Determining Emotions and the Burden of Proof in Investigative Commissions to Palestine

Lori A. Allen
Department of Anthropology and Sociology
SOAS University of London

Abstract: The conflict in Palestine has been the subject of numerous international investigative commissions over the past century. These have been dispatched by governments to determine the causes of violence and how to reach a resolution. Commissions both produce and reflect political epistemologies, the social processes and categories by which proof and evidence are produced and mobilized in political claim-making. Using archival and ethnographic sources, my analysis focuses on three investigative commissions—the King-Crane (1919), Anglo-American (1946), and Mitchell (2001) commissions—that show how “reading affect” has been a diagnostic of political worthiness. Through these investigations, western colonial agents and “the international community” have given Palestinians false hope that discourse and reason were the appropriate and effective mode of politics. Rather than simply reason, however, it was always an impossible balance between the rational and the emotional that was required. This essay explores the ways that affect as a diagnostic of political worthiness has worked as a technology of rule in imperial orders, and has served as an unspoken legitimating mechanism of domination.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1919 on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference that would divvy up the post-Ottoman Middle East among European powers, US President Woodrow Wilson dispatched the King-Crane Commission to Syria (including Palestine). Its stated mission was to assess “the state of opinion there with regard to [the post-Ottoman Middle East], and the social, racial, and economic conditions” that obtained, in order to guide the Peace Conference in assigning mandates.¹ According to the Commission’s announcement about itself, this was “in order that President Wilson and the American people may act with full knowledge of the facts in any policy they may be called upon hereafter to adopt concerning the problems of the Near East—whether in the Peace Conference or in the League of Nations.”²

As part of that investigation, the Commission spent ten days of their 42-day tour in what was then considered “southern Syria,” or Palestine. There the American commissioners heard the same demands that most of the Arabs would present to the investigators in the rest of the region (what is today Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan): residents wanted independence in a multi-faith, united nation of Greater Syria, under the constitutional rule of a monarch, or, if they were forced to be governed by a mandatory state, they wished to be under its temporary tutelage.³ The majority did not want a mandate, because, as one commentator said, “our acceptance of foreign sponsorship would be an admission of our own inability to govern ourselves, and therefore deny us the opportunity at any point in the future to enjoy that right.”⁴ But if they were forced to have a mandate power, the overwhelming preference was for the
United States. The majority was also against the Zionist plan to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Despite this uniform demand, which one of the commission staff, Albert Lybyer, noted, had been expressed with “manifest enthusiasm” in “countless earnest appeals” — the Great Powers granted the mandate of Palestine to the British, which ruled until Israel gained an independent state in much of the territory in 1948.

Although Lybyer believed that they were expected to “'carry on a really scientific investigation,'” the records and reports of the King-Crane commission call that “scientific” basis into question. Even while international investigative commissions are explicitly dispatched to find the facts (Who has committed what abuses? What are the causes of the violence? How many people can the land sustain?) in order to come to conclusions and make recommendations that might set the conflicting parties—Arab and Zionist, Palestinian and Israeli—on a path to a solution, it is emotion that has consistently been their crucial evidence. Reading affect was their method. Affect, the natives’ “true” emotions and attitudes, are what the King-Crane commission investigators were attuned to. And Palestinians’ feelings have been a focus of the many commissions that have examined the conflict in Palestine since then. What investigators have sought, recorded, and interpreted are the nationalist enthusiasms of the Palestinians or, conversely, the superficiality of their patriotism; they have measured their levels of sympathy, determined the causes of their anger, probed their pathos, and documented their suffering.

And yet, until recently, it has been the political principles, reasoned arguments, legal proofs, and rational calculations that Palestinians have concentrated on presenting to their examiners. For each and every commission that has summoned evidence from Palestinians—and there have been tens—they have organised their
arguments, corralled historical facts, collated statistics, presented photographic proof and offered eye-witness testimony. In these recurrent efforts, they have tried to present their political demands for liberation in ways that those with final say over their fate might hear and understand their position. Rationality and the language of law have been, after all, the rationale for colonial rule, making it incumbent upon the colonized to adopt these modes as the format for legitimate self-presentation. But more often than not, these demands have fallen on deaf ears.

This essay explores what happens when facts are called for but emotions are also sought, in the gap between the explicit and implicit rules of the game. It demonstrates how reading affect, as much as reason, is a technology of rule in imperial orders, and has served as an unspoken legitimating mechanism of domination. Throughout Palestinians’ history of seeking self-determination, their emotion has been identified, or found lacking, in ways that invalidate their political claims and disregard their political subjectivity. Commissions provide a particularly revealing lens onto the ways that affect as a barometer of political worthiness has worked within colonial orders over the last century. The Palestinian case is one of many in a long history of investigatory commissions propping up international regimes of inequality.

But the power of this investigative method resides not only in the ways it is used to denigrate the nature of the colonized Other. Its maleficent potency resides in the persuasiveness of the more explicit claims to rule by reason, which has led the colonized to think it was rational debate and logical argument that held sway. The history of international commissions to Palestine shows these investigations to be a mechanism through which western colonial agents and “the international community” have given the colonized false hope that discourse and sensible argument were the
appropriate and effective methods of politics, when it was always an impossible
balance between the rational and the emotional that was required.

Whereas much of the literature on colonial rule focuses on the role of emotion
in delegitimizing claims to self-determination,10 I argue that the criteria according to
which the fitness for self-rule was judged included a much more complex mix of
reason and (that which was deemed) emotion. The demand for the correct emotional
performance has always been part of the adjudication. Reviewing investigators’
claims to be able to access, read, interpret, and judge the non-discursive dimensions
of the colonized’s subjectivity and stance—that is, their affective disposition—in the
production of “facts” shows the slippery ways that “reading affect” has long been a
diagnostic tool wielded by imperial powers.

Despite the fact that the criteria of political legitimacy are always shifting
beneath them, Palestinians persist in engaging with commissions. There are many
reasons for this, foremost among which is their perceived lack of alternatives.11 They
cooperate with every investigation that presents a means to produce the evidence that
might convince “the world” to end the occupation, and more recently, just ease the
siege on Gaza. Israel, on the other hand, rarely cooperates with UN commissions,
because the continuity of its settler-colonial project does not rely on it, and
cooperation with commissions, the results of which they often do not agree with,
would be interpreted as legitimizing those conclusions.12 There are also many
political reasons that investigative commissions continue to be deployed, such as the
need for governments and the UN to show that they are paying attention to the
conflict. To address questions about what else motivates commissions and go beyond
the obvious observations about their effects, however, the mechanism of commissions
and what they mean to the people involved has to be considered and situated within the history of colonialism.\textsuperscript{13}

To show how sentiments have been present as much more than a “halo” for the experts’ work, my analysis focuses on three investigative commissions:\textsuperscript{14} the 1919 King-Crane commission, the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry that investigated the situation of Jews and Palestinians at the end of World War II, and the Mitchell Commission, which involved the US, EU, Norway and Turkey in examining the causes of the second intifada in 2001.\textsuperscript{15} What is so striking a feature of these three commissions is the centrality of forensic reading of Palestinian emotions; it is taken for granted that commissioners can read the Arabs’ feelings, and it is assumed that this is relevant to their task. While the political context and dominant governing institutions have changed shape throughout this period, and the kinds of people called on to represent the Palestinians have shifted from notables to NGOs, and although the value assigned to different emotional states and the feelings deemed important changes over time, analysis of these commissions makes clear that reading affect has been a fundamental part of political epistemology, not only in the early stages of colonialism and in the late colonial period, but also well beyond.\textsuperscript{16} These commissions did not change political actions or attitudes among leaders like US President Truman or others. Palestinians’ performances of affect and their well-communicated worthiness may not have had political effect on the westerners judging them. But investigators’ claims to be able to read Palestinians’ “true” emotions and intentions were a basis on which commissioners and politicians could justify their recommendations, including refusals of Palestinian rights and political entitlements.

\textbf{INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSIONS}
Putting Political Epistemologies to Work

Among the numerous investigative commissions to Palestine, in addition to those I analyze here, there have been British investigations under the mandate, including the Shaw and Peel Commissions that reported on the Zionist-Arab disturbances in the 1920s and 1930s. The UN has also spear-headed many fact-finding missions, including the 2009 Goldstone Commission and the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict, to name but a few. Each of these commissions consisted of a group of experts of one kind or another, including academics, lawyers, and military men. As with most commissions in the world, a government, coalition of governments, or supranational body charged each of them with investigating a specific set of circumstances; in Palestine these have usually been prompted by a period of intensified violence.

These investigations are analytically useful for uncovering the logics of political orders. They often come on the heels of moments of rupture in an ideological formation caused by violent crisis. They invite argument, conducted through multiple media, about the nature and bases of political relations, and they bring international conflicts, as well as government action (or inaction) and policy deliberation, into wider public view. Commissions attract an audience, albeit temporary, and bring a public into being around the various texts that a commission produces (including testimonies, videos, speeches, and the commission reports themselves).

Commissions both produce and reflect “political epistemologies,” the social processes and categories by which proof and evidence are produced and mobilized in political claim-making. As such, commissions also give a special view onto the changing justifications for colonial and other forms of managing conflict, and onto the assumptions underlying how adequate political justifications are determined and...
asserted. Each investigation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is shaped by and reflects systems of political thought and political trends according to which Palestinian worthiness to self-rule has been argued and evaluated.

The manner in which scholars and others discuss and analyze commissions is itself part of the process of producing and maintaining confusion about what they do, and obscures the functioning of political epistemologies. Most commentary reproduces the claim that government policies and plans are based on logic and facts, a notion upon which commissions are premised. Throughout the centuries of world history in which investigative commissions have been a tool of governance—some say the Domesday Book of 1086 was the first such commission—claims to the thoroughness, accuracy, and objectivity of these investigations, and the balanced and unbiased nature of their investigators, have usually been asserted by those involved. Governments (and occasionally universities and professional associations) set up commissions to investigate a variety of phenomena, including violent events, policies, war crimes, famine, histories of national conflict, and race relations, among others. Even with this variety, scholarship and public discourse about investigative commissions consistently assess them on similar grounds—of accuracy, objectivity, and results—that accord with the self-understanding of commissions themselves.

There is no consensus on how to evaluate commissions or measure their impact, since they have vastly differing forms, effects, and scholarly interpretations. Commissions can be “a first step in law creation,” viewed as an abdication of governmental responsibility, seen as a “pacifying mechanism” and a method to block reform, or recognized as a catalytic inciting controversy. More critical analyses try to determine the bias of investigators, the political effects of commission reports, or unravel the political chicanery and machinations that infiltrate commission work.
many cases these assessments are analyzed from the perspective of present political contests.27

The political nature of commissions is also something regularly remarked on across all national cases, with UN commissions coming under particularly sharp critique for the apparent bias that skews results.28 The regular use of commissions to exonerate government policies and actions is also apparent in diverse historical cases and locations. The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, provided “an official narrative of the events that gave rise to the ‘war on terror’” that helped justify it in the United States. The Royal Commission Report of 1834 supported the rescinding of welfare for the poor in England.29 The Iran-contra Hearings, a different kind of spectacle, constituted “a civic ritual” in which public representatives could “pass judgment on the legal and moral status of actions taken in the highest office in the land,” but in the end it fed into “collective forgetting” of the scandal and Oliver North emerged relatively unscathed.30

Another typical observation about commissions is that their recommendations are usually “laboriously arrived at and then customarily ignored.”31 Even while criticizing them for producing no useful results, however, this sort of critique remains within the logic and reasoning of the inquiry commissions’ terms of reference. It starts from an assumption that all the hard work, time, and expense that governments invest in their inquiries should not be ignored. Such arguments presume that investigative commissions seek facts, and that the processes involved in finding the facts bear a significant relationship to the commission’s results, or should do so. They accept that the commission of inquiry’s goal is to come to conclusions from those facts, and improve some political situation based on its recommendations. From there, the quality of the investigative processes, the credibility of the facts and fact-finding
personnel, and the nature of the deductions and resultant recommendations are then judged, and often found lacking.

Although it is uncommon for studies to consider commissions beyond their own terms of reference and policy effects, a few have analyzed commissions from a more Foucauldian perspective as fora in which forms and producers of knowledge are legitimated or discredited. They have looked at commissions for what they reveal about “ruling orders,” to understand how the states that dispatch them conceive of “questions of sovereignty, citizenship, and territorial division,” to determine how commissions “create the categories they purport only to describe,” and thereby support structures of domination and political exclusion. These studies are interested in the commission as a tool of ruling orders. But they tend to approach this problem through trying to understand the rulers; they base their analyses on readings of commission reports with an eye trained on the rhetorical strategies and the discursive constructions of social categories by the dominant.

In contrast, my analysis starts from a question about how the ruled try to speak to the rulers. Exploring the micro-interactions of investigator and investigated through archival research, testimony, memoirs, and personal papers, and through ethnographic interviews with people involved in these commissions, tells us more about the workings of political hegemony from the perspective of the dominated, while revealing much about the interplay between political epistemologies of ruling orders and the rights claims of subjects. This approach helps us understand the mechanisms by which the ruled are led to misunderstand the nature of the regime maintaining their subordination. Commissions hold up the promise of reasonableness in policy-making. They are framed in a way to lead interested observers to believe that the perceptions and concerns of those groups that are under scrutiny will be rationally considered.
Using the language of evidence, proof, and objectivity, and drawing on the tools of law and sometimes positivist social science, they invite interested parties into public discussion to prove themselves reasonable political subjects. The irony is that it is the commissioners’ presumed emotional perspicacity, their claim to be able to read the affect of the investigated, not their reasonable considerations, that has helped justify their rejection of Palestinians’ political demands.

The King-Crane Commission, 1919

In US President Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech before Congress in 1918, he advocated the equality of nations, consent of the governed, and self-determination as principles for political arrangements after WWI. The hope that his proclamations gave to the colonized was an important part of the context of the King-Crane Commission, and helped shape the terms of the debate with the Arabs while the League of Nations was in formation. Arab spokespeople drew on Wilson’s language of justice as a validating pillar for their own political demands. One of the Palestinian delegations to the King-Crane Commission asked that the Peace Conference meeting in Paris at the time “defend the right of general humanity” in line with Wilson’s liberal principles. Prince Faisal, who was one of the Arabs’ emissaries to the Peace Conference and main Arab leader in Greater Syria, said that he could be “confident that the [Great] Powers will attach more importance to the bodies and souls of the Arabic-speaking peoples than to their own material interests.”

Although there were expressions of cynicism about what the King-Crane Commission was really up to, many among those writing about the Commission’s activities at the time seemed to accept its goals in good faith.
British General Allenby in 1918, the Muslim-Christian Association, a Palestinian civic club, asked rhetorically, “So can the destiny of Palestine be determined before taking the opinion of people?” “We don’t think so,” was its buoyant response. The King-Crane commissioners had publicly assured the Arabs that “the Allied powers did not undertake war to expand the extent of their possessions, but to protect justice and that which was right, over power and oppression.” The principles of peace and justice between nations, which Woodrow Wilson was championing, encouraged the belief among Palestinian nationalists that they could prove, through reasoned argument and proper political performance, that their nationalism deserved a state.

The King-Crane commission elicited answers to the explicit question “What kind of government do you want?” Their Arab respondents also answered an implied question, “What kind of nation do you claim to be?”

So how did the King-Crane Commission attempt to take the opinion of the Arab people? The Commission was to consist “of men with no previous contact with Syria.” This would, Wilson believed “convince the world that the [Peace] Conference had tried to do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible for a settlement.” Regardless of how organized and “scientific” the Commission actually was, the language and form of objectivity, science, and fair representation appears repeatedly throughout the Commission’s final report. They were clearly anxious to present themselves as impartial observers, and to produce a report that appeared objective. In one instance, their actions were literally a performance, complete with costume. An Arabic language newspaper reporting on the investigators’ visit “noticed that some of the members [of the King-Crane Commission] wore on their arms a piece of cloth with the [Arabic] word meezan” [scales, balance] on it, pointing to the fact that “justice” was a guiding principle of their work.
The mass of documents assembled by the commissioners shows evidence of their investment in the aesthetics of authoritative knowledge. What counted as data was that which could be counted: expressions of opinion by representatives from a representative number of groups. They used the scientific forms of statistics and tables to constitute social groups, and they determined how many petitions and delegations were needed to be representative through simple assertion. Maps of religious and “racial distributions” were also integral to the report.

They also affirmed the representative nature of their findings by showing how many different kinds of groups they met with. These were categorized according to political type, economic group, and religious affiliation. Muslims were subdivided into Sunni, Shi’ite, and, interestingly, “Moslem Ladies.”

It was not only the Commissioners who were concerned to represent their work as being objective and truly representative, of course. The Arab leadership who helped organize the Commission’s visit also strived to present itself in a way to enhance the credibility of their position. And here we get to something of the double bind in which the Arab representatives found themselves. How could they leverage popular sentiment and prove that their position was representative of the population as a whole, demonstrate publicly that this was a national population deserving of an independent nation, but at the same time, not let their people come across as unruly crowds?

For one, political groups and the central Arab Government organized a large petition campaign. The Commission tallied over 90,000 signatures on the 1,863 petitions. Emir Feisal also spoke the language of impressive numbers, declaring to the Commission that he was “authorized to represent [the people] by official documents containing over three hundred thousand signatures.”
In addition to petitions, demonstrations were staged throughout Syria and Palestine. Arabic news articles from the time reflect a population concerned with proving themselves “civilized,” “mature,” and “intelligent” in front of the commissioners, to prove that they deserved an independent state. In order to prove this, they held “orderly demonstrations showing their national sentiments and desires.” What this amounted to, then, were quick quiet demonstrations. And here we get to the problem of emotions.

The problem for the Arab government, which was trying to prove to the democratic western powers their fitness for self-rule, was the need to show a certain kind of public that could demonstrate the appropriate sensibility: a unified public that was “on message” with a single slogan; a public that was actually in public, as a backdrop to the message, demonstrating that the population was on board with the independence plan; but also a public that was in public without being an unruly mob.

And so it was. An observer describing the demonstrations in a local newspaper wrote that it was perfect: “quiet, without tumult, no speeches—yet through its silence the demonstration announced the advancement of the people.” These quiet demonstrations were a physical embodiment of the orderly modernity of the Arab nation, and their status, therefore, as deserving an independent state. They believed that presenting their unity in a disciplined form was required to convince the Commission. “It is imperative that we unite our voices in the call for complete autonomy,” a commentator urged in a local newspaper. In this article, entitled “At the Doors of the Examination,” he wrote that their voices, united in a demand for autonomy, would “push the commission and [peace] conference to view our self-sufficiency and suitability for rule, as the nation that succumbs to slavery and
humiliation will never earn respect.” Presentation of a unified voice was itself assumed to be an index of political worthiness.

The well-publicized Article 22 of the League of Nations also formed part of the discursive framework shaping the terms of the debate. The League of Nations insisted that a mandate was necessary to train the Arabs into independence. Article 22 spelled out the League’s new form of colonial power in the shape of Mandatory “tutelage.” Many Arab commentators refused Article 22. They refused to be categorized as, “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world,” as the League defined them. The Arabs responded to the hierarchy of development that was institutionalized in the League of Nations’ division of A, B, and C Mandates. Although the Arabs were designated “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves,” they (including Syria and Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, and Iraq) were at the top of the list among the “A” Mandates: people who were “provisionally recognised as independent,” but would receive “the advice and assistance of a Mandatory in its administration until such time as it is able to stand alone.” The Palestinians asserted that their people were already standing. They were being educated in America and Europe, delegations told the Commission, so they had among them all the professions necessary for producing a functioning country, from farmer to pharmacist, mechanic to mathematician, making them “ready with all the necessary tools for independence.”

But there was no convincing some. William Yale, one of the commission advisers, doubted the possibility of developing a Syrian national spirit. He insisted that “this liberal movement [currently] was too feeble… to rally to their support the ignorant, fanatical masses which are swayed by the Ulemas [religious scholars] and the Young Arab Party” (an Arab nationalist group).
And this despite all of the assurances by Feisal, the Arab leader, that what the Arabs wanted was a non-sectarian nation-state, and despite all the Arab delegations’ assurances to the Commissioners that minority rights—in this case Christian and Jewish—would be protected. The long presence of Arabs in Palestine and their demographic majority was, for Arab commentators, argument enough against the Jewish claim to Palestine as a national home. Jewish demands for rights to the land “based on colonization of the area from a different century” was, in their view, unreasonable, given that “by that logic this would mean that Arabs could claim Spain, or the Romans or Greeks [could] claim anywhere they were,” as some wrote in a letter of protest. Judaism was a religion, not a nation. The Christian-Muslim Association wrote in a letter to the Military Ruler in 1918 that they had no “doubt that the civilized world [would] not permit that which is not reasonable.”

But William Yale, the technical adviser on Southern Syria, was skeptical that there was “any genuine sentiment of nationalism in Syria,” and he felt “a distinct note of pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism.” Religious sentiment, if it was Muslim religious sentiment, could not be a valid basis for national unity. And he deemed those Arabs who rejected the League’s Article 22 to be a “fanatical element” fueled by their “profound anti-western feeling.” Yale said that it was by “a clever, well organized and thorough propaganda the Moslems of Palestine and Syria have been united on a program which superficially has every sign of being Syrian nationalism, but which is basically Islamic.”

It is not just that Arab emotion was an important element of the equation that had to be performed for their assessors, but it had to be performed correctly, to be calibrated as properly national and not improperly supra-national, Islamic fanatical—or boring. The fact that the petitions were so uniform, so clear in their requests for...
independence, indicated to Yale that the masses supported nationalism with no understanding of it. Not only did the perceived lack of nationalist emotion disqualify the Palestinians, so too did the emotional pull of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. Emotion was expected to be spontaneous, but not if it spilled over territorial boundaries pulling the Arabs in the “direction of an Arab Moslem Confederation,” which is where Yale believed the Arabs’ ambitions pointed.68

Maybe the Arabs’ demonstrations were too orderly for Yale. In a report about the Commission shortly after its conclusion he wrote: “the demands and wishes of the Syrians and the form of proclamations, declarations, petitions, etc. were cut and dried to the point of boredom.”69 Yale believed nationalism to be “a psychological force,” and a matter to be judged according to the “intensity of emotional reaction.”70 It depended on people accepting group ideas “as a political philosophy” that “stirs their emotions so profoundly that loyalty to this philosophy becomes the dominant loyalty over-riding… all others.”71 Perhaps the Arabs’ quietness did not provide for him enough evidence of true nationalist spirit amongst the people. One wonders whether the colonized could ever get the balance between nationalist enthusiasm and civilized behavior just right.

It is likely that, for Yale, no performance could have convinced him of the Arabs’ sincere nationalism, given his orientalist views of “the Near Easterner,” who he believed had “not fully emerged from the middle Ages.”72 (These beliefs were shared by George Montgomery, another on the King-Crane team).73 It is also the case that Yale’s views, which he recorded in a dissenting report from King and Crane, were not central in the final commission report.74 But the point is that he could dismiss Arab political claims on the grounds of their emotions as he interpreted them.
Yale’s savvy interpretations of emotion served two purposes: it verified his expertise, and, by disqualifying the Arab nationalist aspirations, bolstered the legitimacy of western claims to rule. To Yale, the coherence of the Syrian petitions with which the Commission had been “incontinently inundated,” their orderly submission, and the Arab demonstrations lacked a spontaneity that might have indexed a more convincing, emotion-bound spirit. The Arabs were responding to Wilson’s statements and the language of the League of Nations, which, as Jane Cowan has shown, disallowed “unruly linguistic behavior” and censored violent, or passionate, expression. So while the Arabs were concentrating on demonstrating their reasonable, civilized nature and organized unity, it seems they needed to put on a more demonstrable display of the proper emotion.

**Politics, Emotion, and Affect**

The variable uses of emotion, their deployment in political projects, their range of effects on political actors, have long been evident to anthropologists and others. Emotions are political and cultural, important to social unity, mobilization, and conflict management, and part of economic rationality. Although affect, rather than emotion, has been the trending focus in more recent anthropology, the definitional question remains. What distinguishes affect from emotion, sensibility from sentiment in lived experience and analytical approach is not always very clear. There are also debates about the methodologies required in the study of emotion/affect. As Pinch points out, “the relationships among a historical period’s talk about feeling, people’s experience of feeling, and the historical meanings of feelings may not always be obvious.” There are two key issues that could productively be distinguished to move these discussions along: one, to recognize that the question of how to trace the ways in which emotions are cultivated or affect is
experienced is also a methodological one that must be answered with relation to the specific kinds of material being analyzed; and two, there is a distinction between affect and claims about affect (including claims to be able to judge affect).

The problem of how and whether scholars as observers can make determinations about what affect is and what affects (or emotions) are actually at play in any given interaction or social phenomenon must necessarily return to the question of mediation, and demands sustained reflection on “the possibility of knowing through feeling.”83 How does affect become apparent to the analyst? Whereas earlier studies of emotion have considered this more explicitly, scrutinizing language, culture, or ideology as the mediating frameworks, some of the more recent approaches to affect, especially those coming out of cultural studies or social geography, tend to leave this issue under-examined, assuming an ability to recognize affect when scholars see, feel, or notice it.

Here is where our sensitivity to the imbrication of definition, method, and theory must be heightened. If affect is defined as “a non-conscious experience of intensity,” how does the historian or ethnographer identify it?84 We live, learn, and communicate through symbols. If affect is that which is in excess of the symbolic, as some claim,85 then how can it be data or evidence for our scrutiny as outside observers? Emotion, on the other hand, the culturally mediated, feeling-part of the social that is evident in discourse about it, is more amenable to analysis. So too is any discourse or system of knowledge production that claims to offer evaluations of affect.

What some streams of “affect theory” claim to be trying to get hold of is an aspect of human experience and social life that seems to exist and have its effects in a realm that is not totally encompassed by discourse; affect is distinct from descriptions
of it, distinct from, if not totally untouched by, culture. “Excess,” “intensity,” and “virtuality” are some of the words affect theorists typically use to try to convey this uniqueness. For some, affect is an excess beyond language or, perhaps, reason; a bridge that spreads across the binaries of individual and social, person and environment, mind and body. Affect is an “intensity” in that it is something felt and noticed beyond the ordinary humdrum of daily life.

To be sure, what colonial officials and commissioners are doing in their readings of natives’ hearts and minds is something very different from what the affect theorists are up to, but there is a common thread. For the imperialists as much as the theorists, affect always means something that is at least partially hidden – hidden from reason, language, but somehow available to them to read, decode, and build conclusions on. This provides two forms of power: one is the freedom to interpret and assert, and another is the claim to an extraordinary ability to read beneath the surface of things that gives a privileged access to truth.

Because affect is veiled, unnamed, inexplicit, for those who would find and name it, the scope for interpretation and assertion is wide indeed. The vagueness of the immanent-that-is-affect is precisely what allowed Yale to be bored by what, in Lybyer’s view, was the Arabs’ enthusiasm and earnestness. Perhaps they saw what they wanted to see.

Yale was particularly concerned to present himself as the hard-nosed colonial “expert,” the one who could read into the hearts of the local people and discover the superficiality of their political commitment to the nation. He distinguished himself from the political naïfs like Lybyer who he was forced to work with, and remained unswayed by idealistic liberalism. His contact with “the peasants of the Near East” is what allowed him to understand the true nature of their “passionate attachments” to
their villages and families, and to see that these affections did not extend across the unified nation that the Syrian elite were asking for.90 The expert is the one who can extract the truth of the natives’ motivations and intentions lurking underneath their stated commitments, aims and goals.91 Attesting to his own “real love for Syria,” Yale defended his conclusions about the absent Arab nationalism by declaring his “sincere hope to see Syria eventually a united country with a genuine national spirit.”92 Against his own sincerity, love, and hope, he contrasted the destructive religious intentions and motivations of those demanding independence. His was the power to distinguish the real from the professed, the capacity to see through the murky realm of alleged emotion to the true feelings and dangerous intentions within.93

My argument, then, is not in line with the call of the “affective turn” to attend to the “autonomic processes” and “‘visceral’ forces” below the threshold of consciousness and meaning. The noble intention of this scholarship to make up for a history of social theory in which, supposedly, “philosophers and critics have largely neglected the important role our corporeal affective dispositions play in thinking, reasoning, and reflection” is valid enough.94 But my concern lies elsewhere, with the fact that affect (and specifically, the claim to be able to interpret it) has been a critical instrument in consolidating regimes of power and denying rights to the dispossessed. Commissions to Palestine can prompt questions about how the false claim of colonial and imperial powers to govern through reason and value rationality above all has been understood by the colonized. Uncovering how and why political contenders—and not only we social analysts—recognize and misrecognize the place of sensibilities and sentiments within political reasoning provides one key to understanding the hegemony of international management of various conflicts, and the persistent failure of Palestinians to achieve statehood.95
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY, 1945-1946

For decades, Palestinians have been trying to argue that a political solution is required to remedy their situation. But since World War II they have been up against the particularly poignant humanitarian and emotional claims of the Zionist movement, which sought to make Palestine a homeland for the Jews. In my next case, the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, the Palestinians are once again subject to a forensic reading of their emotions, and once again the affective regime shifts with the introduction of new criteria and the new mediating factor of the Holocaust. The colonial demand for the balance between emotion and political reason becomes impossible to meet, now held out of reach by the traumatic historical experience of the Jews.

Earl G. Harrison, who Truman had sent in 1945 to study the condition of displaced persons in Europe, wrote a report that “stirred Truman’s sympathy for the Jews and alerted him to an issue that would arouse the political as well as the humanitarian emotions of the American public.” This led to the formation of the Anglo-American Committee, which was to “examine the question of European Jewry and to … review the Palestine Problem in light of that examination.” Truman, who continually expressed compassion for refugees to his Jewish constituency, had urged the American chair of the Anglo-American Committee to produce a report that would recommend “an affirmative program to relieve untold suffering and misery.” The Committee was formed, then, through what we might call, following Peter Redfield and Erica Bornstein, a humanitarian structure of feeling, “a cluster of moral principles, a basis for ethical claims and political strategies, and a call for action.”
For their part, the Palestinians persisted with the political logic of their case. In their presentation to the Anglo-American Committee, they explained their opposition to the Zionists’ plan to turn Palestine into a Jewish state. Their own position, they said, was based on democratic principles: “the right of a majority to decide its political destiny.” Among the Palestinians who prepared a presentation to the Committee, there was a clear concern with presenting hard evidence, and keeping emotional expressions in check. In the memoirs of Yusif Sayigh, a Palestinian economist who contributed research for the Palestinian written submission to this Commission, he discusses how his input was shaped. He had been asked to prepare a report assessing the extent and nature of Arab land holdings. When Sayigh wrote his contribution, he only had a BA degree—he later went on to get a PhD in political economics from Johns Hopkins and became a full professor at the American University of Beirut. But at the time, he noted in his memoirs, his English “wasn’t all that good,” so he had a friend edit his paper. Sayigh’s British friend “took away all the things that showed anger or emotionalism.” These strong feelings, which he said appeared in his writing, were prompted by his discoveries about the “awful things, about the injustice, the eviction of hundreds of families from the Esdraelon plain [also known as the Jezreel or Zir’een Valley]. Twenty-three villages were evicted.” Sayigh recounts that his friend told him, “‘Calm down, you’re writing for Britishers and for Americans. If they see this you’ll lose the strength of your point.’” He persuaded Sayigh “to tone things down here and there.” But the crafting and drafting of the appropriate tone could do little to budge the order as it existed, with the suffering Jews the paramount victims overshadowing all other considerations.

Despite the efforts of Sayigh and his colleagues to avoid any expression of anger that might suggest that their facts were not credible or were biased, members on
the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were mostly unimpressed by the Arabs’ case. Evan Wilson, a secretary to the American members of the Committee and Palestine desk officer in the US Department of State, wrote that the Arabs’ testimony was badly organized and bespoke their lack of leadership.\(^{105}\) Echoing Yale’s complaint about the boring uniformity of the petitions submitted to the King-Crane Commission, Wilson dismissed the Arab presentations to the Anglo-American Committee as being “mostly a repetition of the standard Arab argument that Palestine was Arab and the Jews were interlopers.”\(^ {106}\) Although the Arabs had long based their arguments on the principle of self-determination proposed by Woodrow Wilson at the end of WWI, the Americans and British did not interpret the Arab argument as a principled and consistent political stance, but rather as “rigid and unimaginative.”\(^ {107}\)

The investigators did have a begrudging appreciation for one speaker, Albert Hourani, who was an Oxford-educated scholar whose family was from Lebanon. He was working for the Arab Office, a small diplomatic and public relations team for the Palestinians, which was organized to lobby the American government and western public opinion. The Arab Office produced the Palestinians’ main presentation for the British and American investigators. According to eminent Palestinian historian, Walid Khalidi, who had once been a young member of staff at the Arab Office, Albert Hourani and his Oxford training set the tone of the Arab Office’s work. Khalidi explained to me their approach: “The idea was to not be polemical,” he said. “But to be factual. To be documented. To have supporting evidence for whatever you said. To be tough without being vulgar or extravagant.”\(^ {108}\) They had a conscious awareness of the fact that how emotions of different sorts were expressed “provided both cultural and legal ‘proof’ of who one was, where one ranked in the colonial order of things,”
as Ann Stoler puts it. Khalidi said they also tried to put themselves “in the shoes of the other side.” But, it would turn out, their empathetic efforts were off target.

The commissioners conceded that Hourani “did a brilliant job of presenting the Arab side, comparable to Weizmann’s for the Jewish.” But the force of his testimony was weakened, his credibility tarnished, his morality called into question, because he fell short on expressing a crucial emotion: sympathy. When one of the Commissioners questioned him on the Arabs’ demand that Jewish immigration to Palestine stop, the commission’s secretary reported, “he would not agree to the admission of a single additional Jew to Palestine—not even the aged and infirm among the displaced persons.” Indeed, the Arab Office stance was clear: the doors of Europe and America should be opened to the victims of the European war, not the politically fragile Holy Land.

What struck the Committee was “this completely intransigent stand,” rather than Hourani’s argument. Hourani had tried to explain that sympathy for the displaced Jews of Europe could not be addressed as if they existed in a political vacuum: “it is unhappily impossible,” he said, “to consider the question of immigration simply on humanitarian grounds … The question of immigration into Palestine must be seen in its general political framework.” This point was subsequently echoed in the response to the report submitted by The Institute of Arab American Affairs. Signed by Faris S. Malouf and John Hazam, the memorandum asserted that “no solution of the humanitarian aspect of the 'displaced' and 'persecuted' Jews can be discussed, let alone solved, without taking into consideration the wider political aspects of Palestine and the Arab world.” They encouraged compassion for victims of the Nazis, but not if it violated “the inalienable rights of the Arabs.” Hourani and the Arab Office presented these views at a time when some Palestinians (although a decreasing
number) believed coexistence with the Jews already in Palestine was still possible.\textsuperscript{116} And they thought mass immigration to Palestine would spell the destruction of that shared existence.

For a variety of reasons related to US politics, including Truman’s terror “of incurring the ill-will of the very powerful Zionist lobby and of its loyal blocs of voters in key states,”\textsuperscript{117} the President was focused on the displaced Jews as the singular, prioritized problem, which was to be solved through realization of Zionist goals.\textsuperscript{117} On the heels of the Anglo-American Committee report, Truman called for the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. Soon thereafter the state of Israel was established, and some 750,000 Palestinian Arab refugees were dispossessed of their homeland.

The Arab Office that Albert Hourani worked with was staffed by self-described “decent, liberal, approachable people,” as Albert’s brother and director of the Washington branch of the Arab Office (between 1946-1948), Cecil Hourani, told me in an interview. But Hourani and his team had violated the “conventions of sympathy,” a feature of political discourse about Jews in World War II that was entrenched by that time.\textsuperscript{118} Although Palestinians argued that sympathy for the Jews should not come at the expense of their national rights, it was the former that won out. Ultimately, the affective conventions of the day recognized only one set of sentiments as justifying territorial rights, in the process subordinating Arab political claims to Jewish ones.

Similar to what Ann Stoler has discovered in the Dutch colonial archives, rulers in Palestine have also been preoccupied with appraisals of affect.\textsuperscript{119} The unequal value that these statesmen have given to emotion, ideology, and reason in assessments of Palestinians has been changeable, if not capricious. While Arabs were
faced with skepticism about the sincerity of their nationalist sentiment during the
King-Crane Commission, they were discounted for their lack of sympathy during the
Anglo-American Commission. Unearthing these systems of thought and feeling
reveals that the judgment of evidence is always, and has always been, as much a
process of “affective discernment” as it was an evaluation of supposedly “objective”

THE MITCHELL COMMISSION, 2001

The Mitchell Commission, my last case, provides a final telling example of
the changing role of affect in the international community’s ways of understanding—and
governing—the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It raises questions about how (and
whether) Palestinians can meet the ever mutating and unspoken criteria of political
judgment and the shifting place of emotions within it. These historical shifts show
how emotion and reasoned, factual discourse are accepted as evidence in ambivalent,
if not contradictory ways.

The Mitchell Commission, officially the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding
Committee, released its report on April 30th, 2001, about six months after then US
President Clinton called for it at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at
Sharm el-Sheikh, the purpose of which was to “end the violence, to prevent its
recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace process.”121 Dispatched just about a
month after the second Palestinian intifada began, it was not to be “a tribunal but [a
committee] to find out what happened and prevent recurrence.”122

The investigation involved the gathering of, on the one hand, technical and
legal evidence, and on the other hand, hearing personal stories of violence and
victimhood. Throughout their political history, Palestinians’ efforts to inform and
convince through the accumulation of material evidence fell short of commissioners’
affective expectations until the Mitchell Commission, when Palestinian
responsiveness to that demand was heightened. This more recent commission exhibits
a widened focus on the suffering and testimony of individual victims, and also shows
how the Palestinian understanding of the commission differed in some marked ways
from that of the investigators.

One key person on the Palestinian legal team that was responsible for
producing the written submissions and guiding the Committee in the West Bank
understood that the approach to presenting their case was legal. Another team member
likened it to “a civil law case.” He said they organized the ballistics, the maps, the
numbers of settlements, as if they were “presenting the evidence to the judge.” And as
another understood it, the law was “very much seen as a genuine part of the
Palestinian narrative. So by using the law, we were using tools and terms that were at
least familiar to the Palestinian leadership. It’s in keeping with the traditional way
Palestinians have done things.”

In interviews with me, American staff of the Mitchell Commission talked
about the evidence they received as existing on a spectrum from “the rational to the
emotional.” Ultimately, for them it was the form of the presentation that did as much
work—and left more of an impression—as the substance of what Palestinians said
and argued. In preparing their reports for the Commission, the Palestinian team “spent
tons of time trying to actually find out the details; who was killed, the names of the
people who were killed. Because we did not want to be attacked on bad data,” as one
of the Palestinian lawyers recalled. But the commission received the Palestinians’
painstaking legal submissions in a pro-forma way. Even though what the
Palestinians thought they were doing was making sure that “all the evidence [was] on
the table,” presenting the commission “with as much data, facts, and first hand evidence as possible,” the Commission staff did not pour through the evidence. As one of the investigative team told me, he “took [written] submissions with a grain of salt” since he “knew what could be expected” out of both parties. Instead of focusing on this “cold dry paper,” one of the American staff said, “we needed to understand … to walk in their shoes.”

The Palestinians organizing their field visits sought to allow the investigators to do just this. The new focus on the suffering of Palestinian victims marked a change from earlier inquiries. The Palestinian staff sought to “bring home” to the investigators experiences of occupation and violence; to give them a “physical sense” of it, as one told me. “When [the Committee] came on the ground [in Palestine], we made sure that they went to the hospital that was bombed and met the families of the people that were bombed or imprisoned… you have the [written] submission, which is solid law, then you have the facts, then tear jerks.” But none of the Palestinian staff considered these personal stories to be the main focus of their presentation to the Committee.

Although foregrounding this emotional dimension was not key to the strategy of the Palestinian lawyers, it ultimately was the testimony and emotional impact of non-professional, non-politicians that the Mitchell staff perceived to be most authentic, and that convinced them the most. What the Americans recalled twelve years later when they spoke to me were these shared experiences: seeing the large bullet hole from Israeli fire in a little Palestinian girl’s bedroom, receiving a bag-full of shells from distressed parents. They remembered moments of emotional recognition and understanding they shared with both the Israelis and the Palestinians.
These were moments of what Lauren Berlant calls “sentimentality… when emotions communicate authenticity that enables identification and solidarity among strangers.” As an American staffer said, “It didn’t seem like you were talking to a professional communicator who has an agenda. These are people who had families and shops and this is what they had experienced.” Relying on their “affective discernment”, the commission staff put their faith in the apolitical, personal stories. Not Hanan Ashrawi’s reasoned discourse about the history of the occupation, not the speech about democracy by a populist street leader, and not the requirements of international law presented in the Palestinians’ legalistic, written submissions. In the end, what persuaded the Americans most was the evidence gathered in another register: the empathy-inducing interactions with “regular” people.

The commission staff told me that they were from the beginning concerned with keeping the investigation as “objective” as possible. And the Palestinian staff who interacted with them believed them to be “genuine.” “They took their job seriously,” as one said. Another said he was surprised at how “open minded” and “objective” they turned out to be. This attempt at a balanced approach was evident in the report of the Mitchell Commission. There are multiple references to “both sides,” and to the different “perspectives” of the PLO and the Government of Israel. The report was also highly attuned to the emotional scene of the second intifada. It acknowledged the “humiliation and frustration” that the Palestinians experience under occupation; it sought ways to reduce the hostility and mistrust between the parties; it worried about hatred, and about the Israelis’ fear; it recognized anger on “both sides.” Whereas the Palestinian lawyers who organized the presentations to the Mitchell investigators focused on using law as a way to produce “an easily digestible narrative from the Palestinian side,” the fact-finders heard the suffering and grief of
Palestinians and Israelis, and were, in the words of the report, “touched by their stories.” As political analyst Mouin Rabbani stated in his critique of the Mitchell report, it gives the impression that “the Committee was investigating a confrontation between equal forces, each equally responsible for the ‘violence.’” And in the end, the turn to emotion as the authenticating ground of proof resulted in a false equivalence between Palestinian and Jewish experiences, even if in this commission there was more sympathy for the Palestinians’ feelings and frustrations.

**Conclusion**

Each of these three investigative commissions into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, like many others over the past century, have offered languages of political legitimacy and legitimization for Palestinians to appropriate, maneuver within, and present arguments through. All were invitations to prove political worthiness. Palestinians demonstrated in the very form of their interactions with successive commissions “appropriate” political subjectivities: nationally coherent, democratically principled, law abiding, rights demanding, suffering.

Commissions in general often hold up the promise of reasonableness in policy-making; they invite concerned parties into public discussion to prove themselves reasonable political subjects, and promise to rationally consider their interests and make judgments based on evidence. With one hand commissions offer this hope, while with the other their reports are put in a drawer and forgotten. They often have no discernable effect on political outcomes, since the governments that send them often have pre-existing political goals that shape the investigations and how their recommendations are taken up or, more often, ignored. My argument here is that the effects of these commissions have worked in a different register. They have
misled Palestinians into believing that decisions would be based on the evidence
Palestinians presented, and that their reasoned arguments were being considered
according to rational criteria.

Commissions are themselves a method of persuading Palestinians and others
that dialogue and civility are the means to the resolution of the conflict, and that
international management of the conflict is happening on a firm basis of objective
fact. In so doing, they have shaped a false sense of what “’the emotional economy’ of
empire” is.\textsuperscript{129} Despite the investigative experts’ stated commitment to reason as a
modality of both claims-making and evaluation, emotion is never edited out, and is
often central. Claims about affect, and experts’ claims to be able to judge affect—to
know interior states, feelings, and true intentions—are themselves politically
powerful. They justify some people in their role as expert and validate their policy
recommendations. That the enactment and analysis of emotion has been such a
significant scaffold for gathering proof and evaluating Palestinian claims illuminates
the wider emotional economy of imperialism and how it encourages Palestinians into
particular performances.\textsuperscript{130}

The turn towards emotion as the evidentiary ground of testimony has been
increasingly explicit over the course of the three commissions, as the international
context and international governance structures changed over this period—beginning
in the Wilsonian era of the League of Nations when westerns were concerned with the
protection of minorities, through the United Nations and the instantiation of human
rights as a hegemonic legal and moral political language, to American dominance
internationally and as “peace broker” for the conflict. Throughout, Palestinians have
persistently called on democratic principles, demonstrated national coherence, and
stressed the injustice of foreign usurpation of their homeland, always using logical
and reasoned arguments. But reading affect has always been key to how the commissions carried out investigations, always present in how the conflict has been managed and evaluated.

Who was to speak for the Palestinians has also varied since the Mandate period, when religious leaders and “notable” families were prominent. More space has opened for the voice of the intelligentsia, academics, technocrats and legal practitioners, with increasing attention to “ordinary” people and NGO workers as the human rights regime has came to frame Palestinian political appeals. The changes reflect international political dynamics, as a global moral order (or at least a pretense to one) came to be embodied in the human rights and humanitarian system privileging not just international human rights and humanitarian law, but also the testimony of the violated, especially since the 1970s. While the specific demands and “key words” of these political appeals have changed, reasoned and evidence-based presentations have remained a consistent form in which Palestinians have presented their demands.

Although commissioners have claimed to valorize reasoned argument as preferred political method, and to operate with objectivity and reasoned fairness, they have never privileged reasoned argument alone. Contrary to the dominant claims of western political discourse, claims that are sometimes taken at face value in the counter-histories of social theory found in the “affective turn,” reasoned argument has never been the only currency of the normative democratic public sphere. What the Palestinian experience points to for social theory, then, is the need to inquire more into the social, governmental, and political institutions that simultaneously have made affective states indices of political legitimacy and obscured their significance. What we need to understand is not just affect as a part of colonial subjugation or politics
generally, but how and why the powerful role of determining and defining correct affect has been concealed.

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1 For a summary of the King Crane Commission, see http://www.oberlin.edu/library/digital/king-crane/intro.html, accessed May 23, 2015.

American Commission to Negotiate Peace, “Future Administration of Certain Portions of the Turkish Empire under the Mandatory System (Secret).” 25 March, 1919. Oberlin College Archives, Group 2/6-Henry C. King, King-Crane Commission, Reports and Correspondence, Box # 128. Subsequently cited as “King-Crane Commission Archives.”

3 The monarch they chose was Emir Feisal, who had helped establish an Arab government under British protection after they conquered the Ottoman army. Feisal, emissary to the Paris Peace Conference, returned to Damascus in May 1919 to greet the King-Crane Commission.

4 “‘Ala abwab al-imtihan,” [At the door of the examination] Al-Asima, June 25, 1919, 1.

5 The Commission report noted that “the feeling against the Zionist programme is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria,” with a large majority of the petitions “directed against the Zionist programme.” “King-Crane Commission Report.”

6 Box 16/2 (King-Crane Commission, May-August 1919), Albert H. Lybyer Papers, 1876-1949, Oberlin College Repository, University Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (hereafter, ALP/OCR)


7 Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry in the Middle East (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), 44.


11 For example, the Palestinian decision to focus on the Mitchell Committee only happened after it became clear that the Taba peace talks were not leading anywhere.


Sources for my analysis include archival research and ethnographic interviews with those involved in investigative commissions, as well as secondary sources on each historical period. Through the use of memoirs, personal papers, and interviews, I have sought perspectives of individual Palestinians involved with each commission, and of the commissioners and governments that dispatched them, along with the broader public’s reactions to the commissions and their reports.


Other British Royal commissions include: the Palin Commission (1920) that investigated the 1920 riots during the Nebi Musa festival; the Haycraft Commission (1921), an investigation into the causes of the 1921 Jaffa Riots; the Shaw Commission, a British Parliamentary commission investigating the Western (Wailing) Wall riots in 1929; and the Woodhead Commission (1938), established in response to opposition voices (especially Churchill) demanding re-examination of partition proposals. The League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission was established in 1921 and constituted a forum in which Jews and Arabs sought to make political claims, often in terms of international law. See Natasha Wheatley, “Mandatory

18 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are a distinct form of commission. They emphasize political reconciliation, usually within a nation-state and at the perceived endpoint of a conflict. Because the contexts, purposes, and results of TRCs are so divergent, I do not incorporate explicit comparison between them and the Palestinian cases in my analysis, but critical analyses of TRCs inform my approach. See the special issue edited by Greg Grandin and Thomas Miller Klubock, *Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: State Terror, History and Memory*, *Radical History Review* 2007, 97 (2007) and Richard A. Wilson, *The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).


differently, in that I accept that some frameworks for interaction (such as investigative commissions and government lobbying) are explicitly political and popularly recognized as such, and then seek to understand what counts as knowledge and fact within a political context. For a parallel kind of approach to epistemology, see Andreas Glaeser, “Power/Knowledge Failure: Epistemic Practices and Ideologies in the Secret Police of Former East Germany,” *Social Analysis* 47, 1 (2003), 10-26.


22 Ivor Richardson, “F W Guest Memorial Lecture 1989 Commissions of Inquiry,” *Otago Law Review* 7,1. Available at:

23 For example, see Jonathan Beck, “Head of UN Gaza Commission Rejects Claims of Bias,” *The Times of Israel*, June 22, 2015, available at:


34 Especially Ashforth, The Politics.

35 In her study on the role of sympathy in imperial state-building, Danilyn Rutherford has noted the dearth of focus on “the real-time interactions between officials and their subjects that make up colonial practice,” but her emphasis is still on the political work
of feeling among colonial rulers rather than the ruled. Danilyn Rutherford,


46 Ibid.


48 In addition, the commissioners carried with them a reading list that included ethnographic history books, some written by Christian missionaries to the Near East, as well as “statistical and economic data,” maps of physical features of the land, political boundaries, and information on the political situation “showing as accurately

49 They conceded that in Palestine they saw proportionally far more Christian groups. Of the nine members of the Commission, seven had ties to Christian missionary activity in the Near East, and three were preachers themselves. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy.

50 The fear of the Arab mob, and colonial tendencies to blame the Arab mob as collective perpetrator extends throughout history. See Gregory Starrett, “Authentication and Affect: Why the Turks Don't Like Enchanted Counterpublics, A Review Essay,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, 4 (2008), 1036–1046. The Peel Commission attributes the 1936 disturbances in Jaffa to an Arab mob (Ch.IV, p.96). In more recent times it is referred to as “the Arab street.” See Asef Bayat, “The ‘Street’ and the Politics of Dissent in the Arab World,” Middle East Report, 226 (2003), 10-17.

51 Howard, The King-Crane Commission, 121.

52 In James Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 263.

53 Ibid., 264.

54 Ibid., 20.

55 “Ala abwab al-imtihan,” Al-Asima, June 25, 1919, 1.

The League of Nations Charter is available at:

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22


“The Principles of the Mandatory regime.” Available at:


The note on this “protest from Muslims and Christians of Nablus to the Paris Peace Conference and allied states” states that this protest signed by all these people forms the credible popular opinion officially from the Nablus municipality. Zu’aytir, *Watha’iq al-haraka*, 12.
64 “Historical sketch by Albert H. Lybyer of the Commission’s visit to Syria, 1 August 1919. Report by Albert Lybyer providing a narrative description of the King-Crane Commission’s visit to different parts of the Levant,” box 16/1, ALP/OCR. 

65 Zu’aytir, Watha’iq al-haraka, 7.

66 “An Analysis,” box 7/1/6-7, WYP/BU.

67 “Strong National Feeling,” ALP/OCR: Montgomery was also concerned with “Syrian national feeling.” “Report by George Montgomery on Zionism, 1 July 1919” box 16/1, ALP/OCR. Available at: 


71 “Reflections on Syrian Nationalism,” box 5/3/319, WYP/BU.


73 Report by George Montgomery on Syria, 1 August 1919 Box 16/2, ALP/OCR.
Yale’s minority report is mentioned in Knee, “The King-Crane Commission,” 44; Patrick, “Reading the King-Crane Commission,” 25.


Cowan, “Who’s Afraid of Violent Language?”


88 Affect is the realm in which political actors can engage in a “politics of immediation” through which privileged access to reality or truth can be asserted. For related discussions, see Lori Allen, “Martyr Bodies in the Media: Human Rights, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Immediation in the Palestinian Intifada,” *American Ethnologist*, 36, 1 (2009), 162-163; Mazzarella, “A Torn Performative,” 2010.

89 Box 4/2, WYP/BU.

90 William Yale Collection, University of New Hampshire, Box 2, MC21/11/3 (hereafter WYC/UNH); also Howard, *The King-Crane Commission*, 70-71.

91 For an exegesis of how reading and measuring emotion has figured in the history of colonial counterinsurgency, see Laleh Khalili, “The Uses of Happiness in Counterinsurgencies,” *Social Text* 118, 32, 1 (2014), 23-43.

92 “Strong National Feeling,” ALP/OCR.


95 On misreading the emotional terrain of diplomatic interactions, see Winifred Tate, “Proxy Citizenship and Transnational Advocacy: Colombian Activists from Putumayo to Washington, DC,” *American Ethnologist* 40, 1 (2013), 55-70; “Human


97 Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 73.

98 Louis, The British Empire, 420.


102 Ibid. Also see, Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2d Ed. (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 2009), 177.

103 Sayigh, Yusif Sayigh, 188.

104 Ibid.

105 Wilson, Decision on Palestine, 84-85.

106 Ibid., 76.

107 Ibid.

108 Interview with Walid Khalidi, 2013.

109 Stoler, Along the Archival, 40.
110 Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, 76.

111 Ibid.

112 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin also agreed with this point. Louis, *The British Empire*, 4.

113 Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, 80.


119 Stoler, “Affective States.”


122 The Mitchell Commission’s final report highlighted the importance of rebuilding confidence between Palestinians and Israelis, resuming negotiations, for Palestinians to end terror and Israelis to freeze settlements.

123 The Palestinians’ submissions were prepared by the staff of the Negotiation Support Unit, a group of mostly relatively young lawyers, most of whom were Palestinian, Palestinian-American and others of Arab background or heritage. One of them called it “the one centerpiece of Palestinian diplomacy.” The three written submissions are available at: http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Reports/inception_report_final.pdf; http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Reports/a_crisis_of_faith.pdf; http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Reports/response_to_israelis.pdf


126 Although the official PLO response to the Report (available at: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/mitchell3.htm) noted that it did not fully address all of their concerns, they confirmed its “balanced assessment of the facts” and supported the implementation of the Committee’s recommendations.


128 See Wheatley, “Mandatory Interpretation,” 221.

129 Stoler, Along the Archival, 68.
In both the Palestinian case and that of the Australian aboriginals as analyzed by Elizabeth Povinelli it is evident that the less powerful try to make themselves legible to those in control of resources. Povinelli argues that the colonial state has compelled subaltern subjects to “identify with the impossible object of an authentic self-identity,” inspiring in them “impossible desires.” Somewhat similarly, the “cunning” of commissions reinforces a false message of what are the political criteria according to which the colonized are being judged. But commissions do not skew Palestinians’ subjectivity or their political aims. Palestinians have been demanding independence consistently and for a long time; upholding democratic principles is not simply a disciplining imposition from above. There are similar effects, however, in that commissions may enable the continuity of colonial settler practices by reducing the efficacy of Palestinian resistance to them. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “The Cunning of Recognition: A Reply to John Frow and Meaghan Morris,” *Critical Inquiry* 25, 3 (1999), 633.


According to some scholars, in the dominant claims of western political discourse, reasoned argument is at the center of the normative democratic public sphere. See Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” *Social Text* 25, 26 (1990), 56-80; Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Tr. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1989).

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