 12.10.1964, 2.
of material was completed.\footnote{NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 4400/7, 12.10.1964, 2.} According to Lusinde himself, the CSSR was the first socialist country to provide Tanzania with assistance in this sphere.\footnote{Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 207.}

Zídek summarised cooperation between the CSSR and Tanzania in this sphere well. ‘\textit{In 1963 a six-month ‘security course’ for four operatives of Tanganyika’s counter-espionage took place. Following the consignment of arms requested by Minister Lusinde, a six-month counter-espionage course for five operatives commenced in October 1964. [...] In November 1965, a similar course was completed by fifteen Tanzanian security operatives.\footnote{Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 207.}} Upon the completion of each course, the cadets received personal arms and a limited amount of intelligence material.\footnote{Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 207.} A peculiarity in this sphere is linked to the MND Action 141, which was officially organised as military training for Tanzanian cadets. In reality, this action involved members of the South African military wing of the ANC Spear of Nation, who received false identities and documents provided by the CS police for confidentiality purposes.\footnote{VUA 1963, č.j. H, 042862, Aug 1965?, 5.}'

Help provided in the security sphere was delivered with a very different perspective from that offered to Kenya and Uganda. In Kenya, the security sphere was believed to have a major impact on CS competition with Britain and it was thought it might contribute to the victory of the left wing of KANU. In Uganda, both security assistance and military assistance were also provided with the vision of substantial empowerment of a progressive government under Obote. Commercial profit from the approved transactions was also a much-appreciated aspect of special military cooperation with Obote’s Uganda.

In Tanzania, special cooperation was considered a political priority in neither the security nor the military sphere. In the initial period, Czechoslovak officials realistically assessed the internal political situation as not suitable for effective cooperation with Tanganyika’s government. The lack of local political support from Nyerere and the heavy presence of British experts would have made any such effort fail before it began. No substantial cooperation in these spheres developed either at any later stage, besides the few exceptions mentioned above. In the special military sphere the reason for this was perhaps competition from the Chinese and the Canadians.
Meanwhile, in the security sphere it was perceived to be more effective to use the StB’s own active measures executed by StB operatives with the aim of further strengthening Nyerere’s position. Therefore no overly ambitious results were expected from Czechoslovak activities in this sphere, except for potential financial gains from future special material trading and for counterbalancing some measures of Western countries in this sphere. These were, however, not perceived as a critical threat to Tanzanian political stability and socialist orientation.

From 1965 it was becoming clear that Tanzania was stabilised and progressively oriented in its foreign policy. At the same time, however, reports from the Dar embassy began to admit that the ideological and political closeness between Tanzanian and socialist countries had not transformed into a working economic cooperation. While the decreasing British influence was welcomed, the ever more apparent economic orientation of China was, during the period of deepest political rift between China and the rest of the socialist camp, viewed rather negatively.623 No ambitious plans materialised and the execution of planned projects had in most cases not even started. Czechoslovak cooperation with Tanzania in this field was no different from other socialist countries. The CS cabinet approved a loan of 40 million Kčs to be used by 1970 on CS projects, including a tyre factory, the previously mentioned ceramics factory, and technical infrastructure for a textile factory. A critical lack of available funds to cover even the most basic preparatory works for these projects on the Tanzanian side was a main obstacle to their execution, which was therefore to remain unresolved.624 Negotiations on these issues in 1965 and 1966 made it clear that CS conditions for providing loans were unable to match China’s conditions and therefore the Tanzanian side was not overly keen to acquire them.

In the second half of the 1960s relations between Tanzania and the CSSR were not able to overcome the economic limitations of both states and they stagnated. Cooperation in the security sphere did not continue after the last course finished in 1965 and CS hopes of trade relations of special material did not materialise, either.625 Regular contacts were maintained in the diplomatic sphere and occasional visits of mid-ranking government officials took place, but the planned visit by President Nyerere to the CSSR,

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623 MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 026.790/65-10, October 1965, 6.
624 MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 026.790/65-10, October 1965, 6-10.
which might have given mutual relations a new boost, never took place due to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Cooperation continued in the educational sphere, but the records of Tanzanian students at CS Universities are very incomplete. Some hope for stagnating relations was raised after the cultural agreement was finally signed by both countries in February 1968, which, amongst other things, finally provided a legal and practical framework for the civil expert missions to Tanzania. Before this agreement could have any effect on mutual relations, however, the Soviet invasion of the CSSR took place.

5.11.2. Dar es Salaam as a base for Czechoslovak support to ZAPU and FRELIMO

The core principle of Czechoslovak involvement in Africa during the Cold War was its anti-colonial, anti-imperial and pro-independence stance. These principles were stressed again and again by CS officials on the floor of different international organisations, as well as during bilateral talks with African countries. Spreading the message of the CS stance everywhere became perhaps as important as the practical steps that this stance motivated. The actions of the CS government might not always have been as effective as the message that it got out there but the emphasis on political support was often as important as the material aid. Contacts with freedom fighters from ZAPU and FRELIMO and support to the on-going struggle of the NLM of Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique became one of the main objectives of the Dar es Salaam embassy as well as the local StB Residency and the headquarters in Prague. CS support of these organisations included political support, ideological training, military training, technical education, material and special material deliveries and financial aid.

Tanzanian political support of NLMs in the region became vital for their eventual success. The location of Tanzania close to the conflict zone, its ports, railways and road infrastructure became the crucial factors in the external support of NLMs that was provided mainly by socialist countries including Czechoslovakia. The MFA analysis describes its importance as follows: ‘The capital of Tanzania Dar es Salaam has become another important centre of resistance activities of the African liberation movement. Transport of military material of different organizations operating in Tanzania’s territory, distribution of books for school in tropical forests, training of soldiers recruited amongst
inhabitants of countries which are under colonist rule, relocation of Chinese instructors used for training in military camps [...] are very common events in the capital of Tanzania. [...] Tanzania secures training, transport of materials and psychological help to resistance organizations.626 Tanzania also hosted most of the political headquarters of NLMs as well as the executive secretariat of the Liberation Committee of the OAU. Other forms of support for NLMs were provided by Zambia, in whose capital the CSSR also operated an important embassy. Zambia, meanwhile, was used by fighters of these organisations as an operational base for their cross-borders operations.627

From approximately 1965 the Dar es Salaam embassy was effectively in charge of maintaining contacts and mediating help for ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo’s NLM from Zimbabwe. The first contact between CS and ZAPU took place in 1962 when ZAPU officials requested assistance.628 No details of this request are known. In 1963, ZAPU’s request for financial help was declined.629 Another request for assistance was addressed to the Dar es Salaam embassy in 1964. A request for special material for 50,000 people was, however, rejected by the MFA as unrealistic; but, as it viewed ZAPU as a well-established political power, it recommended some special assistance be provided. Eventually, the Politbyro approved the delivery of special material for 1,500 to 2000 soldiers that included, amongst other equipment, 500 Mk 98 rifles, 200 Mk 27 pistols, 500 Mk 23/25 machine-rifles, 1000 grenades, 50 Mk 26 submachine guns and 20 Mk 43 S heavy machine guns, together with 1,000 kg of TNT.630 Means of delivery were discussed with the Tanzanian Vice-President Kawawa, who agreed with delivery being officially addressed to Tanzania.631 During the 1960s the CSSR also provided ZAPU with a limited number of university scholarships.632

The CS MFA also had contacts, mainly via the Dar es Salaam embassy, with representatives of ZANU from 1963; however, after initial hesitation, it had decided not to support ZANU which was receiving substantial assistance from China. That is why, in 1966, all their requests were rejected on the grounds that CS officials did not support

628 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 023.546/62-10, 22.3.1962.
629 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 0210/64, Nov 1964.
630 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 6749/7, 14.10.1965, 1.
631 MZV F. IV/6 10 TO, č.j. 046/69, 25.7.1969, 11.
the fragmentation of Zimbabwe's liberation movement and it also viewed ZANU as rather more right-oriented than ZAPU.

From the first contacts in 1965, relations between ZAPU and CS officials went through phases of fluctuating intensity of cooperation. These were mostly caused by internal conflict within ZAPU or political turbulence in the CSSR. The Soviet invasion in the period after 1968 was the major temporary disruption to mutual relations. The CS embassies in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka turned down multiple requests for educational and material support, while their contacts with other NLMs were limited to acquiring intelligence and expressing political support for their cause. According to MFA reports from 1971 onwards, relations with ZAPU had normalised again.

The second half of 1960s was a period of high intensity cooperation between FRELIMO and Czechoslovak officials from the MFA as well as the Dar es Salaam embassy and Residency. Armed actions by FRELIMO began in September 1964 and, one month later, the CSSR was visited by the front’s leader, Eduardo Mondlane. Mondlane asked the CS government for assistance, particularly with regard to the political and technical training of FRELIMO cadres that was to take place in Tanzania. Before this request could be met, the first delivery of special material for FRELIMO was approved. In 1965, the Politbyro approved special material help for FRELIMO, which was to include, amongst other things, 500 Mk 98 rifles, 200 pistols, 500 machine rifles, 50 light machine guns, 20 heavy machine guns, 1000 hand grenades, and 1000 kilograms of TNT. Delivery was almost identical to that of another delivery for ZAPU and was also officially addressed to the Tanzanian Defence Ministry, which forwarded it to FRELIMO fighters.

CS support for FRELIMO in this period, in spheres other than special material deliveries, was eventually approved as well. In 1966 the StB sent its specialist to teach at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam. Dr Vilím became the fourth member of the local Residency and he regularly reported on his progress at the Institute. Dr Vilím officially taught several courses at the Institute, where he was in everyday contact with young Mozambicans, many of whom were affiliated to FRELIMO. Apart from his official activities, Dr Vilím led multiple ideological courses for FRELIMO members and,

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633 MZV F. IV/8 10 TO, č.j. 058/70, 1.9.1970.
634 Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 154.
635 ABS 81029_000_1_2, ČJA?, 4.5.1966, 1, l. 33.
according to the available documents, he was also asked to organise some military training for FRELIMO cadets directly in Tanzania. Vilím used his contacts with the leaders of FRELIMO, especially Marcellino Dos Santos, to influence the ideological orientation of this organisation. He also followed all FRELIMO activities closely and intelligence acquired was forwarded via the local Residency to the Prague headquarters. In the following years the Dar es Salaam embassy remained in close contact with FRELIMO officials, but no other technical assistance of any kind is mentioned in the archives.

5.12. The introduction of ujamaa

From 1964 on the government of Tanzania sought more intensive relations with socialist countries. This move was not welcome in the West and Tanzania was beginning to be perceived as a socialist country. Even though at first such claims were not completely justified, because Tanzania had still been very much devoted to non-alignment, over the course of 1966 and 1967 internal political developments saw the progressive introduction of socialist policies to the country’s political life as well as to the economy. From 1967 and especially during the 1970s Nyerere came to personify African socialism and Tanzania became a case study for a unique socialist experiment under African conditions. Besides, not many countries established and maintained such tight relations for so long with various socialist countries as Tanzania did. Tanzania’s move towards socialism was determined by the mixture of factors – the West’s controversial role in the affairs of the Congo and Ghana, falling-out with Britain over Southern Rhodesia, Nyerere’s resolution to give effective support to southern African NLMs, the inclusion of Zanzibar’s socialist politicians in the cabinet, the rapidly decreasing amount of foreign aid to Tanzania and the necessity to replace it with help from the East.

An important step towards the introduction of socialism in Tanzania was the passing of a new Constitution in 1965 that officially introduced a one-party system to the country while banning other political parties and restructuring the trade union

636 ABS 81038_000_1_4, Č.jA?, 25.4.1966, 1, l. 32.
This constitutional amendment caused much less domestic opposition in comparison to similar developments in Uganda, coming as it did soon after the triumphant *Uhuru*; TANU and Nyerere were still at the height of their popularity, the alternative political parties had so far failed to gain significant popular support and the country had operated as a de facto one-party state since independence.

The new Constitution was openly socialist in emphasising the responsibility of government to effectively control the means of production and facilitate collective ownership of the country's resources. The government claimed that the introduction of the one-party system did not threaten the democratic nature of the Tanzanian state as membership of TANU was very high and intra-party competition for political nominations remained in place. In this period also military reform took place when the new *People's Militia* was introduced. This new voluntary military force was not apolitical anymore as it was linked to TANU's Youth League which provided most cadets for the militia. Between 1965 and 1967 the role of the country's Parliament was progressively marginalised when most of the effective policies were being decided by the National Executive Committee (NEC), a party organ dominated by low-ranking TANU officials, rather than by the cabinet or Parliament members.

In 1967 Nyerere finally introduced a document that became known as the Arusha Declaration. It ‘provided a blueprint for the country's socialist development strategy, established the principle of state ownership and control of the national economy. The declaration emphasized the need for self-reliant national economic development that would be less dependent on foreign capital.’ The Arusha Declaration further expounded on the three fundamental principles of Tanzanian socialism as declared by Nyerere in 1966. These were: communal socialism, public ownership and control and curiously also dedication to non-alignment. The Arusha Declaration itself was more concentrated on

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637 Nye, TANU and UPC, 238.
638 Aminzade, Race, 98.
640 Aminzade, Race, 88-89.
641 Aminzade, Race, 135.
the so-called *ujamaa* principles which besides the public ownership already mentioned put much emphasis on egalitarianism, hard work and national self-reliance.643

To put the Arusha Declaration principles into practice the Tanzanian government supported the creation of so-called *ujamaa* villages which were loosely similar to Israel’s concept of the kibbutz. The development of *ujamaa* villages tried to establish the blend of traditional Tanzanian peasant system with some modern improvements, in order to form self-reliant communities as the fundamental constituents of Tanzanian society. *Ujamaa* villages were by far not the only practical outcome of the Arusha declaration. The government’s initiatives were ambitious and they addressed every sphere of the country’s political and economic environment. ‘They included: the nationalization of the banks, the foreign-owned plantations growing Tanzania’s export crops, and important parts of the limited industrial sector; the introduction of a stringent leadership code which sought to contain corruption and to block the emergence of private economic activities and the employment of wage labour by political leaders and by senior party and government officials; a sustained effort to reform the educational system in Tanzania so that young Tanzanians would embrace the values and acquire the skills appropriate to the society of equals they were committed to build; the major effort by TANU to induce peasants to farm collectively; [...] an attempt to regulate in detail a wide range of private economic activities; and an extensive state takeover of household properties that were not occupied by their owners.’644 Later, and not unrelated to the Arusha Declaration, the plan of building a new capital Dodoma in the very centre of the country was also introduced.

The introduction of *ujamaa* naturally created various reactions at home and abroad. West clearly did not approve this further move to the left, while the socialist countries saw new possibilities for exerting their influence now that Tanzania had openly declared itself socialist. From 1966 the Soviet government was increasingly pleased with Tanzania’s development, but even though *ujamaa* had been perceived as a step in the right direction by them, the ultimate objective of the Soviets in Tanzania was to achieve full acceptance of the principles of scientific socialism.645 Dr Kitine recalls the

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643 Tordoff, Mazrui, “The Left,” 433.
645 Tordoff, Mazrui, “The Left,” 443-444.
meeting that President Nyerere had with the Soviet ambassador in the late 1960s, when Tanzania’s president patiently and sturdily defended his ujamaa socialism as a feasible and a more appropriate alternative for Africa than the Soviet-modelled scientific-socialism.

Within TANU itself reactions varied greatly: universally the ujamma policies were accepted by most members, but exceptions did exist. On one side of the spectrum, that of left radicals, there was some opposition because they wanted to impose even more drastic policies based on the principles of either scientific socialism, Marxism-Leninism or Maoism.646 Mwalimu Nyerere repeatedly denounced the growing infatuation of some TANU members with Marxism-Leninism.647 At the other end of the opinion spectrum were the fears of some members of the reform’s being too radical and having adverse social and economic effects. Oscar Kambona was also in this last group: once one of the most fervent socialists within KANU, he found himself, however, increasingly excluded from the circle of power, until he ultimately fell out with Nyerere and opted for exile in Britain in 1967.648 Kambona was not the only victim of the growing illiberalism within TANU. Between 1967 and 1970 several influential party members were detained, tried and some even executed for their criticism and their failure to comply with the political course the TANU government had set.649 Nevertheless, none of these events could really alter the course firmly set towards building socialism in Tanzania over the following two decades.

5.13. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its effect on Czechoslovak- Tanzanian relations

The invasion of the CSSR by Warsaw Pact armies led by the Soviets had an immense effect on affairs between the CSSR and Tanzania and was significantly reflected in these relations. As in Uganda, the change of Czechoslovak political leadership resulting from the invasion meant the end of previous partially independent activism in

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647 Aminzade, Race, 148.
Tanzania. Even though cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Tanzania did eventually resume and even surpassed the intensity of relations in the 1960s, Czechoslovakia never again aspired to practise its own partially independent politics in Tanzania. Rather, it became fully subject to the Soviets, while its place was taken by East Germany.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia initially also affected relations between Tanzania and the Soviet Union. Nyerere, never overly fond of the Soviets, was to become one of the loudest critics of the Soviet invasion. In an immediate reaction to the Soviet invasion, Nyerere cancelled his planned state visit to the USSR and postponed it until such time as the Soviets would retreat from the CSSR. The Tanzanian Foreign Office reacted to the situation with a statement of full support and approval of CS political developments prior to the invasion, developments which had been considered by the Soviets a dangerous deviation from socialist principles. The spontaneous reactions of Tanzanian politicians and public are best illustrated by the telegrams that Ambassador Josef Virius sent to Prague. ‘Tanzanian government denounced aggression as an act of colonialism. [..] Tanzanian newspapers resolutely denounce occupation of CSSR since the beginning.’ The official declaration of Nyerere’s government on this matter stated, amongst other things, that the ‘Tanzanian government is deeply shaken by the occupation of the CSSR. [...] This act of aggression constitutes betrayal of all principles of self-determination and national sovereignty. [...] Tanzania is against all forms of colonialism, new as well as old, in Africa, in Europe, everywhere.’ According to Virius, the Tanzanian media reported fully in line with information provided by the CS government and ignored Soviet explanations. Official political statements were followed in the first few days after the invasion by demonstrations organised by student organisations and officially led by the Foreign Secretary of Tanzania. Demonstrators marched across Dar es Salaam in front of the Soviet and the CS embassies on several occasions.

The Czechoslovak ambassador, Josef Virius, himself an outspoken critic of the Soviet invasion, reported numerous declarations of support received by Tanzanian officials, but also by members of other diplomatic missions, including African missions,
with the obvious exception of representatives of countries participating in the invasion.\textsuperscript{655} According to Virius' reports on the local situation, the Soviet invasion was heavily criticised by representatives of African NLMs including \textit{FRELIMO}\textsuperscript{656} and by several African countries with vital relations with the Soviets, for example the Egyptian President Nassir. The Tanzanian reaction to the invasion was among the strongest and most critical that the Soviets faced in Africa, but especially amongst the socialist countries of the world.

Nyerere’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of the CSSR was certainly daring, but Tanzania was in no economic position to abandon all contacts with the USSR for long. According to the recollections of Nyerere's closest colleagues, Nyerere's personal opinion of the USSR was extremely negative, but this view could not have been fully reflected in Tanzanian foreign policy in the long term. While it is true that Tanzanian orientation towards China deepened further after 1968, economic and technical cooperation with the Soviets was also sought, and occasional inter-governmental meetings could not be avoided.\textsuperscript{657}

Eventually, as mentioned above, Czechoslovakia also resumed its activities in Tanzania. Archival documents illustrate, however, how cautious and reserved Tanzania's officials were towards the newly arrived representatives of the Czechoslovak state. The diplomatic and expert staff present in Tanzania at the time of the invasion decided for the greater part to break links with home and opt for exile. The continuum of relations with Tanzanian officials as well as various NLMs being supported was disturbed somewhat by this development and it took some time for cooperation to be fully reinstated.

Czechoslovak political and diplomatic relations with Tanzania after 1968 were deeply affected not only by the invasion itself, but mostly by the change of political leadership that took place in the CSSR and which Nyerere was rather cautious about. It took several years before CSSR foreign political activities were resumed. In respect of sub-Saharan Africa, the 1973 MFA report stresses the effective cooperation successfully established with ‘brother states’, namely the USSR, Poland, Hungary and East Germany, all of which took part in the 1968 invasion of the CSSR.\textsuperscript{658} This best illustrates the nature

\textsuperscript{655} MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 025.801/68-8, Aug 1968.
\textsuperscript{656} MZV F. IV/8 8TO, č.j. 024.096/73-8, 18.7.1973, 5.
\textsuperscript{658} MZV F. IV/8 8TO, č.j. 010.317/74-8, August 1974, 4
and extent of the political turnaround that took place in the early 1970s during the period of harsh ‘normalisation’ of the political situation in Czechoslovakia.

In the plans of the ‘normalised’ MFA, which were based on the objectives approved by the XIV KSČ Congress and by the Politbyro, Tanzania was included in the group of progressive African states, with whom future relations were to be a priority.659 The political coldness of Tanzania towards the new CS government was slowly diminishing and in December 1971 a CS government delegation was invited to attend the national celebrations.660 Mutual interest in re-establishing cooperation led to an economic agreement envisaging projects of up to 10 million USD.661 Available information, however, indicates that once again these ambitious plans of economic cooperation did not materialise and all that remained were political gestures and joint declarations.

659 MZV F. IV/8 8TO, č.j. 024.096/73-8, 18.7.1973, 2.
660 Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 208.
661 MZV F. IV/8 8TO, č.j. 024.096/73-8, 18.7.1973, 3.
6. Czechoslovakia and Africa after 1968

The Soviet invasion in August 1968 became the major historical event in modern CS history and, in a number of ways, it also affected CS relations with East Africa. Nevertheless, it would be grossly inaccurate and wrong to identify 21 August 1968 as a moment of crucial turnaround in CS relations with all African countries. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia carried differing implications even for relations with three East African countries. In the case of Kenya the Soviet invasion only added to Czechoslovakia's swift and ultimate retreat which began in 1966 and sped up from then on. For Czechoslovak activities in Uganda the effects of the Soviet invasion were perhaps the least significant. A much greater disturbance that marked the end of one era of mutual cooperation and the beginning of another was Idi Amin's coup d'état. Only in the case of Tanzania were the effects of the Soviet invasion what they were for Czechoslovak state in general – major disruption, the end of a euphoric stage of socialist development and the beginning of new period of an unambitious, ineffective, subdued Soviet satellite whose position was claimed by other socialist countries.

Between 1965 and 1968 various levels of criticism of past CS activities in Africa were being formulated by different government offices. An assessment of past relations with ELDCs approved by the Politbyro in December 1967 is one of the most positive evaluations. ‘Latest developments have confirmed the correctness of our basic strategy [towards ELDCs] based on accomplishing these tasks: to execute mutually beneficial cooperation with developing countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, to support progressive social forces in these countries in their fight against imperialism, neocolonialism and against the exportation of contra-revolution, support in their effort to attain full political and economic independence and social progress, and to offer general support to national liberation struggles of oppressed nations.’ One has to be aware that it was unacceptable for the Politbyro to denounce its past practice towards ELDCs where no major reason for such step existed. For political and ideological reasons it was much more useful to portray its past activities as successful, even though many of the objectives from the beginning of the decade had not been met.

MFA officials were much more critical of the accomplishments of CS foreign policy in Africa. As shown in internal documents, in 1966 they had already begun to express criticism towards the developments in Africa in the previous decade. They were aware that plans to cripple capitalist camps via close and effective cooperation between the socialist countries and African states had not been fulfilled. Most of the blame for this failure they, however, addressed towards the Africans. The MFA analysis identified a range of political and economic reasons for the failure of their plans. Poor economic performance, minimal economic growth, excessive economic dependency on the markets of former colonial masters and the archaic structure of African societies are the reasons cited for economic disappointment. The on-going economic struggle had had an effect on the political instability of local regimes and subsequent dependency on the West. Political turbulences had effectively put a stop to the continental wave of the national liberation cause, which was yet to be completed.663

The poor state of the political-economic landscape across Africa in the late 1960s was much more challenging and much less favourable to socialist countries than a decade earlier. A more realistic approach to Africa, reconsideration of past errors and of overly optimistic objectives, as well as reassessing the actual political potential of Africa within the global context, were necessary steps to be taken by CS policy-makers at the end of the 1960s. The approach taken towards Africa during the next period was characterised as follows: ‘Tropical Africa, where it is possible to develop diverse relations on the basis of mutual benefits and advantages (especially in the economic area), remains an attractive region for our foreign politics, [...]. It should not be forgotten that due to the multitude of African states, tropical Africa remains an important factor at international forums. Despite current political instability of the majority of these countries and despite the reduced pace of national liberation movement, which has not been completely eliminated by imperialism, one has to take into account that in the long-term perspective, the inclination of this part of the world towards speeding up political and economic emancipation will resurface. [...] Cooperation with socialist countries could be an important factor. Certain evidence of such a trend can already be observed in some eastern African countries.’664

663 MZV PK 126, č.j. 104.876/69-8, 17.3.1969, 17-20.
As is obvious from the previous citation, CS officials were aware that the intensive, euphoric but often erroneous development of the early 1960s needed to be revoked. They also realised that potential CS success in Africa would not have a far-reaching effect on the balance of power between East and West. The global political significance of Africa also needed to be realistically reconsidered. It is important to realise that the wave of de-colonialism and hasty unprepared independence of numerous African states that followed was an unprecedented historical event. As such, it was impossible for CS officials to ready themselves for what was to come and it is only natural that some of the original assumptions, expectations and plans proved faulty. Despite all the limitations and shortfalls that agents of CS relations with African countries had to cope with, their high aspirations, proven abilities and results of their activities achieved in less than a decade must be perceived positively.
Conclusion

The story of Czechoslovak involvement in East Africa in the late colonial and early post-colonial period is a story of unlikely yet important and influential political relations that came into existence as one of many episodes which together represent the wide and complex historical epoch of the Cold War. Czechoslovak cooperation with East Africa was very much a result of the state of global international relations but at the same time it was also a second phase, or an extension of sorts, of an earlier Czechoslovak presence in the African continent from before the Second World War.

A deep exploration of recently opened Czechoslovak archive collections produced a large mass of original historical sources that allowed the reconstruction of Czechoslovak activities in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and a subsequent analysis of a variety of aspects that characterised Czechoslovak involvement. Most of the questions formulated in the very beginning of this research project as well as those which arose during data collection or in relation to the analysis of existing secondary literature have been fully or at least partially answered by these findings. The documentary evidence collected also allowed for the primary hypothesis of this thesis formulated during the research to be satisfyingly proved. Some of the answers to research questions highlighted in the introduction to this thesis have been answered clearly by the documentary evidence collected, while some others had to be derived from a combination of primary and secondary sources.

Czechoslovak activities in East African in the late colonial and early post-colonial period took place as part of the new quest of socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, to establish themselves in Africa. In the late 1950s a wave of decolonisation started in West Africa and eventually reached the eastern part of continent a few years later. In this period Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union successfully initiated contacts with several West African countries thus providing themselves with a policy framework and an applicable strategy to react effectively to the intensifying liberation movements of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika.

There were several main objectives of Czechoslovak and Soviet activities in Africa at this stage. At first, socialist countries aimed to provide effective support to
African national liberation movements in order to end the colonial dominance of the British and the French. They believed that providing local freedom fighters with effective support in their pursuit of independence would help to establish firm ties with the new East African regimes. Through these relations, which would be taking place in various forms and in various spheres, East African political regimes would be brought closer to the socialist camp. An ultimate goal was to influence local governments to adopt socialism as the political and economic system for their countries. Such a move would necessarily lead to a decrease of Western influence in East Africa and to a partial victory in the global political rivalry between the socialist East and the capitalist West.

Czechoslovakia used various means to reach its objectives in East Africa. In the first, pre-independence, stage, it needed to establish working channels of communication which would enable it to react effectively to the requirements and demands of East African NLMs. In the case of Kenya and Uganda these channels were established via KANU’s and the UPC’s office in Cairo, who were in regular contact with officials of the Czechoslovak embassy in Egypt. The Cairo offices of KANU and the UPC remained in regular contact with CS officials who were thus able to respond to their requests for support. At this stage the most effective forms of support proved to be the provision of financial and technical help to both KANU and the UPC, and organising professional training for selected applicants, at this point mainly in the sphere of propaganda and journalism. Czechoslovak officials were aware that expertise of that kind would be vital in order to advertise the political cause the NLMs were following and to attract wide public support for it. Another form of relations of high significance in this period was Czechoslovakia’s outspoken political support of the anti-colonial efforts of African NLMs, thus not only helping KANU, the UPC and also TANU to exert pressure on the British and gain some concessions from them, but also enhancing the image of Czechoslovakia as a fervent supporter of anti-colonial effort in general, which helped in establishing relations with other Third World countries. Czechoslovaks were very successful in their choice of political organisations to support, as KANU, the UPC and TANU emerged as the strongest political parties once independence was won. Colonialism was deconstructed in East Africa much sooner than had been originally anticipated and Czechoslovakia certainly played a part in it through effective support of the national liberation movements.
Once the countries of East Africa achieved independence, the political landscape changed radically. Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika sought to ensure political stability and economic development, but they faced a number of constraints in achieving these goals. Their political institutions were weak and immature and they had inherited various pressing issues from the colonial times. They also lacked trained professional cadres able to fill in all the gaps in civil service, education, military and health care. The means of economic production were to a large extent in the hands of the former colonists, which hindered the chances of economic development. To address these weaknesses all three East African countries sought international support, which, however, entailed some political implications.

Independence for East African countries involved some important changes to Czechoslovak activities in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. The new main objective was to bring these countries’ politics close to the socialist camp and eventually enable the implementation of socialism in their political systems. There were two interlinked strategies for this. It was to strengthen the position of the dominant political party and that of the leader thought the most promising candidate for safeguarding the main Czechoslovak objectives while ensuring Czechoslovakia retained access to and influence over this politician. A second strategy was to provide Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika with effective technical and economic support that would make Czechoslovakia a viable alternative to the West. In theory the successful application of both strategies would seriously undermine the position of Western countries in East Africa, consolidate the decisive political power in the hands of the friendly ruling political party and eventually lead to the inclusion of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika in the socialist camp. Of course, in an attempt to make these successes of a more permanent nature some serious opposition by the West would have to be dealt with together with ensuring lasting political stability of these African regimes.

Czechoslovakia enjoyed differing rates of success in applying the two strategies and in reaching its ultimate objectives. In Kenya Czechoslovak officials initially benefitted from their strong position which was established thanks to effective support provided to KANU before independence. Czechoslovak officials had very close relations with the second-in-command of KANU’s government, vice-president Odinga. In an attempt to strengthen Odinga’s position in the party, while at the same time seriously
undermining the British position, it was decided to provide Kenya with support in special security and military assistance. However, the news of Odinga’s close cooperation with Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries spread, mainly thanks to the activity of British, and this, together with the growing ideological conflict between Kenyatta and Odinga, caused Odinga’s fall from power. His political decline meant Czechoslovakia lost all political influence at the top of Kenyan politics and with it any real chance of reaching the set political objectives in Kenya.

Meanwhile, in Uganda Czechoslovakia benefitted from direct access to and very good relations with President Obote, who was open to cooperation with socialist countries. Here, too Czechoslovakia opted for providing special military and security support. This was executed in such a way that both military and security organisations would be loyal to Obote and thus would safeguard his political position in the country. At the same it was perceived as a chance to undermine the West’s position in Uganda. This strategy was quite successful and it worked in bringing Uganda to the verge of introducing socialism. However, all these achievements were hindered by the fact that socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, failed to provide Uganda with similarly effective economic support and the country thus remained economically dependent on Britain. A failing economy combined with unresolved socio-political issues eventually prompted the military coup that did away with all the successes of Czechoslovak policy in Uganda. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia’s effort in Uganda in reaching the set objectives has to be considered reasonably successful as it initially reached several of its aims, and only failed in providing the conditions that would protect the regime thus created from external as well as internal disturbances in the long term.

The last analysed case study – Tanganyika – is different from the previous two. The Czechoslovak position in the country was initially rather weak as there was no history of substantial cooperation before independence. President Nyerere was the unchallenged leader of TANU and Tanganyika and before 1965 efforts by socialist countries to establish themselves in Tanganyika were greatly limited by Nyerere’s reservations towards the Soviet camp. Once this changed, Czechoslovakia tried to intensify cooperation in the field of civil technical assistance, and regular contacts of civil society organisations took place. Special cooperation remained restricted throughout the 1960s. Czechoslovakia was not able to provide civil technical assistance on such a
scale and under such conditions that would have been able to challenge the growing importance of China. Contacts of civil society organisations and the flourishing cultural exchange proved ineffective in the pursuit of political influence in Tanzania because economic and trade relations had remained seriously underdeveloped. The fact that Tanzania opted for socialism had very little to do with Czechoslovak efforts.

The three case studies support the primary research hypothesis, that if Czechoslovakia was to have a realistic chance of reaching any of its political objectives in East Africa a combination of specific conditions had to be met. The most effective form of exerting influence on political development in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika turned out to be special military or security assistance. However, it proved effective only when Czechoslovakia was able to ensure political support of the Kenyan, Ugandan or Tanganyikan political leadership. In order to sustain the political influence gained, it was necessary to provide the country in question with effective economic support or technical assistance that would drive its development. If all of these conditions were met, Czechoslovakia would be able to actively influence the political development of local states, undermine the position of the West and come close to reaching and sustaining her political objectives. However, if any of these conditions were not present or other forms of support were provided instead, the Czechoslovak ability to influence political development of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika was very low.

The main limitation of this historical research was linked to the data collection stage. Original plans for the data collection were hindered by totally unsatisfactory results of collection of personal testimonies in Czechoslovakia. Also the gathering of personal testimonies in Africa failed to fully reach the high expectations of acquiring the range of original historical data that would enrich the African perspective on this topic. However, the greatest frustration of the data collection phase arose from the fact that archival research in Kenya and Uganda had produced no relevant historical data in the former case, and could not even take place, for reasons beyond control of this researcher, in the latter. Should this subject matter ever be addressed by future projects of historical research, a repeated attempt at archival research in East Africa will most certainly have to be an initial task.
Even though this research project was reasonably successful in addressing the majority of the research questions raised, there are still several issues needing further investigation if they are to be explained satisfactorily. Limitations of the research methodology applied did not allow for certain aspects of Czechoslovak-East African relations to be adequately examined. An obvious area for widening the scope of this research exists in relation to further data collection. Time constraints as well as the length-limitation set for a doctoral thesis were the main reasons for not engaging in archival research in Britain and Russia. It is quite likely that British and Russian archival collections keep a range of historical documentary evidence that would certainly provide a different perspective on Czechoslovak activities in East Africa in the period of the imminent independence of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika.

Russian archives could be useful to explain more clearly some of the aspects of the Czechoslovak-Soviet partnership for their mission to spread socialism to Africa. Investigating sources on Russian foreign policy-making towards Africa could help to explain the cooperation mechanism that existed between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and to establish to what extent the execution of Czechoslovak *Africa policy* was directly controlled by the Soviets, and more precisely to establish how independent and autonomous Czechoslovak policy-making was. It would also be interesting to find out, if at all possible, how much the formation of Russian policy towards Africa was influenced by Czechoslovak expert knowledge of the continent. Russian archives could also shed more light on how the Soviet attitude towards Czechoslovakia as its main collaborator in executing their African objectives started to change in the run-up to 1968.

British archival collections on the other hand could perhaps help to unravel how the British administration perceived Czechoslovak activities and how serious a challenge they felt them to be, both before and after independence. It would also be interesting to see what strategies the British designed to contain Czechoslovak and Soviet activities and how such strategies were implemented.

A natural direction for further research on this topic would be to expand its scope to the later periods of Cold War development in the 1970s and early 1980s when Czechoslovak activities in Africa came from a significantly different domestic political
situation and from Czechoslovakia’s very different role in the Soviet foreign political framework. Such an extension to the present research could benefit from later collections in the various archives gradually being made available, and from greater access to oral testimonies of figures directly involved in the execution of these relations. It would be interesting to see how Czechoslovakia’s political objectives and the forms of cooperation in East Africa changed in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to the Brezhnev regime’s new foreign political doctrine. Alternatively, further research could investigate Czechoslovak relations to a different set of African states and offer a comparative analysis of the two regions studied.

Even though some shortcomings of this research were identified above as well as number of issues that would still need to be addressed, the results and conclusions established here and presented in this thesis are certainly useful and relevant enough to have justified the decision to undertake this project. This thesis has potential to be not only a stand-alone work of historiography, but to become a valid extension of historiographic discourse of the Cold War as well as of national historiographies of Czechoslovakia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, not to mention its applicability for the academic discourse of international relations.
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List of researched archival funds

Used abbreviations

F.- Fond (Fund)
kt.- Kartón (Box)
s.- svazek (Folder)
a.j.- archivní jednotka (archived item)
Č.j.- číslo jednací (reference number)
B.- bod (item)
Čj.A. - číslo jednací archivu (Reference number of archive)
I.č.- Inventární číslo (Inventory number)
l- list (leaf), out of total within carton or folder
r.n.- Reference number
d.n.- Document number
TO- Teritoriální odbor (Territorial Department)
T- tajné (secret)
O- obyčejné (ordinary)
NA- National archive
MZV- Archiv MZV (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
ABS- Archiv bezpečnostních složek (Security Services Archive)
VUA- Vojenský ústřední archive (Central Military Archive)

**Archiv bezpečnostních složek (Security Services Archive), Prague, Czech Republic**

11387- Závislé státy Afriky po linii 9.odb
11451-Afrika oper.rozpracování
11592- Afrika
11691- Kenja oper. rozproc
11701- Uganda – operativní rozpracování
11711- Afrika oper.rozpracování
12592- Agenturně operativní prostředí
12828- Afrika
80952- Rezidentura Nairobi
80955- Rezidentura Nairobi
80958- V. a Z. Afrika
81029- Čs. pomoc africkým zemím po linii bezpečnosti

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559 MZV F IV/4 10 TO, kt. 1, čj. 026023/63 10, Materiály pro konsultaci s PLR o Africe, 11.6.1963, 1-5.


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604 MZV F IV/5 Tanzánie, kt.1, 2, čj. 027.468/64-10, Výsledky jednání delegace SRTZ v ČSSR, 7.9.1964, 1.

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651 MZV F IV/6 Tanzánie, kt. 1, č.j. 025.801/68-8, Stanoviska Tanzánie k srpnovým událostem, 7287 Sa, 2.9.1968.

652 MZV F IV/6 Tanzánie, kt. 1, č.j. 025.801/68-8, Stanoviska Tanzánie k srpnovým událostem, 1748/250, 29.8.1968.

653 MZV F IV/6 Tanzánie, kt. 1, č.j. 025.801/68-8, Stanoviska Tanzánie k srpnovým událostem, 1714/60, 22.8.1968.

654 MZV F IV/6 Tanzánie, kt. 1, č.j. 025.801/68-8, Stanoviska Tanzánie k srpnovým událostem, 1556/68, 23.8.1968.

655 MZV F IV/6 Tanzánie, kt. 1, č.j. 025.801/68-8, Stanoviska Tanzánie k srpnovým událostem, Aug 1968.


658 MZV F IV/8 8TO, kt. 1, č.j. 010.317/74-8, Hodnotící souhrnná zpráva o činnosti 8 odboru v r.1973, August 1974, 4.


Gašpar, Dr. Pavol, Interview with the author. Skalica, Slovakia, May 11, 2011.


Kitine, Dr Hassy. Interview with the author. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, June 29, 2011.


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Appendix 1: Original versions of foreign language quotations

Number refers to particular footnote in main body of text

60 Klimek, and Kubů, Československá, 9. („Naše vnitřní politika bude ovplyvňována tou zahraniční víc než kdekoli jinde.”)

67 Krofta, Zahraniční politika československá, 5. („Všichni národné, velcí i malí, jsou rovnoprávními státními a kulturními individualitami a mají právo o sobě rozhodovat.”)

74 Dejmek, Československo, 336. („V polovině roku 1921, kdy byla organizace československého diplomatického sboru ukončena, fungovalo kolem světa 23 velvyslanectví, 20 generálních konzulátů a 29 konzulátů a honorárních konzulátů.”)

101 Petruf, Taliansko, 94. („Armáda bola vyzbrojená najmodernejšími zbraňami vraťane letectva, tankov a obrněných vozidel, ba i chemických zbraní, najmä yperitu.”)

110 Beneš, Paměti, 43. („Nemůžeme zapomenout, že Vaše Excelence sympatizovala s Etiopii v čase kdy tato postrádala zbraně a byla napadena fašistickou Italií. I když pro přátelské krajiny bylo velice obtížné poskytnout Etiopii zbraně, Československo ignorovalo tyto překážky a pomohlo utlačované krajině dodat tento materiál. Obvinění vznesena agresorem nepohla československou pozici ani o kousek.”)

181 Kalvoda, Role, 175. („byl velice spokojen, že Československo bylo zahrnuto do sovětské sféry operací.”)

184 Kalvoda, Role, 144 ( „Podpis Smlouvy o přátelství, vzájemné pomoci a poválečné spolupráci mezi Československem a Sovětským svazem 12. prosince 1943, která měla dvacetiletou platnost, měl však dalekosáhlé důsledky nejen pro samotné Československo, ale i pro celou střední a východní Evropu.”)

189 Slovenská národná rada. Košický vládní program, quoted in Zbořil, Československá a česká, 207. („Základy naší zahraniční politiky byly položeny již během uplynulé války. Spojenectví se Sovětským svazem, vyjádřené smlouvou z r.1943, zůstává vedoucí zásadou naší zahraniční politiky i v době míru, neboť dobré víme, že je to právě Sovětský svaz, který nám je nejspolehlivější zárukou naší svobody a samostatnosti. [...] Vyjadřujíc
neskonalou vděčnost českého a slovenského národa k Sovětskému svazu, bude vláda pokládat za neochvějnou vůdčí linii československé zahraniční politiky nejtesnější spojenectví s vítěznou slovanskou velmocí na Východě. Smlouva [...] o vzájemné pomoci, přátelství a poválečné spolupráci bude určovat pro veškerou budoucnost zahraničně politickou pozici našeho státu.

Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální, 269 („Jako průmyslově nejvyspělejší země sovětského bloku bylo Československo pověřováno předimenzovanými výrobními úkoly: na jedné straně se čs. průmysl významně podílel na industrializaci ostatních, ekonomicky méně vyspělých členských zemí RVHP, na druhé straně se překotně rozšiřovala zbrojní výroba. ČSR se stala objektem tlaku Sovětského svazu a dalších zemí na maximalizaci tempa růstu strategicky významné produkce.

Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální, 280. („cílem Projektu bylo vyzbrojit čs. armádu tak, aby do konce roku 1953 byla připravena na vedení aktivní obrany“

Petruf, Československá zahraniční politika, 11. („ČSR spája so ZSSR trvalé, úprimné a důsledné spojenectvo, které sa nikdy nestane predmetom stranických sporov. Zároveň máme aj trvalý záujem o priateľské vzťahy s Veľkou Britániou, USA a Francúzskom."

Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 22-23. („Dostupné dokumenty neumožňují fungování předsednictva přesné rekonstruovat...Není však zcela zřetelné, jakým způsobem se jednotlivá usnesení přijímala...zda se o konkrétních bodech hlasovalo, či se schvalovaly jednomyslně."

Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 23. („Sekretariát se zabýval především personálními problémy: do jeho kompetence patřilo mimo jiné jmenování do všech nižších diplomatických funkcí. Do oblasti zahraniční politiky zasahoval sekretariát také tím, že schvaloval výjezdy do ciziny novinářům, vědeckým a kulturním pracovníkům, periodicky mu také byly předkládány zprávy o zahraničních stycích různých organizací."

Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální, 566. („...byl zahraniční obchod vyhlášen státním monopolem, jehož vrcholným orgánem se stalo Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu. V širším pojatí šlo o státní monopol vnějších ekonomických vztahů.“)
204 Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální, 566. („zabezpečení ekonomické nezávislosti na kapitalistických zemích, ochranu před výkyvy světového trhu, usnadnění spolupráce se socialistickými zeměmi, zapojení centrálně regulovaného obchodu do systému národo hospodářského plánování a jednotné řízení dovozu i vývozu v souladu s obchodní politikou a celospoločenskými zájmy.“)

231 NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 00/1509/61, June 1961, 6. („Monopol na hospodářské styky imperialistických zemí s HMVZ byl zlomen vznikem socialistické světové soustavy, která tím, že rozvíjí s těmito zeměmi hospodářské styky na základě rovnoprávnosti, vzájemné výhodnosti a nevměšování se do vnitřních záležitostí aktivně ovlivňuje charakter mezinárodních hospodářských styků kapitalistických zemí navzájem.“)


239 NAA F. 1261/0/5, č.j. 893/9,1966, 37. („... uplatnit se především v oborech, rozhodujících pro řešení hlavních problémů rozvoje rozvojových zemí a na takových místech, odkud lze nejlépe nenáislnou formou pozitivně ovlivňovat jak další orientaci vnitřního vývoje, tak vztahy příslušných zemí k ČSSR a k ostatním socialistickým státům.“)

240 NAA F. 1261/0/5, č.j. 893/9,1966, 37. („... musíme usilovat o to, abychom zejména v pokrokových zemích postupně prosadili náhradu některých poradců z imperialistických států v důležitých orgánech státní správy, ozbrojených sil, hospodářství, kultury a propagandy našimi odborníky...“)

242 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961. 2. („Prohlášení porady představitelů komunistických a dělnických stran konané v Moskvě v listopadu 1960[...] konstatovalo: „Úplný krach kolonialismu je nevyhnutelný. Zhracení systému koloniálního otroctví pod tlakem národně svobodozeneckého hnutí je svým historickým významem druhým nejdůležitějším jevem po vzniku světové socialistické soustavy.“)
243 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961.2. („Naše republika má vzhledem ke své průmyslové vyspělosti a vysoké úrovni školství a kultury přiznivé podmínky k tomu, aby účinně pomáhala osvobozujícím se národům Afriky v jejich hospodářském a kulturním rozvoji.“)

244 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961. 8. („Úkolem našich školských a kulturních styků je pomáhat osvobozeným africkým národům urychleně likvidovat neblahé důsledky kolonialismu na vzdělání afrického lidu, budovat a rozvíjet africké školství všech stupňů, odstraňovat technickou zaostalost, pomáhat při zakládání a rozvíjení vědy a podporovat rozkvět uměleckých oborů.“)

245 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961., 8. („Úkolem naší kulturně propagační činnosti v Africe je přesvedčivě ukazovat obrovské úspěchy při budování socialistického Československa, populární a přístupnou formou seznamovat africkou veřejnost s vysoce uměními a demokratickými zásadami našeho života, zakotvenými v socialistické Ústavě naší republiky, šířit znalosti o úspěších československé techniky, vědy a kultury, seznamovat s vysokou životní úrovní, sociálními vymoženostmi a výsledky práce československého lidu vůbec. Přitom rozbíjet, zvlášte v zemích Severní Afriky, falešné představy o nadřazenosti evropských kapitalistických států a o jejich nepostradatelnosti pro rozvoj afrického hospodářství a kultury.“)

246 MZV PK 1, č.j. 022.704/61-10, 4.3.1961. 8. („...kteří jsou pro naše myšlenky vnímavější než stará generace, formovaná feudálním systémem a ideologii kolonizátorů.“)

250 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 010027/62-SM, 6.1.1962, 6. („Navazování a rozšiřování našich styků po linii cirkevních organizací představuje další nevyužité možnosti našich styků s africkými zeměmi. Náboženské vlivy v Africe jsou silné a imperialisté je používají jako velmi účinné nástroje na udržení svých vykořisťovatelských zájmů. ČSSR má v tomto směru větší možnosti než ZSSR a bylo by správné v tomto směru vyvinout maximální aktivity."

259 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 003.950/61, 1961, 4. („Důsledným stoupencem protiimperialistického boje je místopředseda strany Oginga Odinga, který prosazuje spolupráci se zeměmi socialistického tábora. Odinga má podporu většiny strany a teší se velké oblibě mezi jejími členy. ČSSR udržuje již delší dobu styky s levicovým křídlem KANU, jehož představitel Odinga navštívil v létě 1960 ČSSR.“)
Oginga Odinga, místopředseda, teší se sympatiím mladých, pod jejichž tlakem byl do programu strany vložen požadavek „plánovaného hospodářství.“)

Africký národní svaz Kenje potřebuje naléhavě pomoc ihned. V Kenji začíná předvolební kampaň, která do značné míry rozhodne o budoucím postavení pokrokových sil v zemi. USA a Velká Británie vrhají do Kenje velké sumy, aby korupci udržely své pozice v této oblasti. K tomu nemalou mírou přispívá stočený generální konsulát USA v Nairobi [...] toto odbodí rozhoduje o nejbližší budoucnosti Kenje a [...] pokrokové síly spoléhají jedině na země socialistického tábora, z nichž především na SSSR a ČSSR [...] jestli ČSSR chce pomoci, je nutno pomoc poskytnout nyní, aby se neopakovala historie Konga.

Ve spolupráci vojenského a jiného důvěrného charakteru se bude Kenya po vyhlášení nezávislosti orientovat na země socialistického tábora, zatímco přirozeně nebude odmítat hospodářskou spolupráci se Západem, připadně nevícenou ekonomickou pomoc USA a Mezinárodní banky pro rozvoj.”)

vyvíjeli aktivitu nám nepřátelskou, nabádaly studenty k odchodu z ČSSR, pomluvám a nepřátelským projevům po opuštění našeho území.”)

...prohlásil, že Keňa hodlá úzce spolupracovat se zeměmi socialistického tábora a počítá s naší pomocí. Řekl dále, že Keňa hodlá využít dobrých zkušeností socialistických zemí při budování politicky a ekonomick z nezávislé Keně. Prohlásil též, že se nemáme nechat mýlit tím, mluví-li se nyní v Africe o Africkém socialismu, neboť hlavní zásady socialismu jsou na celém světě týtéž.”)

Bude zapotřebí vyhledávat též těsnější styky zejména s lidmi blízkými samotnému Kenyattovi a zastupujícími v ústředních
orgánech nejsilnější kmen Kikuju. I když se na první pohled zdá táto otázka malicherná, není ji možné přehlížet. Kmenové rozpory, které v době boje za nezávislost ustupovaly do pozadí, nabyly po získání nezávislosti, zejména v době, kdy bylo nutné obsazovat vedoucí místa v nově budovaném státním aparátě, na intensitě a je nutné s touto skutečností počítat.

323 MZV F. IV/4, č.j. 01028/64, 27.4.1964, 3. („Kenyatta [...] prohlásil, že vítá naši přítomnost v Keni a přislíbil nám plnou podporu při veškeré naší činnosti v Keni. [...] Kenyatta vyjádřil ochotu těsně s námi spolupracovat na nejrůznějších úsecích a požádal o konkrétní pomoc na úsecích týkajících se obrany země vzhledem k tomu, že koncem roku odejdou z Keně britská vojska.

325 MZV F. IV/4, č.j. 01028/64, 27.4.1964, 7. („...prohlásil, že byl vždy pro těsnou spolupráci s námi a že podpoří ve vládě každý návrh na spolupráci s ČSSR. Toto jeho prohlášení je tím pozoruhodnější, že se jedná o vyložené proamerického exponenta, což je o něm všeobecně známo. [...] Minister T. Mboya sám vystupuje aktivně v celé řadě dalších otázek a mluví k problému žen, africké jednoty, jižní Afriky a k celé řadě dalších otázek. Veškeré projevy mu připravuje skupina asi 5 amerických expertů, specialistů na jednotlivé ekonomické a politické otázky. Lze se proto domnívat, že jeho prohlášení o spolupráci s námi jsou více méně pokrytecká a sloužila spíše k zamaskování jeho práve orientace.

347 MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 092/65-Ks, 28.7.1965, 2. („Bylo zjištěno a prověřeno, že Angličané a Američané mají v současné době eminentní zájem na jednotě a spolupráci těchto tří pravicových skupin.

349 MZV F. IV/6, Keňa, č.j. 05/66 (020288), 6.1.1966, 1. („Nedocenili jsme ekonomickou a politickou a vojenskou závislost země na Velké Británii a její pozice ve státním aparátě a hospodářství [...] v zemi, kterou také ona ze svých hledisek považuje za klíčovou v oblasti Východní Afriky. [...] Aby zabránila možnému zvratu ve vnitřní i zahraniční politice země, využívala Velká Británie ekonomické a vojenské závislosti Keni ke zvýšenému nátlaku na pravicové síly ve vládě. Ruku v ruce s tím hrály svou úlohu i půjčky západních zemí.

351 MZV F. IV/6, Keňa, č.j. 05/66 (020288), 6.1.1966, 2. („Keňa zůstáva i nadále důležitou zemí Afriky jak z hledisek vztahových s ČSSR, tak z hledisek perspektivního
posílení pozic pokrokových sil. Kromě toho její důležitost a význam neklesl ve východoafrické, ani celoafrické problematice.

352 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 2273/13, 4.11.1963, 5, l. 10. („...požádal o vyškolení nejméně 20 důstojníků pro keňskou armádu v jednoletých a nebo dvouletých kurzech a 30 důstojníků pro bezpečnost v 6-měsíčním kurze. Podle Othiena mají důstojníci, vyškolení v ČSSR, nahradit postupně britské odborníky. Levice KANU hodlá též po nezávislosti nakoupit zbraně v ČSSR a přeškolit u nás vybrané důstojníky, nyní školené ve V. Británie.“)

353 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 2273/13, 4.11.1963, 5, l. 10. („...pomoci při reorganizaci a vybudování nového bezpečnostního aparátu . Jedná se hlavně o vyškolení potřebného počtu kádrů v ČSSR a případné vyslání československých expertů k vypracování organizace a metod řízení tohoto úseku.“)


355 VUA MNO 1965, č.j. H, J, 01375/OTP, 6.4.1965, 1. („Vzhledem k uvedené situaci lze očekávat, že Kenja bude při získávání speciálního materiálu ze zemí socialistického tábora postupovat velmi opatrně, aby nedala záminku k odvetným hospodářským sankcím Anglie.“)

356 ABS 80952_000_1_5, Č.j.A, A1-00 641/40-64, 20.10.1964, 1, l. 43. („Od rezidentury očekáváme, že bude průběžně zasílat oficiální materiály i agenturní poznatky ke všem institucím a úřadům VB v Keně, k anglickým státním příslušníkům, kteří pracují v keňském státním aparátě, k ostatním osobám, které mají k objektům (i osobám) HN přímý vztah.“)

357 ABS 80952_000_1_5, Č.j.A, A1-00 641/40-64, 20.10.1964, 2, l. 45. („Centrála očekává, že do dovolené v roce 1965 se rezidentuře podaří vytypovat nejméně šest vhodných osob se vztahem k HN, z toho dva rozpracovat do stadia před verbkovou.“)

358 ABS 11691_109_1_2, 6.9.1965, 2, 2. („...odhalit neokolonialistické metody pronikání VB do Keně a demaskovat pravicové činitele KANU jako nástroj britské politiky v Keni.“)
383 ABS 11691_109_2_2, Č.jA. A-00 311/40-69, 23.4.1969, 1, l. 73. („...v návaznosti na dříve námí s tímto záměrem realizované operace prohlubovat politickou kompromitaci Mboyi a pomáhat k jeho konečné politické likvidaci.“)

387 ABS 11691_100_3_6, 22.10.1964, 1-6, l. 126-131. („...aby mohla bojovat proti nepřátelům osvozené Keni a proti hlavním imperialistickým státům. [...] Hlavní náplní práce nově vytvořené demokratické bezpečnosti levicových vlasteneckých sil Keni musí být odhalovat úmysly reakčních pravicových proimperialistických živlů, jejich vzájemnou svázanosť s kolonialisty a imperialisty, získavat mezi nimi pozice a vliv a tak uplatňovat politickou linii a zásady vládní strany KANU a levic.“)

388 ABS 11691_301_1_1_6, Č.jA?, Poznámka k fondu, 3 („Představitel kenyjské bezpečnosti s úzkými vztahy ke kenyjskému viceprezidentovi Odinga Oginga i k prezidentovi Kenyattovi, vystupoval pokrokově vůči ZST. Od ČSSR získal zásilku zbraní i odborné školení pro pracovníky kenyjské bezpečnosti. Poznal dobře formy a metody práce čs bezpečnosti. Později se stále s větší jistotou prověřovalo, že jde o agenta britské IS, nasazeného do vlády Keny. Naše akce podnikané v Keni byly před USA a VB rozvědkou dekonspirovány jakož i řada našich KP.“)

390 ABS 11691_100_5_6, Č.jA?, Záznam, 25.8.1965, 1, l. 284. („prohlásil, že má od Odingy zelenou a má se zabývat přípravou násilného odstranění některých pravicových proimperialistických činitelů jako je Tom Mboya, Mungai, McKenzie, Gichuru, Ronald Ngala a další.“)

401 NAA ÚV KSČ A. Novotný, č.j. 264261/1, 1966, 1. („Jako závažný nedostatek této skupiny [progresivních činitelů] nutno uvést, že se ji a obzvláště Odingovi nepodařilo vytvořit celonárodní politickou platformu a že levicové hnutí zůstalo v podstatě omezeno tribálními hranicemi. Odinga neuměl využít protianglických a protiimperialistických nálad, volil taktiku spolupráce s pravicí KANU a umožnil nakonec pravici, aby rozštěpila levici.“)

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424 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 11763/8, 5.11.1962, 1. („V průběhu oslav ministerský předseda projevoval s.Valo mimořádnou pozornost a dával mu přednost před všemi vládními delegacemi. V rozhovorech zdůraznil vděčnost za poskytnutou pomoc a vyzdvihl její význam pro volební větězství strany Lidový kongres Ugandy (UPC). […] Současně požádal, aby ČSSR vyslala pokud možno co nejdříve svého velvyslance do Kampaly, a zvláště zdůraznil, že by uvítal jeho rady a pomoc při řešení závažných otázek, které očekávají nezávislou Ugandu.”)

433 MZF IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 020.930/63-10, 13.2.1963, 13. („Rozhovory s ministerským předsedou M.A.Obote a jeho zástupcem Magezem potvrdili zásadní zájem o spolupráci s ČSSR. […] Kladné v těchto rozhovorech bylo, že oba, hlavně však Magezi mluvili o jejich vnitřní a zahraniční politice zcela otevřeně v přátelském duchu.”)

448 VUA MNO 1965, č.j. 38/3-8, 14, 20, 21, 042862, Aug 1965?, 4. („Dá se však předpokládat, že na základě zkušeností z výcviku v ČSSR a s postupným vnitropolitickým vývojem přistoupí ugandská strana k požádavku na čs. vojenské odborníky pro Ugandu. Dají se předpokládat, kromě leteckých, hlavně dělostřelecké a pěchotní odbornosti, které budou navazovat na materiálové dodávky.”)

523 MZF IV/5, č.j. 0225/61, 3.7.1961. („Kambona naznačil, že dojde-li k realisaci této cesty ještě před vyhlášením nezávislosti Tanganjiky, bude britská vláda tímto faktem šokována.[…] ze strany Nyerereho a vedení TANU jde o přemyšlený krok, jehož má být využito k dosažení dalších ústupků na britské vládě při rozhovorech o hospodářské pomoci Tanganjiky.”)

580 MZF IV/4, č.j. 0322_64, 12.2.1964, 3. („…Dojem, že Tanganyika je nezávislým státem padl, když Britové provedli útok proti africkým vojákům na žádost africké vlády, co demostrovalo Nyerereho neo-koloniální orientaci. […] Jeho silový aparát tak mohl zvýšit svoje útoky proti levici.”)

609 ABS 81038_000_2_4, Č.j.A?, 25.8.1965, 4, l. 94. („Našim hlavním nepřítelem v Tanzanii zůstává Velká Británie. Základním dlouhodobým úkolem residentury je proniknout do organizací, kterými Velká Británie ovlivňuje vývoj v Tanzánii a politiku tanzanijské
vlády s cílem získávat především takové materiály a důkazy o činnosti britského ZU a dalších britských organizací, které by mohly být využity k omezování britského vlivu v Tanzánii a současně k prohlubování spolupráce a porozumění mezi SRT a ZST, zvláště pak mezi Tanzánii a ČSSR.

610 ABS 81038_000_2_4, Č.jA?, 25.8.1965, 4-5, l. 94-95. („Stále větší politický a hospodářský zájem o Tanzanii projevují USA a NSR. Úkolem residentury bude získávat dokumenty a závažné informace o aktivitě těchto států v Tanzánii, zejména pak o aktivitě americké rozvědky.”)

612 ABS 80958_011_1_2, Č.jA?, 15.6.1964, 2, l. 2. („Sledování vztahů mezi Tanganim a Zanzibarem a jejich odraz ve vztahu k ČSSR a ZST.”)

617 NAA 1261/0/4, č.j. 4400/7, 12.10.1964, 2. („Ministerstvo vnitra nepovažuje za správné, aby hned v počátcích spolupráce plné požadavky uspokojovalo. Nechává si možnost dalších jednání na vysoké úrovni a zároveň bude prohlašovat, zda bude účelné dodávat jim v budoucnu další zbraně.”)


626 NAA ÚV KSČ G. Husák, č.j. 01021/73, 1.3.1973, 1-2. („Hlavní město Tanzanie Dar Es Salaam se stalo dalším důležitým střediskem pro odbojovou činnost afrického hnutí osvobození. Doprava vojenského materiálu různých organizací působících na tanzánském území, distribuce knih pro školy v pralese, výcvik vojáků rekrutovaných z obyvatel zemí, která jsou nadále pod koloniální správou, přemístování čínských instruktorů používaných pro výcvik ve vojenských táborech [...] jsou velmi častým jevem v hlavním městě Tanzánie. [...] Tanzanie zajišťuje výcvik, dopravu materiálu a psychologickou pomoc odbojovým organizacím.”)

652 MZV F. IV/6, č.j. 025.801/68-8, 29.8.1968. („Tanzanijská vláda odsouduje agresi jako akt kolonialismu. [...] Tanzanijské denníky od samého počátku ostře odsoudili okupaci.”)
Vláda Tanzánie je hluboce otřesena okupací ČSSR.

Tento akt představuje zradu všech principů sebeurčení a národní suverenity. Tanzánie je proti kolonialismu všeho druhu, jak nových tak starých, v Africe, v Evropě i jinde.

Dosavadní vývoj potvrdil správnost naší základní koncepce spočívající v plné těchto úkolů: uskutečňovat vzájemně prospěšnou spolupráci s rozvojovými zeměmi Asie, Afriky, Latinské Ameriky, podporovat pokrokové společenské síly těchto zemí v jejich boji proti imperialismu, neokolonialismu a vývozu kontrarevoluce, v jejich úsilí o dosažení plné politické a hospodářské nezávislosti a spolecenského pokroku, poskytovat všestrannou podporu národně osvobozeneckému boji porobených národů.

Oblast tropické Afriky zůstává pro naši zahraniční politiku zajímavou oblastí, s níž lze rozvíjet nejrůznější vztahy na základě oboustranné výhodnosti a prospěchu (především na ekonomickém úseku) [...] Rovněž nelze přehlížet skutečnost, že při své početnosti zůstávají země tropické Afriky důležitým činitelem na mezinárodních fórech. I přes současnou politickou nestabilitu většiny těchto zemí a přes zpomalení tempa rozvoje národně-osvobozeckého hnutí, jež se však imperialismu nepodařilo zlikvidovat, je nutno počítat s tím, že v delší perspektivě se v této části světa znovu výrazněji projeví tendence, směřující k urychlení politické a i ekonomické emancipace, přičemž spolupráce socialistických zemí může být významným faktorem. Určité názvky tohoto vývoje lze již pozorovat například v některých zemích východní Afriky.