Strategic tangles: slavery, colonial policy, and religion in German East Africa, 1885–1918

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Abstract: When Germany occupied Tanganyika in 1889, the mobilising rhetoric was built around ending slavery, which in turn was framed religiously, as a “Muslim” institution to be ended by “Christian civilisation”. However, while the German colonisers subsequently suppressed slave-raiding and large-scale slave trade, they never abolished slavery itself or the private sale of slaves. Moreover, the political utility of framing slavery as an “Islamic” practice quickly faded as the German government rested its political rule on the established Omani and Swahili Muslim elites and their economic networks. Settlers and planters, in turn, were soon discussing how to solve the problem of labour shortage by coercive means. Only missionaries had an interest to continue framing slavery as a Muslim practice in order to raise support for their Christianising endeavours. This led to an extended conflict about German colonial policy, in which settlers invoked Islam as an ally for “civilising” Africans for modern labour regimes, while missionaries continued to highlight slavery as an aspect of the “Islamic danger” in the colony. The article traces the German debate of slavery in East Africa with a special interest in how it was connected to perceptions of Christianity and Islam. It demonstrates that the vicissitudes of the debate about slavery were not so much governed by the issue of slavery itself as by entangled strategic interests in the colonial nexus of politics, economy, and religion.

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Slavery and the slave trade in East Africa were quite distinct from their West African and transatlantic counterparts. In East Africa, the translocal slave trade did not emerge until the late eighteenth century and grew throughout the nineteenth century, fuelled by the expansion of ivory hunting and the caravan economy into the hinterland, as well as by the labour demands of Zanzibar's booming clove plantations. When the clove market declined in the 1870s and the British forced the Zanzibari sultan to end slave exports in 1873, the slave trade in Tanganyika did not decrease, now driven by the demand from coconut and sugar plantations along the coast as well as the acquisitions of wealthy households along the caravan routes. In the 1860s, European missionaries began to discover East African slavery as a rallying cause, most notably the Universities’ Mission to Central Africa and the Spiritan Fathers, followed by the White Fathers and the Church Missionary Society in the following decade.

By the end of the nineteenth century, slavery in East Africa was a fairly complex and multi-dimensional industry, a fact which was often lost in the fairly monochromatic descriptions of anti-slavery societies. There were different classes of slaves and slave occupations, from plantation serfdom and concubinage to house servants, tax collectors, and skilled merchants, who managed to retain part of their profits and build up some property. Social hierarchies between slaves depended on their origin, their occupation, degree of autonomy, and their acquired possessions. On the coast, manumission was a regular occurrence; it was seen as a pious act and often coincided with the owner’s death. Slaves were also able to buy their freedom through their acquired trade profits. In some instances, this led to considerable social mobility, for example in the case of Sheikh Ramiya of Bagamoyo. Captured as a child in the eastern Congo, he was sold to a household in Bagamoyo, the most important trading hub of the Tanganyikan coast. Over time, he was not only able to ransom himself, but rose to become the town’s wealthiest and most respected political and religious authority, building a significant clientèle through his leadership of the local Qādirīya brotherhood.

Given the relevance of slavery to the East African economy and to colonial conquest narratives in general, slavery and the slave trade quickly became prominent issues when Germany began its colonial acquisitions in East Africa during the 1880s. However, the newly founded Empire had no previous experience with anti-slavery measures nor possessed relevant policies in this regard. Even the German missions had no previous presence in the region, but followed on the heels of colonial expansion, and the emergence of anti-slavery societies was directly linked to the German conquest. Given this lack of experience, the German approach to slavery and the slave trade in East-Africa was quite haphazard and volatile. It was marked by political circumstances and competing interests, and discussions of the matter were entwined with debates about religion, race, contractual labour, and economic strategy. The outcome was accordingly inconsistent: Enslaving and slave-raiding were suppressed early on, while the sale of existing slaves was bureaucratised. Emancipation was encouraged, but unlike in the adjoining British territories, the institution of slavery was never banned. Instead, it remained a controversial and charged issue in German politics until the end of German rule, while
the institution itself declined significantly due to the changing economic structures.\textsuperscript{vi}

This article studies how colonial discourses on religion played into the German debate about slavery in East Africa, especially with regard to Islam. During the German conquest, a politically engineered anti-slavery platform bridged divides by proclaiming a “civilising mission” against “Arabdom,” Islam and slavery. However, this coalition quickly broke apart with the establishment of the colonial government in East Africa. Gubernatorial pragmatism prevented an effective anti-slavery policy as long as scandals could be avoided, while settler and missionary groups were increasingly coming into conflict with each other over the issue of indigenous labour. By the end of the German rule, the debate had inverted: Islam was now seen by the government as a mobilising power on behalf of Germany in the First World War, while settlers heralded the religion as a necessary force for disciplining indigenous labour, simultaneously critiquing the missionary “civilising” efforts.

Tracing the various political turns, the article highlights how the invocation of slavery served as a strategic or tactical instrument for achieving other political aims. Moreover, it examines the role religion played in these debates, from the activation of certain stereotypes about Islam, to inter-confessional politics and the role of Christianity in the “civilising mission.” These utilitarian and ideological debates will highlight that the volatility of German slavery policy must be attributed most of all to the entanglement of competing colonial visions, which also prevented a proper recognition of the institution of slavery itself.

Acquisition and conquest: Ending the slave trade as colonial cause against Muslim “Arabs”
Initially, slavery and the slave trade were of no concern to the German colonial acquisitions. Carl Peters, the infamous pioneer of German acquisitions in East Africa, and his German East Africa Company sought to lay the economic and political foundations for their nationalist expansionist ideology, and had no interest in the humanitarian rhetoric of their abolitionist contemporaries. Instead, the Company pondered various measures of how to “raise the Negro to plantation work”, and its schemes for labour coercion soon provoked the criticism that the Company was itself practising a form of slavery.\textsuperscript{vii} Likewise, on the side of Imperial politics, there was no incentive to get involved in fight against slavery and the slave trade. Bismarck’s charter policy only allowed for political interference as far as German trade interests were concerned and did not make room for larger geopolitical narratives of “civilisation.” When in 1885 the German consul in Zanzibar, Gerhard Rohlfs, suggested to use the German corvette “Gneisenau” for disrupting the slave trade as a way of bolstering German authority in the region, Bismarck famously replied: “[…] the slaves are none of your business. You are to strive for friendship and transit.”\textsuperscript{viii} Similarly, a judicial expertise by the Foreign Office concluded a few months later that subjects in the territories of the German East Africa Company could not be seen as German citizens and thereby could not claim the constitutional right of freedom from slavery.\textsuperscript{ix}
All of this drastically changed in 1888, when the Sultan of Zanzibar leased the coastal strip of Tanganyika to the German East Africa Company, whose assertive attempts to enforce their treaty with the Sultan led to an uprising that the Company was not able to control. Dubbed the “Arab Revolt” by the Germans, this uprising was not “Arab” at its core, but a simultaneous rejection of German and Omani authority by various elements along the coast, from Swahili patricians and merchants to porters and plebeians who were defending their respective interests in the changing caravan economy. However, despite this considerable heterogeneity of the coastal opposition, the term “Arab Revolt” made political sense. In this rhetoric, “Arabs” were designated as Muslims, slave hunters and traders, and a non-indigenous power – all good reasons to assert “Christian civilisation” in the region.

Colonial interest groups had already prepared the way to this conquest narrative, most importantly the German Colonial Society (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft), formed in early 1888 as a conglomerate of previous colonial associations. Its media outlet, the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, had already run a series of anti-“Arab” articles by the time the uprising began. These articles were compounds of racist stereotypes (“dirty” and “degraded” Arabs vs. “clean” but yet “uncivilised” “Negroes”), denunciations of Islam, and exhortations to end the slave trade. The conflation of religious and “civilising” aspects helped to integrate both Catholic and Protestant missionaries. Unlike the conquests of other colonial powers in Africa, German missions did not precede the advances of their Empire, but more or less followed in their wake. On the Catholic side, the Benedictines sought to form a German counter-weight to the earlier and ultimately more influential French societies (Spiritan Fathers and White Fathers), who were instrumentally engaged in anti-slavery causes. On the Protestant side, two of the Berlin societies were especially significant early on: the Evangelical Mission Society for German East Africa in Berlin (Berlin III), founded in 1886 as a nationalist missionary equivalent to Carl Peters’ colonial efforts, and the more established Berlin Missionary Society (Berlin I), which commenced its work in Tanganyika in 1891.

The latter engaged in the anti-slavery cause right away through its Inspector Alexander Merensky, who was to lead the Mission’s first expedition into the Tanganyikan hinterland. In April 1888, Merensky published his first article in the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, claiming that the “domineering and violent Mohammedanism” was the “actual enemy of Christian culture in Africa.” In the summer of 1888, the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung began to echo Catholic missionary efforts against slavery by closely following Cardinal Charles Lavigerie’s “crusade” proposition, in which the White Fathers’ founder pursued ending slavery in Africa through the creation of a religiously inspired, international band of mercenaries, tasked to enforce an arms embargo against “Arabs.” Non-missionary articles largely agreed with these
religious overtones, detecting a critical religio-political juncture. Already in February 1888, the paper’s editor, Gustav Meinecke had echoed racist sentiments in an editorial, contending that it was now time for the “Japhetites” to rule the African “Hamites”, which would require replacing the “Semitic” rule of the “Arabs”, whose Islam was the biggest obstacle to “Christian civilisation.”xiv Other articles conflated various incidents, like slave traders’ attacks on Livingstonia missionaries in Nyasaland, and the Mahdi Uprising almost 2,000 miles north, into a pan-Islamic resistance against European civilisation. When mobilising for a German “Emin Pasha Expedition,” which was to compete with Stanley’s efforts to rescue the German-born governor of the Egyptian Equatoria province, Hermann von Wissmann painted a particularly dire (and unrealistic) geopolitical drama: If the “Arabs of the South and the Mahdist join hands,” he argued, the continent would be sealed off to Europeans by a strong religious alliance, all ivory and arms trade would be siphoned off via Egypt, and slave raiding would depopulate the continent.xv In some ways, this anti-“Arab” rhetoric was a shift from the earlier attitudes of German explorers and officers. Emin Pasha was a Muslim convert and never warmed up to German conquest policy and rhetoric. Wissmann’s attitude was a bit more ambiguous. During his Africa crossing in the early 1880s he had availed himself of the economic resources and political protection of the Arab ivory and slave trader Tippu Tip and spoke of him with respect in his 1888 memoirs. Though he also called “Arabs” the “pest of Africa” in his book, this was based on the atrocities of individual slave raiders and not the geopolitical, anti-Muslim rhetoric of his newspaper article a few months later.xvi

Therefore, the newspaper’s geopolitical clamour about “Arabs” and Islam reflected the rise of colonial activism.xvii as well as the realisation that the German endeavours in East Africa would require a powerful narrative for replacing the current rulers there. However, this did little to sway Bismarck’s opinion, who even after the East African uprising was opposed to military aid to the German East Africa Company.xviii This is where the issue of slavery rose to ultimate prominence. In early October 1888, Friedrich Fabri, the former Lead Inspector of the Rhenish Missionary Society and prime architect of the German colonial movement, suggested to Bismarck that he utilise the anti-slavery movement for foreign and domestic politics alike. This would not only provide international legitimacy to German intervention, but could also serve as a cause to bridge the confessional divides of the Kulturkampf, which ran right through parliament via the strong Centre Party, which formed the Catholic opposition to Prussian rule.xix Bismarck, who had only months before reacted with disdain to a petition by Lavigerie, began to turn around, especially in light of these domestic considerations.xx A few weeks later, Fabri organised a large anti-slave trade assembly in Cologne, which saw the participation of clergy, politicians, military officers, industrialists, merchants, workers, and tradesmen alike. It was attended by a Catholic bishop and a Protestant superintendent, and its unanimously adopted resolution demanding German interference against slavery was echoed widely by similar conventions in other German towns during the following weeks.xxx This was just the broad and politically useful anti-slave trade platform Fabri had promised, gaining
momentum still with the foundation of the Africa Society of German Catholics in December 1888, which listed the suppression of the slave trade and slavery as its first goal.

Fabri’s efforts were flanked by a number of articles in the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, continuing the already established narrative about “Arabdom.” Articles now began to foreground slavery rather than religious conflict. In the newspaper’s first editorial about the uprising in East Africa, Gustav Meinecke opined, despite his earlier assertions about Islam, that the uprising had been caused by the economic interests of Arabs, who were “lukewarm Ibadis or Shafi’is” and would refrain from religious proselytisation because a “population turned Mohammedan no longer provides slaves.”

Wissmann also changed his tune again. He now denied that religious sentiments played a role in the East African uprising but attributed it to protecting the economic interests of the slave trade, while asserting that the Arabs of East Africa were “lax” in their religion.

The same pivot from religious to economic causality can also be observed in the government’s rhetoric. As Bismarck began to move, he sought to win British support for a naval blockade of the East African coast in order to quench the uprising without direct intervention. However, this support was not immediately forthcoming, especially since the British believed that the uprising was a German problem, sparked by the inappropriate behaviour of the German East Africa Company’s representatives toward Arab rulers and religious sentiment. In pushing back against the British view, Bismarck’s first instinct was to play up the pan-Islamic dimension, invoking a number of unrelated events as indicators of a larger movement: the Mahdi Uprising, the hostile behaviour of Tippu Tipp against Stanley, attacks against English mission stations in Uganda, and raids against merchants on Lake Nyasa. However, the meetings between the German ambassador in London and Prime Minister Lord Salisbury made it clear, that the British were unimpressed by this religious narrative and wary of exacerbating the crisis, while viewing the issue of slavery as the “deeper and real cause” of the uprising. The German government, therefore, changed its tactics, now going as far as attributing the rise of “Muhammadan fanaticism” to the British efforts of abolishing the more than “1,000 year custom” of slavery. Thus, they called on the British to support the naval blockade as a part of the anti-slavery cause and even threatened to publicly isolate and shame England by going alone in seeking public support from anti-slavery societies and Cardinal Lavigerie. At the time this response was drafted, England had already agreed to participate in the blockade for realpolitik reasons, but the response was sent out nevertheless to keep up the pressure for the technical negotiations. Salisbury later mimicked the German turn to anti-slavery measures, when he had to answer an interpellation in the House of Lords, which asked why England was risking its reputation in helping Germany, when the uprising had been caused by German tactlessness. Interestingly, this interpellation was supported by UMCA missionaries, who feared that military measures might be injurious to their work, which reportedly flourished even under Muslim rulers.
After successfully utilizing the anti-slavery movement in foreign affairs, Bismarck turned to domestic politics. Via Fabri he skilfully moved Ludwig Windthorst, the Speaker of the Centre Party, toward introducing a resolution calling on the government to fight slavery and pledging full parliamentary support. The Windthorst Resolution was passed with a large majority on 14 December 1888. It not only enabled Bismarck to delegate the responsibility for his strategic pivot from charter politics to colonial intervention to the Reichstag, it was also a master piece of confessional politics. The Centre Party was not only the main representation of Catholics in the Reichstag, it had also formed a consistent opposition to colonialism alongside the Social Democrats. Injecting the proposition from this wing of Parliament had only been possible via the Christian anti-slavery coalition Fabri had built and through his work behind the scenes. The government’s first white paper on the uprising in East Africa also flanked these efforts, being devoted mostly to anti-slavery measures.

On 26 January 1889 the government introduced a bill requesting 2 million German Reichsmark for “measures to repress the slave trade and to protect the German interests in East Africa,” explicitly invoking the Windthorst Resolution. The bill foresaw the installation of an Imperial Commissioner to lead these efforts, and Hermann von Wissmann, the chosen candidate, introduced his plan of a coastal occupation to the parliament. This move to open colonialism was not uncontroversial. Windthorst himself critiqued the considerable expansion of the original remit of his resolution. However, the law cleared the parliamentary readings within three days and passed on 29 January 1889. Wissmann immediately began his mission to suppress the uprising and occupy the coast, a process which culminated in 1890 with Germany taking over the German East Africa Company’s possession, negotiating borders with Britain, and establishing the German East African colony.

Colonial governance: Diverging interests
Fabri’s anti-slave-trading platform of government, colonial advocates, and missionaries barely lived to see the day of the German take-over. Especially the colonial advocacy groups moved on quite quickly, looking for ways to channel the public humanitarian interest into enthusiasm for the colonies themselves, in order to build support for substantial investments and recast the colonies as a nation-building project. Once again, Fabri was to lead the way. Already in April 1889, he delivered a summary assessment of the anti-slavery movement in his book *Fünf Jahre deutscher Kolonialpolitik. Rück- und Ausblicke* (*Five Years of German Colonial Policy: Retrospects and Prospects*). Apparently eager to harvest the colonial-political fruits of his endeavours, he contended that the anti-slavery movement had been ebbing down for three months and began to unravel the anti-slavery coalition he had crafted only months before. He now argued that Cardinal Lavigerie’s anti-slavery efforts were “noble aims,” but misguided since he underestimated the scale of Arab power in Africa and overlooked the fact that slavery was an “African, customary institution,” which could only be overcome gradually by introducing a “higher civilisation.”
Moreover, he revealed Bismarck’s political motivation for adopting the anti-slavery movement for domestic politics, and asserted that the Centre Party would from now on be supportive of further necessary measures. Echoing David Livingstone, the famous Scottish missionary, explorer and anti-slavery campaigner, Fabri asserted that the fight against slavery necessitated a different trade economy and infrastructure. He proposed to construct a railway from the coast to the great lakes – pioneering the call for the most controversial and protracted colonial projects in German East Africa, only completed in 1914. Summarising the achievements of the anti-slavery movement as having aroused public interest for colonialism, united the confessions, and furthered the cause of missions, *Fünf Jahre deutscher Kolonialpolitik* was all but an implicit obituary for the movement. Fabri repeated his views in front of the second Anti-Slavery Congress in Cologne later in 1889, which ended with remarkably placid resolutions: the Congress thanked the government, proclaimed its trust in the further extension of German endeavours, and called for international treaties on slavery between colonial powers paired with a mutual recognition of spheres of interest.

With few exceptions, the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* followed in this change of pursuit. Whereas in early 1889, a critical commentary on the idea of utilising Arabs and Islam for “civilising” Africa chided that “only the French” would form a coalition with human traffickers, the paper soon adopted a different tone. An editorial from March 1890 commented that it had been a mistake to not properly consider the economic and cultural interests of the Arabs. Rather, it would be necessary to integrate them via an extensive knowledge of their legal and religious customs. The article also called for a utilisation of Emin Pasha in the German colonial service, given his knowledge of the Islamic world, and later that year, the paper agreed with Emin’s assessment that one could very well build a political alliance with Arabs if refraining from “hasty” measures against slavery and small-scale slave trade. Likewise, an 1893 article about a government memorandum on “East Africa and the Arabs” bemoaned the lack of consideration for Islam and its legal precepts, the codification of which could be an instrument for controlling Arabs and Suaheli alike. Two years later, a critical commentary on the British push to abolish slavery in Zanzibar via a Sultan’s decree contended that the Sultan was breaking Islamic law, which only allowed manumission as an act of free will. Later articles offered similar critical sentiments on British abolition from religious and economic vantage points. Interestingly, this reappraisal of slavery as an Arab custom and religious sentiment came alongside debates about the colonial utility of Islam (rather than Christianity). It was now portrayed as the politically more useful religion of “fatalism” or as the economically more suitable alternative for “civilising” and disciplining Africans. Overall, the quick and complete turn-around in this central colonial advocacy paper was quite remarkable.

The political system was slower to manoeuvre, but soon made a similar volte-face, determined by the practical demands of governance and political pragmatics. Whatever Wissman and Fabri may have fantasized about exiling all Arabs from the mainland in 1888, it had quickly become obvious that the local colonial governance needed to rely on established
power structures and “Arab” collaborators. From the adoption of Swahili as administrative language (at first in Arabic script) and the retention of liwalis as local government representatives, to the establishment of “secular” government schools for the education of the children of Muslim notables, German colonial policy was built on the erstwhile elites of the caravan economy. With the exception of suppressing slave-raiding and large-scale slave trade, such a policy would not lend itself to drastic measures against existing slavery or the local slave trade.

In September of 1890, English newspapers began to claim that the Germans had officially sanctioned slave trade in Bagamoyo in an attempt to siphon off the business from Zanzibar and British East Africa, where prohibition was more strictly enforced. The German press reacted vividly, with colonial-critical papers demanding an explanation and conservative outlets insisting that slave-raiding had been banned, but that slave ownership and sales had to be phased out gradually. The German executive denied the claims and ordered an investigation, while the British government insisted that the accusations were accurate, even handing over a copy of the alleged decree to the German consul in Zanzibar. The decree stated that in order to re-encourage agricultural activity, all land owners in the wider area of Bagamoyo were allowed to “recover and retain their slaves” and sell them “to the people of Bagamoyo,” while it was forbidden to ship them by sea. Germany could not deny the existence of the text itself, but the investigation claimed that it had only been a draft – created by their most important Omani collaborator, Soliman bin Nasr, yet not officially sanctioned by the district officer. Soliman’s intervention reflected the local agency of Omani planters, who were pushing for legal clarity for repossessing their slaves and protecting their share in the plantation economy and the corollary forced labour market, while acquiescing to the fact that translocal slave trade was no longer allowed.

The German “clarification” of the origin and draft nature of the decree put the affair to rest, but ironically it accurately described the established German practice, which was to turn a blind eye to slavery and the local slave trade within the colony while suppressing slave raiding and the export of slaves. Slowly, this became official policy as well. When attempting to ratify the anti-slavery measures of the 1890 Brussels Conference Act, the government presented a bill to the Reichstag containing the respective provisions, but made it clear in the parliamentary debate, that private slave trading and slavery were not targeted by these provisions. Defending (especially domestic) slavery as a customary, benign, and necessary institution for the social and economic well-being in the German colonies in Africa, the government representative indicated that its abolition could only be envisioned in a long term process of “civilising.” The Centre Party opposed this stance, though not so much on principal grounds, but because of the lack of a clear timeline for abolition. It is important to note, that due to the fundamental legal constitution of German colonialism, any legislation only applied to “non-natives,” whereas matters concerning “natives,” a category comprising all “coloured” inhabitants like Arabs and Indians, were regulated by executive diction only. This meant that the parliamentary bill only legislated against Europeans capturing and trading slaves, something which was not known to occur. The bill was
therefore unnecessary and controversial, and died in committee.

In 1894, the Reichstag brought up the matter again, demanding a revised draft of the anti-slave-trade bill, which finally reached parliament in January of 1895 and was debated in May.\(^{lv}\) As before, this bill was largely symbolic since it would not apply to Africans or any other “coloured” inhabitants. The debate, therefore, quickly turned on the institution of slavery itself. While conservative parties were supportive of the draft and entrusted the government with finding adequate measures to end slavery, the Social Democrats demanded full abolition. The Centre Party again took a pragmatic middle position. It sided with the government in insisting that it would be an impossible if not brutal imposition to abolish slavery right away, invoking its ties with polygamy and religious views.\(^{lv}\) However, it also insisted that further steps must be taken to prepare abolition, even if this required the “transitional measure” of regulating the rights and duties of slaves and slave owners. In the end, parliament passed both the law and a Centre Party resolution requiring the government to take further measures to prepare the abolition of domestic slavery and debt bondage.\(^{lv}\)

Any regulation of slavery, however, would have amounted to an official recognition of the institution. Therefore, the government did not move on this matter until prompted by another Reichstag debate in 1901. By then, respective regulations had emerged in the colonies. In 1897 the governor of East Africa had drafted a decree, which provided some guideline for district officers on how to adjudicate slavery matters, for example in dealing with fugitive slaves.\(^{lvii}\) Circumventing the Brussels Conference Act, the governor redefined slavery as “serfdom” and regulated the rights and obligations of serfs and their masters, including measures of punishment. Berlin approved the guidelines in March 1899 under the condition that they would not be made public in any manner. In response to the 1901 parliamentary debate, the Chancellor now issued rules based on the East African guidelines, which remained in place until the end of German colonial rule. The only major amendment came in 1904, when the Chancellor declared that all children born to slaves after 31 December 1905 were to be regarded as free.

While the political interest in abolishing the institution of slavery rapidly waned with the suppression of slave raiding and translocal slave trade, missionaries retained the old abolitionist narrative for years to come, even though they now ran counter to the mainstream. Anti-slavery efforts wielded a great potential for mobilising support, and therefore remained a part of the missionary portfolio regardless of changing circumstances. While the former naval blockade had yielded a steady stream of liberated slaves for the missions, the post-conquest policy of repressing the large-scale slave trade whilst ignoring the private market meant that the supply of freed slaves soon dried up. Already in 1894, when the newly formed Evangelical Africa Society (a belated Protestant counterpart to the anti-slavery efforts of the Africa Society of German Catholics) submitted plans to found a station for freed slaves in Usambara, the colonial government argued that there was no need for such a work.\(^{lviii}\) In 1898, the East African government sent out a circular stating that neglected street children should from now on be seized and assigned to mission stations, a decree which was motivated
by missionary complaints about a lack of referred slave children. Missionaries continued to report about the slave trade and slave raids in remote regions, but the veracity of these reports was often doubted by the government, arguing that it was the missions’ “business to complain about the atrocities of the slave trade.”

However, despite this evidently shrinking “business,” the missionary anti-slavery rhetoric remained unchanged for a different reason: They sought to capitalise on the issue for mobilising Christian efforts against Islam. Already in 1889, Alexander Merensky published an article about slavery in the Qur’ân, seeking to theologically document the alleged connection between the two, which before had only been made rather externally via the designator of “Arabdom” and Muslim geopolitics. The last two articles heralding the anti-slavery cause in the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung were published in 1891 and made a similarly strong connection between slavery and the missionary efforts against Islam.

With the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung then fully pivoting in the direction outlined above, such inputs by missionaries disappeared from the paper, but they continued to make the case against Islam on account of slavery elsewhere. This was especially the case, as they felt increasingly threatened by gubernatorial policy in East Africa with regard to language policy, the recruitment of native government workers and soldiers, and the opening of government schools especially for Muslim children without the normally compulsory Christian education.

A clear example of the continued conflation of Islam with slavery in missionary rhetoric can be seen in the first Colonial Congress of 1902. This was an assembly of over 1,300 representatives from 70 organisations, convened by the President of the German Colonial Society, Duke Johann Albrecht of Mecklenburg.

During this first Colonial Congress, the only paper on slavery was delivered in the section “Religious and Cultural Conditions” by Pater Amandus Acker, a former Spiritan missionary in Zanzibar and head of the Spiritan convent and mission school in Knechtstedten. He contended that slavery was so closely interwoven with Islam in religious, moral, and economic aspects that it is possible to conclude that “wherever there are Mohammedans, slavery rules, and as long as there are Mohammedans, there will be slavery.” Acker even laboured to distinguish “Mohammedan” slavery from African forms, contending that in the latter case, slaves were still seen as humans and would find release, whereas Muslims viewed slaves as their property, similar to a donkey or horse. Acker reasoned that the government first needed to stop patronising Islam through its pro-Islamic policies, before other measures would successfully end slavery. This kind of rhetoric would only increase in the coming years and formed a major line of conflict between missionaries and various...
other colonial interest groups.

Overall, it is clear that Fabri’s anti-slavery coalition had little chance of surviving the rhetoric of the German colonial conquest. As various stakeholders sought to guide colonial policy, their aims, methods, and views became increasingly irreconcilable. Slavery, accordingly, became subject of political debate, as settlers and colonial interest groups put economic profitability in the forefront of their concerns, while missionaries sought to employ slavery as a cause against the perceived “Islam-friendly” policies of the government. The government, in turn, mostly sought to avoid scandal and to administer the colony with a thin layer of personnel.

Colonial conflict: Labour shortage, “Islamic Danger” and slavery
In the years to come, slavery and Islam became major battlegrounds in the clash between missionaries and other colonial interest groups. A first fault line for this conflict had already emerged when in June 1890 the Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung published an interview with Wissmann, who praised Catholic missions as introducing “Christian influence, culture and morality,” whereas Protestant missions hindered his work through political intrigue. This prompted strong Protestant reactions, most notably by the Berlin Mission inspector Alexander Merensky and the doyen of German missiology, Gustav Warneck. They not only refuted the alleged political intrigue and pointed to Protestant mission successes, but attacked Catholic missions as a violent, but hollow imposition of Christian values and practices which would not produce lasting results. Especially the Spiritan Fathers’ work in Bagamoyo was characterised as a continuation of slavery. In ransoming (“buying”) children, benefitting from their labour, and retaining power over them, Merensky contended that the priests in Bagamoyo were no different from slave traders and owners. Wissmann countered that the Catholic discipline and the “outwardness” of its cult was the key to its success because one could not expect nations on such a “low level of civilisation” to understand “the Christian religion of love.” He, therefore, saw the “labora et ora” of the Catholic missions as the right approach to raise the “savage” to higher culture, as against the “ora et labora” of Protestant missionaries. The dispute escalated into an exchange of open letters between Warneck and Wissmann, in which both espoused similar racist sentiments toward Africans and a commitment to the European civilising mission, but Warneck advocated that a true conversion to Christianity would lead to higher culture, earnestness, and discipline, whereas Wissmann made the connection the other way around. Wissmann, a Prussian Protestant, had no personal reason to defend Catholic missions, other than evaluating the missionary input from his militaristic understanding of European colonial rule. Warneck, in turn, had been a vociferous critic of the anti-slavery “euphoria” all along, mostly from a narrow confessional standpoint of fearing an “ultramontane” takeover of German
missions, but also from a deep-seated aversion against making missions subservient to the colonial project. The implicit heart of the matter was the question of native labour: was the creation of disciplined labourers a missionary task (and indeed a prerequisite to instilling Christianity as Wissmann had implied), or was the missionary merely to provide “morally raised” individuals whom the colonial economy then might turn into diligent labourers compliant with a modern capitalist regime?

As the German colonial hold increased, the so-called “labour question” became one of the most pressing economic issues. With large infrastructure projects and the rise of sisal, rubber, and coffee production, settlers and the government were in constant need to coerce the Tanganyikan population from a subsistence economy into wage-labour relations. A number of debates and measures to address this question formed an eerie echo of slavery and the slave trade. The treatment of labourers on plantations was hardly preferable to slavery. Already in 1891, the fairly liberal East African governor Julius von Soden had remarked that one of the main obstacles to abolition was that slaves would rather remain in their current state than become “free labourers” on a plantation, where they had to work harder and were punished more severely. However, he did little to curtail these practices and when Wissmann returned to the colony as governor, he legalised the right of employers to chastise labourers. In consequence, brutality was rife and undoubtedly exacerbated the recruitment problem in addition to the often dire living conditions on plantations. The legal right to chastise labourers was not curtailed until the Rechenberg years (1906–1912), and while the measures he took contributed to his ongoing conflict with settler interests, they seemed to do little to improve plantation recruitment.

All other measures to address the labour shortage were coercive ones. Various tax regimes were introduced with the aim of monetising the economy and pressing people into some form of regular wage dependence. Whoever could not pay the tax, was forced to pay off his debt by working for the local district office in infrastructure projects and similar measures. Some districts introduced a mandatory labour card scheme, requiring male inhabitants to work for European employers for a certain part of their time. “Breaking of contract” was made a criminal offence, typically punished by chained imprisonment, with the ubiquitous neck chains forming a cynical echo of the slave trade the Germans had vowed to end. Another such parallel was the conduct of recruitment agents, who hired labourers with false promises, bribes, and force, and after moving them toward the plantations on the coast offered their labour in bulk to plantation owners. A free labour market never emerged in such conditions, nor was this deemed achievable, since the prevalence of racist attitudes caused settlers and colonial officers to attribute the labour shortage to the “indolence” and “laziness” of Africans.

In this atmosphere, the missionary critique of colonial policy as aiding the spread of Islam, was increasingly misplaced and encountered strong resistance among settlers, who accused the missions of disseminating potentially dangerous propaganda, while not addressing the “civilising” issues at hand. The Deutschen-Ostafrikanische Zeitung in Dar es Salaam
was the first to voice these sentiments. Reacting to a German newspaper article about the “Islamic Danger,” an editorial titled “Spectres” dismissed the rhetoric of “danger” as an “un-Christian” attempt to repress another religion and pointed out that the government’s primary task was not to spread “Christian mores,” but to “raise useful citizens out of the native element.” To reach this goal, the article advocated a spread of government schools all over the colony in order to complement the missionary shortcomings. When the Benedictine bishop Cassian Spieß submitted a critical response to the article, the paper replied by calling into question the economic usefulness of mission protégés overall. In the following years, attacks against missions became a regular feature of the paper, often in connection with labour issues and the alleged failure of missionaries to properly discipline Africans.

In Germany the same dynamic unfolded after the second Colonial Congress in 1905. At the Congress, missionaries had once again bemoaned the spread of Islam and asserted the importance of Christianity to the colonial project. The Protestant theologian Julius Richter forecast a Muslim uprising and a return of the slave trade as a result of German policy, while affirming the patriotic outlook of German missions. The Superior of the White Fathers, Joseph Froberger, contended that the “cultural value” of Islam was overrated and that far from advancing civilisation it would promote “moral decay.” The Apostolic Prefect of German South-West Africa, August Nachtwey, also asserted that missions were an important part of the colonial project and reckoned that the teaching of work ethics was one of the “civilising” tasks of missions. This in turn sparked the critical remark from the Protestant side that “personal freedom” was an equally important Christian value, which was necessary to prevent the “slave-like dependence” of workers in “Manchesterdom.” In the end, the missions managed to get two important resolutions passed by the Congress, one recommending the creation of a “strong German-Christian culture” as counterweight to the spread of Islam, and the other calling for the “full moral support” of mission work.

The colonial papers reacted with ire to these resolutions. The most vociferous among them was the Koloniale Zeitschrift, founded in 1900 as a nationalist and economy-centred rival to the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung. Having fought with missionaries about their criticism of the brutal exploitation of Africans before, the paper now argued that missionaries only focused on Islam to cover up their own failures. It also printed a counter-resolution by its trustees, titled “Against the New Crusade,” which contended that the genetic disposition of Africans made them much more susceptible to the “realistic teachings of Islam” than to the “transcendental” mores of Christianity. Moreover, it argued that Richter’s arguments regarding slavery were invalid, since the slave trade was carried out by “half-blooded Negroes” with a “doubtful religion” rather than by Arabs. The latter had “merely made the Negroes subservient and forced them to work” as the colonisers had also attempted “more or less – unfortunately rather less [than more].” The Deutsche Kolonialzeitung began to exhibit a similar tendency to downplay the institution of slavery. A number of articles argued that slavery in the Orient and East Africa was nothing like its counterpart in antiquity or in America, but
more like a patriarchal arrangement, providing housing and welfare to dependent labourers. As slavery was increasingly characterised as a benign social institution, the scale and even existence of the pre-conquest slave raids was also cast in doubt.\textsuperscript{lxxxiv}

Despite this strong resistance from colonial advocacy groups, missionaries gradually gained some ground with their rhetoric of “Islamic danger.” The criticisms in the colonial newspapers began to subside, and when a similar resolution against Islam was passed by the Colonial Congress of 1910, it received no such echo.\textsuperscript{lxxxv} This change in public perception can be attributed to a number of causes. By 1910 the rise of Islam in the German colony was much more evident than only five years before, making it plausible to consider its rising political potential. This perception was aided by the so-called “Mecca letter affair” of 1908, when letters were discovered all over the colony, containing an alleged admonition by the Sharif of Mecca to all Muslims not to collaborate with unbelievers. While the letters did not directly incite uprisings and had little political consequences, their content and sudden emergence was used to argue that one should not underestimate the political potentiality of Islam. Finally, leading scholars of Islam, such as Carl Heinrich Becker, now joined the conversation about how to best govern Islam and how to deal with its less favourable potentialities. While the scholars had different intentions and different opinions on this matter, their participation in the missionary debates helped to raise the issue to prominence, which ultimately forced the German government to some concessions.

However, this new rhetoric of “Islamic danger” was no longer fully connected to the issue of slavery nor did it allow a re-emergence of the erstwhile anti-slavery coalition between political and missionary interests, as can be seen in subsequent parliamentary debates. In 1912, Matthias Erzberger, a leading representative of the Centre Party, inserted a resolution into the budget debate, urging the Chancellor to prepare for full abolition in East Africa by 1920. During the debate, Erzberger profiled his resolution specifically against the more principled Social Democratic criticism of colonial and missionary imperialism, arguing that the “civilising project” had yielded a measurable success and that in order to further “uplift the natives,” Germany now had to “crown a great German civilising work” by the abolition of slavery.\textsuperscript{lxxxvi} His strategy was successful at first. Social Democrats could hardly be against the proposal itself and the government’s representatives could not argue against its “civilising” principle, but only asked for a more flexible time frame. The resolution passed with support from all parties.

Erzberger followed up in the next budget debate in March 1913, asking the director of the Colonial Office, Wilhelm Solf, what had been done in response to the resolution. The exchange of arguments closely resembled that between missionaries and colonial advocates years before. Erzberger attempted to connected the issue of slavery to Islam, the “main enemy of natives in East Africa,” alleging that this religion was spread through government policy and advocating a stronger support of missions.\textsuperscript{lxxxvii} Solf, in turn, deflected the question of religion by advocating
government neutrality and attributing the spread of Islam to missionary failures in countering Muslim “propaganda.”

With regard to the issues of labour and slavery, he repeated the established racist sentiments about the necessity of keeping the “natives” subservient to “white intelligence” by teaching them how to work, and it became clear that he had done nothing more on the issue of slavery than to demand a report from East Africa. The Social Democrats, forming the largest party in parliament at this time, sided with Erzberger in insisting on the 1920 deadline, but otherwise strongly criticised his comments about Islam, making clear that this was hardly a helpful argument in forming a political coalition against slavery.

The East African governor’s report reached parliament in early 1914. It insisted that the still existing form of slavery, or “serfdom,” was a mild arrangement with mutual benefits, stating moreover that to enforce abolition would have severe economic consequences. It would be better to let the institution die out in due course, relying on manumission and a decreased supply as everyone born after 1905 had been declared free. The Social Democrats and the Centre Party reacted with strong criticism of these sentiments and the continued presence of forced labour. The former likened the government’s approach to that of the confederate states in the American Civil War, while Erzberger bemoaned that the governor did not even consider some of the practical propositions the parliament had made, but had simply declared abolition an economic impossibility. However, while the Social Democrat Wilhelm Dittmann led a more foundational attack and argued that plantation capitalism had produced an unprecedented form of slavery, Erzberger sought to distance himself from this critique by affirming that economic interests should be part of an “ora et labora” form of colonialism. He continued to argue for mission support, but did not return to the “Islamic danger”-argument he had brought up rather unsuccessfully the year before. Some liberals joined in with the criticism of the opposition, and it became clear that any attempt by the government to stretch the deadline for abolition would be rejected by the majority.

The debate consumed over four days, and in the end the budget was passed with a new resolution, calling on the Chancellor to report by 1915 on concrete measures taken toward abolition.

This resolution is the closest Germany ever came to abolition, since the First World War prevented parliament from following up on its implicit budget threat. The war also shifted the political calculations with regard to religion yet again, away from whatever gains missionaries made in convincing the public and the government of a potential “Islamic danger.” Now the Reich sought to capitalise on the Ottoman alliance by inciting Muslims into a “Holy War” against the Entente. On 15 November 1914 the Shaykh al-Islām in Istanbul proclaimed his well-known jihād fatwā, which mandated all Sunni Muslims (or those respecting the Ottoman caliphate) to enter the war against England, France, and Russia. While the Ottoman Empire certainly had its own intentions and political calculations in this proclamation, it was prepared and flanked by German diplomacy and propaganda. Among its many uses in German publications and prison camps, the fatwā was also translated into Swahili and distributed in the East African colony.
The actual impact of this measure is disputable, but it certainly affected the outlook toward Islam in the colonial press as can be seen in an article in the *Koloniale Zeitschrift* from 1915. It contended that the “Holy War” declaration had aroused Muslim enthusiasm for the war in a way that “Christian missions cannot have, and perhaps should not have in accordance with their character.” The article called for an end to all criticism of Islam-friendly German policies, and returning to the issue of labour, the author made the following peculiar remarks:

Christianity and Islam will operate in our colonies in equal measure. Of course, we do not think of a reintroduction of slavery. We could do without the passages about the treatment of slaves in the Koran. But the absence of any compulsion to work would mean to leave idle the enormous economic values which our colonies hold. Thus we hope and wish that in practical economic life there will be a compromise between the Islamitic and Christian world view, which introduces labour compulsion in such a measure and form that it guarantees the reproduction and increase of the natives, as well as their economic and cultural elevation […]

In many ways, this quote can be seen as the cynical antithesis to where the colonial propaganda on East Africa had begun during the years of conquest. Then, slavery had been invoked as an issue compelling the German nation to interfere, before a strategic Muslim alliance would forever impose the institution onto the African continent and seal it from Christian “civilisation.” Now, some sort of strategic alliance with Islam was invoked in order to balance out Christian influence and bring about “cultural elevation” via labour compulsion. The short-lived anti-slavery coalition had fully inverted.

Conclusion
The vicissitudes of the German slavery debate certainly point to the volatility of early colonial politics. As multiple actors and interest groups attempted to influence the public, the issue of slavery was defined and discussed as it suited their respective purposes, which changed over time.

However, in many ways it is also possible to argue that the conversation did not change at all, because its fundamental premises remained the same. Firstly, slavery was characterised throughout as an “Arab” or Muslim issue of geopolitical significance. For as long as the strategic vectors of colonialism and mission coincided, their narratives on slavery and Islam matched, but when they pivoted toward economic and religious empire building, respectively, they clashed precisely on the discursively linked topics of slavery and Islam. Moreover, this geopolitical utilisation of Islam was remarkably distant from actual Muslim practices and discussions on the coast. As Jan-Georg Deutsch has pointed out, Islamic teachings and piety were a major motivator for manumission, which played an important role in the decline of slavery along the coast, but this aspect is not reflected in any of the German debates about Islam and slavery. Secondly, the racist paternalism of the “civilising mission” continued to govern the debate as Wissmann’s 1890
altercation with Protestants was replayed time and again: in the settler-missionary conflicts, the parliamentary debates about ending slavery, and even in the 1915 colonial press musings about post-war East Africa. While Wissmann heralded Catholic missions over Protestants as the role model for disciplining the African labour force, later discussions centred on whether Islam or Christianity was the preferable religious force to achieve the same. While not necessarily agreeing on their causal sequence, all sides of the debate envisioned a connection between “ora” and “labora,” between the religious capability and the labour capacity of their African subjects. Finally, the moral discourse connected to slavery retained an enormous utility throughout. Fabri and Bismarck adopted the cause in order to move toward an interventionist colonialism, missionaries built their resources and legitimacy around fighting slavery, and the parliamentary opposition used the moral discourse on slavery to pressure the government on colonial policies. Whoever was on the other side of these arguments, needed to deflate the moral narrative about slavery – be it Warneck’s accusation of Catholic missions harbouring ulterior motives (ultramontanism), the East African government’s tactical refusal to recognise and regulate the institution, or the colonial advocates’ re-definition of slavery as mild serfdom with welfare benefits.

Given that these three fundamental premises remained constant and yet sufficiently explain the various developments in the German discourse and policies on slavery, one may suspect that the debate was at its core all about strategic gains in colonial politics rather than the institution of slavery itself.

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i For the East African slave economy, see esp. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 40–87; Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar; Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, 17–52.


iii For a detailed social history of slavery in nineteenth century Tanganyika, see esp. Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, 53–96; Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 79–114. For a contemporary account of both, see Swann, Fighting the Slave Hunters in Central Africa.

iv See Nimtz, Islam and Politics, 119–123.

v See below.

vi For a detailed analysis of these contradictions, see Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition.

vii See Bückendorf, Schwarz-weiß-rot über Ostafrika!, 294–5.

viii See Schneppe, Sansibar und die Deutschen, 94. Klaus Bade pointed out the irony, that this statement came only three weeks after the conclusion of the Berlin Conference, whose (not yet ratified) General Act mandated the signatory powers to suppress slave trade by all means, see Bade, “Antisklavereibewegung.” 40.

ix See BArch R 1001/1002, 3–13.

x For the plebeian dynamics of the uprising, see Feasts and Riot; for the others, see esp. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 92–98.

xi For this process, see Bade, Friedrich Fabri, 471–503.


xiii Merensky, “Der mohammedanische Gegenstoß.”

xiv Meinecke, “Wandlungen.”
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Wissmann, Unter deutscher Flagge quer durch Afrika, xi, 144-5.

The print run of the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung had reached 18,500 in 1890. It probably closely followed the Colonial Society’s membership, which was roughly 16,000 in 1888, see Bade, Friedrich Fabri, 498.

See Bückendorf, Schwarz-weiß-rot über Ostafrika!, 353–355.

See Bade, “Antisklavereibewegung.” 44–45. Fabri had successfully advised Bismarck on colonial politics before, see Bade, Friedrich Fabri, 513–547.

Bade perhaps overstates Fabri’s influence in turning Bismarck around, since the Chancellor had already instructed the Foreign Office on 30 September to contact Cardinal Lavigerie, see Schneppen, Sansibar und die Deutschen, 246. However, the political utility of the anti-slavery societies for domestic purposes almost certainly was Fabri’s injection.

See Bade, Friedrich Fabri, 534–538.


“Die Araberfrage und der Sklavenhandel.” Wissmann had been a speaker at Fabri’s anti-slavery assembly in Cologne and was likely oriented about his political moves.

One of the main complaints against the Germans in Pangani was the desecration of a mosque, for details, see Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 215–218. For the early British view, see Leyden to Bismarck, 9 Oct 1888. BArch R 1001/706, 51–57.


Hatzfeld to Bismarck, 19 Oct 1888. BArch R 1001/706,104–112.


See Schneppen, Sansibar und die Deutschen, 244.

See Hatzfeld to Bismarck, 7 Nov 1888. BArch R 1001/709, 12–22.

See articles in the Times from 25 Oct, 1 Nov, and 7 Nov 1888, kept in the German records. BArch R 1001/691, 52; BArch R 1001/692, 76; 89–90.

See Stenographische Berichte 105, 303–321; Anlage 27, Stenographische Berichte 108, 182. For the political background to this, see Klaus Bade’s meticulous documentation in Friedrich Fabri, 537–542.

See ibid., 539–541.


xxvii Ibid., 52–53.

xxviii “Gegen den Sklavenhandel,” 354.

xxix “Die Araber in Mittelafrika.”

xl “Die Araberfrage und Emin Pascha.”

xli “Korrespondenzen,” November 29, 1890; “Aufruf zur Unterstützung der Vorschläge Emin Paschas.”

xlii “Die Denkschrift über Ostafrika und die Araber.”

xliii “Die Sklaverei auf Sansibar und Pemba.”


xl “Ein Schreiben von Prof. Dr. Schweinfurth”; Hirsch, “Arabische Weltanschauung.”

xli “Mission oder Islam?”; Passarge, “Mission oder Islam?”

xlii See Bade, “Antisklavereibewegung,” 54; Bade, *Friedrich Fabri*, 542.

xliii The various press clippings collected on this matter in September 1890 fill more than 100 pages of the corresponding Foreign Office file, see BArch R 1001/1002.

xliv Charles Euan-Smith to Gustav Michahelles, 13 Sept 1890. BArch R 1001/1003, 23–25.


lii This was acknowledged in the explanatory statement for the bill, see ibid., 2801. The fundamental colonial law was the Protectorates’ Act, for its genesis and legal implications, see esp. Grohmann, *Exotische Verfassung*.


lv See Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition*, 113. Incidentally policy makers and legal commentators frequently invoked polygamy and slavery as reasons for the incompatibility of Muslim and German law and the resulting need for the category of the “native” – the circle was complete.

lvii *Stenographische Berichte* 140, 2357–6.

lviii For this and the following, see Deutsch, Emancipation, 145–151.

lix See TNA G 9/34. In the end, this work turned into an orphanage and later into a sanatorium for Europeans.

lix See TNA G 9/1, 135. For the decree, see Kaiserliches Gouvernement von Deutsch-Ostafrika, *Die Landes-Gesetzgebung des Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen Schutzgebiets. Teil II*, 308.
Bismarck to Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, 17 December 1895. BArch R1001/1004, 21–22, here 21. For reports see e.g. the roughly 100 pages about Ruanda in TNA G 9/18.

Merensky, “Was sagt der Koran über Sklavenjagden und Sklaverei?”

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See Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1902.

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Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 July 1890 (morning edition). See also Katharina Stornig’s article in this volume, “Catholic missionary associations and the saving of African child slaves in nineteenth-century Germany.”


The German government stayed neutral: they reminded Wissmann of regulations regarding publications in the press, but did not comment on the debate in any way, see BArch R 1001/836.

This was not true of all German missions and in part explains Warneck’s harsh assessment of the new Evangelical Mission Society for German East Africa (Berlin III), which explicitly allied with colonial causes.


See Schröder, Prügelstrafe und Züchtigungsrecht, 112–117.

See Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 106–7.

See Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, 218–227; Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 64–68, 133–138.

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See esp. “Übersicht der Presse”; Der Vorstand des Deutschen Kolonialbundes, “Gegen den neuen Kreuzzug”;
the ensuing debate stretched over more articles later that year.

lxxxiii See also the longer defense of this same argument in Zache, “Koloniale Eingeborenpolitik (Fortsetzung).”


lxxxv For the debate and resolution, see Redaktionsausschuss des deutschen Kolonialkongresses, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1910, 662–673.

lxxxvi Stenographische Berichte 284, 1529. On the resolution and its further development, see also Deutsch, Emancipation without Abolition, 118–122.


lxxxviii Ibid., 4334–7

lxxxix Ibid., 4350, 4354–5.

xc Anlage 1395, Stenographische Berichte 303, 2885–2891.

xci Stenographische Berichte 294, 7903–7906, 7912–7914.

xcii Ibid., 8106.

xciii Tschudi, “Die Fetwa des Schejch-üll-Islâm.”

xciv Schwanitz, “Djihad ‘Made in Germany.’”

xcv Pesek, Das Ende eines Kolonialreiches, 282–295.


xcvii Ibid.

xcviii Deutsch, “The ‘Freeing’ of Slaves in German East Africa.”