Sufism and Liberation across the Indo-Afghan Border: 1880-1928

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Abstract: How do we understand links between sufism and pro-egalitarian revolutionary activism in the early twentieth century; and how did upland compositions of self and community help constitute revolutionary activism in South Asia more broadly? Using Pashto poetry as my archive I integrate a history of radical egalitarian thought and political practice to a holistic study of self-making; of imperial spatiality; and of shifting gradients of power in the regions between Kabul and Punjab. Amid a chaotic rise of new practices of imperial and monarchic hegemony around the turn of the twentieth century, I argue, older sedimentations of ‘devotee selfhood’ in the high valleys of eastern Afghanistan gave rise, in social spaces preserved by self-reflexive poetic practice and circulation, to conscious desires for avoidance of all forms of hierarchy or sovereignty, in favour of a horizontal politics of reciprocity. Such inchoate drives for freedom later played a role in constituting anti-statist revolutionary subjectivities across great geographical and social distance. From upland sufi roots they rippled outward to intersect with the work of transnational socialist and anti-imperialist militants in Indian nationalist circles too; and even influenced scholars at the heart of the nascent Afghan nation-state.

Keywords: Islam; sufism; politics; revolution; Afghanistan; Pashto poetry

Introduction

The most prominent communist organiser in British India’s Northwest Frontier Province in the 1930s and 40s was ‘Abd al-Rahim Popalzai, mufti (legal authority) of Peshawar and a Deoband graduate. Contrary to claims that there was little ‘Islamic’ in his political commitments, Popalzai narrated his activism in terms of piety and of sufi cosmology, citing his acute awareness of wahdat al-wujud, the unity of all being; and the implications of this unity for the individual self and for social responsibility. He also cited dream-apparitions by the Sahib of Hadda, an activist saint of the border region.
Likewise, Sulayman Layiq, a renowned poet, Politburo member, and Afghan Minister of Culture in the communist 1980s, traces his specific politics to internationalism; but in examining his own activist impulse, he cites his childhood on the Indo-Afghan border in a pastoralist mulla family who were embedded in activist devotional networks.\(^3\)

How do we understand the links between revolutionary affect and borderland Islam that occur so frequently in activist narratives of the period? English-language research involving the frontier has often split cosmopolitan genealogies of the left from ‘Muslim identity politics’.\(^4\) Urdu-language historiography has more often located ideas of social justice in lineages of reformist Islam.\(^5\) But both bodies of research focus on how elites brought cosmopolitan ideas like pan-Islam, reformism, or socialism to the frontier. Like imperial anxiety over ‘Wahhabis’ and ‘Bolshevik’ agents,\(^6\) they depend on ideas of a static frontier, in which social change results mostly from outside dynamism.

Finally, in contrast to the above, more recent work has argued that militancy in the Indo-Afghan borderland is better understood contextually, especially in terms of structures of inequality in local and global political economy. This includes the figuration of the imperial frontier as a regional and global frontier in the first instance. This focus is exemplified by a number of selections in Magnus Marsden and Ben Hopkins’ 2012 volume _Beyond Swat_, and has been influenced by debates over class and regional dynamics in the rise of post-2001 Taliban movements. This line of argumentation has had more sociological nuance, and attention to spatiality and power begins to raise the question of why Deobandi activism in the Frontier, for example, resulted in large-scale radical counterorganization, rather than movements of individualized self-help and personal piety as in the north Indian plains. I build on this line of argumentation here.
But, such framing can risk reinscribing the very notions of centre and periphery that underlay the structures it critiques. And, even recent research has prioritised modern ideation-centred notions of activism; whereas even the brief account of Popalzai above, with his dream-devotion and his sensitivity to constitutions of selfhood by a broader cosmos, suggests subtler combinations of reflexive thought and interpersonal emotional geographies. So can we move away from marginalising accounts of ‘frontier leftism,’ toward one that centres upland space; and one that is as sensitive to indigenous modes of understanding action as it is to self-universalising concepts like ‘socialism’?

This essay forms a bottom-up complement to Yasmin Saikia’s discussion, in this collection, of actors between global and local worlds. In it, I integrate a history of radical egalitarian thought and political practice to a holistic study of selfhood; of spatiality; and of shifting gradients of power in the regions between Kabul and Punjab.

In the first half, I retell histories of sufi militancy on the frontier from a devotee’s perspective, to read ‘sufism’ in terms of individual and collective technologies of self-making. Mutuality in agrarian ritual was inseparable from modes of devotion that emphasised social concern and social levelling; while pilgrimage routes, scholarly networks, and the circulation of sufi poetic techniques of self-creation that they fostered, linked individual devotion and local agrarian practices to wider domains. Post-1870s extensions of new forms of sovereignty fractured these worlds suddenly, superimposing multiple hierarchies of tribe and sufi lineage onto them. But amid a chaotic rise of new forms of hegemony, I argue, older sedimentations of ‘devotee selfhood’ gave rise, in social spaces preserved by self-reflexive poetic practice and circulation, to conscious desires for avoidance of all hierarchy in favour of a horizontal politics of reciprocity.

Such inchoate drives for freedom later played a role in constituting revolutionary subjectivities across great geographical and social distance. Local Afghan devotional
worlds and mobile peoples formed a lattice of connected space in Certeau’s sense, a “polyvalent unity of...contractual proximities” from the highlands to the Indian plain, produced by cumulative devotional use. Upland histories were intimately connected to the wider world. So, once we re-centre upland ontologies we should also ask: how did mountain histories shape wider politics? In this essay’s second half, I explore the lives of upland history not as counterpoint to better-known channels of activism, but as a neglected presence within them. Of course, if elite activists like Popalzai narrate mountain sufi roots, one might dismiss this as a bid for legitimacy; but I contend there is more to it. I argue that rhetoric of non-state sovereignty at the 1920s Afghan court is not explainable only by court intellectuals’ often-cited European and Turkish advisers. I argue the same regarding the activism of World War I-era cross-border leftist scholars. I do not dismiss the impact of cosmopolitan genealogies, but I argue that the dynamism of older devotional worlds and new activism together posited new radical alternatives.

I begin tracing these milieus through one of the few non-elite archives we have on early twentieth century Afghanistan’s eastern uplands: Pashto selections from an oral corpus of songs in Pashai, Pashto, Urdu, and Persian attributed to Muhammad Nur (b. 1864), a tenant farmer from the Alingar valley. In the next section I describe how power, operating in society and within subjects, constituted the borderland in the late nineteenth century. But Muhammad Nur’s decentralised poetic landscapes, in the section after that, were other parallel worlds. These nurtured their own dynamic critical resources: indeed, the reflexivity in Muhammad Nur’s songs and in his oral history provides the interpretive frame for my account here.

I: Sovereignty and Territory

By the 1880s, as with imperial frontiers across the world in this period, British technologies of rule fragmented and encapsulated populations on both sides of the Indo-
Afghan border. Starting in the 1850s, bureaucratic authoritarianism in the newly-annexed frontier gradually institutionalised the violence of a colonial state as it expanded, in a manner similar to the way it did in Punjab of which it was originally part: formalisation of landed elites’ customary law; individualised policing; land revenue settlements. As Robert Nichols has traced, over the next half-century, practices of managing frontier security gradually differentiated the irrigated, revenue-producing trans-Indus districts from the less accessible borderland, with the former paying the expenses of garrisoning the empire against, largely, the latter.8 The Settled Districts were formally split from Punjab in 1901 to form the North-West Frontier Province [NWFP]. The border areas were grouped into Tribal Agencies.

As Maira Hayat argues, this mode of indirect control accentuated the political salience of tribe and locality, through policies that saw lineages as collective agents and gave them stakes in acting as such.9 Tribal subsidies were disbursed through Political Agents to hand-picked elders, who received places on ‘tribal councils’ in exchange for preventing cross-border crime into ‘Settled’ territory. Mobility, including trade, did not end but was newly disciplined. At the same time the colonial state disavowed governance in the Agencies but, building on Criminal Tribes legislation that allowed suspension of legal process, the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation formalised collective punishment, including punitive military operations that punctuate the region’s history even now. Neither inside nor outside the state, border residents were subject to violence by a distant imperial army; while a new intensification of lineage patriarchy and seniority was the local face of outsourced rule, by a colonial state that still claimed sovereign rights over life. In response to all this fragmentation, Pashto folklore shows a sharp rise in attention, from about 1900 to 1925, to transgressive self-formation: tales of
hyper-individuals who transcend administrative boundaries, economy, elders, tribe, even sometimes gender, through morally complex ‘criminal’ agency.\textsuperscript{10}

Figure 1. The border region. Laghman consists of two valleys merging at Mihtarlam north of the Jalalabad plain: Alishing to the northwest and Alingar to the northeast. Nuristan starts in upper Alingar, in the centre top of this map.

Afghan rule too was consolidated through modalities of inclusion and exclusion that were personalised and tribalised, backed by military force. As Christine Noelle argues, the Amir Sher ‘Ali (r. 1863-1879) dismantled intermediary power between regional potentates and the state, and many local khans, or power brokers, came into direct negotiation with the centre.\textsuperscript{11} His successor Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman (r. 1880-1901) eliminated all competitors with the help of a substantial annual subsidy from British India, paid in exchange for imperial control over Afghanistan’s foreign affairs and a new definition of the border. ‘Abd al-Rahman incorporated select lineages’ status to the state in numerous ways, up to and including the marriage of his son Habibullah to the
daughter of the Mohmand Khan of Lalpura on the Indo-Afghan border; and he relied on powerful valley tribes’ collective support in disciplining their upland cousins and regulating mobility. Elsewhere the Amir underscored sovereignty by bringing military force to bear on cases of exception: for instance, Hazarajat’s independent Shi’i elites were crushed and thousands of Hazaras were deported in bondage to Kabul.

The Alingar valley, today straddling Laghman and Nuristan provinces, shows how the incorporations and exclusions of new absolute sovereignty worked with local initiative. The upper Alingar was populated by animist tribes as were a number of valleys to the east, all of which were converted in 1896 by the Amir’s army. But this was preceded by violent incursions led by Mulla Khalil Mohmand; ‘Umra Khan who formed a khanate across the border; and other entrepreneurs, not tied to the state but extending modes of quasi-state patriarchy that mirrored empire’s local borderland face. This paved the way for monarchic power, and indeed the monarchy sponsored similar trends: ‘Abd al-Rahman’s successor Habibullah (r. 1901-1919) brought a descendent of the Qadiri sufi order’s twelfth-century founder, ‘Abd al-Qadir Gilani, from Iraq to settle in Afghanistan in 1905, granting him trade concessions and tax-free land. This ‘Naqib’ set up court outside Jalalabad, establishing himself as the authoritative pir, or saint. He built stratified webs of Qadiri politics that exerted significant power in the countryside. As Azfar Moin argues, vocabularies of sovereignty were mutually-constitutive with sufi lineage as it developed in early modern South Asia. Michel Boivin too highlights ‘languages of domination’ in local South Asian sufism, in which devotional centres were phrased as ‘courts’: reinforcing idioms of central authority even if the order was mostly autonomous. Is not the act of concentrating authority at the apex of hierarchic lineage, whether in a pir or in the khan-khel (power lineage) of tribes, a way to reinforce sovereignty in principle, internalising patterns of hierarchy in individual subjects?
Finally, the emergent Qadiri network counterbalanced other saintly-scholarly networks, like that centred on Saydu Baba (1793-1878) of Swat. This network spread through webs of allegiance among enterprising scholar-saints in the late nineteenth century, in spaces across north-western British India, the princely state of Swat, the Tribal Agencies, and Afghanistan as far as Ghazni.\textsuperscript{17} The insurgent \textit{mulla} Mushk-i ‘Alam represented the network there in the 1870s, and his disciple Najm al-Din ‘Sahib of Hadda’ (d. 1903) took up the mantle in the 1880s. The Sahib’s residence at Hadda, south of Jalalabad, supported a scholarly \textit{khanaqah} (hospice) and a political-moral economy centred on his communal kitchen, or \textit{langar}. It is to this saint, the same Sahib of Hadda who appeared in dreams to Peshawar’s socialist scholar Popalzai, that several songs by the oral poet Muhammad Nur of Laghman are dedicated, including one we will read in the next section. The Sahib is more fractured a figure than Gilani, even as the militancy of his \textit{khalifas}, or local deputies, made his networks the most important frontier political phenomenon of their time.\textsuperscript{18} Colonial archives see him as a sometime-ally of the Amir.\textsuperscript{19} He earned his own authority as a miracle worker and a scholar too. And, ordinary devotees like Muhammad Nur, the subject of the next section, remade the Sahib as a devotee-centric institution, through modes of community that undermined all the territory described above.

\textbf{II: Other Geographies, and Devotional Subjects, ca. 1900}

The following elegy for the Sahib of Hadda dates to after the Sahib’s 1903 death. It speaks of militancy but does not centre it, or even elite saintly agency. It narrates a miracle in which imperial designs were averted through nothing more than a gathering of devotees harvesting the crops at Hadda to fuel the \textit{langar}, or community kitchen. It may refer to any of many expeditions against Hadda’s networks, over the early 1900s:
[Refrain] His *langar* operates continuously; all the officers (*afsar*) flock to it

Hadda Sahib is a *wali* (miraculous saint) and has many colorful *faqirs* (anonymous devotees)

* * *

Hadda Sahib, Your *wali*, lies there in Hindustan
Wherever I look, I see people laid out in grief
His *langar* is running well, and believers gather to it
The Friday prayer is up and running; it’s a poor man’s pilgrimage to Mecca

[Ref.][...]

Hadda Sahib, Your *wali*, lies there in Bajaur
He was constantly at the *ghaza* (holy war), he put the infidels to shame
His little court was in Tora Bora, like a clover field in the arid wilderness
His *mullas* all gathered there and cultivated his little court as a field

[Ref.]  Now, Hadda Sahib passed away, and the British army came to know
They leaped for joy, those buggerers were so happy
Thinking “The country has been left to us, in expectation of the harvest,
And in Hadda, in the gateway to the Khyber, the space is clear!”
[Ref.]

But [everyone] sat down in Hadda, and the British began to tremble
The British had to keep themselves in *pardah* [i.e. hidden and immobile]
They continued going around always wounded and afflicted
Saying, “Because of this *faqir*, we are still thrown off-balance!”

[Ref.][...]

May Muhammad Nur compose a poem through the prayers of good people
In his heart there is always a tidy sum of devoted lovers
Lord, may You count me among his servants
You Yourself are familiar with the state of Muhammad Nur the *faqir*.

[Ref.]: His *langar* operates continuously; all the officers flock to it
Hadda Sahib is a *wali*, and has many colorful *faqirs*[^20]

The central story is a miracle attached to the Sahib but the focus is not on saintly

**heroism. The theme, established by the refrain about the *langar*, is two-fold: the**

Sahib’s link to ordinary people through the *langar*, and the collective power of his

community who donate their labour to it. The latter recalls a harvest practice of

mutual labour called *ashar* in which tenants and small-holder families, the majority

of the highland population, helped reap each other’s crops. Here devotional

sociability infuses it with meaning and power and magnifies its scope. In

referencing all the various lands where the Sahib’s *faqirs* are active, the song

emphasises a pluricentric geography spanning India and Afghanistan that the

Sahib’s memory organises for believers. And this enchanted geography defends

itself when devotees embody it at the harvest for the *langar*. Through their
collective mutual service, an expeditionary force is coincidently intimidated into retreating. British mobility is restricted; empire is reduced to garrison, a transient violence imposed on a resilient landscape. Both the miracle and the agency here lie in the conscious maintenance, and hence the resilience, of community-space.

This view of sainthood evokes the living power of decentralised geographies much larger and older than Muhammad Nur, in which the vertical lines of the state, its allies, and hierarchic sufism were far from the only salient channels of culture. Buddhist rock inscriptions in Aramaic attest that the lower reaches of Muhammad Nur’s Laghman were a space where transregional ideoscapes had always overlapped, while Islam and Afghan cultural expansion arrived in upper Laghman in the sixteenth century. This only added to a complex heterogeneity. Animist spirit veneration persisted in upper Laghman into the 1890s. Upland languages like Pashai continue to be spoken, while interregional trade links made Pashto a lingua franca of trade, regional politics, and Islam. Today Pashto-speaking farmers, traders, and migrant labourers own land throughout Laghman alongside Pashai families of landowners, herders, sharecroppers, labourers, and artisans. These groups formed Muhammad Nur’s public.

Religious life linked locality to movement too, often on locality’s own terms. The mythohistory *Sifatnama-yi Ghazi Muhammad Darwesh*, on the Islamisation of Laghman, indicates that Islam from the plains adapted to the high valleys’ sacred practices since the 1500s. The *Sifatnama*’s extant manuscript dates to the nineteenth century and the text was transmitted orally for some time prior to that, but its editor Scarcia believes that its original written text dates to the sixteenth century. *Sifatnama*, then, is best seen as a text in which discourses from earlier waves of conversion sat in dialogue with ongoing action; and the process described is not only one of erasure.
When read alongside reconstructions of pre-Islamic life like Klimburg’s work on the Laghman Ashkun, ethnographic traces in the *Sifatnama*, such as the remembering of pre-Islamic community tutelary deities in the names of Pashai villages, suggest that pre-Islamic collective harvest of clan-god lands held ritual community-sustaining meaning—prefiguring the significance of the Sahib’s collective *ashar* harvest?²²

Such practices were situated in a wider world of ancestor shrines and other sites that were gradually rededicated as memorials to fictive Muslim *ghazi babas*, or legendary holy warriors. Devotees identified these anonymous saints with Qadiri sufism, while devotees’ mobile lives interlinked *ghazi* geographies and even extended them in processes that continued in the modern period: Muhammad Nur’s own family moved to the village Ghaziabad in Laghman’s Alishing valley, then relocated again to a new hamlet, Sultan Ghazi Baba, that grew on the outskirts of the valleys’ shared town, Mihtarlam.²³ From there, these circuits linked into others of the Jalalabad plain, where eleventh-century *ghazi baba* domes succeed Hindu sites.

Was it these very same decentralised Qadiri geographies that the Amir hoped to discipline by importing Qadiri authority from Iraq? Perhaps, but new extensions of hierarchy were in no way totalising. The monarchy both attacked and co-opted networks but, as I argue in the rest of this section, along with the mobility of pilgrimage and trade, mobile landscapes suffused with supernatural power remained in the virtual world of devotional texts and their circulation. This undercut attempts to introduce personalised monistic religious authority to populations who were accustomed to pluricentric practice since before Islam, and undercut new practices of tribal authority that provided monarchy with local negotiating partners. Local landscapes opened into wider circuits in eastern Afghanistan and adjoining regions. *Sayyid* and *miyan* trader-scholar-saint families from outside the region had acculturated to it, and alongside Arabic and Persian
texts they preserved transcendental Pashto knowledge in poetic forms like manaqib, or hagiographical songs, that were part of wider Persianate tradition. Tazkiras, or biographical dictionaries, tell of ‘ulama’s engagements with transregional semiology traditions; while versified sermons in the same sources speak to their composition of didactic poetry for lay people in Pashto folk genres. And so poetry was a leading site of a two-way traffic between the local and the transregional. Some sources speak of poets’ and ‘ulama’s overlapping professional fields, while the popular epithet ‘Haji’ (pilgrim) for subaltern poets registers both a transcendent power of poetic speech and a translocality to these fields. In an early twentieth century sermon on sin by Mulla Haji Gul, a scholar of the Jalalabad plain, we hear:

Students spend time with me too; where they form musical factions
They all call me ‘Haji’; people should note these facts
My enemies, and outsiders, flee everywhere I go, in awe [because of my power]
I ask them for a poet’s patronage (qalang); they give me authority, like a master

From these circuits, students moved into better-studied, more elite scholarly-sufi-commercial networks that arose in the eighteenth century between Delhi and Bukhara to become among the most important unifying factors of a politically decentralised zone, networks that forthcoming work by Waleed Ziad explores; and into newer Deobandi educational webs as well.

Returning to oral poets like Muhammad Nur: local worlds nourished powerful networks and their institutions, and non-elites tried to carve out autonomy in these networks, as the Hadda case shows. But also, some saints coalesced through literary participation alone, not through allegiance networks; and this was not merely an issue of space, but of space-making technologies that were also technologies of self-making. The subaltern perspective that the Sahib of Hadda is but the sum of his devotees finds parallel in existing practices of saintly poetic co-authorship and co-authority. Tawakkul,
a poet who lived a generation before Muhammad Nur, also moved across circuits of anonymous Qadiri shrines in lower Kunar, east of Laghman. He survives as Tawakkul ‘Baba’, a saint in his own right, and songs attributed to him are still occasionally composed today: anyone can ‘sign’ a song with ‘Tawakkul’s’ authorship if it articulates sentiments that fit the saint’s evolving persona. As Parita Mukta argues with regard to the better-studied Mira tradition in India, speaking in a saint’s persona involves partial assimilation of the devotee’s selfhood to new subject-positions: part of the devotee’s agentive self is realised as, or ‘becoming-in’, Tawakkul.

This kind of saint is a hub: both an agent and a collective subject. Couplets from many songs allude to this:

I meekly submit; I ask for peace! If I was Hindu, just consider me Muslim
So don’t kill me, O strong one! Let’s meander leisurely together on the road

Or:

Tawakkul’s poetry circulates as devotees’ prayers
Those who came to take part, set out on the road for this goal

The first is from a song that is a variation on a trope common in South Asian devotional poetry: a non-Muslim professional poet faces off against a Muslim one in a village competition, the usual way poets and their retinues earned patronage. In Pashto versions like this, the weaker party, the non-Muslim, often emerges victorious through superior wit. Tawakkul’s variation subverts an antagonistic idea of victory, calling attention to the violence of the encounter but then harmonising his opponent’s voice onto his “road”. The second couplet is also a common trope: collective sainthood was conscious and reflexive, and songs constantly allude to it. The first couplet’s “meandering-together” would easily be understood as an allegory for wider practices of collaborative circulation; and its subversion of violence, a collective statement on alternative politics.
These assimilations spread to interregional scales. One 1880s Orientalist called Tawakkul “one of the century’s most famous [Afghan] poets”, while a celebrated 1880s poet named Mira, whose songs were collected among peddlers as far from his Khyber homeland as the Deccan, paid tribute to Tawakkul in song, placing himself as Tawakkul’s ‘prime minister’: an indication, part parody and part not, that poetic networks formed an alterpolitical space in people’s awarenesses? In any event, besides the Pashto songs, there exist poems attributed to Tawakkul in Persian and Urdu, and in Pashai. Pashai poetry locates Tawakkul, and Muhammad Nur, in a very specific set of valleys, but a merging of Urdu into their corpuses through co-authorship tied the high valleys into mobile Afghan society: the interregional world of entrepreneurs who worked the entire Indian subcontinent, and the colonial globality of Pashtun labourers.

Finally, interregional poetic circulation returned to remake institutions of local authority. In life, professional poets could not avoid local power. They typically performed in hujras: the men’s lodges that local notables or lineages kept as public space and as lodging for travellers and for workers during harvest. Based on sources like Darmesteter’s monumental 1888 compendium of oral poetry, *Chants populaires des Afghans*, poets of the period sang love songs, and elite-centred narratives about monarchy, empire, and local notables. But while Tawakkul and, later, Muhammad Nur sang such genres too, both are famous for didactic songs that infused transcendent discourse into this temporal space. Such genres and personae, and the publics who sang them, assimilated the power of elite patronage, regional scholarship, and saintly power to transcend all three. Afghan folklorists note they were performed at the start of gatherings as illocution, temporarily making the men’s lodge into a space where plural perspectives were speakable whether they supported local power or not. Returning to the point: interregional practice looped back into local space and local selves, giving
poets some power to temporarily deterritorialise the *hujra*. This kind of poetry shaped both subjects and institutions, and linked everyday material world-making activities like collective harvest into the various transcendences of sainthood and of a mobile society.

This was the professional milieu Muhammad Nur inherited. Let us return to his biography. In oral history collected by folklorist Zalmay Hewadmal, he was conscripted to the army in ‘Abd al-Rahman’s reign.\textsuperscript{34} Does this allude to 1890s incursions through Laghman by Pashtun militias from the plains, on their way to subdue upper Alingar’s animist villages? In some songs Muhammad Nur identifies as a *jadid*, a post-animist new Muslim, calling direct notice to the violent edge between sovereign assimilation and exception. And in another, a love song, he says ‘My love, you’re a non-Muslim’s daughter; I may be son of Jallad (‘Executioner’) Khan the murderer; but I’ve left that city.’\textsuperscript{35} To conclude the oral history: after conscription the farmer Muhammad Nur deserted the army’s violence, retreating with his untutored poetic talent into an itinerant troupe of wedding singers and *hujra* poets. Now if poetic voice was understood to be collective, may we read this history of one life as also a stand-in for its transregional collective, a microcosm of social resilience amid the collective trauma of new territory?

We have clues in poetic critique as to how this trauma manifested. An intensification of new sovereignties was inseparable from sudden forcible promotion of a mode of Islam that heavily emphasised the transcendence of the unitary sovereign God. This contrasted with the region’s equally Islamic, but devotee-centric and uncentralised parallel worlds—ones that devotees preserved in poetic space, even as other sociopolitical conditions were changing. And indeed, besides his devotee-centric rephrasing of sainthood, Muhammad Nur often directly argues for non-centralised everyday publics as a route to alternate political subjecthood, that too in counterpoint to
unitary modes of authority, which the Amir himself commonly phrased in idioms of patriarchy and paternalism. One song refuses this lineal idiom, and more:

[Refrain] Some may have brought their information from the uninformed
I have brought forth my information from the archive (daftar) of the fatherless.

* * *

God gathered up earth together—And He made Baba Adam
And out of that Baba’s earth He brought forth beautiful humanity
There was a seed of generation—It was itself prophetic
From droplets into a cup [of dust, Adam] was brought forth with no mother
[Ref.]
Luqman, too, was fatherless—He was of Iskandar’s race
The Lord brought him forth as the most authoritative of physicians
All children are born to mothers—But the fatherless are dependent on no one’s heart
And some women have brought forth new life without fathers
[Ref.]
‘Isa was a prophet—He also had a fixed presence in heaven
One Bibi Maryam brought him forth without a father
Immersion in the Divine is brought by the Wine-Bearer—It surfaced in Mansur
Shams brought forth to the qazi [the judge, Rumi] the ashes [of his own books]
[Ref.]
He who is ill-fated—The world is hard on him
But I have now turned the oppressors (zaliman) on their heads
He who is wise—He will be open-hearted of his own accord
Muhammad Nur has brought forth artfulness to the poets!
[Ref.]

This song fits into a tradition of popular poetic preaching, but in the refrain and final stanzas, this refusal of lineage also seems defensive—perhaps against questions of parentage, or against Muhammad Nur’s unusual lack of interest in having either a poetic pedigree that he was trained in, or a retinue of his own? Or is it a more general point? In this milieu, amid new consolidations of hierarchy, identities were growing more rigid and locally-rooted. Tribal lineage, along with the hierarchies of age and gender it was built on, constituted local politics and earned state and imperial patronage. Lineages of sufi allegiance, transmitted from deputy to deputy, offered possibilities of evasion but in the practice of allegiance they created webs of hierarchy too. All these relationships patterned the subjective worlds of border populations in newly unequal ways and, if only in part, cemented individuals to fixed points in social space-time.
Prophetic authority, beyond temporality, is higher than fixed roots and inherited power. But even more than that, this poem celebrates the source of that authority and its presence in the historical world: an intuition that God has inspired since Adam, generated into the world anew each time, often through relationships with non-normative women and men. Maryam brought forth ‘Isa, the Word of God, with no husband; Shams burned Rumi’s law books in order to spark the latter’s metamorphosis from jurist to mystic. Collating such points into an ‘archive’ of gnostic self-generation is a move that mirrors Muhammad Nur’s unfragmented geographies, his habitation of multiple speaking personae, or his multilingual fluidity. In subaltern parallel to the experience of hayrat that Saikia describes in her contribution to this collection, this is a call to transcend the violence of fixity and to reground selfhood into more compassionate community-worlds with no specific telos. In the last stanzas Muhammad Nur makes his connections clear: this was possible in the “open-hearted”, antihierarchic relationships that were organic with oral-poetic publics. Finally, though, such publics are also active weapons of the weak that can “turn oppressors on their heads”...perhaps like, for example, when their existence helped organise shared communal labour and repelled imperial incursions at Hadda?

The community of Muhammad Nur imagined this world with a power to outlast specific hierarchies, to continuously arm subjects against elite subjectivation, and to ensure cultural survival. Here Muhammad Nur visualises poetic community—horizontal community like his that did not spread through the path of master and student—as a tool of resilience and a weapon of resistance amid dominant reorderings of the world:

[Refrain] The rotating times of the world have passed and are passing; The kings of the world will not remain. *
* * *
They passed and are passing; but if you understand Take a torch, fear not the pitch-black
Don’t let yourself get dessicated in the desert of the world
[Ref.]
I, Muhammad Nur, made my poems painful
And I put a hidden sword in everyone’s hand
And eventually there turned out to be no need for student-apprentices in the world
[Ref.] 39

Elsewhere, a reflexive comment by Muhammad Nur on his own communities?

... Airplanes fly in the air – They make all kinds of different noises
As automobiles drive on the roads, they conceal a lost caravan... 40

It is this vision that drives my argument in the second half of this essay. ‘Hidden swords’ like Muhammad Nur’s weakened the threads in webs of authority that tied together imperial and monarchic space; even more so for the fact that his songs spread horizontally, without students. But as we will see, by 1920, oral-poetic ‘caravans’ travelled a parallel trajectory alongside other entrepreneurs, who presented their own positionality as universal: reformist intellectuals of a crossregional Persian and Urdu print sphere in urban Afghanistan, Turkistan, and India. Drawing both on international Persianate modernism and on nascent nationalist counter-hegemony, these webs of culture might also seem to marginalise rural populations at first glance. And yet, they were not always so separate from upland space. Yes, upland worlds were reordered amid new political economies, and reciprocal community-making practices like ashar fell out of custom (indeed in one song Muhammad Nur suggests that the jihads of the age should appropriately be directed at the deceits of the market economy and elite-centered notions of transregional civilisation). 41 But broad notions of mutuality were relocated into the virtual world of poetic space in an era when material antihierarchy was a fading memory. As the next section argues, this increased the domains of such notions: oral poetic ‘hidden swords’ were taken up by elite scholars who moved between rural and urban worlds, and were a vital part of more directly revolutionary politics.
III: Mutuality, Multitudes, and Revolutionary Sentiment: 1910-1925

Activists like Fazl-i Mahmud Makhfi (1882-1947) mark a point where an urbane pro-democratic Persian, Urdu and Pashto print sphere of Afghanistan, Turkistan and India met ideas of pan-Islam, revolutionary revivalist theology, transnational leftism, and an upland moral universe built with oral technologies like Muhammad Nur’s.

What was the world into which Makhfi was born? Makhfi’s family were from the Tribal Agency of Bajaur, but had settled in the princely Khanate of Dir; while Makhfi himself was raised in Charsadda, in the agrarian heart of the colonial Peshawar Valley. In these revenue-producing “Settled Districts”, unlike the Tribal Areas but similar to Punjab, colonial rule depended on propertied grandees who possessed titles as well as discretionary power to collect revenue and levy local taxes. The most powerful landowners delegated management of their many villages to headmen of the lower gentry, though, many of whom felt greater solidarity with tenant farmers and labouring castes by this time. Unlike in Punjab, rural politics gained a distinct aura of anti-imperial class conflict, rooted in this small gentry. Reactions against elite landed power sparked the rise of the Indian National Congress-allied Khudai Khidmatgar mass movement in the 1930s. And ‘Abd al-Rahim Popalzai, the mufti of Peshawar, was a communist party branch founder who organised multiple agitations in the NWFP, with the help of small gentry who saw the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Congress as too conciliatory. Makhfi’s example allows us, in this section, to flesh out the early history of these trends and link them to earlier, and wider, devotional sentiment.

Like many among the NWFP’s small gentry, Makhfi’s background straddled, and thus undermined, multiple zones and techniques of imperial rule; and he himself found new routes of mobility too. Unable to break into the landed elite, education was
another path for small landowners’ sons in the Peshawar Valley. Makhfi was admitted to Peshawar’s elite Edwardes Missionary High School. However, he enrolled at Dar al-‘Ulam Deoband instead in 1907. By 1907 individual teachers there like Mahmud al-Hasan (1851-1920) had built underground anticolonial networks among graduates across South Asia. Deoband’s struggle against local custom was echoed in Hasan’s milieu by wider expressions of anti-territory: folklore attached to Bengali peasant leader ‘Abd al-Hamid Bhashani (1880-1976), claims that one of Hasan’s mottoes was ‘Destroy every existing structure’. Makhfi studied with Hasan, the same year as Bhashani.

On his return to NWFP, Makhfi became a leading figure at Dar al-‘Ulam Gadar, Mardan, the epicentre of a frontier network of around a hundred independent schools. These emphasised social reform, grassroots service, and Pashto-medium education, and the force behind the schools was Makhfi’s pir, the ‘Haji Sahib’ of Turangzai (1858-1937). Haji Sahib himself practised a variegated politics across varied terrain to build devotee networks. While his miraculous reputation and his Deoband education gained Haji Sahib authority in frontier jihad networks, and his Settled District schools resonated with Indian nationalist swadeshi (self-reliance) politics, Haji Sahib was a khalifa, or deputy, to the Sahib of Hadda. Like the latter, he built networks through langar politics of reciprocity. Makhfi’s poems were organic with all these networks, and later animated others still: at Gadar, Makhfi mentored a youth from Charsadda named Khan ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan, who would later become the NWFP’s pre-eminent political organiser in the 1930s and ’40s through his Khudai Khidmatgar mass movement. An ally to Gandhi and a pioneer in disciplined nonviolent resistance, the first page of ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan’s memoir opens with one of Makhfi’s few poems to survive in print.
Actors like Makhfi folded all-India activism into global as well as local action. His language skills earned him a post in 1912 as a translator at a British base in Muscat that policed Afghan gun-running in the Persian Gulf. This was ideal for Makhfi, as he was also a double-agent for the ‘Hizbullah’ movement, in which allies of Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband and journalist Maulana Abu’l-Kalam Azad (later to become president of the Indian National Congress) built networks to Afghanistan, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire in hopes of forging an anticolonial bloc. Fazl-i Mahmud took his pen-name makhfi (‘hidden, anonymous’) from these commitments. By 1913, Makhfi’s pir Haji Sahib had set up a Hizbullah branch in the Tribal Areas to bring Turkish troops to train a resistance that would raid British assets. Amid the First Balkan War, nascent global pan-Islamic sentiments tracked existing networks, and the borderland presented a dense set of pathways of scholarship, politics, pilgrimage, and trade that increasingly linked into global networks. In 1914, just before the plot was uncovered, Makhfi fled to the Tribal Areas. Using family ties and links to Haji Sahib, he helped the Indian mujahidin, described by Saikia in this collection, establish themselves locally. He then moved to Kabul in 1916 to seek the support of the Amir’s anti-British brother Nasrullah, who was already cultivating cross-border rebel maliks (elders) and gun-runners.

Kabul was influential in globalising Makhfi’s thought. Both Nasrullah and Makhfi worked with the underground anti-imperial and anti-monarchic Constitutional movement. This circle of Kabuli elites pioneered a critical print sphere, infusing it, and Makhfi, with the positivism that inspired sections of Iran’s 1905 constitutional revolution, Russia’s 1905 revolution, and India’s Swadeshi movement. By 1916 the Movement was at its height. Finally, Makhfi kept ties in Kabul with Indian expatriates like pan-Islamic revolutionary ‘Ubaydullah Sindhi (1872-1944); and Mahendra Pratap (1886-1979) and Mawlawi Barakatullah (1854-1927) of the Ghadar Party, founded by
Punjabi socialists in San Francisco. Barakatullah had already worked in Tokyo and New York and both were members of a 1915 delegation to Berlin. Makhfi and others like him tied this transnational anti-British and anti-monarchic nexus in war-era Kabul back to borderland militancy, amid a series of uprisings throughout the period.

Of course, most accounts of cross-border activism centre elite individuals and networks including those above, in narrating lineages of anti-imperialism. But one can invert the emphasis, as Sana Haroon’s work does, to highlight social networks and practices like bay’at, or allegiance, that joined cosmopolitan actors and power brokers of the borderlands in militancy. And Makhfi the poet helps us go further still in the rest of this section, to highlight ways that channelling upland devotional affect—more diffuse than face-to-face allegiances, yet larger than them—infused elite activism with service-oriented egalitarianism. Even now Makhfi is famous, but few of his works were printed. Most were preserved orally, if at all. A contemporary, ‘Abd al-Akbar Khan Akbar, alludes in his memoir to Makhfi’s early participation in “qawmi musha’ire” which, in the 1910s, would have been real-time oral-poetic exchanges in hujras, the elite men’s lodges. These are among the earliest harmonisations of autonomistic hujra space to libertarian-nationalist politics. And, Makhfi’s poetry’s content is inseparable from this contingent activism. In conversation with nationalist leaders, ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan’s memoir often notes, Makhfi envisioned a modern nation-state upon independence. But he sang of nation as hujra: the men’s lodge that served as village public space and that housed poetic circulation, including Makhfi’s, but also housed the contingent alliances of khans’ factions, dalas, that comprised upland rural politics. In some songs, Makhfi sees these local processes, the confluence of everyday gathering, politics, and poetics, as akin to political articulation of crossregional Pashtun multitudes:
O Lord, may you populate and make prosperous – The hujra of our unity
Let us gather together as selves in this space – The dispersed Pashtun faction [dala]
Make as one heart, one breath, make as one – These scattered Pashtuns
From Kashmir to Herat, distant – From Balochistan, to where we stand
They are all Pashtuns, wherever – Atomised, they may be
Make an entity – O God, of these separate atoms ...

The *hujra* metaphor was important in this era, that of NWFP Chief Commissioner George Roos-Keppel. Roos-Keppel’s policies aimed to defuse political reform and accentuate political informality by accentuating ‘Pashtun’ culture like *hujras* that could support elite *khans*’ face-to-face networks. But by now, large landowner politics were often absentee, focused on ties to colonial bureaucracy, while rural opposition among the small gentry and peasantry began remaking the village *hujra*. It embodied notables’ authority; but also other, non-state, politics too; and it now began to house popular oppositional organisation. *Hujras* thus became a regular site of colonial policing, as ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan writes. Other contemporaries note in memoirs that from the war period, even mildly reformist Urdu publications like *Zamindar* were, in the Frontier, confiscated during *hujra* searches. Activist media were seldom written, then, and activism like Makhfi’s adapted to the forum that *hujras* provided: mobile and contingent activism, unwritten poetics rather than prose.

Afghan and imperial rule both triangulated subjects in a matrix of tribe, lineage, village, and other social and geographic territory. In the uplands, Muhammad Nur’s anonymous pathways broke these bounds of rooted location, and forged mobile publics as lines of flight. In Makhfi’s Settled Districts, as in more elite Afghan politics, state rule created inequality between those for whom roots and lineage were an advantage, like aristocrats or large landowners; and the rest, for whom roots and lineage were more ambivalent features of the social landscape. Finally, Makhfi also worked in a situation of physical surveillance. The embodiment, contingency, and anonymity of oral culture;
a slippage between the rootless/anonymous and the powerless; the reuse of anonymity as tactics rather than liability; and an activism in explicit defence of the powerless: in this context, these all complemented each other. The following is an illustrative early 1920s song by Makhfi, at a time when Frontier activism was beginning to merge with that of the Indian National Congress. It calls for activism in an idiom congenial both to all-India politics and to popular rural preaching:

Rabba! [Lord!] Bring us love for our qawm [people; nation]; grant relief in this fire
May you bring each of our injured members the cup of love
* * *
He who spoke Divine Truth to [the despot] Nimrud
He who was unafraid of [the] Pharaoh
He who will cry out on behalf of his people on Judgement Day.
Bring us their Islam!
Rabba! Bring us love for our qawm; grant relief amid this fire
May you bring each of our injured members the cup of love
And those with no voice to shout, they whisper secretly in their lovers’ hearts
The secrets of their hearts are like the scent of a rose. Bring us that Islam!
Rabba! Bring us love for our qawm; grant relief amid this fire
May you bring each of our injured members the cup of love

We must read this poem in light of Makhfi’s elite connections. He was informed by Afghan Constitutional nationalism; by South Asian reformist religion in Urdu mass print; and by publics in English, Punjabi and Urdu that were constituted by transnational socialist print culture. And he drew on pan-Islamic Urdu print activism pioneered by his Hizbullah comrade, the journalist and pan-Islamic activist Abu’l-Kalam Azad, discussed by Chattopadhyay in this compilation. By the early 1930s, Azad was more responsive to populist currents from which he had earlier segregated himself, and further evolutions of his thought had appeared in print: his eclectic Qur’anic exegesis derived concepts of rububiyyat (lordship) and rahmat (mercy) into a call for social service that was also taken up by the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. In this argument, Azad held that Islam is service to God; while God is both a Nurturing Lord (Rabb) and is Self-Sufficient, requiring no service; so true service of God involves social service by proxy: making
oneself a channel for God’s merciful nurturing of humanity without regard for sect, gender or ethnicity. Similar sentiments, even a quasi-Azadian lexicon, appear in Makhfi’s work above, especially with the refrain ‘Rabba’ used in this specific context.

Notably, though, populism emerges in Makhfi’s songs earlier than in Azad’s work, even as the idea of anonymity resonates with the model of revolutionary secret society activism that Azad worked in during the 1910s. But returning to the primary point, can we link this, and Makhfi’s egalitarian songs more broadly, to sedimentations of earlier devotion as much as to ashraf anti-imperialism? Makhfi’s integration into networks like those of his pir Haji Sahib of Turangzai, and into Hadda’s by extension, was not just a matter of political allegiance. Outside urban constructions of Haji Sahib as either nationalist-reformer or outlaw-fanatic, a corpus of oral poetry is devoted to him too as a saint. And while the song above was part of proto-Congress activism, for this same reason it shows oral-poetic worlds were now inhabiting new social domains. It produces revolutionary desire through devotional desire, building on the topos of the rose as a devotee’s paradigmatic beloved. But the song here adapts a didactic genre of prophetic stories that Muhammad Nur also used, to bring local action into eschatological space-time centred around a mass rather than a messiah. It uses a refrain typical of Pashto call-and-response genres to reinforce a performative ‘we’, one that calls for activists to speak truth to power but that also directs devotional passion into subaltern mutuality. And, the song links mutuality to its own poetic publics, in a way that echoes Muhammad Nur’s ‘hidden pathways’ of collective survival as much as anything else: “Those who have no voice to shout, whisper secretly in their lovers’ hearts; the secrets of their hearts are like the scent of a rose”. The song is by Makhfi. But its form reflects the participative audiences Makhfi met, who circulated and
preserved it beyond its initial performance. *Audiences* maintained slippages between devotional and revolutionary desire in collaboration with activists like Makhfi.

Kabul’s Constitutionalists assumed statism in their attempts at counterhegemony. So did the Indian National Congress. Makhfi’s work intersected with these spheres, but was sustained by polyvocal anonymous worlds of *hujra* poetry. His activism, like Mahmud al-Hasan’s call to deconstruct all structures, wrested space away from empire, monarchy, and elite nationalism, more than it aimed to consolidate specific gains. Its emphasis was process, not telos; and it grounded its process in the *hujra*’s everyday space, organic with casual and contingent local organisation rather than with the abstract space of nation. In this, Makhfi diverged even from the metropolitan Indian left. Even as its revolutionary force intersected with tribal-agency mobilisations, Makhfi’s poetry, echoing its ephemeral pathways of *hujra* circulation, sought survival in the space of oral whispers.

**IV: Between Court and Multitude, an Ethics of Mutuality: 1919-1928**

Of course the afterlives of upland worlds did not affect only one side of the border. In Afghanistan, as this final section argues, the 1920s saw a far more systematic development of similar ideas of anti-state mutuality, and from within the heart of an emergent nationalist state itself. This is not unexpected: individual cross-border activists including Makhfi gained ground in Kabul in the 1920s, but that decade saw a net disarticulation of cross-border activism and a rise in a sense of territory, geographic and social, that was yet more rooted in states than previously. In the colonial sphere, bureaucratic control in the frontier increased, while senses of newly-elaborate territory were subtler in Afghanistan. I describe this new wave of Afghan territorialisation below, before discussing its subversion.
With Amir Habibullah’s 1919 assassination, his son and successor Amanullah sought court allies in a struggle against his uncle Nasrullah, and adopted the Constitutionalist project of elite modernisation and ceremonial nation-building. Persian modernism in a centralised system was still the state’s primary mode of cultural power; but if elite nationalists, Pashtun or otherwise, preferred an institutional nation-state to messy hujra politics, Amanullah’s other agenda appealed to constitutionalists, transnational activists like Makhfi, rural power brokers, and Tribal Agency mujahidin alike: full independence from British India. In May of 1919, just after the end of World War I, Amanullah declared jihad against the British empire. It lasted a few months with limited casualties. The empire ended its subsidy to the Afghan court, and relinquished control over Afghan foreign affairs in exchange for official reaffirmation of the border. But to Amanullah the war was not just a state affair; it was a chance to consolidate national hegemony. It was partly fought by army regulars, led by some of the same elites who spearheaded the Constitutional Movement. But Amanullah also relied on irregulars, organised by familiar solidarities: just before the war, a group of khans, ‘ulama, and other elites of the Eastern Province met at the Sahib of Hadda’s grave in 1919 and signed a pact to liberate the Afghan crown from the British empire. Royal negotiations with rural power were replicated in Pashto print too. The weekly paper Ittihad-i Mashriqi (‘Unity of the Eastern Provinces’) was launched in 1920 on the anniversary of the above meeting, to remind the participants, and the broader society, of their contract with their independent, legitimate Afghan crown. The first issue printed Amanullah’s farman declaring jihad and authorising tribal leaders’ battle standards. It described royal gifts like rifles engraved with tribes’ name, their leaders’ name, and the jihad front where they fought. The paper was an icon of elite monarchic consensus, and of indirect rule that was mutual with local internalisations of hierarchised tribe.
But in less guarded expression within Amanullah’s state, monarchy and rural society negotiated differently. The products of contingent encounters were often a synergy of rural and urban lines of flight: of Persianate modernism, European liberalism, and Pashto oral critique. In such encounters, which had to be commonplace even if sources attesting to them are now rare, we see not statist inscriptions of territory but rather a radically egalitarian vision of individual self-realization through reciprocal social relations. One source that survives is a privately-held document that the scholar ‘Abd al-Hayy Habibi dates to 1925, a versified sermon by court jurist Mawlawi ‘Abd al-Wasi’ Qandahari (1873-1929) that we will come to shortly.

Mawlawi Wasi’ had been a Constitutionalist Movement leader. Under Amanullah he went on to work with Turkish jurists in building the first Afghan constitution, heavily influenced by the French model. He was the authority who signed most of Amanullah’s nizamnamas, or legislative edicts, and he delivered the Friday sermon at Kabul’s Pul-i Khishti mosque. While most of ‘Abd al-Wasi’s preserved work is Persian legal prose, the 1925 poem shows his mastery of Pashto as performed rhetoric, in the popular idiom of versified sermons. A long argument phrased as a poetic meditation on the Qur’anic verse Wa ta’awanu ‘ala ’l-birri wa ’t-taqwa (Cooperate unto piety and righteousness), Wasi’ composed this sermon one year after the 1924 Khost Uprising: a border insurgency led by khans and clerics that was the first serious challenge to Amanullah’s state. The unrest was sparked by a sudden rise of patronage channels—corruption among state officials—that new enforcement of institutions like land tax, private property, and mandatory military service brought even to remote rural areas. Mawlawi Wasi’ was sent as a chief negotiator for the state in talks with the uprising’s leaders. And lines in Wasi’s poem about corruption among khans and mullas could reference events that aggravated the uprising.
The poem begins with a modern iteration of concepts from the Persianate discipline of ethics, akhlaq, that informed seventeenth century Mughal court scholars’ social-theoretical texts. Wasi‘ posits that social fractiousness is mutually-constitutive with weakness of the reflective conscience (wujdan) that balances individuals’ psychological impulses. In the middle section, Wasi‘ illustrates this thesis with a hypothetical village dystopia of individual self-interest and corruption in a competitive, ‘tribal’ Pashtun countryside: a sideways critique of local everyday-state corruption and a stereotyped politics of ‘tribe’ (qabila) driven by competitive masculinity; and as we saw, Amanullah’s state itself reinforced tribe and localism among rural populations. Wasi‘ may not have made those connections explicit, but as a rural land-grantee himself, he surely understood the conflicts arising amid new elaborations of social and geographic territory. In any event, while the first part of the poem expands on classical ethical concepts, this middle portion expands on a Pashto proverb to underscore local relevance: ‘Even if my father owns the village mill, I wait my turn like everyone’. The sermon argues that social, economic and political life cannot be separated; and calls for the mutuality of local non-market political economy to be the basis of society. Finally, the last lines fold the local back into a utopian vision of mutual collective subjectivity, achieved through a mirror of collective self-reflection:

... Everyone has a sort of mirror in their home
But it’s covered in rust and tarnish ...
What is this rust but self-interested ego,
That makes this one into ‘Lord’; me into ‘Akhund’; she, into ‘Lady’ ...
If the idea of harmonious cooperation is ever let loose upon the world
Then it’s clear that all persons will become nobility (khawas) ...
In all of our houses there is an old mirror
The rust can’t harm it; it is clear underneath ...
Come! Let’s place it atop the crossroads
And the whole world will see it from the four directions ...
There will be universal harmony [sulh-i kull]
Everyone’s benefit and injury will be clear for all to see
The winners and losers will be visible
Our place will be filled with the exercise of cooperation
Each individual will be resplendent. 66
In this public address, the court jurist Mawlawi Wasi‘ adapts early modern Persianate ideas including *sulh-i kull*, ‘universal harmony’, to new politics. In the philosophy that Wasi‘ had studied, this concept described a resubjectivation of society, made possible when Divine Radiance was refracted through the ruler’s faculty of rational balance, and outward into society where it ordered the psychologies of other individuals through balanced, just rule. But to Wasi‘, psychology and social harmony are not part of a monarch-centred ordering of the cosmos. Nor, for that matter, are individuals pre-formed, with liberty to be safeguarded by states, as was assumed by the liberal constitutionalism that patterned Wasi‘s written work. The rise of the everyday state in Khost fuelled atomised competition; Wasi‘s solution is an alternate source of *akhlaq* that enables a mutualist political economy. Instead of divine light, individuals are realised through the recovery of a self-reflective mutuality found in “our houses”: Afghans’ own mirror of conscience that enables everyone to see each other. Planted in the collective macrocosm of the common crossroads, the mirror creates new space in the world as it projects the radiance of popular empowerment: not the abstract space of ‘society’ or ‘nation’ that look to monistic sovereignty, but that of a radical equality that ennobles all men and women of a global multitude. For Wasi‘, this is *sulh-i kull*.

I can only speculate; but did ‘Abd al-Wasi’s inversions of imperial and constitutional statism sit in dialogue with sympathetic visions we have seen elsewhere? Wasi‘ composed a verse sermon, parts of it in a rural style, not long after protracted negotiations with leaders of the Khost uprising. Besides the fact that he must have engaged local grievances, another voice on Amanullah’s behalf alongside Wasi‘ was Haji Sahib of Turangzai, Makhfi’s *pir* whom we met earlier. A devotee of the Sahib of
Hadda and a chief inheritor of the Hadda milieu in the Tribal Areas, the Haji Sahib travelled to the negotiations with a number of his own Afghan devotees.\textsuperscript{68}

Whether such interjections of radical mutuality at the centre of the state foretold future change is also hard to say. In 1928 a commoner and former military subaltern of Kabul’s exurbs, Habibullah Kalakani, led the latest in a series of peasant rebellions, one suffused with even more militant rhetoric of social levelling. The monarchy was overthrown, and many within the old order, including Wasi‘, were summarily executed.

Conclusion

In presenting three individuals, I do not intend to centre their individual innovations. Nor do I mean to suggest direct ties between Muhammad Nur, Makhfi, and ‘Abd al-Wasi‘. Their lifetimes overlapped. Makhfi and Muhammad Nur were both devotees in a wider Hadda network. Makhfi and Wasi‘ perhaps knew each other; they shared urban colleagues in the Afghan Constitutional Movement, and borderland associates like Haji Sahib of Turangzai, again tied to Hadda. But rather than playing up such links, I present these actors as tokens in what Deleuze and Guattari call a rhizomic analysis, explicitly in contrast to a linear one: tracing subterranean migrations and metamorphoses of a particular orientation to social, political and religious life across mostly disconnected sproutings in society, and in microcosm within individual activists’ variable work.\textsuperscript{69}

In this, my poetic account of border sufism contrasts with, for example, Sana Haroon’s in \textit{Frontier of Faith}, which is rooted in the colonial archive and tracks state concerns: elite brokerage and face-to-face webs of allegiance. It also contrasts to views that narrate militancy only as reaction to processes of empire. These are both important factors, but in neglecting emic histories one risks reinscribing imperial violence and also misses important lineages of politics in histories that have been considered well-studied.
To summarise: devotee geographies, involving practices of collective selfhood as much as political brokerage, and physically embodied in pilgrimage and harvest, had long been integral to upland life. By 1900 the power of these social domains recontextualised the role of brokers like Sahib of Hadda, as new modes of sovereign authority violently fragmented the landscape and devotees were led to self-reflexively define, and defend, autonomous alter-worlds in the virtual spaces of text. Meanwhile, overlaps in the practice of upland poets, border ‘ulama, and elites closer to state power lent Muhammad Nur, Makhfi, and Wasi‘ overlapping idioms and audiences, complete with shared preoccupations and emphases. As a result, all these spaces mutually deterritorialised each other; while desires for social levelling, nurtured in devotional worlds, became more elaborate as they emerged in rapidly-shifting oppositional politics further afield. Even if actors like Makhfi and Wasi‘ were committed to statism in some contexts, their lives were patterned by such sentiments and in some contexts they came to promote, even reflexively articulate, something like what Maia Ramnath has called ‘small-a anarchism’:

a recurrent tendency or orientation—with stress on movement in a direction, not a perfected condition—toward more dispersed and less concentrated power; less top-down hierarchy and more self-determination through bottom-up participation...and nurturance of individuality and diversity within a matrix of interconnectivity, mutuality, and accountability.  

This has been, in short, an account of the rise of an alternate-modern reflexive political practice, albeit an account derived from Muhammad Nur’s interpretive frame: his positing of hidden streams of anticentralised communitarian social relations within hierarchic systems, and his distrust of lineal historiography. Rather than tracing lineages of cosmopolitan reformism, and their transposition to the rural frontier, I see such ideas as resonant with embodied knowledge like that of Muhammad Nur’s public, that
developed within long histories of resilience in a globally subalternised region. But returning to our introduction, even in displacing a lineal ideation-centred discussion, it is vital to address the reflexivity emergent in these spaces: to emphasise the dynamism of a society that is imagined by policymakers even now, as much as in the era of British empire, as isolated, ‘inward-looking,’ and trapped in ‘tribal’ frames of reference.\footnote{71}

This raises questions for us today, as yet newer modes of violence expand through Khyber. As Manan Ahmed Asif argues, a view of frontiers as a lawless tribal \textit{terra nullius} undergirds imperial policy in the US-led moment.\footnote{72} And Derek Gregory explores how the ‘shadowland’ of global frontiers—zones of exclusion where transnational force meets flexible legality—now suffuse ever-wider swathes of social space near the metropole.\footnote{73} In an afterthought Gregory raises the hope of ‘contrapuntal’ geographies but does not draw out what this might look like, apart from a fear that groups like the Taliban may be the most predictable result.\footnote{74} This critique is vital, but it has far outstripped any imagination of alternatives. Might not scholarship reinscribe the same violence it describes, if even critical academics have difficulty imagining the area’s own embattled yet still living cosmologies? Certainly much of the Taliban’s appeal is that of social levelling and anti-statism, much like the above. In an era of global securitisation, outsourced state functions, commoditised religion, market economy, and no direct memory of reciprocal customs of social cohesion like \textit{ashar}, it is an easy manoeuvre to maintain social levelling while replacing mutuality with yet more exclusion and domination. But Muhammad Nur, singing at an exact point of transition when poetic knowledge became disembodied but became more mobile and more potent for it, alerts us to the possibility that ‘lost caravans’ might carry on in the face of all the above.
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Notes:


3 Layiq, interview with Omar Zahedi, 97.


5 See, eg., Popalzai, ed., Inqilabi Tahrike; also Jahangir, Dastan. In English, M. Qasim Zaman 2012, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Ch. 7 plots a similar trajectory, drawing heavily on Urdu secondary literature.


7 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 117.

8 This is part of the argument in Nichols’s preface to Frontier Crimes Regulation.

9 Hayat, “Still Taming the Turbulent Frontier?”, 186.

10 This forms part of the argument in Ch. 3 of J. Caron, A History of Pashto Literature. For passing mention outside folklore of women as Tribal-Area bandits and antinomian ascetics, see Waris Khan’s memoir, Da Azaday Tahrik.

11 See Noelle, State and Tribe.

12 Lalpura’s khan lineage had maintained elite status since receiving the Khyber toll as a Mughal revenue farm. As the border consolidated, the Amir could no longer discipline Lalpura’s cross-border subordinates directly. See esp. W.R.H. Merk, The Mohmands on Lalpura.

13 Kakar, Political and Diplomatic History, 150-152.

14 See Ja’far-Adili Husayni’s tazkira, Kawsar-i Nabi, 79.

15 Moin, Millennial Sovereign.

16 Boivin 2013, “The Languages of Sufism.”

17 The most detailed account is Haroon, Frontier of Faith.

18 See Winston Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force. Perhaps because Churchill covered these campaigns as a young journalist, Hadda is also the best-studied borderland phenomenon of its time now. See Edwards, Heroes of the Age, on the Sahib; on the network see Surridge, “The Ambiguous Amir” and Haroon,
Frontier of Faith. And for colonial discourses on Hadda see Edwards, “Mad Mullahs and Englishmen”.

19 Surridge, Ibid.

20 Nur, Da Sin Ghare Guluna, 130-131.

21 Sifat-Nama, Scarcia, ed.

22 See especially Klimburg’s discussion of Ashkun religion in “The Arts and Culture of Parun”.

23 On Muhammad Nur’s life, see Azmun’s preface to Nur, Da Sin Ghare Guluna, esp. vi.

24 See Musa Shafiq’s unpublished 1948 tazkira, Da Nangarhar Sha’iran, 52.

25 See, for example, Ziad, “Jeo Sahib Peshawari”; and “From Yarkand to Sindh via Kabul”.

26 For Tawakkul’s biography see Darmesteter, Chants populaires des Afghans; and especially the conference proceedings titled Majmu’a-i Maqalat-i Siminar-i Yad-Bud az Sha’ir-i Namwar-i Zaban-i Pashai Tawakkul Baba.

27 On co-authorship in bhakti, see Novetzke, Religion and Public Memory, and Mukta, Upholding the Common Life. I have not seen direct evidence of women’s co-authorship in Afghan saintly publics, but it is strong in bhakti composition; while women’s attendance at anonymous shrines of the sort discussed here is pervasive in Pashto folklore.

28 Mukta, Upholding the Common Life, esp.

29 Ṣadāqat, “Da Tawakkul pa Shā’irī kē...”, 57.


31 Darmesteter, Chants populaires, ccxv

32 Darmesteter, Chants populaires, iii.

33 Habibullah Rafi‘ defines the didactic genre maqam through two criteria: didactic theme and performance context. “In [rural] poetry gatherings the maqam [‘place’] is performed before anything else...The maqam sets the ground and prepares the gathering to hear other genres of popular poetry...Also, the maqam consists of moral guidance, and a person can adopt an elevated moral position by following it. [But primarily,] maqams... strike the bell to begin a gathering.” Rafi‘, Da Khalko Sandare, 221-222

34 See Azmun’s preface to Nur, Da Sin Ghare Guluna.

36 Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, Ch. 3.


38 Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*.


40 Ibid., 22.


42 For Makhfi’s biography, see Shalman, “Maulvi Fazal Mahmud Makhfi.”


44 As quoted in Bahar, “The Religious and Philosophical Basis of Bhashani’s Political Leadership”, 51.

45 Khan, *Zma Zhwand*, 1.


47 Shalman, “Maulvi Fazal Mahmud Makhfi,” 40; on global trends more generally, see Saikia’s article in this collection.


49 On Nasrullah see Keppel, *Gun-Running*, Ch. 2.

50 On Ghadar, see Ramnath, *Haj to Utopia*.

51 Esp. Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*.


54 This was recited in a 1920s *musha’ira* before being published in ‘Abd al-Ghaffār’s memoir.


56 Waris Khan’s memoir, *Da Azaday Tahrik*, illustrates this change well.

57 Khan, *Zma Zhwand*, 76. Also, FCR prohibits *hujra* construction without official permission. See FCR 1901, V(33).

59 Published on http://adabipanra.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/da-qaam-mena-fazal-mahmod-makhfi.html; accessed 18/08/2013


61 See Qadiriya’s 1971 tazkira *Owa Buzurgan*.

62 Including princes like Sardar ‘Abd al-Quddus; but also bureaucrat-scholars like ‘Abd al-Wasi‘ whose personal Qandahari militia fought under Quddus. See Hotak’s 2003 tazkira *Drana Koranay*, 45.

63 See Wafa’s tazkira, *Da Nangarhar Farhangi Bahir*, 43.


65 See Nawid, “The Khost Rebellion.” It was also a reaction to new legislation that impacted local politics by policing gender and the family.

66 In Hotak’s tazkira, *Drana Koranay*, 62.

67 On which see Rizvi, “Dimensions of Sulh-i Kull”.

68 See Siddiqullah Rixtin’s autobiographical note in Benawa’s tazkira *Osani Likwal vol. 1*, 474. Rixtin’s father was a murīd of Haji Sahib’s and accompanied him to the talks.


70 Ramnath, *Decolonizing Anarchism*, 7.

71 See David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, for an example of this discourse in an academic work written by a counterinsurgency practitioner.

72 For example, Asif, ‘Adam’s Mirror’.

73 Gregory, “The Everywhere War.”

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